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1953

THE IRONY OF OBJECTIVITY IN THE NEW CRITICISM

By

FREDERICK BEATTY RAINSBERRY

A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan State College of Agriculture and applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of English

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A new criticism has arisen during the past twenty years which challenges traditional literary theory. Whereas the literary criticism previous to this generation had emphasized historical, biographical, or Marxist theories as a basis for aesthetic judgment, the new criticism would return the critic's attention to the poem qua work of art as the proper centre of literary interpretation.

The aim of this work is an examination of the New Critics who have employed a metaphysical tradition in their search for objectivity in poetry. The examination reveals that in their attempt to sharpen and to systematize their principles of criticism, they have ironically absorbed the defects as well as the most dynamic qualities of metaphysical idealism. The most living sources of this tradition have been Coleridge's Biographia Literaria and other philosophical essays, Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, and Croce's Philosophy of the Spirit. To maintain the same spirit of objectivity in evaluation which the new criticism has sought in the study of poetry, an exegetical method of paralleling the critical and philosophical texts has been employed. By juxtaposition with the living tradition of idealism, the author reveals in his examination of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, Cleanth Brooks, Kenneth Burke, and the Chicago Critics, persistent problems which the metaphysical idealist must face in his search for objectivity.

The examination of John Crowe Ransom reveals a basic irony in the search for system. The poetic object as well as the poet's creative will are lost in the self-consistency of "the world's body", Ransom's symbol of ontological unity. As he tries to reaffirm his belief in the existence of a world of real things, his account of the creative will becomes simply naturalistic and the poetic object becomes materialistic.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge vigorously asserts the priority of the poet's creative will and deserts unhappy metaphysics when he recognizes that a system of thought will absorb the existence of the creative will a s well as of the poetic object.

Both Allen Tate and Cleanth Brooks show the same fear of system as did Coleridge. Instead of emphasizing Coleridge's voluntaristic theme of the poetic imperative, they try to get along without a basic metaphysical unity. They place their emphasis on the reciprocal dynamic process between the poet and the poetic object. The strength and weakness of Tate's doctrine of tension and dramatic imagination is discussed along with Brooks's more linguistic analysis of wit, paradox and irony.

Kenneth Burke's "dramatism" is a device employed to eliminate the dangers of monism. It is shown how Burke tries to relate G. H. Mead's dynamic social behaviorism to the dynamic phenomenology of idealism. In the end his enthusiasm for system turns from process to categories, from social behaviorism to dialectical materialism and both the poetic self and its object are lost in the same monistic unity.

In their interpretation of Aristotle, the New Critics as idealists fail completely to comprehend the relation of The Poetics to Aristotle's metaphysical system. To illustrate the more consistent interpretation of Aristotle, the doctrines of imitation and of katharsis are restated.

The Chicago Critics as Aristotelians are examined as the contemporary opponents of idealism in the new criticism. After a full analysis of their metaphysical and aesthetic positions, their theories are found wanting. They have selected Aristotle's method without his Metaphysics as a basis for their theories and their rationalism has in the end lodged them in the same epistemological difficulties which confront the new criticism.

In conclusion, the examination shows that any strictly rational philosophical system will not give an account of poetic objectivity. The apprehension of the poem as object is ultimately intuitive and any attempt to explain its existence by rational methods will result in the loss of both the poetic creator and his poem.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is much indebted to Professor Arthur James Marshall Smith of the Department of English at Michigan State College under whose direction this work was undertaken. His penetrating analysis of the work during its progress, his enthusiasm for the subject under discussion, his spirit of fellowship and cooperation, provided springs of confidence and constant inspiration.

To my friend, Bruce Fletcher Attridge, I owe a deep personal debt for the care with which he read the manuscript. This work owes much to his genuine sensitivity for the experience of poetry, to his penetrating but imaginative insights in criticism, and to his sincere and thoughtful evaluation.

From Professor Herbert Marshall McLuhan of St. Michael's College in the University of Toronto, I have derived many critical insights during our fellowship in the summer of 1952. I am also privileged to quote from one of his unpublished essays on the nature of metaphor.

I am indebted to my friend, Grant Murray Paulin who first stimulated my interest in the philosophy of George Herbert Mead and who gave valuable assistance in the conception of the chapter on Kenneth Burke.

E R R A T U M

'or **Ibid.** throughout the footnotes, read **Ibid.**.

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P R E F A C E

The aim of this work is an examination of a group of critics who ave employed a metaphysical tradition in their search for objectivity n poetry. The examination reveals that in their attempt to sharpen nd to systematize their principles of criticism, they have ironically bsorbed the defects of metaphysical idealism. At the same time their ensitive intuitions have provided fresh critical insights which have estored the status of the poem as an aesthetic experience in literature.

Although John Crowe Ransom fails to realize the ironic implications f his metaphysical system, he does express a deep and sensitive irony n his poetry. The metaphysical incompleteness of Allen Tate's account f tension as the instrument of dramatic imagination is fulfilled in the ritical interpretation of his own Ode to the Confederate Dead.[1] By means f his sensitive intuition he excites an awareness of the creative ex- perience in his poem. If Cleanth Brooks has provided no philosophical basis for his theme of paradox and irony, he has made the reading of prose and poetry a significant experience. Although Kenneth Burke's "dramatism" may tend to over-schematize the poetic process, he does force upon the reader the experience of action in poetry. The sus- tained philosophical speculation of the Chicago Critics does not pre- clude relevant and significant poetic insights.

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1 Tate, Allen, On the Limits of Poetry. Selected Essays: 1928-1948, New York, Swallow Morrow, 1948, cf. "Narcissus as Narcissus" pp.248-262.

The tone of metaphysical discussion is often proud and exclusive. : the sense of system develops in the mind the spirit of intolerance 'ows with threatening zeal. But if the stream of conviction flows o confidently, the flood is quickly thwarted by an undertow which would thdraw the prize of truth at the moment of possession. To temper this thusiasm for absolute judgment, an exegetical method of parallcling exts has been employed. The vital element in this new criticism is ntinually illuminated by its juxtaposition with the living tradition idealism, dynamically expressed by Coleridge in his poetic imperative, Hegel in his phenomenology, and by Croce in his expressionistic sthetic.

In the search for fairness and objectivity in this enterprise, ne can do no better than recall the significant humility of one great etaphysician who wrote concerning his own much greater metaphysical ssay:

> "It is difficult again for a man not to think too much of his own pursuit. The metaphysician cannot perhaps be too much in earnest with metaphysics, and he cannot, as the phrase runs, take himself too seriously. But the same thing holds good with every other positive function of the universe. And the metaphysician, like other men, is prone to forget this truth. He forgets the narrow limitation of his own special province, and, filled, by his own poor inspiration, he ascribes to it an importance not its due."[2]

o strive for the spirit if not the genius of such humility would be n enterprise worthy of the search.

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2 Bradley, Francis Herbert, Appearance and Reality, a Metaphysical ssay, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1920, Preface, p.xiv.

Stranger: O heavens, shall they easily persuade us that absolute being is devoid of motion and life and soul and intelligence? That it neither lives nor thinks, but abides in awful sanctity, mindless, motionless, fixed?

Theaetetus: That would be a terrible admission, Stranger.

Plato: The Sophist.

"Acting disturbs the peace of the substance, and awakens the essential Being; and by so doing its simple unity is divided into parts, and opened up in the manifold world of natural powers and ethical forces. The act is the violation of the peaceful earth; it is the trench which, vivified by the blood of the living, calls forth the spirits of the departed, who are thirsting for life and who receive it in the action of self-consciousness."

Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind

"Being has no coming-into-being and no destruction, for it is whole of limb, without motion, and without end. And it never Was, nor Will Be, because it Is now, a Whole altogether, One, continuous; for what creation of it will you look for?"

Parmenides of Elea

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The history of the New Criticism has still to be written. As yet, no
lar with the comprehension of the tradition and with enthusiasm for new
pectives on the history of English Literature has appeared. Many modern
lars believe that the New Criticism arose as a reaction against the ethical
nism of Paul Elmer More and Irving Babbitt. Others see it as a reaction
nst the historical, biographical or marxist theories of literature but
recognize that its roots are deep in the history of our culture. Those
nents who have attempted to discover the sources of the New Criticism
provided answers which are too simple. Ronald S. Crane[1] attributes the
physical source of the New Criticism to Coleridge. There is little doubt
Coleridge's influence but it will be part of the burden of this essay to
that the errors of the New Criticism as well as their creative contribu-
ns arise from the total scheme of metaphysical idealism as it has developed
Plato to the present day. Crane and his group do the New Criticism a
siderable injustice by oversimplifying the ontology of the New Critics to
point where they are made to appear as pale shadows of Coleridge.[2]

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1 Crane, R.S., "Cleanth Brooks; or, the Bankruptcy of Critical Monism", ern Philology, vol. 45, 1948, pp. 226-245. The controversy between Chicago Critics and the New Critics is set forth more sharply in a sequence two articles: Trowbridge, Hoyt, "Aristotle and the 'New Criticism'", and son, J.C., "The Bases of Criticism", The Sewanee Review, vol. 52, 1944, 537-571.

2 Ibid, p.228.

hough Crane deals specifically with Cleanth Brooks, his charges against are intended to apply to the whole group. Accusing Brooks of reducing cri- l theory to one principle denoted by irony, Crane says, "In this, it is e, he is not alone among the 'new critics.' The terms may differ, but the e tendency toward a monistic reduction of critical concepts is manifest in en Tate's doctrine of 'tension' in John Crowe Ranson's principle of 'tex- e,' in Robert Penn Warren's obsession with symbols, above all in I.A. ards' Pavlovian mythology concerning the 'behavior' of words. The doubts ch Mr. Brooks inspires thus become doubts about the general state of criti- learning. I shall treat him therefore rather as a sign than as an indivi- , and I take him in place of any of the others, partly because he has ex- nded his position in full most recently, and partly because the position it- f, as I shall indicate, is set forth in language which at once affords an clue to what happened in critical theory in our age and at the same time rophetic, however unconsciously, of the new direction it may yet take.[3]

It will be a significant conclusion of this essay that there is no such y clue to what happened in critical theory in our age." If the New Cri- sm has failed it is not because it has tried to imitate Coleridge success- y; it is because the complex synthesis of the idealistic tradition has ed to resolve the paradox of poetic objectivity. Crane's failure to see not only Coleridge but Plato, Hegel, Croce, Bosanquet, F.H. Bradley have their influence on the New Criticism, can be attributed only to a near- ntedness which is thelimitation of his own school of criticism. It will the major task of this essay to demonstrate the broad and significant

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3 Ibid, p.227, see Crane, R.S., "Cleanth Brooks: or, The Bankruptcy of tical Monism", Crane, R.S., "I.A. Richards on the Art of Interpretation", on, Elder, "A Symbolic Reading of the Ancient Mariner".

ning of the whole tradition of metaphysical idealism for the new criticism.

In the simplest statement, the New Criticism may be said to aim at a new hasis on the work of art as a work of art first and last. In spite of diseements within the school as to the nature of poetry, its chief exponents ee universally that the poem shall be the center of the critical evaluation. thetic judgment must generate from the essence of the poem under examination all attempts to interpret poetry in terms of biography or morals or any er irrelevant convention are cast aside.

To emphasize the specific essence of the poem as the locus of aesthetic ue and not the poet or some clear and distinct idea is not a new theme in erary criticism. What **is** new is the fact that a sufficiently strong and al movement has arisen in our time to counter successfully the conventions Romanticism as they were rooted in the dualism of Rene Descartes. After cartes poetic experience and, indeed, poetry itself was split up into idea feeling. Instead of poems being objects of our aesthetic contemplation possing intrinsic poetic value, they became media for the communication of clear distinct ideas. Metaphor was merely a colorful accident to ideas which mitted looser comprehension on the part of less able intellects. In all work of the Romantic theorists, Young, Wordsworth, Shelley and others

> "the Cartesian mentality prevails: although the doctrine may be whispered and sometimes only supposed, the absolute and ultimate referent of meaning is the idea, not being. Poetry is strung down from ideas, and emotion or sense-knowledge, admittedly present in the poem, come in somewhat surreptitiously being inexplicable under the terms in which the idea is analyzed. To speak of these other things as integral to the organization of the ideas themselves would be profanation of the intellect and perversion of language."[4]

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4 Ong, Walter J., "The Meaning of the 'New Criticism,'" The Modern Schoolman, .20, 1943, p.194.

Ong is fundamentally correct in his estimate when he suggests that the New iticism wished to get away from the subjectivism of most nineteenth century terary criticism. New Critics would share Ong's conviction as illustrated low.

" In a passage which will be recognized as typical, commenting on King's exquisite "Exequy on the Death of a Beloved Wife", Boyd (James R. Boyd, Elements of Rhetoric and Literary Criticism (8th ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1887),(p.113). From the number of editions we can judge the popularity of this textbook.) has such things as this to say:

'What a "last good night" is this! and oh! what a one "good morrow!" to last for eternity, when such partners awake from the same bed, in the resurrection of the just! Is there the "man born of woman", who has loved a woman, and lost whom he loved, and lamented whom he has lost, that will not feel in the depth of his spirit all the tenderness and truth of these old-fashioned couplets! I dare not offer a comment upon them, lest I should disturb the sanctity of repose which they are calculated to inspire.'

Faced with the complexity of organization in the poem, the commentator throws up his hands. Instead of explaining the poem, he tries registering an emotional reaction, rather less successfully than the poem itself does." 5

It is this subjective inadequacy which the New Criticism would correct. e concern of the critic is conceived to be in the "thinghood" of poetry and t with taste in any personal or subjective sense of that word. What quality es the poem contain or generate which guarantees its objectivity and which nders it as an external aesthetic entity?

The logical question of the metaphysical basis of thinghood or objectivity is basic interest of the New Criticism. In what sense can we speak of external jects as real and independent entities free to create a specific or essential pact upon the observer? Such a significant question has caused the New Critics look back very far into the literary and aesthetic traditions of Western lture to examine the greatest metaphysical systems which have attempted to

5 Ibid, p.194.

resolve the paradox of objectivity. Far from being "new", the New Criticism is largely a revival of great literary tradition of the past from the Middle Ages and from the Renaissance which have necessitated a reorientation of our views concerning the history of literature and the study of literary forms. The attempt is being made to make a re-synthesis of poetry which enables the poem to exist as a specific whole with its own intrinsic formal essence. The New Criticism tries to correct the mistaken notion that a poem is an ornamented idea or concept.

The school has tried to bridge the gap between the poet and his experience of external objects. Metaphor becomes a means of fusion and of total communication and not a sentimental expression of the poet's subjective experience.

> "As the 'new criticism' took over the direction of affairs, the subjects made to bear the weight of its investigation were such things as metaphor, "meaning" in its largest sense and various manifestations, metre considered not as a mathematical abstraction but as a nervous stimulant, ambiguity in poetry, and the behaviour of words in conversational usage - with questions of imagery running through all these things. These subjects lie on the borderline between sensory apprehension and intellection, and thus although its separate parts have other aspects, in its new respect for the organization of poetry in terms of "total meaning" - that is, in terms of its total communication, sensory and intellectual, regarded as a unit, the new criticism differs from what had gone before and becomes a single movement."[6]

This essay will be concerned chiefly with the New Criticism as it developed from the idealistic tradition. Various attempts have been made to identify this group and to indicate its origins. The task here will be to show how the metaphysical and epistemological tools of philosophic

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6 Ibid, p.202.

idealism have been used to defend the principle of objectivity in poetry. The school includes critics whose interest ranges from semantics to the mystical qualities of imagination, from the ideals of logical consistency to those of spiritual unity but in the end there is revealed a metaphysical quality which is common to them all. It will be the task here to show how these New Critics defend their case for objectivity and to study the nature of their success and failure.

In the name of accurate demonstration a careful exposition of the aesthetic position of each of the critics examined has been undertaken. As the exposition develops implicit comparisons are revealed and characteristic weaknesses of the critics' position as philosophical idealists are discussed. Specifically this essay will examine the attempt of the idealistic group within the new criticism to provide a basis of objectivity for poetry. It will be found in every case that the paradox of objectivity is manifested in the inevitable conflict between a rational metaphysical system and the insistence of the poetic object upon existence. What is the status of a poetic object if it is the function of the dialectical process to reduce all existence to absolute unity? What is the status of the poem qua work of art if the critic insists upon its intrinsic aesthetic quality as an object while at the same time calling the poem a manifestation of Spiritual Unity? It will be shown how the new critic in the attempt to make his way along this perilous course has derived his chief inspiration from Hegel's treatment of the concept or idea as a "concrete universal" and Croce's treatment of aesthetic as a science of

xpression". [7] In its more dynamic form this epistemological theme is found
n Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind where consciousness is both of the object
nd of itself --- "being-for-another" and "being-for-itself". For Hegel, ex-
erience is a dialectical process by which it becomes aware of an object in op-
osition to itself. As soon as consciousness, which embraces both itself and
ts object, becomes identical with its own essence, it will have attained to
bsolute knowledge. Thus each consciousness of self and object at the level
f sense certainty cancels itself as soon as it achieves truth, giving way to
he higher, more universal yet never losing its concreteness. The Absolute is
nown not in and for itself alone but rather as the result of a development
hrough the consciousness.

The New Critics examined here rarely if ever speak of the Absolute which
or Hegel (its creator) was the death of art. But they are interested in the
ynamic interaction of the poetic self with the object of its poetic contem-
lation and they show in a highly ingenious if not creative fashion how the
ntrinsic quality of the poetic object is communicated without loss of the
oem's aesthetic independence or of the poet's creative will. The influence of
legelian and Crocean idealism on the New Criticism will be demonstrated here
'or the first time in an effort to show its strength and weakness as an onto-
.ogy for poetry and criticism.

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7 Hegel, G. W. F., The Phenomenology of Mind translated with an Introduction
nd Notes by J. W. Baillie, (Second Edition), London: George Allen and Unwin.
,td., 1931 - 814 pages, and, Croce, Benedetto, (Aesthetic As Science of Expression
nd General Linguistic translated by Douglas Ainslie, (Second Edition), London,
lacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1929, 503 pages.

If the critic who follows the lead of an idealistic metaphysic in his search
r an ontology of poetry has difficulty in defending the poem as an object
also faces the difficult task of preserving the independence of the poet's
ll. Coleridge deliberately foreswore ontology when it threatened to annihi-
te the will of the poet. As one follows the subtle mind of Coleridge through
e analysis of his creative imagination one discovers a fine sensitivity for
ems as poems and a profound awareness of thepsychology of poetic creation.
was a tribute to his philosophical imagination that he saw the pitfalls of
ying to explain poetic objectivity in terms of an objective philosophical
stem. In spite of the paradox involved he asserted the ultimate authority
the will if necessary at the expense of the poem as an object. It is for
is reason that Coleridge is significant for the New Criticism and not because
e new critics have failed to emulate his highly individualistic theory of
agination. Long after Coleridge the problem of the role of the poet as creator
imitator has been revived in the penetrating studies of the new criticism.
what extent must the poet be the real source of poetry and to what extent
the role of the poet that of an " imitator" or a representing agent of what
specifically the <u>essence</u> of an external object?

Following the example of Hegel, and of Croce who purported to have saved
at was living in Hegel's doctrine [8] the new critics have devoted much cre-
tive effort to the dynamic relation between the poet and his object. They
ave attempted to describe the epistemology of poetry through its character-
stic modes of language and metaphor. Far from being the ornamental

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8 <u>Benedetto Croce: What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel</u>. tr.from the original text of the third Italian edition(1912) by Douglas Ainslie, London, MacMillan and Co.,Ltd. 1915,217 pp.

sentation of a clear and distinct idea, both language and metaphor are made be significant of that fusion between the poet and the event described which stitutes the objectivity of the poem itself. So far as the process is made amic the issue of the subjective - objective controversy is not raised. Only n the critic is forced to draw a systematic conclusion to his metaphysical enture does the paradox of objectivity reveal itself and one is left with y an intuitive awareness of a subtle imaginative experience.

As the course of the demonstration advances, the question is inevitably sed: are ontology and aesthetics or poetics mutually exclusive? The Chicago tics or the Chicago Aristotelians have engaged in some sharp controversies h their opponents in the New Criticism on this point. Explicitly they have ounced ontology as a basis for poetry, claiming to derive from Aristotle only oetic method. Yet in their search for a poetic science they have automati- ly raised the question of the reality with which a poetic science must be cerned. Learned and rigorous though their critical discipline may be, it l be seen that they have not escaped the very issue they would avoid. If ology and aesthetics are mutually exclusive then a new aesthetic scepticism t be the order of our day.

It will be the burden of this essay to show that if ontology and aesthetics not to be mutually exclusive; if language and metaphor are not to be re- ed to one basic trope which signifies only the unity underlying all existence; the creative will and the object of its creation, the poem, are both to exist; the poet and poem are not to be lost in one whirling vortex of the idealistic olute; then a new course must be followed which will allow the paradox of

jectivity to be the means of revealing the essence of the poem and not to the instrument of its destruction.[9]

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9 Cf. the suggestion of a compromise between the two schools within the Criticism. Blackmur, R.P., "The Lion and the Honeycomb," The Hudson Review, .3, Winter, 1951, pp.487-507.

CHAPTER II

JOHN CROWE RANSOM: THE POETIC OBJECT IN THE WEB OF "TEXTURE"

Significant theorists of the Romantic period such as Coleridge, Wordsworth Keats, had concerned themselves with the state of the poet's mind in the act creation. They had sought to remove as much restraint as possible from the ıd of the poet so that his imagination might penetrate to the unexplored depths his subjective passion. In their theory, the poem, was a projection of the tist's mind and any objective reality the poem might have could not be dis- nguished from the poet's own state of mind. The poet concerned himself with s Romantic agony of those who had fallen much upon the thorns of life. The mantic poet was more concerned with how the world of nature affected him than was in giving any account of beauty or truth inherent in nature itself. He s more concerned about his imaginative treatment or coloring of the object his contemplation than he was about the intrinsic beauty of the object itself. is this remolding of the scheme of things nearer to the heart's desire which hn Crowe Ransom seeks to disparage. Poetry for him is a reaction from ideality which the poet recognizes the inner reality of the external world. Far from eking to establish the identity of the poem with the poet, Ransom seeks to ınd the nature of the objective, concrete element in the poem itself.

As a part of the modern reaction against the Romantic movement, most liter- ry effort was directed to the re-establishment of the reality of the exter- al world. Naive realists like James T. Farrell, Edgar Lee Masters, Carl Sand- urg, sought to capture the essence of the local American scene by aiming at an

mpirical representation of nature and of society. The realist of the '20's nd '30's was anxious to avoid concern with his private inner world of the ind. But although the modern realist restrained the flight of the imagination e could not escape the charge of subjectivity. Since he insisted on his senses s the only means of apprehending the real world, any order which might result n his writing would come inescapably from his own mind. Because of his superficial view of the nature of reality, his attempts to achieve order and form are doomed to failure. Hence the real claim to distinction which such works possess is the precision with which they mirror the inner imagination.

The admirers of Coleridge's theory of the imagination in the 19th and 20th centuries carried to the limit the idea of Kant that judgments of taste have no determining ground in a universally applicable formula. As Kant had said, "with regard to the representation whereby an Object is given, the Critique of Taste itself is only subjective; viz. it is the art or science of reducing the mutual relation of the understanding and the imagination in the given representation (without reference to antecedent sensation or concept); consequently their accordance or discordance, to rules, and of determing them with regard to their conditions." [1] Poetry could then, in no sense, be imitation of what is real in nature, since reality would seem to lie only in the poet's knowing mind. The analysis of the poem, the painting or the statue served only to show that the knowledge of beauty is a subjective judgment of taste. Both the Romantic idealist and the naive realist failed to provide any

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1 Kant; Critique of Aesthetic Judgment edited and translated by James Creed Meredith, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1911, pp.141-2.

asis for the objectivity of poetry because they both raised a false issue. he separation of the poet's knowing mind from the thing he contemplates is rtain to end in scepticism. If we follow the lead of the Romantics, the oem will have reality only in the poet's mind. If we follow the naive realist, ow shall the poet ever come to know an external world of which he can never be ndependently conscious.

Ransom begins his attack on the Romantic tradition by pointing to this alse separation of the knowing mind from the thing which it knows. He ob- rves that this tendency to separate knowledge of truth from truth itself d to confusion in the moral and religious world as well as in the realm of sthetics. As Romanticism separated the poet's creative genius from the ob- ct of his creation, so the Puritan had separated morality from religion and sthetic. "

> "The splitting up of the moral-beautiful compound for the sake of the pure moral article is visibly at work in the New Testament, and in the bourgeois cult of plainness in seventeenth century England, and in the finicky private life of a Puritan moralist like Kant, and today in moral or sociological treatises and authors which neither exhibit nor discuss charm." [2]

This separation of thought and content, so characteristic of the modern rtesian mind is revealed in science and business as well as in aesthetics nd religion. Puritanism as Ransom describes it, is very much at home in the iences and the world of business where pure and unconditioned principles of fficiency, technological improvement, and maximum productivity hold full sway.

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2 Ransom, John Crowe, The World's Body, New York, Charles Scribner & Sons, 938, pp.65-66.

is separation of thought from content in both the Romantic imagination and e Puritan mind resulted in the denial of any objective quality in poetry. defence of his refusal to separate the poetic act from the poem created, nsom says:

> "The effect which we actually receive from poetry is not that of an aggregate or series or mechanical mixture of distinct properties but only the single effect of a compound. In that event the properties will exist separately only in our minds, by a later act of qualitative analysis, and they will not really be in the poetry in their own identities." [3]

The act of poetic creation and the poem created are inseparable. In this seperability, Ransom finds the metaphysical basis for the distinctly objective istence of the poem. If poetry is to deal with things then we must be conrned with the reality in which the world of things inheres. If poetry becomes ntifiable only with the ideas it contains, the wholeness or content of poetry ll be lost. The concern for taste takes the place of the concern for content.

> "The critic who likes Victorian verse, or the poetry of ideas, has probably not thought of anything of so grand a simplicity as electing between the things and the ideas, being apparently not quite capable of the ontological distinction, having no real or constitutional ground for his liking." [4]

stead of ideas alone, the "thingness", the Dinglichkeit of poetry must be ght. In opposition to the poetry of ideas, Ransom advances the type of ysical" poetry.

The term "physical" is not to be synonymous with "material" or "sensuous" t rather with the quality of "thingness" in poetry. In opposing "physical" stry to the poetry of ideas, Ransom is not opposing the mind and the senses.

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3 Ibid p.74.
4 Ibid p.112.

he raw material of the idea is not pure matter but rather the image. The image s the "physical" or material cause of the idea and is of necessity prior to he idea.

> "It cannot be dispossessed of a primordial freshness, which idea can never claim. An idea is derivative and tamed. The image is in the natural or wild state, and it has to be discovered there, not put there, obeying its own law and none of ours. We think we can lay hold of image and take it captive, but the docile captive is not the real image but only the idea, which is the image with its character beaten out of it." [5]

ansom is convinced that the idea and image are never identical even though the nown element in an image is ideational. But to carry the scientific process of bstraction too far is to lose the image. In spite of man's proud achievement n the systematization of ideas, Ransom points out that man's dreams and memories estore the images "in their rich and contingent materiality", "in their panoly of circumstance and with their morning freshness upon them." [5a] It is this uality of the image represented that prevents poetry from becoming purely didactic or merely the private experience of an over-wrought mind. As Archibald acLeish has said, "A poem should not mean, but be."

Ransom develops his notion of "physical poetry" in a paradox concerning pure poetry". "'Pure poetry' is a kind of 'physical poetry'. Its visible ontent is a thing-content" presented in such a way that images and not ideas ist occupy the foreground of the reader's attention. The art of poetry is the faculty of presenting images so whole and clean that they resist the atalysis of thought." [6] In logical language Poe's verses

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5 Ibid, p.115. 5a Ibid, p.116.
6 Ibid, p.118.

"The silken, sad, uncertain rustling of each purple curtain
Thrilled me."

an mean nothing. Rather it is an image intended to convey a dramatic or hu-
an experience which can be contemplated and enjoyed but not known in the sense
f a proposition. This seems to be what Yeats meant when he wrote of the
elancholy beauty of Burns' lines

"The white moon is setting behind the white wave,
And Time is setting with me, O!"

"Take from them the whiteness of the moon and of the wave, whose relation to the setting of Time is too subtle for the intellect, and you take from them their beauty. But, when all are together, moon and wave and whiteness and setting Time and the last melancholy cry, they evoke an emotion which cannot be evoked by any other arrangement of colours and sounds and forms." [7]

If pure poetry is a kind of physical poetry, then it cannot be as pure as
t is claimed to be. Imagism as a movement in poetry sought purity in the
implicity of things. It was a reaction to the systematic abstractedness of
hought. It was a kind of synthesis in which the child's occupation with things
nd the mind's wilful alienation of this unsystematic activity achieved an ul-
imate unity in maturity where "images are clouds of glory for the man who has
iscovered that ideas are a sort of darkness." [8] Thus the purity of the image
nvolves both the material object as well as the representative idea achieving
still higher and perhaps more concrete significance.

Pure poetry avoided the simplicity of things as such and sought for the
articularity of human action and interests. Avoiding the freedom of form in

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7 Yeats, W. B., Essays, MacMillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1924. p.191.
8 Ransom, [illegible] op.cit., p.116.

the imagist, the "pure" poetry of George Moore was carefully metred as well as technically skilful, technique being the subtle ordering of "thing-content" and metre. For Ransom, metre is the artificial, the human control, while technique is the a priori logic of things. It involves the dramatic 'form' which selects the things and brings out their appropriate qualities and carries them through a systematic course of predication until the total impression is a unit of logic and not merely a solid lump of thing-content. "This technique" or as Ransom calls it, this "sustained effort of ideation. . . is covered up and communicates itself only on a subliminal plane of consciousness" by means of which the experienced reader distinguishes between "a realism shamelessly passing for poetry", and "a well-planned but blundering poetry."[9] If poetry is to be real, its images must not, in the end, be illustrative merely of ideas. The objectivity of poetry does not lie in its ideas.

> "The way to obtain the true Dinglichkeit of a formal dinner or a landscape or a beloved person is to approach the object as such, and in humility; then it unfolds a nature which we are unprepared for if we have put our trust in the simple idea which attempted to represent it."[10]

From his discussion of physical poetry (the poetry of things) and of Platonic poetry (the poetry of ideas) Ransom turns to metaphysical poetry which deals with the miraculous or supernatural. Here Ransom is attempting to describe the intrinsic essence of a poem in intuitive language. He would get at an ontological essence which is neither sensuous nor rational and one which the reader becomes aware of only after the repeated perception of identity among things or in this case, among poetic objects.

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9 Ibid; p.120.
10 Ibid; p.124.

> "Specifically, the miraculism arises when the poet discovers by analogy, an identity between objects which is partial, though it should be considerable, and proceeds to an identification which is complete." [11]

like the simile the identity perceived does not lie in a simple parallel of eas. Never should the metaphor be developed so literally that it is capable meaning only at one level of knowledge. The difference between the 17th and th Centuries depends upon their use of metaphor or simile. As the one period s pithy and original in its poetic utterance so the other was prolix and pre- ctable. And so by example one may compare the rich suggestiveness of nne's conceits as compared with the vague and sentimental didacticism of rdsworth in "The Character of the Happy Warrior".

If poetry is to have an ontology then its ontology will closely resemble at of morals or religion.

> "From the strict point of view of literary criticism it must be insisted that the miraculism which produces the humblest conceit is the same miraculism which supplies to religions their substantive content. . . . It is the poet and nobody else who gives to God a nature, a form, faculties, and a history; to the God, most comprehensive of all terms, which if there were no poetic impulse to actualize or "find" Him, would remain the driest and deadest among Platonic ideas, with all intension sacrificed to infinite extension." [12]

some modern theologians the idea that God's existence depends upon the poet uld seem heretical. Ransom is saying that the reality which the poet perceives that which manifests God's existence. The poet who sings only of the spacious rmament with all its order and design can be accused of creating a gigantic bjective scheme. Such an account of the external world can leave no room for

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11 Ibid, p.139.
12 Ibid, p.140.

at all. But as the poem "leaves us looking, marvelling and revelling in thick dinglich substance that has just received its strange representation" n we do know about "a God who has his being in the physical world as well in the world of principles and abstractions." It is this thick dinglich stance which poetry and religion have in common. It is because of this ective quality that poetry is said to be a metaphysical affirmation, the consequence of which

"is to convince the reader that the living spiritual thing which they (the poets) analogize in physical terms is real and important though not susceptible of definition by the determinate sciences; which is not a dire but a blessed consequence." 13

From the above account, we can see that Ransom tries to provide an onto- ical basis for poetry. He has described a basic technique or order which erlies all things. Technique involves not only things but also the dramatic m which selects them and brings out their appropriate qualities relating parts a whole. Technique was "the sustained effort of ideation", communicating elf only on a subliminal plane of consciousness. Throughout his discussion poetry, he urges that

"the poet must find his way back to those whole states of mind in which the world is originally experienced and from which every pure intellectual achievement had to take its start."14

is in this whole in which images inhere. The body of metaphysical poetry

"is not content with the concepts, but is constantly stopping to insert or attack the particularity which is involved in images; a procedure which might be called the imaginative realization of the concepts."15

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13 Ransom, J.C., "The Malding of a Modern," The Southern Review, vol.1,1935-6,p.8
14 Ibid, p.872.
15 Ransom, J.C., "Honey and Gall," The Southern Review, vol.6,1940-41, p.10.

is within this more or less logical whole that the particularity of poetry is be discovered.

"The particularity is inexhaustible, and if held under observation it offers plenty of apt images. These do not conflict with thought, but only displace it momentarily or, even, realize it."[16]

in Ransom reveals his ontological position when he speaks of "the noun in try, the substantival whole." The poet is able to suggest the nature of real-, "the irreducibility of the object as a whole by citing some perfectly in-ctible part."

It is against this background of ontology that Ransom discusses objectivity. means by facts or particulars "the invincible contingent texture of a situa-n." He is in sympathy with the idealist's passion for real or natural action he wants to keep the substantival or ontological quality of the object her than any pure universal.

"To be vivid is to have special and substantival character which is excessive, or goes beyond the general occasion, so that actually we cannot attend to it without suspending the rule. To be vivid importantly, and to a degree that strikes with an awe of substantival nature, is doubtless to be magnificent; it is an effect unprovided for in tidy discourse; and it is the effect in poetry upon which religion capitalizes."[17]

is this union of poetry and religion in ontology that culminates in the re-sentation of the World's Body. Sturcture in a formal sense is not enough a poem; substantival local texture as its body is also necessary.

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16 Ibid, p.12.
17 Ransom, J.C., "The Irish, The Gaelic, and the Byzantine," The Southern Review .7, 1941-42, p.545.

Ransom has given varied statements of his meaning of ontology in poetry. a poet and a literary critic his primary aim is to give an account of what objective and particular in poetry. He wishes to begin and end with that ality of Dinglichkeit which enables the poem to exist by its own power over l above any conceptual, historical or biographical account which might be given. ; there would seem to be an important distinction to be made between a speci- : Dinglichkeit which **is** the **poem** and the general "thick dinglich substance" ch **poetry** and **theology** share in common. Without the specific quality of God a Creator the ontology of being leads to pantheism: without the specific glichkeit of the poem itself, the critic will be left with only a poetic solute and the specific existence of the poem will have eluded him. For mple, we have seen that Ransom generally places texture or technique prior any rational or emotional content. Yet he can write such an apparently con- dictory statement as follows,

> "The poem is not a poem at all without its free poetic 'texture', of course; but its texture is incidental to its main structure which is scientific; so that I should have to concede that the poem is really achieved under the patronage, or perhaps we should say the unwilling auspices, of scientific discourse."[18]

re he seems to have reversed his position and instead of structure being pre- led by texture he has texture preceded by structure. Indeed it is difficult to conceive how either of these terms could convey the idea of objectivity. xture as a term fails to convey the idea of specific particularity as the rase "thick dinglich substance" failed to convey the idea of Dinglichkeit.

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18 Ransom, J.C., "Positive and Near-Positive Aesthetics," The Kenyon view, vol.5, 1943, p.446.

In spite of this failure, which is the failure of the idealist, Ransom ejects somewhat vigorously the idealistic conceptualism of the abstract univer-al. He does not see that in the end his own attempt to explain essences is as ntologically inadequate as was that of Hegel and of Croce. In several places, ansom has attacked Hegel as a "Platonist" in his reduction of poetry to the ational consistency of a logical whole. By his own confession he says

> "The Neo-Hegelians, for instance; it is from them that I have the impression of having received my fullest understanding of what is implied in a perception."

adds, of course,

> " or even the Greek aestheticians, with their doctrine of imitation - a term meant to confer upon the artistic images at least the dignity of truthfulness." [19]

Hegel wrote

> "that it is not the idea as such, but the imagination of the artist which creates a poetical content, under conditions, that is, in which the imagination grasps the same content in such a way that it is therewith associated in language, words and their more beautiful conjunction as human speech, just as in other arts we find it present in the architectonic form." [20]

ansom would, of course, concur with this insofar as poetry and imagination seek o maintain a middle course between the abstract universality of pure thinking nd the concrete corporeality of material objects. Imagination is "the organ y which we secure the particularity of objects." But for Ransom this particu-arity consisted in "images" rather than in "ideas". He felt that the concrete

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19 Ransom, The World's Body, p.157.

20 Hegel, G. W. F., The Philosophy of Fine Art, tr. F.P.B. Osmaston, London, Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1920, Vol.4, p.11.

ea in Hegel (the general idea or universal receiving concrete or sensible pression) kept its abstract quality much too clearly. The clarity of the con- ete idea brought with it a transcendentalism in which things, persons and e- nts must be transparent enough to be shone through. Ransom now raises the tal question which is at the same time the basic criticism of an aesthetic based absolute idealism - which was to come first, the idea or the expression? nsom continues,

> "In Hegel's view, which was Plato's view, the backward man worked his way towards the pure ideas through the concrete ideas; but the enlightened man would be going backward to find them. He would be doing it only as an educator, as a missionary, for the enlightenment of other men still further back. It was in this way that the arts were the handmaidens of religion and of the Absolute." [21]

was this precedence of the pure universal over the concreteness of the poem ich produced the literary poetry of Romanticism. Ransom feels that such etry in our time "is certain to be approved because it is understood, but is likely to serve up only a warmed-over experience." [22] an emotion re- llected in the tranquillity of reflection in a vacant or a pensive mood.

His fundamental fear of Hegel's philosophy of art was the fear that any entification of poetry with universals or ideas was the destruction of etry - a point of view which Hegel ultimately expressed. Ransom feels at modern positivism owes much to Hegel as far as its attitude to art is ncerned. Hegel had said that art is either rational spirit or it is not. odern thought of the positivistic tradition says art is either scientific

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21 Ransom, J.C., "The Making of a Modern," The Southern Review, vol.1, 1935-6, 365.

22 Loc.cit.

it is not. Hegel reduced art to pure reason but the positivists have scorned t not even taking the trouble to reduce it to their system.[23]

Hegel found beauty in Geist-at-work. Art was man's primitive "impulse express himself, and so again to recognize himself in things that are at rst presented to him as externally existent." And so the moderns are forced admit that

> "art is the portrait of the artist; beauty is the warm suffusion that comes with the recognition of one's own likeness in unexpected places. . . . Art is a useless representation of triumphal process, operation, or hypothesis, such as has already perfected itself in action and imposed its order upon nature."[24]

cause nature and rational order are incommensurables, nature itself is pure order. This, Ransom believes, is the extravagant affirmation of all monists. insist upon a clear, rational structure in the nature of things is to turn e essence of the external world into a mere shadow or appearance of the forms

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23 Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and Logic, Second Edition, London, ctor Gollancz Ltd., 1946, pp.113-114. - "Aesthetic terms are used in exactly e same way as ethical terms. Such aesthetic words as 'beautiful' and 'hideous' e employed as ethical words are employed, not to make statements of fact, but mply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain response. It follows, as ethics, that there is no sense in attributing objective validity to aestheti dgments, and no possibility of arguing about questions of value in aesthetics, t only about questions of fact. A scientific treatment of aesthetics would ow us what in general were the causes of aesthetic feeling, why various socie- es produced and admired the works of art they did, why taste varies as it does thin a given society, and so forth. And these are ordinary psychological or ciological questions. They have, of course, little or nothing to do with aes- etic criticism as we understand it. But that is because the purpose of aesthetic iticism is not so much to give knowledge as to communicate emotion. The critic, calling attention to certain features of the work under review, and expressing s own feelings about them, endeavours to make us share his attitude towards the rk as a whole. The only relevant propositions that he formulates are proposi- ons describing the nature of the work. And these are plain records of fact. conclude, therefore, that there is nothing in aesthetics, anymore than there is ethics, to justify the view that it embodies a unique type of knowledge." talics mine)

24 Ransom, J.C., "Art Needs a Little Separating," The Kenyon Review, vol.6, 44, p.114.

the knowing mind. Ransom's repudiation of the paradox of the concrete uni-
rsal is best expressed in the statement that

> "a true universal is an ideal operation in which partial and abstract functions contribute, but not parts with concreteness or material substance of their own; the private energy of these parts must overflow their functions. A universal can no more be formed out of concrete parts than is a concrete object formed out of abstract functions." [25]

re Ransom is trying to reaffirm the dynamic quality of the idealistic aesthetic.
jectivity does not consist in any static combination of concrete and abstract el-
ents but rather it consists in a vital interaction of abstract and concrete
ements in which each overflows or transcends the other. The objectivity of
etry lies in the expressionistic power of its texture. In the end, we can no
re escape from the charge of aesthetic scepticism in Ransom than we could in
gel or Croce. The element of objectivity remains a rational element and as
ch is more subjective than objective.

So far it must be clear that Ransom is aware of the idealist's pitfall
reducing poetry to abstraction or of reducing the particularity of a poem to
clear and distinct idea. The specific essence of a poem is cognitive but
t in a scientific way. Our knowledge of the poem's essence is intuitive rather
an rational. In the lines, "The oak, ancient, moaning its splendours gone,"
e poet is as much committed as if he had said "the oak moans in pain". "But
ese assertions (the one just cited, for example) may be 'mythical' ones,
d what will be their status as cognition?"[26] Ransom is critical of I. A.
chards for his reduction of objectivity to rational essences and it is clear

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25 Ibid, p.121.
26 Ransom, "The World's Body, p.157.

at Richards is too much of a scientist to tolerate any status for cognition ich is mythical. Images have not the status of perceptions which have a place the rational order of things. Yet Ransom insists that poetry is exactly nowledge by images reporting the fulness or particularity of nature. . . it a context made of images, and the images are attended to and dwelt on without moval from context."[27] We have here a knowledge of truth about nature with- t abstracting the truth from nature as it exists. Science views the world universality while "poetry views the world as particularity, and we have to ve the world in that sense."

Such a creed of objectivity which we have here expressed above by Ransom characteristic of the New Criticism and rhetorically his determination "to ve the world" as particularity is most convincing. But he betrays his deeper pulses as a Hegelian when he will write such a passage as follows:

> "The poetic impulse is much too insistent to stop there. (Presenting its objects in detail without ever exceeding actual observation.) The poet proceeds next to assert properties and behaviors in the object which are not verifiable or not sufficiently so to be approved by the strict canon of science. It animates nature. It confers mentality upon the rock, the tree, the star, which do not discoverably have it, nor the organs for it; it makes the mountain brood protectively over the mountaineer, and the Master bird sing carols. Poetry does this by virtue of what we call the pathetic (sympathetic) fallacy. The poet invests the lower forms of animal life, or even the inorganic body, with his own mentality. (His procedure in elevating an object to a higher classification is opposite to that of the behaviorist, who degrades it into a lower classification.)[28]

nsom's sense of the conflict between the idealist and materialist as the e seeks to elevate the object while the other seeks to degrade it shows his

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27 Ibid, p.158.
28 Ibid, p.159.

easiness with the compulsive logic of the dialectic. Under pressure from the tional will the object cannot exist in either case because its existence must timately be lost in the conceptualizing activity of the mind.

In this same passage Ransom speaks of the movement of the poetic mind in the ocess of creation. He argues for the objectivity of the poem and yet he ems to place the greater emphasis on the poet as the source of reality for the em. Throughout the discussion of Richards both in "The World's Body" and he New Criticism", Ransom realizes that unless the cognitive element is invol- d he will be unable to " know" the poem. Yet, too clear and distinct an ea of the thing perceived - the poem - will be to identify its reality com- etely with the perceiver's idea of it. Therefore, to preserve the image in s reality rather than in its rational purity, Ransom says:

> "I prefer to think that these images or assertions which exceed observation are the form that certain cognitions take with us because of our natural propensities as knowers; perhaps that is a Kantian sort of position. The poet wants to particularize his objects in order to understand them fully, and images of this sort are habitual to our particularization. This argument makes them natural, and therefore makes them stubborn." [29]

is process of securing the particularity of objects Ransom calls imagination. both the scientist and the poet move in the same mental way towards a know- dge of the object wherein do they differ? All knowledge would seem to be ually real or equally mythical if knowledge must derive from the same source the knowing mind. In the end, poetry seems to be more creative than science. ience seeks to reach its object in order to know it, while poetry seeks to

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29 Ibid, p.161.

over-reach its object in its exuberance. It is by this <u>over-reaching</u> that Ransom tries to solve the epistemological problem of the Hegelians. Instead of denying the existence of the poem in its relation to the Absolute, the poem is said to retain its individuality and to derive its vitality from its relation to a much more tolerant kind of unity - the world's body - or Spirit. What remains unsolved is how this Spirit or World's Body is made specific.

The term "body" is a metaphysical term by means of which Ransom tries to make Spirit concrete. In a poem, the metaphor or other figure is the means of making the World's Body specific and by this means it becomes objective. This objectivity is not empirical or material nor is it the result of an abstract operation of the rational mind. Neither is the process which creates it psychological, scientific nor philosophical. It is an essentially aesthetic, poetic or spiritual process the result of which is an art object or a poem. But that which is a metaphor for Ransom is a "muddle" for Empson. Ransom objects to the diffusion of the "muddle" into empirical disorder. He says a muddle could be impressive only "when the complications support and enforce a central meaning and do not diffuse it or dissolve it." Ransom feels that psychologists like Empson tend to admire all possible complications, all muddles, indiscriminately. This confusion comes about because the scientist attempts to think, ignoring the metaphysical foundations upon which his thinking must inevitably operate.

Like Croce, Ransom sees all thought as well as all aesthetic or poetic activity preceded by a cognitive spiritual unity. In relation to the paradox of thought manifested in a "muddle", Ransom says:

> "A logical whole may have as much complication really as a muddle; that is, as many and as unique items discoverable in it. In fact it permits com-

plication up to any particular limit, if that is what these psychologists want. The thing that makes a lyrical poem supreme over the other literary forms, and indeed the epitome and standard of literary forms, is its range of content; or what is the same thing, its density. But the logic of the poem is supposed to control this range, and if it does not, the exhibit falls short as a poem. It is the same principle which works in the meter and it will be recalled what a symbol of righteousness Mr. Winters finds in a good meter; if there is no governing pattern to assimilate the sounds, they are but sound and wasted; their independence dooms them from enjoying in a society, which would be a poetic melody and they remain in their state of nature as a prose."[30]

t is this logical essence which seems to constitute the objectivity of the oem. By logic Ransom does not mean strictly rational essence but some for- l quality transcended by the poet's will and expressed as a manifestation f Spirit or the World's Body. The problem remains as it does in Croce; how can t bjectivity consist in an expression of spiritual or metaphysical unity and still main a self-subsistent object?

In a general way this passage expresses the essence of Ransom's philoso- ical basis for literary criticism. In a concrete way he is concerned with e vital rhythm of poetry, its underlying pattern in sound. This rhythmical oving logic is the means by which we intuit, grasp or comprehend the logical spiritual whole which underlies the individual poem. Muddles, myths, sym- ls, figures of speech, what have you, all are means for the expression of the ensity of the whole. Paradoxically, however, the density of the whole is much dependent upon the particular manifestation - the poem, as the poem dependent upon the density of the whole. Speaking of Hardy's poem According to the Mighty Working" Ransom believes it to have the duality of ot good thoughtful or philosophical poetry.

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30 Ransom, J.C., "Mr. Empson's Muddles," The Southern Review, vol.4, 38-39, p.337.

"It is not content with concepts, but is constantly stopping to insert or to attack the particularity which is involved in images; a procedure which might be called the imaginative realization of the concepts. A genuine poetic energy will work both these dimensions at once. It must be conceded that we do not find here a single extended image to bear the whole weight of the conceptual structure as is the way of that precision method of poetic composition which flourishes in the metaphysical style. But the images come up now and again, to engage the sound reader's imagination; there is playing back and forth between the world of ideas and the world of images."[31]

Here is the perpetually recurring poetical dialectic, the unity of the .stinct concept in the Spiritual whole in Croce, the synthesis of opposites ı the Absolute in Hegel. But as we move through the development of the ɜtaphysical spirit in Hegel, we lose the poem as existence. In Croce we ıst become identical in spirit with the author if we would know the poem. ı Ransom we have a more concerted effort to maintain the individuality of ıe poem. The dialectical unity is shaped so as to preserve the determinate .ement of content at the expense of the indeterminate formal quality. The ɔre determinate the content, the more indeterminate the meter. Hence one ınnot make a poem out of the binomial theorem because it cannot be changed ɔ suit a meter. Again in reference to Hardy, Ransom feels that meter is ɛilfully handled without the sacrifice of the content or subject matter.

"On the contrary, he (Hardy) keeps his sense as sharp and distinct as ever. The indeterminate element within which he has to range to make his meters is the <u>particularity</u> of his object; that is the principle I have been coming to. The particularity is inexhaustible, and if held under observation it offers plenty of apt images. These do not conflict with the thought, but only displace it momentarily or, even, <u>realize</u> it."[32]

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31 Ransom, J.C., "Honey and Gall," <u>The Southern Review,</u> vol.6, 1940-41, p.10.
32 <u>Ibid.</u> p.12.

The particularity, so rich in content, is the element of reality, the ıtological spirit which is the source of poetry. It was this power of the ɔet to realize images which Ransom called imagination. For Croce it is .tuition, a term which "sums up the whole imaginative activity of man and ves rise to a particular philosophical science, Aesthetic." 33 This aginative activity is involved in the synthesizing of distinct concepts in lation to Spirit. It is the conversion of "chaotic" feeling into clear ntuition". Like Ransom, Croce believes that meter, rhythm or sound are not ough in themselves to make poetry.

> "It is a delusion to suppose that a verse delights us by any sounds with which it stimulates our ears to ecstasy. What it stimulates to ecstasy is our imagination and thereby our emotion." 34

ing a line from Racine: "La fille de Minos et de Pasiphaé" he says that the auty of these lines does not lie in the physical combination of sounds for e can easily make infinite other combinations of such sounds without produc- g a beautiful effect. Such an activity could be described as the play of ncy. But language is not the expression of mere whim or fancy; it is all s inter-related meaningful feelings which the richness of the spirit can pply. These lines from Racine are beautiful

> "because these sounds, these syllables and accents, bring before us in an instantaneous imaginative fusion, all that was mysterious and sinister, all that was divine and fiendish, all that was majestic and perverted both in the person and the parentage of Phaedra. And this is expressed

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33 Croce, Benedetto, What is living and What is Dead in the Philosophy Hegel, tr. Douglas Ainslie from third edition, (1912,) London, MacMillan and , Ltd., 1915, p.107.

