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GUBERNATORIAL - LEGISLATIVE INTERACTION IN MICHIGAN

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GUBERNATORIAL-LEGISLATIVE INTERACTION
IN MICHIGAN

By

David William Winder

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ABSTRACT

GUBERNATORIAL-LEGISLATIVE INTERACTION IN MICHIGAN

By

David William Winder

The governor's working relationship with the legislative parties is viewed as a significant aspect of the state policy-making process in the state politics literature. This dissertation focuses on the causes and consequences of that working relationship in Michigan during the 1937-1978 period. This study examines the governor's relationship with his legislative party, his interaction with the opposition legislative party, and his relationship with bipartisan groups of legislators.

Through the use of descriptive evidence, it was found that the governors who shared an ideological position with elements of the opposition legislative party worked closely with that legislative party or with bipartisan groups of legislators. The governor with the ability to compromise worked well with the legislative opposition.

A statistical analysis was employed in the study to assess the support for various hypotheses. The levels of agreement between the governor and the legislative party groups were measured using data from Michigan's House of

Representatives. The proportion of Michigan's House held by the governor's party was negatively related to his level of agreement with his legislative party and positively related to his level of agreement with the opposition legislative party. The electoral strength of the governor's party was negatively related to his level of agreement with the opposition legislative party. The statistical evidence supported the view that the governor's level of agreement with a legislative party is positively related to his level of support by that party's voters in the following election.

Various scholars have suggested that the governor may experience problems in securing the passage of his legislative program if his party fails to control the legislature. The evidence in the dissertation indicates that certain Michigan governors whose parties failed to control the legislature were able to engineer the passage of their proposals by working with the opposition legislative party or with bipartisan legislative groups. Some of the dissertation's findings identify the conditions under which Michigan's governors developed these legislative strategies.

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* * * * *

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CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATIVE PARTIES

Introduction

This study examines the governor's working relationship with the legislative parties on policy matters. This working relationship involves, for example, the governor's dealings with the legislative parties on bills which he supports and on measures which he vetoes. The dissertation also focuses on the causes and consequences of the governor's working relationship with the legislative party groups. The research covers the governor's dealings with his own legislative party, with the opposition legislative party, and with bipartisan groups in the state legislature. The study involves the use of both statistical analysis and the use of descriptive evidence to examine the major research problems which are investigated. Because gubernatorial-legislative interaction is investigated in one state (Michigan) during a certain time period (1937-1978), the working relationship between the governor and the legislature can be studied in a context which has

certain elements that are basically stable during the period covered in the study.

This first chapter focuses on the theories and findings of a number of scholars about the causes and consequences of the governor's interaction with the legislative party groups, and it also covers some literature about the interaction itself. This chapter contains five major topics which follow this introductory section. The first topic is the significance of the research problem studied in the dissertation. Some literature on state politics is reviewed in the second part of this chapter in order to provide some general background on the problems investigated in this study. Literature addressing some of the causes and consequences of the relationship between the state's chief executive and the legislative party groups is covered in the third section of this chapter. The third section also includes some discussion of literature which is focused basically on the gubernatorial-legislative interaction alone. The fourth part of the chapter involves the presentation of some background information on Michigan politics, in order to describe the context within which the relationships studied in the dissertation occur. A summary of the material covered in this chapter and a brief overview of the study constitutes the fifth section.

Significance of the Research Problem

One reason for studying the governor's working relationship with the legislative parties is that the governor's success in working with the legislative parties during an administration may affect his success in the following election. Malcolm E. Jewell states, "A governor is judged today largely on the success of his legislative programs."¹ Jewell argues that to the extent that issues affect voters, the governor's performance in seeing that his promise about legislation are enacted affects voters' judgment of him in the following election. He discusses the governor's ability to deal with the legislative parties as a major aspect of his legislative leadership and as a factor which affects his success in securing the passage of the measures which he supports.²

A second reason for studying the governor's working relationship with the legislative party groups is that this relationship is an important element of the political process which develops public policy at the state level. Sarah McCally Morehouse emphasizes the importance of the governor in heading a party with enough internal cohesion to pass his program. She discusses his interaction with the legislature, particularly with his own legislative party, as one of the ways in which the governor's party leadership helps him to shape public policy in the state.³

We have argued that the governor's dealings with the legislative party groups on policy matters are significant because they affect the governor's fate in the following election and are an important part of public policy-making. Since the working relationship between the state's chief executive and the legislative parties is important, it would also be of considerable interest to know what factors cause the relationship to exist as it does and what effects the relationship may have on other political processes in the state. The causes and consequences of the governor's interaction with the legislative parties, then, are also likely to be areas of some significance for research purposes.

Background on State Politics

In order to provide some general background for the dissertation topic, some of the literature in three areas of state politics which relate to the dissertation topic will be reviewed. These areas are state political parties, the governorship, and the legislative process in the states.

State Political Parties

State political parties have organizational structures. Dye argues that state party organizations tend to be weak and poorly defined. Official party organizations

in the states include a state committee and a state chairman. Dye mentions that many state party positions are not filled. The state committee's role in coordinating campaigns for important elections (such as those for governor and U.S. senator) has been largely taken over by the candidates' own campaign organizations.⁴

Huckshorn identifies three types of state party chairmen: the political agent, the in-party independent, and the out-party independent. The political agent, who works as the partisan assistant to the governor, can be very powerful. The in-party independent chairman often is viewed as providing organizational leadership while the governor provides political leadership. The out-party independent chairman serves in a party that does not control the governorship and is normally viewed as the party leader.⁵

V. O. Key argued that a political party might be able to diminish the problems in governing created by the separation of powers by controlling both the executive office and the legislature. He stated that the control of the executive and legislative branches of government by two different parties (divided party control) compounds the problems involved in the separation of powers. Key argued that popular government is not truly in effect if one party cannot simultaneously be defeated both in the

executive and legislative branches without very exceptional circumstances occurring. During the 1931-1952 period, divided party control existed in about two-thirds of the states. Key found that as party competition increased, divided party control increased.⁶ Key, then, showed concern about a situation in which two branches of state government which are both elected (in somewhat different ways) to represent the state's citizens are frequently controlled by opposing parties.

Divided party control arose due to various causes. Key mentioned nonconcurrent terms for the governor and legislature as one cause. For example, the governor may have had a four-year term, while legislators served two-year terms. This arrangement sometimes resulted in the governor facing a lower house under opposition control during his second two years of service. The situation in which a popular governor resisted electoral trends against his party sometimes resulted in a division of party control in state government. Key stated that the major cause of the division of party control was malapportionment in the legislature. A common pattern was that Democrats repeatedly won the governorship, only to be faced with one or both legislative chambers that were under Republican control.⁷

Political scientists who study state parties have shown substantial interest in state party competition, and

some of them have discussed trends in the competitiveness of state parties. Ranney, in a 1976 publication, notes that there has been an increase in state party competition.⁸ Sorauf states that national and state politics exist in a period of the most even two-party competition in the last century.⁹

Jewell and Olson describe certain impediments to the development of two-party competition. These obstacles include conflicts between new and old leaders in the minority party and Democratic primaries in the South. Registration requirements and third parties also impede the growth of two-party competition in the states.¹⁰

Ranney lists several correlates of state party competition. He finds that the two-party states have particularly high levels of urbanization, income, and union membership.¹¹

Ranney states that political scientists have traditionally held that the parties in the states which are most competitive have the strongest control of nominations, the highest cohesion levels in legislatures, and the highest cohesion in relations between the governor and the legislature. According to this view, parties in the competitive states are likely to be most effective and responsible in governing.¹²

The contention that competitive parties are more effective and responsible has been challenged by those scholars who claim that the state's level of party competition is only weakly related to social welfare expenditures. The state's wealth, however, is found to be highly associated with its spending on welfare. Still other political scientists, using different output measures, have found that high levels of party competition and high levels of welfare expenditures are significantly related to one another.¹³

Dye states that there are some important problems which may arise from a lack of party competition. The degree of control over government held by the public may be diminished if the parties are not competitive. Also, the absence of party competition lowers voter participation.¹⁴

Certain points from the literature reviewed above reflect the importance of state parties to the governor's working relationship with the legislature. Key argued that the problems involved in the separation of powers might be diminished if one party controls both the governorship and the legislature. The governor who faces his own legislative majority, then, would presumably have a better chance to work effectively with the legislature than would the governor facing an opposition legislative majority. Ranney's statement that parties in competitive states have the most

cohesive gubernatorial-legislative relations gives us a further indication about the conditions which may be advantageous for the governor's legislative relations.

The Governorship

The governor's relationship with his political party is a significant one, and it affects his dealings with the legislature. Malcolm Jewell contends that the governor's overall relationship with his party is important to his legislative relations. Jewell states that the governor's legislative leadership depends on the strength of his party's organization and on his ability to control that organization. The governor serves as party spokesman, raising issues which are related to his legislative program. Finally, it is important that the governor accept and work with his party's legislative leaders if he is to be successful in his dealings with the legislature.¹⁵

Sarah McCally Morehouse mentions various resources available to the governor in his attempt to have his program passed, and some of these resources are related to his role as a leader within his political party. The governor may, for example, offer to support a legislator in an election campaign. A legislator may also receive a promise of advancement in the legislative party of the governor. For example, the awarding of committee assignments and

leadership positions may be influenced by the state's chief executive.¹⁶

Certain factors may weaken the governor's leadership of his party. Austin Ranney states that in several one-party states, the governor's leadership is weakened by the constitutional provision prohibiting him from succeeding himself. The decentralization of state parties and the governor's use of the item veto and patronage (which may cause him to make enemies as well as friends) are factors which partially account for the frequency of weak gubernatorial party leadership in two-party states.¹⁷

Leslie Lipson was the first of several scholars whose views we will cover to discuss the governor's formal powers. Lipson's book, The American Governor: From Figure-head to Leader, was published in 1939. Governors received new executive powers by amendments and by statutes. Lipson selected four states for special emphasis: New York, Virginia, Illinois, and Massachusetts. Lipson mentions the executive budget as a tool which was made available to governors in all of these states. The chief executives of New York, Virginia, and Illinois were mentioned as governors who were given considerable powers of appointment and removal. Although Lipson mentions these gains in the governor's formal powers, he argues that good leadership cannot be insured by institutional reform alone.¹⁸

In his study of the American governorship during the 1950-1975 period, Larry Sabato argues that governors have become less hindered by restraints on their formal powers. The governor's veto power was enlarged during the period covered by Sabato's study. Some governors have coordinated the constitutional revisions and reorganizations in their states. Sabato states that the major obstacle remaining in the development of the governor's formal powers is the continued existence of other elective executive offices. Although there has been some reduction in the number of these separately elected officials, the public's support of the long ballot makes it difficult to further consolidate the executive branch of state government.¹⁹

Joseph A. Schlesinger categorized the states' governors according to their formal powers in various areas. Governors were ranked according to their budget powers, appointive powers, tenure potential, veto powers, and by a combined index of these formal powers. Schlesinger found that the more populous and more competitive states provide particularly strong formal powers for their chief executives.²⁰

The importance of some of the governor's formal powers to his influence over the executive branch and the legislature is demonstrated by Ira Sharkansky's research. Sharkansky states that the governor's support is a very

important factor in determining an agency's success in obtaining its requested appropriation and in expanding its budget. Sharkansky concludes that the governor's budget recommendation is usually the best cue available to legislators in their budget actions. The veto and tenure powers of the state's chief executive fortify his position with the legislature and with the agencies in the budgeting process, but the existence of separately elected executives weakens that position.²¹

Thomas R. Dye's article, "Executive Power and Public Policy in the States," presents one of three views which we will examine on the governor's overall role in the states. Dye argues that environmental variables (particularly those dealing with economic development levels) are related to policy variables (which are generally levels of public service). Policy variables in the education, health and welfare, highways, and taxation areas are examined. Dye finds that the statistical relationships between the governor's formal powers and the public policy variables are greatly diminished by controlling for economic development. He argues that for the fifty states, the governor's formal powers are less important than the economic development variables in determining policy outcomes.²² Dye does, however, state that ". . . within any particular state with a given level of economic development, the role of

the governor in policy formations is still vitally affected by the formal powers at his disposal."²³

Sarah McCally Morehouse places more emphasis on the governor's role and on political variables in explaining state policies than does Thomas Dye. Morehouse finds that the combination of the governor's political leadership and his formal powers, together with legislative professionalism, had a significant influence on welfare policy. She argues that economic conditions are important but that their effects are filtered through the political process in the states. She states that the governor's ability to lead is affected by his formal powers and that the governor's party leadership has a major impact on public policy.²⁴

J. Oliver Williams, in "Changing Perspectives on the American Governor," presents the view that the governor is extremely important in state politics. In introducing a collection of articles, Williams notes that many of them support the view that the governor is the leader of administration and politics in the states. In Williams's view, the governor may be led into certain situations by external developments. The governor's actions, however, have a significant impact, and he remains the leader of government as it exists below the national level.²⁵

The literature about the governorship which we have reviewed indicates that the governor can serve as party

spokesman, may control his party's organization, and has gained greater formal powers. The governor, then, possesses power in various areas of state politics which could be used to his advantage in dealing with the legislature. It is not surprising that Williams regards the governor as the leader in state politics.

The Legislative Process in the States

The governor's working relationship with the legislative parties on policy matters occurs in the context of the state legislative process. We will cover four areas which are related to the state legislative process: party responsibility, legislative roles, legislative leadership, and certain aspects of the process which are particularly relevant to the governor.

The concept of "party responsibility" is defined somewhat differently by different authors. Sarah P. McCally presents a definition of the concept which involves party control over nominations, a united party in the ensuing election, and the capacity to discipline the legislators to support the executive's program.²⁶ Thomas A. Flinn states that the minimum conditions for party responsibility are intra-party cohesion and inter-party conflict in the legislature.²⁷

Cohesion within a legislative party, one element of party responsibility, has been related to the level of party competition in the state. Keefe and Ogul indicate that cohesive behavior is prevalent on liberal-conservative issues in northern states with high party competition in the legislatures.²⁸ Meltz found that for the Indiana Republican party (when it was a majority during the 1931-1962 era), legislative party competition was positively related to the party's level of cohesion.²⁹ Jewell and Patterson argue that in state legislatures dominated by one party, the party does not effectively influence voting.³⁰ In general, then, the evidence is consistent with the position that a state's level of party competition in the legislature is positively related to the parties' levels of cohesion in voting.

Although legislative parties may be able to unify the voting of their members, it is important to note that other factors are also likely to affect legislative behavior (particularly voting behavior). Jewell and Patterson review evidence showing that constituency characteristics contribute to explaining voting in most state senates.³¹ Francis argues that American state legislatures are characterized by factional conflict, regional conflict, and pressure group conflict on various issues.³² Keefe and Ogul (in their comments on state legislatures and the U.S. Congress) argue

that the claims of constituencies or interest groups often frustrate efforts to achieve party unity in legislatures.³³

Patterson analyzed voting behavior in the 1959 Oklahoma House of Representatives, a one-party legislative situation. He found that such factors as the rural-urban nature of the district, political competitiveness of the district, and committee structure of the House replaced party membership in influencing voting in specific issue areas.³⁴

Wahlke and his co-authors, in a study of four American states, identified various roles of legislators including the party role. The party-oriented legislator tended to follow party cues in his legislative voting. The importance of the party in the legislative process was less in the states in which there was less party competition. The researchers found that the influence and meaning of partisanship varied in different states and parties.³⁵

Another legislative role identified in the study by Wahlke and his co-authors was the representational role. The researchers identified three major representational-role orientations: trustee, delegate, and politico. These orientations are related to the legislators' decision-making in legislative voting. The trustee tends to follow his principles and his conscience. The delegate, however, does not use his judgment and tends to rely on the views

of his constituency or others in his decision-making. Finally, the politico feels free to use his judgment, follow the constituency, or follow his party in his voting, depending on the situation.³⁶

Although the identification of legislative roles has been useful, it has been somewhat difficult to connect these roles to the characteristics and behavior of legislators. Jewell and Patterson state that the use of patterns of role orientations aids in describing the legislature as an institution. They argue, however, that it has been difficult to identify any characteristics of the legislators or of their districts which are consistently related to legislative roles. Also, Jewell and Patterson state that there has not been much evidence to indicate that legislators' role orientations affect their voting behavior.³⁷ In Sorauf's study of the Pennsylvania legislature, however, he found that legislators who selected the inner-directed trustee role-orientation tended to show high deviation from their parties on certain roll-call votes, while those who selected other role orientations showed low deviation from their parties.³⁸

Legislative leaders generally are very influential in a state's politics. Keefe and Ogul argue that in most states only the power of the governor is greater than the influence of the Speaker in the legislature. The Speaker

is usually responsible for committee appointments and often selects chairmen of committees. He acts as the strategist for the majority party in the lower chamber. The majority and minority leaders are also important, serving as spokesmen of their parties in the legislature.³⁹

The legislative leadership of the governor's party may provide him with an important channel through which he can influence the legislative process. In certain northern states in which a strong party is led by the governor and in some southern states where the governor selects the legislative leadership, the leaders usually view themselves as the governor's agents. In states in which leaders are selected for short terms without the governor's influence in the decision, the leaders act primarily on behalf of the legislative group that chose them. The governor often works through his party's leadership in influencing legislative matters, and the leadership may suffer reduced effectiveness if the governor bypasses them too frequently.⁴⁰

Certain aspects of the legislative process provide opportunities for the governor to influence the legislature. Legislative bodies receive messages from governors. These messages provide the governor with an opportunity to propose important, new programs. Although it is not a critical tool for the governor's influence over the legislature, many governors have the power to call a special session of the

legislature and to set its agenda.⁴¹ Jewell and Patterson argue that the threat of a special session alone may cause the legislature to take action desired by the governor.⁴²

Keefe and Ogul mention the common view that the many centers of power in state legislatures may cause the governor difficulties in mobilizing support for his policy positions. Power is spread among various legislative committees and divided between two legislative chambers. Keefe and Ogul argue, however, that the existence of many centers of power does not always work against the governor. Bicameralism, for example, may allow the governor to gain an advantage by winning support on an issue in one chamber and to thereby increase the strength of his influence on that issue in the second house.⁴³

The literature reviewed above covers some of the problems and opportunities which are presented for the governor in the legislative process. Because legislators are influenced by such factors as constituency and pressure groups in addition to their party, the governor cannot always count on a cohesive party to support him. Party leaders may respond to pressures other than the governor's leadership. Governors do sometimes have, however, cohesive legislative parties and cooperative legislative leaders, and governors can make use of certain powers (such as the right to call a special session) which may provide them with additional access to the legislative process.

Causes and Consequences of Governor's
Working Relationship with
Legislative Party Groups

In order to provide useful background on the subject matter of this study, which involves the governor's working relationship with the legislative parties together with the causes and consequences of that relationship, a review of some relevant literature is needed. This review of the literature's theory and findings covers the work of scholars in four areas. The literature in the first area to be covered suggests that the "size" of the governor's legislative party (sometimes defined as the percentage of the legislative body's seats held by the governor's party) influences the governor's support from the legislative party groups on policy matters. The second area involves material which is related to the view that the governor's concern with the state's electorate affects the nature of his dealings with the legislative party groupings. Literature discussing the governor's personal style and use of political techniques as factors which contribute to his success with the legislative parties constitutes the third area to be covered. The fourth area to be discussed involves literature which generally supports the view that the governor's support from the legislature's party groups during an administration affects the electoral support received by the governor in the subsequent election.

"Size" of the Governor's
Legislative Party

Various scholars suggest that the "size" of the governor's legislative party influences the way in which the state's chief executive works with the legislative parties.⁴⁴ In the following discussion, we regard both the percentage of the chamber held by the governor's party and the majority or minority status of that party as versions of the "size" of the governor's legislative party.⁴⁵ Both of these versions are used by scholars.

The literature to be covered involving the association between the governor's legislative party's "size" and his working relationship with the legislative party groups is focused on three relationships. The first relationship involves the effect of the governor's legislative party's "size" on the support he receives from his own party. A second association is between the "size" of the state's chief executive's party and his dealings with the opposition party. The third relationship is between the governor's legislative party's "size" and his support from bipartisan legislative groups.

One scholar who comments on the relationship between the "size" of the governor's legislative party and the governor's interaction with his own party is Malcolm Jewell. According to Jewell, if the state's chief executive's party

is the legislative majority party, the efforts of government should be more coordinated than they would be if the governor's party were a minority. Jewell states, "A model two-party system is one in which there is frequent alternation of power and in which the governor regularly has a party majority in both houses."⁴⁶ Jewell also comments that if the governor's party fails to control both houses, the governor immediately faces certain difficulties in exercising leadership.⁴⁷

Sarah P. McCally performed a rather extensive data analysis using legislative votes on vetoes (the override question) in thirty-four non-southern states, during the 1946-1960 period. She found a negative relationship between the percentage of seats a governor's party holds and the percentage of his party which supports him.⁴⁸

Sarah McCally Morehouse states that if parties are to coordinate independent branches of government, they need to capture both the executive office and the legislature. She asserts that parties which hold both the governorship and the legislative majority enjoy greater success in passing a program than do those parties holding only the governorship. She also contends that for governors with a majority, about 55 percent is a good "size" for a legislative party to be in order to facilitate support of the governor by his party. Governors with minority parties

receive strong support from party members but must bargain with the opposition for additional votes. State chief executives with overwhelming majorities have trouble controlling the support of rival coalitions which form against them.⁴⁹

Charles W. Wiggins adds another piece of evidence related to the "size" of the governor's party as an influence on the support which that executive receives. He finds that governors of states with unified party control (those in which the governor and the legislative majority share a party label) experience fewer veto overrides than do governors of states with divided party control.⁵⁰

David Truman's study, The Congressional Party, focusing on the Eighty-first Congress, presents the thesis that the existence of an executive and a legislative majority of the same party leads to certain behavioral patterns by that majority party. Although the setting of the study is at the national level of government, some aspects of the executive-legislative interaction may also be applicable to the state level. Truman found that those in the legislative majority party (which was also the party of the President) supported the administration at a higher rate on "administration support votes" than did members of the minority party. Truman also suggests that the presence of a president with program preferences and initiatives helped to

create a less "fluid," more coherent structure in the majority's performance and aided it in its efforts to work as a group.⁵¹

In summarizing the literature on the effects of the "size" of the governor's party on his interaction with that party, certain points can be made. First, the trend among the writers is to indicate that when a governor has a party with a legislative majority, this state of affairs helps to coordinate the efforts of the executive and legislative branches in more effectively passing an executive's program. The evidence which we reviewed generally indicates that there is a negative relationship between the "size" of the governor's legislative party and the level at which that party supports him. McCally, for example, found that there was a negative relationship between the percentage of seats held by a governor's party and the degree to which that party supports him on votes on the question of overriding a veto. McCally deals with the support level of the executive's legislative party at the state level in a study involving a variety of states.⁵² Her evidence is, therefore, quite relevant to the problem under study in this dissertation.

