SUSTAINING WATER RESOURCES AND COMMUNITIES THROUGH LOCAL 
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 

By 

Brockton Feltman 

A DISSERTATION 

Submitted to 
Michigan State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of  

Community Sustainability – Doctor of Philosophy 
Environmental Science and Policy Program – Dual Major 

2024 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Water is one of the essential ingredients for life on earth and touches every aspect of our lives. 

Growing concern for equitably providing safe water now and into the future is an increasingly 

salient for individuals, communities, governments, and researchers as water scarcity continues to 

be a growing issue. In this dissertation I focus on the role of local collaborative governance 

institutions as a strategy for incorporating stakeholders into decision-making processes to 

manage resources. Chapter 1 uses the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework to 

understand agricultural producers’ motivations to collaboratively govern groundwater in Kansas, 

how they measure the success of collaborative efforts, and how they have adapted as individuals 

and a community under conditions of voluntary and collective withdrawal restrictions. Chapter 2 

uses the Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance to understand why Michigan 

water users have not chosen to collaboratively govern shared water resources despite being able 

to do so since the state’s implementation of the 2008 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin 

Water Resources Compact. Chapter 3 outlines a new research agenda for incorporating the 

construct of structural power within the Social-Ecological Systems Framework.   

 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 

Mapping Motivations and Measuring Success ............................................................................... 5 

Rights, Norms, and Collaborative Water Governance Institutions: A Michigan Case Study ...... 25 

Institutional Genesis: Structural Power and the Social-Ecological Systems Framework ............. 54 

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 71 

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 74 

iii 

 
Introduction     

Water is one of the essential ingredients for life on earth (National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration, 2024). Water touches every aspect of our lives, and indeed, life is unimaginable 

without it. Even in our quest to find life on other celestial bodies in the solar system – such as 

Jupiter’s moon Europa - the presence of water is a key criterion (Chappell, 2023). The United 

Nations has made Clean Water and Sanitation its 6th Sustainable Development Goal, because 

clean water “is essential not only to health, but also to poverty reduction, food security, peace 

and human rights, ecosystems and education” (United Nations, 2023).       

In terms of ecosystems services, water is a keystone for providing freshwater, irrigation, 

and is the basis for all fisheries. Another key component is regulating this resource, based upon 

the impact of climate and weather, supporting all ecosystems (from which we derive countless 

benefits), and enabling cultural values as well as recreational activities (that are centered on 

water to flourish). However, population growth and intensification of pressures on water 

resources across multiple sectors are adversely impacting the ecosystem services provided by the 

water that we need and expect (e.g., Salehi, 2022; Mishra et al., 2021; Vasseghian et al., 2021; 

Kilic, 2020); Mekonnen and Gerbens-Leenes, 2020).  

The growing concern for equitably providing water now and into the future has inspired 

researchers to identify effective ways of doing so. Heberlein (2012) outlines three general 

approaches for addressing environmental problems such as growing water scarcity: cognitive, 

technological, and structural. Cognitive fixes emphasize using education as a tool for modifying 

individuals’ behaviors so that they no longer contribute to a problem. Technological fixes focus 

on implementing advancements in technology to ameliorate a problem without having to alter 

underlying behaviors. Structural fixes center on fundamentally altering the basic socioeconomic 

coordinates that determine behavior – often through policy changes.  

In this dissertation, I focus on structural fixes as a method for sustaining vital water 

resources. Specifically, the research I present here investigates the role that local collaborative 

governance institutions can play in managing water to satisfy environmental, social, and 

economic needs now while conserving resources for the future.  

Chapter 1 is titled Mapping Motivations and Measuring Success: Implementing the 

Institutional Analysis and Development Framework for the Collaborative Governance of 

Groundwater. In this chapter I use the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) 

1 

 
 
to understand agricultural producers’ motivations to collaboratively govern groundwater in 

Kansas, and how they measure the success of their collaborative efforts. Using semi-structured 

interviews, I collected qualitative data to show the social and economic impacts that voluntary 

irrigation restrictions have had on producers. Kansas producers rely on groundwater from the 

High Plains Aquifer as the primary source of irrigation, but water levels have been declining for 

decades. Grassroots pressure from producers led the state to adopt the Local Enhanced 

Management Areas (LEMA) Act in 2012, which recognized producers’ ability to make policies 

to manage shared groundwater resources. The first LEMA was formed in 2013, where producers 

imposed a collective cut in withdrawals that resulted in a 31% reduction in average pumping 

over a 10-year period. While previous research has found that rates of groundwater loss have 

declined since the implementation of this LEMA, this study delves deeper into the factors that 

led to the formation and success of the area and broadens our understanding of how producers 

evaluate the success of collaboration. Using semi-structured interviews based upon the IAD, I 

found that producers effectively adapted to using less water by reevaluating how much water is 

necessary to grow crops, adopting water saving technologies including soil moisture monitors, 

and altering the types of crops grown. I also found that producers were driven to collaborate 

primarily by a desire to extend the aquifer’s lifespan, minimize regulatory oversight, preserve a 

sense of agricultural identity and place attachment to their farms and farming community, and 

provide opportunities for future generations to inherit farming operations. By identifying both 

the antecedents and outcomes of self-organized local collaboration, this analysis can help reduce 

the barrier of uncertainty for other producers to co-manage their water resources.  

Chapter 2 is titled Rights, Norms, and the Adoption of Collaborative Water Governance 

Institutions: A Michigan Case Study. Legal rights and norms play a key role in stabilizing natural 

resource governance systems by establishing rules that individuals and organizations follow and 

expect from others. While providing necessary stability for a governance regime, rights and 

norms may also inhibit important adaptations of governance systems in response to changing 

environmental, political, social, and economic conditions. This research focuses on changes in 

Michigan water policy that created the opportunity for water users to collaboratively govern 

shared water resources at the watershed scale. While water users have had the ability to form 

collaborative institutions since the state’s implementation of the 2008 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 

River Basin Water Resources Compact, no institutions have formed to date. I hypothesize that 

2 

 
 
the lack of collaboration can be explained in terms of prevailing water rights and established 

norms in Michigan’s water user communities. Using the concepts of uncertainty, 

interdependence, consequential incentives, and leadership – as outlined in the Integrative 

Framework for Collaborative Governance – I operationalize the constructs of rights and norms to 

test hypothesis. I created a survey that was sent to all large-quantity water users in the state to 

understand why they have not formed collaborative institutions. Results show that the norm of 

individualistic water use, based on expected water abundance, diminishes willingness to 

participate. I also find that water users who do not currently talk with others, nor believe that 

having conversations about water management will improve relationships, and who do not think 

water users should work together to manage water express less willingness to collaborate. By 

identifying barriers for collaboration, this research can help policymakers and other interested 

parties incentive water users to collaborate in Michigan. Moreover, the focus on rights and norms 

– as measured using the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework – offers researchers 

and policymakers a lens through which to understand collaborative institutions in other 

situations, helping to guide evaluation and identify possibilities for improvements.   

The third and final chapter is titled Institutional Genesis: Incorporating Structural Power 

in the Social-Ecological Systems Framework. The collaborative governance of common pool 

resources has become widely accepted by researchers focused on collective action in social-

ecological systems as an effective strategy for sustaining common pool resources and the 

socioeconomic activities predicated upon them. Developing frameworks which accurately depict 

the causal relationships between institutions and the social, economic, political, and ecological 

systems within which they are embedded is crucial for theoretical understanding and the 

practical efficacy of governance. The Social-Ecological Systems Framework (SES) created by 

Ostrom and subsequently expanded upon by others is of particular importance, because it 

provides the most comprehensive and flexible constellation of operationalized concepts 

connected by empirically verifiable relationships. A problem with the SES, however, is the 

insufficient incorporation of power into the framework. While researchers have previously 

attempted to incorporate the notion of power into the SES, this article proposes a new approach 

for doing so that opens novel avenues for future research by emphasizing that how collaborative 

institutions originally form dictates power structures within the institutions, which in turn affects 

policies and actions that emerge from it. Emerson and Nabatchi outline three processes by which 

3 

 
 
institutions come into existence, and which affect structural power: self-initiated, independently 

convened, and externally directed. I argue that the SES framework should incorporate these 

processes to reflect the different power structures associated with them. Doing so entails new and 

exciting questions proposed and pursued by scientists working in collaborative governance 

research.   

Together, these three chapters help policymakers and researchers better understand what 

motivates water users to collaborate, how they evaluate the performance of collaborative efforts 

across social, economic, and environmental metrics, and offers new avenues of research linking 

power to social-ecological systems frameworks. Chapter 1 was funded by a National Science 

Foundation Grant focused on the Nexus of Food, Water and Energy systems. Chapter 2 was 

jointly funded by Michigan Sea Grant and the Michigan Department of Environment Great 

Lakes and Energy. Chapter 3 was not externally funded and constitutes an independent study.  

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mapping Motivations and Measuring Success 

Abstract 

I use the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework to understand agricultural 

producers’ motivations to collaboratively govern groundwater in Kansas and how they measure 

the success of these collaborative efforts. I collected qualitative data to show the social and 

economic impacts that voluntary irrigation restrictions have had on individual farmers. Kansas 

producers rely on groundwater from the High Plains Aquifer as the primary source of irrigation, 

but water levels have been declining for decades. Grassroots pressure from producers led the 

state to adopt the Local Enhanced Management Areas (LEMA) Act in 2012, which recognized 

producers’ ability to make policies to manage shared groundwater resources. The first LEMA 

was formed in 2013, where producers imposed a collective cut in withdrawals that resulted in a 

31% reduction in average pumping over a 10-year period. While previous research has found 

that rates of groundwater loss have declined since the implementation of this LEMA, this study 

delves deeper into the factors that led to the formation and success of the area and broadens our 

understanding of how producers evaluate the success of collaboration. Using semi-structured 

interviews based upon the IAD, I found that producers effectively adapted to using less water by 

reevaluating how much water is necessary to grow crops, adopting water saving technologies 

including soil moisture monitors, and altering the types of crops grown. I also found that 

producers were driven to collaborate primarily by a desire to extend the aquifer’s lifespan, 

minimize regulatory oversight, preserve a sense of agricultural identity and place attachment to 

their farms and farming community, and provide opportunities for future generations to inherit 

farming operations. By identifying both the antecedents and outcomes of self-organized local 

collaboration, this analysis can help reduce the barrier of uncertainty for other producers to co-

manage their water resources.  

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 

Agricultural Water Scarcity and Collaborative Governance 

Water scarcity is a pressing problem around the world (Rosa et al., 2020). Approximately 

80% of the human population faces water insecurity (Scanlon et al., 2023), and one-third of 

individuals or companies that rely on water as an input for their economic production face threats 

to continued water access in the near future (Richter et al., 2017). This growing water scarcity is 

largely driven by irrigated agriculture, which is the primary source of water demand and 

consumption globally (Elliott et al., 2014; Smidt et al., 2019). Large-scale industrial agriculture 

is defined by intensive water application to increase productivity, where utilizing surface and 

groundwater resources to supplement natural rainfall is often necessary for production (Alauddin 

and Quiggin, 2008). In the United States, 90% of consumptive water withdrawals are for 

irrigated agriculture (Sanderson and Frey, 2015). 

The concept of collaborative governance has increasingly been invoked as a model of 

institutional arrangement to address issues of scarcity associated with common pool resources 

like water (Eaton et al., 2022). Elinor Ostrom popularized collaborative governance as a way to 

manage common pool resources beyond state control or the free market (e.g., Ostrom, 2010; 

Ostrom 1990). A defining feature of collaborative governance is the assertion that resource users 

can and should participate in developing and implementing policies for managing shared 

resources (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Ran and Qu, 2019). Including resource users in the 

governance process helps ensure that policies fit the environmental, socioeconomic, and cultural 

realities of the people who will be subject to its policies (e.g., Torfing, 2019; Carlisle and Gruby, 

2019).    

Collaborative governance arrangements primarily emerge through two avenues: top-

down, and bottom-up. Top-down collaboration occurs when federal or state governments create 

policies that compel water users to work together with the intent of sustainably managing shared 

resources, while bottom-up collaboration occurs when resource users organize at the grassroots 

level to form governing bodies that are then recognized by higher levels of government (e.g., 

Eckerberg et al., 2015; Koontz and Newig, 2014). While there is value to both forms of 

collaboration (Watson, 2014), researchers have identified several advantages of bottom-up 

collaboration – in particular, facilitating better institutional fit and promoting greater community 

buy-in compared to top-down approaches directed by state authorities (An, 2021).   

6 

 
 
Research on the collaborative governance of common pool resources has found that, 

within appropriate conditions, resource users will alter behaviors through collaboration even in 

the absence of an external authority that compels collective action (Piazza, 2021). To explain 

why resource users may be motivated to form bottom-up collaborative governance institutions, 

Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) outline four interconnected drivers: uncertainty, interdependence, 

consequential incentives, and leadership. Uncertainty exists when the actions of resource users 

no longer result in the expected outcomes based on previous experiences, because changes in the 

underlying social-ecological system cause unexpected results from these actions. Such 

uncertainty can motivate collaboration if resource users believe that working together, rather 

than acting separately, is a viable strategy to identify and mitigate uncertainty. Furthermore, the 

likelihood of resource users working together increases if they recognize that each person’s 

resource use affects, and is affected by, the use of others. Interdependence means that resource 

users acknowledge the fact that they are dealing with a common pool resource, where each user's 

action affects both the shared resource and others’ ability to use it. Recognition of 

interdependence may promote collaboration if resource users perceive that working together is 

the best way to manage their shared resources. Additionally, if resource users perceive 

consequential incentives from working together to manage shared resources, they are more likely 

to collaborate. In other words, if working together may produce more desirable outcomes for 

individuals and the commonly held resource than acting individually, then resource users are 

incentivized to collaborate. Finally, bottom-up collaboration requires one or more individuals to 

initiate the establishment of collaborative governance institutions. Without such leaders setting 

the process in motion, it is unlikely that collaborative governance institutions will form, even 

given favorable conditions of uncertainty, interdependence, and consequential incentives.  

This research investigates the development of a bottom-up collaborative water 

governance institution in Kansas to identify the motivations that led agricultural producers to 

initiate collaboration, as well as how they measure the success of the institution according to 

categories identified in the IAD. The success of this institution in reaching its conservation goals 

has since led nearby collectives of growers to attempt to replicate it. However, it may be the case 

that there are other important measures of success that need to be considered for both evaluating 

the LEMA as well as wise implementation elsewhere. Finally, I seek to understand how 

7 

 
 
producers, as individuals and as a community, have adapted in response to the transition from 

acting as independent water users to a more collaborative arrangement.   

Local Collaborative Governance in Kansas  

Agriculture is a major component of the Kansas economy. In 2018 agriculture and 

associated industries (e.g., food processing and distribution, fertilizers, and pesticides, etc.) 

accounted for nearly 13% of the state’s workforce, and over 40% of total statewide Gross 

Domestic Product (Kansas Department of Agriculture, 2018a). Kansas exports approximately 

$4.8 billion of agricultural products annually, is the number one producer of wheat and sorghum 

in the U.S. as of 2020 and is ranked third in terms of cattle production and beef processing as of 

2020 (Kansas Department of Commerce, 2023).  Land values in Kansas are also closely tied to 

groundwater availability, with agricultural land values averaging 55% higher for irrigated 

acreage, combining to a total value of approximately $5 billion for irrigated lands in the state 

(Sampson et al., 2019).  

Agricultural productivity in Kansas is threatened by rapid declines in groundwater 

availability (e.g., Whitmore et al., 2023; Buchanan et al., 2023; Haacker et al., 2015) because 

intense pumping has reduced the long-term viability of irrigation (Cotterman et al., 2018). 

