SMART HOMES, SMART HARMS: UNDERSTANDING RISKS, IMPACTS, AND SUPPORT-SEEKING IN CASES OF INTERNET OF THINGS-MEDIATED INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE By Megan Louise Knittel A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Information and Media — Doctor of Philosophy 2023 ABSTRACT Internet of Things (IoT) devices are rapidly penetrating the consumer technology market. This diverse emerging category of sensor-based devices, including audiovisual surveillance systems such as the Ring doorbell, Nest thermostats, voice-activated Amazon Alexa networks, Wi-Fi enabled refrigerators and many other technologies. IoT support the day-to-day activities of users through convenient cross-device data sharing and remote-control capabilities. While these devices support a variety of positive outcomes for the families inviting these technologies into their homes, they simultaneously raise major concerns for privacy and safety, particularly for cases of intimate partner violence. Access to daily activities in the home, alongside user interfaces which prioritize centralized control and automated function, could expand the reach and impact of intimate violence in the hands of an abuser. Though abuse by intimate partners through Internet-connected platforms such as social media and text messages is well-documented, the role of Internet of Things devices in firsthand experiences of abuse have not been examined. Prevalence of Internet of Things-mediated abuse (IoT IPA), risk factors for experiencing this type of abuse, trajectories of abuse via these devices, and how victim survivors seek support for harms inflicted have not been documented. To examine these foundational issues, this dissertation centers on understanding the lived experiences of IoT-mediated abuse survivors. This dissertation investigates how abusers’ use of Internet of Things devices inform intimate partner abuse cycles and investigates how victim survivors utilize support-seeking resources when dealing with IoT IPA. I conducted a qualitative, parallel research methodology. The first study was a netnography of an online community on Reddit.com centered on support seeking and community feedback for firsthand experiences of IoT IPA in intimate relationships. The second study was a semi-structured interview study with self-described IoT IPA victim survivors living in Michigan. Data collection and bottom-up qualitative analysis for the netnography and semi-structured interview study occurred simultaneously. IoT IPA victim survivors undertake misuse forensics. Abused IoT devices are often hidden and used in secret. Thus, to identify and respond to this abuse, victim survivors undertake the misuse forensics process of 1) suspecting their abuser is using technology to violate their personal privacy, 2) processing evidence and considering explanations, and 3) taking action to combat the abuse. IoT IPA victim survivors actively avoid formal support services such as law enforcement in favor of soliciting support from their established, trusted social networks, including informal “tech experts” amongst their friends and family. Fears of social scrutiny alongside an incomplete understanding of how IoT function and what personal data they collect create barriers for seeking support. The sociotechnical capacities of IoT uniquely foster an abusers’ ability to exert coercive control over their victim while simultaneously placing the impetus of action and protection upon victim survivors. Developing policy and design standards for identifying and preventing IoT IPA is of critical importance for managing the scale and penetration of these devices in hundreds of millions of households across the globe. IoT IPA survivors’ lived experiences inform standards and best practices for designing, governing, and researching emerging IoT ecosystems in ways that prioritize user autonomy and safety. Copyright by MEGAN LOUISE KNITTEL 2023 I dedicate this dissertation to Grandma and Grandpa. Thank you for everything. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not be possible without the courage and generosity of my research participants who were willing to share their lives and stories with me for this project. They invited me to listen, ask questions, and learn from terrible experiences in the hope of helping others to not experience violence. Their experiences remain a source of inspiration to enact meaningful change and accountability in preventing and responding to tech abuse in all forms. I would like to thank my advisor Steph Jordan for her mentorship and enthusiasm for this project and me as a human. Her critical eye and gentle kindness allowed this project to bloom in ways that would not have been possible without her insights. I would also like to thank my committee, Susan Wyche, Ruth Shillair, and Nancy Rhodes for their willingness to engage with my scholarship and help me develop this work. My advisor for the first several years of my Ph.D. journey, Rick Wash, instilled a foundation of how to conduct rigorous social science research and a sense of intellectual curiosity I will always be grateful for. I also would like to thank Johannes Bauer for his mentorship and support. I am also grateful for my LHSP family at the University of Michigan. Mark, Tina, Paul, and Carol, thank you for nurturing my creativity, social consciousness, and self-determination. I also would like to thank the Center for Gender in Global Context at Michigan State University, the Health & Risk Communication Center at Michigan State University, and the Department of Media & Information for financially supporting this project. I would not have been able to compensate participants or purchase necessary software and equipment without their generous support. I also would like to thank Dr. Carrie Moylan for providing her expert input for developing the interview protocol. Additionally, I would like to thank End Violent Encounters vi and Women-Inspired Neighborhood Network Detroit for supporting participant recruitment efforts. I would also like to acknowledge the value of the mentorship and support I received from the Gender and Internet of Things project group at University College London throughout the development of this work. Dr. Leonie Tanczer’s mentorship and willingness to platform me and my work through UCL STEaPP’s lecture series made this project better. I would also like to thank Demelza Luna Reaver and Lilly Neubauer for their feedback and camaraderie. 2018 to 2023 was an especially strange time to be a Ph.D. student. Doing a Ph.D. in normal times is a monumental undertaking. My journey, which took place through deep personal losses, the second half of the Trump presidency, a global pandemic, an imploding climate disaster, and the tragic events on Michigan State’s campus on February 13th, 2023, was especially difficult. I would like to thank the academic community rooted in the Department of Media & Information for going above and beyond to support me through these challenges. I would not have made it through without the love and humor of my friends and family. Thank you, mom and dad, for your unwavering belief in me, the many home-cooked meals and laundry quarters, and always being there to listen to me vent and pick me back up. And thank you, Ellie, for the moral support, affection, and enthusiasm to provide editorial feedback. I also would like to thank two of my oldest friends, Tyler and Jessica, for always reminding me to take myself less seriously and find the fun in the day-to-day. Finally, I would like to thank the 2018 I&M doctoral program cohort, a uniquely brilliant group, for their friendship and camaraderie through this doctoral journey. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................... 22 CHAPTER 3: METHOD .............................................................................................................. 60 CHAPTER 4: THE INTERNET OF THINGS AND MISUSE FORENSICS ............................ 105 CHAPTER 5: THE INTERNET OF THINGS AND SUPPORT SEEKING ............................. 153 CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 208 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 233 APPENDIX A: METHODS FIGURES ...................................................................................... 260 APPENDIX B: DISSERTATION INTERVIEW ELIGIBILITY SURVEY ............................... 267 APPENDIX C: SURVIVORS OF INTERNET OF THINGS-MEDIATED INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE ELIGIBILITY PRE-SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE .................................. 277 viii CONTENT WARNING In capturing and understanding experiences of harm and abuse enacted with Internet of Things devices, this dissertation contains mentions of events and experiences that may be disturbing and upsetting. The content of this dissertation includes references to intimate partner violence, domestic abuse, sexual violence/rape, physical violence, emotional violence, mental health, stalking, audiovisual surveillance, food/drink, body weight, and sexism. ix CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Introduction Tech abuse is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the scope and influence of how computers can be used by individuals to harm others. Scholars, technology designers, policymakers, and other stakeholders are increasingly recognizing the capacity of computers to facilitate interpersonal harm, particularly in intimate relationships. Tech abuse refers to individuals using computing technology, like social media or smart home devices to engage in physical, psychological, and emotional violence against another person. Tech abuse is an umbrella term used to describe how people use computers to belittle, harass, threaten, and attack others. Women and other historically marginalized groups encounter the brunt of tech abuse attacks (NW et al., 2021). However, recent developments in how people use computing in everyday life have changed the scope of tech abuse’s impacts and its consequences via the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT). In the past, turning off the computer or logging out of a social media were viable strategies in creating a degree of separation from technology and, by extension, tech-mediated violence. However, The Internet of Things and other ubiquitous computing technologies are designed to be ambient, automized, invisible and ‘always on’. As of 2020, there were over 26 billion IoT devices such as Nest thermostats and Alexa assistants being used on Earth (Maayan, 2020). The adoption of Internet of Things devices in consumer markets worldwide is predicted to continue growing exponentially (Vailshery, 2023). Sensor-based computing is not novel. IoT are novel based on their degree of cross-device connectivity, popularity, and ease of use. The way human bodies exist in home environments 1 become potential points of data collection and communication. Movement, energy consumption, and countless other factors become sources of information made visible to others sharing physical space with IoT. This widespread adoption of Internet of Things devices reflects broader trends in how computing increasingly moves towards what has been called the 4th wave of human computer interaction (HCI) (Homewood et al., 2021). Fourth wave HCI, “entanglement HCI”, captures how computing work has expanded conceptualizations of how people and computers interact with one another. Computing use has expanded from work contexts to many aspects of leisure, social interaction, and family life. Fourth wave HCI interrogates the fuzziness and intersections of people with technology. Technologies intersecting with human intimacies like the Internet of Things are increasingly “probing the limits of where the human ends and technology starts” (Frauenberger, 2020, p. 3) and raise new questions for ethical and equitable computing design. The physical ‘things’ IoT technologies are nested within are diverse, ranging from household appliances to voice activated personal assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa. For IoT devices, data is everywhere all the time – from your heartrate to the temperature you like your shower water and how often you go to the grocery store, these devices make the mundane visible to reflect your activities and preferences and support day-to-day activities. Users are motivated to use IoT for amusement/enjoyment, convenience, meeting personal fitness/other goals (Han & Yang, 2018; Lomas et al., 2018) and simply the chance to experience cutting edge technology (Coughlan et al., 2012). Emerging evidence suggests that Internet of Things devices may create new opportunities for interpsonal harm in the hands of adverse actors including abusive intimate partners. In response to recent reports of tech abuse, such as the Apple Air Tag scandal (Allison, 2022) 2 pushback is growing against so-called “stalkerware” devices (Freed et al., 2018). Technology corporations and independent advocacy groups (Galperin, 2021) are increasingly investing in harm mitigation measures. Some advocacy groups are creating guidelines against harm in design applications (Nuttall, 2020) and deploying new safety features, such as Apple’s new Safety Check user interface (Bell, 2022). Refuge’s Digital Breakup guide offers tangible procedures for addressing tech abuse (Digital Breakup, 2022). Comprehensively addressing tech-mediated domestic abuse implicates many stakeholders across stages of device development and implementation. IoT abuse raises new challenges for domestic abuse support advocates. With thousands of discrete devices possessing unique features and subsequent novel potential for misuse. IoT’s rapid pace of innovation create a constantly changing sociotechnical landscape. This context creates an unattainable standard of knowledge which support specialists need to effectively support the safety and well-being of their clients. But, without standardized privacy and security standards for IoT, domestic abuse advocates are not equipped with training and other resources to keep up with new developments and vulnerabilities. Examining the role of emerging IoT technology in domestic abuse requires connecting emergent capacities of these technologies to the work and knowledge of public health experts, medical professionals, IT professionals, academics, law enforcement and policy legislators, among others. Despite emerging attention towards tech abuse in intimate partnerships, the emergent capacities of Internet of Things for interpersonal abuse have not yet been critically considered. There is no data derived from real world use cases and actual victim survivors on how Internet of Things intersect with intimate partner violence trajectories. Without data on Internet of Things in experiences of intimate abuse from the perspective of victim survivors, there is no way to effectively assess risks, address harms, and prevent altercations. 3 This project examines how Internet of Things technologies change the way people experience and respond to intimate partner violence. Examining the contextual nuances and lived experiences of IoT IPA victim survivors serves as a foundational inquiry for how Internet of Things devices are used by abusers intersect with contextual risk factors, and new pathways for harm to be carried out against victim survivors. Interdisciplinary scholarship from human computer interaction alongside sociology, psychology, and social work identify the applicability of this dissertation project’s focus on emerging IoT IPA for both human-computer interaction scholarship and community advocates supporting victim survivors directly. A semi-structured interview study with IoT IPA victim survivors was conducted alongside a netnography of IoT IPA support seeking on a relationship advice forum on Reddit.com. IoT IPA survivors in the interview study and online community discussions reveal how abusers utilize the capacities of Internet of Things to obfuscate their violations of victim survivors’ personal privacy and amplify the reach and impact of coercive control. I found that, based upon the stories of victim survivors, and the reported ways IoT is misused, the burden of identification, response, is on victim survivors. Victim survivors drive recognizing that IoT-mediated abuse is occurring and lead response and support seeking. Additionally, victim survivors report barriers including fear of social stigma and a lack of understanding of how IoT devices function in knowing what support would be helpful. Available support is fragmented and victim survivors almost universally do report their experiences of harm to law enforcement or tech support available through IoT developers. There is not consistent oversight, response protocol, or follow-up for supporting IoT IPA victim survivors. In violating reasonable expectations of consent for victim survivors sharing spaces with these devices, victim survivors face emotional and material barriers in seeking support for IoT IPA. The vocabulary 4 choices and abbreviations used through this dissertation are summarized in the figure below: Figure: Glossary. 5 Internet of Things (IoT) • As this is a foundational and exploratory inquiry, the following general definition of IoT is adopted. A technology is considered IoT for the findings of this study if it meets the following criteria: 1) a physical object which 2) in addition to Internet connectivity has a different primary function. For example, an Internet of Things coffee maker’s primary function is to make coffee, but the device can also connect to the Internet for purposes such as remote brewing, sharing data about water consumption, and so on. Please see the Defining Internet of Things section of Chapter 2: Literature Review for a review of definitions and classifications of IoT devices. Victim survivor • The phrase victim survivor to refer to all people who self-identify as having experienced harm based upon their current or former romantic partner using an Internet of Things device(s). This phrasing centers the unjust harm victim survivors have experienced while simultaneously centering their personal agency and capacity to overcome challenging situations. Victim survivor is used to refer to individuals who have experienced intimate violence generally. Additionally, victim survivor is used to refer to participants in the semi-structured interview study and community discussants in the netnography. Intimate partner abuse • This project uses the definition of intimate partner violence from the World Health Organization’s research program on violence against women: “behaviour by an intimate partner or ex-partner that causes physical, sexual or psychological harm, including physical aggression, sexual coercion, psychological abuse and controlling behaviours” (World Health Organization, 2021). Intimate partner abuse does not just occur in man abuser-woman victim dynamics, and male survivors in particular face stigma and other challenges in sharing their experiences (see: Peraica et al. 2021; Laskey, Bates & Taylor, 2019). This inquiry includes participation from all genders (see Chapter 3: Methodology). Intimate partner is used rather than romantic partner to capture spectrums of human intimacy, including aromantic and asexual relationships. Internet of Things intimate partner abuse (IoT IPA) • Internet of Things intimate partner abuse (IoT IPA) refers to any “behaviour by an intimate partner or ex-partner that causes physical, sexual or psychological harm, including physical aggression, sexual coercion, psychological abuse and controlling behaviours” (World Health Organization, 2021) carried out entirely or part via the use of an Internet of Things device. The term abuse, as opposed to violence, highlights how IoT- IPA is a form of intimate partner abuse which can occur without physical violence. This is not intended to diminish the severity of physical violence which intercedes, but to provide an expanded definition of intimate abuse and coercive control based upon the diverse experiences of participants in this research. Figure 1. Glossary 6 A major contribution of this project is the focus on firsthand, lived experiences of IoT- mediated harms carried out by an abusive actor from the perspective of victim survivors. To make tangible the ways IoT can change the material reality of how intimate abusers exert power and control, this next section shares Maggie’s story. Maggie (pseudonym) participated in the interview study component of this dissertation project. Maggie outlines her experiences leading up to, during, and after experiencing IoT IPA from her boyfriend at the time. Her story demonstrates how Internet of Things capacities intersect with abuser knowledge and intent to facilitate a capacity to manipulate, harass, and control victim survivors. Following Maggie’s story, the major justifications for this inquiry’s focus on IoT in lived and informal social contexts are summarized. Maggie’s Story: IoT-Mediated Intimate Partner Abuse in Context Maggie was excited to finally be moving on from her abusive ex-boyfriend. They broke up shortly after their baby was born, and Maggie took on raising the baby mostly by herself. She started dating her new boyfriend. Months passed, and she settled into a new routine. However, Maggie started noticing that her ex was acting strangely. They still interacted when he stopped by to visit their son for visitation or when the parents needed to coordinate his care. Maggie noticed that, whenever she left the house with her baby, her ex seemed to always contact her questioning where she was going and what she was doing. She shared that his timing always felt too convenient. If she took the baby to the clinic, she would get a call or text asking if the baby was sick. If she and her new boyfriend went out to lunch, her ex would call and ask why his kid was hanging out with this new guy. This pattern of questioning related to Maggie’s movements within and outside her home continued. She had no idea what was happening, but 7 she was trying to piece together the evidence from her partner’s behavior. How did he know all this about her? Was he following her around, or enlisting someone to watch her house? Maggie was not able to figure out what was going on until one day when her new boyfriend was over. He asked her why she had a camera set up behind the TV, and questioned if it was to keep an eye on the baby’s nanny when she was watching him alone. She confronted her ex and found out that one day when he stopped by for his visitation, he secretly set up wireless cameras in her home which he could control and view from his phone. Maggie described her reaction to discovering the cameras: “My security or my personal space was being breached. And whatever he was seeing, or whatever I was doing in the house, I didn't share it willy nilly. So that was a breach of personal space.” - Maggie Addressing this secret, unwanted Internet of Things-mediated abuse was challenging. She confronted her ex-boyfriend directly. He wouldn’t confirm how many cameras he installed or how long they had been in use. Maggie described him making “excuses” such as claiming that the cameras were necessary so he could make sure her and the baby were safe. Maggie and her new boyfriend swept the house, hired an expert to check the premises, and got her a new phone. Even with these steps, Maggie reported that now that the possibility she had been being surveilled in this way was made reality, she worried it could happen again in her current or future relationships. Additionally, even after finding and disabling the cameras, Maggie continued worrying that her ex may have archived videos of her stored elsewhere. Maggie’s story exemplifies how Internet of Things devices intersect with human relationships. In the hands of abusive actors, IoT’s capacities for automation and convenience allow abusers to expand the reach and impact of coercive control over victim survivors. In 8 Maggie’s words, this “breach” of her “personal space” impacted her feelings of safety and security in her own home. Maggie’s story demonstrates several core elements from the full findings of this dissertation project. The firsthand, lived experiences of IoT-mediated harms offer insight into the surprising ways IoT is misused by abusers within intimate social contexts. The first element of IoT-mediated harm Maggie’s story demonstrated is obfuscation. Her ex-boyfriend hid the IoT devices when she was not home. Abusers rely upon contextual knowledge, such as the victim survivor’s daily routines and access to their home Wi-Fi network, alongside physical access to set up devices in secret. Maggie’s ex-boyfriend did not steal her property or break into her home. Rather, he utilized the social context of visiting his child to set up surveillance devices. Utilizing devices in secret makes discovering tech abuse is occurring at all difficult. Next, Maggie’s story demonstrates how addressing IoT-IPA, even after discovering it is occurring, is difficult. Maggie shared how she was obligated to maintain a connection with her ex because of their son. But her ex-boyfriend justified his use of devices as a safety measure. Maggie described that his denial and repeated returns to the idea of safety made addressing the situation socially challenging. Interpersonal messiness does not translate to refined and revised consent in the use of IoT devices. Maggie’s ex-boyfriend purchased, set up, and remotely monitored the devices in question. There is no process in that model of technical implementation, where physical access presumes permission, to recognize that the devices were deployed and maintained in a non-consensual environment. Finally, Maggie’s story demonstrates how Internet of Things-mediated abuse’s impacts are amplified and sustained through incomplete knowledge of what technologies were used and what personal data they collected. Maggie and her new boyfriend did their best to search the 9 house and make sure there were no other devices. But Maggie’s ex-boyfriend’s unwillingness to reveal the exact details of the personal data he collected left them with uncertainty about what personal information he had. The camera and microphone were in the main area of their home, and thus Maggie’s ex had access to the details of their day-to-day routines for an unknown period. Maggie described the continued anxiety and fear of what her ex-boyfriend may know about her and still possess digital evidence of. IoT and Intimate Abuse: Identifying New Risks IoT devices are becoming increasingly integrated in daily routines and environments. First, the popularity of IoT devices continues to grow. Projections estimate by the year 2030, 159 billion consumer IoT devices will be in circulation (Thormundsson, 2023). The growth of IoT has coincided with increases in intimate partner abuse worldwide, particularly during the height of the pandemic in 2020 – 2022 (Tseng et al., 2021). These increases have been attributed to pandemic-prompted changes in social dynamics such as heightened socioeconomic uncertainty, increased time spent at home, and social isolation, among other factors (Boserup et al., 2020; de Souza Santos et al., 2022). COVID-19 and Intimate Violence Trajectories An increase in IoT device use does not have a direct, causal relationship with these increases in intimate partner abuse, or vice versa. Rather, the confluence of these two trends raises the possibility that IoT-mediated intimate abuse could also see sharp increases now or soon. Based on sheer volume of devices and overall reported intimate abuse levels, even if Internet of Things-mediated abuse only occurs in a small percentage of overall users, this could still present as millions of incidents and victims impacted. The possibility of an amplificatory effect makes defining the current state of IoT IPA, including potential points of emphasis for 10 prevention in emerging design approaches and new device development, especially valuable at this moment in time. Experiencing any form of intimate abuse predicts experiencing future violence and abuse (King et al., 2021). Additionally, experiencing one form of intimate abuse predicts experiencing other forms; for example, experiencing emotional abuse predicts later experiencing physical abuse (Outlaw, 2009). Thus, if Internet of Things devices are being used by an abuser, understanding when and how they are used could be used to predict risks of other forms of intimate abuse. Examining if Internet of Things devices follow these predictive patterns could inform more sophisticated social and technical risk identification strategies. Intimate Abuse Produced by Multiple, Cyclical Factors Additionally, no existing peer-reviewed scholarship has specifically considered the role of Internet of Things devices in the cyclical nature of intimate abuse. Across support services (The Cycle of Domestic Violence, 2023), intimate partner abuse is defined as a repeating cycle with three stages of escalation. The first stage is tension. In this stage, the abuser is sensitive, accusatory, and threatening. Victim survivors experiencing this stage often attempt to appease or calm the abuser. The second stage is Explosion (sometimes referred to as Acute Explosion). This is the stage in which the abuser engages in direct physical, psychological, or other types of violence. The third stage is the Honeymoon phase. In this stage, the abuser apologizes for their violent behavior and attempts to reestablish trust through promises, excessive gift giving, and other reconciliation attempts. After the Honeymoon stage, the abuser shifts back towards aggression and tension and the cycle begins anew (2023; The Cycle of Domestic Violence, 2023). As Internet of Things devices are based in sensors (video, audio, movement in the home, resource use etc.), abuser using these devices to surveil or monitor a victim survivor could 11 intensify the escalation phase from the abuser’s perspective. Additionally, this expanded access to daily routines in the home circumvents victim survivor efforts to seek external support, confide in friends and family, and other activities. Investigating the possibility of these harms is necessary for a complete understanding of intimate partner abuse as a multi-faceted process. Expanding Integration of IoT in Everyday Routines Next, Internet of Things devices have become increasingly interwoven in myriad aspects of everyday life. Internet of Things (IoT) technologies are being increasingly imbedded in everyday homes, schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods. The ‘things’ IoT technologies are nested within are diverse, ranging from household appliances to voice activated personal assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa. For IoT devices, data is everywhere – from your heart rate to the temperature you like your shower water and how often you go to the grocery store, these devices make the mundane visible to reflect your activities and preferences and support day-to- day activities. Many of these expanded applications of IoT devices take place in the home and other intimate, private settings therein such as bedrooms and bathrooms. These types of physical spaces being some of the most common use environments for IoT situate these devices as potentially vulnerable to intimate violations in the hands of abusive actors. Translating mundane activities into rich data traces has the capacity to support abusers’ desires to exert coercive control over all aspects of their victims’ daily lives. Internet of Things devices face similar challenges related to legal action and accountability as other forms of tech abuse such as cyberstalking and text-based social media harassment. Legal mechanisms for addressing tech abuse have been criticized for being incompatible with emerging tech-based interpersonal violations (K. D. Bailey, 2012; Freed et al., 12 2018; Soberdash, 2020). Additionally, traditional cybercrime narratives situate most technological violence as anonymous and stranger based (Yar, 2005) despite evidence which repeatedly suggests that the most common and severe technologically mediated violence happens with known actors (Leitão, 2019b; Millar et al., 2021). IoT collect highly detailed, intimate data from people’s everyday activities. Those data logs can be made visible to other users in the system. Potential harms are made manifest when an individual establishes access and ownership with devices and networks, guesses a password, logs into a shared account, or physically accesses a device. Abusers coerce access and then use these imbedded, semi-autonomous technologies to stalk or harass their intimate partner. Outside of even physical access to devices or technical mastery, intimate knowledge of victims allows predicting their behavior and insight to their unique personal vulnerabilities and other sensitivities. This intimate knowledge can in turn facilitate control and coercion via these devices even without illicit technological access. Robust security systems and other technical approaches can be rendered ineffective when considering the social pressures of abusive situations. To adequately align IoT-mediated violations with avenues for legal accountability, both now and in future developments in law and policy, evidence-based inquiries into how abusers are using these devices to threaten, belittle, defame, and otherwise harm their victims are imperative. Lack of Knowledge of IoT Harms Finally, a basic, foundational understanding of how Internet of Things devices are used by abusers and impact victim survivors (How often are IoT devices misused? What social contexts are they misused within? What does IoT IPA look like in practice? How are victim survivors impacted? How do victim survivors recognize and seek support for emerging and not widely recognized IoT IPA harms? and so on) have not yet been substantially explored. 13 Emerging evidence suggests that these technologies also create new opportunities for interpersonal harm and violence(Freed et al., 2018; Leitão, 2019b; Powell & Henry, 2019). IoT highlight broader recognized problems with data privacy, data ownership and use concerns by technology companies, including aggregation and other “big data” concerns (M. W. Bailey, 2015). Intimate abuse is an important sub-category of these emerging IoT harms, but this context has been neglected in the data privacy literature. This inquiry centers on understanding the practices of everyday people using IoT to enact interpersonal violence through a focus on the experiences of victim survivors. This includes examining how people integrate these technologies and the information they generate into everyday routines, including intimate relationships centered in the home. By examining potential vulnerabilities, capacities for harm, and other outcomes from how people use these devices to learn about and interact with others, we can gain a greater understanding about the role of these devices in perpetuating abusive practices. IoT facilitate sociotechnical contexts in which novel harms can germinate in the hands of abusers. I interrogate the social and technical co-construction of IoT devices in everyday life by critically examining the lived experiences of survivors. This inquiry is directed by the stories of survivors. This approach sheds light on how these devices are integrated into real world homes and communities. The firsthand experiences of victim survivors inform best practices for policy, design, and future research rooted in the concerns and challenges of impacted communities. Dissertation Outline The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows. First, Chapter 2: Literature Review is divided into four major sections. First, the literature review opens with defining conceptualizations of intimate abuse. This section traces the history of recognizing 14 intimate abuse in legal, social, and multicultural contexts and identifies social and cultural factors which contribute to interpersonal violence. Additionally, this discussion identifies the major movements in recognizing and studying tech-mediated domestic abuse and intimate abuse. The second section of Chapter 2: Literature Review draws upon interdisciplinary feminist scholarship, rooted in sociology, human computer interaction, and science and technology studies, to describe how technology and gender co-construct one another in sociotechnical systems. This section also highlights the role of media culture and social media in patterns of violence against women and historically marginalized groups. Next, the third section of Chapter 2: Literature Review discusses support-seeking and barriers intimate abuse victim survivors face in seeking support, including stigma and a lack of resources. Finally, the Chapter 2: Literature Review concludes with a discussion of human-centered privacy drawn from human computer interaction scholarship. This section centers on current models of user consent and privacy decision-making online with an emphasis on the context of emerging interfaces including IoT and implications for equitable and safe computing design. Chapter 3: Methods, describes the methodological decisions for this project. The Methods chapter opens with a discussion of the methodological commitments informed by feminist epistemologies. This section also includes a reflexivity exercise and discussion of my positionality as the sole researcher and author of this project. Then, Chapter 3: Methods outlines the first of the two field sites. The first field site was an online community centered on general relationship advice. Using online ethnography techniques, a final dataset of 206 forum threads were identified and collected from Reddit.com’s r/relationshipadvice community. The second field site was a semi-structured interview study with Michigan-based self-identified victim survivors of IoT IPA, producing 22 hour-long interviews. All findings from this project were 15 derived from both field site using a bottom-up, abductive qualitative coding analysis. The parallel methodology informs the same three research questions across both study designs: 1) How does IoT’s reported role in intimate abuse challenge, confirm, or otherwise inform our understanding of cycles of intimate partner abuse and domestic violence? 2) How does IoT intersect with the concept of consent, defined interpersonally, technologically, and by survivors? 3) How does the recognition and experience of IoT-mediated violence manifest, if at all, in formal and informal support-seeking mechanisms (legal, health, social, and so on)? Chapter 4: Misuse Forensics highlights the process victim survivors undertake to recognize, identify, and respond to their partner’s misuse of IoT against them. In the face of dismissal and lying from their abusive partner, the intentional concealment and innocuous material design of IoT, and difficulty evaluating the exact parameters of personal information access IoT devices afford, victim survivors undertake a process coined as misuse forensics to identify and respond to IoT-mediated intimate harms. Chapter 4: Misuse Forensics, the first of two Findings chapters, is organized in accordance with the three chronological stages of the misuse forensics. The misuse forensics process is identified and coined by this dissertation project. First, victim survivors begin by suspecting some form of tech-mediated misuse is occurring based upon their partner’s behavior and knowledge misaligning with their expectations. Then, victim survivors engage in processing evidence and considering explanations. Along with increased attention to their partner’s knowledge and behavior, victim survivors consider and they test possible ways their partner could be gaining access to highly personal information. Finally, victim survivors shift to taking 16 action, such as confronting the abuser directly, after becoming confident in their assessment that IoT-mediated violations are occurring. Next, Chapter 5: Social Support Seeking and Personal Protective Strategies, the second of two Findings chapters, describes the patterns IoT IPA victim survivors demonstrate when looking for external resources in addressing the violence and harassment they are experiencing. First, Chapter 5 opens with the finding that IoT IPA victim survivors fear social stigma in seeking support. Victim survivors invest high levels of energy and attention in seeking social confirmation that their perception of harm is ‘legitimate’ abuse meriting response. IoT IPA victim survivors describe their avoidance formal support seeking in favor of drawing upon their established, trusted social networks rather than IT experts or other professionals. Victim survivors seek out knowledge of IoT and technical capacities for illicit surveillance from “tech experts” within their networks. Finally, victim survivors, after removing themselves from an abusive environment, articulate social decision-making as their primary protective strategy against future violations. Victim survivors repeatedly share that their firsthand experiences make the possibility of future tech-mediated violations salient and are actively impacted in their Internet and computing use in general, far beyond the contexts and capabilities of the original abuse. Chapter 6: Conclusion connects this dissertation’s findings to implications for future research, policy, and practice. These findings indicate several core take-aways for the future of IoT research and the implementation of Internet of Things devices in consumer spaces at large. First, the capabilities of IoT appear to most support concealed audio and visual surveillance in the home. Additionally, the abused IoT devices are implemented alongside other patterns of intimate abuse and coercive control including repeated threats and manipulation. This pattern of 17 use by abusers places the burden of responsibility on victim survivors to not just respond to abuse, but to identify that abuse and the capacity of devices for personal violations and harms. In the context of Internet of Things devices, victim survivor burden is expanded by forcing victim survivors to undertake even the basic task of recognizing a violation is occurring in the face of intentional obfuscation. Victim survivors question their perceptions and even their own sanity in attempting to confirm the details of how their personal details are being violated. The contextual knowledge required to both recognize and define IoT IPA as such has an incomplete translation to legal or policy mechanisms of accountability. More robust and accessible user education of device information capabilities, alongside an emphasis on making IoT intentionally visible in the environment, can support safety and recognition for victim survivors. Informed consent is not possible for all IoT users. The ability to obfuscate these devices, and the tangible access to daily routines they offer, bolsters the goals of abusive actors. Typical intimate abuser goals of cross-contextual control and unfettered access to information about their victim align with IoT capabilities. Simultaneously, these capacities de-prioritize the agency of victim survivors. As this dissertation contributes, IoT IPA victim survivors report sustained consequences for their safety and well-being. This project argues that IoT and other forms of sensor-based environmental technologies must reimagine approaches to meaningful user consent to create safe environments for all potential users. Domestic violence support advocates cannot effectively help victim survivors safety plan in the context of these devices. Victim survivors remain anxious and uncertain about the actual, tangible capacities of these devices and what private information about them may still exist in cyberspace. In my conversations with domestic abuse advocates, they overwhelmingly report that most of their clients report experiencing one or more forms of tech-mediated intimate abuse. 18 However, advocates reported feeling anxious and poorly equipped to fully understand technical risks and capabilities for abuse. Based on this dissertation project’s findings, the possibility of technological surveillance and other novel forms of technology abuse in IPA should become a core component of advocate training. Advocates need more robust support resources alongside to support victim survivor safety planning surrounding IoT and other technologies. Designing against IoT IPA requires a foundational reimagining of the assumptions made regarding consent, safety, and autonomy in current IoT ecosystems. IoT allows users to deploy these devices without clear pathways for stopping or changing access. Not when violence occurs operates against ethical commitments to user safety. This project concludes with a cursory approach to creating a platform for connection between professionals. The proposed community resource toolkit capturing existing resources and the current state of research knowledge designed for researchers, tech professionals, and advocates. This proposed toolkit for designing against harm is informed by IoT IPA survivors. A commitment to designing against abuse, requires a platform for synergizing insights between scholars and domestic abuse advocates. Conclusion The Internet of Things (IoT) are a diverse and popular category of consumer electronics, physical ‘things’, which are imbedded with Internet connectivity technology. IoT are often based in sensors. Examples range from voice-activated personal assistants to household thermostats controllable with a smartphone application. IoT serve the building block of the ‘smart home’ of the near future in which daily activities are optimized and automated. IoT is positioned to play a large and increasing role in intimate abuse. During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, IoT rapidly grew in popularity alongside sharp increases in IPA prevalence rates. Additionally, based upon the current state of knowledge regarding tech abuse 19 from well-documented examples in online harassment (The State of online Harassment, 2021; Vitak et al., 2017), IoT should be expected to be misused as well. However, no empirical data exists examining how Internet of Things devices may be abused by intimate partners to manipulate and control their partners. Current published research on IoT and networked homes focus on technical security breaches and data privacy. While these are valuable considerations, technical security problems and data aggregation concerns do not capture how IoT is misused in intimate relationships. But the current lack of empirical evidence makes it impossible to effectively evaluate risks of IoT-mediated IPA. Not having data on when and how IoT are misused or outcomes for victim survivors prevents implementing meaningful prevention and response measures. This research project contributes foundational data to capture how IoT devices are misused in real world abuse scenarios. It also contributes how IoT intersects with cycles of abuse and how the use of IoT impacts victim survivors in unique ways as compared to traditional IPA. Drawing upon semi-structured interviews with self-described victim survivors along with an online ethnography of a relationship advice forum, r/relationshipadvice, this approach contributes the first empirical data of its kind derived from real abuse contexts and the perspectives of self-identified victim survivors. I introduce an archetypical example of how IoT misused in contexts created novel challenges and Based on the findings from the interviews and online ethnography, I argue that the major contribution and take-away of this project is that current IoT infrastructures place the burden of action and responsibility on victim survivors rather than making actual abusers accountable. Drawing upon the stories of victim survivors, it is those targeted and harmed by IoT who drive a response and support seeking. Victim survivors rely on their trusted social 20 networks to disentangle the anxiety and confusion that IoT-mediated IPA introduces to the on-going patterns of harassment and manipulation in abusive relationships. Current approaches to consent and user control in IoT ecosystems overlook meaningful, dynamic consent, have technical security measures easily overcome through interpersonal knowledge, and centralize control and power in the hands of abusers deploying devices. Creating equitable and safe IoT infrastructures will require radical transformation in control, access, and accountability measures for consumer devices. 21 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW Introduction Recent mass media attention reflects unanticipated consequences of computing technology being increasingly integrated and made “invisible” (Shaw et al., 2019) in daily routines. Incidents such as the ease of misuse of Apple’s AirTag devices in cyberstalking prompted development of a companion app for iPhone and Android phones to identify users of illicit, unknown Apple AirTags on their person (Allison, 2022). A recent UK report cites rapidly growing evidence of smart speakers and Wi-Fi enabled baby monitors used to surveil unwitting members of the household (Rogers, 2023). Using technology as a tool of domestic abuse is not new. Domestic abuse advocates recognize a long history of emerging technology expanding the reach and impact of intimate abusers, with the National Network to End Domestic Violence’s Safety Net Project serving 20+ years as a premier source of research and support resources on tech-mediated intimate partner abuse (Safety Net Project, 2023). However, despite growing public awareness and discourse surrounding various tech harms including personal privacy concerns (Lopez et al., 2017), the existing scholarship on IoT harms has overlooked interpersonal vulnerabilities. First, current work on IoT pays considerable attention to applications of IoT to public life (i.e. Jacobs et al., 2020). Concepts of the smart city of the near future propose deploying IoT for civic purposes such as traffic control, monitoring pollution, and identifying criminal activity (Jacobs et al., 2020). However, potential concerns with IoT in public life overlook consumer deployment of IoT in home settings. This is an important nuance as intimate partner abuse is often amplified behind closed doors (i.e. Evans & Feder, 2016). IoT invite an unprecedented 22 level of automated, sensor-based computing into home environments. This project builds upon current approaches to understanding the potential risks of IoT by focusing on potential unique considerations and vulnerabilities of IoT in private home settings. Next, issues surrounding data privacy (Morel et al., 2019) and cybersecurity vulnerabilities (Slupska et al., 2021) with IoT have been identified. However, these considerations overlook the interpersonal, intimate vulnerabilities IoT pose. Based upon well- documented forms of tech abuse including cyberstalking (Reyns & Fissel, 2020) and image- based sexual abuse (Powell & Henry), most intimate abusers are not technologically sophisticated. They typically are not hacking their partners’ devices or engaging in other traditionally defined illicit activities. Rather, they are exploiting the regular capabilities of devices (Rounda et al., 2020) and socially pressuring the victim to share passwords and give access to devices (Leitão, 2019b). This dissertation builds upon current projects focusing on technical security risks (i.e. Slupska et al., 2021, Morel et al., 2019) to consider the role of social context and interpersonal factors more critically in understanding IoT IPA. Additionally, current accounts of tech abuse do not focus on how IoT may be used differently, or impact victim survivors differently, as compared to other well-documented forms of tech abuse. Existing accounts of tech abuse capture online harassment generally (Duggan, 2017) or invoke IoT broadly in discussing abuse (Lopez-Neira et al., 2019) whilst not focusing specifically on networked devices in the home context. Pioneering IoT scholarship identifies critical areas for effective policy in addressing the novel risks IoT could pose related to their invisibility, data sharing across multiple devices, and other design concerns (i.e. Tanczer et al. 2019). However, there remains a dearth of empirical evidence capturing how IoT-mediated intimate abuse occurs in real world settings. This dissertation project contributes data from self- 23 identified victim survivors to offer insight into IoT-mediated harms in context. Without data on IoT’s role in intimate abuse from the perspective of victim survivors in real world contexts, it is impossible to meaningfully provide effective sustained support to victim survivors. The literature review chapter begins with contextualizing risks and vulnerabilities of IoT I discuss background on incidence rates and risk factors of domestic violence and intimate partner abuse worldwide. IPA remains such a challenging issue to address due to the sheer scale and prevalence, the multiple social and institutional factors contributing to IPA, and the cyclical nature of IPA. Next, I discuss how IPA can be predicted based upon individual and social factors in online and offline contexts. Based upon trends in IPA and predictors of tech-mediated abuse, we would expect Internet of Things devices to support cycles of intimate partner abuse by offering abusers new opportunities to harass, dominate, and manipulate their partner. However, there is no data examining how intimate abusers use IoT as part of coercive control mechanisms. 1) How do IPA perpetrators deploy IoT as mediators of abuse? The second section of this literature review chapter discusses major insights from technology-facilitated intimate partner violence. Tech-mediated abuse is implicated in coercive control, a suite of psychological, emotional, and physical mechanisms deployed by abusers to maintain authority in an abusive relationship. Human computer interaction scholars and others working on tech abuse have identified how many current user interfaces make it difficult for users to meaningfully understand what data access they are consenting to in using devices, in addition to problems including hierarchical access controls and hidden devices. However, despite these robust trends in identifying interpersonal computing harms generally, no empirical evidence of Internet of Things and their intersection with consent in IPA scenarios exists, motivating research question two: 24 2) How does IoT mediated intimate partner violence rely on both consensual and non-consensual practices? The third and final section of this literature review chapter centers on support seeking. This section begins with an overview of formal support seeking infrastructures for IPA. I highlight challenges including underreporting, problematic experiences with police, and the reporting difficulties emerging computing technologies pose. Next, I discuss the central role of social support seeking in how people recognize and respond to experiencing intimate abuse. The section concludes with a description of the many barriers victim survivors face in seeking support. Despite support seeking’s robust relationship to better outcomes for victim survivors, there is no empirical work examining how Internet of Things-mediated abuse may change the way victim survivors seek support. The role of IoT in the hands of abusive actors may This gap prompted the third and final research question: 3) How do victim survivors of IoT seek support (social and technological)? Background on Intimate Partner Abuse Intimate partner abuse (IPA) is a pervasive, complex phenomena. IPA is often used interchangeably with other terminology including intimate partner violence and domestic abuse (Cares, Reckdenwald, & Fernandez, 2021). This dissertation uses IPA unless quoting a source or otherwise specified. The World Health Organization defines intimate partner violence as “behaviour by an intimate partner or ex-partner that causes physical, sexual or psychological harm, including physical aggression, sexual coercion, psychological abuse and controlling behaviours” (Violence Against Women, 2023). Intimate partner abuse is pervasive. Averaging lifetime prevalence rates worldwide, 1 in 3 women and 1 in 4 men will experience physical violence from an intimate partner (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence: Statistics, 25 2023). 1 in 4 women and 1 in 9 men will experience intimate partner violence classified as severe such as rape, intimate partner stalking, and physical assault resulting in injury (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence: Statistics, 2023). Intimate partner violence accounts for 15% of all reported interpersonal violent crime (Truman, 2014). Technology-mediated intimate partner violence is also exceedingly common. Technology-mediated intimate partner violence has primarily been conceptualized as how computers have become mediators in for abusive activities (Kim & Ferraresso, 2023). Intimate partner cyberstalking is a broadly identified form of technology-mediated IPA, though terminology and prevalence rates are inconsistent in peer-reviewed scholarship (Hinduja & Patchin, 2021). One examination of cyberstalking in German university students reported prevalence rates in current or previous intimate relationships as 6.3% across all demographics (Dreßing et al, 2014). Meanwhile, another more recent examination of cyberstalking and other forms of technology-mediated IPA prevalence found perpetration rates as high as 50% (Hinduja & Patchin, 2021). Abusers use diverse technologies including cell phones, social media, online forums, and GPS systems to non-consensually monitor their victim’s behavior and movements (Southworth et al., 2007). Why Addressing Intimate Partner Abuse Matters IPA costs the economy billions of dollars annually. $8.3 billion is expended annually for costs of intimate violence factoring in medical treatment, missed days of work, and other expenditures (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence: Statistics, 2023). Victims of IPA miss an average of 10.1 days of paid work per year, with a lifetime average loss of income for an IPA survivor being $52,242 as of 2017 (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence: Statistics, 2023). 