VIOLENT COMMUNAL CONFLICT IN BURKINA FASO: A MULTI-LEVEL EXAMINATION

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Political Science

2010

ABSTRACT

VIOLENT COMMUNAL CONFLICT IN BURKINA FASO: A MULTI-LEVEL EXAMINATION

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This project examines violent communal conflict in rural zones in Burkina Faso, a country otherwise known for its relatively low levels of group violence. The study commences with a systematic cross-case analysis at the village level with the goal of shedding light on the factors that explain variation in levels of violent conflict. The second stage of the study proposes a micro-level examination of the factors that contribute to an individual's approval of and participation in violence. The study is executed by means of a mixed methods approach which combines focus group discussions, ethnographic interviews with individuals and a survey of a randomly sampled representative population in areas that have experienced variation in levels of violent conflict. The micro-level investigation tests whether variation in self-ascribed individual identity, traditional and modern institutional capacity, interpersonal trust and levels of social capital in the form of associational life The study finds that when local institutions responsible for land management are weak or lack capacity the chances for violent conflict between producer groups is enhanced. I extend the analysis through an examination of public opinion data collected in Liberia and query whether or not local institutions also play a role in individual participation in violence.

Dedicated to
Robert Kirwin

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my dissertation committee of Michael Bratton, Brian Silver, Ravi Bhavnani, and Walter Hawthorne. These individuals greatly improved the dissertation. Michael Bratton, in particular, provided advice, suggestions, support, and patience that was invaluable to the completion of this dissertation. His professionalism and rigor serve as a model. I would like to thank the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University for providing a great environment in which to obtain an outstanding graduate education. Several fellow graduate students were helpful for their advice and friendship, particularly Wonbin Cho, JP Peltier Nicholas Kerr, David Dreyer, Paul Nikiema and Eric Little. In terms of my Burkinabè colleagues, I thank Augustin Loada, Abdul Karim Sango, Adama Tiendrebeogo and Saidou Ouedraogo. I thank my wife, Martine, for her strong support and my boys, Patrick and Liam, for being my boys.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

"Now Abel was a keeper of sheep, and Cain a tiller of the ground."
The Book of Genesis

"The farmer and the cowman should be friends.
Oh, the farmer and the cowman should be friends.
One man likes to push a plough, the other likes to chase a cow,
But that's no reason why they can't be friends."
Lyrics from Oklahoma! by Rogers and Hammerstein

Introduction

Conflict between farmers and herders continues to be a frequent event in West Africa and there have been many recent cases in which these conflicts have degenerated into intense communal violence. As one example, in December of 2009 over fifty people were killed in a conflict between farmers and herders in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria (BBC, 2009). In some cases, the number of victims is quite staggering; for example in 1991, more than 100 people were killed in a dispute over grazing rights at Toda, in south central Niger (Ngaido 1994). Even in events that did not have a high number of deaths, the extent of human suffering is significant. This is evidenced by a conflict which occurred in the Manga region of Burkina Faso in 2007. In this case, six people were killed and thousands of people were forced to flee their homes to escape the violence (Le Pays 2007). In total 174 family compounds were burned to the ground. This resulted in the displacement of 522 families.[1] In many instances where violence does not occur tensions run high between the two groups and distrust abounds. The case of Ghana serves as one example where Fulani herders have been accused and arrested for rape, vandalism,

1 In Burkina Faso, and in general in most parts of Africa, more than one family unit lives in a compound. This explains the difference between the number of family compounds destroyed and the number of families displaced.

destruction of farms and armed robbery (IRIN 2010).

Explanations abound for why conflict between farmers and herders sometimes acquires deadly characteristics. Undoubtedly environmental factors like greater resource scarcity have played a role (Diamond 2005, Homer Dixon 1999, Baechler 1998). As population has increased and arable and pastoral lands have decreased a zero-sum game has emerged that pits farmers against herders in a battle over scarce resources. When farmers move into pastoral land to cultivate, it is in turn a loss for herders. By the same token, in instances in which herders move their animals into farmland, farmers have lower yields due to crop damage. Other observers have emphasized the role that ethnic antagonism plays in fueling violent conflicts that usually fall along lines demarcated by ethnic identity (Hagberg 1998). In most cases, herders of Fulani extraction are in conflict with farmers of any number of ethnic identities. Another set of scholars argue that rent-seeking local officials benefit from disputes and thus perpetuate conflicts between groups (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009). Finally, other scholars have blamed the colonization of the continent for altering traditional relationships between the two producer groups and thus forging a more adversarial relationship between them (Davidheiser and Luna 2008).

Conflict between farmers and herders in Burkina Faso is a frequent event yet not all conflicts become violent. This study seeks to identify the mechanism or mechanisms which explain why some conflicts become violent and others are mitigated. So far, scholars of violent communal conflict have devoted almost no attention to the role that local institutions play in outbreaks of violence. The present study uses an institutional approach to explain variation in communal violence between farmers and herders and argues that violent conflict occurs when the institutions responsible for land management

are weak or lack capacity. It focuses on farmer/ herder conflict in Burkina Faso, a state otherwise known for its comparatively low levels of violent communal conflict. This chapter presents an introductory discussion of the ethnic and economic context within which communal violence in Burkina Faso occurs or, in most cases, is avoided. Next, it explicitly states the research question that the study is examining and also defines the terms central to the study. Finally, it concludes with a chapter-by-chapter overview of the organization of this dissertation.

Communal Violence in Burkina Faso

Most cases of communal violence in Burkina Faso are initially rooted in struggles over limited natural resources, particularly land. All rural areas in Burkina Faso have land-use disputes to some degree, yet not all have violent outcomes. Breusers et al (1998) argue that disputes of this genre are an almost daily occurrence in village affairs. Such instances of communal violence have frequently occurred between agriculturalists and pastoralists (Faure 1992, Ouedraogo 1997, Bassett 1998, Breusers et al 1998; Hagberg 1998, Baker 2000). Herder/farmer conflicts are endemic to rural areas throughout West Africa and countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Benin experience periodic moments of conflict (Bassett 1988, de Haan et al 1990, Hussein et al 1999, Tonah 2002). This genre of conflict is also found in other parts of Africa and the countries of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia are some examples (Markakis 2003).

Through my fieldwork in Burkina Faso, I found that even among villages that have never experienced violent conflict, most farmers admitted that at one time or

another they did come into conflict with herders when their animals damaged the farmer's crops. The reverse is also true, and herders also reported that land use conflicts with farmers are frequent events, i.e. when access to grazing land is blocked by sedentary agriculture. A common refrain of farmers is that conflict between the two groups, "is never lacking." Figure 1-1, found below, illustrates the frequency with which villagers claim to have witnessed conflict rooted in land issues. These results, which were drawn from a survey I conducted of 400 randomly sampled respondents in four different provinces show that over a third of respondents (34%) claim that they have witnessed conflict between groups that are based on land issues. Moreover, nearly five percent of all respondents report that such conflicts are very frequent.

The research of Brockhaus et al (2005) also points to the frequency of conflicts between farmers and herders. They surveyed 124 households in Southwestern Burkina Faso (Provinces of Poni and Batie, respectively) and they found that in 111 of the households, or nearly 90 percent of all households surveyed, conflicts between farmers and herders were reported. Undoubtedly the majority of these conflicts did not become violent but were resolved peacefully.

Figure 1-1 Percentage of respondents who have witnessed land based conflicts*



N=399- **Have you ever witnessed conflicts based on land use? 0 = No; 1 = Only a couple of times, Often, All the time.* For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other figures, the reader is referred to the electronic version of this dissertation

In Figure 1-2 we can see that only 6 percent of respondents claim to have been physically intimidated by another group. Although conflicts based on land are frequent as noted in Figure 1-1, not all conflicts lead to a physical confrontation.

Figure 1-2: Percentage of respondents who have been physically threatened by another group*



*n=392*Have you ever been physically threatened by another group?0 = No; 1 = Only a couple of times, Often, All the time.*

Figure 1-3 provides the percentage of respondents who have admitted to

participating in violent actions. This figure shows that the rates of participation in violence are relatively low, with only 10 percent of respondents admitting to have participated. If every land conflict degenerated into violence the proportion of people who participate in violence would be much higher.

Figure 1-3: Percentage of respondents who have participated in violence *



*n=399 *Have you in the past 12 months one time participated in a violent conflict or physically menaced another group? 0 = No; 1 = Only a couple of times, Often, All the time.*

It is important to note that not all land-based conflicts are between farmers and herders. Other forms of land based conflict can occur between farmers or between villages. During fieldwork, I found one village near Banfora where villagers recounted how they had been involved in a violent conflict with a neighboring town. The conflict was based on a disagreement pertaining to which village had the rightful claim to a set of farm fields. Other examples of potential land-based conflict occur when the government seizes land for a public works project, such as a dam or housing developments, and villagers oppose the initiative. In the 1970s the Burkinabé state seized large tracts of land as part of the Volta River Valley Authority project and resettled farmers on the fertile land

(McMillan 1983). This has created disputes between people claiming to be the original inhabitants and the more recent arrivals. Chapter 4 discusses cases such as these in greater detail.

Zongo (2009) argues that land conflicts in Burkina Faso can be placed into one of four categories; 1) herder vs. farmer, 2) intra-familial, 3) autochthones vs. immigrants and 4) finally herders vs. herders. Intra-familial disputes are frequently between generations (Gray 2002). As one example younger generations are calling into question the validity of land loans made by older generations to immigrant populations in order to reclaim land for their own agricultural pursuits. This in turn creates inter-generational disputes as well as conflicts between autochthones and immigrant populations which is Zongo's second category. Herder vs. herder disputes typically involve arguments over pasture use as well as access to water points. It is important to point out however that the categories are not hard and fast. For example a conflict between farmers and herders (1) is frequently couched in the terms related to the third category- autochthones vs. immigrant (3). Farmers are typically autochthones and the herders are regarded as immigrants. Many conflicts occur between sedentary farmers and transhumant herders. Transhumance herders have a nomadic approach to animal husbandry whereby they do not remain in any one area for an extended period of time. Transhumant herders move along with their herds in search for the best pasture. This is in contrast to some herders who are more sedentary, or those that practice both agriculture and animal husbandry. As such they tend to have less developed bonds with sedentary populations. Mathieu et al (2003) describe a new form of land disputes in Burkina Faso that has emerged between indigenous farmers and new actors who have taken a serious interest in acquiring land,

specifically government functionaries, politicians and entrepreneurs. These forms of land-based conflict are not only found in Burkina Faso but are also frequent events in other West African countries such as Mali (Beeler 2006).

However, most land based conflicts in Burkina, particularly of the violent variety, are rooted in issues between farmers and herders (Zongo 2009). Since actual violent conflicts are relatively infrequent, it is clear that not all farmer-herder conflicts lead to violence. So conflict is ubiquitous but, violent conflict is not. If this is the case what explains why some conflicts become violent while others do not? What are the mechanisms by which violent conflict is occasionally triggered, or more commonly, averted?

Mitigation of Land Based Conflicts

In Burkina-Faso, negotiations to resolve conflict, and prevent violence, between farmers and herders may consist of a number of steps. The most common first step is informal discussion and negotiation between the two parties involved in the initial dispute. In Burkina, this approach is referred to as resolution *a l'amiable*. This is loosely translated as a "friendly" resolution and either one side agrees to pay for damages or conversely the party that has incurred the transgression pardons the guilty party. This is typically the most efficient way to settle the dispute, since involving other parties usually results in higher costs to both parties.

The next step typically involves notifying the village chief or *chef de terres* of the dispute. It is very important to note that traditional leaders who make these judgments are, first, most typically farmers themselves, and two, members of the same ethnic group

as the farmer who lodged the complaint. The village chief typically assesses the monetary value of the damage and issues a fine for the herder to pay. The herder is given a time frame in terms of when the payment must be made.

If this does not resolve the conflict the following step is to meet with CVDs (*Committee Villagois de Development* or Village Committee for Development). The members of the CVD are responsible for the management of natural resources in the village since one of the objectives of the CVD system is to engage the community in a participatory form of development whereby villagers are deeply involved in the management of their proper resources. These committees typically have eight to twelve members, which includes a president and vice president.[2]

CVDs may resolve the conflict or they may decide to refer it to other members of the local government, which could be people from the local mayor's office or government functionaries who work for animal husbandry or agricultural extension offices. Technical services such as those from the local agricultural extension office require that the farmer pay a fee for the evaluation and pay for the fuel needed for transportation. This evaluation is referred to as the "*constat*." Many farmers complain that since they are the victim they should not be required to pay for the expert evaluation.[3] In some rare cases, the problem can make it all the way to a court of law, though most cases are resolved before they reach this point.

As evidenced in this discussion there are several ways in which disputants may attempt to resolve a farmer-herder conflict. This fact leads to "forum shopping" whereby

[2] A more detailed description of the CVD system is included in Chapter 3: Land Tenure in Burkina Faso.
[3] Interviews with farmers in Nahouri and Poni Provinces.

interested parties may seek to have the judgment rendered in an environment that they deem to be most inclined to offer them a favorable decision. For farmers this may mean a decision reached by his peers. For the herder, he may seek political authorities that are less likely to share the same ethnic or occupational identity as the farmer. There are many potential avenues, but this may point to potential for confusion and frustration rather than potential resolution and closure. It also points to the role that institutions, both traditional and modern, perform in land use dispute resolution and this revelation guides our analysis. Given the myriad possibilities for conflict resolution how does the process break down and give way to violent conflict?

Research Question: The Puzzle of Communal Violence

As evidenced in the preceding section, multiple forms and levels of land-based conflict and conflict resolution exist in Burkina. It has also been demonstrated that not all instances of conflict give rise to violent events. What accounts for the emergence of violent communal conflict in some areas while others remain free from violent conflict? Why does violent conflict occur in some places and not others, especially when recognized ingredients for violence are salient in both milieus? As previously noted most violent episodes in Burkina Faso can be traced to a dispute over natural resources, typically between agriculturalists and pastoralists. However conflict over scarce natural resources is a frequent event and not all conflict turns violent.

Basset in his examination of farmer-herder conflict in Cote d'Ivoire posed the same question (1988). He argues that crop damage does explain tension between the two groups but it cannot serve as the sole explanation for why Senufo famers kill Fulani

herders in Northern Cote d'Ivoire. Hagberg echoes Basset's sentiment and posits that crop damage leads to anger but does not explain outbreaks of violence (1998). My research seeks to move the discussion forward and identify why some conflicts turn violent.

Distinctions must be drawn between the different terms central to this study; namely conflict, violent conflict and communal conflict. There is much nuance within each term and clear definitions are necessary so as to avoid confusion. For the purposes of this study, conflict occurs when there is a disagreement between two parties, whether it is between groups or between individuals. Thus when a herder's animals destroy a field of crops or when a herder accuses a farmer of stealing animals the two groups come into conflict. Violent conflict emerges when violence or the threat of violence is used by one or both of the parties. Conflict is communal when the two producer groups are pitted against one another.

Yet this raises the question of how one should categorize a seemingly isolated incidence of violence between farmers and herders. For example, if a farmer strikes a herder in a field and the herder becomes intimidated and agrees to give the farmer some money would this be classified as communal conflict? I would argue "yes", if conflict between the two groups has become so deeply engrained in the culture of rural areas. Under these conditions the conflict has moved beyond individual transgressions and become part of a public discourse that divides the two producer groups.

Violent communal conflict occurs when two groups oppose one another violently and membership in one group is sufficient justification to be a target of the other group. By the same token the threat of death or other physical harm can also be considered

violence. If, for example, a group of farmers threatens a group of Fulani herders with death or other bodily harm I would consider this a form of violence. Episodes of sexual violence have also been documented and been used as weapon in conflicts between farmers and herders. Sexual assault also falls under the rubric of violent communal conflict.

This study considers the role that formal and informal institutions play in mitigating conflict. Mazzucato and Niemeijer (2002) refer to informal institutions as social norms; customary laws and codes of conduct; and their enforcement mechanisms, such as social networks that together guide people's behavior within a society. I agree with their assertion that social norms are informal institutions, but disagree with the inclusion of social networks as a component of informal institutions. I posit that social networks are more of a function of social capital and associational life. I opt for a more minimalist definition of informal institutions. While formal institutions are those based on written rules, such as regular political elections and judicial review, informal institutions, such as corruption, are grounded in norms and behaviors based on unwritten rules (Bratton 2007, Helmke and Levitsky 2006). Other concrete examples of informal institutions that are salient in Burkina Faso are customary law and patron-client relations. Formal institutions include, village councils affiliated with local political authorities, mayors, agricultural extension agencies and local representatives of national government institutions (*prefets* and governors).

Benjaminsen and Ba (2009) also look at farmer-herder conflicts and call for a deeper examination of the actors (farmers, herders, traditional leaders and local authorities) that are central to conflicts of this genre. This study heeds that suggestion and

pays close attention to both the individual actors (farmers and herders) and the institutional actors (both modern and customary) involved in conflict mitigation.

Presentation of Dissertation Organization

The remaining chapters of the dissertation are organized as follows:

Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to the state and politics of Burkina Faso, in general. It examines the dynamics that may explain Burkina Faso's relatively low levels of violent communal conflict, when compared with other nations with which it shares other important similarities. It reviews the most important of the explanations that have been forwarded to account for this phenomenon.

Chapter 3 reviews the dynamics of herder/farmer relations during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. This chapter demonstrates how relations between the two groups have undergone transformations. It pays particular attention to the Fulani, an ethnic group that is most commonly associated with the herder occupational identity. The chapter also discusses the roots of the rivalry that now exists between the two groups.

Chapter 4 presents an overview of land tenure in Burkina Faso. More than eighty percent of Burkinabé rely on land for their livelihood and land tenure systems play an important role in resource based conflicts. It also provides an overview of the institutions, both formal and informal, that play a role in how land is used and managed. The chapter also includes a discussion of the contentious terms "traditional" and "modern." Finally, it looks at how land tenure systems have changed over the years. It provides a detailed examination of *chef de terres*, *Gestion de terroires* and the Volta River Valley Authority

(AVV).

Chapter 5 offers a discussion of relevant literature and presents the leading hypotheses that explains why violent communal occurs. The bodies of literature that are discussed are: common pool resources, property rights and violent communal conflict, both in general terms and with a specific focus on the African context. The chapter points out lacunae in the literature and how this study makes a contribution to the various fields. Since little of the land in rural areas is deeded, a discussion of common pool resources is warranted. By the same token, property rights are central to the discussion of who has access to land. Numerous studies have examined the factors that give rise to violent communal conflict and this section examines which factors may best explain variation in violent communal conflict in Burkina Faso. The discussion of violent conflict in Africa considers the relationship between violence and factors such as land tenure, ethnicity, and natural resource scarcity. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the three principal hypotheses, described in the literature, which could possibly explain variation in violent conflict in rural areas in Burkina Faso. The leading hypothesis, from this author's perspective, is that local institutions that lack capacity play a significant role in enhancing the potential for violent conflict. A second hypothesis to be tested is that a deep seated feeling of animosity towards other ethnic groups fuels an individual's involvement in violent conflict. Finally the study considers the role that social capital, in the form of associational life and interpersonal trust, play in affecting an individual's participation in violence.

Chapter 6 details research design and methodology. The study uses a multi-method and multi-level approach to the research question. The first stage assembles event

histories of the violent incidences that occurred in two villages. The second stage utilizes a comparative case study approach by comparing six villages that have experienced variation in violent land-based conflict. The results of the first and second stages contribute to the construction of a questionnaire to be used in the third stage. The third stage consists of a survey of a random sample of respondents in four provinces. The study endeavors to see if the results of the first and second stages are confirmed in the second stage.

The first two stages of the research design are executed in Chapter 7. The chapter provides detailed chronologies of the events that led up to the violence that occurred in the villages of Perkoura and Sideradougou. It also compares three villages (AVV3, Perkoura and Kampala) that experienced violent conflict between farmers and herders and three villages that have not (Loropeni, Bilbalgo and Tiakane). In cases where there was a violent outburst, the institutions responsible for land use management were weak or non-existent. But in the cases where violence was averted, the institutions in charge of land management had a greater presence and higher institutional capacity.

Chapter 8 uses logit regression models to test the hypotheses and presents a discussion of the empirical results. My field research demonstrates that when traditional and modern institutions have greater capacity individuals are less likely to act violently. The results of field work demonstrate no support for the argument that social capital reduces the propensity of an individual to resort to violence. Moreover, higher levels of associational life do not make individuals less likely to participate in group violence.

Chapter 9 queries the degree to which the results from Burkina Faso can be extended. This is executed through the use of Afrobarometer data that looks at the factors

that increase an individual's likelihood to take part in violence in the state of Liberia. The Afrobarometer survey conducted in Liberia in 2008 contains a battery of questions that examine many of the same issues examined in this study, such as local institutions , participation in violence and land use issues. The chapter presents the empirical results of a model that tests indicators similar to those used in the examination of Burkina Faso. I found that the results of the Liberia investigation echo the results of the Burkina study and demonstrates that certain characteristics of local institutions have an effect on the chances that an individual will participate in violence.

Chapter 10 serves as the concluding chapter. It discusses the central findings and offers an interpretation of the results. It also compares the empirical results of the cases of Liberia and Burkina to determine if the results exhibit any portability in terms of theory. The chapter also forwards a discussion of potential avenues of research that may be pursued in order to shed more light on violent communal conflict. The chapter concludes with several policy prescriptions that may be applied to decrease the levels of violent land-based conflict.

CHAPTER 2: THE CASE OF BURKINA FASO

Introduction

This section offers a review of the politics, salience of ethnic identities and communal violence in Burkina Faso in order to provide context and background. Although the study focuses on violent conflict between producer groups the goal of this chapter is to look at the political, historical and institutional context of Burkina Faso. Before moving to a more specific examination of actual incidents of violent conflict and related factors, the goal of this chapter is to consider the case of Burkina Faso at the macro-level. It offers an examination of Burkina Faso in terms of how it is situated regarding ethnic diversity, fractionalization and polarization. It concludes with a discussion of why for many Burkina Faso is something of an anomaly in terms of political violence in West Africa.

The State

Burkina Faso is one of the world's poorest countries and has suffered six coup d'états since it gained independence from France in 1960. The territory that currently constitutes Burkina Faso underwent a number of administrative changes during the colonial era that affected its borders. In 1897 the Niger-Volta region was created and was part of the French Sudan (a colony in French West Africa). Two years later the French Sudan was considered too large to be properly governed and it was divided into sections. The northern part was made the first military territory and the south was the second military territory with Bobo Dioulasso as the capital. Up until 1907, the region of Fada N'Gourma was part of the colony of Dahomey (present day Benin). In 1904 the territory of Burkina Faso was enveloped by the colony of Upper Senegal and Niger. In 1909 the

region of Dori which had been part of the military territory of Niger was reattached to the original territory. In 1919, there was additional administrative re-shuffling which created Upper Volta with Ouagadougou as the new capital. In 1932 Upper Volta was divided and distributed among the colonies of Cote d'Ivoire, Niger and French Sudan. The colony of Upper Volta was not reestablished until 1947.

As in other African countries, the push for independence started in earnest with the conclusion of World War II. The main leaders of the struggle for independence were Ouezzin Coulibaly, a Dioula from the Bobo-Dioulasso region, and Maurice Yameogo, a Gourounsi from Koudougou. In 1958, Upper Volta became a self governing colony within French West Africa and on August 5, 1960 Upper Volta achieved full independence from France.

The death of Coulibaly in 1958 paved the way for Yameogo to become the country's first president. Yameogo was overthrown in coup d'etat in 1966 which was led by Sangoulé Lamizana. For most of the time following the overthrow of Yameogo, Burkina Faso endured military regimes that brought little in the way of economic and political development and he country was known for very little other than the export of labor to coastal countries, like Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. In 1983 Captain Thomas Sankara led a coup d'etat and pledged to bring revolutionary change to Burkina Faso.

Under the Sankara regime Burkina Faso went through a number of changes. A greater emphasis was placed on self-sufficiency and less dependence on foreign aid. Sankara also sought to weaken traditional leaders in an attempt to reform their feudalistic style of rule. Although Sankara was a charismatic leader and brought some positive changes to Burkina, such as higher levels of female enrollment in schools and

comprehensive vaccination programs, by 1987 the regime became increasingly unpopular with the upper and middle classes. In 1987 Sankara was killed in a coup d'etat led by Blaise Compaoré who has remained in power until now. Burkina Faso can now be described as an electoral authoritarian regime for the way it controls elections and related institutions (Schedler 2006, Levitsky and Way 2002). Despite frequent military interference in civilian affairs, throughout Burkina Faso's history there have been relatively few instances of serious civil violence and this makes the country an exception in West Africa and certainly in the region of the Sahel as well.

The political environment in Burkina Faso has liberalized in recent years as evidenced by the existence of over 100 political parties. Despite pluralization of the political landscape, Burkina Faso has not witnessed a rise in civil violence along ethnic or religious lines. According to Varshney (2002, 25), "Ethnic conflicts are a regular feature of ethnically plural democracies, for if different ethnic groups exist and the freedom to organize is available, there are likely to be conflicts over resources, identity, patronage, and politics." Although an electoral authoritarian regime, Burkina Faso does nonetheless, in minimalist terms, meet the requirement of elections and does allow political parties the freedom to organize which makes it counterintuitive, at least in the eyes of Varshney, that civil violence has not existed on some level.

When compared with other countries in the sub-region Burkina has low levels of reported communal conflict. Senegal has long suffered from the Casamance rebellion, an armed insurgency in Niger Delta region of Nigeria is a persistent problem, both Mali and Niger have endured Taureg rebellions, northern parts of Ghana witnessed intense ethnic violence in the mid 1990s and Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone have experienced

civil wars. In Burkina Faso, the main cases of violent conflict are typically isolated to rural areas and occur between farmers and herders. If one believes that ethnic plurality and religious division are likely ingredients for communal conflict, then Burkina Faso, like many other West African countries, should be highly susceptible. The population consists of seven major ethnic groups (sixty groups when the major groups are disaggregated), more than ten linguistic groups, and three major religions (Christian, Muslim, and traditional), which offer the potential for conflict. Despite these divisions, Burkina Faso has avoided significant ethnic or religious conflicts. In addition to great ethnic diversity, Burkina Faso has intense poverty, and a primary resource-based economy, two factors frequently cited as drivers of violent conflict.

Perceptions of Political Violence

Generally speaking Burkinabè are opposed to political violence. According to the *FasoBarometre*, over seventy percent of Burkinabè state that they agree that violence is never justifiable in the politics of Burkina Faso.[4] Only eighteen percent agree that political violence is justifiable, with the remaining individuals undecided on the matter. These results do not place Burkina Faso as the least disposed to violent conflict yet they certainly do reflect the general perception that Burkina Faso has low levels of civil conflict.[5]

[4] The FasoBarometre is a public opinion survey that was administered by the Center for Democratic Governance in 2006. The questions and sampling approach closely mirror the approach used by the more comprehensive Afrobarometer.

[5] The source for the data for the other African countries is the 3rd round of the Afrobarometer survey.

Figure 2-1: Percentage of respondents who support the use of violence



Which of the following statements is closest to your view. Choose Statement A or Statement B.
A: The use of violence is never justified in [This country's] politics today.
B: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.

This survey item was measured on a four-point scale and indicates increased willingness to use violence for political ends. The potential responses are: agree very strongly with A, agree with A, agree with B, agree very strongly with B.

Fractionalization, Polarization and other Forms of Ethnic Divisions

Where does Burkina Faso stand in terms of how its ethnic fractionalization predicts violence? The ethnic composition of Burkina Faso is as follows (in percentages): Mossi 45, Fulani 12, Bobo 7, Senufo 7, Lobi 7, Mande 7, Gourounsi 5, Bisa 5, Gourmantche 4 (Englebert 1996). There have been several measures created to test for the effect of ethnic diversity on issues such as violent conflict and economic growth (Fearon 2003, Alesina et al 2003, Posner 2004, Cederman and Girardin 2007). Figure 2-2 presents the various measures used to measure ethnic fractionalization. The ELF, Fearon, and Alesina et al scores for Burkina Faso are very similar. PREG and N* are very similar

due to the fact that the Mossi are the dominant ethnic group in terms of politics and their percentage of the population. The N* score would change dramatically if the president came from one of the ethnic minorities. Observers who believe that a high ELF score would increase the likelihood of communal violence would regard Burkina Faso as highly susceptible. By the same token observers who view the PREG and N* as good predictors of communal violence would view Burkina as being at very low risk.

Table 2-1: Burkina Faso and measures of ethnic diversity and polarization

ELF	PREG	Alesina et al	Fearon	N*	Polarization
.68	0.0	.72	.70	.02 (based on the Mossi group in power with Englebert's figures)	.00

According to the polarization literature, Burkina Faso could be susceptible to conflict based on horizontal inequalities that are reinforced by ethnic and regional identities. Ostby (2008) looks at ethnic polarization and how horizontal inequalities reinforce the polarization. Bobo Dioulasso for example is the second city of Burkina Faso and typically considered the economic hub of the state, yet in recent years the city has suffered high rates of unemployment and economic stagnation. In fact a political party was created by the politician Christian Kone that promoted as its party platform an agenda that sought to redress the monopolization of political and economic power by "the people of the plateau," a term used to refer to the Mossi ethnic group. State capitals in Africa frequently monopolize state resources and the fact that the capital of Ouagadougou and its surrounding environs are the Mossi homeland give this dynamic an ethnic dimension. A second example is the city of Koudougou, primarily Gourounsi, which has suffered economic problems. Koudougou, the city of Burkina's first president Maurice Yameogo, enjoyed economic success during his rule but its economic situation has

stagnated in recent years. It was also the home of Burkina's only textile factory which employed a number of local Gourounsi, but has long since closed. Despite the apparent existence of horizontal inequalities that occur along ethnic and regional lines, Burkina Faso has not experienced violent conflict along these lines.

Explanations for Burkina's Relatively Low Levels of Communal Violence

There have been many explanations forwarded to account for the relative peace that exists in Burkina Faso despite the existence of factors that pre-dispose it to higher levels of civil violence. The following section will present an overview of these various explanations. Some are anecdotal and were gleaned from secondary sources, while others emerged from interviews during a field visit to Burkina Faso in 2007.

One line of argument proposes that political leaders have acted in such as a way as to lessen ethnic and religious divisions. Political entrepreneurs have opted to not use the option of "playing the ethnic card." In some countries, political elites use identity division instrumentally for mobilizing political support (Varshney 2002; Posner 2005). My field work in Burkina Faso revealed that political elites have avoided this approach, and perhaps it has benefited ethnic and religious relations in the country. In my interviews with political elites I found that they claim to avoid this approach so as to gain broader non-sectarian support.

Indeed, the Burkinabè government has done an effective job of appointing high level officials that reflect the ethnic composition of the population. Through a review of 8,500 nominations that occurred between 1958 and 1987 Charles (2003) found that political appointments do not seem to favor one ethnicity over another. Although the analysis is only comprehensive through the Sankara regime and does not look at the

Compaoré era, it appears that Compaoré has kept the same approach.[6] Charles (2003) argues "Burkina is one of the rare cases, if not the only case, where a majority ethnic group has not monopolized the command of the central apparatuses and has not put itself in a position of complete domination." Political representation, whether real or perceived, is important. Birnir finds that a political system will be more stable, volatility between elections will be diminished, and ethnic groups will not use violence as a political tool when they have representation within offices of the state apparatus (Birnir 2007).

The appointment of the current Prime Minister Tertius Zongo in 2007 illustrates the fine line walked by the President of Burkina Faso walks in terms of appointing leaders who mirror the ethnic composition of the country. At the time of the appointment, both the President and President of the National Assembly were Mossi and the nomination of a Mossi as Prime Minister would symbolically represent a Mossi stranglehold on power. Zongo's last name is most commonly associated with the Mossi ethnic group and it engendered a public outcry because it seemingly resembled a Mossi power grab. Compaoré was obliged to issue a press release that demonstrated that although Zongo carries a Mossi name he is actually a Gourounsi from the Koudougou region. This clarification calmed fears that the Mossi were monopolizing the national government.

A second set of explanations considers the role of cultural practices. In particular, it is important to consider the role that *cousinage* plays in the relationships between

6 It would be advantageous to update this analysis through the examination official appointments since 1987. This could be achieved through archival work that examines lists of political appointments.

members of different ethnic groups.[7] *Cousinage* is "a system of make-believe families created across ethnic groups, a system maintained by friendly joking (Flagg 2005)." Sometimes termed imputed kinship, c*ousinage* has been examined by anthropologists but has been largely ignored by political scientists (Radcliffe-Brown, 1949). One recent exception is the study by Dunning and Harrison (2010) that looks at the role that the cross-cutting attributes of *cousinage* play in terms of ethnic politics. They find that cousinage engenders cross-cutting ties that deemphasize the link between ethnicity and political behavior. West Africa is known for this tradition, and it has been known to defuse potential ethnic-based violent conflicts (O'Bannon, forthcoming). The informal institution of *cousinage* may play a role in the mitigation of communal violence in Burkina Faso. For example, the *cousinage* relationship that exists between the *Mossi* and *Samo* ethnic groups precludes acts of violence between the two ethnic groups and this pattern is found in relationships between many of the over sixty ethnic groups that are found in Burkina Faso.

Along these same lines, it is important to examine whether informal institutions contribute to the level of social capital in Burkina Faso. *Cousinage* is a compelling reason yet it cannot explain all. One can imagine that there are situations in which *cousinage* is not able to de-escalate conflict. For instance, one may imagine that some conflicts, such as those based on competition over scarce natural resources, are not always mitigated by cousinage. Moreover migration patterns have radically altered the ethnic map of Burkina Faso, whereby groups that had little historic relations, such as the Lobi and the Mossi, now live side by side and compete for access to the same resources.

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7 Cousinage was an explanation that was brought up time and time again in interviews during a visit to Burkina Faso in 2007.

Third, cross-cutting cleavages may play a role in ameliorating conflict. Lijphart (1977) provides one of the most comprehensive discussions of the definition and consequences of the phenomenon. Cross-cutting cleavages occur when another identity issue, such as religion, further divides the identity of one group, such as those aggregated around ethnicity, or, in other cases, combines diverse groups. For example, the fact that many Yoruba from south-western Nigeria adhere to the Muslim faith has surely helped to cut across the emerging North-South religious divide in Nigeria. Burkina Faso has significant Muslim and Christian populations, and many of the ethnic groups contain significant diversity in terms of religion. Cross-cutting cleavages, such as these, lessen divisions instead of reinforcing cleavages, which accentuate these divisions. Birnir (2007) states that when economic cleavages cross-cut ethnic cleavages people who vote along ethnic lines may view that voting along economic cleavages is preferable to voting along ethnic cleavages. Burkinabè politicians have not distributed economic resources in such a way as to reinforce ethnicity as the single cleavage to the status of the single most important political cleavage.

Englebert, in his case study of Burkina Faso, outlines four reasons that explain the relative paucity of interethnic conflict (1996). First the majority ethnic group, the Mossi, is assimilationist in nature and it helps to blend ethnic distinctions. Savonnet-Guyot (1986) argued that expansionary nature of the Mossi has reduced the differences and unevenness of the modern state. Second, the state has historically distanced itself from ethnic authority and prevented one group from seizing hegemonic power. Third the lack of valuable natural resources, i.e. oil or diamonds, has reduced intense competition to gain control of them. Finally, Englebert posits that Burkina's ethnic groups have a non-

nationalistic outlook in that they define themselves at the household or village level and not at the national level in political terms. In other words, ethnicity is more salient at the micro-level than it is at the national level. The final point is especially interesting given the fact that violence almost exclusively occurs at the village level. Perhaps the salience of ethnic identity at the local level makes violence more likely in the locality.

Finally, a strong, cohesive national identity has also been used to explain Burkina Faso's lack of communal violence. One of the most effective methods to mitigate ethnic conflict is to create a national identity that supersedes sub-national identities. This belief was a central tenet of modernization theory (Lipset 1959, Deutsch 1961). However, other states such as Kenya also have populations that identify in national rather than ethnic terms, yet electoral and post election behavior in Kenya has recently been rife with violence (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008).

National identity is the identity of a nation and it can exist at the individual level or at the group level. I will discuss how it exists at the individual level. Research shows that individuals who adhere to a national identity rather than an ethnic identity are less likely to participate in political violence (Bhavnani and Backer 2007). By means of FasoBarometre data I can report that Burkinabè identify very strongly with a national rather than ethnic identity (Loada 2007). Respondents were asked whether they felt more strongly a member of their sub-national group (ethnicity) or a member of the national identity (Burkinabé), or if they felt equally a member of both groups.

Nearly fifty percent of Burkinabè identify themselves as only Burkinabè, eight percent identify themselves more with national identity than ethnic identity. In other words nearly sixty percent of Burkinabé views themselves first and foremost as

Burkinabé rather as members of a sub-national identity such as ethnicity. By the same token Kenyans view themselves in the same way that Burkinabé view themselves yet the post election violence that followed the 2007 election was significant. In light of this observation, perhaps cohesive national identity is not a sufficient factor in preventing violent group conflict.