Kansas is highly dependent on the High Plains Aquifer (HPA), with 97% of irrigation water in 

the state coming from the HPA (Smidt et al., 2016). Rates of groundwater extraction from the 

HPA in Kansas since the 1970s have been significantly greater than recharge rates, resulting in 

groundwater loss that was evident both to agricultural producers at the field level (i.e., loss of 

well capacity) and state and university groundwater modelers (Brauer et al., 2017; Deines et al., 

2021; Pfeiffer et al., 2014). Without readily available alternative sources of water for irrigation, 

the depletion of the HPA threatens the future of irrigated agriculture in Kansas (Butler and 

Johnson, 2024).  

This issue has motivated agricultural producers and policymakers to design and 

implement strategies that reduce short-term water consumption to ensure long-term water 

availability, while striving for the economic viability of producers now and into the future. In 

2012, the Kansas legislature enacted the Local Enhanced Management Areas Act in response to 

grassroots efforts by agricultural producers who wanted to help resolve water scarcity issues at 

the local level and have the state government recognize their authority to make management 

decisions as a collective of water users (Cruse et al., 2016). Producers in Sheridan and Thomas 

8 

 
 
Counties recognized the imminent threat of water scarcity in their region and elected to impose 

upon themselves a 20% reduction in irrigation averaged over a 5-year period (Pfeiffer and Lin, 

2014). Under this plan, water users have 55 inches of water to apply to their state-certified 

irrigated acreage that they can use in any way they see fit over a 5-year period. Moreover, the 

Act created a binding regulatory order to reduce water use, which was overseen by the Kansas 

Department of Water Resources (DWR-KDA) and gave producers the confidence that everyone 

was adhering to the same set of rules. This area became the first Local Enhanced Management 

Area (LEMA), the Sheridan 6 (SD-6) LEMA (Sanderson and Frey, 2015). 

Under the 2012 Local Enhanced Management Areas Act, for a LEMA to be recognized 

by the state, a majority of the Groundwater Management District (GMD) Board members 

associated with the region must vote to approve its adoption (Kansas Department of Agriculture, 

2016). GMD Board members are elected officials from the agricultural community who hold 

public meetings to understand the desires and concerns of represented producers, and who make 

decisions – such as whether to institute a LEMA – based on stakeholder input (Bossert, 1993). 

Once approved by the GMD Board and Chief Engineer of the Division of Water Resources in the 

Kansas Department of Agriculture, decisions made by a LEMA have the force of law (Golden 

and Guerrero, 2017). If a water user fails to follow policies created by the LEMA, the Chief 

Engineer has the power to enforce any corrective measure approved by the LEMA (Kansas 

Department of Agriculture, 2018b). 

The Sheridan 6 (SD-6) LEMA exemplifies a bottom-up collaborative governance 

institution initiated by, and composed of, agricultural producers, the authority of which is 

explicitly recognized by state authorities. It also represents a paradigm shift in how water 

resources are managed in the state. Kansas has historically operated according to Prior 

Appropriation, which is based on the idea of “first in time, first in right” (Griggs, 2021). In 

practice, this means that when the total quantity of water allocated by the state through permits is 

not available, ‘senior’ rights holders – those who obtained rights first – can use the entirety of 

their allocations, while more ‘junior’ rights holders – those who obtained rights later in time – 

are unable to use all of the water they technically have a right to. However, under the SD-6 

LEMA, all rights holders agreed to proportionally reduce water use regardless of the relative 

seniority of their water rights.  

9 

 
 
Numerous studies have found that the SD-6 LEMA was successful at slowing the rate of 

aquifer decline (e.g., Whitmore et al., 2023; Glose et al., 2022; Zwickle et al., 2021; Deines et 

al., 2019, 2021; Golden and Guerrero, 2017; Steiner et al., 2021). However, environmental 

success is only one outcome of interest. Even if the LEMA resulted in reduced rates of 

groundwater decline, it is important to understand the social and economic impacts that this 

policy has had on producers and their livelihoods, because if users cannot adapt to a smaller 

water budget, then individual and regional economies will suffer. While questions about 

environmental impacts of the LEMA can be answered with groundwater data and models, I used 

a qualitative approach to understand first-hand farmers’ perspectives on the social and economic 

impacts of LEMA.  

This Study 

In this study, I use the Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) framework to 

understand the effects of the SD-6 LEMA on groundwater resources, the water user community, 

and how individual water users adapted to a smaller water budget (Figure 1).  

Figure 1. Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Ostrom, 2011). 

The IAD framework was developed by Ostrom (2005) to model collaborative governance 

institutions as decision making nodes within a larger system defined by biophysical conditions, 

attributes of the resource user community, and the rules-in-use that define resource access and 

use. I apply the IAD framework to understand both how the external variables – biophysical 

conditions, attributes of the water user community, and rules-in-use – gave rise to the SD-6 

LEMA (here depicted as the action situation), as well as how the outcomes of actions taken by 

the LEMA have affected the external variables. It is important to note that “rules-in-use" can be 

10 

 
 
 
analyzed at three levels: constitutional (e.g., federal or state laws), collective choice (e.g., 

agreements among resource users about how resources are allocated), and operational (e.g., 

private decisions made by individuals regarding their resource use) (Ostrom, 2005). In this 

research, all three levels are relevant to understand how the SD-6 LEMA works, and how water 

users behave within it and are investigated during the interview process.  

I investigated the following research questions to understand the conditions that gave rise 

to the SD-6 LEMA, and how water users evaluate the success of collaborative efforts:   

RQ1. What were Kansas producers’ motivations for establishing a LEMA? 

I posit that agricultural producers in Kansas were motivated to form a LEMA for several 

reasons: to preserve their identity as members of a farming community (Valizadeh et al., 2020), 

to ensure that they can pass their land and business on to future generations (Fischer and 

Sanderson, 2022), and to take responsibility for a water scarcity issue that their individual and 

collective actions have (at least partially) created (Ataei et al., 2022).  

RQ2. How do producers define the success of the SD-6 LEMA? Do they believe that it has been 

successful, and if so, why? 

The SD-6 LEMA was first initiated from 2013 to 2017, and then renewed for 2018-2022 

and again for 2023-2027 (Kansas Department of Agriculture, 2023). Given this history of 

renewal, I posit that producers believe that the LEMA has been successful. I explore several 

reasons for why this may be the case, including: improved relationships between water users 

(Jager et al., 2020), changes in water use rules that encourage resource sustainability (Pahl-

Wostl, 2019), maintaining the economic productivity of producers (Ghosh and Ghost, 2023), and 

producers having the ability to adapt individual practices in ways that seem most rational to them 

(Gilmore et al., 2022).     

RQ3. How have producers adapted at the field level to withdrawal reductions enacted through 

the LEMA?   

I posit that producers have adapted farming practices under LEMA policy in the 

following ways: maintaining the same irrigated acreage while applying less water per acre, 

switching to less water-intensive crops, and/or adjusting cropping schedules (Deines et al., 

2021). I also expect that producers adopted technologies that increase irrigation efficiency, such 

as soil moisture probes (Whitmore et al., 2023).  

11 

 
 
 
Methods  

Sample & Recruitment 

This research took place in the summer of 2021. The target population was agricultural 

producers within the SD-6 LEMA boundary. Through an open records request to the Kansas 

Department of Water Resources, the names, addresses and contact information for all water 

rights holders in the LEMA were obtained. To recruit interview participants, letters explaining 

this research were mailed to all water rights holders in the LEMA inviting them to participate, 

followed by two reminder letters at one-week intervals. Additionally, snowball sampling was 

utilized when participants offered to encourage other producers to be interviewed. Sampling 

efforts ceased after the final reminder letter and when participants could no longer suggest 

additional friends/acquaintances to contact. Producers were offered $100 for their participation.  

There are 59 irrigators operating within the SD-6 LEMA. Nineteen producers (32%) 

ultimately participated in this study. Since I was only able to obtain the names and contact 

information for water rights holders in the LEMA, it is not possible to determine the extent to 

which research participants are representative of the larger population. Without available 

demographic information for the entire population regarding, for example, length of time 

farming, age, the number of acres they farm, whether they own or rent the land they work, the 

relative seniority of their water rights and other relevant information, it is difficult to know 

whether and to what extent the results of this research may be biased.  

Data Collection and Analysis 

I conducted 19 phone interviews during the summer of 2021. It was necessary to conduct 

interviews remotely due to COVID-19 related travel restrictions. Before the interviews began, 

participants signed a waiver granting permission to be recorded. On average, interviews lasted 

approximately one hour, and were audio recorded using Rev (2023) for later coding and data 

analysis. I coded transcripts in Dedoose using a combination of deductive and inductive codes. 

Following Rabiee (2004), the data analysis process occurred over three phases: familiarization, 

code application, and interpretation.  

Additionally, I conducted intercoder reliability checks to ensure that the clarity of codes 

resulted in similar applications across multiple researchers. Following O’Connor and Joffe 

(2020) approximately 25% of transcripts (5/19) were independently coded by two researchers 

using codes developed by the primary researcher. After transcripts were independently coded, 

12 

 
 
the researchers compared and discussed their code application until an interpretive logic was 

generally agreed upon. The primary researcher then coded the entire set of transcripts. Analyzing 

data involved identifying coded material, at the sentence level, that was relevant for answering 

each research question. Finally, a detailed reading and interpretation of coded material was 

conducted to offer answers to research questions.  

Instrument 

I used the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) to design a semi-

structured interview guide (Table 1). Producers were also asked about their support for the 

LEMA, how they measure the success of the institution, if they think that it has been successful, 

and how they adapted farming operations under LEMA rules. These questions supplement those 

created using the IAD, which does not integrate resource users’ first-person perspectives of a 

collaborative governance institution and its impacts.    

Table 1. IAD variable and their corresponding interview questions.  

Interview Questions 

Biophysical 

Has your farming practice, or other farmers you know, been impacted by 

Conditions 

groundwater scarcity? If so, can you please explain these impacts?   

Describe, if any, indicators of groundwater scarcity you have observed.   

Have you noticed changes in rainfall patterns in recent years?  

Do you think the Kansas Geological Survey accurately models 

groundwater conditions where you farm, and across Kansas as a whole? 

Why or why not?   

How many farmers do you know in the Sheridan LEMA?   

Attributes of 

Do you think farmers in the Sheridan LEMA share similar views about the 

Community 

condition of water resources?  

Do you think that most farmers in your region support the LEMA? Why or 

why not?   

Is your water right senior or junior?   

Rules-in-Use 

Do you own, rent, or lease farmland?   

What crops do you typically plant, and has this changed after the 

establishment of the LEMA?  

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 (cont’d) 

Have you adopted farming practices after the establishment of LEMA, and 

if so, how? (intensive & extensive).   

Management strategies (row spacing, density of planting, soil moisture 

sensors, etc.).  

Has your water use/acre changed since the establishment of the LEMA?  

What kind of irrigation technology do you use?  

Has the LEMA changed how you perceive water resources?  

Has the establishment of the LEMA reduced energy costs and/or inputs?  

Would you say that you are better off after the establishment of the LEMA? 

Your neighbors? Your children (do you expect them to take up farming 

after you?). – stress, happiness, other ways I have not mentioned?  

Have your profits increased or decreased since the establishment of the 

LEMA?   

Perceptions of LEMA effectiveness (is it working in the interest of 

farmers? – procedural fairness, trust, etc.).   

Are you personally active in water governance?   

To what extent do you think the State is responsible for managing 

groundwater for long-term availability? To what extent do you think this is 

farmers’ responsibility?   

Perceptions of 

Do you think that the LEMA has been a success? 

Success 

How do you measure the ‘success’ of the LEMA? 

Results  

RQ1. What were Kansas producers’ motivations for establishing the LEMA? 

Respondents were highly motivated by the fact that they perceived water scarcity as an 

immediate problem that needed to be addressed if they were to continue irrigating. Nearly all 

participants reported that increasing water scarcity was obvious to them, and the community at 

large, because their wells had gradually lost pumping capacity through the years. They did not 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
need external information from the state or universities to convince them that there was an issue, 

because it was immediately apparent in their daily operations.  

Fifteen participants (79%) explicitly stated that overuse from irrigation was the principal 

driver of declining water levels, and that the cumulative effect of withdrawals was depleting the 

aquifer. Moreover, nearly half of participants (47%) noted that since the LEMA has been 

implemented, they have noticed that their capacities had ceased to decline, indicating a 

stabilization of groundwater levels. Three participants even said that well capacity had slightly 

increased from the lowest point before LEMA was enacted.   

Participants were also asked about changes in climate that may impact water use in the 

LEMA region, with nine producers (47%) describing their perceived changes. Two participants 

(11%) commented that annual precipitation and temperature had changed since they began 

farming but said that weather is always variable and not necessarily due to climate change. Four 

participants (21%) said that the growing season has shifted so that planting now begins earlier in 

spring and harvest lasts later into the fall. Finally, three participants (16%) said that the climate 

was drier in general, making irrigation even more essential. These participants said that they now 

refer to their region as “Kansiowa” - because they perceive their temperature and rainfall patterns 

to be more like those in Iowa.   

Finally, while there was general acceptance among producers that water scarcity was a 

real issue based on the loss of well capacity, two participants (11%) said they were not 

convinced that the LEMA was the proper solution until they attended educational presentations 

by members of the Kansas Department of Water Resources explaining the hydrological models 

used to justify the 20% reductions proposed by the LEMA statute. Ultimately, education efforts 

on the part of the state helped create trust in the models used for regulatory purposes. As one 

participant said, “we all knew there was a problem” but seeing how modeling work helped the 

water user community to visualize the issue “really resonated with me.”     

RQ2. How do producers define the success of the SD-6 LEMA? Do producers believe that the 

LEMA has been successful, and if so, why? 

All participants except for one (95%) said that they support the LEMA, believe that it is 

successful, and will continue to support it into the future. The lone dissenter argued that the 

LEMA was not a good policy because it amounted to an uncompensated taking by the state, 

where water users gave up a percentage of their property right without any monetary benefit in 

15 

 
 
return. Those in favor of the LEMA gave a variety of reasons for their support: their recognition 

that preserving water into the future was a personal and collective responsibility, their desire to 

pass farming operations onto descendants, their ability to maintain their profitability despite 

water reductions, the important role of agriculture in supporting the economy of local 

communities, retaining high land values, and the fact that the LEMA allows users’ discretion for 

how they will use their allotted 55 inches of water over 5 years.  

Fifteen participants (79%) also said that they support the LEMA because they recognized 

that irrigation is the primary driver of aquifer decline, and ten (53%) said that the only 

reasonable way to address aquifer decline is collective reductions in total water withdrawals. 

These participants stated that producers need to take responsibility for their actions and change 

behaviors if they are going to be part of the solution rather than the problem. Eleven of these 

participants also said that they support LEMA because they desire to retain power over water 

resource management decisions within the community, rather than having the state impose rules 

upon them. Respondents said that each producers’ situation is different, and that top-down 

measures created at the state level would likely fail to appreciate this fact. They argued that if 

producers governed water resources themselves it would lead to better outcomes for individuals 

and the community. 

Thirteen producers (68%) talked about inheriting their land and farming operations from 

previous family generations. They were willing to adopt the LEMA and water restrictions 

because they wanted to pass their land and operations to younger generations in their family. 

These participants described a desire to continue their farming heritage into the future and saw 

the ability to irrigate as key for the survival of farming operations, such that if their children and 

grandchildren will have the option to continue this tradition it is essential to reduce water 

consumption now to better ensure availability in years to come.   

Twelve of the nineteen participants (63%) described how their profitability under LEMA 

has been unaffected, and none explicitly mentioned a reduction in profitability. This was a strong 

motivating factor for the renewal of the LEMA and participants expressed support for renewing 

the LEMA into the future. Since water users have been able to use less water while maintaining 

profitability, they are able to extend the life of the aquifer while remaining economically viable.  

