INFORMATION TO USERS This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction. 1. The sign or "target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Pagev,;,v.v,;.v.;.y,v,w ,w ,v.v.y//.v.v/AV£AV.y.v//AXvXvXvX I n tn r n r a tn tm n nnrl A n n ue Data Oulput and Testing of Analytical Measurements F ra m e w o rk (D 3 K Theoretical Concepts ~ j AV.WA' Reality Figure 2.1 An Information System Source: Bonnen, J .T . "Assessm ent of th e C u rren t A gricultural Data Base: An Information System A pproach," Survey of A gricultural Economic L iterature Vol. 2, Q uantitative Methods in A gricultural Economics 1930s to 1970s. George Ju d g e, et a l., e d ito rs. U niversity of Minnesota P ress, Minneapolis, 1977, pp. 386-*107. 24 interdependency of use and of management of th e data base is the responsibility of all involved disciplines. Explicit to th e information system paradigm is the notion that information attain s its value in the context of a decision. T herefore, the criterion of use is central to settin g statistical prio rities. The c riteria for th e design of data a re also derived from the decision uses of th at d ata. C. Theoretical Concerns in the Economics o f Information Two variables a re of fundamental importance for the decision maker: resources and information. Until recently, economic theory has dealt with th e problem of resource allocation among competing u ses, assum ing th at information is equally d istrib u te d at no cost among all individuals of an economic system and th at all individuals possess perfect knowledge. With th ese assum ptions, it becomes immediately a p p arent th a t traditional economic theory does not adequately ad d ress information problem s; they were simply assumed away. A more specific critiq u e of th e th eo ry , suggested by Demsetz, questions a comparison of resource allocation produced u nder a sta te of perfect knowledge with those produced u n d er a sta te of imperfect knowledge. Since imperfect knowledge is regarded as a disto rtio n , it becomes difficult if not impossible to sep arate out the effect of imperfect knowledge from the resulting conclusions of th e theory (based on p erfect know ledge). Some economists have attem pted to adjust for the above mentioned problem by viewing information as an economic good or commodity (A rrow ). And like any o th er good, it becomes subject to demand 25 and supply analysis. But unlike traditional m arketable commodities, information exhibits a se t of c h a ra c te ristic s th a t invalidate th e use­ fulness of a com petitive equilibrium an aly sis; information possesses th e ch arac teristics of a public good. In th e Sam uelson-M usgrave definition, a public good is c h arac­ terized by 1) nonrivalness, o r jointness in supply and utilization, and 2) nonexcludability. T he firs t a ttrib u te implies th a t th e good is equally available to all. The second implies th a t it is impossible for p riv ate p ro d u ce rs to ap p ro p ria te th ro u g h m arket pricing th e full social benefits arisin g directly from production or use o f th e good. That is to say , it is difficult to exclude from utilization of th e good those who do not pay for it—th e so called free rid e r problem . N onrivalness is an in herent c h a ra c te ristic of inform ation. Arrow comments th a t a given piece of information is by definition an indivisible commodity, and the classical problem of allocation in th e p resen ce of indivisibilities is a p p a re n t. For exam ple, th e use of information about m arket tra n sac tio n s by a p ro d u ce r is not hindered by th e adoption of th e same knowledge by o th e r p ro d u c e rs. In essen ce, th e marginal cost of adding an additional u se r of information approaches zero. If it were zero, then optimal allocation would obviously call for unlimited d istrib u tio n of information w ithout c o st. N onexcludability, in c o n tra st, is not a n atural c h a ra c te ristic of inform ation, b u t ra th e r is determ ined by institutional a rran g em en ts. For exam ple, p aten t laws a re institutional arrangem ents th a t make a certain kind of information excludable, th e re b y cre atin g profit incentives for p riv ate activ ities. Arrow points out th a t in th e absence of such special legal p ro tectio n , th e ow ner cannot cover his 26 c o sts of selling inform ation on th e open m arket b e cau se any one p u r­ c h a se r can d e s tro y th e monopoly inasm uch as he can re -p ro d u c e th e inform ation a t little o r no c o s t. As a r e s u lt, it is g e n erally held th a t a socially optimum level o f su p p ly of su c h a good can n o t be ex p e c te d if its su p p ly is left to p riv a te firm s. Ih e public good c h a ra c te ris tic s o f inform ation also p re s e n t a problem on th e dem and sid e o f th e inform ation m ark e t. A rrow s ta te s th a t sim ilar problem s o f in d iv isib ility and u n d e rv a lu atio n e x ist for th e u s e r s o f inform ation: . . . t h e r e is a fundam ental parad o x in th e d eterm ination of th e dem and for inform ation; its value to th e p u rc h a s e r is not known u n til he h as th e inform ation. B ut th e n he has in effe ct a c q u ire d it w ithout c o st. T h ese problem s a re c learly se rio u s fo r th o se who w ish to use neoclassical su p p ly -d em an d th e o ry fo r a n a ly se s o f inform ational phenom ena. Q uoting from Newman, M arshak s ta te s : T h ey lead to se v e re d o u b ts co n cern in g th e optim ality of th e inform ation m arket in its e lf an d more g e n erally to a view th a t—when know ledge p ro d u ctio n is in tro d u c ed into an economy th e n n e ith e r for th e simple com petitive mechanism n o r fo r a n y sim ple m odification o f it is th e optim ality o f equilibrium p re s e rv e d , and even th e e x iste n c e o f equilibrium is d o u b tfu l. Up to th is p o in t, in review ing th e lite ra tu r e , we h av e c e n te re d th e d isc u ssio n on th e economics o f inform ation w hile g iv in g little a tte n tio n to th e in stitu tio n a l a sp e c ts o f inform ational phenom ena. T h is is not s u rp ris in g sin c e most of neoclassical economics is s ta tic ; th e in stitu tio n a l s tr u c tu r e of an economy is a fixed p a ra m eter in th e an aly sis o f re s o u rc e allocation. A lthough a com plete tre a tm e n t of inform ation from an in stitu tio n a l p e rs p e c tiv e has not been d e v elo p ed , some useful in te re s tin g notions p u t fo rth by th e in stitu tio n a lis t a re 27 u sefu l in th in k in g about inform ational problem s. C en tral to th e in stitu tio n al ap p ro ach is th e concept of p ro p e rty rig h ts . viewed a s a commodity alw ays involves p ro p e rty r ig h ts . Inform ation And it is th e s e relatio n sh ip s th a t d eterm ine allocative outcom es in d ep e n d en t of th e trad itio n a l m arket a n a ly sis. Even if it is no more th a n a personal s e c re t, th e ru les th a t gov ern th e relatio n sh ip betw een th e p a rtie s c o n cern ed determ ine who is in th e know and who is n o t. Given th is prem ise, it follows th a t any e ffo rts to resolve su c h problem s can often be more a p p ro p ria te ly d ire c te d a t th e in stitu tio n a l a rra n g em e n ts th a n a t th e inform ation m arket its e lf. B ut as one would s u s p e c t, any c h an g e s in th e ru le s which d e sig n o r c re a te th e flow of inform ation will e n c o u n te r th e reality th a t e ssen tial inform ation is p ro te c te d by e n tre n c h e d in stitu tio n al re la tio n sh ip s. A good exam ple of how th e p ro p e rty rig h ts in inform ation o p e ra te can be tak en from th e U .S . food and fib e r m ark e ts. As in d u stria l c o n cen tratio n c o n tin u es to grow , "th e issu e s o f p riv a te ow n ersh ip of inform ation v e rs u s th e p u b lic 's rig h t to know will become more and more critic a l and heated" (B onnen, 1975). G iant firm s a c q u ire with th e ir g re a t size not only an impact on m arket b u t a major resp o n sib ility fo r p ublic inform ation. Where th e d ata on a m arket a re collected from and d is tr i­ b u te d to firm s by a tra d e asso ciatio n , th e te n d e n c y to monopolize d ata is even g r e a te r . (B onnen, 1975). S ince inform ation as a commodity has unconventional p ro p e rtie s su c h a s n o n -a p p ro p ria b ility , in cre asin g r e tu r n s in u se , and in d iv isib ility . Arrow m aintains th a t no amount of legal p ro tectio n can make a th o ro u g h ly a p p ro p ria b le commodity o f som ething so in tan g ib le as inform ation. Legally imposed p ro p e rty r ig h ts can p ro v id e only a p artial b a r r ie r , since th e v e ry u se of th e inform ation in any p ro d u ctiv e way is bound to reveal it, a t lea st in p a r t. 28 M oreover, th e in h eren t c h a ra c teristics of information a re not only applicable to th e information m arket itself, but also to any attem pt to a lte r th e institutional rules which govern its flow. Con­ s id e r, for example, appropriability where th e proposed problems o f u n d e r-su p p ly of information a re due to th e non-appropriability of r e tu r n s . T hat is to say th a t th e u n d e r-su p p ly will depend on th e d eg ree to which th e re tu rn s to investm ents in information cannot be a p p ro p ria te d . T his also holds tru e (theoretically) for any attem pt to change th e ru les. Institutional innovation itself also m aintains th e p ro p e rtie s of a public good. D. M arket S tru c tu re Effects on th e Costs and B enefits o f Information Because th e value of information is only realized ex post of decision, public or p riv ate re tu rn s on investm ents in information a re difficult to estim ate. It may be reasonable for a decision maker to co n cen trate on minimizing th e costs associated with acquiring inform ation. But u n d er some m arket conditions p riv ate decision m akers can realize d ire c t benefits from information. b en efits shape th e behavior o f decision m akers. Both costs and To help illu stra te th is , hypothetical cases of information cost and benefit for p riv ate firms and for public statistical agencies u n d er four d ifferen t m arket s tru c tu re s and exchange mechanisms a re p resen te d . For th e p u rp o se of th is p resen tatio n , we focus on m arket infor­ mation which tak es on a special m eaning. In th e s tric te s t sen se, we know th a t m arket signals a re not information per se because they have not been analyzed nor in te rp re te d to serv e a specific decision. Economists marvel o v e r th e signaling function which prices play u n d er perfectly com petitive m arket conditions. But o u tsid e of th is 29 se t o f p reco n d itio n s, th e limitations of th e informational co n te n t of p rices a re well docum ented (C o llin s). N ev erth eless, given th e con­ te x t of a m arket, when exchange o c c u rs, th e re is alw ays th e p resen ce of inform ation. T he questio n a rises as to who has access o r rig h ts to th is inform ation, how a re c o sts and b en efits from its u se d is tr i­ b u te d ; why do public sta tistica l agencies and p riv a te firm s behave so d iffe re n tly with resp ec t to information d istrib u tio n and use in d iffe re n t m arket s tr u c tu r e s . To th e e x te n t th a t th e d istrib u tio n of m arket inform ation v a rie s o v e r m arket s tr u c tu r e s , it is reasonable to assum e th a t c o sts and b en efits a re d istrib u te d d ifferen tly among various m arket p a rtic ip a n ts . Even within th e same m arket s tr u c tu r e , th e total cost o f producing inform ation v a rie s betw een o rganizations for any num ber of reasons inclu d ing, for exam ple, size of o rg an izatio n , p u rp o se of o rg an izatio n , m anagement sty le s , analytical capabilities and m ethods of accounting for cost (B u rch , 1979, p . 13). B ecause of its public good c h a ra c ­ te r is tic s , th e problem o f m easuring b e n efits o f inform ation becomes equally d iffic u lt. T he following assum ptions a re made fo r each hypothetical case: 1. Given th e m arket s tr u c tu r e , one h u n d re d p e rc en t of th e m arket volume is tra n sa c te d u n d e r th e exchange mechanism typical to th a t s tr u c tu r e . 2. Both b u y e rs and sellers in th e m arket face th e same m arket s tr u c tu r e s . 3. Firms a re not req u ire d to re p o rt to th e public sta tistic a l sy ste m . 4. T he n a tu re and ty p e of inform ation needed for decision making ch an g es o v e r v ario u s m arket s tr u c tu r e s . 30 T h e an aly sis c o n sid e rs a se rie s o f fo u r com parative hypothetical c a se s. Each c ase exam ines how cost and b e n efits of inform ation a re d is trib u te d u n d e r th e condition of a specified m arket s tr u c tu r e and asso ciated p rice ex ch a n g e m echanism . T he following m arket s tr u c tu r e s w ith a commonly a sso ciated p ric e d isc o v ery mechanism a re c o n sid e re d : com petitive m a rk e t/a u c tio n ; o lig o p o ly /c o n tra c t; m onopoly/bargaining; an d single firm m a rk e t/v e rtic a l in te g ra tio n . In th e f ir s t c a se , we exam ine th e co st and benefit o f inform ation to th e public ag en cy and to th e p riv a te firm (s) in a com petitive m ark e t. A public auction is a close approxim ation o f th e com petitive m ark e t. In th is c a se , it is h y p o th esized th a t th e public a g e n t and th e p riv a te firm would both in cu r relativ ely low co sts fo r o b tain in g inform ation. Why? T h e com petitive m arket with th e assum ption of many b u y e rs and se lle rs ( e t c .) , especially in th e case o f a public au ctio n as th e ex ch a n g e m echanism , p re s e n ts no problem fo r a p a rtic ip a n t o r a n e u tra l a g e n t in ob tain in g a c c u ra te and re p re s e n ta ­ tiv e m arket inform ation m erely by p a rtic ip a tin g in o r o b se rv in g th e c e n tra lly located auction p ro c e ss . is n o n e x c lu d a b ility .) (A c h a ra c te ris tic of inform ation T h e public agency faces relativ ely m odest c o sts in th is c a se , com pared to w hat it faces u n d e r o th e r m arket s tr u c tu r e s Inform ational c o sts a re no h ig h e r an d o ften lower fo r th e firm b u t as o ne com petitive firm among m any, it fin d s it d iffic u lt to c a p tu re any r e tu r n on its in v estm en ts in inform ation. T h e firm is re g u la te d by th e m arket a n d , to th e e x te n t th a t th e m arket is able to su p p ly an a d e q u a te am ount o f reaso n ab ly a c c u ra te inform ation, th e firm does not in v est in th e collection o f m arket inform ation. S ince no 31 p riv a te firm has an in centiv e to p ro v id e th e inform ation needed to facilitate th e coordination of th e m ark e t, th e public sta tistic a l a g e n c y , while facing th e same relativ ely low c o s ts , has th e cap acity to g e n e ra te v e ry high social r e tu r n s to so ciety . As we move to th e n e x t m arket s tr u c tu r e and e x ch an g e m echanism , oligopoly and c o n tra c ts , we e n c o u n te r h ig h e r inform ation c o sts fo r th e public agency and p e rh a p s slig h tly lower inform ation cost for th e p riv a te firm for se v era l re a so n s. While th e re a re many few er firm s in th e m ark e t, th e co st o f inform ation to th e public a g en t is h ig h e r b ecau se o f th e s u b s titu tio n o f a p riv a te c o n tra c t a rra n g em e n t fo r th e open m arket sig n a ls o f a public a u c tio n . inform ation h e ig h te n . P ro p rie ta ry rig h ts in m arket It is in th e individual firm 's in te re s t to w ithhold inform ation so th a t it m aintains a com petitive ed g e on o th e r firm s in th e m ark e t. Inform ation ceases to be a p ro d u c t of th e public p ro c e sse s of th e m arket and becomes more an in te rn al firm p ro d u c t o f a publicly u n re c o rd e d p riv a te tra n s a c tio n . B u t, even if th e con­ tra c tin g firm s should v o lu n tarily re p o rt to th e public a g e n t, th e com­ plex an d v a ry in g sp ecifics o f each o f th e many c o n tra c ts would c re a te major form atting an d dissem in atin g c o s ts . Also, much of th e co o rd in a­ tion o f th e m arket follows from th e few ness o f firm s and th e ir in te r­ d ep en d en ce in b e h av io r—re d u c in g th e b e n e fits to any public in v e st­ ment in m arket inform ation. U n d er th is m arket s tr u c tu r e , th e firm still faces about th e same inform ation c o s ts , b u t th e p o tential n et b en efit to an oligopolistic firm is h ig h e r. B ecause of th e v e ry n a tu re o f th e m ark e t, th e firm can u se inform ation in te rn al to its o p e ra tio n s to a rr iv e a t e stim ates for th e e n tire m ark e t. M oreover, th e firm 32 recognizes th a t more o f th e re tu r n to its in v estm en ts in inform ation can b e c a p tu re d by th e firm u n d e r oligopoly c o n d itio n s. N ext, we co n sid er b ila tera l monopoly and a common e x ch an g e mechanism associated w ith monopoly s tr u c tu r e , b a rg a in in g . H ere it is h y pothesized th a t th e public a g e n t will e x p erien ce v e ry much h ig h er inform ation acq u isitio n c o sts an d th e firm will in c u r still lower inform ation acquisitio n c o st. All m arket inform ation is now th e p ro d u c t of th e in te rn al d ecisio n s o f th e two m onopolists. The public a g en t inform ation c o sts a re likely to be h ig h er b ecau se of th e o b stacle of e n tre n c h e d p ro p e rty rig h ts in inform ation by th e firm . Inform ation held by th e firm is re p o rte d only in th e c a se w here th e firm is re q u ire d by law to re p o rt b ecau se o f some p r e ­ vailing p ublic policy co n cern (see assum ption 3 ). C o n se q u e n tly , th e cost o f a cq u irin g m arket inform ation fo r th e public a g e n t becomes extrem ely h ig h . H ow ever, th e r e a re poten tially high social b e n e fits for su ch public in v estm en ts, b u t fo r public policies reg u la tin g firm b e h av io r, not fo r fa c ilitatin g m ark et coordination which is e n tire ly in te rn al to th e two m onopolies. T h e firm is in full control o f all m arket inform ation—a t least on one sid e . E xchange betw een th e bilateral m onopolists is fac ilitated by b a rg a in in g . A lthough th e co st of b a rg a in in g may be h igh fo r th e m onopolist, th e cost of a c q u irin g m arket inform ation is lower re la tiv e to th e firm s in o th e r m arket s tr u c tu r e s . H ere a g a in , b e c a u se o f m arket s t r u c tu r e s , th e firm h as low inform ational co st and can realize high p riv a te b e n efits from inform ation. 33 In th e last case, we examine th e extrem e situation of a single firm economy—no m arket tran sactio n s. Although the potential social benefits of publicly supplied information is high, the acquisition cost of information for the public agent is prohibitively high. The cost of access to information for the firm becomes extrem ely low. While information processing, managing, and analyzing costs may be high, the cost of access to m arket infor­ mation is nil, and th e advantage and benefits in th e control over d istrib u tio n of information, especially with respect to public v e rsu s p riv ate use, lies in the private firm 's domain. Concluding G eneralization: As one moves from case to case in th e purely hypothetical examples above, m arket concentration increases, and th e cost of m arket information for the public agent increase g re a tly , while th e cost of m arket information for the firm probably d ecreases. As m arket concentration increases, p rivate benefits to firm investm ents in m arket information increase greatly providing a major incentive for th e firm to invest in information and to deny access to any public a g en t. For th e public a g en t, as concentration increases, the social benefits to public investm ents in information to facilitate m arket coordination decline rapidly, while those to informa­ tion for public policy and regulatory decisions grow. T h u s, the purpose of public investm ent in m arket information changes drastically. T hese com parative cases provide hypothetical examples based on theory of how acquisition costs and benefits are d istrib u te d between th e p riv ate firm and th e public agent over various market s tru c tu re s and exchange mechanisms. It is im portant to recognize, however, th a t information is a necessary but not sufficient condition for "good" m arket perform ance. PLEASE NOTE: This page not included with original material. Filmed as received. University Microfilms International 35 conceived o f th is fram ew ork, p e rh a p s he did not envision its u se . in th e m anner which th is th e s is p ro p o se s. B ut intuition s u g g e s ts th a t th e re la tio n sh ip betw een inform ation and each com ponent o f th e I/O fram ew ork ru n in a tw o-w ay s tr e e t a s shown in F ig u re 2 .2 . Inform ation in flu en ces m arket s tr u c tu r e , b u t a giv en s tru c tu ra l c h a ra c te ris tic o f a m arket can g o v e rn th e flow and d istrib u tio n of inform ation; inform ation influences th e b eh av io r (co n d u ct) o f th e firm , b u t th e firm can re d u c e its need s fo r inform ation by a d o p tin g v a rio u s ris k m anagem ent p ra c tic e s w hich allow it to make decisions in an environm ent o f im perfect know ledge; inform ation can be asso ciated w ith m ark et p erfo rm an ce, b u t c o n v e rse ly th e perform ance o f a m arket can im pact inform ation. a full c irc le . T h u s , th is rela tio n sh ip becomes A lth o u g h , a dynam ic rela tio n sh ip betw een th e I/O fram ew ork and inform ation is th e o riz e d , it becom es more m anageable to tra c e o u t co n n ectio n s betw een th e two in a sin g le d ire c tio n . T h at is to s a y , one can hold th e s tr u c tu r a l a n d behavioral dim ensions o f th e m arket g iv e n , an d q u e stio n what im pacts do v a rio u s elem ents o f th e I /O fram ew ork hav e on th e d istrib u tio n and p e rh a p s value o f inform a­ tion in th e firm 's decision m aking p ro c e ss . A lthough th e I/O fram ew ork has c o n trib u te d to valuable re s e a rc h , it c e rta in ly has b ro a d e r im plications th a n its tra d itio n a l u se . P e rh ap s th e two most commonly c ite d lim itations o f th e I / O fram ew ork a re critic a l in a d a p tin g its u se to inform ation p roblem s. T h e I/O fram e­ work d e-em p h asizes (1) v e rtic a l re la tio n sh ip s, and (2) th e b eh av io r o f th e firm 's decision p ro c e ss . INFORMATION . . . . 1 ' | 1 MARKET STRUCTURE /!> < MARKET CONDUCT A . N V. MARKET PERFORMANCE AI Figure 2.2 Market Information and the I/O Paradigm 37 Inform ation is a p ro d u ct of e x ch an g e. And exchange tak e s place in both horizontal and vertical dim ensions. But trad itio n ally , in d u strial organization th eo ry has been applied only to horizontal m arket rela tio n sh ip s. More recen tly several re s e a rc h e rs including B oynton, H enderson, M arion, S h affer (1974), and Williamson (1975) have attem pted to in te g ra te and combine v ertical coordination with I/O th e o ry . T hey have all recognized th a t th e I/O paradigm has im portant applications to th e stu d y o f v ertical m arket relationships and th e coordination o f th e s e system s in addition to its early applica­ tion to single in d u stry re s e a rc h . Developments in th is a re a will have implications for rese a rc h on inform ation system s because more infor­ mation (for both p riv a te and public p u rp o ses) is tr a n s fe r re d via v ertical m arket tra n sa c tio n s th a n in horizontal o n es. R e search ers a rg u e th a t th e I/O fram ework omits a sp e c ts of reality w hich, if in co rp o rated , would e x te n d and stre n g th e n th e scope of th e a n a ly sis. T he I/O fram ework has c o n ce n tra te d on condi­ tions e x te rn a l to th e firm ( i . e . , definition of th e relev an t m ark e t). T h u s, it has tre a te d th e firm like a "black b o x ." S h a ffer (1979) calls for linking th e I/O fram ework with th e bodies of knowledge developed by organizational b eh av io ralists (Simon, M arch, C y ert) whose prim ary concern commences with intra-firm decision m aking. T his line of reasoning would not only add to I/O th e o ry b u t would also make it possible to in v estig ate th e relatio n sh ip betw een th e firm 's decision p ro cess and inform ation, a link th a t is c e n tral in th e inform ation system s paradigm . If I/O th eo ry does not account for th e firm 's decision making environm ent, one cannot ex p ect it to accommodate notions related to inform ation. 38 F igure 2.3 illu stra te s a fram ework which incorporates vertical relatio n sh ip s and th e firm 's decision making p ro cess (M arion). Some definitions o f term s a s th ey a re used in th is fig u re and as they will be used in th is re se a rc h a re p re se n te d below. S tru c tu re is a collection o f param eters th a t define th e oppor­ tu n ity set o f su b sec to r p a rtic ip a n ts . T h re e classes of param eters a re c o n sid e re d : 1. Basic conditions deal with m arket g eo g rap h y in relation to supply and demand conditions and c h a ra c te ristic s of th e p ro d u ce ( i . e . , e la sticities, p ro d u ct p e rish ­ a b ility , location o f m arket, e t c .) . 2. M arket c h a ra c te ristic s include th e m arket s tru c tu re v ariab les in th e application of th e I/O framework ( i . e . , concen tratio n ra tio s, num ber and size of firm s, e n try and e x it, p ro d u ct d ifferen tiatio n , e t c .) . 3. In stitu tio n s re fe rs to e stab lish ed custom s, ru les o r p ro c e d u re s. C onduct d e sc rib e s th e behavior o f p a rtic ip a n ts influenced by m arket s tr u c tu r e , decision making p ro c e sse s, and goals of th e firm . In th is stu d y we focus on th e conduct o f th e firm in its input m ark et. T h e firm 's decision environm ent p ic tu re s th e firm in a world of u n c e rta in ty influenced by m arket s tr u c tu r e , goals of th e firm , and sta n d a rd o p e ra tin g p ro c e d u re s. T he u n iv e rse o f m arket inform ation is divided into th re e p a r ts . Inform ation th a t a ris e s o u t o f m arket tra n sa c tio n s is re fe rre d to as th e informal system ( i . e . , information th a t is tran sm itte d between grow er an d p ro c e s s o rs ). Inform ation th a t is collected by p riv ate firm s and sold to th e m arket p a rtic ip a n ts is re fe rre d to as th e p riv ate sy stem . And inform ation collected an d re d is trib u te d by public in sti­ tu tio n s for th e p u rp o se o f im proving m arket perform ance is called th e public information system . MARKET STRUCTURE Basic Conditions Product Market Location Production T rends Consumption T rends Market C haracteristics # and Size of Firms # of Products E ntry and Exit Type of Firm # of Plants Concentration Channels S Functions Product Differentiation yFIRM N . ^ DECISION \ > N J E N V IR O N -^ / Types of Decisions A lternatives Incentives Control Goals MARKET CONDUCT Procurem ent: Pricing Contracting Quality Control Standard O perating Procedures Risk Management Practices Institutional A rrangem ents Exchange A rrangem ents Ownership Cooperatives Grades Figure 2.3 Market S tru c tu re Analysis and Information 1 1 UNIVERSE OF MARKET INFORMATION 1 ■ Public Information Private Information i Informal Information | 1 , 40 F. A Research Framework An adequate framework for analyzing m arket information problems is still to be evolved. N evertheless, th e need for a framework here is ev id en t; it is needed to provide a means o f o rganizing, in te r­ p retin g , and filtering knowledge about reality while a b strac tin g from the complexities of th e real world. Given th e n a tu re of th e information problems described and th e lack of an applicable integ rativ e theory to solve them , a certain amount of research has to be inductive at th is sta g e. Kemeny defined induction as "the process by which a scientist forms a theory to explain th e o bserved fa c ts ." Induction reasons from th e p a rts to a whole, from th e individual to th e general. T h u s, a fram ework a rise s from th e inductive research process and th en it is used deductively to su g g e st causal relationships, predict outcom es, describ e a phenomena and te s t h y potheses. T he main focus o f th is research effort will be in an inductive mold. At th is point, we explain how th e in teg rated framework illu strated in F igure 2.3 is employed in an evaluation of m arket information for the Michigan processed potato in d u stry . T he theoretical o rigins of each component of th e framework will be identified and a discussion of its application in th is th esis will be p re se n te d . At th e o u tse t, it should be noted th a t th is work does not re p re se n t a complete integration of ail th e elements of each component of th e fram ework. We only borowed what was necessary to illu stra te th e relationship between information and components of proven bodies of th e o ry . Also, certain a sp ects o f each th eo ry were e asier to operationalize in the context of th e Michigan processed potato in d u stry and within th e reso u rce c o n strain ts of th is stu d y . 41 T his rese a rc h e ffo rt sta rte d out with th e intellectual fram ework p re se n te d in th e firs t section of th is c h a p te r. T he inform ation system paradigm s tru c tu re d th e inq u iry process in th a t it focused th e re se a rc h on th e decision m aker. A ltern ativ ely , one may have commenced th e re se a rc h with a given concept and su b seq u e n tly examined how th e inform ation system conceptualized, operationalized, m easured, and analyzed th e concept for a given se t of decision p u rp o se s. B ut th is re se a rc h adopted th e approach which s ta r ts with th e decision m aker, and is informed by th e notion th a t information a tta in s its v alue in th e c o n tex t of a specific decision. T he operationalization and qualification o f th is statem ent was aided by four bodies of th e o ry : in d u stria l o rg an izatio n , behavioral th e o ry of th e firm , th eo ries of v ertical co o rdination, and neoclassical th e o ry . T he stu d y began with th e model of in d u stria l o rganization (I/O ) infused with th e th eo ry of v ertical coordination and applied to th e re se a rc h issue o f information and m arket s tr u c tu r e in th e p ro cessed potato in d u s try . T his encom passes th e left side o f F igure 2.3 u n d e r th e heading of m arket s tr u c tu r e . T he elem ents listed h e re a re d is­ cu ssed in C h a p te r IV of th is s tu d y . Two elem ents of m arket s tr u c ­ tu r e , firm size and firm ty p e , a re inco rp o rated into th e an aly sis p re se n te d in C h ap ter V. Specifically, th e s e elem ents o f m arket s tr u c tu r e w ere used to s tra tify firm s in th e Michigan p ro cessed potato in d u s try . Within th e se s tru c tu ra l se ts we c ro ss tab u late d inform ation o btained from personal interview s with m anagers con­ c ern in g th e ir evaluation of ty p e s and so u rces of m arket inform ation ag ain st specific decisions made by th e firm . c o n sists of th re e categ o ries: T he firm size variab le la rg e , medium, and small. T h e re fo re , 42 th e an aly sis com pared th e re s u lts o f how p lan t m an ag ers ev alu ated inform ation betw een each g ro u p . g o rie s: fre e z e rs and c h ip p e rs . Firm ty p e c o n sists o f two c a te ­ Sim ilarly, com parisons w ere made betw een fre e z e rs ' and chippers* evaluation o f m arket inform ation ty p e s and so u rc e s . C en tral to th e evalu atio n o f m arket inform ation is th e decision environm ent of th e firm . T h is stu d y has p ointed o u t some o f th e lim itations of neoclassical economic th e o ry in d e sc rib in g and ex p lain in g firm m anagem ent d e c isio n s. T h e re fo re , a behavioral th e o ry o f th e firm was adopted which c h a ra c te riz e d th e firm as an a d a p tiv e o rg a n iz a ­ tion su b je ct to u n c e rta in ty . In C h a p te r IV we will lay o u t th is fram e­ work a n d p re s e n t th e d e s c rip tiv e re s u lts of each firm 's p e rc ep tio n s o f its decision en v iro n m en t. T h is inform ation will th e n be u se d to v alid ate a p re se le c te d list of ty p e s o f m ark etin g d ecisio n s made by potato p ro c e ss o rs. T h e re s u ltin g se t o f d ecisio n s was u sed in th e c ro ss tab u latio n s d e sc rib e d ab o v e. M arket c o n d u c t, a c e n tra l com ponent o f th e in d u stria l o rg an izatio n fram ew ork is used to link th e o th e r elem ents In th is s tu d y to th e firm 's pro cu rem en t a c tiv itie s . In th e tra d itio n a l application o f th e I/O fram ew ork, m arket c o n d u ct has re fe re n c e to th e p ro d u c t m ark e t. H ere, how ever, we exam ined th e p ro cu rem en t a c tiv itie s o f potato p ro c e ss o rs. u se fu l. T h eo ries re la tin g to th e b e h av io r o f th e firm w ere also C oncepts and p ra c tic e s of ris k m anagem ent a n d s ta n d a rd o p e ra tin g p ro c e d u re s a re dim ensions o f firm b eh av io r th a t th e I/O fram ew ork does not h a n d le . In C h a p te r IV we d e sc rib e th e s e a sp e c ts 43 of th e firm and in C h ap ter V we attem pt to infer th e direction of impact each category of firm behavior has on th e production, d is tri­ bution and u se of m arket information between a firm , competing firms and public statistical agencies. T his framework provided a means o f organizing and in te rp retin g real world o b serv atio n s. a reas of in q u iry . It allows th e rese a rc h e r to s tru c tu re th e In fact, many questions (re se a rc h issues) a rise from the conceptual fram ework. Some key a re as of inquiry include: 1. What is th e relationship between selected elements o f m arket s tr u c tu re and p rice information? 