

INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of "sectioning" the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.

**University
Microfilms
International**

300 N. Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

8415261

Stojkovic, Stan

**SOCIAL BASES OF POWER IN A MAXIMUM-SECURITY PRISON: A STUDY
OF THE EROSION OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY**

Michigan State University

PH.D. 1984

**University
Microfilms
International** 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

SOCIAL BASES OF POWER IN A
MAXIMUM-SECURITY PRISON: A STUDY
OF THE EROSION OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

By

Stan Stojkovic

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

College of Social Science/Interdisciplinary

1984

ABSTRACT

SOCIAL BASES OF POWER IN A MAXIMUM-SECURITY PRISON: A STUDY OF THE EROSION OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

By

Stan Stojkovic

The purpose of this research was to investigate the social bases of power and erosion of traditional authority within a maximum-security prison. The prison examined was the Huron Valley Men's Facility (HVMF), located in Ypsilanti, Michigan. This prison represented a modern approach to prison construction, with an emphasis on computer technology in the operation and control of prisoners.

The research method was a qualitative procedure into the prison setting, which included seven continuous months of participant observation and interviewing. Interviews were conducted with three distinct groups: inmates, officers, and administrators. Over one hundred interviews were conducted with inmates, consisting of formal and informal approaches. There were twenty interviews with corrections officers and eleven interviews with administrators. The interviews varied in time from forty-five minutes to four hours. Many of the interviews were tape recorded and transcribed at a later date.

In addition, an analysis was done on certain "focal concerns" of the institution. These included: contraband, race relations, homosexuality, and institutional misconducts. A comparative examination was used in an

Stan Stojkovic

exploration of HVMF with a traditional prison structure on these focal concerns. In total, over eight hundred pages of interview data, quantitative figures, newspaper accounts, documentary material, and physical drawings were collected for analysis purposes.

The data revealed that regardless of the advanced technology employed at HVMF, there was an erosion of authority existing within the institution. Based on a typology of power provided by the literature, inmates and officers exhibited more varied forms of power. On the other hand, administrators displayed fewer types of power within the institutional environment.

Concerning the focal concerns examined, it was found that HVMF had an underdeveloped contraband system, good race relations, fewer problems with homosexuality, as compared to a traditionally designed prison, and differences in the type of misconduct report issued by officers dependent upon the social location of the offense. Furthermore, the analysis suggested that HVMF was physically more appealing to inmates than the traditionally structured prison.

However, it was also maintained that HVMF displayed alienation among the groups, particularly between inmates and administrators. A central finding of this research was that estrangement on the part of inmates was a functional response to the coercive control strategy imposed by the administrative hierarchy, and that the inmate society was powerful in reaction to the prison's formal administration. An implication from this

Stan Stojkovic

research is that control and stability of a prison environment could be accomplished if a legitimate form of power is developed by prison officials. This translates into the inclusion of inmate bodies in the governance and decision-making processes of the prison. Further suggestions are provided in promoting more stability and control within our correctional institutions.

To My Father -- Miodrag
Stojkovic -- for starting me
on the road to discovery

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Any piece of research is the product of much work by many people. Such is the case in this study. First and foremost, I wish to thank my doctoral committee -- Doctors David Kalinich, Timothy Bynum, Jack Knott, and Albert Cafagna -- for their support and careful review of the chapters. I would like to express my deepest regard to my mentor and chairman, David Kalinich, for his personal warmth and encouragement throughout my graduate study. Without his critical eye, analytical mind, and sense of humor, this product would have never gotten off the ground.

William Kime, the Director of Programming for the Michigan Department of Corrections is to be thanked for his approval of the research, along with former Warden William Grant and current Warden Robert Redman of the Huron Valley Men's Facility. Also, appreciation has to be extended to all the inmates, correctional officers, and administrative officials who gave their time and effort in completing this research project. I hope the final product meets with their approval.

Finally, I must extend my gratitude to the typists who worked on this project: Karen Goodman, Sandra DeSantis, Mary Ann Christie, Robin Hauser, Dorothy Brostowicz, and Lorraine Haeffel. They all did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, particularly in the final stages of writing. I owe special appreciation to these ladies for their patience, competence, and day-to-day assistance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
1. Purpose of Research	1
2. Past Research on Prison Organizational Structures	4
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE	15
1. Definition of Power and Authority	16
2. Types of Authority and Social Bases of Power	19
3. Consequences of Power Relationships	24
4. Prison Organizations	29
5. Social Control in Prison and Inmate Organizations	31
6. Modern Explanations of Social Control in Contemporary Prison	34
7. Summary and Conclusions	40
III. RESEARCH DESIGN: INSIDE A MAXIMUM-SECURITY INSTITUTION	43
1. Research Site	43
2. History of the Institution and Formal Organizational Goals	50
3. Research Method: Establishing Relations and Interviewing	54
4. Recording, Keeping, and Typing Fieldnotes and Interviews	57
5. Analysis of the Data	59
6. Summary	60
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF POWER: ADMINISTRATORS, OFFICERS, AND INMATES	64
1. Perceptions of Power Among Administrators	67
2. Officers: Perceived Power Among Officers	81
3. Perceptions of Power Among Inmates	100

CHAPTER	Page
4. Social Bases of Power: A Synthesis	127
5. Power and Equilibrium in Prison Society	134
6. Conclusions	136
V. INMATES, OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATORS: FOCAL CONCERNS	146
1. Contraband	146
2. Race Relations	156
3. Institutional Misconducts	171
4. Homosexuality	185
5. Institutional Control and Stability: A Summary Statement	193
VI. INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS: HURON VALLEY MEN'S FACILITY AND MARQUETTE BRANCH PRISON	201
1. Prison Appropriations and Expenditures	203
2. Critical Incidents: HVMF and MBP	210
3. Contraband	220
4. Race Relations	224
5. Homosexuality	227
6. Summary and Conclusion	232
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS	238
1. Conclusions	238
2. Implications	246
APPENDICES	
A. Interview Guide	259
B. Client Release Form	260
C. Contraband Defined	261
D. Major Misconducts Defined	266
E. Minor Misconducts Defined	272
F. Critical Incidents Defined	274
BIBLIOGRAPHY	277

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		Page
3.1	Population Demographics of Huron Valley Men's Facility	51
5.1	Percentage of Misconducts by Type of Offense	175
5.2	Percentage of Misconducts by Type and Final Disposition	178
5.3	Percentage of Misconducts by Type and Social Location	180
6.1	Actual Appropriations at Huron Valley Men's Facility and Marquette Branch Prison by Function	204
6.2	Actual Expenditures at Huron Valley Men's Facility and Marquette Branch Prison by Function	206
6.3	Critical Incidents at Huron Valley Men's Facility and Marquette Branch Prison by Type and Frequency	211

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE		Page
2.1	A Diagram of Prison Social Structure	36
2.2	A Prison Typology	39
3.1	Formal Organizational Structure at Huron Valley Men's Facility	45
3.2	Number and type of Privileges by Housing Unit	48
4.1	Segregation of Racial and Religious Groups in Dining Hall	108
4.2	Types of Social Bases of Power by Group	136
5.1	Segregation of Black and White Prisoners in Housing Unit Dayrooms	161
5.2	Segregation of Black and White Prisoners in Institutional School	164

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose of Research

This research investigates the social bases of power and amount of traditional authority within a maximum-security prison. The prison under investigation was the Huron Valley Men's Facility (HVMF), located in Ypsilanti, Michigan. This prison structure represents a modern approach to prison construction, with a reliance on high-technology in the control of problematic prisoners.

At present, there is a movement across the country to decrease the number of sentenced felons within our prisons.¹ In fact, some have even called for a moratorium on the construction of prison facilities, particularly maximum-security institutions.² HVMF is a prison which is designed to make serious offenders more tractable.

As a result, the construction of the institution is oriented toward the maximization of control and the minimization of violence and conflict. The institution employs an advanced computer technology which attempts to insure the tractability of inmates. This hardware includes sophisticated locking systems operated and monitored by computer.

Furthermore, the facility employs more correctional personnel, specifically correctional officers, in its operation and has an inmate-staff ratio around 2:1. Traditional prison structures exhibit inmate-staff ratios up to 100:1.³ It is for this reason HVMF was viewed as a new step in not only making institutions more controllable but also more humane.⁴

However, the question of whether or not such institutions actually control and stabilize the prison environment has been left unanswered. The aim of this research is to see if such a modern approach to incarceration is any more successful in stabilizing and controlling a prison setting. Past literature has suggested that traditional prison environments were not controlled entirely through the formal prison hierarchy.

This past research has shown that an attempt to instill bureaucratic authority within prison structures often failed. Moreover, the findings from these studies suggested that much of the control within prison environments was predicated on an informal networking relationship between correctional officers and inmates (Sykes, 1958; Sykes and Messinger, 1960; and Cloward, 1960). However, many have questioned whether that is existing within our contemporary correctional facilities. This current view holds that prison societies are no longer cohesively structured, nor are they controlled through various symbiotic relationships.

Instead, this modern perspective maintains that correctional institutions are composed of many disparate groups, often expressing themselves differently within the prison environment. These differences have lead the organization of prisons to be quite complex. As a result, what is presently evidenced within our prisons is heightened racial tension and fragmentation among prisoners, increased violence and the emergence of "super gangs" within the environments of prisons, an increase in the bureaucratization of the prison structure, and an evergrowing demand among correctional officers for more authority in the internal operation of the organization (Rhine, 1981).

In addition, modern prisons have been inundated with lawsuits filed by inmates. The traditional "hands-off" doctrine of the judiciary in relation to prisoners has been modified. Today, the prison organization is more under the scrutiny of the outside world. Much of the traditional coercive power has significantly eroded, and correctional administrators find themselves employing more modern methods in the control of prisoners. HVMF represents this modern approach.

Therefore, the issue of prison control has become more salient and in the forefront to not only researchers but also lay persons and policy makers. In effect, the pivotal question becomes: Do these modern prisons control inmates, while at the same time satisfy the demands of various prisoner groups, public interest groups, media,

courts, and the legislature? This research shall attempt to provide an answer to this question.

The methodology employed is thoroughly examined in Chapter 3; however, at this point, it is essential that a review be conducted which examines how prison organizations have been viewed in the research literature. This review shall include the work of Etzioni (1961), Cressey (1954, 1958, 1959, and 1965), and Street, Vinter, and Perrow (1966).⁵ As such, the review provides us with a method in which to analyze the organizational structure of prisons. Using the information obtained from past literature provides a direction into the analysis of the prison under examination. This literature enables us to build from the past and extend into the future our understanding of contemporary prison structures.

2. Past Research on Prison Organizational Structures

Etzioni's work suggests that at the core of understanding any organization, including a prison organization, is to examine the compliance structures of the organization. Etzioni states three types of compliance structures exhibited within organizations: (1) coercive, in which control is guaranteed through force or threat of force, and members are often alienated; (2) utilitarian, where commitment is obtained through some form of remuneration and members typically have a "calculative commitment"; and (3) normative, where control is insured through manipulation of various status awards and types of prestige and members are often willingly involved in the process.

Prisons are distinguished from other organizations in that they rely on a coercive compliance strategy in maintaining control. As a result, the inmate organization separates itself from the formal structure and is often alienated relative to the amount of force employed by the prison hierarchy. Further, Etzioni states that compliance structures alone do not reveal a total understanding of an organization. In addition, one needs to examine how these compliance strategies are related to organizational goals.

He provides three types of goals within organizations: order, economic or utilitarian, and cultural. Also, he holds that every organization has a primary organizational goal which corresponds to a specific compliance strategy. Within a prison organization, the dominant theme is a coercive compliance mechanism and ordered goals. Moreover, as suggested by Etzioni, such an organization produced an identifiable informal system which opposed the coercive measures developed and perpetuated by the formal structure.

As the formal structure accentuates its coercive powers, it feeds into the solidification and cohesion of an opposing group. In this respect, the inmate organization becomes firmly entrenched within the organizational structure and operates vis-a-vis the existing hierarchy. More importantly, these coercive measures inhibit the development of congruous normative structures among the groups within the organization.

Thus, the inmate organization creates a normative system which is internalized by a number of inmates and expressed through an "inmate code." This code preserves the autonomy of the informal grouping of inmates against the hegemonic role of administrators and officers. However, what is problematic about Etzioni's typology is that it does not allow further analysis of the types of compliance structures and goals within organizations.

In particular, there is no room to determine if other forms of compliance strategies actually exist with prison settings and if they relate to other kinds of goals. For example, the prison literature is replete with instances of how "merchants" within inmate society barter various goods and services for not only financial gain but also provide legitimacy and control within the prison setting (Kalinich, 1980). In effect, the goals within prisons are not only order based, but they are also utilitarian in nature. As a result, prisons may have multiple goals, and these goals often conflict within the organizational environment.

For example, Cressey discusses the custody/treatment conflict within prisons. While correctional officers are required to treat inmates humanely and fairly, it is also incumbent upon them to insure the preservation of order. In fact, Cressey suggests that the traditional prison structure tends to accentuate control and order as its primary goal, even if treatment is listed as a high concern among administrators.

Under this arrangement, officers are expected to conform, and more importantly, are evaluated on how well they accomplish these objectives. As a result, while the officer is required to enforce all rules, he must do this in a fashion which suggests and enhances the treatment of the inmate. Therefore, according to Cressey, the officer is faced with making a decision on how he is going to interact with inmates. More often than not, he will choose that strategy which positively reflects on his ability to conform to the most primary goal. In a majority of correctional facilities that goal is typically the control and stabilization of the inmate body. In effect, custody supersedes treatment, due in large part because correctional officers are evaluated more stringently on how well ordered their respective cellblocks are rather than if they had effectuated some change within an inmate.

However, as suggested by Duffee (1975), the real problem within prison organizations may not be often contradictory goal structures, but more specifically, the faulty implementation of goals. Therefore, it is not that goals cannot be achieved but "managerial practices" which prevent the goals from being realized. Correctional institutions are ineffective and inefficient in controlling themselves because of the often incongruous managerial decisions made by the prison's hierarchy. In brief, correctional institutions are poorly managed and policies and procedures implemented which effectively detract from their ability to control.

As a result, much of the current literature in prison organizations has attempted to focus on the appropriate management style and social climate which would make prison structures more efficient and effective in their operations (Kassebaum, Ward, and Wilner, 1971; Moos, 1975; Duffee, 1975; and Duffee, 1980). This has led to the development and incorporation of various management models to corrections, including the application of Management by Objectives (MBO) and participatory management approaches to deal with inmate populations.⁶ All of these new styles have as their objective the incorporation of the inmate in the decision making process.

Like other social agencies, prison organizations have as one of their basic goals the alteration of human behavior. More importantly, this modification process is not only expected to be effective but it is also designed to provide a maximization of control. The relevant question becomes how do these kinds of organizations realize this type of objective.

While Cressey and Etzioni attempted to address these questions, they were not fully examined in light of the control issue. While Etzioni recognized the importance of gaining commitment among organizational groups for greater control, he did not examine how managerial strategies affect the level of commitment by subordinates. Within the organization of prison, this takes the form of acceptance or non-acceptance of directives by officers and inmates.

To understand control within a correctional environment, one needs to be aware of the role played by the administration in its attempt to achieve control. Street, Vinter, and Perrow suggest that goals are the "essential constraints built into the organization." These constraints are determined, formulated, and implemented through the various policy directives of executives or administrators of the organization. In effect, how correctional administrators go about in effectuating control is contingent upon how well they process their demands and how they are reacted to by officers and inmates.

To fully comprehend this notion, Street, Vinter, and Perrow offer three models of prison environments which are situated on a "custody-treatment" continuum. These three models are:

Obedience/conformity, where the technique of control is conditioning and conformity is emphasized; reeducation/development, where inmate attitudes and behaviors are altered through training and education; and treatment, where an emphasis is on the "psychological reconstitution" of the individual, with very little reliance on punishment.

After a year of research into six institutions on this continuum, they concluded that as the goals progressed from custody to treatment, they found inmates were thought of as sick rather than uncooperative; treated more on an individual basis; the staff was younger, more professionally inclined, and better educated; executive activity tended to switch from political to professional groups; organizational

relations were more varied; the staff had more interdependent tasks and exhibited more conflict; the staff engaged inmates more often; inmate leaders were less often in opposition to the staff and less violent with other inmates; and many inmates were less alienated and more committed to the staff and its values and norms.

The central finding of this research was that there was a relationship between the organizational goal and its operationalization and organizational control. What is important is an examination of how control (the process) is realized by administrators within correctional institutions. While Street, Vinter, and Perrow's previous research has suggested that goals constrain organizations and that inmate groups responded more favorably to treatment goals, it is still relevant to examine this process of control and how it is implemented. In other words, is it the goal of treatment which makes inmates more amenable to the formal structure and less problematic, or is it that this kind of goal initiates specific kinds of relationships which make the differing groups more congruous? Conversely, can punitive custodial institutions exhibit as much control as treatment based institutions? If so, how can this be maintained and enhanced?

The pivotal research question becomes to state and examine the various processes which provide control and stability to the prison organization. Traditionally, this has meant an emphasis on managerial relationships and how they affect the environment of prison. As a

consequence, there has been a plethora of research which has attempted to investigate the relationship between managerial style and correctional outcomes (Duffee 1975; Wright, 1977; and Duffee 1980). The general consensus among this research was that the prison environment was much more controllable if an atmosphere of cooperation could be fostered among organizational groups.

Within prison structures this means the development of positive avenues of cooperation among the disparate groups. This is ultimately left up to the prison's formal administration; it is their responsibility to instill an environment which fosters consensus and agreement among all participants, including officers and inmates. However, this has rarely occurred within our correctional institutions. Because prisoners are held against their wills, it is difficult for administrators to implement programs which a majority legitimize.

Therefore, what is relevant about correctional institutions is not what type of goal they accentuate, but more importantly, the power relationships among the groups in the achievement of goals. This view holds that it is not necessarily the goals which are relevant but how one develops and perpetuates various power relationships in the achievement of goals, whether they be punitive-custodial or treatment based. In addition, an understanding of correctional environments requires an analysis of the forms of power endemic to the prison structure and the reactions to these kinds of power by the various groups in the environment.

As stated by Etzioni, prison organizations do exhibit order goals and coercive compliance strategies; however, how these coercive measures create other forms of power among the organizational groups is of particular relevance. Moreover, does a reliance on formal, coercive methods actually provide control, or does it lead toward the development of other social bases of power? As suggested by Etzioni and Fox (1980), prison organizations are by their very nature coercive. Recognizing this enables one to see how power is a pivotal construct in an analysis of prison organizations.

While past literature on prison organizations has recognized the role of power in understanding the prison structure, it has not taken into consideration three crucial factors: First, coercive power by itself is not the only form of power exhibited within our correctional institutions. More current analyses have concluded that other forms of power do exist within organizations. This research shall attempt to transpose these kinds of power in a more detailed understanding of control within a prison setting.

Second, while there has been a recognition of coercive power among administrators of correctional environments, there has been no systematic attempt to understand how this type of formal and legal authority enhances the development of other types of power among officers and inmates, and how formal authority expressed through coercive means erodes other kinds of power which may provide greater control. As a result, the old adage that "inmates run the joint"

takes on significance; they control activities within prisons because much of their power is a structural adaptation to the formal prison administration. As a result, inmate and officer power is directly related to the coercive practices of the prison's hierarchy.

Finally, if officer and inmate types of power are developed in direct proportion to the coercive power of prison administration, then one could alter the structural arrangement of the prison organization which would emphasize certain kinds of power over others. Also, what forms of power should correctional administrators stress to gain more control over their environments? This research shall attempt to answer this question and other issues in its analysis of social bases of power and control among administrators, officers, and inmates.

The following chapter thoroughly examines the concepts of power and authority within general organizational theory and applies the analysis to prison organizations. In addition, an investigation is provided which examines the two major models of inmate socialization and how they relate to control and stability. Chapter three describes the methodology employed and research location; chapter four, five, and six analyze the social bases of power and other "focal concerns" which gauge the relative stability of Huron Valley Men's Facility with another comparable prison structure. Finally, the last chapter discusses the conclusions and implications of this research for future research and control of correctional environments.

Endnotes - Chapter 1

¹I am referring to the Just Deserts model, where an emphasis is on sentencing fewer individuals to penitentiaries and only incarcerating the most serious offenders.

²There is an organization known as the National Moratorium on Prison Construction which seeks to minimize the number of new prisons being constructed in this country.

³This is not uncommon in many facilities throughout the country, particularly the large facilities such as the State Prison of Southern Michigan (Jackson), San Quentin, and Attica Correctional Facility.

⁴This is a key point in understanding current prison structures; they are now built for not only size but also humaneness. Many correctional officials have stated how this is crucial to the construction of new facilities. See Ward, David A., and Schoen, Kenneth F. Confinement in Maximum Custody (Lexington Books: D.C. Heath and Company, 1981) for a further examination of this topic.

⁵These individuals were chosen because they represented classics in prison organizational literature.

⁶See Killinger, George G. et al., Issues in Corrections and Administration: Selected Readings (West Publishing Company: St. Paul, Minnesota, 1976) for a more thorough exploration of this topical area.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter shall review the literature on the concept of power; to state and describe the types of power within organizations; and to analyze the implications of particular power configurations on organizations. Zald (1962) states that control in any organization "can be described in terms of the distribution of power and the channels for utilizing power." The pivotal question is how power is developed and distributed within an organization. Zald's research, however, lacks any clear definition of power.

How power operates within a correctional environment requires review of how it is dispensed and social control maintained within prison society. A review of the traditional theories of inmate socialization will be conducted, with an emphasis on how power relations affect the socialization and crystallization of various roles within the prison setting. The hypothesis is that the social organization of prison is largely affected by the specific power relations in the institutional environment.

1. Definition of Power and Authority

No concept has been more elusive than the notion of power. Hinings et al. (1967) believe that it is analogous to such vague concepts as bureaucracy and alienation. This has led various authors (Weber, 1947; Bierstedt, 1950; and Blau, 1964) to think of power as purely coercion. For example, Dahl (1957) defines power as "A has the power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do."

However, others have seen the power concept in a more ubiquitous fashion. Power is defined more broadly and extended to include the notion of organizational units functioning within an identifiable social system (Emerson, 1962; Dubin, 1963; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; and Crozier, 1964). How power pervades an organization and how the relative amount of power is determined through the interaction of people and units within an organization is most relevant. The organization not only functions with simple dyadic relationships, but more importantly, operates with the interdependence of many units in various exchange relationships.

Bacharach and Lawler (1980) show, for example, how the personnel subunit is interdependent with the other units of the organization.¹ Perrow (1970) has also shown that sales departments within industrial firms were much more powerful in their interaction with other subunits in the organization, and that any conception of power must consider the role of "interdepartmental power" in

determining the total level of organizational power.² The evidence suggests that power is elevated to the organizational subunit level; therefore, what is relevant are the operations of particular units in the scheme of the entire organization. One implication is that particular units are more powerful, dependent upon how they operate within the organization's task environment (Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967). Specifically, how organizational subunits are able to deal with the many uncertainties of their environment determines how they fit into the power configuration of an organization (March and Simon, 1958).

Hickson et al. (1973) further develop the notion of intraorganizational power. They maintain that organizational subunits which cope with uncertainty effectively have a relatively high level of power within the organization. Concomitantly, the organizational unit which cannot be placed (substitutability), is highly pervasive and immediate (centrality) in relation to the workflow of the organization, and deals with contingencies sufficiently, is usually very powerful.

The concluding factors which are relevant in this discussion are as follows: first, power is a concept which denotes some type of influence or activity in which "a person or group of persons or organization of persons determines, i.e., . . . affects what another person or group or organization will do (Tannenbaum, 1962)." Second, power must be considered as existing within the units of an

organization, as well as the interpersonal level. Past research studies have tended to view the latter approach as the only appropriate method; this has obscured the relevancy of interdepartmental power in the organizational setting. Third, power is relative in an organization, depending upon how organizational subunits cope with the issue of uncertainty, substitutability, and centrality. An hypothesis in the literature is that organizational subunits which deal successfully with these factors will have more power within the organization. Consequently, they will be able to influence not only the direction of the organization but also solidify themselves into a permanent and lasting power position (Michels, 1949).

While one can be aware of the nature of power and how it is dispersed throughout an organization, it is important to focus on the difference between power and authority. Pfeffer (1981) has stated how an understanding of control in organizations requires a distinction between power and authority. He states how the distinction between the two concepts is relative to the amount of legitimation individuals express within the organization. In effect, compliance is gained because it is accepted by the individuals in the work force.

As a result, what is developed is an "acceptance of practices and values, which can include the distribution of influence within the social setting [and], binds together those within the setting, through their common perspective" (p. 4). More importantly, the use of authority within organizations allows further institutional control.

Thus, control over organizational members becomes "expected as part of organizational life." Moreover, this method of control enables the organization to devote more of its energy to accomplishing objectives.

2. Types of Authority and Social Bases of Power

A discussion dealing with the unitary concept of power must examine the work of Max Weber. Initially, Weber distinguished between authority and power, where the former denoted the compliance to particular directives relative to the essentiality of these directives in achieving a common or shared goal. On the other hand, he defined power in terms of pure coercion and discussed its applicability to organizations which emphasized strict organizational compliance, e.g., slave-labor camps and prisons.³

Weber's development of the authority concept gained the most attention in the literature. Accordingly, Weber's typology of authority distinguishes among traditional, charismatic, and legal authority. For example, in the Roman Catholic Church, the Pope depends on traditional authority, which allows him to dictate many directives to a great number of people with very little resistance.

A second form of authority is charismatic authority. This type of authority is characterized through the personal attributes and/or actions of a particular individual within an organization. For example, it has been stated that former President John F. Kennedy wielded charismatic authority, due to his personality and attractability to a sizeable number of the electorate. This type of

person is able to gain compliance from others through personal qualities and is able to transmit these qualities in a fashion which captures peoples' attention and admiration. Many people within organizations exhibit this type of authority.

The last type of authority is legal. Legal authority is based on an appeal to formal rules and regulations of an organization. Specifically, this type of authority is usually rooted in the formal hierarchy of the organization, where people are in positions which allow them to delegate specific orders to subordinates. This type of authority is predicated on the belief of subordinates that superordinates have a right in issuing orders and expecting compliance. Also, the presumption is that such a regimented system is necessary if objectives are to be met and organizational goals fulfilled.

French and Raven (1968) provide a typology of the various types of power on the interpersonal level; however, these bases of power can be extended to include also an analysis at the organizational level (Hall, 1982). They develop five basic types of power, describing each in terms of power holder and power recipient.

The five types of power are: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert. Reward power is exhibited when the power holder is able to influence the power recipient's behavior by providing him with some type of meaningful reward for his compliance. An example of reward power is the piece-work rate in factories as incentives to

increase production by workers. The presumption is that workers will work harder and faster if more remuneration is given as an incentive.

A second type of power, one that has been associated with traditional prisons, is coercive power. This type of power base is predicated on the notion of punishment, or at least the threat of application of punishment. There is a negative sanction given to an individual for noncompliance.

Legitimate power enables a power holder to influence a power recipient because the latter has developed within him some "internalized norm" in relation to the power holder and his position. This internalized norm can be traced to many sources: cultural values, social structure, or through a designated and legitimized leader. For example, French and Raven suggest that an individual in an organization will follow the orders of his superior because the orders reflect the wishes and/or desires of a third person in the organization; e.g., the third person could be the president of the firm.

Power which has its base in identification between the power holder and power recipient is labeled referent power. This fourth type of power is predicated on the attractability of the power recipient to the power holder. French and Raven state "In our terms, this would mean that the greater the attraction, the greater the identification, and consequently the greater the referent power." The power recipient, in effect, follows the demands of the power holder through an identification with him.

The important difference between this type of power and reward and coercive kinds of power is the mediation of rewards and/or sanctions. In reward and coercive power, the power holder is able to control the number of rewards and/or punishments. Conversely, this type of power base is contingent upon the identification of the power recipient with the power holder, regardless of the consequences of the relationship, whether they be positive or negative. For example, an individual may have his own opinion about a particular subject matter, but he will go along with the "group" because he identifies and desires to be like them. In effect, the group is exhibiting a strong form of referent power toward the individual.

The last type of power offered by French and Raven is expert power. Expert power is based on the level of expertise that the power holder has over the power recipient, and the belief, on the part of the power recipient, that the power holder actually has a high level of expertise in a particular subject area. The actual effect of this type of power is on the "cognitive structure" of the power recipient. This fosters a dependence of the power recipient on the power holder; however, this usually changes with the passage of time. For example, the lawyer-client relationship is predicated on the knowledge the lawyer (power holder) can convey to the client (power recipient) in his particular case. However, one can presume that after a period of time the client becomes knowledgeable about the "system" and is less dependent on the lawyer, thereby decreasing the amount of expert power the lawyer has over his client.⁴

Bacharach and Lawler (1980) discuss the role of information as another form of power in organizations. Individuals or groups may have power in an organization through their ability to control the informational sectors of the organization. Most important is the ability to control information which is "unique" in maintaining the operation of the organization (Pfeffer, 1977). This is distinguished from expert power in that access to information is a social position which allows one to gain information, while expert power is relative to a specific type of knowledge. For example, individual inmates who understand the legal system exhibit a form of expert power, while inmate clerks have access to information which allows them to manipulate the prison structure to their advantage (i.e., knowing whose cell will be searched by officers).⁵ What is relevant is how information is crucial to any decision in an organization, and any adequate understanding of power in organizations must look at the role of information and its control in providing organizational stability.⁶

The other type of power base not discussed in the French and Raven typology is providing of resources. Accordingly, Pfeffer (1977) has concluded that a subunit's ability to bring in critical resources to an organization allows it to deal with much organizational uncertainty. Earlier work by Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) has suggested that subunit power was largely contingent upon the ability of the subunit or department to gain outside grant and contract

funds. This providing of resources enables the subunit to be not only autonomous but also allows it to sit well relative to other units within the organization (Lodahl and Gordon, 1973). What is relevant is that subunits with access to resources are able to develop strong forms of power within the organization.

3. Consequences of Power Relationships

The research on the effects of varying types of power in organizations is plentiful (see Hall, Richard, 1982). Using the French and Raven typology, Warren (1968) has shown that on the dimensions of "behavioral conformity" (conformity without any internalization of norms) and "Attitudinal conformity" (conformity and internalization of norms) that school teachers showed high levels of attitudinal conformity in relation to expert, legitimate, and referent power, while the power bases of reward and coercive were more related to behavioral conformity. The important point is that differing kinds of power exist within organizations, and that the behavioral output is noticeably different relative to the types of power employed. This interpretation is further supported by the work of Lord (1977) in his analysis of the relationship between types of social power and leadership functions.

Lord concluded that legitimate power is highly related to the leadership functions of developing orientation, communication, and coordination, whereas coercive power is most highly related to facilitating evaluations, proposing solutions, and total functional

behavior. He maintains that various types of power do exist in organizations and they have differential impacts on the organization and its members.

Julian (1966) concluded that depending upon the type of hospital, different types of power were utilized relative to the nature of the organization. For example, he states that voluntary hospitals relied on a "normative" power system in gaining compliance, where talks and explanations were used in gaining compliance. Conversely, he found that veterans' hospitals employed methods of coercion in gaining compliance. Through the use of sedation and restriction of activity, workers were able to get compliance and at the same time fulfill their goal: the control of the individual patient. An implication from this research is that differing organizations use diverse types of power to accomplish their organizational goal, and the type and amount of power used is variable and contextual. In short, organizations will vary on the types of power employed, dependent upon how the specific power base enables the organization to fulfill its objectives and provide control.

Tifft (1976), in his analysis of control systems and social bases of power in police organizations, attempted to examine the "structural conditions" which affect the location of social bases of power in police organizations, while at the same time exploring the structural conditions affecting the exercise of power, how these could be altered for more organizational control, and what are the consequences of

these structures on the persons within the organization. He concluded that:

The environmental-structural context of the position of the sergeant in each specific organizational unit largely determines whether or not supervisors can even potentially have significant influence on the working ideology, orientation, or performance of the operative policeman in that unit. Consequently, we have seen that only under specific, exacting organizational-environmental-structural conditions which affect the social bases of power located in the position of supervisor has the style of the sergeant had a significant effect on the performance of his subordinates.

Tifft states that different police functional units allow differing types of power to be developed. He mentions that the patrol unit sergeant had more coercive and legitimate power because of the situational-functional aspects of that particular unit, whereas the tactical unit exhibited high levels of referent, legitimate, and expert power bases because of the structural design and activities of that specific unit.

Not only are the power and control varied and limited structurally, but they also lead to a further subdivision of the organization.

Dalton (1959) has suggested that the diffusion of power within organizations produces powerful cliques. These cliques serve the purpose of defending their members in response to various threats to organizational autonomy; they are highly interpersonal and constantly shifting over time and located both horizontally and vertically within the organizational hierarchy.

Pfeffer (1981) points out that not only do cliques and/or coalitions exist, but they are also highly political, relying on various strategies in advancing their own purposes and causes over other cliques within the organization. It is this political nature of cliques and their concomitant power arrangements which are relevant when discussing the decision-making process within organizations (Allison, 1969; Kaufman, 1964; March, 1962; and Pandarus, 1973).

It is more productive to view these political behaviors as part of an integral process which is endemic to decision-making in organizations, whether the political behavior is good for the organization in determining policy (Walmsley and Zald, 1973), or is designed to perpetuate the self-interests of one man or a group of men within the organization (Pettigrew, 1973; and Porter, 1976). Gandz and Murray (1980) suggest the latter interpretation of organizational politics or "workplace politics" in their analysis of subjects' perceptions of political behavior on the part of the managers within public and private organizations.

