

CO-PRODUCTION OF COURT SERVICES: BRINGING THE PUBLIC AND THE COURTS  
TOGETHER

By

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## **ABSTRACT**

Courts at every jurisdictional level are tasked with managing conflict and settling disputes and disagreements between individuals, and further, between individuals and the government. In these environments, cooperation may seem to be a difficult, if not impossible, task. However, previous research in the field of public administration is quite clear in that directly engaging the public in the public services process improves the overall experience for the service user, the service provider, and the public at large through the concept of co-production. While co-production research has been applied to policing for over fifty years, scholars have only recently begun applying the concept to courts. Using survey data gathered as part of the Public Engagement Pilot Projects conducted by the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center and the National Center for State Courts, this dissertation investigates which factors may encourage people to engage in co-production with the courts in their communities. Findings indicate that levels of trust in courts, as well as education and status as leaders in the community influence how people engage in co-production with courts, comporting with the overall literature on co-production and the justice system and other forms of public services. Practical implications of this research, among others, may include more efficient use of public resources and overall improvements in process and outcomes for those involved in the court system.

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of our angel, Winnie Grace. Even though you're not here to share this with us, you've inspired every word.

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mind the house so that I could be with my wife at the hospital for the joy and sorrow of the birth and near-immediate loss of our daughter. Being able to visit with and love on the menagerie of nephews (and a niece) that we have is always joyful and a worthwhile diversion from my work. I also get inspiration from my sister who is doing what she loves in Bloomington and the redemption and success embodied by my cousin and her husband and their terribly strong boys.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

If one was to pick up any newspaper or load any news website, it would be quite easy to find stories on how the public and government interact with each other. The dominant image displayed by many of these stories is one of conflict or controversy (Diaz, 2023, “Jan. 6 rioter...sentenced to prison”; Robertson, 2024, “...[N]onprofit led by lieutenant governor’s wife ‘seriously deficient’). One component of government that deals regularly with conflict and controversy is the judiciary. Inherent within the judiciary is a tension between the government, as a representative of or proxy for broader societal interests, and the public at large. The courts, at every jurisdictional level, are tasked with managing conflict and settling disputes and disagreements between individuals (i.e., civil cases) and further between individuals and the government (i.e., criminal cases). In an environment that deals with conflict regularly and is often characterized by power differentials among actors, cooperation may seem to be at best not possible and at worst, counter-productive. However, even in this environment, it is possible and even beneficial to have all the actors working together to plan the services, deliver the services, and determine whether the services have been effective. In other areas of public service, the literature is quite clear in that directly engaging the public in the public services process, or co-production, improves the experience for the service user, the service provider, and the public at large (Ugwudike, 2017).

Through the latter part of the 19th and first half of the 20th century, the American government was relied upon to guide the country through large-scale events like the Industrial Revolution, the Great Depression and two world wars (Bryson et al., 2014).

Throughout that period, the government was viewed by the public as capable of handling



public problems and providing public services without citizen involvement (Bryson et al., 2014). If anyone outside of the government was involved, their input was secondary to politics; the public's role was narrowly confined to that of client and voter. Through the middle of the 20th century, the public administration field saw a shift from this bureaucratic mindset toward market-based or market-like solutions, including seeing the public as consumers and "participating 'beyond the ballot box'" (Frederickson, 1996, p. 265).

Scholars have studied citizen participation in government dating back at least to the 1970's through the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at Indiana University. Within this research, service production and service provision were initially considered as separate, though the focus remained largely on supply over demand. The co-production scholarship eventually shifted to a greater focus on involving the public in co-production and the public service functions they could fulfill, which can include design, management, delivery, and evaluation (Osborne et al., 2016).

There are several potential benefits to co-production, including therapeutic benefits such as determining needs and building trust and communication (Needham, 2008). Incorporating other members of the community, and incorporating service providers into the community, through co-production promotes community-centered interests such as hearing all voices (McCulloch & PPPF, 2016), efficiently using scarce resources (Boyle & Harris, 2009), and achieving just and fair outcomes (Loeffler & Timm-Arnold, 2020). The concept of procedural fairness also plays a role in that the public is more likely to cooperate with the service provider (in this case, accept and abide by the courts' decisions) if they perceive the service provider to be fair and ethical (De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; Tyler, 1988).

As the public services field evolves, new understanding and new values will lead to changing practices. The importance of co-production lies in its inclusion of everyone involved in the public services process in determining what that process should look like and how it should operate. These benefits have been extensively studied in many public services contexts such as health care, education, disaster relief, and public utilities (McLennan, 2020; Van Eijk & Steen, 2016). Much of the early co-production literature actually focused on policing and public safety, and several have applied co-production to correctional environments, but few have studied this issue in relation to courts. The research that does exist shows some valuable exchange of feedback, but an accompanying reluctance to include lay people in the co-production process as a response to the potential loss of control of the format and results of the co-productive processes (Van Gils et al., 2021).

If part of the goal of co-production is to involve the public more fully in the public service process, and to do so in a sustainable way, then a relationship between the public and the service provider (i.e., the government in most cases) needs to be established. Trust can be also part of the transformation of behavior from the acrimonious nature of bureaucracy—and the actual or perceived adversarial nature of the courts—to that of co-production, though this relationship does not always have to be perfectly equitable to be sustainable. For example, if the public sees that the endeavors in which they are participating have a tangible effect on their lives, they may be more willing to accept some responsibility and some risk for the public service process (Loeffler, 2021).

This dissertation will investigate the role that co-production might play in the design, management, delivery, and evaluation of court services by examining data collected

as part of the Public Engagement Pilot Projects in several courts in different states. The dissertation will proceed as follows: Chapter 2 contains a review of the foundational literature on co-production, including a chronological look at the development of the co-production literature as well as the primary conceptualizations of co-production used throughout the proposal.

Chapter 3 contains an overview of the more limited literature applying co-production to criminology and the law. Included in Chapter 3 is the progression from the early focus on policing and public safety and limited public involvement to increased public involvement and importance of public perceptions of what co-productive activities they can accomplish. Also emphasized is the fact that the research on co-production and the courts, as well as trust's involvement in co-production and the courts, is limited. Chapter 3 closes with a recitation of the research opportunities presented in the extant research and a presentation of the research questions to be examined in this dissertation.

In Chapter 4, I begin by introducing the Public Engagement Pilot Project initiative, the engagement efforts conducted with the courts, and the data that were collected that are the focus of the dissertation. I propose three hypotheses generated from my research questions and prior research centered around the concepts of co-production, procedural fairness, risk, and trust. I then walk through the process of generating the measures I used to answer the research questions and hypotheses, as well as the analysis plan for the results that are presented in Chapter 5. Ordinary least squares (OLS) was used as the statistical technique, and, after accounting for missing values through multiple imputation, findings were mixed. Finally, Chapter 6 closes with discussion of those results, implications of my research, and concluding remarks.

## Chapter 2: Co-Production

### History and Definitions

One of the first notable mentions of citizen participation in government comes from Ostrom (1972). Through the dual lenses of reform and economics, Ostrom discusses the relationship between the size, number, and professionalism of governmental units in each jurisdiction and how those inputs affect outputs such as efficiency, responsibility of public officials, and most applicable to the current study, citizen participation.

According to Ostrom, the reform tradition proposes that increasing the size of governmental units, professionalism, and the reliance upon hierarchy will all have a positive relationship with the dependent variables of interest. Interestingly for the purposes of co-production, increasing the number of locally elected public officials is proposed to have a negative relationship with citizen participation and responsibility of public officials. Compared with this perspective, political economy views urban problems in a significantly different manner. Instead of pairing a sizeable and professional government with participatory citizens, political economists see citizen participation occurring when the smallest possible governmental unit is used that can efficiently perform the task at hand (Ostrom, 1972).

However, Ostrom does not provide a clear definition of what citizen participation is in this article beyond mentioning “the participation of citizens in political life” (p. 480, quoting Stigler, 1962) and the fact that it is among the concepts that may lack consistent, careful, and valid definitions (p. 487-488). Ostrom et al. (1978, p. 383) continue this examination of the relationship between the government and the public by looking at police services, in which the authors explicitly use the term “coproducers” to describe how

the public's activities related to safety (i.e. locking doors, reporting crime, providing evidence) can contribute to police outputs such as arrests and the return of stolen property. Parks et al. (1981) similarly focus on the activities completed by public service agents and the public more so than the people engaged in the co-production. According to the authors, a combination of technological, economic, and institutional considerations determines whether mixing organized production of public services with consumer production is appropriate; co-production is "a mixing of the productive efforts of regular and consumer producers" (p. 1002).

Another line of scholarship focuses more on the individuals or groups engaged in the co-productive process. Osborne et al. (2016, p. 640) define co-production as "the voluntary or involuntary involvement of *public service users* [emphasis added] in any of the design, management, delivery and/or evaluation of public services." Alford (2014) notes that co-production can be a two-person event, but it is just as likely to be a set of interactions between individuals as well as groups. Van Eijk and Steen (2016) are heavily focused on the co-producers and why they engage in co-production, though interestingly their definition of co-production is based on a list of broad and under-defined activities in which both professionals and citizens can engage related to public services (i.e., co-planning, co-prioritization, co-assessment).

This breadth of conceptualization has been seen as both a limitation and a strength in the co-production literature. According to some scholars, co-production has been used in enough disciplines and applied to enough different activities, individuals, and groups that the term is too broad to be of practical use (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2012). Durose et al. (2017) recognize this breadth of conceptualization, but also see a significant practical benefit. Co-

production requires versatility in how public resources are used, the expertise of professionals and citizens is engaged, all to share both control and responsibility. According to the authors, the tangible benefit to that versatility is that co-production then becomes appealing across the political spectrum. Brix et al. (2020, pp. 171-172) take a different approach to the breadth of conceptualizations of co-production, arguing that “[their] study does not consider it essential that co-production does not have a common theoretical definition....” Instead, they argue that the focus of co-production should be on the local context and what activities and forms that context dictates.

### **Co-Production in the Public Administration Field**

Over the past forty years, the prevailing governance model has changed, along with the ability for members of the public to participate therein. Prior to the Civil War, governance was hyper-local, where people would individually settle new territory and have to create new social, political, and business structures for themselves (Seymour, 1878). Government was increasingly relied upon through the latter part of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century to guide the country through several character changing events, such as the Industrial Revolution, the Great Depression, and two world wars (Bryson et al., 2014). In the eyes of politicians, though, the public’s role in governance within this “traditional public administration” (Nederhand et al., 2019) was confined to its status as clients, voters (Kim, 2021), and constituents, or what Meinke (2008, p. 447) calls a “mass electoral audience.”

However, by the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a paradigm shift was already underway in the public administration field. The primacy of bureaucracy began to be questioned (Bryson et al., 2014) and criticized as too insular, too focused on efficiency, and too

dismissive of discretion (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Lynn, 2001). During this period of New Public Management (NPM) (Bryson et al., 2014; Hood, 1991; Osborne et al., 2016), members of the public were increasingly considered as consumers, befitting the market-based tendencies of the field. Members of the public had the right to express their preferences and complaints on how the government provided public services. According to Kim (2020), this customer-based orientation through expressed preferences and complaints did not allow for direct participation in public services.

It is at this point that the direction of the public administration field becomes a little less clear. Frederickson (1996) presents as an alternative to NPM the “reinventing government movement.” Importantly for the study of co-production, reinventing government takes the “citizen as consumer” concept even further than NPM by “breaking the bureaucratic service monopoly” (p. 265). Not only are citizens consumers of public services, but they also make individual choices that work best for them even to the detriment of others. Any consideration of consensus, social equity, or collective democracy is secondary to individual interests (Kim, 2020).

Moore (1995) looks at creating public value both from the citizen’s as well as the public manager’s perspective. Citizens want to see three things from governmental organizations: high-performing bureaucracy, efficient and effective achievement in attaining desired social outcomes, and just and fair operations leading to just and fair outcomes for society at large. From the manager’s perspective, success comes from a “strategic triangle”: achieving something substantively valuable; sustainable both through legitimacy and politics; and operational and administrative feasibility (pp. 22-23).

Any overlap between these perspectives, whether it is in feasibility, performance or outcomes, can only contribute to the co-productive relationship. If the relationship between service providers and service users is sufficiently co-productive, the public will be able to hold public agencies and administrators accountable more directly as the public develops a closer relationship with them (Loeffler & Timm-Arnold, 2020). Co-production brings the citizenry and nonprofit sector to public problems for which government may not have ideal answers and sometimes involves a level of “desperation” on the part of the government due to an inability to secure sufficient resources to produce the desired public services (Cheng, 2019, p. 206; see also Haeffele & Storr, 2019).

Most of the co-production literature acknowledges that the exact co-productive relationship between service user and service provider is going to be different in individual contexts. Weaver (2011) draws a connection between co-production and the concept of “personalization,” which by nature is focused on the service user. The levels of personalization can differ, as more shallow levels of personalization may be limited to the service provider giving individuals some choices. However, she indicates that co-production is a form of “deep” personalization focused on regular and long-term relationships. Bovaird (2007) provides an in-depth consideration of the professional-user relationship demonstrated by case studies on a continuum from sole professional delivery to full co-production and then to traditional self-organized community delivery.