Eight participants (42%) mentioned the LEMA was necessary because agricultural 

production is the economic foundation for their communities. Without money generated from 

16 

 
 
agriculture and spent in communities, non-agriculturally related businesses (e.g., restaurants) and 

agriculturally based businesses (e.g., implement and chemical dealers) would not be able to exist. 

Participants said that the ability to extend the life of the aquifer to ensure the viability of irrigated 

agriculture into the future simultaneously helped ensure the sustainability of local communities.  

Five participants (26%) talked about the close linkage between land values and available 

irrigation water. A piece of land that can be irrigated is worth far more than land where only 

dryland agriculture is possible. The LEMA was seen as a good thing because it helped ensure 

that land values remain high by preserving the aquifer upon which irrigation in the region is 

dependent.  

Finally, three participants (16%) said that the flexibility of water application built into the 

LEMA is one of the policy’s most important components, and that flexibility helped create buy-

in within the farming community. The fact that water users in the LEMA have discretion about 

how they will use their allotted 55 inches over a five-year period is a risk mitigation strategy that 

lets them adjust water use given unpredictable climatic conditions such as rainfall and 

temperature. The participants who emphasized the importance of this flexibility said that without 

it, fewer water users would likely have endorsed the LEMA.  

RQ3. How have producers adapted at the field-level to withdrawal reductions enacted through 

the LEMA?   

Participants described three important changes in the water user community during the 

process of developing and implementing the LEMA: change in perception of water rights, 

greater willingness to have conversations about water use, and education.   

The most important change in the LEMA community was how producers thought about 

water rights. Six participants (32%) talked about the fact that they respect individuals’ water 

rights, but that effectively addressing aquifer decline required a shift in perspective towards a 

more collective approach to management because it was clear that individuals’ actions impacted 

others. These participants argued that since members of the SD-6 LEMA had their water 

allocations reduced proportionally it resulted in a sense that everyone was being treated fairly. 

Proportionally reducing water allocations is a novel phenomenon in the SD-6 LEMA, where 

state water law had previously operated according to Prior Appropriation Doctrine where more 

senior right holders (those who had been granted water use earlier in time than others) can use 

their full water allotment in times of scarcity while more junior right holders must cut back. 

17 

 
 
Four participants (21%) mentioned that producers tend to be more willing to speak with 

each other about their water use since implementation of LEMA. One of these participants said 

that this used to be a taboo subject, but now producers openly discuss their watering schedules, 

how much water they have used, and other similar topics. This participant also said that he now 

felt “we are in this together” to “save our water”, whereas in the past water users were “more in 

competition with each other.”  

Participants also described several changes that occurred at the operational level after the 

adoption of LEMA, and how they adjusted to working with a smaller water budget. These 

changes include a shift in perception about how much water is necessary for irrigation and 

altered strategies for irrigation scheduling, crop types and planting schedules.   

Fifteen participants (79%) talked about how farming within the LEMA changed their 

perceptions of water. Six of these participants talked about the fact that they were surprised at 

how easy it was to adapt to water restrictions and learned that they did not actually need as much 

water to operate effectively as they had previously thought. Although participants said that they 

needed to be more careful and calculated with water uses, they realized that they were wasting 

water before the LEMA by using more than what was necessary to raise healthy crops. Some of 

the ways that the other nine participants described altering their irrigation practices included 

turning off systems when it is raining and using soil moisture probes to be more precise and 

timelier with each application.  

Participants also talked about adapting to water restrictions by changing the types of 

crops that they grow and their planting strategies throughout the season. Roughly half (53%) of 

participants said that they had not changed the types of crops that they grow because they 

realized that they could meet their water reduction targets by watering the same crops less. 

However, five participants (26%) said that they had begun to include soybeans and wheat in their 

crop rotations, rather than growing only corn, because they are less water intensive. Two 

participants (11%) mentioned that new genetic varieties of corn that require less water have been 

a valuable advancement that has allowed them to continue focusing on corn production.  

Discussion 

Overall, producers expressed support for the SD-6 LEMA, now and into the future. There 

was common recognition that groundwater levels were rapidly declining, that immediate action 

was needed for producers to continue irrigating, and that irrigation was the main driver of 

18 

 
 
 
increasing water scarcity. Most participants expressed the idea that the solution was clear: 

irrigation needed to be reduced to extend the usable lifetime of the aquifer. The immediacy of the 

problem, combined with the fact that the LEMA design was perceived as relatively fair in that it 

proportionally reduces all producers’ water allocation, ultimately coalesced into the grassroots 

movement from which the LEMA grew – especially because it offered an avenue for water users 

to make decisions at the local level, rather than relying on state regulators.  

Recognizing the problem and taking responsibility for the collective reduction in water 

use was the first step towards creating the SD-6 LEMA, but there is an important point of 

institutional design that encouraged collaboration: fairness. The decision was made that the rules 

for the SD-6 LEMA would mandate a 20% reduction in water use for every water user. Kansas 

operates under the law of prior appropriation, meaning that in times of scarcity more junior right 

holders bear all the costs of reduction while more senior right holders can utilize their full 

allotment. If the LEMA were to follow the logic of prior appropriation, it is unlikely that it 

would have been successful because the burden of reductions would have fallen heavily on some 

and not at all on others; it is unlikely that those upon which the burden fell would approve of the 

policy because it would have effectively made farming impossible. The LEMA represents a 

paradigm shift in the trend of how water allocations are treated in Kansas, indicating that the 

success of local collaborative governance institutions may have to stray from historical legal 

precedent and embrace innovation.  

Producers said that they witnessed the fruits of their actions as their well capacities 

visibly stabilized. This gave them confidence that they had made the right decision to implement 

the LEMA and that it should continue to be renewed. Producers gave several reasons as to why it 

was important to extend the life of the aquifer, primarily: for future generations to inherit viable 

farming operations and preserving land values. Understanding these cultural and economic 

factors sheds light on what local collaborative governance success looks like to the resource 

users embedded in the system. Although the IAD and other conceptual frameworks used to 

evaluate the success of collaborative governance institutions provide key insights into 

relationships between institutions and environmental, social, and economic variables, they often 

fail to capture the first-person perspectives of resource users who operate within these 

institutions. These first-person perspectives are essential for understanding why resource users 

19 

 
 
create (or don’t create) collaborative governance institutions, as well as provide evidence of 

success for various governance designs.     

Furthermore, the process of creating the SD-6 LEMA helped water users build a sense of 

camaraderie as their mindset shifted towards collective water management. While previously 

producers had perceived water use as an individual concern, now there is greater transparency 

and the sense that “we are in this together.” Shared motivation is essential for members of 

collaborative governance institutions to work effectively together (Emerson et al. 2012), and the 

LEMA exemplifies the development of shared motivation through open dialogue about key 

aspects of water management.  

Conclusion 

Contributions to Theory: The Role of Fairness in Good Policy Design 

The Sheridan 6 LEMA in Kansas offers a positive example of how local collaborative 

governance institutions can effectively resolve common pool resource problems. While the 

specific design of institutions should be congruent with local contexts, the LEMA embodies 

collaboration principles that can be applied elsewhere. First, fairness was a key feature of the 

LEMA that generated a great deal of buy-in for water users to adopt an innovative water 

governance strategy. By imposing an equal reduction in water allocations, rather than relying on 

prior appropriation doctrine, LEMA policy was perceived as an attempt to sustain water for 

everyone. Other locations considering the implementation of a collaborative water governance 

institution should consider fairness as vital to create resource user buy-in. In this case, part of 

ensuring fairness was modifying prevailing rules of water allocations in times of water-use 

reductions; regardless of whether such rules need to be altered in other cases, this study shows 

the value of considering the relationship between water allocations and institutional formation.   

Moreover, participants in this research described several motivating factors that 

researchers can expect to apply in other locations. The primary drivers of collaboration were 

maintaining agricultural revenue and in-community spending, preserving land values, and 

retaining the option of passing viable family farms onto descendants by ensuring irrigation 

remains possible. Understanding these motivations may help researchers better investigate 

perceived success of local governance institutions by having a clear idea about how producers 

measure success, provide advocates for adopting such institutions with communication strategies 

20 

 
 
to increase community buy-in, and offer regulatory agencies greater insight into what drives 

water users’ behaviors.  

This research points toward the value of expanding our understanding of why resource 

users are motivated to form collaborative governance institutions at the local level, and how they 

evaluate its performance. The SD-6 LEMA represents an instance of self-originating 

collaboration, but it is important to note that collaboration is initiated by other means, such as 

state mandate; it may be that certain findings from this study are more likely to be relevant in 

other cases of self-originating institutions compared to cases where collaboration began another 

way.  

However, other findings are applicable to collaborative governance institutions because 

of certain commonalities they share. This study indicates that the perceived fairness of the 

LEMA rules played an encouraging role in its formation, which may be an important factor in 

other instances where resource users have voluntarily created an institution, or places where 

collaboration is being considered. Brisbois and de Loe’s (2016) systematic review of articles 

examining the role of power in collaborative resource governance highlights the impact of power 

relations in either facilitating or foiling collaborative efforts. The prior appropriation doctrine 

that had prevailed in Kansas established significant power disparities between senior and junior 

water rights holders, and a key factor in the formation of LEMA was the fact that water users 

elected to equally reduce water consumption regardless of the relative seniority of their water 

rights. 

In cases where collaboration began as a state mandate, fairness will likely play less of a 

role because participation is mandatory. For example, the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater 

Management Act (SGMA) in California was established by the state legislature to stabilize 

groundwater in over drafted basins by compelling water users to collaboratively create 

sustainable groundwater management plans (Espinoza el al., 2023). Under conditions of state 

mandated collaboration, however, it may still be worthwhile to consider how those affected by 

law and policy implementation perceive the fairness of the rules they must follow. It may be in 

policymakers’ interest to design laws and institutions aiming to sustain resources in ways that 

minimize the costs users bear and maximize the benefits they may take advantage of. Of course, 

this ideal is difficult to realize in practice considering the complexity of resource management 

issues and the diversity of interested parties involved. Nevertheless, meaningful insights may be 

21 

 
 
gained through understanding fairness in these conditions and using this knowledge to inform 

policy making.   

Contributions to Practice: Measuring Institutional Success 

Agricultural producers in the Sheridan 6 LEMA were confronted with the fact that their 

groundwater use needed to evolve if they were going to meaningfully confront the threat of 

increasingly scarce resources. The LEMA represented a way for producers to fairly reduce 

individual and collective withdrawals to extend the period of usable groundwater and do it in 

such a way that they could adapt and remain economically viable. This research sought to 

understand how LEMA participants evaluate its success now that it has been in place and twice 

renewed since 2013. 

In addition to finding that research participants considered the LEMA successful because 

rates of groundwater decline have lessened since its adoption, they also discussed measures of 

success in broader economic and cultural terms. Participants’ economic metrics for evaluating 

the success of LEMA are, unsurprisingly, tied closely to their ability to irrigate now and into the 

future. At the individual level, participants said that the LEMA has proven successful because 

they have been able to adapt in ways that allow them to remain economically viable. Relatedly, 

at the community level, participants explained that agricultural productivity is the cornerstone of 

local economies, and a measure of the LEMA’s success is their confidence that their 

communities can continue benefiting from irrigated agriculture.  

Participants also described cultural values that acted as measures for judging the relative 

success of the LEMA. At the individual level several participants described how many 

agricultural producers in the area had inherited their lands from previous generations and that 

they desire to have the option of passing their property - including water rights – on to 

descendants. A measure of the LEMA’s success is its ability to help sustain a culture that exists 

in the region and is lived through LEMA members and their community. Not only is water a key 

input in the economic realities of agricultural production, but water users in this study want to 

preserve their culture and way of life.    

This work is important because it makes a case that collaborative water governance 

through the LEMA was successful beyond simple environmental measures. The LEMA was 

successful, according to participants, because it helps them to preserve their identity as 

agricultural producers, their communities, and ways of life. As with all communities, the 

22 

 
 
Sheridan 6 LEMA represents a unique case and generalization of findings from this research to 

other cases should be done carefully. Specifically, understanding individual and community 

values is essential to why collaboration exists where and when it does, how collaborative 

institutions adapt and maintain themselves, and why some do not exist where we might expect 

them to.  

The specific economic and cultural values cited by LEMA participants will be found in 

other locations that share similar demographics: midwestern US agricultural communities facing 

the threat of groundwater scarcity, that are of a certain size and cultural composition, that have 

the necessary social cohesion and leadership to organize a collaborative governance institution, 

and the ability to design and implement a plan for how it will operate. Given the geographic area 

of the central and western United States experiencing groundwater shortages, many communities 

fall under these criteria.  

These findings can also be generalized by similarities in collaborative governance efforts, 

even if they are situated in communities with different demographics from the ones studied here. 

Consider interstate compacts like the Rio Grande or Great Lakes Compacts where the rules 

governing water cover diverse communities in and between each of the states involved, water 

sharing agreements amongst municipalities, states and nations, and rules that balance how 

interested parties can interact with shared resources from individual to global scales. It would be 

inappropriate to expect that expressions of economic and cultural values that are vital to the 

success of the LEMA would be the same as those expressed by such very different communities.  

Considering the economic and cultural values of resource users is important both for 

cases like the SD-6 LEMA where the institution developed from the bottom up, as well as cases 

where users are mandated to participate by law (e.g., SGMA in California). Policymakers 

responsible for designing collaborative governance institutions would likely prefer to minimize 

the costs associated with implementation and maximize its efficacy regarding the goals it was 

created to achieve. For example, if a policy is particularly hard to bear economically or offends 

persons’ sense of self and culture, some of those affected may risk behaving in ways that stray 

from intended policy, and thereby require state enforcement to compel adjustments in users’ 

behaviors. It may be better for policymakers to think critically about how potential policies will 

impact the economic and cultural values of communities affected because attempting to design 

23 

 
 
good (as perceived by those affected) at the front end may save unnecessary governmental 

resources and efforts to try and correct the effects of bad policy.  

Future Research 

I hypothesize that the fairness of an institution and the fairness of the rules it creates, as 

perceived by the impacted resource users, will directly affect their willingness to participate. 

Fairness is a complex concept that can be defined socially, economically, politically, and means 

something different depending on a stakeholder’s perspective. Identifying and testing measurable 

definitions of fairness in collaboration is an ongoing and rich field of study (e.g., Roozee et al., 

2024; Annahar et al., 2023; York and Yazar, 2022). This research revealed that the Sheridan-6 

LEMA’s innovative approach to equally reduce users’ water allocations, and thereby stray from 

the previous precedent of prior appropriation doctrine, was a key design feature for making the 

institution feasible for water users. Exploring relationships between water allocations and the 

initiation, operation, adaptation, and failings of institutions offers substantial opportunities for 

improving the design and implementation of collaborative institutions. 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rights, Norms, and Collaborative Water Governance Institutions: A Michigan Case Study 

Abstract 

Legal rights and norms play a key role in stabilizing natural resource governance systems by 

establishing rules that individuals and organizations follow and expect from others. While 

providing necessary stability for a governance regime, rights and norms may also inhibit 

important adaptations of governance systems in response to changing environmental, political, 

social, and economic conditions. This research focuses on changes in Michigan water policy that 

created the opportunity for water users to collaboratively govern shared water resources at the 

watershed scale. While water users have had the ability to form collaborative institutions since 

the state’s implementation of the 2008 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 

Compact, no institutions have formed to date. I hypothesize that the lack of collaboration can be 

explained in terms of prevailing water rights and established norms in Michigan’s water user 

communities. Using the concepts of uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, and 

trust – as outlined in the Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance – I operationalize 

the constructs of rights and norms to test my hypothesis. I created a survey that was sent to all 

large-quantity water users in the state to understand why they have not formed collaborative 

institutions. Results show that the norm of individualistic water use, based on expected water 

abundance, diminishes willingness to participate. By identifying barriers for collaboration, this 

research can help policymakers and other interested parties incentive water users to collaborate 

in Michigan. Moreover, the focus on rights and norms – as measured using the Institutional 

Analysis and Development Framework – offers researchers and policymakers a lens through 

which to understand collaborative institutions in other situations, helping to guide evaluation and 

identify possibilities for improvements.    