The importance of these kinds of political behaviors is that they are interfaced with the power concept, suggesting that various forms of power may be employed in the advancement of personal or subunit objectives within the organization, regardless of the organizational goal. This may lead to dysfunctional behaviors in an organization.

Specifically, in relation to correctional institutions, one notices how organizational groups are extremely fragmented. Inmates,

officers, and administrators have traditionally been alienated from one another, and as a result, the prison structure has been ineffective in accomplishing many of its goals. The literature suggests that specific types of power are more helpful in producing a congruent environment.

Etzioni (1975) has suggested that depending upon the kind of power employed, organizations will have a higher level of commitment by members if more involvement on their part exists in the organization. Moreover, later research has provided similar findings: the amount of control exhibited was relative to the commitment of organizational members (Houghland et al., 1979; Houghland and Wood, 1980; and Styskal, 1980). In effect, as the organization is legitimated by subordinates, it expresses more compliance from them. This research has tended to view compliance only in voluntary organizations. Correctional settings are not voluntary in nature. As a result, much of the activity relies on some sense of coercion in return for order (Etzioni, 1961). Moreover, the only form of power which has been traditionally expressed in prisons is coercive, causing a fragmented system in which power is actually accentuated over authority.

In effect, prison structures have limited legitimate power existing among the groups (inmates, officers, and administrators). Specifically, inmates as a group lack a commitment to the organizational design as supported by officers and administrators. As a response, they typically develop their own interest groups in

response to this coercive organizational scheme. Thus, the coercive control mechanism is dysfunctional unless some intrinsic value is given to members within the organization (Lawler, 1976).

4. Prison Organizations

This section of the review will explore social control and power in prison and inmate society, new developments in the exploration of prison organization, and types of power arrangements in different prison settings. The prison social structure will be viewed recognizing the role of power in determining behaviors among groups in the institution--administrators, inmates, and officers.

Research into prison organization has tended to focus on the dichotomous nature of goals within correctional environments. The dichotomy has lead to a distinction in correctional goals: correctional institutions have either custodial goals or treatment based goals. Cressey (1965) has discussed the difference between custodial-oriented institutions and treatment-based facilities. He suggests that the custodial-type prison emphasizes a strict hierarchy of authority, a structured and limited flow of communication, and a highly centralized decision-making body. Conversely, the treatment institution stresses the importance of authority being patterned on technical competencies of the employees, fewer restrictions on the type and amount of communication, and a very broad base of decision-making authority, where decisions are made by all involved (administrators, officers, and inmates).

Cressey (1959) has also maintained how the goals of correctional agencies are often contradictory, leading toward observable conflicts in types of control mechanisms employed by the organization. Regardless of the stated goal, for example the treatment of individuals, the institution still has to provide a modicum of control over inmates. This has been noted in the literature as the custody-treatment debate.⁷

Furthermore, Zald (1962) has reaffirmed this point in his discussion of multiple goals in correctional organizations and the resulting conflict in the total operation of institutions. Others have discussed this line of reasoning in relation to juvenile institutions (Weber, 1957) and prison camps (Grusky, 1959). In short, there are behavioral effects of certain types of prison organization.

Wilson (1968) maintains that the level of inmate adaptation to an institution is more related to institutional management rather than individual personality types. Moreover, others have suggested that inmate adaptation to institutionalization has been more positive in a treatment oriented institution rather than a custodial facility (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Street, 1965; Berk, 1966; and Tittle, 1974). Whether the goal be treatment or custody oriented, or a combination of the two, it can be stated that there are certain effects on institutional members. Some of these effects may even be detrimental to not only the individuals but also to any effective strategy of rehabilitation.⁸

While effects exist within correctional institutions, it is still necessary to explore more thoroughly the method of social control in prison, and how inmate bodies form in reaction to their incarceration. Many research studies have explored the socialization process within prisons (Bowker, 1977; Leger and Stratton, 1977; and Shover, 1979). These have been broken down into two distinct models of inmate social organization: (1) functional model, and (2) importation model.

5. Social Control in Prison and Inmate Organizations

Functional Model. The concept of prison social structure, particularly its definition, has undergone an extensive change over the last 15 to 20 years. Specifically, we see early on a particular sociological frame of reference (structural-functionalism) dominating the explanation of prison control and organization, with functional answers to the complex interactions of administrators, officers, and inmates (Irwin, 1977). Initially, we find the work of McCorkle and Korn (1954), Sykes (1958), and Sykes and Messinger (1960) explaining inmate society and social control as "functional adaptations" to the inherent coercive structure of the formal prison hierarchy.

In fact, in the seminal work of Sykes (1958), we find the phrase "pains of imprisonment," where inmates respond to their incarceration by forming a tightly bound group, stressing inmate cohesion vis-a-vis officers and administrators. In response to this intense deprivation, inmates develop a "convict code," which consists of five basic

tenets: (1) "Don't exploit convicts," (2) "Don't weaken," (3) "Don't lose your head," (4) "Don't interfere with convict interests," (5) "Don't be a sucker" (Sykes and Messinger, 1960).

The information obtained from these studies attempted to emphasize the importance of an inmate society and how this society functions relative to the deprivations experienced; it is what Goffman (1961) refers to as the "total institution." In effect, any institution which generates such deprivations would cause an inmate society to develop and generate similar behaviors. Sykes mentions that inmates experience the deprivations of (1) liberty, (2) goods and services, (3) heterosexual relationships, (4) autonomy, and (5) security. These deprivations further exacerbate the life of the individual inmate and cause a high level of alienation from institutional staff.

This has led Cloward (1960) to conclude that because prisons cannot structurally control all inmates there is usually some form of "accommodation" maintaining order within the institution. He states:

Limitations on the exercise of power mean that devices must be evolved to secure the voluntary allegiance of inmates. Systems of incentives are one device but, as we have indicated, limited access to formal rewards tends to produce rather than avert deviance. Limitations on power in the one system therefore compel adaptive or reciprocal adjustments between the two systems. In effect, concessions must be made by the officials to the inmates.

Prison control is maintained through various accommodative relationships between inmates and staff, creating a myriad of illegal means and opportunities within the prison society. Accordingly, it is

these exchange relationships which produce what Sykes refers to as the "corruption of authority," where an intricate and diverse informal system of bargaining is created and perpetuated by both groups (officers and inmates) in return for control (officers) and amenities to ease the pains of imprisonment (inmates).⁹

In terms of power configurations, we see the Functional model stressing the role of coercive measures as prerequisites to the development of an inmate social organization. Thus, inmate organization represents a collective response to coercive control mechanisms. Furthermore, the inmate social system functions relative to the coercion experienced by inmates as a group (Carroll, 1974). Thus, the greater amount of coercion, the stronger the opposition within the inmate social arena.

Importation Model

This model of inmate social organization suggests that prison society reflects a system which is acquired on the outside and imported into the prison environment. Irwin and Cressey (1962) argue that inmate society represents three specific subcultures from the outside world: "thief," "convict," and "do right." The thief subculture has its orientation in the world of professional crime, whereas the convict subculture has its origination in the social world of reform school and the lower class. These two subcultures seek to manipulate the prison organization to their advantage, using many illegal means in gaining power, prestige, and wealth within the

institutional environment. Thus, they are thoroughly manifested through the coercive measures of prison life.

On the other hand, the "do right" frame of reference is characterized by the inmate who has middle-class values. Typically, he is attempting to alter his criminal propensities through various institutional programs. In addition, this subculture legitimizes the prison organization and its goals.

6. Modern Explanations of Social Control in Contemporary Prison

The current literature suggests that prison environments have undergone extensive changes from the early prison setting, with heightened racial tension (Carroll, 1974), increased violence and the insurgence of street gangs into the prison systems (Jacobs, 1977), and a disillusioned guard force which entertains the notion of unions and possible strikes (Irwin, 1980).¹⁰ The final product is a highly fragmented and precarious environment.

Therefore, to control the modern prison environment requires much more than a simple give-take relationship on the part of inmates and staff. Instead, the administrator of the modern prison finds himself not only faced with internal strife but he is also more accountable to the public at large; specifically, the courts have intervened in such a way in the past 20 years that much of the autocratic control exercised in earlier years has been taken away or severely truncated (Jacobs, 1977).

Irwin has explored the demise of the "Big House" in corrections, and has stated how many states have begun to be very bureaucratized and formal in the operation of their prison systems. Truly, the prison system has become more in tune with modern thinking; nevertheless, it is still a coercive type organization. It is this threat of coercion which ultimately decides the direction of any prison system (Fox, 1980).

In Figure 2.1, Rhine (1981) provides us with a typical structure of the contemporary prison. The modern prison structure accentuates the role of centralized decision making and a formalized method of dealing with prisoners. However, the concept of power in the prison organization literature is treated rather loosely, relying on a relatively undetermined definition of what exactly power is in correctional settings and how diffuse the power arrangements are. While there has been a dearth of material in the past literature on power and the diffusion of power in correctional institutions, some recent research has attempted to explore the power concept in a more systematic fashion. Stastny and Tyrnauer (1982) have developed a prison typology which details the differing types of prisons and the associated power configurations of these prisons. They suggest that four types of prisons exist or have existed in this country: "Enlightenment," "Warehouse," "Remedial," and "Interactive."

The Enlightenment prison emphasized a unicentric power configuration, with keepers stressing control over prisoners. The

FIGURE 2.1




FIGURE 2.2. A DIAGRAM OF PRISON SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

Source: Rhine, Edward E., Law, Social Control, and Due Process In a Maximum Security Prison, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, page 12, 1981.

main function of this institution was the redemption of the prisoner and the inculcation of correct work habits. It also exhibited a warden autocracy, silence system, and hard labor. They suggest that the Pennsylvania model of prison organization (1820's) emulated the enlightenment prison. This prison structure resembles pure coercion on the part of administration.

On the other hand, the Warehouse prison had a power configuration where the staff was in opposition to the inmates, and the main goal was incapacitation, with principal features of custody, balance of power, and an identifiable inmate code. It is this type of prison that much of the sociological literature on prison organization has been written. It, too, represents the functional reaction of inmates to coercive measures of control.

The third type of prison is the Remedial prison. As opposed to a unicentric or bicentric power configuration, this prison exemplifies a tricentric power configuration, suggesting that not only are there keepers and kept but also the "remediators" or treatment specialists. Its function is to operate as a hospital and/or a school, with its principle features being treatment, indeterminate sentencing, specialized treatment staff and programs, and a host of ancillary educational pursuits for inmates. An example of this type of treatment-oriented correctional setting can be seen in the work of Zebulon Brockway at the Elmira Reformatory (1876). This type of prison structure views power in the hands of three groups as opposed to two, each seeking control of the institution.

The Interactive prison has a polycentric power configuration, consisting of numerous actors and/or groups exercising power internally and externally to the prison: such groups as prisoners, offices, unions, courts, legislatures, and mass media. The underlying theme of such an institution is the "open prison," and its focus is on permeability, a diffusion of power, detotalizing the correctional environment, and judicial intervention and prisoners' rights.

Figure 2.2 portrays the types of prisons, various power configurations, main functions, and their principal features. Interestingly enough, this prison typology puts forth for the first time the relevancy of exploring correctional institutions as having complex power configurations. What is essential is that a more thorough investigation be undertaken of what types of power exist within our prisons. While Stastny and Tyrnauer recognize that there are differing groups within the various institutions, what is not explored is how these groups vary on the types of power they employ. Do administrators exhibit different forms of power than officers and inmate? What is the interaction of these kinds of power? Does one type of power predominate over another?

Stastny and Tyrnauer present the problem: power and how differing groups exist within various prison settings. What is needed now is a further clarification and typification of the types of power these groups wield. This requires an examination of the social bases of power in prison.

Figure 2.2
A PRISON TYPOLOGY

	Power Configuration	Main Function	Principal Features
Enlightenment	Unicentric: Keepers over prisoners	Reformation: Peni- tence leading to redemption, develop- ment of work habits	Isolation Atomized prisoner Silence system Warden autocracy Labor
Warehouse	Bicentric: Keepers versus convicts	Incapacitation	Custody, surveillance "Balance of Power" Static polity Convict code Prison labor
Remedial	Tricentric: Keepers and Remediators and Inmates	Rehabilitation: "hospital" and "school" models	Treatment/training Indeterminate sentence Special role of treat- ment staff Programs Education
Interactive	Polycentric: Mass society: Prisoners, keepers, guards, unions, courts, legislatures, mass media, etc.	Simulated community: the "open" prison	Detotalization Permeability Diffusion of power Pluralism Judicial intervention/ prisoners' rights

Source: Stastny, Charles and Tyrnauer, Gabrielle. Who Rules the Joint: The Changing Political Culture of Maximum-Security Prisons in America. Lexington Books: D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, page 22, 1982.

7. Summary and Conclusions

It has been the purpose of this review to provide an overview of the literature on the power concept, suggest various types of power, discuss the traditional explanation of social control in prison, posit a new look at the contemporary prison, and explore the types of prisons and their power configurations. The research suggests that the definition of power be considered both as interpersonal and intraorganizational.

Furthermore, the literature points out the relevancy of kinds of power and how differing types exist within organizations: coercive, referent, legitimate, reward, expert, access to information, and providing resources. It was stated that these types of power extend to all the major groups in an organization, suggesting the importance of examining different types of power and their degrees of influence among the organizational groups. Specific studies were examined and it was concluded that differing forms of power have differential impacts on the organization.

While the literature on the concept of power is plentiful, it was mentioned that such an in-depth analysis was lacking in correctional research and literature. The material reviewed posited a stance which described inmate society as separated and alienated from administration, cohesively structured and associated with an identifiable inmate code, and predicated on the tenuous symbiotic relationship between keeper and kept. However, the review did

challenge this rather traditional review of prison organization and suggested that the contemporary prison accentuates coercive power, is organized through a formal hierarchy, exemplifies a fragmentation of groups, both staff and inmates, on race, controlled through the predominance of urban gangs, and torn internally because of a hostile and disillusioned guard force.

However, to fully comprehend the complexities of this environment, it was suggested that the role of power in the institutions be examined, i.e., how pivotal types of power exist among the groups and how they are employed. The relevant literature does explore power configurations in the differing types of institutions, but it does not examine more thoroughly the types of power and the exercisers of such power. Therefore, it will be hypothesized that the types of power mentioned earlier do exist within correctional institutions among the groups (inmates, officers, and administrators), and that each group employs differing types of power relative to the concerns, goals, and desires of that group.

Control is realized through a tacit recognition of the various forms of power employed by each group. The types of power are regarded as essential elements in maintaining the organizational status quo, each offering, in part, control to the organization. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to examine the types of power among administrators, officers, and inmates, and to see if these forms of power are affected by the introduction of modern technology.

Endnotes - Chapter 2

¹See the research of Wamsley, Garry L. (1970), for a further discussion of this topic.

²Crozier (1964) gives an interesting examination of "horizontal power" among maintenance men of tobacco firms.

³See Buckley (1967), for a further distinction between power and authority.

⁴Anthony Lewis (1966) provides an interesting discussion of how one man was able to learn the legal system while incarcerated within a penitentiary.

⁵The power of inmate clerks is something which has been recognized for years within correctional institutions. In effect, inmate clerks serve the purpose of being "middle men" between the formal prison structure and inmate society.

⁶Kenneth Arrow (1974) contends that once organizations make investments toward a certain direction, it is difficult for them to change. As mentioned by Arrow, they are constrained by their choices, making it difficult to opt for further strategies. As a result, the current information channels are maintained, and in turn, they provide stability to the organization.

⁷See the work of Cloward, (1960); Ohlin, (1960); and Cressey (1960) for a deeper understanding in this topical area.

⁸Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and Phillip Zimbardo (1973) have demonstrated how the prison environment is pathological for both inmates and officers. In effect, individuals within these roles typically exhibit behaviors which undermine any serious attempt at rehabilitation.

⁹A further analysis is explored more thoroughly in the work of Kalinich (1980). He describes how these accommodative relationships lead to an intricate contraband system within the institutional environment.

¹⁰For an examination of other issues facing corrections today, see Alexander (1978) and Jacobs and Crotty (1978).

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN: INSIDE A MAXIMUM SECURITY INSTITUTION

1. Research Site

The prison under investigation is Huron Valley Men's Facility (HVMF), a newly constructed maximum security prison within the State of Michigan. This prison facility was chosen for three reasons: First, it was a new facility, with only 400 inmates and access was much easier than other institutions in the system.¹ Second, the institution was designed with security and control of inmates as its primary purpose; there was no pretense about rehabilitation--it was not a primary goal nor was it to be emphasized within the operation of the facility. Finally, the institution promulgated a contemporary approach to corrections, emphasizing a lower inmate-staff ratio and modern facilities for inmate care and supervision.²

More importantly, the prisoners were composed of those inmates who were defined as uncontrollable and in need of more supervision. Therefore, it was the intention of correction officials to

design a facility which made inmates more tractable, using the most advanced technology in inmate care and control.


This included many items not typically associated with traditional prison structures: A computer locking system, a lower inmate-staff ratio,³ and an electronic detection system with microwave escape detectors. The prison is constructed similar to a college campus. In fact, at first glance, the facility does not appear to be a prison. It consists of five housing units, each holding approximately 84 men, an academic and vocational school, along with a spacious yard and a modern athletic fieldhouse.

In addition, the facility is surrounded with two 12-foot-high chain link fences topped with barbed wire and six guard towers. There is also a power plant and food services area which are shared with an adjoining women's prison. Currently, the facility holds 391 inmates and is composed of 110 employees and 284 staff members. The latter figure represents the custodial staff (officers) and includes the administration.

Figure 3.1 diagrams the formal organizational structure which exists at HVMF.⁴ The warden is situated at the top of the organizational hierarchy, with the Deputy Warden, Resident Services, Personnel, Business Office, and General Office Services comprising the next level of horizontal positions. Under these positions are the various roles which are filled by custodial and housing personnel. Of

Figure 3.1

FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AT HURON VALLEY MEN'S FACILITY



* Serve Huron Valley Men's Facility and Huron Valley Women's Facility.

** Serves half time at Huron Valley Women's Facility.

*** Serves Huron Valley Men's and Women's Facilities and the Cassidy Lake Technical School.

particular importance are the assistant deputies in housing and custody.

Responsibilities of this position include being in charge of Resident Unit Managers (RUMS) and Assistant Resident Unit Managers (ARUMS). These Assistant Deputies operate within the institutional environment and are the middlemen between the formal administration and corrections officers. The Assistant Deputy for custody supervisors the various correctional officer positions and assigns the officers in the specific housing units.

The housing unit assignments are an integral part of the security of the institution. The five housing units represent differential levels of security and associated privileges.⁵ Unit 1 is designated the Segregation area, for administrative and detention purposes. It is intended for those prisoners who are serving punitive detention sentences, temporarily being segregated pending a misconduct or security classification hearing, or who have been classified to administrative segregation.⁶

Unit 2 is designated as the protective custody section of the prison, with inmates who have confirmed enemies within the institutional environment and/or are physically immature or inadequate and fear some form of assault within general population. An example of this types of individual is the inmate who has been sexually abused.

The third housing unit, composed of general population prisoners, is divided into two wings. B-wing is comprised of those persons who

have demonstrated some motivation for school and/or work programs and have received no more than two major misconducts over a 12 month period.⁷ On the other hand, C-wing is for the prisoner who represents a management problem to the administration and does not desire to work nor enhance his educational development through schooling.

Another general population area is Unit 4, where inmates must express a desire to work and/or go to school. These inmates receive expanded privileges. In order to be in this unit, an inmate must have had no more than two major misconduct reports over a 12 month period.

The last housing unit, sometimes referred to as the "honor unit," is 5. This unit is reserved for those inmates who have served at least six months at HVMF in a general population housing unit and whose institutional record is free of any misconducts and engages in some form of educational development and/or work activity. This living area allows inmates more privileges and rights than the others, and it is typically sought after by many inmates.⁸

One of the keys to understanding the operation of HVMF is to explore this pseudo-behavioral modification scheme instituted by administrators. Ideally, inmates would be given more privileges and fewer restrictions as they move up through the housing units. Figure 3.2 indicates the number and types of privileges each housing unit allows the individual inmate. As represented in the Figure, inmates in unit 5 have more privileges than any other housing unit.

Figure 3.2

NUMBER AND TYPE OF PRIVILEGES BY HOUSING UNIT

Unit #1 - Segregation Status:

1. Telephone calls - one (1) per week (limited).
2. Access to legal materials.
3. Reading materials.
4. Personal property (defined in OP-HVM-61.08).
5. Meals - fed in their rooms.
6. Showers - three (3) times per week minimum.
7. Recreation - one (1) hour per day, five (5) days per week, whenever conditions permit.
8. Religious materials and Chaplain visits.
9. Visits.

Unit #2 - Protective Custody:

1. Telephone calls - minimum one (1) per week.
2. Access to legal materials.
3. Reading materials.
4. Personal property.
5. Meals - fed in the dining room with option to feed in the unit.
6. Showers - daily.
7. Recreation - six (6) times per week - two (2) hour time frames.
8. Visits.
9. Hobbycraft - limited to the unit.
10. Work assignments - limited in unit and special assignments.
11. Academic/vocational school program.
12. Religious materials and Chaplain visits.

Unit #3 - General Population:

B-Wing:

1. Telephone privileges - minimum two (2) per week.
2. Access to Law Library.
3. Religious materials and services.
4. Personal property.
5. Meals - fed in the dining room.
6. Showers - daily.
7. Recreation - six (6) times per week - two (2) hour time frames, twenty-two (22) men per group. Regular gym activities.
8. Hobbycraft.
9. Visits.

10. Work assignments.
11. Academic/vocational program.

Unit #3 - General Population:

C-Wing:

1. Telephone calls - minimum one (1) per week.
2. Access to Law Library.
3. Religious materials and services.
4. Personal property.
5. Meals - fed in dining room with option to feed same in unit.
6. Showers - daily.
7. Recreation - daily, one (1) hour time frames, eleven (11) men per group.
8. Visits.
9. Hobbycraft - limited in room, with restrictions.
10. Work assignments - in unit and grounds surrounding the unit.

Unit #4 - General Population - Expanded Privileges:

1. Telephone calls - minimum one (1) per week.
2. Access to Law Library.
3. Religious materials and services.
4. Personal property.
5. Meals - fed in dining room.
6. Showers - daily.
7. Recreation - daily, six (6) time per week, two (2) hour time frames, forty-two (42) men per group. Regular gym activities.
8. Visits.
9. Hobbycraft.
10. Work assignments.
11. Academic/vocational school program.

Unit #5 - General Population - Full Privileges:

1. Telephone calls - Unlimited.
2. Access to Law Library.
3. Religious materials and services.
4. Personal property.
5. Meals - fed in dining room.
6. Showers - daily.
7. Recreation - daily - 2-1/2 to 3-1/2 hour time frames, forty-two (42) men per group.
8. Visits.
9. Hobbycraft.
10. Work assignments.
11. Academic/vocational school program.
12. Key to their rooms.

In effect, this housing area is the least restrictive and symbolizes a positive effort on the part of administrators to reward good behavior.

Moreover, this organizational design is predicated on the belief that control can be maximized by providing a clear set of rules and regulations by which inmates are to abide. Therefore, the housing unit configuration represents the formal administration's attempt to provide control on one hand, while providing a humane environment on the other hand. HVMF typifies a new trend in corrections which attempts to control a more problematic inmate population, while still appeasing the courts and other public interest groups concerning inmate care and maintenance (Irwin, 1980).

2. History of the Institution and Formal Organizational Goals

On August 20, 1981, HVMF opened its doors to its first 22 inmates. The institution was forced to open early because of overcrowding in the system, and it currently operates at near capacity, confining approximately 391 inmates. Table 3.1 shows the demographic information on these inmates. As indicated, a sizeable number are within the age bracket of 26 to 35, with this representing 58.8% of the total population. Furthermore, 69% of the population is non-white, which includes Blacks, Indians, and Mexican Americans. In addition, many of the inmates (38.7%) have been transferred to this facility from the only other maximum security prison in the state: Marquette Branch Prison. Lastly, the data reveal that a vast majority

Table 3.1

POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS OF HURON VALLEY MEN'S FACILITY
(As of August, 1982)

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Age of Prisoners</u>		
Under 20	5	1.2
20-25	66	16.9
26-30	135	34.6
31-35	94	24.2
36-40	43	10.9
41-45	28	7.1
46 and older	20	5.1
	<u>391</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Racial Breakdown</u>		
Non-white	270	69.0
White	121	31.0
	<u>391</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Sending Institutions</u>		
Reception and Guidance Center - SPSM	96	24.6
Marquette Branch Prison	151	38.7
Michigan Reformatory	35	8.9
State Prison of Southern Michigan	71	18.2
Michigan Intensive Program Center	17	4.3
Riverside Correctional Facility	19	4.8
Kinross Correctional Facility	2	.5
	<u>391</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Sentence Information</u>		
Maximum:		
Less than 10 years	14	3.6
10-15	24	6.2
16-20	57	14.6
More than 20 years	164	41.9
Life	132	33.7
	<u>391</u>	<u>100.0</u>

of the inmate population (90.2%) were sentenced to long sentences, 16 years to life of confinement.

Thus, the prison is confining many inmates who have been convicted of serious crimes and are going to serve long sentences within the facility. As a result, the institution stresses control; nevertheless, the institution has not been perfect in this area. Three months after its initial opening, a convicted murderer escaped in a food truck, which alarmed rural residents as they were not notified until hours after the incident occurred.

Another inmate escaped while he was being taken to court, and this indicated that many of the security precautions established were either being implemented incorrectly or ineffectual. The situation was drawn to the public forefront when on April 30, 1982, inmates within the administrative and detention unit -- Unit 1 -- rioted and destroyed nearly \$50,000 worth of equipment and furniture. The administrative response was to lock down the prison structure and investigate the causes of the disturbance.⁸ Also, officers continually complained that the computer locking system of the prison was inadequate, relaying situations of where doors were automatically opened when they should have been locked.

The tension mounted between not only officers and inmates but also officers and administrators. Officers felt the institution was unsafe and demanded changes be made, specifically having more officers in the

cafeteria and fixing the computer locking system. During its first 17 months of operation, the facility experienced a murder, suicide, numerous stabbings, and beatings of both inmates and guards. In effect, the situation looked dismal for such a security conscious institution.

In response, the Warden was laterally transferred. In his place, Robert Redman was designated as the new warden on February 13, 1983. He inherited many of the problems faced by his predecessor, but his initial response was to control the environment: "My number one responsibility is keeping the prisoners within the confines of these walls."¹⁰ Redman brought with him 23 years of corrections experience and a philosophy which accentuated control of inmates.

Shortly after his arrival, he was confronted by union officials who claimed he was not attempting to bargain faithfully concerning an employee grievance.¹¹ Moreover, shortly after Redman's arrival, an inmate was found stabbed in the cafeteria, something which many inmates felt was a precursor to future inmate violence. Warden Redman responded quickly and sought to shift the entire direction of the organization, including a more relaxed yard schedule for inmates and a restructuring of housing unit arrangements. While in the past the institution had run on a soft version of behavior modification, Redman altered this scheme and designated all areas general population except for the administrative and detention areas.

In effect, four of the housing units became general population areas, each having identical structures and offering similar privileges. Also, the protection unit (Unit 2) was disbanded and made general population, forcing those inmates to either transfer out of the institution or into segregation or reside within general population.

The net effect was an organizational structure which sought more control over inmates. The new warden was attempting to gain control within the institutional environment through methods which had proven effective in the past, i.e., through consistent application of rules and the equal granting of privileges to all inmates. Therefore, the prison's formal organizational goals emphasized not only custody and security of the institution but also included the welfare and safety of the staff, care and welfare of prisoners, viable and progressive programs for rehabilitation, and institutional maintenance, housekeeping, sanitation, and safety standards.¹²

3. Research Method: Establishing Relations and Interviewing

Initial fieldwork began on November 30, 1982. Altogether, there were seven continuous months of doing field research, averaging around four days a week. The actual amounts of time varied, depending upon what had been scheduled for a particular day. The typical day began at about 9:00 a.m. and concluded around 3:00 p.m. However, this did change as the demands of the research became altered. For example, interviews with officers were not completed at the facility; instead,

they were done at a local tavern where a number of officers spent their free time.¹⁴ This was chosen as the interview site because a majority of the officers frequented the tavern after work. Although my initial purpose was to explore the concepts of power and control within the facility and among various groups, the first few weeks were typically spent talking with officers in the school or with inmates in their respective dayrooms. Thus, the investigation began very superficially, and it was not until one month into the research that my time began to be more constructively used.

As suggested by Carroll (1974), the actual relations with the various groups of a prison setting can best be established through temporarily segregating oneself with one group and then proceeding to the others when finished. This strategy was most helpful, particularly in relation to inmates, because they were the most suspicious of the research.

Interviews with officers were conducted when convenient for the officers. Typically, these interviews lasted forty-five minutes to one hour. The method of asking questions was based on an interview guide approach, with officers responding to questions which were open-ended. These questions were the same asked of inmates and administrators. See Appendix A for the complete interview guide.¹⁵

A total of 20 officers were interviewed, with some of the interviews being accomplished in a group fashion. In this method, four or five officers were interviewed simultaneously. A random

selection procedure was initially attempted in selecting officers. Twenty officers were randomly selected from the current corrections officers' list. However, this procedure proved to be ineffective, due in large part to the fact that many officers were wary of discussing anything with someone unfamiliar to them.¹⁶ Nevertheless, other officers were willing to be interviewed and also convinced their counterparts that the end result would be to their benefit.¹⁷

All the interviews were hand recorded by myself in their presence and further note taking occurred in my car in the parking lot of the tavern subsequent to the interviews.

Interviews with administration took place in the respective offices of the interviewees. These interviews lasted anywhere from thirty minutes to two hours and represented many of the administrative positions within the institution. This included the Warden, Deputy Warden, two Assistant Deputy Wardens, three Resident Unit Managers, one Assistant Resident Unit Manager, Institutional Chaplain, Inspector, and the School Principal. These interviews followed the same interview guide used for the officers. Also, five of the eleven interviews were tape recorded and transcribed at a later date.

Inmate interviews were more diverse and time consuming. The initial three months of interviewing were done using a conversational approach. Patton (1981) refers to this method as highly informal and usually employed as a supplement to "ongoing participant observation fieldwork."

Over fifty conversational interviews with inmates were completed over the first three months of the research; in addition, forty inmates were randomly chosen subsequent to these conversational interviews and asked questions from the interview guide. A table of random numbers was used to develop a list of prospective interviewees. The table was used jointly with an institutional list in determining the specific inmates to be interviewed. Moreover, inmates were guaranteed subject anonymity and were told that their involvement in the research was completely voluntary.

To insure voluntariness on the part of inmates, all were required to approve and sign an institutional waiver.¹⁸ The inmate received a copy of the waiver and another copy was also placed into his institutional jacket. All forty of the interviews were tape recorded.¹⁹

4. Recording, Keeping, and Typing Fieldnotes and Interviews

As suggested by Carroll, "unrecorded information does not become data." Thus, an attempt was made to record every incident which seemed relevant and important. This by itself was an extremely difficult task. In addition, if the topical area was too sensitive to record at the moment, it was recorded at a more appropriate time.²⁰ After any particular day of note taking, the notes were typed and elaborated into single-spaced fieldnotes.

The fieldnotes included all of the events which were experienced during a given period of observation. The notes were kept in a

separate file and in chronological order. Typically, additions to the fieldnotes were made when items came to mind at a later date. By the end of the research, there were close to three hundred pages of fieldnotes. Furthermore, the interviews which were recorded yielded a significant number of transcribed pages, numbering approximately two hundred and fifty.

It should be noted that only twelve interviews of the forty-six administration and inmate interviews were transcribed. This was done for three reasons: 1) the clarity of many of the tapes made it difficult to understand exactly what was being said, thus many had to be discarded; 2) the focus and direction of the interviews made it difficult to discern what was actually being stated. Some inmates and administrators strayed off the topical area; therefore, it was difficult to discover what precisely was being conveyed by the respondent; and 3) the cost associated with these twelve transcriptions was close to \$500; thus, transcription of all of the tapes would have run over \$2,000, something not feasible relative to the resources available;²¹ .

Nevertheless, many of the interviews were augmented with notes which were taken during the course of the interviews. This yielded much valuable information in the development of concepts and propositions. Finally, information was collected from newspaper accounts; documentary material, such as institutional files of inmates; and existing policies and procedures' manuals. In sum, over

the seven months of field research, some eight hundred pages of material were collected. This amount of data proved to be enormous, particularly when analysis procedures began.

5. Analysis of the Data:

Because of the sheer volume of fieldnotes, documents, newspaper accounts, policies and procedures, it became necessary to conceptualize the material into some coherent scheme. The creation of a typology is useful in attempting to synthesize the material into specific conceptual categories. Patton refers to these typologies as taking two forms: "indigenous typologies" or "analyst-constructed typologies." The former refers to conceptualization of information through an understanding of "verbal categories" used by the people studied. The latter is a creation of the researcher when he searches for patterns, categories, or themes within the data.

As pointed out by Lofland (1971), this latter approach is particularly dangerous, since the researcher may mistakenly infer concepts or ideas onto the data when they are not actually present. This can only be controlled through a continual checking of one's data with the actual respondents; in short, asking them if the answers you are providing make sense. This was done on many occasions during the course of the research. For example, fieldnotes from March 31, 1983 indicated how access to resources makes an individual powerful:

Don (inmate) feels that money and the amenities that money buy are very tight in the prison and this usually gives someone some power in the prison....a definite form of power - access to resources.

