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AN EXAMINATION OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF SELECTED UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATORS
AND REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING GOVERNMENTAL ENCROACH-
MENT UPON THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

Michigan State University

Ph.D.

1979

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THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

By

Stephen Carson MacLeod

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Administration and Higher Education

1979

ABSTRACT

AN EXAMINATION OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF SELECTED
UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES
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By

Stephen Carson MacLeod

The purpose of this study was to examine the perceptions of three separate groups of people all of whom are involved with public higher education in Michigan, concerning certain key issues relating to institutional autonomy. The three groups were: the presidents of the four-year, public colleges and universities in Michigan; members of the Legislative Branch of state government; and department heads within the Executive Branch. The perceptions of these three groups were examined in three areas: the extent of local institutional autonomy and its implications for relations between the state government and the institutions; the possible encroachment of government upon that autonomy; and the possible need for statewide coordination and planning of public higher education in Michigan.

The population was made up of: the presidents of the fifteen public colleges and universities in Michigan; legislators on appropriations and higher education oversight committees, and legislative staff people; and, Executive Branch department heads involved with public

higher education. The sample, taken from that population, included: six presidents; six department heads from the Executive Branch; and a total of eight from the Legislative Branch, seven legislators and one department head from the fiscal agencies. The criteria used in selecting the sample included: length of service, geographical location, and familiarity with the issues. In the case of the presidents, the sample was made up of individuals representing a cross-section of the institutional sizes and types in Michigan. Legislators from both parties and both houses were also included.

An interview format was developed with questions based on the three main areas of the study. Semi-structured interviews were then taped with each of the twenty participants.

The researcher and two judges listened to the tapes and recorded answers to each question. The data were collated according to the specific questions asked and the answers given. The judges participated in collating and categorizing the data. The data were then put into table form, and the percentage that each answer represented of the total sample was computed. Obvious trends were noted, and the relationships among the three groups and the responses to the questions were discussed.

The major findings of the study were discussed under headings corresponding to the three main areas of the study. The findings in the area concerned with the constitutional and theoretical bases for autonomy included the following: there was substantial disagreement among the groups over the meaning and extent of institutional autonomy; most respondents did not find justification in the Constitution for distinctions in status among the various types or sizes of institutions

in the state; the constitutional status of the colleges was not perceived to be comparable to that of the Legislative and Executive Branches of government; the value of institutional autonomy was seen in its protection of the institutions from political interference; and, as perceived by the other two responding groups, the presidents were considered to be supportive, the Executive Branch to be unsupportive, and the legislators to be divided or unsupportive of autonomy.

The findings in the area concerned with governmental encroachment included the following: encroachment was interpreted as governmental involvement in institutional programs and courses, the determination of faculty work load standards and student mix, and the setting of tuition and fee rates; the majority of presidents and executives argued that some encroachment had occurred in Michigan, while most legislators disagreed; the majority of presidents maintained that relationships with the Executive Branch were different than relationships with the Legislature; and, the Big Three institutions were perceived as more important by both the legislators and executives.

In the area concerned with statewide coordination the findings included the following: the majority of legislators and presidents argued against any form of coordination; executives forwarded several methods of coordination differentiated by the departments that they represented; within each of the sample groups, the respondents perceived their views to be aligned with the population which they represented; and, as perceived by the other two groups, the presidents were judged to be opposed, the executives to be in favor, and the legislators to be divided, but generally opposed to statewide coordination.

Stephen Carson MacLeod

These major findings and problem areas were discussed yielding implications and conclusions. Implications for future research were also suggested.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My sincere thanks are due to many friends and associates. Each of them has helped to make this study possible, but none of them is to be held in any way responsible for it.

I would like to thank Dr. Walter F. Johnson for his help and encouragement in the development of this project and for his support and constructive criticism during its preparation. Appreciation is also due to the other members of the Guidance Committee: Dr. Louis C. Stamatakos, Dr. John R. Powell, and Dr. Norman T. Bell.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to Dr. Fred R. Whims, Director of the Education Division, Office of the Budget, Department of Management and Budget. Dr. Whims was especially helpful in the development of the original idea of this dissertation and with the selection of the sample. He also wrote a letter of introduction which was sent to prospective participants.

Mr. James D. Fielder, Department of Management and Budget, and Mr. Robert J. Martin, Office of Student Affairs, College of Education, were my two judges. They gave freely of their time and effort in helping me to analyze the data.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Robin, for her patience, understanding, and support during the entire period of preparation.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

The idea of university autonomy--of the sanctity of academic pursuits--is as old as the idea of the university itself. From the very beginning, this idea has been the doctrinal shield protecting the university from the state. More subtly, its quiet but persistent influence has helped to attenuate the relations of the university and the church. It has been the conceptual guardian of academic freedom, the moat around the city of the intellect whose drawbridge will lower only in response to internal signals.¹

Historically, colleges and universities have jealously guarded their right to carry on their educational activities shielded from outside influence and interference. The state of Michigan granted constitutional status to its public, four-year institutions of higher education to protect them from political pressure. A long tradition of state support for public higher education and the protection guaranteed by the state constitution have enabled the Michigan institutions to flourish.

Throughout the nation, universities during the past twenty years have experienced unprecedented growth in students, facilities, faculty, programs and dollars. Dressel and Faricy asserted that in a number of institutions, increases in funds resulting from increased student enrollments were diverted to new and costly programs of

¹James A. Perkins, Higher Education: From Autonomy to Systems (New York: International Council for Educational Development, 1972), p. 8.

uncertain merit and unverified need. In following years, these programs were used to justify demands for even more resources, and rivalry among institutions in pursuit of national or international prominence inflated these demands. Therefore, in these cases, autonomy fathered irresponsibility.² According to Leon Epstein, a suspicion has arisen among state officeholders, but more generally among students and the general public, that the enormous expenditure of state funds for higher education is a result of the internal drives of institutions rather than public needs.³

In addition to institutional excesses, there have been many other pressures placed upon institutions of higher education threatening to restrict their autonomy. Demands to restrict autonomy are especially threatening today because they come from so many sources, take so many different forms, and attack the university at so many vulnerable points. When one realizes that autonomy pertains to several levels within a university as well as to the legislature and other state agencies working with higher education, it becomes evident that there are internal as well as external restrictions on autonomy. Many internal restrictions on the autonomy of faculty members, departments and universities already exist. Traditional professorial privileges such as: indefinite library withdrawal; outside consultation; participation in partisan politics; assignment of self-authored textual materials for courses; and use of telephones and campus facilities

²Paul L. Dressel and William H. Faricy, Return to Responsibility (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1972), p. 1.

³Leon D. Epstein, Governing the University (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1974), p. 46.

have all been limited or restricted to some extent on most campuses because of excessive or inappropriate use, abuse, or high costs. The access of students to parts of the library and the use of other facilities or university equipment similarly have been restricted.⁴

Autonomy within a university is obviously affected by the interdependence of its components. Rather than some fixed allocation of autonomy, a dynamic tension exists between the university and its components. The autonomy of a department may be affected by the availability of resources from the university or outside sources. Funds from outside agencies may increase a department's autonomy or independence from the university, while restrictions placed upon the department by the university on the amount and use of funds may decrease that autonomy. University autonomy is weakened by the institution's inability either to alter its organizational structure or to rise above it in order to improve operations. Difficulties naturally arise because of the nature of a university which is made up of many independent elements--departments, colleges, business office, student affairs--who are wary of any threat to eliminate them or to reduce their budgets.⁵

External restrictions are even more extensive than internal restrictions. Regional and professional accrediting groups constrain universities and their departments by setting standards for programs, faculty, and facilities. Some of the dishonesty frequently discovered in big-time athletics probably results from external pressures. The continued use of an outmoded special-purpose building because of the

⁴Dressel, Return to Responsibility, pp. 20-22.

⁵Ibid., pp. 22-23.

building's original funding agreement is another unwelcome external restriction. The federal government is the source of various restrictions on university autonomy. Federal research grants are often dependent on government agency approval of institutional policy statements. In a different vein, the U.S. Office of Education is currently forcing institutions to review their practices and policies in hiring women and minorities. There are many other examples of external restrictions on university autonomy that could be mentioned, however, they all seem to be variations of the same process: influential groups--activist students or faculty, elected officials, political or patriotic organizations, or government agencies--bringing pressure to bear on a university president or board to change institutional policy or priorities.

The most obvious agents of external restrictions on the autonomy of public colleges and universities are the state legislatures. The extent of legislative restriction on public institutions of higher education differs from state to state and even among institutions within particular states. These differences are often a function of: the historical development of public higher education within a state; the legal relationship between the legislature and the institutions; and the effect of political and financial cycles upon a state's support of public higher education.

Legislatures impose quotas on out-of-state students in most state universities.

Legislatures, by their appropriation powers, present one of the most serious sources of interference; at various times and places they have tried to legislate the value of pi, eliminate a professor by deleting his salary, specify teaching loads, determine

curriculum by requiring specific courses, force elimination of programs or addition of new ones by specific appropriations.⁶

Legislatures may also subtly influence patterns of expenditure by their questions or data requests as well as by informal criticisms and formal recommendations.

Other legislative restrictions on autonomy take a more structured, rationalized form. Program budgeting is one technique that budget offices and legislatures are using to relate dollars to specific programs and to understand a university. Many states have placed their public colleges and universities under the supervision of coordinating or control boards which are often given the power of approval of new programs and the elimination of duplicative old ones. One of the most irritating restrictions on autonomy has been the preaudits of state purchasing offices to insure that funds are available and authorized, that bids are taken, and that the cheapest available item is purchased. Many of these restrictions involve the most minute procedural matters and must be viewed as intrusions into normal institutional operations.

Nationally, there has been a trend of centralization of control under the governor's office within state governments throughout this century. In the interest of better management and in the face of soaring budgets and ballooning state bureaucracies, state officials have attempted to make state agencies more accountable for their actions and expenditures. In such a climate, it is only natural that public higher education was affected by these trends of centralization and accountability.

⁶Ibid., p. 24.

The view that states are encroaching upon the autonomy of universities must be balanced with the need of the state to oversee the expenditures of state dollars. In recent years, pressures have developed which may cause considerable change from the traditional concept of institutional autonomy. Michigan has suffered, as have other states, from the combination of recession and inflation resulting in a significant impact on its public colleges and universities. Because of the economic downturn, Michigan, with a critical dependence upon the automobile industry, had suffered a severe recession during the years 1973-1976. Although the state attempted to cut costs, high inflation continued causing agencies and institutions dependent on the state to seek increases to offset the rise in costs. As a result, the public colleges and universities of Michigan lost ground financially and are still trying to restore the firmer fiscal foundations of pre-recession times.

Adding to the problems of the public colleges and universities has been an ever shrinking percentage share of the state's general budget. In recent years, the state has been forced to appropriate larger increases for the ever-expanding area of human services including: welfare, mental health, corrections, and many other social service agencies. A further complication has been the designation of certain tax funds to specific purposes such as licensing fees being earmarked for highway construction and maintenance. Therefore, fewer tax dollars have been subject to legislative review.

Fewer discretionary dollars, the economic strengency combined with high inflation in recent years, the expanding human services needs, and the expected downturn in the college age population for the 1980s have caused legislators to reevaluate the efficiency of higher

education in Michigan in an effort to reduce state expenditures. The Michigan legislature, while possessing a long record of support for higher education, is being forced by many pressures to look at the public institutions as simply other hungry recipients of state aid.

When universities began to provide service to society, they lost their elitist mystique. Their size and apparent wealth have encouraged many persons and groups to suspect, envy, and manipulate them. University expansionist dynamics have made it especially sensitive to pressures and vulnerable to attack. Today, pressures from inside and outside higher education are causing almost irresistible demands for restrictions on universities, their components, and their members. We must meet these demands by establishing a new balance between autonomy and constraint. Most of the new developments in higher education (for example, unionization, management systems, state or regional coordination, organizational changes) will have complex, multifarious effects, increasing autonomy in one area while constraining it in others. None of these factors will operate in isolation. Perhaps for that reason, new forms of cooperation must guide our actions just as new definitions of fundamentals must guide our thoughts.⁷

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to examine the perceptions of three separate groups of people all of whom are involved with public higher education in Michigan, concerning certain key issues of institutional autonomy. The three groups were: the presidents of the four-year, public colleges and universities in Michigan; members of the Legislative Branch; and department heads within the Executive Branch of Michigan's state government. The perceptions of these three groups were examined in three main areas: the extent of local institutional autonomy and its implications for relations between the state and the institutions; the possible encroachment of state government upon that autonomy; and the possible need for statewide coordination and planning

⁷Ibid., p. 26.

of public higher education in the state of Michigan. Hopefully, the analysis of the respondents' perceptions will prove enlightening to those concerned with public higher education in Michigan, will clarify misconceptions on different sides of the issues, and will lead to substantive discussion where none has existed.

Definition of Terms

Institutional Autonomy - For the purpose of this study, a working definition was developed from the review of the literature. As has been demonstrated already in the previous sections of this chapter, institutional autonomy is a complex concept involving relationships within and outside the institution that affect the ability of its leaders to use its resources without external direction and to define and execute programs consonant with the institutional purpose. To examine autonomy in relation to all the agencies or groups that might affect the institution would have required a project well beyond the resources of this study. Since the state legislature is the most powerful agency having direct influence upon the public colleges and universities, it was in the context of that relationship that institutional or university autonomy was viewed. Although the federal government has been providing more and more funds to colleges and universities and has had an impact on the autonomy of those institutions, the relationship of the public institutions to the federal government was not explored in this study.

Constitutional Corporation - "When a state constitution grants to a state university the authority to govern itself through its board

of regents or similar body, that university is generally classified as a constitutional corporation."⁸

Statewide Coordination - The oversight of various activities and/or budget review of all the public institutions of higher education within a state by a formal structure using statutory or voluntary means of cooperation.

Planning - A process to provide the most valuable information and interpretations on which to make decisions relative to establishment of goals and evaluation of the effectiveness of the goal-oriented activities.⁹ The purpose of planning is to minimize accidental change and to maximize intentional change.¹⁰ The types of planning are short-range (1 - 4 years), intermediate range (5 - 25 years), and extended long-range (26 - 50 years).¹¹

Conditioned Appropriation - An appropriation which has been subjected to a condition(s) by the legislature.

Line-item - A budget term used to describe a specific recipient of an appropriation within a larger category.

⁸William P. Wooden, "Recent Decisions," Michigan Law Review LV (1957), p. 278.

⁹Agnes Martinko, Current Status of Planning Process Particularly in Higher Education in Other States (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Department of Education, 1972), p. 14.

¹⁰Ibid., p. ii.

¹¹Ernest G. Palola et al., Higher Education By Design, The Sociology of Planning, Statewide Planning in Higher Education (Berkeley: The Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1970), p. 565.

Methodology

The method chosen for this study consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews with three groups of respondents: university presidents, state Executive Branch department heads, and state legislators. This method was chosen because of the nature of the subject matter and the types of individuals within the sample groups. As was enunciated in the opening section of this chapter, there has been a lack of communication among various groups within the state regarding the relationship of state government and the public colleges and universities. To open that communication and to explore the perceptions of distinguished leaders in higher education and state government required a more wide-ranging, thoughtful, and less structured approach. In addition, the conceptual nature of the stated purpose of the study demanded the opportunity for the expansion of ideas by the respondents. In short, it seemed that the experience and expertise of the respondents was better utilized by a less restrictive format and that more individualized, in-depth responses were more valid than a series of precise statistical comparisons of group responses to a predetermined conceptual framework.

The disadvantages of the interview method were not overlooked. Steps were taken to insure against interviewer bias and subjectivity where possible. In addition, a panel of judges separately conducted analyses of the content of the interview tapes. A more detailed explanation of the methodology can be found in Chapter III.

Delimitations of the Study

Presidents were chosen from six different institutions representing the full-range of public four-year colleges and universities in Michigan: large research universities with enrollments over 25,000; mid-sized universities over 10,000; and the smaller colleges and developing institutions. The academic sample was limited to these positions because of the implied nature of the offices which seemingly provided the best perspective for observing the relationship of the respective institutions to the state government.

Because of the prohibitive size of the Legislative and Executive Branches and the specific nature of the issues involved, only selected representatives were chosen. Included in the legislative sample were members of committees directly involved with public higher education and personnel in key legislative support agencies. From the Executive Branch, respondents were chosen from departments and agencies that have a direct impact upon the state colleges and universities.

Only four-year public institutions were included in the study because of their constitutional status and its implications for institutional autonomy. Private institutions were excluded because their relationship with state government is not as well defined and their autonomy has not been questioned in the same manner as the public institutions. Community colleges were also excluded because of the complicating factors of local authority and the existence of a statewide community college coordinating agency.

Need and Background

This study is considered important and timely for several reasons. First, the issue of constitutional autonomy must be considered. Michigan has the distinction of being the first state in the nation to grant constitutional status to a state college or university. In 1850, to remove the University of Michigan from the direct control or influence of the state legislature, the university was granted constitutional autonomy. This decision followed nearly a decade of capricious political intervention into the internal affairs of the fledgling university in Ann Arbor, almost spelling its death.

Michigan State University was also granted constitutional status in 1908, Wayne State University in 1959, and the remaining publicly supported four-year colleges and universities of the state in 1963.

Michigan's 1963 Constitution granted autonomy to its state-supported universities and colleges as a way of preserving and encouraging diversity, elasticity, and flexibility of educational programs and of stimulating managerial ingenuity and creative drive.¹²

Many consider autonomy one of the highest principles of education. "Without any autonomy, the university probably could not exist as we understand the term. The university could not perform the essential functions that led to its creation."¹³

Despite the Michigan legislature's endorsement of constitutional autonomy and the importance ascribed to the concept by leading educators, encroachment upon that autonomy was charged in a landmark legal case in

¹²Citizen's Committee on Higher Education, Lansing, Michigan, 1965, pp. 26-27.

¹³Dressel, Return to Responsibility, p. 14.

1971--the Salmon Decision. The three major state universities--Michigan State University, University of Michigan, and Wayne State University--filed a lawsuit against the state in which they charged that the state of Michigan had violated their legally constituted authorities by attaching certain conditions to their annual appropriations, and by making policy decisions which only their respective governing boards were empowered to make. Although the final decision stipulated that the Legislature was within its rights in reviewing capital outlay projects and requiring annual financial reports from the institutions, it clearly determined that in the substantive areas of internal control the universities had exclusive control.¹⁴ Since the Legislature controls appropriations, the universities may have won a Pyrrhic victory. Has the appropriations control of the Legislature undermined the concept of institutional autonomy?

Secondly, this study is important in understanding the perceptions of individuals who are attempting to balance institutional autonomy with public responsibility: a task which requires the greatest skill and tact of university officials and legislators.

Two conditions have produced the concern of recent years with state administrative organization for higher education. One condition has been the absence of any state agency with authority to plan and coordinate the development of multiple institutions of higher education. The other condition was the incessant demand by these institutions for more state financial support.¹⁵

¹⁴M. M. Chambers, Higher Education and State Governments, 1970-1975 (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers & Publishers, Inc., 1974), pp. 129-131.

¹⁵John Millett, in The American University: A Public Administration Perspective, ed. by Clyde J. Wingfield (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970), p. 38.

The critical questions involve the extent of coordination needed to provide accountability and how that may have an impact upon the autonomy guaranteed to these institutions by the Michigan Constitution.

Finally, this study is important in considering the concept of statewide coordination of higher education in Michigan. At least three major studies commissioned in Michigan over the last twenty years have dealt with the problem of the coordination of public higher education within the state. All of these studies have attempted to balance the issues of institutional autonomy and statewide coordination. While paying tribute to the role of institutional autonomy in contributing to the strength of Michigan's public institutions of higher education, all three reports asserted the need for coordination specifically in the areas of planning and budget review.

Higher Education in Michigan, also called the Russell Report was published in 1958 and called for the establishment of a coordinating mechanism to be called the Michigan Board of Higher Education. The Report of the Citizens Committee on Higher Education was presented to Governor George Romney in 1965 and recommended that the State Board of Education be given stronger control over the colleges and universities as had been suggested in the Constitution of 1963. Building for the Future of Postsecondary Education in Michigan was the title of the final report of Governor William Milliken's Commission on Higher Education and was published in 1974. This report echoed the Russell Report by recommending a separate State Board of Postsecondary Education. None of these changes were ever enacted.

In twenty years of commissions and debates during which time the "problem of coordination and planning" has been continually

reemphasized, Michigan's legislature has refused to establish any overt coordination machinery. However, the Salmon Case and recent appropriations have displayed other, more covert attempts to control. A statewide coordinating agency might provide the Legislature what it needs in coordination and planning and serve the institutions as well.

In summary, three reasons were given for the importance and timeliness of this study. First, it will examine the definitions of autonomy subscribed to by different factions within the state and the usefulness of these definitions in the determination of state policy. Secondly, this study will examine the perceptions of university administrators and state legislators concerning the proper level of funding for these institutions. Finally, this study is important in that it will examine the need for statewide coordination of the state's public four-year institutions.

Overview

This study is reported in five chapters. A review of the literature follows this chapter.

The methodology and procedures used to conduct this study are presented in Chapter Three.

Chapter Four contains an analysis of the content of the various interviews and of the general trends discovered within the respondent groups.

Conclusions and implications are presented in the final chapter.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Autonomy inevitably involves responsibility, continual renegotiation, and firm confidence between the university and those who support and benefit from it. The continuing need to interpret and fight for autonomy is the greatest security against its abuse.¹

As Dressel has observed above, the autonomy of a university cannot be considered without regard to its milieu. As agencies of the state, public universities are supported by state funds to serve the people of that state. It is necessary then, within the parameters of a study of possible state encroachment upon university autonomy, to examine the relationship of the state to higher education and the arguments on both sides of the issues involved.

The Review of the Literature is divided into four sections:

1. The relationship of state governments to higher education;
2. The development of statewide coordination and planning of higher education in the United States;
3. Institutional autonomy versus statewide coordination; and,
4. The development of autonomy and coordination in the state of Michigan.

¹Paul L. Dressel and William H. Faricy, Return to Responsibility: Constraints on Autonomy in Higher Education (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1972), p. 14.

The first three sections will provide the general background of issues and trends nationwide. The fourth section will trace the historical development of the relationship between the public, four-year institutions of higher education and the state government in the state of Michigan and establish the particular background for this study.

Relationship of State Governments to Higher Education

The extent of institutional autonomy and state control has been and remains a major area of contention in the relationship of the four-year, public colleges and universities in Michigan and the state government. To conduct a study in this subject area, it is necessary to seek clarification on the relationship and types of interaction that have existed nationally between state governments and public institutions of higher education.

In 1935, Alexander Brody attempted to gain perspective on the scope of institutional autonomy by classifying universities as statutory public corporations. He saw the advantages to this incorporation in the facilitation of efficient and expedient administration while making the institutions accountable for their "private acts" since corporations are subject to law.² He explained that the power of a university as a corporation included: the control of property; the

²Alexander Brody, The American State and Higher Education: The Legal, Political, and Constitutional Relationships (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1935), pp. 113-114.

power to contract and be contracted with; the right to sue and to be sued; and, the power to borrow money and administer funds.³

The consequences of such incorporation were to give a university the appearance of a legal entity separate from the state and even the status of a coordinate branch of state government with the legislative and executive branches when given constitutional independence. However, the fact of legal incorporation did not lessen the sovereignty of the state over the institution since ultimately the university was still an instrumentality of the state. While an institution may have been independent of the machinery of government, Brody maintained that it could not be independent of the will of the state.⁴ Since the Legislature is a primary state organ of public authority, such interpretations present many interesting difficulties on the concise boundary lines between the province of state legislatures and institutional governing boards.

While it may have seemed more acceptable to speak of the relationship of colleges and universities with the state governments in theoretical terms in the 1930s, the response of the 1960s was much more pragmatic and direct. Robinson described it as "the Romantic Age (giving) way to an age of realism."⁵ The following statement by Laurence Iannoccone may explain the atmosphere more completely.

³Ibid., pp. 117-133.

⁴Ibid., pp. 213-214.

⁵Donald W. Robinson, "Good Politics Can Provide Better Schools," Phi Delta Kappan, XLIX (February, 1968), p. 289.

Still the bulk of the educationists cling to the words, if not the reality, the shadow, rather than the substance, and are almost incapable of thinking of politics and education except prescriptively as other than discrete and immaculately untouched worlds. The myth that education is not politics--or stated prescriptively, that either "education would not be involved in politics," or "politics should not be in education"--virtually ruled the minds of many professors of education and the public statements of educators even when the practicing schoolmen and professors, such as Paul Mort, were not quite so naive. Ignoring for the moment the prescriptive "ought" concerning the separation of politics and education, and paying attention to the realities of American life, education and politics are and have been inextricably related.⁶

A similarly practical viewpoint was also expressed by Samuel Gove:

Higher education is in politics, has been, and will continue to be. As faculty members, we want the pressures resulting in limitations on academic freedom to be eliminated; as administrators, we want the pressures resulting in administrative interference to be eliminated; and as students, we want the pressures resulting in tuition increases to be eliminated. Wishing won't make it so, but accepting the political facts of life and fighting pressures with counterpressures may.⁷

Beyond the mere fact of recognizing the relationship of politics and education, Stephen Bailey encouraged educators to become politically active:

Since the quality of our society rests in large measure upon the quality of our public education, a widespread recognition that schoolmen must be not only aware of politics but influential in politics may be the key to our survival as a free civilized nation.⁸

⁶Laurence Iannaccone, Politics in Education (New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc., 1967), p. 6.

⁷Samuel E. Gove, "Pressures on Higher Education: State and Local Governments," Current Issues in Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: Association for Higher Education, 1965), p. 71.

⁸Stephen K. Bailey et al., Schoolmen and Politics (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1962), p. 108.