2. How does firm procurem ent behavior impact th e production, d istrib u tio n and use of m arket information? 3. What is th e value (m easured in term s of usefulness) of various so u rces and ty p e s of price information in th e context of specific m arketing decisions? 4. What a re th e firm 's risk management practices and how do th ey impact m arket information? 5. What a re th e firm 's sta n d a rd operating pro ced u res and how do th ey impact m arket information? CHAPTER III A REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES A. Intro duction In C h a p te r II se v era l in te g ra te d fram ew orks w ere p rese n te d which a re applicable to th e an aly ses of inform ation problem s. T he th eo retical developm ents in th e economics of inform ation a re still evolving and th u s m ethodologies a re also d eveloping. E isg ru b er s ta te s " n e ith e r th e o ry nor m ethodology e x ist to a d d re ss ad eq u ately th e economics o f inform ation, and until re c e n tly , little e ffo rt was made to overcom e th is d e fic ie n c y ." Since we a re still a long way from a th e o ry o f inform ation, econom ists have employed sev eral methodological a p p ro a ch e s in th e stu d y o f inform ation system s. Each ap p ro ach re fle c ts th e d iv e rs e view th a t has e a rn e d th is su b ject m atter th e title of th e "m yth o f m ethodology" (M iller). T h e approaches review ed h e re w ere chosen to illu stra te th e v ario u s m ethodologies which have been applied to th e problem o f m ark etin g , especially p rice , inform ation sy ste m s. d isc u sse d : Four m ethodological ap p ro ach es will be 1) n e t social b e n e fit, 2) pragm atic u s e r a p p ro a ch , 3) m arket s tr u c tu r e , p ricin g in stitu tio n and inform ation, and 4) m arket perform ance and inform ation. B. Net Social B enefit T he widely c ited Hayami and P eterso n a rtic le illu s tra te s th is a p p ro a c h . T h eir stu d y is based on p ro d u c e r and consum er su rp lu s 44 45 m easu res from w elfare econom ics. T h e re fo re , th e stu d y m akes th e tra d itio n a l assu m p tio n s o f com petition; lack o f e x te rn a litie s , p e rfe c t m obility, an d hom ogeneous inform ation among th e a c to rs . T h is s tu d y exam ines w h e th e r it is socially beneficial fo r U5DA to seek g r e a te r s ta tis tic a l a c c u ra c y in c ro p fo re c a s tin g . U sing an in v e n to ry a d ju stm en t model a n d co st fig u re s su p p lied by USDA on sam ple s u r v e y s w ith v a ry in g levels o f sam pling e r r o r , th e y found th a t an e x tr a d o lla r s p e n t to in c re a se th e a c c u ra c y o f s ta tistic a l re p o rtin g r e s u lts in n e t b e n e fits ra n g in g from $20 to $100. T he n e t social b e n e fit a p p ro a c h has se v e ra l sh o rtc o m in g s. T he w ork o f Hayami and P e te rso n h a s ' been c ritiq u e d on se v e ra l f r o n ts . F irs t o f all, th e global m odeling a p p ro a c h , w ith its heroic a ssu m p tio n s, d o es n o t make e x p licit all th e im p acts a n d c o s ts o f additio n al in v e s t­ m ents in th e a c c u ra c y of c ro p r e p o r ts . For exam ple, m ore a c c u ra te inform ation fo r so y b e an p ro d u c e rs may be a t th e e x p e n se o f r e p o rts fo r th e c o rn m a rk e t. D obson (1979) n o te s th a t th e r e s e a r c h e r s n e g le c te d an im portant fa c to r re la te d to th e a c c u ra c y o f c ro p fo re c a s ts —w e a th e r. He o b s e rv e s th a t e r r o r s in c ro p fo re c a s ts r e s u lt no t o nly from sam pling e r r o r s , b u t also from c h a n g e s in gro w in g c o n d itio n s a f te r th e c ro p s u r v e y s a r e ta k e n . T h e H ayam i-P eterson s tu d y leaves th e re a d e r uninform ed c o n c e rn in g how m uch o f th e e r r o r in c ro p fo re c a s ts re s u lts from sam pling e r r o r a n d how m uch e r r o r r e s u lts from abnorm al co n d itio n s w hich o c c u r a f te r th e sam pling d a te . T h e re a d e r also is le ft to p o n d e r how m uch im provem ent in c ro p fo re c a s t m ight be o b ta in a b le from m ore a c c u ra te sam pling and how m uch im provem ent would be o b tain ed from d e v elo p in g u sa b le lo n g -ra n g e w e ath e r fo re c a s ts w hich would perm it a d ju stm e n ts to acco u n t fo r e x p e c te d c h a n g e s in co n d itio n s a fte r th e c ro p s u r v e y . 46 C. Pragm atic U ser's A pproach A review of various stu d ies employing th e pragm atic u se r's approach su g g e sts th at it best encom passes problems th a t are ill-defined. Some would a rg u e th a t th is approach lacks a theoretical base b u t n e v erth eless, th e pragm atic u s e r's approach co n trib u te s to th e identification of th e issu es, to th e use and clarification of term inology and to a b e tte r u n d erstan d in g of th e n a tu re of o u r data and information system s. In a sen se, th is approach is disciplinary in th a t it potentially can lead to theoretical contributions as well as add to fu rth e r testin g of th e methodology involved in th is ty p e of re se a rc h . It proposes no sophisticated analytical te s tin g . Before we can get to th e stag e of selecting ap p ro p ria te analytical proce­ d u re s to quan tify th e relationship between information and decisions, we have to complete th e task of identifying and defining those rela­ tionships and developing a system atic conceptual fram ework. The pragm atic u se r approach could serv e as th e link between th e statistical system and an e v e r changing decision environm ent. T he approach relies on th e e x p e rt opinion o f a selected group of decision m akers to ren d e r sugg estio n s about th e design (in term s o f th e ir specific needs) of th e statistical system . In th e application of th e pragm atic u s e r's approach, one often lacks clear c u t c rite ria for deciding trad e-o ffs between a ltern a tiv e decision m akers. P riorities among altern a tiv e statistical activities a re difficult for a governm ent agency to e stab lish . T he Panel on Methodology for S tatistical P riorities concluded th a t b en efit-co st analysis should be used co nsistently in all federal agencies to determ ine data p lans. While d eriving cost of th e program may be fairly stra ig h tfo rw a rd , the 47 difficulty lies in estim ating anticipated benefits to th e u se rs of th e inform ation. N ev erth eless, th e cost-benefit criteria does provide a possible decision rule for determ ining statistical priorities and has been applied in several stu d ies reviewed below. T he search of th e lite ra tu re at th is point focuses on th e p rag ­ matic u se r methodology employed in studies on information for a g ri­ cu ltu ral m arkets. Within th e cash grain m arket, the USDA has completed th e most com prehensive stu d y on m arket information (H eifner, et a l. ) . The stu d y was prim arily concerned with assessin g th e m arket decision m akers' evaluation of m arket information, and determ ine what implications th e u se rs' evaluation has for th e design (in term s o f improving accuracy) of th e A gricultural M arketing S erv ice's Grain M arket News. T he study describ es th e p articip an ts in th e grain pricing process and th e flows of p rice inform ation. A mail su rv e y was employed with follow-up interview s on th e volume of g rain tra d e d at selected tran sactio n points d u rin g 1974. Also of in te re st was d ata on th e term s of tra d e and th e kind o f information used by g rain firms in making th e ir buying and selling decisions. Supplem entary information was obtained from governm ent m arket re p o rte rs via an open-ended interview process. Since th e stu d y was concerned with assessing one m arket p a rtic ip a n t's evaluation of m arket information, a broad system p e r­ spective was not adopted; it only concerned itself with th e infor­ mational needs of p ro d u c e rs. T herefore, tra d e -o ffs betw een various o th e r u se rs of information (elev ato rs, p ro cesso rs, e tc .) w ere not of concern in th e stu d y and th e problem of allocating public in v est­ ment betw een a ltern a tiv e u se rs of information was not a d d re sse d . 48 A lthough th e s tu d y h ig h lig h ted sig n ifican t im plications o f th e d esig n of th e sta tistic a l system (from th e p e rs p e c tiv e o f p r o d u c e r s ) , it did not p ro v id e a basis for determ ining su ch q u e stio n s as how larg e a p rogram is n e ed e d , o r th e r e tu r n s to in v estin g in a lte rn a tiv e s ta tis ­ tical m ethods. T h e stu d y im plicitly assum ed p ro d u c e rs to be th e only u s e rs o f th e inform ation an d th e re fo re se t a n o b jec tiv e to meet th e ir decision n e e d s. To a g re a t e x te n t, th e stu d y took u n d e r co n sid era tio n how s tr u c ­ tu ra l c h a ra c te ris tic s an d p ric e d isc o v ery m echanism s im pact th e u se o f inform ation in th e m arket and su b se q u e n tly th e d a ta d e sig n s o f th e sta tistic a l a g e n c y . H ow ever, some o f th e re la tio n sh ip s betw een v a rio u s p rice d isco v ery mechanisms (fu tu re s m ark et—c ash m arket s tr u c tu r e ) w ere not e x p lo re d . A se co n d , b u t closely re la te d , issu e is th e q u e stio n o f how rela tiv e p rice s among locations and g ra d e s o v e r time re fle c t cost d iffe re n c e s. While th e form er c o n ce rn is w ith linking s tr u c tu r e and p ric e d isc o v ery to th e s ta tistic a l d e sig n q u e stio n , th e la te r issu e deals with th e relatio n sh ip betw een th e d e sig n of th e sta tistic a l system and m arket perform ance (m easu red in term s of p rice d is p e r s io n ). Within o th e r commodity g ro u p s , p a rtic u la rly th e p o tato in d u s try , a com prehensive stu d y ev alu atin g th e p ric e d a ta b a se was com pleted in 1975 (Sjodin and D ahl). T h e a u th o rs se n t a q u e stio n n a ire to a random sam ple o f th e m arket p a rtic ip a n ts to o b ta in th e ir ev aluation o f m arket p ric e inform ation. T h e re s e a rc h e rs o p e ra te d u n d e r th e prem ise th a t d a ta is collected for some specific p u rp o se o r se t of p u rp o se s and th a t th e objectiv e o f th e d a ta system is to fill th e need 49 of the m arket decision m aker. While insights can be gained from the market p articipants who provide information to the statistical agency, th is approach does not reflect th e problems and views of the agency's market rep o rte rs nor does it account for public decision makers or oth er m arket p articip an ts. Here again th e pragm atic user approach is employed without considering a broader range of u se rs of publicly m arketed information. Also, th e study does not develop or apply a decision rule for choosing between altern ativ e u se r g ro u p s. An important empirical stu d y evaluating th e California Federal-State Market News Service also placed emphasis on th e u sers of information. However, th is study goes a step fu rth e r by attem pting to apply a decision rule to establish trad e -o ffs between the various u se r g ro u p s. T he stu d y identifies broad categories of both market and non-m arket u sers of th e publicly supported statistical system . It does not, however, include th e analytical use of data by un iv er­ sities and governm ent agencies. T he purpose of th e stu d y was to determ ine the feasibility of m easuring th e net benefits (value) of th e California Federal-S tate M arket News Information S ervice. Given a value for information supplied by th e statistical agency, th e research ers could apply th e cost-benefit criterio n to the allocation o f m arket information. They concluded th a t it is feasible to measure some benefits derived from M arket News S ervice, but th at th ese m easures u n d e rstate the "tru e" economic value of information. F ur­ therm ore, it was found, in th e conventional se n se , practically impossible empirically to measure th e benefits to non-m arket users and consum ers. Because the value of information was not empirically d eriv ed, th e research ers concluded th a t the co st-b en efit ratio is not a feasible criteria for designing a statistical system . 50 The California stu d y does recognize a viable approach to th e p ro ­ blem by stre ssin g the institutional dimensions of th e sta tistica l agency. T h erefo re, identifying th e institutional relationship betw een th e organizational s tru c tu re of th e agency and organizational perform ance dimensions (criteria for change) may o ffer an approach when dealing with design q u e stio n s. Hence, th e rese a rc h e r concluded th a t fu rth e r research effo rts might be d irec te d tow ard improving th e organizational efficiency of th e statistical ag en cy . F urtherm ore, th e y recognized th e a ltern a tiv e approach of linking changes in m arket s tru c tu re and p rice mechanisms for th e design of th e statistical system . T his section discussed several altern ativ e ways o f organizing resea rch e ffo rts to a d d re ss th e problem at h an d . T he above mentioned stu d ies pull to g eth er some of the applications o f one broad method—th e u s e r 's approach. T h ere a re several c h a ra c te ristic s of th e u s e r's app ro ach. F irst, th is approach focuses on identifying th e u se rs of information provided by th e statistical system (P ro fesso r Raup p re s e n ts an in te restin g discussion of th e th re e broad functional uses of d ata in th e evolution of a statistical d ata system ). data u se r a re obtained. N ext, th e needs of th e Then o th e r step s often include identifying a p p ro p ria te m easures th a t will improve th e system and estab lish decision rules (criteria) for allocating reso u rce s. D. M arket S tru c tu re , Pricing In stitu tio n s, and Information Numerous au th o rs have developed theoretical relationships and implications between m arket s tru c tu re and information (Grossman and S tig litz, 1976; Salop, 1976; and Hayek, 1945). T he pricin g system is th e cen tral mechanism for communicating inform ation. The 51 organ izational s tr u c tu r e o f a m arket im pacts th e sta b ility o f p rice s and th u s has a d ire c t re la tio n sh ip to th e g e n e ra tio n , v a lu e , and use o f inform ation for economic decision m aking. For exam ple, th e com­ p e titiv e m arket w ith d e c e n tra liz e d decision m aking co o rd in ated by a p ric e system is recognized as th e most e fficien t m arket o rg an iz atio n . Implicit in th is position is th e view th a t such a m arket o rg an izatio n has su p e rio r inform ation p ro p e rtie s (p ric e a c c u ra te ly re fle c ts s c a r c ity ) . Hayek sum m arized th e a d v a n ta g e s of em ploying th e p ric e sy stem : T he most sig n ific an t fact about th is system is th e economy o f know ledge w ith w hich it o p e ra te s , o r how little th e individual p a rtic ip a n ts need to know in o r d e r to be able to ta k e th e rig h t a c tio n . In a b b re v ia te d form , by a kind o f sym bol, only th e most e sse n tia l inform ation is p assed o n , and p asse d on only to th o se c o n c e rn e d . It is more th a n a m etaphor to d e s c rib e th e p ric e system a s a kind of m achinery fo r re g is te rin g c h a n g e , o r a system o f te le ­ com m unications which en ab les individual p ro d u c e rs to watch m erely th e movement o f a few p o in te rs , as an e n g in e e r might w atch th e h a n d s o f a few d ia ls, in o rd e r to a d ju st th e ir a c tiv itie s to c h a n g e s o f which th e y may n e v e r know more th an is re fle cted in th e p ric e m ovem ent. In m ark ets th a t e x h ib it some d e g re e of c o n c e n tra tio n , th e infor­ mational co n ten t o f p ric e s d e clin e and firm s o fte n in v e st in th e collection o f additional inform ation in o r d e r to defen d them selves a g a in st o r gain an e d g e on th e ir c o m p etito rs. B ecause firm s in con­ c e n tra te d m ark ets can to some e x te n t realize a r e tu r n to th e ir in v estm en ts in inform ation, th e y are more inclined to develop p riv a te sy stem s and view th is inform ation a s th e p riv a te p ro p e rty o f th e firm . B onnen (1975) d isc u sse d th e p ro p e rty rig h t issu e involving inform ation in c o n c e n tra te d m ark e ts: Some d a ta problem s a ris e b ecau se many o f th e p ro p e rty rig h ts v e ste d in inform ation a re p riv a te ly held by firm s and in te re s ts with c o n sid era b le economic an d th u s political in flu e n c e ., .w e fin d th a t e sse n tia l inform ation is o fte n held by a few firm s whose immediate in te r e s ts would not be se rv e d b y th e rele ase o f th a t inform ation— As in d u stria l c o n ce n tra tio n 52 c o n tin u es to grow in food and fib e r m ark e ts, th e issu e of p riv a te o w n ersh ip of inform ation versus th e p u b lic 's rig h t to know will become more a n d more critic a l a n d h e a te d . Giant firms a c q u ire with th e ir g re a t size not only an impact on m arkets b u t also a major re sp o n sib ility fo r p ublic inform ation. A lthough segm ents o f a g ric u ltu ra l m arkets b eh av e noncom petitively, fo r many p ro d u c ts , farm e rs ten d to re p re s e n t th e classic exam ple of p u re com petition on th e s e lle r's sid e o f th e m ark et. H ence, p rice and its ab ility to signal an d inform m arket p a rtic ip a n ts a re im portant q u a litie s o f th e concept th a t is stu d ie d u n d e r th e heading of p rice d e term in atio n . P rice d eterm ination d eals w ith th e th e o ry o f p ricin g and th e m anner in which economic fo rce s influence p ric e s u n d e r v ario u s m arket s tr u c tu r e s and le n g th s o f r u n . T h e re la tio n sh ip betw een m ark et s tr u c tu r e and inform ation is well founded in economic th e o ry . T h is re la tio n sh ip in and o f itself does not p re s e n t a problem to public sta tistic a l a g e n c ie s. S u n d q u ist n o tes th a t w ith re s p e c t to s ta tis tic s on th e s tr u c tu r e of a g ric u ltu re , th o u g h d a ta needs for decisions have c h a n g e d , th e in stitu tio n al m eans and p ro c e d u re s for collection have not a d e q u a te ly k ep t p ace. For exam ple, R aup c ite s a fundam ental ch an g e th a t is a lre ad y upon us. It involves th e com pelling n e c e ssity to d is tin g u is h betw een th e 'firm ' and th e 'p la n t' in o u r an aly sis o f a g ric u ltu ra l in d u s try p ric e s . No d istin c tio n o f th is ty p e has been n e c e ssa ry in th e p a s t, fo r th e firm and th e p lan t w ere identical o v e r a d ecisiv e p a rt o f A m erican a g ric u ltu re . T he id e n tity can no longer b e ta k e n fo r g ranted* how ever, for it has been serio u sly d is tu rb e d by th e erosion o f th e economic b o u n d a rie s th a t once clearly d efin ed a farm u n it. O th e r s tr u c tu r a l c h an g e s in Am erican a g ric u ltu ra l s e c to rs th a t have c a u se d problem s w ith o u r c u r r e n t s ta tis tic s in clu d e: grow ing d iv e rs ity in size o f p ro d u ctio n u n its , n o n a g ric u ltu ra l a c tiv itie s , an d c o n ce n tra tio n o f p ro d u ctio n an d m ark etin g . 53 Here S undquist takes s tru c tu re to mean essentially th e num ber, size and decision-m aking control th a t prevails for firms engaged in the production and m arketing phases of o u r natural food and fiber in d u stry . This bro ad er definition includes su b sets of s tru c tu r e such as te n u re , legal form, production composition of firm s and d eg ree of v ertical integration. T heoretically, prices may perform some o r all of th re e major functions in any m arket or economy: allocative fu n ctio n s, d is tri­ b u tiv e functions, and eq uilibrating functions (Tomek and Robinson, H ouck). Allocative Function. Price acts as a signal in th e economy. signaling concept lies at th e h e art o f most allocation decisions. This Alloca­ tive information is to a large d e g re e used in sh o rt ru n tactical decision m aking. For example, in making m arketing decisions a p roducer is in te reste d in the c u rre n t m arket p rice because it enables him to decide when and w here to m arket his p ro d u ct. D istributive F unction. The d istrib u tiv e function in which price theoretically plays a p a rt, relates to longer periods of time where prices se rv e as m easures o f economic perform ance and as indicators for lo n g er-ru n allocation decisions—stra te g ic decisions. T his function reflects m arket perform ance ra th e r th an m arket coordination. T hat is, p rice functions as a scorekeeper determ ining how much economic rew ard is received by various m arket p a rtic ip a n ts. E quilibrating Function. T o g eth er, the allocative and d is tri­ b u tiv e functions of p rice perform a th ird role, th e eq uilibrating o r m arket clearing function. In p u re th e o ry , an equilib ratin g set of p rices can be viewed as th e solution to specific mathematical 54 problem s which sim ultaneously em body b oth allocative and d is trib u tiv e fu n ctio n s o f economic a c tiv ity . Collins recognized th e c h an g in g role o f p ric e in a g ric u ltu ra l m ark e ts as a co o rd in a tin g fu n ctio n and co n cern ed him self with alter* n a tiv e m ethods and p ro c e d u re s . He s ta te d th a t th r e e conditions should p rev ail if coordination in a d e c e n tra liz e d , specialized m arketing system is to be a ch iev e d . F ir s t, th e r e should be a communication n etw o rk to link th e perfo rm an ce u n its in th e sy ste m . S eco n d , sig n als should be developed which a c c u ra te ly re fle ct th e re le v a n t economic v a ria b le s. A n d , th ir d , p a rtic ip a n ts o f th e system m ust be able an d willing to tra n s la te th e sig n a ls receiv ed into an a p p ro p ria te se t o f a c tio n s. Collins p o in ts ou t th a t h isto ric a lly , for many a g ric u ltu ra l p ro ­ d u c ts , th e fu n c tio n s of comm unication an d co o rd in atio n hav e been s e rv e d w ithin an open m ark et system u sin g p ric e s a s th e d ire c to r o f economic a c tiv ity . "Yet in a g ric u ltu ra l m ark e tin g , as in many in d u stria l fie ld s, o th e r a v e n u e s fo r c o o rd in a tin g th e a c tiv itie s of d iffe re n t firm s have been in c re a sin g ly em ployed." He c ite s v e rtica l in te g ra tio n b u t n o te s th a t v a ry in g d e g re e s o f incom plete in te g ratio n a re common in a g ric u ltu re . T h u s f a r , th e d isc u ssio n has been in term s o f th e determ in atio n o f p ric e s and th e d istin c tio n s in its th e o re tic a l fu n ctio n s in th e m ark e t. We now tu r n to p ric e d isc o v e ry , th e p ro c e ss by w hich b u y e rs an d se lle rs a rr iv e a t sp ecific p ric e s . T h e v a rio u s m ethods u se d to a r r iv e a t p ric e s fo r a g ric u ltu ra l p ro d u c ts h av e b een cla ssified in a nu m b er o f w ays. Tomek and R obinson s ta te th a t th e following five c a te g o rie s c o v e r m ost of th e p ric in g sy stem s now em ployed in 55 a g ric u ltu ra l m a rk e ts: p riv a te n eg o tiatio n betw een in d iv id u a ls, tr a d in g a t o rg a n iz e d m arket places inclu d in g a u c tio n s , b a rg a in in g betw een g r o u p s , form ula p ric in g , an d a d m in istered p ric in g . Many econom ists a n d m arket p a rtic ip a n ts believ e th a t a t p re s e n t many m ark e ts a r e c h a ra c te riz e d by p ric e d isc o v e ry m echanism s th a t do not perform well. Some of th e c a u s e s in clu d e: c o n c e n tra tio n of decision m aking, h igh c o st o f o p e ra tio n , lim ited m ark etin g a lte rn a tiv e s fo r p ro d u c e rs , lack o f m arket inform ation an d th in m a rk e ts, coupled w ith fa c to rs e x te rn a l to th e m arket su c h a s th e in tro d u c tio n o f so p h istic a te d tech n o lo g y in m ark etin g an d a p p lied political p r e s s u r e . Thus, a lte rn a tiv e s to tra d itio n a l p ric e d isc o v e ry m echanism s a re in c re a sin g ly p re v a le n t. For exam ple, rem ote p ric in g , fo rw a rd con­ tr a c tin g , a n d v e rtic a l p ric in g a rra n g e m e n ts a re grow ing an d may c o rre c t some o f th e sh o rtco m in g s in th e tra d itio n a l sy ste m . C h a n g es in p ric in g d isc o v e ry m echanism s, like c h a n g e s in m ark et s t r u c tu r e , c re a te a new se t o f d e cisio n s fo r b o th p r iv a te an d p ublic d ecision m a k e rs. In th e lig h t o f th e p re c e d in g , it can be seen th a t th e s e c h a n g e s h av e a t least th r e e im plications fo r p u b licly s u p p o rte d inform ation: 1. T h e inform ational n e ed s o f th e d e c isio n -m a k ers m ust be id en tifie d b e c a u se on e can e x p e c t c h a n g e s in th e ir n e ed s a s m arket s t r u c tu r e an d p ric e d isc o v e ry m echanism s c h a n g e . 2. A s m arket s t r u c tu r e a n d p ric e d isc o v e ry m echanism s c h a n g e , o n e m ight e x p e c t th e p u b lic s ta tis tic a l sy stem to employ d iffe re n t d a ta collection m ethodologies. 3. T h e s e new m arket a rra n g e m e n ts b rin g into q u e stio n w h e th e r o r n o t p u b lic fu n d s should be in v e ste d in some m ark et inform ation s y s te m s . 56 R esearchers have long debated th e causal relationship between m arket s tru c tu re and price discovery mechanisms. Two general hypotheses are implicit in the foregoing discussions and hence are implicit in th e research on pricing mechanisms in ag ric u ltu re. One is th at a causal relationship ex ists between pricing mechanisms and m arket s tr u c tu re , governm ent policy, and o th er variables. As a re su lt, th e mechanisms are subject to change. T hat is, price dis­ covery mechanisms a re endogenous variables in the m arketing system , and if the perform ance of a pricing mechanism is somehow unsatis­ facto ry , p riv ate o r public decision-m akers may be able to influence th e development of more a p p ro p riate mechanisms. T hus, the general justification for research on the topic is to develop information for such decision-m aking. A second hypothesis is th at the causation may not run exclusively from stru c tu re to mechanism, bu t ra th e r may be simultaneous in ch ara c te r. S tru c tu ra l ch aracteristics help determ ine the n atu re of th e pricing mechanism, but the n a tu re of th e mechanism may also influence s tru c tu re . For example, farm er bargaining may be a response to th e declining num ber of b u y e rs, but the development of a farm er bargaining group may, in tu r n , co ntribute to changing th e s tru c tu re of b u y e rs. At any ra te , argum ents centered around th is issue are likely to continue. We can all a g ree, how ever, th at th e price discovery process and s tru c tu re o f th e m arket can influence th e q u an tity and quality o f information available, as well as th e distribution of information to m arket p a rticip a n ts, and th e evaluation of th at information in the sense of tr a d e rs ' decisions to buy o r sell. In a v ery general sen se, th e notion of m arket organization and informational p ro p erties is im portant to the design o f a statistical system . The s tru c tu ra l c h a rac teristics of a m arket may se rv e a s a criterio n for public investm ents in inform ation. T his view su g g e sts th a t th e amount and kind of information th at an individual decision maker demands is related to th e s tru c tu re of th e m arket. One can possibly te s t th e relationship between m arket s tru c tu re (m arket arra n g em e n ts-p ric e discovery mechanism) and inform ation. For example, an examination of two o r th re e p rice discovery mechanisms in a major ag ric u ltu ral commodity m arket can be evaluated on th e basis of th e ir ability to g en erate information for th e m arket p a rtic ip a n ts. A major outcome of th is approach is a dem onstration of how th e demand fo r information is altered u n d er various m arket a rran g em en ts. More­ o v e r, inferences can be made as to how th e p re se n t day publicly su p p o rted statistical system can b e tte r facilitate decision making of v ario u s m arket p a rtic ip a n ts. include: Related research q u estio n s would What a re th e institutions used for product tra n s fe r? Where within th e se in stitu tio n s do p rices ex ist? What function o r fu n ctio n s do th e se p rices perform ? How does th e role of price change as in stitu tio n s change? Finally, what is th e relationship, if a n y , between th e various kinds of prices th a t exist within o r among various in sti­ tu tio n s? While th is approach does not necessarily lead to a value of information p er se , it can provide a criterio n by which choice can be made betw een altern a tiv e m arket decision m akers. Not only should th e re s u lts of th is resea rch be useful to th e public sta tistica l agencies, b u t it could tell us a g rea t deal about where and how to collect price information a n d , p erh ap s more im portantly, what p rice information is really needed and what it means in a specific institutional c o n te x t. 58 E. M arket P erform ance a n d Inform ation While th e s t r u c tu r e o f a m ark e t c an h a v e s u b s ta n tia l im pacts on th e d e sig n o f th e s ta tis tic a l sy ste m , a n asso c iatio n b etw een inform a­ tion an d some m easu res o f m arket p e rfo rm an c e may also s e rv e as c rite rio n fo r p u b lic in v e stm e n ts. S e v e ra l s tu d ie s h a v e a tte m p te d to lin k inform ation to se le c te d dim ensions o f m ark e t p e rfo rm an c e su c h a s p ric e s ta b ility an d p ric e d is p e rs io n . Houck a n d P earso n in v e s tig a te d th e e ffe c t o f USDA c ro p r e p o r ts on p ric e s ta b ility in four m ajor comm odity m a rk e ts . w ere te s te d in th e s tu d y : Two h y p o th e se s 1) C rop R e p o rtin g B oard c ro p p ro d u c tio n fo re c a s ts from on e m onth to a n o th e r v a ry in v e rs e ly w ith m ark e t p r ic e . 