A typology is developed to explain the types of power among the groups in the subsequent chapter. However, it is relevant to examine other data which were collected. This data included major misconducts, critical incidents, and prison appropriations. Together this provides data which allows interpretation of not only the social bases of power at HVMF but also objective measures of control within a comparable prison structure.²²

6. Summary:

As prior research has attempted to investigate power and control in prison structures in a general sense, this research was undertaken as an attempt to understand the types of power and how they differed among organizational groups. To achieve such an end, a qualitative methodological approach was employed. Data were collected over a seven month period by means of formal and informal interviewing, the analysis of documents, newspaper accounts, and policies and procedures. As the data was collected, it was recorded into a chronological file. Analysis of the data included the development of a typology of power for all organizational groups. Furthermore, objective measures of control were explored at both HVMF and MBP, attempting to compare the two facilities.

Endnotes - Chapter 3

¹It was easy to access this prison facility because of the relationship developed with the Warden. On many occasions he had come to speak to classes which I taught at Michigan State University. His help was extremely beneficial to the research project.

²To say that there is no other institution designed similarly to this one would be an overstatement. However, it is definitely not a traditional prison structure.

³At the time of this writing, there was an inmate-staff ratio of less than 2:1. This is not typical of traditional facilities, where at times the ratio could get as high as 200:1.

⁴It should be noted that this was constantly changing at HVMF, particularly the functions of the Deputy Wardens. However, to my knowledge, this is the most current organizational scheme at HVMF.

⁵This institutional arrangement was predicated on the philosophy that more benefits and privileges would be given to those inmates who conformed to the institutional rules and regulations.

⁶Administrative segregation was reserved for those people who were deemed extremely dangerous and could not function within general population. They have, typically, records which indicated propensities for violence; therefore, they were permanently segregated from the rest of the inmate population.

⁷What a major misconduct entails will be explored more thoroughly in subsequent chapters.

⁸While being sought after by a significant number of inmates, some, however, avoid this housing unit because they felt all the "snitches" resided in that area.

⁹According to one press release (Ann Arbor News, May 28, 1982), the cause was a mixture of guard negligence and a faulty locking mechanism.

¹⁰Ypsilanti Press, March 13, 1983, "Security No. 1 Concern of New Warden."

¹¹The incident arose when a union representative was attending a grievance conference and arrested ten minutes into the conference. She was arrested because a computer check revealed she had a contempt of court charge against her. Union officials claimed that the institution was harassing union members. This led to a protest in front of the institution and further division between the union and administration.

¹²This is taken from Policy Directive PD-HVM-11.01, "Organization and Responsibility," Michigan Department of Corrections, page 1.

¹³Needless to say after 6 hours of fieldwork and 140 miles of driving I was thoroughly exhausted. All totaled I had put 9000 miles in travel during the course of the research.

¹⁴This tavern was located 2 miles north of the facility. It was suggested by one of the officers that I frequent the tavern because I could gain valuable information. This suggestion proved to be extremely helpful in the course of the research.

¹⁵It should be noted that the interview guide was originally pre-tested with a group of inmates at the State Prison of Southern Michigan. After their input, a more exacting guide was created. It was this guide which was used in the interviewing process at HVMF.

¹⁶This apprehension on the part of officers was due to the fact that two of their colleagues went to a local newspaper and described the problems at the prison. In addition, these two were reprimanded by the institution's administration. Subsequently, many officers were apprehensive to reveal anything, to anyone, about the institution.

¹⁷One particular officer suggested to his counterparts that the research might reveal the problems officers faced in the institution. He was instrumental in gaining information from other officers. In fact, it was he who suggested that I interview the officers at the local tavern, something which I mentioned earlier as helpful in gaining valuable knowledge from officers.

¹⁸This waiver was a client release form provided by the Department of Corrections. It is located in Appendix B.

¹⁹In addition, the forty individuals chosen for the interviews had to have at least six months of time in the prison and six months at Marquette Branch prison. In this way, it was felt that comparative statements could be made about the two prisons.

²⁰This was an extremely important time, since it was in the car where I took down many observations. Furthermore, the observations were clarified and elaborated on once I got back to the University. If any other observations were remembered, they were recorded in the margins of the typed fieldnotes for that day.

²¹In the future, I would suggest that researchers who use the qualitative approach consider the tremendous costs associated with such a design, both in terms of money and time spent.

²²Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) is the only other classified maximum security prison in the State. Along with the State House of Corrections, MBP holds 983 inmates. Moreover, it is a more traditionally designed prison structure, with barred cells and a high inmate-staff ratio. Typically, the residents at HVMF have come from MBP or at least spent some time there.

CHAPTER IV

PERCEPTIONS OF POWER: ADMINISTRATORS, OFFICERS, AND INMATES

HVMF was a prison structure which emphasized control following the Weberian notion of legal authority. Accordingly, this type of authority has a definite hierarchy in which rules are universal and formal, organizational positions determined by special training, and the division of labor contingent upon the tasks being performed (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979).

In general, prison organizations have historically operated on this kind of model, where power is centralized in the hands of administrators and delegated to subordinates (officer) to exercise upon inmates. With the politicalization of the typical inmate today, particularly the identification of black inmates with civil rights and personal and racial identity, this legal type of authority has been questioned as an effective strategy in controlling a problematic prison population.

Grosser (1960) has mentioned how prison organizations were usually out of the purview of general society and that prison management,

which attempted to provide equilibrium to the prison structure, was unencumbered by a probing public and/or interest groups. However, today this is not the case. On the contrary, current prison organizations have been inundated by public organizations, both service and philanthropic, and in particular the Federal courts. In effect, the judicial intrusion by the courts has made the operation of correctional institutions much more problematic, even to the point where many administrators have had their entire systems taken over and restructured by judicial mandate.¹

This influx of varying interests groups has caused what Statsny and Tyrnauer refer to as a "polycentric power configuration" in our maximum security prisons (see Figure 2.3), where inmates, guards, unions, courts, legislatures, and the mass media influence the organization of the prison. The real effect has been on the internal organization of the prison environment and the further regimentation of rules and regulations.

Given the rather difficult position administrators find themselves in it is necessary to see what types of power they employ in attempting to control their institutional environments. It is contended that because of the external and internal demands placed on administrators in our prisons, they are limited, both legally and structurally, in the forms of power they can employ in providing control and stability to the institutional setting.

This chapter explores the mechanisms which administrators, officers, and inmates used in providing control to the prison environment within HVMF. Traditionally, prison organizations have attempted to exercise bureaucratic authority through the use of coercive measures. It is the thesis of this chapter that under current conditions officers and administrators cannot rely on bureaucratic authority in controlling and stabilizing the prison environment. The literature has suggested that prison environments exhibit many informal and accommodative relationships. As a result, control is preserved through the development of various forms of power among administrators, officers, and inmates. This chapter employs the social bases of power developed by French and Raven and other theorists to examine the distribution of power in a prison structure.

These types of power are: coercive power, based on the ability to inflict threats of punishment or punishment; reward power, predicated on some type of reward for compliance; legitimate power, gaining compliance through an acceptance and agreement with the orders of supervisors; referent power, dependent upon an identification of a power holder with a power recipient; expert power, representing influence predicated on special knowledge; access to information, signifying a position of power relative to the control of information; and providing of resources, contingent upon how individuals can gain compliance through the granting of key resources to individuals.

The analysis begins with an explanation and exploration of types of power among administrators. The analysis provides a similar investigation into officer and inmate types of power. Finally, the chapter provides a synthesis of the kinds of power among the groups, offering a position which emphasizes prison equilibrium as a function of interacting bases of power. Ultimately, prison control is viewed as an interaction of many forms of power among groups.

1. Perceptions of Power Among Administrators

Because of the penetration of the outside world into the prison structure and the high level of alienation between prisoners and administrators, administrative power has been drastically modified. Jacobs (1977) has documented the change in authority and leadership at the Stateville Penitentiary, suggesting that early on this prison was maintained by the personal dominance and charisma of a particularly powerful warden. However, with the shift in judicial policy, going from hands off to total submersion into correctional institutions, the power of traditional authority was significantly reduced. Instead, this penitentiary and others like it across the country have become more bureaucratized and legal-rational in their operations, implementing many changes in the formal operation of the prison structure.

More importantly, the procedures of administrators and their staffs have become more accountable and suspect to public scrutiny, thereby limiting their discretionary authority and power.² This is

very clear at HVMF. Through conversations and interviews with inmates, officers, and administrators, it was possible to conclude that administrative power had significantly diminished in comparison to the "old days." As suggested by administrators, the coercive power was gone:

A: It's not like it used to. . . .In the old days, you could do just about anything you wanted and inmates knew it and respected it. Now, you have to listen to all the complaints from everyone, including the inmates Why these guys have it better now than they ever had it on the streets. I think the older guys told them young guys that they haven't seen anything unless they were up at Marquette 15, 20 years ago. That was prison.

. . . .

A: When I started in the system, you did not have all these legal rules to follow All you needed was control and you did that by being hard on the inmates When inmates knew where you were coming from, it was easy to control them. Now its completely different We have no power like we use to.

. . . .

A: The courts, media and liberal-do-gooders are the ones that cause all the problems in prison Maybe if they were to work here for a while, they would see we have no control Control is as far as inmates allow it to be.

Administrators could only identify three kinds of power which they employed: coercive, reward, and access to information, and indicated that the other forms of power -- referent, legitimate, providing of resources, and expert -- were virtually non-existent. Referent and legitimate power bases were seen as weak because the structural make-up of the organization did not allow inmates to legitimize the

organization. The perception among a majority of administrators was that inmates were to be controlled and whether or not they agreed with policy was not important nor relevant. Thus, inmates had no stake in the organization. Moreover, the providing of resources was limited, so inmates were not persuaded to conform because there was nothing administrators could offer. This was also true in relation to expert power; there was no valuable knowledge administrators could provide.

Coercive Power

Coercive power does reside in the formal structure of the prison. This type of power was defined earlier as the actual punishment or the threat of application of punishment by someone upon another person to gain conformity or compliance. As a form of power, this is probably at the root of all correctional institutions, and HVMF does not differ in this regard. This type of power takes two distinct forms: transfer and detention time. Transfer is defined as the actual removal from the facility and transportation to another prison structure.

This approach was the most feared by inmates, and the exercise of this type of power was what one administrator viewed as the "bottom line" in stabilizing the environment. Another administrator stated it this way:

I: Do you think most guys are afraid of being transferred out of here?

A: I would say, I don't think I would say afraid, but most guys wouldn't like to be transferred out of here.

I: So does it provide a sense of control, the idea that if you screw up too much you get transferred out here?

A: Correct. This facility has the uniqueness of being a good clean facility, it's got a mixture of staff that all prisoners can relate to, the food is a lot better, the recreational facilities are a lot more modern and are more. And as we upgrade our vocational training and our schooling, that's going to be an asset in our part, and a method of control for us, you know. And they see that, and they'll bitch and moan, but when they sit down and compare this to Jackson and Marquette, they say wait a minute, you know.

The point is that recalcitrant inmates were made more tractable when it was made clear to them that they might be sent back up to MBP.³

This was particularly disturbing to the typical inmate because of the close proximity of family, relatives, and friends to HVMF.⁴ The consensus among inmates was that the prison was new and very clean. Because of this, inmates tended to comply with the rules and regulations of the prison. As one inmate said, "Doing time is the same everywhere . . . you might as well do it here. This place is smaller, cleaner, and I am closer to my people. . . So why fuck it up?"

However, administrators echoed the sentiment of some of the officers about the problem with transfer and control of some inmates:

A: . . . But as far as transfers, some have transferred and we've gone without trying to transfer them, others have been denied. I would say probably the ones that have been denied in the cases that have proven to be a pain in the ass here, and previous at Marquette and that kind of thinking, there have been those times where it's just kind of, they're future transfers,

they've just worn out everywhere. So they might end up here and be ours for 3 or 4 months, and then maybe Marquette for 3 or 4 months and then maybe Jackson for 3 or 4 months, and maybe back and forth. Because there are those people in the Department who just get moved, and in a sense, you know, everybody has their turn, so to speak.

. . .

A: Someone has to take responsibility for these inmates . . . and we are the ones stuck with it. You cannot just transfer people out when you feel extreme cases . . . the fact is that some of these guys just move from one place to another because nobody wants responsibility for them.

. . .

A: You know that you can transfer and it has to be real . . . but a lot of these real assholes know that they will be back because nobody wants them around . . . neither Marquette or us want them but we just keep on sending them and they send them back. It just goes round and round.

. . .

A: A lot of guys are scared of transfers but it can cause problems You can not transfer everyone, so you just get rid of those guys who are causing trouble . . . like them religious leaders. Ship one out and the rest cool down . . . but it is something that has to be monitored.

While for some individuals the system is nothing but a merry-go-round, key officials see it as necessary and needed in controlling the so-called trouble-makers in the system. The warden of the institution put it this way:

I: Is there a threat here of transfer for the guy who's continually a headache, back up to Marquette?

A: Certainly. It's one that's necessary.

I: If you didn't have that you think that you wouldn't have as much leeway in trying to control certain people?

A: I don't think so. Like I said before, if I was in a maximum security prison doin' time, I'd much rather be here than in Marquette. Probably some of them have never been in Marquette, that might be part of the problem.

I: So if, you can obviously send up a some kind of notice to Lansing, Lansing makes some kind of decision?

A: That's correct.

I: Is that a pretty sure thing, if a guy wants to, do the people know that inside . . .?

A: Sure. If the guy's screwing up or if he's purposely not working or involved in programming, just sitting around, we'll lay a transfer on him up to Marquette and we'll make room for somebody who wants to be here.

In terms of pure coercion, the administrators felt that it was essential that transfer be included as part of their formal system of control.

The second type of coercion was detention or "hole time." At HVMF if an individual was found guilty of a misconduct, he was sent to Unit 1 for detention purposes.⁵ The punishments vary in amount of time spent in detention; however, this form of coercion was relatively weak and not really considered detention by inmates, officers, or administrators. It was common to hear inmates describe how the "hole" at HVMF was nothing compared to Jackson or Marquette's. This disillusioned many officers, particularly since the inmate could take most of his belongings to the hole with him.⁶ In effect, the hole was really nothing but a

converted cell with a cement slab for a bed. Everything else was similar to the general population housing unit cells.

The administration insisted that this was an adequate detention and punishment unit, one that had met all the legal requirements. However, other "street level" administrators⁷ were of the opinion that it did not adequately punish the wrongdoer. One stated:

A: I have no authority in this place . . . the higher ups only care about if they are going to get sued by inmates The hole is a joke and no one but the inmates have any authority in the place If they want to control inmates, they should build a more restricted hole, with less privileges and more punishment.

Other administrators at the housing unit level were of the same opinion, but most felt that if control was going to be maintained by just coercion the institution would not survive. These administrators voiced the opinion that other mechanisms of control should be developed and employed:

A: There has to be incentives in this place. Right now the inmates don't have such . . . there are not enough jobs and the rewards are limited . . . If they expand more opportunities to inmates, things might be better in this place for everyone.

. . .

A: Many guys have no reason to change . . . like Jones (not his real name), he is going to be doing a long term and he needs a reason to live . . . right now he is all depressed and lonely and unless we give him something, he is gong to be a problem for us.

So, while administrators relied on coercive power in their dealings with inmates, a sizeable number also believed in the development of

other means in controlling the inmate population. While the administration did see the value of expanded opportunities in the development of a stabilized prison environment, the evidence indicated the opposite, as the reward power at HVMF was somewhat limited.

By developing a formal mechanism of control which was predicated on coercion, administrators further extended the distance between themselves and inmates. In the long run, the development of any rewards or incentives for inmates was going to be tenuous at best, largely in response to a control system which relied on coercion as an arbiter of disputes. Furthermore, this perpetuated the existing alienation among these groups and created an atmosphere of distrust and fear. While control may be realized, the cost was a substantial contribution toward the maintenance of a highly volatile and antagonistic inmate society, which sought to establish its own hierarchy and organization in response to the perceived repression of the administration.

Reward Power

When administrators were asked to explain the reward structure of the institution, these kinds of responses were given:

A: Only, God, I think the only basic reward, whatever, I think the only basic thing a guy gets like that is, rather than, oh, I don't know, there might be various jobs, there's no real incentive, I wouldn't think except to get the hell out of the institution, there's guys who want a better job someplace for one thing. And these people like infirmaries, porters in the infirmary, or a porter up here or a shoe shine guy, or the barber shop jobs--those are just . . . examples, and the guy says, yeah, I should be able to . . . do a better job, that kind of thing.

Another discussed the subject this way:

I: How about administration in the formal sense, do you reward positive behavior on the part of the guy, the guy who does his time, you know, he has a job or he's going to school, he doesn't really cause trouble, he doesn't have any tickets--is there any kind of formal reward system?

A: That's what you're supposed to do.

I: So they're not really being rewarded for anything that's expected.

A: If they go above and beyond, of course, there's things like special parole. Probably another real big thing, especially on inmates in maximum security, probably close to it is the administration gets to know who they are.

In addition, many administrators were wary of discussing the formal reward structures of the facility. The consensus among administrators was that it was limited for good reason: the facility should punish the wrongdoer and not commend him for doing something which was required. Also, the impression received was that not much was to be made of it. This limitation of reward power on the part of administrators can have both positive and negative effects. First, with the limited formal reward system, inmates are going to have to compete for fewer resources, producing a fierce level of competition for rewards among the inmate population. Positively speaking, the administration is able to get those inmates who want to work and who will do a good job, regardless of the type of work demanded.⁸

Conversely, since a majority of prisoners are not going to be able to obtain employment, they are still left with the need for resources

and "goodies" to cope with their incarceration. In response to this situation, it is evident that the lack of legal opportunity structures within the prison setting causes an increase in the power and prevalence of illegal opportunity structures, along with the increase of resource power among certain inmates within the informal, inmate prison structure. Limited formal reward power produces powerful and/or influential inmate leaders within the inmate social system, in particular those inmates who have access or control of illegal goods and services.

Access to Information

The role of information in controlling organizations has been documented thoroughly by writers in organizational theory.⁹ Because of the precarious nature of the organization, it is imperative that information be constantly collected and maintained by prison administrators.¹⁰ This information is usually obtained through the use of snitches. Knowing that there are many inmates who are willing to "snitch out" other inmates,¹¹ administrators are able to use this information in controlling the institution. However, there is a distinction between voluntarily receiving information from inmates through "snitch kites,"¹² and gaining information through actual recruitment and encouragement. A majority of inmates at HVMF felt that there were an excessive number of snitches at HVMF, and that a sizeable number were recruited and promised privileges if they would give information about other inmates and their activities.

On the contrary, every administrator interviewed stated unequivocally that snitches were not being recruited, neither formally nor informally:

I: How about snitches? Do you have a lot of snitches in this institution?

A: Every prison has a lot of snitches.

I: Voluntary?

A: I don't know that that was always the case here. In fact I've heard that it wasn't, people were promised all kinds of things, I don't believe in that. If somebody . . . two weeks ago I got a 'snitch kite' that inmates were going to have a disturbance in Unit 2. We immediately went down and investigated it, what the inmate said was true, we made some changes and everything went back to calm.

I: Do you think that you need snitches, do you need that kind of information to control the institution?

A: I don't know that you need it to control, I think you need it to avoid problems.

I: What about, does the administration here actively recruit snitches, do you go out and try to find people?

A: No.

I: There are no formal promises of benefits or good time or whatever?

A: If there are, it's without my knowledge and if I find out about it, I'll take action. That's not the way it's supposed to be, that's not the way it should be.

Another administrator summed it up this way:

I: Does the administration try to recruit snitches at all, get information, things like that?

A: No. As far as recruit, you mean trying to establish a person as such?

I: Yeah.

A: Such a conversation as yeah, keep your eyes open, let me know what's happening, that kind of thing?

I: Yeah.

A: No, we have, I have, I think there are people who, you know, I feel I might be able to get information from . . . Because I won't, I won't tell a prisoner I would do anything for him because I can't . . . And I don't want people to do that kind of shit because all it does is, you know, you're a rotten no-good son of a bitch if you do that and a guy goes out there . . . and the whole shot . . . That . . . kind of shit is worthless to me, I won't do that to them.

While the administration denied the actual recruitment of snitches, the role of information is crucial in maintaining prison organization and stability.

While administrators may not attempt to recruit snitches, they were still in a position of trying to obtain needed information about the prisoner population, e.g., who was going to get assaulted, where the contraband was located, who was pressing other inmates for sex, etc. There was a consensus among administrators about the importance of information:

A: Oh yeah, without a doubt. It's, I don't think there's no way we could run it if we didn't have some type of, receive information . . . Or some prisoners in here about all they want to do is come here to do their time, and they don't want any problems. And if they see or hear thing that's happening, they'll say something to an officer. Not necessarily come all the way up here, but they'll tell the officer about it. And in turn the officer will tell a Sgt. or a Cpt. and it gets to us, you know. And there may be bits and pieces of information that we're all aware of up here, but there may be that one key, that one little piece of information we'll need that will come from them and will get the whole picture together, and we sit back and discuss it and we all know what action to take.

. . . .

A: I don't want to say we go out and try to get snitches, but hell, we need information about what is going on in the place If we get it from snitches that is o.k. We don't recruit them though Usually they come to us with the information You have got to listen.

. . . .

A: Snitches are everywhere in prison and that is just a fact We don't really need them because a lot of their information is bullshit and lies but sometimes it is credible and proves accurate so we use them.

It becomes obvious that this information enables administrators to control events in the institution, thereby allowing them to monitor any potential problem areas. Also, the demand for information is so great that it creates and enhances the already high level of alienation and frustration between inmates and administrators.

As a result, administrators, officers, and inmates become divided. Stastny and Tyrnauer describe the social organization in this fashion:

The contradictions and divisions are clearly perceptible, even across caste lines, inmates as well as staff have grown adept at manipulating them to their own advantage. In the fortress prison, 'divide and rule' is a maxim that must take its place next to 'accommodate and survive' as a universal precept of prison life.

The resulting demand for information contributes to the precept divide et impera,¹³ where inmate trust and respect in the administration is significantly diminished. Therefore, the perception on the part of inmates was not only distrust and alienation with administration but

also with other inmates. In effect, no one can be trusted, because as one inmate put it: "everyone can be a potential snitch . . . and you can't take that chance, so you hang only with a couple of close friends If you associate with anyone else, you could be asking for trouble."

As a form of power, the role of information cannot be overstated. It only has its value in an oppositional sense, i.e., it can be used in trying to control a population that is in large part antagonistic to institutional goals. The net effect is the further dichotomization of the prison organization and the perpetuation of disruptive behaviors on the part of inmates. For example, word was going around in the institution that one official of the prison hierarchy was actively recruiting snitches and paying them off with certain benefits and privileges.¹⁴ The perception of the inmates was that, as one inmate put it, this individual was the most "evil bastard" in the system. His position created stress and alienation among the inmate population towards the administration, particularly since he was very noticeable in his dealings with inmates.¹⁵

The crux of this argument is that while information is essential to the operation of the prison, deceptive methods of obtaining information vis-a-vis the inmate population can lead to potentially volatile situations. By gaining information in a negative fashion, that is, through manipulation, deceit, and clandestine operations, administrators develop and nurture an inmate society in direct

opposition to institutional harmony and inmate development. The implications of this type of arrangement will be discussed in a later chapter. At this point, we move to an examination of the kinds of power employed by officers in their attempt to control the correctional environment.

2. Officers: Perceived Power Among Officers

No other position within the prison hierarchy has received less attention in the literature than the role of correctional officers (Jacobs and Retsky, 1975).¹⁶ While there has been systematic study and research into the lives of inmates, the literature on correctional worker attitudes, behaviors, and roles within our correctional institutions has been definitely lacking. Organizationally, they are positioned in the middle, existing and trying to function with the demands of two disparate groups, administrators and inmates. The perspective offered in this analysis is that the role of the correctional officer is structurally positioned which prevents bureaucratic authority yet fosters other types of power. More importantly, the structural condition of this position makes it very difficult for an officer to satisfy the demands of the competing groups; therefore, the role usually demands the development of specific kinds of power usually not associated with the position.

At the crux of this argument is the fact that correctional officers are viewed as the coercive agents of the administration. On the contrary, it is contended that as a type of power, this was

severely limited, even to the point where officers perceived their authority and personal safety to be in question. Therefore, there were four forms of power among officers existing at HVMF: coercive, reward, legitimate, and referent.

On the other hand, officers did not have the powers of expert, access to information, or providing of resources available. Expert power relies on some knowledge which is used to gain compliance; however, the fact is that the officer role prevents any ability to develop this power. Because the officer was viewed as the enemy by inmates, it was difficult to gain any information which would be helpful in completing the requirements of the job. In effect, inmates did not trust many officers and information which was given did not enable expert power to develop, especially when much of the information was questionable.

In addition, the officer role makes it difficult for information to be gathered. As a result, access to information and the control of information was quite difficult. They were not able to gain credible information from inmates. While administrators may recruit snitches in the environment, it was much more problematic for officers, since they were actually interacting with inmates, and such an activity typically separated them from much of the inmate population.

Furthermore, officers were also limited in relation to the providing of resources. Since many of the items which were sought by inmates were illegal, it was difficult for the typical officer to

provide such resources. However, this is not to suggest that illegal commodities, such as contraband, were not provided by officers. They were provided, nevertheless, the provision of contraband was only with a select few individuals. Some experienced officers stated this point:

A: There are not that many of these young guys (officers) bringing shit in I think that pisses off a lot of inmates. Since there aren't that many . . . that isn't to say some guys don't do it. They do it but there just isn't that many people doing it.

. . .

A: Some of these new officers do bring contraband in, especially dope What usually happens is that a guy (officer) who has been around and knows the check points brings the shit in. The young officers really don't know these kinds of things It takes time and plus there ain't too many guys doing that like in the other prisons . . . Marquette and Jackson.

. . .

A: Marijuana always will be in prison There is no way you can stop it coming in the joint . . . but the guys who give it to inmates are the ones who have worked in other prisons and they know they can make money doing it . . . it does cause a lot of problems.

. . .

A: I don't know who is bringing the shit (marijuana) in but someone has got to be I do know that it's not as bad as Jackson Shit, in Jackson you can get anything you want . . . not as many people.

Therefore, this type of power was not as strongly developed as others among officers. It is these other type of power that we now turn.

Coercive Power

Coercive power is the basis upon which many writers of organizational behavior describe the compliance structure of prison (Etzioni, 1961). The fact was that many officers at HVMF felt they had no power, at least very little to keep inmates in step. If anything, the opposite was true. One officer related:

A: The officers in this place are nothing but waiters for the inmates in the system. Officers have to wait on these guys hand and foot and that is what ticks off a lot of the guys. We have to pass their notes and listen to all their bitching about how they have been ripped off by the system.

Related to this description was the consensus among officers that there was no real punishment of inmates. Because of their organizational position, many of the officers interviewed felt betrayed or even left out, not only in the institution but also in society:

A: We are the Indians in the corrections system. Everyone shits on us. We have no togetherness in this place We are the screws no one really cares about . . . we are shipwrecked in the society and are always labeled as the bad guys . . . they [administration] treat us like assholes and we will eventually become nothing but assholes.

. . .

A: Who gives a fuck about corrections officers? We have to deal with all the assholes in the system and they expect us to like it It's this kind of attitude we have to live with . . . then they wonder why we are all alcoholics.

. . .

A: I don't know why anyone calls us corrections officers . . . we are nothing but guards . . . people

who other people don't give a shit about I wish some of those people in Lansing would come down and see the shit we have to put up with.

. . . .

A: The only reason I became a guard is because I was laid-off from my job as a sheriff As soon as that picks up, I'm getting the fuck out of this place A lot of these administrators just care for the inmates. That's because inmates file lawsuits and the public thinks we are all assholes We can't even do our jobs without being thought of as bad by the public.

The despair that many officers felt was related to their rather precarious role and the lack of any kind of perceived help and change from the administration.¹⁷ Because they were stuck in the middle and perceived that administrators cared more about inmates and their rights, officers had very little input into how they were to operate in this rather uncertain environment. This is not to conclude that their coercive power is totally diminished; it was severely restricted because of the lack of authority and coercion they could actually enforce. The only form of coercion that they relied on was the writing of tickets for major and minor violations.¹⁸ However, ticket writing was problematic for officers for two major reasons.

First, officers perceived that nothing would be done to inmates. One officer put it this way: "Your only formal authority is in the tickets that you write, but tickets are not written by a lot of officers because they do not really do anything in the place. A lot of the tickets are thrown away by superiors anyway." Another officer stated that he did not write up a ticket on one inmate whom I observed

disobeying a direct order because "I can't count on them administrators and hearing officers. They all only care about inmates, while us officers are in constant danger. When one of us gets killed, then they'll finally listen." The fact was that officer perceptions questioned the actual authority of the formal procedure; concomitantly, if an individual was found guilty of a violation there was no punishment, at least not like in the "old days."

One seasoned officer stated the way it was in the old days and how he wished he would return:

A: It is not like in the old days when you could beat the shit out of an asshole. I wish they did still have this for some of these guys in this place. Some guys need a good ass kicking, then we wouldn't have that many problems at all in trying to keep them in line.

Another veteran officer also related the same message when I asked him to compare HVMF with some other institutions in the past:

A: There is no real punishment in this place. What would have happened in the old days is that the guy would have gotten his ass beat for about two weeks straight and the other inmates would have known it right away . . . the sad thing is that the inmates know that there is no real punishment and they flaunt it in our faces.

While there was a formal existence of coercive power in the hierarchy at HVMF, the officers felt that it was weak and not really punishing troublesome inmates. My contention was that coercive power was there but it was ineffective or very weak. In short, officers cannot really coerce inmates to do anything, or as one disillusioned officer put it: "Inmates run this place and every joint in this country. We have nothing to say about nothing."

Second, because ticket writing produced more frustration and dissatisfaction among officers, they infrequently issued them. Many officers felt that ticket writing does more harm than good. A young officer stated: "If you resort to tickets everytime, you will probably lose with the guy for good and this can cause problems with him in the long run." Moreover, officers manipulated the issuance of tickets depending upon the offense and the particular individual. At one time during the course of the research, I observed two inmates pushing and shoving each other in one of the housing units. An officer broke the disturbance up, but he just sent the inmates on their ways. Later, I asked him why he didn't write a ticket. He stated "What for? It only produces trouble between those two guys and myself. If someone got stabbed or seriously hurt, then I would have to write a ticket, but no one did."¹⁹

He made it clear that the good correctional officer knows where and when to be in the prison. Other officers stated this in relation to homosexuality and drug behavior among inmates:

A: If I see three or four guys crowding around a guy's cell, I know something is going down, either they are getting high or someone is sucking or fucking. If I get in the middle of that shit, I would be crazy because I'll either get seriously hurt or killed. I am not going to go down there and write tickets. It would be plain stupid.

. . .

A: One thing that you don't want to get involved in is the illegal bullshit between inmates If I know inmates are gong to be smoking (marijuana), I'll let it slide if it isn't going to cause any problems Once you try to step in, then you got problems.

. . .

A: Not too many guys get off into sex into this place, but if I see two guys holding hands or kissing out in the dayroom, I'll let them know that I won't stand for it . . . but if they go somewhere else where its not public I don't care, unless the guy is squeezing someone for sex, then I move in on it.

The point is clear: coercive power did exist among officers at HVMF, but it was very weak as a tool to gain compliance among inmates; instead, officers relied on a selective enforcement of the rules, depending on the situation and the offender. This was a result of an ineffective formal mechanism of control and punishment. As a result, officers had the perception that the administration was only concerned about inmates and their problems and totally disinterested in the plight of the correctional officer and his/her role.²⁰

Reward Power

Because of the erosion of traditional authority, correctional officers relied on other forms of power to gain compliance from inmates. A second form of power which was exhibited by officers was reward power. Reward power gains conformity or compliance through the provision of some type of remuneration or benefit for positive behavior. Within the realm of the prison environment this usually takes two forms.

First, reward power can mean the creation, development, and perpetuation of accommodative relationships between inmates and officers (Cloward, 1960). This give-take relationship is ubiquitous at HVMF and was essential if control was going to be maintained. One

officer discussed how this was not only needed but also made the officer role more bearable: "You have to bend the rules to get along in the place. You write some tickets in the place, but you know that tickets cannot be written all the time, so you try the best you can to deal with 84 inmates, knowing there are only two of you in the place."

Past research had suggested that these accommodative relationships lead to a "corruption of authority" (Sykes, 1958) and all forms of illegal activities.²¹ These symbiotic relationships were also existent at HVMF.

An officer relayed his own frustrations about this behavior:

A: I am sick and tired of guys bringing all this shit from the kitchen into the housing units. It is something that just has to stop. But the problem is that so many officers allow it to happen and you can't get consistency . . . in rule enforcement I remember one time when two officers stopped a guy with a whole coat full of stuff from the kitchen. The inmate responded that officer (so and so) allowed it to come to the unit. When they checked it out with the officer, who was their superior, he reprimanded them for enforcing the rules. All they were doing was their jobs. That type of shit is what really pisses me off about this job.

Other officers summed it up this way:

A: Inmates steal food, knives, and other things and the officers allow it to happen because they get favors from the inmates that make their job easier. In return, the inmates will give things to the officers because they like them.

. . .

A: The kitchen is where all the action occurs . . . guys bring all sorts of shit out of there to the housing units It's good for them and officers because they help each other out. The inmate gets more

food and the officer gets part of it and no hassle from the inmate.

This type of behavior on the part of officers was a functional adaptation to the precarious nature of their role. In response to this, officers provided rewards to inmates, in the form of these accommodative relationships, to gain compliance.

A second form of reward power is based on the flexibility of rule enforcement. All officers at HVMF held that consistency, fairness, and flexibility in the enforcement of rules was what made a good officer. Concerning flexibility, one officer put it this way:

A: If you (inmate) are doing time and you're decent, you'll be alright in this place. Rules are meant to be bent in a place like this; you have to be flexible in how you deal with the inmates. If you are not flexible, then you will be in trouble.