34 Croce, Benedetto, The Defence of Poetry, variations on the theme of alley, tr. E. F. Carritt, Oxford, 1933, the Clarendon Press, P.23.

by two epic names, that of the royal Cretan legislator and that of his incestuous wife, at whose side rises, in our imagination the brutal figure of the bull."[35]

The use of language presupposes the reality of spirit and its correspondence with physical reality is merely a convention by which the self becomes aware of itself, the object corresponding to the name being only a construct of the thinking mind. Croce denies that his reduction of the physical correspondents of words to the level of mere appearance makes him a solipsist. The object of expression in the imagination must have its concrete individuality if the self is to be conscious of itself. The reciprocal relation between the two brings awareness of the true reality which underlies both subject and object, namely Spirit as intuition.

In spite of the similarity of spirit manifested here in Croce and Ransom, in at least two places Ransom has expressed his distrust of Croce's ontological basis for art. We remember Ransom's note in ontology in which he ultimately states all poetry to belong to the class of "physical poetry." Realizing the prejudice of idealistic philosophers that "things" as such may not exist, he speaks of "images" in opposition to ideas rather than of "things" versus ideas. In place of "images" Ransom also suggests "perceptions" or "impressions" (sic Hume) or Croce's pre-intellectual impressions which are independent of concepts. The compulsion to poetry for Ransom is the dream or recollection. But

"It can hardly be argued, I think, that the arts are constituted automatically out of original images, and arise in some early age of innocence.

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35 Loc.cit.

(Though Croce seems to support this view, and to make art a pre-adult stage of experience.) Art is based on second love, not first love. In it we make a return to something we had wilfully alienated. The child is occupied mostly with things, but it is because he is still unfurnished with systematic ideas, not because he is a ripe citizen by nature and comes along already trailing clouds of glory. Images are clouds of glory for the man who has discovered that ideas are a sort of darkness." 36

Ransom's uneasiness about Croce seems to lie in his desire to give more authority to the will of the poet than Croce's more systematic account of aesthetic development will allow. Croce experienced the same conflict as Ransom his efforts to maintain the freedom of the will from the absolute. Naturalism and idealism are in conflict in both critics. But Ransom urges more early the "Poetry is a reaction from ideality." Like Croce he feels that the poet must draw upon whole states of mind in which the world is originally experienced if he will find the true particularity which is poetry. It is from this some source that all cognitive activity has had its beginning. "All poetry, of course, is the record of vision recovered by imagination under the authority of memory."37 It is the <u>role of the poet</u> to find the images of memory which the mind in pursuit of pure reason does not find.

Although Ransom is prepared to accept Croce's placement of art at the intuitive or pre-rational stage, he is more concerned about the will of the artist in the process of poetic creation. Croce's illustrations suggest to Ransom that the intuitive process is the infantile stage.

"In mature poetry the mind which experiences the object does not surrender the edge of its intellectual discrimination. The mind intuits with its

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36 Ransom, J.C., <u>The World's Body</u>, p.116.
37 Ransom, J. C., "The Making of a Modern," <u>The Southern Review</u>, vol.1, 35-36, p.372.

intellectual organs, as well as with its sense organs, and indifferently."[38]

? art is derived directly from the intuitive, pre-rational level, there is no
›om for the poet to represent those objective qualities which he learns to
›cognize in his maturing experiences. The Dinglichkeit of poetry in Croce
›mes about as a development through consciousness. The "distinct concept"
› presupposed by and lives in its other which follows it in the sequence of
leas. The "distinct" concept is not a pure idea but is more a particulari-
›tion of Spirit than it is of Reason.[39] Ransom is fearful that the production

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38 Ibid. p.873.

39 NOTE: In his enthusiasm for the dynamic qualities of Hegel's dialectic, oce tried to save what he considered to be living in Hegel. He thought that e destruction of art in Hegel came about by the achievement of synthesis through unity of opposites. As in Hegel, the Spirit as concrete universal is known t in and for itself alone but as a result of a development through consciousss and it is the development rather than the resolution which interests oce. The real is the spiritual and the concrete universal may be said to possa particular distinct forms of which it is not the mechanical aggregate but e organic whole. In his investigation of reality, we find ourselves confrond not only with opposite concepts, as in Hegel, but with distinct concepts ich attempt to preserve existence rather than destroy it. Croce's "distinct" istinct concept) is somewhat analogous to Ransom's notion of the "image". distinct concept is presupposed by and lives in its other which follows it the sequence of ideas." Distincts are degrees of reality of which the wer is the foundation of the higher but can stand quite apart from the gher. Distincts are not themselves opposites but they are each in themselves synthesis of opposites. Beauty is a distinct because it has ugliness with- it - as a degree or stage of development and not as an opposite or negation itself. To particularize or to distinguish the concept is not to extinish, negate or annihilate it. At the same time the distinct is not someing outside the unity of spirit. Together unity and distinct are a paradoxil whole. Distincts can never be classified or divided into discrete parts. ke the more dynamic Hegel in the Encyclopaedia

> "The feeling that we have the living unity of the spirit is it-self opposed to the breaking up of the spirit into different forces, faculties or activities, whatever they be, concerned as independent of one another."

d so instead of the world of existence being classified as species under

enera, reality is conceived as degrees of Spirit. Croce likens the develop-ent of the distincts related in unity to the spectacle of life as a histori-al process.

> "in which every fact is in relation with all other facts; and the fact which comes after is certainly different from that which precedes, but is also the same." [40]

Unembodied concepts i.e. pure universals have no meaning for Croce. ikewise he dismisses the opposite state of complete empirical particularity.

> "In every concept there is the whole concept, and all other concepts; but there is also one determinate concept. For example, beauty is spirit (universality), and intuitive spirit (singularity); that is to say, the whole spirit in so far as it is intuition". [41]

or Croce, Beauty, Truth, Utility, Moral Good are distinct concepts. Ugli-ess, falsehood, uselessness, evil cannot be treated as existent opposites f their distincts, cannot be added to or inserted among them. None of these atter concepts can be reduced to the former, yet they exist within the unity f the concept, i.e. within the distinct concept.

Taken as distinct moments in the progress through several degrees towards he fulness of the Spirit, these opposite states are no longer negative. pposites have no independent reality but are merely abstractions from Reality. Fair is foul, and foul is fair", beauty is such because it has within it, gliness, the true is such because it has within it the false, the good is uch because it has in it the evil." [42] By correcting and integrating one bstraction with another we attain the fulness of truth.

40 Croce, Benedetto, Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept, tr. ouglas Ainslie, London, MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1917, p.78.
41 Ibid, p.84.
42 Ibid, p.97.

f poetry from an ideal process of any kind will end in the loss of its "phy-
.cal" element. Yet he would not identify "physical" with "material". In-
tead of looking back to any "pre-adult" or "infantile" stage, let us repeat
nsom's conviction that

> "The way to obtain the true Dinglichkeit of a formal dinner or a landscape or a beloved person is to approach the object as such, and in humility; then it unfolds a nature which we are unprepared for if we have put our trust in the simple idea which attempted to represent it." [43]

ere is a contradiction, a paradox with no solution in the attempt on the one
nd to describe a subsisting reality from which all things are derived and on
e other hand to create by the act of will some object or other which is not
iritual but existent depending upon the will of its creator. Ransom will
oose consistently to fight for the latter choice. If the concrete, indepen-
nt existence of the poem is to be maintained, some form of transcendent
turalism rather than spiritual idealism must be developed. The curious fact
that Ransom is as suspicious of the validity of naturalism as he is of
ealism. This fact becomes manifest in his discussions of Aristotle.

Ransom has expressed his indebtedness as well as his discontent with at
st one other critic in the Hegelian tradition - his contemporary, Kenneth
.the. Both are concerned with the unity of the many in the One, the synec-
on of the whole by any part mentioned. Burke has identified the logic of
hecdoche - the mention of the part for the whole - with the "reductive"
ocess used by scientists. Ransom suggests that there is a difference in the
.thological prejudice of poet and scientist which would make for more differ-
ces than similarities in their attempts at synthesis, and Ransom feels that

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43 Ransom, J.C., The World's Body, p.124.

'ke does not emphasize this fact sufficiently.

> "Synecdoche is a way of indicating the irreducibility of the object as a whole by citing some perfectly intractable part, while scientific reduction is a way of indicating the docility or generality of the object by attending only to its commonplace. The difference in the two processes is in the kind of part they propose respectively to fix upon. If the scientist wants us to see how like his object is to all others, the poet wants us to see that his object is unique."[44]

Ransom finds in Burke a kindred soul in reaction to absolute idealism. could say that the whole group of so-called objective idealists react from at Ransom calls the "first moment". This stage of poetic experience is ghly subjective, selfish and sophistical representing "the drive, the passion, r a kind of knowledge which is not practical, and biologically superfluous." s whole trend leads to the loss of the individual datum or external object a timeless world. Since matter can never be subjected systematically to re reason the first moment leads to a kind of monistic materialism. Ran-m's fear of the invasion of poetry by science is on the very ground that

> "a scientific construct in any man's actual science is like a little monistic system in that it premises in the material beneath the generic property it is studying, and hopes to find there a neutrality or inertness upon the part of all other properties which will amount to an effective homogeneity and hence a complete and closed materialism."[45]

But it is in his philosophy of the "Second Moment" that Ransom finds s much stated realm of particularity. This is the moment of art in all s heterogeneity as the first moment was that of science in all its homo-

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44 Ransom, J.C., "The Irish, The Gaelic, and The Byzantine," The Southern eview, vol.7, 1941,42-, p.528, note.

45 Ransom, J.C., "Address to Kenneth Burke," The Kenyon Review, vol.4, 942, p.226.

eneity. Now Ransom is everywhere anxious to avoid all the logical emptiness f abstract idealism and he feels that Burke is too prone to be an absolute dealist in his too great concern for "structure" in poetry. In order to a- oid this logical emptiness Ransom adds that "texture" as well as "structure" ust be considered. Ransom admits, in a note to his address to Burke that he as elsewhere advocated that a poem shows in some fulness both ontological ele- ents viz. (a) rational structure as its skeleton, and (b) substantival local exture as its body. Now, fearing the overemphasis on structure per se, he ould change the formula to read: (a) structure and anti-structure, and b) texture. He is anxious to keep anti-structure under (a), on the ground that t is asdistinct from substantival texture as structure is, but is not an ntological element distinct from structure! [46] Only texture as a direct anifestation of the World's Body is in any sense objective.

We will note here how Ransom, the transcendent naturalist, reasons in a ashion analogous to Croce. He will allow no ontological status to the nega- ive phase of the poetic process in anti-structure. Opposite concepts in roce are mere abstractions from reality and have no real objectivity. Just s in Ransom, anti-structure cannot be an ontological element distinct from tructure, so in Croce, complete and total error is inconceivable, and, since t is inconceivable, does not exist. By over-emphasizing the synthesis of pposites - anti-structure, Hegel destroyed poetic quality in his final aes- hetic synthesis; such was Croce's claim since the synthesis was based on ure reason rather than on Spirit by means of which distinct concepts ab- orbed the opposite concepts as degrees or stages of development.

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46 Ibid. -p.234.

It is because of too great an emphasis on structure and its opposite that Burke loses the quality of poetic genius. Ransom says that Burke's interest is in a dialectical or a critical kind of poetry and that he neglects the lyrical or radical kind of poetry. As Burke places more emphasis on structure, so he tends to go temperamentally in the direction of the "first moment" of philosophy to the monism of the scientist and is in danger of the pitfalls of absolute idealism which Burke had tried to avoid in the first place. Ransom distinguishes Burke as a dialectician, from the absolute idealist - as one who is interested in the process of poetic creation. But,

> "the trouble with the dialecticist is that no more than the idealist need he have any patience with the residuary body of the image when he has done with it. The residuary body, with its irrelevance, is what constitutes the 'free image'. The poet embraces that but not the idealist, naive or critical." [47]

As Croce had offered his philosophy of Spirit as the retainer of the distinct concept and the particularity of beauty so Ransom offers the "texture" of the World's Body as the retainer of the free image wherein lies the objectivity of all poetry. By means of "figures" or "tropes" he would depart from the logico-mathematical level of procedure which is normal to the clear rationale of prose writing and move into the area of intuition where substantival imagery can be found. Images cannot be reduced to the harmony of a rational structure. They are essentially heterogeneous and cannot be reduced to an "effective homogeneity."

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47 Ibid. p.235.

Ransom attacks the Kantian account of the sublime as too idealistic. Admitting that our senses cannot organize a percept of a sublime experience, Kant claims the mind can form a concept which is a kind of super-sensible destination for itself. Ransom prefers to say that instead of the senses trailing the mind in such a futile fashion, the mind actually trails the great density of nature. "The art feels wonderfully rich and strange to us then and we strain ever so painfully to receive it; and adventure with boundless materiality." [48] It is this confusion in Ransom's own mind between body as a manifestation of spirituality and body as material which makes it so difficult to be clear about his ontology. Apparently his naturalistic reaction against dialectical idealism has been so strong that materialism seems to be the only kind of objectivity he can suggest. Far more serious for Ransom's whole argument is the fact that dialectical materialism is the only opposite one can achieve if one resorts to the use of dialectic to reject idealism. And in the end materialism and idealism are not opposites but simply different manifestations of the same dialectical unity.

But Ransom remains firm in his belief that his idea of nature differs from that of Burke, Hegel and Croce. He firmly believes that he can save the poem, as an independent object, from being engulfed in the totality of a rational system. He says

> "I think the trouble with Burke's readings is that his imagination plays too near the rational surface of the poem, and the reason it does not go deeper is that he is no lover of nature!" [49]

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48 Ibid, p.233.
49 Ibid, p.231.

n his desire to save the texture of the World's Body in all its richness we otice that Ransom does not speak of it as a "third moment". In the past the hird stage of synthesis has always spelled the disappearance of the natural bject. He has followed Croce's device of not allowing a real stage of exis- ence to the phase of negativity or anti-structure. By means of images he eeks to designate the objective existence of the World's Body in a poem. ut one does not comprehend fully the relation of these images to the realm f empirical experience. How can an image be an expression of the poet's will, manifestation of the world's body in Ransom's metaphysical sense, and at the ame time have sensuous or empirical qualities? As the prying mind seeks to know" the nature of this specific "texture" in a particular poem, the more ntelligible become its internal relations until finally any hard core of unique nd particular objectivity which the poem might have is lost and Ransom knows nly too well how the dialectic can corrode and destroy any particular or ex- stential qualities a poem or even an object of nature may have.

Ransom would argue in defence of the Dinglichkeit of poetry but his on- ology demands the sacrifice of the poetic object to his ontological synthesis. hat little sympathy he has for Aristotle is based on a misreading of Aristotle ince he confuses realism with his own naturalism. On the one hand, Ransom s anxious to preserve what he calls a "physical poetry" but on the other hand e fears that the complete sacrifice of "texture" in which the physical poetry nheres will mean a return to the name realism which would identify the con- ent of poetry with sense experience alone.

As has been intimated, the real and the natural in Aristotle are not dentical. The process by means of which matter takes on form is not

olutionary in the Darwinian sense of that word but the movement of the velopment is always the result of a real cause, by an actual agent.

The Dinglichkeit of a particular object is not dependent upon ideally ntinuous development of and from the world's body (texture). Instead, to e Aristotle's language, the substance (texture) is immediately present, plicable specifically to individuals. The idea of a man or a horse is only empty universal - a form applied to matter but treated as universal. But th respect to the individual or the particular, Socrates already includes in mself ultimate individual matter. Substance, for Aristotle, is not a substra- m upon which a naturalistic evolution takes place; it is only knowable as is embodied in this particular man or object. He admits, of course, that these there is no clearly intelligible or rational definition;

> "they are known only by the aid of intuitive thinking or of perception; and when they pass our of this complete realization it is not clear whether they exist or not; but they are always stated and recognized by means of the universal formula. But matter is unknowable in itself. And some matter is perceptible and some intelligible, perceptible matter being for instance bronze and wood and all matter that is changeable, and intelligible matter being that which is present in perceptible things not qua perceptible, i.e. the objects of mathematics."[50]

istotle is no idealist, but his real object, at the same time, is no natural ject.

> "To reduce all things thus to Forms and eliminate matter is useless labour; for some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter, or particular things in a particular state." [51]

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50 Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ook Zeta - 1036 a,6 - 13.

51 Ibid; 1036 b,21 - 24.

again

> "The form of man is always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kind; are these then also parts of theform and the formula? No, they are matter; but because man is not found also in other matters we are unable to perform the abstraction." [52]

At no point is the individual object a purely naturalistic phenomenon. ch an individual can have positive existence only when it is really or ac- lly caused and not when it merely develops. The process of evolution is less and indeterminate unless there is at work a final cause which determines e existence of the object in its final form. It is in this role of determi- te causation that the prime mover as an ultimate and primary thinking on it- lf is to be related or reconciled with the concrete existence of particulars.

Ransom's criticism of Aristotle places him in the continuing tradition the neo-Hegelians. He is firm in his belief that the knowledge of indivi- ls is not analytic but the basis upon which he would determine the nature that individuality is dangerously close to the loss of it if he will press o for the "cognition" of the world's body in which individuality inheres. e poem, for Ransom is a desperate ontological manoeuvre.

> "The poet perpetuates in his poem an order of existence which in actual life is crumbling beneath his touch. His poem celebrates the object which real, individual, and qualitatively infinite..... The critic should find in thepoem a total poetic or individual object which tends to be universalized, but is not permitted to suffer this fate." [53]

e paradox is that on Ransom's terms the object will crumble as rapidly in

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52 Ibid, 1036 b, 3-6.
53 Ransom, J.C., The World's Body, p.348.

framework of "texture" as it will in nature.

If we are to be formal, the problem of retaining the object seems to ce upon us some idea of causation apart from the efficient causation of the t. The poem itself, if it is going to be truly objective, must embody its substantival essence. It cannot be objective and depend entirely upon the l of the poet for its existence. Ransom says that "for each poem even, ally, there is distinguishable a logical object or universal, but at the e time a tissue of irrelevance from which it does not really emerge."[54] this the residual area where images lie? If so, how can they be objective they have not yet emerged from the tissue of logical irrelevance - from texture, from the world's body?

Let us recall ransom's own problem of the conflict of will and ideal which saw also in Croce and in Hegel. Ransom finally sacrifices logic in order retain the natural external world in all its richness of particularity. presents the poetic impulse to creation which brings the poet to see nature her richest qualities and believes that the easiest perspective upon such irations of the poet may come from the naturalistic description. Ignoring rst causes in true Heraclian fashion, he says

"The creature was formed within nature, but <u>immediately</u> nature became his vironment, external to him; whereupon self-preservation depended upon enforcing his needs and uses against environment. A risk is run in the formation of any organic species, lest it fail to establish its vital economy firmly against an environment horribly unresponsive to the creatures' poor techniques."[55]

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54 <u>Ibid</u>. p.349.
55 <u>Lectures in Criticism</u>, New York, 1949, The Bollingen Series, XIV, Ransom, J.C., "The Literary Criticism of Aristotle", p.36.

Now Ransom is not a complete naturalist but believes rather in the sufficient power of the will to establish security and hence leisure for contemplation. It is at this point that Ransom's transcendent naturalism becomes manifest. At the point of security,

> "the creature begins to devote some of his leisure and unexpended energy . . . to reversing the normal attitude to environment, so that where there was only dominion and use there develops a sentimental fixation upon certain natural objects, which is conspicuously disproportionate to their utility."[56]

It is at this point that the poet, freed from concern for the practical moves into the area of the aesthetic. By means of his wits, the man of sentiment becomes the man of sensibility.

> "Now the whole of nature, rather than its obvious and familiar concretions, become the object of his affection, so that he will be ready to stop wherever he may be traversing it, and make observations and imitations en passant; for there is nature always and everywhere. He is on the watch for natural effects which are not useful but brilliant and vivid."[57]

And so the naturalist becomes the transcendent naturalist. Nature in its material aspect is not denied but rendered more "significant" as the poet is able to express the relation of inner qualities of things to the texture of which they are a part. And so by means of myths of tropes, the poet achieves a total communication in which thought and feeling are one.

Throughout Ransom's poetry and criticism there runs a central theme of irony. The poet will never quite master the nature of things and only in the trailing concreteness of a world's body not yet comprehended can the poet suggest the true reality. In the Preface to his poems "Chills and Fever" he

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56 loc.cit.

57 Ibid. p.37

s a poem in its structure does not aim at representation of emotion: ther the pure emotional cry is only a fragmentary expression of the experie- e of which complete sensibility is capable."[58] That man is subject to kery who tries to determine human action according to mechanical principles. som would remind the idealists of the grim possibility of the destruction objects which the movement of their metaphysic suggests. At any point of ermination along the line of development Croce and Hegel would allow existence things only as an expression of the spirit. But Ransom will still reserve the t as the agent for the organization of the World's body. He retains the alist's ontological basis but rejects the ultimate demands of any system order to leave the poetic agent free to organize, mythically if you will, relation of things to the texture of reality. Poetry must be concerned with texture of particularity giving it universality without being reduced to abstraction. The irony of the idealistic position lies in the failure of e simpleton idealist" who

> "does not know he is handling dynamite and will be hoisted with his own petard. I am putting the grim interpretation upon humor. Like the dialectic, it is critical of programs. But not "constructively" to make them workable; nor does it try to furnish the frail logico-mathematical structure with some decent imagery in order to make it "ontologically" respectable. It sweeps the whole thing away with laughter; which, though wise, is primitive and organic rather than vocal, but, if it could be articulate, would be found reiterating, Substance, Substance. Humor is neither poetic nor anti-poetic but pre-poetic. The ambitious determinant is absurd by the same considerations that mark the substantial poem as beautiful."[59]

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58 Warren, R. P., "John Crowe Ransom: A Study in Irony", Virginia rterly Review, vol.11, 1935, p.165.

59 Ransom, J. C., "Address to Kenneth Burke", The Kenyon Review, vol.4, 42, p.236.

By his transcendent naturalism then, Ransom seeks to avoid the grim destruction of existence which idealism compels. The will must remain supreme in its unconscious motivation towards the production of poems. Ransom would seem to desert the tradition of philosophical idealism at this point but he clings to the idea of the world's body as the non-rational emporium of nature in her infinite and boundless plenitude. When Ransom sees the simpleton idealist hoisted with his own petard, he is speaking of the idealist who is prepared to sacrifice the creative will to a system of concepts within a rational framework. By his enthusiastic emphasis upon the will as the real source of poetry he hoped to avoid the aesthetic scepticism of the Hegelian idealist. But the difficulty of the idealistic position is not so easily overcome. Not only is the will the source of the poem but the poem is created by that will. Moreover Creation is not a simple subjective process but involves an imitative element by means of which the poet perceives what is substantially specific in the thinghood of natural objects. The poetic object must emerge somewhat more freely from Ransom's "tissue of irrelevance" and its "texture" must be specifically separate from the World's body which is its substratum.

In his aesthetic leisure, Ransom says the poet looks to nature not for useful, but for brilliant and vivid effects. But the substance for which he cries must inhere in something more than a brilliant or vivid effect. The substance is not only pre-poetic; it is the poem itself. In spite of Ransom's rejection of the philosophical idealist as well as the scientist, he has not sacrificed the desire for a systematic unity. To preserve the creative will from absorption into the world's body has been a significant concern. But his method of preserving the will by emphasizing the naturalistic existence of the

rld's Body is confused with the non-mechanical, non-empirical substance he uld describe. It was Samuel Taylor Coleridge who saw how completely the etic imperative must remain supreme in its detachment from any metaphysical stem.

CHAPTER III

COLERIDGE AND THE PARADOX OF THE POETIC IMPERATIVE

Coleridge's enthusiasm for a metaphysics of poetry originated in his early cation under the tutelage of the Reverend James Bowyer, Head Master of the mmar School, Christ's Hospital. Coleridge learned from him

"that Poetry, even of the loftiest and, seemingly, that of the wildest odes, had a logic of its own, as severe as that of science; and more difficult because more subtle, more complex, and dependent on more, and more fugitive causes. In the truly great poets, he would say, there is a reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word." [1]

eridge shared in general the conviction of the Romantic period that there always a sense of the Infinite implicit in human life, the source of all s deepest experiences. For the Romantic thinker, Philosophy was the effort arting from the unity of experience as a whole, to bring the different inter- of the human spirit together so that it might feel itself at home in all them." [2] Characteristically Coleridge states that

"the prime object of all reasoning is the reduction of the many to the one and the restoration of particulars to that unity, by which they alone can participate in true being on the principle of omne ens unum". 3

s statement of Coleridge's is fundamental to the dynamic principle of ima- tion which he later developed. Before we can deal adequately with Coleri- e's concept of Unity, itself a metaphysical problem, we must establish clearly osition with respect to Logic. Like Kant, Coleridge was concerned about e's failure to solve the problem of synthetic a priori judgments.

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1 Coleridge, S. T., Biographia Literaria, edited with his aesthetical says by Shawcross , J., two vols., Oxford University Press, London, 1907. (Thi tion used throughout for reference.)

2 Muirhead, J.H., Coleridge as Philosopher, New York, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1930, p

"Suppose I see a ball moving in a straight line towards another, I immediately conclude, that they will shock, and that the second will be in motion. This is the inference from cause to effect; and of this nature are all our reasonings in the conduct of life: on this is founded all our belief in history: and from hence is derived all philosophy, excepting only geometry and arithmetic. If we can explain the inference from the shock of the two balls, we shall be able to account for this operation of the mind in all instances."[4]

he ground of our belief in this necessary connection between physical or hisorical events Hume conceived to be merely custom, habit, association. Hence it ollowed that the mind had no independent power to initiate a cause or to bring bout an independent synthesis of experience. At the same time that Hume beieved physical or metaphysical judgements to be synthetic but not mental in rigin (a priori) he denied to mathematical judgements any synthetic quality eclaring them to be purely analytical without ground in sense experience. ant (and Coleridge) saw that mathematical judgements did involve a synthesis. ant set up the problem clearly in his Critique of Pure Reason and in the ection of the Categories makes plain the different kinds of synthesis in judgent. Coleridge agreed with Kant this far but when Kant denied that the knowing ind of the individual could penetrate through and beyond the limits of logical nderstanding, Coleridge refused to admit such an impossibility. Unless this were ossible, unity of poetic experience could not be known. Coleridge felt that ant left logic in a state of dichotomy which was paralyzing to thought. He elieved that Plato had penetrated much further into the metaphysical depths f thought than had Kant. When the mind was prevented from reaching into epths beyond its own immediate rational capacity, it had no alternative but

4 David Hume: Abstract of Human Nature, 1740, reprinted with an introuction by J.M.Keynes and P.Sraffa, Cambridge, 1938, p.13.

supply its own unity ending in a sort of pantheism typical of many such thin-
rs from Zeno to Spinoza.

If dichotomy as a basic principle of Logic was not satisfactory, Coleridge
lieved that the principle of trichotomy would make possible the establish-
it of a metaphysic which would not be pantheistic and would leave room for the
l existence of both the knowing subject and the object which it knows. The
nciple of dichotomy continually set up oppositions which made unity impos-
le of achievement because there was no possibility of mediation between the
posites established.

"Everywhere in it we have terms standing in stark opposition to each other without any attempt at mediation: affirmative-negative, universal-particular, unity-multiplicity, real-unreal; with the consequence that where one of them is conceived of as denoting something real or objective, the other is set down as denoting something ideal or subjective." 5

addition to a Thesis and an Antithesis, Coleridge introduces a principle of
ty as an Absolute Idea presupposed in all acts of knowledge. We have, says
eridge, to

"seek first for the Unity as the only source of Reality, and then for the two opposite yet correspondent forms by which it manifests itself. For it is an axiom of universal application that manifestatio non datur nisi per alterum. Instead therefore of affirmation and contradiction, the tools of dichotomic Logic, we have the three terms Identity, Thesis and Antithesis." 6

We come to know nature in a larger sense by seeing opposites as corres-
ndents in relation to a total Unity. Coleridge's method here has two very
iginal characteristics. First of all the dynamics of human thought move to-

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5 Op.cit., p.83.
6 Marginal note on Kant's Allgemeine Naturgeschichte, quoted in Muirhead, J.H. op.cit., p.86.

ards enlargement rather than exclusion. Instead of negating opposites out of xistence, he was able to bring "all problematic results to their solution and educe apparent contraries to correspondent opposites. . . fragments of truth, alse only by negation."[7a]

Here Coleridge anticipates Hegel and although he did not read the great ogic until late in life, his marginalia in the Wissenschaft der Logik show ow perceptive Coleridge's mind actually was. Because Hegel opposed Being with othing in his triad, Coleridge accuses him of sophistry. Hegel's is not a rue dialectic because he loses objectivity in abstraction. The true opposite f Being is not Nothing but mere non-existence. "Nothing" in Hegel's sense annot in any way be said to be objective, since it is, at all times subjective.

On March 23, 1801, Coleridge wrote to Thomas Poole: "My opinion is this: hat deep thinking is attainable only by a man of deep feeling, and all truth s a species of revelation."[7b] What Coleridge meant specifically by such terms s "feeling" and "revelation" no one can be absolutely certain since his pro- ected comprehensive work on Spiritual Philosophy was never written. Yet in he search for possible meaning intended by Coleridge for such a term lies the ay to an understanding of his metaphysical genius. Modern interpreters have ended to underrate the importance of Coleridge as a metaph ysician. It will e the purpose here to discover the nature of his metaphysics and to relate he poet's ontology to his theory and practice of poetry.

7a Coleridge, S.T., Anima Poetae, p.301 , quoted in Muirhead, J., op.cit., .86.

7b Quoted in Richards, I.A., Coleridge on Imagination, London, Routledge nd Kegan Paul, 1934, p.16.

There is little doubt about Coleridge's intention to be a metaphysician the first pages of the Biographia Literaria.

"But it was my constant reply to authorities brought against me from later poets of great name, that no authority could avail in opposition to Truth, Nature, Logic and the Laws of Universal Grammar; actuated too by my former Passion for metaphysical investigations; I laboured at a solid foundation, on which permanently to ground my opinions, in the component faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity and importance."[8]

ls solid foundation must be some real principle upon which poetry can be based. fore the poet can be truly creative he must find some reality underlying all rticular entities in life and in nature. The poem must have some objective ality apart from the artist who created it and yet the poem must also bear e stamp of its creator marking it as truly his. Here is a paradox which many philosophic mind has attempted to resolve , and because Coleridge himself iled to resolve the paradox does not render his attempt completely insignicant. The task here will be to render these insights into some meaningful ttern as a basis for interpreting poetry. The genius of Coleridge is imanative or intuitive rather than philosophic in the strict sense of the word. at he believed to be true about poetry or religion was not always philosophil in a purely rational sense. I. A. Richards indicated two strains which re fundamental to Coleridge's thought and these to some extent seem to be posed to one another, "a projective outlook, which treats imagination's procts as figments, and a realist outlook which takes imagination to be a means apprehending reality."[9]

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8 Coleridge, S. T., op.cit., Vol.I, p.14.

9 Richards, I.A., Coleridge on Imagination , London, Routledge and Kegan aul, Ltd., 1934, p.26.

his essay, Richards for the most part tried

> "to use Coleridge's metaphysical machinery as machinery, disregarding the undeniable fact that Coleridge himself so often took it to be much more. I shall take his constructions, that is, as 'concepts of the understanding' (to use his terminology) and use them, not as doctrines to be accepted, refuted or corrected (however great the temptations) but as instruments to explore the nature of poetry." [10]

though Richards does treat these same concepts, more concretely, as 'facts mind' (to use Coleridge's terminology) in Chapter VII of his work, it cannot said that he has given the fullest implications of Coleridge's metaphysical inking.

There has been much dispute about the influence of Kantian idealism on leridge's thought. The general consensus of opinion is that Coleridge had veloped the main principles of his philosophic thinking before he had read nt.[11] In his marginalia on his own copy of the Critique of Pure Reason, leridge noted some very perceptive criticisms. Kant more or less believed a metaphysical reality which underlay nature but as we have already mentioned, denied that there was any possibility of a rational knowledge of it.

Coleridge had found the source of explaining the unity behind the facts f nature in his reading of Plato and the neo-Platonists long before he had ver read Kant. When he did study the Critique of Pure Reason, he was quick to se the positive side of Kant's work in urging that the dispersed elements f sense experience must be connected necessarily. But Coleridge knew that

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10 Ibid. p.24.
11 Shawcross, J., Introduction, Biographia Literaria, p.xxvii.

o alone and not Kant would provide him with the basis for his spiritual

osophy.

"The difference between them (Plato and Kant) was that, while the emphasis in Kant was upon the conceptions of the understanding into which the ideas of reason entered only as a regulative principle bereft of any substantiating power, in Plato the ideas were the underlying basis of the whole structure of knowledge, being not merely constitutive, but 'productive'. Hence, while to Kant philosophy meant the undermining of their influence over the mind, as guides to the real world beyond the phenomenal, to Plato, all education was the preparation of the mind for their entrance into it and its domination by them."[12]

In his poem Religious Musings, Coleridge tells us that

> There is one Mind, one omnipresent Mind
> Omnific. His most holy name is Love. [13]

as Coleridge's further conviction that the Classical injunction: "Know

elf!" could lead only to an awareness of this fundamental unity in the uni-

se. Through the study and contemplation of Nature, one becomes aware of

"Universal Principle of Life". But, as Shawcross points out,

"not by any process of reasoning, but by a direct intuitional act, the poet feels himself brought into communion with a reality itself emotional, the 'one omnipresent mind' whose 'most holy name is love'". [14]

In in a letter to Thelwall, Coleridge writes:

"My mind feels as if it ached to behold and know something great, something one and indivisible. And it is only in the faith of that, that rocks or waterfalls, mountains or caverns, give me the sense of sublimity or majesty. But in this faith all things counterfeit infinity!" [15]

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12 Coleridge, S.T., op.cit., Vol. I, p.95.
13 Coleridge, S.T., Complete Poetical Works, ed. By J.D.Campbell, London, Millan & Co., Ltd., 1938. p0.55.
14 Shawcross J., op.cit., p.xvii.
15 Coleridge, Edward Hartley, Letters, p.228, quoted in Shawcross. op.

s nature poetry is filled with similar references, as for example, when
aking of nature in Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement:

> It seem'd like Omnipresence! God, methought,
> Had built him there a Temple: the whole World
> Seemed imaged in its vast circumference. [16]

d is reflected through every aspect of nature in Frost at Midnight:

> So shalt thou hear
> The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible
> Of that eternal language, which thy God
> Utters, who from eternity doth teach
> Himself in all, and all things in himself.
> Great universal Teacher! he shall mould
> Thy spirit, and by giving make it ask. [17]

If Coleridge believed that "the true object of Natural Philosophy was to
scover a central Phenomenon in Nature," he also hastened to add that "a
ntral Phaen(omenon) in Nature requires and supposes a central Thought in
e Mind." [18] At all costs, Coleridge was anxious to avoid a sceptical monism
pantheism. The imaginative interpretation of nature did not lead to pan-
eism in Coleridge because "he placed the exclusive transcendent consciousness
God above all other forms of consciousness." [19] Thus God is the great Uni-
rsal Teacher. It is not only a sense of Oneness which is revealed in the
udy of Nature but it is an even more specific awareness of the personality,
e very selfhood of God.

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16 Coleridge, S., Complete Poetical Works, P.53.
17 Ibid, p.127.
18 From Coleridge's MS.C. p.117, quoted in Muirhead, J., op.cit., p.122.
19 Shawcross, J., op.cit., p.xix.

So by a strange and dim similitude
Infinite myriads of self-conscious minds
Are one all-conscious Spirit, which informs
With absolute ubiquity of thought
(His one eternal self-affirming act!)
All his involved Monads, that yet seem
With various province and apt agency
Each to pursue its own self-centering end. [20]
(Coleridge: The Destiny of Nations)

the same MS.C already referred to in Muirhead's treatise there is the more mal statement of this specificity of Spirit in Coleridge's enunciation of the of Bicentrality. "Every Whole, whether without parts or composed of parts, l, in the former, whether without parts by defect or lowness of Nature (= a erial atom), or without parts by the excellence of its Nature (= a Monad or rit), must be conceived as a possible centre in itself, and at the same time having a centre out of itself and common to it with all other parts of the ne system."[21]

Coleridge guards carefully against the pantheistic notion that the self the objects of nature are only appearances or degrees of a monistic unity in e universe. To be sure, Nature is the "Universal Principle of Life" and ture is reflected in every object or part of Nature. But Nature is a power e. with a conscious creative principle at its core and, Coleridge adds with rong emphasis:

"N.B. - In this, the only scientific view, Nature itself is assumed as the Universal Principle of Life, and like all other Powers, is contemplated

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20 Coleridge, S. T., Complete Poetical Works, pp.70-71.
21 Muirhead, op.cit., p.122.

under the two primary Ideas of Identity and Multeity, i.e. alternately as one and as many. In other words, exclusively of degree, and as subsisting in a series of different intensities." [22]

The words "powers" and "Identity" express the deep and unflagging conviction of Coleridge in the part played by the individual Will in the act of poetic creation. Although he has asserted the necessity for a spiritual unity in and behind nature, he also believes that this spirit can be known only through the power of the individual will to express the meaning of this same spiritual unity. In other words, the act of the poet's will in the effort to express the objective and permanent truth of nature is the beginning and end of poetic knowledge. But that same act of will is possible only if it is meaningfully related and is an intrinsic part of the spiritual unity which is behind Nature herself. In this passage Coleridge asserts the superiority of Will over reason. By means of his doctrine of Will he preserved the individuality of things from absorption into a monistic rational Unity or Absolute.

The same principle of will is implied in his Idea of Life. Here it is called a "principle of individuation" and he defines it epigrammatically as "whatever is organized from without is a product of mechanism; whatever is mechanized from within is a production of organization." There is a progressive movement of individual forms through nature up to man in whom "the whole force of organic power has attained an inward and centripetal direction." This centripetal force moves constantly towards unity rather than towards any separation or detachment. Here again Coleridge parts from Kantian idealism because such a synthetic or productive theory cannot be comprehended

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22 MS.C. p.108, quoted in Muirhead, op. p.124.

means of mathematical analysis. As Coleridge says, "the full applicability abstract science ceases the moment reality begins." [23]

All the forces of nature illustrate the law of polarity or "the essential lism of nature" or it is always in the identity of two counter powers that

> "life subsists; in their strife it consists; in their reconciliation it at once dies, and is born again into new forms, either falling back into the life of the whole, or starting anew in the process of individuation." [24]

unity of reality, is then "by a strange and dim similitude" made up of finite myriads of self-conscious minds". These same individual entities all the product of God's "one eternal self-affirming act" and yet they seem

> with various province and apt agency
> Each to pursue its own self-centering end.
> (Coleridge: The Destiny of Nations) [25]

it is by means of this principle of polarity, this dualism in nature, t we become aware of the third element in Coleridge's trichotomy which is basic principle of spiritual unity. Coleridge avoids the error of hy-tatizing Nature by his very insistence on the dynamic will of self-cons-us minds to comprehend the "one eternal self-affirming act" of God. In-d it is correct to say that the spiritual unity of which Coleridge is aking is all this cosmic principle of individuation which was God's "one rnal self-affirming act". And yet somehow, God is also completely universal i transcendent. He is everything but He is One and the passage quoted above m Muirhead shows the living quality of a mind which is dynamic because it

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23 Ibid, p.129.
24 Ibid, pp.129-30.
25 Coleridge, S.T., Complete Poetical Works, p.71.

s unity and unity alone. For all its search for unity, the spiritual reality nade up of "infinite myriads of self-conscious minds." It is at such a nt in Coleridge's philosophy that one sees his priority over Ransom's trans- dent naturalism. Instead of setting nature up independently of the will a means of establishing indirectly the reality of the will, Coleridge s nature as the one eternal self-affirming act of God. Spirit is indivi- l and cosmic at the same time, while in Ransom, both qualities are lost vagueness.

For both Hegel and Croce as it was for Coleridge, the spiritual activity the a priori synthesis of all thought. The concept cannot exist outside the ginal intuition of the spirit and the judgement is a primitive act of the rit. In the logical a priori synthesis pure concept and individual judgement ome identical.

> "Spirit is self-supporting absolutely real ultimate being. All the previous modes of consciousness are abstractions from it; they are constituted by the fact that spirit analyzes itself, distinguishes its moments and halts at each individual mode in turn. The isolating of such moments presupposes spirit itself and requires spirit for its subsistence, in other words, this isolation of modes only exists within spirit, which is existence."[26]

e a priori synthesis which is Spirit belongs to all forms of the spirit. leridge believed as did Croce at a later date that the intuitive knowledge individual things has nothing to do with intellectual or rational knowledge; tuitive knowledge is its own master.

Muirhead summarizes the genius of Coleridge's metaphysics of nature as

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26 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind; tr. J. B. Baillie, Rev. 2nd Edition, ndon, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1949, p.459.

llows:

"What is philosophically valuable in it, connecting it in a suggestive way with recent physical speculations, is, in the first place, the emphasis on the presence in all phenomena of a principle that goes beyond anything that can properly be called mechanical; secondly, the conception of this principle as operating throughout the whole extent of Nature, manifesting itself in ever higher forms, which constitute real differences of kind, and not merely of degree: Nature, as he puts it, 'ascending not as links in a suspended chain, but as the steps in a ladder', assimilating while transcending what has gone before; thirdly, the interpretation of the law of the universe, in harmony with this idea, as 'a tendency to the ultimate production of the highest and most comprehensive unity; lastly, the clearness with which he insists that the unity must consist of individuals, becoming more and more truly such in proportion as they unite themselves with the whole, and reflect the perfections to which as an embodiment of Will it summons them." [27]

From the earliest point in his intellectual history Coleridge realized at no theory of poetry could be effective or meaningful unless it guaranteed e objective existence of the poem. In the Biographia Literaria he gives careful analysis of Hartley's materialistic psychology which emphasizes matter the source of our real experience of nature. Coleridge rejects materialism a basis for objectivity because "in Hartley's scheme, the soul is present ly to be pinched or stroked, while the very squeals or purring are produced an agency wholly independent and alien." [28] He rejects the Hartleian theory

"for it is the mere motion of my muscles and nerves; and these again are set in motion from external causes equally passive, which external causes stand themselves in interdependent connection with everything that exists or has existed. Thus the whole universe cooperates to produce the minutest stroke of every letter, save only that I myself, and I alone, have nothing to do with it, but merely the causeless and effectless beholding of it when it is done." [29]

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27 Muirhead, J.H., op.cit., pp.135-36.
28 Coleridge, S.T., Biographia Literaria, Vol.1, p.81.
29 Ibid, p.82.

ch a naive realism can give no account of the true psychology of poetic crea-
on. The passivity of the knowing self is the very antithesis of creative
tivity. In order to make clear all the factors which cooperate in such spiri-
al activity, Coleridge continues:

> " Most of my readers will have observed a small water-insect on the surface of rivulets, which throws a cinque-spotted shadow fringed with prismatic colours on the sunny bottom of the brook; and will have noticed, how the little animal <u>wing</u> its way up against the stream, by alternate pulses of active and passive motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to it in order to gather strength and a momentary <u>fulcrum</u> for a further propulsion. This is no unapt emblem of the mind's self-experience in the act of thinking. There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to each other are active and passive; and this is not possible without an intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive. (In philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and determinations, the Imagination. But, in common language and especially on the subject of poetry, we appropriate the name to a superior degree of the faculty, joined to a superior voluntary control over it.") [30]

Imagination must be something creative and dynamic. Any theory which re-
ces imagination to purely mechanical laws of association will not give an
telligent understanding of the aesthetics of poetry or of any other art. In
eory, Coleridge required a psychology that would explain two things in the
nction of imagination. Firstly it must establish the existence of a <u>creative</u>
t a reproductive process. Secondly it must be based on a metaphysic that
ll establish the connection between poetry and the very depths of man's in-
vidual soul. Art will never be understood as a recurrence of resembling
cates of feeling but as trains of ideas consciously developing a sense of the
st profound reality both within the heart of the artist and in the world of
ture.

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30 <u>Ibid</u>, pp.85-86.

"A metaphysical solution (like Hartley's) that does not instantly tell you something in the heart is grievously to be suspected. . . . I almost think that ideas never recall ideas, as far as they are ideas, any more than leaves in the forest create each other's motion. The breeze it is runs thro' them - - - it is the soul of state of feeling. If I had said no one idea ever recalls another I am confident that I could support the assertion." 31

Coleridge is clearly aware that any systematically rational attempt to ablish the objectivity of natural objects is foredoomed to failure.

"I began then to ask myself what proof I had of the outward existence of anything? Of this sheet of paper for instance, as a thing in itself, separate from the phaenomenon or image in my perception. I saw, that in the nature of things such proof is impossible; and that of all modes of being, that are not objects of the senses, the existence is assumed by a logical necessity arising from the constitution of the mind itself, by the absence of all motive to doubt it, not from any absolute contradiction in the supposition of the contrary." 32

It is false to create a dichotomy between reason and sense experience such a split makes knowledge impossible and yet a distinction must be made ween the percipient and the thing perceived. All knowledge begins and ends the knowledge of spiritual reality.

"O! the one life within us and abroad,
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul,
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where —
Methinks, it should have been impossible
Not to love all things in a world so filled;
Where the breeze warbles, and the mute still air
Is music slumbering upon her instrument. 33

same theme is current in the Statesman's Manual, Appendix B

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31 Letter to Southey, quoted in Muirhead, op.cit., p.199.
32 Coleridge, S.T., Biographia Literaria, Vol.1, p.133.
33 Coleridge, S.T., Complete Poetical Works, p.49.

"All things that surround us, and all things that happen to us have but one common final cause; namely the increase of consciousness in such wise that whatever part of the terra incognita of our nature the increased consciousness discovers, our will may conquer and bring into subjection to itself under the sovereignty of reason." [34]

Reason is concerned with the entire operation of the mind with respect Ideas. Ideas are defined as

"those truths, namely (supposing such to exist), the knowledge or acknowledgement of which require the whole man, the free will, no less than the intellect, and which are not therefore merely speculative, nor yet practical, but both in one."

ason in this total or comprehensive sense is distinct from Understanding .ch is only an experiential faculty as compared with the sciential faculty of ason. In "The Friend", Coleridge defines Reason as the faculty of the persensuous, all that distinguishes man from the animals while Understanding the faculty of the sensuous, the same as animal instinct with the addition self-consciousness.[35] Reason is the source of Principles, the Understanding e faculty of Rules. "The Reason is all end, summa finium, the understanding l means, summa mediorum. The rules are in all cases means to some end." [36]

The use of the term "Reason" in this broad, intuitive sense is confusing d it has been indicated as one of Coleridge's greatest errors.

"The fundamental error of his aesthetic lies in the confusion of "intuition" with reason. His 'Reason' includes the whole world of feeling which arises in the individual, and also the knowledge of general laws and of "essences'".[3]

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34 Coleridge, Complete Works, ed. Shedd, Vol.1, p.470, N.Y., Harper.
35 Coleridge, S.T., Biographia Literaria, Vol. 1., p.250
36 Snyder, Alice D., Logic and Literature in Coleridge, p.110.
37 Dodds, Mrs. Annie Edwards (Powell), The Romantic Theory of Poetry ew York, Longmans Green and Co., 1926, p.117.

term "spirit" as used by Croce would have been a much more fortunate choice word and would have helped to keep straight the distinction between the ctical ideas of mathematics and the dynamic ideas of Coleridge's theory of gination. Geometry for example, may appropriate to every construction a respondent outward intuition but it is not from the outward image or picture t we learn what a line is.

"On the contrary, we bring this stroke to the original line generated by the act of the imagination; otherwise we could not define it as without breadth, or thickness. Still however this stroke is the sensuous image of the original or ideal line, and an efficient mean to excite every imagination to the intuition of it." 38

Coleridge's theory of Imagination begins with this act of the inner sense means of which the mind becomes aware of the concrete individuality of it- f and of the objects of nature. Self-knowledge consists in the science of ng altogether, neither merely speculative nor merely practical but both one.

"All knowledge rests on the coincidence of an object with a thing. . . . For we can know that only which is true: and the truth is universally placed in the coincidence of the thought with the thing, of the representation with the object represented." 39

This is at once the most difficult but the most important notion in Cole- ge's theory of the Imagination. Somehow we must comprehend the possibility things having individuality in other than a material or sensuous essence. The y objectivity of these "concrete universals" or ideas lies in their close

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38 Coleridge, S. T., Biographia Literaria, Vol. 1, p.172.
39 Ibid., p.174.

ation both to the knowing mind of the artist and to the total spiritual
by of the Divine Creator of all reality. The ideas which are the essence
the objects of nature are not to be known by cold notions or lifeless tech-
al rules of the abstract mind. Rather they are "living and life-producing
s, which shall contain their own evidence, the certainty that they are
ntially one with the germinal causes in nature."[40]

"Now the sum of all that is merely OBJECTIVE we will henceforth call NATURE, confining the term to its passive and material sense, as comprising all the phaenomena by which its existence is made known to us. On the other hand the sum of all that is SUBJECTIVE, we may comprehend in the name of SELF or INTELLIGENCE. Both conceptions are in necessary antithesis. Intelligence is conceived of as exclusively representative, nature exclusively represented; the one as conscious, the other as without consciousness. Now in all acts of positive knowledge there is required a reciprocal concurrence of both, namely of the conscious being, and of that which is in itself unconscious. Our problem is to explain this concurrence, its possibility and its necessity." [41]

If objects exist externally, they must somehow be unconsciously involved
the knowing subject. In the beginning and in the end there can be only one
nciple of being or reality; otherwise if there were several principles each
ld have to refer to some other by which its quality is affirmed and neither
nciple would be self-established. The first principle of reality must there-
e be singular and in addition it must be self-conscious manifesting itself
the Sum or Iam;

"which I shall hereafter indiscriminately express by the words spirit, self, and self-consciousness. In this, and in this alone, object and subject, being and knowledge are identical, each involving, and supposing the other. In other words, it is a subject which becomes a subject by the act of constructing itself objectively to itself, and only so

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40 Coleridge, S.T., On poesy and Art in Shawcross, Vol.2., p.258.
41 Coleridge, S.T., Biographia Literaria, Vol. 1, p.174.

far as by the very same act it becomes a subject." [42]

it is that the act of self-consciousness for us is the source and principle
ll our knowledge. As the artist seeks to represent nature in his poetry
oes not make a sensuous representation but he must create so much according
he laws or ideas of reason that he will be in harmony with the spirit of
re for from this spirit both himself and the objects of nature are derived.
her a slavish copying of nature nor a skilful practice of rules of metre
make poetry. This advice to the poet to sing of the spirit of nature is
d in the Nightingale:

> And many a poet echoes the conceit;
> Poet who hath been building up the rhyme
> When he had better far have stretched his limbs
> Beside a brook in mossy forest-dell,
> By sun or moon-light, to the influxes
> Of shapes and sounds and shifting elements
> Surrendering his whole spirit, of his song
> And of his fame forgetful! So his fame
> Should share in Nature's immortality,
> A venerable thing! and so his song
> Should make all Nature lovelier, and itself
> Be loved like Nature!" [43]

Poet's fame must be based in his spiritual power to represent or imitate
which is within the natural object.