26 These economic figures are just one component of understanding the devastating human toll of intimate partner abuse. People who have experienced intimate partner violence are more likely to contract sexually transmitted diseases, experience mental health challenges including suicidal ideation, and experience adverse physical health outcomes including post-traumatic stress disorder (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence: Statistics, 2023). Additionally, 50% of all female homicide victims in the United States are murdered by current or former intimate partners (Domonoske, 2017). Societal response to IPA is evolving. The United States American Rescue Plan included one billion dollars in supplemental funding for intimate partner violence prevention and support services (Release of the National Plan to End Gender-Based Violence: Strategies for Action, 2023). The UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women works with and funds over 186 non- governmental in 70 countries doing work in intimate partner violence (UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women, 2023). These global initiatives reflect about how cultural attitudes towards IPA are changing. People in the United States overwhelmingly view intimate partner violence and gender-based harassment, both physical and non-physical, as unacceptable behavior (Zhong et al., 2020). The global #MeToo movement has sparked broader recognition of sexual violence and other forms of violence against women at large (Mendes & Ringrose, 2019). Challenges of Addressing Intimate Partner Abuse Despite broader recognition of intimate violence as a social problem, intimate partner abuse remains a widespread issue across the globe. A United Nations 2022 report on global prevalence rates of violence against women during and after the height of the COVID-19 pandemic identifies sharp increases in prevalence of physical and emotional IPA, a phenomenon 27 the United Nations describes as a “shadow pandemic” (Boserup et al., 2020; de Souza Santos et al., 2022). Intimate partner abuse remains a challenging and widespread issue due to several factors. First, IPA is pervasive. The sheer scale of cyber abuse make allocating resources and intervening challenging. Next, Intimate Abuse is Pervasive. Intimate partner abuse intersects with digital platforms. Emerging evidence suggests that Internet-connected technologies have a significant role in carrying out abusive behaviors. Abuser tactics include using cell phones, social media, and GPS devices to exert power and control over their victims (Southworth et al., 2007). One meta-review of 19 articles investigated self-reported technology-facilitated sexual violence (TFSV) from a total of 32,247 participants. The authors reported that 17.6% of people had had visual content recorded about themselves without their consent and 8.8% had their sex related content shared without their permission (Patel & Roesch, 2020). Another investigation of unwanted sexual contact online revealed that 84.3% of female Canadian undergraduate students had experienced this type of contact one or more times (Snaychuk & O’Neill, 2020). Victim survivors of tech-mediated intimate partner abuse experience severe adverse impacts at rates two or three times the national average or higher, including low self-esteem, depression, and anxiety (Ferreira & Matos, 2013; Leitão, 2019; Matthews et al., 2017). Despite the prevalence of TFSV, investigations into how IoT devices in the home may be used as mechanisms of intimate interpersonal abuse has not been studied. Across contexts and tools, intimate abusers operate through coercion, fear, and isolation (Southworth et al., 2007). Based on this, IoT devices in the home subtly recording a wide variety of day-to-day activities could be especially dangerous in the hands of abusers. In light of IoT’s 28 growing popularity, identifying how IoT could be playing a role in intimate abuse tactics is important. Intimate Abuse is Multifaceted. IoT abuse is multifaceted. Abuse is carried out through multiple strategies, at different times and in different locations, and across multiple forms (emotional, physical, financial, and so on). The WHO identifies numerous structural risk factors which increase the likelihood of experiencing intimate abuse. Risk factors include socioeconomic status, sociocultural expectations surrounding masculinity and femininity, exposure to physical violence during childhood, and a lack of legal enforcement and social consequences for abuse (World Health Organization, 2013). IPA is also multifaceted because of social pressures to keep IPA private and hidden. IPA victim survivors report that their abuser was often only violent at home behind closed doors (McCleary-Sills et al., 2016). They reported that their abusers were often well-regarded and viewed fondly in the broader community (McCleary-Sills et al., 2016). This is concerning as IoT is often used in domestic, private spaces. IPA is also often hidden because victim survivors fear the social stigma if they share their lived experiences of violence (McCleary-Sills et al., 2016). A longitudinal study with 200 severe IPA victim survivors found that victim survivors who perceived high levels of social stigma alongside low levels of social support had weaker coping skills and reduced positive outcomes (Wellington, Aina, & Odunubi, 2023). Social pressures to keep experiences of intimate abuse hidden impede support seeking efforts. Abuse is legitimized through silence (Overstreet & Quinn, 2013). Finally, IPA is multifaceted because abusers exert control via multiple social, physical, and cognitive techniques. Intimate partner abuse is defined by two core attributes. First, power, including the abusers’ motivation to maintain power over the victim survivor. Second is control, 29 defined by the abuser’s need for direct authority over the victim survivor’s behavior (Carlson & Dayle Jones, 2010). The Duluth Power and Control Wheel outlines eight power and control strategies abusers use in intimate relationships: 1) threats and coercion, such as threatening to harm the victim survivor or reporting the victim survivor to the police; 2) intimidating the victim survivor such as making violent gestures or brandishing handguns and other weapons in the home; 3) using emotional abuse tactics such as insulting appearance and gaslighting; 4) isolating the victim survivor from social ties and outside information; 5) minimizing victim survivor’s reaction to abusive behavior; 6) using any children as threat or point of contention for maintaining the romantic relationship; 7) deferring to gender stereotypes situating men’s authority over women; and 8) economic abuse such as preventing the victim survivor from working on controlling household money (Mccauley et al., 2016; The Cycle of Violence and Power and Control, 2023). Intimate Abuse is Cyclical. Addressing intimate partner abuse is challenging because intimate partner abuse (IPA) is cyclical. Understanding IPA requires recognition of social, cultural, and individual level factors including gender norms, mental health, law & policy, socioeconomic resources, and support infrastructures (Woodin et al., 2013). The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence highlights risk factors for domestic abuse including dysfunctional communication styles within in families, drug abuse, and stress (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2023). Intimate partner abuse presents in cycles of escalation punctuated by periods of relative peace. The 3-stage model of intimate partner abuse first conceptualized in 1979 characterizes intimate partner abuse as following a consistent cyclical pattern. The first stage is Tension Building (Walker, 2006). In this stage, small normal life occurrences, such as everyday work 30 stress, become justifications for the abuser’s behavior. Nothing seems to appease the abuser despite victim survivor efforts at amelioration. Victim survivors in this stage report walking on eggshells as minor or seemingly irrelevant activities trigger the abuser’s growing rage. The second stage is Explosion/Incident. This period is defined by an intense escalation of the abuser’s violence and can include gaslighting/emotional manipulation, sexual assault, or physical attacks. Over time and repeated cycles, the Explosion stage intensifies and has less of a refractory period (The Cycle of Domestic Violence, 2023). Following the Explosion is the third and final stage, the Honeymoon phase. In this period, the abuser attempts to regain favor through apologies, excessive gift-giving, and so-called love bombing. The abuser attempts to renew the victim survivor’s hope in and loyalty to the abuser. After this reconciliatory period, tensions begin to escalate again, and the cycle begins anew. Walker’s model remains standard in intimate partner abuse support agencies. However Walker’s model has been expanded to include an early component of the Honeymoon stage, sometimes considered a separate 4th stage (DVSN, 2022). This potential 4th stage is Denial/Reconciliation. In this stage, the abuse downplays their behavior by blaming external factors such as stress at work or intoxication. The abuser will also outright deny the explosion of violence occurred at all. In this phase, some abusers also express guilt and make promises to improve their behavior to entrench the victim survivor in the relationship (DVSN, 2022). This multi-faceted enforcement of power and control contributes to the phenomena of victim survivors experiencing incredible difficulties in leaving abuse situations (Marvin, 1997; Evans & Feder, 2016; Rempel et al., 2019; Heron et al., 2022). The rise of the Internet has also accompanied the translation of intimate partner abuse and gender-based harassment in general to cyberspace. 31 Intimate Partner Abuse is Inequitably Distributed. Technology-mediated harms are prevalent. IPA is experienced by people of all communities and sociodemographic groups (The State of Online Harassment, 2021). But in considering the distribution of prevalence rates, intimate harms are experienced inequitably across different identity groups. People of color and the socioeconomically disadvantaged are more likely to experience intimate partner violence and suffer adverse life outcomes from it (Crenshaw, 1991; O’Doherty et al., 2016). Women are particularly targeted in cases of online harassment. Tech-mediated gender-based violence includes threats of sexual violence, gender-based name-calling (NW et al., 2021), technology- facilitated stalking (Chahal et al., 2019), and threats to physically find and attack the target (Laskey et al., 2019). Social Factors Contributing to Intimate Partner Abuse In addition to IPA being pervasive, multifaceted, cyclical, and inequitably distributed, social theory identifies how computer-mediated communication creates new opportunities for IPA to be carried out. Social norms influence what kinds of behaviors are perceived as legitimate and acceptable (Sunstein, 1996). Campaigns to tangibly shift social norms surrounding behavior, including the #MeToo campaign (Mendes & Ringrose, 2019) can impact the prevalence rates of issues like IPA (Copp et al., 2019). No data has been collected on IoT and IPA. However several trends in gender and social norms suggest IoT will be implicated in tech-mediated abuse contexts. Transference of Offline Norms to Online Spaces. First, people transfer social norms from material contexts to digital spaces. Social identity theory proposes that when people imagine themselves as belonging to a group, they adopt some characteristics and beliefs of the group as their own. This influences behavior (Mirbabaie et al., 2021; Petric, 2022). People are 32 more likely to adopt beliefs and practices connected to a group they view themselves as belonging to. Perceived group membership impacts how personal identity is activated and expressed (Mirbabaie et al., 2021). These identity effects can lead individuals to adopt standards for behavior that they may not have accepted independently. For example, people self-categorize based on their perceived similarity to social groups, which can lead to depersonalization effects and amplified impacts of group rather than individual standards for behavior (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Social identity effects manifest in tech-mediated environments. In the Sims online massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG), players who visit others’ virtual homes display adherence to social expectations for visiting a new friend’s home in real life. Demonstrated norms included asking permission to enter, not breaking the owner’s virtual possessions, and offering to clean up after the party (Martey & Stromer-Galley, 2007). In the context of gender and sex-based harassment online, high rates of gender-based harassment and violence women relate to transference of norms about men as more skilled, legitimate computer users (Fox & Tang, 2014). Masculine norms situate male players as more competitive, better at games/sports, more highly skilled, quicker, more intelligent and so on (Fox & Tang, 2014). Gender-Based Violence and Stereotypes. Gender stereotypes are a critical component of understanding IPA perpetration. Endorsing stereotypes about women, ideas like women are weaker than men or women should always obey their boyfriends/husbands, predict tech- mediated IPA perpetration (Smoker & March, 2017; Wilson et al., 2019; Hiduja & Patchin, 2021). Media images in advertisements, movies, and games play a major role in establishing and perpetuating stereotypes (Hill Collins, 2002). The sexualization and subordination of female game characters have also been connected to sexual violence online (Fox & Tang, 2014). 33 Romantic Attachment and IPA Risks. Romantic attachment is the way people form and maintain romantic connections with others (Overall et al., 2003). On an individual level, psychological romantic attachment styles are stable sets of personality and behavioral traits that result from experiences of attachment with care-giving figures (Brennan & Shaver, 1995). Romantic attachment is measured with two scaled traits. First is avoidance, referring to secure vs. avoidant attachment styles. The second attachment style is anxious/ambivalence, which relates to the traits about reciprocal affection and fears of being loved (Overall et al., 2003). Overall et al. found that people maintain sustained patterns in the degree of avoidance, anxiety, and ambivalence they demonstrate in building close relationships. Attachment styles predict emotional and behavioral regulation, which in turn predict abusive behavior. For example, men scoring higher on avoidance and anxious/ambivalence scales predicts engaging in technologically mediated abuse (Gámez-Guadix et al., 2018). Personality factors related to attachment style may predict tech abuse, particularly the capabilities of technology for surveillance to confirm fidelity or catch their partner in a lie (Bellini et al. 2021). IoT may be particularly appealing as a tool of abuse for abusers with an anxious/avoidant attachment style. However, there is no data on the topic on IoT IPA and attachment styles. Accountability for IoT-Mediated Intimate Partner Abuse Accountability for intimate partner violence is a critical aspect of preventing violence, supporting survivors, and enacting consequences for abusers. In the context of tech abuse, most law and policy centers around stranger-based undesirable content such as spam and harassment on online social media platforms (i.e. Gillespie, 2018). Additionally, stalking legislation has been developed to address cyberstalking (Wilson et al. 2019; Reyns et al., 2020). There is no clear and 34 consistent infrastructure or response for IoT IPA harms. Based on this lack of attention and data, I draw upon general legislative and policy approaches to accountability surrounding tech abuse as a starting point for understanding IoT risks. Criminalization & Law. Legal accountability for intimate partner abuse is a relatively recent development. Through the 1990’s, “battered woman” was the standard descriptor. Victims, universally described as women, experienced physical violence from their husband or male partner (see: Gemmill, 1982; Walker, 2006). “Battered Woman Syndrome” was often used in criminal law proceedings as a defense for abused women who killed or injured their boyfriend or husband (see: Holliday et al., 2022; Schuller & Vidmar, 1992). This terminology evolved in response to more widespread recognition that intimate partner abuse often takes non-physical forms (Outlaw, 2009). Emotional, mental, and financial abuse are serious and impactful for victim survivors (see: McHugh & Frieze, 2006). Current accepted definitions of intimate abuse capture these forms of violence of intimate abuse even in the absence of physical violence (Halliwell et al., 2021). Cybercrime. Cybercrimes are illegal activities which occur against computers or by using computing technology. Cybercrimes include traditional crimes supported by computers and novel forms of computer-supported crime such as phishing or hacking (Yar, 2005). Cybercrime is a problem of magnitude: estimates predict cyber security breaches costing the global economy over $945 billion by the end of 2020 (Md & Mehmood, 2022). Crimes on the Internet often transcend national borders, creating challenges for prosecuting across international borders (Donalds & Osei-Bryson, 2019). Additionally, online anonymity and obfuscation techniques can make identifying guilty parties difficult (Meško, 2018). 35 Criminal law faces growing pains in enforcing accountability for tech-mediated forms of intimate partner abuse. Identity-based online harassment is common (Wilson et al., 2023). But the threshold for classifying harassment language as hate speech or other crimes is high, making prevention and enforcing meaningful outcomes challenging (Marwick & Miller, 2014). Additionally, tech-mediated crimes within established romantic relationships have received considerably less attention than large scale technical security breaches. High profile examples include hacking corporate accounts and leaking customers’ personal information (Donalds & Osei-Bryson, 2019; Md & Mehmood, 2022). Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act absolves most platforms of responsibility for the content mediated by their platforms (see Young, 2022 for an overview), creating further challenges for motivating platforms to take interpersonal violations seriously and standardize reporting and prevention. Cyberstalking. One well-evidenced form of criminalized intimate partner abuse is cyberstalking. Stalking is defined as consistent, repeated unwanted contact. Cyberstalking is stalking carried out all or in part through a computing device (Smoker & March, 2017). Federal law related to intimate abuse and cybercrime primarily invoke physical stalking legislation (Chang 2020). Examples of cyberstalking include contact on social media and via email (Wilson et al., 2023). Early population level statistics of cyberstalking estimate that 6.3% of the adult population has experienced cyberstalking (Dreßing et al., 2014) while more recent polls with university students generate prevalence rates as high as 46.7% (Acquadro Maran & Begotti, 2019). While cyberstalking from strangers does occur (Cavezza & McEwan, 2014), cyberstalking within established romantic relationships and via former partners is most common (Spitzberg & Hoobler, 2002). Cyberstalking from a known actor also predicts additional forms of violence including sexual assault (Smoker & March, 2017). Cyberstalking can be difficult to 36 prosecute due to how laws regarding secret audio and visual surveillance vary state-by-state (Chang, 2020) alongside broader issues such as stigma around victim survivors reporting (Powell & Henry, 2019). Image-Based Sexual Harassment. Image-based sexual harassment is another widely evidenced form of tech-mediated intimate abuse. One review of existing legislation and court case outcomes examines online revenge porn, referring to non-consensual intimate photographs shared to a former intimate partner. Sexual imagery is distributed without permission as a threatening, coercive, or embarrassment tactic (Waldman, 2019). Waldman argues that existing legal standards protect platforms from accountability but do not protect free speech and “fail to incent privacy-enhancing platform design, thus making non-consensual intimate photographs a feature, not a bug, of online social spaces” (Waldman, 2019). Sharing an image with anyone online is viewed as adequate justification for the image to be dispersed widely by someone else. Tort law generally only considers pictures that have never been shared anywhere to be private (Waldman, 2019). This is a problem because relationships often do not begin abusive. Abuse is often revealed and escalated over time. Based on this precedent, sexual imagery taken consensually could be distributed after an abuser begins to attack and harm the victim survivor. This precedent makes it challenging for legal stakeholders to embrace alternative concepts of harm and abuse, and thus support new approaches and designs. Risks and Prevention of IoT-Mediated Intimate Abuse. Existing IoT cybersecurity approaches have also not considered the interpersonal risks of IoT devices. HCI work on human- centered privacy centers on identifying and managing the social, human elements in tech- mediated violations. These approaches emphasize how human relationships are complex and change over time. Relationships do not begin abusive. In courting a partner, abusers are often on 37 their best behavior (Stark, 2009; Cantor & Price, 2007). During the honeymoon stage of the relationship, the abuser’s partner may be comfortable with sharing online accounts and passwords, installing shared smart home technology like cameras or personal assistants, or other avenues of digital access. However, as the abuser’s violence and harassment escalates over time, this access becomes a crucial vulnerability in exerting domination. At this point, consent to the intimate data has likely changed on behalf of the victim survivor. However, in light of these new risks, there is not a pathway for victim survivors to intervene and stop the use of smart home devices. Based on this, the flux of human social interaction creates privacy and security challenges for IoT users (Kwon et al., 2018) especially victim survivors. Work centered on ubiquitous computing and the Internet of Things identifies how these vulnerabilities manifest in intimate contexts (Geeng & Roesner, 2019; Apthorpe et al., 2022). IoT user interfaces are designed with a primary user in mind. Typical smart home systems are designed to integrate multiple devices. For example, an Alexa personal assistant can interface with a Ring doorbell camera to allow residents to speak someone at the door or receive a voice message when a package is delivered. Managing multiple functions is handled via centralized control through a primary user. The primary IoT user uses a smartphone application to monitor all devices on the network, add users, and determine data privacy settings. These primary users direct device set-up and maintenance. They also function as a gatekeeper for concerns about the technical function of devices’, other family members’ desires to change settings, and data sharing (Geeng & Roesner, 2019). Centralized control in IoT-enabled smart homes has been identified as a point of tension and concern for household residents. Mennicken and Huang identified archetypes of the roles household residents adopt when using IoT, with more passive users facing unique user barriers 38 (Mennicken & Huang, 2019). A mixed methods inquiry surveyed 508 in-home IoT users about how deploying IoT in their homes impacted their personal relationships (Apthorpe et al., 2022). Participants repeatedly described how the devices created rife opportunity and temptations for non-consensual surveillance of other family members and disagreements about data sharing permissions blocked behind the primary user. The researchers identified IoT-enabled “antagonistic activities” such as blasting music through Alexa during an argument to block out the other person’s voice (Apthorpe et al., 2022). An important consideration is that these investigations are self-report and observational. Based on this, it is unlikely that IPA and other violent interpersonal scenarios would have been captured. Zeng and Roesner explicitly identify how virtually all work on interpersonal conflict and IoT have not engaged with “challenging adversarial situations (e.g., domestic abuse)” (pg. 1, Zeng & Roesner, 2019). There is no empirical evidence available describing IoT-mediated abuse prevention and intervention in real world settings. Research Question 1 Intimate abuse is fostered by a multitude of social and individual factors. Based upon current peer-reviewed scholarship on tech abuse prevalence rates, there is reason to suspect IoT violations be predicted by risk factors for tech abuse perpetration at large. Transference of social factors related to gender identity and group membership will likely also impact IoT’s role in interpersonal violence. Based upon this past work on tech abuse examining tech abuse generally, Internet of Things devices should be expected to be abused similarly to other technologies. But there is almost no data on intimate abuse scenarios involving IoT abuse. IoT are ambient, imbedded in everyday environments, and can capture environmental data without intentional interaction from users. Users may not even be aware that they are ‘using’ an IoT device in their 39 home if it is set up in secret by an abusive partner acting as a primary user controlling the interface. Without data on how these capabilities may support the emergence of amplified or novel forms of abuse, it is impossible to adequately characterize risk and develop interventions. Critically examining how IoT changes the nature of IPA does not absolve abusers of responsibility. Tech abuse scholars have widely identified how intimate abusers repeatedly find creative and unanticipated ways to use new technology to harass and belittle their partners (i.e. Powell & Henry, 2019). The goal of this inquiry is not to shift blame to IoT and the organizations that build them. Rather, data on how these devices are abused is necessary to support legal institutions, technology companies, and abuse advocates in identifying this abuse. Knowing what IoT IPA looks like, when it is likely to occur, and how it harms victim survivors will allow support services to respond effectively. Data on IoT IPA is also critical for resource allocation including training for support services. To this end, being able to describe and identify IoT IPA will help establish protocol for holding abusers’ accountable. RQ1 focuses on identifying the material realities (Borning, Friedman, & Logler, 2020) in which IoT are deployed by abusive actors. RQ1 also seeks to identify how IoT-mediated interaction changes the scope and impacts of intimate partner abuse: 1) How do IPA perpetrators deploy IoT as mediators of abuse? The goal of this research question is to identify how using IoT changes how IPA occurs and how victim survivors are impacted. RQ1 centers on identifying how abusive behaviors are supported by IoT tools. This RQ1 expands upon past work defining tech abuse in general (i.e. Powell & Henry, 2019) by critically examining potential unique vulnerabilities IoT pose in the hands of abusive actors. 40 Technology-Facilitated Intimate Partner Violence Powell and Henry’s meta-analysis identified four key dimensions of technology- facilitated intimate partner violence (Powell & Henry, 2019). First, digital sexual harassment referring to unwanted sexual behavior and commentary on online platforms. Next, image-based sexual abuse refers to the non-consensual distribution of sexual imagery of another person. Revenge pornography, distribution of sexual content as a threat or outcome after a relationship conflict, is common. Revenge porn estimated prevalence rates are between 5% and 20% of the US population (Patel & Roesch, 2020). Next, sexual aggression and coercion are commonly deployed online (Powell & Henry, 2019). Finally, gender and sexuality-based harassment is common especially for women and LGBTQ+ communities (Powell & Henry, 2019). Aligned with Powell and Henry’s typology, most work on tech abuse centers around two main violations: intimate imagery and text-based harassment. IoT Aligns with Coercive Control. Next, coercive control is a major hurdle for meaningful accountability because the manipulation, threats, and dominance of the intimate abuser often make victim survivors feel powerless and unlikely to pursue legal action. Coercive control is a theoretical concept centered on how abusers’ maintain control over their victims. Coercive control is commonly invoked in domestic abuse advocacy and criminalization. Theories of coercive control describe how abusers make victims be afraid, doubt their own perceptions, and anticipate the abusers’ violence to restrict their ability to behave and think freely (Wiener, 2023). Coercive control is defined by two core attributes: power, particularly the abusers’ motivation to maintain power over the victim survivor, and control, defined by the abuser’s need for direct authority over the victim survivor’s behavior (Carlson & Dayle Jones, 2010). The concept of coercive control intersects with the Duluth Power and Control Wheel, a 41 standard abuse advocate reference highlighting some of the most common abuse behaviors/relationship dynamics. The Duluth Power and Control Wheel outlines eight power and control strategies abusers use in relationships to exert coercive control: 1) threats and coercion, such as threatening to harm the victim survivor or reporting the victim survivor to the police 2) intimidating the victim survivor such as making violent gestures or brandishing handguns and other weapons in the home 3) using emotional abuse tactics such as insulting appearance and gaslighting 4) isolating the victim survivor from social ties and outside information 5) minimizing victim survivor’s reaction to abusive behavior 6) using any children as threat or point of contention for maintaining the romantic relationship 7) deferring to gender stereotypes situating men’s authority over women and 8) economic abuse such as preventing the victim survivor from working on controlling household money (Mccauley et al., 2016; The Cycle of Violence and Power and Control, 2023). Coercive control is a manifestation of how abusers use these activities to maintain power and control. These behaviors create a dynamic in which one partner maintains dominance, physically, materially, and interpersonally, over their partner (Hamberger et al., 2017). Though these cycles of escalation and violence have been evidenced across social contexts of abuse (Widom, 1989), how these abusive behaviors could change or expand via using IoT has not been examined. Technology Escalates Domestic Abuse. Intimate partner abuse also presents in cycles of escalation punctuated by periods of relative peace. The 3-stage model of intimate partner abuse first conceptualized in 1979 describes intimate partner abuse as following a consistent, repeated cyclical pattern. The first stage is Tension Building (Walker, 2006). In this stage, small occurrences, such as everyday work stress, become justifications for the abuser’s behavior and 42 nothing seems to appease them despite victim survivor efforts at amelioration. Victim survivors in this stage report walking on eggshells as even innocuous or seemingly irrelevant activities will trigger the abuser’s growing frustration and rage. The second stage is Explosion/Incident. This period is defined by an intense escalation of the abuser’s violence and can include gaslighting/emotional manipulation, sexual assault, or physical attacks. Over time and repeated cycles, the Explosion stage intensifies and has less of a refractory period (The Cycle of Domestic Violence, 2023). Following the Explosion is the Honeymoon phase. In this period, the abuser attempts to regain favor through apologies, excessive gift-giving, and intense affection to renew the victim survivor’s hope in and loyalty to the abuser. After this reconciliatory period, tensions begin to escalate again, and the cycle begins anew. Walker’s model remains standard in intimate partner abuse support agencies, though it has been expanded to include an expanded early component of the Honeymoon stage, sometimes considered a separate 4th stage (DVSN, 2022). This potential 4th stage is Denial/Reconciliation, referring to the abuser minimizing their abusive behavior through blaming external factors (stress at work, intoxication) or outright denying the explosion of violence occurred at all. In this phase, some abusers also express guilt and make promises to improve their behavior to entrench the victim survivor in the relationship (DVSN, 2022). This multi-faceted enforcement of power and control contribute to the phenomena of victim survivors experiencing incredible difficulties in leaving abuse situations (Evans & Feder, 2016; Heron et al., 2022; Marvin, 1997; Rempel et al., 2019). The cycle of escalation present in intimate abuse raises concerns for IoT’s integration into domestic environments and daily routines. IoT has potential to escalate the Tension Building stage of the Walker model. The Tension stage is defined by mundane, innocuous behavior being 43 identified by the abuser as problem and eventually a justification for outbursts (Walker, 2006). Victim survivors report escalating incidents that their abuser would not have been aware without technology. Examples of IoT-mediated escalatory events include: using home camera systems to observe a victim survivor and claim they are eating or sleeping too much; turning off a camera or personal assistant as justification to suspect infidelity or other suspicious behavior; and using electronic door locks to restrict movements in and out of the home. Ubiquity, Privacy Violations and the Ease of Access for Misuse Ubiquitous computing and ubicomp has long envisioned how incorporating computing technology throughout mundane objects and living spaces could support everyday activities (Weiser, 1993) but this approach has long been critiqued for overlooking potential problems such as privacy (Lopez-Neira et al., 2019). A design goal of ubiquitous computing technologies is to operate as a cooperative partner rather than just a tool (Weiser, 1993). Krüger et al. argue that as personal assistants and related technologies become more autonomous, they must correspondingly become more adaptable and flexible in response to the human partner (Krüger et al., 2017). IoT devices demonstrate the tangible manifestations of many of these ubicomp concerns. Widespread adoption of IoT signals a paradigm shift in everyday computing. IoT situates the data flows of mundane everyday activities as rife with possibilities for optimization and automation (Verma et al., 2022). Due to the nature of IoT as a user-facing “black box” intended to autonomously record and act upon embodied experience (Singh et al., 2018) and be integrated within devices typically used homes (ex: washing machines, thermostats, lamps, etc.) examining the lived impacts of IoT necessitates a closer examination of the home and home activities to understand emerging threats, challenges, and opportunities for everyday users. 44 Advanced Technical Skills Are Not Required Finally, a challenge related to privacy and security in computing contexts is that most intimate abusers who abuse technology do not have advanced technical skills. Interviews with domestic abuse survivors about the role of technology in their abuser’s activities revealed several important take-aways (Freed et al., 2018). First, most tech abusers do not have specialized skills or expertise related to technology. Almost always, they are using ‘out of the box’ features and settings, and relying on proximity, social pressure, and other tactics to gain access. Freed et al. argue that most intimate abusers are not hackers. Abusers almost always use basic features of technology to expand or intensify their abusive activities (Freed et al., 2018). For example, logging onto their partner’s phone as an authorized user while they are in the shower, while a social violation, is permitted within the interface. Traditional user-interfaces assume healthy intimate relationships and expect ‘one user, one device, one account’ (Guo et al., 2016), despite these scenarios not reflecting real vulnerabilities which are amplified in intimate abuse scenarios. As investigations of tech abuse repeatedly demonstrate, whether the new tool is a social media app (Fernet et al., 2019) or so- called creepware (Roundy et al., 2020). Creepware is a type of malware which, when installed on an IoT device, allows the abuser to access the device’s microphone, camera, keystroke history, and other activities without the device owner’s knowledge (Roundy et al., 2020). Abuse advocates highlight how any new technology can become enveloped in abusers’ toolkits of domination and control (Patel & Roesch, 2020). They highlight how victim survivors are pressured not to question abusers’ behaviors with technology (Patel & Roesch, 2020). In examining the social pressures surrounding technology use, feminist HCI and critical computing examine consensual and non-consensual activities as an ethical framework for privacy and 45 security of users (Strengers et al., 2021; kang et al., 2015). Consensual activities refers to activities with computing users understand and agree to (Strengers et al., 2021). Non-consensual activities are use activities users did not consent or agree to. However, the social dimensions of consent have not been examined in human-centered privacy conversations surrounding consent. Consent is a useful framing to consider potential risks and vulnerabilities in IoT IPA because of how abusers exert influence over family members, including forcing technology use (Patel & Roesch, 2020). Consent and IoT The concept of consent has gained traction in recent decades as consent to sexual activities (Miller & Wertheimer, 2010) and an ethical obligation to provide participants an opportunity to informed consent when conducting research (Perrault & Nazione, 2016). Consent is defined as awareness and acknowledgement of potential risks and benefits of a particular activity and subsequent agreement to partake in that activity (Strengers et al., 2021). Examples of typical contexts in which the concept of consent is invoked include participating in a research study, making an account on a social media website or engaging in a sexual activity. Many definitions of consent have also been adopted in legal, social, and technological frameworks. Additionally, consent in intimate encounters serves as a site of contestation for masculinity and femininity, power, and control, particularly in cases of consent violation and sexual violence (Carline et al., 2018). However, the concept of consent has not been connected to IoT-mediated abuse. Empirical work on issues of consent have revealed that in the context of the social sciences and online surveys, people frequently do not read and fully understand the consent forms they agree to (Perrault & Nazione, 2016). In human-centered privacy and security work, similar issues have 46 been identified due to the complexity of computing devices and the obfuscated ways personal data is collected and disseminated (Karegar, 2018). Recent calls have identified potential merits of adopting enthusiastic consent from feminist scholarship, namely the concept of consent as being “Freely given, Reversible, Informed, Enthusiastic and Specific”, as a baseline for ethical computing design (Strengers et al., 2021, p.1). However, empirical examinations of how consent is gained, ignored, and violated in IoT ecosystems have yet to be conducted. This is an important area of work. Data on consent in IoT IPA will support being able to articulate what kinds of design features would be useful to empower and support user violations (Lugano et al., 2019). Feminist HCI has examined the role of technology in intimate relationships (i.e. D’Ignazio et al. 2020). However, abuse dynamics have not been well-captured in these approaches. Additionally, Kannabiran et al. critique existing approaches for only focusing on gender and sexual identity in one element of the research design rather than more richly considering how social identity and pwoer operates across the lifespan of a relationship (Kannabiran et al., 2011) as other recent HCI work has worked to emphasize (Bardzell, 2010; D’Ignazio et al., 2020; Rode, 2011; Stumpf et al., 2020). In addition to sex and sexuality, feminist human computer interaction has also led discussions centered on ethical quandaries raised by the Internet of Things and other forms of ubiquitous computing (Bardzell, 2010; D’Ignazio et al., 2020; Rode, 2011; Stumpf et al., 2020). These ethical concerns surrounding new forms of engagement with computing center on how sensor-based systems require expanding conceptions of use and users. However, it is extremely challenging to conduct participatory design work in abuse contexts, particularly in the whole household environments IoT are often deployed within. Examining IoT and other tech-mediated 47 harms through lens of consensual and non-consensual activities, both from the perspective of consent in interpersonal social interactions mediated by tech and the data privacy ‘black boxes’ users face, offers new perspective on understanding the role of IoT in intimate abuse. Consent is a useful starting point for creating approaches to design that anticipate IoT-mediated IPA. Data Feminism as an Antidote to Harm and Problems of Consent Feminist HCI scholarship also reveals how gender influences experiences of technology through critical investigations of existing technologies and user experiences. Feminist human computer interaction approaches emphasize lived experiences of women and other marginalized groups as a core approach to developing useful and relevant technologies (El Morr & Layal, 2020). For example, a study of phone applications for tracking menstrual cycles revealed users interpreted assumptions about cycle length, the gender identity of users, and the gender identity of sexual partners in the platform interface (Epstein et al., 2017). This lead to experiences of isolation for many users (Epstein et al., 2017). It is unclear how historically marginalized users may face unique challenges in engaging with IoT interfaces, especially in abuse contetxs. It is also challenging for users to completely understand what personal information IoT devices collect about them (Page et al., 2018). IoT typically collect data about users’ daily activities, movements in and out of the home, and video/audio recordings of residents. IoT users have questions about: what data is stored, how long data is stored, and how the data is or is not deidentified (Page et al., 2018). Users also ask who can else see that data and what their personal rights to that data are (Garg, 2019). IoT are different from typical online accounts, like social media, which operate under one user-one account models for access. A user logs into their personal account and engages with the site as an individually. IoT take a different approach. IoT 48 devices freely gather data from all people in the home, whether they’ve personally consented to the device software’s terms of service or are even aware it is in use (Morel et al., 2019). Additionally, for many IoT devices, there is no meaningful option to opt out of certain types of data collection while continuing to use the device (M. W. Bailey, 2015). For example, there is no option for one user in a household to have an Amazon Alexa be deactivated for just their voice or have the Ring doorbell camera blur their face. This limited curation is due in part to the monetization of the vast reservoirs of IoT-collected data for targeted advertising and other commercial gains (Shadroo & Rahmani, 2018). This lack of ability for users to adjust how their personal data is recorded raises concerns for IoT IPA. Lack of Ability to Change User Access. Most relationships do not start abusive. Existing work has not examined how feelings about un/authorized device access may change over the course of a relationship, such as how a seemingly trustworthy partner becomes progressively more abusive. Most romantic relationships do not begin abusive. Abuse escalates over time (Gámez-Guadix et al., 2018). However, most computing interfaces do not update permissions and consent protocols when the social context they were established in evolves. Similarly, most existing security/threat models have limited ability to consider how an ally or authorized user may transition to become a threat; existing cybersecurity models typically define actors in binary terms such as friend versus foe and similar terms (Freed et al., 2018). However, this approach does not align with how gender-based harassment via devices often gradually escalates over the course of an intimate relationship. Technological security approaches also generally do not consider threat models of intimate partner violence (Slupska, 2019). Current threat models cannot account for when this abuse is being ‘consented’ to (via coercion, threats etc.) via a user. 49 In other words, existing security models do not have systems to effectively support kicking out a previously trustworthy actor when that person has interpersonal control over the victim. When combined with coercion and other interpersonal control factors, there are currently virtually no mechanisms for survivors to regain control of these systems besides abandoning or destroying the devices completely. Hierarchical Access Permissions. User activities also differ based upon their level of authority within and their level of personal engagement with the system. In the context of ubiquitous computing and IoT specifically, most consumer systems have multiple tiers of user permissions built into the system that are assigned and access by a smartphone application. For example, many ubiquitous home security systems have a single master user who can oversee all the devices and users on the local IoT network, including a log of the information they collect (Zeng et al., 2017). As a result, this top-down control can become dangerous and foster abuse dynamics, such as by locking secondary users out of their home. Interpersonal dynamics that situate hierarchies of access and authority, and by extension facilitate violence, could be supported by IoT. However, there is no data examining IoT’s potential for this type of misuse in real world settings. Most security features that computing systems use to protect personal information, such as two-factor authentication, biometric recognition, and passwords, assume that one account or one device equates to one user. Even though this approach has been recently criticized in HCI and related disciplines (Doherty & Doherty, 2019), it still pervasive. In Internet of Things networks and other ubicomp systems, which inherently record data about all people who use the space rather than just a single user, there is still generally a single head user who can monitor all activities and restrict other users’ access (Zeng et al., 2017). Despite this trends of centralized 50 interfaces, emerging evidence suggests that sharing devices and accounts is the norm rather than the exception. Again, this centralized control could situate IoT as tools of abuse. Social Pressures to Share. The empirical evidence on shared device use and access on the subject suggests that people share devices and accounts (Arief et al., 2014; Marques et al., 2019). Accessing a partner’s device or sharing their personal information without their knowledge and permission is also incredibly common. For example, in an examination of how people distribute non- consensual sexual images online, the researchers found over 8% of people have had a non- consensual sexual image of them shared online without their consent (Patel & Roesch, 2020). Another study found that approximately 30% of women undergraduate students have had their personal devices accessed by an intimate partner, to read their texts or impersonate them on social media among other invasions, without their permission (Burke et al., 2011). The pervasiveness of surveillance technologies has also reflected these trends; so-called creepware (Roundy et al., 2020), referring to surveillance software that does not take much technical skill to set-up and use without the victim knowing, has been implicated in intimate partner violence situations (Douglas et al., 2019; Patel & Roesch, 2020; Sambasivan et al., 2018). Research Question 2 These examples demonstrate how IoT IPA is rooted in UI permissible activities. Existing law, technical design, and social context perpetuate environments rife with possibilities for interpersonal harms. Despite a lack of legal infrastructure, critical approaches to intimacy and computing identify the vulnerabilities of ubiquity, assumption of healthy and safe social environments for deploying technology, and the risks of design orientation such as hierarchical access control. Based upon these findings, I propose RQ2 centered on victim-survivor driven definitions of consent in understanding risk factors and intervention points with IoT. 51 RQ 2) How does IoT mediated intimate partner abuse rely on both consensual and non- consensual practices? Support Seeking and IoT IPA Examining support is critical in understanding IoT’s impacts on intimate abuse because having a perceived strong social support system is one of the strongest protective predictors against adverse outcomes of experiencing the trauma of intimate abuse, and predicts lower incident rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (Dutton et al., 2006), mental health diagnoses (Mechanic et al., 2008), physical health conditions like high blood pressure (Black, 2011), and risk of suicide (Devries et al., 2013). Modes and Contexts of Support Seeking People experiencing intimate partner violence often seek out online support communities due to feelings of being excluded, ignored, or even fear of facing further threats and violence if they share their experiences with their face-to-face support networks (Leitão, 2019b). In many ways, they describe these communities as a haven through which to seek support and devise strategies to reclaim freedom and autonomy in the face of a lack of support from formal institutions. Additionally, seeking social support online can be an avenue in the face of isolation, a commonly deployed strategy of intimate abusers (Heron et al., 2022). Social support benefits people. Both self-report (Harper, 2021; Kimpe et al., 2020) and observational (Kim et al., 2006) data suggest that having a strong social support network is a predictor of health and overall positive well-being outcomes (Taylor, 2011). In the context of intimate abuse, a positive community response, such as confidants believing the victim survivor, validating their experiences, not blaming them, and helping them seek out resources (Evans & Feder, 2016; Sylaska & Edwards, 2013) correlates with reduced stress, feelings of security, and 52 serves as a mediator which buffers the relationship between violence and adverse physical and mental health outcomes (Kimpe et al., 2020; Sylaska & Edwards, 2013; Canady & Babcock, 2007). Underreporting. A critical consideration for legal accountability in cases of IoT- mediated intimate harms is that intimate partner abuse is widely underreported. Current estimates predict that approximately 10%-30% of severe abuse is ever reported to law enforcement (Davis et al. 2003; McCleary et al., 2016; de Souza et al., 2022). Reporting is also an imperfect metric of actual legal prosecution outcomes. Coercive control predicts abusers convincing victim survivors to drop cases (Wiener, 2023). It is common for victim survivors to drop criminal charges against abusive partners (Goodmark, 2021). A core issue is that there is no data on prevalence rates, including reported vs. unreported cases, for Internet of Things-mediated intimate violence. Similarly, there is no data on what avenues of support victim survivors facing IoT-mediated violation pursue, if they are helpful, and how these services predict more positive victim survivor outcomes. Underreporting perpetuates cycles of abuse through silence and makes it challenging for advocacy programs to identify and justify support for victim survivors. Formal and Informal Social Support Seeking. In the context of intimate abuse, support seeking connects survivors with formal and informal support resources. Support seeking, also described as help seeking, refers to any effort to seek external intervention and resources with the goal of acquiring “understanding, advice, information, treatment and general support in response to a problem or distressing experience” (Cornally & McCarthy, 2011, p. 281). Informal resources include friends, family, neighbors, and online resources including online communities. A US-based study identified support seeking is common for victim survivors. 52% of surveyed 53 victim survivors sought support from a friend or family member (Kaukinen, 2004). Formal support seeking was less common. 20% sought support from a healthcare provider while just 5% utilized a social worker (Kaukinen, 2004). Formal resources including healthcare professionals, law enforcement, psychologists, and social workers are utilized less than informal social ties (Cornally & McCartyhy, 20211). Barriers to Support Seeking Technical Support Seeking. While some emerging technology in this area has attempted to help survivors seek support, such as domestic violence phone apps that have emergency buttons (Freed et al., 2017), existing approaches have overall been critiqued for being reactionary rather than proactive (El Morr & Layal, 2020). A survey of existing information communication technologies related to intimate partner violence revealed that most technologies were centered around helping women access resources, such as women’s shelters, which have been criticized for their ‘one size fits all’ approaches rather than tailoring to the unique needs and circumstances of survivors (Eckhardt et al., 2013) rather than intervening or preventing abuse (El Morr & Layal, 2020). These support seeking issues intersect with existing barriers and propose new pathways to build upon widely evidenced strategies of harm. Material Barriers. Many victim survivors face substantial barriers in leaving an abusive relationship due to physical threats, socioeconomic factors, legal concerns, fears of safety and a lack of resources to ensure stability for their children and other family members (Heron et al., 2022). Barriers to reporting intimate partner abuse and seeking support include fear of retaliation from a partner, lack of financial resources to seek a new place to live, fear of children being taken away, and fears of not being understood or believed by the criminal justice system (Essert, 2019). Victims of IPA are also more likely to be underemployed and live below the poverty line 54 (Essert, 2019). These barriers make it challenging to confront an abuser or seek alternative situations. Knowledge Barriers. In the context of IoT-mediated abuses, the opacity of these devices data recording and capacities for harm contribute to under-reporting. Most people do not understand how Internet of Things capture personal data, transfer information, how precisely the data is used, and who can see it (Dourish, 2004; Lupton, 2017; Sambasivan et al., 2018; Zeng et al., 2017). Thus, people who do not understand what these devices record or who can see it may not be able to articulate to an authority figure how they are being abused. To this end, suggestions such as not using ubicomp and social computing technology ignore the fact that people value things like socializing above security (Zeng et al., 2017) and that tech-mediated communications are an essential, imbedded part of everyday life that cannot just be turned off (Lupton, 2017). Social Stigma Barriers. Social stigma is a strong predictor of victim survivors not seeking support (Overstreet & Quinn, 2013). Negative responses from a victim survivors’ close friends and family, such as victim blaming/not believing the victim or minimizing concerns (Sylaska & Edwards, 2013) are correlated with lower self-esteem (Hendy et al., 2003). Additionally, perceived social stigma predict more adverse mental health outcomes (Carlson, McNutt, Choi, & Rose, 2002), and heightened feelings of shame, despair and perceived social stigma (Sylaska & Edwards, 2013). Legal System Barriers. Legal stakeholders such as judges, attorneys, prosecutors, and law enforcement face particular hurdles in supporting design and policy changes. The First Amendment and free speech concerns strongly restrict the ability of governments and other legal stakeholders to criminalize technology-mediated harassment (Balkin, 2012). The First 55 Amendment sets a high bar for prosecuting even direct threats and targeting via online platforms and struggles to recognize certain behavior, such as tagging someone in a photo, as threatening contact or not (Bennett & Parsons, 2013). In the United States, state law and federal law regarding intimate partner abuse, particularly that taking place online, vary widely (Essert, 2019). For example, Connecticut does not classify cyberstalking or monitoring someone without their knowledge via GPS as abuse unless they make direct contact with the victim (Essert, 2019). Explicitly prohibiting surveillance via devices in personal protective orders have been proposed as a partial solution (Bennett & Parsons, 2013). However, current legal approaches overlook context-based, interpersonal factors that may be abusive solution (Bennett & Parsons, 2013). As a result, there are existing barriers to accessing legal help for incidents of technology- facilitated sexual violence. Additionally, accessing the legal system is expensive and time- consuming, making it less likely that marginalized people, including those who experience violence, will be able to access the system. In turn, women experiencing domestic violence describe the criminal justice system’s deficiencies in supporting victim survivors (Tanczer et al., 2021). Victim survivors seeking support from law enforcement express a continued desire for personal privacy, which often conflicts which investigative demands such as seizing electronic devices for a criminal investigation (M. W. Bailey, 2015). Additionally, victim survivors express fear of adverse impacts on their loved ones should they seek police support, such as retaliation from their abuser (Leitão, 2019b). Research Question 3 We should expect all these barriers surrounding support seeking to be amplified in the context of IoT IPA. But, the data do not exist. It is impossible to meaningfully consider support 56 seeking interventions, and what services may be beneficial or appealing to victim survivors, with no data. To begin to assess basic questions describing how IoT-mediated IPA impacts what we know about victim survivor support seeking, I propose RQ3) How do victim survivors of IoT seek support (social and technological)? Conclusion This chapter overviews scholarship centered on tech abuse and IPA at large to identify promising directions for research on IoT-mediated IPA in the face of virtually no empirical data and limited accountability frameworks for seeking justice for victim survivors. The first section discusses the multifaceted nature of intimate partner abuse (IPA) and explores its intersection with emerging technologies, particularly the Internet of Things (IoT). IPA is pervasive, multifaceted, cyclical, and inequitably distributed, affecting victims across various social and demographic groups. Multiple social factors identified in computer-mediated communication contribute to IPA: the transference of offline norms to online spaces, gender- based violence and stereotypes, and romantic attachment styles. There are numerous challenges in addressing accountability for IoT-mediated intimate partner abuse, including a lack of legislative infrastructure and policy responses tailored to IoT vulnerabilities in abusive relationships. To build upon trends in tech abuse and social behavior generally, the first research question centers on capturing the material realities of IoT deployment by abusive actors and how IoT-mediated interactions shape the scope and impact of intimate partner abuse. RQ1: How does IoT become a mediator in intimate partner abuse? Next, peer-reviewed scholarship identifies complexities of technology-facilitated intimate partner violence (TFSV) including two key forms of violation: digital sexual harassment and image-based sexual violence. The cycle intimate partner abuse creates potential points of 57 vulnerability for the integration of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in abusive relationships. Scholarship from feminist and critical HCI identify the vulnerabilities computing for intimacy pose, including a lack of scholarship on abuse contexts. Additionally, ubiquitous computing and IoT devices raise concerns about privacy violations and ease of misuse. Current approaches to privacy and security may create new vulnerabilities for victims. The lack of meaningful, practical consent frameworks for IoT devices, coupled with abusers' use of common features without specialized skills, creates challenges in preventing harm. Based upon a lack of data on how IoT may intersect intimate vulnerabilities, there is a need for research on consensual and non-consensual practices in IoT- mediated intimate partner abuse. Consent, both in the context of interpersonal intimacy and how users choose to engage with devices, offers an opportunity to critically interrogate current approaches to IoT design. Consent also offers a standard to create standards for designing against harm, leading to research question two: RQ2: How does IoT mediated intimate partner abuse rely on both consensual and non- consensual practices? The final section of this literature review chapter explores the significance of support- seeking behaviors in the context of intimate partner abuse (IPA). Victims utilize online support communities due to feelings of exclusion, fear, and a lack of support from formal institutions. Social support is identified as a crucial factor in mitigating the adverse outcomes of IPA, including mental health issues, physical health conditions, and risk of suicide. However, widespread underreporting of IPAcomplicates efforts to measure the true extent of the issue, including cases involving Internet of Things (IoT)-mediated abuse. 58 Victim survivors identify numerous barriers seeking support, including material barriers such as physical threats, socioeconomic factors, and legal concerns. Knowledge barriers arise from victims' lack of understanding about how IoT devices capture personal data, leading to difficulties articulating their abuse experiences to authorities. Social stigma and negative responses from friends and family further deter victims from seeking help. Additionally, legal system barriers, including concerns related to free speech, jurisdictional disparities, and challenges in balancing personal privacy with investigative demands, hinder effective intervention and support for victims of technology-facilitated abuse. Despite these trends in IPA at large, there is no data on how IoT-IPA may impact rates of support seeking and outcomes, prompting the third and final research question: RQ3: How do victim survivors of IoT seek support (social and technological)? 