*Table 1. Case studies from Bovaird (2007) and the design, planning and delivery of services.*

	Design	Planning	Provision/delivery
Porto Alegre, Brazil budgeting process	User/community consultation	User/community consultation	Traditional professional
Gateshead, England family support initiative	Professional	Professional?	User co-delivery
Caterham, England community trust	Full co-production	Full co-production	Full co-production
Falmouth, England community partnership	No formal process	No formal process	User/community co-delivery
France, Villa Family elderly housing	Professional?	Professional	User/community delivery
Tackley, England village shop	Co-designed	Co-planned	User/community delivery

Two examples from Table 1 illustrate how the responsibilities for delivering public services can shift between the public and professionals, all based on the needs of the program and the public. The Gateshead family support initiative was designed by professionals to promote the health of children under the age of four using counselor visits and publicity campaigns. Parents were trained as peer counselors and course organizers as a form of co-delivery. In contrast, the Tackley village shop was planned from the outset by the community based on a need they saw for a central point from which postal services, leisure facilities, a café, and a community meeting room could spin out (Bovaird, 2007).

### **Benefits of Co-Production**

Each individual is going to have a different willingness to participate in co-productive relationships. Some researchers see co-production as being more individualistic or reciprocity-dependent. For example, Bovaird and Loeffler (2012) emphasize reciprocity in the use of resources between the public sector and citizens without a focus on equality in any long-term relationship. In contrast, Needham (2008) notes that co-production can produce therapeutic as well as traditional diagnostic benefits that can apply to individual

citizen-provider relationships as well as system-level relationships between the community and the public sector. Therapeutic benefits include making sure everyone's voice is heard, generating "credible commitments" (p. 223), and building trust; regular advisory board meetings or focus groups could be examples of co-productive efforts along these lines. Diagnostic benefits involve making sure that the community has a higher quality of life, making sure that scarce public resources are used to help as many people as possible, and being able to identify and resolve issues as they occur. A successful co-productive effort can also serve as an example to the community of how being "civically minded" can be extended to other areas in life (Needham, 2008, p. 223, see also Ostrom, 1996). Successful efforts at co-production with housing authorities may translate to a facility at co-production with health care workers and local politicians, increasing the quality of services they obtain beyond the initial co-productive encounter (Ostrom, 1996).

### **Why Co-Production Matters**

Public services—whether provided by public agencies, private agencies, or private individuals—require significant financial and human capital. Co-production on balance is an effective way to harness many different sources of capital but sustaining co-productive efforts may be difficult. Addressing these difficulties means that "we need to understand how institutional, cultural, and biophysical contexts affect the types of individuals who are recruited into and leave particular types of collective action situations" (Ostrom, 2000, p. 154, see also Van Eijk & Steen, 2016). Public agency (or government more broadly) reform has been a recent hot button topic for numerous reasons, including the Supreme Court's rejection of long-standing judicial deference to federal agency interpretations of relevant law (*Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 2024); however, this "frustration with the

functioning of public agencies” is almost as much a constant as the existence of those agencies (Ostrom et al., 1978, p. 381; see also Adams, 1984). In an environment of reform, co-production may play a role in establishing more long-term public service regimes. Part of this reform is making sure that the public services stakeholders participate in designing and delivering those services, making or modifying rules, and determining what constitutes public value (Alford, 2008; Boyle & Harris, 2009; Ostrom, 2000). And according to Osborne et al. (2016, p. 640), “co-production is currently one of [the] cornerstones of public policy reform across the globe.”

This cornerstone role can be seen in a number of different applications: public utilities, schools, neighborhood councils, care for the elderly, among others. One of the areas of public life in which co-production has not been as regularly applied is the justice system, whether civil or criminal. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, where I will discuss the extant research on applying co-production to justice-related organizations and where that extant research may be lacking.

### **Chapter 3: Co-Production in Criminology and the Law**

As discussed in Chapter 2, the co-production literature is quite robust and rich. However, the applications of co-production that dominate the discussion do not often involve the loss of property or loss of freedom through criminal or civil sanction. It seems counterintuitive that a person who might lose some of their property in a civil suit, or someone who is facing a criminal sanction, would be offered or willing to accept a co-productive role in the system that is set to deprive them of their liberty or property. However, many of the benefits that result from co-production in other public service fields (i.e., health care, public utilities, disaster management, and schools; see McLennan, 2020; Van Eijk & Steen, 2016) may well lead to similar positive outcomes for many stakeholders in the justice process, including those who have been subjected to coercive action in areas of public services such as criminal justice and mental health (Osborne et al., 2016).

Beginning in earnest with the work of Elinor Ostrom and colleagues in 1978, the potential role of co-production has been seen in police services, community justice (Ugwudike, 2017), community policing (Scott, 2002), encouraging desistance from crime and contribution to restorative justice (Loeffler & Bovaird, 2020), and family law (Van Gils et al., 2021). However, the extant literature on co-production and how it can be applied to the justice system is still underdeveloped as related to courts. The first section of this chapter will review the early literature on co-production and the justice system, with an emphasis on establishing which justice services might be appropriate for co-productive activity. The second section of this chapter will review the more recent literature on who engages in co-production with justice-related agencies and why they do so, with the

chapter closing with a discussion of the questions left in the literature that this dissertation is designed to answer.

### **Early Developments**

Throughout the course of American history, citizens have made contributions to public safety. Early versions of what we would call a “neighborhood watch” came as early as the immediate post-colonization period. Members of a community would rotate as the watch person whose duty was simply to notify the community of the risk of danger. Even as governmental entities involved in legal and public safety concerns came into play, citizens contributed to their own public safety through self-protective actions such as securing their property (Ostrom et al., 1978) and contributing to informal controls such as faith communities and family units.

It is this type of citizen action that generates the first significant research on the criminal justice system and co-production. Ostrom et al. (1978, p. 389) claim that “[v]iewing citizens as co-producers of police (and other social) services is a rather novel and important aspect of our approach.” The aforementioned self-protective actions were a pre-existing way that citizens could contribute to their own public safety, but Ostrom et al.’s work makes that connection more direct and explicit in the literature.

Their subjective outcomes (i.e., perceptions and evaluations) provide another point of connection between co-production and the justice system. Not only is it appropriate to look at the actions taken by the public toward their own safety, it is also appropriate to consider how the public feels about their interactions with criminal justice or legal agencies, programs, and processes. The justice system overall is not always front of mind for a significant portion of the American public, so the limited interactions that members of

the public have with the system can have a profound impact on those perceptions (Longazel et al., 2011). Courts are not often mentioned in glowing terms (Wegman, 2024, “The Supreme Court is gaslighting us all”). For the majority of the public that has limited contact with the courts, that contact is often through a jury summons or in the context of a dispute, whether it is a divorce proceeding, a property dispute, or an allegation of criminal activity. The courts may have a role to play in improving the public’s perceptions of what they are and what they do (Sun & Wu, 2006), thus contributing to the efficient function of the courts much as the public may also contribute to a better experience using court services through co-productive action (i.e., getting through proceedings in a timely manner, abiding by the court’s decisions).

Considering Ostrom et al. (1978) and Parks et al. (1981), the question then becomes which public services within the realm of criminal justice or the courts might be appropriate for co-productive activity. Whitaker (1980) illustrates the initially pessimistic outlook that law enforcement had on their ability to control crime without any public assistance through an excerpt from a police administration textbook: “if there are no effective forces of community social control at work, there is little if anything the police can do to deal with crime and lawlessness” (p. 243). However, in the next thought, Whitaker mentions how members of the public will easily turn to the courts—often perceived as a force for imposed or mandatory behavior change through punishment or civil damages—to seek assistance with unjust laws or regulations. Whitaker, even though he sees less co-productive potential when forced choice or behavior change is the focus, still acknowledges non-cooperation as a legitimate method of influencing policy: “Citizens increasingly influence public policy by their non-cooperation whether it is recognized formally through

court suits or, more commonly, through the acquiescence of public officials when citizens fail to comply” (p. 244).

## **Modern interpretations**

### ***Policing and public safety***

The connections between co-production and the law have continued in more recent years, building on the work established by Ostrom et al. (1978), Whitaker (1980), Parks et al. (1981), and others. One of the disciplines in which co-production has been more regularly applied is policing and public safety, with mixed results. Within their broader conceptual model of outcomes in policing and criminal justice, Loeffler and Bovaird (2020) have divided the purpose of policing and the criminal justice system into two parts: helping the community feel safe and achieving justice in the community. To make their communities feel safer, the public can engage in co-productive activities to reduce opportunities for crime, deter crime, encourage desistance, and remove criminals from the community. Interestingly, reducing the social causes of crime is something that Loeffler and Bovaird see as being outside the influence of policing and the criminal justice system entirely, even though they recognize it as a “critically important driver of crime reduction” (p. 209)<sup>1</sup>. Of these, Loeffler and Bovaird see reducing opportunities for crime as ripe for citizen contribution, much along the lines of Ostrom et al. (1978) (i.e., police encouraging the public to lock their homes and vehicles). There are also opportunities for co-production in encouraging desistance, often including some form of peer support, as well as reporting crime and giving evidence as witnesses (Loeffler & Bovaird, 2020).

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<sup>1</sup> While other co-productive activities could target these social causes of crime (i.e., housing, education, health care), they are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

However, each of these co-productive activities shares a common characteristic: each primarily, if not exclusively, involves the public in the co-delivery of services. Any involvement of the public in the co-commissioning, co-design, or co-assessment of public safety, policing, and criminal justice services has been minimal (Bovaird, 2007; Loeffler & Bovaird, 2020; Nabatchi et al., 2017). Taking a different approach, Uzochukwu and Thomas (2018) look at the co-production of public services in the city of Atlanta among a sample of participants in the city's neighborhood planning units: a set of 25 citizen advisory councils that make recommendations to the city on neighborhood-level issues (Atlanta City Council, 2024). Among their sample, many participated in the typical co-delivery of services; in their study, this took the form of community clean-ups or neighborhood patrols. Other reported co-productive activities have more indirect impacts on criminal justice, including sharing feelings about a policy or project concerning the community, attending a training session, reporting service malfunctions (i.e. potholes and streetlight outages), and reporting neighbors for code violations (Uzochukwu & Thomas, 2018).

### ***Courts***

Van Gils et al. (2021) conducted a study of how Dutch courts engaged in co-production with the public by gathering feedback during "mirrormeetings," where professionals in a field meet with their clients and ask them to talk about their experiences in the presence of the professionals<sup>2</sup>. These mirrormeetings shared many of the same characteristics as other feedback mechanisms such as focus groups or surveys would,

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<sup>2</sup> In the article title, these are described as "mirrormeeting-focusgroups." They share many of the same characteristics, except that in mirrormeetings, the people being discussed are in the room but most often are nonparticipants in the discussion. As the authors do, I will simplify by using only mirrormeetings.



including the same subjects (experiences of court users), the same content (court function), and the same targeted audiences (court professionals and in *limited* examples, lay people).

The value of Van Gils et al.'s (2021, p. 164) work to the present study comes in what they find missing from the mirrormeetings and what they mention as future directions for research. From the beginning of their work, they note that “[mirrormeetings and focus groups] are almost absent in literature on court administration.” In a significant departure from other studies on co-production, the mirrormeetings examined in the Van Gils et al. (2021) study for the most part excluded lay people, with lawyers, bailiffs, and other public authorities as the primary participants. While co-production can occur between professionals and public officials without any involvement of the public (Alford, 2014), most research on co-production includes the public or citizens as an integral component (e.g., McCulloch & PPPF, 2016; Uzochukwu & Thomas, 2018; Van Eijk & Steen, 2016). The authors note as a significant limitation of the data the fact that the judges select both the topics to be discussed in the mirrormeetings and the participants, leading to the regular occurrence of no change needing to happen; in the alternative, the judges may be too cautious to seek the input of lay people and prefer the relative safety of legal professionals:

That evokes the question why mirrormeetings with non-professional court users have not been organised more often, considering the positive experiences in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. There seems to be some reluctance in many courts to communicate directly with lay court users about their experiences. This shows a tension between the need for control on the content and selection of participants by the organisers of mirrormeetings in the courts and the possible benefits of a more open approach with the possibility of unforeseen feedback (Van Gils et al., 2021, p. 176-177).

As the authors note, limiting feedback to areas the courts find important may exclude areas that would be of significant value to the public, with whom the courts could co-produce the necessary services. This limitation has a practical rationale; courts in the Van Gils et al. study limit feedback to issues for which implementation is easy. Also, they may limit feedback on issues for which they simply do not want suggestions (p. 177).