"that which is active through form and figure, and discourses to us by symbols -- the Natur-geist, or spirit of nature, as we unconsciously imitate those whom we love; for so only can we hope to produce any work truly natural in the object and truly human in the effect. The idea which puts the form together cannot itself be the form. It is above form, and is its essence, the universal in the individual, or the individuality in itself, -- the glance and the exponent of the indwelling power." [44]

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42 Ibid. p.183.
43 Coleridge, S.T., Complete Poetical Works. p.132.
44 Coleridge, S.T., On Poesy or Art, in Shawcross, op.cit, Vol.2. p.2[illegible]

the Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni Coleridge clarifies in
tic practice this response of the conscious self to nature. At first, the
e to identify oneself with nature's harmony attributes only a passive role
the self. Pantheistically the self seems to have been absorbed in harmonious
ty of Heaven:

> Yet, like some sweet beguiling melody,
> So sweet, we know not we are listening to it,
> Thou, the meanwhile, wast blending with my Thought
> Yea, with my Life and Life's own secret joy:
> Till the dilating Soul, enrapt, transfused,
> Into the mighty vision passing —— there
> As in her natural form, swelled vast to Heaven![45]

self is absorbed passively and pantheistically into the vastness of the
venly universe. But in order that this harmonious state can be enjoyed,
shapingspirit of imagination must play its role. The mind must actively
pond to nature before its true reality can be known or experienced. And so,
eridge expresses this dynamic poetic imperative:

> Awake, my soul! not only passive praise
> Thou owest! not alone these swelling tears,
> Mute thanks and secret ecstasy! awake,
> Voice of sweet song! Awake, my heart, awake!
> Green vales and icy cliffs, all join my Hymn.[46]

It is nor our task here to explore the implications of Coleridge's meta-
sics for his philosophy of religion, but one or two observations on this
ject in the Biographia Literaria are especially illuminating. Just as the
ative act in writing poetry is an act of will rather than of understanding,
he wrote that

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45 Coleridge, S.T., Complete Poetical Works, p.166.
46 Loc.cit.

"Belief is an act, not of the understanding but of the will. To become a believer —— one must love the doctrines and must resolve with passion to believe." [47]

he essay on Faith (supplementary to Aids to Reflection, pub.1825), faith aid to subsist

"in the synthesis of the Reason and the individual Will: and 'by virtue of the latter. . . it must be an energy, and inasmuch as it is related to the whole moral man. . . must be a total, not a partial — a continuous, not a desultory or occasional —energy'." [48]

Deeply conscious of the rational uncertainties and contradictions involved he pursuit of metaphysics Coleridge expostulates in a footnote: "

"Poor unlucky Metaphysics! and what are they? A single sentence expresses the object and there the contents of this science.
et Deum quantum licet, et in Deo omnia scibis. Know thyself: and so shalt thou know God, as far as is permitted to a creature, and in God all things. Surely, there is a strange —— nay, rather a too natural —— aversion in many to know themselves." [49]

to know oneself is not to know one's bodily self so much as it is to know s God as Coleridge reveals in the following lyric:

SELF-KNOWLEDGE

—E coelo descendit
Juvenal, xi.27.

'— and is this the prime
And heaven-sprung adage of the olden time! ——
Say, canst thou make thyself? —Learn first that trade:—
Haply thou mayst know what thyself had made.
What hast thou, Man, that thou dar'st call thine own?—
What is there in thee, Man, that can be known?—
Dark fluxion, all unfixable by thought,
A phantom dim of past and future wrought,
Vain sister of the worm, — life, death, soul, clod,—
Ignore thyself, and strive to know thy God! [50]

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47 Diary, etc.MS.Dec.20, in Shawcross, op.cit., Vol.1, p.236.
48 Loc.cit.
49 Coleridge, S.T., Biographia LITERARIA, vol.2, p.212.

eridge insisted throughout that this knowledge of self was metaphysical in
gin rather than epistemological, i.e. the self referred to in
a specific form of concrete spiritual reality rather than an idea of abstract
wledge.

"If then I know myself only through myself, it is contradictory to require any other predicate of self but that of self-consciousness. Only in the self-consciousness of spirit is there the required identity of object and of representation; for herein consists the essence of a spirit, that it is self-representative."[51]

s self is spiritually its own object but in the beginning it must have been
absolute subject out of which all objects must have come. The spiritual
lity which is also the essence of selfhood,

"must therefore be an ACT; for every object is, as an object, dead, fixed, incapable in itself of any action, and necessarily finite. Again the spirit (originally the identity of object and subject) must in some sense dissolve this identity, in order to be conscious of it; fit alter et idem. But this implies an act, and it follows therefore that intelligence or self-consciousness is impossible, except by and in a will. The self-conscious spirit therefore is a will; and freedom must be assumed as a ground of philosophy, and can never be deduced from it."[52]

s self is a form of being rather than a form of knowledge. The unity which
nstitutes the universe is also in the self which knows itself in that same
ity. And that same unity is God Himself, the "one eternal self-affirming
t." Without the one, (Unity), the self can have no existence and vice versa
e unity has no real existence except in the particularity of the Divine Self
well as the human self.

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51 Coleridge, S. T., Biographia Literaria, Vol.1, p.184.
52 Ibid, p.184-5.

"Whatever in its origin is objective, is likewise as such necessarily finite. Therefore, since the spirit is not originally an object, and as the subject exists in antithesis to an object, the spirit cannot originally be finite. But neither can it be a subject without becoming an object, and, as it is originally the identity of both, it can be conceived neither as infinite nor finite exclusively, but as the most original union of both. In the existence, in the reconciling, and the recurrence of this contradiction consists the process and mystery of production and life."[53]

ng to the non-rational nature and origin of the self as will, the problem
t be expressed in persistent paradoxes. "We begin with the 'I know myself'
order to end with the absolute I am. We proceed from the Self, in order to
e and find all self in God."[54]

It is with such a paradoxical, elaborate and not too clear metaphysical
kground that Coleridge says "I shall now proceed to the nature and genesis
the imagination."[55] The key to understanding Coleridge's theory of ima-
ation lies in this self-reciprocating relation between the poet's creative
l and Nature both of which are manifestations of the eternal Unity of Spirit--
elf the Divine Self-consciousness -- the beginning and end of all things.
distinguishes between fancy as "the aggregative and associative power" and
gination as the "shaping and modifying power". Fancy"must receive all its
erials ready made from the law of association." The elements of fancy re-
n the same after they have been combined by the will as they did in their
arate state. As in Wordsworth's Preface to Poems of 1815

"Fancy does not require that the materials she makes use of should be susceptible to change in their constitution from her touch: and where they admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, limited,

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53 Ibid, p.185.
54 Ibid, p.186.
55 Ibid, p.186.

and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these are the desires and demands of Imagination. She recoils from everything but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite." 56

The projected work on imagination which Coleridge was to write was never empted and we have only a few fragments of his scheme intimated in the graphia Literaria. First of all, he makes a distinction between imagination primary and as secondary.

"the primary imagination I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I am. The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, coexisting with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead." 57

the case of primary imagination Coleridge was trying to describe the faculty ordinary practical perception of the world of natural objects around us as use it unconsciously in our daily lives. As Shawcross puts it,

"the imagination of the ordinary man is capable only of detaching the world of experience from the self and contemplating it in its detachment; but the philosopher penetrates to the underlying harmony and gives it concrete expression. The ordinary consciousness, with no principle of unification, sees the universe as a mass of particulars: only the poet can depict this whole as reflected in the individual parts. It is in this sense (as Coleridge had written many years before) that to the poet 'each thing has a life of its own, and yet they have all our life.'" 58

It is interesting to observe a record by Sara Coleridge that the sentence

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56 Shawcross, J., op.cit., vol.1, p.272.
57 Coleridge, S. T., Biographia Literaria, Vol.1, p.202.
58 Shawcross, J., op.cit., vol.1, p.lxviii.

. repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the in-
: I am" is stroked out in a copy of the Biographia Literaria with a few
al notes by the author. Shawcross cautiously observes that "probably
dge felt that the ideas which the sentence suggested were incongruous with
st of the passage."[59] In a recent article a critic of this fact is more
ic.

Surely the reason for striking them out is clear. If the primary or un-
onscious imagination is a repetition of God's act of creation, it follows
/ implication that God's act of creation is unconscious, that he is no
ore than some dim Spiritus Mundi which directs the evolution of the world
thout really knowing what it is doing."[60]

a statement as this shows a failure to comprehend Coleridge's metaphysics
irit. In the ordinary act of perception, we know objects when we unconsciousl;
ruct them as subjects. As Coleridge says, "an object is inconceivable with-
subject as its antithesis." Perception in the finite mind is a repetition
e eternal act of creation because there can be only one original or
iate act of knowledge. All other acts of knowledge are derivative. We
know that we exist as we exist in God. Coleridge distinguishes

the conditional finite "I" (which, as known in distinct consciousness
y occasion of experience, is called by Kant's followers the empirical
I") and the absolute "I am", and the conditional finite "I" depends on
r inheres in the absolute I, 'in whom we live and move and have our being',
s St. Paul divinely asserts, differing widely from the Theists of the me-
hanic school (as Sir J. Newton, Locke, etc.) who must say from whom
re had our being, and with it life and the powers of life."[61]

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59 Ibid, p.272.
60 Benziger, J., "Organic Unity: Leibniz to Coleridge", Publications Modern
age Association, 1951, p.42.
61 Coleridge, S.T., Biographia Literaria, vol.1, p.183-84, footnotes by
ridge.

eridge may have feared that his readers might misinterpret the idea of pri
y imagination as an analogue of the divine creative action, but if there is
y one immediate and original intuition of being or reality and all other
ith is derivative, Coleridge could never have entertained the possibility
God as an unconscious Creator. At all times the relationship between God and
or between man and the objects of his perception is dynamic and interactive.
eridge has already been quoted as saying "that a spirit is that, which is
own object, yet not originally an object, but an absolute subject for which
, itself included, may be an object. It must therefore be an Act." [62] We
ue from the dynamic will of God to the analogous will of man who sees all
ngs in God, and not from man to God. This is in essence Coleridge's critique
Descartes in a footnote in Biographia Literaria[63] and the nature of Coleridge's
ument eliminates the possibility of Benziger's implication that God is
onscious of his creation. In God "the ground of existence and the ground
the knowledge of existence, are absolutely identical. Sum quia sum." and
s principle is the principle of freedom, of self-consciousness, of will.
eridge is no monist but rather a dynamic interactionist. If we argue from
dynamic will of God to the analogous will of man who sees all things in
, then imagination will be analogous to divine perception by means of which
an sees into the essence of God's other creatures. Coleridge's theological
ight and his aesthetic have the same metaphysical basis.

The secondary imagination differs from the primary sort only in degree

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62 Ibid, p.184.
63 Ibid, p.183.

. in the mode of its operation. It is that operation of the individual spirit
ch is in closest harmony with the dynamic principle of interaction in Coler-
e's metaphysics. In Dejection: an Ode, Coleridge distinguishes sharply be-
en the Fancy with its "viper thoughts, that coil around the mind, - Reality's
k dream" and "My shaping spirit of Imagination". There is a contrast between
cy as the deluding instrument of his love for material nature and Imagination
ch is the instrument for the perception of what is genuinely real in nature.

> O Lady! we receive but what we give,
> And in our life alone does Nature live:
> Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud!
> And would we aught behold, of higher worth,
> Than that inanimate cold world allowed
> To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd,
> Ah! from the soul itself must issue forth
> A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud
> Enveloping the Earth ---
> And from the soul itself must there be sent
> A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth,
> Of all sweet sounds the life and element! [64]

as there issues forth from the soul this light which envelops nature, so
ure in reciprocation enables us to have Joy,

> the spirit and the power,
> Which wedding to us gives in dower,
> A new Earth and a new Heaven,
> Undreamt of by the sensual and the proud--

th nature and the soul must reciprocate before the act of poetic creation
be accomplished. In the Ode as it was originally printed in the Morning
st of October 4, 1802, the reciprocal and dynamic relationship which is
agination is expressed in terms of Wordsworth's poetic genius.

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64 Coleridge, S. T., - Complete Poetical Works, p.160.

To thee do all things live from pole to pole,
Their life the eddying of thy living soul. [65]

I. Richards affirms that this "eddying is one of Coleridge's greatest ima-
ative triumphs. An eddy is in something, and is a conspicuous example of
alance of forces."[66] The eddy is the symbol of this dynamic will of God
creation and man's analogous action by imagination.

Coleridge speaks of the imagination as "esemplastic" from the Greek
, to shape into one; the word is of his own coinage. The "one
allectual breeze" which is "At once the Soul of each, and God of all" is
cribed as both "plastic and vast". Throughout his discussion the freedom
the will in creative action is maintained.

"If there is one motive common to all genuine poetic impulse, it is surely
the desire to objectify, and in this object to know and love, all that
in the individual experience has seemed worthy of detachment from the fleeting
personal life." [67]

in it is important to notice that Coleridge never seperates the necessity of
edom of the will for existence of objectivity. There will be poems only as
g as there are free creators to make them. Imagination is again revealed as
f-reciprocating in the following lines to William Wordsworth:

Of tides obedient to external force,
And currents self-determined, as might seem,
Or by some inner power; of moments awful,
Now in thy inner life, and now abroad,
When power streamed from thee and thy soul received
The light reflected, as light bestowed — [68]

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65 Ibid, p.524.
66 Richards, I.A., op.cit., p.158.
67 Shawcross, J. op.cit., p.lxxv.
68 Coleridge, S.T., Complete Poetical Works, P.176.

attempts to draw from Nature

> Deep, heartfelt, inward joy that closely clings;
> And trace in leaves and flowers that round me lie
> Lessons of love and earnest piety. [69]

mphasizes his role as a mediator of spiritual reality. The poet as medi- maintains his selfhood and avoids pantheism as he builds his altar in the ds, the mere "priest of this poor sacrifice!" As the priest of God in Na- his imagination is always partaking "of the reality which it renders lligible: and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living in that unity of which it is the representative." [70]

Hegel struggled with the very same difficulty as Coleridge in this paradox ubjectivity and objectivity, of unity and multeity, of the conscious self elation to an all-inclusive Absolute. Like Coleridge he insisted upon the mic principle of the will as prior to the manifold aspect of nature and to unity of the Absolute. The objects of nature generate their own form from it. The artist perceiving this form at once identifies it with the forms is own mind. This is possible since both the objects of nature and the ective self are derived from Spirit in its Absolute Unite. "Hence it is spirit is equally consciousness of itself as its <u>objective</u> substance, as as simple self-contained self-consciousness." [71] Spirit can operate through ral objects which lose their objectivity as the artist sees into their re or spirit may operate conversely where the artists makes himself into forms of the objects he observes and creates in his work of art.

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69 Ibid, p.190.
70 Cf. <u>First Lay Sermon</u>, quoted in Shawcross, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.xxiii.
71 Hegel, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.751.

"For spirit is knowledge of self in a state of alienation of self: spirit is the Being which is the process of retaining identity with itself in its otherness." [72]

dynamic principle of self-identity is ever present and yet the self is for- sacrificing itself in the comprehension of the forms of external objects. n Coleridge's trichotomic logic, a principle of unity must underly this tant reciprocation between subject and object.

"Spirit is content of its consciousness to begin with in the form of pure substance; in other words, it is content of its pure consciousness. This element of thought is the process of descending into existence, or individuality. The middle term between these two is their synthetic connexion, the consciousness of passing into otherness, the process of imaginative presentation as such. The third stage is the return from this presentation and from that otherness; in other words, it is the element of self-consciousness itself" [73]

becomes more fully aware of Coleridge's idealism when he leaves poems to about poetry much in the same way that philosophical idealists can talk t "becoming" but not about "being" in any specific sense. Process, not tence, is reality.

It is indeed remarkable that Coleridge should so completely anticipate greatest philosopher of the nineteenth century in one of his most vital ributions to the history of thought. Coleridge may have lacked the per- ent tenacity of spirit to realize his original thoughts into a system, the freshness of his creative mind led him to see that poetry would never nderstood by the application of external theories but only by a specific ination of poems themselves and of the poets who wrote those poems. The

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72 Ibid, p.758.
73 Ibid, p.765.

e relation between the poet as subject and the poem as object was a dynamic

tion. Coleridge spoke of

"two cardinal points of poetry, the power of exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature, and the power of giving the interest of novely by the modifying colors of imagination." 74

paradoxical objectivity of subjectivity is presented as a possibility as

ridge describes his role in the double authorship of the Lyrical Ballads:

"It was agreed that my endeavours should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith."75

specific forms of the mind are here projected as manifestations of spirit

as much objectivity or reality as are seen by the artist when he perceives

essence of a natural object in its real or specific form rather than in its

uous or material form.

On the other hand the paradoxical subjectivity of objectivity is presented

possibility as Coleridge describes Wordsworth's role

"to give the charm of novelty to things of everyday, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the mind's attention from the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, bur for which, in consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand." 76

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74 Coleridge, S. T., Biographia Literaria, Vol.2, p.5.
75 Ibid, vol.2, p.6.
76 Ibid, vol.2, p.6.

Concerned as he is with the centering of literary criticism in the poem
lf rather than in historical or classical theories, Coleridge defines at once
he means by a poem and by poetry.

"A poem is that species of composition, which is opposed to works of science,
by proposing for its immediate object pleasure, not truth; and from all
other species (having this object in common with it) it is discriminated
by proposing to itself such delight from the whole, as is compatible with
a distinct gratification from each component part."[77]

There are two points to consider here. First of all, a poem proposes
"for its immediate object pleasure, not truth."

pleasurable activity is the same dynamic principle which we have already
ssed in the relation of the knowing mind to its object, both being mani-
ations of the unity which is spiritual reality.

"Like the motion of a serpent, which the Egyptians made the emblem of
intellectual power; or like the path of sound through the air; at every
step he (the reader of the poem) pauses and half recedes, and from the
retrogressive movement collects the force which carries him onward."[78]

Secondly, a poem "must be one, the parts of which mutually support and
ain each other; all in their proportion harmonizing with, and supporting
purpose and known influences of metrical arrangement."[79] This internal
tion of all the parts of the poem resulting in a total sense of unity is
metaphysical counterpart or foundation for the dynamic relation which
ts between the poet (or reader) and the poem. The existence of a poem

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77 Ibid, vol.2, p.10.
78 Ibid, vol.2, p.11.
79 Ibid, vol.2, p.10.

lways defined paradoxically as the self-representation of spirit, the self bject to itself.

Shawcross is harsh with Coleridge for making a distinction between a poem poetry. He is further critical of the definition of poetry in terms of the "which in its turn resolves itself into an enumeration of the character- cs of Imagination".[80] This passage which Shawcross criticizes is never- ess characteristic of the spiritual idealism of Coleridge. All things are ted to all things with respect to poets, poems, readers and poetry in gen- are concerned. The nature of poetry has been anticipated in the preceding uisition on the fancy and imagination. Imagination was seen to be the mic reciprocation of the poet and the natural objects. This dynamic o- tion of the imagination results in a specific and individual representation pirit; Poetry on the other hand, "is a distinction resulting from the poetic us itself, which sustains and modifies the images, thoughts and emotions he poet's mind."[81] Here the word "distinction" means "separation", i.e. ever the poet creates as a manifestation of Spirit has its own specific viduality. In Coleridge's metaphysical system these distinctions between s and poetry can be fairly drawn, for poems are the multeity which is y, i.e. poetry itself. If Poetry is not to be a meaningless spiritual system poet must be present as self-conscious spirit; otherwise poetic knowledge pleasure" (in the dynamic sense previously defined) would be impossible. ridge insisted on the fundamental intuition of self-consciousness. Just ant insisted dogmatically upon the existence of the moral self as the

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80 Ibid, Vol.2, p.268.
81 Ibid, Vol.2,. p.12.

terion of a possible morality, so Coleridge insists upon the existence of aesthetic self as a kind of poetic imperative which urges all creative wills ards expression. And so the poem must be distinguished from poetry if it to have concrete existence. The poem is the concrete universal of poetry. try alone would be an abstract universal with little or no meaning for aes- tic objects. Just as Spirit is self-consciousness, so is poetry a poetic f-consciousness. The poet is poetry and poetry the poet, in a constantly amic interaction just as the Many constantly strives towards Unity or Spirit Unity or Spirit constantly strives to manifest itself in individual form.

All this aesthetic activity culminates in Coleridge's concept of ima- ation. It is the poet "who brings the whole soul of man into activity"; is he who "diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) se, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which we have lusively appropriated the name of imagination." But the activity of the t's will achieves consciousness of itself only as it is sacrificed to its her" (to use Hegel's term). The power of imagination is necessarily revealed

> "in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness with difference; of the general with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with the old familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than usual order; judgment ever awake, and steady self-possession with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement; and while it blends and harmonizes the natural and the artificial, still subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter; and our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry."[82]

so it is that

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82 Ibid, Vol.2, p.12.

"GOOD SENSE is the BODY of poetic genius, FANCY its DRAPERY, MOTION its LIFE, and IMAGINATION the SOUL That is everywhere, and in each; and forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole."

hout these elaborate distinctions or seperations, Coleridge's aesthetic t degenerate into the "crude egoismus" of Fichte or the Pantheism of elling or Spinoza.

The function of the poet's creative will in the process of imaginative duction is amplified further in Coleridge's discussion of genius. Of Shakeare's Venus and Adonis he says its

"first and most obvious excellence is the perfect sweetness of the versification; its adaptation to the subject; and the power displayed in varying the march of the words without passing into a loftier and more majestic rhythm than was demanded by the thoughts, or permitted by the property of preserving a sense of melody predominant." 83

first reading Coleridge's discussion of the form of poetry leads one to ieve that it is merely an instrument of the poet's will to be used according his subjective feeling; "metre in itself is simply a stimulant of the ention."[84] But as in his previous descriptions of the imaginative process, eridge always concludes with a metaphysical interpretation. Although "the se of musical delight", the reduction of multeity to unity, or the modi-ng of "a series of thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling", all functions of the poet's creative will, "no man was ever yet a great t, without being at the same time a profound philosopher." The philosoical element in poetry is that manifestation of spirit which can be realized ly by the poet of genius.

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83 Ibid, Vol.2, p 14.
84 Ibid, Vol.2, p.53.

"It is throughout as if a superior spirit more intuitive, more intimately conscious, even than the characters themselves, not only of every outward look and act, but of the flux and reflux of the mind in all its subtlest thoughts and feelings, were placing the whole before our view; himself meanwhile unparticipating in the passions, and actuated only by a pleasurable excitement, which had resulted from the energetic fervor of his own spirit in so vividly exhibiting, what it has so accurately and profoundly contemplated." [85]

e once again is summarized the whole function of imagination in its metaphys-
l aspects. The poet is the priest by means of which a sense of objectivity
achieved for the aesthetic object which itself makes reader and poet per-
ve the wholeness in the individuality of the poem. Before the poet can
ate, there must occur this flux and reflux of the mind between the poet and
spiritual reality he would manifest and communicate. The poet is "actuated"
the dynamic flux and reflux of the mind as it becomes aware of its spiritual
erness. He creates an object, a poem which can exist only in terms of his
t sacrificial contemplation of Spirit in both its manifold and individual
ects. As Coleridge says,

"essence in its primary signification, means the principle of individuation, the inmost principle of the possibility of any thing, as that particular thing. It is equivalent to the idea of a thing, when ever we use the word, idea, with philosophic precision. Existence, on the other hand, is distinguished from essence, by the superinduction of reality. Thus we speak of the essence, and essential properties of a circle; but we do not therefore assert, that any thing, which really exists, is mathematically circular." [86]

is the poem has certain sensuous elements which stimulate the feelings of
e reader, but its true individuality or objectivity can consist only in the
dividuation of Spirit which is its essence. It is the human nature of the
st to seek unity by harmonious adjustment.

85 Ibid, Vol.2, p.15.
86 Ibid, Vol.2, p.47.

"The Composition of a poem is among the imitative arts; and that imitation, as opposed to copying, consists either in the interfusion of the SAME throughout the radically DIFFERENT, or of the different throughout a base radically the same." 87

s in this interaction between sameness and difference that the poet achieves fficient awareness of Spiritual reality to make poetic creation possible.

Coleridge is a metaphysician who insists that the beauty of poetry can njoyed only as one apprehends the unified spiritual reality which underlies poetic creation. The elements of poetry such as language and metre are icient to prove that

"such language and such combinations are the native produce neither of the fancy or the imagination; that their operation consists in the excitement of surprise by the juxta-position and apparent reconciliation of widely different or incompatible things." 88

compulsory juxtaposition of images such as hills being made to reflect the e of a voice are the work of a shallow mind,

"not produced by the presentation of impressive or delightful forms to the inward vision, nor by any sympathy with the modifying powers with which the genius of the poet had united and inspirited all the objects of his thought; that it is therefore a species of wit, a pure work of the will, and implies a leisure and self-possession both of thought and of feeling, incompatible with a steady fervor of a mind possessed and filled with the grandeur of its subject." 89

It is part of Coleridge's genius to have avoided the folly of the modern rary positivist who attempts to reduce poetry to the mere juxtaposition of guage and metre for its own sake. Without the fullness of Spirit individu- i in the poetic self, there can be no poetry. It is only when poetry has

87 ibid, Vol.2, p.56.
88 ibid, Vol.2, pp.67-8.
89 ibid, Vol.2, p.68.

an deduced in the author's own mind from considerations of grammar, logic, the truth and nature of things" that it can achieve the level of greatness be the expression of genius.

It has been shown that the intuition of spiritual reality is primary and riori in Coleridge's "system" and that the existence of this reality is iately affirmed in every man. Without this existence of spiritual reality ng manifested in man, knowledge of all kinds, scientific or poetic would impossible. This knowledge of Spirit

> "becomes intelligible to no man by the ministry of mere words from without. The medium, by which spirits understand each other, is not the surrounding air; but the <u>freedom</u> which they possess in common, as the common etherial element of their being, the tremulous reciprocations of which propagate themselves even to the inmost of the soul. Where the spirit of a man is not <u>filled</u> with the consciousness of freedom (. . .) all spiritual intercourse is interrupted, not only with others but even with himself."[90]

As for Kant, so for Coleridge, the Will and not the reason forms the ndation of our knowing minds and of the world of things which we know. Just Kant had allowed a certain metaphysical capacity to the will, so Coleridge .ows the same capacity to the poetic faculty. But Coleridge is less critical l less sceptical than Kant even though the latter was so passionate a defender the freedom of man as derived from his Divine Creator. Less interested in analysis of the antinomies of reason, Coleridge was more interested in the llness or content of knowledge. He loved Plato's "divine nonsense" as he called because "he leads you to see that propositions involving in themselves

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90 <u>Ibid</u>, Vol.1, p.168.

radictory conceptions are nevertheless true; and which therefore, must be- ; to a higher logic — that of ideas."[91] The richness of these ideas lies he awareness of the spiritual unity of which they are the manifestations.

Just as the categorical imperative urged the action of the will towards rational objective of justice and fairmindedness to all men so Coleridge's ic imperative urged the Will towards a more Platonic unity in Love. Con- ing human nature, Coleridge once said,

"There are two mighty mysteries — action and passion (or passive action), and love is a synthesis of these, in which each is the other — and it is only a synthesis, or one of the syntheses of action and passion; other discoveries must be made in order to know the principle of Individuation in general and then the principle of Personality." [92]

head quotes this passage in defence of Coleridge's conviction of the meta- sical nature of the moral (and we may also add) the creative or poetic self.

"It was the growing conviction of his later years that individuality, in the only sense in which it was of moral and religious significance, consisted not in the narrowing down of life to an exclusive point, but in the expansion of it towards the inclusion of the Whole — man in God, doubtless, but also God in man."[93]

All thoughts, all passions, all delights,
Whatever stirs this mortal frame,
All are but ministers of Love,
And feed his sacred flame. [94]

the imperative to such an all-absorbing Love requires a lover and that lover the poetic genius whose creative will can make this universal Love real and ividual.

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91 Coleridge, S.T., Table Talk, April 30, 1830, quoted Richards, I.A. op.cit., p.16
92 Coleridge, S.T., Table Talk, quoted by Muirhead, J.H., op.cit., p.159.
93 Muirhead, J.H., Ibid, p.159.
94 Coleridge, S.T., Complete Poetical Works, p.135.

CHAPTER IV

ALLEN TATE AND CLEANTH BROOKS: THE PARADOX OF OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT A METAPHYSIC

I - ALLEN TATE

The problem of knowledge has always been concerned with the relation the knowing conscious mind to the objects which it perceives and knows. e burden of the New Criticism has been to save poetry from the Romantic adition which reduced the poem to a mere shadow or phantasm of the poet's tense emotion. At the same time the new critic is attempting to save e poem from semantical reductionism which would explain the poem simply a set of signs or symbols and syntactical rules. As the new critics arch for a standard of objectivity, the ancient but persistent conflict tween the Academy and the Sophists, between the realists and the nomi- lists, between the modern Aristotelians and Hegelians, continues with gorous and sometimes bitter struggle. Both traditions in their most con- ncing form discover a paradox between the knowing mind and sense experi- ce. Both schools of thought believe that a work of art has universal well as highly individual qualities but they disagree as to the origin art. The Hegelian describes poetry or art ultimately as an objectifi- tion of the poet's experience while the Aristotelian describes poetry an imitation. For Hegel,

> "the work of art is not only for the <u>sensuous</u> apprehension or sensuous object, but its position is of such a kind that as sensuous it is at

the same time essentially addressed to the mind." [1]

was Hegel who set the pattern of thinking for what is known as objective alism. If universals are primarily derived from the mind, how can they made objective or concrete?

Just as there can be no final answer to this question so there can no final answer to the paradox of imitation. Aristotle says,

"The statement that all knowledge is universal, so that the principles of things must also be universal and not separate substances, presents indeed, of all the points we have mentioned, the greatest difficulty, but yet the statement is in a sense true, although in a sense it is not."[2]

First sight the two philosophers seem to agree but a closer examination eals a fundamental metaphysical difference. Whereas Hegel presupposes etaphysical reality which is essentially rational, Aristotle conceives a metaphysical reality which can be interpreted as substantial or spiri- l rather than rational or sensuous. Whereas Hegel is always concerned h the relation of parts to the whole, Aristotle is more concerned with specific essence of particular things. In what ways does an object ody the substantial reality of the universe in such a way as to preserve individuality before analysis by rational mind which would reduce particularity to a set of ideas in the knowing mind?

For Allen Tate, poetry itself is a kind of knowledge. He rejects opinion that all experience can be reduced to scientific knowledge.

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1 Bosanquet, B., Hegel; Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art. 1.

2 Aristotle: Metaphysics, ed. McKeon, Richard, The Basic Works of stotle, 1087 a,10-15.

ı an assumption

"has logically reduced the spiritual realm to irresponsible emotion, to what the positivists of our time see as irrelevant feeling; it is irrelevant because it can't be reduced to the terms of the positivist procedure. It is my contention here that the high forms of literature offer us the only complete, and thus the most responsible, versions of our experience. The point of view of this essay, then, is influenced by the late neglected T.E. Hulme (and not this essay alone). It is the belief, philosophically tenable, in a radical discontinuity between the physical and the spiritual realms." 3

Out of this radical discontinuity comes the special kind of knowledge ch is poetry. Poetry "is the art of apprehending and concentrating experience in the mysterious limitations of form." 4 And again, "Poetry one test of ideas; it is ideas tested by experience, by the act of direct rehension." 5 Tate observes that I. A. Richards has come to believe t poetry is an independent form of knowledge equal in value if not su- lor, to scientific knowledge. Tate abandons the Doctrine of Relevance etry can be tested by scientific observation of the world that it repre- ts). He also rejects the formalist theory of art for art's sake and cludes that poetry is dynamic; it provides a knowledge of inner ex- lence which is beyond the reach of the scientist. Moreover, the poet the means of figurative language and the power of rhetoric at his dis- al for the expression of such knowledge which the scientific method not communicate. Although Matthew Arnold states both these character- ics of poetry, Tate feels that Arnold has missed the important feature poetical knowledge that language and subject are one. Poetry is more

3 Tate, Allen, On the Limits of Poetry, Selected Essays: 1928-1948, York, Swallow-Morrow, 1948, p.4.
4 Ibid, p.xv.
5 Ibid, p.xv.

the adaptation of man's experience to the forms of language.

ate rejects the positivism of Charles W. Morris because it gives no
nt of the poet or of what the poet is talking about. The nature of
y is said to be semantical and pragmatic without any metaphysical
ng. Tate feels that "since the values are not attached to reality,
are irresponsible feelings."[6]

Tate makes a sudden transition in his reasoning about Morris's dilemma
similar dilemma in Coleridge. Morris seems to be unable to say whether
ot poetry means what it says or whether it means the "situation" we
from it in a process of reduction. Tate observes a similar problem in
ridge as he struggled between psychology and metaphysics.

"He cannot make up his mind whether the specifically poetic element is an objective feature of the poem, or is distinguishable only as a subjective effect."[7]

If Tate is not satisfied with Coleridge's incomplete theory of the
gination, he is still less sympathetic with Richards' attempt to syn-
size Coleridge's theory. Either the poet gains an insight into objective
lity i.e. he sees objective essences in nature not normally perceived
"the mind of the poet creates a Nature into which his own feelings,
aspirations and apprehensions, are projected." Richards tells us that
ther of these alternatives is intelligible apart from Imagination.
ce Richards has not considered Coleridge's metaphysical speculations to
of any importance, Tate may well ask

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6 Ibid, p.35.
7 Ibid, p.39.

"What is this Imagination which Mr. Richards says will make the two doctrines intelligible? No doubt it becomes in his hands something different from Coleridge's conception of it; it closely resembles an Hegelian synthesis, which joins the opposites in a new propogition in which their truths, no longer contradictory, are preserved."[8]

ıards feels that this synthesis makes poetry "the completest mode of

erance." But this is a linguistic or semantical not a metaphysical

thesis. And Tate warns the rationalist and the positivist:

"We do not need to reject the positive and rational mode of inquiry into poetry; yet even from Mr. Morris we get the warning lest we substitute the criticism for the poem, and thus commit ourselves to a 'learned ignorance'. We must return to, we must never leave, the poem itself." [9]

The Romantic movement in poetry illustrates for Tate the fallacy of

munication.

"The poets were trying to use verse to convey ideas and feelings that they secretly thought could be better conveyed by science (consult Shelley's Defence), or by what today we call, in a significantly bad poetic phrase, the social sciences".[10]

ıtry which attempts to communicate the affective state of the poet's mind

essentially unpoetic. Speaking of a typical nineteenth century lyric,

ıe Vine" by James Thomson, Tate says it lacks coherent meaning both

literal terms as well as metaphorical terms; "it may be wholly replaced

any of its several paraphrases which are already latent in our minds."[11]

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8 Ibid, p.46.
9 Ibid, p.48.
10 Ibid, p.77.
11 Ibid, p.78.

In preference to affective poetry, Tate chooses metaphysical poetry as .fied by Donne and the Seventeenth Century Metaphysical poets.

"The metaphysical poem is an analytical proposition exhibiting the properties inherent in the major term; that is, exhibiting as much of the universe as Cowley could get around to before he wearied of logical extension."[12]

.s true that in metaphysical poetry there may occur another fallacy, mere denotation" such as Cowley or Cleveland wrote at their worst level poetic enterprise.

"This is the poetry which contradicts our most developed human insights insofar as it fails to use and direct the rich connotation with which language has been informed by experience.".[13]

The two extremes of poetic expression are best described as the level extension and the level of intension. By extension, Tate means the pro- s of abstraction by means of which a Platonist would reduce an object a poem to a universal concept. For example, one may read Marvell's His Coy Mistress" as recommending immoral behaviour to young men. s is one possible meaning, but it is not the exclusive one. There is o an intensive meaning which expresses the conflict of sensuality and eticism. In Donne's "Valediction: forbidding mourning"

> Our two soules therefore, which are one,
> Though I must goe, endure not yet
> A breach, but an expansion,
> Like gold to aiery thinnesse beate.

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12 Ibid, p.80.
13 Ibid, p.82.

"the infinite image of the gold, in extension, logically contradicts the intensive meaning (infinity) which it conveys; but it does not invalidate that meaning. . . . The clear denotation of the gold contains, by intension, the full meaning of the passage. If we reject the gold, we reject the meaning, for the meaning is wholly absorbed into the gold. Intension and extension here are one, and they enrich each other."[14]

Tate refers to the phrase of John Crowe Ransom "the metaphysical stra-

y" of the poet as

"the point on the intensive-extensive scale at which the poet deploys his resources of meaning. The metaphysical poet as a rationalist begins at or near the extensive or denoting end of the line; the Romantic or Symbolist poet at the other, intensive end; and each by a straining feat of the imagination tries to push his meanings as far as he can towards the opposite end, so as to occupy the entire scale."[15]

ause they are at the centre - they achieve "the poetry of tension, in ich the "strategy" is diffused into the unitary effect" Tate coins the rm "tension" by dropping the prefixes from the terms "intension" and xtension".

Elsewhere, Tate has isolated his ideal of poetry by contrasting three pes of poetry, indicating three attitudes of the modern world. First all there is the poetry of the practical will which looks from scientic explanation to action and leans upon moral abstractions and allegory. condly there is that type of poetry which is a reaction against the mination of scientific knowledge in poetry. This is poetry based upon

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14 Ibid, p.84.
15 Ibid, p.86.

s emotion of romantic irony. Tate rejects both of these types of poetry
:ause they try to make the will do the work of the imagination. Such an
terprise can never produce creative poetry.

In his definition of creative poetry, there is a complete statement
Tate's theory of imagination. "The reader is asked to keep in mind two
:e general statements with some brief commentary:

> First, the power of seizing the inward meaning of experience, the power of poetic creation that I shall call here the vision of the whole of life, is a quality of the imagination. The apologists of science speak as if this were the scientific attitude, but the aim of science is to produce a dynamic whole for the service of the practical will. Our experience of nuclear energy seems to be very different from our capacity to control it. For the imaginative whole of life is the wholeness of vision at a particular moment of experience; it yields us the quality of the experience." 16

ereas the will makes only rhetorical propositions about the whole of life,
e imagination seizes upon the materials of the poem and makes them into
whole. To illustrate his point Tate contrasts Shelley's lines:

> Life like a dome of many-coloured glass
> Stains the white radiance of eternity.

th Edgar's reflection on his father's downfall: "Ripeness is all". In the
elley passage, the simile is imposed upon the material from above:

> "it does not grow out of the material. It exists as explanation external to the subject: it is an explanation of 'life' that seems laden with portent and high significance, but as explanation it necessarily looks towards possible action and it is there that we know that the

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16 Ibid, p.92.

statement is meaningless. Practical experimental knowledge can alone fit means to ends."[17]

can discuss the truth or falsity of such a proposition as Shelley makes t as certainly as we can discuss Edgar's proposition. But Tate observes t Shakespeare's figure

"rises from the depth of Gloucester's situation. It is a summation not only of Gloucester's tragedy but of the complex tensions of the plot before the catastrophe in the last scene. Possibly King Lear would be as good without Edgar's words; but it would be difficult to imagine the play without the passage ending those words. They are implicit in the total structure, the concrete quality, of the whole experience that we have when we read King Lear. The specific merit of Edgar's statement as general truth or falsehood is irrelevant because it is an experienced statement, first from Edgar's, then from our own, point of view; and the statement remains experienced, and thus significant and comprehensible, whether it be true or false." [18]

three types of poetry are summarized specifically as follows:

"The pure scientific spirit I shall call here without much regard for accuracy, a positive Platonism, a cheerful confidence in the limitless power of man to impose practical abstractions upon his experience. Romantic irony is a negative Platonism, a self-pitying disillusionment with the positive optimism of the other program: the romantic tries to build up a set of fictitious 'explanations', by means of rhetoric, more congenial to his unscientific temper. The creative spirit occupies an aloof middle ground — it is in no sense a compromise, as the late Irving Babbitt conceived it to be — between these positions. Its function is the quality of experience, the total revelation — not explanation for the purpose of external control by the will."[19]

The relation of particulars to the total structure of poetic wholes is fectively illustrated in Tate's essay The Hovering Fly. He discusses e meaning of objectivity in poetry as contrasted with empirical objectivity.

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17 Ibid, p.92-3.
18 Ibid, p.93.
19 Ibid, p.94-5.

he seeks to resolve the paradox of the one and the many in poetry. Tate wise enough to avoid the persistent dualism of Descartes between the things sense and the things of reason. The plain man, because of his sentimental entation to his environment, customarily distinguishes between the world poetry and the Actual World. By the term Actual World or Actuality e means the external world of experience.

> "So I take it that the bearing of the phrase 'actual world' is towards something outside us, something objective, whose actuality is somehow an empirical one which tends to look after its own affairs without consulting us, and even at times resisting whatever it is in us which we like to call by names like subjective, private, human as opposed to non-human, although even the human and the subjective lie ready for objective scrutiny if we change our vantage-point and let them stand opposite us rather than let them oppose a third thing, a world, beyond them. It is, in fact, no mere quibble of idealism if we decide to call this subjective field not only the world but the actual world, taking our stand on the assumption that it sufficiently reflects or gathers in or contains all that we can ever know of any other world or worlds that appear to lie beyond it."[20]

How can the subjective field be the actual world? At first sight s would seem to be a worse paradox than the one with which we have begun. we attempt to resolve the paradox philosophically, we shall have to admit helplessness before a "fenced-in apriorism". If we accept the actual rld as the world of sense experience alone, we shall have only a scienti- knowledge not a poetical knowledge. The subjective can be the actual rld if we can think of the actual world as the realm of dramatic imagina- on. To illustrate the relation of the imagination to the actual world, te chooses Dostoyevsky's The Idiot because

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20 Ibid, p.150.

"the resolution is managed by means of that most difficult of all feats, a narrow scene brought close up, in which the "meaning" of the action is conveyed in a dramatic visualization so immediate and intense that it creates its own symbolism. Ans it is the particular symbolism of the fly in the final scene of The Idiot which has provided the springboard, or let us say the catapult, that will send us off into the unknown regions of "actuality" into which we have received order to advance."[21]

ve are to know the actuality, we shall not know it by looking at the em-

ical data of our sense experience but only by comprehending the symbolic

ding of these data in their relation to a dramatic context. As Myshkin

Rogozhin keep their eerie vigil over the dead body of Nastasya, the

osphere is tense and motionless. Suddenly there is the buzz of a fly

ch flies over the bed and settles on the pillow where Nastasya lies.

as he has remarked earlier how Edgar's image "Ripeness is all" rises

the depth of Gloucester's tragedy, so the hovering fly summarizes the

redy of The Idiot. Tate observes,

"I am not sure that the power of the scene would be diminished by the absence of the fly; but at any rate it is there; and its buzz rises like a hurricane in that silent room, until, for me, the room is filled with audible silence. The fly comes to stand in its sinister and abundant life for the privation of life, the body of the young woman on the bed. Here we have one of those conversions of image of which only great literary talent is capable; life stands for death, but it is a wholly different order of life, and one that impinges upon the human order only in its capacity of scavenger, a necessity of its biological situation which in itself must be seen as neutral or even innocent. Any sinister significance that the fly may create for us is entirely due to its crossing our own path: by means of the fly the human order is compromised. But it is also extended, until through a series of similar conversions and correspondences of image the buzz of the fly distends, both visually and metaphorically, the body of the girl into the world. Her degradation and nobility are in that image. Shall we call it the actual world?" [22]

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21 Ibid, p.146-7.
22 Ibid, p.158-9.

Here is a world that is real but is it fair to call it actual when the 'actual' has already an empirical connotation? Since any attempt to an univocal definition of poetry must commit us to a position which is mately untenable, we must conclude that actuality and poetry are res- ively and even reciprocally one. Out of the paradox of poetry and phi- phy comes a unity which is at the same time manifold and specific. The r of our time has been the emphasis upon one art to the ex clusion of the r. Grammar, philosophy and rhetoric must all blend together to "achieve namic and precarious unity of experience."

Tate makes the same attempt to describe the essence of the dramatic ination in his A Reading of Keats. Although the sensuousness of his ery would put Keats in the class of the empiricists, there is a dynamic ity which transcends the whole (the poem) in such a way that all the uous images are converted into a dramatic actuality which is permanent.

"The ambivalence of the nightingale symbol contains almost the whole substance of the poem: the bird, as bird, shares the mortality of the world; as symbol, it purports to transcend it."[23]

same sort of paradox occurs in Ode on a Grecian Urn where

"The poem is an emblem on one limit of our experience: the impossibi- lity of synthesizing, in the order of experience, the antinomy of the ideal and the real, and, although that antinomy strikes the human mind with a different force in different ages (Donne's dualism is not Keats'), it is sufficiently common to all men in all times to be understood."[24]

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23 Ibid, p.172.
24 Ibid, p.177.

"there was, to put it in the simplest language, a strong compulsion towards the realization of physical love, but he could not reconcile it with his idealization of the beloved."[25]

As one recreates in one's own imagination the subtle insights of Allen), one feels the struggle for a sound metaphysical basis for poetry. yet he is unable to state or describe the essence, the reality which the ment of the dramatic imagination reveals. He speaks of Yeats's poetry omantic because

"Yeats's doctrine of the conflict of opposites says nothing about the fundamental nature of reality; it is rather a dramatic framework through which is made visible the perpetual oscillation of man between extreme introspection and extreme loss of the self in the world of action." [26]

In he eludes the metaphysical essence which he seeks when he says that elements of poetry are combined as experience and experience means con- ct and conflict means drama. Dramatic experience is not logical, not egorical. It is not empirical nor sensuous. "Serious poetry deals with fundamental conflicts that cannot be logically resolved." Necessity is dramatically relevant, not the logically necessary as far as poetry concerned. But the reader is not clear as to the nature of the reality to ch the poetry is dramatically relevant.

We are aware of the process by which he might perceive the substance of lity when he speaks of Emily Dickinson mastering life by the rejection it. Over against nature symbolized by death, she sets the puritan theo- gy of redemption and immortality -- a clash of powerful opposites, a

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25 Ibid, p.183.
26 Ibid, p.222,

ion between abstraction and sensation the paradox of which reveals to
he true morality, the true reality.

"The two poles of the mind are not separately visible; we infer them from the lucid tension that may be most readily illustrated by polar activity. There is no thought as such at all; nor is there feeling; there is that unique focus of experience which is at once neither and both."[27]

e is a subtle movement of the poetic mind perceived but it is as though were indulging in the aestheticpleasure of the liturgy without the spiritual essence which is the mass. In speaking of the types of ination, he distinguishes the religious "which can mythologize indis-inately history, legend, trees, the sea, animal s, all being humanly natized, somehow converted to the nature of man." from the historical ch is the religious imagination manque -- an exercise of the myth-ing propensity of man within the restricted realm of historical event." tivism which is the truncation of the historical method, is just plain yday history. He is describing imagination in terms of society rather in terms of poetry at this point, but one feels the same strenuous ort objectify the knowing mind of the poet. How can the religious ination mythologize if there is no agent to perform the act and if the nt is present, then exactly what is the nature of the reality which he ipulates --- or dare we say --- imitates? He criticizes MacLeish because

"there is not one moment of action rendered objectively in the entire poem (Conquistador). There is constantly and solely the pattern of sensation that surrounded the moment of action -- the fringe of the physical shock and awareness that survive in memory."[28]

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27 Ibid, p.210.
28 Ibid, p.367.

Leish has not captured the essentially dramatic, the relevant qualities his experience: the implication is that he is not aware of reality.

In an evaluation of Stephen Spender's Poems, Tate criticizes Spender the translation of doctrine into metaphors. He attacks Spender for the scious attempt to blend belief as a statistical and sociological category h the arts. He singles out such passages as

> The architectural gold-leaved flower
> From people ordered like a single mind,
> I build.
>
> or
>
> . . . .larger than all the charcoaled batteries
> And imaged towers against the dying sky,
> Religion stands, the church blocking the sun.

"Such translation (of doctrine into metaphors) probably precedes(my italics) the creative moment, and the best poetry is probably written by men who are not even aware that it has taken place: the actual expression is the total thought (my italics)."

be seems here to be talking of the same metaphysical reality as Croce es when he speaks of the unity of Spirit of which the artistic object the expression. Just as Croce objects to any distinction between cons- ous form and poetic content, so Tate is anxious that the formal or philo- phical element never be separated from the charged dramatic quality of agination as it is manifested or "expressed" in the poem.

"If there is a single good dogma in poetic criticism it is possibly this: that no philosophy is good enough for a poet unless it is so seasoned in his experience that it has become, like the handling of the gravediggers' skulls, a property of easiness. It is not what a poet 'believes' (Mr. Richards' theory) but rather what total attitude he he takes towards all aspects of his conduct, that constitutes the 'content' side of the aesthetic problem." [29]

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29 Tate, Allen; The Hovering Fly and Other Essays, Cummington, Mass. ummington Press(Limited Edition), 1949, p.72.

K. Wimsatt, in his essay on "The Structure of the Concrete Universal"[29a] erves that Tate arrives at the concrete universal of the idealist in his empt to achieve poetical objectivity. Whereas most modern logicians ept the inverse variation of extension and intension -- the wider the one, shallower the other, Tate suggests that in some peculiar way the poem is erbal structure which has both a very wide extension and a very deep ension. At the same time that Tate has been speaking of the actual ex- ssion in a poem being the total thought, he alsossays that good poems vey "single emotions". The totality of the poet's subjective experience the specific poem. But like the Croceans, he denies the distinction be- en subjective and objective as the loss of the reality which the poem resents. He denies as does Croce that art involves concepts because intuition aims to express individuality. In Tate's terms the jargon intuition and expression is abandoned for dramatic imagination, the matically relevant.

In his essay on Longinus Tate displays his finest critical insights l at the same time his theory of poetry is most readily identifiable h from a historical as well as an aesthetic point of view. He centres discussion upon thetwo Greek words 'houpsos' and 'ekstasis', 'Ele- tion of Language' and 'transport' respectively, which words, he says, not be disentangled.

"They contain, in their interrelations, a version of a persistent biguity of critical reference which appeared with Aristotle, and had gorous life up to Coleridge (whith whom it comes back disguised), and w eggs on the edifying controversy of the contemporary English d American critics: Ransom, Cleanth Brooks, Read, Leavis, Richards, ckmur and Winters. Is Elevation an objective quality of the literary rk? Is Transport its subjective reference denoting the emotions of e reader -- or the 'hearer' as Longinus calls him --- as he

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29a Wimsatt, W.K., "The Structure of the Concrete Universal,"

receives the impact of Elevation? Does either term, Eleva tion or Transport, point to anything sufficiently objective to be isolated for critical discussion?" [30]

Tate attempts to show that Longinus' theory is unique and distinctive
›m that of the Classicists and from that of Aristotle in particular.
:fering from the Classical tradition, Longinus was able to write that the
ıction of the sublime was "not to persuade, but to entrance, like a flash
lightning." By insisting that the style is a compound of natural talent
i conscious method, Longinus

"claims for Thought and Diction (two of the nonstructural elements in Aristotle's analysis of tragedy, a degree of objectivity that Aristotle's rhetorical view of poetic language could not include." [31]

en Longinus tells us to speak at the right length and to the occasion,
are being asked to adapt form to subject and to relate the poem and the
rson to whom the poem is addressed. Tate notes that these relations
'right length' and 'occasion' are the same as Ransom's relation of
xture within a structure or Winters' relation of feeling to rational
ntext. When Longinus asks if there is an art of Elevation, he is really
king if there can be a criticism of convincing objectivity which approaches
.e literary work through its analysis of style and which arrives at its
rger aspects through that aperture. Whether or not we may call Tate an
›sthetic Idealist or not, we can certainly be sure that his theory is not
'istotelian in tone. Reality will likely be much closer to the concrete
iiversal than to any substantial "essence" which is specific but neither

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30 Ibid, p.84.
31 Ibid, p.85.

;ional nor sensuous. Tate says that Longinus' question, "Is there an ; of Elevation?" is the question of our time.

> "In asking it, are we not following Longinus rather than Aristotle? Aristotle began with the conspicuous "larger aspects" of a mature literary genre, Greek tragedy, and got around to the problems of poetic language only at the end, and as a rhetorician (except for one curious remark about metaphor) who offers us shrewd but merely schematic advice about the use of figures."32

The word 'techne' in Longinus means something similar to the dramatic gination in Tate. i.e. Longinus means both criticism and the art of the t. By making too sharp a distinction between the form and the feeling, her writers become coldly formal by aiming only at "the curious and the ificial" or they neglect form and as Longinus writes

> "fall into a maudlin mood and digress from their subject into their own tedious emotion. Thus they show bad form and leave, their audience unimpressed; necessarily, for they are in a state of rapture, and the audience is not."33

chne' is the "controlled awareness (to use Henry James's term) <u>through</u> guage of what can be made actual <u>in</u> language, resulting in a just, if redictable, proportion between what Longinus calls the 'emotion' and the bject'". We have two extremes, "the pride of intellect and the pride feeling, the pride of will and the pride of instinct." The history of imagination seems to be the pendulum between these extremes.