59 CHAPTER 3: METHOD Introduction This project is qualitative investigation of IoT IPA from the perspectives of IoT IPA victim survivors. I chose two methodologies to capture the relevant data to answer my research questions. The first approach I used was an online ethnography, a netnography, of Internet of Things-mediated intimate abuse. I examined how victim-survivors solicited advice, support, and information related to their firsthand experiences of intimate violence on r/relationshipadvice, a sub-forum on Reddit.com. I also deployed a semi-structured interview study. A brief survey was used to recruit self-described victim-survivors for semi-structured interviews focused on firsthand experiences, risks/harms, and support-seeking strategies in relation to their lived experiences of Internet of Things-mediated violence. A bottom-up thematic qualitative analysis was used to analyze the interviews and ethnographic notes and transcripts. This investigation was reviewed and approved by the Michigan State University Social Science/Behavioral/Education Institutional Review Board, study number STUDY00007385. I intentionally used both semi-structured interviewing and online ethnography to answer my research questions. Online ethnographic work incorporates interviews to ask questions and understand what is happening directly from the participants (i.e. Nardi, 2010). Additionally, there is limited research on IoT IPA from the perspective of victim survivors. Both the interview and ethnographic approaches center the stories of victim survivors in real world contexts. Semi- structured interviewing was appropriate to build upon past interview protocols with IPA victim survivors (i.e. Campbell et al., 2009) and human-centered privacy in IoT ecosystems (i.e. Verma, Sharma, & Mistry, 2022; Rodríguez-Rodríguez et al., 2020) to create a protocol applicable to 60 answer the research questions. Examining the in-vivo discussion on r/relationship advice supplemented the interviews. IPA is highly stigmatized (Overstreet & Quinn, 2013) and there is a rich body of evidencing suggesting that IPA survivors feel most comfortable and empowered to share their experiences with social ties. Additionally, capturing back-and-forth chronological discussion offers richer insight into the process of social support seeking surrounding IoT IPA. The goal of this project is to contribute foundational data on how people experience IoT IPA. The combination of interview and ethnographic data is appropriate to capture the data that can answer the research questions. Why Victim Survivors? Language used to describe intimate abuse continues to evolve. In this manuscript I chose to describe people who have experienced IoT-mediated IP as victim survivors. I chose to use the term victim survivors to capture best practices which highlight the value of both “victim” and “survivor” in advocacy work. Both “victim” and “survivor” have been identified by practitioners and targets of abuse as doing valuable work for advocacy and empowering those seeking help (Victim or Survivor: Terminology from Investigation Through Prosecution, 2023). “Victim” is the standard term in legal definitions and is thus necessary for moving through the criminal justice system and advocating for support resources (Victim or Survivor: Terminology from Investigation Through Prosecution, 2023). “Survivor” centers the agency of targets of abuse serves as a tool of empowerment (Victim or Survivor: Terminology from Investigation Through Prosecution, 2023). I use the phrase victim survivor to capture how targets of abuse occupy positions of both “victim” and “survivor” and may move between them at different stages of their healing and support seeking journeys (Victim or Survivor: Terminology from Investigation Through Prosecution, 2023). 61 Netnography Methodology Netnography consists of qualitative approaches developed in computer science (Kozinets, 2019) and anthropology (Boellstorff et al., 2012) used to engage in “ethnographic participant observation” on the Internet (Kozinets, 2019, p. 8). Ethnography produces “a cultural understanding of social media through an integration of data analysis and hermeneutic interpretation operations” (Kozinets, 2019, p. 8). Scholars identity the most important difference between traditional, anthropological ethnographic practice and netnography as being the fluidity and dynamism of online field sites (Boellstorf, Nardi). Netnography requires rethinking traditional ethnographic approaches to defining and engaging with field sites based upon how online social spaces operate with different constraints than physical spaces, including asynchronous communication and relative anonymity (Kozients, 2019). As Hine describes a core tenet of ethnography as embodiment in time and place. Netnography, introducing the complexity in defining a field site online, “involves embracing ethnography as a textual practice and a lived craft and destabilizes the ethnographic reliance on sustained presence in a found field site” (Hine, 2016, pg. 43). Netnography translates ethnographic techniques to the fluidity of digital field sites (Kozinets, 2019). Kozinets describes netnography as particularly suited to capturing cultural data surrounding ““(a) the use of new language and symbols; (b) the expression of various online rituals; (c) the adoption of new identities; (d) the telling of stories, sharing of beliefs, and passing along powerful images and media; e) the inculcations and reinforcements of value and value systems; and (f) relations of power and group dynamics” (Kozinets, 2019, p.144-145). 62 Why Netnography? There is evidence to suggest that Internet-based field sites may be rife for understanding emerging IoT-related issues. People seeking support for stigmatized experiences find value in online communities (Dym et al., 2019; Lindgren, 2014; O’Neill, 2018). Netnography offers insight into how these types of online discussion spaces may support Internet of Things-mediated intimate abuse survivors. Based upon evidence that online communities can support knowledge and recognition of stigmatized and poorly understood experiences, such as helping community members diagnose a rare medical condition (Young & Miller, 2019), online communities are potentially particularly valuable for victim survivors seeking to understand IoT-mediated privacy violations within frameworks of intimate abuse. Next, statistics on population-level reporting rates for IoT-mediated abuse do not yet exist. One survey of self-identified women who owned Internet of Things device abuse found that 20% reported having experienced Internet of Things-mediated intimate abuse at least once (Knittel & Shillair, 2020). Examining prevalence rates of other forms of reported domestic abuse and tech-mediated abuse suggest similar outcomes. One meta-analysis centered on cyberstalking reported between 20% and 40% of respondents having experienced cyberstalking (Wilson et al., 2023). Netnography also provides a window to lived practices surrounding how people seek support for IoT IPA outside of formal channels. Intimate partner violence generally is severely underreported to formal monitoring agencies like law enforcement. Of every 1,000 sexual assaults committed, only about 30% are ever reported to law enforcement (The Criminal Justice System: Statistics | RAINN, 2023). Individuals who do disclose experiences of violence frequently face dismissal, blame, or indifference (L. M. Tanczer et al., 2021) which play a role in 63 fears and hesitancy to report. Cycles of abuse that do not involve physical are further underreported, despite emotional, mental, and financial abuse having severe consequences for victim survivors (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2023). To this end, people who have experienced intimate violence are mostly likely to first share their experience with existing social ties. Victim survivors are more likely to confide in friends and family than formal support services (Evans & Feder, 2016). Netnography expands knowledge of how victim survivors understand and respond to their lived experiences of IoT IPA in social settings based in recognition that much of initial sense-making and support-seeking for IPA victim survivors takes place in social settings with peers (Dichter et al., 2022). Next, online spaces, such as online forums, afford users feelings of relative anonymity and safety even compared to disclosures to face-to-face ties (Perrault & Nazione, 2016). Online communities are popular with people whose experiences fall outside dominant cultural narratives and the reach of effective institutional resources and support. Examples include people living with rare medical conditions (Young & Miller, 2019) and women experiencing infertility (Knittel et al., 2021). Further, as social isolation is a tactic of abuse and coercive control (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2023), the distributed, flexible engagement online spaces afford may be especially accessible and useful to survivors, particularly during the post-Covid period where many day-to-day activities remained shifted online. Thus, online spaces have strong potential to shed useful insight on the lived experiences of people experiencing IoT- mediated abuse. Based upon high prevalence rates of tech abuse generally, we would expect the prevalence of IoT to be reflected in misuse prevalence rates as well. Netnography is suited to capture the emerging language and topics of discussion surrounding novel forms of IoT-mediated 64 intimate abuse outside of formal reporting channels. In particular, the Reddit field site is well- suited to understand IoT IPA because of the relative anonymity as compared to other social media websites. You don’t need an account to r/relationshipadvice. Additionally, it is common for users to make time use ‘throwaway’ accounts to ask personal questions that are only used for that purpose. Though numerous specifically intimate abuse centered online forums exist, victim survivors are often hesitant to associate themselves with victim survivor branded materials, and thus may avoid these types of targeted spaces online. I specifically used an online ethnographic approach rather than text mining to study r/relationshipadvice to capture social context, back and forth conversation, and details how victim survivors talk about IPA and IoT. The goal of studying r/relationshipadvice was to capture emergent, new, and not well recorded experiences of everyday people experiencing IoT-mediated IPA. Netnography Procedure Thus, this inquiry adhered to Kozinets five stages of data collection procedure for netnographic inquiries (2019). 1) Simplification. The first stage of netnographic inquiry, simplification, centers on where netnographic data relevant to your inquiry may be located (Kozinets, 2019). It is accomplished by translating your research questions into searchable terms that can systematically be used to locate data. Simplification incorporates the double funnel process of netnographic investigation (Kozinets, 2019, p.214), where these broad search terms support high level assessment of the data, setting the stage for refining the field site more closely around the research project goals and delving into the topic in a rich, deep manner after a high-level overview. Based upon the dissertation research questions and relevant literature, including database 65 and policy research were used to generate the initial search list. Additionally, part of the initial keyword search list for the “simplification” stage was drawn from Leitão’s netnographic project examining smart home abuse in online forums (Leitão, 2019). This inquiry expands upon Leitão’s work in several ways. First, Leitão’s data corpus was generated from 2012 -2017. Smart technologies penetration and capabilities have rapidly evolved in the 5 - 10 years since this study. Examining recent material will offer insight to new problems, language, and experiences as IoT have rapidly evolved. Additionally, Leitão’s inquiry was specifically centered on self-identified domestic abuse forums. While this is an important perspective, many people who experience intimate abuse do not self-identify as such due to stigma and other factors. Additionally, some domestic abuse forums are only available for registered patients/clients with support advocacy organizations. Often, these communities have professional moderators. This level of oversight may inhibit victim survivors support seeking efforts, particularly if they’re looking to make sense of their experiences with peers and on non-experts. IoT IPA is a novel and emerging phenomenon still gaining recognition and serious consideration in broader society. Based on this, there is value in examining other relevant but not explicitly abuse-identified online communities due to stigma and a lack of cultural narratives identifying and legitimizing tech abuse. My search engine-based initial search queries the Internet more broadly to capture emerging cultural discourses surrounding novel methodologies of tech abuse. Further, this dissertation’s approach possesses a greater capacity to capture the perspectives of individuals who may not self-identify as an abuse survivor but whose experiences align with what we know about the form and impacts of emerging tech-mediated abuse. Finally, while Leitão (2019) also incorporated interviews in her methodology, her analysis and discussion did not orient those findings with her online community’s data (Leitão, 2019b). My approach uses interviews and 66 netnography to capture unique dimensions of the same questions surrounding IoT IPA, offering a more comprehensive understanding of victim survivor experiences. See Figure: Keywords from Academic Literature, Policy, and Domestic Abuse Support Services Review and Figure: Keywords from Leitão 2019 for the initial lists of keywords. After conducting several interviews (See Interview section), several slang terms relevant to IoT IPA harms emerged. I repeated the Scouting stage with these additional emergent keywords (see Figure: Keywords from Interview Study). 2) Search. After refining the keywords, they were used to search for relevant online field sites. The keywords were queried using web search engines to identify potentially relevant field sites. For each item in Figure: Keywords from Interview Study, Figure: Keywords from Academic Literature, Policy, and Domestic Abuse Support Services Review, and Figure: Keywords from Leitão 2019, I input the keyword into Google, Bing, and Safari. Due to the huge amount of material many of these keywords generated, and to focus on data generated by people in everyday conversations, I added the word “forum” to the queries. Spending dozens of hours over the course of several weeks, I worked through these keyword lists and spend time ‘getting the lay of the land’ for where people were talking about IoT IPA online. This work consisted of reading user-generated material, observing additional website material and external links, and revisiting locations to observe new material over time. I generated a document tracking websites I had visited, tracked what material I assessed, and memoed about their potential applicability. 3) Scouting. In the Scouting phase, I further probed each place I identified where potential data exists. I spent time reading, looking, searching, thinking, and analyzing the content on each website. This included reading through domestic abuse forums, Twitter threads, and 67 related sites. From this search, I identified r/relationship advice as a potentially appropriate field site. Reddit.com is a social media website. Reddit is unique in that it is organized into topic- centered communities which are managed by community moderators. Reddit.com is the 7th most-visited website of all-time on the Internet. I selected Reddit.com’s r/relationshipadvice forum based on the five qualities for netnographic data selection outlined by Kozinets 2018. • Relevance: Relevance refers to the capacity of a social media set, upon initial searches, to provide relevant material to answer the research questions. Upon initial examination with the keywords, Reddit.com possessed a large quantity of data. R/relationshipadvice, at the time of this writing, is the 10th largest subreddit forum on all of Reddit.com. • Activity: Reddit in general, and r/relationshipadvice, have high levels of activity. This community has over 9 million registered and averages at least several thousand active users at any given time (Reddit.com). The forum sees hundreds of individual user threads posted daily. • Interactivity: Interactivity refers to what degree user-generated content influences the content hosted on the site. For example, a news media website posts articles with a comment section. This has a lower degree of interactivity than a Reddit forum, where user-generated content drives discussion, links to third-parties such as news articles and blogs, and so on. • Diversity: Diversity refers to the capacity of a netnographic field site to reflect a variety of experiences, both in their content and how they are presented (I.e., Text, visuals, etc.) r/relationship advice has considerable variety in the kinds of discussion 68 generated. The community specifically centers itself on advice-seeking for all kinds of human relationships. Virtually all user-generated content is text-based. • Richness: As in any kind of online discussion platform, there is variance in the level of detail r/relationship advice thread authors share in prompting community discussion. However, the thread creators on r/relationshipadvice are particularly detailed in the sheer length of what they share with the community. It is not uncommon for an initial post to be 1,000+ words. 4) Selecting. After selecting r/relationshipadvice as the field site, I developed criteria for identifying relevant material from r/relationship advice. As I mentioned above, Reddit.com threads are well-indexed on Google and other search engines. In initial keyword searches, I repeatedly came across seemingly relevant conversations on r/relationshipadvice simply through the search engines. Thus, I used the initial keyword lists as a starting point for identifying potentially relevant individual threads through searching r/relationship advice (restricting the queries to content generated in 2022). On r/relationshipadvice, the initial keyword lists produced over 3,000 hits produced in 2022. After reading through all the discussions several times, threads were added or excluded from the dataset based on the following criteria. Reddit Thread Selection Criteria • The thread creator must entirely or predominantly share their firsthand experience. This includes using first-person language to share their story and situating themselves as experiencing IoT IPA via their intimate partner. • The thread must describe shared physical space (such as a house, an apartment, an office etc.) as being the site of IoT device use/tech abuse occurring. • The thread must discuss experiences with a confirmed or suspected device. 69 • Discussions of considering using an IoT device themselves, in an unwanted/abuse capacity or otherwise, is beyond the scope of this investigation. When selecting data identification criteria, I also made decisions related to honing a potential field site based on other relevant factors such as time-period of interest, community demographics, interest in interrogating a certain platform or brand, and so on. I decided to restrict the netnographic inquiry to material (text, images, etc.) first posted online in the year 2022. This approach managed the quantity of material to process. Additionally, I wanted to specifically capture discourse generated after the peak of COVID-19 response due to the pandemic’s impacts in how people use information technology (see: Soroya et al., 2021). Emerging data from the pandemic time period suggests that intimate partner abuse rates increased worldwide (Tseng eta l., 2021). Focusing the inquiry on this time period provided the most contextually relevant and actionable take-aways for supporting survivors in the wake of the pandemic. 5) Saving. I downloaded the r/relationship text-based and visual content in a stable state. I decided to download the individual r/relationshipadvice discussion threads as PDF files. This approach allowed to maintain the overall flow, including timestamps, of the community discussions in a manner authentic to actual user interface a commentator would experience. I stored them on my personal machine and backed up the files on an encrypted, password protected server. Using the three keyword lists targeted to r/relationshipadvice alongside the selection criteria, this initial search produced 411 threads. After omitting duplicate threads (I omitted repetitions of the same thread, i.e. if a thread hit for more than one keyword, I only included the thread in the dataset once), omitting threads that had been deleted by the author and/or 70 community moderators, and reviewing every thread in accordance with the selection criteria outlined in the selection criteria above, 206 threads remained in the final analysis. This final dataset consisted of approximately 40,000 words of user-generated text. I revised participant usernames to protect discussant privacy. Participant usernames were anonymized as User 1, User 2, and so on reflecting the order in which their material appeared in the manuscript. Additionally, it is a social norm on r/relationshipadvice for thread creators to use so-called “throwaway” accounts. Throwaway accounts refer to user accounts individuals generate on Reddit to use just for a single thread, community, or conversation (Ammari et al., 2019). For example, it’s common for individuals to generate a throwaway account to use on /relationshipadvice to share experiences of intimate violence. They will use this account solely for discussing this situation, and then abandon it and never use it again. The goal of using throwaway accounts is to separate the new post, often containing highly personal/identifiable and/or stigmatized information, from the rest of their posting history on (Ammari et al., 2019). Additionally, several victim survivors in the dataset explicitly state they are using a “throwaway” account because their abuser uses Reddit, and they want to reduce the possibility they will discover the post and connect it back to them. In the anonymization process, self-identified throwaway accounts were anonymized as Throwaway 1, Throwaway 2 and so on reflecting the order their material appears in this manuscript. Semi-Structured Interview Methodology The second stage of the dissertation research consisted of a semi-structured interview protocol centered on the experiences of self-described survivors of IoT-mediated abuse. Interview recruitment, interviewing, and analysis took place in parallel with the netnographic inquiry. Participants were eligible if they were: aged 18 years +; who self-reported currently 71 residing in the state of Michigan; who self-identified as at least occasional Internet users; who described having experience with one or more networked, semi-autonomous technologies in the home; from a diverse range of identities (gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, Internet use rates and skills, and so on); and who describe having experienced threatening, harmful, and/or abusive behavior via a device in the home via a former or current intimate partner. The investigation and recruitment centered intentionally on Michigan residents. First, though domestic violence incidents have increased throughout the United States in the wake of Covid (Anurudran et al., 2020), Michigan organizations have identified a sharply increased need for domestic violence support services in the wake of COVID-19. Reports throughout Michigan, ranging from Grand Rapids (Nichols, 2021), Marquette County (Friend, 2021), and the greater Lansing area (Nichols, 2021) indicate sharp increases in police calls and requests for domestic- violence related services. The Michigan Coalition to End Domestic and Sexual Violence reported that in January 2021 the organization received over 1,000 calls; for the entire span of September 2019 to September 2020, hey received 1,300 calls (Nichols, 2021). These data suggest there is value in understanding how Michigan support services and survivors may be facing new challenges related to violence in the home due to the challenges and tensions of the pandemic. Focusing on the Michigan context can also serve as a case study of how national and international level discussions surrounding technology-mediated abuse are captured, ignored, challenged, refuted, and otherwise engaged with in the everyday life of experts and survivors. These high incidence rates in Michigan could offer a particularly poignant window into IoT- mediated domestic violence issues, and potential intervention strategies, as these issues continue to become more pervasive across the USA and world. Additionally, Michigan’s unique geographic demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic characteristics (including diversity 72 between urban and rural centers, racial stratification, broadband and Internet access inequalities, etc.) serve as productive contextual factors to consider in understanding IoT-mediated violence including effective support and intervention approaches. Additionally, focusing on residents of one state is appropriate because intimate partner abuse legislation and support infrastructures vary widely from state-to-state, particularly in the case of legal procedures surrounding intimate violence. Focusing this initial inquiry on Michigan residents allows the analysis to capture experiences of tech-mediated intimate abuse that can directly inform the context and localized constraints of Michigan survivors for Michigan-based support agencies and policy makers. This approach will also serve as a platform to test the emerging trends related to experiences of IoT IPA in other states and nationally. Why Semi-Structured Interviewing? This dissertation project is centered on understanding foundational risks and outcomes of IoT-mediated IPA in real world contexts. This investigation focuses on understanding contextual factors related to IoT-mediated IPA. Semi-structured interviewing balances structure and consistency with the ability to adapt based upon the interviewee. Semi-structured interviewing is useful for digging into the rich details of lived experiences and thoroughly examining the internal process of thoughts and perceptions (What were you thinking at this moment? What happened next?) underlying experiences (Kallio et al., 2016). Semi-structured interviews are also useful in creating space for the participants’ themselves to share relevant and important details beyond the initial scope of the interview and ask their own questions (Melville & Hincks, 2016). Additionally, semi-structured interviewing is useful for theory-building in topic areas which are new and have not been well studied (Kallio et al., 2016). There are no studies on IoT deployed in real world abusive smart homes. To address this gap, this study uses semi-structured interviewing 73 to build upon interview templates from non-IoT cases of IPA (Alaggia et al., 2012) and tech abuse (Freed et al., 2017) to capture new insights in the context of IoT. I also selected semi-structured interviewing as a complement to the data collected from the netnography on r/relationshipadvice. The community on r/relationshipadvice is global and it is difficult to determine demographics of the population being studied. This combined approach allows me to focus on the experiences of Michigan residents in the interview sample while also contextualizing and expanding the findings in the context of online communities. Online communities, including discussants from theoretically anywhere in the world, allowed me to capture the breadth of IoT IPA experiences across contexts. I intentionally selected semi-structured interviewing methodologies over narrative interview and other storytelling methods. The primary reason I selected semi-structured interviewing was so the findings would be easily translatable to other research contexts. Semi- structured interviewing allows this project to build upon core work on cycles of abuse and systemic risks factors from work with victim survivors particularly in healthcare contexts (i.e. Black, 2011, Kafka et al., 2021). Using a semi-structured interview protocol also allowed me to systematically align the interview findings with my past surveys on describing IoT-mediated IPA risks and outcomes (Knittel & Shillair, 2021). I also selected semi-structured interviewing because IPA is traumatic and recalling experiences of harm can lead to reliving negative emotions generally be difficult for victim survivors (Campbell et al., 2009). Semi-structured interviewing allowed me to focus extracting participant data focused specifically on the role of IoT in experiences of abuse without focusing on traumatic experiences unnecessarily. Trauma-centered research practice identifies focusing 74 data collection as much as possible as an important strategy to reduce burden on participants (Isobel, 2021). Interview Procedure Participants were recruited using a brief eligibility survey (approximately 5 minutes in length based on pilot testing) developed using the Qualtrics survey platform. Please see Appendix C for the full eligibility interview questionnaire. The eligibility survey centered on capturing the experiences of individuals who self-identified as having been threatened, attacked, or otherwise experienced interpersonal harm related to Internet of Things technologies. To support potential participants’ understanding of what we mean by “Internet of Things” devices, participants were provided the following language as part of the eligibility survey consent materials: The purpose of this research study is to better understand people’s experiences of intimate partner and/or domestic abuse via an abuser using one or more Internet of Things technologies. Internet of Things refers to home electronics, ‘things’, that can connect to the ‘Internet’. Sometimes Internet of Things technologies are called smart home devices. Examples of these kinds of technologies include but are not limited to: personal assistants like Alexa or Google Home; energy devices such as the Nest thermostat or lights you can control with a phone app; location trackers such as the Apple Air Tag, or using location services on a smart phone; security devices such as the Ring doorbell system; recording and monitoring devices such as a Wi-Fi connected baby monitor or other cameras, microphones etc. used in your home; or health monitoring devices such as a smart refrigerator that monitors food usage or a Wi-Fi connected scale. These are just a few examples of Internet of Things devices. 75 Additionally, in phrasing recruitment materials for the semi-structured interview study, the recruitment materials specifically solicited individuals who self-identified as having experienced “‘smart’ devices [being] used by a romantic or sexual partner to threaten you, harm you, or otherwise learn things about you that you did not want them to know or which made you uncomfortable.” This open-ended, participant-driven language captured experiences of individuals who identified with the general definition of tech abuse and created space for novel experiences to be captured. What precisely constitutes a ‘smart’ device is in flux and will continue to grow and change. Capturing emerging experiences of harm that are not well understood or recognized in professional spaces and cultural discourses of violence requires flexibility and creativity in the protocol. To provide a balance with focusing the inquiry on relevant topics, the recruitment materials provided basic framing to help participants contextualize and recognize their experiences. At the same time, the recruitment materials created space and flexibility for participants to share novel experiences they felt were relevant to the topic at hand. Participants were deemed eligible for the interview study if they met the following criteria: they reported being 18 years of age or older; they responded affirmatively to the question prompting if they currently reside in the state of Michigan; they self-reported having experienced behavior they would describing as threatening, harmful, and/or violent from a current or former intimate partner at least once; they self-reported at least two or more instances of behavior they described as threatening, harmful, and/or violent from a current or former intimate partner using devices in one or more of the six broadly defined categories of Internet of Things technologies included in the survey prompt. All eligible participants received correspondence via the survey platform or over email inviting them to sign up for the interview 76 study. All questions in the eligibility pre-survey were skippable, but skipping items relevant to eligibility removed that respondent from the eligibility pool. All participants who made a good faith effort to complete the survey (which I defined as responding to 80% or more of the multiple-choice items) received $2 compensation in the form of an Amazon gift card. According to the Qualtrics platform, all participants who began the survey completed it. To preserve anonymity, I coordinated with the SONA administration to generate and distribute the $2 gift cards in batches. Participants were solicited using several avenues. First, I created a posting on the Michigan State University SONA system. The SONA system is a platform which is centered on recruiting Michigan State University students to participant in university-sponsored research for course credit. There is also a section of the platform oriented to paid research participation for community members and Michigan residents. I used the latter platform to recruit for the eligibility survey. I did not explicitly prohibit Michigan State University students from the recruitment pool, but intentionally used the paid community research pool to target demographics reflective of mid-Michigan at large. Additionally, I posted several dozen flyers at local businesses in the greater Lansing area (within approximately 100 miles) including grocery stores, coffee shops, and community centers. I also researched and targeted local community organizations and businesses located in areas with variances in socioeconomic, racial/ethnic, education attainment, and other demographic variables. I also collaborated with local domestic abuse advocacy organizations. I contacted local agencies via phone and email to request if they would be interested in posting recruitment materials. Two organizations, Lansing-based EVE (End Violence Everywhere) and the Detroit-based WIN Network responded, and I mailed them paper flyers along with a recruitment email. 77 To contact participants regarding their interview eligibility, SONA participants were prompted to input their anonymized 6-digit SONA ID number in the questionnaire. SONA respondents eligible for the interview received an invitation via the SONA system. Participants who did not have or choose to make an account in the SONA system could alternatively input an email address in the survey. Those who took this approach were contacted via email. The email addresses of interview eligible participants who did not reply within 30 days of receiving the invitations were destroyed. 191 respondents completed the eligibility survey and received compensation. Based on Qualtrics, there were no partial completions. Approximately 60% of the respondents were eligible for the interview component of the study based on their responses. After receiving interview invitations, 22 participants signed up and participated in the interview component of the study. All interviews were conducted remotely. Virtual interviews are strongly preferred by research participants as opposed to face-to-face interviewing (Archibald et al., 2019). Virtual interviews also promote equitable participation by historically excluded and stigmatized groups, including survivors of intimate abuse, due to the convenience and not needing childcare to attend an outside interview (Tseng et al., 2021). Interviews were conducted using the Zoom video- conferencing platform. Participants were provided detailed instructions on how to access the platform via a personal computer, smartphone/tablet, or via phone using their cellular network or Wi-Fi access point. They also received reminder emails 48 hours and 12 hours ahead of their interview time slot with a reminder and my contact information should they run into any problems accessing Zoom. 78 I used the built-in Zoom capture features to record the interview audio. For safety and privacy, in addition to considering that most interviewees were using low bandwidth/unstable Internet connectivity points to participate, I kept the participant’s camera off, and thus did not record any video during the interviews. I kept my camera on to build familiarity and rapport with the participant. I also used Zoom’s built-in transcription software to generate text transcripts of the interview audio. To minimize potential risks of an online data breach, the Zoom audio recordings were designated to be stored on a local hard drive. Then, I manually listened through the interview recordings. I revised the audio files to omit any potentially personally identifiable information. Next, I uploaded the audio recordings to the Otter.ai automated transcription platform. After completing transcription, local copies were generated, and all material stored in the cloud based Otter.ai platform were destroyed. I reviewed the automated transcription alongside the recordings and fixed any errors in the text. Finally, I downloaded the revised and anonymized transcripts for qualitative analysis in NVivo. I created anonymized identifiers for each participant’s interview data linked only via a spreadsheet key stored separately from the data. I also took handwritten notes during the interviews. These texts were stored in a locked safe in a locked private residence. To prioritize participant safety, I engaged in several obfuscation techniques regarding interview documents and scripts. Due to this participant population being uniquely vulnerable to the possibility of a digital database (i.e., there is reason to anticipate that their electronic communications may be being monitored without their knowledge or consent, and they may be uniquely vulnerable if a malicious intimate actor found out) this approach required further safety approaches. To minimize these risks, interview participants received content materials verbally. I 79 began the survey by confirming with the participant that they were in an environment where they felt safe participating in the interview. I read out the consent materials before the survey began and asked the participant to verbally confirm or deny. Additionally, in all one-on-one email correspondence with the participants (which included instructions for signing up for an interview and compensation gift card codes) referred to the study as “Internet Use Study.” I used this vague terminology in all email correspondence to deflect potential unwanted attention from an intimate abuser accessing their email account. Finally, I generated pseudonyms for all interview participants. I asked every participant if they would like to choose a name for themselves to be represented in any research findings. Most participants chose a name for me to use. All participant names used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 were names I asked my participants to choose for themselves. If they asked me to choose a name for them, I selected one randomly. Several participants asked me to choose a random name for them. Based on pilot testing, the interview protocol was estimated to last 60 - 90 minutes (which was accurate in practice, with interview lengths ranging from 50 minutes to 85 minutes). The interview component of the study centered on capturing richer detail and additional relevant experiences as indicated in the eligibility survey. Most interview participants’ responses were quite lengthy. In the interest of focus and efficiency, repetitive or irrelevant transcript text is omitted and replaced with … (for less than one sentence of text) or […] (for one sentence or greater of text). Additionally, I manually removed filler speech such as “uh” and “um.” Please see Appendix C for the full semi-structured interview questionnaire. Semi- structured interviews provided structure and consistency for making comparisons across 80 experiences of IoT and drawing policy-relevant insights, while simultaneously incorporating flexibility to capture emergent experiences and create opportunities for participants to elaborate (Kallio et al., 2016). I asked the participant, for each IoT device/constellation of devices they can recall having experiences related to, to walk me through the memory of event(s) in which the individual first recognized something going on related to IoT in the home as 1) threatening, harmful, and unwanted and 2) caused by the surveillance, interference, or other activity of an intimate partner. I developed these questions drawing upon Free Association Narrative Interview Method (FANIM) (Hollway & Jefferson, 2008). This approach centers on having participants identify events they describe as most important and impactful. The interviewer then identifies associations and works to elicit relevant stories and richer detail through repeated probing questioning of the narrative (Hollway & Jefferson, 2008). I drew upon this approach to develop open-ended questioning in the protocol and focus on questions that push the interviewee to identify specific times, places, and events (Hollway & Jefferson, 2008). This type of narrative interviewing is commonly used in domestic abuse contexts with the aim of gaining a more holistic understanding of risks and considerations of survivors beyond the rigidity of traditional criminal justice approaches (Cole, 2009; Radcliffe et al., 2021). Protocol Section Summaries • Part 1: The interviews began with ‘low stakes’ questions about what the interviewee enjoys using the Internet for. These questions about general Internet use were not used in the analysis. Their purpose was to give participants’ time to ease into the interview and build rapport with the interviewer before moving onto to the challenging intimate abuse questions. After general Internet use questions, I moved 81 into asking participants about their firsthand experiences with Internet of Things devices. I re-iterated the open-ended definition of IoT devices from the survey and provided the survey categories again as examples. I drew upon feminist and trauma- centered approaches, particularly those centered towards interviewing sexual violence survivors to give survivors flexibility and autonomy in the interview protocol and create space in my use of language for diverse experiences (Campbell et al., 2009). This approach included clearly scaffolding the protocol upcoming sensitive questions, creating space for participants to request breaks or to end the interview, and affording participant’s agency by creating space in the interview protocol for participants to ask their own questions and/or share their experiences beyond the initial scope of the study. • Part 2: The second section of interview protocol began with intimate abuse questions involved sharing experiences of violence from a current or former intimate partner. I began with asking participants to recall a specific event related to IoT IPA that initially sparked their recognition that something unusual, surprising, or important was occurring. From this narrative elicitation, I probed for further details and relevant experiences. To this end, after probing these experiences, I used semi- structured interviewing techniques derived from studies of domestic/household information flows which center on prioritizing participants’ definitions of smart computing, probe the narratives of their firsthand experiences with these technologies, and identify concerns related to privacy and safety (Jung & Stolterman, 2011). • Part 3: Next, I moved into asking participants questions about support-seeking as 82 related to the firsthand experiences of IoT IPA they already shared with me. I inquired about support resources they may have sought out including family/friends, community organizations, and legal resources. I also asked participants about barriers and challenges they faced when seeking support. Additionally, I included a line of questioning around asking the participant to imagine they were talking to a technology designer(s) and what they want them to be thinking about. The aim of this line of questioning was not that of a substantial participatory design interviewing methodology. Rather, the goal was to better understand design imaginaries related to the Internet of Things and risks, including perspectives on how they could be imagined differently, from the perspective of real-world victim survivors. These questions set the stage for more in-depth research that pushes current narratives of IoT futures towards perspectives driven by the public (Lupton, 2020). • Part 4: The final phase of the interview was centered on creating time for the participant to ask any of their own questions, expand upon what they shared, and add any details about their experiences with IoT IPA which they feel are important and have not yet been captured. Data Analysis I used bottom-up descriptive coding methods for the first round of analytical coding for both the interview transcripts and r/relationshipadvice discussions. I applied descriptive codes at the sentence level. In these descriptive codes, I captured the who, what, where, when, and how of the narrative the thread creator shared. I particularly focused on how participants described IoT, experiences of violation and violence, and any I drew upon abductive analysis methodologies to iteratively, repeatedly move between the data and relevant literature to identify and test 83 complementary and novel theoretical explanations (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). I began analysis with first cycle (Miles et al., 2014) coding methods including repeatedly revisiting the data as I continued bottom-up coding to identify patterns, new connections, and details missed on earlier passes. In this process, I read through the text for each response five to six times apiece, while also listening and re-listening to the accompanying audio clip. During first round coding, I also engaged in extensive memoing in my immersion notebook including thick description (Charmaz, 2014) to capture my thoughts and emerging take-aways about the data and field site dynamics at large. After completing the first round of descriptive coding, I reviewed the data and open codes. I re-organized the codes into emerging patterns/possible findings centered around the research questions. These clusters served as the basis to develop the focused coding scheme for further interpreting and analyzing the data. I interrogated these emerging takeaways by critically reviewing the data through reconnoitering by rereading all the data and coding multiple times (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012), seeking alternative and contradictory cases (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007), and affinity diagramming to interpret my notes and observations. This process generated over 700 unique descriptive codes from the interview transcripts and over 500 unique codes for the r/relationship advice comments. I moved from this first round of coding into second order coding (Miles et al., 2014). I adhered to Timmermans and Savory’s three-stage process for focused coding: 1) revisiting the phenomena in question through engaging with new and previously read scholarship; 2) drawing upon this knowledge and creatively proposing alternative explanations new theoretical directions through defamiliarization; and finally, 3) identifying patterns of alternative cases and explanations in the data (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). In this process, I engaged in constant comparison (Charmaz, 2014) between examples in the data. 84 From this starting point, I worked through the data repeatedly in constant comparison. From this, I re-organized the hundreds of descriptive codes (including combining redundant codes) into 23 focused codes centered on patterns I identified across individuals and contexts. I developed 23 second order codes for the interview and netnographic data sets. Please see Appendix A for the full list of the focused coding scheme for the interviews and netnography. These 46 focused codes serve as the basis of the findings in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In identifying and confirming potential Findings, each of the emerging Findings were interrogated using Onwuegbuzie and Leech’s 24 principles for evaluating validity and reliability in qualitative data, which included looking for contradictory cases and evaluating consistency of patterns across time and place (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). See Figure Codes and Findings for a breakdown of how each focused code, and the data labelled with it, were connected to the findings presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Presenting Findings I present the Findings in Chapter and 4 and Chapter 5 in an intentionally non-traditional manner. The standard approach for presenting qualitative data is to highlight multiple relevant examples from the data the demonstrate themes and take-aways (Burnard et al. 2008; Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, rather than presenting findings based upon multiple brief vignettes across each participant interview or r/relationshipadvice forum transcript, I highlight each of the findings with the details of each individual victim survivor’s story in context. In practice, this looks like sharing the details of the victim survivor’s reported experiences of IoT-mediated IPA. I adopted this approach as a stylistic choice to communicate the findings clearly and effectively. While analyzing the data, even after identifying clearly defined patterns in 85 experiences of IoT-mediated IPA and support seeking, I discovered that every experience of IoT- mediated IPA is unique and varies across personal circumstances, devices used and how, individual reactions to these experiences of harm. Separating these common threads from the particularities of each victim survivor’s circumstances is not possible. The findings are only made clear through understanding the details and contexts of individual experiences. I used this approach based upon interview findings from IPA victim survivors which repeatedly demonstrate that victim survivors are empowered by sharing their own stories in their own words (O’Neill, 2018). Victim survivors describe posting on social media and talking with friends and family as difficult, but also gratifying and empowering in making experiences of tech abuse more widely understood and controlling narratives thereof (O’Neill, 2018). Victim survivors describe sharing their experiences as a tool of challenging the social structures which maintain IPA, including social stigma, lack of accountability for abusers’ behaviors (Dichter et al., 2021) and lack of meaningful support from formal infrastructures like law enforcement (Tanczer & López-Neira, 2021). As a researcher, my role in repackaging the project’s findings will always serve as a layer of interpretation between victim survivors and the audience of this piece. Centering the language and narratives of victim survivors as much as possible was used to preserve the perspectives and voice of the most important stakeholders in this project and its consequences. Commitment to Centering Historically Marginalized Perspectives Feminist orientations supported the research design decisions for the parallel methodologies. The following sections are divided and labelled as ‘orientations’ for clarity and efficiency. In each section I describe the major influences for each approach I am taking and explicitly connect them to actual decisions, outcomes, and other material consequences in the 86 methodological decision-making for the project. First, I approach this project with the goal of centering historically marginalized perspectives. I operate under the assumption that lived experiences of understudied impacted communities can offer critical insights for taking meaningful action. Next, the second orientation summarizes best practices for trauma-informed research. This section highlights take-aways for the survey and interview protocol design from scholarship in psychology and sociology centered on working with vulnerable populations who have experienced trauma. Then, the third orientation outlines this project’s intentional position as activist scholarship and on-going community engaged research practices which contributed to the methodological design and data collection. Finally, the section concludes with a discussion of my positionality in undertaking this work including reflections on moments of power and access during data collection and a personal positionality statement. The first major feminist orientation used in developing this project is the assumption that firsthand experiences of violence and harm have unique power to advance theory building. Creating space for hearing the people most directly impacted by IoT IPA has the capacity to accelerate understanding of new perspectives on important issues related to inviting Internet of Things devices into homes, workplaces, and communities. Much of the current public discourse and industry attention on tech harms includes attention towards cybersecurity issues (Slupska, 2019), algorithmic curation (Noble, 2018) and barriers in individuals’ privacy and security skills online (Lupton, 2017). While these are all critically important for evaluating human rights in the future of computing, current responses do not adequately address the unique considerations of tech-mediated harms that occur within the known actors and social contexts of intimate relationships. I argue that firsthand experiences of victim survivors cannot just offer surprises or new insights for designers, policymakers, and other stakeholders, but they can reveal particularly 87 critical insights for how to effectively address injustice perpetuated by emerging IoT ecosystems. Dotson and Collins argue that marginalized testimony serves as a root of transformative knowledge (Dotson, 2011). Dotson’s work, utilizing a linguistic analysis of media imagery of black women and the narratives that surround them, argues that silencing of marginalized experiences occurs when stories and their impacts are separated from the bodies that produce them (2011). For example, dominant media imagery of black women in the late 20th century perpetuated stereotypes such as the image of the welfare queen (Collins, 2014) and the idea that black men are predisposed to be domestic abusers (Dotson, 2011). This discourse, these stories, are overwhelmingly produced not by black women and their communities. Thus, silencing occurs not just via lack of discussion, but through (Dotson, 2011). Thus, this project combines netnography and semi-structured interviews, alongside an open-ended protocol and bottom-up coding scheme, to not just identify IoT IPA via the perspectives of survivors but create opportunities for their stories to define the emerging problem(s) of importance for future work. Additionally, this intentional focus on the knowledge of overlooked communities builds upon scholarship which identifies how certain kinds of knowledge networks are prioritized in government, healthcare, and the academy. For example, Hesse-Biber critiqued sociology’s historical emphasis on public, formal networks as the foundation of understanding social systems (Hesse-Biber, 2007). She argued that, especially in historically marginalized communities (women, communities of color, LGBTQ+ communities, etc.) informal networks blooming beyond the public eye and mainstream sociopolitical infrastructures are important and overlooked field sites. These informal community ties are often the primary way through which people come to understand the world, seek support when facing challenges, and build networks of trusted friends and family (Hesse-Biber, 2011). In centering historically marginalized 88 impacted communities, I intentionally focus this project on perspectives that are often overlooked, marginalized, and excluded in mainstream narratives about emerging social technologies such as social media, artificial intelligence, and the widespread consumer implementation of Internet of Things devices in peoples’ homes. In this approach, I use interviews and netnography to prioritize the private, intimate, and informal communities many marginalized groups rely upon for survival and empowerment (Hill Collins, 2002; Hesse-Biber, 2011). First, I intentionally centered my inquiry on Michigan residents to contextualize the findings within the legal and other formal and informal support infrastructures within the state. Additionally, in the interview protocol, I utilized an expanded definition of support-seeking that captured informal networks of support and knowledge-making (see: Figure Interview Protocol). Second, though the primary goal with this inquiry was defining Internet of Things-mediated intimate abuse and identifying directions for further work in particular communities, I worked to recruit a diverse interviewee pool. Please see Appendix A for a demographic breakdown of the interview sample. Next, I took steps in developing the phrasing of the questionnaires and the netnographic keywords to remain cognizant that social and cultural context co-construct meaning in interpersonal relationships and thus will influence what kinds of activities involving Internet of Things are deemed as abuse or not abuse. For example, emerging evidence suggests that, in some cultures in the US and worldwide, digital surveillance by partners is viewed as a socially acceptable and even desirable. This is not to say that these activities don’t fit some definitions of intimate abuse, and it may well be true that people experiencing it view as harmful, but these very cultural norms inhibit their identification as such. Rather, I approach this work with 89 centering what participants define as IoT IPA in their own language rather than imposing firm a priori definitions. Commitment to Trauma-Informed Research Practice Trauma is broadly defined as a stressor outside of the “range of typical human experience” which evokes a distress response (Weathers & Keane, 2007, p.108). Typically, this phrase of distressing events beyond the “range of typical human experience” refers to experiences outside of typical life stressors (I.e., Bereavement, losing a job) which are most likely to influence sustained feelings of fear and hopeless and often involve direct threats to an individuals’ life, such as being tortured or experiencing a vehicle accident (Weathers & Keane, 2007). Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder refers to a complex psychological condition in which trauma produces a neurobiologically detectable change in the brain alongside cognitive and behavioral phenomena. Prevalence rates of PTSD in intimate abuse survivors vary widely but have been reported as occurring for between 14% and 84% of victim survivors (Oakley et al., 2021). PTSD is just one point in a constellation of mental and physical deficits identified in high rates with intimate abuse victim survivors, with trauma in particular predisposing victim survivors to poorer physical health even years after abuse (Dutton et al., 2006). Presenting an exhaustive definition and/or interrogation of trauma as a fraught social, legal, and medical construct (Oakley et al., 2021) is beyond the scope of this dissertation. But considering best practices for doing research with populations who have or likely have experienced trauma is critical to succeed in understanding victim survivors of IoT IPA. Synthesizing take-aways from work in the social sciences in which researchers worked directly with domestic abuse victim survivors, three take-aways to ground this inquiry emerged. 90 Victim survivors emphasize flexibility and autonomy in contributing their experiences to research projects. Interviews with victim survivors reveal that autonomy, referring to the ability to make decisions about what information they share, how the research is conducted, and what the data are used for is important (Campbell et al., 2009). Similarly, trauma-informed computing argues that avoiding re-traumatization in user-focused computing research can be accomplished by focusing on participant experiences which are strictly necessary for the study, actively consider power differentials between the research and participants, and create procedures for collaboration with the community being researched (Chen et al., 2022). Following these guidelines, participant safety and agency is centered in the methodology through several approaches. First, the interview protocol is organized with opportunities for victim survivors to share relevant experiences not captured by the interview protocol. Additionally, the protocol builds in time for interviewees to ask questions about the interviewer and the project beyond the scope of just the interview. Further, participants were debriefed about opportunities to access the output of the work such as presentations and this dissertation. Additionally, before starting data collection I completed several relevant trainings with righttobe.org (formerly known as Hollaback) and a 6-week seminar through Michigan State University’s Center for Survivors. These trainings centered on working with communities that have experienced trauma. The trainings centered on responding to survivor stories empathetically and identifying signs of distress in research participants. Methodological decision-making, particularly for the phrasing and content of the interview protocol questionnaire, was conducted in consideration of how experiencing trauma impacts cognition, emotion, and the brain, particularly memory (Dutton et al., 2006). Traumatic memories are often encoded differently from other forms of long-term memory and are likely to 91 be recalled nonlinearly (Dutton et al., 2006). Based on this, the interview used a free association semi-structured interview technique (Hollway & Jefferson, 2008) in which the interviewer has the participant move through the stories they share iteratively to collaboratively build a narrative. Additionally, the interview protocol also begins with less emotionally evocative content before moving into the questions related to experiences of abuse. This offers time for trust and rapport between the researcher and participant ahead of the most difficult questions. Finally, participants were read a trigger warning-style summary before each block of questions centered on potentially traumatic material. Commitment to Community Engagement and Activism The third and final major feminist orientation charting the course of this dissertation is situating the project as a community-engaged and activist project. I drew on community-engaged scholarship approaches to incorporate community members into this research and give them the agency and opportunity to build the stages of the research project together (Harrington et al., 2019). Thus far, I collaborated with two Michigan non-profit organizations, Lansing based EVE and Detroit-based WIN network, to recruit participants and distribute information about the study. I also informally interviewed legal and social work advocates involved with these organizations to gain perspective on tech abuse issues they face in their day-to-day roles supporting survivors. I used what I learned from the interviews to develop the interview protocol and contextualize the findings within suggestions for practitioners on the ground. Additionally, I was invited to University College London to give a series of invited lectures on Internet of Things- mediated abuse, with an emphasis on risk factors and support-seeking, for an interdisciplinary audience of computer scientists, information technology specialists, and law enforcement. 