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76-5642
SINCLAIR, William Allan, 1945INTER GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTING FOR POLICE
PATROL IN MICHIGAN: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS.
Michigan State University, Ph.D., 1975
Economics, general

Xerox University Microfilms,

Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

INTER GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTING FOR POLICE
PATROL IN MICHIGAN:

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

by

W illia m A lla n S i n c l a i r

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan S ta te U n iv e r s it y
in p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t o f the requirements
f o r the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department o f A g r ic u lt u r a l Economics

1975

ABSTRACT
INTER GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTING FOR POLICE
PATROL IN MICHIGAN: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
By

W illia m A lla n S i n c l a i r

Local o f f i c i a l s

in many r u r a l areas experiencing r is in g demand f o r

p o lice p a tro l services face three i n s t i t u t i o n a l ways o f ob ta in in g t h e i r
desired s e rv ic e l e v e l .

The f i r s t is requesting more p a tro l s e rv ic e

from the county s h e r i f f or S ta te p o lic e .

The second is to s t a r t t h e i r

own p o lic e department, and the t h i r d is to purchase, through c o n tr a c tin g ,
more p a tr o l s e rv ic e from the county s h e r i f f .
n ative r e la t e s lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

Each i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r ­

to a s u p p lie r o f p a tro l s e rv ic e in a

d i f f e r e n t way, and t h is a f f e c t s the type and le v e l o f s e rv ic e produced.
The focus o f t h is d is s e r t a t i o n is c o n tra c tin g f o r p a tro l s e rv ic e between
o f f i c i a l s o f lo c a l communities and t h e i r r e s p e c tiv e county s h e r i f f .
A s tru c tu re and conduct-performance m arketing model has been used
to analyse the c o n tra c tin g operations o f d i f f e r e n t Michigan s h e r i f f s .
The c r i t i c a l s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b le used was the funding r e la t io n s h ip between
each s h e r i f f and his county commissioners r e l a t i v e to the s h e r i f f ' s
d esire to expand his p a tro l d i v i s io n .

The conduct-performance v a ria b le s

used were cost per p a tr o l hour, re p o rtin g to lo cal o f f i c i a l s , d i v i s i b i l i t y
of p a tr o l s e rv ic e s o ld , a c t i v i t i e s performed by contracted p a t r o ls ,
ro ta te d versus permanently s ta tio n e d d e p u tie s , revenue from liq u o r i n ­
spection, amount o f time spent ou tside c o n tra c tin g community, and r e ­
sponse tim e.

W illiam A lla n S in c la ir

Each s h e r i f f in Michigan which had some form o f c o n tra c tin g w ith
local communities was in terv ie w e d by phone.

Of these s h e r i f f s , eleven

with the most e x ten sive contra c tin g operations were s e le c te d f o r more
d e ta ile d study.

Data on the s t r u c tu r a l and conduct-performance v a r i ­

ables was obtained by personal in terv ie w s w ith each o f these s h e r i f f s
and t h e i r o f f i c e r s .

Because o f the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f response time d a ta ,

one s h e r i f f was chosen f o r more in depth a n a ly s is .
The major fin d in g s o f t h is research are the fo llo w in g :
Finding Number One— C ontracting f o r p a tro l services in Michigan
between lo ca l communities and the county s h e r i f f was w id e ly p ra c tic ed
in 1974.

Of M ichigan's 83 county s h e r i f f s , tw e n ty -fo u r o f them had

some type o f c o n tra c tin g arrangement w ith a lo cal u n i t of government.
In a d d itio n s ix s h e r i f f s c o n tra c t w ith the U.S. Forest Service to
provide p a tro l s e rv ic e to n atio nal parks w i t h in t h e i r county.

Great

v a r ie ty e x is ts among c o n tra c tin g o p era tio n s.
C ontracting is most extensive in those counties w ith a la rg e per­
centage o f urban r e s id e n ts .

One reason f o r th is is t h a t the county

boards in these counties are dominated by urban commissioners.

These

urban commissioners are u n w illin g to increase spending on the s h e r i f f ' s
road p a t r o l , which mainly serves r u r a l parts o f the county.

T h e ir

reasoning is t h a t urban c it iz e n s pay an amount over county taxes f o r
c i t y p o lic e s e r v ic e , and c it iz e n s o f v i l l a g e s and townships should do
the same.

W illiam A lla n S in c la ir

Finding Number Two--The conduct-performance v a r ia b le s mentioned
e a r l i e r were useful in comparing the c o n tra c tin g operations o f d i f f e r e n t
s h e r if f s .

A major fin d in g was t h a t not a l l s h e r i f f s provided the same

set of conduct-performance c h a r a c t e r is t ic s to c o n tra c tin g lo ca l com­
m unities.
Finding Number T h re e --Ten o f the eleven s h e r i f f s s tu d ie d , priced
t h e ir c o n tra c t a t less than v a r ia b le costs.

The percent o f s e rv ic e

costs which are not incorporated in to the c o n tra c t p r ic e range from a
low o f 10% to a high o f 64%.

This means th a t in most c o n t r a c t s , the

county general fund is being used to meet p a r t of the c o n tr a c t costs.
Finding Number Four— The s h e r i f f o f Genesee County experiences
g re a te r v a r ia b le costs in the production o f p a tro l s e rv ic e compared to
14 local p o lic e departments w it h in Genesee County.

The d if fe r e n c e

between a s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l costs and those p a tr o l costs met by lo c a l
communities which have t h e i r own p o lic e department p a r t i a l l y determine
the amount o f p ric e concession the s h e r i f f f e e ls he must g iv e in order
to provide f i n a n c i a l in c e n tiv e f o r c o n tr a c tin g .
Finding Number F iv e — The s h e r i f f is capable o f in flu e n c in g the lo cal
o ffic ia ls '

d ecisio n to c o n tra c t w ith him through his a re a l a l l o c a t i o n o f

his no n-contract p a t r o ls .

For the county stud ied in depth, i t was found

th a t the s h e r i f f a llo c a te d p a tro ls to minimize the county-wide response
time which meant t h a t the most populated p o rtions of the county, the
portions most l i k e l y to have t h e i r own p o lic e department, re ce iv e d the
lower mean response time.

The less populated p o rtions o f the county,

those portions less l i k e l y to have t h e i r own p o lic e s e r v ic e , re ce iv e d
a higher mean response tim e.

This means t h a t the less populated areas

wanting more p a tr o l s e rv ic e e i t h e r must c o n tr a c t or s t a r t t h e i r own lo cal
po lic e department which creates a c o n tra c tin g o p p o rtu n ity f o r the s h e r i f f .
I t also means t h a t the s h e r i f f ' s n o n -c o n tra c t p a tr o ls are h ig h ly v i s i b l e
in communities w ith t h e i r own p o lic e department, and lo c a l o f f i c i a l s
and c it iz e n s become accustomed to d ealing w ith the s h e r i f f ' s personnel
encouraging any change from a lo cal p o lic e department to a c o n tra c tu a l
arrangement.
Finding Number S i x - -The s t r u c t u r a l r e la t io n s h ip which the s h e r i f f
has w ith his county commissioners r e l a t i v e to the need which he f e e ls
to increase his p a tr o l d i v i s io n a f f e c t s his prop en sity to c o n tr a c t and
to meet the conduct-performance o b je c tiv e s o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s .

From

in te r v ie w s , the eleven s h e r i f f s s tudied were s u b je c t iv e ly placed in to
one o f two groups.

Group one were s h e r i f f s t h a t f e l t l i t t l e

need to

expand t h e i r p a tro l d i v i s i o n and were able to ob tain c u rre n t and a n t i ­
cipated p a tr o l funding from the county commissioners.

Group two were

s h e r if f s who want to expand t h e i r p a tr o l d iv is io n and have met or
a n t ic ip a te meeting funding re s is ta n c e from county commissioners.

The

conclusion which I draw is t h a t s h e r i f f s in Group two are more in c lin e d
to c o n tra c t w ith lo c a l communities and meet the conduct-performance
o b je c tiv e s o f lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

than s h e r i f f s in Group one.

A more d e t a i l account o f each fin d in g can be found in Chapter VI
which summarizes the e n t i r e study and can be read independently o f
Chapters I - V .

To B etty Jean: Whose Love
and Support I Needed

To my Mother and Fa th e r:
Upon
Whose Foundation I have B u i l t

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My g r a titu d e and a p p re c ia tio n goes to A1 Schmid, my major professor
and f r i e n d , f o r his guidance and patience throughout my e n t i r e graduate
program.

His acceptance and c a re fu l d i r e c t io n allowed me to grow

i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and em otion ally w h ile r e t a in in g my independence.

He

taught me, by example, lessons which w i l l y i e l d a stream o f re tu rn s
fo r years to come.
I am g r a te fu l to have experienced Les Manderscheid in my research
and teaching e f f o r t s .

My thanks goes to the o th e r members o f my committee,

Larry Libby, Leanna S t i e f e l , and A1 House, f o r t h e i r numerous thoughts
and suggestions.
Special thanks is extended to the fo llo w in g Michigan S h e r if f s and
the o f f i c e r s who openly shared w ith me the data and in fo rm a tio n which
made t h i s research possible:

C lin to n County:

S h e r i f f Anthony Hufnagel

Eaton County:

S h e r i f f Eugene Hoag
U n d e rs h e riff Kennedy

Genesee County:

S h e r i f f John O'Brien
L t . Jim Neering

Huron County:

S h e r i f f Richard Stokan

Ingham County:

S h e r i f f Kenneth Preadmore

Kalamazoo County:

S h e r i f f Ronald Keim
C hief Deputy A1 Tuckey

Kent County:

L t , Robert H i l l
L t . Dave P ric e

Lenawee County:

S h e r i f f Richard Germond
U n d e rs h e riff A rt Kerr

Livin g s to n County:

S h e r i f f Charles Hards
L t . Dave Teggerdine

Oakland County:

S h e r i f f Johannes Spreen
L t . Carl Matheny

S t. C l a i r County:

S h e r i f f Norman Meharg
U n d e rs h e riff Norman Lundy

Washtenaw County:

S h e r i f f Fred P o s t i l !
C hief Deputy Robert Shaw

Wayne County:

S h e r i f f W illia m Lucas
D irecto n Executive D iv is io n Frans Heideman

My th e s is is dedicated to my w i f e , B e tty , who encouraged and supported
me during my e n t i r e graduate t r a i n i n g .
Thanks is a ls o expressed to Kent C a rtw rig h t f o r reading and e d it in g
parts o f my th e s is and to my t y p is t s Margaret Beaver, V i r g i n i a G e tz, and
Joyce Jones.
I am indebted to the Department o f A g r ic u lt u r a l Economics o f Michigan
State U n iv e r s ity f o r t h e i r f in a n c i a l support during my graduate program.
My research has p a r t i a l l y been funded under Grant Numbers 7 3 - N I - 9 9 - 1 002
and 7 3 -N I-9 9 -1 0 2 3 from the Law Enforcement Assistance A d m in is tr a tio n , U.S.
Department o f J u s tic e .

Researchers undertaking research under Government

sponsorship a re encouraged to express f r e e l y t h e i r professional judgement.
T h e re fo re , points o f view or opinions sta te d in t h i s document do not
n e c e s s a rily re p res e n t the o f f i c i a l
Department o f J u s tic e .

iv

p o s itio n or p o lic y o f the U.S.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
L is t o f Tables
L is t o f Figures
CHAPTER I :

.................................................................................................

S tru c tu re and Conduct-Performance in the
Provision o f P atrol Services ...............................................

In tro d u c tio n
.............................................................................................
Research Goals
........................................................................................
P r in c ip le s o f Marketing and the Provision o f
P ub lic Services
...........................................................................
Model C o n d i t i o n s ....................................................................................
The M o d e l .....................................................................................................
S tr u c tu r a l V ariables
...........................................................................
Conduct-Performance Varia ble s .........................................................
I n s t i t u t i o n a l A lte r n a tiv e s and the Costs o f
T r a n s a c t i o n ....................................................................................
The Model--So W h a t ? ...............................................................................
C o n c l u s i o n .................................................................................................
CHAPTER I I :

Level o f Patrol Services and Whose Preferences
C o u n t ............................................................................................

In tro d u c tio n
............................................................................................
A Boundary P r o b l e m ...............................................................................
The Consolidation Movement
.............................................................
The Cooperation Continuum ..................................................................
Voice and E x i t ........................................................................................
Overlapping J u r is d ic tio n s and the Optimal Amount
o f a C o lle c t iv e G o o d ..................................................................
The Overproduction T r a p .......................................................................
Fiscal Equivalence
.
.......................................................................
P o te n tia l Purchases o f Incremental Output ...............................
C o n c lu s io n s .................................................................................................
CHAPTER I I I :

The Bargain I n s t i t u t i o n f o r Patrol Services

1
1
3
5
7
9
12
17
20
27
28

30
30
30
34
37
39
41
47
50
53
58

. .

61

In tro d u c tio n
............................................................................................
C ontracting with U.S. Forest Service
........................................
Oakland County ........................................................................................
Huron C o u n t y ............................................................................................
S t. C l a i r C o u n t y ....................................................................................
Wayne County
...............................................................................

61
67
70
77
82
85

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Page
90
C lin to n County ........................................................................................
Kent C o u n t y .................................................................................................
94
99
Lenawee County ........................................................................................
The County S h e r i f f ...........................................
• 100
P r iv a te P o lic e S u p p lie r ............................................................
102
Comparison o f the Two Contracting Operations . . . .
107
Genesee County ...........................................................................................
109
Washtenaw C o u n t y .........................................................
Kalamazoo County ......................................................................................
121
Eaton C o u n t y .................................................................................................. 126
........................................................
131
Other C ontracting Arrangements
C o n c l u s i o n ...................................................................................................... 137
CHAPTER IV:

Whose Preferences Count?

....................................................

138

In tro d u c tio n
...............................................................................................
138
S tr u c tu r a l D iffe re n c e s Between County S h e r if f s
.....................
139
Level o f C o n t r a c t i n g ................................................................................ 143
I n t e r S h e r i f f Comparison o f Conduct-Performance
C h a r a c te r is tic s
..............................................................................
145
P ric e Charged By D i f f e r e n t S h e r iff s ...............................................
156
R e la tio n o f S tru c tu re to Conduct-Performance
C h a ra c te ris tic s
.............................................................................. 168
C o n c l u s i o n ...................................................................................................... 178
CHAPTER V:

A Case Study o f One S h e r i f f ' s
Contracting Operations
........................................................

180

In tro d u c tio n
...............................................................................................
180
Case Study County and S h e r i f f ' s
181
Contracting Operations ................................................................
Performance Measures
.............................................................................. 187
Area D is t r i b u t i o n o f S h e r i f f ' s Non-Contract
P a t r o l ...................................................................................................... 196
A llo c a tio n o f Non-Contract P a tro ls and
P ric e C o n c e s s io n ................................................................................ 205
Percentage o f C a lls Answered Outside
C ontracting C o m m u n it y .................................................... . . . 205
Type o f P a tro l S e r v i c e s ............................................................................207
C o n c l u s i o n ...................................................................................................... 222
CHPATER V I:

Conclusion

. . . . .

............................................................

226

Research Goals
........................................................................................... 230
The Nature o f the P r o d u c t ....................................................................... 231
S tru c tu re and Conduct-Performance ...................................................
232
Research Findings ......................................................................................
237
P o lic y Im p lic a tio n s ..................................................................................
250
C o n c l u s i o n ...................................................................................................... 253

vi

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

APPENDICES
Appendix A .................................................................................................. , 255
Appendix B .......................................................................................................294
BIBLIOGRAPHY

..........................................................................................................

v ii

298

LIST OF TABLES

Table
3-1.

3-2.

3 -3.

3 -4.

Page
Number o f hours sold to c o n tra c tin g communities
and the p ric e charged by th e Oakland County
s h e r i f f in 1974

70

Comparison o f resources used to the county e s tim ate
and the revenue received from c o n tra c tin g
c o m m u n i t i e s .....................................................................................

75

Estimate o f v a ria b le resources used, annual amount
paid to s h e r i f f and s h e r i f f ' s cost es tim ate
. . . .

94

Yearly hours contracted and received and p r ic e
paid in 1974-75

103

3 -5 .

Annual number o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours
produced and p r ic e charged by the Genesee County
s h e r i f f .................................................................................................. 110

3-6.,

Estimate o f v a r ia b le resources used and estim ated
amount b i l l e d to each c o n tra c tin g community . . . .

114

S in gle and double p a tro l hours produced and p r ic e
charged Washtenaw County s h e r i f f in 1974 .........................

116

3-8.

Comparison o f resources used to c o n tr a c t p r ic e

119

3-9.

Annual number o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours
produced and p r ic e charged by the Eaton County
s h e r i f f .................................................................................................. 126

3-10.

Comparison o f p a tro l costs and c o n tr a c t p r ic e f o r
the Eaton County s h e r i f f ..........................................................

130

Percent o f s h e r i f f ' s s in g le and double p a tro l hours
financed by c o n tra c tin g
..........................................................

143

Population d e n s ity and percent population c l a s s i f i e d
as urban f o r counties in Group 1 and Group 2 , 1970 .

144

Annual number and cost o f s in g le and double p a tro l
hours f o r the Genesee County S h e r i f f ' s contracted
p a tro ls and se le c te d lo ca l communities in 1974 . . .

161

3-7.

4 -1 .

4 -2 .

4-3 .

. . . .

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

£lL3e
4-4 .

Comparison o f the per p a tro l hour ( s in g le and double)
costs and p ric e charged f o r the Genesee s h e r i f f ' s
c ontracted p a tr o ls .......................................................................

163

Comparison o f annual c o n tra c t p ric e charged by
Michigan s h e r if f s to the estimated t o t a l v a r ia b le
annual costs in 1974 ..................................................................

164

I n t e r s h e r i f f comparison o f s t r u c tu r a l cond itio ns
and p a tro l performance o b je c tiv e s
....................................

177

5 -1

Demographic C h a r a c te r is t ic s o f Matched Communities

184

5-2

A H ypothetical Example Comparing the Means C alculated
Using Raw Data to Means Using Data Transformed
in to L o g s .............................................................................................. 186

5-3

S h e r i f f ' s Non-Contract P a tro l Services to
Communities o f Varying Population Sizes

4 -5 .

4-6 .

. .

......................

197

5-4

C o r re la tio n Between the V a ria b le s Population S iz e ,
Level o f Complaints, Response Time, and Time
Spent on C o m p l a i n t s ........................................................................200

5-5

Comparison Between S h e r i f f ' s Non-Contract P a tro ls
and Local P a t r o l s ............................................................................ 203

5-6

Complaint C l a s s i f i c a t i o n

...............................................................

209

5-7

Mean Response Time by Complaint C a te g o rie s , Type
o f P o lic e U n i t , and Community ............................................

210

Mean Time Spent by Complaint Category, Type o f
P o lic e U n it , and Community .....................................................

211

Complaint Categories Ranked According to Mean
Response Time f o r Selected Communities and
Responding P o lic e U n i t ....................................................

212

5-8

5-9

5-10

Complaint categ o rie s ranked according to mean time
spent on complaint f o r selected communities
and responding p o lic e u n i t
...................................................... 213

LIST OF TABLES (continued)
Page
5-11.

5-12.

5-13.

5-14.

5 -1 5.

A -l

A-2

A-3

Comparison o f response time ranks f o r d i f f e r e n t
complaint types f o r the s h e r i f f ' s non-contract
p a t r o l , contracted p a tro ls and lo cal p a tro ls . . . .

215

Comparison o f time spent ranks f o r d i f f e r e n t
complaint types f o r c ontracted , lo ca l and the
s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro l ............................................

216

Response time ranking range o f nime complaint
categories f o r three contracted p a t r o ls , f i v e local
p a tro ls and nine s h e r i f f ' s no n-contract p a tro ls . .

218

Time spent ranking range o f nine complaint categories
f o r three contracted p a t r o ls , f i v e lo cal p a tro ls
and nine s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro ls ......................

219

Rank c o r r e la tio n s o f complaint categories f o r s e lected
p a tro l operations w ith response time as the per­
formance m e a s u r e ......................................................................

221

Estimated Value of Resources Used in Each
C ontracting Operation in Oakland County

..................

259

Comparison o f Resrouces Used to the Oakland
County Estimate and the Revenue Received from
Contracting Communities .....................................................

260

Comparison of Per P a tro l Hour P rice and Cost f o r
Oakland County Contracts .....................................................

262

A-4

Estimate o f V a ria b le Resources Used in the Five
Township Contract w ith the Huron
County Sheri f f
................................................................................264

A-5

Value o f S a la r ie s Used in the S t. C l a i r County
S h e r i f f ' s Contract w ith Yale C ity
...................................

266

A-6

T o tal P atrol Expenses f o r the Yale Contract with
the S t . C l a i r County S h e r i f f ..................................................... 267

A-7

Cost o f a new P a tro l u n i t , 1973-74 f o r the
Wayne County S h e r i f f ....................................................................... 269

A-8

Estimate o f V a ria b le Resources Used and C lin to n
County S h e r i f f ' s Cost Estimate ............................................

272

Estimate o f V a r ia b le Resources Used, Annual Amount
Paid to C lin to n County and S h e r i f f ' s
.....................................................................
Cost Estimate

273

A-9

x

.

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

A-10

Actual Expenses B ill e d to the Contracting Townships in
1974 by the Kent County S h e r i f f ..........................................................274

A -ll

Estimate o f Vehicle and Uniform Expense Absorbed
by the Lenawee County S h e r i f f f o r
C ontracting Communities ......................................................................

276

D eviation o f Salary Cost Per Man Hour f o r Lenawee
County S h e r i f f Deputy ..........................................................................

277

1974 P a tro l Hour Costs f o r Single and Double
P a tro l Units Supplied to a V il la g e or a
Township by the Lenawee County S h e r i f f
....................................

278

Actual and 12-month Estimate and Expenditures B ill e d
to Each Township by Genesee County S h e r i f f
...........................

280

Estimate o f Annual Value of V a ria b le Resources Used
in Each Contract by Genesee County S h e r i f f
. . . . . . .

282

Estimate o f V a ria b le Resources Used and Estimated
Amount B il l e d to Each Contracting Community by
Genesee County S h e r i f f
......................................................................

283

Estim ation o f Value o f Resources Used Per P atro l Hour
f o r D i f f e r e n t Contracts in 1974 f o r Washtenaw
County S h e r i f f ..........................................................................

286

Estimated T o tal V a ria b le Resources Used by Each o f the
Washtenaw S h e r i f f ' s Contract Operations
.................................

287

Actual P o lic e Expenses Incurred by ComstockTownship
in 1974 Broken Down by Expense I t e m s ...........................

288

Eaton County S h e r i f f ' s Cost Estimate o f Eaton
Rapids Contract Compared to Value of
Resources Used . . . . .
..................................................................

290

Eaton County S h e r i f f ' s Cost Estimate o f D elta
Township Compared to Value o f Resources Used

292

A-12

A-13

A-14

A-15

A-16

A-17

A-18

A-19

A-20

A-21

A-22

......................

Comparison o f Costs Between Eaton Rapids and
D elta T o w n s h i p ............................................................................................. 293

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

2-1

Demand f o r Patrol Service To Serious Complaints . . . .

33

2 -2

Production R e la tio n Between Number o f P atro l Hours
and Minutes o f Response T i m e .................................................

43

Production P o s s i b i l i t y Curve and In d if f e r e n c e Map
For a County S h e r i f f ..................................................................

45

2 -4

Demands by Communities A and B f o r P atrol Hours . . . .

48

2 -5

Demand f o r Patrol Hours in Community A by County
and Community A ..........................................................................

55

2-3

3-1

Counties w ith Contracting Operations

.....................................

62

CHAPTER I
STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE IN THE PROVISION OF PATROL SERVICES

INTRODUCTION
Many r u ra l areas close to m e tro p o lita n centers have been e x p e r i­
encing r is in g demand f o r urban serv ic e s from an increasing r u ra l non­
farm population.
is p o lic e p a t r o l.

One urban s e rv ic e being demanded in increasing amounts
Consequently, many small c i t i e s , v i l l a g e s , and town­

ships have begun exploring a l t e r n a t i v e ways o f securing more p o lic e
service f o r t h e i r c i t i z e n s .
Over the past 10 years n a tio n a l and s t a t e studies have been
recommending t h a t many d i f f e r e n t types o f p o lic e operations be c o n s o li­
dated.

Typical of th is stance is the fo llo w in g q u o te d

"Formal cooperation o r c o n s o lid a tio n is an e s s e n tia l in g r e d ie n t
in improving the q u a l it y o f law enforcement. Crime is not con­
fin e d w ith in a r t i f i c a l l y c reated p o l i t i c a l boundaries, b u t,
r a th e r , extends throughout the la r g e r community. A workable
program o f formal cooperation o r c o n s o lid a tio n f o r law enforc e ­
ment services w ith in a 'common community of i n t e r e s t s ' is the
desired goal f o r improving the q u a l i t y o f law enforcement a t
the lo cal l e v e l . "
The O f f ic e o f Criminal J u s tic e Planning in M ichigan, which a llo c a te s
fe d e ra l c rim inal j u s t i c e money, has in d ic a te d t h a t the goal in Michigan
is to have a minimum s iz e p o lic e department of 20 persons o r more and

The P re s id e n t's Commission on Law Enforcement and A d m in is tra tio n o f
J u s tic e , Task Force Report: The P o l i c e , U.S. Government P r in tin g
O f f i c e , Washington, D .C ., 1967, p. 68.

1

2
w i l l provide funding in centives to such departments.

o

This p o lic y

a ffe c ts approximately 325 local p o lic e departments o r about 75 percent
O

of a ll

local p o lic e agencies in Michigan.

c e n tra te on decisions fa c in g ru ra l

This research w i l l con­

(non-SMSA) lo c a l governmental u n its .

The argument o f th is c o n s o lid a tio n /c o o rd in a tio n p o lic y is t h a t
the q u a n tity and q u a lit y o f p o lic e "output" w i l l be enhanced i f the
average s ize o f lo cal p o lic e operations increase.

In a d d itio n to the

output improvement, proponents o f c onsolidatio n a s se rt t h a t community
resources can be saved.
But consolidators are meeting a wave o f re sista n c e from local
o ffic ia ls

r e lu c ta n t to give up control over t h e i r p o lic e o p era tio n s.

These o f f i c i a l s seem to be asking two basic questions which re q u ire
extensive and o b je c tiv e a n a ly s is .

F i r s t , how w i l l p o lic e output change

i f po lic e services are provided by another p o l i t i c a l

j u r i s d ic t io n ?

Second, what is the amount o f community tax d o lla r s saved i f a system
of c onsolidatio n o r coordination is e stab lished with another p o l i t i c a l
unit?

The propensity o f lo cal o f f i c i a l s to merge or c o n tra c t is

increased i f they can be shown t h a t the "output" w i l l not change and
th a t there w i l l be 30 percent tax savings r a th e r than having a s h e r i f f
or some s t a te or fe d e ra l o f f i c i a l merely make a general d e c la r a tio n to
th a t e f f e c t .

2

Criminal J ustice Goals and Standards f o r the S ta te o f Michigan,
Michigan Advisory Commission on Criminal J u s t ic e , June, 1975, p. 198.

3
Bruce T. Olson, A Quick Glance a t How Michigan's Counties Rank in
S t a ff in g and Financing Law Enforcement, I n s t i t u t e f o r Community
Development, Michigan S tate U n iv e r s ity , October, 1968, p. 3. This
f ig u r e does not include 40 or 50 very small j u r i s d i c t i o n s .

3
C u rre n tly in Michigan th e re are three major i n s t i t u t i o n a l
stru c tu re s which provide p o lic e p a tro l services to c i t i z e n s .

Asso­

cia te d with each s tru c tu re is a d i f f e r e n t degree o f control and
possibly various kinds and le v e ls o f p a tro l s e rv ic e and c o s t.^
Type 1.

Communities which have no p o lic e department and r e ly
s o le ly on the county s h e r i f f and/or s ta t e p o lic e f o r
s e rv ic e s .

Type 2.

Communities which c o n tra c t w ith the s h e r i f f , in verbal
or w r it t e n form , f o r some or a l l o f t h e i r p o lic e
s e rv ic e s .

There are many kinds o f contractual arrange­

ments, making t h is a very heterogeneous group.
Type 3.

Communities which have t h e i r own p o lic e department.

Type 4.

Communities which combine t h e i r resources and j o i n t l y
produce p o lic e s e rv ic e s .

RESEARCH GOALS
This research uses the marketing model o f s tru c tu re and conductperformance to study contra c tin g f o r patrol services between Michigan
county s h e r if f s and local communities.

I t s goals are the fo llo w in g :

(1 ) to provide inform ation to s h e r i f f s , local and county o f f i c i a l s
about the cost and b e n e fits o f d i f f e r e n t contra c tin g arrangements;
(2)

to c o n tra s t c o ntracting with local p o lic e departments; (3) to

see how the s t r u c tu r a l conditions facing a county s h e r i f f may a f f e c t
the conduct-performance o f his contra c tin g op era tio n s; (4) to describe

^Type o f patrol s e rv ic e re fe rs to the p a r t i c u l a r set o f conductperformance c h a r a c t e r is t ic s associated with the patrol s e rv ic e sold
by the s h e r i f f o r produced by a lo ca l p o lic e department. Throughout
the th e s is patrol preferences, patrol o b je c tiv e s and conductperformance c h a r a c te r is t ic s are used interchangeably.

4
and analyze the e x ten t and v a r i e t y o f c o ntracting f o r p a tro l services
by Michigan s h e r if f s in 1974.
This d is s e r ta tio n has s ix chapters.

Chapter I presents the

s tru c tu re and conduct-performance model and v a r ia b le s .
w i l l be used in Chapters I I I

These v a ria b le s

and IV to d e scribe, compare and c o n tra s t

c o n tra c tin g operations o f d i f f e r e n t s h e r i f f s .

Chapter I I

r e la te s

contra c tin g to the boundary problems where the preferences of community
A may or may not e n te r in to the c a lc u la tio n s o f o f f i c i a l s

in community B.

I t also compares c o n tra c tin g to c o n s o lid a tio n , another way o f d ealing
with the boundary problem.

Chapter I I I

applies the s tru c tu re and

conduct-performance model and describes the contra c tin g o f eleven
county s h e r i f f s .

Chapter IV is a c ontinuatio n o f Chapter I I I

fo r i t

compares and contrasts the d i f f e r e n t s h e r if f s and attempts to assess
s t r u c tu r e 's impact on conduct-performance.

Chapter V takes a m icro­

scopic view o f contra c tin g operations o f one county s h e r i f f .

Chapter VI

summarizes the d is s e r t a t io n and can be read without reading the o th e r
f i v e chapters.
The th re e primary groups a ffe c te d by c o ntracting are (1 ) the
county s h e r i f f s ,

(2) the c o n tra c tin g communities, and (3 ) the county

commissioners representing both the c o n tra c tin g and non-contracting
portions o f the county.

From the s h e r i f f ' s p e rs p e c tiv e , what oppor­

t u n i t ie s does c o n tra c tin g o f f e r to expand his p a tro l d iv is io n compared to
requesting patrol a p prop riations from the county commissioners
(Chapters I I I and IV)?

What conduct-performance measures (p a tro l

performance o b je c tiv e s ) are desired by local o f f i c i a l s

(Chapter IV)?

What tran s ac tio ns costs (costs incurred in reaching and/or m aintaining
an agreement) might the s h e r i f f pay in c o n tracting with a local

5
community (Chapter I ) ?

From the viewpoint o f contra c tin g communities,

how does the s h e r i f f ' s c o n tra c t p r ic e compare w ith costs i f the lo cal
community wishes to produce i t s own p a tro l services (Chapter V)?
How o fte n do contracted p a tro ls leave t h e i r c o n tra c tin g community
compared to what might be expected i f a local p o lic e department is
formed (Chapter V)?

Which o f the p a tro l performance o b je c tiv e s w i l l

be met by d i f f e r e n t s h e r if f s in s e lli n g patrol services (Chapters I I I
and IV)?

From the perspective o f the county commissioners, how does

the c o n tra c t p ric e compare to the costs o f meeting the contractual
o b lig a tio n (Chapters I I I and IV)?

How do the no n-contracting communi­

t i e s b e n e f it from the contra c tin g operations (Chapters I I I ,

IV and V)?

The research fin d in g s are organized in Chapter VI around the
fo llo w in g questions:

(1) How widely is c o n tra c tin g f o r p a tro l services

prac tic ed in Michigan?

(2 ) Do the contracted patrol services d i f f e r

between s h e r i f f s , and how can th is d iffe r e n c e be described?

(3 ) Does

the s h e r i f f p ric e his c o n tra c t close to costs o f operation?

(4) Does

the s tru c tu ra l r e la tio n s h ip between the s h e r i f f and his county commis­
sioners a f f e c t his propensity to c o n tra c t and to meet the p a tro l needs
a r t i c u la t e d by lo ca l o f f i c i a l s ?

(5 ) Can a s h e r i f f , through the a l l o ­

cation o f his non-contract p a t r o ls , a f f e c t the propensity o f lo cal
o f f i c i a l s to c ontract with him?

(6) Are economies of scale present in

the production o f patrol services and does i t s existence or non­
existence a f f e c t the c o n tra c t p r ic e .

PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES
People and groups demand a wide v a r ie t y o f goods and s e rv ic e s .
Some are provided in the p r iv a t e secto r o f the economy and some are
p u b lic ly provided.

The economic f i e l d s o f marketing and in d u s t r ia l

6
organ izatio n study e x te n s iv e ly the linkages between consumers and
producers o f p r i v a t e l y provided goods and s e rv ic e s .

F. M. Schere

states^
In the f i e l d of in d u s t r ia l o r g a n iz a t io n , we t r y to determine
how market processes d i r e c t the a c t i v i t i e s o f producers in.
meeting consumer demands, how these processes may break down,
and how they can be adjusted ( i . e . through government i n t e r ­
vention) to make actual performance conform more c lo s e ly to the
id e a l.
There is no reason why the p r in c ip le s o f marketing cannot be
used to analyze the p rovision o f p u b lic goods and s e rv ic e s .

This

d is s e r ta tio n attempts to apply some marketing p r in c ip le s to analyze
a l t e r n a t i v e systems o f providing p a tro l services to ru ra l communities.
A lla n Schmid and James S h a ffe r broadly d e fin e marketing systems as
. . . the complex p a tte rn o f in s t i t u t i o n s and physical f a c i l i t i e s
which r e l a t e human beings and things in the t r a n s f e r o f goods
and s e rv ic e s .
The c it iz e n s of a given p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n are the consumers o f a
public s e rv ic e paying f o r the s e rv ic e with t h e i r tax es .
is the o rg a n iza tio n which provides the s e rv ic e .

The s u p p lie r

For t h is d is s e r t a t io n

the s e rvice is p o lic e p a t r o l , and the d i f f e r e n t s u p p lie rs are the
county s h e r i f f s , s t a te p o lic e and lo cal p o lic e departments.
One reason why marketing p r in c ip le s have not been used e x te n s iv e ly
in analyzing public s e cto r output is the absence o f performance measures.
How can a l t e r n a t i v e methods of providing p a tro l be compared i f th e re are

5F. M. Schere, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,
Rand McNally and Company, Chicago, 1973, p. 2.
6

A lla n Schmid and James D. S h a f f e r , "Marketing in Social P e rs p e c tiv e ,"
in AGRICULTURAL MARKET ANALYSIS, e d ite d by Vernon L. Sorenson, Bureau
o f Business and Economic Research, Michigan S ta te U n iv e r s ity , East
Lansing, Michigan, 1964, p. 16.

7
no measures f o r the comparison?

Some o f the performance concepts used

by economists in m arketing , such as le v e l o f output and p r i c e , product
v a r ie t y and s u i t a b i l i t y , production e f f i c i e n c y , e t c . , can be used in
t h is research.

The challenge l i e s in developing in d ic a to rs which

r e f l e c t these d i f f e r e n t performance concepts.
The main question o f marketing a n alysis and the main question o f
t h is research is how do a l t e r n a t i v e market s tru c tu re s a f f e c t the
conduct-performance o f the marketing system.

The sectio n e n t i t l e d

"The Model" w i l l present the s t r u c tu r a l and conduct-performance
v a ria b le s used to analyze the marketing system o f p o lic e p a t r o l.

MODEL CONDITIONS
Before d elving in to the model, several general l i m i t s must be
s e t.

P o lic e agencies perform many a c t i v i t i e s , such as p a t r o l , c a l l e r

r e f e r r a l , d e t e c t iv e , j a i l , t r a f f i c , e t c .

P atrol is the a c t i v i t y in

focus, and i t consists o f some mix of responding to c i t i z e n com plaints,
t r a f f i c m o n ito rin g , c r u is in g , performing community r e la te d errands,
i n i t i a t i n g a complaint ( i . e . an o f f i c e r witnessing a law i n f r a c t i o n ) ,
and community s e rv ic e (speaking to c i v i c o rganizations or consulting
with a merchant on crime p re v e n tio n ).^
P a tro l s e rv ic e has c h a r a c t e r is t ic s o f in c o m p a t ib ilit y and j o i n t
impact.

A s e rv ic e is incompatible when A's use denies B's use ( i . e .

A's use is incom patible w ith B 's ) .

A j o i n t impact s e rv ic e is when A's

use does not d e tr a c t from B's use or A and B can both j o i n t l y enjoy
the s e rv ic e a t the same tim e .

P a tro l s e r v ic e , provided by some

^John A. Webster, The R e a lit ie s o f P o lic e Work, Kendall/Hunt Publishing
Company, Dubuque, Iowa, 1973, p. 12.

8
governmental u n i t , is a v a ila b le to a l l c it iz e n s w ith in the boundary
o f the governmental u n it .

One c i t i z e n ' s option to c a ll f o r patrol

s e rvice does not a f f e c t another c i t i z e n ' s o p tio n .
are deterred from operating

A ls o , i f crim inals

in an a re a , a l l c it iz e n s b e n e f it .

But

when a c i t i z e n needs a patrol u n it and t h a t u n it is dealing with another
com plaint, then one c i t i z e n w i l l be denied (u s u a lly te m p o ra rily ) t h is
s e rv ic e ; thus p a tro l s e rvice has in c o m p a t ib ility c h a r a c t e r is t ic s .

Care

is needed to know when the j o i n t impact o f p a tro l services are being
emphasized and when in c o m p a t ib ilit y is most c r i t i c a l .
The p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d ic t io n s c e n tra l to t h is research are v i l l a g e s ,
small c i t i e s , and townships (incorporated and unincorpo rated).

Since

the county is a producer o f p a tro l s e rv ic e s , i t also is a p a rt o f the
model and a n a ly s is .
lo ca l community.

8

The perspective o f the model is t h a t o f the

What are the d i f f e r e n t ways in which lo cal communities

can obtain p a tro l services?
The model actors are the a r t i c u l a t o r s o f demand f o r p o lic e s e rv ic e s .
I t is assumed t h a t a community c i t i z e n r y has some demand f o r p o lic e
s e rv ic e .

Perceiving and a r t i c u l a t i n g t h is demand f o r p o lic e s e rv ic e

type and le v e l are such people as the county s h e r i f f , lo cal p o lic e
c h ie f s , s t a te p o lic e post commanders, and e le c ted o f f i c i a l s who make
pu blic expenditure decisions.

While ele c ted o f f i c i a l s may fe e l

responsible f o r providing p a tro l s e rv ic e s , they may choose not to
produce them.

This research deals w ith d i f f e r e n t ways lo ca l o f f i c i a l s

can provide t h e i r c it iz e n s with p a tro l s e rv ic e s .

O

The Michigan S ta te P o lic e also provide p a tro l s e rv ic e s , but are not
included in the model o r analysis because they tend to concentrate on
highway p a tro l and usually view themselves as servants o f a l l s ta te
c it iz e n s r a th e r than serving any given s e t o f communities.

9
The cond itio n which surrounds t h is model is one o f change.

It

is assumed t h a t e le c ted lo ca l o f f i c i a l s perceive the need f o r more
p o lic e s e rv ic e or f o r the same le v e l o f s e rv ic e but f o r less money.
Another reason f o r not using marketing concepts to analyze the
p ublic secto r is t h a t the l i n k between c i t i z e n preference and the
provision of d i f f e r e n t p u blic goods is u n clear.

What is observed is

t h a t c it iz e n s pay taxes and e le c t re p res e n ta tiv e s who a llo c a t e the
public funds to the production o f a v a r ie t y o f public goods.

For

th is research i t is assumed t h a t f o r lo cal communities e le c te d
decision makers r e f l e c t c i t i z e n s ' preferences f o r le v e l and type of
p atrol s e rv ic e .

I t is also assumed t h a t the degree o f homogeneity o f

patrol preferences is g re a te r f o r lo ca l communities than an e n t i r e
county.
Communities receive p a tro l services from t h e i r lo cal or contracted
p a t r o ls , the county s h e r i f f , o r the s ta te p o lic e .

I f lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

want more patrol s e rv ic e , they can e i t h e r s t a r t or expand t h e i r own
lo ca l department, c ontract or increase t h e i r c o n tra c t w ith the county
s h e r i f f , or approach the s h e r i f f and/or s t a te p o lic e requesting more
s e rv ic e in re tu rn f o r county and/or s t a te tax es .

This study does not

include in i t s analysis the s t a t e p o lic e .

THE MODEL
The model f o r th is piece o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l research

borrows
9

h e a v ily from the marketing model o f s t r u c t u r e , conduct and performance.

A lla n Schmid s u c c in c tly summarizes the marketing model in the f l o w i n g
statement:
"By s t r u c t u r e , economists r e f e r to b a r r ie r s to e n try to a
c e r t a in l i n e o f production ( . . . includes p ra c tic e s . . . to d riv e ° y t
possible competitors as w e ll as governmental b a r r ie r s such as t a r i f f s
and li c e n s i n g ) , the degree o f com petition u sually focused on number
o f firm s and market shares, and the degree o f a r t i f i c i a l (continued)

10
How do a l t e r n a t i v e s tru c tu re s o f p o lic e s e rv ic e supply a f f e c t the
behavior o f p o lic e o f f i c i a l s and the performance o f p o lic e patrols?
A lla n Schmid discusses three i n s t i t u t i o n a l a lt e r n a t iv e s fo r
analyzing a l t e r n a t i v e methods a v a ila b le to communities to secure p a tro l
s e rv ic e s .^

An i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e is a p a r t i c u l a r ordered

r e la tio n s h ip "among people which d e fin e t h e i r r i g h t s , exposure to the
rig h ts o f o th e rs , p r i v i l e g e s , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s " . ^

The f i r s t

in which people or groups o f people can r e l a t e to each oth e r is
b a rg a in in g .

In a bargaining r e la t io n s h ip each party begins w ith an

i n i t i a l ownership o f goods.

Each is fr e e not to e n te r in t o a p a r t i c u l a r

tran s ac tio n and thus withhold something of value to another p a rty .
I f an exchange takes p la c e , one party gives ur the r ig h ts o f sometin* ng
of mutual value in re tu rn f o r another s e t o f r ig h t s and p r iv ile g e s
o f g re a te r value to him.

The exchange may b e n e f it one p a rty r e l a t i v e l y

more than another which then could a f f e c t fu tu r e bargained exchanges;
but both b e n e fit enough to induce the exchange.
A second type o f tra n s a c tio n is a d m in is tr a tiv e where in t e r a c t in g
p a rtie s do not have equal leg a l s ta tu s .

One party has some p o s itio n o f

^(continued) product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n (making homogeneous products
appear d i f f e r e n t ) .
Conduct r e fe r s to the behavior o f firm s such as
p ric in g s tra te g ie s and c o llu s io n .
Performance v a ria b le s include
p r ic e , p r o f i t s , and product innovation o v e rtim e." The Economics o f
P ro p e rty , Power and Public Choice Consequences o f I n s t i t u t i o n a l A lt e r n a t i v e s , A. A lla n Schmid, unpublished manuscript, 1S74, p. 31-32.
^ T h e th re e i n s t i t u t i o n a l a lt e r n a t iv e s are borrowed from the work o f A.
A lla n Schmid in his unpublished manuscript e n t i t l e d The Economics of
Property, Power and Public Choice.
^ A . A lla n Schmid, " A n a ly tic a l I n s t i t u t i o n a l Economics: Challenging
Problems in the Economics o f Resources f o r a New Environment" in
American Journal o f A g r ic u lt u r a l Economics, December, 1972, Vol. 54,
No. 5, p. 893.

n
a u th o r ity r e l a t i v e to the o th e r p a r ty .

Examples o f a d m in is tr a tiv e

tran sactio ns would be a d i r e c t order from an employer to an employee
or a l e g i s l a t i v e or j u d i c i a l o rd e r.

In each case the o rd e r is given to

b e n e fit a c e r ta in group which the ordering p arty wishes to fa v o r .
Behind each a d m in is tr a tiv e tra n s a c tio n is the th r e a t o f some sanction
( e . g . , the t h r e a t o f being f i r e d o r held in court contempt) f o r com­
p liance f a i l u r e ; but u s u a lly the a d m in is tra to r uses a mix of th re a ts and
rewards.

A d m in is tra tiv e tran s ac tio n s do not exclude bargained t r a n s ­

a c tio n s .

Employees in a strong union, more so than non-union workers,

have more o f a bargained r e la tio n s h ip with t h e i r employer.

But once

a union c o n tra c t is signed, tiie employer can order union members to
perform c e rta in functions or r is k d is m is s a l.

Associated with some

a d m in is tr a tiv e tran s ac tio n s are some element o f p r i o r ba rga ining.
The t h i r d tra n s a c tio n type is the status and g r a n t .

The status

t r a n s a c tio n , l i k e a d m in i s t r a t iv e , is a one way movement w ith o u t the
order.
little

A status tra n s a c tio n is consummated out o f o b lig a t io n with
in d iv id u a l c a lc u la t io n on the p a rt o f the g iv e r about r e l a t i v e

b e n e f it .

O f fe r in g .a f l i g h t v a r ia t io n to the status tra n s a c tio n is the

grant tra n s a c tio n where some thought is given by the benefactor to
b e n e f it .

Someone may give to some c h a r it y out o f a sense o f o b lig a tio n

but by g iving to c h a r it y A r a th e r than B, they fe e l b e t t e r o f f .
One d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g element between the th re e i n s t i t u t i o n a l
types is the degree o f s a n c tio n .
community, the more i t w i l l

12

The more powerless the local

be in a grantee p o s itio n being forced to

receive from the s h e r i f f whatever the s h e r i f f chooses to g iv e .

High

1?
Sanctioning power is used to mean power to help o r h u rt o th e rs .
h u rt can be w ithholding what others want but do not have.

The

12
d ensity townships, which r e l y on the s h e r i f f ’ s p a t r o ls , can be in a
stronger bargaining p o s itio n w ith the s h e r i f f .

Taking i t one f u r t h e r

s te p , i f the m a jo rity o f the e le c t o r a t e reside in townships s o le ly
r e ly in g on s h e r i f f p a t r o ls , an a d m in is tr a tiv e t r a n s a c tio n , r a th e r than
bargained o r status and g r a n t , may r e s u l t .

A grantee has no pbwer o f

sanction over a gra n to r though social pressure is o fte n a p p lie d .

In

a bargaining r e la tio n s h ip the sanctioning power o f each p a r t is r e la te d
to the power to withhold what the oth e r wants but does not own.
F i n a l l y , in the a d m in is tra tiv e i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement the sanctioning
power is r e la t e d to legal p e n a ltie s and u lt im a t e ly j a i l .
To obtain p a tro l services lo cal o f f i c i a l s w i l l e i t h e r e n te r in t o
a bargaining r e la t io n s h ip with the s h e r i f f o r they w i l l have t h e i r own
p o lic e department and i n t e r a c t w ith a lo ca l p o lic e c h ie f through an
a d m in is tr a tiv e tr a n s a c tio n .

I f they attempt to obtain more o f the

county-wide s e r v ic e , they w i l l be in a grant t r a n s a c tio n .

Before any

more is said about s tru c tu re o f p a tro l p ro v is io n , the o th e r components
o f the s tr u c tu r e and conduct-performance model w i l l be discussed.

STRUCTURAL VARIABLES
W ithin each i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c tu r e th e re are several s t r u c t u r a l
v a riab le s which can a f f e c t conduct-performance.

The s t r u c t u r a l v a ria b le s

f o r the p a tro l s e rv ic e market are the number o f s u p p lie r s , degree o f
product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , b a r r ie r s to e n try and r e l a t i o n between s u p p lie r
and source o f fin a n c e .

From the perspective o f a community's lo ca l

o f f i c i a l s , the number o f supp lie rs is small enough f o r each s u p p lie r
to know what the oth e r is doing.

The s h e r i f f is aware o f th e number

o f p a tro ls operated and the approximate costs facing lo ca l p o lic e
departments, and lo c a l p o lic e c h ie fs are l i k e l y to have a s i m i l a r

13
awareness.

While the s h e r i f f is th e only s e l l e r o f p a tro l s e rv ic e s ,

local o f f i c i a l s have the option to s t a r t t h e i r own p o lic e department
and produce t h e i r own patrol s e rv ic e s .
Product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n is another s t r u c tu r a l

v a r i a b le .

I f p a tro l

s e rv ic e is a homogeneous product such t h a t no v a r i a b i l i t y is observed
regardless o f who provides the s e r v ic e , then from the p e rspective o f
meeting c it iz e n s preferences, who produces them m atters l i t t l e .

But

i f th e re is high product v a r i a b i l i t y , then i t may take many d i f f e r e n t
producers to meet the wide range o f p re ferences.

For those communities

which have a unique preference s e t f o r p a tro l s e r v ic e s , they have the
option o f s t a r t i n g t h e i r own department.

For those communities whose

p atrol o b je ctiv es are s i m i l a r enough to the s h e r i f f ' s , they can e i t h e r
c o n tra c t with the s h e r i f f or r e l y on the s h e r i f f ' s general p a tro ls f o r
s e rv ic e .

Product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i l l be discussed again with p a tro l

o b je c ti ves.
In a t r a d i t i o n a l market where th e re are few s e l l e r s , each s e l l e r
often attempts to d i f f e r e n t i a t e his product from t h a t o f his competi­
to rs.

Are the d iffe re n c e s re a l or imagined?

The same concern is

present in the buying and s e l l i n g o f p a tro l s e r v ic e .

The s h e r i f f is

l i k e l y to have a concept o f what "good" p a tro l s e rv ic e i s , and he is
l i k e l y to t r y to s e l l his concept to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s showing how they
need his p a r t i c u l a r type o f p a tro l s e r v ic e .

One reason f o r not knowing

i f the d iffe re n c e s are real o r imagined is the absence o f f i n a l p e r f o r ­
mance measures.

For example, how much is the w e lfa r e o f a community

increased (decreased) i f p a tro ls are s t a ff e d with o f f i c e r s who have
graduated from c o lle g e r a th e r than w ith high school graduates?

14
The t h i r d s t r u c tu r a l v a r ia b le is b a r r ie r s to e n t r y .

What might

prevent a local community from o b tainin g i t s d e sired type o f le v e l o f
patrol service?

How might these b a r r ie r s to e n try vary across the

d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l stru ctu res?
b a r r ie r s .

P o t e n t i a l l y th e re are two major

One is high fix e d c o s ts , and the second is the power to act

as a p o lic e department.

Each o f these w i l l be discussed f o r each of

the th re e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tr u c tu r e s .

For the a d m in is tr a tiv e s t r u c t u r e ,

where lo ca l o f f i c i a l s choose to h ir e a p o lic e c h i e f and s t a r t t h e i r own
department, an i n i t i a l investment is required f o r such items as b u ild in g ,
c a r s , p o lic e and o f f i c e equipment, and a disp atching system.
expensive item is d isp atc h in g .

The most

U n ti 1 r e c e n t l y , fe d e ral funds were

a v a ila b le to help finance th is expense.

But th e fe de ral government is

attempting to discourage the formation and the c o n tin u a tio n o f p o lic e
departments o f 1 0 - 2 0 persons o r less by re fu s in g to grant funds to such
departments.

But f o r most lo cal p o lic e o p e r a tio n s , the county s h e r i f f

or local s ta te p o lic e post is w i 1 1 ing to provide the phone answering
and dispatching s e rv ic e w ithout charge.

Many lo c a l p o lic e departments

operate out o f a po rtion o f the township or v i l l a g e h a ll or even the
local f i r e s ta tio n which minimizes b u ild in g expense.

The cost o f

the remaining necessary inputs is not p r o h ib i t i v e f o r a lo ca l community
from having i t s own p o lic e department as evidenced by the la rg e
number o f small departments in Michigan.

The le g a l a u th o r ity to a c t

as p o lic e can be granted by the governing body o f the p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d ic tio n .

13

This power is given to lo cal communities by s t a t e s t a t u t e .

13

Police powers are given to s ta te p o lic e in MSA 4 .4 3 6 , to the county
s h e r i f f in MSA 5 .9 1 7 , to township p o lic e in MSA 5 . 4 6 ( 1 2 ) , to v i l l a g e
p o lic e in MSa 5 .1 3 2 8 , and to c i t y p o lic e is MSA 5.1330.

15
For a community choosing to use the i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c tu r e o f
grant in an attempt to secure i t s needed p a tro l s e rv ic e from the
s h e r i f f ' s general p a t r o l , d i f f e r e n t b a r r ie rs are met.

The s h e r i f f

already has a u th o rity to enforce s t a te and county s ta tu te s anywhere
in the county and a l l the fix e d costs needed to support any marginal
increase in general p a tro l have probably already been p a id .

The b a r r ie rs

come from the s h e r i f f being u n w illin g to r e - a l l o c a t e his e x is tin g stock
o f p a tro ls and/or the county commissioner being u n w illin g to grant
budget increases which would a llo w the s h e r i f f to increase his general
patrol s e rv ic e .
For the bargaining i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , where lo c a l communities
buy p a tro l s e rv ic e , what b a r r ie r s e x is t?
there are no s e lle r s o f p a tro l s e rv ic e .

In most Michigan c oun ties,
In those counties where

patro ls are bought and s o ld , the s h e r i f f is usually the only s e l l e r .
Both o f these observations in d ic a t e t h a t s u b s ta n tia l b a r r ie r s do e x i s t .
The reasons are why many Michigan s h e r if f s do not s e ll p a tro l s e rv ic e
are not known.

Probably no demand e x is ts a t the lo c a l l e v e l .

Many

local communities h i s t o r i c a l l y have had t h e i r own p o lic e department
and the i n e r t i a to r e ta in the lo ca l department is q u ite s tro ng.

Also

these s h e r if f s may not know how to s e l l p a tro l services ( i . e . , how to
p ric e the s e rv ic e o r w r i t e the c o n t r a c t , e t c . ) .
In those counties where c o n tra c tin g takes p la c e , why is the s h e r i f f
the only s e lle r ?

Why do not other p o l i t i c a l ju r i s d i c t i o n s s e l l p a tro l

s e rvice to neighboring communities?

Why are th e re not more cooperative

arrangements where two p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s , such as a c i t y w it h in a
township, coop era tiv e ly provide f o r t h e i r own law enforcement?

F in a lly ,

16
why do not p r iv a t e s e c u rity companies s e l l p a tro l services to lo cal
communities?

No systematic study was done on these questio ns, but

several responses can be suggested.
One possible reason f o r the r e l a t i v e absence o f d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l
j u r i s d ic t io n s s e l l i n g p a tro l s e rv ic e is the boundary o f the p o l i t i c a l
ju r is d ic tio n .

The primary r e s p o n s ib ili t y o f a lo ca l p o lic e c h ie f is

to provide s e rv ic e to his lo ca l community; th e r e f o r e , he has no in c e n tiv e
to s o l i c i t neighboring communities about e i t h e r s e l l i n g them p a tro l
services or undertaking a j o i n t p o lic e operation to supply p a tro l
services to both local communities.

The s h e r i f f , on th e oth e r hand,

has r e s p o n s ib ili t y f o r s e rv ic e to the e n t i r e county and has in c e n tiv e
to increase his le v e l o f s e rv ic e e s p e c ia lly i f a local community is
w i l l i n g to pay an amount over i t s county taxes f o r the higher s e rv ic e
le v e l.

Even i f patrol hour u n it cost should be lower i f a j o i n t

operation were undertaken, the tra n s a c tio n c o s ts , as discussed l a t e r
in t h is c h a p te r, may be too high to f a c i l i t a t e the formation and the
maintenance o f a cooperative p o lic e department.
F i n a l l y , p r iv a te s e c u r ity companies, companies which s e l l s e c u r ity
personnel to business establishm ents, could but a t the present do not
s e ll p a tro l s e rvice to lo c a l communities.

There is no s t a t e s t a tu t e

which e x p l i c i t l y p ro h ib its p r iv a t e s e c u r ity companies from s e l l i n g
patrol s e rv ic e to a lo ca l community; however, i f they should e n te r the
p a tro l s e rv ic e market, they would l i k e l y face a legal challenge over
whether or not they have the r i g h t to hold p o lic e a u t h o r i t y .

My

conclusion from examining Michigan S ta te Statues is t h a t th e re is no
legal reason why a local community could not give p o lic e a u t h o r it y to
p r iv a te s e c u rity employees when the employees are working w it h in

17
the boundary o f the a u th o rizin g community.

The legal environment is

uncertain enough to be a s u b s ta n tia l b a r r i e r to e ntry f o r a p r iv a t e
s e c u rity f ir m .

I t is questionable whether or not p r iv a t e s e c u rity

firms can make a p r o f i t in s e l l i n g patrol services to lo cal communities.
Patrol is an a c t i v i t y where there is lim it e d op portunity f o r c ontrol o f
v a ria b le resources (personnel, v e h ic le s , e t c . ) to allo w f o r p r o f i t s to
be made.

The g re a te s t expense in the production o f a p a tro l hour ( s in g le

or double) is s a la r y .

With a s t a te law r e q u irin g t h a t a l l

law o f f ic e r s

have 280 hours o f p o lic e academy t r a i n i n g , the supply o f q u a l i f i e d
p o lic e o f f ic e r s is r e s t r i c t e d , and a l l e n t i t i e s wishing to h i r e p o lic e
o f f i c e r s , must compete f o r them.

In essence, any community which wants

a s e c u rity o f f i c e r r a th e r than an o f f i c e r who has been through the
p o lic e academy is unable to obtain one.
The fourth s tr u c tu r a l v a r ia b le is the r e l a t io n which the s h e r i f f
has w ith his county commissioners.

Some s h e r if f s are ab le to ob tain

the patrol financing which they fe e l is necessary to provide adequate
p a tro l s e rv ic e to t h e i r county w h ile otner s h e r if f s face county commis­
sioners u n w illin g to fund patrol to meet the s h e r i f f ' s standards.
Contracting o ffe r s s h e r if f s a means o f funding p a tro l independently o f
the county commissioners.

The question asked in Chapter IV is are the

s h e r if f s who face t i g h t f is t e d commissioners more responsive to the
p a tro l preference o f c o n tra c tin g o f f i c i a l s than those s h e r if f s who have
commissioners who fund most o f t h e i r patrol needs?

CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE VARIABLES
Local o f f i c i a l s are in te r e s te d in several conduct-performance

18
in d ic a to r s .

14

These in d ic a t o r s , l i s t e d and discussed below, make up

the patrol performance o b je ctiv es o f s h e r if f s and lo cal o f f i c i a l s .
The f i r s t deals with the product p ric e w h ile the remaining ones focus
on nature o f the product.
Cost per Patrol Hour.
o f in te re s t.

This in d ic a to r brings tog e th e r two concepts

The f i r s t is the number o f p a tro l hours o r the amount o f

coverage, and the second is the t o t a l c o s t.

I f the s h e r i f f or lo ca l

p o lic e c h ie f decides t h a t only double p a tro l un its (two persons in the
car) can be operated, the cost per p a tro l hour w i l l tend to be higher
than i f s in g le units are run.

Decisions about the q u a l it y o f the inputs

(p a tro l personnel and p a tro l equipment) can g r e a t ly a f f e c t the p ric e
along with the presence or absence o f a p o lic e union.

One com plicating

f a c to r is t h a t the s h e r i f f may choose to charge a p ric e which is less
than the cost o f op era tio n .
chapters.

This w i l l be discussed f u r t h e r in l a t e r

There are two issues present.

F i r s t , what p r ic e does the

s h e r i f f choose to charge and how does th is compare with actual costs.
Second is an economies o f scale question.

Can the s h e r i f f produce

patrol services a t a lower p ric e than can small departments?

The d i f f e r e n t tyoes o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tru c tu re and the s t r u c tu r a l
v a ria b le s have been discussed.
I n s t i t u t i o n a l s tru c tu re s are im portant
because they a f f e c t something f o r loca! o f f i c i a l s .
The two things
o f value are behavior o f the p o lic e s u p p lie r ( s h e r i f f o r lo ca l p o lic e
c h ie f ) and performance o f the p o lic e o p e ra tio n . Behavior and per­
formance, along with s t r u c tu r e , occupy d i f f e r e n t spots on a continuum
which lin k s inputs to f i n a l outputs (outputs which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t
people's l i v e s ) .
The d iffe r e n c e between conduct and performance is
one o f degree with performance being more o f a f i n a l output than
conduct which i t s e l f is more f i n a l than i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e .
Some o f f i c i a l s , lo ca l and county, are only in te r e s te d in the lo cal
production o r the c e n tr a liz e d production o f a s e rv ic e regardless o f
the performance and behavior im p lic a tio n o f a l t e r n a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s tru c tu re s . The only in s ig h t which analysis can o f f e r those who value
a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tru c tu re is i d e n t i f y the o p p o rtu n ity cost
o f t h e i r value. As w ith any perceived b e n e f i t , there is an a rra y o f
associated costs.

?9
Reporting to Local Community O f f i c i a l s .

How o fte n w i l l the s h e r i f f

or lo ca l p o lic e c h i e f re p o rt to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s about p o lic e operations?
When lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

receive compliants about the p o lic e s e r v ic e , they

are in te r e s te d in responding and t h is means knowing about the s e rv ic e
le v e l and typ e .
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f P atrol S e r v ic e .

Can lo c a l o f f i c i a l s o b ta in , e i t h e r

from the s h e r i f f o r through having t h e i r own department, the le v e l o f
s e rv ic e they desire?

Some small communities fe e l they need only p a tro ls

to work Friday and Saturday nights during the summer months.

A s h e riff

may be u n w illin g to supply such a p a tro l o p e ra tio n ; and i t may be
d i f f i c u l t f o r lo ca l o f f i c i a l s to s t a f f such an o p era tio n .
A c t i v i t i e s Performed by the P a t r o l s .

A s h e r i f f or lo cal p o lic e

c h ie f may not fe e l t h a t performing community r e la te d errands ( e .g .
taking board minutes around to lo c a l o f f i c i a l s )
a c tiv ity .

Local o f f i c i a l s may fe e l i t i s .

is "proper" p a tro l

Other requests can be made

concerning how p a tro ls spend t h e i r time ( e .g . monitoring t r a f f i c ,
serving as crossing guards, e t c . ) .
o f voicing t h e i r p a tro l o b je c t iv e s .

Local o f f i c i a l s a n tic ip a te d success
The a n tic ip a te d sucess o f voicing

t h e i r p a tro l o b je c tiv e s w i l l a f f e c t t h e i r propensity to c o n tra c t or
have t h e i r own p o lic e department.
Rotating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D ep uties.
o ffic ia ls

Some 1ocal

value having p o lic e o f f i c e r s t h a t know t h e i r lo ca l community

and lo c a l c i t i z e n s .
depu ties.

A s h e r i f f may have a p o lic y o f r o t a t in g his

A lo ca l p o lic e c h i e f may have d i f f i c u l t y r e ta in in g the same

o f f i c e r f o r more than one o r two y e a r s .

Local o f f i c i a l s would l i k e

to know under which s tr u c tu r e are they most l i k e l y to ob tain t h e i r
preference.

20
Revenue from Liquor In s p e c tio n .

When a contracted p a tro l performs

a liq u o r in s p e c tio n , does the revenue from the Michigan Liquor
Commission go to the c o n tra c tin g community o r in to the county treasury?
Response Time and Time Spent on Complaints.

Two in d ic a to rs o f

in t e r e s t to lo c a l o f f i c i a l s are response time and time spent oh
complaints.
in d ic a t o r .

F i r s t , o f f i c i a l s are concerned about the le v e l o f each
A ll e ls e being equal , c it iz e n s are b e t t e r o f f the lower the

response tim e.

And, the more time spent on com plaints, the b e t t e r o f f

c it iz e n s are a l l e ls e equal.

Second, o f f i c i a l s are also in te r e s te d in

complaints which re c e iv e top p r i o r i t y .

I f the most serious complaint

which a lo cal community has is breaking and e n te rin g (B & E) and they
co n tra c t with a s h e r i f f whose deputies do not fe e l B & E's are t h a t
c r i t i c a l compared to armed robberies and bar f i g h t s , the le v e l o f
response time and time spent on B & E's may not be to t h e i r l i k i n g .
Amount o f P atro l Time Spent Outside Local Community.

Local

o f f i c i a l s want to know how much time w i l l be spent ou tside t h e i r
community i f they c o n tra c t with the s h e r i f f and how t h is compares with
what would r e s u lt i f they had t h e i r own p o lic e department.

This

conduct-performance v a r ia b le along w ith response time and time spent
on complaints w i l l be used in Chapter V which is a case study o f the
c o n tra c tin g operations o f one county s h e r i f f .

INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES AND THE COSTS OF TRANSACTION
The cost o f o b tainin g p a tro l s e rv ic e s , regardless o f the i n s t i t u ­
t io n a l a l t e r n a t i v e , has two components.

One is the d o l l a r cost o f the

p a tro l s e rv ic e ( e . g . , c o n tra c t p r ic e paid to the s h e r i f f or the p a tro l
p o rtio n o f the lo cal p o lic e budget).

This cost w i l l be discussed l a t e r .

21
The other cost in t e g r a l is tra n s a c tio n cost which is defined as those
costs incurred in reaching or m aintaining an agreement.

15

Associated with each s tr u c tu r a l type is an a rray o f tra n s a c tio n
costs.

Seldom are these costs made e x p l i c i t o r evaluated in d o l l a r

terms, but t h e i r d i r e c t io n and who bears them can be observed; and
factors which a f f e c t t h e i r d ir e c t io n and r e l a t i v e magnitude can be
suggested.
Bargaining I n s t i t u t i o n s .

1f

There are several tra n s a c tio n costs

which occur when a community buys from the s h e r i f f .

One is the amount

o f time i t takes lo ca l o f f i c i a l s and the s h e r i f f to a r r i v e a t an agree­
ment.

Much o f t h is cost is inform ation c o s t, but a p o rtio n o f i t may

be spent in persuading.

For the s h e r i f f t h is may e n t a il making cost

e s tim ate s , w r it i n g l e t t e r s and memos e x p la in in g the p r ic e and the
s e rv ic e to be d e liv e r e d , and atten din g m e e t in g s .^

Local o f f i c i a l s

w i l l spend time understanding the s h e r i f f ' s proposal, seek inform ation
from other communities who c ontract with the s h e r i f f , atten d meetings
with the s h e r i f f , and discuss among themselves whether or not the
s h e r i f f ' s proposal is acceptable.

For those communities t h a t do not

have t h e i r own p o lic e department, o f f i c i a l s may attempt to estim ate
costs o f s t a r t i n g and m aintaining t h e i r own department by t a lk in g to
community o f f i c i a l s experienced in the production of p o lic e services

^ S ch m id , op c i t e p. 105.
1 ft

Bargaining tran sactio ns
has i t s own department.
le v e l and type o f p a tro l
other budget categories

can take place even i f a lo c a l community
Local o f f i c i a l s , as they t r y to decide the
s e r v ic e , might trad e expenditure le v e ls o f
to secure t h e i r o b je c tiv e f o r p o lic e p a t r o l .

^ I n many cases the s h e r i f f wi 11 have a s t a f f o f f i c e r perform these
functio n s .

22
as well as conta c tin g supp lie rs o f p o lic e equipment to o b ta in cost
e s tim a te s .^
A ll e ls e e q u a l, the g r e a te r the d i f f e r e n c e between the s h e r i f f ' s
patrol o b je c tiv e s and those held by lo ca l o f f i c i a l s and the c lo s e r the
s h e r i f f ' s p r ic e is to the p r ic e o f having a lo c a l p o lic e departm ent,
the longer the period o f n e g o tia tio n .

Haggling can take place over many

points in the c o n tra c t such as who pays f o r d i f f e r e n t costs

(o v e rtim e ,

f r in g e s , v e h ic le , e t c . ) , can p a tro ls be dispatched o u tside th e c o n tr a c tin g
community, how o fte n w i l l
local o f f i c i a l s

the s h e r i f f re p o rt to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s , can

request p a tro l a c t i v i t i e s be done w ith o u t going through

the s h e r i f f , and many o th e rs .

The f u r t h e r away th e two p a r t ie s are on

t h e i r p a tro l o b je c t i v e s , the more time i t w i l l
promise.

take to reach a com­

Like w is e, i f the s h e r i f f ' s p r ic e is not very f a r below the

cost o f having a lo ca l department, o f f i c i a l s w i l l

l i k e l y proceed with

more caution than i f s u b s ta n tia l cost savings are r e a l i z e d .

18

19

I t is le g i t im a te to ask whether o r not c o n tr a c tin g w ith th e s h e r i f f
w i l l e v e n tu a lly lead to county-wide p ro v is io n o f p o lic e s e rv ic e s by
the s h e r i f f .
Several s h e r i f f s do not l i k e c o n tra c tin g and want
e v e n tu a lly to have a set mi 11 age passed earmarked f o r t h e i r d e p a r t­
ment. They fe e l t h a t c o n tra c tin g is a means to t h is end. Once
lo ca l o f f i c i a l s become used to d e a lin g w ith the s h e r i f f through con­
t r a c t i n g , the next step to county-wide enforcement is a r e l a t i v e l y
small one.
As the number of la rg e departments in c re a s e s , p o lic e in p u t s u p p lie rs
concentrate on equipment f o r the la rg e fo rc e and may choose to
discontinue a broad p r ic e range o f p o lic e equipment c o n c e n tra tin g on
the s o p h is tic a te d inputs and thus the h ig h e r priced item s. As t h is
trend continues, small communities wanting to s t a r t their own d e p a r t­
ment w i l l fin d i t in c re a s in g ly expensive because the less sophis­
t ic a t e d equipment w i l l not be r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e .

19

R e a liz a tio n o f cost savings from c o n tra c tin g is a fu n c tio n o f how
much in form atio n lo ca l o f f i c i a l s have about s t a r t i n g and o p e ra tin g
t h e i r own department.
I f lo cal o f f i c i a l s have not in q u ire d about
costs o f having t h e i r own department, they may not p erceive any
real p o te n tia l savings.

23
Many o f the inform ation costs f a l l on the s h e r i f f and thus the
county ta x p a ye r, because the s h e r i f f w i l l

l i k e l y be re q u ire d to supply

inform ation to lo cal o f f i c i a l s concerning his proposal and what i t
would cost them to s t a r t t h e i r own department.

This cost w i l l d e c li n e ,

however, f o r subsequent contracts providing t h a t the s e rv ic e sold is
s im il a r to previous c o n tra c ts .
s h e riff fo r a ll

I f lo c a l o f f i c i a l s do not r e l y on the

t h e i r in fo rm a tio n , they may spend s u b s ta n tia l time in

gathering t h e i r own inform ation about costs o f lo c a l departments as
well as gathering oth e r community s a t i s f a c t i o n
a s h e r i f f ' s c o n tr a c t.

20

( d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ) w ith

A d d itio n a l time can be spent by lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

i f th e re is disagreement among themselves on whether or not they should
c o n tr a c t.

This even may include informing and persuading t h e i r con­

s t itu e n t s about the pending arrangement w ith the s h e r i f f .
The s h e r i f f may choose to pass on to c o n tra c tin g communities
only a p o rtio n o f the costs to provide p a tro l services as an in c e n tiv e
to h e s ita n t communities who want t h e i r own p o lic e department.

This

concession might also be made i f the s h e r i f f is u n w illin g to make any
compromise on his p a tro l o b je c tiv e s .

(Some s h e r i f f s b e lie v e t h a t

i t is good p a tro l procedure to r o t a t e t h e i r patrolmen p e r i o d i c a l l y ,
even though many lo cal o f f i c i a l s
men.)

d e s ire permanently s ta tio n e d p a t r o l ­

Since any d e fic ie n c y between the c o n tra c t p r ic e and the actual

cost is paid out o f the county general fu n d , the s h e r i f f may make a
concession which f a l l s on the no n-c o n tra ctin g p o rtio n o f the county.

20

This cost is so high (who to contact and what questions to ask)
t h a t f o r many o f f i c i a l s the net re tu rn from generating t h e i r own
inform ation is less than the expected re tu rn from e n te rin g a c o n tra c t
w ith the s h e r i f f using only the s h e r i f f ' s in fo rm a tio n .
Consequently,
many lo cal o f f i c i a l s choose to bare the cost o f u n c e r ta in ty r a th e r
than the cost to obtain in fo rm a tio n .

24
The s h e r i f f w i l l tend to be held in check by county commissioners who
a c t iv e l y p a r t i c i p a t e in budget form u la tio n and in c o n tra c tin g n e g o tia tio n and who represent the n o n-contracting p o rtio n o f the county.
Once a c o n tra c t between a s h e r i f f and lo c a l o f f i c i a l s
tra n s a c tio n costs f o r both p a r t ie s do not end.

21

is culm inated,

The s h e r i f f ( o r a l i a i s o n

o f f i c e r ) w i l l deal with lo ca l o f f i c i a l s more on a d a i l y basis dea lin g
w ith d i s s a t is f a c t io n f e l t by lo cal o f f i c i a l s or t h e i r c o n s titu e n ts .
Monthly reports w i l l
o ffic ia ls .

l i k e l y be submitted and discussed w ith lo ca l

Even though i t may have been agreed t h a t p a tr o ls would

perform any "reasonable" request made by lo ca l o f f i c i a l s and th a t
p a tro ls would not be dispatched ou tside the c o n tra c tin g community
except f o r "emergencies", th e re may be c ontinual in t e r a c t io n on
d e fin in g "reasonable" and "emergency".
P o lic in g the agreements f o r lo cal o f f i c i a l s can be very c o s t ly .
To know how many p a tro l hours a c t u a lly worked re q u ire s r e ly in g upon
the s h e r i f f .

L is te n in g to a p o lic e scanner can give o f f i c i a l s an

in d ic a tio n of how much time is spent out o f t h e i r community by con­
tr a c te d p a tro ls and the types of complaints which drew them o u t.

One

method used by lo ca l o f f i c i a l s to know i f c it iz e n s are d i s s a t i s f i e d
is the number of complaints they r e c e iv e .

While costs of p o lic in g a

c o n tra c t with the s h e r i f f are h ig h , th e re is no reason to b e lie v e t h a t
they would be any lower i f o f f i c i a l s had t h e i r own department.

21

Contractual agreements are r e a l l y between th re e d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s - the s h e r i f f , the lo cal community, and the county board of commis­
sio n ers . The document, i f w r i t t e n , w i l l be signed by represen­
t a t iv e s o f each p a r ty .
Even though the county commissioners must
r a t i f y the agreement, they s t i l l may not know t h a t the c o n tra c t p r ic e
may not cover expenses nor the magnitude o f t h i s d if f e r e n c e .
Some
may not r e a l i z e t h a t the s h e r i f f ' s budget w i l l then increase in order
f o r the terms o f the c o n tra c t to be f u l f i l l e d .

25
A d m in is tra tiv e I n s t i t u t i o n s .

One tra n s a c tio n cost o f having a

lo c a l p o lic e department is the cost o f gathering in fo rm a tio n about the
p o lic e services purchased by oth e r s i m i l a r communities.

