

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF EXPERIMENTALISM  
FOR TEACHING PUBLIC SPEAKING

By  
Hugo John David

A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan  
State College of Agriculture and Applied Science  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

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Department of Higher Education

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*Michalsh Muntyan*

The conversational mode of speaking and the educational philosophy of experimentalism developed, for practical purposes, almost simultaneously. The purpose of this study, therefore, has been to determine in what ways and to what extent this philosophy has influenced the writers of textbooks for college courses in public speaking. Accordingly, three major divisions result: an explanation of the principles of experimentalism, its application to teaching public speaking, and an examination of six selected textbooks currently in extensive use in college and university public speaking classes.

Experimentalism, expounded by John Dewey primarily, is founded on man's experience in interacting with his physical and social environment. Intelligent interaction necessitates inquiry from which results learning. Knowledge, intelligence, and thinking are described in relation to this method. The instructor's task is to provide learning experiences which originate in the student's living and constitute problems whose solution requires the intervention of intelligence. In practice speeches students experiment with speech methods and devices and have opportunity for intelligent practice of skills.

Fundamentals of Public Speaking by Bryant and Wallace reveals no important influence of experimentalism. The pattern of inquiry receives scant mention. The method of learning is preceptive and teaching is authoritative. Students learn principles and apply them in practice speeches. Evaluation of student effort is based on conformity in practice to principles learned.

Crocker's Public Speaking for College Students, founded on classical rhetoric, advises conformity to principles and extensive practice of them.

Evaluation of student's work is based on application of prescribed standards, not on the effect of classroom experiences on student growth.

Sarett and Foster in the revised Basic Principles of Speech believe man is malleable by experience but they prescribe his experiences for him. Students should emulate noble examples in thought, language, and style.

In Basic Training in Speech: Brief Edition Thonssen and Gilkinson seem to accept an experimentalist view of experience and emphasize the pattern of inquiry. Their learning theory, however, reinterprets "experience" as following regulative principles and gives great significance to the stimulus-response mechanism. They accept as fundamental certain ideas basic to experimentalism but disregard weighty implications.

The third edition of Monroe's Principles and Types of Speech advocates the pattern of inquiry as a method of organization for all types of speeches, but learning is following principles and directions. The author professes eclecticism despite recognizable inconsistencies. Accordingly, an audience can learn via the method of inquiry while the student must learn speech-making by accepting and applying prepared principle

Baird and Knowler conform extensively to experimental principles in General Speech: An Introduction. The pattern of inquiry is the method of learning and speaking experiences are seen to affect student knowledge, attitudes, and skills. The concepts of knowledge and ultimate truth seem non-experimentalist. Of the texts examined, this one leans most heavily upon the theory of experimentalism.

While textbook authors are under no compulsion to subscribe to experimental principles, they might, however, give additional thought to the consistency with which they adhere to some point of view, even if eclectic.



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the century, two significant developments have occurred in relation to the teaching of public speaking. The first was the shifting from the methods of elocution to those of conversational manner. This shift or change culminated, for practical purposes, in the publication in 1917 of James A. Winans' text Public Speaking.<sup>1</sup> The second development was the ideas of John Dewey on education. These ideas gained considerable acceptance, particularly through the publication in 1916 of Democracy and Education.<sup>2</sup> Each of these has received extensive recognition in its field. Speech departments have been established in many colleges and universities, at first usually as subsidiaries of English departments, but later as separate entities. The number and variety of textbooks have grown along with this expansion. At the same time Dewey's philosophy has grown in influence and popularity especially in the elementary and secondary schools.

Purpose. The present study endeavors to determine the implications and extent of influence of the philosophy of John Dewey, herein called experimentalism, upon the teaching of public speaking in the

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<sup>1</sup>James A. Winans. Public Speaking. New York: The Century Company, 1917.

<sup>2</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916.

colleges as it is reflected in representative textbooks in public speaking currently in wide use. The author has not assumed that such influence or application is either possible or desirable. He has, therefore, proceeded to determine for himself, first, what the essence of the philosophy of experimentalism is, then what the implications of it might be for teaching public speaking, and finally the extent to which these implications are evident in selected public speaking texts currently being used in a variety of college public speaking classes. If, however, experimentalist ideas can be adapted to the public speaking classroom which seeks, upon the foundations of the Winans text and its subsequent tradition, to emphasize communication with an audience, and if greater success can be reasonably expected from the use of its methods; it is not too much to hope that teachers of public speaking can increase their contributions to the solution of one of the most pressing problems of the day, which, in the words of Elton Mayo, is:

I believe that social study should begin with careful observation of what may be described as communication: that is, the capacity of an individual to communicate his feelings and ideas to another, the capacity of groups to communicate effectively and intimately with each other. This problem is, beyond doubt, the outstanding defect that civilization is facing today.<sup>3</sup>

Definitions. Public speaking as used in this context has reference to speaking done by one speaker before an audience. It is not considered to include group discussion, debate of the conventional interscholastic type, nor oral reading as interpretation. It is also to be distinguished

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<sup>3</sup>Elton Mayo. The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization. Andover, Massachusetts: The Andover Press, 1945, p. 22.

from the Speech Fundamentals course which, to be sure, includes public platform speaking but also concerns itself with a variety of other forms of speaking such as those just mentioned; it is more of a survey of kinds of speaking.

"Experimentalism" is the name here used to designate the philosophy, and in this connection particularly, the educational philosophy of John Dewey primarily and secondarily of some who have aligned themselves with it, such as John L. Childs. The latter maintains that "experimentalism" is perhaps the best name for the Dewey point of view when he says, "One of the reasons why experimentalism is an appropriate name for this philosophy is because as a philosophy it desires to promote a society which will be intelligently experimental in carrying forward this reconstructive movement."<sup>4</sup> The same author also states that this philosophy takes a frankly experimental approach to both the world and man and, from the educational standpoint, represents the method of experiment in constructing life and knowledge.<sup>5</sup> He further explains that the foundation for it lies in experience itself:

Experimentalism is a radically empirical philosophy. It maintains that the ultimate source, authority, and criterion for all beliefs and conduct are to be found in ordinary human experience. Experience stands on its own bottom. Life is its own sanction. Whatever of guidance and inspiration man requires to meet the exigencies of his life is to be sought from the resources within experience and not from some supra-empirical source. The very cornerstone of experimentalism is the faith that experience is

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<sup>4</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. New York: The Century Company, 1931, p. 229.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 5-6.



able to develop from within its own processes all necessary regulative standards and ideals.<sup>6</sup>

Review of Literature. The literature dealing with the relationship of experimentalism to the teaching of public speaking in college is limited in spite of the fact that Dewey's steps in thinking have been widely publicized in the field in connection with the process in group discussion. The relation of this method to teaching procedures, however, seems not to have gained extensive popularity among teachers of college speech. A review of the material pertinent to the relation of experimentalism and the teaching of public speaking follows and indicates that only a few have given it sufficient serious thought to study and publish with regard to it. This limited supply of publications may well suggest that experimentalism will also appear in but a minor way in the textbooks later to be examined.

O'Neill,<sup>7</sup> in discussing the implications of the "Changing Curriculum" for the teaching of speech, indicated his belief that this change represented a swing toward the methods of the speech teacher already long in practice. This method is largely the method of student activity in the classroom. After stating the principle that education and life ought not to be divorced, and that minds are not just storehouses of information, he continues:

John Dewey's philosophy of education is based upon this concept. The best education is made up of activity, experience, doing.

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>7</sup>James M. O'Neill, "Speech in the Changing Curriculum." The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXII (1936), 183-186.

Education is not a matter of the distribution of items of information .... The best education consists of active participation in experiences which develop human power and ability.<sup>8</sup>

Baird<sup>9</sup> observes that speech teachers have aligned themselves with one or another point of view in educational philosophy ranging from humanism, rationalism, aestheticism, and scientific determinism, to behaviorism and experimentalism. He emphasizes several controlling principles which should guide the speech teacher in his classroom activity. The first of these is that "speech instruction should be based upon individual needs and capacities."<sup>10</sup> He points out the upper five percent have been taught well but there is need to do equally well with the others so that in education there will be "speech for all." The second is that "speech training should provide for social integration. The assumption here is that every response has social implications."<sup>11</sup> Dewey, he points out, was concerned with social reconstruction. Baird believes speech training is essential in effecting such reconstruction. He also shows how speech teachers have parted company with Dewey in that the colleges have emphasized the vocational aspect of speech training beyond a point acceptable to Dewey. The third principle, a concept directly attributed to Dewey, merits stating in Baird's own words:

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>9</sup>A. Craig Baird, "The Educational Philosophy of the Teacher of Speech," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXIV (1938), 545-553.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 547.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 548.

...speech education should be a 'reconstruction of experience.' Again we revert to Dewey's thesis of the identity of school and life, of learning and doing. Our goal, then, will be to substitute activity for subjects, to make the classroom a miniature world, to carry the pupils into the world, and so enable them to rebuild their experience by reconstructing their ideas 'in the light of newly discovered relationships between the parts of 'their' experience.'<sup>12</sup>

That this principle is thoroughly experimentalistic will become clearer in the subsequent chapters.

The fourth principle, he says, is that "experimentation and evaluation are its moving spirit,"<sup>13</sup> the moving spirit, that is, of a philosophy of speech education. He urges that some attention be given to evaluating teaching results by means of instruments already available or by others to be developed specifically for the purpose.

Freed<sup>14</sup> points out that "The just end of all language education is social efficiency. Increased social efficiency can arise only from increased understanding of the meanings of language symbols."<sup>15</sup> The social purpose in speech training is emphasized here. He observes that the trends in education are toward a more functional type of education, toward a more socialized curriculum, and toward an increase in oral work in the upper elementary and secondary school grades.<sup>16</sup> He concludes that "oral techniques are consistent with the present trends

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 551.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 552.

<sup>14</sup>Conrad W. Freed. The Role of Speech in the Educative Process. Unpublished Ph. D. thesis. University of Southern California, 248 numb. leaves.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 215.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

in educational thought and practice,"<sup>17</sup> and that "in most, if not all, educational teaching situations the most efficient procedures will be those which make the fullest use of oral expression."<sup>18</sup> This thesis shows that both biological and educational development and rhetoric indicate that speech is life in action, speech education must be functional, and language grows with experiencing.

Kopp<sup>19</sup> concludes, "Philosophically we can say that speech is the common denominator of all educational and social activity."<sup>20</sup> He believes with Quintilian that the emphasis in speech training should be on developing the powers of the whole man rather than concentrating on discrete aspects of development individually.

Rodriguez<sup>21</sup> examines briefly various philosophies of education ranging from Plato and Aristotle down to Dewey and Hutchins. In setting up the content for a course in the fundamentals of speech, however, the principles of experimentalism are not a significant influence in spite of the fact that he seems to have caught the essence of the experimentalist point of view from Dewey's Democracy and Education.

A more extended treatment of the implication of experimentalism for the teaching of speech is found in the Master's thesis of Howard W.

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 239.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 242.

<sup>19</sup>George A. Kopp, "Basic Principles of Speech Education," Teachers College Record, 41 (1940), 397-404.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 399.

<sup>21</sup>Alfonso Rodriguez. The Philosophy of a Fundamentals Course in Speech. Unpublished M.A. thesis. Wayne University, 1940, 120 numb. leaves.

Wilson.<sup>22</sup> The discussion is directed toward teaching speech generally rather than specifically toward public speaking at the college level. Its emphasis throughout is upon the educational point of view. Various aspects of it are substantially treated, for example, the relation of the school to life, the concept of experimentalism, the place of language and its relation to the sharing of experience. He concludes that speech education should be based upon a recognition of the social nature and function of speech, and its purpose should be to improve behavior from a speech standpoint. Making over language habits from those having to do with rather general notions to such as deal with more precise notions presents difficulties, but these can be solved. As Dewey recommends, enlarging the student's vocabulary, making its terms more precise, and forming the habit of consecutive discourse are helpful procedures.

An article by Fleischman<sup>23</sup> takes the view that speech is more than a tool in communicating ideas. It is, even more than that, a means of adjusting to a social environment and of making fine adjustments in human relationships. From the standpoint of thinking, speech, is "a mastery of a technique of oral communication by means of which he [the student] can reach an understanding through the efficacy of language of what goes on in the minds of other people."<sup>24</sup> Also it is

<sup>22</sup>Howard Woodrow Wilson. Some Implications of Dewey's Philosophy for the Teaching of Speech. Unpublished M.A. thesis. The University of Illinois, 1940, 69 numb. leaves.

<sup>23</sup>Earl Emery Fleischman, "Speech and Progressive Education," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXVII, (1941), 511-517.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 513.

the "business of speech to develop techniques for testing ideas and dealing with them so that they may be practically useful to the individual,"<sup>25</sup> and to "provide the student with the means for effective participation in all of the situations in his life"<sup>26</sup> in which communication and speech are involved. He emphasizes:

Knowledge is not enough. It is a question of cultivating basic response tendencies--habits, tendencies, preferences. Progressive speech education involves the development of taste, the appreciation of values, the acquiring of skills in dealing with people and the various human relations situations confronting the individual, techniques through which one tries to apply intelligence to the problem of living successfully with others.<sup>27</sup>

These objectives can be accomplished, he says, by requiring self-examination on the student's part and creating a desire in him to control himself. With that problem clear to him, he is ready to progress to learning to use intelligently a mature self-control by acquiring the techniques of adequate adjustment.

Writing primarily perhaps for the pre-college educational levels, but including also the college speech program, Barnes<sup>28</sup> tends strongly toward an experimental view of speech education. He stresses four fundamental processes involved in speech education: "(1) adjustment to the speaking situation, (2) symbolic formulation and expression (thought and language), (3) phonation, and (4) articulation."<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 514.

<sup>27</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>28</sup>Harry G. Barnes, "Basic Concepts of Speech Education," The Speech Teacher, I (1952), 14-19.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

Teaching methods, he says, should include recognition of the fact that the speaker develops as a whole in response to a total situation, grosser skills develop first, habits once developed are difficult to retrain, and insight into specific goals is essential to learning. The experimentalist point of view is expressed in the opening paragraph which states, in part, "The modern educator conceives of a school that adjusts its program to the needs and abilities of its students in terms of the solution of problematic situations with which they are, or may be, confronted."<sup>30</sup> He concludes by saying:

...the speech education program...begins with the individual--his needs, abilities, and his immediate environment. Through systematic and progressive instruction it acquaints him with standards and gives him insight and knowledge as a basis for developing natural, normal habits of speaking. Thereby it aids him to develop a general facility in meeting speaking situations and stimulates him to acquire as much skill as his talent will permit in order that when speaking situations confront him in the future he may meet them normally and well.<sup>31</sup>

Method. The procedure in this study has been to construct, primarily from the writings of Dewey, a sequential pattern of ideas which forms the framework of this philosophy. Chapters Two through Five are devoted to an exposition of experimentalism. Of these four, the first explains the concept of experience and the pattern of inquiry which rests upon it. The second treats various aspects of experimentalist educational psychology, especially the method of learning, the concepts of intelligence, and knowledge and certain other related

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

topics which are reasonably well delineated and therefore discernible. The third is devoted to the theory of language and certain implications aiming toward their significance for the educative process. The fourth presents the major phases of Dewey's theory of value with an emphasis on its relation to educational theory. These four chapters are based on a wide selection of Dewey's writings and on those of several of his "disciples" whose point of view also leans patently toward a reconstructionist theory of education. An attempt is made to relate these various works to one another so that the interpretation which follows in those chapters, necessarily the writer's own, may not suffer excessively from too narrow an overview of the subject as a whole.

Chapter Six presents some reasonably defensible derivations, from the subject matter of chapters two through five, for the teaching of public speaking. The organization follows the sequence of topics as developed in the four preceding chapters so that a consistent pattern of organization may be apparent. The suggestions for teaching procedure primarily, and incidentally several for course content, are based in the main on Dewey's Democracy and Education as it reflects the educational point of view of this philosophy.

The analysis of selected textbooks in public speaking seeks to determine to what extent the implications of experimentalism as a philosophy of education have affected the points of view of the authors of those texts, or, to determine to what extent these texts agree with or differ from this point of view. The method of determining this degree of correspondence has been to carefully examine these texts in the light of both the basic propositions of the philosophy itself and its implications as described in chapter six. First an attempt is made to



base comment on overt statements of the various textbook authors and, secondly, to draw inferences as to their over-all point of view. In the latter case such points of view were judged to be the points of view only if they seemed to be the dominant trend of the discussion either of the subject matter, of the direct advice given to the student, or of the exercises at the ends of chapters.

The six texts in question<sup>32</sup> were selected on the basis of returns of a questionnaire mailed by the author in October 1950 to one hundred forty-four colleges and universities in the United States. A copy of the questionnaire is included in an Appendix. Each of the state universities and one state teachers college in each of thirty-six states was included; the remainder included private colleges and universities representing all areas and nearly all states of the nation. Ninety-two replies, constituting a return of sixty-three percent, were received and indicated thirty-two different texts were being used in college public speaking classes. The list of these also is included in an Appendix.

From the total list of texts, six were chosen because they are being used in a larger number of schools and by a larger number of students than are the others. Each of these books is being used in

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<sup>32</sup>A. Craig Baird and Franklin H. Knower. General Speech: An Introduction. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949. Donald C. Bryant and Karl B. Wallace. Fundamentals of Public Speaking. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc. 1947. Lionel Crocker. Public Speaking for College Students. Second Edition. New York: American Book Company, 1950. Alan H. Monroe. Principles and Types of Speech. Third Edition. New York: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1949. Lew Sarett and William Trufant Foster. Basic Principles of Speech. Revised. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946. Lester Thonssen and Howard Wilkinson. Basic Training in Speech. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1949. Brief Edition.

four or more schools, one of them in nineteen, and each is being used annually by upwards of fifteen hundred students. On the basis of the number of students using them, two others should have been included but are not because the results of this survey indicate they are being used in but one school each, namely, the particular school with which the author(s) are associated. The Brief Edition of Thonssen and Gilkinson's Basic Training in Speech is analyzed here because eighty percent of those replying and using this text indicated they were using this edition.

Summary. The purpose of this study is to discover some implications of the educational philosophy of experimentalism for the teaching of public speaking in college and, secondly, to discover the extent to which those implications are manifest in representative textbooks now in extensive use in college public speaking classes. Public speaking, as used here designates speaking by one person before an audience. Experimentalism refers to the educational philosophy specifically and primarily expounded by John Dewey. The method includes, first, an analysis of this philosophy, secondly, a development of the implications of it for teaching public speaking at the college level, and third, a critical examination of selected texts in the field. The texts were selected on the basis of an almost two-thirds return of 144 questionnaires sent to all of the state universities, to thirty-six state teachers colleges and a select group of private colleges and universities in the United States. The literature is not extensive and reveals a thorough interest on the part of some and only an interest in portions of the philosophy on the parts of other writers.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PATTERN OF INQUIRY

It is well recognized that the now famous "steps in a complete act of thought" are at the heart of the experimental method. What is perhaps less well recognized is the matrix in which this pattern operates. Thus, the present chapter will first describe that matrix in order to clarify the assumptions upon which the procedure in inquiry rests. The second major division will then take up this pattern directly.

#### The Concept of Experience

The experimentalist refuses to go outside of nature to establish a frame of reference for his point of view. He begins and ends his case within nature so that his explanations of phenomena and events need no substantiation from a supernatural or 'mental' side.

While his point of view is thus circumscribed, it does not imply that he considers nature wholly favorable to man. In fact, he considers nature as offering man extensive opposition.

The conditions and processes of nature generate uncertainty and its risks as truly as nature affords security and means of insurance against perils. Nature is characterized by a constant mixture of the precarious and the stable.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1929, p. 243.

...we live in the kind of world in which success is contingent. From the standpoint of human interests our world is a mixture of resources and obstacles; it must be accepted for what it is, an affair of affairs. In this plural world existence is precarious, and human welfare depends upon our ability to comprehend these diverse affairs and to learn how to use them on behalf of human interests.<sup>2</sup>

As related to this contingent world, man is not considered separate and apart from it. "Since man's life is a development--an event--in that natural world, his organic structures are, for the most part, congruent with it."<sup>3</sup> He is an object within that world as much as natural objects are within and a part of it, but within it he is not inactive or passive. Because nature is precarious and unstable, "Man lives in a world in which he has to act."<sup>4</sup> "Man is seen as a living organism, and the most characteristic thing about life is behavior, activity."<sup>5</sup> Dewey adds that man is "instinct with activities that carry him on."<sup>6</sup> The experimentalist thus regards activity as being 'natural' for man during all his waking moments. Further, this activity is not restricted to overt, observable activity. On this point Dewey says:

In truth man acts anyway, he can't help acting. In every fundamental sense it is false that a man requires a motive to make him do something. To a healthy man inaction is the greatest of woes. Any one who observes children knows that while periods of rest are

<sup>2</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. New York: The Century Company, 1931, p. 164.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>4</sup>John L. Childs. Education and Morals. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, p. 158.

<sup>5</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. Op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>6</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: The Modern Library, Inc., 1930, p. 289.

natural, laziness is an acquired vice--or virtue. While a man is awake he will do something, if only to build castles in the air.<sup>7</sup>

Since this world of which man is a part is a process-world, both man and nature are continuously changing, but with an essential difference. Neither a stick nor a stone has any goals to attain, any life to maintain, or any preference as to what happens to it. Man, however, seeks to maintain his life, and he has preferences as to what happens to him. As opposed to the stick or stone, "the organism," as an active agent, "continues its life by maintaining a life-sustaining equilibrium with these surrounding forces."<sup>8</sup> And since the maintenance of this equilibrium is uncertain because of the processes of continuous change both in himself and in the surroundings, man must continuously act, not blindly or from whim, so as to bring about those adjustments either in himself or in the surroundings which will help sustain his equilibrium.

These surroundings with which man interacts are called "environment." "The environment, in other words, is whatever conditions interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and capacities to create the experience which is had."<sup>9</sup> The term environment is not limited to the physical objects in the surroundings; it includes whatever may be experienced whether physical, social or cultural. This point Dewey makes explicit when he says:

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 118-119.

<sup>8</sup>John.L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. Op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>9</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938, p. 42.

...the existential conditions which form the physical environment enter at every point into the constitution of socio-cultural phenomena. No individual person and no group does anything except in interaction with physical conditions.<sup>10</sup>

The environment in which human beings live, act and inquire, is not simply physical. It is cultural as well. Problems which induce inquiry grow out of the relations of fellow beings to one another, and the organs for dealing with these relations are not only the eye and ear, but the meanings which have developed in the course of living, together with the ways of forming and transmitting culture with all its constituents of tools, arts, institutions, traditions and customary beliefs.<sup>11</sup>

The environment consists then not only of physical objects in nature itself but also of the relationships of persons with one another and of the meanings that enter into the life activities and adjustments of the organism. These things in the environment need not always be immediately and physically present. For instance, the physicist who is working out a problem mathematically has as his immediate environment his pencil and paper and whatever else may be in his study, but his activities in the study will vary with the conditions going on somewhere outside his study. The student of the history of the Civil War has as his environment the events of the Civil War period and the records and documents and histories through which he establishes his relationship with that era. "Just because life signifies not bare passive existence (supposing that there is such a thing), but a way of acting, environment or medium signifies what enters into this activity as a sustaining or frustrating condition."<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup>John Dewey. Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938, pp. 491-492.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>12</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 14.

As an active agent within an environment, interacting with those elements in his surroundings having significance in his life-sustaining struggle, man finds the source of his experiences. For the experimentalist defines 'experience' as this "active process of interaction between the human organism and its natural and social environment."<sup>13</sup> That this experience is an important concept for the experimentalist is evident in this statement: "...the entire ideational life of man is considered by the experimentalist literally to derive its substance from the 'doings and undergoings' of what is called 'primary experience.'"<sup>14</sup> In other words, experience is the starting point upon which the point of view of experimentalism is based. It is this which forms the matrix out of which the pattern of inquiry grows, and it is within this framework of experience that man's life is described, wherein his activity occurs.

These experiences the experimentalist takes for just what they are. Dewey says: "All materials of experience are equally real; that is, all are existential; each has a right to be dealt with in terms of its own special characteristics and its own problems."<sup>15</sup> Here, then, are the source of man's problems of adaptation and adjustment, each problem being a separate problem requiring its own treatment, each being as real or existential as any other.

~~No~~ /the experimentalist/ asserts unqualifiedly that experience is all we can have or can ever hope to have. It is 'the ultimate

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<sup>13</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism.  
Op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>14</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>15</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. Cit., p. 216.

universe of discourse.' In more homely language, 'it is anything that anyone can talk about.' As such it has the first word and the last word. Experience 'sets our problems,' and it 'tests our solutions.' Hence if human experience cannot give us an account of realities, then man has no possibility of gaining such an account.<sup>16</sup>

In addition to experiences being individual and particular, they are further characterized by immediate enjoyment and suffering. So far as our undergoing an event is concerned, "things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful; are such immediately and in their own right and behalf."<sup>17</sup>

In addressing himself specifically to the relationship between experience and education, Dewey specifies two criteria which an experience must satisfy if it is to be educative. The first is that it must have continuity and the second, that it must have a certain quality. In its simplest form the principle of continuity means "that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after."<sup>18</sup> If we look at this concept in terms of adjustment, it means that the organism constantly acts while seeking to maintain its equilibrium by satisfying its recurring and differentiated needs, each experience shading off into a succeeding one.<sup>19</sup> In terms of habit it means that the experience

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<sup>16</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. Op. Cit., pp. 50-51.

<sup>17</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Nature. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1925, p. 96.

<sup>18</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. Op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>19</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 27.



an organism has modifies the habits it brought to that experience so that the habit it brings to the next experience is again a modified one.<sup>20</sup> For the classroom it means that activity must build upon previous experiences whose residue serves as background information which may be revised as new knowledge is attained. And from the standpoint of inquiry and knowing it means that an investigator in any given field will seek out the experiences of his fellow workers for "confirmation and correction of his results."<sup>21</sup> Unless and until other workers affirm his conclusions under reinstated conditions, his conclusions retain the status of hypotheses.

The second criterion of experience, that of its quality, applies in one of two ways. In the first instance the quality may be such as is involved in over-indulging a child. Over-indulgence may result in an attitude such that the child will seek those future experiences which will satisfy the desire to do as he pleases at any given time. "It sets up an attitude which operates as an automatic demand that persons and objects cater to his desires and caprices in the future."<sup>22</sup> The result is a low level of performance and a hindrance to further growth and development. On the other hand, Dewey says,

...if an experience arouses curiosity, strengthens initiative, and sets up desires and purposes that are sufficiently intense to carry a person over dead places in the future, continuity works in a different way. Every experience is a moving force. Its value can be judged only on the ground of what it moves toward and into.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. Op. cit., pp. 20-27.

<sup>21</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 491.

<sup>22</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. Op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>23</sup>Loc. cit.

For classroom activity such experiences must be chosen as will lead to growth toward independence and maturity. Continuity is present in every type of experience, but it is the latter kind which develops the individual so that he will become a strong, contributing member of the social group.

Through experience in a social environment man develops. Development is a life-long process having as its objective "the successful integration of environmental forces around the individual as center, and one of its outcomes is the integration of the individual organism itself."<sup>24</sup>

The experimentalist believes that it is within this framework of experience, such experiences, that is, which are 'moving forces,' that the pattern of inquiry operates. If this integration of the environment is to occur, it will not happen accidentally or through whim or caprice.

#### The Pattern of Inquiry

By inquiry Dewey means "the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations so as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole."<sup>25</sup>

Certain traits of experimental inquiry become apparent from the definition. One is that this process of converting an indeterminate

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<sup>24</sup>Joseph Justman. Theories of Secondary Education in the United States. Teachers College Contributions to Education, No. 814. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1940, p. 197.

<sup>25</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., pp. 104-105.

situation into a determinate one involves overt doing. Some activity must occur; an event takes place. Another is that this activity is not a haphazard juggling of the elements in the original situation but that it is "controlled or directed" by an idea of what is desired. The third trait is that out of this activity a new situation, different from the old and different from the individual parts of it, is brought about.<sup>26</sup> In terms of the continuity of experience already discussed, this result of inquiry constitutes the end, temporally speaking, of the present inquiry and the beginning or a part of the facts of the case in a subsequent one.

The process of inquiry, then, "is as accessible to objective study as are...other modes of behavior."<sup>27</sup> It is an event, an experience, and as such it is open to inspection by any observer competent to know what he is looking for.

Within this process of inquiry there are two distinguishable phases: In the first objects are treated as events, i.e., everything about them is ignored except their occurring. The qualities of objects in this phase serve merely as signs which aid in identifying the nature of the event that is happening. Here the observer is interested in seeing what is happening rather than in merely observing objects or in making an appraisal of the event or any constituent factor comprising the event. In the second phase the aim of the inquirer is to discover the relationships between events which are occurring. He seeks to

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<sup>26</sup>John Dewey. The Quest For Certainty. Op. Cit., pp. 86-87.

<sup>27</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 102.

understand what they have to do with one another in the given situation and what they may mean in terms of a possible terminus of the event or what they may suggest as a course of action in resolving the situation.<sup>28</sup>

A corollary of the principle of the continuity of experience is the continuity of the process of inquiry. Of it Dewey says:

The process of inquiry reflects and embodies the experiential continuum which is established by both biological and cultural conditions. Every special inquiry is...a process of progressive and cumulative re-organization of antecedent conditions. There is no such thing as an instantaneous inquiry; and there is, in consequence, no such thing as a judgment (the conclusion of inquiry) which is isolated from what goes on before and comes after.<sup>29</sup>

Later this point will be made more explicit; suffice it here to say that the residue of previous inquiries and experiences plays an important role in present inquiry, and the results of present inquiry will be used, if they are warrantable, in subsequent inquiry. Another aspect of this same idea is that the outcomes of any particular inquiry, no matter how settled the issue may seem to be at the moment, may be subject to further inquiry at any time in the future. Knowledge, then, has a certain tentativeness about it so that any item regarded as knowledge today may be challenged tomorrow and be re-opened for further investigation.<sup>30</sup>

A further characteristic of inquiry is that it is socially and culturally determined. Since man lives in association with other men, and since he communicates with them by means of language, he lives in

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<sup>28</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 126.

<sup>29</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 246.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 8f.

a social environment whose culture has been transmitted to him. In this environment the problems for inquiry arise.

...every inquiry grows out of a background of culture and takes effect in greater or less modification of the conditions out of which it arises. Merely physical contacts with physical surroundings occur. But in every interaction that involves intelligent direction, the physical environment is part of a more inclusive social or cultural environment.<sup>31</sup>

The Indeterminate Situation. In order to understand the present topic it is necessary to clarify what the experimentalist means by the term "situation." Since the environment as experienced is never an isolated, single object or event, but always a part or phase of a given environment in process, the term "situation" refers to this environing process which is experienced. An experienced object may stand out in a given environment but if and when it does stand out, it does so against a background of other objects or events making up that total situation. On the other hand, the particularity of one object as a crucial one in a complex of objects may occur at some given point in the process of inquiry or observation.

There is always a field in which observation of this or that object or event occurs. Observation of the latter is made for the sake of finding out what that field is with reference to some active adaptive response to be made in carrying forward a course of behavior.<sup>32</sup>

An object or event may thus be discriminately viewed for the purpose of clarifying a given situation, and "it is rightly (validly) perceived if and when it acts as clew and guide in use-enjoyment."<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 07.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

When then the experimentalist speaks of the indeterminate situation, he means that the situation is indeterminate, not the inquirer. The latter is doubtful because the situation is doubtful.<sup>34</sup> This fact signifies that the overt activity that must be performed must be performed upon the situation rather than upon the inquirer, for with a clarifying of the situation the confusion and uncertainty in the inquirer will also be alleviated.

The indeterminate situation, then, is one that is questionable. It is "uncertain, unsettled, disturbed."<sup>35</sup> The meaning of the situation is unclear, confused, or ambiguous and so suggests questions to the observer. But these questions which the observer or inquirer asks are not questions about the over-all situation. Each such indeterminate situation has its own distinctive doubtfulness which makes it the exact situation it is and so evokes a particular inquiry rather than just inquiry in general. Were this not the case, the method of inquiry would be immaterial- one method would be just as effective as any other. Or, if a situation lacks uniqueness as to its indeterminateness, then panic and anarchy reign, and responses to it are wild and blind activity.

In what, then, does this indeterminateness consist? Dewey provides an explicit answer when he says:

Every such interaction is a temporal process, not a momentary cross-sectional occurrence. The situation in which it occurs is indeterminate, therefore, with respect to its issue. If we call

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 105-106.

<sup>35</sup>Loc. cit.

it confused, when it is meant that its outcome cannot be anticipated. It is called obscure when its course of movement permits of final consequences that cannot be clearly be made out. It is called conflicting when it tends to evoke discordant responses. Even were existential conditions unqualifiedly determinate in and of themselves, they are indeterminate in significance: that is, in what they import and portend in their interaction with the organism.<sup>36</sup>

Specifically, the problem is to ascertain what kind of response the organism shall make to the existential situation. It is axiomatic that different responses to such a problematic situation will produce different results. The fact that the appropriate response is in doubt and that potential consequences are foreseen emphasizes the flexibility of the situation and the need for maintaining an attitude of tentativeness about each such situation. An immediate overt response to a problematic situation short-circuits the process of inquiry, does away with the necessity and opportunity for it. In dangerous situations which must be handled immediately it is necessary to respond quickly, but it is common knowledge that in retrospect there frequently comes a realization of how much better another response would have been.

In the world of practical activity man deals with particularized problematic situations constantly. To the extent that they are individual, and as such have never occurred exactly in the same way before, there can be no certainty that responses to one situation will satisfy another, even if almost identical; hence absolute certainty about a course of action is not possible.<sup>37</sup> This uncertainty man has in everyday affairs also relates to the thought of an action he may be about to take.

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 106-107.

<sup>37</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 6f.

Objects that are experienced in the process of interaction with the environment have a double status. As individual objects they are experienced as complete in themselves and so may lead to either joy or suffering. On the other hand, they are also part and parcel of a continuity of interaction in which they have the role of potential means toward later experiences. "Immediately and directly they are just what they are; but as transitions to and possibilities of later experiences they are uncertain."<sup>38</sup> Herein lies the problem from this standpoint: the role of the object in the continuity of interactions man has with the environment, that is, its unique role in each individual situation, must be determined and its meaning established.

Instituting a Problem. The first step, according to Dewey, is to recognize a situation to be problematic.<sup>39</sup> The importance of this first step cannot be over-emphasized, for

To mistake the problem involved is to cause subsequent inquiry to be irrelevant or to go astray. Without a problem, there is blind groping in the dark. The way in which the problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what data are selected and which are rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures. On the other hand, to set up a problem that does not grow out of an actual situation is to start on a course of dead work, nonetheless dead because the work is 'busy work.'<sup>40</sup>

The fact that genuine problems are set by existing problematic situations is also true of social problems, social as opposed to more technical

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 236.

<sup>39</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 107.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 108.



and scientific. Problems arising from any other source are not valid problems at all. It is pertinent to observe here that social conflict and uncertainty and confusion exist prior to the establishment of problems for inquiry. "The latter are intellectualizations in inquiry of these 'practical' troubles and difficulties."<sup>41</sup>

In inquiry it is important to ask how the particular aspects of the problem situation can be determined. "This question can be answered only...by operations of observation, collection of data and of inference, which are directed by ideas whose material is itself examined through operations of ideational comparison and organization."<sup>42</sup> Fact-finding is necessary to establish the precise nature of the problem and to provide the data necessary for testing the hypotheses entertained during the earlier stages of the inquiry.

Now facts as facts have no significance in this connection. But facts as evidence of something else not existentially present have tremendous significance. In inquiry it is necessary to observe these facts because of their evidential value, that is, because of their function as signs "of the existence of something else, this something being at the time inferred rather than observed."<sup>43</sup>

These observed facts have a dual role as bases for inferences. They may operate either as obstacles or as resources in instituting specific operations which are intended to solve the problem. If they

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 498-499.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

operate as obstacles, as hindrances so as to restrain the progress of a given action toward its objective, their influence must be diminished. If they operate as resources, they must be released in an ordered sequence so that their full force may help the course of action on its way toward establishing the resolution of the difficulty.<sup>44</sup>

But how are the 'facts of the case' discovered? It was stated earlier that there are two phases of inquiry, the first involving observation of whatever objects or events are concerned, the second involving the establishment of the relationships between those objects or events. The first means that the objects comprising the objective situation are observed through the senses and are called "sense data." As such, however, they supply merely the "material for inquiry: a problematic material."<sup>45</sup> As sense data they are material for knowing, they are not known, according to the experimentalist. This process of observation may yield a massive variety of facts which, until their relationships have been determined, remain a mass of unassembled and unordered facts. To guide the search for facts it is helpful "when some possible meaning is used as a guide in exploring facts, especially in instituting a hunt for some fact that would conclusively point to one explanation and exclude all others."<sup>46</sup> Such a guided search aids in selecting from the totality of facts those which are most likely to throw a more direct light upon the nature of the trouble. Through this process of observation the inquirer can establish, tentatively, what are the facts in a

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 499-500.

<sup>45</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 177.

<sup>46</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. New York: D. C. Heath and Company, 1933, p. 42.

given situation, which are the more important and which have the more obstructive or deflective force. The residue of such observation can then be formulated in "primitive existential propositions,"<sup>47</sup> that is, elementary statements about the constituent parts of the situation.

The complexity of some situations makes handling them difficult. Efficiency and economy then demand that some simplification be effected.

Artificial simplification or abstraction is a necessary pre-condition of securing ability to deal with affairs which are complex, in which there are many more variables and where strict isolation destroys the special characteristics of the subject-matter.<sup>48</sup>

Now the experimentalist also uses data in a sense other than as a technical term for observed facts, for sense data. This other meaning signifies that these noted facts in the sense of data, in their inter-relations,

...have a special function in control of the subject-matter of inquiry. It embodies a fixation of the problem in a way which indicates a possible solution. It also helps to provide evidence which tests the solution that is hypothetically entertained.<sup>49</sup>

Facts become data when they are selected as a part of the special configuration of objects and events which especially constitute the problematic situation. Not all facts are data but all have that potentiality.

At a point in the process of inquiry it may happen that certain facts constituting the unsettled situation will evoke opposing ways of responding to them, or the various facts may point in opposite directions. The process of selecting the positive facts and eliminating the

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<sup>47</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 179.

<sup>48</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 107.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 124.

negative ones, accomplished by means of comparison, may gain direction through resort to previous experiences which may suggest how the selection may best be made.<sup>50</sup> Knowledge gained from solving previous and similar problems may exercise a vital guidance over subsequent inquiry. The evidential nature of available data is formulated in affirmative and negative propositions which function as means of redefining and re-evaluating the situation. To clarify their function a rather complete statement seems indispensable.

Affirmative propositions represent the agreement of different subject-matters in their evidential capacity; they agree in that they support or are taken to support one another cumulatively in pointing the same direction, in spite of the fact that existentially the subject-matters involved occur at different times and places. Negative propositions, on the other hand, represent subject-matters to be eliminated because of their irrelevancy or indifference to the evidential function of material in solution of a given problem. Ultimately, the fact that certain facts or ideas are excluded means that the original indeterminate situation can be transformed or requalified into a determinate one only through existential experimental operative elimination of some of its constituents; affirmation of certain data or ideas means that they are operatively selected to reinforce one another in institution of a unified situation.<sup>51</sup>

This process of selection of facts in the case represents the second phase in inquiry, the discovery of the meaning and relationships of the data in a given situation.

A further aspect of this process of understanding and formulating the relations between facts is that of ordering them on the basis of some principle operative in the specific inquiry. Dewey illustrates this by alluding to a mechanic who, he says, understands the several parts of a machine "when and only when he knows how the parts work together; it is the way in which they work together that provides the

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid., pp. 185-186.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 183.

principle of order upon and by which they are related to one another."<sup>52</sup> This order in an intelligently directed inquiry is that of means-to-consequences.<sup>53</sup> The materials at hand are used in a carefully selected and arranged sequence so that the special interactions may operate to bring about an intended result. The more specific the intended result is, the more precisely those materials must be selected and ordered if that specific result and no other is to be realized. Of course, the materials then serve the function of tools, and the more complex the situation the more care must be exercised if the operation is to be economically performed.

Determining the Solution. Once the data have been selected and arranged in what appears to be the most meaningful order, the next question is how to determine which experimental operation is to be performed.

The experimentalist believes that when the organism is dealing intelligently with the perceptual materials that he has established in the earlier steps in inquiry there will arise notions as to what operation(s) will bring about a settled situation. "Given data which locate the nature of the problem, there is evoked a thought of an operation which if put into execution may eventuate in a situation in which the trouble or doubt which evoked inquiry will be resolved."<sup>54</sup> These thoughts of operations he calls suggestion. The point at which suggestions arise seems to be the point--if indeed it can be located temporally--at which

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 511.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 385.

<sup>54</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 123.

the process of inquiry passes from the manipulation of perceptual to conceptual materials. From this point on, then, the experimenter is dealing not so much with the objects as objects as with the meanings and relationships of those objects in a particular set of circumstances.

In explaining suggestion Dewey recurs to the theme of the inter-relatedness of everything, the concept that nothing exists in isolation.<sup>55</sup> In the process of the organism's interaction with the environment it is "that portion of his present experience which is like that of prior experience which will call up or suggest some thing or quality connected with it which was present in the total previous experience; that thing or quality in turn may suggest something connected with itself; it not only may do so, but it will do so unless some new object of perception starts another train of suggestions going."<sup>56</sup> The inquirer is thus the recipient of suggestions inasmuch as they are something that happen to him, not something which he manufactures or conjures up; "...suggestions just spring up, flash upon us, occur to us."<sup>57</sup> They may come slowly or with difficulty, a few at a time or almost in a flood. Which suggestions will occur is dependent upon the experiences of the person and these experiences, of course, are determined by the cultural environment in which the person lives. And which suggestions will occur is secondly dependent upon "the person's own preferences, desires, interests, or even his immediate state of passion."<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>56</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>57</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>58</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 90.

Usually suggestions, when they first occur, are vague unless the subject matter at hand is highly familiar. When, however, the suggestion "is examined with reference to its functional fitness; its capacity as a means of resolving the given situation,"<sup>59</sup> it becomes an idea. The suggestion attains the status of an idea when it is put to use in the business of transforming the problematic situation into a resolved one. Thus, it follows that all ideas originate in suggestion but not every suggestion becomes an idea. Ideas have genuineness only when they are used as tools in the problem-solving process. Ideas are ideas by virtue of their operational character in leading to appropriate inferences and judgment in settling an undecided issue.

Because suggestions and ideas deal with something not actually present, they must be embodied in symbols. In fact, this is so necessary that Dewey states, "Without some kind of symbol no idea....,"<sup>60</sup> because "a meaning that is completely disembodied can not be entertained or used." Ideas are meanings, and since meanings are in themselves not tangible things, they must be attached to something physical, and what we now regard as the conventional carrier of meanings is language, language as representing something not immediately present, language as a symbol. Ideas may, then, be characterized as linguistic formulations of proposed solutions. They are a vehicle for manipulating the conceptual materials growing out of the process of establishing the facts of the case.

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<sup>59</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>60</sup>Loc. cit.

In logical fact, perceptual and conceptual materials are instituted in functional correlativity with each other, in such a manner that the former locates and describes the problem while the latter represents a possible method of solution. Both are determinations in and by inquiry of the original problematic situation whose pervasive quality controls their institution and their contents. ...As distinctions they represent logical divisions of labor.<sup>61</sup>

In terms of the process of moving from the problem toward a solution ideas have a dual function: they are an anticipation of a possible outcome and as such describe an eventual state of affairs; they prescribe an operation or act which is to be performed. Apparently this duality of function has not been too clear, for Dewey has found it necessary to reply to a critical comment in this way:

An anticipation of the eventual issue is an idea; such anticipation of a possible outcome defines being an idea; and...such anticipations are necessary factors in effecting the existential transformation which it is the business of inquiry to accomplish.... But it is equally a part of my theory that the idea, or anticipation of possible outcome, must, in order to satisfy the requirements of controlled inquiry, be such as to indicate an operation to be existentially performed, or is a means (called procedural) of effecting the existential transformation without which a problematic situation cannot be resolved. ...the validity of the idea, as an anticipation of the eventual resolved existential situation, is tested by the contribution which performance of the operation prescribed by it makes to the institution of the final determinate phase.<sup>62</sup>

Ideas, in Dewey's writings, seem to be tantamount to hypotheses. Perhaps the distinction is one of degree rather than one of kind; perhaps he would consider an hypothesis a more "definite supposition"<sup>63</sup> than an idea although in the sentence in which this phrase occurs the

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 111.

<sup>62</sup> John Dewey. "Inquiry and Indeterminateness of Situations." The Journal of Philosophy. 39 (May 21, 1942), p. 293.

<sup>63</sup> John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 110.



term "idea" is omitted in that he says "...the suggestion becomes a definite supposition, or, stated more technically, a hypothesis."<sup>64</sup> In another instance he speaks of hypotheses in the way he describes ideas: "The process of inquiry as inquiry consists...of treating the general propositions that are formulations of ways of action as hypotheses--a mode of treatment that is equivalent to treating the formulated modes of action as possible, instead of required or necessary."<sup>65</sup> When it is necessary, then, to refer to hypotheses, we shall treat them as identical with ideas, bearing in mind that they may have a higher degree of specificity.

In order to select and appraise both the factual and the conceptual material in a given inquiry, it is necessary to have an idea of an end to be attained. Without such an end-in-view, the inquirer lacks a guide in his observations and any one fact might be as acceptable as any other.<sup>66</sup> In this sense an hypothesis or an end-in-view becomes a means of control of the whole procedure in inquiry. It gives direction both in discovering the facts in a case and in formulating and selecting the ideas about possible modes of response. An important consideration is that such hypotheses be held tentatively because within the course of working out the solution to the problem sufficient changes may occur so as to eliminate one or more procedures and because continued investigation may show an original hypothesis to be erroneous.

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<sup>64</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>65</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 260.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 497.

Discourse in Inquiry. Were one to accept and immediately act upon an idea as it occurs, inquiry would by that very fact be brought to an end. Should the conclusion happen to be valid, it would be accidental in the sense of having little if any realized ground to substantiate it. To avoid this haphazard and irresponsible reaction to an idea, an examination of the meanings as meanings is necessary. Developing the meanings and establishing relationships between them through a symbolic process the experimentalist calls reasoning.<sup>67</sup>

This examination consists in noting what the meaning in question implies in relation to other meanings in the system of which it is a member, the formulated relation constituting a proposition. If such and such a relation of meanings is accepted, then we are committed to such and such other relations of meanings because of their membership in the same system. Through a series of intermediate meanings, a meaning is finally reached which is more closely relevant to the problem in hand than the originally suggested idea. It indicates operations which can be performed to test its applicability....<sup>68</sup>

Another name frequently employed to designate this same process is "deliberation." Others are: "argument, or ratiocination: Discourse."<sup>69</sup>

Just how extensive this reasoning stage will be in a given case is dependent upon the facility with which the inquirer habitually handles ideas, the extent of his knowledge about previous and similar situations, which is again dependent upon the kind of culture in which he is operating and upon the available means of communicating knowledge.<sup>70</sup> The person who customarily delays action until he can look

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 111.

<sup>68</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 314.

<sup>70</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., pp. 111-112.

at an idea from all angles both ~~as~~ to its factual background and as to its implications in practice will make a more thoroughgoing analysis than will one who is more impetuous and unaccustomed to this procedure. On the other hand, he who has little background in the given subject-matter will see fewer of these implications in that he has fewer sources of suggestion in his experience and will therefore tend to cut short the reasoning stage and proceed to act more quickly; he is unable to use previous knowledge as a means of suggesting other ideas or of elaborating ideas as they are suggested. A new object, let us say, from another culture will call up a variety of ideas, including possibly valid ones, but in the absence of guidance from previous experience many of these ideas are likely to be wild guesses and lack sufficient ground to give them merit. And if few or primitive communication facilities are available, either sources of knowledge are cut off or the language itself is unable to convey adequate and precise meanings for lack of sufficient vocabulary.

Sometimes this reasoning stage may be long and intricate. Nevertheless, it is necessary, more necessary for the careful investigator and in situations whose outcome is expected to be of great moment, because its object is "to obtain that meaning or conceptual structure which is best adapted to instigate and direct just those operations of observation that will secure as their consequence just those existential facts that are needed to solve the problem in hand."<sup>71</sup>

Lest it be suspected that deliberation is a simple, elementary process, it is enough to observe here that many possibilities of action

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<sup>71</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 133.

present themselves in extended discourse. Of this matter Dewey comments in various ways:

Whenever there is genuine deliberation, there are alternatives at almost every step of the way. There is something to be said or tentatively affirmed at each step on both sides of the questions that come up.