25 

 
 
  
        
  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 

Rights, norms, and collaborative governance 

Systems of governance created to manage water resources cannot be fully understood 

without considering the legal rights and social norms that structure how resource users interact 

with resources and each other (Muir et al., 2023). Rights determine who may access a resource, 

what resource users may or may not do, and obligations associated with being a resource user 

(e.g., Dade et al., 2022; Tenzing et al., 2021; Sikor et al., 2017). Like rights, norms partially 

structure how people interact with resources. While rights are grounded in law, as well as 

administrative and judicial interpretations, norms, on the other hand, more broadly refer to 

customary social behaviors that resource users perform and can expect from others (Oniki et al., 

2020). 

While rights and norms stabilize governance systems, they can also inhibit important 

adaptations. Collaborative governance is increasingly cited as a potentially powerful strategy for 

sustaining common pool resources and the socio-economic systems predicated upon them (e.g., 

Ulibarri et al., 2023; Jimenez et al., 2020). Transitioning towards collaborative governance may 

be difficult, however, if prevailing rights and norms create barriers to change. The relative 

strength of rights and norms in determining whether collaborative governance institutions form 

depends on the process by which transitions towards collaboration occur. Emerson and Nabatchi 

(2015) identify two ways that collaboration may be initiated: self-origination from bottom-up 

organization by resource users, and external mandate by state authorities.  

Under self-originated conditions, rights and norms play a stronger role in determining 

whether collaboration occurs than in cases of mandated collaboration. Self-originated 

collaboration implies that resource users voluntarily choose to collaborate and seek to create the 

legal and normative space to do so – either within the current structure of rights and norms, or by 

altering them. If there are certain rights and/or norms in place that sufficiently deter resource 

users from voluntarily collaborating with each other to manage shared resources, then they are 

unlikely to do so. On the other hand, if the state mandates resource users to collaborate, then they 

must adapt behaviors regardless of previous rights and norms and adjust to new rights and norms 

within the new governance regime they are subject to.  

While the ideas of self-originated and state-mandated collaboration may be useful 

constructs for describing how collaborative governance institutions are formed, there are other 

26 

 
 
instances where the process of initiating collaboration does not easily fit into either category. 

This research focuses on collaborative water governance in Michigan, where changes in state 

policy enable water users to voluntarily collaborate in efforts to manage shared resources. This 

case is unlike self-origination in that the ability for resource users to collaborate came from 

actions taken by the state legislature rather than collective action by water users. The case is also 

unlike scenarios where collaboration is state mandated because water users can voluntarily 

choose to collaborate or not without legal consequence. In this case, facilitating collaboration is 

critical. The current lack of collaboration indicates that there is not a proper incentive structure to 

encourage water users’ voluntary adoption of collaborative institutions. The state is actively 

seeking strategies to motivate the establishment of collaboration through self-origination.  

Collaborative water governance in Michigan 

This research investigates collaborative water governance in Michigan, or rather, the lack 

thereof. Specifically, I seek to understand why water resource users have not formed 

collaborative governance institutions even though they have been able to do so since the state’s 

implementation of the 2008 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact 

(Compact). In 2008, Michigan became a signatory to the Compact with the intent of promoting 

intergovernmental cooperation between the eight Great Lakes states, two Canadian provinces, 

and Tribal governments to “protect, conserve, restore, improve and effectively manage the 

Waters and Water Dependent Natural Resources of the Basin” (MCL 324.34201). Under this 

agreement, states are responsible for monitoring and restricting, where necessary, large quantity 

water withdrawals to protect hydrologically based ecosystems. 

Michigan’s implementation of the Compact resulted in caps on cumulative withdrawals 

in designated water management areas (WMAs), where caps are based on water levels necessary 

to support characteristic fish populations (MCL 324.32701). Scientists at Michigan’s Department 

of Natural Resources defined characteristic fish populations as those species expected to exist in 

certain stream types (Reeves et al., 2010). Michigan’s legislature then established flow standards 

for each stream type according to ideal conditions for characteristic fish populations. A WMA is 

labeled zone A when water is relatively abundant, through B and C zones which indicate 

increasingly scarce conditions, down to zone D which signals that no more withdrawals can be 

approved because it would adversely impact fish populations (Steinman et al., 2011).   

27 

 
 
Figure 2. below shows current C and D zones in Michigan, indicating locations where 

water scarcity is currently preventing further withdrawals (zone D) or where water levels are 

approaching the maximum number of cumulative withdrawals (zone C).  

Figure 2. Map of C and D zones in Michigan generated from the Water Withdrawal Assessment 

Tool. (O’Neil, 2024). 

Additionally, Michigan water law states that: 

“All persons making large quantity withdrawals within a watershed are encouraged to establish a 

water users committee to evaluate the status of current water resources, water use, and trends in 

water use within the watershed and to assist in long-term water resources planning. A water users 

committee may be composed of all registrants, permit holders, and local government officials 

within the watershed” (Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.32725). 

Water Users Committees (WUCs) were conceived as a planning and conflict resolution 

mechanism inspired by the idea that collaborative governance institutions can be an effective 

vehicle for sustaining shared water resources and the socio-economic activities predicated upon 

28 

 
 
 
  
them. Given the caps on withdrawals established by Michigan’s implementation of the Compact, 

policy makers foresaw a potential for increased conflicts resulting from competition over 

resources effectively made scarcer by law. WUCs are intended to offer water users the option of 

managing water within withdrawal limits without relying on courts or state regulators to 

adjudicate disputes, which also reduces administrative and judicial burdens for the state. 

Additionally, by allowing each collaborative institution to make decisions about water within the 

WMA, WUCs offer greater flexibility in decision-making so that water users can better ensure 

local rules are congruent with their particular social, economic, and environmental 

circumstances. 

Moreover, as environmental, social, and economic conditions change, WUCs may enable 

water users to adapt management practices more efficiently and effectively than courts or state 

authorities. Adaptive collaboration has been shown to be a successful approach for achieving 

more sustainable water usage while avoiding the financial and social costs typically associated 

with decreased withdrawals (Zwickle et al., 2021). There is also evidence suggesting that when 

conflicts do arise among competing users, adaptive collaboration can reduce the likelihood that 

disagreements will escalate to the point of litigation (Chaffin et al., 2014).  

Can the lack of collaboration in Michigan, despite the potential benefits water users 

might gain from working tougher, be explained by prevailing rights and norms? Michigan water 

rights are founded in Riparian Doctrine, which is descended from English Common Law 

(Paganelli, 2007) and rest on the assumption that resources are abundant enough to meet societal 

demands without adversely impacting hydrological systems (Huffman, 2009). Riparian Doctrine 

regulates water use through the notions of correlative rights and reasonable use. The principle of 

correlative rights states that water users have “limited but more or less equal rights” to use water 

(Vermeylen, 2010). These rights are qualified by reasonable use, where “the primary right of a 

riparian proprietor is to receive protection for his reasonable use” of resources “from an 

unreasonable use by another” (Tauer, 2011). What is considered reasonable versus unreasonable 

has evolved through court decisions. For example, a proposed water withdrawal for irrigation 

would be considered unreasonable if it would interfere with private drinking wells of adjacent 

properties (Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy, 2018).   

29 

 
 
 
Combined, the history of correlative rights and reasonable use in Michigan has created a 

legal and normative landscape that lends itself to an individualistic, rather than community-

based, approach to water use and management. Concretely, the only duty that water users have 

towards one another is avoiding unreasonable interference with others’ reasonable use 

(Lautenberger and Norris, 2016). Although caps on total withdrawals may heighten tensions 

between water users over resources made scarce through policy, this may not incentivize 

collaboration but rather entrench individualism.  

Research Hypotheses 

To understand why no WUCs have formed in Michigan, I use the Integrative Framework 

for Collaborative Governance (IFCG), created by Emerson et al. (2012) to operationalize the 

constructs of rights and norms, and explore how they may be preventing water users from 

collaborating. Emerson et al. identify four types of drivers that motivate resource users to initiate 

collaboration: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, and trust. Without the 

existence of all these motivational factors, it is unlikely that resource users will voluntarily 

collaborate to manage shared resources in Michigan.  

This study poses four hypotheses, presented below: 

Hypothesis 1 (uncertainty construct): Perceptions of water scarcity will significantly predict 

water users’ likelihood of participating in a WUC. The more abundant they perceive resources, 

the less likely they are to join a WUC. 

Resource users’ degree of motivation to form collaborative governance institutions is 

related to their perceptions of resource abundance/scarcity (e.g., Bardhan, 1993; Araral, 2009; 

Blanco, Lopez, and Villamayor-Tomas, 2015; Uphoff et al., 1990). Users need to perceive 

resources as sufficiently scarce for them to believe that there is a problem that warrants being 

addressed collaboratively. I predict that the perception of water abundance is a norm in the water 

user community, and that it will remain so into the future. The scarcer water users perceive water 

to be, the more likely they are to express willingness to join a WUC.  

Hypothesis 2 (interdependence construct): The degree to which water users treat water 

management as a collective, rather than an individual enterprise, will significantly predict their 

likelihood of participating in a WUC. The lower the degree of collectivity, the less likely they are 

to join a WUC. 

30 

 
 
Due to Michigan’s history of correlative rights and reasonable use, I predict that water 

users are more likely to perceive water use as an independent, rather than interdependent, 

concern. Communication between resource users is one indicator that the usage of a resource is 

perceived to be interdependent (Osborne et al., 2019), where actors rely on one another for 

resolving common pool resource issues. I predict that (a) water users who report more 

communication with others about managing shared water resources, and (b) who report that 

water users should communicate more about water management, will have a greater likelihood of 

expressing willingness to join a WUC.  

Hypothesis 3 (consequential incentives construct): Water users’ beliefs about the positive or 

negative impacts that communicating with other users about water management may have will 

significantly predict their likelihood of joining a WUC. The more water users believe that 

conversations will have a positive impact on shared water resources, the more likely they will be 

to join a WUC.  

I expect that water users do not perceive consequential incentives for collaborating. I 

expect the norm is that water users do not perceive benefits to be gained, or problems to be 

avoided, from communicating about water management and may even believe that attempts to 

collaborate will have negative impacts. For example, water users may believe that attempting to 

work together may introduce new conflicts that otherwise would not have occurred if they 

continued managing water separately. I predict that water users who believe that conversations 

will improve, and not harm, relationships will be more likely to report a greater willingness to 

join a WUC.  

Hypothesis 4 (trust construct): The degree to which water users trust themselves, other water 

users, and the state to manage shared water resources responsibly will predict their likelihood of 

joining a WUC. The more highly water users trust themselves, other water users and the state, 

the more likely they are to express willingness to join a WUC.   

Trust is critical for the success of collaborative governance institutions (Hickey et al., 

2023). If water users are going to voluntarily form a WUC – and thereby sacrifice a degree of 

autonomy for the sake of the group – they will need to trust themselves, other water users, and 

the state to act as responsible water managers. I predict that water users who report higher levels 

of trust across these metrics will be more likely to report a greater willingness to join a WUC.    

31 

 
 
 
Methods 

Sampling frame 

I obtained contact information for Michigan large-quantity water users from two sources: 

the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (MDARD), and the Michigan 

Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE). MDARD is the state agency 

responsible for food and agricultural sectors in Michigan, and provided contact information for 

agricultural producers that use irrigation, and those who raise livestock. EGLE is the state agency 

responsible for permitting and monitoring all other non-agricultural water users, and provided 

information for these users, which included: public water supply, power generation, industry, 

mining companies, fire protection, lake augmentation, water bottling, HVAC, snowmaking and 

more.    

Data collection 

To explore why Michigan water users have not formed WUCs, I designed a survey to test 

my hypotheses using the IFCG framework. The survey was sent to all registered large-quantity 

water users in Michigan (those that have the capacity to use at least 100,000 per day) (Michigan 

Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy, 2024). The survey was developed in 

Qualtrics and sent electronically.  

Invitations to participate in the survey were sent to 1,788 agricultural producers and 

1,531 non-agricultural water users in the fall of 2022. An initial email was sent that explained the 

intent of the research and provided a link to the survey. This email was followed by three follow-

up emails to maximize rates of participation. Survey respondents were offered the chance to win 

one of ten $100 gift cards as an incentive. 

Survey Instrument 

Considering that no WUCs have been formed, a proxy dependent variable was used to 

predict water users’ willingness to participate in WUCs based on the hypothetical scenario 

described below:  

Imagine that a water user in your watershed was denied a new withdrawal and 

approached you to join a WUC. How likely is it that you would agree to participate? (1, not at all 

likely – 5, extremely likely) 

The independent variables featured in the survey test the four hypotheses described 

above. The measures used to test each hypothesis are presented in Table 2.  

32 

 
 
  
Table 2. Independent variables and response options used to test hypotheses. 

Construct 

Item 

Response Options 

Scarcity (H1) 

How abundant or scarce do you think water 

1 (very abundant) – 5 

resources are in your watershed? 

(very scarce) 

How abundant or scarce do you think water 

1 (very abundant) – 5 

resources are in Michigan in general? 

(very scarce) 

To  what  extent  do  you  believe  that  water 

1 (not at all) – 5 

resources in the future will become scarcer 

(extremely) 

in your watershed? 

To  what  extent  do  you  believe  that  water 

1 (not at all) – 5 

resources in the future will become scarcer 

(extremely) 

in Michigan in general? 

Interdependence 

How often do you talk to other water users 

1 (not at all) – 5 (very 

(H2) 

in  your  watershed  about  your  water 

often) 

management? 

To what extent do you believe your ability 

1 (not at all) – 5 (a great 

to  use  water  depends  on  how  others  use 

deal) 

water? 

How  much  do  you  think  that  water  users 

1 (not at all) – 5 (a great 

currently  work  together  to  make  water 

deal) 

management decisions? 

To  what  extent  do  you  think  water  users 

1 (not at all) – 5 (a lot) 

should  work 

together 

to  make  water 

management  decisions  with  others  in  their 

watershed? 

To  what  extent  do  you  think  water  users 

1 (not at all) – 5 (a great 

should  work 

together 

to  make  water 

deal) 

management  decisions  with  the  state  of 

Michigan? 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 (cont’d) 

Consequential 

To  what  extent  do  you  think  having 

1 (not at all) – 5 (a great 

Incentives (H3) 

conversations with other water users in your 

deal) 

watershed  about  water  management  could 

improve relationships with them? 

To  what  extent  do  you  think  having 

1 (not at all) – 5 (a great 

conversations with other water users in your 

deal) 

watershed  about  water  management  could 

harm relationships with them? 

Responsible 

Do  you  believe 

that  you  use  water 

1 (definitely not) – 5 

Use (H4) 

responsibly? 

(definitely yes) 

Do  you  believe  that  other  water  users  in 

1 (definitely not) – 5 

your watershed use water responsibly? 

(definitely yes) 

Do you believe that water users in Michigan 

1 (definitely not) – 5 

use water responsibly? 

(definitely yes) 

To  what  extent  do  you  trust  the  state  of 

1 (not at all) – 5 

Michigan to manage water effectively? 

(extremely) 

Data Analysis 

I performed descriptive analyses to summarize findings and identify important patterns in 

the data. To test the impact of scarcity, interdependence, consequential incentives, and trust 

constructs on collaborative intention I ran a series of stepwise linear regressions made up of three 

models.  