This is

e s p e c ia lly tr u e a t budget times when a lo ca l p o lic e c h ie f contends
t h a t he needs a c e r t a in piece o f equipment or t h a t a c e r t a in s e rv ic e
is im pe ra tiv e in order to provide "adequate" p o lic e p r o t e c t io n .

It

would be o f i n t e r e s t to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s to know how many o th e r s i m i l a r
communities found the s e rv ic e or equipment in dispensable.
There is some reason to expect t h a t a p o lic e c h i e f w i l l be more
aggressive in arguing f o r increased p o lic e budgets than w i l l a s h e r i f f
under c o n tr a c t.

I f both the s h e r i f f and p o lic e c h i e f d e s ire to have a

la r g e r department, the s h e r i f f has o th e r sources o f revenue ( e .g . county
general fu n d , fe d e ra l and s t a te g r a n ts , and o th e r c o n tra c tin g communities)
Op

w h ile the p o lic e c h i e f has only one well from which to draw.

Con­

t r i b u t i n g to a la r g e p o lic e budget under the a d m in is tr a tiv e i n s t i t u t i o n a l
a l t e r n a t i v e is t h a t lo ca l o f f i c i a l s do not know what p o lic e services
can be obtained from the county o r s t a te w ith o u t e x tra charge.

The

reason f o r th is is t h a t the p o lic e c h i e f may want to perform a l l aspects
o f p o lic e work, such as d e t e c t iv e , d is p a tc h in g , e t c . , and w i l l not use
the d e te c tiv e s and dispatching o f the s h e r i f f and/or s t a t e p o lic e .

22

The hypothesis which would need to be tested is "Over a f i v e y e a r
period lo ca l p o lic e budget increases w i l l be g r e a t e r than i f the
community has i t s own p o lic e department r a th e r than c o n t r a c t ." This
w i l l not be done in t h is study because many o f the c o n tra c tin g opera­
tio n s have not been in operation f i v e y e a rs . Another reason is to
ob tain p o lic e budget fig u r e s f o r lo c a l communities requires digging in t o
the lo ca l community's accounting system to ob ta in a l l p o lic e c o s ts .
(Costs such as v e h ic le or fr in g e s appear in a d i f f e r e n t p a rt o f the
budget.)

26
There can be disagreement over p a tro l o b je c tiv e s w ith a lo ca l
p o lic e c h ie f j u s t as th e re can with the s h e r i f f .

I f the d if fe r e n c e is

too g r e a t , the c h i e f may choose to q u i t o r he can be dismissed.

In

e i t h e r e v e n t, th e re can r e s u lt a loss o f morale among the oth e r lo ca l
o f f i c e r s , more a d m in is tr a tiv e r e s p o n s ib ili t y o f the p o lic e department
going to the e le c te d o f f i c i a l s , and the necessity to spend time in
r e c r u i t in g a replacement.
I f a lo ca l p o lic e o f f i c e r proves u n s a tis fa c to ry to local o f f i c i a l s ,
he can be dismissed, but t h is can c re a te i l l

fe e lin g s in the community.

In a d d it io n , there can be a loss o f p a tro l coverage w h ile a replacement
is sought.

C ontrasting t h is with c o n t r a c t in g , i f a contracted deputy

proves u n s a t is f a c to r y , the s h e r i f f has the p o te n tia l to t r a n s f e r the
deputy to another a c t i v i t y o r community and provide an immediate sub­
s titu te .
Many lo ca l o f f i c i a l s face a p o lic e union.

Depending upon the

aggressiveness o f the lo cal o f f i c e r s , much time can be spent by lo c a l
o f f i c i a l s in n e g o tia tin g w ith a union r e p r e s e n ta tiv e .

Most s h e r i f f s

also deal w ith a la b o r union but the tra n s a c tio n costs o f la b o r r e la t io n s
do not change with an increase in the number of patrolmen through
c o n tra c tin g .
Status and Grant I n s t i t u t i o n s .

Local o f f i c i a l s who attem pt to

secure higher le v e ls o f p a tro l services from the s h e r i f f in re tu rn f o r
county taxes a lre ad y paid are in a grantee p o s itio n tak in g what the
s h e r i f f chooses to g iv e .

The reason f o r t h is p o s itio n is t h a t they

have no power to force a change o r anything to tr a d e .

In order to move

from the grantee p o s itio n in to a tra n s a c tio n type where lo ca l o f f i c i a l s
can e x e r t more c ontrol

(w ithout in creasing lo cal tax d o lla r s which both

27
the bargain and a d m in is tr a tiv e a l t e r n a t iv e s r e q u ir e ) is to organize o th e r
communities t h a t have the same problem.

I f th e re is enough p o l i t i c a l

strength the s h e r i f f along with the county commissioners may choose to
e i t h e r r e a llo c a te p a tro ls such t h a t the complaining communities re c e iv e
more o r they may choose to increase p a tro l s e rv ic e to the e n t i r e coun ty.
The l a t t e r would be cheaper than c o n tra c tin g o r s t a r t i n g a lo ca l d e p a r t­
ment.

Id e n t if y in g and gathering to g e th e r lo ca l o f f i c i a l s o f s i m i l a r

tastes w ith in the county has high costs with an u n certain p a y o ff even
i f i t is done.
Even i f the s h e r i f f says t h a t he w i l l

increase p a tro l s e rv ic e in

a given community, p o lic in g such a promise is d i f f i c u l t .

No s h e r i f f

to my knowledge sent to n o n-contracting o f f i c i a l s a monthly re p o rt w ith
a d e t a ile d breakdown o f the a c t i v i t y in t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r community.

THE MODEL— SO WHAT?
The decision which is being informed is "What is the best i n s t i ­
t u t io n a l means f o r lo ca l o f f i c i a l s to ob tain a higher le v e l o f p a tro l
services?"

The model presented has been one o f s t r u c tu r e and conduct

performance in a c o s t - b e n e f it framework.

Local o f f i c i a l s w i l l

decide

on the i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e depending upon the r e l a t i v e costs and
b e n e fits o f each.

What p r ic e the s h e r i f f chooses to charge r e l a t i v e

to the cost o f s t a r t i n g and m aintaining a lo ca l department and oth e r
conduct-performance o b je c tiv e s o f the s h e r i f f r e l a t i v e to having a
local department w i l l be weighed.
No attempt w i l l be made to i d e n t i f y the r e l a t i v e weight given to
each p a tro l o b je c tiv e in an e f f o r t to p r e d ic t when c o n tra c tin g w i l l and
w i l l not r e s u l t .

What w i l l be done is to ob tain in form atio n about the

v a r ie t y o f c o n tra c tin g in Michigan, the p a tro l o b je c tiv e s being r e f l e c t e d

28
in the e x is t in g c o n t r a c ts , and the procedures used by d i f f e r e n t s h e r i f f s
in e s tim atin g p a tro l costs and determining the c o n tra c t p r ic e .

CONCLUSION
Many r u ra l communities and counties are beginning to explore
a l t e r n a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tru c tu re s to provide them w ith the le v e l and
type o f p a tro l s e rv ic e d e s ire d .
to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s .

Four s t r u c t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are open

They are bargain where lo ca l o f f i c i a l s buy p a tro l

services from the s h e r i f f , a d m in is tr a t iv e where lo cal o f f i c i a l s h ir e
a p o lic e c h i e f and s t a r t t h e i r own departm ent, gra n t where lo ca l
o f f i c i a l s attem pt to gain a d d itio n a l p a tro l services by having the
s h e r i f f give to them more general p a t r o l , and a coop erative undertaking
where lo ca l o f f i c i a l s o f two or more communities pool t h e i r resources
and j o i n t l y produce p o lic e s ervices f o r a l l
p a rtn e rs h ip .
and w i l l

the communities in the

The l a s t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tr u c tu r e was observed only r a r e ly

not be considered in t h i s study.

A d m in is tr a tiv e and grant

tran s ac tio n s w i l l be r e fe r r e d to throughout the s tu d y , but the primary
focus is on b argain.
A market model o f s t r u c tu r e and conduct-performance was presented.
The s t r u c tu r e in the p a tro l s e rv ic e market has one s u p p lie r , the s h e r i f f ,
and several p o te n tia l s u p p lie rs such as communities s t a r t i n g t h e i r own
department, communities j o i n t l y producing t h e i r own p a tro l s e r v ic e s ,
lo ca l communities s e l l i n g p a tro l s ervices to o th e r lo c a l communities,

23

and requesting the s t a te p o lic e and s h e r i f f f o r higher le v e ls o f general
p a tro l s e r v ic e .

23

Some product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and s i g n i f i c a n t b a r r ie r s

P o lic e c h ie fs o f la rg e c i t i e s fe e l no o b lig a t io n to provide p a tro l
services to surrounding communities. They seem more in te r e s te d in
in c re a s in g the p a tr o ls w it h in the c i t y r a th e r than c o n tra c tin g with
small adjacent communities. A ls o , small communities close to la rg e
c i t i e s may f e a r the t h r e a t o f annexation more than the t h r e a t t h a t
the county w i l l take over the lo c a l community.

29
to e n try e x i s t .

Another s t r u c tu r a l dimension which can a f f e c t the c o s t-

performance in the p a tro l s e rv ic e market is the monopsonistic s t r u c t u r a l
r e l a t i o n between the s h e r i f f and county commissioners since the commis­
sioners are the only source (outside o f c o n tra c tin g ) o f p a tro l funds.
The conduct-performance v a r i a b le s , which w i l l be used in Chapters I I I ,
IV and V to analyze the c o n tra c tin g operations o f d i f f e r e n t s h e r i f f s
are cost per p a tro l hour, re p o rtin g to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s , minimum le v e l
o f s e rv ic e s o ld , a c t i v i t i e s performed by p a t r o ls , r o t a t in g versus
permanently s t a tio n in g d e p u tie s , revenue from liq u o r in s p e c tio n , response
time and time spent on com plaints.
Transactions c o s ts , the costs o f reaching and m a intaining an
agreement, were discussed f o r b a rg a in in g , a d m in i s tr a t iv e , and grant
tra n s a c tio n s .

No attem pt was made to estim ate under which i n s t i t u t i o n

these costs are h ig h e r.
One p o in t needs to be emphasized.

Local o f f i c i a l s o fte n assume

t h a t when they h i r e a p o lic e c h i e f , they have more control over the
type o f p a tro l s e rv ic e t h e i r community receives and t h a t tran s ac tio n s
ocsts w i l l be less under the a d m in is tr a tiv e tra n s a c tio n than in dealing
with the s h e r i f f .

But t h is is not n e c e s s a rily the case.

The lo ca l

p o lic e c h ie f is an a r t i c u l a t o r o f demand f o r p o lic e s e r v ic e s , and a f t e r
some tim e in the lo c a l community, he can develop lo ca l support f o r his
p o s itio n and provide c o n f l i c t with the lo cal o f f i c i a l s .

CHAPTER I I
LEVEL OF PATROL SERVICES AND WHOSE PREFERENCES COUNT

INTRODUCTION
Three d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tru c tu re s and t h e i r associated
costs o f tra n s a c tio n have been discussed.

C entral to these s tru c tu re s

f o r lo ca l decision makers are the questions o f whose preferences w i l l
most l i k e l y p r e v a i l , and o f who can c re a te costs f o r whom?

This

chapter explores these two questions f u r t h e r by examining the boundary
problem and by discussing the pressure to c o n s o lid a te small p o lic e
departments which is one possible approach to a boundary problem.

Other

approaches to the boundary problem are discussed, fo llo w ed by a s e ctio n
which shows how overproduction can occur from overlapping j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
The next section deals w ith f i s c a l equivalence or the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p
between who pays and who receives the s e rv ic e .

The f i n a l s ection

discusses d i f f e r e n t options fa c in g a local community as i t attempts to
procure i t s optimal le v e l o f p a tro l s e rv ic e .

A BOUNDARY PROBLEM
A boundary problem e x is ts whenever the a re a l

incidence o f costs

and/or b e n e fits o f a j o i n t impact good or s e rv ic e (w ith high exclusion
costs) do not coincide w ith the boundary o f the providing u n it o f
government.^

With t h i s d e f i n i t i o n a boundary problem p r e v a ils because

H h e Public Economy o f M e tro p o lita n A reas, Robert L. B ish, Markham
Publishing C o., Chicago, second p r i n t i n g , 1971, p. 55.
I do not
want to imply t h a t any time an e x t e r n a l i t y e x is ts t h a t th e re is a
problem. Just because th e re is interdependence does not mean t h a t
the interdependent p a r tie s have a problem.

30

31
o f the presence o f e x t e r n a l i t i e s - - n o e x t e r n a l i t y then no boundary
problem.

For t h is research an e x t e r n a l i t y r e s u lt s

(and a boundary

problem e x is t s ) when the preferences o f county A's d ecisio n makers
p o l i t i c a l boundary o f the governmental u n it producing good or s e rv ic e
is not the same as the boundary o f the consuming u n i t .

In p o lic e

services e x t e r n a l i t i e s occur when p o lic e p a tr o ls respond to complaints
outside t h e i r own community; when c it iz e n s t r a v e l o u ts id e t h e i r
community and demand some le v e l o f p o lic e s e r v ic e ; when one community
increases i t s

le v e l o f p o lic e s e rv ic e d is p la c in g c e r t a in types o f

crimes to neighboring communities; when a c r i m i n a l , being pursued,
fle e s in t o an a d jo in in g p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n ; and when organized
crime is a c t iv e in the a re a .
There are two consequences which flo w from boundary problems.
F i r s t , i f exclusion is very c o s tly and no inter-com m unity cooperation
r e s u lt s , then an underproduction o f s e rv ic e is h ig h ly probable.
Mancul Olson demonstrates t h e o r e t i c a l l y t h a t "the l a r g e r the group,
the f a r t h e r i t w i l l f a l l
c o l l e c t i v e good."

short o f provid ing an optimal amount o f a

His model deals w ith independent e n t i t i e s o f

d i f f e r e n t sizes and he contends t h a t i f the c o l l e c t i v e good is to be
provided a t a l l

th a t . . .

"the la r g e s t member, the member who would on his own provide
the la r g e s t amount o f the c o l l e c t i v e good, bears a d is p ro p o r­
t io n a t e share o f the burden o f prov id ing the c o l l e c t i v e good.
The s m aller member by d e f i n i t i o n gets a s m a lle r f r a c t i o n o f the
b e n e f it o f any amount o f the c o l l e c t i v e good he provides than
a la r g e r member, and t h e r e fo r e has less in c e n tiv e to provide
a d d itio n a l amounts o f the c o l l e c t i v e good. Once a s m a lle r
member has the amount o f the c o l l e c t i v e good he gets f r e e from
the la r g e s t member, he has more than he would have purchased
f o r h im s e lf, and has no in c e n tiv e to ob ta in any o f the c o l l e c ­
t i v e good a t his own expense.

O

The Logic of C o lle c t iv e A c t io n , Mancur Olson, J r . , Schocken Books,
New York, t h i r d p r i n t i n g , 1970, p. 35.

32
An example w i l l apply Olson's p o in t to t h i s research.
two adjacent communities.

Consider

Community A, due to s iz e a n d /o r t a s t e s ,

provides p a tro l services w h ile B, a t the p r e v a ilin g c o s ts , does not.
In many instances p a tro ls w i l l

respond to serious complaints (robberies

or serious personal in j u r y auto accid e n ts ) o u tside t h e i r p o l i t i c a l
boundary.
no b i l l

Most o f the time t h is is done in the name o f humanity and

is sent to the oth e r community.

For serious com pla ints , the

a v a i l a b i l i t y o f p a tro l services is a common property good in t h a t
c it iz e n s o f A and B have equal access.

3

In Figure 1 , w ith d ecisio n makers not

considering the needs

o f B,

i t can be seen t h a t

output OA is

produced.

from B the marginal

amountwhich

B was w i l l i n g to pay, then OB could

be produced.

I f A were able to c o l l e c t

(The demand curves are added v e r t i c a l l y because t h is

type o f p a tro l s e rv ic e is j o i n t impact ( c o l l e c t i v e goods).
two communities are

viewed as a s in g le e n t i t y , the optimal

I f no i n s t i t u t i o n a l

mechanismis

When the
output is OB

used by which A and B can coop erate,

then an underproduction occurs due to the boundary problem.
A second e f f e c t o f a boundary problem e x is ts i f ,

in an e f f o r t to

i n t e r n a l i z e b e n e fits a n d /o r c o s ts , a very heterogeneous community is
c re a te d .

Robert Bish demonstrates t h a t the more heterogeneous the

group, the more l i k e l y t h a t c e r t a in group (those with extreme p r e f e r ­
ences) w i l l not re c e iv e the le v e l or type o f s e rv ic e d e s ire d .

While

Olson speaks about an underproduction o f the s e rv ic e to the e n t i r e area

3
A has more access than B i f response time is the measure o f the output
r a th e r than i f the complaint was answered or n o t. The reason f o r
th is is t h a t the p a tr o ls w i l l be c r u is in g in A when any serious
complaint is received by the p o lic e department and response w i l l be
qu icker to those in A than those in B.

33

Figure 2-1

Demand fo r Patrol Service To Serious Complaints

Agg,.

D,

B
D

M

Level of Patrol Service
To Serious Complaints

34
Bish looks a t the le v e l and type o f s e rv ic e inadequacies which may
r e s u lt i f the e n t i r e s e rv ic e area is i n t e r n a l i z e d .

Both e f f e c t s w i l l

be explored more f u l l y l a t e r in the c hapter.

THE CONSOLIDATION MOVEMENT
One approach to the boundary problem is to c e n t r a l i z e production
o f the good or s e rv ic e .

The impetus f o r c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is s tro n g ,

and i t e n t a ils more than the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f costs and b e n e fits o f
a l l a ffe c te d p a r tie s or achieving scale economies.
o ften oecomes an end in i t s e l f .

C e n t r a l iz a t io n

C e n t r a l iz a t io n is also an o p p o rtu n ity

f o r d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t groups ( e . g . , c rim in a l j u s t i c e p la n n e rs ,
s h e r if f s e t c . ) to d e fin e what p o lic e s e rv ic e ought to be.

Robert Bish

and Vincent Ostrom observe t h a t the fo llo w in g th re e conclusions seem
to emerge in many commission reports on p o lic e s e rv ic e p ro v is io n :

4

(1 )

. . . Departments must have r e l a t i v e l y uniform responses
which f a l l w ith in g u id e lin e s set by courts and good p o lic e
p r a c tic e s . Departments must have strong c e n tr a l c o ntrol
to achieve these o b je c tiv e s .

(2)

Fragmentation o f p o lic e j u r i s d i c t i o n s must be reduced.
Many departments are too small and b e t t e r c o o rd in a tio n
or in t e g r a t io n is needed to p o lic e m e tro p o lita n a reas.
Criminals are not re s tr a in e d by lo cal government boun­
d a r ie s ; p o lic e must not be e i t h e r . . .

(3 )

S tate governments should enact minimum s ta te w id e standards
f o r p o lic e s e rv ic e s .
Only in t h is way can the n egative
consequences from j u r i s d i c t i o n s w ith inadequate p o lic e
services be e lim in a te d .

R efe rrin g to conclusion number t h r e e , one o f the standards r e c e n tly
adopted by Michigan's Goals and Standards Committee is t h a t fe d e ra l

^ Understanding Urban Government, Robert Bish and Vincent Ostrom,
American E n te rp ris e I n s t i t u t e f o r Public P o lic y Research, Washington,
D .C ., 1973, p. 42.

35
funds should not be a llo c a te d to communities w ith p o lic e departments
o f 20 persons or le s s .

5

E lin o r Ostrom summarizes below much o f the reasoning used by
advocates o f p o lic e c o n s o lid a tio n :^
Recommendations f o r c o n s o lid a tin g urban p o lic e agencies
are us ua lly based on th re e underlying and li t t le - e x a m i n e d
a s s e rtio n s .
F i r s t , proponents o f c o n s o lid a tio n a s se rt t h a t
s p e c ia liz a t i o n and p r o f e s s io n a liz a t io n are necessary r e q u is ite s
f o r e f f e c t i v e urban law enforcement. Second, they a s s e rt t h a t
la rg e s iz e is necessary f o r s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and p r o f e s s io n a l i­
z a tio n .
T h ir d , la r g e - s c a le p o lic e agencies are thought to be
more e f f i c i e n t (a b le to produce the same or higher le v e ls o f
output a t lower costs) than small departments.
Consequently,
i t is asserted t h a t :
( 1 ) small departments cannot provide
the le v e l and type o f s e rv ic e needed in complex urban a re a s ,
and ( 2 ) s n a il departments cannot produce services a t costs
as low as la rg e departments.
Sm aller departments with lower
per c a p ita expenditure le v e ls than la r g e r departments are
a u to m a tic a lly assumed to be providing i n f e r i o r s e rv ic e s .
Bish and Vincent Ostrom conclude by saying t h a t , "The recommenda­
tio n s are much more the product o f a 'way o f t h i n k i n g 1 about the
problem --the reform t r a d i t i o n supporting c onsolidated and in te g ra te d
command s tru c tu re s headed by competent men and s t a f f e d by p r o fe s s io n a ls - than an em pirical analysis o f problems and a l t e r n a t i v e s o lu t io n s . " ' 7
They examined a study which was a r e e v a lu a tio n o f the data used f o r
the P re s id e n t's Commission, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY.

5

Instead o f the number o f small departments f a l l i n g , what may instead
happen is t h a t c e r ta in p o lic e functions such as disp atching and record
keeping become c e n t r a liz e d w h ile p a tro l services and possibly even
d e t e c tiv e work remain d e c e n tr a liz e d .
The former p o lic e a c t i v i t i e s
are lumpy w h ile the l a t t e r a c t i v i t i e s tend to be less lumpy and f a i r l y
la b o r in t e n s iv e .
The O f f ic e o f Crim inal J u s tic e Planning adm inisters
LEAA funds in Michigan and w i l l l i k e l y adhere to the g o a l.
But lo c a l
communities can probably s t i l l use fe d e ra l revenue sharing funds f o r
any p o lic e c a p ita l expenditures and CETA funds f o r the s a la r ie s o f
p o lic e personnel.
"Do We R eally Want to C onsolidate Urban P o lic e Forces? A Reappraisal
o f Some Old Assertions," E li n o r Ostrom, Roger Parks, Gordon W hita ke r,
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, September/October, 1973, p. 423.

^Bish and Ostrom, 0£ . c i t . p. 43.

36
The data did not support those advocating l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d i c O

tio n s .

The conclusions from the data are:

(1)

Crime rates a re higher in la r g e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s .

(2 )

C it iz e n e v a lu a tio n o f p o lic e services is higher in suburban
and small j u r i s d i c t i o n s .

(3)

For r e l a t i v e l y s i m i l a r le v e ls o f s e r v ic e , the cost o f
p o lic e services is h igher in la r g e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s .

(4)

When the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f j u r i s d i c t i o n s in a m e tro p o lita n
area is measured by the number o f m u n ic ip a litie s per
1 0 0 , 0 0 0 p o p u la tio n , the g r e a te r the number o f m u n ic ip a lit ie s
to p o p u la tio n , the lower are per c a p ita costs when s e rv ic e
le v e ls are held c onstant.

Advocates o f c o n s o lid a tio n r e ly on the notion t h a t since e x t e r ­
n a l i t i e s e x i s t , t h a t t o t a l performance w i l l be enhanced i f decisions
are made with an e n t i r e area in focus.

These advocates u s u a lly do not

ask the questions "Whose focus?" or "Whose ta s te s w i l l
whose less a f t e r c o n s o lid a tio n occurs?"

count more and

In s t e a d , c o n s o lid a tio n tends

to become an end in i t s e l f .
How does the boundary problem (th e e x is te n c e o f e x t e r n a l i t y )
r e la t e to the th re e i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e s discussed in Chapter I?
F i r s t , the boundary problem i d e n t i f i e s areas where interdependence
e x is ts between d i f f e r e n t e n t i t i e s .

S e t t l i n g the boundary problem

decides who has an o p p o rtu n ity to i n t e r a c t w ith whom, thus e s tab ­
lis h in g the general contours o f th e tr a n s a c t io n s .
contour, th e re are s t i l l

But w it h in any

th re e i n s t i t u t i o n a l ways in which e n t i t i e s

can r e l a t e to each o th e r.
For example, consider c o n s o lid a tio n which attempts to i n t e r n a l i z e
most o f the e x t e r n a l i t i e s and to o f f e r the o p p o rtu n ity f o r each e n t i t y ' s

**i b i d , p. 43.

37
preferences to e n te r the decision making process.

Assume f o r the

moment t h a t a l l p o lic e departments are consolidated w ith the county
s h e riff.

Depending upon the degree o f power each lo ca l community

has r e l a t i v e to the s h e r i f f , e i t h e r an a d m in i s t r a t iv e , bargained o r
grant tra n s a c tio n w i l l take plac e .

A bargained r e la t io n s h ip can e x i s t ,

i f the communities o f s i m i l a r ta s te s can a f f e c t the e le c t io n o f the
s h e r i f f or the h i r i n g o f the p o lic e p r o fe s s io n a l.

I f member communities

are powerless to a f f e c t the s e le c tio n o f the s h e r i f f , a grant r e l a t i o n ­
ship e x is ts where the c e n tra l a u th o r it y gives to the p a r t i c i p a t i n g
communities the le v e l and type o f s e rv ic e he fe e ls they need.
is l i k e l y t h a t some lo ca l

It

units w i l l have r e l a t i v e l y more power than

o th e rs , which allows some to have a bargaining p o te n tia l w h ile the
r e s t must be s a t i s f i e d w ith a grantee r o l e .

THE COOPERATION CONTINUUM
In s p ite o f the g re a t pressure to fo rc e small p o lic e departments
to c o n s o lid a te , th e re are o th e r possible i n s t i t u t i o n a l
handle the boundary problem.

Any tra n s a c tio n

arrangements to

(b a rg a in e d , a d m in i s t r a t iv e ,

or s tatu s and g ra n t) represents some degree o f mutual dependence.
can be said f o r governmental units as well as in d iv id u a ls .

This

A continuum

o f inter-governm ental cooperation e x is ts which has as one extreme
complete independent a c tio n and as the o th e r extreme complete c o n s o lidatio n or merger.

9

The i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e explored in t h is

research is c o n tra c tin g (bargaining tr a n s a c tio n s ) . ^ 0

9

Independent a c tio n attempts to i n t e r n a l i z e no e x t e r n a l i t i e s and merger
attempts to i n t e r n a l i z e a l l e x t e r n a l i t i e s .
^°Acts o f cooperation can be between governmental units ( v i l l a g e s , town­
s h ip s, e t c . ) , between fu n c tio n a l s e rv ic e units ( p o l i c e , f i r e , e t c . )
and between s u b -fu n c tio n a l s e rv ic e units (p o lic e d is p a tc h in g ).

38
There are two types o f cooperative un dertakings.

One is a " h o r i ­

zo n ta l" arrangement which is a c o op erative venture o f mutual a i d . 11
A ll p a r tie s o f a h o riz o n ta l arrangement p erceive a s i m i l a r problem
and advantages to a c tin g j o i n t l y .

Each p a rty is a b le and w i l l i n g to

c o n trib u te an amount and re c e iv e s e rv ic e comparable to t h e i r c o n t r i ­
b u tio n .

An example o f t h is type o f an arrangement is the un w ritte n

mutual a id agreement between the c i t i e s o f Lansing and East Lansing,
Michigan S tate U n iv e rs ity Department o f P ub lic S a f e t y , and Ingham
County.

Each p o lic e agency w ith in these p o l i t i c a l

manpower and equipment to the Metro N arc o tic Squad.

u n its provides
In a d d i t i o n , the

mutual aid pact covers c i v i l disorders s i m i l a r to th e one which
occurred in East Lasning near Michigan S ta te U n iv e r s ity in May, 1972.

12

The cost to p o lic e with th is d is o rd e r has been estim ated to be between
$250,000 and $300,000 most o f which was borne by th e Michigan S ta te
P o l ic e . 13
A second p a tte rn o f cooperation is a " v e r t i c a l " system where
communities are less l i k e p a rtn e rs .

P a rtie s o f a v e r t i c a l arrangement

o fte n times are de a lin g with d i f f e r e n t problems; but through c o o p e ra tio n ,

^ A d v is o ry Commission on Intergovernmental R elations (A C IR ), A Handbook
f o r I n t e r lo c a l Agreements and C o n tr a c t. U.S. Government P r in t in g
O f f i c e , Washington, D .C ., March, 1967, p. 13.
1p
Mutual Aid P la n n in g , John M. Baines e t al_., N ational S h e r i f f ' s
A s s o c ia tio n , Washington, D.C. September, 1973, p. 69. There is an
economic in c e n tiv e f o r such an arrangement. N egative e x t e r n a l i t i e s
from a c i v i l d iso rd er which could not be c o n tr o lle d by th e lo c a l
p o lic e force could s p i l l over in to surrounding communities. Conse­
q u e n tly , the adjacent communities w i l l d e r iv e a b e n e f i t from help ing
t h e i r neighboring community c ontrol the d is o rd e r .

13

I b i d . p. 71.
pact.

The s t a t e p o lic e were not a p a r t o f the mutual aid

39

each; is able to move toward an acceptable s o lu t io n .

An example o f

th is is the c i t y o f Stockbridge buying 40 hours o f p a tro l services
from the s h e r i f f o f Ingham County.

The s h e r i f f could be in t e r e s t e d in

expanding his p a tro l d iv is io n w h ile Stockbridge o f f i c i a l s are l i k e l y
to be in te re s te d in ob ta in in g f o r t h e i r community a h ig h e r le v e l o f
p atrol services a t a p ric e which is less than what i t would cost them
to produce t h e i r own p a tro l hours.

This d is s e r t a t i o n deals e x c lu s iv e ly

with the v e r t i c a l arrangement.

VOICE AND EXIT
Many lo cal o f f i c i a l s , when faced w ith a coop era tiv e v e n tu re , f e a r
a loss o f local c o n t r o l.

Another a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h is concern is t h a t

local o f f i c i a l s are a f r a i d o f r e c e iv in g , f o r a coop era tiv e v e n tu re ,
a s e t o f un d e sira b le , or less than d e s ir a b le , outputs and be unable to
a l t e r the s i t u a t i o n .

What o p p o rtu n itie s e x i s t f o r lo c a l o f f i c i a l s to

a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r preference once a coop erative undertaking commences?
Along the cooperation continuum th e re e x i s t varying degrees o f
voice and e x i t op tions.

I f community o f f i c i a l s

choose to have t h e i r

own department, they w i l l have numerous chances to have constant in p u t
in to the type o f p o lic e a c t i v i t i e s performed and the way they are
performed.

I f e x e rc is in g t h e i r voice (command) option f a i l s to achieve

the desired o u tp u t, they can e x i t from the s i t u a t i o n by f i r i n g the
p o lic e c h ie f or any o th e r department personnel.

I f community o f f i c i a l s

choose to p a r t ic ip a t e in a complete c o n s o lid a tio n o f t h e i r p o lic e
department ( e . g . , m etrop olitan p o lic e force such as operates in Toronto,
Canada), they may s t i l l

have occasion to e x e rc is e t h e i r voice option

a r t i c u l a t i n g t h e i r preferences.
w i l l be more d i f f i c u l t .

But under the merger arrangement, e x i t

Very l i t t l e

is known on how a community secedes

40
from a m e tro p o litan p o lic e department to s t a r t i t s own department.
Can i t be done by the lo cal o f f i c i a l s o f the seceding community passing
a r e s o lu tio n or must the o th e r communities in the m e tro p o lita n system
also agree to i t ? ^

F u rth e r , how e f f e c t i v e is the voice option once
s

the e x i t option is no longer a v a ila b le ?
C ontracting is a type o f c o n s o lid a tio n o f f e r in g both the voice
as w ell as the e x i t o p tio n .

There are numerous examples o f the

e ffe c tiv e n e s s o f the voice o p tio n .

In M ichigan, Genesee Township

contracts w ith the Genesee County s h e r i f f .

A f t e r c o n tra c tin g had begun,

the s upervisor noticed t r a f f i c speeding along a given s tr e tc h o f road.
He mentioned i t to the s h e r i f f ' s li e u t e n a n t and the next day he noticed
one o f his contracted p a tro ls m onitoring t r a f f i c .

In Los Angeles

County, C a l i f o r n i a , the s h e r i f f p r e fe rr e d t h a t only two-man p a tro l
units should o p erate; but as the cost o f contracted p a tro l s e rv ic e
began to in c re a s e , he was forced by the c o n tra c tin g communities to
begin supplying one-man p a tro l

u n its .

15

One thin g which can make the voice option e f f e c t i v e is f o r lo ca l
o f f i c i a l s to know what other s h e r i f f s are w i l l i n g to supply to c o n tra c ­
t in g communities.

I t is easy f o r lo c a l o f f i c i a l s , who must c o n tra c t

w ith t h e i r lo ca l s h e r i f f , to be t o l d t h a t in the name o f "good p ro fe s ­
sional law enforcement" only a c e r t a in type o f s e rv ic e is p o s s ib le .
Some voice leverage is gained when the c o n tra c tin g operations o f o th e r
s h e r if f s are known.

14
15

I f a community is annexed in to a l a r g e r community, how does i t become
unannexed?
"The Impact o f Contract Services Arrangements on the Los Angeles
S h e r i f f ' s Department and Law-Enforcement Services in Los Angeles
County", John J. K i r l i n , Public P o l i c y , V o l. X X I, F a l l , 1973, p. 562.

41
F u rth e r, the voice option can be made more productive i f t h e r e is
a f e a s ib le e x i t o p t i o n . ^

For a lo ca l community the cost of e x i t , when

c a n c e llin g the c o n t r a c t , is e it h e r s t a r t i n g a lo ca l department or con­
t r a c t i n g with another community.

The e x i t cost f o r a community with

i t s own department is f i r i n g the p o lic e c h i e f and h i r i n g a new c h i e f o r
c o n tra c tin g with some e n t i t y f o r the desired p o lic e s e r v ic e .

The e x i t

cost from a merger can be p r o h ib i t i v e in t h a t no e x i t option may e x i s t .
Several things a f f e c t the cost o f e x i t under each i n s t i t u t i o n a l
arrangement.

17

F i r s t is the cost o f breaking th e agreement which f o r

f i r i n g a p o lic e c h i e f might be unemployment compensation.
c o n tra c tin g in M ichigan, a l l

For most

t h a t is required is t h i r t y to s ix t y days

advance n o tic e plus the s t a r t up costs o f some a l t e r n a t i v e .
merger, d is s o lv in g the con s o lid a tio n is expensive.

For

P lu s, th e re is the

p o te n tia l f o r some loss o f p o lic e coverage when c a n c e llin g a c o n tr a c t
with the s h e r i f f o r looking f o r a new p o lic e c h i e f .

OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS AND THE OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF A COLLECTIVE GOOD
Many communities in Michigan pay f o r p a tro l services from the
s t a t e , the county, and t h e i r own lo ca l department.

The question in

focus is how might a lo c a l community not re ce iv e i t s optimum amount o f

16

In E x i t , Voice and L o y a lt y , A lb e r t 0. Hirschman, (Harvard U n iv e r s ity
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1 9 7 0 ), a p r iv a t e market s i t u a t i o n is
described where consumers, discontented with the d e t e r io r a t io n o f a
product, e x i t from the market r a th e r than a r t i c u l a t e to the producer
t h e i r s p e c if ic d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .
Hirschman deals with a pareto b e t t e r
move ( i . e . , no one lik e s a d e te r io r a te d p ro d u c t).
But many times f ir m s ,
as w ell as governments, make changes in order to acquire a d i f f e r e n t
p o rtio n o f the market. This change may in f a c t a lie n a t e another
p o rtio n o f the market. Voice, w ithout the option o f e x i t w i l l , l i k e l y ,
f a l l on deaf ears.

^ F o r the community o f f i c i a l s who had never before had t h e i r own d e p a r t ­
ment and found c o n tra c tin g u n s a t is f a c t o r y , they have a b e t t e r idea
o f the type o f p o lic e s e rv ic e they wish to provide t h e i r c i t i z e n s .
This in form atio n was gained w ithout in c u rrin g the r is k o f in v e s tin g
in t h e i r own p o lic e department.

42
county patrol services even though an optimum amount is produced a t
the county l e v e l .

Optimum amount is defined to be t h a t le v e l

where the cost and

b e n e f it

marginal u n it are equal.

o f output

(as perceived by lo ca l o f f i c i a l s ) o f the

For t h i s a n a ly s is , the u n it o f output is
»

minute o f response

time but the more in te rm e d ia te output i n d i c a t o r ,

number o f hours o f

p a t r o l , could be used e q u a lly w e l l .

When discussing optimal production i t is c r i t i c a l
optimal f o r whom.

to s p e c ify

This s ection w i l l show t h a t a county optimum may

not be optimal f o r the communities which l i e

in s id e the county.

Because

o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the county-wide s e r v ic e , some communities may
re c e iv e a surplus o f the s e rv ic e (surplus r e l a t i v e to what the communi­
t ie s are w i l l i n g to buy a t p r e v a ilin g c o s t s ) , others w i l l
optimal amount, and s t i l l
le r a b ly low.

others w i l l

r e c e iv e the

re ce iv e a le v e l which is i n t o l -

The l a t t e r group o f communities w i l l attempt through con­

t r a c t i n g o r having t h e i r own department to achieve t h e i r optimal amount.
From the county p e rs p e c tiv e , th is could mean an over-productio n o f
p a tro l s e rv ic e s .

This w i l l be shown in the fo llo w in g a n a ly s is .

Consider a county with only two communities, v i l l a g e A and township
B.

Both communities d e s ire low mean response tim e ; and f o r each

community th e re is an inverse r e la t io n s h ip between the number o f p a tro l
hours and minutes o f response tim e .

Figure 2 shows the r e la t io n s h ip

between p a tro l hours and response tim e .

Due to exogenous fa c to rs such

as la rg e geographical a re a , bad roads, e t c . , any le v e l o f p a tro l hours
in B w i l l produce a higher response time than in A.

Given t h is s i t u a ­

t i o n , the county s h e r i f f must a llo c a t e a given number o f p a tro l hours
to A and B.

43

Figure 2-2

Number of
Patro l Hours
Per Capita
Per Week
v
X

Production R e la tio n Between Number o f P a tro l Hours and
Minutes o f Response Time

\

\
V

\

,c

—

-

-

-

^
r

^

B
' i B

Z
I

o

j

10

15

I

Township B

j

V illa g e A

20
Minutes o f Mean
Response Time

44
There are th re e possib le d ecisio n rules the s h e r i f f can use in
a llo c a t i n g the stock o f p a tro l hours.

They are in p u t e q u a li z a t io n ,

output e q u a li z a t io n , o r county-wide m in im iza tio n o f response tim e.
In p u t e q u a lit y says t h a t each community w i l l

re ce iv e the same
>

number o f p a tro l hours.

But i f OX number o f p a tro l hours are a l l o ­

cated to v i l l a g e A and township B, th-en A w i l l

have a mean response

time o f 10 minutes and B w i l l have a 20 minute mean response tim e.
Output e q u a liz a tio n says t h a t p a tro l hours w i l l be a llo c a te d such t h a t
each community has the same mean response tim e .

I f 15 minutes was the

goal f o r each community, more p a tro l hours (0Y) w i l l

be required f o r

B than f o r A ( 0 Z ) .
Since the s h e r i f f is a county e le c te d o f f i c i a l , he fe e ls in c e n tiv e
to u t i l i z e the t h i r d a l l o c a t i v e r u le which is to minimize the countywide mean response tim e .

To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s , i t is h e lp fu l to use a

production p o s s i b i l i t y curve which is shown in Figure 3 and is convex
1O
to the o r i g i n .
The production p o s s i b i l i t y curve shows the d i f f e r e n t
combinations o f mean response times in A and B given the number o f
p a tro l hours a v a i la b le to be a llo c a t e d .

Also shown in Figure 3 are

equal s a t i s f a c t i o n curves ( d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n c u rv e s ).

The s a t is f a c t io n

in t h is example is equal le v e ls o f county-wide mean response tim e , which
means t h a t the s h e r i f f would be e q u a lly s a t i s f i e d a t any p o in t on the
same in d if f e r e n c e curve.

The c lo s e r the curves are to the o r i g i n , the

lower the county-wide mean response tim e and thus the higher the le v e l
o f s a t i s f a c t i o n f o r the s h e r i f f .

18

19

The production p o s s i b i l i t y curve is convex to the o r i g i n because i f
a l l p a tro l hours were a llo c a te d to A, A's response time would approach
z e r o , but not reach i t and B's response time would approach i n f i n i t y .
This production p o s s i b i l i t y curve also r e f l e c t s dim inishing marginal
p r o d u c t iv it y .
Response time in B f a l l s by in c r e a s in g ly small amounts
(continued)

45

Figure 2-3

Minutes of
Mean Response
Time in
V illag e A

Production P o s s ib ility Curve and Indifference Map
For a County S h e riff

j
j
t

(C,D)

15

1 0 ________

i
wv
A ....

0

15

1I, I
4 *3

l 2 *1

20

Minutes of Mean Response Time
In Township B

46
The output and input e q u a lit y points o f Figure 2 a re i d e n t i f i e d
on the production p o s s i b i l i t y curve P - ^
tiv e ly .

as (C,D) and ( A , B ) , respec­

From the f ig u r e the marginal r a t e o f s u b s t it u t io n o f one

minute o f response time in B is worth th re e minutes in A.

S ta rtin g

a t p o in t (C ,D ), i f p a tro l resources are switched from B to A, t h a t mean
response time in

A w i l l f a l l by th re e

w i l l increase by only one minute.

minutes w h ile response time in B

As long as the f a l l

in response tim e

in A is g r e a te r than the increase in response tim e in B, the county-wide
mean w i l l

continue to f a l l

and the s h e r i f f w i l l be a b le to reach

successively higher le v e ls o f s a t i s f a c t i o n

(low er county-wide mean

response tim es) by moving down the curve from p o in t (C ,D ).

The s h e r i f f

w i l l stop r e a llo c a tin g his fix e d number o f p a tro l hours a t the p o in t
o f tangency between the in d if f e r e n c e curve Ig and the production
p o s s i b i l i t y curve.

Beyond t h is p o in t t r a n s f e r o f p a tr o l from B to A

w i l l cause response time in B to increase more than the f a l l
In Chapter V the

in

response time in

A.

general p a tro l o f a county s h e r i f f

w i l l be examined

to see which o f the th re e a l l o c a t i v e ru le s he employs

and the impact i t has on his op p o rtu n ity to c o n tr a c t.
Several s h e r i f f s have in d ic a te d they would p r e f e r a f l a t countywide m illa g e earmarked f o r pro v is io n o f county-wide (except la r g e c i t i e s )
p a tro l s e rv ic e r a th e r than c o n tra c tin g w ith several lo c a l communities

18
19

(Continued)

as p a tro l hours are a llo c a te d from A to B.

The equal s a t is f a c t io n curves are s t r a i g h t lin e s because the countywide mean response time is a l i n e a r combination o f the response times
in the two communities. The curves would be concave i f the surface
was not county-wide mean response time but instead p o l i t i c a l s a t i s ­
f a c tio n to the s h e r i f f .
I f the equal s a t i s f a c t i o n curves were concave,
t h is would r e f l e c t t h a t the s h e r i f f is more s a t i s f i e d ( d i s s a t i s f i e d )
when the response time o f one community decreases (in cre a se s ) r e l a t i v e
to the o th e r community.

47
f o r the "extra" le v e l o f s e r v ic e .

20

Assume a lo c a l community were to

pay an equal increment in county taxes under the s h e r i f f ' s mi 11 age as
they would pay to the s h e r i f f under c o n tr a c t.

With the c o n tra c t they

could s p e c ify when the p a tr o ls would be in t h e i r community and thus
>

control response tim e.
have l i t t l e
s h e riff.

With the s h e r i f f ' s m ill a g e , lo ca l o f f i c i a l s

c ontrol over which a l l o c a t i v e d ecisio n r u le is used by the

Even i f they could c ontrol the decisio n r u l e , the in fo rm a tio n

on how each r u le would a f f e c t t h e i r community would be very c o s t ly to
o b ta in .

THE OVERPRODUCTION TRAP
Overproduction o f p a tro l hours can r e s u l t in the county even i f
the optimal amount had been o r i g i n a l l y produced.

This can r e s u l t

because the s h e r i f f does not d i s t r i b u t e his p a tro l serv ic e s such t h a t
marginal value o f each increment o f p a tro l s e rv ic e is equal in a l l
the communities.
To show how overproduction can occur, we re tu rn to our two
community county w ith each community having a demand f o r p a tro l serv ic e s
as seen in Figure 4.

Since p a tro l hours are a good f o r which consumers

can be excluded, we can add the two demand curves h o r i z o n t a l l y and
construct a demand f o r p a tro l hours f o r the e n t i r e county.
on the h o riz o n ta l axis is d i f f e r e n t than on Figure 1 . )

(The output

Assume t h a t we

are dealing w ith a constant cost in d u s try and t h a t both A and B choose
not to have t h e i r own department or c o n tra c t w ith the s h e r i f f , but

20

One reason t h a t some s h e r i f f s would l i k e a s e t m illa g e f o r the opera­
tio n o f the s h e r i f f ' s department is t h a t they would become com pletely
independent o f the county commissioners f o r budgetary a f f a i r s .
Another
reason f o r the m illa g e is t h e i r budget woyld grow a u to m a tic a lly as
the value o f the property in t h e i r county a p p re c ia te d .

48

Figure 2-4

Demands by Communities A and B fo r Patrol Hours

Dr
°Agg.

D
A

\

\

\
s

M

MC

S

0

Y'

X

(OX+Y'Y)

Number of Patrol Hours
Demanded

49
instead choose to r e ly upon the s h e r i f f f o r t h e i r p a tro l hours.
Through in t e r a c t in g with the county commissioners the s h e r i f f is able
to achieve a budget which allows f o r the production o f OX number o f
p atrol hours.

Since the mechanism leading to the production o f the

county-wide optimal output is unknown, i t should be assumed f o r th is
example t h a t the optimal was produced.
The question facing the s h e r i f f now is how to d i s t r i b u t e output
le v e l OX.

Assume t h a t the s h e r i f f d i s t r ib u t e s OY1 to B and Y'X to A

which means t h a t B receives less than i t s optimal and A receives more
(Y'X > O Z).

(lie are assuming t h a t the s h e r i f f is able to perceive

the county optimal le v e l o f output but is unable to know the optimal
le v e ls o f each community.)

I f B's o f f i c i a l s

are unable to convince

the s h e r i f f t h a t p a tro l hours should be r e a llo c a te d from A to B, then
they can e i t h e r do w ith o u t t h e i r optimal l e v e l , s t a r t t h e i r own d e p a r t­
ment, o r c o n tra c t with the s h e r i f f f o r a higher l e v e l .

Assuming t h a t

B takes one o f the l a t t e r two o p tio n s , o f f i c i a l s of B would be in t e r e s te d
in o b ta in in g Y'Y more p a tro l hours.

Once t h is happens the t o t a l amount

o f p a tro l s e rv ic e produced is OX plus Y'Y.

N otice t h a t B's demand curve

f o r p a tro l hours has not changed and consequently the county a g gregative
demand curve does not change y e t more than the optimal p a tr o l hours is
being produced.

Total cost f o r the p a tro l le v e l is 0MN(0X+Y'Y) w h ile

t o t a l b e n e f it ( i f i t could be measured in d o l l a r amounts) would be
0ST(0X+Y'Y).

The overproduction becomes more serious i f ,

as B obtains

more p a tro l s e rv ic e through c o n tra c tin g o r t h e i r own departm ent, the
s h e r i f f r e a llo c a te s p a tro l OY' away from B to A reasoning t h a t since
B now has i t s own coverage and the s h e r i f f can give more a t t e n t io n to
A where need is perceived to be g r e a t e r .

50
Concluding, overproduction can r e s u l t through the m a l - d i s t r i b u t i o n
o f the e x is t in g stock o f p a tro l hours.

This model does not com pletely

e x p la in why some communities re c e iv e p a tro l services from th re e d i f f e r e n t
o rg a n izatio n s ( s t a t e , county and l o c a l ) .

I t is very conceivable t h a t
j

the s h e r i f f was unable to ob tain a budget from the county commissioners
which enabled the production of OX p a tro l hours i n i t i a l l y .

In t h i s

event the p r i o r i t i e s o f the county commissioners were in c o n f l i c t w ith
those o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s , and a lo ca l department would begin or con­
t r a c t i n g would e x is t to account f o r the d e fic ie n c y between what the
s h e r i f f was able to produce and the aggregate county-wide demand f o r
patrol s e r v i c e s . ^
The p o lic y im p lic a tio n which t h is has f o r s h e r i f f s

is t h a t they

can do much to stem the growth o f new departments i f they in f a c t
choose to a llo c a t e t h e i r p a tro ls such t h a t output e q u a liz a t io n r e s u lt s
(equal response time in a l l communities) r a t h e r than t r y i n g to minimize
the county-wide mean response tim e.

FISCAL EQUIVALENCE
Consolidation and d e c e n t r a liz a t io n have one th in g in common.
the production and f in a n c i a l
the same le v e l o f government.

Both

(p r o v is io n ) r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are found a t
Contracting o f f e r s the o p p o rtu n ity f o r

lo c a l le v e ls to assume f in a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r prov id ing p a tro l
s e rv ic e w ith production remaining a t a more aggregative le v e l

21

l i k e the

Some people contend t h a t not a l l p a tro l hours are homogeneous. A
p a tro l hour can be d i f f e r e n t because o f the le v e l o f education o f the
p a tro l o f f i c e r s . A p a tro l can also be d i f f e r e n t because th e re are two
r a th e r than one o f f i c e r in the car or because some o f f i c e r s a re more
empathetic than o th e rs . A ls o , response time is only one output o f a
p a tro l hour.
Some o f f i c i a l s may fe e l t h a t t r a f f i c m onitoring should
be given more weight r e l a t i v e to responding to com plaints.
I f homo­
gen e ity o f p a tro l hours is im p o rta n t, then aggregating along the
h o riz o n ta l axis as was done in Figure 4 is no longer p o s s ib le .

51
county.

I t is r e le v a n t to examine how the boundary o f the producing

u n it meshes with the u n it responsible f o r f in a n c in g .
Mancur Olson examines th re e possib le r e la tio n s h ip s between the
boundary o f a j o i n t impact good and the boundary o f the governmental
u n it fin a n c in g the good.

22

1
F i r s t , the " c o l l e c t i v e good reaches beyond

the boundaries o f the government t h a t provides i t . "

In t h is case a

p o s itiv e e x t e r n a l i t y e x is ts which cannot be captured by the provid ing
u n it and " i t tends to carry on i t s a c t i v i t y a t a less than Pareto
optimal l e v e l . "

As an example, Putnam Township in Livin g s to n County

decided not to sign a new c o n tra c t w ith the county s h e r i f f once the
federal funds, which were used to fin a n c e the f i r s t c o n t r a c t , e x p ire d .
Two reasons f o r t h is decision e x i s t .

F i r s t , lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

increasing local taxes was p o l i t i c a l l y an im p o s s i b i l i t y .

f e l t th a t

Second,

Hamburg Township, on i t s western b o rd er, was in cre a s in g the number o f
patrol hours purchased from the s h e r i f f ; and the v i l l a g e o f Pickney,
ly in g w ith in Putnam Township, has i t s own p o lic e department.
p o lic e operations respond to "emergencies" in Putnam Township.

Both
While

some o f Putnam's needs were met by the two communities, these needs
were not considered when deciding the production le v e l each was to
produce.

When a l l

three un its are considered in t o t a l , there is l i k e l y

an under-production o f the s e rv ic e .

22

23

23

"The P r in c ip le o f 'F is c a l E qu iva le n c e ':
The D iv is io n o f Responsibi­
l i t i e s Among D if f e r e n t Levels o f Government", Mancur Olson, J r . ,
American Economic Review, May, 1969, V ol. L IX , No. 2 , pp. 482-485.
I t is unknown what Putnam o f f i c i a l s would be w i l l i n g to pay f o r th is
s e rv ic e i f they were forced to pay.
( I t is known t h a t they were
u n w illin g to r a is e $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 .) Assume t h a t they were w i l l i n g to pay
each u n it $2,500 or lose the s e rv ic e ; i t is not known whether th is
$5,000 amount would cause p a tro l s e rv ic e to in c re a s e .
The e l a s t i c i t y
o f supply is dependent upon the lumpiness o f p a tro l production and
whether local o f f i c i a l s o f Putnam and Hamburg want to in c re m e n ta lly
increase p a tro l production.

52
A second r e la t io n s h ip is t h a t "the c o l l e c t i v e good reaches only
a p a r t o f the constituency t h a t provides i t .
e f f o r t is made to i n t e r n a l i z e a l l
c o n s o lid a tio n .

24

This can occur when an

e x t e r n a l i t i e s through some type o f

Consider the case where a sparsely populated p o rtio n
»

o f a county receives less than the le v e l of p a tro l serv ic e s i t needs.
Being unable to fo rc e the s h e r i f f in t o in creasing the road p a tro l
s e rv ic e , i t can e i t h e r do w it h o u t , s t a r t i t s own department, o r c o n tra c t
f o r the needed s e rv ic e w ith the s h e r i f f .

This can lead to an o v e r­

production o f p a tro l services i f each u n s a tis fie d lo ca l community is
allowed to remedy i t s own s i t u a t i o n .

This was discussed in more d e t a il

in the previous s e c tio n .
A t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y is where "the boundaries o f the c o l l e c t i v e
good are the same as those o f the j u r i s d i c t i o n t h a t provides i t . "

In

th is case, there is a match between those who pay f o r the good and
those who receive the b e n e f it s .

Olson c a lls t h is " f i s c a l e q u iva len ce ."

This is approached when a lo c a l community finances i t s own p o lic e
department or i f a community contracts with the s h e r i f f .

But in the

case o f c o n tr a c tin g , the s it u a t io n is not c le a r and d e f i n i t i v e .

24

If

Olson contends t h a t i f taxes used to finance the a c t i v i t y are raised
throughout the e n t i r e u n i t , then "even a c o l l e c t i v e good, which brings
gains much g re a te r than i t s c o s ts , w i l l s t i l l c re a te more losers
than g a in e rs ."
I t is unclear what Olson means.
I f b e n e fits exceed
costs the GNP increases and th e re is a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n from those taxed
to those who re c e iv e .
I f Olson means t h a t the number o f people
paying is g r e a te r than the number b e n e fite d (ig n o rin g the per c a p ita
cost and b e n e f its ) then his statement is incomplete.
Consider a
sparsely s e t tl e d po rtion o f a county r e c e iv in g zero le v e l o f a countywide s e rv ic e which i t helped fin a n c e . The number o f gainers can
exceed the number o f losers q u ite e a s i l y . A t h i r d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is
t h a t the net b e n e fits are not g re a t enough to s u f f i c i e n t l y compensate
the losers f o r t h e i r net lo s s , but t h is outcome is f a r from obvious.

53
the s h e r i f f charges a p ric e which is less than the cost o f p a tro ls
provided, the second r e la tio n s h ip e x is ts where the general county
taxpayer pays f o r a po rtion o f the contracted p a tro ls received by a
lo cal community.

This w i l l be f u r t h e r examined when the s h e r i f f ' s
i

c o n tra c t prices are compared to the costs o f p a tro l production.
Fiscal equivalence is not n e c e s s a rily the goal o f the s h e r i f f or
local o f f i c i a l s .

The next sectio n discusses the d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s

as the s h e r i f f and the lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

i n t e r a c t in attem pting to meet

county as w ell as lo ca l needs.

POTENTIAL PURCHASES OF INCREMENTAL OUTPUT
Local o f f i c i a l s o fte n speak about naying th re e times f o r p a tro l
services ( s t a t e , county and l o c a l ) .

This im plies t h a t when lo ca l

o f f i c i a l s s t a r t t h e i r own p o lic e department o r c o n tra c t w ith the s h e r i f f ,
t h a t they loose r a th e r than augment the p a tro l s e rv ic e supplied by the
s t a t e and county s h e r i f f .

The question which w i l l

be explored in t h i s

s ection is i f a community does not re c e iv e an adequate number o f p a tro l
hours from the s h e r i f f , can i t purchase th e incremental amount needed
to account f o r the d e fic ie n c y between what they are re c e iv in g and what
they wish to re ce iv e or do they loose what they were r e c e iv in g and end
up producing a l l

t h e i r needed p a tro l hours?

P a tro l hours supplied by the s h e r i f f are not e n t i r e l y incom patible
goods; they have j o i n t impact c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

C itiz e n s throughout the

county, f o r in s ta n c e , have some i n t e r e s t in p a tro l services in township A
should they ever be needed when v i s i t i n g o r t r a v e li n g through A.

C itiz e n s

o f township A also have demand f o r p a tro l hours; but since they l i v e
t h e r e , t h e i r demand is g r e a t e r than the county-wide demand.

54
In Figure 5 the demand which the e n t i r e county has f o r s h e r i f f
patrol hours in township A is shown by Dcounty
hours by township residents ( D )
a

is g r e a te r .

The demand f o r p a tro l
The s h e r i f f is w i l l i n g

to supply output le v e l OA to the township and woyld supply more only
»

i f MC o f patrol hours f a l l s or i f the county-wide demand curve in cre a s es .
Township A desires output le v e l OB.

There are d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i e s as

township A attempts to obtain t h e i r optimal le v e l o f o u tp u t.

F irs t,

the township o f f i c i a l s may contend th a t output le v e l OB is owed to
them because they are county taxpayers.

Since the lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

probably do not know how OB per c a p ita compares to the le v e l

received

by oth e r communities, the s h e r i f f can say t h a t he is g iv in g them t h e i r
" f a i r share" which is OA.

I f t h a t f a i l s to s a t i s f y lo c a l o f f i c i a l s ,

the s h e r i f f can say t h a t the county commissioners refused his budget
request which would have allowed him to increase the amount o f road
p a tro l he could give them.

Attempting to coerce the s h e r i f f in to

providing more road p a tro l is not l i k e l y to succeed unless the lo c a l
community organizes with other communities with s i m i l a r problems o r
i f the complaining community should happen to hold a m a jo r ity o f the
e le c t o r a t e .

25

A second option is f o r the lo cal community to s t a r t i t s own
department in order to obtain an increase o f AB in p a tro l s e r v ic e .
There are several problems with t h is s t r a t e g y .

F i r s t , a ttem pting to

b u ild on output le v e l OA is d i f f i c u l t because lo ca l o f f i c i a l s do not
know when OA w i l l be d e liv e r e d .

25

Many s h e r if f s have t h e i r general

A lo c a l community may not hold a m a jo r ity o f the e le c t o r a t e but may
have some c lo u t i f the s h e r i f f believes the lo c a l community contains
the marginal votes necessary to win in a close e l e c t io n .

55

Figure 2-5

Demand fo r Patrol Hours in Community A by County
And Community A

Aqg.

County

M

P.,
c

D

A

N

r

MC

i

0

B

Number of Weekly Patrol Hours

56
patro ls randomly pass through d i f f e r e n t communities.

Consequently,

local o f f i c i a l s may aim f o r producing a l l o f OB and have some double
coverage r a th e r than run the r is k o f producing only AB and being w ith o u t
coverage f o r some p o rtio n o f the day o r n ig h t .

A second problem is t h a t
!
local o f f i c i a l s do not know, nor can they c o n t r o l , what the s h e r i f f w i l l

do w ith output OA a f t e r a lo ca l community e i t h e r s t a r t s
ment or c o n tra c ts .

The s h e r i f f may decide t h a t since the lo c a l community

has some coverage, he w i l l
the county.

26

i t s own d e p a r t­

take OA and g ive i t to another p o rtio n o f

For these two reasons local communities are l i k e l y to

aim f o r producing OB le vels r a th e r than AB.
The t h i r d option is f o r the township to c o n tra c t f o r the needed
patrol services with the s h e r i f f .

The s h e r i f f and the township o f f i ­

c ia ls e n te r in to a bargained tra n s a c tio n and the outcome, in terms o f
p ric e charged and q u a n tity s o ld , is d i f f i c u l t to p r e d ic t .

Several o f

the possible combi nations are l i s t e d below.
Combination 1 :

S h e r i f f refuses to s e l l output AB and instead

o ffe rs to s e l l output OB to township A a t p r ic e OP^.

The township

pays a t o t a l sum to the s h e r i f f o f OP^NB; and the s h e r i f f takes p a tro ls
OA and r e d is t r ib u t e s them to another p o rtio n o f the county.

An

example o f th is is the Wayne County s h e r i f f c o n tra c tin g with the c i t y
o f Romulus.

When Romulus was a township, i t received OA le v e l o f

s e rvice from the s h e r i f f but l o s t t h is when i t became a c i t y .

A fte r

an a b o rtiv e e f f o r t to have i t s own department, Romulus o f f i c i a l s

One s h e r i f f t o l d a local community which was contemplating s t a r t i n g
t h e i r own department t h a t he would deny them any general p a tro l
services unless they contracted with him.

57
contracted with the s h e r i f f f o r the le v e l o f p a tro l serv ic e s they
needed which was OB.

The s h e r i f f charges them a p ric e which a p p ro x i-

mates very c lo s e ly the actual cost of o p e ra tio n .

27

The s h e r i f f provides

no general road p a tro l s e rv ic e (road p a tro l funded from the county
»

general fund) because the Wayne County Commissioners have the p o lic y
t h a t once a p o l i t i c a l

u n it becomes an incorporated c i t y , they have

r e s p o n s ib ili t y f o r a l l
Combination 2 :
r a th e r than AB.

28

road p a tro l s e rv ic e .

The s h e r i f f s e lls to township A output le v e l AC
This combination has the s h e r i f f s e l l i n g more than

the a d d itio n a l amount to A because he sees an o p p o rtu n ity , through
c o n tr a c tin g , to provide higher le v e ls o f s e rv ic e to the n o n-contracting
p o rtio n o f the county; and he w i l l
s e rv ic e l e v e l .

use increment BC to provide th is

The BC increment can be observed in c o n tra c tin g opera­

tions by the s h e r i f f reserving the r i g h t to dispatch o u tside the cont r a t i n g community and by having p a r t o f the time purchased by the
c o n tra c tin g community be spent in t r a n s i t to and from the s h e r i f f ' s
o ffic e .

During the t r a n s i t time non-contracting communities receive

higher le v e ls o f p a tro l s e rv ic e .
I f the county pays i t s marginal v a lu a tio n , then i t c o n trib u te s
OPg and A c o n trib u te s P3 P^-

27

But th e re are o th e r p r ic in g p o s s i b i l i t i e s

The r e la t io n s h ip between the actual costs o f a c o n tra c tin g operation
and the p r ic e the s h e r i f f chooses to charge w i l l be discussed more
f u l l y l a t e r on in the study f o r th is and a l l oth e r examples in t h is
s e c tio n .

po

A s h e r i f f may refuse to s e l l some le v e l o f s e rv ic e because he may
fe e l the le v e l is too small to have any impact or because the le v e l
is so small t h a t i t is d i f f i c u l t f o r the s h e r i f f to produce. Many
s h e r if f s f in d i t d i f f i c u l t to produce less than 40 hours o f p a tro l
s e rv ic e per week due to the d i f f i c u l t y o f h ir in g p a r t- t im e personnel.
(This assumes t h a t they are also u n w illin g to take from t h e i r general
p a tro l in order to s t a f f the c o n t r a c t .)

58
other than each u n it o f government paying i t s marginal v a lu a tio n .

For

in stance, i f the county commissioners play an a c tiv e r o le in the
p r ic in g , they may compel the s h e r i f f to charge p r ic e OP^ f o r output AB
and

f o r output BC.

On the o th e r hand, i f the s h e r i f f is f a i r l y
i

powerful r e l a t i v e to the county commissioners, he may be able to get
them to agree to charging P^P^ f o r output AC.
Combination 3 :

The s h e r i f f s e l l s output OB to A and charges

P-jP^ with the county general fund paying OP^.

The s h e r i f f j u s t i f i e s

th is by contending t h a t the p r ic e break is due A because A pays county
taxes.
OA.

The c r i t i c a l question is what happens to general p a tro l s e rv ic e

I f OA is r e d is t r ib u t e d to oth e r parts o f the county, then the

county commissioners and lo ca l o f f i c i a l s must decide i f re c ta n g le RMNS
equals what the s h e r i f f owes A due to A paying county ta x e s .

I f OA

general p a tro l s e rv ic e is given to A, then tr y in g to j u s t i f y the below
cost p r ic e , because A pays county ta x e s , c a r r ie s less w eig ht.

Most

co n tra c tin g in Michigan seems to be s i m i l a r to combination 3 w ith some
s h e r if f s r e d i s t r i b u t i n g OA to o th e r parts o f the county and others
continuing to give OA to the c o n tra c tin g community.

29

CONCLUSIONS
A boundary problem is c e n tra l to the issue o f which i n s t i t u t i o n a l
a l t e r n a t i v e lo cal o f f i c i a l s
p atrol s e rv ic e s .

u t i l i z e to obtain t h e i r desired le v e l o f

A boundary problem e x is ts when the p o l i t i c a l

boundary o f a governmental u n it producing a s e rv ic e is not the same
as the boundary o f the consuming u n i t .

Several r e s u lts may occur.

F i r s t , th e re may be an underproduction o f the good o r s e rv ic e in

29

Combination 3 could have been done with output AC instead o f AB
and the discussion would remain e s s e n t i a lly the same.

59
question (overproduction f o r a negative good).

Second, i f the b e n e fits

and costs are in t e r n a li z e d in a very heterogeneous community, then
groups in t e r n a l to the community with preferences extreme from the mean
o f the community may not re c e iv e the type o f s e rv ic e d e s ire d .
)
Contracting was placed in between independent a c tio n and complete

c onsolidatio n on a cooperation continuum.

The p o in t was made t h a t

contra c tin g was a type o f v o r t ic a l coordin a tio n which o f f e r s to a l l
p a rtie s both the options of voice (command) and e x i t .

I f lo c a l o f f i ­

c i a l s , c o n tra c tin g with a s h e r i f f , are unhappy about the p o lic e s e rv ic e
they are r e c e iv in g , they can exerc is e t h e i r voice (command o p tio n ) ;
and i f i t

fa ils

to provide the desired r e s u l t s , the lo ca l o f f i c i a l s

can cancel the c o n tra c t and e x i t from the coop era tiv e arrangement.
Three a l l o c a t i v e decisio n rules which the s h e r i f f could use in
the areal d i s t r i b u t i o n o f general p a tro l services were discussed.

The

f i r s t was input e q u a liz a tio n where each community receives the same
le v e l o f p a tro l s e rv ic e s ; the second was output e q u a liz a t io n where
each community receives the same le v e l o f output (response tim e ) ; and
t h i r d is the m inim ization o f the county-wide mean response tim e .

If

a community is unable to re c e iv e i t s optimum le v e l o f p a tro l s e rv ic e
because the a l l o c a t i v e d ecisio n r u le does not fa v o r them, then an
opportunity e x is ts f o r the s h e r i f f to s e l l t h a t p a r t i c u l a r community
a higher le v e l o f s e rv ic e through c o n tr a c tin g .
in d e t a il

This w i l l be explored

in Chapter V.

F i n a l l y , the question o f f i s c a l equivalence was ra is e d and
r e la te d to the s h e r i f f ' s a llo c a t i o n o f general p a t r o l .
tions were discussed.

Three combina­

F i r s t , the s h e r i f f can charge a c o n tra c t p ric e

equal to the costs o f meeting the co n tra c tu a l o b lig a tio n and provide

60
no general p a tro l to the c o n tra c tin g community.

Second, the s h e r i f f

can charge a c o n tra c t p r ic e which is less than costs and s e l l more than
is desired by the c o n tra c tin g community using the e x tra p a tro l services
to provide s e rv ic e to the n o n-contracting p o rtio n o f the county. T h ir d ,
*'
I
the s h e r i f f s e lls the t o t a l desired le v e l o f p a tro l s e rv ic e to the
c o n tra c tin g community but a t a p r ic e which is less than c osts.

The

s h e r i f f is l i k e l y to j u s t i f y the p ric e being less than costs s t a tin g
t h a t he owes the c o n tra c tin g community a p r ic e concession because o f
the county taxes they pay.

The question then becomes what happens to

the le v e l o f general p a tro l services which the community received before
c o n tra c tin g .

I f i t is a llo c a te d to n o n-contracting portions o f the

county, then the budgetary issue facing the county commissioners is
whether o r not the e x tra s e rv ic e going to the n o n-contracting po rtion
o f the county as a r e s u l t o f the c o n tra c t is worth the d if fe r e n c e
between the c o n tra c t p r ic e and the costs o f o p e ra tio n .
d e a lt w ith in more d e t a i l in Chapter V.

This w i l l be

CHAPTER I I I
THE BARGAIN INSTITUTION FOR PATROL SERVICES

INTRODUCTION
In Chapter I the th re e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tru c tu re s o f b a rg a in ,
a d m in is tr a tiv e , and grant were discussed.

This chapter focuses

e n t i r e l y on b a rg a in , and i t along with Chapter IV apply the s tr u c tu r e
and conduct-performance model to analyze the c o n tra c tin g arrangements
o f d iffe re n t s h e riffs .
In the s ta te o f Michigan in 1974, 30 o f the 83 county s h e r i f f s
had some type o f c o n tra c tin g arrangement with another u n it o f govern­
ment.

The map on the next page i d e n t i f i e s the counties which c o n tr a c t.

Great v a r ie t y e x is ts among the c o n tra c tin g operations even though the
commodity most o fte n traded v ia the c ontractual arrangement was p a tro l
s e rv ic e .

Six o f the s h e r if f s c o n tra c t with the U.S. Forest Service

providing p a tro l s e rv ic e to National Parks.

The remaining s h e r if f s

have some type of contractual agreement with lo cal communities.

Of

these, 20 are located in the southern h a l f o f the lower peninsula.
In Cass County during 1974 the s h e r i f f had no contracts but two local
communities contracted to gether f o r p o lic e s e rv ic e .
To apply the s tr u c tu r e and conduct-performance model , several
o f the s t r u c tu r a l conditions and conduct-performance c h a r a c te r is t ic s
need to be r e i t e r a t e d .

One s t r u c tu r a l c o nd itio n which a f f e c t s a

contra c tin g s h e r i f f ' s conduct-performance is t h a t lo ca l o f f i c i a l s

61

62

✓WUOHTOtf

I

IBARAQA

QOOIIIC

*j

"AAfluirri
ICHOOLCRAFT
\M A C K IN A C

DILTA

MICHIGAN
Q

J. _ -1- -

i<V;v>s,TJa

_

, * - jc x « « L H 0 i>
/

i

T m ont.

KALKAAKA |C«AV*AO«D| OICOOA

S h eriffs contracting with
a local government

OICCOIA

I

_________________

I
_____ i .

|cUM|0LADWIN

i

...........

I_r _ | IA »

NtWAVOOl MICOITA T iiM I L L A

I NUOLAND
TUICOLA

^MONTCALM

Counties where only local
communities have a jo in t coopera
tiv e arrangement

ALCONA

|“J5^
\A.\ \ | : ^ v y

S h e riffs contracting with
U.S. Forest Service

Ta l h n a

IaN TIiTm " 1% TIIO O

*

IOAATIOT

i«AOINAW

_!■

r''' I ' •-111^ ---

CALHOUN V* ‘ I JACKSON ^ ~ l ’» * lM 7 tN A W t T w A Y N I.‘ •
bur c n IkKALAMAZOO
a ia m a z o

j branch

Figure 3-1

|H IL l i d a l C | i t N A w i r . -

Counties with Contracting Operations

: J . M 0N ,

KjU

63
always have the option o f c ontinuing or s t a r t i n g a lo cal p o lic e
department, and t h is provides com petition to the s h e r i f f attem pting to
s e ll p a tro l s e rv ic e s .

Another s t r u c t u r a l r e la t io n s h ip is the s h e r i f f ' s

r e la t io n to his county board o f commissioners in a c q u irin g funding
i

f o r his p a tro l d i v i s io n .

One might expect t h a t the more m is e rly the

commissioners, the more disposed the s h e r i f f w i l l be to s e l l the type
and le v e l o f p a tro l services desired by lo ca l o f f i c i a l s .

Conversely,

i f the s h e r i f f is modest and f e e ls he has an adequately financed
department, he may not be w i l l i n g to s e l l any p a tro l s e r v ic e s ; o r , i f
he does s e l l , he may not be w i l l i n g to meet a l l the p a tro l needs f e l t
by lo cal o f f i c i a l s .
I attempted to disc o v e r the r e la t io n s h ip which each s h e r i f f iiad
with his county commissioners by li s t e n i n g to him describe the p a tro l
needs he f e l t his county had and the r e l a t i v e success he met when
requesting funds from the commissioners.

Many tim e s , th is in form atio n

would come in the form o f what the s h e r i f f planned to do, but in any
event the conversations did reveal something about the r e la t io n s h ip
which the s h e r i f f had with his county commissioners.

I f the s h e r i f f

was f r u s t r a t e d with his fin d in g success from the commissioners, he
might already have a high percentage o f his p a tro l d i v i s io n funded
through contracts or he might be planning to c o n tra c t e x te n s iv e ly in
the f u t u r e .

In any case i t was hypothesized t h a t t h is kind o f s h e r i f f

would be more responsive to the conduct-performance o b je c tiv e s o f
local o f f i c i a l s than a s h e r i f f who was s a t i s f i e d w ith the s iz e o f his
patrol d i v i s io n .

This s t r u c tu r a l in fo rm a tio n f o r each s h e r i f f appears

under the subheading "Future Contracting Expectations".

64
The conduct-performance v a ria b le s

( i . e . , the range over which the

product can vary) are the d i v i s i b i l i t y o f p a tro l s e rv ic e which can be
purchased, the type and amount o f re p o rtin g to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s , c ontrol
over d a ily p a tro l fu n c tio n s , ro ta te d o r permanently s ta tio n e d deputies
in the c o n tra c tin g community, and the p ric e o f the p a tro l s e rv ic e s o l d J
The fo llo w in g l i s t o f product fe a tu re s is what many lo c a l o f f i c i a l s
would l i k e to purchase from the s h e r i f f :
- - D i v i s i b i l i t y o f p a tro l s e rv ic e --L o c a l o f f i c i a l s would l i k e to
buy whatever number o f p a tro l hours they fe e l they need and can a f f o r d .
This might mean, f o r some small communities, p a tro l s e rv ic e only on
Friday and Saturday nights and perhaps only during the summer.
--R e p o rtin g to lo cal o f f i c i a l s - - L o c a l
on the a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e i r p o lic e .

o f f i c i a l s want in form atio n

Reporting to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s means

a tra n s a c tio n cost f o r the s h e r i f f ; and the more in fo rm a tio n d e s ire d ,
the higher th is p a r t i c u l a r tra n s a c tio n cost w i l l
--C o n tro l over d a ily p a tro l
functions r e fe r s to two th in g s .

f u n c t i o n - - D a i ly c ontrol over p a tro l
The f i r s t is the scheduling o f p a tr o ls

and the second is whether p a tro l w i l l
errands.

be.

be allowed to perform community

Local o f f i c i a l s want t h e i r p a tro ls to work when they fe e l

the need is the g r e a t e s t , and they also want t h e i r p a tr o ls to perform
community r e la t e d errands.
— Rotated versus permanently s ta tio n e d d e p u tie s — Many lo cal o f f i c i a l s
wish to have control over who is p o lic in g t h e i r community.

Not only

do they want to be able to s e le c t the personnel , but they want the

^Three oth e r conduct-performance v a ria b le s w i l l be discussed in Chapter V
and they are amount o f p a tro l time spent o u tside the c o n tra c tin g com­
munity, response tim e , and complaint p r i o r i t y .