. . . . .

Each state of facts presented in a proposition suggests its own alternative course of action, and if there is genuine inquiry the suggestion has to be formulated.<sup>72</sup>

As soon as a meaning is treated as a meaning, it becomes a member of a system of meanings. . . . This development constitutes reasoning or rational discourse--where discourse is a matter of sequential implications rather than communication of something already possessed.<sup>73</sup>

The statements that embody these meanings are of two kinds, both called propositions: those which deal with the factual materials and those which deal with the alternative courses of action. With the former we have dealt earlier in this chapter. Here it is necessary to dwell on those which deal with conceptual matters.

These propositions or statements predicate the possible solutions to the problem in hand and at the same time prescribe the operations which are to be performed in resolving the difficulty.<sup>74</sup> They originate in the situation under scrutiny as there is reference to the eventual issue from that situation. Hence, in and of themselves they are not "self-determined, self-sufficient, or valid. . . . their validity depends upon their consequences which ensue from acting upon them--as far as these consequences ensue from the operations the propositions dictate

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 163.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 301.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 288.

and are not accidental accretions."<sup>75</sup> Their function is instrumental and intermediate, for it is through their implementation and use as means that the inquirer is able to work forward to a solution.

The form of these propositions is that of an if-then relationship. If a certain course of action is adopted, then certain results can be anticipated. In other words, the experiment enters in at this point. A proposition is held tentatively as a premise of a conclusion, that if a selected set of data are placed in a certain pattern of interaction, it is expected that a given result will ensue. "...experiments that institute the required set of related traits are dependent upon hypotheses formulated in if-then propositions."<sup>76</sup>

The organization of facts and propositions is fluid and is determined by the interactions they have with one another. When there is extensive inquiry into a given problematic situation, there are numerous intervening interactions, a serial process Dewey describes aptly:

Some observed facts point to an idea that stands for a possible solution. This idea evokes more observations. Some of the newly observed facts link up with those previously observed and are such as to rule out other observed things with respect to their evidential function. The new order of facts suggests a modified idea (or hypothesis) which occasions new observations whose result again determines a new order of facts, and so on until the existing order is both unified and complete. In the course of this serial process, the ideas that represent possible solutions are tested or 'proved.'<sup>77</sup>

It is possible through this process to adopt finally a proposition that is far different from the one originally thought to be adequate. These

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<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 453.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., pp. 113-114.

propositions are arranged in terms of their intermediate function in the sequential manipulation of the environment, material or ideational.

Experiment in Inquiry. Once the propositions have been formulated and there is a well-established hypothesis about what special arrangements and conditions are necessary to bring the inquiry to fruition, the next phase of inquiry is testing by overt action of that hypothesis in order to verify it. This is the directly experimental phase of inquiry.

In the preceding pages the term "operation" has frequently been used as a designation for manipulation of factual material and of the ideational content of propositions. Dewey clarifies the word "operation" when he elaborates in the Logic:

Operations...fall into two general types. There are operations that are performed upon and with existential material--as in experimental observation. There are operations performed with and upon symbols. But even in the latter case, 'operation' is to be taken in as literal a sense as possible. There are operations like hunting for a lost coin or measuring land, and there are operations like drawing up a balance-sheet. The former is performed upon existential conditions; the latter upon symbols. But the symbols in the latter case stand for possible final existential conditions while the conclusion, when it is stated in symbols, is a pre-condition of further operations that deal with existences. Moreover, the operations involved in making a balance-sheet for a bank or any other business involve physical activities. The so-called 'mental' element in operations of both these kinds has to be defined in terms of existential conditions and consequences, not vice-versa.<sup>78</sup>

In the ideational phase the operations are of the symbolic type, i.e., whatever manipulations are performed are done in a symbolic manner. Yet Dewey would also call this acting even though it would seem to be done without acting.

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

By means of symbols, whether gestures, words or more elaborate constructions, we act without acting. That is, we perform experiments by means of symbols which have results which are themselves only symbolized, and which do not therefore commit us to actual or existential consequences.<sup>79</sup>

To stop the process of inquiry short of overt experimentation is to manipulate the symbols only and to leave the actual existential conditions as they were. Failure to modify the existential conditions of a problematic situation results in a problematic situation still. Hence experiment is necessary to complete the process as well as to test the validity of the hypotheses that were entertained. Experiment may be described in this way: "...conditions are deliberately arranged in accord with the requirements of an idea or hypothesis to see whether the results theoretically indicated by the idea actually occur."<sup>80</sup> Its object is "the construction, by regular steps taken on the basis of a plan thought out in advance, of a typical, crucial case, a case formed with express reference to throwing light on the difficulty in question."<sup>81</sup>

If the hypothesis is justified in terms of the results of the experiment, i.e., if there is agreement between the anticipated and actualized results, there being no reason to suppose that the same results could not be attained in another way, the residue is strong enough to be called a conclusion. If the results do not agree, all is not lost, for a failure may yet be very instructive in that the very process which resulted in failure may suggest other ways of responding to the

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<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>80</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 114.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., pp. 175-176.

same situation. It may help further to define the existing problem, open up new problems, or suggest ways of modifying the hypothesis so that a different result can occur.<sup>82</sup>

The Consequences of Inquiry. The objective of inquiry, already frequently mentioned, is "institution of a unified resolved situation."<sup>83</sup> To the extent that this result is achieved it may be said that the end-in-view as well as the terminating end have been accomplished. The problem has been solved and so far as the organism in interaction with that problematic environment is concerned, its equilibrium has been restored. Because the inquirer may have uppermost in his mind the verification of his hypothesis, he may regard it as the most important result. But in the process of establishing a unified situation new objects with new features are brought to light, and "As far as the objective course of knowledge is concerned, this result is the important one; in comparison with it the verification of a hypothesis is secondary and incidental."<sup>84</sup>

While earlier the term "conclusion" was used to designate the results of successful inquiry, in his Logic Dewey says he prefers another term, viz., "warranted assertibility."<sup>85</sup> He prefers the latter because of certain ambiguities connected with the terms "belief" and "knowledge."<sup>86</sup> In terms of the continuity of inquiry, specifically that aspect of

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 114f.

<sup>83</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 394.

<sup>84</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 190.

<sup>85</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>86</sup>Loc. cit.



continuity which permits the re-testing of the results of previous experiments, those results have an aspect of tentativeness but are, until such retesting, "warrantably assertible." In Dewey's words:

When knowledge is taken as a general abstract term related to inquiry in the abstract, it means 'warranted assertibility.' The use of a term that designates a potentiality rather than an actuality involves recognition that all special conclusions of special inquiries are parts of an enterprise that is continually renewed, or is a going concern.<sup>87</sup>

Again in the light of the principle of continuity of inquiry, the results of a series of related inquiries are cumulative.<sup>88</sup> Taken together, the results of such a series taken as knowledge constitute the sum total of what is presently known about that particular subject. In terms of their degree of availability these results become resources for further inquiry as they are known to other inquirers. These results then have a double status in that they per se are objectively real and are matters of knowledge and in that they may become instrumental as facts in a later inquiry and as such are a source of suggestions to that inquiry. Beyond having value as the residue of a given problem they have worth only in so far as use is made of them in further inquiry.<sup>89</sup>

Summary. In its relation to the pattern of life-activity the general features of the pattern of inquiry may be summarized with these statements:

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<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p. 470

<sup>89</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 150.

Environmental conditions and energies are inherent in inquiry as a special mode of organic behavior.

The structure and course of life-behavior have a definite pattern, spatial and temporal. (From the problematic to the resolved.)

There is no inquiry that does not involve the making of some change in environing conditions.

The pattern is serial or sequential.

The serially connected processes and operations by means of which a consummatory close is brought into being are, by description, intermediate and instrumental.

The basic importance of this serial relation in logic is rooted in the conditions of life itself. Modification of both organic and environmental energies is involved in life-activity. This organic fact foreshadows learning and discovery, with the consequent outgrowth of new needs and new problematic situations. Inquiry, in settling the disturbed relation of organism-environment...does not merely remove doubt by recurrence to a prior adaptive integration. It institutes new environing conditions that occasion new problems. What the organism learns during this process produces new powers that make new demands upon the environment. In short, as special problems are resolved, new ones tend to emerge.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>90</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 33 passim.

## CHAPTER III

### EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY IN EXPERIMENTALISM

The preceding chapter outlined the pattern or method of inquiry as the basis in the system of the philosophy of experimentalism. The present chapter will present the derivations from that pattern as they apply to the process of education. The first part will indicate the relationship between life, conceived as growth, and education. The second will describe the experimentalist conception of the method of learning and its resultant knowledge. It will also include other aspects of educational psychology based on rather explicit statements of Dewey and several of his interpreters. Finally, the relationship of this point of view to that of other psychological theories will be indicated.

Life and Education. As already pointed out, man is an active being in continuous interaction with his environment. This interaction is considered a two-way process in that both the human organism and the environment have an effect upon one another. The human being, not being inanimate and unconcerned about its future, turns its energy in such a way as to help preserve its own future existence. Hence, life is defined as "a self-renewing process through action upon the environment."<sup>1</sup> It is a continuous process of adaptation and self-renewal. As long as

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<sup>1</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 2.

the organism is expending its energy and is getting a return in terms of self-preservation from that expenditure, it is growing. More broadly, then, this growth is seen as an individual-social process by which society transmits the benefit of its accumulated experience to the neophyte and by which the individual organism re-adapts its adjustments to the demands of the situation. Growth "is a process that is accomplished through a continuous 'reconstruction of experience' that begets new meanings and yields further power control over subsequent experience."<sup>2</sup>

But man is not and cannot be an isolationist in this life-process. "Man...is a social animal."<sup>3</sup> As a social being he lives and experiences and interacts not only with the physical environment but also with the social arrangements peculiar to his locale. Life in the broader sense must include the "customs, institutions, beliefs, victories and defeats, recreations and occupation"<sup>4</sup> of his social group, for it is also within this framework that his experiences will occur. Furthermore, the term "experience" is also used in this broader sense. In adapting to this environment and in adapting the environment to maintaining its life-process the infant will of necessity be initiated into the "interests, purposes, information, skill, and practices of the mature members: otherwise the group will cease its characteristic life."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. New York: The Century Company, 1931, p. 97.

<sup>3</sup>John Dewey. Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938, p. 43.

<sup>4</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

This process of initiating the young into the ways of the mature is called 'education'. "Education, in its broadest sense, is the means of this social continuity of life."<sup>6</sup> "Education, and education alone, spans the gap."<sup>7</sup> It is the process by which the infant develops into a mature adult. In other words, the experimentalist makes a virtual identification between life, growth, and education. Dewey summarizes it this way:

...life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, this means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming.<sup>8</sup>

Education, in the experimentalist view, does not stop at a certain age or with the completion of a certain number of grades in a formal school.

Since life means growth, a living creature lives as truly and positively at one stage as at another, with the same intrinsic fullness and the same absolute claims. Hence education means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age.<sup>9</sup>

The above statements and their implications might suggest that the experimentalist values activity for its own sake or that any activity is educative in and of itself, an accusation not unknown. This point of view is not correct, as Dewey hastens to point out:

Life is not to be identified with every superficial act and interest. Even though it is not always easy to tell whether what appears to be mere surface fooling is a sign of some nascent as yet untrained power, we must remember that manifestations are not to be accepted

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<sup>6</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>7</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

as ends in themselves. They are signs of possible growth. They are to be turned into means of development, of carrying power forward, not indulged or cultivated for their own sake.... What impulses are moving toward, not what they have been, is the important thing for parent and teacher.<sup>10</sup>

The crucial point is in the last sentence. "What impulses are moving toward" is important in determining whether or not an activity will result in growth. And what they will move toward is dependent upon the deliberate intervention of intelligent rather than passive interaction. Man is distinguished from lower animals in that he is able to use tools, ideational symbols as signs of objects, and to communicate and share his experiences with his fellows.

Through these various means man's interaction with his environment comes to possess distinctive intellectual quality. When is behavior intellectual? The simple answer of the experimentalist is, when 'it knows what it is about'--when it knows what can be expected of things and what can be done with them....the organism acts in the present to start influences moving which will bring about an eventual state of affairs more in harmony with its vital interests; when it is more than mere mechanical reaction to immediate stimulus; in short, when present behavior is guided by anticipation of consequences, it is intelligent behavior.<sup>11</sup>

Growth is a product of intelligent activity. It "depends upon the presence of difficulty to be overcome by the exercise of intelligence."<sup>12</sup> The relationship of this statement to the pattern of inquiry described in the preceding chapter is clear: growth is dependent upon the use of intelligent method in solving the problems man experiences; this intelligent method is the method of scientific inquiry. Its use enables a

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<sup>10</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>11</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. Op. cit., pp. 74-75.

<sup>12</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938, p. 42.

better adjustment to the environment in terms of accomplishing the purposes man has and the goals he seeks in the life-process as opposed to passive acceptance of natural events.

For activity to be educative and lead to growth two conditions must be met. One is that the problem to be solved must come from the experience presently being undergone, and hence also within the capacity of the student; the other is that it arouses an active search on the part of the student for facts, information, and ideas with which to solve the problem.<sup>13</sup> Here again the experimentalist emphasizes the continuity of experiences in which the past operates as a guide in handling the present with a view toward future consequences.

In this way the purpose of the school in promoting educational growth is evident, namely, "to insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure growth. The inclination to learn from life itself and to make the conditions of life such that all will learn in the process of living is the finest product of schooling."<sup>14</sup> Put in another way, education is continuous with life. Its activities should come from present living, regardless of the age of the person, and it should enable the student to live more effectively today as opposed to the view that education should prepare the student for future living. Furthermore, this concern is not only with the immediate present, but the experimentalist has also a long-range goal in mind, namely, "so to control the educative process that this tendency to

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>14</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 60.

learn from experience is progressively developed."<sup>15</sup> He seeks to establish the habit of learning to learn from experience as it occurs. If that is established as an enduring tendency, the student will be able throughout life to solve his problems by the same method and so continue learning as he encounters each new experience.

The specific justification for a school "is to provide a selected environment and schedule of activities for the nurture of the young in those appreciations, outlooks, and behaviors considered most important and essential to the life of the group."<sup>16</sup> It is a special agency to initiate the immature into the ways of his social group in a planned and efficient manner. Experiences in the school must be selected from the wealth of experience available in everyday living to prevent the student's being overwhelmed by the great mass and turmoil of existence. There he may be helped to work his way through these experiences so that he learns to understand them, appreciate their meaning and use that meaning in his present and future living.

Now what is the essential condition under which this appropriate growth may take place? Dewey says it is immaturity.<sup>17</sup> Almost apologetically he expands on this statement because to him it means something different from what may be termed absence of maturity. To him it means not only capacity or potentiality in the sense in which a

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<sup>15</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. Op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>16</sup>John L. Childs. Education and Morals. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 49.



glass jar has a specified capacity, but also a power, an ability in the sense of an ability to develop and to grow. Thus growth is not something which an instructor in school does to the student. Rather, because the student is an active being, it is something which he must do for himself. It is this power to grow which he exercises for himself in the process of experiencing and living.

Dewey continues to look at immaturity in a positive way when he describes the two traits of immaturity: dependence and plasticity.<sup>18</sup> By dependence he means, not that the organism is hopelessly dependent and so incapable of development, but that the human organism has an exceptional capacity for social intercourse upon which he depends for development. It is true that the infant is, at the outset, wholly incapable of getting satisfaction for his physical needs by himself, but he is compensated by being able to prevail upon adults upon whom he is dependent to help him satisfy his wants. It is this ability or power to enlist the aid of others which, in Dewey's view, constitutes dependence as a positive trait of his immaturity. Plasticity, the other trait, is not the plasticity of wax which yields to external pressure and molding but rather,

...the ability to learn from experience; the power to retain from one experience something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a later situation. This means power to modify actions on the basis of the results of prior experience, the power to develop dispositions.<sup>19</sup>

The human infant is capable of many "instinctive tentative reactions" but he has to learn to use them effectively. In learning to use them

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 50-54.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

he needs to vary factors within them, combine them in various ways as circumstances demand, and through this process accomplish his objective. While he is doing this combining and varying, he is learning methods which, in addition to serving his purpose in the immediate situation, will serve him in later, similar situations. A series of successes will tend to bring about the habit of learning. Through the process he learns to learn, and in time he will become less dependent upon others for his immediate physical needs.

The Method of Learning. The method of learning follows, according to the experimentalist, the procedure outlined in the foregoing chapter on the pattern of inquiry. Since learning is resultant from the activity of primary purposeful doing, it is derived from that doing. Doing is fundamental while learning is a function of that doing.

The first stage in the process of learning is to experience something. For a child this first contact will be unstructured; at first he will not be able to do more than to get acquainted with the objects involved. This "must inevitably be of the trial and error sort."<sup>20</sup> No matter what the age of the student, his first experience with an unfamiliar environment will necessarily be limited to exploring, trying, playing. As he fumbles in his own way with the objects, he will note what happens to them and to him during and after the interaction and so begin to construct some pattern of organization or find some meaning in his relationship with them. This kind of dealing with a subject is the first step, and it is necessary if education is to be

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 181.

more than a rote memorization of new words. Problems from daily living outside of the classroom have real interest for students and cause real reflection to take place. And if reflection takes place, then learning also occurs. Dewey explains it when he says that these problems "give the pupils something to do, not something to learn; and the doing is of such a nature as to demand thinking, or the intentional noting of connections; learning naturally results."<sup>21</sup>

Here it is clearly implied that the experience must have certain characteristics. If the experience is to have value for the learning process, it must consist of a problem that is real and it must be a real problem to the student. Otherwise it is artificially set and fails to arouse the student's interest. It has no intimate connection with the affairs of his life and so fails to engage him except in so far as he may by compulsion apply himself to it in order to 'get a grade' by satisfying the requirements placed upon him. On the other hand, the problem must be such as is commensurate with his background of experiences. Otherwise it may be too easy to merit his consideration or it may be too difficult and by its very difficulty discourage him. Dewey explains:

...to think effectively one must have had, or now have, experiences which will furnish him resources for coping with the difficulty at hand. A difficulty is an indispensable stimulus to thinking, but not all difficulties call out thinking. Sometimes they overwhelm and submerge and discourage. The perplexing situation must be sufficiently like situations which have already been dealt with so that pupils will have some sort of control of the means of handling it. A large part of the art of instruction lies in making the difficulty of new problems large enough to challenge thought, and small enough so that, in addition to the confusion naturally attending

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<sup>21</sup>Loc. cit.

the novel elements, there shall be luminous familiar spots from which helpful suggestions may spring.<sup>22</sup>

The second phase in learning, again following the pattern of inquiry, is the collection of data which will define the nature of the difficulty and serve as a source of suggestion of solutions. While in the previous chapter observation, broadly interpreted, was suggested as the means of discovering the facts of the case, Dewey says that is relatively immaterial how this information is gathered. "Memory, observation, reading, communication, are all avenues for supplying data."<sup>23</sup> It is important to remember in this connection that this stage in thinking is not performed merely for the purpose of gathering information, because the purpose is not merely to collect it but also to use it in working toward a resolution of the difficulty. Dewey calls these stored facts merely information, not knowledge--"static, cold-storage ideal of knowledge" and "miscellaneous junk."<sup>24</sup> He says it hampers rather than promotes thinking, because the students "have no practice in selecting what is appropriate, and no criterion to go by; everything is on the same dead static level."<sup>25</sup>

The crucial stage in the learning process is the one in which the learner draws inferences from the observed facts, in which ideas arise. These leaps into the unknown as warranted by the discerned facts are creative and inventive. What is original about them is not that the

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 185.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 186.

<sup>25</sup>Loc. cit.

facts are discovered or that they are used but rather the new combinations of them, their relationships, and establishment of meaning among and between them. When a child finds out that he can pile blocks one upon another and make a high tower, he has made an important discovery and has established for himself a new relationship between the blocks even though everyone else around him knows all about it. This discovery is a real addition to his experience in that his experience is enriched by a new quality.<sup>26</sup>

Dewey adds on this point that mere communication of an idea does not constitute an idea for the one who receives the communication. To him it is merely information. "Only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem at first hand, seeking and finding his way out, does he think."<sup>27</sup> This qualification of thinking does not mean that the teacher is merely to make the assignment by providing the conditions which may stimulate thinking and then retire from active participation with the student in the experience. Indeed, he does provide the conditions and after that becomes an active sharer and participant in the conjoint experience with the student. They learn and work together. The emphasis here on the fact that the student must "think his own way out" of the problem, must manipulate the facts himself, must be active in order to learn, is the reason activity by the student receives so much consideration in non-traditional schools.

Now ideas as ideas are guides to action in anticipation of some foreseen consequence. As such, they are intermediary rather than final.

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<sup>26</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

What remains of the over-all process of learning is to test these ideas in action. "...thoughts just as thoughts are incomplete. At best they are tentative; they are suggestions, indications. ...Till they are applied in these situations they lack full point and reality. Only application tests them, and only testing confers full meaning and a sense of their reality."<sup>28</sup> In this same context Dewey admits that real value may come from exercises of the sort usually listed as problems illustrating the application of a problem. On the other hand, he also hastens to point out that so long as these exercises are such as permit the student to look upon them as mere school exercises they retain a certain school-ish artificiality about them. They are valuable, in the student's mind, for recitations, term papers, and examinations have but little value in the affairs of daily living. The alternative to this artificiality is, he continues:

Where schools are equipped with laboratories, shops, and gardens, where dramatizations, plays, and games are freely used, opportunities exist for reproducing situations of life, and for acquiring and applying information and ideas in the carrying forward of progressive experiences. Ideas are not segregated, they do not form an isolated island. They animate and enrich the ordinary course of life. Information is vitalized by its function; by the place it occupies in direction of action.<sup>29</sup>

Looking at this idea in another way suggests that the testing of ideas in action is the best method of providing cross-connections with materials otherwise familiar to the student, either from studying in other areas or from their actual experience in the world of affairs. This is the best method of handling an assignment and the only feasible application and interpretation of the principle of the continuity of experience.

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 190.

This idea in action produces consequences which will in turn become means in their meaningful relationship in another context. These consequences the student has learned in the course of the inquiry he has conducted, that is, in the process of learning, and to the extent that he uses them in subsequent inquiry and further learning they serve as his resource material in those future experiences.

Knowledge. This residue accruing upon the completion of the process of inquiry, or of learning, is knowledge. "Anything that may be called knowledge, or a known object, marks a question answered, a difficulty disposed of, a confusion cleared up, an inconsistency reduced to coherence, a perplexity mastered."<sup>30</sup> Knowledge grows out of or accrues from an intelligent operation of the steps in the learning or inquiry process. The distinctive feature of the theory is that it is a "knowledge mode of experience, defined in terms of the outcome of competent inquiry, as that which accomplishes these functions."<sup>31</sup> It is mediated through the method of inquiry, not immediate.

This view denies that knowledge can be attained in a spectator fashion, by mere looking at something. Sense impressions do not constitute knowledge; neither is the 'mind' a wax tablet upon which impressions are registered. Such a view is far too simple to do justice to the facts.

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<sup>30</sup> John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1929, pp. 228-229.

<sup>31</sup> John Dewey. "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951, p. 563.

If the living, experiencing being is an intimate participant in the activities of the world to which it belongs, then knowledge is a mode of participation, valuable in the degree to which it is effective. It cannot be the idle view of an unconcerned spectator.<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, what is known is not something given a priori which must be absorbed somehow by the organism. It is eventual, that is, something yet to come about as the outcome of experimental operations intelligently directed.<sup>33</sup>

Sense qualities themselves are not cognitive. "Direct experiencing takes care of the matter. What science [scientific inquiry] is concerned with is the happening of these experienced things."<sup>34</sup> They merely exist, and inquiry accepts them as given in experience. The object of knowledge is not to discover them in existence but to discover their meaning and relationships. "Sense qualities...are something to be known, they are challenges to knowing, setting problems for investigation. Our scientific knowledge is something about them, resolving the problems they propose."<sup>35</sup>

On the other hand, knowledge is about specific relationships. There is no general knowledge. "Experimental knowledge is a mode of doing, and like all doing takes place at a time, in a place, and under specifiable conditions in connection with a definite problem."<sup>36</sup> This characteristic of knowledge suggests that knowledge is not all of one piece. Each investigation is individual, and since operations never exactly repeat one another, the accruing knowledge must also be

<sup>32</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>33</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 171.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., pp. 122-123.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 102.



individual to the particular inquiry out of which it originated. However, since operations may be classified into several types, these types serve to identify certain classes of knowledge. Dewey explains them by saying:

...no problem can be solved without a determination of the data which define and locate it and which furnish clues or evidence. In so far, when we secure dependable sense-data, we know truly. Again, the systematic progress of inquiry in dealing with physical problems requires that we determine those metric properties by means of which correlations of changes are instituted so as to make predictions possible. These form the objects of physical science, and if our operations are truly adequate they are truly known. We develop operations, through symbols, which connect possible operations with one another; their outcomes give the formal objects of mathematics and logic. As consequences of suitable operations these too are truly known. Finally, when these operations, or some combination of them, are used to solve the problems which arise in connection with the things of ordinary perceived and enjoyed objects, the latter, as far as they are consequences of these operations, are themselves truly known. We know whenever we do know; that is, whenever our inquiry leads to conclusions which settle the problem out of which it grew. This truism is the end of the whole matter--upon the condition that we frame our theory of knowledge in accord with the pattern set by experimental methods.<sup>37</sup>

Now knowing as a mode of doing, as an overt act, is capable of being observed. It is as much an act as is any other process. There is a set of conditions in terms of which the problem is stated; there is a particular operation or series of operations, both physical and symbolic. It takes place at a time and at a place under certain conditions. These can be reported so that anyone can reinstitute the conditions and relations and the overt acts if he cares to verify the results. Experimental knowing is public and open for inspection by anyone.<sup>38</sup>

As an overt act experimental knowing has three temporal phases through which it passes. "There is the initial phase of a non-cognitive

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., pp. 197-198.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 289.

situation out of which knowing develops; there is the terminal stage of the attained knowledge; and there is the intermediate phase in which subject-matter is what it is as conditioned by inquiry...."<sup>39</sup>

The validity of knowledge as the outcome of inquiry is not final or irrevocable. Absolute certainty is impossible. Its truth, or as the experimentalist prefers to call it, its validity is contingent upon the results of future inquiries. Thus, the most he will claim is "...as near the truth as inquiry has as yet come, a matter determined not by a guess at some future belief but by the care and pains with which inquiry has been conducted up to the present time."<sup>40</sup> Doing "provides insurance but no assurance. Doing is always subject to peril, to the danger of frustration."<sup>41</sup> Because the term 'knowledge' carries with it the notion of certainty, the experimentalist is careful about using the word. He prefers "warranted assertibility" in the sense that whatever statements can be made as the result of inquiry can be made only in so far as the conditions in the process warrant their assertion. This term then permits consideration of the continuity of inquiry and it designates a potentiality rather than a finality.<sup>42</sup> The experimentalist need not, therefore, fall into the opposite extreme of complete skepticism. Just as he knows specific things following inquiry, so also is his skepticism specific. "It relates to the validity of particular beliefs and theories."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>John Dewey. "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. Op. cit., p. 566.

<sup>40</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 573.

<sup>42</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>43</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism.

But why have tentative knowledge? Of course, the answer is in part that certain knowledge is impossible of attainment. But in terms of the continuity of experience, a fundamental concept in experimentalism, "The eventual purpose in knowledge is observation of a new phenomenon, an object actually experienced by way of perception."<sup>44</sup> From this standpoint knowledge is a means of control of future experiences, and its function is not a settled and final thing but instead it is a medium toward more adequate control of subsequent experiences. "When one change is given, and we know with measured accuracy its connection with another change, we have the potential means of producing or averting that other event."<sup>45</sup> As a means or resource for suggestions in future inquiry it is not knowledge in its instrumental function any longer. The term 'information' is then given to it. Thus the method of learning produces knowledge which, when subsequently used in further inquiry, is resource material again and may help in the learning of other knowledge. "'Knowledge', in the sense of information, means the working capital, the indispensable resources, of further inquiry; of finding out, or learning, more things."<sup>46</sup>

Impulse and Habit. While the process of learning resulting in knowledge as described above outlines the major steps of the method of learning, there are certain other factors which enter in and play an important role in the total procedure. Since a particular order of presenting these has not been worked out in Dewey's writings so as to

<sup>44</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 207.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>46</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., pp. 185-186.

constitute a clear system, the pages following from this point may seem more serial than related. However, the writer hopes that the order will be such as to enable the reader to see the relationships as he proceeds. Since, chronologically, in a given inquiry, impulses precede the action of habits, it may seem clearer to begin with the time sequence in arriving at an understanding of the relationship between the two in interaction.

Within the framework of interaction Dewey distinguishes impulse as the "original, unlearned activity."<sup>47</sup> Now impulses seem to be the immediate responses to stimuli in the environment. They are the inclination to act upon whatever presents itself to the organism. They are embryonic in that they are starting points which impel to action without delay or reflection, embryonic in that they initiate action which, if arrested by reflection and a delay of response, will eventuate in an intellectualized response to that situation. The dictionary definition seems to express it well: "a sudden determination to act, without reflection or determination."<sup>48</sup> An impulse, therefore, is random, unorganized, and without direction. "In the case of the young it is patent that impulses are highly flexible starting points for activities which are diversified according to the ways in which they are used."<sup>49</sup> If this initial response is checked and guided appropriately, the impulse to act may be directed into whatever channels are desired. One aspect, then, of impulses is their plasticity. What it will become

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<sup>47</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: The Modern Library, Inc., 1930, pp. 92-93.

<sup>48</sup>The Winston Dictionary. College Edition.

<sup>49</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 95.

"depends upon how the impulse of fear [as an example] is interwoven with other impulses. This depends in turn upon the outlets and inhibitions supplied by the social environment."<sup>50</sup>

Habits, on the other hand, are secondary and acquired, not native and original as are impulses. Habits are "outgrowths of unlearned activities."<sup>51</sup> A series of related acts tends to establish a predisposition to respond in a patterned fashion. Dewey says further:

...we need a word to express that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity.<sup>52</sup>

In this connection he objects to using the word 'attitude' or 'disposition' on the ground that disposition is too restrictive in that it refers to a predisposition to act overtly in a specific fashion and that an attitude is a part of a disposition which has the feature of automatism connected with it. A habit is more broad in its inclusiveness than either of the two preceding terms.<sup>53</sup> In fact, he excludes the element of repetition from habit as an essential feature even though he grants that tendency toward repetition may be one element in some habits. Of its essence he says:

The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, they express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., pp. 40-41.

<sup>53</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

In terms of the plasticity and growth of the young, Dewey says there is the capacity to acquire habits.<sup>55</sup> From the standpoint of growth the first important feature of habits is that they are "a form of executive skill, of efficiency in doing. A habit means an ability to use natural conditions as means to ends."<sup>56</sup> The skill of the artisan enables him to use in an economical and efficient way the patterns already established in order to control certain features in his environment. A habit from this standpoint is motor efficiency in dealing with familiar matters. As more and more habits are acquired, this expansion effects in an active way a greater control of the means for achieving purposed ends. Through habit the organism tends to respond in a relatively passive way, i.e., without expenditure of much physical or mental effort. Thus two aspects of habits as efficiency become apparent. The first is that when the organism meets a new situation there is likely to be much floundering, excessive action, and lack of direction. As it gradually becomes used to the situation, it will select from the mass of stimuli certain items on account of their special pertinence and omit others from consideration either because of their lack of relevance or because adjustments have been made to them. The second aspect is that a more or less permanent background of adjustment in a given situation furnishes the background around or upon which future specific adjustments are made. The organism seeks not to change the entire environment but only those features which stand in the way of its attaining

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<sup>55</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 54.

<sup>56</sup>Loc. cit.

a specific objective. And thus the background of habit needs to adapt to only those specific features immediately involved in the present difficult situation.

The second important feature of habit is its intellectual and emotional disposition as a preference for certain ways of responding, in particular, for those ways which are involved in its exercise. A habit "actively seeks for occasions to pass into full operation."<sup>57</sup> It is an active preference. On the intellectual side it means:

Where there is a habit, there is acquaintance with the materials and equipment to which action is applied. There is a definite way of understanding the situation in which the habit operates. Modes of thought, of observation and reflection, enter as forms of skill and of desire into the habits that make a man an engineer, an architect, a physician, or a merchant.<sup>58</sup>

There are also undesirable habits, namely, those which become routine in ways of acting, which have rigidity, which dominate the organism and prevent adaptation or reflection. This kind of habit is a plague upon the individual; it ruins plasticity and prevents growth; it makes an automatic machine-like individual and prevents development. This kind of skill educators ought not to endeavor to develop. The fact is that practice and repetition of an habituated skill should keep the skill flexible and adjustable. If intelligence subvenes in the practice of a skill, the skill will grow, not only more efficient, but also more varied and flexible as the practice continues. For reflection will enable the organism to see the inefficient aspects of the skill and to find ways of readjustment so as to increase its efficiency.

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>58</sup>Loc. cit.

"Habits reduce themselves to routine ways of acting, or degenerate into ways of action to which we are enslaved just in the degree to which intelligence is disconnected from them."<sup>59</sup>

It might seem from the foregoing statement that habits are capable of knowing in and of themselves. Such is not the case in Dewey's view. Habits, he says, are too fixed, too organized, too insistent upon action to stop and reflect or to leave room for imagination. "Habit incorporates, enacts or overrides objects, but it doesn't know them."<sup>60</sup>

On the other hand, "we may, indeed, be said to know how by means of our habits."<sup>61</sup> Dewey says we do many things in ordinary living without thinking of doing them, e.g., walking, eating, dressing. Here he makes a distinction, however, between knowledge of how to do something and knowledge of and about something, knowledge into which imagination and reflection enter. If knowledge of how is termed knowledge, then the other kinds of knowing are unaccounted for in his system. Consequently, he seems willing to apply the term knowledge to 'knowing how' only as a matter of courtesy.<sup>62</sup> Thus he reserves the term knowledge primarily for results and outcomes of inquiry.

Intelligence. Intelligence, as referred to in the previous pages, is integrally connected with the pattern of inquiry elaborated in the previous chapter. Dewey explains:

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<sup>59</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 58.

<sup>60</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 177.

<sup>61</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 173.



...when the sentient organism, having experienced natural values, good and bad, begins to select, to prefer, and to make battle for its preference; and in order that it may make the most gallant fight possible picks out and gathers together in perception and thought what is favorable to its aims and what hostile, then and there Nature has at last achieved significant regard for good. And this is the same thing as the birth of intelligence. For the holding of an end in view and the selecting and organizing out of the natural flux, on the basis of this end, conditions that are means, is intelligence....

It is indeed true that problems are solved only where they arise--namely, in action, in the adjustments of behavior. But, for good or for evil, they can be solved there only with method; and ultimately method is intelligence, and intelligence is method.<sup>63</sup>

...intelligence means operations actually performed in the modification of conditions, including all the guidance that is given by means of ideas, both directly and symbolic.

The statement may sound strange. But it is only a way of saying that the value of any cognitive conclusion depends upon the method by which it is reached, so that the perfecting of method, the perfecting of intelligence, is the thing of supreme value.<sup>64</sup>

Intelligence, then, is not some innate capacity given at birth. It is rather the method by which the organism adapts itself to the environment and by which it adapts the environment to itself. One can speak of an intelligent being then only in so far as that being is capable of a satisfactory method of adaptation. To say that he has intelligence would in this frame of reference mean that he has an intelligent method of solving his problems. Effective intelligence, then, is "insight into the behavior of persons and things, and actual ability to guide present activities in the light of foreseen consequences."<sup>65</sup> It is the method

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<sup>63</sup>John Dewey. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910, pp. 43-44 quoted from John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. Op. cit., pp. 60-61.

<sup>64</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 200.

<sup>65</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. Op. cit., p. 138.

of reflective thinking, the pattern required to resolve a problematic situation into a resolved one.

The experimentalist further regards nature as intelligent to the extent that man, as part of and continuous with nature, exercises intelligent behavior in his interaction with the environment. Nature, considered in its entirety, is the scene of many interactions which produce effects wholly unguided unless man uses intelligence in instituting some change in the process of interaction to produce a foreseen consequence, a consequence being distinguishable from an effect in that the former has the added quality of direction. When an interaction has the added quality of deliberate direction of change, it is intelligent interaction.<sup>66</sup>

This interpretation of intelligence does away with the necessity for conceiving mind and body as two separate entities. Intelligence is a part or a quality of action, of method of handling interacting parts of an environment. Thinking and doing are likewise but two aspects of one and the same thing. Both are important aspects of the process of adjustment. One is as important in intelligent living as the other; neither is subordinate to the other.

Intelligence as intelligent behavior serves an instrumental function in effecting better adjustment to life and its problems. It is functioning effectively when it redirects the process of interaction from a haphazard course to a consequence which will be more fruitful in terms of the purposes the intelligent organism seeks. A further aspect is that intelligence is experimental in the sense that it cannot be certain of success. As method it is tentative; it must be verified by the actual

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<sup>66</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., pp. 214-215.

test made by instituting the conditions prescribed by the idea of the desired consequences. In that it is tentative it permits of modification of method so that more satisfactory results can be attained.<sup>67</sup>

How then do impulse, habit, and intelligence operate together in the experiencing process? Life is a process of interaction with the environment. The organism seeks to maintain a satisfactory equilibrium in this process. Actually there is almost constant interference with it at some point or other. When this disturbance becomes sufficiently confused and obscure, the organism is upset so that it loses its sense of balance in that an outcome is unclear or uncertain. Normally, however, the disturbances seldom reach such a pitch and most activities proceed on a relatively normal course.

When, however, an unexpected or unknown factor enters into the sequential pattern of an habitual activity, the new factor stimulates an impulse which in turn releases another and different activity so as to upset the original activity and bring about some redistribution of its elements. Here is a point of conflict and uncertainty--two courses seem open and only one can be followed. Dewey explains how this problem is resolved:

Now at these moments of a shifting in activity conscious feeling and thought arise and are accentuated. The disturbed adjustment of organism and environment is reflected in a temporary strife which concludes in a coming to terms of the old habit and the new impulse.<sup>68</sup>

Habit has been operating easily and efficiently; it meets a blockage of

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<sup>67</sup>Joseph Justman. Theories of Secondary Education in the United States. Teachers College Contributions to Education, No. 814. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1940, pp. 115-116.

<sup>68</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 179.

some sort, and yet it seeks to maintain its own course. The blockage arouses a counter-movement promoted by an impulse. Thought intervenes to resolve the difficulty by the deliberative method of determining how satisfaction can best be had. Impulses, then, "are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality."<sup>69</sup> Impulses give new direction to an on-going activity and by so doing turn our attention to a new aspect of the situation. They initiate the new activity toward a new effect.

Dewey describes this relationship very aptly when he says:

Impulse defines the peering, the search, the inquiry. It is, in logical language, the movement into the unknown, not into the immense inane of the unknown at large, but into that special unknown which when it is hit upon restores an ordered, unified action. During this search, old habit supplies content, filling, definite, recognizable, subject-matter. It begins as vague presentiment of what we are going towards. As organized habits are definitely deployed and focused, the confused situation takes on form, it is 'cleared up'---the essential function of intelligence. Processes become objects. Without habit there is only irritation and confused hesitation. With habit alone there is a machine-like repetition, a duplicating recurrence of old acts. With conflict of habits and release of impulse there is conscious search.<sup>70</sup>

It seems Dewey regards impulse, habit, and intelligence as instrumental counterparts of several of the steps in the method of inquiry. Impulse performs the function of observation and establishing the facts of the case; habits, as established ways of looking at things, of performing, and making combinations of elements in the environment and as resource material from previously solved problems, supply content and background;

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 130.

while intelligence corresponds more nearly to the discourse stage, that is, the entire process of selection of the facts of the case, of suggestion, idea, hypothesis, and experiment in the pattern of inquiry.

Thinking. Reference has been made to 'thinking' in the handling of material in the process of solving a problem. Dewey's definition of thinking clearly indicates the relationship with the pattern of inquiry, and, of course, the specific kind of thinking he is concerned with is reflective thinking. Thinking, he says, is "that operation in which present facts suggest other facts (or truth) in such a way as to induce belief in what is suggested on the ground of real relation in the things themselves."<sup>71</sup> Thinking is a method of handling the materials in inquiry. But it is 'handling' with a certain qualification, namely, determining from what is present something which is not present but which is reliably signified by what is present. "Reflection is not identical with the mere fact that one thing indicates, means, another thing. It commences when we begin to inquire into the reliability, the worth, of any particular indication...."<sup>72</sup> There must be reasonable ground for the belief that one thing signifies something else. A cloud, for example, may by its shape suggest some animal, but it does not mean an animal for there is no connection between the two beyond the accidental shape of the cloud. A cloud, however, may signify rain because of the inherent bond between the two. "It is an objective connection, the link in actual things, that makes one thing the ground,

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<sup>71</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. New York: D. C. Heath and Company, 1933, p. 12.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

warrant, evidence, for believing in something else."<sup>73</sup> Because of this connection of thinking with rational discourse in the pattern of inquiry, Dewey uses the two terms, thinking and reflection, synonymously.

As thinking relates to education, Dewey says:

The sole direct path to enduring improvement in the methods of instructing and learning consists in centering upon the conditions which exact, promote, and test thinking. Thinking is the method of intelligent learning, of learning that employs and rewards mind. We speak, legitimately enough, about the method of thinking, but the important thing to bear in mind about method is that thinking is method, the method of intelligent experience in the course which it takes.<sup>74</sup>

Thus, thinking is method and intelligence is method, that is, we think and are intelligent to the extent that we employ the method of reflection.

Now it may be noted here that "Natural impulses and desires constitute in any case the starting point."<sup>75</sup> But these impulses and desires were arrested and inhibited when impulse initiated the search for data and reflection instituted a reorganization of that data into meaningful relationships in terms of desired outcomes. Left uninhibited and unordered by an intelligent method they would only accidentally accomplish the desired end, if indeed any end had already been foreseen. Thinking in this way postpones action and permits the combination of forces through observation and memory into rather specific plans of action.

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<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>74</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., pp. 179-180.

<sup>75</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. Op. cit., p. 74.

Habits, as was pointed out earlier, conflict with impulse and are also inhibited by thinking. When the testing phase of thought has been completed, habits are also transformed in the process. Dewey explains their function and character when he says:

Developmental behavior shows...that in the higher organisms excitations are so diffusely linked with reactions that the sequel is affected by the state of the organism in relation to environment. In habit and learning the linkage is tightened up not by sheer repetition but by the institution of effective integrated interaction of organic-environing energies--the consummatory close of activities of exploration and search. In organisms of the higher order, the special and more definite pattern of recurrent behavior thus formed does not become completely rigid. It enters as a factorial agency, along with other patterns, in a total adaptive response, and hence retains a certain amount of flexible capacity to undergo further modifications as the organism meets new environing conditions.<sup>76</sup>

Aims. The preceding discussion of intelligent acting and of thinking implies clearly that it is identical with having an aim or a purpose. The distinction is between 'result' and 'aim'. The former represents an activity without an objective, e.g., a leaf blown by the wind moves in position but to no purpose. One place for it to rest is as good as another. Aims, contrariwise, must possess the trait of "intrinsic continuity,"<sup>77</sup> that is, they must order activity into a sequential pattern so as to lead to an objective. And this order must be such, in terms of the process of thinking, that it will lead to a foreseen result. The corollary of this trait is that an aim will give direction to the activity based upon careful observation of the conditions involved in the activity, the ordering of the elements in the situation so as to make selection of the means toward that end possible.

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<sup>76</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>77</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 118.

The fact that an aim is essential to the process of thinking, and therefore also of learning, suggests the futility of the notion of "activity for activity's sake." Good aims, as Dewey calls them, must meet certain criteria: (1) they must arise from existing conditions, from what is already going on; (2) since the process of observation may uncover new materials essential to resolving the problem in hand, aims must be flexible so as to enable adaptation to the new facts; (3) they must represent a freeing of activities in that they permit whatever activities are necessary to continuing the activity successfully.<sup>78</sup>

Forming an aim is comparable to getting an idea. An unsatisfactory condition prevails. There is a wish that it were different. Imagination presents a scene which embodies those features which would be satisfactory. This scene is a fancy, and it becomes an aim "when it is worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization, that is in terms of 'means'."<sup>79</sup>

Mind. It is apparent that acting with an aim is identical with acting intelligently. And acting intelligently means having a mind,

...for mind is precisely intentional purposeful activity controlled by perception of facts and their relationships to one another. To have a mind to do a thing is to foresee a future possibility; it is to have a plan for its accomplishment; it is to note the means which make the plan capable of execution and the obstructions in the way,--or, if it is really a mind to do the thing and not a vague aspiration--it is to have a plan which takes account of resources and difficulties. Mind is capacity to refer present conditions to future results, and future consequences to present conditions.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup>Ibid., pp. 121-124.

<sup>79</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 234.

<sup>80</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 120.



Acting with an aim, intelligently, and having a mind to do something means acting with a meaning, doing something and seeing the meaning of things in terms of that intent. Hence, mind is not an entity, a part of the body, which is to be filled with information; it is acting with a purpose, acting intelligently.

The conception of mind as a purely isolated possession of the self is at the very antipodes of truth. The self achieves mind in the degree in which knowledge of things is incarnate in the life about him; the self is not a separate mind building up knowledge anew on its own account.<sup>81</sup>

Mind arises in the process of experiencing. It is not something given at birth, as are arms and legs. Precisely what this mind will become is dependent upon the conditions out of which it arises. Likewise, how one acts and thinks is contingent upon the environment in which that thinking or acting originates. It is not something, therefore, with pre-determined limits and restrictions. Childs explains:

...mind itself is something built in the very process of experiencing. Since experience is in and of the world of men and things, our minds are also continuous with these objective materials. Had our environments been different, our experiences would have been different. Had our experiences been different, our minds would also have been different. In short, to live differently is to think differently.<sup>82</sup>

Consciousness. In this process of intelligent method Dewey observes that the organism is 'conscious' of what it is about. At the point of conflict between the course habit seeks to take and that course which impulse is impelling the organism to take, the organism becomes conscious of the difficulties it is facing. "Now at these moments of a

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p. 344.

<sup>82</sup> John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism.  
Op. cit., p. 9.

shifting in activity conscious feeling and thought arise and are accentuated."<sup>83</sup> The organism does not act in a mechanical stimulus-response fashion, but it takes stock deliberately of what it must do to regain equilibrium in the difficult situation at hand. Again this trait is associated with the activity of problem-solving. Dewey elaborates:

To be conscious is to be aware of what we are about; conscious signifies the deliberate, observant, planning traits of activity. Consciousness is nothing which we have which gazes idly on the scene around one or which has impressions made upon it by physical things; it is a name for the purposeful quality of an activity, for the fact that it is directed by an aim. Put the other way about, to have an aim is to act with meaning, not like an automatic machine; it is to mean to do something and to perceive the meaning of things in the light of that intent.<sup>84</sup>

Capacity and Individual Differences. In accordance with the interpretation of intelligence, thinking, and mind as already described, the experimentalists seem unwilling to engage seriously in the nature-versus-nurture controversy. Since their point of view is naturalistic, they accord considerable significance to the influence of cultural conditions upon the infant. This is not to say that they deny native endowment to that infant. Since education is growth and development, Dewey, asserting that there must be something from which growth may germinate, continues, "There must be a native stock, or capital, of resources; we cannot force the power to think upon any creature that does not first think spontaneously, 'naturally', as we say."<sup>85</sup> "The child has specific powers...."<sup>86</sup> Thus, he assumes that each infant is born with his given capacity for intelligent behavior.

<sup>83</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 179.

<sup>84</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 121.

<sup>85</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>86</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 59.