Despite these "realistic" views of politics and education in the 1960s, as recently as 1970, a study conducted by Heinz Eulau and Harold Quinley for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education reflected a restrained approach by legislators in their involvement in higher education.⁹ In a survey of policy-makers in nine states, Eulau and Quinley found that most of the respondents felt the proper role of the legislatures in dealing with higher education should be limited to budget appropriations and perhaps very general policy guidelines. There was a high degree of respect for academic freedom and the intent to keep politics out of higher education. These legislators questioned their ability to oversee the complexities of higher education, preferring to leave most aspects to the domain of the relevant executive agencies and the universities themselves.¹⁰

However, this study did uncover the prospects of problems for the future. The respondents saw money and competition for the tax dollar as biggest problems and many of them were viewing higher education as simply another area of state activity requiring their attention.¹¹ Other major problems included planning and a seeming dilemma for universities in their dealings with legislatures.

Universities deal with the future--the future of students, the future outcomes of research, the future conditions for university work in service to society. Hence, there will always be a difference in emphasis between what the university seeks to do in

⁹Heinz Eulau and Harold Quinley, State Officials and Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970).

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 52-65.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 67-111.

making a contribution to the future and what people, through¹² their representatives, view as the urgencies of the present.

The actions of the courts during the early 1970s were seen by Robert M. O'Neil to have radically changed the relationship of the states and higher educational institutions. He noted that in reaction to campus radicals, thirty-two states had passed special punitive statutes in 1969-1970 and others had been checking into certain "radical" courses on campuses. In addition, the states of Michigan, New York, Florida, and Washington had attached rigid faculty workload conditions to university appropriations.¹³

O'Neil asserted that these legislative intrusions and invasions of autonomy would continue into the future for several reasons: the scarcity of funds and change in the academic marketplace--downturn of enrollments--gave legislators more leverage than had existed in the highly competitive 1960s; the rapid rise of competing claims within a relatively static state budget increased both the apparent needs and justification for tighter control of university expenditures; the fact that they knew how to intervene and had taken the first step with impunity might embolden legislators to ignore institutional autonomy in the future; and the increased sophistication of legislators and staffs made them more knowledgeable of the internal workings of colleges and universities.¹⁴

¹²Ibid., p. 193.

¹³Robert M. O'Neil, The Courts, Government and Higher Education (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1972), p. 6.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 8-9.

The expanding roles of other agencies such as the National Collegiate Athletic Association, professional and regional accrediting groups, the National Labor Relations Board, the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Trade Commission, and the various government agencies concerned with Affirmative Action were also seen by O'Neil as invasions of autonomy that were likely to continue. The fact that institutions were attempting to protect their own interests through litigation and the use of external agencies to settle controversies, suggested institutional concern over the erosion of their autonomy. O'Neil concluded that legislative intrusion would continue until the courts stopped it; an unlikely event since many states disallowed challenges by state agencies, and in those states that did, very few followed the Michigan experience in the Salmon Decision.¹⁵

M. M. Chambers has observed the relations of state governments and public institutions for many years by reporting the annual appropriations and trends in appropriations for higher education among the fifty states.¹⁶ While noting that traditionally the northeastern states have given the poorest support to their public institutions and the western states have given the best, Chambers has observed a disturbing national trend: in most states, despite the rapid increases in

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 28-31.

¹⁶See M. M. Chambers, Higher Education and State Governments, 1970-75 (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1974); also, Higher Education in the Fifty States (Danville: Interstate, 1974), and The Campus and The People (Danville: Interstate, 1960).

dollar amount support through the 1960s, the percentage of state revenue designated for higher education has been steadily decreasing.¹⁷

Viewing this trend and perhaps the negative publicity that higher education has received in recent years, a number of educators encouraged leaders in higher education to involve themselves in the political process.¹⁸ Lattie Coor has stated that higher education has had low political salience for legislators since citizens have not been supporting it. In addition, he asserted that since higher education funds typically have been general funds, they have not been earmarked for that purpose and, therefore, were prime targets for economy measures. Coor advocated developing a strategy for influencing higher education policies within states and attacking on a dual front. In direct negotiations, he stated that institutions have to make a case for broader issues of higher education and not get lost in the quagmire of cost-per-credit-hour computations. Indirectly, he felt that they also must establish a broader constituent base within the state to increase their influence.¹⁹

William E. Davis, writing in the same volume, presented guidelines for presidents and other administrators in working with state legislators. Calling on his own experience as a college president, he appealed to the president to lead the legislative effort and to become

¹⁷Chambers, Higher Education and State Governments, 1970-75.

¹⁸Roger W. Heyns, ed., Leadership for Education: The Campus View (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1977).

¹⁹Lattie F. Coor, "Making the Case for Higher Education," in Ibid.

knowledgeable about the state and the legislators and the way in which decisions are made in the state. His approach encouraged developing personal relationships with legislators and essentially engaging in lobbying tactics.²⁰

Whether these wholehearted jumps into state politics by educators have been a reaction to state interference or simply a realization of the intense competition for the same limited tax dollars, is not readily discernible. However, the "hands-off" policy professed by legislators in earlier days and the superior attitudes of educators toward legislators, have apparently given way to more open interaction. Our next section of the Literature Review concerns the more formalized interaction of legislatures with institutions of higher education.

Development of Statewide Coordination and Planning of Higher Education in the United States

Several reasons are stated in the literature to account for the ongoing interest in the development of statewide coordination and planning of higher education by public agencies. 'Lyman Glenny has stated that beyond the immediate concerns for economy and efficiency there are essentially two reasons, the increasing complexity of higher education and the growth of state government.²¹ In reference to the early development of higher education in this country, John Corson observed that institutions were subjected to the influence of many

²⁰William E. Davis, "How to Work with State Legislatures," in Ibid.

²¹Lyman A. Glenny, Autonomy of Public Colleges: The Challenges of Coordination (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), pp. 12-22.

external groups (church, alumni, donors, agricultural and business groups, government and others) in matters of program and policies during their first century and a half of existence.²² The present situation of external pressure upon colleges and universities, Corson felt was the result of the centrality of the institution of higher education to society brought about by the increase in the volume of new knowledge.²³ Dwight Waldo, in the same vein, maintained that knowledge is quickly becoming the base of power--supplanting land and capital--making the university a power center, and more and more, the "primary institution" of contemporary society.²⁴

Malcolm Moos and Francis Rourke noted that the movement toward coordination and unification in higher education was not an entirely recent phenomenon. They had traced the origin of the idea to New York's creation of a State Board of Regents in 1784 and the charter of the University of Georgia in 1785, both containing the seeds of centralized systems not to be realized until modern times. Their study indicated that the actual trend of state centralization of higher education began in South Dakota in 1896 with the establishment of a single board of control over the public colleges and universities.²⁵ Centralized

²²John J. Corson, The Governance of Colleges and Universities (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), p. 22.

²³Ibid., pp. 22-23.

²⁴Dwight Waldo, "The University in Relation to the Governmental-Political," in The American University: A Public Administration Perspective, edited by Clyde J. Wingfield (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970).

²⁵Malcolm Moos and Francis Rourke, The Campus and the State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), pp. 203-226.

control or supervision of public higher education has increased from a total of twelve states in 1932, according to Moos and Rourke,²⁶ to include all fifty states now having a board or commission which is by constitution, statute or executive order responsible in some degree for higher education in that state.²⁷

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education pointed out in its report, The Capitol and the Campus, that the states, among all governmental units, had taken the primary responsibility for the development of education throughout the history of the United States.²⁸ The report acknowledged the effectiveness of that sponsorship by stating:

They (the states) have done well with it. Their guardianship has led to substantial diversity, to adaptation to regional needs, and to competitive efforts at improvement.²⁹

While encouraging limits on governmental invasion of autonomy, the report made it clear that public accountability was of equal concern.

Under no circumstances can institutional independence be considered absolute. Not even its strongest advocates can seriously question the legitimacy of requiring some degree of public accountability from educational institutions receiving public support. Indeed, it can be argued that all educational institutions, whether or not they receive direct public support, incur some measure of public responsibility The technique used to achieve public accountability of educational institutions must be balanced against the need of educational institutions for that degree of

²⁶Ibid., p. 205.

²⁷Richard M. Millard, State Boards of Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1976), p. 4.

²⁸The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, The Capitol and the Campus (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 1.

²⁹Ibid.

institutional independence which is essential for their continued vitality.³⁰

The Commission's report gave credence to the previously mentioned reasons for a trend toward coordination, by outlining the extent of the pressure caused by the rapid growth of higher education. Since 1900, the Commission noted, the number of colleges and universities has increased more than 100 percent, institutional income has risen more than 300 times, and state expenditures in the support of higher education have risen from slightly over \$.02 billion to exceed \$2.1 billion. In addition, they observed that enrollment has more than doubled in every decade of this century, and federal aid to institutions, programs and students, both directly and through state agencies, has grown extensively during the past three decades.³¹

Thus the magnitude of current governmental support to public higher education and the complexity of the institutions and their operating missions and needs have given rise to state level concerns for accountability, equality of opportunity and access.³²

The states have responded to public pressure for closer supervision of colleges and universities through the establishment of various mechanisms for exercising state authority. Robert O. Berdahl, in his book Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, used the following typology for the classification of state coordinating mechanisms:

³⁰Ibid., p. 104.

³¹Ibid., p. 23.

³²Thomas E. Johnston, Role of the State in Planning and Coordination of Autonomous Institutions of Higher Education (Lansing: Michigan Department of Education, 1977), p. 6.

- I. States which have neither a single coordinating agency created by statute nor a voluntary association performing a significant statewide coordinating function.
- II. States in which voluntary statewide coordination is performed by the institutions themselves operating with some degree of formality.
- III. States which have a statewide coordinating board created by statute but not superseding institutional or segmental governing boards. This category is divided into the following subtypes:
 - A. A board composed in the majority of institutional representatives and having essentially advisory powers.
 - B. A board composed entirely or in the majority of public members and having essentially advisory powers.
 - C. A board composed entirely or in the majority of public members and having regulatory powers in certain areas without, however, having governing responsibility for the institutions under its jurisdiction.
- IV. States which have a single governing board, whether functioning as the governing body for the only public senior institution in the state or as a consolidated governing board for multiple institutions, with no local or segmental bodies.³³

Differences among such bodies seem to be the result of various approaches and situations within the different states. Millard noted that, with few exceptions, state boards for coordination and planning of higher education were comparatively new agencies while the individual college and university boards originated with the founding of the institutions.³⁴ State level interest in public education through the nineteenth and up to the twentieth century had been concerned primarily with the standards of education at the primary and secondary levels, with much of the responsibility being taken by local school districts.

³³Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1971), pp. 18-23.

³⁴Millard, State Boards of Higher Education, p. 5.

Early efforts in public higher education were directed at the development of normal schools or colleges to train and prepare teachers for the elementary and secondary schools.³⁵

The response of state governments to higher education had been different than their response to elementary and secondary education because up to the middle of the present century, private institutions had provided the majority of postsecondary instruction and services in the United States.³⁶ The traditional college-age population prior to 1900 was small compared to the same group of today's population and only four percent of the college-age population were attending college prior to 1900.³⁷ Another factor which affected the nature of state involvement in public higher education was that higher education had never been compulsory as had elementary and, to a limited extent, secondary education.³⁸

Questions and concerns which arose during the 1950s regarding equality of educational opportunity and access to public higher education stimulated state and federal government involvement to address the educational needs and interests of all citizens beyond high school.³⁹

The development of involvement in higher education among the various states, including Michigan, was affected by several movements

³⁵Johnston, Role of the State in Planning and Coordination, p. 8.

³⁶Millard, State Boards of Higher Education, p. 6.

³⁷Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, p. 28.

³⁸Millard, State Boards of Higher Education.

³⁹Johnston, Role of the State in Planning and Coordination, p. 9.

and factors. Most sources in the literature agree that the first major state role in public higher education was the support and development of normal schools for teacher preparation. Differing substantially from the traditional, classics-oriented colleges of the time in curriculum, student bodies, and instructional objectives, these schools expanded the educational opportunity for higher learning to a broader spectrum of society than had been reached previously. The establishment of the normal schools provided the foundation from which state colleges and university systems would be erected as they became state teacher colleges, then state colleges, and finally regional universities.⁴⁰

The next significant governmental action in public higher education was taken by Congress in 1862 when it passed the Morrill Land Grant Act for the establishment of colleges which taught the mechanical and agricultural arts as well as the liberal arts. As did the Normal School Movement, the Morrill Act increased access to higher education for citizens as a direct result of federal and state government initiative.⁴¹

The enactment of the "G.I. Bill" by Congress following World War II contributed to the growth of public institutions and to the social pressures exerted upon state governments to make higher education available to more citizens.⁴² As in Michigan, the other states found

⁴⁰Millard, State Boards of Higher Education, p. 6.

⁴¹Moos and Rourke, The Campus and the State, p. 183.

⁴²Johnston, Role of the State in Planning and Coordination, p. 10.

that more of their citizens were attending institutions of higher education during the late 1940s and 1950s and into the 1960s, than ever before in their history.

Before 1900, three states had established consolidated governing boards (Berdahl's Type IV) for the control and supervision of public institutions of higher education (Montana, 1889; Nevada, 1846; South Dakota, 1897), and by 1970 that number had increased to nineteen with five such boards being created during the 1960s (Maine, 1968; New Hampshire, 1963; Rhode Island, 1969; Utah, 1969; West Virginia, 1969).⁴³ The majority of states which established this type of consolidated governing body were, according to Berdahl, states with limited financial resources and small numbers of institutions, public and private, and whose intent was:

to control such premature expansion and proliferation by creating one single consolidated board for higher education and, at the same time, abolishing any existing governing boards where necessary. Some of these consolidated boards particularly in Georgia (1931), Iowa (1909) and Oregon (1929)--moved aggressively to reduce program duplication; in Georgia, the agency founded in the depression year of 1931 eliminated 10 institutions.⁴⁴

Halstead noted that the most "preferred agency" of coordination adopted by states after World War II was the statewide coordinating board. Under the direction of a coordinating board, statewide planning and coordination were provided without discontinuing the operations of the elected or appointed institutional governing boards.⁴⁵

⁴³Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, pp. 18-23.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 27.

⁴⁵Kent D. Halstead, Statewide Planning in Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 8.

This form of "superboard" state agency was popular because it was easily established by statute and was relatively acceptable to the colleges and universities since they were able to maintain local initiative and autonomy for their own governing boards.⁴⁶ While only two states had established statewide coordinating boards prior to 1950 (Kentucky, 1934; Oklahoma, 1941), twenty-five states created such agencies in the 1950s and 1960s.⁴⁷

Only two states--Nebraska and Delaware--maintain voluntary coordinating bodies or associations (Berdahl's Subtype III A or B, or Type II), reduced from the original seven in the 1950s, because of structural problems and lack of member cooperation.⁴⁸ Developed and supported primarily by public college and university presidents in response to perceived or actual public pressure, voluntary coordinating associations were ineffective because of total reliance upon institutional cooperation; insufficient arrangements, apparently, to resolve conflicts or impose solutions.⁴⁹ Most authors consulted seemed to concur that the major outcome of voluntary coordinating associations has been the preservation of the status quo.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Johnston, Role of the State in Planning and Coordination, p.13.

⁴⁸ Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, pp. 18-23, and Halstead, Statewide Planning in Higher Education, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Millard, State Boards of Higher Education, p. 10, and Halstead, Statewide Planning in Higher Education, p. 9.

⁵⁰ John W. Minter, ed., Campus and Capitol (Boulder: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1966), p. 38; also, Millard,

The state governments responded favorably to higher education to meet the demands of the 1950s and 1960s for additional facilities, programs and institutions. More recently, however, state officials have been more concerned with the need for a balance among public demands for accountability, institutional requests for support, and other social priorities. Millard observed a trend toward stronger mechanisms of accountability:

. . . in the direction of increasing the role or power of such boards (coordinating and consolidated governing agencies) and in some cases substituting for a coordinating structure a consolidated governing board structure.⁵¹

The literature dealing with statewide coordination and planning suggests the existence of a trend toward more centralized control of higher education and the encouragement of statutory powers rather than advisory power only. In three states (Maine, Utah, and West Virginia) the advisory role of the coordinating boards has been changed to the regulatory authority of governing boards, and, of the other states with governing boards, none of the powers or the responsibilities of the agencies have been reduced.⁵²

In general, the authors reviewed in this section have asserted that within the United States, the state governments have given strong financial and political support to the public institutions of higher education. That support has varied through the years and from state

State Boards of Higher Education, p. 10, and Halstead, Statewide Planning in Higher Education.

⁵¹ Millard, State Boards of Higher Education, p. 12.

⁵² Johnston, Role of the State in Planning and Coordination, p. 14.

to state, but, it has been relatively consistent throughout this century especially in times of particular need--since World War II--and has produced a uniquely American system, unrivaled by any nation in the number and diversity of institutions. This nation can truly "take justifiable pride in a system which is characterized by diversification, decentralization, local autonomy, and free competition."⁵³

However, concomitant with the states' support of higher education has been the concern for the coordination and planning of that enterprise to best serve the public interest. Mechanisms to achieve that coordination have met with varying degrees of success in correlating the seemingly opposite concerns for the independence of the institutions on the one hand, and public accountability on the other. It is not a simple issue and the wide variety of mechanisms developed, have manifested its complexity. Most authorities seem to agree that the trend in recent years, with coordinating agencies being given stronger regulatory powers because of the states' desire for accountability, mirrors the larger and parallel movement toward more centralization within state governments. The next section of the Literature Review includes research on both sides of the argument of local autonomy versus statewide coordination.

Institutional Autonomy and Statewide Coordination

Much of the literature in this area hovers between two seemingly incongruous viewpoints: the one of protecting institutional autonomy; and the other, the need for the states to coordinate the activities of

⁵³ Logan Wilson, ed., Emerging Patterns in Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1966), p. 2.

their public colleges and universities. M. M. Chambers has probably written more books on this issue than any other individual.⁵⁴ From the beginning of his writing, he has been a strong advocate for the protection of the autonomy of individual institutions and their own voluntary coordination rather than statutory coordination by an external agency or agencies.

Most of Chambers' writings were variations on the same theme: the objection to any formal approach to coordination because of its stultifying effect on institutional initiative and innovation.

. . . higher education is an unique public function that especially requires humane and permissive management with latitude for the exercise of judgement and initiative, the diametric opposite of the impersonal, regimented, routinized devotion to "procedures" which is so difficult to expunge from large organizations.⁵⁵

Several of Chambers' books were written in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the American higher educational community was preparing for a period of unparalleled expansion. It was also a period of optimism in the outlook of American society buttressed by liberal ideals and faith in education. Chambers championed egalitarianism in higher education by urging the states to provide all capable young

⁵⁴M. M. Chambers, The Campus and the People (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1960); Voluntary Statewide Coordination in Public Higher Education (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1961); Chance and Choice in Higher Education (Danville: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1962); Freedom and Repression in Higher Education (Bloomington, Indiana: Bloomcraft Press, 1965); and Keep Higher Education Moving (Danville: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1976).

⁵⁵M. M. Chambers, Voluntary Statewide Coordination in Public Higher Education (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1961), p. 63.

people with the opportunity to attend public institutions at prices they could afford.⁵⁶

While Chambers maintained that the rising costs of education were the worst menace to higher education in the United States, he felt that the possibility that the quality of instruction might be allowed to fall to a "dead-level of mediocrity" was the next worse. He felt that the best way of obviating those dangers was to preserve for each institution "a reasonable sphere of freedom" and, therefore, raise its morale.⁵⁷

Chambers' views were buttressed by a study done by the Committee on Government and Higher Education in 1957 - 1959 under the auspices of the Fund for the Advancement for Education. The report of the Committee, entitled The Efficiency of Freedom, traced the background of the conflicting issues of autonomy and statewide coordination, tried to explicate the problem areas, and offered avenues of reform to preserve tradition in higher education.⁵⁸

The Efficiency of Freedom showed the development of autonomy as a local reluctance to give the federal government additional powers and to prevent political patronage. The necessity for protection from the political interference of the state was explained as the creative nature of higher education, its multiplicity and complexity of interests,

⁵⁶M. M. Chambers, Chance and Choice in Higher Education (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1962), p. 95.

⁵⁷M. M. Chambers, Voluntary Statewide Coordination in Public Higher Education, p. 65.

⁵⁸Committee on Government and Higher Education, The Efficiency of Freedom (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959).

unmatched by any other activity of the state. The Committee maintained that the protection of institutional autonomy was as vital as the preservation of freedom for teaching and research.⁵⁹

Recognizing the need for the state to exercise budgetary and fiscal coordination, the Committee maintained the compatibility of the effective operation of democratic government with the essential freedom of institutions of higher education. To achieve that compatibility, it urged that each side communicate with the other more openly and that beyond budgetary concerns, coordination should be voluntary and not coercive. Finally, it warned the institutions that if they did not coordinate themselves, the states would feel compelled to do the job.⁶⁰

In 1962, T. R. McConnell emphasized the primacy of the university and claimed that the diversity of institutions within the United States had been brought about by the tradition of decentralized responsibility for higher education in our nation. However, while echoing Chambers' objections to the centralized control that coordination seemed to imply, McConnell sounded a more moderate approach and maintained that some form of coordination was inescapable. He cited as the reasons: swelling enrollments, mounting budgets, the competition for state funds among public services, and the proliferation of new institutions.⁶¹

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 2-6.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 23-44.

⁶¹T. R. McConnell, A General Pattern for American Public Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 138-160.

McConnell decried the negative approach to coordination and suggested a more constructive role for coordination, encouraging collaborative and comprehensive planning.⁶² Similarly, Lyman Glenny in 1959 had faulted the concentration on efficiency and economy as reasons for coordination, and had emphasized the more positive goal of improving higher education.⁶³ Encouraging coordination, Glenny did not espouse any particular form as best (although obviously preferring a more formal approach) and suggested that individual state situations should dictate the most appropriate type.⁶⁴

In 1964, James B. Conant took a totally opposite viewpoint to that of Chambers and deplored the general lack of master planning and coordination among the states.⁶⁵ Blaming the situation on the selfish interests of, and the uncontrolled competition among the colleges and universities, Conant claimed that some state legislators were reacting negatively and viewing higher education as just another "pork-barrel."⁶⁶

The following year, Chambers answered Conant in his book, Freedom and Repression in Higher Education by maintaining that the strength of the United States' colleges and universities had been in their tradition of independence, self-reliance, adventuresomeness, and

⁶²Ibid., p. 169.

⁶³Lyman A. Glenny, Autonomy of Public Colleges, pp. 17-20.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 263-268.

⁶⁵James B. Conant, Shaping Educational Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1964).

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 56.

competitiveness along with their willingness to cooperate in the public interest and the enlightened policy of legislatures and governments in supporting them.⁶⁷ Samuel Gove and Barbara Solomon summarized the controversy:

Each man has taken the stories that best fit his point of view and woven them into a presentation that supports his preference in coordinating arrangements. No doubt what the authors say about individual decisions is probably correct but it is only a section of the total picture and therefore easily distorted. Abuses of freedom by universities exist, but taken out of context they do not present a study of the relationships between public higher education and state government.⁶⁸

Logan Wilson edited an interesting collection of articles on this general subject from papers originally prepared for the American Council on Education's annual meeting of 1964.⁶⁹ Providing a well-balanced presentation, Wilson attempted to display the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the uncoordinated development of higher education in the United States.

Although we like to think of educational changes as reflecting an orderly growth, the actual process, we must acknowledge, has often been quite different. For all the instances where interinstitutional competition has strengthened the rival involved, there are at least as many where wasteful duplication and proliferation of mediocrity have ensued.⁷⁰

⁶⁷M. M. Chambers, Freedom and Repression in Higher Education (Bloomington, Indiana: Bloomcraft Press, 1965), p. 2.

⁶⁸Samuel K. Gove and Barbara Solomon, "The Politics of Higher Education: A Bibliographic Essay," The Journal of Higher Education (The Ohio State University Press, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, April, 1968), p. 186.

⁶⁹Logan Wilson, ed., Emerging Patterns in Higher Education, p. 2.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 4.

Countering the argument against overcentralization in state government, Wilson maintained that decentralization was not necessarily protection against outside influence. He referred to the many professional and accrediting associations, which have created further problems in themselves so that, paradoxically, American higher education has been both underorganized and overorganized.⁷¹

Writing in the same volume, James Perkins applied a theoretical model to higher education in attempting to deal with the growth of complexity and specialization within the institutions. Referring to the hierarchy of structures within higher education--department, college, university, state coordinating body, regional compact, national and international bodies--he asserted that the autonomy of the university was just one of several competing autonomies requiring independence and integration at the same time.⁷²

In another article in the same volume, Wilson emphasized the need for balance in the whole issue.

Now, however, it is generally recognized that an appropriate balance must be struck between the autonomy with which they (colleges and universities) govern themselves and the responsibility they have to the society in which they exist. This concept along with the new belief that higher learning constitutes a primary national resource, makes it mandatory that we seek clear definitions of the kind and degree of autonomy our institutions need for effective operation and the kind and extent of accountability they owe to society.⁷³

⁷¹Logan Wilson, Emerging Patterns in Higher Education, pp. 1-5.

⁷²James Perkins, "New Conditions of Autonomy, in Emerging Patterns in Higher Education, ed. Logan Wilson, pp. 8-17.

⁷³Logan Wilson, "Myths and Realities of Institutional Independence," in Emerging Patterns in Higher Education, p. 21.

With the dawning of the 1970s came the heights of campus turmoil and the realization that the belief in the unlimited growth potential espoused in the 1960s had been unrealistic. Clyde J. Wingfield edited a collection of essays that attempted to bring a public administration perspective to the issues. Decrying the lack of a general theory, Wingfield called for the discipline of public administration to examine the direction and politics of higher education.⁷⁴

Dwight Waldo, writing in the same book, asserted that the university was, in form or fact, a governmental institution. He based this assertion on the "knowledge-information explosion" that he felt had been occurring, and the fact that knowledge had quickly become the base of power, supplanting land and capital. Since the university was becoming increasingly the place where knowledge was produced, stored and transmitted, it was a power center and, therefore, the "primary institution of contemporary society."⁷⁵

Also writing in this same volume was John Millett, the then Director of Ohio's central coordinating agency. In his article, he attempted to apply the perspective of a political scientist to the state administration of higher education.