65
same persons to permanently work in t h e i r community.^
-- L iq u o r inspection revenue--Local o f f i c i a l s p r e f e r to re ce iv e
the revenue received from the Michigan Liquor Commission as a r e s u l t
3

o f liq u o r inspections performed by the contracted p a t r o l.
- - P r ic e - - L o c a l o f f i c i a l s d e s ire the lowest possible p r ic e f o r p a tro l
serv ic e they purchase from the s h e r i f f .
reported f o r each s h e r i f f but i t

Not only is the c o n tra c t p ric e

is compared to the estimated v a r ia b le

costs (personnel, v e h ic le , e t c . ) o f producing the contracted p a t r o l .
appendix to Chapter I I I

The

contains a discussion on how the cost e s tim atio n

was done and the assumptions made f o r each s h e r i f f ' s c o n tra c tin g o p e ra tio n .
By using the conduct-performance c h a r a c t e r is t ic s presented in
Chapter I , two questions can be r a is e d .

F i r s t , do Michigan s h e r i f f s who

c o n tra c t s e l l p a tro l services with d i f f e r e n t conduct-performance charac­
te ris tic s ?
e x is ts ? )

(I.e .,

in the p a tro l s e rv ic e m arket, what product v a r ie t y

Second, whose p a tro l o b je c tiv e s are met - - the s h e r i f f ' s or

local o f f i c i a l s ' ?
local o f f i c i a l s '

This study did not attem pt to s y s te m a tic a lly measure
p a tro l o b je c t iv e s .

However, some local o f f i c i a l s do

obtain a package o f patrol s e rv ic e in one county t h a t is not a v a i la b le
in another.

While i t

is possible t h a t demand and a v a i l a b i l i t y always

match up, t h is seems u n lik e ly .

From the knowledge o f what some local

o f f i c i a l s o b t a in , we assemble a l i s t o f p a tro l s e rv ic e fe a tu re s

2

Some lo c a l o f f i c i a l s may value having p a tro l services performed by
d i f f e r e n t p a tro l personnel who are not f a m i l i a r with the community
or i t s c i t i z e n s .
3
Liquor insp ection revenue could go to the county and be returned to
the c o n tra c tin g community in the form o f a lower contracted p r ic e .
But many lo ca l o f f i c i a l s view th is as a source o f revenue and something
which can be lo s t
when c o n tr a c tin g , and f o r them not to fe e l th is
loss would r e q u ire t h a t lo cal o f f i c i a l s see e x a c tly how much they are
being c r e d ite d .

66
(performance c a te g o rie s ) which are demanded.

Then we can see which

counties provide these features and which counties do n o t.

In essence,

local o f f i c i a l s w ith a p a r t i c u l a r p a tro l o b je c t iv e would o r would not
obtain i t from d i f f e r e n t s h e r i f f s .
t

This chapter presents the re s u lts o f in te rv ie w s conducted with
eleven s h e r if f s concerning t h e i r c o n tra c tin g arrangements w ith lo ca l
communities w h ile Chapter IV compares each s h e r i f f according to the
s tr u c tu r a l and conduct-performance v a r ia b le s .

A c t u a l ly , Chapter IV is

a continuatio n o f Chapter I I , but I thought i t would be useful f o r
the reader to see the c o n tra c tin g operations o f each s h e r i f f before the
s h e r if f s are compared and contrasted.
The f i r s t p a rt o f th is chapter discusses c o n tra c tin g between
county s h e r if f s and the U.S. Forest S ervice follow ed by a discussion o f
the c o n tra c tin g o f 11 county s h e r i f f s .

The f i n a l sectio n contains

b r i e f statements about the remaining c o n tra c tin g f o r p o lic e s e rv ic e in
Michigan during 1974.
Throughout th is and the next two c h a p te rs, s in g le (one person
p a t r o l) and double (two persons p a t r o l) p a tro l hours w i l l be used as
measures o f output (what is purchased from the s h e r i f f v ia a c o n t r a c t ) .
They are considered d i f f e r e n t outputs because o f the s i g n i f i c a n t cost
d iffe r e n c e (double p a tro l hours cost almost tw ic e as much as do s in g le
ones).

The number o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours produced and sold

by the s h e r i f f are not the actual number o f hours produced but estim ates
obtained from the s h e r i f f ' s d e s c rip tio n o f the p a tro l schedule which
he t r i e s to m a in ta in . 4

4No attempt was made to consult the d a il y logs o f deputies to count the
actual number o f s in g le and double patrol hours given by a s h e r i f f to

I
67
CONTRACTING WITH
S h e r iffs in

U.S. FORESTSERVICE
the s ix counties o f Wexford,

S c h o o lc r a ft, A lg e r , Ir o n ,

Gogebic and Ontonagon c o n tra c t with the U.S. Forest S ervice to provide
patrol s e rv ic e in the n a tio n a l parks located in t h e i r re s p e c tiv e
counties.

Although the Forest Service can enforce fe d e ra l laws in s id e

these parks, Public Law 9 2 -8 2 , enacted in 1971, a u th o rizes the Forest
Service to e n te r in to c ontractual agreements f o r th e enforcement o f
s t a te and county s ta tu te s on fe d e ral p ro p e rty .

A primary reason fo r

encouraging c o n tra c tin g with a lo ca l law enforcement agency is t h a t a
local court is usually c lo s e r to the park and has less case backlog
than the nearest fe d e ra l c o u rt.

Consequently, i t

is more expedient f o r

c it iz e n s and the Forest Service to process complaints and a rre s ts through
s ta te courts r a th e r than fe d e ra l cou rts .
A lger County's s h e r i f f has a c o n tra c t which begins on May 1st and
runs through Labor Day.

During th is p e rio d , the s h e r i f f supplies fo u r

hours per evening o f staggered p a tro l f o r f i v e evenings per week.

In

r e tu r n , the U.S. Forest Service pays $4.00 an hour s a la r i e s and 15<£ per
m ile f o r use o f the v e h ic le .
sick le a v e .

The

The county absorbs the F . I . C . A . and any

s h e r i f f has been able in the

past to h i r e a man

e s p e c ia lly f o r th is d e t a i l , using him f o r snowmobile and marine duty
during the remaining tim e.
is needed and w i l l

In 1975, the s h e r i f f f e e ls a double p a tro l

request the money to h i r e two men.

4 (c o n tin u e d )a c o n tra c t-jng community. The estim ate o f number o f p a tro l
hours sold was made from a d e s c rip tio n o f the p a tr o l schedule which
the s h e r i f f attempted to meet. For in s ta n c e , i f the s h e r i f f attempted
to supply 24 hour coverage o f s in g le p a tr o l f i v e days per week, then
the number o f y e a r ly s in g le p a tro l hours sold to t h is p a r t i c u l a r
community was 6,240 (5 days/week x 24 hours/day x 52 w e e k s /y e a r).
Con­
s e quently, the number o f s in g le and double p a tr o l hours sold could be
inaccurate due to the fo llo w in g fa c to rs which could erode the p a tro l
schedule: court appearance, s ickness, v a c a tio n , and h o lid a y s .

68
S c h o o lc raft County has had a c o n tra c t w ith the Forest S ervice f o r
three y e a rs .

From June 15th u n t i l September 15th the s h e r i f f estab ­

lish e s a p a tro l schedule in conjunction w ith the lo c a l

rangers.

The

s h e r i f f supplies an average o f 32 hours o f double p a tro l each week.

In

r e t u r n , the U.S. Forest S ervice pays $ 2 .8 8 per man hour and 12<£ per
m ile , and the county pays the F . I . C . A .

The s h e r i f f s t a f f s t h i s op era tion

mostly with special deputies who are l i k e l y to be p o lic e o f f i c e r s o f
lo cal communities working on t h e i r o f f duty tim e .

I f th e s h e r i f f ' s

r e g u la r deputies should work the p a t r o l , they re c e iv e time and a h a l f
(which is g r e a te r than th e $ 2 . 8 8 ) , thus the s h e r i f f has in c e n t iv e not
to use his own d epu ties.
with the s h e r i f f ' s
Servic e.

The o f f i c e r s , who are not d e p u tie s , are equipped

uniform and equipment paid f o r by the U.S.

Forest

The U.S. Forest Service also equips the s h e r i f f ' s cars w ith

radios so t h a t the deputies and rangers can communicate.
Iron County contains approxim ately 12 fe d e ra l park s, several o f
which are q u ite remote.

The s h e r i f f provides p a tro l s e rv ic e from May 1

through November 3 0 th , which also includes p a t r o lin g the la k e s .

The

s h e r i f f does not have to increase his s t a f f to handle t h is c o n tra c t
because th e re is no s e t number o f hours which the s h e r i f f agrees to
supply.

During the c o n tra c tin g time p e rio d , the s h e r i f f has his

general p a tro ls d r iv e through the parks during the r e g u la r p a tro l tim e .
The deputies keep tra c k o f the time they spend in the parks and record
the m ileage.

The county is compensated $4.00 per hour and 15<£ per

m ile f o r the time they spend in the parks.

I f they r e c e iv e a c a l l

fo r

assistance by a ranger o r a request to in v e s tig a t e a s p e c ia l com p la in t,
the same rates apply and mileage is kept from where the responding
s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l o r ig in a t e s .

69
The s h e r i f f o f Wexford County contracts w ith the U.S. Forest
Service to run two p a tro ls on F r id a y , Saturday and one p a tro l on Sunday
during the period May 1 through September 30.

Each p a tro l takes

approxim ately 4 hours and covers approxim ately 76 m ile s .

The U.S. Forest
t
S ervice agrees to pay $4.00 per man hour and 11 <£ per m ile and provide
f o r special

radio equipment.

The t o t a l payment by the Forest S e rvic e is

not to exceed $3,200 per y e a r .

The terms o f th e c o n tra c t have remained

unchanged since 1972.
The s h e r i f f o f Gogebic County c o ntracts with the Forest S ervice
from May 20th through September 10th.

During t h is t im e , the s h e r i f f

consents to make an average o f th re e p a tro ls per week with each p a tro l
occurring between 9 p.m. and 2 a.m.

When p o s s ib le , the p a tr o ls are

done on F r id a y , Saturday and h o lid a y evenings.

At the end o f each

month, the s h e r i f f sends to the Forest S ervice copies o f the a c t i v i t y
logs f o r the time spent on park p a tro l along w ith the t o t a l cost f o r
t h a t month.

The Forest Service agrees to pay $3.9 0 per hour o f p a tro l

plus 12<£ per m ile .

In 1974 the Forest S ervice paid a sum t o t a l o f

$ 3 ,2 8 3 .8 9 f o r 4 9 9 -1 /2 hours o f p a tro l and 11,132 v e h ic le m ile s .
The Ontonagon County s h e r i f f has almost an id e n t ic a l agreement
with the Forest Service as does the Gogebic s h e r i f f except the ra te s
o f reimbursement are d i f f e r e n t .

While the Gogebic s h e r i f f is paid

$3.90 per hour and 15<£ per m i l e , the Ontonagon s h e r i f f receives $3.00
per hour and 15<f per m ile .

A ll other provisions o f the c o n tra c t are

the same.
In summary, a l l s ix county s h e r i f f s have contracts which cover
the sunnier months.

The hourly r a te s vary from $2.8 8 to $4.00 and the

range o f the v e h ic le charge is from 11 $ to 15<t per m ile .

One s h e r i f f

h ire s a special person to handle the park p a t r o l , another s h e r i f f

70
uses p a r t - tim e men who are p o lic e o f f i c e r s o f surrounding lo ca l
communities, and the remaining four s h e r if f s cover the park p a tro l as
a p a rt o f the general county p a t r o l .

OAKLAND COUNTY
The Oakland'County s h e r i f f views c o n tra c tin g as the " l i f e blood"
o f his department.

Since 1971 the county commissioners in d ic a te d

a d d itio n a l budget requests f o r road p a tro l s e rv ic e would not be
approved.

Consequently, the only way the s h e r i f f has been able to

increase his p a tro l s e rv ic e has been through c o n tr a c tin g .

Evidence

o f th is fa c t is t h a t o f the 97,600 s in g le p a tro l hours produced by the
s h e r i f f in 1974, approxim ately 52% are supplied to c o n tra c tin g com­
munities .
The s h e r i f f contracted in 1974 with the fo llo w in g seven communities

Table 3 -1 .

Number o f hours sold to c o n tra c tin g communities and the
p ric e charged by the Oakland County s h e r i f f in 1974.

Community
Avon Township
Commerce Township
Highland Township
Oakland Township
Independence Township
Orion Township
S p r in g fie ld Township

Number o f
S in g le Patrol
Hours
11,680
8,760
8,760
2,080
8,760
8,760
2,080

T o ta l Amt.
Paid by
Townships
$89,350
71,480
71,480
17,870
71,480
71 ,480
17,870

P r ic e per
S in g le
Patro l Hour
$7.64
8 .1 5
8 .1 5
8 .5 9
8 .1 5
8 .1 5
8 .5 9

The townships c o n tra c t f o r a s p e c if ic number o f men and v e h ic le s .
The p ric e f o r a deputy and c ar f o r 40 hours o f s e rv ic e per week f o r
one y e a r is $17,870.

Avon purchases f i v e such u n i t s , w h ile Commerce,

71
Highland, Independence and Orion each purchase fo u r u n it s ; and Oakland
and S p r in g f ie ld each purchase one u n it .
lis h e d in

Sub -statio ns have been e s ta b ­

the townships o f Avon, H ighland, Commerce and Independence.

The men re p o rt to the s u b -s ta tio n s with no loss o f p a tro l time to the
t

c o n tra c tin g community due to t r a n s i t tim e to and from the s h e r i f f ' s
5

s ta tio n .
Future Contracting E x p e c tatio n s .

Even

though the s h e r i f f is

dependent on c o n tr a c tin g , he does not a c t i v e l y r e c r u i t communities to
buy p a tro l s e rv ic e from him although he does make his c o ntracted
services known through general announcements both verbal and w r i t t e n .
He does not attem pt to undermine lo ca l p o lic e departments by ou t-p erform
ing them.

I f a c i t i z e n in a community with a lo ca l p o lic e department

c a lls the s h e r i f f fo r s e r v ic e , the s h e r i f f w i l l
t h e i r lo cal department or contact the lo c a l
i f a lo c a l p o lic e u n it is u n a v a ila b le

r e f e r th e c a l l e r to

department d i r e c t l y .

(Only

o r i f the c a l l e r in s i s t s on seeing

a s h e r i f f ' s deputy, w i l l a s h e r i f f ' s deputy be d is p a tc h e d .)

One reason

f o r t h is p r a c tic e is t h a t c o n tra c tin g w ith communities which have t h e i r
own departments is more d i f f i c u l t than c o n tra c tin g with those who do not
U s u a lly , the lo ca l o f f i c i a l s want the s h e r i f f to absorb t h e i r lo ca l
department.

The s h e r i f f attempted t h is once; but lo ca l o f f i c e r s did

not meet the s h e r i f f ' s minimum standard f o r d e p u tie s; and the county
commissioners would not a llo w the l a t e r a l

in s e r t io n to take p la c e .

A ll

o f the contracts are with communities t h a t did not have t h e i r own

5

Oakland Township is a 30 minute one way d r iv e from the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e
Orion is a 20 minute one way d r i v e , and S p r in g f ie ld is a 15 minute one
way d r iv e . While t h is is tim e l o s t to th e c o n tra c tin g community, i t
is time gained by the non-contracting p o rtio n o f the county assuming
the p a tro ls t r a v e l through n o n-contracting communities.
I t should be
added t h a t a s u b -s ta tio n is planned f o r Orion in 1975.

72
p o lic e department but s t i l l wanted a higher le v e l o f s e rv ic e than was
provided by the s h e r i f f through county taxes.
The s h e r i f f ' s c o n tra c tin g p a tro ls w i l l be expanded in 1975 through
the use o f Comprehensive Employment and T r a in in g Act (CETA) funds.^

The

I

townships o f Highland, Independence, and S p r in g f ie ld w i l l
a d d itio n a l man and Commerce w i l l ob ta in 2 men. ' 7

pick up one

Avon in 1974 passed a

local mi 11 age which earmarked funds f o r law enforcement and w i l l
them to increase the number o f contracted
Reporting to Local Community.

allo w

deputies from 5 to 14 men.

The s h e r i f f sends a monthly re p o r t

to each c o n tra c tin g community showing the crime breakdown f o r t h a t
month.

He also attempts to have one o f his o f f i c e r s atten d each annual

meeting and one o f his a d m in is tra to rs w i l l atten d monthly meetings upon
request.
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f P atro l S e r v ic e .

The

s h e r i f f is w i l l i n g to supply

any le v e l o f s e rv ic e to a lo ca l community

as long as i t adds up to one

f u l l man being employed.

For in s ta n c e , he would allo w two townships each

to buy 20 hours o f weekly p a tro l s e r v ic e , but would not s e l l 20 hours
o f weekly p a tro l s e rv ic e j u s t to one township.
t h is p o lic y is t h a t i t

The reason given f o r

is too d i f f i c u l t to procure and schedule a h a l f

o f a man.
g
CETA pays a maximum o f $12,500 f o r s a la r y o f a l o c a l l y unemployed
person. Any d iffe r e n c e in t h i s amount and the cost o f a man and a car
w i l l be paid by the lo c a l community.
^One c r i t i c i s m o f lo c a l o f f i c i a l s spending fe d e ra l funds is t h a t they tend
to spend the money on c a p it a l goods ( v e h i c l e , radio equipment, e t c . ) .
One reason c ite d f o r t h is is t h a t i f the money is used to employ an
a d d itio n a l person, when the funds te rm in a te the lo ca l community fe e ls
compelled to pick up the a d d itio n a l man e i t h e r by r a is in g taxes or
c u ttin g spending in o th e r a reas.
Contracting o f f e r s a way t h a t fe d e ra l
funds can be spent on a d d itio n a l employment because a la r g e r u n i t , such
as the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , o f f e r s the op p o rtu n ity to use a d d it io n a l people
to repla c e personnel which have l e f t the s h e r i f f ' s department through
normal a t t r i t i o n assuming the lo c a l community chooses not to continue to
pay the s a la ry out o f lo c a l funds.

73
S p e c if ic a tio n o f P a tro l Schedule and A c t i v i t i e s Performed.

The

patrolmen working in the c o n tra c tin g communities know t h a t they are
th e re to please the township tru s te e s and supervisors as w ell as provide
s e rv ic e to c i t i z e n s .

The deputies a re encouraged to know the super­

visors and m aintain good working r e la tio n s h ip s with them.

I f the

supervisor wants the deputies to perform community errands o r enforce
local ordinances, such as the junk car ordinance, the s h e r i f f ' s
w ill

lie u t e n a n t

t r y to e x p la in t h a t th e re a re cheaper ways to ob ta in t h is s e rv ic e

o th e r than having the contracted deputy perform the fu n c tio n .
the lo c a l o f f i c i a l

i n s i s t s , the s h e r i f f ' s deputies w i l l

But i f

u s u a lly perform

the e rrand s.^
Sub-stations a llo w township supervisors the op p o rtu n ity to communi­
cate d i r e c t l y with the contracted deputies and make any requests they
might have.

In those townships w ith o u t s u b - s ta tio n s , lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

must f i r s t contact the s h e r i f f ' s disp atc h e r and request t h a t a deputy
be sent to t h e i r o f f i c e , making communication more d i f f i c u l t y .
Rotating Versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D ep utie s .

The s u b -s ta tio n s

are designed to o f f e r a p o in t o f re fe re n c e and i d e n t i t y fo r lo cal
c itiz e n s .

This is re in fo rc e d f u r t h e r by permanently assigning the
Q

same deputies to c o n tra c tin g communities which have s u b -s ta tio n s .

8

There is a l i m i t to the range o f a c t i v i t i e s which the s h e r i f f w i l l
allo w his deputies to perform. This l i m i t cannot be e a s i ly expressed.
As a general r u l e , however, the wishes o f lo c a l o f f i c i a l s c a rry a
g re a t deal o f w eight.
g
A deputy who becomes too f a m i l i a r w ith th e community such t h a t he begins
to show f a v o r it is m , can become u n s a tis fa c to ry to the s h e r i f f .
For
in s ta n c e , i f the s h e r i f f ' s a d m in is tra tio n notices t h a t a deputy is
g ivin g a l l the wrecker business to one f i l l i n g s t a t i o n , o r is around
a c e r t a in re s ta u ra n t too much, they may t r a n s f e r him.

74
Patrolmen f o r the o th e r c o n tra c tin g communities are ro ta te d between
general p a tro l and the c o n tra c tin g o p e ra tio n s .

I f any deputy is deemed

u n s a tis fa c to ry by lo ca l o f f i c i a l s , and i f the s h e r i f f f e e ls the com­
p la in ts are j u s t i f i e d , the s h e r i f f w i l l

reassign a patrolman e i t h e r to

another c o n tra c tin g community or to general p a t r o l . 10

When p o s s ib le ,

the s h e r i f f lik e s to assign to the c o n tra c tin g community a deputy who
liv e s th e r e .

In a f u r t h e r attem pt to s a t i s f y lo ca l o f f i c i a l s , the

s h e r i f f s ta tio n s his most experienced deputies in the c o n tra c tin g
communities.
Liq uor Insp ection Revenue.

The s h e r i f f has a d e te c t iv e sergeant

perform the li q u o r in sp ection f o r the c o n tra c tin g as w ell as th e non­
c o n tra c tin g p o rtio n o f the county.

I f the lo c a l communities are aware

o f the revenue they could r e c e iv e , i t w i l l be re ta in e d by them.

If

no t, then the money coming from the Liquor Commission goes to the
county tre a s u ry .
The Oakland County s h e r i f f extends g re a t e f f o r t to please lo cal
o f f i c i a l s o f c o n tra c tin g communities.

For example, c o n tra c tin g

communities re c e iv e p r i o r i t y over n o n-contracting communities.

A

s h e r i f f ' s a d m in is tr a to r in d ic a te d t h a t i f two compliants o f the same
type are received by the s h e r i f f ' s d isp atcher and the general p a tro l
is equal d i s t a n t from each and i f one is in a c o n tra c tin g community
and the o th e r is in a non-contracting community, the c o n tra c tin g
community w i l l

re ce iv e p r i o r i t y .

Another example is the one township

which cut the number o f y e a r ly p a tro l hours from 8760 to 2080 because

10Many lo ca l communities adopt Act 78 which is the C i v i l S ervice Act
which makes the f i r i n g o f a lo c a l p o lic e o f f i c e r d i f f i c u l t .
Con­
t r a c t i n g is one way to e lim in a te an unpopular lo cal p o lic e d e p a rt­
ment.

75
fe de ral funds which they were using e x p ire d .

The s h e r i f f t o ld the

community t h a t he would f l o a t a general p a tro l in t o t h e i r community
as o fte n as p o ss ib le .
Comparison o f P a tro l Costs to Contract P r i c e .

With the county
i

commissioners u n w illin g to fund any general p a t r o l s , the s h e r i f f f e l t
an in c e n tiv e to e s ta b lis h c ontracts w ith as many communities as he
could i f he wanted to expand his road p a tro l d i v i s i o n .

One way o f

doing t h is was to charge a low p ric e f o r the contracted p a tro l s e r v ic e ,
and one way o f charging a low p r ic e was not to pass a l l
on to the c o n tra c tin g community.

p a tro l costs

Table 3-2 compares p a tro l costs to

c o n tra c t p r ic e .

Table 3 -2 .

Community
Avon
Commerce
Hi ghland
Oakland
Independence
Orion
S p r in g fie ld
TOTAL

Comparison o f resources used to the county estim ate and
the revenue received from c o n tra c tin g communities.

Estimated Value
o f V a ria b le
Resources Used,
1974

County Contracted
Revenue Received
in 1974*

County Cost
E s tim a te **

$148,989
114,003
112,751
26,848
112,751
112,524
27,216

$89,350
71,480
71,480
17,870
71,480
71,480
17,870

$92,295
74.196
74,196
18,459
74,196
74,196
18,459

$655,082

$411,010

$425,997

*The r a te charged by the s h e r i f f in c lu d in g s a l a r i e s , v e h ic le expense,
and uniform costs was $17,870 f o r each man purchased. Avon purchased
f i v e units and thus the revenue they send to the county in 1974 is
5 x $17,870 or $ 89,350.
H ighland, Independence, Commerce and Orion
each purchase four u n its (4 x 17,870 = $71 ,480) and S p r in g f ie ld and
Oakland each purchased one u n it .
**The county estimated the cost o f one u n i t , a man, v e h ic le and uniform
to cost $18,459 per y e ar per u n i t . Avon purchased 5 u n it s ; so the
c o s t, according to the county, is (5 x $18,459 = $ 9 2 ,2 9 5 ).

76
The county budget o f f i c e was a c t i v e l y involved in estim atin g
p a tro l costs.

I t estim ated the annual cost o f a man and v e h ic le

working 40 hours weekly to be $18,459.

The s h e r i f f , through n e g o tia ­

t io n with the county commissioners, chose to charge $1 7,8 70 .

The
l
$17,870 f ig u r e m u lt i p li e d by the number o f men desired by a community
determined the t o t a l p r ic e paid by a community to the county.
purchased 5 men and they paid in 1974 $89,350 (5 x $ 1 7 ,8 7 0 ).

(Avon
In the

appendix a comparison o f the a u th o r's cost estim ate is made to the
cost estim ate o f the county.

While i t

is known how the county a r r iv e d

a t the cost estim ate o f $ 1 8 ,4 5 9 , i t is not known how the s h e r i f f
reached the fig u r e o f $ 17,870.

One possib le e x p la n a tio n is t h a t i t

is the lowest f ig u r e which the s h e r i f f was ab le to g e t th e commissioners
to accept.

This cost s a vin g , which was given to the c o n tra c tin g

communities, was never q u a n tif ie d e i t h e r f o r the b e n e f it o f the c o n tr a c t ­
ing communities or the county commissioners.
What b e n e f it does the n o n-contracting p o rtio n o f the county re ce iv e
from s u b s id izin g the contracted p a tro ls ?

Since the s h e r i f f operates

several s u b -s t a t io n s , t r a n s i t time (p a tr o l t r a v e li n g time between the
s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and the c o n tra c tin g community) is l o s t because
p a tro ls re p o r t d i r e c t l y to the s u b - s ta tio n .

While the s h e r i f f can

dispatch the contracted p a tro ls o u tside the c o n tra c tin g communities,
i t is not known how much time is spent in the n o n-contracting p o rtio n
o f the county.

G enerally the c o n tra c tin g communities w i l l

s lig h te d in fa v o r o f the non-contracting communities.

not be

77
HURON COUNTY
The s h e r i f f o f Huron County has two c o n tr a c ts .

One is w ith the

f i v e contiguous townships o f C a s e v il le , Fairhaven, Lake, Hume, and
McKinley.

This predominantly r e s o r t area has Saginaw Bay as i t s n o rth t
west boundary. The f i v e townships c o l l e c t i v e l y pay the s h e r i f f
$14,000 f o r 2544 man hours o r 1272 hours o f double p a tro l to be d i s ­
t r ib u te d through the f i v e township a re a .

C a s e v ille pays $4,000 because

the s h e r i f f estim ates t h a t r e l a t i v e l y more time is spent t h e r e ; w h ile
Hume, Lake, and Fairhaven each c o n tr ib u te $3,000 and McKinley pays
$1,0 0 0.

The c o n tr a c t runs from May 2 3 , 1974, through March 31, 1975, a t

which time a new c o n tra c t w i l l

probably be w r i t t e n f o r a 12 month

p e rio d .^
Several years ago, the o f f i c i a l s o f C a s e v ille Township approached
the s h e r i f f about c o n tra c tin g f o r p o lic e services f o r the summer months.
C a s e v ille is a r e s o rt area and i t s o f f i c i a l s

f e l t t h a t they were unable

to ob ta in the le v e l o f s e rv ic e they needed from the v i l l a g e o f C a s e v il le ,
with whom they had c o n tra c te d .

They requested t h a t the s h e r i f f s t a t i o n

a p a tro l in t h e i r township from Friday afternoon u n ti l
morning.

12

12 a.m. Sunday

The next y e ar the township supervisors o f Lake and Hume, a f t e r

t a lk in g with the C a s e v ille o f f i c i a l s , approached the s h e r i f f about
buying weekend p a tro l s e rv ic e f o r the summer months.

That y e a r the

The budget y e a r f o r the townships begins on March 31st and runs 12
months. Consequently, the township o f f i c i a l s wanted to sign a new
c o n tra c t a t t h a t tim e.
12

The s h e r i f f contends t h a t one reason t h a t the township o f f i c i a l s
perceived inadequate s e rv ic e was t h a t the v i l l a g e was using an unmarked
c a r.
Even though the v i l l a g e was providing s e r v ic e , the c i t i z e n s and
o f f i c i a l s had l i t t l e perception o f i t .
While the township was buying
p o lic e services from the v i l l a g e , the weekends were peak periods f o r
the v i l l a g e as w e ll as the township and the v i l l a g e received p r i o r i t y .

78
s h e r i f f had a two-man p a tro l o p era tin g in C a s e v ille and another twoman p a tro l o p era tin g in Lake and Hume f o r th e weekends during the
summer months.

The fo llo w in g y e a r the s h e r i f f took the i n i t i a t i v e and

approached McKinley and Fairhaven about jo i n i n g the o p e r a tio n , which
le d

to the c u rre n t c o n tr a c t.
Under the c u rre n t c o n t r a c t , C a s e v i l l e , Hume, and Lake re c e iv e

lower le v e ls o f p a tro l s e rv ic e during the summer month weekends ( t h e i r
peak period) than under the previous c o n t r a c t.

Under the old c o n t r a c t ,

the th re e townships received two double p a tr o ls during the summer
weekends, and under the present one they share one double u n it w ith
two a d d itio n a l townships.

While they re c e iv e lower le v e ls o f s e rv ic e

during summer weekends, they r e c e iv e h igher le v e ls o f s e rv ic e during
non-summer weekend period s.
One d i s t i n c t i v e fe a tu re about the Huron County s h e r i f f ' s c o n tra c tin g
with the f i v e township areas is t h a t he has never h ire d a d d itio n a l men.
One problem encountered with o f f e r i n g a c o n tr a c t o f less than 40 hours
o f weekly p a tro l s e rv ic e is t h a t i t is d i f f i c u l t to h i r e the necessary
personnel and purchase the necessary equipment.

The s h e r i f f s t a f f e d

the c o n tra c t op era tion mostly w ith the t r a in e d p a r t - t im e men and f i l l e d
in w ith his deputies who wanted to work o v e rtim e.

This method was

economical f o r the townships because th e base o f the p a r t - t im e men was
less than the r e g u la r deputies ($ 4 .4 2 versus $4.90 an h o u r).

11

The second c o n tra c t is w ith the v i l l a g e o f Kinde which agrees to
buy 24 s in g le p a tro l hours o f weekly s e rv ic e from J u ly 3rd through

13

Huron County pays r e g u la r base pay f o r any overtim e worked, but
because o f a s t a t e law which becomes o p e r a tiv e in 1975, a l l govern­
ments w i l l be required to pay time and a h a l f f o r any overtim e worked.

79
December 31, 1974, f o r a sum o f $171.36 per week.

This c o n tra c t grew

out o f an expired Emergency Employment Act Grant which had allowed Kinde
to h i r e a man to perform p o lic e s e rv ic e s .
car and the o f f i c e r ' s equipment.

The v i l l a g e purchased the

When the grant ended, the v i l l a g e did
i

not want to assume the man's s a la ry so they sold t h e i r p o lic e v e h ic le
and contracted with the s h e r i f f who in turn h ire d the Kinde o f f i c e r .
The s h e r i f f uses him f o r th re e s h i f t s

in Kinde and two s h i f t s e i t h e r on

general p a tro l or in the oth e r c o n tra c t o p e ra tio n .
At present a small percentage o f one and two man p a tro l hours
produced by the s h e r i f f are the r e s u l t o f c o n tr a c tin g .

On a y e a r ly

basis (a d ju s tin g the c o n tra c t hours to annual e s tim ate s ) the s h e r i f f
produces a t o t a l o f 8,5 4 8 s in g le p a tro l hours, o f which 1248 (14.8%)
annu ally goes to Kinde (24 hours/week x 52 weeks = 1248) the s h e r i f f
also produces 8,7 6 0 hours o f double p a tro l o f which 1460 hours (16.6%)
goes to the f i v e township c o n tra c t o p e ra tio n .
The s h e r i f f fe e ls the n o n-contracting p o rtio n o f the county
b e n e fits from c o n tra c tin g o p e ra tio n s .

Before the present c o n tra c tin g

the s h e r i f f s p l i t the county in h a l f and had a general p a tro l assigned
to each h a l f .

During the w in te r months o f 1973 th e re was a rash o f

breaking and e n terings in the C a s e v i l l e , Lake and Hume a re a .

He

p u lled the car from the east side o f the county to help and noticed
the breaking and e n te rin g moved to the east s id e .

He is now able to

handle the complaints during the w in t e r months in the western town­
ships w ith o u t h u rtin g the east p o rtio n o f the county.
Future C ontracting E x p e c tatio n s .

The s h e r i f f has no a s p ira tio n s

to c o n tra c t w ith those communities which have t h e i r own departments o f
two and th re e men, although two communities w ith t h e i r own departments

80
have approached him.

The s h e r i f f does a l l

the d isp atching f o r f i r e ,

ambulance, and p o lic e f o r the e n t i r e county.

I f a p o lic e c a l l is

received from a community with i t s own department, the s h e r i f f w i l l
e i t h e r r e f e r the c a l l e r to the lo ca l department o r dispatch the lo cal
c a r.

The s h e r i f f w i l l go in only i f the lo c a l department is u n av a ilab le

or i f requested by the lo ca l department.

The s h e r i f f would p r e f e r i t

i f the county would levy a one m i l l ta x earmarked f o r the s h e r i f f ' s
department r a th e r than secure a d d itio n a l p a tro l through c o n tra c tin g .
Reporting to Local O f f i c i a l s .

The s h e r i f f attends some o f the

township board meetings as w e ll as sends monthly reports to each o f
the c o n tra c tin g e n t i t i e s .

These reports contain the number o f hours

worked, number o f m iles d r iv e n , and a breakdown o f the complaints
answered and a r re s ts made.

For the f i v e township c o n t r a c ts , th e re is

no s p e c if ic in form atio n reported f o r each township.
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f Patrol S e r v ic e .

The s h e r i f f is r e lu c t a n t to supply

less than 40 hours o f s e rv ic e because o f the d i f f i c u l t y in h i r i n g a
man f o r less than 40 hours.

Although the s h e r i f f does have his present

f i v e c o n tra c t op eration s t a f f e d with p a r t- t im e deputies and r e g u la r
deputies working o v e rtim e , he is r e lu c t a n t to expand under such an
arrangement.

The Kinde c o n tra c t was possible because the s h e r i f f was

a b le to persuade the county commissioners to pay the s a la r y d if fe r e n c e
between the 24 hours worked and paid f o r by Kinde and the 40 hours
work week.
S p e c if ic a t io n o f P a tro l Schedules and A c t i v i t i e s Performed.

The

s h e r i f f fe e ls he is best q u a l i f i e d to say when p a tr o ls w i l l be most
e ffe c tiv e .

He bases his judgment on the times when the complaint load

is th e h e a v ie s t.

But the s h e r i f f seems w i l l i n g to i n t e r a c t w ith lo c a l

81
o f f i c i a l s and e n t e r t a i n any special requests t h a t they might have.

He

also w i l l a llo w his contracted o f f i c e r s to enforce lo ca l ordinances.
The s h e r i f f does not t o l e r a t e personal errands f o r lo c a l o f f i c i a l s ,
although, i f requested to d e l i v e r board minutes during r e g u la r p a tro l
i

d u ty, he fe e ls t h a t t h is is s e rv ic e which can be rendered.

The s h e r i f f

does reserve the r i g h t to dispatch the contracted p a tr o ls ou t o f the
c o n tra c tin g communities in case o f emergency, and the c o n tra c tin g
community is c re d ite d w ith the time spent o u ts id e the c o n tr a c t a re a .
Rotating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D e p u tie s .
p o lic y is to r o t a t e his d e p u tie s.

The s h e r i f f ' s

The exception to t h i s p o lic y is

the Kinde c o n tr a c t.
Liquor In sp ection Revenue.

Liquor in s p e c tio n revenue is r e ta in e d

by the c o n tra c tin g community.
Comparison o f P atro l Cost to Contract P r i c e .

The s h e r i f f revealed

his p a tro l costs to the c o n tra c tin g communities and even to the county
commissioners in a unique way.

He included in the w r it t e n c o n tra c t

with the f i v e townships what i t would cost th e townships to produce
the same number o f double p a tro l hours which he was s e l l i n g to them.
What in f a c t the s h e r i f f did was to estim ate what i t would cost him to
produce the p a tro l s e r v ic e .

The s h e r i f f ' s e s tim ate was $ 1 6 ,0 0 0 ; t h i s

a u th o r's estim ate was $ 1 5 ,5 7 4 , and the s h e r i f f chose to charge a p r ic e
o f $14,000.
The s h e r i f f has a f a i r l y a n ta g o n is tic r e la t io n s h ip w ith his county
commissioners, but he a ls o has l i t t l e m o tiv a tio n t o c o n tra c t with
a d d itio n a l communities.

Thus, one is not s u rp ris e d to fin d l i t t l e

d if fe r e n c e between the p a tro l costs and th e c o n tr a c t p r ic e .

82
ST. CLAIR COUNTY
The s h e r i f f o f S t . C l a i r County has one c o n tra c t w ith the c i t y o f
Yale located in the northwest p o rtio n o f the county.

The c i t y agrees

to pay the county $48,000 per y e a r .

In re tu rn the s h e r i f f "agrees to
i
provide the c i t y complete law enforcement s e r v ic e , the amount o f s e rv ic e

to be determined from time to time by the s h e r i f f w ith the advice o f
the c i t y mayor.

A unique f e a tu r e o f t h is agreement is t h a t the

c o n tra c t does not s p e c ify the exact number o f p a tro l hours the s h e r i f f
is to provide Yale.

While the phrase "complete law enforcement s e rv ic e "

is vague, the s h e r i f f has v e r b a lly promised Yale o f f i c i a l s
department w i l l

t h a t his

respond to any and a l l complaints w it h in 15 m i n u t e s . ^

I f the contracted car does not spend i t s time e x c lu s iv e ly w it h in
c i t y boundaries, then what does Yale receive f o r i t s money?

Because o f

the c o n t r a c t , the s h e r i f f s ta tio n s a p a tro l c ar in the northwest p o rtio n
o f the county.

In a d d itio n to covering Y a le , i t also responds to com­

p la in t s and p a tro ls in s ix surrounding townships.

The Yale p a tro l

(o r

the northwest p a t r o l) consists o f a s in g le p a tro l during the f i r s t
s h i f t and one double p a tro l f o r the second and t h i r d s h i f t s .
coverage is given seven days a week.

This

P art o f th is tim e , however, is

spent in t r a n s i t to and from the c o n tra c tin g area which takes a p p ro x i­
mately one hour from each e ig h t-h o u r s h i f t .

During th is t r a n s i t time

o th e r general p a tro ls stay near the northwest p o rtio n to cover com plaints.

14

15

1974 c o n tra c t between the c i t y o f Y a le , the county o f S t. C l a i r and
the S t. C l a i r County s h e r i f f .
While the s h e r i f f p re s e n tly c o lle c ts the data necessary to compute
mean response time f o r complaints in Yale (th e d if fe r e n c e between
the t in e a c a l l is received and the time the s h e r i f f ' s c ar a r r iv e s on
the sc en e), he c u r r e n t ly makes no such c a lc u la t io n .

83
The s h e r i f f does not r e l y very h e a v ily on c o n tra c tin g to provide
f o r his road p a tro l s e rv ic e s .

In 1974 th e s h e r i f f produced an e s t i ­

mated t o t a l o f 11,680 hours o f s in g le p a tro l o f which approxim ately
15 percent was a llo c a te d to Y a le .

In th e same y e a r the s h e r i f f also
j

produced 12,553 hours o f double p a tro l o f which 17 percent was spent
1r

s p e c i f i c a l l y in Y ale.
Future Contracting E x p e c tatio n s .

Many contracts w ith a county

s h e r i f f begin a f t e r lo ca l o f f i c i a l s decide t h a t they need higher le v e ls
o f s e rv ic e and the s h e r i f f m aintains he is unable to increase t h e i r
s e rv ic e le v e l because they a lre a d y r e c e iv e the county minimum owed to
a ll

communities.

But the S t. C l a i r County s h e r i f f plans to approach

several communities which he contends re c e iv e more than the county
minimum and in d ic a te to them t h a t i f they wish to r e ta i n t h is
le v e l o f s e r v ic e , they must pay something e x t r a .

"higher"

The s h e r i f f plans

to approach the townships o f Port Huron, K im b a ll, and Fort G r a t io t
which surround the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e .

Anytime a general o r contracted

p a tro l moves from the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , i t must pass through one o f
these townships.

Consequently, they re c e iv e higher le v e ls o f s e r v ic e .

The in d ic a t o r which he plans to use to show the higher le v e ls o f
s e rv ic e is percentage o f complaints answered in the d i f f e r e n t
communities.

16

From monthly reports sent to Yale o f f i c i a l s , hours spent in Yale
are recorded allo w in g f o r these fig u re s to be c a lc u la te d .
I f the
hours f o r the northwest p a tro l are used (reasoning t h a t w ith o u t
the c o n tra c t th e re would l i k e l y be no northwest p a t r o l ) , the percen­
tage o f hours going to the e n t i r e northwest p a tro l is 39 percent
o f the double p a tro l hours and 33 percent o f the s in g le p a tro l
hours.

84
Reporting to Local Community.
a c t i v i t y re p o rt to Yale o f f i c i a l s

Once a month the s h e r i f f sends an
c ontain ing t o t a l hours spent in the

community and a breakdown o f the complaints answered and a r re s ts made.
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f Patrol S e r v ic e .

The minimum le v e l o f s e rv ic e
j
which the S t. C l a i r County s h e r i f f is w i l l i n g to o f f e r is 40 weekly
hours due in p a r t to the u n f e a s i b i l i t y o f h i r i n g a man f o r something
less than 40 hours per week.

Y e t, the c o n tr a c t which he is supplying

to Yale is not in 40 weekly hour increm ents, and the reason f o r t h is
is t h a t the lo cal o f f i c i a l s are w i l l i n g to t r u s t the s h e r i f f to supply
them w ith what they want.
S p e c if ic a t io n o f When P a tro ls Work and A c t i v i t i e s They Perform .

Since

th e re are no s e t hours f o r the p a tr o ls to be in Y a le , the p a tr o ls are
th e re when th e re is a c a l l

f o r s e r v ic e .

Any general p a t r o l l i n g which

is done is a t the d is c r e tio n o f the in d iv id u a l patrolmen.

The s h e r i f f

seems f l e x i b l e on performing community errands as long as they seem
"reasonable".
R otating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D ep u tie s .
p o lic y is to r o t a t e his d e p u tie s.

The s h e r i f f ' s

But the man which works the f i r s t

s h i f t on the northwest p a tro l is permanently s ta tio n e d th e re and he has
frequent contact with the c i t y mayor.

The s h e r i f f requests a l l his

deputies working the northwest p a tro l to v i s i t the mayor r e g u l a r l y .
Liquor In sp ection Revenue.

Any revenue generated as a r e s u l t o f a

liq u o r in sp ection in Yale goes to the county t r e a s u r y .
Comparison o f P atro l Costs to Contract P r i c e .
a c o n tra c t p ric e o f $48,000 to the c i t y o f Yale.
v a ria b le cost is $ 64,472.

The s h e r i f f charges
The estim ated t o t a l

This d i f f e r e n c e was not known to the s h e r i f f

and thus unknown to the county commissioners.

85
For t h is c o n tra c t i t is d i f f i c u l t to s o r t out who is paying fo r
what because the Yale c o n tra c t is a p a r t o f the northwest p a tro l which
supplies a t o t a l o f 2,920 s in g le and 5,840 double p a tro l hours to s ix
townships and the c i t y o f Y a le .

Of these p a tro l hours, Yale receives

1,707 (58%) s in g le and 2,129 (36%) double p a tro l hours.

The non­

c o n tra c tin g p o rtio n o f the county receives nothing from the subsidy
on the Yale c o n t r a c t , because the c o n tra c t costs r e f e r to time a c t u a l l y
spent in Y a le .

Thus, w h ile no n-contracting communities b e n e f it from

contracted p a tro l being dispatched ou tside the c o n tra c tin g community,
such cannot be said f o r the Yale c o n tr a c t.
In a d d itio n to Yale b e n e fitin g from the c o n t r a c t , another group
which b e n e fits is the s ix townships which re c e iv e the p a tr o lin g s e rv ic e
o f the northwest p a t r o l .

The t o t a l cost o f the northwest p a tro l

(in c lu d in g the Yale p a tro l hours) is approxim ately $143,000.

When the

s h e r i f f went to the county commissioners with the Yale c o n t r a c t , he
r e a liz e d t h a t he was requesting more personnel and equipment than what
Yale would r e c e iv e .

Thus, the s ix townships in the northwest re c e iv e

a higher le v e l o f s e rv ic e financed by the e n t i r e county.
This author knows l i t t l e
and the county commissioners.

about the r e la t io n s h ip between the s h e r i f f
But the s h e r i f f does d e s ire to c o n tr a c t

with the communities which surround the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e .

This r e f l e c t s

the s h e r i f f ' s concern t h a t the county commissioners w i l l not grant
budget increases f o r road p a t r o l.

WAYNE COUNTY
Of a l l

Michigan county s h e r i f f s , the Wayne County s h e r i f f has the

la r g e s t s in g le c o n tra c t in terms o f p a tro l person hours and revenue
received from the c o n tr a c t.

The c o n tra c t is with the c i t y o f Romulus

86
which pays $880,000 to the s h e r i f f in re tu rn f o r 11,680 s in g le and
23,360 double p a tro l hours in 1974.

To s t a f f t h is o p era tio n re q u ire s

58,400 person p a tro l hours or approximately 32 f u l l - t i m e p a tro l persons.
In d e fin in g the r o le o f the s h e r i f f the Wayne County Board o f
i

Commissioners d i r e c t t h a t he s h a ll not provide p a tro l serv ic e s to any
incorporated c i t y .

As a township, Romulus p re v io u s ly was provided w ith

s h e r i f f p a tro l s e rv ic e even though they had t h e i r own p o lic e departm ent;
but th is stopped once Romulus became an in corporated c i t y .

A fter

approximately one y e a r o f having t h e i r own p o lic e department as a c i t y ,
the Romulus p o lic e c h i e f and several Romulus o f f i c i a l s

approached the

s h e r i f f f o r recommendations on how they might increase the s iz e and
q u a l it y o f t h e i r department.

The s h e r i f f suggested t h a t they c o n tr a c t

w ith him, and t h is they d id .

A l a t e r a l in s e r t io n took place w ith those

Romulus o f f i c e r s who sta ye d , becoming deputy s h e r i f f s and o b ta in in g a
s a la ry in crease.
The Wayne County s h e r i f f also has an un w ritte n c o n tra c t w ith the
Wayne County Road Commission, which owns the M e tro p o lita n A i r p o r t , to
supply approximately a 57 person force to the a i r p o r t .

Another p a r t

o f the county government, seeing t h a t i t needed p o lic e s e r v ic e s , decided
to u t i l i z e the county s h e r i f f r a th e r than s t a r t i t s own s p e c ia l p o lic e
s e rv ic e .

The a i r p o r t d e t a il

is a f a i r l y independent o p e ra tio n w ith i t s

own command s tr u c tu r e and s p e c ia liz e d units

( e . g . , d e te c tiv e s ).

They

have t h e i r own budget which is incorporated in to the s h e r i f f ' s budget
and then c re d ite d to the Road Commission.

No a n alysis o f t h is c o n tr a c t

was done.
Future C ontracting Ex pe c tations .

Both the s h e r i f f and county

commissioners wish to do more c o n tr a c tin g , but d i f f i c u l t y is encountered

87
with both groups o f prospective contractees - - the townships and
incorporated c i t i e s .

At p re s e n t, the s h e r i f f ' s primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

is to e ig h t townships which do not have t h e i r own p o lic e department.
These townships have a strong township a s s o c ia tio n and refu s e to c o n tra c t
i

with the s h e r i f f contending the s e rv ic e is due them because o f county
taxes.

Together these townships have a chance o f re c e iv in g higher le v e ls

o f s e rv ic e through county taxes r a t h e r than each paying an e x tra amount
through c o n tr a c tin g .

I f each township is able to re c e iv e the type and

le v e l o f patrol s e rv ic e i t desires through the s h e r i f f ' s

general p a t r o l ,

i t w i l l be cheaper, even though each may pay higher county taxes than i f
each were to s t a r t i t s own department or c o n tra c t with the s h e r i f f .
The reason is t h a t i f they are ab le to persuade the county to provide
the incremental output needed f o r each to re ce iv e i t s optimum, a l l o f
the county helps pay f o r t h i s increm ent, but w ith c o n tra c tin g each town­
ship pays f o r the e n t i r e in c r e m e n t .^
Because tiie County Board o f Auditors sets the c o n tr a c t p r i c e , which
attempts to include a l l

p a tro l expenses, the s h e r i f f ' s power is lessened

to making c o n tra c tin g a t t r a c t i v e through a p r ic e concession to communities
which have t h e i r own p o lic e department.

F u rth e r , the s h e r i f f does not

have the s t a f f to compete with lo c a l departments; consequently, deputies
only e n te r communities which have t h e i r own department when requested
by the lo ca l departments.
One unique fe a tu re o f Wayne County c o n tra c tin g with Romulus r e l a t i v e
to other s h e r i f f s ' c o n tra c tin g is t h a t the s h e r i f f does not dispatch

^ R e f e r r i n g to Figure 2 - 4 , the townships are a ttem pting to have the
Dcounty
outward to the le v e l o f Dq .

88
these p a tro ls outside Romulus f o r any emergency.

The on ly tim e the

p a tro ls can be dispatched outside the c i t y boundaries is i f the mayor
a c tiv a te s a mutual assistance plan which Romulus has with surrounding
communities.

The patrolmen re p o rt to a subs ta tion near Romulus, from

which a l l s h e r i f f p a tro ls o r ig i n a t e .

L i t t l e time is l o s t in t r a n s i t

to and from Romulus.
The s h e r i f f is not t h a t dependent upon c o n tra c tin g f o r the p a tro l
s e rv ic e he p re s e n tly produces.

The n o n-contracting p o rtio n o f the

county has b e n e fite d from the Romulus c o n tr a c t.

The s h e r i f f has, over

the past several y e a r s , been able to increase the number o f patrolmen
by 32 (fo u r units and e ig h t p a tro l persons per u n i t ) .

During the peak

demand tim es, such as the World Food Conference held in D e t r o i t l a s t
f a l l , the s h e r i f f can put everyone on 12 hour s h i f t s and a llo w him to
cover the Romulus op eration as well as assign more men to the conference.
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f P atrol S e r v ic e .
s e rv ic e .

There is a minimum le v e l o f

I f a community wanted to buy 10 hours o f weekly p a tro l s e r v ic e ,

the Wayne County S h e r i f f fe e ls he is la rg e enough to absorb the o th e r
3 /4 o f a man.

The question would be ’w hether o r not the Board o f Com­

missioners would a llo w th e budget to increase by 3 /4 o f a man i f th e re
is not enough slack in the manpower to fr e e 1 /4 o f a man each week.
This is probably possible given the s iz e o f the Wayne County S h e r i f f ' s
Department.
S p e c if ic a t io n o f P a tro l Schedules and A c t i v i t i e s Performed.
are scheduled according to the number o f un its assigned.

P a tro ls

A p a tro l u n it

89
is a s in g le patrol during the f i r s t s h i f t and double p a tr o ls during
the second and t h i r d s h i f t s .

This is constant through the e n t i r e week.

The s h e r i f f r e a liz e d t h a t he is th e re to serve not only the
c itiz e n s o f Romulus but also the e le c te d o f f i c i a l s o f Romulus.

Romulus
t

o f f i c i a l s appear to have f a i r l y good c o n tro l over the contra c ted p o lic e
s e rv ic e s .

I f the o f f i c i a l s wanted a com m unity-related errand performed,

they can c a ll the s h e r i f f ' s disp atc h e r and request a c a r .

An example

o f th is occurred when the present c i t y council was sworn in and the
program brochure was taken to the p r i n t e r by one o f the contracted
p a t r o ls .

Romulus o f f i c i a l s also have c o n tro l over complaint p r i o r i t i e s .

Recently the c i t y fa th e rs f e l t t h a t response tim e to breaking and
enterings was too slow.

Given the wide v a r i e t y o f complaints t h a t the

s h e r i f f ' s dispatcher and deputies answer, B and E's are not very
s e rio u s , but to Romulus o f f i c i a l s they a r e .

The d is p a tc h e r and the

deputies working the Romulus op eration received a d i r e c t i v e in d ic a t in g
th a t B & E's were to command higher p r i o r i t y .
Rotating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D e p u tie s .

The p o lic y is

to permanently s t a t io n deputies in the c i t y o f Romulus unless the mayor
or a c i t y council member wants a p a r t i c u l a r deputy t r a n s fe r r e d o u t.
The mayor does not have the r i g h t to s p e c ify who he wishes assigned to
Romulus, although in a c o n tra c t c u r r e n t ly being nego tia ted f o r d e te c ­
t i v e s , the mayor is requesting a p a r t i c u l a r person and w i l l

lik e ly

obtain him.
Liquor Inspection Revenue.
tions is re ta in e d by Romulus.

Revenue generated from l i q u o r in sp ec­

90
Comparison o f P atro l Costs and Contract P r i c e .
was done o f the s h e r i f f ' s p a t r o l .
c o n tra c t p ric e suggested t h a t a l l

No cost estim ate

The method o f determ ining the
costs had been included so t h a t the

c o n tra c t p ric e was not less than c o s ts .

The p r ic e f o r 2920 s in g le and
\

5840 double p a tro l hours is $220,000.
Several comments can be o ffe r e d about the costing procedure used.
F i r s t , i t must be remembered t h a t c o n tra c t p r ic in g is done, not by the
s h e r i f f , but by the County Board o f A u d ito rs , a group e le c te d and
a cting independently o f the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and the county commissioners.
There is strong in c e n t i v e , since they represent the e n t i r e county, which
consists mostly o f c i t i e s which have t h e i r own p o lic e departm ent, or
townships which r e ly on the s h e r i f f ' s
a ll

costs in to the c o n tra c t p r ic e .

general p a t r o l s , to in c o rp o ra te

One item which has not appeared in

any o f the oth e r county costing procedures is an estim ate f o r adm inis­
t r a t i v e overhead.

A f t e r adding up the v a r ia b le inputs ( s a l a r i e s , u n i­

forms, and v e h ic le expense) they take 20% and add i t .
any a d d itio n a l le v e l o f s e r v ic e s , such as t r a f f i c

This is to d efray

bureau, d e t e c t iv e

bureau, e t c . which may operate in the c i t y o f Romulus.

19

CLINTON COUNTY
The C lin to n County s h e r i f f had fo u r contra c ts in 1974.

20

Two were

w ith the contiguous townships o f D alla s and Lebanon and two were with

19

20

Gene Matkowski o f the County Budget Department fe e ls t h a t t h is is too
low.
He estimates t h a t 40% o f a l l the complaints which the d e t e c tiv e
bureau handles comes from the c i t y o f Romulus.
C ontracting in C lin to n County began with the former s h e r i f f through
the in s is ta n c e o f the c u rre n t s h e r i f f who a t th a t time was a p a t r o l ­
man. The previous s h e r i f f was not in c lin e d to c o n tra c t and refused
when D ew itt Township requested a c o n t r a c t .
D ew itt s t a r te d i t s own
p o lic e department and has grown to 9 f u l l - t i m e persons. When townships
on the western p o rtio n o f the county began experiencing h ig h e r complaint
a c t i v i t y (which suggested the need f o r a higher le v e l o f s e r v i c e ) ,
the c u rre n t s h e r i f f approached them about c o n tr a c tin g .

91
the v illa g e s o f Fowler and W estphalia.
Township.

Fowler is lo cated in D allas

Westphalia l i e s next to Lebanon Township.

Each o f the

v illa g e s purchases 1200 hours o f y e a r ly p a tro l s e rv ic e w h ile D allas
and Lebanon purchase each y e a r 100 hours and 50 hours r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Since the s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l would be in Fowler and Westphalia f o r 1200
a d d itio n a l hours each, these two townships also would be b e n e f it i n g .
To prevent the townships from being fr e e r i d e r s , each was requested to
purchase a token amount.

21

Since a l l o f the contracted amounts are s m a ll, the s h e r i f f c o o r d i­
nates the hours spent in the four communities along w ith the general
patrol schedule.

22

The needs o f the general county along w ith the needs

o f the c o n tra c tin g communities i n t e r a c t to determine how many cars w i l l
be near the c o n tra c tin g communities on any given p a tro l s h i f t .
The s h e r i f f charges $5.85 per p a tro l hour.

With t h i s r a t e , Fowler

and Westphalia each pay the s h e r i f f $ 7 ,0 2 0 , D allas pays $585 and Lebanon
pays $292.
The s h e r i f f does not depend upon c o n t r a c t in g , a t t h i s tim e , to
provide f o r his road p a tro l s e rv ic e .

In 1974 the s h e r i f f produced an

estimated t o t a l o f 19,136 s in g le hours o f which 2,500 or 13% went to

21

22

The townships agreed to purchase the nominal amount even though the
s h e r i f f s t i l l would have dispatched the Fowler c o ntracted p a tro l in t o
Lebanon and Dallas regardless o f whether they c o ntracted or n o t.
Many
times to in clude a f r e e r i d e r in cost sharing requires cooperation on
the p a rt o f the p o te n tia l r i d e r .
The s h e r i f f hire d a d d itio n a l personnel to s t a f f the c o n tr a c ts .
The
increase o f o a tro l hours purchased is less than 40 hours per week
f o r each community. The s h e r i f f fe e ls i t is b e t t e r not to s p e c ify
when the p a tro ls w i l l be in the contracted communities.

92
the four c o n tra c tin g communities.
man p a tro l hours.

The s h e r i f f also produced 2,496 two-

23

Future C ontracting E x p e c ta tio n s .

In 1975 th e s h e r i f f w i l l s e l l

to the township o f Watertown 35 hours o f p a tro l each week.

The ag re et

ment is t h a t the s a la r i e s w i l l be paid through C .E .T .A . funds and the
s h e r i f f w i l l provide v e h ic le and equipment, uniform and t r a i n i n g f o r
$4.00 per hour.

Outside o f th is c o n t r a c t , the s h e r i f f does not a n t i ­

c ip a te c o n tra c tin g w ith o th e r communities in the near f u t u r e .

The

s h e r i f f fe e ls t h a t i f a community is able to a f fo r d a department o f
8 to 10 f u l l - t i m e

persons, th e re is enough p ro fe s s io n a lis m present to

serve i t s community.
S p e c ific a tio n o f When P a tro ls Work and A c t i v i t i e s They Perform.
Since the contracted amounts are so s m a ll, the s h e r i f f coordinates the
hours spent in the fo u r communities along w ith the general p a tro l
schedule.

The needs o f the general county along with the needs o f

the c o n tra c tin g communities l a r g e l y determines how many cars w i l l
near t h e i r communities on any given p a tro l s h i f t .

be

Regarding a c t i v i t i e s

the s h e r i f f has the p a tr o ls perform mostly com plaint answering a c t i v i t y
He in d ic a te d t h a t i f the c o ntracts were la r g e r he would e n t e r t a i n the
notion o f running com m unity-related errands.
Reporting to Local Community.

The s h e r i f f does not have any

r e g u la r system o f r e p o rtin g to lo c a l o f f i c i a l s o f the c o n tra c tin g

0 *3

The s h e r i f f does not s p e c ify whether the c o n tra c tin g communities w i l l
re ce iv e one or two-man p a tro l hours.
Sometimes, a two-man u n it w i l l
serve the c o n tra c tin g community. Since most o f the p a tro l hours
produced by the s h e r i f f are s in g le ones and since the c o n tra c ts are
f u l f i l l e d as a p a r t o f general county p a t r o l , i t has been assumed
t h a t only s in g le p a tro l hours are supplied to the c o n tra c tin g
communities.

93
communities due to the smallness o f the c o n tra c ts .

The local o f f i c i a l s

have not questioned the hours a c t u a lly spent in the community, and they
seem s a t i s f i e d with the le v e l o f s e rv ic e rece iv e d .
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f P atro l S e rv ic e .
' ''
"T
'

24

There is no minimum le v e l o f

s e rv ic e which the s h e r i f f would refu s e to s e l l to a lo ca l community.
Rotating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D ep uties.

The s h e r i f f

has the p o lic y o f r o t a t in g his people from one p o rtio n o f the county
to another.
Liquor In sp ection Revenue.

The v i l l a g e o f Westphalia receives

liq u o r insp ection revenue, and the others do i f they apply f o r i t .
Comparison o f P a tro l Costs and Contract P r ic e .
s h e r i f f has l i t t l e

The C lin ton

d e s ire to c o n tra c t with a d d itio n a l communities.

Some s h e r i f f s are motivated to c o n tra c t to prevent o r lessen the
p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f small lo ca l departments, contending t h a t good law
enforcement s e rv ic e is not possiole u n t i l the lo ca l department has
20 persons or more working in i t .

The C lin to n s h e r i f f fe e ls t h a t 8 to

10 persons is adequate to provide good s e r v ic e .

The t a b le below

compares the c o n tra c t p r ic e to the s h e r i f f ' s and a u th o r's estim ate o f
c o s ts .

24

The b e n e f it which lo c a l o f f i c i a l s perceive from a small a d d itio n a l
s e rv ic e le v e l is t h a t people are less l i k e l y to run the stop l i g h t s
or speed or l o i t e r in the center o f town because th e re is a chance
th a t a s h e r i f f ' s ca r w i l l be working in t h a t p a r t i c u l a r community.
The expected value o f such a c t i v i t i e s decreases with the random
assignment o f p a tro l v e h ic le s .
In a d d i t io n , they may also perceive
a lower le v e l o f response tim e.

i

94
Table 3 -3 .

Estimate o f v a r ia b le resources used, annual amount paid to
s h e r i f f and s h e r i f f ' s cost e s tim a te .

Number o f
Annual One-Man
P a tro l Hours
Purchased

Community

Annual Amount
Paid to
S h e r iff at
$ 5 . 8 5 /h r

Sheri f f ' s
Annual Cost
Estimate

Estim ate o f
Resources
Used Annually

Fowler v i l l a g e

12 00

$7,020

$7 ,848

$8,364

Westphalia
v i 11 age

1200

7,020

7,848

8,3 6 4

100

585

849

892

50

292

424

446

2550

$14,917

$16,969

$18,066

Dallas Twp.
Lebanon Twp.
TOTALS

The s h e r i f f does a l l

the cost estim atin g f o r his fo u r c o n tra c ts .

He has chosen to charge a p r ic e which is less than c o s t, j u s t i f y i n g
th is a c tio n by saying t h a t the d if fe r e n c e is owed to the c o n tra c tin g
communities because they pay county tax es .

I t is not known how. much

o f the s h e r i f f ' s oth e r services go to the c o n tra c tin g communities nor
how much general p a tro l

(o th e r than provid ing the agreed number o f

c o n tra c t hours) enters the c o n tra c tin g communities.
amounts o f money are r e l a t i v e l y s m a ll, and l i t t l e

The c ontracts and

care is exerted to

document such in fo rm a tio n .

KENT COUNTY
In 1974 the Kent County s h e r i f f had contracts with seven d i f f e r e n t
townships.

To understand c o n tra c tin g in Kent County, the seven c o ntracts

must be tr e a te d as a package and not i n d i v i d u a l l y because the s h e r i f f
views them in th is manner.

95
During the l a t t e r p a r t o f the 1960's the u n d e r s h e r iff engaged
many township o f f i c i a l s

in numerous discussions about in creasing the

p a tro l s e rv ic e to the o u tly in g a reas.

But th e re always remained the

ubiquitous question o f who should pay fo r the added s e rv ic e .

The
t

County Commission, dominated by urban commissioners, c o n t in u a lly refused
to increase p a tro l s e rv ic e s , contending t h a t i f r u r a l communities
wanted more p a t r o l s , they should pay f o r the a d d itio n a l s e rv ic e load
as do the c i t i e s .

The township maintained t h a t they did not possess

the m illa g e to finance a higher s e rv ic e load.

In 1971 the Emergency

Employment Act was passed which provided fe d e ral employment funds
making possible contracts with nine d i f f e r e n t townships.

The agreement

was t h a t EEA funds would be used f o r the s a la r ie s and t h a t the town­
ships would pay f o r the v e h ic le s .

A t o t a l o f seven s in g le p a tro ls

were put in to nine c o n tra c tin g townships with each p a tro l providing
24 hour, seven day per week coverage.

At the time o f the o r ig in a l

c o n tr a c ts , each lo ca l u n it pledged to pick up the s a la r ie s once EEA
funds e xpired.
When the EEA money ended, two o f the townships in d ic a te d they could
not assume r e s p o n s ib ili t y f o r p o lic e s a la r ie s and the o th e r seven
in d ic a te d t h a t they could not a f f o r d 24 hour coverage.

26

In n e g o tia ­

t in g the 1974 s e t o f c o n tr a c ts , the Board o f County Commissioners, the
s h e r i f f , and the townships, agreed t h a t the county would provide a l l
v e h ic le expense w h ile the townships would pay f o r a l l

the s a l a r i e s .

This would be done in providing f i v e s in g le p a tro l u n i t s , each providing

25

In one o f the communities m illa g e earmarked fo r p o lic e services
f a i l e d to pass.

96
six te en hours o f coverage d a i l y , 365 days per y e a r to seven communitie s .

26

The a ctual amount b i l l e d to a l l the c o n tra c tin g communities

was $203,271 which is approxim ately $6.96 per s in g le p a tr o l hour.
In 1974 the s h e r i f f provided to the c o n tra c tin g townships 29,200
»

s in g le p a tro l hours.

The only th in g which would erode t h is schedule

was a man appearing in co u rt during his r e g u la r to u r o f duty in the
township.

Also during 1974 the s h e r i f f produced 99,280 hours o f s in g le

p a tro l to the n o n-contracting portions o f the county.

These general

patrol hours could be eroded by sickness, va ca tio n s , holidays or court
tim e.

I f f o r some reason p a tro l personnel was la c k ing f o r a p a r t i c u l a r

s h i f t , the s h e r i f f would f i l l

the contracted p a tro ls f i r s t and then

s t a f f the general p a tro ls w ith the remaining persons.

The s h e r i f f is

not t h a t dependent upon c o n tra c tin g to provide p a tro l s e r v ic e .
to ta l

128,480 s in g le p a tro l hours produced by the s h e r i f f in 1974,

23% went s p e c i f i c a l l y to c o n tra c tin g townships.

26

27

Of the

27

Five s in g le p a tro l units can serve seven townships because fo u r o f
the townships each re c e iv e o n e - h a lf o f a s in g le p a tro l u n i t .
In
essence, each o f the fo u r townships receives e ig h t hours o f s in g le
p a tro l coverage - four hours during the f i r s t s h i f t and fo u r hours
during the second s h i f t , although the hours are staggered and given
to the communities on a random basis and as c a lls f o r s e rv ic e w a rra n t.
At the e x p ir a t io n o f EEA funds, the s h e r i f f ' s general p a tro ls
increased as his department picked up those p a tro ls which the town­
ships would not purchase through c o n tr a c t.
I t is i n t e r e s t in g to note
t h a t the county c u r r e n t ly refuses to consider the request by the two
townships, who prev io u s ly discontinued the c o n tra c t s e r v ic e , to use
CETA funds to work a s i m i l a r arrangement as was done w ith EEA funds.
The reasoning is t h a t once CETA funds s to p , the townships would again
be unable ( u n w illin g ) to pick up the s a la r ie s o f the deputies and
continue the s e r v ic e , meaning a la r g e r county budget or the unemploy­
ment o f the a ffe c te d d epu ties.

Future C ontracting E x p e c tatio n s .

The s h e r i f f expects to c o n tra c t

with other to w n s h ip s ,e s p e c ia lly the two which experienced a higher le v e l
o f s e rv ic e in 1972 and 1973 uut were unable to continue c o n tra c tin g in
1974.

I t has been the s h e r i f f ' s th in k in g to encourage c o n tra c tin g in
t

order to discourage the growth o f s m a ll, l o c a l l y operated p o lic e
agencies.

He has been f a i r l y successful to d a te ; th e re are no township

p o lic e departments in Kent County.
Reporting to Local Communities.

The s h e r i f f gives a monthly

re p o rt to each c o n tra c tin g township w ith a breakdown o f the complaints
and a r r e s t s .

He also sends lo cal o f f i c i a l s th e number o f hours spent

on d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s

( t r a f f i c , re p o rt w r i t i n g , e t c . ) along w ith the

logs o f every c a l l answered in t h e i r re s p e c tiv e community complete
with address and nature o f the com plaint.

For those townships which

share a c a r , there is no aggregate r e p o rtin g as to the number o f hours
each received during the month although they do re c e iv e the log o f
OO

complaints f o r t h e i r re s p e c tiv e community.
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f P atrol S e r v ic e .

The minimum package which the

s h e r i f f is w i l l i n g to supply is 40 hours due to the problem o f h i r i n g
p a r t-tim e help and to his unwillingness to cut general road p a tro l to
supply the f r a c t i o n a l man.

He is w i l l i n g and encourages townships to

combine t h e i r revenue and purchase a 40 hour weekly p a tro l package.
S p e c if ic a t io n o f P atrol Schedules and A c t i v i t i e s They Perform .
Patrol schedules are s e t by the s h e r i f f and are standard f o r a l l
t r a c t i n g townships--16 hours per day, 365 days per y e a r .

con­

For those

OO

Also in the log o f complaints are those c a l l s answered by general
p a tro ls so even i f i t is not possib le to say how much time the general
p a tro ls spend in t h e i r community, they can t e l l i f they have received
any general p a tro l s e rv ic e during the month and the number o f com­
p la in ts answered by them.

98
townships which share a c a r , the s h e r i f f t r i e s to keep the car in the
community which has the most com plaints.

For those times when both

townships are e q u a lly busy, c a lls are answered on a f i r s t come bas is .
Community r e la t io n s are very im portant in the s h e r i f f ' s p rovision
o f contracted law s e rv ic e .

As a p a r t o f t h i s , the s h e r i f f allows

community r e la t e d errands to be done although th e re are not many
requests f o r t h is s e rv ic e .

The s h e r i f f in s tr u c ts each s h i f t to v i s i t

the s upervisor each day to see i f th e re are any special complaints
which need to be handled.

This a ffo rd s a convenient op portunity f o r

the township o f f i c i a l s to make a special request w ithout c a l l i n g the
s h e r i f f ' s d is p a tc h e r.
R otating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D ep utie s .

The s h e r i f f

attempts to keep the same deputies working in a p a r t i c u l a r c o n tra c tin g
community.

This could be a ffe c te d by sickness, v a c a tio n , holidays and

normal a t t r i t i o n .
Liquor Inspection Revenue.
in s p e c tio n .

No contracted deputy does any li q u o r

The s h e r i f f has tv/o permanent people which perform th is

a c t i v i t y , and the revenue generated from li q u o r insp ection goes to the
county.

29

Comparison o f Patrol Costs and Contract P r i c e .

The s h e r i f f ' s goal

has been to prevent the growth o f township p o lic e departments.
t r a c t i n g has helped achieve t h is go al.

Con­

Urban commissioners dominate

the county board and have taken the p o s itio n t h a t i f higher le v e ls o f
p a tro l s e rv ic e are desired by the r u ra l portions o f the county than

29

The county has a special budget f o r l i q u o r inspection and i t showed
t h a t the county pays more to provide the s e rv ic e than i t receives
from the Liquor Commission.

99
they should be financed w ith lo c a l r a th e r than county ta x e s .

The

compromise s it u a t io n is t h a t the townships pay f o r the s a la r i e s and
frin g es which were $203,271 and the county pays f o r the v e h ic le and
uniform which were $35,410.

To insure t h a t a l l personnel costs are
»

passed on to the townships, the county has a special account from which
they charge costs and b i l l

the townships.

In th is county, the comis-

sioners have agreed to the c o n tra c tin g knowing t h a t the costs w i l l

not

be covered by the c o n tra c t p r ic e ; however, they probably do not know
the magnitude o f the d if f e r e n c e .
I f the Kent County Board is dominanted by urban commissioners,
how were the townships able to ob tain a p r ic e which is less than
v a r ia b le costs?

The usual response to t h is question is t h a t the county

owes these communities something because o f county taxes they pay.
the townships s t i l l

But

re ce iv e a la r g e number o f p a tro l hours from the

county general p a t r o l .

There are two possible reasons.

F irs t, i f

the townships refuse to c o n tra c t when EEA money ended, the county
would have been faced with e i t h e r g r e a t ly expanding the s h e r i f f ' s
budget or dismissing a la r g e number o f men.

Second, even though the

commissioners are urban o r ie n t e d , f i v e o f them are also Republican
along w ith a l l o f the Republican commissioners representin g the town­
ships.

I t appears t h a t the r u ra l Republicans were able to gain support

from t h e i r urban c o un terparts.

LENAWEE COUNTY
Lenawee County is the only county where communities purchase
patrol services from two d i f f e r e n t s u p p lie r s .

One s u p p lie r is the

Lenawee County s h e r i f f and the o th e r is Frank Becker, a p r iv a t e c i t i z e n

100
who f o r twenty years has had his own p o lic e department and sold p o lic e
services to several v illa g e s and townships.

F i r s t the s h e r i f f ' s and

then the p r iv a t e s u p p lie r c o n tra c tin g operation w i l l be discussed.
The County S h e r i f f
>

C u r r e n t ly , the s h e r i f f contracts w ith the v ill a g e s o f D e e r f ie ld
and C layton.

D e e r f ie ld o f f i c i a l s wanted a maximum o f 20 hours per

week coverage, e s p e c ia lly during the summer months, although the c o n tra c t
does not s p e c ify any c e r t a in amount o f tim e .
the s h e r i f f . . .
and "enforce a l l

" sh all fu rn is h p o lic e p r o te c tio n to . . .

the v i ll a g e "

v i l l a g e ordinances on approval o f the v i l l a g e a tto rn e y

who s h a ll provide a l l
o r d in a n c e s ..."

R ath er, i t s ta te s t h a t

le g a l services in connection w ith a l l

v illa g e

For t h is s e r v ic e , the v i l l a g e pays to th e s h e r i f f a

sum o f $5,200 f o r one y e a r .

Clayton has an almost i d e n t ic a l c o n tra c t

and pays a y e a r ly amount o f $ 1 ,2 0 0 .

The s h e r i f f has not increased his

s t a f f , handling each c o n tr a c t w ith his general p a t r o l .
Future Contracting E x p e c tatio n s .

The s h e r i f f has j u s t th is past

y e a r become involved in s e l l i n g services to lo c a l communities.

Although

in the fu tu r e he a n tic ip a te s a d d itio n a l c o n t r a c ts , he does not a c t iv e l y
s o l i c i t c o n tra c ts .

One reason f o r t h is is t h a t i f he is too a g gressive,

he could a lie n a t e lo ca l o f f i c i a l s which could have p o l i t i c a l

ra m ifi­

cations in the general e l e c t io n .
Reporting to Local Community.

The s h e r i f f sends a monthly re p o r t

to D e e r fie ld containing the t o t a l number o f hours s p e n t, a r re s ts made,
and complaints answered.

No r e g u la r re p o rtin g is done f o r C la y to n ,

although the u n d e r s h e r if f , when a complaint o f a lo c a l ordinance v i o l a ­
tio n is re c e iv e d , w i l l send a copy o f what was done on th e complaint to
Clayton o f f i c i a l s .

101
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f Patrol S e r v ic e .