Tate stresses Longinus' statement that "Most important of all, we t learn from art the fact that some elements of style depend upon nature

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32 <u>Ibid</u>, p.87.
33 <u>Ibid</u>, p.88.

ne." Tate takes this passage paradoxically to mean

"we learn from the development of technique that stylistic autonomy is a delusion, because style comes into existence only as it discovers the subject; and conversely the subject exists only after it is formed by the style. No literary work is perfect, no subject perfectly formed. Style reveals that which is not style in the process of forming it. Style does not create the subject, it discovers it. The fusion of art and nature, of technique and subject, can never exceed the approximate; the margin of imperfection, of the unformed, is always there — nature is intractable to art, art unequal to nature. The converse of Longinus's aphorism will further elucidate it: we must learn from nature that some elements of subject matter, in a literary work, 'depend' upon art alone. There is a reciprocal relation, not an identity — not, certainly, the identity of form and content — a dynamic, shifting relation between technique and subject, and they reveal each other. This is my sense of Longinus's primary insight."[34]

There could be no better revelation of the metaphysical basis of Tate's ticism than is given in this passage. Here is the language of the aphysical idealist in the Hegel of "The Phenomenology of Mind" and in ce's theory that intuition is expression. In Hegel, the notion of the cept as concrete universal is the essence of his dialectical process. sciousness is both conscious of the object and of itself — "being-for-ther" and "being-for-itself". For Hegel, experience is a dialectical cess by which it becomes aware of an object in opposition to itself. As n as consciousness, which embraces both itself and its object, becomes ntical with its own essence, it will have attained to absolute knowledge. s each consciousness of self and of the object at the level of sense tainty cancels itself as soon as it achieves truth giving way to the her, more universal, yet it never loses its concreteness. The Absolute

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34 Ibid, p.90.

known not in and for itself alone but rather as the result of a develop-
at through the consciousness.

When Tate speaks of dramatic imagination, or describes the best poetry "the actual expression is the total thought" he is attempting to make the owing mind, the subjective mind, as dynamic and as objective as did Hegel l Croce. For Croce, the reality is spirit, out of which the pure concept forever springing. All logical activity presupposes intuitions. The ncept as a manifestation of spirit, as an aspect of reality, as a spiri-l activity, itself constitutes the object of Logic. The dynamic con-ot which lies at the core of Croce's Logic is the same kind of specific lity which is the objective core of a poem. And so Croce writes meaning-ly for the occasion of all aesthetic idealists when we read that

> "The concept then, is not representation, nor is it mixture and refinement of representation. It springs from representations, as something implicit in them that must become explicit; a necessity whose premises they provide, but which they are not in a position to satisfy, not even to affirm." 34b

both Hegel and Croce the concept has the character of expressivity moving tward from the real Spirit maintaining unity in diversity. On the one hand, ason must be taken as immediate being, immediate unity. On the other hand, is reality "must see itself as concrete reality, and find itself present objectively embodied form and in the shape of a 'thing'."[35] And so Tate tempts to avoid the reduction of the specific quality of thought or poetry an Absolute in which everything is related identically to everything else.

34b Croce, Benedetto, Logic as the Science of Pure Concept, pp.17-18.
35 Hegel G.F., The Phenomenology of Mind, p.282.

character of expressivity in Hegel and Croce is the same "dynamic, shif-
relation between technique and subject" revealing each other which
believes to be Longinus's primary insight. And this same insight is
core of Tate's dramatic imagination.

It is not surprising that Tate should be critical of Aristotle when
realizes his strong idealistic bias. His admiration for Longinus is
narized as follows:

> "I have shown, I hope, that his considerable originality consists in shifting the centre of critical interest, without rejecting it as an 'interest' from the genetic and moral judgement to the Aesthetic, from the subject matter and the psychology of the author to the language of the work." [36]

The title of Tate's latest volume of criticism "On the Limits of Poetry"
reminiscent of Lessing, of whom little is said in the book. If Lessing
self was responsible for interpreting Aristotle's poetic theory on the
actic level alone, Tate has perpetuated the same prejudice. He admires
ginus because this Ancient did not commit himself to a metaphysical
ition. Tate is trying to say that poetry "is neither religion nor
ial engineering". He would avoid the didacticism and scientism of pre-
us critics. The implication of his criticism of Aristotle reveals
arly that he is not aware of the aesthetic theory which is implicit in
Metaphysics. He criticizes Aristotle because he confined his remarks
the practice of poetry to tragedy, thus limiting the scope of his literary
erence. Whereas Aristotle's remarks on rhetoric are "shrewd but merely

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36 Tate, op.cit., p.95.

matic advice about the use of figures." Longinus surpassed Aristotle
is "awareness of literature at large which raises his theory of the
ation of language and subject to a higher degree of useful generality
n any literary theory before him had reached." [37]

Tate reveals his own awareness of Aristotle's genius when he speaks
some puzzlement of his theory of metaphor. The use of analogy in the
struction of the metaphor leads to metaphysical insights which the more
.ted rhetoric of a Longinus or a Tate will not reveal. Tate finds
totle's remarks on metaphor "curious" because he fails to relate the
ussion of metaphor to Aristotle's Metaphysics which provides the means
.nterpretation of Aristotle's meaning. Tate asserts that "metaphor was
ature of discourse to be described, not a metaphysical problem to be
stigated." It is because of this basic error that all Tate's cri-
.sm must inevitably lead to the very semantical reductionism which he
.ores in positivism. Reluctantly he admits of the existence of a total
.ity in a work which it is beyond the power of language to describe.
.s in this subtle area of intuition where one finds the dynamic quality which
ascends the language which the poet employs. Tate says that Aristotle's
.nition of a good metaphor as one which "implies an intuitive perception
he similarity in dissimilars" is very nearly the beginning and the end
is own inquiries into metaphor. But Tate feels that "the ancient inquiry
the structure of metaphor was less resourceful than ours, if not less
lligent." The implication of Tate's brief remarks seems to be that

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37 Ibid, p.91.

Greeks scarcely got beyond the physical analogy. Even Longinus has not caped this charge.

> "He shared Aristotle's cosmetic sense of the simple relation between word and thing; in a world of fixed forms, thing was unyielding; the word, like its object, retained a plastic visibility. With the Greeks the "transference" of "names" was limited to the surface designation, to the comparison of objects in the round, to sculpturesque analogy."

so by failing to see that the fourfold analogy which is the peculiar ucture of Aristotle's metaphor is also the key to his most profound aphysical insights, Tate makes the error of believing that "metaphor was eature of discourse to be described, not a metaphysical problem to be estigated." He sees only the physical level of meaning in metaphor and didactic level of meaning in Aristotle's theory of tragedy. He fails perceive the similarity, the unity in the dissimilar.

II - CLEANTH BROOKS

Although Brooks shares the same objectives as Allen Tate in his search a criterion of poetical objectivity, one can perceive certain differ- es in temperament which are significant. Both critics condemned the antics. Whereas Tate criticized them for identifying the p oetic ex- ence with the assertion of the will (without the systematic method of scientist who also seeks to express his will), Brooks criticizes the antics for being anti-intellectual. The Romantics distrusted the in- ect as inimical to deep emotion. They would have criticized Donne or rell for sacrificing the intensity of a passionate experience to an ac- ate and therefore dry, logical and precise image. Brooks feels that

h criticism is shortsighted however. It neglects to consider the figure relation to the total context, and fails to consider that a figure may used for a contrast as well as a comparison."[38] Moreover, he adds that Marvell's poem Definition of Love:

> As lines so Loves oblique may well
> Themselves in every Angle greet:
> But ours so truly Parallel,
> Though infinite can never meet.

e geometrical figure gives a sense of logical inevitability and finality a relationship which is usually considered irrational --- a sense of even hematical order to a relationship usually cohsidered chaotic."[39] The t of the validity of any figure should not be the subjective feeling which stirs in us nor the rationality of such a figure. "our only test for validity of any figure must be an appeal to the whole context in which occurs: Does it contribute to the total effect or not?"[40] Tate would ee absolutely with the principle emunciated here but one would feel s sharply the exactness of the point and would be made more aware of spiritual or dramatic quality of what Brooks has called "the total fect".

Both Tate and Brooks will agree that the objectivity of poetry will found in the language of the poem rather than in any intellectual or sen- us quality of the imagery. Tate differs from Brooks in his notion of quality of the language as expressive of dramatic imagination. Brooks

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38 Brooks, Cleanth: Modern Poetry and the Tradition, Editions Poetry, ndon Ltd., 1948, p.24.
39 Ibid, p.24.
40 Ibid, p.26.

uch more concerned with the preciseness and exactness of the imagery
.. Instead of discussing expression, he talks of wit and paradox. He
uch more certain that the moderns are related to the Seventeenth Century
heir conception of the function of metaphor. The sense of the poetic
:ess is much more definitive even if he arrives at the same conclusions
:ate about the unity of the total effect or the necessity for a dramatic
lopment of "the poet's fervour". In a poem like Carew's "Ask Me No More,

"The test of his sincerity is to be measured by the integrity of tone which the poet achieves, and this in turn, as the poem indicates, may be achieved by ingenuity, as well as simplicity -- by a sense of consciously artificial statement as well as by a sense of natural statement."[41]

lyric, to be a good lyric must "be tender, and at the same time, alert
aware intellectually." Such an attitude is complex and mature but not
:ssarily self-contradictory. "The tenderness is achieved, not in spite
:he wit, but through it."[42] When Coleridge spoke of the necessity for
:teady fervour of the mind. . . filled with the grandeur of its subject",
:ks insists that "identificiation of depth of sincerity with a steady
rour leaves out of account the possibility of dramatic development of
fervour."[43]

It is Brooks's contention that metaphor is essentially linked with
urdity, even in common expressions. "For the imaginative act of fusing of
t in ordinary experience is inharmonious, the Hobbesian poet tended to
stitute the rational act of sorting out the discordant and removing it
m the context."[44] But it was by such an aesthetic theory that the dramatic

41 Ibid, p.32.
42 Ibid, p.33.
43 Ibid, p.35.
44 Ibid, p.43.

ities of human feeling and experience were reduced to sentimentalities Brooks continues "the irony of a poem as a whole is a rich and complex ding of pity and laughter in which the attitude of the reader, far being simplified, is developed and complicated." The true aim of the should be "to fuse the conflicting elements in a harmonious whole" not to simplify. Concluding a chapter on the relation of wit to high ousness, he writes "in the end, the only poetry which possesses high ousness is the poetry of wit."

It is important to note Brooks's source for wit in the poet as maker. is his making, his imagination that gives the poem its poetic quality, some intrinsic quality (beauty or truth) of the materials with which uilds his poem."[45] The objective quality of the poet's mind is to ound only in terms of paradox. The Romantic poets had depended upon er, surprise, the charm of novelty to things, etc. for their sense of dox. But Brooks insists that true paradoxes "spring from the very re of the poet's language." Whereas

"the tendency of science is necessarily to stabilize terms, to freeze them into strict denotations; the poet's tendency is by contrast descriptive. The terms are continually modifying each other, and thus violating their dictionary meanings."[46]

ks emphasizes the transcendental qualities of paradox. Without paradox, h its twin concomitants of irony and wonder, the matter of Donne's poem Canonization unravels into 'facts', biological, sociological and eco- c."[47]

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45 Ibid, p.51.
46 Brooks, Cleanth: The Well-Wrought Urn. Studies in the Structure of oetry, Dennis, Dobson Ltd., London, 1949, p.8.
47 Ibid, p.16.

Brooks's ideal is the symbolist poet, best represented by W. B. Yeats. symbolist poet is neither obscure nor escapist.

"The symbolist poet refuses to sacrifice the subtlety and complexity of his total vision of reality. Such a poetry will undoubtedly result in a limitation of the audience, but the limitation will be an unfortunate necessity conditioned by the nature of the poetry, not the effect of the poet's personal snobbery."[48]

Yeats's poem Sailing to Byzantium, the logical unity of the central theme brought into larger imaginative unity.

Brooks's enthusiasm for Yeats is greater than Tate's. Whereas Tate ls that Yeats's poetry is ultimately romantic, Brooks seizes upon Yeats's ction to science as the keystone of modern poetry. Yeats writes in the roduction to A Vision, "I wished for a system of thought that would leave imagination free to create as it chose and yet make all it created, or ld create, part of the one history, and that the soul's". Or as Eliot ht have said, "Yeats set out to build a system of references which would ow for a unification of sensibility."[49]

The appeal of symbolism for Brooks as for Yeats is the means it provides the attainment of a tremendous richness and coherency which is imaginative her than logical.

"Yeats's symbols, though they are interwoven into complex organizations, never give way to a merely allegorical construct; the proof that they do not lies in the fact that on their literal level they tend to take the reader in the direction of the system."[50]

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48 Brooks, Cleanth, Modern Poetry and the Tradition, p.67.
49 Ibid, p.173.
50 Ibid, P.191.

roughout Brooks's essay on Yeats, one finds constant approval of Yeats's tempt to use concrete symbols rather than abstract ideas.

> "The system, to put it concisely, allows Yeats to see the world as a great drama, predictable in its larger aspects (so that the poet is not lost in a welter of confusion), but in a pattern which allows for the complexity of experience and the apparent contradictions of experience (so that the poet is not tempted to oversimplify."[51]

te had been critical of Yeats's attempt to obtain dynamic effects by the nflict of opposites because it said

> "nothing about the fundamental nature of reality; it is rather a dramatic framework through which is made visible the perpetual oscillation of man between extreme introspection and extreme loss of the self in the world of action."[52]

ooks in following Yeats seems to lack the same perception into reality. ereas Tate had tried to visualize a reality of spirit to which language s dramatically relevant, Brooks defines drama in terms of a system in which continually repeated victory over the contradictory is recognized, and rough the recognition, resolved into agreement."[53] Just as Yeats had ught a philosophy that was at once "logical and boundless" so Brooks uld resolve the paradoxes of truth in poetry.

> "Had Yeats merely been content to indulge himself in fairy tales and random superstitions, he would never, presumably, have bothered with a system of beliefs at all. A philosophy which was merely 'boundless' would allow a person to live in a pleasant enough anarchy. The "logical" quality demands a systematisation, though in Yeats's case one which would not violate and oversimplify experience."[54]

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51 Ibid, p.196.
52 Tate, Allen, The Limits of Poetry, p.222.
53 Brooks, Cleanth, Modern Poetry and the Tradition, p.196.
54 Ibid, p.173.

But elsewhere, Brooks has strongly emphasized his affinity with the
llectual side of the Metaphysical poets. He has defined the poetry of
as the dramatization of the lyric, herein placing the emphasis on wit
ıer than on the lyrical quality per se. There is a rigour of logic in
concept of a drama that continually conquers the dissimilars into
;y which is more reminiscent of the inflexibility of Hegel's Logic than it
)f the dynamic movement of The Phenomenology of Mind. Tate had used
language of symbolism to illustrate the operation of the dramatic ima-
ıtion in Dostoyevsky's The Idiot. The resolution of the plot "is managed
ıeans of that most difficult of all feats, a narrow scene brought close up,
hich the 'meaning' of the action is conveyed in a dramatic visualization
.mmediate and intense that it creates its own symbolism" —— the fly.
) the emphasis is on the pictorial quality of the symbolism. One feels
) concreteness in the symbols which Tate uses than in those which Brooks
ı. His description of the dramatic quality of Milton's Lucifer shows
:eater element of abstraction than is shown by Tate in his treatment
;he hovering fly. The character of Lucifer

> "is dramatic in that it represents a union of the subjective and objective: the poet explores experience by separating his symbols from a personal allegiance to his own ego, and while infusing them with an active vitality, allows them to work out in accordance with their own logic and develop in a life of their own."[55]

Brooks of course denies repeatedly that logic can capture the poetic
lity of imagination. Concerning paradox as a means of achieving poetic
ty, he says

55Ibid, p.211.

" to assimilate incongruities requires, of course, a rather vigorous act of synthesis. Such an act finds no counterpart in science, and it is definitely distasteful to a mind impregnated with science. Science, on principle, cannot tolerate the incongruous. Its method is analysis by which it attempts to reduce its world to congruities by an act of abstraction."[56]

as one recalls the drama which demands a continually repeated victory over contradictory, there is an inevitability which is not only rigorous but destructive of lyric quality. As one reads Brooks's ingenious emen- ons of poetry in terms of his critical theory of paradox, or wit, one s that the spiritual unity, the expressivity is giving way to a more exible kind of logic. Let us admit that the epitaph of Gray's Elegy is nctional part of the total structure of the poem but there will be who will feel that the ingenious attempt of Brooks to relate almost every e to the totality of the structure in a specific manner may be under- ng more than the frail structure of the poem will stand. It is possible urn the searching light of analysis upon the unity of a poetic experience he point where the lyrical vision is blinded by the glare.

There is more of a metaphysical quality in Brooks's discussion of cture in the Well Wrought Urn.

"The structure meant is a structure of meanings, evaluations, and interpretations; and the principle of unity which informs it seems to be one of balancing and harmonizing connotations, attitudes, and meanings. But even here one needs to make important qualifications: the principle is not one which involves the arrangement of the various elements into homogeneous groupings, pairing like with like. It unites the like with the unlike. It does not unite them, however, by the simple process of allowing one connotation to cancel out another nor does it reduce the contradictory attitudes to harmony by a process of subtraction. The

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56 Ibid, p.201.

unity is not a unity of the sort to be achieved by the reduction and simplification appropriate to an algebraic formula. It is a positive unity, not a negative: it represents not a residue but an achieved harmony."[57]

ks disclaims paraphrase as a means of rendering the meaning of a poem. efer the structure of the poem to what is finally a paraphrase of the : is to refer it to something outside the poem.[58] To take paraphrase he criterion of meaning in a poem is to misconceive the function of phor and metre. One can perceive the emphasis here on the internality tructure as a pattern of resolved stresses within the whole context he poem. For all his disclaimers about the logical rigour of his de- tion of the function of poetry, one feels again the lack of metaphysical ort for an otherwise logical structure. Without the intuition of a rete, non-logical, non-sensuous reality, all Brooks protests seem very nvincing. Where is the sense of metaphysical reality in the following age?

"But to deny that the coherence of a poem is reflected in a logical paraphrase of its 'real meaning' is not, of course, to deny coherence to poetry; it is rather to assert that its coherence is to be sought elsewhere. The characteristic unity of a poem (even of those poems which may accidentally possess a logical unity as well as this poetic unity) lies in the unification of attitudes into a hierarchy subordinated to a total and governing attitude. In the unified poem, the poet has 'come to terms' with his experience. The poem does not merely eventuate in a logical conclusion. The conclusion of the poem is the working out of the various tensions -- set up by whatever means -- by propositions, metaphors, symbols. The unity is achieved by a dramatic process, not a logical; it represents an equilibrium of forces, not a formula. It is 'proved' as a dramatic conclusion is proved: by its ability to resolve the conflicts which have been accepted as the <u>données</u> of the drama."[59]

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57 Brooks, Cleanth, <u>The Well Wrought Urn</u>. P. 179.
58 <u>Ibid</u>, p.184.
59 <u>Ibid</u>, p.189.

w these "données" are not so dynamically qualitative as Bergson's
onnées" because Brooks is much more concerned with the movement of the
ad than he is with any Lamarckian dynamism of nature such as Bergson
l in mind. Both share in common an anti-metaphysical attitude but
:gson's is inevitably sensuous in its orientation while that of Brooks is
tional. What Brooks fails to see in saying that 'conflicts' are the
nees is that dynamism is not enough. Tate, for all his anti-metaphysical
:s, was aware of the need for some relevancy for his dramatic imagination
:n if he did not state the nature or the metaphysical element to which
.s dynamic quality was related. By failing to face this issue, Brooks
forced into the camp of the monists and must lose the dynamic quality
.ch he would preserve.

Another characteristic of the idealist is to be seen in the strong
jective element in Brooks' theory of poetic creation. Like Tate the
bility to convey in any objective sense the awareness of reality forces
to place greater emphasis upon the creative power of the poet. In his
inition of the metaphor, for example, he is careful enough to avoid the
or of the Romanticist or the sentimentalist in defining the metaphor as
embellishment. The metaphor is an aid to expression in the sense that
is an extension of the known to the unknown, of a familiar term to an
amiliar fact or situation. As previously noted, the metaphor should
bine both the similar and the dissimilar in a central consistency.

"Metaphor is not a mere decoration. It is not an illustration --- not apoint-to-point analogical likeness. It is not an alternate naming of the thing which is chosen because it is 'prettier' or 'simpler'. Rather it is our great instrument for interpreting the thing in question.

> Metaphors are new namings which seize upon the thing and interpret it lovingly, reverently, contemptuously, mockingly, coldly, or warmly as the skilful author may desire. The aptness of a comparison, therefore, cannot be determined in islotation. The author's larger purpose, and the whole context in which the comparison occurs, must be taken into account." [60]

It will be noted that throughout this description of the function of the metaphor, it is essentially a tool of the author to project his own response to his own environment. It is an instrument of interpretation. If "metaphor is ultimately the power (my italics) to take a given and known term and bend it to a fresher and richer use", then its function in extending the imagination can be nothing else than the extension of the poet's mind to a world mind which includes every detail in a sort of mind context, a context in which everything is related to everything else.

It is difficult to distinguish in Brooks whether the psychology of poetic creation is individualistic or monistic. In the fashion of Hegel, Brooks does try to bring about a dynamic interaction between the poet's mind and the structure he creates. The structure is the reflection of a dramatic conflict in the poet's mind as he sets about the task of projecting to his reader the essence of his experience. As he sets about his job, the poet employs various devices such as metrical pattern and metaphor. The apparent irrelevancies do become relevant "when we realize that they function in a good poem to modify, qualify, and develop the total attitude which we are to take in coming to terms with the total situation. Just as the poet's attitude must come to terms with a situation, so must the reader develop

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60 Brooks, C., and Warren, R.P., Modern Rhetoric, p.429.

total attitude to come to terms with the total situation. By dramatizing
s oneness of experience, the poet must at the same time pay tribute to
s diversity. To achieve this feat, the poet must resort to paradox and to
ony. The poet is trying to give us "an insight which preserves the unity
experience and which, at its higher and more serious levels, triumphs
er the apparently contradictory and conflicting elements of experience by
lfying them into a new pattern."[61]

This movement of the mind towards poetic creation is not unlike Hegel's
scription of the operation of the imagination. The objective element in
etry is simply an internal representation, "the images aroused to life
the arbitrary signs of language." The subject matter which the poet
s to hand must be seized by the artistic imagination which operates quite
fferently than does the act of thought in a logical process.

> "This mode of activity is something quite other. (1) The subject is not conceived under the form of rational or speculative thought, nor under that of sentiment inexpressible by words, nor with the precision of sensible objects. (2) The subject in entering into the domain of the artistic imagination puts off whatever particularities and accidents may destroy its unity, rejects all surplusage, and appears as an organic whole, which, though having the look of close relation between the parts, is yet free from that kind of mutual dependence which characterizes the prosaic reality. Its unity is entirely ideal."[62]

other words, the situation is the same as it is in Brooks, the experience
the poet in a particular context. The imagination seizes upon the material
pplied by memory. The imaginative manner of dealing with this same materi-
involves a new kind of activity, the impartation to this aggregation of

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61 Brooks, Cleanth, The Well Wrought Urn, p.195.
62 Hegel, G. F., Aesthetics, p.264. ed.J.S. Kedney, Chicago, S.C.Griggs
Co., 1885.

soul's own unity, thus organising it and giving it objective unity. In .s we have a completer fusion of the subjective and objective elements, in .ch the soul thus determined becomes its own object."[63] There is the ıe attempt here to capture an essence in poetry which is neither rational sensuous. The poet can never analyze his materials and organize them exactly as does the scientist.

> "When we consider the statement immersed in the poem, it presents itself to us, like the stick immersed ih the pool of water, warped and bent. Indeed, whatever the statement, it will always show itself as deflected away from a positive, straightforward formulation."[64]

R. S. Crane, in a recent article published in Critics and Criticism the Chicago Critics, has attacked Brooks vigorously for what he calls s monistic reduction of critical concepts. Brooks, he says, has reduced agination in Coleridge's sense to one principle of structural irony or radox. Crane spends a good deal of time showing how Brooks has failed to rry off a critical enterprise which was attempted and done much better by leridge. From the somewhat elaborate and sophisticated scheme of Coleridge ooks is said to have reduced the poetic process to two principles, the conciliation of opposite and discordant qualities, and the discussion of etry as the contrary of science. Crane rightly points out that Brooks s lost the metaphysical sense of Coleridge's theory by making "poetry" differentia of poems rather than a criterion of their value. "The ideal perfection to which they, or passages in them, are to be referred." Coleridge, poems are said to approach perfection

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63 Ibid, p.265, Note by Kedney.
64 Brooks, Cleanth, The Well Wrought Urn, p.193.

"whenever the poetic genius, or imagination, put in action by the will and understanding and retained under their control, succeeds in reconciling or reducing to unity any of the various "opposite or discordant qualities" involved in the substance or the diction of a poem, and they depart from perfection in proportion as such unification is not achieved."[65]

Crane also observes that Brooks is anxious to avoid any reference of .e poems or poetic values to the mental powers of the poet and their ierations. If he did, he would no longer be able to distinguish the struc- ire of poems from that which produces works of science, philosophy, theo- gy or rhetoric. In his attempt to avoid subjectivity, he has forsaken ie elaborate psychology of Coleridge and has placed the cause of poetic ructure in the poet's language instead.

"The causal efficacy thus runs, not from the poet to the poem, but from 'the language of poetry' to the ironical or paradoxical 'structure of poetry' which the poet's choice of this kind of language, instead of that of science, makes inevitable. But 'the language of poetry' is the language of paradox'; in other words, the two terms signify the same thing, or at most different degrees of the same thing; and thus all the multiple principles which Coleridge found it necessary to invoke -- in proper subordination -- for the adequate criticism of poetry are collapsed into one -- the single principle, essentially linguistic in its formulation, which is designated as 'irony' or paradox'. Brooks, in short, is a complete monist, and, given his choice of language rather than subject matter or the poet or the ends of poetry as the unique basis of all his explanations, a materialistic monist at that."[66]

This critique is penetrating but it depends too much upon the unesta- lished fact that Brooks has deliberately derived his theory of paradox rom Coleridge. It is easy to victimize Brooks's theory if one compares t to the achievement of a critic whose work has stood the test of time. rane has overlooked largely the effectiveness of Brooks's analyses based

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65 Coleridge, S.T., Biographia Literaria, p.91.
66 Ibid, pp.92-3.

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on his theory. He mentions disparagingly Brooks's treatment of Gray's egy but he overlooks the brilliant analyses of such poems as Yeats's iling to Byzantium or the effective interpretation of the symbolism of he naked babe and the cloak of manliness" in Macbeth. It seems much more ir to Brooks to examine his criticism as an example of metaphysical idea- sm. Brooks is the type, not just of Coleridge but of the whole school idealists who have written since Classical times. The difficulties of s theory come not so much from his failure to emulate Coleridge success- lly. He fails for the same reasons that Coleridge himself, Hegel, Croce d all the other idealists have failed. Because the idealist has no be- ef in the independent existence of the external world, he has no diffi- lty in making the world of appearances conform to the whims of his fancy. ce the theory of imitation in its metaphysical sense has been forsaken, will be difficult to preserve poetry from absorption into the solip- stic pleasure of the poet's palace of art or into the nameless unity of e rational Absolute which is the death of art as Hegel too well knew.

Crane is right, however, when he says that Brooks has begun to theorize out poetry with only one of the several internal causes of poems as an solute norm. He should have started, says Crane "with concrete poetic cles of various kinds, the parts of which, with their possible inter- lationships, can be inferred as consequences from inductively established inciples."[67] If Brooks had started with the poem as a "simulacrum of ality" rather than with the language of paradox, he would likely have tten further. Crane is referring here to a significant passage in The

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67 Ibid, p.105.

ll Wrought Urn in the chapter called "The Heresy of Paraphrase" in which rooks almost seems to betray the point of view he has sought to establish. till contrasting vigorously the operation of the will in science with that f the will in poetry, Brooks writes:

> "It is not enough for the poet to analyse his experience as the scientist does, breaking it up into parts, distinguishing part from part, classifying the various parts. His task is finally to unify experience. He must return to us the unity of the experience itself as man knows it in his own experience. The poem, if it be a true poem is a simulacrum of reality — in this sense, at least, it is an 'imitation' — by being an experience rather than any mere statement about experience or any mere abstraction from experience."[68]

But it would be wishful thinking on the part of Crane if he hoped that rooks meant 'imitation' in the sense that Aristotle did. It is an imiation only in the sense that it is a reflection of the unity of a spiriual reality. This unity is the unity of poetic thinking and not of speulative thinking.

> "Both speculative and poetic thinking, as we have said, coordinate, and demand unity; but the one deals with ideas and relations, the other with the concrete manifestations of the same, and feels as the first does not, the correspondence of all the elements of absolute being, and thus makes a completer synthesis, which appeals not to the cool reason only, but to the entire sum of the soul's activities."[69]

he word "imitation" in Brooks is as much a paradoxical term as is any other echnical term he uses. The poem is as much an imitation of the poet's ind as it is the type of all objectified consciousness. Regardless of aradoxical language or the structure of language, poetry and the poetic

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68 Brooks, Cleanth, The Well Wrought Urn, p.68.
69 Hegel, G. F., Aesthetics, p.267, ed.Kedney, op.cit.

ocess are initiated in the poet's mind. Wit makes poetry dependent on

ıe poet as maker.

"It is his making, his imagination that gives the poem its poetic quality, not some intrinsic quality (beauty or truth) of the materials with which he builds his poem." [70]

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70 Brooks, Cleanth, Modern Poetry and the Tradition, p.51.

CHAPTER V

KENNETH BURKE: THE IRONY OF SYNECDOCHE

For us
Thy name a Great Synecdoche,
Thy works a Grand Tautology.[1]
Burke: "Dialectician's Hymn"

I - FORM AND ACTION IN THE POETIC PROCESS

"The titular word for our own method is 'dramatism', since it invites one to consider the matter of motives in a perspective that, being developed from the analysis of drama, treats language and thought primarily as modes of action." [2]

ıe irony of Burke's philosophical theme is summed up in his key term iramatism". Etymologically the word attempts to blend two elements which ıst forever contradict one another. If "drama" means action as the ynamic principle, the suffix "ism" implies "system" or formal order which ıevitably moves in the direction of a static principle. On the whole, ıe work of Kenneth Burke is a highly stimulating and creative effort ɔ solve the eternal problem of philosophical idealism: how can the ıdividual will remain free and yet enjoy the harmony which participation ı an eternal formal unity of Spirit will provide? Burke's study of human ɔtion comes late in the history of philosophy and the dynamic quality of ıs work lies in his attempt to synthesize the most vital elements of western ıought from Hegel to the present day.

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1 Burke, Kenneth, The Philosophy of Literary Form, Baton Rouge, ɔuisiana State University Press, 1941, p.450.

2 Burke, Kenneth, A Grammar of Motives, N.Y., Prentice-Hall, 1945, p.xxii.

Karl Marx [2a] had criticized his master Hegel for the direction of all ght towards formal abstraction. Employing the same dialectic he aimed to turn l upside down and completely embody the dialectic within the context of n history. The dialectic became the class struggle and the Absolute be- the new order of the Workers of the World victoriously united over the body of capitalism.

But Marx's dialectical materialism was based on a destructive principle. ieth Burke sees the drama of human action on a broader scale. Consistent the Platonic theme he imagines a pre-existent harmony or state of peration. He shares Marx's contempt for mystical or spiritual unity and fines the scope of his dramatism to the field of human action. His al sense is highly developed and consistent with his aim to centralize dialectic within the human drama, he speaks of

> "that ultimate <u>disease</u> of cooperation: war. (You will understand war much better if you think of it, not simply as strife come to a head, but rather as a disease, or perversion of communion. Modern war characteristically requires a myriad of constructive acts for each destructive one; before each culminating blast there must be a vast network of interlocking operations, directed communally." 3

so the theme of <u>A Grammar of Motives</u> is "ad bellum purificandum". The gy of economics, of politics, of poetry, of philosophy, of religion, ieed of the whole field of human action is reduced to the context of the ern Barnyard in which all human events take place.

2a Marx, Karl, <u>Capital</u>, Chicago, Chas. H. Kerr and Co., 1906, Preface.
3 Burke, Kenneth, <u>A Rhetoric of Motives</u>, New York, Prentice-Hall, 50, p.22.

But if Burke's enterprise assumes the proportions of an idealistic
rstem, he urges that

> "it is not our purpose to import dialectical and metaphysical concerns into a subject that might otherwise be free of them. On the contrary, we hope to make clear the way in which dialectical and metaphysical issues <u>necessarily</u> figure in the subject of motivation. Our speculations, as we interpret them, should show that the subject of motivation is a philosophic one, not ultimately to be solved in terms of empirical science." [4]

t is in <u>the subject</u> of motivation, the self, the individual will, that
urke is interested. Although Burke's dramatism moves inevitably towards
system of cooperation, he tries at the same time to convince the reader
f the significance of the creative will as the source of human action
n this system. Likewise, within the context of literary criticism he writes
hat "artistic truth is the externalization of taste" and by such a defini-
ion of artistic truth he places the main emphasis upon the role of the
gent in the artistic process.

If dramatism is to function, the initial agent must act in terms of
ome context which in turn may have provided the motivation for his action.
n speaking of Shakespeare's Hamlet, Burke shows how psychology and artistic
'orm interact with one another. In the fourth scene of the first act,

> "the psychology here is not the psychology of the <u>hero</u>, but the psychology of the <u>audience</u>. And by that distinction, form would be the psychology of the audience. Or, seen from another angle, form is the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite." [5]

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4 Burke, Kenneth, <u>A Grammar of Motives</u>, p.xxiii.
5 Burke, Kenneth, <u>Counterstatement</u>, N.Y., Harcourt Brace and Co., 1931, p.40.

ome incidents are purely the psychology of information such as Hamlet's dvice to the players while Antony's instigation of the Roman mob to avenge he death of Caesar illustrates the dramatic psychology of form which timulates an audience. "The drama more than any other form, must never ose sight of its audience". [6] Here the artist has created a form which timulates others to action. The play is formal in an aesthetic sense and et it has the power from its author's creative mind to inspire specific ction in others.

In order to externalize taste, the basic forms of the human mind crescendo, contrast, comparison, and so on) must be experienced emotionally nd "singularized into an example , an example which will be chosen by the rtist from among his emotional and environmental experiences." [7] As the rtist proceeds to express his emotion, a certain counter-theme is called p. "While the originating emotion is still in ferment, the artist is concerned at the same time with impersonal mechanical processes."[8] It is Burke's intention to shift the emphasis from the dichotomy of form and action to the dynamic and reciprocal interaction, of both.

But the question now arises: how does the artist succeed in objectifying his experiences? Burke says that the artist begins with his emotion. He translates this emotion into a mechanism for arousing emotion in others and thus his interest in his own emotion is transcended into his interest in the treatment of his experience.

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6 Ibid, p.48.
7 Ibid, p.62-3.
8 Ibid, p.68.

"The poet steps forth, and his first step is the translation of his original mood into a symbol. So quickly has the mood become something else, no longer occupying the whole of the artist's attention, but serving rather as a mere indicator of direction, a principle of ferment. We may imagine the poet to suffer under a feeling of inferiority, to suffer sullenly and mutely until, being an artist, he spontaneously generates a symbol to externalize this suffering."[9]

Consistent with what he will later call dramatistic, Burke's idea of orm is dynamic from the beginning. "A work has form in so far as one rt of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by e sequence."[10] The movement of form toward the completeness of an tistic object takes five steps. The progression is syllogistic, moving tep by step through a logical series. Qualitative progression is more ibtle, e.g. as Macbeth's murder of Duncan precedes his own death; its nticipatory nature is not so pronounced. Repetitive form is the consistent aintaining of a principle under new guises. Conventional form involves o some degree the appeal of form as form while minor form as the existence f a smaller plot within the larger plot. "Perhaps the lines in Othello, eginning 'Soft you, a word or two before you go,' and ending 'seized by he throat the uncircumcised dog and smote him thus (stabs himself)."[11] ell exemplify the vigorous presence of all five aspects of form, as this uicide is the logical outcome of Othello's predicament (syllogistic pro- ression); the speech has about it that impetuosity and picturesqueness e have learned to associate with Othello (repetitive form); it is very ecidedly a conclusion (conventional form), and in its development it is tiny plot in itself. (minor form)"[12]

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9 Ibid, p.70-71.
10 Ibid, p.157.
11 Shakespeare, William, Othello, Act V, Scene 2.
12 Burke, Kenneth, Counterstatement, p.163.

Burke says this formal process is dynamic and yet one feels from this description that the self has no other choice than to submit to the compulsive pressure of this formal progression.

In addition to the progressive or teleological movement of form towards unity, Burke says that form is not exclusively aesthetic. Artistic forms embodied in the context of the artist's experience parallel processes which characterize his experiences outside of art. Individuated within the context of an artistic form however, this experience becomes specific in words. "The symbol is the verbal parallel to a pattern of experience."[13] Symbols are the means by which the artist forces patterns of experience upon an audience. As symbols schematize a situation

> "the schematizing is done not by abstraction, as in science, but by idealization, by presenting in a 'pure' or consistent manner some situation which, as it appears among the contingencies of real life, is less effectively coordinated; the idealization is the elimination of irrelevancies."[14]

By means of symbols, the perceiver becomes one with the artist, both sacrificing their own emotional experience to the formal quality of the work of art. Symbols help us to accept situations which in real life we may not be able to accept. e.g. the existence of a certain danger which we had emotionally suppressed. Symbols range between two extremes of power and complexity.

> "A symbol is 'powerful' in proportion as it limits its ramifications to a strict reinforcement of the poet's underlying pattern (as in the unified effect of a story by Poe, or in a poem such as Keats's Ode

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13 Ibid, p.193.
14 Ibid, p.195.

to a Nightingale) A symbol is 'complex' in proportion as its ramifications follow the 'logic' of a symbo rather than the emotions of the underlying pattern."[15]

"Eloquence is a frequency of Symbolic and formal effects. One work is ›re eloquent than another if it contains Symbolic and formal charges in ›eater profusion."[16] Eloquence is not a means of helping us to live our lves on paper but rather it is a means of expressing or converting life ıto its richest verbal equivalent. This is nota semantical or positiistic representation of human experience which Burke has in mind. Indeed e is more concerned with how effects are produced rather than with what ffects should be produced. But whatever effect the artist may desire, urke says "he can in all humility be assured that they are "natural" since is desire could not possibly be anything other than natural; and if he finds he present categorical expectancies obstructive to his purposes, he may e justified in violating these expectancies and in allowing his procedures o be viewed as an oddity, as peripheral, on the chance that other men ay eventually join him and by their convergence make such procedures the orm."[17]

The difficulty throughout this account of the poetic process seems ›o lie in the conflict of form as a specific principle and action as a levelopmental principle. Burke's desire is that the work of art shall ›e specific and unique in its internal structure but he does not wish to sacrifice the dynamic action of the poetic process itself. His account

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15 Ibid, p.202.
16 Ibid, p.209.
17 Ibid, p.268.

f the scene from Othello in terms of the five steps of formal development s too subtly logical in its analysis and one feels that the simple and irect dramatic experience is frozen by the rigidity of his concepts. This roblem becomes magnified in some of his later work and we shall leave the ull discussion of it until a later stage of this essay.

For all his concern with form and structure, Burke has said that the ffects which the artist desires are natural i.e. they are part of the rtist's experience of the sociological, psychological and physiological nvironment in which he lives and moves and has his being. Indeed the norm f art itself would seem to depend upon the public approval of his techniques. n the relevant passage just quoted Burke speaks of the artist deviating rom "the present categorical expectancies". Now if the convergence of ther men's opinions can establish the artist's procedure as the norm, then he customary patterns can scarcely be "categorical".

II - BURKE'S DEBT TO MEAD'S SOCIAL BEHAVIORISM

In his concern for the dynamic interaction of the artist in society Burke rejects more basic metaphysical considerations in favour of the more immediate process of the individual as a function of society and vice versa. If Burke sounds like an idealist, he also sounds like a pragmatist in his concern for the principle of action or as Geroge Herbert Mead calls it, "the philosophy of the Act". In order to comprehend the pragmatic element of Burke's dramatism, some salient points from Mead's philosophy must be made. It was one of the great contributions of George Herbert Mead to modern thought when he rejected the hopeless solipsism of Watsonian behaviourism in favour of a more dynamic social behaviorism.

hat I wanted to bring out is that the approach to psychological theory
om the standpoint of the organism must inevitably be through an
phasis upon conduct, upon the dynamic rather than the static." 18

rue pragmatist he disclaimed all concern or interest in systems as

behaviouristic psychology represents a definite tendency rather
an a system, a tendency to state as far as possible the conditions
der which the experience of the individual arises." 19

s he rejected a study of systems in favour of a study of process

rejected a study of consiousness in terms of any physiological or

al origins.

'sychology is not something that deals with consiousness; psychology
eals with the experience of the individual in its relation to the
onditions under which the experience goes on. It is social psychology
here the conditions are social ones. It is behaviouristic where the
pproach to experience is made through conduct." 20

Against this dual background of Mead's dynamic interactionism and
s passionately categorical teleology, Burke attempts to build a
which places aesthetics in the context of social experience. All
action is social ranging from the biological, through the sociolo-
and psychological to the intellectual level. The basic poetic
ory in his Attitudes towards History is the epic, a form which en-
others to be vicariously heroic. The epic, he says is "a typical
of symbolic adjustment under primitive conditions." 21 It is the
of man's individual adjustment to his social environment.

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18 Mead, George Herbert, Mind, Self and Society, University of Chicago Press,
, p.24.
19 Ibid, p.38.
20 Ibid, p.40-41.
21 Burke, Kenneth, Attitudes toward History, New York, The New Republic,
, vol.1, p.42.

lead states that

the aesthetic appreciation of the works of great artists, what we doing is capturing values of enjoyment there, which fill out and erpret our own interests in living and doing. They have a permanent value because they are the language of delight into which can translate the meaning of their own existence." 22

ic experience is based on our own motives and desires. Now it is

in this spirit that Burke describes the "function" of the epic.

lends dignity to the necessities of existence, 'advertising' urage and individual sacrifice for group advantage -- and it enables humble man to share the worth of the hero by the process of dentification'". 23

ter of the epic enobles humility and self-glorification to work

er in the individual."

ic sense of one's limitations (in comparison with the mighty figure the legend) provides one with a realistic attitude for gauging his rsonal resources, while his vicarious kinship with the figure gives n the distinction necessary for the needs of self-justification." 24

epic becomes an artistic means by which the individual establishes

nsciousness of self-existence and self-importance in terms of his

" which is, in this case "society". As Mead says, the individual

es this consciousness not through the rational awareness of abstract

ples but

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2 Mead, G.H., "The Nature of Aesthetic Experience", International Journal ics, vol.36, 1926, p.387.
3 Burke, Kenneth, Attitudes toward History, vol. 1, p.44.
4 Ibid, p.44.

"his own experience as a self is one which he takes over from his action upon others. He becomes a self insofar as he can take the attitude of another and act toward himself as others act."[25]

Since both Mead and Burke emphasize dynamic interaction on a naturastic level, they are both critical of individualistic theories of psyology. "Individual psychology pays too little attention to the matter of mmunion."[26] Burke criticized Freud's naturalism because it tended to duce poetic meaning to too limited a physiological origin. The motive the individual in a specific action is much more complex as, for example, e internal structure of a work of art would indicate. Marxists criticized eud's theories because they were not dialectical enough. But Burke ds

"I should say that both Freudians and Marxists are wrong in so far as they cannot put their theories together, by an over-all theory of drama itself (as they should be able to do, since Freud gives us the material of the closet drama, and Marx the material of the problem play, the one worked out in terms of personal conflicts, the other in terms of public conflicts.)" [27]

is is exactly the sort of criticism which Mead made of the behaviorists the Watson school. Watson identified thought simply with the word, mbol or vocal gesture by means of a transference of a reflex from one timulus to another, i.e. by means of a conditioned reflex. A loud noise ssociated with the presence of a white rat will cause a child to become fraid of white rats. But Mead felt rightly that

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25 Mead, G. H., Mind, Self and Society, p.71.
26 Burke, Kenneth, Attitudes toward History, Vol. 2, p.175.
27 Burke, Kenneth, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p.291.

"the getting of an idea is very different from the result of having an idea, for the former involves the setting-up or conditioning of reflexes, which cannot, themselves, be used to explain the process."[28]

order that the individual may know the meaning of what happens to him-

f, he must

"make use of something answering to the same gesture he observes, saying it over again to himself, putting himself in the role of the person who is speaking to him, then he has the meaning of what he hears, he has the idea: the meaning becomes his." [29]

ke has the same opinion as Mead when he urges that communion of the

ividual with the social group is necessary before meaning can be said

exist.

"It is that sort of a situation which seems to be involved in what we term mind, as such: this social process, in which one individual affects other individuals, is carried over into the experience of the individuals that are so affected. The individual takes this attitude not simply as a matter of repetition, but as part of the elaborate social reaction which is going on. It is the necessity of stating that process in terms of behaviour that is involved in an adequate behaviouristic statement, as over against a mere account of the conditioned reflex."[30]

ke's appreciation of Mead seems to be the basis of his own sociological

ory of criticism. He points out the source of Mead's theory in nine-

nth century idealism and then describes vividly the principle in Mead

ch he has taken over.

"Mead's philosophy of the act, in other words, takes its start in the idealist's concern with the identity of subject and object. The concept of the Self is pivotal, the very word "Self" suggesting the

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28 Mead, G. H., Mind, Self and Society, p.107.
29 Ibid, p.109.
30 Mead, G. H., op.cit., p.109.

reflexive form, a subject that is its own object. The strategy of romantic philosophy (which Mead likens to the beginning of self-consciousness at adolescence) was to identify the individual Self metaphysically with an Absolute Self, thereby making the reflexive act the very essence of the universe, a state of affairs that is open to lewd caricature. But Mead, turning from a metaphysical emphasis to a sociological one, substitutes for the notion of an Absolute Self the notion of mind as a social product, stressing the sociality of action and reflection, and viewing thought as the internalization of objective relationships." 31

speaking of orientation as a means of the individual adjusting to his vironment Burke is not as careful as Mead to distinguish between the nd of adjustment an animal might make and one which a human would ke but his definition of orientation contains the same thought as Mead that nsciousness is creative response in terms of what we expect the responses others to be when we act in certain ways.

"Orientation is thus a bundle of judgments as to how things were, how they are, and how they may be. The act of response, as implicated in the character which an event has for us, shows clearly the integral relationship between our metaphysics and our conduct. For in a statement as to how the world is, we have implicit judgments not only as to how the world may become but also as to what means we should employ to make it so." 32

ere is here both a pragmatic and Marxian tone as we see that art is a ans of persuasian conditioned essentially as a tool for the control of r environment. Burke follows Mead as he describes the individual fulilling his personality by responding to the pressure of society and by eking to exploit its riches for his own enlightenment. The Marxian and herefore categorical response is implied by Burke when he describes the

31 Burke, Kenneth, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p.379-80.
32 Burke, Kenneth, Permanence and Change, New York, The New Republic, 935, p.24.

dividual as seeking for controls to reduce society to his own conception
it. And so for Burke "in its simplest manifestation, style is ingre-
ation. It is an attempt to gain favour by the hypnotic or suggestive
ocess of 'saying the right thing'." 33 It is the means of controlling the
dience's responses by anticipating what the audience's respons will be
a particular situation. Commenting on the subtleties of ingratiation,
rke draws attention to the way in which Shakespeare penetrates deeply
to human motives as De Quincey observes in Macbeth.

> "When he has finished depicting Macbeth's murder of the King, and lets us hear a lewd porter knocking at the gate, has he not here intermingled internal and external events, by objectifying something so private as the harsh knock of conscience, thereby implicating us in the murder not merely as <u>witnesses</u> but as participants?" 34

re is raised again the relation of the poet to form he creates which
turn motivates an audience to act in a specific manner.

The naturalism of Mead and Burke requires that society or the social ocess always be presupposed in any statement about self-consciousness or dividual creative activity.

> "Our contention is that mind can never find expression, and could never have come into existence at all, except in terms of a social environment; that an organized set or pattern of social relations and interactions. . . is necessarily presupposed by it and involved in its nature." 35

en Burke speaks of an underlying situation or context common to the tions of all men, he means exactly this social environment which alone

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33 <u>Ibid</u>, p.71.
34 <u>Ibid</u>, p.73-74.
35 Mead, G. H., <u>op.cit.</u>, p.223.

an give meaning to human consciousness and human action.

Turning this relation of the consciousness to social environment into ts significance for poetic theory, Burke says

> "the general approach to the poem might be called "pragmatic" in this sense: It assumes that a poem's structure is to be described most accurately by thinking always of the poet's function. It assumes that the poem is designed to 'do something' for the poet and his readers, and that we can make the most relevant observations about its design by considering the poem as the embodiment of this act. In the poet, we might say, the poetizing existed as a physiological function. The poem is its corresponding anatomic structure. And the reader, in participating in the poem, breathes into this anatomic structure a new physiological [36] vitality that resembles, though with a difference, the act of its maker, the resemblance being in the overlap between writer's and reader's situation, the difference being in the fact that these two situations are far from identical." [37]

n the one hand, the poem is a record of the social environment out of which ontext it has emerged. On the other hand, it is specifically objective n its internal structure.

> "But to guide our observations about the form itself, we seek to discover the <u>functions</u> which it serves. This takes us into a discussion of purpose, strategy, the symbolic act. When one notes, for instance, that the Pilot's boy in 'The Ancient Mariner' acts as the vessel that takes upon itself the most malign features of a cure effected under the aegis of moonlight (i.e. the worst features of the lunacy affecting the 'greybea rd loon'), one discerns his formal function in the drama -- and, going further back, we may discern the formal function, as foreshadowing, of the 'silly' bucket s that are filled when the cure first begins to take effect." [38]

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36 Actually, Mead is more profound than Burke in describing this process. Burke confines the activity to the 'physiological' because his "system" an control it, while Mead sacrifices system to get a more dynamic social ehaviourism.

37 Burke, Kenneth, <u>The Philosophy of Literary Form</u>, pp.89-90.

38 <u>Ibid.</u> p.101.

ere the content of the poem is not a series of empirical data for the eference of a social scientist but rather the content is functional and any omment concerning the form of the poem involves a statement about the oem's subject. Poetry then is dynamic in the sense that its form as a oem is an objectified process. The value of the poetic object would, n Mead's terms, consist in its capacity to satisfy an interest - its value ould be discovered neither in the object nor in the emotional state of the ubject. And so it is Burke's contention "that if we approach poetry from ne standpoint of situations and strategies, we can make the most relevant bservations about both the content and the form of the poems."[39] But one ould note the contrast of Burke with Mead when Burke uses terms of ystematic control such as "situations and strategies."

In a more Hegelian mood, Burke contrasts the essayistic with the poetic tyle. The former is critical and logical while the latter is necessarily ontradictory. Poetry always manifests the dynamic tension existing between ne individual and society. Suffering accompanies the search for the ideal nd even at the most naturalistic level, we have the neurologist Sherrington oted by Burke as pointing out that

> "whatever "consciousness" may be, it is mainly manifested in those processes involved in the seeking and capture of food; whereas, once the prize is seized and swallowed, the organism's "awareness" is of a very blunt order. Unless the digestion is impaired, there is slight sensation beyond a vague state of well-being, relaxation and somnolence."[40]

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39 Ibid., p.124.
40 Ibid., p.255.