2) P ric es in commodity m a rk e ts a r e less v o latile follow ing a c ro p re p o rt th a n ju s t b e fo re it is re le a s e d . U sing daily p ric e s b e fo re an d a f t e r c ro p p ro d u c tio n a n d p ro s p e c ­ tiv e p la n tin g s r e p o rts o v e r a 13 y e a r p erio d (1963-75), th e y m easu red th e m ark et reactio n to th e re le a s e o f th e USDA fig u re s on c o rn , so y ­ b e a n s , s p rin g w heat an d w in te r w h e at. In g e n e ra l, th e y c o n clu d ed th a t a fa irly s tr o n g re la tio n sh ip e x is te d betw een q u a n tity fo re c a s t by SRS an d s u b s e q u e n t p ric e s . In te s tin g th e second h y p o th e s is , th e y exam ined th e e ffe c ts of c ro p r e p o r ts on d a y -to - d a y p ric e flu c tu a tio n s d u rin g th e w eek b e fo re an d a f te r SRS re le a s e s . T h e ir fin d in g s ra n c o u n te r to th e h y p o th e s is th a t p ric e flu c tu a tio n sh o u ld d e clin e follow ing c ro p r e p o r t s . To th e e x te n t th a t th is re la tio n sh ip can b e em pirically m e a su re d , it may be u se fu l in e stim atin g b e n e fits o f inform ation in te rm s o f th e v a lu e o f th e r e s u ltin g p ric e s ta b ility . 59 T h e body o f inform ation th e o ry o ffe rs th e p lau sib le h y p o th e sis th a t inform ation im p erfections can re s u lt in p ric e d is p e rs io n s . P ric e d isp e rsio n is a m an ifesta tio n —a n d , in d ee d , it is th e m easu re—o f ig n o ran c e in th e m ark e t. D isp ersio n is a b iased m easu re of ig n o ran ce b e cau se th e r e is n e v e r a b so lu te hom ogeneity in th e commodity if we in clu d e th e term s o f sale w ithin th e co n cep t of th e commodity. T h u s , some autom obile d e a le rs m ight perform m ore s e rv ic e s , o r c a r r y a la r g e r ra n g e o f v a rie tie s in sto c k , a n d a portio n of th e o b se rv e d d is p e r­ sion is p resu m ab ly a ttr ib u ta b le to su c h d iffe re n c e s . B ut it would be m etap h y sic a l, an d f r u itle s s , to a s s e r t th a t all d isp e rsio n is d u e to h e te ro g e n e ity . ( S tig le r .) T h is th e o ry in a com petitive equilibrium fram ew ork a rg u e s th a t p ric e d isp e rsio n is a phenom enon o f m arket d ise q u ilib riu m . If th e c o st o f inform ation a cq u isitio n is low e n o u g h , co n su m ers will g ra v ita te to th e lo w e r-p ric e d firm ; o th e r firm s will be o b lig a ted to lower th e ir p ric e s to re g a in c u sto m e rs, a n d th e p ric e d isp e rsio n will e ffe ctiv ely - d is a p p e a r (Dahl a n d H am m ond). T h e optim al d isp e rsio n o f p ric e s a t eq u ilib riu m is assum ed to o c c u r w hen p ric e s a c c u ra te ly re fle c t co n ­ su m er p re fe re n c e s w ith a p p ro p ria te allow ances fo r tr a n s p o rta tio n , p ro c e ss in g an d s to ra g e c o sts (D iv in e ). D ivine c o n d u c te d se v e ra l ex p erim e n ts th a t exam ined th e re la tio n ­ sh ip betw een selected C anadian reta il food m ark ets a n d p ric e inform a­ tio n . T h e e x p e rim e n ts involved th e publicatio n o f co m parative re ta il p ric e in d ices in se le c te d te s t m a rk e ts while m onitoring th e control m a rk e ts . T h e s tu d y had fo u r major h y p o th e s e s : (1) S ig n ifican tly d iffe re n t p ric e s fo r a s ta n d a rd iz e d m arket b a sk e t of food p ro d u c ts would b e c h a rg e d b y com peting se lle rs p rio r to th e dissem ination o f co m p arativ e p ric e inform ation. (2) T h e pu b lic dissem ination o f co m p arativ e p ric e inform ation would a lte r th e d isp e rsio n o f p ric e s a c ro s s s to r e s a n d lower th e a v e ra g e m arket p ric e level in th e te s t m a rk e t. (3) T h e level o f co n su m er sa tisfa c tio n w ith food s to re s and 60 food p ro d u cts would increase significantly in th e te s t m arket as a resu lt of th e com parative price information program . (4) The perceived and estim ated value of com parative p rice information would exceed th e cost of providing such inform ation. Some of th e concerns of th e retail m arket p rice rep o rtin g stu d y range from methodology to practical implementation o f such a system . The cost of o p eratin g th e system , c o n tra ry to th e findings of th e Divine stu d y , may be p rohibitive. cen tral to argum ents on both sid e s. How one accounts for co sts is Some economists feel th a t an a p p ro p riate m arket basket should include a la rg e r num ber of items than th a t which th e Divine stu d y included. Also, m arket b ask ets should reflect th e d iv erse m ake-up of various communities (ethnic b ack g ro u n d , c la ss, e tc .) within and betw een c ities. T h u s, a la rg e r m arket b ask et and increm ents in th e num ber of m arket b ask ets would certainly raise th e costs of such a se rv ice . O pponents of retail p rice rep o rtin g system s also a rg u e th a t price rep o rtin g system s at th e farm level cover homogeneous p ro d u cts (at th a t level in th e m arket) and p rice signals a ccu rate information for making com parative decisions. But at th e retail level in th e m arket, p ro d u cts a re extensively d ifferen tiated and as a resu lt a simple price sta tistic cannot transm it adequate information for a cc u ra te consum er decisions. Also, retail p rice rep o rtin g system s ignore o th e r factors of im portance to consum ers which determ ine th e ir shopping p a tte rn s . O ther facto rs include fre sh n e ss of meats and v eg etab les, q u ality of food and location of sto re , e tc . A spects of th e retail p rice re p o rtin g system c ertain ly re q u ire more re se a rc h . T his does have significant implications for th e p e r­ formance of m arkets. 61 F. Summary T his c h a p te r p re se n te d fo u r methodological approaches to th e stu d y of m arket inform ation. Each approach re fle cts a theoretical base w hich, in many c ase s, is inadequate to a d d re ss specific infor­ mational problem s. T his c h a p te r also illu stra te s th e d ifferen c e s in approach employed by econom ists in stu d y in g informational phenom ena. The net social b enefit approach d e riv e d from th e neoclassical fram ework fails to deal with many o f th e u n d erly in g problem s o f information as a commodity with public good c h a ra c te ristic s . T he pragm atic u s e r 's a p p ro a c h , guided by a limited theoretical b a se, is often applied to a single class of u s e r s . T h ere fo re , q u e stio n s reg a rd in g alte rn a tiv e u ses of inform ation a re seldom co n sid ere d . T he relation­ ship betw een m arket s tr u c tu r e and inform ation is prim arily an in tu i­ tiv e one in th e h an d s of most econom ists. For th e most p a r t, th e lite ra tu re h as only d ealt w ith th is relationship in conceptual term s with no empirical s tu d ie s . While econom ists marvel o v e r th e information signalling abilities of th e com petitive m arket, how inform ation re la te s to o th e r m arket s tr u c tu r e s is given sc a n t a tten tio n in th e lite ra tu re . T he final ap p ro ach review ed h e re re la te s m arket perform ance with inform ation. Most stu d ie s attem pted to show th is relationship em pirically w ithout co n sid erin g behavioral dim ensions of th e m arket p a rtic ip a n ts . In s h o rt, each methodological approach has serious theoretical lim itations. T h is void in economic th eo ry has d irec t impli­ cations for f u r th e r re se a rc h on m arket inform ation sy stem s. CHAPTER IV THE MICHIGAN PROCESSED POTATO INDUSTRY, THE FIRM'S DECISION ENVIRONMENT, AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION SYSTEMS: DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS A. Introduction T his ch ap ter p re se n ts a description of th re e major components of the stu d y framework: the Michigan processed potato in d u stry , the supporting information system s operating in th e m arket, and th e decision environm ent of the firm. Personal interview s were conducted with m anagers of processed potato firms to supplem ent existing infor­ mation on the s tru c tu re and conduct of th e in d u stry . Follow-up interview s were made to obtain information on th e procurem ent behavior of th e firm . Information sources were identified in th e in te r­ views and secondary documents were used to provide a description of th e su p p o rtin g information system s operating in th e m arket. The last section describes th e n atu re of the firm decision environm ent and is based on personal interview s with firm m anagers. B. T he Michigan Processed Potato Ind u stry 1. Market S tru c tu re M ichigan's agricultural industries a re of g rea t importance to both th e agricultural and to th e industrial life of th e sta te . Although th e problems of a g ricu ltu re are inextricably enmeshed in th e business judgem ents of these firms, relatively little attention has been given to the problems of the handlers and th e p rocessors of 62 63 a g ricu ltu ral commodities. Indeed, th e bu sin ess decisions made at th is m arket level impact th e e n tire food system in num erous and significant ways. In g en eral, th e s tru c tu ra l c h a ra c te ristic s of th e commodity m arkets which supply most food and fib er in d u strie s d ifferen tiate s th e problems of th ese in d u strie s from those of o th e rs . T he raw pro d u ct used by th e processed potato in d u stry comes from th o u san d s of farm ers who in total a re producing a fairly homogeneous p ro d u ct which is exceedingly difficult to control; th e pro d u ct e n te rs th e m arket in accordance with w eather and seasonal determ inants th a t a re exogenous to th e production p ro cess. T h ere fo re , special kinds of problem s occur in potato processing because of th e u n certain ty in supply of th e raw p ro d u c t. A nother d istin c tiv e fe a tu re of th is segm ent of th e potato in d u stry is th a t usually th e identity of th e p ro d u cer becomes an unim portant factor since th e commodity can be stan d ard ized and g ra d e d . T his is tru e p articu larly when potatoes a re bought and sold on th e open m a rk e t.1 The economic implications of th is situation a re significant. When p ro d u cts can be bought and sold by d e scrip tio n , sev ere price competition usually e x is ts . Price becomes m arket determ ined and su b ­ jected to any num ber o f exogenous fac to rs which c re ate p rice instab ility . Also, some p ro d u cers believe th a t th e ir ability to "control" is fu rth e r diminished by th e fact th a t th e re a re relatively few b u y e rs who can e x e rt th e ir m arket power to d e p re ss th e prices o f raw p ro d u ct. lnOpen m arket" is an ex p ressio n used in th e in d u stry which implies th at th e b u y e r (p ro cesso r) p u rc h a se s p ro d u ct usually for cash without any c o n tractu al arran g em en ts with th e se lle r. 64 Finally, th e potato m arketing seaso n , a s with o th e r v e g etab les, is relatively s h o rt. A lthough potatoes can be s to re d , th e p a rtic ip a n ts in the m arket m ust decide who should b e ar th e c o sts and risk s asso ciated with sto rin g a p erish ab le pro d u ct o v er th e c o u rse of a y e a r. T he s h o rt m arket season b rin g s on to th e local m arket, within a two to th re e week sp a n , a c ro p which often fu r th e r d e p re ss e s p rices d u rin g h a rv e s t. T h e grow ing and m arketing season, of c o u rse, v a rie s c o n sid erably o v e r th e n atio n , especially from n o rth to so u th . B ecause o f th e num ber of p ro d u c e rs, th e com paratively sta n d ard ize d commodity which th e y p ro d u ce, and th e c o n ce n tra te d m arketing season, th e p ro ­ c essin g firm e n te rs a complex m arketing system for th e p u rc h a se of raw commodities. T he above ch arac teriza tio n o f th e production of potatoes is, for th e most p a rt, th a t of a com petitive a g ric u ltu ra l m arket. B ut as th e p ro d u ct e n te rs th e p ro c e ss o r's level in th e m arket, th e m arket becomes more c o n c e n tra te d ; it has a small num ber of firm s producing d iffe r­ e n tiated p ro d u c ts . T h is m arket organization c re a te s an in te re stin g se t o f implications for th e p ro cessed potato in d u s try . T he discussion th a t follows deals with th e to p ics of p ric in g , location of p lan t, p rocurem ent problem s, q u ality problem s and p ro d u ct d ifferen tiatio n . At th is level in th e m arket, th e p rocessing firm te n d s to be a p rice m aker. While p rice still is an im portant co n sid eratio n , n o n -p rice v a ria b le s—q u a lity , q u a n tity , e t c . —become of g re a te r im portance as th e firm g ains more control o v e r th e p rice o f th e p ro d u c t. T he problem and m ethods of p u rc h a sin g a re d istin c tiv e in th e p ro cessed v egetable in d u s trie s . T h e s u p p ly -p ric e , v ariatio n s in volume of in v e n to rie s, q u ality and m ethods o f procurem ent a re affected 65 b e c a u se th e commodity p u rc h a s e d is a p ro d u c t o f th e farm a n d th e r e ­ fo re su b je c t to u n co n tro lla b le e v e n ts . S ig n ific an t v a ria tio n s in th e s u p p ly o f raw p ro d u c t can re s u lt from c h a n g e s in farm in g p ra c tic e s , in g o v ern m en t p ro g ra m s, o r in w e a th e r co n d itio n s an d o th e r v a ria b le s . Such v a ria tio n s not only h av e an im pact on th e firm 's p ro cu rem en t p ra c tic e s b u t also a ffe c t location o f p la n ts , c o n s tru c tio n o f sto ra g e facilities an d in v e n to ry policies. C h ip p in g and fre e z in g firm s, th e dom inant form s o f p otato p ro c e ss in g in M ichigan, d ecid e p la n t location on v e ry d iffe re n t c r ite r ia . Potato c h ip firm s locate th e ir p la n ts n e a r u rb a n a re a s ; th e y a re m a rk e t-o rie n te d . T h e national d is trib u tio n of c h ip p in g p la n ts b y reg io n s u p p o rts th is c o n te n tio n sin ce th e la rg e s t nu m b er o f p la n ts a r e located in th e h eavily p o p u la te d n o r th e a s te r n re g io n . Within M ichigan, all c h ip p in g p la n ts a r e located in u rb a n a r e a s . Two main fa c to rs in flu en ce th e location o f c h ip p in g p la n ts . F ir s t, th e tr a n s p o r ­ ta tio n c o sts o f th e fin ish e d p ro d u c t re la tiv e to th e raw p ro d u c t a re h ig h e r. T h e h ig h volum e-low b u lk d e n s ity of th e fin ish e d p ro d u c t r e s u lts in h ig h tr a n s p o rta tio n c o s ts . S eco n d , q u a lity in term s o f fr e s h n e s s o f c h ip is im p o rtan t to th e co n su m er. T ra n s p o rtin g th e fin ish e d p ro d u c t o v e r long d ista n c e s would lead to q u a lity d e te rio ra ­ tio n , sto c k in g problem s a n d s h e lf ro ta tio n d iffic u ltie s . T h e re fo re , p la n ts a r e ty p ic a lly b u ilt to s e rv e a sp ecific c ity o r m etropolitan a re a . C re ig , on th e o th e r h a n d , c o n te n d s th a t th e r e a r e c o n sid e ra b le econom ies o f scale in p o ta to c h ip p la n ts . He c ite s th e fa c t th a t c h ip p la n ts in P e n n sy lv an ia s e rv ic e a re a s from F lorida to New Y o rk . feels th a t th e in d u s tr y a s a whole would o p e ra te m ore e ffic ie n tly w ith a sm aller n u m b er o f p la n ts . Most p la n ts still s e rv e a lim ited m ark et a re a an d locate on th a t b a s is . He 66 Quality of raw product is an important locational factor for frozen potato processing. Most freezers tend to locate near th e ir source of potatoes. Nationally, most freezers are located in the w estern potato producing sta te s of Idaho and Washington. Product differentiation supported through various forms of ad v ertising and product quality variation, e tc ., is of in terest here because of th e possible protection which it might afford th e individual processor from th e competitive p ressu re of o th er processors and potential e n tra n ts to th e m arket. In describing product differentia­ tion as a dimension of the processed potato m arket, it is important th at we distinguish between th e nationally advertised brands and what is commonly refe rre d to as "minor brands" (brands th at are not ad v ertised nationally). In Michigan, th e re are plants of two firms producing nationally ad v ertised b ra n d s, one a freezer and one a ch ip p er. The remaining firms serve the minor brand m arket. For th e most p a rt, nationally advertised brands have an advan­ tage over o th er processors in th a t they can command price premiums. P resently available data do not allow detailed examination of th ese ad v an tages, but several reasons can be cited for downgrading th e importance of national b ran d s as a substantial source of market power (Helm berger and Hoos). 1. Small as well as large processors are able to put up a high-quality pack, and private labels on fancy grade p roducts as opposed to stan d ard or e x tra sta n d ard g rad e s, are very common. 2. T he products as consum er goods are relatively non-technical in n a tu re and are purchased and consumed frequently so th a t comparisons can easily be made. 67 3. T he h ig h er p rices received by national p ro c e sso rs a re at least p artially o ffset by a d v e rtisin g and promotional e x p e n se s. In minor b ran d m ark ets, p ro d u ct d ifferen tiatio n provides th e p ro cesso r with v ery little p rotection from th e rig o rs of com petition. In th is segm ent of th e m arket th e re a re many relatively small sellers who sell a p ro d u ct w here quality d ifferen ces a re reflected in p ric e . Beyond th e p rocessing level in th e potato in d u s try , th e n ex t m arket level includes retail c h ain s, sto re s, rem anufacturing and th e in stitutional m arket. A complete s tru c tu ra l p ic tu re of th e in d u stry would look much like th a t of an hour g la s s. S ta rtin g with a highly com petitive p ro ­ d u c e r se c to r, one finds many grow ers producing a homogeneous p ro d u ct th a t e n te rs a c o n ce n tra te d p ro cessin g se cto r c h arac terize d by a few firm s who tran sfo rm th e raw p ro d u ct into a num ber of finished p ro d u c ts which ultim ately find th e ir way via retail o u tle ts to th e com petitive m arket of many consum ers. T he hub of th is m arket system —th e p ro cesso r level—is th e focus of th is s tu d y . Number of P la n ts. Lack of available time se rie s d ata limits an an aly sis o f th e chan g es in num ber o f p lan ts and firm s o p e ra tin g in Michigan o v e r th e y e a rs . To some e x te n t, how ever, th e interview p ro ce ss and secondary d ata provided some inform ation on th e num ber o f firms in th e in d u stry (see T able 4 .1 ). A lthough th e total q u a n tity of p ro cessed potatoes produced in Michigan has in creased over th e last two decad es, th e num ber of com panies engaged in potato p ro cessin g have d e creased su b sta n tia lly . In 1960, th e re w ere approxim ately 23 to 30 potato pro cessin g firms in th e s ta te ; in 1974, th e re w ere 23 firm s. Today only 14 p ro cessed 68 T able 4.1 Number o f Potato P ro cessin g P lants in M ichigan 1960 1970 1980 C h ip p ers 21 15 8 F re ez ers 2 3 2 5 4 T y p e o f Plant O th er S o u rce: Data collected from perso n al in terv iew s with M ichigan p ro ce ssed potato p lan t m an ag ers, 1980. T able 4.2 A verage O u tp u t p e r P ro c essin g P la n t, 1980 A nnual O u tp u t (000 cwt) Num ber of P lan ts P e rc e n ta g e U n d er 100 2 20 100 to 1,000 5 50 O ver 1,000 3 30 10 100 TOTAL S o u rc e: Data collected from p erso n al in terv iew s w ith M ichigan p ro c e sse d potato p lan t m an ag ers, 1980. 69 potato firms o p erate in Michigan. Only two of th ese are free ze rs; eight a re c h ip p e rs. T he larg e st change in num ber of firm s.occurred among the chip p rocessors (see Table 4.1), The 1960s were volatile y ears for th e chipping m arket which was characterized by m ergers and b an k ru p tcies. Many of th ese firms were located in Detroit where at one time as many as tw enty plants operated in th at city alone. As p art of th e F rito-L ay's national expansion, at one time twenty plants were acquired in various cities across th e nation. The company en tered th e Detroit chip m arket d u rin g th e early six ties. In 1968, the Federal T rad e Commission charged the Frito-Lay Company with violation of Section Seven of the Clayton A ct. The Company was subsequently o rd ered to divest itself of ten p lan ts. The impact of F rito-L ay's activities on the Detroit market is difficult to estim ate, b u t d u rin g th a t time period, several firms in the city went out of business while o th ers sold out to la rg e r companies. The most significant change over the last tw enty y ears in th e number of firms in th e Michigan processed potato in d u stry o ccurred in Detroit during th e 1960s. Number of P ro d u cts Handled . In general potato freezers tend to process a single p ro d u ct—potatoes. On th e o th er hand, chipping firms are largely m ulti-product o p eratio n s. A major reason for operating m ulti-product plants is to extend th e processing season and to broaden product lines. unit of o u tp u t. T his te n d s to reduce fixed costs per Although th e re is no ap p aren t relationship between plant size and num ber of p ro d u cts handled (see Table 4 .3 ), most plant m anagers indicated th a t they processed th e optimum num ber o f p ro d ucts given th e size of th e ir p lan ts. 70 Table 4.3 Number of P ro d u cts P rocessed p e r P la n t, 1980 Number o f P ro d u cts 1 2 3 4 o r more Chip 2 2 2 1 F reezer 2 2 2 T ype o f Plant Annual O utput (000 cwt) U nder 100 1 100 to 1,000 1 O ver 1,000 2 S o u rc e: Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan p ro cessed potato p lant m anagers, 1980. 1 71 T h e re is no horizontal in te g ra tio n among M ichigan potato c h ip p e rs an d fre e z e rs . po tato es fo r c h ip s . All ch ip p in g p la n ts w ere en g ag ed in p ro cessin g Potato fre e z e rs located in M ichigan m aintain only th a t line o f b u s in e s s . M arket C o n c e n tra tio n . Economic co n ce n tra tio n in th e Michigan p ro ce ssed potato in d u s try is d iffic u lt to estim ate. S everal problem s a re asso ciated with m easuring a s ta tic co n ce n tra tio n ratio fo r th e p ro ce ssed p otato in d u s tr y . F ir s t, in th e ch ip m ark e t, w here p lan ts a re b u ilt to s e rv e a specific m arket are a o r u rb a n m arket (minor b ra n d m a rk e t), national o r in d u s try wide c o n ce n tra tio n m easures do no a p p ly . S econd, fre e z e rs s e rv e a national o r regional m arket which m akes a s ta te 's m easure of co n ce n tra tio n in a p p ro p ria te . In s h o r t, th e re le v a n t m arket fo r most p ro cessed potato firm s does not coincide w ith th e s ta te ; in a d d itio n , ch ip p in g and fre e z in g a re so d iffe re n t th e y in effe ct c o n stitu te s e p a ra te in d u s try s u b s e c to rs . T h is m arket p a tte rn will likely m aintain itse lf given th e p re s e n t mar­ k et co nditions (tec h n o lo g y , ta s te an d p re fe re n c e s o f c o n su m e rs). T h u s , m aking economic c o n c e n tra tio n d ifficu lt to m easu re. White th e r e is little d a ta on th e co n ce n tra tio n o f th e Michigan p ro c e sse d p otato in d u s tr y , it is possible to p ro v id e some in sig h ts on th e co n ce n tra tio n of p ro cu rem en t o f raw p ro d u c ts by em ploying a m easure of d ista n c e o f p ro c u re m e n t. Much like p ro d u c t sa les, com plete docum entation on th e d e g re e o f co n ce n tra tio n o f p ro c u re ­ ment in local p ro c e sso r-g ro w e r m ark ets is d iffic u lt, if not im possible, b ecau se of th e lack o f good d a ta an d th e co nceptual problem s asso c iated w ith m arket m easurem ent. T he p e rish a b ility a n d b u lk in e ss o f p o tato es n e c e ssita te locating fre e z in g p la n ts n e a r so u rc e s o f raw 72 product supply. On th e o th er hand, chip plants a re m arket-oriented and th erefore locate near urban areas. Table 4.4 displays the percent of raw product procured over various distances from the plant and reflects th e fundamental distinction between freezers and ch ip p ers. A spects of E xchange. Raw product quality is a major concern of potato processing firm s. To maintain quality and to insure a dependable flow of product supply into th e p lant, processors make extensive use of co n tracts with grow ers. R esults of d irect in te r­ views with processors indicate th at contractual exchange with grow ers is employed in procuring 68 percent of th e raw product used by processors (Table 4 .5 ). B rokers provide approxim ately 16 percent of the raw product processed by th ese firm s, and 16 percent of the raw product was obtained via open m arket. Oral agreem ents, vertical integration (own o r ren t land) and grow er cooperatives each make up a small fraction of th e raw product m arketed for processing. Freezers obtain 83 percent of th e ir raw product via w ritten co n tract with grow ers w hile relying on th e open m arket to supply 17 percent of th e ir raw product needs. C hippers, on th e o th e r hand, use w ritten c o n tracts less extensively than free ze rs. C hippers indicated th a t they employ w ritten co n tracts with grow ers to supply 62 percent of th e raw p ro d u ct. B rokers and open market a rra n g e ­ ments accounted for 24 and 13 percent respectively of raw product su p p ly . Compared to free ze rs, chippers employ b ro k ers to a g re a te r e x te n t. As a general m atter, Michigan chippers rely on b ro k ers to supply th e ir raw product needs from oth er sta te s, a fte r the potato storage season ends in Michigan. 73 Table 4.4 S hare of Total Raw Product P rocured Within Specified D istances from Michigan Potato P rocessing P lants, 19801 C h ip p ers F re ez ers All Firms P ercent of Total Raw Product Miles from Plant J Less th a n 50 51-100 101-200 O ver 200 TOTAL S o u rce: 14 11 7 68 63 5 5 27 30 10 6 54 100 100 100 Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan p rocessed potato plant m anagers, 1980. ^Weighted on basis of th e av erag e volume o f potatoes handled in 1980. T able 4 .4 shows th a t ch ip p e rs p ro c u re 14 p e rc e n t of th e ir raw p ro d u ct w ithin a 50 mile ra d iu s of th e plant com pared to 63 p e rc e n t by fre e z e rs . S u b seq u e n tly , for each d istan ce category g r e a te r th a n a 50 mile ra d iu s , c h ip p e rs p ro cu red a la rg e r p ercen t of th e ir raw p ro d u ct th an did fre e z e rs. Within th e 51-100 mile rad iu s c h ip p e rs obtained 11 p e rc e n t and fre e z e rs five p e rc e n t; within th e 101-200 mile rad iu s c h ip p e rs obtained seven p e rc e n t and fre e z e rs obtained five p e rc e n t; and o v e r 200 miles, c h ip p e rs obtained 68 p e rc en t while fre e z e rs obtained 27 p e rc en t of th e ir raw p ro d u ct n eed s. 711 T a b le 4 .5 O p e ra tio n a l A s p e c ts o f E x c h a n g e S o u rce o f Raw P ro d u ct F re e z e rs C h ip p ers All (P e rce n t) C o n tra c ts: W ritten 83 62 68 (*) (*) (*) (*) G row er co o p erativ e (*) (*) B ro k e rs 24 16 17 13 16 TOTAL 100 100 100 S o u rc e: Data collected from p erso n al in terv iew s w ith M ichigan p otato p lan t m an ag ers, 1980. Oral Own o r r e n t land (*) F arm er's M arket O th e r P ro c esso rs O th e r (sp e cify O pen M arket * ) Am ounts th a t a re less th a n one p e rc e n t. W e ig h te d on th e b asis o f th e a v e ra g e volume o f p o tato es p ro c e sse d in 1980. 75 T y p e s of B u y e rs for* P ro c e s so r's P ro d u c t. R etailers o f all ty p e s (national c h a in s, regional and local) p u rc h a se d 71 p e rc e n t of th e 1980 o u tp u t o f th e potato p ro c e ssin g p la n ts included in th is stu d y (T able 4 .6 ). Within th is g ro u p , national food c h ain s a cc o u n ted fo r 48 p e rc e n t of th e p ro d u c t p u rc h a se d from p ro c e ss o rs and regional and local food ch ain s accounted for 12 p e rc e n t and 11 p e rc e n t re s p e c tiv e ly . F u r th e r , w ithin th e ir re sp e c tiv e m a rk e ts, retail b u y e rs o f f re e z e rs ' o u tp u t a r e fairly well d is trib u te d betw een th e n atio n al, regional an d local food c h a in s. B uying o f M ichigan potato c h ip p lan t o u tp u t, on th e o th e r h a n d , is co ntrolled fo r th e most p a rt by national food ch ain s (72 p e rc e n t) . T h is fig u re ru n s m uch h ig h e r th a n estim ates of e x ten sio n econom ists. N ationally, food c h ain s ta k e about half of all potato ch ip o u tp u t, it is likely th a t re s p o n d e n ts had v a ry in g notions o f w hat c o n stitu te s a national c h a in . Regional and local food ch ain s p u rc h a se e ig h t p e rc e n t an d fiv e p e rc e n t o f M ichigan c h ip p e rs ' p ro d u c t re sp e c tiv e ly . T h e second la rg e st m arket fo r p ro c e sse d p o tato es is th e in sti­ tu tio n al m ark e t. In stitu tio n s b u y approxim ately 19 p e rc e n t of all p ro ce ssed p o ta to e s. F re e z e rs sell m ore to in stitu tio n s th a n c h ip p e rs in th a t th is retail o u tle t a c c o u n ts fo r 34 p e rc e n t of fro zen p ro d u c t com pared to fo u r p e rc e n t o f th e p ro d u c t from c h ip p e rs . C ooperative wholesale b u y e rs and g o v ern m en t ag en cies b u y ab o u t five p e rc e n t of th e fre e z e rs ' and c h ip p e rs ' p ro d u c ts . 2. P rocurem ent C onduct We have mapped o u t, in a g e n eral fash io n , th e major elem ents of m arket s tr u c tu r e —num ber a n d size o f firm s, c o n c e n tra tio n , p ro d u c t 76 T a b le 4 .6 T y p e o f B u y e rs fo r P r o c e s s o r's O u tp u t, 1980 Type of Buyer Freezer C hipper All (Percent) National retail food ch ain s1 19 72 48 Regional retail food ch ain s1 19 8 12 Local retail food c h ain 1 19 5 11 4 6 5 34 4 19 5 5 5 C ooperative wholesale buyers 2 In stitutions Government agencies O ther food m anufacturers and processors TOTAL Source: 100 100 100 Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan processed potato plant m anagers, 1980. 1T he various categories of food chains, though term s in common usage do not have a clear, widely established definition in the in d u stry . In its absence, th ere fo re , th e concept was respondent defined h e re . 2 Establishm ents such as re s ta u ra n ts , hotels, hospitals and cafeterias. 