The first model included the following demographic controls: (1) whether the water user 

was an agricultural producer or non-agricultural water user (water user type), (2) whether the 

water user had been denied a proposed withdrawal or not (permit denial), and (3) whether a 

water user’s proposed withdrawal required a site-specific review or not (site-specific review).  

The second model included the controls that were not directly related to research 

questions, but which may have a moderating effect: (1) water users’ degree of self-reported 

water policy knowledge (policy knowledge), (2) water user’s familiarity with the water 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
withdrawal assessment tool (WWAT familiarity), (3) water user’s trust in the water withdrawal 

assessment tool (WWAT trust), (4) and water user’s knowledge of the state’s definition of 

adverse resource impacts (ARI knowledge). 

The third model consisted of the four constructs that were tested (i.e., scarcity, 

interdependence, consequential incentives, and trust). 

After these stepwise linear regressions were performed for each construct, a final 

stepwise linear regression was performed. This regression maintained the first two control 

models described, while the third model included all the independent variables found to 

significantly predict water users’ willingness to collaborate from the four independent construct 

models.  

An important limitation of these regressions is the inability to control for the zone in 

which a water user resides. Contact information from MDARD and EGLE did not include the 

location where a water user operates, and a survey question asking whether water users know 

what zone they are in revealed that a very small percentage (8%) of respondents had this 

knowledge.  

Results 

Demographics 

A total of 1024 large-quantity water users responded to the survey, accounting for 31% of 

all large-quantity water users in Michigan. Of these respondents, 520 (50.7%) were agricultural 

producers and 504 (49.3%) were non-agricultural producers. Table 3 shows the number and 

proportion of water user types who participated in this study. Additionally, Michigan’s diverse 

agriculture was reflected in the sample, with survey respondents identifying 34 kinds of 

agricultural products that they grow (Table 4). It is important to note that respondents could 

select more than one kind of agricultural product.   

Table 3. Number and Proportion of Water User Types in the Study. 

Water User Type  

Irrigation for Agriculture  

Irrigation for Non-Agriculture (e.g., golf 

courses)  

Public Water Supply  

Industry  

N  % of Respondents  

50.7  

18.4  

8.2  

6.9  

520  

189  

84  

71  

35 

 
 
Table 3 (cont’d) 

Livestock Production  

Fire Protection  

Mining  

Snowmaking  

Dewatering  

Heating, Air Conditioning, and Ventilation  

* Other  

Total  

40  

32  

19  

12  

11  

10  

36  

1024  

3.9  

3.1  

1.9  

1.2  

1.1  

1.0  

3.6  

100  

* Eight other water user types each represented less than 1% of respondents  

Table 4. Types of crops produced by large-quantity water users in this study (respondents could 

choose multiple crops).  

Number of Growers  Crop Type 

Number of Growers 

Crop Type 

Apples 

Asparagus 

Beef 

Blueberries 

Cabbage 

Carrots 

Celery 

Cherries 

Chestnuts 

49  Hops 

19  Horticulture 

38  Maple syrup 

47  Nursery and 

landscape 

12  Onions 

10  Peaches 

8  Pork 

28  Potatoes 

4  Poultry 

Christmas trees 

15  Pumpkins and squash 

Corn 

Cucumbers 

Dairy 

Dry edible beans 

Eggs 

278  Snap beans 

22  Soybeans 

25  Sugar beets 

32  Sweet corn 

4  Tomatoes 

36 

1 

31 

3 

37 

8 

21 

15 

50 

5 

34 

29 

231 

18 

29 

26 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 (cont’d) 

Grapes 

Honey 

Descriptive statistics 

13  Wheat 

2  Wood 

110 

2 

Descriptive analysis of the dependent variable reveals that Michigan water users were 

only somewhat likely to express willingness to collaboratively govern shared water resources 

through a WUC (M = 2.36, SD = 0.95). 

Several important findings emerge from the descriptive analyses of the independent 

variables that compose each of the four constructs underlying the hypotheses (Table 5).  

In terms of scarcity, results show that water users perceive current water resources in 

their watershed (M = 2.04, SD = 0.84) and Michigan as abundant (M = 2.15, SD = 0.75) and 

expect water resources in their watershed (M = 2.25, SD = 1.01) and Michigan to remain 

abundant into the future (M = 2.40, SD = 0.99). 

Regarding interdependence, water users rarely speak with others about water 

management (M = 2.06, SD = 0.96) and think that water users currently work together to manage 

shared resources only a little bit (M = 1.94, SD = 0.79). However, they also believe that their 

ability to use water depends on others a moderate amount (M = 2.88, SD = 1.18), and that water 

users should work with other water users (M = 3.08, SD = 1.02), and with the state (M = 2.93, 

SD = 1.11), a moderate amount to manage shared resources.    

In terms of consequential incentives, water users think that having conversations about 

water management with other water users could improve relationships a moderate amount (M = 

2.51, SD = 1.00), and that having these conversations will not harm relationships (M = 1.84, SD 

= 0.93).  

Finally, regarding trust, water users believed that they themselves use water responsibly 

(M = 4,53, SD = 0.65), that others in their watershed (M = 3.80, SD = 0.77) and others in 

Michigan likely do so as well (M = 3.47, SD = 0.76), but that the state of Michigan probably 

does not (M = 2.42, SD = 1.00).  

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Means and standard deviations for independent variables. 

Construct 

Item 

Scarcity (H1) 

How abundant or scarce do you think water 

resources are in your watershed? 

Mean 

2.04 

SD 

0.84 

How abundant or scarce do you think water 

2.15 

0.75 

resources are in Michigan in general? 

To what extent do you believe that water 

2.25 

1.01 

resources in the future will become scarcer in 

your watershed? 

To what extent do you believe that water 

2.40 

0.99 

resources in the future will become scarcer in 

Michigan in general? 

Interdependence (H2)  How often do you talk to other water users in 

2.06 

0.96 

your watershed about your water management? 

To what extent do you believe your ability to use 

2.88 

1.18 

water depends on how others use water? 

How much do you think that water users 

1.94 

0.79 

currently work together to make water 

management decisions? 

To what extent do you think water users should 

3.08 

1.02 

work together to make water management 

decisions with others in their watershed? 

To what extent do you think water users should 

2.93 

1.11 

work together to make water management 

decisions with the state of Michigan? 

Consequential 

To what extent do you think having 

2.51 

1.00 

Incentives (H3) 

conversations with others about water 

management could improve relationships? 

To what extent do you think having 

1.84 

0.93 

conversations with others about water 

management could harm your relationships? 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 (cont’d) 

Trust (H4) 

Do you believe that you use water responsibly? 

Do you believe that other water users in your 

watershed use water responsibly? 

4.53 

3.80 

0.65 

0.77 

Do you believe that water users in Michigan use 

3.47 

0.76 

water responsibly? 

To what extent do you trust the state of 

2.42 

1.00 

Michigan to manage water effectively? 

Study Measures 

H1: Perceptions of water scarcity will significantly predict water users’ likelihood of 

participating in a WUC. 

The following four items comprising the scarcity measure were entered as predictors in a 

stepwise linear regression with willingness to collaborate as the DV: (1) water users’ perceptions 

of current water availability in their watershed (current watershed availability), (2) current water 

availability in Michigan (current Michigan availability), (3) perceptions of the extent that water 

scarcity will increase in their watershed (future watershed scarcity), and (4) perceptions of the 

extent that water scarcity will increase in Michigan (future Michigan scarcity). 

After controlling for all the demographic and moderating variables in Model 2, the only 

item shown to have a significant impact on a respondent’s reported willingness to join a WUC 

was their perception of water scarcity in the state in the future (β = .203, p = .015). The scarcer 

water users believe resources will become in Michigan in the future, the more likely they are to 

express willingness to join a WUC. (Table 6).   

Table 6. Linear Regression Results for Uncertainty Construct. 

Water user type 

Permit denial 

B 

.069 

(-.090) 

.045* 

(-.104) 

C 

.063 

(-.092) 

.070 

(-.093) 

A 

.107 

(-.077) 

.071 

(-.091) 

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.267 

(.054) 

.341 

(-.046) 

.088 

(.089) 

.421 

(.044) 

.020* 

(.116) 

.613 

(.027) 

Table 6 (cont’d) 

Site-specific review 

Policy knowledge 

WWAT familiarity 

WWAT trust 

ARI knowledge 

Current watershed availability 

Current Michigan availability 

Future watershed scarcity 

Future Michigan scarcity 

R-squared 

Adjusted R-squared 

.024 

.018 

.055 

.040 

Standard errors are reported in parentheses 

**, * indicates p < .01, and p < .05 respectively 

.346 

(-.045) 

.123 

(.079) 

.300 

(.056) 

.109 

(.082) 

.666 

(.023) 

.072 

(-.123) 

.915 

(.007) 

.900 

(-.011) 

.015* 

(.203) 

.087 

.064 

H2: The degree to which water users treat water management as a collective, rather than an 

individual enterprise, will significantly predict their likelihood of participating in a WUC. 

The following five items comprising the interdependence measure were entered as 

predictors in a stepwise linear regression with willingness to collaborate as the DV: (1) the 

extent to which water users currently talk with other water users in their watershed about 

resource management (talk with others), (2) water users’ perceptions about the extent to which 

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
their ability to access and use water depends on how others use water (water codependence), (3) 

water users’ perceptions about the extent to which they currently cooperate with others to 

manage water resources (current cooperation), (4) water users’ perceptions about the extent to 

which they should cooperate with other water users to manage resources (should cooperate 

(water users)), and (5) water users’ perceptions about the extent to which they should cooperate 

with the state to manage water resources (should cooperate (with state)). 

After controlling for all the demographic and moderating variables in Model 2, two items 

are shown to have a significant impact on a respondent’s willingness to join a WUC. I found that 

the extent to which water users currently talk with other water users in their watershed about 

resource management significantly predicts their willingness to participate in a WUC (β = .143, 

p = .006). The more water users currently talk with others, the more likely they are to be willing 

to join a WUC. Additionally, water users’ perceptions about the extent to which they should 

cooperate with other water users to manage resources significantly predicts their willingness to 

join a WUC (β = .246, p = .000). The more water users think they should cooperatively manage 

water, the more likely they are to be willing to join a WUC (Table 7).  

Table 7. Linear Regression Results for Interdependence Construct. 

Water user type 

Permit denial 

Site-specific review 

Policy knowledge 

WWAT familiarity 

WWAT trust 

ARI knowledge 

B 

.076 

(-.088) 

.041* 

(-.107) 

.563 

(-.028) 

.046* 

(.104) 

.368 

(.049) 

.059 

(.095) 

.369 

(.048) 

C 

.077 

(-.086) 

.234 

(-.060) 

.663 

(-.020) 

.188 

(.065) 

.081 

(.091) 

.492 

(.035) 

.500 

(-.036) 

A 

.088 

(-.082) 

.047* 

(-.101) 

.501 

(-.033) 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 (cont’d) 

Talk with others 

Water codependence 

Current cooperation 

Should cooperate (water 

users) 

Should cooperate (with state) 

R-squared 

Adjusted R-squared 

.024 

.018 

.061 

.047 

Standard errors are reported in parentheses 

**, * indicates p < .01, and p < .05 respectively 

.006** 

(.143) 

.453 

(-.038) 

.185 

(.065) 

.001** 

(.246) 

.400 

(.054) 

.170 

.147 

H3: Water users’ beliefs about the positive or negative impacts of communicating with other 

users about water management will significantly predict their likelihood of joining a WUC. 

The following two items comprising the consequential incentives measure were entered 

as predictors in a stepwise linear regression with willingness to collaborate as the DV: (1) water 

users’ perceptions of the extent to which they think that having conversations with other water 

users would improve relationships (improve relationships), and (2) water users’ perceptions of 

the extent to which they think that having conversations with other water users would harm 

relationships (harm relationships). 

After controlling for all the demographic and moderating variables in Model 2, the only 

item shown to have a significant impact on a respondent’s reported willingness to join a WUC 

was their perceptions of the extent to which they think that having conversations with other 

water users would improve relationships (β = .368, p = .001). The more water users believe that 

having conversations would improve relationships, the more they were willing to join a WUC. 

(Table 8).  

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Linear Regression Results for Consequential Incentives Construct. 

Water user type 

Permit denial 

Site-specific review 

Policy knowledge 

WWAT familiarity 

WWAT trust 

ARI knowledge 

Improve relationships 

Harm relationships 

R-squared 

Adjusted R-squared 

A 

.055 

(-.090) 

.055 

(-.095) 

.348 

(-.045) 

B 

.039* 

(-.100) 

.035* 

(-.107) 

.398 

(-.040) 

.055 

(.098) 

.321 

(.053) 

.019** 

(.115) 

.592 

(.028) 

.026 

.020 

.062 

.048 

C 

.024** 

(-.102) 

.171 

(-.065) 

.264 

(-.049) 

.084 

(.082) 

.218 

(.061) 

.271 

(.051) 

.648 

(.022) 

.001** 

(.368) 

.433 

(.034) 

.196 

.180 

Standard errors are reported in parentheses 

**, * indicates p < .01, and p < .05 respectively 

H4: The degree to which water users trust themselves, other water users, and the state to manage 

shared water resources responsibly will predict their likelihood of joining a WUC. 

The following four items comprising the responsible use measure were entered as 

predictors into a stepwise linear regression with willingness to collaborate as the DV: (1) the 

extent to which water users believe that they personally use water responsibly (personal 

responsibility) (2) the extent to which water users believe that others in their watershed use water 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
responsibly (others in watershed are responsible), (3) the extent to which water users believe 

that Michigan water users use water responsibly (others in Michigan are responsible), and (4) 

the extent to which water users believe that the state manages water effectively (state 

management). 

After controlling for all the demographic and moderating variables in Model 2, I found 

that none of the items comprising the struct construct significantly predict water users’ 

willingness to join a WUC (Table 9).  

Table 9. Linear Regression Results for Trust Construct. 

Water user type 

Permit denial 

Site-specific review 

Policy knowledge 

WWAT familiarity 

WWAT trust 

ARI knowledge 

Personal responsibility 

Others in watershed are 

responsible 

Others in Michigan are 

responsible 

B 

.125 

(-.075) 

.045* 

(-.103) 

.316 

(-.048) 

.051 

(.100) 

.296 

(.056) 

.052 

(.097) 

.602 

(.028) 

C 

.132 

(-.078) 

.037* 

(-.108) 

.405 

(-.041) 

.056 

(.099) 

.291 

(.057) 

.168 

(.077) 

.688 

(.021) 

.429 

(-.041) 

.650 

(.029) 

.329 

(.058) 

A 

.158 

(-.067) 

.058 

(-.094) 

.225 

(-.059) 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 (cont’d) 

State management 

R-squared 

Adjusted R-squared 

Standard errors are reported in parentheses 

**, * indicates p < .01, and p < .05 respectively 

Regression testing IFCG constructs 

.024 

.018 

.057 

.042 

.274 

(.060) 

.065 

.042 

To understand why Michigan water users have not collaborated through WUCs, I 

attempted to measure their (lack of) motivations in terms of the scarcity, interdependence, 

consequential incentives, and trust constructs outlined in the IFCG. The five IFCG items found 

to be significant predictors of water users’ willingness to join a WUC through the four construct 

regressions were entered as predictors into a stepwise linear regression with willingness to 

collaborate as the DV.  

After controlling for all the demographic and moderating variables in Model 2, I found 

that all these variables remain significant predictors of water users’ willingness to participate in a 

WUC (Table 10).  