As long as Burke follows Mead's example, his defence of the priority
the human will is dynamic but when he tries to make the will fit into
'situation" or into a "dramatistic" context, he loses the identity of the
.f in a deterministic set of internal relations. Burke owes to Mead the
amic naturalistic process which characterizes his dramatism. The poetic
.f in these terms is a sensitive voice in a dialogue with society, each
iprocating with the other and being enriched in the process. But when
self must resort to the use of conceptual strategies to contend with
onceptual social force, the Marxian dialectic is in motion and the very
stence of the self is in peril.

III - THE DEATH OF THE SELF IN BURKE'S DRAMATISM

Like all pragmatists, Mead insists that the self must prevail above
systems of metaphysics. The pragmatist insists that the systems of
aphysics do not describe reality as man experiences it. They have
isted that metaphysical systems leave no room for the
ividual's existence as an active agent. The pragmatist therefore re-
ted historically in all pretence to metaphysical thinking as symbolized
John Dewey's conversion from Hegelianism to Darwinism. While he denied
t he had any system, he had by that same protest to admit that he had one.
ion of the individual was always physiologically motivated. Mead
ids the metaphysical systems with the same vigorous spirit of protest
the concept of society, while still a generic term neverthless suggests
nalogy with the metaphysician's concept of unity which underlies existence.

At first sight it would seem that there was no similarity between
ıd and Hegel. To be sure, Mead's naturalism and his professed freedom
ɔm categories make him seem very far from any popular notion of Hegel.
ıt they did have in common was the notion of a dynamic interaction of
.f with society as the means of communication in the search for truth.
ɜ similarity is not too extensive in the case of Mead and Hegel but in
ɜ case of Burke, the comparison with Hegel is much more significant.

Burke's is the case of a modern critic who returns to the fundamental
ɪrit of Hegel and at the same time tries to retain the most dynamic
ıtures of a pragmatism so characteristic of the reaction to nineteenth
ıtury idealism. Burke sees Mead as one who is deeply concerned with the
ɜntity of subject and object. Throughout Burke's work there is found this
ɪfting emphasis from Mead's social behaviorism to Hegel's idealism. The
ɜmple of the early Hegel is dynamic and is closer in spirit to Burke's
ɜmatistic theory of human conduct. But it will be seen throughout that
ɜ dynamic quality is lost in Burke's work (as it was in Hegel's) when
ɜ categories become too rigid and inflexible. There is little doubt that
ad would have protested against Burke's statement that his (Mead's)
ilosophy of the act began in the idealist's concern with the identity of
bject and object. Mead would have denied that there was any split among
nd, self, or society in the first place. The relation for Mead was ge-
ric and developmental without any separation of elements in the beginning
the end.

Like all idealists, Hegel was trying to solve the paradox of the self
relation to the object which it knew and recognized. When I observe a
ɜir and set about describing its characteristics, I may find that I have

uced the chair as I have first experienced it to a series of concepts shape, colour, texture, and size. But such concepts must inevitably ge in my mind and one is at once compelled to ask what has happened to specific objectivity of the chair as it was first observed. On the er hand, if the knowledge of the world of things is purely conceptual, n there is no basis for the thingness of things at all and the thinker is uced to a hopeless solipsism. To overcome this difficulty, Kant had ed to solve the ancient and persistent problem by bridging the gap ween empirical and rational experience in his intuition of the thing-itself in which the essential thingness of things was situated. Hegel found such a device unsatisfactory in his attempt to give an account human consciousness. It was his early belief that consciousness was h too dynamic and all-embracing to be set apart from the objects of wledge and perception so arbitrarily. By the development of his remark-e theory of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Mind, he set the pattern some of the most creative speculation concerning the human mind since time. He was anticipated by Coleridge in his concern for the specific fficulty of the independence of the will in relation to a rational ex-anation of consciousness but his own account was much more comprehensive.

As soon as Hegel equated absolute consciousness with a completely tional system of internal relations in an ultimate Absolute, it became ear that on such terms, the Self could have no independence. The worst ars of the Stranger in Plato's Sophist that absolute being would be void of motion and life and soul and intelligence were actually realized the Logic of Hegel. It was against this rigorous and inflexible logic at much of twentieth century thought reacted. The Italian school of

alists led by Francesco de Sanctis[41] and later developed systematically Benedetto Croce distinguished the early inspiration of Hegel in The Phenomenology of Mind from the later speculations of the Logic, referring what they considered to be living and to be dead in the Philosophy Hegel. It is with this living tradition that we are here concerned.

In order to bridge the gap between the subject and object so that they uld be at once specific and identical, Hegel conceived the brilliant radox of the concrete universal. The concrete universal is known only rough a moving dialectical process in which the thing is always in process reduction before the analytical power of the mind while the mind in the ne process is forever losing its identity in the thingness of the object its contemplation. Consciousness is both, of the object and of itself -"being-for-another" and "being-for-itself". For Hegel, experience is e contradictory means by which it becomes aware of an object in opposion to itself. As soon as consciousness, which embraces both itself and s object, becomes identical with its own essence, it will have attained absolute knowledge. Thus each consciousness of self and object at the vel of sense certainty cancels itself as soon as it achieves truth giving y to the higher, more universal, yet never losing its concreteness. e Absolute is known not in and for itself alone but rather as the result a development through consciousness.

In speaking of self-consciousness rather than things Hegel says that

41 Breglio, Louis A., Life and Criticism of Francesco de Sanctis. York, S.F. Vanni, 1941.

"consciousness is essentially that which thinks, is a thinking reality, and that anything is really essential for consciousness, or is true and good, only when consciousness in dealing with it adopts the attitude of a thinking being." 42

the beginning, one's self-consciousness is free from all involvement with ngs other than one's self. Over against this feeling of freedom in .ependent self-consciousness comes the awareness of a negative state ch Hegel calls sceptical; here the state of mind which is statically 'erred to as thought becomes thinking and in the process it takes on awareness of the world of substantial objects around it. At first, .f-consciousness is the bare and simple freedom of itself which Hegel .ls Stoicism. In the next stage, Scepticism, self-consciousness realizes self, negates the other side of determinate existence, but in so doing, .lly doubles itself and is itself now a duality. At this stage, Hegel 'ers to consciousness as Unhappy. The whole process is described as llows in rather poetic and moving language:

"Here, then, there is a struggle against an enemy, victory over whom really means being worsted, where to have attained one result is really to lose it in the opposite. Consciousness of life, of its existence and action, is merely pain and sorrow over this existence znd activity; for therein consciousness finds only consciousness of its opposite as its essence --- and of its own nothingness. Elevating itself beyond this, it passes to the unchangeable. But this elevation is itself this same consciousness. It is, therefore, immediately consciousness of the opposite, viz. of itself as single, individual, particular. The unchangeable, which comes to consciousness, is in that very fact at the same time affected by particularity and is only present with this latter. Instead of particularity having been abolished in the consciousness of immutability, it only continues to appear there still." 43

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42 Hegel, <u>op.cit.</u>, p.244.
43 <u>Ibid</u>, p.252-3.

And so Hegel attempts to preserve the individuality of self and at same time he wishes to set it over against its other.

"In one it is a pure consciousness; at another time a particular individual who takes up towards actuality the attitude characteristic of desire and labour; and in the third place it is a consciousness of its self-existence, its existence for itself." [44]

ultimate synthesis which Hegel has in mind is a blend of pure thought h the realm of particular existence over against a background of rit which is dynamic and moving, constantly contributing life to both thinker and the object of his contemplation.

The reader will notice throughout the pages of Hegel's Phenomenology Mind a sense of grim comedy bordering on tragedy. The concrete univer- contains within itself the element of its own destruction. The sense otherness is always conquering and superseding the sense of selfhood and ; without this sense of otherness, the self could not be conscious of self at all. The unhappy consciousness consists in this eternal battle ween the sense of selfhood and the sense of otherness. The very comedy life is to be found in its delusions and contradictions. The genius Hegel's dialectic lay in his conviction the "Everything depends on asping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject well." [45] Hegel began his career enthusiastic in the conviction that uth is what the subject experiences. As the tragi-comedy of the human nd unfolded before him, he confessed to the

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44 Ibid, p.256.
45 Ibid, p.80.

"blindness, ignorance, conceit, delusion, and impotence in the face of a world that is too much with us. The mind that seeks to dominate or to reform this venerable world of ours, to use or to malign it, to be happy in it or to flee from it, soon discovers the solidity and perversity of things. Mind proposes but the world disposes. The world triumphs in the end." 46

G. H. Mead shares with Hegel the idea of the opposition of the self its other but he has eliminated the negative element from it. On the ial level he would seem to have taken what is living from Hegel just Croce sought to take what was living from Hegel for the study of thetics. The attitudes of the whole community are the "generalized ier" of the self which responds to the social group.

" So the self reaches its full development by organizing these individual attitudes of others into the organized social or group attitudes and by thus becoming an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern of social or group behavior in which it and the others are all involved -- a pattern which enters as a whole into the individual's experience in terms of these organized group attitudes which, through the mechanism of his central nervous system, he takes toward himself just as he takes the individual attitudes of others." 47

re is the dynamic movement of the self toward consciousness of itself idered in terms of the individual's awareness of his social self. Just Hegel makes Spirit in its universal and specific form prior to all istence, so Mead makes society prior to all knowledge of self. As we ve already seen, Mind is a social phenomenon which cannot exist outside e context of society. Logic has been forsaken in its more categorical ects in favour of the element of process in Hegel. As Marx spoke of rning the dialectic upside down into historical materialism, one might

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46 Hegel, G. Selections, Introduction by J. Loewenberg, New York, Charles ribner Sons, p.xxxiii.

47 Mead, G. H., op.cit., p.58.

r that Mead has turned the dynamic phenomenology of Hegel upside down
:o social behaviorism.

It should be noted carefully that although Mead and Hegel may share
e same enthusiasm for the idea of society as the responding "other"
relation to the individual, they differ in their notion of how the
ocess is effected. Mead's concept of society is <u>genetic</u> rather than
<u>eological</u> in any spiritual sense. Mind develops in society and as it
velops, the individual personality is organized and the form of society
undergoing constant change. Burke does not follow Mead consistently in
s conception of the mind's relation to society. As Burke's dramatistic
neme expands, the element of cooperation between the self and society
ves way to a Marxian-Hegelian tone and the self is seen to be at strife
ther than in cooperation with society. In the attempt to take on social
titudes, personality seems to <u>dissolve</u> into social conformity whereas
Mead, the interaction of self with society tended to <u>organize</u> personality
to individuality. This conflict of Mead and Hegel is to be seen throughout
rke's work.

In his description of the drama of human consciousness Hegel refers
it as an epic in which the relation of the divine to the human is set
rth and displayed as a whole to consciousness.

> "The content is an 'act' of the essential Being conscious of itself. Acting disturbs the peace of the subtance, and awakens the essential Being; and by so doing its simple unity is divided into parts, and opened up into the manifold world of natural powers and ethical forces. The act is the violation of the peaceful earch; it

is the trench which, vivified by the blood of the living, calls forth the spirits of the departed, who are thirsting for life, and who receive it in the action of self-consciousness." [48]

the self moves into action in society, conflict is the inevitable result.

"In any event, action of an external sort must eventually lead to combat in one form or another. Action of this plane is no longer harmony; it lacks the symphonic quality whereby the notes of coexistent melodies can at the same time both proclaim thier individual identity and function as parts in a whole. Action in the realm of normal experience involves patterns of striving, competition and conquest which reach their ultimate conclusion in war."[49]

common element in Hegel and in Burke is the element of battle, of
ife in which the peace of the earth is destroyed. The only means for
purification of war is to kill the self. Instead of a recognition of
f coming about by cooperation with society, Burke seems to feel the
essity for a death of the self. In romantic poetry there are many
erences to what may be called poetry of the "death wish" in which,
rs Burke,

"you will see that the symbolic slaying of an old self is complemented by the emergence of a new self. In fact, even though every action and person in the plot led downwards, we should find an assertion of identity in the constructive act of the poem itself. I should want to treat even suicide in real life as but the act of rebirth reduced to its simplest and most restricted form (its least complex idiom of expression)." [50]

e act of suicide is the assertion of personal identity. As Peer Gynt
es in search of his personal identity, he passes through several stages
which his original personality is sacrificed, "killed" and in the end

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48 Hegel, G. The Phenomenology of Mind, p.733.
49 Burke, Kenneth, Permanence and Change, New York, The New Republic, 35, p.320.
50 Burke, Kenneth, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p.39.

"Has not Peer here at the last found his identity again in the maternal woman? And since he had gone on his wanderings at the very moment when Solveig had first come to his hut, she is the Virgin Mother, who has conceived him as an idea derived from God. He is, in brief, translated to the role of the Christ-child, whose conception was an Annunciation. And his essence resides in merger with this spiritualized maternal grounding, which simultaneously transforms the wife back into a mother and replaces his real mother and his drunken wandering father by a new and ideal parentage." 51

By means of an imagery of killing, Burke intends to represent the cess of change as it culminates in a rebirth of the self. Without haps intending to go beyond the reconciliation of the conflicts in the an Barnyard by the use of certain rhetorical techniques, Burke never- less ends up with a metaphysical system closely related to those of idealistic forebears. He tells us that he aims to go beyond the tra- ional bounds of rhetoric, to identification rather than confine himself the techniques of mere persuasion. As in Hegel, the self must sacri- e itself to a negative state of otherness before it can enjoy the full- s of self-consciousness. In Samson Agonistes, Milton identifies him- f with the aggressive, self-destructive hero who was in turn identified h God. The following passage from the Rhetoric of Motives is a good ustration of literary criticism in which Burke blends the Hegelian gery of killing with the pragmatic motivational formula.

"The recurring stress upon the reflexive nature of Samson's act (the element of self-destruction in his way of slaying the enemy) can be a roundabout device for sanctioning suicide; yet Milton's religion strongly forbade suicide. Compelled by his misfortunes to live with his rage, gnawed by resentments that he could no longer release

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51 Burke, Kenneth, A Grammar of Motives, p.439.

fully in outward conquest, Milton found in Samson a figure ambivalently fitted to symbolize both aggressive and inturning trends. Here too, though still more remotely, would be 'literature for use': the poetic reenactment of Samson's role could give pretexts for admitting a motive which, if not so clothed or complicated, if confronted in its simplicity, would have been inadmissible. By dramatic subterfuge Milton could include what he would have had to exclude, if reduced to a conceptually analytic treatment."52

Likewise in Arnold, one finds the same theme. After the recognition Sohrab by Rustum, there takes place a cosmic unification, just as re also occurs in Empedocles on Aetna after he jumps into the crater. edocles jumps into a crater as a symbol of absorption into ideal unity, le the river in Sohrab and Rustum flows on to final unity in the sea and armies are at peace. "The poet, in both cases, imagines that the ure with whom he identifies himself is being killed; and in both cases destruction terminates in imagery of a homecoming, a return to sources bably maternal."53 At the same time there is a transformation usually m one order of motives to another. The transformation can take a ign form to a benign form; it can transform an evil motive into a good ive.

By means of the process of killing, the state of identification is ched.

"An imagery of slaying (slaying of either the self or another) is to be considered merely as a special case of identification in general. Or otherwise put: the imagery of slaying is a special case of transformation and transformation involves the ideas and imagery of identification. That is: the killing of something is the changing of it and the statement of the thing's nature before and after the change is an identifying of it." 54

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52 Burke, Kenneth, A Rhetoric of Motives, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1950, p.5.
53 Ibid, p.8.
54 Ibid, p.22.

Here, once again, is the problem of the identity of subject and object which Burke spoke in Mead. But his presentation of the problem is ictly Hegelian as he is very conscious of the relation of identification division, of the whole to the part and for all the social dynamics his context, one feels the trenchant knife of logic penetrating into whole cutting out the parts which in turn must be killed again that y may be reborn in the absolute.

> "Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man's very essence. It would not be an ideal, as it now is, partly embodied in material conditions and partly frustrated by these same conditions; rather, it would be as natural, spontaneous, and total as with those ideal prorotypes of communication, the theologian's angels, or 'messengers'"[55]

toric is concerned with the very realm of communication between the ided objects and their relation to the whole symbolized in identification.

> "In pure identification there would be no strife. Likewise, there would be no strife in absolute separateness, since opponents can join battle only through a mediatory ground that makes their communication possible, thus providing the first condition necessary for their interchange of blows. But put identification and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where one ends and the other begins, and you have the characteristic invitation to rhetoric."[56]

is certain that there would be no strife in pure identification because self would have been completely absorbed and dissolved into the con- otual unity which identification symbolizes. Every time the self is led one thinks of the process of the dialectic in Hegel in which the

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55 Ibid., p.22.
56 Ibid., p.25.

ividual is so completely transcended (aufgehoben) that he is a mere
ction of the absolute without any personality.

In the first section of this study the attempt was made to show
Burke goes about the business of establishing the existence of the
f. Until the basis and the origins for his theory of the self have
n examined one is not in a position to study the techniques which a
tic self migh employ in the act of poetic creation. It has been shown
Burke is more the Hegelian dialectician than the dynamic social be-
iourist. His love of categories and his passion for system within the
ial context seem to be based emphatically upon Marxian theories while
concern for selfhood and the dynamics of social interaction is much
ser to Mead. In the end the two theories are never fused into a
isfactory synthesis because the element of social behaviourism gives way
the dialectical system of dramatism and with the loss of behaviourism,
ke's naturalism becomes materialistic monism.

And yet, Burke is as anxious as Mead to avoid the mechanism of the
entist in order to retain the power of will in the philosophy of the
t. Mead states his theory of the self in terms of the "I" and the "me".
e 'I' means nothing without the 'me' but the 'I' is the sense of freedom,
initiative. The 'me' represents a moral, not a mechanical, necessity.
e 'I' and the 'me', taken together constitute a personality as it
pears in social experience." [57] Burke picks up this theme as central
his rhetoric.

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57 Mead, G. H., op.cit.,p.178.

"The individual person, striving to form himself in accordance with the communicative norms that match the cooperative ways of his society, is by the same token concerned with the rhetoric of identification. To act upon himself persuasively, he must variously resort to images and ideas that are formative. Education ('indoctrination') exerts such pressure upon him from without; he completes the process from within. If he does not somehow act to tell himself (as his own audience) what the various brands of rhetorician have told him, his persuasion is not complete. Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a voice within."[58]

self is an agent in combat against forces which at the same time de-
mine the very essence of his personality. Out of the context of the
ial environment evolves the self which is specifically creative in terms
the most dynamic qualities of that environment. Burke differs from Mead
loses considerably the dynamic quality of individual personality by
luding a number of human experiences which may not fit his categories.
d has no categories but seeks rather to organize personality in all
richness and fullness.

In the account of John Crowe Ransom there was found a contradiction
his search for a subsisting reality for both the poet and the poem,
his insistence upon the creative will of the poet as the source of
poem's existence. Ironically, Ransom was critical of Burke for not
cing sufficiently clear the differences in the syntheses made by the
et and the scientist in establishing the relation of the part to the
ole, of the self to the unity behind all existence.

Burke has insisted that the "kill" is necessary for the rebirth of
lf-consciousness just as Hegel did. Taken in relation to the third

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58 Burke, Kenneth, A Rhetoric of Motives, p.39.

ge of the dialectic, death is not merely a negation of existence. It
ases to signify what it means directly — the non-existence of this
ividual — and becomes transfigured into the universality of the spirit,
ch lives in its own communion, dies there daily, and daily rises again."[59]
s process is what Burke has in mind when he speaks of the dynamic symbol
death in Arnold's Empedocles and his plunge into the crater. It is
o the same theme which Shelley symbolizes in the cloud which is its
cenotaph.

I change, but I cannot die.
For after the rain when with never a stain,
The pavilion of heaven is bare,
And the winds and sunbeams with their convex gleams
Build up the blue dome of air,
I silently laugh at my own cenotaph,
And out of the caverns of rain,
Like a child from the womb, like a ghost from the tomb,
I arise and unbuild it again.
Shelley: The Cloud

Like Croce, however, Ransom feared the quality of negation in the
ond moment of the dialectic and although they allowed the anti-structure
negative moment as a stage in the development of self-expression, they would
allow it any real or ontological status. And so it is with Burke in
logical triad of the self, the kill and the rebirth. Any such syste-
ic incorporation of self in an ontological whole is in direct conflict
h the necessity for the priority of the creative will in the poetic
cess. If the principle of entelechy is to be meaningful it must cul-
ate in fully developed existing and not in an absolute unity which

59 Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p.780.

urs all existence. If the ultimate goal of entelechy is the absorption he death of the self then the system also must meet the same fate. What rue for Hegel must be true for Burke.

"Hegel's own method decrees that his own system be ultimately jettisoned. It too must become 'aufgehoben'. In Logic, alas, the exception never proves the rule. And the rule is relentless: universal and perpetual transition of everything to something else. Hegel's logic is well symbolized by Shelley in the impetuous and uncontrollable West Wind --- the wild spirit which is moving everywhere, tameless and swift and proud, at once the destroyer and preserver of every kind of truth, Hegel's included." 59a

In Ransom nature as a whole confronts the poet who is always on the h for natural effects which are not useful but brilliant and vivid. Burke it is not an idealized concept of nature which confronts the poet it is the context of society. His response is very pragmatic and the t actually does seek for effects which are useful. In Ransom, by means myths or tropes, the poet achieves a total communication in which ught and feeling are one. In Burke, by means of myths or tropes, particularly the trope of synecdoche, the poet achieves a total communication which self and society are one and in the ideal process, the initial conct of individual and group in the human barnyard is reconciled, at least the point where the disease of cooperation is considerably remedied. if the price of cooperation means the death of the self then the ty achieved must be that of a mechanistic whole without life and with- spirit.

59a Lowenberg, Jacob, ed. Introduction, Hegel Selections, New York, 29, Charles Scribner's Sons, p.xv.

IV - LANGUAGE AS SOCIAL AND AESTHETIC CONTROL

From a consideration of the self in relation to its environment of
re, society or spirit, we turn to a discussion of the means of communi-
on between the self and its other. The paradox of the creative will
he poet and the poem which he produces centres in the problem of
her the poem is a mere reflection of the poet's imagination or whether
as some degree of independent aesthetic existence, some public quality
h allows us to call it objective. If language is expression of some
, is the language of the poem only a means of expressing a subjective
e of the poet's mind or does the language of the poem as it is embodied
formal structure constitue a specific object? There seem to be
e possible alternatives for the interpretation of language: (a) it is
means of subjective expression of the poet's feelings; (b) it is an
al imitation of the thingness of the things it describes and the poet's
e is that of the imitator; or (c) it is a process which the poet by
e intuitive means attempts to objectify. The art of poetry is seen to
In the dynamic process of describing in an objective manner the poet's
erience of the external world. The symbols of poetry become the func-
n of this dynamic process which Burke on several occasions calls the
ncing of an attitude."

When we speak of the poet objectifying a process, we imply that the
ect of the process, its end, is the poem which itself will have a
tain objective or independent quality. At the same time, one senses
paradox of a process which is ongoing and of a thing which has objective

istence and is therefore to some extent static. Moreover, a process plies the existence of two poles, in this case a poet and the goal of s creative activity, a poem. But there must also be a third pole, namely e substance out of which the poem is made and indeed the same substance out which the poet himself is created. The major problem of aesthetics is discover, if possible the exact nature of this relationship and by so ing establish the basis for the poetic object for the poet himself as ll as for the nature of that psychological process called poetic creation.

In the Aesthetic of Benedetto Croce, the philosophy of art, the ilosophy of language and the science of expression were all the same.

> "Were Linguistic really a <u>different</u> science from Aesthetic it would not have for its object expression, which is the essentially aesthetic fact; that is to say, we must deny that language is expression. But an emission of sounds which expresses nothing is not language: language is sound articulated, circumscribed and organized for the purposes of expression." 60

Language as expression is a spiritual creation. It does not develop any associative way for

> "if language be a spiritual creation, it must always be a creation . . . .Expressions already produced must descend to the rank of impressions before they can give rise to new impressions. When we utter new words we generally transform old ones, varying or enlarging their meaning; but this process is not associative, it is creative, although the creation has for material the impressions, not of the hypothetical primitive man, but of man who has lived long ages in society, and who has, so to say stored so many things in his psychic organism, and among them so much language." 61

nus language for Croce is a cumulative expression which embodies the tra- ition of a people and conveys not only the direct intention of the speaker ut also the intention of the whole society of which he is a part.

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60 Croce, Benedetto, <u>Aesthetic As Science of Expression and General Linguistic</u> r. Douglas Ainslie. 2nd. ed., London, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1929. p. 143.

Moreover, language has no reality outside the expression or work of
t in which it exists concretely. The culture of a given people is nothing
t the sum total of the individual expressions of the people themselves.
th the one and the many here have their unity as well as their multiplicity
the spirit or intuition which is expression. For Croce the reality of
nguage lies in its expression of spirit, the indivisible whole which is
lture. Croce's theory follows genetically from Hegel's account in the
enomenology of Mind.

> "We see language to be the form in which spirit finds existence. Language is self-consciousness which as such is there immediately present, and which in its individuality is universal. Language is self-separating itself from itself which as the pure ego identical with ego becomes an object to itself, which at once maintains itself in this objective form as this actual self, and at the same time that it is perceived by others: and this perceiving is just existence which has become a self." 62

e unity of culture which is manifested by language rests in the content of
nguage as spirit. "What the language of conscience contains is the self
owing itself as essential reality." 62

Croce's theme that

> "language is perpetual creation" reiterates the truth that all actions of mankind are expressions. Just as Dante's poetry can be enjoyed only by means of raising ourselves to Dante's level of expression, so "what has been linguistically expressed is not repeated, save by reproduction of what has already been produced." 63

man must create out of his own consciousness, according to his own

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62 Hegel, op.cit., p.661.
63 Croce, op.cit., p.150.

ssions. But creation is expression by which the natural object becomes
nbol of the artist's intuition. It is by means of language that an
eness of the inner character of spirit which underlies all particular
s of life is achieved.

Croce and Hegel sought to establish the origins of the theory of
uage as dynamic communication. As idealists, they were not only keenly
e of the problem of the identity of subject and object in the under-
ding of the function of communication but they gave the most intelligible
unt of the nature of that function. Croce, in particular, was careful
mphasize the role of language in the development of self in relation
ts spiritual context. He avoided the deadening influence of categories
logical definitions of language. Language is expression, not classi-
tion. It communicates the traditions of culture through the agent of
ession and at the same time makes meaningful to an audience experiences
h they could not otherwise express. By means of language, the poet
s his deepest self through his sense of community with other spiritual
gs. He is at once aware of the unity of spirit which makes intuition
ecific expression and of that quality in specific expressions which ena-
us to understand spiritual unity. The context of his aesthetics and of
account of the psychology of poetic creation is ideal and somewhat
eric. The dynamics of his thought are the most inspiring element in
writing but as we have already seen in our discussion of the self,
modern mind has craved a more empirical account. It is in the philoso-
of G. H. Mead that the same dynamics are used but in the rich context

our everyday practical experience. Before Burke's discussion of lan-
age and symbol in relation to the idealistic tradition can be evaluated,
e comparison of the idealist with Mead the pragmatic social behaviorist
st be revealed.

For Mead, Language is a part of social behavior. Language is the
chanism of gesture,

> "which makes possible the appropriate responses to one another's behavior of the different individual organisms involved in the social process. Within any given social act, an adjustment is effected, by means of gestures, of the actions of one organism involved to the actions of another; the gestures are movements of the first organism which act as specific stimuli calling forth the (socially) appropriate responses of the second organism. The field of the operation of gestures is the field within which the rise and development of human intelligence has taken place through the process of the symbolization of experience which gestures --- especially vocal gestures --- have made possible. The cialization of the human animal within this field of gesture has been responsible, ultimately, for the origin and growth of present human society and knowledge, with all the control over nature and over the human environment which science makes possible." [64]

As we have already seen, Mead is very careful to distinguish between
symbols used by animals and the significant symbols used by human beings.

> "The vocal gesture becomes a significant symbol (unimportant, as such, on the merely affective side of experience) when it has the same effect on the individual making it that it has on the individual to whom it is addressed or who explicitly responds to it, and thus involves a reference to the self of the individual making it." [65]

means of significant symbols individuals can communicate with one another
comparatively complex levels. Not only does the use of language enable

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64 Mead, G. H., Mind, Self and Society, p.13-14, Note.
65 Ibid, p.46.

o individuals to focus their attention upon a common object but it
ables the speaker to take the attitude of the other person toward his
n gestures.

> "In this way every gesture comes within a given social group or community to stand for a particular act or response, namely, the act or response which it calls forth explicitly in the individual to whom it is addressed, and implicitly in the individual who makes it; and this particular act or response for which it stands is its meaning as asignificant symbol. Only in terms of gestures as significant symbols is the existence of mind or intelligence possible; for only in terms of gestures which are significant symbols can thinking --- which is simply an internalized or implicit conversation of the individual with himself by means of such gestures --- take place. The internalization in our experience of the external conversations of gestures which we carry on with other individuals in the social process is the essence of thinking; and the gestures thus internalized are significant symbols because they have the same meanings for all individuals making them that they arouse in the individuals responding to them: otherwise the individual could not internalize them or be conscious of them and their meanings."[66]

re is a process of expression which is analogous to that described by
oce. Mind as social intelligence is substituted for Spirit and in the
me way as Spirit, Mind is prior to all thinking individuals. Yet it is
ly in terms of gestures as significant symbols that the existence of
nd or intelligence is possible. Likewise for Croce intuition is expression;
e intuits the existence of spirit which can be known only in terms of
rticular expressions. Without Spirit, expression is impossible and yet
thout expression we could never be aware of the existence of Spirit.
the pragmatic level in Mead there is a greater tendency to speak of mind
ising out of the conversation of gestures than to speak of language
ising out of mind. Croce's more idealistic approach tends to place

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66 Ibid, p.47.

ater emphasis on the existence of spirit as necessary for the possibility language and language necessarily arises through Spirit. In spite of these hases, in the case of both Croce and Mead, the common spirit of their ught lies in the great value placed upon the dynamics of interaction. self becomes aware of itself in Croce only when it has expressed itself terms of spirit. In Mead, the body becomes a self only "when it has veloped a mind within the context of social experience."

For Mead the synthesis of expression in language is achieved when we able to communicate on both the intellectual and emotional level. But gardless of the level, language is always functional, fulfilling a need the individual using it. A poet depends upon the emotional character of sture.

> "For him language is rich and full of values which we, perhaps, utterly ignore. In trying to express a message in something less than ten words, we merely want to convey a certain meaning, while the poet is dealing with what is really living tissue, the emotional throb in the expression itself. There is then, a great range in our use of language; but whatever phase of the range is used is a part of a social process, and it is always that part by means of which we affect ourselves as we affect others and mediate the social situation through this understanding of what we are saying. That is fundamental for any language; if it is going to be language one has to understand what he is saying, has to affect himself as he affects others."[67]

characteristic pragmatic fashion, the role of the intellect in the ocess of art is somewhat suppressed in favour of a behavioristic emotional pression. But Mead never loses sight of the necessity for intellect in nguage for without it he knows full well he would eliminate consciousness.

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67 Ibid, p.75.

"The symbol is thus more than a mere substitute stimulus — more than a mere stimulus for a conditioned response or reflex. For the conditioned reflex — the response to a mere substitute stimulus — does not or need not involve consciousness; whereas the response to a symbol does and must involve consciousness. Conditioned reflexes plus consciousness of the attitudes and meanings they involve are what constitute language, and hence lay the basis, or comprise the mechanism for, thought and intelligent conduct." [68]

Having thus far discussed the function of consciousness in relation to more behavioristic aspect of language, Mead now shifts sufficiently far the side of the rational intellect to show the necessity of selfawareness in the process of linguistic expression.

"Language is the means whereby individuals can indicate to one another what their responses to objects will be, and hence what the meanings of objects are; it is not a mere system of conditioned reflexes. Rational conduct always involves a reflexive reference to self, that is, an indication to the individual of the significances which his actions or gestures have for other individuals. And the experiential or behavioristic basis for such conduct — the neuro-physiological mechanism of thinking — is to be found, as we have seen, in the central nervous system." [69]

Here the cycle of Mead's theory of language is complete. From an tional fulfilling of needs by anticipating the responses which his stures will stimulate in his social environment, the individual is given rational consciousness with which to recognize and analyze these responses. then returns to the neuro-physiological mechanism which is the source rational thinking. For all his attempt to insist that mind is a product social experience, he has ultimately submitted to the Darwinian principle at mind, self and society presuppose a physiological unity, a materialistic tology. The value of Mead's contribution to the theory of language lies

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68 Ibid, p.122, Note.
69 Ibid, p.122.

so much in this fact as in his careful analysis of the process of guistic communication. Likewise in Croce, the value of his contribution s not so much in the ultimate reduction of his thought to an idealistic ology as in his acute insights in to the process of expression at the thetic level. The dynamics of mind, self and society, as far as Burke's of the concepts is concerned, are summed up in the following passage m Mead.

> "It is the unity of the whole social process that is the unity of the individual, and social control over the individual lies in this common process which is going on, a process which differentiates the individual in his particular function while at the same time controlling his reaction. It is the ability of the person to put himself in other people's places that gives him his cues as to what he is to do in a specific situation."[70]

The versatile mind of Kenneth Burke has reached into political, economic ial, and religious areas as well as into the aesthetic in his study of guage. He has uncovered valuable information in the previous studies language made by such nineteenth century thinkers as Jeremy Bentham. In A Grammar of Motives, he has studied the use of terms, of language in ieral on all these manifold levels. In keeping with the purpose of this le study an examination of Burke's theory will be made only on the thetic and poetic levels. It will be seen that it is at this level re the conflict in Burke's mind concerning the objective structure of guage is centred.

In Mead, one was accustomed to hear of language as a process of

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70 Ibid, p.270.

munication at the social level alone. He spoke of attitudes and res-
ses, of conventions which society accepted as customary ways of expressing
tions or of maintaining conventions but he did not easily formalize these
itudes. Owing to his intuitive reaction against all categorizing of the
d, he strove to avoid the specific study of formalized conventions. For
ke, the whole enterprise of locating the nature of the various res-
ses and attitudes of individuals in society constitutes a vast ritual.
ual is a means of erecting "a vast symbolic synthesis, a rationale of
ginative and conceptual imagery that 'locates' the various aspects of
erience."[71] Just as in Mead, the aesthetic work was a means of ful-
ling a need of the individual to anticipate the responses or attitudes
society, so in Burke "the organization of a work can be considered with
ation to a 'key' symbol of authority. The work is a ritual whereby the
t takes inventory with reference to the acceptance or rejection of this
hority."[72] In order to gain comprehension on the practical as well
the aesthetic level, the poet must sacrifice his identity to some extent.
a result of his taking on of the attitudes of the society which is his
her', the poet becomes reborn and so increases his perspective while at
same time remaining as his former self. "Rebirth is a process of
cialization."

In this attempt to discover what the response of other individuals is
our actions, we depend primarily upon speech. As in Mead, Language is
e symbolization of gestures and as these symbols develop, they are found

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71 Burke, Kenneth, Attitudes toward History, Vol. 2, p.1.
72 Ibid, p.44.

orm clusters around which additional significance or meaning can be
overed. e.g. Caroline Spurgeon's charting of Shakespeare's imagery.
anguage is used to develop one's awareness of his relation to his
al environment, clusters help the individual to realize this fulfillment.

"The charting of clusters will eventually reveal how thoroughly the syntheses of poetry manage to eschew the 'law of excluded middle' dear to argumentative thought. The symbol, as 'vessel', may quite easily unite logical opposites. The same symbol may contain meanings of parents, child, wife, career, promise, and fear. It may contain both sexual gratification and castration, both retreat and aggression. perhaps it is not complete as a 'vessel' until it has secretly performed this merger of opposites by 'transcendence'".[73]

he same way that Croce and Hegel sought to achieve unity of opposites
:e relates concepts or experiences which are opposed to one another.
implication in all three cases is that such concepts are not really
)sites but merely distinct manifestations of the same substance.[74] In
case of the idealists, Hegel and Croce, the element of identity running
)ugh the opposites is the ontological Spirit. In the case of Burke,
element of identity is the commonality of experience which all in-
.duals must have as partially developed social beings. As spirit
rides the basis of unity for opposing concepts, so the context of
lety provides the basis of unity for opposing experiences.

But Burke is little concerned with words as abstractions of Spirit.
e Mead he shuns metaphysical speculation to search for the content
language. Verbalizations must and do synthesize a whole infinity of
redients. The ideals of pure conceptualization can be attained only by

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73 Ibid, p.77-8.
74 Supra, p.34-5.

overishment, 'alienation'. Words are rich in 'linguistic action' y in so far as there is a 'dance' implicit in their naming. The con- t of symbolic language must constitute a dance, a movement of thought not a mere classification of symbols into categories.

Consistent with his conviction in the dynamic power of language as ression, Burke believes that imagery can never attain scientific cision. He tries to avoid categories which tend to kill the creative ivity of the will. Language is merely the reflection of a self in rch of unity in social context. Just as the self had to sacrifice elf to the kill in order to be reborn as a new self closer to a knowledge the social unity out of which it came, so Burke claims that

> "our basic principle is our contention that all symbolism can be treated as the ritualistic naming and changing of identity (whereby a man fits himself for a role in accordance with established coordinates or for a change of role in accordance with new coordinates which necessity has forced upon him)."[75]

in his attempt to substitute dynamic categories of judgment for the e logical categories of the logician, Burke tends to give too simplified account of the poetic or literary process. The meanings which he asso- ates with the symbols of his ritual dancing of attitudes are too explicit, logical. A certain rigidity of mind tends to kill the dynamic quality spirit and a static as well as dogmatic tone prevails. Symbolism is ritualistic naming and changing of identity. Since his symbols are conceptual, they tend to reduce personality to abstraction. The con-

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75 Burke, Kenneth, Attitudes toward History, Vol. 2, p.169-170.

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ts are sufficiently rigid that a return of the self to the further ob-
tive contemplation of these concepts is impossible. The symbols lack
xibility because they are too frequently made to be manifestations of
ocial spirit which is either Marxian or Freudian in its implications.
materialistic unity is as dissolving of the quality of existence as
Hegel's Absolute. The following passage is typical of his literary
ticism:

"In general, these rituals of change or 'purification' center about three kinds of imagery: purification by ice, by fire, or by decay. 'Ice' tends to emphasize castration and frigidity. (Severe mountains, winter, Arctic exploration, death of the individual or the world by cold. We should thus note the difference between Eliza's crossing atop the ice with her child in Uncle Tom's Cabin and the opening of Odets' play, Paradise Lost, another story of 'redemption', where the leading character complains that he lies drowned beneath ice.) Purificiation by fire, 'trial by fire', probably suggests 'incest-awe'. (As in some mystics' dream of 'the sun death', where one is both welcomed into the sun and consumed by it. The sun was originally a female, the goddess of fertility as preserved in the German 'Frau Sonne'. The feminine character of fire is preserved in Wagner's opera depicting Siegfried's rescue of his bride across a circle of fire. You may find such connotations preserved in the stories of Erskine Caldwell, where imagery of fire, mother, and earth is merged). Redemption by decay is symbolized in all variants of the sprouting seed, which arises in green newness out of filth and rot. Often it seems to gravitate towards connotations of the homosexual (as in the novels of Andre Gide). We may also note the two symbols of perspective, the mountain and the pit (sometimes merged in symbols of bridges, crossing, travel, flying). The mountain contains incestuous ingredients (the mountain as the mother, with frigidity as symbolic punishment for the offense). So also does the pit (ambivalence of womb and 'cloaque', the latter aspect tending to draw in also ingredients of 'purification by decay'." 76

re one experiences the rigidity of Burke's reductionistic mind. He has
obvious enthusiasm for the task of criticism but he tends to violate

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76 Ibid, Vol.2, p.170-1.

object of art by reducing its objective quality to conceptual struc-
es: these structures are more the projection of Burke's mind than they
any account of the object of art itself.

Burke does extend his interpretations somewhat beyond the Freudian
el which he believed to be too limited, too univocal. But he will
go beyond the social level. Brilliant though some of his interpre-
ions are, he begs his own aesthetic question by his insistence upon the
ority of the social context, a context which is more conceptual in
x's sense than it is dynamic in Mead's sense. The study of aesthetics
intended to illustrate how the social elements are involved in the
rossments of individual creativeness. In his Attitudes toward History
concludes his discussion of symbolism with a statement of his creed. Like
of the new critics, he is interested in the metaphor, the symbol, the
m as an objective entity, capable of much greater expression than the
e representation of a single idea.

> "A symbol is a vessel of much more content than is disclosed by its 'face value' as a label. Words may contain attitudes much more complex and subtle than could possibly be indicated in the efficient simplifications of a 'practical' dictionary." 77

is ready to argue that

> "once a man has integrated his whole life about his business (interweaving it with a full texture of social relationships and personal transcendences) you will be far from knowing what is going on if you try to analyze his motives as merely the 'desire for monetary profit'. His business has become a 'vessel', it is 'charismatic'." 78

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77 Ibid., Vol. 2, p.231.
78 Ibid., Vol. 2, p.231.

Burke loses touch with Mead's dynamic naturalism, he loses the poles self and society. All the manifold experience of nature dissolves o unity. The pragmatic aesthetic becomes the monistic aesthetic of Marxist. Yet he concludes by saying

" Our own program, as literary critic, is to integrate technical criticism with social criticism (propaganda, the didactic) by taking the allegiance to the symbol of authority as our subject. We take this as our starting point, and 'radiate' from it. Since the symbols of authority are radically linked with property relationships, this point of departure automatically involves us in socio-economic criticism. Since works of art, as 'equipment for living,' are formed with authoritative structures as their basis of reference, we also move automatically into the field of technical criticism (the 'tactics' of writers')."[79]

So far, Burke had kept himself relatively within the framework of the ial behaviorist and the dynamic pragmatist. Language in its origins s an implement of action, a device which takes its shape by the cooperare patterns of the group that uses it."[80] Speech has two polar funcons; "Speech is communicative in the sense that it provides a common sis of feeling -- or it is communicative in the sense that it serves the common implement of action."[81] Either social attitudes become ecific in the individuals who seek to communicate among other individuals the individual acts in such a way as to anticipate the responses of e member or members of society with whom he would get along. At all mes language can have meaning only in the context of consciousness, e individual mind interacting with the group mind. Words are always mbolic of situations. "We cannot compare mere verbalizations -- we st also correlate the situations behind them."[82]

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79 Ibid, Vol.2, p.234.
80 Burke, Kenneth, Permanence and Change, p.220.
81 Ibid, p.223.
82 Ibid. p.233.

In the Philosophy of Literary Form, Burke shows signs of shifting ground from the naturalistic approach to the poetic process, to a e rationalistic approach. The passion for categorical thinking is inning to loom even more clearly on the horizon of his mind. The sym- ic dance of the individual with society in the universal enterprise of ression is beginning to take on the proportions of the dialectic in ch the moments of activity are much more sharply defined. This is not say that Burke rejects his naturalism. From here on one will find a ater concern with the objectivity of the poem. But the task of main- ning a dynamic process of reciprocation between the poet and his ature, the poem is becoming more difficult. The poetic process with its matic quality is becoming methodized and the inevitable result is lectical criticism in which drama is not likely to live. Imaginative ks of art are strategic answers to the questions which arise in particular tuations. He therefore proposes

> "an initial working distinction between 'strategies' and 'situations', whereby we think of poetry (I here use the term to include any work of critical or imaginative cast) as the adopting of various strategies for the encompassing of situations. These strategies size up the situations, name their structure and outstanding ingredients, and name them in a way that contains an attitude towards them.
>
> This point of view does not, by any means, vow us to personal or historical subjectivism. The situations are real; the strategies for handling them have public content; and in so far as situations overlap from individual to individual, or from one historical period to another, the strategies possess universal relevance." 83

These poetic strategies are the culmination of the poetic process. the first place, the poet is in the state of a dream where the unconscious subconscious factors in a poem are nascent. In the state of prayer,

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83 Burke, Kenneth, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p.1.

poet seeks to communicate his feeling to a public by means of a form, communicative structure. Finally, at the level of chart, the strategy the poet has been worked out. In chart, we have "the realistic sizing-of situations that is sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, in poetic ategies."[84] Here one feels already the cooperative and reciprocal rit giving way to the spirit of war and strife. The harmony of indi-ual with Spirit or Society in Croce's or Mead's sense is giving way to struggle of the individual with class. The poetic process is organis-ally related to the same grim dynamics.

Burke sums up his approach to language and poetry as symbolic action. e symbolic act is the dancing of an attitude. . . . In this attitudinizing the poem, the whole body may finally become involved, in ways suggested the doctrines of behaviorism."[85] But as in Mead, this body which omes involved in the poetic process is an intellectual entity as well a biological entity (as if in Burke's terms these two were not ultimately same thing). The poem is objective because the motivation of an author synonymous with the structural way in which he puts event and values gether when he writes. The total contextual relation is probably un-nscious. Without knowing anything about Coleridge or his poetry, one uld read the Ancient Mariner and perceive how the loathsome snakes were ansformed into something blessed. We would recognize how the poet dured his sufferings under the sun and enjoyed his cure under the moon.

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84 Ibid, p.6.
85 Ibid, p.9.

e develops this theme characteristically as follows, clearly showing
n his categorical turn of mind.

"We would have some 'equations' to work one, as the Sun is 'like God's own head', and the 'loon' whose cure began when 'the moving moon went up the sky', was laved by a curative rain that, in ending the state of drought, filled 'silly buckets'; and when the Mariner entered the pilot's boat the Pilot's boy, 'who now doth crazy go', called him the Devil. We may also see inklings of a 'problem of marriage', in the setting of the poem, and in the closing explicit statement as to a preference for church over marriage."[86]

uage as expression gives way to language as strategy or control in
te. As his concept of society becomes more logical and categorical,
individual is reduced to abstraction while in Mead, Language was a
ns of fulfilment. Mead preserves personality by his own voluntarism
sting on the priority of will independent of any social context as
eridge had on the independence of the will in the imaginative context.
tem is the destroyer of the creative will and is the effective killer
both the poet and the art object in Burke by reducing them to the ab-
ct Marxian concept of society.

V - THE IRONY OF SYNECDOCHE

In Burke's scheme, language as the reciprocal expression of self and
iety is most fully signified in the basic trope of synecdoche. Synec-
he is "

"the figure of speech wherein the part is used for the whole, the whole for the part, the container for the thing contained, the cause

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86 Ibid, p.24.

for the effect, the effect for the cause, etc. The more I examine both the structure of poetry and structure of human relations outside of poetry, the more I become convinced that this is the basic figure of speech, and that it occurs in many modes besides that of the formal trope."[87]

lance at the following illustrations of Burke's use of synecdoche will eal the mechanistic way in which the part symbolizes the whole. The bolic treatment of Coleridge's The Ancient Mariner has already been cussed and certain symbols in the poem were found to be relevant to the t's own personal experience, as he stated his own values on the subject marriage. It will also be found that the images in poems constitute :bolic clusters or wholes which are represented by the specific images the poem. Thus,

"the albatross, we are told, came through the fog 'As if it had been a Christian soul', and the Sun that avenges the murder is said to be 'like God's own head'. In the Aeolian Harp we are told that Sarah, the poet's wife, who biddeth the poet walk humbly with his God, is a 'Meek Daughter in the family of Christ.' Sarah and the Albatross are thus seen to be in the same equational cluster."[88]

rke goes on to point out that the same fears and feelings of guilt which sessed Coleridge's soul also drove on the Mariner's ship. Burke apolo- zes for appearing to reduce the poetic process in Coleridge to his rital troubles and suffering from drugs but he continues:

"My position is this: that if we try to discover what the poem is doing for the poet, we may discover a set of generalizations as to what poems do for everybody. With these in mind, we have cues for analyzing the sort of eventfulness that the poem contains. And in

87 Ibid, p.25-26.
88 Ibid, p.71.

analyzing this eventfulness, we shall make basic discoveries about the structure of the work itself."[89]

can substitute the part for the whole, the whole for the part because se pairs belong to the same whole, to the same associational cluster. symbolic motives in the poem are always moving toward a fullness of perience which is ideally represented by the whole, a kind of ontological metaphysical integrity which underlies all existence. Things which pear to be opposed to one another in reality are manifestations of the ne whole, the same associational cluster.

In this whole discussion one is once again reminded of Croce's critique Hegel wherein he, Croce, distinguished between a destructive unity of posites and a dynamic unity of distincts. "A distinct concept[89a] is presupsed by and lives in its other which follows it in the sequence of ideas." stincts are degrees of reality of which the lower is the foundation of e higher but can stand quite apart from the higher. Distincts are not emselves opposites but they are each in themselves a synthesis of opposes, a synecdochal representation of the whole unity underlying the spefic symbol. Beauty is a distinct because it has ugliness within it -- a degree or stage of development and not as an opposite or negation of self. To particularize or to distinguish the concepts is not to exnguish, negate or annihilate it. At the same time the distinct is not omething outside the unity of spirit. Together unity and distinct are paradoxical whole. The realm of particular symbols is not classifiable

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89 Ibid, p.73.
89a Supra, pp.34-5, Note 39.

o species under genera but are conceived as degrees of development as particular symbols at all times manifest the absolute rather than stentially contradict one another.[90]

Speaking of synecdoche as the basic figure of speech, Burke himself ks up the Hegelian formula that 'everything is its other' and notices same distinction as does Croce between a unity of distincts versus nity of opposites.

> "We have the polar kind of otherness, as a certain kind of villainy is implicit in a certain kind of heroism, and vice versa. And we have synecdochic otherness, as the beloved's house may represent the beloved (or, as the ship on which the Mariner voyages represents the Mariner's own mental and bodily symptoms). Polar otherness unites things that are <u>opposite to</u> one another; synecdochic otherness unites things that are simply <u>different from</u> one another. The beloved's house is not <u>opposite to</u> the beloved, but merely <u>different from</u> the beloved."[91]

There is the same effort here to avoid the destructive quality of ;elian or Marxian logic in which certain particular objects are said be opposites of one another in such a way that the existence of the ;ating force destroys the object of which it is the antithesis. When ·ke spoke of the self, it was noticed how he referred to the "kill" as iecessary stage in the process of identification or transformation by ans of which the poet took on a new form and yet remained himself. He uld remain himself only as he was developing toward a fulfilment of his culties and not as he was literally destroyed or so made over as to lose s former identity.

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91 Burke, Kenneth, <u>The Philosophy of Literary Form</u>, p.77-78.

The next step in Burke's analysis of the account of poetic creation
o introduce the concept of drama into relation with his concept of
cdoche, i.e. he now tries to equate drama with dialectic. At this
it we see how Burke is trying to confine the dialectical movement of
mind to a dynamic level rather than to a logical or categorical level.
s as distrustful of Marxian materialism as Croce was of Hegel's epis-
logical idealism. On the naturalistic level he wants the same dynamic
lity of "expression" which Croce sought on the intuitive or Spiritual level.
s at this point that Burke seems to rely on G. H. Mead, the naturalistic
gmatist rather than the historical materialist, Karl Marx. Mead says
t

> "the mind is simply the interplay of such gestures in the form of significant symbols. We must remember that the gesture is there only in its relationship to the response, to the attitude. One would not have words unless there were such responses. Language would never have arisen as a set of bare arbitrary terms which were attached to certain stimuli. Words have arisen out of a social interrelationship."[92]

ke makes the same point as Croce on the political level and his analogy
a brilliant illustration of the total theme of his work. He wants to
stitute "competitive collaboration" for "competitive destruction",
bellum purificandum that the disease of cooperation known as war may
cured. Burke feels justified in equating drama with dialectic because
is the dynamic and constructive kind of dialectic which he has in mind.
in Plato.