This notion of flexibility in rule enforcement was evident, especially in the housing units where a majority of inmate time was spent. While in one of the housing units, I noticed an individual on the phone for over a half hour. I asked the officer why he allowed that much time for one inmate. He stated: "Since there is nothing else for him to do and he's not always giving me trouble, why not? If he's on the phone talking with his woman, he's not bothering me. Plus, this puts me in good with him in this place." Other officers relied on the same strategy:

A: Some officers give more phone calls to guys who are straight, but the guys who are in trouble, the officers squeeze to get them out of their units. There is no formal mechanism for the reward of the individuals, so informally the extra benefits of the officers provides some order and control in the place.

. . .

A: Phone calls are really important for guys in this place . . . you cut off their calls and they get pissed. So what I do is give them a little extra and they are good to me.

. . .

A: I'll be easy on the rules if the guy is not causing trouble If he is into all those bullshit games, then I want his ass out of my unit. The problem is that nobody wants him . . . but if your smart you can get the real troublemakers out of the place.

. . .

A: For the inmate who doesn't force himself on anyone you got to give him a break I do that by giving him more dayroom time and he respects that . . . You know, you're not always on the guy and inmates admire that in an officer.

However, what is important about reward power in the institutional setting is that it cannot be retracted, or more specifically, the taking away of these rewards as a form of coercive power becomes quite dangerous. Because control has become dependent upon these accommodative relationships and flexibility in rule enforcement, all in an informal sense, it is difficult and quite problematic to rely on formal sanctions to control inmate behavior. The informal structure supplements the gaps created by the formal mechanisms of control (Cressey, 1965). While the formal mechanisms were weak in effectuating control at HVMF, informality prevailed, along with the rising expectations of inmates on how the system would operate. In short, the informal relationships based on reward power between officers and inmates provided certainty to the environment. Any

change of this situation would cause repercussions and disequilibrrious effects in the institutional setting.

Understanding this was essential to maintaining a stable prison environment. As an officer stated:

A: Once inmates expect something you cannot take it away from them. This is where all the problems start to happen. If you give them a benny, make sure that they do not think that it is now expected for the rest of the time. If they do, then you are in trouble.

In essence, because of the structural makeup of the organization, officers were forced to rely on many informal relationships to adequately succeed in completing their jobs. In fact, some officers who were known to be strict and rigid either requested to be moved to non-housing units or were continually bounced from one position to another in the organization.²² The inescapable conclusion is that informal reward power (corruption) is a functional response to the perceived inadequacies of the formal mechanism of control, and once employed by officers it is very difficult to retract. Knowing this fact, officers relied heavily on this type of power in gaining control and compliance, while at the same time provided themselves a modicum of satisfaction and safety.

Legitimate Power

The third type of power existing among correctional officers at HVMF was legitimate power. Legitimate power takes the form of acceptance on the part of the inmate that the officer has the right to enforce the rules and regulations within the institution. In effect,

the inmate legitimizes the organizational position and role of the officer, which in turn allows the officer to control and regulate inmate behavior. At HVMF the prevalence of this type of power was quite rare. However, it did exist with some inmates.

This state existed because of the uncertainties of the officer role and the structural positioning of the officer in the organization. It was common to hear at HVMF that the officer who was fair, consistent, and just to inmates would probably do well in his interactions with inmates. In particular, the inmate will "legitimize" the role of the officer if he is being treated fairly and consistently by the officer. While there is a kernel of truth in this position, this does not explain the diversities and complexities faced by correctional officers. Personal attributes and qualities only account for a minority of the legitimization of the officer role. In fact, legitimate power among officers at HVMF was quite limited because of many structural qualities endemic to the prison structure.

One method of keeping control in an organization is to send conflicting, inconsistent, and/or unintelligible messages throughout the organization.²³ This causes organizational members to scramble in their attempt to fulfill objectives. Ironically, by producing confusion and disorganization, the controlling agents can keep coalitions and cliques in check and yet at the same time fulfill their organizational objectives. This type of disorganization was prevalent at HVMF.²⁴

Officers had a plethora of rules and regulations which restricted their behavior and confused them about their duties and functions. The organizational effect was that much uncertainty existed within the officer task environment. A group of officers discussed how the rules changed from day to day at HVMF and the effects on the prison setting:

A: By fucking with the inmates' minds is where the problems begin. The inmates need to have rules and regulations consistently enforced. But the problem is that the administration always changes the rules of the game for both inmates and staff. Inconsistency pisses off a lot of the inmates. Convicts want and need consistent rules. How can we expect them to follow the rules when the rules are always changing?

. . .

A: I know that we just got a new administrator, but shit all these rule changes everyday makes this job a pain in the ass If I didn't have to work here, I wouldn't . . . and then they wonder why inmates kill guards.

. . .

A: Administrators not only jerk around inmates, but they do it to us . . . they don't want us to be one group because then our union would get stronger. All these different rules put inmates against officers and officers against themselves.

This message was consistent among the officers and one summed it up this way:

The administrators do not want things to be constant; they always change the rules to disband groups and the staff. The administrators are more concerned about little things than those things that are really important in the place, like the safety of the officers.

Because of the uncertainty produced by administrative rule changing and continual redefinition of organizational policies and

procedures, correctional officers were stuck in the forefront in trying to enforce inconsistent policies and procedures. The behavioral effect was that inmates placed their frustrations and anxieties on the officers, them representing the formal prison hierarchy. Officers, in turn, were not left with any ability to legitimize the system. Their legitimate power was eroded by the formal structure and its many directives, which were not properly conceived nor practical in maintaining stability to the prison environment.

As a result, officers had legitimate power but it was reserved for those inmates who understood the rather loosely defined character of the officer role. Typically, these individuals were the older inmates who understood the system and how the "madness"²⁵ worked in the prison:

A: It seems to me that the older inmates understand the officer's job and buy into the system of rules and regulations. On the other hand, the younger inmates cause more problems because they don't buy the rules of the enforcers.

. . .

A: Them older guys know what prison life is all about. They know that your just doing your job and don't want any hassle You never have any problems with them.

. . .

A: It's the bugs (young inmates) that cause all the problem . . . they are the ones involved in spud juice, dope, and sex . . . they don't give a shit about nothing and most have been state raised so they know nothing but prison.

Since the inmate population is younger today and at HVMF you had many young, serious offenders, it was difficult for them to not only legitimize the officer role but also their own incarceration. The end result was that most inmates did not legitimize the officer role, except for the older inmates who understood how to "do time." These older inmates were able to stabilize the prison environment for the officer, thereby making his job much easier.²⁶

In interviews and conversations with officers, many relayed the importance of some of the older inmates in making their jobs more bearable. Of particular significance was the stability factor these older inmates provided to the staff during the disturbance which occurred April 30, 1982.²⁷ One officer explicitly described the situation in the housing unit where the disturbance occurred. He stated that one inmate told him that something was going to happen and that he should get out of the unit. The information proved to be accurate and the officer felt that if the inmate did not respect his position he probably would have been killed or seriously injured. Another officer described how his unit was calmed down by an older inmate when the disturbance occurred:

This guy prevented the whole place from jumping. He was respected and admired because he had been around for a while. He got all the other inmates back in their cells and I think he calmed the whole fucking place down.

What can be concluded about legitimate power among officers at HVMF was that it was structurally limited and usually more prevalent in the interactions between officers and older members of the inmate population.

Referent Power

The last type of power base identifiable among officers at HVMF was referent power. Referent power is defined as power which is determined by the identification an inmate has with an officer, specifically where an inmate respects and desires to emulate the officer. This type of power is exhibited when an officer serves as a role model for the inmate. At HVMF this type of power base was developing, relative to two factors: structural positioning and officer respect.

As in the case of legitimate power, officers, because of the nature of their function, could not develop a role which inmates would seek to emulate. In fact, officers were usually thought of as representatives of the administration and their desire to repress inmates' interests. Again, the officer role did not generally allow the development of a positive relationship between keeper and kept. One inmate stated a common opinion among all inmates:

A: All those officers are just lackeys for the administration. They just sit on their fat asses and collect 20,000 dollars a year. Their jobs are nothing but a big waste of money, just like this whole fucking system.

As in the case of legitimate power, the officers and their roles were conflated by inmates, where there was no real distinction between the officer as a person and the person as doing a specific job. Instead, inmates thought of the two as the same and viewed the officers in a negative light.

Because of the changing nature of the policies and procedures, along with the identification of officers with repressive rules and regulations, they were left with very little opportunity to set a positive example for inmates. This situation puts into question the role of not only officers but also treatment officials in trying to change attitudes of inmates, particularly if the treatment strategies are predicated on some type of trust and reliance between inmates and therapists.

Referent power is developed through the respect established with an inmate. While the position of being a correctional officer is precarious and uncertain, effective officers are able to develop a sense of respect with inmates by being fair and consistent. However, the pivotal point is that this respect requires a degree of informality and flexibility in rule enforcement. In this way, officers provide a sense of fairness and certainty to an inmate's existence, allowing the officer to exhibit an aberrant form of referent power. This type of power is anomalous because it represents a diversion from policies and procedures of the institution in attempting to effectively complete one's job. While rules at HVMF were continually changing, institutional stability demanded consistent and clear regulations. Officers provided this through the negotiation of their own environments. In this way they were able to develop referent power.

An officer stated this type of negotiated environment when asked about rules and regulations at HVMF:

A: You do what you think is right and you disregard anything the administration says. You are the one who is doing the job, and you do anything that you think will make your job more effective and easy in the long run.

Another officer stated the same thing but in a different fashion:

A: Them administration types don't care about us or our jobs. So, why should I stick my neck out for them. I'll do anything to keep myself safe If that means letting them burn down the place that's fine with me.²⁸

An environment can only be certain if the rules are consistent, or if they do not change with such rapidity that officers cannot keep up with the changes. To deal with this, officers at HVMF selected those rules which they felt were effective in providing certainty to the environment, thereby making them more respected among inmates.

However, what was problematic at HVMF was that many officers were new to the correctional system,²⁹ something which did not allow them to be selective in their rule enforcement. The net effect was that they usually changed their behaviors relative to the rule changes.

This created a situation where the referent power base was significantly eroded and uncertainty escalated. It was not until they become socialized into the world of corrections that this power developed and was perpetuated by officers. The interesting long-term effect was that while referent power was created through the socialization process of officers, and as a result, the inmate deferred

to officers, the deleterious final effect was that the inmate learned a form of deceit and manipulation in the process.

Therefore, because of the position the officers found themselves, they were unable, in part, to effectively help the inmate in his so-called rehabilitation process. In addition, what was occurring at HVMF was that the development of referent power was in reaction to the uncertain environment produced by an administration which was changing the rules of the game. In response, officers developed a sense of respect and referent power through manipulation of the prison hierarchy, and it allowed them to stabilize and control their environment. Subsequent behavior on the part of inmates was learned and reacted to in the same fashion--deceit and manipulation became virtues and any hope of effective change in an inmate's behavior was largely diminished.

As the structural organization of the prison environment leads to the development of specific types of power among officers, the same was true among inmates. In fact, it is contended that the organization of the prison enables more diverse forms of power to be created by inmates. These specific kinds of power are examined in the following section. After such an examination is completed, a synthesis of the types of power is provided.

3. Perceptions of Power Among Inmates

There were five basic types of power found among inmates at HVMF. These five are: coercive, referent, providing of resources, expert,

and legitimate. The bases of power of reward and access to information were not evident. Reward power relies on some type of remuneration; however, inmates had very few items which they could reward other inmates. As a result, many of the amenities were kept and other means were used to gain compliance. Furthermore, very few inmates were able to access key information and use it as a conformity mechanism.

Information was not as crucial for inmates as it was for administrators. Since administrators required information on what was occurring within the environment to control, it immediately had value. However, information was ubiquitous among the inmate population and its value was not as great. Therefore, access to it was not as significant. Nevertheless, the traditional literature does suggest that some inmates who do have access to information are powerful, particularly inmate clerks who are in positions which enable them to access certain information, e.g., whose cell is to be searched and when (Prelesnik, 1972). Typically, this was not the case at HVMF, since there were no inmate clerks. Other power bases are more relevant and the following paragraphs are devoted to them.

Coercive Power

The first type of power among the inmate population was coercive power. Coercive power, as defined earlier, is punishment or threat of punishment to gain conformity. The current literature in prison organization stresses the role of force among inmates to gain

compliance from other inmates, particularly powerful inmate groups or gangs. Jacobs (1977) states:

When the gangs emerged at Stateville in 1969, they placed the old con power structure in physical and financial jeopardy. For the first time those convicts with good jobs were not necessarily protected in their dealings, legitimate or illegitimate. Seeing strength in numbers, the gang members attempted to take what they wanted by force.

While force and prison violence have been documented in the literature, this investigation showed not only decreased violence and force but also a less developed group or gang system at HVMF.³⁰ At HVMF, the religious leaders of the various Islam denominations could resort to coercive measures to gain conformity among inmates, particularly followers; however, this was not evidenced. The use of force by inmates against other inmates was reserved for particular actions. However, this is not to conclude that force did not exist.

Coercive measures used by the inmate population were usually reserved in developing one's "respect" in the institution. It was exhibited by "new fish" in their interaction with older and wiser inmates. One has to develop respect, initially using coercive methods, to survive in the institution. One inmate stated the following about how one developed respect in the institution:

I: Ok, what about inmates, per se, what gives an individual inmate respect among these other inmates?

A: Well, integrity towards each other, the fact that you don't snitch, the ability to stand up to your own.

I: Cover yourself, you mean.

A: You're pressed, or whatever, and you can handle yourself.

I: What if you back down?

A: That's the worst thing you can do in prison.

I: Why?

A: Because you're gonna have everybody after you.

I: In other words, you open yourself up and everybody's gonna try to turn you out some way or another?

A: Oh yeah, one way or the other. Try to take you for everything you got. There's a couple in here that let stuff slide by, don't have nothin' no more.

I: When you say they don't have nothing . . . ?

A: Well, they make store order and they gotta hand it all out to those people who're comin' in here, give me this.

I: What should you do if somebody comes at you like that?

A: Blow his face out.

I: So then the word's out.

A: Yeah, right. There are different ways, that's the quickest way. But, of course, you can't just stop and hit somebody one time, you gotta really mess somebody up. I mean if you tell him, well, you can't But basically it's like you just tell by the situation what's required to get yourself out of it, but there's a lot of different ways of handling it. Sometimes that's the only way it could be, you gotta mess somebody up . . . and then everybody understands, well . . . and that's it. That's the most surest way.

A majority of inmates at HVMF believed that adequate force was the only method available to protect oneself. While the use of coercive

power was prevalent among the inmate population for protection purposes and the development of respect, other inmates still believed that if you treated people fairly or decently you would still have your respect:

A: Like if I give somebody respect, I have to get respect. If he respects me, I treat a person the way he treats me. If he's decent with me There's some people that you know yourself . . . that you didn't like right off the bat . . .

. . .

A: If a man treats me like a man, then I'll do the same for him If someone tries to front me off, then I got to tell him that it is not going to be tolerated.

. . .

A: Prisoners only get respect if they give it . . . no one wants to be moved in on . . . you need respect and if your cool with other people, they'll be good to you.

. . .

A: I know you got to establish yourself. That includes letting it be known that you ain't going to take no shit Now you can do that in a number of ways. I think the best way is through treating a man fair . . . but that doesn't mean letting him taking advantage of you.

. . .

A: Respect is something you get if you give. You got to get it because if you don't you aren't shit . . . that type of reputation will kill you in here You can get it without tearing some dudes head off. You know, you got to give it to get it.

The important point is that the development of respect and an image is essential to survival within the institution. Because of the

sense of alienation inmates felt from staff and administrators, they had no positive means to express their own individual identities. In response to this situation, the use of coercive power was inevitable in maintaining one's self-image and social position within the institution. The level of alienation among most inmates was relatively high and reflected dissatisfaction with the reward structure of the prison.³¹

A majority of the inmates would agree with the following statement an inmate made: "The only reward that the administration gives to inmates is the privilege of being here." While administrators did have an institutional design which was based on more privileges and rights for good behavior,³² the perception of inmates was that it was not much relative to the deprivation they experienced. The consensus among the inmates was that the only kind of power exercised in the prison environment by administrators and staff was coercive in nature.

The ability to express concern and discuss issues with administrators was somewhat limited. Inmates did explain how there was a Warden's Forum,³³ but that it was largely ineffective in providing any substantive relief to their pains of imprisonment. What was observed was the existence of a highly fragmented organization of inmates which sought to deal with institutionalization separated, divided, and alienated from the formal prison hierarchy. These conditions perpetuated an institutional environment which allowed

artificial or superficial realities to be constructed by inmates, and in response to these conditions, other kinds of power developed among the inmate population.

Referent Power

In reaction to the alienation and loss of identity, inmates looked for someone to emulate. Those inmates which were emulated developed a sense of referent power. Every individual needs a referent point or a model to emulate. In the world of prison, this image usually takes the form of a strong male identity. Individual inmates who were able to portray the tough, virile male role exhibited a sense of power in the institution and were able to manipulate others for their own self-aggrandizement. Inmates looked up to and admired these individuals, even to the point of attempting to be like the admired individual, or as one inmate put it "they masquerade their vices as virtues." However, within HVMF, the strongest form of referent power was noticed among the various religious groups.

There were five basic religious groups at HVMF: The Sunni Muslims, the Moorish Science Temple of America (Moors), the American Muslim Mission, and the Melanic Muslims.³⁴ Assorted loosely knit Christian groups also existed.³⁵ These religious groups served two purposes in the inmate social system: first, they provided a needed group identity which stressed the fulfillment of certain religious and spiritual ideals, while at the same time they allowed weaker individuals the ability to get protection from enemies within not only


the institution but the system as a whole.³⁶ These religious groups typically expressed a strict and uniform code, with certain punishments for even minor deviations from the groups norms.³⁷

These groups voluntarily segregated themselves from each other. Figure 4.1 reflects a diagram of the social location of these major religious groups in the dining hall. This voluntary segregation was used as a means of expressing group solidarity and sincerity in religious convictions. All of the Muslim groups believed in the purpose of their action, that was a devotion to the religion of Islam and the improvement of oneself in the process. Because of the strong identification these members had with each other and their religious beliefs, the leaders exhibited a strong sense of referent power among their adherents.

Discussions with members of these religious groups expressed the identification and deference they had to their religious leaders and the importance of having a belief system while incarcerated. These religious groups were of particular importance to many of the black inmates; in fact, one religious group allowed only blacks among their ranks.³⁸ The important point is that they are tightly bound as a group. Because of this other inmates and administrators perceived them as a threat to institutional stability or as a front for other activities, specifically protection of their members.³⁹ One inmate voiced a concern that many inmates echoed later:

FIGURE 4.1

SEGREGATION OF RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN DINING HALL



A: They worry. 'Cause actually, OK, the Moselms outside in the streets, may be originally where they came from, are a religion--Islam religion--they are a religion, one of the most law abiding ones, really. I don't know, I mean they have set rules in their religion that if you don't follow them, it's worse than any kind of punishment we get because they'll kill you. In here it isn't as much a religion as it is a gang. Mostly it's just a front for religion. Some of them that I know of that really look at it as religion.

I: You mean they're sincere about it.

A: Right, they're really into it on a religious basis. Where a lot of them, it's just to get together with, and I've seen them myself, to plot against the administration itself and how we can go about gettin' to do this and gettin' to do that. There's no way I think an institution should . . .

I: Are they powerful enough to do things, to get people that are outside of their group?

A: It is believed that that's what started the riot. That is what started it, from the people I know, that is what started it. They were the people that started it.

Others put it this way:

A: Shit, there ain't no religion in prison . . . all that is is bullshit smoke screen so them guys can fuck with administrators heads. I don't know too many that really care about their allah.

. . .

A: Religion is protection in this place. It allows these weaker guys to get some gang to protect them and other guys like them. You don't need it really, except if your a sissy or weakling.

. . .

A: Many of those Muslims mean what they say, but a lot don't give a fuck about anything but themselves They aren't really a gang at all, but they aren't no real religion either. Its protection . . . don't let no one bullshit you.

The validity of the religious convictions of the various Muslim groups was not the intent of this research; nevertheless, it was clear that they were essential elements to the inmate social system at HVMF. In fact, their referent power was so great that many officers and administrators had attempted to diffuse their power within the institution.⁴⁰ Again, the presence of these groups indicated the solidarity of inmates vis-a-vis the formal prison organization. In effect, groups provided access to alleviating many of the frustrations and problems that inmates experienced (Cloward, 1960). This brings into question other methods of accommodation which officers and inmates relied on in maintaining institutional stability.

The literature on prison society is replete with examples of how keepers and kept arrive at some type of symbiotic relationship in providing control to the prison organization (Sykes, 1958; Sykes and Messinger, 1960; and Cloward, 1960). This was also true at HVMF. On one occasion, an officer was observed "shaking down"⁴¹ an inmate as he entered the housing unit. The inside of the inmate's coat was lined with sandwiches from the dining hall. The officer responded "are some of these for me?" The inmate nodded in the affirmative and was let on his way.

While these tenuous relationships existed, other inmates expressed the idea that the degree of accommodation was not as developed in HVMF as in other institutions in the state. Inmates relayed that difference:

A: Where you, it's the back . . . I had it crammed full of food, I was in the kitchen workin', right? I was cleaning it out, me and another guy was cleanin' it out, and it was full of cheese and hamburgers, the whole bit. And the unit. And more or less what he was tryin' to say was you're comin' back in the kitchen, you're fired. Well, when I got back in my area, and I was supposed to be workin' in the kitchen, the cop in the unit called the fucker and said hey, leave . . . alone, he said I don't want him in the kitchen no more. And the inspector went over the and . . . their asses are out . . . fuck with me, tore up the ticket. I had a nice ticket for it and he tore it up.

. . .

A: Marquette was nice . . . you could get anything you wanted - drugs, booze, pills, money . . . here it is tighter, but things are going to change. You wait and see what happens to this place in a couple of years.

. . .

A: Other joints have all sorts of shit if you got the money . . . there isn't no money in this place . . . prisoners can't rob each other Officers know how to deal with inmates better because they know if I scratch his back, he'll scratch mine. That's not happening here, but it will.

. . .

A: You got to get a long with the police (officers) if you want to survive . . . this place is new and they ain't start dealing and jeffing (working with officers) yet . . . not like other places in the state . . . but give it time, all sorts of things will change.

More importantly, the group affiliation was tenuous in the institution. While the religious groups were noticeable within the inmate social system, many inmates tended to stay to themselves or only affiliated with very few friends, "homies," or cliques (Irwin,

1980). There is a specific reason for such a social organization of inmates--no one wants to be recognized as a gang member. One inmate put it this way:

I: Are these groups also members of these groups, or are they just little cliques of guys that get together and . . . ?

A: Cliques. You know, you got maybe 8, 9 guys . . .

I: What do you mean by that?

A: Well see any time that you get a group together, all eyes are on you. On-oh, we got a group over here, everybody starts watchin' you. But if your message is relayed in twos, or one by one . . .

I: Oh, so in effect they're a group, but they don't hang together?

A: Yeah, 'cause they don't wanna be recognized as a group . . .

I: Do administrators know who these guys are?

A: No, nobody knows who they all are, you know who a few of them are, but you don't know who all of them are. It's like . . . nobody knew . . . somebody hurt you, one of your brothers would take them out. . . It's the same thing with this group here, there might be 35 guys involved in this group, but you don't see no more than 2 or 3 at a time and you don't know who they all . . . because everybody mixes and talks and bull shits with everybody. They know who they are, but you don't know who they are.

The long-term effect was that the socialization process within the institution was limited to a few people, producing a highly fragmented organization of inmates which sought to survive and cope in their own manner.

While in the past, one had groups which were strong, solidified, and cohesive in prison settings, this research suggests that the inmate society at HVMF was loosely connected with self-serving and protective cliques. These cliques served the purpose of past functional groups in the environment: they provided needed relationships and resources to the individual inmate as means of coping with incarceration. As a result, there was value within the inmate social hierarchy if one could provide resources.

Providing of Resources Power

Sykes (1958) has stated that inmates experience pains of imprisonment, one of those pains being loss of material possessions. This pain, along with the others (loss of autonomy, denial of heterosexual relationships, feelings of insecurity, and the restriction of movement), produced an homogenous inmate society which organized in an attempt to alleviate these pains. The end result was a cohesively structured social organization of prisoners which operated in a subrosa fashion and functioned relative to the degree of deprivation experienced by the group. Concomitantly, this research suggests a similar structural adaptation to incarceration at HVMF but that the level of homogeneity among inmates is no longer present.

Many current writers have suggested that the modern prison is fragmented, looking at how the makeup of our large penitentiaries have shifted along racial, social, economic, and political lines (Irwin, 1980; Fox, 1980, Jacobs, 1977; and Huff, 1977). While the

compositional character of maximum security prison has drastically changed over the past 20 years, the functional argument of inmate society still holds true today: inmates experience a high level of alienation and frustration over their incarceration. In effect, the "prisonization" process still exists and is applicable today, but the social groupings and solidarities of the past have faded. Inmates still group together; however, the groups are much smaller⁴² and more hedonistic in their outlook towards incarceration.

A majority of inmates at HVMF had expressed the fact that the large gangs and traditional inmate social system had broken down, with much smaller groups and a more self-centered approach to incarceration:

A: I know a couple of guys that when I first came to prison, they had 20 years in, I'm pressin' 40 years. You just didn't have this syndrome of client-guard relationships. It just didn't exist, you didn't talk to guards. You know, that was bad businesses. You didn't talk to the guard by yourself, you know, that wasn't done. Today it's done. A lot of things like the (?) of a lot of guys in here, cell beaters (?), they didn't (?) from that kind when I came into the penitentiary . . . for 72 cents . . . And the administration takes the view of this way, we can use our psychology on these young people because, number one, most of them are ignorant, most of them haven't finished high school let alone thought about college, OK? Now the ones that have gone to college are the ones that are, have some type of education are trying to . . . a lot of this nonsense because they know it's . . . But we're not concerned about the old-timer . . . that's the way the administration feels, we're concerned about the young guy, he's the guy that's been giving us problems because he has that 'I don't give a damn' attitude--why? Hey, I'm doin' life sentences, a guy may be 3 or 4 life sentences or he may be doin' time . . . time.

. . .

A: Institutional time isn't shit like it use to be. Hell, when I came to the penitentiary, we had hard time. Now everything is a piece of cake . . . there ain't no hard time . . . that's gone. No gangs anymore, just young assholes thinking their bad and can fuck over anyone.

. . .

A: Whites use to run the place, but that shit has changed. You got all sorts of people coming to prison . . . only caring about themselves and their time. In them old days, you had people respecting groups. It has changed . . . who knows what's going to happen.

Because of this you find an inmate associating with only a few people who share the same interests and desires as he has and doing his own time in his own fashion. And one of the best ways to cope with one's incarceration is through the use of narcotics.

The presence of contraband items in correctional institutions is fairly common, and very few prisons do not have some type of problem in controlling drug markets. Because of the relative newness of HVMF, the elaborate contraband system was not as developed as in other institutions; however, because of the demand for such substances, inmates who were able to supply their fellow inmates with narcotics were able to wield much power in the inmate social system. Specifically, inmates who had access to this form of resource were able to live comfortably in the prison environment and command authority upon other inmates.

In addition, it is important to see how this form of power is distinguished from reward power. Reward power is when someone is given some type of remuneration for compliance. On the other hand,

providing of resources is an access issue. Inmates have this kind of power if they are able to access those needed resources. In this case, the inmate who can enter drug markets has power. Moreover, this is different from the inmate who can provide a few extra cigarettes to another for a service or good. The penetration into this subrosa situation is what establishes power. No type of power is probably so pivotal in understanding inmate society and social control within prisons today. The following excerpts show the power in such a position:

I: Is drugs that important in an institution?

A: Of course, that's like you say money, money is important--drugs is money, that's their money, you know.

I: And if you control the drugs in the institutions, you're really controlling a lot of units.

A: You bet.

I: So, that's a very pivotal, important factor.

A: Right, that's like the goal you try to achieve while you're in here, you know.

. . .

A: Those who got it in with them officers got connections. They got drugs with them coming into the place Everybody need some satisfaction, so you go to the man. In here, it's the white boys. They got the drugs and power cause they give what you want.

. . .

A: You know everyone wants to get a little high sometimes, so you go and get it . . . you be running that kind of stuff everybody likes you and wants to be your friend. But that can be dangerous because they try to rob you if you are not careful.

. . .

A: Nobody has real power in here except them people with stuff (marijuana). If you be running it, well you got what you want and what others want . . . that makes you king, so you try to get some . . . if you got connections on the outside, you can get it in and make money. Them officers and visitors brings it in . . . and that's what is done.

. . .

A: It's not really drugs is power; it's money . . . but dope and juice is what gives you power . . . you got one, then you got the other. That's that.

. . .

A: Many don't want to talk about this kind of stuff because it's no good It causes problems, but I'll tell you if you got someone doing it for you (bringing it in), you can live any way you want with no one bothering you.

Because of the alienation and fragmentation of the inmate social system, drugs were usually controlled by a select few individuals and sold to small cliques or groups of inmates. In this way, the supplier was able to control his distribution and the administration was kept off guard on who was operating the market. In short, key inmates at HVMF sold drugs to individuals in a small group fashion, dealing directly with users and often circumventing middle men in the operation. The end results were that the sales were direct and the payment was usually up front to the dealer.⁴³

While the sales were often direct, another interesting point was that much of the selling was done by a few inmates who had some type of access to drug connections exterior to the prison setting. Also,

since the money supply at HVMF was very tight,⁴⁴ and the demand for illegal narcotics was high, especially marijuana, the dealers were often in positions of controlling much of the capital raised in the institution.⁴⁵ This concentration of wealth allowed dealers to influence many behaviors of other inmates and officers. When inmates were asked to describe the influence of drugs at HVMF, they stated the following:

A: Right. Like 3 or 4 months, the whole prison was tense. From December to March, tense. I mean these are white people, they bring in the weed and cool off, I mean 2 Block, 3 Block, 4 Block, 5 Block,. They just bring in weed and . . . and they give it to people who . . . stop all the tension, stop all the.

I: Do they actually, they get all this weed that they pay for.

A: Right.

I: And they give it to people to calm them down?

A: Right.

I: OK, what's the payback?

A: They don't lose nothin'. They do this, you know, I've spoken to them, they will control all the blocks. For instance somebody over in 3 or 4 Block does something real ugly, like squeezin' a guy, pushing a guy, for sex, off into the hole. They will, that whole block, punish that whole block and lettin' you know for a reason that they're not getting any weed for months. And anybody from any other block that gives them weed, will cut their block off. That's how they do that.

. . .

A: People who got drugs can get a lot from people in here . . . they know that people want what they got, so they use it for just about everything. If you need some weed to keep you going, you talk to the man who can

get it for you . . . with marijuana you can really cool this place out It's like this in all of these prisons. This place ain't no different.

What was produced was a situation where institutional capital was concentrated and power centralized with a few inmates.

Conversely, the short-term effect was that the inmate society was pacified until the next supply of drugs was delivered. In the interim, inmates attempted to cope with imprisonment using illegal means. It was at this juncture that inmate violence, assaults, and robberies surface. Initially, to deal with this problem, administrators allowed no form of purchasing in the institution and ran the institutional store through a credit accounting system.⁴⁶ However, at the time of this writing, administrators at HVMF were considering the use of "script"⁴⁷ by inmates in their purchasing of store goods. What the long-term effect of script on the institutional environment will have is uncertain, but it can be speculated that assaults, robberies, and holdups may increase due to the increase in the money supply. Also, the relative power position of the dealers will be unaffected, only the method of payment will be altered. Instead of having money transferred to a dealer's account or paying him off with cigarettes, users will pay with institutional script. One effect may be the theft of script from dealers; however, this is unlikely since dealers will probably pay for protection, using other consumers as strong-arm men or providing drugs to them for protection services (Irwin, 1980).

The value of resources cannot be overstated; it is not only important when examining drug distribution, but it is also essential to psychological and physical survival within the institution. Because of the separation of inmates from administration and the fragmentation of the inmate social system, inmates at HVMF sought psychological relief through work, school or hobbycraft.⁴⁸ However, none of these activities were really too well developed at HVMF. Disgruntled inmates stated it this way:

I: Is that a valued thing among inmates in here, having a job, trying to . . . get money?

A: Yeah, it's probably what everybody tries to do, and . . .

I: And if you're denied access to a job, how do you get money?

A: If you don't have anybody from the street you don't.

I: You say nobody from the street, what do you mean?

A: Family sending you money, or friends, or something like that.

I: Does that force guys to get into certain illegal stuff to make money?

A: Yeah, I'd say so, yeah. It's the same as on the street. And that's what they're here for, they didn't make any money out on the street, so they stole it--I mean, if it's not stealing, it's something.

. . .

A: Not enough jobs are here for inmates to do. You just sit around this place all day This prison is boring and convicts don't like that . . . you know if you got nothing to do your hands get real tired . . . they got hobby-craft but still that ain't enough.

. . . .

A: Nobody has any money in this joint. That's because there aren't any jobs I tell you they better get jobs if they want this place to stay trouble-free. When inmates don't have any money, that is when they start to steal stuff from each other. That's when the trouble starts. Guys go around sticking each other for their property. You can't let anyone steal your shit or else everyone will come after you It's this kind of shit they got to change.

Resulting from this structural condition was that inmates relied on subrosa activities to deal with their institutional pains, causing a total state of distrust and disorganization among the inmate population. The final product was that a minority of inmates lived relatively well because of the accumulation and distribution of highly sought after goods. This illegitimacy was exacerbated by an underdeveloped legitimate sector within the structural-contextual environment of the prison. In short, a genuinely capitalistic economic system was perpetuated within the prisoner society, with few holding power over the resources and a majority scrambling to get money to purchase those resources.

