In this dissertation, I articulate and develop a particular account of feminist care ethics, which I offer as a critical orientation toward the world. I interpret the "care perspective" as a critical framework that contains various conceptual tools and resources for interpreting and interrogating practices of responsibility within our socio-political world. Although a positive association is often attached to the word "care", relations of care can nevertheless be manifestations of marginalization and oppression. If care ethics wishes to ground itself in human experience, it must be capable of recognizing when relations of care are problematic and of considering how they might be improved. Because of these commitments, I refer to my account of care ethics as a "non-idealized" approach to care. The care perspective I develop here does not provide transcendent guidance that informs someone "how to care". Nor does this approach contain a normative injunction to bring "more care" into the world - for better or for worse, care already permeates the world. What my approach does do is provide conceptual assistance for examining current facets of oppression and asking how arrangements of care both support them and could help mitigate them if arranged differently. Having a non-idealized approach to care ethics involves acknowledging that even when care is well intentioned it can express problematic understandings of our responsibilities towards others, which results in harm that is personal, social, political, or some combination thereof. One important concept that can help us comprehend how relations of care can be problematic in the above fashion is the concept of paternalism. Drawing on the resources that my critical care framework provides, I argue that paternalism should be construed as a matter of exerting control over another through one's relationship with them. I then demonstrate the importance of having a sensible conception of paternalism, and reasons for care ethicists to be on guard against paternalism in relations of care, through discussing how cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) works as a treatment for major depression. I emphasize the important potential that CBT as a practice of care has for treating depression. I also stress the importance of being able to appraise CBT from the perspective of care ethics, which I bring out through my discussion of how paternalism as I describe it can thwart the effectiveness of CBT. That my critical care framework can furnish and utilize a conception of paternalism that makes more sense than competing definitions of paternalism demonstrates the value of my critical care framework for evaluating relations of care.
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