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92 Mead, op.cit.,p.189.

"Inimical assertions are invited to collaborate in the perfecting of the assertion. In fact, the greatest menace to dictatorships lies in the fact that, through their 'efficiency' in silencing the enemy they deprive themselves of competitive collaboration. Their assertion lacks the opportunity to mature through 'agonistic' development. By putting the quietus upon their opponent, they bring themselves all the more rudely against the unanswerable opponent, the opponent who cannot be refuted, the nature of brute reality itself. In so far as their chart of meanings is inadequate as a description of the scene, it is not equipped to encompass the scene. And by silencing the opponent, it deprives itself of the full value to be got from the 'collective revelation' to the maturing of which a vocal opposition radically contributes."[93]

yet it is by means of "collective revelation" in a social structure meanings that the individual forms and comes to know himself. There no wrong charts or strategies for coping with situations; they are ely different degrees of approximation to the truth. Out of the unending versation of language as described by G. H. Mead the individual in peration with society creates <u>tools</u> which help everyone to achieve the lness of character of which they are individually capable.

"It is, then, my contention, that if we approach poetry from the standpoint of situations and <u>strategies</u>, we can make the most relevant observations about both the content and form of poems. By starting from a concern with the various tactics and deployments involved in ritualistic acts of membership, purification and opposition, we can most accurately discover 'what is going on' in poetry. I contend that the 'dramatic perspective' is the unifying hub for this approach."[94]

e significant difference in Mead and Burke is signified by their choice terms to describe social adjustment. Mead talks of tools but Burke lks of strategies. Mead is interested in cooperation of individual

93 Burke, Kenneth, <u>The Philosophy of Literary Form</u>, p.107-8.
94 <u>Ibid</u>, p.124.

society as a means of personal fulfillment while Burke still sees iety as a human barnyard in which the individual fights a grim but nic strife for survival. The tendency towards depersonalization in ms of the social group rather than the tendency towards personal lization is more predominant.

In the examination of all the previous idealists, there was found the e distrust of sharp dichotomies and oppositions. Croce had protested ongly against the false distinctions between form and content, between te and art, between beauty and ugliness. Ugliness could not exist ept as an inadequate expression which in his terms would be an incomplete ression. In a similar manner Burke has protested against the idea of ng charts or strategies for coping with situations. He now takes up issue between semantic and poetic meaning and in a manner of address ch is consistent with the previous pattern of his thinking, he says ly be a kind of 'synecdochic fallacy' mistaking a part for the whole, this opposition appear to exist."[95] Semantic meaning is a precise empirical manner of definition. Ideally, says Burke, the semantic finition of a chair would be such that, on the basis of the definition, ople would know what you wanted when you asked for one. Semantic ning is a way of pointing to a chair while poetic meaning is weighted h emotional values, attitudes. Poetic meaning cannot be said to be ght or wrong. Burke's illustration of the idealistic philosophy of error stated well in the following passage:

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95 Ibid, p.139.

"Meaning, when used in the sense of 'correct meaning', leads to an either-or approach. 'New York City is in Iowa' could, by the either-or principles, promptly be ruled out. The either-or test would represent the semantic ideal. But I am sorry to have to admit that, by the poetic ideal, 'New York City is in Iowa' could not be ruled out.

"Has one ever stood, for instance, in some little outlying town, on the edge of the wilderness, and watched a train go by? Has one perhaps suddenly felt that the train, and its tracks, were a kind of arm of the city, reaching out across the continent, quite as though it were simply Broadway itself extended? It is in such a sense that New York City can be found all over the country — and I submit that one would miss very important meanings, meanings that have much to do with the conduct of our inhabitants, were he to proceed here by the either-or kind of test.

"'New York City is in Iowa' is 'poetically' true. As a metaphor, it provides valid insight. To have ruled it out, by strict semantic authority, would have been vandalism." 96

can see here that the semantical approach is the logical approach from h all dramatic quality has been eliminated. In poetic meaning there ramatic development in which the truth is expanding as by a set of entric circles ever widening in its comprehension until the fullness ruth is comprehended, and within the context of the circles all par- lar experiences are both related to each other and to the fullness of th of which they are an ever-revealing part. It is by means of ex- ssion, by fulfillment that the emptiness of a more formal logic is ided.

Burke's attempt to solve the paradox of the identity of subject and ect in his philosophy of action reaches its fullest and most complex ression in his A Grammar of Motives. To solve such a problem the alist must establish the fundamental basic existence of the poles or rdinates in the relationship to the basic principle of unity or identity.

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96 Ibid, p.144.

s Plato in opposing Non-Being to Being was careful to point out that -Being was not mere Nothing but was rather an assertion of the negation the existence of Being. If non-Being were Nothing then Being could rcely be said to have a real opposite at all and the means of relating mediating between Being and the ultimate unity of the universe would be ossible. Hegel had seen this difficulty, of course, but his logical lectic involved the complete destruction of Being by Non-Being. Croce hasized the importance of the dialectic as a developmental process in ch the principle of Antithesis was a principle of otherness rather than rinciple of nothingness and the process of mediating between the world existence and the unity of spirit which underlies all things was de- opmental rather than purely dialectical. Coleridge had pointed out t the dichotomy of existence and its opposite continually set up op- itions which made ultimate unity impossible and so in addition to the .es of thesis and antithesis, he introduces a principle of Unity as an solute Idea presupposed in all acts of knowledge.[97]

If Coleridge was sufficiently concerned to preserve the existence of e poles of action in the development of the dialectic towards its ful- lment in the unity of thought, Burke as a more dogmatic naturalist was en more concerned. As a typical pragmatist, he was anxious to avoid e metaphysical speculations of a philosopher like Coleridge. To accom- ish this end, he actually built up an even more complicated system to tablish the existence of the poles on the process of action. If Coleridge

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97 **Supra**, p.51-52.

ored his principle of trichotomy to save existence from the ravages
ichotomy, Burke may be said to have outdone all previous idealists
his pentad, or shall we say, his pentachotomy of dramatism. In the
ginal idealistic triad, one had the agent acting in terms of his environ-
t, in terms of a purpose which was a manifestation of the unity under-
ng both the agent and the environment with which the agent was reacting.
e now distinguishes further the act as the event which took place, the
nt (that person or kind of person he is or was) and the agency, the means
instrument used by the agent. By this means, Burke hopes to analyze
e carefully the nature of action itself. But the elaborate structure
dramatism as defined by Burke does not help us to understand the object
creative action. Such an elaborate rational tool conceptualizes our
erstanding of the object to the point where its objectivity is lost in a
yrinth.

Paradoxically, this elaborate structure to preserve the particularity
existence promptly moves inevitably towards the destruction of existence
n the dramatic process begins. The act is simply the scene made more
licit.

> "Using 'scene' in the sense of setting, or background, and 'act' in the sense of action, one could say that 'the scene contains the act'. And using 'agents' in the sense of actors, or acters, one could say that 'the scene contains the agents'.
>
> "It is a principle of drama that the nature of acts and agents should be consistent with the nature of the scene. And whereas comic and grotesque works may deliberately set these elements at odds with one another, audiences make allowance for such liberty, which re-affirms the same principle of consistency in its very violation."[98]

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98 Burke, Kenneth, A Grammar of Motives, p.3.

integration of the five elements of dramatism is illustrated in Burke's ount of Ibsen's An Enemy of the People in which the scene-act ratio is dominant.

"The whole plot is that of an internality directed outwards. We progress by stages from a scene (reported) wherein the plan of social purification was conceived in loneliness, to the scene in his study where the hero announces in the exaltation of a dramatic finale: 'The strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone'. The pronouncement is modified by the situation in which it is uttered: As Dr. Stockmann speaks, he is surrounded by a loyal and admiring family circle, and his educational plan calls not for complete independence, but for cooperation. He is not setting himself up as the strongest man in the world, but merely as one headed in the same direction. And, with the exception of his brother Peter, we may consider his family circle as aspects of his own identity, being under the aegis of 'loneliness' since it began so and retains the quality of its ancestry."[99]

In the same way, the scene-agent ratio is a synecdochic relation. Wordsworth's sonnet, "It is a beauteous evening, calm and free,"

"by selecting a religious image in which to convey the purely naturalistic sense of hush, the octave infuses the natural scene with hints of a wider circumference, supernatural in scope. The sestet turns from scene to agent; indeed, the octave is all scene, the sestet all agent. But by the logic of the scene-agent ratio, if the scene is supernatural in quality, the agent contained by this scene will partake of the same supernatural quality. And so, spontaneously, purely by being the kind of agent that is at one with this kind of scene, the child is 'divine'. The contents of a divine container will synecdochically share in its divinity."[100]

At the same time that Burke is emphasizing the synecdochic quality the ratios of the elements of dramatism, he is careful to limit its inction in the ratio of act and agent.

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99 Ibid, p.5.
100 Ibid, p.8.

"Both act and agent require scenes that 'contain' them. Hence the scene-act and scene-agent ratios are in the fullest sense positive (or positional). But the relation between act and agent is not quite the same. The agent does not 'contain' the act, though its results might be said to 'pre-exist' virtually within him. And the act does not 'synecdochically share' in the agent, though certain ways of acting may be said to induce corresponding moods or traits of character. To this writer, at least, the act-agent ratio more strongly suggests a temporal or sequential relationship than a purely positional or geometric one."[101]

passage summarizes once again the conflict between will and idea, een creator and creature, between thinker and the object of his conlation. It is obvious that the trope of synechdoche is not effective description of temporal relationships. In order to establish the tence of poet and poem, time is an essential factor. And so then e is willing to allow full scope to synecdoche in the relation of act agent to scene but he realizes that a sort of poetic solipsism would lt if he were unable to distinguish between act and agent. At this it, he must forsake his oft-stated premise that synecdoche is the basic pe of language.

The process of dramatism with its basic figure of synecdoche reveals paradox of substance or in Burke's terms the irony of contextual inition. It was seen previously how Ransom and Brooks and Tate got o difficulties with texture or context as a background for existence. t as in their situations, texture was strongly inclined to absorb the lity of existence in its all-embracing internal relations, so Burke tends with the same problem here and he is not helped particularly his choice of Spinoza whose doctrine of substance he tries so desperately

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101 Ibid, pp.14-15.

naturalize into a meaningful context for existence. To avoid Spinoza's ditional monism, Burke parallels two types of definition, contextual nition which stresses placement and ancestral definition which stresses vation. These he tries to interweave by specifying two kinds of stance; geometric substance which is more closely akin to the spirit of ecdoche and familial substance which is biological and hence derivative. naturalizing geometric substance, Burke reaffirms the necessity of ex- ence in the synecdochic relation. Directional substance is a means tying up motivation and purpose, of knitting the contradictions of the adox by sacrificing the self in a cause the fulfillment of which must vitably result in advantages for the agent involved in the cause. To Burke's verbalization of the paradox of directional substance, "such ents are directional in that, being led up to and away from, they sum- ize the foregoing and seminally contain the subsequent."[102] Finally lectical substance, is the

> "over-all category of dramatism, which treats of human motives in terms of verbal action. By this statement we most decidedly do not mean that human motives are confined to the realm of verbal action. We mean rather that the dramatistic analysis of motives has its point of departure in the subject of verbal action (in thought, speech and document)."

ediately one recognizes the teleological movement of the dialectic ard unity of thought and transcendence of existence. The naturalistic rtones make the form of the dialectic more in the Marxian than the ictly neo-Hegelian tradition. The application of Burke's idealistic ology to aesthetics becomes clear in such a passage as that which follows:

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102 Ibid, p.32.

"A poem, by shifting the imagery of its metaphors, permits us to contemplate the subject from the standpoint of various objects. This effect is dialectical in the sense that we see something in terms of some other. In a more restricted sense, however, the dialectical considers things in terms not of some other, but of the other."[103]

The poetic act must have a universal paradigm in the Act of Creation. naturalist. Burke is in difficulties here because he must face the lem of the distinction between process and reality, between what he s the Act of Creation and the Process of Evolution, between what the ents called Being and Becoming. Ultimately, Burke states that he is ussing Creation

"not as a temporal event, but as the logical prototype of an act. Indeed, even if one believed it literally, one would hardly be justified in treating it as a temporal event, since it was itself the positing of time; it was the act that set up the conditions of temporal development; hence a terminology that reduced it to terms of time would lack sufficient scope. Thus, even a literal believer would have to treat it in terms that placed it rather, at an intersection of time and the timeless --- a point at which we place ourselves when we discuss it in terms of those non-temporal firsts called 'principles'."[104]

e again Burke gives himself away completely. He wants a system which ches beyond time and yet he wishes to be completely in control of the uation. His "strategy" is a clever one in which he becomes out-smarted. if he would sacrifice time, he must sacrifice existence. His scope l be extended to the fullness of rational unity but its transcending er of relating all things to one another must dissolve all existence h the aqua regia of dialectic.

It now would seem that this initial or first creative act must have oduced something out of nothing.

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[103] Ibid., p.64.

"This enables us to equate magic with novelty --- and leads us to look for a modicum of magic in every act to the extent that the act possesses a modicum of novelty. This consideration also admonishes us, however, to make a distinction between 'true' and 'false' magic. 'False' magic is a quasi-scientific ideal that would suspend the laws of motion, as in the attempt to coerce natural forces by purely ritualistic means. 'True' magic is an aspect not of motion but of action. And if the motives properly assignable to scene, agent, agency and purpose are already given, there could be novelty only if we could also assign motives under the heading of act itself. That is, there would be something new intrinsic to the act; and this novelty would be the modicum of motivation assignable under the heading of act rather than under the heading of the other four terms, singly or in combination. There must, in brief, be some respect in which the act is a cause sui, a motive of itself."[105]

This whole passage is analogous to the discussion of Croce concerning ıdo-Statements and pure statements, pure concepts and pseudo-concepts. ıre concept resolves contradictions in terms of the spiritual unity of ch it is the manifestation while a pseudo-concept is quasi-scientific that it eliminates from meaning any of the spiritual or emotional over- es. Burke seems to admit the element of the irrational as the place re objectivity both of the creative self and its object may exist. He s in Coleridge the point where this element of novelty made poetry the n analogue of creation." At this point, however, he makes a signifi- ıt comment about Coleridge's dictum:

"that formula was obscured by the idealist stress upon agent, as locus of the "shaping spirit of imagination" by which we give forth that which we receive, since 'in our life alone does Nature live.' And to glimpse more clearly the independent claims of the term act, we might better go back to Spinoza who, mediating between the mediaeval and the modern, defined the universal Substance as the 'cause of itself'.

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105 Ibid, p.66.

God would thus be perfect action, in that there would be no motivating principle beyond his own nature (a consideration, incidentally, that enables us to see why Spinoza would equate God and Nature)." 106

this statement of Burke's reveals again his recurrent weakness. He s not see as did Coleridge that God without the motivating principle ld not be God at all. He does not see that to equate God and Nature in Spinozistic sense is to sacrifice all specific identity without any e of recovery of the self or of any other kind of particularity. Pure cannot exist without an actor and we are once again back to the problem synecdoche as the basic trope of language over against the naturalistic ertion of the creative will. One cannot be first without the other and h a paradox makes the attempt to reduce drama to order impossible in ke's terms.

In order to avoid losing the individual in the vortex of the Absolute ke resorts to the device of the circle or circumference which William es as well as Croce and Hegel all used.

"If we locate the human agent and his act in terms of a scene whose orbit is broad enough to include the concept of a supernatural Creator, we get a different kind of definition than if our location were confined to a narrower circumference that eliminated reference to the 'supernatural' as a motivating element in the scene, and did not permit the scenic scope to extend beyond the outer limits of 'nature'." 107

the circle expands to the full comprehension of unity, it supersedes e circumferences of the various agents in its development but it does not clude them nor destroy them. Rather it includes them and by the conuual expansion towards fulfillment, each of the participants at various vels has deeper insights into reality. Burke sets the motion of the

106 Ibid, p.69, (my italics).
107 Ibid, p.77.

xpanding circumference towards a cultural or social fulfillment. The se-
uence of events is not temporal. Priority rests simply in the priority or
niversality of Spirit (Croce) or culture (Mead and Burke). And so Burke
oncludes,

> "so ar as we can see, this matter of circumference is imbedded in the very nature of terms, and men are continually performing 'new acts', in that they are continually making judgments as to the scope of the context which they implicitly or explicitly impute in their interpretations of motives. To select a set of terms is, by the same token, to select a circumference."[108]

When the idealistic logician's concepts threaten to destroy movement, the
circle is often the means of escape from the dilemma. The trouble is
hat the escape is short-lived for the fugitive must always meet himself
n the circumference of the dialectic and he must return once again to
olve an unsolved problem.

> "The idea of the circle is nothing but the true philosophical idea of <u>progress</u>, of the perpetual growth of the spirit and of reality in itself, where nothing is repeated, save the form of the growth; unless it should be objected to a man walking, that his walking is a standing still, because he always moves his legs in the same time."[109]

The dynamics of this passage are the same as those of Burke who simply
substitutes a naturalistic or cultural context. Croce was particularly
anxious to maintain the reality of self in the ever-expanding circular
movement. Burke has the same aim but he is not as consistent as Croce.
Like Croce, he rejects the idea of a superhuman personality but unlike
Croce, he opposes human personality with a naturalistic impersonality.

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108 <u>Ibid</u>, p.90.
109 Croce, <u>The Essence of Aesthetic</u>, p.79.

e scope and reduction of the dialectical movement of Burke's dramatism stroys the individual.

> "For when the scene was narrowed to a secular circumference, human personality could no longer be 'logically deduced' familially from the divine personality. But it might be vigorously affirmed simply as an 'empirical fact', as part o 'the given' in contrast with any new calculus in which the personality was 'logically reduced' to atomistic, naturalistic terms of impersonality."[110]

In his frequent discussions of the Self, Burke spoke constantly of e necessity of 'the Kill' as a part of the process of identification and ansformation. One can see what Croce meant by the transformation of the ll in the process of intuition as expression because he was operating an idealistic or spiritual level. But to translate this quality of pression into naturalistic terms and deliberately set about 'killing' rsonality by the process of identification, is much more difficult to complish if one is to retain the self in its former identity after the ocess has taken place. Now Burke achieves this feat in a way similar that of other idealists. Coleridge, seeing that the movement of his nd towards a philosophical system involved the destruction of the self, mply abandoned it. Burke, somewhat naively, thinks he can change his ctics and still retain both the system as well as the will. "By a ange in the tactics of grammar, men ceased to think, 'God's personality, erefore human personality' and began to think, 'nature's impersonality, vertheless human personality', the first pair being related consistently, e second oppositionally."[111] Now it was against the impossibility of

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110 Burke, Kenneth, A Grammar of Motives, p.112.
111 Ibid, p.113.

s oppositional explanation of the dialectic that both Coleridge and
ce objected. They were both shrewd enough to abandon what Burke calls
synechdochic principle in its more logical or geometric implications.
eridge wrote his most brilliant criticisms of Kant and Hegel in this
n; Croce rejected this quality of Hegel's logic as 'dead' in favour of
more 'living' and developmental phenomenology. Burke is not sufficiently
re of this difficulty when he tries to retain the advantages of both
d and Marx in his philosophical thinking. He wants Mead's dynamism but
wants Marx's (i.e. Hegel's) system. If he is to give any consistent
ount of the psychology of poetic creation, he cannot have both.

In speaking of the means and ends of his grammar, Burke says

> "our concern is primarily with the analysis of <u>language</u> rather than with the analysis of <u>reality</u>; Language being essentially human, we would view human relations in terms of the linguistic instrument. Not mere 'consciousness of abstracting', but <u>consciousness of linguistic action generally</u>, is needed if men are to temper the absurd ambitions that have their source in faulty terminologies."[112]

Croce, language was expression, the symbol of spiritual self-fulfillment.
Burke, language is the means of communication for the purification of war.
Croce the context of linguistic action is Spirit while in Burke the
ntext is society. Burke's problem is centered in the meaning of the
rm society. One is never sure when "society" is a dynamic medium avail-
le to personality as a tool for self-fulfillment at the practical level
when it is a category in the Marxian fashion which will necessitate
general "killing" of individuals in the realization of the impersonal
d abstract social concept.

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112 <u>Ibid</u>, p.317.

Burke's studies of Keats' Ode to a Grecian Urn, the Ancient Mariner, i Othello are particularly ingenious but they fail to satisfy the nsitive reader; the interpretations are much too conceptualized. The uty of "The Ancient Mariner" is not necessarily enhanced by having s central images related categorically to the morbid aspects of the author's appy domestic life or of his sickly body. The lyrical quality of the ecian Urn is somewhat deadened as Burke resolves all its paradoxes in a ometrical fashion. The poem is more of a lyric if the paradoxes are ft to express their meaning within the harmonious context of the poem a whole, as an existent object independent more or less of the critic's alectical tricks.

Burke firmly believes that the structural quality, rooted in a naturastic setting or scene, linguistically expressing a social and physical ate more than constitutes the objectivity of the poem. There is unubtedly some validity in Burke's observation that Desdemona is the keyone in the dialectic of ownership and theft. As Burke works out his er-schematized account of Shakespeare's drama, one becomes aware of more d more symbols coming constantly into closer and closer internal relationip until one feels a tremendous structural unity, the paradigm of the nguistic relationship of individuals to society, the one the interacting nction of the other. Piously, Burke extends his area of speculation

> "beyond the terminological integration of a single play, in search of an over-all motivational scheme that might account for the shifts from one work to another. I admit that here all tends to grow nebulous. I use the word deliberately, thinking of great gaseous masses

of which solid bodies presumably emerge. But we should keep peering
o these depths too, the farthest reaches of our subject. For here
t lie the ultimate secrets of man, as the symbol-using animal." 113

seeker will peer in vain into that nebulous mass since Burke's
excludes a priori the emergence of any solid mass. Particularity,
vity is indeed far beyond the reach of Burke's critical scheme.

.3 Burke, Kenneth, "Othello: An Essay to Illustrate a Method", Hudson
vol.4, 1951, p.203.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEW CRITICISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE

The central doctrines of Aristotle's Poetics have been frequent topics discussion among the New Critics. As is so often the case with the gesis or interpretation of Aristotle's works, the would-be expositor ds into the text his own opinions. The New Critics recommend enthu-stically that a poem or work of art be allowed to exist for its own e and that the principle of judgment must arise within the work of art. they have not been content to read Aristotelian texts in terms of Ar-totle's system. It will not be difficult to see how John Crowe Ransom Kenneth Burke have read Aristotle from the point of view of an idealist. e the position of the New Criticism on Aristotle's poetic principles been examined, an attempt will be made to suggest the metaphysical sis of these principles in the context of Aristotle's more complete stem. By means of this comparison, the reader will be made more aware the inherent idealistic bias of the New Criticism.

Kenneth Burke makes more direct references to Aristotle than any her of the New Critics. His interpretations of Aristotle are not too curate because his own idealism prevents him from seeing the essential nius of Aristotle's mind and thought. Like J. C. Ransom, he misuses istotle's terms <u>mimesis</u> and <u>katharsis</u>. In true dialectical fashion, rke sets up these two principles as opposite excesses -

"the cathartic poetry which would relieve the poet of his spell by transferring its malignities to his audience, in so far as he was capable of doing so." [1]

s Burke fails to grasp the metaphysical implications of katharsis as the ns of apprehending the true essence of the objective world. As for the erialists the principle of purgation is given a strictly univocal inter- tation. As Burke calls "cathartic poetry" a "monotonic art" he reveals arly his own failure to grasp the analogical quality of Aristotle's theory katharsis.

In the same way, Burke reveals his idealistic bias in his interpretation the mimetic principle. For Burke, the poetry of imitation depends

"on the recognition of the incantatory quality in imagery (its function in inviting us to assume the attitudes corresponding to its gestures), but was disposed towards the strategy of the 'idealistic lie' in simply renaming an evil as a good, establishing solace by magical decree." [2]

e difficulty here lies in the fact that Burke confuses, perhaps purposely, e terms 'incantatory' and 'revelatory'. For Aristotle, Mimesis was a ans of apprehending the real or central or individual essence of an ex- ting object. The process was not one of incantation in which the poet would njure up an image which fulfilled a need of his soul or subjective mind ch in the fashion of a primitive worshipper of nature. On the contrary, mesis was a stern methodical process guided by a rigorous logic at every rn of the mind's search. By a process of careful classification of data

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1 Burke, Kenneth, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p.118.
2 Ibid, p.118-119.

oth the mind and of the senses, one was able to apprehend the particu-
.zed universal, the objective reality of the external object under ex-
ıation.

In the same way, Burke misinterprets the Aristotelian principles of
ıarsis and mimesis as christianized in the Holy Eucharist. Just as he can-
distinguish between the function of katharsis as spiritual development
the physical fact of purgation, so he cannot distinguish between the
y Eucharist as a sacrament and as a ritual purification. His difficulty of
erpretation begins when he sets up an opposition between 'scientific'
'symbolic' processes. According to Burke, the primitive rite of puri-
ation was a scientific process in which purification was accomplished
ply by the material operations of the rite.

> "No matter of conscience was involved; no private "belief" was thought necessary to the success of the rite. The purification was, rather, thought to operate like the cures of modern medicine (from the mere performing of the correct material acts themselves) — as the effects of castor oil are the same with 'believer' and 'non-believer' alike." 3

'ke's idealistic heresy is made more explicit in the passage which follows:

> "Theological tacticians had the problem of taking over the 'scientific' magic of paganism and introducing a religious emphasis upon the need of belief as a factor in the effectiveness of the rite, without thereby implying that the rite was purely 'symbolic'. The magical doctrine was 'realistic'; and similarly, the religious sacrament was 'realistic' (that is, the rite was held <u>really</u> to have transubstantiated the holy wafers and the wine into the body and blood of Christ: the act was not deemed merely 'symbolical' except among schismatics; it was as materialistic a means of purification as castor oil, yet at the same time its effective operation required the collaboration of belief, as castor

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3 <u>Ibid</u>, p.121.

oil does not; the effect could not be got, as with pagan magic and scientific materialism, through the objective operation alone, i.e. ex opere operato." 3a

The problem here centres around the question of what is real. Burke ys that the magical doctrine is 'realistic' and he presumably means alistic in the empirical sense. And so he commits his first theological nder when he interprets transubstantation on an univocal and materialis- level. The wafer and the wine are not transubstantiated in a material nse at all but only in the sense that the suppliant with the aid of the iest and the church becomes aware of the individual and specific essence the body and blood of Christ as he died on the Cross of Calvary for a ry definite purpose. On the one hand, the elements of the Eucharist nnot remain on the purely symbolic level if we are to avoid the charge religious subjectivism and hence of religious scepticism, in the negative nse of that word. On the other hand, Christian doctrine certainly does t teach that the process of transubstantiation is a purely carnal one. ther it is a process in which one becomes aware analogically of the person d cause of Christ, which in this process are identical. The process is no physical sense purgative or incantatory. It is spiritual and existential.

It was just such a function as this which Aristophanes, and Sophocles had mind as the function of comedy and tragedy in Greek society. Aristotle had en the weakness of Plato's position in reducing ethics and aesthetics to his nistic metaphysics and Aristotle was anxious to preserve the individu- ity of the work of art as well as the individual will of man. But

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3a Loc.cit., p.121.

re is little real metaphysical evidence that he intended to set himself as a thorough-going materialist. If Ransom, for example, thinks that stotle was such a materialist and finds the Stagirite lacking in a the- gical sense, he must never have given very serious attention to Aris- le's Book Lambda in the Metaphysics. The drama was a means of discovering reality of the universe and the place of man in its order. As the hartic process took place, the audience had its mind gradually focussed the centre of action in the characters who in the nobility of their ception were contending with the real issues of all human action. The ywright was not here giving the audience the advantages of his own private antations nor the latest physical cure for the disease of the body. He here aiming to reveal the essential nature of human character and to icate in a creative way the most effective responses to one's environment, ponses which would contribute to the greater fullness of life for each indi- ual who witnessed the action. As the poet imitates noble actions, he s not seek to give materialistic representations but rather he seeks give his audience an awareness of the inner reality of individual ex- iences. In one sense, the tortures of Oedipus are the tortures of all . We witness the tragedy of a man first of all and last of all, but in tragedy of that man we see the universal tragedy of all mankind. The ultant cathartic experience for the audience is not a subjective experi- e but an objective awareness of qualities in human conduct which are rnal. Contrary to Burke's opinion, Aristotle does not back any psycho- lytic thesis of tragedy making for a state of resignation or acceptance the part of the audience. Burke says that

" by the psychoanalytic thesis this state of resignation is produced through fusing, in aesthetic symbols, mental conflicts which cannot be fused in the practical sphere." [4]

ne would understand Aristotle, his work must not be confused with d. Aristotle never once leaves the practical sphere in his account of edy. It was just this departure from the practical sphere for which riticized the Platonists so severely. Burke's dialectical mind forces to make constant dualisms between the practical and the aesthetic. edy for Aristotle was a metaphysical process in which the individual came to a fuller awareness of itself without losing its individuality.

In "The World's Body" Ransom opens his discussion of Aristotle on Cathartic Principle" with an attack on the famous 19th Century critics, Arthur Quiller-Couch [5] and his preceptor S. H. Butcher [6]. Ransom s that Butcher and Quiller-Couch are derived from a long line of German heticians who have tried to render Aristotle's rather crude and realistic ogy for poetry in more sympathetic language. In short, Ransom believes Butcher and his contemporaries rather implausibly try to show that totle loved poetry as much as he loved the sciences. Ransom shares with nquet[7] and Bernays[8] the conviction that "Aristotle's view of catharsis simply that of an act of elimination." He is sharply critical of

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4 Ibid, p.320.
5 Quiller-Couch, Sir Arthur, The Poet as Citizen, and Other Papers.
6 Butcher, Samuel H., Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, with ritical text and translation of The Poetics, third edition, London, Mac-lan and Co., 1902.
7 Bosanquet, Bernard, History of Aesthetic, second edition, George en and Unwin Ltd., 1949.
8 Bernays, Jacob, Zwei Abhandlung über die Aristotelische Theorie des Drama, lin, 1880.

her for such an extension or development of the idea of catharsis as
ows:

"Tragedy, then, does more than effect the homoeopathic cure of certain passions. Its function on this view is not merely to provide an outlet for pity and fear, but to provide for them a distinctively aesthetic satisfaction to purify and clarify them by passing them through the medium of art." 9

her is accused of reading into Aristotle's doctrine of catharsis a qua-
which a strictly literal reading will not allow. Again in the following
age Ransom firmly believes that Butcher is interpreting Aristotle in
context of Victorian Liberal thought giving the Poetics a pious and
.e tone completely out of harmony with the rather pragmatic if not
iavellian tone of Aristotle's practical treatises.

"The tragic katharsis requires that suffering shall be exhibited in one of its comprehensive aspects; and the deeds and fortunes of the actors shall attach themselves to larger issues, and the spectator himself be lifted above the special case and brought face to face with universal law and the divine plan of the world."10

sover, the tone is false particularly for Ransom since he will acknow-
ge Aristotle only as a naturalist who conceived of all knowledge as strict-
scientific.

Ransom dismisses the sense of religious and moral activity in catharsis
ch Butcher stresses, on the grounds that God is not in any sense divine
Aristotle. God is simply the top of a hierarchy of substances - the

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9 Butcher, Op.cit., pp.254-255.
10 Ibid, p.271.

'e completion of a natural series. He tolerated religion simply as a ns by which the Greeks worked off their orgiastic rites from time to ie.

Ransom believes that Aristotle had as much contempt for the emotions pity and fear as he did for mysticism or the expression of emotion in giastic rites. Music was a pragmatic instrument to purge the Greeks their enthusiasm and tragedy was to purge them of their sense of cosmic il. In short, Ransom feels that Butcher is unjustified in his metaphysical terpretation of catharsis and argues that Aristotle's opinion

> "was that of a man with a medical training; it amounted to saying that people had better make the most of a delicate situation, and it was precisely like the point of view of a modern authroity legalizing prostitution in the neighborhood of the camp."[11]

Ransom confuses his own conviction that Aristotle's analogy of katharsis inept in the following passage and feels that it is better to reject the eory as such than it is to save it in terms of Nineteenth Century liberal eology.

> "Katharsis is a gross physiological metaphor out of materia medica, whereby the draining of the poisonous slops from the body is made to stand for the subtle psychic relief under the fourth figure of metaphorical substitution, which proceeds by analogy; this would be according to Aristotle. He does not miss in his linguistic analysis, but he is not so proficient in the psychic mysteries. If he is sometimes a pre-Darwinian naturalist, he makes it all too clear that psychologically, for all his shrewdness, he dwells in an untechnical pre-Freudian night. For my part, I cannot help but find this figure of purgation

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11 Ransom, J. C., The World's Body, p.189.

inept; it is too hard to apply it and see how the clearing out of the painful emotions must follow from artificially prompting them; there must be subtler mechanisms at work."[12]

Ransom interprets Aristotle's mimetic principle on the same naturalistic as he did katharsis. He says that Aristotle meant simply that the object should look natural, not strange.

"Aristotle did not talk about art as an imitation of nature trying surreptitiously to convey the metaphysical "Behind-Nature" ; that is, suggesting Big Ideas or a Higher Reality or a Concrete Universal or Absolute. It simply didn't. Nor did he regard art as entertaining that easier and not less noble project, the communication of moral universals. Nor, finally, did he think of it as a handmaiden to science (which he loved), busying itself in supplying case-illustrations for common universals of any sort."[13]

Ransom suggests that there are only two ways of imitating nature, one which records the universal relations in nature and the other which merely a full representation of nature in an empirical sense of that "representation". He does not mean a photographic likeness since the photograph is a mechanical imitation but not a psychological one. Although Ransom is not willing to recognize in the picture or poem anything more moral than the physical representation, he does value "the arduous pains of the artist". A photograph is characterless while the art-object reflects and stimulates in us a deeply personal feeling. Ransom denies that Aristotle means by imitation anything more than the physical. He suggests that the only distinction between a natural object and an art-object is the subjective contribution on the part of the artist.

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12 Ransom, J. C., The Literary Criticism of Aristotle, in Lectures in Criticism, The Johns Hopkins University, The Bellingen Series XVI, Pantheon Books Inc., New York, 1949, p.29.

13 Ransom, J. C., The World's Body, pp.203-204.

t is remarkable that one who has argued for objectivity in poetry,
ontology of poetry, should fail so completely to grasp Aristotle's
g in the doctrines of katharsis and of imitation. Probably his basic
lies in the reading of the **Poetics** as a separate work without relation
of Aristotle's major works. Perhaps his basic misinterpretation lies
fact that the Nicomachean Ethics and not the Metaphysics was his
for a time.[14] It is only natural that he would find Aristotle an
sfactory basis for literary criticism if he would insist on reading
etics without relating the work to its context in Aristotle's meta-
al thinking. It is indeed true that Butcher and Quiller-Couch may
ected to some extent by the liberal optimism of Nineteenth Century
stic thought. But at no point will their scholarship allow them to
ome of the extravagant statements uttered by Ransom. In the light
stotle's metaphysical teaching it is quite wrong to reduce the meaning
harsis and imitation to such a univocal interpretation on the natura-
level alone. There is ample evidence both in Plato and in the prac-
of Greek religion to the effect that katharsis meant purification
enduring substantial quality as well as physical expulsion. It is
to assume that the several meanings of katharsis which have been ad-
contain degrees of truth for the most part.

If there is a degree of truth in all the definitions of katharsis
nt to Aristotle's general position some basis for apprehending the
ity of meaning in each must exist; i.e. it must be possible to dis-
some coherent pattern of meaning persisting throughout the extensive

14 Ransom, J.C., "Humanism at Chicago," The Kenyon Review, vol. 14, 1952.

varied use of the term. Such a concept can never be comprehended at level of clear and distinct ideas. We can, for example, grasp some ies of existence abstractedly apart from other phases with which they are ined in rerum natura. Man, animal, colour, two, and most of the res- ted concepts of common speech are univocal i.e. clear and distinct in .onal terms. More inclusive concepts, such as the idea of goodness, ity, unity and now to add one more, katharsis can be known only by analogy. .ogy as a method of thought stands in opposition to the univocal method hose who seek to reduce definitions to the level of one clear and dis- t idea. An analogous concept is one

"by which the broader metaphysical modes of being, such as being, unity, matter, etc., are grasped in terms of a minimal, proportional similarity. Even though A is dissimilar to B and C to D, the relation of A to C may be similar to the relation of B to D. Thus one thing may be quite dissimilar to another, as may also their existences. Yet as the first is to its existence, so is the second to its existence. In this way existence and other metaphysical concepts of a very broad scope may be grasped not by a univocal concept but analogously by an analogous concept."[15]

Therefore, we can, on the basis of analogy retain the common element of th in all these definitions of katharsis including the moral one on the con- lon that we do not seek a strictly univocal definition of katharsis. sing[16] had insisted upon a moral definition of katharsis as the "con- sion of passions into virtuous aptitudes"/ Aristotle actually distin- shed between tragic katharsis as purification through tragedy and Paideia purification through education. But the two meanings of purification e a common element of truth in relation to one another. Since art

15 Wild John, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, New York, 1948, Harper, 499-500.

16 Lessing, G., Werke, 6 vols., Stuttgart, 1890, Vol.4., Hamburgische maturgie, No.78, p.262.

monizes and purifies, it may indirectly prepare us to act morally in an nticipated ethical situation arising immediately after the experience of harsis in the theatre. Plato, for all his indictment of poetry, had gested a certain indulgence of the passions to aid in achieving the perate life:

"When a man's pulse is healthy and temperate and when before going to sleep he has awakened his powers, and fed them on noble thoughts and enquiries, collecting himself in meditation, after having first indulged his appetities neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep and prevent them from interfering with the higher principle."[17]

cher's conclusion concerning the meaning of katharsis includes this moral el of interpretation. Katharsis is the process of bringing men face to e with universal law before which all egoism dissolves and disappears. In s state presumably man is most suitably conditioned for moral action. eady the role of analogy in arriving at a satisfactory definition of harsis is becoming clearer. It becomes still more clear how erroneous som's interpretation of katharsis really is. Because he fails to com- hend Aristotle's analogical method, he tends to reject all meanings his own univocal interpretation. Because Butcher's meaning is taken erally rather than analogically, Ransom thinks he is being untrue to stotle's position. However, if our explanation is not to be too univocal, import of Aristotle's metaphysic for his poetic theory must be examined ther.

Ransom fails to realize that the doctrine of imitation in Greek thought basic to Aristotle's meaning of katharsis. Specifically Aristotle tells

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17 Plato, The Republic, Book IX, 571 e, ed. Jowett, B., The Dialogues of ato, vol. 3, p.281, Oxford, The University Press, Third Edition, 1931.

that tragedy is a species of the genus imitation. When we are told that gedy is the imitation of an action neither ludicrous nor trivial we may er that katharsis will not take place unless the action is noble. Imi- ion is not a mimicking of either the physical or rational action of any individual. Imitation is an analogical process by means of which we ceive in any action that element which is noble and hence real or per- ent in value for all men. In all Aristotle's thought from his treatise poetry to those on biology he is concerned primarily with the true end life. He is shrewd enough to see that the spectacle of tragedy in the atre should be pleasing. He is pragmatic enough to realize that we not cure men's souls of pity and fear by the simple process of escape or ulsion. Such means as these fail to appeal to the true nature of man, reature designed to achieve a noble and harmonious end for all his ac- ities. By means of imitation the poet gives much more than a mere re- sentation. he reveals the way of things, of life.

It is this process of idealization which Butcher, Bosanquet and Su- ihl stress,

" Let us not assume then, that the tragic katharsis involves only the idea of an emotional relief, but the further idea of the purifying of the emotions so relieved," says Butcher, and he adds that "the tragic katharsis requires that suffering shall be exhibited in one of its comprehensive aspects; that the deeds and fortunes of the actors shall attach themselves to larger issues, and the spectator himself be lifted above the special case and brought face to face with the universal law and the divine plan of the world." [18]

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18 Butcher, S, op.cit., p.271.

ıeaning of this passage now becomes really significant in contrast to ım's treatment of it.[19]

Susemihl concludes that purgation means "to associate the cure of the ɯrdened heart with the universalizing element of the drama in virtue ıich Aristotle regards it as an idealization of experience."[20] Bo- ıet concludes that Aristotle's process of katharsis is parallel to and ıgous to the insistence upon unity.

'He identifies the object of artistic representation not with the common ıhows of life, but with the spiritual forces in their deepest reality. . . . .The reality of common experience shows in Aristotle a tendency to lose its controlling position; for, metaphysically art and we must suppose all formal beauty in its degree is credited with the power to represent what is unseen, and the deeper truth."[21]

ıquet indicates that Aristotle

"has no direct answer to the question what principle prescribes the direction which this idealization is to take. To say 'the direction of beauty' is tautology; to say 'direction of symmetry and unity' is dangerously formal and empty; to say 'the direction of morality' is simply false."[22]

nquet concludes that no deeper theory is suggested and that by abandoning Hellenic tradition of rational idealism, Aristotle's theory must remain for unsatisfactory.

What Bosanquet describes as the Hellenic tradition is none other than own interpretation of what he thought Plato and the earlier Greeks had nded to say. He overlooks completely the element of realism in Plato's

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19 Supra, p. 204 ff.

20 Susemihl, Franz, and Hicks, R.D., The Politics of Aristotle, a ised text with introduction, analysis and commentary, London, 1894, Mac- ıan and Co. Note on Katharsis, p.653.

21 Bosanquet, op. cit., p.75

ght and accuses Aristotle of being unclear simply because his conception
hat is real is strictly rational. Certainly any direction to beauty
autologous if we are prepared to admit that the concept of beauty and
goal it must realize is pure, rational self-consistency. If symmetry
unity mean nothing else than mathematical, logical or epistemological
rence, then surely they are dangerously formal and empty. If to be moral
o be strictly rational, then there are no degrees of morality. Morality
.ts own goal. Aristotle however, saw more truth and reality in life as
lives it than his reason alone could indicate. He was painfully aware
he paradoxes of those first idealists of western thought, the Eleatics.
.izing that their sophistry offered no account of the world of existence
.ts broad experience Aristotle searched the depths of metaphysics, pre-
d to admit that reason might not be the only means of apprehending truth.
ough he depended upon his intuition to perceive analogies between being
existence his analogous concepts were never to clash with reason. For
there was a direction to beauty the fulfilment of which embodied the
iest aesthetic experiences of man. Unity and symmetry were not danger-
Ly formal and empty so long as these elements in things and experiences
ld be perceived beyond the level of rational coherence. Morality was
sible when there existed a physical and spiritual condition leading to
anized and teleological conduct; for Aristotle, morality was not merely
tilitarian or rational measure of conduct in terms of certain univocal
positions. There is, of course, a certain contradiction in the morality
be derived from the Physics and the Metaphysics and that set forth in
Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics or the Rhetoric. But even in the Ethics
all its utilitarian bias, the apprehension of the Mean is intuitive rather

strictly rational. The mean between virtue and vice can be known only
nalogy from our previous knowledge or experience.

Since we feel that beauty or tragedy can have a purpose or direction
ust discover Aristotle's development of this theme. He avoids the charge
osanquet that any direction for beauty is tautologous by emphasizing
art is the process of realization of the potential into the actual. It
his process which Aristotle calls katharsis. By means of imitation
s potential capacity for truth becomes actualized. As we imitate noble
ons or witness such an imitation we come to know ourselves in the fullest
most complete sense of manhood. Such is the process and end of all
ledge. Katharsis is one of many modes by which man learns to imitate
h in all his actions. At a more metaphysical level Aristotle discusses
relation of potentiality and actuality in the Physics. He says that
interrelation of the mover and the moved is necessary "so that the one
of moving in the movable is the realization not only of its capacity of being
d but of the capacity of the potential mover to be actually moving it."[23]
energizing of a potential activity can not be different from that of a
ntial passivity. In the end the two movements of action and passion are
. An actor cannot inspire an audience with a noble action unless the
ence is capable of being inspired. The power to move and the capacity
e moved are in the end identical and the same. Such is the real nature
an. Likewise in the process of learning and of teaching we have the same
s although the two species are conceptually different. Since the function

23 Aristotle, The Physics with English translation by Wicksteed, Philip and Cornford, Francis M., London, 1929 W. Heinemann Ltd., Vol. 1. a, 16-20

both processes is to imitate truth, the realization of the common goal teacher and learner must be the same. As Aristotle says, "the teacher learn in the taught and the process is said to be the actualizing this in that and not the actualizing of that by this."[24] To learn, a must rid himself of confusion among particulars and concentrate upon the versals which underlie the complex existence of the world.

And such, says Aristotle, is the function of poetry —— to imitate the versal, while history confines itself to particulars. Ransom says that totle prefers poetry to history only

"because of his understanding of history. History is either a compi-on of marvels, as in Herodotus, whom Aristotle cites, or it is science suing a thread of ideas by an abstraction as perfect as possible; in ther sense an imitation of nature." [25]

real reason for this preference as stated in Aristotle's Poetics is that etry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, e its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those istory are singulars."[26] Indeed Aristotle is not anxious that poetry concerned with abstract universals or ideas which can be grasped by the ematical mind alone. Nor is he advocating an empirical imitation of erial nature. Rather he says "By a universal statement I mean one as what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do which is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the racters."[27]

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24 Physics, III; 202 a 30-202 b 22.
25 Ransom, J. C., The World's Body, p.204.
26 Aristotle, Poetics, 1451 a,5-7.
27 Loc.cit., 1451 - a 7, 8-9.

niversal statement here has no reality apart from an individual speaker et we can know it to be true of all men.

And so it follows that Aristotle places both thought and plot before cter in the elements of tragedy because character is not an end in f. Character is merely the agent of imitation. Individuality can be ved only when a potential nature is actualized in terms of its proper Like the teacher, the actor inspires as he performs and performs as spires. As the process of purgation takes place the change (or motion) t the removal of that (emotion) by this (actor) but the purification at (emotion) by this (actor). Tragic fear attaches "itself not so to this or that particular indicent, as to the general course of action is for us an image of human destiny."[28]

Ransom's fundamental error in his interpretation of Aristotle lies in univocal reading of the doctrines of katharsis and imitation. He fails omprehend Aristotle's great religious genius owing to his failure to rehend the metaphysical method used in the Metaphysics, particularly Lambda. Just as Burke makes the mistake of saying that "we could arrive ristotle's 'unmoved mover' simply by the generalizing of motion," so Ran- commits the same idealistic fallacy by speaking of a prime mover without active power to move. Aristotle would have considered it irrelevant to k of an unmoved mover if he were not trying to prevent the very inter- ation which Burke and Ransom would give. If we are to lend any meaning he world of existence at all, we must provide a specific source out of which

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28 Butcher, op.cit., p.263.

. things come; otherwise there will be an infinite regress into infinity
ere there is no existence at all. Any ineptitude which Ransom feels
ut Aristotle's theories of religion or of katharsis, must lie essentially
his own misreading of the text of the Metaphysics and of the Poetics
elf.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHICAGO CRITICS AND THE FAILURE OF RATIONAL FORM AS A PRINCIPLE OF OBJECTIVITY

I- THE BASIC ATTACK OF THE CHICAGO CRITICS ON THE "NEW CRITICISM"

At the turn of the century J. E. Spingarn complained that

"all criticism tends to shift the emphasis from the work of art to something else. The other critics give us history, politics, biography, erudition, metaphysics. As for me, I re-dream the poet's dream, and if I seem to write lightly, it is because I have awakened, and smile to think I have mistaken a dream for reality. I at least strive to replace one work of art by another, and art can only find its alter ego in art."[1]

aesthetics of the nineteenth century was essentially subjective. Works rt were interpreted in terms of abstract principles which were accepted he absolute criteria of judgment. Rarely did one find that the aestheti- was concerned with works of art themselves. Rather, aesthetics was science of adapting the art of criticism to the latest metaphysical ries in the idealistic or Hegelian mode.

The Chicago Critics share the enthusiasm of the New Critics for a re- to the study of works of art in and for their own sake. A valid hetic or an effective critical method can be developed only from the ination of works of art themselves and not from the external application

1 Spingarn, J. E., "The New Criticism", Criticism in America: Its tion and Status, New York, Columbia University Press, 1911, p.14.

aphysical principles to works of art. But the New Critics and the
o Critics have engaged in a controversy which is vigorous and pro-
e in its argument. Although they may agree that the poem or the work
should be the centre of the critical activity, they disagree violently
the metaphysical basis upon which the objectivity of poetry should be
ished. A close examination of both the controversy and the essays in
ism reveals that the dispute is not as basic as it might at first
Because the New Critics are somewhat persuasive and intuitive in
style and in their approach to the work of art, they are not unschol-
Because the Chicago Critics are committed to a somewhat scholastic
of analytical criticism, they are not insensitive in their response
rs of art. Both schools have made the most significant contributions
criticism of our age. Burke's ingenuity in his analysis of Keats's
a Grecian Urn[2] is paralleled by Elder Olson's analysis of Yeats's
to Byzantium.[3] Both Allen Tate[4] and Elder Olson[5] can use en-
different methods to arrive at a more exact appreciation of Longinus'
ion in his essay "on the Sublime". Both succeed in eliminating dis-
ns or misrepresentations of Longinus' doctrine which have persisted
ticism up to this time.

Burke, Kenneth, A Grammar of Motives, pp.447-463.
Olson, Elder, "Sailing to Byzantium: Prolegomena to a Poetics of the
The University Review, vol.8, 1942, The University of Kansas City,
219.
Tate, Allen, "Longinus", The Hudson Review, vol.1, 1948, pp.344-361.
Olson, Elder, "The Argument of Longinus 'On the Sublime'," Critics and
sm, Ancient and Modern, edited by R.S. Crane, Chicago, The University of
Press, 1952, pp.232-259.

Thus far in the development of this survey of the New Criticism, asic attempt has been made to show that the New Critics have professed or lied an idealistic metaphysic as the basis of objectivity in art. The cago Critics are highly sceptical about the possibility of accounting the objectivity of art in this way. In addition, they suggest that the Critics are not thorough metaphysicians. In opposition to the pseudo- alism of the New Critics, the Chicago Critics would go back to Aristotle a method of criticism which they believe will bring the critic much se to the objective quality of a poem or a work of art. This declaration a traditional basis for their point of view is not given without qualifi- ion.

"The writers would not wish to minimize their admiration for the Poetics and, indeed, for the other basic works of its author, for whose characteristic approach, as they interpret it, to problems of knowledge, action and art they feel a strong temperamental affinity. They have not supposed, however, that this prevented their admiring and using for their own ends other great philosophers, from Plato to Dewey, who on all fundamental points of principle and procedure have taken a quite different line; and in criticism likewise they have viewed their "Aristotelianism" as a strictly pragmatic and nonexclusive commitment --- much like a modern physicist's preference for Einsteinian over Newtonian concepts -- to hypotheses about poetry and poetics that seem to them capable of being developed into a comprehensive critical method, at once valid in itself and peculiarly adapted to the study of problems which they think are still significant but for the solution of which none of the prevailing modes of criticism affords the necessary analytic tools." [6]

At the same time, Crane states what it is essentially that he and his up consider to be important in Aristotle.