On the other hand, a major emphasis seems to be given to the sustaining nurture provided by the specific environment in which the organism develops. The opportunity for growth of that innate capacity is also important. In fact, while recognizing that each individual has his own native capacity, which is not exactly duplicable by any other individual, Childs expresses the idea that

...such organic uniqueness as is given at birth by no means predetermines the sort of mature individual the child is to become. Innumerable different adult selves are all genuine possibilities in the normal native equipment of any child. Which of these potential selves is actually to be realized depends upon the specific educative experiences to which the organic capacities are subjected.<sup>87</sup>

Nurture, however, has the dominant hand in determining the extent of growth. In interpreting their point of view Justman states that the influence of the environment is of major importance when he says:

Every human being inherently possesses the capacity to 'know' to 'understand' experience and the capacity, therefore, for intelligent behavior. That is what makes him, rather than any other kind of being, a human being. Individuals differ among themselves in the extent to which they can direct and control their experience, but all possess an initial capacity. The extent to which they ultimately obtain this power is not determined by heredity, but is a functioning of the experiencing process--of the experiences they have, of the manner in which they deal with these experiences, of the meanings that they obtain, and of the manner in which they use these meanings subsequently.<sup>88</sup>

Childs elaborates on this same point by saying:

The individual acquires most of his meanings through communication with the members of his cultural group, and through participation in their established activities. If such activities are rich in the number and variety of meanings they incorporate, the individual with an average capacity to learn will in time probably achieve a valuable equipment of meanings by sharing in the activities of his group.

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<sup>87</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism.  
Op. cit., p. 137.

<sup>88</sup>Joseph Justman. Theories of Secondary Education in the United States.  
Op. cit., p. 193.

On the other hand, if the activities of one's group afford meager 'weighted stimuli', the individual nurtured on these meager stimuli will achieve a meager mind no matter how excellent his native endowments may be.<sup>89</sup>

This point of view denies the inheritance of fixed and immutable qualities of mind and capacity. "The inherited nature of a creature is not immutable---it is whatever it becomes through the process of living and learning."<sup>90</sup> They do not go so far as to say, however, that no limits are set by nature. Childs states on this point:

The more knowledge that we accumulate about human beings and the processes by which they develop, the more we are confident that the patterns of human nature are neither uniquely given at birth nor do they automatically develop by a process of the unfolding of a pre-formed self. Inherited factors set broad limits for the growth of the individual human being, but evidence from a variety of sources--biological, psychological, and anthropological--indicates that a wide range of possibilities lies within these native determinants..<sup>91</sup>

The experimentalists, therefore, have little concern with intelligence testing in order to measure individual differences. In fact, Dewey says,

How one person's abilities compare in quantity with those of another is none of the teacher's business. It is irrelevant to his work. What is required is that every individual shall have opportunities to employ his own powers in activities that have meaning.<sup>92</sup>

Allport, in discussing Dewey's individual psychology comments significantly:

Here we must comment on Dewey's lack of interest in capacity psychology. Intelligence testing concerns him not at all. Anyone is capable of thinking and so improving his adaptations and mastery within his environment. A pupil labelled as hopeless, he points

<sup>89</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. Op. cit., p. 138.

<sup>90</sup>John L. Childs. Education and Morals. Op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>92</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 203.

out, may react in a quick and lively fashion when the thing in hand seems to him worth while. He has likewise written, 'Barring physical defect or disease, slowness and dullness in all directions are comparatively rare.' (How We Think, 35) There is no homogeneous faculty of thought nor any uniform power of intelligence that would, because of differential possession, make education for some pupils unnecessary and for others worthless. In short, individual differences in capacity are of far less consequence than is the fact that everyone can be taught to think more effectively than he does.<sup>93</sup>

Interest. Dewey, characteristically, ties up his view on interest with on-going activities. He distinguishes the attitude of a spectator from that of the person who 'has an interest' in an activity. The former has no preferences as to the outcome of the activity while the latter "is bound up with what is going on; its outcome makes a difference to him."<sup>94</sup> Practically, the attitude of the latter person is that of a participant with these two characteristics: "...there is solicitude, anxiety concerning future consequences, and a tendency to act to assure better, and avert worse, consequences."<sup>95</sup> An interested person is one who is concerned about what an activity may do to him and he is eager to act in such a way as to secure a desired outcome. Interest and aim are connected in the continuity of the same activity, but each from a different point of view.

Such words as aim, intent, and, emphasize the results which are wanted and striven for; they take for granted the personal attitude of solicitude and attentive eagerness. Such words as interest,

<sup>93</sup>Gordon W. Allport. "Dewey's Individual and Social Psychology," in The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. Op. cit., fn., p. 277. Note: The quotation from Dewey's How We Think is in the 1910 edition. In the 1933 revision it reads, "Barring physical defect or impaired health, slowness and dullness in all directions are comparatively rare." P. 42.

<sup>94</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 140.

<sup>95</sup>Loc. cit.

affection, concern, motivation, emphasize the bearing of what is foreseen upon the individual's fortunes, and his active desire to secure a possible result.<sup>96</sup>

Interest involves an interaction of a person with an active environment with whose outcome he is vitally concerned.

Literally the word 'interest' means something which 'lies between', a connecting link between two things remote from each other. Educationally speaking, this distance may be a temporal distance, specifically the distance in growth between the initial stages and the final stages of consummation. Again Dewey's succinct statement presents the matter clearly:

In learning, the present powers of the pupil are the initial stage; the aim of the teacher represents the remote limit. Between the two lie means--that is middle conditions:--acts to be performed; difficulties to be overcome; appliances to be used. Only through them, in the literal time sense, will the initial activities reach a satisfactory consummation.<sup>97</sup>

The problem of interest in the classroom, according to this view, is for the teacher to discover such objects and methods of doing things which have some relation to the present powers and attitudes of the student. When material has to be made interesting, either the connection of the material with present activities is lacking or it lies concealed from the student. The simple expedient is to lead the student to recognize this connection between this material and his activities. On the other hand, "to make it interesting by extraneous and artificial inducements deserves all the bad names which have been applied to the doctrine

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<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 149.

of interest in education."<sup>98</sup> The remedy lies not in activity alone but in activity which meets certain qualifications.

Discovery of typical modes of activity, whether play or useful occupations, in which individuals are concerned, in whose outcome they recognize they have something at stake, and which cannot be carried through without reflection and use of judgment to select materials of observation and recollection, is the remedy.<sup>99</sup>

Discipline. Activities take time, effort, and concentration. He who persists in an activity by seeing it through all of its stages from realization of difficulty to resolution is said to have 'will'. This persistence includes the meeting of obstacles, the framing of ideas and ends in as clear a fashion as possible, and sufficient patience to wait for the action to be consummated as a test of the idea. A person who can thus persist in a course of action in spite of obstacles, who can deliberately continue in an activity, is said to be disciplined. Discipline is thus viewed as a positive power instead of the usual conception of physical punishment administered by the teacher whose orders have been defied.

A person who is trained to consider his actions, to undertake them deliberately, is in so far forth disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen course in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have the essence of discipline. Discipline means power at command; mastery of the resources available for carrying through the action undertaken. To know what one is to do and to move to do it promptly and by use of the requisite means is to be disciplined, whether we are thinking of an army or a mind. Discipline is positive.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 156.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 151.

The relationship between interest and discipline is thus not to be sought far afield. The processes of deliberation and concentration will be perfunctory and superficial without interest in the outcome. Students shy away from thinking about something which has no perceptible connection with their living. Such materials have no relation to them and do not touch them. They may act to satisfy superimposed requirements but with only a minimum of effort and with even that minimum begrudgingly given. Furthermore, persistence at the task, discipline, in other words, also suffers along with the quality of response. The student without an interest in an assignment will probably take the first opportunity to find an excuse for not doing that assignment and instead engage in an extraneous 'mischievous' activity. Dewey concludes his observations upon this phase of the question by saying: "Interest measures --or rather is--the depth of the grip which the for-seen end has upon one in moving one to act for its realization."<sup>101</sup>

Motivation. The experimentalist point of view on motivation rests squarely upon the assumption that man is an active being, that he cannot help acting. As a consequence he needs no motive for acting. "It is absurd to ask what induces a man to activity generally speaking. He is an active being and that is all there is to be said on that score."<sup>102</sup> He therefore rejects the view that such drives, as they are now commonly called, as anger, hunger, sex are motives although he grants that hunger

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 152.

<sup>102</sup> John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 119.



is an "unqualified natural impulse"<sup>103</sup> to a starving man. The reason for rejecting them is that anger, for example, varies for the same individual from situation to situation and upon the condition of the organism at the time, this condition never being twice alike. Besides, to speak of them in this way is an over-simplification of the facts in the case, since such classification involves transforming "social results into psychic causes."<sup>104</sup>

However, the question of motive is important when a teacher, for example, seeks to have a student act in a specific way, to have him direct his activity in a specific direction. In this sense, then, a motive is "that element in the total complex of a man's activity which, if it can be sufficiently stimulated, will result in an act having specified consequences."<sup>105</sup> When a parent praises or censures a child for a particular manner of eating, the praise or censure constitutes that element which will tend to reinforce that kind of action pattern. "A motive does not exist prior to an act and produce it. It is an act plus a judgment upon some element of it, the judgment being made in the light of the consequences of the act."<sup>106</sup> When this pattern of acting is thus evaluated by the actor, he recalls the response of others to it. This "inchoate activity taken in this forward-looking reference to results, especially results of approbation and condemnation, constitutes a motive."<sup>107</sup>

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., pp. 152-153.

<sup>104</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>106</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

This description indicates that a "motive...is simply an impulse viewed as a constituent in habit, a factor in disposition."<sup>108</sup> Its results, tempered by previously established and applicable habits, are a plan of action which, when put into operation, produce knowledge which retroacts upon the old habit so as to modify it. For this reason, and because there are as many motives as there are impulses, it is not satisfactory to lump motives into a few small classifications, the experimentalists believe.

Dewey's view is clearly a move far afield from the usual concept of motives in that it does away with the mechanistic classificatory approach and so seems, according to Allport, "built not upon solid rock but upon shifting sand."<sup>109</sup> Allport admits, however, that, while it may lack the incisiveness of other psychologists, "he may yet perceive more clearly than they the infinite variety of ways in which man can accomplish his primary task of adapting and growing within the surrounding world."<sup>110</sup> He continues to criticize the theory, though, on the ground that it seems to undermine the stability of personality. He says in the same context that Dewey seems not to have given ample consideration to the durableness of either interests or habits. This comment again points out that Dewey never wholly worked out his psychological concepts into any sort of systematic picture. Many points remain unclear for that reason. All one knows is what he said; beyond that

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>109</sup> Gordon W. Allport, "Dewey's Individual and Social Psychology." in The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. Op. cit., p. 275.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 276.

only inference, based upon a complete understanding of the philosophical point of view in so far as it is systematic, is possible.

Retention and Forgetting. Dewey frequently refers to memory as a kind of backlog of resource material for suggestions. He seems unconcerned about it beyond that; he seems to take it for granted.

With regard to forgetting, he makes this comment: "When knowledge is cut off from use in giving meaning to what is blind and baffling, it drops out of consciousness entirely or else becomes an object of aesthetic contemplation."<sup>111</sup> This point of view is reminiscent of Thorndike's Law of Disuse.<sup>112</sup>

Transfer of Training. Dewey rejects the notion of transfer as propounded in faculty psychology when he says, "...the more specialized the reaction, the less is the skill acquired in practicing and perfecting it transferable to other modes of behavior."<sup>113</sup> By the same token he also rejects the theory of the transfer of common elements within the old and new situations.<sup>114</sup>

He does not deny, however, the possibility of the applicability of broad adaptations from one situation to another. Even this can occur only because of widely extensive experiences. He comments:

But the wider the context--that is to say, the more varied the stimuli and responses coordinated--the more the ability acquired

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<sup>111</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op.cit., p. 397.

<sup>112</sup>Ernest R. Hilgard. Theories of Learning. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948, p. 23.

<sup>113</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 75.

<sup>114</sup>Ernest R. Hilgard. Theories of Learning. Op. cit., p. 71.

is available for the effective performance of other acts; not, strictly speaking, because there is any 'transfer', but because the wide range of factors employed in the specific act is equivalent to a broad range of activity, to a flexible, instead of to a narrow and rigid, coordination.<sup>115</sup>

One may be an authority in a particular field and yet of more than usually poor judgment in matters not closely allied, unless the training in the special field has been of a kind to ramify into the subject matter of the other fields.<sup>116</sup>

The Point of View. On the basis of what has been said thus far it may appear that the psychology of Dewey, so far as it deals with impulse at least, is a thoroughgoing behaviorism. Dewey admits that fundamentally within his view of the experiential continuum, wherein one act may follow another in somewhat serial fashion, wherein observed materials arouse suggestions, wherein a difficulty arouses an impulse which may run counter to established habit, "the psychological theory involved is a form of Behaviorism."<sup>117</sup> Yet he does not accept a mechanical behaviorism in toto; in fact, he has a different interpretation of it altogether.

He explains that a response is an answer to a stimulus, the latter not merely exciting an activity, but also directing it to an object. There is an interaction between the stimulating object and the perceiving and responding organism such that mutual adaptation takes place. The organ of perception will perceive in its distinctive way under such appropriate conditions as enable it to perceive. Hence, "the stimulus is but a condition of the fulfillment of the proper function of the

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<sup>115</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>117</sup>John Dewey. "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. Op. cit., p. 555.

organ, not an outside interruption."<sup>118</sup> Thus, it merely helps the perceiving organ do what it is in the process of doing or tending to do anyway.

The response, however, is not merely a blind response, mechanical, and irresponsible, but rather a response in terms of the meaning of the stimulus. He objects to the highly mechanical type of S-R theory on this very point when he says:

...a person learns by merely having the qualities of things impressed upon his mind through the gateway of the senses. Having received a store of sensory impressions, association or some power of mental synthesis is supposed to combine them into ideas--into things with a meaning. ...But as matter of fact, it is the characteristic use to which the thing is put, because of its specific qualities, which supplies the meaning with which it is identified.<sup>119</sup>

A simple response to a stimulus is purely physical, not intelligent.

The difference between an adjustment to a physical stimulus and a mental act is that the latter involves response to a thing in its meaning; the former does not. ... when things have a meaning for us, we mean (intend, propose) what we do: <sup>120</sup>when they do not, we act blindly, unconsciously, unintelligently.

Bode explains this reciprocal adaptation of stimulus to response when he says, "Our pedestrian does not first see the objects and then respond to them..., but he sees them in terms of the responses that he makes to them."<sup>121</sup> This is also another way of saying that the response is determined, not blindly, but by the meaning the stimulus is deemed to have. It is thus a relative affair of an element within a total situational field.

<sup>118</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>119</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., pp. 34-35.

<sup>120</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>121</sup>Boyd Henry Bode. How We Learn. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1940, p. 219.

Dewey also observes that when habits become too automatic they result in automatic action and that when this process has gone to the extreme, it is called absent-mindedness. "Stimulus and response are mechanically linked together in an unbroken chain. Each successive act facilely evoked by its predecessor pushes us automatically into the next act of a predetermined series."<sup>122</sup> Habits then control the organism. He voices his objection more specifically when he comments:

In the first place, behavior is not viewed as something taking place in the nervous system or under the skin of an organism but always, directly or indirectly, in obvious overtness or at a distance through a number of intervening links, an interaction with environing conditions. In the second place, other human beings who are also acculturated are involved in the interaction, including even persons at a great distance in space and time, because of what they have done in making the direct environment what it is.<sup>123</sup>

The first of these two points, that action is really interaction, emphasizes the totality and wholeness of interaction, rather than representing a dualism of environment and organism. The organism-as-a-whole responds to the situation-as-a-whole rather than that an element responds to an element. The naturalistic view that a man is part and parcel of nature, that he is continuous with nature, precludes this kind of separation. The second emphasizes the fact that experience is all of one piece. One problem solved produces knowledge which will be useful in another problem at a future date. The sum total of previous experiences is available now as resource material in the solution of present problems. Responses of previous individuals to the environment

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<sup>122</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 173.

<sup>123</sup>John Dewey. "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. Op. cit., p. 555.

and their modifications of it are also involved in what serves as a stimulus in present conditions.

These two objections imply the orderliness and serial nature of human activity as it moves from difficulty toward resolution. To determine what activity shall be instituted it is necessary to arrange the facts of the case in such a manner that the desired result will be accomplished. This process requires reflection, thinking, not merely an undelayed response to a stimulus. The typical stimulus-response mechanism is an over-simplification of what intelligent activity, according to the experimentalist, requires. On the other hand, another element is implied by this same serial and orderly nature of human activity. This is that thinking has a very definite place in the process. Through thinking this order is established. The organism is conscious of its own activity and thus "it is able to take more things into account, to display greater flexibility in its activity, to define more adequately the ends for which it is striving, and to utilize and create better means for the realization of those ends."<sup>124</sup> For Dewey, behavior is purposive, not merely a temporal pattern of stimulus-response sequences. A further point by the same author is that reflection begins with a problematic situation and moves toward a resolution. He explains:

Reflection starts with a difficulty--with a block in activity. It arises from a situation that is experienced as a problem. In other words, it is not the presence of an adequate stimulus, but the absence of stimulus adequate to produce an overt response that initiates reflection.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>124</sup>John L. Griggs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism.  
Op. cit., pp. 211-212.

<sup>125</sup>Loc. cit.

Now thinking is the active search for stimulus adequate and appropriate in its meaning so that the action can go forward toward a purposed goal. 'Meaning' is, in fact, so important to the experimentalist point of view that the terms 'means' and 'consequences,' referring to intelligent and purposeful activity, are suggested as better terms than are 'stimulus' and 'response'.<sup>126</sup> On this point Dewey's psychology differs from behaviorism, for the latter tries to explain activity without considering the reason for the activity. If Guthrie's continuous conditioning may be taken as representative of the earlier theories of behaviorism, then a comment of Hilgard effectively points up this difference:

Concepts like "insight" are handled in a derisive manner, although it is recognized that learning with foresight of its consequences may occur. The tendency is to talk down such learning, however, just as Thorndike does, and to emphasize the stupid, mechanical, and repetitious nature of most human as well as animal learning. Such learning with intention and foresight as does occur is explained on the basis of conditioned anticipatory or readiness reactions, based upon past experience and hence not contradicting association principles.<sup>127</sup>

The stimulus-response type of psychology, then, is considered inadequate for the experimentalist point of view in that it is an oversimplification of what happens in intelligent behavior, in that it is too mechanical a conception of behavior, and in that it omits consciousness of behavior, conscious purpose in behavior, and reflection from intelligent activity, even though certain aspects, for example, the existence of a stimulus-response type of relationship, impulsive behavior, are admitted and frequently used in discussing various phases of human activity.

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<sup>126</sup>Ernest R. Hilgard. Theories of Learning. Op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., p. 71.



In some respects the psychology of experimentalism favors the point of view of the field theories in psychology. Both accept, at least the latter do not deny, consciousness as opposed to the largely mechanical impressions of connections in behaviorism. In the field theories this aspect is called insight and seems to correspond fairly well with what Dewey calls rational discourse in the problem solving pattern.<sup>128</sup> Both emphasize that the learning situation is one which involves a problem to be solved.<sup>129</sup> Dewey says that the conclusion of an experience will create something new which will serve as a stimulus to reshape that experience into a somewhat different meaning. This is strangely similar to the "trace" theory of new learning in Gestalt psychology. The main features of this trace theory are:

1. Some processes are directly dependent upon stimuli. When such stimuli are presented a second time, the processes differ from those present the first time because the stimuli have been reacted to before. ...
2. Processes may undergo transformations within a single sustained presentation. ...
3. Some processes are transformed by their consequences. ... Once success is achieved the process leading to success is transformed. It has a new meaning, a new role in the goal-directed activity.<sup>130</sup>

Both agree that trial-and-error fumbling with a confused situation may precede the point at which insight takes place and becomes effective in working out the solution to a problem.<sup>131</sup> Both agree that transfer--the field theorists prefer to call it 'transposition'--happens to the

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<sup>128</sup>Ibid., pp. 190-193.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>130</sup>Ibid., pp. 187-188.

<sup>131</sup>Ibid., pp. 191-192.

extent that meaning or relationships are common to each situation.<sup>132</sup> Both insist that effective thinking or intelligence occurs to the extent that there is understanding as opposed to blind application of formulae or immediate response to impulses.<sup>133</sup>

The difficulty in classifying experimentalism psychologically is that Dewey never explicitly formulated his ideas in any systematic fashion.<sup>134</sup> Hilgard speaks of experimentalism as a subdivision of functionalism and says of it, "Functionalism is empiricist rather than systematic."<sup>135</sup> Later he says, "The disadvantage of an extreme empiricism and relativism lies in its lack of articulating principles to cut across empirical laws."<sup>136</sup> It is eclectic without special preference for any one position and without feeling obligated to defend its choice from any source.

Summary. Interaction with environment constitutes life and results in growth if the activity involved grows directly out of ongoing affairs and requires an active search for means by which difficulties can be overcome. The child is a social being and interacts also with the society of which he is a part. Through interaction with both his human and physical environment he is inducted into society or is educated. Hence, growth is equivalent to education. A school is designed to initiate the

<sup>132</sup>Ibid., p. 194. See also p. 205.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>134</sup>John Dewey. "Experience, Knowledge, and Value: A Rejoinder." In The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. Op. cit., p. 554.

<sup>135</sup>Ernest R. Hilgard. Theories of Learning. Op. cit., p. 172.

<sup>136</sup>Loc. cit.

immature into adults ways in a planned and efficient manner. Learning occurs through the process of solving problems growing out of interacting with an environment. As a method it follows the pattern of inquiry from instituting and defining a problem to testing and revising an hypothesis if the outcome of experiment warrants reconstruction. Knowledge is a problem solved or the result of inquiry. A person is intelligent in the degree he has a facility in resolving difficulties. He thinks as he handles materials in inquiry, and he develops mind as he becomes able to see the reciprocal relation between present conditions and future consequences. Intellectual ability and process are intimately connected with the method of inquiry so that the customary dichotomy between body and mind or intelligence is unnecessary. Individual differences are important but more significant for the teacher is the fact that everyone can be taught to think better than he does think. Students will be interested in school activity if they apprehend the connection between such activity and matters important to them. Discipline, instead of being rigid order and quietude so commonly required in the classroom, is the power to see inquiry through to completion. Motive, too, concerns inquiry; a motive is an act plus a judgment of the consequences of that act. Forgetting occurs through disuse of knowledge. Transfer is possible in that broad adaptations can be made as a result of wide experience.

## CHAPTER IV

### DEWEY'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE

Chapter Two explained some of the basic assumptions upon which the philosophy of experimentalism is constructed and then described the essential framework upon which the inferences and implications depend--the pattern of inquiry. Chapter Three explained what knowledge is and how it may be attained within, through and as a result of the pattern of inquiry. The present chapter will reiterate some of those pertinent assumptions so as to establish a basis upon which to explain the origin of language as Dewey conceives of it and then pursue some of the implications involved so far as they apply to use in general and to education with certain additional particularity.

Background Assumptions. It will be recalled that Dewey considers man as part and parcel of nature, that he is in and of nature, that he is continuous with it, and that his life consists largely of the process of interacting with it. Man interacts with his environment for the purpose of adapting to it and of adapting it to himself and to his purposes so that the ends he conceives as being desirable may better be accomplished through this reciprocal interaction. He is an active being and as such is constantly striving to secure his life against the uncertainties of nature which in itself constitutes an on-going process of change from its present state to something different. It is not certain what the outcome of the process of change will be, but man is the beneficiary of its results whether favorable or unfavorable. He must interact with

it, and to the degree that he interacts intelligently with it, i.e., after examining the component elements in a situation and framing ideas as to what outcome he would prefer to see eventuate and so instituting the necessary changes and modifications so as the more probably to bring about those desired changes, to that degree he is able to exercise some control over nature and adapt on-going change to his needs. Within this pattern of change, experience and interaction, language has a distinct place and performs various significant functions.

For Dewey, however, the term 'language' is more inclusive than merely words, either oral or written. He explains that "...language includes more than oral and written speech. Gestures, pictures, monuments, visual images, finger movements--anything deliberately and artificially employed as a sign is, logically, language."<sup>1</sup> On another occasion he amplifies this idea and says, "...language is taken in its widest sense, a sense wider than oral and written speech. It includes the latter. But it includes also not only gestures but rites, ceremonies, monuments, and the products of industrial and fine arts."<sup>2</sup> In this broader sense, then, language may be almost anything which has a representative function as a sign of something else. He does make a distinction between natural and artificial signs and classifies 'verbal' language as artificial. This distinction will be elaborated upon below.

Language--Its Origin and Status. Man, active and interacting, utters groans and other sounds and he gestures and points. From these

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<sup>1</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1922, pp. 230-231.

<sup>2</sup>John Dewey. Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938, p. 46.

coarse beginnings language developed. "Language, signs and significance, come into existence not by intent and mind but by over-flow, by-products, in gestures and sound. The story of language is the story of the use made of these occurrences; a use that is eventual, as well as eventful."<sup>3</sup> There is nothing ideal or extra-worldly about the origin of language in this view; language grew out of man's necessary experiencing and interacting. When these groans were perceived as distinct and indicative of specific phases of behavior, language was there. "These vocalizations are perceived and sorted out so that certain parts of the organic over-flow of activity represent certain aspects of adjustive behavior."<sup>4</sup>

He explains the unintentional aspect of the origin of language in another instance by saying:

Men did not intend language; they did not have social objects consciously in view when they began to talk, nor did they have grammatical and phonetic principles before them by which to regulate their efforts at communication. These things came after the fact and because of it. Language grew out of unintelligent babblings, instinctive motions called gestures, and the pressure of circumstance.<sup>5</sup>

Yet mere sounds and mere gestures in themselves do not constitute language. If they did, the lower animals through their cries and shrieks might better be able to communicate with one another than man. These signs, whether visual or auditory, became language "...only when used within a context of mutual assistance and direction. The latter are alone of importance in considering the transformation of organic gestures

<sup>3</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Nature. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1925, p. 175.

<sup>4</sup>Alfred S. Clayton. "Dewey's Theory of Language with Some Implications for Educational Theory." In Essays for John Dewey's Ninetieth Birthday. Ed. Kenneth D. Benne and Wm. O. Stanley. Urbana, Illinois: Bureau of Research and Service, College of Education, University of Illinois, 1950, p. 42.

<sup>5</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922, p. 79.

and cries into names, things with significance, or the origin of language."<sup>6</sup> Dewey explains further that this signalling, as he calls it, has significance for the observer as when an infant cries as an overflow; this cry has no intent beyond itself but is interpreted by a devoted mother as having a meaning. The infant has no purpose in terms of securing something and its crying, if it did not serve as a stimulus to an observer, would not constitute language as Dewey conceives of it. It is a condition that has to be fulfilled but it is not a sufficient condition.

This sufficient condition is that mutual communication is established between the actor and the observer. The actor, that is, the person who utters a sound or makes a gesture, does it intentionally and with a purpose and the observer of that sound or gesture responds in terms of the actor's point of view. If the observer responds as the actor indicates, there is understanding, there is sharing of the same idea, there is communication. Only then can it be said that language is being used. Dewey explains:

Such is the essence and import of communication, signs and meaning. Something is literally made common in at least two different centres of behavior. To understand is to anticipate together, it is to make a cross-reference which, when acted upon, brings about a partaking in a common, inclusive, undertaking.<sup>7</sup>

A sharing of the meaning of such signs by both actor and observer is essential for signs to be language. This meaning attached to a sign distinguishes human from animal behavior. Meaning is thus something belonging to the behavior in question. "But the behavior of which it is a

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<sup>6</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Nature. Op. cit., p. 176.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 178.

quality is a distinctive behavior; cooperative, in that response to another's act involves contemporaneous response to a thing as entering into the other's behavior, and this upon both sides."<sup>8</sup> It is apparent that language is "...a strictly biological mode of behavior, emerging in natural continuity from earlier organic activities, while, on the other hand, it compels one individual to take the standpoint of other individuals and to see and inquire from a standpoint that is not strictly personal but is common to them as participants or 'parties' in a joint undertaking."<sup>9</sup>

What language or set of symbols or signs a particular individual uses is dependent upon the cultural conditions in which he is reared. An infant will learn the signs and symbols of those about him if he is to enter into any real communication with them. To build up an individual system of symbols, as small children sometimes do, is too impractical for purposes of communication; it is much more convenient to adopt the symbols in common use by those with whom a person comes into contact. The meaning of symbols must be established between those engaging in communication. Without common meanings there is misunderstanding. Dewey explains this feature in relation to differing cultures in saying:

...the meaning is established by agreements of different persons in existential activities having reference to existential consequences. The particular existential sound or mark that stands for dog or justice in different cultures is arbitrary or conventional in the sense that although it has causes there are no reasons for it. But in so far as it is a medium of communication, its meaning

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>9</sup>John Dewey. Logic., Op. cit., p. 46.



is common, because it is constituted by existential conditions. If a word varies in meaning in intercommunication between different cultural groups, then to that degree communication is blocked and misunderstanding results. Indeed, there ceases to be communication until variations of understanding can be translated, through the meaning of words, into a meaning that is the same to both parties.<sup>10</sup>

Many cultures have their own language, a language often peculiar only to their own particular culture. And so language "...is itself a cultural institution, and, from one point of view, is but one among many such institutions."<sup>11</sup>

Language then has a physical existence of its own. It consists of sounds, marks, a statue, or a machine. "For symbols and language are objective events in human experience."<sup>12</sup> However, when any symbol is used as a symbol, it is not its physical existence that bears the signifiatory power but rather the fact that it operates in communication as representative of something else or as a meaning.

The particular physical existence which has meaning is, in the case of speech, a conventional matter. But the convention or common consent which sets it apart as a means of recording and communicating meaning is that of agreement in action; of shared modes of responsive behavior and participation in their consequences.<sup>13</sup>

Lest there be confusion about language, in particular as it relates to verbal language, Dewey distinguishes between 'sign' and 'symbol'. 'Sign' refers to natural events or objects as signs, as smoke is a sign of fire or a cloud may be a sign that it will rain. 'Symbol' he reserves for designating artificial signs such as words, numbers, oral sounds.

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 234.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

This distinction does not imply that either is subordinate to the other, for as signs both function as indications of something else.<sup>14</sup>

Natural signs have their limitations in terms of efficient living and thinking. They tend to distract attention from the thing designated to themselves and may lead to misunderstanding. They occur only when they occur and at other times man would be without the meanings they signify; he has to wait for nature to present them. Finally, since they were not originally intended to be signs, many are large and unwieldy so as to make any kind of manipulation difficult. Artificial signs, symbols, have several advantages in their favor. Since their value as physical objects is slight, attention may well be focused upon their value as signs of something else. Their presence is possible at any time since their production is under man's control. Man cannot easily make a cloud, but he can make the sound or write the word as he pleases. Finally, artificial signs are small, easily handled, convenient. Compared with a gesture, phonation is a very small matter and requires a minimum of effort. For purposes of dealing in ideation, then, natural signs are far too inconvenient and cumbersome and symbols more desirable.<sup>15</sup>

Now the efficient use of language necessitates that the same word should have relatively the same meaning to all people. Granted that there is much misunderstanding between people, yet there is much stability of meaning, a necessity for effective communication. As a matter of fact,

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>15</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., pp. 231-233.

...the social necessity of meanings that are the same for two persons in spite of differences in their experiences and their conditions of life is one of the chief forces in standardizing meanings. ...Each of our entire list of common nouns always refers to the same objects, in spite of differences of place, time, and other conditions of experience.<sup>16</sup>

Dewey does not deny, of course, that it is possible to shift the meaning of a symbol in the course of a discussion. The obvious remedy is to take stock of the new meaning and be sure that all parties to the common discussion are aware of the new or revised meaning currently in use. It is not possible to have a strictly correlative relationship between a word and that which it represents. Dewey specifically emphasizes this precaution about language in saying that "...there is not possible any such thing as a direct one-to-one correspondence of names with existential objects; that words mean what they mean in connection with conjoint activities that effect a common, or mutually participated in, consequence."<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, words as individual words in isolation are not a part of a language. "Any word or phrase has the meaning which it has only as a member of a constellation of related meanings."<sup>18</sup> Words are part of an extensive system of symbols and can function in a representative capacity only in conjunction with other members of that system. They are **part** of a cohesive system made possible by the activities of a group, by the customs, institutions, and interests of a group. Dewey calls such a system common sense as distinguished from science. In the

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>17</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

latter, language must be examined and tested for its express relation to other members of the system. Scientific language is intellectual, precise, and its "meanings are related to one another in inference and discourse" and "the symbols are such as to indicate the relation."<sup>19</sup> In the former, meanings are not so precise; they contain much that is irrelevant, and many meanings may be inconsistent with one another. Meanings may vary from the various contexts within which they are used, i.e., they mean one thing with relation to conversation on business, something else in a religious situation, and still something else in an educational setting. Scientific language is thus more exact and permits of fewer misunderstandings than does the language of common sense.

The Functions of Language. It was implied above that words have concern with meanings. One function of language then is that it is a repository of meanings. In this connection Dewey says that a word acts as a fence, a label, and a vehicle. As a fence it "puts limits around the meaning, draws it out from the void, makes it stand out as an entity on its own account."<sup>20</sup> It thus circumscribes an area of meaning and restricts its use to that area. As a label it fixes the meaning to itself so that henceforth it represents that meaning and may be reproduced without the presence of that for which it stands. It is admitted that sometimes these meanings may change, but there seems to be sufficient stability to words as labels to enable communication by their use to continue with reasonable facility. As a vehicle language permits

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>20</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 233.

the transfer of a meaning from an old context to a new one.

To be able to use the past to judge and infer the new and unknown implies that, although the past thing has gone, its meaning abides in such a way as to be applicable in determining the character of the new. Speech forms are our great carriers, the easy-running vehicles by which meanings are transported from experiences that no longer concern us to those that are as yet dark and dubious.<sup>21</sup>

Language and Mind. The last statement above has a significant bearing on the emergence of mind. Since Dewey defines mind as "precisely intentional purposeful activity controlled by perception of facts and their relationships to one another,"<sup>22</sup> mind has to do with manipulation of objects according to their meaning in a situation. Transfer of meaning through language and its reapplication in another context of meaning "is the key to all judgment and inference."<sup>23</sup> Meanings are selected and applied; ideas arise and are pursued in dramatic rehearsal of the foreseen consequences; thinking takes place. "Through speech a person dramatically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many roles, not in successive stages of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama. Thus mind emerges."<sup>24</sup> The relationship of language to thinking, to intelligence, to mind is thus clearly indicated. As the stock of meanings increases and becomes available for future use mind grows; action in future becomes more intelligent, thinking becomes more adequate, and the pattern of inquiry more

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 234-235.

<sup>22</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 120.

<sup>23</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 234.

<sup>24</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Nature. Op. cit., p. 170.

complicated in the fact that more data is available for establishing the facts of the case and that more ideas arise relative to possible solutions to the difficulty.

Even more, symbolization effects a change in both the knower and in his relationship with what is known.

The brute events and happenings of organic interaction are converted through the addition of meanings into objects of knowledge. A change occurs in the relationships between organism and events which remakes the basic nature of their interaction. Knowing makes a real difference not only inside the knower but also in the existential field of energy which defines the thing known. New potentialities are unleashed. Mind, the functioning of the organism by means of symbols, creates a new order of energies which was not there before. It is a creative intelligence which emerges within the totally natural order and in so doing changes that order into something that was not there before.<sup>25</sup>

In this same connection Dewey says, "Where communication exists, things in acquiring meaning, thereby acquire representatives, surrogates, signs and implicates, which are infinitely more amenable to management, more permanent and more accommodating, than events in their first estate."<sup>26</sup> Thus experience is transformed into new meanings and relationships so that a new and different conception of them comes into being in the knowing subject. With it comes a new and more adequate appreciation of them such that their import in the affairs of living and inquiry becomes more apparent.

Implied in the above paragraphs is the idea that language makes reasoning possible. It enables inference and conceptualization. Dewey explains:

When events have communicable meaning, they have marks, notations, and are capable of connotation and denotation. They are

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<sup>25</sup>Alfred S. Clayton. "Dewey's Theory of Language." Op. cit., p.42-43.

<sup>26</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Nature. Op. cit., p. 167.

more than mere occurrences; they have implications. Hence inference and reasoning are possible; these operations are reading the message of things, which things utter because they are involved in human associations.<sup>27</sup>

Piatt emphasizes this point in stating, "Granting that reasoning operates with ideas or concepts, it does so only by the manipulation of symbols arranged as terms, propositions, and the like. There is no thought without language behavior."<sup>28</sup> Symbols make groupings of ideas possible so that even these groupings can be related to one another. Words are parts of sentences. To cite Dewey on this point again:

Propositions, sentences bear the same relation to judgments that distinct words, built up mainly by analyzing propositions in their various types, bear to meanings or conceptions; and just as words imply a sentence, so a sentence implies a larger whole of consecutive discourse into which it fits. ... The chief intellectual classifications that constitute the working capital of thought have been built up for us by our mother tongue.<sup>29</sup>

Language--Instrumental and Consummatory. Dewey states further that language is both instrumental as well as consummatory. It is instrumental in that it is "a means of concerted action for an end...."<sup>30</sup> Again he says, "Communication is an exchange which procures something wanted; it involves a claim, appeal, order, direction or request, which realizes want at less cost than personal labor exacts, since it procures the cooperative assistance of others."<sup>31</sup> It is in this sense the medium through and by which a course of action is instigated, directed, and controlled. It is consummatory in that it may be enjoyed

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 174.

<sup>28</sup>Donald A. Piatt. "Dewey's Logical Theory." In The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951, p. 122.

<sup>29</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 235.

<sup>30</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Nature. Op. cit., p. 184.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 183.

for its own sake. "The dance is accompanied by song and becomes the drama; scenes of danger and victory are most fully savored when they are told. Greeting becomes a ceremonial with its prescribed rites."<sup>32</sup> Literary forms and figures of speech are discovered and treasured for their own beauty. Even scientific discourse may have its own fascination despite the fact that abstract thinking is generally regarded as difficult. "In view of the importance of such activities and its objects, it is a priceless gain when it becomes an intrinsic delight. Few would philosophize if philosophic discourse did not have its own inhering fascination."<sup>33</sup>

Language is also the repository for the experiences of the race. Considered in its widest sense, language

is the medium in which culture exists and through which it is transmitted. Phenomena that are not recorded cannot even be discussed. Language is the record that perpetuates occurrences and renders them amenable to public consideration. On the other hand, ideas or meanings that exist only in symbols that are not communicable are fantastic beyond imagination. ... Neither inquiry nor the most formal set of symbols can escape from the cultural matrix in which they live, move and have their being.<sup>34</sup>

Since it is the repository of the experiences of history, it is the chief means of transmitting the culture to later generations. On the one hand, "By it we are led to share vicariously in past human experience, thus widening and enriching the experience of the present."<sup>35</sup> Were it not for this fact, each person would have to experience every-

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 183-184.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 203.

<sup>34</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>35</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 45.



thing for himself directly; there could be no accumulation of experience; man would be in the position of an animal. It is thus a time-binder, tying the present with the past so that previous experience is available to provide information and background for judging proposals about future action. The other facet is that it is a medium of transmission of previous experience. It is the vehicle which is most economical for transmitting information spatially or temporally. It is no wonder, then, that Dewey says of it, "Of all affairs, communication is the most wonderful."<sup>36</sup>

Care in Using Language. Yet the use of language is also fraught with certain dangers and limitations. Dewey observes that linguistic symbols can function in their representative capacity only for such a person as has had the kind of experience to which these meanings are relevant. Unless these experiences have first been undergone, the meanings will to that extent be shallow and lead to only a superficial appreciation. Familiarity with a thing is essential to understanding a meaning. Learning mere words means that there is no significant understanding; "...ability to repeat catch-phrases, cant terms, familiar propositions, gives the conceit of learning and coats the mind with a varnish waterproof to new ideas."<sup>37</sup> A second difficulty is that while new ideas may be derived from reading the writings of others or from listening to their speeches, there is a limit to this process. If such ideas are accepted without the intervention of physical things to which they relate and without pursuing the process of inquiry, mental laziness

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<sup>36</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Nature. Op. cit., p. 160.

<sup>37</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Op. cit., p. 237.

results. This procedure does not further inquiry; it arrests it. Then the ideas of other persons are substitutes for one's own ideas. Dewey adds:

The use of linguistic studies and methods to halt the human mind on the level of the attainments of the past, to prevent new inquiry and discovery, to put the authority of tradition in place of the authority of natural facts and laws, to reduce the individual to a parasite living on the secondhand experience of others--these things have been the source of the reformers' protest against the preeminence assigned to language in schools.<sup>38</sup>

A third difficulty occurs when symbols are manipulated without awareness of what it is they signify. Then they are mere pawns with no attention paid to their worth as bearers of meaning. The assumption accompanying such manipulation seems to be that, by this handling of the words, that which is designated by them is also changed. The result is that symbols are changed and rearranged but there is no accompanying change in the things designated by them. "...words that originally stood for ideas come, with repeated use, to be mere counters; they become physical things to be manipulated according to certain rules or reacted to by certain operations without consciousness of their meaning."<sup>39</sup>

Education and Language. Dewey explains that language has a twofold relationship to the work of the school: on the one hand it is the medium by which all studies are conducted, including the social relationships within the school, and on the other it is a subject of study in and of itself. In the former sense it has several purposes, namely:

The primary motive for language is to influence (through the expression of desire, emotion, and thought) the activity of others; its

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<sup>38</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>39</sup>Loc. cit.

secondary use is to enter into more intimate sociable relations with them; its employment as a conscious vehicle of thought and knowledge is a tertiary, and relatively late, formation.<sup>40</sup>

The problem of the school is to transform language into an intellectual tool so that students can use it with facility and ease. Again Dewey emphasizes this point in this way, "That problem is to direct pupils' oral and written speech, used primarily for practical and social ends, so that gradually it shall become a conscious tool of conveying knowledge and assisting thought."<sup>41</sup>

He further points out that it is a relatively easy matter to encourage a free and spontaneous flow of words, even to establish accepted modes of expression in certain areas of endeavor. This may in some cases be desirable but it is not the important aspect of language usage. What is important is that the student's habits of language usage are so reconstructed and developed that the language is used to express more exactly the ideas he has, to be more precise in his meanings so as to be the more able to receive communication with more specific understanding as well as to communicate more precisely the meanings he himself has.

He says three things are essential if this objective is to be accomplished.<sup>42</sup> The first of these three is to enlarge the vocabulary. Since this enlarging occurs as a result of wide experience either directly or indirectly, through actual contact with persons and things, or through determining the meanings of words from the context in which

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 239.

<sup>41</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 240-246.

they are used, it follows that this area of contact must be broadened. Mere acquaintance is not enough, for it results in what is usually called a passive vocabulary, an acquaintance without a real appreciation for the significance of the word, a reading vocabulary but not an active one capable of being used either in writing or speaking. Such an acquaintance indicates that the word has not become a part of that person and that its meaning is still somewhat unclear. Carelessness and slovenly habits may account for a small stock of words; addiction to the use of substitute words or slang likewise suggests an inert mind or an environment not conducive to enlarging the bounds of a vocabulary. But mere fluency and glibness are also undesirable, for they may indicate a certain familiarity with a limited subject area but do not necessarily assure a real appreciation even of those areas nor do they indicate familiarity with anything beyond the small sphere. Even volubility about the subject matter of one's work in the classroom may suggest that such freedom of expression has its limits within a small area.

The second step necessary to make language an intellectual tool is to make the meanings of words more precise. Words are at first usually vague and general in their meaning because underlying them is but a superficial acquaintance with whatever they represent. These meanings become differentiated and more exact as experience widens so that trees are distinguished as shade trees, fruit trees, as maple, elm, and oak. Growth toward specificity occurs in two directions, one toward more concrete designations of individualized traits, the other toward abstract words designating exact relationships. Both strands must develop for adequacy and fullness. In either case it is not to be assumed that familiarity with a more specific word is the same as having a full

sense of the idea of that word. If that exact idea is grasped, the learning of the word for it, that word which names that shade of meaning and none other, will help to fix the clarity of the idea.

The third step in improving language facility is to form habits of consecutive discourse. It is not enough to select and differentiate individual words. For effective communication it is necessary to fashion the words into phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, and even larger units. With this facility persons may perform the task of inquiry and reasoning by manipulation of symbols. Only with this facility can persons carry through long and intricate problems involving serious reflective thinking. Unfortunately, teachers frequently operate a classroom so as to prevent the development of this facility. If the teacher does all of the talking in class and the student may be permitted merely to supply a few short answers to questions, the student has no opportunity to practice whatever language skills he already has. Frequently, too, lessons are so short as to involve only a few details, to show no relations, to seem to have no direction or objective; they neither call for nor enable any procedure comparable to reasoning to take place. Finally Dewey mentions the habit of some teachers to concentrate upon correcting errors to the extinction of continuous discourse not only because of the interruptions but also because the attacks upon every error direct the student's attention away from the discourse itself to its mechanics; the student becomes self-conscious about them instead of devoting his energies to the discourse which served as the starting point of the discussion. When this happens, interest in the topic under discussion wanes, and discouragement is almost certain to ensue.

Dewey denies that learning and using language for acquiring and conveying meanings is in conflict with the principle that meanings are gained by using things in action. Words are first learned by virtue of their being used in a joint action by, let us say, a parent and child. Because the sound was employed in connection with doing a thing, the child and the parent have the same idea, they share the same meaning for the word. In reading, the reader shares imaginatively the meaning the author had at the time of writing. Admittedly, this process is not as clear or as easy as a direct participation with someone else in the sharing of the manipulation of an object. Dewey comments on the difficulty involved:

Then words do not enter as factors into a shared situation, either overtly or imaginatively, they operate as pure physical stimuli, not as having a meaning or intellectual value. They set activity running in a groove, but there is no accompanying conscious purpose or meaning. Thus, for example, the plus sign may be a stimulus to perform the act of writing one number under another and adding the numbers, but the person performing the act will operate much as an automaton would unless he realizes the meaning of what he does.<sup>43</sup>

He does grant that "Informational statements about things can be acquired in relative isolation by anyone who previously has had enough intercourse with others to have learned the language."<sup>44</sup> The immediately succeeding sentence, however, emphasizes activity again. "But realization of the meaning of the linguistic signs is quite another matter. That involves a context of work and play in association with others."<sup>45</sup> He explains that "Playgrounds, shops, workrooms, laboratories not only

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<sup>43</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 410.

<sup>45</sup>Loc. cit.

direct the natural active tendencies of youth, but they involve intercourse, communication, cooperation,--all extending the perception of connection."<sup>46</sup> Thus, even though some language may be learned in relative isolation from connection with matters in hand, the appreciation of meanings can be attained only through active dealing with those affairs.

As a matter of fact, Dewey identifies communication with education. In the context of social life as it relates to education, he makes this unequivocal statement, "Not only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative. To be a recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience."<sup>47</sup> He explains that in order to communicate a fact to someone it is necessary to get outside of that fact, look at it as he would probably see it, look at it in terms of his probable experience with it or something similar, and then formulate it in such a way that he with his background of experience will be able to understand it. To do this it is essential to assimilate somewhat of the other person's experience into one's own; otherwise one cannot understand how the other person will view it. This process is educative in itself, for the very process will result in changing one's own attitude toward the idea as he is trying to see it through the eyes of another person. In this way then communication itself is educative.

A further implication of this theory of language is that there is no worthy distinction between learning through doing or learning through verbal symbols, or put in another way, between cultural and practical

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

subjects. Clayton summarizes this view in the following comments:

Professor Dewey's thought does not call for opposition between learning by doing and learning through the use of word symbols. It is highly critical of educational theories which emphasize the intellectual and the cultural at the expense of the practical and vocational and which therefore tend to separate the activities of gaining a livelihood from the more refined activities appropriate to a more privileged class.<sup>48</sup>

In fact, if actual first-hand acquaintance is prior to adequate realization of meanings, it is necessary to begin with materials at hand before turning attention to printed material which states a background for the present. Hence, the immediate materials relevant to the problem at hand are of first importance and form the background for whatever reading needs to be done. Without this prior experience there is no meaning to which read material can be related, understood and appreciated.

Summary. These are the chief considerations having to do with Dewey's conception of the origin, nature, and educational implication of language. His high regard for language and for its importance in the civilized world compels him to eulogize it at various places and in various ways, not the least of which is the following: "As to be a tool, or to be used as means for consequences, is to have and to endow with meaning, language, being the tool of tools, is the cherishing mother of all significance."<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Alfred S. Clayton. "Dewey's Theory of Language." Op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>49</sup> John Dewey. Experience and Nature. Op. cit., p. 186.



## CHAPTER V

### VALUE IN EXPERIMENTALISM

Chapter Two described experience as being fundamental to the process of inquiry and then explained the process of inquiry itself. The point was made that man, being continuous with and a part of nature, need not go outside of experience to explain his place and function within life-processes. Chapter Three set forth, again based upon the process of experiencing and of inquiry, the way knowledge is attained, what its limitations are, and how it is to be treated.