The strong national identity present in Burkina Faso can be in part attributed to initiatives of the Sankara era (1983-1987). Sankara's approach to managing ethnic tension in a multi-ethnic society was to de-emphasize ethnic identity while promoting a cohesive national identity. Sankara did not politicize ethnic identities for political gain, but rather took several steps to establish a stronger national identity. Sankara removed ethnic identity from national identity cards (Kuba 2003). This helped eliminate discrimination along ethnic lines by police, gendarmes and bureaucrats. Moreover he effectively made appointments to government offices that mirrored the country's ethnic makeup in order to avoid the politicization of ethnic identity.

Many of the acts by Sankara to create a more cohesive national identity were largely symbolic. One of the first acts was to change the name of the country to Burkina Faso. The term, which translates as the "land of upright people," is derived from words from the country's two most popular languages, Dioula and More. It is facile to dismiss the effect of symbolic acts such as changing the name of the country to Burkina Faso, which can have a positive effect in fostering a new identity and contributing to nation-building. For many the previous name, Upper Volta and the term for its citizens, *Voltaique*, had negative connotations. This identity primarily defined one as a menial laborer throughout the sub-region. In the sub-region of West Africa *Voltaiques* were

commonly regarded as plantation laborers, especially in light of the long tradition of *Voltaiques* who worked on cocoa and palm plantations in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. To be called a *Voltaique* was to be humiliated and regarded as a beast of burden. The change in name produced a different identity and one that inspired more pride among Burkinabè.[8] The term Burkinabè was strategically constructed so that it avoids feminine and masculine forms (Kuba 2003). As opposed to Senegalais (masculine) and Senegalaise (feminine) there is merely Burkinabè.

Undoubtedly it is difficult to attribute a strong national identity solely to the works of Sankara, but it can be argued that the policies of his administration may have had an effect on the way people view themselves today. Additionally, although Compaoré has not made similar symbolic gestures, he has been able to strengthen nationalistic sentiments in other ways. His strong stand towards the war in Cote d'Ivoire has raised feelings of nationalism among Burkinabé. Yet in terms of explaining lack of civil violence, political scientists tend to shy away from using the role of elite leadership as an explanatory variable. To be sure there are factors that cannot be measured. As previously noted, Sankara initiated several nation building programs that have fostered a stronger sense of nationalism that supersedes sub-national identities such as ethnicity and religion. However, we cannot control for a Sankara effect, the same way that we cannot control for an arap Moi effect for the politicization of ethnic identities in Kenya.

The previous discussion focused on Burkina Faso as case that is something of an anomaly in terms of its low levels of large scale communal violence; certainly when compared with countries like Liberia, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. The following chapters

8 This sentiment was intimated frequently in interviews with Burkinabè during a field research during the summer of 2007.

will bring into greater focus the type of violent conflict that does occur in Burkina Faso. In order to set the scene for the study of the variety of violence that occurs in Burkina Faso, I will next discuss how relations between herders and farmers have changed over the years.

CHAPTER 3: RELATIONS BETWEEN FARMERS AND HERDERS IN WEST AFRICA: AN HISTORICAL REVIEW

Introduction

Farmers and herders have interacted over many centuries in West Africa and during this time the dynamics of their relationship have changed considerably. This chapter presents a general overview of current relations between the two groups and makes reference to cases which have occurred both within and outside of present day Burkina Faso. Farmers, both in Burkina and elsewhere in West Africa, lead a sedentary lifestyle reliant on the production of agricultural goods for subsistence and a cash income. Farmers may also be members of any one of a number of ethnic groups, which are prevalent in their nation state. This study, of conflicts in Burkina Faso, deals most frequently with farmers of Mossi, Lobi and Kassina backgrounds.

Herders, both in Burkina and elsewhere, rely on animal husbandry for their livelihood and typically, although not exclusively, lead a nomadic lifestyle. Traditionally, in the Savannah region of West Africa at least, herders are most frequently recognized as members of the Fulani ethnic group.[9] It must also be noted that both groups have recently diversified their activities; many farmers practice small scale animal husbandry and some herders now pursue agricultural endeavors.

Fulanis are one of the largest ethnic groups in West Africa and significant groups of Fulani can be found in all West African states.[10] It is for this reason that it is necessary to draw into clearer focus that which is meant by Fulani. According to Bruijn (2000), the Fulani identity is very porous. In most contexts, Fulani are almost always considered as

[9] Silimissa, Fla, Pulaar, Fulbe, Borroro, and Wodabe are other names used to identify Fulanis.

[10] I use Fulani since the term is most typically used in the English language.

immigrants, even if they have lived in an area for a great many years. In Burkina, non-Fulanis in rural areas typically divide Fulanis into two separate groups. One segment consists of "settled" or those who take care of local sedentary groups' cattle and occasionally make forays into farming. The second group is characterized as "foreigners" or Malians who are long distance herders (transhumant). This identification reflects the belief that these people are members of a population that is highly mobile.

In Burkina Faso, the Fulani occupy an important place in the broader national identity and they compose approximately 10% of the population and their main livelihood is an important part of the economy. When the former President Sankara eliminated the term Voltaique, the colonial era term for native persons in Burkina, and created the new term Burkinabè he did so with the consideration of the Fulani identity. The *bè* in the name is a reference to the way that the Fulani refer to themselves as Fulbe in their language of Fulfulde (Kuba 2003).

In the colloquial language of Burkinabé farmers, the terms "Fulani" and "herder" are used interchangeably. How closely linked, in the minds of survey respondents, are the occupational identity of herder and the ethnic identity of Fulani? Are they one and the same? When an individual, whether farmer or herder, refers to a person as a herder is he also referring to a Fulani? One way we can gain greater understanding of the degree to which the identities are linked is to examine the correlations between individual opinions regarding Fulanis and individual opinions regarding Fulanis with opinions regarding herders. If opinions are closely similar, then it may be reasonable to assume that the two terms are synonymous.

To address this problem, the survey in this study asked a battery of semantic

differential items to gain insight into how people view farmers, sedentary ethnic groups (Mossi, Lobi etc), herders and Fulanis.[11] The pattern of responses to these questions indicates that the identities are inextricably linked. Figure 3-1 reports the Pearson's correlation coefficient for responses that query individuals' views of Fulanis and herders. We do indeed see that there is a strong correlation between people's views of Fulanis and people's views of herders. The correlation between individuals who view Fulanis as "good" and also view herders as "good" is 0.5044. Moreover, there is a strong correlation between individuals who view Fulanis as peaceful and herders as "peaceful" (0.5082). Finally there is strong correlation (0.5310) between responses to the question of whether or not Fulanis and herders are "honest". On the basis of these findings, it appears reasonable to conclude that the terms "herder" and "Fulani" are used interchangeably in the survey population.

Table 3-1: Correlation between Fulani identity and Herder identity

	Fulani "good"	Fulani "peaceful"	Fulani "honest"
Herder "good"	0.5044		
Herder "peaceful"		0.5082	
Herder "honest"			0.5310

N=400

The figures presented in Figure 3-1 give us insight into how people (the majority of respondents being non-Fulani) conflate the Fulani with the occupation of herder.

How do Fulanis define their ethnicity? At what moment do Fulanis feel their ethnic identity to be strongest? Half of the Fulanis surveyed in this study define their ethnicity in occupational terms and describe themselves as behaving most like a typical

[11] The survey and its approach are discussed in great detail in Chapter 6.

Fulani when they are involved in activities related to caring for animals.[12] Some responses indicative of this attitude include, "I feel most like a Fulani:

> "When I hold my cattle herding stick and wear my scarf."
> "During the periods when my cattle sell for a lot of money."
> "When I am with my cattle."

Despite their occupational and ethnic differences, herders and farmers are inextricably linked in social, economic and political spheres. There are many reasons why herders and farmers are obliged to have such complex and multifaceted relationships. First, because both groups depend on the same natural resources for survival, especially land, but also water, and plant products, their relationship is in many ways unavoidably adversarial. Second, some cooperation is necessary because herders are dependent on farmers for grains and other foodstuffs. There are multiple other activities and interactions in which the two groups are interdependent and many of these interactions are salient and inescapable in ongoing contemporary relations between the groups, as is indicated in the description which follows.

First, manure generated by herders' animals is beneficial for the fields of farmers. Second, herders produce goods (milk, butter etc.) which are purchased by farmers (Howorth 1999). Third, herders are entrusted with cattle owned by farmers and take care of them for the farmers. Herders, in turn, are guaranteed a percentage of the offspring and the dairy products produced by the cattle which they oversee. For a farmer to entrust his cattle implies that there must be a certain level of trust between the two groups,

[12] The survey question used to query this subject is: "At what moment do you feel your ethnic identity the strongest?" Responses to the question are open-ended.

particularly when the contract is non-public. This arrangement is still in practice, yet despite the high degree of trust that this relationship requires, there are inevitable, recurring instances which create distrust between the two groups. For example, farmers oftentimes complain that herders lie by telling them that some of their animals have died when in reality they sold them at the market.

There are multiple reasons for why Fulanis are frequently entrusted with sedentary populations' cattle. First, it is advantageous to have a herdsman, a "specialist," rather than a "generalist," look after cattle. Farmers benefit from this relationship by having their cattle taken to areas with better grazing which enhances the health of the animals. Herder specialists, Fulanis, are able to move the animals to grazing areas without the fear of neglecting primary tasks such village farming. Second this arrangement allows the animals to be further from the village whereby they will be less likely to cause damage to farm fields. Third, a farmer's herd can be divided among several herders so as to hedge one's bet in terms of losses and theft. Finally, entrusting a herder with one's cattle keeps cattle ownership somewhat hidden from other members of one's family and community. This is important in two regards. First, in a culture where responsibilities for members of the extended family are hard to avoid, reducing the evidence of personal wealth can help an individual avoid repeated requests for aid from other family members. This strategy may also help individuals avoid taxes levied by government tax collectors on an individual's assets (Finnegan and Delgado 1981).

Pre-colonial Era

An examination of pre-colonial history leading up to the contemporary era reveals

that power relations between Fulanis and other ethnic groups have gone through tremendous transformations. In the pre-colonial era there were several Fulani empires that dominated various regions in the area now referred to as West Africa. The Sokoto Caliphate in what is now Northern Nigeria was perhaps the strongest Fulani Empire. The Liptako Emirate, an early 19th century Fulani Islamic state, spanned parts of present day Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Finally, the empires of Massina, Futa Djallon and Futa Toro are other examples of Fulani political structures that commanded large swathes of pre-colonial West Africa.

In the pre-colonial era, and within the area that currently comprises Burkina Faso, Fulani typically resided in the Sahel region and, to a much lesser extent, in the Savannah. Relations between farmers and herders in the pre-colonial era are frequently portrayed as symbiotic and idyllic (de Haan et al 1990, Davidheiser and Luna 2008). However, there is much evidence that conflict between farmers and herders predates colonization. As one example, a Muslim revolution led by Sheeku Amadu in the Niger Delta in Mali in the 19th century was essentially a battle between farmers and herders over access to water sources (Cotula 2007). Another example, this one within the contemporary borders of Burkina Faso, describes herders from the northern Sahel who raided "black" farming areas in order to gain access to agricultural opportunities (Webb 1995). It is also relevant to an understanding of ongoing ethnic differences to remember that a great deal of slave raiding occurred between farmer and Fulani populations, and that both groups were known to capture the other as opportunity allowed. The ramifications of this historical situation still resonate today in references to *cousinage* relationships.[13] By means of

[13] Fulani frequently refer to the Mossi as their slaves, and vice versa.

which, Fulani frequently and jokingly refer to members of the Bobo, an ethnic group in Southwest Burkina Faso, as their slaves.

Colonization

Did colonization exacerbate relations between farmers and herders? The literature is conflicted. According to Finnegan and Delgado (1981) relations between the Mossi farmers and Fulani herders are a direct continuation of pre-colonial patterns. Davidheiser and Luna (2008) disagree and argue that the capitalist system introduced through colonization created hostility between Fulani and farmers. Whether or not colonization is responsible for increasing the incidence of conflict between farmers and herders is debatable. Less debatable is the contention that colonization did alter the relations between the two groups.

The Berlin Conference of 1885 radically altered property rights and land tenure systems throughout Africa. Three changes stand out in particular for the way that they redefined relations between farmers and herders. First, with colonization, the French colonizers assumed a monopoly over violence and, as a result, African empires, Fulani or otherwise, became subservient to colonial powers. Most of the Fulani empires that dominated West Africa in the pre-colonial era were enervated under colonization. The Mossi Empire, one of the most formidable pre-colonial empires in all of West Africa, also deferred to French power.

Under the French, wars and slave raids between traditional African empires and societies were circumscribed to a large extent. French colonial rule, though admittedly brutal in its own right, guaranteed better protection from these traditional forms of

insecurity. As a result, colonization allowed different ethnic groups to interact in ways heretofore very risky due to insecurity. According to Breusers (2003) the colonial administration pacified the no-man's land that separated the different kingdoms. Very frequently, Mossi farmers moved into these empty spaces and brought with them a social and political organization that was rapidly manifested in the installation of political chiefs and *chef de terres*. The French colonial administration supported the installation of these traditional institutions of rule since it eased the administrative tasks of government. Although the development of inter-ethnic interaction was the general trend under colonization there are also many examples of pre-colonial cooperation between herders and farmers. [14]

In the pre-colonial era pastoralists focused their activities in arid areas in the Sahelian regions, rather than in the Savannah, but this changed under colonization. Previously, farmers and herders did not engage in intense competition over resources. Farmers lived together in villages and typically only cultivated land located close to the village. Wars between different societies necessitated villagers to maintain close living arrangements in order to guarantee security. French colonization, however, brought relative peace between rival groups and thereby increased potential interaction. Additionally, evidence points to role that colonial medicine had in contributing to population growth (Cordell and Gregory 1987).

Moreover, repressive colonial policies of military recruitment and taxation

[14] As early as the 18th century groups of Fulani began to move into areas better known for agricultural production. As one example are Ouegado Fulani who moved into the Tenkodogo area 200 years ago (Feinnegan and Delgado 1981). An ethnic group unique to Burkina Faso, the Silmi-Mossi are regarded as descendents of marriages between Mossi fathers and Fulani mothers and usually lead primarily sedentary life.

encouraged people to spread out into previously unsettled areas so as to escape interference from the colonial authorities. This spreading out of homesteads resulted in an increase in "bush camps", which are compounds in remote areas inhabited by farmers during the six or seven months that comprise the preparation, cultivation and harvest of the fields. As security and agricultural yields increased, these bush compounds were eventually transformed into new villages (Mazzucato and Niemeijer 2002). When farmers wanted to increase their tilled acreage, they inevitably moved into areas previously only used for pastoral purposes by Fulani herders.

The second effect of colonization was the creation of social identities based on non-traditional criteria. For example, the colonial government instituted a classification of resource users in rural areas. This worked to place different groups into clearly separable social and occupational units that were exclusive of each other, such as ethnicity and occupation (farmer and herder). The approach of centrally planned social engineering was a general trend in Europe around this period (Scott 1998).

Lentz (2003) argues that until the advent of colonization, the polarization between autochthones and allochtones, and by extension between ethnic groups, did not exist. He argues that, during that long time period, immigrants were effectively culturally and linguistically assimilated into local societies. This contrasts with the way that immigrants are frequently ostracized today, as a result of the lasting effects of colonization.

With colonization, the divisions between ethnic "first comers" and "late comers" were cemented. The French classified different ethnic groups into "*race autochthones*" or "conquering races" and "*etrangeres*" or "outsiders" (Lentz 2003: 122). In multi-ethnic contexts, such as they found in Burkina, the French colonizers found it necessary

to label one ethnic group as natives (which gave this group the privilege of naming their chief) and the other group as *etrangeres*, and so denying them the right to choose their chief. Lentz (2003) also argues that traditional chiefs personally profited from the opportunity to manipulate and extort individuals who were classified as *etrangeres*. Colonial authorities supported traditional chiefs in their efforts to broaden their control of all resources and sometimes the village chiefs reclassified some of their subjects as *etrangeres* in order to extract additional revenues from them.

This colonial process which increased ethnic divisions and social differences is important because of the effect which it had on land tenure systems in Burkina Faso. The problem results from the fact that traditional leaders of pastoral societies do not have the same power over their groups as do traditional leaders of sedentary societies, who gain power because of their ability to establish land-management relationships between persons in their villages. Traditional leaders of farming communities have a say in who gets land, while traditional herder leaders have no similar patronage granting opportunities (Marty 1993). Pastoral leaders are not vested with the authority to actually dictate usage of the land. Consequently, local leaders of farming communities control rights over pastures while pastoral authorities are obliged to only enforce activities in their communities. The former may rule on how land is used and who has access without seeking the opinion of pastoral authorities (Ngaido 1994).

Third and finally, colonization changed relations between farmers and herders by introducing cash-crop production which generated demand by farmers for fertile land and the inevitable increase in the commoditization of land and water (Davidheiser and Luna 2008). This resulted in a dramatic intensification of competition over land ownership and

use. Ethnic groups that had previously cared little over who lay claim to certain pieces of land suddenly had strong economic reasons to become more protective of land claims (Lentz 2006). This was especially the case in acephalous societies in the Savannah regions, namely among the Lobi and Kassina. In the pre-colonial era, competition for arable land and pasture land was not the dire problem that it is today. The problem of land scarcity commenced in earnest in the colonial era.

Moreover, as early as 1910 colonial rulers pushed for a greater emphasis on agricultural production (Kuba et al 2003). The colonial agricultural model did include consideration of animal husbandry, but more as a complement to grain and other crops than as an important productive resource in its own right. The mixed farming approach promoted by the colonial government also called for the establishment of property rights that would give actors the necessary security so as to encourage investment (Breusers 2003). As a result of this general preference by colonial administrators, the rights of herders, compared to the rights of farmers, were circumscribed and their occupational livelihood was threatened.

The Post-Colonial Era and Contemporary Relations

After achieving independence, the government of Burkina Faso, and other governments in the West African sub-region, promoted policies that favored agriculturalists and gave little consideration to the interests of pastoralists. These policies were essentially an extension of colonial era policies. Little was done to restructure the dynamics of the farmer-herder relationship with reference to its pre-colonial nature, whether to redress inequalities caused by colonization or to correct other issues.

The sedentary community (farmers) is often regarded by governments and powerful elites or ethnic groups as the group that has a right to the land because of their linkage with the original founder. All other groups that arrive after the original founding may or may not have access through the land as determined by those in the community who are linked to the original founders. Decisions are typically made by the *chef de terres* who, typically, favors agriculture and agriculturalists. Pastoral production, particularlythat which is practiced by nomadic peoples, is generally regarded as an archaic livelihood and a waste of land resources. National governments also characteristically regard animal husbandry as ill- adapted to meet the demands of modernization (Diallo 2008). Many post-colonial governments wished to trumpet self-sufficient food production and strong economic growth and continued nomadic pastoralism did not figure into their vision of development. Another problem is that land that is left fallow has been traditionally returned to the household of the family that originally owned it. This in turn raises the incentives for cultivating fallow land which in turn decreases the amount of land available for pasture (Gray 2002).

National and local politics figure prominently in the ways that farmer-herder social and economic interests are protected or neglected. In the post-colonial era, Africans of one ethnic group assumed the political posts previously held by their colonial predecessors and thereby accumulated some prestige and power to their group. As such, the face of the government became important in terms of the symbolic representations of religious and ethnic identities. In some post-colonial states, such as Nigeria, the Fulani played a prominent role. Two of Nigeria's most prominent post-colonial leaders, Ahmedu Bello and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, had Fulani lineage, as did Cameroon's first

president, Ahmadou Ahidjo.

By contrast, in Burkina, Fulanis assumed a much lower profile in the post colonial political scene (Diallo 2008). Although Fulanis traditionally composed as much as ten percent of the Burkinabé population, they traditionally lacked high level leaders in the national government. By contrast the Mossi Empire, though weakened under colonial authority, still remained powerful. On the eve of independence, the Mossi king even made a last ditch attempt to have the French declare Upper Volta a monarchical democracy with himself at the head. This may explain why, in Burkina (and in other West African countries, such as Ghana for that matter), the Fulanis have not attained the social and political status which they have found in the post-colonial era in other nations.

In addition to their lack of representation in the Burkina government pastoralists are also viewed with suspicion since they frequently traverse regional and national borders but not through formal channels. For this reason authorities associate herders with illegal activities like cattle stealing and smuggling of goods. As one example, in April of 2010, Ghana Immigration officials arrested five Fulani herdsmen for rape, vandalism, destruction of farms and armed robbery on the Ghana-Togo border, and drove their 700 cattle back into Togo (IRIN 2010). Governments frequently blame pastoralists for the low social and economic development of pastoral communities (Tonah 2002).

Fulanis are also frequently referred to in derisive terms, such as untrustworthy, cunning and dishonest (Tonah 2002). In Ghana, for example, Fulani have been referred to as "illegal alien herdsmen" (Tonah 2002). Marty (1993) argues that Fulanis have been politically, demographically, spatially and economically marginalized. In the post-colonial era the Fulani have frequently been portrayed in the media as backwards and

savage. As part of my research I examined the archives of the Burkinabé daily newspaper, *L'Observateur*. I found multiple instances in which Fulani were portrayed in unflattering terms. As just one example, during the drought and famine of the 1970s, Fulani were referred to as "bush people" and beggars (*L'Observateur* 1973*)*. Today's media forums avoid referring to Fulanis as "bush people" yet pejorative portrayals of Fulani are still present.

This type of discourse is also prevalent in quotidian verbal exchanges. One conversation that I had with the *Mediateur* of the province of Gaoua revealed the extent to which Fulanis are spoken of in racist terms.[15] We discussed how conflicts occur frequently between herders and farmers and how the conflicts are resolved. The *Mediateur* stated:

> "In these sorts of conflicts Fulanis are always the guilty party. Sometimes they destroy farmers' crops on purpose. You have to understand that Fulanis are very cunning. They are like monkeys."

Climatic Effects on Farmer-Herder Relations

The droughts of the 1970s and 1980s had a profound effect on Fulani populations in West Africa and this too has had an effect on farmer-herder relations in Burkina and elsewhere. According to Bruijn (2000) many Fulanis lost as much as three-quarters of their cattle during this time plunging them into an existential crisis. Some Fulanis held onto their way of life while others had to abandon their nomadic lifestyles and seek work as traders in urban centers. Some of them adopted an *agropasteur* lifestyle and some

[15] The *Mediateur du Faso* is an institution created in 1994 with the goal of resolving conflicts in any number of aspects of life. It is similar to an institutional ombudsman with a national office in the capital and regional branches in all of the provinces.

completely switched to agriculture. In some cases Fulanis who turned to agriculture did so as field laborers for sedentary farmers. Fulanis who did seek to continue raising cattle moved into less arid zones, namely the Savannah which increased conflict over land.

The droughts did not only affect herders, they also influenced migration among farmers as well. Many farmers left the arid regions and moved to less populated areas with more abundant rainfall, particularly in the south and southwest regions. According to Breusers, the migration was circular (2003). Initial migrants obtained fields from local *chef de terres*. Oftentimes, other family members would join the first generation of migrants who would then return to the original homeland, leaving the later arrivals to farm the new land. By this method, the immigrant families would continue to hold on the land rights invested in them by the chef des terres.

The Burkina government also created a program known as the Volta River Valleys Development Authority (AVV) program which magnified the movement of farmers by settling migrants in areas with great agricultural potential (McMillan 1983). This program, which promoted mass migration to southern regions in southern Burkina Faso, is explained in greater depth in Chapter 3.

Breusers et al (1998), through an inspection of colonial administration archives, found evidence that conflict between farmers and herders during that period are very similar in content and frequency to those that occur in the contemporary era The relationship between farmer and herder in the pre-colonial era is most frequently portrayed as a symbiotic relationship. As Hagberg points out, this description is problematic (1998). He argues that the symbiosis is overemphasized. He contends that just because two different groups have a relationship that has some positive aspects does

not mean that the relationship is symbiotic.

Contemporary Relations

Yet, as relations between farmers and herders have changed from pre-colonial times and into the post-colonial era, traditional institutions still play an important role in interactions between the two groups. Bruijn (2000) provides one example in a detailed investigation of how relations have changed between farmers and herders in Central Mali. He found that farmers and herders in Central Mali are able to coexist thanks to the cultural institution of *Jatigi*. Through the institution of *Jatigi*, immigrants, in this case Fulanis, are linked to a village host who takes care of their needs. As part of the relationship the Fulani must follow the directions of his host and they are then looked after by the *Jatigi*. An immigrant may not settle in this area without a *Jatigi*. Cousins, by contrast, argues that local institutions lack the proper capacity to resolve conflicts due to the transformations that they have undergone in the colonial and post-colonial era (1996).

The literature on contemporary relations between farmers and herders is conflicted. While Davidheiser and Luna (2008) argue that the capitalist system imposed by colonizers led to market integration which in turn created hostility between Fulani and farmers. Moreover, Davidheiser and Luna (2008) claim that the colonial government obliterated existing political systems which fostered herder-farmer symbiosis. This critique is short-sighted; to lay all the blame at the feet of colonization is simplistic. A shift to a market economy certainly altered relations between farmers and herders yet it cannot explain why some individuals participate in violent conflict and others do not participate. In some instances, a shift to a market economy has brought the two producer

groups closer or created relationships that did not previously exist. Mazzucato and Niemeijer (2002), in contrast to Davidheiser and Luna, posit that market integration has actually brought the two producer groups into more cooperative relationships. Institutional changes and adaptations were responses to market integration and actually gave rise to more environmentally sustainable practices.

Mazzucato and Niemeijer (2002) found that in some areas in Burkina Faso, where no historical ties existed between farmers and herder groups, villagers have developed a system of monetary loans through which they establish high levels of trust between members of the two groups. They credit this trend to market integration which has created a situation in which almost all individuals are either a potential lender or a creditor. Farmers of the Gourmantche ethnic group have used the advantage of their relatively better-off situation with respect to Fulani by giving loans of money or grains to Fulani. Gourmantche farmers make small loans to herders, and if the creditor repays his debt, the subsequent loan will be more significant. Over a series of successful loans and repayments a Gourmantche farmer ultimately entrusts his cattle with the Fulani. The authors find that in areas where social networks did not historically include Fulani, these networks have been extended to include Fulani so as to take advantage of their experience in livestock rearing. Moreover new ways have been developed (through financial loans) to establish such networks. It is also worth noting that the herding agreements between Fulani and Gourmantche have avoided environmental degradation, since most cattle are grazed on transhumance routes.

Another example of a newly developed symbiotic relationship exists between farmers and herders in Northern Ghana. The establishment of such a mutually beneficial

relationship with host populations explains why more Fulani farmers have moved to humid savanna and the forest zones (Tonah 2002). Farmers in northern Ghana have benefited from relations with Fulani herders in much the same way as Gourmantche farmers in Burkina Faso. In an interview that I conducted with one frustrated Burkinabé Fulani herder he admitted he had sent all his animals to Ghana for his cousin to look after.

Finally another set of scholars argue that self-enriching public officials have altered the relations between farmers and herders. Benjaminsen and Ba (2009) argue that rent-seeking local officials are culpable for increasing levels of conflict between farmers and herders. In Burkina Faso, farmers frequently complained that herders oftentimes paid bribes to local officials, usually the *prefet*, in order to win judgments in their favor. As one farmer noted, "All a Fulani has to do is give a cow to the *prefet* and he will give a decision in their favor." This refrain is frequently repeated, but does not make all that much sense. A cow can cost anywhere from 50,000 to 300,000 *cfa* ($100 to $600). Why would a Fulani give up a cow when he could usually settle a dispute for a much lower cost 30,000 to 50,000 cfa?

As evidenced in this chapter, the rapport between farmers and herders has changed from the pre-colonial era to the contemporary era. The chapter has presented the deep roots, multi-dimensionality and complexity of farmer-herder relations. One of the key factors for this transformation was the colonization of the continent. I argue that colonization had a profound effect on the way that the two groups get along, but I do not believe that it can be isolated as the paramount reason that farmers and herders do not always live in harmony. The next chapter looks at land tenure; a related topic that has also had effects on, or in some cases been affected by, relations between farmers and herders.

CHAPTER 4: LAND TENURE IN BURKINA FASO

> "There is land here in Burkina Faso, and we have no idea who owns it. It belongs to everyone and no one. Anybody can stand up and say this is my land."
> Director of Agriculture, Province of Poni, Burkina Faso
> August 2009

Access to land is of primordial importance in Burkina Faso. More than 80% of the population depends on land and water natural resources for food and other necessities (Ouedraogo 2002). These resources include, farming rights, access to water points for animals, fishing, access to pastoral areas and gathering firewood and fruits in bush areas. To further complicate the matter, land tenure and land access is also defined seasonally. For example during the rainy season farmers claim ownership of their fields yet in the dry season, herders also have access to this land. Meek (1946:1) argues that under this arrangement there are "bundles of rights" attached to specific pieces of land. Natural resources in Burkina Faso have multiple layers of rights with socio-spatial dimensions and temporal dimensions and one piece of land may be managed by several different individuals or groups.

There is a vast and deeply complex set of rules and regulating institutions that govern access to shared resources by different communal groups or producer groups (Bonnet 2000). A survey by Stamm et al (2003) found that social factors, such as kinship ties, social relationships, gratitude and solidarity play a significant role in land tenure systems in Burkina Faso. This stands in stark contrast to the formal institutions that, on paper at least, dictate how land use should be managed. Few people in Burkina Faso, outside of urban dwellers, hold actual deeds for the land that they possess and in rural areas customary rights form the foundation for land management. This chapter looks at

how land tenure has changed over the years. It examines in greater depth, the evolution of formal rules pertaining to land tenure, and specifically discusses *chef de terres, gestion des terres* (GdT) and the Volta Valleys Development Authority (AVV) system in Burkina Faso.

Colonization and Customary Law

Land tenure in Burkina Faso has gone through tremendous transformations, yet one constant and unwavering element is the importance of customary rights. The state of Burkina Faso is a product of French colonization and as a result land tenure is a mixture of pre-colonial traditions, colonial legacies and post-colonial modifications. In the pre-colonial era, each society had its own approach to land management. Colonization altered these arrangements yet French colonizers also used customary law to manage land use (Lund and Hesseling 1999). In other words their approach to land management- at least as far as the French understood prevailing tenure systems was channeled through the traditional institutions that were initially charged with land management.

There is a great debate over the authenticity of customary laws used to regulate land use in Burkina Faso and in Africa in general for that matter. Are contemporary traditional institutions pre-colonial or are they products of colonization? The invention of tradition argument as forwarded by Ranger (1983) contends that many symbolic and ceremonial traditions are rather recent inventions that were created to serve an instrumental purpose, oftentimes for the colonial masters.[16] In contrast to the invention of tradition argument, Spears (2003) argues that colonial power and its ability to

[16] An excellent recent example of the invention of tradition is the use of the "traditional" vuvuzela plastic horns used at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa.

manipulate African institutions has been overstated. According to Spears, Ranger's approach does not pay adequate attention to the historical roots of traditional institutions.

Berry (2001) suggests that perhaps customary law is a product of both pre-colonial and colonial legacies. She argues that traditional chiefs in Ghana were empowered by the British colonial administration. Berry finds that new forms of "traditional" rule emerged as a result of colonization. This empowerment has persisted and played a significant role in attempts of privatization of land in Ghana in the 1990s. Although Burkina Faso experienced French colonial rule some parallels can be drawn to the conclusions drawn by Berry. Lentz (2006) argues that French colonial policy tied political privilege to native status. Therefore it was imperative for individuals to demonstrate their high degree of "localness" in front of colonial powers in order to obtain political power. This policy, in turn, created the dichotomized groups of autochthones and immigrants and by extension empowered one group to the detriment of the other. Lentz also shows that individuals on the losing end of colonial decisions had occasional opportunities to improve their status in instances in which colonial administrators were transferred and replaced or when a *chef de terres* passed away. This points to the malleable characteristics of so-called "traditional" institutions and demonstrates that they are not fixed and far from unchanging. Therefore it is difficult to say with great certainty that the current forms of customary law are the unadulterated offspring of pre-colonial forms of land management. It is more likely that they were altered in some way by colonization and for that matter, post-colonial governments as well. By the same token, it is short-sighted to view traditional institutions as passive recipients of alterations at the hand of the government. It may also be the case that political actors within those

institutions modified the institutions as well.

"Traditional," "Modern," and Hybrid Institutions

The term "traditional" is contentious in two ways. First, the term "traditional" may imply stasis. Second, the word "traditional" when paired with '"modern" or "contemporary" may suggest that the categories are rigid and immune from hybridity. The discussion that follows offers a deeper discussion of these terms and notions.

I do not suggest that today's 'traditional' institutions are merely rigid and unchanging manifestations of pre-colonial structures. I am cognizant that the term 'traditional' may carry the implications that these institutions are static when in fact the institutions that I am examining are constantly evolving and frequently dynamic. Despite the contentiousness of the term 'traditional' it is a term frequently used in Burkina Faso and other parts of Africa, both colloquially and in formal government documents. Moreovertraditional leaders use the term to describe themselves. For the purposes of this study, tradition represents something "which has been handed down from the past" (Gyekye 1997: 219). By extension, traditional institutions are structures that were "created or pursued by past generations and that, having been accepted and preserved, in whole or in part, by successive generations, has been maintained to the present" (Gyekye 1997:221). Yet one must keep in mind that traditional institutions are modifiable and in some cases erasable.[17]

[17] The modifiability of "traditional" institutions in Africa is exemplified in the recent decision by the President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, to abolish six traditional monarchies. Zuma argued that the traditional monarchies affected by the decision were created by the apartheid regime to weaken other forms of traditional leadership. This points to the role that some states may play in deciding that which is "true tradition" and that which is "invented tradition" (BBC July 2010).

In the political arena, hybridity exists in many forms. Political regimes, for example, may be democratic, authoritarian or hybrid (Diamond 2002). By the same token, there are hybrid forms of traditional and modern institutions. Due to this, the binary categories of "traditional" and "modern" are equally contentious. The use of categories neglects the fact that there are instances where there is mixture. Hybridity has existed since the debut of colonization in French West Africa. In most cases chiefs in French West Africa had very little autonomy and were forced to follow the directives of the colonial administration (Crowder and Ikime 1970). Due to these arrangements it was difficult to disentangle that which was ordered by the colonial masters and that which was the opinion of the traditional chief. van Dijk and van Nieuwaal argue that in some cases African chiefs have become "syncretic leaders" which further points to the potential hybridity of the institution (1999: 10).

As noted by Englebert, traditional power structures have witnessed a resurgence in political relevance (2002). Englebert notes that South Africa and Uganda have revised their constitutions so as to recognize and augment the political influence of traditional institutions and their leaders. In 1992, the fourth republic of *Ghana* adopted a constitution that guarantees the institution of chieftaincy with its traditional councils, (Englebert 2002). There are examples of crossover among traditional and modern institutions in Burkina Faso as well.

One high-profile example of the occasionally hybrid nature of "traditional" and "modern" institutions is evidenced by the current occupant of the "traditional" institution of the Larle Naaba in Burkina Faso. At the head of the traditional Mossi monarchy is the Mogho Naaba, followed by the second most powerful man on his court, the Larle Naaba

(Stossel 1989). The Larle Naaba is an institution that has existed for centuries. The current Larle Naaba, Adama Tiendrebeogo, serves both the role of traditional leader and politician as he holds the elected office of deputy in the National Assembly.

This study is concerned with local institutions in rural areas. The local institutions examined in this study may be traditional (*chefs de terres*) or recently implemented (CVDs). Evidence from other parts of Africa point to the potential for crossover among local institutions. Shackleton et al (2002) detail the role that traditional authorities continued to play a role in natural resource management with varying degrees of legitimacy and control in Southern Africa. In Zambia and Lesotho, they argue, chiefs command a disproportionate amount of power as chairpersons of sub-district Natural Resource Management structures and on some occasions they channeled some community-based (CB) NRM benefits to solidify their own power base. Shackleton et al also demonstrate that the exclusion of traditional leaders from conservation committees in Namibia resulted in conflict and delays, until these leaders were co-opted onto the committees (2002). There have been some cases in rural areas in Burkina Faso where there is an overlapping of traditional institutions.

Clearly the occasional hybridity of "traditional" and "modern" institutions at the local level presents a dilemma in terms of how one goes about measuring and interpreting the effects of the respective institutions on violent outbreaks. It is important to keep in mind that in some circumstances the two forms of institutions do overlap and have an effect on one another. At the same time it is critical to remember that the two forms of institutions play different roles in different ways and by extensions they are likely to have different effects on individual behavior.