"It is the merit of Aristotle, uniquely among systematic critics, that he grapsed the distinctive nature of poetic works as wholes or concrete artistic wholes, and made available, though only in outline sketch,

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6 Ibid, Introduction by R.S. Crane, pp.12-13.

hypotheses and analytical devices for defining literally and inductively, and with a maximum degree of differentiation, the multiple causes operative in the construction of poetic wholes of various kinds and the criteria of excellence appropriate to each." [7]

ddition to this element in Aristotle concerning essentially his doctrine

ubstance, Crane adds that

"that important thing in Aristotle for the present essayists, however, is not so much the statements of doctrine and history contained in the poetics itself as the method through which these statements are derived and validated in the arguments of the treatise when it is read in the light of the methodological principles stated explicitly in its author's other works or inferable from them." [8]

s important for an evaluation of the Chicago Critics later in this chapter

ote the specific nature of their qualification of the use of Aristotle's

rine and method. For Crane adds on behalf of his fellow critics that

"The Aristotle they have thus reconstructed is not, it will easily be seen, the Aristotle of the Renaissance and neoclassical commentators or any of the more recent Aristotles of such interpreters as Butcher,[9] Bywater,[10] Murray,[11] Lane Cooper,[12] or Francis Fergusson.[13] It may not, indeed, except in a general way, be Aristotle at all! They think it is; but, whether Aristotle's or not, the poetic method which they credit to him can be described in universal terms in such a manner as to remove it effectually from the circumstances of its historical origin and make it accessible, once its nature is clarified and its potentialities further developed, as a method for common use today." [13a]

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7 Ibid, p.17.
8 Loc.cit., p.17.
9 Butcher, S. H., op.cit.
10 Bywater, Ingram, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1909.
11 Murray, Gilbert, Essays and Addresses, (Chapt. V, "Poesis and Mimesis" 07-124), London, G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1921.
12 Cooper, Lane, The Poetics of Aristotle, its meaning and influence, York, Longmans Green and Co., 1927.
13 Fergusson, Francis, The Idea of the Theater, Princeton, Princeton ersity Press, 1952.
13a Ibid, p.17.

ort, the Chicago Critics reserve the right to select from Aristotle
elements which they can apply to their own critical purposes whenever
convenient or pragmatic to do so. Their use of what they call Aris-
's method does not imply

'any assumption that the concept of imitation, in its most general
eaning, is more than an empirically verifiable hypothesis for dis-
inguishing objects of art from natural things; or, taking the term in
he more restricted sense in which it denotes one possible final cause
n poetry, that all poems are imitations, though unquestionably many
f them are. It does not imply, again, that the critic must define the
nd of poetry or art as pleasure simply or consider its function, as
ne contemporary has supposed, to be only that of ornamenting pleasur-
bly, in a moment's leisure, the life of its beholder': [14]

Crane disavows for his group any interpretations of the distinctions
; poetic species as

'labels for conventionally determined classes of poems or as concepts
signifying ideal values in the light of which individual productions
may be compared and judged by considering the degree of their approxi-
mation to a previously determined norm: for the 'Aristotelian' critic,
definitions of kinds are causal formulas inductively derived from an
inspection, in 'poetic' terms, of poems, and his use of them in prac-
tical criticism is essentially as heuristic devices for discovering what
are the relevant questions to be asked about the individual works he
proposes to study."[15]

careful reader will already have discovered for himself that the Chicago
ics seem to be anxious to avoid the truly metaphysical character of
totle's philosophy in favour of a more selective emphasis upon its
temological or dialectical qualities. One has no doubt of this fact
one is told of the need of improvement on Aristotle.

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14 Crane, R. S., op.cit., p.18.
15 Ibid, p.18.

"If the method, however, is to be of more than limited use today, it must be developed, through extension and refinement of its basic concepts, far beyond the relatively primitive state in which Aristotle left it."[16]

ıddition to the two species of mimetic poetry discussed by Aristotle,

method must be developed along the lines of

" much inductive theoretical research, based on wide knowledge and close analysis of modern and contemporary writings, into problems both of general poetics and of the specific poetics of literary forms as these are posed by the achievements of writers of all kinds since antiquity." [17]

ıe stresses the empirical and analytical characteristics of Aristotle's

hod. He wishes to go beyond the conception of art as mere production in

stotle's sense of the word. He does not wish to imply that because the

ool has chosen to describe itself as 'Aristotelian' it will exclude

er critical methods. Nor does he wish to suggest "that poetic kinds can

r be completely enumerated or always differentiated accurately from on

ther"

"What is held constant in this criticism is the whole complex of accidental causes of variation in poetry that depend on the talents, characters, educations, and intentions of individual authors, the opinions and texts of the audiences they address, the state of language in their time, and all the other external factors which affect their choice of materials and conventions in particular works. The provisional exclusion of these is necessary if the analysis is to be concentrated upon the internal causes which account for the peculiar construction and effect of any poem qua artistic whole."[18]

The peculiar quality of Aristotle's method of classification appeals to

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16 Ibid, p.18.
17 Ibid, p.19.
18 Ibid, p.20.

Chicago Critics as a means of identifying the poetic object in its in-
sic essence and enables them to avoid what Crane calls "the reductive,
frequently monistic, treatment of poetic elements to be found in much
icism of the present time." Aristotle's method is comprehensive

"because it embraces all the elements necessary, in some particular determination and ordering, to the existence of a poem of any kind as a made object productive of definite effects upon our minds, and because it considers these (as in Poetics 1-3) as independent variables."[19]

r analysis includes poetic language, poetic subject matter and poetic
nique as all parts of the generic quality of the poem as a composite whole.
of these is considered as an abstract principle or characteristic of
s to which all poetry may be reduced. In addition, the Aristotelian
od (as the Chicago Critics see it) tolerates the existence of many
erent kinds of forms and principles of poetry and as many functions which
can be made to serve in making poetic wholes.

"When the method is properly used, it permits a far wider range of relevant differentiations in the discussion not only of poems but of poetic devices and materials than any method in which such a functional treatment of elements has no place."[20]

Crane and his group are to be commended for their attempt to achieve
de scope and comprehension for critical activity. The Chicago Critics
edly do not wish to set themselves up as an opposition to existing
ical methods but rather to fill a gap in the tradition.

"The criticism of the past generation has been prevailingly as we have seen, qualitative and general rather than functional and specific,

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19 Ibid, p.20.
20 Ibid, p.20.

concentating on selected parts or aspects of poems and treating these in terms of wholes which are not concrete artistic objects but compositions of qualities having their substrate in the poet or his tradition or age or in poetic language rather than in individual poetic works."[21]

ne observes that Eliot is a classic instance of this method. Before pecific statement and analysis of the Chicago Critics' doctrines is made would be well to pick up the attack made by Crane on Cleanth Brooks which examined in an earlier chapter.[21a]

Elder Olson once referred to Empson's method of examining a poem as nping poetry with "the mindless brutality of a machine".[22] Ever since Eighteenth Century critics have tended to seize upon one or more abstract nciples which characterize a school of criticism and they apply these nciples externally to works of art accepting or rejecting them as they formed or failed to objectify the prescribed principle. In Part I of tics and Criticism, Crane has grouped those essays of the Chicago Critics ch consist of attacks upon the weaknesses of contemporary critics. Every of the essays makes a major point of those theories of poetry which ace criticism to a direct play of the critic's mind upon the poetic ob- t. In spite of the success with which the New Critics have brought about s-emphasis upon the poem as the centre of aesthetic judgement, they are ased by the Chicago Critics of reading poetry as if it were all construc- upon identical principles. I. A. Richards is attacked[23] for reducing try to the psychological and linguistic levels while Brooks reduces try to irony and paradox and Empson interprets poetry in terms of ambiguity.

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21 Ibid, p.23. 21a Supra, Chapter IV, p.122ff.
22 Ibid, p.48 (Olson, Elder, "William Empson, Contemporary Criticism Poetic Diction").
23 Ibid, pp.27-44 (R.S.Crane, "I.A.Richards on the Art of Interpretati

w Critics are classified as neo-Coleridgeans lacking the keen meta-

al sense which was so characteristic of Coleridge.

hat they share with Coleridge is his great sensitivity to literary
nts; but being committed to a philosophical mode of criticism, and
nce disinclined to look for purely poetic principles by an inductive
quiry into poems, they have perforce had to seek substitutes for the
emises which Coleridge was able to deduce, as he said, from 'the com-
nent faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity
d importance.' The substitutes they have found can best be described,
no intentionally invidious way, as commonplaces or topics in the
nse which these words had in the older writers on rhetoric and logic;
at is to say, predicate terms not specialized in meaning to poetics
any other specific subject-matter, which are yet capable, through
alectical opposition and equation, of serving the critic's ends of
stinguishing, comparing, and ranking works or passages from the works
poets and of doing this with some appearance of rigor and exhaustive-
ss at least in a given context or on a given occasion." 24

Olson feels

he absence of any clear, fruitful, and widely accepted metaphysics,
pistemology, philosophy of science; a discipline --- call it what you
ll --- capable of articulating and organizing the arts and sciences,
stablishing and criticising their principles and methods, and, in short,
ettling the broader and more general questions which the pursuit of any
epartment of inquiry must involve." 25

me shallowness is stated more specifically by Crane in his criticism
eanth Brooks. Brooks's 'normative' judgments by means of which he
res poems in a predetermined way are assumed to have validity for all
no matter what their kind or intended effect.

He cannot, in fact, hold anything else but this, lacking any premises
hat would warrant judgments of individual poems founded on a mean
elative to their peculiar ends and forms. And he lacks such premises

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24 "Two Essays in Practical Criticism, Prefatory note by R.S.Crane", University Review, The University of Kansas City, vol.8, 1942, p.199-200.
25 Crane, R. S., Critics and Criticism, p.57, (Olson, Elder, "William
on, Contemporary Criticism and Poetic Diction").

because he has no concept of poems as concrete wholes the unity of which requires that the parts should be of a certain quality and magnitude and present in a certain order if the desired poetic effect is to be fully achieved." [26]

R. Keast [27] attacks R. B. Heilman [28] (and presumably Kenneth Burke ld fall in the same category) for searching for a basic metaphor for all try. The Chicago Critics feel that such an enterprise results in a ory of poetry but gives no aesthetic basis for judging poems.

This whole tendency to reduce poetry and the criticism of poetry to abstract principle is called "critical monism" by R. S. Crane and "qualtive Criticism" as over against " specific criticism" by Elder Olson. the term "qualitative criticism", Olson means that process by which nciples are made universally valid in analyzing poems when these prinles do not always apply. Such criticism is blind to the great variouss of poetry. The ultimate result of such a technique of criticism is reduce poetry to the level of didacticism or allegory and the particular etic quality which makes poems so specific in Aristotle's sense of that d is lost completely. The folly of this critical reductionism is made y telling indeed as W. R. Keast attacks R. B. Heilman's account of <u>King r</u>. By reducing the concept of plot to too singular a principle, Shakeare is made to appear as a protagonist of the universe as the best of possible worlds, an impression which few should have after reading or ing <u>King Lear</u>. Yet, Keast adds,

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26 <u>Ibid</u>, p.98 (Crane, R.S., "The Critical Monism of Cleanth Brooks").
27 <u>Ibid</u>, pp.108-137 (Keast, W. R., "The 'New Criticism' and King Lear").
28 Heilman, R. B., <u>This Great Stage: Image and Structure in "King Lear"</u>, isiana State University Press, 1948.

In the terms in which Heilman describes it I do not see how it can be anything else. The whole tendency of his analysis -- with its emphasis on salvation as the goal of Lear's actions, with its Christian 'transvaluation' of a pagan world, with its placement of the climax of the play in Lear's reachievement of insight, with its treatment of the reversal as a passage from bad fortune to good — all this and much more make it clear that Lear is a man who, after much suffering, which is expiatory and therefore in the proper sense deserved, achieves what he had all along been in search of — the vision in which is eternal life. That Lear dies, that he loses Cordelia at the moment of their reunion — these are incidental, parts of the play's superficial aspect, not of its inner reality, and serving at most to underscore paradoxically the magnitude of Lear's victory; for he that loseth his life shall find it. Only a person incapable, as Heilman says, of distinguishing between quality and quantity of life could feel anything but spiritual exaltation at Lear's triumph over himself and the world." [29]

Another characteristic of modern criticism which disturbs the Chicago cs is the method of dichotomy which accompanies this reductionism. This d brings about a separation of form and matter which must eliminate all bility of treating poems as artistic wholes. The matter of poetry must he Procrustean forms which the arbitrary critic may have decreed as ute in the examination of poetry.

It is a method in which the 'form' of literary works is usually iscovered in the means and in which the 'matter' is a function of the ds or the interest of the critic; the 'form' thus, is statable exclusively in stylistic terms, whereas the 'matter' becomes that which s intended, communicated, expressed, or 'imitated' — in a word, the subject matter. This dichotomy of 'matter' and 'form' collapsing and reversing the qualitative parts of Aristotelian poetics, is due in turn to definitions of poetry which are not causal but analogical in character — definitions which equate poetry with the habits, acts, passions, or opinions of the author and which consequently do not permit the consideration of poetry as an object; definitions which equate poetry with natural substances and which consequently permit the discussion of poetry only in terms of its instrumentality; and definitions which, although characterizing poetry as an object of art sufficient in itself, define poetry in terms of its community with the other arts or treat it as a single species."[30]

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29 Crane, R.S., op.cit., p.133, (Keast, W.R., "The 'New Criticism' and Lear".)

30 Elder Olson, "Recent Literary Criticism," p.278, Modern Philology, vol.40,

tomy sacrifices the intrinsic objectivity of the poem and the critic
ft to his own abstract devices as final decrees of the nature of poetic
ty.

A poem, in such an analysis, ceases to be a concrete object of a par-
icular sort, constituted of parts deliberately ordered to a specific
rtistic end by the poet, and becomes instead a kind of emblem or
xemplar of principles broader in their relevance than poems or any given kind
f poems. In a strict sense, therefore, the poem, considered as a product
f purposive activity on the part of its author, remains unexplained; any state-
ents the critic can make about its structure or parts can only be descriptive
nd, as such, preparatory to judgements concerning its degree of participation
n the universal causes of excellence discriminated by the contrary terms
f his theory." 31

Much of the attack of the Chicago Critics upon the New Critics will
ntiate the position taken in previous chapters of this work that the
oss of the New Criticism lies in their attempt to base a theory of
tivity for poetry upon an idealistic metaphysic. As soon as the essence
jectivity is to be found in 'mind-stuff' alone, then any perception
jectivity in a realistic sense is impossible. The more idealistic
riticism, the more abstract it becomes and with this subjective process,
er vital it may be to the mind which undergoes the experience, the
ic quality of the original artistic object is lost. The Chicago
cs profess to be interested in lyrics

not as exemplars but as objects; they insist on approaching them as
oems of a distinctive kind rather than as receptacles of poetry; the
holes they are concerned with are not the constructed wholes of any
ialectic but concrete wholes determined by the poet's choice of such
nd such parts in such and such an order in a poem presumably complete
nly when its final line is reached. In other words, eschewing philo-

31 Crane, R. S., "Prefatory Note to Two Essays in Practical Criticism",
University Review, vol.8, 1942, p.200.

sophic generality and the insights which arise from the analogical application to lyrics, or to passages from lyrics, of principles and definitions in no way proper to poems as distinct from other things or to constitute the criticism of lyrics as a subject matter by itself and within this subject-matter to orient practical criticism toward as complete a discovery as possible, in individual lyrics, of the internal causes of their peculiar effects. Their end, as in any criticism worthy of the name, is appreciation; but the appreciation they wish to make possible is one of which the object is not a universal form or value reflected in the poem but the poem itself in its wholeness and particularity as a structure of mutually appropriate parts."[32]

II - RICHARD McKEON AND THE MISCONCEPTION OF ANALOGY

In the controversy which has taken place between the New Critics and
s Chicago Critics, R. S. Crane has been recognized as the leader of the
.cago School. As editor of the recent volume, Critics and Criticism
l as the leading controversialist in the dispute over modern criticism,
s administrative role in the group is clear. But when one turns to an
amination of the subject matter of the Chicago Critics' theory of poetry,
:hard McKeon with his wealth of classical and scholastic learning seems
provide the metaphysical foundation for their position. The most per-
ptive elements in the Chicago School's theory of criticism seem to be based
Aristotelian principles stated first of all be McKeon. In Critics and
lticism all of the learned articles on Aristotle are written by McKeon
d his essay on The Philosophic Bases of Art and Criticism[33] takes the
ading position in the third part of the book dedicated to a positive
atement of their position or creed. One is immediately impressed by
Keon's erudition and the scope of his reading from ancient and mediaeval
xts and commentaries to a careful analytical reading of modern criticism

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32 Ibid, p.201.

33 Crane, op.cit., pp.463-545 (McKeon, Richard, "The Philosophic Bases Art and Criticism.").

well. At the same time, one will observe that McKeon's fundamental roach is prerequisite to what Crane, Olson, MacLean and Keast have to about a poetics of the lyric.

McKeon begins his account of the philosophical basis of art and criti- n by making a distinction between literal and dialectical theories. The lectical approach will never give an account of objectivity in poetry. difficulties of criticism are not to be solved

> "by referring the problem to irreducible and stubborn facts or (what is the same thing) to indisputable and appropriate theories, but by examing the meanings of the various explanations and their relations to one another and by formulating criteria for the truth and utility possible to such theories."[34]

r against any dialectical theory which reduces criticism to a basic me- nor or abstract generality, McKeon goes back to Aristotle's theory of guage and its function in poetry. A poem consists of symbols which sent thought and represent action. A literary work consists of an or- lzation of symbols in the argument of the work. "Language is the means imitation in literature; it is the matter from which a poem is constructed; the form of the poem, however much it may depend on the subject treated, achieved by devices which may be recognized in the manner and organiza- n of the expression."[34a]

Another term which McKeon uses frequently for this dialectical process aesthetics is "analogy". It is very important for the understanding of

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34 Ibid., p.466.
34a Ibid., p.180, (McKeon, R., "Aristotle's Conception of Language and Arts of Language," pp.178-231).

basic opposition between literal and dialectical criticism to know
tly what McKeon means by this term, "analogy". "When terms are defined
he method of analogy, the principles of the discussion are found in the
amental metaphor or metaphors. Poetry may be conceived as vision,
riving, or imitation, experience, imagination, or emotion, symbol, action,
elation". [35] This is what Crane and Olson mean by the external appli-
on of abstract principles to works of art reducing the poetic to a
stic whole and "analogizing" objectivity out of existence. However,
n terms are defined literally, the principles of discussion are to be
d in the causes by which an object is to be isolated in its essential
re."[36] What McKeon emphasizes is the necessity of maintaining strict
gories for the various abstractions in order to prevent their indis-
inate application to subject matter for which they are not appropriate.
eas the tendency of the "analogical" method is to explain the poet,
and audience all in one anaysis, the literal method concentrates on
e characteristics which are properly those of the poem and leaves other
lems such as the psychological effect upon the audience to the appro-
te science of psychology. The so-called analogical method is most
ily typified by Kenneth Burke whom McKeon quotes as a representative of
position. Poetry is analogized to one basic metaphor --- synecdoche.
ddition, McKeon identifies the term "analogically" with the term "or-
stically" showing clearly the manner in which he intends the term "ana-
" to be taken. Analogy is a process by which all particularity is
ified to unity.

Ibid, p.472.
Ibid, p.472.

On the whole, McKeon is closer to the spirit of Aristotle than any of other critics of the school. His description of Aristotle's doctrines his own account of the nature of art and criticism are closer than is case with the other critics. In every case, his own opinions about ics presuppose the metaphysical position of Aristotle, with one or two rvations. He accepts Aristotle's method of proceeding by literal de- tion of terms and the careful division of the domain of knowledge into mber of sciences. His own theory of the poetic process is appropriately ed "poetic science", which is of course the science of making. As a r, the poet imitates particular things and it is the imitative element ne's work which makes one a poet. "Art does not abstract universal forms cience does, but imitates the forms of individual things." [37] Therefore poet as imitator is concerned exclusively and specifically with the gness or particularity of things which is their essence. Language as means of imitation in poetry seeks to describe this intrinsic quality bjects, i.e. to define them. Language is considered

> "not only in relation to its subject matter or to men but in relation to the structure and unity which a work of literature possesses when viewed as a concrete whole ('sunalon') composed of form and matter. Poetry is an imitation of things as they ought to be, and each kind of poetry produces its proper pleasure; but it is also a whole, complete in itself, with a beginning, middle, and end and with all the organic unity of a living creature."[38]

stotle would eliminate the rivalry of poetry and philosophy by eliminating false problem of the relation of form and matter.

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37 Ibid, p.162 (McKeon, Richard, "Literary Criticism and the Concept Imitation in Antiquity," pp.147-175).

38 Ibid, p.212; cf also, Aristotle, Poetics, 23, 1459 a,17-24.

"The Platonic analogy of poetry and philosophy thus, is combated in Aristotle's philosophy by distinguishing the kind of knowledge required for poetic constructions from other kinds of knowledge by its purpose; for theoretic knowledge is pursued for its own sake and for truth, practical knowledge for the sake of conduct, and poetic knowledge for the sake of making something useful or beautiful."[39]

analogical tradition thrives on opposites contesting with one another to eve universality. There is a constant compulsion to eliminate unreal inctions in order to discover the basic unity which underlies the appar- y opposing forces.

"In the literal tradition the effort is to find a technique proper to each subject matter and therefore to separate, for the purposes of accuracy and clarity, considerations of moral, political, scientific, metaphysical, and aesthetic characteristics even in the judgment of a single object; and the development of the tradition is therefore a succession of analyses which achieve critical particularity in application to objects of art, canons of taste, or means of production and manners of social use."[40]

McKeon indicates three headings under the literal tradition, poetic nce which deals with artificial objects and products, criticism which s with the relation of art to the poet's thought, and evaluation or ure which is a consideration of the work of art in relation to audience, its style or power of expression. Criticism confines itself to a study he work of art in relation to the artist and the conditions of its pro- ion. And so Longinus sought to study the sublime in terms of the natural us of the poet which in turn is restrained and formalized by art. uation consists in a consideration of the work of art in terms of its cts upon the audience. If the work of art fails to arouse the desired cts in audiences the combinations of diction, composition and subject

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39 Ibid, p.498.
40 Ibid, p.505.

ar will come in for censure.

'Evaluation may be achieved, in general, by comparing the effects of what is written on actual or chosen audiences or by measuring it against the canons for statements of the 'kind' to which it belongs; the judges are either men conceived by various standards to be good and prudent or men judged to be expert in rhetoric or some other appropriate science of expression. Broadly conceived, evaluation so practiced is concerned with qualities of genres of literature and art or with the virtues of style and expression."[41]

tic science analyzes the poem in terms of its unity and structure as and whole and in terms of the adaptation of means to ends. For ex- e, in Aristotle, tragedy is considered in close comparison with the ted art of epic poetry, "first by analysis of both as parts and wholes, nd, by analysis of them with respect to the means used to achieve their arable ends and the success or failure of those means."[42] It is out his sort of consideration that the process of evaluation develops.

Having made a basic distinction between the <u>analogical or dialectical</u> <u>ition</u> and <u>the literal tradition</u>, McKeon is careful to point out that e are not pure categories. What is being emphasized by the distinction he tendency towards universality by the more dialectical tradition and insistence upon the particularity of the work of art by the literal ition. McKeon now suggests a classification of six modes as a means of ring the many forms of aesthetic analysis. '"

'"Dialectical" criticism may be viewed as a single mode among these six, comprising a vast, sometimes amorphous series of forms, which merge or move from one emphasis to another to take up in altering but appropriate terms the continuing opposition of dialectical criticism to each of the five remaining forms of "literal" criticism. It is a

41 <u>Ibid</u>, p.522.
42 <u>Ibid</u>, p.516.

ingle mode, despite its diversity, since the full universality of sub-
matter and scope which it achieved in the hands of Plato is possible
n any of the forms which it has assumed since his time. Since it is a
lialectical mode, however, that achievement must await, in each form,
great dialectician or poet, while in the hands of lesser critics
he mode deteriorates to timid and commonsense apologies for what seems
xtravagant or sophistical in the moral judgment of art or to literal
epetitions of those judgments in limited -- sometimes trivial, sometimes
ppressive --- applications. In any of its forms, the terms of dialec-
ical criticism reflect the two moments or aspects of the method: the
ifferentiation of terms in application to subjects and their reduc-
ion in the solution of problems." [43]

Although the dialectical mode in the end fails to deal with the work
t as a specific object, it does establish sharp boundaries which do
esult in "a single varegated mode of criticism, but a series of literal
more or less sharply and successfully separated from one another and
the dialectical mode."[44] The first of the five modes of literal
cism is the <u>scientific mode</u> of Aristotle in the Poetics as distinct
Plato's dialectical mode. By means of the scientific mode,

a criterion of unity and structure is thereby rendered available,
nd on it the possibility of a poetic science depends, for otherwise
he analysis of an object of art must reduce the diversity of concepts
hat might be included under Aristotle's six terms to two broad analytic
lements --- form and matter --- and must go for its criteria directly
o the intention of the artist, or the reaction of the audience, or the
echnical achievement of the structure."[45]

"The third mode of criticism, '<u>poetic' criticism</u>, proceeds from the
oet, or more broadly the author, conceived as universal in the sense
f being possessed of lofty thoughts and inspired by vehement emotions
ntelligible or moving to all mankind, to the particular language of
he author's expression" [46]

mode differs from its more subjective counterparts in such authors as

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43 <u>Ibid</u>, pp.530-531.
44 <u>Ibid</u>, p.533.
45 <u>Ibid</u>, p.534.
46 <u>Ibid</u>, p.535.

inus or Kant in that "it is concerned not with the conditions of the ment of beauty and sublimity in general, but exclusively with their ces in literature."[47]

"The fourth mode of criticism, 'scholarly' criticism, reverses this procedure and attempts to reconstruct the peculiar character and significance of an author from the corpus and development of his work."[48]

again there is a counterpart with the dialectical mode where one might a critic attempting to derive abstract principles from other sciences rder to apply them somewhat indiscriminately to art objects or poems. scholarly critic in the literal tradition uses the "devices of historical nces to explain the significances of objects of art." By recovering the or's meaning, the scholarly critic tries to discover its effectiveness value in the art object itself. Again,

"the scholarly critic will examine all the data bearing on the establishment of the text and its interpretation before venturing an evaluation of the quality of any part of it or the sense or imagination of its author."[49]

"The fifth mode of criticism, 'technical' criticism which is developed in 'arts' of poetry, constructs its precepts about what pleases or instructs audiences in terms relevant to thought and expression in a manner similar to poetic criticism."[50]

reas poetic criticism is concerned with the sublime and elevated moments ieved by literature itself, the great masters of technical criticism,

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47 Ibid, p.535.
48 Ibid, p.535.
49 Ibid, p.536.
50 Ibid, p.537.

e, Vida, Boileau,[51] are concerned with any device which achieves a pleas-
r profitable effect. In contrast to technical criticism, the sixth

formal criticism,

reverses the procedure of technical criticism, beginning with the work
nd the effort to express rather than with the audience and the effect
f the expression. . . . The concern of formal criticism is with the
nalysis of compositions or communications into their constitutive parts
o evaluate the effectiveness or appropriateness of devices to purposes:
igures of speech relative to subject matters and effects in the older
nalysis, strategies and devices of evocation relative to objectives
nd attitudes in the newer; it proceeds by a part-whole analysis from
ords or phrases to composition as a whole; and the controlling con-
ideration is the characteristic or thought which determines the de-
ices suited to it. Consequently, the consideration of audiences and
ircumstances in technical criticism yields canons and censures for
omposition, whereas the consideration of the devices of language in
ormal criticism, since it takes language (according to the phrase of
emetrius) as a lump of wax from which anything may be molded, yields
ifferentiations in effects to be achieved."[52]

McKeon is as aware of the limitations of the literal tradition as he
f the limitations of the dialectical tradition. How easily the scien-
c mode can become a set of "classical" rules. The poetic mode can become
ly a biographical explanation of the poet's activity and technical
degenerate from the level of an audience with taste to one of a lower
e which still insists on its authority to determine standards. In
, Scholarly criticism offsets these perversions by carefully relating
poet to his environment and cultural setting which helped to determine
manner of his expression and the characteristics of his objects which
identifiable with elements of his time and habitation.

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51 Cook, A.S., The Art of Poetry, the Poetical Treatises of Horace,
and Boileau with the translations by Howes, Pitt and Soames, edited
Introduction and notes, Boston, 1892, Ginn and Co., 303 pp.
52 Crane, R.S., ed., op.cit., p.537.

"Formal criticism marshals the verbal or other technical devices by which a medium may be made to achieve any of the effects of which it is capable and from which the artist may choose, or the amateur recognize, devices and means."[53]

McKeon claims that his essay, The Philosophic Bases of Art and Criticism ot so much concerned with the criticism of art as it is with the cri- sm of criticism. He has shown himself to be comprehensive in his scope scholarly in his examination of the literature of criticism. His cri- ie of dialectical criticism is vigorous and effective while his account iteral criticism is not as convincing. Ronald Crane dismisses the ous labels which have been applied pejoratively to the Chicago Critics undling them into an insignificant aggregate ranging through "Aristo- lanism or neo-Aristotelianism, as Croceanism, as a confusion of Croceanism moral or logical positivism, as naturalism, scholasticism, nominalism, stemological realism, absolutism, and relativism."[54] Although some these charges have been delivered in rather vituperative fashion by n Crowe Ransom and others, a search is here being made to discover fun- ental difficulties in McKeon's position and not to reduce his enterprise anonymity by too simple a classification of his philosophical thinking.

As a professed Aristotelian one would expect that McKeon would be e specific in his use of the term "analogy" which he so readily identi- s with the dialectical process of an idealistic metaphysic. When he 's that the analogical tradition thrives on opposites contesting with one ther to achieve universality, he is certainly not using the term analogy Aristotle's sense of that word.[55]

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53 Ibid, p.543.
54 Ibid, p.2, (Introduction).
55 Aristotle, The Topics, 108 a, 7-17, ed. McKeon, R. The Basic Works of Aristotle cf also Aristotle, the Metaphysics, 1016 b 32, ed. McKeon, op.cit.

s true that Aristotle was seeking to discover the unity which underlay things but at no point was he prepared to sacrifice existence or parlarity to this unity. Indeed he states plainly enough that the relation he One to the Many can be understood only as a paradox. "The causes the principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a e, if one speaks universally and analogically, they are the same for all."[56] e principles and elements cannot be the same for all things since a tance is so distinct from a relative term. In principle Aristotle es that all things have the three principles of form, privation and er; in this sense they are the same analogically. It is this unity of h McKeon speaks. But before analogy can be meaningful in a realistic e the similarity in the difference must be seen. The analogy is differfor each class. The three principles applied specifically would be as ows: "in colour they are white, black and surface, and in day and night are light, darkness and air."[57]

Analogy is essentially specific in Aristotle's use of the term. ness is not perceived by means of identity alone but also in difference.

> "Likeness should be studied, first, in the case of things belonging to different genera, the formula being 'A:B:: C:D' (e.g. as knowledge stands to the object of knowledge, so is sensation related to the object of sensation), and 'As A is in B, so is C in D' (e.g. as sight is in the eye, so is reason in the soul, and as is a calm in the sea, so is windlessness in the air). Practice is more especially needed in regard to terms that are far apart; for in the case of the rest, we shall be more easily able to see in one glance the points of likeness. We should also look at things which belong to the same genus, to see if any identical attribute belongs to them all, e.g. to a man and a horse and

56 Aristotle, the Metaphysics, 1070 a 32, ed. McKeon, op.cit.
57 Ibid, 1070 b 21.

a dog; for in so far as they have any identical attribute, in so far they are alike."[58]

s by means of analogy that Aristotle arrives at what is specific or ctive while McKeon seems to suggest that analogy moves in the direction basic metaphorical unity such as one finds in Burke's basic trope of cdoche. What McKeon does is to overemphasize the element of identity hings at the expense of their independent existence. Practice is ed in the perception of likeness in things that are far apart but Aris- e never loses sight of the emphasis on the particular existence. The nature of analogy is to fix the four points of existence in any relation essed.

What Aristotle achieves in terms of his definition of analogy, McKeon s to achieve by means of poetic science or the literal criticism. on rejects the analogical tradition as he calls it because it seeks

"to avoid unreal distinction between the emotional and the intellectual, the moral and the aesthetic, the artistic and the practical; and the development of the tradition is therefore the evolution of a single dialectic in which opposed devices for achieving critical universality jostle one another: criticism is sometimes the application of a theory in the judgment of objects and actions; it is sometimes the technique which determines both theories and arts; it is sometimes, like theory, itself an art."[59]

nterpreting Aristotle's doctrine of analogy as a movement of thought rds ideality, he reduces the existence of things to a single whole. interested Aristotle was the existence of the world of things. He would gnize a commonground of existence but in the end essence was existence not an absolute ontological whole such as the Eleatics had conceived.

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58 Aristotle, the Topics, 108 a,7-17 ed. McKeon, op.cit.
59 Ibid, p.505.

movement of thought is towards particularity as well as similarity. method is essentially inductive and not deductive as it is in McKeon's sense nalogy. The process in Aristotle is

"an imperfect induction in which the mind passes from one or several singular facts (or from a particular enunciation) not to a universal conclusion, but to another singular or particular enunciation which it infers in virtue of a resemblance: Paul was cured of his headaches by this medicine, therefore John will be cured of his headaches by this same medicine." [60]

If McKeon professes to be an Aristotelian it seems strange that he should ort the meaning of analogy in Aristotle; it is the very term which would him to achieve his goal, namely objectivity for poetry. As it is, his on of a poetic science falls far short of the ideal of specific objecty which Aristotle described so effectively. McKeon proceeds by means part-whole analysis of the words or phrases in the poem to a conception t as a whole. The objectivity of a poem is a specific formal construct, lving the trope of synecdoche in a particularized existence. He differs Burke in his organicism by making each object generate its own essence tself while Burke's dramatism is a universal pattern to which all poetry orms. To this extent McKeon's position is an improvement over Burke's he has fallen short of Aristotle's genius by overlooking the intuitive eption of essences in particular things qua works of art. Our knowledge hings by means of analogy certainly does refer to a universal concept it also refers to the things in which that concept is realized.

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60 Maritain, Jacques, Formal Logic, translated by Imelda Choquette, York, Sheed and Ward, 1946, p.284.

"Consequently, if one of the things signified by an analogous concept (for example, created being) is within our immediate range, and the other is not (for example, uncreated being) we can know the second by the first as 'by a mirror.'. This knowledge is undoubtedly inadequate, but it may be absolutely certain."[61]

awareness of objective qualities in poetry is a dynamic and intuitive ess much more than it is the perception of a structural, formal and ic element in poetry.

III - ELDER OLSON: THE FAILURE OF RATIONAL FORM AS A PRINCIPLE OF OBJECTIVITY

From the metaphysical criticism of McKeon, one turns to the practical icism of Elder Olson, Ronald Crane and others. In one sense, Elder n is the most outstanding of these critics because he has not only set h his ideas concerning a poetics of the lyric but he has applied his ry both to specific poems as well as to the analysis of criticism. At same time he has examined specimens of the New Critics in his critique obert Penn Warren's analysis of Coleridge's The Rime of the Ancient ner[62] and William Empson as poetic diction. As Olson sets about the of writing An Outline of Poetic Theory[63] he presupposes the metaphysi- basis and the interpretations of Aristotle which have been made by on. Through the analysis of particular poems, he would search for a tcs of the lyric. Since Aristotle discusses tragedy and epic poetry the most part Olson must speculate on Aristotle's possible approach to c poetry. McKeon classified the study of poetry under the heading of

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61 Maritain, op.cit., p.286.
62 Crane, op.cit., (pp.138-144 and pp.45-82 resp.).
63 Ibid, pp.546-566.

science. The study of poetry was the study of forms in individual
A poem would be, therefore, an essence in the formal sense of the
which the parts were related to the specific whole and the intrin-
mal quality would be sui generis in the poem. Olson believes that
rch for a poetics of the lyric is a search for a specific formal
le in art objects. In his examination of Yeats's Sailing to Byzantium
s a coordination of references within the poem constituting its ar-
much as plot in Aristotle's sense constitutes tragedy. Since the
c quality of a lyric poem is formal or argumentative, "the events. . .
er incidents as such, connected by necessity or probability, but de-
or making poetic statements."[64]

e priority of the poem as an individual object before the affirmation
tence of any abstract principle is analogous to Aristotle's doctrine
dividual things in their single particularity are never predicable of
ct i.e. of any generic quality or abstraction. The poet as maker has
language into specific form in imitation of the specific individuality
ural things. In his interpretation of Aristotle's theory of poetry,
says "poetry is therefore distinguished from theory and practice
pleasure proper to the poem itself, in which the unity is constituted
ument and plot expressed in language."[65] In Aristotle the search
e formal principle is in the examination of the language of the poem
imitation of human action. Having already distinguished lyric poetry
he category of tragedy which Aristotle was concerned with, Olson says

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4 Olson, Elder, "'Sailing to Byzantium', Proloegomena to a Poetics of the
, The University Review, vol.8, p.217.
5 Crane, R.S., op.cit., (see chapter by McKeon, R., "Aristotle's Concepti
guage", p.192-3.)

bjectivity is of another sort.

roperly taken, poetic questions would be concerning the poetic struc-
re of a particular work, in the sense of inquiring what form has been
posed upon the medium of words. Such an enquiry, properly prosecuted,
uld terminate in a discovery of the parts of a work and of the inter-
lations through which the parts are parts of a whole." 66

eats's poem lends itself very conveniently to Olson's formalistic theory
ic poetry. The problem of old age, death and regeneration is examined
poet in terms of the paradox of age and youth as analogous to sen-
y and spirituality. There is a shift or juxtaposition of the condi-
of the young and the old throughout the poem which might be said to
e an atmosphere of tension in Tate's sense of the word.

'Stanza I presents a rejection of passion, stanza II an acceptance of
tellection; then, turning on the realization that art is insouled,
anza III presents a rejection of the corruptible embodiment, and
anza IV, an acceptance of the incorruptible. There is an alternation,
us, of negative and affirmative: out of corruption into permanence,
clear balance, the proportion being: I; II :: III : IV; and what
ders these sections is their dialectical sequence."67

undergoes the emotional experience of shifting from one position to
r, one becomes aware of the internal structure of the poem. Our
ness of the contradictions of age and youth so formally imitated de-
es our emotional response.

That is, passion must be condemned before the intellect can be esteemed;
he intellect must operate before the images can be known to be insouled;
he realization that the images are insouled precedes the realization
at the body may be dispensed with; and the reincarnation of the soul

66 Olson, Elder, "'Sailing to Byzantium', Prolegomena to a Poetics of the
," The University Review, vol.8, p.210.
67 Ibid. p.213.

in some changeless medium can be recognized as a possibility only through the prior recognition that the flesh is not the necessary matter of the soul."[68]

"O sages standing in God's holy fire
As in the gold mosaic of a wall,
Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre,
And be the singing-masters of my soul."

The third stanza represents the core of individuality which is the lyric em. Here it is that art is insouled and specific. God's transcendent holy re at once encompasses the individuality of all the sages of the past into e unity of a gold mosaic wall and yet they remain individual in eternity erning in a gyre". As the sensual elements of the old man's soul are rified, he is absorbed into the artifice of eternity which is found to have soul. Individuality is not an imitation of nature in the sensual sense r in the intellectual sense. So far the definition of the lyric poem plicit here is consistent with Aristotle's theory of imitation. Imitation re is

> "the presentation of an aspect of things in a matter other than its natural matter, rendered inevitable by reasons other than its natural reasons; . . . . It is not contradiction, consequently, that the artist should imitate natural things, and that he should none the less imitate them 'either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be.' (Poetics: 25: 146- n 7-11). Art imitates nature; the form joined to matter in the physical world is the same form that is expressed in the matter of the art. Art does not abstract universal forms as science does, but imitates the forms of individual things."[69]

e artifice of eternity is insouled with the permanence symbolized by the tefacts of Grecian goldsmiths. Olson does not concentrate upon the dy- mic quality of Yeats's symbols so much as he does on the structural essence

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68 Ibid, p.213.

69 Crane, R. S., op.cit., p.162 (McKeon, Richard, "The Concept of itation in Antiquity").

poem. He is not so much interested in the expansive or comprehensive of the imagery as he is in the argument of the poem. Yet he is careful to that he is not reducing the poem to a mere paraphrase. "The poem comprehends the argument and collocates with it many terms which, gh they could scarcely be formulated into some order approximating the n of the argument, nevertheless qualify the argument and determine urse." [70] The terms or symbols of the poem are not specific in the l or the semantical sense. "Like terms in most discourse, they take significance from their context through juxtaposition to other terms hich they are equated, contrasted, correlated, or combined." [71] The 'Byzantium' is not a place, nor yet the scene of a historical incident ther its specific quality is determined from its context within the "signifying a stage of contemplation wherein the soul studies itself o learns both what it is and in what consists true and eternal joy." [72]

The argument of the poem cannot be explained either in terms of plot e dramatic sense of the word nor in terms of character in the specific of a dramatic agent. "Rather, the character in the sense in which cter may be said to exist here is almost completely universalized." [73] the objectivity of the poem is discovered to be centred in the problem inding a suitable compensation for the losses suffered in old age." roblem determines the character such as it is. Olson places himself somewhat compromising position by making character subservient to thought

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70 Olson, Elder, "'Sailing to Byzantium', a Prolegomena to a Poetics of ramic", The University Review, vol.3, p.215.
71 Ibid. p.216.
72 Ibid. p.216.
73 Ibid. p.217.

seems to feel himself forced to eliminate the idea of character in the atic sense of character in action. The parts are meaningful only in the e that they are related to a whole context. The whole is static rather dynamic because its essence is argument rather than plot.

"Whereas in the Aristotelian treatment of poems which have a plot as their principle, certain qualitative parts of the various species resulted from an analysis of the object of imitation, that is, the action, a different procedure is necessary here; the principle is a tissue not of events but of ideas, and the ordering of the poem will not be by necessity and probability, by the antecedents and consequents of action, but by dialectical priority and posteriority. Lastly, while character will be necessitated here as where a plot is the principle, it will be determined, not by its share in an action, but by its role in a drama, not of action, but of thought. That is, it is determined, as the characters in a Platonic dialogue are determined, by the nature of the discourse which they are to utter."[74]

he end, the specific essence of a lyric poem is a formal principle, a ctural essence which is internally caused by its relations of parts to ole. For all the abstract qualities which one may recognize, "however liar the pattern in which it is apparently laid --- is always in the last ysis *sui generis*."[75]

In spite of the attempt of the Chicago Critics to be inductive it has seen in Chapter IV, how R. S. Crane becomes the victim of his own ectical method in his attack on Cleanth Brooks. Since the Chicago tics are unwilling to accept the metaphysical elements in Aristotle's trine, they were driven into the very kind of subjectivism they sought eagerly to avoid in the first place. Kenneth Burke offers additional

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74 *Ibid*, p.218.
75 *Ibid*, p.219.

ence to prove that the Chicago Critics have not come out with anything
er than have the "neo-Coleridgeans" whom they so vigorously attack.
e is much wisdom in Burke's comment that

"one cannot be purely 'inductive' in his observations of poems when making these observations through the instrumentality of so highly developed a philosophic language. One owes too much to the language. However, if Mr. Crane admitted that his 'inductive' method also contained strongly 'deductive' elements he would have to relinquish the symmetry of his own dramatizing, got by pitting his position in dialectical opposition to the 'Coleridgean' mode of derivation."[76]

Burke has no difficulty in reducing the critical opinions of the Chi-
Critics to his own dramatistic or idealistic aesthetic. This is pos-
e because the Chicago Critics have chosen to de-emphasize the metaphysi-
element in Aristotle in favour of a strong emphasis on his rational method.
ced to rational terms there is no reason why one deductive method won't
s well as another. And so we find both Burke and the Chicago critics
erned with synecdoche as a basic trope. Concerning the sonnet of
sworth analyzed by Norman Maclean, Burke says:

"We have here a cluster of closely related words: action, rest (designated in the sonnet by such synonyms as 'calm' 'quiet' 'tranquillity', 'gentleness'), motion, attitude or potential action. Mr. Maclean says something much to our purposes here, in his gloss on the word 'free' in the first line: 'It is a strange word when coupled with 'beauteous' and 'calm'. As endowing the evening with the power to act, it seems at variance with the beauty of tranquillity.' The comment enables us to discern that in 'free' we find obliquely a reference to potential action. However, our thoughts on the relation between action and the rest that is the end of action would lead us to hold that there is nothing 'strange' about this usage. Who would be more 'tranquil' than the wholly 'free'? For his complete freedom would so thoroughly contain the potentialities of action that there would be no problem to disturb the state of rest."[77]

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76 Burke, Kenneth, A Grammar of Motives, p.472.
77 Ibid, p.476.

In the end, both critics perceive the same kind of fundamental organic
in the poem. The difference seems to lie in Burke's compulsion towards
edness which the Chicago critic abhors as theapplication of an external
ciple in a Procrustean manner to every poem that is evaluated. The
go critic aims to be objective and specific but only in terms of an
nal rational structure which in the end requires reference to an ex-
l principle of judgment in order to make it meaningful.

"As a matter of fact, there are many passages in Mr. Olson's essay where
e profits by going beyond his principle of uniqueness. For he launches
nto generalizations about the lyric generically that are not at all
onfined to the particular poem he is analyzing. . . . These place the
yric as a class with relation to other classes. When he says, for
nstance, that tragedy, epic, and comedy are "dynamic for they imitate
hange," whereas "the kind we have been scrutinizing is static," his
oncern here with stasis profits by dramatistic reference." 78

not surprising that Burke can so readily reject the Chicago Critics'
pt at objectivity when they reduce poetic objectivity to a principle
ternal or specific rational form. In neither case does the critic
into account the individuality of the poem as a dramatic event in the
ity of human response to experience. In both cases the critics aim
rasping a universal or abstract principle which is somehow individuated but
ither case do these critics see the poem as a mode of consciousness in
face of experience. Only then can one form a judgment concerning ob-
vity. It must be a fundamentally inclusive judgment concerning humans
their relation to the totality of human experience. On this level,
particular pattern of Wordsworth's response to nature and God becomes

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78 Ibid, p.478.

ant. This necessary step which allows one to pass from the restrictions
hisness" or particularity without surrendering its strength is made
sary by the requirements of the Aristotelian metaphysic.

It may well not be the business of the critic to pass qualitative judg-
upon the particular mode of consciousness (qua mode) held for inspection
t is as much his responsibility to invite his readers to experience it,
is his responsibility to help them to taste and feel the other aspects
e substance of the poem. It is a legitimate part of a poetics of the
and relevant to comments made on an object "qua work of art".79

IV - ELDER OLSON: THE FAILURE OF RATIONAL FORM AS A PRINCIPLE OF POETIC COMMUNICATION

Language is the device of disclosure in most mimetic poetry. . . .But
t would be a mistake to suppose that language can be adequately analyzed
s an instrument of disclosure merely by talking about its meaning.
have already distinguished, in the first part of this essay, between
peech as action (praxis) and speech as meaningful(lexis); to neglect
hat distinction is, I think, to blind one's self to a great deal of
he poetic mechanism."80

is highly critical of any theory which would derive meaning from the
pretation of speech as action alone. Mimetic poetry as he sees it
es its meaning from the textual structure of the poem alone. It has
dy been seen how he derives the meaning of 'Byzantium' from Yeats's
Using King Lear as an illustration, he takes his pathetic speech at
nd of the play, "Pray you, undo this button!" to reveal the four causes

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79 I am indebted to Mr. Bruce Fletcher Attridge for this interpretation
etic objectivity.

80 Crane, R. S., op.cit., p.71, (Olson: "William Empson, Contemporary
icism, and Poetic Diction").

notion in mimetic poetry. We get meaning from the speech as we relate
o the precedent context; the concatenation of Lear's previous actions
s to this tragic consummation. The particular speech-action reveals
ifically Lear's helplessness and hopeless repentance. The diction
imple and stark in harmony with the mood already prevalent in the tragedy.
ornament of the speech lies in the rhythmic quality which affects us as
.

If the purpose of language in the imitative mode is disclosure, then
language should be as concise and clear as possible. Olson notes two
s of concision in language: "one is obtained by the use of as few words
ossible to express the meaning, while nevertheless expressing the full
ing; the other by expressing only part of the meaning, leaving the rest
nference."[81] Now instead of depending upon metaphor in the ordinary
rary sense of that word, Olson becomes typically logical and adds that

> "the use of enthymeme for syllogism is concise in the latter way; and the famous Lacedaemonian dispatch 'Dionysius in Corinth' is of this order. The implication involved here is different from the implications of character, etc., by speech as action in that what is implied is meaning, whereas the implications of speech as action are derived from meaning. For instance, the full meaning of the dispatch is 'If you attack us, you will be served like a similar aggressor, Dionysius, who was also a great kind and is now living, an exile and a private citizen, in Corinth.' With the meaning clear, the speech may now be interpreted as an act of defiance implying the moral qualities of Spartans."[82]

Turning from concision to clarity in the expression of poetic meaning,
n is careful to indicate that he does not mean by clear language, language
h raises no problems even though he is attacking Empson for identifying

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81 Ibid, p.73.
82 Ibid, pp.73-4.

anguage with ambiguity.

The conditions of clarity itself can be seen if we consider that it is ependent upon three things: the words, the syntactical arrangements, nd the relations of sentences. Clarity is produced by the words in so ar as they are prime, immediate, commensurate, consonant, and familiar. ords are prime if they are used in their first literal meaning.... ords are immediate if they yield their meaning without special calcu- ation and are intelligible as a synthesis. . . . Words are commensurate hen they are neither too general nor too particular for the thing they tand for; thus "animal" or "Socrates" is incommensurate with "man"".[83]

ould be noted for the benefit of the reader who is not especially trained istotle's metaphysical thinking that words which are commensurate are words which describe the substance or essence of things. Hence, Man ly an abstract universal, while the man Socrates is a good illustration at Aristotle ultimately meant by substance. Words are consonant when belong to the same context and do not suggest meanings which are in- tible with the organic wholeness of the passage.

Words are familiar when they not only are commonly employed but are sed in their customary grammatical functions, i.e., qua parts of speech or instance, if a given word is commonly used as a noun and rarely as very, it is not wholly familiar when it is used as a verb."[84]

Syntactical arrangement implies the common and familiar grammatical of sentence structure and sequence of parts which are customarily iated with statements in sentence form. Clarity is also produced by roper relation of sentences. "Sentences are related to each other ur ways: additively, qualificatively, antithetically, and inferentially: either add fresh information, qualify what has been said, oppose each in some way, or are related as parts of an argument."[85]

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83 Ibid, p.75.
84 Ibid, P.75.
85 Ibid, p.76.

age is clear when it requires as few mental operations as possible.

Clarity is not necessarily characteristic of the maximum effectiveness of em. But Olson does suggest that even the elements of suspense created ppressed elements in plot or meaning are ultimately resolvable into es in which the parts are internally caused or related.

"The effect of imagery ought to be more like that of dramatic presentation, than of narration; we must feel as though we are seeing or hearing not as though someone were describing something to us. The 'brightness' should be brought out by an accurate word, or implied, or suggested by metaphor."[86]

But Olson's use of clarity here is in a grammatical or syntactical alone. When he says that the effect of imagery ought to be like dra- presentation, he means the logical clarity of scientific language. htness, clarity is primarily effected by accurate words if not implied ggested by metaphor. If we are to capture the essence of lyric poetry ast be comprehended on a much more inclusive and intuitive level. Olson's of the Aristotelian theory of perception is derived from the De Anima.

"As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name phantasia, (imagination) has been formed from phaos (light) because it is not possible to see without light." [87]

is an excellent illustration of the use of analogy by Aristotle to unicate the true nature of knowledge. As sight must have light for on, so must knowledge have light for the perception of truth. The le term "light" in this analogy is a universal concept but it is only

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86 Ibid, p.80.
87 Aristotle, De Anima 429 a,1-2, ed. McKeon, op.cit.

igicant in the two particular experiences which it relates -- vision
nowledge.