Two conditions have produced the concern of recent years with state administrative organization for higher education. One condition has been the absence of any state agency with authority to plan and coordinate the development of multiple institutions

⁷⁴Clyde J. Wingfield, ed., The American University: A Public Administration Perspective (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970).

⁷⁵Dwight Waldo, "The University in Relation to the Governmental-Political," in The American University: A Public Administration Perspective, ed. by Clyde J. Wingfield, pp. 18-36.

of higher education. The other condition was the incessant demand by these institutions for more state financial support.⁷⁶

In 1972, James A. Perkins edited Higher Education: From Autonomy to Systems, in which he attempted to explain the factors behind the drive for coordination as: the growth in higher education and the knowledge explosion; specialization of institutions leading to interdependence; the towering costs of academic enterprises; a growing reliance on public funds leading to demands for accountability; and, the need for planning.⁷⁷ This drive had resulted, also, from the degree of accomplishment that higher education had achieved in fulfilling the requirements that society had imposed on it. Through their autonomy, institutions have been able to protect academic freedom but the requirements of innovation and planning have not necessarily been met. Perkins asserted that private foundations had become the most vigorous agents for change and the woeful lack of planning required that the universities modify their instincts for autonomy and take their places as full partners in the new planning agencies.⁷⁸

Dressel and Faricy addressed the concern of the public and the state governments that has led to the recent drive toward coordination:

⁷⁶John Millett, "State Administration of Higher Education (The Perspectives of Political Science)," in The American University: A Public Administration Perspective, ed. by Clyde J. Wingfield, p. 38.

⁷⁷James A. Perkins, ed., Higher Education: From Autonomy to Systems (New York: International Council for Educational Development, 1972).

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 1-11.

Universities have lost the confidence of the public because they have ignored their social responsibilities and have demonstrated their inability to govern themselves or to operate efficiently.⁷⁹

They blamed the tradition of organizing universities by department for much of the economic inefficiency which had undermined public confidence in higher education. Although defending autonomy as essential to the continual existence of the university as we know it, they cautioned that the actions of institutions might necessitate some changes.

Problems of autonomy have arisen partly because universities and their faculties have assumed that unplanned growth and competition with other universities will produce better quality, diversity,⁸⁰ and satisfaction of social needs than will development by plan.

Much research in higher education has been done in recent years at the University of California at Berkeley in the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education under the direction of Lyman Glenny. The researchers at the center have done extensive work in the area of coordination and have produced several books.

In 1971 Glenny and three of his associates wrote guidelines for the practice of coordination in the 1970s.⁸¹ Departing from Glenny's earlier reticence to favor a particular form of coordination, the authors affirmed strong support for coordinating boards supervising the governing boards of institutions rather than the "single governing board" concept. Moreover, they strongly favored regulatory powers for

⁷⁹Dressel and Faricy, Return to Responsibility, p. 11.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 14.

⁸¹Lyman A. Glenny et al., Coordinating Higher Education for the 70's: Multicampus and Statewide Guidelines for Practice (University of California, Berkeley: The Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1971).

the coordinating board to reinforce the intent of the state to plan and create a comprehensive system. In a different approach, they called attention to the growing power of the executive branch in most states and characterized the coordinating board as a balanced method of, on the one hand, protecting the institution from being ingested into that branch and, on the other hand, of protecting the public interest in higher education.⁸²

This volume was part of a larger nine volume series on state budgeting for higher education under the principal direction of Glenny. In these books, the investigators concentrated on the creation and use of budgetary formulas, the development and use of information systems and analytic technique, and the dilemmas involved in the design of budget processes.⁸³

The extensive work of Glenny and his associates in the development of guidelines and systems for the budgeting process has paralleled the general movement among the 50 states, in recent years, toward some sort of coordination of higher education. The underlying implication in Glenny's work has been that coordination is necessary. However, many authorities are still concerned that coordination will have a negative impact on the autonomy of institutions and the quality of higher education.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Lyman A. Glenny, State Budgeting for Higher Education: Inter-agency Conflict and Consensus (University of California, Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1976), and Ralph A. Purves and Lyman A. Glenny, State Budgeting for Higher Education: Information Systems and Technical Analyses (University of California, Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1976).

Writing in 1976, M. M. Chambers was still advocating voluntary teamwork among institutions. Admitting the need for cooperation, he advised the state institutions to join with private institutions in area consortia to share resources. Yielding moderately in his distrust of coordinating boards, he still expressed preference for advisory responsibilities rather than providing them with coercive powers.⁸⁴

In an ERIC/Higher Education Research Report in 1976, Burton Clark and Ted I. K. Youn supported the diversity of control and authority that have made higher education in the United States what it is and, they argued, would provide its strength for the future.⁸⁵ They identified the key characteristics of the American mode of academic organization as: dispersed control, institutional diversity, competition and a major role given to trusteeship and institutional administrative authority. The consequences of this mode of organization were seen both negatively and positively. Results on the negative side were the persistence of institutional inequalities and the formation of corporate identities at the level of the college and university. However, on the positive side, the authors felt that the American authority structure had proven conducive to scientific advance and to the maintenance of system flexibility and innovation.⁸⁶

⁸⁴M. M. Chambers, Keep Higher Education Moving.

⁸⁵Burton R. Clark and Ted I. K. Youn, Academic Power in the United States: Comparative, Historic and Structural Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: ERIC/Higher Education Research Report, No. 3, 1976).

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 41-43.

In a commentary of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching published in 1976, a comparison was made between the current financial stringency and that of the 1930s.⁸⁷ The approach of the 1930s to cope with the economic situation was characterized by the authors as a tendency toward unification and singleness of control by the state over public higher education: a tendency they felt was being repeated in the 1970s in a greatly augmented fashion. The writers also pointed out that prior to the 1930s, some institutions had increased their offerings without regard to the possibility that at some time they might not be able to maintain so expanded a service: a situation similar to current talk of "surpluses" and "outmoded programs." Providing historical perspective to the 1930s theme of "unified control," the report was highly critical of the modern tendency toward centralization.⁸⁸

Arguing that centralization of authority had reduced the influence of constituencies at the institutional level and had placed more power in the hands of those furthest removed and "knowing the least," the Carnegie Report asserted that no coordinating mechanism had proven itself superior.

With all the experimentation of the 50 states, it cannot yet be shown that any one approach is superior to any other approach in its "impacts." There are seemingly no known quantifiable consequences for actual operating results that can be associated with one or another approach to centralization of authority--not on tuition policy, not on state funds for research, not on

⁸⁷ A Commentary of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, *The States and Higher Education: A Proud Past and a Vital Future* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishing Co., 1976).

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. i-vii.

proportionate dependence on private institutions, not on composition of the public sector, not on any other thus far statistically tested results.⁸⁹

Warning that independence was eroding at the fastest rate in history, the report favored advisory mechanisms only, to facilitate planning and to encourage cooperation. The authors of this report also maintained that the best restraints on public colleges and universities were competition from private and other public institutions, careful analysis and good information flow on the state budget, and effective long-range planning.⁹⁰

The argument continues among academicians and public administrators concerning the foundations of higher education's strength and its hope for the future. It cannot be denied that in the past institutions of higher education have been given autonomy--whether constitutional, statutory, or implied--to protect them from too much political interference. The real issue today, may concern how much is "too much."

Chambers and others have claimed that the strength of higher education in the United States has been in the autonomy and independence of its institutions which have provided a strong climate of competition and striving for excellence. Others, including Logan Wilson, have claimed that the "climate for competition" has been overdrawn, and have called attention to the negative results of that competition and the often needless, and costly, duplication of programs. In the 1950s and 1960s, before the explosive growth of institutions and the dramatic

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 87.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 11-17.

economic downturns of the 1970s, the encouragement toward coordination was for voluntary cooperation rather than the distasteful specter of political intervention. However, voluntary cooperation apparently did not curb institutional competition, and the economic stringency of and the centralization movement within state governments changed the trend significantly toward regulatory rather than advisory coordination. The question of the 1970s concerns the extent of control implicit in coordination and whether any control is compatible with institutional autonomy or a modification of autonomy.

The final section of this chapter will trace the relationship of public higher education and the state government in Michigan. Having noted the development of coordination and planning nationally, and the arguments for and against the issues of autonomy and coordination, it is necessary to examine the development of the relationships in Michigan: why they developed in the way that they did, and the present situation. It is only in understanding the developments within Michigan and where the issues now stand, that the perceptions of those involved can be examined honestly and clearly.

The Development of Autonomy and Coordination in the State of Michigan

Unlike their European forerunners, American colleges, from their beginning, have been more susceptible to popular demand. Even the private colleges in the original thirteen colonies were developed to fulfill the religious and educational needs of the people. The Yale Plan--whereby a mixture of laymen, government officials, and clergy comprised a single governing board--became generally accepted by

private and public institutions alike as the governance norm.⁹¹ Likewise, when the Legislature of the territory of Michigan updated the original concept of the Catholepistemiad in 1821, they decreed that the new University of Michigan should be governed by a single elected group called the Board of Regents.⁹²

After the birthpangs of statehood in 1837 and several political hassles with the Legislature and governors, the University of Michigan finally opened its doors in 1841. In its first years of existence, the school floundered without direction and was buffeted by the wrangling of government officials and a severe lack of funding. During the constitutional revision of 1850, many delegates complained that the Board of Regents had become "politics-ridden" and they sought for ways to strengthen the University.⁹³

Under the terms of the Constitution of 1850, the University of Michigan was elevated to the status of a constitutional corporation. Its governing board, the Board of Regents, was given responsibility for "the general supervision of the University, and the direction and control of all expenditures from the University interest fund."⁹⁴ This decision to be the first state to grant constitutional status to a state university seems to have been a deliberate attempt to remove the

⁹¹ Willis F. Dunbar, The Michigan Record in Higher Education (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963), p. 11.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 25-40.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 71.

⁹⁴ Michigan, Constitution (1850), Article XIII, Sections 7 and 8.

university from the arena of partisan politics and to place it on a more stable and permanent foundation.⁹⁵

Under the guidance of presidents like Henry Tappan and James Angell and after significant changes in funding and attitude from the Legislature, the University of Michigan has grown to become one of the foremost institutions of higher education in the nation. That is not to say the governmental involvement in University affairs totally abated, but the changes in constitutional status and leadership did allow the institution the necessary growing space.

In 1855, the Michigan Agricultural College was founded in East Lansing for the training of farmers and the furtherance of scientific agriculture. The history of this school through the latter half of the Nineteenth Century was replete with problems of governmental interference similar to the problems experienced by the University of Michigan in its early years.⁹⁶

Eventually placed under the control of the State Board of Agriculture in 1861 and supported by the sale of state and federal land, the Michigan Agricultural College was not in any educational way the rival of the University of Michigan that it is today. Accepting students with only an eighth grade education, using a very specified and limited curriculum, and operating on a totally different academic calendar, Michigan Agricultural College was a single purpose institution

⁹⁵ Norman J. Schlafmann, An Examination of the Influence of the State Legislature on the Educational Policies of the Constitutionally Incorporated Colleges and Universities of Michigan Through Enactment of Public Acts from 1851 through 1870, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1970, p. 70.

⁹⁶ Dunbar, The Michigan Record in Higher Education, pp. 90-100.

and actually was threatened by absorption into the University for several years. The institution was continually besieged by the struggles between the faculty and the Board of Agriculture and between the Board and the Legislature. Despite some historic work in agriculture having been done by dedicated faculty members, the College remained an underdeveloped, single-purpose institution enrolling less than 700 students by the turn of the century.⁹⁷

Apparently aware of the detrimental effect of governmental interference and the confusion over control, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1908 gave the State Board of Agriculture complete control over Michigan Agricultural College and elevated that body to the same constitutional status as the Board of Regents. With this recognition of the State Board of Agriculture's control, the development of stronger presidential leadership, the recognition of more diversified educational goals, and the introduction of more stable funding procedures by the Legislature, the Michigan Agricultural College began to mature into a distinctive institution of higher education.⁹⁸

Similar control by the State Board of Education over the Normal Colleges--Eastern, Western, Central, and Northern--to preserve their status as single-purpose institutions delayed their development. Not until some controls were removed and recognition was made of the need for diversity of programs, did these institutions also begin to mature.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 267.

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 267-287.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 193-214.

By the 1920s the public institutions in the state of Michigan had reached a stature far beyond the wildest dreams of their founders. Freed from the power of short-sighted restrictions, they had grown in size to meet the desire of more young people to go to college; they had grown in diversity to meet the needs of a quickly expanding economy; and they had grown in the recognition of the residents of the state of Michigan. Most of this maturation seemed to occur when the institutions were allowed to determine their own destinies and as they responded to the burgeoning educational needs of the state. Lawmakers and the populace in general may have assumed, based on the history of higher education in Michigan and their own respect for it, that a laissez faire approach would achieve the best results. The experience of the early years may have been the basis for the non-regulatory approach to coordination that was followed in Michigan.

By the end of the 1920s, the institutions had all gone through their early growing pains and had become established. From this period on, they had to be viewed as parts of the whole.

By 1929, when the depression era began, Michigan had evolved a system of public and private colleges and universities to meet its need for higher education. No longer can the story of higher education in Michigan be told in terms of the development of individual institutions or even institutional types. After 1930, the colleges, universities, and other types of higher educational institutions in Michigan must be considered as parts of an educational complex, responding to the changing requirements of the people of the state, affected by the same currents of educational philosophy, and conditioned by the same problems.¹⁰⁰

Through the depression of the 1930s, both the war and the GI influx of the 1940s, and the unparalleled expansion of the 1950s, the

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 266.

state and federal governments attempted to meet the fluctuating needs of the institutions. Despite the many changes of these decades, there seemed to be a general spirit of cooperation and the institutions all grew to unprecedented sizes. Michigan Agricultural College had become Michigan State College, and finally Michigan State University as it grew to become a rival of the University of Michigan in size and program diversity. The normal colleges had become state teachers colleges, then simply colleges, and finally, universities. The state had taken control of Wayne University in Detroit and Ferris Institute. Both Michigan State University and the University of Michigan had opened branches in other parts of the state and the futurists were estimating unlimited growth potential. No one seemed to know what the future held and no one seemed to have a plan: the institutions continued to expand to meet the state's needs as they, individually, assessed them.

However, there was concern within the state government about the direction of higher education and the large amount of money that was needed to fund the institutions. Over a fifteen year period, from 1958 to 1973, there were six major governmental reports made, all of which included examinations of higher education in Michigan and recommendations for the future.

In 1955 the Legislature of the state of Michigan adopted a resolution creating a joint committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate to study and recommend ways and means to meet the increasing needs for higher education in the most effective and economical manner. The committee hired Dr. John Dale Russell and a professional staff which eventually published a preliminary report in 1957, twelve staff

studies, and their final, comprehensive report in 1958.¹⁰¹ As a result of the manner in which the study was conceived and conducted and because of the full support of the Legislature, the Russell Report was well received, and eventually, thirty-five of its forty-five recommendations were implemented.¹⁰²

In the area of autonomy the Russell Report recommended that each state institution should be governed by a separate governing board with the same autonomy as that of the governing boards of Michigan State University, the University of Michigan, and Wayne State University--the board of Wayne State University was granted constitutional autonomy in 1959. The committee recommended the establishment of a coordination mechanism called the Michigan Board of Higher Education to coordinate the state's system of higher education by collecting data concerning facilities, finances, and operations of all state colleges and universities. This Board of Higher Education, it was also suggested, should make an annual estimate of the needs of each institution and advise the Legislature on all matters affecting higher education.¹⁰³

Virtually every recommendation of the Russell Report that enhanced services or improved the capacity of the institutions to better serve the public and deliver programs eventually was enacted

¹⁰¹ John Dale Russell, Higher Education in Michigan, The Final Report of the Survey of Higher Education in Michigan (Lansing: Prepared for the Michigan Legislative Study Committee on Higher Education, 1958).

¹⁰² Gerald A. Faverman, Higher Education in Michigan, 1958 to 1970, 3 vols., unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1975, p. 85.

¹⁰³ Russell Report, pp. 114-118.

either by statute or the Constitutional Convention of 1961-1962. Virtually none of the control mechanisms that were dear to the hearts of centralized planners have been enacted.¹⁰⁴

The Michigan state government constructed by the Constitution of 1908 had become antiquated by the 1950s because of its inability to use modern administrative mechanisms. Michigan's government found itself strapped and unable to respond quickly to new problems. This was one of the reasons for a strong consensus of opinion within the state for a new Constitution. A Constitutional Convention was approved and convened in October, 1961.¹⁰⁵

Since Michigan's citizenry was not unhappy with the educational system, educational concerns appear to have been far less vital than other issues before the convention. The Committee on Education did not make significant changes in the public education structure of Michigan, mostly concerning itself with elementary and secondary education.¹⁰⁶

The key issue concerning higher education that faced the Committee was the question of administrative supremacy and how to deal with the problem of coordinating the public colleges and universities. Although considerable favor was expressed for a single governing board for all state-supported colleges and universities, the spokesmen for the institutions urged separate governing boards with voluntary coordination. The decision of the Committee was a compromise, but did lean

¹⁰⁴Faverman, Higher Education in Michigan, 1958 to 1970, pp. 104-105.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 77-78.

very strongly towards the autonomous perception of the schools. In accordance with the Russell Report, all baccalaureate institutions were given separate boards. While the framers of the 1963 Constitution allowed the three major universities to maintain elective boards, they decreed that the boards of the other institutions, and any other institutions to be established later, would be composed of eight members appointed by the governor. As a compromise to those favoring coordination, the State Board of Education was given the responsibility for the coordination and planning of all public education, including higher education. However, the language was vague and encouraged cooperation and voluntary coordination rather than control, thereby leaving authority and the nature of that responsibility unclear.¹⁰⁷

The Citizens Committee on Higher Education, known as the Blue Ribbon Committee, was appointed by Governor George Romney in the fall of 1963. The Committee, comprised of a broad cross-section of the citizenry, made its report in 1965. Most of its recommendations were made to the State Board of Education which, apparently, had not been successful in effecting change in public policy for higher education. The majority of the study had been oriented to the community colleges and the need to extend and enhance them. The coordination of the four-year public colleges and universities by the State Board was seen by the committee as ineffective, blame being placed on the language of the Constitution. The committee recommended that the language be clearly defined giving the State Board stronger control, specifically in the

¹⁰⁷ Albert L. Sturm, Constitution-Making in Michigan, 1961-1962 (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1963, University of Michigan Governmental Studies, #43).

area of program review. In general, however, the report was congratulatory to the higher education establishment and did not include any recommendations for improvement.¹⁰⁸

Really the John Dale Russell Report placed the agenda before the public, the Constitutional Convention enacted most of its recommendations, and the Blue Ribbon Committee reported to the public that all was well, that the institutions were a great treasure, that was that.¹⁰⁹

In 1964, the Michigan Coordinating Council for Public Higher Education appointed a committee to study the university branches. That committee made its final report at the end of that year and its statements regarding coordination are very important in assessing the attitudes prevalent in the state at that time. Before making its recommendations on branching, the committee gave its perceptions of the Michigan higher educational system.¹¹⁰

The Advisory Committee stated that in Michigan there was no system and that opinions in the state fell into two basic positions:

The first holds that the best growth will come through the exercise by each institution of its legal right to pursue its own destiny and to what it believes to be best for the people of Michigan. Those holding this position find a clear mandate for the independent exercise of authority granted by the new Constitution to present and future Universities.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸Report of Citizen's Committee on Higher Education in Michigan, Governor George Romney (Kalamazoo, 1965).

¹⁰⁹Faverman, Higher Education in Michigan, 1958 to 1970, p. 105.

¹¹⁰Report of the Advisory Committee on University Branches (Lansing: Michigan Coordinating Council for Higher Education, 1964).

¹¹¹Report of the Advisory Committee on University Branches, p. 7.

The committee asserted that the other major position was a middle-of-the-road view held by those who believed in autonomy, but had also faced the reality that cooperation was vital if free institutions were to survive. The view of those who argued that the need for coordination was so great that it transcended the machinery available or contemplated for the future, was seen by the committee as a third position which might become important in the future.¹¹²

The committee recommended that the State Board of Education prepare a Michigan Plan for Higher Education and that an Advisory Council for Planning and Coordination of Higher Education be established that would parallel the State Board for Public Community and Junior Colleges.¹¹³

In addressing the question of branches, the Advisory Committee essentially reiterated the recommendations of earlier studies. It recommended that no more branches be allowed until a Michigan Plan for Higher Education had been completed. Making specific recommendations for each of the branches then in existence, the committee urged autonomy for Oakland University from Michigan State University and possibly Flint from the University of Michigan.¹¹⁴

The State Board of Education heeded the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and adopted the State Plan for Higher Education in Michigan in 1969. The final report was the culmination of the work of

¹¹²Ibid., pp. 8-9.

¹¹³Ibid., pp. 10-11.

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 12-14.

several study committees on various subjects and a Citizens Advisory Committee for Higher Education. The Plan recommended a stronger role for the State Board in serving as the general and coordinating body for all public education--including higher education--to fulfill the language of the Constitution.¹¹⁵

Faverman maintained that there was no strong support for this plan because those in power, including the Governor, were not behind it. Furthermore, he maintained that this was not a plan, but simply an attempt to create a broader consensus of public support for the State Board and the Department of Education.¹¹⁶

The State Board of Education, because of the autonomy of the individual institutions and the support of this autonomy by the citizenry of the state, has never been able to exert any control over the public, four-year institutions. In the very famous Salmon Case, the judge's decision further exemplified the Board's plight.

The State Board of Education has constantly stressed upon this court the opinion that its constitutionally imposed duty to plan and coordinate would be rendered virtually meaningless if it is denied the authority to require plaintiffs to receive its prior approval of any new programs Thus, whether the Board's authority is rendered virtually meaningless is a matter more within the discretion of the Board than of this court.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵The State Plan for Higher Education in Michigan (Lansing: State Board of Education, 1969).

¹¹⁶Faverman, Higher Education in Michigan, 1958 to 1970, p. 139.

¹¹⁷Michigan. Circuit Court for the County of Ingham. The Regents of the University of Michigan; The Board of Trustees of Michigan State University; The Board of Governors of Wayne State University versus the State of Michigan, and Michigan State Board of Education as Intervening Defendant. 7569-C Mich. 6 September 1971.

Although the institutions won a significant battle in the Salmon Decision in 1971, it may have been a Pyrrhic victory. The Legislature does hold the purse strings and during the last ten years the academic community in Michigan has seen the application of increasingly sophisticated management and budget systems by a Legislature striving for more adequate data gathering mechanisms. This is not only a Michigan phenomenon, as state governments across the nation are being forced to use more sophisticated approaches to improve their management of tax money. Despite the lack of institutional coordination at the state level in Michigan, the budgetary process and its accompanying machinery of systematic reporting and funding models, have resulted in a systematized approach or attitude by the budget divisions of the Legislative and Executive Branches: treating all of the institutions as a whole.

The Governor's Commission on Higher Education reporting in 1973 and the Michigan Efficiency Task Force reporting in 1977 encouraged Michigan's movement toward more efficient coordination for all of the institutions of higher education in the state. The Governor's Commission reemphasized the need for coordination and planning for higher education that had appeared in the earlier reports.¹¹⁸

The Michigan Efficiency Task Force was appointed by the Governor in 1976 to analyze all state budgets and programs, with emphasis on administrative efficiency, to determine where costly duplication and

¹¹⁸Report of Governor's Commission on Higher Education, Building for the Future of Postsecondary Education in Michigan (Lansing: 1974).

marginal activities could be eliminated.¹¹⁹ The Task Force reported in its findings that the colleges and universities were autonomous with respect to both academic affairs and operational activities. The Task Force recommended the establishment of a planning authority for higher education based upon the view that optimum utilization of the state's financial resources required centralized planning to identify long-range requirements and program needs while maintaining the high quality of the institutions.¹²⁰

Related to the development of statewide coordination and planning of higher education in Michigan has been the continuing effort of state government to develop and implement a formula funding mechanism for the determination of appropriations to the colleges and universities. For the past four years, the legislative fiscal agencies and the Office of the Budget have committed staff and resources to the generation of a criterion based formula funding model.

The import of the state funding project with respect to coordination and planning of higher education is that such a model, if implemented for appropriations purposes, prioritizes institutions, service functions, and programs which inadvertently achieves a form of state-level coordination and planning of operations not directly possible under the provisions of the Constitution.¹²¹

In summary, the history of higher education in Michigan has manifested strong aversion to any overt centralized control of or

¹¹⁹Michigan Efficiency Task Force, Summary Findings and Recommendations (Lansing: 1976), p. 1.

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 39.

¹²¹Thomas E. Johnston, Role of the State in Planning and Coordination of Autonomous Institutions of Higher Education (Lansing: Michigan Department of Education, 1977), p. 25.

political interference in the colleges and universities by the state government. At least six major government sponsored commissions and studies over the last twenty years have been unanimous in their recommendations for some mechanism of coordination and planning, yet the state government, in concert with the institutions, has resisted those recommendations. Some authorities have maintained that this reticence to centralize is based upon a strong tradition of autonomous institutions and a pride in what those institutions have accomplished. Dr. John Jamrich, President of Northern Michigan University explained this thought in an interview:

To go back to why central coordination has not found a good nest in Michigan, I think that has some obvious reasons and it goes back to the point I was making before. This state's higher education enterprise has been of such long standing . . . and of such high reputation, and all in a setting of individuality and individual performance.