Land Ownership

Since independence in 1960 Burkina Faso has experienced several changes in national land laws. At the debut of independence however, Burkina Faso, then known as Upper Volta basically continued the colonial era style of development. As such development strategies gave short shrift to land tenure problems and instead focused on the economic development of the different regions (Ouedraogo 2002). In rural areas customary rights were the basis for land management. Ouedraogo (2002) also points out that the only arena in which the government intervened in terms of land tenure was in the classification and protection of forest and wild game parks.

The most influential law in terms of shaping land ownership is the RAF (*Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière or Land and Tenure Réorganisation)* which was introduced in 1984. The passage of this law handed ownership of all rural land over to the state. This act was passed during the revolutionary regime of Thomas Sankara (1983-1987) in an effort to break up the dominant structures of traditional land ownership. Sankara argued that the traditional form of land ownership was too beholden to archaic feudalistic structures that enriched the powerful elite at the expense of rural peasants. The RAF was designed to provide all Burkinabé, regardless of socio-economic background, equal access to agricultural land. The national government also took initial steps at this time to empower local communities by increasing their participation in decisions regarding the management of their natural resources (Howorth 1999). This initiative, which was exercised by village level Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), was the forerunner of the much more expansive Program National de Gestion des Terroires (PNGT). Despite the introduction of the RAF, traditional chiefs still held extensive powers in the arena of land management.

The RAF had multiple effects on land tenure issues and not all of them were intended consequences. Gray found that in southwest Burkina the RAF actually raised the competitive stakes over land (2002; 173). Other observers believe that individuals used the RAF to justify a "land grab" since rural land did not belong to individuals (Laurent and Mathieu 1993). In many cases farmers started to cultivate pasture land that had previously been used by herders. They justified this action by the belief that herders could no longer prove that they had claim to this land since all land now belonged to the state. Herders also claimed that the RAF gave them the right to extend their pasture land since technically a farm field could not be "owned" by a farmer. In 1984 the government of Burkina Faso passed a law, known as the Loi sur la Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière (RAF), that stipulated that all untitled land is the property of the state. The RAF was created to curtail land speculation by limiting privatization. Its intent was also to diminish the deeply entrenched hierarchical land tenure system. Despite this, it has little legitimacy in rural areas and nearly everyone still follows traditional rules when seeking access to land (Ouedraogo 2002).

The passage of the RAF brought other unintended consequences. It fostered the conditions for free and open access to land reserves (Faure 1995). This distortion of the RAF created an environment whereby people extended their farmland and moved into new areas to clear forests and occupy land previously used for animal pasture. It also accelerated the migration of Mossi from the increasingly infertile fields of the Central plateau to the more forested zones in the south and the west. Since *chef de terres* had lost much of their authority under the RAF, individuals from arid areas were emboldened to settle new areas (Faure 1995). This migration assumed that with the state owning the

land, *chef de terres* were no longer relevant and could no longer prevent the newcomers from cultivating.

In 1991 the RAF was modified by the Compaore regime. This 1991 version of the RAF maintained the ownership rights of the Burkinabé state but not in rural lands where individuals had claimed exclusive property rights. The 1991 RAF also legalized the participation of chef de terres in discussions of land management by Village Committees that were created under the *gestion des terroirs* programs. This effectively formalized a practice that had already been long established. Compaore has been skillful in garnering support from traditional leaders during election time and the RAF of 1991 and 1996 was a subtle nod to their importance. Compaore relies heavily on support from rural areas and traditional leaders are frequently charged with delivering victories in these areas.

A further modification of the RAF in May 1996 gave the state the right to transfer land titles to legal entities and private persons (Ouedraogo 2006). According to the current RAF, access to land and land rights for individuals are organized in two different structures; private property and usufruct (use rights) (Brockhaus 2005). According to the RAF, titles fall into one of two groups: permanent land titles and revocable titles which, as the name implies, are less permanent.

However, under the RAF individuals in rural areas only infrequently make efforts to pursue official land titles and this is due to several key reasons. The vast majority of rural inhabitants are illiterate and not cognizant of their rights which in turn diminishes the chances that they will seek a formal title (Ouedraogo 2006). Second, obtaining a title is a laborious process and its procurement raises the possibility of incurring the payment of taxes and fees on the land. Finally, title seekers are sometimes obliged to offer bribes

to more easily navigate through bureaucratic red tape and rent seeking gate keepers. As such, the majority of Burkinabé in rural areas continue to use natural resources in a traditional manner.

Ouedraogo very effectively details the ineffectiveness of modern legal proceedings in reaching decisions that are legitimate and respected by all parties.

> "Land tenure conflicts judged in accordance with modern law are never really settled. Moreover, a judicial solution tends to lead to one of two possible outcomes: either the winner in court is treated as a pariah and is often forced out of local society; or he has further recourse to the courts after being assaulted, intimidated or receiving death threats. In any case, where land tenure issues are concerned, a favorable judgment goes no further than the courthouse door, and everyone is aware of the fact (Ouedraogo 2002; 12)."

A decision that carries no weight beyond the walls of where it was decided certainly lacks authority. Given the lack of legitimacy of modern legal proceedings, the decisions reached by traditional institutions are likely to garner more respect.

The Institution of *Chef de Terres*

Land use is still largely dependent on the decisions made by traditional leaders, notably local *chefs de terres* (chiefs of the earth, or as some people refer to them, earth priests) (Hagberg 1998, Liberski-Bagnoud 2002). *Chef de terres* is an institution that is recognized in the majority of the savannah region of West Africa and it differs from the traditional institution of village chief. Earth priest is a suitable translation given the strong spiritual connection that they have with the land, but for the purposes of this study we will refer to the institution as *chef de terres*. Similarly, access to lakes, floodplains and rivers for drinking water or fishing is dictated by *maître d'eau* (masters of water). In Mossi culture the chef de terres is referred to as *Tengsoba,* while in societies where

Dioula is spoken the institution is referred to as *Dugukolotigi*, and among the Kassina they are the *Tiga-tu*. Although there is undoubtedly variation by ethnicity in terms of how the *chef de terres* gain their power there is nonetheless great commonality in how their exercise their power (Dacher 2004).

Typically the *chef de terres* is a descendent of the people who first settled the area. Most ethnic groups have a mythology that connects them with their ancestral land. The Mossi for example believe that their ancestors are descended from a princess who migrated from what is present day Ghana. She married a local hunter and gave birth to the first Mossi, Ouedraogo. As Mossi settled in new lands they also created new *chef de terres* in the newly settled lands. This first settler assumed the responsibility of negotiating a relationship with the spirits that originally occupied the land. In the generations that follow the post of *chef de terres* is passed down and subsequent *chef de terres* are obliged to also communicate with ancestors in addition to the spirits.[18]

One example of a mythology that connects current residents and the land is found in the Kassina region of south central Burkina Faso (Province of Nahouri). In some Kassina villages the *chef de terres* is descended from an ancestor who exited the belly of the earth. For example the original settler of the Kassina village Kaya Navio was a "troglodyte" who lived in a grotto and emerged to claim the land. This original *chef des terres* had no father or mother but was placed there by a God or gods (Kibora 2003). The current *chef de terres* traces his lineage to this founder. The power of the village chief may be usurped by someone not in his lineage but this cannot happen with the *chef de terres*.

[18] Hagberg provides a detailed account of chef des terres in the region of Sideradougou.

Ouedraogo (2003) states that one of the characteristics of the land chief is that he is invested with mystic preternatural religious powers that allow him to mediate between ancestors and the living. This is particularly important in terms of distribution of land. The land chief is charged with communicating with ancestors in order to inform them of the way that land will be used and also to obtain their approval. As such *chef de terres* typically make a number of visible sacrifices, such as killing a chicken, before the beginning of the farming season. Helmke and Levitsky (2006) argue that there is a distinction between informal institutions and culture. While culture may be a set of values, informal institutions are defined much more narrowly and as a set of shared expectations or beliefs. C*hef de terres* are inextricably linked to indigenous culture since they are based on shared expectations and as such can be regarded as institutions.

The following description of the role of the *chef de terres* succinctly illustrates the strength of the institution:

> "The rights of land access and other resources are often inscribed in a ritual grammar where the protagonists communally execute certain public rituals for the well-being of the locality. Regular and visible sacrifices for the entire community remind the status of the actor and, by extension, also his lineage. Comparable to a juridical document, certain public sacrifices are acts that define certain rights and social positions. Guaranteed by supernatural forces and reinforced by regular and public repetition, the status of a *chef de terres* and his lineage is not easily contested. Actors are certain of different perspectives in the local space and on the historic construction of borders and identities. They legitimize their position by justifying it through a discourse that relies on a certain vision of the past (Kuba and Lentz 2003; 10)."

Bonnet (2000) illustrates the conflicting views towards the importance of customary institutions in the management of land and resource management. Colonial

authorities undoubtedly had an effect on shaping customary law, but the legitimacy of *chef de terres* is grounded in pre-colonial cultural practices. On one hand some people believe that traditional institutions, such as the *chef de terres*, are "on their way out" in terms of their influence on land management. Laurent and Mathieu (1993) argue that the RAF weakened the legitimacy of traditional leaders. Hagberg (1998) posits that the RAF was interpreted as a way to circumvent the need to negotiate with *chef de terres* for the acquisition of property. Other observers, by contrast, argue that traditional institutions have evolved over time and remain relevant in the arena of land distribution and conflict resolution. Debrouvry (1997) argues that the inclusive nature of the palaver approach has helped keep traditional institutions from becoming obsolete. The palaver approach creates a public sphere where members of the community may express their opinions on problems and issues in order to foster social harmony. One of the goals of this study is to assess the importance of traditional institutions in resolving land-based conflicts.

Gestion des Terroirs: Modern Institutional Intervention

More recently states such as Burkina Faso, typically through decentralization programs, have promoted institutional designs that reconfigure the structures used to manage natural resources. An example of such an institutional intervention is the government-instituted national program, known as *Gestion des Terroirs,* or GdT (Village Land Management Committees), which was created to more effectively manage village resources and land (Howorth 1999). *Gestion des terroirs* has been implemented in all villages of Burkina Faso. According to Bonnet (2000) the GdT approach has allowed local people to be more involved in how village lands are developed and managed. GdT may be regarded as an institution that is created for both environmental conservation and

land management purposes.

The state usually intervenes in land tenure issues under the auspices of massive donor-funded projects. The *Gestion des terroirs* program (or as it is known in Burkina PNGT) is an example of this type of intervention. The program is funded by the World Bank, UNDP and other organizations. The introduction of soil and water conversation technologies and the reconfiguration of institutions that manage land use and distribution are the key methods of GdT. The approach is typically participatory whereby villagers help design the interventions and assume the responsibility of stakeholders. One way they do this is to have the village mapped by a committee composed of village representatives. By means of this map development specialists are able to identify the priorities of the village. Villagers are responsible for creating a management plan over a three year period during which they outline current land use and present and future needs.

One of the outcomes was the establishment of village councils that were given the responsibility of managing resources and resolving disputes that are related to resources. In the first wave of the GdT program members of the CDR were responsible for planning. In the second wave of the GdT program délégués were the village representatives. The délégués system was primarily top-down and the délégués typically followed a plan of resource management dictated by the state (Howorth 1999). In the most recent GdT initiative, délégués were replaced by *Commission villageoise de développement* or Village Council for Development (CVD). The creation of CVDs commenced in 2007 and they now exist in all villages in Burkina. Although CVDs exist, at least on paper, the capacity of the institutions varies widely by village. CVDs are an extension of the local government and the committee's composition should reflect village interests. The

management of natural resources and conflict resolution are among its central activities. CVDs are to engage fellow villagers to create a village development plan and foster methods to protect natural resources.

One of the key objectives of the implementation of the CVD system is to minimize land use conflicts through negotiation and delineation of land use zones. Examples of how this is to be achieved is through the delimitation of pastoral zones and empowering village committees with the responsibility of defining who is eligible to use common property (Batterbury 1998). The idea is for the village committee to demarcate the territory into different zones of land use. In some cases, as evidenced by the *Gestion de* Terroires program, governments have imposed top-down, detailed prescriptions for solving collective action problems. Institutional design is used to prevent collaborative failure and GdT was implemented in this regard. However the creation of institutions is in itself conflictual and sometimes results in the exclusion of some groups (McCay 2002). This raises the questions of whether or not the institutions that manage resources in Burkina are created in a way that disadvantages one group to the benefit of another. Fulanis frequently complain that they receive short shrift in resource management.

According to Engberg-Pedersen (2003) the GdT program is welcomed by rural populations for its financial resources and not necessarily for its advertised benefits. Engberg-Pedersen also argues that Burkinabé villages (at least in the villages he studied) already had traditional decision-making institutions that deal with collective action issues, such as natural resource management. Engberg-Pedersen notes the tension that exists between customary authorities who are almost exclusively male (most of which are related to the local royal family) and representative committees that include women and

immigrants. Engberg-Pedersen observed that the implementation of GdT was hindered by tension between the two groups. In my own research I found that in some cases the local *chef de terres* or village chief, or one of their offspring would also be members of the village committees. This trend, in some cases, substantially limited the potential for change. According to one observer, the interventions forwarded brought about by GdT "lack both institutional depth and legitimacy" (Gray 2002).

One of the results of GdT sponsored programs has been an intense effort to recuperate abandoned land or land that is susceptible to erosion and nutrient loss. The problem is that land such as this is typically used for pasture or as paths used to transport herds of cattle (Batterbury 1998). This change in land use patterns benefits one group to the detriment of another group and it may result in conflict between the two groups.

Bonnet (2000) also argues that the effectiveness of GdT programs also has to do with how well they mesh with existing traditional local institutions. In some cases decentralization has created institutions that are not regarded as legitimate by the population. The creation of new institutions may also be viewed as a development that marginalizes traditional structures. GdT endeavors to redefine spatial boundaries and as a result it is frequently ensnared in local political debates in how land is defined and used (Gray 2002). Gray also posits that the delineation of village space has worsened land conflicts. Institutions for the commons are not created exclusively for the management of scarce resources or environmental problems but rather for the protection of resources from outsider use and to reassert cultural identities (McCay 2004). This may be attributed to the observation that the participatory committees created to represent different groups are often ineffectual or fall apart due to divisions among the different

factions (Gray 2002). This is similar to that which occurred in village of Perkoura, a case that is discussed in great depth in Chapter 7.

Marty (1993) argues that the very definition of the program *gestion des terroirs* is exclusionary to certain groups. A *terroir* is based on village boundaries and a village is defined as a group of farmers. This approach does not allow an integration of activities that are outside of the realm of agriculture. Moreover, herders may utilize more than one territory for pasture so how can their interests be considered? In other words herders may be inhabitants of one village yet their cattle require access to pasture land that is linked to other villages of which they are not inhabitants. Also herders have nearly no rights when they claim a piece of land. They can only lay stake to land if they have cultivated it or constructed wells on it. Marty remarks that in Niger some Fulani have seeded fields with millet just for the simple purpose of demarcating their land and not with the intention of actually harvesting the crop.

The AVV Program in Burkina Faso

Faced with food shortages, a population that increasingly looked to other countries for economic opportunity and high population densities in areas with diminishing agricultural potential, the government of Upper Volta turned to a new program. In 1974 the government created agricultural areas known as *Autorite d'Amenegemant des Vallees des Volta* (Volta River Valleys Development Authority) or Zones AVV. These areas, also referred to as *zones amenage*, consist of valleys that have abundant water sources and fertile soil that up until that moment had not been used for large scale agricultural exploitation (Faure 1995).

A confluence of factors gave rise to potential of the AVV initiative. In the 1970s

the World Bank presented a program that stated that the intensification of mixed farming in Africa could be achieved if infection rates of diseases such as trypanosomiasis (also known as sleeping sickness) could be transcribed. As a result, Tsetse fly was better controlled which resulted in lower rates of human and animal trypanosomiasis.[19] At the same time the World Health Organization implemented a program to control Onchoceriasis, commonly referred to as River Blindness, and to lower transmission rates of Malaria. Reduction in all three diseases in areas with great agricultural potential made the areas more attractive for farming initiatives.

The program also wished to provide domestic alternatives for people who typically emigrated and sought work on plantations in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana (Faure 1995). Since the colonial era and through the post-colonial era millions of Burkinabé had moved to neighboring countries in search of work on coffee and cocoa plantations. The AVV program sought to counteract this massive emigration. It specifically targeted people from the Mossi plateau in central Upper Volta, who were most typically associated with migration to Cote d'Ivoire.

According to McMillan, under the initiative 30,000 square kilometers were handed over to the AVV program which amounts to 12% of the Burkina Faso surface area and includes all or most of the Red, White and Black Volta Rivers (now known as the Nazinon, Nakambe and Mouhoun respectively) (1983). McMillan outlines the five main goals of the program:

1. To plan the immigration of voluntary settlers from densely populated areas to the decontaminated river valleys

[19] The eradication of animal trypanosomiasis, or specifically bovine trypanosomiasis, also increased the potential for raising cattle in the zone. This development figures prominently in the ensuing discussions concerning farmer/herder conflicts.

2. To promote improved agricultural techniques to increase output while minimizing the ecological impact.
3. Increase national production of cotton and grains.
4. To provide the settlers with better living conditions than they experienced in their home regions.
5. To encourage regional economic growth

Planned villages were set up in installations known as blocs. The AVV agency was responsible for providing infrastructure i.e. roads, schools, health facilities, and wells. They were also responsible for the recruitment, selection and transportation of settlers from their home regions to the new sites. Radio broadcasts and informational sessions were the method by which farmers were recruited (McMillan 1983).. Farmers who agreed to re-locate and work in AVV zones were required to sign an agreement known as the *contrat de mise en valeur*, which outlined the terms of the arrangement. Under the agreement farmers agreed to work the land, keep a percentage of their production and receive social benefits for their families. Since the government essentially created these villages, or blocs, there were no traditional institutions, particularly *chef de terres*, to play a role in resource management. Agricultural extension agents employed by the government oversaw the program and were responsible for land use management. These agents informed farmers which plots of land they could cultivate.

Despite the optimism, as early as the late 1970s, the AVV program had already started to receive criticism. The costs ($12,000 to $15,000 a family) for resettling families were prohibitive and were all the starker in light of the intense poverty that existed in other parts of the country (McMillan 1983). Moreover, settlement of the planned areas was moving at a sluggish pace. To make matters worse, indigenous populations had grievances with their forced removal from the land. Finally, there was a noticeable trend of illegal and unassisted immigration to AVV areas. This final criticism along with the

absence of traditional forms of resource management both figure prominently in the discussion of cases of violent conflict that have occurred in AVV areas in Burkina Faso.

This created many disputes between indigenous land owners (who became disenfranchised by the creation of AVVs), migrants who had been installed initially by the government program, and more recently arrived migrants. Land based conflicts in these areas are the result of contested ownership of AVV land and ancestral lands. Another cause of conflicts is anarchical occupation of reserved land (Sidwaya 2005).

According to Chauveau (2003) in the Province of Ganzourgo there are intense conflicts between people who claim to be indigenous, farmers settled by the AVV program (who never received actual titles to the land) and newer migrants. In this area, unlike other AVVS, a program known as *Plan Foncière Rural* (PFR), or Rural Land Plan, has been initiated to help these areas overcome the legacy of land based disputes engendered by previous state interventions and subsequent withdrawals. PFR's aim is to manage and reduce conflict over land tenure and promote rural development by securing customary land rights. The initiative endeavors to clarify land ownership issues.

As evidenced in this chapter, land tenure in Burkina Faso has undergone tremendous transformations. Land management is dictated by both customary institutions that pre-date colonization and institutions that have been more recently created such as the CVD. Moreover, massive development projects, namely the AVV initiative have altered the way that land is used and managed in Burkina Faso. The following chapter will outline the theoretical lenses that this study uses to examine violent land based conflicts in Burkina Faso.

CHAPTER 5: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE LEADING HYPOTHESES

Introduction

This study of violent communal conflict in Burkina Faso engages several bodies of literature and attempts to bridge the lacunae that exist within and among them**.** This chapter will first discuss the literatures on common pool resources and property rights. A discussion of these two bodies of thought leads, by extension, to an examination of the role that institutions play in the management of resources and property. I will then look at the literature on violent communal conflict; in general terms and then with a specific focus on Africa. This followed by a discussion of how other scholars have examined farmer-herder violence in Burkina Faso and other parts of West Africa. The chapter concludes with the presentation of the study's leading theory that explains variation in violent communal conflict.

Common Pool Resources and Property Rights

In Africa people are very closely tied to their land in both economic and spiritual terms. In some cases land in Africa is much more than an issue of material distribution; it is steeped in symbolic issues about which people care deeply (Gibson 2010). Land, through agricultural and pastoral use, is also the primary means by which many Africans draw an income or live a life of subsistence. Eighty percent of the population of Burkina Faso is reliant on the land for food and other provisions (Ouedraogo 2002). Moreover, issues pertaining to land, such as tenure reform or infringement of property use rights, can lead to explosive situations. Land policy issues have played an important role in violent incidents in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire.

The literature on common pool resource provides a lens through which one may

observe the violent conflict that has occurred in Burkina Faso. Common pool resource (CPRs) systems are "resource systems where excluding potential appropriators or limiting appropriation rights of existing users is non-trivial and the yield of the resource system is subtractable" (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994, 4). According to Williams, CPRs are, in general, characterized by contrasting scales of exploitation, overlapping rights, and recurrent contestation and negotiation of rules that provide access (1998). Notable examples of common pool resources are fishing grounds that are open to all who practice the occupation and irrigation systems that are exploited by multiple farmers. The emergence of violent conflict is most often rooted in how these common pool resources are managed, or rather mismanaged. In instances where output is less for each group, which is sub-optimal, the potential for conflict increases. Institutional failure, in this case the failure to properly manage shared resources, raises the chances for conflict.

Hardin's theory of the tragedy of the commons is that the collective ownership of land creates incentives for great waste and degradation of resources since each user is motivated to use the maximum amount of resources in order to earn the biggest possible profit (1968). As noted by Hardin, "It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons (1968, 1244)." Therefore in pastoral zones herders endeavor to have the largest herd possible which in turn degrades the pasture land, and in some cases destroys crops. The same goes for farmland. Farmers cultivate land that is collectively owned by the community at large and not by individuals. In cases such as these there is an enhanced chance of conflict. Each farmer and herder is a member of a system that encourages him to increase the size of his field or herd respectively.

The CPR system compels individuals to increase their use of resources and as such the management of resources in rural areas presents a collective action problem. Ostrom (2004) states that collective action occurs when more than one individual is required to contribute to an effort in order to achieve an outcome. Institutions are needed to manage collective action problems. According to Olson, under collective action, organizations are expected to further the interests of its members and, if this is not achieved, they typically perish (1971). In cases when individual unorganized action adequately serves the interests of the individual there is no reason to form an organization. Organizations advance the common interests of groups and individuals (Olson 1971; 7). It is also important to consider who benefits from these institutions. Lesorogol (2008) argues that all too often the literature assume that benefits from CPRs are equitably distributed and neglects the extent to which certain groups benefit more than others from the use of the common resource. Institutions for the commons are not created exclusively for the management of scarce resources or environmental problems but rather for the protection of resources from outsider use and to reassert cultural identities (McCay 2002).[20]

As established in Chapter Four of this study, natural resource use and property rights in Burkina Faso are decidedly complex and make natural resource management a challenge. It is frequently the case in rural areas that land does not belong to one person, but rather belongs to a community. It is in fact a tremendous challenge to find a person in a rural area that has an actual land deed for the property they are living on or for the field that they are cultivating. Outside of urban dwellers, few people in Burkina Faso hold

[20] This is phenomenon played an important role in the violent conflict in Perkoura that is described in detail in chapter 8.

actual deeds for the land on which they live and work. Land in rural areas is therefore a resource that belongs to a common pool.

Institutions do exist that intervene and provide some constraints on who uses these common resources and at what period of the year. Institutions provide rights, typically usufruct rights, to individuals for the use of resources such as land. As noted by Williams, CPRs fall under the rubric of a variety of property-rights, including state property, communal property, private property and open-access forms (1998). Property rights associated with land tenure systems deal with two relationships; first, that which exists between humans (Lynch and Alcorn 1994), and second, the relationship between resource and humans (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).

One of the central tenets of private economic activity is the right to and protection of private property. Protection of private property was one of the requisites for the emergence of state systems in Europe (North 1990). If the government cannot guarantee this right then citizens may be inclined to resort to violence and to theft or destruction of private resources. Boone (2007) argues that property rights in Africa are complex and frequently contested by citizens. She finds that property rights disputes coupled with intense demographic and environmental stress could lead to conflict. Boone (2007) also argues that issues related to property rights are central to discussions about reform and reconstruction of the African state. This points to the responsibility that the state should have in managing private property disputes. In this case successful management of natural resource exploitation needs to be supported by institutions (Ostrom 1990). The debate over property rights is also complicated by the fact that land in Burkina Faso is not

only a source of agricultural production, but a place of spiritual and social importance (Gray 2002, Engberg-Pedersen 2003).

CPRs in Burkina Faso have multiple functions and are utilized by a variety of user groups. The objectives, production strategies and priorities in resource use vary widely according to the specific producer group. Arable land and grazing land are of limited availability and management of these resources is important to ensure sustainable use and the prevention of conflict between user groups. Herders and farmers both depend on land for their livelihoods and when a herder's animals destroy crops the situation becomes tenuous. As argued by many farmers, herders purposely let their animals into a field of crops in an attempt to fatten their animals. Another situation that has potential for conflict is when farmers use previously uncultivated land that had been typically used by herders for grazing purposes (Marty 1993; Engberg-Pedersen 2003). As land has become scarcer, farmers have moved into areas that were typically reserved for pasture.

Although competition for use of these resources is intense, during certain moments of the year the two groups use common pool resources in a manner that does not generate contentious competition. For part of the year, typically the dry season, pastoralists are not discouraged from entering fallow fields to allow their animals to graze. Furthermore, by allowing herders to enter their fields farmers understand that animal manure left by animals will enrich the fertility of their field and enhance yields. Finally, when herders and farmers live in proximity both groups accrue benefits in economic and social terms.

As is always the case, some individuals will seek out short-term benefits for themselves. An example of this would be a herder allowing his animals to eat a farmer's

crop prior to harvest. Individuals are better off when they do not contribute to the collective action while others do contribute to the collective action. In a case such as this, these individuals benefit without paying the costs of contributing to the collective action. Of course no collective benefits are achieved when all individuals pursue short-term, self-centered benefits. Institutional failure is usually recognized when cooperation breaks down and violent conflict emerges over common pool resources.

Institutions and Collective Action Problems

It is important to look at other institutions besides those that are rooted in the state and at the national level. Institutions, traditional and modern, local and national, formal and informal, may have different effects on whether or not violent conflict occurs. It is important to note the legal pluralism that has resulted as a result of the over-lapping regulations and cultural norms (Nori, Taylor and Sensi 2008). Nori et al argue that land tenure systems are managed by diverse institutions that range from formal statutory bodies to informal traditional institutions. Ouedraogo argues that in Burkina Faso the land management tenure system is so complex that people avoid formal channels and refer to traditional institutions (2003). As evidenced in Chapter Four land use is still largely dependent on the decisions made by traditional leaders, notably local *chef de terres*.

What roles have indigenous and modern institutions played in overcoming collective action problems? As noted by Ostrom (2004), in many areas indigenous institutions have persisted and overcome challenges posed by war, drought, floods, migration and other important factors. More recently however, state elites in countries like Burkina Faso, typically through decentralization programs, have promoted

institutional designs that reconfigured the structures used to manage natural resources. In some cases, as evidenced by the Gestion de Terroires program (GdT), governments have imposed top-down, detailed prescriptions for solving collective action problems. Institutional design is used to prevent collaborative failure and GdT was implemented in this regard. However, the creation of institutions in itself can create conflict and sometimes result in the exclusion of some groups (McCay 2002). McCay is referring to the bias that favors sedentary groups over pastoral groups. As evidenced in Chapter Four, land tenure, and by extension property rights, have undergone tremendous transformations in Burkina Faso and the institutions that manage land use have evolved as well. Yet due to the combination of multiple legacies, (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) the issue of land ownership in Burkina Faso is less than clear.

This study bridges a gap in the common pool resources and property rights literature by examining the local institutions that play a role in natural resource management. This project endeavors to look at the role that local institutions, both recent creations and those that pre-date the advent of colonization, play in the onset of violent conflict. Decentralization efforts came into vogue with the international donor community in the 1980s and 1990s, yet there has not been a systematic examination of how the institutions created under the auspices of these initiatives have affected the incidents of violent conflict over scarce resources in rural areas. The study also looks at how institutional failure in the management of collective action problems plays a role in the emergence of violent conflict between producer groups. This study's contribution to the literature on common pool resources and property rights will be to examine how institutions affect the management of natural resources that are not clearly, at least in

formal terms, owned by one party. It will additionally look at local institutions frequently neglected in examinations of natural resources conflict. These are customary institutions, namely village chiefs and *chef de terres*.

Missing from the CPR literature is a discussion of how institutional breakdown may lead to violent conflict. Given the important role that local institutions play in land use management in Burkina Faso it is possible that their performance may have an effect on outbreaks of violent conflict. This study will make an original contribution to the CPR literature by examining how the capacity of local institutions has an effect on the emergence of violent land-based conflict.

Violent Communal Conflict

The literature on communal violence also frames the issues germane to this study, namely the mechanisms that explain why individuals participate in violent communal conflict despite the inherent risks involved with the act. I interrogate this body of literature in three ways. First, I look at the broader literature on violent communal conflict. Second, I look specifically at violent conflict in Africa. Finally, I engage the literature that has contributed to the study of violent communal conflict within the specific context of farmer-herder relations in West Africa, including Burkina Faso. This study endeavors to make a contribution to these bodies of literature.

It is important to look beyond the context of Burkina Faso and consider the general communal conflict literature that examines the phenomenon. Associational life is a factor frequently cited for its potential to mitigate violent communal conflict. Varshney's examination of communal conflict in India concludes that everyday engagement between individuals and face to face interaction is sufficient to preclude the

outbreak of violent conflict (2002). Likewise Brass argues that exclusively intra-communal engagement creates the potential for ethnic violence, which suggest that extra-communal interaction may diminish the specter of violence (1997). The social capital approach has not been used to examine violent conflict in Burkina Faso, yet should be examined due to the associational life that exists between farmers and herders.

Varshney's investigation of violence in India focuses on cities and excludes rural zones due to the paucity of communal violence in the latter. Varshney (2001: 106) notes, "It may be that communal tensions flare up less in smaller towns, for they lack the relative anonymity of India's largest towns and allow greater routine interaction between Hindus and Muslims." In Burkina this quotidian face-to-face interaction is present yet it does not prevent communal violence from occurring between groups.

Brass looks at conflict in India and argues that exclusively intracommunal engagement creates the potential for ethnic conflict. Brass dismisses the ancient hatred primordial argument and places blame for ethnic violence at the feet of political entrepreneurs who use relatively minor events to mobilize their supporters. Brass also emphasizes the role that political parties play in fomenting ethnic conflict through institutionalized riot systems. Violence between groups in Burkina is not typically part of a meta-narrative portrayed in the media and the political sphere. However, it is possible that the institutions that should be in place to deal with violent outbursts are either ineffectual or nonexistent.

As noted by Hagberg (1998) inter-ethnic relations exist in economic, social and religious domains in Burkina Faso. Moreover, groups that come into conflict at other times pray together in the same mosques and churches. Hagberg (1998) also finds that

groups that come into conflict also frequently collaborate and communicate as members of the same community. Yet this form of inter-communal associational life does not preclude these same groups from clashing violently with one another. Is there another factor that serves as the mechanism by which villages, or individuals for that matter, succumb to violent episodes?

Horowitz (2001) examines the question of why deadly ethnic riots occur in some places and not others and argues that it is a challenge to discern the reasons. Horowitz is most concerned with how and why violent acts occur and persist in certain areas. He argues that the ethnic conflict has an urban bias due to higher levels of ethnic diversity and that violence typically spreads from urban to rural areas. Horowitz (2001; 421) cites a "curious cognitive brew of the magical and empirical" that mobilizes rioters. This is somewhat of an oversimplication of his argument but nevertheless, this explanation leaves much to be desired in terms of explanatory value. Moreover, civic peace, according to Horowitz (2001: 478) may be explained by the absence of one or more of the following: "appropriate precipitants, appropriate targets, police indifference or social support for violence." Horowitz does not provide a specification of the variables that are most likely to increase the probability that violence will occur in one area rather than another.

Herein lies the puzzle of communal violence in Burkina Faso. Villages similar in almost every regard have drastically different variation in terms of the occurrences of violent conflict. This project proposes a more systematic and specified approach to the examination of why violent conflict selectively occurs in certain areas and why some individuals are more receptive to violence as an option.

The literature on communal conflict has some gaps that do not explain communal violence in Burkina Faso. According to Varshney and Horowitz, rural environments should be less prone to violence yet in the case of Burkina Faso, communal violence is largely limited to rural areas. Moreover ethnicity has not been politicized which, intuitively, would seem to decrease the potential for ethnic conflict. If resource scarcity is widespread in Burkina Faso, what is the mechanism by which some villages are able to escape violent conflict while other villages fall victim? Finally if everyday engagement and economic relations between ethnic groups are supposed to prevent conflict why is this not the case in Burkina? The fact that there is variation in violent conflict in Burkina suggests that there is an as of yet unidentified variable (or variables) that mitigates the onset of violence.

Violent Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

The negative impact of violent conflict in Africa is immense and it endangers democratic reform, political stability, the prospects of economic development, and creates human suffering and in some cases may degenerate into civil war. Due to the gravity of the topic many scholars have examined communal violence in Africa. This discussion provides a general overview of the factors that contribute to violent conflict on the continent. It then devotes closer attention to two factors, land tenure and ethnicity, and their respective relationships with violent conflict.

Cross national studies have examined the onset of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These studies identify poverty and primary resource dependence as factors that increase the likelihood of civil war and discount the role that ethnic diversity and group grievance have on the onset of conflict. However the highly

aggregated measures used in these studies do not fully reveal the mechanisms that link sources to outcomes. Moreover they ignore violent conflicts that produce tremendous suffering yet miss out on consideration since they do not meet the thresholds necessary to be coded as civil wars.

Another set of observers posit that environmental factors have engendered greater resource scarcity which has consequently played a role in the onset of violent communal conflict (Kaplan 1994, Homer-Dixon 1999, Baechler 1999, Diamond 2005). More specifically, and more relevant for this project, Markakis (1997) and Kahl (1998) posit that violent pastoral conflict is driven by resource scarcity. As population has increased and arable and pastoral lands have decreased a zero-sum game has emerged that pits farmers against herders. Baechler contends that the zero-sum game between groups has actually been transformed into a non-win game (1999). Too many people and limited fertile land were, in the opinion of Diamond, key variables in unlocking the puzzle of the Rwandan disaster (2005). When the approach is applied to the context of violent conflict in Burkina Faso, it intuitively makes sense that natural resource scarcity is at the base of violence. On occasions when farmers move into pastoral land to cultivate, it is in turn a loss for herders. By the same token in instances when herders move their animals into farmland, farmers have lower yields.

Turner (2004) rejects the scarcity as a source of conflict approach and calls for a deeper examination of the broader set of tensions and their moral dimensions that exist within agro-pastoral societies. He argues that these conflicts should not be simply regarded as in-the-moment struggles to subsist, but as rather an action that has longer term goals such as political gain. I believe that the resource scarcity approach does help

in explaining incidences of violent conflict but, like Turner, I find that it has some shortcomings. I argue that resource scarcity is a country wide phenomenon and if all villages that suffered from resource scarcity experienced violent conflict it is likely that Burkina Faso would have long ago spiraled into widespread violence. Most villages in Burkina Faso suffer from extreme resource scarcity yet remain violence-free. A deeper discussion of the relationship between natural resource scarcity and violent conflict in Burkina Faso is offered in Chapter 7.

Another body of literature considers the role that weak states play in fostering an environment in which violent conflicts break out frequently (Clapham 1996, Herbst 2000, Bates, Greif and Singh 2002, Kirwin and Cho 2009). The attributes of weak states are numerous and two stand out in particular. The first aspect pertains to the personalized and informalized political decision making that occurs outside of the formal state institutions (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Clapham 1996). A product of this form of governance may lead to an increase in horizontal inequalities and by extension violence (Stewart 2002, Langer 2005, Ostby 2008). A weak state is also unable to adequately project power and maintain a monopoly of violence within its borders in order to maintain order (Herbst 2000, Hyden 2006). The attributes of a weak state may increase the potential for violence in two ways. First, it may motivate an individual or groups to act violently because there is now an opportunity. The second possibility may be that a weak state creates grievance among certain segments of the population and those marginalized may act violently to redress the situation.