### **Trust and Co-Production**

To this point, co-production has been described in more transactional terms: goods and services, feedback, evaluation, delivery, and more, or what Needham (2008) would call diagnostic co-production. However, for co-production to be a viable long-term strategy to improve the delivery of public services, whether in criminology and the courts or in other venues, there has to be a continuing relationship between the parties that regularly encourages both the public entity and the citizens to continue to co-produce (Bovaird, 2007; Needham, 2008). Many consumer-producer relationships are categorized in adversarial ways: each party is trying to get the most benefit out of the relationship, thereby determining who at least feels like they got the “win” from the deal (Needham, 2008). This can even be seen in the provision of public safety; the horse trading that goes on between the public, law enforcement, and elected officials for services, influence, and limited financial resources often results in acrimony. One of the most prevalent examples of this over the past five years has been the “defund the police” movement. It became unclear what “defunding” actually meant, what disbanding police would entail, what police reform might look like, and what the public’s role in the process would be. All of these uncertainties in many cases lead to abandoned efforts, continued tensions, and public safety issues that “remain raw and unresolved” (Londoño, 2023).

However, the “transformation of citizen behavior” (Whitaker, 1980, p. 243) that comes with service delivery changes can be a starting point toward Needham’s therapeutic co-production. Therapeutic co-production helps to build communication between participants, and it helps to build trust between participants as well. Trust is an often-discussed and often-misused concept in overall society, but it has a valuable place within the study of co-production. First, several of the most common definitions of trust will be presented. This will be followed by a discussion of how trust has been included in the broader co-production literature and how trust has been included in the literature on co-production in criminology and the law.

### ***Defining trust***

Given the scope of the trust literature—and what would seem to be common sense—it might be surprising to think that early trust research focused so strongly on the trusting party over the party to be trusted (Mayer et al., 1995). According to the authors, trust is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (p. 712). For the authors, the vulnerability component is key. Without the ability to control the other party or the ability to monitor whether they are taking the agreed upon action, the trustor may be placing themselves at some level of risk. Similarly, Rousseau et al. (1998, p. 395) define trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.” Both definitions share the psychological component—vulnerability—but Rousseau et al. do not focus on the actions of another, just on positive expectations of their intentions or behavior. There is an

interesting comparison to be drawn here between the trust literature and the public administration literature when it comes to risk. As seen here, trust and risk—or the willingness to accept risk—are closely linked. However, in the public administration literature, the connection is not present or not as strong (e.g., Brown & Osborne, 2013; Loeffler, 2021). Loeffler presents low trust or a lack of trust as a barrier to co-production; risk management is tied closely to co-production without any connection to or mention of trust. Similarly, Brown and Osborne (2013) draw a close positive connection between innovation and risk without envisioning any role for trust.

Both definitions concentrate on the perspective of the trustor. Additionally, each of these foundational works examines what is needed of the trustee for trust to be established. Mayer et al. (1995) gives three essential characteristics of a trustworthy trustee: ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability is a set of skills that enable the trustee to have influence within their domain. Benevolence is the extent to which they are believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from any profit motive. And finally, integrity is the perception that the trustee adheres to an acceptable and consistent set of principles. For Rousseau et al. (1998), the trustee is either at risk of sanction for breach of the relationship or there is a pattern of interactions and a long-term trust relationship in play for trust to be established.

### ***Trust and co-production***

Throughout the co-production literature, there is a concern that the individuals or groups engaging in co-production might only treat the co-productive relationship in a transactional manner (Needham, 2008), similar to how Rousseau et al. see some forms of the trust relationship. Other scholars see this level of engagement as an entry point to a

co-productive relationship; Loeffler and Timm-Arnold (2020) progress through three different forms of governance (hierarchies, markets, and networks), showing how the potential for co-production increases as the engagement between citizen and traditional service provider (i.e., the government) increases.

Similarly, Van Eijk and Steen (2016) view ad hoc engagement as the first rung of a metaphorical co-production ladder: the citizen must understand how the service will affect their family and their community. Those forms of salience—personal and social—then lead into consideration of just how much effort it would take to engage in recurring co-production and what the results might be: the second rung of their ladder. First among these is ease, which is common sense: if the task requires too much effort, there is less likelihood of involvement. Another consideration they posit is trust, which they circularly operationalize as “trust in the ‘system’ perceived when deciding about whether to engage” (p. 40). However, looking at the other component at this stage, one can see much more of a progression toward co-production and trust. According to Van Eijk and Steen (2016), external efficacy in this context involves asking the following question: “Does the government provide room for my interaction, and will it matter?” (p. 31). The focus group participants they interviewed felt it was very important that they have input and that public officials were willing to listen to their concerns, bringing to mind notions of representation (Tyler, 1988) and procedural fairness (De Cremer & Tyler, 2007). This was combined with a significant presence of internal efficacy in successful co-productive relationships, where the governmental organization went beyond providing room for the interaction and progressed to allowing the respondents to effect change.

Fledderus et al.'s (2014) seminal work on trust and co-production provides a useful way of making this connection between efficacy, trust, and co-production. Their assumption throughout the work is that changing the relationship between service users and service deliverers (increasing co-production) will result in changing attitudes, specifically toward more trust (or at least less distrust). Without a feeling of self (or internal) efficacy expressed as the thought that the user's actions have the potential to change policies or services, they may become disillusioned, disengaged from co-production, and distrustful of the process and the institution. Conversely, Fledderus et al. note that if a service user does feel as if their actions influence their daily lives, they "will feel less risk in trusting others" because they are not as dependent on others (p. 433).

This willingness to be vulnerable to the risk of alienation from the decision-making process (Mayer et al., 1995) can also be seen in more positive terms. If the expectations and goals are clearly understood from the beginning of the co-productive relationship, the change in attitude (Fledderus et al., 2014) should lead to more positive or benevolent expectations and interdependency (Rousseau et al., 1998). Weaver (2019) looks at prisoner-led councils engaged in co-productive partnership with prison administration in the United Kingdom. There are risks for both groups: the users risk significant effort and personal capital being expended with the potential for administration to backtrack or not provide accurate support, while the administration risks giving up some of their ability to control the users by granting limited authority to these councils. This co-productive relationship does not always have to be perfectly equitable to be sustainable, however. As noted by a prison officer, "[Prisoners] are not always gonna get what they want but they know things will be listened to and a decision will be made" (Weaver, 2019, p. 257).

### ***Procedural fairness***

In the prison environment, maintaining order is the primary concern of the administration, along with the safety of the staff and the incarcerated individuals. However, maintaining order in prisons cannot be achieved by recourse to a system of rewards and punishments alone (Rottman, 2007). There needs to be another technique by which authorities gain compliance from the incarcerated. And it is not just prisons for which authorities need cooperation, compliance, and satisfaction from other parties. In 1975, Thibaut and Walker hypothesized that people who were involved in dispute resolution decisions would be independently influenced by their judgments about how fair those processes were. They found strong support for the effect of procedural fairness on the assessment of dispute resolution decisions.

This same effect has been proven across many different justice and non-justice environments. Rottman (2007) tracks the potential effects of procedural fairness throughout the criminal justice system from the family (if the parents treat their children in a fair manner, it should lead to less deviant and antisocial behavior), through to probation and parole (if the supervision officer or treatment provider treats the client in a fair manner, non-compliance should be reduced significantly) to the aforementioned corrections environment. Rottman notes that for courts, there are two publics or two ways to look at procedural fairness: one for those with court experience and one for those without experience. For those with experience, the focus is on indicators of trustworthiness of the judge; the impact of procedural fairness assessments is longer-lasting regardless of whether the court proceeding was over a \$500 car repair bill, child custody, adoption, or criminal prosecution. For those without experience, the focus tends

to be on issues of neutrality, political ideology, and media images of the justice system (Rottman, 2007, p. 838).

Early research on procedural fairness weighed which criteria were most important when assessing fairness, and research also asked whether everyone shares the same set of criteria or whether individual characteristics of the people involved, and the encounter would influence the choice of criteria (Tyler, 1988). According to Tyler, there are seven aspects of process that people consider when assessing fairness: authorities' motivation, honesty, ethicality, quality of decisions, bias, any opportunities for representation, and any opportunities for error correction. Two positive findings were key. First is the most commonly stated finding among all procedural fairness research: judgments on how hard authorities try to be fair are the key overall factor in assessing procedural fairness. Additionally, one criterion from Tyler's list that emerged as new at the time was ethicality, which he operationalized as "being treated politely and seeing one's rights respected" (p. 129). De Cremer and Tyler (2007) apply the concept of procedural fairness beyond the criminal justice system to social interactions and the workplace, noting that interactions can be more enjoyable and efficient when there is cooperation and a pursuit of collective goals. Procedural fairness can promote this cooperation, especially when the authority in question is trusted.

There is one major caveat to the demonstrated effect of procedural fairness on how people assess their interactions with authority figures and people in social situations. In order for the authorities' effort to be fair (Tyler, 1988) to have a positive effect on peoples' evaluations and levels of cooperation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2007), those efforts have to be meaningful and sincere (Rottman, 2007; see also De Cremer & Tyler, 2007). Without



sincerity and meaning, people will not value the opportunities for interaction and cooperation and any reciprocity will be non-existent (Rottman, 2007).

### **Research Opportunities**

Since the 1970's, a robust literature on co-production has developed on broad questions of how to examine citizen participation in government and metropolitan reform (Ostrom, 1972) to other questions of public governance and administration (e.g., Frederickson, 1996; Lynn, 2001, Nederhand et al., 2019). The literature has moved the citizen's role in co-production from the limited, transactional, or passive, to the fully involved position of primary responsibility in some cases (see Table 1). However, within this robust literature there are opportunities for the co-production literature to develop even further, questions that have yet to be answered.

Research on co-production began in the late 1970's with how people could co-produce public safety services, though those self-protective activities had been taking place in the United States for long before then (Ostrom et al., 1978; Whitaker, 1980; Parks et al., 1981). This application of co-production to policing and public safety has continued in the ensuing decades (e.g., Loeffler & Bovaird, 2020; Nabatchi et al., 2017). In recent years, co-production has also been applied in correctional contexts, such as community-based supervision (Ugwudike, 2017), prison councils (Weaver, 2019), and with people who are ex-offenders (McCulloch & PPPF, 2016). While there has been research on user participation in courts through the concept of compliance (e.g., McIvor, 2009; Tyler, 2006), applying co-production to courts remains an understudied part of the field.

## ***Court experience***

Courts are traditionally hierarchical regardless of jurisdiction (i.e., civil, criminal, community) (Loeffler & Timm-Arnold, 2020). Especially in criminal courts, but in any court environment, the citizen's role is most passive. They are there to give testimony or they are a party to a case. Even then, they are typically represented by a professional attorney or there is a specific reason why an attorney is not participating. In some circumstances, their role is passive almost—if not fully—to the point of coercion. This comes out, of course, most commonly in criminal courts, but coercion can still come into play in other types of courts. As an example, participants in civil cases related to property (i.e., foreclosures and evictions) are likely to feel coerced into participation when they do not have the resources to properly defend their interests. Even when someone is serving on a civil or criminal jury, they are not there of their own free will; they were summoned to participation as part of their civic obligation.

How willing might an individual who has had coerced encounters with the courts be to participate in any form of co-production with the courts they may feel have oppressed them? Conversely, could positive experiences with the courts lead to better co-productive efforts? Loeffler (2021) suggests that research should focus on perceived barriers to effective citizen co-production rather than actual barriers. It also remains to be what other factors may contribute to the influence of that experience, leading to Research Question 1:

*Research Question 1: How does experience with courts affect the public's co-production of court services?*

## ***Trust***

Trust, along with ease and efficacy, are among the motivations on Van Eijk and Steen's (2016) ladder model of co-production. While they focus more closely on and find that more of their respondents mention efficacy as motivation for engaging in co-production in their study, trust still has a role to play, especially once the decision to co-produce has already been made. They invite further development of their model in other policy domains and other countries (i.e., other than the Netherlands) to look at motivational patterns across different types of co-production and different motivations and their impacts. This dovetails into the continued need in the literature to determine how the service experience integrates with a service user's overall life experience, how that experience will affect their engagement with the service, and what they will bring to the co-production table (Osborne et al., 2016). The centrality of psychological motivations for co-production (Uzochukwu & Thomas, 2018; Van Eijk & Steen, 2016) ties into both trust and co-production but is not immediately considered when thinking about the courts. These questions and gaps in the literature lead to Research Question 2:

*Research Question 2: What role does trust play in the co-production of court services?*

In the next chapter, I introduce the data I will use to answer these research questions, as well as the research project from which the data were gathered. After generating hypotheses from my research questions and the research opportunities in this chapter, I walk through the process of measurement and planning the analysis to follow.

## Chapter 4: Data and Methods

### Data Set

The Public Engagement Pilot Projects (PEPP) initiative chose six courts from across the United States and Puerto Rico to receive support from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center in their efforts to initiate public engagement with the courts in their jurisdictions, all with the underlying goal of “improving public trust and confidence across minority and economically-disadvantaged communities” (NCSC, 2024). Depending on the location, examples of engagement efforts included: small, facilitated discussions with the public, meetings with community leaders, and/or focus groups. In many of these projects, the PEPP team members actively worked with community leaders and local professionals to craft and deliver the engagement efforts (NCSC, 2024), a crucial component of co-production as viewed by Needham (2008).