Various scholars have dealt with the relationship between the "size" of the governor's legislative party and the state's chief executive's interaction with the

opposition party. Jewell and Patterson, in The Legislative Process in the United States, suggest that if the chief executive lacks a majority in one or in both chambers, he must adjust his strategy to deal with the necessity of compromise with the opposition.⁵³ Jewell, in "The Governor as a Legislative Leader," notes that if a governor has a large minority in the legislature and his own party is united behind him, the governor can bargain with the opposition from a position of strength.⁵⁴

In a study of twenty states, Sarah McCally Morehouse assesses the effect of the percentage of seats held by the governor's party on the levels of support for the governor on his legislative proposals. She finds that although there is an inverse relationship between the percentage of seats held by the governor's party and the level of support the governor receives from that party, there is no distinct pattern between the opposition party's "size" and the level of opposition to the governor shown by the opposition party. Regarding this lack of a pattern, she states that the governor's party leaders sometimes need votes to pass legislation, and the opposition party provides enough defectors to make a winning coalition on many of the governor's bills. She does find, however, that the average level of opposition to the governor shown by the opposition party is higher when the governor's party is the majority than when it is the minority party.⁵⁵

The effect of the percentage of seats held by the governor's party on his support from bipartisan legislative groups has also received some comment in studies on executive-legislative interaction. Sarah McCally Morehouse, when discussing the actions of the opposition party, mentions that the opposition party often adds enough votes to those of the governor's party to allow the administration's program bills to pass.⁵⁶ Morehouse's finding, then, indicates that governors do receive, at least to some extent, support from both parties in passing program legislation. Malcolm Jewell refers to a situation in which the governor with a legislative minority bargains with the legislative opposition in building legislative support. Jewell also states, "Very often, then, the successful governor must be effective both as a partisan leader and as a bipartisan leader."⁵⁷

Coleman Ransone, in The Office of Governor in the United States, provides a fairly concrete discussion of the relationship between the state's chief executive's legislative party's "size" and the governor's interaction with both parties in the legislature. Ransone mentions that in the state of New York, during the 1900-1950 period, Democratic governors were usually faced with Republican majorities in both houses of the legislature. The Democratic governors (Smith, Roosevelt, and Lehman) apparently operated

effectively only because they built voting blocs with members from both parties on key issues.⁵⁸

In order to emphasize certain trends in the literature which has been reviewed, we need to summarize the research on the relationships between the "size" of the governor's legislative party and the governor's interaction with the legislative party groups. In summarizing this research, we focus on the effects of the "size" of the governor's legislative party on the support received by the state's chief executive from the legislative party groups, although other effects of the governor's party's "size" were also mentioned. The evidence indicated that there is a negative relationship between the "size" of the governor's legislative party and the level of support he receives from that party. The evidence also indicates that governors with legislative minority parties tend to receive relatively strong support from the opposition legislative party and from bipartisan groups of legislators.

Governor's Concern with the State's Electorate

We might also examine the governor's concern with the state's electorate as an influence on his interaction with the legislative party groups. Before presenting the views of scholars on this relationship, we will present some information on gubernatorial reelection, in order to

determine how realistic it is to view a concern related to reelection as a motive for gubernatorial behavior.

Certain studies indicate that the possibilities of longer tenure in office and of running for reelection are increasingly available to governors. Morehouse notes that during the 1950s and 1960s, the trend for governors was toward longer tenure in office than was the case in the previous 110 year period. It is important to note, however, that because states may change the duration of one gubernatorial term, this finding does not necessarily indicate that governors were seeking reelection at an increasing rate. She also demonstrates that in the recent past (in the 1970-1974 period), the percentages of incumbents allowed to run for reelection who did so ranged from 60 percent to 73 percent.⁵⁹ In a later publication, Morehouse demonstrates that the trend toward longer tenure for governors continued in the 1970s. She also presents data which indicate that in the 1960-1978 period, the number of states prohibiting consecutive reelection for governors decreased from fifteen to six.⁶⁰ The evidence reviewed indicates, then, that governors are running for reelection at fairly high rates and that the opportunity to run for reelection has been available in many states.

The arguments of Malcolm Jewell are generally consistent with the view that the governor's concern with

the state-wide electorate is related to his interaction with the legislative parties. Jewell argues that a governor is judged on the success of the legislative programs which he advocates. Jewell is referring to the governor being "judged" in terms of an election, and he mentions that the judgment has to do with the public's perception of how the governor has kept or broken his campaign promises.⁶¹ Since the governor's electoral fate is affected by his dealings with the legislative parties on his legislative program, the governor might have a desire to increase his appeal to the state's electorate as a motive for his interaction with the legislative parties.

McCally argues that the governor's interaction with his party on legislation is, at least in part, affected by his concern with pleasing his state-wide constituency. She states, "The governor's legislation is geared to please his state-wide constituency and, depending largely on his degree of control over his party, is passed, modified, or rejected."⁶²

Personal Style and Political Tools

The governor's personal style of interaction and use of political techniques are factors which may affect his dealings with legislative party groups, and we begin the discussion of these factors by mentioning various

political techniques. Jewell and Patterson mention that the governor's contacts with legislative leaders and with "rank-and-file" legislators help him make his input into legislative decision-making. Governors also may be able to offer patronage or special services and favors as enticements to legislators.⁶³ The governor commands public attention and various techniques of media communication are exercised by him. Through the use of the media, the governor's role as a party spokesman may become merged with his role as a leader of bipartisan public opinion. Public opinion leadership is a major factor in determining the governor's success in his working relationship with the legislature.⁶⁴

Another dimension of the governor's dealings with the legislature involves his style of interaction. A governor's personal style of interaction might be cooperative, coercive, or somewhere in between these extremes. Thad L. Beyle, in an article reflecting data gained from the responses of governors and of legislative staff people to various items, finds that governors are less inclined to deal with the legislature on a "power" basis (involving "hard-sell" lobbying and threatening the use of the veto) than on a more persuasive, or bargaining, type of basis.⁶⁵ In a study of the Arizona governorship, Morey notes that Governor Pyle, who faced an opposition majority, was

successful in passing over half of his program by maintaining a cooperative attitude toward legislators of both parties. By comparing various governors, Morey concludes that the governors who were successful legislative leaders adopted a cooperative rather than a forceful and coercive stance toward the legislature.⁶⁶

Our review of this portion of literature indicates that the governor's use of political techniques and his personal style affect his dealings with the legislature. Since the legislative parties are often involved in legislative activity, it is quite likely that the governor's personal style and use of political tools influence his interaction with the legislative party groups.

The Association Between Legislative and Electoral Support

Arguments contending that various factors affect the working relationship between the governor and the legislative parties have been presented. It is also possible that the governor's dealings with the party groups in the legislature on policy matters have certain consequences. For example, the governor's working relationship with the legislative party groups during an administration might affect the type of voter support he receives in the following election. In the following discussion, we will examine the views of certain scholars on the association

between the state's chief executive's dealings with the legislative party groups and his support in the following election.

The argument that the level of support received by the state's chief executive from his legislative party is associated with the governor's support from his party's voters in the following election is consistent with the statements of certain scholars. Jewell and Patterson, in discussing the governor's role as a spokesman for the party, make reference to the possibility of an association between the governor's interaction with his party's legislators and with its voters. They note that the governor, as party leader, speaks about policy to both loyal members of the legislative party and to loyal voters.⁶⁷ Sarah Morehouse, in a study of legislative sessions from various states, finds that among Democratic legislators, the legislative support of their party's governor is positively associated with the governor's support in the post-session primary vote in the legislative constituencies.⁶⁸

In "The Governor as Political Leader," Sarah Morehouse states that the influence of the governor over the legislative party is associated with his political leadership within the electoral party, meaning the party existing outside of the legislature. The highest correlations which she obtained involving this association were

those between the level of loyalty from the governor's party's legislators and the governor's state-wide primary percentage after the legislative session. She states that the processes involving the governor's building of party support within and outside of the legislature probably occur at the same time.⁶⁹

Malcolm Jewell contends that governors are judged, in electoral sense, by their successes or failures in guiding their legislative programs through the legislature. There may be a positive relationship, then, between the level of support for the governor by the overall legislature and the governor's overall level of electoral support. Jewell also mentions that some governors may have to compromise with the opposition party, or be effective in leading bipartisan groups in the legislature, in order to be "successful."⁷⁰

Background on Michigan Politics

Because this study focuses on Michigan during the 1937-1978 period, it is useful to provide some background on the state and particularly on Michigan politics. The background material to be covered includes information on Michigan's parties, the state's governorship, and the Michigan legislature. We will also present some material on the "sizes" of Michigan's governors' legislative parties and on the legislative relations of Governors Romney and Milliken.

One way of initiating a general description of Michigan government and politics is to briefly describe the nature of the state in which the government and politics occur. Peirce describes Michigan as a large, industrial state which has been largely developed based on the automotive industry.⁷¹ Michigan is also a state which might be described as "developed" in a general economic sense, as indicated by its median family income level. Information presented by Thomas R. Dye reflects Michigan's standing as the ninth highest state in terms of median family income. Michigan also has the fifteenth highest level of per capita state-local tax revenue.⁷²

Michigan parties and Michigan's politics tend to be oriented toward issues. Fenton describes three states in the Midwest (Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota) as being characterized by an "issue-oriented" politics in which programmatic political leadership emerged.⁷³ A study by Sawyer, focusing on the Democratic party's apparatus (largely in the 1950s), portrays the two state parties as differing on programs, or issues such as the level of government spending.⁷⁴

Certain scholars have argued that there is relatively strong two-party competition in Michigan politics. Fenton described a situation in which two fairly vigorous parties competed for power in Michigan during the early

1960s.⁷⁵ Ranney employed a measure of interparty competition with which he classified the states for the 1962-1973 period. There are five possible categories in his system. Michigan falls in Ranney's "two-party" category.⁷⁶

Two relatively strong parties have existed in Michigan for some time, and both parties have historically been oriented toward fairly distinct elements within the state. LaPalombara mentions that in the 1930s, Democrats began to significantly challenge Republican dominance in the state. On two occasions during the 1930s, Democrats held majorities in both houses in the state legislature.⁷⁷ The identification of the working-class in the state with the Democratic party dates back to the governorship of Frank Murphy, in the late 1930s, according to Fenton. In discussing the political history of the two parties in Michigan, Fenton generally emphasizes the role of labor unions (particularly the United Auto Workers) in the Democratic party and that of the management of the automobile companies in the Republican party.⁷⁸

The nomination procedures of Michigan's political parties have involved the use of the direct primary for a considerable period of time. LaPalombara states that the use of the direct primary for the nomination of certain elected officials has been required in Michigan since 1909.

LaPalombara's information, published in 1960, was that the open primary was the method of nomination for the state legislative offices and for the governorship.⁷⁹ These offices are the ones that are most relevant to this dissertation. The gubernatorial and legislative candidates were also selected by the primary method in 1978.⁸⁰

Dye states that most candidates for public office in the United States are elected by the primary. He argues that the influence of party organizations on the nomination process was reduced by changing from conventions to the primary method. Michigan is one of only nine states using the open primary. Party leaders normally would rather have a closed than an open primary because they believe that the closed primary reduces the possibility of interference in the nomination procedure by the other party's voters. There is no evidence, however, that large numbers of voters act in an organized fashion to disrupt the opposition party's primary elections.⁸¹

There have been significant changes relating to the Michigan governorship during the 1937-1978 era. One change under the state's new 1963 constitution involved the requirement for an annual executive budget. Another change involved the granting of a four-year term of office to the governor, replacing the previous two-year term of service.⁸² Schlesinger states that the short terms of

office for governors may decrease their power.⁸³ The governors serving after the creation of the four-year term, Romney and Milliken, had longer time periods guaranteed to them in which to develop relationships with the legislative parties and with important legislators. These governors may have felt less pressure to see legislation which they favored enacted during the first two years of their tenure in office. Gubernatorial elections for the four-year term of office have not been held in presidential election years, so that the more recent Michigan governors may have been elected with less possibility of influence from national voting trends than were some of their predecessors.⁸⁴

Michigan's governor has strong formal powers. As Schlesinger argued, however, the formal powers of the governor are not necessarily related to the magnitude of his influence. In Schlesinger's study, Michigan's governor ranked relatively high in all of the areas in which formal power was assessed: budget powers, appointive powers, tenure potential, and veto powers. Michigan's chief executive was ranked among the nine strongest governors in the United States on Schlesinger's combined index of the formal powers of governors. Populous and highly competitive states generally had governors with high combined indexes of power.⁸⁵ Michigan's governor's high ranking is therefore not unexpected.

Another aspect of the Michigan governorship is the tenure in office of those who have served as the state's chief executive. As may be seen from Table 1, only three governors (Republicans Romney and Milliken, and Democrat Williams) held office for more than four years during the 1937-1978 period. Williams (in the 1949-1960 period) and Milliken (in the 1969-1978 period, in terms of this study, and after 1978 as well) held office for long enough periods to potentially have a strong influence on state politics for a decade or more. To the extent that longevity in office reflects the opportunity to have an influence on the state, then, two governors had particularly good opportunities to affect Michigan's destiny.

The Michigan legislature has become more professionalized over time. Stieber states that Michigan's legislators have gained better salaries and expense money. The legislature has expanded its staff, developed research assistance, and gained the services of a fiscal agency.⁸⁶

The consequences of the changes in legislatures have been outlined by Morehouse, and these changes generally appear to be applicable to Michigan. Morehouse argues that the transformed legislatures may have become more responsive to the public, since the professionalization occurred.⁸⁷ Sabato states that some of the changes in legislatures, for example the development of full-time staffs for their

Table 1. Michigan Governors and Legislative Party Percentages for the 1937-1978 Period

Legislative Period	Governor	Governor's Party	House Democratic Percentage of Seats	House Republican Percentage of Seats	Senate Democratic Percentage of Seats	Senate Republican Percentage of Seats
1937-1938	Murphy	Democratic	60.0	40.0	53.1	46.9
1939-1940	Dickinson ^a	Republican	27.0	73.0	28.1	71.9
1941-1942	Van Wagener	Democratic	32.0	68.0	31.3	68.8
1943-1944	Kelly	Republican	26.0	74.0	21.9	78.1
1945-1946	Kelly	Republican	34.0	66.0	25.0	75.0
1947-1948	Sigler	Republican	5.0	95.0	12.5	87.5
1949-1950	Williams	Democratic	39.0	61.0	28.1	71.9
1951-1952	Williams	Democratic	34.0	66.0	21.9	78.1
1953-1954	Williams	Democratic	34.0	66.0	25.0	75.0
1955-1956	Williams	Democratic	46.4	53.6	32.4	67.6
1957-1958	Williams	Democratic	44.5	55.5	32.4	67.6
1959-1960	Williams	Democratic	50.0	50.0	35.3	64.7
1961-1962	Swainson	Democratic	49.1	50.9	35.3	64.7
1963-1964	Romney	Republican	47.3	52.7	32.4	67.6
1965-1966	Romney	Republican	66.4	33.6	60.5	39.5
1967-1968	Romney	Republican	49.1	50.9	47.4	52.6
1969-1970	Milliken ^b	Republican	51.8	48.2	47.4	52.6
1971-1972	Milliken	Republican	52.7	47.3	50.0	50.0
1973-1974	Milliken	Republican	54.5	45.5	50.0	50.0
1975-1976	Milliken	Republican	60.0	40.0	63.2	36.8
1977-1978	Milliken	Republican	61.8	38.2	63.2	36.8

SOURCES: Information on the periods of service for governors and on the numbers of seats held by the legislative parties (from which the percentages were calculated) came from the following source: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Michigan Manual (Lansing: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 1980), pp. 100, 114-115. The parties of the various governors were obtained by checking election records of appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual.

^aGovernor Fitzgerald, also a Republican, served as governor in the first part of 1939 and died on March 16, 1939.

^bGovernor Romney resigned to become U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development on January 22, 1969.

appropriations committees, resulted in a stronger voice in state government for the legislative branch. Such changes may decrease the governor's prerogatives. Since reapportionment, though, the governor has gained by having a legislature that works more closely with him. The revitalized legislatures have helped states to reclaim greater authority from Washington.⁸⁸

A major development affecting the legislature, reapportionment, occurred in Michigan during the early 1960s. Under the 1963 constitution, a bipartisan apportionment commission was created to decide questions involving the drawing of legislative district boundaries. The commission began its deliberations in 1963, considering both the implications of a formula using population and area and those of the *Baker v. Carr* decision. In 1964, however, the *Reynolds v. Sims* decision by the United States Supreme Court led to a decision in Michigan to accept a Democratic party plan which redistricted both chambers of the legislature on a population basis. Steiber reports that most of those she interviewed in her study of Michigan politics were pleased with the "new breed" of legislators selected after the 1964 reapportionment.⁸⁹

Wayne L. Francis, in his study of the views held by legislators about important issues in 1963, found that Michigan ranked relatively high on partisan conflict on

important issues. By comparing the values of Francis's index of partisan conflict for the fifty states, we can determine that Michigan ranked sixth. The index of partisan conflict was based on legislators' responses to a questionnaire item, rather than on measures of legislative votes or other official legislative actions.⁹⁰

Information drawn from two sources suggests that Michigan's legislative parties have been rather cohesive. Jewell and Patterson present information on legislative cohesion in the House for seven states, but the years in which cohesion was measured were not the same for all of the states. On roll call votes on which the parties were opposed, Michigan ranked second among the seven states in terms of the percentage of roll calls on which both parties had a cohesion index of sixty. Because of the small sample of states covered and the variation in the years in which cohesion was measured, this information provides only a very rough indication that Michigan's House parties have voted relatively cohesively.⁹¹ Dye presents information on party cohesion in twenty-six state senates for a single session. His information shows that both parties in Michigan's Senate had comparatively high levels of cohesion.⁹²

Since the "size" of the governor's legislative party is of interest in this study, we should note that

for governors of both parties, there is some variety in the proportions of the legislative chambers held by the governor's party. Information on the "sizes" of the governors' legislative parties is provided in Table 1. Among Republican governors, for example, Governor Milliken faced Republican minorities in both chambers during the 1977-1978 period, but Governor Romney faced majorities of his party in both houses during the 1963-1964 period. Among the Democrats, Governor Murphy served while his party held both chambers in the 1937-1938 period. The Democratic Governor Williams, however, was confronted with minorities of his party in both chambers in the 1949-1950 period.

In order to cover some background on executive-legislative interaction in Michigan, a brief discussion of certain Michigan governors who manifested either a tendency to work with the opposition party or with bipartisan legislative party groups will be undertaken. From the literature reviewed in this chapter, we can discern that there is a fairly significant body of literature dealing with the interaction of the governor with his own legislative party, but there is less material on the governor's dealings with the opposition party and with bipartisan groups. In this dissertation, therefore, it would be useful to study the state's chief executive's interactions with opposition and bipartisan party groupings.

In order to provide some background for later discussion of these interactions, some brief background information on the governorships of George Romney and William Milliken should be provided.

Steiber, in The Politics of Change in Michigan, describes several situations in which Governor Romney was successful in making accomplishments with significant bipartisan support. She mentions that by the time Romney began his tenure as governor in 1963, moderate Republicans had gained power in both legislative chambers. A list of legislative accomplishments during the Romney era, often involving Republican "moderates" aligned with Democrats to pass legislation, includes actions in the following areas: mental health, civil rights, minimum wage laws, and unemployment compensation. She notes that a particularly important achievement of the bipartisan cooperation was the passage of an income tax during the tenure of Governor Romney.⁹³

In order to have some background on a governor who worked well with the opposition party, we can examine the governorship of William Milliken. In the case of Governor Milliken, a Republican, we find evidence that he was concerned about his electoral appeal to groups of voters who would tend to vote for Democrats. According to one account, Milliken stressed to a Republican Governors' Conference that

the party could not afford to alienate Black voters.⁹⁴ In an interview, Milliken mentioned that union, blue collar, and minority voters had helped him to do well electorally.⁹⁵

Milliken's appeal to groups which tend to vote for Democrats has been paralleled by his support of programs which would tend to appeal to Democrats and by his ability to work with Democratic legislators. A newspaper article published in 1973 mentions that Milliken's programs to aid cities and the Detroit area caused some criticism within his own party. The article also cites Milliken's effectiveness in engineering the passage of eighteen of his twenty legislative programs during 1972.⁹⁶ In the interview mentioned above, Governor Milliken stressed his efforts to deal with urban problems and unemployment. He also mentioned that he had worked well with Detroit's Mayor Young, a Democrat, to benefit that city and that he had worked fairly well with the Democratic legislative majority.⁹⁷

Summary and Brief Overview of the Study

This dissertation examines a subject matter of some significance for research. This subject matter includes some causes of the governor's working relationship with various legislative party groups, the relationship itself, and some consequences of that working relationship. In examining this research area, we focus on the state of

Michigan during the 1937-1938 period as the setting of the study.

One of several points which became evident from the literature reviewed in this chapter is that the "size" of the governor's legislative party is associated with the governor's interaction with his legislative party, with the opposition party, and with bipartisan groups of legislators. There is also some indication that the governor's concern with his appeal to the state-wide electorate affects his interaction with various legislative party groups. Thirdly, there is some basis to contend that the governor's personal style and use of political techniques affect his interaction with party groupings in the legislature. Finally, there is some indication that the governor's interaction with the legislative party groups during an administration affects the type of voter support he receives in the election near the end of the administration.

In summarizing the material covered on Michigan politics, we begin by mentioning that Michigan is a large, industrial, "economically developed" state. During the 1937-1978 period, two relatively strong parties have been active in the state. Michigan politics is described as being "issue oriented." Michigan's governor is granted fairly extensive formal powers. Governors of both parties have faced legislatures controlled by their own party and

by the opposition party during the period of this study. A brief summary of the activities of two Michigan governors indicated that Governor Romney was able to work with bipartisan legislative groups and that Governor Milliken showed a tendency to work well with the opposition legislative party.

The dissertation examines relationships based on those reviewed in the literature and relevant to the Michigan case. The association between the "size" of the governor's legislative party and his working relationship with the legislative party groups will be examined. The relationship between the governor's concern with his appeal to the state-wide electorate and his dealings with the legislative parties on policy matters will also be investigated. The study also examines the relationship between gubernatorial-legislative interaction and the ensuing voter support of the governor, in order to determine if the governor's pattern of agreement with a legislative party group is paralleled by support from voters aligned with that party group.

Since the study is about political phenomena as they occurred in Michigan, it will be beneficial to use certain events and political situations as they occurred in the Michigan setting to aid in developing an understanding of the subject matter. The initial presentation

of case information about the governorships of George Romney and William Milliken indicates that Michigan is an appropriate case to use in examining the areas least covered in the literature, the governor's interaction with opposition party and with bipartisan groups of legislators.

CHAPTER I--FOOTNOTES

¹Malcolm E. Jewell, "The Governor as a Legislative Leader," in The American Governor in Behavioral Perspective, ed. Thad Beyle and J. Oliver Williams (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 127.

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³Sarah McCally Morehouse, "The Governor as Political Leader," in Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, ed. Herbert Jacobs and Kenneth N. Vines (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1976), pp. 196-241.

⁴Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981), pp. 110-111.

⁵Robert J. Huckshorn, Party Leadership in the States (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976), pp. 69-95.

⁶V. O. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 52-61.

⁷Ibid., pp. 64-84.

⁸Austin Ranney, "Parties and State Politics," in Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, ed. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1976), pp. 87-90.

⁹Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1980), p. 51.

¹⁰Malcolm E. Jewell and David M. Olson, American State Political Parties and Elections (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1978), pp. 40-48.

¹¹Ranney, pp. 63-65.

¹²Ibid., pp. 58-59.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴ Dye, pp. 101-102.

¹⁵ Jewell, "Governor," pp. 127-134.

¹⁶ Morehouse, pp. 221-222.

¹⁷ Ranney, pp. 84-86.

¹⁸ Leslie Lipson, The American Governor: From Figurehead to Leader (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 239-268.

¹⁹ Larry Sabato, Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie: The American Governor Transformed, 1950-1975 (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath & Co., 1978), pp. 68-91.

²⁰ Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Comparison of the Relative Positions of Governors," in The American Governor in Behavioral Perspective, ed. Thad Beyle and J. Oliver Williams (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), pp. 141-150.