Other scholars look beyond the macro level and endeavor to uncover the micro-processes which foster violent conflict (Kalyvas 2003, Weinstein 2007). These studies

focus on civil war which is a much less frequent event than instances of political violence. There has also been a growth in micro-level examinations of violence in Africa. Individual level data provide a unique lens through which to examine violent conflict in Africa. Bhavnani and Backer (2007) have found that higher levels of social capital, namely civic activism, reduce a person's approval of political violence. Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) have found that ex-rebels in Sierra Leone had little attachment to political parties prior to their engagement in violent conflict. They argue that political apathy and little interest in civic life predisposed rebels to violent action.

Scacco also uses the micro-level approach and examines the question of individual participation in riots in Nigeria (2008). She found that riot participation is driven by the interaction between grassroots networks and individual grievances. Scacco discovered that participating in a riot is a social process and that most rioters do not work alone. Moreover, the social networks are not elite driven but rather decentralized and organized by community. Scacco concludes that people who have grievances and are deeply embedded in community social networks are most likely to participate in riots.

Yet gaps remain in our understanding of violent conflict in Africa, particularly those that occur in rural areas. The examination of violent conflict between producer groups in West Africa has been under examined. Moreover, the role that local institutions play in shaping individual participation in violent conflict has not been examined. This study endeavors to examine violent conflict at the micro-level while also considering the role that inefficacious or weak local institutions play in increasing the potential for an individual to participate in violence. Other examinations of violent conflict between farmers and herders have not approached the question from the micro-level.

Land Tenure and Violence in sub-Saharan Africa

Land tenure in Africa has garnered attention from scholars for a number of reasons such as its effects on economic development, gender and development and food security (Besley 1995, Gray and Kevane 1999, Tripp 2004, Deininger et al 2006, Maxwell and Wiebe 1999). There is also a growing body of literature that identifies a link between land tenure systems and the emergence of violent conflict. The following discussion demonstrates that the way that land is managed and distributed has led to violent outcomes in multiple cases.

In the 1990s the push towards democratization had an effect on land distribution. According to Boone, land allocation became another political object with which politicians could influence voters and recompense devoted supporters (2009). Boone also points out that in the case of Cote d'Ivoire, "the cost of losing an election may be the loss of both property rights and citizenship rights (2009: 196)." These high stakes led to intense violent conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, which was first manifested in the form of electoral violence during the 2000 election and then in the outbreak of civil war in 2002. Boone states that the international community has reached a consensus that peace and stability can only be restored once issues related to property and citizenship is resolved (2009). As such the issue of land tenure is at the center of the *Ivoirien* conflict.

Other observers have identified a link between land tenure issues and violence in the Great Lakes region (Boudreaux 2009). According to Buijtenhuijs, the genocidal violence in the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi were not ethnically driven but rather rooted in land allocation disputes (2000). Gatunange also argues that land tenure problems in Burundi are both a producer and product of violence. (2002). Refugees, mostly Hutu, who fled Burundi in the 1970s, returned to the country and found that their

land was occupied by Tutsi peasants. This has led to incidences of violent conflict between landholders and the landless (Gatunange 2002).

According to one set of observers the degeneration of the state of Somalia into the status of failed state is at least partially grounded in failed land distribution programs (Besteman and Cassanelli 1996, Besteman 1999). Besteman argues that land tenure reform in the Jubba Valley in the 1970s enriched regional big men and national elites. As a result, disputes over control over land "contributed to murderous militia activity, environmental destruction, and the virtual annihilation of agricultural productivity in the very area targeted to provide for Somalia's future (Besteman 1999, 215)." These factors contributed to the violence that has dominated the country since the 1990s.

Kenya, perhaps more than any other case, has served as an example of where land use and allocation has been linked to violent outcomes (Kahl 1998, Klopp 2000 and 2002, Anderson 2002, Kagwanja, 2003). Anderson notes the link between vigilante groups and land protest movements in Kenya (2002). According to Campbell et al land tenure disputes are giving rise to increasingly violent conflicts (2000). Kagwanja posits that political elites use land use issues to mobilize supporters and as a result violent confrontations have increased (2003). The issue of land tenure in Kenya has been so contentious that one of the goals of the new constitution is to address the issue of land distribution.

The majority of the aforementioned examinations of land tenure and violent conflict look at the role that national actors play in fomenting violence. In these studies the behavior of political elites or the central government is the decisive factor that influences the outbreak of violence. This study, by contrast, looks at local institutions and

the part that they play in land tenure and how that affects outbreaks of violence.

Ethnicity and Violent Conflict

The study of the relationship between ethnicity and violence in Africa has been a constantly evolving process. Fearon and Laitin argue that low-level societal ethnic violence is in reality an extremely rare event (1996). They also posit that institutional mechanisms, namely in group policing and apprehension concerning out of control violence, work to prevent ethnic violence. Bhavnani and Backer, by contrast, find that in-group policing may also be detrimental, specifically when it is employed to promote ethnic violence instead of being used to deescalate ethnic antagonism (2000).

Large n cross-national studies, such as those conducted by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found ethnic fractionalization to be insignificant in terms of its effect on civil war. Rather than settling the debate, these studies provoked a new debate among scholars which concerned whether or not the indices of ethnic fractionalization were actually capturing the desired concept. As such new measures were introduced, such as PREG (Posner 2004). New approaches to the study of ethnicity and violence were introduced as well. As one example Cedarman and Girardin (2007) found that the state plays a major role in ethnonationalist conflict when an ethnic minority is in power and an ethnic majority is out of power. One drawback to their study is that they did not include sub-Saharan Africa because it was too difficult to code cases in the region. Moreover, Cederman and Girardin's investigation focuses on the ethnicization of political positions and does not consider violence that may be instigated by features of the state that may not be related to ethnic identities. These limitations point to the importance of more extensive research on the topic.

Dunning and Harrison (2010) look at the role that the cross-cutting attributes of *cousinage* play in terms of ethnic politics. They find that *cousinage* engenders cross-cutting ties that deemphasize the link between ethnicity and political behavior. Given the similarities in the cases of Burkina Faso and Mali, their findings may have implications for this study, despite the fact that their investigation does not look at violent conflict. More specifically, perhaps *cousinage* weakens the link between ethnicity and violence in Burkina Faso.

Cousinage occurs between specific groups in Burkina Faso and not all groups have *cousinage* relationships (Sissao 2002). In this study we are most concerned with the relationship between herders of the Fulani ethnicity and farmers of one of a number of ethnicities (Mossi, Lobi, Kassina etc). However the Fulani only have *cousinage* links with one ethnicity in Burkina Faso which are the Bobo (Sissao 2002). However, perhaps *cousinage* engenders an environment in which even ethnicities that do not share a formal *cousinage* link are still able to use the institution to deescalate ethnic tensions. In other words, *cousinage* is so pervasive that it even mitigates conflicts between ethnic groups that are not traditionally linked through *cousinage*.

This study uses a new approach to examine how ethnicity plays a role in outbreaks of violent conflict in Africa. Osgood et al (1957) argue that how a person behaves in a situation is contingent upon what the situation means or signifies to him. Edelman's analysis deals with the symbolic dehumanizing images of the enemy (1957). It also concerns how individual actors characterize (caricature) members of different groups. According to Edelman (1964; 31), "it is characteristic of large numbers of people to see and think in terms of stereotypes, personalization, and oversimplification, that they

cannot recognize or tolerate ambiguous and complex situations, and that they accordingly respond chiefly to symbols that oversimplify and distort." Moreover Edelman (1964; 191) argues that divisions among groups on policy issues create potent symbols that further differentiate the groups. Do stereotypes and oversimplifications that producer groups hold for their rival have an effect on whether or not they participate in group violence? In terms of this study do the negative images that an individual holds of a rival ethnic group have an effect on the individual's participation in violence?

Communal Conflict-The Burkina Context

Explanations abound for why some conflicts between farmers and herders have more deadly characteristics in Burkina Faso. Several scholars have concentrated specifically on explaining the causes for incidences of violent conflict between the two groups in Burkina Faso. Due to the similarities between conflicts between farmers and herders in West Africa, I also make reference to some cases that occur in neighboring countries, specifically Mali, Cote d'Ivoire and Niger.

Some observers have cited deep seated animosity between members of different ethnic groups as the primary factor that increases an individual's proclivity to participate in violent conflict. In Burkina, journalistic accounts typically provide a narrative that paints the violent feuds as ethnically driven (*Le Pays* 2007 and 2008, *Sidwaya* 2007 and 2008, *L'Evénement* 2007). Even noted African history scholar Joseph Ki Zerbo characterized farmer-herder conflicts in Burkina Faso as the "embryonic stage of a genocide."

Hagberg's examination of violent conflict in Burkina Faso also emphasizes the role that ethnic antagonism plays in fueling violent conflicts that usually fall along lines

demarcated by ethnic identity (1998). In most cases, herders of Fulani extraction are in conflict with farmers of any number of other ethnic identities. I agree that, in some cases, ethnic divisions may help fuel the violence, yet these ethnic divisions are salient in almost all conflicts and not all such conflicts lead to violence. In fact members of both occupations frequently refer to the opposing group in derisive terms grounded in ethnic stereotypes but this behavior does not typically result in violent confrontations. For example, a Mossi farmer may refer to a Fulani herder as untrustworthy. These kinds of stereotypes and concomitant verbal jousting are pervasive in Burkina Faso. Most typically they are manifested in social interactions within the context of *cousinage*, or joking relationships, which serve to diffuse rather inflame conflict (Sissao 2002).

As noted in the introduction of the dissertation, farmer-herder conflict can be found throughout West Africa. Therefore it is useful to discuss the findings of scholars that have examined similar research questions yet in different contexts. I now turn to a broader discussion of farmer-herder conflict in West Africa. Beeler, for example, examines the role that social capital plays in preventing conflict between farmers and herders in Mali and concludes that ethnic animosity outweighs social capital. In her examination, Beeler notes that while in-group social capital (Soninke and Soninke) helps resolve conflicts, out-group (Soninke and Fulani) social capital is trumped by ethnicity (2006). Damage done to a field by a Fulani is not tolerated by a farmer although social capital may exist between the two individuals. Meanwhile if a Soninke's animals cause destruction to a Soninke farmer's field their ethnic bonds and linkages through associational life tend to deescalate the conflict.

Other observers argue that the capitalist system imposed by colonizers led to

market integration which in turn created hostility between Fulanis and farmers (Davidheiser and Luna 2008). They also claim that the colonial government obliterated existing political systems which fostered herder-farmer symbiosis. This critique is short-sighted; to lay all the blame at the feet of colonization and the introduction of capitalism is simplistic. A shift to a market economy certainly altered relations between farmers and herders yet it cannot explain why some individuals participate in violent conflict and others do not participate. Their argument also does not explain variation in violent conflict between farmers and herders since colonization is a treatment that most African countries have experienced. Moreover, pre-colonial institutions, despite colonization, have not been obliterated and are still highly relevant.

Benjaminsen and Ba argue that local political authorities have exacerbated conflicts between farmers and herders in Mali by seeking rents in dispute resolutions (2009). Frustration gives way to violence as members of both groups realize that institutions responsible for conflict resolution are willing to render their judgment in exchange for the most lucrative bribe. Although the examination focuses on Mali, the numerous similarities that the country shares with Burkina make the findings relevant. They also call for a deeper examination of the actors (farmers, herders, traditional leaders and local authorities) that are central to conflicts of this genre. My study heeds the suggestion and pays closer attention to not only the individual actors (farmers and herders), but also to the institutional actors involved in conflict mitigation (both modern and customary). This dissertation looks at the mechanisms, or more specifically the institutions, that manage the use of these scarce resources.

Basset (1988) uses a political ecology approach which identifies a set of broader (macro) processes of change within specific historical contexts as the driving forces behind conflicts over resources. Basset argues that the deterioration in the marginal standard of living of farmers combined with uncompensated destruction of crops gives rise to violent incidences in northern Cote d'Ivoire. Basset argues that these conflicts contain structural factors related to the larger political economy. Basset does not fully specify the relationship between these structural factors and macro-level dimensions of the political economy of Cote d'Ivoire. Moreover, he overlooks the role that local institutions play in mitigating conflict between farmers and herders.

Turner also uses a political ecology approach in his examination of farmer-herder conflicts in Mali and Niger. He argues that disputes may be embedded within material struggles but they also mirror substantive underlying perspectives concerning proper resource use, community, memory, interpersonal relations and, priority in customary law (2004). As one example Turner brings up the issue that in West Africa cattle are a symbol of wealth, someone else's wealth. Therefore when a farmer strikes back at a herder's animals or the herder, he is striking out at a higher socio-economic class in a context of unequal wealth distribution in rural areas. Turner also laments the approach of scholars who frame the conflicts as "here and now" scrambles over available resources. Turner contends that most violence of this genre results from strategic longer-term choices by herders rather than 'heat of the moment" outbursts. Turner also recommends that researchers should not only examine the material interests but also the moral claims and narratives that drive these conflicts.

This study avoids looking at violent conflicts in a vacuum. The research design, particularly the event histories and case studies, considers the narratives of the conflicts that have occurred. The event histories offered in chapter eight paint in great detail the events related to the emergence of the conflict and thus circumvents the approach that touts the "here and now" violent scramble for natural resources. By the same token, by focusing too closely on one case one takes the risk of telling the story of only one case. I endeavor to look at several cases rather than focusing on one in an attempt to identify generalizable threads.

Leading Hypothesis: The Role of Institutions

In this study the leading explanation for the emergence of communal violence is grounded in institutional theory. According to North (1990) institutions influence human interaction by defining and restricting the set of choices faced by individuals. I argue that local institutions, whether they are the recently instituted formal kind or a traditional form rooted in pre-colonial beliefs, should influence whether or not land based conflicts turn into violent confrontations. Local institutions that lack capacity are unable to meet the needs of individuals and thus are poorly situated to mitigate land based conflict. As such, local institutions lacking capacity should lead to situations where low scale conflicts are unable to be effectively resolved thus giving rise to violent confrontations. Institutional capacity refers to the ability of an institution to effectively achieve its goals. Local political institutions now play an important role in managing local natural resources, while local traditional leaders have conventionally held an essential position in resource management. The degree to which the aforementioned institutions are able to effectively manage the resources may have an effect on individual behavior and attitudes.

In theory, decentralized, modern institutions should be better situated to prevent and manage resource conflicts than indigenous, traditional institutions. The reasons are twofold. First, local modern forms of government are democratic in nature, although sometimes only nominally. CVDs and mayors are accountable in the sense that they must deliver public goods or they risk losing their elected position. It would make sense therefore that local governmental institutions provide a service or outcomes that prevent or resolve land-based conflicts.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, since 1984, with the passage of the RAF (*Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière*) under the Sankara regime, the ownership of all rural land was transferred over to the state. As noted earlier this act was an effort to break down and disempower traditional hierarchical forms of land ownership. To this day the RAF is still in place (with some minor modifications) and, needless to say, *chef de terres* and other traditional chiefs feel deeply marginalized by the act. Perhaps the passage of the RAF fostered a situation whereby traditional institutions lost their influence and ability to prevent the outbreak of land-based conflict. This study will provide excellent insight into whether or not these institutions still play an important role in conflict mitigation.

I also hypothesize that traditional institution that lack capacity increase the potential for the occurrence of violent conflict. As evidenced in the discussion of land tenure in Chapter 4, Burkinabé still look to traditional leaders as authorities in the realm of land use management. Finally, although the institutional capacity of local institutions serve as the leading hypothesis, I also consider the role that other factors, such as associational life and interpersonal trust play in influencing the outbreak of violent

conflict.

Chapter 6: Methodology, Research Design and Case Selection

Micro-level analysis of Communal Conflict in Burkina Faso

The research design consists of three stages and employs a mixed methods approach by combining ethnographic research with the analysis of public opinion data collected in Burkina Faso in 2009 and Afrobarometer data collected in Liberia in 2008. This study also approaches the research question from two different level of analysis. The first two stages are executed at the meso, or village level, through an ethnographic approach. The final stage is conducted at the micro, or individual level and uses statistical methods to analyze the survey data collected in Burkina Faso and Liberia. The goal was to test the results of Stages I and II with the results of Stage III, thus probing the robustness of the results.

The employment of mixed methods has gained increased respect as a research approach in political science. An advantage of using multiple methods is that it presents information from one method that was not identified in an alternative approach (Axinn and Pearce 2007). It also makes sure that a potential bias originating from one method is not replicated. Blakie (2000) argues that this eclectic approach has been most useful in reducing error or bias but less useful in establishing the existence of a phenomenon or the value of a given variable. In the mixed-methods approach, otherwise referred to as triangulation, data sources are combined to study the same social phenomenon (Denzin 1978, Jick 1979, Patton 1990).

Blakie (2000) cautions that use of a mixed methods approach is frequently just "lip service" and that the two or more methods used rarely converge to shed helpful light on the research question. Blakie also criticizes the use of different methods that have

different ontological assumptions. Blakie contends that one of the most legitimate and practical ways to use the approach is through the sequential combination of methods.

This present research design uses different methods in sequence, in a series of stages. According to Blakie (2000):

> "A common example of such stages occurs in good survey research when an exploratory phase, that might include observation or even participant observation, and perhaps, in depth interviewing, is used to assess respondents' level of or knowledge about or awareness of the issue being investigated, the meanings associated with it, and the range of possible responses that they might have if asked a particular question about it. The results of this investigation can then be used to develop, say, a structured interview schedule that approaches the phenomenon from the point of view of the researcher's construction of reality (271)."

Sieber (1973) offers a useful approach to the integration of ethnographic field work and survey data. The present research design employs some of Sieber's suggestions. Sieber argues that fieldwork can contribute to the development of a meaningful survey design. My approach to the use of mixed methods is a developmental process, rather than the creation of one or more fixed points that which may then serve as lenses through which to observe a single political phenomenon.

A distinct challenge of this research design is the step from small n analysis (SNA) at the village-level to large n analysis (LNA) at the individual level. Lieberman's discussion of combining LNA and SNA supports the use of SNA to test or build upon LNA models but he also outlines another approach:

> "The findings from SNA can form the basis for valid LNA. Close-range analysis of one or a few cases can be akin to developing a survey instrument through open-ended interviews and focus groups using a small sample of cases before fielding a large-scale survey. (2005: 449)."

My preparatory field visit to Burkina Faso in 2007 was used to stimulate theory

construction. Information gleaned at that time from in-depth interviews of key observers of violent conflict enhanced my understanding of the context and gave me a more accurate understanding of the issues at hand. These initial interviews were conducted among government officials, civic activists, church and community leaders, and others in rural and urban areas. Insights from these interviews were incorporated into the research design. I also used my 2007 field visit to Burkina Faso to inform the construction of a survey instrument and the selection of cases to be used in the research design. Finally, the preliminary visit enabled me to consider how I should assemble a capable research team.

In the first stage of the research design for this project, I endeavored to obtain a foundational insight into the processes and dynamics of violent conflict in Burkina Faso by conducting interviews in villages that had experienced intense violent conflict. The construction of event histories revealed the dynamics of communal violence. In the second stage, I compared six villages, three which had experienced violent conflict and three which had not, in order to begin to identify the factors that might predict violent communal conflict between producer groups. In the initial phase of the third, and final, stage of the research design I collected and analyzed public opinion data based on a representative random sample of four provinces in Burkina Faso where violent communal conflict is prevalent. And, in the second component of the final stage of the research design, I the examined the research question through the analysis of survey data collected in Liberia. The remainder of this chapter describes the three stages in greater depth.

Stage I: Construction of Event Histories in Villages that Have Experienced Violence

The first step in this project is to use the method of process tracing to examine the circumstances that give rise to violence in the areas that have had such a history. This

component of the research design examined the micro-processes of civil conflict. In process tracing a researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal processes a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case are in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case (Bennett and George 2001, George and Bennett 2005, Bennett and Elman 2006). Process tracing constructs a causal pathway that has occurred in a single case through a long complex formalized causal chain. It is essentially a series of *n*=1 observations. King, Keohane and Verba (1994) regard the chief merit of process tracing as its ability to increase the number of observations while Brady and Collier (2004) posit that it creates a chain of observations, not simply multiple observations of the same phenomena. For the purposes of this study, I tend to subscribe to Brady and Collier's view of process tracing. I regard the report of an event history as a causal process observation. This form of an observation provides "process-oriented causal inference (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 253)." Collier et al also note that a causal process observation "provides information about mechanism and context (2004, 253)." This approach allowed me to develop a kind of event history, through which I was able identify and describe sources of conflict, who the central actors and agents were, how the issues were framed, how the conflict arose, and whether it was tempered or escalated to violence.

Process tracing, in this case, can be used to examine how a dispute first emerged. It can then follow the sequences that led it to degenerate into violent conflict. The event histories in this study were assembled through examinations of newspaper archives, discussions with local leaders, members of the media who reported on the incidents, local police and gendarmes and interviews with witnesses and participants. At the very least,

process tracing allows me to offer a chronology of the events that eventually led to the group-on-group violence. Establishing the chronology of events is important because it allows the researcher to establish the causal chain. For example, in terms of this study, the issue of endogeneity is a perfectly reasonable critique in regards to causality. Put another way, it could be argued that a factor which I cite as enhancing the potential for violent episodes - low levels of associational life, as an example- is actually affected by violent episodes itself. Associational life may be diminished by violent conflict just as well as associational life may diminish the potential for violent conflict. A remedy for this problem is to carefully assemble event histories in order to more clearly and reliably ascertain the direction of causality and avoid issues of endogeneity. Small *n* analysis is best situated for confidently inferring the nature of causal order (Lieberman 2005).

In order to assemble event histories, I focused on the two Burkinabè villages, Perkoura and Sideradougou, which have experienced the most widely reported and most deadly conflicts between farmers and herders in recent years. Perkoura experienced violent conflict in 2008 and I was able to conduct interviews with people who witnessed or participated in the violence. The violence in Sideradougou, by contrast, occurred less recently yet I was still able to interview individuals who had witnessed or been affected by the violence. Moreover, since it had been such a newsworthy event there were many secondary sources, particularly Hagberg's 1998 work.

I will briefly outline how I applied the process-tracing method to examine the case of Perkoura.[21] To begin the process, I studied multiple information sources to reconstruct the events of the violent conflict that occurred there. I first examined

[21] The process tracing approach used to examine Perkoura mirrors the approach used for Sideradougou.

newspaper archives to identify articles that detailed the violent conflict. Next, I interviewed journalists who covered the story in the immediate aftermath of the incident.[22] The following step was to interview officials who had in-depth knowledge of the case. These included government functionaries who work for the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Decentralization and Territories in the capital, Ouagadougou. This was followed by interviews in regional capitals with *prefets*, governors and regional directors who represent the Ministry of Agriculture.

In addition to interviewing regional political authorities to gather information, it was an important step to meet with them in a step-by-step fashion. Often, regional authorities, before they would speak to me, would phone up the chain of command to confirm that I had followed proper protocol and gone through the appropriate channels. In Perkoura, for example I met with the mayor of the commune and also interviewed the prefet of the *arrondisement* (the equivalent of a county) and they were both concerned that I had met with their higher-ups, in this case the governor. Once they felt confident that I had been properly vetted by their superiors, these officials offered unparalleled insight into the events that led up to the violence and the steps that were taken to resolve it. Because they had been involved in calming the violence, they had firsthand experience with how the conflict started and the identities of the groups involved.

The final phase of data collection necessary to assemble and construct the event history consisted of making several trips to the village of Perkoura myself to interview members of the community. This step always began with greeting village dignitaries,

[22] The two newspapers are L'Observateur-Paalga and L'Evenement. L'Observateur-Paalga is a daily and the most widely read newspaper in Burkina Faso. L'Evenement is published twice a month and is known for its deeper analysis of current events. Both newspapers are privately owned.

usually including the village chief and members of his entourage. In some cases, the village chief was not present and my research assistant and I would have to wait several hours until he arrived before we could move on to interview other members of the community. Following these formalities, the first interview in the village was usually with a group of village elders that also included the village chief, *chef de terres* and CVDs. Subsequent interviews were with individuals and focus groups that were composed of members of one of the several groups which were of interest to the study, that is, farmers, herders or women. It was difficult to make contact with Fulani herders in this village due to the history of conflict between the two groups. Because of this, I had to search out Fulanis who had fled Perkoura and now lived in nearby villages. I was able to interview Fulanis who had relocated to the village of Gouroum Gouroum. Through this active search process, I believe I was able to contract and conduct effective interviews with significant parties representing all sides of the conflict.

After the completion of the initial research into conflict in Perkoura and Sideradougou (the process here was much the same as in Perkoura) I had a significantly improved understanding of how violent communal conflict between farmers and herders starts. It was important for me to gain insight into how violent conflicts emerge by working backwards to identify the factors that contributed to the events. By assembling a set of observations, in this case the events that lead to violent conflict, I gained insight into the factors that explain incidences of violent communal conflict. Based on these findings I formulated the second stage of the research design.

Stage II: Comparative Case Studies

Case Selection

Having focused exclusively on violent cases I then move to an exploration of

variation in violence and in areas where it is most present, principally rural zones. As noted by Varshney (2002), variance in the dependent variable is key to understanding the factors that give rise to violence. As such appropriate selection of cases is important (Geddes 2003). Horowitz argues a similar point, that quiescence and violence studied together provide much more potential in terms of explanatory power than do examinations of quiescence in general Cases of borderline episodes are the most useful in which ceteris paribus logic can be used (Horowitz 2001; 479). Given the numerous instances of conflict occurrence which lacked violent outcomes, there were many "borderline cases" that could be examined. As such I compared villages that experienced violence and villages that had near misses in terms of violent conflict.

In Stage II, the study shifts to a comparison of similar cases that only vary in terms of the dependent variable. This stage presents the village as the level of analysis and compares the differences between villages that were purposively selected with the criteria that half of them have experienced violent conflict and the other half have not. The approach of purposive selection has inherent weaknesses, the least of which is selection bias, yet it served an important role in the investigation. Case studies provide in depth knowledge of a political phenomenon.

A review of newspaper archives and discussions with scholars who study land-based conflicts allowed me to compile a list of villages that have recently experienced violent conflict (within the past six years) between the producer groups.[23] Once I had identified and selected the villages that experienced violent conflict, I sought to identify neighboring villages that were similar in all or most characteristics with the exception of

[23] This list is presented in Chapter Seven.

experiences with violent conflict. The goal was to compare and contrast the villages in order to identify the reasons for which one village would experience violence while the other would not (Lijphart 1971, Mill 2002).

Another criterion was that the villages lie within a relatively similar climatic zone. Burkina Faso can be roughly divided into two climatic zones, Savanna and Sahel. Selecting four provinces in the Savanna region that are similar climatically allows me to control for one more variable. The provinces that were selected are located in the south Sudanian zone of the Savanna where average annual rainfall typically exceeds 900 mm. The region has two seasons; a dry season that runs from November to late April and a rainy season that occupies the remaining months. Moreover the four provinces share comparable species rich vegetation found in savannah, forests and numerous water sources. Rather than choose provinces that vary dramatically in climatic terms, such as the Plateau and Sahel regions, I chose provinces in regions that share similar agro-ecological features (Ouedraogo 2003).[24]

The six cases were arranged in pairs. Each pair of villages is located in the same province and within a relatively short distance from one another. Also the ethnic composition of each pair of villages is identical. Tiakane and AVV 2 are both located in Nahouri province and are similar in all regards with the exception of experiences with violent communal conflict. Loropeni and Perkoura of Poni Province and Bilbalgo and Gogo of Zoundweogo represent the other two pairings. Table 6-1 shows the six villages that were purposively chosen according to variation in the dependent variable.

[24] Although I conducted research (including surveys) in all four provinces, the case studies are drawn from three provinces (Poni, Nahouri and Zoundweogo). Due to logisitical reasons I was able to spend most of my time in the field in these three provinces.

Table 6-1: Comparison of cases

Province	Village	Experienced violent conflict
Poni	Perkoura	Yes
	Loropeni	No
Zoundweogo	Gogo/AVV3	Yes
	Bilbalgo	No
Nahouri	Kampala	Yes
	Tiakane	No

A number of methods were used to unpack the factors that explain why some villages experience violent conflicts between farmers and herders. Information was drawn from in-depth interviews with members of both producer groups, focus groups and elite interviews. The interviews, with the exception of elite interviews, took part in villages which had been selected with variation on the dependent variable. The first step for research that was conducted in villages was to have an introductory meeting with the village chief. After this initial visit, subsequent visits focused on interviews and interactions with other members of the community. Interviews with villagers followed a semi-structured format to allow the respondent to speak freely. Focus groups provided a more natural setting than the one-on one interviews and it fostered a dynamic whereby villagers discussed amongst themselves. Focus group discussions revealed details that may have not emerged during individual interviews. Focus groups can be used in a preliminary capacity to develop the content of questionnaires (Morgan 1996; 134). This attribute proved important in the last stage of research.

It was not difficult to set up interviews with farmers, but this was not the case for discussions with herders. Given their lifestyle, herders were more difficult to contact.

When this was the case the research team would frequently have to make a conscious effort to move outside the village to locate Fulani camps.[25] In some cases Fulani camps were several miles outside of the village itself and given the lack of roads the research team would have to go there on foot. In the case of AVV3 (like Perkoura), where violent conflict had driven out the Fulani population, the research team was obligated to seek out the Fulani population in surrounding villages where they sought refuge in the aftermath of the confrontation.

The comparison of villages that varied in violent experiences allowed me to identify several explanatory factors. There was a common thread that emerged in villages that experienced violence. Moreover the depth of the examination provided greater confidence in the causal chain of violence. The generalizability of the results however is limited due to the small number of observations. The next step in the investigation was to test the results of the case study at a different level and with a contrasting methodological approach. Additionally, results of this investigation were used to develop a structured interview schedule to provide insight into the same research question but through a different analytic lens. Based on the results of the first two stages of the research design, this study develops quantifiable indicators at the individual level.

Stage III- Collection and Analysis of Individual Level Survey Data
Burkina Faso

This stage turns to a micro-level analysis of the research topic. This section details the design, execution and analysis of an original survey conducted in 2009. Through means of a survey of 400 respondents drawn from a random sample of the representative

[25] At this point the research team consisted of myself and an interpreter. The research team expanded during the survey data collection stage.

population of four different provinces (Nahouri, Cascades, Zoundweogo and Poni) I examine the factors that lead to communal violence between farmers and herders. Each province consists of a number of communes and the number of respondents for each commune was chosen as a function of the size of the commune's population. The objective of Stage III is to see if the results obtained in Stages I and II extend into the quantitative analysis. By means of logit regression models I seek to identify the factors that increase the probability that an individual will approve of or take part in violence. I present two models; the first is attitudinal, namely, to what degree do people support violence as an option? The second is behavioral; to what degree do people participate in violent conflict?

Questionnaire Formulation

Although I did have a questionnaire created before leaving for the field I did not finalize it until after the completion of a preliminary round of visits to sites where violent conflict had taken place. This allowed me to add questions that probed in greater depth the issues germane to incidences of violent conflict. As one example, factors that I had not considered before, such as the role of traditional institutions in conflict mitigation emerged as a compelling explanation for lower levels of violent conflict and I introduced questions to more fully query the subject. The first round of visits also offered me the chance to remove questions that were not particularly relevant to the study. In addition, I was better situated to phrase survey questions in a way that respondents would best understand the question. I employed research assistants to help translate the

questionnaire. This was an important step since Burkinabé have a solid understanding of colloquial rather than just formal French.

In order to interrogate issues pertaining to the images and stereotypes of members of different groups (tribal-ethnic and occupational (herders, farmers) a semantic differential scale was used in the questionnaire. Osgood et al (1957) argue that how a person behaves in a situation is contingent upon what the situation means or signifies to him. The differentials allow for the "successive allocation of a concept to a point in the multidimensional semantic space by selection from among a set of given scaled semantic alternatives (Osgood et al 1957; 26)." The results could help account for people's justification for and engagement in collective actions including violent conflict. The semantic scale will also be helpful in providing into insight into how different groups regard each other. The semantic differential gave insight into the symbolic interactionist framework used by Edelman (1957).

Recruitment and Training of Research Assistants

Interviewers were recruited based on their previous experience conducting interviews and the criteria that they had knowledge of at least two languages. Each interviewer attended a training session that dealt with interviewer protocol, interviewer methods and how to properly complete a questionnaire. Actual questionnaires were only printed in French, so it was imperative that each research assistant had an idea of how he was going to pose questions in the national languages. It was helpful to have the research assistants discuss together how questions could be best phrased so as ensure comprehension on the part of the respondent. Each research assistant had the opportunity

to conduct pilot interviews before having to conduct actual interviews.[26] After the pilot session we met for a debriefing session to discuss the challenges of the interview and ways to improve upon it. I accompanied each sortie, but I did not sit in on each interview.

Data entry was performed by two research assistants who were trained to use CS Pro software.[27] I sat in on these work sessions to assure quality control and to answer any questions that the data entry technicians had. Open-ended responses were included in the data set. Statisticians from CGD created a template and were able to enter the data into STATA.[28]

Sampling Methods

The first step in sampling was to identify the secondary sampling unit (SSU) which is the smallest, well-defined geographic entity for which reliable population data is obtainable. In the case of Burkina Faso these units are communes and I was able to obtain population data from the *Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie* (INSD or National Institute of Statistics and Demographics). In Burkina Faso the state is divided into regions followed by provinces, and then finally communes.

In the first stages of sampling communes were selected by probability proportionate to population size (PPPS). This provided the assurance that more populated geographical units had a proportionally greater probability of selection. Tables 6-2 through 6-5 list the four provinces along with their respective commune's population

[26] A number of the research assistants learned new skill sets through their participation in the training and data collection which enhanced their chances for employment with other organizations. As one example I was able to facilitate an arrangement whereby five of the assistants were employed by the Peace Corps as research assistants.

[27] CS Pro is a software package that was developed by the US Census bureau and is available as a free download. http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/cspro/

[28] CGD- Centre de Gouvernance Democratique

distribution. In Table 6-2, for example, the Commune of Guiaro composes 15 percent of the population of the Province of Nahouri, so fifteen of the hundred respondents of the province were from Guiaro. The Commune of Po makes up approximately 20% of the population of Nahouri Province and as such supplied twenty respondents.

Table 6-2: Distribution of the rural population in Nahouri Province

Rural Commune	Number of inhabitants	Proportion	Number of respondents
GUIARO	19,352	.15	15
PO	27,232	.20	20
TIEBELE	54,985	.41	41
ZECCO	9,204	.07	7
ZIOU	21,978	.17	17
Total	**132,751**	**1**	**100**

Table 6-3: Distribution of the rural population in Comoé Province

Rural Commune	Number of inhabitants	Proportion	Number of respondents
BANFORA	33,907	.11	11
MANGODARA	51,799	.17	17
MOUSSODOUGOU	22,323	.07	7
NIANGOLOKO	31,828	.10	10
OUO	23,508	.08	8
SIDERADOUGOU	75,397	.24	24
SOUBAKANIEDOUGOU	28,073	.09	9
TIEFORA	42,466	.14	14
Total	**309,301**	**1**	**100**

Table 6-4: Distribution of the rural population in Poni Province

Rural Commune	Number of inhabitants	Proportion	Number of respondents
BOUROUM-BOUROUM	30,295	.13	13
BOUSSERA	17,834	.08	8
DJIGOUE	20,319	.09	9
GAOUA	27,629	.12	12
GOMBLORA	18,793	.08	8
KAMPTI	43,850	.19	19
LOROPENI	45,191	.19	19
NAKO	27,916	.12	12
Total	**231,827**	**1**	**100**

Table 6-5: Distribution of the rural population in Zoundweogo Province

Rural Commune	Number of inhabitants	Proportion	Number of respondents
BERE	28,738	.12	12
BINDE	36,512	.15	15
GOGO	38,208	.16	16
GOMBOUSSOUGOU	46,420	.19	19
GUIBA	30,157	.12	12
MANGA	33,042	.13	13
NOBERE	32,870	.13	13
Total	**245,947**	**1**	**100**

In the second stage, I randomly selected primary sampling units (PSU's) from within each selected SSU. In this study villages are the PSU. The goal was to have eight interviews conducted in each village. For example, as evidenced in Table 6-2, the Commune of Guiaro composes fifteen percent of the total population of the Province of Nahouri, therefore fifteen interviews were scheduled for the commune. As such two villages, Pore and Koumbili, were randomly selected from the list of villages located in the commune of Guiaro. In Pore eight interviews were conducted, while seven interviews were conducted in Koumbili. In some cases, in order to save time and money, more than eight interviews were conducted in one village, but every effort was made to avoid this. In Table 6-3, for instance, one can see that a total of twenty interviews were scheduled for the Commune of Po. Ten interviews were conducted in Gougogo and Songo1, respectively. This exception is similar to the exception made in the Round Four Afrobarometer Survey manual to reduce the traveling distance between PSUs, and hence the costs of fieldwork. In one case, in the commune of Moussoudougou, an EA was inaccessible due to a bridge that had been washed out. In this case substitution became necessary. We randomly drew another EA in the same stratum which was fortunately in more convenient location.