The present Chapter aims to present first, the basic concepts of the experimentalist with regard to value, or what man may regard as desirable in the process of life-experiencing. The second portion will describe how these values may be arrived at and what qualities and limitations attach to them once they are determined. And finally these principles will be applied, from the experimentalist point of view, to education.

The Concept of Value. The term 'value' has two meanings in philosophical discussion. One is concerned with prizing something which has a value of some sort but which does not include reference to other objects of either a like or unlike nature. The other refers to aspects of appraisal, that is, making a choice as to which of two or more objects is the more significant for present purposes, establishing a relationship between the objects pertinent to the attaining of an objective. The former has a personal-emotional and the latter an intellectual connotation.

Dewey says, "...to value means to weigh, appraise, estimate; to evaluate--a distinctly intellectual operation."<sup>1</sup> He thus makes a distinction between the verbs 'value' and 'evaluate.' He explains his point of view most aptly when he states:

...when attention is confined to the usage of the verb 'to value', we find that common speech exhibits a double usage. For a glance at the dictionary will show that in ordinary speech the words 'valuing' and 'valuation' are verbally employed to designate both prizing, in the sense of holding precious, dear (and various other nearly equivalent activities, like honoring, regarding highly), and appraising in the sense of putting a value upon, assigning value to. This is an activity of rating, an act that involves comparison, as is explicit, for example, in appraisals in money terms of goods and services. ... For in prizing, emphasis falls upon something having definite personal reference, which, like all activities of distinctively personal reference, has an aspectual quality called emotional. Valuation as appraisal, however, is primarily concerned with a relational property of objects so that an intellectual aspect is uppermost of the same general sort that is found in 'estimate' as distinguished from the personal-emotional word 'esteem.'<sup>2</sup>

Dewey distinguishes intrinsic from instrumental values. If something has intrinsic value, it is not subject to comparison with something else of value; it has its own value, or it may be said that it is invaluable, "and if a thing is invaluable, it is neither more nor less so than any other invaluable."<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, when a choice is necessary in the course of activity, there comes about an "...order of preference, a greater and less, better and worse. Things judged or passed upon have to be estimated in relation to some third thing, some

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<sup>1</sup>John Dewey. Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938, p. 172.

<sup>2</sup>John Dewey. "Theory of Valuation." In International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Vol. II, No. 4. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 279.

further end. With respect to that, they are means, or instrumental values."<sup>4</sup> In the subsequent discussion it will become apparent that Dewey is chiefly concerned with instrumental values. He recognizes intrinsic values, but since they have no end beyond themselves, it seems sufficient to recognize them for what they are; further discussion is not especially called for.

The appraising of instrumental values happens in the process of man's interacting with an environment. If he is active--and according to the experimentalist view man is active--then, following the method of inquiry, he regards the present state of affairs as being unsatisfactory and seeks to re-arrange affairs so as to be more satisfying. At this point 'liking' and 'disliking' enter in. There is dislike of the present state of things in that they are not compatible with ends-in-view. When then there is activity directed in pursuit of a more satisfactory state of affairs, 'desire' enters into 'valuing'. Dewey comments: "Because valuations in the sense of prizing and caring for occur only when it is necessary to bring something into existence which is lacking, or to conserve in existence something which is menaced by outside conditions, valuation involves desiring."<sup>5</sup> Thus desiring is more than mere wishing, i.e., wishing designating what is usually called 'wishful thinking'. Desires, then, if they are of significance in action, are not complete in and of themselves but are such only when they are functioning in the context out of which they arise. There is the further distinction

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 280.

<sup>5</sup>John Dewey. "Theory of Valuation." In International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Op. cit., p. 15.

that desires as conceived by the experimentalist are more than mere enjoying, because 'enjoying' in an inactive sense refers to receiving gratification from something already existent and in an active sense refers to perpetuating "the existence of conditions from which gratification is received."<sup>6</sup>

Desires in so far as they relate to existential contexts in which a lack of some sort is seen to be evident have these characteristics, according to Dewey:

(i) The content and object of desires are seen to depend upon the particular context in which they arise, a matter that in turn depends upon the antecedent state of both personal activity and of surrounding conditions. ... (ii) Effort, instead of being something that comes after desire, is seen to be of the very essence of the tension involved in desire. For the latter, instead of being merely personal, is an active relation of the organism to the environment..., a factor that makes the difference between genuine desire and mere wish and fantasy.<sup>7</sup>

Because situations in which desires operate are open to observation and appraisal in terms of the consequences of an act, "the adequacy of a given desire can be stated in propositions."<sup>8</sup>

It is apparent that values, in this view, are not values unless they result from intelligent action, action involving recognition of the consequences of that act. "...to call an object a value is to assert that it satisfies or fulfills certain conditions."<sup>9</sup> To know whether or not an action fulfills those conditions involves knowledge of interaction. Dewey again explains:

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>9</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1929, p. 260.

If we know the conditions under which the act of liking, of desire and enjoyment, takes place, we are in a position to know what are the consequences of that act. The difference between the desired and the desirable, admired and admirable, becomes effective at just this point. Consider the difference between the propositions "That this has been eaten," and the judgment "That thing is edible." The former statement involves no knowledge of any relation beyond that stated; while we are able to judge of the edibility of anything only when we have a knowledge of its interactions with other things sufficient to enable us to foresee its probable effects when it is taken into the organism and produces effects there.<sup>10</sup>

From the foregoing the definition of the 'good' readily follows.

Man lives in an environment in which he has both to adapt himself to his environment and the environment to himself. The outcome of his action is not always secure nor is it necessarily the ultimate of what he seeks. Thus, "The potential better will...be regarded as the good--and the only good--of any situation, a statement as applicable to scientific inquiry as to any moral matter."<sup>11</sup> From the standpoint of the pattern of inquiry described in the chapters above the following definition seems more clear: "Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release in action."<sup>12</sup> This conception marks a clear departure from other philosophies which assume an a priori good to which man must seek to conform, a good conceived as pre-established and given.. Rather good, as experimentally conceived, is something to be brought about by interaction with an

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 260.

<sup>11</sup>John Dewey. "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in The Philosophy of John Dewey. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951, p. 589.

<sup>12</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922, p. 210.

environment, yet not something absolutely good for now and all subsequent times, but good as the preferred outcome of present activity and inquiry. And since the outcome of present inquiry is subject to revision in later inquiry, the good may also be revised at a later time. It is thus specific to the present inquiry, and while it may have general application in future inquiry and action it is not to be completely depended on just because it has been the good of a particular inquiry.

Childs explains the specificity and plurality of good when he says:

Undoubtedly one of the chief reasons for its [experimentalism] opposition to all attempts to set up some such final hierarchy of values is rooted in its respect for the individual and the uniqueness of his experiences and perspectives. This profound respect for human individuality prompts experimentalism to resist the idea that there is some universal pattern of goodness which can be discovered and made into a final authoritative standard. Life is a dynamic affair. Individuals change, and the conditions in which their lives are set also change. Hence goods are many and various. How much any particular good is to be valued is conditioned by the circumstances. It is relative to the actual needs and the possibilities of those concerned. If a general principle be demanded, the experimentalist says that is good which promotes the growth and happiness of individuals and does not interfere with the happiness and growth of other individuals. But here, again, the principle does not fix the end. Such a principle is a 'tool of insight.' It points to the fundamental importance of the continuous task of finding out in each situation that which is good and that which is bad. It has value only to the degree that it makes us more sensitive to the actual factors that limit and thwart growth as well as to those which lead to expansion and more effective control.<sup>13</sup>

Through the process of experiencing and of arriving at judgmental values taste is built for a standard of excellence. "Expertness of taste is at once the result and the reward of constant exercise of thinking. Taste, if we use the word in its best sense, is the outcome of experience brought cumulatively to bear on the intelligent appreciation

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<sup>13</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. New York: The Century Company, 1931, p. 227.

of the real worth of likings and enjoyments."<sup>14</sup> This process of building tastes is continuous and cumulative. Through expressed tastes it is possible to judge a person's previous experience, his likes and dislikes, for it is through them that he reveals himself most effectually. For this reason they are so important. "The formation of a cultivated and effectively operative good judgment or taste with respect to what is esthetically admirable, intellectually acceptable and morally approvable is the supreme task set to human beings by the incidents of experience."<sup>15</sup>

It is from observing behavior "that the existence and description of valuations have to be determined."<sup>16</sup> What a person will do in a given set of circumstances reveals what that person's values are with relation to the elements in that situation. The discovery of comparative strength of a person's values may require continuous observation over an extended period of time and over a variety of actions and choices among actions before a particular aspect of his value system will become clear. Likewise, it not only reveals positive preferences but the negative ones as well. From such observation it becomes possible to make statements or propositions about values.

Now when a proposition of appraisal is made, it sets forth the conditions to be adhered to in future action in that regard. It thus establishes a norm which will serve to guide future action and to

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<sup>14</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 262.

<sup>15</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>16</sup>John Dewey. "Theory of Valuation." In International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Op. cit., p. 15.

assess the significance of such action. Such "Appraisals of courses of action as better and worse, more and less serviceable, are as experimentally justified as are nonvaluative propositions about impersonal subject matter."<sup>17</sup> Yet they are also different from scientific generalizations in that they are "rules for the use, in and by human activity, of scientific generalizations as means for accomplishing certain desired and intended ends."<sup>18</sup> Dewey points to the significance of these facts when he says:

Examinations of these appraisals discloses that they have to do with things as they sustain to each other the relation of means to ends or consequences. Wherever there is an appraisal involving a rule as to better or as to needed action, there is an end to be reached: the appraisal is a valuation of things with respect to their serviceability or needfulness.<sup>19</sup>

He explains, on the basis of examples he has already cited in this context, that real estate has a value set on it for the purposes of taxation, a medicine is valued in relation to its effectiveness in restoring health. The value placed upon an item depends upon its potential efficacy in producing a particular result. Now when a result has been accomplished, there is comparison of the actual result with the intended result so that a judgment as to the appropriateness of the means can be made. Conduct is on the basis of such analysis determined to be appropriate or inappropriate, wise or unwise. Dewey summarizes this discussion of the ends-means relationship in three propositions:

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>19</sup>Loc. cit.



...(1) There are propositions which are not merely about valuations that have actually occurred...but which describe and define certain things as good, fit, or proper in a definite existential relation: these propositions, moreover, are generalizations, since they form rules for the proper use of materials. (2) The existential relation in question is that of means-ends or means-consequences. (3) These propositions in their generalized form may rest upon scientifically warranted empirical propositions and are themselves capable of being tested by observation of results actually attained as compared with those intended.<sup>20</sup>

The significance of the above discussion lies in the means-end relationship. One might suspect that the end to be attained is the measure of the value of a thing. Actually, Dewey says, "In empirical fact, the measure of the value a person attaches to a given end is not what he says about its preciousness but the care he devotes to obtaining and using the means without which it cannot be attained."<sup>21</sup> Thus he denies the notion that ends are ends in and of themselves from which follows the idea that such ends are so important as to justify any means. Dewey's position also denies the separation of means from consequences as to value. Such a sharp separation he calls fanaticism, about which he says: "Any view which in the name of inherent difference in 'type' between final and instrumental values sets up values per se, no matter what consequences or 'ends' they are 'instrumental' to, tends in practical logic to promote fanaticism."<sup>22</sup> Such a separation of ends from means does violence to the principles of interaction and the continuity of experience. So significant is this point that he says rather forcefully:

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>22</sup>John Dewey. "The Field of 'Value'". In Value A Cooperative Inquiry. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, p. 71.

If the lesson were learned that the object of scientific knowledge is in any case an ascertained correlation of changes, it would be seen, beyond the possibility of denial, that anything taken as end is in its own content or constituents a correlation of the energies, personal and extra-personal, which operate as means. An end as an actual consequence, as an existing outcome, is like any other occurrence which is scientifically analyzed, nothing but the interaction of the conditions which bring it to pass.<sup>23</sup>

Method and Value. In the preceding discussion it is apparent that the means-consequence relationship has an important role in the experimentalist theory of value. Value thus lies in human experience, in the process of interaction with the environment, in the area of human activity. Dewey explicitly emphasizes this point when he says: "...the field in which value-facts belong is behavioral, so that the facts must be treated in and by methods appropriate to behavioral subject matter."<sup>24</sup> On another occasion he points out that "...all planned human conduct, personal and collective, seems to be influenced, if not controlled, by estimates of value or worth of ends to be attained."<sup>25</sup> That this conduct includes more than mere response to a fancy and that its essence lies within the pattern of inquiry is apparent from the following description he gives of conduct: "All conscious human life is concerned with ends, and with selecting, arranging, and employing the means,

<sup>23</sup>John Dewey. "Theory of Valuation." In International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Vo. II, No. 4. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939, p. 29.

<sup>24</sup>John Dewey. "The Field of 'Value'". In Value: A Cooperative Inquiry. Ed. Ray Lepley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, p. 64.

<sup>25</sup>John Dewey. "Theory of Valuation." In International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Op. cit., p. 2.

intellectual, emotional, and practical, involved in these ends."<sup>26</sup> Thus values are significantly related to the method of intelligence in which the progression is from an unsettled to a resolved situation through a series of means-ends relationships. Value enters in at the point where a choice of courses of action must be made in terms of the end-in-view.

Deliberation, or inquiry, begins with an unclear situation and proceeds through observation of the facts of a case to a dramatic rehearsal of the possible courses of action. Impulses and habits are held in check by deliberation so that in imagination each possibility can be traced through to its own conclusion. Finally, a choice is made as to what to do, but it occurs, in genuine deliberation, only when "...the various factors in action fit harmoniously together, when imagination finds no annoying hindrance, when there is a picture of open seas, filled sails and favoring winds...."<sup>27</sup>

Choice is in this context "...the emergence of a unified preference out of competing preferences."<sup>28</sup> Deliberation thus leads to a choice of some kind from among the possibilities in the circumstances. Not every action, however, results from genuine deliberation and to the extent that such thoroughgoing deliberation has not preceded choice the resulting mode of action is unintelligent even though perhaps satisfying. Choices, while common to all individuals, become "...true choices under the direction of insight."<sup>29</sup> And insight occurs only when there is

<sup>26</sup>John Dewey, and James H. Tufts. Ethics. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1908, p. 205.

<sup>27</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 192.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 193.

<sup>29</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 250.

understanding of the relations one to another of those objects pertinent to an interaction. Knowledge becomes of greater significance when it is realized that choosing wisely or unwisely does make a difference. Knowledge thus considered is an instrumentality enabling more adequate choices to be made in the furtherance of life-processes and of growth. Dewey explains:

I do not for a moment suppose that the experience of the past, personal and social, are of no importance. For without them we should not be able to frame any ideas whatever of the conditions under which objects are enjoyed nor any estimate of the consequences of esteeming and liking them. But past experiences are significant in giving us intellectual instrumentalities of judging just these points. They are tools, not finalities. Reflection upon what we have liked and have enjoyed is a necessity. But it tells us nothing about the value of these things until enjoyments are themselves reflectively controlled, or, until, as they are not recalled, we form the best judgment possible about what led us to like this sort of thing and what has issued from the fact that we like it.<sup>30</sup>

Choices are influenced by attitudes of admiration, enjoyment, esteem. If deliberation is cut short and attitudes are allowed to guide the action, conduct has no intelligent direction. It is necessary, therefore, to investigate the connection of things and so to estimate their probable consequences. Inquiry is inevitable. Past experience in similar situations may be used as a guide when such connections as have previously been established are formulated as principles or rules. But there are likely to be a variety of principles and rules with greater or lesser differences into which or under which a present situation may more or less accurately fit. Since all experiences are individual and differ from one another, exact duplication will never occur.

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 272.

But the question of the applicability of the rules and principles at hand (however tested they have been) to the special situation in question always enters in. Choice has to be made among them. Consequently, in order to obtain a grounded final judgment there also has to be evaluation or appraisal of principles.<sup>31</sup>

But choice must also operate so as to select from among desires that one most compatible with the person's objectives. Childs observes that desires do not occur singly in life and that in this multiplicity of desires some are inconsistent with one another in an individual situation, others seem more potent; and then he points out that

The aim of intelligent inquiry is to help one find in the light of all his desires or preferences that which he really wants, including the question of the type of person he desires to become and the kind of society he wants to live in. If one is to do this effectively, it is important that he should have knowledge of the consequences of the activities into which his desires would lead him....<sup>32</sup>

Choice is a function of judgment and of intelligence. A decision is grounded only as there is an intelligent selection and arrangement of those conditions which will produce an end-in-view. Inquiry is intelligent to the degree in which it establishes the connections between events so that some things are seen in their capacity of signifying other things. "... if we can judge events as indications of other events, we can prepare in all cases for the coming of what is anticipated."<sup>33</sup> In another instance Dewey says: "...the operations that institute a 'this' as subject are always selective-restrictive of something from out of a larger field. What is selected and what is rejected flows from an estimate of their probably evidential significance."<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 173.

<sup>32</sup>John L. Childs. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. Op. cit., p. 158.

<sup>33</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 213.

<sup>34</sup>John Dewey. Logic. Op. cit., p. 127.

The relationship of judgment to value is more precisely stated in these words of Dewey:

...all judgments of practice are evaluations, being occupied with judging what to do on the basis of estimated consequences of conditions which, since they are existential, are going to operate in any case. The more it is emphasized that direct enjoyment, liking, admiration, etc., are themselves emotional-motor in nature, the clearer it is that they are modes of action (interaction). Hence a decision whether to engage or indulge in them in a given situation is a judgment of practice--of what should be done.<sup>35</sup>

Judgments are not single in the process of inquiry. "Judgment as final settlement is dependent upon a series of partial settlements."<sup>36</sup> This series of intervening judgments are propositions about the several aspects or events involved in carrying inquiry toward a resolution of the inquiry. Now "The judgments by which propositions are determined is recognized and marked off linguistically by such words as estimates, appraisals, evaluation."<sup>37</sup> It is evident that appraisal or valuing is involved in the entire process of inquiry. It is an appraisal of the means in that they are not only an evidential sign of other things but also of their effectiveness in producing foreseen and desired consequences. Hence, the definition of judgments about values clarifies and sums up this relationship of values to judgment and to conduct:

...Judgments about values are judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects; judgments about that which should regulate the formation of our desires, affections and enjoyments.<sup>38</sup>

Appraising and valuing is thus intimately part and parcel of the process of intelligent inquiry. Valuing occurs throughout the process

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 174.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>37</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>38</sup>John Dewey. The Quest for Certainty. Op. cit., p. 265.

and its results are stated in the form of propositions about the worth of objects as means toward accomplishing an end-in-view. It is also through inquiry that values are discovered, a process that is open to inspection by the public and verifiable by other investigators.

In order to make such intelligent choices it is necessary that man be free to make them. Freedom in this sense is more than mere absence of external restraint. "Genuine freedom, in short, is intellectual; it rests in the trained power of thought, in ability to 'turn things over,' to look at matters deliberately, to judge whether the amount and kind of evidence requisite for decision is at hand, and if not, to tell where and how to seek such evidence."<sup>39</sup> Childs similarly explains: "Our acts are free, not simply because they are not under constraint from others, but because they are becoming intelligent. They become intelligent as they grow in their grasp of meanings. We become free as we learn to think."<sup>40</sup> It may well be that lack of restraint from the outside is one condition of being free; but the other side of the matter is that unless one can handle the materials involved, see them as evidences of other things and foresee consequences of possible actions, one is hemmed in by this very lack and necessarily takes action motivated by impulse or habit without exercising any choice or, if he can manipulate relationships in an embryonic way, his choice of action will probably be ill-advised and in large part unsatisfactory. Thus the more intelligently he can think and foresee, the more free he is.

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<sup>39</sup>John Dewey. How We Think. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1933, p. 90.

<sup>40</sup>Joan L. Childs. Education and Morals. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950, p. 151.

Man begins with a certain natural freedom in that nature, as distinct from man, does not wage a total war against man. Some aspects of nature help him in his life processes, but many aspects of this helpfulness are of an accidental nature and are therefore not completely dependable.<sup>41</sup> An intelligent handling of nature and the environment must step in to adapt nature to man's purposes. In this way man attains to a greater freedom. Dewey explains, "We do not use the present to control the future. We use the foresight of the future to refine and expand present activity. In this use of desire, deliberation and choice, freedom is actualized."<sup>42</sup>

Value in Education. Education has been defined above as growth, i.e., growth toward as full a measure of self-realization as the limitations of heredity and environment permit. It has been identified with developing and with life. Development is not just development toward anything or just something but toward the maximum that the individual can become in terms of his potentialities. This point of view means, then, "(i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming."<sup>43</sup> Education, in other words, has no aims unless it be more education. "Only persons, parents, and teachers, etc., have aims, not an abstract idea like education."<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., pp. 306-307.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 313.

<sup>43</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 59.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 125.



Since there are many different parents and teachers, those purposes will vary infinitely with parents, teachers, and the person who is in the process of becoming educated. Hence, it is impossible to state aims which are binding for everyone at all times. At best such statements can be no more than suggestions for the educator in directing the choices of experiences which he will utilize in teaching his pupil. His aim will then be to select from among the resources at his disposal and "...to utilize these various conditions; to make his activities and their energies work together, instead of against one another,"<sup>45</sup> so that growth and development can take place efficiently, so that the individual undergoing the education will proceed from a less to a more complete phase in his development.

The significance and quality of this development is also affected by the degree of interest the individual has in its component experiences. If he is interested, he has a feeling of personal attachment and concern with the outcome of an activity in so far as it will affect his future. The presence of such an interest indicates that the connection between objects and events and aims is recognized; lack of interest signifies that such a connection remains unrecognized.<sup>46</sup> Having an interest is tantamount to recognizing a value. Dewey explains, "...there is no difference between speaking of art as an interest or concern and referring to it as a value."<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., pp. 146ff.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 271.

The point has been made that learning occurs through the process of experiencing, not of mere response to external stimuli, but of purposeful, intelligent interaction with elements in an environment. This qualification emphasizes the need of appreciation of an experience, a recognition and a realization of its relation and importance. Dewey explains that much of the learning in school happens through vicarious experience, the medium being language. He points out that such experiences are indirect and suffer from the lack of real appreciation by reason of this indirectness, from the danger of misrepresentation or misinterpretation through linguistic symbols, and from the danger that language as the medium will become an end in itself and so result in mere bookishness. Should these possibilities become actualized, the real appreciation of an experience will fail. The real value is missed and the significance has failed 'to sink in'.<sup>48</sup> The educational importance of this condition he elaborates clearly:

Before teaching can safely enter upon conveying facts and ideas through the media of signs, schooling must provide genuine situations in which personal participation brings home the import of the material and the problems which it conveys. From the standpoint of the pupil, the resulting experiences are worth while on their own account; from the standpoint of the teacher, they are also means of supplying subject matter required for understanding instruction involving signs, and of evoking attitudes of open-mindedness and concern as to the material symbolically conveyed.<sup>49</sup>

The import of this appreciation for classroom practices is that the appreciation can be secured most efficiently through play and activity involving typical situations. Laboratory work provides such

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<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 271-272.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 273.

opportunities for a real appreciation of the meaning of what is going on. It distinguishes first-hand experience and a genuine feeling for given circumstances from a superficial acquaintance. This appreciation is more important than getting a command of information and technique at first. Dewey says: "Getting command of technique and of methods of reaching and testing generalizations is at first secondary to getting appreciation."<sup>50</sup> And the more immature and inexperienced the learner is with the subject matter involved, the more important is this first hand experience.

This same distinction between superficial and meaningful appreciation applies also to the standards of value which an individual builds up in the course of his experiencing and living. These standards operate as rules or principles in evaluating the worth of new experiences as these concrete situations present themselves. These "...working as distinct from professed standards depend upon what an individual has himself specifically appreciated to be deeply significant in concrete situations."<sup>51</sup> Working principles of value, in other words, cannot be taught by a mere telling of them to an individual, but concrete situations must be experienced if they are to become absorbingly meaningful to him. Developing tastes and appreciations of value is accomplished through active experiencing, not through indoctrination and telling; the latter is likely to produce superficiality and adopted standards but not real, felt, and personally important ones. Mechanical habits can perhaps be established, but they will remain a "...purely mechanical

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 274.

<sup>51</sup>Loc. cit.

thing unless habits are also tastes--habitual modes of preference and esteem, an effective sense of excellence"<sup>52</sup>

The play of imagination is an essential condition in developing real appreciation in activity, for "The imagination is the medium of appreciation in every field."<sup>53</sup> Through imagination the individual is able to project an idea into relationship in concrete situations, follow it through to its conclusions, and evaluate the outcome in terms of its desirability or undesirability. Without imagination an activity is just a mechanical process. Dewey particularly observes that, in the laboratory, for example:

Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it.<sup>54</sup>

Earlier in this chapter the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values was stated. It remains to indicate the implications of this separation for education. On the basis of intrinsic value, no choice is necessary since the value is considered apart from any relationships, and therefore no hierarchy of values is possible. "In the abstract or at large, apart from the needs of a particular situation in which choice has to be made, there is no such thing as degrees or order of value."<sup>55</sup> The import of this fact for education is that it

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 276.

<sup>53</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 277-278.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 280.

disallows a ranking of school subjects according to a measure of their value. Dewey explains:

In so far as any study has a unique or irreplaceable function in experience, in so far as it marks a characteristic enrichment of life, its worth is intrinsic or incomparable. Since education is not a means to a living, but is identical with the operation of living a life which is fruitful and inherently significant, the only ultimate value which can be set up is just the process of living itself.<sup>56</sup>

Furthermore, since anything may conceivably make a contribution to life, and since that contribution may have meaning in a variety of ways, it is impossible to ascribe particular kinds of values to any individual study. On this point Dewey says:

Science for example may have any kind of value, depending upon the situation into which it may enter as means. ...All we can be sure of educationally is that science should be taught so as to be an end in itself in the lives of students--something worthwhile on account of its own unique intrinsic contribution to the experience of life.<sup>57</sup>

He argues that

...as long as any topic makes an immediate appeal, it is not necessary to ask what it is good for. This is a question that can be asked only about instrumental values. Some goods are not good for anything; they are just goods. Any other notion leads to an absurdity.<sup>58</sup>

He says further it is impossible for either the pupil or teacher to tell what purpose some bit of learning may some day serve in the student's life. So long as the student responds, it is worth while.

On the other hand, when a subject is taught for its instrumental value, as let us say, persuasion for a prospective salesman, then it may be necessary to point out the particular connection of the subject

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<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 281.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 282.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 283.

matter in hand to the total selling performance. This connection is not to be labored unless the connection is not clear to the student. Dewey summarizes his view on the matter of intrinsic and instrumental value in teaching when he says:

In general what is desirable is that a topic be presented in such a way that it either have an immediate value, and require no justification, or else be perceived to be a means of achieving something of intrinsic value. An instrumental value then has the intrinsic value of being a means to an end.<sup>59</sup>

He recognizes, however, that there is some point in listing as aims or values some of the "various valuable phases of life,"<sup>60</sup> for they provide breadth of outlook and a greater measure of flexibility. Actually such lists or statements are but "generalizations, more or less adequate, of concrete goods."<sup>61</sup> As generalizations in the abstract they are not values or standards of valuation, because such standards of valuation are found "in the specific realizations which form tastes and habits of preference."<sup>62</sup> With regard to this question of establishing aims or values a final statement seems constructive and important to the point of view. In it Dewey offers a positive suggestion as to how far one can go, and what limitation must be imposed in framing a set of educational values:

We may say that the kind of experience to which the work of the schools should contribute is one marked by executive competency in the management of resources and obstacles encountered (efficiency); by sociability, or interest in the direct companionship of others; by aesthetic taste or capacity to appreciate artistic

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 284.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 285.

<sup>61</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>62</sup>Loc. cit.

excellence in at least some of its classic forms; by trained intellectual method, or interest in some mode of scientific achievement; and by sensitiveness to the rights and claims of others--conscientiousness. And while these considerations are not standards of value, they are useful criteria for survey, criticism, and better organization of existing methods and subject matter of instruction.<sup>63</sup>

Summary. The present chapter has sought to explain the more basic aspects of the experimentalist point of view with regard to value theory. It was emphasized that instrumental values are determined through the process of inquiry and that choice of value is intimately associated with method, desire, and intelligence. Some applications were made to the educational process in general. The succeeding chapter will proceed from this point to an elaboration of the implication of the experimentalist point of view thus far developed to the teaching of public speaking at the college level.

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., pp. 284-285.

## CHAPTER VI

### SOME IMPLICATIONS OF EXPERIMENTALISM FOR TEACHING PUBLIC SPEAKING IN COLLEGE

In the four preceding chapters the essential concepts of Dewey's philosophy chiefly, and of the experimentalists in general, have been elaborated. The basis of this philosophy, as explained in Chapter Two, lies in the concept of experience out of which grows the method of intelligence, that is, the pattern of inquiry. Chapter Three states the implications of this pattern and process for the psychology of learning and for some related aspects of the educational process. The next chapter sums up Dewey's view on the origin, nature and functions of language in inquiry and in learning. The fifth chapter, dealing with value theory, expresses the experimentalist view that value is derived through the same pattern by which knowledge is attained.

The present chapter sets forth some of the implications of these ideas as they relate specifically to the teaching of public speaking. It is not necessarily implied in the ensuing discussion that all of such possible implications are indicated or that the procedure followed here represents the only possible mode of attack. What is presented, however, is believed to be a defensible interpretation of this philosophy as applied to the public speaking classroom.

The major divisions in this discussion will be the titles of Chapters Two through Five, namely, the Pattern of Inquiry, Educational Psychology, Theory of Language, and Theory of Value. Under each of these,



of course, will be appropriate sub-headings though perhaps not in every instance in as many discrete units as in the previous discussion. In so far as it is feasible, overlapping with material coming before or after a particular point will be avoided. However, in a few cases it has seemed more convenient to group several related headings in order to avoid splitting ideas into minutiae when actual separation would prevent meaningful discussion of a point.

Furthermore, excessive dichotomizing seems to destroy the coherence of the discussion and necessitates that the reader do much of the assimilating for himself. Therefore, some ideas will be discussed at one point only even though their consideration also may be appropriate in another context.

Since the chief concern is with the teaching of public speaking, the following discussion will deal in the main with methods of teaching. While it is true there are numerous applications of the theory of experimentalism which may be well suited as subject matter for such a course, the intent is not to emphasize it as a major part of this endeavor. For example, the pattern of inquiry will be treated mainly as the method of learning rather than as a separate area of the subject matter content of a course in public speaking.

### The Pattern of Inquiry

The Concept of Experience. The student who comes into a college class in public speaking already has a large accumulation of experiences with public speaking in his background. Through them he has established habits, attitudes, and variegated preferences. His speech habits and patterns are well formulated, and his habits of thinking and valuing

are probably fairly well established whether or not he recognizes them as such. Consequently, much of the plasticity of childhood has given way to some set of standards or other. He has acting and reacting patterns which are typical for him, and he responds largely in accord with those habit patterns. He has a certain stability of being, responding, and thinking which distinguishes him from every other member of the group.

Yet he remains in his formative years so that changes in his adaptations to the environment still are possible. Daily he is experiencing many varied kinds of communication situations, whether or not they are of a 'public' nature in the sense in which the word is used in the usual connection with 'public speaking'. He receives communication from the radio, the press, instructors, textbooks, classmates, and friends. Conversely, he engages frequently in classroom recitations, conversations with friends, writes term papers and examinations, and may appear as a speaker at student meetings or even at meetings of civic clubs. In his world as he experiences it there are manifold opportunities for him to communicate and to receive communication.

Consequently, it may be said that he is an active being participating in the affairs about him, adjusting to the environment as well as adapting the environment to suit his own purposes and objectives. His existence corresponds to Dewey's conception of the process of interaction in and with his environment. Each situation requires specific adaptation because each is different from every other. A constant application of the method of solving problems is necessary for successful realization of his goal. In spite of the variance of situations, one

from another, sufficient stability from one to the other exists to enable him to use the accrual from one experience in working out the best solution in another situation. His failings, fumbings, successes and partial successes, his accumulations from observation and direct study have resulted in a considerable accretion of experience with regard to the processes and techniques of communication. Yet the newness of each situation as it arises creates a new problem which his prior experience may not enable him to solve satisfactorily or as rapidly as he needs to respond. To solve these new problems he may seek help through an organized course such as Public Speaking.

The fact that he enrolls in such a course does not mean he is thoroughly aware of what his problems are. He may feel merely there are some unsatisfactory aspects in his communication patterns. He may not have made sufficient analysis of them, because he lacks information as to how to analyze his problems or a sincere appreciation of the nature of his difficulty. However, one may assume that he has considerable experience in communicating with others and has at least an initial understanding and an inchoate appreciation of the problems involved in his speaking with others.

Therefore, it may be assumed the enrollee in a Public Speaking course has some appreciation of his problems from his daily intercourse with others who constitute his environment, and he comes to the class with the hope of finding assistance in overcoming these difficulties, of getting some opportunity to practice in the presence of the group, and of getting constructive comments which will help his growth as an effective speaker. He hopes to enlarge his speaking experiences and to improve his skill in getting ideas understood and accepted by others.

In terms of such a student's expectations, how can the instructor, operating upon the principles of experimentalism, and specifically in this context of the nature of an educative experience, provide such experiences as will aid the student in growing to a more adequate realization of his potential?

In order that the student and instructor may mutually understand the problems the student believes he has, the student might well try to explain before the class what he feels are his problems. In this way he will have to analyze his own activities and as he speaks the instructor will be able to form some judgment as to his assets and liabilities. This impression, of course, will be a hasty one but it will help to identify the problems and enable the two of them to discuss them more understandably. This speech naturally receives no grade evaluation since it is not designed for that purpose; its purpose is to try to establish the problem and to form a starting point for intelligent development. At the same time, it is the first step in problem-solving and so is necessary to define, not only the starting point, but also the difficulty and perhaps how it originated.

From this beginning the student may derive a clearer notion of the several problems connected with his own speaking activities. "The need of the individual ... is the starting point of the educative process."<sup>1</sup> On the basis of these needs the activities of the class may be built.

The tasks deriving from present needs must be sufficiently difficult to require reflective thinking but not so complicated as to result in discouragement. Once the student's problem has been tentatively

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<sup>1</sup>Joseph Justman. Theories of Secondary Education in the United States. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1940, p. 309.

identified, he may be referred to related source material, no matter in which chapter in the text. In this way he can continue on his own initiative to clarify his problem, restructure his comprehension of it if necessary, and proceed to discover what steps can be taken to resolve the difficulty. Such an approach to his problems does not permit the instructor to listen to the student read a sentence or two from a given list and so diagnose the problems and prescribe repetitive exercises as a cure. This latter process does not engender a recognition, much less an understanding and appreciation of the difficulty on the student's part. Neither does such an approach permit the instructor to assign a round of speeches for a certain number of class meetings for the purpose of, let us say, developing platform movement. This kind of assignment leaves the student without a problem of moment to himself; if he does the assignment he does it to satisfy the instructor but not necessarily to derive any personal gain or development from it. Indeed, the student sees no reason to discover any relationship between that exercise and anything else he may be doing. The assignment becomes a perfunctory task and he loses interest in the class as a result. But if the student can set his own problems or at least see the relation of what he does in class to his personal needs in affairs that are of concern to him, he will profit from the experience and reconstruct his ways of doing and thinking in accordance with the results of the activities he engages in in class. In this way continuity of experience is really established, whereas the mere following of some rules in carrying out a task, a task imposed upon him from without, undercuts the concept of continuity by eliminating the background, that is, the identification of the problem, the study of the resource material, and the formulation of ideas into hypotheses for action.

The difficulties Dewey describes are also avoided:

Individuals act capriciously whenever they act under external dictation, or from being told, without having a purpose of their own or perceiving the bearing of the deed upon other acts. One may learn by doing something which he does not understand.... But we learn only because after the act is performed we note results which we had not noted before. But much work in school consists in setting up rules by which pupils are to act of such a sort that even after pupils have acted, they are not led to see the connection between the result--say the answer--and the method pursued.<sup>2</sup>

The instructor does not give the student an exercise just to keep him busy or just to provide the occasions for experiencing. The work of the student must be based on his problems and present understandings so as to lead toward discovery of expanded meanings and relationships. If his problem is clearer articulation, routine exercises are not enough. He must understand precisely why his present manner of articulating is unsatisfactory, discover how it should sound, then find the appropriate method of acquiring a more satisfactory articulation, and check on his production of letters to see how well he does them now. Dewey explains these conditions of an educative experience:

It is a mistake to suppose that the principle of the leading on of experience to something different is adequately satisfied simply by giving pupils some new experiences any more than it is by seeing to it that they have greater skill and ease in dealing with things with which they are already familiar. It is also essential that the new objects and events be related intellectually to those of earlier experiences, and this means that there be some advance made in conscious articulation of facts and ideas. It thus becomes the office of the educator to select those things within the range of existing experience that have the promise and potentiality of presenting new problems which by stimulating new ways of observation and judgment will expand the area of further experience. He must constantly regard what is already won not as a fixed possession but as an agency and instrumentality for opening new fields which make new demands upon existing powers of

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<sup>2</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 91.

observation and of intelligent use of memory. Connectedness in growth must be his constant watchword.<sup>3</sup>

The Problem-Solving Sequence. The pattern of reflective thinking is identical with the method of intelligence, Dewey said. It is also the method of learning, and the residue, proceeding from carrying through all the steps in the process, is what is learned from an experience intelligently handled. The outcomes of inquiry are tentative and subject to further inquiry if deemed necessary and to revision as soon as different results have become warrantably assertible.

This pattern has a dual application in the teaching of public speaking, indeed in every subject of study. It is that series of steps through which the instructor may lead his student in the study of the subject matter of the course. As such it implies first that topics be studied as problem areas rather than as chapters in a text and that these problems be framed in such a way as will relate them to student needs and felt difficulties. As such it will not be taught directly, but the questions the instructor uses to guide the thinking of the student will follow in the sequence of this pattern. In the second place, it is the pattern the student may well use in preparing his own speeches which he will deliver before the class. He will use it in formulating and defining the problem, in discovering what the essential data are, in arranging that material and deriving from it suggestions as to what point of view he shall adopt and advocate in regard to it. He will use it further in determining how he may best present his ideas to the audience, that is, in analyzing problems he will have to cope with in presenting it and

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<sup>3</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932, pp. 39-90.

determining which methods he can best use to secure understanding or acceptance. For this purpose it may be more expedient to attack the teaching task directly after the class has had some experience with the process.

The first step in the pattern of inquiry deals with the indeterminate situation. Here it must be remembered that problems arise from the process of interaction of the individual with his environment, both physical and human. Organized society establishes certain knowledges, attitudes, and skills which it expects the immature members to acquire or develop. The student is a social being who interacts with his fellow human beings in conjunction with whom he attempts to realize his objectives. Failure to attain these purposes in his interactive relationships gives rise to a feeling of inadequacies or needs, but these needs are determined by the expectations of his societal environment. As already indicated, the student may not be certain of the exact nature of his difficulty either because he does not have the background of information or skill to identify it or because he does not understand precisely what society demands of him. For the same reasons he may feel certain of the nature of his problem but be erroneous in his judgment.

The instructor's role in this society-individual relationship is that of a mediary in narrowing the gap, in so far as is possible, between the student's actual deficiencies and society's expectations. Because he knows what these expectations are and because he understands what principles and methods to employ to help the student grow to a more adequate functioning in his interactions, the instructor's obligation is to help the student identify and resolve his inadequacies.



His objective is to help the student become a full-fledged, responsible, and accepted member of his society.<sup>4</sup>

In terms of the pattern of inquiry, then, the student and instructor must cooperatively determine what are the student's deficiencies. It may not be amiss to caution here that these difficulties are not always those the instructor, before he ever meets the class, believes the students have or that they are always what the students say they are. To accept either of these possibilities without investigation is likely to result in frequent error and to shortcircuit inquiry. The type of project described above followed by detailed discussion between the two of them helps to delimit the problem area they might mutually agree to work on together.

The student will use this step in the pattern not only in getting at the subject matter of the course, but also in connection with the preparation of practice speeches, e.g., in the selection of topics, audience analysis, preparation of persuasive speeches in which he needs to uphold a point of view, and in determining which method of organization to use, which arguments to maximize, and which to minimize in the presentation of his ideas. After he has gone through the process of solving a problem or two, it may be necessary for the instructor to call attention to the method of reaching a decision and thereby seek directly to clarify the method. In this way the learning of the process derives from actual problems the student has vitally experienced in the work he

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<sup>4</sup>An extended treatment of objective may be found in Chapter 7, "Educational Objectives: Individual or Social," in B. Othaniel Smith, William O. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores. Fundamentals of Curriculum Development. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Company, 1950, pp. 156-173.

has thus far done. The process itself becomes a part of the subject matter of the course.

Instituting a problem, the second phase in inquiry, is the elaboration of the indeterminate situation so as to gain a thorough understanding of all aspects of the problem and the establishment of some orderly arrangement of the related data. So far as the instructor's teaching goes, the course content should be framed around a series of major questions constituting the major areas of the course. For example, questions such as these would serve: What constitutes clear, articulate speech? What methods of organization are possible and when may each be used? What kinds and how much platform movement are appropriate? How may one control stage fright? From these questions the student proceeds to determine what are the particular aspects of the problem. This is done by observation of classmates and of others, by reading of the text as it relates to the problem, by reading other sources, and by inference based upon such reading and observation. This search helps to identify the exact nature of the problem, to relate the facts so discovered to one another, to eliminate the extraneous and to correlate and order the important ones so as to define the problem in accurate detail.

In the same way the student can identify, describe, and more accurately understand his own problems which he brings to the class. If it is lack of vocabulary, he uses the methods mentioned above to delineate the problem, perhaps does some definite individual experiments and investigations designed to determine the limitations of his vocabulary. He uses the same procedure in preparing his speeches for classroom delivery. He selects a topic of concern to him; he investigates the

necessary information so that he can clearly formulate the problem; he tries to determine what will be his purpose in a given speech. He orders the facts constituting the problem into a coherent, significant sequence so that upon completing this phase of his investigation he will have precisely clarified for himself the nature of the difficulty he faces.

While the student is establishing the exact nature of the problem, certain notions will suggest themselves as to how he may handle this or that aspect of the speech-making situation. Determining the solution is distinguishable as a distinct step in the process, but it is essential to recognize that the dividing line is not absolute. However, to the extent the student is inclined to take the first suggestion which occurs, and therefore to shortcircuit the process of inquiry, he is operating unintelligently. To make certain that the student is acting intelligently, it is necessary that the instructor occasionally raise additional questions as to why a particular idea was selected in preference to some other one.

In this third phase the instructor will help the student to see and evaluate the various suggestions arising out of the material in the preceding step. The instructor no doubt will see more of them than will the student, and by skillful questioning he may try to get the student to see them himself. If the instructor suggests them himself--and he may in connection with more difficult materials--he runs the risk of presenting alternatives which the student will not appreciate to the full extent and therefore will reject with little attempt at understanding or evaluating them. Nevertheless, they may well be offered directly with the hope they will come to fruition at a later time. From the host of alternatives that thus present themselves the student is urged to make

his own choice as to which course of action will best provide the results, the end-in-view he seeks to attain. It may be he will need exercises for improving certain articulatory difficulties; together instructor and student decide which is more likely to produce the desired end of a clear articulation of the particular sound in question. Or, together they may determine which introductory device will gain the attention, establish a desired mood, and yet gracefully introduce the topic of a speech in a specified speaking situation.

The process of determining the solution is closely interrelated with the following one, namely, rational discourse. Meanings are compared, the less effective eliminated and the ones more likely to be successful followed through to their conclusion. From this entire process eventuates a hypothesis which is to be carried out in action. From the instructor's point of view he seeks to have the student understand, for example, which attention devices to use with a group of children, which with an audience of middle-aged adults, which plan of organization to use in explaining how something operates as contrasted with explaining the floor plan of a proposed office building, which motive appeals to use in persuading an audience of ladies to participate in modernizing a hospital as compared to those effective in persuading a group of business men to advertise in a local newspaper. It is not sufficient merely to have the student determine which ones he might better use, but also he must understand why he would use them.

The student himself will engage in rational discourse in building his own speeches. He will need to adopt a plan of organization in terms of the material and his purpose in giving the speech, to adopt a plan of attack in terms of the dominant values of a particular

audience, to decide which is the best solution he will seek to advocate, and which devices and manner of presentation he will use. He will need also to recognize that the plans he adopts and the decisions he makes of necessity must be tentative and therefore subject to change until the time he delivers the speech, because there is the constant possibility of discovering new and additional information until that time. He will also recognize even then when he is compelled to act upon his best hypothesis he may still be in error but that he has done the very best possible.

Once the best possible hypothesis has been formulated, the final test must come in actual practise or experiment. Verbal experiment is preliminary and results in discarding those ideas less likely to bring about the desired consequences. The final hypothesis must be put into action, action that is usually beyond recall even if it should fail. The instructor will endeavor to insure that the student will act only upon this best suggestion or hypothesis. On occasion, however, it may be permissible to act on a suggestion less well thought out for the purpose of a negative illustration; something still may be learned, namely, the less satisfactory way of doing a specific act. Actual practice in making and presenting speeches is necessary to try out ideas the student has formulated about a topic and about a method of procedure. This point further militates against a course requirement of each student giving a specified number of speeches, this number being so large as to necessitate a close schedule with every student appearing on a pre-established, detailed schedule whether he has an hypothesis to try or not, indeed whether or not he even has recognized a problem.

Furthermore, experimenting necessitates sufficient freedom to permit the student to try out his ideas so long as they are well conceived even though to the instructor they may seem slightly out of the ordinary. It means the schedule will not be so closely and rigidly made as to eliminate anything but a standard pattern of, let us say, a five-minute speech. Some topics may take more time to develop in order to try a particular idea. Inflexibility does not permit new ideas to develop; rigidity is opposed to plasticity and antithetical to development. Besides, it means the student must try his own ideas in the crucible of experience instead of those the instructor sets up or assigns. The instructor can not provide a list of topics from which the student must choose subjects for his speeches; as suggestions such a list would be acceptable, but the student must understand they are mere suggestions, and he need not choose one from the list unless he thinks it will serve his purposes.

Experimentation also necessitates a change in the kind and mode of assignment. It is probably customary to assign textual material to be 'learned', as principles to apply in the next round of speeches. But since learning occurs through activity and the method of learning culminates in an experiment and its evaluation, the assignment must be a problem to be solved, an hypothesis tried, and the outcome appraised. This process the student must undergo himself. Pre-digested material, pre-arranged subject matter in outline form presented to the student saves instructor time and effort but does not necessarily bring about the desired learning, according to this theory. It may result in the desired learning if the student understands the subject-matter, relates it to his activities in a practical way, and then turns back the conclusions

of his reflections so as to modify and reconstruct his understanding and insight. If, however, this material is given to him to 'learn' by memorizing without seeing any relationship to his living, or if he is given principles of public speaking to which he must strive to conform in his own speaking, it does not follow that he will necessarily learn what was intended. He may learn how to conform and so please the instructor, but pleasing the instructor is not his learning objective. He may also learn some undesirable habits and skills quite unintentionally.

The final step is the consideration of the outcomes of inquiry to determine to what extent actual outcomes agree with anticipated results. The instructor will expect the student to appraise the extent of his success and, conversely, also of his failure. Since the audience is essentially the judge of that effectiveness, they will necessarily help in making the appraisal, at least in terms of their own subjective reaction to a speech. Likewise the instructor will need to offer constructive comment as he sees the performance. Without this mutual appraisal there will be little learning or there will be misconceptions and misgivings in the student's mind and the result will remain indeterminate for him. He will be worse rather than better for the experience in that he is likely to fixate old habits, not reconstruct them.

To do this effective evaluating of a speech requires more than a mere minute or two of class time. Ample time--and that in some instances may mean as much as fifteen minutes or more--must be allowed for such discussion. Again a rigid time schedule in order to get as many speakers as possible on the platform each day is ruled out. Such a program does not meet the criteria of an educational experience, namely, continuity and a necessary application of intelligence.