Anyone who thinks about it for any length of time has to ask the question: "If we've done so well under these questions of individuality and autonomy, who says there is anything better to be obtained by merging all of this under one board?"¹²²

Others have suggested that the Legislature prefers the present arrangement because it allows that body to exercise ultimate control. If that is the truth, the recent efforts to generate a formula funding model imply a broadening of that control with a more systematic approach.

Whatever the true motivation, Michigan remains the only state, with such well-developed colleges and universities, to maintain a decentralized approach to the control of public higher education.

¹²²Faverman, Higher Education in Michigan, 1958-1970, p. 105.

Summary

For convenience of presentation the studies reviewed in this chapter were placed in one of four categories. The first three sections provided a general background for the study of institutional autonomy and statewide coordination while the fourth focused on the specific background of these issues in the state of Michigan.

First, a number of studies were reviewed which concerned the relationship of state governments to higher education. Most of the authors, whose works were reviewed, wrote glowingly of the tradition of state support for higher education. However, as studies by M. M. Chambers have demonstrated higher education's percentage share of tax monies has been steadily decreasing over the last decade. Concurrently, an ever increasing accountability was being required of higher educational institutions by state governments.

Because of these trends, several authors have suggested that a new era has dawned in the history of relations between institutions of higher education and state government. Some authors reviewed, warned of more constraints by and involvement of the state in the affairs of institutions of higher education. However, other educators and public administrators encouraged university presidents and other academicians to actively bring their causes into the political arena and offered suggestions on lobbying tactics.

The second category of studies reviewed in this chapter chronicled the development of statewide coordination and planning nationally. The central issue concerned the correlation of the healthy independence of individual institutions with the public's demand for accountability in the use of tax dollars. The majority of authors

cited demonstrated the trend of recent years toward the centralization of the control of public higher education in statewide agencies or governing boards with regulatory powers. This trend was seen by many as a parallel movement to the larger movement toward the centralization of state agencies under a strong Executive Branch.

The compatibility or distinction of the issues of institutional autonomy and statewide coordination was examined in the third category of studies. The central argument over institutional autonomy concerned whether it had been the strength of American higher education or the cause of too much competitiveness, and the needless and costly duplication of programs. Even authors like M. M. Chambers who continually emphasized the value of institutional autonomy, encouraged public and private institutions to coordinate their program efforts voluntarily. The concern was mentioned over and over that in a time of declining enrollments and fewer tax dollars there was a significant need to coordinate the efforts of the higher education enterprise. The questions for the 1970s and 80s concern the amount of control implicit in coordination and whether any amount of control is compatible with institutional autonomy.

The final section of this chapter included a review of literature concerning the development of institutional autonomy and statewide coordination within the state of Michigan. Michigan's record in higher education revealed a strong historical support of autonomy, especially for the University of Michigan and later, Michigan State University, and finally culminating in constitutional status for all the public four-year institutions in 1963. Although several commissions and government-generated study groups over the last twenty years, have

all recommended the establishment of some coordinating mechanism for higher education, none has ever been supported by the institutions or the Legislature.

The motivation for the preservation of the only major decentralized system in the United States is not readily discernible. While many have pointed to the quality of Michigan's institutions, with justifiable pride, others have suggested that the Legislature's desire to maintain its power over higher education is the major reason.

In conclusion, it is apparent from the many books and studies reviewed that the issues facing educators and state planners are complex. Whereas, in many states the issues of autonomy and coordination have been obviated by the centralization of the system, Michigan's status as the only highly developed state with such a decentralized system, offers a perennial battleground for their discussion. The economic constraints of the times and the predictions of enrollment declines in higher education's future have brought these issues to the forefront in Michigan again. This study, which is concerned with the perceptions of the primary actors in the discussion of these issues, seems most timely.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study was to examine the perceptions of three separate groups of people all of whom are involved with the public higher education enterprise in Michigan, concerning certain key issues of institutional autonomy. The three groups were: the presidents of the public four-year colleges and universities in Michigan; members of the Legislative Branch; and department heads within the Executive Branch of Michigan's state government. The perceptions of these three groups were examined in three main areas: the extent of local institutional autonomy and its implications for relations between the state and the institutions; the possible encroachment of state government upon that autonomy; and the possible need for statewide coordination and planning of public higher education.

The Population and Sample

The population was composed of: the presidents of the fifteen public colleges and universities in Michigan; legislators on appropriations committees, committees overseeing higher education, and legislative staff people; and, Executive Branch department heads involved with public higher education.

From the population the sample was taken and included: six presidents; six department heads from the Executive Branch; and a total of eight from the Legislative Branch, seven legislators and one department head from the fiscal agencies.

Selecting the Sample

The Presidents

The criteria used in selecting the sample of presidents included: length of service; types of institutions represented; geographical locations of their institutions; and, their familiarity with the issues. In Michigan, the fifteen public colleges and universities differ significantly in size, program offerings, and institutional mission. Recognizing that these differences might influence certain responses, presidents were selected from colleges and universities across the full spectrum of institutional type. (A full list and description of Michigan's public colleges and universities may be found in Appendix A.)

The six presidents selected for the study have averaged more than ten years of service, and several have been involved with the issues of institutional autonomy and public higher education in Michigan in other capacities enabling them to offer a broader perspective than simply the present situation and its impact on their respective institutions. Over the years, much has been said of the differences between Michigan's Upper and Lower Peninsulas. Although not by design, it is interesting to note that three of the presidents represent institutions from the Upper Peninsula and three represent institutions from the Lower Peninsula.

The Executive Branch

Within the Executive Branch, different and often overlapping responsibilities for public higher education are divided among the Department of Management and Budget, the Governor's Office, and the Department of Education. Department heads from within all three units who had significant involvement with the higher educational institutions were selected for a sample of six. Individuals selected are a representative sample of leaders within the Executive Branch who determine executive policy for public higher education in Michigan.

The Legislative Branch

Within the state Legislature there is such a wide spectrum of particularized interests represented and such varied committee assignments, that it is only possible for a small minority of legislators to be involved with higher education and to be aware of the issues being examined in this study. Therefore, the sample was selected from a smaller group of legislators who have served on committees directly involved with higher education. Special attention was paid to legislators serving on the powerful Appropriations Committees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, and the subcommittees of those committees, Higher Education and Capital Outlay. Since the appropriations process is the primary vehicle of interaction between the institutions and the Legislature, it seemed very important to select legislators intimately involved in that process.

Reasonable attention was also paid to length of service in the Legislature, party affiliation, and membership in the House or the Senate. For the latter two criteria, a representative number of

individuals was selected from the Democrats and Republicans, and the House and Senate. Both houses of the Legislature also have their respective fiscal agencies which provide supportive services. Within each of these agencies, higher education services are directed by one department head. One of the two was selected for this study, and, with the seven legislators also selected, combined for a total legislative sample of eight. These eight individuals were a representative sample of legislative leadership concerned with areas relating to higher education.

The Interviews

The basis for the interviews and the study itself, was the differences in perception that exist among three separate groups concerning central issues with which their work requires them to be knowledgeable. The questions used in the interview were derived from the areas outlined in the purpose section (Chapter I) and specified by issues revealed in the Review of Literature (Chapter II). Three major areas were identified: the theoretical and constitutional bases for institutional autonomy and its importance to higher education in Michigan; the actual relationship that exists between the higher educational institutions and the state government of Michigan and the possible encroachment upon autonomy; and, the need or desirability of a mechanism for statewide coordination of public higher education.

Questions were derived within these three areas and collated into an interview format. The particular wording and validity of individual questions were determined in consultation with three knowledgeable people at Michigan State University: Dr. Walter F. Johnson,

Professor of Administration and Higher Education and the Director of this dissertation; Dr. Mary Lee Davis, Assistant Professor of Administration and Higher Education, and Assistant Vice President for State Relations; and Elliott G. Ballard, Secretary to the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University and a former Analyst for Michigan's Department of Management and Budget. A trial run of the interview was taped with Mr. Ballard to determine the fluidity of the format and the time needed to conduct the interviews. (A copy of the interview format is included in Appendix C.)

A letter explaining the scope of the project and outlining the interview procedure was sent to each of the prospective respondents. It was explained in the letter that the interviews would be taped, but that results would be reported in the aggregate and that individual responses would remain confidential. Confidentiality was guaranteed to insure the most candid responses possible and because of the sometimes sensitive nature of legislative-institutional relations. (A copy of the letter may be found in Appendix B.)

Telephone calls were made to each respondent to verify their willingness to be interviewed and to arrange an appointment. The plan to tape the interview was reemphasized during the telephone call to either the respondent or the respondent's secretary, but no objections were voiced.

The interview format was semi-structured or "semi-standardized" as defined by Maccoby and Maccoby.¹ In this approach, a series of set

¹Eleanor and Nathan Maccoby, "The Interview: A Tool of Social Science," in The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I, ed. by Gardner Lindzey (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1954), pp. 451-455.

questions is used in all interviews with the option of slight digressions with subquestions or probing questions.² This particular method was selected for this study over a strictly structured or unstructured approach for several reasons. First, reliability is apparently enhanced by a more detailed interview guide³ and the researcher felt that a set group of questions would insure coverage of all essential points. Secondly, face validity is also enhanced by the conversational approach of the unstructured format⁴ and the researcher felt that the opportunity to probe further in certain areas might elicit more complete answers. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to increase the reliability and validity of the instrument by choosing a semi-structured format. Furthermore, the backgrounds of various respondents seemed to favor an approach which allowed for elaboration and fruitful digression. Finally, the Maccobys had suggested that the use of any particular interview method should depend on the stage of development of the subject matter.⁵ Since this study was an examination of the perceptions of groups of individuals, it seemed unrealistic to attempt to use a strictly standardized interview format before the dimensions of those perceptions had been well delineated. However, the semi-structured format did provide the interviewer with confidence and helped to reduce the concern with interviewer bias.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., pp. 454-455.

All interviews were conducted by the researcher one-on-one in the respondents' respective offices. Because of the busy schedules of administrators and legislators, the interview was designed for an hour or less. The interviews generally lasted between forty and sixty minutes, depending somewhat on the respondent's schedule, but primarily on how much discussion was generated by the topics. However, on several occasions, because of extended discussion, the interviews went well beyond one hour, and, in one instance, lasted three hours. Each interview was taped using 120-minute cassettes and a portable cassette recorder.

Analyzing the Data

After the interviews were completed, the researcher listened to the tapes with a copy of the interview format as a guide. As answers to the questions were given, they were transcribed on the appropriate page of the interview format. In order to enhance the reliability of the study two judges were asked to participate at this point. Mr. James Fielder, Policy Analyst for the Education Division of the Bureau of the Budget, Department of Management and Budget, and Mr. Robert Martin, Coordinator of Undergraduate Student Affairs, College of Education, Michigan State University, were each supplied with tapes of the first interview from each of the three groups as a sample. The judges were asked to listen to the sample tapes and to write the responses to the questions on a copy of the interview format. They were instructed to write the answers as they interpreted them and to include all qualifying statements regarding the question or issue. The researcher collected the copies of the interview format completed by the judges

and a meeting of the researcher and the two judges was held. Answers were compared and the judges determined that their answers and those of the researcher were consistent. It was then agreed that the researcher was to proceed with this phase of the study independently.

The researcher listened to the remainder of the tapes and recorded the answers. The information was collated according to the specific questions asked and the responses given. In some cases, the answers were simply "yes" or "no," easily identifiable and easily categorized. In other cases, the answers were quite different and categories were difficult to determine. The judges were asked to assist in the determination of the final categorization of the more complicated answers. The data were then put into table form, and the percentage that each answer represented of the total sample, was computed.

The data have been presented in Chapter IV. Tables displaying the data have been included in Appendix D. Obvious trends have been noted, and the relationships among the three groups and the responses to the questions have been discussed.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

The purpose of this study was to examine the perceptions of three separate groups of people all of whom are involved in the public higher education enterprise in Michigan, concerning certain key issues relating to institutional autonomy. The three groups were: the presidents of the public four-year colleges and universities in Michigan, members of the Legislative Branch; and department heads within the Executive Branch of Michigan's state government. The perceptions of these three groups were examined in three areas: their understanding of the constitutional and theoretical bases for and the extent of the local autonomy of the colleges and universities; the possible encroachment of state government upon that autonomy; and the possible need for statewide coordination and planning of public higher education in Michigan.

The data corresponding to these three areas have been analyzed and presented in the text of this chapter. The data have been presented in Appendix D. Each question asked of the respondents has been numbered and has been referred to by number in the text. All questions presented in Appendix D have been discussed in the text of this chapter.

The Theoretical and Constitutional Bases for and
The Extent of Local Institutional Autonomy

The first group of questions (1 - 11) was concerned with the theoretical and constitutional bases for institutional autonomy. The data have been analyzed and are presented under four headings: the meaning and the extent of institutional autonomy; the value of institutional autonomy; the respondents' perceptions of their colleagues' views; and, the respondents' perceptions of the views of the other two groups.

The Meaning and the Extent of
Institutional Autonomy

For the purposes of this study, a working definition of institutional autonomy was formulated and read to each respondent before the interview began. Institutional autonomy was defined as:

a complex concept involving relationships within and outside the institution that affect the ability of its leaders to use its resources without external direction and to define and execute programs consonant with the institutional purpose.

Each respondent was asked to compare that definition with their understanding of the autonomy of the public four-year colleges and universities in Michigan (Question 1). Table 1, below, represents the responses to that question.

Although a majority of the respondents were in general agreement with the working definition, a large minority disagreed, suggesting a fundamental difference in the perceptions of the three groups regarding the meaning of a concept very central to the essence of this study.

Table 1.--Views on Definition of Autonomy.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislature n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Agree - Boards have control	5	4	3	12
b. Disagree - Institutional control restricted	1	2	5	8

A majority of the presidents (5) were in agreement with the working definition. One president described the autonomy of Michigan's colleges and universities as "extensive." Another president was more specific. "Unlike some states, the question here is constitutional. The Constitution gives governing boards responsibility to run the universities." However, a president who agreed with the definition sounded a cautionary note.

Generally, the definition conforms to historical understanding. The "Four-years" have historically been totally autonomous. That autonomy served the institutions well in a period of rapid growth; however, that is changing to meet today's needs.

The only president who disagreed with the definition seemed to be viewing autonomy in its sociological and political setting.

It is a good construct within which to work. The reality of autonomy is restricted by external factors--accountability, the reality of historical milieu, and the frame of reference of social agencies to the people.

A less theoretical stance was taken by those who disagreed with the definition in the executive branch. One respondent expressed it in this way.

The institutions are granted authority in programs, property, and how programs will be put into effect. However, in practical terms that doesn't exist. There are external restrictions on even these

things. Once programs are funded by the state, the institutions then determine the content of programs and personnel matters.

More than half the legislators (5) maintained that while the institutions had a certain degree of autonomy, that autonomy only existed within the parameters of the Legislature's control over their appropriations, making the Legislature the ultimate authority.

Half of the legislators felt that the 1963 Constitution had not dictated any difference in status among the categories of four-year, public institutions (Question 3), while the other half maintained that the elected boards of the Big Three institutions were more autonomous than the appointed boards of the other institutions. All of the legislators had difficulty separating the intent of the Constitution from what they perceived to be the present situation. Their answers ranged from definite to uncertain. "The appointed boards are more susceptible to or are flavored by the personality in that office (Governor)." Another legislator who saw a difference in status was less certain. "The Big Three may be perceived as more autonomous because of their size and their elected boards. I don't know if the Con-Con intended it that way."¹

Even those legislators who answered the question in the negative, manifested similar ambivalence between what was intended and what exists. One answered: No, not within the Constitution, although it works out that way."

A majority of the Executive Branch respondents (4) and two presidents agreed that no difference in status had been dictated.

¹Con-Con refers to the Constitutional Convention of 1961-62 which culminated in the formulation of the 1963 State Constitution of Michigan.

One executive replied: "Not at all, the language is identical--word for word in the two sections (of the Constitution)." Another was just as adamant. "The Big Three saw themselves in a different status; the Constitution did not, the Salmon Decision did not."

Only one president and one member of the executive sample felt that the elected boards of the Big Three were more autonomous than the boards which had been appointed by the Governor. Although not a president of a Big Three institution, this respondent offered an historical perspective.

The Big Three have elections of their boards. The perception is that there is a difference which suggests that it is so. It is the result of a compromise in Con-Con. Some felt they were more autonomous. The U of M feels that it is unique, historically.

Three presidents (50%) and another member of the executive sample agreed on a historical difference of the Big Three. While maintaining that there was no difference in the autonomy of different categories of institutions according to the Constitution, they all stated that a difference in status had been accorded the Big Three historically, and that the Constitution may have fostered that status.

When asked if there should be a difference in status by type or size of institution either in the Constitution or by statute (Question 4). Ninety percent of the total sample replied in the negative. Although all of the presidents replied in the negative, slight differences of perception were apparent dependent upon size of institution. Those presidents representing smaller and developing institutions were adamant in their opposition. One president of a developing institution asserted: "That is the antithesis of autonomy." Another

president of a mid-size institution added that it, "implies a different class of citizens, which the state should not support."

However, the president of one of the Big Three institutions struck a more moderate tone. "As a general principle with respect to autonomy, no, although there are a great number of differences among the institutions in Michigan."

All of the executive sample responded in the negative with one asserting that there was "no apparent reason to distinguish." Similar responses came from the legislative sample where six also replied in the negative. One legislator expressed it thusly: "the nature of the institutions vary in scope but that doesn't dictate their level of autonomy."

Only two respondents out of the total sample (10%) felt that there should be a difference in status among the various categories of institutions, and both were legislators. One reasoned that it "would be helpful in clarifying their status within society." The other legislator apparently saw it as the institutionalization of a political reality. "It would take into account the natural difference in size, the larger institutions having a larger constituent base."

The majority of the respondents (100% of the presidents, 75% of the legislators, and 50% of the Executive Branch) agreed that the constitutional status accorded the colleges and universities was not comparable to that of the Legislative and Executive branches of state government (Question 5). Respondents in each of the three groups answering in the negative argued that the institutions were a part of the Executive Branch. Others felt that the major difference was the inability of the institutions to solicit revenue or to appropriate public

funds. Aware that the Executive Branch was in a similar situation, they still felt that the institutions could not be compared to the branches of government. While some legislators intimated that the institutions might have regarded themselves as equal, none of the presidents saw any comparison possible.

It is not accurate to say that they are a fourth branch of government. They are a kind of agency of the state that has been given some special powers, but, in the overall, I would not suppose this equates with any of the three main branches of government.

Two legislators and half of the executive respondents asserted that the constitutional status of the colleges and universities was comparable to that of the Legislative and Executive branches. One Executive Branch respondent was very definite. "They are equal. That is exactly the way the Salmon Decision interprets it. The only restraints are fiscal. They are in effect like a fourth branch of government." A legislator viewed it similarly. "They are very similar, almost a fourth branch of government. They are given a broad range of powers."

The other three respondents in the affirmative took a less definitive stance.

From a theoretical application, yes. However, the institutions are not free to raise funds. If they chose to go out and get funding elsewhere, then it might work that way.

Six respondents said that the constitutional statements regarding institutional autonomy should not be changed (Question 7). The only change suggested by the other fourteen (70%) was the language regarding the role of the State Board of Education in the coordination of the colleges and universities.

Among the thirty percent suggesting no changes were five legislators and one president. Although differences of opinion were expressed, the majority seemed to feel strongly that the Constitution should not be tampered with. One respondent from a legislative fiscal agency stated that there was "no need to clarify every vague item in the Constitution."

The larger part of the sample (70%) that felt the language regarding the State Board should be clarified included all six executives, five presidents, and three legislators. There was general agreement among the presidents that the role of the State Board should not be mandatory as exemplified in this statement.

I subscribe to and was a member of the Blue Ribbon Commission which the Governor appointed a few years ago. We did propose some constitutional amendments which would have clarified the respective roles of the universities and the State Board and would have made it clear that the powers of the State Board were not mandatory but were advisory.

The Executive Branch respondents all agreed that the language regarding the State Board should be clarified and that the issue of coordination should be settled within the Constitution. One respondent said: "I feel that we need a body politic to deal with higher education in a number of ways." The three respondents within the executive sample who were from the Department of Education were more sensitive to the possibility of the State Board performing the coordinative function than were those from other departments.

At least one respondent from each of the three sample groups strongly urged that the language regarding the State Board should be eliminated and that the role of that body should be limited to the K-12 sector of public education.

The answers to this group of questions (Questions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7) suggest a diversity of views regarding the meaning and bases of constitutional autonomy. A slight majority of the respondents agreed with the working definition that the institutions had power over the use of their resources and the determination of their programs. This view was held by five presidents, four executives, and three legislators. However, the majority of the legislators, two executives and one president maintained that the autonomy of the institutions was restricted by external factors and had to be understood within the parameters of the appropriations control of the Legislature.

Half of the legislators, one president, and one executive asserted that the Constitution had dictated that the elected boards of the Big Three institutions were more autonomous than the appointed boards of the other institutions. Half of the presidents and another executive surmised that while the Constitution did not dictate a difference in autonomy, that the Big Three did enjoy an historical status above the other colleges and universities. However, fifty percent of the total sample, including respondents from all three sample groups argued that no difference in status had been accorded any category of institutions in the Constitution.

In addition, ninety percent of the respondents asserted that a difference in status by category of institution should not be encouraged by the state either in the Constitution or by statute. Most respondents suggested that such a stance would be antithetical to the concept of autonomy.

Seventy-five percent of the respondents contended that the constitutional status accorded to the colleges and universities was

not comparable to that of the legislative or executive branches of state government. The other twenty-five percent of the sample, however, did liken the status of the institutions to a fourth branch of government, equal to the other branches, but without the power to appropriate funds. Interestingly, there were no presidents included in this latter group.

Thirty percent of the respondents--one president and five legislators--maintained that there should be no changes in the constitutional statements regarding autonomy. The other seventy percent all favored either the clarification or elimination of the constitutional language regarding the role of the State Board of Education in coordinating the colleges and universities.

The Value of Institutional Autonomy

Six executives, six legislators, and two presidents stated that the framers of the 1963 Constitution intended to insure "academic freedom," or "autonomy," or "freedom from politics" (Question 6). Within the executive sample, several responses centered on the belief in the importance of higher education that was apparent in 1963.

They put a high priority on education and the institutions and they tried to take them out of the politics, although they weren't and couldn't be all that successful.

Among the legislators, most responses were directed at the need to curb the tendency of the government to interfere and at least one remarked on the Legislature specifically.

Possibly in 1963, to secure the autonomy for the institutions. Some in the Legislature are questioning that now, however, I feel that it was a wise course of action for 1963. It prevented legislative interference.

One legislator and one president argued that decentralization of control was the intention of the constitutional framers. Both responses reflected historical perspectives as in the legislator's view. "To decentralize the control of goods and services in the delivery system. Michigan has a long tradition of doing this in its government." The president seemed to reflect the view of his institution--one of the regional institutions.²

To give the institutions a single board to give single attention to the institution. Also, to put in a new pattern of budget procedures with more flexibility to the regionals. There was not a great concern over political control, but more interest in the general educational goals of Michigan. I feel it was successful.

Three presidents and one legislator (20% of the total sample) claimed confusion over the intentions of the constitutional framers. The presidential responses, however, were more directed at the vagueness of the document itself and a history of ambiguity in its interpretation by various groups within the state. One president tried to provide a sociological perspective.

Very often it is true in our society that when there is a contentious problem, it is resolved by allowing a certain amount of ambiguity in the document which settles it, thus permitting people to make different arguments as to what it means. That is not an unusual phenomenon. Looking back at Con-Con, there were strong contending forces on this issue. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they were as aware as we are of the ambiguity which remained in what they did.

Forty-five percent of the total sample (6 legislators, 2 executives, and 1 president) repeated that political interference would be the result if institutional autonomy were no longer guaranteed

²Regional institutions--the original Normal Colleges, Central Michigan University, Eastern Michigan University, Northern Michigan University, and Western Michigan University.

(Question 8). The legislators were the most direct and critical of possible interference on their part and the probable negative impact upon the institutions. One legislator stated, "I would be concerned about legislative interference. Some independence is necessary to a great degree, although not totally." Another cautioned that it would be "very dangerous. Autonomy protects the institutions from legislative interference." Finally, a powerful senator from the Appropriations Committee summed up the fears voiced by several others.

The Legislature would line-item more of their budget and direct them to use it directly as we want, and I am not sure that 148 legislators know in what direction the universities should be going. I feel that direction, for the most part, should be left up to those people involved with the university business.

Another forty-five percent of the total sample conditioned their response on the probability of a new power structure to supplant the vacuum created by the demise of autonomy. Five presidents, three executives, and one legislator envisioned a centralization of governance. The majority of this group asserted that it would be detrimental to higher education in Michigan as expressed by the president of one of the Big Three universities.

I think it would, over a period of time, probably diminish the quality of the institutions. I have always argued that there are only two good reasons for a greater centralization. One is if you can show that it will achieve economies, and the other, is if you can show that it will improve the quality. I would argue that there is no evidence in those states which have gone to a strongly centralized system that it does either of those things. On the contrary, I would argue that there is very little evidence of any economy in it.

One legislator and one executive (10% of total) suggested that there would be little change or "no problem" if autonomy were no longer guaranteed. The main argument in these responses seemed to center on the already established tradition of relationships and methods of

interaction that would remain the same with or without the legal construct of autonomy.

Ninety percent of the total sample agreed that there would be more overt interference or control by the Legislature without autonomy (Question 9). The same individuals, one legislator and one executive, who had maintained that there would be no change without autonomy in Question 8, reaffirmed that stance. However, the executive's response seemed dependent on the assumption that no middle-level agency would enter the vacuum left by the legal change. He stated that a significant change would occur "only if there were a coordinating board which would then hamper the freedom of the institutions to lobby the Legislature."