77 d iffe re n tia tio n , and several le sse r o n es—which make up th e economic environm ent of th e Michigan p ro cessed potato in d u s trie s . As developed in th e th eo ry p re se n te d in C h a p te r II, m arket s tr u c tu r e has an u ndeniable relationship to m arket co n d u ct, th e topic of th is section. In its most common application, m arket conduct re fe rs to th e firm 's policies tow ard its p ro d u ct m arket and tow ard th e moves made by its rivals in th a t m arket (C av es, S c h e re r). For th e p u r­ poses of th is section, em phasis is placed on th e behavior o f th e firm in p ro cu rin g raw p ro d u cts for p ro cessin g ra th e r th an docum enting th e firm 's behavior in its finished p ro d u ct m ark et. Firm procurem ent of raw p ro d u c ts is of in te re st for several rea so n s. F irs t, it allows th is stu d y to link with p revious stu d ie s d o n e .at th e p ro d u c e r's f ir s t tra n sa c tio n level in th e m arket. Second, little w ork has focused on th is v ertical relationship from th e p ro c e ss o r's p e rs p e c tiv e . Finally, th is m arket level provides a m anageable scope of th e in d u stry from which to stu d y th e implications o r relatio n sh ip s betw een m arket co n d u ct and inform ation. In trad itio n al in d u stria l organization th e o ry , key v ariab les commonly used as m easures of m arket conduct include pricin g b eh av io r, p ro d u ct s tra te g y , re se a rc h and innovation, a d v e rtisin g , legal tac tic s and o th e rs . T h ese v ariab les a re of in te re s t because th e y enable one to u n d e rsta n d how firms behave u n d e r a given m arket s tr u c tu r e . T his section defines and d e scrib e s a se t of variables th a t explain th e behavior of p rocessed potato firm s in p ro cu rin g raw p ro d u c t. In th e n ex t c h a p te r (C h a p te r V ), th e s e p ra c tic e s a re linked to th e su p p o rtin g m arket inform ation sy ste m s. In o th e r w ords, h e re we exp lore th e im portant c ateg o ries of firm beh av io r in p ro cu rin g 78 raw p ro d u c t. In th e n e x t c h a p te r, we also exam ine th e im plications o f firm b ehavior (m arket con d u ct) fo r th e inform ational needs o f th e firm . To make th is stu d y m anageable, maket conduct a s it rela te s to th e pro cu rem en t a c tiv itie s o f th e firm is d ivided into th e following p rim ary a re a s o f c o n ce rn : 1. C o n trac tin g policies and p rac tic es 2. P ricin g policies 3. Q uality co n tro l policies 4. M arket inform ation a ttitu d e s and b ehavior o f th e firm C o n trac tin g Policies an d P ra c tic e s . C o n tra c ts a re widely used in th e M ichigan p ro ce ssed p o tato in d u s try . T hey make up 68 p e rc e n t o f th e volume o f p ro d u c t ex ch an g ed betw een th e p ro ce ssin g firm s an d th e g ro w e rs. As th e num ber o f p ro ce ssin g firm s declined and as a la r g e r p e rc e n t o f th e Michigan potato cro p has been m arketed for p ro c e ss in g , c o n tra c t e x ch an g e has in c re ased in u se o v e r th e y e a rs . S everal rea so n s a re c ited by econom ists fo r th e e x iste n c e o f c o n tra c t ex ch a n g e ( S a r g e n t) . F ir s t, th e m ark ets in which c o n tra c t e x c h a n g e o c c u rs g e n e ra lly tr a d e in non-hom ogeneous p ro d u c ts . S eco n d , c o n tra c t e x ch an g e usu ally c o v e rs an ex te n d ed time period th a t involves two o r more p a rtie s in an e x clu siv e commitment. And fin ally , c o n tra c t e x c h a n g e o fte n a ris e s b ecu ase o f specific p ro d u ct o r se rv ic e dem ands on th e p a rt of th e b u y e r. S ince a p rim ary p u rp o se o f th is s tu d y is to d e sc rib e th e rela­ tio n sh ip betw een firm b eh av io r a n d inform ation, it is n e c e ssa ry to u n d e rs ta n d th e term s d isc u sse d in c o n tra c t ex ch a n g e betw een p o tato p ro c e ss o rs an d p ro d u c e rs . To th is e n d , two basic q u e stio n s w ere a sk e d of all potato p ro c e s s o rs : 1) what term s o f tr a d e a re 79 . covered in your c o n tra cts with p ro d u cers? 2) Which additional term s o f tra d e do you believe should be included in th e co ntract? The resp o n ses to th ese questions a re discussed below. All firm s indicated th at th e ir c o n tra c ts covered p ric e , delivery sc h e d u le s, weighing p ro ced u res and quality s ta n d a rd s . Price was a term of tra d e on all firm s' c o n tra cts and under certain conditions p rice was subject to change. For exam ple, chipping firms included provisions for th e p ro d u cer to sto re th e pro d u ct over th e y e a r, which affected th e final p rice of th e pro d u ct received by th e grow er. Usually sto rag e fees a re added to th e p rice of th e product at a rate of 20C to 40C p er month p e r h u ndredw eight. Also, free ze rs would c o n tra ct to pay a premium for th e quality c h a ra c teristics of th e raw p ro d u c t. Although delivery schedules and weighing p ro ced u res were considered in each c o n tra c t, th e enforcem ent provisions and a rra n g e ­ ments d iffered among th e processing firm s. Some firms adm itted th a t th e ir delivery schedules u n d er c o n tract were flexible and more o r less serv ed as a guide to th e grow er. Weighing procedures d iffered ; some firm s, usually th e la rg e r ones, would weigh th e load at th e plant while some o th e r firms would req u ire a delivery tic k et indicating th e load had been weighed at th e source o f d e liv ery . Quality provisions were also im portant term s specified in th e c o n tra c ts. As p a rt o f th e con­ tr a c t, some p ro cesso rs insisted upon hig h er sta n d a rd s of quality th an o th e r p ro ce sso rs. For exam ple, some c h ip p ers c o n tracted for 100 p e rc en t G rade A load while o th e rs co n tracted for 85 percent G rade A load. 80 R esponsibilities and rig h ts d u rin g production w ere sometimes specified. T hese fea tu res determ ine th e d istrib u tio n of expenses for sp ra y in g , w hether c ertain chemicals were u sed , o r who applied th e s p ra y s . For th e most p a rt, fre e z e rs make provision for such term s of tra d e in th e ir c o n tra cts while th e large chipping firms did not co n tra ct for production term s of tra d e . When questioned on th e need for introduction of new term s of tra d e in th e c o n tra c t, firm m anagers indicated th a t they were sa tis­ fied with th e p re se n t num ber and choice of term s included u nder c o n tra c t. One m anager believed th a t th e term s included in his con­ tra c t were th e optimum num ber. He sta te d th a t more term s would make a complex process more complex and would inhibit exchange. C ontracts v a ry g rea tly from processor to p ro cesso r. T h ere a re clearly no sta n d ard c o n tra c ts in use although several sta n d ard con­ ventions occur as fea tu res of individual c o n tra c ts. T ypes of Prices C ontracted for by P ro c esso rs. Pricing policies a re a key m easure of firm behavior. T he pricing policies of firm s a re used in d istin g u ish in g oligopolistic m arkets from com petitive m arkets in th a t firms in oligopolistic m arkets a re "p rice m akers" ra th e r than "p rice ta k e rs ." Several case stu d ies and some empirical research have su g g e ste d th a t many firms use relatively simple rules of thum b (sta n d a rd o p eratin g p rocedures) for se ttin g p rice —c o st-p lu s, m ark -u p , fixed cost p ricin g , e tc . (S c h e re r, B reim yer). In th is case, th e policies used by p rocessing firms in se ttin g p rice to g row ers for raw pro d u ct is of in te re s t. What a re th e processing firm 's rules of thum b for se ttin g co n tra ct prices with potato grow ers? 81 From th e review o f o th e r stu d ie s and based on informal d is ­ cu ssio n w ith m arket p a rtic ip a n ts , several ty p e s of p ric e s which p ro ­ c e ss o rs may o ffe r in c o n tra c ts w ith a grow er w ere id e n tifie d . A b ase p ric e is e sta b lish e d p rio r to p lan tin g and is common in most c o n tra c tu a l a rra n g e m e n ts . T h is p ric e is not a m arket determ ined p ric e in th a t it may not re fle ct th e re la tiv e sc a rc ity o f th e commodity; it may not re fle c t th e o p p o rtu n ity co st o f grow ing p otatoes re la tiv e to o th e r c ro p s ; and it may not re fle ct c h an g e s in th e c o sts of in p u ts o v e r tim e. T h is form of p ricin g is typ ical in most v eg etab le m a rk e ts. To gain some in sig h t into th e p ric in g p ro c e d u re s of M ichigan p ro ce ssed p o tato firm s, each m anager was a sk ed to d e sc rib e his p ric in g policies. Two firm s in dicated th a t th e p ric e th ey c o n tra c te d fo r was a b a se p ric e (see T able 4 .7 ). A b ase p ric e is a g re e d upon p rio r to p la n tin g . final p ric e paid th e p ro d u c e r, how ever, is ultim ately d e p e n d e n t upon sto ra g e fees o r th e q u a lity o f raw p ro d u ct d e liv ere d to th e p la n t. F re e z e rs prim arily employ "q u ality clauses" in th e ir c o n tra c ts which rew ard o r penalize (p ro v id e in cen tiv es) th e gro w er a cco rd in g to th e q u a lity o f th e p ro d u c t (siz e , p e rc e n t b ru is e fre e , co lo r, e t c . ) . Most p ro c e sso rs indicated th a t th e p ric e th e y se ttle d on was p eg g ed to an ongoing c o n tra c t m arket p ric e . Two p ro c e ss o rs s ta te d th a t th e y would follow o r m atch th e p rice o ffe re d by th e dom inant firm in th e m arket b e cau se th e y felt th a t th e la rg e r firm for th e most p a r t se t (controlled) th e m ark et. Two firm s s ta te d th a t th e y really made th e ir p ric in g decision in d e p e n d e n t of th e o th e r firm s in th e m ark et. One s ta te d th a t th e p ric e he o ffere d a gro w er was heavily d e p e n d e n t on his o p e ra tin g b u d g e t. T h e o th e r p ro c e ss o r, who d ealt w ith a limited num ber of T he 82 T ab le 4 .7 K inds o f P ric e s C o n tra c te d fo r b y P ro c e s s o rs T ype of C ontracted Pricing Base Price All Processors 2 Pegged to Some Market Price 4 Pegged to C rower Costs of Production Formula Price Dependent upon Quality Levels Dominate Firm O ther Source: Followed as Price Leader 2 2 Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan processed potato plant m anagers, 1980. 83 g ro w ers, indicated th a t one of his prim ary concerns was to "keep th e grow er in b u sin e ss11 and th at he often paid a premium to his g row ers. T his statem ent may reflect how some p ro cesso rs view th e importance o f dealing with grow ers who can co nsistently deliver quality p ro d u ct. B ut it is unreasonable to expect th e firm to rew ard th e grow er for "good wil!" p u rp o se s. G row ers who produce a quality pro d u ct may receive p rice premiums. Quality C o n tro l. Quality co n tro l, as a dimension of m arket con­ duct is p e rh a p s a unique variable to be considered u n d er procurem ent co n d u ct. Quality control becomes of p a rticu la r im portance here for several reaso n s: (1) th is stu d y focuses on th e procurem ent activities of th e pro cesso r who faces th a t p a rt of th e ag ric u ltu ral secto r of the food m arketing system w here perishability is a co n stan t th re a t; (2) price oftentim es does not reflect q u ality of product and th e re fo re m easures o f quality become a se p ara te topic of negotiation between exchange p a rtn e rs . In an environm ent w here th e m arket fails th ro u g h th e pricing system to transm it information about quality of th e p ro d u ct being ex ch an g ed , decisions with resp ect to quality become negotiated decisions which a re su p p o rte d by one o r both of two arran g em en ts: c o n tract and governm ent g rad es and s ta n d a rd s. One is a public decision, th e o th e r is p riv a te . The c o n tra ct perform s many functions—specifies forms of tra d e , red u ces u n c e rta in ty , a ssig n s ris k , and estab lish es liabilities. T his in stru m ent is a response to m arket failure c h aracterized by im perfect inform ation, high cost associated with committed reso u rce s, and un d esirable ex a n te d istrib u tio n s of ris k . At th is level in th e m arket. 84 th e c o n tra c t plays an im portant role in d efin in g th e q u a lity o f raw p ro d u c ts . T h is p ro c e ss may be han d led e x clu siv ely betw een th e se lle r an d b u y e r o r it may b e n efit from e sta b lish e d governm ent g ra d e s and s ta n d a rd s . S h e p h e rd and o th e r s h av e id en tified th e U .S . g ra d e s and s ta n ­ d a rd s for a g ric u ltu ra l commodities a s one o f th e facilitatin g fu n ctio n s. Hill s ta te s th a t sta n d a rd iz a tio n is especially im portant in th e list of facilitatin g fu n ctio n s b ecau se it is closely re la te d to one o f th e s tr u c ­ tu ra l req u ire m e n ts for p e rfe c t com petition. "Com petition among se lle rs is p o ssible only if th e y a re selling identical o r com parable p ro d u c ts ." Uniform ity o f term inology an d m easurem ent of im portant c h a ra c te ris tic s is u seful fo r e sta b lish in g re la tiv e v alu es betw een th e v a rio u s form s o f th e p ro d u c t. In th e c ase o f p otato g ra d e s an d s ta n d a r d s , th is uniform ity o r sta n d a rd iz a tio n s e rv e s two basic p u rp o s e s : (1) it perm its b u y in g an d selling of th e p ro d u c t by d e sc rip tio n r a th e r th a n by inspection o f each load o ffe re d for sa le ; (2) it p ro v id e s a m ethod fo r b u y e rs to estim ate th e v alue o f a p a rtic u la r load an d to com m unicate th is value back th ro u g h a complex m arket system to d e a le rs and p ro d u c e rs . T h e re fo re , g ra d e s an d sta n d a rd iz a tio n is one of th e prim ary fu n ctio n s o f th e m arketing sy stem . T hey a re e sse n tia l in an y m arket w here millions o f d o llars ch an g e h a n d s via th e tele p h o n e . To gain in sig h t into how potato p ro c e ssin g firm s h an d le q u a lity o f raw p ro d u c t, th e following q u e stio n was posed to M ichigan potato p ro ce ssin g firm s: How does y o u r firm control for p ro d u c t q u a lity ? T he re sp o n se s a re sum m arized below. 85 B ecause q u a lity o f p ro d u c t (p a rtic u la rly on th e sa les sid e o f th e firm ) is a m ajor d e te rm in a n t o f p ro d u c t d iffe re n tia tio n in th e p ro c e sse d p o tato in d u s tr y , m ost firm m an ag ers in d icated th a t raw p ro d u c t q u a lity was a major c o n c e rn o f th e b u s in e s s . M anagers re sp o n d e d to th e q u e stio n o f c o n tro llin g p ro d u c t q u a lity in se v era l w ay s. common re s p o n se was "to in sp e c t each lo a d ." T h e most M anagers in d icated th a t all loads d e liv e re d to th e ir p lan t would b e in sp e c te d b y ta k in g a sam ple o ff a n d ru n n in g it th r o u g h v a rio u s t e s t s —g r a v ity , co lo r, p e rc e n t of fo re ig n o b je c ts . th a t T h is was a s ta n d a rd o p e ra tin g p ro c e d u re ra n c o n s is te n tly th ro u g h o u t th e in d u s tr y . T h e second m ost common re s p o n se was th e u se of g ra d e s and s ta n d a r d s via th e c o n tra c t p ro c e ss o r when b u y in g p o ta to e s on open m a rk e t. O ne m anager s ta te d th a t he sp e cified p a rtic u la rly h ig h s ta n ­ d a rd s o f q u a lity on c o n tra c ts to a s s u r e th a t th e d e liv e re d load would fall w ithin th e lim its o f a c c e p ta b ility . A lso, he had each load in sp e c te d a t th e p la n t g a te . L east o fte n m entioned a s a m easu re o f a s s u r in g p ro d u c t q u a lity , b u t n e v e rth e le s s c ite d by two p ro c e s s o rs , was th e relia n c e on a long term tra d in g re la tio n sh ip w ith a "good g ro w e r." T he m anagers s ta te d th a t th e re la tio n sh ip w hich th e y h ad d eveloped w ith a few g ro w e rs o v e r th e y e a rs was p e rh a p s th e main fa c to r in in su rin g a d e p e n d a b le su p p ly o f h igh q u a lity p ro d u c t. P ro c e sso rs A ttitu d e s T ow ard In fo rm a tio n . T h is section a tte m p ts to m easu re p ro c e s s o rs ' a ttitu d e to w ard inform ation w ithin th e p ro ­ c e ss e d p o tato in d u s tr y . firm m an a g er. S e v e ra l scale q u e s tio n s w ere posed to each T h e r e s u lts a r e re p o rte d in T ab le 4 .8 . 86 Table >1.8 P ro cesso rs' A ttitu d es Toward Information^ Statem ent 1. Scale Rating Score Information is a major source of power in th e m arket p ro cess. 4.444 2. We could fully share information (on prices p roduction, c o sts, concerns and plans) which we have with grow ers and th e ir organization without p u ttin g u s at a com petitive disad­ v an ta g e. 3.555 3. We solicit such information activ ely . 3.444 4. A processor and grow er plan jointly th e ir m arketing stra te g ie s, coordinate price s tru c tu re s and exchange information between each o th e r about th e ir plans and goals. Do you believe th a t it should be perm itted? Do such actions e v er have desirab le m arket consequences? C ases such as th is probably occur fre q u e n tly . 2.444* 5. Two processing firms exchange information about sales plans and p rice schedules. Do you believe th a t it should be perm itted? Do such actions e v e r have d esirab le m arket consequences? C ases such as th is probably occur fre q u e n tly . 2.555* 4.000 1.44>(* 1.666* 3.222 ^For each of th e statem ents g iv en , resp o n d en ts w ere asked to check th e most ap p ro p ria te response below. 5= 4= 3= 2= 1= S o u rce: S trongly A gree A gree No Opinion D isagree Strongly D isagree *3 = Yes *2 = No Opinion *1 = No Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan p rocessed potato plant m anagers, 1980. 87 T h e f ir s t th re e statem en ts w ere d esig n ed to obtain a reading on th e firm 's a ttitu d e tow ard inform ation, tow ard sh a rin g information with g ro w e rs a n d tow ard selecting inform ation for th e firm 's u se . Most m anagers believed th a t "inform ation is a major source of power in th e m a rk e t," resp o n d in g to th e statem ent with an overall 4.44 ra tin g ou t of a scale o f 1 to 5. When m anagers were ask ed to ra te statem en ts about sh a rin g inform ation with grow ers or soliciting inform ation from o th e r m arket p a rtic ip a n ts , th e y responded with an overall score of 3.555 and 3.444 resp e c tiv e ly . T h ere fo re , it was concluded th a t th e y had no opinion on which th e y w ere likely to act about sh a rin g inform ation w ith g ro w ers o r obtaining information from o th e r m arket p a rtic ip a n ts . The last two statem en ts p re se n te d th e m anager with a situation involving sh a rin g inform ation with o th e r m arket p a rtic ip a n ts . S ta te ­ m ent 4 d e alt with p ro c e sso rs and g ro w ers sh a rin g inform ation. For th e most p a rt, p ro c e sso rs resp o n d ed by ra tin g th e statem ent slightly above a no-opinion re sp o n se . However, th e y all ag re ed th a t p ro ­ c e ss o rs and g ro w ers do exchange inform ation fre q u e n tly . d ealt with two p ro c e sso rs sh a rin g inform ation. Statem ent 5 P rocessors in general believed th a t such c ase s did not o c cu r fre q u e n tly and also were of th e opinion th a t th e action o f two p ro cessin g firm s exchanging infor­ mation would not have d e sira b le m arket co n seq u en ces. In te re stin g ly , p ro c e ss o rs indicated th a t th ey had no opinion on w hether th e y ex ch an g e inform ation betw een them selves. C. T h e S u p p o rtin g Inform ation System s T h is section will attem p t to d e sc rib e th e major inform ation s y s ­ tems o p e ra tin g in th e Michigan p ro cessed potato in d u s try . T h is stu d y 89 Public Information « I % Public Decision Envlronmen Private Information System » $ I In fo m tlo n Figure 4*1 The S upporting Information Systems in the Michigan Processed Potato Industry * 90 prices received by g row ers, estim ates o f crop sizes, and farm income estim ates. T his information is generaiiy thought of as an indicator of sector perform ance. On th e o th e r hand, AMS publishes spot m arket prices and develops th e g rad es and sta n d a rd s for fresh and processed produce. T heir d ata a re designed to reflect th e c u rre n t m arket situation and a re directed tow ard m arket p a rticip a n ts to aid in th e ir decision m aking. The P rivate M arket S tatistical S ystem . The p riv ate statistical system is distin g u ish ed from th e public statistical system by th e fact th at p riv ate m arket firm s supply information to m arket p a rticp a n ts for profit while th e public agency supplies information for the purpose of facilitating th e functioning of th e m arket and meeting public policy information needs related to our food and fib er se c to r. From th e interview s conducted with Michigan processed potato plant m anagers, we learned th e re a re at least th re e p riv a te statistical firms o perating in th e m arket. The informal S tatistical S ystem . T he informal statistical system is p erh ap s th e most difficult to define. Unlike th e above two system s, th is system does not supply information to m arket p a rticip a n ts for p ro fit, nor attem pt to achieve public policy goals. For th e most p a rt, th e system is composed of m arket p a rtic ip a n ts who transm it information automatically th ro u g h th e ir activ ities in th e m arket o r when q u eried about m arket e v e n ts. B ro k ers, b u y e rs , m arketing cooperatives all perform informational fu n ctio ns. They aid in th e tran sactio n of goods and serv ices between b u y e rs and se lle rs. 91 D. T h e Firm Decision E nvironm ent In C h a p te r II, an inform ation system paradigm was p re s e n te d th a t u n d e rs c o re d th e n a tu re of th e rela tio n sh ip betw een inform ation an d d ecisio n : inform ation a tta in s its value only in th e c o n te x t o f a specific d ecisio n . T h e c h a p te r w ent f u r th e r into a d isc u ssio n on th e economics o f inform ation, th e lim itations of neoclassical th e o ry in d ealin g w ith inform ational phenom enon, and s u g g e s te d an a lte rn a tiv e fram ew ork fo r an aly zin g and id en tify in g m arket inform ation problem s. T h u s f a r , little h as been said about decisio n , th e p ro c e ss th a t re q u ire s inform ation. Decision m aking, m ore th a n inform ation, is a major c o n ce rn in economic th e o ry . B ut to a larg e d e g re e , economic th e o ry does not p ro v id e any unified s e t of analytical tools p ro v en em pirically (p a rtic u la rly as decision re la te s to th e firm an d its environm ent) w hich one could call th e th e o ry of firm decision m aking. Do firm s a ctu a lly e q u a te m arginal c o sts with m arginal re v e n u e s? T h e n eed to s tu d y th e decision en v iro n m ent o f th e firm in th e c o n te x t of e v a lu a tin g inform ation is n e v e rth e le s s se lf ju stify in g and n e c e s s a ry . h as th r e e main o b je c tiv e s: T h is sectio n o f C h a p te r IV (1) to review th e m anagem ent decision m aking th e o rie s o f th e firm , (2) to p re s e n t th e r e s u lts of th e in te r ­ view s w ith firm m anagers on m ark etin g d e c isio n s, an d (3) to o u tlin e some bro ad p rin c ip le s for view ing firm b eh av io r (decision) a s it re la te s to inform ation in th e m arket place. T h eo ries of m anagem ent decision m aking a t th e level of th e firm fall into two b ro ad g ro u p s: forma) models an d inform al b eh av io ral models (Jo sk o w ). Formal models a re e sse n tia lly m icroeconom ic. T h is 92 body of th eo ry contains c e rta in assum ptions and concepts about th e way businessm en make p ricin g and production decisions u n d e r p re ­ scrib ed m arket conditions. V irtually all of th e th eo ries assum e (a) th a t th e decision m aker is om niscient and ratio n al, (b) th a t firms seek to maximize p ro fits, and (c) some behavioral assum ption con­ cern in g th e ways in which a p a rtic u la r firm rela te s to th e o th e rs in the m arket. Given th is fram ew ork, what th e n a re some of th e diffi­ culties in using microeconomics th e o ry a s an aid in stu d y in g decision making at th e level of th e firm? T he limitations of microeconomic th e o ry in firm decision making a re well documented (S p en cer, C y e rt and M arch). F irs t, th e notion of "economic man" as an om niscient, high speed com puter confronting a set of known o r probabilistic outcom es is a g ra v e d isto rtio n of re a lity . Second, th e utility function is too am biguous and a b s tra c t to accommodate th e v aried objectives of th e m odern firm . T hat is, th e firm may have objectives o th e r th a n p ro fit maximization (m arket s h a re , good will, pow er, e t c . ) . T h ird , th e trad itio n al th eo ry of th e firm ignores the internal problem s and conflicts of th e firm re su ltin g from organizational s tr u c tu r e , b ecause it is assum ed th a t in th e long r u n , competition in th e m arket place will perm it th e su rv iv al of only th e most efficiently organized firm s. The above limitations (and o th e rs ) of neoclassical microeconomic th eo ry se rv e as a point of d e p a rtu re an d p e rh a p s an incentive to reform ulate th eo ries th a t explain th e firm decision making p ro c e ss. The work of Nobel L aureate, H e rb ert Simon and o th e rs a re noted for exploring th e firm 's decision th eo ry (B ehavioral T h e o ry ). 93 T his school of thought a s s e rts th a t real world organizations do not maintain continuous, perfectly calibrated control over all th e ir activities in o rd e r to in su re "optimal" outcomes. Simon and o th ers a rg u e th a t doing so is often impossible, and in any case it is generally not globally ratio n al; th e gains of perfect over imperfect decisions a re typically not worth th e added c o sts. Instead, "satisfactory" solutions ra th e r than "maximatory" behavior are sought to a series o f problems as th ey a re generated by changing external circum stances, b u reau cratic ro utines, o r th e poor perform ance of th e organization in th e eyes of Its members (R o b e rts). Decision theory of th e firm is also complicated by a heterogenous external and internal environm ent of the firm which exten d s from a competitive m arket, with many firms and hence many decision m akers, to one of p u re monopoly with a single decison m aker. Somewhere between th ese extrem es is th e oligopolistic m arket where theoretical formulations a re not as well developed. What makes oligopoly theory d ifferen t from competitive m arket theory is th e recognition by th e firms th a t outcomes of th e ir decisions a re affected by th e behavior o f o th e r firm s. Since it ap p ears th a t th e im portant ch arac teristics of oligopoly behavior a re not c ap tu red by conventional (formal) models, th e informal school points out th at research based on the "oral" trad itio n s of in d u strial organization theory involves more careful analysis of actual firm decision making processes and th e phenomena which determ ine decision form ulation. More specifically, the im portant ch arac teristics of much of th is applied work incorporates th e use of informal models, case stu d ies, th e consideration of p articu lar decision making p rocesses, situation-specific reasoning, consideration of u n c e rta in ty , information c o sts, transaction c o sts, and various institutional c o n strain ts (Joskow ). 94 In th a t tra d itio n , th is stu d y employs an oral case stu d y approach which em phasizes th e decision m akers' perception of th e decision making processes within th e ir firm s. It is assum ed th a t each manager has a conception of his decision se t and information n e ed s. For a m anager to know what information he needs he m ust be aw are of each ty p e o f decision he needs to make and he m ust have an adequate con­ ceptualization o f each decision. It would ap p ear from th e following re su lts th a t th e s e conditions a re seldom sa tisfie d . Most m anagers had a conception of at least some o f th e ty p e s of decisions they make. Ackoff, w riting on common m isconceptions about management informa­ tion system s, notes th a t th e decision m akers' conceptions about th e ir decision environm ent a re likely to be deficient in a v e ry critical way, a way th a t follows from an im portant p rinciple of scientific economy: "T he less we u n d e rstan d a phenomenon, th e more variables we req u ire to explain it." T h is situ atio n leads to an environm ent where th e m anager/decision m aker demands more information th an he really needs and th e re fo re may overload th e decision p ro cess with an "over abundance of irrelev a n t inform ation." To obtain insight into th e firm 's decision environm ent, th e study posed th e following q u estio n to each plant m anager: What a re your most im portant m arketing decisions? T he resp o n ses to th is question a re summarized below. Firm #1. When q uestioned on th e n a tu re of th e firm 's m arketing decisions, th e m anager of th is large potato p rocessing firm responded with broad operational and s tru c tu ra l explanations reflecting his role in a complex o rganization. He began to explain th e organizational s tru c tu re of th e firm em phasizing th e relatio n sh ip s and responsibilities 95 o f each d iv isio n . In th is c o n te x t, th e m anager c h a rac terize d his role as th a t o f a lead er who conform ed to a dem ocratic sty le ; he did not p a rtic ip a te in th e d a y -to -d a y o p e ra tio n s (a c tiv itie s o r decisions) of each division h ead , b u t reta in e d veto pow ers o v e r each decision. He did see his overall resp o n sib ilities and o bjectives a s o p e ra tin g an efficien t (p ro fitab le) p la n t. T h e ty p e s of specific decisions he saw him self m aking ran th ro u g h a sp e ctru m . His resp o n se s did not focus d ire c tly on m arketing decisions p e r se , b u t r a th e r focused on th e broad operational ty p e o f decision (p ro d u ctio n sc h e d u le s, labor c o n tra c ts , b u d g et and fin a n c e s ). He did in dicate th a t d u rin g c o n tra c t time he sa t in on th e b a rg a in in g sessio n s b u t th a t for th e most p a rt he allowed his field people to n e g o tiate . He supplem ented th e negotiation p ro c e d u re s with inform ation rela tin g to th e firm 's p ro ce ssin g p lan s fo r th e upcoming y e a r. Firm #2. T he m anager o f th is medium size potato p ro ce ssin g firm em phasized th e im portance o f m aintaining "control" of his b u sin e ss. He d efin ed control of th e b u sin e ss in term s of selectin g th e b u y e rs of his fin ish ed p ro d u c t; he determ ined th e d istrib u tio n of sales to a lte r­ n a tiv e retail o u tle ts . T he policy o f th e firm was to re s is t th e attem pt o f larg e national ch ain s to control a m ajority s h a re o f th e firm 's p ro d u ct m ark et. T h e re fo re , th e firm prim arily dealt with local chains and o th e r small retail o u tle ts . B ecause of in flation, specific decisions on ch an g es in w eights of fin ish ed p ro d u c t, size of packages a n d p ric e s of raw and fin ish ed p ro d u c ts become im p o rtan t. T he amount of p riv a te labeling was also 96 important because th e firm also viewed th is aspect of th e business as a method of maintaining control over m arket sh a re. The m anager also mentioned the need to make decisions on the quality of raw product on a daily b asis. Firm #3. Manager of th is medium size processed potato firm indicated th at pricing decisions for raw product and for his finished product were v ery im portant. He also noted th at decisions relating to tran sp o rtatio n of raw product a re of major concern because of the rapid increases in fuel prices. The m anager also mentioned decisions related to expanding his p lant. The plant had been expanded five times over th e past forty y e ars and he anticipated expanding his plant again within th e next y ear. Firm #4. Because of the general conditions of th e economy, the m anager believed th a t his decisions were not clearly defined. A major objective of th is firm was merely to su rv iv e . He believed th at it was important for decisions about product changes to be accepted by his custom ers. Because of the rapid changes in neighborhoods, he felt th a t th e re was a g rea t need to change th e composition of his product lines to meet th e changes in demand. He emphasized th a t only the p riv ate sector could and would ad ju st rapidly to changing m arket dem ands. Firm #5. The manager of a small potato processing firm stated th at he made all decisions—from contracting with grow ers to the sale of th e finished pro d u ct. p ro cessor. Pricing decisions were of major concern to this The manager stated th a t he knew th at th e prices of his products were "out of iine" (higher) than o th er p ro cesso rs. He indicated th a t th is did not concern him v ery much because at th e 97 c u rre n t p ric e levels his firm was able to make a modest p ro fit although he quickly sta te d th a t th e re were seasons his firm had and would o p e ra te at a loss. In e ffe c t, th e inflation problem was complicating pricin g d ecisio n s. T he m anager also e x p re sse d concerns about developing a p ro d u ct th a t would meet changing consum er p refe ren c es. He also noted th a t decisions relatin g to th e procurem ent of raw p ro d u ct would v a ry in n a tu re o v e r th e c o u rse of th e y e a r. When th e potato season came to an end in M ichigan, he used b ro k e rs to pro cu re most o f his raw p ro d u ct needs from o th e r producing a re a s , th e re fo re relieving him of th is problem . Firm #6. T he m anager sta te d th a t his m arketing decisions were th o se o f m eeting th e in v en to ry needs of th e v arious pro cessin g p la n ts. T h at is, his job was making s u re th a t potatoes were supplied on sch ed u le . Also, he saw the need to make decisions about quality of raw p ro d u c t. The m anager sta te d th a t he was fully aw are of th e in te r­ d ep en d ence betw een th e grow er and th e firm and th e re fo re attem pted to resolve all conflict th a t might a rise betw een th e two p a rtie s . E. T he B ehavior o f th e Firm a s an A daptive In stitu tio n 1 T h u s f a r , a case has been p re se n te d th a t c h a rac terize s th e formal th eo ry of an om niscient firm as in ap p ro p riate in dealing with questions o f m icrobehavior. As a re s u lt, a behavioral approach was employed which relaxed th e classic assum ptions and hence viewed th e firm as an in stitu tio n th a t is co n fro n ted by th e u n c ertain ty of its environm ent, *This section borrow s heavily from C y e rt, R .M ., and M arch, J .G . A B ehavioral T heory of th e Firm . P rentice-H al I, I n c ., Englewood C l i f f s , 1963. 