²¹ Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support, and Budget Success in State Legislatures," in The American Governor in Behavioral Perspective, ed. Thad Beyle and J. Oliver Williams (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), pp. 170-183.

²² Thomas R. Dye, "Executive Power and Public Policy in the States," Western Political Quarterly 22 (December 1969): 926-939.

²³ Ibid., p. 939.

²⁴ Morehouse, pp. 235-241.

²⁵ J. Oliver Williams, "Changing Perspectives on the American Governor," in The American Governor in Behavioral Perspective, ed. Thad Beyle and J. Oliver Williams (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), pp. 1-5.

²⁶ Sarah P. McCally, "The Governor and His Legislative Party," American Political Science Review 60 (December 1966): 923.

²⁷ Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," American Political Science Review 58 (March 1964): 60.

²⁸ William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 303.

²⁹ David B. Meltz, "Legislative Party Cohesion: A Model of the Bargaining Process in State Legislatures," Journal of Politics 35 (August 1973): 649-681.

³⁰ Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 462.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 465-466.

³² Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), pp. 20-50.

³³ Keefe and Ogul, p. 267.

³⁴ Samuel C. Patterson, "Dimensions of Voting Behavior in a One-Party State Legislature," in American Legislative Behavior: A Reader, ed. Samuel C. Patterson (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 365-378.

³⁵ John C. Wahlke et al., The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 343-376.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 267-286.

³⁷ Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, pp. 429-430.

³⁸ Frank J. Sorauf, Party and Representation: Legislative Politics in Pennsylvania (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 139-140.

³⁹ Keefe and Ogul, pp. 272-282.

⁴⁰ Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, pp. 180-316.

⁴¹ Keefe and Ogul, pp. 368-369.

⁴² Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, p. 305.

⁴³ Keefe and Ogul, pp. 363-375.

⁴⁴ McCally, pp. 912-942; Jewell, "Governor," pp. 127-141; and Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process.

⁴⁵ The two versions of the governor's party's "size" may be viewed as two ways of operationalizing one variable, or these two versions of "size" might also be viewed in a different way. Riker has argued that in situations similar to certain games, coalitions which are just large enough to win will be formed. This viewpoint is presented in the following source: William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 47-48. Riker's argument suggests that the governor's party would show a higher rate of support for his proposals if it were a small majority than if it were a large majority. The governor's party's percentage of the chamber and that party's minority or majority status are regarded as separate factors which operate together in this application of Riker's argument.

This dissertation involves an initial study of the effects of "size" and other variables on the Michigan governor's working relationship with the legislative parties. We have therefore taken a more basic approach and regarded the governor's party's majority or minority status and that party's percentage of the chamber as versions of one variable.

⁴⁶ Jewell, "Governor," p. 128.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ McCally, pp. 923-942.

⁴⁹ Morehouse, pp. 229-235.

⁵⁰ Charles W. Wiggins, "Executive Vetoes and Legislative Overrides in the American States," Journal of Politics 42 (November 1980): 1110-1117.

⁵¹ David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 279-319.

⁵² McCally, pp. 923-942.

⁵³ Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, pp. 310-311.

⁵⁴ Jewell, "Governor," p. 128.

⁵⁵ Sarah McCally Morehouse, "Party Loyalty in a House Divided," paper presented at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 3-6 September 1981.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

⁵⁷ Jewell, "Governor," p. 128.

⁵⁸ Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., The Office of Governor in the United States (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1956), pp. 184-191.

⁵⁹ Morehouse, "Political Leader," pp. 198-201.

⁶⁰ Sarah McCally Morehouse, State Politics, Parties and Policy (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981), pp. 203-207.

⁶¹ Jewell, "Governor," pp. 127-141.

⁶² McCally, p. 923.

⁶³ Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, pp. 315-324.

⁶⁴ Jewell, "Governor," pp. 132-133.

⁶⁵ Thad L. Beyle, "The Governor as Chief Legislator," State Government 51 (Winter 1978): 2-10.

⁶⁶ Roy D. Morey, Politics and Legislation: The Office of Governor in Arizona (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1965), pp. 111-113.

⁶⁷ Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, pp. 306-309.

⁶⁸ Sarah McCally Morehouse, "The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process," American Political Science Review 67 (March 1973): 61-66.

⁶⁹ Morehouse, "Political Leader," pp. 232-233.

⁷⁰ Jewell, "Governor," pp. 127-128.

⁷¹ Neal R. Peirce, The Megastates of America: People, Politics, and Power in the Ten Great States (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972), pp. 403-404.

⁷² Dye, States and Communities, pp. 466-473.

⁷³ John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), pp. 11-231.

⁷⁴ Robert Lee Sawyer, Jr., The Democratic State Central Committee in Michigan, 1949-1959: The Rise of the New Politics and the New Political Leadership, The University of Michigan Governmental Studies, no. 40 (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, The University of Michigan, 1960), pp. 248-262.

⁷⁵ Fenton, p. 43.

⁷⁶ Ranney, pp. 59-61.

⁷⁷ Joseph LaPalombara, Guide to Michigan Politics (East Lansing, Mich.: Bureau of Social and Political Research, College of Business and Public Service, Michigan State University, 1960), pp. 22-24.

⁷⁸ Fenton, pp. 11-24.

⁷⁹ LaPalombara, pp. 66-69.

⁸⁰ Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Michigan Manual (Lansing: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 1980), pp. 533-555.

⁸¹ Dye, States and Communities, pp. 113-115.

⁸² The League of Women Voters of Michigan, The State We're In: A Citizen's Guide to Michigan State Government (Lansing: The League of Women Voters of Michigan, 1979), pp. 5-9.

⁸³ Schlesinger, p. 142.

⁸⁴ According to information in the Michigan Department of Management and Budget's 1980 edition of the Michigan Manual (pp. 527-531), the elections for four-year gubernatorial terms were held in 1966, 1970, 1974, and 1978.

⁸⁵ Schlesinger, pp. 141-150.

⁸⁶ Carolyn Stieber, The Politics of Change in Michigan (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970), pp. 86-90.

⁸⁷ Morehouse, State Politics, p. 290.

⁸⁸ Sabato, pp. 82-83.

⁸⁹ Stieber, pp. 32-38.

⁹⁰ Francis, pp. 1-45.

⁹¹ Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, pp. 444-447.

⁹² Dye, States and Communities, pp. 146-147.

⁹³ Stieber, pp. 75-81.

⁹⁴ "Milliken Proposes a New GOP Strategy," Lansing State Journal, 10 January 1971, sec. A, p. 3.

⁹⁵ Bill Hart and Etta Fielek, "Milliken: Michigan's Pragmatic Governor," First Monday 7 (November 1977): 5-14.

⁹⁶ "Governor in Trenches: A Tough New Stance," Detroit Free Press, 7 January 1973, sec. B, pp. 1-4.

⁹⁷ Hart and Fielek, pp. 5-14.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH DESIGN OF THE STUDY

In order to investigate the research problems of this study, it will be useful to develop some hypotheses for examination. Before stating the major propositions of this study, we will present a brief discussion which examines Sarah P. McCally's conception of the governor's relationship with his legislative party and the conception of that relationship taken in this study. The major hypotheses of this study and the operationalizations of important concepts will then be presented. A description of the data sets to be used in this research will be presented, followed by a brief summary of the chapter.

Differing Conceptions of the Governor's Relationship with the Legislative Parties

The major hypotheses in this dissertation's research design deal with the causes and consequences of the governor's working relationship with the legislative party groups. Our view of the nature of the governor's working relationship with the legislative parties, then, is important background information to an explanation of

the research design. Since Sarah P. McCally performed a significant study of gubernatorial-legislative interaction, we will use her view of the governor's relationship with his legislative party as a reference point for explaining our view of the governor's dealings with the legislative parties.¹

Sarah P. McCally emphasizes the governor's use of a limited supply of favors, or of "resources," to gain support from his legislative party.² McCally measures the governor's support on the vote on the question of overriding a veto, which is an extremely important vote.³ McCally asserts that the governor's party leaders will use all of the influence they can muster to see that the veto is sustained. She states that ". . . when a veto does come before the legislature, the greatest amount of party activity attends it."⁴

In this dissertation, the governor's relationship with the legislative parties is largely viewed in terms of agreement and disagreement on policy issues. For example, a governor and his legislative party might agree on and both support legislation to increase the scope of a given state social welfare program. We acknowledge, however, that other approaches to the governor's dealings with the legislative parties (such as the use of rewards or favors) may be relevant under certain circumstances in

Michigan or in other states. In this study, in contrast to McCally's, legislative votes on bills which are later vetoed are used to measure the governor's level of agreement with the legislative parties. These votes are less likely to involve an "all-out" effort by the governor and his party to prevail than are the votes on the "override question." The votes preceding vetoes, therefore, provide a more typical indication of the state's chief executive's agreement with partisan groups in the legislature.

Certain evidence about the governorship of G. Mennen Williams is consistent with the position that the governor interacts with the legislative parties by working in areas of policy agreement. In A Governor's Notes, Williams maintains that he chose to conduct his dealings with legislators on a program basis, rather than on the basis of mutual favors. Williams states, ". . . since I was sure anyway that there would be more demands than available legitimate favors, I decided to deal with legislators on a programmatic basis, and did so."⁵

Stieber's discussion of the passage of "progressive" social legislation during the governorship of George Romney demonstrates that the legislation's passage was made possible by the election of Republican "moderates" in the early 1960s. Stieber's discussion indicates that the "gulf" between the governor and the legislature which

existed on policy matters during the "Williams era" was "bridged" under Governor Romney, when the legislature was finally "progressive" enough to work with the moderate Governor on social programs.⁶ The similarity of the views of Governor Romney and elements of the legislature on social programs appeared to be a significant part of their working relationship.

While the above discussion suggests that the relationship between Michigan's governor and the state's legislature (including the legislative parties) sometimes involved their policy positions, it does not demonstrate that McCally's emphasis on the governor's use of resources in dealing with his legislative party is inappropriate. Our emphasis on agreement on policy issues in the governor's relationship with the legislative parties might therefore be considered to be another aspect of the relationship, in addition to McCally's emphasis on the governor's use of favors to gain the support of his legislative party.

Statement of Hypotheses and Operationalization of Concepts

In order to develop the hypotheses for this study, we need to make certain theoretical arguments using relevant literature and descriptive evidence about Michigan. In the course of stating the hypotheses, the operationalizations of the basic concepts involved will also be presented.

"Size" of Legislative Party
and Agreement with the
Legislative Parties

The first set of four hypotheses focuses on the relationship between the "size" of the governor's legislative party and his level of agreement with various legislative party groups. Literature reviewed in the first chapter examined the "size" of the governor's party both in terms of its percentage of the legislative chamber and in terms of its status as a majority or a minority party. McCally focused on the percentage of seats held by the party.⁷ Truman, however, viewed the party in terms of its majority or minority status.⁸

The two versions of the governor's party's "size" may be viewed as two ways of operationalizing one variable.⁹ In this study of Michigan, we will make use of both versions of the "size" of the governor's legislative party in examining that variable's relationship to the governor's agreement with various party groups. By examining the hypotheses with the governor's legislative party's "size" measured on an interval scale, we can determine if "size" has an effect on the governor's "agreement levels" throughout a large range of party "sizes." When we measure "size" on an interval scale, we operationally define the governor's legislative party's "size" as the governor's party's proportion of the House. By examining the hypotheses

with "size" measured at an ordinal level, we can determine if the governor's agreement level with his own or with the other party depends on his party's majority or minority status. When we use ordinal measurement to operationalize the governor's legislative party's "size," we assign a value of one if the party is a majority and a value of zero if the party is not a majority.

The variables involving the governor's levels of agreement with the legislative party groups can also be operationalized using both interval and ordinal measurement. For example, the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party will be operationalized (using interval measurement) as the proportion of his House party's votes on the bill which are "No" votes. The one legislative vote on each bill used in the study deals with the passage of the bill, and this vote occurs before the veto. Under these conditions, "No" votes by individual legislators on a bill which is eventually vetoed indicate agreement with the governor's position. It is also important to know whether or not the governor agrees with the majority of his party. In order to operationalize the level of agreement between the governor and his own party using ordinal measurement, we assign a value of one if the party casts a majority of "No" votes and a value of zero if the party does not do so.

In performing statistical analyses involving the first four hypotheses, we will use "interval level" versions of both variables in initially testing each hypothesis. We will then test the hypothesis using ordinal level versions of the two variables. The operationalizations of additional variables will be discussed as the variables are mentioned in the first four hypotheses.

It is useful to explain our choice of the House rather than the Senate for measuring the governor's levels of agreement with the legislative parties and the "size" of his legislative party. In making this choice, we considered the more frequent elections for the House, which sometimes tend to make it more representative than the Senate of the changing strength of political forces in Michigan. The House may also better capture the diversity in the state due to its larger size and the smaller constituencies which House members have.¹⁰ There is also some indication that the Michigan Senate was malapportioned to a greater extent than the House was prior to 1964.¹¹ The House, then, in some ways has been more representative of the political make-up of the state.

We will propose and test hypotheses involving the relationship between the governor's dealings with the legislative parties and the political forces in the state. For example, we will propose a hypothesis which relates

the governor's level of agreement with his legislative party to his support from the voters of his party in the next election. Given our desire to test the associations between the governor's dealings with the legislative parties and the state's political forces, it is appropriate to measure the governor's dealings with the legislative parties in the chamber that best represents the political forces in the state.

The House has been more representative of Michigan's political make-up than has the Senate. For either party, there may have been some differences in the levels of agreement between the governor and the legislative parties in the two chambers. In Chapter I, however, we argued that each political party has taken positions on the issues and has been oriented toward a fairly distinct group of the state's population. Under those conditions it seems reasonably likely that for each of Michigan's parties, the party's House and Senate legislators would take similar positions on the issues. Both the House and Senate contingents of either party would therefore be in a similar position in relationship to the governor on the issues. In a study at the national level, David Truman examined the voting patterns of both parties in the House and Senate. He found that in both chambers, the Democrats supported the administration position at a higher rate than did Republicans.¹²

We have also chosen to measure the "size" of the governor's legislative party using the House's membership instead of the Senate's membership. By using the House's membership, we can be consistent with our use of the House votes to measure the governor's levels of agreement with the legislative parties. In developing a strategy for dealing with the legislature on policy matters (for example on a bill's passage), the governor needs to deal with the parties in both the House and the Senate. As may be seen from Table 1, there were some differences in "size" between the House and Senate contingents of each party, particularly before the 1964 reapportionment. We find, however, that the two chambers were never held by majorities of two different parties during the years actually involved in the data sets which will be used in this study.¹³ There is a basic similarity, then, in the party control of both legislative chambers faced by the governor.

Since the governor's legislative party's "size" and his levels of agreement with the legislative parties are measured only in the House, the associations between "size" and these levels of agreement will only be examined for the House. Because the governor's legislative party's "size" and the agreement levels between the governor and the legislative parties are likely to be generally similar in both chambers, we might expect that similar results

would be found concerning the relationships between these variables if we examine them in the House and in the Senate.

In developing the first hypothesis for the study, we focus on the relationship between the "size" of the governor's legislative party and the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party. McCally's finding was that the governor's party's percentage of seats was negatively related to that party's support on votes to override a veto.¹⁴ For some legislators, support for the governor on a veto override vote may indicate agreement with his position, although for others it may result from outside pressures. We might expect that the governor's party's "size" will be negatively related to the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party.

Descriptive evidence from the gubernatorial administration of Kim Sigler in Michigan supports the position that a governor with a majority legislative party tends to experience a fairly low level of agreement with that party. Governor Sigler, a Republican, served in the 1947-1948 period. As may be seen from Table 1, he was the governor whose party held the largest share of the House of Representatives (95 percent) of any governor during the 1937-1978 period. We also find that Governor Sigler experienced difficulty with his political party. White observes that

Sigler was a political "maverick," rather than being an "organization Republican," and that he was unable to win the friendship of certain prestigious Republicans.¹⁵ Although this evidence does not necessarily refer directly to the legislative party, it seems likely that a governor who had general difficulty with his party would also experience problems in gaining the legislative party's support.

Both the evidence from the literature and the information on the Sigler administration suggest that the "size" of the governor's legislative party is negatively related to his level of agreement with that party. We would expect support for the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1:

The governor's party's "size" is negatively related to the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party.

The arguments and findings reviewed in the previous chapter generally indicate that a governor with a legislative minority party experiences high agreement with the opposition legislative party. This literature also indicates that the governor with a majority party experiences low support from the opposition.

In order to propose a hypothesis concerning the relationship between the governor's party's "size" and his level of agreement with the opposition legislative

party, additional evidence should be considered. The evidence in Chapter I was that the Michigan legislature has had rather high partisan conflict and that the legislative parties have been relatively cohesive. In Hypothesis 1, we stated that the governor's party's "size" is negatively related to his level of agreement with his legislative party. This hypothesis indicates that governors with large parties will show low agreement with their own legislative party. Given that the legislative parties in Michigan tend to be in conflict and cohesive, we would expect that the governor with a large legislative party would demonstrate high agreement with the opposition legislative party. Based on Hypothesis 1, we would suggest that governors with small legislative parties would tend to show high agreement with their own legislative party. Given the conflict between Michigan's legislative parties, we would expect that the governors with small legislative parties would demonstrate low agreement with the opposition legislative party.

Based on the relationship proposed in Hypothesis 1 and the nature of Michigan's legislative parties, it is likely that the governor's party's "size" will be positively related to his agreement with the legislative opposition. In the Michigan setting, we would expect support for the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2:

The governor's party's "size" is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party.

In performing the statistical analysis involving Hypothesis 2, we operationalize the "level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party" in two ways. In order to operationalize the variable as an interval measure, we use the proportion of the House opposition party's votes on the bill which are "No" votes. In order to operationally define the variable as an ordinal measure, we assign a value of one if that party casts a majority of "No" votes, and we assign a value of zero if the party does not do so.

The literature reviewed in the previous chapter is consistent with the position that a governor with a legislative minority will be especially prone to build support and find agreement from members of both legislative parties. An example of this pattern is provided by Ransone's description of certain New York Democratic governors. These governors were faced with opposition majorities, and they apparently worked with bipartisan groups on key issues.¹⁶ The foregoing information provides a basis for the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3:

The governor's party's "size" is negatively related to the average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties.

In order to evaluate Hypothesis 3 with statistical evidence, we need to operationalize "the average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties." This variable is operationally defined (as an interval measure) as the average of the levels of agreement shown between the governor and the House legislative parties. In other words, we operationally define the variable as the average of the two "agreement level" measures which we have introduced for use in Hypotheses 1 and 2. In order to use this variable as an "ordinal" measure, we take the average of the "ordinal" version of the "level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party" and the "ordinal" version of "the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party."

As was discussed in the previous chapter in a different context, Charles W. Wiggins found that chief executives of states with "unified" party control (meaning that the governor and the legislative majority are from the same party) experience fewer overrides of their vetoes than do governors of states in which party control is divided.¹⁷ Malcolm E. Jewell states that a governor with a legislative minority faces certain basic problems in exercising

legislative leadership, including a "dulling" of the tools of party leadership.¹⁸ This information is consistent with the position that governors with legislative majorities experience relatively high levels of agreement with the legislative body. The information also indicates that governors with minorities have extra problems and might experience relatively low levels of agreement with the legislative chamber as a whole. In performing the empirical analysis of this study, we will examine the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4:

The governor's legislative party's "size" is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the House.

The "level of agreement between the governor and the House," as an interval measure, is operationally defined as the proportion of all House votes cast on the bill which are "No" votes. All of the legislature's votes used to measure this variable dealt with the passage of the bill, and the bills were passed on these votes and were eventually vetoed. Since the majority of legislators always voted "Yes" on the votes used to measure this variable, the proportion of "No" votes is always less than one-half. We cannot, therefore, use a cutoff point at which the proportion of "No" votes is one-half in defining the ordinal version of the variable if we are to have any variation in

the values which the variable takes on. For the ordinal version of the "level of agreement between the governor and the House," we assign a value of one if the House's "No" votes exceed a one-third share of the House (or, technically, a .333 proportion of the House). We assign a value of zero if the House's proportion of "No" votes does not exceed a one-third share (more precisely a .333 proportion) of the House.

Party's Electoral Strength
and Agreement with the
Legislative Parties

Literature reviewed in the previous chapter indicates that governors are likely to desire reelection and that this reelection desire affects their relationship with the legislature's party groups. We can illustrate the effect of the governor's concern with the state-wide electorate on his agreement with the legislative parties by discussing Governor Milliken's tenure. Governor Milliken, a Republican, has been concerned with his appeal to Democratic voters, has sponsored programs which would probably appeal to Democrats, and has worked fairly well with the Democratic legislative majority. Information in Table 2 indicates that for the period of his tenure which is examined in this study (1969-1978), Milliken's Republican party's strength in the "minor office" election generally was significantly under 50 percent.¹⁹ We have chosen to

examine the governor's party's electoral performance in "minor office" elections in Table 2 in order to attempt to avoid the effects of well-known candidates on the parties' shares of the vote. We contend that Governor Milliken's awareness of the low level of his party's electoral strength (in addition to his lack of a legislative majority party) influenced him to work closely with the Democrats in the legislature in order to develop policies which could increase his appeal to Democratic voters in the next election.

There are two variations on a basic viewpoint about the way in which the governor's party's electoral strength affects his agreement with the legislative parties. We can attempt to assess whether or not these variations are supported by the way in which we operationalize the variables in Hypotheses 5-8. The basic viewpoint which we advocate is that the governor's desire to be reelected makes him aware of and concerned about his party's electoral strength and that this awareness affects his relationships with the legislative parties.

The first variation on our basic viewpoint is that the governor is conscious of change in his party's electoral strength throughout a whole range of values and continually adjusts his agreement with the legislative parties as his party's performance at the polls varies. In order to assess

Table 2. Governor's Party's Percentage of the Two-Party Vote for a "Minor Office" for the 1937-1978 Era

Year of "Minor Office" Election	Legislative Period Following "Minor Office" Election	Governor	Governor's Party	Governor's Party's Percentage of Two-Party Vote in "Minor Office" Election ^a
1936	1937-1938	Murphy	Democratic	52.9
1938	1939-1940	Dickinson ^b	Republican	53.2
1940	1941-1942	Van Wagener	Democratic	46.9
1942	1943-1944	Kelly	Republican	57.9
1944	1945-1946	Kelly	Republican	53.2
1946	1947-1948	Sigler	Republican	62.6
1948	1949-1950	Williams	Democratic	49.7
1950	1951-1952	Williams	Democratic	46.6
1952	1953-1954	Williams	Democratic	46.9
1954	1955-1956	Williams	Democratic	51.0
1956	1957-1958	Williams	Democratic	50.5
1958	1959-1960	Williams	Democratic	54.4
1960	1961-1962	Swainson	Democratic	52.2
1962	1963-1964	Romney	Republican	49.6
1964	1965-1966	Romney	Republican	43.1
1966	1967-1968	Romney	Republican	53.4
1968	1969-1970	Milliken ^c	Republican	47.3
1970	1971-1972	Milliken	Republican	45.2
1972	1973-1974	Milliken	Republican	51.5
1974	1975-1976	Milliken	Republican	44.7
1976	1977-1978	Milliken	Republican	46.5

SOURCES: Information on the periods of service for governors came from the following source: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Michigan Manual (Lansing: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 1980), p. 100. Information on the governor's party and raw data to be used in computing percentages for the "minor office" elections were available in appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual.

^aDue to changes in the methods of selection and timing of elections for the offices, two different offices are used for the "minor office." The "minor office" used for the 1936-1962 elections is Auditor General, and the "minor office" used for the 1964-1976 elections is the Michigan State University Board of Trustees.