92 Through this lecture series, I expanded my network of interested readers and feedback providers to support professionals working in law enforcement and the healthcare industry within the US and UK. Finally, as part of my research work with the Trust and Safety Professional Association, I am incorporating historical trends in identifying and responding to online harassment, including intimate abuse online, into my literature review project. This project also adopts a community-engaged approach through considering knowledge production beyond traditional academic spaces as legitimate sources for understanding what problems IoT IPA victim survivors face. Critiques of these devices often emerge from experiences of harm reported by consumers. For example, domestic abusers slipping Apple Air Tag GPS devices into women’s backpacks and purses prompted backlash (Allison, 2022). Subsequent responses including Apple’s overhaul of the Apple product suites security settings user interface (Cameron, 2022) are beginning to highlight how, as these devices penetrate everyday life, they may have social consequences far beyond the intention (or control) of their creators and regulators. Finally, this work is an activist project. I define activist research as that which centers social change as a core impact of the work, and which recognizes social change as a form of knowledge production (Choudry, 2013). I identify networks of power which disempower victim survivors in order to build new metaphors (Star, 1990) that center safety, autonomy, and consent. In the methodology for this project, ‘activist’ refers to two specific goals. Self-Care An important aspect of completing this dissertation project was self-care. “Emotionally demanding research” is research involving trauma, violence, and other sensitive topics which make major demands on researchers’ emotional, cognitive, and physical energy (Kumar & 93 Cavallaro, 2017). Kumaro & Cavallaro proposed the first conceptual framework of research self- care (2017). The proposed model highlights the relationship between researcher wellness, study design, and institutional training and support responsibilities (Kumar & Cavallaro, 2017). Recent scholarship on researcher self-care also emphasizes recommendations including university trainings for research in fragile contexts, community discussions on ethical research, and financial support for debriefing and other post-research support (Baker, Bellemore & Morgan, 2023). I contribute to this growing area of my scholarship by sharing the strategies which personally benefited me and my mental health in working with IoT-mediated IPA victim survivors. My self-care work was rooted in spending time with friends and colleagues also doing work with tech abuse and tech abuse victim survivors. Building this network included emailing scholars I was citing to discuss their work, visiting University College London’s Gender & IoT project research group, and connecting with local experts working with victim survivors. Developing genuine, reciprocal relationships (i.e. informal book clubs, reading eachothers’ manuscript drafts) where we could vent and share challenges about doing this work was incredibly valuable. I encourage new researchers doing this work to develop these networks of community and friendship, even if they have not yet begun data collection. Show genuine commitment and curiosity about other scholars’ work. I found this to be the root of building the kinds of relationships where I could be authentic about the challenges of working with IoT- mediated IPA victim survivors and seek social support for myself. Additionally, I found value in seeking a regular therapist to specifically discuss the project every few weeks or months. I specifically sought out a therapist who had a PhD, had training in support patients with work-life balance, and who had self-identified expertise in 94 trauma-centered care. It was valuable to have a regular therapist established across stages of the project to check in with even when I was feeling okay. Next, an important element of self-care was focusing on positive impacts for participants. To accomplish this, I found it valuable to connect with and learn from professionals working directly with victim survivors. Learning from colleagues working with victim survivors in diverse contexts (research, policy, NGO’s, advocacy, healthcare) made visible knowledge and practice beyond the peer-reviewed canon. This expanded the perspectives I brought to the work and supported my ability to make meaningful connections beyond academic audiences. Finally, taking intentional breaks from the work was important to recharge. I found physically separating myself from my day-to-day was especially helpful. I accomplished this by periodically scheduling time to put down the work. I also tried to travel, even just to stay with friends or family for a few days, every couple months. Intentionally building into physical and mental separation helped me to recharge and bring my best to the project. Positionality Statement I approach this work as a (mostly) able-bodied, cisgender, gay, queer, adoptee, white woman from a middle-class Midwestern background. My life and the lives of people close to me have been indirectly and directly impacted by intimate and digital violence. In doing work with self-identified survivors of intimate abuse and domestic violence, I want to name that I do not identify as a violence and abuse survivor. My personally vested interest in this topic stemmed from several places. My interest in designing against intimate harms also stemmed from my work in higher education and student services. I lived in communities with and served as a first responder for undergraduate students. In this role, I was the first person many survivors shared their firsthand 95 experiences of stalking, intimate partner violence and other experiences of assault and harassment. Hearing stories from the source of these high rates of violence, along with the barriers and challenges of seeking institutional support alongside social stigma, inspired me to investigate this issue in the context of my own work on online communities and gender-based harassment. From that point, I developed my research program in emerging social computing technologies and harms in the context of intimate relationships. I am in a position of privilege in approaching work with communities impacted by tech abuse. My affiliation with a university affords authority and perceived legitimacy in accessing these communities. My communications and other output derived from this project, such as peer- reviewed manuscripts and lectures sponsored by academic institutions will probably be considered more carefully and supported (funding, marketing etc.) than a survivor sharing their stories in similar contexts. Further, in empathizing with firsthand experiences of intimate abuse, I do not have dependents or a job that requires certain physical proximity, further entanglements that would make seeking support if I were experiencing intimate violence more challenging. As a middle-class, white, mostly feminine presenting person, in engaging with and producing material for criminal justice perspectives and law enforcement, fears for my physical safety or facing discrimination based on my body are not concerns at the forefront of my mind. I have the privilege, should I so choose, of entering and exiting impacted communities at will. I considered how I am asking the participants, especially through the interviews, to relive traumatic experiences that are still impacting their lives every day. There is a further irony in the fact that I am recruiting participants and conducting the interviews using social computing devices which may very well be one and the same with the physical technology and day-to-day contexts they experienced abuse within. I have a responsibility that I believe goes beyond 96 institutional architectures (i.e., the IRB) to honor this willingness to give me access to these experiences demonstrated by the participants and work to keep their information safe from unwanted actors. I elaborate upon how this was put into practice in the methodology throughout the remaining sections of this Methods chapter. To this end, my goal is to keep my personal experiences and perspectives, particularly how my orientations situate me as an individual and as a group member in networks of social power, at the forefront of all elements of all stages the research process. I ground this way of knowing in all its possibilities, limitations, and opportunities for understanding Internet of Things-mediated intimate abuse and all forms of gender-based violence by critically considering perspectives beyond my own and challenging the biases and assumptions imbedded in the research method choices I made. To accomplish this goal, I engaged in several practices during the research process from brainstorming to data collection and now writing and analysis. I draw on standpoint epistemologies (Harding, 1992) to practice reflexivity “by identifying preconceptions brought into the project by the researcher, representing previous personal and professional experiences, pre-study beliefs about how things are and what is to be investigated, motivation and qualifications for exploration of the field, and perspectives and theoretical foundations related to education and interests” (Malterud, 2001, p.484). I draw upon McCorkel and Myers work to move past weak positionally by 1) continually revisiting my position at critical stages of the project and 2) as clearly and explicitly as I can connecting my position to the actual methodological decisions I made by “explicating how their [my] data, analyses, and conclusion were shaped by their [my] positionally” (McCorkel & Myers, 2003, p.10). I revisited this positionality statement after data collection and several points during analysis. A core component 97 of reflexive research practice is to revisit positionality, bringing new tensions and pre- occupations, as the work expands. Reflexivity was an on-going practice while conducting the parallel methodology. The next section outlines the first of the two parallel methodologies: the netnography study. Limitations I used semi-structured interviewing rather than narrative and storytelling methodologies. A goal of this study was to describe abuse experiences directly involving Internet of Things devices. Past studies on IoT have identified that everyday consumers are confused regarding the boundaries of what is or is not IoT (Garg, 2019; Page et al., 2018). Having a semi-structured interviewing protocol provided a clear definition of IoT for participants. This directed and focused their recollections around IoT devices specifically. This approach contributes a focused examination of how IoT intersect with other forms of intimate abuse and tech abuse. Semi- structured interviewing is appropriate for targeted theory-building around a specific topic (Kallio et al., 2016). Despite my interest in capturing the rich lived experiences of participants, I selected semi-structured interviewing to provide structure I felt necessary to 1) ensure participants had a basic understanding of what IoT was and center their recollections around relevant experiences and 2) accurately capture relevant experiences across all participants. The semi-structured interviewing template allowed me to capture the same core experiences related to IoT IPA and victim survivor support seeking across IoT IPA victim survivor experiences. This structure supports identifying theoretical areas to explore more deeply in future qualitative studies. Additionally, I used semi-structured interviewing so I could use modified interview protocol questions from other IPV and tech abuse inquiries. I modified interview protocol 98 questions from Leitão (2019a) to focus specifically on home-based IoT and IPA. I also modified questions from Campbell et al.’s interviews with general victim survivors of intimate abuse (2009) to focus on the role of IoT in their experiences of abuse and how the role of IoT changed support seeking efforts. In my future work, I plan to expand the findings from this project using multiple methodological approaches to further validate and expand my take-aways. First, future inquiries would benefit from considering narrative interviewing and other story-telling methodologies to further inform IoT IPA from the perspective of victims survivors. The semi-structured interview and netnography approach captures both the firsthand experience and social behavior surrounding IoT IPA. Building upon this project with a narrative interviewing approach with IoT IPA victim survivors would expand on the firsthand experiences of IoT IPA victim survivors. Narrative interviewing would be especially valuable for learning how to effectively translate insights into design (Golsteijn & Wright, 2013). Narrative and storytelling methods have also been evidenced to inspire and empower victim survivors to share their experiences (Dichter et al., 2022). Additionally, I plan to continue my longitudinal survey study on the prevalence of IoT IPA I started in 2021 (Knittel & Shillair, 2021). Finally, I also plan on further interview studies to capture the perspectives of domestic abuse support advocates in navigating cases of IoT IPA with their clients. Another limitation of this methodology is that early adopters of new computing technologies differ from people who aren’t early adopters (Munnukka, 2007). ‘Smart’ device adopters are more likely to be white, socioeconomically advantaged, and highly educated (Knittel & Shillair, 2020). One study of Internet of Things adoption in India found that men and the socioeconomically advantaged were more motivated to use Internet of Things devices 99 (Kasilingam & Krishna, 2022). Even in the past several years, IoT have become more ubiquitous (Nguyen & Simkin, 2017) and many classes of devices have become considerably less expensive. For example, the Amazon Alexa suite of devices begins at around $25 USD. But it is possible that a dataset centered on Internet of Things will favor early adopters. The interviewee sample favored young adults aged 21-25 and women (see Figure: Interview Study Demographics). The sample was racially/ethnically diverse, with approximately two thirds of the sample identifying as non-white. In the case of the netnography, it is difficult to identify demographic characteristics of users on Reddit.com and based on available data the platform overall is most popular with young adult men (Fiesler et al., 2018). Future studies would benefit from investigating additional demographic characteristics, such as socioeconomic status and attitudes towards Internet of Things. Individuals who would use IoT for intimate abuse likely differ in motivations from a typical new technology adopter. Investigating this dynamic further will support a richer understanding of the risk factors predicting IoT IPA. Next, there is likely a self-selection bias in play with the interview study. Victim survivors who have left an abuse situation, and thus are likely more comfortable with their home setting for an interview and have had time to process their experiences, may be more likely to be willing to participate in research, this manifested in the data. All 22 interview participants self- identified as having left the relationship in which the IoT IPA occurred. Future studies would benefit from specifically recruiting victim survivors currently actively experiencing IoT IPA. This type of population will likely identify different aspects of their firsthand experience of abuse. Future work should critically consider how to approach victim survivors actively experiencing IoT IPA to reveal richer insights for prevention and potential interventions. Finally, this inquiry sought to capture the spectrum and breadth of experiences of Internet 100 of Things-mediated intimate abuse. This inquiry did not capture how IoT IPA risk factors, lived experiences, and support-seeking present in historically marginalized communities. LGBTQ+ populations (including non-women), men, racial/ethnic communities within and beyond the United States, and people with disabilities may experience IoT IPA differently. Communities may face different social stigma in support seeking and other unique challenges. Research with these populations will be invaluable to connect (or challenge) the findings of this study within these unique social contexts. Conclusion To understand the risks and outcomes victim survivors space in emerging IoT-mediated intimate abuse contexts, I collected data from semi-structured interviews with self-identified victim survivors along with an online ethnography of Reddit forum r/relationshipadvice. I draw upon Kozinets netnographic methods guidebook (Kozinets, 2019). Netnography is an online ethnography protocol designed for doing ethnographic work with social media field sites. Identifying keywords was followed by identifying and examining potential field sites online. After identifying the Reddit.com online forum r/relationshipadvice as an appropriate field site, I describe the criteria for each thread’s inclusion in the final data set. Self-identified survivors of IoT-IPA residing in the state of Michigan were recruited using an online questionnaire. Participants participated in a Zoom interview with a protocol centered on their general experiences with IoT devices, their recollection of identifying and dealing with IoT IPA carried about by their partner’s behavior, and their support-seeking activities. The section concludes with a discussion of the bottom-up and abductive techniques used to analyze the interview transcripts. I used both r/relationshipadvice and semi-structured interviewing as this project was 101 centered on capturing foundational descriptive data about IoT-mediated IPA, lived risks and experiences of victim survivors, and barriers and opportunities for support-seeking. The relative anonymity of r/relationshipadvice combined with the targeted questioning of the semi-structured interviews were selected to capture depth and breadth of experiences of harm. Additionally, I intentionally selected semi-structured interviews in favor of storytelling and narrative interviewing methodologies. I did this so that I would have consistent questions, and thus basis for my data, in the interview even across diverse and unique experiences of IoT-IPA. My goal was for the interviews, and the basis I used to develop the interview protocol, was to directly interface with established models of intimate partner abuse and support seeking strategies. Semi- structured interviewing was appropriate to comprehensively align my data collection with established standards in health care and community advocacy organizations surrounding tech abuse. Then, I describe the bottom-up qualitative coding procedures applied to both the interview transcripts and forum transcripts. The section concludes with a summary of the final dataset and final second order codebook. These methodologies were directly informed by feminist epistemologies drawn from feminist human computer interaction scholarship and related interdisciplinary social science work. The final datasets, consisting of 22 approximately hour- long interviews and 206 forum discussion posts, were analyzed using bottom-up and abductive techniques. After reviewing the initial bottom-up codes, revisiting the data, and identifying broader themes through memo-ing and reflecting, I generated 23 second level codes from each field site’s dataset which identify consistent patterns in the data about IoT-mediated IPA. A total of 46 codes were used to develop the findings which make up Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Finally, I discuss commitments drawn from feminist/critical human computer interaction 102 and feminist technoscience scholarship are discussed. The feminist commitments I ascribed to in doing this work are: 1) centering the firsthand, lived perspectives of historically ignored and disenfranchised communities 2) developing the netnographic and interview protocols with trauma-centered practices and 3) past efforts and on-going plans for community-engaged and activist contributions of the project. The next section of the Methods centers on positionality. This section draws upon standpoint epistemologies (Harding, 1992) to interrogate my relative positions of power and access as the author of this work and sole data collector and analyst. This consists of my positionality statement and a discussion of points of tension and reflexivity throughout elements of doing this project. Reflexivity is an on-going process. Thus, this section is intended to capture my experiences and reflections where I grappled with tensions and moments of power made visible (McCorkel & Myers, 2003) in completing the dissertation and it serves as the start of an on-going conversation. I conclude Chapter 3 with a discussion of the limitations of my empirical approach. This project does not contribute a novel approach in terms of the methodologies used. I draw upon clearly defined semi-structured interview and online ethnography methodologies. The novel contribution of this project is the topic and focus on understanding IoT IPA victim survivors’ experiences in their own words. To my knowledge, there is also limited empirical research which examining how victim survivors of IoT IPA navigate adverse experiences and outcomes. Using semi-structured interviews and netnography allowed me to capture the stories of IoT IPA victim survivors in their own words and communities. Using semi-structured interviews and netnography builds upon existing work in several ways. First, this approach contributes directly to understanding how abusive actors use IoT as 103 tools of harm and what role IoT-mediated activities play in this harm. The interviews center on identifying how victim survivors experienced abuse facilitated by IoT interfaces. The netnography captures how victim survivors tell the stories of their partner’s abusive activities with IoT. This contributes data on how victim survivors identify IoT IPA, what they identify as most problematic and harmful, and how they relay these experiences to seek social support. Next, the interview and netnography approach is effective in identifying implicit and explicit practices related to IoT abuse. The interviews capture how victim survivors experience IoT used in secret, without their knowledge or consent. It captures how victim survivors came to recognize non-consensual practices and data flows as a component of abuse. The netnography further captures how, even when victim survivors do not use words like “consent”, their experiences of violation and harm demonstrate the boundaries of their expectations for IoT and the way their abusive partner uses it. These combined approaches capture the escalation of abuse in intimate relationships, including how IoT victim survivors initially consent to using transform into tools of harm in the wake of increasing abuse. Finally, interview and netnography make visible the multifaceted ways IoT IPA victim survivors seek support for their experiences. Interviews capture the internal process of support seeking, including perceived stigma and other challenges. The netnography captures how IoT IPA victim survivors rely on community networks to make sense of their experiences and take steps towards support seeking. 104 CHAPTER 4: THE INTERNET OF THINGS AND MISUSE FORENSICS Introduction IoT’s dependence on sensors (cameras, microphones, motion detectors, and so on) allow abusers to connect to victim survivors beyond their own physical presence. This paradigm shift introduces new challenges for both supporting survivors and understanding how the use of these technologies intersect with the cycle of violence. Victim survivors reveal how in most cases of IoT-mediated intimate partner abuse, technology being used in the home and in everyday routines is implemented without the knowledge of the victim survivor. Many IoT technologies are integrated into everyday devices, designed to be physically small and innocuous, and operate wirelessly over home Wi-Fi networks (Alaa et al., 2017). Surveillance capacities are effectively misappropriated by abusers to surreptitiously surveil victims without their knowledge or consent. Victim survivors of Internet of Things- mediated intimate partner abuse (IoT IPA) reveal how these technologies further entrench power disparities between the victim survivor and abuse. Unlike traditional intimate partner abuse, discovering and responding to IoT IPA requires recognizing something is wrong when the roles of devices is obfuscated. After recognizing that something is wrong, victim survivors work to figure out how specifically it is wrong, an essential process for responding to and seeking support for intimate abuse. The physical access these devices provide for secretive, automized data collection about everyday activities in the home reveal that IoT design sensibilities oriented for convenience and efficiency are also convenient and efficient for misuse. IoT IPA victim survivors undertake a misuse forensics process rooted in victim survivors’ amplified awareness 105 of their abuser’s behavior and critical examination of their knowledge and activities which deviate from expectations. Misuse forensics expands upon existing concepts of how intimate abuse victim survivors anticipate and respond to abuse. First, an evidenced phenomena of victim survivors experiencing the cycle of violence is hypervigilance. Hypervigilance is a cognitive and neurobiological trauma response associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Cantor & Price, 2007). A meta- analysis of peer-reviewed studies published between 2000 and 2019 found that approximately 16% of people who experienced trauma, including intimate partner abuse victim survivors, met criteria for a PTSD diagnosis (Oakley et al., 2021). Around 15-20% aligns with studies focused on intimate partner abuse victim survivors (Dutton et al., 2006; Sanderson, 2008) PTSD in domestic abuse survivors manifests as amplified attention towards the behavior of an abusive actor. Victim survivors report highly amplified attention to relevant environmental stimuli centered on identifying forthcoming violence and attempts to escape. Victim survivors describe the anxiety and exhaustion of feeling constantly on alert for potential threats from their partner (Sanderson, 2008). Thus, effective support for domestic abuse victim survivors involves removing victim survivors from spaces where they are at risk from physically interacting with their partner (Baker et al., 2010), particularly if they have, through their highly detailed knowledge and expectations regarding their abusive partner, identified escalation as imminent. Subsequently, providing comprehensive support resources center on material and financial resources including housing, healthcare, and legal support (Warwick-Booth & Coan, 2022). IoT IPA victim survivors undertake misuse forensics to identify how IoT-mediated intimate abuse is taking place. Due to the obfuscated and inconspicuous nature of most IoT devices, connecting abusers’ surprising knowledge of victim survivors to physical devices is not easy or 106 obvious. The data from this study demonstrates that victim survivors uptake similar practices over time to gather evidence, interpret findings, and actively seek support and respond to the harassment, manipulation, and other violence carried out against them via these devices. The misuse forensics process demonstrates how the impetus of responsibility for recognizing and addressing IoT IPA falls upon the shoulders of survivors. Additionally, misuse forensics exemplifies how IoT remove the necessity of physical proximity for violence and abuse to continue, adding challenges and ambiguities to effective safety planning. Finally, misuse forensics demonstrates how IoT IPA is only visible and trackable via patterns of behavior over time which are only recognizable through highly contextual knowledge of behavior, environments, and daily routines. This take-away contends that the evidence and lived experiences of survivors’ themselves must be taken seriously as evidence in identifying and responding to IoT IPA. The misuse forensics process demonstrates how victim survivors serve as the driver of harm recognition and accountability for the consequences wrought by IoT-mediated abusers. Survivors must identify and then advocate for themselves based on their evidence for anything to change. First, an overview of the misuse forensics concept and how the process is exemplified in the data is discussed. First, the entire misuse forensics process is summarized via the story of one participant, Alyssa. Next, the motivation for the misuse forensics naming convention is outlined. Then, the three stages of misuse forensics evidenced in the data are defined. The first stage, suspecting, is triggered when victim survivors first notice that their abuser possesses surprising knowledge about them: knowledge that they materially should not be able to possess. The second stage of misuse forensics is processing evidence and considering explanations. Victim survivors carefully observe the environment and their partner’s behavior to build their mental 107 evidence boards and, with each new piece of dis/confirming information, fit it into working narratives of how exactly abusers are misusing technology to access their personal information to identify patterns and probable cause. The final stage, taking action, is when victim survivors externalize their internal sensemaking and investigation process after confirming the details of the on-going IoT IPA by confronting the abuser and/or seeking external support to remove themselves from the abuse setting. Then, the chapter discusses the cyclical nature of misuse forensics, how victim survivors will repeat the three stages in the face of novel technologies being introduced to the abuse ecosystem. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of implications of misuse forensics for human-centered design and domestic abuse advocates. Misuse forensics is the process of noticing, identifying, and responding that IoT IPA victim survivors undertake to identify, confirm, and respond to the unique challenges that IoT IPA pose through device invisibility, autonomy, and obfuscation. Misuse forensics is a new terminology introduced by this dissertation. Misuse forensics captures the unique and distinct process IoT IPA victim survivors undertake to recognize and respond to experiences of abuse. Misuse forensics happens because of specific technical capacities of IoT in the home. First, IoT support invisibility of knowledge. These devices are automized, innocuous, and operate remotely. Abusers can conveniently access data including audio/video, movements within and in/out of the home, and other intimate details about victim survivors virtually 24 hours per day. Next, IoT obfuscate physical evidence of non-consensual monitoring and recording. Often, abusers own the devices and set them up. Victim survivors have no recourse to access what the devices are recording or have a complete understanding of how they function. Finally, IoT IPA is primarily evidenced through secondary cues. It is common for victim survivors to never see or directly interact with a misused device. Thus, victim survivors almost universally discover 108 misuse is occurring via secondhand cues, such as their abuser possessing highly private, personal knowledge about them which should be impossible unless technology was being used in secret. Finally, distinguishing between innocuous everyday behavior and the potential of IoT IPA requires detailed, contextual knowledge of the social situation. Without discounting the capacities these devices support for ease and access of abusers, victim survivors repeatedly, explicitly identify IoT IPA as a social choice and a problem with the abuser that must be addressed as such. Victim survivors were overwhelmingly of the opinion that abusers, regardless of the tools available to them, technical or otherwise, would probably find a way to harass, belittle, and attack their intimate partners. The participatory design-focused questions centered on envisioning an alternative IoT, coalescing around a resounding powerful opinion of the participants: it is predominantly the responsibility of technology users to make prosocial decisions with technology. While survivors recognize the value of potential technical security measures (as I will describe further in the chapter Social Support Seeking and Personal Protective Strategies), victim survivors described IoT misuse in terms of their abuser’s behavior, violations of trust, and misalignments or blatant violations in the social contract of their intimate relationship. They then shared resiliency practices against each identified form of misuse, with each victim survivor following a similar pattern toward safety. Even if they aren’t sure of what devices have been used, they know there has been some kind of violation of trust that must be addressed, either by changing their own behavior or through confrontation with their abuser. Often a piece of surprising knowledge demonstrated by the abuser confirms a trust violation has occurred. 109 Misuse forensics reveals how IoT-mediated intimate abuse is construed as predominantly a social violation and choice by the abuser rather than a technical foible. Victim survivors use their access to and knowledge of the social and physical context to identify and respond to violations. The complex process of misuse forensics is necessitated by three core attributes of IoT-mediated intimate abuse: 1) the invisibility of knowledge, 2) the invisibility of physical evidence, and 3) the central importance of secondhand cues. A core violation of Internet of Things-mediated intimate partner abuse (IoT IPA) is that, in virtually every example in this dataset, Internet of Things devices were being used without the victim-survivor’s knowledge. Whether it’s a location tracking peripheral, microphones/cameras, remote access to iMessage or other accounts, or electronic door locks, survivors are unaware these devices are being used in any capacity. Discovery of these devices being used to surveil everyday movements and routines often occurs purely by chance. Sometimes, the victim survivor spontaneously comes across the physical device by chance during everyday activities such as cleaning the house or taking their car to the mechanic. They report being surprised to find a mysterious camera or microphone hidden in a flower vase or behind the entertainment center. Finding a device in this manner leads to inevitable questions: how did this get here? What’s it for? Who’s responsible? In the case of these survivors, through their knowledge of their home, their everyday routine, and their abuser’s behavior, they discover that devices must be being misused in some way without ever seeing or directly interacting with it themselves. To this end, the second, more common outcome of recognizing IoT IPA is occurring is that a physical device is never discovered, nor the exact parameters of its use. It is extremely common for victim-survivors to never directly interact with the device being misused themselves. Even after learning about the access these devices afforded, such as through 110 confrontations with the abuser or finding images and audio recordings of themselves posted on the Internet, often they never have a full picture of what exactly the device(s) collected, for how long, or what access the abuser may still have. This trend of identifying and contextualizing firsthand experiences with IoT IPA without tactile engagement with the actual accused devices raises a critical question: How, then, can individuals speak to the nature and outcomes of the IoT misuse they experienced if they have never seen or held the device being used to carry out the misuse? IoT IPA survivors undergo a cognitive process of identifying surveillance related IoT IPA through secondhand cues and information. Survivors almost universally discover that device- mediated misuse is occurring by recognizing that something abnormal is going on based on knowledge that their abuser has that is surprising, unexpected, and/or confusing. In other words, misuse is discovered through recognizing that abusers possessed knowledge of the survivor that they logically should not. This surprising knowledge of the victim survivor is viewed as materially impossible for the abuser to possess. Through observing the behavior of their abuser (what they say, what they know, how they behave, and so on), combined with their intimate knowledge of daily routines, suspecting arises through recognizing knowledge about their intimate partner which is surprising. Often, this suspecting is only made salient after spontaneously discovering the involvement of hidden IoT devices. Discovering the role of technology leads to victim survivors retroactively linking their initial feelings of suspecting and the belief that something wrong is going on to the capacities of the implicated device. The invisibility of knowledge, invisibility of physical evidence, and the role of secondhand cues in revealing breaches and prompting suspecting make the misuse forensics process of analysis and investigation necessary for victim survivors to explicate the scope of 111 misuse and respond. In tangibly undertaking this process, misuse forensics draws from participant experiences to define the three-stage process victim survivors undertake in navigating their experiences of IoT IPA where they 1) become suspicious of the abusers’ behavior and soft- launch the investigation, 2) analyze evidence, consider potential explanations and determining misuse, and 3) begin taking action such as manipulating a discovered device (e.g. moving objects to obscure line of sight from cameras), reaching out for help from a friend (e.g. to problem-solve new cybersecurity practices), and confronting the abuser directly about the possibility of misuse (e.g. through direct conversation and questioning). Naming Misuse Forensics ‘Misuse’ centers the primary binary categorization and evaluation of ‘misuse’ or ‘not misuse’, as told in the terms and agency of victim survivors. Not obfuscating or minimizing the abuse carried out with these devices, misuse forensics centers victim survivor categorization to grapple with the fuzzy ontology of tech-mediated abuse (Emami-Naeini et al., 2020) which is still being categorized and understood in the face of rapid technological change and incomplete cybersecurity responses from researchers and practitioners (Verma et al., 2022). The categorization of appropriate or inappropriate use of IoT must be built from the perspectives of participants: what they classify as good or bad, harmful or acceptable, made them feel happy or sad, and so on. Victim survivors also repeatedly described their ideas surrounding using IoT in ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ ways. Thus, ‘Misuse’ centers the development understanding and expertise of IoT IPA in victim survivors, including the spectrum of experiences of harm reported by victim survivors, whether they fit into extant definitions of abuse or not. The word ‘Abuse’ or ‘Survivor’ may signal identifying with the phrase ‘victim survivor’ in broader cultural discourses surrounding social and legal responses to intimate and sexual abuse, such as the #MeToo 112 movement (Hsu & Yeh, 2017). I do not want to alienate people who could benefit from considering how misuse forensics may help them understand their intimate experiences with technology even if they would not identify themselves as a victim/survivor. ‘Misuse’ is an intentional etymological choice to recognize that intimate abuse is one category of the many kinds of interpersonal harms IoT can play a role in. ‘Misuse’ broadens the scope of experiences which could be captured and supported by researchers and professionals. ‘Forensics’ designates that a crime has occurred and must be investigated. The US Department of Justice sponsored handbook for crime scene investigations describes forensics as collection and analysis of physical evidence from the scene of a crime or crimes (Technical Working Group on Crime Scene Investigation, 2000). The DoJ outlines core sequential stages of forensic investigations, summarized as: arriving to the scene and emergency response, documenting the scene and chronicling evidence, initial review of the evidence, followed by creating an analysis plan, assigning investigators, and related logistical and record-keeping activities (Technical Working Group on Crime Scene Investigation, 2000). The process outlined in the handbook generatively mirrors the stages identified by participants, now conceived as misuse forensics: with core stages 1) suspecting 2) processing evidence and considering explanations and 3) taking action. To figure out what exactly is going on regarding their firsthand experiences of IoT IPA, victim survivors engage in an investigation that mirrors this formal definition of forensics. First, victim survivors identify that a crime has been committed. The stimulus for these investigations often begins with abusers demonstrating surprising, private knowledge about the victim survivors they should not possess. What is unclear to victim survivors is the details - the where, the how, the when - of abuser’s gaining access to this information. This assumption echoes the misuse forensics process as found 113 in the data, where victim survivors assume their abuser will leave some kind of evidence. Like an investigator arriving to the scene after a crime has occurred, victim survivors know a violation has occurred but must investigate to confirm the details of the tools and technologies used to gather their private information. Directly connecting victim survivor’s practices to legal forensics processes and definitions centers the legitimacy and relevance of considering user-centered ‘forensics’ in identifying and addressing the unique considerations of IoT IPA. Further, ‘Forensics’ highlights how victim survivors are operating within an extreme power differential. In all cases in the dataset, abusers are the ones who purchase, set up, and maintain user-interface authorized access to IoT devices and direct their misuse. Victim survivors rarely have direct access to the device or the contents of the data they collect. Thus, identifying abuse depends on their careful investigation of the environment and their abuser, while simultaneously attempting to avoid further scrutiny and not tip off their abuser to the investigation. Finally, the use of ‘Forensics’ centers that a crime has taken place. As victim survivors bear the brunt of negative consequences from this surveillance and violence, ‘Forensics’ legitimizes how IoT-mediated violations are part of the patterns of criminal behavior which constitute domestic violence in the State of Michigan. Importantly, the use of ‘forensics’ here engages and extends conversations computing contexts that emphasize the assessment of crimes, identification of perpetrators, and remediation of technical vulnerabilities. Digital forensics refers to technical procedures for identifying, collecting, and analyzing digital artifacts evidencing a crime, with common examples including bank fraud and hacking corporate databases (Årnes, 2017). The Cybercrime Convention outlines methods, rules, and procedures for collecting digital evidence in relation to a crime (Årnes, 2017). Similarly, a subset of digital 114 forensics called cloud forensics centers on identifying illicit activity in cloud-based architectures (Shah & Malik, 2013). Recent scholarship in feminist computing has used digital forensics techniques to critically examine user data privacy, such as Johnson et al.’s examination of data storage procedures and cybersecurity vulnerabilities in social media applications (Johnson et al., 2022). Misuse forensics expands the concept of digital forensics beyond these historically technical, distributed investigations to the material and social reality of victim survivors physically investigating and identifying misused devices in their homes and other intimate spaces. Misuse forensics also shares epistemological DNA with infrastructure studies from the fields of Science & Technology Studies. Star’s work examining ethnographic research’s application to understanding information technology infrastructures is centered on how this approach can reveal the boundary spaces and “fringes” of access, power, and control in information technology and impacts for social groups (Star, 1990). I draw on this critical perspective in identifying and interpreting misuse forensics in the data set to demonstrate the consequential nature of categorization, invisibility of infrastructure and breakdown. When the physicality of IoT surveillance is obfuscated or incompletely understand by victim survivor ‘investigators’, relying on the truth of their own knowledge and experiences, their efforts through misuse forensics identify technical capacities and create a platform of recognition to seek out support resources. Alyssa’s Story: Demonstrating Misuse Forensics in Context The following section details an archetypical example of a survivor moving through the three stages of Misuse forensics. This chronological narrative follows the details of one interviewed survivor’s experiences and demonstrates the decision-making processes that underlie 115 identifying and responding to concealed IoT misuse. After walking through Alyssa’s story as an overview of misuse forensics as a concept in action, the next sections expand further upon each of the misuse forensics stages. These sections elaborate on patterns and trends of the challenges victim survivors and how they make decisions about their experiences of IoT IPA. Additionally, they explore the non-linear nature of misuse forensics that many survivors go through in their personal situations. Often, IoT IPA does not just occur once. After one instance of IoT IPA is considered and confirmed, participants describe a several weeks to several month refractory period in which the abuser appeared to abstain from abusive behaviors including IoT tracking. However, after this period, the abuser began to start secretly surveilling their partner with a new device(s) discovered later by the victim survivor. Thus, misuse forensics often develops in a cynical process, with victim survivors revisiting the stages suspecting, processing evidence and considering explanations, and taking action as new problems and forms of misuse from their partner arise. Alyssa shared her firsthand experience of their “former partner” who accessed video cameras and microphones via their apartment’s Alexa interface to monitor Alyssa without her knowledge. In recounting her story, Alyssa’s recollection centered on how she recognized her partner’s suspicious behavior, investigated the situation, and eventually confronted their abuser about the situation. Alyssa did not initially suspect that her partner was misusing any technology, as she shared at the beginning of the interview: “I don't know how it happened. […] So I thought everything was just normal.” As Alyssa identified, she initially was not suspicious about any kind of unwanted technology use going on in their home. Alyssa described the change towards their initial feeling 116 of suspecting that something may be going on based on a new pattern of behavior that emerged in their partner. Alyssa described her partner started asking them unusual questions about their physical activities, such as what times she was coming and going from their apartment: “But so, after some time, she [abuser] started asking me some questions like about, where were you? What were you doing at this place? What were you doing at this place at this time? So I was wondering, How did she know exactly what I was doing? “ Alyssa described how “after some time”, their partner started asking them repeated questions about their daily movements in and out of their home. Suspecting for Alyssa began when she started "wondering” about how this person could possibly be aware of the precise details of the periods of times they were or weren’t at home. Alyssa’s partner did not live with them or near them, so they shouldn’t have been able to see him coming or going or out and about in town. Per many examples of suspecting in the dataset, Alyssa described the initial stages of suspecting as being marked by repeatedly questioning themselves - how did they know this information? Where did they get this information? “How did she know exactly what I was doing?” Alyssa progressed from initial suspecting to stage two processing evidence and considering explanations. Suspecting prompts a heightened sense of awareness for the day-to- day expectations of the everyday environment in the home and the behavior of their abusive partner. Victim survivors describe paying close attention to what their partner knew and how they acted leading up to discovering technology misuse was occurring. Alyssa described continued examples of her partner questioning her about Alyssa’s daily movements and conversations she had with friends and family in the home. Alyssa’s partner should not have been privy to any of these discussions. Processing evidence occurred for Alyssa, not in the case of physical evidence, but through repeatedly thinking about the evidence he gained from their 117 partner’s suspicious behavior. Alyssa described repeatedly playing over their conversations in her head and trying to put the pieces together of how their partner could have this intimate knowledge. Building on this cognitive work, Alyssa describes Testing Explanations through considering multiple potential explanations as to how his partner may have this knowledge, such as talking to her friends without her knowledge. Part of the challenge in addressing this type of subterfuge is that often, any level of clarity and certainty about what was going on only occurs in retrospect, often after tech abuse has been ‘confirmed’ after discovering a hidden device or enlisting an expert. As Alyssa considered the potential explanation her partner was accessing this surprising knowledge about her mundane activities and person details by talking to her close friends. However, upon further investigation, she realized that her Alexa voice-activated smart home system may be a co-conspirator. Her girlfriend was a registered user on his Amazon account. Alyssa investigated and went on to describe: “She could use the Alexa through maybe the fridges and the lights, she could access my conversations with my parents and maybe my friends. So in which she could come and tell me everything an, she could slip up some things. So I was talking with my friends or my family. And I was wondering also what is happening. She could access my voice notes and everything through the Alexa and the Google Alexa Application.“ Thus, Alyssa describes processing evidence and considering explanations in retrospect, after he had learned that her partner had not only accessed his Alexa smart home system to listen to his conversations with friends and family. Alyssa learned they had purchased and installed an additional camera of their own on the network in his bedroom without Alyssa’s knowledge. It is difficult for participants to separate their sense-making process from the fact that they are now aware technology was being misused. But, following the thread of their narratives reveals the ways in which victim survivors closely examined their partners’ behavior and knowledge for 118 contradictions and confirming evidence before technology misuse was confirmed, but only after they had an initial reason to be suspicious. Often, during this investigation period, processing evidence and considering explanations looks like informally testing and experimenting with what knowledge their partner has as situations they shouldn’t have firsthand knowledge about arise. For example, Alyssa describes how she had her cousin over for a surprise visit, which her then partner didn’t know about. “So this came out when my cousin visited me and she [former partner] was making sure okay, she was a female, and so this she when my cousin visited and we had we spent time together the whole day and after she had gone my partner came over. She came over and confronted about the event.” Here, Alyssa describes her partner coming over immediately after her cousin left as suspicious behavior. At this point, Alyssa had considered how her home Wi-Fi network and/or personal smart home devices may be being accessed by his partner. She used the devices for home security purposes. She goes onto to describe further evidence supporting this explanation during the confrontation: “She [former partner] was she was not aware in the first place of my cousin so she thought it was maybe another girl who I brought over and so she came and she lost it so suddenly… I was wondering how did she manage to access all this so we had a rough patch about it. We argued, in my case, about how she was accessing [this information] and [how] she was in her case was like knowing I got another girl in the apartment. So we argued, argued and later on I found out that she had access to me, to my cameras and she had connected into my system to my cameras and she also inserted another camera in my room.” In this example, Alyssa’s former partner confronted them about their cousin visiting. As Alyssa described, the confrontation was sparked by the fact that their former partner didn’t know who their cousin was. So, the former partner assumed the girl they saw on the cameras in their house was a love interest of Alyssa’s and that they were being cheated on. When the former partner arrived at the apartment right after the cousin left, the resulting altercation led Alyssa to 119 move from processing evidence and considering explanations to taking action about confirming some kind of technology misuse was going on, Taking action happens when the victim survivor takes moves from considering explanations and taking an active step(s) towards figuring out what’s going on. This can look like going to a trusted friend or family member for support. This can look like physically discovering a hidden device in the home, confirming that what they were suspecting about illicit IoT use was in fact occurring. In the case of Alyssa, the confrontation about their cousin, which the abuser initiated led, to her taking action about their situation. Alyssa’s abuser, after some verbal pressing, admitted to having accessed Alyssa’s Alexa and connected devices, including adding a camera only they knew about to her bedroom. “Oh yeah, well of course where we had we had to after the confrontation we had to take a break about it and sort out things. Yeah, we took a break and after some time she came and apologized about it so I had to settle things but I had to learn about the previous intuition about not trusting my cameras in my apartment. We don't live together but since you [former partner] had generated access to the cameras in my apartment and inserted another camera in my apartment after … we had a rough patch about it but we had to sort out and after we tried okay we went on to the maybe the IT expert and sorted the issue.