98 co n fro n te d w ith problem s o f m aintaining a viable v ertical b u sin e ss coalition, and co n fro n te d with a limited capacity to assem ble, to s to re , and to utilize inform ation. C y e rt and M arch in A B ehavioral T heory of th e Firm , c h a ra c te riz e "th e firm as an ad ap tiv e ly rational system r a th e r th a n an om nisciently rational sy ste m ." 2 T hey a rg u e th a t a b u sin e ss org an izatio n is an a d a p tiv e in stitu tio n ; th e firm lea rn s from its e x p e rie n c e s. T hey assum e th e a d a p tiv e system has th e following p ro p e rtie s : 1. T h e re e x ist a num ber o f s ta te s of th e system . At any point in tim e, th e system in some se n se " p re fe rs " some of th e s e s ta te s to o th e rs . 2. T h e re e x is ts an e x te rn a l so u rc e of d istu rb a n c e o r shock to th e sy ste m . T h ese shocks cannot be c o n tro lled . 3. T h e re e x ist a num ber o f decision v a riab les in tern al to th e sy stem . T h ese v a ria b le s a re m anipulated acc o rd in g to some decision ru le . 4. Each com bination o f e x te rn a l sh o ck s a n d decision v a ria b le s in th e system ch an g es th e s ta te o f th e sy stem . T h u s , given an e x istin g s ta te , an e x te rn a l s ta te , and a d ecisio n , th e n ex t s ta te is d e term in ed . 5. A ny decision ru le th a t lead s to a p re fe rre d s ta te a t any point is more likely to be used in th e fu tu re th a n it was in th e p a s t; any decision ru le th a t leads to a n o n p re fe rre d s ta te a t one point is less likely to b e u sed in th e fu tu re th a n it was in th e p a s t. C y e rt and M arch a s s e r t th a t a s long a s th e environm ent of th e firm is u n s ta b le , th e h e a rt of a behavioral th eo ry m ust be a p ro c e ss o f s h o rt ru n a d a p tiv e re a c tio n s. To exam ine th e major a ttr ib u te s of s h o rt ru n ad ap tatio n by firm s e x istin g in a chan g in g w orld, th e y focused on th e s ta n d a rd o p e ra tin g p ro c e d u re s of b u sin e ss o rg an iz atio n s and th e ways in which th e s e p ro c e d u re s c h a n g e d . S ta n d a rd o p e ra tin g p ro c e d u re s a re a se t o f fairly w ell-defined ru le s which en ab le th e firm See H .A . Simon, Models o f Man. New Y ork: Macmillan, 1956. C y e rt a n d M arch s ta te th a t th e y " p re fe r th e term 'ad ap tiv ely ra tio n a l1 to refle ct some sen tim en ts about th e ratio n ality of le a rn in g ." 99 (decision process) to adapt to different environm ents; th ey a re the formal institutional memory of an organization. For example, in micro- economic theory one finds th e decision rule which equates costs and revenue at th e margin (MC=MR). For similar p u rposes, the firm adopts a set of rules th a t aid in decision making. As p a rt of th e sh o rt run n atu re of th e firm, C yert and March summarize th re e basic principles of general choice procedures: 1. Avoid U ncertainty. R ather than looking for ways of dealing with uncertain ty through certain ty equivalents, th e firm looks for procedures th a t maximize the need for predicting uncertain fu tu re e v e n ts. One method uses sh o rt run feedback as a trig g e r to action, another accepts (and enforces) standardized decision ru les. 2. Maintain th e R ules. Once it has determ ined a feasible set o f decision p ro ced u res, th e organization abandons them only under d u re s s. T he problems associated with continuously redesigning a system as complex as a modern firm a re large enough to make organizations cautious about change. 3. Use Simple R ules. The firm s rely on individual "judgement" to provide flexibility around simple ru les. One of th e most common forms of a decision rule consists in a basic, simple procedure and the specification of a list of "considerations" describing th e conditions u n d er which th e procedure may be modified. Specific examples of stan d ard operating procedures of the firm a re review ed. C yert and March note th a t procedures most likely to be tre a te d as fixed are those incorporated in th e explicit stan d ard operating procedures of th e firm. "They give stability to th e organiza­ tion and direction to activities th at are constantly re c u rrin g ." In addition to providing needed stability, the stan d ard operating pro­ ced u res influence (and in many cases dictate) the decisions made in th e organization. C onsider the four major ty p es of p rocedures described below: 100 1. T ask Perform ance Rules a re a set of rules th a t relate to a specific "job" o r d u ty th at is perform ed by a member or su b g ro u p within th e firm . T ask perform ance rules a re im portant to th e organiza­ tion for several rea so n s. F irs t, they permit th e tra n s fe r of knowledge gained by o th er members in th e organization. Second, organizations oftentim es req u ire solutions to problems th a t a re consistent with a large num ber o f o th e r solutions to o th e r ta s k s being perform ed in th e organization; th ese ru les control behavior within the firm. T ask perform ance rules o riginate from two sources: firm and external to th e firm . within th e They emerge from in-house train in g of w orkers to rules th a t a re learned within th e organization and communicated to o th e r organizational members. On th e o th er h and, th ey can be introduced by recruitm ent and selection. Also, some ru les a re more general than th e individual firm and th e re fo re originate out of a b ro ad er se ttin g such a s "sta n d a rd industry p ra c tic e s ," or " sta n d a rd b u sin ess p ra c tic e s," "ethical bu sin ess p rac tic es," o r "good bu sin ess p ra c tic e s." 2. Records and re p o rts kept by th e organization enable one to deduce im portant c h a ra c te ristic s of th e firm 's decison-m aking system . Tn most organizations record and re p o rt keeping are used to maintain control and make p red ictio n s. Records ten d to be related to elem ents of b u sin e ss operation th a t a re most im portant to the effective operation o f th e firm (financial statem ent, cost re p o rts, e tc .) . 3. tio n s. Inform ation-handling rules a re found in all b u sin ess o rganiza­ They transm it information in th e form of d irections, estim ates, and re s u lts . In o rd e r to provide reasonable certain ty th a t relevant information will be available at th e p ro p er place and p ro p e r tim e, 101 ru les developed by th e firm govern th e flow and c o n te n t.o f inform ation. C ertain ty th e size and sophistication of th e firm d eterm ines th e d etail, specification, and com plexities of th e ru le s. S ta n d a rd o p eratin g p ro ce d u res for information a re o f two ty p e s : ro u tin g and filterin g ru le s. "R outing ru le s specify who will communicate to whom about what" (C y ert and M arch). T he b e st known and one of th e most im portant o f such ru les is th e "th ro u g h -c h a n n els" ru le, w here th e organization re q u ire s th a t c e rta in kinds o f inform ation be handled th ro u g h th e p re sc rib e d channels (chain of com m and). For exam ple, th e p re sid e n t talk s only to th e Board of D irecto rs, his sta ff and vice p re s id e n ts . T he th ro u g h -c h a n n e ls ru le is closely related to th e sta n d a rd organization c h a rt which is itself a ru le for communication. F iltering ru les a re p ro c e d u re s which eliminate th e " irre le v a n t b its" of information o r e n tire bodies of information o r p a ss on "re le v a n t b its" o f information to the p ro p er so u rc e s. From th is point o f view. It is clear th a t biases a re in troduced in th e filterin g ru le s . (For exam ple, each departm ent within th e firm may view inform ation rela tin g to th e ir perform ance d ifferen tly th an an unbiased a p p ra ise r would ev aluate th e d e p artm e n t's p erform ance.) But it is o b se rv e d th a t in th e long ru n , o rganizations learn to p rovide c o u n te r biases fo r each b ia s. M oreover, in th e long r u n , inform ation-filtering and bias has a learn in g e ffe ct. Q uoting from C y e rt an d M arch, "one o f th e ways in which th e organization a d a p ts to th e u n reliab ility of inform ation is by devising p ro ced u res fo r making decisions w ithout a tte n d in g to a p p a re n tly relevant inform ation." T h u s , th e intern al biases in th e organization increase th e p re s s u re (from e x te rn al 102 u n c e rta in ty ) to develop decision m ethods th a t do not re q u ire reliable inform ation (o th e r th an th e sim plest, most easily ch eck ed in fo rm atio n ). Plans and Planning R ules a re a c tiv itie s perform ed by th e firm which p re s c rib e a fu tu r e c o u rse of a c tio n . In th e usual se n se of th e word " p la n ," one th in k s o f long-term plan n in g which p lay s a rela tiv e ly minor role in d a y -to -d a y decision m aking in th e firm . B ut firm s do en g ag e in a c tiv itie s th a t may b e classified a s p lanning (d e sc rib e d a s su ch by th e firm) and th e s e a c tiv itie s a r e specified as s ta n d a rd o p eratio n p ro c e d u re s . A lso, b e ca u se p lan s a re made on a p erio dic b a s is , th ey en fo rce a v a rie ty o f in te re s tin g b eh av io rs w ithin th e firm . b u d g e t. P e rh ap s th e b e s t exam ple of a plan is th a t of th e It plays two basic roles w ithin th e firm . F irs t it is u sed as a m anagem ent control d ev ice to implement policies w hich e x e c u tiv es have d ecided and to clock achievem ent a g a in st e sta b lish e d c rite r ia . S eco n d , th e b u d g e t is a device fo r determ in in g feasib le p ro g ram s. In b o th c a se s, th e b u d g e t te n d s to d efin e in a d v an c e a se t o f fixed commitments and fixed e x p e c ta tio n s, in th is s e n s e , th e b u d g e t a ffe c ts th e firm 's b e h av io r and decision m aking p ro c e ss . T h is section has p re s e n te d a th eo re tic al p ic tu re o f th e firm in a real w orld environm ent of u n c e rta in ty , c h a n g e , and a d a p tio n . It d e v ia te s from th e depiction of th e firm assum ed in microeconomic th e o ry . C y e rt and M arch su b s c rib e to th e notion th a t th e firm is an a d a p tiv e in stitu tio n an d fiv e p ro p e rtie s o f th a t system w ere p re s e n te d . A lso, it was po in ted o u t th a t th e firm is heavily conditions by ru le s (s ta n ­ d a rd o p e ra tin g p ro c e d u re s) a n d th e s e ru le s in t u r n re fle ct o rg an iz a ­ tional le a rn in g p ro c e sse s by w hich th e firm a d a p ts to its env iro n m en t. 103 The classification of specific stan d ard operating procedures will be useful in obtaining insight into th e firm 's decision making process. How specific operating procedures are employed by th e firm have many implications for market information system s. At th e o u tse t, some categories of operating procedures will be more useful in developing th is relationship than o th e rs, primarily because information on some stan d ard s a re held closely by the firm and are difficult to obtain. T ask perform ance rules are general and can be identified fairly easily. It was expected th a t th e firm 's reco rd s, plans and budget would be "sensitive information." CHAPTER V AN EVALUATION OF INFORMATION AGAINST PROCESSOR'S DECISIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FIRM BEHAVIOR A. Introduction T his c h a p te r p re s e n ts a b rie f evaluation of th e su p p o rtin g d ata and information system s o p e ra tin g in th e Michigan p rocessed potato in d u s try . In a p rev io u s c h a p te r, th e shortcom ings of neoclassical th eo ry in evaluating (valuing) inform ation w ere d isc u sse d . T h is c h a p te r is prem ised on the notion th a t inform ation a tta in s its value only in th e context of a specific decisio n . We will attem pt to ev alu ate c u rre n t m arket inform ation a g a in st decisions made by potato p ro c e ss o rs. T his a n aly sis will th en be e x te n d e d by relatin g it to dim ensions o f m arket s tr u c tu r e and of firm b e h av io r. T he d ata analyzed in th is c h a p te r w ere o b tain ed from d ire c t personal interview s with m anagers and b u y e rs in M ichigan's p ro ­ cessed potato firm s. T he in terv iew s w ere d esig n ed to obtain infor­ mation on th e n a tu re of th e decision environm ent o f th e firm , ty p e s and so u rces of information used by th e firm and its perceiv ed value for decision. R esponses w ere elicited by open en d ed q u e stio n s on each of th e above a re a s . T h ese open ended resp o n se s w ere used in v alidating o th e r q u e stio n s u sin g a p re -s e le c te d list o f ty p e s and so u rc es of inform ation, an d specific decision s e ts . An attem p t was made to ev aluate e x istin g inform ation system s of th e p ro c e sse d potato in d u stry from th e p e rsp e c tiv e o f th e p ro c e ss o r's decision m aking n e e d s. 104 105 T h is p ro c e d u re for e v a lu atin g inform ation d iffe rs from th e usual opinion poll ap p ro ach in th a t th e q u e stio n s posed to each m anager w ere placed in th e c o n te x t o f th a t firm 's decision e n v iro n ­ ment r a th e r th a n ju s t ra tin g an inform ation so u rc e o r ty p e d ire c tly a g a in st a g en eral q u a lita tiv e v a ria b le . M anagers w ere ask ed to ra te th e u se fu ln e ss o f d iffe re n t ty p e s and so u rc es of inform ation in th e co n te x t o f how th e y w ere u se d in specific decisions o f th e firm . T h is an aly sis has as its p rim ary prem ise th a t inform ation can be valued only in th e specific decision c o n te x t. T he L ikert scaling m ethod (L ansing a n d M organ) is u se d to m easure th e d e g re e o f u se fu ln e ss to p ro ce ssin g firm s o f v a rio u s ty p e s an d so u rc e s of p ric e inform ation for decision m aking. L ansing and M organ point o u t th a t scaled q u e stio n s a re well a d a p te d to th e d is ­ co v ery o f g en eral a ttitu d e s . "People a re ask ed to resp o n d to each item not sim ply by a g re e in g o r d isa g re e in g , b u t by in dicating th e d e g re e o f agreem ent o r d isa g re e m e n t." T ypically sev eral s te p s , in th is stu d y fo u r, a re given betw een extrem e ag reem en t an d extrem e d isa g ree m e n t. T h is form s an o rd in al scale which ra n k s individual a ttitu d e s along a continuum . T h e re is, how ever, no implication of d ista n c e betw een th e s c o re s . T he scale q u e stio n s a sk e d resp o n d en ts in th is stu d y included " v e ry u s e fu l," "m oderately u s e fu l," "ra re ly u s e fu l," a n d "not usefu l" a s p o ssib le re s p o n se s. T h e L ikert scaling m ethod has a d v a n ta g e s a s well as d isa d v a n ­ ta g e s . B irch a n d Schmid note th a t "scales o ffe r th e a d v a n ta g e , o v e r o p e n -e n d e d q u e stio n s , o f p ro v id in g easily q u a n tifia b le m easures th a t a re am enable to sta tistic a l m anipulation a n d in te rp re ta tio n ." T h e a u th o rs s ta te th a t while scaled q u e stio n s a re useful in d isc o v ery 106 of general a ttitu d e s, "they are not useful . . . in th e discovery of resp o n dents' specific marginal p re fe re n c e s." They fu rth e r note that "th ere are no limitations preventing a person from saying th at he feels all problems are serious o r taking some o th e r consistently extrem e position." A nother limitation in th is specific study is th at it is a case study and as such empirical resu lts a re based on a limited number of observations. On the oth er hand, small as it is, th e universe of Michigan potato processors was completely enum erated in the stu d y . This c h ap ter is divided into th re e sections. Section one p re ­ sen ts the resu lts of th e interview s with Michigan processors con­ cerning th e ir evaluation of the value of various ty p e s and sources of information for use in specific processing firm decisions. Section two stratifies the group of firms by m arket s tru c tu re variables ( i . e . , size o f firm and type of firm) and p re se n ts th e re su lts of Section one arra y ed across various elements of m arket s tru c tu re . Section th re e of th is ch ap ter examines the relationship, if a n y , between th e firm 's behavior in th e procurem ent of raw product and of m arket information. B. T ypes of Information Used by Potato Processors in Making M arketing Decisions Table 5.1 p resen ts th e pro cesso rs' evaluation of th e usefulness of various types of information in making m arketing decisions. mation is divided into four broad categories: Infor­ p rice, supply, demand, and co st. An a priori list was firs t co n stru cted from variables derived from published d ata, from economic th eo ry , and from o th e r stu d ies. T his list was then modified a fte r d irecting an open ended question to plant m anagers. The absolute num ber of firms responding in the su rv e y to each data type is p resen ted in the table. 107 T a b le 5.1 U se fu ln e ss o f V a rio u s T y p e s o f In fo rm atio n in D ecision M aking, All P ro c e s s o rs T ypes of Information Very Useful Moderately Useful Rarely Useful Not Useful Total (A bsolute Frequency) Prices Quotations C ontracts Wholesale Retail F u tu res Past Year Forecast O ther 6 4 6 5 2 3 4 7 2 3 1 3 1 5 2 0 1 1 1 0 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 9 9 8 8 8 9 9 7 Supply P v t. Intentions Crop Estimates Vol. Ship Stocks (Storage) 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 3 1 0 1 2 2 3 1 0 9 9 8 9 Demand Population T ren d s Income T ren d s Consumer Profile Demand Estimates 1 2 3 2 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 8 8 8 8 Cost Production Processing T ran sportation Labor (Wages) 6 8 8 5 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 8 9 9 9 S ource: Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan processed potato plant m anagers, 1980, su rv e y question 11.5, Appendix A. 108 Within th e category of p rice inform ation, p rice q u o tatio n s, contra c t p ric e s, wholesale p rice inform ation, retail p ric e s, fo recast p rice and p rices of in p u ts were ra te d most often as "v ery useful" by all p ro c e sso rs. P ast y e a r p rice received a ra tin g of "m oderately u se fu l." Futures m arket p rices w ere ra te d "rarely " to "not useful" by more th a n 50 p e rc en t of th e firm s. In g e n e ra l, c u rre n t p rice —p ric e q u o tatio n s, wholesale and q u o tes on input p rices w ere given h ig h er ra tin g s . Historical p rice inform ation o r estim ates of th e fu tu re were generally ra te d lower. T h ese re s u lts a re not s u rp risin g in th a t many of th e firm m anagers indicated th a t th e general c u rre n t economic situ atio n (inflation) d ictated th e need to maintain a daily check on p ric e s. M oreover, th e y indicated th a t because of p rice flu ctu atio n s common in a g ric u l­ tu ra l m ark ets, daily m onitoring of p rices was im portant. N on-price inform ation; su p p ly , demand and cost a re also impor­ ta n t c ateg o ries of information to p ro c e sso rs. Of th e th re e categ o ries, co st inform ation was most co n sisten tly ra te d " v e ry useful" by all p ro c e ss o rs. Cost information included fo u r categ o ries: p ro c e ssin g , tra n sp o rta tio n and w ages. cost w ere given th e highest ra tin g . p ro d u ctio n , P rocessing and tra n sp o rta tio n A lthough information on wages was given a ra tin g of "v ery useful" by o v er 50 p e rc en t o f th e firm s, it receiv ed th e lowest overall ra tin g within th e cost c ateg o ry . Plant m anagers indicated th a t labor union c o n tra c ts , which often covered sev eral y e a rs , reduced th e u sefu ln ess of wage information to th e firm . Within th e supply c a te g o ry , planting intention re p o rts , crop estim ates and stock re p o rts received a ra tin g of " v e ry useful" from 109 44 p e rc e n t o f th e firm s. A t th e same tim e, c ro p estim ates w ere o f little im portance to 33 p e rc e n t of th e p ro c e s s o rs . T hose p ro ce sso rs who ra te d c ro p estim ates low s ta te d th a t th is inform ation was often in c o rre c t a n d th e re fo re was not useful in m aking d e cisio n s. While p lan tin g in te n tio n s receiv ed a high ra tin g , 30 p e rc e n t of th e p ro c e sso rs " ra re ly used " o r did not u se th is inform ation. T h is la tte r g ro u p ra te d p lan tin g in te n tio n s tow b e cau se th e y b elieve th a t th e grow ing season is too u n p re d ic ta b le a n d th u s th e inform ation is usu ally e rro n e o u s. A lthough 50 p e rc e n t o f th e firm s ra te d alt ty p e s of demand inform ation a s "m oderately u s e fu l," th e actu al u se fu ln e ss of th e ty p e s o f inform ation d isp lay e d in th e q u e stio n a re po ssib ly low er. Several rea so n s lead to th is con clu sio n : only a few firm s ra te d inform ation dem and ty p e s as " v e ry u s e fu l." S eco n d , firm s fo r th e most p a rt employ a g e n eral m arket tria l a n d e r r o r a p p ro a c h (m arket te s te d ) in determ in in g th e dem and for th e ir p ro d u c ts . F inally, inform ation on population tr e n d s , income t r e n d s , a n d dem and estim ates a re u su ally available in a g g re g a te s th a t do not a p p ly to th e p ro c e s s o r's re le v a n t m ark e t. A lso, dem and inform ation su c h a s th e ty p e obtain ed from consum er p ro file s a re a p ro d u c t o f an analytical p ro ce ss th e c ap a city for which many o f th e firm s in th e s tu d y do not p o ss e s s. C. S o u rc es o f Inform ation in Decision M aking T able 5.2 p r e s e n ts th e r e s u lts of p ro c e s s o rs ' e v alu atio n s of th e u se fu ln e ss of v a rio u s so u rc e s of p ric e inform ation in decision m aking. T he lis t of p ric e so u rc e s was developed a p rio ri an d modified via an open en d ed q u e stio n posed to each firm m anager. O v er 90 p e rc e n t o f th e p ro c e s s o rs ra te d b r o k e r s /d e a le r s as a " v e ry u sefu l" so u rc e of 110 Table 5.2 U sefulness of Sources of Price Information in Decision Making, All Processors Source of Information Very Useful Moderately Useful Rarely Useful Not Useful Total (Absolute Frequency) Radio and T .V . 2 1 3 3 9 Newspapers 3 3 1 2 9 Magazines 0 4 2 3 9 U niversity Publications 2 1 2 4 9 USDA Economic Publications 3 4 1 1 9 USDA Crop R eports 3 3 1 2 9 Consultation with Persons in Govern­ ment o r U niversity 0 1 6 2 9 Commercial M arketing Services 1 3 2 3 9 Banks 0 0 6 3 9 Retail S tores 2 5 1 1 9 D ealers, B rokers 8 1 0 0 9 O ther Processors 3 3 3 0 9 S ource: Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan processed potato plant m anagers, 1980, survey question 11.6, Appendix A. 111 p rice inform ation. S u rp risin g ly , even th e firms who employed b u y e rs also indicated th a t b ro k e rs/d e a le rs were v ery useful sources of price inform ation. N ew spapers, tra d e journals (m agazines), USDA economic publications, and o th er pro cesso rs were rated "m oderately" to "v ery useful" sources by o ver 80 percent of th e firm s. Rated low in u se­ fulness as a source of p rice information were radio and T .V ., consul­ tation with governm ent o r u n iv ersity , commercial m arketing firms and ban k s. Several reasons can be offered for th e above evaluation of th e u sefu ln ess of th e sources of price inform ation. P erhaps th e most im portant factor a rises out of a distinction between information sources th a t a re p a rt of th e m arket and sources th a t a re not d ire c t p articip a n ts in th e m arket. B ro k e rs/d ea le rs perform an im portant function in th e m arket; th e y a re b e a re rs of inform ation. The information they tr a n s ­ mit is often c u rre n t and a cc u ra te. If not, th e ir tra d in g p a rtn e rs —pro­ c e sso rs, p ro d u c e rs, and b u y e rs—can choose to deal with o th er b ro k e rs . T hey can e x it. This potential penality provides an incentive for th e b ro k e r to perform well. On th e o th e r h an d , p a rticip a n ts who transm it information but who a re not directly involved in th e m arket a re generally rated low in u sefu ln ess. P rocessors feel th a t th ese non-m arket sources transm it "stale information" but p erh ap s more im portantly, th e processor-decision maker has little reco u rse if th e information obtained from th e non-m arket source leads to a poor decision. The logic here does not su g g e st, for exam ple, th a t USDA, a non-m arket source of inform ation, must become a d ire c t m arket p articip an t in o rd e r to gain cred itab ility as a useful source of infor­ mation. But it may su g g e st to th e non-m arket p a rtic ip a n ts, who wish 112 to become a useful source o f Inform ation, to build in feedback mechanisms so th a t th e public sta tistic a l agencies can respond o r modify th e infor­ mation source for b e tte r use in decision m aking. D. U sefulness of Price Inform ation in Specific Decisions Made by Potato P ro cesso rs Table 5.3 p re s e n ts th e re s u lts of th e p ro c e sso rs' evaluations of th e u se fu ln ess of p rice inform ation in making specific decisions. An im portant bu t d ifficu lt p a rt of th is an aly sis is specifying th e decision m aking environm ent so th a t a re p re se n ta tiv e list or set of decisions can be id en tified . T he approach in identifying th is set of decisions is sim ilar to th a t used in developing th e lis ts of ty p e s and so u rces of inform ation. F irs t, an a p riori list of decisions was c o n stru c te d . T his list was com pared with resp o n se s obtained from open ended q u estio n s posed to firm m anagers about th e ir decision s e t. Inasmuch as th e re su ltin g list of decisions w ere not modified v e ry m uch, th is leads one to conclude th a t: 1) th e a p rio ri list adequately reflected th e firm decision environm ent, o r 2) open en d ed q u e stio n s a re p e rh a p s not a good approach fo r a cq u irin g knowledge about th e firm 's decision en v iro n m ent. At any ra te , th e re s u lts of th e open ended q u e stio n s on th e firm 's decision environm ent rein fo rced th e list of p re -se le c te d decisions. A lso, it should be noted th a t no attem pt was made to ran k th e list of decisions in term s o f im portance and th e re fo re it is assum ed th a t all decisions a re of equal im portance. In g e n e ra l, p rice inform ation was found to be v e ry im portant among more th an 50 p e rc e n t o f th e p ro c e sso rs in making th e following 113 T ab le 5 .3 U se fu ln e ss o f P ric e D ata fo r V a rio u s D e cisio n s, All P ro c e s so rs Very Useful T ype of Decision Moderately Useful Rarely Useful Not Useful Total (Absolute Frequency) Size of Plant (Expansion) 1 3 3 2 9 Number of Plants (Build) 1 4 3 1 9 V ariety of Potato To Buy 4 2 2 1 When to Buy Potatoes (Timing of Purchase) 5 4 0 0 9 Geographical Market in Which to Buy Potatoes 7 2 0 0 9 Market in Which to Sell Potatoes Product 5 3 1 0 9 Quality of Raw Product 1 2 4 2 9 Source: Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan processed potato plant m anagers, 1980, survey question 11.8, Appendix A. 114 d ecisio n s: 1) v a rie ty of potato to b u y , 2) timing of p u rc h a se s, 3) place o r m arket to buy raw p ro d u c t, and 4) m arket in which to sell p ro cessed p ro d u c t. Several reasons may e x ist as to why p rice inform ation is v e ry im portant in th e above decisions. With a num ber o f d iffe re n t v arieties o f potatoes grow n in Michigan and o th e r v arieties sh ip p ed in from o th e r s ta te s , th e p ro c e sso rs demand for potatoes is fairly specialized. p o tato . T he fin ish ed p ro d u ct yield v aries by v a rie ty of P rocessors p re fe r th e v a rie tie s th a t a re known to have high potential p ro d u ct yield. T h e re fo re , th ey will pay a premium b u t not an ex cessiv e premium, for a v a rie ty th a t will give h ig h er y ield s. D ecisions on when to sell and buy and in which m arket a r e , o f c o u rse, d ire c tly influenced by p rice . Decisions in which p rice a p p e a rs to have little impact as rated by p ro c e sso rs a re expansion of p lant size, num ber of p la n ts , and q u ality o f raw p ro d u c t. T he com plexities of decisions to expand o p e ra tio n s and to build additional p lan ts a re such th a t a single bit of d a ta ( e . g . , price) cannot possibly supply all th e needed inform ation. Price inform ation is a factor b u t o th e r ty p e s of inform ation m ust be c o n sid e re d : th e cash flow sta te m e n ts, su p p ly , dem and, in te re s t r a te s , tra n s p o rta tio n , and s o o n . P rice information was rate d v e ry low by 70 p e rc e n t o f th e p ro ­ c e sso rs when making decisions about q u ality o f raw p ro d u ct to p u rc h a s e . In o th e r w ords, th e y believe th a t p rice c a rrie s v e ry little inform ation about th e q u ality o f th e raw p ro d u c t. P ricing decisions and q u a lity decisions a re two se p a ra te decisions. T h is relationship a p p e a rs to be c o n sisten t in all p ro cessin g firm s. Some p ro c e sso rs sta te d th a t th ey would not accept raw p ro d u ct of poor q u a lity for a 115 lower p ric e while o th e r p ro c e sso rs w ere willing to make some m arginal tra d e -o ffs betw een p ric e and q u a lity . A lthough th e r e w ere no a p p a re n t in co n sisten cies betw een e v alu atin g th e u se fu ln e ss o f p ric e in th e c o n te x t of g en eral decision u se s a s com­ p a re d to its evaluation in th e co n te x t o f a specific decision, th e p o ssib ility may e x is t. In g e n e ra l, p ric e inform ation received a high ra tin g in all d ire c t m arket e x ch an g e (b u y and sell) situ a tio n s. In o th e r a s p e c ts o f th e b u sin e ss, p ric e becomes one o f many fa c to rs to c o n sid e r. O f major in te re s t h e re is th e fact th a t p ro c e sso rs believe th a t p ric e tra n s m its little inform ation about th e q u ality o f th e raw p r o d u c t. E. Inform ation an d M arket S tr u c tu r e T h is section p re s e n ts an a n a ly sis of th e u se fu ln e ss o f inform ation a c ro ss v a rio u s elem ents o f m arket s tr u c tu r e . In an e a rlie r c h a p te r, a review o f th e lite ra tu r e on th e re la tio n sh ip betw een m arket s tr u c tu r e and inform ation was p re s e n te d . A lthough th e lite ra tu re is v e ry d iffu s e , econom ists have long recognized th is rela tio n sh ip in th e o ry an d in tu itiv e ly , b u t th e topic is poorly d ev elo p ed ; th e re a re few em pirical stu d ie s which attem p t to analy ze th is basic re la tio n sh ip . In tra d itio n a l m arket s tr u c tu r e stu d ie s employing th e I/O fram e­ w ork, it is common to focus on se v era l s tr u c tu ra l v a ria b le s: size and n um ber o f firm s, b a rr ie r to e n tr y , p ro d u c t d ifferen tiatio n and concen ­ tra tio n ra tio s . For th e p u rp o se of th is s tu d y , two elem ents of m arket s tr u c tu r e w ere se le c te d , size o f firm and ty p e o f firm . T h ese v a riab les w ere se lec te d b e ca u se th e y a re easy to o b tain giv en b u d g e t c o n s tra in ts ; 116 th e y a re c ritic a l to th is s tu d y 's h y p o th e sis on th e re la tio n sh ip b etw een m ark e t s t r u c tu r e an d inform ation; and th e y can be o p e ra tio n a liz e d . Two b a sic ty p e s of p o tato p ro c e ssin g firm s o p e ra te in M ichigan: fre e z e r s a n d c h ip p e r s . T h e q u e stio n ra ise d in th is se ctio n is w h e th e r th e u se fu ln e ss o f inform ation fo r decision m aking d iffe rs by firm ty p e . Size o f firm , th e second elem ent o f m arket s t r u c tu r e u n d e r co n ­ sid e ra tio n is d e fin ed in term s o f th e volume of raw p ro d u c t h a n d led by each p la n t. 1. T y p e s o f Inform ation A cro ss Firm T y p e T able 5 .4 p re s e n ts th e r e s u lts o f p ro c e s s o rs ' ev alu atio n o f v a rio u s ty p e s o f inform ation a c ro ss firm ty p e . In g e n e ra l, fre e z e r s g a v e h ig h e r ra tin g s to most ty p e s of inform ation th a n did c h ip p e r s . S e v e ra l in te re s tin g o b se rv a tio n s can b e made on d iffe re n c e s b etw een fre e z e rs and c h ip p e rs . With re s p e c t to p ric e inform ation, fre e z e rs c o n s is te n tly ra te d all ty p e s of p ric e inform ation (fo r b o th p ro c u re m e n t a n d p ro d u c t m a rk e ts ), e x c e p t p o tato f u tu r e s p ric e s , a s "m oderately u sefu l" to " v e ry u s e fu l." Somewhat s u r p r is in g ly , c h ip p e rs ra te d c o n tra c t p ric e inform ation a t 2.857, w hich is slig h tly below "m o d erately u s e f u l." On th e o th e r h a n d , c h ip p e rs view ed w holesale (p ro d u c t) p ric e inform ation a s m ore th a n "m oderately u s e fu l." A n o th e r m ajor d iffe re n c e betw een fre e z e rs a n d c h ip p e rs is in th e ir e v a lu a tio n of fo re c a st (p ro d u c t) p ric e inform ation. F re e z e rs r a te th is ty p e of in fo r­ mation as " v e ry u s e fu l," while c h ip p e rs in d ic ate d th a t fo re c a s t p ric e inform ation is " ra re ly usefu l" to them when m aking d e c isio n s. With n o n -p ric e inform ation, a sim ilar com parison is m ade b etw een th e u s e fu ln e s s fre e z e rs a n d c h ip p e rs place on v a rio u s ty p e s o f in fo r­ m ation. H ere a g a in , fre e z e rs g e n e ra lly ra te d all ty p e s o f inform ation 117 T a b le 5 .4 A v e ra g e R an k in g o f V a rio u s T y p e s o f Inform atio n A c ro ss Firm T y p e f T ypes of Information All Firms Freezers C hippers Prices Quotations C ontract Wholesale Retail F utures Past Year Forecast O ther Inputs (Oil) 3.555 3.111 3.625 3.600 2.375 3.222 2.888 4.000 4.000 4.08 3.500 3.500 2.500 3.500 4.000 -------- 3.428 2.857 3.666 3.666 2.333 3.142 2.570 4.000 Supply Pit. Intentions Crop Estimates Vol. Shipments Stocks 2.888 2.777 2.875 3.222 3.500 3.500 3.500 4.000 2.714 2.571 2.666 3.000 Demand Population T ren d s 1ncome T rends Consumer Profile Demand Estimates 2.500 2.875 3.250 3.000 2.500 2.500 3.500 4.000 2.500 3.000 3.166 2.666 Cost Production Processing T ransportation Labor (Wages) 3.444 3.888 3.888 3.333 4.000 4.000 4.000 3.500 3.285 3.857 3.857 3.285 Source: Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan processed potato plant m anagers, 1980, su rv ey question 11.5, Appendix A. The average number is based on assignm ent of number 4 to "very u se fu l," 3 to "moderately u seful," 2 to "rarely u sefu l," and 1 to "not u se fu l." T herefore, th e highest ratin g possible would be 4.0 and the lowest, 1.0. 