The evaluative comment, too, must be focused on the extent to which the purpose was accomplished. It must deal with the hypotheses which were being tried in that particular speech. Criticism must deal with the subject matter and the method of the speech instead of with the personality of the speaker or with his personal effectiveness. Now if a speaker is effective, it means he is using the devices and methods of speech-making well; and if he is using them well, he will be effective. During such an evaluation of a speech inevitably other matters will enter into the discussion because the audience will react not to one aspect of the speech but to the entire situation of speaker, occasion, speech, and audience. All elements of the situation are fused into the ~~one~~ situation. These relationships are subtle, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish clearly between them. It is inevitable that a variety of different aspects of this whole situation will enter into any evaluation of the speech performance. The emphasis no doubt will center on a specific aspect, but in and with this one phase others will also come up for discussion. If all of the comment then is summarized, preferably by the speaker himself, he will crystallize his thinking on the main points and to that extent learning will occur.

The role of the instructor in this problem-solving process is that of a guide and a fellow discussant. He will learn along with the student, for new situations will present themselves which he will have to appraise along with the class. He cannot be a dictator or a constant lecturer and so detract from the student's time and opportunity for active participation.

Time likewise will be consumed in extensive discussion so the number of speeches by each student during the course will be relatively



small unless the size of the class is held down. Even so, a small number of speeches will result in a greater accrual of benefit if the entire process of inquiry is diligently carried out and the student really understands those experiences which time permits him to have. These will result in a real modification of his habits of thinking and doing whereas a mere telling him the principles of speaking and demanding his applying them in a context which he neither understands nor cares about results in nothing better than superficiality, acting from caprice, or a satisfying of the instructor.

The problems-type of class procedure involves much more free discussion on the part of the student than does the lecture system. In the latter the student is presumed merely to absorb the materials the instructor presents; he absorbs it probably by rote memory through frequent repetition and rehearsal. In the former he makes the information his own. He has to assume for himself the burden of analyzing the material, establishing some sort of order, and trying the hypothesis with the problems-type of classroom procedure.

Following the pattern of inquiry is also the method of group discussion, for it is the same pattern which current texts have taken from Dewey and now advocate.<sup>5</sup> The student who learns this pattern also learns a method for his personal and social problems, for the method is identical. He learns further how to get along with his fellow classmates and with the instructor, for he works with them in a class operated according to this plan.

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<sup>5</sup>cf. Henry L. Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer. Handbook for Discussion Leaders. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947, p. 67. James H. McBurney and Kenneth G. Hance. Discussion in Human Affairs. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950, pp. 10-11. Russell H. Wagner and Carroll S. Arnold. Handbook of Group Discussion. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950, p. 57.

The by-products of such a method of teaching are of major significance: the student has many more experiences and many different kinds so that, if he is at all observant of the reactions he makes and of those his fellows make, whether or not these extra-course materials are of direct concern or not, he cannot avoid adding variety and depth to his learning experiences. In the lecture-dominated class the student has little if anything to say, has rare opportunity to work with either the instructor or his fellow students, has no problems to solve beyond trying to remember the content of the text and of the lectures. Dewey emphasizes this point clearly and forcefully in stating:

Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies is the notion that a person learns only the particular thing that he is studying at the time. Collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and often is much more important than the spelling lesson or lesson in geography or history that is learned. For these attitudes are fundamentally what count in the future. The most important attitude that can be formed is that of desire to go on learning.<sup>6</sup>

Experience with this pattern will provide clearer understanding of the process of persuasion and of its place in the steps in thinking. Exposition may progress through all or the steps in the pattern of inquiry whereas persuasion begins with the hypothesis stage, traces enough of the material background to call attention to the problem, and then seeks through a variety of ways to secure acceptance of the hypothesis and sometimes to move the audience to overt action. In persuasion the spade work of investigation is done by the speaker. He arranges the material and explains the essence of it as the result of his private investigation, and then proceeds to the proposition which he may or may not bolster with several logical reasons which accrued from his own

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<sup>6</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. Op. cit., p. 49.

discourse. After that he seeks to maximize the personal advantages the audience may secure from adopting his proposal in order to get them to act. Persuasion as it is usually practised thus shortcircuits the pattern of inquiry and expects an audience to act in a rather unintelligent fashion, that is, largely on faith in the integrity of the speaker. Exposition, on the other hand, particularly of a topic which is controversial, is more conducive to intelligent behavior in that it seeks understanding rather than action and thus needs, in order to secure thorough understanding, to include an adequate consideration of each of the steps in the pattern of inquiry. Exposition includes the steps of inquiry; persuasion presents the results of inquiry in summary fashion without leading the audience through the entire process.

In so far as an audience is intelligent, the experimentalist would seem to say that in its effect exposition is also highly persuasive because it leads to an understanding of what is desirable, an appreciation of the alternatives to action, and an intelligent choice of the action to be taken. An audience which takes action only after intelligent and informed consideration of all possibilities will act more effectively, in a more concerted manner, with a clearer perception of its goals and with more enthusiasm because they have been able to identify themselves with that action.

### Educational Psychology

Growth. Growth is conceived of as identical with life and education. As equivalents of education, growth and life have the same definition as education which Dewey says is "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and

which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."<sup>7</sup> Experience is the basis of the educational process, and the modification of experience is education's purpose. Within this framework must lie the objectives of a course in public speaking.

Generally these objectives must be framed in terms of the student and what concerns him when he enrolls in the course. The instructor may establish goals that to him seem pertinent but he perhaps does not or may not be permitted to take into account individual differences. Such goals may be beyond the reach of the majority of the class or miss the problems that are of concern to the class members. The corollary of this statement is that these objectives should be framed with the cooperation of the student, in terms of what he feels he needs and seeks to accomplish in the course. Together the student and instructor need to come to a mutual understanding of what the former will do to effect a more adequate adjustment to his environment. Furthermore, the work of the course must be framed in terms of experiences, not in the terminology of subject matter. The experiences, intelligently handled, educate the student with relation to an area of subject content. The subject content does not educate the student. These objectives must be constructed in terms of an intelligent kind of experience rather than in terms of rote memorizing. The experiences should be such as are likely to increase the tendency to learn from experience rather than emphasize the development of the 'faculty' of memory. Finally, these objectives must be such as will challenge even the better student in some ways but not so difficult as to defeat and frustrate him. If

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<sup>7</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., pp. 89-90.

these experiences are to serve the purpose of education and growth, they must lead the student beyond his present status; otherwise it results in a stunting of growth, not in growth.

Three requisites for growth are important. The first is that the student maintain an open mind which, Dewey says, means, "accessibility of mind to any and every situation that will throw light upon the situation that needs to be cleared up, and that will help determine the consequences of acting this way or that."<sup>8</sup> Growth means the expansion of mental horizons. The instructor needs to delay hasty decisions, to raise questions, to offer suggestions lest the student rush to action upon a poorly conceived hypothesis. Willingness to consider all possibilities is essential to intellectual growth. The second requisite is that the particulars which strike the senses in any situation be clearly discerned and inter-related.

Without the particulars as they are discriminated by the active responses of sense organs, there is not material for knowing and no intellectual growth. Without placing these particulars in the context of the meanings wrought out in the larger experience of the past--without the use of reason or thought--particulars are mere excitations or irritations.<sup>9</sup>

The situation must be seen by the student both as to its elements and as to the inter-relation of those elements as meanings. And the other requisite is that the student must see the relation between the materials with which he is concerned and the method involved in using them. Merely to recognize the elements in the situation without understanding what he can do with them leaves him, if not helpless, then at best in a

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 200.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 400.

blind and fumbling stage and likely to institute erroneous or irrelevant combinations. Method without material is equally disastrous for development. The task of the instructor is not to resort to artificial devices and busy-work exercises to correct the student, for these will not effect the desired integration. Dewey explains:

When there is no intimate organic connection between the methods and materials of knowledge and moral growth, particular lessons and modes of discipline have to be resorted to: knowledge is not integrated into the usual springs of action and the outlook on life....<sup>10</sup>

While the reference in this statement is particularly to moral knowledge, it is equally true of knowledge generally.

Learning. In the experimentalist view learning is a process of reconstruction instead of mere addition. The organism as a whole responds to the environment, and through intelligent interaction with its surroundings it learns. It follows that the organism becomes what it learns. And the method of learning is the method of intelligence, following the steps in the pattern of inquiry.

Certain characteristics of this way of learning, Dewey points out, are important in their implications for education.<sup>11</sup> The first of these is that the experimental method attaches far more significance to the importance of ideas in learning than do other methods. Ideas guide experiment in its characteristic direction and they are therefore of greater importance in this method. They are tentative and as such must be tested and revised in accordance with the outcomes of experiment. This tentativeness is a distinct departure from the first truths or

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 420.

<sup>11</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. Op. cit., pp. 109-110.

principles so often expounded in the classroom, expounded and to be 'learned' by the student without understanding their origin or clearly seeing their application and significance.

Secondly, the validity of hypotheses is tested by the consequences they produce in action. Consequences must be carefully observed and the results of such observation serve to modify the ideas from which the consequences followed. This operation requires intelligent observation, reflection and evaluation. When intelligence operates through this process learning occurs. This method of learning requires a more pervasive operation of intelligence than does mere memorizing of given rules and applying them as one sees fit.

A third characteristic of this method of learning is it requires keeping in mind the relevant and related facts, the activities, and the consequences of their operation. Such keeping-in-mind requires the operation of intelligent reflection as it is developing during the course of experience. It is far more than a mere accumulation of a series of names, dates, and places. It is this plus an understanding of the background, the interpretation, and consequences of the interrelation of such names, dates, and places. To do this requires much more reflective thinking than does a system of taking notes on a lecture and reproducing them on an examination paper.

Learning, according to this point of view, is far more than mere repetition, a fixing of automatic responses, or a storing of isolated data. "We learn as we grow in the 'feel' and in the mastery of the varied conditions with which we have to do."<sup>12</sup> The acquisition of this

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<sup>12</sup>John L. Childs. Education and Morals. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950, p. 65.

'feel' and mastery is more than mechanical, it requires reflective thinking and a thorough appreciation of the elements in the situation in hand.

The significance for teaching public speaking is multiple. Memorization of the principles of speaking from the text so as to 'know' them is wholly inadequate. It does not insure an understanding of them either as to their background, interrelations, or their application. It depreciates the role of ideas in the experimentalist sense, for it asks for no evaluation or comprehension of their relationships, and therefore it is unintelligent. Secondly, the application of principles which are handed to the student by-passes the major part of the pattern of inquiry. If there is a problem, it is ready-made by the instructor. There is no investigation of the facts of the situation out of which the principles arose; even the ordering of the data is prefabricated by the instructor. It calls for no suggestions; it eventuates in no ideas; the principles substitute as ideas and the student is expected to conform to them; once he applies them, the evaluation of the result is in terms of the extent to which the student used or applied them in his performance and no questions are considered concerning the validity of the principles. And in all probability no cross-connections between the principles are established. Such a procedure places the student in the position of, let us say, an adding machine. He has a high grade value if his performance conforms to the 'correct' standard of the instructor and a low value if it does not. He gets a good grade if he produces the 'right' answer on an examination, and he is 'out of order' when he does not; then he needs repairs or remedial work.



Furthermore, when the text is considered authoritative and the facts and principles are immutable, when it is the final authority, there is no opportunity for the reconstruction of the student's experience except to a greater degree of conformity with such established principles. Reconstruction of experience in the experimentalist sense signifies an intelligent consideration of a problem, a selection of a possibility of improvement, a final evaluation of the outcome of the selected possibility in action, by turning this result back upon the hypothesis so as to modify it if necessary. Anything less is to that extent unintelligent. In the fourth place, an instructor-conceived assignment which asks the student to do a particular kind of speech emphasizing certain specific techniques, gesture for instance, leaves no room for the student, the learner, to experiment. He has no choices to make, no investigating to do, no problem indeed to concern him except to fulfill what to him is an arbitrary assignment. Such an assignment becomes a burden to the student; it is a distasteful task to him, and the sooner he can finish with it the better.

Finally, an externally imposed assignment which does not place upon the student the obligation of reflective thinking cannot, according to the experimentalist view, eventuate in knowledge. Striving to conform to orders received does indeed present a problem, namely, that of how to conform, but the lesson learned has nothing to do with the material of the course; that is a lesson in itself; and since it is probably all the student will concern himself with while he is doing the assignment, that is what he will learn.

The experimentalist pattern of learning, however, is altogether different, and it might look something like the following description.

It is recognized, of course, that there is a variety of ways of doing a particular thing, but perhaps typically the following example includes the essential features of the procedure.

Let the example be that of the speech to inform and the time during the course be about the third week. All of the students have been on the platform one or more times, perhaps to introduce themselves or to relate a simple experience, at least enough so both the instructor and the student together have been able to reach some common ground on the difficulties the student has as a platform speaker. Suppose that one rather common problem is that of organization of material, even of material that will by its very nature fall into a pattern. It has been pointed out by both the instructor and class members as they have listened that it has been difficult to follow the ideas.

Here then is the problem of organization and closely allied to it is that of outlining material in a clear, sequential fashion. Since expository speeches deal with such materials as are more readily amenable to ordering, and since all students have some experience in listening to explanations, reading directions, and in giving directions to others, there is a background of experience upon which to build which makes the students more thoroughly aware of the difficulties involved. It is a problem that has grown out of their own experience. Consequently, the expository speech as a unit for study, practice and experiment is suitable for a learning situation.

Before the students read the text for suggestions as to ways of solving their difficulties, they need definitely to clarify their individual problems either through class discussion or in conference with the instructor. Perhaps a manuscript of a speech will serve well

for comparison with a model speech such as might be found in an appendix of the text. In this way, and possibly other ways, the students begin to see their own problems clearly enough to identify the factors that cause difficulty. This analysis helps them to constitute their problems in such a way that they themselves will have a full realization of the precise nature of their difficulties.

Now they are ready for suggestions from outside sources as to the possible ways out of their trouble. The public speaking text is usually a convenient reference as are texts in rhetoric and composition; these may be supplemented by lecture-demonstration by the instructor, by class discussion, by analysis of models and samples either by individual class members or by groups working together. This first-hand familiarity with the details brings about a heightened appreciation of the problem, but it also introduces ideas which constitute possible solutions and from which suggestions may flow directly.

Discourse follows further in comparing various ideas as to the best ways the students can solve their own inadequacies. Some ideas may be retained to serve specific purposes, others for additional reasons while still other ideas may be eliminated altogether. From this weighing and following through of ideas results the selection of the one plan most likely to accomplish the resolution of the difficulty. This plan constitutes the hypothesis described in Chapter Two above.

During the discourse stage, as indeed at every stage, the instructor is an active participant in the discussion. As a co-learner with the students he probably will discover ideas he has not evaluated in a similar context. More important from the students' standpoint, however, is the instructor's function with relation to the students'

learning process. In this relationship his function is to guide the discussion along its course so it will be fruitful for the students. He may ask questions and offer suggestions about unexplored possibilities, about hasty assumptions the students might make, provide additional information as needed, and generally assure the inquiry is conducted in an intelligent manner. His province is not to give the students clear-cut answers to their problems but rather to work with them so that they may find a satisfactory answer which they may frame in a clear-cut manner. The burden of the inquiry and, therefore, of the learning is on the students. The instructor is their resourceful assistant, not their dictator.

With a formulated hypothesis the students are ready to try out ideas to determine whether or to what extent the actual outcome compares with the projected one. Or they may prepare and deliver several speeches provided they revise the succeeding ones in terms of what they have learned in doing the earlier ones. They may want to try a plan of giving directions to some one who is lost; once they may want to do it with a map, the next time without. They may want to try explaining the function of a small utensil or how to arrange furniture in a living room. They may want to give the same speech twice, once for an audience of college students, once for a group of business men, in order to discover which adaptations of the material, language, and manner are necessary for clear understanding by each group. In this latter situation the class, of course, will assume the role of the group of business men.

A shift in emphasis from common classroom procedures is apparent in the above paragraph, a shift away from the giving of speeches because the instructor requires so many speeches from everyone to pass the course.

The latter system has been deplored above and needs no further development here. The experimental method emphasizing the purpose of giving speeches in class makes the student want to give speeches for purposes he himself has formulated, for the verification of outcomes he wants to make secure for himself. He does it because he has something at stake other than a grade. In fact, a grade is an artificial stimulation and detracts attention from the main objective. As long as the student has his own ends and interests at stake, there is no need to urge him to work; he cannot be kept from it. It is his engaging interest and motivates him to a high-grade and persistent effort.

Once the experiment has been tried there remains the task of determining to what extent actual results coincide with anticipated outcomes and of using that knowledge in modifying future behavior. These outcomes constitute knowledge, knowledge, to be sure, valid only specifically for that one situation but possibly applicable in other similar circumstances. To determine the correspondence between anticipated and actual outcomes the students need to consider their own reactions and observations, those of their classmates and that of the instructor. These they need to compare in order to draw some kind of conclusion which they can then correlate with what they had hoped would result. The extent of difference between results determines the extent of change and adaptation they will need to make in their next similar speech. When results are so used, learning has taken place because they have been operating intelligently.

Implied above is the fact that the speech to inform was considered as a unit. There was no study of organization separate from any other of the aspects of such a speech even though the major emphasis was on

the problem of organization. All aspects were involved in the investigation, not primarily as discrete but rather as component elements of the whole unit. To consider them as discrete elements leaves them discrete and without meaning; to consider their cross-connections with other aspects and elements means to see their significance within the sphere of their operation and effectiveness. Dewey believes this is most necessary and always possible: "Every recitation in every subject gives an opportunity for establishing cross-connections between the subject matter of the lesson and the wider and more direct experiences of everyday life."<sup>13</sup> Dewey believes teaching which does establish such connections is the best kind of teaching, for he asserts, "The best type of teaching bears in mind the desirability of affecting this interconnection. It puts the student in the habitual attitude of finding points of contact and mutual bearings."<sup>14</sup>

The knowledge gained is of various sorts. First of all, there is the knowledge of the data which define the problem; this the students gained from careful analysis and observation of activities they had engaged in, comparison of speeches, and discussion. Secondly, by handling the materials in the problem they have learned, as a by-product perhaps, the operational techniques of handling and relating information. They have learned the consequences of the operations performed upon the materials; they have discovered how to modify the ideas they evolved from analyzing the materials involved. And finally, they know what the results of a set of operations are in certain circumstances. They come

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<sup>13</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 191.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 192.

away from experiencing this unit of study with a genuine appreciation of what an expository speech is, how it may be organized, what techniques they can use and how, and somewhat of the nature of the results they can expect.

Background materials, such as textbooks, sample speeches, and published rhetorical analyses, also have a place in an experience curriculum. They are resource material, storehouses of ideas as to how others have solved similar problems. But they are not storehouses of permanent truths to which all future generations must subscribe. In the example suggested above the students read background sources, not to conform to them, but to discover additional ideas which might offer suggestions as to how they might proceed. These ideas were not considered binding but instead topics to be re-tested in the present situation with whatever modification the scene of the moment seemed to demand. Used in this way textbooks contribute to an intelligent exercise of the student's abilities and powers; used as fixities to which to conform they stifle imagination, restrict freedom, and curb intelligent inquiry.

A significant difference from the lecture system also lies in the way material is ultimately organized by the experimental method. In the former the instructor orders the material of his lecture according to his adult and expert standards; about this procedure Dewey comments, "...the educator cannot start with knowledge already organized and proceed to ladle it out in doses."<sup>15</sup> The experimental procedure described above begins with the student's experiences and proceeds from a small nucleus to add material, first to the problem and then to the possible

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<sup>15</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. Op. cit., p. 102.

solution, until the student effects an orderly arrangement of the subject matter largely for himself. This method corresponds to Dewey's conception as he describes it:

It is a cardinal precept of the newer school of education that the beginning of instruction shall be made with the experience learners already have; that this experience and the capacities that have been developed during its course provide the starting point for all further learning.<sup>16</sup>

Just prior to this context he says that finding and selecting the material for learning is a first step in the educative process and "The next step is the progressive development of what is already experienced into a fuller and richer and also more organized form, a form that gradually approximates that in which subject-matter is presented to the skilled, mature person."<sup>17</sup>

Impulse and Habit. Impulses are spontaneous responses to stimuli while habits are the settled ways of responding in established patterns. Dewey expressed their relationship by saying, "Thought is born as the twin of impulse in every moment of impeded habit."<sup>18</sup> Taken together, they provide the opportunity for the instructor to create situations which will occasion thought.

The public speaking instructor will find his students with well established habits of speaking and of thinking. Activity in the class will provide the stimuli for responses. The instructor's standards will require performances of articulation, clarity of explanation and

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>18</sup> John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922, p. 171.



of thinking, preciseness of vocabulary, adequate fluency, freedom from distracting platform mannerisms above the habitual performances of the student. The student prepares a speech and delivers it in his usual way. Class and instructor comment will select such aspects of his performance as were unsatisfactory and so arrest the smooth flow of expressing his established habits. Habit thus impeded will find occasion for retrenchment through thought, for through consciously meeting an obstacle in the way of free expression of habit a problem situation arises. This problem is the beginning of the learning process. From that point the student can be helped to improve his speaking habits. This problem impels to inquiry and this activity so impelled the instructor needs to guide into a better performance. In this sense, Dewey avers, "Impulse is needed to arouse thought, incite reflection and enliven belief."<sup>19</sup>

If, for example, a student lacks the continuous eye-contact with his audience while he is on the platform and thereby distracts them without knowing it, he is probably following his ordinary pattern of speaking; or if he has so little platform experience as to have no pattern, then his lack of contact may well be an impulsive reaction to seeing all eyes of the class focussed upon him. In the former case he recognized no problem and it will need to be pointed out to him by both the class and the instructor that it is an undesirable element which he might well improve. Upon his realization of that fact--and that realization may be difficult for him to come to--his first impulse may be to want to escape or to respond in some other unintelligent way. Here lies the occasion for suggesting how he might study the problem

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 170-171.

in order to find out what he can do to improve his performance. He has to recognize his problem; when he does, he will probably ask without any prodding by the instructor what he can do about it. Thus a real learning situation is born.

In the latter case his lack of eye contact is an expression of the first reaction that occurred to him under the pressure of the situation. His platform experience constituted a problem for him; he had no ready method for solving it from previous experience, and so the first impulsive response he could make to this unsatisfactory situation is gazing out of the window, at the floor, or over the heads of the students sitting in the back row of seats in the room. If this weakness of his response is not called to his attention, he may believe the response was satisfactory and repeat it another time and thereby establish a habit. But if the class objects to it, and he knows no way of reacting in a more satisfactory manner, he has a problem which provides the occasion for a real learning situation.

The student's responses need guidance--that he will act is a foregone conclusion--so his performance will be more acceptable. He can study the problem by observing other speakers in the class, watching his instructors, and discovering what are his own reactions to their good and less satisfactory performances. It may even be necessary for someone to show him precisely what he does on the platform, so he will come to a more thorough realization of his own problem. Care is necessary to prevent him from being too superficial in his analysis of the problem and from regarding the first suggestion that comes to him as the sum total of that problem. The same is true of the first suggestion that occurs as the remedy for it. In either event impulse will work

to shortcircuit the process of intelligent inquiry, and to the extent that it does, learning will not accrue. Impulsively taking the first suggestion as the answer to a problem is a crucial error. Dewey says of this stage:

A genuine purpose always starts with an impulse. Obstruction of the immediate execution of an impulse converts it into a desire. Nevertheless neither impulse nor desire is itself a purpose. A purpose is an end-in-view. That is, it involves foresight of the consequences which will result from acting upon impulse.<sup>20</sup>

An unfavorable comment about a speaker's performance is the occasion for an impulsive response. "The teacher's business is to see that the occasion is taken advantage of."<sup>21</sup> He needs to understand that the student will make some kind of response and to recognize the opportunity to help the student respond in a more intelligent manner. He needs to understand how he can help him establish and implement the method of inquiry when such occasions arise.

Intelligence, Thinking, and Mind. The method of intelligence is identical with the pattern of inquiry. To the extent that this pattern is employed in the solving of problems a person is said to be intelligent and to have mind. Intelligent thinking arises when impulse and habit are impeded and new ways of responding become necessary.

The significance of this phase of the experimentalist view lies in the requirement of reflection as a necessary aspect of the learning experience. Earlier it was observed that for an experience to be educative it must possess continuity and necessitate intelligent thinking.

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<sup>20</sup>John Dewey. Experience and Education. Op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

Routine assignments either to 'learn' a given quantity of factual material or to do a specified number of speeches during a term do not meet these qualifications in that there is no demand for the student to institute relation of the material with any other nor any necessity to consider preparing and presenting a speech as having to do with thinking.

Under the heading of Learning above the pattern of reflective thinking and of learning was presented. It was pointed out a speech was an occasion to experiment with an idea or hypothesis the student had developed in studying a body of material in order to clarify an unclear situation. When this procedure is employed in the classroom, thinking must occur or there is neither an hypothesis nor an experiment but mere capricious action which is unintelligent in so far as it is merely capricious.

The principle of continuity requires the student do something, for example, present a speech to the class, and the experience and its residue do something to the student. That is, he must analyze his experience for its successful and less successful aspects and so modify his future action in accordance with those results. This is the method of intelligence. It is tautological to add that when this is done thinking has taken place or that mind is an element in the total situation. A purpose has been framed and the results are analyzed to determine whether or not that purpose has been accomplished.

On the one hand, this principle implies that to begin with ready-made subject matter organized according to mature standards is a serious mistake. The earlier stages in the method of thinking have already been done and the student is not expected to do those steps at all. He is presumed willing and able to somehow absorb it without thought, without

understanding, and almost certainly without appreciation. He has no problem and hence no need, no sense of an unsatisfactory set of circumstances. It follows that he need frame no ends or purposes in accordance with which he adapts future action; he needs make no comparison of anticipated and actual results of action--if indeed any action is called for in any event. To assign a chapter in the text, let us say, on ways of getting and holding attention, as so much subject content to be learned is to avoid placing any burden of thinking on the student at all. The result is described adequately in these words of Dewey:

And skill obtained apart from thinking is not connected with any sense of the purposes for which it is to be used. It consequently leaves a man at the mercy of his routine habits and of the authoritative control of others, who know what they are about and who are not especially scrupulous as to their means of achievement. And information severed from thoughtful action is dead, a mind-crushing load. Since it simulates knowledge and thereby develops the poison of conceit, it is a most powerful obstacle to further growth in the grace of intelligence.<sup>22</sup>

The student may be able to reproduce the information of a chapter but it will effect little change in his behavior in future action. He is cluttered with a mass of information which serves no purpose.

On the other hand, merely to expect a long series of speeches from each student in the class is tantamount to an almost equally long series of routine performances. The student's purposes in the course and in giving speeches should be to develop his abilities as far as possible within the time and opportunities available in the class. If he merely gives speeches in order to fulfill the required number of performances, his problem is not to develop as a speaker--though that may incidentally occur as a by-product--but rather to fulfill the requirements of the

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<sup>22</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 179.

course. He has no ideas to try out, no audience to be concerned with; he merely has to appear so many times in order to get a passing grade. His action is likely to become more and more automatic, his habits, desirable or undesirable, more ingrained; growing to be an effective speaker will be his least concern. Dewey comments on routine, thoughtless action:

Routine action, action which is automatic, may increase skill to do a particular thing. In so far, it might be said to have an educative effect. But it does not lead to new perceptions of bearings and connections; it limits rather than widens the meaning-horizon. And since the environment changes and our way of acting has to be modified in order successfully to keep a balanced connection with things, an isolated uniform way of acting becomes disastrous at some critical moment. The vaunted 'skill' turns out gross ineptitude.<sup>23</sup>

The critical moment leaves him possibly with a wealth of information which he has gleaned from a text but which he cannot apply in a situation which is serious. Habits seek to retain their dominant status, and when they are inadequate or inappropriate, he is at the mercy of impulse and impulse seeks expression without caring how intelligent the expression is.

Giving speeches merely to fulfill course requirements arbitrarily set up by the instructor identifies the end with the process. Repetition of the process becomes the goal and purpose rather than giving a speech with a purpose the student himself has developed. Thereby the emphasis is shifted from trying out ideas to trying to get through without any troubles, such as lapses of memory. The evaluation is likely to stress only the elements of getting through the speech as smoothly as possible, with appropriate mechanics such as stage bearing

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 91.

and gestures which the student knows the instructor approves. These supplant the learning and thinking the student needs to do in order to have an intelligent learning experience. When the emphasis is placed on externals and on conforming to rules, it is reminiscent of the elocutionary methods of an earlier day in speech training when emphasis was clearly on mechanics of posture and gesture, inflection, and modulation instead of on content or expression appropriate to the sense being uttered and its effect on the audience.

Reflective thinking also demands that the student really prepare his speeches intelligently. It expects the student to study the subject matter of the speech so as to have a thorough grasp of the material, to have selected well the ideas he expects to present, and to formulate these ideas into a pattern comprehensible to the audience. It expects further that he will give careful thought to the manner of presentation, to the selection of material that will introduce the subject and gain the attention of the audience, to selection of his illustrations, to the phrasing, rate, vocal variety, and all of the other aspects of a well-prepared and well-delivered speech. It denies a place to mere glibness and volubility, both of which may merely be habit on the rampage. Glibness and volubility may also occur when a person is deeply prejudiced or has well established attitudes; on these he may expound at length without revealing any real thinking at their base. If the instructor wants to guard against his kind of routine action, he must distinguish between real preparation and mere free expression. Impromptu speeches may have their place for purposes of occasional drill, or for providing occasion for 'getting the feel' of the platform. However, if the task is to speak impromptu for a given number

of minutes irrespective of the significance of what is being said, it falls within the category of either fulfilling an assignment or capricious action, and the action involved is unintelligent.

Aims. Since aims arise in the process of thinking, it is apparent that both the student and instructor establish aims in the course in public speaking. Establishing aims is not the same as saying that as long as they are established all is well and good. Negatively, it is not appropriate that the aim be to get through the material of the course and to conform to the course outline. Neither is it appropriate, since activity is desirable, all students should be active in some way during the term.

Dewey states that educational aims must, first of all, be based upon "the intrinsic activities and needs...of the given individual to be educated."<sup>24</sup> The instructor should indeed have aims, but these aims must be formulated in terms of the student's level of attainment and experience, his further needs or inefficiencies as determined by society's demands, instead of in terms of subject matter or a certain number of speeches. Aims, furthermore, "must be capable of translation into a method of cooperating with the activities of those undergoing instruction."<sup>25</sup> This qualification militates against fixed aims which prevent modification as demanded by the status of the students. It militates likewise against aims fixed by course supervisors or other personnel above them or by syllabi or outlines prepared for teachers.

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 126.

<sup>25</sup>Loc. cit.



For such prescribed aims allow the instructor no freedom to adapt to the needs of the class or to use his own ingenuity and resourcefulness in effecting situations which produce learning. Furthermore, the student is the recipient of aims established remotely from his needs and interests so as to confuse him between aims that are natural to his stage of development and those to which he is expected to submit.

A third qualification of aims is they should be general, that is, general in the sense "of a broad survey of the field of present activities."<sup>26</sup> Action, it is true, is specific at a given time and place and with reference to a particular activity, but it also has ramifications and connections with related activities. A broad aim permits a wider view of the field and stimulates a broader outlook over the field of means and consequences. Generality of aim does not preclude specificity of action, for when action is to take place it is specific, and there are usually a variety of ways of doing from which a choice must be made.

The public speaking instructor, as every instructor, "has certain things to do, certain resources with which to do, and certain obstacles with which to contend."<sup>27</sup> Within this framework he establishes his aims which in this context mean "acceptance of responsibility for the observations, anticipations, and arrangements required in carrying on a function."<sup>28</sup> As general statements, aims may take this form: The student should develop a platform manner free from distracting

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 128.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 125.

mannerisms; he should present his material in a manner an audience can follow; he should develop, in so far as possible within the time limits of the course, a pleasant voice. While general, these statements of purposes permit a wide range of activity, adapted to the needs of the individual, to be instituted and carried out. These activities and the textual materials are the resources, and the established habits, misconceptions, uncontrolled impulses, and individual incapacities are the obstacles with which he needs to contend.

The student must also have aims in participating in the activities of the course. Such aims as "credit," "rounding out my schedule," and "I thought this would be good for me," are unworthy reasons or excuses showing little recognized need on the student's part and much less interest in what is going on. He has not thought about what he is doing. His aim should be to develop, as far as possible, his talents in the area of platform speaking, especially those aspects which present difficulties. He should have some notion as to what those difficulties are on the basis of his past experiences.

Furthermore, he should formulate for himself a purpose in giving a speech so he knows precisely why he is giving it and what he expects to learn from the experience. This point refers to an earlier discussion of overt action as experiment to test hypothesis. It was asserted that fulfilling an instructor's objective of so many speeches per term is detrimental to the real purpose of being in the class, namely, that of developing his efficiency as a speaker. Indeed, the student in the classroom must select his own speech topic, develop it with a purpose in mind so far as it may be an influence on the audience, and at the same time he must also have the aim of learning something about speaking

from the experience. Without both of these aims, his performances will waste his own time as well as that of the instructor and the class.

Capacity and Individual Differences. Because the experimentalist recognizes each person as individual, distinct in background and experience from every other individual, he hastens to affirm the fact of difference of individual capacity. Each student has some native capacity but what that student will become depends to a large extent upon the kinds of experiences which he has had and will have.

No student in a public speaking class is thoroughly stupid or unintelligent. The student may indeed appear to be unintelligent, but this appearance is due more to the fact that present activities do not touch his areas of interest in such a way as to concern him than it is to innate incapacity. The problem for the instructor is to find some activity which is within the student's realm of interest and concern and in which he has had some previous experience. This calls for greater effort from the instructor to discover these interest areas, greater, that is, than the usual lecture provides, greater than following a syllabus ready-made for all, greater than routinely executing a prescribed series of speeches common to the entire class.

Individual differences do not necessarily mean each student will have his own program of study, so to speak, within the same class. Justman explains that some commonality may well exist:

In general, the curriculum offerings on any level of learning are to be common experiences. What each student brings to a situation is, of course, an individual thing, and what he takes from it, in terms of attitudes, understandings, techniques, patterns of conduct, is also specific to himself. The school curriculum does not need to be specialized in order to provide for individual differences. Facing a common situation, learners react to the situation in their own ways, and at the same time profit from the experience or working together. Of course, some differentiation is desirable.

While the core of the curriculum is to consist of common situations which each learner faces in his own way, additional learning experiences are to be provided to meet special needs and interests.<sup>29</sup>

The fact each student as an individual is different from every other member of the class signifies the instructor will need to determine, as nearly as he can, what each student's assets and liabilities are at the beginning of the course. A speech performance at the beginning of the course, without being graded, followed by a personal conference with the student should help the instructor and the student to establish some measure of agreement on the latter's needs and problems. After that the emphasis each student places even on doing the common activities of the entire class may be directed toward his special needs. He may adopt as his aims also the aims of the group but his major aim may be to solve his individual difficulties. This can happen only when the course objectives are flexible enough to permit individual activity and to allow changes to occur after the term has begun. It can happen only when the instructor is willing to make allowances for differentiation between the capable and less capable students. For instance, all class members may be expected to have a minimum number of platform experiences and the more capable may be permitted to do more and longer speeches.

Since the individual student is trying to eliminate his personal and private deficiencies as a speaker, and since this kind of development is growth, evaluation of the student must take this progress into account. Growth, however, is more than mere platform skills, such as smooth and free gestures, noticeable state of ease, or eye contact with

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<sup>29</sup>Joseph Justman. Theories of Secondary Education in the United States.  
Op. cit., p. 379.

the audience. It includes such additional matters as skill in handling speaking devices, ability to analyze and adapt to different audiences, knowledge of the procedures in gathering and organizing information into acceptable rhetorical patterns, attitude toward the speaking situation and to the audience, and an attitude of tentativeness about information about the speech topic and of reasonableness toward listeners. Taking account of such items is far different from assessing merely the quantity of subject matter the student has absorbed from the text. A more acceptable question is to ask whether or not the student has made as much progress as might be reasonably be expected of him considering his starting point and the time and opportunity for growth provided by the course. Evaluation concerns itself more with the question of what the student has become as a result of his experiences in the classroom than with how much information he has stored away.

Significant difficulties stand in the way of such an evaluation. The platform performance is a complex of a large variety of factors so that it is difficult, if not almost impossible except on an arbitrary basis, to determine what relative weights to assign to the sundry elements in the speaking situation. Really satisfactory measuring devices are not available for assessing the many factors in respect to which growth is possible. Classes in public speaking are held relatively small so that the normal curve of distribution is not applicable.

That evaluation of the many factors of growth is a major obligation upon the educator attempting to teach by the experimentalist method is apparent from the explanation of this philosophic point of view. What is not apparent in experimentalist writings is how a grade is to be established in a course. The absence of direct suggestions for solving

this problem of the teacher does not, however, militate against examinations. The kind of examination the experimentalist would accept is one which seeks to determine the extent of growth in ability to handle materials pertinent to the course, not to determine how many factual items were memorized as so much memory work by the student.

Interest. A student will be interested in the activities of a class if he can see the relationship between those activities and his present concern, that is, if the outcome of the activities makes a difference to him. The other interest factor necessary in those activities is that they "cannot be carried through without reflection and use of judgment to select materials of observation and recollection...."<sup>30</sup>

Significance lies in these principles for the public speaking instructor in that he will need to select or permit the students to work with him in selecting those class activities which will be of concern to them. Perhaps a preconceived sequence will be disturbed, for example, the demonstration speech preceding the persuasive one, but the important consideration is to enable the student to establish the connection between on-going activities with his daily affairs. From whatever beginning is made new problems will arise and so begins a spiralling process which will cover the essential materials of the course. The advantage lies in the fact the students will want to cover the materials because they see its importance to their existence. Their activity will have its own momentum and motivation. They will study, observe and reflect, because they want to do those things for themselves. The instructor

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<sup>30</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 156.

will not need to go in search of artificial devices, illustrations, activities, and anecdotes to keep the class interested.

This procedure implies, of course, the instructor is both free and willing to let the students do a large share of the planning of the course. It is quite unlikely he will be able to predict accurately the interests and concerns of the class before he meets them. Such a class procedure reduces the domination of the instructor and enhances the opportunities and responsibilities of the individual students. They will select their own topics for speeches, determine the kinds of speeches they will want to practice, originate the hypotheses they will want to try, and read the text as they need it to solve their problems. This is not to say the instructor is relegated to the background, that he will be a mere visitor to the class; indeed not, his role continues to be that of the more mature adult who because of his greater accumulation of experience with current social demands is available for suggestions and guidance, for help in evaluation of experience, and for learning with the students and sharing their experiences with them.

Discipline. Discipline, according to the experimentalist, is the power to see a problem through to its resolution rather than keeping a classroom quiet and orderly in a physical sense. As long as students are working toward accomplishing their objectives in the class, that is, as long as their objectives are directing their activities and holding them to their task, discipline may be said to exist in that classroom.

The relation of this principle to the principles of interest are evident. Discipline is not something taught directly as an item of subject matter. It accrues as the students work out problems with

whose solutions they are concerned. The instructor needs to help the students decide what they wish to investigate and which experiments they wish to do. If they are interested in gesturing, they will investigate and try out and practise gesturing in their speaking until they find the answers they need, and they will remain with the task until they have completed it. If they are vitally interested in the effective use of visual aids, more precise articulation, they will study and work until satisfactory answers and techniques are clear to them. Conversely, as soon as the instructor gives them assignments which are of no perceivable concern to them, interest wanes and problems of attention, orderliness, and fruitful occupation develop. Even the introduction of artificial devices, such as courtroom cross-examination adapted to the classroom situation, will deflect from the subject matter at hand to the technique itself and result in by-passing the ideational content and concentrating on the game for its own sake. Discipline is best secured by material that is of concern to the student and by developing the habit of investigating a problem and seeing it through to its resolution.

Frequently the instructor will need to suggest an appropriate series of questions for the student's reading. These, phrased so as to constitute practical problems for the student, will guide his reading and thinking so that it will be more purposeful and capable of relation to the student's ongoing living. Suggestions of practical applications or study of present extra-class application of the ideas will help to clarify the significance of certain topics such as language, gestures, illustrations, and dialectal differences.



Motivation. The task of motivating, according to the experimentalist point of view, is not to stir the student to action he-will act anyway--but rather to stimulate him to act in certain specific ways. Action is characteristic of man, but if left unguided it will receive its power either from blind impulse or from established habit. Neither is the source of a truly educative experience, for each lacks the qualities of continuity and intelligence.

The public speaking instructor's task is to guide the student so that he will have an educative experience in giving speeches. He will give speeches in response to a command, but through such speeches he will merely seek to satisfy the requirements the instructor places upon him. The student needs to prepare the kind of speech which requires reflective thinking both as to subject matter and as to speech techniques so that the results can be assessed and reflected back upon the ideas being tested. The student doing the latter kind of speaking finds his motivation in the satisfaction of increasing his range of experience, in gaining extended insight into the speech-making process, in being commended by the instructor and his fellows, in gaining knowledge which will be applicable in another situation, and in restoring an irresolute situation into a resolved one.

Comments following the delivery of a speech ought to mention the good points of a speech as well as those which did not measure up to expectations. The schedule of speeches ought not to be so close as to prevent adequate discussion of the extent of success and lack of success in terms of the student's purpose in giving it. For such "inchoate activity taken in this forward-looking reference to results, especially

of approbation and condemnation, constitutes a motive."<sup>31</sup> The desire to bring about anticipated results, to verify an hypothesis, to determine the relative merit of an idea, to vindicate one's own thinking, is vigorous and persisting motivation. Needless to say, instructor-determined assignments do not afford this personal type of motivation for the individual student, for the student does not know--nor care either--what the anticipated results should be nor what hypothesis is at stake, nor does he seek to vindicate his own thinking for in such an assignment he has not done any reflecting. The only motivation in such an assignment is the desire to make a sufficiently good showing to avoid severe censure and perhaps ridicule, but that is scarcely what is sought here. It is instead bypassing what may be worth while in the experience and only superficially and externally fulfilling imposed requirements; it does not constitute desirable motivation.

Retention and Forgetting. Since Dewey's concept of retention is somewhat obscure, clear implications are difficult to describe. However, it would seem that what is experienced in one speaking situation and what is learned from it by a frank appraisal of the results will be remembered when another and similar speaking occasion arises. It does not signify that such resulting knowledge needs be written and preserved for future reference. The fact that it is experienced is enough to make it available as resource material as occasion demands. On the other hand, should the student have no occasion to give another speech for a considerable time afterward, it is likely that this knowledge would not be clearly evident and available to him. Lack of use would tend toward forgetting. Hence, it seems necessary that the student be

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<sup>31</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 121.

given the opportunity to appear on the platform frequently lest what he learned in one speech situation be forgotten before he has an opportunity to use it again. Obviously, memorizing a body of facts, in the sense of cramming or filling pigeon-holes, is out of the question. Overt, or at least vicarious, experience with an idea or a datum is more important.

In order to provide frequent opportunity for the student to appear as a speaker, class size must be small or the speeches must be short. Another possibility is that the same speech may be reworked for purposes of experimenting with some other idea; this procedure will at least save the time of discussing the subject of the speech again and so allow more time for appraisal of the method and technique. Still another way to overcome this difficulty is to have only parts of the class do certain kinds of speeches, for example a speech giving directions on how to do something, while those who did not give this kind of speech can give one explaining some kind of spatial relationship. Of course, this latter procedure does not provide all with the same kind of experience, if that is desirable, and it is to that extent a compromise necessitated by time limits.

Transfer of Training. The experimentalist accepts the notion of the transfer of training in so far as there are general similarities between two situations. In the speech making process a variety of such aspects are common to nearly all speaking occasions, e.g., clear articulation, pleasant voice quality, appropriate gestures and stage bearing, understandable organization. These are staples from one situation to another. This is not equally true, however, of such phases of speaking as choice of vocabulary, rhetorical devices, illustrations, and linguistic style.

Once the student has learned how to prepare a speech from selecting a topic, gathering material and organizing it, to framing a rhetorical outline or writing it in manuscript form, he will understand the general procedure and find it applicable in many future situations. Having learned how to analyze an audience he will have a method for analyzing other audiences. Similarly, other techniques and skills such as gesturing, using visual aids, speaking into a public address microphone remain fairly stable from situation to situation. Particular materials for a specific speech, of course, are peculiar to that speech and to that one only; they may be used again only as they relate closely to that same topic though under another heading.

The Point of View. Teaching public speaking, even in so far as it deals with certain skills, is then not to be conceived of as merely a stimulus-response operation. Simple response to stimuli corresponds to an impulsive reaction or the setting in motion of already established habits, neither procedure satisfying the qualifications of a really educative experience. Reflection and intelligence are necessary on the student's part to make the experience educative. This implies that understanding is necessary and the student needs insight into the various connections between the elements of the situation confronting him.

Stimulus-response reactions are too mechanical and over-simplified to enable an intelligent handling of the many variables in the process of preparing and delivering a speech. Influencing an audience requires careful selection of material in terms of the specific audience and detailed planning of the kinds of appeals which will set an audience in motion in the desired direction. This insight demands a careful audience analysis by the student so that he understands the meaning of all

the elements in the situation and the significance of their relationship to one another. The instructor, therefore, cannot be satisfied with providing just a series of stimuli in the hope of producing the appropriate response. He must, on the contrary, be a leader, stimulate the student to discover problems of concern to him and then guide him through the process of intelligent inquiry toward socially acceptable goals. The educational enterprise involves the student and his purposes, purposes which he formulates in conjunction with his instructor. Operating a class by mechanistic stimulus-response reactions disregards the student's purposes and presumes the instructor's purposes can be realized by merely providing the appropriate stimuli.

Allied to this point is the fact that speech-making, as well as any other educative experience, involves intelligence. To establish fixed habits of doing things circumvents intelligence, effects inflexibility, and depreciates the significance of an idea. Yet habits also have their place so long as they remain flexible enough to enable the student to adapt to new and different situations. The student ought to make clear articulation, gestures, and unequivocal eye contact with the audience, for example, largely a matter of habit so that he can devote his attention to other elements in the total speaking situation, yet not so habitual that all plasticity has disappeared.

The foregoing discussion has separated certain aspects of the total public speaking situation for convenience of discussing them. Actually, such splitting off of minute elements does injustice to the facts, for the total process of speech-making is a unitary process in which steps overlap and mesh with one another at various points. Each of the separate elements has its place and needs consideration. Dewey recognizes

maintenance of a strict temporal sequence in terms of the steps in intelligent inquiry is scarcely feasible and the student needs to recognize this fact. This is not to say that the process of thinking can be done in any haphazard manner or that speech-making is an accidental procedure. The more connections the student sees as he analyzes his material with relation to an intended audience, the more overlapping and skipping back and forth from step to step will occur; the more intelligently the student is able to go about the task, the more he is able to do this skipping and yet maintain his bearing in regard to the overall picture.

### The Theory of Language

The Definition of Language. The public speaker must include in his definition of language more than spoken words, for an audience may draw inferences about the speaker and his subject from every move he makes while he is before them. His manner of approaching the podium, his gestures, grooming, state of composure, diction, handling of the topic, illustrations, figures of speech, organization of the subject, all of these are capable of carrying a message. The student must become aware of this fact so that when he is on the platform he will be careful to act and speak in such a way as to direct the attention of the audience to the subject, to what he has to say about it instead of to some mannerism he may inadvertently give free play. This awareness and appreciation he will get from comment about the speeches he gives and hears others give in the class; it may be necessary for the instructor to guide the comment in such a way that his point will be clearly brought to light.

Language--Its Origin and Status. Since mutual understanding of symbols originates in a common experience, it is incumbent upon the speaker to make sure the audience gets the impression from the symbols he uses that he intends them to get. Students have used the language all of their lives and frequently assume everyone understands the meaning of a word as they themselves have understood it. That this assumption is not true when dealing with specific things is easily demonstrated with even such words as common concrete nouns. If a class is asked to report the first response they would make to the word 'dog', a wide variation of responses will immediately become evident. In the writer's experience it is not uncommon to discover that there are usually no more than two or three nearly identical responses in a class of twenty-four students. This little experiment serves to emphasize that it may not be assumed everyone will interpret a word in the same way.

Another way to show them a word will mean different things to different individuals is to remind them that language is culturally conditioned, that is, people in different locales attach different meanings to a word. A few simple illustrations will suffice on the instructor's part; the members of the class are usually able to contribute others. In St. Louis, for instance, a 'car' is a street car, sometimes also called a 'trolley' and an automobile, or 'car' in other geographic areas, is a 'machine'. A speaker needs to be aware of the differences so as to adapt his language to the audience he is addressing. The instructor can easily maximize this point by skillfully raising questions about the meanings intended by various speakers. Of course, this need not be done in commenting upon every speech, for that would detract from the main task of the speakers, but an occasional well-selected illustration is in order.