In terms of the scarcity construct, I found that water users’ willingness to join a WUC 

was significantly impacted by their perceptions about the current degree of water availability in 

their watershed (β = -.116, p = .015). The scarcer they perceive water to be in their watershed, 

the less likely they were to express willingness to join a WUC. Additionally, water users’ 

perceptions of the extent to which water scarcity is likely to increase in Michigan in the future 

significantly predicted their willingness to participate in a WUC (β = .107, p = .031). Water users 

who believed that water was likely to become scarcer in Michigan in the future were more likely 

to express willingness to join a WUC.  

In terms of the interdependence construct, I found that the extent to which water users 

currently talk with others in their watershed about comanaging resources significantly impacts 

their willingness to join a WUC (β = .107, p = .035). The more respondents reported talking with 

other water users in their watershed about resource management, the more likely they were to 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
report a greater willingness to join a WUC. Moreover, the extent to which water users thought 

they should talk with others about collaborative water management significantly and positively 

correlated with their willingness to participate in a WUC (β = .111, p = .045).  

In terms of the consequential incentives construct, I found that the extent to which water 

users believe that having conversations with others in their watershed about water management 

would improve relationships significantly impacts willingness to join a WUC (β = .254, p = 

.001). The greater the extent to which respondents thought that having these conversations would 

improve relationships, the more likely they were to express greater willingness to join a WUC.  

None of the survey items I used to operationalize the trust construct proved significant 

predictors of water users’ willingness to participate in a WUC.  

Table 10. Linear Regression Results for Testing IFCG Constructs. 

Water user type 

Permit denial 

Site-specific review 

Policy knowledge 

WWAT familiarity 

WWAT trust 

ARI knowledge 

Current watershed availability 

Future Michigan scarcity 

A 

.146 

(-.069) 

.055 

(-.096) 

.241 

(-.057) 

46 

B 

.101 

(-.081) 

.040* 

(-.106) 

.325 

(-.048) 

.101 

(.085) 

.356 

(.050) 

.028* 

(.110) 

.580 

(.030) 

C 

.143 

(-.069) 

.276 

(-.052) 

.266 

(-.050) 

.272 

(.053) 

.179 

(.069) 

.377 

(.043) 

.760 

(-.016) 

.015* 

(-.116) 

.031* 

(.107) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 (cont’d) 

Talk with others 

Should cooperate (water 

users) 

Improve relationships 

R-squared 

Adjusted R-squared 

.024 

.018 

.055 

.040 

Standard errors are reported in parentheses 

**, * indicates p < .01, and p < .05 respectively 

.035* 

(.107) 

.045* 

(.111) 

.001** 

(.254) 

.209 

.187 

Discussion 

This research investigates why Michigan water users have not formed collaborative 

watershed governance groups despite their ability to do so since 2008. I hypothesized that rights 

and norms in Michigan’s water user community are preventing the adoption of collaborative 

institutions, and I test this hypothesis by operationalizing the constructs of rights and norms 

using the categories of motivational factors found in the Integrative Framework for Collaborative 

Governance. Since Michigan water law allows, but does not require, water users to 

collaboratively govern shared watershed resources, it is important to understand their 

motivations – or lack thereof – for collaborating. Below I discuss the results of the four 

hypotheses. 

Hypothesis 1: Perceptions of water scarcity will significantly predict water users’ likelihood of 

participating in a WUC. 

Michigan has historically been a water-rich state, where members of the water user 

community could expect resources to remain plentiful and available for use. However, as 

pressures on water resources have increased, the risk of scarcity – both locally and across the 

state in general – continues to increase. Research shows that willingness to participate in 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
collaboration falls on a bell-curve, with willingness being the lowest on either end (too scarce or 

too abundant), and highest between these end points.  

Our findings indicate that Michigan water users perceive resources as abundant, and 

therefore do not believe that scarcity is a salient risk. Water users’ perceptions that water is 

currently abundant in their watershed and in Michigan, and their expectation that resources will 

remain abundant into the future, may be a norm so strongly ingrained in Michigan’s water user 

community that the treat of scarcity appears quite unlikely. The lack of perceived abundance is 

likely a major factor explaining why water users do not believe that voluntary collaboration is 

necessary, hence the lack of WUCs in the state.    

More generally, findings support the idea that voluntary collaboration is unlikely to occur 

if resources are perceived as too abundant to warrant forming collaborative groups to resolve a 

problem not perceived to exist. In cases where resources are perceived as abundant and 

collaboration remains voluntary, it is likely that strong incentives need to be in place to 

overcome the lack of urgency created by perceptions of abundance. Alternatively, if water is 

perceived to be abundant it may be the case that policies should mandate collaboration, rather 

than relying on the voluntary actions of resource users, if collaboration is going to occur at all.   

Hypothesis 2: The degree to which water users treat water management as a collective 

enterprise will significantly predict their likelihood of participating in a WUC. 

Given the body of riparian law that developed in Michigan based on historic conditions 

of water resource abundance, water rights entailed very little obligation on the part of users to 

co-manage resources. The only substantive obligation water users must observe is avoiding 

unreasonable interference with other water users’ reasonable use. For this reason, I expected that 

water users who participate in more pro-collaborative behaviors are more likely to report 

willingness to participate in a WUC. Indeed, I found that water users who spoke to others about 

water management, who thought that there was currently a high degree of cooperation among 

water users, and who thought water users should cooperate, were more likely to be willing to 

collaborate.   

This link between pro-collaborative behaviors and attitudes and willingness to participate 

in WUCs may represent a leverage point for encouraging the adoption of WUCs. Facilitating 

conversations among water users about shared resources, without explicitly asking water users to 

form WUCs, could provide researchers and the state with a starting point for building dialogue 

48 

 
 
between resource users. Strengthening conversations about water resources in this way could 

reduce perceived barriers that may currently be associated with forming WUCs.  

However, perceived interdependence and willingness to participate in a WUC were not 

significantly related. This lack of relationship may be due to different definitions of 

interdependence. From a social-ecological systems perspective, the very nature of surface and 

groundwater being a common pool resource implies that resource users are interconnected. 

However, from a rights perspective, water users are not necessarily interconnected because each 

individual water rights holder has a recognized ability to use a certain permitted amount. Even if 

water users may recognize their interconnectedness from a social-ecological systems perspective, 

the nature of water rights in Michigan protects their ability to use water in the case of 

interference from others. 

The difference between definitions of interdependence – the social-ecological perspective 

and that of water rights in Michigan – becomes more complicated with the fact that the state has 

set caps on cumulative withdrawals in watersheds. Effectively this creates a new type of 

potential conflict between water users and state law and changes the rights of water users. No 

longer are the duties of water users limited to refraining from the unreasonable interference with 

other water users’ reasonable use, but from avoiding adverse resource impacts by overdraft. Caps 

on cumulative withdrawals create a new, legal, form of interdependence between water users 

who are now responsible for collectively avoiding excess withdrawals. It remains an open 

question whether this institutional setup will incentivize the formation of WUCs.  

Hypothesis 3: Water users’ beliefs about communicating with other users about water 

management will significantly predict their likelihood of joining a WUC. 

Communication is a fundamental component within collaborative governance 

institutions, essential for developing shared norms of reciprocity and trust among participants 

(Ulibarri and Scott, 2017). Moreover, improved communication is linked to more deliberative 

modes of interaction that are aimed at collective problem solving rather than actors exercising 

individual power through negotiation or bargaining (Newig et al., 2018). This was the case in my 

data, where water users who believed that increased communication with others about watershed 

management would improve relationships were more likely to report greater willingness to 

participate in a WUC.   

49 

 
 
The IFCG identifies the existence of consequential incentives as a key factor for 

motivating collaboration. Findings suggest that the potential for improving relationships between 

water users through communicating about shared resources management is one such incentive. 

This suggests another example where facilitating communication in water user communities may 

be a way to build relationships between water users that are key for successful collaboration. By 

placing the emphasis on finding mutually beneficial outcomes made possible through 

communication, it is possible that collaboration will appear more desirable to water users. If 

water users can recognize avenues for realizing individual and community benefits through 

dialogue and working together in an informal way, then water users may be more inclined to 

form collaborative groups.  

Hypothesis 4: The degree to which water users trust themselves, other water users, and the state 

to manage shared water resources responsibly will predict their likelihood of joining a WUC. 

I expected that for water users to voluntarily collaborate trust between potential WUC 

members, and between water users and the state would be required. Here, I operationalize the 

construct of trust as water users’ perceptions that potential WUC participants manage water 

responsibly. More specifically, I measured the extent to which water users trust themselves, other 

water users, and the state to manage water responsibly.  

Collaborators need to trust each other to create shared values and goals, and foster 

legitimacy in collective decision-making (Bianchi et al., 2021). In this context, where water users 

may be voluntarily transitioning from individual to collective decision-making, it is important 

that they trust relevant actors to manage water resources responsibly (Muff et al., 2020). Without 

this trust, it is unlikely that individuals will be willing to sacrifice their power of individual 

decision-making to collaborate with others who are believed to be irresponsible water users.  

However, I found that willingness to participate in a WUC was not predicted by the 

perceived responsibility of personal water management, the water management of other water 

users, nor water management by the state. It may be the case that my operationalization of the 

construct of trust was not appropriate for the context of this study. This is discussed in further 

detail below.  

Research Limitations 

The most important limitation of this study was the fact that I substituted trust for the 

leadership construct in the IFCG. I made the choice to do this because no WUCs have been 

50 

 
 
formed, and therefore there are no official ‘leaders’ or examples of leadership that could be 

tapped into. However, I could have tried to operationalize the construct of leadership even in the 

absence of WUCs.  

After making the decision to substitute leadership with trust, I then operationalized trust 

as ‘trust in responsible management.’ I expect that trust is key if Michigan water users are going 

to voluntarily transition from independent to collaborative water use, making it important for 

researchers to properly measure this construct. Trust is a multifaceted concept (Sohns et al., 

2021), and it may be that frames other than the one I selected are perceived as more important to 

Michigan water users. For instance, Hamm et al. (2016) describe six distinct, through 

interrelated, ways of defining trust: dispositional trust, care, competence, confidence, procedural 

fairness, and salient values similarity. It may be the case that other trust frames beyond the one 

used in this research are more relevant predictors of water users’ willingness to participate in 

WUCs.  

Future research on the role of trust as a predictor of willingness to participate in WUCs 

could explore a more comprehensive set of trust frames to identify what is most salient for water 

users. Moreover, future research could seek to operationalize the construct of leadership and test 

whether it is a significant predictor of water users’ willingness to participate in WUCs.  

Conclusion 

This paper investigated why Michigan water users have not formed collaborative 

watershed governance groups despite having the ability to do so since 2008. I predicted that 

certain rights and norms which exist in the water user community are preventing transitions from 

individualistic to collaborative governance. I tested hypotheses using the concepts of uncertainty, 

interdependence, consequential incentives, and trust as outlined by the IFCG. 

While theory predicts that as resource conditions transition from relatively abundant to 

relatively scarce and users become less certain about their ability to access and use resources that 

they will become more likely to collaborate. However, I found that Michigan water users do not 

report a greater willingness to collaborate even as some watersheds have begun to become water 

stressed according to the Water Withdrawal Assessment Too. It may be the case that water users 

in Michigan still perceive water resources – both locally and state-wide, now and into the future 

– as being abundant, and that there is little need to form voluntary collaborative groups to 

manage an abundant resource. 

51 

 
 
The right for water users to use resources in Michigan does not legally depend on 

working with other water users, in the sense that once an individual receives a registration, they 

can use their allotted amount almost completely independently of other water users or state 

regulatory oversight. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that their perceived lack of 

interdependence is reflected in their unwillingness to participate in a WUC. However, I find that 

those water users who currently communicate with other water users about water management, 

and who believe that water users should work together to manage shared resources, are more 

likely to express willingness to collaborate. 

Facilitating communication in water user communities about water management with the 

intent of building trusting relationships between water users and highlighting potential benefits 

that can arise from working together, can help set the stage for WUC adoption. Beginning with 

informal processes that encourage communication in a low stake setting, while helping water 

users to recognize mutually beneficial gains from doing so, will make WUCs appear less foreign 

and intimidating, and instead as a vehicle for cooperative, sustainable, and community-driven 

water management.  

Additionally, I found that my operationalization of trust through the lens of responsible 

water use failed to predict willingness to participate in WUCs. Future research would benefit 

from exploring measures for trust in this context. Identifying what trust means to water users, as 

well as the form(s) of trust that need to exist to encourage WUC participation, will be important 

if Michigan water users are ever going to voluntarily collaborate. This is especially true for 

researchers and state actors interested in facilitating the formation of WUCs, because they will 

have clearer insight on how to build trust in water user communities.  

This research shows that rights and norms are crucial for understanding the development 

– or lack thereof – of local collaborative governance institutions, and that my approach using the 

Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance yielded valuable insights. In the context of 

WUCs in Michigan, I identified several leverage points that can be used to encourage 

collaboration, as well as barriers that need to be addressed if they are going to voluntarily 

collaborate. Perhaps the most significant barrier I found is strong perceptions of resource 

abundance. This problem is particularly wicked because in some places water is abundant in both 

an environmental and legal sense, in others it is abundant in an environmental sense but not 

legally, and in still others it is scarce in both senses. This situation echoes Ostrom’s statement 

52 

 
 
that there are no panaceas for resolving common pool governance issues (Ostrom, 2007), and 

means that the process of developing WUCs will be different case by case.   

This work can help guide policymakers, water users and other parties interested in 

promoting WUCs. Focusing on how rights and norms create or inhibit motivations to collaborate 

helps identify and leverage specific sources of willingness to collaborate and identify existing 

barriers. Whether institutions arise through self-initiated organization such as the 2012 Local 

Enhanced Management Areas in Kansas (e.g., Steiner et al., 2021; Perez-Quesada and 

Hendricks, 2021), state mandated collaboration such as the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater 

Management Act in California (e.g., Dobbin and Lubell, 2021; Lubell et al., 2020), or more 

unique scenarios like that of Michigan, understanding how rights and norms facilitate or inhibit 

transitions to collaboration is important for evaluating how institutions are structured and 

function, as well as how they can be improved.   

53 

 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Genesis: Structural Power and the Social-Ecological Systems Framework 

Abstract 

The collaborative governance of common pool resources has become widely accepted by 

researchers focused on collective action in social-ecological systems. Collaboration has proven 

an effective strategy for sustaining diverse common pool resources and the socioeconomic 

activities predicated upon them. Developing frameworks which accurately depict the causal 

relationships between institutions and the social, economic, political, and ecological systems 

within which they are embedded is crucial for theoretical understanding and the practical 

efficacy of governance. The Social-Ecological Systems Framework (SESF) created by Ostrom 

and subsequently expanded upon by others is of particular importance. The SESF provides the 

most comprehensive and flexible constellation of constructs connected by empirically verifiable 

relationships. A problem with the SESF, however, is the insufficient incorporation of power into 

the framework. While researchers have previously attempted to incorporate the notion of power 

into the SESF, this chapter proposes a new approach for doing so. This approach opens novel 

avenues for future research by emphasizing that how collaborative institutions originally form 

dictates the nature of power structures within them. This in turn affects policies and actions that 

emerge from it. Emerson and Nabatchi outline three processes by which institutions come into 

existence, and which differentially affect structural power: self-initiated, independently 

convened, and externally directed. I argue that the SESF can be improved by incorporating these 

modes of institutional genesis and the different power structures associated with them. Doing so 

entails new and exciting questions to be proposed and pursued by scientists working in the field 

of collaborative governance research.   

54 

 
 
   
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 

Collaborative Governance Frameworks: A Brief History 

Conceptual frameworks play a key role in the social sciences. Frameworks identify 

essential elements of a system and arrange these variables into visible relationships that help 

researchers analyze phenomena from a similar theoretical perspective (McGinnis and Ostrom, 

2014). The purpose of a framework, then, is to guide research by grounding inquiries in well-

established theoretical constructs, thereby allowing multiple investigations to contribute towards 

a common understanding (Adom et al., 2018). Without the use of frameworks, there is a risk of 

researchers “speaking different languages” by conceiving of systems in distinct and perhaps 

incompatible ways; this makes it difficult for diverse projects focused on similar phenomena to 

contribute towards the creation of a more holistic theory and practical applications (Van der 

Waldt, 2020).     