Data collected as part of PEPP generally included quantitative surveys of court actors and members of the public taken directly before and after each engagement effort, as well as qualitative, structured interviews with members of the PEPP teams who were responsible for crafting and delivering the engagement efforts with each of the six court entities. For this dissertation, the data set includes survey responses collected in person at five different sites, described throughout as: Midwest state, Southern state, East Coast state, Great Plains state, and Great Lakes state<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> To account for differences in engagement efforts across location, I am including data collection site as a control variable, see Table 6.

## Research Questions and Hypotheses

*Research question 1: How does experience with courts affect the public's co-production of court services?*

Based on previous research, there are several ways that experience with courts could affect the public's co-production of court services. Some members of the public have little contact with the courts, but some have significant contact. Experimental research indicates that when people have contact with legal authority, procedural fairness is positively associated with concepts of cooperation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2007), leading to:

Hypothesis 1 (H<sub>1</sub>): *Increased perception of procedural fairness will increase individual co-production of court services.*

Engaging in co-production requires an outlay of resources on the part of the public agency typically tasked with providing the services as well as the members of the public newly participating in the co-productive efforts. With this changed relationship, there is the potential that people might see too much risk involved in the process and choose against engaging in co-production, leading to:

Hypothesis 2 (H<sub>2</sub>): *Increased perception of risk to the community will decrease individual co-production of court services.*

*Research question 2: What role does trust play in the co-production of court services?*

This study seeks to extend previous literature on trust and co-production from more traditional public services such as housing and health care—and even other justice-related services such as policing—to court services, leading to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3 (H<sub>3</sub>): *Increased trust in the courts will lead to increased individual co-production of court services.*

## Measures

### *Co-production*

As this dissertation seeks to develop knowledge related to the concept of co-production, it follows that co-production is the dependent variable of interest. I follow the definition of co-production used by Osborne et al. (2016, p. 640), which says that co-production is “the voluntary or involuntary involvement of public service users in any of the design, management, delivery and/or evaluation of public services.” As discussed in Chapter 2, this provides a reasonable balance between parsimony and breadth. I took component variables from the survey given to PEPP participants after each engagement event. Each component variable was measured using a Likert-type scale; however, since the scales were not consistently worded or of the same number of levels, instead of creating my own scale from the components, I created a factor score for co-production that was then used as the dependent variable in subsequent analyses. Table 2 displays the component variables in the factor analysis as well as other statistics.

*Table 2. Dependent variable factor analysis: Coproduction.*

Component variable name	Variable label	Factor component loading	Overall
increase2	During today’s engagement, to what degree, if any, did your knowledge of the [courts in your area] increase?	.712	<i>KMO</i> .815
important2	How important to you were the topics addressed during the engagement activities?	.525	<i>Eigenvalue</i> 2.958
helpful2	How helpful were the engagement activities in making progress toward solving one or more problems?	.735	<i>% Variance</i> 49.292
discusshelp2	How much did the discussion help you see new viewpoints?	.766	
viewpoints2	How many different viewpoints were expressed in front of the whole group?	.644	
satisfied2	How satisfied or unsatisfied were you with the engagement activities?	.795	

As constructed, the co-production variable fits well according to prior research as well as the measurable statistics. For example, being able to design a public service requires knowledge of that area, or what Van Eijk and Steen (2016) would call salience; the “increase” question directly asks whether the activity increased the respondent’s knowledge of the courts. Additionally, if the respondent indicates a high level of satisfaction with the engagement activity or that the activity was helpful in making progress toward solving a problem, this indicates a level of involvement on the part of the respondent with the activity, at minimum on an informational or co-evaluation level and probably on a co-management or co-delivery level (Osborne et al., 2016).

More so than the independent variables, co-production required more exploration before I was able to find a suitable measurement. There were several components that I had initially included that I was able to excise essentially out-of-hand. Those included the following:

- timediscuss2: “Was there time for discussion?”
- missing2: “Were any groups of people or viewpoints missing from today’s engagement?”

In the early factor analyses, these components had loadings of .15 or less that persisted through the inclusion of other components. Without available follow-up information, they did not provide much in the way of theoretical value either, hence their elimination. Two additional components that required more exploration were the following:

- followup2: May the evaluation team contact you again later about your opinions?
- socnetsurvey2: Would you be willing to invite people you know to do a very short survey?

These two questions ask whether the respondent would be willing to continue PEPP-like efforts in the future, which does comport with co-production. I did consider leaving them in, which led to a reasonable two-factor solution. The “importance” component would have had to be eliminated in that instance, as it did not load well on either factor. Forcing a one-factor solution was not a reasonable solution, as it led to a split between components with higher loadings and those two with loadings under .32. After returning to the research questions and the literature again, I felt that the focus is best placed on present co-production and that eliminating these two components made sense on that basis.

***Procedural fairness***

Directly related to H<sub>1</sub> is the independent variable of procedural fairness. Similar to co-production, the chosen component variables were both measured using Likert-type scales of different levels. As such, even though there are only two component variables, factor analysis was the technique of choice, as displayed in Table 3.

*Table 3. Independent variable factor analysis: Procedural fairness.*

Component variable name	Variable label	Component factor loading	Overall
fair1	How fair or unfair do [courts in your area] treat people of different races, genders, ages, wealth, or other characteristics?	.908	<i>KMO</i> .500
care1	How much do you feel the [courts in your area] care about the problems faced by people like you?	.908	<i>Eigenvalue</i> 1.650
			<i>% Variance</i> 82.492

This variable draws validity from Van Eijk and Steen’s (2016) concept of external political efficacy (“Does government...provide room for my interaction, and if so, will my interaction matter in their decision-making and service provision processes?”). Additionally, including both of these components draws validity from the work of De Cremer and Tyler (2007) as an example of the fair procedure of providing voice to the court users: “the authority



listens to me and uses this information to make the best possible decision” (p. 640). Tyler’s (1988) ethicality criterion for assessing procedural justice includes a desire to see one’s citizen rights be respected as well as a concern with the “interpersonal aspects of encounters with authorities” (p. 129). In the PEPP context, both fair treatment and caring about the respondent’s problems address the same overall concepts. The components loaded well on one factor and the total variance explained (TVE) was high, though some of that is likely due to the fact that there are only two components.

**Risk**

*Table 4. Independent variable factor analysis: Risk.*

Component variable name	Variable label	Component factor loading	Overall
neg_likely1	In your opinion, how likely is it that [courts in your area] will have negative effects on your community?	.907	<i>KMO</i> .500
neg_extent1	If negative effects happened, how negative would they be?	.907	<i>Eigenvalue</i> 1.644 <i>% Variance</i> 82.180

Table 4 displays the factor analysis I ran that generated the factor score used to measure risk in the subsequent multivariate analyses in Chapter 5. Both of the component variables were measured using Likert-type scales of the same number of levels in the survey. Loeffler (2021) similarly conceptualizes risk as having two elements: the magnitude of the negative effect of an event (“how negative”) and the likelihood that an event with adversarial effects is going to take place in the future (“how likely”), while Wilson et al. (2019) in general measure risk perception using probability and consequences. Where prior research diverges is in how to measure the independent variable. Wilson et al. (2019) see probability and consequences (in the data set: likely and extent) having a multiplicative effect; further, they view probability through exposure and vulnerability, and they view

consequences through severity and affect (emotion). I chose to measure risk using factor analysis and factor score as shown in Table 4 primarily due to the fact that prior research best supported that choice (Brown & Osborne, 2013; Loeffler, 2021). Specifically, Loeffler defines risk as having two elements: the magnitude of the negative effect of an event and the likelihood that an event with negative effects will take place in the future (p. 261). These are direct parallels to the components in Table 4. Additionally, using this technique allowed for consistency with the other variables of interest measured in that manner. As was the case with procedural fairness, both components loaded well on one factor and the total variance explained was over 80 percent.

**Trust**

I conducted a factor analysis using trust-related variables from the post-engagement surveys, incorporating the components seen in Table 5 below:

*Table 5. Independent variable factor analysis: Trust.*

Component variable name	Variable label	Component factor loading	Overall
trust1	How much do you trust or distrust the [PEPP] courts?	.783	<i>KMO</i> .869
honest1	How much do the [courts in your area] act with honesty and integrity?	.795	<i>Eigenvalue</i> 4.724
ctcomm1	To what extent do you see the [PEPP] Courts as being part of your community?	.679	<i>% Variance</i> 59.053
comfort1	How comfortable would you feel letting the [courts in your area] decide a case that was important to you?	.826	
pos_likely1	In your opinion, how likely is it that [courts in your area] will have positive effects on your community?	.806	
pos_extent1	If positive effects happened, how positive would they be?	.699	

Table 5 (cont'd)

resp_judges1	judges – In the [courts in your area], how much are court personnel respectful and courteous to all members of the public?	.786	
resp_staff1	other court staff – In the [courts in your area], how much are court personnel respectful and courteous to all members of the public?	.761	

None of the component factor loadings were any lower than 0.67, and with an eigenvalue of over 4.0 and a TVE of 59%, the factor score generated here was what I chose to use in my analyses. Further, these components find support in some of the foundational trust research: for example, the “comfort” and “community” questions both tie into identification-based trust (Fledderus et al., 2014) and relational trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). Additionally, the components that ask about the positive effects that the courts can have on the community speak directly to benevolence (Mayer et al., 1995) and the positive expectations that the respondent may have of the courts (Rousseau et al., 1998).

**Control variables**

The controls used throughout the analyses consist of a series of demographic variables, as well as binary variables related to prior experience with the courts and the community. Table 6 provides a list of the included control variables.

Table 6. Independent variable factor analysis: Procedural fairness.

Variable name	Variable label	Variable name	Variable label
	<b>Please indicate if you have had each of the following experiences with the courts before today:</b>	education	<b>What is the highest degree you have attained?</b>
jury	<i>Served on a jury</i>		<i>No high school diploma</i>
defend	<i>Defendant (in a civil or criminal case)</i>		<i>High school diploma/GED</i>
witness	<i>Witness</i>		<i>Some college or post high school, but no degree</i>
plaintiff	<i>Plaintiff (who brought a case to court)</i>		<i>Technical/associate, junior college (2 yr, LPN)</i>

Table 6 (cont'd)

juvjust	<i>Participant in a juvenile justice or child welfare case</i>		<i>Bachelor's degree (4 yr, BA, BS, RN)</i>
probat	<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>		<i>Some graduate school</i>
public	<i>Engaged as a member of the public</i>		<i>Graduate degree (Masters, PhD, law, medicine)</i>
other	<i>Other</i>		
workcts	<b>Do you currently work with or for the courts in any official role or position?</b>	ideol_lib	<b>In general, how would you describe your ideological views?</b>
lead	<b>Do you play any leadership roles in your community?</b>		<i>Very liberal</i>
age	<b>What is your age?</b>		<i>Liberal</i>
gender_recode	<b>What is your gender?</b>		<i>Middle-of-the-road</i>
	<b>What race or races do you consider yourself to be?</b>		<i>Conservative</i>
race_AI	<i>American Indian or Alaska Native</i>		<i>Very conservative</i>
race_asian	<i>Asian</i>		
race_black	<i>Black or African American</i>		<b>Data collection site</b>
race_hisp	<i>Spanish, Hispanic, Latina/o/x, Puerto Rican</i>	sitebinary_1	<i>Midwest state</i>
race_white	<i>White (Caucasian)</i>	sitebinary_2	<i>Southern state</i>
race_other	<i>Other</i>	sitebinary_3	<i>East Coast state</i>
		sitebinary_4	<i>Great Plains state</i>
		sitebinary_5	<i>Great Lakes state</i>

## Analysis plan

### *Bivariate analysis*

The analysis plan begins with a series of independent-samples t-tests to evaluate whether there are any differences among the study sample when it comes to the binary control variables and co-production. For the categorical and ordinal control variables, I will conduct a series of analyses of variance (ANOVA) to make the same determination. If the ANOVA shows that there is at least one statistically significant mean difference, post hoc analysis will be run to determine where that difference is. The bivariate analysis will be informative, but it will not be dispositive for my analysis and conclusions; any statistically

significant differences in means may help answer the hypotheses and, if necessary, modify the multivariate analyses I conduct.

### ***Multivariate analysis***

Once the factor scores for the dependent and independent variables have been constructed and the control variables have been chosen, I plan to run a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to test my hypotheses, using co-production as the dependent variable in each. Given their importance, the independent variables will be present in every model. What will be adjusted are the categories of control variables that are present in each OLS model. This should show how meaningful the relationship between the independent variables and co-production is, accounting for the effects of the other characteristics that the data set makes available.

