Chapter 1: How Effective Are Low-Emission Vehicle Standards?While mobile emission standards have been used for decades in several countries, their effectiveness is rarely discussed. Using the spatial and temporal variation caused by the implementation of California’s Low Emission Vehicle (LEV) program, the paper applies the difference-in-differences method and the event study method for study. It compares the monitor level ozone concentration between states that implemented the LEV program with the states that did not. It is found that the LEV program significantly reduces the ozone concentration. By using the same empirical methods on county level mortality data, the paper also find a significant reduction in respiratory diseases. The results build the first step of evaluating the LEV program, and shed light on the less-studied field of mobile source emission standards.Chapter 2: Essay Two: Monitoring and Inspections: the Correlation Between Monitor Breakings and Inspection IntensityThis study analyze the relationship between two critical regulation activities in air pollution control: monitoring and inspection. Utilizing a theoretical model, we reveal that the relationship between monitoring and inspection is complicated and not merely substitute. In particular, variations in monitoring intensity can change the marginal benefits of inspection differently across regions, depending on their cleanliness and the associated penalties for non-compliance. Empirical examination on the impact of incomplete monitors uncovers diverse responses from regulatory bodies at federal, state, and local levels. Specifically, while the EPA's actions remain unaffected, state agencies tend to curtail inspection irrespective of regional cleanliness in the face of monitoring reductions. Conversely, local regulators display a marked drop in inspection activities for dirtier regions under similar circumstances. Our findings underscore the importance of refining the monitoring system and allocating resources judiciously, especially in regions with higher pollution. Chapter 3: Too Small to be Regulated? An Empirical Study on the Spillover Effect of Colorado’s Exemption PolicyPolicy interventions for the mispriced externalities often have geographical and participant-specific limitations, potentially prompting regulated parties to sidestep compliance. This paper examines Colorado's "Permit Section (PS) Memo-10-01"—an exemption introduced in 2011 that relaxed compliance requirements for smaller emitters of Nitrogen Oxides (NOx). Using the national emission inventory database, this study assesses whether this policy influenced smaller facilities to adjust their emission patterns. My findings suggest no significant evidence of emission manipulation at the specified 40 tons threshold or any strategic evasion by smaller emitters. Nonetheless, the nuanced complexity of such regulations underscores the necessity for future in-depth investigations.
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