In common pool resource management, there has been an evolution in the frameworks 

used to conceptualize institutional arrangements for governing commons. In his seminal 1968 

article The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin presents readers with a hypothetical scenario where 

cattle ranchers grazed their herds in a commonly shared pasture range. He describes how each 

rancher is incentivized to increase their herd for private gain, but in doing so, they each 

contribute to the pasture's degradation. Eventually, by following the logic of individual profit 

maximization, the pasture will be overgrazed to the detriment of everyone involved. Hardin 

proceeds to argue that the only way these ranchers – and by extension, all resource users 

dependent on common pool resources – can avoid overconsumption or pollution is by ceding 

individual decision-making rights to the state, thereby ensuring that laws can be developed in 

recognition for the need of “mutual coercion mutually agreed upon” (Hardin, 1968). 

Concretely, Hardin argued that the sustainability of the commons can only be achieved 

through top-down state regulation and resource privatization (Frischmann et al., 2019). This sort 

of governance, Hardin believes, is necessary for overcoming the incentives each user has for 

maximizing personal short-term profits to the detriment of shared resources. However, state-

centric governance that relies on privatization has been found to harbor its own dilemmas, 

including, for example, rent-seeking behaviors, governmental corruption, and the creation of 

unaccounted externalities (e.g., Leitheiser et al., 2022; Papadimitropoulos, 2017).  

55 

 
 
Elinor Ostrom pioneered an alternative position for thinking about the governance of 

common pool resources by conceiving of institutional arrangements other than the narrow set of 

options emphasized by Hardin (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom 2010). While Hardin 

claimed that there is a need for privatization and strong state regulation to avoid a tragedy of the 

commons, Ostrom’s research showed that when resource users themselves create and participate 

in “flexible, inclusive and locally governed institutions”, it is possible to achieve 

environmentally sustainable socioeconomic practices (Forsyth and Johnson, 2014, 8). This idea 

has commonly come to be known as collaborative governance. 

To develop her idea of collaborative governance, Ostrom challenged the notion of human 

rationality underpinning Hardin’s view of the tragedy of the commons. Hardin’s parable about 

herdsmen inevitably destroying their shared pastureland as a logical consequence of individuals 

exercising rational economic choice within the context of a common pool resource asserts that, 

ultimately, humans seek to maximize short-term personal gain to the detriment of (a) other 

people now and into the future, and (b) to themselves in the future (Oakes, 2016). In this frame, 

it is considered ‘rational’ for actors to behave this way because they believe that if they do not 

maximize their own resource appropriation in the short-term, others will, and they will suffer for 

it. 

However, through theoretical and empirical work, Ostrom showed how communities of 

resource users have instituted systems for managing common pool resources that are “better than 

rational” as Hardin would understand it (Ostrom, 1998, 3). This is accomplished by operating 

according to a different mode of rationality where “reciprocity, reputation, and trust” have 

enabled them to “overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest" (Ostrom, 1998, 3). 

These findings helped to inspire the creation of the Social-Ecological Systems Framework 

(SESF). The SESF aimed to standardize the concepts and language researchers interested in 

common pool resources and social dilemmas use, both to guide context-specific work from a 

general starting point, as well as make these findings more generalizable and useful for 

developing collaborative governance theory (Ostrom, 2009). 

This Chapter 

The purpose of this chapter is threefold: 

56 

 
 
First, I present the SESF and highlight how it helped to advance collaborative governance 

theory. I also identify and discuss some of the main critiques that researchers have leveled 

against the framework. 

Second, I introduce the concept of structural power to represent the political dynamics 

inherent to natural resource governance. Furthermore, I draw upon Emerson and Nabatchi’s 

(2012) work describing how structural power is related to different processes by which 

institutions are formed – a process I refer to as institutional genesis.  

Finally, I outline new avenues of research that become available through updating the 

SESF using the concept of structural power as a function of institutional genesis. Doing this, I 

hope to contribute towards a new chapter of collaborative governance research and practice.   

The Social-Ecological Systems Framework 

Advancing Social-Ecological Systems Governance Theory 

The Social-Ecological Systems Framework (SESF) was developed to help researchers 

develop a shared language, set of concepts, and framework for designing social-ecological 

systems governance research and organizing their findings (Ostrom, 2009). Doing so helped to 

formalize and make more sophisticated the science of social-ecological systems governance. The 

SESF acts as a diagnostic tool for understanding the source(s) of social-ecological problems and 

possible solutions to these problems, while providing a common ground and language for 

researchers to make research generalizable (e.g., Ostrom and Cox, 2010; Schluter et al., 2019). 

The diagnostic nature of the SESF enables researchers to both specify in detail what makes a 

particular social-ecological problem (and potential solutions to the problem) distinct, while 

simultaneously enabling the generalization of findings from each case to larger theoretical 

implications for social-ecological systems governance (Basurto, Gelcich, and Ostrom, 2013).   

The SESF is composed of two tiers of variables, where the first-tier variables (Figure 3) 

act as constructs that are further decomposed into second-tier dimensions that can be 

operationalized within research projects (Table 11). The first-tier variables are Resource systems, 

Resource units, Governance systems, Actors, and Action situations (McGinnis and Ostrom, 

2014). The resource system refers to the type of common pool resource being governed (e.g., 

forests, pasturelands, freshwater, etc.) and is characterized by such metrics as its size and the 

clarity of the resource boundary. Resource units refers to the extractible and consumable parts of 

a resource system (e.g., a tree in a forest, an area of pastureland, the number of gallons of water). 

57 

 
 
Governance systems refer to the organizations and rules that structure how resource users 

interact with resources and with each other. Actors refers to individuals involved in governing 

and using resources and are characterized by measures such as number of relevant actors, their 

demographic makeup, and the types of relationships (e.g., cooperative, conflicting) that exist 

between actors. Lastly, Action Situations refer to the interactions between actors to jointly affect 

the outcomes of resource governance processes.  

Figure 3: Social-Ecological Systems Framework (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014). 

Table 11. SESF first- and second-tier variables (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014). 

First-tier variables 

Second-tier variables 

Social, economic, and political settings (S) 

Economic development 

Demographic trends  

Political stability 

Other governance systems 

Markets 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 (cont’d) 

Resource systems (RS) 

Sector (e.g., water, forest, pasture) 

Media organizations 

Technology 

Clarity of system boundary 

Size of resource system 

Human-constructed facilities 

Productivity of system 

Equilibrium properties 

Predictability of system dynamics 

Storage characteristics 

Location 

Governance systems (GS) 

Government organizations 

Resource units (RU) 

Actors (A) 

Non-government organizations 

Network structure 

Property-rights system 

Operational-choice rules 

Collective-choice rules 

Constitutional-choice rules 

Monitoring and sanctioning rules 

Resource unit mobility 

Growth or replacement rate 

Interaction among resource units 

Economic value 

Number of units 

Distinctive characteristics 

Spatial and temporal distribution 

Number of relevant actors 

Socioeconomic attributes  

History or past experiences 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 (cont’d) 

Action situations 

Related ecosystems (ECO) 

Location 

Leadership/entrepreneurship  

Norms(trust-reciprocity)/social capital 

Knowledge of SES/mental models 

Importance of resource (dependence) 

Technologies available  

Harvesting 

Information sharing 

Deliberation processes 

Conflicts 

Investment activities 

Lobbying activities 

Self-organizing activities 

Networking activities 

Monitoring activities 

Evaluative criteria 

Social performance measures 

Ecological performance measures 

Externalities to other SESs 

Climate patterns 

Pollution patterns 

Flows into and out of focal SES 

The SESF has proven to be perhaps the most conceptually comprehensive framework in 

the social-ecological systems governance literature and is unique in that it treats social and 

ecological components as equally important for defining systems’ structure and function 

(Johnson et al., 2019). The multitiered structure of the framework provides enough flexibility 

that it can be modified to fit different types of resources and social dilemmas while enabling the 

generalizability of findings to other situations (Partelow, 2018). By characterizing complex 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
social-ecological systems using first-tier variables that are arranged in a network of causal 

relationships, and which consist of multiple second-tier dimensions, the SESF acts as a boundary 

object that facilitates interdisciplinary knowledge co-creation between researchers from diverse 

disciplinary backgrounds (e.g., Guimaraes et al., 2018; Hertz and Schluter, 2015). 

In practice, the SESF has been used to understand a diversity of social-ecological systems 

governance problems. These include fisheries (e.g., Blythe et al., 2017; Basurto, Gelcich, and 

Ostrom., 2013), forests (e.g., Schmitt-Harsh and Mincey, 2020; Xie et al., 2019; Guimaraes et 

al., 2018), food systems (Kopainsky et al., 2015), irrigation systems (Cox, 2014), lakes 

(Nagendra and Ostrom, 2014), soil carbon (Amin et al., 2020), freshwater (e.g., Baudoin and 

Arenas, 2020; Flynn and Davidson, 2016), national parks and biosphere reserves (e.g., Ferreria et 

al., 2019; Gurney et al., 2019), methanation projects (Arfaoui et al., 2022), cooperative 

approaches to rural electrification (Holstenkamp, 2019), and payments for ecosystem services 

(Bennett and Gosnell, 2015). 

Critiques of the SESF 

Despite the theoretical and empirical advancements achieved through the SESF, 

researchers have identified several limitations of the SESF. Nagel and Partelow (2022) reviewed 

51 studies where researchers used the SESF and found that they were often unclear how to apply 

it in ways that made their results generalizable to other cases. Moreover, Fabinyni et al. (2015) 

notes that the SESF puts excessive emphasis on human adaptation to environmental change and 

less on environmental change due to human activities. Delgado-Serrano and Ramos (2015) 

describe how the SESF originally failed to acknowledge the fact that a diversity of actors may be 

involved in governing common pool resources beyond direct users, and that the SESF should 

reflect a broader array of actors who have direct influence on the social-ecological system in 

question (e.g., researchers, government officials, etc.) (Delgado-Serrano and Ramos, 2015).  

Most important for this chapter, however, is the fact that the SESF inadequately 

represents the concept of power (Thiel, Adamseged, and Baake, 2015). Power plays a key role in 

shaping relationships between actors, which in turn affects resource management policies and 

outcomes (e.g., Calderon-Conteras and White, 2020; Clement, 2013). Natural resource 

management is not an apolitical matter, and it is important for the SESF – or any framework – to 

incorporate this concept (Rutting et al., 2022). Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the role that 

power plays in resource governance. Power determines who designs the structure of institutions 

61 

 
 
(Epstein et al., 2020), who determines how problems are framed (Ingalls and Stedman, 2016), 

and who can participate in decision-making within the institution (e.g., Mendez et al., 2019; 

Wiegleb and Bruns, 2018).  

Structural Power and Institutional Genesis 

Defining Structural Power 

Power and institutions are closely related (e.g., Coy et al., 2021; Clement, 2010). Brisbois 

and de Loe (2016) identify three types of power at play in natural resource governance: 

instrumental, discursive, and structural. Instrumental power is perhaps the most readily 

observable aspect of power and refers to the measurable use of force or financial, technical, and 

social resources in competition with others. Discursive power deals with the ability of certain 

actors to shape social norms and values in their interest through dialogue and other forms of 

communication. Lastly, structural power refers to how the form of an institution privileges 

certain interests over others in terms of ability to frame issues, make and implement decisions, 

and more generally influence the purpose and actions of an institution. 

I focus here on the integration of structural power into the SESF because this form of 

power partially determines how instrumental and discursive power are manifest within and by an 

institution. Structural power defines who has power to participate in governance in the first place 

and who does not, which in turn dictates who has power over others, who has the power to steer 

institutions toward specified goals, and who has power within an institution to mobilize resource 

to achieve desired outcomes (Partelow and Manlosa, 2023).    

Integrating structural power within the SESF enables researchers to conceptually capture 

the dynamic landscape of empowerment/disempowerment within a social-ecological system, and 

thereby understand the organization and actions of an institution as a function of the empowered 

interests at its helm. Focusing on structural power in this way further allows researchers to 

analyze how power interacts with specific variables already featured in the SESF, and how 

power ultimately helps shape a social-ecological system.  

To integrate structural power into the SESF, it is necessary to characterize types of 

structural power based on how institutions came into being – a process that I call institutional 

genesis. The way that power is structured within an institution depends on the circumstances that 

brought the institution about. The following section details three modes of institutional genesis, 

and the type of power structures likely to be associated with each.  

62 

 
 
How Institutional Genesis Shapes Structural Power 

Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) describe three ways that collaborative governance 

institutions can develop in their book Collaborative Governance Regimes. These modes of 

institutional genesis include:  

“… self-initiated, independently convened, or externally directed. In self-initiated [institutions], 

participants come together after being inspired and galvanized by a set of core stakeholders. In 

independently convened [institutions], an autonomous third party assembles participants and 

designs processes for interaction. In externally directed [institutions], outside entities with 

sufficient authority or resources incentivize or mandate participants to work together in a preset 

manner.” 

Self-initiated institutions are most like the cases originally described by Ostrom used to 

argue for local collaboration as a means of sustaining resources against Hardin’s position of 

state-centric governance and privatization. In self-initiated collaborations, resource users begin 

organizing independently of state agencies, and therefore may be in a better position to articulate 

the purpose, scope, and logistical operations of an institution than if a collaboration was 

externally imposed. When resource users self-initiate collaborations, we might say they have the 

most “power” – relative to other genesis modes – in sense of being most able to structure the 

purpose of the institution.  

Villamayor-Tomas and Garcia-Lopez (2018) conducted a meta-analysis of 81 

community-based natural resource management regimes worldwide to understand how social 

movements contribute to the structure and mission of institutions. A key takeaway from their 

work is that that social movements often acted as catalysts for shifting power over resource 

decisions towards more local jurisdictions; these institutions were able to capture power to 

advocate a resource management position that emphasized benefits and protections to local 

interests.  

Independently convened collaborative governance institutions do not easily fit into the 

top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy that is often invoked to describe how institutions form 

and are uncommon in the literature on collaborative governance (Douglas et al., 2020). 

Independently convened collaborative situations are defined by the fact that external actors – 

such as professional facilitators – design processes and platforms that help potential collaborators 

engage in conversations necessary for initiating collaborative institutions (Swette et al., 2023). In 

63 

 
 
cases of independently convened collaborative institutions, it is more difficult to generalize about 

how diverse actors’ powers will be structured within an institution. Unlike the organizational 

structure that grows organically through self-initiation, or one thoughtfully crafted through 

policy, the outcomes of convention and facilitation processes require negotiating with diverse 

interests and building bridges between them.     

Lastly, externally directed collaboration occurs when state authorities mandate that 

resource users work together to manage shared resources. In these cases, structural power is 

generated through law created by state authorities rather than from the bottom-up mobilization of 

resource users. While it is possible for laws mandating collaboration to be written in ways that 

are perceived as beneficial or fair to resource users, it is also possible that certain interests are 

privileged while others are minimized or excluded. An example of state-mandated collaboration 

is the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) in California, which was 

established by the state legislature to stabilize groundwater in over drafted basins by compelling 

water users to collaboratively create sustainable groundwater management plans (Espinoza el al., 

2023). As explained below, the intent of SGMA is to maintain the agricultural sector as a strong 

presence in global markets while altering practices to extend the life of groundwater resources; 

the structure of this policy ultimately privileges large water users in the sense that the purpose of 

collaboration is to use water in ways that support agricultural interests.   