Table 6-6: Selected villages and number of respondents in each commune in Nahouri Province

Rural Commune	Number of villages	Names of villages	Number of respondents
GUIARO	02	Pore Koumbili	15
PO	02	Gougogo Songo1	20
TIEBELE	05	Sino Dollo Bloc AVV-V2 Brebie Goumpia	41
ZECCO	01	Gabie	7
ZIOU	02	Bouga Tamissougou	17
Total	**12**	**12**	**100**

Table 6-7: Selected villages and number of respondents in each commune in Comoé Province

Rural Commune	Number of villages	Names of villages	Number of respondents
BANFORA	01	Korogora	11
MANGODARA	02	Diomanidougou Gnamanidougou	17
MOUSSODOUGOU	01	Diamon	7
NIANGOLOKO	01	Mitieridougou	10
OUO	01	Konamisse	8
SIDERADOUGOU	03	Dalan Deregace Foungangoue	24
SOUBAKANIEDOUGOU	01	Dougoudioulama	9
TIEFORA	02	Kangounaba Koumoussanra	14
Total	**12**	**12**	**100**

Table 6-8: Selected villages and number of respondents in each commune in Poni Province

Rural Commune	Number of villages	Names of villages	Number of respondents
BOUROUM-BOUROUM	01	Timbarbirtionao	13
BOUSSERA	01	Sorpera	8
DJIGOUE	01	Kaleboukoura	9
GAOUA	01	Sampoli	12
GOMBLORA	01	Kelgbora	8
KAMPTI	02	Langara Timbikora	19
LOROPENI	02	Silaoinera Tako	19
NAKO	01	Guinguene	12
Total	**10**	**10**	**100**

Table 6-9: Selected villages and number of respondents in each commune in Zoundweogo Province

Rural Commune	Number of villages	Names of villages	Number of respondents
BERE	01	Signoghin	12
BINDE	02	Tambaongo (AVV SUD V) Nonghin	15
GOGO	02	Safoula Pissi	16
GOMBOUSSOUGOU	02	Sare peulh Kourguereya	19
GUIBA	01	Guiba	12
MANGA	01	Toula	13
NOBERE	01	Koakin	13
Total	**10**	**10**	**100**

In the third stage, we randomly selected sampling start-points (SSPs) within the selected PSUs. Neither household lists nor physical maps of selected villages were available; therefore the research team was obliged to randomly select a starting point in each village. Examples of randomly selected starting points included, wells, pumps, the biggest shade tree in the village, schools and the village chief's compound. After the SSP was selected interviewers were given a direction to follow and they headed out in this designated direction to conduct their interviews.

In the fourth stage, we randomly selected the pre-determined number of households within each selected PSU. We used a day code to establish the interval (n) between selected households. The day code was used to ensure randomness in the interval between selected households. We established the day code by adding together the numbers in the day of the month as follows. On the 4th, 13th and 22nd of the month the interval would be 4, but on the 7th, 16th and 25th it would be 7. Interviewers were directed to select the nth house on the right**,** walking in the pre-determined direction away from the SSP. After completing their first interview, interviewers continued on in the same direction, and select the nth household again making sure to count houses on both the right and the left. Due to the non-linear arrangement of houses in rural areas in some cases it was not possible to discern a left side or right side and as such we selected the nth house, regardless of the side it was on.

In the fifth and final stage, each research assistant randomly selected an individual respondent from each selected household. We used a gender quota to ensure that an equal number of men and women in the overall sample. If the interviewer's previous interview was with a female the next interview was to be done with a male. As such the interviewer would assign a number to all male household members over the age of eighteen. A member of the household was then directed to select a card from a deck of cards that represented the eligible members of the household. The person represented by this card was then interviewed. Research assistants made sure to have the respondent move to an area that was out of earshot of the rest of the community so as to encourage the respondent to speak freely and frankly. Sometimes this was just a simple move to a shade tree outside of the family compound or to a corner of the compound. Due to the sensitive

nature of the topic it was important that respondents felt that their responses were confidential.

Liberia

The final component of Stage III consists of testing the leading hypotheses with Afrobarometer public opinion data collected in Liberia. Fortunately, the Liberia data, collected in 2008, contains a number of questions that allow me to look at issues related to land use, violence and local institutions. The motivation of this analysis is to extend the examination of land and violence issues and explore whether or not the results found in the Burkina Faso case are portable to other contexts. To do this I analyzed the rural subset of the Liberia data.

The Afrobarometer is a series of public opinion surveys that measure the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa.[29] Twenty countries currently take part in the survey and there have now been four rounds of surveys, the latest of which was conducted in 2008 (which is actually the first round for Liberia). The Afrobarometer provides the most comprehensive public opinion data from Africa. The survey covers a wide array of topics, but some of the central themes are people's perceptions of concepts such as democracy, economic conditions, corruption, civic participation and interpersonal trust.

The Afrobarometer uses representative samples that ensure a minimal sampling error. Random selection is used at every stage of sampling and the sample is stratified to ensure that all major demographic segments of the population are included. Sample size varies from a minimum of 1,200 in each country to up to 2,400 or more for large and

[29]For more information, see http://www.afrobarometer.org.

diverse countries such as Nigeria. All interviews are face-to-face and conducted by professional interviewers in the language preferred by the respondent. The surveys are executed in a non-partisan manner by African partners, namely university research units or non-governmental organizations.

Chapter 7: Event Histories and Comparative Case Studies

"Il s'agit là d'un embryon génocidaire."
"It is the embryo of a genocide."

Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo describing the violent conflict between farmers and herders in Kankounandeni

Introduction

This chapter provides an examination and discussion of violent conflicts that have occurred in rural areas in Burkina Faso. The first section looks at the relationship between natural resource scarcity and occurrence of violent conflict. I next offer a detailed examination of two violent episodes. The goal of this component is to reconstruct the events leading up to the violent conflict, detail the composition of the groups in conflict, and, finally, describe how the violence occurred, plus its amplitude and intensity. The sources used to assemble the event histories are first-hand interviews with participants, witnesses, political and administrative authorities who responded to the situation and journalists, as well as newspaper and scholarly publications. The discussion demonstrates that violent conflicts typically commence with relatively banal events that are otherwise frequent occurrences. Given the banality of the sparks that typically precede the violence I then move to a systematic comparison of villages that vary in their experiences with violence. This step will provide insight into how commonplace events ubiquitous in most villages serve as stepping stones to violent outbursts. As such the second part of this chapter will compare violent and non-violent cases.

There have been many high-profile violent conflicts between farmers and herders in Burkina Faso. Table 7-1 provides a list and several details of the most violent conflicts that have occurred in the country. Comoé Province has been plagued with an inordinate amount of violent conflict in comparison with other provinces in Burkina Faso.

Table 7-1: List of violent herder-farmer conflicts in Burkina Faso[30]

Year	Province	Village	Deaths-Injuries	Other damages
1986	Comoé	Sideradougou	8 deaths, several people disappeared	Hundreds of animals slaughtered, houses robbed and destroyed.
1994	Kénédougou	Samarogouan et Sikorola	Multiple deaths	Animals killed and houses burned
1995	Comoé	Mangodara	7 deaths, 8 injuries	Hundred of cattle killed or lost, people missing or unaccounted for
1995	Kénédougou	Samarogouan	1 death	No widespread destruction
2001	Comoé	Mangodara	3 deaths, multiple injuries	Seven Fulani villages destroyed
2001	Comoé	Kankounandeni	6 deaths	Houses burned, hundreds of animals slaughtered
2002	Comoé	Farakorosso	1 death, several injured	Houses burned, 80 children without homes, hundreds of animals slaughtered
2004	Gourma	Baléré	10 deaths	Houses burned, hundreds of animals slaughtered,
2004	Nahouri	Kampala	2 deaths, 2 life-threatening injuries and other less serious injuries	Houses destroyed, people forced to flee. Fulanis unable to return to the village for two years
2006	Bam	Boulmiougou	1 death, several injured	No widespread destruction
2007	Zoundweogo	Gogo /AVV3	6 deaths, multiple injuries	Houses burned, thousands displaced, hundreds of animals killed
2008	Poni	Perkoura	2 deaths, multiple injuries	Houses burned, thousands displaced, motorcycles and other belongings destroyed
2008	Bougouriba	Tiankoura	6 deaths	Many herders forced to seek refuge with security forces
2010	Bam	Lefourba	Multiple injuries	Herders houses destroyed and over seventy persons displaced

[30] There is no database that chronicles all the violent conflicts between farmers and herders in Burkina Faso. I compiled this list and in my opinion it represents the most comprehensive and systematic list ever compiled. I examined the archives of Burkina's longest publishing daily newspaper, L'Observateur 1972- present. However there are still episodes that occurred that the L'Observateur missed.

The Role of Resource Scarcity

As noted in the literature review, several observers have argued that natural resource scarcity increases the potential for violent conflict (Kaplan 1994, Markakis 1997, Kahl 1998, Homer-Dixon 1999, Baechler 1999, Diamond 2005). Population density has grown steadily in Burkina Faso and it is possible that his had an effect on engendering greater levels of violence. In 1985 there were 29.4 inhabitants per square kilometer, followed by38.1 in 1996 and 58.1 in 2006.

Yet when we take a closer look at where violent conflict between farmers and herders has occurred in Burkina Faso it is not clear that natural resource scarcity is driving the violence. For the purposes of this study, I argue that natural resource scarcity is driven by the number of people competing over a finite resource in a given area. As such I use population density as a proxy for natural resource scarcity. Figure 7-2 presents population density data at the provincial, regional and national level. In Figure 7-2 we can see that provinces that experienced violent conflict did not have unusually high population densities. In fact in many cases where violence occurred the given provinces had lower population densities than the region to which they belong. Moreover, most typically the population density of the province where the violence occurred is lower than the average population density of the nation as a whole. It is not clear that areas with higher population densities are any more at risk of violent conflict than are areas with relatively low population densities.

Table 7-2: Population density and violent conflict [31]

Village	Year	Province	Population Density-km^2 Provincial level	Population Density- km^2 Regional, National
Sideradougou	1986	Comoé	11.7	13.7, 29.4
Samarogouan et Sikorola	1994	Kénédougou	24.4	40.7, 38.1
Mangodara	1995	Comoé	15.8	18.1, 38.1
Samarogouan	1995	Kénédougou	24.4	40.7, 38.1
Mangodara	2001	Comoé	26.6	28.8, 51.8
Kankounandeni	2001	Comoé	26.6	28.8, 51.8
Farakorosso	2002	Comoé	26.6	28.8, 51.8
Baléré	2004	Gourma	27.5	26.2, 51.8
Kampala	2004	Nahouri	41.9	56.7, 51.8
Boulmiougou	2006	Bam	67.4	60.6, 51.8
Gogo /AVV3	2007	Zoundweogo	68.3	56.7, 51.8
Perkoura	2008	Poni	35.0	38.4, 51.8
Tiankoura	2008	Bougouriba	36.0	38.4, 51.8
Lefourba	2010	Bam	67.4	60.6, 51.8

In only three of the cases (Gogo/AVV3 of Zoundweogo and Boulmiogou and Lefourba of Bam) where violence occurred is the population density of the province substantially higher than the regional population density.

Does population have an effect on the amplitude of the conflict? In other words are conflicts in more densely populated areas more deadly in nature? Figure 7-1 graphs the relationship between provincial population density and the intensity of the violence in

[31] The source of the population density data is the *Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie* (INSD or National Institute of Statistics and Demographics). The data is offered in tranches, 1985, 1996 and 2006.

terms of the number of deaths. According to Figure 7-1 higher population density does not increase the intensity of violence; rather they appear to have an inverse relationship.

Figure 7-1: Population density and violence intensity



n=13

A major caveat of the data just presented is that it is aggregated at the provincial level and thus tells little about variation in population density at the sub-provincial level. It would be much more useful to have the population density at the village level or at the commune level. Unfortunately population density data is not available for villages or for all communes for that matter. However I am able to present the population density at the commune level for two provinces where violent conflict occurred between producer groups. As we can see in Tables 7-3 and 7-4 none of the communes that experienced violent conflict had an inordinately high population density. In fact in the case of Comoe province, the two communes that experienced violent conflict, Mangodara (2001) and Sideradougou (1986 and 1995), have strikingly low population densities, 12 and 7, respectively. In Table 7-4, the population density of Tiankoura is only 22 inhabitants per

square kilometer.

Table 7-3: Population Density for Comoe Province

Commune	**Population**	**Surface area(km^2)**	**Density (inhabitants/km^2)**
Banfora	30.780	934	33
Bérégadougou	2.564	265	10
Mangodara	31.986	2.658	12
Moussodougou	6.865	296	23
Niangoloko	17.532	2.880	6
Ouo	7.142	2.856	3
Sidéradougou	27.676	3.788	7
Soubakouiedogou	17.990	847	21
Tiéfora	24.750	1.073	23

Source : INSD 1996

Table 7-4: Population Density for Bougouriba Province

Commune	**Population**	**Surface area(km^2)**	**Density (inhabitants/km^2)**
Bondigui	12 622	502	25
Diébougou (Provincial capital)	12 341	56	220
Dolo	8 940	475	19
Lolonioro	9 540	788	12
Tiankoura	12 442	556	22

Source : INSD 1996

Although this is an albeit limited view of the relationship between natural resource scarcity and violent conflict it does provide us with some insight. Due to the relative unavailability of population density data we are only able to look at a small number of cases. According to the data presented in Tables 7-2, 7-3 and 7-4 areas that experienced violent conflict did not appear to have strikingly higher population densities than areas that did not experience violent conflict.

Event Histories of Violent Conflict

There are many parallels between the thirteen cases listed in Table 7-1 in terms of how the conflicts started. "The farmer found the animals in his field." These words or a similar variation of the refrain typically precede a description of how a violent conflict broke out between farmers and herders. The violent conflict of Kankounandeni which occurred in June of 2001 serves as an example (Journal de Jeudi, 2001). Here, before several hundred farmers and *Dozo* hunters installed themselves just south of a herders' camp to plan an attack on the Fulanis, cattle had entered a farmer's field. In this case six herders were killed, the youngest victim an eleven year-old boy. Immediately prior to the violence in Kampala in 2004, several cows had grazed in a farmer's millet field. Preceding the violent outbreak and murder of three people in Mangodara in 2001 several cows had sought water from a water source usually reserved for human consumption (Hagberg 1998). In order to gain a better idea of how these conflicts are transformed from cows wandering into a field to deadly encounters between farming and herding communities, the ensuing section will examine in greater depth two violent conflicts: Sideradougou and Perkoura.

Sideradougou

Sideradougou stands out as one of the bloodiest conflicts that have ever occurred between farmers and herders in Burkina Faso. The Sideradougou conflict, which pitted Karaboro farmers against Fulani herders, happened in December of 1996 and resulted in the deaths of seven people. Equally alarming as the death toll is the systematic manner in which the violence was prosecuted. According to the Deputy Mayor of the Commune of Sideradougou, "Karaboro farmers fired on Fulanis like they were hunting animals." The

original site of the conflict actually occurred in the village of Noumousso, which is situated four kilometers to the west of Sideradougou.

Sten Hagberg recounts the dynamics of the incident and his work provides probably the most detailed account ever offered of a violent conflict between farmers and herders in Burkina Faso (Hagberg 1998). The account offered in this section relies on first-hand interviews with witnesses of the conflict and Hagberg's description. Interviews in Sideradougou were conducted in March, April and September of 2009. Although the conflict started in one village; it was regenerated in multiple nearby villages and thus pitted Fulanis against farmers of multiple ethnic identifications.[32]

As in the majority of disputes between farmers and herders, this conflict commenced with cattle passing through a farmer's field. The damages were incurred by a Karaboro farmer at the hand (or hooves) of a Fulani's cattle, however unlike other conflicts this incidence occurred during the dry season when most agricultural activities are usually suspended. The initial incident was witnessed by several Karaboro women who went and informed the owner of the field. The field owner's son headed to the field armed with a gun and when he met the herder the two of them began to discuss the situation. The Fulani claimed that the field had been harvested and thus was open to grazing by his animals. The Karaboro disagreed with the Fulani's contention and a shouting match ensued. The Karaboro subsequently shot and killed the herder. The farmer returned to his village and then turned himself into the gendarmes (Hagberg 1998).

[32] Interview with Deputy Mayor of the Commune of Sideradougou, March 2009.

Fulanis heard of the death of their co-ethnic and went to the field to prepare the body for funeral. At this point the local security forces made a critical error and allowed the father of the suspected of killer to return to the field. The father was brought to the field to help an agricultural agent assess the extent of the damage to his field. This incendiary decision served as the spark that took the conflict to another level of violence. Fulanis felt insulted by the presence of the father of the alleged killer and beat the man to death.[33] When the body of the dead Karaboro farmer was brought to the chief's house this triggered greater anti-Fulani sentiment among the Karaboro.

In another instance that raised the tenor of the conflict, a Fulani attempted to pass through an area where a number of Karaboro were mourning the death of their comrade. Accounts differ here in terms of what transpired. Karaboros claimed that the Fulani was armed and a threat. Others disagree and say that the Fulani was unarmed (Hagberg 1998). Sensing a threat, Karaboros organized themselves and endeavored to seek and kill Fulanis. From here the conflict became more ferocious with people murdered, cattle gunned down, destruction of farm fields, camps burned and ravaged and thousands of people displaced. A vicious cycle was unleashed. As Fulani were murdered their animals became unfettered and entered into farm fields in greater numbers thus raising the ire of the farmers. Eventually military forces from Bobo Dioulasso arrived to calm the situation.

Like other violent conflicts in Burkina Faso there were a number of factors that preceded the violent conflict in Sideradougou. Both producer groups had grievances with the opposing group. Fulani herders were frustrated with the lack of respect that farmers

[33] Interview in Sideradougou September 2009

paid to transhumance routes which in turn may have increased illegal grazing practices.[34] Fulani herders were also perturbed with repeated thefts of cattle. By the same token, farmers were aggravated by repeated destruction of crops. This may explain why cows entering a field, otherwise most likely devoid of crops, could invoke such an intense and violent reaction on the part of the farmer.

Given the pervasiveness of conflicts between the two groups leading up to the violent eruption, it is worthwhile to examine the role that institutions typically engaged with conflict resolution played, or failed to play, in preventing the violence.

According to one Fulani who witnessed the violence:

> "Before the violence happened, there were too many instances where herders' animals destroyed farmer's crops. It would happen a first time, a second time and by the third time farmers would seek to resolve the conflict through violence. Herders were also frustrated. The government created corridors through which herders could bring their animals without disturbing farm fields. Sometimes herders would take the animals down the corridors to pasture in the morning and when they would return in the evening the corridor would have been planted with crops. That also brings a problem. People did not seek to resolve the conflict with the Tiefo *chef de terres* or the prefet. This is what brought the violence between the two groups."[35]

The reference to the ethnicity of the *chef de terres* of the Sideradougou area is an important point. The problem here is that the Fulani and Karaboro are both ethnic groups that migrated to Sideradougou from other regions. The ethnic group that claims to be the first inhabitants of the area is the Tiefo and thus occupies the institution of *chef de terres*.

[34] Transhumance routes refer to corridors or paths that have been created by the state to allow herders to move their animals without disturbing farm fields.
[35] Interview with Fulani inhabitant of Sideradougou.

Hagberg describes how the lack of consideration of the *chef de terres* played a role in violent conflicts. Hagberg refers to *chef de terres* as masters of the Earth. Hagberg, making reference to Fulanis and Karaboros states, "they tend to 'jump the traditional basis,' and the authority of Masters of the Earth [land priest] is, at least implicitly, challenged (1998: 217)." Moreover Hagberg also states:

> "The institution (*chef de terres*) represents a central condition for farming, but was disregarded in both violent conflicts (He is referring to violence in Mangodara and Sideradougou). Traditionally the way of solving conflicts would require that both parties (in this case the Karaboro and the Fulani) presented the case to the Master of the Earth. The reason is that he is the host (Jatigi) for both of them. The role of the *chef de terres* is transcribed and respect for the institution is diminished (1998: 188)."

A discussion with a member of the Conseils Villageois de Développement or Village Council for Development (CVD) of Sideradougou revealed how farmer/herder conflicts are now resolved more amicably.

> "We basically help with the negotiations between the two parties. The herder offers a sum and the farmer responds with a sum. We try to help the two groups reach an equitable sum for reimbursement. We also include the *chef de terres* in the negotiation. We would not dare resolve a problem without his input."[36]

In recent years Sideradougou has, in fact, successfully managed to avoid violent conflicts between farmers and herders. Although tensions are still bound to exist between the two groups there have been no conflicts that even remotely resemble the episode in 1986.

Perkoura

Perkoura, a primarily Lobi village in the province of Poni in southwest region of Burkina Faso, represents the latest village to experience violent conflict. The deadly

[36] Interview conducted in March 2009

confrontation commenced on May 24th of 2008 when a farmer of Lobi extraction quarreled with a Fulani herder regarding the alleged destruction of crops in his field by the herder's animals. According to multiple sources, the conflict started when a herd of cattle came close to the field of a Lobi farmer in which a Lobi woman was working. The women told the herder to not let his animals into the field because the seeds that she had planted were starting to emerge. The herder insulted the woman which coincided with the arrival of her husband. The argument quickly escalated and the herder killed the farmer. The woman escaped the violence and fled to return to the village. When the woman returned to the village she immediately sought the aid of her older brother. Remarkably when she hurried back to the village she passed through a camp of immigrant Mossi farmers who had moved to the area in 2006. Rather than ask for help from the Mossi farmers the woman continued on to the Lobi village. Moreover the Mossi farmers did not take part in the violence, rather only Lobi farmers.

Villagers who witnessed the conflict regarded the start of the conflict as "banal." In other words there was nothing unique about this conflict in comparison to other conflicts that had occurred between and farmers in this village in the past. To be sure, the violence that occurred was anything but banal; the banality of the event is specifically in reference to the commonness of the events that immediately preceded the violent outbreak.

According to the regional director of agriculture for the province of Gaoua, "The Fulani herder was frightened by the arrival of the farmer and chose to strike the farmer as a pre-emptive move." The wife of the victim witnessed the murder, returned to the village and informed the rest of the population. When the other farmers saw that the

Fulani had murdered the farmer "it released a hatred for Fulanis."[37] The latent animosity that existed between the two groups was manifested in violence. It should be noted however, that latent animosity exists between Fulanis and farmers exists in many villages, yet they never experience violence. The president of the CVD of Perkoura and the village *delegue* went to visit the field to see the body and then pleaded with the villagers to avoid escalating the conflict.

The CVD and *delegue* went and told the local political authorities to intervene in the village and warned local Fulanis to leave. Consequently Fulani women and children in the area fled leaving behind the men. It was the next day when police came to investigate the scene of the initial murder that the second stage of the conflict started. Similar to the case of Sideradougou, the Lobi farmers regrouped and set out to exact vengeance on Fulani herders. In the words of a local government official "it was the drop of water that spilled the vase."[38] They killed the father of a local family of Fulanis at 2PM although he had nothing to do with the initial conflict in the field. At 8PM security forces, including the military, from the neighboring towns of Dano, Diébougou and Gaoua arrived on the scene to finally put an end to the violence, but not before another Fulani had been killed. The number of deaths is disputed, rumors circulated that ten people had been killed. One NGO claimed that fifteen people were killed in the conflict while Agence France Presse reported that fourteen people were killed in Perkoura and surrounding areas. In the end a total of three people (One Lobi and two Fulanis) were killed in the dispute and thousands of people were displaced (Sidwaya 2008, Le Pays

[37] Interview with director of Agriculture of Poni Province.
[38] Interview with the Mediateur of Poni Province.

2008). In addition to the deaths there were six other serious injuries, dozens of home destroyed and hundreds of animals killed.

After the Fulanis had been killed, there were some investigations led by local authorities to find out the identity of the herder who started the conflict. Although the Fulani herder who committed the initial transgression was never apprehended the authorities eventually found out that he was "*passant*" or Fulani herder who practiced a transhumant form of animal herding.[39] The Lobi farmers, however, who took part in the murder of the Fulani were caught and sentenced to prison. They are still in prison and this is an issue that bothers the farming community of Perkoura. Many of them intimated that as long as their brother remains held in jail the conflict is not really resolved.[40]

If we examine the events of the violent conflict between farmers and herders in Perkoura we find that the farmers of Perkoura targeted Fulani herder families for retribution despite the fact that these families had nothing to do with the original incident. Nahité Palé, the brother of the murdered farmer, was quoted as saying "Peul, c'est Peul"- literally, "A Fulani is a Fulani," or, idiomatically, "All Fulanis are the same." The meaning is that they all have same character and that one is just as guilty as the other. The debasement of the Fulani identity was rooted in latent animosity that existed before the violence and the actual violent acts. However, many of the farmers in Perkoura remarked that the Fulanis that were killed in Perkoura had actually lived in the area for a number of years and had been on relatively good terms with the rest of the village.

Unfortunately, like Sideradougou, there was a contagion effect whereby Fulanis in

[39] This approach to herding is described in greater depth in Chapter 1.
[40] I provide a deeper discussion of the factors that gave rise to the conflict in the Comparison of Cases section in this chapter

other surrounding villages were also physically threatened and forced to seek refuge with police and gendarmes. The rumors of multiple deaths and the escalation of ethnically charged language spread to surrounding villages and threatened their peace. This is what contributed to the deaths that occurred in the village of Tiankoura in the province of Bougouriba (Agence France Presse 2008). Fulani herders sought refuge in the neighboring town of Bouroum-Bouroum. Some of them stayed at the *Prefet's* residence while others lodged with family members.

The event histories of Sideradougou and Perkoura illustrate how violent conflicts grow from incidents in farm fields to episodes of intense violence. As the cases demonstrated simple transgressions sometimes give rise to violence that falls along ethnic lines. Having detailed the events of violent conflict in two villages to gain a better idea of the dynamics of violent land conflicts in rural areas, I now turn to a comparison of villages that have experienced variation in violent conflict.

Comparison of Cases

I now focus on six villages that are grouped in pairs. As noted in the methods chapter I compare neighboring villages; one that has had a violent incident and one that did not have a violent incident but has had near misses. I chose villages where violent conflict had occurred relatively recently (within the past six years). Table 6-1 (presented in Chapter Six) lists the pairs of villages that are compared in this section.

As a first step, in villages that had experienced violence I assemble event histories of the violent events through the examination of newspaper archives and interviews with villagers where the violence occurred. Second, focus group interviews were conducted to allow me to observe and record participants debating in greater depth the circumstances of the violent conflict and the reasons for its emergence. The focus group discussions

were complemented by individual interviews. In terms of the villages that had not experienced violent episodes I used focus groups and individual interviews to examine how the village managed to avoid violence.

The Cases of Perkoura and Loropeni

The dynamics of the violent conflict of Perkoura were presented in the opening component of the chapter. This section compares the village of Perkoura with Loropeni a neighboring village that has not experienced violent conflict. In Perkoura, individual interviews with villagers revealed that the deficiencies within both local institutions that manage land use may have played a role in the emergence of the violent conflict in 2008. Like other villages in Burkina Faso, Perkoura has twelve CVDs. The members of the CVD are responsible for the management of natural resources in the village. This more decentralized form of community management replaces the *delegue* system in which village delegates (*delegues)* followed a more centralized plan of development as dictated by the state. As noted in Chapter Four, the goal of the CVD system is to engage the community in a participatory form of development whereby villagers are deeply involved in the management of their proper resources. However the CVDs of Perkoura did not have a feasible approach for resolving conflict between farmers and herders.[41] Despite the rhetoric surrounding formal institution design, most villages including Perkoura subscribe to a hybrid form of natural resource management whereby CVDs (in addition to other local political institutions) and the *chef de terres* both wield varying levels of influence. The deficiencies with the local modern institutions are twofold.

First, unlike other villages whereby the composition of the CVD is diverse in

[41] The president and vice president CVDs of Perkoura asked the researcher for his advice on how to resolve conflicts between farmers and herders.

terms of ethnic and producer group representation, Perkoura's CVD is composed exclusively of people of Lobi extraction.[42] Among the twelve CVDs all are Lobi farmers with the exception of one Lobi who concentrates on animal husbandry. As such when a Fulani farmer is accused of destroying a farmer's crops he is guaranteed to be judged by a set of Lobi farmers. This arrangement in turn likely decreases the confidence that the herder places in the CVD delivering a fair decision. An analogy can be made to a black American who faces the prospects of being judged by an all white jury. It is possible that Fulani herders view the CVD as providing an unsatisfactory service and less legitimate. In turn they may be less likely to follow its decisions. This may increase the incentives for the Fulani herder to flee or react violently when faced with a farmer who is upset with the destruction of his crops.

Second, the fact that the CVD and *delegue* both visited the site of the transgression points to the confusion that exists in modern institutions. *Delegues* are a remnant of a former institution and CVDs are the latest manifestation of decentralized institutions. With the implementation of the CVD system the formal hierarchy of dispute management forums was restructured anew. The fact that the CVD and *delegue* both visited the site of the transgression points to the confusion that exists in recently created institutions. Who holds the power in this situation? *Old* modern institutions or *new* modern institutions? This adds to the confusion of which institution is legitimate and most efficient in resolving land based conflict.

The institution of the *chef de terres* in Perkoura also lacks capacity. In Perkoura, like other villages in Burkina, the *chef de terres* is responsible for distributing pieces of

[42] This is in contrast to the scenario described in Gray (2002). In this case Mossi, Fulani and Bwa came together to create a plan de zonage" which delineated land use.

land to immigrants. The institution insufficiently incorporates the needs and interests of all segments of the population. In interviews with villagers it became clear that respect for the institution of *chef de terres* has been diminished. This is due to several reasons. First in recent years *chef de terres* have lost respect because they have sold land to immigrants. Tradition precludes the sale of land in rural areas and many villagers feel that the *chef de terres* has violated this tradition. Second, in interviews with farmers it became clear that the *chef de terres* of Perkoura does not command respect within the population due to his unsatisfactory management of natural resources. Both producer groups frequently disagree with the *chef de terres'* distribution of land.

Moreover there is little cooperation between the *chef de terres* and the CVDs. The *chef de terres* considers his authority to be supreme. In instances where there is a conflict in the fields, the farmer first goes to see the CVD. The CVD then goes to call the agricultural extension agents to make a *constat*.[43] As such problems are usually not resolved at the village level. In many cases if a villager is referred to an agricultural extension agent he will not take that next step because it costs money and takes time. This leaves them discouraged and with little faith in the local institutions in place to resolve conflicts with herders. There were many herders that left the area with debts that still had not been paid to farmers for destruction of crops. So, in some cases the fact that the different local institutions work at cross purposes diminishes the potential for resolving disputes.

Many times the herders let their animals in the field on purpose. Sometimes the millet has been harvested and left in the field and the herder allows his animals to eat all

[43] A *constat* is a monetary evaluation of crops destroyed by a herder's animals.

the millet. Even if the farmer catches the herder in the act the herder denies it. Sometimes herders commit the same destruction in the same field on multiple occasions. One farmer noted:

> "The herder could give a damn about the farmer and this leads to tensions. In the incident that happened last year (2008), not only did the herder come and start to destroy our field, he also killed one of our brothers."[44]

In some cases the herders who are guilty of destroying the field tell the CVD that they are not guilty because the land belongs to the government and not to the farmer.[45] This demonstrates a strong knowledge of land tenure laws on the part of the herder. In a case such as this the CVD does not know how to respond to the herder. This succinctly illustrates the challenges of hybrid forms of land use management. Who controls the use of resources? Which institutions hold producer groups accountable?

The lack of a clear set of institutions that govern land use created a vacuum in which herders and farmers came at odds. In some cases the same herder may commit the same transgression multiple times without earning any sanctions.

By contrast, interviews in the neighboring village of Loropeni revealed how the village's institutional capacity has helped it avoid violent conflict. In Loropeni the composition of the CVD is multi-ethnic and multi-occupational. Therefore each ethnic group in the village and both farmers and herders has at least one person as a representative. In one discussion with CVDs they detailed how the institution is able to manage land use conflicts. The Fulani CVD of Loropeni negotiates with the Fulanis that have committed a transgression. This helps make the negotiations smoother between the different parties. Is a multi-ethnic and multi-occupational CVD a panacea for violent

[44] Interview in Perkoura, September 2009.
[45] As discussed in Chapter 4, the RAF Act declared that all land belongs to the state.

conflict between farmers and herders? Most likely not, but the lower the capacity of the CVD is perceived by a set of its constituents, the less likely that they will follow its decisions.

The *chef de terres* of Loropeni is highly solicited by villagers who have problems related to land issues. Discussions with villagers revealed that the *chef de terres* of Loropeni are deeply respected by the population. They cover a large area but people follow their decisions.[46] When the *chef de terres* makes a decision regarding the amount that a herder must pay to farmer, the herder follows the decision. If the herder commits an error by allowing his animals in a field, they will go to see the *chef de terres* immediately to resolve the problem. The role of the chef de terres is to foster a situation where the two parties can pardon one another. In other villages there are farmers who will never pardon the herder because they do not believe that the *chef de terres* or CVD will make the herder pay.

One of the CVDs of Loropeni offered his opinion of why land use conflicts may turn violent:

> "In some cases the farmer thinks that local political institutions always favor the herder, so the farmer prefers to "settle it" in the field through violence. When the conflict goes all the way to local political authorities the resolution does not favor anyone. "[47]

As such the ability of local institutions to provide avenues for negotiation is key for preventing violent confrontations.

The Cases of Gogo/AVV3 and Bilbalgo

The commune of Gogo in the province of Zoundweogo serves as an area that

[46] Interview with Director of Agriculture, Poni Province, March 2009
[47] CVD Loropeni, September 2009.

provides insight into the origins of violent conflict between farmers and herders. In 2007 over the days of August 3rd and 4th, there was a significant violent conflict between sedentary and nomadic populations in the commune of Gogo. Sometimes described as the conflict of Manga Est or Gogo, the actual conflict took place in the village of AVV 3, which is about 20 kilometers from Gogo. In this case (as is oftentimes the case in other conflicts) the press used the name of the largest nearby town as the name of village in conflict. Six people were killed and thousands of people were forced to flee their homes to escape the violence (Le Pays 2007). In total 174 family compounds were burned to the ground which resulted in the displacement of 522 families.[48]

The origins of the violence can be traced to the moment when two teenage Fulani herders allowed their animals to enter a farmer's field. The farmer, in his field at the time, verbally castigated the herders. An older Fulani, who witnessed the exchange came over and asked him why he verbally abused the two herders. The argument escalated and the Fulani drew his machete and chopped off an arm of the farmer (Issiaka Congo) and fled. The farmers' friends came and found him in the field bleeding to death. They took him and his arm to a local clinic and the medical staff there told them that they could do nothing. They subsequently evacuated him to the hospital in Manga, but at this point he had already lost too much blood and died. In turn groups of farmers banded together to hunt down and kill Fulani herdsmen and the violence spread to other neighboring villages. The Fulani who committed the transgression was a member of the local community and not a transhumance herder.

48 In Burkina Faso, and in general in most parts of Africa, more than one family unit lives in a compound. This explains the difference between the number of family compounds destroyed and the number of families displaced.

One journalist who arrived on the scene on the second day of the conflict described the following situation:

> "On the road to AVV 3, a group of twenty men, the majority of them young, armed with clubs, axes, machetes and bows and arrows, grouped together and then disappeared in the bush. 'We are going to avenge the life of Issiaka. We do not want Fulanis here anymore', we heard them say. On the same road we crossed paths with 150 to 200 cows. 'We are going to kill them all,' said one of the people (a farmer) leading the animals. In the market in the town of Manga the news of the violence is at the heart of all discussions (Le Pays 2007 8 August)."

Lohbo Diallo, a Fulani herder of the neighboring village of Zem described his predicament:

> "My two bicycles, my motorcycle and my granary have all gone up in smoke. My entire herd of cattle has been destroyed. We have become refugees in our country. People take us for Ghanaians or Togolese (Le Pays 2007)."

Alou Bahadio, a Fulani herder from AVV3, stated,

> "I have lived here for eleven years. I have two wives and five children. At this moment I do not know if they are alive. Faced with the violent situation, I was advised to leave the area. I fled in the middle of the night on Friday without my family in order to find refuge in the Gendarme base in Manga (Le Pays 2007)."

This last quote illustrates that the two parties knew one another. Bahadio has lived in AVV3 for eleven years, roughly half the time that AVV3 has existed as a village. The violence rapidly took on ethnic overtones.

The deaths were restricted to AVV3 yet other areas were affected. In the province of Zoundweogo, there were five sites that were identified to host people displaced by the violence. One site in the town of Manga hosted 150 displaced persons, while in the village of Kaibo a Koranic school received 80 people. The largest grouping of displaced persons was lodged in Gogo in three different sites and their number reached 1000. There

was also another site that sheltered seventy people in the neighboring province of Boulgou in the town of Niogo. According to the governor of Zoundweogo there were 2,500 persons displaced. The violence was finally brought to an end by the arrival of gendarmes and police from Manga.