The constant possibility of misinterpretation confronts every speaker and is cause for some concern to him. The persuasive speaker, for example, will usually recommend to his audience a specific course of action. He will want all of his audience to do the same thing in concert. The necessity of careful choice of language cannot be over-emphasized, for it would be disastrous to his cause to have the audience leave and each member do something different while believing, however, he was carrying out the recommendations of the speaker. In exposition, too, precision of meaning is important for clarity of understanding. Different understanding of words leads to misunderstanding; action based upon misunderstanding leads to confusion; confusion caused consciously or unconsciously by a speaker discredits his veracity and integrity.

Dewey observes that words in isolation are not language. Meanings cannot be conveyed in any adequate way by single words remote from other words, for connectives such as conjunctions and prepositions are essential in a context of words to indicate relationships even when an otherwise whole statement is made. The speaker will do well to avoid a telescopic style from which such connectives have been eliminated. To utter just a noun and a verb is usually not enough to convey meaning satisfactorily. Words comprising the other parts of speech are necessary both for clarity of expression and for greater certainty of understanding.

Besides, it is the speaker's task to utter words in terms of thought, that is, in what in oral reading is called 'oral phrases'. To break ideas and combine in utterance half of one with half of the next one is to confuse the listener or at least to place an undue burden upon him. For example, if a speaker were to phrase the first sentence of the



Gettysburg Address in this way: Fourscore and // seven years ago our fathers // brought forth upon this // continent a new nation conceived // in liberty and dedicated //, etc., it would be virtually impossible for the listener to make sense out of it. On the other hand, were he to say, Four score and seven years ago // our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, // conceived in liberty...//, each group of separated words expresses an idea which the audience can grasp at once. This latter phrasing is the speaker's obligation, and he must utter words in their appropriate groupings if he wishes to be understood.

Language Usage--Consummatory. On occasion language is enjoyed for its own sake. Poetry, literature, declamation, and sometimes oratory fall within this category for beauty of expression and elegance of language are of major importance in these arts. The beginning public speaker, however, does not ordinarily seek to practice oratory; his primary concern is to be able to convey ideas to a group of people or to influence their thinking or their conduct directly, usually in references to practical things as opposed to matters esthetic. While, of course, he needs to use appropriate diction and acceptable syntactic constructions, the emphasis is not on elegance but instead on clarity, unity and coherence. Emphasis on elegance tends to induce formalism and distracts from the task to be done however mundane. If he can attain a measure of beauty of language, he is to be commended so long as beauty of expression is not his first objective.

Language Usage--Instrumental. There are dangers in this function too. At the outset it was observed that sharing the meaning of language is possible only as a result of common experiences. The instructor--and

for that matter, the public speaker outside of a classroom as well--addresses his audience on a topic through the medium of language. What the audience receives from such communication is not an idea, but another fact. Dewey comments:

...no thought, no idea, can possibly be conveyed as an idea from one person to another. When it is told, it is, to the one to whom it is told, another given fact, not an idea. The communication may stimulate the other person to realize the question for himself and to think out a like idea, or it may smother his intellectual interest and suppress his dawning effort at thought. But what he directly gets cannot be an idea. Only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem at first hand, seeking and finding his own way out, does he think.<sup>32</sup>

There is not possible a complete sharing of an experience merely through the medium of language. The significance for the classroom teacher is, according to Dewey:

When the parent or teacher has provided the conditions which stimulate thinking and has taken a sympathetic attitude toward the activities of the learner by entering into a common or conjoint experience, all has been done which a second party can do to instigate learning. The rest lies with the one directly concerned. If he cannot devise his own solution...and find his own way out he will not learn, not even if he can recite some correct answer with one hundred per cent accuracy.<sup>33</sup>

Unfortunately, the lecture system usually stops with telling the idea on the assumption that the student then has the idea, understands it, and knows precisely when and how to use it. While this view does not condemn the lecture system outright, it does say it is not enough. What is necessary is that the student have opportunity to work out ideas with the aid of such information; in this activity the instructor's role is not that of a casual observer, it is not quiescence, but "participation, sharing, in an activity. In such shared activity, the teacher is

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<sup>32</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 188.

<sup>33</sup>Loc. cit.

a learner, and the learner is without knowing it, a teacher..."<sup>34</sup> Thus is denied the readily-made assumption that delivery of a lecture equals learning on the student's part. From the standpoint of language, sharing of activity is essential to sharing ideas. The public speaking student will have ample opportunity to share in such activity since the course is largely an activity course. Even so, Dewey's warning words may be worthy of notice,

Knowledge which is mainly second-hand, other men's knowledge, tends to become merely verbal. ... But in the degree in which what is communicated cannot be organized into the existing experience of the learner, it becomes mere words: that is, pure sense-stimuli, lacking in meaning.<sup>35</sup>

Neither is the information the student gleans from his reading of texts, resource materials, and sample speeches to be identified with ideas or knowledge unless he has opportunity to use it in solving his own speaking problems. Dewey's caution cited above applies to this material as well. Even remembering and reproducing it on an examination is no assurance that the student has made it his own. He may have it in his fund of information but without a real appreciation of it; he may have mechanically stored it away to satisfy course requirements without understanding the connection it has with ongoing affairs. He has a superficial acquaintance with it but no knowledge of it in the sense in which the experimentalist speaks of knowledge.

Since understanding language is dependent upon common experiences, the speaker must study his audience carefully to determine in so far as possible what their experiences have been so that he may choose language

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<sup>34</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 221.

which is most likely to be meaningful to them. Otherwise he is apt to address them in what amounts to a foreign tongue. For this reason audience analysis is an important step in speech preparation. He will need to know how they live, what and how they think, what they do and what their concerns are, what their beliefs and values are; in fact, he must consider all aspects of the audience as it may relate to his speech. This analysis in itself will be a most illuminating, educative experience.

### Values and Public Speaking

Appreciation. Classroom teaching is accomplished largely through the medium of language and is to that extent an indirect experience for the pupil. Furthermore, the use of language itself is likely to introduce some error into the concepts the student takes away from the classroom, the extent of error increasing as the extent of the student's familiarity with the topic being discussed decreases. This results in gross misconceptions on the student's part or in the mechanical study of the language involved as a formality in order to pass the course. In either event the presumed purpose of the course is by-passed.

Now language may be studied for its own sake; it may be appreciated in a practical or an esthetic way as a thing of beauty of itself, or even as an historical subject, for it has its own physical development. To some extent the oral reader, and for that matter also, though to a lesser degree, the public speaker seeks to appreciate language for itself. To those who have developed such standards of taste and elegance this kind of appreciation has considerable value.

However, the public speaking classroom situation is not primarily concerned with this phase of appreciation but rather with the subject

matter of the course. The instructor must insure that those in his class get a real appreciation of public speaking and of the many concepts connected with a systematic study of it. The students must experience these concepts so that 'they come home' to them, so that they effect a 'genuine appreciation' and are 'really taken in', says Dewey.<sup>36</sup>

This genuine appreciation derives only from live experiences, experiences which are direct and first-hand. Dewey explains:

Before teaching can safely enter upon conveying facts and ideas through the media of signs, schooling must provide genuine situations in which personal participation brings home the import of the material and the problems which it conveys. From the standpoint of the pupil, the resulting experiences are worthwhile on their own account; from the standpoint of the teacher, they are also means of supplying subject matter required for understanding instruction involving signs, and of evoking attitudes of openmindedness and concern as to the material symbolically conveyed.<sup>37</sup>

This condition for thorough appreciation is easily supplied in the public speaking class in that short speeches of introduction or of narration can be suggested at the very outset. Several times on the platform is usually enough to effect sufficient familiarity with elemental principles for class discussion and analysis of each student's inadequacies. And since the public speaking class is conceded to be a laboratory course, this same procedure can be used throughout the term so that speeches already given provide the backlog of experience for each new topic as it is introduced. After the student has platform experience he can begin the study of textbook materials and improvement of his techniques. Through these initial speeches he can, with the help of his instructor, begin to analyze his own problems in speaking and

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 272.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 273.

then the search for ways to reconstruct inefficient habits into more effective ones. So important is this procedure that Dewey explicitly states, "Getting command of technique and of methods of reaching and testing generalizations is at first secondary to getting appreciation."<sup>38</sup>

Through a series of such experiences, each of which is evaluated and examined, the student will develop standards of appreciation and excellence on his own account. Such a procedure will avoid the difficulty of classroom materials becoming and remaining on a purely symbolic level and having only a second-hand kind of appreciation. Meaning of a personal and significant kind attaches to such experiences, meaning which will retroact and thereby reconstruct old habits and concepts.

With such standards of real appreciation the student can then listen to a speech by a classmate and make a reasonable judgment of its effectiveness. The student is the consumer of the speeches given in a class and as a consumer he is in a position to make critical comment on a performance. With the help of his imagination and an accumulation of experiences he can suggest other ideas as improvements upon the performances he hears. Thereby he will deepen his sense of realization of the many aspects of speech-making both for himself and for him whose speech he is evaluating. It may not be too much to suggest that the students might well grade one another's performances toward the end of the course. The obligation of grading fairly and appropriately, so far as this is possible on a largely subjective basis, places an added responsibility of careful observation, analysis, and discriminating judgment upon the

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 274.

student so as to heighten his appreciation of the speech from the listener point of view.

Considered from another angle, this real appreciation expresses the difference between a professed standard of evaluation such as might be derived from the text and from the instructor, and a working standard as derived from the text, the instructor, and from a wealth of first-hand experience. In the latter case the student has made the materials of the course his own so that he understands their relationships and applications; they are a part of his ways of operating and thinking; they have made a difference to him and in him; they have realigned his habits and so help to guide his impulses; they are at his constant disposal. In the former case he may be capable of reproducing them on an examination paper; he may sometimes be able to apply them in ready-made situations such as classroom assignments; he may be able to talk of them with seeming intelligence, but away from the classroom he sees no practical application of them for they are not a real part of him; they have been 'learned' in some mechanical fashion, but they make no difference in any ready and significant way.

This doctrine of appreciation denies the validity of such procedures as assigning a chapter in a text, learning the principles, and then applying them in a platform speaking situation. For example, it would be superficial at best to explain to a class various kinds of gestures and then assign a speech for the next class period in which the particular task would be to use each of these gestures at least once. Or, for that matter, supplying a set of rules which are to be used in the next speaking assignment cannot guarantee any real sense of appreciation for the rules regardless of their general applicability.

Intrinsic Value. Since the experimentalist denies the possibility of establishing a hierarchy of values among subjects of study, it follows that public speaking may be a subject of study on its own account, worthy and capable of being experienced and appreciated for itself. This statement assumes that the experiences the student has during the course fulfill the criteria of continuity and the application of intelligence to solving its problems. Dewey, as cited above, stresses the importance of providing "genuine situations in which personal participation brings home the import of the material and the problems which it conveys. From the standpoint of the pupil, the resulting experiences are worthwhile on their own account...."<sup>39</sup> In another instance he says, "It is as true of arithmetic as it is of poetry that in some place and at some time it ought to be a good to be appreciated on its own account --just as an enjoyable experience, in short."<sup>40</sup>

Dewey furthermore says, "...as long as any topic makes an immediate appeal, it is not necessary to ask what it is good for."<sup>41</sup> It is impossible to say for what specific purposes the student will later use each of the principles or skills included in a course in public speaking. This impossibility need not dismay anyone, for "The proof of a good is found in the fact that the pupil responds; his response is use. His response to the material shows that the subject functions in his life."<sup>42</sup> If the instructor can secure a lively and sincere response

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 273.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 281.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 283.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 283-284.



from the student, then he need not be concerned that the work of the course is without value to the student.

Instrumental Value. A course in public speaking may have value for its own sake, but it may have also instrumental values though they may be difficult in any given instance to specify. If the student sees no such values, it is fruitless to suppose that he will realize them by merely telling him what they are. Dewey explains, "The way to enable a student to apprehend the instrumental value of arithmetic for example is not lecture him upon the benefit it will be to him in some remote and uncertain future, but to let him discover that success in something he is interested in doing depends upon ability to use numbers."<sup>43</sup> The public speaking instructor can well take a hint from this statement to the effect that no amount of textbook assignments or lecturing will enable the student to see such values; he will have to experience situations in which an ability to speak in public is of significance to success in accomplishing desired ends.

The instructor will need to guide the student into such situations where public speaking ability is a factor. Does the student belong to any campus organizations? Would he like to become president of one such club? Would he like to be able to debate public issues on the platform? Would he desire to be a civic leader in his home community? These and similar questions are applicable to the situation he is presently in as a student on a college campus. Besides, many of the principles of platform speaking are equally pertinent to conversation with fellow students, to class discussion, to student government activities, and to

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<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 281.

the programs of living units and campus clubs. Helping the student consciously to see the connection between the principles of effective speaking and accomplishing desired objectives in his realm of activities enables him to see the instrumental value of public speaking experiences. A word of caution is particularly apropos at this point, namely, establishing such connections should be done as unobtrusively as possible even though done consciously. Dewey comments pointedly:

In general what is desirable is that a topic be presented in such a way that it either have an immediate value, and require no justification, or else be perceived to be a means of achieving something of intrinsic value. An instrumental value then has the intrinsic value of being a means to an end.<sup>44</sup>

With the establishment of such connections the student will be capable of perceiving the good in situations which he experiences, for he will see "the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release in action."<sup>45</sup> Upon the completion of inquiry during which aims were carefully framed he will recognize the potentially better way of doing things to accomplish an objective. He will recognize that, with so many variables involved in the public speaking situation, hard and fast rules are impossible and even the principles put to use will need to vary with the situations confronting him. He will select principles in terms of their potential effects in a specific situation at a specific time and place. This point militates against the propounding of incontrovertible rules and principles applicable to any and all situations. Selection of ways and means of

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 284.

<sup>45</sup>John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. Op. cit., p. 210.

accomplishing objectives implies the exercise of intelligent choice and judgment of the alternatives available. Should the speaker seek to persuade an audience of fellow students to contribute to the Campus Chest, he will need to select those arguments which will fit into the existing climate of opinion prevalent in that audience. The results of his efforts constitute the good in that case and the devices, arguments, and techniques he employs are the instrumental means in the process.

The relation of selecting the good as described above indicates how closely the process of speech construction is related to the method of intelligence. During the process of intelligent inquiry suggestions of choices based on the facts in the given case and directed by the end-in-view arise. The larger this realm of intelligent experiences in public speaking becomes, the greater and more extensive does the student's freedom become. This freedom cuts two ways: In the first place, the student's command of technique and skills in public speaking increases; his supply of resources expands to permit greater choice of means in accomplishing objectives, and as the range of possibilities increases his freedom of choice likewise expands proportionately. On the other hand, since his speaking will deal with pertinent and timely questions of a social, personal, economic, or political nature, and since he must investigate these topics before he can speak intelligently about them, he will concomitantly increase his command over these fields of subject matter and become aware of the various choices open to him also in these areas. As these choices expand, his freedom expands proportionately. And in so far as his communication with an audience is effective, secures real understanding and conviction, and leads to wiser choices on the part of the audiences he addresses, the freedom of the

audience is likewise enlarged. Thus an effective course in public speaking makes its long-range contribution to the welfare and progress of democracy and to the cause of freedom.

As already indicated, the various problems of inquiry involved in preparing a speech require an analysis of relationships between the various factors involved: the audience, their background, interests, beliefs and aspirations, possibilities of treatment, and the techniques of communication. To understand these factors in their interaction is to comprehend manifold relationships. For that reason public speaking has unlimited cultural value, for, as Dewey says, "...any subject is cultural in the degree in which it is apprehended in its widest possible range of meaning."<sup>46</sup>

On the other hand, a subject is humane when it is "imbued with an intelligent sense of human interests."<sup>47</sup> Public speaking viewed in this light has extensive humane value because it deals with communication between human beings, its effectiveness depends in large part upon an intelligent selection of topic, an intelligent treatment of that topic in terms of a particular audience, their probable reactions to selected stimuli, the speaker's choice of point of view to be advocated, material to be used as support for generalizations, ways of treating and organizing such materials, and upon an active concern for promoting the welfare of the listeners in particular and of man in general. "Any study so pursued that it increases concern for the values of life, any

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<sup>46</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., p. 336.

<sup>47</sup>Loc. cit.

study producing greater sensitiveness to social well-being and greater ability to promote that well-being is humane study."<sup>47</sup>

Summary. The implications of experimentalism for the teaching of public speaking includes student participation and activity in all phases of the course from planning activities to their evaluation, intelligent insight into the relationships between elements comprising a problematic situation, and testing hypotheses about speaking by overt experiment. Implied is a shift away from instructor-domination of class activity to cooperative study in which the instructor guides the student's growth toward the accepted ways of adult society. Real appreciation must precede development of techniques. Language, symbolic of mutual experiences and instrumental to achieving ends-in-view, must be used so as to convey meanings to an audience accurately. Public speaking is primarily a tool for accomplishing practical objectives, such as understanding, conviction, action, or inspiration.

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 337.

## CHAPTER VII

### AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TEXTBOOKS

Chapters Two through Five have presented in condensed form the essential principles of the philosophy of experimentalism as it is found primarily in the writings of John Dewey. Chapter Six explains the implications of this philosophy specifically for teaching college courses in public speaking.

The present Chapter is an attempt to assay the extent to which the principles of experimentalism are used in representative textbooks currently in wide use in college public speaking classes. Again the sequence of ideas in treating each of the six books is that of the four chapters dealing with the successive aspects of the philosophy itself. While the major emphasis has been placed on experimentalism as it affects teaching methods and procedures, minor attention has also been given to it as subject matter where applicable. The implications of experimentalism as explained in Chapter Six have been the criteria against which these six books are evaluated.

The purpose here is to discover whether and to what extent the principles of experimentalism are influencing the authors of college textbooks in public speaking and probably, therefore, also the teaching methods of those instructors who use these books in the classroom. It has not been considered the purpose of this study to indicate what is the point of view of those authors who do not follow the experimentalist approach. Here the concern is with the question: To what extent has

the philosophy of experimentalism influenced the educational points of view of the authors of the public speaking texts here under scrutiny?

### Fundamentals of Public Speaking

By

Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace<sup>1</sup>

In this text, designed for a beginning class in public speaking at the college level, the authors make no claims of originating new materials in this subject. In the Preface they say:

In adding another volume to the shelf of textbooks in public speaking we cannot appear as innovators in the theory or principles of public address. Our indebtedness to the teachings and writings of our predecessors and our contemporaries will be obvious.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time they have not intended to produce another "treatise on rhetoric."<sup>3</sup> The authors attempt to re-orient the principles of well-known rhetoricians to present-day living. In their own words, "It is those ancient principles of Aristotle, amplified by such later textbook writers and teachers as Cicero, Quintilian, Thomas Wilson, George Campbell, and Bishop Whately, and adapted to the needs and fashions of a modern day, which we shall try to set forth in this book."<sup>4</sup> In other words, they put the time-worn concepts of rhetoric in modern dress. As they say, "The principles of public speaking which must be adapted to life and work and society today must be explained in terms of today. Those are the terms in which you will study them in this book."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace. Fundamentals of Public Speaking. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1947.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.v.

<sup>3</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

They do, however, aim to present these principles in a somewhat different and new arrangement for the benefit of the student. Their statement reads, "We believe, however, that in the arrangement of the customary materials, in the exposition and illustration of many of the principles, and in the mode of approach to the student, we have managed to improve somewhat over previous practice."<sup>6</sup> Thus, they have arranged the materials in the chronological order in which they believe the student can begin speaking with some helpful principles in his initial speeches and amplify them as the course proceeds. For that reason topics are treated more than once in some cases, e.g., outlining. They aim to present the principles as the student needs them.

The topic of organization is of such importance, in the opinion of the authors, that they have given it especially extended treatment. They say, "In spite of their high-school and first-year college courses in composition, students do not commonly retain the sense of or respect for total pattern which we think essential to enlightened speechmaking."<sup>7</sup>

In treating persuasion too they follow the chronological steps. But more than that, "...the chronology is divided so as to permit the study of each major step and to apply the principles of each step to practice speeches before going on to the next step and its application in turn."<sup>8</sup>

Their pedagogical point of view is summed up reasonably well in the following statements:

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. v.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. vi.

<sup>8</sup>Loc. cit.



Our pedagogical purpose, finally, has led us to write primarily for the student, especially for the student who is taking his first college course in public speaking. We have attempted, wherever possible, to supply him with how-to-do-it directions. Indeed, perhaps the dominant tone of the book is preceptive. Nevertheless, we have gone beyond the handbook or manual, for we have not stopped with directions only. We have steadily endeavored to bring the student to some understanding of the principles which inform his practice. Even the novice, especially in college, should understand as well as do.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, they have placed public speaking "squarely upon a psychological basis,"<sup>10</sup> which is basically a stimulus-response psychology.

The point of view then is that the principles of public speaking, dressed for the modern student, are to be learned and applied in the order of psychological need.

The concept of experience has little significance for the subject matter or the methodology of this text. Inferentially, one sees that each speech is an individual experience and that no two experiences, such as making a speech, are the same.<sup>11</sup> In connection with the discussion of stage fright it is also pointed out that situations vary from one to another.<sup>12</sup> Experience is mentioned as a means of learning from time to time, but its import is minimal.

The pattern of inquiry fares little better. 'Analysis' and 'synthesis' are recommended as the methods of preparing and outlining materials for a speech, but it will be difficult for the novice public speaking student to discover the relationship of this process to the experimental pattern.<sup>13</sup> A veiled allusion to it is also expressed under the heading of persuasion in discussing the method of arriving at decisions:

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. vi-vii.

<sup>10</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid. Ch. 10. p. 213ff.

"Men believe that effective control of our environment comes, not through blind trial-and-error, but through rational methods of securing knowledge and of using it to solve problems."<sup>14</sup> Thinking rationally seems to mean thinking logically upon the basis of evidence and inference. In the chapter on Analyzing the Problem "Dewey's Steps in Analysis" are specifically recommended as one of two methods of discovering the material constituting a problem. The other method is called "The Traditional Scheme of Analysis" and is considered similar to the steps outlined as Dewey's. These steps are to determine what evils exist, their causes, what program will abolish the evils, whether it is the best solution, whether it would produce evils as bad as the one to be remedied--stock questions to the debater.<sup>15</sup> Both schemes are recommended as ways of securing and preparing materials for a speech and are a method of learning. In spite of this discussion, a recognition of this relationship to learning is not indicated.

Learning, as the authors say and as has been cited, is to occur through application of precept. The concluding paragraph in the text re-emphasizes this point of view, for it reads in part, "Speeches are fruitful of judicious study as evidence of the practice of good speakers from the past, but for most effective development of the student speaker's own ability to meet a problem in public speaking, the intelligent application of precept and principle are of prime importance."<sup>16</sup> They seem confident enough also to say, "One who has learned well the principles

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 375.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 404-407.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 567-568.

of public speaking and has mastered the practice of them, will be able to use them for speeches on a great many subjects."<sup>17</sup> In other words, the authors give the directions, the student follows; the student who 'knows' the directions can talk on many subjects.

The experimentalist would say, however, that this is an authoritative method of teaching since it does not allow freedom to the individual student; he would say further that it does not follow that knowing the 'rules' enables the student to select and apply rules intelligently; he also would contend that principles thus known probably are no real part of the student who, therefore, can have no real appreciation of them. He would maintain too that this method sets tasks which are frequently of no concern to the student but which he may do to fulfill in a perfunctory and artificial way the obligations assigned him from the outside. The experimentalist would contend that the principles extolled in the text and to be applied are not knowledge at all, merely information which may hamper rather than insure growth; he would say that being ordered to apply predetermined principles to instructor-set problems is not an intelligent procedure.

The position of these authors, however, appears somewhat ameliorated by including in it an additional technique, namely, "critical, guided practice yields greater, quicker, and more permanent improvement."<sup>18</sup> Taken by itself this statement sounds experimental enough, but it still omits several necessary factors. It still does not make the learning situation one involving the student's problem, for the criticism

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. x.

and guidance suggested in this context concern a judgment by the instructor as to the efficiency with which the student applied a ready-made principle. Criticism here concerns conformity to principle, not to the process of solving a problem intelligently. It 'informs his practice' after the practice is over rather than before when he could benefit most from being so informed. The function of 'informing' is misplaced in the sequence of the process.

Furthermore, the student is advised, in connection with the discussion of delivery, "You can learn only through doing, by handling yourself mentally and bodily as the situation demands."<sup>19</sup> Similarly, he is told that "by gaining experience in the speaking situation, we become accustomed to it. That is, we learn to think-and-talk on the platform as the occasion and circumstances demand."<sup>20</sup> The context of the entire chapter on delivery seems to climax in the discussion of habit-formation for which they advise first that the student know what his goal is, that he proceed purposefully, and secondly that he "practice; practice; practice."<sup>21</sup> So important is practice that the authors are willing to accept practice as the only rule in speechmaking. The experimentalist unfortunately would say of this too that intelligent practice is impossible when it is practicing something that is not the student's own idea--idea in the experimentalist sense--but something that he is ordered to make his own; such a procedure carries with it lack of appreciation, much perfunctoriness and automatism, but not intelligence.

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. x.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

The foregoing paragraphs suggest that the authors subscribe to the idea of learning by experience, as indeed they overtly and succinctly say. "You can learn through experience, an unsurpassed teacher."<sup>22</sup> But the next sentence deprives this one of much of its significance, for it reads; "you can learn, too, through study."<sup>23</sup> The importance seems undoubtedly to be attached to learning "through study". But even were that not true, 'learning through experience' as here used is not consistent with the experimentalist view even though the words are the same. Experience in the authors' view is practice in applying tailored principles to platform situations and critically determining the degree or excellence of conformity. It seems completely separate from study. The experimentalist, however, regards the entire pattern of inquiry, including study of resource material, an experience in which criticism serves to determine the extent of congruence between anticipated and actual results of action directed by ideas the student himself has thoroughly understood prior to the action.

Allied to the method of learning is the concept of knowledge. According to the authors of this text it seems knowledge equals what the experimentalist terms 'information'.<sup>24</sup> Knowledge and experience are not the same; apparently experience does not produce knowledge although, as is indicated above, it is possible to learn through experience. Their own language may help to clarify this difference:

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>23</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 375.

All except the dullest of us gain some knowledge and some experience from the mere process of living, and the more we are subjected to education, the greater our knowledge and experience become. Much of what we acquire is common to others like us, but each of us has some store, however meager, of knowledge and experience more or less peculiar to himself.<sup>25</sup>

Seemingly, experience merely gives experience while study gives knowledge, that is, what the experimentalist designates by the term "information."

How does the student remember material? The authors say that "The stronger, deeper, and more vivid the idea, the easier it is remembered."<sup>26</sup> How is he to do this? He is advised to read several good sources, skim many others, know the meaning of all words in those sources, outline the structure of the articles read, the aim of all of which is "to drive ideas into yourself until they become yours."<sup>27</sup> A gentler statement of this idea earlier in the text suggests that the intensity of the understanding of the meanings and relationships of subject matter helps memory.<sup>28</sup> Dewey, it will be recalled, mentions only frequent use as an aid to memory, that is, over and above having had an intelligent experience with the material in the first place. He would probably say of the authors' view that their 'experience' interprets the principle which without experience is just words.

Habit, they say, is "learned behavior that meets the needs of a situation; an instinct," as opposed to habit, "is unlearned behavior in

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 323.

<sup>27</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 54-55.

response to a situation."<sup>29</sup> The experimentalist would say that man needs many habits since situations are never twice alike, as also the authors admit. He would also say that instinct, as used above, is equivalent to what he calls "impulse." In the present authors' view 'instinctive' action is unpredictable and uncertain and probably inefficient; the answer lies in making the adaptation to the stimulus habitual. This he can do only "through doing,"<sup>30</sup> that is, through practice. The relationship between habit and instinct (impulse) is thus to avoid the instinctive reaction, to determine what one is after and then to practice that so as to make it habitual. This procedure fits in well with a preceptive method of learning; it does not correspond to the experimentalist view according to which the conflict between habitual and impulsive response necessitates the intervention of intelligence in order to determine which is the appropriate response.

Thinking seems to mean logical reasoning. Under the heading of Managing Ideas in the First Speeches,<sup>31</sup> a deductive type outline is given after which follows a description of how minds work. They say:

In building and outlining this speech you would probably not think of the parts in the order in which they appear in the outline. Our minds don't work that way. We tend to think first of a specific instance, of an incident, of certain facts, and then to move on to what those facts mean--that is, to the general statement. These examples and general statements tend to make us think of or look for other examples, facts, and general statements until we have a large assortment which we distinguish and group and arrange according to the pattern and methods here under discussion. Probably you would make many tries and revisions before you arrived at the outline above....<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., Ch. 2, pp. 27-44.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

The experimental pattern of inquiry seems not to have a part in thinking.

Mind fits also into this pattern thus far delineated. The authors speak of mind as an entity, a container, when they say, "The stimuli that prompt your mind during utterance are not on a page; they are in your minds, and you need to gain facility in controlling them."<sup>33</sup> Again, "Your own mind and your own experience are your first good sources of subjects...."<sup>34</sup> Mind and experience seem totally unrelated to one another. Dewey, it will be recalled, describes mind by stating, "Mind as a concrete thing is precisely the power to understand things in terms of the use made of them...."<sup>35</sup>

Intelligence seems to mean native capacity only. Perhaps the clearest statement in regard to it is not especially felicitous for quoting here but it reads, "Given a reasonable portion of brains, however, almost anyone can learn to be an acceptable public speaker."<sup>36</sup> From learning, they seem to say, accrue 'knowledge', experience, but not intelligence.

For the student to develop habits effectively he must have motivation. A synonym the authors use is "desire". In their words, "The results of experimental studies on learning agree that the desire to do a thing helps in the doing. To one who expects to acquire a good delivery this leads to a great axiom: the desire to speak to this audience,

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>35</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 39.

<sup>36</sup>Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, Fundamentals of Public Speaking. Op. cit., p. 9.



on this subject is a powerful stimulus to facility, fluency, and variety of utterance."<sup>37</sup> But whence this desire is to come is a problem left entirely to the student to solve.

Education, while explicitly undefined, is inferentially a 'learning' of the principles developed in and handed down from the past, and skill developed through extended practice. The instructor's role, at least in connection with 'teaching' delivery, is that of a "Friendly guide and sympathetic critic."<sup>38</sup> That is a description of his role which fits well with the experimentalist point of view except that for the latter it means that the instructor guides the student through the method of learning whereas in this text it means that he directs the student through the process of applying principles in practice and then criticizing the degree of conformity of practice with established principles.

The authors, in speaking of language, refer exclusively to words; they also recognize, however, that the visual cues an audience receives from the speaker also bear meaning.<sup>39</sup> Communication via words is dependent upon common meanings which both parties to the communicative situation attach to the same words. Meanings have become attached to individual words through long usage in association with the same referent. For that reason, "by means of a language symbol that has a common association for both you and me, the communication of ideas is accomplished."<sup>40</sup> This view, so far as it becomes clear, is not remote from that of the experimentalist.

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 54.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., Ch. 3, pp. 45-59.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

In learning new words the student is advised to look up definitions. Beyond that he is given six different ways of defining a word: synonym, classification, etymology, negation, illustration, and context. Clarity of meanings of words is one way of securing clarity of a speech and of supporting the content of that speech. Emphasis is not excessive on this phase of speaking, however, in this text.

Of the worth of public speaking the authors say, "It is ineffective and useless so far as it seems to be engaged in for itself."<sup>41</sup> That is, it has no intrinsic value if that is taken in the sense of exhibitionism. It does have a value, intrinsically, in that the student will "learn not only to speak but to speak about something."<sup>42</sup> And in that it will lead to more education it still has another value, which reminds one of the experimentalist view of education as growth whose end is more growth. This is expressed in their words, "You will learn how to discover and use the resources which you already have; and you will learn to increase those resources and keep on increasing them."<sup>43</sup>

Primarily, however, public speaking has more practical aims. The definition indicates what they are when it says, "It [public speaking] is merely one kind of communication--systematic, practical discourse, that aims, through speech sounds or gesture, to add to the information of others or to influence their attitudes and their action."<sup>44</sup> These values, usually stated in terms of the purposes of speaking, are to inform,

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>43</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 14-15.

entertain, influence conduct, influence attitudes or beliefs, and to move to direct action.<sup>45</sup> Public speaking is in this relationship a means toward the attainment of other ends. Such ends, in this text, are attributed to oral reading about which the authors say, "...those persons who expect in later life to read in public, especially those preparing for political and administrative positions, for the law, for the ministry, and for teaching, should take intensive instruction in reading."<sup>46</sup> And since it is aimed at influencing conduct, the authors say, "Public speaking is a tool or an instrument in this process, not a performance or an exhibition."<sup>47</sup>

On the surface, these authors seem in accord with the experimentalist position on value. Their views of knowledge as so many precepts learned and applied and of learning as memorizing suggest that they have little concern with what the experiences undergone during a course in public speaking do to the student beyond making him appear capable on the platform. Their text does not concern itself with what the student becomes as a person, with his attitudes toward speech topics, toward the audience, or with how intelligently he is able to select the means for accomplishing his speaking ends. They seem not to want to evaluate in any inclusive way what happens to the student as a result of undergoing these speaking experiences; they seem merely to want to make of him a technician externally skillful in handling the tools

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 114-115.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., pp. 308-309.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

though without an intelligent understanding of the reasons for selecting the tools which he uses.

This text by Bryant and Wallace, then, does not represent the experimentalist point of view to any significant extent. The concept of experience plays an exceedingly minor role, and where the word is used in connection with learning its function is not the same as in the pattern of experimental inquiry. According to this text, learning does not occur through the intelligent use of the pattern of inquiry even though this pattern is recommended as a method for preparing speeches; neither the internal organization of chapters nor the exercises for the student bear any consistent relation to the pattern. This incongruity between learning speech materials via the problem-solving method, learning by precept, and "learning by experience" is apparent throughout the text. Language, receiving minimal treatment by the authors, is close to the concept of language held by Dewey although the precise extent of that correspondence is impossible to ascertain. Their concept of values of public speaking bears only a superficial similarity to the experimentalist view. It is a text in which the ancient rhetorical point of view dominates the concept of learning and education.

Public Speaking for College Students  
Second Edition

by

Lionel Crocker<sup>48</sup>

The twenty-five chapters in this text are divided into four sections, each dealing with one of the four major aspects of the total

<sup>48</sup>Lionel Crocker. Public Speaking for College Students. Second Edition. New York: American Book Company, 1950.

speaking situation: the speaker, speech, audience, and occasion. In addition, two appendixes contain selections for interpretation and models of speech composition, and introductory materials preceding the first chapter include an outline of the Principles of Speech Composition, Principles of Delivery, and Criteria for Judging a Speech.

The educational point of view of this text is probably best expressed in the Foreword to the Second Edition where the following paragraph appears.

We build on the past. Students familiar with classical rhetoric --and their number is increasing--will recognize my borrowings from Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero. And I have felt free to take whatever suited my purpose from more recent writers. Other workers in the field have been generous in permitting such borrowings. Teachers of public speaking may enjoy pointing out to their students portions of the book that owe their origin to some rhetorician of the past, for in this way the student will gain a sense of the sweep of this noble discipline, which is as old as any in his curriculum.<sup>49</sup>

The student can then expect a large measure of classical rhetoric in modern ensemble plus a sizeable quantity of related information. The inference that the student is to learn the tried principles of public speaking representing the best thought of the centuries and then to develop his own skill through acceptance and practice of them in the classroom is not impertinent.

Experience figures frequently in the pages of this text although it is not as important a concept to the author as it is to Dewey. A clarifying of experience enables a more satisfactory adjustment to the environment, the author says. His advice to the student is:

In classes in public speaking the student is urged to talk about those problems common to his colleagues. In speaking about them,

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., pp. vii-viii.

the student tends to find a solution to his own difficulties. He may talk on fraternity rushing. As he prepares to talk about this or that solution, a phase of the problem that he has never considered may dawn on him. In this way he proceeds to an adjustment to his environment.<sup>50</sup>

He emphasizes adjustment to the environment in another context when he advises the student to instruct the audience he addresses—for as a public speaker he is also a teacher--and to "Throw some light on man's struggle to adapt himself to his environment."<sup>51</sup> Whether or not it is possible, in the opinion of the author, to adapt the environment to man's individual needs is not clear from the text. And only incidentally, while advising the student how to be interesting, does he state that "Life is uncertain."<sup>52</sup> Experience does not have a major role in the development of this text.

It follows, therefore, that the pattern of inquiry as understood by the experimentalist should have an equally minor role. A few brief references to it indicate that this is true. The citation above carries a slight allusion to it. In discussing the interests of an audience these statements are made, "What concerns an audience? Problems and their solutions. A public speaker who cannot discern what problems are disturbing an audience will lack an audience."<sup>53</sup> This again seems to imply adaptation to the environment by the speaker. The problem-solution sequence is again suggested as a technique for analyzing some subjects, but it is only one method out of a list of ten such schemes

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 221.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 214.

and it is not elaborated.<sup>54</sup> Soon thereafter a skeleton outline is given as a pattern for a problem-solution speech.<sup>55</sup> The most extensive discussion of this pattern occurs, almost in disguise, in one of the two paragraphs on the value of group discussion in which he says, in explanation of an illustration, "The chairman sought to direct the discussion along three lines: (1) What are some of the needs of our college at this particular time? (2) What qualities should the new president have to meet these needs? (3) What suggestions as to names have already been made?"<sup>56</sup> Clearly the pattern of inquiry has a small role in this text.

Learning, according to this text, occurs through a variety of methods. In the first Chapter the student is told, "College is the place where we learn from the experience of others."<sup>57</sup> The context indicates the meaning to be that the student is to 'learn' the rhetorical principles of the past and to put them into practice in the classroom to develop his skill. The influence and role of the past is stated to be, "Yet from generation to generation certain useful facts about delivery have been recorded and can be passed on."<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, in connection with bodily activity learning is also said to be possible and best achieved in another way, namely, "Delivery is best learned not from a book but by imitation and under the guidance of a skillful teacher."<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 277.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 286.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 411.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>59</sup>Loc. cit.

Emphasis is on 'learning' the principles of good speaking as formulated in the past and conforming to them by practice and imitation in order to attain to some measure of the ideal.

The manner of presenting these principles lends support to this interpretation of Crocker's learning theory. Perhaps the greatest concentration of commands to the student in any one single place is in the following paragraph:

Stand tall. Hold up your head. Throw your shoulders back. Let the hands rest at the sides. Don't rock on the sides of your shoes; don't teeter on heel and toe. Don't wrap one leg around the pedestal upon which the desk rests. Don't play with the desk. Don't dust it off. Look at the audience. Don't look at the floor.<sup>60</sup>

The exercises at the ends of chapters further exemplify this theory of learning. One of the more lengthy but typical illustrations is:

Give a speech of seven minutes in which you pay particular attention to the construction of the introduction. Do the four things suggested in the chapter. On the paper you hand in to the instructor, mark in red pencil the places where you have attempted to conform to the principles laid down.<sup>61</sup>

Perhaps more frequently the assignment is phrased like the following one: "Give a speech on faculty-student relationship in which the end to convince dominates."<sup>62</sup> At the end of each of twenty-three of the twenty-five chapters in this text one particular assignment appears; the phrasing may vary slightly from chapter to chapter and the topics listed are different but it is otherwise standard: "Make a short speech on one of the following subjects."<sup>63</sup> No other directions as to purpose or problem are included.

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 269.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 168.

<sup>63</sup>Loc. cit.



However, the author also believes that one learns from experience although the process is not at all clear since it is not explained. One such statement will perhaps suffice to illustrate: "We have learned through long experience to control the muscles of the face so that our emotions are not visible to a curious world. Through experience we can learn to control the voice...."<sup>64</sup> Apparently the "guidance of a skillful teacher," referred to above, is necessary for competent criticism and for motivation.

For the most part, then, learning is impressing upon oneself tested principles and conforming to them as nearly as possible or conforming to noble examples which embody actively those principles. This method of learning is far removed from the method of learning envisioned by the experimentalists.

The concept of intelligence too fails to correspond with the experimentalist's understanding of it. The author writes, "We shall speak of intelligence in a rather broad sense as including common sense, tact, good taste, wide interests, and self-criticism."<sup>65</sup> The immediately succeeding discussion indicates that it is an inherited entity or ability and manifests itself in a variety of ways. The author further states:

Anyone who presumes to stand before his fellow men and direct their thinking should be well endowed mentally. Intelligence shows in how accurately and how quickly one can judge a situation. The public speaker will show his intelligence in the way he chooses his subjects for presentation, in the way he can diagnose needs in communities and proceed to meet those needs. A doctor may memorize his medical books; but if he does not have the intelligence to apply what he knows to individual cases, he does not develop a practice.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 35-36.

The last sentence indicates that intelligence is ability to apply principles and in so far conforms to the concept of learning described above. The phase of diagnosing and meeting community needs would seem to meet the experimentalist's viewpoint in that the latter describes intelligence as method. One suspects, however, that were the author to grant that intelligence manifests itself in the ability to solve problems, he would recognize it as only one relatively insignificant way in which it is manifested; the major concept certainly is not, as the experimentalist would say, that intelligence is method.

If intelligence is given by inheritance, then one may suspect that mind will also be considered a "something" and that it will be spoken of as an entity or a locale. The author conforms to this inference when he says, "It will help the speaker to keep fear out of his mind...."<sup>67</sup> This text contains this statement, "Not the least of the advantages of this way of organizing a speech is that of sinking the text into the minds of the audience."<sup>68</sup> In the absence of further specific statements as to what the author believes mind to be, statements as just cited do warrant the inference that mind is a physical something which learning fills with information. The experimentalist, on the other hand, views it as acting with a purpose, acting intelligently.

Similarly, memory is spoken of as a reservoir which is to be filled.

Note this statement:

In order to think, we must have materials with which to think; the reservoir of these materials has been called the memory. Memory

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 283.

deals with the past; it is a 'reinstatement of an old experience or a present consciousness of an old experience, with knowledge that it is old,' as Professor W. B. Pillsbury has said.<sup>69</sup>

From the standpoint of memory, the author further states that "A successful speech will, then, employ references to experiences that were accompanied by a strong mood, experiences that were originally striking, experiences that keep recurring to consciousness, experiences that occur daily, and experiences that are recent."<sup>70</sup> Even though Dewey is not explicit in defining memory, he does say that things are forgotten largely by disuse, or are remembered if they recur frequently in practical situations.

Habit receives virtually no attention in this text. The author does state that "As a speaker gains experience it is to be hoped that his concern with the machinery of communication will grow less and less."<sup>71</sup>

Likewise knowledge is, in the author's view, an already established body of material. He says, under the sub-heading of Knowledge in the first chapter, "Most teachers of public speaking want to teach you the principles of public speaking that have been discovered through the years and to supervise your practise of the art."<sup>72</sup> Knowledge is pre-digested material which is to be learned and to be conformed to in practice. The experimentalist labels such material 'information', all too likely to

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 109. Note: There is no identification of the source of the quotation from Professor Pillsbury.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 118.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., pp. 7-8.

clutter rather than serve purposes, and he reserves the term 'knowledge' to designate the outcome of experiment. However, the author does say that "there are no cut-and-dried rules for the practice of public speaking,"<sup>73</sup> and he does aver that "The speaker must have insight,"<sup>74</sup> that is, in this context, apparently insight into the materials of a speech, not the techniques of speaking.

Crocker defines language in a way sufficiently broad to approximate Dewey's definition. Crocker says, "Language may be defined as 'any means, vocal or other, of expressing thought or feeling.'"<sup>75</sup> As to how language arises, however, there seems to be a discrepancy. Dewey maintains that it is dependent upon common experiences; Crocker, on the other hand, seems to say that a word is a convention, mutually agreed upon, for he says,

To understand our language, the person to whom we speak must agree with us that certain symbols stand for certain experiences. Language is thus arbitrary. An infant can communicate with its mother through a set of symbols which both have agreed to understand, but no one outside this two-way circuit can understand them.<sup>76</sup>

Furthermore, Crocker says that through using words "The speaker is interested in awakening in his listeners a similar experience--not the same one, for that is impossible."<sup>77</sup> Dewey would say that through a common experience, in so far as that is possible, the speaker and audience would come to use the same word.

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<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 291.

<sup>76</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 294.

The text indicates that speech is to be used "for communication and not for exhibition."<sup>78</sup> This statement corresponds with Dewey's insistence upon the meaning of words rather than upon words for the sake of words, for "words for the sake of words" results in formalism and ostentation.

Eight rules are given for improving the vocabulary.<sup>79</sup> These include the use of a good dictionary, use of new words, checking to see that variety of diction is employed, maintaining a knowledge of a foreign language, reading widely and looking up all unfamiliar words, reading aloud the speeches of others to improve pronunciation, and keeping up the habit of writing. The text includes a four-column, two-page list of words frequently mispronounced, six pages of pairs of words frequently confused, and fifty-eight grammatical expressions in both their right and wrong forms. Besides these, in the Chapter on Language in Speech the student is advised to learn new words with the help of a dictionary and is provided in the Exercises with almost six pages of Vocabulary Drills.<sup>80</sup> The emphasis in this text seems to be on learning already existing labels for experiences, whether or not they have any significance in experience.

While "Public speaking does not exist to adorn life nor to give aesthetic pleasure....,"<sup>81</sup> the student is advised that if he performs his assignments in public speaking faithfully it will help him "enjoy

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<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., pp. 319-324.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

his campus life,"<sup>82</sup> This, of course, is not an intrinsic value of public speaking; it is the value accruing from fulfilling assignments. And since language is for the purpose of communication, not for exhibition as the elocutionists supposed,<sup>83</sup> the text classifies public speaking among the useful arts; "it does not exist for its own sake."<sup>84</sup> The student is also informed that public speaking has work to do, namely, that of "instructing, actuating, convincing, impressing, and entertaining."<sup>85</sup> The student furthermore is told the working world wants public speaking talent for leadership and job efficiency, ability as a public speaker is frequently the direct means of securing high financial remuneration, and it is essential in a democracy.<sup>86</sup> Its value, then, lies heavily on the instrumental side as a means to other desired goals.

This text, too, places little emphasis upon the value of experiences in public speaking upon the manifold phases of student growth. The guiding principle seems to be: learn the principles well, practice their application, become skillful in platform techniques, and success in terms of dollars and cents is just short of guaranteed. This attitude toward the value of such a course bears no resemblance to experimentalist values. Indeed, Dewey would frown on the vocational and financial benefits of public speaking here laid before the student. On

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>85</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-7.

the contrary, Dewey would insist upon intelligent handling of the tools and upon the intelligent growth in ability as a public speaker.

This textbook, then, does not conform significantly to the principles of experimentalism. The pattern of inquiry has a negligible role. It seems inconsistent to emphasize, on the one hand, that "Problems and their solutions," as cited above, are of tremendous importance to an audience, and then to neglect, on the other, any serious attempt to show the student what is that problem-solving pattern. The method of learning differs notably from experimentalism as does the notion of language. On values there is some agreement in emphasis on instrumental value but Crocker fails to make important what the experiences in a public speaking class do to a student.

Basic Principles of Speech  
Revised Edition

by

Lew Sarett and William Trufant Foster<sup>87</sup>

In the absence of either a Preface or an Introduction the reader is left largely to infer the point of view of this book; for that reason it is omitted at this point in the hope that it will become clear in the discussion of the various phases of the text.

The Table of Contents divides the twenty-three chapters into two sections, the first eleven dealing with Delivery, the ~~last~~ twelve with Speech Composition. Chapter One deals with Speech in Everyday Life and emphasizes the importance of speech in today's world. Chapter Two sets

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<sup>87</sup>Lew Sarett and William Trufant Foster. Basic Principles of Speech. Revised Edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946.

forth the functions and nature of effective speech and so presents the authors' "philosophy of speech."<sup>88</sup> The remaining chapters of Part I deal with specific aspects of delivery in turn: Developing Confidence, Poise, and Power; The Basic Pattern of Modern Speech; Bodily Action; A Method of Self-Motivated Action; Principles of Bodily Action; The Voice; Melody; Time; Force. Part II traces the order of steps in speech composition and adds, more or less as a special chapter, Radio Speaking. The eleven chapters are: First Steps in Composition; Finding, Choosing, and Recording Ideas; Methods of Arranging Ideas; Outlines; The Introduction; The Body; Persuasion; The Conclusion; Suggestion; The Language of Speech.