### ***Missing data analysis***

The final step in the analysis will be to examine the data set for missing values and potentially re-run the OLS model(s) accounting for any missing data. First, I will use the missing value analysis function of SPSS to take an account of what data are missing on the dependent and independent variables, as well as the control variables. The method I will use to replace any missing data will be multiple imputation. Multiple imputation provides a way to generate statistical inferences on the entire study sample, based on the known relationships between measured variables and cases (Manly & Wells, 2015). Multiple imputation has been used as a primary technique for dealing with missing data in the field of higher education (Manly & Wells, 2015), and it is being used with more regularity in criminal justice research as well (e.g., Doherty & Bersani, 2020; Mitchell et al., 2022; Motley et al., 2020; Wadsworth & Roberts, 2008). Once any missing data are imputed, I would then

be able to re-run the OLS model(s) and compare the imputation models to the previous models to see if there are any differences.

## Chapter 5: Results and Analysis

### Descriptive statistics

Table 7 presents descriptive statistics on the overall study sample (N<sub>0</sub>=419). Gender is one of the few demographic variables that is somewhat skewed. Across the study sample, 60% of respondents report as female. There is significant racial diversity across the study sample, with 30% of respondents reporting they are American Indian or Alaskan Native, 26% Black, and 32% White. The sample is educationally diverse with at least 10 percent of respondents self-reporting in each educational category except for “some graduate school.” However, the sample does contain a significant number of respondents with graduate degrees (21%) or a 2- or 4-year degree (27.2%). In terms of political ideology, the sample is quite “middle-of-the-road,” as shown by their mean score of 3.21 on a 1-5 scale.

*Table 7. Sample descriptive statistics.*

	N	% N <sub>0</sub> (N=419)	Mean	SD	Missing	% N <sub>0</sub> (N=419)	
<b>Age</b>			43.94	17.1	19	4.5	
<b>Gender</b>			.62	.49	12	2.9	
	<i>Female</i>	253	60.4				
	<i>Male</i>	154	36.8				
<b>Race/ethnicity</b>							
	<i>White (Caucasian)</i>	135	32.2	.33	.47	14	3.3
	<i>Spanish, Hispanic, Latina/o/x, Puerto Rican</i>	64	15.3	.16	.37	14	3.3
	<i>Black or African American</i>	110	26.3	.27	.45	14	3.3
	<i>Asian</i>	5	1.2	.01	.11	14	3.3
	<i>American Indian or Alaska Native</i>	125	29.8	.31	.46	14	3.3
<b>Education</b>			4.05	2.05	15	3.6	
	<i>No HS diploma</i>	50	11.9				
	<i>HS diploma/GED</i>	58	13.8				
	<i>Some college</i>	77	18.4				
	<i>Tech/Assoc/Jr college (2 yr)</i>	51	12.2				
	<i>Bachelors (4 yr)</i>	63	15.0				
	<i>Some graduate school</i>	14	3.3				
	<i>Graduate degree</i>	91	21.7				

Table 7 (cont'd)

<b>Ideology</b>				3.21	.883	23	5.5
	<i>Very conservative</i>	10	2.4				
	<i>Conservative</i>	56	13.4				
	<i>Middle-of-the-road</i>	205	48.9				
	<i>Liberal</i>	90	21.5				
	<i>Very liberal</i>	35	8.4				
<b>Experience</b>							
	<i>Court actor</i>	68	16.2	.17	.38	19	4.5
	<i>Community leader</i>	147	35.1	.37	.48	23	5.5
	<i>Served on a jury</i>	116	27.7	.29	.45	14	3.3
	<i>Defendant (civil or criminal case)</i>	89	21.2	.22	.42	14	3.3
	<i>Witness</i>	96	22.9	.24	.43	14	3.3
	<i>Plaintiff (brought case to court)</i>	68	16.8	.17	.37	14	3.3
	<i>Participant in juvenile or child welfare case</i>	109	26.0	.27	.44	14	3.3
	<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>	47	11.2	.12	.32	14	3.3
	<i>Engaged as member of public</i>	114	27.2	.28	.45	14	3.3
	<i>Other</i>	37	8.8	.09	.29	14	3.3
<b>Data collection site</b>							
	<i>Midwest state</i>	115	27.4	.28	.45		
	<i>Southern state</i>	66	15.8	.16	.36		
	<i>East Coast state</i>	91	21.7	.22	.41		
	<i>Great Plains state</i>	139	33.2	.33	.47		
	<i>Great Lakes state</i>	8	1.9	.02	.14		

## Bivariate analysis

Independent-samples t-tests were conducted on the dichotomous control variables as presented in Table 8. This bivariate analysis was conducted to determine whether there are any significant differences among the overall study sample on the mean value of the dependent variable of interest: coproduction.

Table 8. Independent-samples t-tests.

	Mean <sub>DV</sub> (X=1, yes)	Mean <sub>DV</sub> (X=0, no)	t	p
Controls: Previous experiences with the courts before data collection				
<i>Engaged as member of public</i>	.137	-.071	-1.557	.121
<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>	-.112	.003	.664	.507
<i>Participant in juvenile justice or child welfare case</i>	.017	-.025	-.321	.748
<i>Plaintiff (who brought a case to court)</i>	.019	-.018	-.224	.823
<i>Served on a jury</i>	-.027	-.007	.150	.881
<i>Witness</i>	-.019	-.011	.058	.953



Table 8 (cont'd)

<i>Defendant in a civil or criminal case</i>	-0.007	-.014	-.053	.958
<i>Other</i>	-.077	-.007	.325	.746
<i>Any leadership role in the community</i>	.109	-.075	-1.411	.159
<i>Currently work with or for the courts in any official role or position</i>	-.132	.013	.884	.377
<i>Gender (0=female, 1=male)</i>	.017	-.018	-.273	.785

Three of the variables merit some discussion. First is the subset of the study sample who had previous experience with the courts through engagement as a member of the public, either through other surveys or input or learning about the courts. Additionally, there were slight mean differences in the sample for those who worked with or for the courts at the time of data collection, as well as those who played a leadership role in their community. Each of the mean differences was considerable in the sample group (.208, -.145, .184 respectively); however, none of these mean differences was statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot infer that these differences exist in the overall study sample.

Table 9. Analyses of variance (ANOVA).

				Bonferroni		Overall	
				Group differences	p		
Political ideology	N	Mean <sub>DV</sub>	S.D.				
1.00 Very conservative	7	-.198	.947	<i>no sig. diff.</i>		<i>F 1.890</i> <i>Sig. .113</i>	
2.00 Conservative	39	.168	.841				
3.00 Middle-of-the-road	137	.113	.981				
4.00 Liberal	62	-.243	.899				
5.00 Very liberal	24	-.164	1.444				
Highest degree attained	N	Mean <sub>DV</sub>	S.D.	Group differences	p		
1.00 No HS diploma	43	-.347	.985	1.00 & 2.00	.013*	<i>F 2.971</i> <i>Sig. .008**</i>	
2.00 HS diploma/GED	40	.395	.906	2.00 & 7.00	.036*		
3.00 Some college	57	.162	.966				
4.00 Tech/Assoc/Jr college (2 yr)	36	-.009	.908				
5.00 Bachelor (4 yr)	43	-.039	.869				
6.00 Some graduate school	12	.220	.802				
7.00 Graduate degree	44	-.279	1.208				

Table 9 (cont'd)

Data collection site	N	Mean <sub>DV</sub>	S.D.	Group differences	<i>p</i>		
1.00 Midwest state	85	-.251	1.069	1.00 & 2.00	.027*	<i>F</i>	4.755
2.00 Southern state	57	.255	.847	1.00 & 3.00	.006**	<i>Sig.</i>	.001**
3.00 East Coast state	30	.467	1.062	3.00 & 4.00	.054		
4.00 Great Plains state	105	-.095	.941				
5.00 Great Lakes state	5	.551	.711				

\*\**p* < .01; \**p* < .05

Analyses of variance were conducted on the categorical control variables, as presented in Table 9, to examine whether there are any significant differences among the study sample on these variables as related to coproduction. Prior research indicates that political participation and political efficacy—both internal and external—may have a direct relationship with the choice to engage in coproduction (Uzochukwu & Thomas, 2018; Van Eijk & Steen, 2016), making political ideology a valid choice as a control variable. The mean value of coproduction was considerable for each category, though not in a consistent direction. However, there were no statistically significant differences shown among the political ideology categories on the mean value of coproduction. This lack of significant group differences was somewhat surprising given the historical and recent prior research.

Level of education is also a commonly examined variable in other studies on coproduction (e.g., Kang & Van Ryzin, 2019; Loeffler, 2021). The overall result of the analysis of variance was statistically significant ( $F(6, 268) = 2.971, p = .008$ ). Bonferroni post hoc analysis shows that there are significant mean differences between those with no high school diploma as their highest level of education and those with a high school diploma or a GED, as well as those with a high school diploma or GED and those with a graduate degree. At the bivariate level, the mean values of coproduction relative to highest

degree attained do not follow a consistent pattern; multivariate analysis may generate further information and relationships.

The PEPP data were collected at several different sites across the United States; this study used data from five of these sites as shown in Table 9. The analysis of variance ( $F(4, 277) = 4.755, p = .001$ ) again showed that there was at least one statistically significant mean difference in the study sample. Post hoc analysis showed two statistically significant mean differences: Midwest and Southern states ( $-.251$  &  $.255, p = .027$ ) and Midwest and East Coast states ( $-.251$  &  $.467, p = .006$ ).

### Multivariate analysis

Analysis of the relationship between co-production and the main independent variables then moved to multivariate, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Based on prior research and the bivariate analysis, five models were developed as shown in table 10.

Table 10. OLS regressions on co-production.

Model 1 (n=131)	B	t	p	Overall	
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.134	-1.030	.305	<i>F</i>	3.281
<i>Trust</i>	.369	2.754	.007**	<i>Sig.</i>	.023*
<i>Risk</i>	.075	.829	.409	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.072
Model 2 (n=131)					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.124	-.903	.368	<i>F</i>	1.781
<i>Trust</i>	.406	2.683	.008**	<i>Sig.</i>	.097
<i>Risk</i>	.060	.644	.521	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.092
<i>Data collection site:</i>					
<i>Midwest state</i>	-.185	-.689	.492		
<i>Southern state</i>	-.115	-.499	.619		
<i>East Coast state</i>	-.444	-1.362	.176		
<i>Great Lakes state</i>	.399	.678	.499		
Model 3 (n=131)					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.088	-.620	.537	<i>F</i>	1.239
<i>Trust</i>	.365	2.575	.011*	<i>Sig.</i>	.261
<i>Risk</i>	.123	1.231	.221	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.125

Table 10 (cont'd)

<i>Experience:</i>						
	<i>Work with the courts</i>	-.121	-.530	.597		
	<i>Community leadership</i>	.333	1.611	.110		
	<i>Served on a jury</i>	-.180	-.910	.365		
	<i>Defendant in civil or criminal case</i>	-.214	-.919	.360		
	<i>Witness</i>	.023	.109	.914		
	<i>Plaintiff (brought case to court)</i>	-.130	-.545	.587		
	<i>Juvenile justice or child welfare case</i>	-.070	-.341	.734		
	<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>	.210	.795	.428		
	<i>Engaged as member of the public</i>	.002	.009	.993		
	<i>Other</i>	-.289	-.996	.321		
<b>Model 4 (n=126)</b>		<b>B</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>p</b>		
<i>Procedural fairness</i>		-.096	-.721	.473	<i>F</i>	2.836
<i>Trust</i>		.347	2.323	.022*	<i>Sig.</i>	.002**
<i>Risk</i>		.072	.794	.429	<i>R<sup>2</sup></i>	.231
<i>Demographics:</i>						
	<i>Age</i>	.005	.790	.431		
	<i>American Indian or Alaska Native</i>	.149	.683	.496		
	<i>Asian</i>	.084	.146	.884		
	<i>Black or African American</i>	.272	1.148	.253		
	<i>Spanish, Hispanic, Latina/o/x, Puerto Rican</i>	.266	1.150	.253		
	<i>Race, other</i>	-1.063	-2.134	.035*		
	<i>Ideology (liberal is high)</i>	-.236	-2.136	.035*		
	<i>Education level</i>	-.122	-2.397	.018*		
	<i>Gender</i>	.097	.497	.620		
<b>Model 5 (n=122)</b>		<b>B</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>p</b>		
<i>Procedural fairness</i>		-.036	-.229	.819	<i>F</i>	1.734
<i>Trust</i>		.389	2.365	.020*	<i>Sig.</i>	.029*
<i>Risk</i>		.092	.862	.391	<i>R<sup>2</sup></i>	.322
<i>Demographics:</i>						
	<i>Age</i>	.008	1.225	.223		
	<i>American Indian or Alaska Native</i>	.202	.633	.528		
	<i>Asian</i>	.282	.454	.651		
	<i>Black or African American</i>	.071	.207	.837		
	<i>Spanish, Hispanic, Latina/o/x, Puerto Rican</i>	.531	1.790	.077		
	<i>Race, other</i>	-1.570	-2.544	.013*		
	<i>Ideology (liberal is high)</i>	-.180	-1.438	.154		
	<i>Education level</i>	-.113	-1.931	.056		
	<i>Gender</i>	.210	.939	.350		
<i>Experience:</i>						
	<i>Work with the courts</i>	-.097	-.408	.684		
	<i>Community leadership</i>	.328	1.540	.127		
	<i>Served on a jury</i>	-.071	-.335	.738		
	<i>Defendant in civil or criminal case</i>	-.018	-.079	.938		

Table 10 (cont'd)

	<i>Witness</i>	.200	.904	.368	
	<i>Plaintiff (brought case to court)</i>	-.140	-.575	.567	
	<i>Juvenile justice or child welfare case</i>	-.006	-.030	.976	
	<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>	-.043	-.160	.873	
	<i>Engaged as a member of the public</i>	.095	.398	.691	
	<i>Other</i>	-.375	-1.268	.208	
<i>Data collection site:</i>					
	<i>Midwest state</i>	.002	.005	.996	
	<i>Southern state</i>	-.120	-.300	.765	
	<i>East Coast state</i>	-.014	-.032	.975	
	<i>Great Lakes state</i>	1.560	1.612	.110	

\*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

### Model 1

I chose to present Model 1 in the most parsimonious way possible, using only the independent variables as predictors and co-production as the dependent variable, without controlling for any outside factors. Several of the limited extant studies on co-production and courts or other justice system-related issues also emphasize similar concepts, lending validity to their use (Loeffler & Bovaird, 2020; Van Eijk & Steen, 2016).