After the violence was extinguished farmers and herders came to together to ask for forgiveness. The state created a set of guidelines that individuals in the Manga region should use to help avert violent conflicts in the future. First, conflicts should now be resolved with the intervention of the *delegue*, CVD and village chiefs. Other resolutions included: herders agreed to carry machetes, young children should no longer be responsible for large cattle herds, and animals were not allowed to circulate at night.

We cannot merely cite the transgression of the herder as the cause of the violence, since as previously noted events such as that one are relatively common events. Interviews with villagers and functionaries with the Minister of Agriculture provide better insight into the factors that gave rise to the intense violence in AVV3. The village of AVV3 is essentially a recent creation by the government of Burkina Faso as part of the AVV program of agricultural development.[49] In 1974 the government created agricultural areas known as Zone AVV (Autorite d'*Amenegemant des Vallees des Volta*) Volta Valleys Development Authority also referred to as *zones amenage* (Faure 1995).

Conversations with villagers revealed how the village was created and how use of the land has changed over the years. Villagers explained that the village was created in 1976 during the Lamizana administration. Through a publicity program the government informed people of the opportunity, and people, mostly Mossi from the semi arid areas of

[49] The creation of the AVV program is described in great detail in chapter 4.

Yatenga and Sanmatenga, resettled to cultivate the AVVs. The numbers of people who migrated to new lands under the auspices of the AVV program is staggering. According to Mathieu et al (2003) just one area north of Bobo-Dioulasso saw an influx of hundreds of thousands of Mossi farmers who were encouraged to move there by the central government to cultivate cotton.

Yet since these lands, such as AVV3, were formerly unoccupied and previously not in use by local populations there were no *chef de terres* in place to manage land use. Instead agricultural extension agents were charged with managing land use. As the original settlers experienced success word spread and family members from natal villages also migrated to AVVs to seek their fortune. This ultimately brought more farmers and herders to these areas. This not only placed additional stress on the natural resources but created anarchical installations of new farmers.

Many of the villagers that I interviewed were originally from the villages of Binde and Bosse which are located in the Mossi Plateau.[50] As one inhabitant noted,

> "When we first arrived here there were functionaries from the Ministry of Agricultural who distributed the land among us newcomers. The agents also made sure that people respected their farm field borders and that only approved migrants moved to the area. Each AVV had a set number of people and the land was divided among the families."[51]

During visits to various AVV villages the vestiges of the once very organized initiative are still visible. Laterite roads that bisect the fields are straight and divide the various fields into squares. This stands in stark contrast to most rural villages with fields that are amorphous and without borders that are easily recognizable.

[50] Based on interviews conducted in August of 2009
[51] Interview conducted in August 2009.

However in the mid 1980's support and oversight by the government for AVV programs began to diminish. In 1986, under the Sankara regime, the number of agricultural extension agents was reduced from four to one. Observers frequently make the mistake of viewing Sankara's government as a bloated communist state. Sankara's government in reality trimmed state interventions in a way that was actually applauded by the IMF. In any case, people in AVV3 noted that this reduction in government personnel brought negative repercussions. There were many new people who were not registered with the program, many births increased the population and land use was mismanaged and archaic.

With the assassination of Sankara in 1987, the new regime adopted structural adjustment reforms which decreased the role that governments played in subsidizing large scale development projects. AVV programs benefited greatly from state sponsored infrastructure improvements and social service subsidies. Top-down government planned initiatives; particularly those that were heavily dependent on government subsidies, such AVVs, were most susceptible. In the era of structural adjustment programs such as these were frequently axed. According to agricultural agents in the Zoundweogo Province structural adjustment played a role in their departure from AVV zones.

There were many new people who were not registered with the program and land use was mismanaged. In 1997 and 1998 the AVV zone underwent a *re-lotissement*, or repartition of the land among the families that were living there. This was to counteract the archaic nature of land use in the AVVs. Yet, after the *re-lotissement* the national government left *no* extension agents to oversee land use and management. The *re-lotissement* of the land did help to make it clearer in terms of who occupied specific

pieces of land, but without an onsite arbiter long term sustainable management to avoid conflict could not be guaranteed. Farmers noted that after the last of the agricultural agents left, farmers began to cultivate land that been reserved for other purposes and Fulani herders started to bring their animals into the region in greater numbers.

As the state withdrew support a vacuum emerged in terms of resource management. The absence of *chef de terres* precluded their intervention. Farmers and herders competed for the same set of natural resources, but without the institutional constraints to modify behavior that are present in the other parts of Burkina Faso. As it became ambiguous as to who controlled resource management, the specter of conflict between the different producer groups figured more prominently on the horizon. Low scale conflicts started after the departure of the agents and in less than ten years the village of AVV3 exploded in violence. This is not an indictment of structural adjustment it is rather evidence that the absence of local institutions raises the chances of violent communal conflict between farmers and herders.

This does not mean that all AVV zones in Burkina Faso have or will experience violent conflict. Undoubtedly there are numerous AVV zones and not all of them have witnessed intense violent conflict of the variety that occurred in AVV3. However in the province of Nahouri there was another AVV village, the innocuously named village of Bloc AVV 2, located within the commune of Tiebele, which had also suffered from violent conflict between producer groups, yet not to the extent witnessed in AVV3.[52] Perhaps the lack of a traditional *chef de terres* and the diminished presence of modern institutions played a role in the conflict in Bloc AVV 2 as well. In the past conflict was

[52] This revelation was made during survey research. This village which randomly selected turned out to have experienced a violent conflict between farmers and herders.

managed by the state and different zones had different uses but it was very clear with the exit of the state's intervention conflict increased.

Bilbalgo, a village with similar characteristics, demonstrates, by contrast, the important role that local institutions play in the management of conflict over land use. The *chef de terres* occupies an important place in the deeply hierarchical structure of traditional Mossi political structures. Focus group participants noted the efficacy of the *chef de terres* in managing the use of land.[53] Specifically, he is responsible for communicating with farmers and herders and making sure that their zones are sufficiently delineated.

Villagers in Bilbalgo described the *chef de terres* as the most effective person in the management of problems related to land use. In Bilbalgo one finds that it is impossible that the *chef de terres* is not implicated in the process of land use or distribution. As one informant noted:

> "There are multiple people responsible for the use of land in Bilbalgo but the final word always rests with the *chef de terres*. When the mayor's office makes a decision regarding land use, they always have to get the permission of the *chef de terres*. So either they consult the *chef de terres* before making a decision or they inform the *chef de terres* about that which they decided in order to receive his final approval."[54]

The distribution of land in Bilbalgo is also well organized. If a person wishes to cultivate a new piece of land or bring his herd of animals for pasture he is brought before the *chef de terres*. In addition to the *chef de terres* there are also eight CVDs in the village of Bilbalgo and they also play a role in the management of land resources by meeting with the *chef de terres* when a decision needs to be made. In terms of seeking help when

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53 Focus group composed of farmers and herders, September 2009.

54 Interview in Bilbalgo May 2009.

there is a conflict between farmers and herders, the first institution that is approached for help with resolution is the *chef de terres*. However, there are also modern institutions that work alongside the *chef de terres*. The focus group with whom I discussed the problem, voiced their confidence in the CVDs and *chef de terres* in terms of bringing an equitable resolution. In Bilbalgo the *chef de terres* and CVDs work in concert. Once again, as was the case in Perkoura, different local institutions work at cross purposes and as a result inhibited their potential for resolving disputes.

The Cases of Tiakane and Kampala/Gougogo

Kampala experienced a serious violent conflict between farmers and herders in 2004. Kampala is located in the province of Nahouri and is essentially a grouping of nine smaller villages. The conflict started when a herder's animals entered a farmer's field.

> "A Fulani let his animals into a field and it destroyed the millet that was growing there. The farmer insulted the Fulani and the Fulani responded by insulting the farmer. The herder attacked the farmer with his machete and the conflict took off like that. The two groups got together to resolve the problem, but another herder became incensed and attacked another farmer with his machete."[55]

The conflict then spread to the eight other sub villages that compose Kampala. Fulanis kept to one side and farmers kept to the other side. In the end there were two deaths as a result of the combat.

Amadou Sondé, a Fulani herder from Mationgo describes the violence:

> "I have lived in Mationgo for twenty years. We lived in perfect harmony with the farmers up until November 30th, the day of the deadly conflicts. I was a victim myself and I was saved by the arrival of security forces on the scene. I was axed on my head and I was bathing in my blood. My huts were destroyed

[55] A group of Kampala CVDs recounted the origin of the conflict, February 2009.

> and over eighty of my animals were killed. I had just returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca and all the money and belongings that I brought back were destroyed. I lost my cousin who was very well known by people in Kampala and Po (the regional capital located twenty kilometers from Kampala). He was cut up like an animal. It was horrible (Sidwaya 2006)."

Once again, as in the other cases where violence occurred, villagers noted local authorities had done a poor job of resolving conflicts between the two groups. One villager recounted the typical scenario regarding a conflict between the two groups:

> "A farmer's field is destroyed by a herder's animals. A field cannot move itself and be destroyed, it is the cattle that move and destroy the field. The farmer then calls the local authorities (usually agricultural extension agents) and they come out to see the field. They make the *constat*, but it ends there. The farmer is never reimbursed for the damage. This is what makes tensions mount between the different groups and brings violent conflict."[56]

The herders of Kampala also had grievances, "We do not have enough space. The farmers are always taking over our space."[57] Now there is a severe lack of land and many Fulanis have chosen to send their animals to Ghana. Even farmers who wish to find new fields to cultivate are severely constrained. Fulani herders were forced to leave Kampala and were not able to return to the village until 2006, about two years after the violent episode. However in 2006 there was another violent event in Gougogo in which a farmer was seriously wounded in fight with a herder. The local authorities in Kampala have had a difficult time enforcing land use regulations. Due to the number of villages under the umbrella of Kampala it is difficult to discern who manages specific pieces of land.

By contrast, a comparison between Kampala and another village that has not suffered violence demonstrates the important role that institutions play in the management of conflict over land use. The village of Tiakane, like Kampala, is a Kassina

[56] CVD Focus group, February 2009
[57] Ibid

(Gourounsi sub-group) village located in the province of Nahouri. The village of Tiakane, although similar to Kampala in most regards has experienced no instances of violent conflict between farmers and herders. The capacity of the institution of *chef de terres* in Tiakane is well respected. In Tiakane the position of *chef de terres* is decentralized and managed by multiple *chef de terres* who supervise the different sections of the village. Villagers in Tiakane view the *chef de terres* as the most effective person in the management of problems related to land use. As one informant noted:

> "The local mayor's office is responsible for the use of land in Tiakane but the *chef de terres* must be consulted on all decisions. When the mayor or his assistants decide how land is used, they are obliged to also obtain approval of the *chef de terre*. The *chef de terre*s must be part of the decision process."[58]

The inhabitants of Tiakane detailed the organization of land distribution. People who desire to clear and farm a new piece of land or use land for pasture must discuss their plans with the *chef du terres*. CVDs in the village of Tiakane meet with the *chef de terres* when decisions on land management are taken. Many of the inhabitants of the village also practice small scale animal husbandry and it has been this way for generations. In many cases they give their cattle to Fulanis who take care of them, so relations between the two groups are good.

In cases where animals damage crops in Tiakane the first step is to try to resolve the problem in the field. "If the farmer is able to pardon the herder then things usually go well." In other cases, if the herder cannot be located, the farmer will catch one of the animals and hold onto it until the herder comes to retrieve it. Farmers are motivated to settle the conflict "*a l'amiable*" because they do not wish to pay for the police and

58 Interview in Tiakane February 2009.

agricultural extension agents to come and make a "*constat*" evaluation.[59] The focus group, with which I discussed the problem, has confidence in the CVDs and *chef de terres* in terms of bringing an equitable resolution. They offered that perhaps in other villages people do not have confidence in their local authorities and they seek first to confront the herder often in a threatening way.

Finally members of the community of Tiakane mentioned that they have an alternative method for resolving a problem with a herder if none of the other methods work. In most instances the *chef de terres* makes a judgment and the herder is required to pay a certain sum. However, there are some cases in which the guilty party does not pay the fine. Villagers explained that the *chef de terres* has means by which to convince the guilty to pay. In this approach they take a small amount of tobacco and go to the field where the damage occurred. They put the tobacco on the earth and talk with their ancestors about what transpired. Once this is done the guilty party will have to deal with severe consequences. They said that once this act is completed the herder will experience an unavoidable catastrophe. Either the herder will fall gravely ill or his animals will die.

Conclusions Drawn from Case Studies

Individual interviews with villagers and focus group discussions in rural settings shed light on how banal events become tragically violent. The comparative examination of villages that vary in experiences with violent conflict allowed me to identify several explanatory variables. The specific circumstances of the villages vary yet there are themes that form a common thread in terms of explaining variation in outcomes. First,

[59] The term "a l'amiable" refers to an instance in which a farmer and herder can come to an agreement on how to resolve a land based conflict without involving a third party.

both modern and traditional institutions play a role in conflict mitigation. When traditional and modern institutions have greater capacity it reduces the potential for the onset of violence. By the same token, lower capacity or absence of institutions increases the chances of violent conflict. The complete absence of a *chef de terres* in AVV3 and a *chef de terres* with low capacity in Perkoura diminished the possibility of conflict mitigation. Moreover in Bilbalgo and Loropeni the high capacity of the CVD and *chef de terres* enhanced the potential for peaceful resolution of land based conflicts. Of the two institutions, the *chef de terres* played a more pivotal role in de-escalation of the conflict. Table 7-5 demonstrates the characteristics of the villages examined in this study.

Table 7-5: Institutional capacity versus presence of violent conflict

	Experienced violent conflict	**Local institutions with high capacity**	**Associational Life**
Loropeni	No	Yes	Yes
Bilbalgo	No	Yes	Yes
Tiakane	No	Yes	Yes
Gogo (AVV 3)	Yes	No	Yes
Perkoura	Yes	No	Yes
Gougogo	Yes	No	Yes

Second, villages that experienced violence typically had recurring disputes between farmers and herders. The cases of Sideradougou, Perkoura, AVV3 and Kampala pertinently illustrate this assertion. In villages that experienced violence there had been an accumulation of conflicts that local institutions had not been able to deal with effectively. This finding helps establish the causal chain of events. As conflicts between the two producer groups accrue and mitigation fails repeatedly the potential for violence increases. It is also important to remember that the stakes are higher for farmers. The destruction of a field of crops is a greater individual loss than the transformation of a

pasture land into a farm land for a herder. A herder sees the loss of pasture land as one out of several (Turner 2004). For a farmer however he may only have one field.

Third, more often than not, when violent conflict did occur it frequently happened between people that knew each other. Farmers and herders are oftentimes in contact in social and economic circles. These informal types of social contacts serve as forms of associational life. Farmers rely on herders for bulls to pull their plows and also for the cow manure that enriches their fields. Herders rely on farmers for grains to feed their families and for straw for their animals during the dry season. Women from herder families sell their milk to farmer families. However when violence commences people target other groups according to their ethnic or occupational identity, or both. This suggests that associational life may actually play a role in increasing violent conflict because it helps attackers identify members of rival groups.

Finally the belief that the influence of traditional institutions has been transcribed is shortsighted. Davidheiser and Luna (2008) claim that the colonial government obliterated existing political systems which fostered herder-farmer symbiosis. Laurent and Mathieu (1993) argue that the RAF weakened the legitimacy of traditional leaders. Hagberg (1998) posits that the RAF was interpreted as a way to circumvent the need to negotiate with *chef de terres* for the acquisition of property. Pre-colonial institutions still play an important role in conflict negation and are far from obliterated. Moreover despite the introduction of the RAF traditional institutions are still relevant. It may be useful to consider how traditional institutions may be reinforced in a manner that enables them to play a more formal role in conflict resolution.

Despite the contributions of this chapter to our understanding of violent

communal conflict there are several caveats. First, the examination relied on cases that were clearly selected due to their variation on the dependent variable. Selection on the dependent variable limits the confidence that we may place in the results. A study that has a random selection of cases would be an improvement in the methodological approach. Random selection with a large number of observations enables me to disregard the relationship between the selection criteria and other variables in this study (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Second, the small number of observations limits the generalizability of the results. Approaching the research question from a different level of analysis and methodology may provide better insight.

The following chapter marks a shift in levels of analysis from the meso-level (village) to the micro-level (individual). Do the variables found to explain variation in violent conflict at the village level also explain variation in violent conflict at the individual level? Do the conclusions reached in this stage of the chapter extend to a larger universe of cases? In order to answer this question I will now examine the research question through analysis of survey data collected from a randomly selected population. This section will present the results of a micro-level analysis of the research question. It uses data drawn from a survey of 400 respondents randomly selected from a representative population in four provinces. Each province consists of a number of communes and the number of respondents for each commune was chosen in function with the commune's population. Using survey data I am able to create indicators of the explanatory variables identified in Chapter 4. I present two models; the first is attitudinal, namely, to what degree do people support violence as an option? The second is behavioral; to what degree do people participate in violent conflict?

Chapter 8: Individual Orientations to Violence

Introduction

As evidenced in the case studies, there are several factors that have played a role in prevention, or in some cases outbreaks, of violent conflict. The cases illustrated that the absence of effective local institutions, whether modern or traditional, increase the potential for violent conflict. By the same token, the role of associational life *vis a vis* violent conflict is ambiguous; in most cases it did not seem to play a role in preventing violent conflict as both villages with a history of violence and those with not had populations that interacted on a daily basis. This section examines whether or not the conclusions reached in the case studies are significant at the individual level. The results of the case study analysis are based on a small number of observations at the village level thus limiting their generalizability. This section now shifts to the micro-level and endeavors to find out if the conclusions of the case studies remain compelling explanations for variance in violent conflict.

As outlined in the chapter on methods, I present two basic models to predict perceptions of violence and participation in violent conflict. The first is attitudinal; namely, to what degree do people regard violence as an option? The second is behavioral; to what degree do people participate in violent conflict? By means of logit regression models I seek to identify the factors that increase the probability that an individual will approve of or take part in violence. The first model predicts how various explanatory factors affect support for the use of violence. The second model tests how the same factors affect an individual's self-reported participation in violent conflict. I created attitudinal and behavioral indicators of violence in an attempt to test the robustness of the results. Do the factors that make a person more likely to approve of violence also make

him more likely to participate in communal violence? Moreover, I constructed three separate indicators for the capacity of local institutions, which I will discuss in greater depth in the following section.[60]

In addition to systematically testing the results of the case study analysis I also explore the effects of factors that have also been referenced as influencing communal violence. They are specifically: strength of national identity versus sub-national identity, associational life, interpersonal trust, and finally animosity towards other ethnic groups. The following section discusses the theory that underpins each of the indicators. It also describes how each of the indicators was constructed from specific survey questions.

Operationalization of Concepts

Violence

Attitudinal- Views towards violence

The dependent variable in this model is attitudes towards violence.

One question is used as an indicator:

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.
A: Violence is never justified in this country.
B: In certain circumstances, violence is justified.

This survey item was measured on a five-point scale and indicates increased willingness to use violence. The potential responses are "agree very strongly with a", "agree with a", "in agreement with both a and b", "agree with b", and "agree very strongly with b."

Behavioral- Participation in violence

In an attempt to test for the robustness of the results of the first model I will test the effect of the same variables on a behavior rather than an attitude.

[60] The exact phrasing of all questions used for the indicators can be found in Appendix A.

Two questions are used for this indicator.

Q1-*Have you participated in a violent conflict based on land issues in the last 12 months?*
Q2-*Have you ever physically threatened the member of another group?*

In this case if the respondent declared to have participated in a violent land conflict or physically intimidated or threatened the member of another group with bodily harm they were coded as having had participated in violence.[61]

Explanatory Factors: Indicators

For this component of the research I created five indicators that I will test for their respective significance on an individual's views towards violence and actual participation in violent conflict. Field work conducted in the first stage allowed me to construct a questionnaire that is based on findings gathered in the villages. The five indicators were constructed from questions in the survey.[62] The indicators are the following:

Institutional Capacity

This variable looks at how two separate local institutions play a role in resolving conflict. The two institutions are formal, local forms of governance and the informal type occupied by traditional leaders. I hypothesize that higher institutional capacity should have a diminishing effect on people's support of violence as a means to resolve a dispute. One of the results of the case studies chapter is that villages with local institutions with little or no capacity experienced violence. Institutions are recognized for their ability to act as constraints on human behavior (North 1990). If local institutions are viewed as

61 The exact phrasing of all survey questions and responses can be found in Appendix A.

62 The survey is described in full detail in Chapter 7 in terms of population, sampling, questionnaire construction, administration, fieldwork and limitations.

having the capacity to provide a satisfactory service people should be more inclined to use them when potentially violent situations present themselves. The logic is that if institutions exist that can potentially mitigate conflict; people will view violence as a less promising alternative and opt for peaceful resolution. It is important to note that each indicator of institutional capacity (customary and modern) stands on its own. In other words, the models in this study do not test for the joint effects of the two institutions on attitudes and behaviors concerning violence.[63] I argue that rather than testing for the aggregate effects of local institutions it is worthwhile to disaggregate them and test for the specific effects of each institution. By disaggregating local institutions we have a better idea of the specific institution that does a more effective job mitigating potentially violent land based conflict.

In order to test the robustness of the finding that local institutions play an important role in preventing violent conflict, I will test three separate indicators for the capacity of local institutions. They are performance, legitimacy and efficacy; with each indicator discussed in greater depth in the following section. As such, the first two models test for performance of local institutions, the third and fourth models test legitimacy of local institutions and the final two models test the effects of the efficacy of local institutions. Each model is followed with a table that details the marginal effects of the

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63 It should also be noted that in some cases the separation between traditional and modern institutions is not as cut and dry as one would assume. There are some instances where the line between traditional and modern institutions is blurred. For example, the son of the village chief or *chef de terres* may have a seat on the CVD.[63] Yet steps were taken by the organizations (PNUD, World Bank) that funded the creation of the CVD framework to counteract this tendency. In most cases the organizations that bankrolled the creation of local land use committees succeeded in producing a diversified CVD that includes female members and members of immigrant communities (Engberg-Pedersen 2003).

model. The following section provides a discussion of how the indicators were constructed.

First indicator: Performance

Local institutions are charged with enforcing land use rules and resolving land based conflicts. How well do local institutions manage natural resources? The performance of a local institution is measured as follows:

Traditional

Question used for performance of traditional leaders in management of land issues:
Rate, whether good or bad, how well traditional leaders respond to problems concerning the management of land and other natural resources.

Modern

Question used for performance of local government leaders in management of land issues:
Rate, whether good or bad, how well local government leaders respond to problems concerning the management of land and other natural resources.

Second indicator: Legitimacy

This indicator is a proxy for the degree to which individuals view modern and traditional institutions to be legitimate. I regard legitimacy as the respect earned by those who govern, mainly through the degree to which they are responsive to their citizens' needs. It is queries whether or not the decisions taken by the institutions should be respected by individuals. As such individuals who believe that they must follow a decision made by a chief view the traditional institution as legitimate. By the same token individuals who believe that they are not obligated to conform to a decision made by the local government perceive that institution to be lacking legitimacy.

Traditional

Question used for legitimacy of traditional leaders in management of land issues:
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

A: The decisions made by traditional chiefs concerning the management of land must be respected by the population.
B: Sometimes the population is not obliged to respect the decisions made by traditional chiefs concerning the management of land

Modern
Question used for the legitimacy of local government leaders in management of land issues:
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.
A: The decisions made by the local government concerning the management of land must be respected by the population.
B: Sometimes the population is not obliged to respect the decisions made by the local government concerning the management of land

The survey items were measured on a five-point scale and indicate increased willingness to follow a decision made by either a CVD or a traditional leader. The potential responses are agree very strongly with a, agree with a, in agreement with both a and b, agree with b, agree very strongly with b.

Third Indicator: Institutional Efficacy

The final indicator of the role that local institutions play in mitigating violent conflict measures how individuals rank institutions in terms of their ability to resolve conflicts and how the ranking affects their attitude and behavior. What is the most effective institution for aid in resolving a land based conflict? Respondents were asked which institutions they consult first when faced with a land-based conflict. Individuals face an array of possibilities for resolving conflicts of this genre. Modern institutions include the *prefet,* mayor, CVD, police and gendarmes, and or, agricultural extension agents. In terms of options that fall under the rubric of traditional approaches, they include village chiefs, *chefs de terres,* religious leaders and other traditional conflict negotiation methods. The question was open-ended and responses were coded as either

modern or traditional institutions. Individuals were asked the same question three times and ordered their preferences in terms of the institutions they found to be best situated in regards to resolving a land based conflict. I created a dummy variable for this indicator.

Question used for the institutional efficacy of local institutions:
What is the most effective institution for resolving land-based conflict?

Cohesive National Identity

One of the most effective methods to mitigate ethnic conflict is to create a national identity that supersedes sub-national identities. This belief was a central tenet of modernization theory (Lipset 1959, Deutsch 1961). However modernization and political development has also been recognized to create stronger ethnic identities. Bates (1973) argues that modernization strengthened ethnic identities due to the important role that ethnicity plays in gaining access to state distributed resources. Posner (2005) found that modern political institutions shape how individuals identify themselves ethnically. Does the fact that an individual prescribes to a national rather than a sub-national identity have an effect on the individual's views towards and participation in violence? Research shows that individuals who prescribe to a national identity rather than an ethnic identity are less likely to approve of political violence (Bhavnani and Backer 2007). I hypothesize that the stronger one's sense of national identity, the less likely one is to support violence or take part in communal violence. If an individual views his own identity in non-ethnic terms then perhaps he will be less likely to allow the ethnic antagonism that exists between ethnic groups to drive his perceptions or participation in violence.

Question used for indicator of national identity and possible responses:
Suppose you had to choose between being Burkinabé and being a member of your ethnic group. Which of the following statements best expresses your views?:

"I feel exclusively Burkinabé;" "I feel more Burkinabé than member of my ethnic group;" "I feel as much Burkinabé as I do member of my ethnic group;" "I feel more member of my ethnic group than Burkinabé;" "I feel exclusively member of ethnic group."

Associational Life

This variable is a measure of the degree to which an individual participates in different aspects of associational life, which may also be considered a form of social capital. The mode of associational life referred to in this study denotes informal social contacts (Varshney 2002). This is in contrast to the voluntary type of organized social structures of cooperation in the form of civil associations as discussed by Putnam (1993). There is a paucity of civil associations in rural Burkina Faso, but on the other hand there is a wealth of informal social contacts between different producer groups. These contacts occur in diverse environments, ranging from market activity to religious celebrations to informal exchanges of services. Hagberg makes special mention of the strong economic links between Fulanis and farmers' particularly those that exist between women (1998). Specifically in terms of conflict between farmers and herders, social capital has been cited as for its significant role in influencing negotiations between the two parties. However Beeler, in her examination of farmer/herder conflict in Mali, notes that while in-group social capital (Soninke and Soninke) helps resolve conflicts, out-group social capital is trumped by ethnicity (2006). Damage done to a field by a Fulani is not tolerated by a farmer although social capital may exist between the two individuals.

As noted earlier in this study, intra-communal face-to-face interaction should decrease the potential for violent communal violence (Brass 1997, Varshney 2002). Varshney argues that everyday engagement between individuals is sufficient to prevent violent conflict in rural areas in India. Varshney (2002: 106) notes, "It may be that

communal tensions flare up less in smaller towns, for they lack the relative anonymity of India's largest towns and allow greater routine interaction between Hindus and Muslims." Brass argues that exclusively intra-communal conflict also raises the specter of violent communal conflict. In Burkina Faso, it is often the case that the parties involved in the violence live in common neighborhoods and know each other (Hagberg 1998). Clearly the two groups discussed in this project, farmers and herders, do interact frequently in various forms of associational life.

This variable of associational life is a summary index of different aspects of associational life:

Question used for indicator of level of respondent's associational life:

The question asks how frequently the respondent takes part in various activities:

A. Participate(s) in a religious gathering of your religious group.
B. Participate(s) in a religious gathering of another religion.
C. Member of a community group
D. Leader of a religious group

The indicators of associational life are combined into an index that takes into account in-group and out-group forms.[64] Parts A and D of the question serve as in-group indicators. These questions seek to provide insight into the level of the respondent's in-group associational life. In terms of parts B and C, I posit that the responses provide insight into the degree to which a respondent associates with people beyond his circle. Parts B and C of the question offer insight into out-group forms of associational life that provide individuals with greater exposure to people outside their group. For example how frequently does a Muslim attend baptisms for his Christian friends? Or how frequently does a Christian attend a celebration or gathering of a traditional African religion?

[64] Factor analysis Eigen value=1.36 and Cronbach's Alpha= .67.

In contrast to previous studies, I disagree that high levels of intra-communal interaction preclude violence and argue that associational life may actually increase the incidence of participation in communal violence. In some cases it may make it easier for rioters to identify members of the rival group. In most cases, in conflicts such as those based on land issues, people are specifically targeted by their ethnic affiliation. The case of Perkoura clearly illustrates how Fulanis were targeted on the grounds of their ethnic identity. In Perkoura and AVV3 individuals knew exactly where to find members of the other group. The case studies inform my prediction that higher levels of associational life may lead to higher participation in violence.

Interpersonal Trust

How do individual levels of interpersonal trust affect one's attitudes towards violence? Interpersonal trust, much like associational life, is considered a form of social capital. Oftentimes it is the lack of trust that pushes producer groups to act violently against one another. Yet there is trust that exists between the two groups. Herders are entrusted with cattle owned by farmers. Herders in turn are guaranteed a percentage of the offspring and the dairy products produced by the cattle. Entrusting one's cattle also implies that there must be a certain level of trust between the two groups, particularly when the contract is non-public. This arrangement is still in practice, yet despite the high degree of trust that this relationship requires there is oftentimes distrust between the two groups. For example, farmers have very little trust in herders and typically believe that herders deliberately destroy the crops in their fields. Moreover, in some instances herders promise to repay the farmer for the damage, yet they vanish, never to be seen again. By the same token few herders trust farmers because they claim that farmers demand

unrealistically exorbitant sums of money as compensation when their crops are destroyed.

Question used for indicator of level of respondent's interpersonal trust:

This indicator is constructed from an index of four separate questions that query the degree to which the respondent has trust in regards to the following groups:

1. *close friends and family*
2. *other people that they know*
3. *members of the same ethnic group*
4. *members of a different ethnic group*

Conventional wisdom points to elevated levels of interpersonal trust as a mitigating factor in terms of participation in violent acts. Oftentimes farmers do not trust that the herder will reimburse him for crop damage and as such they take matters into their own hands, sometimes violently. At the same time herders may not trust that farmers will seek an equitable outcome, but rather make them pay an exaggerated sum. I predict that high levels of interpersonal trust lower an individual's acceptance of violence, but do not have an effect on one's participation in violence.[65]

Inter-ethnic animosity

Deep seated animosity between members of different ethnic groups has also been cited as a factor that increases an individual's proclivity to participate in violent conflict. In Burkina, journalistic accounts typically provide a narrative that paints the violent feuds as ethnically driven (Le Pays 2007 and 2008, Sidwaya 2007 and 2008, L'Evénement 2007). As noted in the chapter that examines relations between farmers and herders, some observers have emphasized the role ethnic antagonism plays in fueling violent conflicts that usually fall along lines demarcated by ethnic identity (Hagberg 1998).

[65] Cronbach's Alpha = .79, Eigen value=1.95

Noted African history scholar Joseph Ki Zerbo characterized farmer/herder conflicts as the "embryonic stage of a genocide." Farmers often use disparaging terms to describe Fulani herders. In some of my interviews, I have heard Fulanis variously described as monkeys, savage, cunning or simply evil. In most cases, herders of Fulani extraction are in conflict with farmers of any number of ethnic identities. In some cases ethnic divisions may help exacerbate the violence, yet these ethnic divisions are salient in almost all conflicts and not all conflicts lead to violence. The identity categories of occupation and ethnicity are frequently blurred. In fact members of both occupations frequently refer to the opposing group in derisive terms grounded in ethnic stereotypes. For example, a Mossi farmer may refer to a Fulani herder as untrustworthy. These kinds of stereotypes are pervasive in Burkina Faso yet they usually do not result in violent conflict.

Are Fulanis who view non-Fulanis as untrustworthy and bellicose more likely to participate in land based conflicts? By the same token, are farmers who view Fulanis as trustworthy and peaceful less likely to commit violent acts based on land related disputes? I argue that deeply engrained negative views of rival producer and ethnic groups do not increase the likelihood that an individual will take part in violent conflict. I base this belief on the salience of *cousinage* relations in Burkina Faso. People frequently speak of other ethnic groups in disparaging terms, yet most of it is done within the parameters of "joking relationships." Most typically ethnic insults are manifested in social interactions within the context of *cousinage*, or joking relationships (Sissao 2002). It is important to keep in mind that my reference to rival groups is based on the assumption that the two groups are rivals in terms of their competition for scarce resources. As noted in Chapter Four farmers and herders use the same resources and this

oftentimes puts them at odds.

There is a battery of questions that probe individual's views of their own ethnic group and the ethnic group of the opposing producer ethnic group. For example Mossi were asked if they viewed Fulanis as good or bad, truthful or dishonest and peaceful or violent. Fulanis were also asked to give their opinions of the local sedentary ethnic group. The respondent was asked to situate their opinion on a semantic differential scale from 1 to 7. The responses were recoded and ranged from zero to two. A score of zero is a positive view, a score of one is ambivalent, and a score of two represents a negative view. The responses were combined and then averaged to create an index of ethnic animosity.[66]

Table 8-1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Support for violence	363	.256	.439	0	1
Participation in violence	399	.083	.275	0	1
Identify first as Burkinabé	392	1.280	.820	0	2
Interpersonal trust index	377	1.982	.849	0	3
Associational life index	376	1.109	.706	0	3
Local gov't performance *(Good=1)*	371	0.876	.330	0	1
Trad. leader performance *(Good=1)*	393	0.903	.296	0	1
First Institution consulted (*Trad.*=1)	393	0.445	.498	0	1
Traditional leader legitimacy	371	3.164	1.398	0	4
Local gov't legitimacy	378	3.278	1.227	0	4
Ethnic animosity	400	1.058	.906	0	2
Gender	400	0.453	.498	0	1
Age	397	42.33	14.672	18	87
Education (*Attended primary school=1*)	400	.1075	.3101358	0	1

[66] Cronbach's Alpha= .950 and Eigen value=2.530

Controls

The models also controls for other variables that may affect an individual's views towards political violence, namely gender, age, and education. In order to test the relationship between the dependent variables (both behavioral and attitudinal) and the listed independent variables, I estimate a multivariate ordinary logit model. Table 2 reports the results of estimations of the first model.

Results

Table 8-2: Acceptability of the use of violence (local institutions (government and traditional) performance as explanatory variables)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Burkinabé	1.262	.275	.000***
Index of trust	-.368	.178	.038**
Index of associational life	-.374	.219	.088*
Local government performance in management of land issues*(Good=1)*	-.710	.473	.134
Traditional leader performance in management of land issues*(Good=1)*	-1.241	.511	.015**
Ethnic animosity	-.131	.175	.457
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	-.467	.340	.170
Age	-.005	.011	.662
Education *(at least finished primary school=1)*	-.313	.575	.586
Constant	.201	1.016	.843
Pseudo R2	.1872		
Prob>Chi2	0.000		
Number of observations	320		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

Table 8-3: Marginal Change in variables of interest found to be significant

	Acceptability of Political Violence
Identity	0.166
Interpersonal trust	-0.048
Associational life	-0.049
Performance of traditional chiefs	-0.225

Note: Change in predicted probability as an independent variable changes from ½ standard deviation below base to ½ standard deviation above, holding all other variables constant.

In Table 8- 2 the results for control variables all have valence in the expected direction yet none of the three are at significant levels. It is somewhat surprising that higher levels of education do not have a significant effect of reducing support for violence. However, when we note that very few people in rural areas have obtained elevated levels of education there may not be sufficient variation to produce significant results. In terms of age, this variable is insignificant which is also surprising given that one would think that younger people would be more receptive to violence as a justifiable option.

Turning to attitudinal considerations, I find, counterintuitively, the more that an individual prescribes to a national identity the more likely that they are to find violence as acceptable. This does not conform to expectations. Perhaps an alternative interpretation is that people with national identities are less inclined to use traditional forms of conflict resolution that are an effective means for settling disputes in rural areas. An individual who regards himself as a member of a modern identity may not see the relevance of traditional means of conflict negotiation. This is despite the fact that traditional means of conflict resolution are an effective approach in West Africa. One study found that Nigerians were twice as likely to prefer informal intervention by traditional or religious leaders than the national judicial system (Afrobarometer 2002). In Mali, the Tuareg rebellion was settled by traditional means of negotiation by concerned leaders (Poulton and Youssof 1998).