The other executives (5) concurred with the majority that more interference by government would result, however, their responses ranged from definitive to wistful. One executive did not doubt that "the Legislature would attempt to prescribe use of funds and to control the institutions." Another was less critical of legislative motives, but, implied the inevitability of the same results. "The Legislature is very sensitive to institutional autonomy and would not violate it intentionally, but, if it were lifted"

Seven legislators stated that there definitely would be involvement of the Legislature in the affairs of the institutions. One assumed that the smaller colleges would suffer the most since they had less political influence. Another legislator asserted that interference might happen even if autonomy were not eliminated. "If the Legislature had more power, it might force cooperation. It will probably happen in the next few years anyway with declining enrollments and dollars."

The responses to the three previous questions (Questions 6, 8, 9) have been combined into Table 2 representing the perceptions of the three groups regarding the impact of institutional autonomy upon the relationships of the institutions to the state government.

Table 2.--Views on Impact of Autonomy.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislative n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Protects the Institutions from political interference	6	5	7	18
b. Has no impact		1	1	2

Six of the legislators believed that the intention of the framers of the 1963 Constitution had been to protect the institutions from political influence (Question 6) and that without the constitutional provision of autonomy, the state government would involve itself more in institutional affairs (Questions 8 and 9). A seventh legislator concurred (Question 8) that centralization of governance would probably be the result if autonomy were no longer guaranteed.

While only two presidents were sure that the intentions of the constitution framers were to protect the institutions from political interference (Question 6), five were convinced that centralization of governance would ensue without autonomy (Question 8), and all six agreed that without autonomy, the Legislature would involve itself more in the affairs of their institutions (Question 9).

Finally, while one executive assumed that the tradition of relationships superceded the power of autonomy, the other five asserted

that there would be interference without it. All six had concurred (Question 6) that the 1963 Constitution was intended to prevent such interference.

Respondents' Perceptions of Colleagues' Views

Table 3 represents the respondents' perceptions of whether or not their colleagues would agree with their views on the value of institutional autonomy.

Table 3.--Respondents' Perceptions of Colleagues' Views on Autonomy.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislative n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes--they would agree	5	6	1	12
b. There would be differences of opinion			7	7
c. No--they would not agree with me.	1			1

Five presidents felt that their view was similar to most or all of the presidents in the system and that most would favor autonomy, but, they all recognized that the depth of agreement would probably vary. One president spoke from long experience. "I've met forty (presidents) in my fifteen years and the majority view it similarly." Another president cautioned against the assumption of a unified view among all presidents. "All are committed to the idea of it and the need for it. However, there are differences in how it applies to

individual institutions." A president from one of the Big Three institutions stressed a realistic view in light of declining enrollments.

Yes, but not always in the same degree. I think that a number of institutions do not have the traditions of autonomy that this university always had. They see themselves as more vulnerable to the forces of the market and the forces, perhaps, of the Legislature. It would not be difficult, therefore, for some of them to persuade themselves that the better part of discretion was to favor some centralized controls; give up autonomy to not be closed out.

One president felt that his views were not typical of the others.

I am more favorable to less autonomy and they (other presidents) want all they can get, a general assessment of human nature. The present economic situation argues for less autonomy.

There was general agreement within the executive sample that others in that branch would agree with them and that they would be favorable to the concept of autonomy for the institutions. Although most felt that the issue of the role of the State Board would divide the views of those in the Department of Education from others in the executive sample, autonomy was assumed to be supported by all. Even the executive who had claimed that there would be no change in the relationship of the state government to the institutions without autonomy agreed with his colleagues. "The people we deal with feel that the institutions need a strong degree of autonomy and flexibility to meet their needs."

Only one legislator assumed that a majority of the Legislature would agree with his views on autonomy. The rest said that there would be differences of opinion. Some were confident that most of their colleagues would agree with them and be in favor of autonomy to a

degree. Others contended that their colleagues would not necessarily agree with them and that there would be a full spectrum of views.

Respondents' Perceptions of the Views
of the Other Sampled Groups

Six presidents (100%), six executives (100%) and seven legislators all felt that there was general agreement among those in the Legislative and Executive Branches and in the institutions of higher education concerning the meaning of institutional autonomy (Question 2). However, these responses must be understood in light of the differences in meaning espoused by the groups in Question 1.

Although all the presidents answered that there was general agreement among the groups on the meaning of autonomy, there seemed to be recognition that there were some differences. One president viewed it as "general theoretical agreement with differences in application." Another said that while there was not general agreement on a specific definition, there was agreement that some autonomy exists.

While all six of the Executive Branch sample stated that they felt that there was general agreement on the meaning of institutional autonomy, two had slight reservations. One said that while there was general agreement on the meaning, some legislators would like more say in the control of the institutions. Another assumed that some presidents would differ from others on the general meaning.

The only dissenter from a unanimous view of general agreement was one legislator.

A great spectrum of opinion exists within the Legislative and Executive Branches. Institutions may perceive themselves as more autonomous and some legislators might agree with them.

Table 4 represents the perceptions of the respondents regarding the other two groups in the study concerning the value of institutional autonomy.

Table 4.--Respondents' Perceptions of Views of Other Sampled Groups Concerning Autonomy.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislative n = 8	Total n = 20
1. Presidents				
a. Supportive		4	8	12
b. Not supportive				
c. Divided		2		2
2. Executive				
a. Supportive	1		2	3
b. Not supportive	2		4	6
c. Divided	3		2	5
3. Legislative				
a. Supportive	2			2
b. Not supportive	2	3		5
c. Divided	2	3		5

Eight of the legislative respondents (100%) and four of the executives (75%) agreed that the presidents would be supportive of autonomy. Many of those legislators thought that the presidents would argue for more autonomy. One stated "presidents would like total autonomy spelled out in the Constitution." Two of the executives, however, suggested that the presidents would offer a variety of responses based on their particular situations.

The perceptions of the legislators and the presidents regarding the views of the Executive Branch were divided. The largest group (6) viewed the Executive Branch as not supportive of autonomy. Four legislators (50%) asserted that the "Executive Branch wants centralized

control." Two presidents, both from Big Three institutions, agreed with that assessment. One president suggested that it was simply a matter of human nature--desiring more power--while the other saw it as an inherent element in government.

There seems to be a feeling among some in the Legislative and Executive Branches that there is something inherently good in centralization, to get rid of duplication.

Two legislators and one president said that they thought that the Executive Branch was generally in favor of autonomy for the institutions. However, three presidents and two legislators answered that the Executive Branch was divided in its views. One president felt strongly that the Department of Education would favor control by the State Board, but, that the Governor's Office and the Department of Management and Budget would support local autonomy. A legislator declared that the Department of Management and Budget was in favor of centralized control and less autonomy. The other three respondents suggested that differences of opinion existed across the range of the Executive Branch and were not necessarily differentiated by department.

The six presidents were equally divided in their assessment of the views held by the legislative branch--two answering that the Legislature was supportive, two sensing that it was not, and two suggesting that it was divided. Those presidents who felt that the legislators favored autonomy were not unaware of possible disagreement. One president explained, "in the Legislature it depends on who is in leadership, but generally they favor it (autonomy)." Those presidents who saw the Legislature as not supportive of autonomy grouped the executive branch members with the legislators and saw both government groups opposed to local autonomy. Recognition of the sheer numbers and the diverse

backgrounds of 148 legislators flavored the opinions of the final two presidents who saw obvious reasons for the view that a wide range of opinion concerning autonomy existed within the Legislature.

Three executives (50%) said that the legislators were not supportive of autonomy. These respondents seemed to think that the members of the Legislature would like to limit the powers of the institutions. The other three executives perceived that the views in the Legislature were divided regarding autonomy, yet, disagreed among themselves on the bias of the majority. One executive saw a confusing situation. "In the Legislature many have not given it much thought. Those who do are sensitive to autonomy although sometimes thwarted in policy." Another executive saw a more consistent bias. "The Legislature is pro and con, opinion is divided. More legislators than not would prefer to see them with less autonomy."

The Encroachment of the Branches of State Government Upon Institutional Autonomy

The second group of questions (12 - 26) was concerned with the relationships that exist among the Legislative and Executive Branches and the possible encroachment of those branches upon the institutional autonomy of the educational institutions. The data have been analyzed and are presented under four headings: encroachment upon institutional autonomy; the nature of the relationships of the institutions to the Legislative and Executive Branches; the respondents' perceptions of their colleagues' views; and, the respondents' perceptions of the views of the other two groups.

Encroachment Upon Institutional Autonomy

The areas or issues mentioned most often by the respondents which were or could be interpreted as examples of encroachment were governmental involvement in the control or operation of academic programs (5 times), governmental determination of faculty work loads (5), and, the line-item control over the internal use of appropriated funds (6) (Question 12). Faculty work loads and program control were listed by one president, two executives, and two legislators, whereas, the internal use of appropriated funds was mentioned by three presidents and three legislators.

Other issues noted more than once included the capital outlay process (2 times), and limitations on the number of out-of-state students (4). The latter issue was of primary concern in the Salmon Case and was mentioned by two executives and two legislators. The long process of first gaining approval for new buildings, and thereafter, the approval of the architects and their designs by both the Legislative and Executive Branches was listed by one executive and one legislator.

Issues which were mentioned only once included: legislative approval of buildings to be built with private funds; political influence in personnel and admissions decisions; the budget process itself; and, the indirect impact upon the institutions because of regulations legislated in other sectors such as labor, pollution, and Civil Rights laws.

One member of the legislative sample expressed the views of those who downplayed the threat of encroachment.

Frequently, encroachments have been attempted, but in a check and balance system, they are quickly seen. As a result of the Salmon

Case, there has been much less incidence of legislative encroachments on such things as tuition rates, program control, or teaching load standards as in the early 70s.

A president of one of the Big Three institutions (University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and Wayne State University) presented an opposing viewpoint.

There is a steady turnover in the Legislature. New people not familiar with autonomy or higher education attempt to add new provisions to appropriations and are outraged when older legislators tell them that they can't do it. We'll always have that recurring as legislators change just like a change of students. The University of Michigan has had six constitutional cases with the state in its history. There will probably be another in five or ten years.

The majority of presidents (4) and executives (4) and half of the legislators (4) concurred that the issues mentioned in Question 12 had involved encroachment (Question 13). Those within the legislative and executive sample groups who agreed that encroachment had occurred, seemed to view it as less overt or less damaging than those in the presidential sample. One legislator termed it as very "subtle." Another legislator suggested that minimal encroachment may have been justified because "the Legislature may be forced to do more in the future if we are not conscientious now." Within the Executive Branch, a similar attitude was expressed. "Yes, (encroachment occurred), but there is a legitimate concern in this office (Governor's) in the growth of capital outlay and expensive projects."

Those presidents not agreeing that the issues mentioned involved actual encroachment, did not deny that encroachment had occurred, only the severity of its impact. Both presidents were from smaller schools and termed the impact as negligible or not bothersome.

At least one legislator and one executive asserted that the state had the right to exercise its power over the institutions. The legislator referred to the Legislature's right to expect money to be used for the purposes for which it was appropriated. The executive, who was from the Department of Education, seemed ready to retry the Salmon Case.

The workload issue was not a true encroachment. The Legislature was concerned with the number of hours worked for the money. I question the need for two hours of preparation per class hour for the same course that an instructor has been teaching for six years.

Only two presidents and one executive viewed the formula-funding approach to appropriations as an obvious encroachment upon autonomy (Question 14). Only one of these three respondents took issue with the concept of formula-funding itself, saying that he would prefer to take his institution's case to the Legislature himself. The other president, although critical of a formula-funding approach, was supportive of its impact upon his institution which he claimed was "small and underfunded." He interpreted the formula-funding approach as an attempt to bring equity to the appropriations results. A similar view was voiced by the executive.

Yes (it is an encroachment), although the formula approach does create more equal access to the dollars and is, therefore, a welcome change from previous methods.

The majority of respondents (55% of the total sample) did not view formula-funding as an encroachment upon autonomy. Included in this group were three presidents, who talked of formula-funding as a simpler method for the branches of government to use to divide available resources. Rather than an invasion of autonomy, they emphasized that the weakness of formula-funding was in devising a formula that

would satisfy the leaders of small, less sophisticated institutions while also meeting the needs of complex and sophisticated institutions like the University of Michigan or Michigan State University.

Five legislators and five executives agreed with those answering that formula-funding was not an encroachment upon autonomy. The majority of these respondents pointed to the improvement of formula-funding over previously used methods, and claimed that it was the result of the attempts of government leaders to bring a more rational approach to the appropriations process. One of the executives, who has been involved in the annual preparation of the Executive Budget for many years, explained it in this manner.

No, the Executive Branch has tried to avoid encroachment. We try to determine their needs and fund them. Once they have funds, they use them as they please. The formula is less restrictive than dealing with institutional budgets.

A third group, three legislators and one president fell into another category intimating the possibility of encroachment through use of formula-funding. The president differentiated between the "Investment Needs Model" used by the Legislature and the "management model" being used by the Executive Branch in the preparation of the Governor's Executive Budget recommendations. He apparently did not feel as threatened by the latter as by the former.

Two legislators in this final group, contended that the possibility of encroachment was involved. One tried to outline those possibilities.

It can be (an encroachment) depending upon elements of the formula. If the formula attempts to change the system unilaterally, it would be an encroachment. If it tries to change collectively, through the political process, that is okay. Treating all institutions the same has inherent dangers of encroachment. However, formulas should not dictate policy.

The issue of categorical or line-item budget restrictions on appropriations as a possible encroachment upon autonomy drew a polarized response (Question 15). All of the executives (100%) and four presidents replied in the affirmative, however, only one legislator agreed.

The agreement within the executive sample centered on the fact that line-item restrictions do not allow the institutions the flexibility that they need because they essentially concentrate management control in the Legislature. However, one executive noted that institutions sometimes had requested line-items in their budget proposals. Another asserted that while it might be an encroachment, it was pleasurable, in that more institutions had gained from the practice than had lost.

Most of the presidents who regarded line-item restrictions as encroachments, claimed that they knew why it was done. One president explained the phenomenon of an unrequested windfall. "We all get money we didn't ask for and didn't want because some legislator has a particular interest, mostly in medical schools for those who have them." Another president talked of fair and unfair line-items.

Yes, but there are reasons for some of them. I have no objection to some of them such as funding for particular research units. There has to be some level of "rapprochement" between the universities and government, but not when it goes too far, such as line-item for each and every piece of equipment. That's poor management. Institutions need flexibility.

The only legislator who acknowledged that line-item restrictions constituted encroachment, countered that there had been very few in recent budgets and only in areas where the Legislature was "trying to make a point."

Those legislators who denied that line-item restrictions constituted encroachment, seemed anxious to justify the right of the Legislature to control the use of money appropriated. One legislator grounded his views on a legal decision. "No, legally the Salmon Decision said if the Legislature makes an appropriation for a certain purpose, then the institution must use it for this purpose."

Two presidents and two legislators fell into a third category, suggesting the possibility of encroachment. The two presidents gave "yes and no" answers. One president stated that he was open to the use of line-item restrictions providing that they were not too narrow and allowed some flexibility at the institutional level. The other president, while professing awareness of the encroachment threat, concluded that some new programs would not progress without the use of line-item designations.

The legislator in this final group posed the dilemma.

It's a two-way street. The institutions need flexibility, but the Legislature is trying to make sure the money is used well. But who knows the needs of the institutions better than they themselves.

While three presidents (50%), four legislators (50%) and two executives could not think of any other issues which would constitute or could be interpreted as encroachment, eleven others apparently had been stimulated with new ideas through the discussion of the previous questions. Program control (one president, one executive, one legislator), capital outlay (one executive), faculty teaching loads (one legislator), and influence peddling (one legislator and one president), were mentioned again as issues which would be regarded as encroachment. Issues raised that were previously unmentioned included: the source of

funding (one legislator), governmental involvement in course offerings (two executives and two legislators), the punishment of "radical" faculty or students (one president), and the control of institutional property (one president) as outlined in this statement.

(For example) the uses of your property in the state bonding bill for capital outlay, because you have to deed your property to the state to get the funds. There are real constitutional questions in this method of bonding, so the Bonding Authority is being careful about giving "automatic reverter" clauses, even though that is traditional. This is a clear encroachment, but the schools can't afford to back away.

One executive and three legislators agreed that the constitutional statements regarding institutional autonomy did make it difficult for the Legislature in its attempts to make higher education more responsive to the needs of the people of Michigan (Question 17). Only one of these respondents, a legislator, was concerned with the dilemma of accountability versus local autonomy. The others seemed more concerned with singular problems or issues. Two legislators lamented the lack of legislative control over self-liquidating projects--those buildings built with private funds--since the Legislature was required to provide for their upkeep later. The executive expressed concern over the ability of the institutions to control the amount of state support per student for medical education through their determination of the methods of instruction.

All of the presidents (6), three executives (50%) and five legislators concurred that the Constitution did not interfere with the Legislature in its involvement in higher education. One president, one legislator, and two executives in this group concluded that the vagueness of the Constitution permitted the executive and legislative branches to "work around" any restrictions that might exist, and,

therefore, seemed to imply that some encroachment upon autonomy was possible. One executive explained it in this way.

The branches can circumvent any problems through the use of the purse strings and sitting down with the institutions. This is with the understanding that there is a difference from the constitutional basis of autonomy and what actually exists.

Two other legislators who replied in the negative, reasoned that any problems in this area had been worked out through cooperation or the Salmon Decision. The final two legislators argued that it was not the Legislature's responsibility to make public higher education more responsive to the needs of the people of Michigan.

It is not the Legislature's responsibility to do that. The responsibility of the Legislature is to finance higher education, legally. In reality, everybody's involved in it. The legislators are the prime linkage with the people and try to make the universities responsive to the people. They get the issues out in debate which is not precluded by the Constitution.

Two executives, from the Department of Education, made up a third category on this question. One executive asserted that autonomy prevented state agencies from "exercising initiative which might prove to be an impediment in the future." The other argued that the Constitution had to be tested. "The Constitution means what the court says it means."

A wide variety of responses was proffered in the assessment of possible university reactions to threats of possible encroachment (Question 21). Two presidents, five legislators, and two executives reasoned that the institutional leaders would attempt to "work things out" through lobbying and other interaction with the governmental body involved. One president talked of using the alumni to influence the Legislature while the other respondents in this group suggested that

the institutional leaders would try to deal directly with the Legislature.

One executive and two legislators ventured that the use of a lawsuit was possible as in the Salmon Decision. One of the legislators termed this approach as extreme and the Salmon Case as "unique," as did many other respondents, who had suggested other alternatives as more typical. However, the executive asserted that the Salmon Case was not unique and that it had set the tone for governmental-institutional relations for succeeding years. Another legislator also maintained that cooperation had been accomplished because of that lawsuit.

Two executives said that they thought that the institutions reacted defensively and relied on the legality of their autonomy in the face of threatened encroachment, rather than trying to "work things out." One legislator claimed that the institutional leaders took the problem to the public forum of the press, court, Attorney General, or the university community. One president, from one of the Big Three institutions, declared that the leaders of the Big Three were more apt to talk things over and decide on an action, while the leaders of the other institutions were more hesitant to threaten legal action for fear that their boards might not support it.

Three presidents (50%) and one executive agreed that the most common response of the institutional leaders was with one voice, most typically through their advisory body, The Presidents' Council of State Colleges and Universities (PCSCU). However, as one president explained, getting unanimous agreement is not a simple chore.

Generally, we discuss it in the Presidents' Council. It is difficult to get full agreement. It is very rare when you get to a Salmon Decision which unites us. Something more mild, we will

draft a resolution or appoint a committee to talk to the legislative committees involved, or decide to do it individually, or, disagree violently.

Four presidents, two executives, and three legislators stated that the impact of encroachment upon individual governing boards would mean an undermining or preemption of their power (Question 25). The presidents seemed to view this inevitable result in an academic or theoretical manner. They answered either casually that it "could preempt their power to make decisions," or more directly, "the more encroachment, the less autonomy, then, the less power the boards have." The legislators, perhaps reflecting a more regular association with the gain and loss of power, suggested that it would be up to the boards to protect themselves.

(It would be) up to them to get it straightened around or take us to court. If they didn't, they would take the chance of losing what they have. It's not (a) perfect (solution), but better than letting the Legislature run it.

One executive contended that the governing boards simply reflected the views of the institution's president. Two other executives and one legislator suggested that the boards were not aware of problems or sensitive to the issue of autonomy. An even less appreciative view was expressed by another legislator who termed the governing boards as "not that important or effective." However, one president reflected the opposite viewpoint and feared the impact of encroachment for less obvious reasons.

If there were (encroachment), it would mean a poorer quality of governing boards. Boards view themselves as protectors of the public interest, not of the universities'. They take their jobs very seriously. If their jobs were diluted, it would not be as attractive.

Responses in this section (Questions 12 - 17, 21, 25) were contradictory. When first asked about problems regarding governmental encroachment upon autonomy, several respondents in each of the groups, especially the executives and legislators, claimed that there were few problems and that they could not think of very many examples. However, after several more direct questions, some of these same respondents listed many examples. This may suggest that many governmental and even institutional leaders may not view their actions as threats to autonomy until they are forced to discuss the implications of those actions in light of their own understanding of the concept of institutional autonomy.

Table 5 represents the respondents' perceptions of those issues wherein government involvement would constitute encroachment upon institutional autonomy (Questions 12 and 16).

Items a, c, d, and e in Table 5 are issues that reflect on the ability of the institutional leaders to determine what programs they will offer, how or by whom they will be taught, and the student mix: areas traditionally viewed within the domain of academic freedom and, institutional autonomy. Respondents from all three sample groups showed concern for the possible involvement of state government in these areas. Examples of such involvement on a large scale were mentioned by various respondents in different answers. Various members of the executive and legislative samples referred to the involvement of both branches in the placement of an Optometry School at Ferris State College and the College of Osteopathic Medicine at Michigan State University, and in opposition to the establishment of the College of Urban Development at Michigan State University.

Table 5.--Views on What Actions Represent Encroachment.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Control or operation of institutional programs	2	3	3	8
b. Internal use of funds--line-items	3		3	6
c. Faculty work loads	1	2	3	6
d. Number of out-of-state students and tuition and fees (Salmon Decision)		2	2	4
e. Involvement in course offerings		2	2	4
f. Personal influence in personnel and admissions	2		1	3
g. Capital Outlay process		2	1	3

Line-item appropriations and the process of capital outlay as listed in Table 5 represent concern that institutional leaders have the flexibility necessary to redirect funds in light of changes in management priority and the autonomy to direct construction after initial approval has been granted. The presidents asserted that it was necessary to have at least the freedom of managerial flexibility. While they were supported in these areas by some legislators and executives, it was not unanimous.

Table 6 represents the data from Questions 13, 14, 15, and 17 regarding the existence of encroachment.

Table 6.--Views on the Existence of Encroachment.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes, it exists	4	4	4	12
b. No, it does not	2	2	4	8

In all of these questions, at least two presidents had argued that any encroachments that have taken place, have either been too small to be concerned about or of no particular concern to their institutions. Both of these individuals were from smaller schools which may give credence to statements made by others that the smaller institutions were either not as concerned about autonomy or could not afford to be concerned.

The majority of respondents (14) claimed that the Constitution did not interfere with the Legislature's ability to perform its responsibilities regarding public higher education (Question 17). The

small percentage of respondents (20%) claiming that it did interfere compares startlingly with numerous assertions by members of both the legislative and executive samples, that line-item appropriations and other constraints were necessary to make the institutions more accountable. The numerous responses that the vagueness of the Constitution permitted circumvention, suggested a less than idealistic approach to that document and the concepts contained therein, including institutional autonomy.

The realistic approaches suggested by all sample groups as possible institutional responses to threatened encroachments (Question 21) seemed to reflect a common understanding of the continuous struggle to maintain and assert power. While many contended that the Salmon Decision was an atypical response, several argued that it was not and that it had accomplished much in setting the tone for institutional-governmental interactions in succeeding years.

The Nature of the Relationships of
the Institutions to the Executive
and Legislative Branches

Five legislators, two executives, and one president asserted that there were no differences in the relationships that the colleges and universities had with the Legislature from their relationships with the Executive Branch (Question 18). Both executives perceived that the relationships of the institutions with both branches were positive, providing opportunities "to work things out." The president, from one of the Big Three institutions, maintained that each branch was approached in a similar fashion, so that both branches would understand what his institution was doing. The legislators echoed these viewpoints.

Six respondents (30% of the total sample) maintained that there were differences in the relationships, but, of style rather than substance. Two presidents and two legislators reported that the relationships with the legislative branch were more individualized than those with the Executive Branch. Both of these presidents referred to the relationships with their legislators, or the legislator from their districts. One president, from a mid-size institution, emphasized the politics of the situation.

(There is) the relationship of a legislator to his institution. The Governor is more evenly distributed. The Executive and the Legislature respond to state-wide differences, but in different ways. Education is in politics and always will be.

One executive and one legislator suggested that the opposite was true in that the Governor was the single head of the Executive Branch implying a one-on-one relationship as opposed to the relationship with the collective body of the Legislature.

Four respondents (20% of total) asserted that the differences were more in substance than style. One executive referred to the statewide scope of the Governor's viewpoint as opposed to the more provincial approach of each legislator. Three presidents (50%) emphasized the difference in the approaches of the two branches: the Executive proving to be more "rational," while the Legislature was more "political." A president from a Big Three institution described it in this way.

The relationship with the Governor is more rational. (We) may not agree but a rational discussion with conclusions is ultimately drawn. In dealing with the Legislature there is a much stronger political influence. (It is) most important where the Appropriations Committee members are from. (With the) Governor it is more rational and analytical. In the Legislature it is highly political and analysis is irrelevant.

Finally, two executives claimed that the difference in relationships was that the Executive Branch was ignored.