118 more useful th a n did c h ip p e rs . Alt supply ty p e of inform ation, p lan tin g in ten tio n s, cro p estim ates volume shipm ents, and c a rry -o v e r sto ck s w ere rate d "m oderately useful" to "v ery useful" by fre e z e rs. C h ip p ers ra te d su p p ly ty p e of inform ation as " ra re ly useful" to "m oderately u se ­ fu l." Demand and cost ty p e s of information w ere evaluated fairly co n sisten tly betw een ty p e s of firms with th e exception of th e ir evalua­ tion of demand estim ates. F reezers rate d demand estim ates as "very u se fu l," while c h ip p e rs felt th a t th is information ty p e was less th an "m oderately u se fu l." Some generalizations can be made about how th e fre e z e rs and c h ip p e rs rate d th e u se fu ln ess of v arious ty p e s of inform ation. As noted above, fre e z e rs g enerally ra te d most ty p e s o f information h ig h er th a n did c h ip p e rs. For exam ple, fre e z e rs ra te d c o n tra ct p rice and all su p p ly information as "v ery u se fu l." C h ip p ers generally ra te d p ro d u ct side information ty p e s as more u sefu l. For exam ple, th ey gave h ig h er ra tin g s to wholesale and retail p rice inform ation th a n did fre e z e rs. M oreover, fre e z e rs rated Information ty p e s th a t re q u ire more an aly sis ( i . e . , forecast p ric e , demand estim ates) h ig h er th a n did c h ip p e rs. 2. Sources of Inform ation A cross Firm T ype T able 5.5 p re s e n ts th e re s u lts of p ro c e ss o rs1 evaluation o f v ario u s so u rces of inform ation a cro ss firm ty p e s . Most o f th e so u rces of in fo r­ mation for both fre e z e rs and c h ip p e rs w ere ra te d "rare ly useful" to "m oderately u se fu l." F re ez ers and c h ip p e rs both ra te d b ro k e rs as a v e ry useful source of p rice inform ation. F re ez ers rate d o th e r p ro ­ c e ss o rs, USDA economic p u b licatio n s, and commercial m arketing firms as a " v e ry useful" to "m oderately useful" source of inform ation. On 119 T a b le 5 .5 A v e ra g e R a n k in g o f S o u r c e s o f P r ic e D ata A c ro s s Firm T y p e 1 S o u rce o f Inform ation All F re ez ers C h ip p e rs (9 firm s) (2 firm s (7 firm s) Radio and T .V . 2.222 2.000 2.285 N ew spapers 2.777 2.000 3.000 M agazines 2.111 2.000 2.142 U n iv e rsity Publications 2.111 2.500 2.000 US DA Economic Publ ications 3.000 3.500 2.857 USDA C rop R ep o rts 2.777 3.500 2.571 2.500 1.714 C o n su ltatio n with P erso n s in G overnm ent or U n iv e rsity Commercial M arketing S e rv ice s 1.888 3.500 1.857 B an k s 1.666 1.500 1.714 R etail S to re s 2.888 2.500 3.000 D ealers, B ro k e rs 3.888 4.000 3.857 O th e r P ro c esso rs 3.222 4.000 2.714 S o u rc e : Data collected from p erso n al in terv iew s with M ichigan p ro c e sse d p otato p lan t m an ag ers, 1980, su rv e y q u e stio n M .6, A ppendix A. T h e a v e ra g e num ber is b ased on assig n m en t o f num ber 4 to “v e ry u s e fu l," 3 to “m oderately u s e fu l," 2 to " ra re ly u s e fu l," an d 1 to "not u se fu l." T h e re fo re , th e h ig h est ra tin g possible would be 4.0 an d th e low est, 1.0. 120 the o th er hand, chippers rated new spapers and retail sto re s as "moderately useful" sources of information. Here again, from examining th e ratin g s given each source, it appears th at for free ze rs information on the procurem ent side of th e firm is most im portant, while for chippers information from the product side of th e firm is more important for decision making. 3. Specific Decisions Across Firm Type This section of th e analysis p resen ts resu lts on processors' perceptions of the usefulness of price information in making specific ty p es of decisions (see Table 5 .6 ). Freezers rated price information "moderately useful" to "very useful" for th e se t of decisions. Price information was rated "very useful" in deciding on th e num ber of plants to build, when to buy raw product, and from which geographical m arket to buy raw pro d u ct. For ch ip p ers, p rice information rated th e highest when deciding in which geographical m arket to buy. C hippers make a g re a te r distinction than freezers when making q u a lity /p rice tra d e -o ffs. In oth er w ords, chippers rate price information as "rarely useful" when making raw product quality decisions while freezers rated price information as "moderately u seful." C hippers also rated price information low when making decisions on th e size o f plant and in making a decision on th e number of plants to o p erate. 4. Size of Firm and Market Information Table 5.7 p resen ts the resu lts of processor evaluations of ty p es of information across various sizes of firm. For the most p a rt, large firms rated information sets as "very useful" to "m oderately u sefu l." Medium and small firm s, on th e whole, rated information ty p es lower. Price information received a "very useful" rating by th e large firm. 121 T a b le 5 .6 A v e ra g e R a n k in g o f P ric e D ata fo r . V a rio u s D e c isio n s A c ro s s Firm T y p e All P ro cesso rs F reezers C hippers Expansion of Plant Size (9 firms) 2.250 (2 firms) 3.500 (7 firms) 1.833 Number of P lants 2.625 4.000 2.166 V ariety of Potato 3.111 3.500 3.000 When to Buy 3.555 4.000 3.428 G eographical M arket in Which to Buy 3.750 4.000 3.666 M arket to Sell 3.500 4.000 3.333 Quality of Raw P roduct 2.000 3.000 1.857 Decision S o u rce: Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan p ro cessed potato plant m anagers, 1980, su rv e y q u estio n 11.8, A ppendix A. T h e a v erag e num ber is based on assignm ent of num ber 4 to " v ery u s e fu l," 3 to "m oderately u se fu l," 2 to "ra re ly u se fu l," and 1 to "not u s e fu l." T h e re fo re , th e h ig h est ratin g possible would be 4.0 and th e low est, 1.0. 122 T a b le 5 .7 T y p e s of Inform ation A v e ra g e R a n k in g o f V a rio u s T y p e s o f In fo rm a tio n A c ro s s Firm S iz e ' 2 Small2 Medium2 L arge (2 firm s) (4 firm s) (3 firms) (9 firm s) P rice Q uotations C o n tra c ts W holesale Retail F u tu re s P ast Y ear F o recast O th e r In p u ts (Oil) 3.500 2.000 4.000 3.000 1.500 3.000 2.000 4.000 3.400 3.400 3.400 3.800 2.400 3.000 2.800 4.000 4.000 3.500 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 3.555 3.111 3.625 3.600 2.375 3.222 2.888 4.000 S u p p ly P it. In ten tio n s C rop E stim ates Vol. S hip S to ck s (S torage) 2.000 1.000 2.500 3.000 3.200 2.800 2.800 3.600 3.000 3.500 4.000 3.000 2.888 2.777 2.875 3.222 Demand Population T re n d s Income T re n d s C onsum er Profile Demand E stim ates 2.000 2.500 3.000 3.000 2.400 2.800 3.200 2.800 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 2.500 2.875 3.250 3.000 C ost P roduction P ro cessin g T ra n sp o rta tio n Wages 3.000 3.500 3.500 2.500 3.400 4.000 4.000 3.400 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 3.444 3.888 3.888 3.333 S o u rc e: All Firms Data collected from personal in terv iew s with Michigan p ro c e sse d potato p lan t m an ag ers, 1980, su rv e y q u e stio n I I . 5, A ppendix A. T h e a v e ra g e num ber is based on assignm ent o f num ber 4 to " v e ry u s e fu l," 3 to "m oderately u se fu l," 2 to " ra re ly u se fu l," and 1 to "not u s e fu l." T h e re fo re , th e h ig h est ra tin g possible would b e 4.0 and th e low est, 1.0. 2 Firm size m easured in volume of potatoes han d led annually by th e p la n t, a s d efin ed in T able 4 .2 , C h a p te r IV. 123 All non-price information received high rating from large firms while medium and small firms ran the spectrum from "moderately" to "rarely usefu l." In o th er w ords, medium and small firms did not ex p ress strong feelings one way o r th e oth er on the usefulness of information ty p es. The resu lts indicate th a t larg er firms rated supply information higher compared to small and medium firms' evaluations of supply information. Within th is categ o ry , volume of product shipped was the only information ty p e th a t large firms rated as v ery im portant. The high rating of supply information may indicate th at larg er firms are more concerned about stable supplies of raw product th an small and medium sized firm s. As a re su lt, they find supply related types of information more useful. A nother reason th a t may explain why larger firms rate most information higher th an small and medium firms is the g re a te r analytical capability of the larg er firm s. L arger firms have, for th e most p a rt, an analytical sophistication which resu lts in a g re a te r realized value for information in th e ir decisions. T herefore, it can be expected th at larg er firms rate most information as "very u sefu l." 5. Firm Size and Source of Information Table 5.8 p resen ts the re su lts of processor evaluations of sources of information by size of firm. B ro k er/d ealers a re rated as th e most useful source of price information, all o th er sources of price information were rated low by all firm sizes. Besides giving b ro k ers a "very useful" ratin g , th e large firms also rated USDA crop rep o rts as a "v ery useful" source of price information. O ther processors as a 124 T a b le 5 .8 A v e ra g e R a n k in g o f S o u rc e s o f P ric e D ata b y Firm S ize 1 All Small2 Medium 2 Large 2 (9 firms) (2 firms) (4 firms) (3 firms) Radio and T .V . 2.222 3.000 2.000 2.000 N ew spapers 2.777 3.000 2.600 3.000 Magazines 2.111 2.500 1.600 3.000 U niversity Publications 2.111 2.000 1.800 3.000 USDA Economic Publications 3.000 2. 500 3.000 3.500 USDA Crop R eports 2.777 2.500 2.400 4.000 2.000 1.600 2.500 Sources of Information C onsultation with P ersons in G overn­ ment o r U niversity Commercial M arketing S ervices 1.888 2.500 1.800 3.000 B anks 1.666 2.000 1.400 2.000 Retail S to res 2.888 3.500 2.400 3.500 D ealers, B ro k ers 3.888 3.500 4. 000 4.000 O th er P rocessors 3.222 2.500 3.200 3.000 S o u rce: Data collected from personal interview s with Michigan processed potato plant m anagers, 1980, su rv e y question 11.6, A ppendix A. T he av erag e num ber is based on assignm ent o f num ber 4 to "v ery u se fu l," 3 to "m oderately u se fu l," 2 to " ra re ly u se fu l," and 1 to "not u se fu l." T h ere fo re , th e highest rating possible would be 4.0 and th e lowest, 1.0. 2 Firm size m easured in volume of potatoes handled annually by th e p la n t, as defined in Table 4.2, C h ap ter IV. 125 source of p rice information were rate d "ra re ly useful" by small firm s and "m oderately useful" by medium and large firm s. 6. Size of Firms and Specific Decision L arge firm s ra te d p rice information "v ery useful" in all decisions ex cep t fo r decisions related to quality o f pro d u ct (see T able 5 .9 ). Medium an d small firms ra te d p rice information as "ra re ly useful" when making decisions related to th e quality of raw p ro d u ct for p ro ce ssin g . Price inform ation was rated "not useful" to " ra re ly useful" by small p lan ts when confronted with decisions to expand o r built p la n ts, and to choose a v a rie ty o f potatoes to p ro cess. For all firm siz es, p rice information proved to be "v e ry useful" to "m oderately useful" in making decisions on when to buy an d in which geographic m arket to b u y . F. Im plications of Firm B ehavior for M arket Inform ation System s In th e p revious c h a p te r, th e question was posed o f, "What a re th e major dim ensions of input m arket conduct?" w ere d isc u sse d : Four elem ents c o n tra c tin g , p ric in g , quality co n tro l, and a ttitu d e s tow ard inform ation. Beyond th e conventional notion of m arket s tr u c tu r e , environm ental c h a ra c te ristic s should be considered as fac to rs which influence p ro c u re ­ ment behavior o f p ro c e sso rs. T his would include such fa c to rs as technology, u n c e rta in ty , and im perfect know ledge. Im perfect know­ ledge is th e "code word" in economic th e o ry fo r inform ation. In th is stu d y it is of p a rtic u la r im portance to tra c e th e relatio n sh ip betw een 126 T a b le 5 .9 A v e ra g e R a n k in g o f P r ic e D a ta f o r . V a rio u s D e c isio n s A c ro s s Firm S iz e 2 2 All Small2 Medium (9 firm s) (2 firm s) (4 firm s) (3 firm s) Size o f Plant (E xpansion) 2.250 1.000 2.400 4.000 Num ber o f P lants 2.625 2.000 2.600 4.000 V ariety of Potato 3.111 2.500 3.200 3.500 When to Buy 3.555 3.500 3.600 3.500 G eographical M arket 3.750 4.000 3.600 4.000 M arket to Sell 3.500 4.000 3.200 4.000 Q uality o f Raw P roduct 2.111 2.000 2.400 1.500 D ecisions L arge Which to Buy S o u rce: Data collected from personal in terv iew s w ith M ichigan p ro ce ssed potato p lan t m an ag ers, 1980, su rv e y q u e stio n 11.8, A ppendix A. T he a v erag e num ber is based on assig n m en t o f num ber 4 to " v e ry u s e fu l," 3 to "m oderately u se fu l," 2 to " ra re ly u s e fu l," an d 1 to "not u s e fu l." T h e re fo re , th e h ig h est ra tin g p ossible would be 4 .0 and th e low est, 1.0. 2 Firm size m easured in volume o f potatoes han d led an n u ally by p lan t as d efined in T able 4 .2 , C h a p te r IV. 127 m arket information and firm behavior. With th is broader view of the firm 's environm ent, it seems ap p ro p riate to pose a more encompassing q u estio n , "What are th e firm 's rules (stan d ard operating p ro ced u res), policies, stra te g ie s th at guide its decision making process in pro­ cu rin g raw product?" Why do firms vertically integrate? Under what market conditions do firms employ b rokers? What are th e firm's information handling rules? The premise here is th at the above practices of th e firm exist not so much because information has changed th e firm 's behavior, but ra th e r, th e lack of information (u n certain ty ) has altered its behavior (p rac tic es). These behavioral practices influenced by uncertainty subsequently impact market s tru c tu re and market perform ance. Given the above dimensions of m arket conduct and risk management practices of the firm, what implications do firm procure­ ment m arket behavior and risk management practices have for m arket information? Here, we a re concerned with th re e actors: the firm , o th er firms in the m arket, and non-m arket p articipants (public statistical in stitu tio n s). It should be evident th at a firm 's behavior has implications for its information needs. E arlier, the firm was p o rtray ed as an adaptive institution. The behavior of the firm will certainly impact its decision process and hence suggest something about its information needs. At the same time, the firm 's behavior also has implications for o th e r market p a rticip a n ts, th eir decisions and information need s. is a non-m arket p a rticip a n t. The last acto r, statistical agencies, In th is case, reference is to th e two principle public su p p o rted USDA statistical institu tio n s, th e Economics and S ta tistics S ervice, and the A gricultural M arketing Service. 128 T ypically, commodity procurem ent stra te g ie s , p ricing policies and th e like a re closely held by th e firm because of th e potential com petitive re p e rc u s sio n s. Firms ten d to hold onto th e ir " s e c re ts ." As a re s u lt, much of th e following discussion stems from personal interview s with m anagers and o b se rv atio n s su p p o rted by o th er stu d ie s . No e ffo rt was made to obtain information on two im portant sta n d a rd o p e ra tin g p ro c e d u re s, th e firm 's record keeping and its plan n in g , b ecause it was th o u g h t most firms in the in d u stry would not p ro v id e th is inform ation. N e v erth eless, information on ta s k p e rfo r­ mance rules and inform ation handling ru les were solicited from th e firm and o th e r m arket p a rtic ip a n ts. 1. C ontracting T h ree main o b se rv atio n s come out of th e descrip tio n of c o n tra c ts (in C h ap ter IV, see Procurem ent C onduct) used by Michigan p ro ­ cessed potato firm s. T h ese have d ire c t implications for th e d is trib u ­ tio n , need, and p e rh a p s value of inform ation in th e m arket. F irs t, th e c o n tra c tin g process is complex. Many dim ensions of th e p ro d u ct and conditions m ust be d isc u sse d before exchange ta k e s place betw een p ro d u c e r and p ro c e sso r. To th e e x te n t th a t th e re is no co n sistency betw een c o n tra c ts o ffere d by each firm , th e term s of tr a d e o r inform ation which flows from th e exchange process becomes tailo red for th e firm , difficu lt to summarize and, in any case, g en erally closed to th e p u b lic. T he complex co n tra ctin g process would make inform ation (p ric e , q u a n tity , e tc .) collection costs high fo r th e public sta tistic a l in stitu tio n s . Also, th is closed information ex ch an ge arran g em en t makes it d ifficult to evaluate m arket perform ance. 129 S econd, th e c o n tra c tin g p ro c e ss d ev ia te s from com petitive m arket co n d itio n s. In th e o ry , p rice is th e single signaling a g en t which is e x p e c te d to aid decision m akers w ith re so u rc e allocation. In a m arket w here th e inform ational c o n te n t of p ric e is lim ited, some o th e r mechanism is re q u ire d to perform th e inform ation signaling fu n ctio n —c o n tra c ts . T he c o n tra c tin g p ro ce ss does p ro v id e a forum th ro u g h which infor­ mation is g e n e ra te d while goods and se rv ic e s a re e x ch a n g ed . T he th ir d o b se rv atio n about c o n tra c ts in th e M ichigan p ro cessed potato in d u s try deals with th e relatio n sh ip betw een th e firm 's behavior and o th e r firm s in th e m ark et. T h e e x iste n c e of inform ation and c o n tra c tin g c o sts have im portant im plications for many a sp e c ts of firm b e h av io r. T h e oligopoly firm is not only c o n cern ed with th e p rev a ilin g m arket inform ation—p ric e , c o s ts , q u a n tity —b u t is also c o n ce rn e d with th e beh av io r o f rival firm s an d potential e n tr a n ts in th e m arket (J u s k o w ). Juskow s ta te s th a t th e firm 's ability to m onitor and resp o n d to th e actio n s of riv a ls , both real and p o tential is lim ited b y c o n sid eratio n s o f inform ation c o st. A lso, th e firm 's ab ility to form , m onitor an d e n fo rc e informal collusive agreem ents (c o n tra c ts) is determ ined by th e same c o n sid e ra tio n s. T h e d ire c t im plications o f th is statem en t a re th a t th e lower inform ation and c o n tra c tin g c o sts become, th e g r e a te r will be th e ability o f a small g ro u p of firm s to beh av e th e way one single monopoly firm b e h a v e s. B a rrie rs to e n try become extrem ely h ig h . T he la rg e r a re inform ation c o s ts , th e more likely will firm s b eh av e com petitively, th u s easing th e b a rr ie rs to e n tr y . 130 2. Pricing Behavior and S trategy Because of the volatility of price in agricultural commodity m arkets, procurem ent decisions are becoming increasingly im portant. Processors can employ several strateg ies in procuring raw product; (1) purchase from th e open market and be subjected to price instability, (2) position them selves in the m arket in advance and in this case stand to gain if price increases and lose if market prices fall, and (3) employ a combination of th ese two stra te g ie s. If price instability is ch aracteristic of a m arket, th e firm 's timing o f commodity purchases has a significant influence on the cost of th e finished product, and th u s on its competitive position relative to o th er firms in the m arket. Hayenga notes th at key elements in the decision must include the forecast probability distribution of th e relevant cash and fu tu re delivery commodity price levels (and th e ir ■basis' relationship) over th e time period p rio r to use, the key contingencies or environm ental factors (w eather, governm ent policy changes, e tc .) affecting those prob­ abilities, th e typical distrib u tio n of forecast e rr o r , and the c u rre n t cash and fu tu re contract p rice. Although an accurate assessm ent of th e probability distribution of fu tu re commodity price levels is d ifficult, it is critical in effective risk management. Hayenga co n stru cts a model which shows how the expected probability distribution of commodity p rices, which will be available to th e firm in the fu tu re time period, fits into th e firm 's decision process. In Figure 5.1 the expected probability distribution of fu tu re commodity prices available to th e firm is illu stra te d . Because a g re a te r num ber of undeterm ined factors can influence p rices, the figure is constructed such th a t prices in th e more d ista n t time period are p o rtray ed with a larg er variance. Hayenga sta te s th a t th e firm 131 Price P robability Most Likely P robability roE ab ility Time F igure 5.1 The Firm 's Decision P rocess and E xpected Probability D istrib u tio n of F u tu re Commodity P rices can in co rp o rate th is inform ation into th e m anagem ent decision process by tak in g commodity p ric e s p re se n tly available fo r c u rr e n t and fu tu re d e liv e ry , and o v erlay in g them on th e expected p rice s in th e fu tu re . Hayenga identifies additional fa c to rs c ritical to firm 's decision on commodity p ric e s . They include th e ex p ec te d p rice of th e p ro d u c ts to be sold by th e firm , th e re su ltin g m argin, ex p ectatio n s re g a rd in g com petition's b ehavior in both th e commodity and p ro d u ct m arket, and th e level o f ris k a ccep tab le to firm m anagem ent. R esults from d ire c t interview s with m anagers of potato p ro cessin g firms indicate th a t th e y employ much sim pler ru le s in making decisions on p ric e s . F re e z e rs, fo r exam ple, minimize th e ir risk th ro u g h forw ard 132 purchases of production (acreage) co n tra cts. C hippers employ co n tracts to lock in a price of a fu tu re delivery of raw product to th e ir plant. Both freezers and chippers buy on th e open market to fulfill processing short falls throughout th e y e a r. T hus, they use a combination of pricing stra te g ie s. When it comes to determ ining an offer price, interview resu lts indicated th at processors resorted to a combination of pricing rules th at ranged from a price leadership model to a market determ ined p rice. The price leader model holds particularly tru e in Michigan during late w inter and early sp rin g of the year when the processor comes to term s with th e grow er on th e contract price. One firm stated specifically th at they were not signing contracts with th eir grow ers in 1980 until th e dominant firm in th e m arket had completed its co n tractin g . He fu rth e r indicated th a t his firm would attem pt to match th e price offers of th e dominant firm. This su p p o rts th e resu lts of o th er research on th e m arket conduct of processors in the determ ination of th e ir procurem ent policies which suggested barom etric price leadership of a competitive variety as a plausible form of pricing behavior (Collins, Mueller and B irch ). Quoting from Heimberger and Hoos, Jesse Markahm defines barom etric price leader of a competi­ tive ty p e which "appears to do little more than set prices th a t would eventually be set by forces of com petition." The authors state th at in th is ty p e of price leadership, th e price leader is more o r less the victim o f competition; an announced price by a would-be leader is not intended to achieve price discipline among oth er firm s, but ra th e r to reflect or anticipate an inevitable development. 133 This behavior has significant implications for price information system s. It appears that the cost of price determination falls on the dominate firm; this firm has the task of arriving at a price which ultimately serves (or greatly influences) the market price. Assuming th at the smaller firms in the market rely heavily on the actions of the dominate firm in making pricing decisions, the cost of th is activity should be low for the smaller firm. They become free rid ers in th at this strateg y facilitates smaller firm decision making on pricing without having to invest in collecting price and other types of information. The public statistical agencies could not rely solely on th is source of price data because a public information agency is charged with the responsibility of collecting representative market prices. Price offers determined by one firm may not rep resen t the entire market (industry) in th at contract prices are often signed with specific groups of farm ers in a concentrated production area. 3. Quality Control Rules Evidence strongly suggests th at processors make pricing decisions separate from decisions on quality of raw product p urchases. T herefore, information related to quality is needed by th e firm for its quality decisions. The firm has two options in plotting a quality control stra te g y : 1) invest in obtaining information on quality of raw pro ducts, or 2) adopt specific rules and procedures which reduce the need for such information thereby simplifying the decision process. R esults indicate th at the latter option best describes th e behavior of Michigan processors in making quality related decisions. 134 The c o n tract is th e integral mechanism for controlling quality o f raw p ro d u cts in th e processed potato in d u stry . T he co n tract disp lay s th e " ru le s," specified by th e firm and ag reed upon by the p ro d u cer th a t governs raw product q u ality . T his specification ran g es from production p ractices to specific g rad es of raw p ro d u ct. One rule th a t has been controversial is th e so called "chip on arriv al ru le ." T he rule provides for rejection of any potatoes th a t do not chip to th e b u y e r's (processor) satisfaction. A lthough favored by p ro ce sso rs, th e rule is not favored by many grow ers because they feel th a t th e clause is used to b rea k co n tracts and obtain lower priced supplies (H a rriso n ). C ontracting is sta n d ard p rocedure with most firms and even if not included in a w ritten c o n tra c t, th e chip on arriv al ru le ap p ears to be a p ro ced u re practiced in d u stry wide. The firm 's decision process is significantly influenced by th e sta n d a rd o p eratin g p ro ced u res of th e in d u stry relating to quality co n tro l. T his rule reduces th e information needed by th e firm in making q u ality decisions. T he o p eratin g p ro ced u res for quality control o f th e individual firm , although p racticed in d u stry wide, have little impact on o th e r firms in th e m arket. Quality plays a significant role in product differentiation and each firm s triv e s for th e highest possible sta n d a rd s of q u a lity . Each firm se ts its sta n d a rd s somewhat independent of o th e r firm s in th e m arket. For exam ple, it was found th a t firms in th e Michigan processed potato in d u stry specify d ifferen t p ercen tag es of G rade A potatoes in th e ir c o n tract and re q u ire d iffe re n t ru les governing quality co n tro l. 135 N on-m arket p a rtic ip a n ts p e rh a p s could c o n trib u te to th e m ark eting p ro cess not by sup p ly in g more inform ation on q u a lity , b u t ra th e r by s tre n g th e n in g ru les (s ta n d a rd s ) which will enable m arket p a rtic ip a n ts to make b e tte r decisions relatin g to q u a lity . For exam ple, re se a rc h could p ro v id e some basis for estab lish in g ch ip p in g potato d isease and defect color c h a rts (C hipper S n a c k e r). A lthough th e in d u stry has developed such c h a rts , little is known in th e Michigan m arket about th e p ro ce sses u n d e rly in g th e ir developm ent, th e ir b a sis, w h eth er g ro w e rs w ere involved, and so on. At any ra te , it seem s th a t a plausible solution to th is issu e is for th e statistical agency to su p p ly inform ation relatin g to sta n d a rd p ro ce d u res ra th e r th a n q u ality rela te d d a ta . 4. Risk Management P ractices A v a rie ty of risk m anagement p ra c tic e s adopted by th e firm have im plications for m arket inform ation need s o f th e firm , com peting firms and non-m arket p a rtic ip a n ts . (1) Why do firms vertically in te g ra te ? 1 F irst of all, v ertical in teg ratio n th ro u g h ow nership in th e Michigan p ro ce ssed potato in d u stry is limited to two firms and th e re fo re does not re p re s e n t a major form of ex ch a n g e. A lthough vertical integration is not a major m arket arran g em en t in th e M ichigan potato in d u s try , it is a common p rac tic e in many o th e r fru it and vegetable m ark ets. Protection a g ain st ris k is one of th e major reaso n s many p ro ce sso rs "V ertical in teg ratio n em braces a broad ran g e o f in ter-firm rela tio n sh ip s betw een su ccessiv e sta g e s in p ro d u ctio n . Elements in v e rtica l in teg ratio n e x ist in almost all in te r-firm a rra n g em e n ts th a t affect p roduction o th e r th a n th o se a rriv e d a t in th e open com petitive m arket" (M ighell). In th is stu d y v ertical in teg ratio n has refe ren c e to o w n e rsh ip . 