Moreover individuals who prescribe to a national identity may view other groups as non-Burkinabé and this could explain their increased proclivity to support violence. This may mean that farmers do not consider Fulani herders to be Burkinabé but rather

étrangères. This interpretation illustrates the allochtone versus authochtone condition that exists in many parts of West Africa. Many farmers do not consider Fulani herders to be compatriots.

In the results from this model that pertain to institutional considerations, I find that only the capacity of traditional institutions has a significant effect on individual support for violence. People who perceive the performance of traditional institutions as satisfactory have lower approval of violence. Evidence from the case studies suggested that traditional institutions would have a stronger effect on decreasing the acceptability of violence. Perhaps it is that individuals show more deference and respect for traditional institutions than modern institutions such as local government. It may also be that traditional institutions are better situated to invoke sanctions through the strength of cultural norms.

Interpersonal trust is significant and as expected has a diminishing effect on an individual's support of violence. Associational life has a significant effect in lowering attitudes towards violence. Feelings of animosity towards the ethnic group of a rival producer group do not have a significant effect on support of violence. This finding suggests that the animosity that exists between rival ethnic groups in public discourse is just verbal jousting. Once again, given the prevalence of joking relationships in Burkina Faso this may explain why there is no link between ethnically tinged charged verbal volleys and actual violence.

In terms of the marginal effects listed in Table 8-3, a ½ standard deviation increase in the level of individual approval of traditional institutional performance leads to an approximately 22.5% decrease in popular acceptability of political violence as a

justified tool. In addition, ½ standard deviation increase in identification with a Burkinabé rather than sub-national identity is associated with a 16.6% increase in the acceptability of political violence. A ½ standard deviation increase in popular attitudes of interpersonal trust corresponds with a 4.8% decrease in the acceptability of political violence. The marginal effect of associational life on popular views about violence results in a 4.9% reduction in support of violence.

Thus far the study has tested for the effects on acceptability of the idea of violence in the abstract. Do the results of the exploration of attitudes extend into actual behavior? Table 8-4 reports the results of estimations.

Table 8-4: Participation in violence (local government and tradition leader performance as explanatory variables)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Burkinabé	.080	.263	0.761
Index of trust	.170	.258	0.510
Index of associational life	.149	.293	0.612
Local government performance in management of land issues*(Good=1)*	-1.319	.467	0.005***
Traditional leader performance in management of land issues*(Good=1)*	-1.045	.566	0.065*
Ethnic animosity	.144	.238	0.547
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	-1.315	.576	0.022**
Age	-.002	.014	0.876
Education *(at least finished primary school=1)*	-.080	.657	0.904
Constant	-.670	1.13	0.554
Pseudo R2	0.1276		
Prob>Chi2	0.0023		
Number of observations	333		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

Table 8-5: Marginal change in variables of interest found to be significant

	Acceptability of Political Violence
Performance of local government	-0.124
Performance of traditional chiefs	-0.092

In the behavioral model we find that gender becomes significant and that men are much more likely to participate in violent acts than are women. It is also notable that the other variables, such as national identity and trust that were significant in the attitudinal model have lost significance. However the leading theories, namely that performance of traditional and modern institutions affect participation in violence remain significant. The effect of local government is more significant than the effect of traditional institutions. The effect of ethnic animosity remains insignificant. Moreover, the marginal effects of local government institutions (12.4%) are stronger than the marginal effects of traditional institutions (9.2%). Perhaps modern institutions have the ability to invoke sanctions through security apparatuses and this lowers the incentive to participate in violence.

Table 8-6 explores the effects of the legitimacy of local institutions which is substituted for performance of local institutions. All of the other variables that were presented in the first two models remain. The analytic goal of replacing performance of local institutions with legitimacy of local institutions is to examine whether or not another dimension of local institutions is also significant in the mitigation of behavioral and attitudinal conceptualizations of violence.

Table 8-6: Acceptability of Use of Violence (View modern and traditional institutions as legitimate)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Burkinabé	1.210	0.258	0.000***
Index of trust	-0.405	0.189	0.032**
Index of associational life	-0.258	0.222	0.246
Traditional leader legitimacy	-0.478	0.113	0.000***
CVD legitimacy	-0.244	0.132	0.065*
Ethnic animosity	0.079	0.182	0.665
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	-0.282	0.339	0.406
Age	-0.002	0.011	0.889
Education *(at least finished primary school=1)*	0.297	0.535	0.579
Constant	0.316	0.981	0.747
Pseudo R2	0.2381		
Prob>Chi2	0.000		
Number of observations	324		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

Table 8-7: Marginal change in variables of interest found to be significant

	Acceptability of Political Violence
Identity	0.161
Interpersonal trust	-0.054
Legitimacy of traditional chiefs	-0.063
Legitimacy of local government	-0.032

In this model the results demonstrate that greater levels of legitimacy of local modern and traditional institutions diminish the chance that an individual will actually take part in violence. Identification as a Burkinabé increases acceptance of violence while higher levels of interpersonal trust diminishes it. In terms of the marginal effects, a ½ standard deviation increase in the level of individual identification with a national identity results in a 16.1% increase in acceptance of violence. Interpersonal trust has a marginal effect of 5.4%. A ½ standard deviation increase in the perceived legitimacy of

local traditional institutions results in a 6.3% reduction in support of violence. Finally, the legitimacy of local government institutions has a marginal effect of 3.2%.

Table 8-8 also substitutes legitimacy of local institutions for performance of local institutions, while preserving the other explanatory variables. In this model, in terms of significance, females are less likely to take part in violence as well people who have high levels of associational life. The only other variable that has a significant effect is local traditional institutions which decrease support of violence. According to Table 8-9 a ½ standard deviation augmentation in the perceived legitimacy of local traditional institutional performance results in a 1.5% reduction in participation in violence.

Table 8-8: Participation in violence (View modern and traditional institutions as legitimate)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Burkinabé	0.174	0.268	0.515
Index of trust	0.292	0.271	0.281
Index of associational life	0.318	0.298	0.286
Traditional leader legitimacy	-0.266	0.146	0.069*
CVD legitimacy	0.012	0.184	0.946
Ethnic animosity	0.406	0.250	0.104
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	-1.327	0.573	0.021**
Age	-0.005	0.0150	0.730
Education *(at least finished primary school=1)*	0.265	0.650	0.683
Constant	-3.261	1.081	0.003
Pseudo R2	0.1015		
Prob>Chi2	0.0210		
Number of observations	334		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

Table 8-9: Marginal change in variables of interest found to be significant

	Acceptability of Political Violence
Legitimacy of traditional chiefs	-0.015

Tables 8-10 and 8-12 examine another dimension of local institutions. As such the models look at how perceptions of the efficacy of local institutions influence individual attitudes and behaviors towards violence. Once again, in the behavioral model of Table 8-10 people who prescribe to a national, rather sub-national identity, have greater approval of violence. A ½ standard deviation increase in identification with a national identity results in a 14.9% increase in support of violence. The only other variables that reach significance are trust and associational life and they lowers one's acceptance of violence. The marginal effects of trust and associational life are 7.8% and 7.0%, respectively.

Table 8-10: Acceptability of use of violence (First institution consulted)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Burkinabé	0.906	0.211	0.000***
Index of trust	-0.477	0.167	0.004***
Index of associational life	-0.428	0.110	0.032**
First institution consulted *(Traditional=1)*	0.373	0.285	0.189
Ethnic animosity	-0.004	0.157	0.979
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	-0.456	0.300	0.127
Age	-0.007	0.010	0.460
Education *(at least finished primary school=1)*	0.184	0.476	0.699
Constant	-0.728	0.749	0.331
Pseudo R2	.1240		
Prob>Chi2	0.000		
Number of observations	332		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

Table 8-11: Marginal change in variables of interest found to be significant

	Acceptability of Political Violence
Identity	0.149
Interpersonal trust	-0.078
Associational life	-0.070

The model detailed in Table 8-12 demonstrates that individuals who view

traditional institutions as the most effective means of land conflict resolution are less likely to participate in violent conflict. According to Table 8-13 an augmentation of a ½ standard deviation in preference for traditional institutions results in a 5% decrease in participation in violence.

Table 8-12: Participation in violence (First institution consulted)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Burkinabé	0.149	0.257	0.561
Index of trust	0.101	0.249	0.685
Index of associational life	0.141	0.284	0.621
First institution consulted *(Traditional=1)*	-0.856	0.430	0.047*
Ethnic animosity	0.140	0.230	0.541
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	-1.661	0.567	0.003
Age	-0.001	0.014	0.918
Education *(at least finished primary school=1)*	0.020	0.630	0.974
Constant	-2.243	1.046	0.032
Pseudo R2	0.0883		
Prob>Chi2	0.0211		
Number of observations	346		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

Table 8-13: Marginal change in variables of interest found to be significant

	Acceptability of Political Violence
First institution consulted (traditional=1)	-0.050

Interpretation

As evidenced by the empirical results, local political institutions not only have an effect on people's views towards violence but also the degree to which they participate in violent acts. Each model disaggregated the local political institutions into traditional and modern components. Moreover since both variables were significant in both attitudinal and behavioral models we can have more confidence in the results. It is also noteworthy that modern decentralized institutions are having an effect on people's behavior and

attitudes in rural areas. This is an encouraging sign for supporters of decentralized forms of governance and institutional engineering geared towards violent conflict prevention.

By the same token despite the introduction of decentralized modern institutions to manage natural resources, traditional leaders still play an important role in this domain. Perhaps one way to avoid conflict over land would be to reinforce the capacity of traditional leaders. Their role in the mitigation of land conflicts is important and does not seem to be disappearing anytime soon. Moreover, this finding also demonstrates that despite the existence of a national act, the RAF, which circumscribes the power of traditional chiefs, the institution is still highly relevant in terms of land management. Perhaps one reason for their relevance is the way they have been empowered by the Compaore regime in the post-Sankara era. Traditional chiefs play an important role in supporting the regime in power and nearly all of them are aligned with Compaore in his political party of CDP. This is an example of the hybrid nature of local institutions.

In terms of the effects of associational life, perhaps it depends on context. It may be that in urban areas higher levels of associational life among individuals do lower one's proclivity to participate in violence, but in rural areas this is not the case. It appears that associational life may make it easier to target rival groups for violent retribution. The indicator of associational life that I used in this study consists of both bridging and bonding forms. Perhaps it would be better to disaggregate this variable and create two separate variables. Anderson, in her examination of social capital and democratization in Latin America, found that the two forms of social capital have different effects on democratization (2010). This may also be the case with participation in violence. Negative forms of associational life refer to only those that reinforce within group bonds.

Positive forms of associational life refer to out group, or cross-cutting, activities that bring together different groups. This can also work in terms of testing the effects of interpersonal trust. It would be interesting to see how the effects of interpersonal trust within one's ethnicity compares to the effects of interpersonal trust with groups outside one's ethnicity.

It is also noteworthy that factors such as associational life and interpersonal trust diminish an individual's acceptability of the idea of violence in the abstract. However this result does not extend into the behavioral models. In terms of first hand-hand participation in violence, higher levels of associational life and interpersonal trust are not sufficient in precluding individual participation in violent conflict. Perhaps individuals who are active in a number of associations and active in other forms of associational life are generally opposed to violence because they are thinking of violence in general terms and not within the specific context of violence based on competition over scarce resources. I argue that individuals who interact with people in multiple forms of associational life and are generally trusting of people and should be opposed to violence because they understand how it may affect people in their networks. When the question shifts to concrete participation in violent acts, associational life and interpersonal trust are inconsequential because the conflict has become more personal and real-life access to resources lies in the balance.

In terms of ethnic animosity this variable is not significant in any of the models. People may speak about other groups in negative ways yet it is not enough to actually increase their likelihood to support or take part in violence. Interestingly enough among the ethnic groups that are part of this analysis there are not *cousinage* relationships

between any of them. Yet despite the inexistence of formal *cousinage* relations between the different groups I would argue that the general joking environment that *cousinage* creates in Burkina Faso may play a role. All ethnic groups do somewhat casually joke with one another.

Individuals who regard themselves as first and foremost Burkinabé are more likely to support violence. The story presented in Chapter Eight of the Fulani herder who was victimized in a violent conflict and complained that farmers viewed him as a foreigner serves as a powerful anecdote. The degree to which an individual views a rival ethnic group in terms of belonging has an effect on whether or not he will participate in a violent conflict. This result suggests that further research should be done in order to better understand the finding. This could be accomplished by more interviews with villagers in areas that have experienced violent conflict which could shed light on issues pertaining to the politics of belonging. The following chapter will test the same indicators in the data set collected in Liberia in 2008.

Chapter 9: Extending the Results: The Case of Liberia

Introduction

One of the substantive conclusions of the study heretofore is that local institutions play an important role in the mitigation of land-based conflicts. However the question remains as to whether or not the results of my investigation of violent land-based communal conflict are only relevant within the context of the areas where I conducted my case studies and survey data collection. One possible way to do this would be to test my results in the much larger 2008 Afrobarometer survey that was conducted in Burkina Faso. Unfortunately, there were no questions asked in this round that pertain to attitudes towards, or participation in, violence. Fortunately, due to the availability of Afrobarometer survey data collected in Liberia in 2008 the results may be tested in another context. The survey conducted in Liberia queries issues related to violent land conflicts. Rather than use the full nationally representative data set, I use a subset that is limited to individuals in rural areas (n=630), where land-based conflicts are most prevalent.

However, before delving into the examination of the data collected in Liberia there are several caveats associated with this analysis that must be considered. First, I did not conduct field work in Liberia, so I am unable to state with confidence that the causal process of violence in Liberia completely mirrors that of violent outbursts in Burkina Faso. Second, there are differences between the questions in the Burkina Faso and Liberia questionnaires that query the different aspects about local institutions. As such I am unable to confirm that the indicators that I use in the examination of the Liberia data represent exactly the same dimensions as the indicators used in the examination of Burkina Faso. That being said, I made every effort to construct indicators that resemble

the indicators used in the Burkina Faso study. Finally, the second civil war of Liberia concluded, more or less, in 2003 and the data that I use was collected in 2008. Does the fact that there was recent civil war in Liberia make Liberia "off-limits" in terms of serving as a laboratory where I may explore issues related to land and violence? I argue that the examination of public opinion data collected in Liberia is still a worthy endeavor. I believe that it is still useful to examine micro-level data collected in Liberia, while making sure to keep in mind the contextual factors such as the recent civil war.

The chapter commences with a presentation of a number of descriptive statistics that elucidate issues related to violent conflict and land in Liberia. I then turn to an examination of the presence and role of traditional leaders in Liberia. In the final component of this chapter I present two models that are used to test the results of the Burkina Faso study in the Liberian context. The results of the models present several interesting findings and confirm the important role that local institutions play in influencing individual participation in violent conflict.

Land-Based Conflict in Liberia

First, according to the descriptive results in Figure 9-1, we can see that conflicts rooted in land issues are a serious problem in Liberia. The vast majority of individuals (60 percent) cited land issues as the primary driver of violent conflict in their country. Individuals are on average three to one more likely to identify land as the cause of violence than they are to cite ethnic differences (18 percent) as a fomenter of violence. Besides land or ethnicity, none of the other issues surpasses more than 8% of the survey population. Although I cannot say with any degree of certainty that the land conflicts in Liberia are exclusively rooted in farmer versus herder disputes, it is clear that land is a

contentious issue, much like it is in Burkina Faso.

Figure 9-1: The Source of Violent Conflict between Groups in Liberia (in percentages)*



n=624**Over what sort of problems do violent conflicts most often arise between different groups in this country?*

Figure 9-2 reports the frequency with which individuals believe violent land conflicts occur in Liberia. Among the individuals surveyed, 24 percent report that they occur all the time, 27 percent state that they are often, and 37 percent said they happen sometimes. Only a small portion (12 percent) report that they never or rarely occur. These results point to the ubiquity of violent land based conflicts. Given the frequency of violent conflicts over land in Liberia, the country serves as an excellent laboratory for the empirical exploration of the explanatory factors that were identified in the examination of Burkina Faso.

Figure 9-2: Frequency of violent land-based conflicts (in percentages)*



n=625 *In your experience, how often do violent conflicts arise over land ownership and distribution in Liberia?

The Role of Local Institutions

The results of the study of Burkina Faso demonstrated that local traditional leaders play an important role in the distribution of land. In Burkina Faso traditional leaders, most typically *chef de terres* are frequently solicited when individuals seek use of land. Is this the case in Liberia? According to Figure 9-3 the majority of individuals (51 percent) believe that land distribution is the responsibility of the central government. A much smaller segment of the population (17 percent) believes that it is the responsibility of traditional leaders. This is probably due to the decisive rule that American Colonization Society played in the creation of the country of Liberia. According to Richards and Chauveau close connections to the President's office are a key to obtaining land in Liberia which once again points to the key role that the central government plays in land distribution (2007).

Figure 9-3: Institution with the primary responsibility for land allocation (in percentages)*



n=625 ***Who do you think actually has primary responsibility for managing each of the following tasks. Is it the central government, the local government, traditional leaders, or members of your community: Allocating land?*

Traditional rulers may play a minor role in the allocation of land yet when it comes to the resolution of local conflicts they are expected to play a larger role. As evidenced in Figure 9-4 more individuals tout the conflict resolving attributes of traditional leaders (33 percent) than they do any other element. 29 percent of respondents state that conflict resolution is the responsibility of the local government while 25 percent say it is the job of the central government. Given the frequency of violent land disputes in Liberia this finding suggests that traditional leaders are frequently responsible for resolving this genre of conflict.

Figure 9-4: Institution with the primary responsibility of resolving local disputes (in percentages)



n=629*****Who do you think actually has primary responsibility for managing each of the following tasks. Is it the central government, the local government, traditional leaders, or members of your community: Solving local disputes?

Given the important role that individuals afford traditional leaders in the realm of conflict resolution it is not surprising that the overwhelming majority of respondents (60 percent) state that their influence should increase in the local political arena. 31 percent of respondents believe that the influence in governing their local community should remain the same. Only 9 percent of those interviewed believe that their influence in local political affairs should decrease.

Figure 9-5: The amount of influence of traditional leaders in political affairs (in percentages)*



n=615 **Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing your local community should increase, stay the same, or decrease?*

How do respondents regard local institutions? There is a clear difference in the way that individuals perceive their local institutions. As evidenced in Table 9-1, 35 percent of individuals find their local government councilors to be mostly or all corrupt while only 27 percent have the same opinion of traditional leaders. 37 percent of respondents stated that they found traditional leaders listen to them often or always while only 20 percent of those interviewed believe local government councilors do the same. These results suggest that local traditional institutions are more responsive than local government representatives. Does this contrast in variation in institutional capacity play a role in individual behavior in terms of violence?

Table 9-1: Individual perceptions of local institutions

Institution	**Corrupt***	**Responsiveness****
Local government councilors	35 percent (589 respondents)	20 percent (626 respondents)
Traditional leaders	27 percent (591 respondents)	37 percent (624 respondents)

**How many (officials) do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough to say? ***How much of the time do you think elected local government councilors try their best to listen to what people like you have to say?* The figures are the percentages of respondents who perceive institutions to listen "often" or "always." The figures are the percentages of respondents who perceive corruption among "most" or "all."

The presentation of simple descriptive statistics regarding land conflicts has revealed the degree to which land is a contentious issue in Liberia and that disputes of this ilk oftentimes lead to violence. Moreover, most individuals in local areas look to local institutions to resolve conflicts. Could local institutions in Liberia, like their counterparts in Burkina Faso, affect individual participation in violence? I now turn to an examination of the factors that predict an individual's proclivity to participate in violent conflict.

Empirical Analysis[67]

I look at two indicators of institutional capacity which are based on the survey questions probed in Table 9-1. The first indicator of institutional capacity is a measure of the degree to which individuals perceive their local government councilors to be corrupt.[68] The second indicator of institutional capacity is responsiveness which is based on individual perceptions of how well local institutions listen to their constituents (Bratton 2010). [69] This variable is measured by the survey question "How much of the time do you think elected local government councilors try their best to listen to what people like you have to say?" Answers are ordered on a four-point ordinal scale of "never," "only sometimes," "often" or "always."

As in the models tested in the Burkina context, I include indicators for associational life, interpersonal trust, and strength of national versus group identity as well as the control variables of gender, age, and education. Interpersonal trust is an index

[67] The exact phrasing of all questions used for the indicators can be found in Appendix B.
[68] It is important to note that local government councilors are not village level institutions. They are at a higher (district), yet still local, level.
[69] For a deeper, cross-national discussion of the responsiveness of local government in Africa see Bratton 2010 which identifies the factors that increase political responsiveness on the part of local government.

constructed out of three questions that query the extent to which individuals trust relatives, other people they know and other Liberians.[70] Associational life is an index constructed from four questions that query how active an individual is in religious circles, community associations, attending community meetings and raising issues with others.[71]

The only variable that I am unable to construct is the ethnic animosity indicator since the Afrobarometer does not have a semantic differential that explores individual opinions of other ethnicities. Due to this limitation I instead constructed an indicator for group grievance. As such group grievance serves as a proxy for ethnic animosity. It is not a perfect proxy but I think it is important to at least include a variable that gives an indication of how an individual's ethnic group is situated in terms of how it is treated by the national government in relation to other ethnic groups. I predict that interpersonal trust will have the effect of lowering participation in violent conflict. By contrast I predict that associational life and national rather sub-national identity will act to increase participation in violent conflict. I also contend that group grievance will not have a significant effect on individual participation in violence.

I predict that individuals who view local government officials as corrupt will be more likely to participate in violence. This prediction is based on the frustration that many villagers experience with corrupt local political officials who demand bribes for services. On countless occasions over the course of interviews in Burkina Faso, farmers complained that wealthy herders were able to bribe local political leaders to get them to rule that the damage caused by cattle did not require them to pay restitution to farmers. Moreover, in a study of violent conflict between farmers and herders in Mali

[70] Cronbach's Alpha=.714, Eigen value=1.357
[71] Cronbach's Alpha=.626, Eigen value=1.228

Benjaminsen and Ba found that corrupt officials are to blame for a rise in incidences of violent conflict (2009). As mentioned before there is no guarantee that in Liberia violent land conflicts take place within the context of farmer/herder disputes. Nonetheless even if this is not the case, one can easily imagine how corruption intervenes in other land use disputes such as redrawing of property lines, land seizures and access to resources. I also predict that local traditional institutions will not have an effect on increasing individually violent action since it is difficult to discern the difference between a bribe and a tribute that is paid to a chief.

The dependent variable in both models is whether an individual has used force or violence in the past twelve months.[72] The fact that the question limits the participation in violence to the last twelve months is important. This is due to the civil wars that took place in Liberia in 1989-1996 and 1999-2003. The survey question gives the respondent the option of responding that he would have used violence if he had the chance. If respondents answered this way I did not code them as having taken part in violence.

Table 9-2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Participation in violence	618	.120	.325	0	1
Identify first as Liberian	630	1.124	.597	0	2
Interpersonal trust index	627	1.641	.773	0	3
Associational life index	623	1.542	.635	0	3
Local government corrupt	589	1.409	.785	0	3
Traditional leader corrupt	591	1.214	.761	0	3
Traditional leader listens *(Listen=1)*	624	.368	.482	0	1
Local government listens *(Listen=1)*	626	.203	.402	0	1
Group grievance	590	.468	.776	0	3
Gender (Female=1)	632	.502	.500	0	1
Age	630	36.730	12.978	18	88
Education	630	.578	.717	0	2

[72] I also used acceptability of violence as a dependent variable and the two models can be found in Appendices C and D.

Results

In the first model I test how individual perceptions of corruption on the part of local institutions affect an individual's participation in violent conflict. One of the key findings in Table 9-3 is that individuals who view the local government councilors as corrupt are much more likely to participate in violent conflict. Another finding is that individuals with higher levels of associational life are more likely to act violently. Gender and age are also significant. Females are less likely than males to participate in violence and as age increases one is less likely to act violently.

Table 9-3: Participation in violence (local government and tradition leader corrupt)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Liberian	-.236	.385	0.539
Index of trust	.386	.300	0.198
Index of associational life	.771	.388	0.047**
Local government corrupt	.866	.277	0.002***
Traditional leader corrupt	-.426	.284	0.134
Group grievance	.202	.252	0.423
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	-1.315	.576	0.025**
Age	-.065	.023	0.006***
Education *(finished primary school=1)*	-.524	.325	0.107
Constant	-2.690	1.268	0.034
Pseudo R2	0.1394		
Prob>Chi2	0. 0009		
Number of observations	530		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

Table 9-4: Marginal change in variables of interest found to be significant

	Acceptability of Political Violence
Corruption local government	0.023
Index of Associational Life	0.021

In terms of the marginal effects, according to Table 9-4 a ½ standard deviation augmentation in the perceived corruption of local government results in a 2.3% increase in participation in violence. Additionally, a ½ standard deviation increase in associational

life corresponds with a 2.1% augmentation in involvement in violent action.

Individuals who believe that local officials are easily corrupted are more likely to take matters into their own hands. In terms of corrupt chiefs there is no significant effect. This confirms the findings of Benjaminsen and Ba who found that local political authorities have exacerbated conflicts between farmers and herders in Mali by seeking rents in dispute resolutions (2009). It is interesting that while local government officials who give the impression that they are corrupt increase the probability that individuals will act violently, corrupt chiefs do not have the same effect. Perhaps the concept of a corrupt chief is more difficult to grasp. It is difficult to discern the difference between a tribute to a chief and bribe for a chief and this may explain why the level of corruption on the part of the chief does not have a significant effect on an individual's participation in violence. Undoubtedly there are instances where chiefs do clearly act in a corrupt manner. One example is the *chef de terres* in Perkoura in Burkina who sold land to newcomers.

Associational life has the effect of increasing an individual's taking part in violence. Perhaps the social connections created through associational life allow individuals to target members of rival groups in instances when land disputes arise. It may also be that associational life has a bonding effect rather than a bridging effect.

The empirical examination now turns to a test of another aspect of institutional capacity. In the second model I examine how the degree to which individuals believe that local institutions listen affects their probability of participating in violence.

Table 9-5: Participation in violence (local government and traditional leader listen)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Liberian	.160	.372	0.668
Index of trust	.410	.301	0.174
Index of associational life	.469	.378	0.214
Local government listen	1.793	.603	0.003***
Traditional leader listen	-1.774	.650	0.006***
Group grievance	.390	.229	0.089*
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	-.980	.487	0.044**
Age	-.056	.022	0.012**
Education	-.212	.318	0.505
Constant	-2.106	1.112	0.058
Pseudo R2	0.1390		
Prob>Chi2	0.008		
Number of observations	560		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

In Table 9-5 we can see that gender and age have the same significant effects as they did in the model in Table 9-3. Traditional leaders who listen to their constituents have the effect of lowering individual participation in violent acts. Against expectations, I found that individuals who believe that local governmental officials listen are more likely to have participated in violence. On the surface this result is counterintuitive. How could it be that when a local institution listens more closely to members of the community it raises the chances that an individual will take part in violence? The results make more sense, however, when we consider the results of the first model in Table 9-3. Perhaps gaining the ear of the local government is contingent upon the offer of a bribe. Local government councilors are a captive audience provided they receive something under the table. Individuals who believe that their ethnic group is treated poorly by the government are more likely to use violence. In this case it appears that individuals who feel that their identity group is poorly treated seek to redress the inequity through violence.

Table 9-6: Marginal change in variables of interest found to be significant

	Participation in Violence
Local government listen	.0812124
Traditional chiefs listen	-.038434
Group grievance	.0095947

In terms of the marginal effects, according to Table 9-6 a ½ standard deviation augmentation in the perception that members of local government listen results in an 8.1% increase in participation in violence. Additionally, a ½ standard deviation increase in perceptions of an attentive traditional chieftaincy corresponds with a 3.8% decrease in involvement in violent action. A ½ standard deviation augmentation in perceptions that one's ethnic group is treated poorly translates into a 0.9% increase in the use of violent force.

The results of this chapter confirm the results found in Burkina Faso. According to the empirical examination of survey data collected in Liberia local institutions do play an important role in influencing the chances that an individual will participate in violent conflict. In the case of institutions occupied by traditional leaders, they serve to mitigate violent conflict when they listen to the members of the community. By contrast modern local political institutions enhance the chances of violence, particularly when they are viewed as corrupt. The next chapter will draw conclusions from the findings from the examination of Burkina Faso and Liberia.

Chapter 10: Interpretation and Conclusion

Introduction

The goal of this study has been to identify the factors that explain variation in violent communal conflict between farmers and herders in rural areas. More specifically, it attempts to identify the mechanism by which violent conflict is triggered, or in most cases, as illustrated in the case of Burkina Faso, averted. Local institutions were found to have a significant effect on the incidence of violent conflict. At the micro-level, in cases in which local institutions were seen to have low levels of institutional capacity individuals were more likely to act violently. And at the meso-level, villages that have local institutions with low capacity were more likely to experience violent conflict.

This finding demonstrates that institutions have greater explanatory power than do other frequently cited conflict mitigating factors including associational life and interpersonal trust. Confidence may be placed in these results due to the study's multi-method and multi-level approach. In-depth case studies demonstrated how villages with low or non-existent institutional capacity faced a serious challenge in avoiding violent communal conflict between farmers and herders. The case of AVV 3 succinctly illustrated that when the local institutions responsible for land management were non-existent or lacked capacity the specter of violence arose between farmers and herders. Additionally, by constructing event histories of the violent events I was able to bring the causal chain of events into starker relief. To be sure, in situations where disputes between producer groups arose, local institutions with high institutional capacity serve as the mechanism that prevents the conflict from turning violent.

Moreover, statistical analysis of original survey data collected in rural areas in Burkina Faso also found that local institutions play an important role in preventing

individual participation in violent conflict. The study also endeavored to extend the analysis beyond rural areas in Burkina Faso by examine the results in the context of rural Liberia. Local institutions in Liberia also play an important role in influencing whether or not an individual will resort to violence which demonstrates the robustness of the results found in Burkina Faso. More specifically, when individuals view local government councilors as corrupt they are more likely to take part in violence.

This chapter commences with a discussion of how this study contributes to the bodies of literature that it engaged. Second, it outlines several caveats that demonstrate the limitations of the study. It then discusses potential research avenues that may be pursued to overcome the limitations and expand the analysis to increase our general understanding of violent communal conflict. The chapter concludes with the presentation of a number of policy suggestions that may be implemented in countries that suffer from conflicts of this genre.

Contributions to Relevant Literature

Common Pool Resources

Given the arrangements of land tenure in Burkina Faso the engagement of CPR literature was critical. As noted time and again in this study, outside of urban dwellers few people in Burkina Faso hold actual deeds for the land that they occupy. As such, Burkinabé typically share resources that are part of a common pool. This presents a collective action problem. Under this system there are many cases of dispute over resource use and access. In some of these cases the disputes degenerate into group violence. One of the contributions of this study is the finding that inept institutional management of CPRs can in some cases lead to violent conflict.

This study identifies the factors that facilitate management of the collective action problem related to natural resource use. It also identifies the characteristics or attributes of local institutions that increase the ability to avoid institutional failure and prevent violent conflict. The systematic comparison of villages that have experienced variation in experiences with violent conflict revealed that the capacity of local institutions is the key factor in predicting the onset of violence. As one example, in the case of Burkina Faso, the results demonstrated that institutions regarded as legitimate by their constituents are more likely to decrease an individual's proclivity to participate in violent conflict. The logic is that individuals who feel that an institution is legitimate will be more likely to follow its rulings and not take matters into their own hands.

The case of Perkoura, a village that experienced violence, points to the role that legitimacy has in helping an institution prevent violent outbreaks. In Perkoura, herders were not represented on the CVD committee and this led them to view the institution as lacking legitimacy. When the CVD would make a judgment, such as requiring a herder to pay restitution to a farmer, the herder would frequently ignore the judgment. This created a cycle whereby farmers had little faith in the ability of the CVD to effectively invoke sanctions. Ultimately farmers no longer counted on the CVD to manage resources and as a result they resorted to violence to protect their fields.

The study also points to the importance of traditional leaders, namely *chef de terres*, in the management of natural resources. Individuals who viewed traditional leaders as legitimate and doing a good job managing natural resources were less likely to resort to violence. This finding is important given the way the state has intervened on multiple occasions in ways that in theory would enervate the influence that traditional

leaders have in the sphere of land management. As one example, recent attempts have been made to re-zone land similar to those promoted under the auspices of the GdT approach.

As a second illustration, the results from Liberia demonstrate that local government institutions perceived as corrupt have the effect of increasing the odds an individual will take part in violent acts. Furthermore, the results of the data from Liberia show that individuals who view traditional leaders as listening to their problems are less likely to participate in violence. Against expectations, I found that a more attentive local government council actually leads to higher individual participation in violence. I argue that given the way that many individuals view the local institution as corrupt it may be that citizens believe that local government councilors are willing to listen given the inducement of an attractive bribe.

Violent Communal Conflict

The central finding in this investigation of violent communal conflict is that local institutions occupy a pivotal position in the resolution of potentially violent confrontations. Even when compared with commonly recognized factors like interpersonal trust and associational life, local institutions are found to be more significant in the prevention of violence. Additionally, the study demonstrates that associational life enhances the potential for violence. This runs counter to the findings of other scholars. In the case studies component of this study I found that in villages that experienced violence and in those that had not, the populations had strong ties based on informal economic and social interactions. However, my research found that these linkages were not sufficient to prevent violence. I also found in the quantitative analysis

of Liberian and Burkinabé survey data that individuals with higher levels of associational life tended to be more pre-disposed to violent actions. Compared with previous studies of the relationship between associational life and violence the results are counterintuitive. However, I argue that associational life actually makes it easier for individuals to target members of rival groups when conflicts break out. As demonstrated in the case studies of villages that experienced violent conflict, the groups that engaged in combat actually had multiple interactions in social and economic circles. These findings suggest that the forms of associational life are the bonding rather than bridging type.

A key finding in the study reveals that traditional institutions are still highly relevant in terms of the mitigating effect they have on violent conflict in rural areas. Based on the case studies conducted in Burkina Faso it is evident that traditional leaders with high capacity , particularly *chef de terres,* are better situated to prevent violent conflict, or in the case when conflicts do emerge, to deescalate them. The statistical analysis of survey data collected in Liberia and Burkina Faso additionally confirms the important role traditional leaders play.

Despite the ethnic overtones that narrate the violent conflicts between farmers and herders, my analysis found that the animosity an individual feels towards his rival producer group does not predispose him to act violently. I used a semantic differential to construct an indicator of the symbolic imagery that individuals hold *vis a vis* members of their rival producer group. I also found in my investigation of villages that derogatory ethnic stereotypes abound yet they do not translate into higher levels of violence. I argue that ethnic-tinged insults need to be recognized as being situated within the broader context of *cousinage* relations between the groups. In the Liberian context I found that

when individuals feel they are mistreated by the government they are more likely to participate in violence.

An additional finding is that, in the context of Burkina Faso, individuals who feel a strong sense of a national identity, rather than a sub-national identity, have attitudes that are more accepting of violence. In the behavioral models of violent participation, self ascribed identity does not have a significant effect. In Liberia, whether an individual subscribes to a national or sub-national identity or not has no effect on their probability of engaging in violence. Perhaps the effects of national versus sub-national identity are case specific. It may be that in some countries contextual factors such as an intense autochthones versus allochthones rivalry is salient. This in turn affects how people view their identity and ultimately view violence.

Limitations

Despite the merits of what has been presented, there are several limitations to the results and to the study as a whole. First, the survey data collected in Burkina Faso consists of only 400 observations. A larger sample would have been preferable but budgetary constraints prevented it. Also, it would have been fortuitous to have surveyed a larger part of Burkina Faso and not restricted the analysis to only four provinces.

In terms of the examination of Liberian survey data, my analysis rests on the assumption that the violence that occurs in Liberia has the same causality as that which occurs in Burkina Faso. By assembling event histories of violent confrontations in Burkina Faso, the causal chain of events was clearly established. I was not able to do this for the analysis of Liberia. However, the Liberian data clearly demonstrates the ubiquity of violence rooted in land issues. As such there are many similarities between the two

cases. Nevertheless, the Liberian component of the study rests exclusively on public opinion data analysis and lacks first-hand field work. It is also important to point out that the questions used as indicators for institutional capacity refer to general perceptions of the respective institution and not specific perceptions of how they handle land and resource management. There is always the possibility that the order of causality that I found in Burkina Faso does not exist in Liberia. Another caveat is that the indicators for institutional capacity in the Burkina Faso and Liberia analysis are not built from the same exact survey questions.