^bGovernor Fitzgerald, also a Republican, served as governor in the first part of 1939 and died on March 16, 1939.

^cGovernor Romney resigned to become U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development on January 22, 1969.

whether or not this sort of phenomenon occurs, we would operationalize both the independent and dependent variables as interval level measures. We operationally define the new variable, the "governor's party's electoral strength," as the governor's party's proportion of the two-party vote in selected "minor office" elections.²⁰ We operationally define the governor's "levels of agreement" with the legislative parties as we have done above, using the interval level versions of these variables.

The second variation of our basic viewpoint is that the governor is mainly conscious of whether or not his party holds a majority of the state's electorate and that he makes a stronger effort to develop agreement with most of the legislative party group which corresponds to a strong "party group" of voters. In order to assess whether or not this sort of a phenomenon takes place, we will employ ordinal versions of both the independent and dependent variables. We operationally define the ordinal version of "the governor's party's electoral strength" by assigning a value of one if the governor's party receives the majority of the votes in the "minor office" election and by assigning a zero if the governor's party fails to win an electoral majority in that election. The variables reflecting the governor's agreement levels with the party groups have been operationalized above as ordinal measures.

In evaluating Hypotheses 5-8, we will examine both variations described above. That is, each hypothesis will first be tested using the "interval level" versions of both variables, and then a separate test will be made using versions of the variables measured at the ordinal level.

In developing Hypotheses 5-8, the first situation to be considered is the one in which the governor's party's electoral strength influences his interaction with his legislative party. We argue that a governor whose party is strong in the state's electorate will tend to work closely with his own legislative party, in order to make policy that appeals to his party's voters. A governor from a party which is weak in the state's electorate, however, would be less interested in working mainly with his own party in the legislature, because the voters of his party are not numerous enough to reelect him. The above argument is reflected in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5:

The governor's party's electoral strength is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party.

In examining the effects of the governor's party's electoral strength on the governor's levels of agreement with his own party and with the other legislative party groups, we are focusing only on the governor's levels of

agreement with the legislative parties in the House. It seems, however, that the governor would tend to show a fairly similar pattern of agreement with the legislative parties in both chambers, if his motive is to please the stronger party in the electorate.

The accounts of Governor Milliken's behavior illustrate that a governor whose party's electoral strength is low will tend to show high agreement with the opposition legislative party. Alternatively, a governor whose party is dominant in the electorate would probably not often bother to work very closely with the opposition party in the legislature, as he is able to work with his own legislative party to develop the types of policies which will appeal to the majority of the electorate. Based on the foregoing reasoning, we state the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6:

The governor's party's electoral strength is negatively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party.

The governor's party's electoral strength may also be related to his working relationship with both legislative parties. In discussing George Romney's tenure as a governor in Michigan, we emphasized that many of Romney's accomplishments during that era were made with bipartisan legislative support. As may be seen in Table 2, Governor Romney's Republican party's strength was below 50 percent in the

first two elections listed for Romney. The Republicans' relative weakness in the electorate during Romney's early years as governor was probably a factor which contributed to his tendency to work with both legislative parties. This evidence from the "Romney era" provides some indication that a governor whose party's electoral strength is relatively low demonstrates agreement on certain policies with both parties, perhaps in an effort to win votes from both party groups in the electorate.

A governor with a party which dominates the electorate would probably lack interest in closely cooperating with bipartisan groups of legislators on policy, because he could work with his own legislative party and thereby appeal to his party's electoral majority.²¹ The preceding arguments are consistent with the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 7:

The governor's party's electoral strength is negatively related to the average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties.

An additional association to be examined involves the relationship between the electoral strength of the governor's party and the level of agreement between the governor and the entire legislative chamber. We might expect that a governor from the party which is a "majority" in the electorate would usually be elected by generally reflecting the views of that party. The governor's party

would also normally be a strong legislative party.²² Such a governor, then, would fairly easily find significant areas of agreement on policy with most of the legislature. A governor from a party which is relatively weak in the state's electorate would be less likely to find that his party dominates the legislature. He would, therefore, find fewer areas of agreement with the entire legislature. The preceding argument, then, provides a basis for proposing the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 8:

The governor's party's electoral strength is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the House.

Agreement with the Legislative
Parties and Support from
Voters

A study by Sarah McCally Morehouse is relevant to the association between the governor's level of agreement with the legislative parties and his support from "party groups" of voters in the following election. Morehouse finds an association between the governor's primary percentage after the legislative session and his legislative party's loyalty during that legislative session. Her interpretation of this finding is that the governor's strength in his "outside" (electoral) party organization (which is measured by his primary percentage after the

session) generates discipline within the legislative party (which is assessed by measures of legislative party loyalty during the session), although she states that the two processes may occur simultaneously.²³ One problem with the interpretation which Morehouse makes is that the "cause" (the governor's strength in his electoral party organization) actually occurs after the "effect" (discipline within the legislative party) has taken place. The interpretation that the two processes occur simultaneously is possible, but it is not very straightforward.

By reinterpreting Morehouse's finding, we can begin to develop an alternative position on the nature of the relationship between the governor's legislative support and his electoral support. Morehouse's empirical finding is that the governor's legislative party's loyalty during a session is positively associated with his primary percentage after the session. In presenting an alternative to her interpretation of this finding, we argue that the loyalty of the governor's legislative party aids him in developing policies which appeal to his party's voters, so that he then receives support from those voters in the ensuing election. One advantage of this alternative interpretation is that the causal ordering of the variables, as we discuss them, is consistent with the order in which the variables take on their values in Morehouse's research.

In developing Hypotheses 9-12, we will generally argue that a governor's agreement with a legislative party group aids him in creating policies which attract the support of a similar "party group" in the electorate. For example, Governor Milliken's support from Democratic legislators aided him in developing certain policies, and those policies probably helped generate support for Milliken among Democratic voters.

Although our measurements of the levels of agreement between the governor and the legislative parties for Hypotheses 9-12 are made in the House, the governor would be concerned about the parties' levels of agreement with his positions in both legislative chambers. As we stated above, however, the patterns of agreement between the governor and the legislative parties are probably fairly similar in both chambers.

Before developing additional hypotheses, it will be useful to review some information about the governorship of G. Mennen Williams. This information is relevant because it describes Williams's working relationship with his own legislative party and the support which Williams received from his party's voters.

In his own account of his governorship, Williams indicates that he worked through his own supportive party in his efforts to achieve his policies. He mentions that

he tried to have preliminary consultations on legislation with his own party and that he went to House and Senate Democratic caucuses. He also indicates that the Democratic legislators nearly always supported his program.²⁴

Becker and his co-authors made a study of the Michigan House of Representatives during the 1955-1961 period. These researchers found that Republican legislators voted for the "conservative" position with a high degree of cohesion and that Democrats voted for the "liberal" position with an even higher level of party cohesion.²⁵ These findings are consistent with the view that Williams was a "liberal" Democratic governor who received support from his party. Peirce describes Williams as a governor who took "advanced stands" and achieved partial success in the workmen's compensation area and in mental health reform, although the Republican-controlled legislature thwarted many of his efforts.²⁶ Governor Williams, then, was a chief executive who worked with the support of his legislative party toward his "liberal" policy goals, and he enjoyed certain successes in his efforts to affect public policy in Michigan.

There is evidence which suggests that Governor Williams received substantial support from traditionally Democratic voters in his gubernatorial races. Nicholas A. Masters, in a 1957 article, argues that labor organizations

in the Detroit area have been closely affiliated with the Democratic party, and he cites statistics confirming that members of the United Auto Workers vote overwhelmingly Democratic.²⁷ Masters and Wright find uniformly high correlations in Michigan cities of various sizes between the percentage of laborers in the work force and the Democratic percentage of the 1950, two-party, gubernatorial vote. They also find high correlations between the percentage of managers in the work force and the Republican percentage of the two-party gubernatorial vote in 1950. Since Williams was the Democratic candidate for governor in 1950, this evidence indicates that he received high support from traditionally Democratic voters and low support from traditionally Republican voters.²⁸

The evidence from the governorship of G. Mennen Williams indicates that he worked with his own legislative party's support to make policies and take positions which earned him the support of his party's voters. Literature reviewed in the previous chapter also indicates that the governor's support by his legislative party is paralleled by support from voters of his party. Based on this information, we state the ninth hypothesis in the following way:

Hypothesis 9:

The level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party is positively related to the governor's level of support from voters of his party in the following election.

The dependent variable in Hypothesis 9, "the governor's level of support from voters of his party," is operationally defined using a specific formula. The operationalization of this variable and the other variables dealing with the governor's support from "party groups" of voters will be described following our statement of Hypothesis 12.

The descriptive evidence about Governor Milliken is that he worked well with the opposition Democratic legislative party and received substantial support from the Democratic voters. Governor Williams, however, experienced major disagreements with the opposition Republican legislators and received little electoral support from a group of voters who traditionally vote Republican. This information about Milliken and Williams is consistent with the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 10:

The level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party is positively related to the governor's level of support from opposition party voters in the following election.

Certain statistical information indicates that it is likely that Governor Romney, a Republican, received some bipartisan electoral support. As may be seen from Table 2, the Republicans were a minority party in the state's electorate during 1962 and 1964, the first two election years

in which George Romney won the office of governor. In 1964, for example, Romney received more than 55 percent of the two-party vote. In 1966, when the Republicans received about 53 percent of the two-party vote in the "minor office" election, Romney received over 60 percent of the two-party gubernatorial vote.²⁹ Since Romney's share of the vote in the gubernatorial elections exceeded his party's share in the "minor office" elections, it appears likely that he received a significant number of votes from Democratic voters. George Romney's ability to attract significant bipartisan legislative and bipartisan electoral support, then, indicates that there is adequate justification to propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 11:

The average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties is positively related to his level of support from voters of both parties in the following election.

Malcolm Jewell argues that governors are judged in elections by their level of success in engineering the passage of their legislative programs.³⁰ A governor who experiences a high level of agreement with the legislature would be able to have much of his program passed and probably would be taking policy positions which receive broad support in the era in which he holds office. Such a governor would also be likely to enjoy general support

at the polls. The above arguments are consistent with the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 12:

The level of agreement between the governor and the House is positively related to the governor's level of electoral support in the following election.

In order to statistically assess the strength of the relationships in Hypotheses 9-12, we need to develop measures of the governor's support from various "party groups" of voters. Correlations indicate the extent to which variables covary, or how high or low the strength of the relationship between the variables is.³¹ We can therefore use the correlation coefficient to indicate the degree to which the governor's support by voters in the county is related to the strength of the party group in the county. The correlation, then, gives us an indication of the strength of the party group's support of the governor.

In measuring the governor's levels of support from the "party groups" of voters, we use the correlations in formulas which are presented in Table 3. The first variable presented in that table, the "governor's level of support from voters of his party," is operationally defined as one plus the correlation between the governor's proportion of the two-party vote in the county and his party's proportion of the two-party vote in a "minor office" election in the

county.³² The "governor's level of support from opposition party voters" is operationally defined as one plus the correlation between the governor's proportion of the two-party vote in the county and the opposition party's proportion of the two-party vote in a "minor office" election in the county. The "governor's level of support from voters of both parties" is measured by a more complex measure which reflects an average of his levels of support from the two parties' voters in geographic areas in which the parties are strong. The exact formula for this variable is presented in Table 3. The "governor's level of electoral support" is measured by the governor's proportion of the two-party vote.

Sources for and Composition of the Data Sets

Sources for the Data Sets

Information on elections and about the governor and legislative parties was available in editions of the Michigan Manual. Information on the party of the governor and a variety of election data were recorded from the appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual. The 1980 edition of the Michigan Manual includes information on the number of House members from each legislative party for all legislatures in the study, and this reference also includes state-wide gubernatorial election results for all years in

Table 3. Formulas for Variables Measuring Governor's Support from "Party Groups" of Voters

Variable	Computational Formula Used to Operationalize Variable
Governor's level of support from voters of his party	$r_{xy} + 1$
Governor's level of support from opposition party voters	$r_{xz} + 1$
Governor's level of support from voters of both parties	$\frac{[(r_{cd} + 1) + (r_{ef} + 1)]}{2}$
where:	
r = Pearson's correlation	
x = the governor's proportion of the two-party vote in the county	
y = the governor's party's proportion of the two-party vote for a "minor office" in the county	
z = the opposition party's proportion of the two-party vote for a "minor office" in the county	
c = the governor's proportion of the two-party vote in the county ^a	
d = the governor's party's proportion of the two-party vote for a "minor office" in the county ^a	
e = the governor's proportion of the two-party vote in the county ^b	
f = the opposition party's proportion of the two-party vote for a "minor office" in the county. ^b	

^aThe measures c and d are computed only for counties in which the governor's party's proportion of the two-party vote for a "minor office" exceeds .50.

^bThe measures e and f are computed only in counties where the opposition party's proportion of the two-party vote for a "minor office" exceeds .50.

the study. The needed election results for state-wide "minor office" races and for gubernatorial and "minor office" elections at the county level were available in appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual.

Obtaining information for the study's entire period about bills that were eventually vetoed and on the individual members of various legislatures entailed consulting various sources. Lists of vetoed bills and the texts of gubernatorial veto messages (which were used to screen out those vetoes not made for "policy reasons") were available in appropriate editions of the Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Michigan and in the appropriate editions of the Journal of the Senate of the State of Michigan. We used legislative histories of vetoed bills in order to select the most appropriate legislative vote on the bill for the data set. This selection of the most appropriate legislative vote will be further explained below. The legislative histories and the records of the votes cast by House members appeared in the Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Michigan. Lists which identify the party membership of individual legislators were available in appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual.

Criteria for Collection of Data Sets

The statistical analysis which will be performed in this study on the data on vetoes involves the use of two data sets. The data sets were collected using similar criteria for compiling them, and both of them contain much of the same data. The differences between the data sets will be explained at the end of this discussion about data collection, and any procedures not used in the collection of both data sets will be identified.

In the process of collecting the data which we use to measure the governor's levels of agreement with the party groups in the legislature, it was necessary to make counts of the votes of individual legislators on House actions on bills before the legislature. Because the hypothesized associations in this study involve the governor's agreement with party groups on policies, we made a careful effort to select vetoed bills which reflect this sort of agreement, under relatively similar conditions. In both stages of the data collection (identifying the vetoes and working with the legislative votes), it was necessary to make exclusions in order to compile data relating to the "policy positions" of the actors and to avoid including data generated in unusual situations.

The data set basically covers the 1937-1978 period. Data on the 1939-1940 and the 1967-1970 periods, however,

were not included in the data set due to changes in the governorship by means other than elections which occurred in these periods.³³ One problem with the eras in which these changes took place is that the first governor does not face reelection, so that Hypotheses 9-12 cannot be tested for that governor. Also, the second governor does not take office by winning an election, so that he may not consider his "party's electoral strength" (a factor in Hypotheses 5-8) in the same way that an elected governor might consider that factor. Finally, the legislative relationship which develops over the full course of an administration is disrupted in these periods, and this disruption constitutes an unusual set of circumstances not found during a "normal" administration.

Hypotheses 5-8 involve the relationship between the governor's party's electoral strength (as measured in a "minor office" election) and his agreement with the legislative party groups. The "minor office" election occurs late in the two-year legislative period, so that the governor's outlook on his party's strength in the state's electorate may also change at this point. During most legislative periods, the governor runs for reelection at the same time as the new "minor office" election occurs. The governor may receive a "new mandate" or become a "lame duck," as a result of this new election. Both of these

situations may change the circumstances under which the governor relates to the legislative parties. For these reasons, vetoes occurring after a late-session, "minor office" election were excluded. This exclusion could not be applied in exactly the same way for both data sets (as will be described below), and this type of deletion caused relatively few vetoes to be omitted from the data set.

In an effort to identify vetoes which were made on policy grounds, we examined the veto message of each veto which was otherwise "eligible" before including it in the data set. This examination was made to insure that the governor gave some policy-oriented reason (rather than purely a technical reason) for the veto. If no policy reason was given in the veto message, the veto was excluded from the data unless the legislature made an override attempt. The override attempt indicates that the veto probably involved a controversial policy.

Additional exclusions were made in order to allow us to measure "agreement levels" on policy for the vetoed bills in the data set, and a few exclusions were made for technical reasons. Because partial vetoes involve a situation in which the governor takes different positions (positive and negative) on different items in a bill on which legislators can only take one position, there is no feasible way to assess the "agreement level" between the

actors on the policy involved in these vetoes.³⁴ Partial vetoes were therefore excluded from the data set. Pocket vetoes do not require the filing of a veto message by the governor, so we were unable to assess the governor's official reasons for such vetoes. Pocket vetoes also involve an unusual circumstance in which the legislature generally lacks the option of overriding the veto. Pocket vetoes were, therefore, excluded.³⁵ Finally, a small number of vetoes were left out of the data set for technical reasons.³⁶

In order to develop tallies of the numbers of "Yes" and "No" votes within the legislative parties, we needed to select appropriate "roll call" votes for the bills. For each bill, we selected a vote which dealt with the substance of the issue and which also occurred most recently before the veto was made. The "House vote on passage of the bill" and the "House vote on a conference committee version of the bill" are examples of the types of votes which deal with the substance of the policy or issue.³⁷

Among the roll-call votes which were selected, only those which reflected 10 percent or more disagreement among the legislators were retained in the data set. The use of some "disagreement level" for screening legislative votes is found in certain previous studies of the working relationship between the governor and the legislature.³⁸ We required 10 percent disagreement in order to examine only

the votes on which there was at least some minimum level of controversy on and interest in the issue. This study focuses on the relationship between the "size" of the governor's legislative party and his "agreement levels" with the legislative parties. We also examine the effect of the governor's "levels of agreement" on his support from groups of voters. The more controversial votes tend to draw the interest of the legislative parties and have more of an impact on the voters, and these votes are, therefore, more relevant to the relationships examined in the study.

Two data sets were collected for use in examining the twelve hypotheses, and the first data set will be used to test Hypotheses 1-8. The independent variables involved in the first eight hypotheses take on their values by the start of a legislative session, and the dependent variables (the "agreement levels" between the governor and the legislative parties) take on their values as the legislative votes occur during a legislature. The first data set, therefore, is developed based on the two-year legislative time periods. Those bills vetoed on or after the day of the "minor office" election (which occurs near the end of the legislature's two-year period) were excluded, however, as discussed above. For convenience, the first data set is referred to as the "legislatures data set," and it includes 110 cases.

The second data set is used to test Hypotheses 9-12. It is used to test relationships between the "agreement level" variables, which take on values during the governor's administration, and those variables reflecting the support of the governor by groups of voters in the ensuing election. The second data set is, therefore, developed based on the time periods of gubernatorial administrations. The second data set is designated as the "administrations data set." While the legislatures are held within two-year periods, certain gubernatorial administrations (those since 1966) span a four-year period. Because of the differences in the periods covered by the administrations and the legislatures and because of other factors, there is a slight difference in the number of cases in the two data sets.³⁹ The "administrations data set" includes 105 cases.

Summary

The research design of this study is designed to provide for the statistical evaluation of hypotheses concerning the causes and consequences of the governor's agreement levels with the legislative party groups on policy matters. The focus of the study differs from the theoretical emphasis of McCally in that this study emphasizes the governor's agreement on policy issues with legislative party groups, while McCally stresses the governor's use of favors in order to gain the support

of his legislative party. The focus of this dissertation is appropriate in the context of Michigan's "issue-oriented" state politics.

Certain innovations are developed in this study, and the research involves a focus on certain problems which are not emphasized in most of the existing literature. The study develops a new viewpoint in examining the governor's party's electoral strength as a determinant of his relationship with the legislative parties. The governor's agreement with the legislative party groups and his support by party groups of voters are operationalized in ways which are not employed in other studies. The dissertation puts emphasis on the governor's working relationship with the opposition legislative party and with bipartisan groups, while many studies emphasize the governor's dealings with his own legislative party.

The data sets were selected in order to allow for an empirical analysis of hypotheses about the causes and consequences of the governor's levels of agreement with the legislative parties. The data collection was done so that we can examine the phenomena of interest as they occur on policy issues and under relatively standard conditions.

CHAPTER II--FOOTNOTES

¹McCally (pp. 923-942) performed an extensive analysis of the governor's dealings with his legislative party involving thirty-four non-southern states during the 1946-1960 period.

²Ibid., p. 929.

³Ibid., pp. 926-928.

⁴Ibid., p. 927.

⁵G. Mennen Williams, A Governor's Notes (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, The University of Michigan, 1961), p. 11.

⁶Stieber, pp. 79-81.

⁷McCally, pp. 923-942.

⁸Truman, pp. 279-319.

⁹These two versions of the governor's party's "size" may also be viewed in a different way, as we explain in footnote 45 of Chapter I.

¹⁰The senators have unstaggered terms of four years. The House members serve two-year terms. There are thirty-eight senators and 110 House members. Stieber, p. 89.

¹¹Stieber (p. 34) states that the 1959 suit by Michigan AFL-CIO president August Scholle was designed to bring about change in Michigan's legislative apportionment, and the suit was directed at the state Senate.

¹²Truman, pp. 282-286.

¹³ An examination of Table 1 reveals that the two chambers were held by two different parties in the 1969-1970 period. This period was not included in the data set, however, due to changes in the governorship by means other than an election. This type of gubernatorial change disrupts the normal development of the governor's relationship with the legislature and creates difficulties in the measurement of some of the variables used in this chapter.

¹⁴ McCally, pp. 279-319.

¹⁵ John P. White, Michigan Votes: Election Statistics, 1928-1956, Papers in Public Administration, no. 24 (Ann Arbor: Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, The University of Michigan, 1958), p. 82.

¹⁶ Ransone, pp. 184-191.

¹⁷ Wiggins, pp. 1110-1117.

¹⁸ Jewell, "Governor," p. 128.

¹⁹ We do not consider information for the 1978 "minor office" election on this point because the governor's party's showing in that election would mainly affect the governor's relationships with the legislative parties during the 1979-1980 legislature, which is beyond the scope of this study.

²⁰ Due to various problems, two different "minor office" elections are used in operationalizing the "governor's party's electoral strength." Auditor General, for example, was at one time an elected office (as shown in Table 2), but it has more recently been an appointed office. The State We're In (p. 12), written by The League of Women Voters of Michigan, describes the mode of appointment for the Auditor General. The Michigan State University Board of Trustees election, however, lacks comparability over the period of the study. That election was once a Spring election, but it has more recently been a Fall election. This change may lead to turnout differences for the parties over the time period. The Spring election is reflected in election records in the state of Michigan's 1937-38 Michigan Official Directory and Legislative Manual (Lansing: State of Michigan, 1938), pp. 650-652. The Fall election records for the same office appear in the Michigan Department of Management and Budget's Michigan Manual (Lansing: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 1978), pp. 568-569.

The "governor's party's electoral strength" is measured from 1936 through 1976. In the 1936-1962 period,

this variable is measured by the proportion of the two-party vote received by the governor's party's candidate for Auditor General. In the 1964-1976 period, the variable is measured by the proportion of the "total two-party vote" for Michigan State University Board of Trustees positions received by the governor's party's two candidates. In the Michigan State University Board of Trustees elections, each major party has two candidates, so that the "total two-party vote" is the sum of the votes for the four major party candidates.

²¹ There could be some exceptions to this trend when the legislature is malapportioned. An examination of Table 1 and Table 2 reveals that the "majority" party in the electorate is also the majority party in the House in all but six of the twenty-one legislatures covered in the 1937-1978 era.

²² Malapportionment could cause exceptions to this trend. As we stated in footnote 21, the "majority" party in the electorate is also usually the majority party in the House.