136 (a n d g ro w e rs) in te g ra te fo r su p p lie s o f raw p ro d u c t. T h is form o f m ark et a rra n g e m e n t e n s u r e s p ro c e s s o rs a q u a n tity o f p e ris h a b le p ro d u c ts to th e firm . F u r th e r , u n c e rta in tie s a sso c ia te d w ith p ric e in sta b ilitie s a re co n tro lle d to a g r e a te r d e g re e . V ertical in te g ra tio n also p ro v id e s th e p ro c e s s o rs w ith some c o n tro l in th e in p u t m arket w hich may s e rv e as a b a r r ie r to p o te n ­ tial m arket e n tr a n ts (W illiamson). T h e e x te n t o f v e rtic a l in te g ra tio n in th e M ichigan p ro c e sse d p o tato in d u s try is so limited th a t it p ro b a b ly does not p ro v id e en o u g h "m ark et pow er" to c a u se m uch o f a b a r r ie r to m ark et e n tr y . (b ) B ro k e r v e rs u s B u y e r? T h e choice betw een em ploying a b ro k e r o r a full time b u y e r is o fte n d ic ta te d by th e size o f th e firm . For th e m ost p a r t , la rg e r firm s employ b u y e rs a n d th e sm aller firm s em ploy b ro k e rs to p ro c u re th e ir raw p ro d u c ts . R e su lts from th e p re v io u s se ctio n of th is c h a p te r re p o rt th a t w ithout a n y d o u b t, b r o k e r s a re th o u g h t o f b y th e firm s in th e M ichigan p ro c e ss e d p o tato m ark et a s th e major so u rc e o f inform ation. A lso, from th e firm 's p e rs p e c tiv e , b ro k e rs play an im portant role in re d u c in g r is k . G iven th e im p o rtan t role th a t b r o k e rs p lay in re d u c in g r is k an d tra n s m ittin g inform ation in th e p ro c e ss e d po tato in d u s tr y , p e rso n al in te rv ie w s w ere c o n d u c te d w ith fiv e o f th e la rg e s t b r o k e rs in th e s ta te . All b ro k e rs in d ic ate d th a t th e y a r r a n g e th e e x c h a n g e betw een b u y e rs a n d s e lle rs . T h is p ro c e ss o ften re q u ire s th e b r o k e r to b e a r much o f th e ris k involved in th e m a rk e t. For exam ple, one b ro k e r d e s c rib e d it by sa y in g th a t h is b u s in e s s was to " p ro te c t th e m a rk e t." He a r r a n g e s th e e x c h a n g e betw een a ris k a d v e rs iv e g ro w e r a n d a ris k a d v e rs iv e b u y e r by ta k in g re s p o n sib ility o f e n s u rin g paym ent o f goods 137 and tran sp o rtatio n of goods over a specified time period. The broker believed th at th is function was necessary because neith er buyer or seller would otherw ise undertake the risk of making the transaction. These responses may exag g erate b ro k er risk s since b ro k ers are rational and, in addition, only infrequently take title to the potatoes. A nother dimension of risk bearing occurs when a load of potatoes is "rejected at the plant door" by th e processor. In some cases, the bro k er takes the responsibility, th u s reducing th e risk of a bad quality load to both grow er and processing firm by absorbing tra n s ­ portation c o sts, or if possible, by locating another buyer who requires lower quality sta n d ard s (soup firm s, e tc .) . Information transm itting is a prim ary function perform ed by the b ro k er. In a sense, one can think of his commission as th e value of information to the firm. When questioned on th e ir sources of market information each bro k er indicated th a t they telephoned various market p articip ants around th e c o u n try . One broker stated th at while he supplied USDA with price q u o tes, public price re p o rts were not useful to him because th ey were not timely enough to meet his immediate decision needs. T his may ignore th e use of such USDA information for ex post validation of oth er ro u rces. The functions of th e b ro k er have trem endous implications to the firm decision process with resp ect to th e procurem ent of raw p ro d u ct. Michigan processors employ b ro k ers in procuring 16 percent of th eir raw product n eed s. The firm simply delegates th is function to the b roker and as a resu lt many o f the firm s' decisions and th eir information problems a re resolved. 138 (c) Information handling ru le s. T hese ru les a rise in the pro­ cessed potato in d u stry from basically two situ atio n s: 1) those th a t a re in d u stry wide (filterin g ru les related to Information sources ex te rn al to th e in d u s try ), and 2) those th a t a re internal to the firm b u t c h a ra c te ristic of th e m arket s tru c tu re (oligopoly). Firms within th e in d u stry seem to have established a set of ru les which govern th e value of various sources of information. Non-m arket information sources a re generally considered not useful. Information resu ltin g from m arket p articip a n ts w hether req u e ste d by th e firm o r obtained via tran sactio n (exchange) is given a higher premium. T his ru n s fairly co n sistently th ro u g h o u t th e in d u stry . Because of the s tr u c tu r e of th e in d u stry , th e firm can o b serv e its internal op eratio n s and make inferences about total m arket infor­ mation. One m anager indicated th a t th e b e st so u rce of information about his com petitors was obtained by m onitoring th e changes in volume o f finished p ro d u ct demanded in th e m arket. force o f th e firm serv ed as information collectors. Also, th e sales One firm m anager indicated th a t he has weekly m eetings with salesmen to d iscu ss information g a th e re d on th e ir com petitors. O ther firm s in the in d u stry ten d e d to have a fairly "loosely s tru c tu re d " organizational system for acq u irin g m arket inform ation. T hat is, th ey have not developed ru les for tran sm ittin g information within th e firm and for th e most p a rt th e y collect m arket information on an ad hoc b asis. C H A P T E R VI SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH A. G en eral C onclusions T h is re s e a rc h had two b ro ad g o a ls . T h e f i r s t was to d e s c rib e o n e ty p e o f problem , o b so le sc e n c e , a s it re la te s to th e d a ta sy stem s and as it im pacts th e d ecision m aking p ro c e ss e s o f firm m an a g ers in th e M ichigan p ro c e ss e d p otato in d u s tr y . T h e seco n d m ajor o b je c tiv e w as to d ev elo p an d implement a m ethodology fo r e v a lu a tin g inform ation sy ste m s o p e ra tin g in th e M ichigan p ro c e ss e d p o tato in d u s tr y . o b je c tiv e s a r e re la te d to th e ab o v e m ajor g o a ls: S e v e ra l (1) to d e s c rib e th e m ark e t s t r u c tu r e s and o p e ra tio n a l a s p e c ts o f e x c h a n g e a t th e g ro w e r-p ro c e s s o r level in th e M ichigan p ro c e sse d p o ta to in d u s tr y ; (2) to d e s c rib e th e p u b licly s u p p o rte d inform ation s e r v ic e s , th e p r iv a te inform ation se rv ic e s a n d th e inform al inform ation sy stem o p e ra tin g w ithin th e M ichigan p ro c e s s e d p o tato i n d u s tr y ; (3) to id e n tify im p o rtan t m a rk e tin g d e cisio n s m ade by p o tato p ro c e ss in g firm s; (4) to e v a lu a te th e s u p p o rtin g inform ation sy stem by re la tin g sp e cific m arket d ecisio n s to sp e cific ty p e s an d s o u rc e s of d a ta ; (5) to s u g g e s t im provem ents in th e p u b lic ly s u p p o rte d s ta tis tic a l s e rv ic e s p ro v id e d th e M ichigan p ro c e ss e d p o tato i n d u s tr y , a n d (6) to t e s t th e a p p lica b ility of th e inform ation system parad ig m an d to re v is e o r e x te n d it w h ere p o ss ib le . 139 140 At the o u tse t, it should be pointed out th at th e generality of inferences draw n from th is stu d y is somewhat limited because a case study approach was adopted. Moreover, given the relatively small number of firm s, although comprising the total population within the sta te of Michigan, the re su lts may not be directly applicable to the national processed potato in d u stry . In addition, in Michigan th ere a re only two freezers and nine chippers (eight chippers p a rti­ cipated in this s tu d y ). The analysis of th e firm s' evaluation of various ty p es of m arket information was done using th e Linkert scaling method. Since scaled questions do not result in cardinal, but ra th e r in ordinal re su lts with no basis of com parability, one cannot assign levels of significance to observed d ifferences, for example, between freezers and ch ip p e rs. T his leaves one with a substantial amount of d escrip tiv e material but a limited potential for extensive analysis. N evertheless, th e re a re some conclusions from this stu d y which have implications for th e following defined areas of concern: th e firm decision environm ent, stru c tu ra l change in the processed potato in d u stry , agricultural economic resea rch , public statistical agencies, th e method used h ere, and fu tu re research . This stu d y began with th e premise th at one of th e major problems of an information system is statistical obsolescence. Given the nature of al[ information system s, th is fundamental problem is seen as stemming from two so u rces: (1) changes in th e policy agenda, and (2) changes in the reality being track ed by th e information system (Bonnen, 1975). 141 In th e context of th e m arket, th e p h rase "policy agenda" is taken to mean "decision a g en d a ." A nd, th e re fo re , th is stu d y was concerned with th e ty p e s , n a tu re , and changes in th e decision agenda of processed potato firm s th at might re n d e r th e su p p o rtin g inforsystem obsolete. T he need to stu d y th e decision agenda was found not only n ecessary to illu stra te obsolescence in th e information system , b u t it was also n ecessary to indicate th e relativ e value of different ty p es o f information to th e decision m aker. T h u s, th ro u g h o u t th e co u rse of th is d isse rta tio n , th e following prem ise has been a rg u e d : information obtains its value only in th e context of a specific decision. As a re s u lt, th e decision process of th e firm became a prim ary area of in q u iry . A lthough decision is an integ ral p a rt of economics, microeconomic th eo ry does not provide a tr u e th eo ry of management decision making at th e firm level. T h e re fo re , th e behavioral th eo ry of th e firm has been employed to stu d y th e decision environm ent o f processed potato firm s. For th e most p a r t, one would expect th e decision agenda for p riv ate m arket firms to remain fairly constant o v er time. T his is to be expected because th e firm , unlike public in stitu tio n s, is p ri­ marily concerned w ith th e p u rs u its of limited "well defined" objec­ tiv e s. Public decision m akers, on th e o th e r h a n d , a re concerned with a m ultitude of o bjectives—efficiency, e q u ity , grow th, balanced b u d g e ts, national s e c u rity , to list a few. M oreover, changes in political power a lte r th e em phasis placed on each of th e se o b jectives. In a relative se n se , th e firm sails in still w a ters. But from time to time, it experiences extrem ely rough w aters th a t rock th e boat and make decision less c le a r. 142 Recent years have been tough times for the business community in general. Inflation has had a trem endous impact on the firm's ability to plan and thus make decisions concerning pricing, expan­ sion, and disinvestm ent. Many apprehensive feelings were voiced throughout the interview process. Quite a few managers had never operated a business during inflationary periods and as such registered concern about its effect on th e ir decision processes. Statistical systems also become obsolete when fundamental changes occur in reality of th e market which make it more difficult for the statistical agency to collect d ata. Sometimes the agency does not even recognize the change when it evolves slowly. Within the processed potato in d u stry , changes in market s tru c tu re are th e major facto rs contributing to statistical obsolescence. Perhaps the most noticeable change in th e potato in d u stry is th e g reat shift away from fresh toward processed o u tlets in potato m arkets. This change has implications for the market channels, market functions, and many economic aspects of exchange. Each of them, in tu r n , have implications for our public statistical system . For many years th e producer had one major outlet for his potatoes, the fresh m arket. But with th e grow th in the potato pro­ cessing in d u stry over th e past two decades, th e spectrum of possible m arketing channels has widened significantly. Along with these new m arketing alternatives arises the need for information to meet the new set of m arketing decisions faced by p ro d u cers. Also, some decisions a re no longer faced or have become less im portant and th erefo re so have related information needs. This phenomena has occurred in many segm ents of o u r food se cto r. And for the most p a rt, public statistical agencies have responded appropriately to 143 th is ch an g e by re p o rtin g s ta tis tic s on th e new p ro d u c ts th a t flow th ro u g h th e various c h a n n e ls. T his tre n d is likely to co n tin u e as consum er demand for th e more convenient p ro ce ssed food e x p a n d s. USDA's sta tistica l agencies have g en erally a d a p te d well to th is so rt of change and have e stab lish ed th e n e c e ssa ry in stitu tio n al m echanisms to deal e ffectiv ely w ith th is phenom ena. For exam ple, u s e r w orkshops co n d u cted by E S S -S tatistic s a re well su ite d fo r id en tify in g th e chan g es in m arketing c h an n els and th e new s ta tis ­ tical n eed s of th e in d u s tr y . T his is th e ty p e of feedback an y s ta tis ­ tical system should seek in o rd e r to reta in c re d ib ility w ith its d ata u se rs. T his mechanism p ro v id es "feedback" from th e u s e rs of s ta tis tic s to th e m anagers o f th e sta tistic a l a g e n c y . When en g ag ed in th is e ffo rt, how ever, a sta tistic a l ag en cy n eed s to develop c rite ria fo r d eciding on th e adoption of c h an g e s in sta tistic a l pro g ram s which a re su g g e ste d by th e v a rio u s m arket p a rtic ip a n ts . It a p p e a rs th a t in some c a se s th e in d u s try th ro u g h its v a rio u s in d u stria l asso ciatio n s could and should p ro v id e fo r c e rta in of its own d a ta n e e d s. ideas a re d u b io u s in term s o f cost e ffe c tiv e n e ss. Some O th e rs b e n efit a q u ite narrow segm ent o f th e food m ark etin g system an d th e b e n e fits a re alm ost, if n o t, e n tire ly c a p tu re d by food m ark etin g firm s. In o th e r c a se s th e re a re major social r e tu r n s to co n su m ers an d th e p u b lic and public inv estm en ts in d a ta a re ju s tifie d . H ow ever, at th is po int we lack su itab le c rite ria fo r d ecid in g su c h tra d e -o ff s . T he second im portant consequence th a t th is c h a n g e in potato m arket o rg an izatio n has for o u r p ublic s ta tistic a l ag en cies is th a t it a lte r s th e d istrib u tio n o f m arketing fu c n tio n s a t th e f i r s t h a n d le r level betw een th e th re e major a c to rs —g ro w e rs, b r o k e r s , and p ro c e s s o rs . 144 Market organization changes cause m arketing functions to be defined differently, sometimes discontinued, and oftentim es exchanged between the acto rs. For example, at one time many of th e m arketing functions—from production to tra n sp o rtin g produce to m arket—were performed by th e p ro d u cer. But as specialization in agricultural marketing intensified th ese activities were spun off th e farm to oth er market participants (and vice v e rs a ). The degree to which th is has occurred varies across geographical m arkets, across market channels, and even across individual firms (both producer and pro­ cessor) . T his brings up the question w hether th ese changes are reflected in c u rre n t statistical agency procedures to collect and compile data series on prices received by grow ers. Perhaps a fu rth e r question to consider is could or should statistical agencies respond to these changes. ESS-Statistics has, for example, recently responded to the shifting m arketing functions in potatoes by examining a new data series (proposed by a farm er organization) which would rep o rt a synthetic farm gate price o f potatoes by su b tra ctin g out of th e first transaction price any m arketing functions perform ed by the grow er. This price concept b rin g s up im portant questions about th e m erits of any synthetic sta tistic . What decisions does th is information facilitate? How accurate an indicator of farm level prices would th is statistic be? Are th e re d an g ers in rep o rtin g prices th at are not market determ ined? A re E SS -S tatistics price series designed to make sta te comparisons? It is difficult to conceive of any d irect decision needs th at a synthetic farm gate potato price would se rv e . In contracting or 145 b id d in g , m arket p a rtic ip a n ts a re su rely sophisticated enough to u n d e rs ta n d and discount th e se v ariatio n s in m arketing functions (especially as th e y affect th e ir own costs) perform ed by potato farm e rs. If th e m arket already d isco u n ts for th is phenomena an d , as re p o rte d in th is s tu d y , if p ro ce sso rs do not now find USDA p rices v e ry useful in th e ir decisio n s, one is at a loss to know what practical value a "farm gate" potato p rice concept would have e ith e r fo r p ro ­ c e sso rs o r g ro w e rs. K lein's evaluation o f potato grow er information needs does not su g g e st any u rg e n t grow er decision u se s for a sy n th e tic farm g a te p rice e ith e r in th e case of pro cessin g o r fre sh m ark ets. M oreover, costing out m arket functions from a m arket determ ined f irs t tra n sa c tio n p rice may g re a tly d isto rt th e signalling a b ility , if a n y , of th e re p o rte d m arket determ ined p rice se rie s. Price is d eriv e d from th e interaction of supply and demand fo rces in th e m arket place. Cost is a major component on th e supply sid e . To s u b tr a c t out cost on a p e r un it b asis would re s u lt in a concept with little m eaning. M oreover, c o stin g out m arketing functions could, especially in an inflationary p e rio d , re s u lt in an agency periodically re p o rtin g n eg ativ e p ric e s—which only u n d e rlin es th e questio n of what th e concept behind su ch a p rice means and what real world u ses it might h av e. Finally, th e prim ary p u rp o se o f ESS p rice d ata a re to p ro v id e m easures of m arket perform ance especially when combined with q u a n tity sold to p ro v id e a farm income m easu re. In th is u se , a sy n th e tic farm g a te p rice would u n d e rs ta te farm er income and d is to rt th e m easure of farm er w elfare. A nother s tru c tu ra l ch an g e in th e potato in d u stry which has implications for public sta tistic a l system s focuses on th e exchange 146 m echanism . As th e in d u s tr y s h ifts from f r e s h tow ard p ro c e ss e d m a rk e ts, th e p rim a ry e x c h a n g e m echanism s a r e also sh ifte d from an "open system " to one th a t is c lo sed . T h e e x c h a n g e m echanism w hich tra d itio n a lly tr a n s f e r r e d fre s h p ro d u c e , a term inal m a rk e t, re s u lte d in a situ a tio n w here th e public sta tis tic a l a g e n t could d ire c tly o b s e rv e an d re p o rt th e p r lc e s th a t p rev a ile d in th e m a rk e t. B u t a s m ore p ro ­ d u c t moved th ro u g h th e p ro c e sse d p o tato m a rk e t, th e e x c h a n g e m echanism s w ere a lte re d to meet th e n e ed s of th e p o tato p ro c e ss in g firm s. T h e new ex ch a n g e m echanism , c o n tr a c ts , m akes it d iffic u lt to o b tain a c c u ra te p ric e d a ta sin ce th e flow of inform ation in th e e x ch an g e p ro c e ss is hig h ly tailo red to th e individual firm a n d is closed to th e p u b lic . T h is ty p e o f s tr u c tu r a l c h a n g e r e p r e s e n ts a se rio u s problem fo r th e p ublic sta tistic a l sy stem b e c a u se it inv o lv es th e fundam ental q u e stio n o f p ro p e rty r ig h ts to inform ation—a q u e stio n th a t is y e t to be re so lv e d . In th e c o n te x t o f th e p otato in d u s tr y s h ift from f r e s h to p ro ­ c e ss e d m ark e ts we find e v en more fundam ental s tr u c tu r a l c h a n g e . In M ichigan betw een 1964 a n d 1974 th e nu m b er o f p o tato g ro w e rs d eclin ed from 3154 to 860, while d u rin g th is p e rio d , p o tato a c re a g e p e r farm in c re a se d from 12 to 47 a c re s (H a rris o n ). From all indica­ tio n s p ro c e ssin g firm s have also declin ed in nu m b er w hile in c re a s in g in siz e . T h e se s tr u c tu r a l c h a n g e s an d o th e rs s u g g e s t th e n eed fo r some fundam ental a d ju stm en t in o u r s ta tis tic a l in s titu tio n s . If a d e ­ q u a te inform ation is to b e available fo r m onitoring m ark et developm en ts a n d m eeting p u b lic a n d p riv a te d ecision n e e d s , a new focus in o u r r e s e a rc h an d d a ta collection in s titu tio n s is n e e d e d . 147 B . Market S tru c tu re , Procurem ent Behavior and Information: T he R esults T his research approach, in effect, held m arket s tr u c tu r e and firm behavior co n stan t, and then evaluated information in th e context of th e firm s' decison environm ent. More specifically, th is stu d y evaluated ty p es and sources o f m arket information ag ain st th e firm s' m arketing decisions. C u rre n t m arket price inform ation—farm level p rice q u o tes, wholesale p rices, and quotes on input prices were given high ra tin g s by most of th e firm s. Historical p rice information and estim ates of fu tu re p rice w ere, on th e whole, ra te d low er. Within th e n o n -price information categ o ries, all ty p e s of cost information were most often rated useful by potato p ro ce sso rs. P rices, how ever, stan d well above all o th e r ty p es of information in th e ir value in p ro ­ cesso r decisions. B ro k ers and dealers were rate d as th e most useful source of p rice information by p ro ce sso rs. information transm ission. B rokers perform th e function of They a re m arket p a rtic ip a n ts and th ere fo re th ey a re subjected to recourse by p ro d u cer or p ro cesso r if th ey transm it faulty inform ation. USDA p rice re p o rts w ere considered by the p ro cesso rs as th e next most useful source of p rice inform ation. Given th e public good c h aractistic of inform ation, it can be assum ed th a t o th e r sources such as new spapers, radio, and T .V . relied heavily on USDA p rice data as a source. Price information was given higher ra tin g s when considered in specific decisions th a t involved d ire c t exchange of goods in th e m arket. It is in te restin g to note th at price information was rated v e ry low by p ro cesso rs when making decisions about quality of raw p ro d u c t. Also, 148 p rice information was rate d low in specific decisions related to expanding o r building new p la n ts. B ecause p rice informati n was rate d low in th is in stan c e, it is assum ed th a t a single sta tistic could not provide enough information for th is se t of complex decisions. Two elem ents o f m arket s tr u c tu r e , size o f firm and ty p e o f firm w ere used to evaluate inform ation in th e p ro cessed potato in d u s try . C ross tab u latio n s ran k in g th e u sefu ln ess of various ty p e s and so u rces o f information w ere em ployed. With re sp e c t to information ty p e s , fre e z e rs generally ra te d most ty p e s of inform ation h ig h er than did c h ip p e rs . M oreover, fre e z e rs ra te d h ig h est information ty p e s th a t w ere related to th e p rocurem ent side of th e firm . C h ip p e rs, on th e o th e r h an d , rate d pro d u ct m arket inform ation h ig h e r. T h is clearly re fle cts th e relativ e dom inance in decision m aker concern for pro d u ct m arket problem s in th e case of c h ip p e rs and procurem ent problem s in th e case of fre e z e rs. Both fre e z e rs and c h ip p e rs recognized b ro k e rs as th a t most impor­ ta n t so urce o f m arket inform ation. For th e most p a rt, ag ain , fre e z e rs ten d e d to ra te sources on th e procurem ent side h ig h er and c h ip p e rs ra te d p ro d u ct side m arket inform ation sources h ig h e r. F re ez ers and c h ip p e rs w ere also ask ed to ran k th e u sefu ln ess o f p rice inform ation in m aking specific d ecisio n s. F re ez ers rate d p rice inform ation "m oderately useful" to "v ery useful" fo r th e ir d ecisio n s. For c h ip p e rs, p rice information ran k e d th e h ig h est when decid in g in which geographical m arket to b u y . T he re s u lts indicate th a t c h ip p e rs ra te p rice inform ation as "ra re ly useful" when making q u ality d ecisio n s. 149 T h is s tu d y also exam ined th e re la tio n sh ip betw een siz e o f firm a n d ty p e o f inform ation. As was e x p e c te d , ta rg e firm s ra te d most inform ation ty p e s a s " v e ry u sefu l" to "m oderately u s e f u l." One in te re s tin g re s u lt is th a t la rg e r firm s ra te d su p p ly d ecision inform a­ tio n h ig h e r com pared to small and medium firm 's e v a lu a tio n . T he h ig h ra tin g o f su p p ly inform ation may s u g g e s t th a t la r g e r firm s r e q u ire more co n tro l o v e r th e s ta b ility in su p p ly o f th e ir raw p ro d u c ts th a n do small and medium sized firm s. h ig h e r v alue on su p p ly inform ation. A nd a s s u c h , th e y place a All firm siz e s c ite d b ro k e r s /d e a le r s as a " v e ry u sefu l" so u rc e o f p ric e inform ation. In m aking sp ecific d e cisio n s, all firm sizes ra n k e d p ric e in fo r­ m ation as " v e ry u sefu l" to "m oderately u sefu l" in m aking d ecisio n s re la te d to d ire c t ex ch a n g e o f g o o d s. H ere a g a in , p ric e inform ation was ra n k e d low in m aking d ecisio n s about th e q u a lity o f raw p ro d u c t to p u r c h a s e . Elem ents o f firm b eh av io r an d how th e y re la te to m arket in fo r­ m ation was also o f c o n ce rn in th is s tu d y . A d is tin c tio n was made betw een firm b e h av io r th a t a ris e s from and is in flu e n ce d b y m arket s t r u c tu r e , and b e h a v io r th a t stem s from th e firm 's en v iro n m en t (g en e ral m arket c o n d itio n s ). T he la tte r b e h a v io r is p rim arily in flu en ced by u n c e rta in ty o r lack o f inform ation. T h is c a te g o ry o f b e h av io r g e n e ra lly involves r is k m anagem ent p ra c tic e s . Within each g ro u p , sp ecific elem ents w ere d isc u sse d in th e lig h t of th e im plications fo r inform ational need o f th e firm , o th e r firm s in th e m a rk e t, an d th e p u b lic sta tis tic a l a g e n c y . U nder th e b eh av io r o f th e firm c o n tra c tin g , p ric in g , and q u a lity co n tro l w ere c o n s id e re d . U n d e r th e r is k m anage­ m ent p ra c tic e s th e d isc u ssio n in clu d ed (1) why do firm s v e rtic a lly in te g r a te , (2) b ro k e r v e rs u s b u y e r, a n d (3) inform ation h a n d lin g r u le s . 150 Generally, the firm attem pts to reduce th e risk by employing any number of the above elements of behavior. Whenever a m arketing practice becomes too risk y , the firm avoids th is activity by attem pting to shift it toward another market participant. This research examined th e usefulness of publicly provided information in an oligopoly m arket, th e Michigan processed potato in d u stry . From the theory of cost and benefits of information across d ifferen t market s tru c tu re s , as developed in C hapter II, one can draw some inferences about the provision of public information in th e Michigan processed potato in d u stry . First of all, th is m arket stru c tu re is p erh aps th e most difficult one in which to a sse ss th e directional d istrib u tion of costs and benefits to private and social investm ents in information. Let us firs t consider cost d istrib u tio n s. The theory su g g e sts th at the cost of data accessibility for th e firm declines as one d e p arts from competitive conditions. We reason th u s because, as th e m arket grows more monopoloid, the firm can obtain an estim ate o f various param eters of the en tire m arket by examining its internal operations in relation to th e m arket. The larg e st firm has th e g rea test advantage in th is , and th e smaller less. T his follows from th e basic s tru c tu re of an in d u stry with few firm s. F u rth e r, a firm in this m arket can reduce the cost of information for decision making by employing any number of risk management practices and stan d ard operating procedures. On the o th er hand, public statistical agencies without th e cooperation of the oligopoly firm experiences relatively high cost of collecting m arket information. T his, in p a rt, explains why public statistical agencies do not collect v e ry much information for facilitation of m arkets in concentrated in d u strie s. F u rth e r, th e use of 151 c o n tra c ts th a t a re tailored for each firm ad d s to th e h etero g en eity of tra n s a c tio n , and to th e public co st of collecting m arket inform ation. One m ust also co n sid er th e social b en efits of in v estin g in infor­ mation in oligopoly m ark ets. A side from th e difficulties of accounting fo r social b en efits of public investm ents in inform ation, th e direction of social benefits of publicly supp lied m arket inform ation a p p e a rs to d iv e rg e in oligopoly m arkets betw een r e tu r n s to (1) tio n , and (2) public policy and reg u la to ry pro g ram s. m arket facilita­ As pointed ou t in C h a p te r II, th e b en efits of public information in m ark ets th a t ap p ro ach th e com petitive model a re realized prim arily in gains from facilitating m arket coordination. B ut as one moves away from competi­ tiv e m arkets to su b sta n tia lly c o n ce n tra te d o n e s, th e benefit o f public inform ation ta k e s th e form o f re tu rn s to various ty p e s o f public policy which often re q u ire inform ation on th e perform ance of th e m arket. With th e case o f th e Michigan p ro cessed potato in d u s try , we found little evidence of m arket coordination problem s th a t can be improved by simply providing more m arket inform ation—especially p rice d a ta . A lso, public policy issu es w ere o f th e n a tu re which su g g e s t th a t more sta tistica l information would not add su b sta n tia lly to social b e n e fits. T h e re is a need for re se a rc h to tra c k and b e tte r u n d e rsta n d th e effe cts of th e ch an g es ta k in g place in m arkets such as th is . On m arket s tr u c tu r e and p ro cu rem en t, one can o ffe r th e following conclusions: 1. An evaluation of p rice inform ation ag ain st specific decisions made by potato p ro cessin g firm s su g g e sts th a t only c u rre n t p rice inform ation d ire c tly related to th e ex change o f goods is valued highly by th e firm . T he re s u lts also indicate th a t only th e m arket can p rovide 152 th is ty p e of p rice inform ation to meet th e firm 's decision n e ed s. So called " th ird p a rty " information sources for th e most p a rt a re valued lower. USDA was considered by p rocessing firm s to be th e most reliable non-m arket source of inform ation. 2. S tru c tu ra l c h a ra c te ristic s of th e processed potato m arket do have an impact on how various ty p e s of m arket inform ation a re v alu ed . In th e main, p ro ce sso rs a cro ss d iffe re n t m arket s tr u c tu r e elem ents rate d b ro k e rs a s th e most useful so u rce of inform ation. 