Expert Power

While the providing of key resources was an important kind of power within HVMF, another influential type of power existed within the world of prisoner organization; this form of power is expert power. In our earlier description of this type of power, we stated that an individual has expert power if he is able to convey some specific kind of knowledge to another person. The source of the power

is the knowledge present. In the correctional setting, this knowledge typically means awareness of the legal system.

Starting with the early 60's and carried into the middle 70's, we saw the traditional "hands-off" doctrine of the courts being eroded. In its place we find all the procedural guarantees to prisoners that insure due process, especially those in relation to prison discipline (Jacobs, 1977; Hawkins, 1976; and Goldfarb and Singer, 1973). Probably more than any other intervention into corrections this changed the operation and maintenance of traditional institutions. One of the most significant impacts was the creation of law libraries and the providing of legal materials to inmates.⁴⁹ In effect, the courts have given inmates access to the courts to grieve the conditions of their confinement.

This monumental decision affected the operation of many correctional systems and introduced into the system the "writ writer" or "jailhouse lawyer."⁵⁰ Because of their advances, jailhouse lawyers were able to access the legal system, impact the correctional system and influence the inmate social system. Specifically, inmates who are knowledgeable about the legal system are able to exercise tremendous amounts of power within the inmate social arena. Putting aside their effects on the legal machinery of criminal justice and the operations of correctional systems, knowledgeable inmates who understand the exterior legal system can position themselves into bastions of power within the prisoner world.

Such was the case at HVMF. Observations and discussions with inmates indicated concern for their appeals and retrials.⁵¹ A day does not go by without inmates discussing points of law and the status of their cases. Inmates who ran the law library were well-off. They always had a sufficient supply of cigarettes and other resources at their command. Surrogate lawyers were being paid off with basic goods in return for help on their cases.

In one inmate's cell, piles of papers and legal cases were clipped to a clothesline. The cell's occupant related they were the cases he was working. Also, that other inmates always kept him busy with their work and he did not have time to do his own. He even relayed an incident on why he was transferred to HVMF from MBP:

A: That's why I'm here. That's why I'm here from Marquette. I was told that already. When they rioted (?) and Marquette, they laid the whole prison down and they locked you up in your cell 24 hours a day. We was eatin' 3 meals a day in our cells--breakfast we had a bowl of cereal, lunch we had a peanut butter sandwich.

I: That was it.

A: That was it, and a cup of milk. At nighttime we had a sandwich, a bologna sandwich and a cheese sandwich--that was supper. And a cup of coffee, everything else was . . . Gettin' a lot of treats from the store . . . existence. I filed a lawsuit, downtown Marquette. And prior to that the National Lawyers (?) of Detroit came up to Marquette to investigate the situation. And I got call in the office . . . kickin' around what was the cause of the riot, what do you intend to do about it? Filed a lawsuit, at the same time they filed an (?) lawsuit on conditions after the riot in all the Michigan prisons. Well, mine was (?). My suit was to have us go out of our cells to the mess hall for 3 well-balanced daily, OK. Went downtown filed a lawsuit ex parte, which means . . ., got a hearing in

4 days, had the hearing, the Attorney General came in with his bag of lies and the following day we went out for breakfast, and the next day, the next 2 days we went out for supper, and the following we were on 3 meals. And the (?) came up to my cell, get your bags packed, you're leaving . . . challenging . . .

This type of inmate was not only powerful in relation to the inmate social system but he was also feared by administrators:

A: There ain't nobody in here powerful. There's one guy I think that's pretty powerful. And his name is . . . and he's the inmate attorney.

I: Lawyer.

A: Yeah, he just had . . . about 3 or 4 different murder cases.

I: What gives him the power?

A: Well, he's just like a person in society, whenever you got a good reputation goin' for yourself, that reputation automatically make you powerful.

I: And his reputation is one of what?

A: One of . . .

I: Why, because he knows the law?

A: Because he knows the law.

I: How does the administration deal with a guy like that, are they afraid of him?

A: They got to be afraid of them because he keep the administration in check.

I: Through what, how does he do it?

A: Through court.

I: Ah, so he's always filing lawsuits?

A: Right. He win 'em too.

I: Do you think he'll be transferred?

A: They transferred him to Jackson, I was in Jackson with him and I did 6 years there in Jackson with him and they transferred him from down there to Marquette and from Marquette to here. And I couldn't say how long they'll keep him here in this place, he'll probably straighten this place out before he leaves.

. . .

A: You know them guys that sue this place cause a lot of problems for them administrators . . . they know they (lawyers) can shut this place down if the administrators fuck up in this place . . . guys are always filing or threatening to file lawsuits and other inmates know it . . . they got a lot of power because of it.

. . .

A: There are some guys in here who got lots of power . . . them inmate lawyers . . . those guys who sit in that law library. They always got some of these dumb inmates doing shit for them because they help them in their cases . . . Nobody fucks with them because we figure they help us all against this bullshit they put you through.

Because of the hope that every inmate had of being released from prison, other inmates were able to exploit this situation and enhance themselves into lasting power positions within the convict social system. Recognizing the fact that the courts were continually "interferring" with the operation of the prisons, administrators were wary to provide legitimate opportunities for inmates to grieve their incarceration.⁵² A functional response was the development of writ writers or jailhouse lawyers who attempted to access the courts for their clients, and at the same time exploited them for the little money and/or amenities they had. In reality, the denial of formal

opportunities, in this sense legal representation for inmates, created a situation where particular inmates exercised a tremendous amount of power over other inmates, thereby relieving their own level of deprivation while exacerbating others. As in the case of resources, a very few inmates were able to live off their abilities at the expense of a majority of the prisoner population, causing further divisions in an already highly divided inmate organization.

Legitimate Power

The last type of power exhibited by inmates was legitimate power. Legitimate power is where an inmate may show deference to another inmate because he feels that inmate has been around or understands the system. As observed at HVMF, many of the older inmates⁵³ not only legitimize the system but were legitimized themselves. Their experiences over the years has not only taught them the operation of the system (expert power) but also given them some type of admiration and respect. As one inmate stated, "the old guys used to run the prisons,⁵⁴ but now they are left alone because the young dudes are taking over." The degree of legitimate power exercised by these older inmates was relatively weak, particularly since they could not exercise any other type of power.⁵⁵ Their power was limited but yet respected.

As inmates gained knowledge, the expertise of the older inmates became less valuable and reliance on older inmates diminished. As a result, their power was reduced and they usually faded into the

background of institutional life. As another inmate put it, "No one will fuck with the old guys because they've done their time and got their respect." This notion of legitimate power suggests that forms of power do change with time and that some are more relevant in understanding inmate society than others. Moreover, this argument can also be transposed to officers and administrators. The concluding section of this analysis examines all three groups, synthesizing the findings in an attempt to understand control within HVMF. It is hypothesized that interaction of the types of power among the groups provides equilibrium to the prison organization.

4. Social Bases of Power: A Synthesis

Organizations are typically composed of various groups. Within the realm of correctional institutions, this can be broken down into three types: inmates, officers, and administrators. Each group exhibits certain behaviors within the organizational setting to fulfill its own goals. These groups each have their own goals and/or objectives as functions of a particular organizational structure, that structure being highly formalized and regimented.

Being aware of this fact allows one to examine the differing power arrangements among the groups. Within the prison structure at HVMF, it was stated that different social bases of power were employed by the groups to gain compliance of both group and non-group members. Interestingly enough, all three groups at HVMF relied on coercive power to gain compliance of people within the organization. Inmates

used force or the threat of force with other inmates and staff; officers and administrators relied on it in their interactions with inmates. While some used it more frequently and relied on it more so than others (administrators), it was similarly used at HVMF.

Reward power, as a compliance mechanism, was not that common among the groups at HVMF. It was only used informally by officers and tangentially by administrators within the institutional environment. This may be the major reason why there was such a separation between inmates and staff at HVMF: the reward power exercised by officers at HVMF was an informal response to an insufficient and inadequate formal structure, exacerbated by the fact that the formal reward structure employed by the administration to gain compliance of inmates was very weak, if not totally nonexistent. In addition, inmates provided very limited if no rewards to other inmates for compliant behavior.

The resulting situation produced more elaborate corruption by both inmates and officers in attempting to function within the environment. In short, the lack of reward power was a reflection of the prison's formal structure which accentuated coercion as a primary method of control. Since coercion could not be totally guaranteed by staff, reward power became inherent to those informal-accommodative relationships between officers and prisoners.

This was also true in relation to the development of referent power. This form of power was extremely strong among the inmate population, in particular the religious groups. These groups

represented the solidification of a part of inmate society which was in conflict with the traditional structure of the prison organization. While these groups were not continually antagonistic toward the prison hierarchy, they did represent alienation and group estrangement with the administration. Therefore, they were able to exercise power among their group members and the inmate population. In addition, because the inmate population was fragmented and highly individualistic, the inmate who had a good reputation within the prison system was able to get others to do what he sought; his reputation was his source of power, and usually the inmate who was tough, virile, and was able to "get his respect" exhibited high levels of referent power. He was a reference point for many individuals coming into the system.

While this was well developed among the inmate population, in large part due to the alienation and division fostered by the prison structure, referent power was also exhibited by correctional officers in their interactions with inmates. However, this was restricted at HVMF because of the ever-changing policies and procedures. In effect, officers were able to develop referent power by negotiating their own environments and selecting those rules which made their jobs more bearable. The resulting situation was one where inmates sought to learn the manipulation process of the officers. Thus, inmates emulated the officers. In this way, officers were exercising a form of referent power. It was mentioned that this was a form of anomalous

referent power, particularly since the exercise of such power portrayed to inmates an invidious and manipulative organization; while maybe detrimental in the long run, this type of power was a functional product of the officer role.

A similar type argument was made in relation to legitimate power. Officers at HVMF had very little legitimate power. This type of power was limited because of the structural makeup of the prison organization. Specifically, it was difficult for inmates to legitimize the rules and regulations of the prison when they were continually in flux. Recognizing this problem, officers attempted to gain legitimacy through fairness, consistency, and flexibility in rule enforcement.

In reference to inmates, legitimate power existed, but it was considered an ancillary form of power and usually reserved for older inmates who could not exercise any other form of power. This does not discount its relevancy in inmate society; however, it does suggest that this power was representative of older inmates who had "earned their respect," and it existed at the periphery of the inmate social world.

Of greater significance within the inmate society was the providing of resources as a base of power. The access to resources by key inmates within the inmate social system represented the pinnacle of inmate alienation and disillusionment with the formal prison hierarchy. Specifically, inmates who were able to access contraband items,

particularly marijuana and other assorted drugs, exercised tremendous amounts of power within the institution. They represented the adaptive mechanism of inmate society, suggesting that their existence was, in large part, determined by the repressive control strategies of the formal prison organization. No other inmate base of power was so influential and yet at the same time problematic to institutional stability. Because of the demand for such products by a majority of inmates, no other social base of power had so much influence to gain compliance among inmates.

More importantly, this kind of power perpetuated an illegal normative system, with separate rules and regulations on how inmates were to behave. Specifically, the ability to access key resources allowed inmates to devise a legitimate system of proscribed behaviors which was in opposition to the prison's formal structure. In this way, prison contraband fostered the development of particular behavioral patterns which were recognized and legitimized by a majority of inmates. In short, the illegal system created and supported by the provision of these illegal resources was instrumental in determining subsequent actions on the part of inmates. The research literature points out this was not only true at HVMF but also every other prison organization which attempted to control inmates through repressive means, whether they be traditional or more contemporary in nature.

Similarly, expert power was extremely influential to gain compliance among those inmates who valued the jailhouse lawyer's expertise. Since inmates were able to access the courts with relative ease, it was essential that they understood the formal mechanisms inherent to the legal system. Those inmates who could provide that type of information could live comfortably because of their consulting business. More importantly, they were able to influence others to get what they desired out of the inmate social system. Because of their potential trouble to administrators they are usually checked and controlled, making their value even more acute in the inmate society.

Again, as with those inmates who had access to key resources, these types of inmates were typical manifestations of an adaptive culture which sought autonomy over the hegemonic role of the prison administration. Any attempt to restrict their activities made them more valuable in the illegal inmate social hierarchy, and it allowed them to extort scarce resources from other inmates in return for legal advice. As with the resource allocators, the restriction of their trade could produce deleterious effects in the social organization of prisoners.

Thus, there were two things which could occur if repressive measures were employed to control these inmates. First, by temporarily removing those individuals from the prison environment, you could create more power for those remaining who could provide the services. Second, you symbolically legitimize the role these

individuals play in the environment. As a result, the inmate body, on the whole, becomes less tractable and often identifies with these inmates.

Because of this dividing nature of correctional institutions, including HVMF, the value of information concerning inmate activity is paramount. This typically produced many questionable practices in an attempt to maintain control within the institution, in particular the recruitment of snitches. While denied vehemently by administrators at HVMF that snitches were being recruited, the fact of the matter was that information was crucial about inmate activity; somebody had to tell somebody. Volunteering information was widespread at HVMF, and administrators did nothing to discourage the perception that snitches were fairly common among the inmate population.

This activity of snitching more than any other in the facility produced and perpetuated the separation between the administration and inmates. It is a vicious cycle which is difficult to interrupt, particularly if unilateral control is sought by the administrative staff. In effect, to gain control one requires information; to gain information one needs people to talk; and once begun it is difficult to stop. To break into this cycle requires some form of collaboration among the groups. But, as currently constructed, HVMF exhibited much dissensus among the groups.

While deleterious in the long run, the institutional design did allow for a perverted sense of equilibrium to exist. By upsetting

this equilibrium, anarchy and a full scale riot could occur at HVMF. To comprehend this notion it is necessary to see how the seven types of power fit into a scenario of tenuous equilibrium among the groups, suggesting that if any power is severely truncated or removed, there will be disequilibrium aftershocks within the institutional environment. It will be put forth in a subsequent chapter that this equilibrium can still be maintained but not dominated by illegal kinds of power.

5. Power and Equilibrium in Prison Society

Equilibrium or stability within the prison setting at HVMF represents an understanding of the seven types of power interacting among the groups, and how a drastic rearrangement of key types of power would be a precursor to institutional stability. In addition, this research has shown how coercive mechanisms of control foster more erosion of power and diminution of authority among administrators. Figure 4.2 displays the types of power each group employed to gain compliance from both group members and non-group members. It is evident that the inmate organization has more types of power available to them. Their power is in direct proportion to the formal mechanisms of control exhibited by the prison structure. Because of coercive measures employed by prison officials, they have created a situation where prison equilibrium demands the development of these diverse forms of power among inmates.

More importantly, if administrators attempted to diffuse some of the key kinds of power among the inmate population, e.g., crack down totally on the drug market, harass writ writers, or transfer religious leaders, etc., they would cause this aberrant equilibrium to be upset. Because of this potentially volatile situation, administrators must be wary of upsetting this balance. Therefore, the old inmate adage that "inmates run the joint" is particularly relevant and true. They run the joint because of the diverse and yet anomalous types of power which were made available to them vis-a-vis the formal structure of the prison organization.

As evidenced in Figure 4.2, administrators are in a rather perilous position: they must be sensitive to the demands of the inmate social organization, while at the same time attempt to increase their relative power and the concomitant element of control through the diversification of their own power. Ironically, the development of more diverse power bases is structurally impossible for the administration at HVMF. Unless they are able to attract inmates through a more formalized reward structure, it will be difficult to control the institutional environment.

Furthermore, the separation and division was also evident when examining officer power. While not as diminished as administrative power, Figure 4.2 indicates that officer forms of power are not much better. In fact, much of their power was at the informal level,

Figure 4.2
TYPES OF SOCIAL BASES OF POWER BY GROUP

<u>Administration</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Inmates</u>
Coercive	Coercive	Coercive
Reward	Reward	Reward
Information	Reference	Legitimate
	Legitimate	Access to Resources
		Expert

particularly their use of reward power. A common complaint of officers was that they had no power; what they really meant was no coercive power. What they failed to realize is that the coercion is what separates them from the inmate body. In reality, they should attempt to develop more reward, referent, and legitimate form of power, but these types need to be more consensual and not accommodative in nature. While the tenuous symbiotic relationships are needed in maintaining a perverse prison equilibrium, they still serve as the demarcation line between officer and inmate, due in large part to an inflexible and coercive prison setting.

6. Conclusions

From the previous discussions, three conclusions can be drawn: First, inmate power at HVMF was much more diverse than either officer or administrative power. This was a result of functional adaptations

to the formal prison organization. In effect, it was quite true at HVMF, like other prisons across the country, inmates had the power and control the prison.

Second, an aberrant prison equilibrium was observable at HVMF, which provided control and stability to the institution while at the same time fostered further estrangement between inmates and officers and administrators. In addition, if administrators attempted to be more coercive in their dealings with inmates, they perpetuated the division and enhanced the further diversification of inmate power. This made the tractability of those individual inmates who were powerful in the inmate social system more problematic.

Third, because of this creation and furtherance of a false sense of equilibrium by the prison administration, it was difficult to inculcate upon inmates the value of conventional societal norms. They were, in effect, being taught the exact opposite: manipulation, deceit, and illegal activity were masqueraded as virtues in a world where honesty and fairness were virtually non-existent.

Endnotes - Chapter 4

¹Such was the case of the Alabama correctional system where Federal Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. ordered the Alabama correctional system to instill a classification scheme and alleviate the overcrowding in its prisons. This was met by stiff opposition, particularly then Governor George Wallace who perceived it as "coddling criminals." Furthermore, when Wallace was no longer governor, Judge Johnson put the entire Alabama Correctional system in receivership, under then Governor James, with full authority and responsibility to the judge.

²See Stastny, Charles, and Tyrnauer, Gabrielle, Who Rules the Joint: The Changing Political Culture of Maximum-Security Prisons in America (Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, and Toronto, Canada, 1982) for an examination of this topic in relation to the Walla Walla prison in Washington state.

³Marquette Branch Prison is the only comparable maximum-security prison in the state, with an average inmate population of around 900. Its conditions are much worse and it is situated in the upper peninsula of Michigan, where most inmates cannot get their friends and relatives to visit. Also, many black inmates disliked the Marquette environment because of the perceived racist attitude of the prison staff, particularly since most, if not all, were white and rural born. In contrast, the typical inmate at Marquette were black and from an urban environment. Hence, the difficulty in relating and communicating to one another is evident.

⁴HVMF is only 20 miles from the center of the Detroit area, where a majority of the inmates come from. For this reason, it was much easier for their friends and relatives to visit them, as opposed to traveling up to the Branch prison in Marquette, Michigan.

⁵"Hole-time" usually varies depending upon the nature of the offense and the history of violations the perpetrator has acquired. In addition, inmates can be held in detention immediately following the rule violation until a hearing date is set. So, in effect, administrators have full discretionary authority in deciding who remains in detention. Once adjudicated, then the remainder of hole time is determined, if any at all.

⁶By belongings I am referring to those amenities which help the inmate cope with incarceration: tobacco, writing and reading material, and other personal items or properties. The officers believed that this did not really make it a punishment unit; it was more attuned to a "baby-sitting service."

⁷Here I am referring to those administrators who served as housing unit managers and their assistants. There were three Resident Unit Managers (RUM) and five Assistant Resident Unit Managers (ARUM) located within the administrative hierarchy of HVMF. These administrators differed from the warden and his staff because they actually worked in the housing units and functioned as mediators between inmates and administration, similar to the role of counselors in many treatment-oriented facilities.

⁸Since the work assignments at HVMF were quite limited, the actual positions entailed many menial and often arduous work. For example, on one occasion I witnessed four inmates working in a grassy area of the institution digging ditches. When I asked them why they were doing such activity, one of them responded, "this is how I make my 86¢ a day."

⁹See Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-- Making Processes in Administrative Organization (Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., New York, Second Edition, 1957) for an analysis of how information is controlled in the decision-making process. Also, Arrow, Kenneth, "Organizations and Information," in The Limits of Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974).

¹⁰In this perspective, inmates are often viewed as the "enemy" by correctional administrators. It is because of this perception that information is so crucial and relevant in controlling the inmate population. Without information, administrative power would be significantly reduced.

¹¹It was common for inmates at HVMF to snitch out other inmates because of personal dislike, or because the inmate had some item that a particular snitch would want to obtain. For example, this was not any more true than in relation to drugs. It was common for inmates to reveal how snitches sent kites to the administration on someone because they wanted the guy to lose his supply of drugs. It seems jealousy and envy produced a lot of snitching which occurred at HVMF.

¹²I developed this term when I noticed how the formal "kite box" in Unit 3 was defaced and scribbled on it were the words "snitch box." In this case, a snitch kite is when an inmate reveals information to an administrator about the illegal activities of another inmate or group of inmates.

¹³This is a concept which literally means "divide and rule." As Stastny and Tyrnauer suggest, this is a common strategy among correctional administrators in our maximum-security prisons; the same holds true for HVMF.

¹⁴This rather inflammatory information was given by many inmates. The privileges they mentioned were: a transfer to a medium security penitentiary, green money, a work assignment, and more visits. If true, this could produce many problems within the institution, especially when this information spreads throughout the entire inmate world via the informal prison grapevine.

¹⁵Ironically, this individual was given the assignment of showing me around the prison on my first appearance. Later, inmates told me that they thought I was a Federal Investigator sent from Lansing to spy on the prison population. I was told that this was passed around because of my initial appearance with this individual. It did not dawn on me until later the precarious situation I was in, and how I had been lucky no one physically assaulted me during the research.

¹⁶While still somewhat true, there is still a misunderstanding of the nature and function of the correctional officer role. See Crouch, Ben, The Keepers: Prison Guards and Contemporary Corrections, (Charles Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1980).

¹⁷This was a common complaint among the officers interviewed. Most believed that the administration would listen to inmate demands, but they would not negotiate fairly with the officers' union. One officer stated it this way: "This administration does not have any understanding of modern management techniques. All they think is that they are in charge and we have to listen. It is sad that something has to happen before they will listen to us."

¹⁸The distinction between these two types of tickets will be examined in Chapter 5 when assaultive behavior is explored.

¹⁹It seems that officers rely on the issuance of formal tickets when it is serious enough that their superiors will find out. What was operating was the principle of C.Y.A. (cover your ass), where major tickets were typically written only when the violation was serious enough and deserved some type of formal attention.

²⁰Because of the plethora of lawsuits filed against correctional administrators, they have to be sensitive to inmate demands within reason. The point being that their concerns were so centered around inmate lawsuits that officers felt left out of the total picture, thereby disillusioning and alienating them from the central administration.

²¹These illegal activities ranged from smuggling in contraband to allowing certain sexual acts to occur. The argument is one of reciprocity, where officers allow and even encourage illegal activities to occur in return for order and control in the prison setting.

²²In particular, one officer referred to as "Idi Amin" by the inmates was continually being shifted from housing unit to housing unit because of his strict enforcement demeanor. Other officers requested periphery assignments (control center or gun tower) because they could not deal with the bargaining which occurred within the housing units between keeper and kept.

²³See Warwick, Donald P., A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1975) for an interesting analysis of how the State Department functions in relation to its subordinates.

²⁴Another frustrating item which concerned officers was the continual changes in policies and procedures. They could not keep up with the changes and this lead to further division between officers and inmates. In part, however, this may be due to the switch in administration which occurred while conducting this research. The new administration came in with their own personnel and differing methods of operating the institution. Obviously, this affected the front-line interactions of inmates and officers.

²⁵By "madness" I am referring to all the games that inmates play with each other, in particular, the continual displays of a "macho-image." As one inmate stated, "living in prison is nothing but psychological, and it can turn into madness if you allow these assholes (other inmates) to intimidate you." Also, this includes the con games, the gambling, and interludes with sex and dope.

²⁶It was common for officers at HVMF to show deference to the older and experienced convicts. On one occasion I observed how an older inmate was used by an officer to calm down some rather irate and disturbed younger inmates. The end result was positive, and the officer told me how he was glad this older inmate was there to assist him.

²⁷On April 30, 1982, a "disturbance" occurred in housing Unit 1, the punishment and segregation unit, where inmates destroyed close to \$50,000 in equipment, supplies, and the actual physical structure. While the cause of the disturbance is still quite uncertain, the point being made is that without the help of some key inmates the situation could have been much worse.

²⁸Officers at HVMF continually discussed the unsafe environment, and how they would do anything to get out of the housing unit if trouble erupted. It was my perception that many officers did not care about the majority of the inmates, and therefore, that is why they were obsessed with maintaining more direct control through coercive means.

29At the time of the opening of the institution, 68 percent of the officers or 115 of the 172 officers employed at HVMF were new to institutional corrections completely.

30While this may be true at HVMF, this could be a function of the relative newness of the prison facility. As the facility develops, many inmates felt that gangs would surface, even though they would be much smaller than some gangs in the other institutions around the state.

31One of the most revealing questions I asked was: "How does the administration reward positive behavior on the part of an inmate?" It was a consensus among the inmates that there were no rewards for inmates. In fact, many inmates expressed their vehemence toward the administration because of the lack of any formal reward mechanism.

32Initially, the institution was based on a behavior modification scheme, where inmates could move from housing unit to housing unit dependent upon their behavior. There were five housing units at HVMF with Units 1 and 2 being segregation and protection, and Units 3, 4 and 5 general population. However, the differences among the units were also relative to privileges and rights, with Unit 5 having the most and Unit 1 the least. When the new warden took office in February of 1983, he changed the system and made all the housing units the same, general population, except for Unit 1 which was to be segregation, protection, and detention cases. As far as I know, this system is still existing at HVMF.

33The Warden's Forum consisted of inmate representatives from all the housing units. They posed a series of questions to the warden once a month and he responded to them via the institutional newspaper--The Huron Valley Monitor. However, the point was that the Forum, according to the representatives, was ineffective and pretty superficial. Many inmates viewed it as a placation device and not a sincere attempt to listen to inmate demands.

34This religious group was originally recognized by the Department of Corrections but later it was denied the status of an official religion. The founder, leader and prophet was a resident of HVMF, and he was attempting to get official recognition at the time of this writing.

35The Christian denominations were predominantly white, while the Muslims were exclusively black. The Christian denominations, Catholic and Lutheran, were much fewer in number and less cohesive in comparison to the Muslim religions.

36This idea of religious groups serving as protection for their members seemed ubiquitous throughout the inmate population at HVMF. In fact, one religious leader was so powerful it was rumored that he had connections and influence in other prisons throughout the system. In short, no one "squeezed him" because he was so well respected throughout the correctional system.

37One member of the Moors explained how strict discipline was essential in the group. Each member had to pay fines or receive physical punishment if they did not follow the rules and regulations of the group, particularly if they did not show up for prayers and group meetings.

38This group was the Moors. When I inquired about attending one of their services, I was told that whites were not allowed at the prayers and/or meetings. Interestingly, they also have their own names which are determined by status. The Moors keep their last names, but a suffix was attached to denote a scholar or a warrior. The suffix "EL" referred to a scholar, whereas a "BEY" referred to a warrior. It was common in my research to be introduced to Moors by a recognition of the suffix attached to their last names.

39The administration was particularly wary of the influence of religious groups in the inmate population. One administrator relayed how the Moors had their annual feast and extorted money out of other inmates to hold the celebration, while at the same time provided protection to the inmates.

40One of the religious leaders was constantly spending time in Unit 1 while I was doing my research. The word out among the inmate population was that he was being harassed by the administration because of the power he wielded in the institution.

41Shaking down refers to a thorough search of an inmate. It also is made in reference to the inspection and searching of an inmate's cell. In fact, officers were required to shake down a certain number of individuals and their cells to ascertain whether or not contraband was being kept by the inmate. Ironically, because inmates were aware of this fact, it was common for them to "stash their stuff" in other areas, particularly the day rooms and the laundry room of their respective housing unit.

42The typical inmate group or clique usually only consisted of 3 or 4 inmates. It was very common at HVMF to see these little cliques moving around the day rooms, yard, and gymnasium. Irwin (1980) suggests that this is very common in today's prisons, particularly where there is a high level of alienation and fragmentation among inmates.

⁴³By "up front," I mean that payment was usually made after store orders were delivered to the unit. On many occasions, I observed inmates paying each other off with cigarettes after their deliveries from the store. At one particular time, I noticed an inmate receiving over five cartons of cigarettes as payment.

⁴⁴Because of the lack of many institutional jobs, there was not much money or capital in the prison. Inmates typically got paid less than a dollar a day for an entire day's work. Unless they had money coming in from the "outside," it was difficult to obtain amenities to cope with incarceration.

⁴⁵One inmate relayed how because of the lack of capital, some drug dealers wound up having all the money in the institution. Obviously, this created a situation similar to Feudalistic society, where the entrepreneurial class had much control over the behavior of serfs. The same was true at HVMF.

⁴⁶This credit accounting scheme ran on an order system, where inmates would order items from the store and their accounts credited. If they did not have sufficient funds, the items were not delivered. They were delivered in sealed paper bags to inmates when the units were locked down and count was being taken. In effect, inmates would not carry their items from the store to their cells; all purchased items were brought to them to prevent robberies and assaults from the store to the housing unit.

⁴⁷Because of the problems with the store, specifically the lack of items, the administration was thinking of switching to institutional money or "script" to be given to inmates. This did not occur because it was felt inmates would gamble and steal each other's script. So, in its place, the credit accounting system was maintained, but currently, inmates can pick up items at the store and take them back to their cells. The future events which may result from this new policy is only speculative at this time. However, an educated guess may be that strong-arming and robbery of items in transit from the store to the housing units are quite possible.

⁴⁸Hobbycraft refers to the use of hand tools in the making of products. It is considered a craftsmanship ability among inmates. Typical items made and sold are plant holders, wallets, belts, and clocks. These items are sold up front by the administration, with proceeds going to the individual inmate and the Inmate Benefit Fund.

⁴⁹For an interesting and provocative examination of this topic, see Ronald L. Goldfarb and Linda R. Singer, After Conviction, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), pp. 364-369.

⁵⁰These names refer to inmates who are particularly skillful in their comprehension of the law. These descriptive names were used in the early 1960's to describe imprisoned inmates who were successful in accessing the Federal Courts. See Krantz, Sheldon, The Law of Corrections and Prisoners' Rights: Cases and Materials (West Publishing Company, 1977) for an historical examination of this topic.

⁵¹The topic of inmate trials and retrials was very difficult to handle on two accounts. First, not being a lawyer, I was unable to help most inmates. Second, it was difficult to keep inmates off their cases during my discussions with them. I found the best strategy to prevent this kind of situation from developing was to be honest and up-front with inmates that my purpose was not to be their legal advisor. This proved to be successful with a number of inmates, and it was the strategy I employed after my first few months at the institution.

⁵²While administrators frowned upon the number of lawsuits filed by inmates, they might be more successful in reducing the number of suits, in the long run, by providing competent lawyers to inmates. This would provide access to the courts and at the same time erode the power of some of the more manipulative writ writers.

⁵³By older inmates, I am referring to those inmates who have done 15 to 20 years behind bars. They usually range from their late thirties to middle fifties in age.

⁵⁴This type of expert power usually refers to how the system works, particularly a knowledge of good and bad inmates, and how to survive in the prison system. However, this knowledge is short lived, especially after the first six months of incarceration, because the younger inmate does not need, nor is he attracted to the older inmate. In part, he has learned how to "do time" and does not need the assistance of the older inmate.

⁵⁵It was common for the older inmates to convey that they did not want any power in the system any longer. They "had their time" and now the young guys control everything. In effect, there was no desire on their part to be perceived as macho or tough. As far as they were concerned, it was all over. In part, institutional life had burned many of them out.

CHAPTER V

INMATES, OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATORS: FOCAL CONCERNS

The previous chapter analyzed the bases of social power among administrators, officers, and inmates. While attempting to assess the various power relations among the groups, it did not examine specific issues which may indicate relative stability or instability, of the institution. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to examine specific focal concerns -- contraband, race relations, institutional misconducts, and homosexuality -- and how they relate to institutional stability. These measures were chosen because past literature suggested that they were indicators of prison stability (Carroll, 1974). The analysis begins with an explanation of contraband, definition of contraband and types, accessibility to contraband, problems with contraband, and consistency of contraband flow.

1. Contraband

Contraband defined and types of contraband. Contraband in the prison environment can be thought of as being any unauthorized substances or materials possessed by a prisoner. Some common examples of contraband goods are weapons, drugs, or possession of any item or

product which belongs to another inmate. At HVMF contraband was defined relative to the seriousness of the item. For example, "possession of dangerous contraband" refers to weapons, explosives, acids, caustics, and any "critical" tool which may be dangerous and/or used to commit a violent act. On the other hand, contraband in general refers to the "possession or use of non-dangerous property which a resident has no authorization to have, where there is no suspicion of theft or fraud." Included in this definition is anything with someone else's name or number on it or excessive store items.

In addition, the Michigan Department of Corrections has a list of items which they define as general categories of acceptable property. Everything not on the list is considered, by definition, as contraband. These general categories are located in Appendix C.

The types of contraband at HVMF were relative to the demand of the inmate population; however, there were items which predominated within the inmate social organization. In particular, marijuana and spud-juice¹ existed as the most common items. It was an accepted fact among the groups that marijuana and spud-juice were just common elements which existed in all correctional institutions, and that if you attempted to eradicate these elements from the prisoners' world there would be many repercussions within the institutional environment.

It was a consensus among prisoners that violence and assaults would increase if the contraband system was curtailed. In fact, many officers agreed that a denial of these commodities to inmates would

cause more problems, specifically increased tension within the prison environment. Understanding the value of contraband is essential to maintaining a stable prison setting.