²³ Morehouse, "Political Leader," pp. 232-233.

²⁴ Williams, pp. 8-13.

²⁵ Robert W. Becker et al., "Correlates of Legislative Voting: Michigan House of Representatives, 1954-1961," Midwest Journal of Political Science 6 (November 1962): 392-396.

²⁶ Peirce, pp. 419-420.

²⁷ Nicholas A. Masters, "The Politics of Union Endorsement of Candidates in the Detroit Area," Midwest Journal of Political Science 1 (August 1957): 136-150.

²⁸ Nicholas A. Masters and Deil S. Wright, "Trends and Variations in the Two-Party Vote: The Case of Michigan," American Political Science Review 7 (December 1958): 1078-1090.

²⁹ The figures for George Romney's share of the two-party gubernatorial vote are as follows: 51.5 percent in 1962, 56.1 percent in 1964, and 60.7 percent in 1966. We calculated these percentages from "raw vote" information which appears in the 1980 edition of the Michigan Department of Management and Budget's Michigan Manual (p. 530).

³⁰ Jewell, "Governor," p. 127.

³¹ Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, Inc., 1973), pp. 145-146.

³² One is added to the correlation in order to prevent the measure from being a negative number. Two different "minor offices" are used in computing the governor's levels of support from various "party groups" of voters. The reasons for using two different offices are provided in footnote 20. In the 1938-1962 period, the "minor office" used is Auditor General. The Michigan State University Board of Trustees elections are used as the "minor office" elections in the 1964-1978 period. A party's proportion of the two-party vote in the Board of Trustees elections is computed by dividing the vote gained by the party's two candidates by the total vote for all four major party candidates.

³³ Frank D. Fitzgerald was replaced by Luren D. Dickinson in the 1939-1940 period, and George Romney was replaced by William Milliken in the 1967-1970 period. The foregoing information is presented in the 1980 edition of the Michigan Department of Management and Budget's Michigan Manual (p. 100). A summary of the elections for governor during the 1835-1978 period reveals that Dickinson and Milliken did not take office by election during the above periods. The Michigan Department of Management and Budget's 1980 edition of the Michigan Manual (pp. 527-531) is the source for the summary.

³⁴ The governor's power to make partial vetoes (or "item" vetoes) in Michigan is confined to items which appropriate funds in appropriation bills. This power is covered in Article V, Section 19 of Michigan's 1963 constitution. This section of the constitution appears in the Michigan Department of Management and Budget's 1978 edition of the Michigan Manual (pp. 54-55).

³⁵ Pocket vetoes are covered in Article IV, Section 33 of Michigan's 1963 constitution. This section of the constitution which discusses pocket vetoes appears in the Michigan Department of Management and Budget's 1978 edition of the Michigan Manual (pp. 49-50).

³⁶ There were three situations which led to exclusions of vetoes for "technical" reasons. In the first situation, the veto was signed by someone other than the elected governor. A second set of circumstances involved the Attorney General ruling that the veto was illegal. A final situation leading to an exclusion occurred when there was no record of the legislative vote to use for making a count of the legislators' votes.

³⁷ In the very few cases in which no appropriate House vote existed on the bill, it was not included in the data set. An example of a bill on which there was no "appropriate vote" is one for which a two-thirds vote was required for passage. Since most bills require only a majority of the votes to pass, the above situation is quite an atypical one for the legislative parties, in which there might be unusual pressure to vote for or against the bill.

³⁸ McCally (p. 927) required that at least 10 percent of those voting on the bills be in disagreement in her 1966 study of "votes on vetoes." Morehouse, in "House Divided" (p. 13), required that there be 10 percent disagreement with the majority position on the bills used in this study of governors' program legislation.

³⁹ The "administrations data set" includes one case which falls within an administration but was excluded from the "legislatures data set" because it occurred after a biennial "minor office" election. The "administrations data set" also excludes certain votes on bills during administrations which were followed by elections in which the incumbent governor did not seek reelection.

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS ON THE GOVERNOR'S AGREEMENT WITH THE LEGISLATIVE PARTIES

Statistical analyses are useful in the process of assessing the level of support for the major hypotheses of this study. In order to provide some background for the findings which apply to the hypotheses, we will first present information on Michigan governors, the varied situations which they faced, and their vetoes during the period covered by the study. Secondly, we will present the statistical findings which are relevant to the study's major propositions, including those from the estimation of a series of regression models. Finally, a conclusion will be presented.

Background Information on Governors and Vetoes in Michigan

Before presenting the findings relating to the study's hypotheses, we will cover some background information on Michigan governors, certain legislative and electoral situations faced by those governors, and their vetoes. The political parties are one element of a state's

politics. The information to be presented is broken down by the party of the governors, in order to provide more detailed background information for the research findings which will follow.

The governorship in Michigan has been held equally by the two major parties during the period covered by the data analysis in this study. As may be seen from Table 4, there have been four Democrats and four Republicans who have served as governor during this period. Each party held the governorship for eighteen years.

As the figures in Table 5 indicate, Michigan governors from both parties have faced legislatures in which their parties held and lacked control during the 1937-1978 era. More Republican governors than Democratic governors faced their own parties' majorities in both legislative chambers during the years covered in Table 5. More Democratic than Republican governors lacked a majority of their party in either chamber.

During a majority of the years covered in Table 5, Michigan governors lacked a legislative majority of their party in both legislative chambers. This situation is not uncommon, as is indicated by information presented by Sarah McCally Morehouse. In commenting on the situations faced by governors in forty-two states during the 1966-1978 period, she notes that ". . . over half the time governors face legislatures in which they do not have majorities."¹

Table 4. Party Control of the Governorship, 1937-1978^a

Party	Number of Governors	Years Holding the Governorship
Democratic	4	18
Republican	<u>4</u>	<u>18</u>
Both parties	8	36

SOURCES: Information on the numbers of governors of each party and years holding the governorship by each party was compiled from the following source: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Michigan Manual (Lansing: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 1980), p. 100. The party affiliations of the various governors were available in appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual.

^aThe information in Table 4 is based on the 1937-1978 period, without including the 1939-1940 and 1967-1970 eras (which are excluded from the study's empirical analysis).

Table 5. Party Control of the Governorship and of the Legislature,
1937-1978^a

Party	Number of Years Holding Governorship and Lacking Any Legislative Majority	Number of Years Holding Governorship And One Legislative Majority	Number of Years Holding Governorship And Two Legislative Majorities
Democratic	16	0	2
Republican	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>8</u>
Both parties	26	0	10

SOURCES: Information on the periods of service for the governors and the number of seats held by the legislative parties was available in the following source: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Michigan Manual (Lansing: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 1980), pp. 100, 114-115. The parties of various governors were recorded from appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual.

^aThe information in Table 5 is based on the 1937-1978 period, without including the 1939-1940 and 1967-1970 eras (which are excluded from the data sets in the study).

In Table 6, figures on the governor's party's electoral strength during the period covered by the data analysis are presented. For each party, figures on the number of years in which it holds the governorship with and without a majority in the state's electorate are presented. The party holding the governorship has an electoral majority when that party's candidate has won more than 50.0 percent of the votes in the designated "minor office" election preceding the governor's administration.² As may be seen in Table 6, Michigan governors have faced situations in which their parties held and failed to hold "majorities" in the state's electorate for equal amounts of time. Governors of both parties have faced electorates in which their party has held and failed to hold an electoral majority for roughly equal periods of time.

As may be seen from Table 7, Michigan governors vetoed 351 bills during the period covered by the data analysis. Republican governors were responsible for a majority (about 56 percent) of the vetoes. The figures for "vetoes per year holding the governorship" are quite similar for both parties.

The yearly rate of vetoes for governors of both parties (shown in Table 7) is approximately ten. This figure appears to be an "average" number of vetoes, based

Table 6. Electoral Strength of Governor's Party, 1937-1978^a

Party Holding Governorship	Number of Years Party Holds Governorship and Has an Electoral Majority ^b	Number of Years Party Holds Governorship and Lacks an Electoral Majority ^c
Democratic	10	8
Republican	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>
Both parties	18	18

SOURCES: Table 6 is based on information compiled from appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual. Information on the periods of service for governors was available in the following source: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Michigan Manual (Lansing: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 1980), p. 100.

^aThe information in Table 6 is based on the 1937-1978 period, without including the 1939-1940 and 1967-1970 eras (which are excluded from the data set in the study).

^bThis column reflects the number of years in which the party held the governorship and which were preceded by a "minor office" election in which the party's candidate won more than 50.0 percent of the vote. The "minor office" used for the 1936-1962 elections is Auditor General, and the "minor office" used for the 1964-1976 elections is the Michigan State University Board of Trustees.

^cThis column reflects the number of years in which the party held the governorship which were preceded by a "minor office" election in which the party's candidate received 50.0 percent of the vote or less.

Table 7. Governors' Vetoes by Party, 1937-1978^a

Party	Number of Bills Vetoed by Party's Governors	Percentage of Vetoes for Which Party's Governors Are Responsible	Vetoes per Year Party Holds Governorship
Democratic	156	44.4	8.7
Republican	<u>195</u>	<u>55.6</u>	10.8
Both parties	351	100.0	9.8

SOURCES: The veto totals were compiled using information obtained from appropriate editions of the Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Michigan and the Journal of the Senate of the State of Michigan. The parties of the governors were available in appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual.

^aThe information in Table 7 is based on the 1937-1978 period, without including the 1939-1940 and 1967-1970 eras (which are excluded from the data sets of the study).

on information presented by Charles W. Wiggins. Wiggins presents a listing of the numbers of gubernatorial vetoes which occurred during 1947 and 1973 in the forty-nine states which provided for gubernatorial veto power.³ In either year, Michigan's average of ten vetoes would cause it to be ranked as the twenty-sixth highest state.

Based on this review of some information about governors and their vetoes in Michigan, certain points can be emphasized. First, the balance between the Democratic and Republican parties' strengths, in terms of the number of years in which they held the governorship, is consistent with Michigan's status as a two-party state. Secondly, Michigan fits national trends in terms of the average yearly number of vetoes and in terms of the tendency for the state's governors to lack their own parties' legislative majorities. Finally, there is significant variation in the majority or minority status of the governor's party in the legislature and in the electorate. This variation is useful for this study, because it means that we are not unduly limited in examining the effects of the independent variables due to a lack of change in them.

Statistical Findings Relating to the Hypotheses

In this section we will cover statistical analyses which are related to three groups of hypotheses presented

in the second chapter and a series of regression models. Hypotheses 1-4 reflect relationships in which the governor's legislative party's "size" affects the levels of agreement between the governor and the legislative party groups. The governor's party's electoral strength is viewed as a cause of the agreement levels found between the state's chief executive and the legislative party groups in Hypotheses 5-8. In Hypotheses 9-12 we propose that the governor's levels of agreement with the legislature's party groups affect his levels of support among similar "party groups" of voters.

We regard the governor's legislative party's "size" and the governor's party's electoral strength as possible causes of the levels of agreement between the governor and the legislative parties. It is important to note that these two causal factors are strongly associated with one another. The correlation between these variables is 0.91. This strong association between the governor's legislative party's "size" and the governor's party's electoral strength may make it difficult to assess the independent effects of the two variables on the governor's levels of agreement with the legislative parties. We therefore will regard the initial findings (involving Pearson's and Kendall's coefficients) about Hypotheses 1-8 as being preliminary indications on the support for these hypotheses. By using

regression analysis, we may be able to make better judgments about the independent effects of these causal factors on the levels of agreement between the governor and the legislative parties.

"Size" of the Legislative Party
and Agreement Levels

By referring to Table 8 and to Table 9, we can determine that the governor's party's "size" is negatively related to his level of agreement with his own party. The relationship is negative whether we consult Table 8, in which correlations between variables measured at the interval level are reported, or Table 9, in which the associations between variables measured the ordinal level are reported. The statistics in both tables indicate that the association is of moderate strength. The findings are consistent with the position taken in Hypothesis 1, then, regardless of whether we conceive of the relationship as one that changes throughout the range of values of the governor's legislative party "size" or as one that depends on the governor's legislative party's status as a majority or a minority party.

The findings which provide support for Hypothesis 1 are generally consistent with the literature reviewed in the first chapter. The findings are also consistent with our discussion of Governor Kim Sigler. Governor Sigler's

Table 8. Correlations Between the Independent Variables and the Levels of Agreement Between the Governor and the Legislative Party Groups

Levels of Agreement	Independent Variables			
	Governor's Legislative Party's "Size"		Governor's Party's Electoral Strength	
	r^a	Significance	r^a	Significance
Agreement between governor and own party	-.33	.001	-.31	.001
Agreement between governor and opposition party	.40	.001	.31	.001
Average of governor's levels of agreement with the two parties	-.11	.117	-.15	.059
Agreement between governor and House	.10	.158	.08	.199

NOTE: This analysis was performed on the "legislatures data set" which includes 110 cases. The variables were operationalized as interval measures.

^aPearson correlation coefficient.

Table 9. Measures of Association Between Independent Variables and Governor's Levels of Agreement with the Legislative Party Groups

Levels of Agreement	Independent Variables			
	Governor's Legislative Party's "Size"		Governor's Party's Electoral Strength	
	Tau ^a	Significance	Tau ^a	Significance
Agreement between governor and own party	-.39	.001	-.15	.011
Agreement between governor and opposition party	.49	.001	.09	.079
Average of governor's levels of agreement with the two parties	-.15	.011	-.11	.050
Agreement between governor and House	.06	.190	.18	.003

NOTE: The analysis was performed on the "legislatures data set." The ordinal level measures of the variables were used.

^aKendall's tau coefficient.

legislative party held a high percentage of the House, but Sigler had difficulty in dealing with members of his party.

An examination of the findings presented in Table 8 and Table 9 indicates that the governor's party's "size" is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party. These findings support the relationship between the variables proposed in Hypothesis 2. The statistics in Table 8 and in Table 9 indicate that the association is moderate in strength and that the finding is significant at the .001 level. Again, the results of the data analysis are quite similar regardless of whether we use ordinal level or interval level measures for the variables.

When we examine the findings in Table 8 and Table 9 which are relevant to Hypothesis 3, we determine that the governor's party's "size" is negatively related to the average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties. The magnitude of both statistics is small, and the findings provide rather weak support for Hypothesis 3.

The findings presented in Table 8 and Table 9 support the position taken in Hypothesis 4. This position is that the governor's party's "size" is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the House. The magnitude of the statistics is very small,

and we regard the findings as "suggestive" rather than as providing very significant support for the hypothesis.

Governor's Party's Electoral
Strength and Agreement Levels

As may be seen from Table 8 and Table 9, the results of the data analysis indicate that the governor's party's electoral strength is negatively related to the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party. These findings are of low to moderate strength. The findings using either the interval level or the ordinal level versions of the variables are similar to one another. The findings are not consistent with the relationship stated in Hypothesis 5. At this point we will not attempt to explain this inconsistency, because we will first need to examine the results of the estimation of a regression model in which the effects of both independent variables on the agreement between the governor and his legislative party are examined.

The statistical values in Table 8 and Table 9 indicate that the governor's party's electoral strength is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party. This association is of low to moderate strength. The results of the data analysis are not consistent with the negative direction of the association which we proposed in

Hypothesis 6. At this point, we will refrain from commenting on the inconsistency between the findings and the hypothesized association.

The findings indicate that the governor's party's electoral strength is negatively related to the average of the governor's levels of agreement with both parties. The magnitude of the statistics is small. The results using either the interval level or the ordinal level versions of the variables are similar to one another. The findings are consistent with the relationship stated in Hypothesis 7.

The results of the data analysis provide support for Hypothesis 8, which states that the governor's party's electoral strength is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the House. The measures of association are of small magnitude.

Effects of Both Independent Variables on Agreement Levels

Hypotheses 1-8 propose the existence of various relationships between the two independent variables (the governor's party's "size" and the governor's party's electoral strength) and the dependent variables (the levels of agreement between the governor and the legislative party groups). For each "agreement level" (such as the level of agreement between the governor and his party), we have proposed that the two independent variables are causes. It will be useful to investigate the relative strengths of

the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables.

A comparison of the statistical measures of association reported in Table 8 and Table 9 provides an initial indication of the relative influences of the governor's legislative party's "size" and the governor's party's electoral strength on the dependent variables. An examination of the statistics indicates that the governor's party's "size" is the stronger influence in six out of eight possible comparisons. Only when we examine the determinants of the average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two parties in Table 8 and the influences on the agreement between the governor and the House in Table 9 do we find that the governor's party's electoral strength is the stronger of the two determinants. In nearly all of these comparisons, however, the statistics are quite similar to one another in magnitude. The initial indication, then, is that the governor's party's "size" is the stronger of the two influences on the "agreement levels" which we examined.

Multiple regression analysis can be helpful to the researcher in various ways. Multiple regression analysis can determine the relative importance of different independent variables in making predictions of the dependent variable's value. This statistical technique also determines the share of the variance in the dependent variable which is explained by the effects of the independent

variables. Multiple regression, finally, involves a determination of whether or not the regression of the dependent variable on the independent variables is statistically significant."

We will present four regression models for which we will use the "ordinary least squares" method of estimation. In the case of each model, one of the "agreement level" variables is regressed on the governor's legislative party's "size" and the governor's party's electoral strength, the two independent variables. Kmenta states that a high degree of multicollinearity is present when one independent variable is highly correlated with another independent variable. In the case of a regression equation with two independent variables, the degree of multicollinearity is indicated by the value of the square of the correlation between the two independent variables.⁵ Given the correlation between the independent variables in the models which we will estimate (a correlation of .91), we will find that a high degree of multicollinearity is present in these models.

When a high degree of multicollinearity is present in a regression model, various problems may arise. First, the multicollinearity contributes to the unreliability of the estimated coefficients. Also, if the variances of the estimated coefficients are large, the hypothesis tests will be rather ineffective in choosing between "true" and "false"

hypotheses. Under conditions of high multicollinearity, it also may be difficult to assess the separate influences of the independent variables.⁶ Due to the problems which may be associated with the high multicollinearity, we will interpret the statistics relating to the following models with some caution about the level of confidence which we place in the conclusions that we draw.

In discussing the regression results, we will comment briefly on the implications of the findings for the hypotheses and on the amount of variation in the dependent variable which is explained. Most of the statistics indicate that rather weak relationships are present. Since the evidence is generally weak, we will not develop an extended discussion about the implications of the evidence for each hypothesis. Following the presentation of the findings from the four regression models and in the conclusion of this chapter, we will discuss the most important implications of the regression findings for the study.

In the first model the "level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party" is regressed on the independent variables. The model to be estimated has the following form:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \epsilon$$

Where: Y = level of agreement between the governor
and his legislative party

α = the intercept

X_1 = governor's party's "size"

X_2 = governor's party's electoral strength

ϵ = the error term

In Table 10 various statistics which reflect the estimation of the first model are reported. The unstandardized coefficient estimates (the " β " values) indicate that both the governor's party's "size" and the governor's party's electoral strength are negatively related to the level of agreement between the governor and his own party. The negative relationship between the governor's party's "size" and the level of agreement between the governor and his own party is consistent with the correlation presented above and with Hypothesis 1. The F statistics for the coefficients are not statistically significant at the .05 level. A comparison of the standardized regression coefficients indicates that the governor's party's "size" is the stronger of the two determinants of the level of agreement between the governor and his own party.

Although the unstandardized coefficient in Table 10 indicates that the relationship between the governor's party's electoral strength and the level of agreement between the governor and his own party is negative, this

Table 10. Results of the Estimation of the Model with the Level of Agreement Between the Governor and His Legislative Party as the Dependent Variable

Independent Variable	β	Standard Error of β	F Ratio of Coefficient	Significance of F Ratio	Standardized Coefficient
Governor's party's "size"	-.6118	.4951	1.5269	.219	-.2788
Governor's party's electoral strength	-.3359	1.4804	.0515	.821	-.0512
Constant	.9939				
R^2	.1064				
F	6.3716		Significance = .002		

NOTE: The regression analysis was computed on the "legislatures data set" using ordinary least squares regression.

is a very weak relationship. The previously reported indication that the relationship was negative (a $-.31$ correlation which was significant at the $.01$ level) was much stronger. The unstandardized coefficient represents the effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable while the other independent variables are held constant.⁷ Since the negative relationship becomes very weak when we control for the effects of the governor's party's "size," it is likely that the governor's party's electoral strength has very little independent effect on the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party. We conclude that the positive relationship proposed in Hypothesis 5 between the governor's party's electoral strength and the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party is not supported by the findings. There is also, however, a lack of any significant support for the existence of a negative relationship between these variables.

The R^2 value for the first estimated model indicates that about 11 percent of the variation in the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party is explained by the effects of the independent variables. The F statistic for the entire equation is significant at the $.01$ level of statistical significance.

The second model involves regressing the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party on the two independent variables. The model which we estimate has the following form:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \epsilon$$

Where: Y = level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party

α = the intercept

X_1 = governor's party's "size"

X_2 = governor's party's electoral strength

ϵ = error term

As may be seen by examining the unstandardized coefficients in Table 11, the governor's party's "size" is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party in the second model. This finding is consistent with the information provided by the correlation between the two variables and is consistent with the position taken in Hypothesis 2. The F statistic based on the coefficient is significant at the .01 level.

As the appropriate unstandardized coefficient in Table 11 indicates, the governor's party's electoral strength is negatively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party. The F statistic for the coefficient does not indicate a

Table 11. Results of Estimation of the Model with the Level of Agreement Between the Governor and the Opposition Legislative Party as the Dependent Variable

Independent Variable	β	Standard Error of β	F Ratio of Coefficient	Significance of F Ratio	Standardized Coefficient
Governor's party's "size"	.8667	.2744	9.9801	.002	.6845
Governor's party's electoral strength	-1.1797	.8203	2.0681	.153	-.3116
Constant	.3380				
R ²	.1756				
F	11.3988		Significance = .000		

NOTE: The regression analysis was computed on the "legislatures data set" using ordinary least squares regression.

statistically significant finding but does indicate a somewhat "suggestive" finding. When we control for the effects of the governor's party's "size," then, the negative relationship that we find between the governor's party's electoral strength and the governor's agreement with the opposition legislative party is consistent with Hypothesis 6 (although the correlation between the variables was inconsistent with Hypothesis 6). Upon reviewing the evidence (including the regression results), we find support for Hypothesis 6 and for Hypothesis 2.

The R^2 value for the second estimated model indicates that about 18 percent of the variation in the governor's agreement with the opposition legislative party is accounted for by the effects of the independent variables. The F statistic for the entire equation is significant at the .001 level of statistical significance. We are able to explain more of the variation in the governor's agreement with the opposition party than we could in the governor's agreement with his own party.

In the third model we regress "the average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties" on the two independent variables. The third model has the following form:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \epsilon$$

Where: Y = average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties

α = the intercept

X_1 = governor's party's "size"

X_2 = governor's party's electoral strength

ϵ = the error term

By referring to Table 12, we find that the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable are quite weak. The F statistic based on the unstandardized coefficients are not significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for the governor's party's electoral strength indicates that the variable is negatively related to the average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties. This indication that the relationship is a negative one is consistent with the evidence provided by the correlation, and it is also consistent with Hypothesis 7. The results of the estimation of the third model indicate that the governor's party's "size" is positively related to the average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties. The correlation between the two variables, however, was negative. There is "mixed" evidence on the direction of the relationship between the variables, and the evidence is that the relationship is a weak one. We conclude that the position taken in Hypothesis 3, that the governor's

Table 12. Results of Estimation of the Model with the Average of the Governor's Levels of Agreement with the Two Legislative Parties as the Dependent Variable

Independent Variable	β	Standard Error of β	F Ratio of Coefficient	Significance of F Ratio	Standardized Coefficient
Governor's party's "size"	.1275	.2150	.3514	.555	.1397
Governor's party's electoral strength	-.7578	.6430	1.3892	.241	-.2776
Constant	.6659				
R^2	.0257				
F	1.4107		Significance = .248		

NOTE: The regression analysis was computed on the "legislatures data set" using ordinary least squares regression.

party's "size" is negatively related to the average of his levels of agreement with the two parties, is not supported to any significant extent by the evidence.