3. Elements of firm procurem ent behavior do have an impact on th e d istrib u tio n and value of m arket information to th e firm , o th e r firms in th e m arket and public sta tistica l ag en cies. T he firm as an a d ap tiv e in stitu tio n can a d ju st its behavior by employing risk m anage­ ment p rac tic es to o p e ra te u n d e r u n c e rta in ty o r to tr a n s fe r m arket fu n ctio n s when th e risk becomes too g re a t. 4. A tangential questio n th a t ran th ro u g h th is re se a rc h e ffo rt was what a re th e potentials for USDA to improve its sta tistica l se rv ice s to p ro cesso rs and c o n v erse ly , how can p ro c e sso rs aid in im proving public statistical p ro d u c ts . While some p ro c e sso rs indicated th a t th e y cooperated by filling o u t s ta te cro p re p o rtin g q u e stio n n a ire s, most p ro ce sso rs th o u g h t th a t th e y and th e USDA could do little to improve public m arket inform ation. C. Implication for Public R eporting System It should f irs t of all be noted th a t USDA's sta tistic a l agencies w ere not d esig n ed d irec tly to se rv e th e informational needs o f food p ro c e ss o rs, th e focal g ro u p in th is s tu d y . In fa c t, th e inform ational n eed s of th is g ro u p of firms a re p e rh a p s in h eren tly a lower p rio rity on th e ir sta tistica l agenda th an a re p ro d u ce r n e e d s. B ut th e reality 153 of th e situ atio n , th e problem of statistical obsolescence, makes it possible for one to draw some inferences from th is stu d y for the public statistical system whose prim ary mission developed some y ears ago and has not fundam entally changed, in creasin g ly , th e decisions made by p ro cesso rs affect th e e n tire food system and th u s the activ ities of processors impact th e public statistical agencies. With th e trem endous change in m arket organization, new ty p e s of problems a ris e , and th e re fo re , th e need for information for both p riv ate and public decisions in creases. Perhaps one of th e most im portant public data se ries is th a t of p ric e s. While it is questionable w hether or not th is data se ries can significantly a lte r th e firm 's behavior, re su lts of th is stu d y indicate th a t public p rice data se rie s, n e v erth eless, ran k second in u sefu ln ess in p ro ce sso r's decision m aking. Most of th e b en efits of th e se p rice re p o rts go unnoticed because information can easily be reproduced by o th e r in stitu tio n s and d istrib u te d as th e irs w ithout many m arket p a rticip a n ts knowing th e connection between th e various so u rc es. R esults of th is stu d y indicate th a t nonprice data se ries a re also q u ite im portant to p ro ce sso rs. Crop estim ates and p lanting intentions a re two major data se ries published by E S S -S tatistics. T he informa­ tional content of prices is being reduced by changes in m arket s tru c ­ tu r e and p ricing mechanisms. The ability of p rice to perform its signaling function so th a t reso u rces a re efficiently allocated has been red u ced . C onsequently, nonprice information increases in value to th e decision m aker. T his is p articu larly tr u e in ag ric u ltu ral m arkets w here p rice elasticities a re such th a t small changes in supply can d rastically affect m arket p ric e s. If a m arket p articip an t in th e potato 154 in d u stry waited to react to changes in m arket p ric e s, he would be placed at a d isadvantage compared to th e p articip an t who had p rior d irect information about changes in th e size o f th e c ro p . Because of inflationary p re s s u re s , th e cost of m arketing has risen rapidly in recent y e a rs. Many m arketing serv ices a re in fact becoming more costly th a n th e p e r unit value of th e raw p ro d u ct. M arketing d a ta , in most c ase s, a re not rep o rte d by th e public sta tis­ tical agencies, d espite th e ir im portance to th e food system . For example, tran sp o rta tio n makes up ten p ercen t of all food-m arketing c o sts. Data published on food tran sp o rta tio n is rep o rted by th e In te rsta te Commerce Commission. U pchurch a s s e rts th a t food hauling is, for th e most p a rt, by u n reg u lated c a rrie rs w here th e re is no complete and con sisten t body of d a ta . Cost information on tran sp o rta tio n of processed food would be o f value to th e in d u stry as well as th e public se cto r. Improved information on an o th er area th a t would be of value to both p riv ate and public secto r decisions involves g rad e s and sta n d a rd s in th e potato in d u stry . R esearch on th is problem area can p erh a p s b est be perform ed by AMS with ESS cooperation. C onsistent g rad e s and sta n d a rd s tailored to processing uses could g rea tly enhance th e exchange of p ro d u c ts between p ro d u ce rs and p ro ce sso rs. D. A ppraisal of th e Information System Paradigm : Methodological Implications T his stu d y has employed th e information system paradigm in th e analysis of m arket information in th e Michigan processes potato in d u s try . H ere th e s tre n g th s and w eaknesses of th is framework a re d isc u sse d . 155 P e rh a p s th e g re a te s t s tr e n g th of th e fram ework lies in its a b ility to aid th e re s e a rc h e r in defin in g problem s. c la rity to a complex s e ttin g . It help s b rin g T he fram ew ork is applicable to most inform ational problem a re a s a t b o th a micro and macroeconomic level. It is p a rtic u la rly su ited for th a t ty p e of re s e a rc h w here th e problem is ill-d efin ed an d th e em phasis o f th e re s e a rc h is a t least p a rtly to a rtic u la te th e problem b e tte r . A n o th er s tre n g th o f th e paradigm , a s exem plified by th is s tu d y , is th a t it can easily be combined with v ario u s c o n cep ts from th e o rie s w hich aid in sh ed d in g lig h t on th e re s e a rc h problem . T he fram ew ork is an epistem ological taxonom y, not a m ethodology, which allows it flex ib ility . For exam ple, in th is stu d y th e inform ation system s p a ra ­ digm was combined with co n cep ts from neoclassical th e o ry , in stitu tio n al economics and from in d u stria l o rg an izatio n . T he inform ation system paradigm does not help one w ith th e fundam ental p arad o x of inform ation: decision m akers cannot place a v alu e on inform ation u n til th e y have u sed it. T h e re fo re , decision m ak ers1 evaluation o f inform ation ty p e s and so u rc e s is limited to th e ir realm o f e x p e rie n c e w ith e x istin g inform ation ty p e s an d so u rc e s . T he fram ew ork relies on th e com plete specification o f th e u s e rs decision en vironm ent to id en tify em erging inform ational n eed s of decision m ak e rs. T h is is an em pirical m atter w hich is o ften d ifficu lt to a s s e s s . A n o th e r lim itation of th e fram ew ork is th a t it does not p ro v id e d ecision ru le s so th a t, for exam ple, tra d e -o ffs can be made betw een com peting d a ta u s e r s . T h e fram ew ork does not help th e re s e a rc h e r in p re s c rib in g w hich ty p e s of inform ation should be publicly s u p p o rte d an d which ty p e should b e su p p o rte d by th e p riv a te m ark et. All 156 th is hinges on th e fact th a t th ere remain serious problems in placing a value on d ifferen t uses of data and on th e distribution o f benefits. The above characterization of the information system paradigm are germ ane to its application to almost any problem. T here a re , how ever, some specific insights and difficulties arising directly from the application of th is framework to the p articu lar problem in this research . Previous stu d ies have identified difficult problems in applying th e information system paradigm . Riemenschneider stated th at th e problem of identifying th e universe of data u se rs was critical to his stu d y of th e USDA farm income data system . Klein also alluded to the problem of identifying data u se rs in his stu d y of th e potato price data series in Michigan. Because the data u se rs in th is stu d y were a relatively definitive group, identifying or obtaining a frame did not p resen t a problem as much as th e re was a problem of identifying and validating th e decision environm ent ( i .e ., specifying a specific list of decisions) of the u se r. Specifying th e decision environm ent of a modern day firm is difficult for at least two reasons: (1) lack of theoretical explanation for firm management decisions, and (2) conceptual problems of defining th e phrase "m arketing decisions." As pointed out earlier, microeconomic theory serv es as a limited guide to th e management decisions of the firm . T herefore, th is theory could not be totally relied upon in developing a se t of decisions against which to evaluate various ty p es and sources of m arket information. 157 The second concern deals with the conceptual problem of what a re m arketing decisions. Almost any decision made by pro cesso rs would in some way d irectly or indirectly affect th e demand o r supply of th e m arket p ro d u c t. As a re s u lt, choices of decisions to include in th e decision set must conform to some definition which operational­ izes the concept of m arket decisions. T his stu d y adopted L azer's concept of m arketing decision. He notes th a t m arketing decisions a re often made from a d ifferen t basic p ersp ectiv e than decisions in th e organizational a reas . . . The p ersp ectiv e of th e m arket place is adopted and th e m arketing executive trie s to perceive his altern a tiv e s and decisions th ro u g h th e eyes of consum ers. T his concept of m arketing decision provides some basis for selecting some ty p es of decisions while rejecting o th e rs . The above two concerns had a bearing on th e methodology employed in th is stu d y . T he procedure th a t was followed involved developing a set of p re-selec ted m arketing decisions made by potato processing firm s.. A combination of economic th eo ry and L azer's concept of m arketing decisions w ere used in developing th is p re-selected list of decisions. T he list of decisions was th en validated in a pilot su rv e y and with an open ended question posed to plant m anagers in th e ta rg e t g ro u p . By allowing th e firm m anager and o th e r know­ ledgeable m arket p a rticip a n ts to modify th is p re-selec ted decision se t, th e p rocedure tak e s on a norm ative a sp e c t. It has th e advantage of identifying o th er decisions which may not otherw ise be recognized by th e o ry . By th e end of th is ex ercise, v ery few changes o c cu rred in th e p re-selec ted list of decisions. T hat leaves th is validation pro ced u re open to question because it was expected th a t th e list would be modified o r e x ten d ed . 158 M oreover, it is difficult to determ ine w hether th e decision se t u sed to evaluate information ty p e s and sources re p re se n te d a complete list of m arketing decisions made by potato p ro c e sso rs. A lso, th e decision set was not p rio ritized so th a t one could assig n im portance to one ty p e of decision o v er a n o th e r. T h u s, we have a decision set th a t is assum ed to be re p re se n ta tiv e of th e firm decision environm ent and th a t is assum ed to contain a list of decisions th a t a re equally w eighted. T h is method not only involved th e evaluation of ty p e s and so u rces of inform ation ag ain st specific firm m arketing d ecisions, a p ro ce d u re whose im portance is implied by th e information system paradigm , b u t also stra tifie d firm s along elements of m arket s tru c ­ t u r e , as defined by in d u strial organization th e o ry . Hence, th is p ro ce d u re in te g rate d two intellectual fram ew orks. The s tru c tu ra l v a riab les used in th is stu d y w ere firm size and ty p e of firm . T hese elem ents of m arket s tru c tu re in th e Michigan processed potato in d u stry w ere relatively easy to operationalize. B ut th e re a re sev eral o th e r elem ents of m arket s tru c tu re which may have an impact on th e d is tr i­ bution and value (to th e decision m aker) o f information th a t could be in co rp o rated in th is analysis such as various dim ensions o f p ro d u c t d iffe re n tia tio n . For th e most p a rt, th e approach only se rv e s to form an association betw een selected elements of m arket s tr u c tu r e and th e value of information to decision m akers. It does not specify th e d e sire d s tru c tu ra l (in stitu tio n al) arrangem ent th a t will p rovide m arket inform ation of value to th e decision m akers. To do so would involve th e in stitu tio n al questio n of specifying in detail th e elem ents o f m arket s tr u c tu r e which will yield th e d e sired informational flows to m arket 159 and n o n -m ark et decision m ak ers. T he ap p ro ach applied h e re m erely illu stra te d th e directional impacts o f selected elem ents o f m arket s tr u c ­ tu r e on th e value o f inform ation. B ut it is a n e c e ssa ry f ir s t s te p in th e developm ent o f ideas about th e specification o f a model o f m arket s tr u c tu r e im pacts on th e inform ation d e sire d by decision m ak ers. T his re s e a rc h a p p ro ach involved a f u r th e r in te g ratio n o f th e I /0 fram ew ork w ith th e inform ation system s paradigm b y tra c in g o u t th e p ro b ab le relatio n sh ip s betw een selected elem ents o f th e firm 's p ro cu rem en t b eh av io r an d m arket inform ation. H ere a g a in , th is ap p ro ach is limited to th e explanation of directio n al im pacts o f v a ria b le s (th a t is, th e impact of th e b ehavior o f th e firm on m arket in fo rm ation). As in th e c ase with m arket s tr u c tu r e and inform ation, d irectio n al im pacts a r e a n e c e ssa ry f irs t s te p in an aly zin g firm b e h av io r an d inform ation. E stablishing th is re la tio n sh ip is d iffic u lt. One cannot hold c o n sta n t many o f th e o th e r v a ria b le s which may also influence th e value and d istrib u tio n o f information to th e firm 's decision m aker. T h is a n aly sis basically in fe rre d from th e e x is tin g p ro cu rem en t b e h av io r an d ris k a rra n g em e n t p rac tic es o f potato p ro c e ssin g firm s th e likely im pacts on inform ation d istrib u tio n and v alue fo r th e firm its e lf, o th e r firm s in th e m arket and public sta tistic a l a g e n c ie s. T h is ap p ro a ch could g re a tly be enhanced if a m ethod w ere available to m easure d ire c tly th e im pacts o f th e firm pro cu rem en t beh av io r on th e v alu e an d d is trib u tio n of m arket inform ation. E. Im plications fo r A g ric u ltu ra l Economists O ut o f th is s tu d y flow c e rta in im plications for a g ric u ltu ra l econom ists. B ecause much o f th e problem solving and su b je ct m atter re s e a rc h of a n y field o f stu d y is larg ely c o n stra in e d by th e 160 s tre n g th s and w eaknesses of its th e o ry , the comments which follow will ad d ress th e limitations of economic th eo ry , in its application to information system s research . As a resu lt of th is research experience it became abundantly clear th at in its c u rre n t level of developm ent, neoclassical economics makes but a limited contribution toward the solution of informational problem s. The theory re s ts upon assum ptions th a t avoid the problem o f information. Lack of theoretical development in th is area is perhaps responsible for the inactivity of applied research (problem solving and subject m atter) on information system s. As th e costs of producing information increase, questions concerning th e derived benefits (value) of information services will a rise more freq u en tly . Economics has yet to provide a practical framework for valuing information, a critical input into both public and p riv ate decisions. If we are to deal with many of the p resen t day and emerging problems facing our public statistical system , we must fu rth e r develop our economic theory base. A nother area which lacks applicable economic theory development is th at o f management decision th eo ry o f th e modern firm. The modern firm makes economic decisions on resource allocation, p rices, o u tp u t, quality of p ro d u ct, and any num ber of m atters. C yert and March note th at th e re is a "disparity between th e process by which business decisions appear to be made by complex organizations in the real world and th e way in which th ey are explained by economic th e o ry ." T hus fa r, much of th e research conducted by agricultural economists has involved firms (the farms) in m arkets th at a re com petitive. Increasingly th is is no longer th e case for agricultural m arkets; they a re growing 161 more concentrated and less com petitive. The firms which make up th e food and fiber m arkets from production u n its to retail o u tlets a re becoming more complex. This su g g e sts th at agricultural economists cannot totally rely on th e ir c u rre n t economic theory base to solve many em erging problems of our food and fib er system . F. F u rth e r R esearch T his research involved a case stu d y which ad d re ssed some a sp ects of valuing information at a given m arket level in th e Michigan processed potato in d u stry . A case stu d y was u n d ertak en because th is approach could best te st an unproven methodology on a limited scale with th e minimum resource requirem ents. From th is e x p erien ce, th e following o bservations a re offered for fu tu re resea rch on m arket information system s. F irst of all, many conceptual and theoretical asp ects of the paradigm need fu rth e r w ork. As noted in C hapter II, no all encom­ p assing framework ex ists for dealing with th e problems of inform ation. P erhaps th e g re a te st possibility o f stre n g th e n in g th e information system paradigm e x ists in in teg ratin g it with o th e r conceptual fram e­ w orks. Even th is proposition re q u ire s more investigation. At its c u rre n t stag e of developm ent, th is framework could be u sefully applied to some ag ricu ltu ral m arketing resea rch problem s. For example, several em erging institutions within a g ricu ltu ral m arkets have trem endous implications for th e use, value, and d istrib u tio n of inform ation. A stu d y o f various pricing in stitu tio n s, p articu larly as p racticed in cooperatives, would be a fertile area of re se a rc h . APPENDIX APPENDIX A QUESTIONNAIRE DIRECTED TO PROCESSED POTATO FIRMS The purpose of th is questio n n aire is to provide information on th e major c h a rac teristics of th e Michigan processed potato in d u stry . T he answ ers will be used to determ ine how potatoes a re bought and sold in th e m arket. All information you provide will be kept con­ fidential. No identities o f individuals' resp o n ses will be revealed in th e rep o rt derived from th is stu d y . SECTION I: Economic C h arac te ristic s of th e Processed Potato In d u stry 1. Please indicate th e major use of potatoes in your firm. c h ip p in g f r e e z in g ______ o t h e r ____________________ 2. What is th e average volume (cwt) o f potatoes your firm handles in a y ear?_____________________________________________________ 3. What o th er commodities a re processed by your firm? A. _______________________ D._____________________________ B. E. ____________________________ C. F. ____________________________ 4. Potato p ro d u cts re p re se n t what proportion of your total s a le s ? 5. By what method do you obtain raw p ro d u ct (potatoes) ? If more than one means of acquiring raw p ro d u ct is u se d , please indicate th e proportion of potatoes acq u ired by each m ethod. C o n tra c ts: Written Oral Own or Rent Land Grower Cooperative B roker Farm er's M arket O ther P rocessors O ther ( s p e c if y 6. % % % % % % % % ) If you co n tract with grow ers d ire c tly , how many grow ers are involved? ___________ 163 % 164 7. What is th e distance of raw pro d u ct (potatoes) supplies from your p ro cessing plant (s) ? D istance %of Raw Product Less than SO miles ______% ______% % 51-100 ______%___ ______% % 101-200 % % % over 200 ______% ______% % Location of Plant______________ _________ __________ 8. Indicate th e p ercen t of pro d u ct sold to th e various b u y e rs. National retail food chains Regional retail food chains Local retail food chains C ooperative and buying group Wholesalers In stitu tio n s Governmental agencies Food m anufacturers % % % % % % % % 9. What proportion of your firm 's processed o u tp u t (potato) sold to chain retail o u tle ts is m arketed as p riv ate la b e l? ________% 10. How many processing plants do you o p e ra te ? ___________ Which o f th e following functions a re perform ed by your firm after you have taken title to th e potatoes? W ash S to r a g e ______ G ra d e O ther (specify) ____________ Pack None of th e a b o v e __________ T ran sp o rt (from th e farm to the processing plant) ______ 165 11. From which of th e major p o tato p ro d u ctio n a re a s do you b u y your raw p ro d u c t? M anistee % Mecosta % Montcalm % Monroe % Bay % Red R iv er Valley % O th e r (sp ecify ) ________ % O th e r (sp ecify) ________ % O th e r (sp ecify ) ________ % % O th e r (sp ecify ) ________ SECTION I I : Inform ation S o u rc e s , M arketing Decisions and U ses of M arket Inform ation (E valuation) 1. What a re y o u r most im portant m arketing d ecisions? 2. What a re your so u rc es of m arket inform ation? 3. What is y o u r p rim ary u se o f p ric e inform ation? 4. What ty p e s o f d ata do you feel b e st s u it y o u r decision making need s? 5. Various ty p es of information a re available to aid m anagers in decision making. Please indicate how useful th e following ty p es of information are to you when you make m arketing decisions. Check one category for each ty p e of information. Very Moderately Rarely Type of Information Useful Useful Useful Price Information ____ ____ Potato price quotations ____ C u rren t contract prices ____ ____ ____ Wholesale prices ____ ____ ____ Retail prices___________ ____ ____ ____ Potato fu tu re s prices ____ ____ ____ R eports of potato prices for p ast year_________ ____ ____ ____ Potato price forecasts ____ ____ ____ Supply Information ____ ____ Intentions to plant______ ____ Estimates of acres planted, harvested and yields ____ ____ ____ Volume of potato ____ ____ ____ shipm ents Estimates of stock (carryover)_______________ ____ ____ G rade-size d istribution of potatoes delivered to processors ____ ____ ____ Demand information Population tre n d s_______ ____ ____ ____ Income tre n d s__________ ____ ____ ____ Consumer profile data ____ ____ ____ Demand estim ates ____ ____ ____ Cost information Cost of production ____ ____ ____ Cost of processing by product ____ ____ ____ T ran sp o rtatio n cost by product ____ ____ ____ M arketing cost by pro duct ____ ____ ____ Labor Wage rates Labor availability I do not use because Not Useful Not Aware ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 167 6. Price information can be secu red from various so u rces. From th e following list please indicate which sources of information you find to be useful to you in making m arketing decisions. Source Very Useful a . Radio and T .V . ____ b . N ew spapers ____ c . Magazines ____ d . U niversity publications ____ e . USD A economic publications ____ f. USDA crop re p o rts ____ g . C onsultation with perso n s in governm ent o r u n iv ersity __________________ ____ h . Commercial m arketing serv ices____________________ ____ i. B an kers and lending in stitu tio n s_________________ ____ j. Retail sto re s ____ k . Potato d e a le rs, b ro k e rs, s h ip p e rs, e tc . ____ I. O ther p ro cesso rs_____________ ____ m. O th er sources (specify) ____ Moderately Useful Rarely Useful Not Useful ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 7. From which of th e sources above do you g e t most o f your m arket inform ation, rank f ir s t to last 1-6 (list lette rs) ? 1. 2. ______ 3. n. ______ 5. 6. 168 8. P ublished o r re p o rte d economic p rice d a ta may be helpful in making many m arketing decisions. Please indicate how useful th e data you receiv e a re when you make th e following decisions. Check one c ateg o ry for each ty p e of decision. T y p e o f Decision V ery Useful Size o f p lan t (expansion) ____ Number o f p la n ts (to build)______ ____ V ariety o f potato to b u y _________ ____ When to buy potatoes (tim ing of p u rch ase) ____ G eographical m arket from which to buy potatoes (location)___________________________ M arket in which to sell p otatoes ____ Q uality of raw p ro d u ct ____ P ricin g of raw p ro d u ct___________ ____ P ricing of p ro cessed p ro d u ct ____ 9. M oderately. Useful ____ ____ ____ R arely Useful ____ ____ ____ Not Useful ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Does y o u r firm perform its own d ata an aly sis? To what deg ree? Yes No 10. A p ro c e sso r and grow er plan jointly th e ir m arketing s tra te g ie s, co o rd in ate p rice s tr u c tu r e s and exchange inform ation betw een each o th e r ab o u t th e ir plans and goals. Do you believe th a t it should b e perm itted? Yes No No opinion Do such actions e v e r have d esirab le m arket consequences? Yes No No opinion C ases su ch as th is p robably occu r fre q u e n tly . S tro n g ly a g re e D isagree A gree S tro n g ly d isa g re e No opinion 169 11. Two p ro c e ssin g firm s ex ch an g e inform ation ab o u t sales plans and p ric e s sc h e d u le s. Do you believe th a t it should be p erm itted ? Yes No No opinion Do su c h actions e v e r have d e sira b le m arket co n seq u en ces? Yes No No opinion C ases su ch a s th is p robably o c cu r fre q u e n tly . S tro n g ly a g re e A gree D isagree No opinion S tro n g ly d isa g re e 12. Is th e r e a need to im prove inform ation in th e p ro c e sse d potato in d u s try ? If so , what im provem ents in th e inform ation would you su g g e s t re le v a n t to y o u r decision m aking n eed s? 13. For each o f th e statem en ts given below , in dicate by checking th e most a p p ro p ria te re sp o n se given in fro n t o f each sta te m e n ts. S A =strongiy a g re e D =disagree SA A A =agree N= no opinion SD =strongly d isa g re e N D SD Inform ation is a major so u rc e o f pow er in th e m arket p ro c e ss . ____ ____ ____ ____ We could fully sh a re inform ation (on p ric e s , p ro d u c tio n , c o s ts , c o n ce rn s and p lans) which we have with g ro w e rs an d th e ir o rg an izatio n s w ithout p u ttin g us a t a com petitive d isa d v a n ta g e . ■ ____ ____ ____ ____ We solicit su ch inform ation (on p ric e s , p ro d u c tio n , c o s ts , c o n c e rn s an d p lans) a c tiv e ly . 14a. Do you subscribe to any commercial m arketing s e rv ic e s ? Yes b. If so, which ones? 15. Please list o th er m arketing information th at you pay for (such as U niversity m arketing n ew sletters, commodity new sletters, o r farm magazines) and indicate w hether they help you do a b e tte r job of m arketing. Name of new sletter, magazine, etc. Annual cost Help with m arketing Yes - SECTION III: Economic Behavior and the C ontracting Process 1. Would you briefly describe th e b argaining/contracting process between your firm and grow ers o r grow er organization. 2._How long has your firm been involved in contracting? _______ y e a rs. No D u rin g th is tim e, h a v e new te rm s o f tr a d e b een a d d e d to c o n tr a c ts ? 1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No F o r w hich o f th e follow ing te rm s o f tr a d e do you c u r r e n tly c o n tra c t. Which o f th e s e te rm s o f tr a d e do you b eliev e c o n tra c tin g sh o u ld ta k e p lace ? P rice Tim e o f p ay m en t Q u ality s ta n d a r d s Q u ality m easu re m e n ts p ro c e d u re s D eliv ery s c h e d u le s P ro v isio n o f tra n s p o rta tio n W eighting p r o c e d u re s Raw p ro d u c t h a n d lin g p ro c e d u re s L en g th o f c o n tra c t R e sp o n sib ilitie s a n d r ig h ts d u rin g p ro d u c tio n _ _ _ P ric es fo r p ro v isio n on p ro d u c tio n in p u ts S p ra y in g a n d d u s tin g P la n tin g tim e H a rv e s tin g tim e U se o f irrig a tio n eq u ip m en t O th e r (p le a se sp e c ify ) Who m akes th e fin al decisio n on w h e th e r to a c c e p t o r re je c t term s o f tr a d e ? What p ro c e s s is inv o lv ed h e re ? 172 6. Is th e p ric e fo r w hich you b a rg a in (raw p ro d u c t) ? A firm p ric e P egged to some m ark e t p ric e P egged to c o st of p ro d u c tio n (g ro w e r's) Pegged to c o st o f p ro c e ss in g (p ro c e sso r) A form ula p ric e d e p e n d e n t upon p ro d u ctio n levels P rice len d e r dom inate firm O th e r (p lea se sp e cify ) 7. How would you c h a ra c te riz e th e b a rg a in in g p ro c e ss in te rm s of th e re la tio n sh ip betw een g ro w e r a n d p ro c e ss o r (you may ch eck more th a n o n e ) . A d v e rs a ry re la tio n sh ip w ith c o n sid e ra b le conflict T o u g h , b u t w ith m utual re s p e c t an d a cc ep tan c e Dominated by p ro c e s s o rs O th e r (p le a se sp ecify ) 8. What p ro c e d u re s a n d c rite r ia you employ to e n s u re fo r p ro d u c t q u a lity ? 173 QUESTIONNAIRE DIRECTED TO POTATO SHIPPERS, DEALERS, AND BROKERS 1. What percent of your shipm ents (potatoes) a re m arketed tablestock %, processed ( c h ip %o r f r o z e n %) ? 2. List processing firms in th e sta te th a t you freq u en tly deal with. 3. Do you co n tract for raw potatoes? Please d escribe your contracting process ( see Section III if y e s ) . 4. Is th e price for which you bargain a firm price _____ pegged to some m arket price pegged to th e cost of production (grow er) a formula price o th er (please specify) 17*1 5. V arious ty p e s of m aking. Please a re to you when fo r each ty p e of inform ation a re available to aid m anagers in decision indicate how useful th e following ty p e s o f information you make m arketing decisions. Check one category inform ation. V ery M oderately R arely T y p e of Inform ation Useful U seful Useful Price Inform ation Potato p rice q u o tatio n s ____ ____ ____ C u rre n t c o n tra c t p rice s _____ ____ Wholesale p rice s ____ _____ Retail p ric e s ____ ____ Potato fu tu re s p ric e s R ep o rts of potato p rice s fo r p a st y e ar _____ _____ Potato p rice fo re c a sts ___________ S upply Inform ation In ten tio n s to p lant ___________ Estim ates of a c re s p la n te d , h a rv e ste d and yields Volume of potato shipm ents _____ Estim ates of stock (ca rry o v e r)___________________ G rad e-size d istrib u tio n of potatoes delivered to p ro ce sso rs _____ Demand Inform ation Population tr e n d s ____ Income tre n d s ____ Consum er profile d ata Demand estim ates C ost Information Cost of production C ost o f pro cessin g by p ro d u ct T ran sp o rta tk m co st by p ro d u ct M arketing cost by p ro d u ct Labor Wage ra te s Labor availability _____ ___ _ ____ I do not use because Not Useful Not Aware ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___________________ ~ ____ _________ ____ ____ ____ ____ _____ _____ ________ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ______ ____ ____ _______________ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 175 6. P ric e inform ation can b e s e c u re d from v ario u s s o u rc e s . From th e follow ing list p lease indicate which so u rc es o f inform ation you find to b e useful to you in m aking m ark etin g d e cisio n s. S o u rce V ery Useful a . Radio an d T .V . ____ b . N ew spapers ____ c . M agazines ____ d . U n iv e rsity p u b licatio n s ____ e . USDA economic pu b licatio n s ____ f. USDA c ro p re p o rts ____ g . C o n sultation with p e rso n s in go v ern m en t o r u n iv e rs ity ___________________ ____ h . Commercial m ark etin g se rv ic e s_____________________ ____ i. B a n k ers a n d lending in stitu tio n s j. R etail s to re s k . Potato d e a le rs , b ro k e rs , s h ip p e rs , e tc . ____ I. O th e r p ro c e ss o rs______________ ____ m. O th e r so u rc es (sp e cify ) ____ 7. M oderately Useful R arely U seful Not Useful ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ ____ ____ _____ ______ ____ ____ • ____ ____ ____ ____ From which o f th e so u rc e s above do you g e t m ost o f y o u r m arket inform ation, ra n k f i r s t to la st 1-6 (lis t le tte rs) ? 1. ______ 2. 3. ______ 4. _______ 5. 6. APPENDIX B List o f In terv iew s Name o f O rganization D ate Nov. Nov. Nov. Nov. 9 15 27 28 Dec. 11 F eb . 14 F eb . 15 USDA-MSU MSU M5U M ichigan Potato In d u s try Commission M ichigan Potato In d u s try Commission National Potato Council U S D A -S tatistics M arch 28 C hief W abasis Potato G row ers C ooperative A ssociation A pril 1 Mid Am erica Potato Co. A pril 1 M rs. B ees Potato C hip Co. A pril 3 O re -ld a A pril 9 Made R ite A pril 15 Be Mo A pril 22 B e tte r Made A pril 23 New E ra A pril 23 F rito Lay A pril 24 S u p e rio r May 15 C hief W abasis Potato G row ers C o o p erativ e A ssociation May May May May 20 20 21 21 May 21 May May May May 28 28 29 29 Individual (s) Interv iew ed Location L a rry Hamm Tom P ierson G eorge Stackw ick Roy K aschyk E ast L ansing E ast L ansing E ast L ansing L ansing S ta te P ro c e sso rs B rig h to n W ashington, D .C Dan LaPointe R o b ert H. A xvio, W ashington, D.C Jo h n L ange, a n d Bill Wilken L a rry Je n se n M cBride G rand R apids G rand R apids G reenville Bay C ity Kalamazoo D etroit D etroit Allen P ark D etroit M cBride Bay C ity Bay C ity Six Lakes Edmore S ta n to n Ja ck Mall Made R ite G eorge Tow ne P ro d u ce Potato M arket S e rv ice R obert M cCrea Potato S h ip p e r New Era S u p e rio r D etroit D etroit D etroit D etroit B e tte r Made F rito Lay 176 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY A ckoff, R u ssel. 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