“ Alyssa went on further to describe that, despite having “sorted the issue” with “the IT expert”, eventually Alyssa and her former partner broke up due to a lack of trust in the relationship that Alyssa deemed irreparable. Alyssa described how, even after these efforts to eliminate this use of the technology in their relationship and restore trust, they were not able to recover in a way that was satisfactory to Alyssa. Cycle of Misuse Forensics Alyssa’s story also reflects the cyclical nature of misuse forensics. After initially initial suspecting, victim survivors carefully Process Evidence and Test Potential Explanations before identifying tech abuse and developing a plan for taking action. Victim survivors move through 120 this process sequentially, progressing from complete unawareness of incomplete knowledge of how technology is being used by their partner in non-consensual aways to taking direct action and seeking support. However, unfortunately, IoT IPA is not typically a one-off situation. Thus, the stages of Misuse forensics are often cyclical in nature and can be repeated in the face of new abuse methodologies. Taking action typically does not mean that victim survivors are done engaging in Misuse forensics. Participants also described ‘restarting’ misuse forensics when abusers implement new- to-their-situation devices and IoT misuse techniques, necessitating a new process of becoming suspicious, investigating, and responding. The cyclical nature of this process was evidenced in the interview protocol. My interview protocol specifically interrogated participant’s full history of IoT IPA experiences. In contrast, r/relationshipadvice users appear to use the platform to solicit targeted advice/support for singular incidents. These users did not share as many specific details about every incident related to IoT. Based upon the interview study, victim survivors re- enter the Misuse forensics process typically after a confrontation about IoT misuse has already occurred. Often, victim survivors will move through the stages of Misuse forensics much more quickly now that there is a precedent of tech abuse in their relationship. Interviewee Alyssa (he/him) describes how he became suspicious that his partner was using surveillance again: “I had to settle things but I had to learn about the previous intuition about trusting my cameras in my apartment. Maybe we don't live together but since you had generated access to the cameras in my apartment maybe to insert another camera in my apartment…” - Alyssa As Alyssa describes further, at this point, they had broken up with their girlfriend and moved out. However, based upon “the previous intuition” from their partner misusing their smart home system during their relationship, they were suspicious that their ex-girlfriend may have still “generated access” or “insert another camera” even after their confrontation. This precedent for 121 mistrusting the home camera system lowered the thresholds to trigger suspecting, led to Alyssa processing evidence and considering explanations by re-examining their apartment for any hidden cameras, and taking action to confirm their ex-girlfriend no longer had access. Alyssa’s story again highlights the important take-away that victim survivors’ experiences of suspecting and noticing suspicious behavior become especially meaningful in their memory only after they have been contextualized with the confirmation that technology was being used in surprising and undesired ways. In other words, ‘making sense’ of what made them suspicious, and the evidence they collected when thinking through potential explanations, are made clear after technology misuse has been made visible. Alyssa shifted towards processing evidence and considering explanations after making the connection between their partner’s knowledge and their home Amazon system, and shifted to taking action after discovering their partner was using a hidden camera to spy on them and their cousin and accuse them of cheating. Alyssa’s story highlights the major components of misuse forensics that many IoT IPA survivors undertake due to the nature of technology’s misuse being so often concealed until happenstance or conflict brings their usage to light. The remaining discussion builds upon this case study summary and dives deeper into the details of each stage of misuse forensics via further examples of victim survivor experiences. Each stage is defined in terms of how victim survivors describe their thoughts and behavior, their motivations for their decisions, and examples of the kinds of IoT IPA misuse that accompany the investigation process. The participants experiences motivate that misuse forensics begins through a lack of clarity in devices potentially being misused and the full extent of unwanted surveillance and other harms they offer. The invisibility of knowledge and physical evidence, alongside a reliance on secondhand cues to evaluate how violations have taken place, place the impetus of abuse recognition and 122 reconciliation on victim survivors, driven by misuse forensics. Placing this impetus of investigation and accountability on victim survivors further entrenches power differentials in abusive relationships and highlight shortcomings of the IoT model of consent and information access. Misuse Forensics Stage 1: Suspecting In ‘traditional’ cases of intimate partner abuse, victim survivors have a clear understanding of the boundaries of physical and interpersonal threats and risks. Many victim survivors face substantial barriers in leaving an abusive relationship due to physical threats, socioeconomic factors, legal concerns, fears of safety and stability for their children and other family members, among other barriers. Thus, coping skills for managing the day-to-day threats and harms of living with an abuser become part of victim survivors day-to-day. The suspecting stage of misuse forensics is defined by the survivor becoming aware of knowledge their abuser possesses about them. This knowledge is evaluated as surprising, impossible, and a violation of personal privacy. Suspecting is a prerequisite to consider misuse is occurring. In this first stage, victim survivors recognize a mismatch between what their partner could feasibly know about their daily activities and interactions with technology and what they demonstrate they know. This mismatch triggers feelings of surprise, upset, anger, confusion, stress, and suspecting. Internet of Things devices and capabilities challenge many of the strategies victim survivors use to recognize and avoid abuse. Usually, violence is obvious to the person experiencing it. But in the case of IoT IPA, how abusers are gaining knowledge about their survivor to exert control and domination is unclear. Victim survivors question their own sanity (Bowles, 2018). Doubting perceptions of reality in facing abuse is not unique to IoT IPA victim survivors. Lying, gaslighting, and manipulation used to downplay the severity and 123 legitimacy of abusive behaviors is employed by intimate abusers (Outlaw, 2009). The presence of IoT introduce new variables in victim survivors’ identifying and responding to harm. Victim survivors can only recognize that IoT-mediated surveillance is an explanation for their current reality if they know technology is implicated in the harassment or manipulation. Suspecting is the internal emotional experience that drives recognizing Internet of Things- mediated abuse may be occurring. Suspecting Triggered by Surprising Knowledge Victim survivors describe their initial suspecting related to technology misuse, alongside recounting their firsthand experience of what they were noticing and thinking about when becoming suspicious, as a feeling or an emotion. When their partner does or says something that they don’t expect or just seems off, victim survivors describe a visceral, emotional, and physical reaction of violation and privacy breach. Most victim survivors describe this reaction using emotion-related words and metaphorical language. Participant Connor’s description of their initial suspecting towards their partner captures what happens when suspecting is being triggered: “I think my raised eyebrows, I raised eyebrows. It was like I was so paranoid about this and because this was something I didn't expect.” Connor Connor is responding here to an interview question asking participants to walk through what they were thinking when they first started thinking that something related to their intimate partner using technology in unwanted ways might be going on. Connor responded by describing their reaction to their partner questioning them about their daily activities. Connor described this questioning as unusually highly detailed and specific about their day-to-day activities. They recognized this event via what they called “raised eyebrows.” Connor said their gut reaction to this behavior from their partner led to “raised eyebrows”, an automatic reaction they identified as 124 their first moment of realization something was going on. They went on to describe their “raised eyebrows” and feeling “paranoid” as due to this knowledge their partner had about them being “something I didn’t expect.” Surprise and defied expectations trigger suspecting for Connor. Similarly, participant Kate describes curiosity about how their partner had access to similar personal information: “I realized that there are some things that I do when I'm just alone that my partner will ask me about them. I think I felt curious how he knew about all those situations that are happening.” Katie Katie is describing how she initially became suspicious something was going on when her partner would comment on her activities while she was home alone. Kate described feeling “curious how he knew about all those situations.” She was surprised he knew the specific details from when she was home alone. Because of this, she was not expecting him or anyone else to know what she was up to. As Kate went on to describe, this curiosity prompted her to consider that some kind of device may be being used to monitor her. Kate went on to describe this curiosity prompting her to investigate the house and discovering a camera hidden in one of her flower vases. She later went on to destroy the camera and confront the abuser. In addition to mundane activities in the home, suspecting is often triggered in relation to the abuser’s intimate knowledge of movements in or out of the home. Frequently, victim survivors will describe a change in their routine, such as bringing over a friend, as prompting the knowledge mismatch revealed by their abuser that sparks these initial feelings of suspecting: “Yeah, like, he [abuser] had this apartment. So like, he used to have a key and I also have a key. So like, I also noticed that he has a CCTV, in his apartments, like, maybe if I come in when he's not there. So I didn't know I didn't know it [that he had the CCTV] just the other day, I came with my friend and he was not there. And he has never told me that he had been in that apartment. […] So I told my friend, let's like, like, we were going somewhere and I had to take something real quick. So I told him, we got together I get that thing. Then we go where we're going. So I happened to notice some changes … some changes with my boyfriend the next day. And I was wondering, like what happened and 125 yesterday we were just okay. So that's how I noticed something fishy. Something fishy, because how did they know? How did he know I came with my friend like that?” - Tracy Tracy’s suspecting was being prompted by her bringing a male friend over to her partner’s house on their way to meet up with another friend to go out on the town for the evening. Her partner wasn’t home at the time, and, to Tracy’s knowledge, she nor her friend ever mentioned the brief visit to her partner. When Tracy spoke to her boyfriend the next day, rather than directly saying something like ‘I saw you on the cameras’, Tracy described her observation of “some changes with my [her] boyfriend the next day.” She went on to describe him as seeming quiet and upset. The boyfriend also asked her questions exclusively about this friend she had over. This triggered Tracy suspecting him because she had not told him that friend stopped by with her. Tracy described feeling confused because “yesterday we were just okay” but now she “noticed something fishy”. This suggested her boyfriend somehow knew about her and her friend’s visit and was responding adversely to these activities. Suspecting arises from a mismatch between what the abuser knows about the victim survivor and what the victim survivor expects or anticipates the abuser to already know about them. As Tracy recounted, suspecting that “something fishy” might be going on is raised in the context of the victim survivors’ knowledge of their partner and their everyday behavior and routines. Tracy’s partner asking about her friend may seem totally innocuous outside of Tracy’s contextual knowledge. However, her boyfriend’s atypical behavior sparked suspecting for Tracy that her boyfriend was doing something to know these details about her without her consent or knowledge. Suspecting Requires Social Context Suspecting is recognized and recounted as such by survivors within the broader narrative of their experience of abuse. Victim survivors initially have no confirmation that “smart security cameras” or whatever other IoT devices are being used at all. In fact, often these kinds of devices 126 are not even suspected as part of the equation when victim survivors first become suspicious of their partner’s behavior. In the initial stages of suspecting, survivors don’t always immediately connect what they’re experiencing to technology misuse. As Kate and Connor described above, their initial suspecting was rooted in an emotional reaction that something simply felt off to them. Directly connecting that suspecting to IoT misuse often doesn’t come until later, like when Kate found the hidden camera in the vase or when Tracy discovered that her WhatsApp calls were being diverted to her abuser’s phone. In addition to these examples of the suspecting stage of misuse forensics drawn from the interview protocol, victim survivors seeking support on r/relationship advice also describe a similar process of becoming suspicious. Thread authors on r/relationship advice almost universally describe a “turning point” where they became suspicious that their partner was misusing technology, or some other explanation such as physically following them or garnering intel from a shared social tie, against them. Suspecting catalyzes investigating potential ways their partner could be keeping tabs on their day-to-day activities online and offline. Initial suspecting arises based on the victim survivor’s reaction to surprising behavior and knowledge of their day-to-day activities in the home. Many r/relationshipadvice users described similar tensions with their partner acting strange or bringing up unusual details about topics such as chores they were doing while home alone or the time of day they went to the grocery store. When sharing their experiences with the community, r/relationshipadvice users often describe suspecting retroactively. By the time they seek input from the Reddit community, they usually have already confirmed that their partner is missing technology. Their motivation to seek input from the larger community is rooted in confirmation that their partner’s behavior is 127 ‘actually’ abusive and justifiable for them to take action towards escaping. User 1 shares how she discovered her boyfriend’s surveillance of her phone and home computing devices. “This whole week he has been interrogating me on everything and he knows things that he’d only know if he could see my phone. Like, he knew my location and asked what I was doing there and I have all my location services turned off. He was questioning things in my search history and I don’t know how he’d know that. […] Someone please just tell me this isn’t normal. … I feel like there has to be some kind of spyware on my phone and I would have never thought that before this week.“ – User 1 As User 1 describes, suspecting her partner was amplified when her boyfriend started “interrogating me [her] on everything” while she was out of town due to a death in her family. She described his surprising knowledge, “I don’t know how he’d know that” related to her activities across multiple devices including her phone, smart watch, and personal computer. Additionally, User 1 goes on to describe how, considering this knowledge, she is suspicious of further violations occurring without her knowledge. As she describes, this new behavior from her boyfriend sparked suspecting regarding her boyfriend having installed “some kind of spyware on my phone” which she “would have never thought” before her boyfriend’s knowledge related to her movements and online activities was revealed. R/relationshipadvice users also clearly articulate situations in which a known IoT interface, which has already been used in the couple’s shared living space for a while, becomes a target of suspecting again in light of their partner’s suspicious knowledge. For example, User 2 shares the story of breaking up with her boyfriend. During the move, she kept trying to return a smart watch he gave her as a gift, but he refused. However, as time went on after the separation, she started becoming suspicious that he was somehow using the watch to monitor her still. “I moved out. He took the watch back. Dick move, right!? But I don’t think it was solely to be petty. I think that dude is using the watch to monitor me. So. It’s been back and forth, on and off between me and him since I moved out, though he never gave the watch back. […] Sometimes it’s weird that he knows certain stuff he shouldn’t know. I wonder how he knew it, if not for looking at the watch. […] Other times, like today, it registers as 128 being where I was, at some point during the day, so it must have been on or in my car. Side note I live in a house made of brick, and there are grates that cover the crawl space along the bottom of the house. One of the grates all of the sudden, after 21 years of living in this house, just “pops out” not long ago. I came home one day and saw it and was immediately freaked out by looking at the dark, abysmal black hole in the brick where the grate should have been, with the grate on the sidewalk.” – User 2 User 2 shared that when she would talk to her ex, he seemed to know oddly specific details about her daily activities. She began to suspect that he was somehow still accessing an Apple Watch that he had given her as a gift, despite him taking it back after their separation. But, she still had access to the Apple account and described a hunch which led her to monitoring the watch’s GPS location. She found that the watch’s location was inconsistent. Sometimes it “registers as being where I was”, sometimes it did not appear accurate. She concludes by describing the intense fear she experienced when, coming home one evening, she noticed how a grate that lined the crawlspace along the base of her house started popping out. She described this as a highly unusual and new phenomena, not replicated “after 21 years of living in this house.” Through suspecting her ex, she “was immediately freaked out” that because this grate repeatedly popped out after the breakup and she suspected her ex had successfully installed some type of tracking device or was attempting to do so. Suspecting is prompted by victim survivors recognizing when their intimate partners know detailed, specific information about their daily activities in the home and movements which should be impossible. Additionally, suspecting promotes victim survivors to consider more deeply that tech misuse may be attributable to the ‘surprising knowledge’ which sparks suspecting. The quotes from the interviews and r/relationshipadvice analyzed exemplify how suspecting serves as a shift in attention. In this last example from User 2 recognizing potential misuse being enacted by her partner, new events and observations are interpreted within this lens. After becoming suspicious, User 2 begins connecting evidence and testing out potential 129 explanations for what she is seeing and feeling. Evidence included monitoring the location data from the returned AppleWatch and the repeated dislocation of a grate on her house. User 2 ’s experience demonstrates how seemingly innocuous environmental phenomena made salient by having already become suspicious of her ex being up to something dangerous. Suspecting is triggered when a partner’s knowledge defies expectations, which requires the victim survive to have knowledge of day-to-day routines and information access. Suspecting sets the stage for the subsequent misuse forensics process of figuring out what’s going on with potential tech abuse. This process is also rooted in processing evidence and considering explanations. This ‘considering’ can look like evaluating possible explanations for their partner’s knowledge and behavior mentally. Additionally, it can also look like setting up ‘experiments’ to test if their partner’s knowledge or other reactions confirms or refutes their working theories. In the face of secrecy and subterfuge surrounding IoT in intimate abuser, victim survivors must direct the discovery of, and subsequent response to, personal privacy violations carried out via these devices. Suspecting sets the stage for moving on to processing evidence and considering explanations. Misuse Forensics Stage 2: Processing Evidence and Considering Explanations The second stage of misuse forensics, processing evidence and considering explanations, captures how victim survivors interpret evidence that “something fishy” is going on, phrasing drawn from the participants, and test out possible explanations about how the suspected tech misuse is occurring. Processing evidence and considering explanations details the actions taken by victim survivors in reviewing what they have witnessed and attempting to fit those observations into a logical explanative narrative of their abuser’s violations. After becoming suspicious, the ‘gut feeling’ impulse that something is wrong prompts 130 heightened attention and leads to processing evidence and considering explanations. This stage consists of two main activities that operate iteratively and in parallel and function to continuously influence the development of one another. The goal of processing evidence and considering explanations is to identify the who, what, where, when, and how of their partner gaining access to their personal information and daily activities. Processing evidence is the actions in which victim survivors review all the evidence they have gathered and suspecting “something fishy” going on. Evidence in this context mostly refers to non-tangible evidence rooted in the victim survivor’s own recollections. This includes the victim survivor reviewing their memories of their own behavior and comparing what they know about the abuser in contrast with how they acted: what they said, what they did, how they behaved, particularly in ways that defy the victim survivor’s expectations. Evidence can include physical evidence, such as data traces (text messages, photographs) and physical objects (finding a hidden camera or GPS tracker). Evidence is overwhelmingly rooted primarily in firsthand observations and interpretations of behavior rather than direct data sources. Victim survivors frequently describe, after becoming suspicious, noticing more events in everyday life that they add to their mental evidence board of suspicious behavior and other evidence from the environment. Processing Evidence and Considering Explanations Prompts Recognition of Abuse Simultaneously, with processing evidence, victim survivors undertake considering explanations. As they interpret and review the evidence that “something fishy” is going on, victim survivors think through potential explanations that weave together the narrative of what they are observing and connect all the pieces of evidence they have considered thus far. Victim survivors don’t usually immediately assume that they are being monitored with technology. 131 Often, they consider possibilities such as their own misremembering (did they tell their partner that they were coming home early last week?). Often, victim survivors will consider that their partner got the information from a third-party source, such as a shared friend or a family member (did they hear I was at the mall from my sister or my dad?). These working explanations evolve over time as victim survivors acquire new information. Victim survivors are not scrutinizing one- off comments. Rather, they are critically considering and identifying systematic patterns of knowledge their partner materially should be able to have. Additionally, IoT IPA is often obscured and difficult to identify with precision for lay users. As interviewee Connor describes, they considered multiple potential explanations before considering that IoT IPA was occurring: “How did this person have someone close to me that is telling them whatever I do, and deep down I thought that I'm not spending time with any of their friends… It began by first I had to ask myself is this person meeting people around me to get information about me, but then on that point, I think I wrapped up that investigation … And so once I was going through, once I had this direction, because the person used to allege to me several things that I used to do, yet, I couldn't remember if I had interacted with the person over the same issue that the person was alleged to have done. So that's when it dawned on me that the person is using Alexa to monitor me.” - Connor Connor begins with describing how, when they were initially considering explanations, they first considered that “someone close to me” is telling their partner “whatever I do.” He considered explaining his partner’s surprising knowledge via the possibility that they have a friend who could have relayed them this information. As they considered this potential explanation, they rejected it after they “wrapped up that investigation” after further considering how they had not spent time with or communicated with anyone likely to share details with their significant other. They went on to consider how they could not remember if they had brought up the details their significant other themselves. Eventually, they described reaching the conclusion that the most reasonable explanation was the abuser using technology to monitor them. 132 In this process of considering evidence and testing out the logic of potential explanations, often coming across a pivotal piece of new evidence will turn the tide of the victim survivor’s investigation. Victim survivors in the interviews would highlight how a ‘smoking gun’ piece of evidence related to non-consensual technical surveillance triggers them re-contextualizing their past observations in a new light. In other words, clear evidence of tech misuse makes them reconsider previously innocuous or unrelated behavior as patterns of abuse, as Mr. Wine described: “So, she [intimate abuser], I think she decided like to improvise a way to monitor me. And that was using the app that she was using to access my location and also my WhatsApp messages and Instagram and Facebook messages. It's like she was like, having a look at what I was doing with my phone. And you see most of the things that I was doing yesterday, like she would, like, monitor that conversation with others. So it happened that the app was saving the messages on her side. […] And I noticed that whenever I texted someone the same message that I texted, and they received the recipient that said they will now come to her phone. So I was like, you were monitoring me all this time.” - Mr. Wine Mr. Wine discovered his ex-girlfriend’s tech misuse via his observation that, every time he sent a text or WhatsApp message Connecting experiences of surprising, suspicious knowledge to technology requires victim survivors to figure out how the technology could be providing this access. This knowledge is often fragmented, incomplete, and technically inaccurate. Often, once considering technology misuse as a possibility, victim survivors piece together what is going on by paying close attention to the technology visible in their everyday lives. As Mr. Wine describes, “she [abuser] was like, having a look at what I was doing with my phone.” He went on to describe how he noticed that the moment he would send a text to someone, she would also get his message and any replies. Seemingly innocuous stimuli, in this case the audible phone notification, became connected to harm and privacy violation based on Mr. Wine’s firsthand experience of his ex-girlfriend’s behavior. Mr. Wine’s attention to the details of what was 133 happening with technology around him, particularly that also being used by the abuser, led him to treat this scenario as evidence which made on-going tech abuse visible. In processing evidence and considering explanations, victim survivors depend on their contextual knowledge of the situation to determine what is or is not suspicious. While Mr. Wine’s example of paying attention to context specifically focused on technology, that’s not the only strategy victim survivors use to validate their working theories. Victim survivors analyze a variety of behaviors, environmental phenomena, and other subtle details to determine something related to technology misuse might be going on. Diana shares how she pieced together that technical surveillance was occurring: “I was out with my friends and as usual, he [boyfriend] had gone to his daily work. So he had left home and a few minutes later, and then he called me asking me where I was. He was coming there. And it was like an interval of time between when asked and the time he arrived; it’s like, it was a very short time. Aha. So I knew maybe he was he had already. He was already coming before he asked so I thought maybe there was something to do with the tracking my location. Like he already knew where I was …” - Diana As Diana described, she was going about her day as usual while her boyfriend was at work. Suddenly, he called her asking about her whereabouts then met her there. At first, this appeared to be completely innocuous behavior. However, Diana became suspicious based upon the speed at which he arrived: “[the] interval of time between when [he] asked. And the time he arrived. It’s like, it was a very short time.” She deduced that “He was already coming before he asked” and postulated that he was using “something to do with the tracking my location.” Diana went on to describe how she suspected that him calling her to ask her location was farce to make her less suspicious of some kind of tracking going on. Diana’s ability to connect the speed of her boyfriend’s arrival to technical surveillance required intimate, contextual, highly detailed knowledge of her and her boyfriend’s routines. She had to know the distance and approximate timing to arrive at this location from their home to recognize that the timing of her boyfriend’s 134 arrival would have been impossible without advanced knowledge. This discrepancy served as the ‘smoking gun’ evidence that Diana used to eventually confront him and discover a larger trajectory of non-consensual IoT surveillance was occurring. Processing Evidence and Considering Explanations Prompts Seeking Collective Sensemaking Processing evidence and considering explanations also plays a major role in what kinds of input participants seek out from the Reddit community. r/relationshipadvice thread authors describe paying attention to their partner’s behavior, anything different or unusual in their home environment, and any other potential sources of evidence. For many advice seekers, reaching out to the Reddit community for knowledge plays a central role. By the time victim survivors share their stories with the community, they are confident that tech abuse is occurring. They seek support from the community to confirm, challenge, or expand their ‘investigation’ and compiled evidence thus far. Additionally, these postings are often updated with more comments from the thread creator, especially after they have had time to consider the crowd-sourced advice. In the days and weeks following their initial postings, these Redditors will often share updates about their situation, including new evidence and adding clarifying details for the community to consider, as this user did: “Hello! I recently made a post here. There were a few questions in messages and PM’s that I would like to answer (I’m unable to reply to comments on the original post) To answer some questions: 1) The camera I found was an Amazon Blink. It’s not the smallest, but it was able to stay hidden on my dresser because of how cluttered my room is. […] I do not know how many other cameras there are. I did the phone trick mentioned in the comments on my previous post on the camera in my bedroom and the “halo” didn’t appear around it. I have completely searched both of my bathrooms (no cameras there) but I’m not going to look in my kitchen/living room/dining room because it’s more likely that there would be a camera in those rooms because it would be easier to hide. I also want there to be less of a chance that whoever put the camera(s) in my house notice that I found them. […] I didn’t touch the camera in my bedroom, but I did put some clothes in front of it to block it’s line of sight. I’m not stupid enough to have moved it because then the fingerprints on it could have been messed up.“ - Jodie 135 Jodie created a thread on r/relationshipadvice to ask for advice after she discovered a hidden “Amazon Blink” camera that her boyfriend hid in her bedroom. As she shared in the beginning of her follow-up post, she wanted to provide more details from “questions in messages and PM’s (personal messages}” she received from Redditors. As she goes on to share, she used advice from the community, “the phone trick mentioned in the comments”, to further investigate her home and attempt to find any more hidden devices. She also shared how, based upon community advice, she blocked the current camera’s “line of sight” with some of her “clothes” to prevent further violation while also not alerting her abuser that she knows about the camera or generate “fingerprints” if she decides to take further legal action. When processing evidence and considering explanations, r/relationshipadvice discussants also focus much of their solicitation efforts around specialized technical expertise. Victim survivors seek technical expertise on how to escape or mitigate a surveillance situation. As was the case with Jodie, much of the discussion on r/relationshipadvice is centered on this kind of targeted technical advice-seeking. Many comments from the broader community, in response to these solicitors, or offering input spontaneously simply based upon the kinds of technology users describe in their initial posts, are centered on the technical details of specific software, websites, and devices. For example, User 3 offered advice to a poster reporting IoT IPA via an Amazon Alexa device: “FYI: from your Amazon account you can “archive” purchases so that the purchase doesn’t appear in your regular Order history when scrolling to show things. They’re still accessible in your Account settings, but I think you can only get to that specific area a computer.” - User 3 User 3 suggested to the IoT IPA victim survivor to double check their Amazon account’s purchase history “in your Account settings.” The victim survivor was trying to confirm when the elicit Amazon Alexa device (specifically, a camera) entered the home. User 3 advised that the 136 full purchase history can be archived and obfuscate purchases of misused devices. This example of specific technical details underscores how community discussion on r/relationshipadvice supports processing evidence and considering explanations. In alignment with the narratives from the interview study, IoT IPA is enveloped in established patterns of abuse beyond the role of technology and require extensive processing evidence and considering explanations on the part of victim survivors to understand, evaluate, and respond to. These pivotal moments of confirming technical possibility drive soliciting support on r/relationshipadvice. Victim survivors appear to find value in Reddit commenters bringing specific technical expertise to their sense- making process. Commentators often offer their firsthand knowledge of individual apps and software. This knowledge is tailored and directly relevant to the situation outlined in the parent thread. Commentators will spontaneously contribute highly contextual details about the specific technologies the thread author referenced to further support the sense-making process. Seemingly banal day-to-day activities become interpreted as evidence of “something fishy” with technology occurring in the context of patterns of behavior, knowledge of day-to-day routines, and interaction with the victim survivor’s expectations and perspective. These examples further demonstrate a critical trend in understanding how IoT IPA victim survivors recognize, and thus become able to react to, technology misuse: they often have no direct interaction with the technology itself. Most often, they reach the conclusion that some kind of technology use must be occurring based on contextual evidence. Seemingly random or innocuous information becomes critical evidence when interpreted through the lens of knowledge of everyday routines and expectations that victim survivors possess. Processing evidence and considering explanations serve to confirm victim survivors initial ‘gut feelings’ that something is going on with their partner’s behavior that is unwanted, upsetting, and harmful. Both the interviewees and 137 Reddit posters emphasize how, due to the easily obfuscated nature of misused IoT devices, confirming that technology is playing a role in intimate harm requires ruling out alternative explanations and gathering proof that the only viable explanation is technology. Victim survivors undertake processing evidence and considering explanations until they feel confident that they have accurately identified some kind of unwanted activity with technology is occurring. Misuse Forensics Stage 3: Taking Action The final stage of misuse forensics is taking action, where after considering current evidence and potential explanations, victim survivors transition to taking action to confront the abuser directly about the possibility of IoT IPA or they reach out for support, such as to a technical expert, to address device misuse. Taking action is defined by victim survivors shifting their internal processing and recognition of tech-mediated abuse from internal consideration to external action. This externalizing can look like seeking support, connecting with a resource, or directly confronting an abuser. Taking Action Prompted by Device Discovery Taking action via direct confrontation is particularly common when victim survivors, often by chance, come across a physical device they suspect has been used against them. Tori describes taking action after discovering that his girlfriend has installed cameras in the home. In response, Tori hired a company to remove the cameras and confronted their girlfriend after she came home. “So yeah, when my girlfriend came back I just showed them, just showed her the the cameras having been uninstalled. So I, so we now got into a conversation. And I said this is it. We can't just do this anymore. So we ask each other I, just ask her to give me some space.” - Tori Taking action and directly confronting the abuser most commonly occurs after technology discovery. Often, this confrontation accompanies resetting boundaries and 138 expectations for the relationship. Tori communicated that setting up secret cameras is unacceptable. He said, “We can’t just do this anymore”, and asked “her to give me some space” to think through the future of their relationship. He went on to describe ending the relationship. Taking action serves as a point of escalation and transformation about trust and expectations for the relationship as a whole. Before directly taking action, such as removing a device or talking directly to the abuser, victim survivors frequently talk through thoughts and firsthand experiences with a trusted friend, which in turn gives them confidence and support to take action. Charlie shared how connecting with his family and friends helped him gain external perspective and conclude that what he was experiencing wasn’t okay: “It was nice, it was nice to just kind of have a good conversation about it and for someone who was on the outside looking and be able to tell me you know, like this isn't this is not a healthy behaviors are this is not something that is like okay to just put up with a relationship or this is you know, this is something that is not typical in what you would see in a, like a healthy relationship between two people” - Charlie As Charlie identifies, simply having a loved one “on the outside looking [in]” say “this is not a healthy behavior” was reassuring and affirming for addressing the perceived violations their partner was engaging in. Externalizing the upsetting and often isolating realization that they are experiencing abuse from their intimate partner helps victim survivors. Seeking clarity and confirmation from their most trusted social ties can also help victim survivors to take action while also prioritizing their personal security. As Charlie went on further to describe, this recognition talking to their family made possible led to them confronting their significant other and removing their access to their Apple Watch. 139 Taking Action Directs Victim Survivor Safety Planning In addition to mental and emotional benefits victim survivors describe when seeking social support before taking action, seeking social support can also provide victim survivors with tangible strategies to safety plan and build a case of evidence regarding their abuser’s activities. Often, when victim survivors share what’s going on with their partner during casual conversations with their friends, they are the first to use words like violence or abuse to describe what’s going on. Support seeking of this type often does not start as intentional. Rather, through casually sharing about their family and day-to-day activities or commenting on their partner’s behavior, friends will be the first to raise the possibility that what’s going on is abuse. Additionally, social ties will often also be the catalyst for raising the possibility that IoT could be being used to carry out these activities without the victim survivor’s knowledge. Diana shared how it was through a spontaneous conversation with a friend that she first considered she was experiencing tech abuse: “Later that day, he came back and yeah, I asked him about it and he denied though I shared with my friend and that's when I came to know about these technology door locks and convinced me that that's what he had done.” - Diana This is a snippet of Diana sharing her experience of her partner using an electronic door lock to lock her in the home. She first discovered “something fishy” when she went to leave the house one day and the singular entry door would not open. She called her boyfriend at work, and he claimed there must some kind of mechanical problem to the door. When Diana recounted this experience to her friend, who told “about these technology door locks and convinced me that’s what he had done.” With her friend’s prompting and encouragement, Diana investigated further and discovered this was in fact what occurred. 140 In addition to informing victim survivors about technical misuse scenarios they had not considered as viable explanations by themselves, friends will often actively help their friend experiencing abuse safety plan. This support also appears to help victim survivors feel safe and confident in taking action. As interviewee Scarlett shared, her friends helped her investigate the technology her boyfriend was using to surveil and harass her: “I had to talk to someone to know what was going on first before I confronted him so much in case something went bad so that someone knew what, what was going on. Yeah, so then I turn to my friends and talk to them I told them hey, I found this camera and it has recordings of me, points of view it has been recording me in my house. I don't know what to do, what should I do people please advise me to do so we like made a copy of all the recordings so that in case I confronted my boyfriend and he like, do you see maybe I don't know, I don't know something like that. We have everything so we made copies and then we chose to confront him.” - Scarlett Scarlett’s quote begins with her discussing her motivation to reach out to her friends before doing anything about removing or deactivating the hidden wireless cameras her boyfriend installed in her home: “I [she] had to talk to someone to know what was going on.” Scarlett went on to describe how she told her friends about the camera she found and how the data on the device suggested multiple cameras from multiple vantage point throughout the home. After talking it through with her friends, they came to her place and helped her gather evidence from the devices. “We like made a copy of all the recordings” with the goal of, when she confronted her boyfriend, having evidence to back her up if he tried to deny the cameras. Making the back- up copies of the video recordings supported Scarlett taking action. However, many victim survivors anticipate that confronting their abusive partner, especially if they have deactivated an IoT device which they’re controlling to surveil them, could put them in danger. As Scarlett began her story with, part of her motivation to seek input from her friends was so that “in case something went bad” with her boyfriend’s reaction to her activities “someone knew what, what was going on.” Most of the participating victim survivors’ 141 attempts at taking action were fortunate in that their confrontations appeared to resolve without further escalation, and they were able to extricate themselves from the relationship. While most of the participating victim survivors clearly describe taking action as challenging and potentially opening themselves to new threats, Beth experienced the potential dangers of taking action. Beth shared the physical danger taking action put her in when she confronted her abuser and the steps she took to escape the IoT IPA: “Today I remember from that day, but that was the scariest day of my life. I've like, somebody has never, like done that to me or confronted me in such a manner. So it really scared me. Yeah, yeah, that's, that's, that's what I can recall from that day. […] it was the worst day. After the confrontation, [I] just decided to go back home and leaving my, I left our apartment and decided to go back home because like, so it was unhealthy and so toxic. So I left for home. […] I just decided to go on with my life and try new part” - Beth The “today” Beth is referring is the day she confronted her boyfriend about her discomfort about the way he was using IoT devices to monitor her activities and Internet activity. To her knowledge, he was tracking her car, computer, and use of smart devices in the home including video and audio recordings. After bringing up that she wanted him to stop, he physically restrained her and threatened physical harm. Beth described this as “the worst day” of her life. After this confrontation, Beth left her home to move in with family and try “to go on with my [her] life.” As this example with Beth demonstrates, moments of confrontation frequently pose high physical risk for victim survivors. Taking action can lead to new risks and vulnerabilities. Often, these vulnerabilities are directly related to the digital materials that caused issues in the first place, as Carmen describes: “So I came up with the idea of separation. And that's when he was threatening me that if I tried to split up with him, he will just send the videos and my family will see them and you know, yeah.” - Carmen 142 Carmen is sharing here her thought process after discovering her boyfriend was secretly recording her during sex with wireless cameras. When she confronted him, she mentioned “the idea of separation.” In response, he threatened that if she left him, he would share the videos he captured with these illicit devices and share them Carmen’s family and friends. Carmen went on to describe how she was terrified of this happening because she would be extremely embarrassed by her close social ties seeing this explicit sexual content of her. This threat functioned as a barrier that delayed Carmen’s ability to safely leave the relationship. Victim survivors seeking support on r/relationshipadvice seek input on strategies to effectively taking action while also prioritizing their own well-being. These requests manifest as advice from community members on what strategies they should use to protect themselves and prepare evidence should they choose to move forward with a legal case or other support seeking. “You're not going to find anything "on the hub" because no one who isn't verified can post. You're going to find yourself in places like 4chan and obscure porn sites where men share videos of their wives/girlfriends. I know it may seem tough, but seeing what I've seen, you need to get out asap. It is absolutely one of those fetishes where men like to share the videos. Leave now. If you want to report him to the cops, you should. He most definitely has a stash somewhere.” – User 4 User 4 is offering advice to a r/relationadvice thread creator who discovered her partner was using an Alexa camera to film them having sex and her using the bathroom. User 4’s reference to ‘on the hub’ is referring to thread creator mentioning that they checked PornHub but did not find any videos of themselves. User 4 encourages this victim survivor to consider looking for videos on “4chan” and other less common websites. User 4 also encourages this victim survivor “to get out asap.” They go on to argue that it is likely her partner has many more videos in “a stash somewhere” that he will share on the Internet. This comment from User 4 exemplifies how victim survivors seek support on r/relationshipadvice to learn more about technical possibilities of misused devices and plan for taking action. 143 Victim survivors who utilize r/relationshipadvice also seek advice on if their approach to taking action is reasonable, logical, or justifiable. A driving concern in thread creators and commenters on r/relationship advice is if the complainant’s experience ‘qualifies’ as abuse and if it’s worth ending the relationship over. Victim survivors use r/relationshipadvice to collectively work through the ‘pros and cons’ of taking action, as this post from user Throwaway Account 1 describes: “Tonight, I discovered that he had a hidden camera installed in my room, aimed at my bed. I feel so violated. I can’t believe he would do such a thing. He’s not the person I thought he was. I got angry and had him remove the camera. I told him that he had to move out now. However, I am a logical person. I’m way more pragmatic than emotional. Kicking him out means I lose out on the contribution from him that goes towards my mortgage. Also, we share a car. He needs it to go to work. Should I let him use it, as his job is much further away? Or should I be like, “screw him, I pay all the car expenses anyway”? What should I do? And am I a robot for thinking about these minor details and not raging about how my privacy was violated?” - Throwaway Account 1 Throwaway Account 1 is sharing how they discovered a “hidden camera installed in my [their] room, aimed at my [their] bed” and asked their boyfriend to move out. But, after their initial reaction, they recognized the consequences of him leaving, such losing out on the money he pitches in “that goes towards my mortgage”, in addition to the shared car situation. Throwaway Account 1 is seeking input from the community about what their plan for taking action should look like in light of these socioeconomic variables. As Throwaway Account 1 asks the community, “am I a robot” for focusing on these considerations at the forefront rather than “how my [her] privacy was violated.” All interview participants self-described as having left their abusive relationship. Confronting an abuser or taking a potentially escalatory action such as attempting to leave the relationship, is incredibly risky for survivors. For example, having succeeded or attempted to leave an abusive relationship increases the risk a woman will be physically assaulted or 144 murdered by her former partner (Harper 2022; Campbell et al. 2003). Victim survivors also face major economic, social, and legal barriers to leaving abusive relationships (Heron, Eisma, & Brown, 2022; Henry et al., 2003). Identifying taking action as good or bad for an individual victim survivor requires careful consideration of their personal circumstances and support resources. As these examples demonstrate, taking action often does not lie completely in the control of the survivor. Sometimes, situations escalate based on the behavior of the abuser, such as when they confront the victim-survivor about perceived slights or reveal to them the details of the misuse that is taking place In these scenarios, victim survivors report feeling forced to respond in order to defend themselves, escape the confrontation, or gain more information about what is going on. Taking action also does not mean the end of individual victim survivors’ engaging in misuse forensics. IoT-mediated abuse always occurs in the context of other forms of intimate abuse such as physical violence, gaslighting, threats for behavioral coercion, and attacking self-esteem/emotions, among others. Additionally, victim survivors report that, usually, IoT-mediated abuse occurs more than once. Often, after escalation and conflict related to the misused IoT device, during the reconciliatory period, abusers will begin surveilling their partner again using a new IoT modality. Thus, the cycle of misuse forensics repeats in the face of victim survivors having to investigate when new violations are evidenced. Identifying these three stages of misuse forensics has valuable implications for understanding how victim survivors experience, understand, and respond to their firsthand experiences of IoT IPA. First, the misuse forensics process illuminates the multi-faceted ways intimate abusers misuse IoT devices. Abusive actors utilize IoT in surreptitious and malicious ways to non-consensually surveil victim survivors. As revealed by real abuser behavior, these 145 devices introduce several sociotechnical capacities to expand the reach of harm, coercion, and control enacted by abusers. These outcomes intersect with the cyclical nature of intimate violence to introduce new opportunities and strategies for exerting influence and control over survivors. Maintaining the cycle of intimate violence relies upon knowledge of victim’s everyday routines and activities. IoT expand the ease of access and insights available to abusers, especially due to their ease of obfuscation. IoT separates physical proximity from abuser’s ability to monitor a victim’s movements in and outside of the home. Usually, victim survivors can expect a degree of safety and privacy when separate from their partner. However, IoT circumvents physical proximity via the access sensors which record victim survivors’ movements and activities in the home without their consent. These technical capacities reiterate that the entire misuse forensics process is prompted by abuser’s having surprising knowledge. Victim survivors ask themselves How can they possibly know that about me? and ‘work backwards’ to investigate and discover illicit technology use as the culprit. This process exists at all because intimate partners are behaving in secret. Misuse forensics mirrors in many ways human-centered privacy scholarship focused on how people navigate complex and uncertain computing interfaces, including what these firsthand accounts can inform about designing more equitable and appropriate approaches to personal privacy in design. Namely, most people who use computers view the process of how exactly they work and the data they collect as ‘black boxes’ (Ehsan et al., 2022). IoT further entrenches the disparities in informed decision-making when approaching emerging computing devices by placing the impetus of control and implementation in the hands of abusers rather than the victim survivor’s whose personal information is collected by these devices. 146 Misuse forensics emphasizes how the impetus of action and accountability falls upon survivors themselves. This is part due to how misuse forensics captures how, often, seemingly innocuous activities often only become recognized as misuse in the context of patterns of behavior. The recollections of survivors demonstrate how through the act of sharing experiences of IoT misuse, survivors often notice even more activities they had not connected to the misuse of devices. Though this study is qualitative, the misuse forensics findings re-iterate quantitative findings which demonstrate that tech abuse is viewed as widespread across different devices and that victim survivors often must take the lead in identifying, legitimizing, and seeking actionable consequences and support for the violence . In summary, misuse forensics process necessitates the critical importance of taking victim survivors intimate knowledge of their lives and situation more seriously. As misuse forensics reveals, seemingly innocuous or even irrelevant information becomes tangible evidence of sustained patterns of intimate violence when interpreted through the firsthand knowledge and experiences of victim survivors. It remains important to have external verification measures for identifying and prosecuting intimate abuse. However, the misuse forensics process re-iterates that intimate abuse is only identifiable within social context and patterns of behavior over time. Victim survivors are experts of the details of their own routines and lives. Creating structures to capture these firsthand reflections and incorporate them in accountability processes will serve to identify and respond to the unique barriers and risks of tech-mediated abuse. Interpreting the interview findings in conversation with the netnographic study further reveals nuances in how the different populations of their field sites approach engaging with misuse forensics. As these example discussions from r/relationshipadvice demonstrate, differences in the netnographic data as compared to the interview dataset include the trend that 147 r/relationshipadvice participants appeared to have a more detailed understanding of the technical capabilities of the misused devices in question, at least to the degree that they were able to solicit regarding specific technical details. It it also possible that r/relationshipadvice posters are not reflective of the general IoT IPA abuse survivor - the sheer fact that they are soliciting social support on Reddit suggests that have a high degree of digital literacy, feel comfortable, and are willing to share the details of their experiences with strangers on the Internet. However, the similarities in overall misuse forensics processes between the interview and netnographic dataset suggest this general process plays an important role for many IoT IPA survivors. Further, this synchronicity indicates that further research would benefit from further exploring this process. Examining how misuse forensics is culturally distinct, such as across different racial/ethnic groups or in LGBTQ+ communities, would be beneficial in tailoring support and identifying unique risks to historically marginalized communities of survivor. Conclusion Chapter 4 centered on the first set of findings from the semi-structured interviews with self-identified Michigan-based IoT-mediated IPA victim survivors and community conversations surrounding stories of IoT-mediated intimate partner abuse. This chapter presents the novel finding, misuse forensics, a process demonstrating how IoT-IPA victim survivors undertake a clear pattern of noticing and acting upon highly contextualized details of their abusive partner’s behavior in order to reach the conclusion that IoT are being misused as tools of manipulation, harassment, and control. I named this novel process misuse forensics. Interviewees and forum discussants clearly articulated undertaking misuse forensics as a three stage process. First, victim survivors suspecting that something is going on with their partner. Their partner will share knowledge about the victim survivor that should be practically 148 impossible for them to have, which makes the victim survivor suspect “something fishy” is going on. Second, victim survivors begin processing evidence and considering explanations. Victim survivors describe paying extra careful attention to what their partner does and says to search for clues and explain how they may be tracking the victim survivor’s movements and activities. Third and finally, victim survivors start taking action. What taking action looks like varies across victim survivor contexts but is always prompted by victim survivors feeling as if they have no choice but to confront the abuser directly or seek other support. Taking action most often occurs after a victim survivor discovers an IoT device being used to surveil in their home without their knowledge, such as a hidden camera or remote-activated microphone. Victim survivors further shared how it was not uncommon for abusers to start using new IoT devices after their initial strategies are discovered, and misuse forensics is repeated in the face of new illicit IoT being deployed in the home. I contribute coining the concept misuse forensics, three-stage process IoT-IPA victim survivors describe undertaking to recognize and respond to obfuscated IoT misuse by abusers. First, misuse forensics contributes to expand upon what is known about surveillance in tech- mediated IPA. Surveillance has long been attributed to abusive dynamics in IPA scenarios including GPS tracking (Chatterjee et al., 2018). What IoT changes about surveillance in the IPA equation is how IoT separates physical access from an abuser’s ability to maintain power and control. Victim survivors depend on breaks from their abusive partner to seek support resources and safety plan. IoT being easily deployed and maintained across physical environments makes it impossible for victim survivors to effectively assess risks and become aware of their partner’s surveillance without misuse forensics. This take-away contributes the need for more barriers and 149 ‘checkpoints’ in setting up and using IoT devices to recognize and halt non-consensual, abusive surveillance. Next, misuse forensics demonstrates how meaningful consent in computing interfaces unravels in the face of abusive actors deploying IoT’s capacities for wireless, innocuous integration into everyday spaces. IoT-IPA victim survivors have no idea IoT is being used to non-consensually surveil their activities 24/7 until they become suspicious and take on the impetus of investigating and putting the pieces together. Better communication to users on device data sharing (Stary et al., 2022) and more dynamic models of consent (Strengers et al., 2021) are insufficient in the face of IoT ecosystems which can be deployed and maintained with no knowledge or consent from unknowing ‘users’ in the household. This take-away prompts a more radical rethinking of meaningful user consent in abuse scenarios. Finally, misuse forensics demonstrates how victim survivors drive recognition and accountability for IoT-mediated IPA. Victim survivors describe individual journeys of becoming suspicious, paying attention to their partner’s knowledge and behavior, and confronting them after confirmation of secret surveillance IoT. This both increases personal risk for victim survivors and leaves these types of IoT-mediated violations outside of reported statistics on tech abuse. Misuse forensics demonstrates how IoT-mediated IPA introduces unique risks and complexities for victim survivors. Addressing IoT-mediated IPA requires broader recognition of IoT’s rife vulnerabilities for interpersonal abuse, support services informed about misuse forensics and consequences for safety planning, and more critical consideration in designing and deploying IoT in consumer settings. Taken together, these findings build upon current knowledge in several ways. First, misuse forensics demonstrates that, in the face of IoT IPA, technical security measures (i.e. 150 Emami-Naeini, Agarwal, Cranor, & Hibshi, 2020; Arief, Coopamootoo, Emms, & Van Moorsel, 2014) appear ineffective to support IoT IPA victim survivors. This is because virtually all victim survivors are unaware the system is even being used. Changing how users interact with the technology is not an effective approach to harm mitigation if victims have no awareness the tech is being used against them. The complex and labor-intensive misuse forensics process victim survivors undertake to demonstrates the value in developing IoT user interfaces that make these IoT more visible to people sharing physical space with them. This is especially true for users outside the bubble of access afforded to primary users setting up and controlling these devices. Future approaches to designing IoT for safety and accountability in abuse contexts must make these devices visible and actionable to the experiences of victim survivors. In practice, this could look like making these technologies less easily disguisable. The devices could be larger, periodically light up or make sound. It could also look like features to communicate their presence to users in the environment but not given access to the device by the primary user. Perhaps any unregistered users could receive a notification from the device letting them know it is in use. Misuse forensics demonstrates intimate abusers deploy IoT to expand their ability to exert a feeling of 24/7 control over their victims. IoT-mediated tools, particularly surveillance capabilities such as electronic door locks and audio/visual recording, transform the feeling of complete control into a material possibility. Victim survivors undertake misuse forensics to understand how their abusive partner gained knowledge about them should be materially impossible to have. After figuring out technology must be involved and going on to confront their partner or incidentally discover illicit devices, victim survivors become suspicious about 151 other secret IoT they may not have found. Victim survivors describe the breach of trust in choosing to use IoT against them making them hypervigilant of future violations of their privacy. Finally, misuse forensics demonstrate how IoT-mediated abuse creates new challenges for victim survivors seeking support. It is extremely difficult for victim survivors to gather evidence of secret IoT surveillance. Victim survivors report being afraid that if they remove or destroy an obfuscated IoT device that it will escalate their abuser’s violent behavior. Without material evidence, victim survivors feel uncertain about seeking support or naming their experiences of harm as abuse. This finding expands upon what we know about the value of social support seeking in abuse outcomes (i.e. Lindgren, 2014; Taylor, 2011). Beyond emotional support, sharing experiences of IoT IPA allowed victim survivors to learn about the potential forms and capabilities of tech-mediated abuse. Future research should expand upon this promising direction to implement public education program surrounding IoT IPA. Victim survivors are already burdened with undertaking misuse forensics to figure out how they are being targeted. Broader public awareness of illicit IoT use will equip victim survivors and the people supporting them with knowledge to examine the possibility of tech abuse. 