The s h e r i f f demonstrates t h a t he

is w i l l i n g to supply any le v e l o f s e rv ic e which a community d e s ire s .
He is able to do t h i s because in the c o n tra c t the exact number o f hours
to be spent in the community is not s p e c if ie d .

Because the exact

number o f hours is not s p e c if ie d , the s h e r i f f does not f in d i t necessary
to increase his p a tro l s t a f f .
re g u la r general p a t r o ls .

The e x tra s e rv ic e is provided during the

P r io r to the c o n tr a c t, the s h e r i f f responded

to complaints and to some c ru is in g in the v i l l a g e s , but he would not
enforce lo c a l ordinances which he now does and which c o n s t it u t e the
bulk o f the e x tra le v e l o f s e rv ic e .
S p e c if ic a t io n o f P a tro l Schedule and A c t i v i t i e s They Perform.
the s h e r i f f f u l f i l l s

Since

his c ontractual o b lig a tio n during re g u la r general

p a t r o l , the schedules are ou tside the control o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s .

If

the s h e r i f f had a c o n tra c t la rg e enough to have p a tro l personnel
permanently assigned, he would not be opposed to having the c o n tra c t
p a tro ls perform community r e la t e d errands.

In his present c o n t r a c t ,

he enforces lo ca l ordinances.
Rotating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D eputies.

The s h e r i f f ' s

p o lic y is to r o t a te his patrolmen r a th e r than have them permanently
s ta tio n e d .
Liquor Inspection Revenue.

Revenue generated by li q u o r in sp ection

goes to the v i l l a g e s .
Comparison o f Patrol Costs and Contract P r i c e .
chosen to charge D e e r fie ld an annual p ric e o f $5 ,2 0 0.

The s h e r i f f has
I t is estim ated

t h a t the s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l w i l l spend approximately 473 hours in Deer­
f i e l d , and the cost o f these hours is approximately $ 6,073.

Since the

s h e r i f f had not increased his s t a f f to meet his co n tra c tu a l o b l i g a t i o n ,

102
the $5,200 has been paid simply to r e - a l l o c a t e e x is t in g general p a t r o ls .
This means t h a t the non-contracting p o rtio n o f the county receives fewer
general p a tro ls a f t e r the c o n tra c t than b e fo re .

No a n a ly s is was done

f o r the Clayton c o n t r a c t , although much the same reasoning would apply.
»

The presence o f a p r iv a t e s u p p lie r , who has consid erable knowledge
in the cost o f producing p a tro l s e rv ic e in Lenawee County, helps keep
the s h e r i f f honest in re p o rtin g a c o n tra c t p r ic e .

During 1974, the

s h e r i f f reported t h a t he could provide p a tro l s e rv ic e f o r a c e r t a in
amount.

The p r iv a t e s u p p lie r challenged him, contending t h a t the only

way he could charge such a low p ric e was because the county tre a s u ry
would make up the d if fe r e n c e .
P r iv a te P olice S up p lier
In 1953, Prank Becker and his w ife began provid ing p o lic e serv ic e s
to the v i l l a g e o f B r i t t o n , Michigan.

Becker, a r e s id e n t o f B r i t t o n ,

along with other v i l l a g e council members f e l t t h a t he could provide the
needed p o lic e s e rv ic e a t a p ric e which was a ff o r d a b le to B r it t o n
re s id e n ts .

By 1956, he was also supplying p o lic e services to the v i l l a g e

o f D e e r fie ld and the townships o f Macon and Ridgeway.

Becker became a

sworn deputy s h e r i f f enabling him to enforce s ta te and county s ta tu e s .
He is also the sworn c h ie f o f p o lic e o f each o f the c o n tra c tin g communi­
t i e s , allow ing him to enforce local ordinances.
In 1965, the v i l l a g e o f D e e r fie ld discontinued t h e i r c o n tra c t
because they needed the funds to finance a sewer p r o j e c t .

In a d d i t io n ,

there was some disenchantment by D e e r fie ld o f f i c i a l s who expected Becker
to put in more hours than they were w i l l i n g to purchase.
v i l l a g e o f C lin ton contracted with Becker.

In 1970, the

This w r it t e n c o n tr a c t along

with the Macon, Ridgeway, and B r itto n w r it t e n c o n t r a c t s , comprise the
communities to which Frank Becker c u r r e n t ly provides p o lic e s e rv ic e s .

103
Frank Becker operates his p o lic e business out o f his home in
B r it t o n .

He provides 24 hour phone s e rv ic e to the c it iz e n s o f B r i t t o n ,

Macon, and Ridgeway.

When his w ife is unable to answer the phone and

dispatch a c a r , a switch is thrown, t r a n s f e r r in g a l l c a lls to his
t

daughter, who then provides the phone answering s e rv ic e .

When c it iz e n s

of C lin to n need p o lic e s e rv ic e s , they c a l l the C lin to n S ta te P o lic e
post who dispatch Becker's o f f i c e r s o r handle the complaint i f Becker's
personnel are o f f duty.

A s p i r i t o f cooperation between Becker and

the S ta te P olice seems to p r e v a i l .
The ta b le below l i s t s the number o f s in g le p a tro l hours contracted
f o r and received by c o n tra c tin g communities and the amount each pays
in 1974-75.

Table 3 -4 .

Yearly hours contracted and received and p r ic e paid in
1974-75.

Community
C lin ton v i l l a g e
Ri dgeway

Yearly Hours
o f S in gle P atrol
Contracted

Y e a rly Hours o f
S in g le Patrol
Recei ved

P ric e
Paid

4000

4000

$36,000

480

1300

3,600

360

1 ,500

Macon

5,200

B r it to n

Macon and B r it t o n do not c o n tra c t f o r a set number o f hours.

Becker

estimates t h a t he puts in about 360 hours in Macon each y e a r and t h a t
he puts in almost t r i p l e the hours which Ridgeway purchases through
c o n tr a c t; no estim ate was made f o r B r i t t o n .

Since Becker h ire s men to

104
handle the C lin to n o p e r a tio n , the hours placed in t h a t community are
c a r e f u l l y counted.
and b i l l

30

For special events Becker w i l l h i r e e x tra personnel

the communities e x tr a .

Becker h ire s two f u l l - t i m e men and a h a lf - t i m e person and makes use
o f fo u r p a r t - tim e men who l i v e in B r i t t o n .

The two f u l l - t i m e men

e x c lu s iv e ly work the C lin ton c o n tra c t w h ile Becker does the m a jo r it y o f
the complaint answering s e rv ic e fo r B r i t t o n , Macon and Ridgeway.

If

Becker is u n a v a ila b le , his w ife c a lls one o f the p a r t- t im e men to
respond or requests the s h e r i f f ' s department to respond.
Future Contracting Ex pe c tations .

At th is time Frank Becker has no

d e s ire to c o n tra c t with any oth e r communities.
are a l l

The fo u r c u rre n t contra c ts

in contiguous communities, and he fe e ls t h a t i t

to c o n tra c t with any community t h a t is not nearby.

is not p r o f i t a b l e

D e e r fie ld was on

the edge o f his c u rre n t c o n tra c tin g boundary and Becker found i t
d i f f i c u l t to handle a l l the requests f o r s e rv ic e .

31

B r it t o n was the only community which Becker approached concerning
provision o f p o lic e s e rv ic e s .
to him.

The o th e r communities made overtures

The v i l l a g e o f C lin to n f i r s t requested to purchase a higher

le v e l o f s e rv ic e from the S ta te P o lic e post in C lin to n .

30

31

The post

The C lin to n hours do not include t r a n s i t to and from B r it t o n (a p p r o x i­
mately 25 m iles per s h i f t ) and they include time spent in court and
time spent a s s is tin g other p o lic e departments.
D e e r f ie ld contracted f o r a set number o f hours which would be s e rviced
by Becker.
But D e e r f ie ld c it iz e n s would have need f o r s e rv ic e when
Becker was not in t h e i r community.
Since D e e r fie ld was approxim ately
19 miles away from B r i t t o n , i t was c o s tly f o r Becker to provide the
s e rv ic e f r e e and D e e r fie ld was u n w illin g to pay any a d d itio n a l money.
I t is in t e r e s t in g to note t h a t Becker works more hours in B r i t t o n ,
Macon, and Ridgeway than he is paid f o r ; but since tiiese communities
are close to his residence and he is a c i t i z e n o f B r i t t o n , he does
i t f r e e o f charge.

105
commander refused and r e fe r r e d C lin to n o f f i c i a l s

to Becker.

Several

communities, which have t h e i r own p o lic e departments, have also approached
Becker about tak in g over t h e i r p o lic e o p e r a tio n , but he has refused to
c o n tra c t w ith them because he senses t h a t the e le c te d o f f i c i a l s w i l l
i

be too a c t iv e l y involved in the day to day p o lic e o p e ra tio n ( e . g . ,
s p e c ify in g which t ic k e t s should be ignored and which ones e n fo rc e d , e t c . ) .
Such a s it u a t io n is not t o l e r a b le to Becker.
C u rre n tly the c it iz e n s o f C lin to n have in d ic a te d t h a t they want
t h e i r own department and are considering fo u r o p tio n s .
could s t a r t i t s own department.
from the county s h e r i f f .

F i r s t , C lin to n

Second, i t could buy p a tr o l serv ic e s

T h ir d , Becker could continue to provide p o lic e

services under the c u rre n t c o n tr a c t.

Fourth, Becker, who is a lre a d y

t h e i r p o lic e c h i e f , could sign a d i f f e r e n t c o n tra c t and e s ta b lis h and
operate out of a p o lic e s t a tio n located in C lin to n .
Repo rtin g

to Local Community.

Once a month C lin to n v i l l a g e

receives a re p o rt regarding the p o lic e a c t i v i t y in t h e i r community from
Becker; the re p o rt has a breakdown o f the complaints and a r re s ts as well
as the amount of time spent on p a t r o l , answering com pla ints , c o u rt time
and time a s s is tin g o th e r p o lic e agencies.

Becker sends to the th re e

communities complaints and a rre s ts broken down every 6 months.
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f Patrol S e r v ic e .

Becker has a lre ad y demonstrated

t h a t he is w i l l i n g to provide the amount o f s e rv ic e a community fe e ls
i t can a f f o r d .

However, a t t h is time Becker is u n w illin g to supply

s e rv ic e to another community regardless o f what they wish to buy.
S p e c ific a t io n o f When P a tro ls Work and A c t i v i t i e s They Perform .
Becker s p e c ifie s when the p a tro ls w i l l work in C lin t o n .

In the o th e r

th re e communities Becker responds to c a lls f o r s e rv ic e as he receives

106
them.

Becker does allo w his o f f i c e r s to perform community r e la te d

errands but not personal errands.

32

Rotating versus Permananetly S ta tio n in g D eputies.

The same two

men work in C lin to n v i l l a g e , and Becker is widely known by people in
i
B r i t t o n , Macon, and Ridgeway.
Liquor Inspection Revenue.

Revenue generated from Becker o r one

o f his men performing a li q u o r inspection goes to the c o n tra c tin g
community.
Comparison o f Patrol Costs and Contract P r ic e .

Becker estimates

his per hour cost a t $8.42 to supply C lin ton with 4000 hours o f s in g le
p a t r o l.

Incorporated in to t h is p r ic e is the gross s a la ry o f the two

men (vacatio n time o f two weeks per man, frin g es which include FICA and
a l i f e and health insurance p o lic y , and double pay i f tiiey work h o lid a y s ) ,
v e h ic le

32

33

and uniform expenses, and re n t f o r the o f f i c e .

I t is possible t h a t lo cal o f f i c i a l s might be in h ib it e d in requesting
conmunity r e la t e d erra n d s, e s p e c ia lly when they must go through the
s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e f o r approval or even through the s h e r i f f ' s d is p a tc h e r.
In h ib it io n s could be lessened i f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s had d i r e c t contact
with the contracted deputies o r , as in C lin to n County, lo ca l o f f i c i a l s
can c a l l the S tate P o lic e Post to request the c a r.

33

Becker estimated t h a t i t cost him approximately $8,760 to operate the
C lin ton ve h c ile f o r 4000 hours. This expense includes a l l operating
costs (gas, o i l , and m aintenance), v e h ic le d e p re c ia tio n which is h a l f
the purchase p ric e ( i f we assumed t h a t the c ar la s ts two y e a r s , then
no t r a d e - i n value is deducted; but i f the
ca r la s ts only one y e a r , then
i t is assumed
t h a t the t r a d e - i n would be approximately $ 2 , 0 0 0 which is
f a r more than
Becker would l i k e l y get f o r
a p o lic e c a r with 60,000
miles on i t ) .
During the 4000 hours, the
car tr a v e le d approximately
57,000 miles which means the cost per m ile is 15<£. [Per m ile cost
estim ate f o r two o f the s h e r i f f ' s cars was done and the average was
1 0 .5<t per m ile .
This f i g u r e included the purchase p r ic e o f the v e h ic le
minus the expected t r a d e - i n o f $ 1 2 0 0 per c a r , operating expenses, car
insurance and d e p re c ia tio n and maintenance estiamtes f o r rad io equip­
ment. The d iffe r e n c e in the cost per m ile between the s h e r i f f and
Becker is due in p a r t to d if fe r e n c e in gas prices ( s h e r i f f pays approxi­
mately 251 per g a l. w h ile Becker pays 44<t) and the s h e r i f f obtains
f l e e t prices f o r car insurance.

107
I f $8.42 is an accurate r e f l e c t i o n cost and since he charges $9.00
per hour, his y e a r ly p r o f i t on the C lin ton c o n tra c t is approximately
$2,000.

But there are some costs which have probably not been included.

I f Becker spends any time in C lin t o n , th is is not included in the p ric e
j

nor is an estim ate f o r the time his w ife gives through answering the
phone and doing any dispatching f o r the C lin to n area.
Other sources o f revenue f o r Becker include $500 from the F ire
Department f o r answering f i r e c a lls and dispatching t h e i r f i r e tru c k s .
Becker is also the Building In s p e c to r, which is another source o f
revenue.
A unique fe a tu re which Becker has incorporated in to the 1975-76
c ontract w ith C lin ton w i l l be q u a r te r ly re-assessment o f co s t.
1974, Becker was caught with unexpected r is in g gas p ric e s .
fo r any oth e r unforeseen cost in creases, he w i l l

During

To allo w

r e -e v a lu a te his cost

q u a r te r ly and be allowed to a d ju s t his p ric e a cco rd ing ly.

No county

s h e r i f f c u r r e n tly has such a s t ip u la t io n in any o f t h e i r c o n tra c ts .
This means t h a t the county bears a l l

r is k o f unforeseen expense.

Those counties which come the c lo s e s t to avoiding a l l the r is k are
those which b i l l

the c o n tra c tin g w ith actual expenses.

Comparison o f the Two Contracting Operations
N e ith e r the s h e r i f f nor Becker is a c t iv e l y attem pting to increase
the number o f c o n tra c tin g o p eration s.

As evidence o f t h i s , when C lin to n

approached the s h e r i f f p r i o r to t h e i r 1974-75 c o n tra c t with Becker, the
s h e r i f f was not prepared to quote them a p r ic e .

Before D e e r f ie ld and

Clayton contracted w ith the s h e r i f f , n e ith e r one approached Becker f o r
a p ric e quote nor did Becker approach e i t h e r community with an o f f e r .

108
Both Becker and the s h e r i f f are very s im il a r in the s e rv ic e they
are w i l l i n g to provide.

Both allo w t h e i r o f f i c e r s to perform community

r e la te d errand s, enforce lo cal ordinances, provide the le v e l o f s e rv ic e
which best meets the community's w illin g n e s s and a b i l i t y to pay, re p o rt
t

monthly to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s , and allow liq u o r in sp ection revenue to go
to the c o n tra c tin g community.

The only apparent d iffe r e n c e is t h a t the

s h e r i f f is u n w illin g to s t a tio n men permanently in a community (providing
he had a c o n tra c t which c a lle d f o r a c e r t a in le v e l o f personnel) w h ile
Becker is w i l l i n g to do so.

Both the s h e r i f f and Becker attempt to

use experienced men on p a t r o l .

Becker attempts to h i r e men with

experience and who have already been through academy t r a i n i n g .

I f the

s h e r i f f h ire s an inexperienced person, he w i l l have him attend the
p o lic e academy f o r a t le a s t 256 hours o f t r a i n in g and then work in the
o f f i c e and j a i l

u n t i l there is an opening on the road p a t r o l.

While the services provided by Becker and the s h e r i f f to t h e i r
respective communities do not d i f f e r , the prices t h a t they charge
do d i f f e r .

Becker charges $9.00 f o r a s in g le hour o f p a tro l to C lin to n

v i l l a g e , and $7.50 per hour to Ridgeway township.

Becker says t h a t he

puts in 1,300 hours in Ridgeway, which would make the per hour p ric e
$2.77 per hour.

Even though no s p e c if ic number o f hours was s p e c ifie d

in the Macon c o n tr a c t, Becker estimates t h a t he spent about 360 hours
l a s t y e ar which makes the per hour p ric e $4.17 f o r Macon.
The s h e r i f f ' s p ric e per hour to D e e r fie ld o f f i c i a l s

is $10.9 9.

But

i t must be remembered t h a t the s h e r i f f supplies a double patrol w h ile
Becker provides s in g le p a tro l coverage.

While the s h e r i f f charged

$10.99 per hour, i t is estimated t h a t the cost per hour was $12.84.
I f the s h e r i f f p e rs is ted in operating double p a t r o l s , then he would not

109
be able to provide the s e rv ic e cheaper than Becker.

However, i t

appears t h a t i f the s h e r i f f chose to run s in g le p a t r o l s , and i f Becker
gave to contra c tin g communities the number o f hours he claims he gave,
ra th e r than the number o f hours c o n tra c ted , he would s t i l l

be a t a
>

cost disadvantage.
Since i t is not known how Becker a rriv e d a t the $9.00 per hour
p r ic e , a cost comparison cannot be done.

I t is possible t h a t Becker

included in his cost estimates some things which were not included in
the s h e r i f f ' s cost e s tim ate.

For example, Becker includes an item f o r

rent o f his o f f i c e w h ile no b u ild in g d e p re c ia tio n was included in the
s h e r i f f ' s e s tim ate .

Overtime is another cost the s h e r i f f has which

was not included in his cost estim ate because i t

is not c le a r how much,

i f any, overtime re su lted from the D e e r fie ld c o n tr a c t.

No overtime

re su lts in Becker's op era tio n .

GENESEE COUNTY
In 1974 the Genesee County s h e r i f f contracted with th re e d i f f e r e n t
communities.

Table 3-5 shows the number o f p a tro l hours, number o f

persons under c o n t r a c t, and the maximum p r ic e which the s h e r i f f can
charge f o r each c o n tr a c t.

Contracting accounts f o r 50% o f a l l s in g le

and 2 2 % o f a l l double p a tro l hours produced by the s h e r i f f .
Tv/o o f the th re e contracts emerged from township o f f i c i a l s '
d is s a t is f a c t io n w ith e i t h e r the cost o f the lo ca l department and/or
the lo cal p o lic e c h ie f .

34

P r io r to c o n tr a c tin g , Genesee township had

i t s own p o lic e department o f 15 f u l l - t i m e o f f i c e r s .

Some o f the

34
The contracts a c t u a lly begin during d i f f e r e n t months o f 1974 and run
to t h e i r re sp ec tiv e months in 1975.
Each township has in d ic a te d t h a t
they w i l l renew t h e i r contracts w ith the s h e r i f f .

no
Table 3 -5 .

Annual number o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours produced
and p r ic e charged by the Genesee County s h e r i f f .

Annual
Number o f
Single
Patrol Hours

Annual
Number o f
Double
Patrol Hours

Number o f
Persons
Under
Contract

Maximum
Revenue to be
Received from.
Each Contract

General Patrol
Genesee Township

5840

7920

Vienna Township

2920

5840

5

77 ,0 0 0 3

2920

2

32,250

18

$304,751

Fenton Township
TOTAL

11

$195,5012

The county attempts to b i l l the townships f o r actual expenses incurred
in providing the contracted p a tro ls but i t is agreed t h a t the costs
s h a ll not exceed the reported amounts.
2

Genesee Township agrees to pay f o r o v e rtim e ,th e amount not to exceed
$11 ,400.
3
Vienna Township agrees to pay fo r overtim e, but the maximum amount is
not s p e c if ie d , although the s h e r i f f agrees to keep i t to a minimum.

o f f ic e r s were paid through a fe de ral grant which was to e x p ir e , and
c o n f l i c t between the p o lic e o f f ic e r s and the township o f f i c i a l s arose
when i t became known t h a t several o f f ic e r s would be l a i d o f f once the
grant ended.

Local o f f i c i a l s decided to c o n tra c t w ith the s h e r i f f f o r

11 men, providing the s h e r i f f h ire d the Genesee Township o f f i c e r s .
he d id .

This

Vienna Township also had i t s own department before c o n tra c tin g

with the s h e r i f f .

C o n f lic t between the p o lic e c h ie f and the township

supervisor led to the f i r i n g o f the c h ie f and a c o n tra c t w ith the
s h e riff.

The Fenton Township c o n tra c t is a contin u a tio n and an expan­

sion o f a c o n tra c t which Fenton had with the s h e r i f f ' s predecessor.
The s h e r i f f s p e c ifie s in his c o n tra c t t h a t the s e rv ic e le v e l
purchased by each c o n tra c tin g community is in a d d itio n to the general

le v e l o f patrol s e rv ic e produced in re tu rn f o r county tax es .

Of a l l

the c a lls answered in the c o n tra c tin g communities by the s h e r i f f ' s
department, between 57% and 60% were handled by the s h e r i f f ' s general
p a t r o l.

35

Also s p e c ifie d in the c o n tra c t is t h a t the contracted
i

pa tro ls w i l l

respond to complaints outside the c o n tra c tin g communities.

Of the c a lls answered by the contracted p a tro ls in 1974, 11%, 8 % and 23%
were ansv/ered outside the townships o f Vienna, Genesee and Fenton
Townships, r e s p e c tiv e ly .
Future Contracting Expectations.

The s h e r i f f hopes t h a t communities

with no p o lic e department begin c o n tra c tin g f o r higher s e rv ic e l e v e ls .
The s h e r i f f does not fe e l he should attempt to s e l l his s e rv ic e or
undermine lo ca l departments because many lo ca l p o lic e departments c u r r e n tly
fe e l threatened by him.

Due to c e n tra l d is p a tc h in g , which has a p o lic y

o f assigning the c a lls to the nearest p o lic e u n it regardless o f j u r i s ­
d ic t io n a l boundaries, the s h e r i f f ' s

patro ls do respond to many c a lls in

communities which have t h e i r own department.

36

S p e c ific a tio n o f Patrol Schedules and A c t i v i t i e s Performed.

Each

c o n tra c t has a set number o f s in g le and double p a tro ls which operate
seven days per week; consequently th e re are no scheduling issues to be
resolved.

35

The s h e r i f f ' s p o lic y is to provide the same type o f p o lic e

From the s h e r i f f ' s 1974 Annual Report, the general p a tro ls handled
11,489 c a lls in Genesee, 8,898 c a lls in Vienna, and 1,521 c a lls in
Fenton. The y e a r ly estim ate o f c a lls handled by the contracted
p a tro ls were 8,949 f o r Genesee, 4,167 f o r Vienna, and 1,088 f o r Fenton.
The s h e r i f f , s t a te p o lic e , and a l l but two lo cal p o lic e departments
p a r t ic ip a t e in the Genesee County c e n tra l dispatching system. C alls
f o r s e rv ic e are given to the c lo s e s t p o lic e u n it regardless o f p o l i ­
tic a l ju ris d ic tio n .
Since the s h e r i f f has many general p a tro ls
op era tio n s, he is ab le to handle many c a lls in communities with t h e i r
own p o lic e department.

112
s e rv ic e to which the local o f f i c i a l s were accustomed with t h e i r own
department.

37

This includes the performing o f community r e la t e d

errands and the enforcement o f local ordinances.

To sim ulate a lo cal

department atmosphere, the s h e r i f f has estab lished s u b -s ta tio n s in
t

Genesee and Vienna Townships which f a c i l i t a t e s easy communication
between township o f f i c i a l s and d epu ties; and i t also e lim in a tes t r a n s i t
time between the s h e r i f f ' s c e n tra l headquarters and the c o n tra c tin g
community.
The s h e r i f f ' s p o lic y is to s t a f f the contracted p a tro ls f i r s t
before s t a f f i n g the general p a t r o ls .

Thus, the contracted patrol

schedule w i l l not be eroded due to v a c a tio n , sickness o r ho lid ay compensatory tim e.

38

Reporting to Local Communities.

The s h e r i f f prepares monthly

reports f o r each o f the c o n tra c tin g communities.

The reports contain

the number o f c a lls f o r s e rv ic e r e c e iv e d , number o f a rre s ts and
accidents, number o f patrol miles d r iv e n , number o f c a lls answered out
o f the township.

The s h e r i f f also has a sergeant serve as a li a i s o n

o f f i c e r f o r Genesee and Vienna Townships.

The sergeant attends many

o f the monthly meetings, answering any questions about p o lic e a c t i v i t y
in the communities.

S h o rtly a f t e r the s h e r i f f ' s c o n tra c t began, the Genesee Township
supervisor noticed speeding along a s p e c if ic s tre tc h o f road. A f t e r
he mentioned th is to the sergeant, he noticed the next day t h a t one
o f his contracted patro ls was monitoring t r a f f i c along t h a t same
s tre tc h o f road.
38

L i t t l e p a tro l time is lo s t due to court appearances. The court
a d m in is tra to r has implemented a p o lic y o f t h i r t y minute c a l l - i n .
I f an o f f i c e r who is on p a tro l is needed, the court w i l l c a ll him
o f f p a tro l.
He then has 30 minutes to a r r i v e a t the c o u rt.

113
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f Patrol S e r v ic e .
f o r fr a c t io n a l le v e ls o f s e rv ic e .

The s h e r i f f has had no requests

His predecessor had a c o n tra c t with

Fenton Township which provided p a tro l s e rv ic e only during the summer
months.

The s h e r i f f encountered d i f f i c u l t y in securing the q u a l i f i e d

p a rt-tim e personnel to s t a f f th is c o n tr a c t.
Rotating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D ep u tie s .

The s h e r i f f ' s

p o licy is to r o t a t e his deputies.
Liquor Inspection Revenue.

Revenue generated from li q u o r inspec­

tions is re tained by the c o n tra c tin g community.

The s h e r i f f w i l l also

w r it e t r a f f i c tic k e ts under the Uniform T r a f f i c Code providing the
local community has adopted i t .

39

“

Comparison o f P atrol Costs and

Contract P r i c e .

The Genesee s h e r i f f

tends to be very aggressive in providing p a tro l s e rv ic e to his county.
U n o f f i c i a l l y , he has s tated t h a t i f he had the personnel, he would
provide patrol s e rv ic e (answer comDlaints) in s id e the c i t y o f F l i n t .
A ll th is in d ic a te s the s h e r i f f desires to have his p a tro l d iv is io n
grow.
Table 3-6 compares the costs being passed on to the c o n tra c tin g
communities to the estim ate o f resources used.
The county c o n t r o l le r plays an
trac ts .

An e f f o r t has been made to

a c t iv e r o le in p r ic in g the con­
pass a l l costs

on to the c o n tra c tin g

communities; but an item which was fo rg o tte n was compensation f o r
patrolmen t im e - o f f (v a c a tio n s , h o lid a y s , e t c . ) .

To insure t h a t a l l

costs are passed on to the c o n tra c tin g communities, the county has

•3Q
The Uniform T r a f f i c Code allows t r a f f i c v io la tio n s to be w r it t e n
under a local ordinance with 1 /3 o f the f i n e money being re ta in e d
by the local community.

114
Table 3 -6 .

Estimate o f v a r ia b le resources used and estimated amount
b i l l e d to each c o n tra c tin g community.

Annual
Number
o f S in g le
P a tro l Hours

Annual
Number
o f Double
Patrol Hours

Estimated
Value o f
V a ria b le
Resources
Used in
1974

Estimate o f
Annual
Amount o f
V a ria b le
Resources
B ill e d by
County
D iffe re n c e

Genesee Twp.

5840

7920

$242,260

$204,509

$37,751

Vienna Twp.

2920

5840

153,403

95,245

58,158

2920

60,683

33,350

27,333

15680

$456,346

$333,104

$123,242

Fenton Twp.
TOTAL

8760

established a special account f o r each c o n tr a c t.

But an item w i l l not

be placed on any o f the contracted accounts u n t i l the s h e r i f f sends a
voucher to the county c o n t r o l l e r .

This gives considerable power to

the s h e r i f f in deciding what costs are passed on to the c o n tra c tin g
communities.

40

The approximate $100,000 expenditure by the county general fund
to finance the c o n tra c t d e f i c i t does purchase s e rv ic e f o r the non­
contra c tin g p o rtio n o f the county.

F i r s t , 16%, 13% and 7% o f the c a lls

received by the Vienna, Genesee, and Fenton contracted p a t r o l s , respec­
t i v e l y , are answered in the n o n-contracting communities.

But the

s h e r i f f ' s general p a tro l answered 55%, 34% and 47% o f a l l c a l l s o r i g i ­
nating in Vienna, Genesee and Fenton, r e s p e c t iv e ly .

Second, because

the s h e r i f f controls scheduling o f the contracted p a tro ls and does

^When the 1974 contracts ended and the s h e r i f f was in the process o f
n e g o tia tin g new c o n tr a c ts , the s h e r i f f became an advocate to the
c o n t r o l le r to keep the costs as low as p o s s ib le .

115
respond outside c o n tra c tin g communities, he has the op portunity to
a llo c a t e his general p a tro ls such t h a t the non-contracting po rtio n o f
the county receives higher le v e ls o f s e rv ic e .

However, the la rg e

number o f complaints answered in the c o n tra c tin g communities suggests
th a t he has not done t h i s .

WASHTENAW COUNTY
The Washtenaw County s h e r i f f has a m ixture o f contracts ranging
from a 17 deputy c o n tra c t with Y p s ila n t i Township to a s in g le deputy
contract with Superior Township.

In a d d itio n to p a tro l s e rv ic e s , the

s h e r i f f s e lls 60 weekly hours o f animal c ontrol to Y p s ila n ti Township.
He has organized several lo ca l communities and to g e th e r they pay the
local c o n trib u tio n f o r a s t a t e t r a f f i c grant and an LEAA school
lia is o n g r a n t . ^

The focus o f t h is analysis is on the contracted road

patrol s e rv ic e s .
The s h e r i f f ' s goal is to provide a l l p o lic e services to the e n t ir e
county with the exclusion o f Ann Arbor c i t y .

Table 3-7 shows the

s h e r i f f ' s dependency on c o n tra c tin g f o r the p rovision o f road p a tro l
s e rv ic e .

In 1974, 31% o f the s in g le p a tro l hours and 53% o f the double

patrol hours are financed e n t i r e l y from the general fund with the

^ T h e Highway Safety Grant is from the Department o f S ta te P o lic e and
i t provides 8 f u l l - t i m e deputies f o r t r a f f i c monitoring purposes.
Six deputies go to Y p s ila n ti Township, one is s p l i t between the
townships o f Dexter and S c io , and the eighth deputy works in P i t t s f i e l d
Township. The p o lic e support grant is from LEAA and provides 3
school lia i s o n o f f i c e r s . The goal o f the gra n t is to obtain
r e f e r r a l s reported to the c o u rts .

Table 3 -7 .

Single and double patrol hours produced and p r ic e charged
Washtenaw County s h e r i f f in 1974.

Single
Patrol
Hours

Number o f
Personnel
Under
Contract

T o tal
Amount
Paid to
S h e riff

%o f
Total

Double
Patrol
Hours

Total

7,648

31

14,600

53

5,736

23

11,680

42

17

204,000

N o r th fie ld Township^

1,664

7

1,248

5

1

16,000

Dexter V illa g e ^

7,648

31

4

71,000

Superior Township

2,080

8

1

15,000

24,776

100

23

306,000

General Patrol^
Y p s ila n ti Township

TOTAL

2

27,528

%o f

100

-

Assumes t h a t 4 s in g le p a tro l positions open on f i r s t s h i f t can be
eroded due to vacation and sickness.
Because o f t h is i t is assumed
t h a t each man working th is s h i f t provides 1,912 hours o f s in g le
p atrol converage.
(1,912 is the average number o f hours worked during
the y e a r a f t e r allowing f o r v a catio ns, s ick days and weekends.)
(4 x 1,912 - 7 ,648)
2

The same applies f o r the f i r s t s h i f t in the Y p s ila n ti c o n tra c t
(3 x 1 ,912 - 5 ,7 3 6 ).

3

North f i e l d purchased one deputy and the s h e r i f f supplies an a d d itio n a l
deputy. The usual weekly schedule is fo r 4 days each week a s in g le
u n it operates and f o r 3 days a double u n it operates.
^Dexter v i l l a g e purchases one sergeant and three deputies from the
s h e riff.
No attempt is made to cover vacation and days o f f .
Con­
sequently, the number o f s in g le patrol units is 4 x 1,912 - 7 ,6 4 8 .

remainder provided under c o n tra c t.

Table 3-7 also shows the number o f

personnel under c o n tra c t and the revenues the s h e r i f f receives from
each c o n tra c t.
The h is to ry o f the Dexter c o n tra c t is o f i n t e r e s t .

A f t e r the l a s t

local e le c t io n the Dexter c i t y council did not agree w ith how the newly
e le c ted mayor intended to use the local p o lic e department.

They

proceeded to disband the lo cal department and c o n tra c t w ith the

117
s h e riff.

42

The mayor refused to sign the c o n tra c t and contends t h a t

the agreement is i l l e g a l without her s ig n a tu re .
Patrol services to the non-contracting po rtion o f the county have
increased as a r e s u lt o f c o n tra c tin g .

Because o f c o n t r a c t in g , the

s h e r i f f has been able to fr e e a general p a tro l f o r the southern p o rtio n
o f the county which has tended, in the p a s t, to re ce iv e lower le v e ls of
s e rv ic e due to s p a rc ity o f population.

In a d d it io n , o f f i c i a l s o f York

Township have to ld the s h e r i f f th a t they receive higher le v e ls o f p a tro l
s e rvice because the s h e r i f f dispatches the c o n tra c t cars in to York
f o r emergencies.
Future Contracting Expectations.

The s h e r i f f expects t h a t as

some o f the o ld e r local c hiefs o f p o lic e r e t i r e , he w i l l c o n tra c t with
t h e i r resp ective communities.

He e v e n tu a lly sees the Y p s ila n t i c o n tra c t

doubling in s iz e in the next couple o f y e a rs .

While the s h e r i f f spends

time speaking to local o f f i c i a l s about the s e rv ic e he can provide and
the p ric e he is w i l l i n g to charge, he does not attempt to undermine
local departments.

When a c a ll comes from a c i t i z e n l i v i n g in a

community with i t s own department, the s h e r i f f r e fe r s th e c a l l to the
local department.
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f Patrol S e rv ic e .

The s h e r i f f p re fe rs to c o n tra c t

f o r 40 hours o f service per week because t h is is the e a s ie s t u n it to
s t a f f , although a community may c o n tra c t f o r a p o rtio n o f a 40 hour
weekly u n it providing another community can be found to buy the remaining
p o rtio n .

42

One community, however, purchases 30 hours o f p a tro l

s e rv ic e .

I t is not c le a r whether the s h e r i f f h ire d the deputies from the
Dexter department to s t a f f the c o n tra c t or h ire d new d e p u tie s.

119
Rotating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D eputies.

The s h e r i f f

permanently s ta tio n s deputies in a p a r t i c u l a r c o n tra c tin g community.
He attempts to place in to the contra c tin g communities those deputies
who he fe e ls w i l l best get along with the c i t i z e n s .
i

Comparison o f Patrol Costs to Contract P r i c e .

The Washtenaw

s h e r i f f desires to expand his road patrol s e rv ic e and views c o n tra c tin g
as one way o f doing t h i s .

In f a c t , the s h e r i f f has advanced the idea

th a t a l l funding fo r the crim inal ju s t i c e system should be taken away
from the county commissioners and handled by a county-wide mi 11 age
•which would a llo c a t e s p e c ific numbers o f m ills to the c o u r ts , s h e r i f f ,
and prosecutor's o f f i c e .

With th is d esire to by-pass the commissioners,

i t is not s u rp ris in g to see the c o n tra c t p ric e be less than patrol
costs as displayed in the follow ing ta b le :

Table 3-8.

Comparison o f resources used to c o n tra c t p r ic e .

Estimated Value
o f Resource Used
in the Contract
Y p s ila n ti Twp.

Contract
P rice

D iffe re n c e
Between Cost
and Control
P rice

322,123

204,000

118,123

88,716

71 ,000

17,716

Superior Twp.

24,148

15,000

9,148

N o r th fie ld Twp.

45,205

16,000

29,205

Dexter

V illa g e

The procedure and assumptions used by the s h e r i f f in determining
the c o n tra c t prices is unknown to the a u th o r, but the s h e r i f f and county
commissioners are aware t h a t the costs do exceed the p r ic e although

120
they probably are not aware o f the magnitude.

The Y p s ila n ti c ontract

s p e c ifie s t h a t the township agrees to pay $204,000 and the county
agrees to c o n trib u te $ 1 0 2 , 0 0 0 toward the provision o f road patrol
s e rv ic e .

The agreement w ith the Y p s ila n ti o f f i c i a l s was t h a t the
i

county would provide them with s ix deputies i f Y p s ila n ti financed 12.
To the township o f f i c i a l s

the s h e r i f f probably s a id , "You can obtain

s ix fr e e deputies i f you finance tw e lv e "; and to the county comissioners he probably s a id , "We can add twelve more deputies w ith no
increase in county expenditure i f the commissioners would fund s ix
a d d itio n a l d e p u tie s."
There is a considerable d iffe r e n c e between costs and prices o f
the N o r th fie ld c o n tra c t.

N o r t h fie ld o r i g i n a l l y contracted f o r one

deputy, but the s h e r i f f decided t h a t one deputy would do l i t t l e
so he assigned a d d itio n a l personnel.

good

The lo ca l o f f i c i a l s t o ld the

s h e r i f f t h a t they could perceive a d iffe r e n c e and were very s a t i s f i e d
with the arrangement.

I t is not known i f the s h e r i f f plans to keep

the a d d itio n a l personnel in N o r t h f ie ld , but s a t i s f i e d customers can
pay t r i b u t e to c o n tra c tin g which w i l l
contra c tin g e f f o r t s .

not h u rt the s h e r i f f in fu tu re

P lu s , lo ca l o f f i c i a l s may become so accustomed to

the serv ic e t h a t in several years they w i l l be w i l l i n g to pay f o r the
higher le v e l which now they enjoy without charge.
As a r e s u l t o f c o n tr a c tin g , the s h e r i f f has been able to assign
a patrol ca r to the southern p o rtio n o f the county which had a very low
le v e l o f s e rv ic e p r i o r to c o n tra c tin g .
For the remaining th re e c o n tra c ts , no s p e c if ic inform ation was
a v a ila b le to show how each p ric e was determined.

An in te r e s tin g item

in the Superior c o n tra c t is t h a t the p a tro l w i l l be " . . . w i t h i n the

121
Superior Township boundaries f o r e ig h ty (80) percent o f . . .

tim e ..." .

I t is not known how th is a ffe c te d the p ric e charged.

KALAMAZOO COUNTY
Central to the theme o f c o n tra c tin g is the s h e r i f f ' s r o le .in
providing s e rv ic e to townships and c i t i e s in re tu rn f o r the payment o f
county taxes.

No where is th is more evident than in Kalamazoo County.

Late in 1974 the county commissioners attempted to cut 17 men out o f
the s h e r i f f ' s budget.

The commissioners, p r io r to t h i s , attempted to

persuade those townships which were re ce iv in g the highest percentage
o f the s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l time to c o n tra c t f o r the 17 men.

The townships

refused, contending th a t they were owed t h e i r le v e l o f s e rv ic e as
county taxpayers.

44

The s h e r i f f has contracts with three communities.

One c o n tra c t

which has been in existence f o r several y e a r s , is with the township o f
Comstock.

In 1974, the s h e r i f f supplied them with one s in g le p a tro l

d a i l y , f i v e days per week and one double p a tro l during the second s h i f t
f i v e days per week.
There are several unique fe a tu re s about the Comstock arrangement.
F i r s t , the c o n tra c t does not s pecify the amount to be paid by Comstock.
The reason f o r t h is is t h a t each month the township is sent a b i l l f o r
actual expense o f providing s e rv ic e incurred by the county.
statement includes the s a la r ie s

The

(base plus a l l the fr in g e s ) o f the men

^ T h e issue is s t i l l not resolved. There w i l l be a general mi 11 age
vote a t which time c it iz e n s w i l l vote on a .5 m ill which w i l l be
earmarked f o r the s h e r i f f .
I f the m i l l age f a i l s , the s h e r i f f may
s t i l l be required to cut his budget although he w i l l have the
l a t i t u d e to make the budget cuts where he wishes.

122
who a c t u a lly worked and any equipment o r supplies used in the Comstock
operation .

Second, Comstock purchases i t s own p o lic e v e h ic le s , uniform

and equipment even though some o f the purchases are made through the
s h e r i f f ' s department.

One reason f o r th is is t h a t they can control

the q u a l it y and q u a n tity o f p o lic e supplies purchased;

45

’
and second,

i f they should term inate the c o n tr a c t, th is equipment would be a v a i l ­
able immediately f o r use in t h e i r own p o lic e department.

In a d d itio n

to the p a tro ls Comstock receives from the s h e r i f f , they also h ir e the
same deputies on t h e i r off-d a y s to enforce local ordinances and perform
normal p a tro l a c t i v i t i e s i f the need a r is e s .

In the l a t t e r op eration the

township pays the re g u la r hourly r a t e plus the township frin g e s which
is only F . I . C . A .

The expense o f time and a h a l f overtime can be avoided

by Comstock through th is procedure because the deputies have two
employers, the s h e r i f f and the township.
The oth e r two contracts are worked in conjunction w ith each o th e r.
One is with the v i l l a g e o f Climax and the other is with the township
o f Wakeshma.

Climax began c o n tra c tin g with the s h e r i f f during the

f i r s t p a rt o f 1974.

The v i l l a g e agrees to pay the s h e r i f f $6.00 per

man hour o f s e rvice plus 14.21% f o r frin g es and
w ith in the v i l l a g e l i m i t s .
to exceed $300.

45

Mb per m ile driven

The t o t a l sum each month, however, is not

This averages out to be approximately 36 hours o f

One township o f f i c i a l in dicated t h a t i t was more economical to buy
a he a v ie r car than what the s h e r i f f was purchasing. Since they
were going to be b i l l e d actual expenses, th e re is in c e n tiv e to search
out the most economical purchase.
In a d d it io n , by c o n t r o l lin g some
ve h ic le purchases and r e p a ir s , they d i r e c t business to lo ca l estab ­
lishments .

123
single p a tro l s e rvice each month.

46

Climax, which had never before

had i t s own department, is a low complaint a re a ; and the s h e r i f f ' s
general p a tro ls were not v i s i b l e enough to s a t i s f y v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s .
Now, on a random b a s is , a s h e r i f f ' s car spends on the average 4 hours
9 times during the month.

Climax o f f i c i a l s fe e l t h is is s u f f i c i e n t to

re s tr a in people from running t h e i r s in g le stop sign and to re ta r d some
o f the teenage l o i t e r i n g .
Toward the end o f 1974, the s h e r i f f was approached by the o f f i c i a l s
o f Wakeshma township about providing a higher le v e l o f s e rv ic e .
wanted to spend no more than $100 per month.

They

Since they are located

adjacent to Climax, i t was possible to schedule a p a tro l t h a t would
work Climax f o r about 4 hours and then spend an hour in Wakeshma.
Without Climax the s h e r i f f f e l t t h a t he would have been unable to
provide Wakeshma such a le v e l o f s e rv ic e due to d i f f i c u l t y in scheduling
patrolmen f o r such short periods.

Wakeshma pays $6.00 per hour plus

14.21% frin g es and 17<t a m ile driven w ith in the township l i m i t s .
$100 monthly l i m i t provides

The

f o r about 12 s in g le p a tro l hours each

month.
The s h e r i f f is not t h a t dependent upon c o n tra c tin g f o r road p a tro l
s e rv ic e .

Yearly he supplies a t o t a l o f 47,696 hours o f s in g le patrol

s e rvice with 576 hours going to Climax and Wakeshma, 6240 going to
Comstock, and the remainder to general p a t r o l.

The s h e r i f f also

produces 4160 hours o f double p a tro l s e rv ic e .

^ T h e c o n tra c t has a provision f o r the s h e r i f f going over $300 one
month but making up f o r i t the next month. The 36 hour monthly
average was a rriv e d a t by adding to the $6.00 per hour 85<t f o r frin g es
and $1.36 f o r mileage (assuming d r iv in g an average o f 8 miles per
each hour o f p a tro l m u lt i p li e d by 17<t) and d iv id in g t h is in t o $300.

124
I t is worth noting t h a t Ross Township contracted with the previous
s h e riff.

A disagreement occurred between the s h e r i f f and the deputy

who was working in Ross.

Ross o f f i c i a l s backed the patrolman and the

c ontract was term inated.

Ross Township purchased t h e i r own car and
»

s ta rte d t h e i r own p o lic e department.

During the t r a n s i t i o n , Ross

Township was never w ithout p o lic e coverage because once the c o n tra c t
e x p ire d , the lo cal department began.

The s h e r i f f c u r r e n tly handles

a l l o f the Ross Township's disp atching.
Future Contracting Expectations.

In 1975, Comstock w i l l add fo u r

more men to provide them with 24 hour s in g le p a tro l s e rv ic e seven days
a week.

The v i l l a g e o f Galesburg is in the process o f c o n tra c tin g f o r

40 hours o f weekly p a tro l s e rv ic e .

Galesburg had t h e i r own department

but found themselves w ithout p o lic e coverage when t h e i r o f f i c e r s would
resign.

V il la g e council members also disagreed on how to use the lo cal

p o lic e o f f i c e r s .

Some council members wanted the o f f ic e r s to serve

as crossing guards and others wanted them a v a ila b le a t a l l times f o r
c i t y p a tr o lin g .

The c o n f l i c t s t i l l

e x is ts between how the o f f ic e r s

should be used, but the council members fin d i t e a s ie r to allow the
s h e r i f f to s e t p r i o r i t i e s
local l e v e l .

r a th e r than have the c o n f l i c t remain a t the

In a d d itio n to Galesburg, seven other communities have

explored c o n tra c tin g p o s s i b i l i t i e s with the s h e r i f f .
Reporting to Local Community.

The s h e r i f f sends monthly reports

to Comstock o f f i c i a l s which l i s t a c t i v i t i e s , hours worked, miles driven
and a rre s ts made.

To Climax and Wakeshma he sends each month the

number o f hours worked and miles driven and also uses t h i s f o r b i l l i n g
purposes.

125
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f Patrol S e r v ic e .

There is no minimum le v e l o f

s e rv ic e which the s h e r i f f refuses to supply to a community, although
the s h e r i f f has had some d i f f i c u l t y over the past y e ar s t a f f i n g the
Climax and Wakeshma operation because he r e l i e d on deputies to volunt

te e r.

C u rre n tly one man handles the e n t ir e Climax and Wakeshma opera­

t io n .
Rotating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D eputies.

The patrolmen

are permanently statio n e d in a contra c tin g community, although local
o f f i c i a l s can request t h a t a man be tr a n s fe r r e d i f they fin d his
performance u n s a tis fa c t o r y .
S p e c ific a tio n o f Patrol Schedules and A c t i v i t i e s Performed.

The

Comstock Township o f f i c i a l who is t h e i r p o lic e commissioner p a r tic ip a t e s
s u b s ta n tia lly in deciding when p a tro ls work and what a c t i v i t i e s they
perform.

He places a higher p r i o r i t y on having the p a tro l respond to

complaints than on monitoring t r a f f i c or p re ven tive p a t r o l .

If

Comstock o f f i c i a l s want lo cal ordinances enforced, they h ir e the men
during t h e i r o f f duty.

The scheduling f o r Climax and Wakeshma is

worked out by the s h e r i f f depending upon a v a i l a b i l i t y o f personnel
and the complaint load.
Liquor Inspection Revenue.

Liquor inspection performed in the

township o f Comstock goes to Comstock and amounts to about $3,500 per
y e a r.

In the other two communities, the money goes to the county

tre a s u ry .
Comparison o f Patrol Costs and Contract P r i c e .

The county has

a b i l l i n g system designed to pass a l l costs on to the c o n tra c tin g
community.

But when deputies take vacation tim e , the s h e r i f f provides

another deputy.

Compensation to the vacationing deputy was not being

126
paid by the contra c tin g community.
co ntracting community pay a l l

Every attempt was made to have the

v a ria b le c o s t; but compensation f o r time

o f f was one cost item which was apparently overlooked.

No cost e s t i ­

mation o f the Kalamazoo patrol s e rv ic e was done.
>

EATON COUNTY
The Eaton County s h e r i f f had two contracts in 1974.

One was with

Delta Township and the other was with the c i t y o f Eaton Rapids.
Contracting operations account f o r a high percent o f the s in g le and
double patrol hours produced.

In 1974, i t is estimated t h a t the s h e r i f f

produced 35,445 s in g le and 15,514 double p a tro l hours o f which 61%
and 39%, r e s p e c t iv e ly , went to the c o n tra c tin g communities.

47

Table

3-9 below shows the number o f p a tro l hours sold and the t o t a l p ric e paid.

Table 3 -9 .

Annual number o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours produced
and p ric e charged by the Eaton County s h e r i f f .

Annual
Number o f
Single
Patrol Hours

Annual
Number o f
Double
Patrol Hours

Number o f
Persons
Under
Contract

Total Revenue
Received from
Each
Communi ty

General

13,727

9,308

Delta Twp.

15,513

3,103

15

$230,863

Eaton Rapids

6,205

3,103

5

84,079

TOTAL

35,445

15,514

20

$314,942

Scheduled p a tro ls f o r general and c o n tra c tin g communities are f o r
9 .5 hours each, but one hour is taken out f o r lunch f o r which the
men are not paid but are s t i l l on c a l l .
This was not included in
the p a tro l hour e s tim ate.
For the c o n tra c tin g communities, 30
minutes was also deducted f o r t r a n s i t time to and from the con­
tr a c t in g communities. The 30 minutes was s t i l l included as p a rt o f
the general p a t r o l .

127
D elta Township is the la r g e s t o f the two contracts consuming 15,513
hours o f s in g le p a tro l and 3,103 hours o f double p a t r o l.

For several

years D elta Township, which borders Lansing c i t y , has been a r a p id ly
growing township.

D elta Township o f f i c i a l s

r e a liz e d t h a t they needed

more p o lic e s e rv ic e than they could expect the s h e r i f f to provide
through t h e i r county taxes and explored d i f f e r e n t ways o f securing a
higher le v e l o f s e rv ic e .

They asked the c i t y o f Lansing to provide

them law enforcement s e rv ic e under c o n tr a c t, but found the p ric e pro­
h ib itiv e .

They then requested the Eaton County s h e r i f f to deputize a

local p o lic e department and provide t h e i r uniforms w h ile the township
provided the vehicles and a s u b -s ta tio n and paid the s a la r ie s d i r e c t l y
to the men.

The s h e r i f f r e je c te d th is id e a , contending t h a t i t would

be too d i f f i c u l t to supervise the men and t h a t the deputies would have
48
two employers - th e s h e r i f f and the township supervisors.
F in a lly
the township agreed to buy the services o f f i v e men and two cars which
operated out o f the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e in C h a rlo tte approximately 15
minutes away.

A very small o f f i c e is provided in D elta Township w ith

a ty p e w r ite r f o r re p o r t w r i t i n g .

The c o n tra c t grew to a le v e l o f

15 men and 4 vehicles in 1974 and a t o t a l p r ic e o f $230,863.
Eaton Rapids has been contra c tin g w ith the s h e r i f f since 1968.
Before c o n tr a c tin g , Eaton Rapids had i t s own p o lic e department but
found r e ta in in g a s a t is f a c t o r y c h i e f o f p o lic e d i f f i c u l t .

The

o r ig in a l c o n tra c t was f o r f i v e men and two v e h ic le s , but f o r the
s a fe ty o f the men, the s h e r i f f f e l t i t was necessary to provide the

48This oroDOsal came from the knowledge that the s h e riff o f Ingham
County has a sim ilar arrangement with three o f his townships.

128
community with s ix men, even though Eaton Rapids pays f o r only f i v e .

49

Total p ric e paid in 1974 was $84,079.
Future Contracting E xpectations.

V erm ontvilie v i l l a g e and township

have made a j o i n t request to the s h e r i f f f o r p a tro l s e rv ic e s .

In 1975,
}

they w i l l pay the s h e r i f f approximately $10,000 f o r the purchase and
maintenance o f a v e h ic le and the equipping o f two men.
w i l l be used to pay the s a la r ie s o f the men.

C .E .T .A . funds

I t is hoped t h a t when

the fe de ral funds e x p ire the community w i l l perceive the b e n e fits o f
the e x tra p o lic e s e rv ic e and pay f o r the men with lo ca l funds.
S p e c ific a tio n o f When P atrols Work and What A c t i v i t i e s They Perform.
The s h e r i f f ' s department decides when the p a tro ls work based on complaint
load.

The s h e r i f f w ill consider requests f o r s p e c if ic a c t i v i t i e s but

does not always consent.

An example o f th is is the time when the Eaton

Rapids c i t y council approached the s h e r i f f about not having the "no
parking" ordinance between 2 a.m. and 5 a.m. enforced on a c e r t a in
s t r e e t where there were a l l n ig h t re s ta u ra n ts .

The s h e r i f f refused

to do th is and suggested t h a t the ordinance be changed to exclude the
one s t r e e t .

The l a t t e r course was taken.

The s h e r i f f granted a request

to have the deputies turn on the Christmas t r e e lig h t s and a s s is t lo ca l
o f f i c i a l s during e le c t io n day.

Since the supervisor does not see the

patrolmen r e g u l a r l y , requests must usually come through th e s h e r i f f .

49

With f i v e men working the Eaton Rapids operation th e re was a s in g le
patrol during the evening s h i f t .
There were many complaints ( f i g h t s ,
domestic t r o u b le , e t c . ) where an Eaton County general car was required
to back up the Eaton Rapids c o n tra c t c a r. The s h e r i f f f e l t i t was
cheaper to s t a tio n another man in Eaton Rapids, a llo w in g f o r a double
u n it on evenings, r a th e r than continue to back up w ith a general c a r.
Response to complaints where th e re was a p r o b a b ili t y o f violence f e l l
because a s in g le p a tro l w i l l o fte n w a it f o r back-up before responding.
With a double p a tro l u n it i t would not be necessary to w a it on a
general car to t r a v e l to the complaint.

129

Reporting to Local O f f i c i a l s .
co n tracting community.

Monthly reports are sent to each

In a d d it io n , a command o f f i c e r attends each

o f the monthly board and council meetings to answer any questions.
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f P atro l S e r v ic e .

The c r i t e r i a which the s h e r i f f
»

uses to decide i f a request f o r s e rv ic e is too l i t t l e

is whether or

not he fe e ls the s e rv ic e le v e l w i l l make a d if f e r e n c e .

I f th e re is

not enough patrol hours being purchased to allo w f o r a "good job" to
be done, then the s h e r i f f w i l l

refuse to supply the requested amount.

Rotating versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D ep uties.

50

The man are

permanently sta tione d in t h e i r re s p e c tiv e c o n tra c tin g operations although
they can be tr a n s fe r r e d i f they or the lo ca l community desires i t .
Liquor Inspection Revenue.

Liquor

insp ection revenue is re ta in e d

by the contra c tin g communities and c r e d i t is given f o r the salvage
value o f the v e h ic le s .

Since Eaton Rapids had t h e i r own department

p r io r to c o n tr a c tin g , the s h e r i f f made use o f some o f t h e i r equipment.
An inventory is included in the c o n tra c t on the equipment which is owned
by the c i t y and c u r r e n t ly used by the s h e r i f f .
the c i t y i f the c o n tra c t is term inated .

This equipment goes to

They also w i l l be paid the

sum o f $2,000 which is the salvage value o f the two p o lic e vehicles
tra n s fe rre d to the s h e r i f f ' s department when they f i r s t began c o n tra c tin g .
Comparison o f Patrol Costs and Contract P r i c e .

For the Eaton

County s h e r i f f the c o n tra c t p r ic e is very close to the s h e r i f f ' s cost

50

For the s h e r i f f , a "good job" means s a t is f y in g the c it iz e n s o f the
contracted communities.
I f a c i t i z e n knows t h a t they are buying e x tra
se rvice from the s h e r i f f , even though i t is only 2 hours a week, they
are l i k e l y according to the s h e r i f f , to expect a l o t more s e rv ic e
than they are a c t u a lly purchasing. To keep from such a s it u a t io n
developing, the s h e r i f f attempts to determine i f the s e rv ic e le v e l
purchased is enough to keep complaints o f "no" s e rv ic e to a minimum.

130
e stim ate; the s l i g h t d iffe r e n c e cannot be explained.

For both con­

tr a c ts i t appears t h a t the c o n tra c t p ric e is less than the actual
costs o f o p eration .

The decision by the s h e r i f f to place a s ix th deputy

in Eaton Rapids accounts f o r the d iffe r e n c e in th a t c o n tr a c t.

The

s h e r i f f , in e x plain ing t h is a c t io n , f e l t i t was cheaper to s t a tio n an
extra deputy in Eaton Rapids r a th e r than have the general county p a tro l
provide continuous back-up s e rv ic e .

Whether the s h e r i f f w i l l ever

charge Eaton Rapids f o r the e x tra deputy or w i l l

continue to contend

t h a t the county owes the community th is e x tra s e rv ic e is not known.
Deciding what p ric e to charge depends upon whether or not the s h e r i f f
thinks Eaton Rapids w i l l pay.

Table 3 -1 0.

Comparison o f patrol costs and c ontract p r ic e f o r the
Eaton County s h e r i f f .

Contract
Pri ce

Sheri f f ' s
Cost Estimate

Author's
Cost Estimate

Eaton Rapids

$84,074

$84,075

$82,042 (5 patrolmen)
94,619 (6 patrolmen)

Delta Township

230,863

230,679

272,224

The D elta c o n tra c t is very la r g e , and i t
actual number o f deputies working i t .

is d i f f i c u l t to know the

The m a jo r ity o f the d if fe r e n c e

between costs and p ric e occurred in v e h ic le expenses which re s u lte d
from two unanticipated costs - - r is in g fuel costs and the need f o r a
fifth

v e h ic le .
While the s h e r i f f has made an attempt to i d e n t i f y most c o s ts , he

seems to r e a l i z e t h a t both communities, Eaton Rapids and D elta Town­
s h ip , would re q u ire a g re a t deal o f general p a tro l to provide adequate

131
s e rv ic e s .

This le v e l o f general patrol would probably not be funded

by the county commissioners.

Thus, the only way to provide the s e rv ic e

is to keep the c o n tr a c t, and t h is means not a llo w in g cqsts to r i s e too
high.
>

OTHER CONTRACTING ARRANGEMENTS
The follow ing contractual agreements were studied less in t e n si v e ly .
The s h e r i f f o f Sanilac County has one c o n tra c t which is with
Worth Township.

Worth is a summer r e t r e a t f o r many D e t r o i t c it iz e n s

who are demanding higher le v e ls o f p o lic e s e rv ic e .

The township

trustees refuse to s t a r t a local p o lic e department, and because the
D e t r o it c it iz e n s have voting residency in D e t r o i t , the low le v e l o f
p o lice s e rv ic e never becomes an e le c tio n issue f o r the t r u s t e e s .

In

1974 the s h e r i f f provided Worth with s in g le and double p a tro l coverage
fo r the weekends from May 31st through October 30th.

Worth pays to the

county $4.50 per deputy hour and 25t per m ile with mileage being kept
from the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e .

The s h e r i f f s t a f f s th is p a r t- t im e op era tion

with p o lic e o f f ic e r s from surrounding communities and his own o f f - d u t y
d e p u tie s .
The s h e r i f f o f the sparsely populated Mackinac County has a
s in g le w r it t e n c ontract which is with C lark Township.

The s h e r i f f

agrees to s t a t i o n two s in g le patrol units in the township and make them
responsible f o r responding to complaints 24 hours per day seven days
per week.

In r e t u r n , the county receives a l l

li q u o r in sp ec tio n revenue

which would normally go to the township, approximately $6,000 per y e a r .
This c ontract is congruent to the s h e r i f f ' s method o f supplying p a tro l

132
service to the county.

With a four deputy force the s h e r i f f has a l l

deputies l i v i n g in d i f f e r e n t parts o f the county operating from where
they l i v e .

This c ontract seems to have helped in flu e n c e where the

s h e r i f f s ta tio n s two o f his d epu ties.
»

The Charlevoix County s h e r i f f has a verbal c o n tra c t w ith the two
townships, S t. James and Piean, o f Beaver Is la n d - - an is la n d 32 miles
from shore in Lake Michigan which is 6 miles wide and 18 miles long
and has a population o f 180.
e n t ir e y e a r .

One deputy liv e s on the is la n d the

He receives the liq u o r inspection money from the two

townships, which is approximately $1,800 and $ 4 ,3 2 5 , from the county
s h e riff.

The deputy operates out o f his home and uses his own c a r.

The s h e r i f f contends t h a t the county owes the is a ln d p o lic e s e rv ic e ,
and th is is an e f f i c i e n t way to provide i t .
The Missaukee County s h e r i f f has had a verbal c o n tra c t with the
c i t y o f McBain f o r seven y e a rs .

The s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e is in Lake C ity

which is a long distance phone c a l l from McBain.

McBain agrees to

pay 25% o f the u n d e rs h e r iff's s a l a r y , who liv e s in McBain.
McBain c it iz e n s can c a ll the u n d e rs h e r iff a t any hour.

In r e t u r n ,

The under­

s h e r i f f w i l l e it h e r re la y the c a l l to the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , respond
immediately to the complaint i f i t

is an emergency, or i f he is o f f -

duty and the complaint can be h e ld , respond when on duty.
The Io n ia County s h e r i f f has one c o n tra c t which is with Saranac
v illa g e .

In 1974 the v i l l a g e paid the s h e r i f f $12,000 f o r 8 hours o f

d a ily coverage seven days per week.
The s h e r i f f o f Iosco County has one c o n tra c t which is with the
c i t y o f Tawas, also the lo c a tio n o f the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e .

The s h e r i f f

was the former Tawas c h ie f o f p o lic e and a f t e r the e le c tio n he o ffe re d

133
Tawas o f f i c i a l s 24 hour coverage seven days a week f o r s l i g h t l y more
than they were c u r r e n tly paying f o r t h e i r two man department.

The

contract operation is run s im il a r to Huron County where the contracted
deputies p a tro l outside Tawas c i t y l i m i t s .

According to the s h e r i f f ,
i

the contracted patrol is w ith in a 10 minute response time to any p a r t
o f the c i t y a t any tim e.

In 1974 Tawas paid $23,000 f o r th is s e rv ic e .

The s h e r i f f o f Livingston County in 1974 had two c o n tra c ts .

One

was with Hamburg Township and the o th e r was w ith th re e contiguous
townships.

These contracts began in 1971 when EEA money was used to

finance the m a jo rity o f the cost.
The S t. Joseph County s h e r i f f has two c o n tra c ts .

One is with

Mendon which pays $11,000 per y e ar and receives the s ervices o f one
deputy.

The second c ontract is with C e n t e r v il le which pays $8,000 and

receives s i m i l a r services as Mendon.
b e n e fits o f the deputies and a l l

The county pays f o r the fr in g e

ve h ic le expense.

The s h e r i f f ' s

deputies l i v e in the two communities and decide t h e i r own work schedule
in conjunction with local o f f i c i a l s .
The s h e r i f f o f Lapeer County has a c o n tra c t signed j o i n t l y by
Marathan Township and by the v illa g e s o f O tte r Lake and C o lu m b ia v ille
which l i e in s id e Marathan.

For most o f 1974 the communities received

80 s in g le patrol hours per week provided by two f u l l - t i m e d e p u tie s .
Columbia paid $10,311; O tte r Lake paid $ 6 ,5 6 4 ; and Marathan paid $13,125.
The amounts d i f f e r e d because the p a tro ls tend to work more in Marathan,
and these were the
Monroe

prices t h a t the buyers would bear.

County s h e r i f f has three d i f f e r e n t c o n tra c ts . One is with

the c i t y o f Petersburg which p r io r to the c o n tra c t had
department.

i t s own p o lic e

Local c it iz e n s were d i s s a t i s f i e d w ith the way c i t y o f f i c i a l s

were using the p o lic e and began a p e t i t i o n to r a is e taxes to allo w
contracting with the s h e r i f f .

Under the c o n tra c t Petersburg is b i l l e d

r e g u la r ly f o r a l l expenses incurred by th e county.
t h e i r own v e h ic le s .

Petersburg purchases

A second c o n tra c t is with Monroe County Community
t

College which purchases two d e p u tie s .

The c o lle g e buys i t s own v e h ic le

and is b i l l e d by the county f o r actual expenses.

The t h i r d c o n tra c t

is with Monroe High School which had a c o n tra c t w ith Monroe c i t y p o lic e .
The high school is re lo c a tin g ou tside the c i t y l i m i t s and desires a
contract with the s h e r i f f .

51

The high school pays 2 /3 o f the deputy's

sa la ry and the county the remaining 1 /3 using the deputy during the
summer months to s u b s titu te f o r vacationing d e p u tie s .

The s h e r i f f

a n tic ip a te s contracts w ith o th e r high schools.
The s h e r i f f o f Ingham County has two types o f c o n tr a c ts .
a p a r t i a l control and the o th e r is a f u l l control c o n tr a c t.

One is
The s h e r i f f

has three verbal p a r t i a l control contracts w ith the townships o f
M eridian, Lansing, and D e lh i.

The s h e r i f f agrees to provide a l l the

equipment (replacement and new) f o r the deputies and vehicles w h ile
the townships pay f o r the d e p u tie s ' s a la r ie s and purchase and operation
o f the v e h ic le s .

A lie u te n a n t is in charge o f each o p era tio n and is

responsible to his (re s p e c tiv e ) township o f f i c i a l s .

The lie u te n a n ts

are also responsible to the s h e r i f f , although the s h e r i f f and lie u te n a n ts
i n t e r a c t l i t t l e concerning d a i l y d i r e c t i v e s .

The township o f f i c i a l s

s e le c t the personnel they want to work in t h e i r community, but the

^ T h e Monroe c i t y p o lic e reported t h a t p r i o r to t h e i r c o n tra c t with the
high school they made numerous c a l l s to the high school to take
larceny re p o rts . They f e l t t h a t i t was very expedient to s t a tio n an
o f f i c e r th e re f u l l - t i m e r a th e r than continuing to respond to c a lls
f o r s e rv ic e .

135
s h e r i f f must approve before he deputizes them.
three townships have t h e i r own departments.

For a l l purposes, the

52

The second type o f c o n tra c t is a f u l l control type which has the
s h e r i f f d i r e c t l y responsible f o r the d a il y actions o f the contracted
i

deputies.

The v i l l a g e o f Stockbridge contracts f o r a deputy f o r 40 hours

o f weekly s e rv ic e .

The v i l l a g e provides the v e h ic le and paid the

s h e r i f f $6.42 per hour to cover the s a la ry o f the deputy.

The townships

o f Stockbridge and Onandaga and the v i l l a g e o f D a n s v ille each have a
w r itt e n c o n tra c t with the s h e r i f f .

Each receives less than 30 hours

o f p a tro l s e rv ic e each week and each pays $7.70 per hour which is to
cover a l l personnel and v e h ic le expense.
The Calhoun County s h e r i f f in 1974 had three contractual arrangements.
One was with the v i l l a g e o f Burlington in which the s h e r i f f supplied a
deputy f o r 20 hours o f weekly p a t r o l .

The v i l l a g e paid the wage o f the

deputy w h ile the county paid fo r the v e h ic le and deputy's f r in g e b e n e fit s .
A second c o n tra c t is with Clarence Township which buys weekend patrol
se rvice during deer season and the summer months.
verbal and s ta f f e d with o f f - d u t y d epu ties.

Both contracts are

The hourly r a te each

community pays depends upon the rank o f the deputy providing the

52

In August, 1975, Lansing Township w i l l discontinue t h e i r verbal
co n tra c t with the county s h e r i f f . The decision to have t h e i r own
independent p o lic e department w i l l cost the township an estimated
e x tra $42,000 f o r the remainder o f 1975. The township supervisor
in dicated in a phone conversation t h a t the main reason f o r deciding
to break w ith the s h e r i f f was t h a t Lansing Township o f f i c i a l s did not
have complete control over p o lic e op era tion s. Two in cid e n ts were
r e la t e d .
F i r s t , the lie u t e n a n t and the supervisor wanted to h i r e a
p o lic e academy r e c r u i t but the s h e r i f f would not d e p u tize him because
the r e c r u i t had been in prison f o r t h i r t y days. Second, there was
confusion on whose orders the deputies should f o llo w — the s h e r i f f ' s
(since they were deputy s h e r i f f s ) or the township s u p e rv is o r.
For
example, the Lansing deputies would a r r e s t a p rison er and take him to
the county j a i l only to have the j a i l e r refuse to accept the p ris o n e r.
(The s h e r i f f has not been contacted to check out the s p e c ific s o f th is
example given by the Lansing s u p e r v is o r .)

136
s e rv ic e .
o f Athans.

A t h i r d c o n tra c t was negotiated w ith the v i l l a g e and township
C .E .T .A . funds are used to pay a re s id e n t deputy, and the

county pays fo r the v e h ic le purchase and up-keep w h ile the v i l l a g e
pays f o r 25% o f the v e h ic le operating expense (gas, o i l , e t c . ) .

In

1975 the s h e r i f f w i l l have a c o n tra c t with Albion College in which he
w i l l grant t h e i r s e c u rity force the a u t h o r it y to a r r e s t .

The s h e r i f f

also plans to c o n tra c t with M a rs a h ll, a c i t y o f 5 ,000.
There are two types o f c o n tra c tin g going on in B errien County.
One involves the s h e r i f f and the oth e r is a j o i n t cooperative arrange­
ment between a v i l l a g e and a township.

The s h e r i f f has informal agree­

ments with two d i f f e r e n t p o lic e o p era tio n s.

One o f the p o lic e operations

involved the townships o f Baroda and Lake and Baroda v i l l a g e .

In 1974

these three communities j o i n t l y paid the s a la r y and v e h ic le expense o f
one man who provided them with p o lic e s e rv ic e s .

The s h e r i f f agreed to

support services with the arraignment o f p ris o n e r s , d is p a tc h in g , record
keeping, and d e te c tiv e work a l l w ithout compensation.

The s h e r i f f has

a s i m i l a r agreement with the p a r t-tim e p o lic e department o f Lincoln
Township.

The s h e r i f f r e a liz e s th a t each community does not possess

the ta x base to a ffo r d a complete c o n tra c t w ith the s h e r i f f , so the
s h e r i f f provides whatever assistance he can with no charge.
The second type o f c ontract is between the township o f Oronako
and the v ill a g e o f B errien Springs which l i e s in s id e the township.
Together the two communities have a seven o f f i c e r p o lic e fo r c e .
p o lic e c h ie f is responsible to a j o i n t p o lic e board comprised

The
o f two

representatives from the v i l l a g e , two from the township, and the p o lic e
c h ie f h im s e lf.

In 1974 each community c o n trib u te d $60,000 to finance

the p o lic e op era tio n .

The p o lic e c h ie f records the amount and type o f

137
a c t i v i t y in each community.

Even though the township is approximately

three times as la rg e as the v i l l a g e , the amount o f time spent in each
community is almost the same because o f the commercial establishments
and bars located in the v i l l a g e .

In 1975 two a d d itio n a l persons w i l l
i

be h ire d using CETA funds.
A s i m i l a r h o riz o n ta l arrangement to the Oronako and B errien Springs
e xists between Ontwa Township and the v i l l a g e o f Edwardsburg which l i e s
in side Ontwa.

A p o lic e board made up o f two re p res e n ta tiv e s from the

v ill a g e and two from the township and one person e le c ted a t la r g e is
responsible f o r the j o i n t p o lic e o e p ra tio n .

F in a n c ia ll y , the township

paid in 1974 $ 4 1,750; the v i l l a g e paid $16,000 and approxim ately $7,250
came from liq u o r in sp ection revenue, gas tax r e b a te , and fees from
serving le g a l papers.

The $65,000 budget allowed f o r the employment

of fiv e fu ll-tim e o ffic e rs .

In a d d it io n , the c h i e f u t i l i z e s

7 r e s e r v is t s .

CONCLUSION
The summary and conclusion section to th is chapter is a c t u a lly
Chapter IV .

In Chapter I I I

I have presented a d e s c rip tio n o f the

c o n tra c tin g operations o f most Michigan s h e r if f s in 1974.

The c o n tra c tin g

o f eleven s h e r i f f s were described in more d e t a i l , focusing on the
conduct-performance r e s u lts o f each s h e r i f f along with the s t r u c tu r a l
v a ria b le o f how each s h e r i f f views c o n tra c tin g as a means o f funding
his a n t ic ip a te d p a tro l needs compared to funding from the county
commissioners. Chapter IV w i l l compare the conduct-performance r e s u lts
o f d i f f e r e n t s h e r i f f s and r e l a t e the d iffe re n c e s to the observed
d iffe re n c e s in the s tr u c tu r a l
county board o f commissioners.

r e la tio n s h ip each s h e r i f f has with his

CHAPTER IV
WHOSE PREFERENCES COUNT?

INTRODUCTION
In a com petitive market where tastes d i f f e r , we would expect to
fin d a v a r i e t y o f products each o ffe re d a t d i f f e r e n t prices i f pro­
duction costs d i f f e r e d .

But under oth e r market s tru c tu re s , the s e l l e r ' s

preference may dominate and only a s in g le product is made a v a i la b le .
Local o f f i c i a l s w it h in a county can purchase p a tro l services from only
one s u p p lie r - - t h e county s h e r i f f .

The s h e r i f f , as a p a tro l s e rv ic e

s u p p lie r , may have a d i f f e r e n t concept of what c o n s titu te s "good"
p a tro l s e rv ic e than local o f f i c i a l s .

This chapter asks "Whose pre-

ferences count?— the s h e r i f f ' s or local o f f i c i a l s ? "

Local o f f i c i a l s have the option of s t a r t in g t h e i r own p o lic e d e p a rt­
ment, but i f they want to c o n tra c t f o r p a tro l s e rv ic e , then there is
only one s u p p lie r — the county s h e r i f f .
2

Local p o lic e c h ie fs are also supp lie rs o f p a tro l s e rvice and w i l l
have a concept o f what c o n s titu te s "good" p a tro l s e rv ic e . They are
l i k e l y to advocate t h e i r type and le v e l o f p a tro l s e rv ic e even i f
i t is in c o n f l i c t w ith the concept o f the lo ca l o f f i c i a l s who hired
them. W ith in some range, local o f f i c i a l s may choose to compromise
some o f t h e i r conduct-performance o b je c tiv e s in dealing w ith a p o lic e
c h ie f .
Given t h a t p a tro l preferences o f lo cal o f f i c i a l s d i f f e r from
the county s h e r i f f and a local p o lic e c h ie f who they might h i r e ,
under which arrangement would local o f f i c i a l s have the g r e a te s t chance
of ob taining most o f t h e i r p a tro l preferences? Local p o lic e d e p a rt­
ments were not studied ; consequently, th is question can not be
answered.

138

139
Chapter I I I
s h e r if f s .

discussed the c o n tracting operations of eleven county

This chapter builds on Chapter I I I

by comparing the con-

3

tra c tin g operations of the eleven s h e r i f f s .