While the consumption of alcohol and marijuana was fairly common at HVMF,² the pivotal theoretical explanation of such behavior can be traced back to the formal prison structure, where because of the lack of many formal rewards and/or incentives, inmates developed their own system as a method of coping with incarceration. However, while these behaviors can be considered as structural adaptations on the part of inmates, they also represented an organizational control mechanism. A group of officers discussed the value of contraband, specifically marijuana in making their jobs easier. Officers described the role of marijuana in this fashion:

A: When these guys are high, I don't have to worry about them. They don't bother me or anyone else and I can control them much easier . . . It's a pain in the ass to always listen to their bitching. When they're high they usually stay in their cells and everything is fine. . . that makes my job much easier.

. . .

A: While dope causes a lot of problems . . . it still is good because I don't have to watch the guys all the time. Plus, they aren't hurting anyone but themselves. That's O.K. with me 'cause I get no problems from them.

. . .

A: Marijuana can cause some problems, especially fights and stabbings . . . but I'm telling you sometimes it's good because people are calmer when their stoned.

Accessibility to Contraband

The accessibility to contraband at HVMF was contingent upon the types and amounts of contraband which one desired. For example, it was a consensus among officers and inmates that dangerous contraband needed to be controlled and strictly monitored, each group believing that the introduction of an excessive number of knives (shanks) and/or other dangerous weapons produced more disorganization rather than comfort to the inmate social world.³ As one officer put it: "You've got to stop those shanks (knives) from being made. If you do that, you'll be in good shape running this place."

While dangerous contraband, such as weapons, were not as prevalent at HVMF, other types of contraband, especially marijuana, were more common. How this was brought into the institution was relayed by inmates:

A: With the officers.

I: Is that the most common way?

A: For quantities, yes. Just for some to get yourself right, you can get it when you're visiting and (?) it up and you know, bring it in.

I: Can an officer make a lot of money doing that?

A: Yeah, of course.

Since the topic of contraband markets was a sensitive area, it was difficult to discern exact figures relating to amounts and types of contraband. However, it was a consensus among inmates that a sufficient amount of contraband was being brought into the institution

by officers. Moreover, the type of contraband was in most cases a drug, specifically marijuana. By granting this item, select officers provided some inmates with commodities which they sold or bartered to other inmates. In turn, officers received a sense of control from these prisoners and it enabled them to function smoothly within the prison setting. Specifically, key inmates provided officers with order in the institution in return for the contraband items.

In addition, many inmates suggested that there was no risk to this type of business, since many officers understood the value of contraband to the environment. Also, the actual importation of contraband was done only in small amounts. In effect, officers were not going to bring in much contraband if it was going to raise the suspicions of superiors.

Typically, the officer who was new to the system and did not understand the many problems associated with such an activity was involved in contraband smuggling. Experienced officers described smuggling of contraband in this fashion:

A: Them young guys always get caught bringing in dope. . . . They usually got a lot of problems outside and they think that bringing in dope can solve their problems. But the real problem happens when them inmates blackmail those young guys . . . once your hooked by an inmate, he can use you until he is finished with you . . . then he blows the whistle on you. . . . You just can't trust any of these assholes. They'll screw you everytime, and until they get everything out of you.

. . .

A: These young guys (officers) are the dummies. . . . They let these inmates fool them that contraband is good for the place. Shit, once they are through using the asshole, they throw them to them administrators . . . then the administrators fire their asses.

While it was true that officers did bring in milder forms of contraband into the facility, this activity was not restricted to officers. In fact, it was common to hear inmates describe their "stuff" as coming in through their visits.

A: OK, my experience from what I can see, Ok like people come in, and people from the outside, you know, they find it all over, you know. So, for instance like a woman, you know, she come in and she got the stuff on her--actually, there's two places they could put it, that's . . . All right, one, it could go, put it in her vagina or they can put it in her rectum, or, even in her brassiere, you know? But most of this come in through the body contact, you know.

. . .

A: A lot of officers are tight . . . you can't get shit from them, so you get your stuff brought in by visits. Them officers are so concerned about counting heads at visits, they don't see the shit coming in.

. . .

A: It's not like in some other joints . . . this place is smaller but you still can get your drugs in. . . . Why worry about it. It only makes their job hard to do.

So, drugs were made accessible to inmates through officers and visits. Once in the institution, these drugs could be consumed or sold to people for favors, something which was described earlier as a form of resource power. Because of the demands for these resources, they attained a very high value among the inmate population. In fact,

as one inmate stated to me, "Money is power in here; if you have drugs, you have money and power." Again, the demand was relative to the deprivations experienced by the inmate population.

Moreover, these drugs were only accessible to those who were able to pay for them; no money -- no services. Furthermore, if payment could not be done through money, other avenues were resorted to in an attempt to pay back the suppliers. For example, cigarettes were thought of as a common exchange item within the institution. This type of payment was also evidenced in the gambling debts incurred by inmates. On one occasion, I witnessed an inmate paying his gambling debt to another inmate with cartons of cigarettes.⁴

In effect, drugs and other forms of "soft"⁵ contraband were accessible to the inmate at HVMF if he was able to pay for the product or service. It was when the demand for such products was high and there were no means accessible to gain them that problem areas developed within the inmate population.

Specifically, inmates experienced a form of strain when commodities were not obtainable. As a result, the inmate attempted to cope through various exchange relationships with officers, something examined earlier as a form of accommodation between keeper and kept. It was when the strain became unbearable that problems occurred within the environment.

Problems with Contraband

Because the institutional-structural makeup of the prison organization did not supply a sufficient number of legitimate

opportunities, inmates were left with their own methods of coping with incarceration. In response to this condition, some inmates were able to live relatively well in relation to other inmates, in large part due to their ability to access and distribute key items, most considered contraband, to the inmate population. However, while marijuana provided an inmate with the ability to cope with his incarceration, it did cause problems within the prison environment. For example, when this topic was discussed with a group of inmates, one voiced the opinion of the group when he stated: ". . . weed causes tension in prison. I believe that the institution, when it's necessary to have tension, extreme, or a disturbance, will bring weed into the institution . . . weed causes all kinds of problems."

Because of the overwhelming demand for this type of contraband, inmates resorted to violence, theft, and all forms of manipulation. In fact, the "hustle"⁶ for contraband items was so great that inmates were continually being swindled by each other in order to gain status and prestige within the loosely constructed inmate hierarchy.⁷ In short, the hustling of inmates by inmates created a crime rate within the institutional structure, including robberies, assaults, knifings, and theft. In addition, the commodities, monies, and services available at HVMF were severely limited as compared to other institutions in the system. As a result, the deprivational experience of the average inmate was much more intense and he was prone to illegal activities.

This condition was fostered by an environmental structure which attempted to control contraband in a formal sense, while at the same time provided no means to effectively deal with the frustrations and anxieties of the inmate population. The product of this kind of administrative arrangement is simple to predict: more criminal activity on the part of inmates as a mechanism of innovation in coping with the pains of imprisonment.

Contraband can produce many problems within the prison setting; however, these problems must be considered in light of the organizational structure of the institution. At HVMF, like other correctional institutions throughout the country, contraband markets served the purpose of providing inmates with goods and services which were denied them because of their incarceration. Knowing that the formal structure was going to provide them with a limited number of items, inmates developed their own scheme of access and distribution of goods and services, which by definition is contraband. This, in turn, created a situation where the inmate demand could not be met when formal control mechanisms worked well by the informal and illegal distribution of contraband. The inevitable consequence was violence and theft among inmates for these valued resources. Also, the distributors of these resources were placed into powerful positions, resulting largely from their ability to access the contraband through officer complicity and/or visitor involvement.

At HVMF both officers and visitors were considered by a majority of the inmate population as the avenues of access, with some inmates and officers expressing the fact that some contraband, specifically marijuana, stabilized the prison environment and made institutional life more bearable for both inmates and officers. What is being suggested is that while there were problems with contraband, in the form of assaults and violence, the long-term effect was one of stabilization of the prison setting.

Stability of Contraband Flow and Institutional Control

As a form of power, then, those inmates and some officers who were able to provide key resources to inmates were able to exercise power at HVMF. Because of the intense demand for some of the contraband products, particularly marijuana and spud-juice, inmates developed illegitimate structures and avenues of access which helped them with their incarceration. The key inmate figures who were able to control these contraband markets provided a sense of stability to the prison environment. By providing and monitoring the flow of contraband, both inmates and officers were able to appease a large portion of the inmate population, making them more tractable in the long run.

The "corruption of authority"⁸ as suggested by the literature was a necessary part of the structure at HVMF. In response to the formal prison hierarchy, the accessibility, availability, and distribution of some contraband was necessary and essential to prison equilibrium. In short, the prison's formal structure would crumble if not supported by the illegal sector or the contraband system.

In turn, the informal organization of inmates which supported the contraband markets provided needed stability to the environment. Therefore, the informal system enabled the formal structure to stand. Ironically, contraband markets created and perpetuated the current organizational structure at HVMF. If, for example, administrators attempted to clamp down on the contraband markets, they would receive negative feedback from a good portion of the inmate population. In turn, the informal accommodative relationships between prisoner and officer would be in question, something which cannot occur if officers and administrators seek control over the prison environment.

Since contraband has value in the institution, it was essential that the amount be controlled. If too much contraband was circulated within the inmate environment, many more inmates would attempt to enter the market as dealers. With this event, however, there would be an increase in competition among suppliers. Typically, within prison settings this competition is resolved through physical force, specifically acts of violence among competitors (Kalinich, 1980).

2. Race Relations

Carroll (1974) has suggested that within a punitive custodial institution the idea of race relations typically loses its significance when the deprivations of inmates are so great that cohesion is necessary for institutional survival. In short, inmates require group solidarity when the prison experience affects them equally. On the other hand, with the rise of the civil rights

movement and the identification among black inmates with black nationalism and equality before the law, the typically situated inmate society began to break down, with blacks identifying with a black identity exterior to the prison and often segregating themselves from the old, white power structure within the prison environment. This, in turn, produced a disparate number of groups and gangs within the prison setting; these groups often attracted members who were of the same race and socio-economic status and who could identify with the cultural values of the group.⁹

The long-term effect was that differing gangs competed for control and power within the institutional setting, causing many problems and conflicts motivated from a racial perspective. In effect, the 60's saw the more culturally aware and ethnic oriented individual coming into the penitentiary, breaking down the traditionally white dominated con structure. In addition, black inmates attempted to over-throw this traditional model of inmate organization, one that had been white oriented and controlled, through violence and fear. As Irwin (1980) states this became more of a social reality for blacks in the 60's: "As black prisoners developed their new identities, experienced new levels of rage, and steadily asserted themselves more and more in the prison public life, racial hostilities and eventually racial violence increased."

Organizationally, with the influx of more "humanitarian reforms" in the prison environment and the group identification of black

inmates with their own cultural values, the prison environment became a place where group solidarity was no longer needed; specifically, if the deprivations experienced by inmates became less severe as a group, they no longer relied on the traditionally white con-power structure. The prison evolved into a conglomeration of smaller groups, each oriented toward the accomplishment of their own objectives and goals. In short, the prison environment became more fragmented.

With this fragmentation of the prison environment came the importance of relationships and arrangements among the competing groups, often structured along racial lines. Specifically, blacks developed their own subgroup structure, as well as whites and Mexican-American groups.¹⁰ Furthermore, the focus became more revolved around the interactions these groups had with each other in maintaining the prisoner world; also, these diverse groups tended to foster separatism and alienation from the old convict code and each developed its own norms and rules regarding group behavior in relation to both group members and non-members. What became problematic was the relationships these groups had in the organization of the contemporary prisoner society.

What is important is the type of race relations between the competing groups and how they functioned within the correctional environment. However, of greater significance, theoretically, is the relevancy of deprivation as a stimulant of race as a key variable in understanding prisoner organization. Carroll states:

Thus, while under conditions of high deprivation and control, race may be of minimal significance within the prison; as deprivation and control are decreased, race is likely to assume greater social significance. Today, as a result of the coincidence of humanitarian reforms within prisons and racial-ethnic social movements outside the prison, the structure of social relationships within prisons is increasingly taking on the character of race relations.

In essence, race relations become an important topic in understanding the prisoner world and prison organization. By exploring the interaction of the races, one is able to construct an understanding of how inmates cope and survive within the prison setting.

Race relations at HVMF had a special character. Within the institutional environment, groups were identifiable. For example, many of the religious groups at HVMF were divided along racial lines, with the Muslims being exclusively black and the Christian denominations predominantly white. These black religious groups, all being different variants of the Islam religion, exemplified the black movement of the 60's and the identification of these groups with black ideas, values and norms. Many Muslims relayed the importance of the black message as expressed through the Islamic religion:

A: Islam is the religion of truth . . . The Europeans (whites) don't have no true religion. Their religion is based on hate and suppression of the black people . . . With Islam black people can identify with themselves and the true creator, Allah.

. . .

A: Us blacks need the truth of Islam to keep up going in this place. . . . We know that some day the truth will come out about the true Allah and his message for blacks.

. . .

A: There is no true religion for blacks but Islam . . . through our Islamic brothers, we unite as one against the whites. . . . We need this kind of thing because many whites don't give us anything. We don't hate whites, we just don't trust them.

Because of the smallness of the institution, the Muslims were the most identifiable groups within the prison setting.¹¹ While they were noticeable as a group because of their religious beliefs and identification with black separatism, they were also viewed as very powerful vis-a-vis the white groups in the institution. In fact, the only white group that was identifiable at HVMF was the "bikers."¹² However, these bikers were not really a group or gang in the sense that they were organized and devoted to any cause. On the contrary, they were of small numbers and usually only congregated when they ate in the dining hall (see figure 4.1).


Observations throughout the institution indicated that many inmates tended to associate with only a few select individuals and that the group structure of the prison was based on a loosely organized series of cliques or groups largely divided along racial lines.

Social Location of Racial Groups

Figure 5.1 portrays the social location of prisoners within the dayrooms of one of the housing units. The drawing indicates the segregation of inmates. These dayrooms were designed for different

FIGURE 5.1

SEGREGATION OF BLACK AND WHITE PRISONERS IN
HOUSING UNIT DAYROOMS



- - Black Prisoners
- - White Prisoners
- e - Officers

activities. Within the active dayroom there was a television and pool table. In some housing units, there was also a ping pong table. The passive dayroom was used by inmates for writing, reading, playing cards, and general relaxation. Typically, black inmates congregated in the active dayroom, while white inmates situated themselves in the passive dayroom. Interestingly enough, this was a very common occurrence at HVMF.

The pivotal issue is whether the segregation was voluntarily constructed or based on some type of racial hatred between blacks and whites. One black inmate suggested that these areas were "territories" for each racial group to locate and rap about items which they had in common with each other. When asked could a white inmate go into the active dayroom and demand that he be allowed to play pool, a black inmate stated that it would never happen. He responded: "If a dumb white boy tried that, then he better be ready to throw down."¹³

What this inmate felt was that black prisoners did not particularly hate or dislike white inmates, but they did have areas which white inmates had to respect. In essence, there were unwritten rules about how whites and blacks were to interact with each other; some behaviors were just not tolerated and inmates respected this type of arrangement:

A: No black hates whites . . . it's just that we don't get along together totally. They do their thing and I'll do mine. . . . I think a lot of guys feel this way.

. . .

A: Some guys (blacks) don't like the whites because they think they oppressed them. . . . I don't know if that is true, but it is hard because we are so different. . . . I figure if a man gives you respect, I don't care what color he is.

. . .

A: Them boots (blacks) think they own this place . . . always crying to the man . . . but I'll tell you I've got my space and they better respect it. I respect any man who doesn't shit on me. . . . They leave me alone and I'll leave them alone.

. . .


A: It's common in prison for blacks and whites to separate. . . . We do our thing and they do theirs. That way no problems arise. . . . I know it's better for the races to be divided and each go its own way. Any other way and blacks are going to fuck it up for all of us.

This separation of blacks and whites was also evidenced in the institutional school. Figure 5.2 depicts the self-imposed segregation which black and white inmates had upon themselves.

What is suggested, however, is that the deprivation is high at HVMF, but that the separation of blacks and whites is not explained through the rhetoric of black nationalism and a rising black identity, along with a hatred on the part of whites toward blacks. Blacks and whites did not particularly hate each other¹⁴ -- they just had nothing in common. This lack of commonality between the groups fostered divisions, and these divisions lead black and white inmates to cope with their incarceration in voluntary segregation.

FIGURE 5.2

SEGREGATION OF BLACK AND WHITE PRISONERS IN INSTITUTIONAL SCHOOL



This state of affairs was in flux contingent upon how the degree of deprivation affected those elements which were common to both racial groups.

Problems Between the Races: Unifying and Segregating Themes

In regard to race relations and racial tension, it appeared that relations between blacks and whites was quite good at HVMF compared to other institutions in the state.¹⁵ One particular incident an inmate conveyed demonstrated the importance of recognizing the informal, voluntary segregation of the races:

I: Would it be common to see blacks and whites socializing in this institution, in the same dayroom, yard time?

A: Socializing, no. General conversation or something like that, yeah.

I: Would they be frowned upon . . . ?

A: If I would spend a lot of time with either a group or an individual black, some people around here would start to wonder what was up.

I: Because they'd think what, you're a sissy?

A: That, or they're using me or something . . . then they would know something was up.

I: If a black hung around with a lot of whites, would the black also have the same thing?

A: Yeah.

I: And that's just been something that's always been in the institutions, it's not something that, it's a very common thing, that idea of separation.

A: I think there will always be, but it's getting to be, there's no real tight tension here, where you have to worry about a race riot or a racial gang tryin' to move in and beat somebody up and take somebody's property. Not because a black or a white gang couldn't if they wanted to. There are pretty solid people here, as far as getting together. I had problems with one guy one time I got in a fight with. He used come out here and he was a loud-mouth black. And they wanted to hassle because I was a young white guy. That went on for about 2 weeks, and finally I cornered him and we almost fought till he backed down. But he had brought 6 blacks with him and I had brought 6 whites. . . . Most of the blacks had realized that . . . was getting . . . he was just blowing hot air, they just, they didn't even want to talk to him anymore. The same with the whites, they kind of uplifted me, you know.

I: . . . start bullying . . .

A: Right, but I'm sayin' . . . racial is, it could have been . . . me and him. 'Cause that's where I . . . look like he came back with 6 of his brothers and said, OK now, let's go an have a free for all. So I . . . my own friends, I said let's me and you go back there. And the blacks and whites are pretty much together on it, because it was another black that brought up the idea--you two go back there alone and settle this thing out.

I: We don't need . . .

A: Right, we will be here if somebody else jumps in. If something happens that you need us.

I: In other words, we don't want to get involved?

A: Right, and . . . didn't, you know, he wasn't thinking . . . that's why he went and got 'em. But generally there's not much racial, there is individual racial problems.

While not totally accepting of each other as groups, black and white inmates at HVMF voluntarily segregated themselves because they recognized the differences between themselves and each group did not

desire tension in the prison environment. If problems did arise between an individual black inmate and a white prisoner, this was usually settled by the two disputants. However, if the conflict escalated, some groups did step into the situation. Because blacks outnumbered whites in the institution,¹⁶ it was common for inmates to reveal how one religious group (Moors) scared off the whites:

I: Is there racial tension here?

A: No, there ain't no racial tension here, not between, there's no conflict between the brothers, man, here. Because, I don't know, there's very few of them here, there's not too many whites here, the Moors run them out. . . .

. . .

A: Them Moors got lots of power. . . . None of them whites would fuck with them. They kill you, especially if you're white and you're running some bullshit on them.

. . .

A: The Moors are the group that keep the power against the whites . . . They know that no whites is going to fuck with them because the mean business . . . whites generally stay away from them.

In essence, because of the predominance of black prisoners within the inmate social system, white inmates had very little coercive power over their non-white counterparts. In addition, black inmates were able to gain compliance through the referent power they developed within their religious groups. However, while segregated voluntarily, the inmate organization was able to solidify when an issue arose which affected them collectively. One of the issues which arose which

solidified the inmate polity was the organization and operation of the prisoner store.

Because merchandise and commercial products are essential in the adaptation to the prison environment, it is paramount that these products be distributed to inmates on a regular basis. Many inmates complained about how the store was poorly run and lacked the necessary articles which inmates required to cope with incarceration. Articles like soap, toothpaste, deodorant, candy, cigarettes are essential to a menial existence of any prisoner, regardless of his racial background. Because of the perceived inadequacies of the store operation, inmates, both black and white, protested vehemently to the prison administration that the operation needed to be altered. Recognizing the many problems with the store operation, the warden organized it differently and promised the inmate body that a reorganization would occur in the system.¹⁷

What was important about this event was that it solidified the diverse inmate groups, usually divided along racial lines, into a cohesively structured group with identifiable demands and objectives. This was something which the administration could not neglect in the maintenance of the entire organization. In effect, race relations as a significant topic within the institutional environment loses its importance when other pressing demands face the inmate polity, specifically issues which affect the level of deprivation inmates experience. Consequently, race relations have an impact on the level

of power and control certain groups have within the prison setting. Nevertheless, this issue may become secondary as other primary concerns face the entire inmate organization.

Race Relations: Affect on Power and Control

Knowing that black inmates outnumbered white prisoners at HVMF created a situation where influential blacks were able to gain conformity from many other black inmates. Noticeably, the power of the black religious groups was high, with referent type power being the predominant method of control. The power of influential black inmates within the religious groups was decreased when all inmates were experiencing intense repression and/or deprivation. The resulting situation was one where inmates organized to voice their opposition to particular conditions which they found reprehensible.

Until the situation was altered, the inmate society was tightly bound. When finally rectified, inmates fell back into their old social arrangements, where racial division existed and voluntary segregation was tacitly encouraged. Therefore, as a method of control, administrators attempted to diffuse the referent power of the religious groups and their leaders through the creation of a common problem which all inmates could identify.¹⁸ Conversely, they attempted to break up the inmate organization through the perpetuation of divisions between the races. This would keep the inmate organization fragmented and much easier to control.

The latter interpretation is more probable since the former would create a more organized and unified group of prisoners. Therefore, it would behoove them to divide the inmate organization:

I: Well, how about things like inmate groups--are there inmate groups in here? And if there are, are they powerful . . .

A: Well, yeah. The Moslems, that's one group, and you have the . . . that's another group.

I: Are they powerful?

A: Well the administration don't like groups like that.

I: Why's that?

A: Well, they're all together, see, and when you have a together group . . . There's . . . because they get 70 or 80 guys in this group, and you really do something . . . because there's so many guys, so they don't really like that. They usually try transfer Moslems and Moors to other institutions because they get too big.

. . .

A: None of them administrators like these religious groups. . . . They always try to break them up because it is easy for them. . . . Whenever you got a group in prison, administrators are afraid, so what they do is break them up and then they can control these others because most are dumb.

. . .

A: Administrators never want to see inmates strong . . . that just creates a lot of shit for them. . . . If inmates get too much power, then officers and administrators get worried. What they do is try to split everyone up.

This further alienated the groups from not only each other but also the administration.

Concomitantly, it created a situation where some inmates, particularly black religious leaders, developed more power, referent in nature, and opposed the institutional hierarchy. Nevertheless, this could be controlled much easier through transfer of powerful inmates rather than the subjugation of the entire inmate population to have repressive tactics.¹⁹ In this light, race relations took on a new dimension. The old adage "United we stand, divided we fall," was significant within the prison setting.

3. Institutional Misconducts

Misconducts defined and numbers and types. When discussing the element of control within a correctional environment, nothing is more problematic than the notions of violence and disruptive behavior. In fact, within HVMF, the central concern of many officers and administrators was that nothing would "jump off,"²⁰ or no displays of violence would occur. If something did occur, it was the responsibility of the administration to handle such behavior in a procedurally fair manner. In addition, it was important to prison administrators, officers, and inmates that rule violations were clearly defined beforehand and that inmates were aware of what was and was not acceptable behavior. This was done at HVMF through the distinction of major and minor misconducts.

Appendices D and E distinguish major and minor misconducts, along with common examples of the types of incidents which refer to the violations.²¹ In addition, the offenses are also defined relative to whether or not they are "bondable" or "nonbondable." The former is when the inmate may be "free" within the institution until his formal hearing, while nonbondable refers to confinement in segregation or on "toplock"²² until the formal hearing. The later charges are also shown within Appendix D as asterisk (*) charges.

In brief, there are twenty-four major misconduct rule violations and eleven minor misconducts. However, many of these misconducts are intended to be broadly or ambiguously defined; in effect, allowing for much discretionary authority on the part of the issuing officer. For example, Disobeying a Direct Order (020) is defined as a "refusal or failure to follow a valid, reasonable order." An example of this would be a refusal to submit to a shakedown. While this is a reasonable order, other behaviors may be more problematic, such as refusing to get a cup of coffee for an officer.²³ The point is that, as with police officer discretion, it is broadly interpreted to include a wide variety of behaviors and activities on the part of an inmate.

The end result was that officers typically expressed any behavior on the part of the inmate under the umbrella of a major or minor misconduct violation. This perpetuated an atmosphere of regimentation within the prison setting. However, as indicated previously, many

officers at HVMF did not exercise this right stringently, partly because of the long-term alienation effects between officer and inmates. Also, officers found the system a "sham" and felt other members of the organization did not effectively enforce the rules when they were required by policy.²⁴

Table 5.1 shows the number of misconducts written by offense. This table reflects a compilation of numbers of misconducts, both major and minor, from January 1983 through April 1983.²⁵ Table 5.1 reflects many important points. First, the total number of misconducts is 511, with 62% (315) of those being major rule violations as opposed to 38% (196) minor misconducts. This indicates that a majority of the tickets written were major violations, suggesting that if officers at HVMF were going to write a ticket it would, in most part, be for the more serious rule violations.

Second, of those serious or major rule violations, the three most frequent misconducts written were Disobeying a Direct Order (18%), Assault and Battery (6%) and Substance Abuse (6%). Furthermore, it must be noted that other behaviors were close in their frequency of occurrence, such as Insolence (5%) and Out of Place (5%). What is striking about these figures, particularly the Disobeying a Direct Order percentage, is how they represent the most arbitrary rule definition. As suggested earlier, the Disobeying a Direct Order rule could encompass a variety of behaviors, and the resulting written

ticket may reflect more the behavior of the individual officer rather than the targeted inmate.

In fact, the relative frequency of this rule violation suggests that if officers were going to write an inmate up for a violation this one was employed more so than any other, in part due to the ambiguity of the defined rule and also relative to the success of other methods of control. It was mentioned in a previous chapter how the officer role at HVMF was not only precarious but also difficult and frustrating. In addition, it was suggested that because of the alienation and dissatisfaction with the prison administration, officers were required to partake in many informal and symbiotic relationships with inmates, promoting and maintaining a prison equilibrium predicated on informality.

As a result, many of the formal operations internal to the prison setting, such as written rule violations were avoided by many of the officers, except those which could be employed to get recalcitrant inmates out of the housing unit. In this instance, the disobeying a direct order rule was employed when officers felt that informality had failed:

A: What you do is squeeze the assholes who are giving you trouble and be flexible with those who go along with the game plan You squeeze them because you want to get them out of your hair. Let someone else deal with them. This is typical of a lot of officers in this place.

. . .

TABLE 5.1

PERCENTAGE OF MISCONDUCTS^a BY TYPE OF OFFENSE

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Escape	(0)
Felony	*	(2)
Homicide		(0)
Assault and Battery	6%	(29)
Threatening Behavior	4%	(20)
Sexual Assault	*	(2)
Fighting	2%	(10)
Disobeying a Direct Order	18%	(94)
Possession of Forged Document	*	(1)
Incite to Riot		(0)
Interference w/Administration of Rules		(0)
Bribery of Employee		(0)
Insolence	5%	(28)
Destruction/Misuse of State Property	4%	(19)
Failure to Maintain Employment		(0)
Possession of Dangerous Contraband	3%	(15)
Possession of Money	*	(1)
Creating a Disturbance	4%	(20)
Sexual Misconduct	1%	(7)
Substance Abuse	6%	(29)
Unauthorized Occupation of a Cell/Room	2%	(9)
Out of Place	5%	(25)
Theft	*	(1)
Gambling	*	(3)
Minor Misconducts	38%	(196)
Total	100%	(511)

^aMajor misconducts represent 62% (315) of the distribution.

*These totaled together make up the remaining 2 percent of the distribution.

A: Writing tickets is worthless unless you can prove the violation . . . so you only write one when you think it will be found guilty.

. . .

A: You got to write tickets on some stuff, but other stuff you let slide because you know it ain't going to stick anyone. . . . I only write when I have to . . . anything else is just bullshit.

. . .

A: Tickets are O.K. for major stuff, but the minor junk you let go because its just bullshit. . . . If you can't clear it with a guy in another way, then you've lost the guy . . . some guys need tickets but most don't.

. . .

A: Nobody gives a shit about tickets, even the supervisors, so why should I write them. . . . I've been here since this place opened and I only wrote about ten tickets . . . you don't need them if you're good.

In effect, officers selectively enforced and applied those rules which allowed them to control the prison environment, choosing specific rules which were inherently nebulous in the enforcement procedure. Also, because some of the rules were written so vaguely, many inmate activities and/or behaviors were able to be categorized within some type of rule violation.

While most officers were of the perception that many inmates were "getting off" the charges, or that the final disposition was resolved in favor of the inmate, the data indicated something quite different. Table 5.2 shows that the percentage of guilty findings in relation to the number of formal charges was quite high, with 89% of the charges

in major violations being found guilty and 99% of the minor misconducts being adjudicated guilty.

Furthermore, a chi-square analysis of this data revealed an association between the type of misconduct and the final disposition, showing the association to be significant at the .001 level. However, further analysis revealed that the relationship between type of misconduct and the final disposition was weak (.16), suggesting that regardless of the type of misconduct there was still going to be a greater percentage of guilty findings. From this data, one can suggest two possible interpretations.

First, a majority of the inmates who were charged were guilty of the specific violations. This does not seem reasonable considering the broadly defined character of the violations. In brief, because the rules were inherently nebulous, it would be difficult to conclude that a majority of the inmates were guilty of the charged offenses. A second interpretation is more plausible in this discussion. This view holds that the formal charging procedure of the officers reflected only those behaviors which they considered convictable.

Therefore, officers at HVMF only wrote a ticket on a prisoner if he/she felt there was a good probability that the perpetrator would be found guilty. Following this line of reasoning is consistent with the data, and it suggests that most rule violations on the part of inmates were handled informally, supporting the informal structure at HVMF.

TABLE 5.2
PERCENTAGE OF MISCONDUCTS BY TYPE AND FINAL DISPOSITION

	<u>Minor</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Total</u>
Not guilty	1% (4)	11% (34)	7% (38)
Guilty	<u>99% (197)</u>	<u>89% (276)</u>	<u>93% (473)</u>
	100% (201)	100% (310)	100% (511)

$\chi^2 = 14.271$ with 1 df; significance = .001

$\phi = .167$

More importantly, this degree of informality and rule enforcement were relative to the particular area within the institution.

One would expect there would be varying degrees of both informality and formality of rule enforcement contingent upon the social location of the incident. For example, Housing units 1 and 2 were the detention, segregation and protection units, and one would expect more stringent and formal rule enforcement within these units rather than the other housing areas. On the whole, these individuals required more supervision and were made more tractable through the limitation of institutional privileges and the restriction on movement. As a result, one would expect more misconducts and disruptive behaviors to occur, or at least be observed, within those areas or locations where control was more formalized.

Social Location and Etiology of Misconducts

Table 5.3 indicates the percentage of misconducts by type and social location. The data indicate that Major Misconducts were the most prevalent, 315 out of a possible 511 or 62% of all misconducts. Furthermore, 43% of the major misconducts were written in the detention, segregation, and protection areas, with 31% in general population locations and 26% in other areas, respectively. On the other hand, a sizeable percentage of the Minor Misconducts were written in the general population locations (60%), with other areas (22%) following and Detention, Segregation, and Protection areas showing the lowest percentage (18%). Also, when examining the percentage totals, the highest percentage exists in the general population category (42%), followed by the Detention, Segregation, and protection areas (34%) and the least percentage in the category labeled other areas (24%).

The major misconducts tended to be located in the Detention, Segregation, and Protection locations, offering three possible explanations to the data. First, one would expect more major tickets being written in these areas because of the problematic nature of these inmates.

On the other hand, the high percentage of Major Misconducts within these locations may be indicative of a particular enforcement pattern on the part of officers. Specifically, major misconducts were more a function of the officer and his/her perception of the inmate. The

TABLE 5.3

PERCENTAGE OF MISCONDUCTS BY TYPE AND SOCIAL LOCATION

	<u>Minor</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Total</u>
^a Detention, Segregation, & Protection	18% (36)	43% (136)	34% (172)
^b General Population	60% (118)	31% (97)	42% (215)
^c Other Areas	<u>22% (42)</u>	<u>26% (82)</u>	<u>24% (124)</u>
	100% (196)	100% (315)	100% (511)

$\chi^2 = 47.95$, with 2 df; significance = .001

$v = .30$.

^aThese locations were housing Units 1 and 2 in the institution. They were designated as detention, segregation, and protection units by the institution.

^bGeneral population consists of Units 3, 4, 5. This, too, is an institutional definition of general population.

^cThese areas refer to the school, food service, yard, infirmary, control center, visiting area, and gymnasium.

major misconduct represented more the officer's beliefs and attitudes relative to the type of inmate, and as a result, the officer attempted to be more observant of rule violations, particularly those defined as major. Also, these units were designed to make inmates more tractable and rule violations, therefore, become necessary products of intensive control strategies and procedures.

Thus, major misconducts in these specific locations represented the interpretation of the rules more stringently, allowing behavior which may be a minor violation to become major. For example, officers within the detention, segregation, and protection areas may view marijuana smoking as a major misconduct (substance abuse), while officers in the general population areas may view the same offense as a minor rule violation (contraband). It would be expected that the specific goals of the detention, segregation, and protection areas were control and stringent rule application; therefore, many violations became indicative of specific interpretations of the rules.