The Executive Branch is ignored because decisions are made in the Legislature. (The institutions) are more concerned with relationships to the Legislature especially as concerns the Department of Education.

Both of these respondents were from the Department of Education which may explain their viewpoints.

Two presidents and two legislators did not perceive differences in the relationships of the branches with the institutions by category (Question 19). The legislators contended that they attempted to treat all institutions the same despite their size differences. The presidents reemphasized that any differences in the relationships were due to the political realities rather than the size of the institutions. "The real difference is who is in who's district, since legislators favor their institutions."

The other sixteen respondents (80%) countered that there were differences by category, but their explanations varied (Question 20). Eleven respondents concurred that the larger institutions, specifically the Big Three, were viewed as more important by state government than other institutions, although for varied reasons. Four legislators, one president, and one executive stated outright that the larger institutions were more important to the state. The general contention of these respondents was that the Big Three were more visible and stronger politically, and required more attention in terms of time and money.

Two presidents, one executive, and one legislator also termed the Big Three as more important than the smaller institutions, but emphasized the political impact of their larger group of alumni.

Another executive, reemphasizing style differences, characterized the Big Three as "more organized and more sensitive to autonomy."

Five respondents indicated other differences in the relationships by category of institution. One executive suggested that rather than size in the absolute sense, that differences existed because of program type. "More attention is paid to institutions with high cost medical programs and the needs of developing institutions." Another executive offered that the major difference was between the elected and appointed boards and was an "operational difference because of the political backgrounds of the boards, Democrats with a Democratic Legislature, rather than Republicans with a Republican Governor."

One executive and one legislator contended that the smaller schools needed the Legislature more and, therefore, were protected by it. A president emphasized the negative treatment of the Big Three which was echoed by several others in passing.

The Big Three are treated differently--sometimes negatively. (There is) much more jockeying for small sums among small schools and therefore it is more rewarding for those schools. The Big Three must deal in bigger money. A legislator looks good for giving a smaller sum and other legislators are willing to help them.

When asked to characterize the trend in the relationships of the colleges and universities to the legislative and executive branches (Question 26), the majority of respondents looked to either a future of more cooperation or one of more accountability. Three presidents (50%), three executives (50%) and two legislators (25%) pointed to a better atmosphere of cooperation and positive interaction. The presidents emphasized the continuity and trend of mutual respect in the Governor's Office. One president contended that the declining

availability of public money and tax limitation would drive the institutions closer to the state government. Legislators and executives alike pointed to improving relationships with "much less divisiveness than in past years."

Two presidents and five legislators stressed the ominous trends of declining enrollments and available money which they contended will lead to more emphasis on accountability. To insure that accountability, they said that both branches would ask for and utilize more relevant data and perform more programmatic analyses. One legislator suggested that he looked for a trend toward better methods of financing higher education so as not to price "our constituents out of higher education."

Two executives carried the "accountability" view a step further and suggested that the movement would be away from institutional autonomy with greater encroachment particularly from the legislative side. Another executive felt that the trend was in maintaining the status quo or at least trying to do so. Recent declines in "state support by percentage" and declining enrollments were seen as trends portending possible changes in the relationships.

Finally, one president described the trend as "cyclical," and offered his perceptions based on extensive experience.

In the 50s, the schools were under tremendous pressure to economize and cut back, because the state was in difficulty. Then, in the halcyon days of the 60s, they were funded well and regarded favorably. Then came the "student dissent" era that focused attention on the schools to their detriment. Until then, legislators were not aware. Then, legislators became aware of student actions and destruction. Their reaction was that the students were getting into the political arena and that was theirs, so they reacted and got into the university arena. It wasn't the crush of budgets or anything else. The Salmon Decision was brought about because of the Legislature trying to get into the universities'

bailiwick, a reaction to the universities getting into theirs. We moved from a peaceful, coexistence era into a very tough situation. We'll never recover from that "student dissent" era. We lost our ivory tower, lost it consciously. But, it's easing up obviously.

The perceptions of the three sample groups were very different in this section (Questions 18 - 20 and 26). The majority of the legislators indicated that the relationships of the institutions with the Legislature were no different than their relationships with the Executive Branch. Those who perceived a difference said that it was more of style than substance. The majority of presidents countered that there were differences in the relationships. While some (2) considered them to be more of style, more (3) viewed their relationships with the Executive Branch as "more rational," and their relationships with the Legislature as "more political." The executive respondents were more evenly divided: two saw no difference in the relationships; two others claimed that the Executive Branch was ignored by the institutions; one considered the differences as simply stylistic; and, one asserted that the approach of the executive branch was wider in scope than that of the Legislature.

The majority of the respondents (11) concurred that the Big Three institutions were regarded as more important than the other institutions by the legislative and executive branches, which affected their relationships. Several respondents contended that the large size of these institutions was often a negative factor in their relationships with the branches of state government.

While many of the respondents perceived a trend of positive relationships and a spirit of cooperation among the institutions and the branches of state government (Question 26), others countered that

the trend was the requirement of more accountability and information from the institutions. Still others carried the latter view further, by asserting that the trend was away from institutional autonomy and toward more encroachment.

The Respondents' Perceptions of
Colleagues' Views Concerning
Encroachment

Table 7 represents the respondents' evaluations of the agreement of their colleagues with the respondents' perceptions regarding possible encroachment upon institutional autonomy (Question 22).

Table 7.--Respondents' Perceptions of Colleagues' Views on Encroachment.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Agree--generally	4	5	2	11
b. Agreement among those involved in Higher Education		1	4	5
c. Wide variance			2	2
d. Disagree	2			2

The majority of respondents (11) considered their views to be generally aligned with those of their colleagues. Five executives and two legislators said that they assumed that there would be general agreement within their branches. Four presidents also interpreted their views as typical, allowing for individual differences as expressed by one president.

(I would expect) a selective response based upon individual impacts upon their institutions, but, in general, similar views on the principles that I stated.

Four legislators (50%) and one executive included a disclaimer on affirmative responses, by restricting agreement to those "involved with higher education."

Those who deal with Higher Education are very aware of what is involved and try to avoid it (encroachment). The Legislature at large is not aware. However, very few, if any, want to run higher education.

Two legislators assumed that a wide variance of opinion would prevail in the Legislature. They contended that in such a large and diverse group, differences of opinion were to be expected on most issues. Two presidents stated that their colleagues would probably disagree with their views. One president whose views might be classified as "conservative," suggested that his fellow presidents would "probably react violently." The other president, perhaps owing to his past and future association with state government, characterized his views as "different" and "probably less institutional," than those of his colleagues.

Respondents' Perceptions of the Views of the Other Sampled Groups Concerning Encroachment

Table 8 represents the respondents' perceptions of the views of the other two groups regarding their respective views on encroachment upon institutional autonomy (Question 23).

Half of the executives and legislators concluded that the presidents would be in general agreement concerning encroachment. The legislators based their responses on the lack of any evidence of substantial disagreement and the fact that the relationships had been

Table 8.--Respondents' Perceptions of Views of Other Sampled Groups Concerning Encroachment.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
1. Presidents:				
a. Agree		3	4	7
b. Disagree		3	3	6
c. Differ individually			1	1
2. Executives:				
a. Agree	3		6	9
b. Disagree	3		1	4
c. Differ individually			1	1
3. Legislators:				
a. Agree		3		3
b. Disagree	6	3		9

"cordial." The executives based their conclusions on their mutual understanding with the presidents for a "rational approach" to their interactions.

The other half of the executives (3) and three legislators declared that the presidents would have dissimilar views from theirs concerning encroachment. These executives maintained that the presidents would feel that there had been encroachment, or at least more than the executives would admit. The legislators echoed similar assessments. One legislator contended that differences in views concerning encroachment would depend on "personalities" and individual situations.

The presidents were split evenly on their perceptions of the views of the Executive Branch. The presidents who saw agreement between themselves and the Executive Branch perceived the Governor as either desirous of preserving autonomy or sympathetic to the

institutional position. Those who felt the executives would disagree, tended to lump both branches of government together and to claim that they were unaware of encroachment even while doing it.

Six legislators (75%) stated that the Executive Branch would probably be in agreement with the Legislature that either encroachment had not occurred or that what had been done was necessary. One legislator disagreed by claiming that the Executive Branch "had made encroachments."

The executives were equally divided in their assessments of the views of the legislators. Those who claimed agreement with themselves, seemed to be comparing their views with those legislators who deal with higher education rather than the whole body. One of those who claimed disagreement with the Legislature, concluded that the legislators "may not see things as issues of autonomy or encroachment--they are less theoretical." All six of the presidents (100%) concurred that the legislators would disagree with their views concerning encroachment. Some viewed the legislators as naturally desirous of more power. Another compared the advantages of the years of continuity shared with the same Governor with the disadvantages of the continual changeovers in the Legislature requiring reeducation concerning the institutional positions.

When asked if the responses of the presidents might differ by category of institution (by size), all of the executives felt that they would while the legislators manifested diversity in their opinions (Question 24). Three of the executives felt that the larger institutions were more sensitive to autonomy and less accepting of encroachment. Two other executives, however, countered that the

larger institutions were more secure in their roles and that the smaller institutions were more concerned with encroachment either by the state or their sister institutions. The last executive offered simply that a difference in size meant a difference in power which would probably affect the views of institutional leaders.

Two legislators agreed with the view that the presidents of the larger institutions would reflect a view more sensitive to their autonomy and encroachments upon it. Five legislators disagreed and countered that the differences would be because of the individual or the particular institution or situation, not because of the size of the institutions.

The responses in this section (Questions 22 and 23) manifested apparent confusion over the views of individuals by the various sample groups. Interestingly, all six of the presidents, even those down-playing encroachment in previous sections, concluded that the Legislature would be in disagreement with them as a group and would favor encroachment upon their institutional autonomy. A majority of the legislators perceived that the Executive Branch would be in agreement with them. The rest of the groups were evenly divided in their perceptions of the views of the other groups and whether there would be agreement among them.

All of the executives maintained that the presidents would differ in their views according to the sizes of their institutions, although they were divided on the which views would coincide with which size. The majority of legislators, countered that rather than differing by size of institution, the presidents' views would probably

depend on them as individuals or the particular situation of their institutions.

Statewide Coordination of Public Higher Education in Michigan

The final group of questions (27 - 34) was concerned with the need for a statewide coordination mechanism for public higher education in Michigan. The data have been analyzed and presented under three headings: the need for a statewide coordination mechanism; the respondents' perceptions of their colleagues' views regarding the issue of coordination; and, the respondents' perceptions of the views of the other sampled groups regarding statewide coordination.

The Need for a Statewide Coordination Mechanism

The majority of the respondents (19) asserted that the Legislature should not have a stronger role than it now has in the control or direction of public higher education in Michigan (Question 27). Only one legislator expressed an opposing viewpoint.

Yes, if we are going to get a handle on some of these problems-- the cost factor, etc. There must be government planning to avoid needless duplication of courses, buildings, etc.

Some of the legislators (3) declared that the present role of the Legislature was strong enough and should not be expanded, although possibly improved. Other legislators (2) carried that view further by claiming that legislators had "ample tools right now" to carry out their responsibilities concerning higher education. However, two legislators determined that because of the diversity of opinions and interests prevalent in the Legislature, that body could not do a "good job" of controlling higher education.

The executives were unanimous in their opposition to increased legislative control, but divided in their explanations. Two executives contended: that the Legislature was sufficiently strong already; that the perspectives of individual legislators were not global enough to be effective in controlling higher education; and, that the appropriations process was not an adequate method of control because it precluded "long-range planning and program development." Another executive claimed that the legislators could not possibly have a stronger role in the control or direction of public higher education since they were already literally "the coordinating element by the appropriations process."

Four of the presidents termed the present level of legislative involvement as sufficient with enough power "to do what they have to do." Another president added the following:

No, they should make the general funding decisions, but they are already more involved in higher education administration than they should be. (That is) one of the reasons, I feel, that we do not have the good planning that we need.

The majority of the respondents (14) also maintained that the Executive Branch should not have a stronger role in the control or direction of public higher education (Question 28). The view expressed among four of the presidents was that the balance was good between both branches and that good working relationships had been established. Another president maintained that the Governor's appointment of the governing boards of individual institutions gave that branch a very strong role. The only president advocating a stronger role for the Executive Branch stated that he felt that there should be a "State Board of Higher Education within the Executive Branch."

Among the legislators, two contended that the Executive Branch's role should be stronger. One had argued the same case for the Legislature's role in the previous question, maintaining that both should be strengthened. The other legislator stated that the Executive Branch should direct public higher education "subject to the advice and consent of the Senate." The other six legislators argued that the Executive Branch had sufficient power in relation to the institutions, although two suggested that their budget process could be strengthened to provide some coordination of the institutions through that medium.

The executive sample was evenly divided over the issue of a stronger role for their branch. Two executives, from the Department of Management and Budget, contended that the role of their branch should be stronger because "it has a more global perspective," and because they "believed in the role of a strong executive." The other executive proposing a stronger role was from the Department of Education, and he suggested that the present budget agencies should expand their involvement in coordination and planning, under the control of the State Board of Education. Another executive, also from the Department of Education, argued that while the role of the Executive Branch should not be strengthened to direct higher education, the Department of Education "should have a stronger role in coordination." He made a distinction between coordination and planning, claiming that the latter should be left to the discretion of the individual institutions.

All eight legislators (100%) stated that there should not be a separate coordinating agency for the four-year, public colleges and universities in Michigan (Question 29). One legislator argued that the "educators should do any coordinating necessary." Two others agreed

that the institutions should be involved in voluntary cooperation. However, all three legislators also maintained that the Legislature should continue its very strong role in the control of appropriations.

At least four other legislators (50%) contended that rather than forming another state bureaucracy with a new coordinating agency, coordination should be accomplished through the strengthening and improving of the processes carried on by the legislative fiscal agencies and the budget division of the Department of Management and Budget. One member of a legislative fiscal agency delineated the fine points.

Coordination and control are two different things. In higher education, we're usually talking about control. Coordination is a process. The important thing is process and function. The fiscal agencies are a coordinating agency in the true sense of the word, not control agents. We do that now and that process should be strengthened, strengthened even if it involves a new agency. There should not be a control agency.

Three executives (50%) also argued for no separate coordinating agency. Two of these executives, from the Department of Management and Budget, concurred with those urging an expansion of the present budget process, although they maintained that it should be within the Executive Branch. Another executive argued the basis of the question.

The issue is whether or not the Constitution should be changed, then, we can address these questions. Are we willing to sacrifice autonomy for coordination?

Three presidents (50%) also asserted their opposition to a separate coordinating agency. Two of these presidents contended that the Presidents' Council (PCSCU) could provide any coordination that would be necessary, as expressed below.

No, although I have voted yes in the President's Council. I did it because we know it's a choice of this or a stronger board. We are doing a much better job of voluntary coordination in the Presidents' Council now, it should be stronger and is getting

better. The fiscal and budget agencies are not a threat and should continue to gather their information and data to do the formulas.

One president and one executive advocated a separate coordinating agency. The executive suggested that "there is a need for a responsible forum for the discussion of issues beyond the appropriations process." He did not advocate a "governance board," but, "something with some power to cause discussion." The president, however, urged a more comprehensive agency.

Yes, appointed by the Governor. The present agencies could do it, but I favor a separate board, tradition would support it. The state needs coordination. The real bane of higher education is everyone wanting to be like everyone else. We can't afford it. We have to get into specialization. We won't see it without a coordinating board.

Two presidents came down in the middle and found it difficult to choose sides. One stated that although he had advocated a separate board "since 1957," he was beginning to reconsider that position. The other, although generally "opposed to the idea," granted that he could "see one on an advisory basis." He felt that it would be useful for the Governor and the Legislature to "have some agency making recommendations on what should be done in the expansion of programs." He doubted the ability of the Presidents' Council to be effective in this role, because of the "nature of the institutions and their boards," but, suggested that the fiscal agencies or State Board could do it "with the help of outside panels."

Two executives from the Department of Education, argued against a separate agency outside of the control of the State Board. Both contended that the State Board would be effective in a coordination role. One advocated a separate State Board for Higher Education to be under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education. The other was

concerned that a separate State Board for Higher Education would tend to separate the control of certain educational areas that naturally transcended the K - 12 - Higher Education barrier, such as Teacher Education, Vocational Education and others.

Very few respondents could agree on the function of a coordinating agency if one were established (Question 30). Two presidents suggested that an expansion of the functions of the present fiscal agencies was in order, to provide for coordination on a voluntary basis. One contended that an "identifiable subagency" already existed in the Governor's Office, probably referring to the Education Division of the Bureau of the Budget in the Department of Management and Budget.

The president who had advocated a separate agency in the previous question, explained that "coordination implies control and some influence with the Legislature." Another president contended that the Presidents' Council could do a "better job than anything else."

Four executives suggested that a coordinating agency should be involved in investigative and evaluative processes, the review of budgets and program proposals, and the recommendation of policy. Another executive urged coordination without planning, while a final executive argued that "coordination implies control."

Four legislators (50%) urged voluntary coordination through the present budget mechanism. They advocated the cooperation of the executive and legislative branches in this regard.

Since most respondents did not favor a separate coordinating agency, the majority did not indicate whether such an agency should have statutory or advisory powers (Question 31).

The president advocating a "coordinating board" in Question 29 and claiming that "coordination implies some control" in Question 30, opted for an agency only with advisory powers. Another president, apparently in favor of coordination through the present budget process, argued for some statutory powers.

There should not be a single board of control over higher education. (Any agency) has to have statutory powers recognized by others. The Bureau of the Budget and the fiscal agencies are dealing with coordination mechanism items. The biggest obstacle is getting the Legislature, Executive, and agencies to recognize (its) authority.

Four executives argued that any agency should have statutory powers. As one executive explained, there would be no incentive for the institutions to "change" without statutory powers. Another added that statutory powers would be needed "to bring the institutions together where they are encouraged to work things out." Doubting that "opportunity for encroachment would be any greater," another executive declared that such an agency "would automatically have statutory powers through the power of the Governor and the Legislature." A fifth executive contended that the Governor "should have the right to recommend and the Legislature to dispose, while the institution still maintains local control."

The only legislator answering, repeated his advocacy of the present budget and fiscal agencies as a coordinating agency, without control.

Only to coordinate, not to control or manage. There is a need to beef up the process or mechanism that now exists. What could an agency do better than we can now? (We should) beef up and strengthen the linkages that now exist. Keep it as broad as possible in its involvement. Any control system would be detrimental. Centralized control systems are a result of crisis which we don't have.

Only seven respondents (35% of total) commented on what limitations a coordinating agency should have (Question 32). The president who had advocated a separate coordinating agency previously, argued for a reduction in local autonomy, but with the continuation of the local governing boards. Another president said that he would still prefer "to have autonomy and flexibility in the local institutions."

Four executives, three of whom had advocated statutory powers in the previous question, also argued for the preservation of local autonomy. Their concern was for the most efficient operational control. Areas that they declared should be controlled at the statewide level were the expansion of programs beyond local geographical areas and decisions on enrollments. One executive, who had advocated the role of the State Board in coordination, maintained that the overriding concern should be "coordination and not institutional prerogatives."

From the responses in this section (Questions 27 - 32), it seems apparent that several approaches to coordination have been advocated. Table 9 represents an evaluation of which proposals seemed to be favored by which group.

These conclusions in Table 9 seem to reflect a Michigan tradition strongly opposed to centralized coordination, especially in higher education, and the phenomenon of individual power and influence preservation. Three presidents (50%) opposed coordination at the state level. If given their preference, they would advocate the continuation of the "status quo," which they perceive as a system providing them with constitutional power and protection. One of these presidents, from a Big Three institution, and possibly operating from a position of power, declared openness to the decisions of the

Table 9.--Views on Methods of Coordination.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
1. Separate Coordination Board with Advisory powers	2	1		3
2. State Board as statutory Coordination Board		3		3
3. Coordination through Budget mechanism:				
a. Executive control with some local autonomy		2		2
b. Executive and Legislative fiscal agencies--no control	1		3	4
4. Status Quo--PCSCU for voluntary coordination, Legislature has appropriations control	3		5	8

marketplace rather than accepting coordination. The other presidents showing preference to the present arrangement were from smaller institutions and may have perceived more protection for their interests in the present structure.

Five legislators also argued for no change. Some said that the present mechanisms should continue and others contended that any coordination should be done by the educators. However, their perceptions of the extent of their appropriations power differed considerably from the perceptions of the presidents. Since many respondents in all three sample groups had previously contended that the Legislature exerted a considerable amount of control through their appropriations power, it is understandable for them to oppose a change that would compromise that power.

One president, two executives, and three legislators apparently recognizing a need for some coordination, favored a strengthening of the present budget and fiscal agencies to accomplish it. The two executives, from the Department of Management and Budget, contended that such an activity should be under the control of the Executive Branch. The three legislators and the president agreed that the present budget and fiscal agencies could facilitate coordination, but seemed to be suggesting a cooperation of the fiscal agencies under the two branches.

Three executives (50%), all from the Department of Education, favored the placement of any coordination power under the control of the State Board of Education, which would obviously enhance the responsibilities of the Department of Education in higher education. Two of these executives argued that the State Board was the legitimate

coordinating agency according to the Constitution, and, that with a minimum of revision, it could perform that function effectively. They also contended that it would be optimistic and naive to assume that the institutions would comply with requests from an advisory body, a conclusion undoubtedly based on the experiences of the State Board in its ill-fated attempts at coordination prior to the Salmon Decision. Therefore, they recommended statutory powers. The third executive argued that the question was the constitutional issue of whether the state wanted coordination or autonomy, the implication being that one precluded the other.

One executive argued that a coordinating agency was necessary to provide a forum for discussion where the institutions would be encouraged to coordinate their efforts.³ Two presidents also favored a coordinating agency. One, admitting to an "Executive Branch view" because of his own political ties and positions, had argued for a separate agency throughout the interview. His preference was for some reduction in autonomy and a coordinating agency with "advisory powers," although his statements did seem to favor an agency with more power than the other president. The final respondent, the president of a Big Three university, said that he saw the value in an advisory body which could make recommendations to the Governor and the Legislature regarding declining enrollment issues and program expansion. He was

³It should be noted that Governor Milliken had favored a coordinating agency with advisory powers for several years. However, in recent months this policy has been changed in favor of coordination through the Executive Budget process. This interview was given while that change was being contemplated. This respondent, from the Governor's Office, may have supported the latter coordination method, had the interview been done at a later date.

reticent to assign that responsibility to the Presidents' Council because of the conflicting interests involved.

Respondents' Perceptions of Colleagues'
Views Concerning Coordination

Table 10 represents the respondents' perceptions of their colleagues' views regarding statewide coordination of higher education in Michigan.

Table 10.--Respondents' Perceptions of Colleagues' Views on Coordination.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Favor a state coordinating agency-- State Board would like to be the agency		4		4
b. Favor budget mechanism--State Board would have a different view		2		2
c. Mixed views--mostly against	2		6	8
d. Against a Coordinating Agency	4		2	6

All of the executives (6) agreed that the State Board's perception, and therefore, the perception of at least part of the Department of Education, would be different from the rest of the Executive Branch. Four executives maintained that the Executive Branch would generally be in favor of a statewide coordinating agency, acknowledging that the State Board of Education would like to be that agency. Two

executives argued that the Executive Branch would support coordination through the budget mechanism already in operation within that branch. They also acknowledged that the State Board would have a different view than the rest of the branch. All six executives apparently perceived that the majority of their colleagues' would favor the coordination method that they had espoused in the previous section of questions.

All of the legislators perceived that all or most of their colleagues would be against statewide coordination. Most reasoned that they had heard "little talk" of a coordinating agency and that there would be very few who "would view it positively." Two legislators claimed that opposition would be unanimous against starting a "new bureaucracy adding frustration for the people." One legislator argued that most legislators were not aware of the situation and that coordination was "not an issue."

All of the presidents perceived that all or most of their fellow presidents would be against statewide coordination. Four of the presidents characterized their views as "hostile" or "quite negative." Even those who conceded that some might accept a coordinating agency, maintained that the majority would oppose it, and if a coordinating mechanism emerged, all would prefer it to be advisory only.

Respondents' Perceptions of the Views
of the Other Sampled Groups Con-
cerning Coordination

Table 11 represents the respondents' perceptions of the attitudes toward statewide coordination of higher education in Michigan among the other groups involved in this study.

Table 11.--Respondents' Perceptions of the Views of the Other Sampled Groups Concerning Coordination.

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
1. Presidents:				
a. Favor voluntary Coordination Board		1	1	2
b. Favor coordination through Budget mechanism		2	1	3
c. Oppose coordination		3	6	9
2. Executives:				
a. Favor Coordination Agency	2		5	7
b. Favor coordination through budget mechanism			1	1
c. Favor coordina- tion--Mixed views on method	3		1	4
d. Oppose coordination	1		1	2
3. Legislators:				
a. Favor voluntary Coordination Board	1	1		2
b. Oppose coordination	4	3		7
c. Mixed views-- Most do not know	1	2		3

The majority of presidents and legislators declared that the Executive Branch was generally in favor of statewide coordination. Five legislators characterized the whole Executive Branch as being in favor of coordination, the motive for which, they maintained, was the desire for more power. Two presidents concurred that the Executive Branch would favor coordination by an agency, controlled by that branch. Three presidents (50%) and one legislator added that the Executive Branch would favor some form of coordination, although they would not be unanimous on what form it should take. The three presidents seemed very cogniscent of nuances of difference within the Executive Branch. They described the Governor and the Department of Management and Budget as being in favor of coordination through their budget mechanism, while they contended that the Department of Education was in favor of a coordination role for the State Board.

The majority of executives (3) and legislators (6) perceived the presidents as opposed to coordination of any kind. They contended that the presidents would view coordination as a threat to their autonomy. Two executives, from the Department of Management and Budget, and one legislator, from one of the legislative fiscal agencies, argued that the presidents would be open to the coordination mechanism of the budget agencies. They reasoned that the presidents might be open to that approach because of concerns over declining enrollments and the decreasing availability of state funds.