152 CHAPTER 5: THE INTERNET OF THINGS AND SUPPORT SEEKING Introduction Support seeking is a core component of how IoT IPA victim survivors deal with the challenges of living with intimate partner abuse. Support seeking refers to the process survivors undertake to seek social, financial, legal, and other support resources. Social support seeking is one of the most common methods people use to face and overcome stress and problems in everyday life (Evans & Feder, 2016). Social support refers to elements of an individual’s social network which make them feel supported and cared for. Having social support means having a reciprocal network of attention and responsibility for one another. While all human cultures practice forms of social support seeking and giving, what social support looks like and how people seek it out varies. For example, in some collectivist cultures with relational norms rooted in harmony and interdependency, support seeking centers on cohesion and restoring social ties rather than personal retribution or justice (Cornally & McCarthy, 2011). Individuals’ models of social support seeking are theorized to develop from models of attachment in early childhood (Evans & Feder, 2016). Secure childhood attachments predict stronger social support networks in adulthood (Sarason et al., 1990). Social support benefits people. Both self-report (Harper, 2021; Kimpe et al., 2020) and observational (Kim et al., 2006) data suggest that having a strong social support network is a predictor of health and overall positive well-being outcomes (Taylor, 2011). In the context of intimate abuse, a positive response from an individual’s community, such as confidants believing the victim survivor, validating their experiences, not blaming them, and helping them seek out resources (Evans & Feder, 2016; Sylaska & Edwards, 2013) correlates with reduced stress, 153 feelings of security, and serves as a mediator which buffers the relationship between violence and adverse physical and mental health outcomes (Kimpe et al., 2020; Sylaska & Edwards, 2013; Canady & Babcock, 2007). Simultaneously, negative responses, such as victim blaming/not believing the victim or minimizing concerns (Sylaska & Edwards, 2013) are correlated with lower self-esteem (Hendy et al., 2003) and more adverse mental health outcomes (Carlson, McNutt, Choi, & Rose, 2002), and heightened feelings of shame, despair, and social stigma (Sylaska & Edwards, 2013). Social support seeking is the most common form of support seeking survivors of intimate abuse engage with (Sylaska & Edwards, 2014). In addition to social support, survivors seek support from formal institutions including health agencies and legal systems. Efforts to track intimate violence prevalence rates and open conduits to support resources for victim survivors motivate formal support service providers. For example, many healthcare agencies employ standardized screening procedures for identifying and providing support for victim survivors (Aljomaie, Hollingdrake, Cruz & Currie, 2022; Ramsay, Carter, & Feder, 2002). But domestic abuse remains formally underreported, with as little as 10% of all survivors sharing their experiences of violence at all with many survivors never seeking out a formal support resources such as a doctor or police officer (Anderberg et al., 2020). Many survivors have reported new problems and intense negative pushback from attempting to pursue legal such as re-victimization (L. M. Tanczer et al., 2021). Domestic abuse professionals report that the legal and social support infrastructures for tech-mediated intimate abuse are weak, ambiguous, and often create more problems (Williams et al., 2023). Further, beliefs surrounding domestic violence, such as the idea that intimate abuse is a private, personal issue that should be shared 154 outside the intimate relationship, further inhibit reporting and support seeking (Fanslow & Robinson, 2010). Discussions in information policy and criminal justice spaces center on current deficits of legal and healthcare systems capacities to provide support for tech abuse victim survivors (Knittel & Shillair, 2020; Singh et al., 2018; L. Tanczer et al., 2019; L. M. Tanczer et al., 2021). This dissertation expands this body of work to capture how informal support-seeking from friends, family, and victim survivors’ local communities inform best practices for law and policy for accountability in cases of Internet of Things mediated intimate partner abuse. Informal support from trusted social ties is often the first resource people living through trauma access (Lindgren, 2014; Taylor, 2011; Yoshioka et al., 2003). Understanding how IoT IPA victim survivors utilize social support informs understanding of how victim survivors access social resources and new barriers they encounter in the face of new challenges IoT pose for support seeking. The involvement of Internet of Things technologies in abuse changes the way people seek support. Material shifts in how abuse is identified are represented through Chapter 4’s misuse forensics. IoT devices are frequently misused in secret. Victim survivors initially have no firsthand knowledge of the misused device. The invisibility of knowledge and data alongside the reliance on secondhand cues places the impetus of responsibility for identifying and responding to IoT IPA on the victim survivor. Additionally, victim survivors report incomplete and often inaccurate mental models of how IoT functions including what personal data they collect, making communicating their experiences in seeking support more challenging. Further, emerging work stereotypes and cultural beliefs regarding tech-mediated interpersonal violence persist. For example, intimate partner cyberstalking perceptions are 155 influenced by perceived responsibility of the victim (Wilson et al., 2023). Work examining potential barriers and challenges such as social stigma around technology-facilitated intimate partner violence, or that which examines IoT specifically, remains limited. Based on these precursory considerations, we should expect that as IoT introduce new factors into victim survivor’s risk benefit calculations when considering seeking support. IoT IPA victim survivors could fear a lack of understanding or belief from social ties due to the novelty and perceive impenetrability of IoT devices. Not being believed or taken seriously drives how victim survivors experiences are delegitimized (Overstreet & Quinn, 2013). Poorly understood, emerging IoT entrench fears of misunderstanding and dismissal for victim survivors seeking support. To make tangible how IoT IPA victim survivors’ shed light on barriers and stigma IoT IPA victim survivors face in seeking support, this next section shares Hope’s story. Hope is one person from this dissertation project’s interview study. Her experience of considering seeking support began with her anticipating social stigma, then accessing support resources, followed by her sharing how her experiences with IoT IPA impacted her in the aftermath of support seeking. Hope’s story demonstrates how, in the wake of cultural attitudes towards survivors and a lack of recognition of IoT IPA’s distinct vulnerabilities and harms, victim survivors experience amplified barriers to effective support seeking. Hope’s Story: Support Seeking in Context Hope shared her experience of seeking support for dealing with her abusive partner’s violent activities, including extensive use of IoT to scrutinize her behavior and control her daily movements in their home. Hope shared that she knew the situation with her abusive partner was untenable, but fear of social judgement made the vulnerability of support seeking feel 156 impossible. Hope described how her fear of social judgement inhibited reaching out to her family and friends. “My biggest barrier was just judgment from the, from the society from my neighborhood, like people passing judgment, judgment was the biggest barrier. If it weren't for judgment, I would have seeked help long time ago because, yes, I have that problem. Like, I have this problem whereby I'm always wondering how people think of me how they say about the decisions that I make. So I was so conscious about making that decision at the earliest stages. “ - Hope Hope invoked an abstract fear of “society” judging her for experiencing IoT IPA. She described this fear of judgement as the “biggest barrier” for seeking support she wanted, including talking to friends and family and speaking to a mental health professional. This barrier prevented her from seeking out this help a “long time ago.” Additionally, she described how she was “conscious” of this potential social scrutiny from the “earliest stages” of her considering seeking support as an IoT IPA victim survivor. Hope’s experience demonstrates how the support seeking process adheres to a cycle. First, in anticipating seeking support, victim survivor interviewees report major hesitance in seeking any support due to the expectation of social scrutiny and judgement. These participant interviews demonstrate a gendered element which mediates how victim survivors perceive potential barriers and risks related to support seeking. While both self-identified men and women participants reported social stigma as a barrier, male participants explicitly identify stereotypes related to male survivors, while women survivors shared their fear of scrutiny within their families and friend circles. In the face of technical uncertainty combined with fragmented and nebulous social models of what tech-mediated abuse looks like, victim survivors engaged in extensive confirmatory work and extensively considered the risks of potential negative social scrutiny and judgement in sharing their experiences. 157 As a result of fear of social stigma within face-to-face social networks and communities, IoT IPA victim survivors are driven to seek support to identify and socially legitimize their partner’s questionable behavior as abuse, violence, or otherwise ‘bad’ and needing to be addressed. Victim survivors are deeply invested in the social perception of revealing experiences of IoT IPA. They weigh the potential benefits and risks of seeking support. Victim survivors seek out advice, opinions, and collective sensemaking support as part of initial support-seeking efforts. Victim survivors strive to validate their feelings of violation and seek advice for how to begin addressing the harm by conveying their internal experience to their partner in hopes of prompting a change in behavior. This approach builds victim survivor confidence to seek support from face-to-face support resources. Hope shared how her fear of social stigma prevented her from seeking help earlier. The second stage of support seeking is accessing support. IoT IPA victim survivors avoid formal support-seeking institutions in favor of reaching out their established, trusted, informal social networks. Resources such as law enforcement, legal counsel, healthcare professionals, social workers, and information technology professionals were virtually never utilized by victim survivors. Interviewed victim survivors sought support from close friends and family to identify and respond to abuse. Interviewee Hope described seeing an online advertisement for an intimate partner abuse online community while listening to music. Reaching out to this community helped Hope to generate a plan to leave her partner and gave her confidence to reach out to her family for help. Finally, the third stage of support seeking victim survivors’ demonstrated was altering their personal protective strategies in the aftermath of seeking support and leaving an IoT IPA relationship, the most common protective strategy victim survivors describe is choosing intimate 158 partners who will not misuse technology. They emphasize social rather than technical decision- making as the most visible locus of control in personally circumventing potential misuse. Second, victim survivors describe how experiencing IoT IPA firsthand makes potential risks of personal information being breached by malicious actors more visible and salient than ever before across all their engagements with the Internet. Hope described challenges with making new friends and an overarching fear of using the Internet in general. This lingering specter, this haunting, that remains in their universal approaches to future Internet use suggests that intimate violence plays a strong role in altering users’ mental models of privacy online. After experiencing the ambiguous, multifaceted, and intimate nature of IoT IPA misuse, victim survivors experience dramatic and global revisions to their approaches to computing privacy at large. This shift in perspective manifests as sustained transformations in social, technical, and cognitive strategies for thinking about privacy and security online far beyond the experienced context or real technical capabilities. Support Seeking and Cycles of Intimate Abuse IoT IPA victim survivors demonstrate how intimate partner abuse, including IoT IPA, is cyclical. The literature review chapter identified how intimate partner abuse occurs in stages. Tensions build, followed by an abuser’s explosion, which moves into a refractory honeymoon period, before tensions and threat build again. Chapter 4 articulated the misuse forensics concept, in which victim survivors move through three stages of considering, identifying, and responding to IoT IPA, with the cycle repeating the face of novel duplicitous technology use. This chapter interrogates the role of informal support seeking in how IoT IPA victim survivors face unique challenges and barriers to effective support seeking. In contrast to current law and policy-oriented driving approaches, this chapter focuses on informal networks of support. 159 Trusted social ties and other informal resources function as catalysts to victim survivors accessing support resources. Though informal social confidants do not have professional training, these actors serve as catalysts for victim survivors to externalize their experiences of violence and receive affirmation. Hope’s discovery of online support resources was entirely incidental but served as a major turning point in her experience. Hope and other participants’ experiences reveal how opportunities for effective support, including social and material barriers to effective support seeking, offer respective moments of agency and disruption while simultaneously reinforcing social and cultural notions which harm victim survivors attempting to leave cycles of intimate abuse. IoT IPA victim survivors navigate elements of the support seeking process, including the types of support utilized and perceived barriers to accessing support, in the face of cycles of intimate abuse. Intimate abuse is supported by cultural narratives which diminish victim survivors and question their experiences of harm. IoT IPA Victim survivors seek external opinions in the relative safety and anonymity of online communities to find language and social narratives of what IoT IPA is and how they can respond to it. Once victim survivors are confident in conveying their experiences of harm, they rely on their closest friends and family to actively seek support. Victim survivors’ efforts to disrupt cycles of abuse are rooted in relying upon trusted “tech experts” to understand the social context of the intimate relationship and employ technical solutions which will not escalate tensions. Victims survivors reject formal support resources such as law enforcement based in fears of further victimization, privacy violations, and potential escalations with the abuser. In the aftermath of surviving IoT IPA, victim survivors employ strategies to choose trustworthy lovers and take extra safety precautions online. Victim 160 survivors describe how the best way to overcome a cycle of IoT IPA abuse is to avoid become trapped in the cycle again. Anticipating Seeking Social Support Before taking active steps to seek out support, interview victim survivors report carefully considering the potential pros and cons of support-seeking. They recognize that, while seeking out support from friends & family, professional resources like therapists, and other sources, can be beneficial, it also opens victim survivors to new uncertainties and vulnerabilities. In describing potential drawbacks and perceived barriers to support-seeking, victim survivors reflecting on their own experiences of considered and pursued support seeking almost exclusively identify their barriers as social ones; they are concerned with how society in general, alongside friends and family, will perceive their decision to seek support. Making visible one’s experience as a survivor by seeking support is perceived by victim survivors as opening themselves to amplified scrutiny. The perceived barriers and opportunities for support-seeking the participants described intersect with social pressures and judgement surrounding victims and intimate violence. In connecting these experiences to his discussion of his motivations to seek out support, Ronaldo went on to interpret his emotional reaction to this perceived violation of his personal vulnerabilities as a barrier to support seeking in relation to his gender identity. Ronaldo explained his process in considering support-seeking as follows: “I thought of seeking support. But you know, this is nowadays [people] expect men to be stoic, expect men to be stoic and suppress the emotions themselves but that's not what happened because I think even men should express their emotions. So I didn't I didn’t, didn't seek any form of help. It was really scary idea. Because, because of what I've told you, I thought that I'll fear, a form of, a form of discrimination or anything but I tried an on an online one, which was a non facial. “ 161 Ronaldo describes how he was hesitant to seek support for his experiences of IoT IPA due to his fears of what people would think of man expressing that he felt “not safe” and “breached” by the way his partner was using these devices. Ronaldo does work to challenge his anxieties surrounding this stereotype: “I think even men should express their emotions.” He did not “seek any form of help” due to the possibility of facing “discrimination” based on his gender identity. The stereotype of men as “stoic” and keeping their emotions hidden made Ronaldo hesitant to seek out support. He went on to describe that he did reach out to an “online” support resource that was “non facial.” After asking him more questions, he elaborated further and clarified that by this he was referring to an online therapy platform where he didn’t have to turn his camera on. Ronaldo emphasizes that after experiencing the violation of his partner using IoT IPA, he was determined to prevent further breaches and intentionally sought out potential support resources where he could honor his privacy preferences, which included not sharing personally identifiable information. Victim Survivor Gender and Stigma Only approximately 20% of the interview sample identified as men, so it is difficult to formulate robust take-aways related to gender and IoT IPA support-seeking (I say approximately due to the issue I discuss in the Methods chapter about inaccuracies in self-reported SONA demographic data). However, there is a recurrent thread in the interview dataset related specifically to perceived barriers to support-seeking which indicates gender differences in how barriers to support-seeking are conceptualized. Critically examining demographic patterns alongside explicit references to gender-based stigma reveal patterns in how barriers to IoT IPA support are articulated and acted upon. As was the case with Ronaldo, male participants 162 explicitly evoke the idea that seeking support outside the relationship for IoT IPA issues challenges their position as a man. Ronaldo specifically referenced the “discrimination” he feared he would face seeking support for tech-mediated abuse as a man. Participant Charlie highlighted similar concerns in charting his support seeking journey. “I guess this isn't specific to the internet of things, but kind of just like the stigma regarding the abuse and men and relationships and kind of just that was definitely somewhat of a barrier and in seeking support and seeking help. Yeah, that was definitely one of the main ones. “ - Charlie 3 As Charlie highlights here, men often face stigma related to victimization support- seeking. He remarks “this isn’t specific to the internet of things.” He directly connects this perspective to his hesitancy to seek out support. As he went on to describe, this orientation led to Charlie not directly seek out formal support for his experiences. Charlie went on to describe much of his support-seeking came from his family, his most trusted confidants. He did not initially go to them intentionally seeking out support for this situation. But, through the course of just talking to his parents about what was going on in his life, his partner’s behavior related to his smart watch and Charlie’s reaction came out. From there, his parents asked how he was feeling about what was going on in his life. Based on gradually opening up to his family and receiving positive feedback, Charlie felt more affirmed in sharing the details of what was going on and how he was feeling about it. Further, Charlie also demonstrated a rare example of formal support seeking related to his firsthand experiences of IoT IPA. Charlie sought out a counselor to help deal with university stress. Charlie described to me how they did not initially seek out a therapist with any intention of bringing up what was going on with their partner and the smart watch. Charlie met with the counselor and found them helpful. Over the course of several sessions with the same counselor, when talking about everyday stress, his boyfriend’s use of IoT came up. Charlie describes his 163 therapist’s questioning and input helping to raise the possibility that what was going on with his boyfriend was not okay. The therapist provided language and knowledge surrounding intimate abuse and coercive control helped Charlie contextualize his experiences within support seeking frameworks and legitimize his experiences of harm. As Charlie’s shares, victim survivors often don’t reach out to their trusted ties and other support resources with the explicit intention of seeking support for experiences of IoT IPA. In the face of potential social stigma, particularly as Charlie related to being a male survivor, a major barrier in any kind of support seeking is fear of social judgement, stigma, and dismissal. Having a vibrant network of social ties, as in the case of Charlie seeing and talking to his family often, supports victim survivors in bringing to light patterns of intimate partner behavior that are upsetting and harmful but are not be fully recognized as such without this trusted external perspective. Additionally, building rapport with a formal support resource was important for bringing firsthand experiences of IoT IPA to the forefront and internalizing those experiences as ‘legitimate’ abuse. Contextualizing firsthand experiences of violence within the expertise of a mental health professionals also provided Charlie, and the handful of other victim survivors who sought out a counselor, with language to seek further resources and feel more confident in seeking out support. In summary, in the face of stigma and skepticism male victim survivors face, trusted informal social networks serve to help identify and validate the feelings of harm and violation related to IoT IPA. However, formal support seeking is rare. Victim survivors like Charlie report seeking out a therapist for reportedly unrelated issues (such as, in Charlie’s case, academic stress), and then after building trust and rapport with the professional, bringing up their experiences of IoT IPA abuse naturally. 164 In contrast the perceived gendered cultural challenges Charlie, Ronaldo, and other self- identified male participants identified, female participants shared different experiences. As opposed to male participants’ experiences, not one of the self-identified women participants used a formal support service like a counselor or healthcare professional. One participant described moving to a women’s shelter after a physical confrontation with her abusive partner. Additionally, none of the women participants referenced gender stereotypes explicitly. I found that women survivors often reported fears of direct physical harm and other forms of domination from their, in the case of this sample, male partners. None of the male respondents reported physical intimidation or threats as part of their risk calculation. This excerpt from Beth’s experiences reflects the threats of physical harm that tragically many women seeking support for IoT IPA faced. “I remember from that day, but that was the scariest day of my life. Somebody has never, done that to me or confronted me in such a manner. So it really scared me. It was the worst day.” - Beth Beth is describing what happened after her abusive partner confronted her about activity, which he deemed suspicious from her computer activity log. IoT IPA occurs alongside other forms of intimate abuse, including physical violence and mental degradation. In this case, Beth’s innocuous activities online and everyday behavior served as potential sparking points for her partner’s violence. She shared how this imposing threat of physical violence made many forms of support seeking feel unattainable, let only risky or difficult to access. Beth went on to describe further how, in seeking support for her situation, that she feared judgement from her family and broader community despite what she was experiencing. While the male interviewees also described fear of social stigma, when doing so they specifically oriented their concerns around their perspectives as male survivors. Interestingly, women 165 survivors alluded to fears that their social networks would view them as weak or overly sensitive should they consider seeking out support. “I was scared, I was scared of them judging me, my family members, that knew me. Of course I was scared of the judgement that will come from people. So it gave me a lot of trouble getting help. Because I didn't want to know, I didn't want people to know that I'm suffering. Because when actually they know me as a strong person, this bubbly person, so I didn't want to put out a face that I'm struggling and I'm weak. So that was one of the barriers that I did face in in trying to seek help. “ - Beth I asked Beth to share her thoughts and reflections on the social, legal, resource, and other barriers and challenges to IoT IPA support seeking she experienced. Beth shared several instances of multiple partners engaging in tech abuse. One former partner, she described, gained access to her home Wi-FI network and was monitoring her communications and Internet search history on her home computer and smart home devices. However, Beth described that fear of “family members” and other “people” “judging me [her]” was a major barrier in her seeking support for her experiences. As she described, her friends and family knew her “as a strong person, this bubbly person” and she feared that they would think worse of her for seeking support. Additionally, she described how her husband was known as a good man in their social community. Eventually, after her partner’s abusive behavior escalated, Beth sought her family’s support, and she described them as being accepting, loving, and supportive of her decision to leave. As these examples from Ronaldo, Charlie, and Beth demonstrate, seeking support for experiences of IoT is not as simple as identifying available resources. As these two sections centered around anticipating and approaching support have demonstrated, victim survivors are deeply concerned about potential social stigma when seeking support. They fear that their concerns as victim survivors will not be taken seriously, or they will be viewed as weak. As victim survivors on r/relationshipadvice demonstrated, they sought social affirmation from the 166 online community to confirm their feelings of harm and violation surrounding IoT IPA aligned with socially legitimate narratives of intimate violence. Additionally, the quotes drawn from interviewees in this section demonstrate how victim survivors perceive barriers to social and other forms of support seeking. Male survivors identify their stigmatized position as male survivors, while women survivors focus on risks of physical harm and potential scrutiny from their community. The complexity and uncertainty of IoT appears motivates victim survivors to seek social input and confirmation surrounding their experiences while simultaneously amplifying their awareness of potential social stigma. Participants demonstrate that their initial support-seeking centers on seeking advice, suggestions, and general input from the collective brainpower of the community to identify and classify their experiences of tech abuse as ‘legitimate’ intimate abuse. Social legitimization is a process of developing, identifying, and activating social representations to create new “social objects” (Weber, 1978; Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006). Legitimization is the process people undertake in which they consider how an individual, group, or phenomena fits into the status quo: the norms, status, and values they view as wider society possessing (Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006). Legitimization helps people interpret and act upon the complexities and ambiguities of social realities, with alignment with the status quo generally being associated with greater perceptions of legitimacy (Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006). Measured influences on the perceived legitimacy of intimate partner violence include patriarchal ideologies, romantic love ideologies (Lelaurain, Fonte, Giger, Guignard, & Monaco, 2021), adherence to domestic abuse myths, and internalized sexism (Lelaurain et al., 2017). The attention victim survivors give to seeking community input on their experiences of IoT IPA occurs as a social legitimization process. In addition to the general stigma surrounding intimate 167 abuse, IoT IPA as a ‘social object’ is emerging and evolving. Thus, victim survivors solicit broader social input to recognize this type of violence as legitimate, and thus, actionable for response and support-seeking. Online Platforms Support Overcoming Stigma and Reaching Out Victim survivors often face challenges in reaching out for social support regarding stigmatized experiences like domestic abuse. Sharing experiences with social networks can also have adverse impacts on coping and survivor outcomes. A negative and/unsupportive reaction can reduce survivor resiliency (Matheson, Asokumar, & Anisman, 2020) and is associated with victim survivors internalizing negative stereotypes towards themselves (Overstreet & Quinn, 2013). Despite these challenges, seeking support in online community settings for experiences neglected and stigmatized in mainstream discourses can help survivors find tailored, targeted advice and firsthand expertise from other people who have experienced the same situations (Young & Miller, 2019). In examining narratives of IoT IPA survivors on r/relationshipadvice, I found that several trends from thread creators and commenters emerge. Community discussions on r/relationshipadvice reveal how IoT IPA victim survivors undertake social legitimization surrounding their experiences. Victim survivors, before even using words like “violence” or “abuse” to describe their experiences, seek advice and feedback from other people. Discussants on r/relationshipadvice share the stories of their partners, how their behavior made them feel, and asking for general feedback rather than targeted strategies from the broader communities. How participants solicit support for their lived experiences of IoT IPA, and how advice givers respond, reveal both the multifaceted challenges victim survivors face in seeking out support and recognition for their experiences. These netnographic findings demonstrate the ways in which online support-seeking makes visible emerging social norms 168 surrounding the use of IoT in intimate relationships. In the face of unclear and incomplete social models of IoT IPA, victim survivors draw upon their internal feelings of harm and violation as a starting point to seek social input on if this is a ‘legitimate’ form of violence that they would be justified in feeling bad about and responding to. Victim survivors use r/relationshipadvice to navigate technical, social, and resource constraints in their responses to abuse. These netnographic findings demonstrate that most thread creators, rather than just seeking specific technical advice or other pragmatic steps, seek input on how tech-mediated violations do or not fit into the schemas of appropriate personal privacy boundaries for ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ intimate relationships. After experiencing perceived violations, victim survivors identify the contextual details (such as a history of violence, length of the relationship, and other factors) contributing to their initial reaction to perceived misuse and seek external perspectives from the community to validate their concerns. Additionally, the stories victim survivors share and the advice they receive demonstrate the ways in which intimate relationships change over time. What may or may not have been an acceptable at a different point in the relationship is interpreted within the history of the relationship and past behavior. Victim survivors recognize these gray areas, and they seek to navigate this inherent social complexity via asking more questions and providing contextual details in their initial posts. Keeping in mind that r/relationshipadvice is a community explicitly centered on soliciting diverse input regarding all kinds of interpersonal relationships, most community posts and comments center on recognizing and legitimizing experiences of IoT IPA. Recognizing intimate abuse, especially novel forms like IoT IPA for which well-defined cultural schemas do not yet exist, is challenging even for survivors experiencing it firsthand. Victim survivors describe, prior 169 to seeking support from their close face-to-face ties, desiring community input via the anonymity r/relationshipadvice provides to confirm that their situation is ‘serious enough’ to merit seeking support. Without a clear standard of comparison, victim survivors often lack a model of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behavior with technology beyond their own emotional reactions to perceived threats and personal privacy violations. Participants describe their anxiety about how responding to perceived violence will impact the way other people view them. For example, r/relationshipadvice discussants discuss how they fear that, if they set a boundary with their partner related to their use of IoT, that they will be perceived by others as mean, unreasonable, or even an abuser themselves in the context of their relationship. When describing the situation which they are seeking support for, victim survivors will often share about the history of a relationship. They will touch on the good and the bad far beyond the context of the current situation of what happened directly involving Internet of Things devices. Through these efforts, victim survivors seek to provide what they view as a complete assessment of the situation. Often, victim survivors begin their parent posts (Reddit terminology for the initial text that generates a Reddit thread) by broadly describing their intimate relationship and their significant other, setting the stage for sharing the story of the technical violation. User 5 explains the history of her relationship and context surrounding her feelings of discomfort with home cameras her boyfriend has installed. Due to the length of User 5’s post, their post is segmented with analysis. Each quote appeared sequentially as one body of text on the r/relationshipadvice. “First off, my boyfriend is a very insecure and jealous person. This is, in part, due to some “infidelity” on my end from our “talking” stage. There was no actual cheating as we had not entered an official relationship at that time, but it did cause a lot of serious trust issues on his end. We live together and recently, he installed a Ring camera in our living room to keep an eye on the dogs while we’re both at work. He works long days and I’m usually home 2-3 hours before he is.” 170 User 5 begins with describing her boyfriend and the history of their relationship. She points out negative traits: she describes her boyfriend as “a very insecure and jealous person.” Victim survivors highlight ‘red flags’ in their partner’s past behavior and general attitudes to explain why they are behaving in unwanted ways related to technology. Additionally, she heavily emphasizes this moment of her boyfriend perceiving some of her behavior as cheating before their “official relationship” began as cheating. Sexual infidelity - often imagined on the part of the abuser - is commonly raised by abusers as a justification for their use of IoT for surveillance. User 5 posits this tension around suspected infidelity as generating “serious trust issues” over the course of their relationship. Further demonstrating social legitimization, User 5 confirms that she had not cheated. User 5 anticipates, and attempts to circumvent, commentators who may suggest camera surveillance is a appropriate if cheating occurred in the past. User 5’s emphasis here situates her boyfriend’s use of the Ring camera as a potential problem based on a lack of actual infidelity, though his perception of this possibility is a driver he revisited over the course of their relationship to justify his behaviors with technology. Additionally, User 5 highlights these infidelity accusations to more deeply contextualize her boyfriend’s motivation to use surveillance in unwanted and uncomfortable ways. Victim survivors, in sharing their stories and seeking support, work towards unpacking the why of how their once trusted partner would behave in ways that repeatedly violate their personal privacy and won’t stop even after confrontation. Finally, User 5 shared her initial contact with the device in question. She describes how her boyfriend installed a Ring camera system “to keep an eye on the dogs” while he was away at work. User 5 goes on to describe when the conflict related to the camera started. 171 “About a week after he installed the camera in the living room camera he called me and said he saw me use our back stretcher thing after work and asked how I liked it. I said “oh, you saw me using it?” He said “yep! I saw you do a cool stretch!” Later on, he brought up something I did a couple of hours later and I felt a little weirded out, because it seemed like he was watching me. From then on, I decided to hang out away from the living room (most of the time) until he got home. […] he was going through the Ring camera footage and noticed I avoid the living room camera most of the time when he’s not home. He asked me why that was. I said “I just prefer being in the kitchen or bedroom while you’re not here.” He got suspicious and asked what I was doing in the other places. I finally told him that honestly, I don’t like feeling watched while he’s not there. It’s not that I don’t want to feel watched by HIM, it’s just a general feeling. He told me that did make him suspicious, but I assured him it’s just for my own peace of mind. “ User 5 describes how her boyfriend came home and mentioned her “do a cool stretch” on their exercise machine and other activities while she was home alone. User 5 shares this was the first moment she “felt a little weirded out” about the camera. Due to feeling “like he was watching me”, she described changing her routines in the home so she could avoid the living room where the camera was when her boyfriend wasn’t around. But, she described how, when he would look through the camera footage, he began questioning her as to why she wasn’t hanging out in the living room as usual. She went on to describe how he “got suspicious”, with that suspicion being amplified when she confessed, she didn’t like “feeling watched while he’s not there.” Like virtually all victim survivors on r/relationshipadvice, these feelings of violation prompt reaching out for social support. All the IoT IPA stories shared on r/relationshipadvice share this focus on one pivotal moment or sparking incident where suspicions, discomfort, and other early signs of “something fishy” going on escalate. Typically, this point of escalation happens through discovery of the details of the data these IoT surveillance devices collect, either through finding a hidden device or conversations with their partner. User 5 shares how, in her case, her boyfriend’s comments on her physical movements in the home sparked this discomfort. She goes on to describe her 172 continued challenges with responding to this situation, particularly in how sharing her discomfort made her boyfriend more suspicious. “He has brought it up a few times and seems genuinely offended and suspicious that I don’t want to be in front of the camera. He camera told me I could have just moved it or turned the camera off which I told him I thought about that, but if I were to ask, he’d probably think something more was happening. Nonetheless, he is still very suspicious and brought it up again this morning. Is there a way to explain this to him better, without him getting suspicious? It’s bothersome to me that he is so bothered by it…” -User 5 User 5 concludes her story with soliciting advice, guidance, and support from the r/relationshipadvice community. User 5 shares the details of how her boyfriend, in response to expressed discomfort about the living room camera, questioned why she didn’t move or turn off the camera instead of avoiding it. User 5’s story here highlights another important trend in how victim survivors contextualize their lived experiences and seek support - they never being their story with explicitly identifying the behavior as abuse, violence, or even problematic. Rather, they often describe their problem as an issue of communication, a misunderstanding, with their partner. As User 5 centered her questions around how “to explain this to him better” and manage his suspicion. In part due to abuser’s reversing the locus of discomfort and responsibility back to the victim survivor, as User 5’s boyfriend did with asking her why she didn’t move the camera instead, victim survivors often center their solicitations around what they can do through their own behavior to improve the situation. By extension, this initial support-seeking is deeply rooted in defining what behavior is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and thus a standard to accept or challenge, within their intimate relationship. Victim survivors use the online community as a tool to socially define their experiences as a legitimate form of abuse which justifies a response. Rather than the victim survivor themselves, it’s people in the community offering interpretation and advice who begin 173 using words like “violence” and “abuse”, which in turn supports the victim survivors using their own language to identify the behaviors as such. User 5’s story is an archetypical example of IoT IPA support seeking demonstrated on r/relationshipadvice. On r/relationship advice, the majority of IoT IPA incidents reported involve home camera systems. Examples include intimate partners using audiovisual interfaces to monitor mundane home activities, recording sexual activity, or monitoring peoples’ movements in and out of the home dominate the IoT-related conversations. User 5’s shared her story with the community through the lens of her own discomfort and sought support for how to get her boyfriend to recognize that he had crossed a line from ‘acceptable’ to ‘unacceptable’ behavior. Strikingly similar to the interview data, most of support seeking inquiries on r/relationshipadvice center around confirming or identifying the boundaries of acceptable vs. unacceptable behavior in intimate relationships. Additionally, victim survivors often describe a fear of social stigma surrounding intimate abuse survivors. Victim survivors are often being manipulated and degraded by their abusive partner. The gaslighting, isolation, and subsequent low self-esteem often lead to victim survivors doubting what they see, feel, and think, particularly in relation to their partner’s activities. Thus, much of the support-seeking on r/relationshipadvice is centered on seeking external input that recognizes, gives language to, and legitimizes shared experiences of intimate partners’ behavior with smart home devices as abusive or not beyond the perspective of their abuser. This support is conducive to victim survivors feeling confident to take action to improve their situation. Throwaway Account 2 shares an example of this type of support-seeking, and support-giving, in the community: “They played the Alexa until I woke up between 10-10:30. Then they got mad at me when I said I must’ve fallen asleep and apologized, and they said “what were you actually 174 doing?” “who is over there?” and I had to send pictures of me alone in the bed with the pets. I played it cool and acted like I was okay with it but honestly the lack of trust really hurts me. Instead of assuming I was asleep or believing me when I said I was, they instantly accused me of cheating. … I fall asleep early all the time, it’s nothing new. Sometimes I’m passed out by 8-8:30PM so I don’t understand why their first reaction was that I was with someone else in our bed. I’m honestly just hurt and I don’t know how to respond when they come back today.” - Throwaway Account 2 Throwaway Account 2 is describing how her boyfriend, when she did not answer their texts immediately, logged onto their shared Amazon account and blasted music through her bedroom Alexa until she responded. Throwaway Account 2’s boyfriend accused them of doing something suspicious or having another person over until they took “pictures of me alone in the bed with the pets.” In response what they describe as their surprising “reaction”, Throwaway Account 2 is not seeking out support via a specific question. Rather, they share how they are feeling “honestly just hurt” and are seeking general input before the next potential point of conflict and escalation when they see their boyfriend later that day. Experiencing suspicious and uncomfortable behavior from their partner often leads to victim survivors interpreting the tech-mediated violation in the context of other ‘bad’ behavior over the course of the relationship. They attempt to identify the current violation as a more easily forgiven one-off or a more consistent adverse pattern which they must address. To this end, victim survivors will also often describe how their partner will attempt to justify and normalize their behavior when questioned or otherwise confronted. Often, the described behavior of their partners alludes to a tension that appears to emerge in victim survivor narratives surrounding tech-mediated violations - is the victim survivor themselves part of the problem or even an instigator themselves? Planting this seed of doubt prompts support seeking for victim survivors. User 6’s post exemplifies this process of seeking support related to validation their concerns in the face of their partner’s responses. 175 “I (21F) and my significant other (37M) have been seeing each other for around 3/4 months. I have noticed the last time that there’s a security camera on the windowsill in the livingroom. innocently I think perhaps it’s for security because it is plugged in and pointed towards one of the main doors in the house. Arguably a little far but still pointed. […] I didn’t know what to do it felt like a complete set up. […] Because what if i’m wrong. I thought if he really was looking back he’ll see that I know and most likely say something. But if he wasn’t looking back he’d never know what I’m doing when facing the camera. I’m not sure what to do really because it’s hard to accuse someone of it ???? if that makes sense. I thought maybe if I saw myself on the hub i’d have solid proof then but i honestly wouldn’t want it to get to that point. Opinions? Thoughts? Comments? I’m dying for advice or a second brain to process it.” - User 6 As is the norm on r/relationshipadvice, user User 6 begins their post by describing the history of their relationship, including how long they have been together and how the relationship is going so far. Users also identify their gender and that of their partner with “F” for woman and “M” for man. This user shared that, last time they visited their boyfriend’s house, they noticed a new camera “on the windowsill.” At first, they gave their partner the benefit of the doubt that their partner was using it for “security” because it appeared to be aimed at the doors. However, they do acknowledge that the location of the camera was “a little far” for this explanation. User 6 goes on to describe her and her boyfriend having sex in the kitchen, living room, and other areas of the home and she noticed that her boyfriend appeared to be intentionally positioning them in the view of the camera. As she described “it felt like a complete set up.” Despite noticing these details, User 6 is still uncertain that he is intentionally using the camera to record them having sex. As she describes, without access to video of herself on the “hub” of the camera system, it is extremely difficult to confirm what is going on before making an accusation “Because what if I’m [she’s] wrong.” User 6 goes on to describe that “it’s hard to accuse someone of it ????”, “it” referring to misuse of the home IoT system. 176 User 6’s experience demonstrates how IoT makes “solid proof” of violence not obvious or tangible. As is the case with user User 6, a lack of access to the IoT system, along with ambiguity if the data it collects about her is an incidental side effect of an appropriate security tool or intentional violation of her personal privacy in highly vulnerable moments. User 6 reaches out to the community to seek external opinions on what they think is going on and see if others believe their working explanation is logical. To this end, User 6 ends their post by emphasizing the value of another perspective on this situation, or as they describe, “a second brain to process it.” The clearest form of advice that victim survivors in the online community describe wanting, time and time again in their initial postings, is simply the thoughts, beliefs, and perceptions of people in the community reading their stories. In the face of ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding IoT devices social support becomes a catalyst for identifying the existence of potential violations. Part of the evidenced motivation to seek support on r/relationshipadvice is that victim survivors doubt their own perceptions and emotions. This self-doubt appears to be due to a combination of factors including the invisibility and ambiguity of data collection, a lack of access to the systems in question, and like User 6 described a desire to think the best of their partner and jump to conclusions. However, as User 6 shares, this doubt is also capitalized upon and fostered by IoT abusers. “I left the conversation alone but I still feel very weird about the situation today. In a way I feel violated because he didn’t tell me and overall it’s all just… weird? But I’ve also never been with someone this long while he has, so I feel like I can’t say much when I don’t have as much relationship experience as him. I don’t know how to move forward honestly. Should I let it go? TLDR: Boyfriend has secretly been filming me in intimate moments and I feel weird about it but he says it’s normal” - User 7 This segment from user User 7’s story precedes their initial explanation of their situation. They described finding and investigating a mysterious device in the bathroom of the apartment 177 they share with their boyfriend. She was able to log onto their computer shared cloud repository and found videos of herself in the background. When she confronted her boyfriend, he said “he didn’t think I [she] would mind because we’ve filmed during sex in the past and that long term couples do things like these because they trust and love each other. “ The quote presented here is User 7’s thoughts immediately after that confrontation and “conversation.” User 7’s boyfriend is making a claim that his behavior with technology is not just normal, but his activities represent that “they trust and love each other.” IoT IPA is difficult to identify without clear models of what kinds of IoT behavior are typical, normal, or expected. Victim survivors are also inclined to trust their intimate partner. Thus, IoT abusers challenge their victim’s internal experiences of violation with claims to normalcy and desirability surrounding non-consensual IoT use. Abusers use justifications like safety and caretaking in attempts to normalize their illicit IoT use. Doubting their own perceptions and emotions is incredibly common r/relationshipadvice. Most thread creators ask for thoughts and feedback on if their intimate partner’s behavior was okay or not. User 6 asked for interpretation from the broader community: “Opinions? Thoughts? Comments? I’m dying for advice or a second brain to process it.” Additionally, as User 7 went on to do, victim survivors solicit support from the community to gain external perspectives on their experiences. Victim survivors who create threads on r/relationship advice often reply with gratitude and appreciation for commentators who share their own experiences with IoT use in intimate relationships, unwanted or otherwise. Seeking social input on the boundaries of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ IoT use in intimate relationships is made visible in this dialogue between thread creators and commenters. Commenters center the conversation on how they evaluated their partner’s 178 activities using technology to access personal information or monitor them. In this pursuit, commenters also frequently identify a spectrum of variables, such as how they had been in the relationship and other factors, that they used to evaluate the behavior. The people who comment on the stories of IoT violations victim survivors share often draw upon their own relationships and experiences with technology in describing their perceptions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behavior, as user User 8 describes: “My husband and I share location because he was terrible about communicating when he’d be home, leaving me waiting up at night wondering if he was dead on the street. I shared my location with him as well, because fair is fair and when I go out, I like to know that someone knows where I am. I’ve known him for nearly 15 years though, and we’ve been together for 5. We had that foundation of trust built and we openly communicated about the existing issue and how to best solve it.” – User 8 User 8’s comment is in response to a victim survivor who shared their conflict with their boyfriend about using GPS location software between partners. User 8 shared how her and her husband use GPS technology on each other’s devices, and describes why she likes it and thinks it is beneficial. First, User 8 describes how the GPS locator was helpful to make sure her husband was safe when going out. She reported liking that he had access to the same information about her as well: “I like to know that someone knows where I am.” Finally, User 8 described how the length of her relationship with her husband provided a “foundation of trust” that made her comfortable doing the communication work necessary to make GPS tracking a viable solution. User 8’s comment is an archetypical example of how commenters identify relevant factors impacting the perception of IoT use as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. In this example, User 8 specifically referenced the length of the relationship and on-going confidence in their communication with one another. Other commenters re-iterate the length of the relationship and presence of any other ‘red flags’ prompting victim survivor suspicions in evaluating behavior with IoT devices. Other commenters reference numerous other factors in sharing their own 179 experiences of intimate IoT use, but most identify equal access to control devices and the data they collect as important criteria for ‘good’ behavior. To this end, User 8 specifically identified the idea of reciprocity as an important factor in evaluating intimate data relations. She emphasized that because she wanted access to her husband’s location, she gave him hers as well: “fair is fair.” These examples of support-seeking on r/relationshipadvice reveal the work victim survivors undertake to identify their experiences as legitimate abuse within social concepts of intimate violence and overcome barriers to this realization produced by the abusers’ themselves. This section centered on r/relationship advice seeking and giving illustrates how victim survivors seek social validation for their feelings of violation and harm in regards their partner’s IoT use. Moments of IoT-mediated violation become sparking points for individuals’ re-evaluating their safety and comfort in the relationship. They seek support to make sense of their often confusing and upsetting experiences and seek out validation that what happened was not okay. Beyond validation, r/relationshipadvice users will bring their experience to the community for emotional support in their moments of hurt and confusion. They draw upon feedback and shared experiences from the community to seek feedback on if what they are experiencing is ‘not okay’ and worth doing something about. Seeking this social feedback to identify what is or is not abuse provides victim survivors with social frameworks to define and legitimize their experiences of harm surrounding new, complex, and difficult to understand IoT devices. Accessing Social Support Support seeking in practice takes many forms. IoT IPA victim survivors most reported connecting with friends and family. Participants described, through the course of simply spending time with friends and family and sharing about the day-to-day happenings of their 180 lives, often their social ties were the first ones to identify and give language to uncomfortable experiences of IoT-mediated intimate behavior as ‘not okay’. Victim survivors emphasized, regardless of if they chose to take any kind of action towards their abuser/situation or not, that knowing they had a sounding board that would not judge or criticize them was central in coping with IoT IPA. This second section of the second Findings chapter centers on the novel forms of support seeking IoT IPA survivors seek out. The main take-away from this section is that IoT IPA survivors are often unaware of and actively avoid formal support services when seeking support to cope with IoT IPA. Prioritizing social support networks is not surprising in the context of any form of intimate partner abuse. However, this finding section innovates upon extant models of social support seeking through 1) IoT IPA victim survivors’ unique emphasis on informal “tech experts” imbedded within their existing social networks and 2) victim survivors actively identifying short-comings with law enforcement as a support resource specifically for IoT- mediated violations. Victim Survivors Rely Upon “Tech Experts” The interview participants revealed that when victim survivors elect to seek out social support, they almost exclusively depend on trusted, established social ties including so-called “tech experts.” “Tech experts” to individuals in their extended social network they perceive as “tech experts” to help them respond to the violence they are experiencing. Often, after talking through what’s going on with friends and family and identifying how they have been impacted by IoT misuse, their social ties will identify “tech experts” to connect with in their extended social network. Additionally, sometimes victim survivors themselves will immediately think to a cousin, childhood friend, or other connection who possesses perceived technical skills. 