In the third model the independent variables account for very little (about 3 percent) of the variation in the average of the governor's levels of agreement with the two legislative parties. The F statistic for the entire equation is not significant at the .05 level.

We assess the effects of the independent variables on the level of agreement between the governor and the House in the fourth model. The model has the following form:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \epsilon$$

Where: Y = level of agreement between the governor and the House

α = the intercept

X_1 = governor's party's "size"

X_2 = governor's party's electoral strength

ϵ = the error term

As may be seen in Table 13, the relationships between the independent variables and the level of agreement between the governor and the House are very weak in the fourth model. The F statistics for the regression coefficients are not significant at the .05 level. The governor's party's "size" is positively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the House.

Table 13. Results of Estimation of the Model with the Level of Agreement Between the Governor and the House as the Dependent Variable

Independent Variable	β	Standard Error of β	F Ratio of Coefficient	Significance of F Ratio	Standardized Coefficient
Governor's party's "size"	.0945	.1665	.3221	.572	.1348
Governor's party's electoral strength	-.0874	.4979	.0308	.861	-.0417
Constant	.2947				
R ²	.0096				
F	.5201		Significance = .596		

NOTE: The regression analysis was computed on the "legislatures data set" using ordinary least squares regression.

This finding is consistent with the position taken in Hypothesis 4 and with the evidence provided by the correlation between the variables. The unstandardized coefficient for the governor's party's electoral strength indicates that this variable is negatively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the House. The position taken in Hypothesis 8 is that this relationship is positive, and the correlation between the variables provides support for that hypothesis. Since there is a discrepancy between the sign of the correlation and of the regression coefficient regarding this association, we have mixed evidence on the direction of the association stated in Hypothesis 8. Since both statistics indicate that the relationship is a very weak one, Hypothesis 8 is not supported to a significant extent by the evidence.

The R^2 value in Table 13 indicates that the independent variables in the fourth model explain only about 1 percent of the variation in the level of agreement between the governor and the House. The F statistic for the entire equation is not significant at the .05 level.

In reviewing the findings of the regression analysis, certain of the stronger results should be mentioned. The governor's party's "size" is negatively related to the governor's agreement with his legislative party and positively related to the governor's level of

agreement with the opposition legislative party. These findings will provide the basis for further discussion in the concluding section of this chapter. The governor's party's electoral strength is negatively related to his agreement with the opposition legislative party and the average of his levels of agreement with the two legislative parties. Based on these findings one might suggest that, as we hypothesized, the governor who lacks a party which is strong in the electorate tends to find alternatives to the strategy of agreeing closely with his own legislative party on policy matters.

The results of the regression analysis are consistent with the view that the governor's party's "size" is more important than the governor's party's electoral strength in determining the values of the "agreement levels." In three out of the four models, the standardized coefficient for the governor's party's "size" was of greater magnitude (in terms of absolute value) than the standardized coefficient for the governor's party's electoral strength.

Agreement Levels and Voter Support

Hypotheses 9-12 generally reflect the view that a governor's level of agreement with a legislative party group will be paralleled by a similar level of support from an analogous "party group" of voters.⁸ As may be ascertained

from Table 14, the governor's level of agreement with each of the party groups of legislators is positively related to his level of support from a similar "party group" of voters. Hypotheses 9-12, then, are supported by the evidence. The magnitude of each of the correlations is small, although two of the four correlations are significant at the .10 level.

In the previous chapter we used the gubernatorial tenures of G. Mennen Williams and George Romney as examples in arguing that the voter support received by the governor from various party groups of voters results, at least in part, from his agreement levels with similar party groups of legislators. We also discussed the arguments of Jewell which indicate that a governor's level of agreement with the legislature is likely to be paralleled by his level of support from the electorate. The findings in Table 14 compose a pattern which supports these arguments.

Although the correlations in Table 14 are low, the likelihood of all the correlations being in support of the hypotheses by chance alone is small. We therefore conclude that there is moderate support for the general view that the level of agreement between the governor and a legislative party group is associated with a similar level of support for the governor by the analogous party group of voters. The empirical evidence for each of the hypotheses, however, is rather weak.

Table 14. Correlations Between Governor's Levels of Agreement with the Legislative Party Groups and Governor's Levels of Support from Party Groups of Voters

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Pearson's r	Significance Level
Agreement between governor and own party	Governor's support from his party's voters	.12	.105
Agreement between governor and opposition party	Governor's support from opposition party's voters	.08	.206
Average of governor's levels of agreement with the two parties	Governor's level of support from both parties' voters	.15	.059
Agreement between governor and House	Governor's level of electoral support	.14	.074

NOTE: These statistics were computed on the "administrations data set."

Summary and Conclusion

In the opening section of this chapter, we reviewed some background on Michigan governors, the situations which they faced, and the number of bills which they vetoed during the period of the study. As we would expect in a state which has two fairly competitive parties, the governorship was held fairly evenly by each party and the governor was often faced by an opposition legislative majority. Michigan appeared to be an "average" state in terms of the governors' number of vetoes per year. During the period covered by the study, there was significant variation in the majority or minority status of the governor's party in the legislature and in the electorate.

The governor's party's "size" is moderately strongly related to certain of levels of agreement between the governor and the legislative parties. The governor's party's "size" is negatively related to his level of agreement with his own legislative party and positively related to his level of agreement with the opposition legislative party. In other words, the governor with a smaller party tends to concur with his own party's "No" votes by vetoing legislation backed by the opposition majority. A governor with a larger legislative party, however, tends to concur with the opposition party's "No" votes by blocking legislation passed by his own majority party. There is a tendency,

then, for governors to veto the legislation of a large party (or a majority).

The findings on certain other relationships between variables should also be mentioned. We found that a governor whose party is weaker in the electorate has a greater tendency to agree with the opposition legislative party and with bipartisan legislative groups than would otherwise be the case. We found a consistent pattern of empirical evidence which indicates that the governor's levels of agreement with the legislative parties are positively associated with his levels of support from analogous "party groups" of voters.

In examining the statistical evidence on Hypotheses 1-8, we found that it was similar whether we used ordinal level or interval level versions of the variables. The influences of the governor's legislative party's "size" and of the governor's party's electoral strength on the "agreement levels" were similar, then, regardless of which versions of the variables we used.

Certain conclusions are supported by the results of the regression analysis. The estimation of the four models using multiple regression indicates that the governor's party's "size" generally has a stronger influence on the governor's agreement with the legislative parties than does the governor's party's electoral strength. A

modest amount of the variation in the governor's agreement with his own legislative party and in the governor's agreement with the opposition legislative party can be explained by the models we developed. A much smaller amount of the variation in the governor's level of agreement with the two parties and of the governor's level of agreement with the House is explained by the models presented in this chapter.

There was some empirical support for many of the hypotheses proposed in the second chapter. The hypotheses were generally supported, however, by findings of low to moderate strength. The lack of stronger empirical support might be partially explained by the importance of other explanatory factors. The relationship between the governor and the legislative parties is one in which various factors involving the governor (such as his style of dealing with legislators and his position within his political party) may play a significant role. Because the empirical evidence presented in this study was consistent with some of our hypotheses, we contend that the theoretical perspective has some merit. The lack of stronger confirmation of our hypotheses, however, will lead us to consider some personal and political factors in our attempt to more fully examine the governor's working relationship with the legislative parties.

CHAPTER III--FOOTNOTES

¹Morehouse, State Politics, p. 294.

²The "minor office" used for the 1936-1962 elections is Auditor General, and the "minor office" used for the 1964-1976 elections is the Michigan State University Board of Trustees.

³Wiggins, pp. 1110-1117.

⁴Fred N. Kerlinger and Elazar J. Pedhazur, Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1973), pp. 2-72.

⁵Jan Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 380-389.

⁶Ibid., pp. 389-391.

⁷Ibid., p. 349.

⁸The voters of the governor's party constitute an example of a "party group" of voters. The operationalizations of the governor's levels of support from the "party groups" of voters are presented in Chapter II.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THREE MICHIGAN
GOVERNORS WITH THE LEGISLATIVE
PARTIES

A study of the relationships between the governor and the legislative parties can benefit from the examination of descriptive and quantitative evidence. In this dissertation we have examined statistical findings relevant to the relationships between various variables which we have quantified. Jewell, in his examination of the governor's role as a legislative leader, mentions several factors which he does not measure numerically. Among these factors are the strength of the governor's party's organization and the governor's role as a party spokesman.¹ In this chapter, then, we will add a discussion of some additional factors (based on descriptive evidence) to the discussion of the statistical findings presented above.

In this chapter we will examine the effects of two previously studied variables and two additional factors on the working relationship between the state's chief executive and the legislative parties in Michigan.

We will use a broader range of evidence, rather than examining only the "agreement levels" between the governor and the legislative parties which were employed in Chapter III, to assess the working relationship between the governor and the legislative parties. This broader range of evidence will consist of some descriptive evidence, the "agreement levels" measured on certain vetoes, and legislative votes on certain bills supported by the governor. Since we have some indication about the effects of the two previously studied variables, the governor's party's "size" and the governor's party's electoral strength, we should take the influences of these variables into account in this chapter. One additional factor to be examined is the governor's ideological position in relationship to the ideological positions held in the two parties. A second additional factor is the governor's style of relating to the legislative parties.

We will examine the role of each of the four "explanatory" factors during the governorships of G. Mennen Williams, George Romney, and William Milliken. In the conclusion to this chapter, we will make some generalizations about the effects of these factors on the governor's working relationship with the legislative parties in Michigan.

The governorships of Williams, Romney, and Milliken were chosen for study for several reasons. First, these governors held office for the longest periods of those covered by the study. Governors Williams, Romney, and Milliken therefore had the greatest opportunities to affect Michigan's destiny. Secondly, these three Michigan chief executives are among those serving most recently, so that there is more information available about them. Finally, information presented in the foregoing chapters indicates that each of these three governors manifested a different strategy in working with the legislative parties. Governor Williams worked closely with his own party. Governor Milliken worked successfully with the legislative opposition, and Governor Romney worked well with legislative groups composed of members from both parties. By selecting the governorships of these three men for study, then, we can attempt to determine if the various explanatory "factors" have any effect on the governor's relationship with the legislative parties under various approaches to this relationship which governors may take.

The governorships of G. Mennen Williams and George Romney are of interest also because there was concern that each man was a politician who might gain the presidential candidacy of his party.² In this chapter we will cover some of the circumstances related to the possibility that

each of these men might have gained a presidential nomination.

Governor Williams

G. Mennen Williams served as Michigan's governor in the 1949-1960 period. Peirce indicates that the Williams era followed a long period in which Republicans held an advantaged position in the state's politics. The rise of the United Auto Workers during the years preceding Williams's tenure meant that there was a strong union movement with an interest in politics. Williams's predecessor, the Republican Kim Sigler, had alienated conservative members of his own party and was not supported by them. By 1948, then, a series of factors had created the opportunity for a Democratic candidate to win Michigan's governorship.³

G. Mennen Williams's victory in the 1948 gubernatorial race was achieved despite his Democratic party's inability to win 50 percent of the vote in the "minor office" election (as may be seen from Table 2). The victory by Williams, however, left the "organization Republicans" who were against the "maverick" Sigler with an opportunity to recover the leadership of their party. Republicans were confident that they would defeat Williams in 1950.⁴ As the figures in Table 2 indicate, Williams did win election in his first three terms despite

his party's lack of a "majority" in the state's electorate. In the elections which preceded Williams's final three terms as governor, however, the governor's party's electoral strength exceeded 50 percent.

The governor's party's "size" is another factor which might have influenced Governor Williams's dealings with the legislative parties during his long tenure as the state's chief executive. By examining Table 1, we find that Williams's legislative party held a minority of the House of Representatives during the entire period of his tenure except for the 1959-1960 era, during which the parties each held 50 percent of the chamber's seats. We should note that during the Williams era, the legislature was not apportioned strictly by population. The apportionment of the Senate led to the most serious objections, including a lawsuit by August Scholle, president of Michigan's AFL-CIO, in 1959.⁵

Governor Williams's role as a leader in the Democratic party is important background information for understanding his ideological position and his style of dealing with the legislative parties. In 1947 Williams and August Scholle developed a strategy to regenerate the Democratic party under the leadership of Williams. The labor movement (largely the CIO) played a key role forming the "labor-liberal" alliance that held a substantial majority of state convention votes by 1952.⁶

Sawyer states that the relative stability among the Democratic State Central Committee officers in the 1949-1959 period was partly due to the long tenure of Governor Williams and Williams's support of Chairman Staebler.⁷ LaPalombara depicted Williams as the unchallenged leader of the Democratic party and as the leader of a faction which controlled the Democratic party organization.⁸ Governor Williams, then, emerged as the leader of the "labor-liberal" alliance which dominated the Democratic party during most of his period of service as governor.

The political parties of the Williams era were "issue-oriented." Fenton notes that the two parties differed quite sharply on the relative values of "human rights" and "property rights," with the Democrats stressing the importance of "human rights."⁹ In the second chapter we indicated that Republican and Democratic legislators of the Williams period differed quite sharply in their "liberal" or "conservative" ideological positions on the issues and that Williams took "advanced" (or "liberal") stands on the issues. From this information we can reach a conclusion about the relationship of Williams's ideological position to the ideological positions held in the two parties. Williams was a liberal whose position on the issues was consistent with the dominant group in his Democratic party, but

his ideological position left him with little basis on which to compromise with members of the conservative Republican party.

There are several aspects involved in Governor Williams's style of relating to the legislative parties and to the legislature. As we stated in the second chapter, Williams was likely to work closely with his own party on policy matters. Peirce notes that Governor Williams was often frustrated in his attempts to make policy achievements by working with the Republican-controlled legislature. Williams therefore appealed to the public on such issues as workmen's compensation and mental health reform.¹⁰ One clear element of Williams's approach in dealing with the legislature was his forceful, and perhaps stubborn, personal style. Peirce's account of Williams's legislative relations indicates that the Governor could be less than diplomatic when faced with the frustration of having his policy-making efforts thwarted.¹¹ In G. Mennen Williams's account of his tenure as governor, he states that there were bitter, long debates between the legislature and himself on income taxation. He asserts, however, that these debates helped to change the views of some Chambers of Commerce in the state.¹²

One interesting phase of Williams's dealings with the legislative parties occurred in the late 1950s when he was considered to be a candidate for the Democratic

presidential nomination. Stieber mentions that some of Williams's supporters wanted him to run for president in 1960. In 1959, Governor Williams requested that a state income tax be passed. The tax became an issue which divided the legislature along party lines, partially due to the widely held view that Williams had political ambitions beyond the governorship. The income tax issue became an explosive one, and action on it was blocked in the Republican-controlled Senate. Due to the 1958 recession, the state's revenues declined while the expenditures rose. Some state employees went unpaid and contractors were owed large sums of money by state government. A measure including a variety of selective sales taxes and corporate fees was finally enacted in December of 1959, but Michigan had already received much adverse publicity.¹³ This situation could hardly increase Williams's chances of securing his party's presidential nomination. It is evident that the governor's supporters and detractors can take an especially strong interest in the measures the governor supports once he is viewed as a possible candidate for president. It seems likely that the governor's status as a possible presidential candidate would tend to polarize the political parties on major elements of his program.

Having examined certain factors which may account for Governor Williams's relationship with the legislative

parties, we need to present some general information about Williams's dealings with those parties. In Table 15 the vetoes of the three governors on "controversial" bills are categorized by the policy area of the bill.¹⁴ The "policy areas" used to categorize the vetoes are drawn from the study of Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis.¹⁵ As may be seen from Table 15, Williams's vetoes fell into twelve of the twenty possible categories. Williams's vetoes most commonly fell into the following categories: taxation, local government, social welfare, and "courts-penal-crime."

In Table 15 more of Governor Williams's vetoes were classified in the "taxation" area than in any other single policy area. A brief examination of the "agreement levels" which apply to these vetoes in the taxation area is useful in understanding Williams's relationship with the legislative parties. For Williams's vetoes in the taxation area, the average value of the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party was .645. This figure represents the proportion of the party's votes which were "No" votes. For these same vetoes, the average value of the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party (the proportion of that party's votes which are "No" votes) is .135. We find, then, that Governor Williams showed a much higher level

Table 15. Policy Areas of Bills Vetoed by Various Governors

Policy Area of Bill ^a	Numbers of Vetoes by Governors		
	Williams ^b	Romney ^b	Milliken ^b
Taxation	10	1	1
Apportionment	0	0	0
Education	1	0	2
Finance	0	0	0
Labor	0	0	3
Health	1	2	1
Business	1	3	1
Civil rights	0	0	1
Highways-transportation	0	1	1
Administration	1	3	2
Local government	5	3	3
Social welfare	3	0	0
Courts-penal-crime	3	3	0
Liquor	1	5	1
Gambling	0	0	0
Land	0	1	0
Elections-primaries-conventions	2	5	0
Constitutional revision	2	0	0
Water resources	0	0	0
Agriculture	1	0	0
All areas	31	27	16

SOURCES: Veto messages were available in the appropriate editions of the Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Michian and the Journal of the Senate of the State of Michigan.

NOTE: The policy areas which applied to the bills vetoed by the governors were determined by reading the governors' veto messages. Only those bills on which 10 percent or more of those voting on the question of passage (or its equivalent) disagreed were included in the table. The vetoes were drawn from the "legislatures data set."

^aThe categories for policy areas are those used in the following source: Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), p. 11.

^bThese figures represent Governor Williams's vetoes over the 1949-1960 period, Governor Romney's vetoes in the 1963-1966 era, and Governor Milliken's vetoes in the 1971-1978 period. These periods used for the three governors encompass their years of service, except that certain years which have been excluded from the data set (1967-1970 and the period after 1978) are omitted for Governor Romney and Governor Milliken.

of agreement with his own party than with the Republicans in the important taxation policy area.

Both the descriptive evidence presented in the second chapter and the statistical evidence presented above indicate that Governor Williams worked closely with his own legislative party but did not work well with the opposition legislative party. In Chapter II we stated that Williams attended the Democrats' legislative caucuses and that he held preliminary consultations on bills with his legislative party. Williams was viewed as a "liberal" Democratic governor who received support from his party but was often blocked in his efforts to achieve his program by the Republicans who generally controlled the legislature. The statistical evidence on Governor Williams's vetoes in the taxation policy area indicates that he demonstrated a higher level of agreement with his own legislative party than with the opposition legislative party.

In explaining G. Mennen Williams's ability to work well with his legislative party and his lack of a close working relationship with legislative Republicans, three out of the four "explanatory" factors discussed at the beginning of this chapter are important. We will discuss the effect of the legislature's perception that Williams would seek his party's presidential nomination in the conclusion of this chapter. Since Williams's Democratic

party held electoral "majorities" and "minorities" equally during his tenure, it is unlikely that the governor's party's electoral strength had any consistent effect on the Governor's abilities to work well with his own and the opposition legislative parties. Based on the evidence from the analysis using vetoes in Chapter III, the "minority" status which Williams's party generally had in the legislature would contribute to his tendencies to work closely with his own party and face opposition from the Republicans. Since Williams's "liberal" ideological position placed him within the dominant Democratic faction and set him apart from the "conservative" Republicans, his basic ideological position enabled him to work well with his own party but did not facilitate close working relationship with the opposition. Finally, Williams's close working relationship with his own party and opposition from the Republicans were partially due to his style, which involved tendencies to be fairly stubborn with the opposition and to work through his own party.

Governor Romney

George Romney served as Michigan's governor during the 1963-1979 period, a very eventful era in Michigan politics. Two major changes of the period, the ratification of the 1963 constitution and the reapportionment

of the state legislature on a population basis, were discussed in the first chapter.

In the beginning of George Romney's development as a leader in Michigan politics, he showed a certain amount of independence from the political parties. In 1959 Romney led Citizens for Michigan, a nonpartisan group promoting a revised constitution for the state and a reformed system of taxation.¹⁶ In 1961 Romney ran as Republican for the position of delegate to the constitutional convention. When George Romney ran for and won the governorship in 1962, he attacked both the state's political parties and its special interests.¹⁷

One factor which influences the working relationship between the governor and the legislative parties is the governor's party's electoral strength. From Table 2 we can determine that Romney's Republican party constituted a "minority" of the electorate before two of his terms, but the Republicans were an electoral "majority" preceding Romney's final, abbreviated term. The Republican party, then, constituted an electoral "minority" during most of George Romney's tenure as governor.

During the period of George Romney's governorship, the governor's party's "size" varied significantly, as the percentages in Table 1 indicate. During Romney's first and last terms as governor his party held legislative

"majorities," but during his second term the Republicans were the "minority" party in the legislature. It is important to note that the reapportionment of the legislature was made before Romney's second term.

The effects of Michigan's 1964 reapportionment have been the subject of some disagreement. In Table 1 there is a large increase in the Democrats' share of the House and Senate seats following the reapportionment of 1964. Stieber mentions that some people in Michigan contend that the new apportionment gave the Democrats an advantage, but others contend that the Johnson "coat-tails" caused the Democratic increase in seats.¹⁸ We should note that the legislature reverted to Republican control in 1967 (as is reflected in Table 1). Peirce argues that the Republican suburbs, rather than the Democratic cities, were the main beneficiaries from Michigan's reapportionment. He does note, however, that this type of legislative reform gave Democrats a chance to win legislative control in northern states. The increased bargaining power of Blacks and the election of young, educated legislators are also cited as benefits of reapportionment.¹⁹ Observers of Michigan politics, then, have identified several possible results of Michigan's 1964 reapportionment.

Jewell and Patterson argue that ". . . the malapportionment of most state legislatures guaranteed that there would be sharp contrasts between the constituency bases of the governor and his legislative party."²⁰

Reapportionment in the 1960s, however, insured that the groups of constituents represented by the state's chief executive and his legislative party would be much more closely matched.²¹ We might expect to find, then, that the policy orientations of governors who served after the reapportionment (Romney and Milliken) would be more closely matched to their legislative parties than would otherwise have been the case. The addition of suburban legislators to the Republican legislative parties after reapportionment may have made those parties ideologically closer to the "progressive" Governors Romney and Milliken. The existence of other factors, such as the need to gain Democratic voter support and the frequent minority status of the Republican party in the House, may have encouraged the governors to seek legislative support outside of the Republican party despite the existence of legislators within the party who agreed with the governors' policy stands.

George Romney's ideological position was that of a "progressive," or moderate Republican. Fenton indicates that after 1962 George Romney held the leadership of Michigan's Republican party as a political "moderate."²²

Stieber notes that many of the accomplishments under Romney's administrations were policies which had been supported by Democrats. These accomplishments included programs in civil rights and construction safety.²³

Steiber discusses some of Romney's struggles within the Republican party. One Romney opponent was Arthur Summerfield, an announced supporter of Goldwater in 1964. Romney generally was in a difficult position on the Goldwater candidacy. As governor of Michigan, George Romney refused to endorse Goldwater and did not appear with the presidential candidate in Michigan. At the 1964 national convention, Romney had opposed the Republican platform positions on political extremism and civil rights.²⁴ Romney's history of political disagreements and clashes with "conservative" Republicans, then, is consistent with his role as a leader of "moderate" Republicans.