The next section con­

tra s ts the s t r u c tu r a l r e la tio n s h ip s which the s h e r if f s have with
>

t h e ir county commissioners follow ed by a comparison o f the conductperformances of the d i f f e r e n t s h e r i f f s ' c o n tra c ts .

The f i n a l po rtion

of the chapter r e la te s the s t r u c tu r a l d iffe re n c e s to the conductperformance d iffe re n c e s .
STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTY SHERIFFS
In Chapter I , a marketing model of s tru c tu re and conduct-per­
formance was presented.

The fo u r s t r u c tu r a l v a ria b le s discussed were

number o f s u p p lie rs , product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , b a r r ie r s to e n t r y , and
r e la tio n s h ip between the s h e r i f f and his county commissioners.

For

the f i r s t three s t r u c tu r a l v a r ia b le s , Michigan s h e r if f s are f a i r l y
homogenous.

Each s h e r i f f s e lli n g p a tro l services faces competition

from local communities who can s t a r t t h e i r own p o lic e department,
attempts to d i f f e r e n t i a t e his p a tro l services from what is produced
by local p o lice departments and meets no e n try b a r r ie r s in to the
patrol s e rvice market.

The s t r u c tu r a l v a r i a b i l i t y among s h e r i f f s ,

occurrs in the r e la tio n s h ip each has w ith his county commissioners.
Given the le v e l of p a tro l the s h e r i f f desires f o r his county, how
successful is he in gaining p a tro l funding from the county commissioners.
Does th is s tru c tu ra l v a r ia b le a f f e c t the s h e r i f f ' s tendency to c o n tra c t

O
A ll Michigan s h e r if f s who contracted f o r p a tro l s e rv ic e in 1974 were
interviewed by phone. The eleven s h e r if f s s tudied were chosen be­
cause o f t h e i r d i v e r s i t y in method and approach to c o n tra c tin g .
I
f e l t th a t l i t t l e new in form atio n would be obtained by studying in
depth any o f the other s h e r i f f s .

140

and his w illin g n e s s to meet the p a tro l conduct-performance o b je ctiv es
o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s .
fo llo w in g :

S h e r if f s

The hypothesis tested in th is chapter is the
unable to ob ta in the p a tro l funding they desire

w i l l do more c o n tracting and b e t t e r meet the conduct-performance
»

o b je ctiv es o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s than s h e r i f f s re c e iv in g the p a tro l
funding they want.
The s h e r i f f is a unique county o f f i c e r .

He is an o f f i c i a l e le c te d

every fo u r years and a t the same time a bureaucrat heading and procur­
ing funds f o r an agency.

As an e le c te d law enforcement o f f i c e r , the

s h e r i f f is s e n s itiv e to the needs of his c o n s tit u t e n ts .

As a bureau­

c r a t , the s h e r i f f can be m otivated by a d e s ire to have a la r g e r depart­
ment which can mean a higher s a la r y , more power, and g r e a te r pu blic
re p u ta tio n .

Constraining the s h e r i f f are county commissioners, who

also are e le c te d and who fund the s h e r i f f .

Each commissioner r e ­

presents c o n s titu te n ts from a county p r e c in c t and is s e n s it iv e to the
needs o f his c o n s t it u te n ts .

The reader should not f in d i t s u rp ris in g

t h a t the s h e r i f f ' s perception of the county's road p a tro l needs d i f f e r
from the perceptions held by the county commissi oners.

This is

e s p e c ia lly true in counties w ith la rg e urban populations.

Urban com­

missioners view road p a tro l as serving p rim a rly the r u r a l parts o f the
county.

These urban commissioners reason t h a t i f r u r a l areas want

more p a tro l s e rv ic e , then the r u ra l areas should pay f o r i t l i k e the
c i t i e s do by s t a r t i n g t h e i r own p o lic e department.

In predominantly

r u ra l c o u n tie s, s h e r if f s and commissi oners may be more in accord.

Thus, two groups o f s h e r if f s can be formed.

One group contains

those s h e r if f s who want to expand t h e i r p a tro l d iv is io n and meet
funding re s is ta n c e from the county commissi oners.

The second group

are those s h e r if f s who obtain most o f the road p a tro l funds they fe e l
4

t h e i r county needs.

I f s h e r if f s in the f i r s t group want t o ’expand

t h e i r p a tro l d i v i s io n , they w i l l have to do i t independently o f the
county commissioners.

Contracting w ith lo cal communities o ffe r s

these s h e r if f s an opportunity to increase t h e i r road p a tro l w ithout
going to t h e i r commissioners f o r funds.

I expect t h a t the s h e r i f f

in the f i r s t group w i l l do more contracting than s h e r if f s in the
second group.
The s h e r i f f as a s e l l e r of p a tro l services is d i f f e r e n t than a
p riv a te s e l l e r , and these d iffe re n c e s need to be discussed.

F irs t,

p r iv a te s e lle r s attem pt to make a p r o f i t and w i l l p ric e t h e i r product
accordingly.

5

The s h e r i f f , as a p u b lic o f f i c i a l , is not l i k e l y to

p ric e his p a tro l s e rvice a t a p r o f i t because of the stigma attached
to p u b lic o f f i c i a l s
can accrue to him.

p ric in g f o r p r o f i t and because none o f the p r o f i t s
Second, p r iv a t e s e lle r s take l i t t l e

i n t e r e s t in

The reader should not i n f e r t h a t the s h e r if f s in the second group are
completely s a t i s f i e d w ith the le v e l of t h e i r road p a t r o l . But r e l a t i v e
to the f i r s t group o f s h e r i f f s , the s h e r if f s in the second group a re
more s a t i s f i e d .
5

Another m o tiv a tio n o f a p r iv a t e s e l l e r would be to p ric e his product
such t h a t com petition is driven from the market. The s h e r i f f may in
f a c t be doing t h i s .
Not because he wants e v e n tu a lly to reap monopoly
level p r o f i t s but because he wants his type o f p a tro l s e rv ic e im­
plemented in the county.

c
The s h e r i f f might p ric e f o r p r o f i t i f he could use the surplus money
to fund a p r o je c t which the commissioners refused to fund.

142
the type or q u a l it y o f the product they s e ll as long as i t is purchased
by the consumer.

Many s h e r if f s view themselves as professionals in the

f i e l d o f law enforcement and have a concept o f what "good" p a tro l serv ic e
is .

They receive a c e r t a in amount o f s a t is f a c t io n from seeing t h e i r
>

type o f p a tro l service implemented in t h e i r county.

This suggests t h a t

the s h e r i f f may f e e l very s tro ngly about the conduct-performance charac­
t e r i s t i c s o f the p a tro l service he s e l l s , and he may refuse to s e ll
patrol service with any other set o f c h a r a c t e r is t ic s .
From in te r v ie w s , I placed the eleven s h e r if f s in t o e i t h e r group
one or group two depending on whether I f e l t they were wanting to ex­
pand t h e i r road p a tro l and were meeting re s is ta n c e from the county
commissioners or not. ^

Group one consisted of the s h e r i f f s from the
g

counties of Wayne, Oakland, Washtenaw, Eaton, Genesee, and Kent.
Group two consisted of s h e r if f s from the counties o f C lin t o n , Lenawee,
Kalamazoo, Huron, and S t. C l a i r .

Interview s are s u b je c tiv e .
From t a lk in g to each s h e r i f f , I t r i e d to
hear whether they wanted to expand t h e i r road p a tro l and were meeting
resistance from the county commissioners or were f a i r l y s a t i s f i e d a t
t h e ir present le v e l of p a t r o l.
Then I looked a t the le v e l o f con­
t r a c tin g and whether or not they attempted to meet the conduct-per­
formance o b je c tiv e s o f local o f f i c i a l s . One group o f s h e r if f s not
studied were those who had no c o n tra c tin g a t a l l .
I t is not known i f
there e x is ts in the group o f s h e r i f f s not contra c tin g a group o f s h e r if f s
who want to expand p a t r o l , meet re s is ta n c e from county commissioners
and do not, fo r some reason, attem pt to expand t h e i r road p a tro l through
c o n tra c tin g .
O
From some o f the counties such as Wayne and Oakland, placing them in
group one was easy in both coun tie s, the commissioners have a p o lic y
of not granting any funding increases to the s h e r i f f f o r road p a t r o l .
Early in 1975, commissioners of Kalamazoo county attempted to cut the
s h e r i f f ' s road p a t r o l.
Kalamazoo is placed in group two because i t
was my impression th a t the s h e r i f f , in 1974, was r e l a t i v e l y s a t i s f i e d
with the le v e l o f road p a t r o l.
In f a c t , p r i o r to 1975, the s h e r i f f
had had many communities approach him about contra c tin g bu t l i t t l e
came o f i t .

143

LEVEL OF CONTRACTING
The in d ic a to r used to r e f l e c t the le v e l o f contra c tin g is the
percentage o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours produced by the s h e r i f f
which are funded by c o n tra c tin g .

The hypothesis is t h a t the s h e r i f f s
'
»

in group one, those s h e r if f s who want to expand p a tro l and meet
resistence from county commissioners, w i l l have a higher le v e l of
contracting than s h e r if f s in group two.

Table 4-1 shows the percent

o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours financed by contracting f o r nine o f
the eleven s h e r if f s s tudied .

Table 4 - 1 .

9

Percent o f s h e r i f f ' s s in g le and double p a tro l hours financed
by c o n tra c tin g

S h e riff

Percent of S in gle
P atro l Hours Financed
by Contracting

Percent o f Double
P a tro l Hours Financed
by Contracting

Group 1
Oakland
Genesee
Eaton
Washtenaw
Kent

52%
58%
61%
69%
23%

22%
39%
48%

Group 2
Huron
C li nton
Kalamazoo
S t. C l a i r

g

15%
13%
14%
15%

17%

Data was not r e a d ily a v a ila b le f o r computing the percentage of p a tro l
hours financed by contra c tin g f o r Wayne and Lenawee county s h e r i f f s .

144

As can be seen from Table 4 - 1 , a l l the county s h e r if f s in group
one, w ith the exception o f Kent county, have a considerably g r e a te r
percent o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours funded through c o n tra c tin g
than county s h e r if f s in the second group.

I t a ls o happens t h a t

t

counties in the f i r s t group, w ith the exception o f Eation county, are
more urban than counties in group two, w ith the exception o f Kalamazoo
county, as can be seen in Table 4 -2 .

This tends to support the reasoning

th a t urban commissioners are r e lu c t a n t to fund the s h e r i f f ' s road
patrol causing the s h e r i f f , i f he wants to expand his p a tro l d i v i s i o n ,
to c ontract w ith local communities.

Table 4 -2 .

Population density and percent population c l a s s if ie d as
urban f o r counties in Group 1 and Group 2, 1970

Population Per
Square M ile

Percent Population
C la s s if ie d as Urban

Group 1
Wayne
Oakland
Genesee
Kent
Washtenaw
Eaton

4,407
1,047
692
479
329
120

98
90
77
83
78
42

Group 2
Kalamazoo
S t. C l a i r
Lenawee
C lin to n
Huron
Source:

358
163
108
85
41

76
46
40
21

46

U.S. Bureau o f the Census, U.S. Census Population:
Number o f In h a b ita n ts , Final Report, Michigan.

1970,

145
INTER SHERIFF COMPARISON OF CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS .
The eleven s h e r if f s studied w i l l be compared according to the
follow ing conduct-performance c h a r a c t e r is t ic s :

d i v i s ib i lit y of

p atrol service sold, re p o rtin g to local o f f i c i a l s , c ontrol over d a i l y
p atrol functio n s , r o ta tin g versus permanently s ta tio n in g deputies
and liq u o r inspection revenue.

Since p ric e is a very important conduct-

performance v a ria b le to local o f f i c i a l s , i t is tre a te d s e p a rte ly in
the next section.
D i v i s i b i l i t y of P atrol Service S o ld .

I t is assumed t h a t local

o f f i c i a l s would l i k e to buy whatever number o f p a tro l hours they fe e l
they need and can a f f o r d .

This might mean, fo r some small communities,

patrol service only on Friday and Saturday nights
during the summer.

D i f f i c u l t y is encountered i f

and perhaps only
lo cal o f f i c i a l s

attempt to h ir e personnel on a f u l l - t i m e permanent basis to produce
such a small le v e l of output.
The s h e r i f f can also meet obstacles in s t a f f i n g a p a r t-tim e
p o lic e operation.

Most s h e r if f s in terview ed expressed a preference

f o r a minimum contract of 40 hours o f weekly p a t r o l. ^

The s h e r i f f

has several possible responses to requests f o r a c o n tra c t of less
than 40 hours of weekly p a tro l s e rv ic e .

F i r s t , the s h e r i f f could

simply refuse to supply such an increment.

The county s h e r if f s o f

Wayne, Kent, Genesee, and Eaton have th is p o lic y .

^

The Kent County

10A community may want to buy 40 hours o f weekly p a tro l but have round
the clock patrol in t h e i r community using a l l p a tro l hours on the week­
end.
Due to the s h e r i f f ' s s iz e , t h is could be accommodated with the
increase in s t a f f o f one person w h ile a lo cal department would need more
than a one person department to s t a f f such an o p e ra tio n .

11

According to Dr. A1 House, Michigan State U n iv e r s it y , a lo cal community in
Eaton county appropriated $10,000 o f lo cal money to buy $10,000 worth o f
patrol s e rv ic e . The s h e r i f f refused to s e ll to them the requested le v e l
of se rv ic e .

146

s h e r i f f is r e lu c t a n t to h ir e p a r t-tim e deputies and is u n w illin g to
cut general road patrol to supply the f r a c t i o n a l personnel.

N e ith e r

of the Eaton or Genesee s h e r if f s have been approached about a c o n tra c t
of less than f o r t y hours o f s e rv ic e .
about s t a f f i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s .

The Genesee s h e r i f f remarked

The Eaton s h e r i f f uses as his c r i t e r i a

of minimum service le v e l whether or not the increment o f s e rv ic e
purchased w i l l have any perceivable impact.

I f there are not enough

patrol hours being purchased to allo w f o r a "good jo b ," then the
Eaton s h e r i f f w i l l refuse to supply the requested amount.

12

Second, s h e r if f s could agree to supply less than f o r t y weekly
p atrol hours but only i f two or more communities combine such t h a t
the t o t a l is f o r t y hours.
Counties have th is p o lic y .

The s h e r if f s of Livin g s to n and Oakland
The s h e r i f f o f S t. C l a i r County in d ic a te d

th a t his p o lic y was not to s e ll in increments of less than 40 p a tro l
hours per week but the Yale c o n tra c t is so constructed t h a t no s e t
amount of time is placed in Yale.

This was possible because the con­

trac te d patrol provided coverage to Yale and no n-contract p a tro l s e rv ic e
to s ix sorrounding townships.

12

For the s h e r i f f , a "good job" means s a t is f y i n g the c it iz e n s o f the
contracted communities.
I f a c i t i z e n knows t h a t they are buying
extra service from the s h e r i f f , even though i t is only 2 hours a week,
they are l i k e l y , according to the s h e r i f f , to expect a l o t more s e rv ic e
than they are a c t u a lly purchasing.
To keep from such a s i t u a t i o n
developing, the s h e r i f f attempts to determine i f the s e rv ic e le v e l
purchased is enough to keep complaints of "non" s e rv ic e to a minimum.

147

T h ird , the s h e r i f f could agree to s t a f f less than f o r t y hours o f
weekly p a tro l s e rvice by u t i l i z i n g o f f - d u t y o f f i c e r s , e i t h e r deputy
s h e r if f s o r o f f ic e r s of lo cal p o lic e departments.

The Huron County

s h e r i f f has most o f his contracts s t a f f e d w ith o f f - d u t y o f f iq e r s but
is r e lu c t a n t to expand his c o n tra c tin g under such an arrangement.
The Washtenaw s h e r i f f p refers 40 hour increments but has one c o n tra c t
f o r 30 hours s ta ffe d by an o f f - d u t y o f f i c e r .

The Kalamazoo s h e r i f f has

no minimum and has two contracts where one community buys 10 hours
and another 40 hours per month.

In the past he has had d i f f i c u l t y in

obtaining volunteers to meet these two small c o n tra c ts .

Two o f the

U.S. Forest Service contracts also make use o f o f f - d u t y o f f i c e r s .
Also, a s h e r i f f could s e l l less than 40 weekly hours and meet
the c o n tra c t o b lig a tio n by using general p a t r o l.

In th is case the

communities pay something e x tra to a f f e c t the geographical a llo c a t i o n
o f the p a tr o ls .

Mackinac and Lenawee County s h e r if f s meet t h e i r con­

tra c ts in th is fashion .

A fo u rth way would be to have the commissioners

fund the po rtion of the man not covered by the c o n tr a c t .

The Wayne

County s h e r i f f in d ic a te d t h a t w h ile he has never been approached about
less than 40 hour increments, he would agree to provide the increment
assuming the county commissioners funded the p o rtio n o f a man not
funded by the c o n tra c t.
Reporting to Local O f f i c i a l s .
on the a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e i r p o lic e .

Local o f f i c i a l s want in form atio n
They are l i k e l y to want reports a t

t h e i r monthly meetings as w e ll as the presence o f a p o lic e re p re s e n ta tiv e
to answer questions.

Reporting to lo cal o f f i c i a l s , e i t h e r f o r the

p o lic e c h ie f or the s h e r i f f , means a tra n s a c tio n c o s t.

The more i n f o r -

148
mation desired the higher th is p a r t i c u l a r tran s ac tio n cost w i l l be.
Most s h e r if f s provide a monthly re p o rt and have some re p re s e n ta tiv e
attend the monthly local board meetings.

S h e r if fs w ith small contracts

(le s s than 40 hours) may not do t h i s , such as the C lin to n County s h e r i f f .
»

However, the Lenawee s h e r i f f , w ith the small D e e r fie ld c o n tr a c t, pro­
vides monthly reports and sends to D e e rfie ld o f f i c i a l s copies o f any
D e e rfie ld ordinances enforced by the contracted p a t r o l.
The d iffe r e n c e between s h e r if f s is in the degree o f d e t a i l and
the items they choose to include in t h e i r monthly r e p o rts .

The

Genesee County s h e r i f f , aided by the Genesee Central Dispatching System,
breaks the monthly re p o rt down to include the number and type o f c a lls
f o r s e rv ic e (breaking and e n te r in g , missing c h i l d , e t c . ) , number of
a rre s ts and a ccidents, number o f miles d riv e n , and number o f c a lls
answered outside the contra c tin g township.
and sends to lo cal o f f i c i a l s

Kent County goes f u r t h e r

the a c t i v i t y log o f every complaint

answered which provides local o f f i c i a l s
w ell as the nature o f each complaint.

the names and addresses as
Local o f f i c i a l s in Kent County

can t e l l whether a contracted or a non-contract p a tro l responded to
the c a l l f o r s e rv ic e .

The S t . C l a i r s h e r i f f has 18 d i f f e r e n t complaint

categories l i s t e d and the number o f compliants and a r re s ts f o r each.
He also has the t o t a l hours spent in the contra c tin g community broken
down by hours spent on p a t r o l , on answering complaints and on supple­
mentary in v e s tig a tio n s .

The c h ie f o f the j o i n t p o lic e e f f o r t of

B errien Springs v i l l a g e and Oranko township knows th a t the c i t y fa th e rs
want to have re g u la r property checks so the c h ie f monitors the amount
of time spent on th is a c t i v i t y .

He also reports the amount o f time

149
spent in each community.

I t is in t e r e s t in g to note t h a t those s h e r i f f s

which have contracts w ith two or more contiguous communities do not
record the amount o f time spent in each community.
Control Over D a ily P a tro l Functions.

One hinderance to c o n tra c tin g
t

c ite d by many s h e r if f s is t h a t lo ca l o f f i c i a l s f e a r losing lo ca l c o n t r o l.
One in t e r p r e t a t io n o f lo c a l c ontrol is t h a t lo ca l o f f i c i a l s want to
have a f e e lin g of power— the a b i l i t y to t e l l someone what to do.

Em­

ployees o f t h e i r own lo ca l p o lic e department o f f e r such an o p p o rtu n ity .
Another i n t e r p r e t a t io n is t h a t o f f i c i a l s want a s e t o f p a tro l outputs
s h e r i f f is u n w illin g to produce.

C onceptualizing conduct-performance

involves an attem pt to s p e c ify more e x a c tly what is meant by lo ca l
c o n tr o l.
One p a tro l o b je c tiv e is a voice in the scheduling o f p a tro ls and
the range o f a c t i v i t i e s

they perform.

I t is assumed t h a t lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

want p a tro ls to work when they f e e l the p a tr o ls are most needed.

It

is f u r t h e r assumed t h a t local o f f i c i a l s want contracted p a tr o ls to
perform community r e la t e d errands ( e . g . d e liv e r in g reports to board
members, r a is in g the courthouse f l a g , e t c . ) .
is considered a community errand.

Enforcing local ordinances

Most o f f i c i a l s r e q u ir e t h a t these

a c t i v i t i e s be performed during slack tim e, not in place o f responding
to a c i t i z e n ' s c a ll f o r a s s is ta n ce .

With a lo ca l p o lic e department,

a p o lic y d i r e c t iv e can be issued, but w ith the s h e r i f f no such d i r e c t i v e
can be issued. ^
I t is not known how much say lo cal o f f i c i a l s have had in scheduling
contracted p a t r o ls .

1?

But several c o n tra c tin g o f f i c i a l s do not know when

A p o lic e c h ie f and/or lo ca l o f f i c e r s may refuse to perform community
errands and w i l l e i t h e r q u i t or be discharged. Then lo ca l o f f i c i a l s
pay a tran s ac tio n cost o f discharging and/or f in d in g replacements.

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t h e i r contracted p a tr o ls w i l l be in t h e i r community.

This holds f o r

the small contracts in Lenawee, Kalamazoo, and C lin to n Counties.

In

Lenawee and C lin to n , the contra c tin g communities are covered as p a r t
of the general p a tro l w h ile in Kalamazoo the p a r t-tim e deputy decides
when he w i l l work in Climax and Wakeshma.

In S t. C l a i r County, the

contracted car handles not only Yale but s ix other townships.

Deciding

when time is spent in Yale is up to the d is c r e tio n of the patrolman
operating the northwest p a t r o l.

A s im il a r s it u a t io n e x is ts f o r those

communities which j o i n t l y c o n tra c t f o r a p a t r o l .

The three contiguous

townships in Livingston County do not know when the p a tro l w i l l be in
t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r community.
in Kent County.

The same can be said f o r j o i n t contracts

Most of the time the car tends to handle complaints

on a f i r s t come f i r s t served basis regardless o f where they are located
The contracts which the s h e r if f s o f Gogebic, Ir o n , and Alger
have w ith the U.S. Forest Service s p e c ify the time when the p a tro ls
should be operated on F rid a y , Saturday, and holiday evenings.
In la r g e r c o n tra c ts , local o f f i c i a l s may know when the p a tro ls
operate in t h e i r community, but i t
they had in to the scheduling.

is s t i l l

not known how much input

Many o f these contracts have a set

number o f hours o f d a il y coverage seven days per week.
uniform s e rvice throughout the week is given.

In most cases,

Whether lo ca l o f f i c i a l s

p re fe rre d more s e rv ic e on the weekends and less during the f i r s t p a rt
of the week is not known.
Most s h e r i f f s in d ic a te d t h a t scheduling was a t t h e i r d is c r e tio n
and t h a t i t was based on when the complaint load was the h e a v ie s t.
But many o f these same s h e r if f s had uniform s e rv ic e throughout the week
The Washtenaw s h e r i f f in d ic a te d t h a t contracted p a tro ls are scheduled

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when complaint load tends to be the heav ie s t; but p a tro ls are also
scheduled in conjunction with non-contract p a tro ls such t h a t not a l l
patro ls work during peak periods, which would leave l i t t l e or no
coverage during slower times.
A l l s h e r if f s made the d i s t i n c t i o n between community errands and
personal errands f o r local o f f i c i a l s .

Fixing a t i c k e t a t the request

o f a local o f f i c i a l s or tran sp o rtin g a local o f f i c i a l were considered
personal errands (fa v o rs ) and were r e je c te d by a l l

the s h e r i f f s .

Most

s h e r if f s in d ic a te d t h a t they would e n t e r t a in requests f o r the contracted
deputies to perform community errands.

The d i s t i n c t i o n between s h e r if f s

is which ones seemed the more approachable.
The C lin to n s h e r i f f in dicated his contracts were too small to
e n t e r ta in performing community errands; but he would examine such
a c t i v i t i e s w ith la r g e r contra c ts.

The Eaton s h e r i f f was requested by

the contracting o f f i c i a l s o f Eaton Rapids not to enforce a "2 AM to 5 AM
no parking" ordinance on a c e r ta in s t r e e t .

The s h e r i f f refused to do

th is suggesting t h a t the ordinance be changed to exclude the one s t r e e t .
Since the s h e r i f f refused to comply w ith t h e i r request, the lo ca l
o f f i c i a l s were able to achieve the desired performance by changing
the ordinance.

This is a good example o f which contracting party (th e

s h e r i f f or the lo cal o f f i c i a l s ) bear the tra n s ac tio n costs o f making
a change.
S u b -s ta tio n s , located in the c o n tra c tin g community, provide con­
ve n ie n t access f o r local o f f i c i a l s and make i t e a s ie r to request com­
munity errands than i f

the s h e r i f f must f i r s t be contacted.

An example

o f th is is a c o n tra c t which the Livingston County s h e r i f f had with

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Putnam township in 1973.

The s h e r i f f in d ic a te d t h a t his p o lic y was

not to allow community errands.

But the contracted deputy operated

out of the township h a ll and according to Putnam o f f i c i a l s would per­
form community errands.

This l i k e l y would not have occurred i f the

deputy had not associated w ith Putnam o f f i c i a l s .
Sub-stations are also operated in Genesee, Oakland and Washtenaw.

14

In each o f these counties the deputies are allowed to perform community
errands.

Oakland deserves special mention.

The Oakland s h e r i f f

attempts to please lo ca l o f f i c i a l s in every way p o s s ib le .

For in sta n c e ,

he s ta tio n s his most experienced deputies in the communities and in s tr u c ts
them to r e g u la r ly v i s i t the lo ca l o f f i c i a l s .

When lo ca l o f f i c i a l s r e ­

quest deputies to perform community errands o r enforce lo cal ordinance,
the s h e r i f f ' s

lie u te n a n t attempts to e x p la in t h a t there are cheaper

ways to ob tain th is s e rvice other than having a contracted deputy
perform them.

15

In Kalamazoo County, the s h e r i f f has encouraged

the contracting o f f i c i a l s o f Comstock to h ir e the contracted deputies
during t h e i r time o f f to enforce lo cal ordinances.

In Kent County,

even though there are no s u b -s ta tio n s in the c o ntracting communities,

Eaton County s h e r i f f had a s u b -s ta tio n f o r the Eaton Rapids c i t y
contract; but the s h e r i f f f e l t t h a t he was losing c ontrol o f his
deputies.
For example, the s u b -s ta tio n had a tr a n s m ittin g radio and
the s h e r i f f could not t e l l i f the contracted p a tro l was responding
from in sid e the p a tro l car or from in s id e the s u b -s ta tio n .

15
While the requests of lo cal o f f i c i a l s have g r e a t w e ig ht, a l i m i t to
the range o f a c t i v i t i e s performed by the contracted deputies
e x is ts .
I f the deputies f e e l they are not doing enough "p o lic e work"
they w i l l complain to the s h e r i f f and i t then becomes a m a tte r f o r
discussion between the s h e r i f f ' s a d m in is tr a to r and lo cal o f f i c i a l s .

153
the s h e r i f f requests t h a t the contracted deputies v i s i t the local
o f f i c i a l s r e g u la r ly .
In summary, most s h e r if f s w i l l consider most requests f o r special
types o f s e rv ic e .

Some s h e r if f s are more approachable than o thers.

Sub-stations or d a i l y contact between contracted deputies and local
o f f i c i a l s makes i t e a s ie r f o r lo ca l o f f i c i a l s to request communityr e la t e d errands.

Another a l t e r n a t i v e is f o r lo ca l o f f i c i a l s to

s t i p u la t e in the c o n tra c t the a c t i v i t i e s they want performed by the
contracted p a t r o ls , but th is was not observed in any o f the Michigan
contracts.
Rotating Versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D eputies.

Many local

o f f i c i a l s wish to have control over who is p o lic in g t h e i r community.
Not only do they want to be able to s e le c t the personnel but they
want the same persons to work permanently in t h e i r community.

The

f e e lin g is th a t the b e t t e r the o f f i c e r s know the community and i t s
c i t i z e n s , the b e t t e r c it iz e n s f e e l about in t e r a c t in g w ith the o f f i c e r s .
Also, the o f f i c e r s w i l l be more s e n s itiv e to what is abnormal i f they
know what is normal.

Some s h e r if f s contend t h a t the more f a m i l i a r

an o f f i c e r becomes w ith the community the g re a te r chance f o r cor­
r u p tio n , f o r enforcing laws s e le c t i v e l y over d i f f e r e n t people (g iv in g
person A a t i c k e t and not B f o r the same o ff e n s e ), and f o r becoming
less a l e r t w h ile on p a t r o l.

Since the range of complaints is lim it e d

in small c o n tra c tin g communities, deputies become bored and p r e fe r
to be t r a n s fe r r e d .

I t is assumed t h a t lo c a l o f f i c i a l s are w i l l i n g

to run the r is k o f c o rru p tio n , s e le c tiv e enforcement, and o f f i c e r
boredom in order to have p a tro l persons permanently s ta tio n e d in
the community.

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The only contractual arrangement where local o f f i c i a l s have
s ig n i f i c a n t voices in who is hired to work in t h e i r community are
the three contracts which the Ingham s h e r i f f has w ith the three
townships of M e rid ia n , Delhi and Lansing.

The lie u te n a n t who is in

charge o f each c o n tracting operation is h ired by the lo ca l o f f i c i a l s
and in turn hires a l l other deputies.

The Ingham s h e r i f f

must

confirm a l l who are h ire d , but a t le a s t local o f f i c i a l s o r t h e i r
re p re s e n ta tiv e have some voice in who w i l l p o lic e t h e i r community.
A ll other s h e r if f s make complete h irin g decisions.

I f lo cal o f f i c i a l s

are d is s a t is f ie d with a p a r t i c u l a r deputy, most s h e r if f s w i l l t r a n s fe r
the deputy to another p a tro l operation.
The s h e r if f s in the counties o f Huron, Genesee, Lenawee, C lin to n ,
S t. C l a i r , and Livingston a l l r o t a t e t h e i r deputies between contracted
and general p a tr o ls .

Lenawee and C lin to n do th is because they provide

the contracted p a tro l s e rv ic e with t h e i r non-contract p a t r o ls .

L iv in g ­

ston s h e r i f f has the p o lic y o f r o ta tin g his depu ties, but in 1973 when
o f f i c i a l s o f the Putnam c o n tra c t desired the same deputy, the s h e r i f f
attempted to meet th is request.
The county s h e r if f s o f Washtenaw, Oakland, Kent, Wayne, and Eaton
attempt to permanently assign deputies to d i f f e r e n t c o n tra c ts .

The

Monroe County s h e r i f f , in his contracts with the community college
and the high schools, attempts to pick persons who w i l l r e l a t e to the
d i f f e r e n t communities and then permanently assign them thos persons.
For some o f the sm aller contracts in Oakland County, the s h e r i f f
ro ta te s his men between general p a tro l and the c o ntracting o p eration s.
The Oakland s h e r i f f assigns his most experienced deputies to the

155

contracting communities and when possible attempts to assign to the
contracting community a deputy who liv e s th e re .
Liquor Inspection Revenue.

1

Liquor in sp ec tio n money is a c t u a lly

a p a r t of the cost (n e g a tiv e ) of having a p o lic e department, but since
many local o f f i c i a l s view the revenue generated by p o lic e s e p a ra te ly
from the costs, liq u o r inspection revenue is being signaled out as
a performance dimension o f c o n tra c tin g .

The Michigan Liquor Control

Commission sends money to lo cal communities th a t employ a f u l l - t i m e
p o lic e or ordinance enforcement department and perform liq u o r i n ­
spections w ith in t h e i r p o l i t i c a l boundaries.

C ontracting operations

are included in the d e f i n i t i t o n of f u l l - t i m e p o lic e department.
a community contracts and i f

If

liq u o r inspections are performed w ith in

th a t community by the contracted d e p u tie s , then the lo cal community
is e n t i t l e d to the money sent from Liquor Control Commission.
The s h e r if f s o f the counties o f Eaton, Washtenaw, Genesee, Wayne,
Huron, and Lenawee allo w the liq u o r in sp ection money to be re ta in e d by
the contracting community.

The s h e r if f s o f Oakland and Kent have f u l l ­

time deputies who do nothing else but perform liq u o r in s p e c tio n s .

In

these two counties the liq u o r in sp ection revenue goes to the county
trea s u ry .

In Oakland county, i f a local community were aware of the

revenue i t could r e c e iv e , i t could probably o b ta in i t .

In Kalamazoo,

Comstock receives the liq u o r inspection revenue but the two sm aller
contracts do not.

1

Likewise in C lin to n County, only one c o n tra c t

A deputy who becomes so f a m i l i a r w ith the community t h a t he
shows f a v o r it is m , can become u n s a tis fa c to r y to the s h e r i f f .
For
instance, i f the s h e r i f f ' s a d m in is tra tio n notices t h a t a deputy
is givin g a l l the wrecker business to one f i l l i n g s t a t i o n o r is
around a c e r ta in r e s ta u ra n t too much, they may t r a n s f e r him.

156
receives the insp ection money.

In S t. C l a i r county a l l revenue

generated from liq u o r inspections is re ta in e d by the county tre a s u ry .
PRICE CHARGED BY DIFFERENT SHERIFFS
An important v a r ia b le f o r local o f f i c i a l s is the p ric e charged
by the s h e r i f f f o r p a tro l services sold .

Local o f f i c i a l s want to

compare the c o n tra c t p ric e to the costs met i f they were to s t a r t and
m aintain t h e i r own department.
which must be addressed.

There are r e a l l y two questions here

F i r s t , how do the p a tro l costs met by the

s h e r i f f compare to the costs met by a local department?

Second, what

portion of the costs does the s h e r i f f choose to pass on to the con­
t r a c tin g community?

A s h e r i f f may experience s im il a r or higher costs

than a lo cal department but not in corporate a l l
c ontract p ric e in order to secure the c o n tra c t.

the costs in t o the
These questions w i l l

be handled by f i r s t comparing the s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l costs to p a tro l
costs experienced by local departments and second by comparing the
s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l costs to c o n tra c t p r ic e .
Comparison o f S h e r i f f ' s Costs to Costs o f Local Department.

No

systematic analysis o f p a tro l costs met by small p o lic e departments in
Michigan was done, but the p a tro l costs o f local departments in Genesee
County were estimated and compared to the s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l costs and
contract p r ic e .

Before the comparison is made, a b r i e f discussion of

why e i t h e r the s h e r i f f or small local departments might experience
d i f f e r e n t p a tro l costs is useful along w ith a b r i e f discussion of
previous em pirical attempts to t e s t f o r the presence of economies o f
scale in p o lic e o p eration s.
Many f e d e r a l , S ta te and even county o f f i c i a l s who advocate the
consolidatio n and or e lim in a tio n of small p o lic e departments contend
th a t large p o lic e departments have a cost advantage over sm aller

157
departments.

T h e ir arguments are i n t u i t i v e , f o r no em pirical evidence

is ever advanced.
tracks.

T h eir li n e o f reasoning moves on several d i f f e r e n t

F i r s t , c onsolidatio n advocated contend t h a t small departments

u s u a lly have a p o lic e c h ie f , which is unnecessary a d m in is tr a tiv e over­
head.

Second, la rg e departments can purchase equipment in b u lk , r e ­

ceiving a b e t t e r p ric e than small departments which purchase in small
amounts.

T h ird , there are c e r t a in s p e c ia liz e d p o lic e fu n c tio n s , such

as n a r c o tic , d e t e c t iv e , and ju v e n ile which can not be affo rd e d by
small p o lic e departments.

Consequently, small departments provide

incomplete p o lic e s e rvice to t h e i r communities.
Counter arguments can be presented.

Many lo ca l departments have

a p o lic e c h ie f who performs p a tro l d u tie s .

Second, i t is questionable

how much is saved by bulk purchasing by large departments.

While

la rg e r departments may receive p ric e concessions, th is savings can be
more than o f f s e t by la r g e r departments wanting to buy the l a t e s t and
most s o p h is tic a ted equipment a v a i la b le .

Small lo cal departments have

the option o f buying more inexpensive equipment which meets there
needs keeping equipment costs to a minimum.

17

F i n a l l y , many small

departments do not encounter drug problems and i f they do they can
turn to the la r g e r departments ( e .g . s h e r if f s and s ta te p o lic e ) f o r
assistance.

The in d iv id u a l patrolmen serve as d e te c tiv e s and ju v e n ile

From a p ric e catalogue o f one s u p p lie r o f p o lic e equipment, the
fo llo w in g p ric e ranges were observed: revo lvers from $79.93 to $183.76;
b e lts from $5.70 to $14.70; re v o lv e r s h e lls from 8 <£ to 15<t per s h e ll;
and ho ls ters from $7.11 to $16.4 7. This demonstrates the g re a t range
in q u a l it y of some standard p o lic e in puts . There is a l o t of equip­
ment which some departments choose to have t h a t others f e e l in unnecessary;
and th is f u r t h e r widens the p o te n tia l cost gap o f p o lic e equipment and
supplies.

158

o ffic e rs .

Whether or not the lo cal o f f ic e r s handle the d e te c tiv e

and ju v e n ile matters s a t i s f a c t o r i l y must be decided by lo ca l o f f i c i a l s .
There have been several attempts to determine e m p ir ic a lly the
existence o f economies o f scale in production o f p o lic e s e rv ic e s .
Werner Hirsch in one study and Harry Schmandt and Ross Stephen in
another did not fin d a s i g n i f i c a n t r e la t io n s h ip between t h e i r scale
v a ria b le (population of the community) and p o lic e expenditure per
c a p ita .

18

But is p o lic e expenditure per c a p ita a meaningful cost

per u n it output v a riab le ?

Two communities o f s i m i l a r s iz e may have

d i f f e r e n t p o lice expenditure per c apita because o f d i f f e r e n t com­
munity preferences (as r e f le c t e d in d i f f e r e n t a ll o c a t i o n o f public
funds).

Thus, what is not being explained is the behavior o f o u t­

put costs as scale o f operation in creases.

Norman Walzer suggest

t h a t these studies concentrate on spreading p o lic e expenditures
over large numbers o f re s id e n ts .

19

Norman Walzer, in another study, used an index o f s e rv ic e which
was a "composite of the number o f offenses c le a re d , number o f accidents
in v e s tig a te u a number o f miles d r iv e n ."

20

Total p o lic e expenditures

was divided by the s e rv ic e index to generate an average cost v a r i a b le ,
and the service index served as the scale v a r i a b l e .

W alzer's r e s u lts

18

Studies were reported in Werner Z. H irs c h , "The Supply o f Urban
Public S ervices," in Issues in Urban Economics, ed. by Harvey S.
P e r lo f f and Lowdon Wingo, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, pp. 504-505.
^Norman Walzer, "Economies of Scale and Municipal P o lic e Services:
The I l l i n o i s Experience," in Municipal Needs, Services and Financing:
Readings on Municipal Expenditure, ed. by P a t r ic k Beaton, Center f o r
Urban P o lic y Research, Rutgers U n iv e r s i t y , New Brunswick, New Jersey,
p. 242.

20Ib id , p. 243.

159

showed a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t negative r e la t io n s h ip between the
scale v a r ia b le (composite s e rvice index) and average c o s t.

When p o lic e

expenditure divided by population was used as the average cost measure
and the community population was used as the scale v a r i a b le , no s t a t ­
i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t negative r e la tio n s h ip e x is te d using the same
communities over the same time period.
the scale v a r ia b le is so c r i t i c a l

Walzer concludes t h a t since

in te s tin g f o r the presence or

absence o f scale economies, much more research is needed on the
c o n c e p tu a liza tio n and q u a n t if ic a t io n p o lic e outputs.
The problem which haunted a l l
the output.

three studies was s p e c if ic a t io n of

In iny study the in term e d ia te output which is being pur­

chased by a c o ntracting community or being produced by a local p o lic e
department is s in g le and double p a tro l hours.
How do the s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l costs and c o n tra c t p ric e compare
with the p a tro l costs faced by lo ca l communities.
was used as a case study county.

Genesee County

A cost estim ate o f s in g le and double

p a tro l hours was made f o r those local communities w i l l i n g to cooperate
and the Genesee County s h e r i f f ' s department.

Value estimates of

v a ria b le inputs r e la te d to p a tro l ( la b o r , v e h ic le s , and equipment)

160

were made.

21

not included.

Labor and equipment associated w ith dispatching were
While dispatching is a necessary support a c t i v i t y o f

p a t r o l , i t is an expense which local communities can avoid.

Most

s h e r if f s and s ta te p o lic e posts are w i l l i n g to perform th is func tio n

without charge.
Are there economies o f scale present in the production o f s in g le
and double p a tro l hours in Genesee County?

Table

--3

compares the

s in g le and double p a tro l hour costs f o r selected local communities and
the s h e r i f f ' s three c o n tra c t operations.

22

No c le a r answer emerges;

but f o r the s h e r i f f , who has the la r g e s t scale of o p e ra tio n , the cost
o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours f o r his three contracted p a tro ls is

21

The per p a tro l hour cost estim ate f o r local p o lic e departments was
done in the fo llo w in g manner. F i r s t a d e s c rip tio n of the patrol
schedule was obtained to determine the number o f s in g le and double
p a tro l hours per year each local department attempted to produce.
The l i n e item budget was taken and a l l items not r e la te d to the
p a tro l a c t i v i t y were substracted which created a p a tro l budget.
If
a community produced both double and s in g le p a tro l hours, the t o t a l
number o f man p a tro l hours was c a lc u la te d .
This was done by m u ltip ly in g
the double p a tro l hours by two and adding the number o f s in g le patrol
hours,
( e .g . I f a community produced 10 double and 10 s in g le p a tro ls
then the number o f man p a tro l hours is 30 = 10x2+10). The number o f
man p a tro l hours was d ivided in to the patrol budget to estim ate the
cost o f a s in g le p a tro l hour. This was double to estim ate the double
p a tro l hour cost.
Double counting re s u lts from including v e h ic le ex­
pense twice in the double p a tro l hour cost f ig u r e ; consequently the
double p a tro l hour costs are s l i g h t l y high f o r local communities.
For the s h e r i f f ' s cost estim ate f o r the three c o n tra c t op era tion s, the
double counting has been e lim in a te d by substracting an estim ate o f
v e h ic le expense per hour out o f the double p a tro l hour cost e s tim ate .
22

Of the 19 local communities (excluding F l i n t ) which had t h e i r own
p o lic e department, 13 provided the necessary p a tro l and cost in fo rm a tio n .
Local department in fo rm a tio n was obtained over the phone and the cost
fig u re s were the proposed 1974-75 budget f ig u r e s .
Since the time of
the phone survey was w e ll in to the f i s c a l y e a r , the local p o lic e c h ie f
u sually had an idea o f how close he would come to spending d i f f e r e n t
budgeted amounts.
The concern was how close they would come to
spending the p a tro l p o rtio n of the budget. No adjustments were needed.
The cost f ig u r e f o r the s h e r i f f were based on value estimates o f
v a r ia b le inputs used in 1974-75.

161

Table

4 -3

Annual number and cost o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours
f o r the Genesee County S h e r i f f ' s contracted p a tro ls and
selected local communities in 1974.

Communi ty

Number o f Annual
P a tro l Hours Produced
Single

Mt. Morris Township
Mt. Morris C ity
O tis v ille *
Swartz Creek
Grand Blanc C ity
Flushing C ity
Goodri ch
F l i n t Township
Montrose V illa g e
Linden
C lio
Burton C ity
Davison Township

2,920
11,994
4,584
8,648
4,576
8,736
8,320
1,352
5,408
10,432

Double

8,760
8,760
832

Cost Per P atrol
Hour
S in gle

4.95
9.37

4,160
2,920
1,080
5,110

5,840
11,680

6 .6 6

9 .1 7
4.59
4 .0 0
5.26
3 .2 0
7.15
7.19

Double

$14.83
9 .8 9
18.63
18.73
13.32
18.34
7.1 4
9 .19
8 .0 0

10.52
6.40
14.39
14.38

Genesee S h e r i f f
Non-Contract P atro l
Genesee Contract
Vienna Contract
Fenton Contract

6,240
5,840
2,920

59,904
7,920
5,840
2,920

11.17
10.51
10.39

21.09
19.49
18.98

* O t i s v i l l e has a p a r t-tim e p o lic e department w ith a l l the o f f i c e r s on
c a l l tw en ty -fo u r hours per day. The number o f hours shown are
worked Friday and Saturday evenings.

162

higher than a l l

the lo ca l departments examined.

There are several reasons why the s h e r i f f may not experience
any cost advantage but instead meets higher p a tro l costs than local
departments.

F i r s t , p a tro l is a very labor in te n s iv e a c t i v i t y .

This

means t h a t any savings from bulk purchases may be lo s t in higher
s a la r ie s .

Why might the s h e r i f f in c u rr higher s a la r ie s than a

local department?

Most s h e r i f f ' s departments a re un io n ize d , and the

unions are l i k e l y to keep deputy s a la r ie s on a par w ith the highest
po lice o f f i c e r wages in the area.

While many lo cal departments

are un ionized, t h e i r unions tend to be less aggressive; although
there is no em pirical proof o f t h i s .

23

Second, as s h e r i f f s ' de­

partments attem pt to become more p ro fe s s io n a l, they tend to r e c r u i t
personnel w ith previous experience.

One way o f a t t r a c t in g and r e ­

ta in in g experienced people is to provide a career tr a c k .

Implementing

the career trac k may r e q u ire t h a t patrolmen be paid enough to keep
them as patrolmen u n t i l a supervisory p o s itio n is a v a i l a b l e .

The

personnel in many lo cal departments tend to be r e l a t i v e l y tr a n s is e n t
due in p a r t to the r e l a t i v e l y low wages.

Some lo ca l departments use

volunteers to s t a f f h a l f of t h e i r double p a tro ls or to be on c a ll to
provide back-up a s sistan ce.

23

S t r ik in g f o r higher s a la r ie s a g a in s t c it iz e n s whom one knows is
more d i f f i c u l t than a g a in s t an anonymous po pula tion.

163

I f the Genesee s h e r i f f experiences p a tro l costs which are higher
than those met by local departments, why do three communities choose
to contract?

The answer is th a t the Genesee s h e r i f f does not pass on

to the contra c tin g conmunities a l l the p a tro l costs (v a r ia b le Gosts).
Table

4 - 4 compares the s h e r i f f ' s costs to the c o n tra c t p r ic e .

As can be

seen, the s h e r i f f ' s c o n tra c t prices are much more in l i n e w ith costs
met by local p o lic e departments.

The p a tro l costs and c o n tra c t p ric e

w i l l be explored f o r other s h e r if f s in the next s e ctio n .

Table

4-4 .

Comparison of the per patrol hour ( s in g le and double)
costs and p ric e charged f o r the Genesee s h e r i f f ' s
contracted p a tro ls

Number of
P atrol Housing

Contract
Operation

P atrol Hour
Costs

Contract Price
Per P a tro l Hour

Si ngle

Double

Genesee Township

5,840

7,920

$11.17

$21.09

$9.43

$17.62

Vienna Township

2,920

5,840

10.51

19.49

6 .52

11.51

2,920

10.39

18.98

5.71

9.62

Fenton Township

Si ngle

Double

Si ngle

Comparison o f S h e r i f f ' s P atrol Costs and Contract P r i c e .

Double

The

s h e r i f f ' s a b i l i t y to keep the c o n tra c t p ric e low provides in c e n tiv e to
local o f f i c i a l s

to c o n tr a c t.

But i f the p ric e is less than costs, then

the non-contracting p o rtio n of the county finances p a r t of the con­
tr a c t in g o p e ra tio n .

Table

4»5

compares the c ontract p ric e to p a tro l

costs f o r the eleven s h e r i f f s s tu d ied .

Of the contracts examined the

Table

4 -6 .

S h e riff

Inter sh eriff comparison of structural conditions and patrol performance objectives

Percent of Patro:
Hours funded by
dumber of
contracti ng
contracts
Single

Double

Does the
s h e r iff
W ill the
s h e r iff sel 1 ro ta te his
deputies fo r
less than 40
weekly hours? contracted
patrol?

Does the s h e riff
send liq u o r in ­
spection revenue
to contracting
communities?

Does the
s h e riff re ­
p o rt monthly
to contract­
ing community?

Does the
s h e r iff
allow com­
munity re­
lated e r­
rands

Percentage
o f contract costs
financed by county
general fund (average
over major contracts)

Group 1:
Oakland

52%

Wayne

7

no

no

no

yes

yes

36%

1

no

no

yes

yes

yes

10%

7

no

no

no

yes

yes

15%

23%

Genesee

58%

22%

3

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

33%

Washtenaw

69%

48%

4

maybe

no

yes

yes

yes

40%

Eaton

61%

39%

2

maybe

no

yes

yes

maybe

13%

Group 2:
Clinton

13%

4

yes

yes

some

no

no

16%

Lenawee

NA

2

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

14%

Kalamazoo

14%

3

yes

no

some

yes

yes

Huron

15%

17%

2

yes

some

yes

yes

yes

8%

St C la ir

15%

17%

1

no

some

no

yes

yes

26%

NA

164

Kent

165
Washtenaw s h e r i f f ' s c o n tra c t w ith Y p s ila n ti shows the g r e a te s t ab­
solute d iffe r e n c e between p ric e and c o s t, and his c ontract w ith Northf i e l d has the g r e a te s t percentage o f the c o n tra c t cost being funded
by county taxes.

The s h e r if f s of Eaton, C lin to n , and Huron have the
i

s m allest percentage o f the c o n tra c t cost being funded from the county
. ?4
treasury (range f o r -2% to 16%)
w h ile the s h e r i f f o f Oakland, S t.
C l a i r , and Washentaw have the higher percentage (range from 20% to
64%).

Even though no cost estim ate was done in Wayne county, i t would

f i t in to the f i r s t group of counties along w ith Kalamazoo County.
The d iffe re n c e s in the percentage o f c o n tra c t costs financed from
the county treasury w it h in a s h e r i f f ' s department r e f l e c t in p a r t the
price concessions the s h e r i f f made to secure d i f f e r e n t c o n tra c ts.
While l i t t l e

s p e c if ic inform ation is known about the n e g o tia tio n s f o r

each s h e r i f f s '

c o n tr a c t, one may suspect t h a t the Washentaw s h e r i f f

r e a liz e d t h a t i t was e a s ie r f o r the Y p s ila n ti o f f i c i a l s

to consider

a p o lic e package costing $204,000 than one costing $322,000.

In

Genesee County, the Fenton c o n tra c t is w ith a community t h a t did not
previously have a p o lic e department.

The s h e r i f f could fe e l

t h a t more

of a p ric e concession is needed f o r Fenton o f f i c i a l s , who are not use
to paying f o r a higher le v e l o f p o lic e s e r v ic e , than to Genesee and
Vienna townships who p r io r to c o n tra c tin g had t h e i r own department.

24

The C lin to n s h e r i f f ' s c o n tra c t w ith Dallas and Lebanon are not in
the range because the absolute d iffe re n c e s are very small even though
the percentage d iffe r e n c e s are high. Because o f the assumption which
needed to be made in estim atin g the p a tro l c o s t, i t is dangerous to
conclude t h a t the c o n tra c t the s h e r i f f has w ith the v i l l a g e o f Kinde
is generating a p r o f i t f o r the s h e r i f f . However, i t can be concluded
t h a t costs are very close to p r ic e .

166

The county commissioners, as re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f the contracting
and non-contracting communitites, play varying roles in e s ta b lis h in g
the c o n tra c t p r ic e .

In the case o f Oakland County, the commissioners,

through the County Budget O f f i c e , are very a c tiv e in e s tim ating the
t

cos t, but they then bargain w ith the s h e r i f f to determine what the
c o n tra c t p ric e w i l l be.

In 1974, the s h e r i f f was able to secure a

c o n tra c t p ric e which was less than costs.

A s im ila r s it u a t io n e x is ts

in Genesee County where the county plays a c e n tral r o le in determing
c o n tra c t p r ic e .

To help insure a l l

re le v a n t costs are passed on to

the c o n tracting communities, a special budgeting account was e s ta b lis h e d ;
but no item is b i l l e d to the s h e r i f f r e ta in s considerable power in
deciding what costs are passed on to the contra c tin g communities.
The degree o f awareness which county commissioners have con­
cerning the c o n tra c t p ric e and cost v a r ie s .

Some know t h a t costs

exceed prices and have an approximate idea o f the amount.

For example,

the w r it t e n co n tra c tu a l agreement, which the Washentaw s h e r i f f has
w ith Y p s i l a n t i , in d ic a te s th a t $102,000 w i l l be contributed by the
county to t h a t p a r t i c u l a r contractual arrangement.

The Oakland and

Huron county commissioners know the approximate amount which the c o n tra c t
p ric e is less than costs.

Some county commissioners know the p r ic e is

less than costs but do not now the magnitude of the d if f e r e n c e .

Kent

County is an example of th is where the commissioners know t h a t they
pay f o r a l l v e h ic le and uniform expense bu t do not know the amount
of the d e f i c i t .

Some county boards are not aware of whether the

167

contract p ric e is g re a te r than, less than or equal to contracted
p a tro l costs.

25

Some o f the d iffe re n c e between the cost and p ric e comes from i n ­
experience in estim ating costs.

One cost which was most c o n s is te n tly

overlooked was deputy compensation f o r t im e - o f f .
d iffe r e n c e was in the choice o f base s a la ry .

Another source of

This d iffe r e n c e stems

not so much from inexperience but from deciding what is a c t u a l l y the
cost to the county.

For instance Oakland County used a beginning

patrolman base r a th e r than the base o f the men who a c t u a l l y worked
in the contracting communities.

The reasoning was th a t the actual

cost to the county as a r e s u l t of the c o n tra c t, was h ir in g a new
deputy.

Thus the county commissioners chose not to make the d i s t i n c t i o n

th a t the c o n tracting communities received more s k i l l e d deputies w h ile
non-contracting communities received ro okies.

In Wayne County, how­

ev er, the County Board o f Auditors chose to use the base s a la ry o f a
fo u rth year deputy.

An a d d itio n a l source of d if fe r e n c e comes from

un an ticipated expenses such as r is in g fuel costs.

The Genesee S h e r i f f ' s

contracts have a w r it t e n section which says th a t u n a n tic ip a te d expense,
such as fu e l costs or a union s e ttle m e n t f o r higher wages, w i l l be
passed on to the contracting community.

25

Livingston County is a possible example o f th is l a t t e r case although
no e f f o r t was made to p o ll the county commissioners to check t h e i r
awareness. However, when the author asked the s h e r i f f i f the county
commissioners r e a liz e d how much money the county was spending to
finance his c o n tra c tin g o p e ra tio n , he said t h a t they had l i t t l e or
no knowledge of the c o n tra c tin g op era tio n .

168

What m otivations might a county board have in agreeing to a con­
t r a c t where p ric e is less than costs?
are both e le c ted o f f i c i a l s .

The s h e r i f f and commissioners

When the s h e r i f f is refused a budget f o r

a l l the p a tro l he fe e ls is necessary to provide adequate s e rv ip e , he
can push the r e s p o n s ib ili t y o f s e rv ic e f a i l u r e on to the county
commissioners.
time.

This could have negative repercussions a t e le c t io n

Agreeing to a p ric e which is less than costs can be viewed as

a compromise with a s h e r i f f who has not received a l l o f his p a tro l
budget requests.

Second, the non-contracting p o rtio n o f the county

can b e n e f it from contracted p a t r o ls .

Almost a l l s h e r i f f s studied

allowed f o r the contracte d p atrols to be dispatched outside the
contra c tin g communities to handle emergency s it u a t io n s .

A lso, some

o f the contracting communities paid f o r p a tr o l time which was spent
in t r a n s i t between the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and the c o n tra c tin g communities.
The non-contracting communities, through which passed the contracted
p a t r o l , re ce iv e higher le v e ls o f p a tro l s e rv ic e .

F i n a l l y , c o n tra c tin g

allows the s h e r i f f to have a la r g e r p a tro l d i v i s io n and makes i t
possible f o r the s h e r i f f to handle any la rg e scale disturbance which
might occur anywhere in the county ( e . g . rock concert or natural
d is a s te r).
RELATION OF STRUCTURE TO CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
E a r l i e r in th is c hapter, i t was shown t h a t the county s h e r i f f s
in group one, those wanting to expand p a tro l and meeting r e s is ta n c e
from county commissioners, had a g r e a te r percent o f the s in g le and
double p a tro l hours funded through c o n tra c tin g than s h e r i f f s in group

169
two who received most o f the p a tro l funding they d e s ire d .

The

question asked in th is s ection is do the s h e r if f s in group one attem pt
to meet the conduct-performance o b je ctiv es o f local o f f i c i a l s more
than s h e r if f s in group two.

To answer th is qu estion, each o f the

s h e r if f s in both groups w i l l be discussed r e la t in g the s h e r i f f ' s
approach to c o n tra c tin g to the conduct-performance c h a r a c te r is t ic s
of his e x is t in g c o n tra c ts .

Discussed f i r s t are the s h e r if f s in group

one which a re from the counties o f Oakland, Wayne, Kent, Genesee,
Washtenaw and Eaton.
The Oakland county commissioners have to ld the s h e r i f f t h a t they
w i l l not fund any more general p a t r o l.

Given th is and the s h e r i f f ' s

desire to expand p a tro l s e rv ic e , he depends g r e a t ly on c o n tra c tin g to
generate the necessary p a tro l funds.

The s h e r i f f w i l l

than 40 weekly hours o f p a tro l s e rv ic e , is w i l l i n g

not s e ll

less

to and does

permanently s t a t i o n deputies in c o n tra c tin g communities, reports
monthly to lo cal c o n tra c tin g o f f i c i a l s , and does a llo w but attempts
to discourage community r e la t e d errands.

The s h e r i f f has been sucess-

f u l in ob ta in in g a p ric e concession (36%) f o r the c o n tra c tin g communi t i e s .

The s h e r i f f s ta tio n s his most experienced deputies in the

co n tracting communities and encourages a close r e la t io n s h ip between
local o f f i c i a l s and c o n tracted ddeputies.

The s h e r i f f appears to make

every attem pt to meet as many lo ca l needs as p o s s ib le .

I f a s h e r i f f charges a p r ic e which is less than co s ts , then th is
is a p ric e concession to a c o n tra c tin g community. The d iffe r e n c e
between c o n tra c t p r ic e and costs expressed as a percentage o f the
t o t a l costs o f the c o n tra c t is the amount of the p r ic e concession.

The Wayne County s h e r i f f has been d ire c te d only to provide
p a tro l services to the unincorporated portions o f the county.

Be­

cause o f the urban o r ie n t a t io n of the county board, ob taining p a tro l
budget increases is d i f f i c u l t .

The s h e r i f f ' s contracting e f f o r t s are
i

hindered by the unincorporated communities which have organized and
which refuse to c o n tra c t f o r a higher le v e l o f s e rvice contending
t h a t they are owed the higher le v e l o f s e rv ic e because o f t h e i r
county taxes.

The s h e r i f f is only able to s e l l

less than 40 weekly

hours o f p a tro l s e rv ic e i f the county commissioners are w i l l i n g to
fund the remaining p o rtio n .

The s h e r i f f permanently s ta tio n s

deputies in the c o n tra c tin g community, retu rn s liq u o r inspection r e ­
venue to the c o ntracting community, and allows community r e la t e d
errands.

He even has allowed the c o ntracting o f f i c i a l s a voice in

assigning complaint p r i o r i t i e s .

27

Although I made no cost estim ates,

I concluded t h a t the s h e r i f f has been unable to ob tain any p ric e con­
cession fo r the contra c tin g community.
The Kent County s h e r i f f is s im il a r to the Wayne County s h e r i f f
in t h a t his county board is dominated by urban orie n te d commissioners
who refuse to fund higher le v e ls o f p a tro l s e rv ic e f o r r u ra l parts

27

Romulus o f f i c i a l s expressed d i s s a t is f a c t io n w ith the response time
going to breaking and e n te rin g complaints. The s h e r i f f d ire c te d
his dispatcher and deputies working the Romulus c o n tra c t to give a
higher p r i o r i t y to breaking and e n te rin g complaints.

171

o f the county.

Contracting f o r most of the p a tro l costs has been an

agreeable way to the commissioners to increase the le v e l o f p a tro l
services.

The s h e r i f f is s tro ngly motivated to c ontract because he

does not want township p o lic e departments to begin to grow in his
5

county, and contracting is one way to prevent t h i s .

The s h e r i f f is

un w illin g to s e l l less than 40 hours o f weekly p a tro l s e rvice to a
community unless two or more communities combine t h e i r revenue to
purchase 40 hours o f s e rv ic e .

The s h e r i f f permanently s ta tio n s his

deputies, reports to local o f f i c i a l s each month, allows community
re la te d errands, and was able to ob tain a 15% p ric e concession f o r
the contracting communities.

The s h e r i f f does not send revenue

from liq u o r inspection to the c ontracting communities.

O v e r a ll,

the s h e r i f f makes every attem pt to please lo cal o f f i c i a l s and en­
courages the deputies working in the c o ntracting communities to
e s ta b lis h and m aintain good working r e la t io n s with the lo cal con­
tr a c tin g o f f i c i a l s .
The Genesee s h e r i f f has a g re a t d e s ire to expand his p a tro l
service views contracting as one way o f doing i t .

Through a county-

wide ce ntral dispatching system, the s h e r i f f responds to many com­
p la in ts in communities which have t h e i r own departments.
an opportunity to show local o f f i c i a l s

This o f fe r s

th a t he can provide a higher

q u a lity service a t less money than can a lo ca l department.

The

s h e r i f f r o ta te s his deputies and refuses to s e l l less than 40 hours
of weekly p a tro l s e rv ic e .

The s h e r i f f does re tu rn liq u o r inspection

revenue to contracting communities, allows contracted deputies to
perform community errands, and reports to lo cal contra c tin g o f f i c i a l s

172
monthly.

The s h e r i f f in general t r i e s to perform the same type o f

po lic e s e rvice to which lo cal o f f i c i a l s were accustomed w ith t h e i r
own department.

The s h e r i f f has been able to ob tain f o r the con­

tr a c tin g communities an average 33% p ric e concession.
t

The Washtenaw s h e r i f f is s im il a r to the Genesee s h e r i f f in
th a t he wants to increase his p a tro l s e rv ic e and views c o ntracting as
a mechanism w it h in his means to achieve his go al.

Hot only does the

s h e r i f f aggressively pursue new c o n tra c ts , but he advocates the
growth o f his c u rre n t c o n tr a c ts .

The s h e r i f f p re fe rs to c ontract

f o r 40 hours of weekly p a tro l s e rv ic e but has agreed to supply one
community w ith 30.

The s h e r i f f does not r o ta t e his deputies in the

contracting communities, reports monthly to local contra c tin g o f f i c i a l s ,
allows f o r community r e la te d errands, and allows the liq u o r inspection
revenue to be re ta in e d by lo cal communities.

The s h e r i f f attempts to

give local c o n tra c tin g o f f i c i a l s the type o f serv ic e they want.

The

s h e r i f f has been able to ob tain an average o f a 40% p ric e concession
fo r the c o n tracting communities.
The Eaton County s h e r i f f desires to expand his p a tro l d iv is io n
by c o ntracting y e t he has a s e t concept of the conduct-performance
c h a r a c t e r is tic s his contracted p a tro ls should have.

When o f f i c i a l s

of one c o n tra c t wanted the deputies not to enforce a p a r t i c u l a r no
parking ordinance, the s h e r i f f refused to agree to i t suggesting th a t
the law be changed which the lo cal o f f i c i a l s d id .
s e ll

The s h e r i f f might

less than 40 hours of weekly p a tr o l s e rv ic e i f he f e e ls t h a t an

adequate job can be done w ith such a le v e l o f p a tro l s e rv ic e .

The

s h e r i f f permanently s ta tio n s his deputies in the c o n tra c tin g can-

173

munity, reports monthly to local c o ntracting o f f i c i a l s , allows liq u o r
inspection revenue to be returned to the contracting community, and
may allo w community r e la t e d errands.

The s h e r i f f has e i t h e r been

unable to ob ta in or u n w illin g to give a very large p ric e concession
(13%) to local communities.
The s h e r if f s in group two are from the counties o f C lin t o n ,
Lenawee, Kalamazoo, Huron, and S t . C l a i r .
the U.S. Forest Service f a l l

The s h e r if f s dealing with

in to group number two.

They have been

very accomodating in s e l l i n g the le v e l o f s e rv ic e d e s ire d , but they
have not met any o f the other p a tro l performance o b je c tiv e s .

I t should

not be in fe r r e d from th is t h a t the U.S. Forest Service is unhappy.
the c o n tra ry , since a l l the contracts have e x is ted f o r more than one
ye a r, the U.S. Forest Service is s a t i s f i e d enough to m aintain the
arrangement.
The C lin to n s h e r i f f does not have g r e a t m otivation to c o n tra c t.
The s h e r i f f has been w i l l i n g to c o n tra c t f o r less than 40 hours o f
weekly p a t r o l .

Because c o n tra c tin g is not t h a t important to him a t

the present, the C lin to n s h e r i f f is not w i l l i n g to bear any time
expense to consider allo w in g community r e la t e d errands, permanently
s ta tio n in g deputies or r e g u la r ly re p o rtin g to local o f f i c i a l s .

The

s h e r i f f is w i l l i n g to give the contracting communities some p ric e
concession by charging a p ric e which is less than costs.

But the

d iffe r e n c e between p a tro l costs and c o n tra c t p ric e is not as g re a t
as i t is in other counties.

On

The Lenawee s h e r i f f has j u s t re c e n tly begun c o n tra c tin g and hopes
to c ontract w ith a d d itio n a l communities in the f u t u r e .

In the pa s t,

the s h e r i f f has not been very aggressive in approaching communities
about c o n tra c tin g .

When o f f i c i a l s o f C lin to n V i l l a g e , who c o n tra c t

with a p r iv a te s u p p lie r , approached the s h e r i f f about a c o n tr a c t,
the s h e r i f f made l i t t l e e f f o r t to quote a p r ic e .

The s h e r i f f f e e ls

th a t an aggressive approach can lead to a lie n a t i o n o f lo cal o f f i c i a l s
and d i f f i c u l t y a t e le c t io n tim e.

The s h e r i f f has been w i l l i n g to s e ll

the le v e l of service desired by local o f f i c i a l s and to meet the con­
tr a c tu a l o b lig a tio n s by r e a llo c a t in g general p a t r o ls .

The s h e r i f f

controls the p a tro l schedule and is not opposed to community r e la t e d
errands, although the general p a tro ls serving the c o n tra c tin g com­
munities do not perform any outside o f enforcing lo cal ordinances.
The s h e r i f f sends monthly reports to the D e e r fie ld o f f i c i a l s and
copies o f any local ordinance in v e s tig a tio n and enforcement to
Clayton o f f i c i a l s .

The s h e r i f f gives a s l i g h t p ric e concession to

the contra c tin g communities s im il a r to what is given by the C lin to n
s h e riff.

In summary, w h ile the Lenawee s h e r i f f is s i m i l a r to the

C lin ton s h e r i f f in m otiv a tio n to c o n tra c t, the Lenawee s h e r i f f tends
to meet more p a tro l performance o b je c tiv e s than the C lin to n s h e r i f f .
The s h e r i f f does not seem a ffe c te d by the presence o f a p r iv a t e
supp lier o f p a tro l services p a r t i a l l y because the s h e r i f f r e a l iz e s
th a t the p r iv a te s u p p lie r is not in te r e s te d in expanding his o p e ra tio n .
The Kalamazoo s h e r i f f has j u s t re c e n tly begun to have d i f f i c u l t i e s
w ith the county board on the funding o f road p a tro l s e rv ic e .

In recent

y e a rs , the s h e r i f f has had many local communities approach him about

175

contracting but only one la rg e and two very small contracts have
re s u lte d .

28

The s h e r i f f has been w i l l i n g to s e l l less than 40

weekly hours of p a tro l s e rv ic e .

He permanently s ta tio n s his deputies

in the contracting communities, re ports monthly to lo c a l o f f i c i a l s ,
allows f o r community r e la te d errands and in general allow s the local
o f f i c i a l s to have a large say as to the a c t i v i t i e s performed and even
what equipment is purchased.

No cost estim ate was done, but the

county is attempting to pass on a l l costs to the c o n tra c tin g communities.
Thus, the s h e r i f f , i f he has t r i e d , has not been successful in gaining
any p ric e concession f o r the contra c tin g communities.
The Huron s h e r i f f is not s tro n g ly m otivated to increase his con­
t r a c tin g operations and c u r r e n tly depends l i t t l e
funding his road p a tro l s e rv ic e .

on c o n tra c tin g f o r

The s h e r i f f is w i l l i n g to s e ll

less than 40 hours o f weekly p a tro l s e r v ic e , reports monthly to local
contracting o f f i c i a l s , sends liq u o r in sp ection revenue to c o n tracting
communities, allows community r e la t e d errands to be performed, ro ta te s
his deputies in one c ontract operation and permanently s ta tio n s his
deputies in the other c o n tra c t.

The s h e r i f f gave a s l i g h t p ric e

concession to one c o n tra c t ( 10 %) but priced the oth e r c o n tra c t
s l i g h t l y above costs.
The S t. C l a i r s h e r i f f has been able to secure one c o n tr a c t by
g e ttin g lo ca l o f f i c i a l s

to agree to having t h e i r community served in

conjunction with s ix townships and by g e t tin g the county commissioners

28

The s p e c ific reasons f o r no more than th re e contra c ts is not know.

176

to agree to increase the non-contract p a tro l to p a r t i a l l y meet the
needs o f the northwest p a t r o l.

The s h e r i f f desires to increase his

contracting e s p e c ia lly w ith communities c u r r e n tly re c e iv in g a high
percentage o f general p a tro l s e rv ic e s .

The s h e r i f f reports monthly

to local

contracting o f f i c i a l s , is u n w illin g to supply less

than 40

hours of

weekly p a tro l s e r v ic e , is agreeable to performing reasonable

community r e la te d errands, ro ta te s his d e p u tie s, and re tu rn s liq u o r
inspection revenue to his contra c tin g community.

The s h e r i f f has

been able to gain a g r e a te r p ric e concession (26%) than the other
s h e r if f s in th is group.
Table

4-6can be used to compare the two groups o f counties.

With the exception o f Wayne County, s h e r if f s in group one gave g r e a te r
price concession to the c ontracting communities than s h e r i f f s in group
two.

S h e r iffs in group two were more w i l l i n g to supply less than 40

hours of

weekly p a tro l s e rv ic e than s h e r if f s in group one.

group tended to permanently s ta tio n deputies in c o n tra c tin g
than the second group.

The f i r s t
communities

Both groups tended to r e p o r t monthly to local

c ontracting o f f i c i a l s , a llo w community r e la t e d errands, and re tu rn
liq u o r inspection revenue to local communities.

I t is the conclusion

o f th is author t h a t lo c a l o f f i c i a l s in the f i r s t group o f counties
stand a b e t t e r chance o f buying the p a tro l services w ith the conductperformance c h a r a c t e r is tic s they d e s ire than lo ca l o f f i c i a l s in counties
in the second group.

The reason is t h a t the s h e r if f s in the f i r s t

group are more in te r e s te d in s e lli n g p a tro l services because they
want to expand p a tro l and meet re sista n c e from t h e i r county commissioners.
Consequently, they are more in te r e s te d in meeting the s p e c if ic needs
o f local o f f i c i a l s than s h e r if f s in the second group.

177

T a b le

S h e r if f / C o n t r a c t

4 --5 .

C om parison o f a n n u a l c o n t r a c t p r ic e ch a rg e d b y M ic h ig a n s h e r i f f s
to th e e s tim a te d t o t a l v a r ia b le a n n u a l c o s ts i n 1974

(1 )

(2 )

A nn u al Number o f
P a t r o l H ours S o ld

T o ta l A nn u al
P r ic e Charged
by S h e r i f f

S in g le

(3 )
E s tim a te o f
T o ta l V a r ia b le
A nn u al C osts

D ouble

(4 )

(5 )

D if f e r e n c e
B etween E s tim a te d
T o ta l V a r ia b le
C o sts and A nnual
C o n tr a c t P r ic e

P e rc e n ta g e o f
C o n tr a c t P r ic e
Funded b y C o un ty
G e n e ra l Fund
%

(C o l. 3 - C o l. 2)

( C o l. 4

t

Oakland
Avon
Comrterce
H ig h la n d
O akland
Independence
O rio n
S p r in g f ie ld

$ 3 9 ,3 5 0
7 1 ,4 8 0
7 1 ,4 8 0
1 7,8 70
7 1 ,4 8 0
7 1 ,4 8 0
17,8 70

$ 1 4 8 ,9 8 9
114,003
112,751
2 6 ,8 4 8
-112,751
1 12,524
2 7 ,2 1 6

$ 5 9 ,6 3 9
4 2 ,5 2 3
41,271
8 ,9 7 8
41.271
4 1 ,0 4 4
9 ,3 4 6

40
37
37
33
37
36
34

1 ,2 7 2
576

14,0 00
4 ,1 1 3

15,5 74
4 ,0 4 4

1 ,5 7 4
-6 9

10
-2

1 ,7 0 7

2 ,1 2 9

4 8 ,0 0 0

6 4 ,4 7 2

16,4 72

26

1 1,6 80

2 3 ,3 6 0

8 1 0 ,0 0 0

1 1.6 80
8 .7 6 0
8 ,7 6 0
2 .0 8 0
8 ,7 6 0
8 ,7 6 0
2 ,0 8 0

Huron
f i v e Township C o n tr a c t
K inde
S t. C la ir
Yale
Wayne
Romulus

NA

C lin t o n
f o w le r
W e s tp h a lia
Da 11 a s
Lebanon

1 ,200
1 ,2 0 0
100
50

7 ,0 2 0
7 ,0 2 0
585
292

8 ,3 6 4
8 ,3 6 4
892
446

1 ,344
1 ,3 4 4
307
154

16
16
34
35

Genesee
Genesee
Vienna
fe n to n

5 ,8 4 0
2 ,9 2 0

7 ,9 2 0
5 ,8 9 0
2 ,9 2 0

2 04,509
J6 .6 7 6
3 3 ,3 7 7

242 ,26 0
153,403
6 0 ,6 8 3

37,751
56,727
27,3 09

16
37
45

5 ,7 3 6
1 ,6 6 4
7 ,6 4 8
2 ,0 8 0

1 1 ,6 8 0
1 ,2 9 8

2 )4 ,0 0 0
16,0 00
71 ,0 0 0
15,0 00

3 22 ,12 3
4 5 ,2 0 5
38,716
2 4 ,1 4 8

118,123
29 ,2 0 5
17,7 16
9 ,1 4 8

37
64
20
38

Washtenaw
Y p s ila n t i
N o r t h f ie ld
D e xte r
S u p e rio r
Ka lamazoo
Corns tock
Clim ax
Wakeshma

6 ,2 4 0
432
144

4 5 ,2 8 6
3 ,6 0 0
1 ,200

NA
NA
NA

E aton
D e lta
E aton

230,863
3 4,0 79

2 72 ,22 9
9 4 ,6 1 9

41,361
1 0 ,5 4 0

15
11

473

5 ,2 0 0

6 ,0 7 3

873

14

2 9,2 00

233,271

2 3 8 ,7 0 0

15,513
6 ,2 0 5

3 ,1 0 3
3 ,1 0 3

Lenawee
D e e r fie ld
Kent
A l l C o n tra c ts

3 5 ,4 1 8

15

C o l. 3 )

178

CONCLUSION
The product (p a tr o l s ervices) sold v a rie s from one s h e r i f f to
another as can be seen from Table I V - 6 .
formance is desired by local o f f i c i a l s ,
which provides i t .