Characterizing types of structural power that are associated with each mode of 

institutional genesis is key for incorporating these concepts into the SESF. Specifically, the mode 

of institutional genesis at least partially determines (1) who can participate in resource 

governance, (2) who has power over others in making decisions, (3) who has the power to set 

agendas and steer the institution, and (4) who has power within the institution to mobilize 

resources to accomplish goals.   

The following section considers how the SESF can be improved by incorporating the 

concept of structural power as a function of how institutions are formed. Specifically, I consider 

which Tier 1 and Tier 2 variables are likely to be impacted, and the nature of these impacts based 

on the mode of institutional genesis. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
Incorporating Structural Power in the SESF 

Outline of a New Research Agenda 

Considering that the SESF is primarily a diagnostic tool used to identify and help address 

problems in social-ecological systems (McKay et al., 2020), incorporating the concept of 

structural power as a function of institutional genesis, can help to explain the developmental 

process of institutional formation. This perspective can improve our understanding of why an 

institution is structured and functions in a particular way, what actors are enabled to participate 

in governance, the policies and actions enacted by the institution, and how the institution affects 

the larger social-ecological system within which it is embedded. 

More specifically, applying the lens of structural power to the SESF reveals how 

institutional genesis directly affects, and is affected by, the social components of a given social-

ecological system, which then indirectly affects the ecological components. Concretely, then, the 

SESF components affected by the incorporation of structural power are the following first-tier 

categories and their underlying second-tier variables: (1) Social, economic, and political settings; 

(2) Governance systems; (3) Actors; and (4) Action situations. The important challenge is 

understanding and elaborating how these features of the SESF are affected by the mode of 

institutional genesis. How does the way that collaboration begins – self-initiated, independently 

convened, or externally mandated – affect the social components of the SESF? It is precisely 

here that new avenues of research come into view.  

Table 12 below displays a set of possible, though not exhaustive, research questions that 

emerge from integrating institutional genesis into the SESF. I present this set of questions 

because they touch on common questions well-established in the literature. The point I hope to 

make by discussing these illustrative cases through the lens of institutional genesis is that the 

SESF becomes a more useful diagnostic tool when we think about how power is structured in 

institutions. This lens can be applied to all of the tier-1 and tier-2 variables already found in the 

SESF and offers researchers a language for understanding the role of institutional power 

dynamics in shaping social-ecological systems.    

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Research Questions Combining Institutional Genesis and the SESF. 

First-Tier Construct 

Second-Tier Variable 

Research Questions 

Social, economic, and 

Economic development 

Do economic characteristics 

political settings 

affect the mode of 

institutional genesis?  

Governance systems 

Monitoring and sanctioning 

Does the mode of 

rules 

institutional genesis affect the 

kinds of monitoring and 

sanctioning rules enacted by 

institutions? 

Actors 

Number of relevant actors 

Does the number of types 

(degree of heterogeneity) of 

actors predict the mode of 

institutional genesis? 

Research Examples Integrating Institutional Genesis and SESF 

Below I give examples of research that has been conducted on each of the research 

questions in Table 2. I highlight both externally directed and self-initiated cases for each 

question to show that the mode of institutional genesis affects how power is structured, and how 

these different power structures affect variables of interest in social-ecological systems. I do not 

here consider cases of independently convened collaborations because, as stated above, they are 

still rare in the literature (Douglas et al., 2020).  

Do economic characteristics affect the mode of institutional genesis? 

The 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) in California represents a 

case of externally directed collaboration. The state passed legislation requiring water users to 

form groundwater sustainability agencies (GSAs) to manage resources with the goal of achieving 

sustainable yields (Miro and Famiglietti, 2018). The principal reason for enacting SGMA is the 

fact that groundwater throughout the state is being overdrawn, leading to aquifer declines that 

threaten the future of irrigation in California (Langridge and Van Schmidt, 2020). California’s 

agricultural sector has been structured for participation in global markets – highlighting the 

tension between the desire for economic growth and long-term water sustainability (Veeck et al., 

66 

 
 
 
2020). Bernacchi et al. (2020) find that the continued emphasis on economic growth has resulted 

in GSAs being structured so that agricultural producers hold more decision-making power than 

other stakeholders – such as disadvantaged communities (defined by the authors as <80% of the 

statewide annual median household income by census tract).  

This case of state-mandated collaboration in California structures power in such a way 

that water users whose businesses are geared towards economic development and competition in 

global markets have more power that other stakeholders who may be interested in managing 

water towards other goals. SGMA represents an externally directed collaboration that 

exemplifies how this form of institutional genesis offers less power to resource users to structure 

institutions, as well as how state mandated collaboration weighs the interests of some 

stakeholders over others.  

Michigan’s Wester Upper Peninsula (UP) Food Systems Collaborative represents an 

opposite case, where collaborative processes were self-initiated, aim to serve local markets, and 

are structured to be more inclusive of stakeholders (Christensen, 2020). Collaborative local food 

systems in the Western UP have emerged not only to supply communities with local produce and 

encourage entrepreneurship but have emerged to fill economic gaps left over from post-industrial 

mining in the region (Lu and Carter, 2023). Moreover, unlike the SGMA policy in California that 

aims to support agriculture’s continued participation in global markets, the purpose of 

Michigan’s western UP food systems collaborative is to “create a supportive, interconnected, and 

equitable food system across the region through service and stewardship for the wellbeing of our 

earth, air, and water, and all living beings” (Western UP Food Systems Collaborative, 2022). 

This case supports the argument that economic self-initiated collaboration may be more 

likely to occur in conditions where economies aim for supporting and enriching the local 

community rather than competing in larger/global markets. Unlike the SGMA’s support for 

entrenched agricultural interests, the Western UP food systems collaborative reflects grassroots 

efforts to create a system that revitalizes communities as they reorient local economies.  

Does the mode of institutional genesis affect the kinds of monitoring and sanctioning rules 

implemented by institutions?  

In 2012, the Kansas legislature passed the Local Enhanced Management Areas (LEMA) 

Act in response to grassroots organization by agricultural producers to address rapidly declining 

aquifers (Cruse et al., 2016). Producers in Sheridan and Thomas Counties recognized the 

67 

 
 
imminent threat of water scarcity and elected to impose upon themselves a 20% reduction in 

collective withdrawals averaged over a 5-year period (Butler et al., 2023). The legislature put 

producers’ plans into law, and the state’s Division of Water Resources monitors and enforces 

this agreement (Sanderson and Frey, 2015). If a water user fails to follow policies created by the 

LEMA, the Chief Engineer can enforce any corrective measure approved by the LEMA (Kansas 

Department of Agriculture, 2018). Not only does the state enforce rules created by producers 

themselves, but the LEMA also represents a paradigm shift in how water is managed in the state. 

Kansas historically operated according to Prior Appropriation, based on the idea of “first in time, 

first in right” (Griggs, 2021). In practice, this means that when the total quantity of water 

allocated by the state through permits is not available, ‘senior’ rights holders – those who 

obtained rights first – can use the entirety of their allocations, while more ‘junior’ rights holders 

– those who obtained rights later in time – are unable to use all the water they technically have a 

right to. However, under the LEMA, all rights holders agreed to proportionally reduce water use 

regardless of the relative seniority of their water rights.  

One of the 8 institutional design principles outlined by Ostrom (1990) is that rules for 

governing resources match local needs and conditions. Since producers in the LEMA were able 

to construct monitoring and sanctioning rules themselves by taking the initiative to collaborate, 

they were able to ensure that these rules fit their circumstances and intentions. An important 

metric for evaluating an institution is the extent to which it is perceived as being procedurally 

just. Alexander (2021) defines procedural justice as referring to decision-making processes, how 

these processes work, who is recognized as having a stake in governance, and who can 

participate. The LEMA may be viewed as procedurally just because producers have a strong 

ability to affect the rules that impact them.  

In Michigan, the state’s adoption and implementation of the 2008 Great Lakes-St. 

Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact (Compact) charges regulators to “protect, 

conserve, restore, improve and effectively manage” water resources by monitoring and 

restricting, where necessary, withdrawals to protect hydrologically based ecosystems (MCL 

324.23401). The Compact caps cumulative withdrawals in designated water management areas 

(WMAs), where caps are based on water levels necessary to support characteristic fish 

populations (MCL 234.32701). Additionally, the state also allows large quantity water users 

(100,000 or more gallons per day) and local government officials to voluntarily collaborate to 

68 

 
 
govern resources to stay within the limits of caps (MCL 324.32725). Unlike the situation in 

Kansas, where water users’ self-initiated efforts led to a self-imposed governance regime 

monitored and enforced by the state, Michigan water users have withdrawal restrictions imposed 

on them and can choose to collaborate or not. Perhaps because Michigan water users do not 

perceive immediate scarcity in the same way as Kansas producers, they are not motivated to 

voluntarily collaborate. It may be that the Michigan case goes against Ostrom’s design principle 

that rules should match local needs and conditions because water users do not perceive water 

caps and voluntary collaboration as necessary.   

Does the number of types of actors predict the mode of institutional genesis? 

Continuing with Kansas and Michigan, these cases suggest that a lower diversity of actor 

types makes self-initiated collaboration more likely to occur than in situations of higher actor 

diversity. Agricultural producers in Kansas were able to form the LEMA through grassroots 

efforts partly because all participants are the same type of user – agricultural producers – and 

therefore share similar backgrounds, interests, and desired outcomes from collaboration (Feltman 

et al., under review). Producers were strongly motivated to extend the life of the High Plains 

aquifer because irrigation is key for crop yields and the long-term viability of farming in the 

region. They saw collaboration as a means of achieving this goal together, while simultaneously 

avoiding top-down rules imposed by the state.  

The situation is different in Michigan. While agricultural producers comprise a large 

proportion of water users, the state’s implementation of the Compact is more inclusive by 

explicitly including all large-quantity water users and government officials (who, ostensibly, 

represent the interests of the public who care about water but are not large-quantity water users – 

such as people who care about the health of hydrologically based ecosystems). While water users 

have been able to form WUCs since 2008, to date, none have formed. It is likely that other 

factors – such as relative water abundance – confound the simple statement that a higher 

diversity of actor types in Michigan has prevented collaboration, but it is also likely that this 

actor diversity represents an important obstacle to be overcome if collaboration is to occur.  

Conclusion 

The role of structural power has critical and wide-ranging impacts on how institutions are 

structured and function, who can participate and who is excluded, what types of policies and 

practices emerge from institutions, and how institutions impact the broader social-ecological 

69 

 
 
systems within which they are embedded. One key factor for determining the specific nature of 

structural power for any given institution is how the institution forms, a phenomenon identified 

by Emerson and Nabatchi, and which I have coined as institutional genesis.  

Recognizing how structural power relates to institutional genesis, and integrating 

institutional genesis into the SESF enables researchers to ask new and valuable questions about 

the governance of social-ecological systems. Posing and exploring these questions can improve 

our understanding of how different conditions give rise to self-initiated, independently convened, 

or externally mandated collaborative institutions, and how each genesis mode may impact 

variables in the SESF. These new insights may ultimately increase researchers’ and 

policymakers’ ability to use the SES as a diagnostic tool for evaluating the conditions of a social-

ecological system and the collaborative governance institution(s) in place to manage resources, 

identify potential problems to be addressed, and find solutions to issues parties desire to resolve.  

70 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 

Throughout this dissertation I have focused on local collaborative water governance as a 

structural fix for water quantity problems. However, this is only one way of thinking about how 

to address environmental issues. Cognitive and technological fixes also have important roles to 

play in sustainable resource governance. Researchers and policymakers will be able to gain a 

more holistic understanding of social-ecological systems and craft more effective policies if 

research agendas and policy discussions consider cognitive, technological, and structural fixes as 

interrelated lenses and tools that each offer unique points of leverage for engaging environmental 

problems.  

Moreover, local collaborative institutions are often integrated into larger political 

structures – counties, states, nations, etc. While it is important to consider the conditions that 

foster the development of collaborative governance institutions and explore how this strategy can 

aid equitable and sustainable resource management, it is equally important to understand how 

these institutions can contribute to the success of higher-scale governance regimes. The future of 

natural resource sustainability will entail building thoughtful synergies between top-down and 

bottom-up governance efforts, as well as creating horizontal connections between 

actors/institutions to promote inter-agency cooperations.     

Dissertation Key Takeaways 

There are four main takeaways from this dissertation. First, it is essential to include more 

nuanced social factors for understanding resource users’ motivations for collaborating, as well as 

for understanding how resource users evaluate the performance of collaborative efforts. Second, 

fairness and flexibility may be considered institutional design principles – the presence of which 

increases the likelihood that collaboration will occur and prove successful through time. Third, 

the perceived abundance or scarcity of a resource strongly predicts resource users’ willingness to 

voluntarily collaborate. Finally, more strongly incorporating the construct of power into 

frameworks that depict the functioning of social-ecological systems offers researchers fruitful 

avenues of research – the pursuit of which may ultimately help resource users and policymakers 

better design and implement institutions to accomplish goals of environmental sustainability, 

social equity, and economic productivity.  

Including social factors in efforts to understand resource users’ motivations for 

collaborating, as well as how they measure the success of collaborations, brings to light the lived 

71 

 
 
experiences of individuals and communities involved in governance. While environmental 

factors are clearly important in situations centered on resource governance, the inclusion of 

social factors provides a richer picture by illuminating the role of resources in the lifestyles, 

traditions, and cultures of resource users.  

Ostrom (1990) identified eight institutional design principles that were virtually always 

present in cases of successful local collaborative governance, and my research indicates that 

fairness and flexibility may be important design principles as well. This is especially true in 

cases of bottom-up collaborations where resource users voluntarily choose to comanage 

resources. If resource users are going to voluntarily collaborate, it is likely that perceptions that 

the rules are fair and provide enough flexibility for individuals to make decisions that make 

sense for their personal circumstances, will increase the likelihood that collaboration will occur 

and continue through time.  

Previous research has found that the relative availability of a resource predicts resource 

users’ willingness to collaborate. Resource users’ willingness diminishes both when resources 

are perceived as too scarce (collaboration will not fix a problem that is too severe) or too 

abundant (there is no reason to collaborate because there is not a problem to be addressed). In the 

Kansas study I find that water users collaborated because they perceived water as being scarce 

enough to warrant changing how they govern resources, while in Michigan resources are 

perceived as abundant and so water users do not have the incentive to collaborate.  

Finally, resource governance is a highly political matter where power strongly determines 

who has access to resources and the ends towards which governance regimes aim (e.g., 

sustainability, economic profitability, etc.). By thinking about power as related to the structure of 

institutions and recognizing that the process by which institutions come into being affects the 

structures of institutions, it is possible to better incorporate the construct of power into 

frameworks that depict social-ecological systems. The value of a framework rests on its ability to 

accurately portray a situation and its usefulness in guiding research and policy. One crucial way 

of increasing the value of frameworks – particularly the Social-Ecological Systems Framework – 

is by integrating the construct of power.  

Actions taken to address environmental problems such as water scarcity, and efforts to 

intentionally adapt societies towards social, economic, and political processes that promote 

resource sustainability, are fraught with uncertainty and unintended consequences. Sustainability 

72 

 
 
is a wicked problem, and engaging with it promises only temporary and tentative solutions; 

‘achieving’ sustainability is an ongoing process rather than an end that can be fully realized in 

any final or absolute sense. Finding ourselves in this precarious position, it is natural to seek out 

answers that can provide some surety. The goal of this dissertation was to examine the role of 

local collaborative governance as a theoretical foundation and pragmatic tool for addressing 

water scarcity issues. Understanding what motivates resource users to collaborate, how they 

measure the success of their collaborative efforts, and design elements of institutions that 

promote successful collaboration will help stakeholders, researchers, and policymakers better 

understand when local collaboration is appropriate, and how best to facilitate it.  

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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