George Romney's ideological position in the "progressive" wing of Michigan's Republican party enhanced the possibility of his cooperation with the opposition legislative party. Since Michigan's Democratic party has been a rather "liberal" one, the potential existed for Romney to work with the opposition party or with elements of both parties which favored "progressive" policies.

George Romney tended to be forceful in his political style, although he was also known to compromise on certain issues. In reflecting on Romney's political career in Michigan, Stieber indicates that he was frequently criticized for his inflexibility. She does discuss, however, the "Romney-Brake" compromise which helped to shape a new Michigan constitution during the 1961-1962 state constitutional convention.²⁵ Romney's harsh public criticism of certain Republican state senators at the Michigan party's 1964 convention is an example of his ability to deal forcefully with a legislative party. As a result of that criticism, a vast majority of the Republican senators supported the Governor's redistricting plan on which they had earlier been more evenly divided.²⁶ Judging from this incident and from Romney's political style, he was capable of being quite dominating in his dealings with the legislative parties.

George Romney eventually became a contender for the Republican presidential nomination. Based on his impressive 1966 election victory, Romney became a leading figure in the contest for the Republican presidential nomination. Peirce argues that Romney did not have adequate staying power and depth to successfully campaign for the nomination.²⁷ Stieber states that Romney's personality was a problem in his attempt to become the Republican nominee for president. With unflattering press coverage, Romney

withdrew from the 1968 New Hampshire primary campaign before the voting occurred.²⁸ Romney's personality and style, which enabled him to succeed at the state level, were not helpful in his efforts to gain the presidency.

We can develop some general background on Governor Romney's relationship with the legislature by reviewing the policy areas of the bills which he vetoed. As may be seen from Table 15, Romney vetoed controversial bills in ten policy areas. A significant number of vetoes fell into each of the following areas: business, administration, local government, and "courts-penal-crime." The two categories with the most vetoes are liquor and "elections-primaries-conventions." Only one of Romney's vetoes falls into the area of taxation, a policy area into which many of Governor Williams's vetoes fell. The economic advances in Michigan's economy during the 1960s may have temporarily convinced some politicians that new taxes were not required. The taxation issue was again prominent in 1967 when a state income tax was passed.²⁹

As we indicated above, one of the policy areas which covers the most bills vetoed by Governor Romney is the liquor area. Peirce mentions John Kennedy's remark about Romney being a politician without vices (Romney was a nondrinker) and therefore a dangerous political foe.³⁰ This concern with "clean living" may have contributed to Romney's tendency to veto bills in the "liquor" area.

Much of the evidence about Governor Romney which has been presented indicates that he was able to work with bipartisan groups of legislators to enact policies which he desired. In Chapter I we indicated that Governor Romney was able to work with legislators of both parties to make policies in many areas. Probably the most important example of bipartisan support for a policy sponsored by Romney was the passage of the income tax. Romney is also given credit, by Peirce, for restoring confidence in the state government and putting Michigan in a good financial situation.³¹

Three factors are particularly useful in explaining George Romney's ability to work well with bipartisan legislative groups. First, Romney's Republican party constituted a "minority" in the state's electorate during most of his tenure as governor. Romney's party's weakness in the electorate may have contributed to his tendency to demonstrate agreement on policies with elements of both parties. Secondly, Romney's ideological position in the "moderate" wing of the Republican party meant that he shared certain areas of agreement with members of the generally "liberal" Democratic party. It is likely that Romney's "ideological" agreement with major elements of both parties made it easier for him to work with bipartisan legislative coalitions. Finally, although Romney demonstrated a forceful and occasionally an inflexible leadership style, he was also

able to compromise. The combination of Romney's party's low electoral strength, his "progressivism," and his ability to compromise contributed to his success in working well with bipartisan legislative groups on major issues.

Governor Milliken

In this discussion of William Milliken's service as Michigan's governor, the 1969-1978 period will be covered (although he continued to serve as the state's chief executive after 1978).³² Milliken took office in 1969 following service in other elective offices. The future governor was in a group of nine Republican "moderates" elected to Michigan's Senate in 1960.³³ William Milliken was then elected as Governor Romney's lieutenant governor in 1964. When George Romney left Michigan to assume a position in President Nixon's cabinet, Milliken became governor.³⁴

Governor Milliken's Republican party was usually a "minority" party in the electorate during the 1969-1978 period of Milliken's governorship. As may be seen from Table 2, the Republicans won more than 50 percent of the "minor office" vote in only one of the five elections which apply to the 1969-1978 era. Milliken's "progressive" positions on the issues may have been partially motivated by his party's lack of strength in the electorate. The relative electoral weakness of the Republican party may have

been a factor which motivated Milliken to support urban programs and other programs that would appeal to Democratic legislators and Democratic voters.

The Republican party's status as a "minority" party during Governor Milliken's tenure is also reflected in its party "size" in the Michigan House of Representatives. The percentages in Table 1 indicate that the Republican party never had a House majority in the 1969-1978 period.

Governor Milliken's ideological positions fell within the moderate wing of Michigan's Republican party. A report on Milliken's 1977 State of the State message notes that Milliken again proposed a program for regional tax base sharing in that year. Under the proposal, wealthy communities would have shared their tax base with less wealthy communities in their region. In the same message the governor proposed a program of incentives to create employment and urban grants, as well as a program to deal with urban decay through youth employment.³⁵ Milliken's emphasis on redistributive, urban, and social programs, then, serves as evidence of his "moderate" position in his party.

Milliken's views on the Republican party also help to identify him as a "progressive" Republican. In a 1977 television appearance, Michigan's governor argued that the national Republican party should not "write off"

the black vote. He contended that it would be wrong and pragmatically unwise to do so. Milliken also argued that the party needed to become more "moderate" and to gain a broader membership.³⁶

The "progressive" policies which Governor Milliken advocated and his desire to broaden his party's base and moderate its positions provide strong evidence that Milliken is a "moderate" Republican. Some of Milliken's initiatives, however, suggest that he also held some more traditionally "Republican" views. In his 1977 State of the State message, for example, the governor proposed the curbing of welfare abuses, advocated a program to deter crime through punishment, and acknowledged that there are limits on what government can do for people.³⁷ Milliken's ideological position as a "moderate Republican" would have facilitated a strategy of working with the Democrats, who generally took "liberal" positions.

Governor Milliken's style in dealing with the legislature has generally been characterized by a willingness to compromise. At first, the governor may have been too "gentle" with the legislature. Peirce notes that in his early years as the state's chief executive, Milliken's unwillingness to be forceful may have impaired quick approval of his proposals in the legislature.³⁸ A 1978 account quotes statements by Democratic House Speaker

Bobby D. Crim which indicated that he had cooperated with the governor and tried to compromise in areas where there were differences.³⁹ In Chapter I we indicated that Milliken stated that he worked well with the Democratic legislative party. Later in his tenure, Governor Milliken was involved in an incident that showed he was capable of "getting tough" with legislators. A 1977 article states that Milliken, uncharacteristically, threatened to retaliate against six Republican legislators who helped override his veto of a bill which eroded the governor's power over administrative rules.⁴⁰ In general, however, Milliken demonstrated a "style" involving cooperation and compromise with the legislative parties.

From the categorization of Governor Milliken's vetoes by policy areas presented in Table 15, an initial view of his dealings with the legislature can be gained. Governor Milliken vetoed controversial bills in ten out of the twenty policy areas, and he had no more than three vetoes in any one policy area. Milliken had fewer vetoes of controversial bills than the other governors, but his vetoes covered quite a few areas given their small total numbers. Local government and labor were the policy areas into which the largest number of Milliken's vetoes fell. The only other areas in which more than one bill was vetoed were education and administration. The figures

in Table 15 show that while Governor Milliken blocked legislative action in a fairly large number of policy areas, his veto actions did not center heavily on one policy area.

Certain data were recorded concerning the legislation which Governor Milliken supported and the legislature's votes on those bills. Since much of the descriptive information about Milliken has centered on the 1977-1978 period, the data on Milliken's legislative "proposals" has been gathered on bills which were under consideration by the legislature during the 1977-1978 period. The proposals supported by the governor were identified from his Michigan State of the State Message of January 1978.⁴¹

The data on Milliken's "proposals" were collected so that the governor's support from various legislative party groups could be measured. Four variables were employed in connection with the data on the legislation Milliken supported, and these variables are similar to those used in connection with the "veto" data sets. The "governor's level of support from his legislative party" is measured by the proportion of the governor's party's members voting on his proposal who vote for it.⁴² The "governor's level of support from the opposition legislative party" is measured by the proportion of the opposition

party's members voting on his proposal who vote for it. A third variable is the "average of the governor's levels of support from the two legislative parties." This variable is operationally defined as the average of the "governors level of support from his legislative party" and the "governor's level of support from the opposition legislative party." The "governor's level of support in the House" is operationally defined as the proportion of all House members voting on the governor's proposal who vote for it.

In collecting the data on the legislative proposals supported by Governor Milliken, an effort was made to follow procedures which were fairly comparable to those used in gathering the data on vetoes. The basic procedure in gathering the "proposals" data was to select the first "allowable" legislative vote on each bill which occurred after the governor had supported the legislation in his 1978 Michigan State of the State Message. That legislative vote was then used for measuring the support of the governor by the legislative party groups. "Allowable" votes were those that dealt with the substance of the issue involved in the bill."³ Certain other checks were made on the data set to try to insure that the votes represented support of the governor's proposals and to make the "proposals" data set reasonably consistent with the data involving vetoes."⁴

The full data set of Milliken's legislative proposals involved thirty-nine bills. For this set of proposals, the average value of the governor's level of support from his legislative party was .833, but the average value for the governor's level of support from the opposition legislative party was .908. The mean value for the average of the governor's levels of support from the two legislative parties was .870. The average value for the governor's level of support in the House was .879. These figures indicate that Governor Milliken received the highest level of support from the opposition legislative party. The governor's level of support from the two parties was higher than his support from his own party. This statistical evidence is consistent with the descriptive information indicating Governor Milliken worked well with the opposition Democratic party in the legislature.

A smaller data set of Milliken proposals is obtained when we select out of the thirty-nine proposals only those proposals on which 10 percent or more of the legislators voting were in disagreement. This set of "controversial" Milliken proposals consists of thirteen bills. These controversial proposals tend to attract more interest, may be more concern to the governor in his desire to appeal to the stronger party in the electorate, and tend to receive more attention from the legislative parties.

In Table 16 the values of the variables for the "controversial" bills supported by Governor Milliken are presented. The bills are categorized by policy area, according to the categories assigned in the 1978 Michigan State of the State Message.⁴⁵ By referring to the values of the variables for bills in all the policy areas in Table 16, we can find indications about the governor's support from the legislative "party groups" on his more controversial proposals. Governor Milliken received higher support from the opposition legislative party and from bipartisan legislative groups than he received from his legislative party. Whether we examine his controversial proposals or a wider range of his proposals, we find that Governor Milliken received more support from House Democrats than from House Republicans.

The statistics in Table 16 for the individual policy areas reinforce the conclusion that Governor Milliken received the strongest support for his legislative programs in the House from the Democrats. In six out of seven policy areas listed, the governor's support from the opposition legislative party was higher than his support from his party. Only in the area of "consumer protection" did the Republicans support their party's chief executive at a higher level than did the Democrats. The evidence in Table 16 supports the view that the Governor drew his

Table 16. Governor Milliken's Levels of Support from the Legislative Party Groups on Controversial Proposals

Policy Areas	Number of Bills	Gubernatorial Support Variables ^a			
		Governor's Level of Support From His Legislative Party	Governor's Level of Support From the Opposition Legislative Party	Average of Governor's Level of Support From the Two Legislative Parties	Governor's Level of Support in the House
Consumer protection	1	1.000	.467	.733	.673
Education	1	.459	.667	.563	.585
Environment, land, and recreation	1	.795	.821	.808	.811
Human services	4	.599	.872	.736	.770
Individual rights	1	.450	.787	.618	.653
Labor	1	.778	.964	.871	.891
Transportation	4	.421	.678	.549	.580
All areas	13	.582	.762	.672	.693

SOURCES: Information on the legislative votes on the bills was available in the following sources: Michigan, House of Representatives, Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Michigan (1978) and Michigan, Senate, Journal of the Senate of the State of Michigan (1978). The proposals supported by the Governor and the policy areas into which they fell were identified in the following source: Michigan, Michigan State of the State Message, by William G. Milliken, January 1978.

NOTE: The statistics in Table 16 are based on legislative votes with 10 percent or more disagreement on Milliken proposals during the 1977-1978 legislature.

^aThe values reported for the gubernatorial support variables are averages for the policy areas.

support most heavily from Democrats in a wide range of issue areas, rather than only in a few, isolated policy areas.

Governor Milliken's strongest support came from the Democratic party both in policy areas which have traditionally been prominent as divisive ones for the parties and other policy areas which may not have been as important in polarizing the parties. It is likely that the labor and human services areas have been divisive ones for Michigan's major parties. The "labor" orientation of the Michigan Democratic party and the "management" orientation of the state's Republican party were described in Chapter I. During the Williams era, the Democratic party took "liberal" positions in favor of government action on compulsory health insurance, social security, and training programs for the unemployed.⁴⁶ Many of these types of programs were blocked in the Republican-controlled legislature.⁴⁷ In Table 16, we find that in areas which had been traditionally divisive for the parties (such as labor and human services) Governor Milliken received his strongest support from House Democrats. The Democrats also gave the Governor the most support in areas in which the parties may not have traditionally been so polarized, such as transportation and "environment, land, and recreation."

Among all the issue areas listed in Table 16, the human services and transportation policy areas contained the most bills supported by Governor Milliken. The human services area included bills which would enact a public health code, create an office of youth services in the Department of Social Services, and increase funding for a program to "decriminalize" intoxication. The legislation to enact the proposed Michigan Public Health Code was the Governor's top legislative priority in human services for the year.⁴⁸ The four bills in the transportation area provided a major part of Governor Milliken's "transportation package." The Governor stated that additional funds were needed to maintain Michigan's transportation network. The "transportation package" included measures to increase the gasoline tax and personal car registration fees and to designate a percentage of the sales tax on automobiles for transportation.⁴⁹ In areas as different as human services and transportation, Governor Milliken received higher support from legislative Democrats than from his legislative party.

It is useful to examine Governor Milliken's support on his controversial legislative proposals and his levels of agreement with the legislative parties on vetoed bills in certain issue areas. The two policy areas in which there are both "controversial" Milliken proposals and vetoes of

"controversial" legislation during the 1977-1978 era are individual rights and education. For both the proposals and vetoes which we will cover from these areas, there was at least 10 percent disagreement on the legislative vote used in the data set.

In the individual rights area, the vetoed bill (House Bill 4108) dealt with the accessibility of public transportation to handicapped persons. Governor Milliken's major reason for the veto of House Bill 4108 was that although the intent was to provide accessibility for handicapped people on public transportation, its provisions contained the potential to encourage the development of separate transportation services for physically impaired and able-bodied people.⁵⁰ For this veto the governor's level of agreement with the opposition party was .629 and his agreement level with his party was .154.

The legislative proposal supported by Governor Milliken in the individual rights area provided for the possible suspension of the real estate license of a real estate person who was found to engage in "racial steering." Proponents of the bill argued that "steering" promotes segregation in housing. The "legislative analysis" of House Bill 4846 indicates that it was supported by the Department of Civil Rights and the Department of Licensing and Regulation and that it was opposed by the Michigan

Association of Realtors.⁵¹ The governor's level of support on the bill from the opposition was .787 and his level of support on the legislation from his party was .450.

We have reviewed Governor Milliken's actions on two pieces of legislation in the "individual rights" policy area. The Governor indicated that he vetoed one bill in order to support the interests of handicapped persons, and he promoted another bill to encourage racial integration. On both of these pieces of legislation, the statistics indicate that Governor Milliken's position was closer to that of the Democrats than the Republicans in the legislature.

Governor Milliken's veto in the "education" policy area was of a bill to require that Legislative Merit Awards be awarded only to students attending institutions of higher education in Michigan. In the message in which he vetoed the bill (House Bill 6494), the governor argued that it puts a restriction on the awards which is inconsistent with their purpose and that it serves no useful purpose for Michigan.⁵² Although the Governor did not show high agreement with either party on House Bill 6494, his level of agreement with the opposition party (.148) was higher than it was for his own party (.034).

The "controversial" legislation which Governor Milliken supported in the "education" issue area provided

for tuition grants for state residents to attend Michigan's private colleges and universities. In the "legislative analysis" of the bill, it is noted that the amount of the grant would be limited to \$600 per year, but that the program could cost the state over \$18 million by its fourth year.⁵² On this measure to provide funds to attend private colleges and universities (House Bill 5548), the governor's level of support by the opposition legislative party was .667, and the governor's level of support by his legislative party was .459.

In the "education" issue area, Governor Milliken took positions which would enable college students to use state scholarships outside Michigan and to receive some extra support for education at private institutions. Governor Milliken was closer to the legislative Democrats than Republicans in his positions on the legislation which we examined in the "education" policy area.

Various evidence on the governorship of William Milliken has indicated that he developed a close working relationship with the Democratic party. Certain descriptive evidence in Chapter I indicated that the governor was able to work with the legislative opposition to develop policies which he felt would earn him support from Democratic voters. A 1978 newspaper article indicated that Milliken had demonstrated excellent ability to work with the Democratic party

in the legislature.⁵⁴ The statistics on the large set of Milliken's proposals, the "controversial" proposals only, and the "controversial" proposals within various policy areas all indicated that the Governor received more support from the legislative Democrats than from legislators of his party. The measures on the vetoes and proposals in the same policy areas, while only representing a few bills, also indicated that Governor Milliken's positions were closer to those of the legislative Democrats than the legislature's Republicans.

All four of the explanatory factors we have examined in this chapter appear to be useful in accounting for Governor Milliken's close working relationship with the opposition legislative party. Since the Governor's party held a "minority" position in the electorate through most of his tenure, he had an incentive to propose policies that would gain the support of House Democrats and eventually appeal to Democratic voters. The Republicans never held a House majority during the 1969-1978 period of Governor Milliken's governorship, and this lack of a legislative majority may have encouraged Governor Milliken to work closely with the more powerful Democrats on his legislative program. William Milliken's position as a "moderate Republican" allowed him to work well with the "liberal" opposition party while maintaining many of the positions endorsed

by his faction of the Republican party. Finally, the abilities to cooperate and compromise which William Milliken possessed enabled him to work fairly smoothly and productively with the Democratic legislative party.

Conclusion

Before presenting some conclusions on the effects of the four major explanatory factors which we covered on the governor's relationship with the legislative parties, we might comment briefly on the consideration of Governors Williams and Romney as possible presidential candidates for their parties. As we discussed above, Romney's personality was mentioned as a major problem in his efforts to secure the Republican presidential nomination. The governor's personality, then, can hamper his efforts to move to a higher office despite his accomplishments at the state level. The view that Governor Williams had further political ambitions polarized the legislative parties and contributed to the stalemate that caused fiscal problems for Michigan. One of Williams's problems was that his party did not have a majority in either legislative chamber, so that he could not force a solution during the deadlock on the taxation issue. If the governor is seen as having presidential ambitions and his party does not control the legislature, unfortunate consequences for the governor and the state can result.

In this chapter, we have reviewed the governorships of G. Mennen Williams, George Romney, and William Milliken. The major purpose of this chapter has been to assess the effects of four factors on the types of working relationships which these governors engaged in with the legislative parties. The four factors which we considered were the governor's party's electoral strength, the governor's legislative party's "size," the governor's ideological position in relation to the ideological positions of the parties, and the governor's style of dealing with the legislative parties. In this conclusion, we will examine the influence of each explanatory factor on the working relationships between the governor and the legislative parties, based on the evidence presented above.

We have discussed the possible effects of the governor's party's electoral strength on the legislative relations of Governors Williams, Romney, and Milliken. This factor showed both relatively high and low values during the Williams era, and it is difficult to determine what influence it had on Williams's relations with the legislative parties. The governor's party's electoral strength tended to be low during the tenures of Governors Romney and Milliken. Governor Romney worked closely with bipartisan legislative groups, while Milliken worked well with the legislative opposition. The evidence indicates,

then, that when the governor's party's electoral strength is low he tends to work cooperatively with bipartisan legislative groups or with the opposition legislative party.

Based on the three cases examined, the effects of the governor's legislative party's "size" on his working relationships with the legislative parties are not clear. Governor Williams, whose party was normally a legislative minority, worked closely with his own party in the legislature. Governor Romney, whose party was most often a majority, worked well with bipartisan groups. Based on these cases, we might conclude that the governor with the smaller legislative party is most likely to work closely with his own party. Governor Milliken's Republican party never held a House majority during his tenure, however, and he tended to cooperate closely with the opposition legislative party.

The effects of "the ideological position of the governor in relation to the ideological positions of the parties" on the relationship between the governor and the legislative parties are fairly clear. Governor Williams, a "liberal," was in the ideological "mainstream" of his party, but lacked a common general position on the issues with the "conservative" Republicans. He worked closely with his legislative party. Governors Romney and Milliken,

Republican "moderates," shared an ideological position with a major segment of their own party and were reasonably close in their positions on many issues to the preponderance of Democrats. Romney cooperated with bipartisan groups and Milliken cooperated with the legislative opposition. The information about the three governors indicates, then, that the governor whose ideological position has little in common with the other party will tend to work with his own legislative party. The governor who shares a common orientation on the issues with much of the other party may work closely with the legislative opposition or with bipartisan legislative groups.

The three cases we examined provide useful evidence on the role of the governor's legislative style in determining his relationships with the legislative parties. Governor Milliken seemed to be most able of the three chief executives to compromise and be cooperative with the legislative parties. Governor Romney demonstrated a forceful style, but showed an ability to compromise. Governor Williams was forceful and, quite possibly, the least flexible of the three. Given our knowledge of how these governors worked with the legislative parties, the information covered indicates that governors who are able to compromise are more likely to work closely with the opposition party's legislators and with bipartisan legislative

groups. The less flexible governor, however, would be likely to work most closely with his own party.

The analysis presented in this chapter is based on the legislative relations of only three governors. We were, however, able to develop some significant indications about the effects of the governor's party's electoral strength, the governor's ideological position in relation to those of the parties, and the governor's legislative style on his working relationship with the legislative parties. The effects of the governor's party's "size" on his dealings with party groups in the statehouse were less clear.

CHAPTER IV--FOOTNOTES

¹Jewell, "Governor," pp. 127-134.

²Stieber (pp. 9-14) mentions that Williams was urged to run for the presidency in 1960, and legislators believed that he had political ambitions beyond the governorship. Stieber (pp. 74-75) states that Romney attempted to become the Republican nominee for president in 1968.

³Peirce, pp. 418-419.

⁴White, p. 82.

⁵Stieber, pp. 32-38.

⁶Stephen B. Sarasohn and Vera H. Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns in Michigan (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957), pp. 49-68.

⁷Sawyer, p. 67.

⁸LaPalombara, p. 47.

⁹Fenton, pp. 38-39.

¹⁰Peirce, pp. 419-420.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Williams, pp. 8-9.

¹³Stieber, pp. 9-14.

¹⁴"Controversial" bills are those on which 10 percent or more of the legislators voting disagreed on the question of passage (or its equivalent). The governor's discussion of the subject of the bill in his veto message was used to categorize the bills, since we have consistently emphasized the governor's role and viewpoint in his interaction with the legislature in this dissertation.

¹⁵Francis, Legislative Issues, pp. 10-11.

¹⁶ Stieber, p. 62.

¹⁷ Peirce, p. 421.