No m atter what p a tr o l per­
they can p o in t to one s h e r i f f
t

This inform ation should provide some market

leverage to local o f f i c i a l s n e g o tia tin g a c o n tra c t f o r p a tro l services
with t h e i r s h e r i f f .
One o f the most important p a tro l performances o f lo c a l o f f i c i a l s
is the p ric e which the s h e r i f f charges f o r his product.

This p ric e is

a ffe c te d by the p a tro l costs met by the s h e r i f f and by the percentage
o f these costs which he is able to fin an ce out o f the county general
fund.

Does the s h e r i f f have a cost advantage in the production o f

patrol services compared to sm aller p o lic e departments?

I t was found,

from looking a t 13 local departments and three of the s h e r i f f ' s
contractual operations in Genesee County, t h a t the s h e r i f f ' s costs
f o r s in g le and double p a tro l hours were higher than the costs of
the 13 local departments.

But the p ric e which the Genesee s h e r i f f

charged f o r p a tro l services was com petitive to the costs met by the
local departments.

This meant t h a t the county general fund was being

used to pay f o r a p o rtio n o f the contracted p a tr o l s e rv ic e s .

A ll of

the c o n tra c ts , except f o r two (th e Wayne c o n tra c t w ith Romulus and
the Huron c o n tra c t w ith Kinde) o f the eleven s h e r i f f s studied had a
p ric e which was less than costs.
S h e r iffs o f the eleven counties s tudied were c l a s s i f i e d according
to one o f two groups.

Group one contained a l l s h e r i f f s who wanted to

expand t h e i r p a tro l d iv is io n and met funding re s is ta n c e from t h e i r

179

county commissioners, and group two consisted o f those s h e r i f f s who
received most, i f not a l l ,

the p a tro l funding they d e s ire d .

S h e r iff s

in group one were found to have a higher percentage o f t h e i r s in g le
and double p a tro l hours funded through c o n tra c tin g than s h e r if f s in
>

group two.

I also conclude t h a t the s h e r if f s in group one attempt

to b e tt e r meet the conduct-performance p a tro l o b je ctiv es o f local
o f f i c i a l s than s h e r if f s in group two.

CHAPTER V
A CASE STUDY OF ONE SHERIFF'S CONTRACTING OPERATIONS
t

INTRODUCTION
This chapter takes one o f the eleven Michigan s h e r if f s studied and
examines his c o n tracting operations in depth dealing w ith several ques­
tio n s .

^

F i r s t , what is the area d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the s h e r i f f ' s non­

contract p a tro l and does i t help or hinder the s h e r i f f ' s e f f o r t s to
contract?

Second, how does the p ric e concession given by the s h e r i f f

to the contracting communities r e l a t e to the le v e l of non-contract
p atrol service going to the c ontracting community?

How much time do

the contracted p a tro ls spend in the non-contracting p o rtio n o f the
county responding to c a lls f o r service?

Fourth, does the type of

patrol s e rv ic e , in terms of p r i o r i t i e s assigned to d i f f e r e n t com­
p l a i n t categories (breaking and e n te r in g , la rc e n y , e t c . ) d i f f e r i f a
local community contracts w ith the s h e r i f f , has i t s own p o lic e d e p a rt­
ment, or r e l i e s e n t i r e l y on the s h e r i f f ' s no n-contract p a tro l?

This county was chosen f o r the case study because o f the ready a v a i l ­
a b i l i t y of response time data which is used to answer the questions o f
the chapter.
In order to gain permission to use p o lic e u n i t response
time in fo rm a tio n , i t was agreed t h a t the county and communities w ith in
the county w i l l remain anonymous. The a n a ly s is and conclusions are not
a ffe c te d by the community names remaining unknown.

180

181

Two new performance measures w i l l be used to probe these questions.
One is response time which is the lapse o f time between when a c a l l is
received by the dispatcher and a p o lic e u n i t a r r iv e s on the scene.

The

second is time spent on a complaint which is the lapse o f time from when
the p o lic e u n i t a r r iv e s on the scene u n t i l

the u n i t is c le a r to respond

to another complaint.
The next section contains a d e s c rip tio n o f the case study county
and the s h e r i f f ' s contra c tin g operations in clu d in g the s t r u c t u r a l r e ­
la tio n s h ip th a t he has w ith his county board.
discussion of the two new performance measures.

This is follow ed by a
Subsequent sections

deal with the four questions o f th is chapter.
CASE STUDY COUNTY AND SHERIFF'S CONTRACTING OPERATIONS
The p o lic e production fu n c tio n is r e la t e d to several c h a r a c t e r is t ic s
o f the area.

To give some general bounds f o r these, but to avoid i d e n t i ­

fy in g the s p e c if ic ounty, i t can be noted t h a t the geographic areas is
in the 600-700 square m ile range and population in the 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 -5 0 0 ,0 0 0
range.

W ith in the county are approximately 30 lo ca l u n its o f government,

twenty-one of which have some form of lo c a l p o lic e fo rc e and an S.M.S.A.
Running through the county are i n t e r s t a t e highways w ith several s ta te
highways connecting many o f the lo cal communities.
This p a r t i c u l a r county s h e r i f f desires to expand his p a tro l d iv is io n
but is meeting funding resistance from the county commissioners.

In 1974,

the s h e r i f f had 58% o f his s in g le and 22% o f his double p a tr o l hours
financed through contracting o p era tio n s.

The s h e r i f f refuses to s e l l less

than 40 hours of weekly p a tro l s e rv ic e , ro ta te s his d e p u tie s , retu rn s
liq u o r inspection revenue to c o n tra c tin g communities, allows contracted

182
deputies to perform community errand s, and monthly reports to lo ca l
o ffic ia ls .

In gen e ra l, the s h e r i f f attempts to provide the same type

o f p o lice p a tro l serv ic e which lo ca l o f f i c i a l s a re accustomed to i f
they had t h e i r own p o lic e department.
t

The s h e r i f f had three contracts in 1974.

One was w ith a f a i r l y

urbanized township w ith a 1970 population range o f 2 4 ,0 0 0 -2 6 ,0 0 0 .
to c o n tra c tin g , th is community had i t s own department.

P r io r

The e x p ir a t io n

of a fe d e ra l grant re s u lte d in the dismissal of several local p o lic e
o f f ic e r s .

Before the grant ended, the lo cal p o lic e o f f ic e r s requested

the s h e r i f f c ontract with the community and the s h e r i f f and lo cal
o f f i c i a l s were agreeable to the id e a .

The s h e r i f f provided t h is com­

munity with a 16% p ric e concession.
The second c o n tracting community is an u rbanizing township w ith a
1970 population range o f 8 ,0 0 0 -1 0 ,0 0 0 .
p r io r to c o n tra c tin g .

I t too had i t s own department

C o n f li c t between the lo cal p o lic e c h ie f and lo ca l

o f f i c i a l s provided the main impetus f o r t h is community c o n tra c tin g w ith
the s h e r i f f .
cession.

To th is community the s h e r i f f has given a 37% p r ic e con­

The s h e r i f f operates substations out o f both of these two

communi t i e s .
The t h i r d contracting community has s im il a r population to the second.
I t did not have i t s own department p r io r to c o n tra c tin g and receives a
45% p ric e concession from the s h e r i f f .
The case study county has a c e n tra l dispatching o p e ra tio n .

C itiz e n s

wanting a p o lic e p a tro l c a l l the dispatching c e n te r which in turn dispatch

183
the u n i t .

2

This dispatching system produces on one card the fo llo w in g

pieces o f in form atio n:

the nature o f the com plaint, the time when the

c a ll was received by the dispatching c e n te r, the time when a p o lic e
u n i t was dispatched, the time the p o lic e u n i t a r r iv e d on the scene, the
time when the u n i t was c le a r and ready fo r another com plaint, t'he name
of the community in which the complaint o r ig in a t e d , and the name o f the
3

responding p o lic e u n i t .

This inform ation was a v a ila b le f o r 27 communities

and 22 p o lic e departments.

2

Several s h e r if f s do the dispatching f o r a l l p o lic e u n it s ; but they do
not have a data system which has a l l the necessary in form atio n r e a d ily
a v a i la b le .
There is wide l a t i t u d e in the type and q u a l i t y o f p a tro l
data which is recorded by d i f f e r e n t p o lic e departments. To c a lc u a lte
response time f o r the va st m a jo r ity o f p o lic e operations requires the
very time consuming process o f going to the d is p a tc h e r's log f o r the
time o f complaint is received and then f in d in g from the patrolm an's
log when he a r r iv e d on the scene. Some departments are more c a re fu l
with th is data than o th e rs . Some do not record when the complaint comes
in but only the time when the complaint is dispatched.
I t would be
possible to standardize the data generation by having a l l p a r t ic ip a t i n g
departments gather the same type o f data f o r a period o f tim e.
Care
would need to be exerted to i d e n t i f y and i s o l a t e any te s tin g e f f e c t ( e . g .
patrolmen saying they were on the scene before a c t u a lly a r r i v i n g ) .
The telephone operator takes a d e s c rip tio n of the complaint and then time
stamps the complaint card in d ic a tin g when the c a ll was received and sends
the card to the d isp atc h e r.
The disp atc h e r then broadcasts t h a t there is
a c a ll a t a c e r t a in address and waits f o r u n its in t h a t p a r t o f the county
to re p o rt with t h e i r lo c a tio n . The dispatcher then chooses the c lo s e s t
u n it and dispatches t h a t u n it to the com plaint.
The d isp atcher a ls o i n ­
forms the dispatched u n i t the nature o f the c a l l .
This procedure was
adopted to prevent rap id response to high p u b l i c i t y complaints (armed
robbery, murder, e t c . ) and r e l a t i v e l y slow response time to less glamorous
complaints ( e . g . , breaking and e n te rin g r e p o r t , noisy p a r t y , e t c . ) .
Dispatching the c lo s e s t p o lic e u n i t was done not only to minimize r e ­
sponse time but to prevent any in d iv id u a l dispatcher favoring one p o lic e
department over another. Once a p o lic e u n i t has been dispatched, the
complaint card is again time stamped two more times once f o r when the
p o lice u n i t a r r iv e s on the scene and the l a s t f o r when the p o lic e u n i t
is c le a r and ready f o r another assignment.

184

A twenty-one day sample o f complaints was taken from the f i r s t s ix
months in 1974 f o r a l l communities p a r t ic ip a t i n g in the c e n tra l dispatching
operation .

(An equal number o f Mondays, T u esdays... Sundays a re contained

in the sample.)

An a d d itio n a l twenty-one days covering the same s ix
i

month period (b u t including d i f f e r e n t days) was taken f o r the fo llo w in g
communities:

L-07, C-08, L-1 5 , C-15, L-1 9 , N-20, and C-27. 4

The second

sample was taken in an e f f o r t to increase the number o f observations in
some of the c e lls of a three dimensional m a trix (community by p o lic e
u n it by type o f complaint) which had 17,280 c e lls (27 X 22 X 3 0 ) .

For

these seven communities l i s t e d , the number o f days in the sample o f
complaints was 42 and not 21.
The communities chosen f o r the more in te n s iv e sample were matched
according to population s i z e , age composition, and r a c i a l makeup.
5 _i

shows the demographic c h a r a c t e r is t ic s .

Table

Communities C -15, L -1 5 , and

L-19 comprise the f i r s t group; and C-27, C-08, N -20, and L-07 make up
the second group of s im ila r communities.

Table 5 - 1 .

Population
(1 9 7 0 )*
% Under
Age o f
18
% Nonwhite
*

Demographic c h a r a c t e r is t ic s o f matched communities.

C-15

L-15

25,600
43.5

10 %

L-07

C-27

25,600

29,300

9,400

8,900

8,000

8,300

43.5

45.2

4 3 .2

3 8 .8

43.2

4 3 .4

10 %

10. 6%

.3%

C-08

N-20

L-19

. 2%

.3%

1 . 1%

Population is rounded to nearest hundred.

The "C" before the community number in d ic a te s the community contracts w ith
the s h e r i f f ; the "N" in d ic a te s no c o n tra c t or lo ca l p o lic e department; and
the "L" s i g n i f i e s th a t the community has i t s own lo ca l p o lic e department.

185

The same community is included as L-15 and C-15.

For the f i r s t

three months o f 1974, th is community had i t s own lo c a l p o lic e department;
th is accounts f o r the la b le L-1 5 .

For the next three months, the com­

munity contracted with the s h e r i f f and purchased a s im il a r number of
i

weekly p a tro l hours to what was produced when the community had i t s own
local department.

5

Thus C-15 and L-15 are the same community a t

d i f f e r e n t points in time.
The response time data was transformed in to logs from which means
were c a lc u la te d f o r d i f f e r e n t communities.

The mean of the logs is a

geometric mean and was used to g ive c le a r e r re p res e n ta tio n of c e n tra l
tendency when the d i s t r i c u t i o n has a few la rg e observations and the d is ­
t r ib u t i o n is truncated a t zero.

An example w i l l

i l l u s t r a t e the d i f ­

ference between the a r it h m e t ic and geometric means.
munities with the same number o f complaints.

Consider two com­

In Table 5-2

the

response time f o r each complaint is given along w ith the log ( t o the
base 1 0 ).

Means using the raw data and the data transformed in t o logs

are a t the bottom o f each column.

C
P rio r to c o n tra c tin g , community 15 had a Federal T r a f f i c gra n t which
funded an a d d itio n a l 120 weekly p a tr o l hours. The conditions o f the
grant were to have the p a tr o ls spend the v a s t m a jo r ity o f t h e i r work on
t r a f f i c r e la te d a c t i v i t i e s . According to the s h e r i f f ' s department,
the lo cal p o lic e c h ie f e x te n s iv e ly used the t r a f f i c p a tro ls to respond
and hold the complaint u n t i l another lo ca l car could handle i t .
This
was done in an e f f o r t to out perform the s h e r i f f ' s general p a t r o l.

186

Table 5 -2 .

A hypo thetical example comparing the means c a lc u a lte d using
raw data to means using data transformed in to logs.

Community A

Community B
i

Response
Time
(Mi nutes)

Log of Re­
sponse Time

Response
Time
(Minutes)

Complaint #1

8

#2

9

.90
.95

#3
#4
#5

10
11
12

#6

50

1 .0 4
1 .08
1.70

13
14
15
16
17

Mean

16.6

12.88

1.00

Log o f Re­
sponse Time

1.11

1.15
1.17
1.20

20

1.23
1.30

15.8

15.48

Notice t h a t the response time o f f i v e o f s ix complaints f o r Com­
munity A have a response time lower than any o f Community
one unusual complaint
than B.

took 50 minutes, and t h is

B's mean.

gives A a

But

higher mean

When the data is transformed in t o lo g s , Community A has a mean

less than B 's.

Is the a r ith m e tic or the geometric mean more r e f l e c t i v e

o f the actual data?

In the case o f Community A, more complaints a re

c loser to a geometric mean o f 13 minutes than to an a r ith m e t ic mean of
17 minutes.

Community B's mean response time had l i t t l e

v a ria tio n .

The fo llo w in g quote summarizes the d iffe r e n c e between using the
a r ith m e tic versus the

geometric mean.

6

The value o f the a r ith m e tic mean is
based on a l l the
ob­
servation s and th is is a ffe c te d by a l l the values o f the
v a r ia b le .
This may r e s u l t a t times in giving c e r t a in
extreme values too much in flu e n c e .

In tro d u c tio n to Business and Economic S t a t i s t i c s , John Stockton and
Charles C la rk , South-Western Publishing Company, C in c in n a t i, Ohio,
1971, pp. lu 7 - ly o .

The geometric mean is based on a l l the observations,
and thus is a ffe c te d by a l l the values o f the v a r i a ­
b le .
However, i t gives less w e it h t to extremely
large values than does the a r it h m e t ic mean.
For th is data which has extreme values, the geometric mean provides
more re p re s e n ta tiv e in fo rm a tio n .
One disadvantage o f using complaint in fo rm a tio n from th is c e n tra l
dispatching system was t h a t c i t i z e n preference f o r one p o lic e u n i t versus
another could not be determined.

I t was impossible to d e te c t c o n s is te n tly

whether a c i t i z e n c a lle d requesting a s p e c if ic p o lic e department or merely
requesting a p o lic e p a tro l regardless o f p o lic e department.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Previous Attempts to D i f f e r e n t i a t e P o lic e P a t r o l s .
in d ic a to r used by c itiz e n s and e le c te d o f f i c i a l s
department is the lo cal crime r a t e . ^

The most common

to evalu a te a p o lic e

But t h is in d ic a t o r is very

aggregative r e f l e c t i n g the movement o f many v a r ia b le s , many o f which
cannot be a ffe c te d by the p o lic e department.

8

James Q. Wilson reviewed

several studies which attempted to assess the impact of d i f f e r e n t le v e ls

The Uniform FBI Crime Index is u s u a lly used to in d ic a te the lo c a l crime
r a te ; and i t comprises seven crimes said to represent a community's
c r im in a li t y .
These seven crimes are c rim in a l homicide, rape, robbery,
aggravated a s s a u lt, b u rg la ry , larceny and auto t h e f t .
These crimes
are sometimes r e fe r r e d to as P a rt I crimes.
P a r t I I offenses in clude
a l l other offences.
^The fo llo w in g works discuss the d e f ic ie n c ie s o f using the FBI Crime
Index as a measure o f the output o f a p o lic e agency. See A lb e r t D.
Biderman, "Social In d ic a to rs and Goals" in Social In d ic a to rs ed. by
Raymond A. Bauer (Cambridge, Mass: M . I . T . Press, 1 9 6 6 ), pp. 117-118;
James E. P r ic e , "A Test of the Accuracy o f Crime S t a t i s t i c s , " Social
Problems, 14 ( F a l l , 1966), pp. 214-221; P re s id e n t's Commission, The
Challenge o f Crime (Washington, D .C ., 1965); and Marvin E. Wolfgang,
"Uniform Crime Reports: A C r i t i c a l A p p r a is a l" , U n iv e r s it y of Pennsyl­
vania Law Review, 109 ( A p r i l , 1963), pp. 708-738

188

and types o f p a tr o ls ( f o o t p a t r o l , car p a t r o l , e t c . ) on c e r ta in types
o f crimes.

His conclusions fo llo w :

F i r s t , a massive increase in p o lic e presence on f o o t in
densely s e t t l e d areas w i l l probably lead to a reduction
in those crimes, such as muggings and auto t h e f t , t h a t
re q u ire p e rp e tra to rs to use the c i t y s t r e e t s . . . N o one
can s a y ...h o w long th is reduction w i l l p e r s i s t . . .and
how much crime is merely displaced to another lo c a tio n .
Second, s u b s ta n tia l increases in random preven tive
p a tro l by p o lic e in marked cars do not appear to
have any e f f e c t on crime ra te s nor do they tend
to reassure the c i t i z e n r y about t h e i r s a fe ty .
T h ird , the community-service model o f neighborhood
team p o lic in g appears, on the basis o f p re lim in a ry
r e s u l t s , . . . t o be o f some value in reducing b u rg la rie s
even w ith o u t massive increases in p o lic e manpower.
Wilson concludes his a r t i c l e by s t a t in g t h a t "Our knowledge o f how
crime can be c o n tro lle d is s t i l l

s u r p r is in g ly p r im i t i v e " .

g

Several other attempts have been made to c a te g o riz e p o lic e operations
which do not use incidence o f crime s t a t i s t i c s .

But most s t i l l

deal

with the two p o lic e functions--m aintenance of order and enforcement of
laws.

Jerome Skolnick in d ic a te s :
I f the p o lic e could m ain ta in o rder w ith o u t regard
to l e g a l i t y , t h e i r s h o rt-ru n d i f f i c u l t i e s would be
considerably dim inished. However, they are i n e v i ­
ta b ly concerned w ith in t e r p r e t in g l e g a l i t y because
o f t h e i r use o f law as an instrum ent of ord e r.
The c rim inal law contains a s e t o f ru le s f o r the
maintenance o f s o c ia l ord e r. 10

Q
James Q. Wilson, "Do the P o lic e Prevent Crime?", The New York Times
Magazine, October 6 , 1974.
^Jerome S k o ln ic k , J u s tic e Without T r i a l :
Law Enforcement in Demo­
c r a t i c S o c ie ty , John W iley & Sons, I n c . , New York, 1966, pages 6 - 7 .

189
The problem is f u r t h e r aggrevated.

Robert C. Trojanowics and Samuel

L. Dixon in d ic a te :
...m o s t laws t h a t municipal p o lic e are supposed to
enforce have been enacted a t s ta te le v e ls o f gov­
ernment. The s ta te laws o fte n do not r e f l e c t v a r­
ia tio n s t h a t e x i s t in the many local j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
The policeman can have d i f f i c u l t y applying the law
to his p a r t i c u l a r community because o f many fa c to rs
in cluding p o l i t i c a l pressure. 11
James Q. Wilson deals w ith the same continuum o f order maintenance
and law enforcement in his book V a r ie t ie s o f P o lic e Behavior by desc rib in g three s ty le s o f p o lic e behavior.

12

Before presenting the

three s t y le s , Wilson spends considerable time discussing the g re a t
amount of patrolman d is c r e t io n and the g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y in t i g h t
control of patrolmen actions through any s o r t o f h e ir a r c h ic a l command
s tru c tu re .

The in d ic a t o r used by Wilson to know when more or less of

a c e r t a in s t y le is achieved is the propensity o f o f f i c e r s to a r r e s t
and t i c k e t d i f f e r e n t groups in s o c ie ty .
W ilson's f i r s t s t y l e is c a lle d "watchman" which tends to emphasize
order maintenance or keeping the peace.
t o le r a t e d .

D e v iatio n from the law is

T ic k e tin g and a r re s ts per c a p ita tend to be low, but more

blacks tend to be a rre s te d than whites f o r s im il a r offenses.

This

^ R o b e r t C. Trojanowics and Samuel L. Dixon, Criminal J u s tic e and the
Community, P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . , 1974, p. 125.
^2James Q. Wilson, V a r ie t ie s o f P o lic e B ehavior, Harvard U n iv e r s ity
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968.

190

p o lice s t y le tends to be found in middle and lower class in d u s t r i a l a rea s .
O ffic e r s are judged on how w e ll they handled the s i t u a t io n r a th e r than
on the number o f a rre s ts made or tic k e t s issued.
The " l e g a l i s t i c s ty le " is W ilson's second s t y l e where th e re is
g re a te r propensity to t i c k e t and a r r e s t .
s im ila r to t h a t f o r w h ite s.

The black a r r e s t r a te is

Emphasis by patrolman is placed on how

f a r people deviate from the law.
The "se rv ic e

type" is W ilson's t h i r d and is a m ixture o f l e g a l i s t i c

and watchman s ty le s .
communities.

This type tends to be found in f a i r l y homogenous

Equal a t t e n t io n is given to a l l requests f o r p o lic e s e rv ic e

be they to enforce a law, re s to re peace, or perform a community e rrand .
Wilson uses the a r r e s t and t i c k e t tendencies to show how p o lic e
services can d i f f e r .

E lin o r Ostrom e t . a ! . , use the fo llo w in g f i v e

areas to show d iffe re n c e s between services received by p o rtions o f
large m etro p o litan area and s i m i l a r communities which have t h e i r own
department:

IT

1)

How r a p id ly in d iv id u a ls thought p o lic e responded to callr.
in t h e i r neighborhood.

2)

Whether they thought crime in t h e i r neighborhood was
increasing.

3)

T h eir e v a lu a tio n of neighborhood p o l i c e - c i t i z e n r e ­
la tio n s h ip s .

4)

Whether they thought p o lic e serving t h e i r neighborhood
accepted b rib e s .

5)

A general e v a lu a tio n o f the job p o lic e in t h e i r
neighborhood were doing.

1^
E lin o r Ostrom, e t . a ! . , Community O rganization and the P rovisio n o f
P olice S ervices, Indiana U n iv e r s it y , Bloomington, In d ia n a , p. 42.

191
Wilson and Ostrom e t . a l . both focus on the patrolman w ith Wilson
making and recording his perceptions o f patrolm en's a ctions and Ostrom
e t . a l . recording the perceptions of c i t i z e n s .

Since p a tro l hours is

what purchased from the s h e r i f f , p a tro l performance measures are needed
f o r local o f f i c i a l s .
P atrols perform a v a r i e t y o f a c t i v i t i e s .

F i r s t they respond to

c a lls f o r s e rv ic e , c rim in a l as w e ll as no ncrim inal.
time on complaints.

I f the i n i t i a l

Second, they spend

responding o f f i c e r is in charge

o f the complaint from beginning to end, the o f f i c e r might spend more
time per complaint than in those departments where complaints are
turned over to a d e te c tiv e bureau f o r c lo s in g .
t r a f f i c flow and enforce t r a f f i c laws.

T h ir d , p a tr o ls monitor

This consists o f being v i s i b l e

on stretches o f road where speeding is o c c u rrin g , w r it i n g t i c k e t s , and
giving verbal and w r i t t e n warnings.

Fourth, p a tro ls c ru is e d i f f e r e n t

areas being v i s i b l e checking doors and p o t e n t i a l l y suspicious s it u a t io n s .
F i f t h , p a tro ls are a t the disposal of p o lic e a d m in is tra to rs and/or
local o f f i c i a l s to perform p o lic e support or community errands ( d i s t r i b u t e
.

minutes o f l a s t board meeting to council members).

14

Local o f f i c i a l s , contemplating c o n tra c tin g or s t a r t i n g t h e i r own
department would f in d i t in fo rm a tiv e to know what a c t i v i t i e s w i l l be
performed by t h e i r p a t r o ls .
Local o f f i c i a l s also l i k e to know whether
the type or the amount o f a c t i v i t i e s performed would d i f f e r i f they
contracted or had t h e i r own department. To know more f u l l y what is
received from p a t r o ls , contracted or l o c a l l y produced, a time a n a ly s is
o f d i f f e r e n t p o lic e operations could be done. Such a study could show
the time d i s t r i b u t i o n over t r a f f i c , p re v e n ta tiv e p a t r o l , p o lic e support
work, community e rrand s, responding to com plaints, and spending time on
complaints. Due to resource l i m i t a t i o n s , such a study was not done.

192
Response Time and Time Spent on Complaints.

Two o f the p a tro l

a c t i v i t i e s , responding to complaints and spending time on com plaints,
can be q u a n t ifie d .

The two in d ic a to rs which w i l l be used are i n i t i a l

response time and i n i t i a l amount o f time spent on complaints.
I n i t i a l response time is defined to be the lapse in time between
when a c a ll is received by a p o lic e telephone operator and when an
o f f i c e r a r riv e s a t the s i t e o f the complaint.

This in d ic a t o r o f per­

formance

has two c h a r a c te r is t ic s worth noting.

formance

measure o f in term e d ia te outputs which e n te r a d d itio n a l

duction fu n c tio n s .

F i r s t , i t is a per­
pro­

W ithin some l i m i t o f c o n s is te n tly low response

time, there is g re a te r p r o b a b ilit y o f suspect apprehension, q r e a te r
deterence to c e r t a in crimes, and the lessening of some f in a n c ia l
losses due to crime.

A second c h a r a c t e r is t ic is t h a t i n i t i a l response

time can be linked conceptually to consumer w e lf a r e .
ceives a

A c i t i z e n p e r­

g re a te r loss o f u t i l i t y i f he must w a it 10 minutes f o r

a

policeman than i f he must w a it f i v e minutes, a l l e lse remainig equal.
The level o f w e ll being of c it iz e n s is a p a r t i a l fu n c tio n o f how long
they must w a it f o r a policeman.
Response time has two components which need to be recognized.
The f i r s t is dispatching time (T^) which is the time in t e r v a l between
when the c a ll is received by the dispatching c enter and when a car is
dispatched.

The higher the complaint load and the fewer p a tro l u n its

working, the g re a te r the p r o b a b ili t y t h a t p a tro l u n its w i l l not be

^ U t i l i t y received from response time is learned and might change i f
response time were r e g u la r ly re p o rte d .

15

193

a v a ila b le when

a complaint is made. ^

The second component is

t r a v e lin g time

(T t ) which is the amount o f time between when the c a ll

is dispatched and when the car a r r iv e s on the scene.

A ff e c tin g th is

time increment is the proxim ity of the car to the complaint and whether
or not fla s h e r lig h t s and s ir e n are used in proceeding to the com plaint.
A large p a tr o lin g d i s t r i c t , heavy t r a f f i c , and not using li g h t s and
s ire n are v a ria b le s which w i l l make Tt la r g e .
is the sum o f the dispatching
Time spent on complaints

I n i t i a l response (T^)

time and t r a v e lin g time.
is a performance measure f o r much o f the

same reasoning

used to explain response tim e.

Time spent is an i n t e r ­

mediate p a tro l

output which enters oth e r production fu n c tio n s .

For

c e rta in complaints, the more time i n i t i a l l y spent gathering in fo rm a tio n
the g r e a te r the chances o f apprehension or recovery o f sto le n p ro p erty .
Time spent can also be lin k e d

to

consumer w e lfa r e .

A ll e ls e being equal

a c i t i z e n is b e t t e r o f f the more time and a t t e n t io n he

re c e iv e s .

The amount of time spent on each complaint is dependent upon the
type o f complaints, p r i o r i t y o f other p a tro l a c t i v i t i e s , and the type of
follo w -u p c a p a b il it ie s a department has.

C e rta in complaint types tend

to re q u ire more tim e , i n i t i a l l y , than do others ( e . g . murders and armed
robberies versus noisy party or unfounded co m p la in ts ).

Deciding which

1 /:

Some p o lic e c h ie fs consider the only r e le v a n t response time to be
the t r a v e lin g tim e , but i f th is time is used, the c r i t i c a l component,
dispatching tim e , which is s e n s itiv e to the number o f p a tro ls and the
length o f time spent on each complaint is missed.
17

People's r e c a ll w i l l be more accurate the s h o rte r the time period
between in c id e n t and in te r v ie w .

17

194
complaints re ce iv e a t t e n t io n r e f l e c t s in p a r t the values o f the com­
munity and in p a r t standard p o lic e p ra c tic e s developed and disseminated
in schools o f crim in a l j u s t i c e and p o lic e academies.

The p r i o r i t y o f

other p a tro l a c t i v i t i e s can a f f e c t time spent in t h a t a responding
o f f i c e r may be r e lu c t a n t to spend too much time on any given complaint
in l i g h t of oth e r complaints which are w a itin g to be answered or t r a f f i c
which needs m onitoring.

F i n a l l y , the i n i t i a l

in v e s tig a tin g o f f i c e r has

complete r e s p o n s ib ilit y f o r the closing o f most com plaints, more time
may be spent i n i t i a l l y on a complaint than in departments where most
complaints are turned over to a d e te c tiv e bureau or a ju v e n i le bureau
f o r closing.
Type and Level o f P atro l S e r v ic e .

Using the performance in d ic a to r s

of response time and time spent on com plaints, I f in d i t useful to
d i f f e r e n t i a t e between le v e l and type o f p a tr o l s e r v ic e .

Level o f p a tro l

services is r e fl e c t e d in the mean response time and the mean amount c f
time spent on complaints over a l l complaints answered.

W ith in some range,

the number o f p a tro l hours purchased or produced by a lo ca l community
w i l l lower mean

response time and/or increase mean amount of time spent

on complaints.
The type o f p a tro l s e rvice r e fe r s to the r e l a t i v e p r i o r i t y given to
d i f f e r e n t complaint categories ( e .g . breaking and e n te r in g , prop erty
d is t r u c t io n , auto a c c id e n t, personal in j u r y auto a c c id e n t, e t c . ) .

The

complaint p r i o r i t y held by the s h e r i f f may not be the same as t h a t held
by local o f f i c i a l s .

If

the most serious complaint experienced by a

contracting community is B&E, i t may not re ce iv e as much a t t e n t i o n (low

195
response time and high amount o f time spent on i t )

because the contracted

s h e r i f f ' s deputies may not f e e l i t is t h a t important r e l a t i v e to the
"more serious" complaints ( e .g . armed ro b b e rie s , murders, e t c ) .
Knowing complaint p r i o r i t y f o r the s h e r i f f is d i f f i c u l t .

The s h e r i f f
i

is not l i k e l y to have in w r it t e n form his complaint p r i o r i t y .

Because

the in d iv id u a l p a tro l o f f i c e r has much d is c r e t io n , the s h e r i f f may not
honestly know the complaint p r i o r i t y f o r his department.

Even more

d i f f i c u l t to know is the process by which the complaint p r i o r i t y is
e s tab lis h e d , which is important to know because i f no process e x i s t s , then
any observed complaint p r i o r i t y could merely be a random happening.
I t is not known how much demand there is f o r such in fo rm a tio n by
local o f f i c i a l s .

One example is worth noting.

C ity o f f i c i a l s o f Romulus

who c ontract with the Wayne County s h e r i f f n o t i f ie d the s h e r i f f t h a t
breaking and entering complaints were not re c e iv in g a low enough r e ­
sponse time.

A 'd i r e c t i v e was sent from the s h e r i f f to the contracted

patro ls operating in Romulus and to the dispatcher o f those p a tro ls
th a t B&E complaints were to re ce iv e a higher p r i o r i t y .

18

Other than

this example, l i t t l e

discussion was heard from local o f f i c i a l s about

complaint p r i o r i t y .

One reason f o r th is is t h a t such in fo rm a tio n is not

r e a d ily a v a i la b le , and any d ir e c t iv e s tend to be informed.

18
As explained by Frans Heideman, the s h e r i f f ' s a d m in is tr a to r , Romulus
is a f a i r l y heterogenous community but the c i t y f a t e r s tend to be from
suburbia where the most serious complaint is B&E and they wanted a lower
response time to B&E even i f i t meant higher response time to a more
serious complaint in the ghetto p o rtio n of Romulus.

196

AREA DISTRIBUTION OF SHERIFF'S NON-CONTRACT PATROL
In 1974, i t is estimated t h a t the s h e r i f f produced 6,240 s in g le
and 59,904 double p a tro l hours.

How does the s h e r i f f a llo c a t e these

general p a tro l hours to the communities in his county and how might
th is a f f e c t his c o n tracting operations?
In Chapter I I ,

three a l l o c a t i v e decision ru le s were suggested.

F i r s t , the s h e r i f f could e q u a liz e inputs assigning an equal number o f
p a tro l hours to each community.

The second r u le is to e q u a liz e outputs

with p a tro ls being a llo c a te d such t h a t each community has the same mean
response time.

The t h i r d is f o r the s h e r i f f to a llo c a t e his p a tro ls

such t h a t the county-wide mean response time is minimized.
From a d e s c rip tio n o f the geographic assignment o f the s h e r i f f ' s
general p a t r o ls , i t is ev id e n t t h a t the s h e r i f f does not e q u a liz e in p u ts .
Some general p a tro ls have a p a tro l area o f 4 - 1 /2 townships w h ile others
confine themselves to a s in g le township.

When e x tra p a tr o ls are operated,

they tend to be assigned to the p a tr o lin g d i s t r i c t s which are on the
f r in g e o f the m e tro p o lita n area located in the center o f the county.
Table 5 - 3 shows the s h e r i f f ' s response time to d i f f e r e n t communities
in the county.

From th is ta b le i t is c le a r th a t the s h e r i f f does not

attem pt to e q u a lize output f o r a l l

communities in terms o f equal response

time, equal amounts o f time spent on complaints, or equal percent of
complaints answered.
The t h i r d a l l o c a t i v e decision r u le is to minimize the county-wide
mean response tim e.
achieve th is goal?

What w i l l be observed i f the s h e r i f f attempts to
F irs t,

the county-wide mean response time is the

average response time o f the local conmunities weighted by the number

•tL - W

* .

.

Table 5-3.

S h e r i f f 's non-contract p a tro l services to communities of varying population s iz e s .

% of complaint
Communi ty

L-01
L-02
L-03
L-04
N-05
L-06
L-07
C-08
L-09
L - 10
N -ll
N-12
L-13
L-14
C-15
L-15
N-16
L-17
L-18
L-19
N-20
L - 21
N- 2 2
L-23
L-24
L - 25
N-26
C-27
*

Approximate
1970 Population

2,900
3,100
32,500
2,400
5,300
5,300
8,300
8,900
29,900
7,200
7,000
3,300
5,100
19,200
25,600
25,600
3,400
700
1,100

29,400
8,000

1,500
6,500
700
5,500
4,900
6,000

9,400

Mean times are geometric means.

answered by
the s h e r i f f

35
50
35
9
51
5
10

49
40
18
58
60
16
15
31
37
47
50
16
52
79
35
79
33
50
18
71
18

Mean response
time (rounded to
nearest m in u te)*

Mean time spent
on complaints (rounded
to nearest m inu te)*

25
23
9

10
20
10

6

13
15
15
14
14
14
18
15
31
13

23
63
15
20
11
11

17
16
10

9

11
10
10

10
8

17
5
5

23
11
22

9
14

10

11
20

12

25
15
7
21
11

13

-

14
24
15
10

13
11

198

of complaints.

I t can be expressed in the fo llo w in g equation:

T
c

Where:
Tc = county-wide mean response time
T.j = mean response time by s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l
i n communi ty
i
a. = number of complaints answered by the
s h e r i f f in community i
I f the s h e r i f f desires to minimize the o v e r a ll county-wide response
time, then he w i l l tend to a llo c a t e his p a tro ls in order to minimize
the response time in high complaint communities.

The fo llo w in g model

and numerical example w i l l help i l l u s t r a t e t h i s .
Assume t h a t there is a county w ith three communities and t h a t
d riv in g conditions are id e n t ic a l on each o f the three communities.
Assume t h a t no two complaints come in a t the same time ( i . e . response
time is the same as d riv in g tim e ).

The s h e r i f f has only one p a tro l

to a llo c a t e and he knows the production r e l a t i o n between c ru is in g
practices and a minute o f response time.
F i r s t , consider t h a t the three communities have the same number
o f complaints, ten; and t h a t the s h e r i f f has so in s tru c te d his p a tro l
to cruise in such a manner t h a t each community receives the same le v e l
o f response tim e, ten minutes.
time o f 10 minutes.

This produces a county-wide mean response

199
=
Tc

10 min. x 10 comp. + 10 comp. + 10 min.

x 10

_ ln

.

30 complaints

Suppose t h a t the s h e r i f f wants to give one community a one minute lower
response time and assume th is means a minute increase in another comt

munity.

T

The county-wide mean remains unchanged.

=

c

11 min. x 10 comp. + 10 min. x 10 comp. + 9 min. x 10 comp. _ ln
30 complaints

.
r

Consider the same county and s h e r i f f but now assume the complaint load
is unequal and t h a t the s h e r i f f has in s tru c te d his p a tro l to give each
community the same mean response time.

The county-wide mean remains

10 minutes.

T =
c

10 min. x 15 comp. + 10 min. x 10 comp. + 10 min. x 5 comp._ qn •
30 complaints
iu min,

I f the s h e r i f f chooses to give the community w ith 15 complaints a one
minute lower response time a t the expense o f a one minute higher r e ­
sponse time in the 10 complaint community, the county-wide mean w i l l
now fa 1 1 .

T

c

=

9 min. x 15 comp. + 11 min. x 10 comp. + 10 min. x 5 comp._ Q
30 complaints
'

The county-wide mean would f a l l even f u r t h e r 9 .6 minutes, i f the increase
of one minute would occur in the community w ith only f i v e complaints.
This example shows how the county-wide mean w i l l

tend to f a l l

i f p a tro ls

are a llo c a te d away from low complaint areas to high complaint areas.
The Spearman rank c o r r e la tio n was used to t e s t the r e la t io n s h ip
between community complaint load and the s h e r i f f ' s response tim e.

1

200

Results are shown in Table

Table § -4 .

5. 4

,

C o r re la tio n between the v a ria b le s population
s i z e , le v e l o f com plaints, response time and
time spent on complaints.
»

R ela tio n s h ip examined

C o rre la tio n
c o e ffic ie n t

Level a t which
c o r r e la tio n
c o e f f i c i e n t is
s ta tis tic a lly
d i f f e r e n t from
zero

Population s iz e and le v e l
o f complaints

+ .9

.001

Level of complaints and
s h e r i f f ' s response time

-.3 9

.05

Population s iz e and
s h e r i f f ' s response time

-.3 6

.10

Time spent on complaints
and le v e l of complaints

-.2 0

.40

As hypothesized, there is a negative a s so cia tio n between response time and
le v e l o f complaints and population s iz e .

19

A lso, a strong p o s itiv e

r e la tio n s h ip e x is ts between s h e r i f f ' s complaint load and population s iz e .

19

There is a reason why county-wide mean response time could increase
with the s h e r i f f ' s p a tro ls operating in high complaint areas. Consider
a high complaint township which has i t s own p o lic e department. During
c e rta in times o f the day, a complaint can reach the dispatcher when a l l
p a tro ls ( s h e r i f f ' s non-contract and lo ca l p a tr o ls ) in the area are occupied
on other complaints.
I f the s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l becomes a v a ila b le f i r s t
i t w i l l receive the complaint.
But, attached to the complaint is a
w a itin g tim e.
Consequently, even i f the s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro l
were very close to the complaint, a la rg e response time could r e s u l t
due to the timing o f the complaints. Although, there is no reason to
expect t h a t th is would tend to happen more f o r the s h e r i f f ' s non c o n tra c t
p a tro ls compared to lo ca l p o lic e p a t r o ls .

201

The a r t i c u la t e d goal of th is p a r t ic u la r s h e r i f f is to respond to as
many complaints as p o ssib le.
county-wide response time.

But th is goal is c onsistent w ith minimizing
The reason f o r t h is is t h a t the c e n tra l

dispatching operation assigns complaints to the c lo s e s t a v a ila b le p a tro l
u n it .

In order to maximize the number of complaints s e rv ic e d , the

s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l u n its need to be p a tro lin g those areas where there is
a high p r o b a b ilit y o f a complaint occurring, and th is tends to be
the highly populated areas.
How might the s h e r i f f ' s p ra c tic e o f a llo c a t in g p a tro ls away from
low complaint areas to high complaint areas ( e i t h e r because he is
attempting to minimize county-wide response time or maximize the
number o f complaints answered) c o n trib u te to his success a t c o n tra c tin g .
With the s h e r i f f ' s p o lic y to a llo c a t in g p a tro ls away from growing but
s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y low populated communities, local o f f i c i a l s o f such
communities may not have t h e i r concept o f present or fu tu r e p a tro l
needs ( i . e .

low response time) met by the s h e r i f f ' s general p a t r o l .

I f the lo cal o f f i c i a l s are unable to ob tain higher le v e ls o f general
p a t r o l, then they face the decision of purchasing a higher le v e l o f
service; and th is o ffe r s a c o n tracting opportunity to the s h e r i f f .
In the h ig h ly urbanized communities, which l i k e l y have t h e i r own
p o lice department, the concentration o f s h e r i f f ' s

non-contract p a tro ls can

accustom lo cal c it iz e n s to seeing and dealing with s h e r i f f ' s deputies
and demonstrate to local o f f i c a l s the s h e r i f f ' s w illin g n e s s to provide
high q u a l it y s e rv ic e .

Both o f these events tend to lessen re sista n c e

from local o f f i c i a l s disbanning t h e i r lo cal department and c o n tra c tin g
with the s h e r i f f .

But resistance could also be o ffe red e s p e c ia lly

i f the local p o lic e c h ie f f e e ls threatened by the concentration of
s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro ls and pushes lo ca l p o lic e o f f ic e r s to give
prompt courteous service in order to out perform the s h e r i f f .
,,on-contract p a tro ls tend to be a llo c a te d according to community s iz e .
j

But w ith in s im il a r s ize communities, does the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement
( a d m in is tr a tiv e , bargained, or gra n t) used by local o f f i c i a l s

to secure

higher le v e ls o f p a tro l service have any impact on the le v e l o f general
patrol service?

Table

5-5, p u lls ten communities from Table

and groups the communities in to two groups.

,.j

The f i r s t group (L -0 3 ,L ~ 0 9 ,

L-14, C -1 5 ,L -1 5 , and L-19) are the more urbanized communities w ith a 1970
population range o f 19,200 to 32,500.

The second group ( L -0 7 ,C -0 8 , N-20,

and C-27) is the less urbanized group with a population range o f 8,000
to 9 ,400.
For the urbanized group, the s h e r i f f ' s response time in C-15 w i l l
be compared to L-03, L-09, L-14, L -1 5 , and L-1 9 .

The d iffe re n c e s in

s h e r i f f ' s response time is not s t a t i s t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from zero
between L-03 and C-15, L-19 and C-15, and L-14 and C-15.

While a

s ig n ific a n c e t e s t ( a t the .05 s ig n ific a n c e l e v e l) was not run f o r the
comparison o f L-09 to C-15, i t appears the d iffe r e n c e is g r e a te r than
zero w ith a lower level of s e rv ic e going to L-09.

The d iffe r e n c e between

Table 5 - 5 .

Comparison between s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro ls and local p a tr o ls .
Percent o f complaints
answered by

Community

1970
Population

Local or
contracted
p a tro ls

S h e riff's
non-contract
patrol

Minutes o f mean
respond time
Local or
; S h e r i f f 's
contracted ; non-contract
patro ls
;
patrol

Minutes o f time
spent on complaints
Local or ; S h e r i f f 's
contracted ; non-contract
p a tro ls
;
patrol

Percent
L-03

32,500

61

35

8.2

9.1

11.3

9.5

L-09

29,900

40

40

11.7

11.4

14.0

13.8

L-14

19,20n

78

15

6.2

8.8

9.6

10.9

C-15

25,600

63

31

10.8

9 .5

9.1

9 .5

L-15

25,600

59

37

8 .7

8.16

10.6

8.2

L-19

29,300

38

52

8 .4

9.1

10.3

10.3

L-07

8,300

83

10

11.6

14.7

12.2

13.6

C-08

8,900

54

49

15.3

19.6

14.3

14.1

N-20

8,000

N.A.

79

N.A.

13.9

N.A.

13.0

C-27

9,400

67

18

8 .3

11.1

10.0

11.1

204
the s h e r i f f ' s response time in C-15 compared to L-15 is s t a t i s t i c a l l y
d i f f e r e n t from zero.

20

For the less urban group, C-08 receives s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t l y
higher response time from the s h e r i f f than N-20, L-0 7 , and C-27.
i

C-27 receives about the same response time as N-20 and a lower response
time than L-0 7 .

The conclusion which is drawn from a l l o f th is is

t h a t the s h e r i f f tends not to d is c rim in a te a g a in s t communities in the
a llo c a t i o n o f non-contract p a tro ls on the basis o f whether they c o n tra c t
(ba rga in) w ith him, have t h e i r own department ( a d m in i s t r a t iv e ) , or take
what they can g e t n e ith e r contracting nor having t h e i r own department
(g r a n t) l i k e N-20.

When both groups o f communities are examined

using the performance in d ic a to r time spent on com plaints, the same
conclusion is reached.

20

There is a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t d iffe re n c e between C-15 and L-15
w ith C-15 having a higher response time than L-15.
This suggests t h a t the
s h e r i f f gives high s e rv ic e to out perform a local department, and once
a c o n tra c t is signed places non-contract p a tro ls in a d i f f e r e n t p o rtio n
o f the county. This d iffe r e n c e deserves special a t t e n t i o n .
I t should
not be in f e r r e d t h a t higher response time from the general p a tro ls is
due to c o n tra c tin g . One explanation f o r the higher response time is
th a t i t was due to the wanner weather o f spring and e a r ly summer.
During the f i r s t three months o f the sample (January through March)
community 15 had i t s own p o lic e department; and f o r the l a s t three
months o f the sample ( A p r il through June) community 15 contracted with
the s h e r i f f .
During the warmer months, complaint load increases s i g n i f i ­
c a n tly meaning a longer w a itin g time f o r the complaints to be dispatched.
When the response time from a l l complaints over a l l communities and
p o lic e u n its are aggregated f o r the f i r s t three months and compared to
the aggregation f o r the second three months, the second three months
mean is one minute g r e a te r than the mean f o r the f i r s t three months.
This d iffe r e n c e is s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t .
I f the response time
is adjusted f o r season, the response time d iffe r e n c e between C-15 and
L-15 is not s t a t i s t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from zero.

205

ALLOCATION OF NON-CONTRACT PATROLS AND PRICE CONCESSION
How the s h e r i f f geographically a llo c a te s his p a tro ls has im p lic a tio n s
concerning the p ric e concession given to the contra c tin g communities.

Many s h e r if f s j u s t i f y the c o n tra c t p ric e being less than costs by
s ta tin g t h a t the s h e r i f f owes something to these communities since
they pay county taxes.

This j u s t i f i c a t i o n is accurate i f the s h e r i f f

takes some le v e l o f s e rv ic e away from the contracting community which
i t form erly received before c o n tracting ( e .g . r e a llo c a t in g non-contract
p a tro ls away from c o ntracting communities to a low s e rv ic e a r e a ).
Community 15 receives a 16 percent p ric e concession on i t s c o n tra c t
w h ile community 08 and 27 receive a 37 and 45 percent p ric e concession
r e s p e c tiv e ly .

The le v e l of s e rvice going to these c o n tracting communities

is very close to the s e rv ic e going to s im il a r sized communities which
do not c o n tra c t.
iff's

The le v e l of serv ic e received by community 15 from the sher­

non-contract p a tro l was about the same as before as a f t e r c o n tra c tin g .

While i t is true t h a t the s h e r i f f could be withholding some other
service from the c o n tracting communities, i t is h ighly u n l i k e l y .

The

p ric e concessions appear to be given to contracting communities in re tu rn
f o r t h e i r c o ntracting with the s h e r i f f and not as compensation f o r
any loss o f the s h e r i f f ' s services given to county taxpayers.
PERCENTAGE OF CALLS ANSWERED OUTSIDE CONTRACTING COMMUNITY
One concern o f c o n tra c tin g which local o f f i c i a l s have is th a t
the contracted p a tro ls w i l l spend too much time outside the contra c tin g
community.

In most contracts the s h e r i f f s p e c ifie s t h a t the contracted

patrol w i l l be dispatched outside the c o n tra c tin g community in cases

206

o f emergency; and emergency is never d e fin ed .

21

From Table ( V - 5 ) ,

there is no c le a r p a tte rn t h a t contracted p a tr o ls spend more time outside
the contracting community than local p o lic e departments.

The highest

percentage o f c a lls answered outside the p a tr o lin g d i s t r i c t is f o r
s

C-08 which is located in a more sparsely populated p o rtio n o f the county.
Since the s h e r i f f a llo c a te d more p a tro ls to the more densely populated
areas, i t is not s u rp ris in g to have the only a v a i la b le p a tro ls in th is
portion of the county be the contracted ones which r e s u lts in 23 percent
of contracted p a tro l c a lls occurring outside C-08.
d iffe re n c e between C-27, L -0 7 , and L-10.

There is l i t t l e

P a tro ls from L-07 leave t h e i r

local community less than C-27 p a tr o ls leave t h e i r community, but L-10
patro ls leave t h e i r community more than C-27 p a tro ls leave t h e i r community.
A f te r community 15 began c o n tr a c tin g , the contracted p a tro ls l e f t
community 15 s l i g h t l y less than the local p a tro ls had done.

For the

la rg e r communities, C-15 answered a higher percentage of c a lls outside
community 15 than did lo cal department 19, 9 , and 3.

F i n a lly f o r a l l

communities except C-27, the percentage o f c a l l s answered outside the
local community is g re a te r than the percentage o f c a lls answered w it h in
the lo c a l community by o th e r lo ca l departments.

22

PI

Many local o f f i c i a l s o f c o n tra c tin g communities have radio p o lic e
scanners which allo w them to monitor where t h e i r p a tro ls a re .

^ T h e m o tiv a tio n to answer c a lls ou tside the lo ca l p a tro l d i s t r i c t is
probably not to encourage o th e r lo ca l departments to respond to c a l l s
inside the lo ca l p a t r o ll in g d i s t r i c t .
The percentage of c a lls answered
outside local communities being g r e a te r than percentage o f c a lls
answered in s id e the local community by o th e r lo ca l departments might
b e t te r be explained by lo ca l p a tr o ls looking f o r something to do and
going where the a c tio n i s .

207

TYPE OF PATROL SERVICES
How might the type o f p a tro l s e rv ic e d i f f e r i f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s
should c o n tra c t w ith the s h e r i f f compared to having t h e i r own p o lic e
department?

One approach to th is question is to compare the amount of
i

time the p a tro ls spend on complaint answering a c t i v i t y .

The problem is

th a t i t is d i f f i c u l t to compare p o lic e operations as to the p r i o r i t y
given to complaint answering a c t i v i t y r e l a t i v e to t r a f f i c , community
errands, p o lic e support a c t i v i t i e s , e t c . , j u s t by looking a t mean response
time and mean time spent on complaints.

The reason is t h a t mean response

time can be low e it h e r because o f a la rg e number o f p a tro l hours, a
high p r i o r i t y given to complaint answering a c t i v i t y , or low le v e l of
complaints.

For example, compare C-27 w ith a 1970 population of 9,400

to L-19 w ith a 1970 population of 29,400.

Both communities receive

24 hours o f d a ily p a tro l s e rvice and they both have id e n t ic a l mean response
times and times spent on complaints.

One might conclude th a t they give

id e n t ic a l p r i o r i t y to complaint answering a c t i v i t y but L-19 answers
almost 2 .5 times as many complaints per day as does C-27.

I f the number

of complaints in C-27 should in crease, would response time r i s e or
would the oth e r a c t i v i t i e s performed by the contracted p a tro ls d ecline
to keep response time about where i t is?

The only way to know more

about t h is would be to do a time a n la y s is o f d i f f e r e n t lo ca l departments
and compare them to contracted p a tr o ls .
Another way to d i f f e r e n t i a t e the s h e r i f f ' s contracted p a tro ls from
local p a tro ls is the weight assigned to d i f f e r e n t complaint types.
Response time and time spent on complaints w i l l d i f f e r f o r d i f f e r e n t
complaints depending upon the importance assigned to p a r t i c u l a r complaint

208

types.

T h ir t y complaint categories were used to c la s s if y a l l complaints

Nine complaint categories were chosen because o f high frequency o f
occurrence.

These complaint types are described in Table 5 -6 .

t h i r t y complaint categories are described in the Appendix.

A ll

Response

time and time spent were recorded f o r each complaint type by d i f f e r e n t
po lic e u n its operating in d i f f e r e n t communities (see Tables 5-7 and 5 -8 )
Two questions are o f concern.

F i r s t , do complaint p r i o r i t i e s

d i f f e r from one p o lic e operation to another?

Second, is there any

p a tte rn of p r i o r i t i e s which emerge depending upon whether a community
receives p a tro l s e rv ic e from the s h e r i f f ' s no n-contract p a tro l

(g ra n t),

having i t s own department ( a d m in i s t r a t iv e ) , or c o n tra c tin g (bargain)?
Tables 5-9 and 5-10 have the complaint categories ranked according
to response time and time spent.
the highest p r i o r i t y ( i . e .

Those complaints ranked f i r s t have

the lowest r e l a t i v e response time and

g re a te s t amount o f time spent on com pla in ts ).

I t can be seen from

these l a t t e r two tables t h a t p r i o r i t y o f complaint types is not the
same f o r the contracted p a tr o ls , lo cal p a t r o ls , and the s h e r i f f ' s
non-contract p a t r o ls .

Many p o lic e professionals when asked about the

complaint p r i o r i t y contend t h a t a l l
(i.e .

complaints o f the nonserious nature

complaints where there is no personal i n j u r y , t h r e a t o f v io le n c e

or chance o f suspect apprehension) are a l l

tre a te d e q u a lly .

Two

complaint c a te g o rie s , B&E re p o r t and larceny re p o r t are two nonserious
complaint types t h a t have d i f f e r e n t p r i o r i t i e s .

23

Using response

pO
These complaint types are considered nonserious by many p o lic e
professionals because these complaints a re made a f t e r the crime had
been committed and a l l t h a t can be done by the responding o f f i c e r is
to take a r e p o r t.

Table 5 - 6 .

Complaint
Code

Complaint
Type

Complaint c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .

Complaint

Des cr ipt io n

Property
de str uct io n
accident

This complaint type is an auto accident wi th no per sonal injury.
This group also contains hit and run pr operty destruc tio n acci ­
dents .

05

Br e a k i n g and
Ent er in g
Report

A br e a k i n g and e n te ri n g (B& E) is where there has been forcible
entry into a reside nce or place of business.
This complaint
type is after the fact; and usually all that can be done is for
the r e s p on di ng o f fi cer to take a report.

07

Larceny
Report

A larceny is a ny t hi ng stolen w h i c h did not require a br eak in g
and ent e ri ng to get it.
These are complaints after the fact.
Any larcenies in progress were cla ssified with br eak in g and e n ­
tering in progress.

19

Trouble
wi t h ...

This is a very het er og en ou s group cont ai nin g calls where two or
more citizens are in conflict but the conflict is not likely to
lead to violence.
A caller might be b o th er ed by a n e i g h b o r ’s
b a r k i n g dog or kids ma k i n g noise or pl ay in g in the street.

21

Vandalism

This group might also include attemp te d br ea ki ng and ent er ing or
att e mp te d larceny.

22

Alarms

This
car.

23

Fire

When p eop le need an ambulance or there is a fire, they often
times call the di sp at ch in g center and often times a police car
is di sp atc he d to the scene.

2k

Public
Ass is tan ce

This is a very heter og eno us group con taining such items as v e h i ­
cle inspection, di s cu ssi ng a civil m at te r wi th a citizen or
someone found some pro pe rty and d o e s n ’t know what to do wi t h it.

25

Traffic
complaint

This is any complaint r el ate d to traffic such as loud cycles,
parking, road hazard, squea lin g tires, etc.

is res po nd in g to any alarm, bank,
Many of these alarms are false.

business,

resident or

209

02

Table 5 - 7 .

Community

Mean response time by complaint ca teg o ries, type o f p o lice u n it, and community

Police Unit

C-15

#08

#15

#15

S heriff*

L-15

S heriff*

#27

C-08

Sheriff*

C-27

#20

#19

#07

S heriff*

L-07

Sheriff*

14.7

L-19

Sheriff*

Sheriff*

Complaint Type
Overall Mean
Response Time

10. 8

9-5

8.7

6.2

15-3

19.6

8.3

11.1

11.6

Property Damage
02
Accident

12. 6

22.0

8.8

6.8

11. 3

27.4

7-3

2.0

10.7

Breaking and
Entering Re­
port

05

22.1

14. 5

8.0

12.1

17.8

35-6

11.8

40.0

11.1

12.0

11.8

10. 8

15.6

23.1

8.1

13-3

16.5

9.0

9-1

10.6

8.9

10.6

17-7
12. 0

3-1

2.8

07

21. 0

Trouble with
Someone

19

10. A

Vandalism

21

Alarms

22

17-5
6.1

9.9
20. 0
2.4

Fire or
Medical

23

5-9

7-7

4.9

5-6

Fublic
Assistance

24

9.2

13.1-

12.8

Traffic
Complaint

25

15-7

14. 7

13.6

Larceny Report

8.4

9.1

13-7

7.6

9-7

11.0

11.3

16.3

24.2

9-3

10.9

21.5

9.1

9.6

8.6

18.0

11.5

10.1

34.5
8.0

12.4

17. 2

13-3

12.2

10.2
12.4

16.3
14.0

3-5

15.8
9.4

4.3

4.2

5-1

6.0

29- 6

3.-6

4.7

6.4

22.0

5-1

4.7

6.8

9. 3

21. 6

41.4

11.3

17. 0

9.8

15.0

10. 5

8.8

20.7

10.9

17. 8

'25.3

12.5

11.6

19-8

26.2

8.5

8.5

17.4

*Mean response time in th is column is received from the s h e riff's non-contract patrol.

3.8

Table 5 -8 .

Community

Mean time spent by complaint category, type of p o lice u n it, and community

#15

#08

#15

#27

#07

#20

#19

Sheriff^

L-15

Sheriff^

C-08

Sheriff^

C-27

Sheriffs

L-07

Sheriffs

L-19

S heriff+

Sheriff^

9.1

9.6

10.6

9-8

14.3

14.1

10.0

11.1

12.2

13.7

10.3

10. 3

13.0

Property Damage
Accident
02

16.6

12.1

23.0

20.0

18.0

17.5

18.8

4.4

46.6

21.6

14. 5

23-5

Breaking and
Entering Re­
port

05

18.6

12.2

19-5

14.1

17-9

20.1

14.5

19-0

32.1

12.0

22.0

Larceny Report

07

9-0

10.0

8.9

9-2

13-1

13.7

11.2

17.1

19.1

15.2
12.4

8.7
11.6

6.9

8.5

8.6

16.1

19-5

9.5
10.0

9.0

5.6

4.7

Vandalism

19
21

14.6

Alarms

22

6.8

6.3

7.0

7-9

7.9
7.6

15-5

Fire or
Medical

23

10.1

Public
Assistance

24

Traffic
Complaint

25

Police Unit

C-15

Complaint Type
Overall Mean
Time Spent on
Complaint

Trouble with
Someone

11.0

12.1

14. 6

8.4

8.5
4.0

14.8

7.1
9.6

13-8

9-0

6.7

11.6

17.8

10.7

5.4

10.8

8.2

10.8

2.9

10.2

4.2

8.2

8.2

9-8

9.6

4.2

6.2

13-7

10.1

34.0

7.2

10.2

12.5

7-8

8.3

3-7

8.3

5-1

7.1

10,4

4.3

8.1

15-3

6.8

7.1

18.5

5-7 .

12.9

10. 3
1.0

♦Mean response time in this column is received from the s h e riff's non-contract patrol.

13.3

211

8.5
6.1

6.0

7.3

9-5

Table 5-9. Complaint categories ranked according to mean response time
fo r selected communities and responding police un it.
Community #15

Community #15

Community #19

Community #20

C-15 ; S h e r i f f *

L-15! S h e r i f f * C-08i S h e r i f f * C-27! S h e r i f f * L -0 7 : S h e r i f f * L-19! S h e r i f f *

S h e riff*

Community #08

Community #27

Community #07

23

:

22

22

:

22

23 :

22

23 :

02

22 :

07

22

:

22

22

22

:

23

23 :

23

02

:

19

22 :

23

23 :

19

23 :

23

23

24

:

19

05 :

02

21 :

07

02 :

19

24 :

21

02 :

25

02

19

:

07

02 :

24

07 :

25

07 :

22

02 :

24

25 :

24

21

24

21 :

19

19 :

02

19 :

25

05 :

23

07 :

02

19

02

25

:

05

19 :

07

25 :

23

24 :

07

07 :

25

19 :

19

25

21

:

25

07 :

21

05 :

21

05 :

21

21 :

(05)

24 :

07

24

07

:

21

24 :

25

24 :

05

21 :

24

19 :

(02)

05 :

21

07

05

:

02

25 :

05

(2 2 ):

24

25 :

(05)

25 :

(22)

21 :

05

05

♦Ranking o f complaint categories f o r s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro ls in the d i f f e r e n t communities.
( ) In dicates t h a t th is complaint category did not occur f o r th is community.

Table 5-10.

Community #15
C-15

; S h e riff*

Complaint categories ranked according to mean time spent on complaint
for selected communities and responding police un it.

Community #15

Community #08

Community #27
C-27

L-15

S h e riff*

C-08

! S h e riff*

! S h e riff*

Community #19

Community
N-20

L-07

L-19

S h e riff*

S h e riff*

05

:

05

02

02

23

:

05

02

:

05

02

02

05

02

02

:

02

05

05

02

:

19

05

:

07

05

07

02

05

21

:
07
: o v e ra ll
:
21
:
:
25

05

:
02
: o v e ra ll
:
07
:
:
21

07

:

21

07

05
o v e ra ll

07

25

25

:
24
: o v e ra ll
:
19

19

21

23
o v e ra ll
24

22

23
o v e ra ll
07
19

:

24

21

23
o v e ra ll
07
19

24
o v e ra ll
07
19
21

19
o v e ra ll
07
24

:

25

23
21

o v e ra ll
19

22

22

02

21

19

22

25

25

25

25

07

22

23

19

19

:

19

24

25

21

:

24

22

:

22

22

23

25

:

23

22

:

24

:

23

25

22

:

22

24

:

:

23

:
:
:

25

(22)

24

23
o v e ra ll
24

:

(23)

♦Ranking o f complaint categories f o r s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro ls in d i f f e r e n t communities.
( ) In dicates t h a t th is complaint category did not occur f o r t h is conmunity.

21

21

o v e ra ll
24

*

214

time, B&E has a rank o f three in some p a tro l operations and e ig h t in
others.

While a d i f f e r e n t complaint p r i o r i t y can be observed, the

c r i t i c a l question is whether or not the complaint p r i o r i t i e s are random
happeninqs (chanqinq from day to day) or the r e s u l t o f some formal or
informal p o lic e operating p o lic y .

This is a question f o r f u r t h e r research

and w i l l not be analyzed in any g r e a t depth.
What complaint p r i o r i t y d iffe re n c e s e x i s t o v e r a ll p o lic e departments
operating in the county and between the s h e r i f f ' s no n-contract p a t r o ls ,
c o n tra c t p a tr o ls , and local patrols?

T a b les 5-11

and 5-12 show the

ranking ranges and the mean ranks over a l l p a tro ls as w e ll as the mean
rank f o r the contracted p a t r o ls , local p a tro ls and s h e r i f f ' s non-contract
p a tro ls .
From these tables i t can be seen t h a t complaint p r i o r i t i e s f o r
any p a r t ic u la r type of p a tro l ( i . e .

s h e r i f f ' s n o n -c o n tra ct, c o n tr a c t,

or lo c a l) are not c onsistent f o r response time and time spent.
rank o v e r a ll p a tro l types o f response time f o r f i r e

Mean

(23) and alarms (22)

are 1 . 6 and 2 . 1 r e s p e c tiv e ly meaning a very high p r i o r i t y ; but according
to the time spent on complaints the same complaint types are ranked 8
and 5 .8 r e s p e c tiv e ly .

For alarms th is d iffe r e n c e can be explained by

the f a c t t h a t a high percentage o f the alarms are f a l s e .

P a tro ls

respond q u ic kly thinking there is a crime in progress to f in d t h a t a
home owner or an employee has a c c id e n ta lly s e t o f f the alarm .
little

time is spent on the complaint once the p a tro l a r r i v e s .

Thus,
24

Just the opposite occurs f o r property d e s tru c tio n accidents (02) and

24

I t is not known i f a s im ila r explanation f i t s f o r f i r e s .

Table 5-11.

Complaint
types

Comparison of response time ranks fo r d iffe re n t complaint types fo r the s h e riff's
non-contract p a tro l, contracted patrols and local patrols

Ranking
range*

Mean rank f o r
nine s h e r i f f ' s
non-contract p a tro ls

Mean rank fo r
contracted
p a tro ls

Mean rank f o r
six local
p a tro ls

02

1 -9

4

3 .3

3 -0

05

3 -9

7 .9

7 -7

6 .1

07

3-0

5 -7

4 .6

5 -6

19

2- 8 .

4 .6

4 .6

5 -8

21

3 -8

6 .8

6.0

7 -7

22

1 -9

1 .3

23

1-6

27
25

/*\

c

].

2 .9

1

2

3 -9

6 .5

5 .7

6 .2

3 -9

5 .3

7 .0

7 .3

*This concept in d ic a te s the extreme rank o f the given complaint type ( i . e . , complaint type 02 ranked
f i r s t in a t le a s t one patrol and ninth f o r a t le a s t one other p a t r o l. The average rank f o r a l l s h e r i f f
p a tro ls was 4 . )

Table 5-12.

Ranking range
fo r a ll
p a tro ls

Complaint types
mean rank f o r
nine s h e r i f f ' s
non-contract p a tro ls

Mean rank
f o r three
contracting
p a tro ls

Mean rank
f o r six
local p a tro ls

02

1 -7

2 .7

1 .7

1

05

1 -5

1 .8

2

2 .2

07

2-8

3 .6

4 .3

3 -5

19

2 -9

6

6

5 .6

5 .8

21

3 -9

5 .1

5 -3

4 .5

22

5 -9

7 .9

CO
•

Complaint
types

Comparison of time spent ranks fo r d iffe re n t complaint types for
contracted, local and the s h e riff's non-contract patrol

7 .8

23

1 -9

6 .0

3 .3

6 .2

24

3 -9

5 .4

8

6 .6

25

3 -9

6 .4

6 .3

7 .6

.

217

breaking and entering ( 0 5 ) .

Using response time again as the performance

in d ic a t o r , B&E has a r e l a t i v e l y low p r i o r i t y but according to time spent
a r e l a t i v e l y high p r i o r i t y .

The e xplanatio n of th is is t h a t p a tr o ls

respond knowing t h a t there is no p r o b a b ilit y o f suspect apprehension.
Once on the scene, B&E's take r e l a t i v e l y more time than the other
complaint types examined because a r e p o r t is u s u a lly taken.

On

property d e s tru c tio n auto a c c id e n t, there is no personal i n ju r y and
thus no urgency to have a rap id response tim e.

But once on the scene,

reports are taken and in te r a c tio n w ith the c i t i z e n occurs.
What d iffe r e n c e seems to e x i s t in complaint p r i o r i t i e s f o r the
contracted p a t r o ls , s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a t r o ls , and lo ca l patrols?
Before dealing w ith th is question, we need to ask whether or not the
s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro ls are homogenous enough to aggregate them
together.

The same question can be raised f o r the lo c a l p a tr o ls and the

contracted p a t r o ls .

Tables 5-13 and 5 - 1 4 show the ranking ranges f o r

the three types of p a tr o ls .

Notice f o r the s h e r i f f ' s

no n-contract

p a tro ls the la rg e ranking range ( f i v e or more ranks) f o r s ix complaint
types (0 2 , 07, 19, 21, 24, and 2 5 ).

There is considerable d i v e r s i t y as

to the p r i o r i t y given to the same complaint in the nine d i f f e r e n t
communities observed.

The ranking range is not as g r e a t f o r the

contracted or local pa tro ls with two complaint types f o r each group
having a ranking range o f f i v e or g r e a te r .

25

OC

The ranking ranges f o r the contracted and f o r the lo ca l p a tr o ls could
be t i g h t e r than the s h e r i f f ' s general p a tro ls because a fewer number o f
p atro ls o f the former were chosen. Nine s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tr o ls were
being compared w h ile s ix local and three contracted were used.

Response time ranking range of nine complaint categories fo r three contracted
p a tro ls, f iv e local patrols and nine s h e r if f 's non-contract patrols.

Ranking range over
a ll seventeen
patrol operations

Ranking range
for six
local patrols

02

1 -9

2 -5

1 -4

1 -9

05

6 -9

8-9

3-8

3-9

07

3 -8

4 -8

4 .5 -7

3 -8

19

2 -7

4 -5

4-8

2 -8

21

2 -9

5 -9

3 -9

22

1 -4

1 -9

1 -1

1 -9

23

2 -6

1 -1

2 -2

1 -6

24

4 -9

3 -8

3 -8

3 -9

25

3-9

6-9

4 -9

3-9

1

Ranking range for
three contracted
patrols

Complaint
type

CO

Ranking range for
nine s h e riff's
general patrols

LO

Table 5-13.

Table 5-14. Time spent ranking range of nine complaint categories fo r three contracted
p a tro ls , f iv e local patrols and nine s h e r if f 's non-contract patrols.

Ranking range
for six
local patrols

Ranking range over
a ll seventeen
patrol operations

Ranking range for
nine s h e riff's
non-contract patrols

Ranking range for
three contracted
patrols

02

1 -7

1 -2

1 -1

1 -7

05

1 -5

1 -3

2 -3

1 -5

07

3 -8

3 -5

2 -5

2 -8

19

2 -9

4 -7

4 -7

2 -9

21

3-7

3 -7

3 -9

3-9

22

6 -9

8 -9

5-9

3-9

23

1 -9

1 -5

4 -9

1 -9

24

3 -9

6-9

4 -9

3-9

25

3 -9

4 -8

5-9

3-9

Complaint
type

220

No patterns seem to emerge when comparing the mean ranks f o r the
three groups o f p a tro l operations.

For some complaint c a te g o rie s , using

response time, the s h e r i f f ' s general p a tro ls have a s im il a r mean rank
to the contracted p a tro ls as in the case o f B&E ( 7 .9 and 7 .7 r e s p e c tiv e ly
i

compared to 6.1 f o r contracted p a t r o l s ) .

But f o r t r a f f i c complaint (#25)

the contracted and local p a tro l means are s im il a r and d i f f e r e n t from the
s h e r i f f ' s general patrol ( 7 .0 and 7 .3 re s p e c tiv e compared to 5 .3 f o r
the s h e r i f f ' s general p a t r o l ) .
When the rank of the complaint types o f each in d iv id u a l p a tro l
operation were c o rre la te d with each o th e r, no p a tte rn was observed.
The c o r r e la tio n c o e f f ic ie n t s and the le v e l o f s t a t i s t i c a l s ig n ific a n c e
are shown in Table 5 -1 5.

The range o f c o r r e la t io n c o e f f ic ie n t s range

from .4 to . 6 8 fo r the local p a tro ls (L -0 7 , L -1 5 , and L - 19); f o r the
three contracted p a tro ls the range is from - . 0 3 to .61; and f o r the
s h e r i f f ' s general p a tro ls the range is from 0 .19 to .7 3 .
If

local o f f i c i a l s wish to know what s o r t of complaint p r i o r i t y

w i l l be received i f they c ontract w ith the s h e r i f f , i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t
to answer them with the inform ation c u r r e n tly a v a i l a b l e .

D iffe re n c e s in

complaint p r i o r i t y have been observed, but no model is in hand which can
explain the d iffe r e n c e s .

I t was i n i t i a l l y

thought t h a t since the s h e r i f f ' s

general p a tro ls were under the same p a tro l a d m in is tr a tio n , t h a t more
consistency in complaint p r i o r i t y would be observed r e l a t i v e to the
groups o f local patro ls and the contracted p a t r o ls .
the case.

One explanation

But t h is was not

is t h a t d i f f e r e n t communities have d i f f e r e n t

complaint p r i o r i t y needs; and the s h e r i f f , through th is general p a t r o ls ,
attempts to meet them.

While th is is p la u s ib le , i t is h ig h ly u n l i k e l y .