Model 1, while parsimonious and direct, is not functionally practical. These data were not collected in an experimental context. Any conclusions made about the relationships between co-production, procedural fairness, trust, and risk would be suspect without considering the impact of the additional factors present in the additional models. While this model may not be functionally practical, it presents a reasonable baseline for the other regressions. The overall predictability of this model is low ( $R^2=.072$ ,  $F=3.281$ ,  $p=.023$ ), and neither procedural fairness nor risk are statistically significant. However, trust as a predictor of co-production is robust, positive, and significant at the .01 level. This is consistent with the broader co-production literature; specific to Model 1, Ostrom (2000) views assuring mutual trust as an element of the basic structure of most contractual

relationships and collective action. Additionally, Alford (2014) notes that building trust is a contextual matter, and co-production is the context.

## **Model 2**

Peeking back briefly to Chapter 4 to some of the components of the independent variables, we can see that many of them involve either the participant or the courts being part of the community or the effect that the courts can have on the community. Model 2 looks at the geographic aspect of community by controlling for the data collection site in conjunction with the independent variables of interest. Overall predictability of model 2 is modest but not statistically significant ( $R^2=.092$ ,  $F=1.781$ ,  $p=.097$ ). People in the East Coast state were considerably unwilling to engage in co-production, and people in the Great Lakes state were almost as equally willing to engage in co-production,<sup>4</sup> however, none of the coefficients were statistically significant.

Interestingly, the impact of trust on co-production maintains statistical significance, and there is a slight increase in the slope of the co-efficient. Procedural fairness and risk each lose some of the limited explanatory impact they had as compared to Model 1. At this point in the analysis, it is unclear<sup>5</sup> whether this is due to the inclusion of the data collection site controls or the importance of trust.

## **Model 3**

Prior research has also indicated that experience with public services can affect how a member of the public may engage in co-production (Longazel et al., 2011). In what might be the greatest difference with those using other public services (i.e., housing, health care,

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<sup>4</sup> Of the  $n=131$  in Model 2, only 8 made up the Great Lakes subset.

<sup>5</sup> Examination of the VIF and tolerance values indicated no issues with collinearity.

education) who may experience some level of coercion, those engaging in co-production with courts may be doing so under the threat of punishment (Weaver, 2011). Model 3 looks at the effect of experience by controlling for previous experience with the courts and the independent variables only to isolate this effect. Somewhat surprisingly, there was no statistically significant effect shown overall. The overall predictability of this model improves modestly ( $R^2=.125$ ), though it loses statistical significance ( $p=.261$ ) due to the fact that enough variables without statistical significance were added to the model to make the entire model lose predictability.

A pattern is developing regarding the relationships among the independent variables, and between the independent variables and co-production. Trust persists in its strong predictability of co-production (though there is a very modest deduction in the slope of the coefficient). One might have anticipated more of a change in this model, as several of the added controls could be related to trust. As an example, one might think that those who have previously been defendants or probationers, or those who have been part of a juvenile case, may have their trust in the courts affected. However, adding these controls to the model showed no effect.

#### **Model 4**

Previous models have looked at the impact of where the respondents are located (Model 2) and their previous experience (Model 3) on levels of co-production. However, it is essential to also consider the importance of each individual's characteristics on their levels of co-production. Ostrom and her colleagues (1978) included individual characteristics at multiple stages of their foundational study on policing and co-production,

as has much of the research on co-production in the decades since (e.g., Brudney & England, 1983; Loeffler, 2021; Van Eijk & Steen, 2016; Weaver, 2011).

Personal characteristics, socio-demographic factors (Loeffler, 2021), or demographics as they are described in Table 7, cover a wide spectrum of influences and may be expected to have a wide range of statistical effects as shown in Model 4. Both age and gender have a very modest positive effect on co-production; however, those effects are not statistically significant. Relative to the reference category (white), none of the racial categories have a statistically significant effect on the respondents' levels of co-production, save for those people that self-identify in the "other" category ( $B=-1.063$ ,  $p=.035$ ). This is, including the trust variables, the greatest slope seen so far in any of the previous models, indicating that these people are highly disinclined to co-produce with courts.<sup>6</sup>

Two additional personal characteristics in the data set are level of education and political ideology, both of which in Model 4 have a negative and statistically significant effect on respondents' level of co-production ( $B=-.236$ ,  $p=.035$ ;  $B=-.122$ ,  $p=.018$  respectively). As Loeffler (2021) states, those with higher levels of education may be less inclined toward co-production because they are busier with work commitments or that they live in neighborhoods where public services are of better quality. However, for these respondents there may be an additional explanation worth noting. While there is little measurable difference in the mean value for education in the overall study sample ( $\mu_0=4.05$ ) versus Model 4 ( $\mu_4=4.24$ ), the education variable is not normally distributed, with a significant number of people self-identifying as holding a graduate degree (7 on a 1-7 Likert-type scale). Logically this makes sense, as many of the professionals involved in

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<sup>6</sup> Of the  $N=419$  in the overall study sample, only 7 self-identified in this category.



the work of the courts might find it either helpful or necessary to have that level of education.

The addition of ideology to the model theoretically could have had an impact on trust relative to co-production, as those on each end of the ideological spectrum seem to show a distrust of governmental entities of many types, including courts. However, even though ideology had a negative and statistically significant effect on co-production in Model 4 ( $B=-.236, p=.035$ ), trust maintains its positive relationship with co-production ( $B=.347, p=.022$ ).

### **Model 5**

Model 1 was presented in a highly parsimonious, yet functionally impractical fashion, with only the independent variables of interest included. Each of the subsequent models has helped to develop the picture of how members of the public engage in co-production with the courts. With a better understanding of these factors, it then becomes necessary to look at the entire picture at once, to consider each potential co-producer in full. Model 5 does this by including the primary independent variables, as well as the controls for data collection site, experience, and demographic factors. Concluding the pattern established in Models 1-4, including all of the control variables did not diminish the impact or statistical significance of trust on co-production in Model 5. Regardless of where they were, how they self-identified, or what they did, how they trusted the courts in their communities had the greatest impact on whether they would engage in co-production with those courts.

At this point in the analysis, it is important to recognize that Model 5 is based on a total of 122 cases, while the number of cases in the overall study sample is 419. In order to

determine whether this discrepancy may have any effect on how trust affects how people engage in co-production with courts, I conducted a missing value analysis, including imputing values for any missing data. In addition, the number of independent variables with a small sample size can result in unreliable estimates. Multiple imputation can help avoid such issues.

*Table 11. Pooled imputation model with missing value analysis.*

Variables with >5% missing values	N	Missing N	%N <sub>0</sub>	
Trust	211	208	49.6	
Coproduction	282	137	32.7	
Risk	334	85	20.3	
Procedural fairness	386	33	7.9	
Community leadership	396	23	5.5	
Ideology (liberal is high)	397	22	5.3	
Original OLS Model 5 (n=122)	B	t	p	Overall
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.036	-.229	.819	<i>F</i> 1.734
<i>Trust</i>	.389	2.365	.020*	<i>Sig.</i> .029*
<i>Risk</i>	.092	.862	.391	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> .322
<i>Demographics:</i>				
<i>Age</i>	.008	1.225	.223	
<i>American Indian or Alaska Native</i>	.202	.633	.528	
<i>Asian</i>	.282	.454	.651	
<i>Black or African American</i>	.071	.207	.837	
<i>Spanish, Hispanic, Latina/o/x, Puerto Rican</i>	.531	1.790	.077	
<i>Race, other</i>	-1.570	-2.544	.013*	
<i>Ideology (liberal is high)</i>	-.180	-1.438	.154	
<i>Education level</i>	-.113	-1.931	.056	
<i>Gender</i>	.210	.939	.350	
<i>Experience:</i>				
<i>Work with the courts</i>	-.097	-.408	.684	
<i>Community leadership</i>	.328	1.540	.127	
<i>Served on a jury</i>	-.071	-.335	.738	
<i>Defendant in civil or criminal case</i>	-.018	-.079	.938	
<i>Witness</i>	.200	.904	.368	
<i>Plaintiff (brought case to court)</i>	-.140	-.575	.567	
<i>Juvenile justice or child welfare case</i>	-.006	-.030	.976	
<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>	-.043	-.160	.873	
<i>Engaged as a member of the public</i>	.095	.398	.691	
<i>Other</i>	-.375	-1.268	.208	

Table 11 (cont'd)

Data collection site:					
	<i>Midwest state</i>	.002	.005	.996	
	<i>Southern state</i>	-.120	-.300	.765	
	<i>East Coast state</i>	-.014	-.032	.975	
	<i>Great Lakes state</i>	1.560	1.612	.110	
Pooled model (n=419)		B	t	p	
<i>Procedural fairness</i>		-.054	-.337	.711	
<i>Trust</i>		.390	2.085	.056	
<i>Risk</i>		.097	1.041	.310	
<i>Demographics:</i>					
	<i>Age</i>	.010	2.712	.008**	
	<i>American Indian or Alaska Native</i>	.067	.346	.730	
	<i>Asian</i>	.481	.886	.379	
	<i>Black or African American</i>	.156	.833	.408	
	<i>Spanish, Hispanic, Latina/o/x, Puerto Rican</i>	.358	1.630	.114	
	<i>Race, other</i>	-1.366	-2.771	.008**	
	<i>Ideology (liberal is high)</i>	-.119	-1.806	.076	
	<i>Education level</i>	-.097	-2.990	.004**	
	<i>Gender</i>	.155	1.111	.275	
<i>Experience:</i>					
	<i>Work with the courts</i>	-.259	-1.355	.186	
	<i>Community leadership</i>	.290	2.348	.021*	
	<i>Served on a jury</i>	-.012	-.082	.935	
	<i>Defendant in civil or criminal case</i>	-.016	-.087	.931	
	<i>Witness</i>	-.069	-.470	.640	
	<i>Plaintiff (brought case to court)</i>	.177	1.171	.243	
	<i>Juvenile justice or child welfare case</i>	.041	.292	.771	
	<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>	-.192	-.911	.367	
	<i>Engaged as a member of the public</i>	.229	1.548	.130	
	<i>Other</i>	-.344	-1.643	.106	
<i>Data collection site:</i>					
	<i>Midwest state</i>	-.459	-1.897	.061	
	<i>Southern state</i>	-.043	-.142	.887	
	<i>East Coast state</i>	.378	1.192	.244	
	<i>Great Lakes state</i>	.402	.748	.458	

\*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

After setting a conservative threshold of 5 percent for display purposes, Table 11 shows the variables from Model 5 for which there are substantial missing values. Important for the analysis are that trust, co-production, and risk each have over 20 percent of cases with missing values. There seem to be no discernible explanations for these

missing values either from the survey instruments themselves (i.e., skip patterns) or from the overall missing value patterns, leading to the thought that statistical correction in the form of either deletion of cases or some form of data imputation is necessary. Given that this study is already having to handle a lower number of cases than what would be ideal, using a technique such as listwise deletion to entirely eliminate the cases in the study sample without complete data would unreasonably reduce its explanatory power (Manly & Wells, 2015).

To set up a multiple imputation model, I used the *impute missing data values* command in SPSS version 29 to create 10 new datasets in addition to the original dataset (IBM, 2024). Multiple imputation can produce useful estimates with as few imputed data sets as two (Rubin, 2018); imputing 10 datasets should be sufficient to produce the estimates needed without the 20 or more datasets suggested by other researchers (Graham et al., 2007; White et al, 2011). Included in the imputation command were all of the variables from Model 5. After splitting the file by imputation, I then ran a new OLS regression which generated 12 different results: the original result from Model 5, 10 imputed models<sup>7</sup>, and a pooled imputation model. Table 11 presents the results from Model 5 and the pooled imputation model for comparison; in short, from Model 5 through all of the imputed models and the pooled model, the R<sup>2</sup> values do not significantly change, indicating that the explained variance does not change significantly.