181 While it is known that victim survivors are most likely to seek out social support above other support resources (Evans & Feder, 2016; Yoshioka et al., 2003), this finding reveals how IoT IPA particularly seek out and utilize “tech experts” in their social networks, rather than formal resources like online tech privacy guides or tech abuse clinics, in facing the unique challenges of IoT IPA. Victim survivors rely on their friends and family to connect them with “tech experts” to help them effectively deal with their situation. In addition to access to technical expertise, victim survivors emphasize that seeking support within established, trusted networks of support fosters confidence in being vulnerability about the violence they are experiencing in their daily lives. Victim survivors report a range of negative feelings when considering going to their friends about the technology misuse they are experiencing. Often, this support seeking is due to a self-reported lack of certainty; they are often not 100% confident regarding the technical means through which they are being surveilled without their knowledge or permission. They go to their friends because they are still making sense of everything suspicious going on that they have noticed. In going to their friends, they describe fears of social scrutiny and further violation of their personal vulnerabilities. Despite these fears, victim survivors who seek out support from their friends describe being motivated to trusting their friends to possess knowledge, connections, and an outside perspective they wouldn’t have by themselves. In sharing their experiences with friends, victim survivors often go on trust their friends to have their own personal contacts with the skills and tools to tackle technical problems. Brad shared how she talked through with her friend about suspected hidden cameras in her phone, and his friend connected her with a “tech expert”: “Then she called their a friend who is an IT guy, an expert. Well that's how we managed to extract the secret recorder in my room.” - 21 Brad 182 As Brad shared, when he shared with his friend that he believed his girlfriend was somehow monitoring his day-to-day activities in her home and bedroom, this friend became a liaison between Brad and further active support-seeking. After talking through what Brad was noticing - including his girlfriend commenting on people he had over before he mentioned it to her - Brad’s friend suggested that his girlfriend may have cameras and/or microphones set up in his place. His friend called his friend, whom Brad described as “an IT guy, an expert. Brad’s friend served as a node in Brad’s extended social network to connect him to this “tech expert” as a resource. As Brad went on to describe, he hired this friend-of-a-friend to come to his apartment do a sweep for devices. The “tech expert” subsequently discovered a “secret recorder” device in Brad’s bedroom. Brad used this newfound knowledge to confront their girlfriend about the surreptitious device and eventually broke off the relationship. Accessing tech experts within victim survivor’s expanded support networks demonstrates how victim survivors place a high degree of trust in their friends. This is especially critical because, though victim survivors describe these friends-of-friends as “tech experts”, upon further pressing none of the participants identified these “tech experts” as having any kind of professional IT training such as a university degree or certification. Without discounting the remarkable technical skillsets, particularly as related to personal privacy and security, victim survivors are putting faith in these “tech experts” to help them, with their confidence primarily based in their friend’s recommendations and their relationship with the person. Sometimes, victim survivors will intentionally go to a “techie” friend in the first place for their perspective and eventual help with an intervention. As victim survivors describe when recounting their motivations to seek help from friends despite perceived possibility of stigma and other barriers, they identify a major challenge: victim 183 survivors, if they have already considered or come to consider the possibility that technology misuse might be going on, they don’t fully understand the form, function, and capabilities of these devices they report being victimized via. Even after seeking support, discovering devices being misused in the home, and exiting the relationship, victim survivors describe not being entirely sure what these devices were capable of or what data they may have captured. Thus, victim survivors describe being particularly motivated to utilize the expertise of “tech experts” in disentangling how these devices’ usage in their homes. However, inviting in a tech expert is also opening themselves to potential new vulnerabilities, and victim survivors recognize this too. They are giving this persona access to these devices and their homes with the faith that they will improve their situation, not make it worse. In the face of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge, they trust their community and the faith of their friends in the “tech experts” they suggest, despite the recognized risk of making oneself vulnerable to new people about their situation. As Melody’s recollection exemplifies, putting this confidence in the expertise of these informally accessed “tech experts” is an important strategy for feeling safe and confident in their home again. “Okay. I don't, I don't know. I'm not a professional in IT. I don't know what he actually did with my phone. Actually, I don't know the process of what he did. But after some time, he just told me my phone is now okay. I guess the tracker? I don't know where the tracker was put. He just told me after sometimes that I'm okay. That my partner will not track me anymore. He said I should not worry anymore.” Melody Melody begins sharing what happened after she sought support from her “tech expert” friend. I asked her to describe what her “tech expert” friend did to her phone and what happened after. As she shared, her knowledge of how her personal cellphone was compromised, and what needed to be done were incomplete: “I’m not a professional in IT. I don’t know what he actually did with my phone.” As Melody shared here, victim survivors frequently don’t have complete 184 knowledge or understanding of the technical interventions. Melody’s confusion here is apparent. She broadly refers to “the tracker” but was unsure about “where the tracker was put”, what information it collected, if it was a software or hardware-based tracking technology, and other functional details. Melody knew she was being surveilled and harassed with technology, and that she wanted to do something about it. But it was difficult to do without personal technical expertise and experience. As a result, victim survivors place incredible trust in these “tech experts” to have secured their devices and assuage their fears of continued surveillance. Melody was reassured by her “tech expert” friend’s claims that she “should not worry anymore.” Victim survivors also highlight the value and trust they place in “tech experts” not only because of their perceived technical expertise, but because they are already imbedded in the victim survivor’s social circle. In addition to victim survivors generally trusting their friends, they appreciate that, often, the “tech expert” personally knows the victim survivor and their partner. Victim survivors describe feeling more justified in seeking out support for their partner’s tech misuse behavior when the person they’re getting help from already has knowledge of them, their history, and the general dynamics of their relationship. In other words, friends, through the course of hanging out with each other, get to know their friends’ close ties too, including their intimate partners. This baseline of knowledge appears to be valuable to victim survivors: “I have a friend who knew about a lot actually. Not actually about it, but I tried to talk to that friend about it, and he told me that if he had Wi Fi access he could have hacked into my phone. … And he knew about kind of issues I was having with my partner. Because this friend of mine was an expert ... on the issues that my partner did. And he knew about these harms.” - Evan As Evan highlights, this friend is not just someone who she views as “tech expert.” This person is someone that Evan and her boyfriend have known for a very long time. Evan describes this person as one of her childhood best friends and someone who she has always considered 185 highly skilled and knowledgeable with technology. In talking to her friend about how her partner could be monitoring her daily activities in her own private apartment, he was the first to bring up a possible explanation. He conjectured that Evan’s boyfriend, simply by logging onto Evan’s Wi- Fi network in her apartment, which she had given him the password for, could be enough to set up and use surveillance technology in her home. Evan was not aware of this possibility until discussing with her “tech expert” friend. Many victim survivors, including Evan, enlisted their “tech expert” friends to help them with direct interventions such as sweeping their homes for hidden devices, resetting their phones, setting up a new home Wi-Fi network, and other forms of technical support. Evan goes on to discuss that this friend’s perspective was valuable because they were an “expert.” However, as Evan describes, their friend was not just an expert in IoT and home computing. They also were an “expert” “on the issues that my [Evan’s] partner did.” Evan’s tech expert friend was valued based upon their knowledge of the social context and the history of the relationship. Evan explicitly identifies both this friend’s perceived technical knowledge and their knowledge of the relationship as driving motivators in utilizing his offer for support. Evan concluded with describing how this knowledge of the relationship meant that her friend “knew about these harms” and took them seriously. Evan knew that not only would this person be a source of knowledge, but that they took the harm she was experiencing seriously and wouldn’t judge her. Victim Survivors Distrust and Avoid Formal Support Victim survivors simultaneously almost universally avoid formal support services. The next section expands upon this finding with a second set of evidence drawing upon data from r/relationshipadvice. As the current section demonstrated, victim survivors prioritize their 186 established social networks even for technical interventions traditionally imagined as belonging to the realm of formal support-seeking. The next section further highlights this trend through identifying a disparity between community commenters and victim survivors. Most community commenters suggest going to police and law enforcement. In contrast, victim survivors push back and highlight perceived short-comings to justify avoiding this support-seeking approach. IoT IPA demonstrate their avoidance of formal support seeking in their discussions on r/relationshipadvice. In capturing the back-and-forth dialogue between victim survivors and the myriad community members who provide advice and input on their experiences, victim survivors center their concerns about potential new risks and vulnerabilities formal support seeking pose. First, commentators overwhelmingly suggest that victim survivors pursue legal action related to their partner’s tech misuse. The section sections of every victim survivor’s post will contain commenters suggesting they call the police, file a restraining order, contact a lawyer, or similar legal action. In invoking these formal support services, commenters suggest these formal support services as monolithic, transformative interventions which will directly and cleanly fix the victim survivor’s problems. This pattern exemplifies cultural narratives surrounding IPA/DV support-seeking which center formal support-seeking and appear to overlook. Further, victim survivors and community members often reply to these comments advocating police and legal resources as easy or obvious solutions. They will raise personal issues and hesitancies with seeking out these types of resources such as not wanting to further disrupt their family, fears their issues will be misunderstood or neglected by the police due to involvement of technology, and other perceived barriers. This pushback against seeking support from law enforcement represents how, from the perspectives of survivors, there is a tangible 187 awareness, and by extension anxiety, about making their experiences of IoT IPA visible to formal support services. Sharing their position as a survivor of intimate violence creates new vulnerabilities for victim survivors. Support seeking always accompanies potential risk of social judgement, more third parties becoming privy to their personal information and other potential negative outcomes. Thus, IoT IPA survivors understand and anticipate that the emergent capabilities and opaque nature of tech misuse in intimate relationships creates challenges for effective support. Comments from both victim survivors and other community members exemplify this avoidance of formal support-seeking. Seeking support on r/relationshipadvice follows a distinct pattern. First, victim survivors will create a new conversation, called a thread. They will open with a usually quite lengthy and detailed (1,000+ words is not uncommon) sharing the history of their intimate relationship, the details of the IoT IPA they are experiencing, and end with a solicitation for advice, interpretation, and other support from the community. Community members will comment on this initial post. Then, often the thread creator will reply to answer questions or provide more information about their situation. It is also common for the thread creator to provide updates, particularly after they have decided to act upon advice from the community. More community members will contribute their own thoughts, expanding these discussion threads over the course of several days to a week or two. Additionally, in examining trends in the kinds of advice and suggestions commenters propose on these initial posts, community members almost always suggest reaching out to police and law enforcement. This trend persists across virtually all experiences of IoT IPA victim survivors share. Community members will implore victim survivors to act by reporting to law enforcement. Often, these community members will outline clear plans victim survivors should 188 follow to gather evidence and build a case against their abuser. User 9’s comment on a victim survivor’s story of being monitored with a smart home camera system reflects this pattern. “You need to start officially logging everything and start a paper trail with the police. You need to do this before she gets any worse and escalates any further. Getting a restraining order in place is the first step to protecting yourself should she try anything else. Also get one for your partner and potentially your Mom. Tell the police first about the messages she is claiming you’re sending so they have it on record. You need to take this seriously and do everything you can do to protect your family. Also, are you 100% sure she doesn’t have access to any of your accounts? Social media, WhatsApp, messenger services, Alexa? I’d start moving everything over to new accounts, new passwords and set up everything so you get an alert when someone is trying to log in.” - User 9 User 9 is offering suggestions to the victim survivor about how to address their abusive partner using an IoT-integrated smart camera system to monitor their activities in the home. User 9 beings with outlining the steps they view as critical for preparing to go to the police. The first step is to “start a paper trail with the police.” First, they tell them to “start officially logging everything.” User 9 argues that keeping a detailed record of the abuser’s activities, including the “messages” they abuser was logging into the victim survivor’s social media and iMessage accounts to send, is critical so the police can “have it on record.” User 9 posits this record- keeping and approaching law enforcement as required before “she gets any worse and escalates any further.” This commenter argues that approaching the police is time sensitive for providing best results. They implore this victim survivor to begin a “paper trail” with the police before what they view as inevitable escalation and further problems. Additionally, User 9’s comment exemplifies the trend in these comments that commenters don’t simply suggest or encourage reaching out to law enforcement. They situate reaching out to law enforcement as an imperative or necessity for their situation. Commenters equate reaching out to law enforcement as the responsible choice for prioritizing their personal well-being. User 9 indicated this ideology in several elements of this comment. They state “You 189 need to take this seriously and do everything you can do to protect your family.” A universal belief with r/relationshipadvice users is that seeking support from law enforcement is synonymous with properly addressing the severity of the situation and taking the abuse “seriously.” To this end, User 9 equates approaching the police as “protecting yourself.” Finally, User 9 demonstrates another common trend: offering technical insights and advice. Commenters on r/relationshipadvice will often offer detailed strategies for personal privacy and security in digital interfaces. They will ask questions about potential vulnerabilities and likely security breaches the victim survivor may not be aware of. User 9 questioned the thread creator: “are you 100% sure she doesn’t have access to any of your accounts?” User 9 went on to suggest they go through all their social media accounts and create “new accounts, new passwords.” Additionally, they suggest setting up alerts for these new accounts to monitor failed password attempts and new browser logins as a measure to identify another person, such as the abuser, attempting to gain access. This type of ‘tech support’ typically accompanies suggestions to seek support from law enforcement. In addition to repeatedly suggesting law enforcement, victim survivors will simultaneously prompt victim survivors to unilaterally end the relationship. When suggesting victim survivors seek out support from law enforcement, commenters will also suggest completely cutting off the relationship, regardless of constraints such as situation. Commenters equate ending the relationship as a necessary component of maximizing the potential benefits of seeking support from law enforcement. Throwaway Account 3 demonstrates this pattern in their comment. “Did you have a conversation about how long the camera was there and where the recordings were going? Because you really fucking need to. This POS could have hours and hours of recordings of you doing private things. If he's sick enough to film you in the first place, who knows what he might do with the footage. ETA: You don't owe him 190 anything. It's his problem how he gets to work. If him leaving is going to cause you to struggle, get another roommate. Having him in your home is not worth the violation to your privacy.” - Throwaway Account 3 Throwaway Account 3 is replying to a victim survivor’s story. The victim survivor in this case reported discovering a wireless hidden camera hidden in her bathroom. She reported that the camera appeared to be aimed at her toilet and shower. The thread creator wants to end the relationship but expressed concerns about affording her rent without him in the picture. This comment from Throwaway Account 3, after encouraging her to contact the police first a foremost, argues that she should kick him out and end the relationship immediately. Throwaway Account 3 says “You don't owe him anything. It's his problem how he gets to work.” Throwaway Account 3 is referring to the victim survivor’s concern that, without her driving him to and from work, Throwaway Account 3 goes on to respond to the paying rent concern with the comment “get another roommate.” Throwaway Account 3 views this as an obvious, reasonable compromise and that the “violation to your [victim survivor’s] privacy” should overshadow these other hesitancies. Finally, Throwaway Account 3’s comment also appears to overlook or at least fail to mention potential new legal problems kicking him out may create, such as tenancy laws, or considering that the abuser’s name may be on the apartment lease. In addition to material and legal complications, victim survivors also push back against seeking the support of law enforcement for personal mental health reasons. User Throwaway Account 4 represents this perspective in her reply to dozens of comments on her post suggesting she seek support from the police. “Edit: 1. I just wanted to mention that because we've been together for 8 years a lot of our stuff is shared etc etc including cats, cars, expensive bed, and more. I know these things can be talked about but just packing my stuff and leaving is not an option for me. 2. Calling the cops is the last thing I want to do. I'm asking for help with talking about the subject not what to do with the info, as stated in my post I have anxiety and calling 191 the police would put so much more of that and stress on me I want to avoid it unless he escalates the issue” -Throwaway Account 4 Throwaway Account 4’s quote begins with “Edit” because of how Reddit’s user interface is structured. Users can edit the text of their posts after the initial posting. Doing so adds “Edit’ to the revised text. On r/relationshipadvice, it is the norm for IoT IPA survivors to, after receiving comments and feedback, edit their initial postings to offer further information and clarification. Throwaway Account 4 opposes the tidal wave of suggestions to 1) leave her boyfriend immediately and 2) contact law enforcement. She shares that she has been with her boyfriend “for 8 years” and they have shared ownership of pets, furniture, and vehicles. With this constraint, she does not see leaving without discussing these issues as an option. Throwaway Account 4 goes on the state that contacting the police “is the last thing I want to do.” She describes that her “anxiety” and the “stress” contacting the police would add to her life takes contacting them out of consideration for the time being. She also explicitly orients her wishes for further social support from the online community. She re-iterates “I’m asking for help with talking about the subject not what to do with the info”, referring to initial request asking for help on how to communicate with her boyfriend about the tech abuse. In the face of this strong coalition suggesting the police as a cornerstone of valuable support seeking for IoT IPA survivors, victim survivors in the community express apprehension. Thread creators and other community members also push back about the potential risks and shortcomings of approaches like going to the police or hiring a lawyer. User 10’s comment highlights some of these concerns considering IoT IPA. “All those articles fretting about hackers exploiting smart devices and missing the big picture that it's going to be authorized people using it to abuse each other instead. Yikes. Your partner sounds not just insecure but really impulsive. You can try and discuss boundaries and them chilling out, but I don't think anyone would fault you for leaving either.” - User 10 192 User 10 is replying to a thread creator who was seeking advice from the community about her partner installing a wireless camera in their living room. In contrast to other commenters suggesting seeking out support from police and similar approaches, User 10 identifies narratives surrounding criminalization of forms of tech abuse, such as “hackers’, are “missing the big picture.” They go on to describe how “authorized people” create interpersonal, contextual vulnerabilities which create immediate and relevant harms. These interpersonal harms are interpreted as different from anonymous “hacking” and stranger-based exploitation. These lived experiences make salient how user-authorized actors drive lived experiences of intimate harm in IoT ecosystems. User 10’s recognition that abuse is a human behavior choice, and not the sole responsibility of technology, underlies the pushback from victim survivors and community members. User 10 connects this interpretation to the fact that so much IoT IPA occurs not via hacking or other traditional forms of cybercrime, but through shared physical space and violations of the trust that entails. However, many commenters, even when recognizing shortcomings of the police, particularly specific challenges for IoT IPA survivors, they still center legal resources as the core advisable support seeking strategy. User 11 demonstrates this recognition of police short- comings and offer alternative methods of engagement with the legal system to address IoT IPA. “If the police suck where you live, hire a lawyer to send him a no trespassing letter. Hopefully these steps will scare him back into acting like a normal human, otherwise you'll have better evidence for an order of protection”- User 11 User 11 opens their comment with the disclaimer “If the police suck where you live”, seemingly in response to the victim survivor’s initial posting expressing hesitancy to involve law enforcement. However, in their further elaboration, their suggestions continue to center around legal mechanisms as the driver of effective support seeking. User 11 is offering advice to a thread 193 creator who suspects her ex-boyfriend installed a GPS tracker in vehicle and a wireless camera outdoor on her property. User 11 suggests that this victim survivor “hire a lawyer to send him a no trespassing letter.” This user posits that this act may “scare him” into stopping the behavior. User 11 also justifies setting up the no trespassing letter because, should the abuser’s behavior escalate, it will provide the victim survivor with “better evidence for an order of protection.” Even when recognizing potential inefficiencies or shortcomings with law enforcement as support for IoT IPA survivors, community commenters repeatedly center police support as a potential future option or necessity and orient their advice regarding the legal system around that fact. Victim survivor stories capture how IoT IPA victim survivors anticipate seeking support, including fears of social stigma, desire for advice and feedback from others about their situation, and desire for tangible knowledge for strategies for combatting IoT-mediated violations. These stories offer insight into the informal support seeking practices which drive how IoT IPA victim survivors seek social legitimization to validate their firsthand experiences of harm. Additionally, in accessing social support, IoT IPA victim survivors relied upon their most trusted informal social ties. Friends as families served as sounding boards and prompted access to informal “tech experts” to support victim survivors. “Tech experts” were valued for possessing both perceived technical knowledge and contextual knowledge of the victim survivor’s personal situation and social network. The practices IoT IPA victim survivors demonstrate when anticipating and accessing support reveal how social sensemaking and informal resources drive how victim survivors work to identify their experiences as abuse and engage in efforts to reclaim their personal safety. In addition, IoT IPA victim survivors demonstrate how the need for support extends beyond directly facing an abuser or attempting to leave an abuse situation. 194 Aftermath: Altering Social and Technical Protective Strategies in the Wake of IoT IPA In the aftermath of seeking support and leaving an IoT IPA abuse situation, IoT IPA survivors remain actively aware of, and in turn impacted by, their experiences of IoT IPA. Their experiences of intimate harm relate to global shifts when making decisions about using social computing technology in the future. First, interviewees identified how, due to a lack of knowledge and confidence in social computing technology, alongside an explicit recognition of IoT IPA being driven by their abuser’s behavior, avoiding people they view as likely to abuse technology becomes a driving criterion in their future intimate relationships. In identifying potential protective strategies against IoT IPA in the future, interviewed victim survivors identify a critical protective strategy as being avoiding people who then identify as likely to misuse IoT. In tandem with this, victim survivors describe becoming more reserved in the intimate information they choose to share with their existing family and friends. In other words, rather than technical or legal protective strategies, survivors overwhelmingly report social decision-making as their protective strategy of choice. In the face of technical complexity and incomplete understanding of threats related to technology misuse, social behavior and decision-making becomes the perceived locus of control to protect oneself going forward. An important piece of context for this finding is that all the interview participants self- identified as having left the intimate relationship(s) in which they experienced IoT IPA. This is, at least in part, a self-selection bias - individuals who have left the relationship in which they experienced harm likely feel safer to participate in an online videoconferencing-based interview. Victim survivors face cultural, personal, and socioeconomic barriers to leaving abuse partners. On average, it takes a victim survivor seven attempts to successfully leave an abusive relationship (Why It’s So Difficult to Leave, 2023). Even purported ‘success stories’ of victim 195 survivors who have left IoT IPA abusers reveal how victim survivors remain impacted by their experiences of IoT IPA. These extended impacts are relevant for not only for understanding how victim survivor support seeking, but also reveal how IoT IPA victim survivors change their personal privacy behavior online and offline based in their experiences of harm and violation. Social Choices as Core Protective Strategy Tracy’s interview comment demonstrates this orientation towards prioritizing social decision-making. The people an individual intentionally chooses to spend time with and share parts of their life with become major locus of personal protection and personal privacy in the wake of experiencing IoT IPA. “Don't get into a toxic relationship where somebody has to monitor me and track me. In my case, my boyfriend was tracking me that meant he didn't trust me, because he was tracking me tracking my messages and diverting my calls. So I think it's, yeah, it's not like a technical one, but practical, like, I can choose my friends who can trust me and they can trust me because I trust them.” - Tracy This quotation is part of Tracy’s response to the interview protocol question centered on individuals’ self-described personal privacy behavior. When asked about how Tracy’s experiences of IoT IPA has impacted, if it all, her approach to personal privacy and security online, Tracy immediately identified “Don’t get into a toxic relationship” as her strategy moving forward. Tracy begins with describing her abusive relationship as “toxic” because her ex felt the need to “monitor and track me [her].” A lack of trust is repeatedly identified by victim survivors as the driving force in why abusers use IoT and other technology to manipulate, harass, and invade their privacy. This is evidenced by how Tracy attributes her boyfriend’s surveillance activities to a lack of trust: “that meant he didn’t trust me.” Tracy goes on to describe this trust as reciprocal. She argues that going forward, she wants to choose “friends” who she believes trust her in turn. She wants to choose friends and 196 other people in her life who “trust me because I trust them.” Tracy emphasizes that trust is not something one individual can decide. Everybody involved in the relationship must remain committed to that trust to maintain a healthy, positive relationship. Finally, Tracy explicitly compares technical protective strategies versus non-technical protective strategies. She explicitly describes her approach to protect herself going forward as “not like a technical one, but practical.” Tracy explicitly contrasts her perceived autonomy to choose the people in her life, “I can choose my friends”, with what she perceives as a not practical “technical” approach. This perspective emphasizes that victim survivors often prioritize strengthening and improving their core social networks as a support seeking strategy during abuse and in moving forward. Next, a post-IoT IPA orientation towards altered social behavior is also represented with victim survivors discussing tech-mediated socialization. Victim survivors report changes in how they use social media, text messages, and other platforms after experiencing IoT IPA. Mr. Wine shared his experience: “Yeah, I'll recall, especially when I noticed about about the app that was monitoring my messages. So like, I'll say, it was hard for me also to like, go on and socialize anymore. Because, like, I've felt that maybe she will do the same. So like, I had that fear of using the internet maybe to socialize with people. So I'll drive as much as to meet people in person. So that I will not be like, exposed with the confidentiality that we share with the person.” - Mr. Wine Mr. Wine’s ex-girlfriend installed a tracker on his cellphone alongside a microphone in his bedroom. In reflecting on the relationship Mr. Wine identified how, after being surveilled by “the app that was monitoring my messages”, he faced new challenges with socializing in general. He attributed it being “hard” to “go on and socialize anymore” due to this new fear that other people would behave like his ex-girlfriend. 197 Mr. Wine went on to describe feeling particularly vulnerable communicating with people online. He feared that they would misuse the platform “the same” as his ex-girlfriend. In response to this, Mr. Wine shared that he prioritized socializing offline as much as possible: “I’ll drive as much as to meet people in person.” He stated that making this effort to meet people in person was in the pursuit of preventing or reducing the possibility that his trust and vulnerability would be violated through the online platforms as happened with his ex-girlfriend. His efforts to avoid his “confidentiality that we share with the person” becoming “exposed” exemplifies the trend of victim survivors becoming more hesitant using online platforms to meet new friends and intimate partners. These two interviewees centered their post-IoT IPA personal protective strategies as being rooted in choosing trustworthy friends and avoiding talking to people online. Their changes in approaches to tech-mediated personal safety exemplify how interviewees recognize that IoT IPA is driven by individual human choices but are simultaneously cognizant that technological interfaces introduce amplified and expanded vulnerabilities in malicious hands. In the wake of surviving IoT IPA, vulnerability and being “exposed” become not just potential realities, but material expectations which remain possible in new contexts with new people. The next section examines how victim survivors report changes in how they approach personal privacy and security on the Internet. Victim survivors remain actively impacted by their experiences of IoT IPA through their discussions of how they engage with user interfaces in efforts to prioritize their safety. Broad Shifts in Mental Approaches to Online Privacy IoT IPA victim survivors report global, high-level shifts in their beliefs about personal privacy online. In the wake of living through IoT IPA firsthand, unexpected, and invisible 198 violations become a salient possibility and expectation in future tech-mediated engagements. Prior to experiencing IoT IPA, victim survivors had not critically considered potential risks of not just the devices involved in the misuse they experienced, but their everyday interactions with social computing technology at large. Their lack of awareness about the reach and breadth of security permissions was only made salient after harm occurred. Victim survivors describe how this salient possibility of future violations in tech-mediated intimacies create new patterns in their interpersonal privacy behaviors. This includes social behaviors, which participants describe as taking particular care and caution in choosing future friends and intimate partners. This shift manifests in actions like avoiding online interactions. Victim survivors also report an amplification of protective strategies when using computing interfaces and the Internet generally. Victim survivors report broad shifts in their orientation towards personal privacy and protective strategies in their engagement with Internet-connected technologies at large, even far beyond the sociotechnical context the original misuse occurred within. Survivors described their technical approaches to privacy decision-making (activities such as changing passwords, deleting their web browser history and so on) in ways that are often abstract. Their models of how these activities connect to their experiences of violence, and how they view their protective capacities going forward, are fragmented. The core of this finding is precisely this: victim survivors recognize vulnerabilities amplified by digital platforms, but in the face of confusion and incomplete mental models, adopt broad orientations towards using the Internet and general. This take-away points towards a significant need to connect existing resources, alongside developing new interventions based upon this study and others, to IoT IPA survivors even after they have left an abusive relationship. 199 All interview participants reported - before, during, and after experiencing IoT IPA - having incomplete, fragmented mental concepts about what IoT could do. Statements like “I don’t know exactly what happened” or “I don’t know how he did that” were repeated by interviewees. These feelings of vulnerability and confusion were amplified for victim survivors who were completely in the dark about a device being used until after seeking support or finding a device themselves. Considering these challenges, victim survivors describe a variety of orientations towards using Internet-connected technologies in the future. First, many victim survivors report changing the type of personal information they share on social media, over text messages, or similar modalities. Victim survivors report that, when using social technology, they feel more reserved and hesitant in sharing personal information. “Yeah, it's really hard. It's really hard. Using the Internet nowadays, and even now I'm using, I'm not using I deleted my Facebook account ... I feel insecure, just live with pseudo accounts that doesn't express, it doesn't portray my image into the Internet society. I feel unsafe. Nowadays, even using websites. It's really hard for me accepting cookies, haha.” - Ronaldo Interviewee Ronaldo shared that protecting himself online is “really hard” after experiencing IoT IPA. His ex-girlfriend installed smart home cameras throughout his home and blackmailed him with the footage. After leaving the relationship, he shared several protective approaches he took. First, he shared that he “deleted my [his] Facebook account.” He went on to describe that his remaining online accounts, including an email account, are “pseudo accounts.” He elaborated that, due to his hesitancies with sharing personal information online, he felt that his online profiles did not “portray my image” authentically to people online. Ronaldo goes on further to describe feeling “unsafe” using websites in general and accepting “cookies” and other data related to his online activities. 200 Ronaldo’s engagement with the Internet at large, particularly around sharing personal information, highlights how victim survivors orient their protective strategies far beyond the material context they experienced intimate abuse. Victim survivors repeatedly describe broad, generalized changes to their online activities such as posting fewer details on social media or being more restrictive on what permissions they afford websites. Ronaldo’s reported experiences of intimate abuse primarily centered around hidden wireless cameras in his living space. But he identified changes to his personal protective strategies being centered on his Internet activities more broadly, with his new strategies centered around general web browsing and social media use. This trend suggests victim survivors’ threshold for online risk-taking, self-disclosure, and acceptance of online activity tracking are altered by experiencing IoT IPA in the home. Next, victim survivors justify their expanded and amplified perceptions of online vulnerabilities. They describe how, due to living through IoT IPA, a transformed worldview in which tech-mediated violence becomes a salient possibility permeating their perspectives on daily Internet use. Again, this hesitancy persists far beyond the material context the IoT IPA violations occurred in. Tera describes this shift when sharing her post-IoT IPA personal privacy activities online. “After that incident in all, my websites, the browser, browsing history, the process anytime I went online, looking for anything, I would clear my data because before I really didn't imagine that hacking was normal function. So you know, then I changed my statement password, all my passwords in the phone, accessing different apps. Yeah, I changed my number. Because back then I couldn’t imagine that it was possible the first time. So the second time is possible. So I had to pick another phone number, the one that he doesn't know. So, so that it can be a bit same that motivation I had back then. Yeah.” - Tera Tera shared that, after leaving her ex-boyfriend, she overhauled many of her online accounts. She described how she would actively make sure to “clear my [her] data” anytime she used the Internet. She also shared how she changed her passwords for her bank statements, her 201 phone login, and her phone applications. She also changed her phone number to make sure her ex wouldn’t know her active number. Tera rooted this approach in what she articulated as the newfound realization of what kinds of personal violations were possible across “different apps” and the Internet at large. Tera described how “After that incident”, referring to being harassed and surveilled without her knowledge via her ex’s Alexa system and GPS bug on her phone, she began to imagine “hacking was a normal function.” As was the case with all the interviewees, Tera and the other interviewees commonly referred to IoT IPA violations as “hacking”, through their abusive partner’s typically were not “hacking” in the traditional sense. Abusers socially pressured victim survivors to share their passwords or simply installed devices without their knowledge. These devices, being owned and operated by the abuser, were technically not hacked. Considering her experiences, Tera emphasized that experiencing IoT IPA firsthand made her acknowledge that future violations were possible for her. Her words “hacking was a normal function” suggest she views future violations as more than a possibility, but an expectation. She went on to share how this shift in her thinking motivated her extensive personal protection activities across numerous online platforms and accounts. This awareness sprang from her firsthand experiences of IoT IPA. “back then I couldn’t imagine that it was possible the first time.” Prior to experiencing those types of violations, she did not have any model of what intimate IoT violations looked like. But, after living through that violation and the consequences, possibilities of harm in future engagements with technology became visible and were interwoven with her day-to-day use of technology. This new perspective makes a “second time”, another experience of abuse, perceived as “possible” and motivates her to take active preventative steps. 202 In the aftermath of IoT IPA, victim survivors’ thoughts and behaviors transform to encompass technical and social dimensions of future protection, with loci of action centered around cutting off informational access from a former partner(s) and exercising heightened caution in future engagements. This aftermath reflects how victim survivors anticipated seeking support and how they described accessing support while still being involved with their IoT abuser. In anticipating support seeking, victim survivors fear social stigma, and respond by seeking interpretation and affirmation in the relative anonymity r/relationshipadvice offers. In accessing support, victim survivors rely on their most trusted ties for emotional affirmation and technical expertise while simultaneously rejecting formal support services such as law enforcement due to fears of dismissal and further vulnerability. In the wake of overcoming IoT IPA abuse situations, victim survivors articulate amplified sensitivity to preserve their personal privacy in social encounters and computer use. Virtually all victim survivors never gained complete access or understanding of the devices used by their abuser, including all the details of what personal information collected. This uncertainty manifests are broad Internet privacy behaviors, such as deleting all social media or shifting to exclusively using private web- browsing. Victim survivors’ continued fear and uncertainty suggest ample opportunity not just for further support seeking, but a necessity for accessible, accurate tools to help victim survivors develop personal privacy skills. Educational tools and resources centered on tangible expectations for what data web platforms and IoT capture regarding user data will support victim survivors personal decision making. However, without radical reimagining of the ease of access IoT afford abusive actors, placing the impetus of protective behavior on victim survivors overlooks foundational concerns for privacy, agency, and consent in IoT ecosystems. 203 Conclusion Across traditional and tech abuse, social support seeking is the most common way victim survivors share their firsthand experiences and begin the path to seeking support (Fanslow & Robinson, 2010; Evans & Feder, 2016). Giving language and social recognition to experiences of intimate violence has tangible impacts for victim survivor outcomes and having a strong social support network decreases likelihood of adverse physical and mental health outcomes and other harms (Lee, Pomeroy, & Bowman, 2007). However, no data exists examining how the intersection of IoT with IPA may create new barriers and challenges for victim survivors seeking social support. IoT is difficult for people to understand in terms of functional capacities, data capture and sharing, and awareness of illicit capabilities in the hands of abusive actors (Kwon et al., 2018; Page et al., 2018; Garg et al., 2019) which may make effective support seeking more challenging. The stories of victim survivors across the interviews and forum discussions highlight how IoT-IPA victim survivors consistently face unique barriers in seeking support for their firsthand experiences. First, in anticipating talking to loved ones about the abuse they experienced, victim survivors fear social stigma. They fear that their concerns about abuse won’t be taken seriously, diminished, or otherwise perceived as not ‘real’ abuse. In response to fears about social scrutiny from close times, victim survivors described seeking out resources and advice online, including advice on r/relationship, for help determining if their experiences are ‘real’ abuse or not. Next, I found that when victim survivors seek support, they usually avoid formal support services like law enforcement, online information like the Safety Net Project guides, and healthcare professionals. Instead of these resources, victim survivors seek out close friends and friends-of- friends who they perceive as having high levels of general technical literacy, who they describe 204 as “tech experts”. Victim survivors describe their prioritization of these support networks based upon their knowledge of both technical skills and the victim survivors’ personal situation. Finally, victim survivors shared strategies in preventing future tech-mediated intimate abuse. To this end, victim survivors identified a desire to form bonds with people who simply would choose to not not misuse IoT and similar technologies. Additionally, many victims survivors identified amplified, broad hesitancies about socializing with technology in the future. Victim survivors describe preferring to date and meet new people offline. Chapter 5’s findings demonstrate how the involvement of IoT in intimate abuse makes support seeking more challenging. Victim survivors fear that because they don’t fully understand the technology or are not experiencing physical violence, that their experience of abuse is not as ‘real’. Based upon these anxieties, victim survivors go to great lengths to seek out avenues, including posting in online forums, to share their stories and seek community input on their experiences. They depend on community support to give language and legitimacy to their perceived experiences of harm and abuse. This finding suggests efforts to educate and prevent IoT-mediated IPA would benefit from focusing on offline and online communities. In actively seeking out support resources, victim survivors almost universally favor reaching out to close social ties versus formal institutions. Zero interviewees or discussants on r/relationshipadvice mentioned using or being aware of resources considered seminal by tech abuse experts such as the NCADV’s Safety Net Project. These findings build upon what we know about effective support seeking surrounding intimate abuse in two main ways. First, most current approaches to support focus on making support services visible for victim survivors such as through advertising and educational programs (i.e. Lupton, 2020; McCleary-Sills et al., 2016). However, the findings from IoT IPA 205 victim survivors demonstrate that trust is the driving factor in what support services IoT IPA victim survivors seek out. IoT IPA victim survivors push back against suggestions to involve law enforcement due to fears they will not be helpful or cause further problems. They reach out to trusted “tech experts” in their extended social networks based upon an established foundation of trust in these individuals combined with perceived technical expertise. Based upon these findings, advocacy resources would benefit from establishing networks of trust with the communities they serve around tech abuse. This could include general community workshops surrounding online security and privacy. Establishing these networks of trust before community members experience IoT IPA will establish ties making support seeking more likely. Additionally, current approaches to support do not recognize how IoT IPA victim survivors may not be aware that their experiences of harm are recognized as a form of IPA. Victim survivors solicit interpretation from their friends and online communities not just for support – often, their initial efforts are centered around sharing the narrative of what they are experiencing and seeking input if what’s going on qualifies as a problem. Future research should examine how to help victim survivors articulate their boundaries and expectations surrounding technology use in their relationships, including identifying violations. As #MeToo did for public awareness and education surrounding sexual violence at large (Mendes & MacMillan, 2019), IoT IPA needs similar cultural movements to increase awareness of these merging forms of intimate violence. Finally, victim survivors report far-reaching anxieties about their personal safety far beyond the technical contexts of the IoT-mediated IPA they experienced. This suggests the impacts of experiencing IoT-mediated IPA bleed over into other user contexts and continue to cause victim survivors harm. Education on reasonable, accurate privacy and security 206 expectations across different Internet platforms could be a beneficial starting place for empowering victim survivors’ decision making online. 207 CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION Introduction The stories of resilience and survival captured in the interviews and online ethnography demonstrate how current IoT infrastructures place the burden of action and responsibility on victim survivors rather than making actual abusers accountable. The people most targeted and harmed by IoT are the ones responsible for accountability in cases of IoT IPA. Victim survivors rely on their trusted social networks to disentangle the anxiety and confusion that IoT-mediated IPA introduces to the on-going patterns of harassment and manipulation in abusive relationships. The misuse forensics finding demonstrates how IoT-mediated abuse amplifies the burden of not just response, but identification of illicit technology use on already vulnerable victim survivors. Additionally, victim survivors experience distrust in formal institutions due to challenges around recognizing tech abuse as a form of intimate abuse. Current approaches to consent and user control in IoT ecosystems overlook meaningful, dynamic models of user consent. Additionally, IoT ecosystems centralize control and power. This is convenient for users to manage whole home ecosystems. However, this is a problem in the hands of abusers. These findings demonstrate how current approaches to consent and accountability in IoT ecosystems will continue to harm victim survivors. Creating equitable and safe IoT infrastructures will require radical transformation in control, access, and accountability measures for consumer devices. The explosive popularity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is a paradigm shift in how people use computers in everyday life. The Internet of Things are the most widely adopted realization of ubiquitous computing’s vision of computing as “concrete information conveyers” 208 (Weiser 1993, p. 76), physical objects imbedded with computing hardware to support day-to-day activities. Imbedding household electronics, ranging from security systems to kitchen appliances, with sensors and networking capabilities situate everyday items as active, learning agents. IoT are made invisible through their automation and through being interwoven into physical devices (Shaw et al., 2019). The Internet of Things change the ease, degree, and scope of access possible for the integration of computing into everyday routines. Computer mice and keyboards are exchanged for the sensory data present in the everyday environment - no intentional interaction is required. Camera, microphones, movement sensors, energy trackers, thermometers and other IoT capabilities weave rich tapestries of daily activities from the physical environments the devices are implemented in. Based upon these capabilities, Internet of Things devices expand how much data from human environments can be captured and what that data can do because IoT are not intended for use in isolation. Popular IoT product lines, such as the Amazon Alexa line, Ring doorbell interfaces, and Nest smart thermostats, are out of the box compatible with thousands of other Internet of Things devices. Further, many Internet of Things are relatively inexpensive (the Amazon Alexa line of personal assistants starts around $20 USD) and easy to set up, further incentivizing household networks with dozens of devices. These environmental data flows create new flows of data visualizations for users as well. Through simply opening a smartphone app or using a voice command, users can live video feeds from home camera systems, recall a query log of voiced Alexa commands, check their home’s electricity use for the month, program their coffee maker to start their favorite brew, and other daily tasks. 209 The Internet of Things phenomenon is predicted to continue growing exponentially. The National Institute of Standards and Technology predict by 2025, there will be over 75 billion IoT devices in use, or over nine devices for every human being on Earth (Vailshery, 2023). IoT devices support convenience, connection, and resource saving in everyday life. Additionally, their usefulness for under resourced communities has been well-documented, such as the value of audio interfaces for blind users and companionship for elderly people living alone (Domingo, 2012), supporting dignity and autonomy for users. But, the Internet of Things’ autonomous function, invisibility, integration, extensive use of sensors, and cross-contextual applications create opportunities for interpersonal harms. In the hands of an abusive actor, the capacities of Internet of Things devices facilitate new platforms for intimate abusers to surveil, threaten, and harass their intimate partners. Tech abuse, computer-mediated interpersonal personal, has been widely evidenced on social media, particularly cases of identity-based harassment online and cyberstalking (NW et al., 2021). However, how the unique capacities of Internet of Things devices, and their material embodiment in intimate relationships and domestic spaces, intersect with current knowledge and best practices in identifying and preventing intimate partner abuse. This dissertation project centered on identifying how the implementation of Internet of Things devices, rooted in the experiences of real-world IoT IPA victim survivors, inform a richer understanding of the role computing plays in intimate partner abuse. Reviewing Project Goals Chapter 1 introduced the Internet of Things as creating new contexts, and by extension new exploitable capacities, for tech-mediated intimate harms. This introductory chapter defined the Internet of Things, a diverse constellation of technologies, as unified by embodiment in 210 physical objects and capabilities to transmit data between devices. Despite widespread tech abuse and severe physical and other risks to victims of tech abuse (Cares et al., 2021), empirical inquiries have not yet captured foundational details about the role Internet of Things devices may play in intimate abuse. Risk factors, frequency rates, contexts in which abuse occurs, firsthand experiences of victim survivors, support-seeking strategies, and resource utilization, and impacts of victim survivors have not yet been examined from the perspective of IoT IPA victim survivors. Internet of Things devices are varied and complex, and no two experiences of intimate abuse are identical. To make tangible an example of IoT IPA, I described Maggie’s story. Her experience navigating her ex-boyfriend, her child’s father, installing remote-operated video cameras and microphones in her home demonstrated the challenges of identifying and responding to IoT-mediated intimate partner abuse. The ease of obfuscation, perceived impenetrability of device functions and data collection, and social entanglements of confronting her ex make effectively responding to IoT IPA abuse challenging and creates barriers for effective support. The value of critically examining IoT IPA from the perspective of victim survivors is justified by rapid proliferation of IoT technology alongside COVID-19 motivated increases in intimate partner abuse overall, the potential of IoT to amplify coercive control behaviors, the multifaceted use contexts of IoT, IoT’s historical neglect in cybercrime discourse and legal mechanisms for accountability, and a lack of empirical studies. Chapter 2 contextualizes the Internet of Things within interdisciplinary social science literature defining intimate partner abuse. Intimate partner abuse remains common. Interpersonal harassment based around sex and gender on the Internet is also common, with 41% of Americans reporting firsthand experiences of online harassment (Duggan, 2017). Addressing intimate partner abuse is challenging. Social and cultural dynamics entrench, and are reinforced by, 211 conditions legitimizing violence and authority in intimate relationships. Intimate partner abuse is a cyclical process rooted in power and control with periods of escalation, explosion, and reconciliation which amplify over time. Additionally, the criminal justice system’s adaptation to rampant cybercrime and cyberstalking has been incomplete. Chapter 2 further discussed the emergent vulnerabilities within IoT device ecosystems within feminist human computer interaction and human-centered privacy discussions. Feminist HCI’s emphasis on historically marginalized groups and design research driven by the users and communities most impacted by the design problem has identified how technology embodies dynamics of gender and power in the way technology takes on social meaning. Ubiquitous computing, a broader orientation in computing research the Internet of Things is a particularly widespread example of, has been critiqued for not fully considering how, as use experiences and contexts expands, so do surprising, unintended opportunities for harm. Finally, seeking support from social ties and formal resources is core strategy for intimate abuse victim survivors and predicts more positive victim survivor outcomes. In addition to social and legal support seeking barriers, human-centered privacy scholarship argues that computing contexts like IoT create challenges for users’ meaningful, informed consent with devices. Current single user-oriented design approaches to security do not adequately allow adaptation in the change of social realities, such as intimate abuse. Chapter 3 outlined the methodological approach used to answer the project’s three research questions: 1) How do IPA perpetrators deploy IoT as mediators of abuse 2) How does IoT mediated intimate partner abuse rely on both consensual and non-consensual practices? 