Man, according to this text, is a malleable being upon whom experience can effect manifold changes. "A man is a part of everything that he sees and touches. No man can come constantly into contact with cheap books, cheap plays and cheap persons without becoming like them."<sup>89</sup> Taken literally, this statement indicates that the authors regard man as a part of nature as does the experimentalist; in the absence, however, of further indication on this point it is not safe to say that they would go that far. They do regard man as capable of being transformed by his experiences when they state, "Man comes into the world with instincts, but he lives only a little while before most of those instincts are modified by experience and by habit."<sup>90</sup> Man interacts with his environment, and this interaction reflects upon him so as to reshape him according to

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<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 318.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 494. Cf. Footnote.



those experiences. One suspects, however, that this interaction is restricted to other men, for they say,

The world is a complex, social machine with wheels and gears that interlock at a million points. Every human being, a cog in that machine, touches thousands of other units. If he has the power of speech, he can work smoothly and to good purpose with other units; if he has not, he remains a more or less isolated gadget.<sup>91</sup>

In other words, speech is the medium of interaction, and since man alone has the ability to speak, this interaction is limited to interaction with other men. Furthermore, they seek to have the student restrict his interactions, via speech, to the 'better' class of things, such as plays, speeches, and persons lest he become as low as the "cheap" things with which he might have consort.

On the other hand, they also say that the influence of experience is not merely a one-way process for, "It is not the business of a speaker to get pleasant things said of his art but to get things done."<sup>92</sup> Through his speech the speaker is to exert an influence upon his hearers which will transform them from something they were to something else. On this point that interaction has a two-way influence they would agree with the experimentalist, but if they actually mean to limit interaction between men, then interaction and experience have a narrower meaning than the experimentalist attributes to them.

The experimentalist pattern of inquiry too has a limited sphere of influence in this text. As Dewey describes it, it appears nowhere, and what specific references to problem-solving there are do not elaborate it enough to render it easily distinguishable. For example, in connection

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<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

with the discussion of "feelings of inferiority" the student is presented some of the symptoms, then is advised to seek out its causes and face the facts.<sup>93</sup> Again, the difficulties with acoustics are explained briefly and possible solutions are suggested.<sup>94</sup> Or, various kinds of indirectness are described, the causes are noted, and then follow suggestions as to how to overcome it.<sup>95</sup> Similarly, a "Specimen Brief" follows the pattern but its arrangement and form of statement illustrate more clearly a deductive, logical pattern; only upon analysis will the student find the problem-solution sequence in it.<sup>96</sup> In the same way the discussion of the stock issues, while including the pattern, does not make it clear to a student unfamiliar with it.<sup>97</sup> Chapter arrangements are, it is true, frequently in this sequence, but the student is not given a clear statement of it as such--which suggests that the principles of logical arrangement and relations are a more important consideration for the authors than is the pattern of inquiry. The Chapter on Persuasion, for example, begins with an illustration which establishes a problem so as to prepare the student for the subject matter of the chapter.<sup>98</sup> If the student is to recognize this sequence, he must either discover it for himself or have it pointed out to him by the instructor.

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<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 69ff.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., pp. 103-105.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., pp. 105-111.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., pp. 375-378.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., pp. 442-443.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., pp. 478-509. Chapter 19.

Apparently the authors, without specific mention of it, believe that the experimentalist pattern of inquiry is an effective method of learning. Part of their learning theory may be this method of inquiry, but the fact that it is left for the student to discover suggests at least that it is not the major method in their opinion, or that it is one of several methods.

Actually various learning techniques are referred to in one or another place. Under the heading of developing poise and confidence, the student is urged to adopt the "will-to-fight" attitude lest his platform fears overcome him. Several successes with this technique, they say, will give him power to stand before an audience and then they add:

Such power can be achieved, not through reading books, memorizing rules, practicing gestures, or swallowing pills, but only through wrestling repeatedly with tough audiences. There is no easy road. This way prepares a man not only to face audiences, but to meet other situations in which he has to come to grips with men.<sup>99</sup>

Another method is to adopt a "speaking-for-a-cause" mental attitude; this will help the student overcome his difficulties.<sup>100</sup> One might interpret these suggestions as learning from experience. In another instance they suggest that learning is understanding. At the end of the chapter on Suggestion the student is told to prepare an extemporaneous speech in which he is to show his grasp of the fundamentals and "In addition you should show that you understand and can apply the basic principles of speech....."<sup>101</sup> They also suggest that the student must "fix in this mind" certain principles before he goes about applying

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<sup>99</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>100</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

them.<sup>102</sup> This phrase suggests stamping principles in by frequent repetition and 'study'. Perhaps their whole theory is summarized in the following statement: "There is only one way to power on the platform: that is the long road of self-development through study, hard work, self-denial, experience, strengthening of moral fiber, exposure to great books and great persons."<sup>103</sup> In this way the student is to become "an able speaker [who] is an able person, intrinsically fine, honestly and earnestly communicating at all times, and, ideally, serving a cause, institution, or principle bigger than himself."<sup>104</sup> He must become the ideal.

While experience is one entry on the list of items leading to self-development, its role is minor; and from another standpoint its meaning is different from that of the experimentalist. The Exercises at the ends of Chapters--and they are labelled Exercises--indicate what it means, namely, reading and "fixing in mind" the principles of the Chapter and then applying them in ready-made Exercises. Examples of Exercises are:

Review the chapter on Time. Fix in mind the principles that relate to rate, pause, quantity, and rhythm. They are not so simple that one reading is enough; they require study. The control of the elements of time is so important that an interpreter of literature must sooner or later master the subject if he is to read effectively. Practice the exercises in the chapter.

Read aloud all the following selections and try to communicate their full meaning by the skillful use of rate, pause, quantity and rhythm.

Finally, choose a selection to which you respond deeply. Memorize it and deliver it in class, or read it from the book, with

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<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 285.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 558.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., pp. 140-141.

primary attention to communicating its full meaning and beauty, and secondary attention to the control of rate, pause, quantity and rhythm.<sup>105</sup>

On any subject in the following list, make an outline for an extemporaneous speech. Use one of the following types of Conclusion or a combination of types: the dawn-of-a-new-day Conclusion; the quotation type. [Ten topics are listed.]  
Deliver your speech in class.<sup>106</sup>

These exercises, which are typical, together with the advice to the student to associate only with the best indicate that the "learning experiences" are designed to compel the student to conform to the established principles and to the best. It is not an experience in which the student analyzes the problems and develops ideas about solutions; it does not include the hypothesis, experiment, and evaluation sequence, as the experimentalist would recommend.

The authors' method of learning does not present the student with a problem which he has to come to appreciate or which has come from his own experiences in living. The speaking topics are listed for him; from these he is usually told to choose one whether or not he has any interest in it. He need not, at least so far as the exercises are concerned, have a problem in speechmaking; he needs only to use the principles suggested. He need, therefore, not carry through the process of inquiry; he needs but to satisfy the dictates of the instructor who selects the exercises for him. Whatever measure of understanding the student develops after he has the experience of fulfilling the assignment does not need to be an understanding of the principles but merely of the extent to which he complied with the principles. The result is

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<sup>105</sup>Ibid., p. 285.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 523.

no real appreciation of the principles, for the method of learning here prescribed does not insure that. It does not result in learning, for assaying the degree of compliance is neither the knowledge nor the skill sought in this instance. However, what the student needs to understand is how to attain certain ends in speaking, not how well or how poorly he meets certain standards. Consequently, even if there is an appraisal with emphasis on extent of conformity, the kind of knowledge which has to do with the worth and efficiency of speech principles is probably passed by. The knowledge, then, has to do merely with how well the student conforms, not with what the authors would have him know. According to the experimentalist, the knowledge which the student has of the principles is information, not knowledge at all.

Thinking, in this text, seems to mean to handle material according to the recognized logical forms or according to recognized patterns of arrangement of ideas, such as space, time, and cause-to-effect. With regard to argumentation they say, "...the basic requirements of sound thinking must be met. No one can win the desired response except through the application to his specific purpose of the basic principles of logic and persuasion."<sup>107</sup> A major part of the chapter then has to do with evidence and reasoning. The pattern of inquiry which constitutes thinking in the experimentalist view is not mentioned in connection with this discussion.

Within the limits of the subject matter of this text the authors seem not to diverge essentially from the view of the experimentalist in what constitutes language. Language is, of course, words, written or

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<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 439.

spoken, but there is also recognition of the fact that--and this is one of the "Seven Basic Principles" of delivery--"Impressions of the Speaker Are Derived from Signs of Which the Audience is Unaware."<sup>108</sup> That is, what the speaker does on the platform, his action, voice quality, state of ease, timing, rate, and gestures are cues from which the audience obtains some kind of meaning. One suspects that here is one of the reasons for emphasizing the delivery aspect of speaking so heavily as to devote eleven chapters to it.

On the purpose of language they seem also to agree with the experimentalist. They say, "The ultimate objective of every speaker is to influence human behavior; to move an audience to believe, to enjoy, to act--in short, to respond as he wishes it to respond."<sup>109</sup>

However, on the method of learning language there is less agreement. For the student at the college level the advice is, "The first requirement of a good style is conformity to good use...."<sup>110</sup> Negatively, he is to avoid, among others, barbarisms, slang, provincialisms, archaic and foreign words, hackneyed and overworked words and phrases. Positively, he is to learn accuracy, force, colorfulness, and several other characteristics of good style or language usage by "mingling with well-bred persons and reading formal and informal essays in the classics and contemporary magazines and published letters."<sup>111</sup> Further and more important suggestions are to associate with inspired writings of various

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p. 504.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 545.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 565.

kinds, "through listening to good speakers, actors, interpreters; through hundreds of avenues of education; and through persistent self-development."<sup>112</sup> The experimentalist recommends the sharing of experiences as the way to learn language.

The authors believe that speech training may have real value for a person, value for the man himself irrespective of whether he uses it for an ulterior purpose or not. They say, "The setting up of good speech habits trains the mind in many ways."<sup>113</sup> Among such values are: clarifying ideas, organizing materials, discriminating between what is logical and what is not and between good and bad taste. Beyond these such training may also "develop powers of value" through training in oral interpretation, "develop character," that is, if the examples are of sufficiently high quality.<sup>114</sup> The techniques of speaking have intrinsic value as means toward some other value. They state, "The techniques of speech are not ends in themselves but means to an end--unobtrusive means."<sup>115</sup> That is, speech techniques are valuable as means because the ends attainable through their use are valuable. They do, however, deny that speech should be used for purpose of exhibition. The purpose of speech, they aver in the first of the seven basic principles, is, "Effective Speech is not for Exhibition but for Communication."<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>112</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., p. 14.



They decry the methods of the elocutionist as belonging to "an artificially heroic age, an age of self-display."<sup>117</sup>

At the same time, the authors state, "Speech is a functional tool."<sup>118</sup> Or, "The chief justification of a speaker is his success in communicating ideas that have value for his audience."<sup>119</sup> Or its value may be stated in another way, namely, to move an audience to believe, to enjoy, to act. In this way they recognize the instrumental value of speaking. They do not emphasize its specific place in various occupations, such as selling, though it may well be implied in the citations above.

Here again, as in the instance of the other two texts already commented upon, the view of values ostensibly rather than actually conforms to experimental ideas. Since the student is to become more and more like the ideal by following precept and by imitation, he will find little encouragement here to analyze his experiences intelligently and to modify his beliefs, attitudes, and skills. Classroom speaking experiences are not seen to warrant reconstruction of earlier beliefs and attitudes.

This text, then, is essentially not experimentalist in its point of view. Taken as a whole and by implication the conception of experience and interaction seems in the main to conform to experimental principles, but on the matter of inquiry they differ widely from experimentalism. Emphasis in inquiry seems to be on "thinking logically" instead of on the scientific method of investigation. Consequently, the learning theory of this text depreciates the role of experience and

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<sup>117</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid., p. 94.

of ideas and emphasizes rather the learning of principles which the student is to put into practice. Language theory, so far as it becomes evident, corresponds with the experimentalist view. Conformity to principle is considered somehow capable of producing desirable effects upon the student even though virtually no attention is given to evaluation either of the results of speaking experiences or to the method of arriving at such an evaluation.

Basic Training in Speech: Brief Edition

by

Lester Thonssen and Howard Gilkinson<sup>120</sup>

In the Introduction the authors state that "Speech behavior is complex and may be viewed in many different ways."<sup>121</sup> After enumerating several different ways of looking at speech behavior, they point out that a brief edition such as theirs does not permit a broad treatment of all the related topics; they have therefore "selected those topics which seem most relevant to the purposes of a short, practical, introductory course."<sup>122</sup> Just what those purposes are is stated in each of the four immediately following paragraphs which describe briefly the sections of the book.

The first section is "a discussion of some of the intellectual and emotional factors which lie at the base of effective speech: the speaker's tendency to react thoughtfully and imaginatively to his environment

<sup>120</sup>Lester Thonssen and Howard Gilkinson. Basic Training in Speech: Brief Edition. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1949.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>122</sup>Loc. cit.

and experience, his social fear or confidence, his personal attitudes toward himself and others."<sup>123</sup> They regard as a "fundamental fact that the growth of an individual's speech effectiveness depends to a considerable extent upon his intellectual and emotional development."<sup>124</sup>

In the second main division they treat some of the mechanics of speaking, such as the visible and audible symbols of speech, articulation, and vocabulary. They say, "One of the ultimate aims of speech training is to make all of these components function adequately and more or less automatically as a matter of habit, leaving the speaker free to concentrate on his ideas and his audience."<sup>125</sup>

The third area of subject matter is speech composition and includes topic selection, research for materials, organization and support of ideas, the use of visual aids and delivery. Mastery of this phase of speech making is hard work, they say, but extremely rewarding in developing speech skill and contributing to the general education of the student.

The last major division deals with several special topics: oral reading, debate, discussion, and radio. These are included because everyone, they say, will have use for them at some time in his life in a democratic society.

In these two-hundred forty-one pages they have condensed much material common to most college texts in public speaking. Because it is a brief edition, some matters are treated so lightly and tersely as to

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<sup>123</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>124</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>125</sup>Loc. cit.

leave the student short on understanding of the material which is included. Particularly the first section, actually only twenty pages of copy, excluding the space for Exercises, deals with the Reflective Experience, Social Adjustment, and Personality. Obviously much will have to be supplied by the instructor or by references to instructor-selected supplementary material. This brevity makes it somewhat more difficult to get a clear picture of what their points of view on some significant subjects are. These will appear in the discussion below.

The concept of experience seems to be in accord with the view of the experimentalist. Frequent references throughout the text indicate that the authors interpret the term broadly, for example: "One student talking before her speech class, related the following experience."<sup>126</sup> The description of the content of the speech suggests that she interacted with a specific environment through careful observation, analysis, and critical evaluation. This experience they classify as a reflective experience. On another occasion they aver: "Through an experience resulting from direct observation, listening, or reading, we encounter something which implies the existence of a certain state of affairs, situation, or condition."<sup>127</sup> They stress the uncertainty of experience and the impossibility of reducing speechmaking to a simple set of rules: "The good speaker tries to avoid unnecessary risks. He knows that, even with the utmost careful preparation, conditions may develop in the speech situation which may complicate his original plans."<sup>128</sup> From these

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<sup>126</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

citations it seems fairly clear that on these points the authors have an experimentalistic concept of experience.

They devote Chapter One to "Reflective Experience." This discussion of thinking and speaking they base on a quotation from William James when they say:

In describing the act of thinking, William James said that the mind 'must first get its impression from the object which it confronts; then define what that object is, and decide what active measures its presence demands; and finally react. The stage of reaction depends on the stage of definition, and these, of course, on the nature of the impressing object.'<sup>129</sup>

In the subsequent paragraphs they develop a pattern of thinking quite similar, even if simplified, to Dewey's pattern of inquiry, and this constitutes to all intents and purposes the reflective experience. In passing it may be noted that the Index refers the reader to page sixteen for a reference to John Dewey, but close scrutiny of page sixteen fails to contain any such reference to him either in the text or in a footnote. The reference is apparently to a three-statement summary of the act of thinking so popular in speech circles and taken from Dewey's How We Think, but the student unfamiliar with Dewey's volume will be at a loss to understand to what the allusion refers.

While this reflective experience, probably adequately described for the student who is first getting an introduction to it, seems to correspond to the experimentalist point of view, it does not mean that the two main criteria of an intelligent experience are always met throughout the text. The criterion of continuity is especially violated in some of the Exercises which seem wholly without purpose. For example,

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<sup>129</sup>Ibid., p. 13. Quoted from William James. The Will to Believe. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1931, p. 123.

Exercise No. 3 on pages 104 and 105 directs the student to search for sources of information on one of eight listed topics. The directions continue: "In this project you are not asked to read any of the books or articles on the subject; simply get a representative bibliography of selected materials by consulting the appropriate catalogs and indexes."<sup>130</sup>

Exercise No. 5 on the same page says:

Prepare a bibliography of at least six items (two for each of the book, periodical, and newspaper divisions) on one of these general topics: Strikes, United Nations, Medicine, Radio, Good Neighbor Policy.

Make sure that the entries are recorded so as to be consistent with the method suggested in the preceding chapter.<sup>131</sup>

Both of these sample exercises violate the principle of the continuity of experience because mere collecting them is all that is asked; the task leads to nothing else, for the student does not even have to read the sources he finds. The second Exercise assumes that learning is possible by complying with some highly organized information presented earlier. The student has no problem and the task is set for him by an instructor, a task in which he probably has no interest and which serves no immediate purpose beyond fulfilling an arbitrary assignment.

In only rare instances do the exercises direct the student to make a speech. The usual task set by them is illustrated by the following examples:

Now, try your hand at outlining the contents of an editorial from your favorite newspaper.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup>Ibid., pp. 104-105.

<sup>131</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>132</sup>Ibid., p. 133. Ex. No. 2.

Using the daily newspapers and the magazines as the source, find specimens of the various types of argument. Keep a record of them --or, even better, the clippings themselves.<sup>133</sup>

Rehearse the following selection for manuscript delivery. Then read it before the class, making an effort to engage the listeners as fully as possible through eye contact.<sup>134</sup>

Check the pronunciations of either, neither, and been.<sup>135</sup>

In each case the principles related to the Exercise are presented in the Chapter to which they are pertinent. The implication is that the student will read the chapter, directly apply his 'knowledge' to examples of the instructor's or authors' devising, and thus will he learn. This procedure in no way conforms to the method of learning of the experimentalist.

The experimentalist pattern of inquiry is presented in Chapter I under the title Reflective Experience. This pattern they regard as the habit of thinking, of which they say:

Summarized, these are the habits of thinking which have a basic influence upon the quality and effectiveness of our speech:

1. Lively response to the environment, and the further probing and analysis of the resulting experiences.
2. Delaying decision until we have become familiar with the essential elements in a state of affairs.
3. Delaying a final judgment until we have considered alternative solutions.<sup>136</sup>

Clearly, then, this pattern, abbreviated and adapted to the speaking situation, is considered the method of thinking. It follows that it is

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<sup>133</sup>Ibid., p. 157. Ex. No. 3.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid., p. 185. Ex. No. 4.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid., p. 85. Ex. No. 4.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid., pp. 15-16.

also the accepted method of learning although they do not say that it is. In fact, the only application they make of it is in the construction of speeches. An analysis of Chapters Nine through Sixteen comprising Part III and entitled "Technique of Speech Composition" reveals some similarity to it. The steps, in general, are:

- Select a topic, preferably from personal experience.
- Narrow the topic and determine the general end of the speech.
- Gather materials.
- Analyze subject, occasion, audience.
- Determine the central idea.
- Determine the main divisions of the material.
- Find the main points and the supporting materials for each.
- Determine the form of discourse: narration, description, exposition.
- Rehearse.

The individual chapters do not follow the pattern either. The style and usual organization of chapters is an introduction, presentation of the subject matter, and the Exercises. Thus the student ordinarily is not presented with any problems but rather with brief treatments of material and factual data which he is expected to apply in selected projects and exercises. This lack of organizing according to the pattern of inquiry may be due more to insufficient appreciation of the pattern than to unfamiliarity with it. At the end of the chapter on Reflective Experience they conclude with this terse comment: "This is the time (1) to take inventory of one's skills and to find out in what respect they are deficient; (2) to discover ways and means of improving them; and (3) to set about the task."<sup>137</sup> If they assume, as they seem to do, that the student is unfamiliar with the pattern, and if secondarily they want to build the habit of reflecting in this way, and if this pattern is the method of thinking, it would seem helpful to the student

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<sup>137</sup>Ibid., p. 16.



to have the chapters serve as a series of successive experiences so arranged in the sequence of inquiry that the habit would be built more easily. They do not recommend this pattern either for speech organization but emphasize instead the Aristotelian divisions of Introduction, Body, and Conclusion.<sup>138</sup>

Much of their theory of learning seems, on the other hand, to be based on building habit by means of a stimulus-response mechanism. They say, "One of the ultimate aims of speech training is to make all of these components function adequately and more or less automatically as a matter of habit...."<sup>139</sup> They explain speech in a similar way when they say:

Speech is normally an intentional act directed at other people; it is a response to people--not merely people in general, but individual persons. That is what speech has been all through the speaker's life. He has thus stored in his nervous system normal habits of expressive speech. The habits are there, and he exercises intelligent control over them when he permits them to come into operation by attending the stimulus which is normally attached to them. When we swing a golf club, we attend (look at) the ball. When we drive a car, we attend the road. When we speak, we attend the person or persons whom we address.<sup>140</sup>

What this citation seems to say is that people have learned to speak as a response to other people, the other people being the stimulus. These responses become habits stored away in the nervous system. Intelligence consists in permitting habit to function by attending (looking at) the stimulus.

From the experimentalist point of view several observations with regard to these statements seem apropos. Stimulus-response mechanism

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<sup>138</sup>Ibid., p. 119.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., pp. 23-24.

does play a significant role in learning speech, but the response is not only to persons but to the entire situation in which the learner and the other person are only some of the elements. The statement just cited seems to take too narrow a view of the role of environment, experience, and interaction as the experimentalist conceives of them. Secondly, many aspects of speaking are a matter of habit, more or less automatic, for the adult speaker. His articulation, vocabulary, voice, tune pattern, and grammar and syntax fall under this category. But habits, in so far as they are automatic at least, are called into operation by the appropriate stimulus rather than by intelligence; they will function automatically without conscious application of intelligence. Furthermore, intelligence for the experimentalist consists in the method of resolving problems, not in looking or not looking at a stimulus. Intelligence or reflective thinking enters when impulse as a response and habit as a response are in conflict. Finally, if these statements represent the theory of learning of the authors, it omits insight entirely, an essential feature in the experimental pattern of knowing. How does the student, to whom this statement is directed, determine whether or not to attend a stimulus? How does he go about reconstructing old habits? By practice, so as to build new ways into the nervous system? How does he decide what it is that he shall practice? Does looking at the stimulus tell him when his skill is perfected? These questions the experimentalist would surely raise about these statements.

The authors do use the term 'insight' but with an altogether different meaning from that usually designated, namely, understanding relationships. In the chapter on Personality they describe several desirable personal qualities a speaker should have. Of one of these they say,

"Closely related to self-acceptance is the quality of objectivity, or insight, by which we mean the understanding or awareness of one's emotional tendencies."<sup>141</sup> In other connections, however, they advise the student to discover relationships, e.g., between the speaker, the speech, the occasion, and the audience,<sup>142</sup> but the term 'insight' seems reserved for this "awareness of one's emotional tendencies."

Many of the Exercises and illustrations in the text deal with current materials which may be of concern to the student and a part of his present environment. There are directions to analyze materials from the daily newspapers, recent and current magazines and speeches, and from the student's daily experiences. But these are directions and are stated in imperative sentences, not as problems of concern to the student to solve.

The authors do recognize that the principles of effective speaking cannot always be cast into fixed and formal rules. For instance, in connection with the discussion of the Visible Symbols of Speech they say, "Let it be clear that in the following discussion of principles of bodily activity in speech we are not interested in laying down any hard and fast rules regarding the details of the actions in which the speaker engages."<sup>143</sup> And again in the chapter on Discussion they aver, "The discussion plan need not follow fixed rules so long as it brings out the essential phases of the problem in logical order."<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>141</sup>Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid., pp. 106-118.

<sup>143</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>144</sup>Ibid., p. 227.

Evaluation of speeches receives considerable treatment. Of its importance to increasing effectiveness of the student speaker they say that this increment of excellence is largely accomplished by affording the student sufficient opportunity to speak before an audience and by helpful criticism from his listeners. They describe what they consider to be 'good speech' and issue seven points of advice to the student for making himself more effective as a listener and critic. It would seem that they regard appraisal of actual results important to the student. They fail to mention in this connection, however, the other steps in the learning sequence though they do say that at the level of expert criticism the critic should offer suggestions as to how the speaker may improve his performance.<sup>145</sup> This is reminiscent of the preceptive method of learning already discussed above.

One entire chapter is devoted to Word Study.<sup>146</sup> A full three pages are devoted to the use of the dictionary, nearly four pages directly to vocabulary building, and six pages to word tests. Dewey recognizes that building a vocabulary is an important element in developing language facility and accuracy, and the authors of this text would be in accord with him. Three word lists are given to help the student make finer discriminations between words: synonyms, antonyms, and Frequently Confused Words such as 'adapt' and 'adopt', 'ability' and 'capacity'.

Several notions about the authors' concept of the value of speech training may be gleaned from the text. One resultant value is increased "effectiveness of the student as a speaker."<sup>147</sup> What this means is

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<sup>145</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-8.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid., pp. 65-79. Ch. 7.

<sup>147</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

perhaps more clear from the definition of "good speech" which they say is "the kind of speech which evokes a favorable response from an audience."<sup>148</sup> A second value resides in the general education the student receives, as a by-product perhaps, from preparing materials for speeches; this process includes gathering the materials, evaluating them and organizing them into patterns clear enough for an audience to comprehend easily; it includes the many subject matter areas about which the student may speak.<sup>149</sup> It also has an instrumental value in that the techniques of radio speaking, debate, discussion, and oral reading may have utility in the life of the student at a future but unknown date. This scheme of values suggests some awareness of the relationship between public speaking experiences and student growth. Yet the position, so far as it becomes evident, is suspect in the light of the learning theory here accepted, namely, following precept, for following directions does not necessarily result in student growth.

In summary, this text has some of the concepts of experimentalism and lacks others. It seems to accept the pattern of inquiry but slights it in practical application to the materials in the text. The concept of learning includes the stimulus-response mechanism in a major way. In spite of the prominence given to the pattern of inquiry, conformity to principle is the major method of learning. In language study and value theory it seems not to disagree with experimentalism, but this agreement is more apparent than real.

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<sup>148</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>149</sup> Loc. cit.

Principles and Types of Speech  
Third Edition

by

Alan H. Monroe<sup>150</sup>

The thirty-three chapters in this text cover, as the title indicates, both the principles of delivery and speech composition and the basic and special types of public speeches. In addition, the two introductory chapters treat "Essentials of Effective Speaking" and "Backgrounds and Fundamental Concepts" while Part Five concludes with three chapters devoted to Group Discussion and a final chapter to "Parliamentary Law for Informal Groups."

The author states that he has preserved the functional approach in this text by which he seems to mean, "The basic philosophy of this edition...is that the purpose of speech is to communicate and that its effectiveness must be judged by the reaction of the audience."<sup>151</sup> A basic assumption, then, is that public speaking has work to do, it is not an activity to be engaged in for its own self, and its purpose excludes formalism and exhibitionism. A second feature of this text is that it "reflects a frankly psychological slant."<sup>152</sup> This point of view, the author says, is most evident in dealing with such topics as attention, motivation, and to a lesser extent in the discussion of audience analysis and adaptation of the speech to the specific purpose

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<sup>150</sup>Alan H. Monroe. Principles and Types of Speech. Third Edition. Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1949.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid., p. vi.

<sup>152</sup>Loc. cit.

and to a specific audience. It is also revealed in explaining problems of delivery as it relates to "the influence of habit and emotion on voice and action...."<sup>153</sup> In this connection the author comments, "the psychological viewpoint of the writer is frankly eclectic."<sup>154</sup> He has taken ideas from a variety of sources even while recognizing a discrepancy between the several schools of thought. He explains:

The fact that some of these theories are mutually irreconcilable weighs far less in the writer's opinion than the fact that they have a practical value in the speaker's problem of analysis and speech construction. Thus, in the present instance, [audience motivation] the writer's discussion will be seen to combine McDougall's concept of purposive reaction with the idea of tensions caused by unclosed patterns which Gestalt psychology advances.<sup>155</sup>

A distinctive feature of the functional and psychological approach is the recommendation of the "motivated sequence" as the method of thinking and, therefore, the dominant method of speech organization. This sequence replaces the well known type of speech organization of introduction, body and conclusion by expanding the recognizable steps in a speech from three to five and naming these steps according to the function of each in the total process. These steps are: attention, need, satisfaction, visualization, and action.<sup>156</sup> This plan of organization the author adapts to each of the types of speech he discusses in the text.

Lest the impression remain that all of the subject matter included in this text is based on current theory, it may be observed that various

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<sup>153</sup>Ibid., p. vii.

<sup>154</sup>Ibid., p. 193, cf. fn.

<sup>155</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid., p. vii.

points of view of several rhetoricians of an earlier day are also included, as for instance, Quintilian and Aristotle are credited with the idea that the speaker must be a "good man."<sup>157</sup> The good man is one who has a high measure of personal integrity, extensive knowledge, sufficient self-confidence, and well-developed skill.

Perhaps the educational point of view is best expressed in this statement, "You can build on the foundation you have already laid, and you will need to correct what mistakes there are in yesterday's building."<sup>158</sup> Education is thus a matter of development and reconstruction, beginning with what the individual is upon enrolling in a course in public speaking.

The concepts of man and experience seem not especially remote in this text from the experimentalist point of view. Man, it is said, has a tendency to act in response to the environment. In Monroe's words:

...in all human beings there are certain universal action tendencies --the organism has within it the capacity and the tendency to move in different directions; ...these tendencies are set in motion and modified in their direction by pressure put on the individual by his environment.<sup>159</sup>

Man is capable of being moulded by his environment and what he becomes and thinks depends upon what he has experienced in his interactions with that environment. We read, "Either as the result of personal experience or because of repeated assertions by parents, teachers, respected friends, and 'great authorities,' people tend to develop pretty definite opinions

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<sup>157</sup> Ibid., pp. 5-7.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p. 193.



about many things in their environment."<sup>160</sup> Man is a social being dependent upon others to a large extent in such a highly organized society as exists today.<sup>161</sup> As a society men "join forces to control our environment, developing the great strength of our industrial and political organizations."<sup>162</sup>

The medium of interaction of man with his environment in order to effect some kind of control over it is language. "We hold these joint enterprises together and direct their course of action through language, written and oral."<sup>163</sup> So important is the use of language in the process of adaptation that by it "the human race has speeded greatly the rate of its own development."<sup>164</sup> Language is seen to be the medium of interaction and adaptation which emphasizes its importance and explains in part the reason for the functional approach to speech by this author.

The pattern of inquiry is represented in this text as the "motivated sequence" which has already been mentioned. This sequence of steps constitutes the framework of a speech, and each division is functional in that it describes what duties it performs "in directing the mental processes of the listener."<sup>165</sup> The attention step serves to gain the attention of the audience; the need step presents the problem which needs consideration; the satisfaction step presents the solution the

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<sup>160</sup>Ibid., p. 208.

<sup>161</sup>Ibid., p. 435.

<sup>162</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>163</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>164</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>165</sup>Ibid., p. 319.

speaker is advocating; in the visualization step the speaker leads the audience orally and imaginatively to see the results of putting the proposed solution into operation; and the final step, action, serves as the conclusion and asks for the audience to engage in a specific action. It is clearly a problem-solution sequence with the need step analysing the problem and the satisfaction and visualization steps determining the solution. In a speech, of course, probably only the salient features and most important details will be elaborated though it is quite conceivable that the speaker will have to do much more analysing privately than he will present to the audience in his final speech. Likewise in presenting the solution he will probably focus on the solution he is recommending rather than discuss all of the alternative possibilities he might have considered while he was studying the problem. He may, on occasion, present alternative plans, especially if the audience already knows of them, but then he will have to show their inadequacies in order to get the recommended one adopted.<sup>166</sup>

There are other references to this pattern although in briefer form. The process of preparing a speech is cast into the problem-solution sequence in that the first three steps (Determining the Purpose of the Speech, Analyzing the Audience and Occasion, Selecting and Narrowing the Topic) are called "Surveying the Problem" while the succeeding three steps (Gathering the Material, Making an Outline of the Speech, and Wording the Speech) correspond to the solution stage though Monroe calls them "Building the Speech."<sup>167</sup> These six steps plus a final one,

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid., pp. 319-330.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., p. 156.

Practicing Aloud, constitute the "Seven Essentials of Speech Preparation." This sequence suggests that this problem-solution plan is recognized as a method of study or learning. The same plan is also recommended as the thinking process for deliberative discussion groups.<sup>168</sup> It is not explicitly suggested as the five steps of an act of thought as proposed by Dewey in How We Think but as the motivated sequence adapted to the reflective thinking of a group.

The method of learning receives direct treatment in several places in this text. This revision of the book was done "to improve the teaching efficiency of the book while also extending its scope and refreshing its content."<sup>169</sup> The keynote of the method of learning the author advocates is sounded in the Preface where he says, "...the close combination of precept and example, a marked characteristic of the earlier editions, has been retained and extended in the present book."<sup>170</sup> Here he suggests that the method is essentially to provide the principles, illustrate them, and expect the student to apply them in his own speeches.

On the other hand, he also says, "Undoubtedly the best method of learning to speak well is practical experience."<sup>171</sup> At first blush this statement would seem to reflect the experimental point of view, but the context makes clear what "experience" here means. He says, "Study of principles, actual practice, constructive criticism--all are at your disposal."<sup>172</sup> Experience as a method of intentional learning

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<sup>168</sup>Ibid., pp. 599-604.

<sup>169</sup>Ibid., p. v.

<sup>170</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>171</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>172</sup>Loc. cit.

signifies learning of time-tested principles, applying them in practice speeches, receiving an evaluation from the instructor to assess the extent of conformity to those principles. At the end of the chapter on Analyzing the Occasion and the Audience the student is told:

A systematic method for finding out the other fellow's point of view has been presented. Your task is to apply this method in the specific situations that arise. Examine carefully the sample analysis outline which follows and notice how the speaker used the facts at his disposal to draw a clear picture of the audience which would confront him.<sup>173</sup>

Similarly in discussing motives he advises the student, "It will be extremely worth your while to learn the list [of motive appeals], to get a thorough understanding of the meaning of each item listed, and to begin your analysis of people and the main points of your speeches upon them."<sup>174</sup>

While the class activities or assignments, in other books usually called Exercises, are in this text labelled "Problems", many of them actually reflect the learning theory suggested above. For example, the following assignments illustrate the method:

Take a simple topic from the following list (or a similar topic which interests you) and prepare to give a two- or three-minute speech on it. Follow the suggestions for increasing self-confidence presented on pages 10 through 15; make a rough outline of the points you expect to make, and practice aloud often enough to be sure of the sequence. When you step before the class, do so firmly; move about occasionally as you talk; and make what you say interesting to the audience. [A list of nine topics follows.]<sup>175</sup>

On some subject not familiar to your audience prepare an informative speech employing the technic explained in this chapter. Be sure to make effective use of both initial and final summaries.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>173</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>175</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>176</sup>Ibid., p. 410.

The student is assured that this method will be rewarding, for he is told, "A careful study of these principles of speech composition--as they relate to speaker, subject matter, and audience--coupled with frequent practice in the preparation and delivery of speeches in which these principles are applied will increase the clarity, logic, and persuasiveness with which you speak."<sup>177</sup> On another occasion the student is told the virtues of practice under competent guidance: "Practice, and more practice, under intelligent and critical guidance, will develop the precision, power, and vividness of your oral expression."<sup>178</sup>

Practice, however, is not to be mere rote repetition. It is true that practice is also strongly recommended for making habitual the physical aspects of delivery<sup>179</sup> and for improving voice quality,<sup>180</sup> but the author does recognize that undesirable action patterns or voice qualities may also become habitual and so defeat the purpose of the practice. To avoid this result the student must know something, in this case, about how sound is produced and what a good voice is. Then he should consult his instructor who has a more experienced and trained ear for help in analysis and for suggestions as to what and how to practice.

The final page of text in this book reminds the student, "You have prepared speeches of different sorts and have received the criticism of your instructor upon them. As a result of these experiences your ability

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<sup>177</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>178</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>179</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>180</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

to speak has undoubtedly improved."<sup>181</sup> This statement, as well as others, indicate that competent criticism has an important function in a class for which this book is the text. It is not certain, however, that this experience and criticism is at all what the experimentalist would mean by the same terms. In this text it would seem to mean criticism, constructive to be true, of the skill in applying principles; the experimentalist would mean by the same terms evaluation of the idea the student is proposing to test in a given speech, that is, the extent to which it is appropriate to the situation at hand, the extent to which it had the desired consequences, the possibility of finding a better way of doing what the student is attempting to accomplish, and incidentally possibly also the skill with which the student used it. Hence, the learning theory of the present text diverges widely from that of the experimentalist.

It is strange indeed that in this text the problem-solving sequence should constitute the method of speech organization and a method of thinking but have no role in the learning process. Apparently learning and thinking as processes are not seen to have anything in common. Of course, the author warns that consistency has not been a primary concern in the selection of psychological principles.

As already indicated, the author regards problem-solving as one method of thinking. The topic sentence for the discussion of the thinking process is, "Thinking consists essentially of identification, classification, determining relationships, and solving problems."<sup>182</sup> It is

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<sup>181</sup>Ibid., p. 645.

<sup>182</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

not quite clear whether these four items constitute one unit in process or whether they are entirely separate entities, for they are designated as "types", on the one hand, while on the other they are also a part of the problem-solving method. The text states, "Much thinking of the types described above would be purely academic were it not for its application to another form of thinking which we do, namely, problem solving."<sup>183</sup> The first three of these are included in the fourth which is a process, a method. It is this method which the experimentalist considers thinking.

For the experimentalist, mind also has to do with method. Monroe would seem to regard it as an entity somewhere in the organism, for he says, "...photograph upon your mind the profile of the whole speech..."<sup>184</sup> This statement and similar comments to the student bear out the inference that he does consider mind an entity instead of an equivalent of method. Likewise intelligence seems to be 'capacity' rather than application of method in problem solving. He says, "If, however, a young man or woman has little character or intelligence to begin with, speech training can do little more than make him a glib rascal or a slightly more efficient parrot."<sup>185</sup> On the other hand, he says, "If you have intelligence and character, careful training in speech will help you express your ideas with clearness and force...."<sup>186</sup> Intelligence seems in the author's opinion, to be a fixed capacity at birth, incapable of fluctuation or

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<sup>183</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>184</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>185</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>186</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

improvement, a capacity enabling the organism to think, to adapt, to develop skill within the limits set by heredity for an individual. These citations also indicate that the fact of individual differences is recognized at least so far as heredity endows different individuals with varying degrees of capacity.

Knowledge, too, is not what the experimentalist calls knowledge, but information. Knowledge, Monroe indicates, is attained by living, reading extensively, observing, and studying--nothing is said in Chapter One to indicate that knowledge comes from testing hypotheses.<sup>187</sup> Later, however, the author indicates that there are two sources of knowledge, one being the scientific method of controlled observation, the other the method of the artist, who, he says:

...projects himself into his work: he applies a sensitive and creative imagination to his observation until he has conceived a design which embodies the true essence of the thing he has observed or felt, and which is expressed in an effective pattern. He then applies his artistic skill in molding the raw material with which he works into a complete and beautiful expression of that design. And if he is engaged in one of the practical arts like architecture, his design and execution will be concerned with usefulness as well as beauty.

The study of speech employs both of these methods: the scientific and the artistic. Thus, through the scientific study of speech, we may learn a great deal about its phenomena, and we may test many of its basic hypotheses in an objective manner. And since speaking, like writing or painting or designing bridges, is a form of creative expression, we may learn a great deal about how to do it by a study of the creative methods recommended by experts and by a study of the great masterpieces themselves. We must not expect all the principles we study to be capable of scientific demonstration, for creative expression is an individual act and varies from person to person.<sup>188</sup>

Knowledge is thus derived from these two sources, according to Monroe,

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<sup>187</sup> Ibid., pp. 7-10.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., pp. 36-37.



whereas the experimentalist would regard both processes as exemplifying the same method.

Memory is dependent upon frequent use, says Monroe in agreement with the experimentalist, "Only by constantly applying them will the principles you have studied remain fresh in your mind..."<sup>189</sup>

Even beyond the difference in the meaning of the terms 'experience' and 'criticism' as used by Monroe and by the experimentalist, the role of the teacher seems to be different in the two points of view. Monroe says, "Your instructor will help you to overcome any genuine difficulties that face you...."<sup>190</sup> Again, "Whenever you are in doubt, consult your instructor; he will show you how to apply these suggestions to your own individual problems."<sup>191</sup> The instructor is not a co-learner when he performs these functions, as the experimentalist prefers to have him, but one who tells and provides the answers to a confused student.

On the theory of language there is closest agreement between Monroe and the experimentalist. Monroe says, "...speech develops in the child as in the race in order to meet a social need. It serves a communicative function."<sup>192</sup> Words "are only the symbols of meaning"<sup>193</sup> whose precise denotation depends upon the mutual experiences the individuals have had. Hence, the student is advised that to clarify something he must use language with which he [the listener] is familiar or make

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<sup>189</sup>Ibid., p. 645.

<sup>190</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>191</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>192</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>193</sup>Ibid., p. 359.

comparisons to experiences which are common to him."<sup>194</sup> More than that, language, also for Monroe, includes more than merely words, namely, various aspects of the voice and the physical behavior of the speaker on the platform. This includes eye contact, posture, movement, and gesture.<sup>195</sup>

Vocabulary building may be accomplished through "Wide reading, close observation of the language of cultured people, even the systematic attempt to 'use a new word every day'...."<sup>196</sup> But the most important method is using that vocabulary which a person already has lest he forget it through disuse. Audience adaptation, of course, suggests also that language must be chosen which will express to the listeners the intended meanings of the speaker, but in this connection the speaker is advised to approach an audience in terms of their understandings rather than in terms of his own.<sup>197</sup>

The value of public speaking is amply pointed out to the student of this volume. The intrinsic value is thoroughly de-emphasized when it is said that public speaking is not designed for exhibition as an end in itself.<sup>198</sup> The instrumental values are correspondingly maximized, particularly in the chapters dealing with the types of speeches, in which a section at the beginning of each chapter is devoted to pointing

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<sup>194</sup>Ibid., p. 361.

<sup>195</sup>Ibid., pp. 56-63.

<sup>196</sup>Ibid., p. 367.

<sup>197</sup>Ibid., p. 440.

<sup>198</sup>Ibid., pp. 16-18. See also pages 362 and 489.

out the specific situations where the respective types are used.<sup>199</sup> Consequently, as a means public speaking has an intrinsic value; as Dewey pointed out, the means are safely guarded if the end to be attained is significant. But here congruence with experimentalism again seems to end, for as in the texts already discussed, no appreciable attention is given to the reflective effect of classroom speaking experiences upon the attitudes and appreciations of the student.

Monroe employs the basic structure of the pattern of inquiry as the organizational framework of various types of speeches. His basic assumptions about man and experience are closely akin to those of experimentalism. He agrees with the experimentalist also on the topics of retention, language, and value. But he differs in that he believes learning occurs through the principle-application-criticism method. Likewise the problem-solving method is but one method of thinking in his view although the other methods he enumerates, namely, identification, classification, and determining relationships, are a part of the experimental method of problem-solving. Furthermore, what he considers knowledge is what Dewey would designate information, and the teacher in Monroe's view is in the classroom largely to provide information and directions while according to the experimentalist he is a guide and co-learner.

Of course, the author is not concerned with discrepancies between the various parts of his psychological theory. It is cause for wonder, though, that he can, on the one hand, devote a portion of one chapter to the forms of support thereby indicating some concern for logical reasoning and, on the other, be deliberately oblivious to consistency in developing his own psychological theories.

<sup>199</sup>Ibid., See pages 238, 373, 387, 430, 500, 509.

General Speech: An Introduction

by

A. Craig Baird and Franklin H. Knower<sup>200</sup>

This text of nearly five-hundred pages has its purpose stated in the opening paragraph of the Preface which says:

Our purpose in preparing this text has been to write a book for those college students who take a speech course generally with the expectation that it will be their only such college course. Although the text may serve simply as an introduction to college speech, it is also focused on speaking for general education.<sup>201</sup>

To fulfill this objective the authors include in the twenty-three chapters a treatment of the major elements in speechmaking, such as speech habits, composition and delivery, listening, informative, argumentative and persuasive speaking, and discussional and radio speaking and oral reading. Its inclusiveness is designed to cover all the major aspects of speaking plus the several kinds or forms of speaking so that the student who takes only one course will have in one volume at least some guidance in all of the more common phases of speaking.

Four Appendixes include the chief symbols of the phonetic alphabet, a word list for pronunciation, some information on library research, and the Speech Performance Scale.

The authors refer on numerous occasions to experiences the student may have had. They advise him to go to his experience for speech topics, remind him of the "experience of straight and productive thinking,"<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>200</sup>A. Craig Baird and Franklin H. Knower. General Speech: An Introduction. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949.

<sup>201</sup>Ibid., p. v.

<sup>202</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

describe stage fright as a "typical emotional experience,"<sup>203</sup> and suggest to him the possibility of having had problems of clear and effective informative speaking<sup>204</sup> as typical examples. They further recognize the continuity of experience when they advise the student:

Your experience in trying to marshal ideas into departments and subdepartments will no doubt sharpen your awareness of methods of analysis. Your exploratory attitude will stimulate you to fresh inquiries and so lead you into the realm of creative thinking.<sup>205</sup>

In fact, they have arranged the chapters of the book in such a way as to lead from one phase naturally into another so that "As the student, under competent criticism, acquires experience with the elements of good speech, he is better prepared to see the value of more intensive work on specific processes and principles."<sup>206</sup>

They also recognize that experience is not the same for everyone. What man is or becomes is largely culturally determined, is dependent upon the environment in which he lives and moves. Even the kind of training he has had will make a difference: "Much of our failure in learning to speak as effectively as we might, in spite of our many years of talking, may be traced to the education to which we have been exposed."<sup>207</sup> Or, they point out that many of our speech habits have been acquired in the home and from other contacts; of this they say, "Such learning, when purely incidental, has been shaped by the habits and standards of speech of those about us."<sup>208</sup> And because experience

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<sup>203</sup>Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>204</sup>Ibid., p. 315.

<sup>205</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>206</sup>Ibid., p. vi.

<sup>207</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>208</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

is not the same for all and so produces individual differences, man who is malleable, changes from one set of habits to another. This modifiability is true even with regard to personality; on this point they clearly state, "One's personality may seem to him to be 'natural', but much that is important in this human nature is subject to modification."<sup>209</sup>

In so far as a point of view of man and experience becomes clear in the context of this subject, it seems in close harmony with the concepts held by the experimentalist.

The relationship between speech and inquiry into problematic situations is indicated as early as page two, "Speech is a form of practical communication and closely tuned to the world in which we live. Such oral communication aims at helping us handle problematic situations and meeting our responsibilities in dealing with those situations."<sup>210</sup> The steps in settling a problem are enumerated in connection with the discussion of sources of materials, and while they are not exactly as Dewey lists them, the pattern is nevertheless clear, and the footnote indicates the source in Dewey's How We Think. The authors write:

The steps of thinking in working out a controversial problem will give a clue for one type of procedure. We ask concerning a problem, 'What is the difficulty or perplexity?' Here we attempt to visualize it as clearly as we can. We view the phenomenon before us. Further, we inquire, 'What are the probable causes and results of its operation?' We raise questions about the sufficiency of the alleged cause and results. Moreover, we ask, 'What course or courses are best for us to choose in dealing with the problem?' 'Why is one course more satisfactory than the others?' Our pursuit of these questions will constitute what John Dewey calls 'thought in process.'<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>209</sup>Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>210</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>211</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

This pattern of thinking is illustrated by the organization of the various chapters. Chapter Four, for instance, on "Ideas: Subjects for Speaking," opens with the question, "What shall I talk about?"<sup>212</sup> After explaining that topics for the first few speeches may not be difficult to find, they point out that the task of finding topics becomes more burdensome; they then offer several objectionable solutions, recall typical instances which frequently happen in a speech class, and then launch into the subject matter of the chapter. They discuss audience interests, speech occasions, the speaker's interests and beliefs and activities, then offer suggestions on how to limit and test the subject, and upon completing the inquiry to this point they list fourteen points following this statement, "We are warranted in subscribing to the following conclusions, directly or inferentially developed in this chapter...."<sup>213</sup> Each chapter then has a series of Projects and Problems followed by a list of references. In other words, the usual plan of organization is: problem, solution, evaluation, practise.