221

Table5 -15. Rank c o rre la tio n s o f com plaint categories f o r selected p a tro l
operations w ith response time as the performance measure.
C-15
01

L-15
01

C-08
01

07
01

19
01

N-20
01

Patrols

C-15

C-15
01

.58
(•1)

L-15

.31
(.4 )

.38
(.3 )

L-15
01

.88
(.002)

.5
(-1 )

.52
(.15)

C-03

-.03
(.94)

-.27
(.47)

-.1 5
(-7 )

-.0 8
(.83)

C-08
01

.20
(.60)

.46
(-21)

.13
(.73)

.3
(.32)

-.12
(.77)

L-07

.60
(.08)

.47
(.2 )

.68
(.04)

.76
(-02)

-.1 0
(.8 )

-.1
(.80 )

L-07
01

-.11
(.76)

.15
(.69)

-.53
(.15)

-.1 9
(.63)

.23
(.54)

.08
(.82)

-.44
(.24)

L-19

.63
(.07)

.47
(.2 )

.40
(-29)

.70
(.04)

.05
(.89 )

.60
(.08)

.50
(.17)

-.3 9
(.3 )

L-19
01

.87
(.003)

.48
(.19)

.17
(.70)

.71
(-03)

-.06
(.86)

.28
(.46)

.48
(.18)

-.25
(.51)

.82
(.01)

N-20
01

.73
(.03)

.28
(.46)

.58
(-10)

.82
(.01)

.24
(.53 )

.40
(.29 )

.47
(.21)

-.2 9
(.45 )

.67
(.05)

.65
(.06)

C-27

.61
(-07)

.61
(.07)

.67
(•05)

.85
.004

.15
(-7 )

.45
(.23)

.77
(.02)

-.1 9
(.63 )

.75
(.02)

.50
(-17)

.61
(.07)

C-27
01

.57
(.11 )

.17
(-7 )

.30
(-43)

.64
(.06)

.5
(.17)

.55
(.14)

.17
(.7 )

-.14
(.73 )

.75
(.02)

.67
(.11)

.73
(-03)

:

L-15

C-08

L-07

L-19

C-27

J

,

.62
(.08)

The top number shows the c o rre la tio n and the bottom number is the le ve l o f s t a t is t ic a l s ig n ific a n c e .
C-15-01 re fe rs to the s h e r if f 's non-contract p a tro l operating in community 15 when community 15 was co n tra c tin g .
L-15-01 re fe rs to the s h e r if f 's non-contract p a tro l operating in community 15 when community 15 had i t s own
p o lice department.

222
The s h e r i f f r e g u la r ly ro ta tes his deputies from one general p a tro l to
another and from the contracted p a tro ls to the general p a t r o ls .

To

meet the unique complaint p r i o r i t i e s o f each community would r e q u ire
g re a t amounts o f time and e f f o r t to o r ie n t the p a tro ls each month, and
»

th is was not observed.

26

CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has taken a microscopic view o f the c o n tra c tin g opera­
tions o f one s h e r i f f .

Two a d d itio n a l performance measures, response

time and time spent on complaints, were presented and discussed.

With

the use of these in d ic a to rs and a v a ila b le d a ta , several questions could
be analyzed f o r th is county which could only be ra is e d f o r other c o u n tie s .
How does the area d i s t r i b u t i o n of the s h e r i f f ' s general p a tr o ls
a f f e c t c o n tra c tin g operations?

I t was shown th a t th is s h e r i f f tends

to a llo c a t e his p a tro ls in such a way as to minimize the county-wide
mean response time (maximize the number of complaints s e r v ic e d ) .
the s h e r i f f is a county-wide ele c ted o f f i c i a l ,
th a t s u r p r is in g .

Since

th is behavior is not a l l

This a l l o c a t i v e r u le is achieved by a llo c a t i n g p a tr o ls

so t h a t the high complaint areas (h ig h ly populated areas) tend to r e c e iv e
a lower mean response time from the s h e r i f f ' s

non-contract p a tr o ls than

low complaint areas (low populated a re a s ).

This p r a c tic e tends to

co n trib u te toward c ontracting in two ways.

F i r s t , r e l a t i v e l y low

populated areas experiencing a r is in g demand f o r p a tro l s e rv ic e s , but not

^ T h e c o r r e la t io n between the s h e r i f f ' s non-contrat p a tro ls o p era tin g in
community 15 when 15 had i t s own department and the s h e r i f f ' s general
patrol when #15 contracted was .5 .
(15-01 c o r r e la te d w ith 1 5 -0 2 ).
It
is not l i k e l y t h a t the community's demand f o r complaint p r i o r i t y changed,
was reported to the s h e r i f f who in turn communicated the change to the
p a tro ls operating in community 15.

223
wanting to s t a r t t h e i r own department, are not l i k e l y to have t h e i r
needs met thorugh a grant tran s ac tio n by the s h e r i f f r e a l lo c a t in g to them
more non-contract p a tr o ls .

Second, since the s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro ls are

h ighly v i s i b l e in highly populated a reas, many o f which have lo ca l
i

p o lic e departments, local o f f i c i a l s and c it iz e n s become accustomed to
dealing with s h e r i f f ' s personnel which tends to lessen the t r a n s i t i o n
from a local department to a contractual arrangement.

But re s is ta n c e

can be o ffe re d i f the lo cal p o lic e c h ie f f e e ls threatened and pushed
his o f f ic e r s to out perform the s h e r i f f ' s d e p u tie s .
Another issue which was examined was the claim made by many
s h e r if f s t h a t the reason t h a t they gave a p ric e concession to c o n tra c tin g
communities was t h a t they owed something to c o n tra c tin g communities
because o f the community's c o n trib u tio n to county taxes.

This im plied

th a t the contracting communities were not re c e iv in g the same le v e l o f
non-contract p a tro l services t h a t the non-contracting p o rtio n o f the
county received.

In terms o f non-contract p a tro l s e r v ic e s , the contra c tin g

communities in th is p a r t i c u l a r county received s im il a r le v e ls o f services
as non-contracting communities of s i m i l a r s i z e .
s l i g h t l y more and some s i i g h t l y le s s .)

(Some received

While i t is not know what

happens to the s h e r i f f ' s other outputs to the c o n tra c tin g communities,
i t appears t h a t the p ric e concession goes to communities as an in c e n tiv e
to c ontract r a th e r than as compensation f o r any loss o f s h e r i f f ' s
services r e l a t i v e to other communities.
Several questions were ra is e d in comparing contracted to local
p a tr o ls .

F i r s t , what p r i o r i t y was given to the complaint answering

service r e l a t i v e to oth e r p a tro l a c t i v i t i e s such as t r a f f i c monitoring

224

fo llo w -u p in v e s tig a tio n e tc .?

In the absence o f output measures f o r

many of these a c t i v i t i e s , a time analysis must be done to provide local
o f f i c i a l s w ith such in fo rm a tio n .

This was not attempted.

Second, do contracted p a tro ls spend much time outside the
contracting community?

While percentage o f t o t a l p a tro l time spent

outside the local community was not measured, percentage of t o t a l
complaints answered by contracted and local p a tro ls outside t h e i r
respective p a tr o lin g areas was recorded.

Two o f the contracted p a tro ls

answered about the same percentage o f a l l t h e i r c a lls outside t h e i r
resp ec tiv e contra c tin g community as did local departments.

One con­

trac te d p a t r o l , which serves a more remote township, answered twice
as high a percentage of i t s c a lls outside i t s c o n tra c tin g community
than did any other lo cal or contracted p a t r o l.

I t is d i f f i c u l t to

draw a conclusion from th is in fo rm a tio n ; b u t, two o f the contracted
p a tro ls were not d is s im ila r from lo ca l departments.

The one which was

much higher could have been op erating in a community which did not
have a complaint load or oth e r non-complaint answering a c t i v i t i e s

to

keep i t busy.
F i n a l l y , was there a d iffe r e n c e in the p r i o r i t y assigned to the
same complaint type by the co n tra c ted , l o c a l , or s h e r i f f ' s general
p a tr o ls .

While there are d i f f e r e n c t weights given to the same complaint

type by d i f f e r e n t p a t r o ls , i t is not known whether these d iffe re n c e s
r e s u lt from conscious design on the p a r t o f p a tro l a d m in is tra to rs or
merely a random happening.

I t was observed t h a t the s h e r i f f ' s general

p a t r o l , operating under one p a tro l a d m in is tr a tio n and in d i f f e r e n t
communities, had d i f f e r e n t weights assigned to the same complaint type.

225

I f the s h e r i f f ' s non-contract p a tro ls are not homogenous enough to be
considered as a s in g le gorup, i t
a unique type o f

is even more d i f f i c u l t to speak about

complaint p r i o r i t y coming from contracted o r lo cal

p a tro l operations.
i

The conclusion about using complaint p r i o r i t i e s to d i f f e r e n t i a t e
p a tro l operations suggests several things.

F i r s t , p a tr o l o f f ic e r s may

have so much d is c r e t io n t h a t any i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e has l i t t l e
or no a f f e c t on causing a uniform and con s is te n t complaint p r i o r i t y
system.

For example, a p o lic e c h ie f , s h e r i f f , or local o f f i c i a l may

have a complaint

p r i o r i t y system in mind but is unable to e x e r t enough

control over the

p a tro l o f f ic e r s to enforce the p r i o r i t y system.

Second, the complaint categories used may be s u f f i c i e n t l y vague such
t h a t what is being r e fl e c t e d is the h e te ro g e n ity o f the complaint
categories r a th e r than complaint p r i o r i t y o f d i f f e r e n t p o lic e o f f i c i a l s
However, some of the complaint p r i o r i t i e s
larceny r e p o r t , and i t s t i l l
non-contract p a t r o l.

Mere t i g h t l y defin ed such as

had a ranking range o f 3 - 8 f o r the s h e r i f f

More research though is needed i f complaint

p r i o r i t y is to be used to d i f f e r e n t i a t e p a tro l op era tion s.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Local o f f i c i a l s in many ru ra l areas are encountering a r is in g
demand f o r urban services such as p o lic e p a t r o l .

I f they are unable to

obtain higher le v e ls o f patrol s e rv ic e from the county s h e r i f f or s ta te
p o lic e , a common course to fo llo w is to s t a r t a lo ca l p o lic e department.
But local po lic e departments are expensive to begin and m aintain and
federal and s ta te g ra n ts , to defray a po rtio n o f p o lic e c o s ts , are
becoming in cre a s in g ly d i f f i c u l t to o b ta in .

Consequently, lo cal o f f i c i a l s

are examining a lt e r n a t iv e ways of procuring p a tro l s e rv ic e .
The three a l t e r n a t iv e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s tru c tu re s t h a t can be used
by local o f f i c i a l s to provide higher le v e ls o f p a tro l s e rv ic e to t h e i r
c itiz e n s are g r a n t, a d m in is tr a tiv e , and bargain.

Each a l t e r n a t i v e

r e la te s local o f f i c i a l s to a s u p p lie r o f p a tro l serv ic e in a d i f f e r e n t
way, and th is a ffe c ts the type and le v e l o f s e rv ic e produced.

A gra n t

re la tio n s h ip is one where the receiving p a rty has no d i r e c t power over
the giving party and must accept whatever the g iv e r chooses to g iv e .
A grant tran sactio n e x is ts between local o f f i c i a l s and s h e r i f f s and
s ta te p o lic e .

The s h e r i f f is ele c ted county-wide and has a p a tro l

d iv is io n funded by the county commissioners.

The s h e r i f f and county

commissioners determine together the o v e r a ll le v e l o f p a tro l s e rvice
while the s h e r i f f decides the areal d i s t r i b u t i o n .

The s t a te p o lic e

ad m inistratio n decides on how p a tro ls w i l l be a llo c a te d to what a c t i v i t i e s
in what area of the s t a t e .

S ta te p o lic e post commanders then decide

the area d is t r ib u t io n o f pa tro ls assigned to t h e i r post.

226

In each case

227
a local community receives from a s h e r i f f or s t a t e p o lic e whatever le v e l
o f s e rvice each chooses to g i v e . 1
I f local o f f i c i a l s are d i s s a t i s f i e d w ith the le v e l o f patrol
received from the s h e r i f f and s t a t e p o lic e , they then have two tr a n s t

action a lt e r n a t iv e s .

One is a d m in is tr a tiv e where lo ca l o f f i c i a l s

appropriate money f o r a lo cal p o lic e department, h i r e a p o lic e c h i e f ,
and produce t h e i r own p a tro l s e rv ic e s .

I f the le v e l o f p a tro l is s t i l l

u n s a tis fa c to ry , lo cal o f f i c i a l s can a p prop riate more money; i f the
type of p a tro l service is u n s a tis fa c to r y , they can communicate t h e i r
d is s a t is fa c t io n to the p o lic e c h ie f .

I f th is does not produce the

desired r e s u lt s , the p o lic e c h ie f may be dismissed and a new one h ire d .
The t h i r d tran s ac tio n a l t e r n a t i v e is bargained, where lo cal o f f i c i a l s
buy patrol services from another u n it o f government and have a voice in
the type and level o f p a tro l services supplied.
is the county s h e r i f f .

The most common s e l l e r

Another type o f bargained tra n s a c tio n is where

two or more local communities combine resources and j o i n t l y produce
patrol services.
The focus o f th is research is c o n tra c tin g between lo c a l communities
and the county s h e r i f f .

Contracting a f f e c t s th re e d i f f e r e n t e n t i t i e s .

They are the county s h e r i f f s , the c o n tra c tin g communities and the county
commissioners representing both the c o n tra c tin g and non-contracting
communities.

I t is h e lp fu l to know how each group can be a ffe c te d

( p o s it iv e ly and n e g a tiv e ly ) in order to be f a m i l i a r with m otivations
each has f o r c o n tra c tin g .

V o r the county s h e r i f f , an exception to tn is may e x i s t f o r those local
communities t h a t can p o l i t i c a l l y a f f e c t the s h e r i f f a t e le c t io n tim e.
Even with th is circumstance a lo c a l community can only make known t h e i r
general wishes r a th e r than a s p e c if ic demand f o r a c e r t a in le v e l o f
se rv ic e .

228
The s h e r i f f is a bu reaucrat—he heads an agency and attempts to
procure funds f o r i t — as well as an o f f i c i a l e le c te d every fo u r y e a rs .
The s h e r i f f ' s in t e r e s t in contra c tin g r e f l e c t s th is dual r o l e .

The

s h e r i f f as s e l l e r o f p a tro l services is d i f f e r e n t from a p r iv a t e s e l l e r .
He has l i t t l e

in c e n tiv e to make a p r o f i t from c o n tra c tin g (charging a
p

p ric e which is g r e a te r than c o s ts ).

But c o n tra c tin g o f f e r s the s h e r i f f

an opportunity to have a la r g e r department, by having a la r g e r p a tro l
d iv is io n financed independently o f the county commissioner's a p p ro p ria tio n
process.

With a la r g e r department the s h e r i f f can gain through s a l a r y ,
3

public r e p u ta tio n , power and patronage.

Since the s h e r i f f is an e le c te d

o f f i c i a l , he fe e ls in c e n tiv e to please voters w ith the type and le v e l
o f s e rv ic e .

To the average c i t i z e n the p a tro l d iv is io n is the most

v i s i b l e p a rt o f the s h e r i f f ' s department, and such v i s i b i l i t y is an
in c e n tiv e to have t h is d iv is io n grow.

F i n a l l y , many s h e r i f f s view

themselves as professional law o f f ic e r s with a concept o f what "good"
law enforcement i s .

Contracting o ffe r s the s h e r i f f an o p portunity to

have his type of law enforcement implemented a t the lo ca l l e v e l . ^
O f f i c i a l s o f c o n tra c tin g communities can b e n e f it in numerous ways.
F i r s t , they can obtain p a tro l s e rv ic e cheaper from the s h e r i f f , depending
upon the c o n tra c t p r i c e , than i f the p a tro ls are produced l o c a l l y .
Second, f o r those o f f i c i a l s who have never before had t h e i r own p o lic e

O
The only in c e n tiv e t h a t he might have would be i f he were able to take
any p r o f i t s from c o n tra c tin g to subsidize another a c t i v i t y .
^William A. Niskanen, J r . , Bureaucracy and Representative Government,
A ld in e -A th e rto n , Chicago, 1971, p. 38.
^This can be in c o n tra s t to the p r iv a t e s u p p lie r who may have l i t t l e
i n t e r e s t in the type o f product demanded by consumers as long as
there is p r o f i t in supplying i t .

229
department, the s h e r i f f immediately o f f e r s experience which could only
be acquired a f t e r several years o f having a lo ca l department.

T h ir d ,

local o f f i c i a l s can avoid many a d m in is tr a tiv e tasks by not having to
in t e r a c t r e g u la r ly with a p o lic e c h i e f .

Any complaints about s e rv ic e
t

can be r e fe r r e d to the s h e r i f f .

I f there is d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with a

p a r t ic u la r patrol deputy, the s h e r i f f can t r a n s f e r him out of the
contracting community, avoiding the problem o f dism issing him as would
be the case with a lo cal department.
unionized.

Many lo c a l p o lic e departments are

Contracting o ffe r s the lo cal o f f i c i a l s

the op p o rtu n ity to

avoid sometimes c o s tly ( in terms o f s e ttle m e n t time and expense) la b o r
n e g o tia tio n .

Local o f f i c i a l s can lose from c o n tra c tin g i f they do not

receive from the s h e r i f f the type o f p a tro l s e rv ic e they d e s ir e .

This

w i l l be discussed more s p e c i f i c a l l y when d ealing w ith the conduct
performance measures, but i t should be noted t h a t t h is issue is not
avoided with a lo ca l department.

Local o f f i c i a l s w i l l have to i n t e r a c t

with a p o lic e c h ie f who has his own concept o f what "good" p a tro l
service i s , and th is concept can be a t odds w ith what lo ca l o f f i c i a l s
want.
The county commissioners are e le c te d l i k e the s h e r i f f , are charged
with the r e s p o n s ib ilit y of c o lle c t in g and dispersing county fu n d s , and
usually have one of t h e i r repres e n ta tiv e s sign the c o n tra c t along w ith
the s h e r i f f and a lo ca l o f f i c i a l .

The commissioners are in te r e s te d in

providing serv ic e to county residents and one a c t i v i t y which they have
control over is the s h e r i f f ' s department.

That is why they are in te r e s te d

in the p ric e charged by the s h e r i f f and how the n o n-contracting p o rtio n
o f the county is a ffe c te d by the contracted p a t r o l s .

I f the sheri f f

charges a p ric e which is less than c o s ts , the county general fund w i l l

230
be used to pay the d if fe r e n c e .

If,

in the eyes o f the conmissioners,

the county as a whole b e n e fits from the contracted p a t r o l s , then they
w i l l be w i l l i n g to pay the d if fe r e n c e .

The contracted communities, as

already mentioned, may b e n e f it by re ce iv in g a p r ic e discount.

The
i

non-contracting communities may b e n e fit by the s h e r i f f dispatching the
contracted p a tro ls outside the c o n tra c tin g communities to respond to
emergency c a l l s .

A lso, commuting to and from the c o n tra c tin g communities,

contracted p a tro ls may tr a v e l through several no n-contracting communities
providing some a d d itio n a l coverage to these communities.

F in a lly ,

with a higher le v e l o f manpower, the s h e r i f f is b e t t e r ab le to r e a c t to
a la rg e emergency, wherever i t might occur, such as a n a tu ra l d is a s t e r
or a rock c o n c e r t , r i o t o r t r a f f i c jam.

RESEARCH GOALS
This research has attempted to accomplish several th in g s .

F irs t,

i t has t r i e d to d i f f e r e n t i a t e , conceptually r a th e r than e m p i r i c a l l y , the
bargain i n s t i t u t i o n a l form from the a d m in is tr a tiv e and gra n t tr a n s ­
actions in providing of patrol s e rv ic e .

Second, i t has endeavored to

present market inform ation on p ric e and d i f f e r e n t types o f p a tro l
se rvice sold by Michigan s h e r if f s in 1974.

To do th is meant constructing

performance categories which could be used to discern the c o n tra c tin g
operations o f one s h e r i f f from those o f another.

F i n a l l y , t h is research

has made an e f f o r t to see how s t r u c tu r a l conditions fa c in g a county
s h e r i f f may a f f e c t the conduct-performance o f his c o n tra c tin g op era tion s.
The research findings are organized around the fo llo w in g questions:
(1 )

How w idely is c o ntracting f o r p a tro l services p ra c tic e d in Michigan?

(2)

Do the contracted patrol services d i f f e r between s h e r i f f s , and how

can t h is d iffe r e n c e be described?

(3 )

Does the s h e r i f f p r ic e his

231
c ontract close to costs o f operation?

(4 )

Does the s tr u c tu r a l r e l a ­

tio n s h ip between the s h e r i f f and his county commissioners a f f e c t his
propensity to c o n tra c t and to meet the p a tro l needs a r t i c u l a t e d by
local o f f i c i a l s ?

(5 )

Can a s h e r i f f s through the a llo c a t i o n o f his
\

non-contract p a t r o ls , a f f e c t the propensity o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s to
contract w ith him?

(6 )

Are economies o f scale present in the produc­

t io n o f p a tro l services and how does t h is r e l a t e to the c o n tra c t p r ic e
charged by the s h e r if f ?

THE NATURE OF THE PRODUCT
Often in research the product being studied is not e x p l i c i t l y
defined.

Local o f f i c i a l s considering c o n tra c tin g o r s t a r t i n g t h e i r own

po lic e department u sually want more p o lic e s e rv ic e .

But p o lic e s e rv ic e

may in vo lve many d i f f e r e n t s p e c i a l i t i e s such as d e t e c tiv e s , p a t r o l ,
crime la b , narcotics u n i t , e t c .

The dominant a c t i v i t y f o r ru ra l

communities is p a t r o l , and th is is the product s tu d ie d .

I t must be

emphasized, however, t h a t p a tro l s e rv ic e sold by one s h e r i f f is l i k e l y
to be d i s s i m i la r to t h a t sold by another.

The performance in d ic a t o r s ,

discussed in the next s e c tio n , allo w the contracted p a tro ls of one
s h e r i f f to be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from those o f another.

6

5
Patrol consists o f some mix o f responding to c i t i z e n com plaints, t r a f f i c
m onitoring, c r u is in g , performing community errand s, i n i t i a t i n g a com­
p l a i n t ( i . e . , an o f f i c e r witnessing a law i n f r a c t i o n ) , and community
s e rv ic e (speaking to c i v i c o rganizations or consulting with a merchant
on crime p re v e n tio n ).
r

When discussing the p ric in g o f the contracted p a t r o ls , i t is h e lp fu l to
know whether the good is a j o i n t impact o r incom patible. A s e rv ic e is
incompatible when A's use denies B's use and i t is a j o i n t impact
when A's use does not d e tr a c t from B's use. Patrol s e rv ic e can be both
a j o i n t impact as well as an incompatible s e rv ic e depending upon the
question being asked.
I t is a j o i n t impact s e rv ic e in t h a t the county
s h e r i f f and county c it iz e n s have a c e r t a in demand f o r p a tro l s e rv ic e
in community A. Local c it iz e n s o f community A also demand p a tro l (continued)

232
STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE
A p a tro l s e rvice market e x is ts f o r those lo ca l o f f i c i a l s d e s irin g
to ob tain a d d itio n a l p a tro l hours.

There are two supp lie rs facing lo ca l

o f f i c i a l s — the county s h e r i f f (bargain tra n s a c tio n ) and a lo ca l p o lic e
i

c h ie f (a d m in is tr a tiv e t r a n s a c t io n ) .

A s tru c tu re and conduct-performance

market model was used to study the c o n tra c tin g o f Michigan s h e r i f f s and
c ontrast contracting with i t s clos e s t com pe tito r, which is s t a r t i n g a
7

local p o lic e department.

Discussed f i r s t are fo u r s t r u c t u r a l v a ria b le s

followed by the conduct-performance v a ria b le s .
The s tr u c tu r a l v a ria b le s fo r the p a tro l s e rv ic e market are the
number o f s u p p lie r s , degree o f product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , b a r r ie r s to
e n try and r e la t io n between s u p p lie r and source o f fin a n c e .

From the

perspecti ve o f a communi t y ' s local o f f i c i a l s , the number o f supp lie rs

r

(continued) services in t h e i r own community. When the c it iz e n s o f
communi ty A consume the patrol services o f the county s h e r i f f , the
w e lfa re o f the county c it iz e n s is not a f f e c te d .
P a tro l s e rv ic e is
an incompatible s e rvice in t h a t when p a tro ls are serving one community,
they are not a v a ila b le fo r s e rv ic e in another community.
I f i t is
possible to d i f f e r e n t i a t e t o t a l demand f o r p a tro l services in community
A in to t h a t demanded by the county and t h a t demanded by ci tiz e n s of
the community, then the former demand could be funded out o f the county
general fund with the l a t t e r being financed from some user charge such
as a contract p r ic e .
(This assumes t h a t decision makers do not want
to r e d is t r ib u t e resources toward community A .)
^ Structure re fe rs to the predetermined c h a r a c t e r is tic s o f a s i t u a t io n
which constrains decision makers and determines t h e i r op portunity s e t .
Conduct re fe rs to a l l the choices, de c is io n s , or s t r a t e g ie s used by
decision makers w ith in the op portunity set e s tab lis h e d by the s t r u c tu r e .
And, performance re fe rs to a l l the consequences ( a l l b e n e fits and
costs) t h a t r e s u lt from the decision makers' choices. The d iffe r e n c e
between conduct and performance is one o f degree with performance
being c lo s e r to f i n a l consequences which a f f e c t people's w e lf a r e ;
consequently, an attempt was made to d is tin g u is h between conduct and
performance.

233
is small enough f o r each s u p p lie r to know what the o th e r is doing.

The

s h e r i f f is aware o f the number o f p a tro ls operated and the approximate
costs facing local p o lic e departments; and, lo ca l p o lic e c h ie fs are
l i k e l y to have a s im il a r awareness.
\

S h e r iffs and p o lic e c hiefs attempt some product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
A s h e r i f f may claim t h a t his p a tro ls are s u p e rio r to those produced
l o c a l l y w h ile s im il a r counter claims may be made by lo ca l p o lic e c h ie f s .
The burden o f knowing whether the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n is real o r imagined
f a l l s to lo cal o f f i c i a l s .
B a rrie rs to entry a f f e c t p o te n tia l s u p p lie r s .

The s h e r i f f and

lo cal departments are the two most p re v ale n t sources f o r lo c a l o f f i c i a l s
to obtain a d d itio n a l patrol hours, but the s t a t e p o lic e , a p r iv a t e
s e c u rity f ir m , a j o i n t cooperative v e nture, o r another lo ca l community
are p o te n tia l s u p p lie rs .

The only b a r r i e r which faces the s t a te p o lic e

appears to be the s ta te p o lic e a d m in is tr a tio n 's unwillingness to s e ll
O
patrol hours under c o n tra c t to local communities.
A p r iv a t e s e c u r ity
f ir m , which s e lls s e c u rity services to p r iv a t e and p u blic i n s t i t u t i o n s ,
could face a legal b a r r i e r .

C urre ntly there is no s t a te s t a tu t e which

e x p l i c i t l y p ro h ib its p r iv a t e s e c u rity companies from s e l l i n g p a tro l
s e rvice to a local community; however, i f they should e n te r the p a tro l
se rvice market, they could l i k e l y face le g a l challenge over whether or
not they have the r i g h t to hold p o lic e a u t h o r i t y .

The le g a l environment

Q
Several communities have in the past requested the Michigan S ta te
Police to c ontract with them f o r a d d itio n a l p a tro l hours, but the
s t a te p o lic e refuse contending t h e i r duty is to serve the e n t i r e
s t a te and not any s in g le community. I f they are to change t h e i r
p o lic y , i t w i l l probably be in response to d i r e c t io n provided by the
s t a te le g i s l a t u r e .

234
is uncertain enough to be a s u b s ta n tia l b a r r i e r to entry f o r a p r iv a t e
g
s e c u rity fir m .
I t is not known v/hy there are few j o i n t community
ventures o r one community s e l l i n g to another.

I t can be due possibly

to a long h is to ry o f adjacent communities not cooperating in the area
o f p o lic e s e rv ic e or maybe even to a p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r y between adjacent
communities, o r to the absence o f a c a ta ly s t to f a c i l i t a t e a cooperative
arrangement.

A lo ca l p o lic e c h ie f has no r e s p o n s ib ili t y f o r p a tro l

needs outside his p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n and consequently has l i t t l e
in c e n tiv e to s o l i c i t a neighboring community to e it h e r buy or cooperate
in the production o f p a tro l s e rv ic e s .

More study is needed on these

a l t e r n a t iv e ways f o r lo ca l communities to ob tain more p a tro l hours.
The conduct-performance v a riab le s used in t h is study and the
preferences o f lo cal o f f i c i a l s are presented below:
Cost per Patrol Hour--Local o f f i c i a l s , l i k e oth e r consumers, want
to receive the highest le v e l o f patrol s e rv ic e f o r the lowest possible
p ric e .
Reporting to Local O f f i c i a l s --Most lo ca l o f f i c i a l s want inform ation
about the type o f p a tro l s e rv ic e which t h e i r community re c e iv e s .

For

in sta n c e , they want to know the type o f complaints re c e iv e d , the o v e r a ll
complaint lo a d , and the amount o f time spent on preventive p a t r o l.
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f Patrol S e r v ic e - -Can lo ca l o f f i c i a l s ob tain the

I t is questionable whether o r not p r iv a te s e c u rity firms can make a
p r o f i t in s e lli n g p a tro l services to lo cal communities. P atrol is an
a c t i v i t y where there is lim it e d op portunity f o r control o f v a ria b le
resources (personnel, v e h ic le s , e t c . ) to allo w f o r p r o f i t s to be made.
The g re a te s t expense in the production o f a p a tro l hour (s in g le o r
double) is s a la r y . With a s t a te law re q u irin g th a t a l l law o f f ic e r s
have 280 hours o f p o lic e academy t r a i n i n g , the supply o f q u a l i f i e d
p o lic e o f f ic e r s is r e s t r i c t e d , and a l l e n t i t i e s wishing to h i r e p o lic e
o f f ic e r s must compete f o r them.
In essence, any community which wants a
p o lic e department o f s e c u rity o f f ic e r s r a th e r than o f f ic e r s who have
been through the p o lic e academy is unable to obtain i t .

235
le v e l o f s e rv ic e they desire?

The minimum le v e l sold by the s h e r i f f

may be g r e a te r than local o f f i c i a l s care to buy.
A c t i v i t i e s Performed by Contracted P a t r o l s - -Local o f f i c i a l s want
input in to the choice o f the a c t i v i t i e s performed by patro ls

(e .g .,
j

t r a f f i c m onitoring, performing community errands, e t c . ) .
Rotated versus Permanently S ta tio n in g D e p u tie s -- I f local o f f i c i a l s
have t h e i r own department, t h e i r o f f ic e r s are permanently s ta tio n e d in
t h e i r community and are f a m i l i a r with the community and i t s c i t i z e n s .
Many lo ca l o f f i c i a l s

value t h i s .

10

Revenue from Liquor In s p e c tio n --When p a tro ls perform a liq u o r
in s p e c tio n , the Michigan Liquor Commission sends revenue to the funding
community.

Local o f f i c i a l s want to receive th is revenue.

Amount o f Patrol Time Spent Outside Local Community--Local o f f i c i a l s
want to know how much time w i l l be spent outside t h e i r community i f
they c o n tra c t with the s h e r i f f and how th is compares w ith what would
r e s u lt i f they had t h e i r own p o lic e department.
Response Tim e-- A ll else being e q u a l, c itiz e n s are b e t t e r o f f i f
response time is low than i f high.

Response time w i l l be high i f th e re

are few p a tro ls working or i f the p a tro ls are performing non-complaint
answering a c t i v i t y such as w r itin g reports or monitoring t r a f f i c .

Also

o f concern to lo ca l o f f i c i a l s is the response time according to complaint
p rio rity .

What is the response time to the complaint type "breaking and

e ntering" compared to "destruction o f property" complaint?

^® It is conceivable th a t local o f f i c i a l s w i l l not want to have deputies
permanently statio n e d in t h e i r community, b e lie v in g t h a t b e t t e r p a tro l
s e rv ic e can be rendered from patrol persons who do not know the
in d iv id u a ls in the community.

236
One question which th is research addresses is how do the s tr u c tu r a l
variables facing the contra c tin g s h e r i f f a f f e c t his responsiveness in
meeting the p a tro l preferences o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s ?

Three o f the four

s tru c tu ra l variab le s are s i m i l a r f o r most s h e r if f s who s e l l patrol
i

s e rvices.

Each s h e r i f f faces competition in t h a t a lo cal community

always has the option o f s t a r t i n g i t s own p o lic e department r a th e r than
continue c o n tra c tin g with the s h e r i f f ; most s h e r if f s attempt to
d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e i r patrol s e rv ic e from what is produced by a local
po lic e department; and the s h e r i f f has the legal a u t h o r i t y , sub jec t to
approval by county commissioners, to produce p a tro l s e rv ic e f o r s a le
to local communities.

The one s tru c tu ra l condition which is v a ria b le

among county s h e r if f s is the r e l a t io n which the s h e r i f f has with his
county c o m m i s s i o n e r s S o m e s h e r if f s are able to ob tain the p a tro l
financing which they fe e l is necessary to provide adequate patrol
service to t h e i r county w h ile other s h e r if f s face county commissioners
u n w illin g to fund p a tro l to meet the s h e r i f f ' s standards.

C ontracting

o ffe rs s h e r if f s a means o f funding p a tro l independently o f the county
commissioners.
This study examined the contracting operations o f eleven
s h e riffs .
groups.

Michigan

From in terview s each s h e r i f f was placed in to one o f two
One group consists o f those s h e r if f s who fe e l t h a t many o f

t h e i r p a tro l needs were going unfunded, and the second group consisted
of those s h e r if fs who tended to get most o f t h e i r p a tro l needs funded

^ W i l l i a m Niskanen, in his book Bureaucracy and Represen t a t i ve Govern^
ment, uses the analogy o f a b i l a t e r a l monopoly when describing| the
I n t e r a c t io n between an agency and the l e g i s l a t u r e , i t s sole f a d i n g
source.
For the agency, there is only one buyer or source o f ^ nds»
and f o r funding body th e re is only one s e l l e r o r producer o f the
output desired by the funding body. PP. 24-25.

237

by the county commissi oners.

Are the s h e r i f f s who face t i g h t - f i s t e d

commissioners more responsive to the patrol preference o f c o n tra c tin g
local o f f i c i a l s than those s h e r i f f s who have commissioners who fund most
o f t h e i r p a tro l needs?

RESEARCH FINDINGS
Listed below are the major research findings followed by a b r i e f
discussion o f each.
Finding #1:

Contracting f o r p a tro l services in Michigan between
lo cal communities and the county s h e r i f f was w idely
p ra c tic ed in 1974.

Finding # 2 :

V a rie ty e x is ts in the conduct-performance o f d i f f e r e n t
c o n tra c tin g s h e r if f s s tu d ied .

Finding

#3: Of the eleven s h e r if f s s tu d ie d , ten p r ic e t h e i r con­
tr a c te d p a tro ls a t less than v a r ia b le costs (personnel
v e h ic le and un iform ).

Finding

#4: Comparison o f the v a ria b le p a tro l costs o f one county
s h e r i f f to the v a r ia b le p a tro l costs o f 14 local
p o lic e departments in the same county reveals t h a t
the s h e r i f f experiences g r e a te r p a tro l costs than
do any o f the lo ca l departments.

Finding

#5: The s h e r i f f is capable o f in flu e n c in g lo c a l o f f i c i a l s
to c o n tra c t with him through the deployment o f his
non-contracted p a t r o ls .

Finding

#6 : The s t r u c tu r a l r e la tio n s h ip which the s h e r i f f has
with his county commissioners a f f e c t s his propensity
to c ontract and his w illin g n e s s to meet the conductperformance preferences o f c o n tra c tin g lo c a l o f f i c i a l s

Finding #1— In the s t a te o f Michigan in 1974, 24 o f the 83 county
s h e r if f s had some type o f c o n tra c tin g arrangement w ith a lo c a l u n it o f
government.
o f the s t a t e .

Most o f these s h e r if f s are found in the southern po rtion
In a d d it io n , s ix s h e r if f s c o n tra c t w ith the U.S. Forest

Service to provide p a tro l s e rv ic e to national parks w ith in t h e i r county.
Contracting is most extensive in those counties with a la rg e percen
tage o f urban re s id e n ts .

One reason f o r t h is is t h a t the county boards

238
in these counties are dominated by urban commissioners.

These urban

commissioners are u n w illin g to increase spending on the s h e r i f f ' s
p a t r o l , which mainly services r u r a l parts o f the county.

road

T h e ir

reasoning is th a t urban c it iz e n s pay an e x tra amount over county taxes
f o r c i t y p o lic e s e rvice, and c it iz e n s o f v illa g e s and townships should do
the same.
In most of the c ontractual arrangements the s h e r i f f charges a lo cal
community a p ric e which is paid out o f local taxes.

However, the

s h e r if f s o f L iv in g s to n , Eaton and Kent Counties have used fe d e ral employ­
ment money to provide in c e n tiv e to local communities to c o n tra c t with
them.

12

The local communities may or may not pay any contracted patrol

expenses not met by the fe de ral g ra n t.

Usually the federal money only

covered the s a la r ie s so the county would e it h e r absorb equipment,
uniform and v e h ic le expense or b i l l

the c o n tra c tin g community.

It

was o fte n sta te d in these contracts t h a t once the federal money ended,
the lo ca l communities were responsible f o r h ir in g those persons th a t
would become unemployed.
Some s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t contractual arrangements must be mentioned.
While a high percentage o f contracts are between the county s h e r i f f and
a lo cal community, the Monroe s h e r i f f provides contracted deputies to
a high school and to a community c o lle g e .

The s h e r i f f o f Ingham County

has contracts with th re e townships in which he agrees to provide and
m aintain a l l
ships.

v e h ic le and personnel equipment a t no charge to the town­

In r e t u r n , the s h e r i f f has the r i g h t to have a voice in who is

h i r e d , and the o f f ic e r s use the s h e r i f f ' s uniforms and v e h ic le markings.

^Two fe d e ra l grants most o fte n used were the Emergency Employment Act
and the Comprehensive Employment T ra in in g Act.

239
Outside o f the s h e r iff being able to take c re d it fo r a larg e patrol
d i v i s io n , these three townships, f o r a l l purposes, have t h e i r own
po lic e department.

13

In Lenawee County, in a d d itio n to the s h e r i f f c o n tra c tin g with two
communities, there is also a p r iv a te s u p p lie r s e l l i n g p a tro l s e rv ic e s .
For over 20 years a man and his w ife have been providing p o lic e services
to three d i f f e r e n t communities.

He is deputized by the s h e r i f f as well

as the local communities in which he operates.

He maintains a close

working arrangement with the s h e r i f f and the s t a te p o lic e .

The amount

of p r o f i t s is s m a ll, and much o f the renumeration to t h is p r iv a te
s u p p lie r comes in the form o f psychic reward in providing a community
s e rv ic e .
Several communities have combined resources and j o i n t l y produce
patrol s e rv ic e s .

In B errien County the township o f Oronako and the

v i l l a g e o f Berrien Springs, which l i e s in s id e the township, together
have a seven person p o lic e fo rc e .

The p o lic e c h i e f is responsible to

a j o i n t p o lic e board comprised o f two repres e nta tiv e s

from the v i l l a g e ,

two from the township, and

Each community

the p o lic e c h ie f h im s e lf.

co ntrib utes $60,000 to finance the o p e ra tio n .

A s im il a r arrangement

e x is ts between Ontwa Township and the v i l l a g e o f Edwardsburg which l i e s
in sid e Ontwa in Cass County.

13

In August, 1975, one o f the townships ended t h e i r contractual arrange­
ment with the Ingham s h e r i f f to s t a r t t h e i r own p o lic e department
completely independent o f the s h e r i f f . A p o lic e r e c r u i t , h ire d by
the township and completing p o lic e academy t r a i n i n g , was re je c te d by
the s h e r i f f .
This in c id e n t o f who had the a u th o rity to h i r e a town­
ship employee was a major f a c t o r in the decision to cancel the con­
t r a c t with the s h e r i f f and s t a r t t h e i r own p o lic e department. The
change from working with the s h e r i f f to having t h e i r own department
is estimated to cost the township an e x tra $42,000.

240
Finding # 2 --The conduct-performance v a ria b le s discussed e a r l i e r
were useful in comparing the contra c tin g operations o f d i f f e r e n t
s h e riffs .

A major fin d in g was th a t not a l l s h e r if f s provided the same

set o f conduct-performance c h a r a c te r is t ic s to lo cal communities.

This

can be useful inform ation to a local o f f i c i a l contemplating c o n tra c tin g .
For example, i f an o f f i c i a l wants his contracted deputies permanently
s tationed in his community but the s h e r i f f , in the name o f good patrol
p r a c t ic e , has the p o licy o f r o t a t in g deputies between contracted and
non-contracted p a t r o l , then the local o f f i c i a l

can point to another

s h e r i f f who does not r o t a t e his contracted deputies.

This may provide

some leverage to help the lo ca l o f f i c i a l obtain a p a r t i c u l a r conductperformance c h a r a c t e r is t ic .

However, the s h e r i f f may s t i l l

refuse to

s e ll p a tro l service with the desired conduct-performance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .
D i v i s i b i l i t y o f p a tro l s e rv ic e sold--Tiie s h e r if f s o f C lin to n ,
Lenawee, Kalamazoo, and Huron s e ll less than 40 hours of weekly p a tro l
se rvice w h ile the s h e r if f s o f S t. C l a i r , Oakland, Wayne, Kent, and
Genesee w i l l not.

The s h e r i f f o f Eaton did not s e ll less than 40 weekly

hours but would consider i t .

The s h e r i f f o f Washtenaw had a p o lic y o f

not s e lli n g less than 40 weekly hours o f s e rv ic e but made an exception
and arranged f o r 30 hours o f s e rv ic e f o r one community.
The s h e r i f f encounters some s t a f f i n g d i f f i c u l t y when s e l l i n g less
than 40 hours o f weekly p a tro l s e rv ic e .

I f the s h e r i f f does not h i r e

an e x tra person but instead meets his contractual o b lig a tio n by assigning
his general patrol to the c o n tra c tin g community, then the non-contracting
communities lose because th e re is less general patrol f o r county-wide
s e rv ic e .

This is done by the Lenawee s h e r i f f and some o f the s h e r if f s

who c o n tra c t with the U.S. Forest S ervice.

The s h e r i f f can h i r e an

241
a d d itio n a l person, but then the county general fund pays f o r t h a t p o rtio n
o f the s a la ry not covered by the c o n tra c tin g community, and the s h e r i f f
must j u s t i f y how he w i l l use the f r a c t i o n a l person.

Some s h e r if f s

s e ll less than 40 weekly hours to a community by having two or more go
i

together to purchase 40 hours o f s e rv ic e with each community paying f o r
a po rtion o f the c o n tra c t p r ic e .
Reporting to lo cal o f f i c i a l s - - 0 n l y the C lin to n County s h e r i f f does
not re p o rt monthly to the o f f i c i a l s o f the c o n tra c tin g communities
because there the s h e r i f f handles the contracted p a tro ls as p a r t o f
his general patrol operations.

The remaining s h e r if f s provide some

form o f monthly re p o rt which varies in type and amount o f content.
Some s h e r if f s augment t h e i r monthly re p o rt by sending a r e p re s e n ta tiv e
to each monthly meeting to answer questions which the lo ca l o f f i c i a l s
might have.
A c t i v i t i e s performed by contracted p a tr o ls --L o c a l o f f i c i a l s

fe a r

loss o f control over d a ily p a tro l a c t i v i t i e s i f they should c o n tra c t
with the s h e r i f f .

Local o f f i c i a l s want to know when the contracted

p a tro ls w i l l be in t h e i r community and to be able to request t h a t the
patro ls perform community errands.

O f f i c i a l s o f those communities t h a t

j o i n t l y c o n tra c t with the s h e r i f f f o r a p o rtio n o f 40 weekly hours, plus
some o f the U.S. Forest c o n tra c te e s , and some o f the contractees with
the s h e r if f s o f Lenawee, Huron, Kalamazoo, and C lin to n do not know
when the p a tro ls operate in t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n s .

For the o th e r c ontrac­

tin g op era tio n s, lo cal o f f i c i a l s know when the p a tro ls are serving
t h e i r communities.

A ll s h e r i f f s , except those in C lin to n and Lenawee

Counties, c u r r e n tly allow the contracted p a tro ls to perform community
errands ( e . g . , r a is in g the f la g o r d i s t r i b u t i n g board minutes to lo cal

242
o f f i c i a l s ) , and a l l the s h e r if f s w i l l consider any request f o r d e te r ­
mining use o f p a t r o ls .

But th e re is a d if fe r e n c e in the ease in which

local o f f i c i a l s can make t h e i r preferences known.

In Oakland, Genesee

and Washtenaw the s h e r i f f s operate some o f t h e i r contracted p a tro ls
i

out of sub-s ta tion s which allow the lo c a l o f f i c i a l s an o p portunity to
communicate d i r e c t l y with the contracted d e p u tie s.

The Kent County

s h e r i f f requests t h a t his contracted p a tro ls r e g u la r ly v i s i t local
o f f i c i a l s to see i f th e re are any special needs.

To make a special

request to the contracted deputies in many o f the oth e r contracts
requires lo ca l o f f i c i a l s to f i r s t contact e i t h e r the s h e r i f f or the
s h e r i f f ' s disp atc h e r.
Patrol time spent outside the lo ca l community— One concern t h a t
local o f f i c i a l s have about c o n tra c tin g is t h a t the s h e r i f f w i l l send
the contracted p a tro ls outside the c o n tra c tin g community to handle county
county business.

Every s h e r i f f , except the s h e r i f f o f Wayne County,

has e i t h e r a verbal or w r it t e n understanding with c o n tra c tin g o f f i c i a l s
th a t the contracted p a tro ls w i l l be sent outside the c o n tra c tin g
community in cases o f emergency.

But "emergency" is never d efin ed .

The contracted p a tro ls o f one s h e r i f f were studied to see what
percentage o f t o t a l complaints answered were answered outside the
c o n tracting community compared to lo c a l p o lic e departments o f s im il a r
sized communities.

For t h is one county, no c le a r p a tte rn was observed

o f contracted p a tro ls leaving t h e i r community any more than local
p o lic e departments.

14

^ T h r e e c o n tra c tin g operations were examined. The p a tro ls o f two o f
the c o n tra c tin g operations responded to a s i m i l a r percentage o f
complaints outside t h e i r communities as did lo ca l p o lic e departments
o f s i m i l a r sized communities. For one o f the c o n tra c tin g operations
the contracted p a tro ls answered 23% o f a l l t h e i r complaints (continued)

243
Rotated versus permanently s ta tio n e d deputies--Many lo ca l o f f i c i a l s
wish to have control over who is p o lic in g t h e i r community.

Not only

do they want to be able to s e le c t the personnel but they want the same
persons to work permanently in t h e i r community.

The only contractual

arrangement in which local o f f i c i a l s have an a c tiv e voice in deciding
who is hire d to serve in t h e i r communities are the contracts three
townships have with the Ingham County s h e r i f f .

In a l l other contracts

the s h e r i f f decides who w i l l work in a c o n tra c tin g community.

Some

s h e r if f s t r y to be s e le c tiv e in matching deputies to c o n tra c tin g
operations.

In Oakland County the s h e r i f f assigns his most experienced

men to work the contracted p a t r o ls , and the Monroe County s h e r i f f
assigns deputies who can r e l a t e to students to his contracts with the
high school and community c o lle g e .

In most cases i f a deputy is

u n s a tis fa c to ry to local o f f i c i a l s , the s h e r i f f w i l l t r a n s f e r him to
another p a t r o l.

The deputies are ro ta te d f o r the contracts in C lin to n ,

Lenawee and Genesee and f o r some o f the contracts in Huron and S t.
C a l i r ; the remaining s h e r if f s attempt permanent assignments to c o n tra c tin g
communities.
Liquor inspection revenue--Revenue is sent from the Michigan Liquor
Control Commission to lo ca l communities t h a t employ a f u l l - t i m e p o lic e
or ordinance enforcement department and perform liq u o r inspections w ith in

^ (c o n t in u e d ) outside the c o n tra c tin g community which was more than
double any o th e r lo cal or contracted p o lic e o p e ra tio n . This p a r t i ­
c u la r c o n tra c tin g operation was in a sparsely populated community,
and there may not have been the complaint load to keep t h i s . c o n ­
tra c te d patrol busy. Thus, when a c a ll f o r s e rv ic e was received
from a neighboring community, t h is p a tro l f e l t i t could respond with
no opportunity cost. What is not known is the number o f complaints
which had a higher response time because the contracted p a tro l was
outside i t s lo ca l community.

244
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l boundaries.

Contracting operations are included in

the d e f i n i t i o n o f a f u l l - t i m e p o lic e department.

I f a community

contracts and i f liq u o r inspections are performed w ith in th a t community
by the contracted d e p u tie s , then the lo ca l community is e n t i t l e d to
;

the money sent from the Commission.

The s h e r if f s o f Eaton, Washtenaw,

Genesee, Wayne, Huron, and Lenawee allo w the liq u o r inspection money
to be re ta in e d by the c o n tra c tin g community.

The s h e r i f f s o f Oakland

and Kent have deputies who spend f u l l - t i m e inspecting liq u o r e s t a b lis h ­
ments and as a r e s u lt the money goes to the county tre a s u r y .

The same

holds f o r sm alle r contracts in C lin ton and Kalamazoo Counties and the
contractee with the S t. C l a i r County s h e r i f f .
Finding # 3 --Most o f the s h e r if f s in the sample p ric e t h e i r
contracts a t less than v a ria b le costs.

15

The exception to t h is was

the Wayne County s h e r i f f ' s c o n tra c t with the c i t y o f Romulus:

The

c o n tra c t p ric e matches a l l v a r ia b le costs and includes a charge f o r
overhead expenses.

The percent o f s e rv ic e costs which are not in c o r ­

porated in to the c o n tra c t p ric e range from a low o f 10% (the Eaton
Rapids c o n tra c t with the Eaton s h e r i f f ) to a high o f 64% (th e North f i e l d c o n tra c t with the Washtenaw s h e r i f f ) .

This means th a t in most

c o n tra c ts , the county general fund is being used to meet p a rt o f the

1^

I f a po rtion o f overhead expenses such as dispatching and s a la r ie s
o f the s h e r i f f and d e te c tiv e s , e t c . had been included in the cost
a n a ly s is , the p ric e concession would have been much g r e a te r .

245
c o n tra c t c o s t s J 6

As mentioned e a r l i e r , the county commissioners and

the non-contracting po rtion o f the county can b e n e f it from the con­
t r a c t i n g o p eration s.

But i t is my conclusion th a t w h ile many county

commissioners know a d iffe r e n c e e x is ts between costs and p r i c e , few
i f any know the amount o f the d if fe r e n c e .

F u rth e r, none o f the

s h e r if f s or commissioners s y s te m a tic a lly associate th is d iffe r e n c e to
b e n e fits received by the non-contracting po rtion o f the county.
One reason given by many s h e r if f s to j u s t i f y p ric e concenssions
was t h a t the s h e r if f s owed something to the c o n tra c tin g communities
because o f county taxes.

This implies t h a t the c o n tra c tin g communities

were not re ce iv in g the same le v e l o f non-contract p a tro l services t h a t
the non-contracting portion o f the county rece iv e d .

The c o n tra c tin g

communities in the case study county received le v e ls o f non-contracted
p a tro l s e rv ic e s im il a r to those o f non-contracting communities o f
comparable s iz e .

While i t is not known what happened to the s h e r i f f ' s

other outputs to the contra c tin g communities, i t appears t h a t tne
p ric e concession goes to the communities as an in c e n tiv e to c o n tra c t
r a th e r than as compensation f o r any loss o f s h e r i f f ' s s e rv ic e s .

16I t cannot be concluded t h a t the county is providing a net subsidy
to a p a r t i c u l a r area because the le v e ls o f other county services going
to a p a r t i c u l a r community is not known. I t is possible t h a t a community
receives less than i t s " f a i r share" (however, t h a t might be d e fin e d )
from the county health department and is making up f o r i t by re c e iv in g
more than i t s " f a i r share" by g e ttin g a la rg e c o n tra c t p r ic e concession.
Another f a c t o r which prevents us from concluding t h a t a s h e r i f f is
givin g more than the " f a i r share" to a p a r t i c u l a r c o n tra c tin g community
is t h a t the s h e r i f f may contend t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r c o n tra c tin g community
is a high crime area. Even i f the community were not c o n tr a c tin g ,
the s h e r i f f would be sending non-contracted p a tro ls in t o respond to
complaints. Since the s h e r i f f is an a r t i c u l a t o r o f demand f o r p a tro l
s e rv ic e in his county, he may contend t h a t the county s demand f o r
p a tro l services in a p a r t i c u l a r community is very high and he is
attem pting to meet th a t demand.

246
Finding # 4 --The s h e r i f f o f Genesee County experiences g r e a te r
v a ria b le costs in the production o f p a tro l s e rv ic e compared to 14 lo cal
p o lic e departments w ith in Genesee County.

The d iffe r e n c e between a

s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l costs and those p a tro l costs met by communities which
t

have t h e i r .own p o lic e department p a r t i a l l y determine the amount of
p ric e concession the s h e r i f f fe e ls he must give in order to provide
fin a n c ia l in c e n tiv e to lo cal communities to c o n tra c t with him.

The

patrol costs o f the Genesee County s h e r i f f ' s th re e contracts had a
range o f $10.39 to $11.17 f o r s in g le and $18.98 to $21.09 f o r double
p a tro l hours compared to the range f o r the 14 local departments o f
$3.20 to $9.37 f o r s in g le and $6.40 to $18.73 f o r double p a tro l hours.
The c o n tra c t p ric e charged by the s h e r i f f was com petitive to the lo ca l
departments.

The p ric e range was $5.71 to $9.43 f o r a s in g le and $9.62

to $17.62 f o r a double p a tro l hours.

17

The p a tro l costs o f other

s h e r if f s need to be compared to t h e i r surrounding local departments
before any conclusion can be made concerning resource savings accruing
to lo cal p o lic e departments.
Finding # 5 --The s h e r i f f is capable o f in flu e n c in g the local
o f f i c i a l s ' decision to c o n tra c t with him through his area l a llo c a t i o n
o f his non-contract p a t r o ls .

The output measure used to le a rn the

The reader should not conclude t h a t scale economies do not e x i s t f o r
some p o lic e fu n c tio n s . The only s e rv ic e examined in Genesee County
was patrol s e rvice and only v a ria b le costs were estim ated. One
reason t h a t la r g e r departments do not experience cost saving in the
production of p a tro l services is t h a t p a tro l is a la b o r in te n s iv e
a c tiv ity .
Patrolmen are professionals with a high degree o f s e l f d ir e c t io n and d is c r e tio n . This means t h a t the production technology
and resource combinations are li m i t e d . Another reason is t h a t la r g e r
departments may face more powerful unions and be forced to pay higher
wages than sm aller p o lic e departments. F i n a l l y , la r g e r departments
tend to use the l a t e s t equipment which is expensive. A ll t h is more
than o ffs e ts any savings which re s u lts from bulk purchases.

s h e r i f f ' s areal a llo c a t io n was response time which is the lapse in
time from when a c a l l f o r s e rv ic e is received u n t il a p o lic e u n it
a r riv e s on the scene.
presented.

In Chapter I I

th re e a l l o c a t i v e rules were

They were to e q u a lize inputs (assign the same number of
t

p atrol units per c a p ita to each section o f the c o u n ty ), e q ualize
outputs (assign p a tro l such t h a t each po rtion o f the county has the
same mean response t im e ) , or minimize the county-wide response tim e.
For the county studied in depth, i t was found t h a t the t h i r d a l l o c a t i v e
ru le was used which meant th a t the most populated portions o f the
county, the portions most l i k e l y to have t h e i r own p o lic e department,
received the lower mean response time and the less populated portions
o f the county, those portions less l i k e l y to have t h e i r own p o lic e
s e rv ic e , received a higher mean response tim e.

This p r a c tic e tends

to c o n trib u te twoard contra c tin g in two ways.

F i r s t , less populated

areas meeting a r is in g demand f o r p a tro l services but not wanting to
s t a r t t h e i r own department are not l i k e l y to have t h e i r needs met
through a grant tra n s a c tio n by the s h e r i f f r e a llo c a t in g more non-contract
patrol to them.

Second, since the s h e r i f f ' s non^contract p a tro ls are h ighly

v i s i b l e in h ig h ly populated area s , many o f which have lo ca l p o lic e
departments, lo cal o f f i c i a l s and c it iz e n s become accustomed to dealing
with s h e r i f f ' s personnel, which tends to encourage any change from
a lo cal p o lic e department to a contractual arrangement.

But the lo cal

p o lic e c h ie f can r e s i s t i f he fe e ls threatened and push his o f f ic e r s
to out-perform the s h e r i f f ' s depu ties.
Finding #6 — The s tr u c tu r a l r e la t io n s h ip which the s h e r i f f has with
his county commissioners r e l a t i v e to the need which he fe e ls to increase
his p a tro l d iv is io n a f fe c ts his propensity to c o n tra c t and to meet the

248
conduct-performance o b je ctiv es o f lo cal o f f i c i a l s .

18

From in t e r v ie w s ,

the eleven s h e r if f s studied were s u b je c t iv e ly placed in to one o f two
groups.

19

Group #1 were s h e r if f s t h a t f e l t l i t t l e

need to expand t h e i r

patrol d iv is io n and were able to obtain c u rre n t and a n tic ip a te d patrol
funding from the county commissioners.

S h e r if f s in th is group were

C lin to n , Lenawee, Kalamazoo, Huron and S t. C l a i r .

20

The second group

comprises s h e r i f f s who want to expand t h e i r p a tro l d iv is io n and have
met or a n t ic ip a t e meeting funding re sistance from county commissioners.
S h e r iffs in th is group are from the counties o f Oakland, Washtenaw,
Kent, Genesee, Wayne and Eaton.

The hypothesis is t h a t the s h e r if f s

in the second group have a g r e a te r propensity to c o n tra c t and meet
the conduct-performance ob je ctiv es o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s than s h e r if f s
in the f i r s t group.

I t was found not s u r p r is in g ly , t h a t the percentage

o f p a tro l hours funded by c o n tra c tin g was g r e a te r f o r the second group
o f counties than the f i r s t .

21

Several conduct-performance variab le s can be noted.
both groups re p o rt r e g u la r ly to lo cal o f f i c i a l s .

S h e r if f s in

Sheri f f s in the second

18

The need f e l t by a s h e r i f f to expand his p a tro l d iv is io n is an aggre­
gate o f several th in g s . One is the need f o r p a tro l s e rv ic e which he
fe e l his county (his c o n s titu te n ts ) has. A second one is his own
psychological need f o r a la r g e r department, and t h i r d is his need to
be r e -e le c t e d .
19
The s u b je c tiv e c r i t e r i a used to group the sheri f f s was how much the
s h e r i f f wanted to expand his p a tro l d iv is io n and what success he had
a n tic ip a te d having with his county commissioners.

on

The Kalamazoo County s h e r i f f s it u a t io n was changing in 1975 when the
in te rv ie w was conducted. At the time o f the in t e r v ie w , the Kalamazoo
commissioners were attem pting to cut the s h e r i f f ' s patrol d iv i s io n .
I f the study were done f o r 1975, Kalamazoo would be in group #2.
on

I t should not be too s u rp ris in g t h a t s h e r if f s in the second group who
want to expand p a tro l s e rv ic e meet funding re sista n c e from t h e i r county
commissioners. F i r s t , p a tro l s e rv ic e goes almost e n t i r e l y to ru ra l a re a s .
Second, the counties in the second group, w ith the exception o f Eaton
County, have a la rg e urban population which means t h a t the county boards
are dominated by urban commissioners who are l i k e l y to be r e lu c t a n t
to fund the s h e r i f f ' s p a tro l d i v i s i o n .

group grant g r e a te r p ric e concessions than s h e r if f s in the f i r s t group.
The exception to t h is is Wayne County where the County Board o f Auditors
p rice the c o n tra c t and are c a r e f u l , because o f the county's urban
o r i e n t a t i o n , to p ric e the c o n tra c t as close to actual costs as they can.
The Wayne County s h e r i f f has l i t t l e
p r ic e .

control over s e t t in g the c o n tra c t

S h e r if f s in the second group tend to make i t e a s ie r f o r local

o f f i c i a l s to have a voice in p a tro l a c t i v i t i e s than s h e r if f s in the
f i r s t group.

A ll the s h e r if f s in the second group, with the exception

o f Genesee, permanently s t a tio n deputies in the c o n tra c t communities
while fo u r o f the s h e r if f s in the f i r s t group r o t a t e t h e i r deputies in
e it h e r a l l or some o f t h e i r c o n tra c ts .

There is no p a tte rn regarding

whether or not the s h e r i f f allows c o n tra c tin g communities to r e t a in
liq u o r insp ection revenue.
Concerning d i v i s i b i l i t y o f p a tro l s e rv ic e s o ld , most o f the s h e r if f s
in the second group refuse to s e l l less than 40 hours o f weekly p a tro l
s e rvice w h ile sheri f fs in the f i r s t group were more accommodating in
the le v e l o f s e rv ic e sold .

Sheri f f s in the second group tend to have

large departments which already re q u ire much o f t h e i r a d m in is tr a tiv e
tim e.

The time cost o f n e g o tia tin g a small c ontract plus the d i f f i c u l t y

in s t a f f i n g i t does not make i t worth w h ile f o r s h e r i f f s in the second
group.
The conclusion which I draw is t h a t s h e r i f f s in group two (those
who want to exapnd t h e i r patrol d iv is io n and meet funding resistance
from t h e i r county commissioners) are more in c lin e d to c o n tra c t with lo ca l
communities and meet the conduct-performance o b je ctiv es o f lo cal o f f i ­
c ia ls than s h e r if f s in group one.

250
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
What p o lic y im p lic a tio n s flow from t h is study?

F i r s t , the e x p l i c i t

formation and a r t i c u l a t i o n o f conduct-performance preferences by lo c a l
o f f i c i a l s and s h e r if f s is almost n o n -e x is te n t.
p atrol s e rv ic e market operates im p e r fe c tly .

Because o f t h i s , the

Rural lo cal o f f i c i a l s

attempting to meet the r is in g demand f o r urban services need an
independent in form atio n source.
C u rre n tly most lo ca l o f f i c i a l s do not know how to c l a r i f y and
rank t h e i r own values in the provision o f p a tro l services to t h e i r
c it i z e n s .

One reason f o r th is is the absence o f conduct-performance

c a te g o rie s , which makes i t d i f f i c u l t f o r o f f i c i a l s to know s y s te m a tic a lly
what they want and to a r t i c u l a t e i t to a s u p p lie r .

Local o f f i c i a l s

are not always aware o f the d i f f e r e n t a lt e r n a t iv e s facing them in
providing t h e i r community with p a tro l services and even i f the
a lte r n a t iv e s are known, s t i l l
o f each a l t e r n a t i v e .

less is known about the costs and b e n e fits

For example, in the c o n tra c tin g a l t e r n a t i v e the

s h e r i f f is the main and cheapest source o f in fo rm a tio n .

Because many

local o f f i c i a l s do not t r u s t the s h e r i f f ( e . g . , because he is o f a
d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l p a rty or because they d i s t r u s t county o f f i c i a l s

in

g e n e r a l) , they may discount what the s h e r i f f could provide them through
c o n tra c tin g .
A clearinghouse o f in form atio n and ideas on a l t e r n a t i v e ways o f
providing public services is needed.

Cost and b e n e f it data could be

r e g u la r ly gathered and monitored and any new innovations done by one
community could be shared w ith o f f i c i a l s o f o th e r communities facing

251
a s im il a r problem . 22

Monthly new sletters could be sent to lo cal

o f f i c i a l s and evening and weekend seminars could be held in d i f f e r e n t
parts of the s t a te on issues o f i n t e r e s t .
Increase the Number o f P atrol Suppliers
I t is not known how the conduct-performance in the p a tro l s e rv ic e
market would change i f the number o f s u p p lie rs o f p a tro l services should
increases b u t, as competition in c re a s es , one would expect the conductperformance preferences o f lo cal o f f i c i a l s to gain g r e a te r weight
r e l a t i v e to the preferences o f s u p p lie r s .

The number o f supp liers

could be increased by encouraging p r iv a t e supp lie rs and the s t a te p o lic e
to begin c o n tracting f o r p a tro l s ervices with lo cal communities.
P o te n tia l p r iv a t e supp lie rs o f p a tro l services are p r iv a t e s e c u rity
firm s .

S tate laws are unclear on whether or not p r iv a t e s e c u rity firms

can s e ll patrol services to lo ca l conmuni t i e s .

To lessen the le g a l r i s k ,

what is probably needed is a s ta t e law which allows p r iv a t e s e c u rity
firms to e n te r

the p a tro l s e rv ic e market. Another law which needs

to

be modified is

the one which requires t h a t a l l

departments o f

three persons o r more must have a t l e a s t 280 hours o f

p o lice academy

tra in in g .

p o lic e o f f i c e r s o f

I f t h is law were waived f o r a community

wanting only s e c u r ity type p o lic e s e r v ic e , added in c e n tiv e would be
given to p r iv a t e s e c u rity fir m s .
I f the s t a te p o lic e are to begin c o n tr a c t in g , change must come
w ith in s t a te p o lic e a d m in is tra tio n and from the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e .

If

22Within the i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e o f having a lo ca l p o lic e d e p a rt­
ment, there are many d i f f e r e n t costs per p a tro l hour possible depending
on the inputs used. For in s ta n c e , lo ca l o f f i c i a l s and p o lic e c hiefs
might be w i l l i n g to bypass the expense o f doing t h e i r own dispatching
i f they had some knowledge o f the consequences o f having s t a te p o lic e
or s h e r if f s do t h e i r disp atc h in g .

252

the s t a te l e g i s l a t u r e should decide t h a t the s ta t e p o lic e should p a tro l
only the expressways (as is done in several s t a te s ) and not p a tro l in
local communities, they might w ell cut back the c u rre n t amount o f
s t a te p o lic e p a t r o l.

I f the s t a t e p o lic e a d m in is tra tio n wanted to
i

r e ta in p a tro ls in lo ca l communities and were unable to obtain funding
from the s t a t e , they would have to turn to c o n tra c tin g to finance t h a t
p a r t ic u la r o p e ra tio n .

Another option would be to have a s t a t e law passed

d ire c tin g the s t a t e p o lic e to s e l l p a tro l services to lo ca l communities.
Making the S h e r i f f a More Responsive Contractor
Local o f f i c i a l s , wishing to c o n tra c t but unable to ob tain the
conduct-performance c h a r a c t e r is tic s they d e s ir e , can work through t h e i r
county commissioners to ob tain what they wish.
the commissioners to cut the s h e r i f f ' s

They could encourage

p a tro l funding making him more

dependent on c o n tra c tin g i f he wants to m aintain the same s iz e patrol
d iv is io n .

With increased pressure to c o n tr a c t, the s h e r i f f is l i k e l y

to be more responsive to the needs o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s .
th is maneuver w i l l

Opposition to

l i k e l y be met from o f f i c i a l s o f communities who do

not have t h e i r own departments, do not want to c o n tr a c t, and who receive
adequate le v e ls o f non-contract p a tro l s e rv ic e from the s h e r i f f .
Support w i l l be found from o f f i c i a l s o f urban areas who have t h e i r own
p o lic e department and probably fe e l they pay tw ice f o r p o lic e s e rv ic e .
Another option is to work f o r the e le c t io n o f a s h e r i f f who is w i l l i n g
to meet the conduct-performance o b je c tiv e s o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s .

Where

local o f f i c i a l s have d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s , not everyone can be s a t i s f i e d .
Both o f these options have high tra n s a c tio n costs and uncertain outcomes.

253
County-wide Mi 11 age to Fund S h e r iff
Several s h e r if f s have advocated t h a t t h e i r department be funded
from a county-wide mi 11 age voted on in a popular e le c t i o n , ta k in g the
funding away from the county commissioners.

How might t h is a f f e c t

ru ra l communities and prospective c o n tra c tin g communities?
no reason to expect t h a t each community in a county w i l l

There is

receive i t s

desired type or le v e l o f p a tro l s e rv ic e i t wishes under th is arrange­
ment compared to having the county commissioners funding the s h e r i f f .
I f the s h e r i f f chooses to a llo c a t e p a tro ls to minimize the county-wide
mean response tim e , then th e re are l i k e l y to be some communities wanting
a higher le v e l of s e rv ic e .
I f the s h e r i f f agrees with a s e t o f lo cal o f f i c i a l s who want a
higher le v e l o f non-contract p a t r o ls , the s h e r i f f may agree to go to
the e le c to r a te and request a miVIage in crease.

I f he refuses to do

t h i s , he may be w i l l i n g to s e ll p a tro l services to the lo ca l community.
I f the p ric e the s h e r i f f chooses to charge is less than c osts, the
d iffe r e n c e must be made up from w ith in his budget which means t h a t he
w i l l have to cut back one o f his other services in order to increase
p a tro l to the contra c tin g community.

This w i l l provide in c e n tiv e to

p ric e c lo s e r to costs and i f the s h e r i f f faces higher costs than lo ca l
departments, the a l t e r n a t i v e o f having a lo cal p o lic e department could
look b e t t e r to lo cal o f f i c i a l s .
Conclusion
The c o n tra c tin g operations o f eleven Michigan county s h e r if f s have
been s tu d ied .

I t was found t h a t there is v a r ie ty in the p a tro l services

sold through c o n tra c tin g in terms o f d i v i s i b i l i t y o f p a tro l s e rv ic e
s o ld , c o n tra c t p ric e charged, p ric e concession made, a c t i v i t i e s

254

performed, assignment o f d e p u tie s , and revenue received from liq u o r
insp ection.

I t was also found t h a t the s t r u c t u r a l r e la t io n s h ip between

the s h e r i f f and his county commissioners a f f e c t s his propensity to
c ontract and meet the conduct-performance o b je c tiv e s o f lo c a l o f f i c i a l s
given t h a t the s h e r i f f wants to expand his p a tro l d i v i s i o n .

S h e r if fs

facing t i g h t - f i s t e d commissioners tend to c o n tra c t more and meet more
o f the conduct-performance o b je c tiv e s o f lo ca l o f f i c i a l s than s h e r if f s
who receive from the commissioners the p a tro l funding they want.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
METHOD USED AND ASSUMPTIONS MADE IN
ESTIMATING VALUE OF RESOURCES USED IN CONTRACTED SERVICES

Where possible the s h e r i f f ' s estim ation o f costs and the p ric e he
chooses to charge were compared to an estim ate o f the value o f
resources a c t u a lly consumed in providing the contracted services in
1974.

The method used to estim ate the value o f these resources is

described below followed by the assumptions made f o r each o f the eleven
s h e r if f s studied in depth.
The method of estim ating c o n tra c tin g costs focused only on
v a ria b le p a tro l costs which included s a la r y , v e h ic le , uniform and
equipment.

No attempt was made to estim ate any overhead expenses

because th e re are a v a r ie t y o f ways to defray such costs as the
s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and s a la r y , d is p atc h in g , d e t e c t iv e , record keeping,
e tc .

In most cases (exculding d e te c tiv e s ) in order to accommodate the

c o n tra c t operation with these overhead s e r v ic e s , i t was probably not
necessary to e i t h e r expand them or cut such s e rv ic e to o th e r parts of
the county.
Each v a ria b le cost was broken down to an h o urly r a t e .

The hourly

r a te included gross s a la ry (adjusted f o r time o f f due to vacation and
sickness) v e h ic le and uniform expense.

I f the s h e r i f f supplied double

p a tro ls (two persons in a c a r ) , then a double p a tr o l hour cost was
estimated which doubled the s a la ry and uniform hourly and added the
cost per hour f o r v e h ic le .

255

256

An estim ate was made f o r the number o f s in g le and double p a tro l
hours produced by the s h e r i f f in 1974 f o r each c o n tra c t o p era tio n .
This was done by having the s h e r i f f describe the p a tro l s e rv ic e supplied
to each c o n tra c t.

For example, i f the s h e r i f f s a id t h a t he gave 7 days

per week coverage w ith s in g le p a tro l during the f i r s t s h i f t , then f o r
t h a t p a r t i c u l a r c o n tra c t the t o t a l number o f s in g le p a tro l hours
supplied in 1974 was ( 8 hours/day x 7 days/week x 52 weeks = 2192)
2192 hours.

I t must be emphasized t h a t these hours are t h e o r e t ic a l in

t h a t no attempt was made to measure the actual number o f hours supplied
to a c o ntracting community unless the s h e r i f f had such in fo rm a tio n .
To obtain t o t a l v a r ia b le cost o f the c o n tr a c t, the number of s in g le
p a tro l hours was m u lt i p li e d by the s in g le p a tro l hour cost and t h is was
added to the product o f the number o f double p a tro l hours times the
double patrol hour r a t e .

To t h is is added an estim ate o f the amount

paid in overtime and h o lid ay s .

I f compensation f o r overtime and

holidays was made in time o f f , then these items were tr e a te d s i m i l a r l y
to vacation and s ic k time which a f f e c t the number o f hours paid f o r
but not worked.

PERSONNEL
--Average Base S a l a r y - - I f the patrolmen a re ro ta te d between the
contracted communities and the no n-contract p a t r o l , then an average base f o r
the e n t ir e department is used.

I f the men are permanently s ta tio n e d ,

then the average base of the men working the contracted communities
alone is used.
— Fringes— Some o f the fr in g e s such as F . I . C . A . and re tire m e n t are
percentages o f the base s a la r y .

Others are f l a t amounts such as f a l s e

257

a r r e s t insurance and

h o s p i t a liz a t io n .

rates depending upon

the type o f

For Blue Cross th e re are d i f f e r e n t

plan each deputy has; f o r such cases

an average is used.
--V a c a tio n and Sick Leave--The average number o f vacation days and
s ic k leave taken is c a lc u la te d and m u lt i p li e d by 8
estim ate the number o f hours paid but not worked.

hours a day to
This f i g u r e is then

subtracted from the y e a r ly hours (2080 i f 40 hours/week o r 2184 i f
they work 42 hours/week).

The number o f hours a c t u a lly worked is then

divided in to the gross s a la ry to estim ate a gross s a la ry per hour.
--O v e rtim e and H oiidays--The average amount o f overtime per p a t r o l ­
man is used i f the actual overtime drawn by a contra c tin g operation
cannot be very a c c u ra te ly estim ated.

Those c o n tra c tin g communities

which have l i g h t complaint loads w i l l

have t h e i r value o f resources

estimated too high.

Holiday pay

is tacked

on a f t e r the hourly ra te

o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours is m u lt ip lie d by the re s p e c tiv e number
o f s in g le and double p a tro l hours supplied.

VEHICLE
--C o s t per M ile - -T o estim ate cost per m ile requires two estim ates:
one is t o t a l v e h ic le miles in 1974 and the oth e r is the value o f
v e h ic le inputs consumed in 1974.
record t o t a l v e h ic le m ile s .

Many s h e r i f f s ' departments measure and

For those t h a t d o n 't , an estim ate o f the

number o f miles driven in an 8 hour s h i f t times the number o f 8 hour
s h if t s supplied in 1974 was made.
- - T o t a l Vehicle Cost--To estim ate t o t a l v e h ic le cost a l l

v e h ic le

inputs are added, such as gas, o i l , radio equipment, v e h ic le purchase,
car insurance, e t c . f o r 1974 and 1973.

A f t e r 1973 has been i n f l a t e d

in to 1974 v a lues, the two are averaged and divid e d by the number o f

258

miles in 1974.

I f the t o t a l v e h ic le miles are known f o r 1973, then a

cost per m ile f o r 1973 ( i n f l a t e d to 1974 values) is averaged with a
cost per m ile f o r 1974.

The reason f o r th is procedure is to ob ta in a

b e t t e r estim ate f o r d e preciation o f v e h ic le s .

Many s h e r i f f s ' departments

w i l l have a two y e ar budget cycle on v e h ic le purchases ( i . e . , i t w i l l
be higher one y e a r than another, meaning they tend to run t h e i r cars
f o r more than one y e a r ) .

Some o f the la r g e r departments do have a

one y e a r cycle and f o r these no averaging is done.

One problem is t h a t

the estimates may tend to underestimate the 1974 v e h ic le charge because
i t w i l l spread the r is in g fu e l costs over the years r a th e r than leaving
the t o t a l brunt to be f e l t in 1974.

For those la r g e r departments which

have had the county c o n t r o l le r estim ate a cost per m ile , t h e i r fig u r e
is used.
- - V e h ic le Cost Der Hour is obtained by taking tne cost per mile
times the number of miles driven in a p a r t i c u l a r c o n tra c t and d iv id in g
by the number of patrol hours (s in g le and d o uble).