3) How do victim survivors of IoT seek support (social and technological)? To answer these questions, I used a qualitative methodological approach composed of semi- 212 structured interviews and an online ethnography of r/relationship advice discussions centered around IOT abuse and victim survivor support seekin. Chapter 3 opened with a discussion of the orientations drawn from feminist epistemologies to center lived experiences of IoT IPA victim survivors, consider social and cultural context, use trauma-informed procedures to develop study instruments, and develop the study and align contributions with impacted communities. Reviewing Project Findings Chapter 4 discussed the misuse forensics cognitive process IoT IPA victim survivors undertook to identify, verify, and respond to IoT IPA occurring in their homes. Misuse forensics is prompted by IoT devices being misused in secret. Participants describe being unaware devices are in use, but they suspect their partner is violating their privacy through secondhand information. The nomenclature of forensics captures the idea of investigating the scene of a committed crime for details and evidence to piece together the story of what happened. Victim survivors know a ‘crime’, IoT-mediated non-consensual surveillance, has occurred based on their partners’ knowledge and behavior. Even without physical evidence of devices, victim survivors experience the violation’s consequences and shift their perspective to seek out evidence as to what exactly is going on. Misuse forensics occurs via three stages. First, suspecting is prompted by a victim survivor’s recognition of their partner having knowledge about their daily and activities which should be materially impossible for them to possess. Second, processing evidence and considering explanations is prompted by victim survivors suspicions that their partner is doing something in secret to access private, personal information. This stage is characterized by victim survivor’s heightened attention to their partner and the environment. In addition to increased sensitization to their partner’s behavior, victim survivors critically consider potential narratives of how their partner is monitoring them. These 213 potential explanations are tested and evolve in response to new ‘data’ derived from observing their partner’s behavior over time. Finally, taking action occurs when internal processing and observation transforms into external actions towards addressing the situation, such as confronting their abuser directly or destroying a discovered device. Misuse forensics is cyclical, and the three-stage process begins anew in the face of the abuser employing new surreptitious IoT surveillance techniques and devices. Chapter 5 describes the second set of project findings centered on the before, during, and aftermath of IoT IPA victim survivors seeking out informal and formal support. In anticipating seeking support, victim survivors identified their motivation to seek input and interpretation of their experiences by their social communities. Victim survivors seek this support to identify their experiences as legitimate (or not) experiences of intimate abuse which merit support seeking. Having other people name their stories as violence and abuse gives victim survivors confidence to seek support. In considering barriers to considering seeking out social support, social stigma is the most clearly and consistently identified barrier, with male participants describing stereotypes surrounding male victims, while women participants describe fear of social scrutiny. Next, while seeking out support, victim survivors prioritize their established, trusted social networks for support. These extended social networks connect victim survivors to “tech experts”, friends-of-friends and other secondary connections in their social circle perceived as trustworthy and informed about technology issues. In tandem with seeking support from “tech experts, “victim survivors actively push back against universal suggestions to seek the support from police and law enforcement. Finally, victim survivors how they actively consider strategies to protect themselves from future IoT-mediated violations after leaving an abusive intimate partnership involving IoT IPA. In the face of incomplete and uncertain understanding of IoT 214 capabilities, IoT IPA victim survivors repeatedly focus on social protective strategies, choosing trustworthy friends and lovers, as the locus of their personal protective strategies. Finally, in the wake of digitally mediated personal violation being made salient and imminently possible after experiencing it firsthand, IoT IPA victim survivors report broad technical approaches to online privacy, far beyond the material contexts of their IoT IPA experiences. This research evaluates how real-world IoT IPA victim survivors experience IoT IPA and seek support for their experiences of harm and violation. Internet of Things devices give users the technical capabilities to develop sociotechnical environments which systematically disadvantage the most likely victims of intimate partner abuse. By affording individual users who purchase and set up the devices unilateral control, alongside the ease of intended obfuscation and blending into everyday networked environments, power and manipulation which are at the heart of coercive control are expanded through the new practical realities of constant personal data flows IoT offer. Implications for Future Research A sociotechnical context in which wireless, 24/7 physical, video, and audio surveillance are afforded any individual who purchases a device, alongside unclear formal support pathways, violate the rights of victim survivors caught in the crossfire of non-consensual surveillance they have no or incomplete knowledge of. 24/7 surveillance capabilities do not diminish or overlook the fact that that intimate abuse is the responsibility of the individuals who choose to abuse. Preventative measures and support seeking are an important component of harm mitigation but are only part of a multifaceted approach which also requires real consequences for abusers who use IoT to carry out coercive control. I argue that on a systemic level, current implementations of IoT amplify the risks and impacts of intimate violence on victim survivors. The use of IoT 215 transforms abusers’ capacity for harm through material imbedding of IoT in everyday environments. This integration of IoT in hidden, unexpected places operates alongside user consent models which function based on shared physical space. By capturing data based upon physical proximity rather than awareness, without considering knowledge and agency of all users in the environment, combined with abusers’ tendencies to manipulate and socially pressure their victims (Hamberger, Larsen & Lehrner, 2017)), IoT are primed to support abusers’ domination. This project informed research question one 1) How do IPA perpetrators deploy IoT as mediators of abuse? in several ways. First, the misuse forensics finding from Chapter 4 re- iterated the known fact that tech abuse usually occurs alongside other forms of abuse (i.e. Freed et al., 2017, Marganski & Melander, 2018). Every interview participant and person seeking help on r/relationshipadvice reported experiencing other repeated forms of abuse alongside IoT misuse such as threats, physical violence, emotional manipulation, and controlling finances. The take-away is that when other forms of physical and emotional abuse are present, the potential of IoT being misused, especially in regard to concealed devices, should be examined. Not considering that surreptitious IoT could overlook important safety planning considerations for victim survivors. Additionally, I found that IoT serves as a locus of escalation in abusive relationships. Victim survivors described, after discovering hidden IoT or otherwise confirming that their partner was misusing IoT to surveil and harass them, destroying or deactivating the device and directly confronting the abuser to explain what’s going on. Attempting to challenge an abuser’s authority can escalate IPA and put a victim survivor at increased risk of physical harm (Kafka et al., 2021). Domestic abuse advocates should be aware of victim survivors’ likelihood of engaging in misuse forensics to investigate and confront abusive partners. Additionally, most 216 standard advice in traditional cybersecurity frameworks such as changing passwords (Levy & Schneier, 2020) is unhelpful when victim survivors don’t know devices are being misused or don’t have access to them. Further, following advice to cut off abuser access to IoT could be an escalation trigger, making this well-intentioned advice potentially harmful without contextualizing risks in IPA contexts. These findings inform RQ1 through revealing how victim survivors seek support for their experiences of IoT-mediated IPA. As Chapter 5 described, victim survivors prioritize reaching out to their social networks, including the support of informal “tech experts” in their extended social networks when support seeking. This finding contributes established work on the importance of social support seeking in better victim survivor outcomes (Heywood et al., 2019). Future interventions and support programs would benefit from public education legitimizing IoT abuse as a form of intimate partner abuse and increasing awareness of support resources like the Safety Net Project. Additionally, many victim survivors sought out anonymous social input regarding their situation on r/relationshipadvice before seeking other forms of support in their face-to-face networks. Interview participants described similar fears of judgement and scrutiny in their close social networks. They often sought irrefutable evidence, such as a concealed device, before reaching out to friends and family. These findings demonstrate that social stigma remains a major barrier to experiences of support seeking in IPA generally (McCleary et al., 2016). Narratives surrounding intimate abuse identification and prevention should further incorporate the potential role of IoT to combat this stigma. The findings inform research question 2) How does IoT mediated intimate partner violence rely on both consensual and non-consensual practices? First, the findings in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 demonstrate that most victim survivors had no awareness that IoT tools were 217 being misused against them. They only considered and recognized the possibility of IoT misuse based upon contextual knowledge of what information their partner should be able to know about them without some type of secret tracking occurring. While more dynamic models of consent (Morel et al., 2019), including those driven by models of enthusiastic and retractable models of consent from sexual education (Strengers et al., 2021) are a valuable starting point, current models of consent in IoT are incompatible with the social reality of IPA victim survivors face. Consent assumes open communication and consideration for victim survivors (Strengers et al., 2021), and intimate abusers are not good faith actors. To combat the amplified vulnerabilities IoT introduce, consenting to use these devices should expand beyond centralized control (Lopez- Neira et al., 2019). To overcome the current power disparity between abuser-appointed devices and victim survivors, every person sharing a space with devices should be made aware they are in operation and have access to information about what data is collected. In the context of consenting to IoT device use, I propose the value of future work examining what a social model of IoT consent could look like, such as requiring full household access to and approval of devices before they would become functional. Another possibility for consideration is the ability to request remote deactivation of devices, without attributing deactivation to the victim survivor, if abuse is reported. IoT expand the scope and impact of what consenting to device access means in practice (Luger, 2012). Additionally, these findings illuminate the disparity between legal definitions of non- consensual, illegal surveillance (Wisnewski, 2016) and what victim survivors perceived as violation and are actively harmed by. From the perspective of victim survivors, using illicit IoT for surveillance and monitoring of activities in the home is in and of itself a form of physical control regardless of if the use of the devices may technically be legal. This informs RQ2 218 because current legal infrastructures addressing domestic violence almost exclusively center on direct contact such as physical assault or one-on-one messaging (Essert, 2019) despite observation also being a violation of victim survivors’ rights. Non-consensual observation, especially with devices purchased by the abuser deployed on property/a residence the abuser owns, would not be considered a legal matter. This narrow view of consent overlooks the experiences of victim survivors living with abuse. Legal accountability frameworks would benefit from being able to consider patterns of IoT-mediated surveillance as part of larger patterns which define IPA (Stark, 2009) for legal accountability and building cases for victim survivors engaging with the criminal justice system. Finally, this project contributed to a deeper understanding of research question 3) How do victim survivors of IoT seek support (social and technological)? I found that victim survivors prioritize seeking support within their social networks. This supports past work identifying social support seeking as the most common support seeking strategy victim survivors pursue (Evans & Feder, 2016). On r/relationship advice, victim survivors sought community feedback on if their experiences with IoT constituted intimate abuse or not. This finding supports the value of online communities for people undergoing stigmatized and challenging experiences (i.e. Foster, 2016; Dym et al., 2019, Young & Miller 2019). Online communities offer relative anonymity, potentially buffering the effects of perceived social scrutiny from close ties. Online communities simultaneously offer opportunities to connect with peers and receive social validation in a relatively low stakes fashion; users can separate their Reddit persona from more obviously and easily connected identification on other social media (i.e. Facebook). While providing online communities for intimate abuse survivors is not new, this project suggests overlooked value in supporting existing communities specifically centered on IoT- 219 mediated IPA and other forms of tech abuse along with developing advocate-moderated tech abuse online communities. Additionally, victim survivors reported seeking support from so- called “tech experts”. “Tech experts” are individuals within their extended social networks who victim survivors identify as having general technical expertise. Often, victim survivors connect with tech experts through sharing about their concerns with their partner’s behavior with friends and family. These findings about social support are also valuable in what they reveal about support resources not being utilized. Only a handful of victim survivors reported using a support service like a therapist or a domestic violence shelter. These findings demonstrate the critical importance of attention to social norms and cultural attitudes surrounding IoT-mediated IPA. It is likely most victim survivors, and the friends and family supporting them, are unaware of support services and resources specifically informed by emergent risks and vulnerabilities of tech- mediated abuse. Contributions to Critical Computing Scholarship These findings build upon several areas of work in feminist and critical computing scholarship in human computer interaction. Feminist HCI projects centered on redesigning breast pumps (D’Ignazio et al., 2016), menstrual tracking apps (Epstein et al., 2017), and the risks of online dating for transgender users (Fernandez & Birnholtz, 2019) demonstrate how “unanticipated consequences” of technology are made visible, and thus actionable for design, only through context-based participatory design approaches situated in the real-world contexts in which the technology is deployed. This dissertation builds upon this work by identifying how design sensibilities of IoT further entrench power disparities between victim survivors and abusers inequitably. The “unanticipated consequences” of IoT in the context of abuse this 220 dissertation contributes are imposed upon victim survivors already facing the challenges and disadvantages of intimate abuse. The Misuse forensics finding and support seeking findings demonstrate how IoT create a new pathway for domination precisely through both the invisibility of devices and the ambiguity of information they collect about users outside of the core user interface. Internet of Things devices are nearly always used by abusers in secret. This feature of invisibility, while supporting embodied interaction with devices, synergizes with the cyclical and multimodal nature of cycles of intimate abuse. From the perspective of victim survivors in intimate abuse contexts, invisibility entrenches not just the responsibility of self-protection and anticipation of abuse, but an additional, new responsibility of identifying the material features and patterns of how their abuser is exerting control and domination. Current approaches to harm and remediation in cases of tech abuse, both from a design and legal perspective, place the locus of responsibility on victim survivors. Victim survivors are already putting in incredible amounts of time and energy to disentangle the basic capabilities of the devices involved in their partner’s abusive behavior. The necessity of Misuse Forensics to even identify tech misuse, and by extension recognize broader patterns of abuse and seek out support, further entrench power disparities between victim survivors and abusers. Next, this dissertation’s findings build upon work on ubiquitous computing, smart homes, and IoT recognize user-facing challenges with these types of technologies. User-facing challenges with IoT have almost exclusively been considered from a traditional technical cybersecurity perspective (Carr & Lesniewska, 2020) or examined privacy concerns in family dynamics in non-abuse contexts (Pierce et al. 2022). Empirical work in this areas centers on a lack of user engagement with consent procedures like terms of service (Karegar, 2018) and 221 incomplete mental models of security features, data risks, what data is collected, and how personal information is used even after extensive engagement with a device or platform (Kang et al., 2015). These approaches overlook a more foundational problem in victim survivors’ experiences of IoT IPA. Creating a more engaging terms & condition page or more accessible user interface is meaningless when IoT IPA victim survivors often never interact with devices directly. These discussions have not considered the interpersonal vulnerabilities IoT pose, especially in an abuse context. This project contributes how the IoT context introduces a particular wrinkle in how victim survivors identify and anticipate abuse: in traditional abuse contexts, victim survivors can use environmental information, like their partner’s behavior, to predict a tangible escalation outcome, such as physical violence or verbal aggression, threats, and so on. In the context of secret IoT use, victim survivors have no idea how their abuser is gaining access to highly granular, personal information about their movements and daily activities in the home. In traditional abuse, tactics like social isolation are maintained through interaction with the abuser, particularly in the same physical space. IoT circumvents the relative reprise physical separation affords through the functionally undetectable automized surveillance capabilities. A lack of clear connection between abuser’s knowledge and physical proximity leads to victim survivors’ doubting their perceptions, and ultimately produces the misuse forensics process by necessitating victim survivors, who know their privacy is being violated even if they don’t know how, to collect the physical evidence explaining how the violation occurs themselves. This dissertation emphasizes the importance of continued work in re-imagining approaches to online privacy as a social responsibility (see calls from Stephanidis et al., 2019; Collier 2020) rather than purely a site of individual decision making. These findings also push 222 calls for more dynamic models of consent in HCI (Morel et al., 2019, Strengers et al. 2021) by identifying how consent in a valuable but incomplete approach to tech-mediated abuse. Current approaches to consent in social computing do not reflect the social reality of abuse being carried out in secret or with victim survivors being pressured to share passwords and otherwise circumvent safety measures. Contributions to Intimate Abuse Scholarship Challenging an abuser’s access to and authority over a victim survivor is risky (Boxall & Lawler, 2021). This dissertation contributes the finding that discovery of illicit IoT devices spark confrontation and serve as a major point of risk for victim survivors. This dissertation contributes the finding that IoT-mediated IPV victim survivors describe how the data flows IoT devices in the home collect serve as new sparking points for their abusive partner’s anger and potential explosions. As victim survivors describe seemingly innocuous activities such as spending more time in a different room of the house or going to the grocery store on a different day of the week than usual serve as ‘justifications’ for the abuser’s IoT surveillance. Without these devices, the abuser would simply not have access to this level of personal information when they are not in the home. Additionally, these findings expand upon the phenomenon of hypervigilance in abuse contexts. Hypervigilance, a trauma response common in intimate abuse victim survivors, has been theorized as resulting from the safety planning efforts of victim survivors attempts to protect themselves from harm by anticipating their abuser’s explosions (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2023). Misuse forensics appears to be sparked by a shift to a form of hypervigilance based upon an abuser’s suspicious behavior. This project contributes an early 223 model of how hypervigilance could be particularly pronounced for victim survivors experiencing IoT-mediated violence. Next, this dissertation demonstrates a disconnect between available support services for IoT-mediated intimate abuse and what support services victim survivors seek out in practice. For example, the Office on Violence Against Women predominantly fund projects centered on developing technical support services and online resources like the Safety Net Project (OVW Grant Programs, 2023). However, no victim survivors indicated knowledge of any online resources surrounding tech abuse. This disconnect emphasizes the importance of furthering general education and awareness of tech abuse and available support resources. As victim survivors depend closely on their trusted social networks in seeking support, population-level increases in acknowledging and legitimizing IoT IPA will increase the likelihood of connecting victim survivors with these critical services. Without discrediting the value of participants’ “tech experts”, better connecting victim survivors with certified security professionals will improve efforts for victim survivor safety planning, accurately identifying breaches and data risks, and involving law enforcement when relevant and desired by impacted parties. Finally, this dissertation project contributes how experiencing IoT-mediated intimate abuse produces a broad fear of technology in victim survivors. Investigations of impacts on victim survivors are often short in length (6 months to a year) (i.e. Evans & Feder, 2016, Maas, Bray & Noll, 2019) and centered on clearly defined adversities such as diagnosed health outcomes (i.e. Dutton et al., 2006). There is no data on how experiencing IoT-mediated intimate abuse may produce future behavioral impacts related to computing safety and user confidence with devices. Tech abuse and domestic violence researchers need to expand time and scope of how outcomes of IoT harms are measured. This specter of uncertainty, the new lurking, eternal 224 possibility that ‘online’ and ‘offline’ activities may be remotely scrutinized amplifies feelings of control and domination far beyond the technical realities of today’s Internet of Things technologies. This newly salient expectation of digital violation becomes a new user interface capacity that must be considered by designers, HCI researchers, and domestic abuse advocates intersecting with tech abuse scenarios. For victim survivors, it exists beyond any individual piece of technology or smart home ecosystem in any individual home. This dissertation’s findings indicate that examinations of IoT-mediated IPA must extend the timeline and scope of outcomes they measure to capture how experiencing this form of abuse may have extended impacts on victim survivors. Contributions to Information Policy Scholarship Governments are increasingly recognizing the need for more meaningful and comprehensive information policy interventions for tech abuse. In the UK, MP’s recently released a report calling for increased governmental attention to identifying and addressing tech abuse, including explicitly referencing the harms posed by “smart home security systems” (Farah, 2023). The MP’s also identified that current criminalization of smart abuse are “lacking” with most forms of cyber abuse not constituting standards for interpersonal violence and harassment under current law (Farah, 2023). The United States’ 2023 Task Force to Address Online Harassment and Abuse does not specifically identify smart home or Internet of Things mediated harms, but this task force does identify a need for “strengthening coordination among Federal, state, Tribal, territorial and local law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute” tech-mediated crimes against individuals (Executive Summary, 2023). Last year’s Online Safety Act passed in Australia is the most major recent legal development in addressing tech-mediated 225 abuse by increasing the speed and scope online platforms must comply with reporting abusive and harassing content (Yeo, 2022). Despite these important movements, if and how these initiatives translate to improved outcomes, support measures, and reduced incident rates has not been determined. To this end, there is no published peer-reviewed policy work specifically focused on IoT’s role in IPA. The aforementioned policy and legal movements discuss tech abuse and harms broadly, with the UK report being the only example of Internet of Things being specifically identified as a potential harm. As this dissertation identified, IoT-mediated IPA survivors face particular challenges in discovering abuse, seeking quality support, and moving on from their experiences. The findings of this project contribute to several early directions for developing information policy to prevent, identify, and make accountable abusers. First, victim survivors need distinct avenues of support for both learning about IoT-mediated IPV and reporting. Chapter 4 and 5 outlined how victim survivors undertake extensive investigation work prior to labelling their experiences IoT-mediated IPA. Media messaging in everyday spaces, not just IPA support contexts, would contribute to public awareness of these issues, particularly for victim survivors working to recognize and contextualize their experiences within narratives of what IPA can look like. Information policy investments in this space should invest in multimodal approaches to public education and education for relevant stakeholders including law enforcement. Next, tech policy needs both standardized rules and reporting procedures when IPA mediated by their products is identified. There are currently no standards for technical cybersecurity standards, such as firewalls or security testing for IoT (Hunko, Ruban, & Hvozdetska, 2021). There are also no standards for identifying and responding interpersonal 226 violations. The closest analogue that currently exists in the tech policy space are standards for Internet platforms reporting illegal content such as terrorist content (Hunko, Ruban, & Hvozdetska, 2021) or child sexual assault material (Salter et al., 2021). Building upon these national databases and reporting procedures for mediated content, all IoT-enabled devices should adopt standards and procedures for reporting when these devices are deployed in abuse. This could include recording general usage logs to corroborate victim survivors’ claims of being surveilled, building in user reporting capabilities, and even potentially preventing repeat offenders from purchasing IoT or using them in their personal residences. Without standard policy and enforcement for the source of IoT, abuse will continue to be neglected in broader conversations about combatting tech abuse. Additionally, making platforms accountable has evidenced success in combatting social media and harassment in other publics (Gillespie, 2018), and thus serves as a empirically backed starting point for comprehensively identifying and addressing IoT-mediated violations. Finally, policy approaches, particularly legal interventions and the criminal justice system, must take seriously victim survivor’s firsthand experiences, particularly in relation to patterns of abuse and escalation over time. Random or seemingly innocuous behavior, like knowing what time someone arrived at the grocery store or left to take their child to the doctor, becomes evidence of patterns of abuse based upon victim survivors’ expertise of their everyday environment, their partner, and where technology misuse is occurring. Current legal approaches to accountability in cases of IPA have been critiqued for their lack of ability to consider patterns of behavior that are abusive but fall outside traditional definitions of stalking (Arntfield, 2015; Bennett, 2019). Without undermining due process or evidence collection, the criminal justice 227 system must create avenues to collect and legitimize victim survivors’ firsthand experiences to accurately identify and investigate IoT-mediated abuse. Designing Against Harm Based upon these findings which identify the multifaceted impacts of IoT IPA, a multifaceted approach to support technologists, researchers, and advocates is necessary. All these relevant stakeholders involved in identifying intimate abuse, preventing violence, and supporting victim survivors require new approaches to how standards for recognizing and respond to harm are created. I argue that one way to accomplish this creation of usable, enforceable standards is an interdisciplinary toolkit. This interdisciplinary toolkit, targeted for technology designers, human computer interaction scholars, this project serves as the beginning of the conversation to translate manifesting technology harms into real preventative and response approaches. Based on IoT IPA victim survivors’ experiences, I identify five visions for this interdisciplinary toolkit, to be discussed and interrogated as the discipline of technology-facilitated sexual violence continues to develop and expand. 1) Interdisciplinary and cross-contextual language. For the interdisciplinary toolkit to be effective, it must contain language which captures the core components of IoT IPA in a way that is penetrable to technical and non-technical along research and non-research audiences. 2) Interventions at multiple points in time. As abuse is cyclical, an interdisciplinary toolkit which contains tangible steps and criteria for evaluating devices and technologies along dimensions of potential (and realized) IoT IPA risks will require strategies for designers and community advocates to intervene at multiple points in time. This will require contextualizing response points within other relevant contextual information, such as the victim survivor’s current safety plan, available resources, and local law. 228 3) Capturing data across contexts. This tenet will require careful consideration to overcome creating new data vulnerabilities and further violating victim survivors’ privacy. But we need more data from more contexts. Interviews and surveys are a useful starting point, but integrating the experiences of domestic abuse advocates and other on the ground stakeholders will be necessary in identifying the full scope of IoT IPA harms. 4) Process for identification and response. IoT devices are diverse. So are the contexts in which they are misused. Often, victim survivors, despite being experts of their own experiences and most equipped to identify patterns of harm, lack technical knowledge and language. Effectively identifying IoT IPA must incorporate approaches to capture victim survivor experiences even if they do not align with industry language and in light of incomplete knowledge. 5) Network of expertise. I envision the interdisciplinary toolkit as a living resource, a platform that will grow and expand through expert feedback and new data. This requires developing a network of expertise for refining, expanding, and reviewing the toolkit. Developing an interdisciplinary network of expertise could look like creating online resource platforms and trainings, workshops, creating a toolkit against tech-mediated intimate harm conference or journal as a locus of institutional knowledge development. Conclusion The traditional three units of analysis in human computer interaction are the user, the interface, and the designer. This approach assumes a certain degree of autonomy of the user’s own behavior alongside an implicit expectation of access as informing how their perceptions of computing technologies manifest. This project identifies how Internet of Things technologies do more than offer abusive actors tools to expand their reach of surveillance and control. Rather, IoT 229 serve to blur the lines of user agency between their personal autonomy and conscious interactions with devices. Through obfuscation, centralizes oversight and control, and limited or non-existent accountability measures, IoT’s deployment in abuse contexts violates victim survivors’ fundamental rights in engaging with technology. By embodying and support the agency and the desires of intimate abusers, Internet of Things devices are well-positioned to become co-conspirators and collaborators in exerting coercive control. IoT change the material possibilities of intimate harm through transforming victim survivor perceptions of absolute knowledge and control into a technical reality. Intimate partner abuse support services face similar challenges in responding to the complex and dynamically evolving landscape of IoT-mediated intimate abuse. Domestic abuse advocates are resource and time constrained. They identify a lack of resources and support in helping victim survivors with experiences of tech abuse, despite them emphasizing how common these forms of harm are. Further, it is challenging to help victim survivors who have incomplete knowledge about the technical risks of the IoT IPA they are experiencing. The effects of living through IoT IPA, including impacts on mental models of Internet privacy at large, are poorly understood. Further, the multimodal nature of intimate abuse suggests amplification effects for IoT’s use in intimate partner abuse. If the foundations of the future of networked homes continue alongside current approaches, dramatic increases in intimate abuse will be unsurprising, both in terms of sheer prevalence and modalities through which control is exerted. To address IoT IPA, we first and foremost need more data. This project is one of the first published empirical examinations of IoT IPA from the perspective of self-identified victim survivors. The emergent findings, centered on misuse forensics and the central role of social support seeking, present several valuable directions to expand upon in future inquiries. First, the 230 misuse forensics concept should be examined in a broader victim survivor population. Future research expanding upon the misuse forensics stages would support capturing this experience of IoT IPA victim survivors in advocacy training and public education. Additionally, this project was centered on contributing to theory on the form and features of IoT IPA as compared to what we know about tech abuse and IPA in general. This project described how IoT places victim survivors in a uniquely difficult position. They undertake misuse forensics to make sense of hidden, impenetrable IoT tools being used for harassment, manipulation, and non-consensual surveillance. Victim survivors rarely pursue support through formal institutions or law enforcement, preferring to reach out to trusted social ties and “tech experts” in their extended social networks. Further work is needed to begin translating these insights into standards for design. Finally, the findings of this dissertation prompt increased attention towards understanding prevalence and outcomes of IoT IPA over time. Victim survivors reported their experiences of IoT IPA making them distrustful and anxious of using the Internet at large because they do not feel equipped to prevent these types of violations in the future. Resources and attention should interrogate potential points in the cycle of IoT IPA to intervene, including creating pathways for victim survivors to report adverse experiences and seek accountability. Victim survivors ‘efforts through misuse forensics and reliance on their trusted social networks demonstrate the strength and resiliency of IoT IPA victim survivors in the face of unprecedented challenges. The challenges they face and their understanding of how IoT supports intimate abusers create clear pathways for research, design, and policy which usurps currently temperate conditions for misuse and abuse. 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Association for Computing Machinery. http://doi.org/10.1145/3290605.3300359 Zeng, E., Mare, S., & Roesner, F. (2017). End User Security and Privacy Concerns with Smart Homes. Undefined. Zhong, L. R., Kebbell, M. R., & Webster, J. L. (2020). An exploratory study of Technology- Facilitated Sexual Violence in online romantic interactions: Can the Internet’s toxic disinhibition exacerbate sexual aggression? Computers in Human Behavior, 108, 106314. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2020.106314 259 APPENDIX A: METHODS FIGURES Table 1 Interview Population Demographics Demographics Count Percentage Age 21-25 26-30 Gender Identity Male Female Race/Ethnicity Black White/Caucasian American Indian/Alaska Native Hispanic Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 19 3 4 18 7 5 8 1 1 86% 14% 18% 82% 32% 23% 36% 5% 5% Table Note: The study consisted of 22 interviews. The percentages are rounded to the tens place. All these demographics variables were derived from the SONA platform. Users create a profile with basic demographic details. The gender selection options from this source do not align with best practices for inclusive survey design which emphasize 1) avoiding terminology referring to biological sex in favor of that capturing gender identity and 2) including gender options which reflect LGBTQ+ identities and self-describe options (See: Spiel, Haimson, & Lottridge, 2019). 260 This is a limitation of the dataset. Table 2 Keywords from Leitão 2019 Keywords 1. Camera 2. Find My Phone 3. Find My iPhone 4. Find My Friends 5. Recording Me 6. Spyware 7. Stalkerware Figure Note: This figure contains keywords used to identify online forum data. These were derived directly from Leitão’s (2019) methodology. Table 3 Keywords from Academic Literature, Policy, and Domestic Abuse Support Services Review Keywords 1. Surveillance 2. Door Lock 3. Alexa 4. Siri 5. Google Home 6. Smart watch 7. Smartwatch 8. iCloud 9. Mic 10. Microphone Figure Notes: These additional preliminary, exploratory keywords were derived from memoing and reflection during the literature review. Please see Chapter 2: Literature Review for an in- depth discussion of the empirical background for this project. 261 Table 4 Keywords from Interview Study Keywords 1. Tracker 2. GPS Track 3. Bugged my 4. Microphone 5. Record Me 6. Smart home 7. Smarthome 8. Smart fridge 9. Smartfridge Figure notes: I conducted the survivor interviews in parallel with collecting and analyzing the netnographic data. These search terms also supported selection of r/relationship advice as the netnographic primary field site. 262 Table 5 Focused Coding Codebook from Netnography Code 1. Changed Perception of Partner 2. Claim to Expertise 3. Commentary if That Okay or Not 4. Confrontation 5. Connecting Evidence 6. Dating App 7. Describing Tech 8. Experimenting 9. Forcing Communication 10. GPS 11. Home Camera 12. Legal Advice 13. Multiple Forms of Abuse 14. Personal Assistant 15. Phone Access 16. Privacy 17. Reaction 18. Sensemaking 19. Shared Devices 20. Smart Watch 21. Soliciting Advice 22. Unaware 23. Update Figure notes: These codes emerged from bottom-up analysis of the keyword-identified threads on r/relationshipadvice. These are the second order codes deduced from analyzing the first-round descriptive coding and memoing. These codes reflect patterns in the dataset. Codes are listed in alphabetical order. 263 Table 6 Focused Coding Scheme from Interview Transcripts Code Label 1. Abuser Justification: Infidelity 2. Abuser Justification: Safety 3. Abuser Justification: Other 4. Aftermath: Reconceptualization of Privacy Threats 5. Aftermath: Social Protective Strategies 6. Aftermath: Technical Protective Strategies 7. Challenge Responding 8. Confrontation 9. Describing Surveillance 10. Emotions After Perceived Violation 11. Misuse Forensics: Suspicion 12. Misuse Forensics: Processing Evidence and Testing Explanations 13. Misuse Forensics: Taking Action 14. Motivations to Seek Support 15. My Privacy 16. Pattern of Device Misuse 17. Formal Support Seeking 18. Informal Support Seeking 19. Tech Expert Support Seeking 20. Trust in Relationship 21. Unaware Technology Was Being Misused 22. Unclear on Exact Use Capacities 23. Using IoT in the Wrong Way 264 Table 7 Qualitative Codes and Findings from Chapter 4: Misuse Forensics Chapter 4: Misuse Forensics Finding Codes from Netnographic Transcripts Codes from Interview Transcripts Changed Perception of Partner Abuser Justification: Infidelity Confrontation Abuser Justification: Safety Connecting Evidence Abuser Justification: Other Describing Tech Experimenting Challenge Responding Confrontation Multiple Forms of Abuse Describing Surveillance Privacy Reaction Emotions After Perceived Violation Misuse Forensics: Suspicion Shared Devices Misuse Forensics: Processing Evidence and Soliciting Advice Misuse Forensics: Taking Action Testing Explanations Unaware Update Pattern of Device Misuse Trust in Relationship Unaware Technology Was Being Misused Unclear on Exact Use Capacities Table notes: This table summarizes the thematic codes from each field site, the semi-structured interviews with Michigan-based victim survivors and the netnographic study of r/relationshipadvice, with the Misuse Forensics finding chapter. Patterns across the unique codes from each data set were analyzed to determine cohesive findings represented across all the data. Codes from each field site are listed in alphabetical order. 265 Table 8 Qualitative Codes and Findings from Chapter 5: Support Seeking and the Novel Impacts of IoT Chapter 5: Support Seeking and the Novel Impacts of IoT Finding Codes from Netnographic Transcripts Codes from Interview Transcripts Claim to Expertise Aftermath: Reconceptualization of Privacy Threats Commentary is that Okay or Not Aftermath: Social Protective Strategies Dating App Aftermath: Technical Protective Strategies Forcing Communication Motivations to Seek Support GPS Home Camera Legal Advice My Privacy Formal Support Seeking Informal Support Seeking Personal Assistant Tech Expert Support Seeking Phone Access Shared Devices Smart Watch Using IoT in the Wrong Way Table notes: This table summarizes the thematic codes from each field site, the semi-structured interviews with Michigan-based victim survivors and the netnographic study of r/relationshipadvice, with the Support Seeking and the Novel Impacts of IoT finding chapter. Patterns across the unique codes from each data set were analyzed to determine cohesive findings represented across all the data. Codes from each field site are listed in alphabetical order. 266 APPENDIX B: DISSERTATION INTERVIEW ELIGIBILITY SURVEY Are you a resident of the State of Michigan? o o Yes No If you accessed this study via the SONA interface, please write in your 5-digit SONA ID number in order to have your participation recorded. You were assigned this number when joining the SONA platform. It can be referenced when you click "My Profile" on the SONA home page. If did NOT access this study via the SONA interface, please skip this question. ________________________________________________________________ This first set of questions will ask about activities you use the Internet for. How many hours per day do you typically spend accessing the Internet? • Less than 1 hour • 1 to 3 hours • 3 to 5 hours • 5 to 8 hours • 8 hours or more What devices do you use to typically access the Internet? Please check all that apply. ▢ A mobile phone ▢ A desktop computer at home 267 ▢ A tablet (such as an iPad, Kindle Fire, etc.) ▢ A laptop computer ▢ A desktop computer in a public place that is free to use (such as a library) ▢ A video game console ▢ A smartwatch (such as an AppleWatch, FitBit, etc.) ▢ Other (please describe) How often do you use the Internet… Nearly every day A few times a week Once a week Once a month Less than once a month Never …to check email? O O O …to text message or check instant messaging? O O …to go on online social networks? O O …to watch a video online? (4) O O O O O O O O O 268 O O O O O O O O …to stream or download music, radio, podcasts, etc.? O O O O …to shop, make reservations, or use other consumer services? O O O O O O …to use online financial services like banking, investing, paying bills etc.? O O …to work to earn money? O O …to work to search for a job? O O O O O O O O …to work to take a class or participate in a job training? O O O …to interact with household equipment? O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O The next set of questions that follow this screen relate to experiences of intimate partner violence and other kinds of experiences that may be sensitive or triggering. You may skip questions at any time or completely exit the survey without any penalty. We deeply appreciate your help in learning about how to better develop online systems to protect people. The following questions ask about your experiences with violence and harassment caused by an intimate partner. This includes experiences of psychological, physical, and sexual violence Have you ever experienced psychological violence, such as name calling, shouting, or 269 demeaning behavior from a romantic or sexual partner? O Yes O No O Prefer not to answer Have you ever experienced physical violence, such as slapping or pushing, from a romantic or sexual partner? O Yes O No O Prefer not to answer Have any of your romantic or sexual partners ever done any of the following? Please select all that apply. ▢ Taken pictures or videos of you that were sexual in nature when you did not want them to? ▢ Shared any intimate or private pictures or video of you when you did not want them to? ▢ Excessively and/or repeatedly called or texted you on your mobile device? ▢ Taken away one or more of your electronic devices, such as a mobile phone or a computer? ▢ Destroyed one or more of your electronic devices, such as a mobile phone or computer? ▢ Deleted one or more of your online accounts (such as a Facebook account or an online shopping account)? ▢ Demanded access to one or more of your online accounts, such as by demanding you give them your password? 270 ▢ Changed your password for one or more of your online accounts without telling you? ▢ Accessed one or more of your online accounts without your consent? ▢ Used one of your online accounts to communicate with people you know in a way that made you feel uncomfortable? ▢ Used one of your online accounts to communicate with people you know while pretending to actually be you? ▢ Used location-monitoring technology (for example, the GPS on a mobile device) to monitor you behavior? ▢ Used location-monitoring technology (for example, the GPS on a mobile device) to threaten you, harm you, or otherwise learn things about you that made you feel uncomfortable? ▢ Used an online platform (for example, a social media website or phone app) to monitor your behavior? The next set of questions that follow this screen relate to experiences of intimate partner violence and other kinds of experiences that may be sensitive or triggering specifically in relation to technologies from everyday life. You may skip questions at any time or completely exit the survey without any penalty. We deeply appreciate your help in learning about how to better develop online systems to protect people. The following questions ask about your experiences with violence and harassment caused by an intimate partner using these technologies. This includes experiences of psychological, physical, and sexual violence Have any of the following ‘smart’ devices been used by a romantic or sexual partner to threaten 271 you, harm you, or otherwise learn things about you that you did not want them to know or which made you uncomfortable? Please check all that apply. Yes No Prefer not to answer Personal assistants (Ex: HomePods/Apple Siri, Google Home, Amazon Alexa) (1) Yes No Prefer not to answer Smart energy devices (Ex: Wi-Fi connected thermostats such as the Nest Thermostat, Wi- Fi connected lamps and lightbulbs Yes No Prefer not to answer Location tracking devices (Ex: A GPS tag for your keys, or your car, or your bike) (3) Yes No Prefer not to answer Security devices (Ex: locks on your doors that can be controlled with a phone app or a computer) Yes No Prefer not to answer 272 Recording / monitoring devices (Ex: such as a Wi-Fi enabled baby monitor or video cameras in rooms of the home that can be accessed with a phone) Yes No Prefer not to answer Health monitoring devices (a Wi-Fi connected scale, a refrigerator that records what groceries you have in stock) Yes No Prefer not to answer How often have you experienced threatening, harmful, or otherwise unwanted behavior from a sexual or romantic partner from the following devices? Never Once or twice 5-10 times 20 or more times Personal assistants (Ex: HomePods/Apple Siri, Google Home, Amazon Alexa) Never Once or twice 5-10 times 20 or more times Smart energy devices (Ex: Wi-Fi connected thermostats such as the Nest Thermostat, Wi- 273 Fi connected lamps and lightbulbs) Never Once or twice 5-10 times 20 or more times Location tracking devices (Ex: A GPS tag for your keys, or your car, or your bike) Never Once or twice 5-10 times 20 or more times Security devices (Ex: locks on your doors that can be controlled with a phone app or a computer) Never Once or twice 5-10 times 20 or more times Recording / monitoring devices (Ex: such as a Wi-Fi enabled baby monitor or video cameras in rooms of the home that can be accessed with a phone) Never Once or twice 5-10 times 20 or more times Health monitoring devices (a Wi-Fi connected scale, a refrigerator that records what 274 groceries you have in stock) Never Once or twice 5-10 times 20 or more times Do you have any other details about your personal experiences with Internet of Things-mediated abuse and violence you would like to share? ________________________________________________________________ Do you have any comments or feedback about this survey and/or the topic of this research? ________________________________________________________________ Can you use the Zoom Videoconferencing platform to conduct the interview? If not, please explain alternative options you would prefer (such as a phone call). O Yes (1) O No (2) __________________________________________________ Page Break Thank you for your time and effort in completing this survey. A member of the research team will reach out to you if you are eligible to be invited to participate in the interview study. Please reach out to knittel2@msu.edu if you have any questions or concerns. 275 Please include the email address at which you would like to be contacted with your compensation and invitation to participate in the interview study if eligible. The email address will not be used for any other purpose. ________________________________________________________________ 276 APPENDIX C: SURVIVORS OF INTERNET OF THINGS-MEDIATED INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE ELIGIBILITY PRE-SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE Part 1 Tell me about the most recent time you personally have interacted with something that you would consider an “Internet of Things” device in any capacity. What did you use it for? What did you observe it doing? Where did you use this device? Any other devices in the home? Can you recall any other times you interacted with an Internet of Things device? Thank you for sharing with me. I have noted down X, Y, and Z devices you mentioned. Are there any other IoT devices you can recall using at any time before we move on? Part 2 Thank for you for sharing your experiences with these IoT devices. If they already mentioned experiences of abuse: In our discussion, you shared X/Y/Z harmful experience with your S/O using an IoT device(s). I would like to ask you to think back to this situation. When was the first time you noticed something was wrong? When do you recall first recognizing that something seemed “off”, unusual, or surprising? If they have not mentioned experiences of abuse: I now would like to ask you to think back to any harmful experiences you had related to the IoT devices you mentioned. Specifically, think back to anytime an IoT device(s), that you think was being used by a significant other, led you being threatened, harassed, harmed, or otherwise negatively affected. When did you first notice something was wrong? When do you recall first recognizing that something seemed “off”, unusual, or surprising? 277 Thank you so much for sharing your experience of noticing that IoT devices were involved in these adverse experiences. You mentioned [X/Y/Z]. What happened before/after [X] that you mentioned? Were any other IoT devices involved in these experiences? [Probe in plural/singular based on if they mention isolated problems with devices in the singular or if they mentioned devices as a an ecology.] • Who do you think was using the device or devices? Did they set it up? Did they use it often? • What did they use the device(s) to do to you? • How did you discover that the device was being used in these ways? • Did this experience change how you personally used the device or devices? Did anything inform that change? • Did you consider other technologies in the home may be involved? • You mentioned [X]. Could you tell me more about what happened leading up to this? What happened after? • What were you feeling when this happened? • What were you thinking when this happened? • Were any other technologies or items in your home involved in this abuse? Other people involved? Based on response to this, repeat probes as necessary. • Before we move on, can you recall any other times you experienced personal harm or abuse through someone using an Internet of Thing device or devices? Part 3 Thank you for sharing these experiences with me. When facing these kinds of experiences, people may or may not choose to seek out support for a variety of reasons. I use the word 278 “support” here to refer to anything you did, during or after experiencing the Internet of Things- mediated abuse you described to me, to help cope or otherwise deal with what was going on. This could look like something you did for yourself (like engaging in a favorite hobby), getting in touch with loved ones, or seeking out a professional resource such as a mental health professional, a doctor, an attorney, etc. To this end, in reference to [INSERT DESCRIBED EXPERIENCE(S) ONE AT A TIME], did you consider seeking out any kind of support? (repeat for all relevant experiences) If affirmative: What did this support-seeking look like? Who did you reach out to? Probes as need [INSERT DESCRIBED EXPERIENCE(S)]:…family?...Friends?...community group?...religious leader?...medial professional?...websites?...online communities?...social media?...law enforcement?...legal expertise such as an attorney? If negative: What were some of your motivations when you chose to not seek out support? Think back to the moment you described. What were you thinking? Was there a ‘turning point’ in which you considered seeking support but then stopped considering, or vice versa? Did you perceive any barriers or challenges to seeking support for your experiences of Internet of Things-mediated abuse? If affirmative: What were these barriers? How did you see these barriers as standing in your way? What did you imagine these barriers would make more difficult? Did you anticipate positive or adverse outcomes when you imagined seeking out the type of support you described considering. (repeat for each experience/device as relevant). For the [INSERT DESCRIBED EXPERIENCE(S)] you shared with me, I am also interested in hearing about if you thought about your personal privacy and security behaviors related to using 279 the Internet and the Internet of Things devices you have firsthand experience with. This could look like changing your password to log into your phone or a favorite website or otherwise changing the way you use the Internet in the interest of personal safety. Can you recall thinking about these kinds of activities at all? If affirmative: When did you first start thinking about privacy/security activities in relation to this [insert relevant experience/device]? What did you consider doing? What did you actually do? How did this turn out? If you had it to do again, is there anything you wish you had done differently? Finally, imagine that you’re talking to someone who builds Internet of Things devices, like the ones you described when you shared your experiences. What would you want them to know, if anything? How would you like them to consider your experiences when they’re making decisions about building IoT technologies? What would you want them to be thinking about when they are designing these technologies? How would you want these designers to be thinking about social support and other support for people experiencing harms? What would you want them to try to do better with these technologies in the future? What would you want them to avoid doing? Are there problems you would want them to try to fix? Part 4 We’re coming to the end of our time here. Did you have any final thoughts about what we were just discussing? Or anything you would like to add to which we discussed today? Thank you for sharing your experiences with me. I sincerely appreciate you taking the time and effort to discuss with me today. As we wrap up: Did you have anything else you would like to share with me about the topics and events we 280 discussed today? Did you have questions about absolutely anything else? It does not have to be about this project. Before we wrap up, I have one final question for you. When I write about what you shared with me today, what name would you like me to call you? Some people choose to use their real name or a nickname; others make up a pseudonym or choose to be called after a favorite person or character. How would you like me to refer to you? I also have information about several resources based in Michigan, nationally, and internationally that offer technical, financial, and other assistance for survivors. I will send a copy of this information along with the gift card. Down the road, I will also share a copy of my dissertation and any other output of this work with you. If you are all set, then we are finished with the interview. Please feel free to contact me or my supervisor at Dr. Steph Jordan (per the emails) if you have any questions, think of anything else you would like to share, or would like to schedule a follow-up conversation. Thank you and have a wonderful rest of your day. Figure Notes: This is the semi-structured interview questionnaire used for all interview participants. I omitted the verbal consent text and the “warm-up” questions text as those items were not used in the analysis. Text that is italicized indicates “If, then” statements providing alternative interview question text based on if the interviewee has already provided certain information. Bracketed text indicates instructions/notes for the interviewer. Bracketed text can also include “fill in the blank” sections of questions where the interviewer fills in the question with relevant information gained from earlier questioning in the protocol. 281