The usual Exercises found at the ends of chapters are in this text called "Projects and Problems," not Exercises. Many such suggested assignments, it is true, are simple directions to give a speech of a specified kind; for example, "Deliver a short argument (four minutes) in which you include at least one fully developed analogy. Justify its use on logical grounds."<sup>214</sup> One of the more extended illustrations of the project type is this one:

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<sup>212</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>213</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>214</sup>Ibid., p. 375. Project No. 13.

## Project 1: Using Visual Aids

Purposes of This Assignment: The main purpose of this assignment is to develop skill in exposition with the use of visual aids. This means the use of a blackboard or cardboard drawing, the demonstration of a pattern of action such as that used in the strokes of tennis or applying splints or shooting a bow and arrow, or the explanation of an object or model, such as a clarinet.

### Suggested Subjects for This Assignment:

(Fourteen are listed)

Procedure in Preparing and Presenting This Project: Read the discussion of informative speaking presented in the chapter. Select a topic and assemble materials for a five-minute speech. Organize materials and rehearse the presentation of this speech with an object or diagrams. Present the speech to your classmates. Be sure you have provided for the presentation of visual aid materials. Have your classmates rate you on this performance. Conduct a discussion of the speech content and your speech methods.

### Questions to be Considered in Evaluating This Type of Informative Speaking:

1. Is the drawing large, in relative proportion, and clearly labeled? . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_
2. Does the drawing simplify without oversimplifying the object? . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_
3. Are important parts clearly labeled? . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_
4. Are all references to the drawing stated clearly and arranged in order? . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_
5. Is the drawing for the speech done easily, with confidence and with poise? . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_
6. Does the speaker handle the pointer effectively, speak directly to the audience, and avoid action which distracts attention from the diagram? . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_
7. Are the general processes of language and speech used effectively? . . . . . \_\_\_\_\_

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For discussional speaking they also recommend following the steps in inquiry, that is, "(a) the recognition of a 'felt difficulty', (b) the testing of various avenues of escape or of solving the perplexity, and (c) the full endorsement and description of the chosen 'way out'."<sup>216</sup>

<sup>215</sup>Ibid., pp. 342-343.

<sup>216</sup>Ibid., p. 72.



In the chapter on Discussional Speaking they point out that "The aim of discussional speaking is the analysis and solution of a problem," and explain that "the discussers caucus to determine and define the difficulty, to note the most reasonable methods of dealing with it, to weigh each proposed outcome, and to map out that course of action which reflects the group conclusions."<sup>217</sup>

Even in listening the pattern applies, for they state that "Effective listening must be an active process"<sup>218</sup> in which, if it is to be profitable for the student, "He must recognize the ideas presented, evaluate and organize them, discover relationships among them, and select from what he hears those ideas he finds worth remembering."<sup>219</sup> How the student is to do this is the subject matter for the remainder of the chapter. Incidentally, the first project at the end of the chapter on listening is a thirty-question inventory of listening habits.

The experimentalist pattern of inquiry is in evidence throughout the text so that the student is constantly confronted with it and will therefore be enabled, incidentally if not intentionally, to acquire it as his own method of solving problems. And at the same time, of course, it is the recognized method of learning. The fact that the chapters are cast more or less consistently in this pattern and that many projects are set up according to this pattern increases significantly the experiences the student will have with it.

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<sup>217</sup>Ibid., p. 405.

<sup>218</sup>Ibid., p. 281.

<sup>219</sup>Loc. cit.

The authors clearly specify what the steps in learning speech are.

You will need (1) to develop an interest in this subject; (2) to analyze your individual needs and abilities in speech; (3) to keep clearly before you certain objectives, such as increased skill, favorable attitude toward speaking, knowledge of speech techniques; (4) to engage in much practice under direction; and (5) to profit by repeated and constructive criticisms of your speech performances.<sup>220</sup>

In the ten succeeding pages they explain each of these steps so that the student can clearly understand what the task before him is. First of all, he is urged to recognize his own deficiencies in terms of present and future undertakings. He is secondly advised to study his problems with expert help and in various areas and types of speaking; four distinct procedures are recommended: getting a clear understanding of speech processes and activities; evaluation of his speaking by an expert; a critical analysis of his own speech processes; a self-evaluation to enable him in conjunction with the instructor to determine what to do. A Speech Performance Scale for instructor evaluation of his problems is provided at this point.<sup>221</sup>

In the third step they emphasize that the student's practice and study ought to be purposive, guided by ideas of what he expects to accomplish, and based on insight into principles of effective speaking instead of on a trial-and-error basis. Each speech performance, they assert, ought to have its own purpose or goal, e.g., "In this short oral description I am going to make use of words of vivid sensory imagery."<sup>222</sup> Fourthly, they encourage the student to engage in directed practice,

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<sup>220</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

practice being used to mean "all preparation for and participation in selected learning activities under favorable conditions."<sup>223</sup> Ten more specific directions for practice and study are included so as to insure student understanding. Finally, they recommend that the student evaluate his achievement so that he may know what he has accomplished. This step, of course, refers to competent criticism of his speeches to enable him to determine to what extent he has been able to accomplish the objectives he established for a specific performance. Clearly, then, the method of learning is that of the experimentalist adapted to the public speaking class situation.

The authors recognize that the chief purpose of speech training is "the substitution of new and effective habits of speaking for older and relatively ineffective ones."<sup>224</sup> Now habits, although the authors do not use the label in this connection, are "The organized response patterns of the individual" and "consist of reflexes or of acquired forms of behavior which have proved satisfying in meeting his needs."<sup>225</sup> How this is to be done seems to be clarified in their saying:

"...without minimizing the importance of practice, we agree that an intelligent rather than trial-and-error method of learning speech is preferable. At the college level, moreover, we are concerned with the objectives of learning that include intellectual insight into facts and principles as well as the acquisition of skills themselves."<sup>226</sup>

In other words, understanding, insight, and purposeful practice are of signal importance. They comment in another context, "It is commonly

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<sup>223</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>224</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>225</sup>Ibid., p. 382.

<sup>226</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

conceded that adult learning based on a thorough understanding of the elements and processes involved is more satisfactory than learning directed singly to practice on the development of skill."<sup>227</sup> In relation to stage fright they stress the importance of insight in reconstructing a reaction pattern when they say, "When we acquire insight into the nature of our emotional responses and learn that what was considered a mystifying, embarrassing peculiarity is a commonplace experience subject to natural law and reasonably precise explanations, the panicky feeling which aggravates fear gives way to hope and determination to develop new habits of response."<sup>228</sup>

Impulse as here used seems to mean uncritical suggestibility, for under the heading of 'Suggestibility' the authors say, "The suggestible person tends to be uninhibited, submissive, and impulsive."<sup>229</sup> Suggestibility is heightened by stimulated emotions so that thought fails to play a role in the responses made to stimuli. This conflict between emotional and impulsive reactions and intelligent behavior they regard as one of the major aspects involved in stage fright. The remedy then lies in increasing intellectual activity and delaying the impulsive responses.<sup>230</sup>

It has already been pointed out that thinking is using the method Dewey explained in How We Think. In explaining reflective thinking as the method to be used in discussion, they say that it begins with a

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid., p. 223.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., p. 193.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., pp. 190-191.

felt difficulty, and proceeds through these steps, "(1) it penetrates the factors and causes of the problem; (2) it formulates a series of hypotheses concerning the facts to be ascertained and proposes possible conclusions; (3) it weighs in turn the possible outcomes; and (4) after a comparison of the choices, it determines the solution to be followed."<sup>231</sup> Following this pattern enables the student to know what he is doing and why and to make better adjustments. In this connection the authors state, "But if you know what you are doing and why you are doing it, the new habits also may soon become natural. Then you become not only skillful but also intelligent."<sup>232</sup> In this way the relationship between method, thinking, and intelligence becomes clear. The method of thinking is the method of intelligence. Again the close adherence to the experimentalist point of view is apparent.

The role of the instructor in the educative process then becomes a secondary one while the limelight is on the learner. The individual student must think for himself, and the present authors assert, "The development of the necessary interests for education is not exclusively the responsibility of our teachers. He who would be surely educated must shoulder his own responsibilities for learning."<sup>233</sup> Generally the point of view as to the function of the instructor seems to be that he is to help the student realize his problems, serve as an expert critic, and to help and guide the student to reconstruct his speaking habits.

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<sup>231</sup>Ibid., p. 407.

<sup>232</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>233</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

Individual differences in speaking ability and habits are recognized in various places throughout the book. In the Preface they state that "The book is sufficiently broad in its treatment of principles to permit the student and the teacher to adapt individual and group differences to speech needs and abilities."<sup>234</sup> They accept the fact of individual differences and attribute it to speech handicaps largely of an organic nature, to differences in the way speech has been taught in school, to differences in interests and attitudes resulting from varying experiences, and to the influence of the environment which produces primarily incidental learning.<sup>235</sup> While their major concern is with speaking ability, their point of view seems best expressed in these words:

Why these differences? The results are explainable neither altogether nor chiefly on the assumption that some are 'natural-born orators' or that they are superior in intelligence. The real answer is to be found in the variable opportunities for learning, the effectiveness of the instruction, and the extent to which we have applied ourselves to the job of learning.<sup>236</sup>

On retention and forgetting, too, they represent the experimentalist point of view. After saying that evaluation of what has been done ought to follow any period of study, they observe further, "Learning is best retained when real satisfaction is derived from it. If one does not know what he has achieved, his skills are lost more quickly than if he can take some pride in accomplishment."<sup>237</sup> Their statement on forgetting

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<sup>234</sup> Ibid., p. vi.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., pp. 14-17.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., pp. 14-15.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

will remind one of Dewey's statement on the same point; it is that "Skills in speaking, like other skills, are dulled by disuse."<sup>238</sup>

In this regard they observe that the satisfaction of accomplishing something is excellent motivation to continued study.

If the student discovers that his study of speaking has been profitable for him, he should not only continue to practice his newly acquired habits, but also formulate new goals and set out to develop further skills. If learning is so conceived and practised, life continues to be a challenge.<sup>239</sup>

There is thus motivation for continued growth.

Beyond that, they contend that materials of the classroom must come from the daily lives of the students and be among those things which make a difference to them. They say, for instance, "The essential features of useful practice are that the performances be typical activities in realistic situations...."<sup>240</sup> In selecting topics for speaking engagements in the class or otherwise they advise the student to go to his own personal experiences, to the things he has seen, come to believe, has read, appreciated and reflected upon, has done or studied in another course.<sup>241</sup> Typical of the Projects emphasizing this point are those at the end of Chapter 17 on "Adapting Speech to the Listeners." The first asks the student to indicate which re-written version of the Gettysburg Address would fit one of the listed situations. The second lists twelve situations which might be typical of 'bull sessions' at college and asks the student to indicate whether the character in the

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<sup>238</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., p. 40ff.

problem situation used his arguments well, poorly, or questionably. Five other Projects ask the student to adapt the treatment of a topic of his own selection to varying kinds of audiences.<sup>242</sup> Not only are these Projects problem situations--many more could be secured from additional sources--but they are typical of the life and experience of the student and they require intelligent analysis in order to solve them.

The authors' concept of knowledge is difficult to determine on the basis of the text alone. Knowledge, they say, is "that insight into the subject which makes it possible for you to develop your personality as an educated person."<sup>243</sup> They further state, "Knowledge may be increased by the correction of false understanding, by extending the penetration of insight, by extending the boundaries of information, and by sharpening the habits of discrimination."<sup>244</sup> The latter statement occurs in the discussion of informative speaking and there, in particular, under the heading: "The informative speaker seeks to increase knowledge, direct action, or provide a reliable foundation for judgment or belief."<sup>245</sup> Now the informative speaker dispenses information, it is true, but this factual material which he tells about remains information, not knowledge, until it is used by the audience in resolving a difficult situation. Knowledge accrues from the process of resolving a problematic situation; merely telling someone a fact does not make it knowledge for him though it may be information.

<sup>242</sup>Ibid., pp. 308-314.

<sup>243</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>244</sup>Ibid., p. 317.

<sup>245</sup>Loc. cit.



The authors agree that "Knowledge is always about something,"<sup>246</sup> that it deals with particulars at a specified time and place and under given conditions. It would seem to follow from this that they would not accept the notion of ultimate truth, but it is not at all clear what their attitude is from the text; they mention that hard and fast rules for speaking are impossible to frame, but they also mention 'ultimate truth' in such a way as, not necessarily to indicate that it is their own point of view, but certainly to suggest the possibility that they believe there is ultimate truth. It seems safe to say that they do not deny Dewey's concept of knowledge but they may accept also as knowledge facts stored through memorization.

Education is viewed as having a double function: preparation for the future and the extension of the possibilities of adapting to the environment in the present. The first function is stated in these words:

As we launch out from home and our environment expands, we may find that circumstances demand of us performance in broader activities and achievements of a higher standard than were previously required. We should prepare early to meet those demands.<sup>247</sup>

However, there is recognition of the fact that those circumstances and demands are at any given present time unknown; therefore adaptation is a major function of education. This point is clearly stated:

...since it is impossible to train one's self specifically for all possible types of activities and situations to be met, an intelligent understanding of principles will enable one to adjust to them more effectively than if education were strictly a matter of developing blind mechanical habits.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

On the latter point they are in close accord with the point of view of experimentalism, but not on the former, for Dewey argues that education-as-preparation leads to a loss of motivation, to procrastination, to merely an average expectation of what the individual is some day to become, and it encourages the use of artificial stimuli, notably pleasure and pain.<sup>249</sup>

A stimulus-response psychology also finds limited application in this text. We read, "...the speaker is reacting to stimuli which arouse his mental processes and are somehow translated into coherent ideas, ideas which he is impelled to transfer to those willing to listen."<sup>250</sup> The energy of the stimulus, we are told, "serves as a trigger to start the chain of events which determines the nature of behavior. The stimuli in any situation are complex and the particular stimuli to which anyone reacts are determined by his capacity and his experience."<sup>251</sup> But this responding to a stimulus is not a mechanical process for it is influenced by capacity and experience and between the two "there intervenes the process of selection and organization of behavior."<sup>252</sup> This solution constitutes a problem which calls for analysis and resolution. Apparently intelligent inquiry involving insight intervenes at this point. The authors state that most situations involving stimuli are more complex than simple and entail more or less extended reflection. In another context the idea of a whole being more than a sum of its

<sup>249</sup>John Dewey. Democracy and Education. Op. cit., pp. 63-64.

<sup>250</sup>A. Craig Baird and Franklin H. Knower. General Speech. Op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>251</sup>Ibid., p. 381.

<sup>252</sup>Loc. cit.

parts in its meaning is emphasized. "Facts, like the letters used in playing anagrams, may have little meaning or significance in themselves. When well fitted together, they form an idea, a picture, a map, or a plan of action."<sup>253</sup> Apparently the authors recognize limitations to a purely stimulus-response type of psychology as do the experimentalists with whom, on this point too, they seem to feel a close kinship.

For the purposes of this text, at least, the definition of language is somewhat more limited than is that of the experimentalist. "Language", they say, "is any means of expressing ideas through speech or printed representation, or through signs or gestures."<sup>254</sup> More particularly, and within the context of public speaking, language is:

...the use of words and combinations of words in phrases, clauses, sentences, and larger units, to provoke a specific response from listeners. It is verbal expression in oral communication. Words are the symbols by which the objects, experiences, ideas, and emotions are represented.<sup>255</sup>

It is not to be studied for its own sake or for self-gratification.

"The study of communication as a form of social behavior has no place for the development of action patterns for purposes of exhibitionism."<sup>256</sup>

Its purpose in the public speaking situation is said to be, "Communication is always a form of adjustment to a specific situation. The adjustment to be made is primarily to the person to whom the communication is addressed. Speech and writing are tools."<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>253</sup>Ibid., p. 320.

<sup>254</sup>Ibid., p. 132.

<sup>255</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>256</sup>Ibid., p. 259.

<sup>257</sup>Ibid., p. 298.

Adjusting to the listener is understood to mean, not the selection of words which will appeal merely to his taste and sense of beauty, but "To make your communication effective you must reach his mind--establish rapport with him. Begin by trying to put yourself in his shoes."<sup>258</sup> That is, language must be chosen in terms of the meanings the audience has experienced and understands in common with the speaker. If communication is to be understood by a listener or an audience, "...we must talk to him in terms of his own language. In most cases this is not difficult, but it is often overlooked. Help the listener recall what he knows, not only as a point of departure, but wherever needed for clarity during the development of the idea."<sup>259</sup> That is why the student is told at the outset, "What you want is ability in communication, not as a goal in itself, but as a means of social adaptation and influence."<sup>260</sup> What the speaker really is attempting to do is to provide the listener with such information and background as will enable him to develop for himself the kind of intellectual experience the speaker desires him to have. For example, "'When we speak with the purpose of 'conveying information' we are engaged in the attempt to stimulate some other person into developing certain ideas which, when fully assembled, will constitute for him the meaning which we wish him to have.'"<sup>261</sup>

The student is reminded that establishing the necessary rapport necessitates constant attention to definition: "These listeners, even

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<sup>258</sup>Ibid., p. 299.

<sup>259</sup>Ibid., p. 321.

<sup>260</sup>Ibid., pp. 2-3.

<sup>261</sup>Ibid., p. 135.

though they hardly realize the ambiguity or obscurity of the words, should have each important phrase or word carefully explained."<sup>262</sup> Subsequent discussion in the text illustrates eight different problems which the student will experience, problems which emphasize the importance of trying to establish a common meaning.

How is the student to improve his language facility? His first task is to enlarge his vocabulary through word study by reading widely in the speeches of excellent speakers, by studying logic and semantics, by careful listening for words others use, and by direct habit of definition with the help of dictionaries.<sup>263</sup> In the area of argumentative speaking the student is advised to make meanings more precise, for "It demands careful definition and sharp discrimination in word meanings."<sup>264</sup> He is advised to use a good dictionary, to study words in context, and to use examples and illustrations to help make meanings clear to himself. Here again the authors' point of view coincides with that of the experimentalist.

As indicated above, the authors state that the study of public speaking has significant value for the general education of the student. Specifically they say:

Training in the methods of finding and using sources of materials for speaking; learning the techniques of analyzing, classifying, reasoning about, evaluating and organizing data, drawing conclusions, rendering judgments, and formulating beliefs and attitudes; putting ideas into words and ordering them effectively in various types of communicative activities--these are part and parcel of the educative system. You are to answer questions, to describe events,

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<sup>262</sup> Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid., p. 373.

to trace relationships, to generalize from examples, and apply a principle to a specific case, to explain a system, to give instructions on the operations of a process, to experience the give and take of discussion, to make oral reports. ... Clearly, then such training contributes significantly to your general education.<sup>265</sup>

Here, then, is an expression of what the authors consider to be one of the intrinsic values of speech education. Along with that they mention also that "Vocabulary extension and application is a problem in your general education."<sup>266</sup> Furthermore, the projects in speechmaking "have been selected for their contribution to general speech development,"<sup>267</sup> considered apart from any utilitarian purposes. In other words, here is recognition of the values the experimentalist calls 'intrinsic'; it is not a question of determining what they are good for--they are desirable. Growth is its own end.

On the other hand, the authors are aware also of the student's daily needs for language and effective communication. The student needs a text, they state, "emphasizing those objectives in speech education which are most functional in the everyday living of college students and college graduates. This book concentrates on the fundamentals of speech which bear most directly on those practical objectives."<sup>268</sup> What these practical values are, that is, what speech training is good for, becomes clear in the first Chapter where several pages are devoted to discussing the importance and practicality of effective communication. It is first

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<sup>265</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>266</sup>Ibid., p. 374.

<sup>267</sup>Ibid., p. v.

<sup>268</sup>Loc. cit.

...a means of social adaptation and influence. Your speaking purpose is to influence others to take a given stand, or to give them acceptable information, or to strengthen their good opinion of some person, institution, or event. Your motive is a practical one.<sup>269</sup>

These practical values correspond to the purposes of speaking, stated in this text as to inform, to interest, arouse to praise or blame, convince, stimulate, persuade, or to achieve a combination of these.<sup>270</sup>

Two other values are mentioned.<sup>271</sup> One is the possibility of using speech as a career, and they cite a quotation from Lowell Thomas and another from Frank Knox to support the point, the former to emphasize the importance of speaking in a 'speaking career,' and the latter to indicate its significance for any man of public importance. On this point they are beyond what the experimentalist would accept under the heading of the educational value of a public speaking course. The other value is its significance for the preservation of the democratic way of life through its social and political institutions.

This analysis reveals how much the authors have appropriated from the point of view of the experimentalist. In practically every respect under consideration the influence of experimentalism is apparent. There is direct evidence of their indebtedness in that Dewey is referred to in the footnotes three times, twice in citations from How We Think and once from Human Nature and Conduct. On the other hand, current materials and sources abound to the virtual exclusion of references to ancient rhetoricians such as Aristotle, Quintilian and Cicero, or, for

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<sup>269</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>270</sup>Ibid., pp. 66-67.

<sup>271</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-4.

that matter, even to the more recent British ones, namely Campbell, Whately, and Blair. This text incorporates more of the principles of experimentalism than do any of the others included in this analysis.

Summary. These six texts, then, range from practically no application of the principles of experimentalism in Fundamentals of Public Speaking by Bryant and Wallace to a rather thorough experimentalistic approach in General Speech: An Introduction by Baird and Knower. Monroe has included many of the elements in his text while Sarett and Foster's text, followed closely by the one by Crocker, are nearly as non-experimentalistic as Bryant and Wallace's book. The one by Thonssen and Gilkinson falls somewhere between the two extremes in that some elements of experimentalism are apparent though intermingled with other points of view.

Recency of publication has no bearing on the matter either, for the latest of these six, Crocker's published in 1950 in revised form, leans strongly away from experimentalism while Baird and Knower's text, published in 1949, is written almost entirely from this point of view. The oldest text, by Sarett and Foster, in its latest edition antedates Baird and Knower's by only two years.

The two texts closest to the experimentalist point of view emphasize the functional value of public speaking proportionately more with the exception of, perhaps, the text by Crocker. But even in the instance of Crocker there seems to be the difference that he slants more heavily toward the economic value of public speaking ability instead of toward its value in a wide variety of practical situations.



The more experimental the approach the less the emphasis is on "rules" and imperatively stated principles. It seems that the less experimental texts issue more frequent orders to the student to do so-and-so upon the assumption that an explanation including an illustration is sufficient for the student to understand a principle well enough to apply it. In the main the more experimental text sets such problems for the student as will require an evaluation and a judgment of ideas in their relations. It thus places greater premium upon understanding and appreciation of the principles and upon the intervention of a larger measure of intelligence in applying them to practical situations.

The more experimental text permits greater freedom to the student in selecting his topics for practice speeches, for selecting even the kinds of speaking he prefers to do; the non-experimental texts tell him what to do and sometimes even precisely how to do it so that freedom and intelligence consist largely in following exact directions only.

It appears unusual that some authors stress problem-solving and learning by experience and at the same time indicate, indirectly if not directly, that learning occurs mainly through following precept, engaging in frequent practice, and criticism of that practice. Apparently "experience" is used in several ways, once to suggest the usual experience of ordinary living, and then to signify the experience of applying precept in practice speeches. Casual references to learning seem to refer to the first meaning; direct comments about learning suggest the second meaning is intended. With the exception of the Baird and Knower text, each of the others includes this semantic confusion.

## CHAPTER VIII

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary. The purpose of this investigation has been to ascertain whether or not the philosophy of experimentalism, as developed primarily by Dewey, has had any significant influence upon the points of view of authors of selected textbooks in public speaking for college classes. The procedure has been to describe the essence of the philosophy of experimentalism, to explain what seem to be some defensible implications of that philosophy for the teaching of public speaking, and then to examine six representative public speaking textbooks currently being used in a considerable number of colleges and by a relatively large number of students.

This philosophy, asserts that man lives in an environment, both physical and social, which is neither thoroughly stable nor entirely friendly to him. Man is compelled to interact with it to maintain his life and his equilibrium. This interaction constitutes experience which, if it is to be educative, must have continuity and the potentiality of leading to further development of the individual. Experience forms the matrix of inquiry, and the experimentalist does not go outside of experience for explanations of human activity.

Inquiry signifies the transformation of an indeterminate situation into a unified whole. As a process it requires, first, that the problematic situation be described by determining what precisely is uncertain, unsettled, or disturbed. Secondly, it is necessary to ascertain the

facts in the situation and their relation to one another; this can be done by observation, collecting data, inference, and by comparison. Such facts must then be ordered and arranged into a meaningful sequence. From such data there arise, as the third step, suggestions as to which operation must be performed with or upon them. Suggestions when put into use become ideas or hypotheses which serve as an anticipation of a possible outcome and describe an operation to be performed. Discourse, the fourth step, also called reasoning, designates the process of developing meanings and establishing relationships between meanings through the use of symbols or language. Reasoning eventuates in an if-then proposition which constitutes the hypothesis basic to the experiment to follow. Experiment as the fifth step is an arrangement of conditions dictated by the hypothesis to determine whether the results theoretically indicated by the hypothesis will actually occur. The consequence of inquiry, lastly, is the institution of a unified situation. Results are not final and are said to be warrantably assertible. Such results constitute knowledge, are objectively verifiable by other experimenters, and are subject to modification by later findings. As they may be pertinent to a later inquiry, they become resource material or information.

Life, education, and growth are different ways of looking at the process of intelligent interaction with physical and social environment. Education, or growth, is dependent upon the intervention of intelligence in solving life's problems. Man will act in any event, but educative activity must have its source in present living and must require a search for the means by which problems can be solved.

The method of learning follows the pattern of experimental inquiry. A problem must be instituted and defined. From the materials involved

in the problem will arise suggestions as to solutions. Through establishing connections between the data the possibilities of solutions will resolve into one plan deemed most advantageous; this plan is an hypothesis. It is acted upon. The actual consequences are compared with anticipated results and the residue retroacts upon the hypothesis thereby reconstructing the experience. Furthermore, this residue as the outcome of inquiry constitutes knowledge, knowledge which is valid under the conditions of the particular inquiry but subject to modification by subsequent inquiry.

Impulses, or unlearned responses, and habits as learned responses to stimuli give rise to activity by the individual. They are arrested by the intervention of intelligence which seeks to determine which of the possible responses is the more desirable. Intelligence, in this frame of reference, is insight into relationships and ability to direct activity in the light of consequences to be attained. Thinking is the process of discerning the connections between facts present and facts remote but signified reliably by those facts present.

An aim is a foreseen condition capable of being attained through available means. Aims must arise from present conditions, be flexible, and allow sufficient freedom to permit the activity necessary for accomplishing them.

Acting intelligently constitutes mind. Mind is the ability to see the reciprocal relation between present activity and future consequences. Consciousness is awareness of what present activity is about.

Individual differences are recognized. Differences in native endowment are admitted but such initial differences are magnified by the kind

of environment in which the individual has his experiences. Measurement of ability in school is secondary to providing the kind of activity which will insure growth and to helping the individual think better than he does.

Interest signifies personal concern for the outcome of an activity. Learners are interested if they can discern a relation between school activity and matters that make a difference to them.

Discipline is a positive power to persist in carrying inquiry through to a successful conclusion. This view militates against discipline as fear of punitive measures. It expects constructive and intelligent activity in school; it opposes rigid seating arrangements and absolute quiet in the classroom.

A motive is an act plus a judgment of its consequences, particularly praise and blame. Since man is active by his very nature, it is not essential to seek for motives for action or to attempt to classify them.

Memory involves a backlog of resource materials from previous inquiry. Forgetting results when such materials are not used in inquiry.

Transfer of learning occurs only in terms of broad adaptation of materials in similar situations. Transfer of common elements or of specialized skills is impossible because no two situations are identical.

The stimulus-response mechanism is too simple and too mechanical to explain the adaptation of a response to a situation as a whole, the experimentalist believes. The tendency of this theory is in the direction of the field psychologies, especially on the topics of learning, insight, transfer, and intelligence.

The experimentalist's concept of language is very broad and includes, over and above oral and written speech, whatever may deliberately and

artificially be used as a sign of something else. Language arose from the overflow of man's energy in gesture and sound. When sounds were perceived and sorted out as indicative of certain types of behavior, language was born. The sufficient condition for the existence of language is that the symbol must represent a mutual communication between two or more individuals. Meanings of symbols are relatively inexact and subject to change in ordinary or common-sense usage; in scientific discourse they are precise and fixed. As a fence, a symbol sets the bounds of its meaning; as a label, it in itself represents a meaning; and as a vehicle it permits the transfer of a meaning from an old to a new context.

Since mind deals with the meanings of things, and meanings reside in symbols, mind and language are closely inter-related. Because symbols as meanings have implications which can be manipulated, inference and reasoning become possible. Hence, thinking is heavily dependent upon language.

Language is consummatory when it is appreciated for its own sake; it is instrumental when it is a means to an end. Functionally, it is both the repository of a culture and the means of its transmission.

Using language about something not experienced, as a substitute for dealing with the things themselves, or without thorough awareness of what it signifies, is fraught with danger. Effective language usage in school is dependent upon the learner's acquaintance with the actual things symbolized. It is used both to convey information and to aid thought. Its use can be improved by enlarging the vocabulary, making meanings more precise, and by forming habits of consecutive discourse. If language usage constitutes a real communication between two individuals

it is educative in that it transforms experience. Communication is held to be education.

Both intrinsic and instrumental values are recognized, the former signifying things prized for their own sake, the latter referring to things worthwhile as means to some further end. The experimentalist's major concern lies with instrumental values.

Desiring means to want conditions better than those now present. Hence, a value is something which fulfills certain conditions, and the "good" is the preferred outcome of present activity. Since conditions change, values cannot be fixed and final. Taste as a standard of preference develops from continuous experiencing. Because experience and inquiry are observable, statements about values are possible and involve a means-end relationship.

Values arise from interaction with the environment. Interaction involves inquiry during which choice based upon intelligent judgment emerges as a unified preference for an outcome. Judgments concern things in their capacity as signs of other things capable of producing desired consequences. Freedom, or the ability to inquire with dispatch and thoroughness, is pre-requisite to intelligent choice.

Values in school activity are apparent to students when they have an appreciation of such activity and of the things involved in it. Teachers' aims must be flexible, therefore, and adaptable to student interests or appreciations. Education via language alone is likely to ignore interests and to become formalized and bookish. The alternative to such superficiality is to secure thorough appreciation prior to command of techniques and to develop working instead of professed standards. If necessary, instrumental values in school activity must be made clear

to students by way of generalizations of specific goods, but they must not be labored when presented.

The concept of intrinsic value militates against a hierarchy of values among studies. A study is worth while if the student responds intelligently to it.

The concept of experience suggests that, basic to discovery of the identity of his problems, are the communicative experiences the student undergoes prior to enrolling in a public speaking course. This backlog of experience makes possible a real appreciation of his problems. If the instructor and student together discuss an introductory speech to define those problems more precisely, the activities of the class can be built upon the needs thus established.

To solve such problems textbooks, lectures and discussions provide helpful resource materials. Information derived from these sources must be made the student's own through use. The student selects, with instructor help but not dictation, such materials as are applicable to solving his problems. Choice is guided by the end-in-view. Thus, the student works on the solution of his own problem by developing materials and formulating hypotheses which he uses in experiment. He compares the actual results with anticipated outcomes and modifies the hypothesis as necessary. This method is based upon the pattern of inquiry, and it is antithetical to instructor-dominated assignments, a rigid speaking schedule, and learning ready-made principles, applying them upon command, and criticism of extent of conformity to them.

Teaching by the experimental method can be done by framing questions as problems the students have with relation to the course content. They investigate areas of the subject matter to solve their problems.



This pattern applies both to learning the course content and to preparing practice speeches. In the latter case it may be taught directly as course content.

Growth in public speaking ability occurs through experiences that are related to the student's activities and goals, have continuity, and require intelligent search for means. An open mind, understanding of relationships among the facts in a given instance, and awareness of the connection between materials and method is requisite to growth.

Learning by the experimental method requires appreciation of ideas, retention of related data, and testing the validity of hypotheses. Routine memorizing of predigested materials is inadequate, because it leads to formalism and can occur without insight into relationships among perceptual and conceptual data. This method militates against domination of a class by the instructor through imposing upon them a textbook as a fixed and final authority, pre-conceived assignments requiring only conformity to principles and rules, through criticizing performances on the basis of conformity to those principles, and through demanding a close schedule of speeches in order to have each student speak as frequently as possible within the time available in the course.

Impulsive and habitual responses need to be arrested by intelligent search for appropriate responses. Intelligent search follows the method of experimental inquiry which requires insight and reflection. Thinking occurs when relations between the constituent elements in a speaking situation are perceived. Mind signifies foreseeing possible consequences of putting these elements into active combination. These factors affect both learning of the course content and the preparation of practice speeches.

Aims for a course in public speaking should be based on student needs and activities, be capable of practical implementations, and be general in the sense of a broad survey of the field of present activities. The student should have aims in enrolling in the course and in each speech he gives in the classroom.

Differences in ability, skill, and aim must be recognized. Too, such differences may become magnified as experience and opportunity vary. Students at all levels of ability must be permitted and enabled to develop to their fullest potential.

The doctrine of interest requires that class activity be of concern to the students, it must make a difference to them. Practice in speaking must clearly enable them to accomplish their objectives more efficiently. If the activity is interesting, students will pursue it until it is concluded. Discipline is this persistence in pursuing a problem to its conclusion. Both interest and discipline are taught, if at all, indirectly.

Motivation occurs when the student recognizes the significance of attaining greater knowledge of and skill in public speaking, or restoring unity in a confused situation.

Frequent speaking and evaluating of the speeches of fellow students are essential for retention. Disuse tends to increase forgetting.

The staples in speaking, such as articulation, types of gestures, voice quality, and patterns of organization may transfer between speaking situations. Choice of vocabulary, style, speech content and audience adaptation are specific to individual speeches and therefore less amenable to transfer.

Speaking effectively includes many factors, all interrelated. Discrimination of relations between these elements requires insightful analysis and synthesis, a process too complicated for successful accomplishment through a stimulus-response mechanism. Problem-solving requires intelligent reflection and evaluation, not a hasty, impulsive or habitual response to stimuli.

Language, broadly defined, includes all that a speaker does and says before an audience. Platform activity and verbal language merit improvement by speakers. Language, to be communication, must have the same interpretation by both speaker and audience. Ideas must be experienced as well as transmitted if they are to be meaningful. Instructors may not assume a class understands through a lecture alone; information so dispensed must be used if it is to become the student's own.

Language has consummatory use if it is enjoyed for its own sake, as in poetry and some oratory. Public speaking employs language mainly as a practical instrument for securing a desired response.

Genuine appreciation results from practical association and direct experience with a thing. The student can get such appreciation in the classroom through giving speeches. Standards of taste for excellence develop through a series of experiences. Standards so developed are real working standards, more keenly felt than professed ones.

Public speaking as an experience may have intrinsic value for a student. He responds and there is no further need to ask what it is good for. Primarily, however, the value of public speaking in an elementary course is instrumental and practical. It is a means for securing understanding, conviction, inspiration, or action.

The textbooks in public speaking examined in order to determine the extent of influence of experimentalism upon their authors range from practically no ostensible congruence with that philosophy to almost complete accord with it.

Bryant and Wallace's Fundamentals of Public Speaking reveals agreement with experimentalism only in a minor way. The pattern of inquiry is not presented in a form recognizable by the student unfamiliar with Dewey's writings. The learning method is precept, application, practice, and criticism, but also it includes experience and problem-solving. The concept of language seems, in so far as it becomes clear, to correspond with Dewey's view. In emphasizing the instrumental value of language and communication the authors approximate one aspect of the experimentalistic interpretation of value.

Crocker's Public Speaking for College Students is based essentially on classical rhetoric. Experience is undergone but it has no apparent relation to inquiry or learning in this text. Inquiry deals with solving practical problems but seems to have no relation to learning. Learning occurs by studying principles, applying them in exercises, and receiving instructor comment upon how well the application was made. Intelligence and mind seem to be distinct physical entities unrelated to the problem-solving method. Knowledge consists of the body of material handed down by previous generations; even though the author insists that students learn from the experience of others, his interpretation is that what past generations have learned from experience is to be learned now as subject matter and applied in practice.

Sarett and Foster in their Basic Principles of Speech emphasize heavily the rhetorical tradition which began with the Greeks. Equally

important is their stress on adequate use of the language. They regard interaction as a two-way process during which man is continuously being transformed. Experimental inquiry seems an incidental matter for them and therefore suffers from lack of explicit treatment. It is admittedly a method of learning, but other methods are suggested also. For example, the principle-application-criticism sequence is probably their favorite method even though it does not square with learning by experience. Accordingly knowledge has to do with learning organized bodies of information and thinking seems to mean handling material logically. On the definition and purpose of language they agree with the experimentalist. Learning language is concerned here with good usage by imitation of good examples and by following precept. Stress also is given speech as worthwhile for its own sake, and only secondarily does it have instrumental value.

Tending toward experimental theory in a variety of ways is Thonssen and Gilkinson's Basic Training in Speech: Brief Edition. Experience seems broadly interpreted in this textbook; apparently it includes interaction, overt and covert, with a widely varied environment. The pattern of inquiry is explained, but its implications of continuity of experience are not consistently followed. The reflective experience is described as a way of thinking but neither the subject matter organization of the chapters nor the exercises indicate a realization of its implications. Learning occurs through a stimulus-response mechanism by which actions are made habitual. Insight signifies in this text "awareness of one's emotional tendencies." Language development deals with building vocabulary and accuracy of meaning. Speech has both intrinsic and instrumental value, in the former sense as general education, in the latter

for future occupations. In spite of the basic emphasis on the pattern of inquiry in the early part of this book, there is abundant evidence that its implications are not carried through to other phases of teaching.

A text which leans somewhat toward the experimentalist philosophy is Monroe's Principles and Types of Speech. The concept of man and of experience seems akin to experimentalism. The pattern of inquiry is here called the "motivated sequence" and is the basic framework for organizing every kind of speech. The introduction-body-conclusion sequence is thus replaced by the five functional steps: attention, need, satisfaction, visualization, and action. The series of chapters on speech preparation also follow this plan of organization. In spite of that, the learning method is indicated to be precept and example followed by application; experience is also a method, he says, but in this instance experience again means study of principles, application in practice, and constructive criticism. Furthermore, the method of problem solving is but one method of thinking for this author; other methods, actually necessary procedures in inquiry, are identification, classification, and determining relationships. Other differences from experimentalism are that in this text mind is an entity, "knowledge" corresponds to experimentalist "information", and a teacher is in school to provide answers. Agreement exists in that both say memory depends upon frequent use, language developed from social need, and that the value of public speaking is largely instrumental.

Baird and Knowler's General Speech: An Introduction embodies many principles of experimentalism. Man is a social being whose direction of growth is culturally determined. Experiencing is a continuous

process of interaction. The pattern of inquiry is explicitly explained as the method of solving problems; it provides the organizational framework of the chapters, and in the main student activity suggested at the ends of chapters is cast into this mold. Learning results from understanding, insight, and intelligent practice in problem-solving. Thinking also occurs according to this pattern. The instructor is the student's guide and assistant, not his director. They agree also on individual differences, retention and forgetting, motivation, and in the main on the theories of language and value. They differ from the experimentalist view in that they include under knowledge what Dewey calls information, and they also stress, more than did Dewey, that education not only enriches present living but is also preparation for life. These divergences, however, do not constitute major differences from experimentalist concepts.

Conclusions. On the basis of this study of the philosophy of experimentalism, of some of its implications for the teaching of public speaking, and of selected textbooks written for college public speaking classes, it seems possible, perhaps desirable, to conduct such classes in conformity with educational implications of this philosophy. At present, however, there is in the literature only meager evidence that serious consideration has been given to this possibility. Of the six textbooks examined, only one gives extensive indication that this philosophy has been the major and consistent point of view of its authors. Three of the others contain little more than an occasional reference to it. The remaining two incorporate several of its major principles but they also include other principles whose implications

are not in accord with those taken from experimentalism; the result is an eclecticism in which the principles are at variance with one another.

There is, of course, no cogent reason compelling textbook writers to conform to the principles of experimentalism. However, it would seem desirable that such authors maintain some consistent point of view. Even if it is an eclectic one, it might avoid contradicting itself. Several writers are eclectic, one by his own admission, with the result that they appear to contradict themselves. They advocate logical reasoning in their textbook and at the same time fail to follow through the implications of these principles. They state that much is learned from experience but their learning theory fails to include the same kind of experiencing. Again, they advocate building speeches on the problem-solving sequence, implying that audiences learn best in that way, but they seem to say that the student learns only by applying learned principles and by being criticized on the extent of his conforming to those principles.

Textbook authors, furthermore, are probably under no compulsion to state their basic assumptions which guide them in their writing. Nor is it necessarily expected of them to say to what extent they are adopting the principles of a particular educational philosophy. But when they do enunciate such assumptions, it is not too much to expect that they will persevere in their beliefs. When, for example, a writer states that no hard and fast rules exist in a particular instance and then, in spite of that statement, in the Exercises at the end of the chapter directs the student in his own speaking to apply the principles laid down in that chapter, the reader is justified in inferring that the author



is giving no more than casual lip service to his own basic assumptions. This kind of illustration is not uncommon in these textbooks.

The results of this inquiry warrant suggesting, therefore, that textbook authors determine which school of thought they are willing to adopt as a basic educational point of view and then adhere to it throughout the process of writing their books. Such consistency of point of view would avoid confusing the thinking student while he is using the book as a text in a course. In its long-range effect it might likewise avoid inculcating, incidentally if not intentionally, habits of thinking which are mutually at variance with one another. On the other hand, such consistency would well illustrate, if not develop, wholesome habits of thinking about personal and social problems. It would enable the student to respect the educator for thinking a thing through and for holding to one point of view, whether or not the student agreed with him. And were the student thus enabled to follow a consistent philosophy in his own living and experiencing, significant improvement could conceivably result in his thinking about public social issues of the day.

**APPENDIX A**

**QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO 144 COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES TO ASCERTAIN WHICH  
TEXTBOOKS THEY WERE USING IN THEIR PUBLIC SPEAKING CLASSES.**

Name of School

Location of School

Author, Title, and Edition of text now being used in your beginning Public Speaking classes

How many students will probably use it this year?

How many years have you used this text?

Please indicate briefly why you preferred this text to others on the market.

If you use a syllabus, course of study, or other list of classroom exercises, assignments, etc., how may a copy be procured? At what price?

Return to

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**APPENDIX B**

**QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS INDICATING PUBLIC SPEAKING TEXTBOOKS, NUMBER  
OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, AND NUMBER OF STUDENTS  
USING THEM ANNUALLY**

	Name of Text	Number of Schools	Number of Students
1.	Monroe, Alan H. <u>Principles and Types of Speech</u> . Third Ed. New York: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1949. 658 pp.	19	8165
2.	Bryant, Donald C., and Karl R. Wallace. <u>Fundamentals of Public Speaking</u> . New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1947. 580 pp.	8	3385
3.	Sarett, Lew, and William Trufant Foster. <u>Basic Principles of Speech</u> . Rev. Ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948. 604 pp.	8	2535
4.	Baird, A. Craig, and Franklin H. Knowler. <u>General Speech: An Introduction</u> . New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949. 500 pp.	6	2190
5.	Thonssen, Lester, and Howard Gilkinson. <u>Basic Training in Speech. Brief Edition</u> . Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1949. 249 pp.	5	1600
6.	Crocker, Lionel. <u>Public Speaking for College Students</u> . 2d Rev. Ed. New York: American Book Company, 1950. 508 pp.	4	1720
7.	Brigance, William Norwood. <u>Speech Communication</u> . New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1947. 220 pp.	3	950
8.	Gilman, Wilbur E., Bower Aly, and Loren D. Reid. <u>The Fundamentals of Speaking</u> . New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. 608 pp.	3	635
9.	Sandford, William P., and W. Hayes Yeager. <u>Principles of Effective Speaking</u> . 4th Rev. Ed. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1942. 580 pp.	3	3250
10.	Gray, Giles W., and Waldo W. Braden. <u>Public Speaking: Principles and Practice</u> . New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951. 581 pp.	2	670
11.	Mulgrave, Dorothy I. <u>Speech For the Classroom Teacher</u> . New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1936. 398 pp.	2	200
12.	Oliver, Robert T., and Rupert L. Cortright. <u>New Training for Effective Speech</u> . Rev. Ed. New York: The Dryden Press, 1951. 563 pp.	2	425

	Name of Text	Number of Schools	Number of Students
13.	Oliver, Robert T., Dallas C. Dickey, and Harold P. Zelko. <u>Essentials of Communicative Speech</u> . New York: The Dryden Press, 1949. 338 pp.	2	725
14.	Soper, Paul A. <u>Basic Public Speaking</u> . New York: Oxford University Press, 1949. 376 pp.	2	550
15.	Barnes, Harry G. <u>Speech Handbook: A Manual for a First Course in Speech Training</u> . New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1941. 138 pp.	1	350
16.	Borchers, Gladys, L., and Claude M. Wise. <u>Modern Speech</u> . New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1947. 522 pp.	1	100
17.	Dolman, John. <u>A Handbook of Public Speaking</u> . 2d Rev. Ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944. 174 pp.	1	200
18.	Ehrensberger, Ray, and Elaine Pagel. <u>Notebook for Public Speaking: A College Course in Basic Principles</u> . New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946. 166 pp.	1	1800
19.	Eisenson, Jon. <u>Basic Speech</u> . New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. 344 pp.	1	75
20.	Ewbank, Henry L., and J. Jeffery Auer. <u>Discussion and Debate</u> . New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1941. 524 pp.	1	40
21.	Huston, Alfred C., and Robert A. Sandberg. <u>Everyday Business Speech</u> . New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943. 302 pp.	1	470
22.	Lamers, William M., and M. Edward Smith. <u>The Making of a Speaker</u> . Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1937. 522 pp.	1	300
23.	McCall, Roy. <u>Fundamentals of Speech</u> . New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. 240 pp.	1	400
24.	Murray, Elwood, Raymond C. Barnard, and J. V. Garland. <u>Integrative Speech</u> . Denver: The University of Denver, 1946. 266 pp.	1	500

	Name of Text	Number of Schools	Number of Students
25.	Norvelle, Lee, R., and Raymond G. Smith. <u>Speaking Effectively: Preparation and De-</u> <u>livery.</u> New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1948. 238 pp.	1	1000
26.	Orr, Frederick W., <u>Essentials of Effective</u> <u>Speaking.</u> New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. 305 pp.	1	462
27.	Parrish, W. M. <u>Speaking in Public.</u> New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. 461 pp.	1	150
28.	Reager, Richard C. <u>You Can Talk Well.</u> New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1946. 312 pp.	1	100
29.	Runion, Howard L. <u>Essentials of Effective</u> <u>Public Speaking.</u> New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1948. 160 pp.	1	225
30.	Williamson, Arleigh B., Charles A. Fritz, and Harold R. Ross. <u>Speaking in Public.</u> 2d Rev. Ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948. 445 pp.	1	200

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3. Barnes, Harry G. "Basic Concepts of Speech Education." The Speech Teacher. 1 (January 1952), pp. 14-19.
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6. Childs, John L. Education and Morals. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950. 299 pp.
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8. Crocker, Lionel. Public Speaking for College Students. Second Edition. New York: American Book Company, 1950. 502 pp.
9. Dewey, John. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916. 418 pp.
10. \_\_\_\_\_, and James H. Tufts. Ethics. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1908. 606 pp.
11. \_\_\_\_\_. Experience and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 116 pp.
12. \_\_\_\_\_. Experience and Nature. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1925. 443 pp.
13. \_\_\_\_\_. How We Think. Revised Edition. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1933. 301 pp.
14. \_\_\_\_\_. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922. 336 pp.
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20. Essays for John Dewey's Ninetieth Birthday. Kenneth D. Benne and William O. Stanley, Editors. Urbana, Illinois: Bureau of Research and Service, College of Education, University of Illinois, 1950. 92 pp.
21. Ewbank, Henry L., and J. Jeffery Auer. Handbook for Discussion Leaders. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. 118 pp.
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34. The Philosophy of John Dewey. Library of Living Philosophers. Revised Edition. Paul A. Schilpp, Editor. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951. 686 pp.
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