This is also borne out when one examines the percentage of Minor Misconducts. Sixty percent of all minor misconducts occurred within the general population areas, and of the total misconducts, 42% were found in these areas. The data suggest that in relation to major and minor misconducts, the bulk of major rule violations resided in the detention, segregation, and protection areas, while a significant percentage of minor misconducts were located in the general population areas.

Moreover, the chi-square analysis revealed an association between the type of misconduct and these specific institutional locations, with the level of association being significant at the .001 level. In addition, the Cramer's V indicated that while the measure of association is .30, the actual variance being explained is only 9%. Therefore, one can conclude that there was a connection between the type of misconduct and the various social locations within the institution. However, it should be noted that the association was relatively weak, as other factors may intervene in this relationship.

Frequency of Assaults and Controlling Disruptive Behavior

Table 5.1 indicates that 6% of all major misconducts written were for assault and battery. While assaults represent a rather low percentage in terms of the total picture, they still are indicators of tension within the prison setting, making them good indicators of prison stability and equilibrium. More importantly, HVMF staff have this as one of their top priorities: the prevention and control of violent behavior on the part of inmates.

While officers perceived that inmates could take over the prison any time they desired,²⁶ the reasons for violence and disruptive behavior could be traced to specific behaviors on the part of other inmates and staff:

A: People get attacked and stuck for a lot of reasons. . . . The most common are someone owing money to someone, people have contracts on others, or just one guy is jealous because his sissy is going to someone else. . . . All sorts of bullshit can get you assaulted.

. . .

A: Some of these officers get stuck because they give inmates very little respect. . . . I'm telling you the ones that get stabbed deserve it.

. . .

A: Inmates get stabbed because they might got money somebody wants or they got drugs. . . . If you got something, someone always wants it and they'll take it when you don't do something about it.

. . .

A: These assholes will stab each other for just about any reason . . . but the big thing is how much money you got Also if you be fucking with people and pressin' them for money and sex, then you better watch your back all the time.

. . .

A: Both officers and inmates get stabbed because they're dumb. . . . Officers because of power trips and inmates because they get off into other people's business. That bullshit will always get you in trouble.

Also, many assaults which occurred within the institution were not reported, particularly inmate upon inmate attacks. Inmates did not want to be identified to the administration as troublemakers, nor did they want to wind up in protection or segregation, since this would mean isolation from other inmates and a loss of privileges. One inmate discussed why he did not want to report the fact that he had been stabbed:

A: . . . I don't know how many stabbings. A lot of these stabbings don't get reported.

I: Why's that?

A: 'Cause he locks you up.

I: Nobody wants to get locked up.

A: Nobody wants to get locked up. See, that's what probably caused me to get, be so fatal, because I wouldn't go to the infirmary. You know, I was wastin' a lot of time, you know?

I: What's so bad about being locked up?

A: They just don't want to be in segregation.

I: Cause then everybody knows that you're in segregation for some reason?

A: No, it ain't so much that. When you get stabbed everybody gonna know anyway. So, like you now, they cut your freedom off. You're sayin' if I stabbed you and they locked us up, they put me in segregation and they put you in segregation, and we got the same kind of privileges and, you now, I stabbed you, you know? That's why, you know, that's what everyone go through--you know, why should I be lock up, you know? And they do that you know, they keep you locked up for a while.

Therefore, the formal measure of assaults via the major misconduct report was somewhat tenuous and assaults were occurring at HVMF which were going unnoticed or unreported.

While the frequency of assaults is relevant in understanding prison stability, there are other behaviors which enable one to assess control within prison structures. One of these behaviors is prison homosexuality. Probably no other topic has received so much public outrage and journalistic coverage.²⁷ In fact, these reports have distorted the reality of prison homosexuality. Nevertheless, the purpose of the following section is to define and explore the extent of homosexuality at HVMF, discuss the types of homosexual alliances,

state the social location of homosexuals, and examine the problems endemic to prison homosexuality and its control.

4. Homosexuality

Homosexuality defined and amount of homosexuality activity.

Wooden and Parker (1982) have distinguished four types of sexual behavior or sexual scripts among incarcerated men: First, the "kid" or "punk" represents a class of men who have been "turned out" or forced into some type of sexual encounter, usually assuming the sexually submissive role. The second type, the "jockey" or "stud," are individuals who identify with the "masculine identity" and do not consider themselves as homosexuals; it is the partner who is typically considered submissive and is thought of as a "broad" or "sissy" in the encounter.

The "queen" or "sissy" refers to the inmate who adopts the stereotypical version of the submissive partner, with identifiable female characteristics and effeminate mannerisms. They are distinguished from the fourth type, which is the "homosexual" or "gay." These inmates vary in their sexual orientations, assuming both dominant and submissive roles in their sexual affairs. Accordingly, the prison population can be broken down into one or a combination of the above sexual scripts. In this way, the sexual proclivities of the inmate population can be divided and systematically examined.

At HVMF the amount of homosexuality was limited compared to other institutions in the system.²⁸ A consensus among the inmates

interviewed was that the frequency of homosexual encounters was low. In fact, one inmate showed surprise over the amount of homosexuality among inmates:

A: I'm surprised that it's not high here, there's not, there's a very few, they're here, but there's no . . . See, up at Marquette you'd have a kid, and there'd be 3 or 4 guys . . . they're white. I haven't seen that down here, I haven't seen anybody, a sissy going around with a man, or a man goin' around with a sissy. It's strange, it's a first. There's not that many homosexuals here.

Another inmate was more explicit about how the homosexuals were viewed by other inmates:

I: Ok, I see. What about the level of homosexuality in this institution compared to Jackson?

A: Shit. Jackson is full of them.

I: What about here?

A: 3 or 4, 5 or 5, maybe.

I: A lot lower.

A: A lot lower.

I: Does everybody in here know who the homosexuals are?

A: Yeah, they know them.

I: What, how do they treat them, how do they deal with them?

A: Well, just like they deal with them in the street.

I: In what regard, explain that a little bit more.

A: Just like if I know if it's your king, then I won't fuck with him. I'm speakin' to him and treatin' him nice, you know, just because of the fact that he

belongs to you. It's just like a prostitute or something, you know. The guy is usually prostitutin' him around, you know, from this guy to that guy, this guy to that guy.

I: Do a lot of guys enter into homosexual relations around here?

A: No.

I: Ok, so it's only a few people.

A: Right.

I: Ok. Is most of the homosexuality that does occur here, is it agreed upon or is it forced?

A: Mostly agreed upon.

I: A lot of rape in here?

A: No. I don't know, but since I've been here . . . one guy got raped over in Unit 2.

The relevant point out of this response was the notion of treatment which some "sissies" were afforded by inmates. On many occasions I was told the identity of one individual who was a known sissy and servicing many inmates among the prisoner population. I initially observed him in the dining hall. It was not necessarily his mannerisms but more so his social location within the dining hall. As Figure 4.2 indicates, the dining area is typically segregated by race and religious groups. However, on one occasion, I noticed how one white inmate sat in the middle of a group of blacks, so I inquired about it to the officer on duty. He stated that individual was a sissy for those black inmates, and he typically serviced many inmates

in the prison. In effect, his reputation got out and he was labeled as a sissy, one to be sexually exploited, in the inmate hierarchy.

Types of Homosexual Alliances

At HWMF the most common type of sexual orientation among the inmate population was that of a "jocker" or "stud." Since the purpose of this research was not to investigate the frequency of differing sexual alliances, it was difficult to assess the prevalence of one sexual orientation over another. However, it was made clear by inmates that homosexuality did occur but that the jockers or studs did not view themselves as homosexuals per se. This is consistent with Wooden and Parker's typology, since their typification of the prison stud usually embodies masculine features and does not accept the sexual encounter as being homosexual.

These studs were usually serviced by a select few inmates who were known sissies and considered homosexual because of their submissive attitudes toward the more aggressive studs. Typically, the interaction of the sissy with the stud lasted only a few minutes, with the sissy providing a variety of sexual services. These services range from anal penetration to some form of oral sex. More specifically, most of these sexual encounters were voluntarily agreed upon by both parties:

A: No, no. Matter of fact, I've done it myself, I've done it myself. But see it's like, I do something like that, man, it's going back to what I tell earlier. There's going to be understanding, understanding to be understood--no pressin'. . . I would say like, I don't condone it, man, I figure like they people, you know.

And it's just like anything else, when you're hungry, you eat, you know, and when you gotta take a shit, you take a shit, when you gotta piss. It's just like anything else that gotta be taken care of. But hey, . . . I couldn't have sex, intercourse, with one of these women officers, no way, Jack. So I gotta do the best, I gotta go to the substitute to do the thing that I can get into, you know?

. . .

A: The sex that goes on here is pretty much not forced . . . you know people need it and they'll do anything to get it. Shit, if two guys want to do that sort of thing, that is their business. Just keep them away from me.

. . .

A: Not much sex goes on compared to other places . . . you can pick the fags out, and they collect with each other. Everybody knows who they are and what they want. . . . If you're into that type of bullshit, you can always find it.

. . .

A: I've done it. . . . Not too many guys appreciate you discussing it with them. But, I bet most have done it but they won't admit it. . . . I do have to say though there ain't much rape and squeezing for sex in here like other places . . . but it does occur. The guys who do it regularly are your sissies. They got to watch themselves because they can be squeezed by other inmates.

Therefore, the inmate population at HVMF can be broken down further into sissies and studs. The other two conceptual categories--homosexual and punk--existed at HVMF, but they were quite rare. In fact, the kid or punk, the individual who had been coerced into a sexual affair or raped, was virtually non-existent at HVMF. It was rumored that one of the religious group members was raped during

the institutional disturbance which occurred in 1982. For protection purposes, this individual joined a religious group and was no longer sexually harassed by other inmates.³⁰

When inquiring about the level of homosexuality among inmates, administrators voiced the following opinions:

A: We haven't had a hell of a lot of tickets indicating what we've caught, OK, for sexual misconduct, you know, whatever that may consist of. We haven't had a hell of a lot of tickets in respect to that. There are a number of, you know, admitted homosexuals in the population who seem to be getting along just fine. There are some homosexuals who are locked up in protection. The amount of homosexual activity, what is apparent that we're well aware of, is, in my opinion, probably, maybe a bit less than usual. And again, I say, that's only what is documented. What I've been informed of, what I know of, be it through a ticket, be it through heresay, be it through what, that's really, you know, there's never, it has not been brought to my attention a great deal in respect to homosexual assaults. Homosexual activity, all consensual type thing, going on. I think it might be very shielded, you know. The guy takes his opportune shot at another guy and they hook up, or whatever, consensual, you know, doin' their thing, that kind of thing.

. . .

A: We don't have the problems with homosexuals and rape like other prisons. That's because we segregate them if they are causing problems. . . . If we don't then they can cause more problems and that is something we can't afford.

. . .

A: There is some rape but most of these guys who do that shit are caught and bounced out of here. . . . If fact, the only rape I heard of happened a while back. We responded to it and that's that. It's really no big deal here.

As a result, much of the homosexuality at HVMF occurred among sissies and studs and was consensual in nature, with a few number of people being "turned out" and known homosexuals. As one inmate put it, "It's no big deal . . . You have them in every prison and that's just a part of prison life."

Social Location of Homosexuals

The actual location of many homosexuals was very difficult to determine, partly because of the nature of the behavior. Homosexual activity was not located in any specific area. However, it was the concern of many administrators at HVMF that having known homosexuals among the general population would have deleterious effects.³¹ In response to this situation, all known homosexuals were isolated within housing unit 2, and some were even placed under protection status because of the problems they had caused in general population.³²

While many were centrally located in unit 2, some key inmates interviewed suggested that there were still a number of sissies in general population and that they serviced many of the inmates in housing units 3, 4 and 5. As a result, the level of homosexual activity was remaining constant. The belief was that the blatant (known) homosexuals would become overly aggressive in the inmate population and cause many problems among inmates, all competing for the homosexual's services. This may not be necessarily true; nevertheless, it was believed and determined institutional policy. It was the problematic character of the homosexual role which

administrators feared, even to the point of isolating them from other inmates in general population.

Problems with Prison Homosexuality and Its Control

Because of the somewhat limited number of sissies in the general population many inmates were often desirous of them. Typically, inmates fought over the ownership of a particular sissy. Even inmates who claimed that they were not homosexuals stated that many the assaults and stabbings occurred because two prisoners were fighting over the use of a sissy:

A: Them sissies cause a lot of problems . . . they use inmates against each other and cause a lot of problems in the place. There aren't that many here, but they still cause problems . . . they should ship all their asses out of here . . . I think a lot of guys would be better in the long run.

This opinion was generally held by many of the administrative staff interviewed. In particular, the warden expressed the problems homosexuals could cause in the prison environment:

I: How about the level of homosexuality among inmates here compared to other institutions. Is it about the same, more, less?

A: I don't know if it's the same. I know homosexuality in a prison is a problem, and if anybody'll tell you different, they're lying to you.

I: How is it a problem?

A: Well, one person is with one person, and the other person wants them and you have fights, you have assaults and everything else.

Another administrator was more specific about the problems of homosexuality:

A: Yeah, as I said there was a previous, you get guys that are fighting over a sissy, you know, . . . over a sissy. You know, that might just be a situation where the person wants to change lovers . . . change and for whatever reason, goes for another person and that kind of thing and they end up fighting over it and, oh shit. And a lot of that, not a lot of it, but I still think that the biggest, one of the biggest problems in that is the, for lack of a better term, the homosexual who is the recipient of the affections placed upon him, in other words the passive, the more feminine acting and this kind of thing, the self-admitted homo in this kind of sense, causes a lot of that shit because he's just, he gets enjoyment out of having these people fight over him. Yeah, that kind of thing, it's no, you know, and that causes us rape problems. You know, as I said that one situation, they were doin', you know, that's what happened.

Therefore, prison homosexuality posed a problem for inmates, officers, and administrators in keeping a stable prison setting. Nevertheless, the crucial point about homosexuality at HVMF was the varied roles which it assumed.

Based on the typology offered by Wooden and Parker, we can conclude that a majority of the homosexual activity existed via the sissy/stud or jocker relationship, with very few rapes and sexual assaults. Concomitantly, the presence of actual or known homosexuals in the prison social setting was very limited because of the segregation of these individuals from general population. As a result, the limited number of sissies in the environment typically serviced those inmates in the general population who desired this form of sexual release.

5. Institutional Control and Stability: A Summary Statement

The purpose of this chapter was to explore specific focal concerns in the institutional environment at HVMF. These focal concerns were:

contraband, race relations, institutional misconducts, and prison homosexuality. It was contended that each of these reflected on and impacted upon the level of control in the prison environment. More importantly, they impinged upon the power relations within the institutional setting.

Concerning contraband it was mentioned that "soft" types of contraband were accessible to the inmate population at HVMF, especially marijuana and alcohol. Also, the demand for these types of contraband was quite high and it affected the level of stability in the prison environment; however, the amount of contraband was limited. For this reason, some inmates were powerful because of their ability to supply these desired resources. In response to this situation, administrators attempted to control the prison contraband system. While no one administrator admitted a formal recognition and support of illegal markets at HVMF, it was understood as something inevitable and endemic to prison organization. By stabilizing this type of market activity, they were able to control the power of key inmates who influenced the direction of the inmate society.

This idea of prison stability was also true in reference to race relations in the prison setting. At HVMF there was a voluntary segregation of inmates by race, where blacks and whites were typically dispersed throughout the institution and situated in identifiable social locations. In addition, the problems between the races which many institutions had experienced over the past 10 to 15 years were rare at

HVMF. While the literature suggested that race as a variable in understanding contemporary prison social structure was important, this was only relevant when the prison environment, in toto, was not experiencing some deprivational event which affected both white and black inmates. Overall, the relations between blacks and whites were positive, even though blacks outnumbered whites within the prisoner population.

An area which was much more difficult to assess was institutional misconducts. The data revealed that the issuance of a formal misconduct ticket was more related to the behavior of the officer rather than the violating inmate. In fact, it was suggested that ticket writing represented the final effort on the part of an officer when informal means failed. Furthermore, the officer was not going to issue a ticket unless he/she perceived a high probability of it being disposed as guilty. In this way, officers stabilized the prison environment through informal and formal means.

In addition, the location of a majority of the serious rule violations occurred in the detention, segregation, and protection areas, while a sizeable number of minor infractions were evidenced in the general population areas of the prison, suggesting that a differential level of rule enforcement existed relative to the organizational structure of those areas and the perceptions of individual officers within those areas. This was due to their assessment of the degree of control needed to promote stability.

In relation to prison homosexuality, it was concluded that its frequency was much lower at HVMF than other institutions; however, the analysis also suggested that violence and assaults resulted from these relationships. When the prison population was experiencing sexual deprivation, these assaultive behaviors were natural by-products.

Up to this point, some focal concerns of inmates, officers, and administrators at HVMF have been discussed; however, a comparative analysis of HVMF with a similar institution on these areas is required. The purpose of the following chapter is to examine these focal concerns, exploring how HVMF is similar and/or dissimilar to another maximum security institution. Also, the analysis includes an examination of cost figures, attempting to determine where a majority of the institutions' monies are spent. In brief, where do the institutions spend their monies, and do they indicate any kind of philosophical orientation on the part of the institutions? Are the elements of control more important than treatment programs? How developed are their educational and vocational programs? These and other questions shall be examined and explored in an attempt to comprehend not only the nature of HVMF but also another prison facility which has a similar inmate population.

Endnotes - Chapter 5

¹Spud-juice was the institutional name for an alcoholic beverage. It was made by inmates in their cells. On a few occasions I observed inmates who appeared to be drunk in the housing units. My hunches were proven correct when officers stated it was a common phenomenon.

²Common in the sense that it was noticeable. I do not want to suggest it is atypical behavior for a prison setting. On the contrary, it is usually common behavior in many prisons throughout the country.

³Inmates expressed the desire to be safe in the prison. One way to prevent trouble is to control dangerous weapons, something which even a majority of inmates agreed is needed in prison settings.

⁴In this particular incident, the payment was five cartons of cigarettes, which is a significant number considering the value of cigarettes in the inmate social system.

⁵By soft contraband I am referring to not only drugs but also money, unauthorized items, or excessive store items.

⁶This term was coined by Carroll in his analysis of race relations in a maximum security prison. It refers to a form of economic exchange, such as sharing, trading, and/or selling.

⁷Inmates discussed how many prisoners were great con artists and how you had to watch out for those individuals. As one inmate stated, "They could talk you out of the gold in your teeth."

⁸A classic phrase attributed to Sykes and Messinger (1960) in their discussion of how informal relationships are at the core of control in prison society. In effect, this corruption is necessary to maintain institutional stability.

⁹This is a key point. Group behavior in prison represents the concerted effort(s) of individuals who identify and relate to similar value structures. Similarly, they do not identify with other groups because they dislike them; they disassociate themselves with alienating groups because "they have nothing in common with them."

¹⁰This is particularly important in prisons of western states, where inmate populations represent a diverse grouping of cultural, economic, and social values. In fact, much of the research on contemporary prison society has come from these areas. This may indicate the invalidity of much of the modern research: it tends to be centralized in certain regions of the country, and the applicability of these findings to other areas of the country may be suspect.

¹¹At the time of this research, there were four Muslim religious groups, each having anywhere from 15 to 30 members. These numbers may seem small but they reflected group solidarity, something which administrators were fearful of in relation to the institution's stability.

¹²This group of bikers was loosely connected. In fact, they were not really considered a group; however, they did "hang together" within the institution.

¹³"Throw down" refers to getting ready to fight. It was a phrase which inmates used constantly when I probed about institutional violence.

¹⁴Nor do they totally like each other. However, the real separation between the two was not based on hatred but differences in what they valued and desired. In essence, there was not much in common between the two.

¹⁵This was made apparent to me by many inmates when I asked them to compare HVMF with their previous institutions. Without a doubt, HVMF was much better in this regard.

¹⁶This numbers advantage was roughly 2:1 at HVMF. At some institutions in the state, the numbers reflected an even higher proportion of black prisoners to white prisoners.

¹⁷At the time of this writing, the store was to be reorganized to include more items and a different method of acquiring the goods. How this will operate is speculative at this time. However, the point is that a change is being made by the warden to alleviate the problems associated with the store.

¹⁸Some of the resident unit managers (RUM's) suggested that the administration was using this strategy because of the perceived power of some of the religious groups.

¹⁹A strategy which administrators of prisons have traditionally employed in controlling recalcitrant inmates.

²⁰This was an institutional phrase which referred to a disturbance or riot about to occur.

²¹It should be noted that along with these misconduct violations an inmate can also be charged with accomplice, attempt, or conspiracy to commit a specific violation. These are charges which may be added to the original major or minor misconduct violation.

²²Toplock was a term which referred to being locked up in one's cell for punishment purposes. It was a common form of punishment given to inmates who violated minor misconduct rules.

23I observed this in one of the housing units. It was at this time that I realized the broad discretionary authority of the rules, and how officers manipulated the rules to fit just about any behavior on the part of inmates.

24This was a common complaint among officers, i.e., the rules were useless and often contradictory. So, in effect, "you do what you feel is necessary to control the unit." This supported the informal relationships between officers and inmates and further alienated both groups from central administration.

25A total of four months of misconducts was all I could obtain, partly because of the newness of the institution and their accounting system. Also, to retrieve this kind of information required much patience because many administrators did not want the information released until they were sure what you were using it for.

26This was a common perception among both officers and inmates, even more so for officers. This was something which was not taken lightly by the officers, especially if their safety was in question. That was why they sought more coercive control over the inmate population.

27The point I am trying to make here is that many journalistic accounts of prison homosexuality have accentuated the violence and brutality without examining it in relation to the total prison situation. In other words, these accounts have failed to realize how homosexuality is only a small part of a complex social world. Homosexuality is only one expression of this environment. This limited perspective does not allow a deeper understanding of the problems associated with contemporary prison structures.

28This will be one of the topics in the next chapter, along with a comparison of contraband, critical incidents, race relations, and cost figures.

29One of the problems with studying this topical area is the sensitive nature of the information. One can only hope that some type of assessment is reliable but yet aware of the problematic nature of the topic.

30Many inmates interviewed relayed this experience and most felt that the religious groups were only fronts for protection rackets, along with other illegal activities.

31This belief implies that homosexuals will exploit the prison population. While true in some instances, I am not sure that all known homosexuals act in this fashion. A more accurate picture might be to view them similar to heterosexuals, each striving for a sexual outlet relative to the deprivation they are experiencing.

³²This is changing at HVMF, with Unit 2 switching from a protection unit to general population. As a result, homosexuals will have to "walk the yard" like anyone else or be put into segregation. This will alter some arrangements in the inmate social system. What problems may arise is speculative, but one could expect more assaults due to the increased number of homosexuals.

CHAPTER VI

INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS: HURON VALLEY MEN'S FACILITY AND MARQUETTE BRANCH PRISON

The previous chapter examined HVMF relative to four focal concerns: contraband, race relations, institutional misconducts, and homosexuality. Concerning contraband, the analysis concluded that it was accessible to those inmates who had resources. Also, it was suggested that certain kinds of non-dangerous contraband provided stability to the prison environment. In regard to race relations, the analysis pointed out how the races at HVMF were segregated and that race relations took on a significant meaning only when the entire inmate organization was not experiencing group deprivation.

Furthermore, information concerning institutional misconduct was analyzed. The interpretation provided suggested that whether or not officers relied on institutional misconducts as a control strategy was dependent upon two factors: the probability of gaining a guilt conviction and the social location of the offense. Finally, an investigation was conducted in the area of homosexuality. Relying on past literature, a typology of prison sexual scripts was used in the analysis of sexual encounters at HVMF. Of the four scripts provided

by the literature, it was held that the two dominant scripts among the inmate population were jockers or studs and sissies. The prisoner who had been raped or turned out and the known homosexual were virtually non-existent at HVMF.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore these issues at a comparable prison facility which emphasizes strict control of inmates and routinization of the prison environment. The institution selected is the only comparable facility within the Michigan Correctional System, an institution which is classified as maximum security and emphasizes a punitive-control philosophy. The comparison will be on the focal concerns examined earlier in relation to HVMF and a section on prison appropriations and expenditures. The examination will explore how these focal concerns assess the relative amount of control and stability at both HVMF and Marquette Branch Prison (MBP).

To explore these issues, a variety of measures are employed, ranging from objective data to perceptual material provided by inmates who had been at MBP and currently reside at HVMF. This latter material is qualitative and represents the perceptions of inmates on the stated focal concerns. Conversely, the objective data reflects prison appropriations, institutional and programmatic expenditures, and the numbers and types of critical incidents at each facility. These figures give objective indices to assess the elements of control, stability, and cost effectiveness in relation to the institutional settings of the two prisons.

1. Prison Appropriations and Expenditures

During the fiscal year ending September 30, 1983, the State of Michigan appropriated \$234,051,900 to the Department of Corrections for the maintenance and operation of all those facilities and services which deal with corrections. Included in this definition are the following: executive section of the department, the administrative operations bureau, prison industries operations, programming bureau, correctional facilities administration, office of health care, institutional clinical operations, field services administration, field supervision, community correction centers, and the operation and maintenance of twelve correctional facilities or prisons.

Table 6.1 shows the total monies appropriated to both HVMF and MBP by function. The table indicates that a majority of the monies, 75% and 76% of the totals, were appropriated to HVMF and MBP for personnel matters, while 21% and 19% were allocated for operations of the institutions. More importantly, the table reflects a minimal percentage allocated for treatment and/or rehabilitation purposes, consisting of only 4% and 5% of the total appropriations.

While the sizes of the institutions are quite different, with HVMF averaging around 411 inmates and MBP about 983¹, this data reveal that personnel and operations appropriations far exceed the treatment/rehabilitation function. In effect, both institutions are predicated on a control philosophy, with very little concern for treatment or change of the individual inmate. However, this statement is only speculative at this point, since appropriations are

TABLE 6.1

ACTUAL APPROPRIATIONS* AT HURON VALLEY MEN'S FACILITY
AND MARQUETTE BRANCH PRISON BY FUNCTION

<u>Function</u>	<u>HVMF (%)</u>	<u>MBP (%)</u>
Personnel ^a	\$6,435,700(75)	\$10,307,300(76)
Operations ^b	\$1,826,900(21)	\$ 2,500,100(19)
Treatment/Rehabilitation ^c	\$ 318,400(4)	\$ 694,100(5)
Total	\$8,581,000(100)	\$13,501,500(100)

^a This category represents those appropriations in the following areas: salaries and wages, longevity and insurance, and retirement.

^b This includes contractual services, supplies and materials, fuel and utilities, travel, equipment and food.

^c The only appropriation in this category is labeled Academic/Vocational Programs.

*This appropriation is for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1983.

Source: State of Michigan, 81st Legislature, Enrolled Senate Bill No. 740, Act No. 262, Public Acts of 1982.

not necessarily indicators of where the monies are spent. It is prison expenditures which seem relevant in understanding the philosophy and direction of these institutions.

Programs, Services, and Costs

Table 6.2 exhibits the total expenditures of HVMF and MBP by function. This table shows the actual amount of monies spent by each specific function for the fiscal year ending in 1982.² The expenditures represent five functions: inmate care and control, treatment, administration, schools, and other.³

Table 6.2 indicates that both institutions spend a sizeable percentage of their monies on inmate care and control--54% at HVMF and 60% at MBP. In addition, 42% of the expenditures at HVMF were for administrative purposes, while 28% of MBP expenditures occurred in this area. The percentage difference may represent the inclusion of advanced computer technology in their locking system at HVMF. In fact, this institution was built with the idea of using a computer locking system for more efficient and effective control of inmates. This is supported by a reduced number of personnel working at HVMF compared to MBP--252 to 369; however, HVMF does have fewer inmates.

In essence, HVMF attempts to control the inmate population through more contemporary methods, utilizing computer technology and a limited number of personnel. On the other hand, MBP is a traditionally designed prison organization which attempts to control inmates through increased numbers of personnel and limited advanced technology. However, the most significant piece of datum from the table may be in

TABLE 6.2

ACTUAL EXPENDITURES* AT HURON VALLEY MEN'S FACILITY
AND MARQUETTE BRANCH PRISON BY FUNCTION

<u>Function</u>	<u>HVMF (%)</u>	<u>MBP (%)</u>
Inmate Care & Control ^a	\$4,376,243.36(54)	\$ 8,244,944.22(60)
Treatment ^b	\$ 197,141.72(3)	\$ 150,678.01(1)
Administration ^c	\$3,407,235.66(42)	\$ 3,862,773.70(28)
Schools ^d	\$ 121,215.78(1)	\$ 612,182.53(5)
Other ^e		\$ 832,194.09(6)
Total	\$8,101,836.52(100)	\$13,702,772.55(100)

a Included in this category are wages and salaries, travel, equipment, and supplies.

b This refers to the psychological programs, job readiness activities, substance abuse programs, and educational preparedness activities.

c Administration refers to the actual operating units which allow the institution to operate. For example, personnel office, business office, maintenance, and budgeting personnel are all considered a part of administration of the prison. Included in this is the computer locking system at HVMF.

d This category solely depicts the monies spent on the schools for their care and upkeep.

e This figure at the Marquette Branch Prison represents monies spent for work orders and riot costs. Since these were not evidenced at HVMF during the '82 fiscal year, there were no figures.

*This expenditure is for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1982.

Source: Fiscal Management Information System Responsibility Report,
Michigan Department of Corrections, September 30, 1982.

relation to the monies spent on treatment and schools. Only 4% of the expenditures at HVMF were spent on treatment and school-oriented activities and 6% of the expenditures at MBP representing similar functions.

Institutional Comparisons: HVMF and MBP and Cost Effectiveness

While the Michigan Department of Corrections reports that the per capita costs for prisoner care and custody was much lower at MBP (\$38.42) than HVMF (\$53.65) for fiscal year '81-'82, this is a misleading figure which does not take into consideration the limited number of inmates at HVMF during this fiscal year.⁴ HVMF was not at capacity, and the figure cited does not actually reflect the true character of total cost. Thus, any statement about the comparative cost effectiveness of the two institutions would be inaccurate. However, what can be examined is the inherent tradeoff between the institutions in terms of technology and personnel.

Therefore, the essential question becomes: Does the technology at HVMF provide greater control and stability to the prison setting, while at the same time being more cost effective? The only credible way to assess this construct was to appeal to those who worked in the institutional environment.⁵

While correctional officers were sensitive about revealing information, there were issues which many openly discussed. One of these areas was the effect of the computer locking system on maintaining control within the prison environment. There were a

myriad of stories about the inadequacies of the system. One of the more revealing tales an officer provided was how the locking system opened when it was supposed to automatically lock:

A: It was night . . . I was really scared because the doors all opened, and if the inmates wanted they could have walked out of their cells . . . They didn't but that was I think because a lot of guys didn't know that their doors were open. That was when I wanted to smash that computer terminal . . . Ever since then I've had nothing but problems with the damn thing.

It was common to hear this among officers; in fact, officers even suggested that it made them lazy and negligent in doing their jobs:

A: These computers are nothing but a joke; they make you lazy, so you don't walk around when you are supposed to . . . You rely on them too much and that causes problems, especially when the damn things break down.

. . .

A: I've gained so much weight since I've began here . . . that's because you really don't have to do much . . . the computer does everything for you You can really be negligent in your duties if you rely on this thing It still breaks down.

. . .

A: You can become really lazy when you work here. . . . The computer opens the doors, tells you if its opened or not, and locks it. . . . Why should you get off your rear end when you don't have to? Many guys know this and try to get up and do their jobs . . . it's just so hard after a while.

As a result of the many problems with the computer locking system, many officers felt that they were not able to satisfactorily complete their tasks and provide control in the environment.

Many officers at HVMF rejected the mechanization of corrections, partly because there were so many malfunctions with the system and also the fact that it limited their numbers in relation to inmates. This, in effect, was the dilemma which the hardware created: one has increased technology for the control and stability of the prison organization but the return was a limited number of people operating in the officer role. For this reason, many officers voiced the opinion that the computer locking system should be removed, and in its place, money should be spent on obtaining more corrections officers:

A: Nobody knows why we have all these computers in here anyway. . . . The people who sold this junk to the state are here every month trying to fix it. . . . It always malfunctions. . . . Shit, I would rather have more people on the front line instead of a useless pile of junk.

. . .

A: When you got 84 inmates in a housing unit and only 2 officers, problems can always come up What we need is more officers in the housing units, and the administration knows it, but they just like all the politicians don't give a shit about us. . . . Inmates know they can outnumber us and they will if nothing is done.

. . .

A: What we need here is a gun tower right in the middle of the dining hall. All our gun towers are on the outside of the place . . . but that means more men as officers. Nobody wants that cause it costs too much, but hell what about all the money they spent on building and fixing this computer system . . . it's always fucking up.

However, this argument is only tenable if it can be shown that the introduction of such advanced technology to corrections is really not

beneficial in terms of violence, assaults, and disruptive behaviors. Does HVMF exhibit fewer incidents which indicate instability? The next section examines this question in relation to the number of critical incidents between the two institutions.⁶

2. Critical Incidents: HVMF and MBP

Table 6.3 shows the frequency of critical incidents at HVMF and MBP by type and number. The table indicates that the total number of incidents was much lower at HVMF--113 to 154, suggesting that there may be more stability and control at HVMF than MBP.⁷ However, by examining the critical incidents more thoroughly, some were more prevalent at HVMF than MBP and vice-versa. For example, while both HVMF and MBP had few homicides and suicides,⁸ the number of assaults was higher, with 39 occurring at HVMF and 40 at MBP.