Before conducting the missing value analysis and the multiple imputation process, the importance of trust on how people engage in co-production with courts was quite clear across models. The trust factor score maintained significance regardless of which controls

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<sup>7</sup> See Appendix A for the results of the other 10 imputations relative to Model 5.

were added to or subtracted from the regression. This seemed to indicate that people’s trust in the courts in their communities was the dominant factor in how they engaged in co-production with those courts. Comparing Model 5 to the multiple imputation, however, may change the analysis. Looking at the missing value patterns across all variables in the model, only half of the respondents have a valid value for the trust variable and only 122 cases have complete data for all variables, leading to the n=122 for Model 5, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Missing values summary.



After running the multiple imputation, comparing Model 5 to the pooled model leads to some interesting observations. First, the coefficient for education does not measurably change but it does become significant at the .01 level. As previously mentioned, this does seem to agree with previous research indicating that people with higher levels of education are less inclined to engage in co-production with the courts. A new entrant to significance is community leadership, which is positively associated with co-production and statistically significant ( $B=.290, p=.021$ ). Once considered across the entire study sample, this inference makes sense. Co-production is often considered a community-level concept (Osborne et al., 2016; Van Eijk & Steen, 2016); these respondents are proxies for the rest of the community,

and they can act as examples of how co-production could work for the rest of the community.

However, of primary interest for this study is what happens to trust when missing data are imputed. As a reminder, through the five OLS models in Table 10, trust maintained a  $p$ -value of no more than .022 and averaged a coefficient of .375. When pooling all ten imputation models, however, trust loses statistical significance. This infers that, if the data were complete across all 419 respondents, trust might not hold the same importance as it did in Model 5 when there were only 122 complete cases. In the final chapter, I discuss some of the implications of these findings and how future research can expand upon them.

## Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion

The relationship between the public and the public sector has always existed in a state of change and, in some cases, a state of tension. Depending on the prevailing governance model, the public has been viewed by the government in a limited fashion from mere audience members (Meinke, 2008) to constituents and voters (Kim, 2021). It has taken several decades for the government to be willing to see the public's ability to participate "beyond the ballot box" (Frederickson, 1996, p. 265) in providing public services. This is where the concept of co-production enters the discussion. As the "voluntary or involuntary involvement of public service users in any of the design, management, delivery and/or evaluation of public services" (Osborne et al., 2016, p. 640), co-production is a way that the public can participate in typically government-provided services that benefit them.

In the public administration and economics literature from which much of the scholarship on co-production has been developed, we typically see it applied to services such as health care, education, and elder care, among others. The question then becomes which public services within the realm of criminal justice, justice-related services, or for the purpose of this dissertation the courts, might be appropriate for co-productive activity. The extant literature on co-production and the justice system largely has involved policing and how people can co-produce public safety with the police through neighborhood watches and citizen review boards among other opportunities. When the concept of co-production has been applied to the courts, it has been limited and for example, in different jurisdictions that would not be generalizable to the American context (Van Gils et al., 2021). This dissertation has contributed to this discussion. The extant literature on co-production

has also invited application of its models and concepts in other policy domains that may not be immediately considered when thinking about co-production and public services (Loeffler, 2021; Van Eijk & Steen, 2016). This dissertation has contributed to those efforts.

## **Discussion**

### ***Procedural fairness***

The literature on the effect of procedural fairness on cooperation, or the effects of procedural justice and legitimacy, is quite clear and quite robust (e.g., De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006). However, making the step forward from cooperation and legitimacy to Osborne et al.'s (2016) four components of co-production (design, management, delivery, evaluation) as measured by my dependent variable was shown by my models not to be affected by perceptions of procedural fairness. As these perceptions fall under the broader research question of experience with courts, it is interesting to note here the fact that the fact that demographic controls not having any significant effect on co-production parallels Tyler's (1988) result that a person's characteristics do not influence their criteria on whether a procedural decision is fair. Overall, though, Hypothesis 1 is *not supported*.

### ***Risk***

The public administration literature sees risk largely as a negative influence or a barrier against co-production, both from the service provider's and the service user's perspective. The service provider risks losing the control they have had for an extended period of time and the loss of reputation from getting the blame for poor results, even if the public co-producer may be to blame (Loeffler, 2021); it may take significant human and financial capital to convince them to participate in co-production (Kim, 2021). The service



user also will likely have to spend time and other resources to participate in co-production when the potential benefits may not be immediately apparent (Loeffler, 2021).

In this study, even though never statistically significant, the results of the regressions suggested a direct relationship between risk and co-production. Why in a risk-laden environment, when many of the stakeholders may be risk-averse and resistant to change, would risk be directly related to levels of co-production? Brown and Osborne (2013) provide some guidance: it may be cliché, but innovation requires stepping outside of one's comfort zone through those risks to reputation, potential expenditure, or loss of resources and personal capital. Without a shared understanding among all of the involved stakeholders of the risks, fear and misapprehension. However, even though the potential rewards of innovation through co-production may not be immediate, they are potentially significant. For example, if one community leader is encouraged enough by these pilot projects to continue to work with the courts in their community, and potentially they end up encouraging their own constituents (neighborhood members, church members) to do the same on an issue like getting members of the community into treatment courts or conflict resolution, that can only be of benefit. However, Hypothesis 2 is *not supported*.

### ***Trust***

Given the significant literature supporting a connection between trust and the provision of other public services, I expected and hypothesized a connection between trust and court services. Whether it is a dispute over a \$500 car repair bill, mediation concerning a child custody dispute, or criminal prosecution, to the individuals involved there is always an important matter at issue. The courts have to keep that in mind as they approach these issues, and the individual's need to feel self-determination should motivate them to engage

in co-production, where they would have greater influence over “their own life politics” and make them a “key arbiter of service quality and performance” (Fledderus et al., 2014, p. 434). Throughout the five OLS models, trust maintained a pattern of statistical significance to an extent that it seemed as if it was going to share the same importance as in the rest of the co-production literature; however, it lost statistical significance in the pooled imputation model. This suggests that trust may not be as important as originally suggested, but for some people it still influences their levels of co-production with the courts. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is *partially supported*.

### ***Alternative measures***

During the process of data analysis, there was some thought that trust and procedural fairness could be measured using single-item measures, instead of the two-item factor scores that I have used in my analysis. Appendix B contains the results of OLS regressions and imputations using single-item measures for those independent variables. While there were some increases in the number of cases in the OLS regressions and some variables that gained and lost statistical significance, none of the conclusions related to my hypotheses changed using those measures.

### **Implications for Court Administration**

“No government can be efficient and equitable without considerable input from citizens” (Ostrom, 1996, p. 1083). In the eyes of much of the public, courts’ reputations have suffered from the public’s perception of a lack of efficiency, equitability, and trust over the past several years (Shaw et al., 2024, ‘The justices dropped this bomb...’). Part of this negative perception comes from the fact that Supreme Court justices are appointed by political actors (Buchanan & Meller, 2019, “Brett Kavanaugh: A representation of the

damaged U.S. judiciary”); at other jurisdictional levels, many judicial actors are elected. And as part of the electoral process, there is a demonstrated connection between public opinion and judicial behavior (Nelson, 2014). Given this, there is a significant need for research and techniques to improve these relationships so that the function of the courts for all involved can improve. Hearings can take an appropriate amount of time and judgments can be handed down in an efficient manner (Van Gils et al., 2021). People can walk away from an experience with the courts feeling as if they were able to tell their story and plead their case, even if the result of the experience went against their interest (Longazel et al., 2011). This study contributes to these efforts by showing that increasing trust in courts increases co-production at the individual level. It is important to note that much of the literature emphasizes the fact that co-production is best accomplished in a personalized fashion (Weaver, 2011), and that “[w]hat works well in what set of circumstances may be unsuitable for another” (Alford, 2014, p. 312). This research could be used to build trust networks (Fledderus et al., 2014) as a way to sustain co-productive efforts in courts over time. Increasing trust works, at least in certain contexts.

Everyone covered by the control variables in this dissertation (i.e., plaintiffs, defendants, court employees, members of the public) has a role to play in the function of the courts and could be part of the related trust network. Building this network requires making the relationships between co-producers explicitly known, establishing shared rights and obligations, communicating shared connections, and developing boundaries from outsiders. Brown and Osborne’s (2013) research on risk governance is instructive on this front. Public agencies can contribute by providing the enabling frameworks and convening the groups in which collaboration and innovation can take place. Court

administrators can provide grant writing and other resources to which members of the public likely do not have access. Members of the public in collaboration with those professionals then can use those resources to operate the courts, run advisory councils, connect probationers and other court users with community resources, and engage in other co-productive efforts (Fledderus et al., 2014).

Further, increased trust in the courts allows court personnel to delegate court functions within the court system and also to actors not traditionally associated with the court system as a form of co-production. As the public increases trust in the courts, they are more likely to act in a manner comporting with any positive expectations that the courts have of them (Rousseau et al., 1998). For example, while the government may have full control over formal criminal sentencing and punishment, if the public trusts the government enough to engage in co-productive activity, court personnel may then delegate some court functions back to the public in the form of techniques like restorative justice, which according to Howard Zehr (2015) can be outlined as “...address[ing] the harms and needs of those harmed, hold those causing harm accountable to ‘put right’ those harms, and involve both of these parties as well as relevant communities in this process” (p. 35). This is also where the findings on risk come into play. Both court administrators and members of the public have to take on some level of risk in order to have co-production become successful, and also for any level of innovation to take place. However, potential benefits of more just outcomes in court proceedings, better use of financial resources, and better goodwill with the community may follow.

## **Limitations**

The primary limitation to my study is one that cannot be avoided, and that is the low number of overall cases in the data set ( $N_0=419$ ). Beyond that, after accounting for all of the independent variables and the controls, Model 5 was based on 122 cases, which is significantly low. I ended up having to bring in a high number of cases through multiple imputation. I wanted to bring in the larger number of cases to avoid as much bias as possible from the low number of cases, which likely inflated some of the significance in my models. Even though I lost some contact with the actual data, my conclusions were improved through my use of multiple imputation, an accepted missing data replacement technique.

When working through the measurement part of the dissertation process, my first effort was to go through the data set and find variables that seemed to intuitively fit the concepts I was trying to measure. This led to less focus and refinement than what was eventually used in the dissertation. I based each of the variables here on prior research, working for example from Osborne et al.'s (2016) definition of co-production and the dual definitions of trust from Mayer et al. (1995) and Rousseau et al. (1998), lending validity to each measure. Even though this dissertation is more exploratory in nature, grounding the measures in prior research is essential. Finding components for the trust variable was not difficult, which makes sense as the PEPP projects were targeted at "improving public trust and confidence" in the courts and not specifically at co-production. Again, though, prior research was instructive in finding enough component variables to create reasonable measurements of each variable of interest. Any future research based on this study should include a longitudinal component, as this study concentrated on present co-production.

Future research should design survey instruments specifically with these concepts in mind, so that these measurements can improve even more.

It was important to include as much information about each case as the data set provided, given the low number of cases, hence the higher number of control variables. And for the most part in the models, they did not have a significant impact on the respondents' level of co-production. Though not the subject of any of the hypotheses or the direct focus of the dissertation, several of the controls have been the focus of prior research on co-production. Take, for example, education, which has been shown to have an effect on co-productive activity (Kang & Van Ryzin, 2019; Loeffler, 2021). In my study, education had a considerable but not statistically significant effect on co-production before and after data imputation. Future research on co-production and the courts should be designed specifically to test the effect of education, as it was not a focus of mine.

An additional limitation to my study is the lack of generalizability, including the fact that this is not an experimental study. Additionally, these data were collected at five different sites across the country. While they show geographic, cultural, political, and other forms of variety, they are not representative of the entire country. Future research could expand on my measures and models by using a more representative dataset for improved generalizability.

### **Implications for Practice and More on Future Research**

This study also shows how more people could participate with the courts and with justice-related issues overall. As an example, one of the control variables in my models was whether the respondents had ever served on a jury. This is probably the most easily accessible example for the largest number of people participating with the courts.

Hannaford-Agor and Moffett (2024) say that in 2021, an estimated 33 million summonses were sent out for jury duty in state courts; far fewer than that were eventually qualified to serve on a jury, let alone actually served. Among their study sample, 27.7% replied they had served on a jury. Co-production through one of the four main methods could be another way to bring the community closer to the courts in addition to jury duty.

The findings support the fact that those who identify as community leaders engage in more co-production. According to Tørfing et al. (2019, p. 817), part of advancing systemic change is transforming the public sector from professional knowledge being “the holy truth” to where there is a premium on “dialogue, curiosity, and openness,” which can be seen in design, management, delivery, and evaluation. If formal leaders are able to delegate the co-creative or co-productive process to “experienced and trusted participants” such as community leaders, they would better allocate their time to tasks for which co-production is not an option. Durose et al. (2017) found that co-production is most likely to grow through the spread of ideas at the local level using locally appropriate practices. Community leaders are ideally positioned to know what those practices are, and if they are already engaged in co-production with the courts through participation on an advisory board or a peer support group, that makes entry for other members of the community even easier, starting with smaller-scale activities and growing to full engagement (Durose et al., 2017).