I f miles f o r a

p a r t i c u l a r c o n tra c t are unknown, an estim ate is made f o r an 8 hour s h i f t ,
m u lt ip lie d by the cost per m ile and divided by 8 hours.

UNIFORMS
For most counties the union c o n tra c t s t ip u la t e s how much s h a ll be
paid to each deputy f o r c lo th in g , c le a n in g , and maintenance.

This

f ig u r e is used in such cases and d ivided by the number o f man hours.
The accounting procedures f o r each county are d i f f e r e n t ; t h e r e f o r e ,
m odifications o f th is method have been implemented where necessary.
The assumptions o r d iffe re n c e s are noted f o r each county.

259
OAKLAND COUNTY
The follow ing t a b le shows the estimated value o f resources used
in each o f the c o n tra c tin g operations during 1974.

The next ta b le

compares the value o f resources used to the revenue received by the
county from each c o n tra c tin g community and f u r t h e r compares the revenue
received to the estim ate o f the costs done by the Oakland County Budget
O f f ic e .

Table A - l .

Community

Estimated value o f resources used in each c o n tra c tin g operation
in Oakland County.
Number o f
one-man
Personnel Vehicle Uni form
Cost^
P atrol Hrs.
Cost'
Cost^

Total
Cost

Cost per
S in gle
P a tro l Hr.

$148,989

$12.75

1,462

114,003

13.01

17,082

1,462

112,751

12.87

22,445

4 ,056

347

26,848

12.90

8,760

94,207

17,082

1,462

112,751

12.87

Orion

8,760

93,980

17,082

1,462

112,524

12.84

S p r in g fie ld

2,080

22,813

4 ,056

347

27,216

13.08

Avon

11,680

$124,264

$22,776 $1,949

Commerce

8,760

95,459

17,082

Highland

8,760

94,207

Oakland

2,080

Independence

Personnel costs include overtim e. The average overtime paid per p a t r o l ­
man was $2,600.
Since Avon contracts f o r f i v e men, f i v e times $2,600
was included in with gross s a la ry estim ates.
2
To c a lc u la te v e h ic le c o s t, i t was assumed t h a t 150 miles was tr a v e le d
per e ig h t hour s h i f t o r 18.75 miles per hour. The 18.75 fig u r e was
then m u lt ip lie d by the number o f s in g le p a tro l hours and f u r t h e r
m u lt ip lie d by $ . 1 0 4 /m ile (which is the weighted average o f $ . 1 0 /m ile
being used f o r the f i r s t 7 months o f the y e a r and $ . l l / m i l e being used
as the r a te f o r the remaining f i v e months. The cost per m ile fig u r e s
were obtained from the County Budget O f f i c e .
^ h e s h e r i f f is b i l l e d $ 1 0 0 per man per y e a r which when d ivid e d by the
actual number o f hours worked by each man ( 1 , 8 6 8 ) gives an expense o f
$.054 per hour times the number o f s in g le p a tro l hours. This fig u r e
is added to the estim ate o f equipment used up during the y e a r o f $211
per man divided by actual hours worked ( 1 , 8 6 8 ) and m u lt i p li e d by the
number o f s in g le p a tro l hours.

260
Table A -2.

Comparison o f resources used to the Oakland County estim ate and
the revenue received from c o n tra c tin g communities.

Community

Estimated
Value o f
V a ria b le
Resources
Used, 1974

County
Contracted
Revenue
Recei ved
in 19741

Avon

$148,989

$89,350

$92,295

Commerce

114,003

71,480

74,196

Highland

112,751

71,480

74,196

26,848

17,870

18,459

Independence

112,751

71,480

74,196

Orion

112,524

71,480

74,196

27,216

17,870

18,997

$655,082

$411,010

$425,997

Oakland

S p r in g f ie ld
TOTAL

County Cost
Estimate^

The r a t e charged by the s h e r i f f in cluding s a l a r i e s , v e h ic le expense,
and uniform costs was $17,870 f o r each man purchased. Avon purchased
f i v e units and thus the revenue they send to the county in 1974 is
5 x $17,870 o r $89,350.
H ighland, Independence, Commerce and Orion
each purchased fo u r units (4 x 17,870 = $71,480) and S p r in g f ie ld and
Oakland each purchased one u n it .
?
The county estimated the cost o f one u n i t , a man, v e h ic le and uniform
to cost $18,459 per y e a r per u n it .
Avon purchased 5 u n it s , so the
cost according to the county is (5 x $18,459 = $ 9 2 ,2 9 5 ).

The County Budget O f f ic e estimated the cost o f a p a tro l u n i t , one
man, a c a r , and equipment f o r 40 hours per week a t $18,459 per y e a r.
In a r r i v i n g a t th is y e a r ly f i g u r e , the county estim ate o f s a la ry expense
used an average base s a la ry o f $13,000 w h ile the average base o f the
men a c t u a lly working in the c o n tra c tin g communities was $14,280 w ith a
range between contracts o f $14,182 to $ 1 4 ,5 0 0 J

Some frin g e s were

There is a r a t io n a le f o r using the $13,000 base f i g u r e .
The men h ire d
as a r e s u l t o f the c o n tra c t were new deputies brought in a t a lower
base than the c o n tra c t mean o f $ 1 4,2 80 . The reason f o r using the base

261

omitted by the county such as income p r o te c tio n insurance and t i m e - o f f
f o r v a c a tio n , h o lid a y s , and s ick days.
estim ate o f overtime attempted.

In a d d i t io n , there was no

2

The county used 10<£ per m ile and an average o f 1 ,660 miles driven
per patrolman per month.

D ividing th is f ig u r e by 20 days a c t u a lly

worked, y ie ld in g an average o f 83 miles per e ig h t hour s h i f t .

Estimates

made by the s h e r i f f ' s adm inis tra to rs put the mileage fig u r e c lo s e r to
150 miles per e ig h t hour s h i f t .

Not only is th e re a d if fe r e n c e in the

estimated number o f mi 1 es per e ig h t hour s h i f t , but th e re is also some
doubt as to the a p p ro p riate cost per m ile f i g u r e .
his p a tro l cars from the county.

The s h e r i f f leases

During the f i r s t seven months the

county b i l l e d the s h e r i f f ' s department 10 <£ per m ile and f o r the remaining
f i v e months used 11<£ per m ile .

But the county did a study in 1974 and
3
discovered the cost per m ile was a c t u a lly 1 2 <£.
Even though the county cost estim ate was $18,459 per u n i t , the
u n it p ric e charged by the s h e r i f f was $17,870.

This accounts f o r the

^
^salary o f men a c t u a lly employed is based on the assumption
t h a t a more experienced man is more valuable to a community than a
ro o k ie .
Consequently, the c o n tra c tin g communities were re c e iv in g more
valuable resources than the non-contracting p o rtio n o f the county.
In the estim ate o f value o f resources used p a r t o f holidays are included
in the overtime estim ate and p a r t included in the number o f hours paid
f o r but not worked.
I t is estimated th a t the average patrolman works
2 /3 o f the holidays in which case he gets paid overtim e and is p a r t o f
the $2,600 f ig u r e . The remaining 1 /3 o f the hoiidays are paid f o r in
t i m e - o f f and go in to a d ju stin g the fig u r e o f the actual number o f
hours worked. The men are paid f o r 2080 hours per y e a r but a f t e r
a d ju s tin g f o r v a c a tio n s , ho 1 idays not worked, and the average number
o f s ic k days used per patrolman, 1868 hours are a c t u a lly worked.
O
The r a te used in the estimated value o f resources used was the weighted
average o f 10<£ f o r seven months and 11<£ f o r f i v e months which was 10.4<£.

262

d iffe r e n c e between the county cost estim ate and the revenue received
o f approximately $14,000.

I f most o f the cost items which the county

did not include in t h e i r cost estim ate are in clu d e d , t o t a l costs are
$655,082; and the d iffe r e n c e between t h i s and the revenue is about
$244,000.
Table A -l shows t h a t the s h e r i f f does not charge the same per
p atrol hour p ric e to each community.

One possible explanatio n o f t h is

behavior is t h a t the s h e r i f f is re a c tin g to cost d iffe r e n c e s .

Table A-2

shows t h a t the cost per p a tro l hour is not the same f o r each o f the
contra c tin g communities,

i'fost o f the cost d if fe r e n c e re s u lts from the

degree o f experience held by the deputies assigned to a p a r t i c u l a r
c ontract area.

Those communities with s l i g h t l y less p a tro l hour cost

have deputies with less experience than the communities which experience
a higher p a tro l hour c o s t.

Is the s h e r i f f charging a higher p r ic e to

communities with more experienced deputies?
The answer appears to be no.

Table A-3 compares the per p a tro l

p ric e with the per p a tro l hour cos t.

Table A -3.

Oakland and S p r in g f ie ld pay the

Comparison o f per p a tro l hour p r ic e and cost f o r Oakland
County c o n tra c ts .
Per Patrol
Hour Cost

Avon

Per P atrol
Hour P ric e

$12.75

$7.64

Commerce

13.01

8 .1 5

Highland

12.87

8 .1 5

Oakland

12.90

8 .5 9

Independence

12.87

8 .1 5

Orion

12.84

8 .1 5

S p r in g fie ld

13.08

8 .5 9

263

highest p r ic e but Oakland does not have the same costs as does Spring­
fie ld .

Avon has the lowest cost and pays the lowest p r ic e .

But when

Avon is

compared to O rio n , the cost gap is 9<t and the p r ic e gap is 51 <t.

What can account f o r the p ric e d iffe re n c e s i f i t is not costs?

Another

possible answer is t h a t the s h e r i f f behaved as a discrim inating'm ono­
p o l i s t charging the highest p r ic e which each buyer would t o l e r a t e .

But

from examining the s h e r i f f ' s p r ic in g procedure, t h is does not appear to
have been done.

The s h e r i f f did not th in k in terms o f p a tro l hours but

instead

he used a p a tro l u n it which wasa deputy and a c ar f o r 40 hours o f

s e rv ic e

each week f o r one y e a r ; and the p ric e he charged f o r t h is u n i t ,

to any who wished to buy, was $17,870.

I t appears th a t the per p a tro l

hour p ric e and the cost d iffe re n c e s between communities was not known
by the s h e r i f f because the c o n tra c tin g costs and p ric e were never broken
down by number of p a tro l hours f o r each c o n tra c tin g community.

HURON COUNTY
For the f i v e township a re a , the c o n tra c t period is from May 2 3 , 1974,
to March 31, 1975, and i t contains 4 4 .7 weeks or 313 days.

During t h is

time the s h e r i f f agrees to supply the f i v e townships with 2544 man hours
or 1272 hours o f double p a t r o l .

Per day, the average is approxim ately 4

hoursor 2 8.5 p a tro l hours each week.

At the time o f th is a n a ly s is , data

was a v a i la b le f o r the period May 23 through September 30.

During th is

131 day period the s h e r i f f should have spent 1064 man hours in the
townships but a c t u a lly spent 1045.
The f i v e townships agreed to pay the s h e r i f f a t the end o f the 313
day period a sum o f $14,000.

I f costs continue to behave as they did

during the 131 day period from flay 23 - September 30, the estim ate o f
resources used is $ 1 5 ,5 7 4 .2 6 .

The Huron County s h e r i f f estimated what

264

Table A -4.

Estimate o f v a r ia b le resources used in the f i v e township
c o n tra c t w ith the Huron County s h e r i f f .

Period of Hay 23
to October 1
V ehicle

( $ . 0 9 3 /m ile x 14,693 m ile s )
$1 ,366.45

S a la rie s
P a rt-tim e
F u ll- t im e
TOTAL

Estimate f o r Hay 23
through March 31
( $ 1 0 .41/day x 313 days)
$ 3 ,2 6 4 .5 9

4 ,0 2 1 .1 6
1 ,1 3 0 .9 3

9 ,6 0 7 .5 4
2 ,7 0 2 .1 3

$ 6 ,5 1 8.54

$ 15,574.26

i t would cost the townships i f they were to produce the s e rv ic e them­
selves and included the fo llo w in g fig u re s in t h e i r c o n tra c t:
2544 hours(base s a la r y )
Blue Cross
F .I.C .A .
Vehicle Expense

$12,4 91 .0 4
1 ,0 8 0 .0 0
730.72
1 ,6 9 8 .2 4
$16,000.00

The s h e r i f f , in his estim ate o f c o s ts , covered a l l expenses; but decided
to charge a p ric e less than actual c o s t.^

4

Some o f the d iffe re n c e s in the way the s h e r i f f estim ated costs and the
way the author did fo llo w s .
The s h e r i f f used an average base s a la ry
r a te o f $4.90 and to th is he included th e frin g e s o f Blue Cross and
F . I . C . A . f o r the 131 day p e rio d , p a r t - t im e men worked 84% o f the con­
tra c te d hours with an average base o f $ 4 .4 9 . The s h e r i f f chose to use
F . I . C . A . and Blue Cross as the frin g e s on a l l 2544 hours. But p a r t time personnel are not covered by Blue Cross but are covered under
F . I . C . A . The author chose not to include any estim ate f o r Blue Cross
even f o r the f u l l - t i m e men because the r a t e would not change by much,
i f any, as a r e s u lt o f them working overtime on the c o n tra c t o p e ra tio n .
The item included f o r the men working o v e rtim e , which was not included
in the s h e r i f f ' s estim ate was re tire m e n t which does vary by the number
o f hours worked. On the n e t , the s h e r i f f was high on his estim ate o f
wages and frin g e s but t h is was need to o f f s e t his low extim ate o f
v e h ic le expense.
I t is not known how the s h e r i f f a r r iv e d a t the
v e h ic le cost estim ate . The author used cost data f o r in d iv id u a l cars
operated by the s h e r i f f and estimated a cost per m ile and m u lt i p ii e d
i t by the number o f miles d riv e n . One reason f o r the s h e r i f f using the
$4.90 base s a la ry f ig u r e as his estim ate was t h a t he did not know what
po rtion o f the hours would be worked by p a r t - tim e men and what p o rtio n
worked by f u l l - t i m e deputies.

265

The Kinde c o n tra c t is d i f f e r e n t than the township c o n tra c t because
i t required the s h e r i f f to h i r e an a d d itio n a l man.

The s h e r i f f ' s cost

e s tim a te , which is included in the Kinde c o n t r a c t , costs very a c cu rately
e ig h t hours o f p a t r o l.

For v e h ic le expense, the s h e r i f f estimated th a t

the c a r would d r iv e an average o f 75 miles f o r an e ig h t hour s h i f t .
For th re e months o f J u ly , August and September, the average was 81 miles
per e ig h t hour s h i f t .

The s h e r i f f priced the miles a t $.12 which was

done a t the d ir e c t io n o f the county commissioners.

For 1975, the p ric e

per m ile w i l l go to $ .15 again by order o f county commissioners.
I t is estimated t h a t the 1974 cost o f a s in g le p a tro l hour to
the v i l l a g e o f Kinde is $ 7 .1 4 .

The estimated cost o f a double p a tro l

hour supplied to the f i v e township area is $12.24 ($15,574 divided by
1272 double p a tro l ho urs).

However, the s h e r i f f charges $11.00 per

double p a tro l hour ($14,000 d ivided by 1272 double p a tro l hours).

ST. CLAIR COUNTY
As a r e s u lt o f the c o n tra c t the s h e r i f f h ired th re e men a t s t a r t i n g
wages.

In p r ic in g his c o n tra c t he allowed f o r a gross s a la ry o f $15,000

per man and $3,000 f o r v e h ic le expenses.

The $15,000 gross s a la ry fig u r e

used the base s a la ry o f a t h i r d y e ar deputy and accounted f o r most, but
not a l l , the fr in g e s .

The $3,000 v e h ic le fig u r e seemed to be a general

es tim ate.
To measure resources used in the c o n tra c tin g operation a value
estim ate was made of the time a c t u a lly spent in Y a le .

A mean gross

hourly r a te was used to e v a lu a te the time spent by the second and t h i r d
s h i f t p a t r o ls , since these deputies were r o t a t e d .

The actual gross

hourly r a te f o r the man permanently s ta tio n e d during the f i r s t s h i f t was
also used.

266

Table A -5 .

Value o f s a la r ie s used in the S t. C l a i r County s h e r i f f ’ s
c ontract w ith Yale C it y .
Number o f
Single
P a tro ls Hrs.

F irs t S h ift1

830
455

Second S h i f t

422

Th ird S h i f t
TOTAL

1,707

Number o f
Double
P atrol Hrs.

Number o f
Man Hours

Gross
Hourly
Rate

Total
Gross
Salary

830
455

$9.39
8 .5 3

$7 ,7 9 3 .7 0
3 ,8 8 1 .1 5

422
844

1 ,6 8 8

8 .5 3
8 .5 3

3 ,5 9 9 .6 6
14,398.64

1,285

2,570

8 .5 3

2 2 ,1 7 9.10

2,129

5,965

$ 51,852.34

T
The man permanently assigned to the f i r s t s h i f t is an 18-year veteran
and receives more frin g e s in cluding lo n g e v ity pay than the oth e r men,
thus accounting f o r the higher hourly r a t e . The a d d itio n a l 455 hours
are those worked by another patrolman when the permanent man is o f f
duty.

Since the s h e r i f f estimated $15,000 per man and h ired th re e men,
t o t a l s a la ry cost was $45,000 compared to the estim ate o f $51,852.
P art o f the under e s tim ation o f s a la r ie s by the s h e r i f f re s u lte d from
f i v e 2 - 1 / 2 percent cost o f l i v i n g increases gained by the patrolmen
during 1974.

In making the gross hourly r a te e s tim a te s , only th re e o f

the cost o f l i v i n g increases were included and used as the average f o r
a l l o f 1974.

The d iffe r e n c e between th re e increases o f cost o f l i v i n g

wages and none is approximately $1,100 per man.

T h is , plus some

frin g e s omitted by the s h e r i f f , accounts f o r the s a la ry d if f e r e n c e .
The estimated cost o f the e x tra le v e l o f s e rv ic e received by Yale
is $64,472 compared to the p ric e charged to Yale o f $ 48,000.

d1fference in s a la ry has alre ad y been mentioned.

The

In a d d i t i o n , the

s h e r i f f did not include in his cost estim ate any overtim e o r uniform

267

expense.

Using the same cost f ig u r e s , the cost estim ate f o r a s in g le

p a tro l hour is $10.97 and f o r a double p a tro l hour is $19.0 1.

Table A - 6 .

Total p a tro l expenses f o r the Yale c o n tra c t w ith the S t.
C l a i r County s h e r i f f .

Item

Analysis

Amount

S a la rie s

Already discussed.

$51,852

Overtime

An estim ate o f $34,000 was paid in 1974
to the e n t i r e northwest p a tro l but i t was
not known how much re s u lte d from a c t i v i t y
in Y a le . Since Yale accounts f o r about
15 percent o f the s in g le and double p a tro l
hours, 15 percent o f the $34,000 was used.

Vehicle^

To estim ate the cost per m ile f ig u r e o f
9.6<£, actual v e h ic le budget expenditures
were taken f o r 1973 ( i n f l a t e d in to 1974
values) and averaged w ith the 1974 actual
v e h ic le expenditures which were d iv id e d
by the average number o f v e h ic le miles
f o r 1973 and 1974.
I t was assumed t h a t 150 miles were tr a v e le d
per e ig h t-h o u r s h i f t and th e re were app ro x i­
mately 481 e ig h t-h o u r s h i f t s a c t u a lly spent
in Y a le . The v e h ic le estim ate is (150 miles
x 481 x .096)

Uniforms

TOTAL COST

5,100

6,920

The union c o n tra c t c a lls fo r $200 f o r a l l
beginning patrolmen f o r the f i r s t year
o u t f i t t i n g and $150 per y e a r a f t e r th a t
f o r cleaning and maintenance. Since th re e
deputies were h i r e d , $600 is used.

600
$64,472

T-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Vehicle cost estim ate is probably high. When the p a tro ls operate
ju s t w it h in Yale c i t y , they probably do not d r iv e 153 m iles but
something less than t h i s .

268

WAYNE COUNTY
The c it y o f Romulus purchased from the s h e r iff four patrol u n its .
A patrol u n it consists o f one s in g le patrol during the f i r s t s h i f t and
a double p a tro l f o r each o f the second and t h i r d s h i f t s seven days per
week.

To s t a f f one p a tro l u n it requires 8 patrol persons which allows

f o r time o f f due to sickness and annual le ave.

The s h e r i f f guarantees

Romulus t h a t the scheduled p a tro is w i l l not be eroded f o r any reason.
When s t a f f i n g p ' t r o l s ,

i f there should be a personnel shortaoe, the

s h e r i f f makes sure t h a t a l l a v a ila b le personnel goes to Romulus and
the residual goes to the county general p a t r o ls .
An estim ate o f the value o f resources used in one p a tro l u n it was
not done because i t was f e l t t h a t the method used in determining the
p ric e o f the p a tro l u n it by the county was f a i r l y accurate in id e n t if y in g
and valuing the resources used.

The ta b le below shows the costing

methods used by the county.
Several comments can be o ffe r e d about the costing procedure used.
F i r s t , i t must be remembered t h a t c o n tra c t p r ic in g is done, not by the
s h e r i f f but by the County Board o f A u d ito rs , a group e le c te d and
a c tin g independently o f the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and the county conrnissioners.
There is strong in c e n tiv e by the county a u d ito r s , since they represent
the e n t i r e county which consists mostly o f c i t i e s which have t h e i r own
p o lic e departments o r townships which r e l y on the s h e r i f f ' s general
p a t r o ls , to in co rp o rate a l l costs in to the c o n tra c t p r ic e .

One item

which has not appeared in any o f the oth e r county costing procedures
but does appear in Wayne County is an estim ate f o r a d m in is tr a tiv e o ver­
head.

A f t e r adding up the v a ria b le inputs ( s a l a r i e s , uniforms, and

ve h ic le expense) they take

20% and add i t .

This is to d e fra y any

269

Table A-7.

Cost o f a new p a tro l u n i t , 1973-74 f o r the Wayne County
s h e riff.
2

Item

Analysis

Amount

Base S a la rie s

8 men x $14,236

$113,890

Court Time^

8 men x $731

’

Overtime^

8 men x $625

Holiday Time

6 fa m ily holidays

S h ift D iffe re n tia l

Saturday and Sunday

Fringe B enefits

5,845
5,000

x 8 hours
x f i v e men x $13 .6 9 /h r

3,285

4 men x 8 hours x 365 days
x .30 per hour

3,510

53 S at. x 8 hours x .1 0 /h r
52 Sun. x 8 hours x .1 5 /h r

520

31.1% o f r e g u la r s a la ry
18.23% o f o th e r s a la r ie s

38,635

Uniform Equipment

$565 x 8 men

4,5 2 0

Uniform Allowance

$250/man x 8 men

2 ,0 0 0

Automotive Cost

Cost o f ca r and equipment is
estimated to be $6,260 and
operating cost per miles is
estimated to be $ . 0 8 /m ile
o r $4,000

Workmen's Compensation

10,260
1,135

1 % o f s a la r ie s

TOTAL

$188,600
37,720

A d m in is tra tiv e Costs (20% o f t o t a l )
GRAND TOTAL

$226,320

^Based on average p a tro l person f o r s h e r i f f ' s department.

2

A ll amounts have been rounded.

a d d itio n a l le v e l o f s e r v ic e s , such as t r a f f i c bureau, d e t e c t iv e bureau,
c
e tc . which may operate in th e c i t y o f Romulus.

5
Gene i'latkowski o f the County Budget Department fe e ls t h a t t h i s is too
low. He estimates t h a t 40% o f a l l the complaints which the d e t e c tiv e
bureau handles comes from the c i t y o f Romulus.

270

Other observations can be made.
the top patrolmen base s a la r y .

The base s a la ry used per man is

The reason given f o r t h i s is t h a t the

person working in Romulus is most l i k e l y to be a t the top pay s l o t .

6

Romulus pays $220,000 f o r a p a tro l u n i t , not the $226,320 which
is the cost estim ate o f a new p a tro l u n it .

P a rt o f the d iffe r e n c e is

due to the uniform expense ($565 per man) which is only charged when
a patrol u n it is f i r s t purchased.
per y e a r per man.

Yearly uniform maintenance is $250

The d if fe r e n c e between uniform maintenance and f i r s t

y ear equipping o f personnel f o r 8 p a tro l persons is $3,024 (which includes
the 20% a d m in is tr a tiv e component).

A p o rtio n o f the remaining d i f f e r ­

ence is accounted by f i r s t round v e h ic le expense such as s i r e n , gun
h o ld e r, r a d io , which t o t a l s $2,352 (in c lu d in g 20% a d m in is tr a tiv e component).

The t o t a l o f these two items is $5,3 7 6.

A fte r making these

two adjustments, a d if fe r e n c e o f $944 remains between costs and what
Romulus pays.

What could account f o r the remaining d iffe r e n c e is t h a t

in the v e h ic le e s tim a te , no c r e d i t is given to Roirulus f o r t r a d e - i n
value o f the p a tro l v e h ic le .

Regardless o f what accounts f o r the $900

d i f f e r e n c e , the Wayne County cost procedure has Romulus paying f o r a l l
v a ria b le costs and some a d m in is tr a tiv e overhead.

I t is estimated t h a t 90% o f the patrolmen are a t the top pay s c a le .
Anyone hire d in new to the s h e r i f f ' s department r a r e l y goes on the
road but f i r s t works in the j a i l u n ti l there is an opening in the
road p a tro l d iv i s io n .
Under th is system Romulus is unable to pay
f o r a rookie p a tro l person.
^Some amount must be added to allo w f o r d e p re c ia tio n o f the v e h ic le
equipment.

271

CLINTON COUNTY
The ClintonCounty s h e r i f f has taken care to estim ate the value o f
resources used in providing a s in g le p a tro l hour o f s e rv ic e .

The

s h e r i f f fe e ls t h a t in any contractual arrangement, the county should
match 'whatever the local c o n tracting community pays which, in his
eyes, is the county's o b lig a tio n to the lo cal community in re tu rn f o r
t h e i r county taxes.

He r e a liz e s t h a t the contra c tin g communities

receive a d d itio n a l s h e r i f f inputs such as a d m in is tr a tio n , d e t e c t iv e ,
t r a f f i c u n it s , e tc . other than those item ized in Table A- 8 .
The main d iffe re n c e s between the s h e r i f f ' s cost estim ate and the
estim ate o f resources used comes in the base s a la ry used and in the
number o f hours a c t u a lly worked.
s a la ry o f a l l patrolmen.

The s h e r i f f used the average base

But since sergeants also perform patrol

a c t i v i t i e s , they should be included in the base s a la r y .
base s a la ry also a f f e c t s many o f the f r in g e s .

The higher

For h o lid ay pay, the

s h e r i f f apparently estimated f o r e ig h t holidays instead o f the 10 f o r
which the men were paid.

In estim ating the actual number o f hours

worked, the d iffe r e n c e between the s h e r i f f ' s estim ate and the resources
used is t h a t the l a t t e r includes an allowance f o r vacation time and
s ic k le ave.
The s h e r i f f charges $5.85 f o r a s in g le p a tro l hour o f s e rv ic e .
This p ric e applies to the v illa g e s and the township.

Table A-9

compares the revenue the s h e r i f f receives from each o f the c o n tra c tin g
communities, the s h e r i f f ' s estim ate o f the c o s t, and the estim ate o f the
resources used.

(For the v i l l a g e s , the v i l l a g e p a tro l estim ate o f

costs is used; and f o r the township, the county patrol operation
estim ate is used.)

272

Table A - 8 .

Estimate o f v a ria b le resources used and C lin to n County
s h e r i f f ' s cost e s tim ate.

S h e r i f f 's
Cost
Estimate
Average Base Salary
Social S e c u rity
Reti rement.
Blue Cross
Health and Accident
Holiday Pay
Uniform, Equipment and Cleaning

Estimate o f
Resources
Used

$9,856
505
259
439
137
371
588

$10,041
587
418
325
137
442
500

12,155

12,450

2,184

2,076

$5.56

$5.99

Vehicle Charge per Hour^
County Patrol
V illa g e Patrol

2.93
0 .9 8

2 .9 3
0 .9 8

Average Hourly Rate f o r Singe Patrol
Hour o f Service
County Patrol
V il la g e Patrol

8 .49
6 .54

8 .9 2
6.97

Average Gross Wage

2

Humber o f hours worked

3

Average Gross Hourly Wage

The r a te in January was $211 per man, but in J u ly a new plan was
adopted which moved the r a te to $439. The average o f the two rates
was taken f o r the estim ate o f resources used w h ile the h igher r a te
was used in the s h e r i f f ' s estim ate.
2
L i t t l e i f any overtime was paid during 1974.
3

The s h e r i f f ' s deputies are paid f o r 42 hours per week o r 2,184 hours
per y e a r . T h irte e n and o n e -h a lf days are paid f o r but not worked due
to vacation and sick days. The s h e r i f f estimates two such days per
man per y e a r.
^The s h e r i f f took several vehicles and monitored the actual expenditure
f o r equipment, r e p a ir s , gas, and o i l and divided by th e miles tr a v e le d
during the y e ar to generate an operating cost per m ile .
He also took
several cars over a th re e year period and c a lc u la te d a d e p re c ia tio n
value per m ile by s u b tra c tin g the salvage value o f the c ar from the
purchase p ric e and d iv id in g by the number o f miles t r a v e le d .
For
the f i r s t h a l f o f 1974 the r a te was 1 1 . 7<£, but due to r is in g fuel
costs i t jumped to 1 4 .7<t/mi 1e . From spot checks o f o f f i c e r s ' d a i l y
lo g s , he estimated the average miles tr a v e le d during 8 hours f o r the
county was 180 (2 2 .5 /h o u r) and 60 f o r the v i l l a g e ( 7 . 5 / h o u r ) .

273

Table A-9.

Estimate o f v a ria b le resources used, annual amount paid to
C lin to n County s h e r i f f ' s cost e s tim a te .

Community

Number o f
Annual
Single
Patrol Hours
Purchased

Annual
Amount
Paid to
S h e r iff at
$ 5 .8 5 /h r

S h e r iff's
Annual
Cost
Estimate

Estimate o f
Resourfces
Used Annually

Fowler v i l l a g e

1200

$7,020

$7,848

$8,364

Westphalia
v illa g e

1200

7,020

7,848

8,364

100

585

849

892

50

292

424

446

2550

$14,917

$16,969

$18,066

Dallas Twp.
Lebanon Twp.
TOTAL

Using the higher cost estim ate the s h e r i f f is g iv in g to the con­
t r a c t in g communities approximately $3,0 0 0.

Granted, th e re are oth e r

services which these communities receive which are not included in the
Q

cost estimates such as de te c tiv es and t r a f f i c u n its .

But i t

is

d i f f i c u l t , i f not im possible, to f a c t o r out t h a t po rtio n o f these
county-wide services which go to the c o n tra c tin g communities as county
taxpayers and the po rtion which goes to them because o f t h e i r p a r t i c i ­
pation in the c o n tra c t.

KENT COUNTY
According to the c o n tr a c t, the c o n tra c tin g townships pay f o r the
s a la rie s and frin g e s and uniforms o f the p a tro l persons and the county

Q
Sometimes the c o n tra c tin g communities may re c e iv e a double p a tro l u n it
but they are b i l l e d as i f i t were a s in g le u n i t .

274
pays f o r a l l v e h ic le expenses.

The townships are to be b i l l e d f o r the

actual s a la ry expense each month and are to pay promptly.

In 1974 the

t o t a l gross s a la ry expense f o r a l l seven contra c tin g townships is
$203,271 and the townships have paid $162,000 which means the town­
ships are re ce iv in g an in t e r e s t f r e e loan.

Since the seven c o n tra c tin g

communities are t r e a te d as a u n i t , no attempt has been made to p r ic e
the actual resources used in each o f the c o n tra c tin g townships.

The

actual expense charged to the c o n tra c tin g townships as provided by the
Kent County deputy c o n t r o l le r are l i s t e d below:

Table A-10.

Actual exoenses b i l l e d to the c o n tra c tin g townships in 1974
by the Kent County s h e r i f f .
Item

Amount

Wages
Overtime
Computer Services
FICA
Reti rement
H o s p it a liz a tio n
L i f e Insurance
Insurance Bonds
TOTAL

$159,383
5,845
10 2

9,663
16,937
6,213
958
4,219
$203,271

I t should be noted t h a t in 1974 the county absorbed the uniform main­
tenance.
To s t a f f 16 hours o f p a tro l 365 days per y e a r requires a l i t t l e
over th re e p a tro l persons which allows f o r vacation days, h o lid a y s ,
and an average f i v e days o f sick leave per man.

Since th e re are f i v e

cars each supplying 16 hours o f d a i l y p a tro l s e rv ic e every day o f the
y e a r , th e re is a need f o r f i f t e e n plus p a tro l persons.

The c o n tra c tin g

communities are a c t u a lly buying 16 and pay f o r the s a la r ie s o f the men

275

who a c t u a lly work in t h e i r communities.
co n tracting communities pay f o r a l l

From a l l

in d ic a t io n s , the

costs r e la t e d to personnel.

B i l l i n g o f th is t o t a l cost is done in te n th s .

Since th e re are

f i v e cars o r 10 h a l f cars which can be purchased, communities pay f o r
the number o f h a l f cars they re c e iv e .

Three communities re ce iv e a ca r

each so they each are b i l l e d f o r 2 /1 0th o f the t o t a l cost.

The oth e r

fo u r townships receive a h a l f a car and each pay 1 / 10 th o f the t o t a l
cost.
I t is in s t r u c t iv e to estim ate the amount o f v e h ic le and uniform
and equipment expenses absorbed by the county.

Kent County has a motor

pool t h a t services 64 county c a rs , 25 o f which are p a tro l v e h ic le s .

It

was only through very broad guesstimating by s h e r i f f and county o f f i c i a l s
regarding the number o f cars used up by c o n tra c tin g communities in
1974 and number o f miles driven in an e ig h t hour s h i f t , were the
v e h ic le fig u re s in the Table A - l l a t a l l po ss ib le .
Total 1974 costs to the county to supply e x tra le v e ls o f p a tro l
services to the c o n tra c tin g communities was approxim ately $238,700.
The cost o f a s in g le patrol hour o f s e rv ic e was $ 8 .1 7 .

The amount to

be paid by the contra c tin g communities is $203,271 o r $6.96 per hour.

LENAWEE COUNTY
Even though the s h e r i f f does not have a c o n tra c t which s p e c ifie s
the exact number o f p a tro l hours, an estim ate o f value o f resources
used is s t i l l

done in order to c o n tra s t w ith the expenses met by the

p r iv a t e s u p p lie r .

Table A-12 deals with s a la ry and uniform components

o f a per p a tro l hour cost f ig u r e .

276

Table A - l l .

Estimate o f v e h ic le and uniform expense absorbed by the
Lenawee County s h e r i f f f o r c o n tra c tin g communities.

Item

Analysis

Amount

Average 1974 p r ic e o f p a tro l c ar was $3483
x 6.67 cars.

$23,233

P rice per g a llo n o f gas @ 26<£. Assume
average o f 80 miles d riv e n in an 8 hour
s h i f t f o r a t o t a l o f 292,000 miles driven
by a l l c o n tra c t ca rs .
F u rth e r assume cars
get 7 miles per g a llo n so t h a t t o t a l
gallons o f gas used is estim ated a t
41 ,7 1 4.
(41 ,714 x . 26)

10,845

Assume one q u a rt o f o i l per 1 0 0 0 miles o r
292 quarts o r 73 gallons o f o i l x 1 .84 per
gal Ion

134

1

Vehicle Purchase

Gas

Oil

A n tifr e e z e

Assume each car uses 2 .5 gallons times $3.65
per gallo n times 6.67 cars

Car Insurance
Vehicle Repairs

$60 per car per year x 6 .6 7 cars

2

Total amount budgeted f o r 1974 was $ 41,050.
There were 64 vehicles s e rviced by the motor
pool o f which 25 ( . 3 ) were p a tro l cars.
Assuming t h a t each v e h ic le receives the same
amount o f v e h ic le r e p a ir and operating
supply .3 x 41 ,050 = $12,315 and divided by
25 p a tro l cars gives average amount o f $492
per p a tro l car x 6.67 ca^s
GROSS TOTAL

T ra d e -in

Assume t r a d e - i n o f each car is 800 times
6.67 cars

Assume $175 is required to handle the normal
wear and t e a r o f personnel uniforms and
equipment each y e a r times 16 persons
TOTAL EXPENSE ABSORBED BY COUNTY

,

400

3,282
37,954

- 5,336
$32,618

Net Vehicle Expense
Uniform

60

2,800
$35,418

_

The county says t h a t they l i k e to trad e t h e i r cars when they have
60,000 miles on them. I f the assumption o f 80 miles per 8 hour s h i f t
is c o r r e c t , then 292,000 d ivided by 60,000 y ie ld s only 4 .8 vehicles
used up during 1974.
The 6.67 cars used up in 1974 by c o n tra c tin g communities seems high.
For v e h ic le re p a irs and operating supplies p a tro l cars re c e iv e more
than the average f o r the cars serviced by motor p o o l, so t h is f ig u r e
is probably low.

277

Table A-12.

D eviation o f s a la ry cost per man hour f o r Lenawee County
s h e r i f f deputy.

Item

Analysis

Amount

Average Base Wage The 1974 base s a la rie s were added and
divided by 26 patrolmen

$10,632

F .I.C .A .

0.0585 o f base s a la ry (0.0585 x 10,632)

Retirement

Rates are $6.00 per month per man

Longevity

One patrolman receives an e x tra $400 per
y e a r f o r having worked more than 8 years
and 11 patrolmen received each an e x tra
$ 2 0 0 per y e a r f o r having worked more than
4 y e a rs . The average spread over 26 men
in $ 1 0 0 .

100

The monthly r a te o f $40.89 is f o r coverage
o f two persons and is the one used.
For
those men who had fa m ily coverage, the
r a te is $42.95 per month (12 x 4 0.89)

490.68

Blue Cross

622
72

L i f e and False A rre s t Insurance

112.

TOTAL GROSS SALARY
Uniform Cleaning

Maintenance and
Replacement

$12,029

By union c o n tr a c t , the county Days to
each man $150 f o r uniform cleaning

150

The cost to o u t f i t a patrolman is $570
and the s h e r i f f estimates t h a t i t costs
about $105 per y e a r to cover normal
uniform d e p re c ia tio n

105

TOTAL UNIFORM EXPENSE

$225

In 1974 the s h e r i f f ' s deputies were paid f o r 4 2 .5 hours per week
or 2210 hours per y e a r .

But they were paid f o r 11 h o lid a y s , an average

o f 8 vacations and an average o f 5 sick days.

9

The t o t a l number o f

hours which the men were paid but did not work was 192.

9

To c a lc u la t e

I t was estimated t h a t 20 patrolmen received 10 days vacation time and
the average over 26 men is 8 days per man. The average number o f sick
days a c t u a lly taken per man is estimated to be f i v e by th e s h e r i f f ' s
o ffic e .

278

the actual number o f hours worked, 192 hours is taken from 2210 g iv in g
2018 hours a c t u a lly w o rk e d .^
(12,029 divided by 2018).

The hourly wage per man hour is $5.96

Cost o f the uniform per hour is 13<£.

To estim ate v e h ic le expense per hour cost per m ile estimates were
done to two o f the s h e r i f f ' s

v e h ic le s .

which v/as 10.8<£ per m ile , was u s e d .^

An average o f the two e s tim a te s ,
The s h e r i f f estimates t h a t he

would probably d r iv e 100 miles per e ig h t hour s h i f t i f the c o n tra c t
operation were a township and 50 miles per e ig h t hour s h i f t i f a
v i l l a g e was c o n tra c tin g .

12

Using these fig u re s the v e h ic le cost per

hour f o r a v i l l a g e c o n tra c t would be $ . 6 6 per hour and f o r a township
$1.31 per hour.
The t a b le below estimates the per p a tro l hour cost f o r a s in g le
and a double patrol hour.

P resently the s h e r i f f operates only double

patrol units but i t is possible t h a t he would provide a s in g le i f t h a t
is a l l a community could a f f o r d .

Table A-13.

1974 patrol hour costs f o r s in g le and double p a tro l un its
supplied to a v i l l a g e or a township Lenawee County s h e r i f f .

V illa g e
Single P atrol Unit

Salary
Vehicle
Uni form

TOTAL
Double Patrol Unit

TOTAL

Salary
Vehicle
Uni form

$5.96
0 .6 6

0 .1 3
$6.75
$11.92
0 .6 6

0.26
$12.84

Township
$5.96
1.31
0 .1 3
$7.40
$11.92
1.31
0.26
$13.49

In 1975 the deputies w i l l be paid f o r 40 hours per week.
I f the
number o f h o lid a y s , sick days and vacation days do not change,
the number o f hours a c t u a lly worked w i l l drop to 1888. Given the
same gross s a la r y , the hourly wage then becomes $ 6 .4 6 .
(Continued on next page.)

279

GENESEE COUNTY
Genesee Township receives from the s h e r i f f 5,840 s in g le and 7,920
double patrol hours per y e ar fo r an amount not to exceed $195,501.
Vienna Township receives 2,290 s in g le and 5,840 double p a tro l hours per
year f o r an amount not to exceed $ 7 7 ,0 0 0 , and Fenton received 2,920
double p a tro l hours f o r an amount not to exceed $32,250.

Each c o n tra c t

contains a paragraph which says t h a t i f costs increase during the y e a r ,
th a t the c o n tra c t w i l l be amended to r e f l e c t the higher costs.

For

each township, overtime is not included in the cost f ig u r e . I t is
recorded by the county and b i l l e d to each township.
When the township contracts were signed, the union c o n tr a c t,
s e t tin g new wage le v e l s , had not been signed.

Consequently, the estim ate

o f value o f resources used w i l l not be compared to the p ric e appearing
in each c o n tra c t.

In s te a d , actual costs b i l l e d to each township were

obtained from the time each c o n tra c t began through December 1974.

A

1 2 -month estim ate was obtained by d iv id in g each amount by the number

o f months the c o n tra c t had ex is ted in 1974 and m u ltip ly in g by 12.

The

re s u lts are shown in Table A-14 below.
The estim ate o f the value o f v a r ia b le resources used in the
d i f f e r e n t contracts is shown in Table A-15 below.
Table A -16 compares the estim ate o f v a r ia b le resources used to the
y e a r ly estimates o f the amounts to be b i l l e d each township.

(Continued from previous page)
^ T o t a l ve h ic le cost includes purchase p ric e o f $4,500 minus $1,200
f o r t r a d e - i n , operating expense (gas, o i l , and m aintenance), car
insurace o f $305 and $270 f o r rad io d e p re c ia tio n and i n s t a l l a t i o n .
1?
For Frank Becker the number o f miles driven f o r 4000 hours o f s e rv ic e
to the v i l l a g e o f Clayton was approxim ately 57,000 o r 14 miles per
hour.
I t is unclear 'whether t h is mileage includes t r a v e l to and from
court and to and from Becker's o f f i c e .

Table A-14.

Actual and 12-month estim ate and expenditures b i l l e d to each township by Genesee County s h e r i f f .

B i l l i n g Period f o r
Most Cost Items

Genesee Township
Actual
Expenditure
fo r B illin g
12-Month
Period
Estimate 1
5 /3 /7 4 5 /3 -1 2 /2 7
5 /3 /7 5

Vienna Township
Actual
Expenditure
12-Month
fo r B illin g
Period
Estim ate 1
3 /8 /7 4 3 /8 -1 2 /2 7
3 /8 /7 5

Fenton Township
Actual
Expenditure
fo r B illin g
12-Month..
Period
Estimate
4 /5 /7 4 4 /5 -1 2 /2 7
4 /5 /7 5

S a la rie s
S h ift D iffe re n tia l
F . I.C .A .
H o s p ita liz a tio n
L i f e and Health
Insurance
Reti rement
Workmen's Compensation

$90,452
4,598
5,855
7,734

127,696
6,491
8,267
10,918

51,484
2,397
3,150
3,594

58,838
2,739
3,600
4,107

16,080
954
1,053
1,272

20,311
1,205
1,330
1 ,606

1,585

2,237

1,038

1,186

370

467

7,600
2,700

10,814
3,811

4,081
1,438

4,663
1,643

1,455
558

1,837
704

Gross Salary

120,525

170,234

67,182

76,776

21,742

27,460

5,405

7,630

2 ,2 2 2

2,539

1,379

1,741

776
4,138
15,167

1,095
4,138
21,412

285
1,883
11 ,963
50

325
1,883
13,672
50

136

171

146,071

204,509

83,535

95,245

649
782

649
782

84,966

96,676

Overtime
Cleaning
Uni forms
Vehicle Rental
Other^
3
False A rre s t Insurance
Total V a ria b le Costs
Overhead Expenses
E le c tric ity 4
Telephone
Total Costs 5

146,071

204,509

0

0

3,171

4,005

26,428

33,377

26,428

' 33,377

The 12-month estim ate f o r those expenses which change each month was obtained f o r Genesee Township by
d iv id in g by 8 .5 and m u ltip ly in g by 12; f o r Vienna Township by d iv id in g by 10.5 and m u ltip ly in g by 12
and f o r Fenton Township by d iv id in g by 9 .5 and m u ltip ly in g by 12. Those items which were not increased
f o r 12 months are uniform, e l e c t r i c i t y , telephone and o th e r.
2 n-f-hov* ic
. a m m i m i .+ ' i. n n

3For Genesee Township, $825 and f o r Vienna Township $335 was budgeted f o r fa ls e a r r e s t insurance but
no expenditure was made during the b i l l i n g period observed.
4 For Genesee Township $600 was budgeted f o r e l e c t r i c i t y but none was expended during the b i l l i n g
period observed.
5For Genesee and Vienna Townships the t o t a ls f o r actual expenditure do not agree with the c o n t r o l le r
computer p r in t o u t.
For Genesee Township the c o n t r o l l e r 's t o t a l is $149,108 and f o r Vienna the t o t a l
is $80,860. The reason f o r the d iffe r e n c e is not known.

Table A-15.

Estimate o f annual value o f va ria b le resources used in each contract by Genesee County s h e r iff.

Fenton

Genesee

Vienna

F i r s t Shift^

5840 hrs x $ 9.04 = $ 52,793

2920 hrs x $ 9 .04 = $26,396

Second S h i f t 2

5840 hrs x $18.98 = $110,843

2920 hrs x $18.98 = $55,421

Third S h i f t

2920 hrs x $19.28 = $ 56,297

2920 hrs x $19.28 = $56,297

$219,933

$138,114

Salary

Total Salary
V e h ic le 5
Uniform^
TOTAL5

165,353 x 11* = $18,189

121 ,875 x 11* = $13,406

$4,138

$1,883

$242,260

$153,403

&
2920 hrs x $18.98 = $55,421

$55,421
47,843 x 11* = $5,262
—

$60,683

Since the s h e r i f f ' s p o lic y is to r o ta te his patrolmen throughout the county, an estimated average base
s a la ry ($13,244) over a l l patrolmen was used.
(This base includes 1974 union adjustm ent.) Fringes
were estimated using the base. To a djust f o r s h i f t d i f f e r e n t i a l , 6 % and 8 I were used re s p e c tiv e ly fo r
the second and t h i r d s h i f t .
( I t is assumed t h a t fring es are not increased by s h i f t d i f f e r e n t i a l . )
2

The hourly r a te is doubled f o r double patrol hours.

3

4

Monthly mileage is kept by the s h e r i f f .
Yearly estimates have been made from these s t a t i s t i c s .
Mileage r a te o f 11* per m ile is used by the county f o r the leasing o f the s h e r i f f ' s cars from the
county motor p o o l.

The s h e r i f f ' s estim ate o f uniform expenses is used.
5
Total does not include fa ls e a r r e s t insurance.

283

Table A-16.

Estimate o f v a ria b le resources used and estimated amount
b i l l e d to each c o n tra c tin g community by Genesee County s h e r i f f .

Annual
Number
o f Single
Patrol Hrs

Annual
Number
o f Double
Patrol Hrs

Estimated
Value o f
V a ria b le
Resources
Used
in 1974

Estimate o f
Annual
Amount o f
V a ria b le
Resource
B ill e d by
County

D iffe re n c e

Genesee Twp.

5840

7920

$242,260

$204,509

$37,751

Vienna Twp.

2920

5840

153,403

95,245

58,158

2920

60,683

33,350

27,333

16680

$456,346

$333,104

$123,242

Fenton Twp.
Total

8760

An shown in

Table A -lb there is over sl'j'J,U<K) d iffe r e n c e between the

amount which c o l l e c t i v e l y w i l l be b i l l e d the th re e townships and the
estimated amount o f resources used.

This d iffe r e n c e w i l l

be financed

from the county general fund.
There are two reasons f o r such a d if fe r e n c e between the s h e r i f f ' s
cost estim ate and the estim ate o f actual resources used.

F i r s t , the

s h e r i f f was tr y in g to a n t ic ip a t e costs as w ell as e s ta b lis h a costing
procedure f o r the f i r s t tim e.

Second, the b i l l i n g procedure does not

pass on to the townships actual expenses.

In s te a d , an estim ate o f

s a la r ie s f o r the number o f men to be purchased by each c o n tra c t is
made, which is 11 f o r Genesee, 5 f o r Vienna and 2 f o r Fenton.

1

13

F irs t

Before Vienna contracted w ith the s h e r i f f , they had a budget o f about
$100,000 f o r the services o f 5 personnel in the department, the same
number which is purchased from the s h e r i f f .
One reason Vienna was
a b le to do i t cheaper t h a t the s h e r i f f was the use o f p a r t-tim e
personnel to cover vacation and o th e r o f f - t i m e . Another reason is
the lower s a la ry le v e l o f the o f f i c e r s .

284

step base pay was used f o r frin g es and e s tim ating s a la ry c o s t.
mately 1 /1 2th o f th is amount is then b i l l e d to each township.

Approxi-

14

But

the s h e r i f f rota tes his patrolmen which means t h a t a patrolman a t a
higher step could work in the c o n tra c t community.

To estim ate resources

used requires t h a t an average base over a l l patrolmen be used.

15

The

d iffe r e n c e in bases between a beginning deputy and the average base over
1 /"

a l l deputies is approximately $ 2,300.

Fringes f u r t h e r widen the gap.

In the s h e r i f f ' s estim ate o f the number o f patrolmen needed to s t a f f each
c o n tra c t o p e ra tio n , allowance was not made f o r time o f f .

I t is e s t i ­

mated t h a t the average patrolman is paid f o r 2080 hours but works only
1800 hours.

17

Total number o f annual man hours to s t a f f the Genesee

c o n tra c t is 21,680 or 12 men, 14,600 man hours o r 8 men f o r Vienna and
3.25

men f o r Fenton.

^ A n adjustment was made when the new union c o n tra c t went in to e f f e c t .
^ T h e r a t i o n a le which could be advanced j u s t i f y i n g using beginning pay
bases is t h a t the men employed due to the contracted p a tr o ls began a t
the f i r s t pay ste p .
But since the s h e r i f f ro ta te s his men, the non­
c o n tra c tin g po rtio n o f the county receives the services o f beginning
deputies (many o f whom, however, are experienced p o lic e o f f i c e r s ) .
^ T h e o v e r a ll base wage f o r patrolmen is estim ated to be $13,244 and
the base f o r step A deputy is estimated to be $10,908.
^From the county's p e rs p e c tiv e , the amount o f unproductive time f o r
the average patrolman is 120 hours (3 weeks) fo r v a c a tio n , 56 hours
f o r personal days and 104 hours (13 days) f o r h o lid a y compensatory
tim e. Total number o f hours paid f o r but not worked is 280 and sub­
tr a c te d from the 2080 hours paid f o r leaves 1800 hours a c t u a lly worked
per man.
^ T o t a l man-hours f o r each c o n tra c t is d iv id e d by 1800 hours to c a lc u ­
l a t e the number o f men needed to s t a f f the o p era tio n allo w in g f o r
vacation tim e , personal days, and h o lid a y s .

284

step base pay was used f o r frin g e s and estim atin g s a la ry cost.
mately 1 /1 2th o f th is amount is then b i l l e d to each township.

A pproxi-

14

But

the s h e r i f f ro ta te s his patrolmen which means t h a t a patrolman a t a
higher step could work in the c o n tra c t community.

To estim ate resources

used requires t h a t an average base over a l l patrolmen be used.

15

The

d iffe r e n c e in bases between a beginning deputy and the average base over
a l l deputies is approximately $2,3 0 0.

1

fs

Fringes f u r t h e r widen the gap.

In the s h e r i f f ' s estim ate o f the number o f patrolmen needed to s t a f f each
c o n tra c t o p e ra tio n , allowance was not made f o r time o f f .

I t is e s t i ­

mated th a t the average patrolman is paid f o r 2080 hours but works only
1800 hours.

17

Total number o f annual man hours to s t a f f the Genesee

c o n tra c t is 21,680 o r 12 men, 14,600 man hours o r 8 men f o r Vienna and
TO

3.25

men f o r Fenton.

^ A n adjustment was made when the new union c o n tra c t went in to e f f e c t .
15

The r a t io n a le which could be advanced j u s t i f y i n g using beginning pay
bases is t h a t the men employed due to the contracted p a tro ls began a t
the f i r s t pay ste p .
But since the s h e r i f f ro ta te s his men, the non­
c o n tra c tin g po rtion o f the county receives the services o f beginning
deputies (many o f whom, however, are experienced p o lic e o f f i c e r s ) .

IC
The o v e ra ll base wage f o r patrolmen is estim ated to be $13,244 and
the base f o r step A deputy is estimated to be $10,908.
^From the county's p e rs p e c tiv e , the amount o f unproductive time f o r
the average patrolman is 120 hours (3 weeks) f o r v a c a tio n , 56 hours
f o r personal days and 104 hours (13 days) f o r ho lid ay compensatory
tim e. Total number o f hours paid f o r but not worked is 280 and sub­
tr a c te d from the 2080 hours paid f o r leaves 1800 hours a c t u a lly worked
per man.
^ T o t a l man-hours f o r each c o n tra c t is divided by 1800 hours to c a lc u ­
l a t e the number o f men needed to s t a f f the op era tion allo w in g f o r
vacation tim e , personal days, and h o lid a y s .

285

In the Genesee c o n tra c t the s h e r i f f budgeted an amount o f appro x i­
mately $7,000 f o r a d m in is tr a tiv e overhead.
done f o r overhead items.

However, no b i l l i n g had been

An item w i l l not be b i l l e d to the townships

u n t il the s h e r i f f sends to the county c o n t r o l le r a voucher f o r the
s p e c ifie d amount.

I f the s h e r i f f does not issue a voucher f o r overhead

expense, then none w i l l be charged to Genesee Township.

WASHTENAW COUNTY
The fo llo w in g two ta b le s d is p la y the p a tro l cost e s tim a tio n .

The

f i r s t t a b le (Table A-17) derives the cost per s in g le and double natrol
hour and the second t a b le (Table A-18) generates the t o t a l cost o f
each c o n tra c t and compares i t to the p r ic e .

No discussion o f the

Washtenaw s h e r i f f ' s p r ic in g pra c tic es was held because the s h e r i f f ' s
budget personnel were extremely busy and could not take time to show
the author how they estimated the prices o f the d i f f e r e n t c o n tra c t
p a tro ls .

KALAMAZOO COUNTY
To estim ate actual costs incurred by Comstock fo r the higher le v e l
o f p a tro l s e rv ic e , expenses received by the county and b i l l e d to the
township must be added to the expenses b i l l e d d i r e c t l y to Comstock.
Table A-19 below has t h is in fo rm a tio n .

The t o t a l cost o f securing

6,240 s in g le p a tro l hours o f s e rv ic e (excluding overtim e) was $52,591
or $8.42 per p a tro l hour.

Of the $45,286 expenses incurred by the

county, as o f January 13, 1975, Comstock had tra n s fe rre d a sum o f
$36,590 which means t h a t the county was loaning Comstock approximately
$9,000 in t e r e s t f r e e .

Comstock also paid to the contracted patrolmen

in 1974, $9,891 f o r 1800 hours o f o f f duty work enforcing township
ordinances.

286
Table A-17.

Estimation o f value o f resources used per p a tro l hour f o r
d i f f e r e n t contracts in 1974 f o r Washtenaw County s h e r i f f .

Average Base Salary
F .I.C .A .

(0.0585 x Base)

Y p s ila n ti
Township

Dexter
V il la g e

$13,026^

$14,771

Superior N o r t h f ie ld
Township Township
$1 2,9 31 2

:i>12,9763

762

864

756

759

Retirement (0.0713 x Base)

928

1,053

921

925

H o s p ita liz a tio n ($ 3 6 .00/month)

432

432

432

432

Workmen's Compensation
($ 3 .0 8 per $100)

400

452

397

397

74

80

69

69

15,622

17,652

15 ,506

15,558

L i f e Insurance ($5.76 per $1000)
AVERAGE GROSS SALARY PER MAN
Average hourly wage per p a tro l
hour (d iv id e gross hourly wage
by 1836 hours ) 4

8.51

9.61

8 .4 4

8 .4 7

Uniform Maintenance and
Replacement per Hour Worked

0 .2 6

0 .26

0 .26

0 .2 6

Vehicle Cost per Patrol Hour^

1.54

0 .9 8

2.91

2.91

Cost per Single Patrol Hour

10.31

10.85

11.61

11.64

Cost per Double Patrol Hour

19.08

20.72

20.31

20.37

H h i s is the average base f o r 15 deputies assigned to Y p s ila n ti Township.
I t does not include the lie u t e n a n t o r the serg ea n t's base wages.
2

Superior Township had one person working the c o n tra c t f o r two months
and another one working i t f o r 10 months. A weighted average was taken.
3
N o r th fie ld Township was handled s i m i l a r l y to S up erio r.

^To obtain the number o f hours a c t u a lly worked, i t is assumed t h a t each
deputy gets on the average o f 12 days vacation and 1 2.5 h o lid a y s . This
is 196 hours fo r which the deputies are compensated but do not work.
I t is estimated t h a t the average patrolman also takes 6 s ick days per
year which are paid and add on an a d d itio n a l 48 hours.
(2080 - 244 =
1836).
5In 1974, $150 was spent f o r uniform replacement and $325 f o r maintenance
per hour per y e ar on the average (425 7 1836 = $ 0 . 2 6 /h o u r).
r

I t was estimated t h a t the average cost per m ile was 12<£. I t was f u r t h e r
estimated t h a t the number o f annual miles d riv e n f o r Y p s ila n ti was
224,125; f o r Dexter i t was 6 2 ,6 6 4 ; f o r Sueprior and N o r t h f ie ld each i t
was 650,508.
(Mileage fig u res were estimated from c a lc u la t in g the
number o f miles driven in October and m u lt ip ly in g by 1 2 .)
F i n a l l y , the
t o t a l number o f patrol hours ( s in g le + double) is divid e d in to the t o t a l
v e hicle cost ( 1 2 <£ x m ileage) to generate v e h ic le cost per p a tro l hour.

Table A-18.

Estimated t o t a l v a ria b le resources used by each o f the Washtenaw s h e r i f f ' s contract
operation.
Y p s ila n ti
Township

Dexter
V illa g e

Superior
Township

N o r th fie ld
Township

Total cost o f
s in g le patrol
hours

$95,178
(5736 x $10.31)

$82,980
(7648 x $10.85)

$24,148
(2080 x $11.61)

$19,368
(1664 x $11.64)

Total cost o f
double patrol
hours

222,285
(11,680 x $19.08)

S h i f t D if f e r e n t i a l^

2,336
(2336 x $0.10)

25,421
(1248 x $20.37)
416
(4160 x $0.10)

573
(5736 x $0.10)

Overtime Estimate
A d m in istra tiv e
Overhead^
Total Cost
Yearly Amount
Received from
Each Contract^

38,364
$322,123

$88,716

$24,148

$45,205

204,000

71,000

15,000

16,000

H h e s h i f t d i f f e r e n t i a l is lOtf per man hour f o r any hours worked during the second and t h i r d
s h ift.
o
For the Y p s ila n ti c o n tr a c t, one lie u te n a n t and sergeant are used f o r supervisors and adminis­
tra to r.
There is also a c l e r k / t y p i s t who is paid out o f federal funds but since th is is not
a cost to the county i t is not included; however, th is could become an expenses once federal
funds end.
3
The amounts were obtained from each c o n tra c t.

288

Table A-19.

Actual p o lic e expenses incurred by Comstock Township in
1974 broken down by expense items.

Expenses B ille d Through County^
Item

Amount

S a la rie s

$31,091

F . I.C .A .

1,869

Reti rement

1,733

Employee Insurance

2,154

Radio Maintenance

294

Vehicle Maintenance

3,222

Gas and Oil

1,804

Uni forms

675
Subtotal

$42,842

Overtime

2,444
Total

$45,286

O
Expenses B ill e d D ir e c t l y to Cornstock^
New Car

3,774

Radar and Radies

3,815

Miscellaneous (Uniform and Equipment)

2,160
Total

$9,749

Source is the Kalamazoo County C o n tr o lle r
2

Source is the Comstock Township C lerk

In itia lly

i t may look as i f the county is passing a l l expenses

on to Comstock; however, th e re are two costs which do not appear.
is an expenses f o r vacation tim e.
t i o n , the s h e r i f f f i l l s
the f i l l - i n

One

I f a Comstock deputy goes on vaca­

in with another deputy.

While the s a la ry o f

deputy is b i l l e d to Comstock, the vacationing deputy's

289

s a la ry is paid out o f the general fund.

With th re e deputies taking

a t o t a l o f 35 days, the y e a r ly cost is $1,6 7 7.

19

Sick days, providing

the s h e r i f f used general p a tro l personnel to cover when a Comstock
deputy is i l l ,

needs also to be added.

holiday pay and health and l i f e

Second, i t

is not c le a r i f

insurance is included in the fr in g e

benefi t s .
The Climax and Wakeshma c o n tra c t operations pay a base r a t e o f
$6.00 per hour which is above the average base r a te o f $4.50 but less
than the time and a h a l f overtime r a t e .

To th is is added 14.21% fo r

fring es as compared to the 24% which is normal county fr in g e markup.
The reason f o r the d iffe r e n c e is t h a t the insurances have already
been paid and no a d d itio n a l expense is incurred by the county in these
items as a r e s u lt o f the c o n tra c ts .

The 17<t per m ile fig u r e is an

estim ate by the county c o n t r o l l e r .

EATON COUNTY
The Eaton Rapids c o n tra c t c a lls f o r f i v e p a tro l persons and two
v e h ic le s .

But to provide the contracted number o f s in g le and double

p a tro l hours, requires 6 p a tro l persons due to the decision to run a

^ ( 3 5 days x 8 hours/day x 5 .9 9 /h o u r ) . Hourly r a t e is the average f o r
the th re e deputies who work the Comstock c o n tra c t in c lu d in g f r in g e s .
The average base is $1 0,1 10 , F . I . C . A . (.0 5 8 5 o f base) is $591, r e t i r e ­
ment ( 8 % o f base) is $808, workmen's compensation ( 1 % o f base) is
$101, h o s p it a liz a t io n (fa m ily ) is $711 per man, l i f e insurance is
approximately $80 per man and l i a b i l i t y insurance is about $60 per
man. D ivid in g by 2080 hours per y e ar gives an hourly r a t e o f $ 5 .9 9 .

20

A t o t a l o f 35 vacation days w i l l be taken by the th re e men and i f
they each average 3 days sick le a v e , t h is is an a d d itio n a l 9 days
s a la ry expense.

290

double p a tro l during the evenings r a th e r than a s in g le p a t r o l .

In

the c o n tra c t the s h e r i f f in s e rte d the cost breakdown which is compared
to the estimated value o f the v a r ia b le resources (personnel and equip­
ment) used.

Table A-20.

This is done f o r 5 as w ell as 6 p a tro l persons.

Eaton County s h e r i f f ' s cost estim ate o f Eaton Rapids c ontract
compare to value o f resources used.

Sheri f f ' s
Cost
Estimate
S ala rie s

Value Estimate o f Resources Used
Six
Fi ve
P atro l Persons
Patrol Persons
$ 6 8,6 65 1

$80,8982

14,102

11,750

11,750

Uniform Cleaning
and Maintenance

875

1,625

1,950

O ffic e Supplies

200

82,040

94,619

Vehicle

TOTAL

$68,898

84,075

The estim ate o f gross s a la ry f o r the f i v e p a tro l persons was gained by
taking the mean gross s a la ry ( in c lu d in g h o lid a y pay) and m u ltip ly in g by
fiv e .
Vacation and s ick leave are accounted f o r by adding in the gross
pay o f the persons necessary to f i l l in f o r those on vacation or s ic k .
The average vacation f o r the f i v e is 8 days and 3 days is average sick
leave used.
(11 days x $47/day x 5 men = $ 2 ,5 8 0 .)

2

The mean gross hourly r a t e , which included vacation time (average 7 per
patrol person, s ic k time (average 3 days per p a tro l person) and h o l i ­
days (11 per p a tro l person), was m u lt i p li e d by the number o f p a tro l
person hours needed to s t a f f a l l o f the s in g le and double p a tro l hours
produced in 1974.

The mean base s a la ry used by the s h e r i f f in his cost estim ate was
$10,858 compared to $10,362 used in my e s tim a te .

The s h e r i f f ' s

estim ate does not include an estim ate f o r replacement o f p a tro l persons
due to vacations and s ic k le a v e .

I f i t had, his s a la ry estim ate would

have been grea ter, than the f i v e p a tro l person s a la ry e s tim a te .
d iffe r e n c e e x is ts on v e h ic le c o s t.

Another

The estimated number o f miles

291

tra v e le d by the Eaton Rapids contracted p a tro l was 94,000 miles which
is about 10 miles per hour o f p a t r o l.

I t is l i k e l y t h a t th is mileage

estim ate is too low which accounts f o r much o f the d if fe r e n c e beween
the s h e r i f f ' s and the auth o r's estim ates.

The s h e r i f f ' s cost

estim ate is f o r f i v e persons and is approximately $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 less than
the estim ate o f resources used by the Eaton Rapids c o n tra c t in 1974
o -i

which used s ix p a tro l persons r a th e r than f i v e .
The D elta Township c o n tra c t c a lls f o r 15 persons and four v e h ic le s .
These persons can be patrol d e te c tiv e s or whatever the s h e r i f f chooses.
For most o f 1974, the s h e r i f f chose to provide 1 2 .5 persons doing p a tro l
work, one sergeant who administered the program and did some p a tro l
work (although he was not in the r e g u la r p a tro l s c h e d u le), one d e te c t i v e f u l l - t i m e , and 0 .5 o f a person who did follo w -u p work.

??

The

s h e r i f f had a cost breakdown f o r the D elta c o n tra c t (although i t was
not included in the c o n t r a c t ) .

21

22

The s h e r i f f did do a cost breakdown f o r s ix p a tro l persons in 1974
and the t o t a l was $97,147. The average base f o r t h is cost estim ate
was $10,721 compared to the one used in the a u th o r's estim ate o f
$10,142. This would account f o r most o f the d if fe r e n c e between the
a u th o r's cost estim ate o f $94,619 and the s h e r i f f ' s estim ate o f
$97,147.
The s h e r i f f has several oth e r d e te c tiv es on his force and they
spend most o f t h e i r time in D elta Township. They were not included
in cost estim ate because they were not a p a r t o f the c o n tr a c t.

292

Table A -21 .

Eaton County s h e r i f f ' s cost estim ate o f D elta Township com­
pared to value o f resources used.

Sheri f f ' s
Cost
Estimate
Gross S ala rie s

Estimate o f
Value o f
Resources, Used

$199,848

$205,381

Overtime

28,206

1 2 ,0 0 0 1

Vehicle

28,206

4 9 ,9 6 8 2

2,625

4 ,8753

Uniform Cleaning and
Maintenance
TOTAL

i
2

272,224

2 3 0 ,6794

Overtime estim ate was given by u n d e rs h e r iff.
This fig u r e includes f i v e p a tro l vehicles plus the cars used by the
d e te c tiv e and sergeant in 1974. The c o n tra c t only c a l l s f o r four
cars upon which the s h e r i f f ' s estim ate is based.
I f fo u r vehicles
are used and no mileage included f o r the d e t e c t iv e and s e rg ea n t, the
fig u r e is $36,090.

3

I t is estimated t h a t the county spends $150 per man per y e ar f o r
cleaning and $175 per man per y e a r f o r uniform and equipment r e p la c e ­
ment. The s h e r i f f ' s estim ate does not include the cleanin g estim ate .
4
The s h e r i f f ' s t o t a l cost estim ate d i f f e r s from the c o n tra c t p ric e o f
$230,683 because cents were not included when adding up the d i f f e r e n t
l i n e items.

Tiie cost estimates used in basing a c o n tra c t p r ic e are estimates
o f what costs w i l l be.

The estim ate o f value o f resources used is

c lo s e r to what a c t u a lly happened during the y e a r.

The s h e r i f f may not

have been able to a n t ic ip a t e the need o f f i v e p a tro l vehicles in D elta
Township ju s t to f u l f i l l

the c o n tra c t.

This along with r is i n g gas

prices during 1974 accounts f o r the v e h ic le d i f f e r e n c e .

Overtime was

not included in the s h e r i f f ' s estim ate as w ell as the allowance f o r
vacation and s ic k le ave.
The cost o f a s in g le and double p a tro l hour are found in the ta b le
below.

The main d iffe r e n c e between the Eaton Rapids op eration and the

293

D elta operation is t h a t the sergeant is considered a d m in is tra tio n
and is added in to each p a tro l hour in D elta and Eaton Rapids.

The

other d iffe re n c e s are in v e h ic le (D e lta cars d r iv e more miles than
patrol cars do in Eaton Rapids) and in s a la r ie s

(th e mean base is

higher f o r the o f f i c e r s in D elta than they are in Eaton Rapids).

Table A-22.

Comparison o f costs between Eaton Rapids and D elta
Township.

V il la g e o f Eaton Rapids

Salary

D elta Township

Single
Patrol
Hours

Double
Patrol
Hours

Sin gle
Patrol
Hours

Double
Patrol
Hours

$6.52

$13.04

$8.95

$13.48

0.68

0.68

Adm inistration
Vehicle

1.26

1.26

2.01

2.01

Uniform

0.21

0 .4 2

0.20

0.4 0

TOTAL

7.99

14.72

9 .63

16.57

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX 0
COMPLAINT CLASSIFICATION

Complaint Code

ro

UD
4=»

Complaint Name__________________________ Complaint Description

01

Unknown Accident

02

Property des­
t r u c tio n accident

03

04

05

06

Personal in ju r y
accident

Breaking and e n te r ­
ing in progress

Breaking and e n te r ­
ing re p o rt

A possible breaking
and entering in
progress

This is an auto accident o f unknown seriousness. The c a l l e r
us ua lly has driven past an accident and has lim ite d inform ation.
Often times the o f f i c e r tr e a ts th is as a serious accident and
proceeds with lig h t s and s ir e n .

An auto accident w ith no personal in j u r y . This group also con­
tains h i t and run property destru c tio n accident.

An auto accident where there is personal in ju r y .
This group
also includes personal in ju r y h i t and run. O ffic e r s usually
proceed with lig h t s and s ire n .

The c a l l e r is q u ite sure th a t someone is breaking and entering
a home or business. This type of complaint, because i t is
an in progress complaint, receives a high p r i o r i t y and p o lice
usually responde with lig h ts and s ir e n .

This complaint is a breaking and entering which is a f t e r the
f a c t . Usually very l i t t l e can be done other than take a r e ­
po rt; consequently th is complaint w i l l tend to rece iv e a low
p r io r i ty .

Reasonable doubt e x is ts th a t th is is not a breaking and e n te r­
ing in progress. The c a l l e r may re p o rt a car in f r o n t o f a
home where the people have gone on vacation. This is usually
a suspicious s it u a t io n .

Complaint Code

Complaint Name

07

Larceny re p o rt

08

Missing person and
run away

09

Missing c h ild

10

Robbery, armed and
unarmed and a t ­
tempted

Complaint Description
This is anything stolen which did not re q u ire a breaking and
e n te rin g .
These complaints are a f t e r the fa-ct. Any larcenies
in progress found were c la s s if ie d also with breaking and e n te r­
ing in progress.

This complaint u s u a lly e n t a ils taking a r e p o rt.
The d iffe re n c e between c h ild and person is the age 12. The
response is u s u a lly quick f o r th is type o f complaint i f the
c h ild is very young and i f the weather is cold and i f i t is
dark.

This complaint has the t h e i f confronting the v ic tim .
complaint u s u a lly receives a high p r o r i t y .

This

11

Prowler

This is u sually someone up close to a h o u s e --e ith e r the c a l l e r ' s
or someone e l s e 's .

12

Slumper

This is someone who is slumped over the steerin g wheel o f the
car.
I t is usually a drunk sleepin g, but i t could be someone
who is i l l .

13

Suspicious v e h ic le

This is a parked v e hicle in some neighborhood and the c a l l e r
is not use to seeing i t .

14

Suspicious person

This is u s u a lly a person in a car e it h e r parked or driv in g
around in the neighborhood.

15

Assults

This is another complaint which is a f t e r the f a c t . The a s su lt
has taken place, and the v ic tim , or in a case o f a f i g h t , the
one who has l o s t , wants to re p o rt i t .

Complaint Code
16

Complaint Name
Murder, rape, s u ic id e ,
a s s u lt in progress,
shooting, e tc .

Complaint Description

This is a very hetereogenous group containing those complaints
which tend to be few in number but the most threatening to a
person.

17

S h o p liftin g

This is r e a l l y a larcen y, but there were so many, t h a t a special
category was created.

18

Domestic

This category contained any fa m ily f i g h t or any f i g h t which
would be c a lle d in .
This complaint would u s u a lly receive a
f a i r l y high p r i o r i t y because there is o fte n a high p r o a b i l i t y
o f personal in ju r y .

19

Trouble w i t h . . .

This is a very heterogenous group containing c a lls where two
or more c itiz e n s are in c o n f l i c t but the c o n f l i c t is not l i k e l y
to lead to v io le n c e . A c a l l e r might be bothered by a barking
dog of a neighbor; o r, kids are making noise or playing in the
stre e t.

20

Trouble w i t h . . .

Another very heterogenous group containing c a lls where two or
more are in c o n f l i c t but in th is group the c o n f lic tin g p a rtie s
are closer together p h y s ic a lly thus enhancing the chance f o r
v io le n c e. Some examples are a customer w on't pay, or trouble
w ith husband or son, or unwanted guest e t c .

21

Vandalism

This group might also include attempted breaking and entering
or attempted larceny.

22

Alarms

This is responding to any alarm, bank, business or re s id e n t
or car.

23

F ire

When people need an ambulance or there is a f i r e , they often
times c a ll the center and often times a p o lic e 'c a r is dispatched
to the scene.

Complaint Code

Complaint Name

Complaint Description

Public assistance

This is a very heterogenous group contining such items as
v e h ic le in s p e c tio n , discussing a c i v i l m atter w ith a c i t iz e n
or someone found some property and doesn't know what to do
with i t .

25

T r a f f i c complaint

This is any complaint r e la te d to t r a f f i c such as loud cycles,
parking, road hazzard, squealing t i r e s e t c .

26

Abandoned v e h ic le

This is a car which has been abandoned.

27

N o t if ic a t io n

This is the d e liv e r y of a message such as c a ll home someone is
i l l or dying e t c .

28

Animal complaint

Any complaint re la te d to an animal such as shot dog, dog b i t e s ,
lo s t c a t , e tc .

29

O f f i c e r in trouble

Sometimes c itiz e n s w i l l see an o f f i c e r who needs back up or
assistance and w i l l c a ll in the complaint.

30

Follow-up work

Sometimes a c it iz e n w i l l c a ll in with a d d itio n a l information
or request to see the o f f i c e r again regarding a previous com­
p la in t.

297

24

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