Finally, the question persists as to whether or not the dichotomization of local institutions into traditional and modern forms is justified. On the surface, the two institutions stand alone. Traditional institutions are clearly rooted in pre-colonial systems yet they have undoubtedly evolved and adapted to changes in the colonial and post-colonial eras. In terms of modern institutions, decentralization is a relatively recent phenomenon and local formal political institutions such as mayors and CVD are new additions.

However there are instances when the two institutions overlap and cross into the other's sphere. In Burkina Faso traditional leaders, such as the Larle Naba, make occasional forays into the political realm. Furthermore there are instances when the two institutions work in concert and other times when the two institutions arrive at contradictory positions. This fuzziness of the borders between the institutions is a reality that has to be recognized. At the same time the disaggregation of local institutions is a worthy endeavor since it allows one to understand how the different institutions vary in the outcomes they deliver. As one example, in the case of Liberia, results demonstrate

that individuals who view local government officials as corrupt are more likely to act violently. However, individuals who view traditional chiefs as corrupt are no more likely to act violently than those who view the institution as transparent. Evidently corruption on the part of chiefs and local government officials is not interpreted the same way.

Unfortunately the survey data used for this study does not provide insight into the degree to which the two institutions have been hybridized and as a result I am not able to control for the effects of this factor. However as noted in the case studies there was evidence that when *chef de terres* and CVDs worked together violent conflicts were averted. In the village of Tiakane, for example, the chef des terres was consulted by CVDs and the mayor's office before any land use decisions were made. Some of the villagers credited this collaborative approach for the maintenance of good terms between farmers and herders. In the village of Bilbalgo the conditions were analogous to those of Tiakane and the village has been able to avert violent conflict. Meanwhile in the village of Perkoura, where violent conflict erupted in 2008, the *chef de terres* and CVDs did not have a rapport which enabled them to work together. Although I am not able to say definitively if crossover between the two institutions has an effect on violence, I can say that evidence from the case studies points to the conflict mitigating potential that is engendered by local institutions that work together. Moreover, by extension, when the two institutions do not cooperate, such as was the case in Perkoura, a violent outcome is more likely.

I believe that both traditional and modern local institutions can justifiably be examined as separate institutions. But one must keep in mind that there is certainly an interface that exists between the two and that occasionally the line between them is less

than clear. Given the aforementioned limitations of the study, I move to a brief discussion of potential ways that the research question could be further examined.

Potential Research Agendas

There are several avenues that may be pursued to expand our knowledge of violent communal conflict. Given the results pointing to the significance of local institutions in conflict mitigation, it would be worthwhile to extend the analysis to other contexts. One potential way to do this would be to encourage the inclusion of similar questions in future Afrobarometer survey questionnaires, much like the way they appeared in the Liberian questionnaire. Recognizing the already expansive length of the standard Afrobarometer questionnaire this may not be possible in all countries. However, given the existence of country specific questions in each questionnaire perhaps some Afrobarometer partners would be open to the proposition of including this battery of questions in such a section. This may be possible in light of the salience of land based conflicts in a number of Afrobarometer countries.

Another approach is to compare two areas that vary only in their local institutional interventions. This examination could be conducted by comparing two areas that are perhaps divided by an international border. For example it is likely that Ghana has local institutions that vary in comparison to that of Burkina Faso. This approach could employ the method Morris-McLean used to examine how contrasting national agricultural policies in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire had differing effect on the emergence of social support networks (2004, 2010). Perhaps the way local institutions have been implemented has had an effect on the level of violent conflicts between farmers and herders.

Finally, another possible way to examine the research question would be to identify all AVV villages and compare them with non-AVV villages to see if they differ in their rates of farmer versus herder violence. This approach could mirror that of Wantchekon et al who examined colonial legacies in Madagascar and Benin (2010). Wantchekon et al found that the violent repression of the Malagasy uprising in 1947 traumatized some locations of the country more than others and the effects still resonate. A similar examination could be conducted in Burkina Faso. Did AVV regions give rise to different behaviors and attitudes towards violence on a significant scale? The first step would be to identify all the AVV villages and then code them in the Afrobarometer data collected in Burkina Faso in 2008.

Policy Suggestions

The results of this study clearly identify local institutions as playing a role in influencing the onset of violent conflict. Do these results offer any lessons to help lower the potential for violent conflict between producer groups? Are there changes or modifications that can be made in the way local institutions operate and are structured in order to enhance their conflict mitigating characteristics? I offer several suggestions. Yet before launching into this discussion it is important to consider the ramifications of alterations to local institutions. Turner (2004) and Williams (1998) state there are several caveats concerning potential changes that may be made to natural resource management in rural areas.

Turner cautions that policy prescriptions for farmer herder conflict may actually make matters worse because they are based on oversimplifications of the conflict (2004). Additionally, as noted by Williams, devolution of power must be conducted in

recognition of the spatial and temporal aspects of existing formal and informal usufruct rights (1998). He goes on to argue that a failure to recognize the rights of all existing producer groups may result in the appropriation of key resources by the more powerful group, which in this case is typically the farmer. Furthermore it could exacerbate inefficient use of the CPRs in addition to complicating already tense relations between different groups. Williams also states that modifications in the way that land is used needs to take into account the multiple functions and heterogeneity of users of CPRs.

The first suggestion I offer is to have guaranteed representation of the different producer groups on the CVD committee. In order to increase the legitimacy of the CVD committee it is important that farmers and herders are both represented. This recommendation goes a step further than Williams' suggestion that the "access, use and management of CPRs are best handled by mixed associations of local user groups (e.g. farmer-pastoralist associations) (1998, 7)." In many cases "associations" do not exist, yet CVD committees do exist. However, in some villages herders are not permanent residents and this diminishes the potential of creating a diverse CVD.

As noted earlier, a CVD committee that is homogeneous in the occupation of its committee members has the potential of being viewed as illegitimate by the group lacking representation. This created a context where herders ignored the decisions of local institutions and farmers became increasingly frustrated not only with herders but with the institutions that lacked the "teeth" to effectively sanction the guilty party for its transgressions. In addition to creating group diversity, it may be a good idea to ensure ethnic diversity on the CVD committee as well. In areas where Fulani or other immigrant communities have a presence it would be advantageous to ensure they are properly

represented on the CVD committee.

The demand for conflict mediation is fairly constant during certain periods of the year, particularly from the onset of the rainy season up until its conclusion. Since there is a wide variety of users constantly challenging overlapping rights, disagreements are certainly going to take place on a nearly constant basis. In the lead up to this period of the year the government or donor agencies should sponsor workshops or re-training sessions for the institutions responsible for land management and conflict resolution.

A third suggestion is for greater transparency in the resolution of land based conflicts. Corruption is already recognized as the root of multiple problems in Africa (Hibou 1999, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Olivier de Sardan 1999, Hope and Chikulo 2000, Berman 2004). Land-based violence can also be added to the laundry list. As noted anecdotally in the case studies in Burkina Faso as well as in the study by Benjaminsen and Ba (2009), corrupt local officials have exacerbated poor relations between farmers and herders and by extension increased the potential for violent conflict. One of the key findings of the examination of survey data collected in Liberia is that corrupt local officials have a strong effect on increasing individual participation in violent conflict. As individuals realize that the offer of a bribe is the only means by which to resolve a land dispute in their favor, they have less faith in the unbiased conflict mitigating attributes of local political institutions. Furthermore when individuals believe that one producer group (herders) is continually absolved of guilt by bribery, this raises the animosity of that group towards the former.

This finding suggests that petty forms of corruption must also be combated, particularly when they may contribute to violent conflict. Frequently the focus of anti-

corruption campaigns are on large scale forms of the vice, but the results of this study also demonstrate that relatively small-scale acts of corruption can also lead to tragic outcomes. The institutions with the responsibility of making judgments regarding land use and resolving land disputes need to make their decisions in a more transparent manner. As such, local decentralized political institutions must be included in the discussion of corruption eradication efforts in Africa.

Institutional capacity needs to be increased in both traditional and more recently created institutions. In general terms, Africans regard local government councils as weak and lacking capacity (Bratton 2010). Local institutions, in particular CVDs in Burkina Faso, frequently complained that they received an initial training from the government and then were left on their own with no support. Without a clear understanding of the job they need to do and a population that is equally confused about their responsibilities, CVDs face an unenviable task of managing land and natural resource use. This being so, CVDs and the populations they serve need elucidation of their responsibilities and tasks. State institutions, or in some cases donor agencies, need to provide support for the strengthening of CVDs where their presence is nearly non-existent or decidedly weak.

Chef de terres also need to be recognized for the integral role that they play in resolving land based conflicts. It is clear that their influence has not abated. At the same time the further blurring of the line that separates traditional and modern institutions presents problems. Given the decisive responsibility that traditional leaders have in land conflict mitigation, what steps may be taken to reinforce this important function? The argument can also be made that traditional leaders need to play a more formal role in local politics. Figure 10-1 demonstrates that the majority of respondents in Burkina Faso

and Liberia believe that traditional leaders should sit on local government administrations.

Figure 10-1: Should traditional leaders sit on local government administrations?



Source Afrobarometer Round 4, Burkina Faso n=759, Liberia n=611
Do you think that traditional leaders should sit on your local government administration, or not? The figures are the percentages of respondents who answered "yes" or "no."

The argument can also be made that it is these non-formal ties to the government that makes traditional institutions legitimate and influential. It can be argued therefore that a formalization of traditional institutions may actually result in weakening any power or influence that they now hold. If formally linked with local political institutions, traditional leaders may no longer be regarded as above the political fray. The formalization of traditional institutions as a component of local state institutions may be debatable. What is less debatable is that traditional leaders should be provided support for enhancing their conflict mitigating capabilities. Government agencies could sponsor institutional strengthening and training in such areas as management, leadership skills and program planning.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Burkina Faso

Acceptability of political violence:

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

A: The use of violence is never justified in Burkinabé politics today.

B: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.

0 = Strongly Agree with A, Agree with A; 1 = Strongly Agree with B, Agree with B

Participation in violence:

Have you in the past 12 months one time participated in a violent conflict?

0 = No; 1 = Only a couple of times, Often, All the time.

Have you in the past 12 months physically menaced another group?

0 = No; 1 = Only a couple of times, Often, All the time.

National versus sub-National Identity:

Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Liberian and being a _____*[R's ETHNIC GROUP]*. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?

1 = I feel only _____ *[insert R's ethnic group*; 2 =I feel more _____ *[insert R's ethnic group*; 3 = I feel equally Burkinabé and _____ *[insert R's ethnic group*; 4 = I feel more Burkinabé than _____ *[insert R's ethnic group]*; 5= I feel only Burkinabé.

Associational life index:

a.) Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A religious group (e.g., church, mosque)
0 =Not a member; 1 = Inactive member; 2=Active Member; 3=Leader

b.) Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: Some other voluntary association or community group
0 =Not a member; 1 = Inactive member; 2=Active Member; 3=Leader

c.) Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take part in. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? Attend a religious gathering often, several times, once or twice, would if had the chance, would never do this.
0 =No; 1 = Would/Once; 2=Several; 3=Often

d.) Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take part in. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? Attend a religious gathering of another religion often, several times, once or twice, would if had the chance, would never do this.

0 =No; 1 = Would/Once; 2=Several; 3=Often

Interpersonal trust index:

a.) How much do you trust each of the following types of people? People close to you
0 =No; 1 = Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=A lot

b.) How much do you trust each of the following types of people? Other people you know
0 =No; 1 = Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=A lot

c.) How much do you trust each of the following types of people? Members of your ethnic group
0 =No; 1 = Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=A lot

d.) How much do you trust each of the following types of people? Members of other ethnic groups
0 =No; 1 = Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=A lot

Local institutional legitimacy:

a.) For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree:
A. Decisions taken by traditional leaders concerning land management issues must always be respected by the population.
B. Sometimes, decisions taken by traditional leaders concerning land management issues do not need to be respected by the population.

b.) For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree:
A. Decisions taken by the CVD concerning land management issues must always be respected by the population.
B. Sometimes, decisions taken by the CVD concerning land management issues do not need to be respected by the population.
0= Strongly agree with b, Agree with b; 1=Strongly agree with a, Agree with a.

Institutional Performance:

a.) How well or badly would you say traditional leaders handle the management of land and natural resources, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
0 = Very Badly, Badly; 1 = Well, Very Well.

b.) How well or badly would you say the current local government is handling the management of land and natural resources, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
0 = Very Badly, Badly; 1 = Well, Very Well.

Conflict Resolution Efficacy:

What is the most effective institution for resolving land based conflicts?
0=Modern institution (Local government, Agriculture extension, Prefet/sous-prefet, Police/Gendarmes, CVD); 1=Traditional institution (Traditional leader, Chef de terres,

Religious chief)

Ethnic Animosity:
How do you feel about Herders?
0=Good, 1=No opinion, 2=Bad
0=Peaceful, 1=No opinion, 2=Violent
0=Honest, 1=No opinion, 2=Dishonest

How do you feel about Farmers?
0=Good, 1=No opinion, 2=Bad
0=Peaceful, 1=No opinion, 2=Violent
0=Honest, 1=No opinion, 2=Dishonest

How do you feel about Fulani?
0=Good, 1=No opinion, 2=Bad
0=Peaceful, 1=No opinion, 2=Violent
0=Honest, 1=No opinion, 2=Dishonest

How do you feel about _____ (insert local predominate sedentary ethnic group)?
0=Good, 1=No opinion, 2=Bad
0=Peaceful, 1=No opinion, 2=Violent
0=Honest, 1=No opinion, 2=Dishonest

Education: "What is the highest level of education you have completed?'
0= no formal schooling, informal schooling only, some primary school completed; 1 = primary school completed, some secondary school/high school, 2=secondary school/high school completed, post-secondary qualifications, other than university, some university, university completed, post-graduate

Age: "How old are you?" (range from 18 to 87 years old)

Gender: (0 = male; 1 = female)

Appendix B: Liberia

Participation in violence:

Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? Used force or violence for a political cause.
0 = Would if had the chance, would never do this; 1 =Often, several times, once or twice

Associational life index:

a.) Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member.: A religious group (e.g., church, mosque)
0 =Not a member; 1 = Inactive member; 2=Active Member; 3=Leader

b.) Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member.: Some other voluntary association or community group
0 =Not a member; 1 = Inactive member; 2=Active Member; 3=Leader

c.) Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? Attend a community meeting often, several times, once or twice, would if had the chance, would never do this.
0 =No; 1 = Would/Once; 2=Several; 3=Often

d.) Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? Got together with others to raise an issue often, several times, once or twice, would if had the chance, would never do this.
0 =No; 1 = Would/Once; 2=Several; 3=Often

Interpersonal trust index:

a.) How much do you trust each of the following types of people? Your relatives
0 =No; 1 = Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=A lot

b.) How much do you trust each of the following types of people? Other people you know
0 =No; 1 = Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=A lot

c.) How much do you trust each of the following types of people? Other Liberians
0 =No; 1 = Little; 2=Somewhat; 3=A lot

Responsiveness:

a.) How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say? Traditional leaders.
0 = Never; 1 = Sometimes; 2=Often; 3=Always

b.) How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say? Local government officials.
0 = Never; 1 = Sometimes; 2=Often; 3=Always

Corruption:

a.) How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Traditional leaders.
0 = None; 1 = Some; 2=Most; 3=All

b.) How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Local government officials.
0 = None; 1 = Some; 2=Most; 3=All

National versus sub-National Identity:

Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Liberian and being a _____*[R's ETHNIC GROUP]*. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?
1 = I feel only _____ *[insert R's ethnic group*; 2 =I feel more _____ *[insert R's ethnic group*;
3 = I feel equally Liberian and _____ *[insert R's ethnic group*; 4 = I feel more Liberian than _____ *[insert R's ethnic group]*; 5= I feel only Liberian.

Group grievance:

How often are _____s [respondent's identity group] treated unfairly by the government?
0=Never, 1=Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always.

Education: "What is the highest level of education you have completed?'
0= No formal schooling, informal schooling only; 1 = some primary school completed, primary school completed, some secondary school/high school; 2 = secondary school/high school completed, post-secondary qualifications, other than university, some university, university completed, post-graduate

Age: "How old are you?" (range from 18 to 88 years old)

Gender: (0 = male; 1 = female)

Appendix C : Questionnaire: Conflits Fonciers au Burkina Faso

Numéro Répondant

[Enquêteur: Choisir le Code approprié pour Région/Cercle. Ecrire les noms de Commune, Ville/Village et le Numéro SE dans les cases.]

Région		**Commune**		
Département		**Ville/Village**		
		Numéro SE		

Quand vous trouvez une habitation avec quelqu'un sur place, présentez-vous par la formule ci-dessous. Vous devez apprendre cette présentation de manière à pouvoir la restituer exactement telle qu'elle est formulée.

Bonjour. Mon nom est _____. Je suis envoyé par un organisme indépendant. Je ne représente ni le Gouvernement ni un quelconque parti politique. Nous étudions les opinions des citoyens Burkinabé sur un problème que vivent nos communautés villageoises. Chaque individu des villages concernés par l'enquête a une chance égale d'être inclus dans cette étude. Toutes les informations seront gardées confidentielles. Vous avez a été choisi au hasard. Nous voudrions interroger un adulte d'ici. Voulez-vous nous aider à choisir cette personne?

Commençons par quelques questions sur vous-mêmes.

1.) Quel est votre âge?*[Enquêteur: Inscrire un nombre à 3 chiffres. Ne sais pas = 999] [Enquêteur: Si le Répondant est âgé de moins de8 ans, arrêter l'interview et utiliser les cartes pour tirer un autre répondant dans le même ménage. Si le répondant refuse de répondre, utiliser le code 998]*

2.) Quel est le plus haut niveau d'éducation que vous avez atteint? *[Coder à partir des réponses. Ne pas lire les options]*			
Pas d'enseignement formel	0	Autres post-secondaires qu'universitaires (diplôme technique)	6
Enseignement informel seulement (y compris ecole coranique)	1	Université inachevée	7
Enseignement primaire inachevé	2	Université achevée	8
Enseignement primaire achevé	3	Refusé de répondre	998
Enseignement secondaire / lycée inachevé	4	Ne sais pas *[Ne pas lire]*	999
Enseignement secondaire / lycée achevé	5		

3.) Quel est votre occupation principale? *[Coder à partir des réponses. Ne pas lire les options]*			
Cultivateur	0	Ménagère	6
Eleveur	1	Commerçant	7
Fonctionnaire	2	Autre*[Spécifier]*:_ _____	995
Chômeur	3	Refusé de répondre	998

Retraite	4	Ne sais pas *[Ne pas lire]*	999
Pécheur	5	Ménagère	6

4.) Quelle est votre religion, si vous en avez? *[Coder à partir de la réponse. Ne pas lire les options]*	
Aucune	0
CHRISTIANNISME	
Chrétien seulement (i.e., répondre seulement "Chrétien", sans s'identifier à un sous-groupe spécifique)	1
Catholique Romain	2
Protestante	3
ISLAM	
Musulman seulement	4
AUTRE	
Religion traditionnelle/ethnique	5
Athée (Ne crois pas en Dieu)	6
Autre *[Spécifier]:*	995
Refusé de répondre	998
Ne sais pas	999

5.) A quelle ethnie ou groupe culturel appartenez-vous ? *[Ne pas lire les options. Coder à partir des réponses]*					
Mossi	1	Djerma			12
Peul	2	Turka			14
Gourmatche	3	Yanan			15
Gourounsi	4	Marka			16
Bobo	5	Bwaba			17
Bissa	6	Karaboro			18
Dagari	7	Refus de répondre [NPL]			998
Birifor	8	Ne sais pas			999
Lobi	9	Autre			
Samo	10				
Sénoufo	11				
		Autre *[Spécifier]:*_____	Post Code		995

6.) Etes-vous marié?	
Non	0
Oui	1
Oui mais Divorcé(e)	2
Oui mais Veuf (ve)	3
Refusé de répondre	998
Ne sais pas *[Ne pas lire]*	999

7.) Si oui, quelle est l'ethnie de votre épous(e)? *[Ne pas lire les options. Coder à partir des réponses]*						
Mossi	1	Samo		10		
Peulh	2	Sénoufo		11		
		Djerma		12		
Gourmatche	3	Goin		13		
Gourounsi	4	Turka		14		
Bobo	5	Yanan		15		
Bissa	6	Marka		16		
Dagari	7	Bwaba		17		
Birifor	8	karaboro		18		
Lobi	9	Refus de répondre [NPL]		998		
		Ne sais pas [NPL]		999		
		Autre *[Spécifier]:* _____	Post Code		995	

8.) Si oui, quelle est la religion de votre épous(e)? *[Ne pas lire les options. Coder à partir des réponses]*	
Aucune	0
CHRISTIANNISME	
Chrétien seulement (i.e., répondre seulement "Chrétien", sans s'identifier à un sous-groupe spécifique)	1
Catholique Romain	2
Protestante	3
ISLAM	
Musulman seulement	4
AUTRE	
Religion traditionnelle/ethnique	5
Agnostique (Ne sais pas s'il y a un Dieu)	6
Athée (Ne crois pas en Dieu)	7
Autre *[Spécifier]:*	995
Refusé de répondre	998
Ne sais pas	999

9.) Concernant les dernières élections présidentielles de *2005*, laquelle des affirmations suivantes est vraie pour vous? *[lire les options de réponse à haute voix]*	
Vous n'avez pas été inscrit ou vous étiez trop jeune pour voter	0
Vous avez voté	1
Vous avez décidé de ne pas voter	2
Vous n'avez pas trouvé le bureau de vote	3
Vous avez été empêché de voter	4
Vous n'avez pas eu le temps de voter	5
Vous n'avez pas voté pour d'autres raisons	6
Refusé de répondre	998
Ne sait pas/ Ne se souvient pas *[Ne pas lire]*	999

10.) Concernant les dernières élections municipales de *2005*, laquelle des affirmations suivantes est vraie pour vous? *[lire les options de réponse à haute voix]*	
Vous n'avez pas été inscrit ou vous étiez trop jeune pour voter	0
Vous avez voté	1
Vouss avez décidé de ne pas voter	2
Vous n'avez pas trouvé le bureau de vote	3
Vous avez été empêché de voter	4
Vous n'avez pas eu le temps de voter	5
Vous n'avez pas voté pour d'autres raisons	6
Refusé de répondre	998
Ne sait pas/ Ne se souvient pas *[Ne pas lire]*	999

11.) Vous sentez-vous proche de quel parti politique *(Ne pas lire les options)*?	
Aucune *(c'est-à-dire ne se sent pas proche d'un parti politique)*	
CDP (Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès) le parti de Rock Marc Christian KABORE et du président Blaise Compaoré	
ADF/RDA (Alliance pour la démocratie et la fédération/Rassemblement démocratique africain) Maître Gilbert Noël OUEDRAOGO	
UPR (Union pour la République) Toussaint Abel COULIBALY	
UNIR/MS (Union pour la renaissance/Mouvement sankariste) de Me Bénéwendé Stanislas SANKARA	
CFD/B (Convention de forces démocratiques du Burkina) de Amadou Diemdioda DICKO	
PDS (Parti pour la démocratie et le socialisme) de Sambo Issouf BA	
PDP/PS (Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès/Parti socialiste) du Pr. Ali LANKOANDE et du Dima du Boussouma Salfo OUEDRAOGO	
RDB (Rassemblement pour le développement du Burkina) de Saidou Célestin COMPAORE	
UPS (Union des partis sankaristes) de Joseph OUEDRAOGO	
PAI (Parti africain pour l'indépendance) de Soumane TOURE	
PAREN (Parti pour la renaissance nationale) du Pr. Laurent BADO	
RPC (Rassemblement Populaire des Citoyens) de Antoine OUANRE	
UDPS (Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social) de Djezouma SANON	
Oui, Autre *[Spécifier]*: _____	Post code
Refusé de répondre *[i.e. répondre "Véhément" à Q85, mais sans identifier le parti]*	998
Ne sais pas	999

12.) A part votre groupe ethnique, vous sentez vous encore plus membre de quelle groupe? *(lire les options)*	
Je me sens uniquement Burkinabé	1
Je me sens membre de mon groupe religieux	2
Je me sens membre des *(----------citer le groupe professionnelle)*	3

Je me sens membre du groupe des *(----------citer le genre homme ou femme)*	4
Autre *[Spécifier]:*	995
Refusé de répondre	998
Ne sais pas *[Ne pas lire]*	999

13.) Supposons que vous ayez à choisir entre être Burkinabé et être de votre groupe ethnique. Laquelle des affirmations suivantes exprime mieux vos sentiments ?	
Je me sens uniquement Burkinabé	1
Je me sens plus Burkinabé que de mon groupe ethnique	2
Je me sens autant Burkinabé que de mon groupe ethnique	3
Je me sens plus de mon groupe ethnique que Burkinabé	4
Je me sens uniquement de mon groupe ethnique	5
Refusé de répondre	998
Ne sais pas *[Ne pas lire]*	999

14.) C'est à quel moment que vous sentez le plus fort votre identité ethnique? [*Ouvert]*

15.) Considérer les conditions de votre groupe ethnique. Les membres de votre groupe ont-ils moins, autant ou plus d'influence sur la politique que les autres groupes ethniques de ce pays ? *[Sonder la force de l'opinion]*	
Beaucoup moins	5
Moins	4
Autant	3
Plus	2
Beaucoup plus	1
Refusé de répondre	998
Ne sais pas [Ne pas lire]	999

16.) Je m'en vais vous listé deux organismes ou groupes auxquels les gens adhèrent ou participent. Pour chacun d'entre eux, pourriez-vous me dire si vous en êtes Dirigeant, Membre actif, Simple adhérent ou Non adhérent.

	Dirigeant	Membre actif	Simple adhérent	Non adhérent	Ne sais pas *[NPL]*
Un groupe religieux (église, mosquée)	3	2	1	0	9
Une association ou un groupe communautaire	3	2	1	0	9

17.) Voici une liste d'actions que les gens mènent parfois. Pour chacune d'entre elles, Veuillez me dire si vous avez personnellement effectué une de ces actions au cours des 12 derniers mois.. *[Si Oui, lire à haute voix les options de réponses 2-4]*. **Si non, le feriez-vous si vous en aviez l'occasion ?** *[Si Non, lire à haute voix les options de réponse 0 et 1]*

	OUI			NON		Ne sais pas *[NPL]*	
	Souvent	Quelques fois	1 ou 2 fois	Je le ferai si j'en avais l'occasion	Je ne le ferai jamais		
A. Participer à une réunion de mon groupe religieux	4	3	2	1		0	9
B. Participer à une réunion d'un autre groupe religieux	4	3	2	1		0	9
C. Collaborer avec des gens qui ne sont pas de la même ethnie que vous	4	3	2	1		0	9

18.) Dans votre village est ce qu'il y a des gens qui ne sont pas membre de votre groupe ethnique? *[Si Oui, lire à haute voix les options de réponses 2-4]. [Si Non, cochez la réponse 1]*

	OUI			**NON**	Ne sais pas *[NPL]*
	Beaucoup	Plusieurs	1 ou 2		
	4	3	2	1	9

19.) Dans quelle mesure faites-vous confiance aux personnes suivantes? *[Lire les options]*

	Pas du tout	Juste un peu	Partiellement confiance	Très confiance	Ne sais pas *[NPL]*
A. Vos proches	0	1	2	3	9
B. D'autres gens que vous connaissez	0	1	2	3	9
C. Membres de votre groupe ethnique	0	1	2	3	9
D. Des personnes d'autres groupes ethniques	0	1	2	3	9

20.) Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est-elle la plus proche de votre opinion? Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2.

[Enquêteur: Sonder la force de l'opinion: Etes-vous d'accord ou très fortement d'accord?]

Affirmation 1: Les décisions prises par les chefs coutumiers concernant la gestion des terres doivent être respectées par les populations.		**Affirmation 2: Parfois, les populations ne doivent pas être obligées de respecter les décisions prises par les chefs coutumiers concernant la gestion des terres.**	
Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1 1	D'accord avec Affirmation 1 2	D'accord avec Affirmation 2 3	Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2 4
En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et Affirmation 2 *[Ne pas lire]*			5
Ne sais pas *[Ne pas lire]*			9

21.) Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est-elle la plus proche de votre opinion? Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2. **[Enquêteur: Sonder la force de l'opinion: Etes-vous**

d'accord ou très fortement d'accord?]			
Affirmation 1: Les décisions prises par les CVD concernant la gestion des terres doivent être respectées par les populations.		**Affirmation 2: Parfois, les populations ne doivent pas être obligées de respecter les décisions prises par les CVD concernant la gestion des terres**	
Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1 1	D'accord avec Affirmation 1 2	D'accord avec Affirmation 2 3	Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2 4
En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et Affirmation 2 *[Ne pas lire]*			5
Ne sais pas *[Ne pas lire]*			9

22.) Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est-elle la plus proche de votre opinion? Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2.
[Enquêteur: Sonder la force de l'opinion: Etes-vous d'accord ou très fortement d'accord?]

Affirmation 1: Les décisions prises par le gouvernement local concernant de gestion des terres doivent être respectées par les populations.		**Affirmation 2: Parfois, les populations ne doivent pas être obligées de respecter les décisions prises par le gouvernement local concernant la gestion des terres**	
Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1 1	D'accord avec Affirmation 1 2	D'accord avec Affirmation 2 3	Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2 4
En désaccord avec Affirmation 1 et Affirmation 2 *[Ne pas lire]*			5
Ne sais pas *[Ne pas lire]*			9

23.) Quelles sont les institutions les plus efficaces pour la résolution de conflits foncière ?
[Ne pas lire les options. Coder à partir des réponses. Accepter jusqu'à 3 réponses. Si le Répondant donne plus de 3 options, demander "Lesquelles 3 sont-elles les plus importantes ?"; si le Répondant donne 1 ou 2 réponses, demander "Plus rien d'autre?"]

	1ère réponse	2ème réponse	3ème réponse
Institutions modernes			
Gouvernement local	1	1	1
Service agricultures	2	2	2
Préfet/sous préfet	3	3	3
Forces de sécurité	4	4	4
CVD	5	5	5
Institutions traditionnelles			
Leaders traditionnels	6	6	6
Chef des terres	7	7	7
Chefs religieux	8	8	8
Autres réponses			
Autre (i.e. autre institution)	995	995	995
Personne	0		
Pas d'autres réponses		996	996
Ne sais pas	999		

24.) Qualifiez la manière, bonne ou mauvaise, dont les personnes suivantes répondent aux problèmes concernant la gestion de terres et d'autres ressources naturelles, ou n'en avez-vous pas suffisamment entendu parler pour vous prononcer? *[Enquêteur : Sonder la force del'opinion]*

	Très mal	Plutôt mal	Plutôt bien	Très bien	NSP/ N'en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler *[NPL]*
Le Gouvernement local (marie)	1	2	3	4	9
Les chefs traditionnelles	1	2	3	4	9
Le préfet/sous préfet	1	2	3	4	9
Les forces de sécurité	1	2	3	4	9

Semantic Differential:
25.)

a. Eleveur

Juste _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Injuste
Fort _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Faible
Bonne _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Mauvais
Paisible _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Violent
Honnete _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Malhonnete

b. Cultivateur

Juste _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Injuste
Fort _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Faible
Bonne _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Mauvais
Paisible _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Violent
Honnete _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Malhonnete

c. Fulani

Juste _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Injuste
Fort _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Faible
Bonne _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Mauvais
Paisible _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Violent
Honnete _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Malhonnete

d. Propre ethnie

Juste _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Injuste
Fort_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Faible
Bonne _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Mauvais
Paisible _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Belligerent
Honnete _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Malhonnete

26.) Laquelle des affirmations suivantes est la plus proche de votre opinion? Choisir Affirmation 1 ou Affirmation 2. **[Enquêteur: Sonder la force de l'opinion:** Etes-vous d'accord ou tout à fait d'accord?**]**

Affirmation 1: La violence n'est jamais justifiée dans ce pays.		**Affirmation 2: Dans certaines circonstances, la violence se justifie.**	
Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 1	D'accord avec Affirmation 1	D'accord avec Affirmation 2	Tout à fait d'accord avec Affirmation 2

1	2	3	4
En désaccord avec A Affirmation 1 et Affirmation 2 *[Ne pas lire]*			5
Ne sais pas *[Ne pas lire]*			9

27.) Est ce que vous avez une fois été témoin des conflits liés aux conflits foncières? *[Si Oui, lire à haute voix les options de réponse 1 2 3]*

	OUI			**NON**	Ne sais pas *[NPL]*
	Souvent	Quelques fois	1 ou 2 fois	jamais	
	3	2	1	0	9

28.) Avez-vous personnellement dans les dernier douze mois

	Jamais	Seulement quelques fois	Souvent	Toujours	Ne sais pas *[NPL]*
A. Une fois participer à un conflit violent?	0	1	2	3	9
B. Eté menacer physiquement par un autre groupe	0	1	2	3	9
C. Menacait physiquement une autre groupe	0	1	2	3	9

29.) Ayant déjà été témoin ou acteur d'un conflit foncier, quelles étaient les parties en conflit? (Ouverte)

30.) Ayant déjà été témoin ou acteur d'un conflit foncier, de quel coté étiez vous? (Ouverte)

31.) Voici une liste d'actions que les gens mènent parfois en tant que citoyens. Pour chacune d'entre elles, Veuillez me dire si vous avez déjà personnellement effectué une de ces actions. *[Si Oui, lire à haute voix les options de réponses 2-4]*. **Si non, le feriez-vous si vous en aviez l'occasion ?** *[Si Non, lire à haute voix les options de réponse 0 et 1]*

	OUI			**NON**		Ne sais pas *[NPL]*
	Souvent	Quelques fois	1 ou 2 fois	Je le ferai si j'en avais l'occasion	Je ne le ferai jamais	
Participer à une réunion pour résoudre le conflit	4	3	2	1	0	9
Jouer le rôle d'un leader pour trouver une solution paisible dans un conflit foncier	4	3	2	1	0	9

32.) Approuvez-vous ou au contraire désapprouvez-vous les résultats des conflits fonciers ?				
Fortement en désaccord	En désaccord	D'accord	Fortement d'accord	Ne sais pas / N'en ai pas suffisamment entendu parler *[NPL]*
0	1	2	3	9

33.) Lors des conflits auxquels vous avez été témoin ou acteur, qu'est ce qui a pu calmer la situation ? (ouverte)

34.) Dans ce pays, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous libre d'exprimer?				
Pas du tout libre	Pas très libre	Quelque peu libre	Complètement libre	Ne sais pas *[NPL]*
0	1	2	3	9

35.) Juste encore une question. Qui pensez-vous nous a envoyé faire cette enquête ? *[Ne pas lire les options]*			
Personne	0		
Gouvernement		***Privé***	
Gouvernement (en général)	1	ONG	10
Gouvernement national	2	Parti politique / Politiciens	11
Gouvernement provincial/régional	3	Organisation/Bureau/Centre de recherche	12
Gouvernement local	4	Journaux/Média	13
Présidence / Primature	5	Université / Ecole / Collège	14
Bureau central de recensement / statistique	6	Dieu ou une organisation religieuse	15
Sécurité d'Etat / Renseignements généraux	7	Autre	995
Ministère/Département de l'éducation	8	Refusé de répondre	998
Université / Ecole / Collège	9	Ne sais pas	999

TOUTE LES QUESTIONS CI-DESSOUS DOIVENT ETRE REPONDUES PAR

L'ENQUETER APRES QUE L'INTERVIEW ETE CONDUITE

36.) Les facilités suivantes sont-elles disponibles dans la SE ou à une distance de marche aisée ?	Oui	Non	Ne sais pas
A Ecoles ?	1	0	9
B. Poste de police ou gendarme?	1	0	9
C. Centre de santé?	1	0	9

37.) Sexe du Répondant	
Homme	1
Femme	2

Appendix D: Attitudes toward Violence (local government and tradition leader corrupt- Liberia)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Liberian	-.416	.110	0.037 **
Index of trust	.441	.150	0.003***
Index of associational life	.098	.070	0.162
Local government corrupt	-.134	.182	0.462
Traditional leader corrupt	.328	.180	0.068*
Group grievance	.006	.154	0.969
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	.123	.240	0.608
Age	-.020	.010	0.044**
Education *(at least finished primary school=1)*	-.081	.166	0.628
Constant	-1.707	.637	0.007
Pseudo R2	0.0462		
Prob>Chi2	0. 0045		
Number of observations	536		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

Appendix E: Attitudes toward Violence (local government and tradition leader listen-Liberia)

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P value
Identify first as Liberian	-.422	.194	0.030**
Index of trust	.386	.150	0.010***
Index of associational life	.088	.071	0.213
Local government listen	.350	.149	0.019**
Traditional leader listen	-.114	.138	0.410
Group grievance	-.029	.150	0.849
Social Structure			
Gender *(female=1)*	.085	.237	0.719
Age	-.021	.010	0.032**
Education	-.122	.164	0.458
Constant	-1.450	.566	0.010
Pseudo R2	0.0549		
Prob>Chi2	0.008		
Number of observations	564		

Level of significance: ***≤.01, **≤.05, *≤.10.

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