¹⁸ Stieber, pp. 37-38.

¹⁹ Peirce, pp. 427-428.

²⁰ Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, p. 312.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Fenton, pp. 23-24.

²³ Stieber, p. 74.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 61-75.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 23-74.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 64-67.

²⁷ Peirce, pp. 422-423.

²⁸ Stieber, pp. 74-75.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 80-81.

³⁰ Peirce, p. 423.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 421-422.

³² Since this study covers the 1937-1978 period, the discussion of Milliken's governorship will not extend beyond 1978.

³³ Stieber, p. 79.

³⁴ Peirce, p. 425.

³⁵ "Milliken Outlines Ambitious Agenda," Detroit News, 13 January 1977, sec. A, p. 1.

³⁶ "Milliken Raps GOP on Blacks," Detroit Free Press, 12 September 1977, sec. B, p. 13.

³⁷ "Milliken Outlines Ambitious Agenda," Detroit News, 13 January 1977, sec. A, p. 1.

³⁸ Peirce, pp. 425-426.

³⁹ "Milliken Likely to See Win as Policy Endorsement," Lansing State Journal, 9 November 1978, sec. B, p. 1.

⁴⁰ "Heat's on 6 Who Defied Milliken," Detroit News, 30 September 1977, sec. A, p. 1.

⁴¹ The Michigan State of the State Message of January 1977 did not mention the bill numbers of the proposals endorsed by Milliken, so they could not be precisely identified. See Michigan, Michigan State of the State Message, by William G. Milliken, January 1977. The 1978 proposals endorsed by Governor Milliken were identified in the following source: Michigan, Michigan State of the State Message, by William G. Milliken, January 1978.

⁴² Sarah P. McCally used this measure in her study of the governor's support from his legislative party. McCally, pp. 928-929.

⁴³ "Allowable" votes included votes such as the House vote on passage of the bill. Such votes as the House vote on amendments to the bill's title or those on "immediate effect" were not considered "allowable."

⁴⁴ The bills in the data set were checked to insure that none of them were eventually vetoed. A veto would indicate that the bill had been altered in the legislative process in such a way that it was no longer acceptable to the governor. In order to be reasonably consistent with the data collected on vetoes, those bills whose "allowable" votes occurred after the "minor office" election were excluded. This type of exclusion resulted in only one bill being omitted.

⁴⁵ In order to be consistent in our emphasis on the governor's viewpoint in legislative relations, we used his "policy categorization." The categorization of the bills appears in the following source: Michigan, Michigan State of the State Message, by William G. Milliken, January 1978, pp. 112-115.

⁴⁶ Fenton, pp. 20-22.

⁴⁷ Peirce, pp. 419-420.

⁴⁸ Michigan, Michigan State of the State Message, by William G. Milliken, January 1978, pp. 41-113.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 95-96.

⁵⁰ Michigan, House of Representatives, Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Michigan (1977) 3:2333-2334.

⁵¹ Michigan, House of Representatives, House Legislative Analysis Section, First Analysis (6-24-77): House Bill 4846, 79th Legislature, 1st Session, 1977.

⁵² Michigan, House of Representatives, Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Michigan (1978) 2:2826-2827.

⁵³ Michigan, House of Representatives, House Legislative Analysis Section, Second Analysis (8-11-78): House Bill 5548, 79th Legislature, 2nd Session, 1978.

⁵⁴ "Milliken Likely to See Win as Policy Endorsement," Lansing State Journal, 9 November 1978, sec. B, p. 1.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study has produced a variety of findings about the governor's working relationships with the legislative parties, and the study may be relevant to further research. In this chapter we will discuss our assessments of the relationships between various causal factors and the governor's dealings with the legislative parties. The relationship between the governor's levels of agreement with the legislative parties and his support from the corresponding "party groups" of voters will also be covered. In one part of this chapter, we will relate some of the information about the governor's dealings with the legislative parties in Michigan to the state politics literature. The applicability of this study to further research which might be conducted on gubernatorial-legislative relations will be discussed. Finally, a brief conclusion will be presented.

Findings on the Causes and Consequences
of the Governor's Relationship with
the Legislative Parties

The statistics computed on the "legislatures data set" in Chapter III indicate that the governor's legislative party's "size" is negatively related to his level of agreement with his own party. The "legislatures data set" involves legislative votes on controversial bills that were eventually vetoed by Michigan governors. The statistical finding is consistent with the descriptive evidence about Governor Williams. Williams's party normally held a legislative minority, and he worked closely with his legislative party. Our finding is also consistent, in a general way, with McCally's finding that the percentage of seats held by the governor's party is negatively related to the level of support he receives from his party on votes to override his vetoes.¹

Our data analysis in Chapter III indicated that the governor's legislative party's "size" is positively related to his level of agreement with the opposition legislative party. Our description of Governor Milliken as a governor who lacked a legislative majority party but worked well with the legislative opposition, however, appears to be inconsistent with the statistical results. Governor Milliken held common "progressive" or "liberal" views with the opposition Democrats and was willing to compromise

with them, and these factors would tend to encourage a closer relationship with the legislative opposition. These additional factors may account for the inconsistency between Milliken's actual working relationship with the legislative opposition and our expectations based on the statistical analysis of the data.

We can summarize our statistical findings on the effects of the governor's party's "size" by stating that the variable is negatively related to the governor's level of agreement with his legislative party and positively related to his level of agreement with the opposition legislative party. Information which we presented in Chapter I indicates that the legislative parties in Michigan tend to oppose one another on controversial legislation and tend to be internally cohesive. Our findings indicate that the governor with a legislative minority shows agreement with his party's "No" votes by vetoing the opposition majority's legislation. The governor with a larger legislative party, however, tends to block his own party's legislation and, in doing so, shows agreement with the smaller opposition party. In both these situations, the legislative parties would be internally cohesive but opposed to one another. These statistical findings, then, are consistent with our knowledge of Michigan's legislative parties.

The results of the regression analysis reported in Chapter III indicate that the governor's party's electoral strength is negatively related to the level of agreement between the governor and the opposition legislative party. This analysis was performed on the "legislatures data set." In Chapter IV, the evidence about William Milliken's governorship was that his party's electoral strength was generally low and that Milliken received strong support on his legislative proposals from the opposition party. Both the statistical evidence from the regression analysis and the analysis on Milliken's proposals indicate that the governor whose party is weak in the electorate will work well with the opposition party in the statehouse.

The electoral strength of the governor's party is negatively related to the governor's level of agreement with bipartisan groups in the legislature. This conclusion is based on the regression analysis performed in the third chapter. In our examination of George Romney's governorship, we found that his party's electoral strength tended to be low and that he worked closely with bipartisan legislative groups.

Our findings which show that the governor's party's electoral strength is related to his levels of agreement with the legislative party groups are generally consistent with McCally's view on this matter. She argued that the

governor's concern with pleasing his state-wide constituency affects his interaction with his party on legislation.²

The evidence from the governorships of George Romney and William Milliken indicates that governors who share major aspects of a common ideological position with the opposition party tend to work well with it or with bipartisan groups in the legislature. G. Mennen Williams's service as Michigan's chief executive illustrates that a governor whose position "on the issues" is much different than that of the opposition party will probably not work well with the legislative opposition. Based on our information, the degree to which the governor shares an ideological position with the opposition party is directly related to the closeness of his cooperation with the legislative opposition party.

Our conclusion about the effects of the "governor's ideological position in relationship to those of the parties" on the governor's dealings with the legislative parties is related to the development of the two major parties in Michigan. Fenton describes the rise to power of the "labor-liberal" alliance in the Democratic party in the 1948-1950 period and the eventual dominance of George Romney and the "moderates" in the Republican party.³ During the period covered by this study, elements in each party which favored "liberal" or "progressive" policies

came to power. The presence of these elements in the Michigan parties helped to foster a situation in which a governor (such as William Milliken) shares major areas of policy agreement with the opposition party and works cooperatively with that party's legislative contingent.

The governor's working relationships with the legislative parties are also affected by his legislative style. In Chapter IV our information indicated that the governor who has the ability to compromise tends to work more closely with the legislative opposition and that the less flexible governor is more likely to work more closely with his own legislative party. The evidence indicated that the governor's capacity for compromise is directly related to the closeness of his cooperation with the opposition legislative party. In Chapter I we stated that Morey found that a governor's cooperative attitude enhanced his success as a legislative leader. The findings of this dissertation are consistent, in a general way, with Morey's conclusions on the Arizona governorship because the governor's legislative style was found to be a significant influence in his legislative relations in both studies."

We have reviewed four factors which affect the governor's working relationships with the legislative parties on policy matters. These explanatory factors are the governor's legislative party's "size," the

governor's party's electoral strength, the ideological position of the state's chief executive in relationship to the ideological positions of the parties, and the governor's legislative "style." In certain cases, our confidence in our conclusions about the relationships between these influences and the governor's dealings with the legislative parties was increased by the consistency between the statistical and descriptive evidence. Because we have used many different types of evidence in assessing the effects of these influences on the governor's dealings with the legislative parties, it would be inappropriate to compare the strengths of these various influences. Since we have emphasized agreement on policy in our conception of the governor's relationship with the legislative parties, however, the "ideological position of the governor in relationship to the general policy positions of the legislative parties" is a particularly relevant causal factor because it also deals with policy considerations. This ideological factor is particularly important in Michigan because the state's politics tend to be issue-oriented.

It has been found that the governor's working relationships with the legislative parties are associated with certain consequences. In specifying these consequences, we can examine the statistics presented in Table 14, which indicate that the level of agreement between the governor

and a legislative party group is positively related to the level of support for the governor by the analogous "party group" of voters. For example, the level of agreement between the governor and his legislative party is positively related to the governor's support from his party's voters. The statistical evidence on the various relationships of this type is rather weak.

Our finding, that the governor's agreement with a legislative party is positively related to his support from voters of that party in the following election, is basically consistent with the research of Sarah McCally Morehouse. Morehouse found a positive association between the governor's support from his party's legislators and the governor's primary percentage after the legislative session. Morehouse's finding dealt with the primary, while our research involved the general election.⁵ The association which she found, however, does support the view that the governor who works well with a legislative party to develop policies is later "rewarded" with the electoral support of that party's voters.

The Governor's Relationship with the
Legislative Parties in Michigan and
the State Politics Literature

We have discussed the specific findings of the dissertation and related them to certain literature which directly applies to them. It will also be useful to relate

some additional information gained from this study of the governor's dealings with the legislative parties in Michigan to the more general literature on state politics.

Before discussing the relevance of some of the additional Michigan information to the state politics literature, it is appropriate to discuss the nature of Michigan politics, which constitutes the basic setting of this dissertation. In Chapter I we described Michigan as a high-income, developed state, with a strong union movement. Ranney argues that this sort of state would tend to have two-party competition. Two-party states generally have high legislative party cohesion.⁶ As we discussed in the first chapter, Michigan has two strong parties which are largely drawn from different economic groups within the state. We also stated in the first chapter that Michigan politics is issue-oriented and that the state has a legislature in which the voting cohesion levels and the levels of partisan conflict are likely to be relatively high.

As we stated in Chapter I, Michigan has both a governor with strong formal powers and a professionalized legislature. Schlesinger found that the more competitive and populous states tend to have governors with strong formal powers.⁷ Michigan government and politics, then,

has certain characteristics which we might expect to find in a high-income, competitive state.

Many of the descriptions in and findings of this study are relevant to the literature on state politics. Our descriptions of the party leadership of certain Michigan governors, for example, are consistent with the views of Sarah McCally Morehouse on gubernatorial party leadership. Information presented in Chapter IV indicates that Governor Williams led the "liberal-labor" alliance which dominated the Democratic party during most of his governorship and that Governor Romney led the Republican party as a political "moderate." This information is consistent with the contention of Sarah McCally Morehouse that the governor is the leader of his party, as well as being the head of state government.⁸

It is interesting to note that Governor Romney, who showed leadership within his political party, did not confine his policy-making efforts to working with his own legislative party. A governor may show some independence from his party in his legislative strategy, then, even though he is the leader of his political party.

In his discussion of gubernatorial leadership of the legislature, Malcolm Jewell indicated that the governor may choose to work with his party or with bipartisan groups in the legislature.⁹ The governor may also work most

closely with the legislative opposition party. One reason that Michigan has provided an interesting state setting for the study we have conducted is that the state's governors have made use of all three legislative strategies. According to our discussion in Chapter IV, G. Mennen Williams worked with his own legislative party, William Milliken worked with the opposition legislative party, and George Romney worked effectively with bipartisan legislative groups.

Keefe and Ogul state that the governor's message provides him with an opportunity to propose new programs and to influence the legislature. The message can be a way of focusing the attention of the legislature and the public on the governor's program. The gubernatorial message is effective when legislators believe the governor will follow it with support for the bills he endorses.¹⁰ Our research on the proposals from Governor Milliken's 1978 Michigan State of the State Message indicates that the Governor was effective in securing legislative support for many of his proposals. We found that there was a high mean level of legislative support on the measures which Governor Milliken proposed. Judging from the successful passage of Governor Milliken's program in the legislature, it seems likely that his message provided an effective way to introduce that program.

Key argued that the problems involved in the separation of powers are compounded by divided party control of state government.¹¹ Jewell stated that if the governor's party fails to control both houses of the legislature, the governor will have difficulty in exercising leadership.¹² By examining Table 1, we find that there was divided control in Michigan in all but four years of the 1949-1978 period.¹³ The governors on whom we have focused (Williams, Romney, and Milliken) served during this era. Because high levels of partisan conflict and party cohesion have existed in the legislature, the Michigan governors' efforts to secure the cooperation of the opposition legislative party in the policy-making process may have been especially difficult.

The experiences of some Michigan governors exemplify ways in which governors may work effectively with the legislative parties to make policy, despite divided party control or other obstacles which chief executives may face. Governor Williams, for example, often had his efforts blocked by the Republican-controlled legislature. Williams appealed to the public for support in an effort to deal with this situation.¹⁴

Michigan's reapportionment of 1964 probably aided Republican Governors Romney and Milliken in their efforts to work with the legislature. Jewell and Patterson argued

that the constituencies of governors and their legislative parties became more closely matched after reapportionment.¹⁵ Michigan's reapportionment may have increased the "progressive" elements in the Republican party and made it ideologically closer to these "moderate" governors. The new legislative apportionment may have narrowed the ideological distance between the two parties by increasing the suburban, less conservative, elements in the Republican party. If the distance between the parties on policy did narrow, this development would have increased the governor's chances of working with elements of both parties.

Governor Romney and Governor Milliken were able to develop strategies which allowed them to work successfully with the legislative parties to accomplish policy goals, despite the frequent control of at least one legislative chamber by the opposition party during their governorships. As may be seen from Table 1, George Romney served during three legislative periods. During this time, he faced the opposition's majority once and his party held a very slim majority once. As we have stated in previous chapters, George Romney worked with bipartisan legislative groups to develop policies in the mental health, civil rights, and taxation areas. Governor Milliken faced a situation in which the Democrats controlled at least one chamber of the legislature during the entire 1969-1978 period of his

governorship. Our evidence has indicated that William Milliken worked with the opposition legislative party and received strong support of his 1972 programs and on his 1977-1978 proposals.

Certain factors, in addition to Michigan's reapportionment, contributed to the success of Governors Romney and Milliken in engineering the passage of various policies. The evidence in Chapter IV indicates that both of these governors had an ideological position that was not too different from some elements of the opposition party, and that they were able to compromise. As we argued in Chapter I, although Michigan's governor holds extensive powers, he also must face a professionalized legislature which has its own resources. Sabato describes this type of situation as the "best government," in which both the executive and legislative branches have the resources to meet their responsibilities.¹⁶ Perhaps in this situation both branches are strong enough to affect policy, to take positive action, and to compromise with the other branch. The existence of a strong executive branch and a strong legislative branch may have contributed to the policy-making success of recent Michigan governors.

As Key accurately pointed out, there are difficulties in governing when "divided party control" exists.¹⁷ The experiences of certain Michigan governors suggest that

state chief executives who have certain characteristics and follow certain legislative strategies are able to lead the policy-making process when their parties are not in firm control of the legislative process.

Suggestions for Further Research

The research performed in this dissertation might constitute a basis for the further study of a variety of problems related to the governor's dealings with the legislative parties. For example, this study's findings concerning the causes of the governor's tendency to work closely with the legislative opposition contribute to the basis for additional research on this matter. It would be interesting to determine whether or not the "size" of the governor's legislative party, the governor's ability to compromise, and the governor's party's electoral strength affect the governor's dealings with the legislative opposition party in a variety of states.

The governor's relationship with bipartisan legislative groups has received relatively little scrutiny from political scientists. The findings of this dissertation would be useful in the process of selecting variables to explain the causes of the governor's working relationship with bipartisan legislative groups in a wider range of states. For example, it could be suggested from our statistical findings that the governor's party's electoral

strength would be negatively related to his level of agreement with bipartisan legislative groups. We might also suggest that governors who are able to compromise would tend to work closely with bipartisan groups in the statehouse.

In this dissertation, we have taken a policy-oriented approach to studying the governor's working relationship with the legislative parties. We have emphasized the positions of the governor, the legislative parties, and other political forces in the state on matters of public policy. The major measures of the governor's dealings with the legislative parties were of his levels of agreement with the parties on policy issues. "The governor's ideological position in relationship to those of the parties," an important cause of the closeness of the governor's working relationship with the legislative parties, also involves the policy positions of the governor and the parties. We have viewed the governor's support from the "party groups" of voters as a consequence of the cooperation between the state's chief executive and the legislative parties in making policies that appeal to those voters. The governor's support from "party groups" of voters is also, therefore, related to policy considerations.

We contrasted our emphasis on policy positions in gubernatorial-legislative relations with McCally's stress

on the governor's use of favors and resources to gain the support of his legislative party. Malcolm Jewell discusses the importance of such factors as the governor's leadership of public opinion and the governor's relationship with his party's legislative leaders in the success of the state's chief executive's legislative leadership.¹⁸ This dissertation's major approach, emphasizing policy-related factors, is one of several approaches that might be taken in understanding and explaining gubernatorial-legislative relations.¹⁹ Given the importance of issues to Michigan governors (such as Williams) and the issue-oriented nature of the state's politics, our approach has been reasonably consistent with the Michigan setting of the study.

This policy-oriented approach to the study of the governor's dealings with the legislative parties might be considered for research in other, similar settings. Fenton found that, like Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin were two-party states in which the party leaders were oriented toward the issues.²⁰ To the extent that these descriptions of Minnesota and Wisconsin are presently accurate, a "policy-oriented" approach toward explaining the closeness of the governor's working relationship with the legislative parties would be especially applicable in states such as these. In this type of state, the similarity between the ideological positions of the governor and a legislative party might

contribute heavily to the likelihood of a close working relationship between the governor and that party.

It would be reasonable to consider taking a "policy-oriented" viewpoint of gubernatorial-legislative relations in a study of a wider range of states. Malcolm Jewell indicates that the governor's use of patronage has been a valuable tool in his legislative relations in certain states.²¹ Larry Sabato, in his study of the changes in the American governorship in the 1950-1975 period, discusses the decrease in the "patronage" appointments available to the governor.²² Perhaps with the decline in the use of patronage, certain governors are placing more emphasis on shared policy views in their dealings with the legislative parties. Such a development would add to the significance of a policy-oriented approach to the study of the working relationships between the state's chief executive and the party groups in the statehouse.

Conclusion

In this concluding chapter, the major findings of the study have been reviewed. The consistency between our descriptive and statistical evidence allowed us to be more confident about some of our conclusions. The use of a mixture of statistical and descriptive evidence might be appropriate in further research on gubernatorial-legislative relations. We described the way in which some of the

information and findings presented in this dissertation are related to the literature on state politics. This study's policy-oriented approach to examining the governor's relationships with the legislative parties would be of value to those studying similar states and, quite possibly, to those studying a wider range of states.

In this dissertation a variety of information on the relationship between the governor and the legislative parties in Michigan has been presented, and some ways in which Michigan's governors have dealt with the problem of divided party control of state government have been described. Divided party control can raise significant problems for the coordination of policy-making between branches of state government. In this study, we found that certain Michigan governors were able to engage in effective policy-making despite their party's lack of a legislative majority by working with elements of the opposition legislative party or with bipartisan groups of legislators. We found that these legislative strategies were associated with certain specific factors (such as the governor's ability to compromise) in Michigan. We need to be somewhat cautious about generalizing to other states based on the one case which we have examined. Further study is needed to determine if the findings which have emerged in our study are applicable to states which are similar to Michigan and to a wider variety of American states.

CHAPTER V--FOOTNOTES

¹McCally, pp. 933-935.

²Ibid., p. 923.

³Fenton, pp. 11-43.

⁴Morey, pp. 111-113.

⁵Morehouse, "Political Leader," pp. 232-233.

⁶Ranney, pp. 64-85.

⁷Schlesinger, pp. 141-150.

⁸Morehouse, State Politics, p. 203.

⁹Jewell, "Governor," p. 133.

¹⁰Keefe and Ogul, p. 368.

¹¹Key, pp. 52-61.

¹²Jewell, "Governor," p. 128.

¹³Key (p. 55) classifies states as having been under divided party control if ". . . the governorship and one or both of the legislative houses were in control of opposition parties." We used this definition of divided party control in this examination of divided party control in Michigan in the 1949-1978 period.

¹⁴Peirce, pp. 419-420.

¹⁵Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, p. 312.

¹⁶Sabato, pp. 83-84.

¹⁷Key, pp. 52-61.

¹⁸Jewell, "Governor," p. 133.

¹⁹ This study has also examined other aspects of the governor's relationship with the legislative parties. We did use a variable related to the governor's election prospects and a variable based on the "size" of the governor's legislative party in the statistical analysis. We also discussed such diverse aspects as Governor Williams's appeals to public opinion and the relationships of Governors Romney and Milliken with "maverick" legislators.

²⁰ Fenton, p. 228.

²¹ Jewell, "Governor," p. 139.

²² Sabato, pp. 71-74.

APPENDIX

NUMBERS OF VETOES BY GOVERNORS IN MAJOR DATA SETS

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NUMBERS OF VETOES BY GOVERNORS
IN MAJOR DATA SETS

Table A.1 Numbers of Vetoes by Governors in the "Legislatures Data Set"

Governor	Party	Period of Service Applicable to Data Set	Number of Vetoes in Data Set
Murphy	Democratic	1937-1938	1
Van Wagoner	Democratic	1941-1942	8
Kelly	Republican	1943-1946	6
Sigler	Republican	1947-1948	5
Williams	Democratic	1949-1960	31
Swainson	Democratic	1961-1962	16
Romney	Republican	1963-1966	27
Milliken	Republican	1971-1978	<u>16</u>
All governors			110

SOURCES: The periods of service for the governors were available in the following source: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Michigan Manual (Lansing: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 1980), p. 100. The party affiliations of the governors were obtained from appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual.

Table A.2 Numbers of Vetoes by Governors in the "Administrations Data Set"

Governor	Party	Period of Service Applicable to Data Set	Number of Vetoes in Data Set
Murphy	Democratic	1937-1938	1
Van Wagoner	Democratic	1941-1942	8
Kelly	Republican	1943-1944	5
Sigler	Republican	1947-1948	5
Williams	Democratic	1949-1958	26
Swainson	Democratic	1961-1962	16
Romney	Republican	1963-1966	27
Milliken	Republican	1971-1978	<u>17</u>
All governors			105

SOURCES: The periods of service for the governors were available in the following source: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Michigan Manual (Lansing: Michigan Department of Management and Budget, 1980), p. 100. The party affiliations of the governors were obtained from appropriate editions of the Michigan Manual.

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