The majority of presidents (4) and half of the executives perceived that the majority of legislators would oppose coordination. The general reasoning was that the Legislature viewed itself as holding most of the power and would prefer not to have that compromised.

One president countered that both branches were for coordination by an agency within that particular branch. One executive, perceiving a favorable attitude toward coordination among legislators, also contended that it was probably dependent on the fact that such an agency would not be independent of the Legislature.

Summary

In this chapter, the results of the research have been reported. The major findings were summarized in the order in which the concerns were presented.

Theoretical and Constitutional Bases for Institutional Autonomy

In the area of the theoretical and constitutional bases for autonomy, a diversity of opinion was clearly evident. A slight majority of the respondents agreed with the working definition of institutional autonomy which emphasized the local control of institutional leaders over the use of resources and the definition and execution of programs. Strong support for such a view was found among the presidents, the majority of the executives, but less than half of the legislators. The minority argued that the autonomy of the institutions was restricted by external factors and had to be understood within the parameters of the appropriations control of the Legislature.

A mixed group of respondents, including half of the legislators, asserted that the Constitution had dictated that the elected boards of the Big Three institutions were more autonomous than the appointed boards of the other colleges and universities. Another

group, including half of the presidents, surmised that while the Constitution had not contained the idea of differences in autonomy, tradition within the state had accorded historical status that elevated the University of Michigan and perhaps the rest of the Big Three above the other institutions. However, half of the total sample argued that no difference in status for any category of institution was contained in the Constitution. In addition, 90% of the respondents asserted that no difference in status should be encouraged by the State of Michigan either in the Constitution or by statute. A large majority of the respondents, including all of the presidents, also contended that the constitutional status accorded to the colleges and universities was not comparable to the status of the Legislature or the Executive Branch. A minority maintained that the institutions had a constitutional status which was comparable to a "fourth branch of government."

A majority of the respondents suggested that the language regarding the role of the State Board of Education in the coordination of the colleges and universities should either be clarified or eliminated from the Constitution. No other changes were advocated.

The vast majority of respondents in each of the groups concluded that the value of institutional autonomy was in the protection of the institutions from political intervention in their affairs. The majority also contended that without the constitutional provisions of institutional autonomy, governmental interference or the centralization of governance at a statewide level would result.

The majority of the presidents and the executives maintained that their colleagues would agree with their perceptions on the meaning

and value of institutional autonomy. However, the majority of legislators ventured that there would be a wide variety of opinion concerning autonomy within the Legislature.

A majority of presidents, executives and legislators perceived that there would be general agreement among those in both branches of government and in the colleges and universities regarding the meaning of institutional autonomy. However, since agreement among the respondents was almost evenly split on the definition of autonomy provided, it is obvious that each group must have been answering based on their own understanding of the concept.

The majority of legislators and executives agreed that the presidents would be supportive of autonomy. The legislators and presidents, however, were divided in their views on the executives. The largest group asserted that the executives were not supportive of autonomy, while another section, including all of the presidents, perceived the executives as divided in their opinions.

There was also diversity of opinion across the presidential and executive samples regarding the views of the legislators. One group saw them as unsupportive of autonomy, while an equally large segment characterized them as divided.

Encroachment Upon Institutional Autonomy

In the area of encroachment of the state upon the institutional autonomy of the colleges and universities, contradictions were apparent. Although, when first asked, many respondents maintained that there had been no encroachment, subsequent answers brought several examples.

Respondents from all three sample groups expressed concern over governmental involvement in the determination of programs and courses, faculty work load standards, tuition and fee rates, and the student mix, all of which have been viewed traditionally as within the domain of institutional autonomy. Other areas of concern included restrictions on appropriated funds and the capital outlay process in the Legislature. There was more debate in these latter areas as presidents argued for the freedom of managerial flexibility while legislators and executives were concerned over accountability in the use of state funds.

The majority of presidents and executives contended that there had been encroachment by the state upon the autonomy of the institutions. Half of the legislators agreed with this view. Those who disagreed within the sample groups maintained either that what may have taken place was not too serious or that it was legitimate within the framework of their understanding of the concept and political realities.

The majority of respondents contended that the Constitution did not interfere with the Legislature's ability to perform its responsibilities regarding higher education. However, a number of legislators and executives revealed that the vagueness of the Constitution permitted any circumvention necessary to achieve their purposes.

While the majority of legislators indicated that the relationships of the institutions with the Legislature were no different than their relationships with the Executive Branch, the majority of presidents countered that there were differences. Although some respondents in each of the sample groups contended that such differences

were more of style than of substance, others declared that the relationships with the Executive Branch were "more rational," while the relationships with the Legislature were "more political."

The majority of respondents concurred that the Big Three institutions were regarded as more important by the Legislature and the Executive Branch. Others maintained that the large size of these institutions was often a negative factor in relationships with the branches.

While many of the respondents perceived that the trend in relationships among the branches of state government and the institutions was toward more "positive" interaction and cooperation, others maintained that the trend was toward more accountability. Some executives added that they perceived the trend to be away from autonomy and toward encroachment.

The majority of respondents considered their views concerning encroachment to be generally aligned with those of their colleagues. This was especially true among the presidents and executives. However, the majority of legislators explained that agreement within the Legislature would be limited to those "involved with higher education."

All of the presidents concluded that the legislators would be in disagreement with them as a group and would favor encroachment upon their institutions' autonomy. A majority of the legislators perceived that the majority of the Executive Branch would be in agreement with their views. The rest of the sample was evenly divided in their perceptions of the other groups as either supporting their views or opposing them. All of the executives maintained that the presidents would differ with each other on encroachment according to the size of

their institutions. The legislators, however, contended that the presidents' views would differ not because of the size of their institutions, but, because of them as individuals or the particular situation of their institutions.

Statewide Coordination for Public Higher Education

In the area of statewide coordination, the most distinct delineations according to sample group occurred. Half of the presidents and a majority of the legislators argued against any statewide coordination. The presidents argued from Michigan's tradition and excellent record. The legislators, however, seemed to be more conscious of maintaining their already considerable power.

The majority of the executives favored some method of coordination. Those within the Department of Management and Budget argued for coordination through the budget process already in existence within that branch. Those from the Department of Education contended that the legitimate state coordinating agency was the State Board of Education. These and other suggestions for and against coordination, all presented with seemingly rational arguments, were all products of the agency or group that would eventually wield power in the eventuality that their approach was followed.

The respondents' perceptions of their colleagues' views concerning coordination also corresponded generally to the particular respondent's own views on coordination. Within the executive sample, all six respondents perceived that the views of the State Board of Education, and possibly, the Department of Education, would be at variance with the rest of the Executive Branch. The majority of the

executives contended that the majority of that branch would favor a state coordinating agency and that the State Board would probably like to be that agency. The majority of the presidents and the legislators perceived that their colleagues would not favor any coordinating agency.

The majority of presidents and legislators perceived that the Executive Branch was generally in favor of coordination. The presidents' perceptions closely mirrored the executives' views of themselves. The presidents' were seen by the executives and legislators as quite opposed to coordination. Finally, the presidents and executives contended that the legislators were divided in their views, but generally were opposed to coordination.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary of the Study

The purpose of this research was to examine the perceptions of three separate groups of people, all of whom are involved in public higher education in Michigan, concerning certain key issues regarding institutional autonomy. The three groups were: the presidents of the public, four-year colleges and universities in Michigan; members of the Legislative Branch of state government; and, department heads within the Executive Branch. The perceptions of these three groups were examined in three areas: their understanding of the constitutional and theoretical bases for and the extent of the local autonomy of the colleges and universities; the possible encroachment of state government upon that autonomy; and the possible need for statewide coordination and planning of public higher education in Michigan.

The population was composed of: the presidents of the fifteen public colleges and universities in Michigan; legislators on appropriations committees and committees overseeing higher education, and legislative staff people; and, Executive Branch department heads involved with public higher education. From the population, the sample was taken and included: six presidents; six department heads from the

Executive Branch; and a total of eight from the Legislature, seven legislators and one department head from the fiscal agencies.

The criteria used in selecting the presidents included: length of service; type of institution represented; geographical location of the institution; and, the individual's familiarity with the issues. From the Executive Branch, department heads were chosen from units that have significant involvement with higher education: the Department of Management and Budget, the Department of Education, and the Governor's Office. In addition to committee assignment, other considerations for members of the legislative sample included: length of service; party affiliation; and membership in the House or the Senate. In the case of the latter two criteria, a reasonable cross-section was sought.

The basis for the interviews and the study itself, was the differences in perception that exist among three separate groups concerning central issues with which their work requires them to be knowledgeable. The interview format was semi-structured, to insure the coverage of all essential points and to allow for elaboration and fruitful digression.

All interviews were conducted by the researcher one-on-one in the respondents' respective offices. Because of the busy schedules of administrators and legislators, the interview was designed for an hour or less. The interviews generally lasted between forty and sixty minutes, depending somewhat on the respondents' schedules, but primarily on how much discussion was generated by the topics. Each interview was taped using 120-minute cassettes and a portable cassette recorder.

After the interviews were completed, the researcher listened to the tapes with a copy of the interview format as a guide. As

answers to the questions were given, they were transcribed on the appropriate page of the interview format. Two judges were asked to record answers from three interviews. Their answers were compared to the researcher's and they were judged to be accurate. The researcher then proceeded independently.

The researcher listened to the remainder of the tapes and recorded the answers. The data were collated according to the specific questions asked and the answers given. The judges were again asked to assist in this procedure. In some cases, the answers were simply "yes" or "no," easily identifiable and easily categorized. In other cases, the answers were quite different and categories difficult to determine. The judges were asked to assist in the determination of the final categorization of the more complicated answers. The data were then put into table form, and the percentage that each answer represented of the total sample, was computed. Obvious trends have been noted, and the relationships among the three groups and the responses to the questions have been discussed.

Major Findings

The major findings of the research were discussed under three major headings and various subheadings.

Theoretical and Constitutional Bases for Institutional Autonomy

The findings within this area are presented under three headings: the meaning and extent of institutional autonomy; the value of institutional autonomy; and the respondents' perceptions of the views of their colleagues and the other sampled groups concerning autonomy.

The Meaning and Extent of Institutional Autonomy

A majority of the presidents and executives agreed with a working definition of institutional autonomy which emphasized the local control of institutional leaders over the use of resources and the definition and execution of programs. A majority of legislators argued that the autonomy of the institutions was restricted by external factors and had to be understood within the parameters of the appropriations control of the Legislature.

Although half of the respondents maintained that no status difference for any institutional category was dictated by the constitutional statements regarding autonomy, some argued that the elected boards of the Big Three institutions were more autonomous. Another group contended that an historical status difference had been accorded the larger institutions. The vast majority of respondents, however, concurred that such a status difference should not be encouraged within the Constitution or by statute. A majority of the respondents, including all of the presidents, claimed that the constitutional status of the institutions was not comparable to that of the Legislature or the Executive Branch. It was also suggested, by the majority, that the language in the Constitution, referring to the role of the State Board of Education in the coordination of the public colleges and universities should be clarified or eliminated.

The Value of Institutional Autonomy

The vast majority of respondents in each of the sample groups concluded that the value of institutional autonomy was in the

protection of the colleges and universities from political or governmental interference. Moreover, they asserted, the elimination of autonomy would result in governmental intervention at the local level or the centralization of governance at the state level.

Respondents' Perceptions of the Other Views

A majority of the presidents and executives maintained that their colleagues would agree with their perceptions of the meaning and value of institutional autonomy. However, the majority of legislators ventured that there would be a wide variety of opinion on those subjects in the Legislature. The presidents were perceived to be supportive of autonomy by the other two groups, the executives to be largely opposed to autonomy, and the legislators to be either opposed or divided.

Encroachment Upon Institutional Autonomy

The findings within this area are presented under three headings: encroachment; the nature of the institutional relationships to the branches; and, the respondents' perceptions of the other views.

Encroachment

Respondents from all three sample groups expressed concern over governmental involvement in programs and courses, the determination of faculty work load standards and student mix, and the setting of tuition and fee rates. Other areas of concern included restrictions on appropriated funds and the capital outlay process. The majority of presidents and executives contended that there had been encroachment

upon autonomy while the legislators disagreed. The Constitution was not perceived as interfering with the Legislature's ability to perform its responsibilities regarding higher education.

Nature of Institutional Relationships with the Legislature and the Executive Branch

While the majority of legislators perceived that there were no differences in the institutional relationships with either of the branches, the majority of presidents argued that the relationships were different. Difference of style and substance were both noted. The Big Three institutions were perceived as more important by the legislators and the executives. Some respondents saw a trend in the relationships toward more positive cooperation while others labeled the trend as toward more accountability.

Respondents' Perceptions of the Other Views Concerning Encroachment

The majority of respondents considered their views to be generally aligned with those of their colleagues, especially the presidents and the executives. All of the presidents concluded that the legislators would be in disagreement with them as a group and would favor encroachment upon the autonomy of their institutions. A majority of the legislators perceived that, generally, the Executive Branch would be in agreement with their views. The rest of the sample was evenly divided in their perceptions of the other two groups as either supporting their views or opposing them. All of the executives maintained that the presidents would differ with each other on encroachment according to the size of their institutions. The legislators, however,

perceived presidential differences to be a function of personal preferences or particular institutional situations.

Statewide Coordination of Public Higher Education

The findings in this area are presented under two headings: the need for statewide coordination, and the respondents' perceptions of the other views on coordination.

Need for Statewide Coordination

Half of the presidents and a majority of the legislators argued against any form of statewide coordination. The majority of executives favored some method of coordination. The methods or approaches forwarded seemed to be motivated by the desire of particular agencies or groups to gain control or more power in higher education.

Respondents' Perceptions of Other Views Concerning Coordination

Within each sample group, the respondents perceived their colleagues to be in agreement with their particular views. The majority of executives viewed their branch as favoring coordination, while the other two groups contended that their colleagues would oppose it. The majority of presidents and legislators perceived that the Executive Branch was in favor of coordination. The presidents were opposed to coordination according to the executives and legislators. Finally, the executives and presidents agreed that the legislators were divided in their opinions regarding coordination, but, generally were opposed to it.

Discussion and Implications

Autonomy

Unlike other states, the question of institutional autonomy in Michigan is constitutional. Whereas in other states, centralized governing boards and coordinating boards have been established, that has been resisted in Michigan and a decentralized approach has been preserved, at least legally. Despite protestations of legislators to the contrary, over the years, the courts have ruled that the institutions have been given independence through the Constitution.

However, the perceptions of the sample groups reflected an ambiguity or vagueness in the Constitution which has allowed for individual interpretation. In addition to the differences expressed between groups concerning the definition of autonomy, individual differences of perception were also revealed over the extent of autonomy on a continuum from absolute independence to a total lack of it. In contrast to that situation, were the conclusions of a distinct majority of the respondents that the intentions of the Constitution's framers and the value of institutional autonomy were the protection of the colleges and universities from "political interference."

From such confusion, some legislators argued that any political document is created by a certain group of people with special interests at a particular time in history and, that such a document, and the concepts contained therein, have to be judged by each succeeding generation in light of the contemporary needs of the state. Such constitutional relativism has not been supported by Michigan court

decisions over the years. However, the majority of the presidents contended that they were well aware of their responsibilities to society and did not view their autonomy within a vacuum. Nor did they deny the Legislature's power to control appropriations.

These concessions and attitudes exemplify the nature of the "social contract" between the institutions and the state. The institutions exist and flourish as the mutual interests of the state are being met, and as the perpetuation of the institutions is perceived positively by the public. Concerns over autonomy and accountability reflect the impairment of public confidence in higher education that Dressel¹ and Wilson² asserted in the review of the literature. In the face of economic stringencies and, yet, incessant demands by the institutions for more money, the future seems gloomy.

Wilson emphasized the need for balance in the issue between the autonomy with which the institutions govern themselves and their responsibility to the society in which they exist. The Committee on Government and Higher Education urged the institutions and state governments to achieve compatibility by more open communication and the voluntary coordination of the institutions themselves, outside of budgetary concerns.³

At the present time in Michigan it seems that compatibility has been achieved. However, that compatibility lies somewhere at an

¹Dressel and Faricy, Return to Responsibility, pp. 11-14.

²Logan Wilson, ed., Emerging Patterns in Higher Education, p. 21.

³Committee on Government and Higher Education, The Efficiency of Freedom, pp. 23-44.

on a definition of roles and what are acceptable levels of mutual encroachment upon those roles.

The majority of respondents indicated that the most obvious encroachments were interference in program offerings, personnel decisions, and the types of students admitted. Yet, one of the major complaints of those who wish to coordinate higher education has been the proliferation of programs and the desire to expand all institutions into large graduate research universities. While Chambers⁴ and others argued strongly in the review of literature that the strength of higher education in the United States had been its diversity of programs and control, Wilson⁵ contended that there had been many examples where institutional competition had caused "wasteful duplication and proliferation of mediocrity." In Michigan, the record of the Presidents' Council and other attempts at voluntary coordination have been spotty at best. To avoid encroachment in the future possibly at a more serious level, the institutions may need to exhibit the ability to be more successful at voluntary coordination.

In the area of line-item appropriations, the institutions may have exasperated the problem by requesting such considerations themselves. In some instances, the institutions have willingly accepted government largesse while at other times they have complained. Such intermittent integrity has probably served to undermine the credibility of institutional complaints.

⁴M. M. Chambers, Freedom and Repression in Higher Education, p. 2.

⁵Logan Wilson, ed., Emerging Patterns in Higher Education, p. 2.

While the majority of respondents reasoned that encroachment was best handled through lobbying and cooperation, the threat of court action was not ruled out. The Salmon Case was not atypical, only the most recent in a long line of court decisions that upheld the autonomy of the institutions. To protect themselves against encroachment, the institutions must be willing to make a stand. However, the statements of some presidents indicated that negative impacts of the economic situation may undermine the resolve of smaller institutions to maintain independence.

Nature of Institutional Relationships to the Legislature and the Executive Branch

Some respondents characterized the institutional relationships with the Legislature as "more political," and relationships with the Executive Branch as "more rational." In the review of literature, Iannoccone,⁶ Gove,⁷ and others exposed the myth that education is not in politics. The words of a president, in this study, that the institutions have lost their "ivory tower," seemed to echo a tradition that "politics should not be in education." However, the involvement of Michigan institutions in the political process through their alumni and lobbyists indicate that in this state, education is in politics. Similarly, some presidents of Michigan institutions have been rated on their ability to gain additional funds from the Legislature.

⁶Laurence Iannoccone, Politics in Education, p. 6.

⁷Samuel E. Gove, "Pressures on Higher Education: State and Local Governments," p. 71.

A number of respondents characterized political influence as dependent upon the power of individual legislators and the connections of individual institutions to those powerful legislators. The pursuit of such influence by institutional leaders suggests considerable involvement in the arena of political power. The vulnerability of political power to public popularity must be considered as an issue which interfaces with the concept of institutional autonomy and independence from governmental intervention. Some legislative respondents argued, as justification for their own encroachment, that the institutions have encroached upon the Legislature through lobbying efforts and their attempts to gain larger appropriations by pitting one branch against the other.

The various methods of coordination proposed seemed to be a function of which agency wanted power. The Legislature maintains power through its control of the purse strings. The Executive Branch departments, and the colleges and universities to a degree, maintain power by control over the use of that money. In the arena of power politics and institutional lobbying, dangerous games are being played for high stakes.

In accordance with the research of Eulau and Quinley,⁸ this study showed that most respondents felt that the proper role of the Legislature in dealing with higher education should be limited to budget appropriations and perhaps very general policy guidelines. However, it would seem that some of the respect for higher education, evident in their 1970 study, has been eroded, and that the legislators,

⁸Heinz Eulau and Harold Quinley, State Officials and Higher Education.

and even moreso the executives, are threatening coordination unless the universities can resolve some issues among themselves.

Coordination

A majority of legislators and half of the presidents argued against any form of coordination. The majority of executives favored coordination and several different methods were advocated. Despite claims of a "more rational" approach on the part of the Executive Branch, the various methods of coordination seemed to be generated from motives of control or authority.

Problems of excess and duplication within public higher education in Michigan were admitted by most respondents. Some reacted to that by suggesting coordination was needed. Others were concerned that the cure might prove to be worse than the problem. As quoted in the review of literature, a Carnegie Foundation for Teaching Commentary contained the argument that with all the experimentation of the fifty states in coordination, it has not been shown that any one approach is superior to any other.⁹ A number of respondents complimented the institutions of Michigan for a proud tradition of accomplishment, and argued that the advantages for coordination in Michigan had not been shown.

There were mixed perceptions of the amount of coordination that does exist and what should. Some perceived that the Legislature coordinates through its use of appropriations. A number of legislators admitted that they were confident that they could exert

⁹A Commentary of the Carnegie Foundation for Teaching, The States and Higher Education: A Proud Past and a Vital Future, p. 87.

considerable influence through that medium. The problem, as most of them agreed, is that the interests of 148 legislators often conflict and the effects of such formalized coordination could be disastrous.

The budget process carried on by the Department of Management and Budget also involves a certain degree of coordination as the institutions are required to supply a considerable amount of information which is used to compute their share of the Executive Budget recommendation. The expansion of this process to include a number of other policy areas would not require much revision, according to members of that department. However, any transference of institutional control to another agency reduces local control. There is no guarantee that the benefits of a system-wide view will prove of ultimate advantage to the state. Can the uniqueness of the University of Michigan or Michigan State University be preserved in such a system? Or, will other, smaller institutions be sacrificed to preserve the stature of those with national reputations?

Some respondents, from the Department of Education, recommended that the State Board of Education should assume its rightful position as the state's coordinating agency. However, the political influence of the State Board, according to this study, seemed very low. If any form of statewide coordination emerges in the near future, it is highly unlikely that the State Board of Education will be that agency.

The combined attitudes of all the respondents in this study almost argue against the establishment of an explicitly outlined mechanism of coordination in Michigan. Rather, they seem to suggest that the already established activity of entering into implicit agreements and compromises will be continued with institutions submitting to more

data-gathering processes as dictated by the Legislature and the Executive Branch. The strength of such an approach is in continued state support with the anchor of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy. The weakness would seem to be the erosion of the credibility of autonomy as the institutions gradually submit to the encroachment by the state.

Respondents' Perceptions of Other Views

Under each of the headings, the respondents' perceptions of the views of their colleagues and also, the views of the other two groups, were analyzed. These perceptions revealed that in each of the groups there is a considerable amount of ignorance of the views of the individuals in other groups, often worsened by stereotyped labeling. In addition, suspicion characterized the attitudes of many respondents as they perceived the motives of their colleagues and the individuals in other departments or agencies.

The revelations of political activity and concerns over power and control that emerged from this research provide perspective to the suspicion among respondents. The majority of legislators and presidents perceived the Executive Branch to be in favor of coordination. Several legislators and presidents characterized departments in the Executive Branch as desirous of gaining control over higher education. Within the Executive Branch, respondents from the Departments of Education and Management and Budget advocated different methods of coordination which would place control in their particular department, adding credence to the perceptions expressed by the other groups.

The presidents, as a group, were labeled as obviously in favor of autonomy without any statewide coordination by a majority of

legislators. The views of the presidents, however, proved them to be less monolithic than the legislators presumed. As a group, the presidents seemed much more aware of the perceptions and views of the other groups than either the executives or legislators. On the one hand, this acute awareness has given these individuals valuable tools in the administration of public institutions and in their relationships with state government. On the other hand, such awareness is indicative of the extensive amount of valuable time and money expended by institutional administrators both in performing their duties in governmental relations and in surveying the arena of political lobbying and intrigue. At least one president argued the benefits of such expense, however, the presidents seemed resigned to the fact of being pulled more and more into such activities.

The executives and presidents seemed more conscious of each others' views, than did the legislators: possibly the result of more regular interaction of the two former groups over budget and data-gathering processes. This was especially true of respondents within the Department of Management and Budget. The Department of Education respondents seemed partially correct in their assessment that the Executive Branch, at least their part of it, was essentially ignored by the institutions.

The legislators were not as aware of individual views within the other groups. This situation is probably related to the priority level of higher education on the total list of their concerns. In addition, the institutions often interact more regularly through the legislative fiscal agencies, their lobbyists, or their own district's legislator and, therefore, personal interactions are not frequent with

a wide variety of legislators. However, the legislative respondents revealed that decisions on particular issues such as higher education are usually most heavily influenced by the legislators in charge of the committees handling those issues and that the majority of legislators are not aware of the background information. Such revelations enhance the image of individualized power in that body. Some of the executive respondents had contended that a coordinating agency would offer protection to the institutions as a buffer from power-wielding legislators who might prove to be unsympathetic to their cause.

Issues are rarely solved by simple solutions in our society. The institutional leaders must weigh many possible alternatives in light of their knowledge and perceptions of present realities and predictions of future economic and political trends. Their responsibilities lie not only with their individual institutions, but also with the society in which they exist.

Governmental leaders, although needing to be conscious of their power, are charged with the responsible representation of the people of Michigan. The perceptive decision-making that is necessary in the face of competing priorities is monumental. Based on the foregoing, in the view of the researcher, the heavy decisions in matters of public higher education in Michigan should not be reduced to simply a game of power politics.

Implications for Future Research

A number of questions and issues were suggested by this study which could serve as a basis for developing future topics of research. Several possible areas are explained below.

1. One of the problems identified in this study was concept definition. Although definition was sought for such concepts such as autonomy, encroachment, and coordination, it was only touched at the surface. Would it be possible to develop comprehensive definitions of these concepts within a given context such as Michigan, and agreed to by all concerned, which would provide the bases for future institutional-governmental relations?