## **Conclusion**

My choice to study co-production and how it could apply to the provision of court services comes from its potential to bring more people into the function of a public service that is sometimes tension-filled and controversial. It is important to see co-production as

multi-faceted and individualized. Part of the value of the concept of co-production is that it provides an avenue for people to individualize their experience with public services (Alford, 2014). Going through the court process can be intimidating for anyone, especially for people who feel like, as Feeley (1979) describes it, the process itself is the punishment. Lower-level processes, whether they are misdemeanor criminal court cases (Natapoff, 2018) or local eviction proceedings (Sudeall & Pasciuti, 2021), can treat the participants as impersonal widgets on an ever-running assembly line. Participants are not offered any choices or input, and when they are, these are limited. Any notions of fair procedures or treatment (Tyler, 1988) are minimized.

While my hypotheses generally were not supported, it is still important that I found that for some people, their trust in the courts has a positive effect on their co-productive activity. Co-production offers an opportunity to “deep[ly]” personalize (Weaver, 2011) the courts for those who are involved with them. This deep personalization, according to Weaver, requires sustained negotiation, interaction and support (pp. 1042-1043) that can take the form of trust networks (Fledderus et al., 2014; see also Van Eijk & Steen, 2016).

Co-production involves the actions of several or many individuals in a personalized fashion, yet it is an inherently social enterprise, impacting social order (Diver, 2017). Even though there may be some significant individual and administrative risks to finances and capital (Weaver, 2019), there also may be significant benefits. All co-productive processes, even the largest-scale, most sustained ones, must start from somewhere. This dissertation, and the opportunities for others to build upon its findings, represents a valuable contribution to the research in this field. Further, court administrators, community leaders,



and interested members of the public can use its findings to be encouraged to engage in co-productive activities with their local courts to improve the courts for everyone.

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## APPENDIX A: IMPUTATIONS

Table A.1. OLS coefficients for each of the imputed data sets: Model 5.

Original OLS Model 5 (n=122)	B	t	p	Overall	
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.036	-.229	.819	<i>F</i>	1.734
<i>Trust</i>	.389	2.365	.020*	<i>Sig.</i>	.029*
<i>Risk</i>	.092	.862	.391	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.322
<b>Imputation 1—Model 5</b>					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.026	-.214	.831	<i>F</i>	2.912
<i>Trust</i>	.292	2.237	.027*	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.075	.873	.384	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.304
<b>Imputation 2—Model 5</b>					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.014	.115	.909	<i>F</i>	2.789
<i>Trust</i>	.269	2.002	.047*	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.078	.884	.378	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.295
<b>Imputation 3—Model 5</b>					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.016	-.139	.889	<i>F</i>	2.984
<i>Trust</i>	.203	1.629	.105	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.094	1.137	.257	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.310
<b>Imputation 4—Model 5</b>					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.026	-.220	.827	<i>F</i>	2.219
<i>Trust</i>	.290	2.311	.022*	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	-.028	-.344	.731	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.250
<b>Imputation 5—Model 5</b>					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.100	-.867	.387	<i>F</i>	2.538
<i>Trust</i>	.386	3.088	.002**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.186	2.265	.025*	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.276
<b>Imputation 6—Model 5</b>					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.063	-.516	.607	<i>F</i>	3.156
<i>Trust</i>	.301	2.309	.022*	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	-.039	-.461	.645	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.322
<b>Imputation 7—Model 5</b>					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.037	-.319	.750	<i>F</i>	2.105
<i>Trust</i>	.333	2.703	.008**	<i>Sig.</i>	.003**
<i>Risk</i>	.105	1.294	.198	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.240
<b>Imputation 8—Model 5</b>					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.075	-.635	.526	<i>F</i>	3.463
<i>Trust</i>	.336	2.668	.008**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.001	.011	.991	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.342
<b>Imputation 9—Model 5</b>					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.137	-1.215	.226	<i>F</i>	3.262
<i>Trust</i>	.399	3.292	.001**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.067	.842	.401	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.329

Table A.1 (cont'd)

Imputation 10—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.084	.728	.468	<i>F</i>	3.535
<i>Trust</i>	.176	1.402	.163	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	-.020	-.245	.806	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.347
Pooled model					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.054	-.337	.711		
<i>Trust</i>	.390	2.085	.056		
<i>Risk</i>	.097	1.041	.310		

\*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

**APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF KEY CONCEPTS**

*Table B.1. All OLS regression models with single-item measures.*

Model 1 (n=208)		B	t	p	Overall	
<i>Procedural fairness</i>		.062	1.477	.141	<i>F</i>	4.700
<i>Trust</i>		.118	2.417	.017*	<i>Sig.</i>	.003**
<i>Risk</i>		.085	1.161	.247	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.065
<b>Model 2 (n=208)</b>						
<i>Procedural fairness</i>		.063	1.440	.151	<i>F</i>	2.564
<i>Trust</i>		.093	1.808	.072	<i>Sig.</i>	.015*
<i>Risk</i>		.089	1.170	.243	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.082
<i>Data collection site:</i>						
	<i>Midwest state</i>	-.168	-.823	.411		
	<i>Southern state</i>	.192	1.085	.279		
	<i>East Coast state</i>	.216	.916	.361		
	<i>Great Lakes state</i>	.401	.782	.435		
<b>Model 3 (n=197)</b>						
<i>Procedural fairness</i>		.041	.929	.354	<i>F</i>	1.936
<i>Trust</i>		.149	2.825	.005**	<i>Sig.</i>	.029*
<i>Risk</i>		.086	1.044	.298	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.121
<i>Experience:</i>						
	<i>Work with the courts</i>	-.302	-1.572	.118		
	<i>Community leadership</i>	.147	.902	.368		
	<i>Served on a jury</i>	-.164	-1.038	.301		
	<i>Defendant in civil or criminal case</i>	-.109	-.573	.567		
	<i>Witness</i>	-.052	-.305	.761		
	<i>Plaintiff (brought case to court)</i>	.033	.158	.874		
	<i>Juvenile justice or child welfare case</i>	-.078	-.469	.639		
	<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>	-.100	-.449	.654		
	<i>Engaged as member of the public</i>	.323	1.896	.060		
	<i>Other</i>	-.197	-.821	.412		
<b>Model 4 (n=198)</b>						
<i>Procedural fairness</i>		.070	1.569	.118	<i>F</i>	2.781
<i>Trust</i>		.104	1.928	.055	<i>Sig.</i>	.002**
<i>Risk</i>		.091	1.195	.234	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.153
<i>Demographics:</i>						
	<i>Age</i>	.004	.773	.440		
	<i>American Indian or Alaska Native</i>	-.050	-.282	.778		
	<i>Asian</i>	.361	.712	.477		
	<i>Black or African American</i>	.068	.335	.738		
	<i>Spanish, Hispanic, Latina/o/x, Puerto Rican</i>	.335	1.713	.088		
	<i>Race, other</i>	-.900	-2.016	.045*		

Table B.1 (cont'd)

	B	t	p		
<i>Ideology (liberal is high)</i>	-.017	-.215	.830		
<i>Education level</i>	-.123	-3.096	.002**		
<i>Gender</i>	.054	.356	.722		
<b>Model 5 (n=187)</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>p</b>		
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.055	1.121	.264	<i>F</i>	2.242
<i>Trust</i>	.121	2.122	.035*	<i>Sig.</i>	.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.108	1.244	.215	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.267
<i>Demographics:</i>					
<i>Age</i>	.007	1.268	.207		
<i>American Indian or Alaska Native</i>	.042	.157	.875		
<i>Asian</i>	.598	1.131	.260		
<i>Black or African American</i>	.023	.090	.928		
<i>Spanish, Hispanic, Latina/o/x, Puerto Rican</i>	.455	1.957	.052		
<i>Race, other</i>	-1.342	-2.802	.006**		
<i>Ideology (liberal is high)</i>	-.063	-.744	.458		
<i>Education level</i>	-.157	-3.600	<.001**		
<i>Gender</i>	.106	.644	.520		
<i>Experience:</i>					
<i>Work with the courts</i>	-.261	-1.341	.182		
<i>Community leadership</i>	.336	1.948	.053		
<i>Served on a jury</i>	-.055	-.337	.737		
<i>Defendant in civil or criminal case</i>	-.045	-.232	.816		
<i>Witness</i>	.066	.385	.701		
<i>Plaintiff (brought case to court)</i>	.043	.206	.837		
<i>Juvenile justice or child welfare case</i>	-.012	-.071	.944		
<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>	-.247	-1.087	.278		
<i>Engaged as a member of the public</i>	.308	1.784	.076		
<i>Other</i>	-.389	-1.619	.108		
<i>Data collection site:</i>					
<i>Midwest state</i>	-.131	-.388	.698		
<i>Southern state</i>	.068	.216	.829		
<i>East Coast state</i>	.444	1.305	.194		
<i>Great Lakes state</i>	.743	1.071	.286		

\*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$

Table B.2. OLS coefficients for imputed data sets with single-item measures: Model 5.

OLS Model 5 (n=187)	B	t	p	Overall	
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.055	1.121	.264	<i>F</i>	2.242
<i>Trust</i>	.121	2.122	.035*	<i>Sig.</i>	.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.108	1.244	.215	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.267
Imputation 1—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	-.031	-.925	.356	<i>F</i>	5.871
<i>Trust</i>	.131	3.298	.001**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	-.066	-1.144	.253	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.280
Imputation 2—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.041	1.209	.227	<i>F</i>	5.958
<i>Trust</i>	.165	4.059	<.001**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.100	1.833	.068	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.283
Imputation 3—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.060	1.770	.078	<i>F</i>	5.628
<i>Trust</i>	.102	2.591	.010**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.110	1.956	.051	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.272
Imputation 4—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.035	1.035	.301	<i>F</i>	4.942
<i>Trust</i>	.105	2.660	.008**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.117	2.164	.031*	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.247
Imputation 5—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.034	1.022	.307	<i>F</i>	6.266
<i>Trust</i>	.074	1.918	.056	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.035	.659	.510	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.294
Imputation 6—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.025	.770	.442	<i>F</i>	4.965
<i>Trust</i>	.131	3.375	<.001**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.038	.727	.468	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.248
Imputation 7—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.098	2.755	.006**	<i>F</i>	4.605
<i>Trust</i>	.068	1.648	.100	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.134	2.353	.019*	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.234
Imputation 8—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.023	.687	.493	<i>F</i>	4.303
<i>Trust</i>	.081	1.999	.046*	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.015	.266	.790	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.222
Imputation 9—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.039	1.172	.242	<i>F</i>	6.676
<i>Trust</i>	.126	3.349	<.001**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.055	1.027	.305	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.307

Table B.2 (cont'd)

Imputation 10—Model 5					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.052	1.537	.125	<i>F</i>	6.221
<i>Trust</i>	.110	2.792	.005**	<i>Sig.</i>	<.001**
<i>Risk</i>	.030	.556	.579	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.292
Pooled model (n=419)					
<i>Procedural fairness</i>	.038	.785	.438		
<i>Trust</i>	.109	2.164	.034*		
<i>Risk</i>	.057	.680	.502		
<i>Demographics:</i>					
<i>Age</i>	.009	2.403	.017*		
<i>American Indian or Alaska Native</i>	.043	.180	.858		
<i>Asian</i>	.452	.901	.369		
<i>Black or African American</i>	.183	.918	.363		
<i>Spanish, Hispanic, Latina/o/x, Puerto Rican</i>	.245	1.256	.215		
<i>Race, other</i>	-1.230	-2.464	.018*		
<i>Ideology (liberal is high)</i>	-.137	-2.265	.025*		
<i>Education level</i>	-.110	-3.572	<.001**		
<i>Gender</i>	.101	.732	.469		
<i>Experience:</i>					
<i>Work with the courts</i>	-.211	-1.093	.282		
<i>Community leadership</i>	.180	1.365	.177		
<i>Served on a jury</i>	-.052	-.333	.741		
<i>Defendant in civil or criminal case</i>	.078	.446	.657		
<i>Witness</i>	-.007	-.040	.969		
<i>Plaintiff (brought case to court)</i>	.096	.469	.643		
<i>Juvenile justice or child welfare case</i>	.142	1.087	.278		
<i>Probationer (on probation)</i>	-.288	-1.335	.187		
<i>Engaged as a member of the public</i>	.310	2.389	.019*		
<i>Other</i>	-.351	-1.521	.136		
<i>Data collection site:</i>					
<i>Midwest state</i>	-.303	-1.053	.299		
<i>Southern state</i>	.208	.793	.429		
<i>East Coast state</i>	.614	2.067	.046*		
<i>Great Lakes state</i>	.495	.815	.421		

\*\**p* < .01; \**p* < .05