Olson tells us that

"the constituents of beauty are, therefore, definiteness, order, and symmetry; the last being such commensurability of the parts as renders a thing self-determined, a measure to itself, as it were; for example, plot is symmetrical when complication and denouement are commensurate."[88]

ntially these are the qualities which Thomistic aesthetic derives from
totle., as integrity, proportion and light. The idea of integrity
ests completeness in the artist's sense of that word realizable in as
ways as the artist creates works of art. Proportion, fitness, harmony,
r are consistent with the object and the end which the artist has in
in his creation. So far, Olson's parallel terms of definiteness and
r seem to be consistent with the Aristotelian tradition. Where he falls
is in confining the idea of clarity to syntactical symmetry. By clarity
rilliance of form in the Thomistic sense

"must be understood an <u>ontological</u> splendour which happens to be revealed to our minds, not a conceptual clarity. There must be no misunderstanding here: the words <u>clarity</u>, <u>intelligibility</u> and <u>light</u>, used to characterise the part played by <u>form</u> in the heart of things, do not necessarily indicate something clear and intelligible <u>to us</u>, but rather something which, although clear and luminous <u>in itself</u>, intelligible <u>in itself</u>, often remains obscure to our eyes either because of the matter in which the form in question is buried or because of the transcendence of the form itself in the things of the spirit. The more substantial and profound this secret significance, the more concealed from us it is; so much so, in truth, of <u>intelligibility</u> is to say at the same time that it is the peculiar principle of <u>mystery</u>. (There can in fact be no mystery where there is <u>nothing to know</u>: mystery exists where there is

88 Crane, R. S., p.557, (Olson, Elder, "A Dialogue on Symbolism)

more to be known than is offered to our apprehension.) To define beauty by brilliance of form is at the same time to define it by brilliance of mystery."[89]

When Olson speaks of the objective element of a poem as a specific ructural form, generating its own objectivity, one feels that the essence a poem is a rational essence lacking the dynamic vitality of a living k of art. The quality of clarity must extend beyond its syntactical el if we are to have an aesthetic experience.

"First we recognize that the object is one integral thing, then we recognize that it is an organised composite structure, a thing in fact; finally, when the relation of the parts is exquisite, when the parts are adjusted to the special point, we recognise that it is that thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany."[90]

other words, clarity is the faculty of recognition of the objective element the poem. The point made by Joyce as well as St. Thomas is that syntacal clarity is not enough to perceive particularity in a poem or a work art.

"By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments."[91]

Olson and the Chicago Critics have over-emphasized the rationalistic ctor in Aristotle's method, neglecting the suggestive metaphysical insights his First Philosophy. By concerning themselves too much with the science

89 Maritain, Jacques, Art and Scholasticism, N.Y., Sheed and Ward, 1947, p.23, not
90 Joyce, James, Stephen Hero, Oxford, Alden Press, 1944, p.192.
91 Ibid, p.188.

oetry in their search for literal objectivity, they have succumbed to Joyce calls the vivisective in the modern spirit.

"Vivisection itself is the most modern process one can conceive. The ancient spirit accepted phenomena with a bad grace. The ancient method investigated law with the lantern of justice, morality with the lantern of revelation, art with the lantern of tradition." 92

· by means of the light of tradition and the intuitive process of reve- on will one ever become aware of the true objective quality of a work rt.

V - ALLEN TATE AND ELDER OLSON: A CONTRAST IN THE TECHNIQUE OF CRITICISM

In their approach to other works of criticism, the Chicago critics r the same caution and the same capacity for penetrating and ingenious ana- .s. If the objectivity of poetry is to be discovered in the knowledge- e element in a poem or a work of art, the critical intention of an author e Longinus can be discovered by means of a literal interpretation. A r of criticism, like a work of art is treated as a reasoned structure therefore the discovery of the method proper to the poet's or the cri- 's reasoning is essential to the apprehension of truth. With tough- iedness in the best scholastic tradition, Olson sets forth the method will employ in his examination of Longinus. There are exactly five racteristics of the literal interpretation as employed by Olson. First, author sets out to solve some specific problem and the argument ends h the resolution of that problem. Second, the question must be expounded

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92 Ibid, p.165.

lely from the text as from the only proper clue to the meaning and that e argument itself must be regarded at all times as the means by which, evious knowledge mediating, the end is achieved. third, subproblems ll be consequent upon the main problem and the critic has the obligation organize these carefully in relation to the total problem. Fourth,

> "we may assume that every device —— distinction, definition, example, analogy, quotation, etc. —— is used deliberately and that the use of every such device is to be explained in terms of the necessity of the end and to be noted as a sign of what the author considers to be demonstration." Fifth and "finally, the order of the text as a whole is to be explained in terms of demonstration as the author conceives it, that is, in terms of his method."[93]

The analyticcare with which Olson proceeds to the task of analysis of nginus' essay "on the Sublime" is outdone only by his own careful examina- on of the distinction between symbol and metaphor in poetry or in the ghly conceptualized analysis of Yeats's "sailing to Byzantium". Longinus found to have a fundamental triad of terms in his work;

> "in order of composition the genius (author) composes a work which has a certain literary quality of sublimity (work) and which effects <u>ekstasis</u> in hearers or readers (audience); the order of inquiry into the technique of composition, however, is the reverse of this; for we begin with a sensation in ourselves, as audience, which we recognize to be ekstasis. Inquiring into the cause of this sensation, we find it to be a certain quality of sublimity in the work; but, while this is perhaps explicative of our sensation, we can at this stage say nothing concerning the manner in which a work must be composed. Consequently, we must inquire beyond the work into the faculties of the author which permitted its composition; and when we have achieved a statement of these, we have only to ask how these may be acquired or cultivated to answer the question of how the sublimity of a work may be achieved or the ecstasy of an audience effected."[94]

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93 Crane, R. S., <u>op.cit.</u>, p.234, (Olson, Elder, "The Argument of nginus 'On the Sublime'")

94 <u>Ibid.</u>, p.239.

dialectical juxtaposition of author and audience through the medium of work of art is a process of what both McKeon and Olson have previously ed "analogy", the reduction of the work of art and its explanation or ing to a single plane of interpretation.

"So analogizing, Longinus has made it impossible to discuss separately the various literary kinds; there can be here no theory of tragedy, of comedy, epic, or comic-epic and no theory of rhetoric, since sublimity may be found in all these and in philosophic and historical literature as well and since it results from the nature of neither one nor another of these kinds of literary production but from the faculties of the agent who produced these. So analogizing, too, it is impossible to escape the consequence that the foundations of the art must be stated in psychological terms."[95]

Olson suggests that the technique of "analogy" as used by Longinus is liarly suited to the purpose of the essay. Although the essay has the e-mentioned limitations, within the defined purpose of the essay, Lon- s has been consistent.

"We may deny the analogy constituted by the triad, we may demand an answer in other terms; but the argument of the treatise itself could be called in question only if we insisted on affixing other significances to the terms which Longinus employs or on asserting that the study of literature involves totally different questions."[96]

It is profitable to compare the enterprise of one of the New Critics he field of scholarly criticism and interpretation with that of the ago Critics. After a very careful piece of textual analysis, Olson ludes that the term "sublimity" means something more than mere elevation iction. Olson is convinced as a result of his analysis of the text of essay that Longinus intended much more than a merely verbal arrangement ords to create an artificial effect.

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95 Ibid, pp.239-240.
96 Ibid, p.240.

e treatise of Longinus affords every evidence that he sought to avoid
h a reduction and that hence the word should not be taken in its
ely stylistic sense but should receive its definition in terms of
t communication of nobility which is made possible by the perfection
the human soul and of art, and which received its answer in the wonder
admiration of all men." [97]

ng on entirely different technique, Allen Tate arrives at a similar
ion in his essay on Longinus.[98] He sets out to prove a hunch that
.s' stress on the sublime is more than a verbal one. The important
'or Tate is Longinus' emphasis on the sublime "not to persuade, but to
.e, like a flash of lightning."

the beginning, Longinus asserts that style is a compound of natural
and conscious method. The essay on the sublime is actually a study
ns of the author and the creature of his artistic imagination. When
is speaks of literary method as a means of achieving the right length
e proper means of speech for a specific occasion, Tate feels that he
ot have in mind only the orator and the public occasion; he may also
mind a criterion of objectivity for any sort of literary composition.
ggests that "right length" may mean the adaptation of form to subject
the "occasion" means the relation between the poet and the person to
he poem is addressed. There is a sense of rightness here which the
s captured and which may be said to be at once dynamic as well as
ive. In his discussion of metre, Tate feels that Longinus is not
attributing to certain metres specific effects. Longinus seems to
that in the author's choice of his occasion for the poem, the mode of

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7 Ibid, p.259.
8 Tate, Allen, "Longinus", The Hudson Review, vol.1, 1948, pp.344-361.

ression, "the objective and communicable features of his work" are necessary comitants of the occasion itself, the mode is as objective as the subject ch the poet treats.

Olson has declared in the first place that he considers Longinus to be objective critic whose limitations prevent him from separating the various erary kinds such as tragedy, comedy, and epic. The strength of Longinus' y lies not in any unsuspected quality of objectivity he may have achieved in the careful exploitation of an otherwise limited critical method. hin the framework of his terms and definitions, Longinus' account of the ime is entirely adequate. If we prefer another sort of description of poetic process, we must look elsewhere and not try to make Longinus' he conform to our own or some other critical pattern.

On the other hand, Allen Tate is convinced that Longinus does give an ount of what is objective in the poetic process. Contrary to the popular ion of Longinus, Tate feels that it is not the "grand" style that is being ommended. Rather it is a fitting proportion between "emotion" and bject".

> "It is clear that Longinus, by and large, is not recommending the "grand style"; his translators have probably done him a disservice in rendering his characteristic adjective, megas as "grand"; it is, rather, great, unusual, uncommon; and likewise hupsos, "height", which I understand as "excellence." Exstasis is our subjective acknowledgement of the presence of the uncommon, of an objective order of unpredictable distinction. He is quite explicit in this matter. By means of 'an appropriate structure, and this means only, as we have sufficiently shown, (the best writers) give the effect of stateliness and distinction which is removed from the commonplace'".99

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99 Ibid, p.358.

There is no doubt as to the difference in style and approach of these schools of criticism, represented by Olson and Tate. Olson is scholarly methodical in his approach much in the fashion of a scholastic logician e Tate is intuitive in his critical perceptions. As he apprehends the eness of Longinus' essay, he has a creative awareness of the dynamic ity of the work. In the end; his observations are not so far from e derived by Olson with his analytic method. Olson will not disagree Tate when he says that Longinus conceives of style as coming into ex- nce

"only as it discovers the subject; and conversely the subject exists only after it is formed by the style. No literary work is perfect, no subject perfectly formed. Style reveals that which is not style in the process of forming it. Style does not create the subject, it discovers it."[100]

Olson would agree with Tate about the matter of "composition" in inus. "There must be, in short, a total quality of the work which abides first impact; to that total quality he gives the name of composition."[101] is the quality which Olson so strongly emphasizes both in the inter- tation of poetry as well as of criticism. Every part, every argument contribute to the immediate effect of the whole upon the reader or lence.

Olson concludes that if there is to be consistency in the analogy loyed by Longinus, "the artist must himself be sublime in soul if he is reflect the sublime; if he is led by the love of pleasure or the love money, he becomes little and ignoble."[102] The synthesis which Longinus

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100 Ibid, p.352.
101 Ibid, p.359.
102 Crane, R.S., op.cit., p.258.

tes is more than a rhetorical device; it is an elevation of the soul
ell as of the style of language. From Olson's essay one concludes that
inus was writing in the long tradition of paideia in which the arts of
oric and of poetry were intended to reflect the greatness of the spirit
he age as well as the faultless style.

"Literary greatness is to be estimated not by mere freedom from fault
but by the greatness of the spirit reflected in the words as in a mirror.
Art thus in a sense is a double discipline, being both moral and aes-
thetic; but its literary function is ultimately only to provide some
suitable medium which the spirit of the writer transcends and illuminates."[103]

Allen Tate concludes that in addition to the peculiar cultural signi-
nce which Longinus' essay might have, he does say something relevant
the modern critic. He agrees with Olson that style is something more
a mere arrangement of words. As the author seeks to create a just
ortion between emotion and subject, he creates at the same time something
ctive. Its objectivity consists in the dynamic interaction of nature
art where nature and art are never completely at harmony with one another.

"There is a reciprocal relation, not an identity --- not, certainly,
the identity of form and content --- a dynamic, shifting relation be-
tween technique and subject; and they reveal each other. This is my
sense of Longinus' primary insight. It is an insight of considerable
subtlety that has a special claim to the attention of our generation."[104]

Olson is not prepared to allow the extension of Longinus' "analogizing"
nd the framework of the essay itself while Tate feels that Longinus'
rine has relevance for the modern critic. Exstasis, or the response

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103 Ibid., p.258.
104 Tate, Allen, op.cit., p.352.

he audience to the artist's use of the sublime is for Tate "our subjec-
acknowledgement of the presence of the uncommon, of an objective order
npredictable distinction." The occasion "forces upon the poet the ob-
ive and communicable features of his work." Tate is quick to perceive
llels of the same technique in modern critics recognizing here John
e Ransom's theory of a "texture" within a "structure". This is exactly
Olson objects to in the New Critics: this extension of the analogizing
ess to areas where it does not apply. Only in so far as the principles
sui generis from the work itself can one argue for any specific objec-
ty for them. Critical principles both in essays in criticism as well as
oems must be generated from within and not applied from without. The
of the validity of such concepts of criticism must depend upon the reader's
tion of the concepts to the whole of the essay.

On the other hand there would seem to be a certain begging of the poetic
tion in Olson's essay. One may well ask wherein lies the criterion of
istency and one discovers it to be in two sources: in the rational con-
ency of the analytic method as set forth at the beginning of the essay;
in the harmony of Longinus' statements on the nature of style with the
ational ideal of the Greek culture: the word sublime "should receive its
nition in terms of that communication of nobility which is made possible
he perfection of the human soul and of art, and which receives its answer
he wonder and admiration of all men."[105] Without doubting the validity
lson's observations, they are not exclusive of other possible observations

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105 Crane, op.cit., p.259.

onclusions. Tate shows quite effectively that Longinus' notion of struc- "is not the formal 'type' or genre, a viable body of special conventions, as the lyric, the ode, or the epic provides, but exists in the language he poem."[106] Longinus discovers the genius of Sappho's poem in the union ontradictions which characteristic he specifically states. The Chicago ics are surely right that the indiscriminate application of such a prin- e of judgment to all poetry is a little absurd and it is only fair to t that Brooks and Empson in particular go too far in this direction. admires the fashion in which Longinus captures the total quality of em which abides in its first impact. It is the awareness of this quality omposition which leads to an imaginative appreciation of the poem or ny poem. If the poet's style is "to entrance, like a flash of lightning", to be sure, the source of illumination must be in something more than rational consistency of the parts of a poem as a formal whole; it must n something more imaginative than the ideals of the aristocratic cul- of the Greeks.

It is the awareness of the imaginative power of rhythm which alone will ey the dynamic meaning of Longinus' essay. To have experienced this thmic quality in Longinus' work or indeed to have experienced the imagina- element in a poem, is to have had a real experience which is unique the work itself and it is not by any means fair to accuse the critic applying abstract principles externally simply because the critic cannot cover the principle formally generating itself out of the internal ucture of the poem in the fashion of the Chicago critics.

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106 Tate, op.cit., p.354.

' sense of the achievement of the past may issue in a critical acqui-
lon of knowledge which is not to be put away in the attic when the creative
ent comes."[107]

This comparison of two approaches to the analysis of Longinus' On the
.ime has served to show the respective advantages of Tate's intuitive
.ghts and Olson's rational analysis. Each critic could agree concerning
function of the sublime in Longinus as an instrument of Paideia. But
'e is a wide gulf between the Chicago Critics and the New Criticism
Longimus's conception of style. Olson interprets Longimus's meaning of
rationally as an instrument of Paideia for the communication of nobility.
.e not denying this element in Longimus, Tate interprets Longimus's
ding for style metaphorically as illumination by a flash of lightning.

VI - SYMBOLISM VERSUS METAPHOR IN OLSON'S POETIC THEORY

If one examines carefully the discussion of metaphor and symbol and the
.s of distinction between these two terms in Olson's poetic theory,
becomes aware of a fundamental dispute concerning the use of Aristotle's
guage and metaphysics as a basis for aesthetic judgment. The term
aphor' is used in the sense that an idealist would use it, as a repre-
ative of the whole or unity of mind which lies behind the significant
s. And so,

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107 Ibid, p.349.

"there are three elements in every metaphor; perhaps we may call them the 'referent' or thing analogized; the 'analogue', or thing to which the referent is analogized; and the 'continuum' or ground of likeness, whether in fact or thought, which permits the analogy. A metaphor is clearly stated as metaphor when these are explicit and when the grammatical indications of similitude are present or easily understood."[108]

e an object or experience is compared with another similar object or
erience in such a way that both reveal the 'continuum' or ground of
eness which makes possible the perception of identity in the first
ce.

Olson believes that the intricate rational structure, the knowledgeable
ment constitutes the hard core of objectivity in an art object. With
pect to metaphor he also insists that the likeness be 'intelligible'.

"A metaphor can never be false; it must be true, either in that the analogy is real, or in that someone in a certain condition might think it real. Hence a metaphor can be "difficult" in three principal ways: through omission of one of its elements, through unclear statement grammatically, through apparent falsity."[109]

suppressing or omitting one of the elements, suspense is often created
the reader is forced to make an inference as to the intended meaning.
ne is used as an illustration of what is here called the metaphysical
aphor.

"Anyone knows that the sun is like a lamp in respect of light; but why a flea is like marriage, or why lovers resemble compasses, is another matter. The metaphysical metaphor takes referents and analogues with no apparent continua; or states the continua last."[110]

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108 Crane, op.cit., p.81 (Olson, Elder, "William Empson, Contemporary
ticism and Poetic Diction").
109 Ibid, p.81.
110 Ibid, p.81.

When both the specific thing to which the described object refers
ferent) and the ground of likeness (continuum) are suppressed, or as
on adds, only vaguely intimated, we have symbol instead of metaphor.
Olson, symbols are far more dynamic than metaphors since metaphors are
y exemplars or analogues which use the preposition 'like' to connect
identical things in order to make a metaphor. But when the poet so
anizes his conception "that it is not a mere mirror, as examples and
logues are, but, as it were, a window, a transparency through which we
the thing he truly intends; then and then alone has he made a symbol."[111]
far this would seem to be what Joyce means in the function of claritas
the epiphany as a means of intuitive illumination. Unfortunately as
on goes on to say what the distinction is between a symbol and a me-
hor, one does not find the symbol to be the rich figure which Joyce
ceived it to be. In Olson the relation of thought and sign is strictly
vocal, intelligibly conceived in a strictly rational sense.

> "Whatever name we give to our symbol will now apply immediately to the symbolized, and thus differ from metaphor; for a metaphor is only the name of a certain thing transferred to its similar in respect to a certain similarity, although their concepts remain distinct; whereas the name of the true symbol will stand not metaphorically but directly for the symbolized; because the concept of the symbol has been identified with that of the symbolized."[112]

so the five ways in which symbols are connected with the symbolized are
intelligibly identifiable in a rational sense: eg. resemblances of
m or shape or nature, or a circle as the cause of a sphere; the parts

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111 Crane, op.cit., pp.586-7, (Olson, Elder, "A Dialogue on Symbolism"
112 Ibid, p.587.

t stand for the whole as the keystone does for the house or the victim the murder; instrumental causes such as the sword and shield symboliz- the art of war;

"things that have a use, purpose, function, or result, each may be symbolized by its proper work or use. . . the shipbuilder's art is represented by a ship; accidental comcomitants of the afore-mentioned classes, arising our of confusion with the true causes just mentioned or out of historical happenings or customs or legends or analogies, and so forth. For example, members of a given religious cult will be most likely to take as symbols things connected with the most crucial articles of their faith, or a nation will accept something connected with some important event or period in its history."[113]

If the essence of the symbol is a knowledgeable essence, then

"anyone who wishes to invent true and powerful symbols will have, therefore, to study that concept which he wishes to symbolize and determine its most striking and important attributes, that is, those which determine the conception and our emotions toward it; next, he will have to find or invent something which incorporates these attributes; and with these he will have to combine the index."[114]

What Olson seems to be searching for here is a kind of calculus by as of which he can anticipate conceptually the emotional response to structural essences of an epistemological object. Although he recognizes t the artistic or poetic object must have a direct emotional appeal, neverthless insists that the prior quality of the essence is structural, nal, intelligible in a rational sense. Essentially, the symbolic poet concerned with beauty of form. Symbolism is the art of poetic communi- lon without depending upon analogy, as over against allegory which ays depends upon analogy. The transparency of the symbol depends upon

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113 Ibid, p.583.
114 Ibid, p.586.

ledge: the symbol has an epistemological quality which is much more ctly defined than any intuitive quality it might have. "Apart from ledge, he could never achieve plausibility of action or character or ment."[115]

The confusion of allegory with analogy is similar to the confusion by McKeon between analogy and dialectic. Objectivity is reduced to rmal or structural essence understood intelligibly by the rational . The epistemological process here seems to be much more deductive than ctive. The syllogistic movement of thought in Aristotle's use of ana- is much more inductive. The third figure of the syllogism as conceived ristotle is called the inductive figure because the conclusion is de- d from a middle term which is always particular.

There is a close connection between analogy and metaphor although they not necessarily the same.

"In the case of Analogy, there is a real resemblance between the two objects which are directly compared with each other --- as when knowledge, wisdom, power, justice, and goodness, as they exist in man, are said to be analogous to similar, but infinitely higher, perfections in God. In the case of Metaphor, there is often no resemblance between the sign and the thing signified by it, although there may be a real resemblance between the latter and something else with which it is compared, in virtue of which the same sign may come to be equally applied to both. --- Thus the eye is first made the symbol or sign of human intelligence, and the arm of human power, --- the corporeal member or organ being substituted for, and made to represent, these properties in man, --- and thereafter transferred to denote similar perfections in God, on the ground of a real analogy, not between the sign and anything like it existing in the Divine nature, but between the properties which it represents equally in the case of man and God."[116]

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115 Ibid, p.593.

116 James Buchanan, Analogy: A Guide to Truth and an Aid to Faith, burgh, Johnstone Hunter Co., 1864, p.70.

analogy is metaphorical but not all metaphors are analogical. Metaphors uently depend upon other relations to communicate resemblance such as use of metonymy. If we speak of knowledge in terms of the eye, or he power of God in terms of the arm we are using a bodily sign to te similar powers in God.

"not because there is anything in His nature corresponding to the bodily organs from which the metonymical metaphor is derived, but because there is something in His nature which corresponds to the thing signified by it."[117]

when certain properties which belong to man are compared with certain ections which belong to God, one makes a comparison directly without intervention of metonymy or of any other trope. By means of analogy becomes aware of the true relation between the intellectual and moral erties of one's own nature which resemble corresponding perfections od and in the Scriptures. This knowledge is often communicated effec- ly by means of metaphor. Indeed, metaphor and analogy are seldom dis- ed. But to confuse metaphor and analogy so that one were to ascribe to bodily members and organs similar to our own would be to commit ido- y. "By this fallacy we proceed when we conclude from the sign to the g signified. By this encroachment Idolatry first crept in."[118]

The illustrations from theology of the dangers of confusing metaphor analogy are relevant to the evaluation of the Chicago Critics since would seem to dismiss the relations involved in favour of the idea symbol. Symbols provide the critic with a kind of knowledge which

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117 Ibid, p.72.
118 Sir Thomas Browne, Vulgar Errors: in Buchanan, op.cit., p.72.

uch more certain. The intuitive element of knowledge gained by the eption of resemblances is apparently rejected. Hence "anyone who es to invent true and powerful symbols will have, therefore, to study concept which he wishes to symbolize."[119] When the Chicago Critics cted the metaphysical element of Aristotle's thinking in favour of his ntific method they committed the same blunder as did I. A. Richards in cting Coleridge's metaphysics in favour of his method. Not only does n miss the point of the analogical metaphor by calling it threefold making the trope a pale shadow of the idealist's Absolute but he l ooks his recognized mater's specific discussion of the nature of phor in the Poetics.

To understand how analogy functions one may illustrate from Aristotle elf. In the Poetics, metaphor as a rhetorical device is explained in terms nalogy. Aristotle says

"metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion. . . when the second term is to the first as the fourth is to the third. We may use the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth. Sometimes, too, we qualify the metaphor by adding the term to which the proper word is relative. Thus the cup is to Dionysius as the shield is to Ares. The cup may, therefore, be called 'the shield of Dionysus' and the shield 'the cup of Ares'. Or again, as old age is to life, so is evening to day. Evening may therefore be called 'the old age of day' and old age, 'the evening of life' or, in the phrase of Empdeocles, 'life's setting sun.' For instance, to scatter seed is called sowing: but the action of the sun in s cattering his rays is nameless. Still this process bears to the sun the same relation as sowing to the seed. Hence the expression of the poet, 'sowing the god-created light.' There is another way in which this kind of metaphor may be employed. We may

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119 Cf. p.32.

apply an alien term, and then deny of that term one of its proper attributes: as if we were to call the shield, not 'the cup of Ares' but 'the wineless cup'".120

later in xxii, Aristotle says "the greatest thing by far is to have ommand of metaphor. . . it is a mark of genius, for to make good meta- s implies an eye for resemblances." Now it is exactly this rich me- orical insight which the epistemological limitations of Olson's theory ymbol cannot comprehend. What specific concept or structural essense symbolized' by Aristotle's remarkable metaphor "the wineless cup". To ine oneself to a literal interpretation of this metaphor would be to its meaning completely.

The great thinkers of the Middle ages continued the tradition of totle's doctrine of analogy. Augustine indicates the four levels of ogy in his De Utilitate Credendi.121 Whereas Aristotle describes the t level in specific terms, Augustine describes the Historical or Literal l at the point when "it is declared therein what is written or what is ." The tropological level determines the end of the enterprise "when s showed thereby for what cause anything is either done or said." analogical level occurs when "it is demonstrated that the two Testa- s are not contrary unto one another." The Allegorical level occurs n it is read therein that certain things that are written ought not e understood according to the letter, but according to the figure."

The language of Dante's Divine Comedy is conceived on the same ern as explicityly described in Dante's Epistle X to Con Grande.

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120 Poetica, xxi: 4, ed. McKeon, op.cit.

121 Augustinus, S. Aurelius, De Utilitate Credendi, in Migne, J.P. iae Latinae, Tomus 42.

"7. To elucidate, then, what we have to say, be it known that the sense of this work is not simple, but on the contrary it may be called polysemous, that is to say, 'of more senses than one'; for it is one sense which we get through the letter, and another which we get through the thing the letter signifies; and the first is called literal, but the second (140) allegorical or mystic. And this mode of treatment, for its better manifestation may be considered in this verse: 'When Israel came out of Egypt, and the house of Jacob from a people of strange speech, Judaea became his sanctification, Israel his power.' For if we inspect the letter alone the departure of the children of Israel from Egypt in the time of Moses is presented to us; if the allegory, our redemption wrought by Christ; if (150) the moral sense, the conversion of the soul from the grief and misery of sin to the state of grace is presented to us; if the anagogical, the departure of the holy soul from the slavery of this corruption to the liberty of eternal glory is presented to us. And although these mystic senses have each their special denominations, they may all in general be called allegorical, since they differ from the literal and historical; for Allegory is derived from alleon, in Greek (160), which means the same as the Latin alienum or diversum." [122]

a technique of interpreting the Scriptures to a mode of writing poetry, method of analogy as a basis of linguistic expression was employed through- the Middle Ages. Consistent with the Classical, the literal aspect of gs was never conceived to be the only aspect. The fullness of truth d be comprehended only by the analogical method. Strong emphasis was ed upon the literal or existential but the existential was never con- red to be purely empirical.

In modern times, indeed since the time of Addison, metaphor has been ted in an univocal sense. Metaphors are representations of single con- s. A modern illustration is in order. I am indebted to Professor Herbert hall McLuhan for the following illustration. Yvor Winters has made an rpretation of the following lines of Shakespeare's Sonnet 104 -

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122 From Dante, Epistolae X, Temple Classics, p.347ff.

Ah! yet doth beauty, like a dial hand,
Steal from his figure, and no pace perceived:
So your sweet hue, which methings still doth stand,
Hath motion, and mine eye may be deceived.

rs' interpretation moves as follows: "Subject is change' by which we
ure Time, but especially as that change occurs in the human face: Con-
ually there is no irrelevance here; the comparison is used to make
arful judgment absolutely certain and inescapable."[123]

Concerning Winters' interpretation, McLuhan says that the metaphor
llowed to amplify only the concept. He excludes any notion of Eliot's
ing for metaphor in his idea of the 'objective correlative' as a pre-
counterpart of a moment of consciousness and yet every metaphor is
that. As indicated above, there are four terms to a metaphor as a
ure of thought". If we deny the metaphysical reality on which the
phor is based, truth itself becomes mere self-consistency or tautology.

We may interpret the first line of the quotation analogically: "Just
our beauty is to your face, so is the hand of the dial to the face of
dial." The second line introduces the word "steal". "As the hand of
dial is to the thieving of Time, so is your beauty to your face." One
ily observes the pun on the word "steal" implying "robs", "sneaks
". Instead of Winters' insistence on relevance, we have from Shakes-
s an intellectual surprise in the manner in which Donne was later to
rise his reader. The word "figure" becomes leaded with ambivalence about
declining wealth (Time) of day; its lengthening shadows and changing

The phrase "Steal from his figure" involves not only the face (French

123 Winters, Yvor, The Anatomy of Nonsense, Norfolk, Conn., New
ctions, 1943, pp.212-213.

:e) which is losing shape but the physical figure which is getting
r. It is not, then, beauty which is being stolen but beauty that is
the cause of the theft.

There is still beauty in the face but "no pace perceived". Since
:e" was pronounced "pace", the rationale of beauty as thief becomes
apparent: "There is still beauty but no peace in your face." The
o then is this: "As the dial hand steals from the dial, so your beauty
robbed you of your peace which once appeared on your face." Here again
:an see that a theory of the symbol such as that advanced by Olson
d be quite inadequate to comprehend the analogical development of this
re. The literal interpretation of Winters is clearly inadequate because
eeks to settle once and for the poet's meaning on an univocal level of
ing. Metaphor is the mere representation of an idea without any ob-
ive quality at all.

In a somewhat patronizing manner, Tate has observed the fact that
totle had interpreted metaphor as analogy by which he means the for-
of arithmetical proportion, a quantitative and relational procedure.
for Tate, as for Ransom and Burke, Aristotle was ordering solid ob-
s under a physics of motion. Since analogy for the idealist must always
n terms of rational reality, existence will always be a mere shadow
hat reality. Tate feels that we have come a long way from the crude rea-
of the Greeks as he sees it.

"we are thus in the Greek Cosmos, an ordering of solid objects under a physics of motion, in which the formal object offers but a narrow margin of analogy to any other. If the ancient enquiry into the structure of metaphor was less resourceful than ours, it was not I daresay because Aristotle was less intelligent than the best modern critics. Our

iverse has increasingly, since the seventeenth century, consisted
nstable objects dissolving into energy; and there has been no
t to the extension of analogy." [124]

he analogy has been extended to the ultimate of Reason in Hegel's
and the existence of things as objects has dissolved into energy,
f the subjective mind in which the quality of objectivity has been
elessly as long as we seek for an objective quality which is purely
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VII - SUMMARY - THE QUANDARY OF IDEALISM

basic failure of the Chicago Critics lies in the attempt to save
n as object by means of rational form. The specific quality of a
an object must be somewhat more substantial than a generic formal
. The Chicago Critics have seen the weakness of the New Critics in
their poetic judgment to a single principle which they apply ex-
y to every poem. But it was Kenneth Burke, who saw as quickly the
s of the Chicago Critics. They set out to be inductive in their
for a principle of objectivity but in the end they are as deductive
rationalistic as their opponents whom they have attacked so vigor-
Their inductive observations have been completely transcended by
solving energy of their highly developed philosophic language.
Burke has managed his argument so subtly that he converts this
t between the inductive and the deductive into the scheme of his
sm. By implication the dialectic must move as inevitably toward

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124 Tate, Allen, "Longinus", The Hudson Review, vol.1, p.360.

"kill", towards the death of poetry for the Chicago Critics as it did Burke.

Reason alone cannot provide illumination on the path towards objec-ity. If one depends upon reason alone in the search for truth objects l be seen in a light not their own. If the principle of rational form the only criterion for poetic objectivity then there will be no real by means of which one can keep the poem independent of the knowing d. By means of the fourfold analogy Aristotle described the movement thought as intuitive rather than rational. He was able to preserve stence of the four poles by not reducing the internal relation of the le to a rational system.

But it has been seen that McKeon whose epistemological position is damental to the Chicago School made no real distinction between analogy synecdoche. Without this distinction no practical case for existence poetic objectivity can be established.

Olson falls into the same pit of rationalism when he is unable to tinguish between the totality of human experience and the totality of ional parts. Instead of trying to individuate universal or abstract nciples, the poet relates human events to the totality of human exper-ce. If one would experience the poem as an object, one must be able to te and to feel its substance as well as to comprehend it rationally.

Therefore poetic communication on the level of syntax is insufficient. rity of style must consist in something more than grammatical exactness. wledge by means of poetry is revelatory not demonstrative in any mathe-tical sense of that word. The structure of a poem must be a means of

lation not of mere semantical precision. Olson's conception of the scope language does not go beyond a rational system and it is for this reason t the poem as object must forever elude him.

Ultimately the Chicago Critics themselves are monists. Longinus's ay is reduced to one level of meaning, the communication of nobility. bols are the mere vestments of concepts which will stand out best in the text of the syntactical and grammatical whole. Metaphor is triadic rather n fourfold. The ground of likeness provides a basis for the movement the mind towards a sense of unity which dissolves specific existence. separating Aristotle's methodology from his metaphysical system, the cago Critics have recreated the same dualism as did Descartes. By creating ission between mind and body Descartes concluded that clear and distinct as were the test of truth and of objectivity. By creating a dichotomy ween formal structure and the fact of human experience, the Chicago Cri- s have concluded that specific and generic form should be the test of tic truth and objectivity. Descartes failed to prove the existence God because his doctrine of ideas placed mind first, God next and then external world.[125] By the same dualism the Chicago Critics e assigned priority to the mind and by that same token must fail as did scartes to prove the existence of anything external or objective.

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125 Gilson, Etienne, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p.181.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CIRCLING SPHERE

"It is all the same to me from what point I begin, for I shall return again to this point."
Parmenides of Elea

The persistent irony of the idealist's theme is found in its re-
rent contradictions. Action and Being are never happy in the presence
each other when their relation is based on the dialectic. As man
es in this eternal conflict, he is in the restless state of the
appy Consciousness. No sooner does the seeker of Truth possess his
ze than the very act of possession begins the process of its des-
ction. In Ransom's aesthetic the poet is never quite able to esta-
sh the permanence of poems as objects. He is only able to suggest
ir existence in the trailing concreteness of the world's body. With-
the web of texture spun from the poet's mind there can be no real
stence. Ransom seems to realize the withering power of the dialectic
because the source of existence remains essentially in the poet's
l, he never completely escapes from the dialectic. The will must
ain supreme but that same will is soon destroyed by the use of reason
ch is the substrate of the dialectical process. The object of
wledge is likewise lost in the web of texture along with the knower.

Coleridge was a more astute metaphysician and a deeper lover of
ms as poems than any of the New Critics examined. As his mind
ured he became less confident in metaphysics based on a dialectic and

ore confident in the creative activity of the Will. He made no attempt o save spiritual unity at the expense of the self but when he rejected he unity he had lost any hope of giving a metaphysical account of ither the self or of the object of his contemplation.

Allen Tate tried to resolve the irony of objectivity in his state-ent that in the best poetry "the actual expression is the total thought". y means of a shifting reciprocal movement between subject and object, etween poet or reader and poem, the quality of dramatic imagination s achieved. In fact his account of the imaginative insight of Dos-oyevsky in the symbol of the hovering fly in The Idiot is a fine piece f analysis but its quality depends entirely upon an existence of the rtistic situation which Tate takes for granted. One is vividly cons-ious of the objectivity of this finely created artistic experience ut in the end Tate has given no metaphysical account of the poetic or rtistic process involved.

Cleanth Brooks was as competent as Tate in dealing with the poetic bject but was equally unsuccessful at providing a metaphysical basis or it. Instead of searching for that substantial quality which is entral and specific in the poem, Brooks depended upon an aesthetic rinciple externally applied to poetry. By means of paradox and irony rooks would "dramatize" the oneness of experience as a means of pprehending its specific objectivity. As in Tate the emphasis fell ltimately upon the subjective mind interacting with the object of con-emplation and the issue of the poem's specific objectivity was not resolved.

The irony of Kenneth Burke's position lay in the conflict of na-
alism and idealism. He was as much concerned as Tate, Brooks and
som to establish the dynamic nature of the poetic process. His
hod was to temper the logical and categorical relation of parts to
whole in the trope of synecdoche with the dynamic interactionism
Mead's naturalism. In the end, the naturalism, frozen by the too
enious use of poetic categories became formalized into dialectical
erialism. The process became a system and both the self and the
tic object were lost in a web of internal relations.

The Chicago Critics attaked the idealism of the New Criticism and
posed the use of Aristotle's method to describe the poem as an
ject. In the end the account of objectivity was reduced to an account
structural essence or specific form. Because the method was a ra-
nal method divorced from the more intuitive element of Aristotle's
taphysics poetics becomes poetic science and the ironic failure of
ls neo-Aristotelianism concluded with the same dilemma as faced the
w Criticism. The same contradictions pervaded the ideas and beliefs of
th the new Critics and the Chicago Critics. In the moment of most
gmatic assertion of their poetic faith, the rationalism of its founda-
ons began to crumble. In the end, the relation of poet and poem
d been forced into the alien mould of a conceptual unity which des-
oyed both the poet and the poem. Herein lay the grim and ironic
medy. Speaking of Hegel in this same relation of the self to the
alm of sense certainty, Lowenberg writes:

"The comedy results from our endeavour to force it (the contradiction of discourse and sense-certainty) into an alien mould. The joke, as it were, is on us. It is our histrionic feat which is ludicrous. The dialectic, so finely spun, has its inception in the false hypothesis or assumption that the ineffable can be represented as if it were effable. But for that hypothesis or assumption there would be no 'story'. The tale is after all nothing else than the record of a fanciful experiment. Far from being objective and necessary, it is simply the product of Hegel's creative imagination."[1]

timately Hegel had never escaped from the dilemma of Parmenides.

"To think is the same as the thought that It Is; for you will not find thinking without Being, in (regard to) which ther is an expression. For nothing else either is or shall be except Being, since Fate has tied it down to be a whole and motionless; therefore all things that mortals have established, believing in their truth, are just a name."[2]

Such a grim monism was revived in modern times by Descartes with his ealistic philosophy of the clear and distinct idea. It was the same sire for certainty that led him to substitute mathematics for meta- ysics in the pursuit of truth.

"The principle that lies at the root of Cartesian mathematicism is that, since the most evident of all sciences is also the most abstract, it would be enough to make all the other sciences as abstract as mathematics in order to make them just as evident."[3]

aimed to make the objects of knowledge in every field of human action similar as possible to the objects of mathematical knowledge. i.e. as

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1 Lowenberg, Jacob, "The Comedy of Immediacy in Hegel's 'Phenomenology'" nd. N.S., Vol.44, 1935, p.36.

2 Parmenides of Elea - in Freeman Kathleen, Ancilla to the Pre- cratic Philosophers, trans. of Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker ford, Basil Blackwell, 1948, p.44.

3 Gilson, Etienne, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p.144.

and distinct ideas or concepts. Throughout this examination of
stic aesthetics the inevitable result in every case has been a
ion of poetic objectivity to structural forms or essences. Since
forms are essentially rational and hence cognizable by the mind
it is difficult to attribute any real objectivity to them at all.
e has put it, ever since Descartes our multiverse has consisted of
ble objects dissolving into energy." Whereas analogy was the means
covering similarities of a real sort among the objects of knowledge
ern times it has become the instrument by means of which objects
duced to unity and lost in its dissolving energy. Hence Tate
idealist would be uneasy about Aristotle's ordering of solid
s under a physics of motion. Existence is in this framework
really significant but to the idealist analogy is a powerful ener-
mind constantly transcending objects into a spiritual or rational unity in
no specific identity or objectivity can exist.

But the idealist has not accepted too readily this charge that he
acrificed existence to a spiritual or rational unity. We have
rilling dynamism of Hegel's account of the relation of self to
bject. We know and perceive objects by recognizing their opposites.

We find, as result of experience, that the thing exhibits itself,
n a determinate and specific manner, to the consciousness appre-
ending it, but <u>at the same time</u> is reflected back into itself out
f that manner of presenting itself to consciousness; in other words,
he thing contains within it opposite aspects of truth, a truth whose
lements are in antithesis to another." [4]

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4 Hegel, G.F.W., <u>The Phenomenology of Mind</u>, p.172.

e we have a double process involving movement towards a realization only of the object but of the self.

"In the entirety of the movement, taken as an unbroken quiescent whole, that which obtains destination in the course of its process and secures specific existence, is preserved in the form of a self-recollection, in which existence is self-knowledge, and self-knowledge, again, is immediate existence."

so it is in this revolving energy that

"The truth is thus the bacchanalian revel, where not a member is sober; and because every member no sooner becomes detached than it eo ipso collapses straightway, the revel is just as much a state of unbroken calm."[5]

first reading it would seem that the idealist's philosophy is well resented in the first verse of the Gospel According to Saint John -

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God."[6]

ording to Hegel when the Word is spoken, the self immediately loses identity and knows itself in its objective otherness. By a process led kenosis the self knows itself only as the express otherness Essential Being which underlies the existence of all things and selves.

"It is the 'Word', the Logos, which when spoken empties the speaker of himself, outwardizes him, and leaves him behind, emptied, but is as immediately perceived, and only this act of self perceiving himself is the actual existence of the "Word". Hence, then, the distinctions which are set up are just as immediately resolved as

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5 Ibid, p.105.
6 St. John I: 1-2.

they are made, and are just as directly made as they are resolved, and the truth and reality consist precisely in this self-closed circular process." [7]

The metaphor of the circle has frequently been appropriated by the idealists as a means of illustrating what is independent and what is dependent in the knowledge of truth and reality. Croce had used it in a specific way to illustrate this relation in the process of artistic expression. By the metaphor of the circle he does not mean any "perpetually even revolution" such as one might have in geometry. Those who have attacked the idealist's use of the circle have interpreted on such a logical or mathematical level in which the movement of thought would be a sterile repetition of coming and going. Instead, Croce says it is the means of comprehending the truly dynamic quality of aesthetic activity. "To be sure the last term, which again becomes the first, is not the old first, but presents itself with a multiplicity and precision of concepts, with an experience of life lived and men of works contemplated, which was wanting to the old first term; and it affords material for a more lofty, more refined, more complex and more mature art. Thus, instead of being a perpetually even revolution the idea of the circle is nothing but the true philosophical idea of progress, of the perpetual growth of the spirit and of reality in itself, where nothing is repeated, save the form of the growth." [8] The swelling movement of the circle moves progressively towards truth and the awareness of the spiritual and hence the enduring quality of an aesthetic object which may be said to be its most objective quality.

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7 Hegel, G. op.cit., p.767.
8 Croce, B. Essence of Aesthetic, p.79.

In the figure of the bacchanalian revel, Hegel tried to grasp the ensity of truth transcending its objective manifestations. Not a ber is sober as both things and selves strive towards a higher reness of the element of truth they contain within themselves. To n Crowe Ransom, the bacchanalian revel became the agony of composition the poet sought to perpetuate in his poem an "order of existence which actual life is constantly crumbling beneath his touch". There is in here a circular process as the poem reveals a logical object or versal, but at the same time there is always a tissue of irrelevance n which it does not really emerge. Truth is constantly losing its ntity in particular things as particular things are constantly losing ir identity in the absolute self-consistency of truth.

Croce responds to those who would condemn the figure of the circle ause of its restlessness, that such motion is the very law of life. y would attain

> "to a region of repose from movement, so full of anxiety; withdrawn henceforward from the ocean and standing upon the shore, they would turn back and contemplate the tossing billows. But I have already had occasion to state of what this repose consists: an effectual negation of reality, beneath the appearance of elevation and sublimation; and it is certainly attained, but is called death; the death of the individual, not of reality, which does not die, and is not afflicted by its own motion, but enjoys it. Others dream of a spiritual form, in which the circle is dissolved, a form which should be Thought of thought, unity of the Theoretical and of the Practical, Love, God, or whatever other name it may bear; they fail to perceive that this thought, this unity, this Love, this God, already exists in and for the circle, and that they are uselessly repeating a search already completed, or are repeating metaphorically what has already been discovered, in the myth of another world, which repeats again the same drama of the real world."[9]

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9 Ibid, p.79-80.

The wheel has come full circle and within its circumference a
gious as well as an aesthetic experience has been comprehended.
nity and circularity are one and the self is essentially the process
iovement towards greater and greater self-consciousness until it
mes consciousness itself. Yet at that moment it turns upon itself
becomes itself again. In a drama of comic proportions Hegel has
arized the circular movement of the dialectic as follows:

"Here, then, the Fate, formerly without consciousness, consisting in empty rest and forgetfulness, and separated from self-consciousness, is united with self-consciousness. The individual self is the negative force through which and in which the gods, as also their moments, (nature as existent fact and the thoughts of their determinate characters), pass away and disappear. At the same time, the individual self is not the mere vacuity of disappearance, but preserves itself in this very nothingness, holds to itself and is the sole and only reality. The religion of art is fulfilled and consummated in it, and is come full circle. Through the fact that it is the individual consciousness in its certainty of self which manifests itself as this absolute power, this latter has lost the form of something ideally presented (vorgestellt), separated from and alien to consciousness in general — as were the statue and also the living embodiment of beauty or the content of the Epic and the powers and persons of Tragedy."[9a]

It is in this sense of a basic unity in which divine love, God Himself
ts in and for the circle that one can cause the first two verses of the
el according to Saint John to confom to the idealistic metaphysic.
But a serious difficulty for the idealist is introduced in the third
e of that traditional reading of the gospel. This God of Love was a
tor as is the poet by the same analogy. To be sure the Word was in the
nning in God and it was God as the same was in the beginning with God.
much more significant was the fact that

9a Hegel, G, op.cit., p.748.

"All things were made by Him; and without him was not any thing made that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not."[10]

whirling revel of the figures in the idealist's bacchanale was blind without any direction in the end for how could the lover of truth find way if he were not sober? How could he really know himself when as in the continual process of destroying himself? What an expensive physical indulgence was that mode of thinking which brought about loss of the self in the maelstrom of a seething Absolute? The con- ation of the idealist's religion of art has in every case come full le but if the figure of the circle represents the completeness or eness of truth it also represents the loss of both poetic objectivity ell as the loss of the poet's selfhood.

The turning sphere revolves and in contemplation we can see that e are no still points on its circumference which can be the foundation a theory of art or of poetic objectivity. No fixed point can be n in itself as truth for any such concept must be taken in and for lf.

"Indeed", says Hegel, "no concept has in our day been more mishandled than the concept in and for itself; for by concept is generally meant the abstract determinateness or one-sidedness of representation and intellectualistic thought with which it is naturally impossible to think either the entirety of truth or concrete beauty."[11]

the world turns and in its turning it should give meaning to the realm

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10 The Gospel according to Saint John, I:3-4.

11 Hegel, G, Vorlesung über Aesthetik, (ed.cit.) p.118, in Croce, B., op.cit. p.298.

tence instead of leading us into a darkness which shall never
end the light. The Word must be made flesh as the poetic spirit
made into a poetic object and both poet and critic must bear
to its objectivity at the peril of aesthetic scepticism, or as
imself inevitably called it, the death of art. Perhaps in an
spirit, Hegel often uses Aristotle's doctrine of teleology to ex-
is own dialectic. But the analogy breaks down when one remembers
olution in Hegel was towards dissolution in the Absolute while in
le evolution was the realization of potentiality into actual and
e existence.

the same paradoxical manner, T. S. Eliot may be quoted to express
ning here -

> At the still point of the turning world
> Neither flesh nor fleshless;
> Neither from nor towards; at the still
> point, there the dance is,
> But neither arrest nor movement, and
> do not call it fixity,
> Where past and future are gathered. Neither
> movement from nor towards,
> Neither ascent nor decline.

note the change of emphasis from Croce to Eliot, or indeed from
o Aristotle, we have Eliot continuing immediately from the above
s of existence rather than in terms of Spirit:

> cept for the point, the still point,
> ere would be no dance, and there is only the dance.
> can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say where.
> d I cannot say, how long, for that is to place it in time.[12]

Eliot, T.S., Four Quartets, Burnt Norton, New York, Harcourt
1934, p.5.

nd the still point does make all the difference between a bacchan lian evel in which not a member is sober and a dance in which the arrested lgure of existence punctuates the circumference of an otherwise aimless evolution. For the idealist, the still point is only an appearance; ts existence is merely an expression of the Spirit. The Word has no .esh and the light must forever shine in a darkness which comprehends ; not for what more Stygian gloom can there be in which the light of elf-consciousness does not exist? In Eliot the still point has its istence as an actual moment. It is in time and yet out of time. Time, admits, "allows but a little consciousness" but he reminds us that "To conscious is not to be in time." Both the Aristotelians and the gelians agree upon the connection of time with movement, with teleology. r Hegel,

> "Time is just the notion definitely existent, and presented to consciousness in the form of empty intuition. Hence spirit necessarily appears in time so long as it does not grasp its pure notion, i.e. so long as it does not annul time. Time is the pure self in external form, apprehended in intuition, and not grasped and understood by the self, it is the notion apprehended only through intuition. When this notion grasps itself, it supersedes its time character, (conceptually) comprehends intuition, and is intuition comprehended and comprehending. Time therefore appears as spirit's destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yet complete in itself."[13]

r Aristotle, "time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it nits of enumeration," and again time is "number of movement in respect before and after, and is continuous since it is an attribute of what continuous".[13a] But as time is a measure of motion and of being moved,

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13 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p.800.
13a Aristotle, Physics, V, 22 a 25, ed. McKeon, op.cit.

thing is in motion and it is to this thing which Hegel and the
lsts ultimately do not allow reality. Aristotle uses the metaphor
e circle to explain the perfect infinity of motion which has always
and always will be. It is by analogy with this perfect motion that
lerstand the notion of our souls within our existing bodies. It
.s emphasis on existence over against essence that the idealist
:izes. To the idealist existence is more appearance, a construct
e knowing mind. And so both sides may agree upon the reality of the
; but they separate when one side accepts the existence as it is
the other side takes existence as a passing appearance of reality
; transcendent vitality of expression.

n this "process that creates its own moments in its course, and
hrough them all; and the whole movement constitutes its positive
.t and its truth" [14] we experience time which we must lose if we
be it. "Time is no phantasm. It is not a form of intuition, an
ction, or a measure; it is integral to the real, and is to be
ned only at the price of losing the world." [15] We need not insist
xistence or objectivity per se in order to preserve reality. No
ysical analogy is necessary to comprehend the reality of Spirit
it be the sort of analogy described by McKeon or Kenneth Burke.

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5 Weiss, Paul. "Time and the Absolute", The Journal of Philosophy,
, 1935, p.290.

The only analogy left to the idealists is the unlimited extension of metaphor brought about by the dissolution of unstable objects into the energy of Hegel's bacchanalian revel. For the idealist, "to be is to be incomplete"[16], but for the realist, to be is to exist.

> Hereunder Jacob Schmidt who, man and bones,
> Has been his hundred times around the sun
>
> His chronicle is endless -- the great curve
> Inscribed in nothing by a point upon
> The spinning surface of a circling sphere.
>
> Dead bones roll on.
>
> Archibald MacLeish: Immortal Helix

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16 Ibid, p.290.

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