2. A number of veiled threats were hinted at by respondents concerning the ability of the Legislature to retaliate against institutions for lawsuits, like the Salmon Case, or overt actions of revolt. Since the Constitution mandates support of the colleges and universities by the Legislature, other respondents discounted such threats. In view of these conflicting perceptions, what are the constitutional implications of legislative action to recommend funding at zero for an institution? What are the alternatives available to institutions if such action were taken?

One executive respondent commented that constitutional status of the institutions on a par with the branches of government might be possible if they could obtain outside funding. It would be interesting to assess the possible status as a private institution for an institution with a national reputation like the University of Michigan, or a smaller institution facing extinction because of statewide coordinative decisions made to preserve enrollment levels at other public institutions.

3. This research study revealed that some low-level coordination, on an informal basis occurs in Michigan, even though formalized procedures have not been enacted and no statewide system of higher

education exists. Using Berdahl's typology¹⁰ of coordinating approaches, what are the differences between the actual and legislated levels of coordination and autonomy throughout the fifty states?

4. Although a rush to statewide coordination has seemingly occurred throughout the fifty states during the 1960s and 1970s, recent studies by the Carnegie Foundation For Teaching¹¹ and Burton Clark and Ted Youn¹² have revealed inconclusive results on its effectiveness. Obviously there is a need for further research to help the state governments make intelligent decisions. Has statewide coordination been effective in reducing costs or duplication of programs? Which forms of coordination have been most effective in various situations? What significant problems have been caused by statewide coordination?

5. Much of the content of this study centered on the interaction of institutional leaders with governmental agencies and leaders. The Michigan experience is probably mirrored in many of the other states and can undoubtedly be interpolated into interactions with the federal government. What amount and types of preparation are being offered in university graduate programs in the developing of strategies for institutional-governmental relations? What kinds of projects or information sharing are being facilitated at meetings and conferences of professional organizations at state and national levels?

¹⁰Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, pp. 18-23.

¹¹A Commentary of the Carnegie Foundation for Teaching, The States and Higher Education: A Proud Past and a Vital Future.

¹²Burton R. Clark and Ted I. K. Youn, Academic Power in the United States: Comparative, Historic and Structural Perspectives.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE FOUR-YEAR, PUBLIC COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES OF MICHIGAN

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THE FOUR-YEAR, PUBLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OF MICHIGAN

The Big Three

Michigan State University

In 1855, the Michigan Agricultural Colleges was founded in East Lansing for the training of farmers and the furtherance of scientific agriculture. Aided by the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862 and constitutional incorporation in 1908, this institution developed into a major research and graduate university with a strong national reputation. Today, MSU is organized into seventeen colleges representing a broad range of academic disciplines, including many graduate programs and professional colleges in veterinary, allopathic, and osteopathic medicine. Since the early 1960s, it has been the largest university in the state, enrolling more than 40,000 students.

University of Michigan - Ann Arbor

Founded in 1841 and constitutionally incorporated in 1850, the University of Michigan has always been regarded as the most prestigious institution in the state. Due to the accomplishments of its leaders throughout the years and their continual striving for excellence, the university has been ranked by professional educators as one of the finest institutions of higher education in the nation. This institution, located in Ann Arbor, is a large multi-purpose university consisting of 17 colleges and schools, including many graduate programs and the professional areas of medicine, law, and dentistry. Among a student population of over 35,000, approximately 25 percent come from other states.

Wayne State University

This institution, in Detroit, was established in 1917 as the public school system's Detroit Junior College. Merging with other colleges founded as early as 1868, it grew rapidly and in 1934 became

Wayne University. Conversion to a state university occurred by legislative action in 1956 and constitutional incorporation was established by an amendment in 1959. Due to its metropolitan setting, Wayne has a large part-time enrollment. The University has numerous graduate programs plus professional schools of medicine and law.

Regional Universities

Central Michigan University

This institution, in Mt. Pleasant, originally was a private normal school. It became a state institution in 1895. As the curriculum expanded, Central was designated a college in 1941 and a university in 1959. Although still largely an undergraduate institution, Central offers graduate degrees, with emphasis in the area of education.

Eastern Michigan University

This institution, in Ypsilanti, was established by the Legislature in 1849 as the Michigan State Normal School, the first such institution in Michigan. Education of teachers was its original purpose and continues to be one of its basic functions. In 1959 Eastern was designated a University.

Northern Michigan University

Established in 1899 as the Michigan Normal School, a two-year, state-supported teacher training institution, Northern is located in Marquette, in the Upper Peninsula. As the curriculum expanded, Northern became a bachelor's degree-granting institution, and in 1963 it was designated a university. The university is still largely an undergraduate institution, although it offers a number of master's degree programs in arts and sciences and education. Although Northern is the smallest of the Regional Universities, it enrolls almost 10,000 students.

Western Michigan University

Located in Kalamazoo, this institution was created by the Legislature in 1903 as the Western State Normal School. The curriculum was limited to teacher education until 1935, when degree programs in other fields were instituted. In 1957 Western officially became a university. The University's academic program includes a variety of programs leading to bachelor's, master's, specialist's, and doctoral degrees. As the largest of the Regional Universities, Western enrolls over 20,000 students.

Smaller Institutions

Ferris State College

This institution, in Big Rapids, was established in 1884 as a private industrial school. It became a state institution in 1950. The college traditionally has emphasized industrial and vocational training. It continues to do so, while also offering baccalaureate degree programs in commerce, pharmacy, and education and a professional degree in optometry. The unique nature of the instructional program and an open admissions policy attract a student body proportionate to population distribution throughout the state.

Grand Valley State Colleges

Located in Allendale, near Grand Rapids, this institution was created by the Legislature in 1960 and enrolled its first students in September, 1963. Bachelor's degree programs emphasize liberal arts and include preparation for teacher certification. Master's degree programs in Business and Education are also offered.

Michigan Technological University

This institution, in Houghton in the Upper Peninsula, was established by the Legislature in 1885 as the Michigan Mining School. Over the years, the curriculum has expanded to other fields of engineering and science. In 1964, the Legislature formally recognized its status as a university. The university continues to emphasize engineering in both undergraduate and graduate programs, while degrees also are offered in arts and sciences, business, and forestry. Because of its specialized nature, the academic program attracts students from all parts of Michigan, as well as from other states and countries.

Oakland University

After operating as a branch of Michigan State University for eleven years, this institution, near Rochester, became an independent university in 1970. Oakland is primarily undergraduate, although it offers master's degrees in many fields. Because of the university's location in the heavily populated southeastern area of the state, the commuter nature of the student body, and the existence of several large community colleges in the area, enrollment growth has been steady.

Developing Institutions

Lake Superior State College

On January 1, 1970, this institution, in Sault Ste. Marie, became a state college operating under an independent board of control after 24 years as a branch of Michigan Technological University. Until 1965 the curriculum was limited to two years of college work, with students then transferring to other four-year institutions. Lake Superior now offers baccalaureate degree programs in addition to technologically oriented two-year associate degree programs. It serves both the baccalaureate and the community college roles for the eastern portion of the Upper Peninsula.

Saginaw Valley State College

Located within the Saginaw-Bay City-Midland triangle, Saginaw Valley College was established as a private, four-year, liberal arts college in 1963. The institution admitted its first students in the 1964 fall term, using the facilities of Delta College, a neighboring community college. In 1965, legislation was enacted establishing Saginaw Valley as a state college. The college now operates on its own campus and offers a bachelor's degree in several liberal arts curricula and master's degrees in Business and Education.

University of Michigan-Dearborn

The Dearborn branch of the University of Michigan was established pursuant to gifts of the Fairlane Estate and \$6.5 million from the Ford Motor Company in 1956. The branch is operated as a separate college within the University, with a Chancellor as chief executive officer. Curricula, originally limited to the junior and senior years and a small graduate program, have been expanded to include freshmen and sophomore instruction.

University of Michigan-Flint

The Flint branch of the University of Michigan was established in 1965 as a junior-senior level institution to be closely related to the then existing Flint Junior College. Graduate instruction is conducted through the University Extension Service and the Rackham Graduate School. A new campus presently is being developed on urban renewal land in downtown Flint. Until such time as the downtown campus is fully developed, the Flint branch will continue to operate certain instructional and related service activities in facilities located on the C. S. Mott Community College campus.

APPENDIX B

LETTERS OF EXPLANATION AND INTRODUCTION

APPENDIX B

LETTERS OF EXPLANATION AND INTRODUCTION

- I. Letter of explanation and request for interview
- II. Letter of introduction from Dr. Frederick R. Whims

Stephen C. MacLeod
1205 C University Village
East Lansing, Michigan
48824
(517) 355-5978

November 24, 1978

Dear Sir:

I am presently a doctoral candidate in the Department of Administration and Higher Education at Michigan State University. While completing an internship at the Office of the Budget, it became apparent to me that the concept of institutional autonomy and its impact upon the relationship of Michigan's four-year, public colleges and universities with the state government, was a topic of paramount concern both to members of the legislative and executive branches of government and their counterparts within the academic institutions. As a result, I have decided to conduct a research project for my dissertation on this subject and I would like to request your confidential participation.

The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of university presidents, executive branch department heads, and state legislators concerning this very important issue and related areas. This examination is intended to clarify issues, misunderstandings, and differences in viewpoint. Hopefully, the results of the research will enlighten the discussions of those responsible for higher education in Michigan and enhance their formulation and administration of policies.

In order to accomplish this, I would like to interview you because (INDIVIDUALIZED EXPLANATIONS). To insure accuracy in reporting the data, the interview will be taped and notes will be taken. The interview will be structured around questions deemed important but will allow for discussion of the issues and for qualifying statements. Individual responses will remain confidential, with findings being reported by aggregate groups only.

The interview will take approximately one hour and will be arranged at your convenience. I will call your office within the week to learn of your response to my request and to make an appointment.

After the study has been completed, I will be happy to provide an appropriate abstract of the research. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

Stephen C. MacLeod

STATE OF MICHIGAN



WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, Governor

DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGETP.O. BOX 30026, LEWIS CASS BLDG., LANSING, MICHIGAN 48909
GERALD H. MILLER, Director

November 22, 1978

To Whom It May Concern:

Steve MacLeod has informed me that his doctoral committee has reviewed and approved his dissertation proposal. The subject chosen by Steve pertains to the erosion of the constitutional autonomy granted to institutions of higher education by state agencies, the Legislature, and the Executive office; a topic which I consider to be a most timely issue.

Steve spent a term working with the Education Division, Office of the Budget, as an intern earning doctoral credits at Michigan State University. I am very confident of Steve's capabilities in conducting this research activity, and since interviewing key decision makers is required to complete the study, I am requesting your full participation, knowing that you can share your most candid observations in complete confidence.

I recognize that you have very busy schedules, but I believe that the time spent will contribute to a better understanding of Michigan's higher education institutions and the autonomy issue. If I can be of any assistance to you in this request, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

Dr. Frederick R. Whims, Director
Education Division
Office of the Budget

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW FORMAT

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW FORMAT

- I. The Theoretical and Constitutional Bases for and the Extent of Local Institutional Autonomy: Questions 1 - 11.
- II. Encroachment Upon Institutional Autonomy: Questions 12 - 26.
- III. Statewide Coordination in Michigan: Questions 27 - 34.

Introduction: I would like to restrict our inquiry to the four-year, public colleges and universities in Michigan, dividing them into four categories: the Big Three, mid-size universities (headcount of 10,000 or more), the smaller institutions, and developing institutions. Therefore, community colleges and private institutions are to be excluded. In addition, I am particularly concerned with the impact of institutional autonomy upon the relationships of the public colleges and universities to the legislative and executive branches of state government and not the other possible implications of the autonomy issue.

For the purpose of this study, I have developed a working definition of institutional autonomy. I have defined institutional autonomy as a complex concept involving relationships within and outside the institution that affect the ability of its leaders to use its resources without external direction and to define and execute programs consonant with the institutional purpose.

1. How does this definition compare with your understanding of the institutional autonomy of the four-year, public colleges and universities in Michigan?
2. Do you feel that there is general agreement among those in the legislative and executive branches and in the higher education institutions concerning the meaning of institutional autonomy? If not, how do they differ?
3. Do you think that the statements addressing institutional autonomy in the 1963 Constitution dictate any difference in status among categories of four-year, public institutions (Big Three, mid-size, smaller, developing)?

4. Do you think that there should be a difference in status among the institutions by category either in the Constitution or by statute?
5. How does the status afforded the four-year colleges and universities in the 1963 Constitution compare with the constitutional status of the legislative and executive branches of state government?
6. What do you think were the intentions of the framers of the 1963 Constitution in granting constitutional status to the four-year institutions?
7. Would you suggest any changes in the present Constitutional statements regarding institutional autonomy?
8. What do you think would be the impact upon the educational institutions if constitutional autonomy were no longer guaranteed?
9. Would the institutions or the legislature operate differently in their relationships with each other without the constitutional provisions?
10. Do you believe that the other _____ (presidents, legislators, executive branch) would agree with your perceptions of the value of institutional autonomy? (Within own respondent group)
11. How do you think that the other two groups would respond to the value of institutional autonomy?
12. Allegations are sometimes made that the state has encroached upon the autonomy of the colleges and universities. Whether you agree that they are encroachments upon autonomy or not, indicate which issues may have been construed or interpreted as encroachment?
13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that any of these issues do involve encroachment?
14. Do you consider the formula-funding approach to higher education appropriations to be an encroachment upon institutional autonomy? Why?
15. Are categorical and line-item budget restrictions on appropriations an encroachment? Why?
16. Beyond the issues already mentioned, can you think of any areas or issues which you regard or would regard as obvious examples of encroachment by either the legislative or executive branches upon the institutions?

17. From your perspective, do you think that there are any restrictions in the constitutional statements regarding institutional autonomy that interfere or make it difficult for the legislature in its attempts to make public higher education more effective or responsive to the needs of the people of Michigan?
18. From your perspective, do you see any difference in the relationship that the four-year, public institutions have with the executive branch from the relationship that they have with the Legislature?
19. We have already referred to four possible categories of four-year, public institutions. Do you perceive any differences in the relationships of these different types of institutions with either the executive or legislative branches?
20. In what ways is the relationship different?
21. From your perspective, when the universities believe that there is a threat of encroachment, how do they react to prevent it or what steps do they take to protect their autonomy?
22. Do you think that most of your colleagues (presidents, executive branch, legislative branch) would agree with your perceptions regarding encroachment by the executive or legislative branches?
23. Do you think that the reactions might be different among the other two groups involved in this study? How?
24. Do you think that perceptions among the presidents might differ by category of institution? How?
25. What impact do you perceive that encroachment has or would have upon the governing boards of individual institutions?
26. What do you perceive to be the trend in the relationship of the executive and legislative branches with the four-year, public colleges and universities?
27. Do you think that the Legislature should have a stronger role in the control or direction of public higher education in Michigan? If so, how strong or what should that role be?
28. Do you think that the executive branch should have a stronger role in the control or direction of public higher education in Michigan? If so, how strong or what should that role be?
29. From your perspective, should there be a separate coordinating agency for the four-year, public colleges and universities in Michigan?

30. If there should be a coordinating agency, what should its function be?
31. Should it have statutory or advisory powers?
32. What should its limitations be?
33. What do you perceive to be the general attitude to a statewide coordinating agency among your colleagues? (President, executive branch, Legislature)
34. What do you perceive to be the attitude concerning statewide coordination among the other two groups in this study?

APPENDIX D

COMPILATION OF SAMPLE GROUPS' RESPONSES
IN SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

APPENDIX D

COMPILATION OF SAMPLE GROUPS' RESPONSES IN SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

The responses have been compiled for each question. The judges have categorized these responses and they are displayed in the following tables. Each table is preceded by the question being answered.

The Theoretical and Constitutional Bases for and the Extent of Local Institutional Autonomy

1. Question: How does the working definition compare with your understanding of the institutional autonomy of the public, four-year colleges and universities in Michigan?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Agree--Boards have control	5	4	3	12
b. Disagree--Institu- tional control restricted	1	2	5	8

2. Question: Do you feel that there is general agreement among those in the Legislative and Executive Branches and in the higher education institutions concerning the meaning of institutional autonomy?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes--general agreement	6	6	7	19
b. No			1	1

3. Question: Do you think that the statements addressing institutional autonomy in the 1963 Constitution dictate any difference in status among categories of public, four-year institutions?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. No difference	2	4	4	10
b. No--Except historical difference of Big Three	3	1		4
c. Yes--Elected boards are more autonomous	1	1	4	6

4. Question: Do you think that there should be a difference in status among the institutions by category either in the Constitution or by statute?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. No	6	6	6	18
b. Yes			2	2

5. Question: How does the status afforded the four-year colleges and universities in the 1963 Constitution compare with the constitutional status of the Legislative and Executive Branches of state government?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Cannot be compared	6	3	6	15
b. Equal--similar to a fourth branch of government		3	2	5

6. Question: What do you think were the intentions of the framers of the 1963 Constitution in granting constitutional status to the four-year institutions?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. To insure autonomy or freedom from politics	2	6	6	14
b. Do not know	3		1	4
c. To decentralize control	1		1	2

7. Question: Would you suggest any changes in the present constitutional statements regarding institutional autonomy?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. No changes	1		5	6
b. Clarify language regarding the role of the State Board	5	6	3	14

8. Question: What do you think would be the impact upon the educational institutions if constitutional autonomy were no longer guaranteed?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Political interference	1	2	6	9
b. Centralization of governance	5	3	1	9
c. Little change		1	1	2

9. Question: Would the institutions or the Legislature operate differently in their relationships with each other without the constitutional provisions?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. More overt interference or control by the Legislature	6	5	7	18
b. Little change		1	1	2

10. Question: Do you believe that your own colleagues would agree with your perceptions of the value of institutional autonomy?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes--They would agree with me	5	6	1	12
b. There would be differences of opinion			7	7
c. No--They would not agree with me	1			1

11. Question: How do you think that the other two groups would respond to the value of institutional autonomy?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
1. Presidents:				
a. Supportive		4	8	12
b. Not supportive				
c. Divided		2		2
2. Executives:				
a. Supportive	1		2	3
b. Not supportive	2		4	6
c. Divided	3		2	5
3. Legislators:				
a. Supportive	2			2
b. Not supportive	2	3		5
c. Divided	2	3		5

Encroachment Upon Institutional
Autonomy

12. Question: Allegations are sometimes made that the state has encroached upon the autonomy of the colleges and universities. Whether you agree that they are encroachments upon autonomy or not, indicate which issues may have been construed or interpreted as encroachments?

Responses	Presidents #	Executives #	Legislators #	Total #
1. Governmental involvement in:				
a. Determination of Faculty work-loads	1	2	2	5
b. Control or operation of programs	2	3	2	7
c. Influencing personnel decisions			1	1
d. Influencing admissions decisions	1		1	2
e. Setting Tuition and Fee rates		2	1	3
f. Determination of the number of out-of-state students		1	1	2
g. Approval of buildings built by private funds		2		2
h. Appropriations requirements	3		4	7
i. Capital Outlay		1	1	2
j. Indirect regulation (Labor, pollution, Civil Rights laws)	1			1
2. Encroachments of institutions on the prerogatives of the Legislature		1		1

13. Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree that any of these issues do involve encroachment?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes, they do	4	4	4	12
b. No, or not enough to matter	2	2	4	8

14. Question: Do you consider the formula-funding approach to higher education appropriations to be an encroachment upon institutional autonomy?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes	2	1		3
b. No	3	5	5	13
c. Do not know or maybe	1		3	4

15. Question: Are categorical and line-item budget restrictions on appropriations an encroachment?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes	4	6	1	11
b. No			5	5
c. Possibly	2		2	4

16. Question: Beyond the issues already mentioned, can you think of any areas or issues which you regard or would regard as obvious examples of encroachment by either the legislative or executive branches upon the institutions?

Response	Presidents #	Executives #	Legislators #	Total #
1. Governmental involvement in:				
a. Course offerings		2	2	4
b. Control or coordination of programs	1	1	1	3
c. Capital Outlay		1		1
d. Funding Sources			1	1
e. Faculty work loads			1	1
f. Personal influence peddling	1		1	2
g. Punishment of radical faculty or students	1			1
h. Property control	1			1
2. No, I cannot think of anymore issues involving encroachment	3	2	4	9

17. Question: From your perspective, do you think that there are any restrictions in the constitutional statements regarding institutional autonomy that interfere or make it difficult for the Legislature in its attempts to make public higher education more effective or responsive to the needs of the people of Michigan?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes		1	3	4
b. No	6	3	5	14
c. Possibly		2		2

18. Question: From your perspective, do you see any difference in the relationship that the four-year, public institutions have with the executive branch from the relationship that they have with the Legislature?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
1. No	1	2	5	8
2. Yes				
a. Executive more rational and Legislature is more political	3			3
b. Style: more individualized in Legislature	2		2	4
c. Style: Single-head in Governor while collective with Legislature		1	1	2
d. Executive viewpoint is wider in scope		1		1
e. Executive is ignored		2		2

19. Question: We have already referred to four possible categories of four-year public institutions. Do you perceive any differences in the relationships of these different types of institutions with either the executive or legislative branches?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes	4	6	6	16
b. No	2		2	4

20. Question: In what ways are the relationships different?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Big 3 are more important and stronger	1	1	4	6
b. Big 3 are more organized and aggressive		1		1
c. Big 3 have more influential alumni	2	1	1	4
d. Negative attitude against larger schools	1			1
e. Smaller institutions are protected		1	1	2
f. Differ by program type High cost programs		1		1
g. Difference is between elected and appointed boards		1		1
Note: Four answered no to previous question	2		2	4

21. Question: From your perspective, when the universities believe that there is a threat of encroachment, how do they react to prevent it or what steps do they take to protect their autonomy?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Try to work it with the Legislature-- lobbying	2	2	5	9
b. All react together, speak jointly	3	1		4
c. React defensively		2		2
d. Bring a law-suit		1	2	3
e. Take issue to the Public forum			1	1
f. Big 3 carry the ball	1			1

22. Question: Do you think that most of your colleagues would agree with your perceptions regarding encroachment by the executive or legislative branches?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Agree-generally	4	5	2	11
b. Agreement among those involved in Higher Education		1	4	5
c. Wide variance			2	2
d. Disagree	2			2

23. Question: Do you think that the reactions might be different among the other two groups involved in this study?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
1. Presidents:				
a. Agree		3	4	7
b. Disagree		3	3	6
c. Differ individually			1	1
2. Executives:				
a. Agree	3		6	9
b. Disagree	3		1	4
c. Differ individually			1	1
3. Legislators:				
a. Agree		3		3
b. Disagree	6	3		9

24. Question: Do you think that perceptions among the presidents might differ by category of institution?

Response	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 14
a. Yes	1	1	2
b. Yes, larger institutions are more concerned for autonomy	3	2	5
c. Yes, smaller institutions are more concerned for autonomy	2		2
d. No, differ by individual or the particular institution		5	5

25. Question: What impact do you perceive that encroachment has or would have upon the governing boards of individual institutions?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Undermines their power	4	2	3	9
b. Harms the quality of people willing to serve	1			1
c. Makes them aware of need for accountability		1	1	2
d. They see it the same as their president		1		1
e. Do not know	1		2	3
f. Boards are not sensitive to autonomy issue		2	1	3
g. Boards are not that important or effective			1	1

26. Question: What do you perceive to be the trend in the relationship of the executive and legislative branches with the four-year, public colleges and universities?

Responses	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. More positive-improving	3	3	2	8
b. Toward more accountability	2		5	7
c. Less autonomy and more encroachment		2		2
d. Trying to maintain the status quo		1		1
e. Cyclical	1			1
f. Toward better methods of financing Higher Education			1	1

Statewide Coordination in Michigan

27. Question: Do you think that the Legislature should have a stronger role in the control or direction of public higher education in Michigan?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. No	6	6	7	19
b. Yes			1	1

28. Question: Do you think that the executive branch should have a stronger role in the control or direction of public higher education in Michigan?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. No	5	3	6	14
b. Yes	1	3	2	6

29. Question: From your perspective, should there be a separate coordinating agency for the four-year, public colleges and universities in Michigan?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Yes	1	1		2
b. No	3	3	8	14
c. No--the State Board should do it		2		2
d. Possibly	2			2

30. Question: If there should be a coordinating agency, what should its function be?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Policy + Planning + Budget		4		4
b. Coordination without planning		1		1
c. Coordination + control	1	1		2
d. Voluntary coordination with present system	2		4	6
e. PCSCU should do it	1			1
Note: Answered no to previous question	2		4	6

31. Question: Should it have statutory or advisory powers?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Statutory	1	4		5
b. Advisory	1	1	1	3
Note: Answered no to Question 29	4	1	7	12

32. Question: What should its limitations be?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Still preserve local autonomy	1	4		5
b. Reduce local autonomy	1	1		2
c. Coordination only--no planning		1		1
Note: Did not answer	4		8	12

33. Question: What do you perceive to be the general attitude to a statewide coordinating agency among your colleagues?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
a. Favor a state coordinating agency--State Board would like to be the agency		4		4
b. Favor budget mechanism--State Board would have a different view		2		2
c. Mixed views--mostly against	2		6	8
d. Against a coordinating agency	4		2	6

34. Question: What do you perceive to be the attitude concerning statewide coordination among the other two groups in this study?

Response	Presidents n = 6	Executives n = 6	Legislators n = 8	Total n = 20
1. Presidents:				
a. Favor voluntary Coordination Board		1	1	2
b. Favor coordina- tion through Budget mechanism		2	1	3
c. Oppose coordi- nation		3	6	9
2. Executives:				
a. Favor Coordi- nating Agency	2		5	7
b. Favor coordi- nation through Budget mechanism			1	1
c. Favor coordina- tion--Mixed views on method	3		1	4
d. Oppose coordi- nation	1		1	2
3. Legislators:				
a. Favor voluntary Coordination Board	1	1		2
b. Oppose Coordi- nation	4	3		7
c. Mixed views-- Most do not know	1	2		3

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