However, these assaults, as the table indicates, can be broken down into resistance and non-resistance.⁹ Where resistance did occur, the victim of the assault was always a staff member at both HVMF and MBP, while the non-resistance assaults indicate a greater number occurring with the resident being the victim at HVMF and the staff member the victim at MBP. While at HVMF the inmate would be attacked more so without provocation, this was the opposite at MBP. The reason for this difference can only be speculative at this point because of the low number of occurrences at both institutions.¹⁰ In effect, the data does not really indicate an identifiable difference between the two institutions on assaults.

TABLE 6.3

CRITICAL INCIDENTS* AT HURON VALLEY MEN'S FACILITY
AND MARQUETTE BRANCH PRISON BY TYPE AND FREQUENCY

<u>Type of Incident</u>	<u>HVMF</u>	<u>MBP</u>
HOMICIDE	1	
Staff		
Resident	1	
SUICIDE	14	10
Death	1	1
Attempt	13	9
ASSAULTS	39	40
Resistance	14	8
Staff/Victim	14	8
Res. Victim		
Weapon	2	1
Serious Injury	4	1
Non-Resistance	25	32
Staff/Victim	9	17
Res. Victim	16	15
Weapon	8	13
Serious Injury	6	9
SMUGGLING	1	2
Staff		
Drugs		
Weapons		
Alcohol		
Money		
Other		
Resident		
Drugs		
Weapons		
Alcohol		
Money		
Other		
Visitors	1	
Drugs	1	
Weapons		
Alcohol		
Money		
Other		
RIOT/MUTINY/STRIKE	2	3
INSUBORDINATION	1	
THEFT		10
EXTORTION		2
SUBSTANCE ABUSE	1	73

Table 6.3 (continued)

<u>Type of Incident</u>	<u>HVMF</u>	<u>MBP</u>
FIRE/ACCIDENT	2	2
Staff Injury		
Resident Injury	1	
FIREARM/MACE DISCHARGE	7	1
DEATH	1	
ESCAPE FROM SECURE INSTITUTION	1	
OTHER VISITOR		
OTHER	12	1
STAFF USE OF FORCE	15	5
ATTEMPTED ESCAPE	2	
VANDALISM	13	3
POSSESSION OF MONEY	1	2
FIGHT	2	1
Weapon	1	1
Injury		
TOTAL	113	154

*This is for the 1982 institutional year.

Moreover, the table suggests that HVMF and MBP were similar in relation to critical incidents. However, other important and relevant statements can be made from the data. First, there were four critical incident areas where a difference was discernable: theft, staff use of force, vandalism, and substance abuse. Concerning theft, the data indicate that there were 10 incidents which occurred at MBP, while no such events were known at HVMF. This does not suggest that no theft occurred at HVMF, only that it was not reported nor listed with the department.

Furthermore, the critical incident categories of staff use of force and vandalism were higher at HVMF than MBP, with 15 incidents occurring at HVMF and 5 at MBP for the former and 13 occurrences at HVMF and 3 at MBP for the latter. While there were some noticeable differences which were negligible on these three categories, the fourth critical incident area was more revealing in examining the differences between the two institutions.

The substance abuse category showed a significant difference between the two prison structures. At MBP there were 73 incidents of substance abuse, while HVMF only had recorded 1 such occurrence, suggesting that MBP may have more problems with narcotics and its control than HVMF. This finding indicates that there may be more access to narcotics and alcohol at MBP than at HVMF, something which is consistent with a prior finding that the contraband market in narcotics was not as developed at HVMF as opposed to MBP.

Second, it is interesting to see how substance abuse was higher at MBP, while the incidents of smuggling were virtually non-existent. Table 6.3 shows that there were only two incidents of smuggling at MBP and one at HVMF. Nevertheless, the most common method of gaining access to narcotics within a prison structure is via smuggling, whether it be through staff, visitor, or resident. One cannot obtain drugs and other contraband unless it is smuggled in by someone, yet the data in Table 6.3 indicate very few incidents of smuggling which were known to both institutional staffs. There are a number of possible reasons for such an occurrence.

First, the staffs of both prisons were unaware of the smuggling techniques and how contraband was coming into their respective institutions. This explanation is tenuous, particularly if one is aware of how prisons are the worst place to keep secrets. Knowledge of such an operation would not be difficult to discern, as there are always institutional leaks on information, especially contraband items.

Second, contraband reporting via critical incidents may not be reported because of the negative image it would portray about the institution. As a result, administrators would not release all of the information they know about the contraband system in their prison, particularly when one is talking about the smuggling of contraband by officers or other correctional workers.¹¹ As in the former interpretation, this is unlikely, since administrators would be concealing and condoning criminal activities within their

institution. While being a correctional administrator is a risky business, it is not probable that gross violations of the law would be condoned by many of them.

A third interpretation may be more accurate in understanding the smuggling phenomenon. This view holds that it was an informal occurrence which was operated, monitored, and controlled by a few key figures among both the officer and inmate ranks. This explanation is consistent with what was said earlier about the role of informality as being a functional adaptation to the formal system of control. Much of this activity is maintained by informal and loosely constructed reciprocal relationships, thereby escaping the purview of the formal prison structure.

Therefore, the diversity of smuggling contraband may be explained through a combination of the first and third interpretations, where only those individuals who were pivotal in the informal prison system were aware of the smuggling operations and cognizant of the inherent value in keeping it quiet. As indicated in Table 6.3, substance abuse existed at MBP, and it would be ludicrous to think that smuggling did not occur to support such an activity. However, this latter explanation must be tempered with the fact that known occurrences of smuggling at HVMF were also quite low, which may suggest that HVMF has better control over smuggling. This may be true, particularly when one examines the number of substance abuse incidents at HVMF.

Not only does HVMF have a fewer number of smuggling incidents but it also has a rather insignificant number of substance abuse incident reports. This data suggest smuggling was an informal activity among key participants in the inmate social world and officer corps and that it was underdeveloped at HVMF. This would be an understandable explanation, since HVMF is a new institution, and a diverse contraband system which is predicated on a covert smuggling operation may not be entrenched within the prison organization. However, another explanation can be provided. This interpretation simply stated is that HVMF has much more control at this time in relation to contraband and smuggling than MBP.

This explanation would not be erroneous but it would be speculative because of the newness of the facility.¹² It is the notion of stability and control which we are attempting to assess. Thus, it would be accurate that, at least in regard to the data provided by Table 6.3, there was more control over smuggling at HVMF than MBP if we consider it in connection to the number of incidents of substance abuse. If critical incidents are sufficient measures of relative control and stability of both HVMF and MBP, one can say that HVMF is more controlled.

However, many inmates at HVMF felt MBP was more controlled even though the physical structure was much worse:

A: It was a hell hole, it's a hell hole, OK? You've got no problems here, right here you've got a door, a metal door, like this . . . glass on. If you want to go to the toilet . . . piece of paper, sit down and relax and read the paper--I'm in the habit of readin' the paper when I take a shit, you know?--read the damn paper, and I feel more comfortable when nobody's lookin'. Where in Marquette, you've always got somebody, a hall boy or guard, comin' in when you're sittin' on the pot. And you've got privacy as far as someone standin' there takin' count when you're takin' a shit, you know? There's no privacy at all. The room up there, all right, you got a tower, a guard tower, you can't go anywhere there where you can't be seen by the tower or a guard, down here you can. You've got little hide-aways. The guards up there, of course, are a lot different than they are down here to an extent, but they're still guards. The reason I say that is this, the guards up there, it's more or less a family thing. In other words, they've been working up there for years and years, their father's been working there for years, and their cousin, nephew, . . .

. . .

A: Marquette is nothing but a dungeon. . . . It and Jackson are about the same. You have no privacy at all at either of those places. . . . They can see everything that is going down there and everyone knows it . . . you know they got more physical control up at Marquette than down here (HVMF).

A: There isn't any real total control in any prison . . . but Marquette is much tighter. They got more police (officers) walking around and watching you. . . . You can't shit out of place up there because eyes are all over. In this place (HVMF), there is more slack on the actual physical construction and some blind spots.

A majority of the inmates interviewed felt that the social arrangement between keeper and kept was more developed at MBP than HVMF, and that officers were aware of all of the tricks which inmates attempted:

A: At Marquette it's a different ball game. It's been there a long time, the guards for the most part have been there a long time, they've heard every story, there's no type of benefit of the doubt. You get caught with . . . there's no benefit of the doubt. Here you can talk your way out of it, usually.

. . .

A: It was nice up at Marquette, especially if you were white, because the officers ran the shit a lot better. . . . They really understood inmates . . . that includes all the games and craziness that inmates try to pull on them. . . . Not only that you could deal with them. . . . They would let shit slide, but they made it clear that they were in control.

. . .

A: Marquette has too many officers that have been around. . . . They know all the bullshit that convicts run on them and each other . . . but that's good. . . . It's good because you can deal with them . . . still though they can really squeeze you with the rules if you fuck up in Marquette. One thing you don't want is them guards thinking you are running something on them . . . shit, that's when they really get pissed off. . . . You can bet they will let you know real quick.

While a majority of inmates felt that MBP was controlled and stabilized much more than HVMF, they still, on the whole, wanted to remain at HVMF because of its physical structure and closeness to friends and relatives.

However, at MBP, inmates and officers knew their roles and executed them with full awareness of what the outcomes would be. This does not exist at HVMF. On the contrary, many officers and inmates expressed uncertainty on how they were expected to act. In effect, the institution has not "settled down"¹³ enough for certainty in the environment. In more practical terms, the informality which prevailed

at MBP was weak at HVMF. Thus, the stabilization of the environment has not occurred, and until formal and informal lines are drawn, there will be a jockeying of inmates, officers, and administrators for organizational positions.

It is for this reason that HVMF had many problems of adjustment in its early beginning; the demarcation between formal and informal activities was not identified; consequently, all subsequent institutional behavior became an attempt to define and solidify the parameters of the organization. Therefore, control and stability of a prison organization can largely be determined through the alliances and interdependencies of the formal system of authority with the informal network of inmates and officers. In this regard, MBP was much more controlled because of the stabilization of its formal mechanism of control with the informal workings of inmates and officers.

A: It is so important that inmates and officers know how to do time together. . . . When I was doing time up in Marquette, the officers knew where you were coming from and you could make deals with them . . . that took time. They would always cut you some slack if you were good to them. This kind of stuff doesn't happen here . . . there are too many young officers. . . . They don't know what corrections is all about yet.

. . . .

A: I liked it better in Marquette. . . . You could gamble and deal with more inmates and officers up there. Hell, they had gambling tables right in the yard and everyone knew what was going down. . . . It's that kind of respect you develop between yourself and the police (officer). . . . I'm telling you that is what ran Marquette . . . not here now.

. . .

A: You got to work with them guards to make it man. . . . I don't want to say everyone does, but it seems the smart ones do all the time. . . . You know its like he gives me things and I help him out. . . . When you work together, everything is cool . . . it's when they try to jump on your shit that trouble starts. . . . That's what's happening here (HVMF). These officers have to learn that we all here together . . . trying to make it.

Thus, officers and inmates knew how to "do time" at MBP. On the other hand, at HVMF these roles, expectations, and alliances have not sufficiently developed to indicate a stable prison environment.

3. Contraband

Overview of contraband at HVMF. In the prior chapter the dynamics and complexities of contraband were examined at HVMF. The analysis concluded that there was a contraband network existing at HVMF; however, that network was not as developed as in some prisons in the system. In addition, the analysis suggested that the most sought-after contraband items were marijuana and spud-juice, with many inmates stating that dangerous weapons as a form of contraband needed to be controlled in the prison environment. In addition, it was mentioned that the accessibility of contraband, particularly those items which were high in demand, was contingent upon the resources an inmate had to negotiate.

Contraband at MBP

The amount of contraband at MBP was much higher and more diverse than in HVMF. In fact, this statement sums up an opinion which many

inmates expressed during the field research. While a majority of them agreed that they wanted to stay at HVMF, what they did miss about MBP was the diversity of the contraband system, especially in relation to the variety of drugs that it did provide. On one particular occasion, two inmates discussed how contraband at MBP was operated and controlled by white inmates and how both of them lived well at MBP because of their involvement:

A: You could get any kind of drug that you wanted and money could buy up at Marquette. . . . Everyone knew what was going on. . . . It was nice because you not only could get high, but you could also make some money off of doing it. . . . After I left Marquette, I had so much money from dealing that I didn't know what to do with it. . . . I left almost 4 or 5 ounces of dope up there because I couldn't take it with me.

. . . .

A: Dave (not his real name) and me had a real good business up in Marquette. We were running 15 to 20 ounces of dope, pills, some cocaine to anyone who could pay for it. . . . I had it good with them guards. . . . I made my money and they made theirs. . . . Shit, if I didn't want to, I never went to chow because I had all my own stuff in my cell . . . it was like a little store with all the pleasures of home. I wish I didn't have to leave.

Another inmate discussed the amount of dope at MBP in comparison to HVMF:

I: OK. What kind of contraband are you talking about, then, that's here?

A: I was looking at everything.

I: What about dope?

A: Very little do you have contraband here. Down here you may have guys maybe caught with a couple of ounces, a reefer or a spoonful of heroin or something--in Marquette, you get caught with pounds, you know, a lot of ounces--10 or 11 ounces--probably the biggest amount you get caught down here maybe is 2 ounces, I haven't even heard of it.

Many inmates discussed how the MBP environment could be dangerous because of the amount of money and resources in the prison setting. One inmate described his gambling activities at MBP and the associated tension it produced:

A: Yeah, I had, at one time, I had 3 blackjack tables going, and 2 . . . tables goin' and I had \$1800 book, that I was loan-sharking up there. I had about, ah, \$2300, all the time. And I was takin' a net of \$500.

I: Holy Christ, you had a good life. Do the guys, sort of, does that piss 'em off because there's no money around here?

A: Yeah. But you know, a lot of men do, because, see, when there's money, there's a little more tension and you got something to protect, it's something that everybody's after.

The irony of this situation was that while inmates were able to cope with their incarceration more effectively because of the presence of a more elaborate contraband system at MBP, there was the tradeoff of increased tension. Nevertheless, this tension was mollified through the informal relationships which occurred among officers and inmates at MBP. In the long run, the prison social setting at MBP was stabilized through the informal exchange relationships which inmates and officers established. For example, a group of inmates discussed

how these tenuous exchange relationships made MBP a better facility to do time:

A: Life in prison is nothing but pure hell, and so you do your best to deal with it. . . . If you can get something going with the guards, that's good because they can make your life a lot easier . . . very common at Marquette.

. . . .

A: Doing time is nothing but a head game. . . . You have got to know what is needed to make your life better . . . the only thing that makes life better is the guards. You know you wash my back and I'll wash yours. . . . A lot of them guards do that with inmates and I think it makes everybody's life easier . . . it's just normal at Marquette.

. . . .

A: Some of these officers need all the help they can get . . . inmates know this. . . . So you try to get a thing going with him. If he sees your straight with him, then he'll give you some slack later some time. . . . When I was up at Marquette, this was real common . . . you know you need it in this kind of place.

. . . .

A: It's only the dumb officers who don't understand the game . . . that's what you have down here (HVMF), a lot of dumb motherfucking police (officers). . . . When I was up at Marquette, you had almost all racist guards but you could work with them if you were smart. It made time easier for you and them.

As a result of these bargaining relationships between officers and inmates, the perception among a majority of the inmates was that MBP was a much tighter facility and exhibited more overall stability. In relation to contraband, it was found that it served the function of stabilizing the environment at MBP. On the other hand, the data

revealed that officers and inmates did not have such a relationship at HVMF. Therefore, inmates were of the opinion that it produced a less controlled structure and more susceptible to problems in the future.

4. Race Relations

Race relations at HVMF. It was stated that the relations between blacks and whites at HVMF were better than in most institutions in the system.¹⁴ The most powerful inmates among the blacks were the religious leaders, exhibiting a form of referent power as their compliance strategy. On the other hand, white inmates were more fragmented, with only the bikers being identified as a group, even though to consider them as a gang would be erroneous since they did not have any identifiable group goals or objectives similar to the religious groups. It was suggested that there was no racial tension, but that there was voluntarily segregation because of a lack of commonality between the races.

MBP: Race Relations

While racial division does exist at HVMF, this was more problematic at MBP. In fact, when discussing this topic with black inmates, many did not want to return to MBP because of the racial tension and division between the races. A number of black inmates suggested that the interactions among staff and inmates were between white officers and white inmates. The white inmates at MBP controlled the entire inmate organization, with very few, if no, interruptions from black prisoners. As a result, the white and black inmates were alienated from each other.

It is the perception of racism at MBP which was so entrenched within many of the black inmates at HVMF. Many had spent time at MBP, and their feelings were extremely negative about MBP, especially in relation to racial tension and divisions:

A: Marquette is centered on racism.

I: A lot of racism?

S: Right, because the penitentiary is . . . almost white population entirely and we'll just come there and when most inmates are from Marquette. And a lot of blacks are prejudice up there. You may have two black officers in the whole institution.

I: Two?

A: Yeah, yeah.

I: Holy shit.

A: And as far as gettin' . . . there, it's impossible. The whites can do just about anything.

I: Are there gangs up there--white . . . ?

A: Well, not . . . gang . . . They see a white guy associating with a black guy, . . . they say, hey man, you can't keep associating like that . . . white guy . . .

I: Is there a lot of racial tension up there?

A: Oh, very much.

I: How do you compare that, the tension now, to here?

A: There is no comparison. There's really no racial tension here. Blacks and Whites are really separated at Marquette. . . . There are no Blacks and Whites that want to really get together up there. You could even say there is a lot of hatred between the two. That's what the administrators want . . . they want to separate us because they can control us better . . . a lot of racism at Marquette.

. . .

A: I never want to go back to Marquette. Not only is the place all fucked up and old . . . it also has nothing but racist guards. . . . Mothers, fathers, brothers, and sisters all work up at Marquette. It's a family thing where they all hate the niggers and they want to press you down . . . that shit don't work here, but it does at Marquette.

. . .

A: Racism is everywhere. . . . It's just concentrated higher in Marquette. . . . You know there isn't but, I think, one guard up there that is black. . . . Not only that the guards hate blacks up there, and they let whites do anything they want. . . . It's terrible for blacks at Marquette.

This lack of involvement was what further separated blacks from whites at MBP and perpetuated the racial tension. Not only were blacks of the opinion that they had no authority in the workings of the inmate social system but they were also exploited by a majority of white inmates.

A: There is no doubt about it . . . Them whites control everything up at Marquette. They shit on us blacks everywhere, and up at Marquette it's the worst . . . That's because all the whites have their brothers, sisters, cousins and uncles working at the prison . . . They are all there to shit on the blacks.

. . .

A: White man is the only man up at Marquette. . . . You have nothing for blacks up at Marquette. . . . Other white inmates don't give a fuck about you or any other blacks. . . . They do all their bullshit with the racist guards and then they wonder why Blacks and Whites don't get along in the place.

These impressions were consistent with white inmates who had done time at MBP. A number of white inmates expressed how the "boots"¹⁵

were in line at MBP, and more importantly, how they had no control over any of the contraband markets. The traditionally white-oriented con structure existed at MBP, with the inmate organization being controlled and operated by a few white prisoners who had established positive relations with custodial staff.

One white inmate even wanted to go back to MBP because he lived much better and did not have to deal with the blacks up there:

A: As soon as possible I'm going to try to go back to MBP because it's a lot nicer up there. . . You got everything you want and you don't have to put up with all these jitterbugs (blacks) up there. They know their place and I know mine . . . Plus I can live a lot better up there. Their store isn't all fucked up like it is down here.

This situation further divides the inmate organization, and it could be problematic in the control of inmates, particularly if racial tension is high. Therefore, it can be concluded that HVMF had more stable relations between the races, while MBP exhibited racial divisions which indicated greater instability. When these divisions lead to increased violence and assaults between the races, it is at this point that there is no control.

5. Homosexuality

Overview of Homosexuality at HVMF. Homosexuality at HVMF was examined relying on the typology provided by Wooden and Parker. Accordingly, it was suggested that a majority of homosexual encounters at HVMF occurred between jockers or studs and sissies. The last two categories of the typology--punk and homosexual--were virtually

non-existent at HVMF. It was concluded that the jocker or stud was the most common sexual script among inmates, with sissies servicing many of the inmates in general population. Also, the known homosexuals were typically segregated from the general population, due to the perception on the part of many administrators that they caused problems within the institution.

Finally, it was suggested that the prevalence of sissies within the general population caused many violent interactions among inmates, where the jockers or studs typically resorted to physical violence in competing for a few number of sissies. Because sissies were quite limited in the institutional environment, they were usually in demand among those inmates who desired their services. They, as a result, could cause problems if they desired, and administrators were often monitoring the activities of these inmates.

Diversity of Homosexuality at MBP

While the typical homosexual alliance at HVMF was between a stud and sissy, MBP exhibited more diverse sexual scripts, including more inmates being "turned out" and known homosexuals in the environment. Many inmates at HVMF explained that MBP had a variety of sexual activities existing, especially the prevalence of homosexual rape where young inmates were turned out by the more aggressive studs. One inmate discussed how he was protecting a young inmate who was terrified of being sexually assaulted:

A: Marquette is pretty bad. I know a young kid up there that I was protecting . . . They thought I was turning him out . . . Shit, he was just a kid who was scared and crying all the time. He was only 17 fuckin' years old, man . . . and he was scared to death of being attacked and raped by other inmates.

Also, the jocker or stud was able to get serviced any time he desired because of the prevalence of institutional sissies. This sexual script was so common that anyone could "get off"¹⁶ if they desired. In fact, the environment had so many sissies that fewer problems existed in trying to obtain sexual release:

A: Marquette is almost like Jackson. You can have anything you want. . . . There are sissies, fags, queens . . . all sorts of shit up there. . . . You know that's good sort of because you don't have as much killing and sticking for sex up there. . . . If you want it you can have it . . . that's not true here.

. . .

A: When your in prison, sex is something you think about, especially when your young. . . . At Marquette, guys were always getting off . . . the same in Jackson. . . . You ain't got that down here . . . not as many sissies and homos. I think you got more trouble with sissies here because they use guys to fight for them. . . . You always have that in prison but here it's a little bit worse.

. . .

A: If you did that kind of stuff at Marquette, it wasn't that bad because people were more willing . . . you had more of them and everyone knew it. There wasn't that much sticking and knifing unless you fucked with the wrong sissy. . . . Here you got less of them and that causes some problems. . . . I don't do that type of shit but there are a lot of inmates who do and they'll fight and kill for them.

Nevertheless, while acts of violence over homosexual encounters may be reduced because of the number of willing sissies, you still have problems when individual inmates "fall in love."¹⁷ It was a consensus among the inmates how sissies were thought of as property once they developed sexual relations with some inmates. Thus, it became very difficult for inmates to share with others; the resulting situation was where inmates fought over the use of a particular sissy. In short, the alliance between a sissy and a stud may lead to some jealousy on the part of the stud; as a result, he does not wish to share his relationship with anyone else, sometimes causing conflict between him and another inmate:

A: The problem with all those sissies is that guys fight over them . . . One guy will stick another guy because his sissy was going to him and feels his stuff (property) was taken from him . . . These guys are so dumb and those sissies know it. They like to use guys against each other. It makes them feel big when they're nothing but cowards.

. . .

A: It's like out on the street . . . you have some woman and you own her. . . . In here, there are guys who have their sissies and nobody can fuck with them but them. I know guys who would kill someone for taking his property . . . that's a very private matter for a lot of inmates.

. . .

A: I know guys who got stuck by other dudes because they be fucking with a man's sissy . . . that shit is all bullshit . . . but it happens in this place. It's a serious matter and nobody wants his stuff taken from him, including his sissy.

In addition, known homosexuals were harassed and sexually abused by many inmates at MBP. This was consistent with the literature which suggested that many known homosexuals were often sexually exploited by other inmates.¹⁸ Being an admitted homosexual is a dangerous existence within the prison setting; it is a position which many inmates rejected yet manipulated for their own sexual self-satisfaction:

A: Nobody likes them homosexuals, but I tell you that a lot of these inmates go to them. . . . Sure they won't admit that fact to you but it is still something that occurs. . . . I don't care, but I've gone to guys for sex; it's a part of being in this place. . . . Now, Marquette is a lot different. . . . Everybody exploits them homosexuals up their, plus they got a lot more of them.

. . .

A: There is no respect for the fag in prison . . . like Marquette it was worse. . . . They are abused and thrown out like garbage. I guess that's all part of being in prison. . . . Still guys hate them but they use them. Any guy who says he's been in prison longer than five years and hasn't had sex with another guy is bullshitting. Everyone does it once.

Therefore, what can be concluded about homosexual affairs at MBP is as follows: first, the sexual scripts of the institutional population were much more diverse, including punks, sissies, studs, and known homosexuals. Second, there were more sissies at MBP in comparison to HVMF, with the typical relationship being between the stud and sissy. This can cause problems in the institutional environment, specifically when studs compete for the exclusive use of a particular sissy; this was not evidenced at HVMF, since there was a

restricted supply of these individuals. The violence which occurred over sissies was because of the limited number of them and not over an individual sissy.

Third, many young and weak inmates were being raped or turned out at MBP. Fourth, the known homosexuals within the institutional environment were harassed by a number of inmates at MBP, where they were sexually exploited and manipulated by the inmate population. This occurred because the perception of the typical inmate was that known homosexuals were weak and deserved to be manipulated.¹⁹

6. Summary and Conclusion

Institutional stability and control: HVMF and MBP. This chapter has attempted to explore the relative stability and control of two institutions on the focal concerns of critical incidents, contraband, race relations, and homosexuality, with a further analysis of prison appropriations and expenditures. An analysis of these appropriation and cost figures revealed that both HVMF and MBP spent a majority of their monies on inmate care and control and a small percentage on the treatment/rehabilitation of inmates. Also, it was suggested that there was an inherent tradeoff between the advanced computer technology and the number of personnel being employed in the operation of the facilities.

While HVMF attempted to control inmates through the use of a computer locking system, MBP's control philosophy was predicated on personnel, where more officers were employed in the control function.

It was found that many officers at HVMF did not favor the modernity of corrections, due to the fact that it promoted indolence on their part and they often experienced technical problems in maintaining its operation.

In relation to critical incidents, the data revealed that there were a fewer number at HVMF in comparison to MBP. However, it was suggested that some categories were higher at HVMF than MBP and vice versa. Nevertheless, the important point was that the critical incidents represented officer behavior and institutional reporting strategies rather than actual disruptive behavior. This was consistent with the expressions of inmates who had done time at MBP and currently reside at HVMF.

Similarly, the analysis of contraband systems at both facilities indicated that MBP was more diverse in terms of quantities and types of contraband. In addition, the contraband market evidenced at MBP indicated the relative importance of inmate-officer networking relationships and how contraband was used as a vehicle in the stabilization of the prison setting. In effect, prison contraband provided officers with the necessary certainty of control, while it enabled inmates to deal with the deprivations of prison life.

Therefore, when discussing control within a correctional institution, the key feature is the degree of deprivation experienced by the prisoner social system and administrative responses to the demands of inmates in trying to cope with their incarceration. This

is also applicable in an understanding of race relations and prison homosexuality. It was mentioned that in relation to the former HVMF had less racial division and the separation of the races was more voluntarily imposed, whereas the racial situation at MBP suggested more of an identifiable division between the races.

If separation of the races was employed as a strategy to divide and conquer the inmate organization, the net effect was the increased alienation and deprivation felt by inmates. More importantly, such a strategy provides less control and could lead to more serious conflict and disorder within the prison environment. By promoting antagonism between the races, the administration is developing a situation where violence could erupt. The pivotal argument presented here centers around the degree of deprivation perceived by prisoners and how they adjusted to this situation within the organizational environment. The same line of reasoning holds true for homosexual alliances within prison environments.

It was found that the deprivational experiences of inmates at HVMF was much lower than at MBP, thereby creating a less diverse set of sexual activities. Specifically, HVMF showed a predominance of institutional sissies and studs, with very few rapes and known homosexuals within the general population. Conversely, MBP exhibited a more diverse set of sexual scripts, including the prevalence of rape and the sexual abuse of known institutional homosexuals. The argument for such a variety of sexual scripts was found in the amount of

deprivation experienced by prisoners. Therefore, one would expect more manifestations of sexual variations as the deprivational experience increases (Akers et al., 1974; Wooden and Parker, 1982).

It shall be the purpose of the concluding chapter of this research to examine the many findings and implications provided by this research. Furthermore, suggestions shall be provided which enable correctional administrators to effectively control and stabilize their prison environments. It is hoped that these recommendations will prove helpful in making our correctional institutions more tractable, while at the same time provide a safe and humane environment for all people involved.

Endnotes - Chapter 6

¹Marquette Branch Prison's population also included the inmates residing in the Michigan Intensive Program Center, which housed an additional 89 prisoners.

²In this case the expenditures reflected the first year of operation for HVMF.

³The other category refers to capital outlays and costs incurred from riots.

⁴The figure represents 311 inmates at HVMF, while the current population is 411.

⁵This method of assessing cost effectiveness was chosen because other figures were not available, plus it would be much more problematic to extrapolate some type of meaning from figures which represented only a small portion of the total activity within the environment. A more appropriate method would be to ask those individuals who work in the setting for a deeper understanding.

⁶A listing and definition of critical incidents are provided in Appendix F.

⁷These were extremely problematic, in large part due to the fact that what they measured may have not been control of inmate behavior but the reporting strategies of the institution. Also, there were more inmates at MBP, so one would expect a greater number of critical incidents reported.

⁸Contrary to public belief, these figures suggest that these events are quite rare within the institutional settings of prisons. Nevertheless, they are embellished as if they were typical behaviors of such an environment. Nothing is further from the truth.

⁹Resistance refers to a situation where an inmate actually fights with a staff member and/or another inmate. Provocation is included in this definition. Non-resistance is defined as where there is no provocation. For example, when an inmate attacks a staff member, this is considered a non-resistance assault if no provocation existed during the assault.

¹⁰Because there were only 40 incidents of assault of MBP and 39 at HVMP, it was difficult to determine from these figures exactly why a staff member would be involved in non-resistance assaults at MBP as opposed to an inmate at HVMF.

¹¹Some officers at HVMF indicated that the administration sought to cover up the incidence of smuggling because it reflected poorly on their ability to control. Some even suggested that was why officers were no longer searched thoroughly when coming into the facility.

¹²If anything would be true, it would be the exact opposite: there is more smuggling because the facility is new and the officers would not be aware of how to adequately detect contraband in its many forms.

¹³This was a common phrase inmates used in talking about the organizational environment and how inmates, officers, and administrators fit into identifiable roles which insured certainty in the prison setting.

¹⁴This was a consensus among inmates at HVMF. In fact, a majority wished other institutions in the system were not so racially divided.

¹⁵This was a phrase which white inmates used to refer to black inmates who were particularly annoying and troublesome in the environment.

¹⁶This was inmate jargon which referred to relieving one's sexual frustration.

¹⁷On occasion, inmates do fall in love with each other. The bond is near permanent, at least within the institution, and this is why there are so many problems; it leads to violent conflicts among inmates.

¹⁸See Wooden, Wayne S. and Parker, Jay, Men Behind Bars: Sexual Exploitation in Prison, (Plenum Press, New York and London, 1982), for a further understanding of this area of prison sexuality, especially Chapter 7 of the book.

¹⁹Despite the fact that many inmates engaged in these often bizarre sexual relations, many expressed the fact they felt no pity for homosexuals. In fact, there was much resentment among inmates toward homosexuals at HVMF.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

1. Conclusions

The purpose of this research was to explore the social bases of power and the amount of traditional authority within a maximum-security penitentiary. Earlier research suggested that prison societies were typically coercive and often lead to a division between keeper and kept. In fact, much of the literature hypothesized that the social organization of prisoners was largely determined by the strategies of control imposed upon them by prison officials. In effect, as the prison administration attempted to achieve control through coercive measures, inmate society became alienated and further separated from the prison's formal structure.

Such was the case at HVMF. This research pointed out that there were identifiable divisions among the groups at HVMF and suggested that estrangement was a product of a formal prison hierarchy which attempted to instill control via a coercive control strategy. In essence, administrators at HVMF sought control through a centralization of authority and promulgation of specific rules and regulations.

Nevertheless, this research indicated that such a rigid, formal structure was ineffective in providing control to the prison setting. On the contrary, the central finding of this research was that the prison organization at HVMF perpetuated the development of specific types of power among administrators, officers, and inmates which further divided the organization. Furthermore, the introduction of more sophisticated hardware did not provide greater control in the prison setting. On the contrary, it created identifiable groups, each exercising various forms of power.

As a result, the prison environment had visible groups which sought to achieve their own objectives. In short, the setting was extremely fragmented. For administrators, it was found that their power was limited to the bases of coercive, reward, and access to information. It was mentioned that of the three groups administrators had the least diverse arrangement of power available. On the other hand, inmates had a greater number of power bases, exercising coercive, referent, legitimate, access to resources, and expert power. Finally, the officer role allowed the exercise of coercive, reward, referent, and legitimate kinds of power.

Three significant conclusions emerged from the analysis. First, the forms of power available within the environment at HVMF were unevenly distributed. Because the hierarchy at HVMF had fewer types of power available, it was difficult to control the institutional setting. Their reliance on coercive power, limited reward structure,

and questionable methods of collecting information had, in effect, made them less powerful in relation to the inmate body.

This is not to suggest that they had no power; however, their power was limited. For example, while it was consistent among those interviewed that administrators had the power to transfer out recalcitrant inmates or punish rule violators, this was viewed as an ephemeral response to much deeper problems. Administrators cannot transfer everyone out of the institution; they must rely on other forms of power to control the environment. At present, the development of other means of control have not been initiated, and as a consequence, administrators have very little long term control within the institution.

Second, because of the formal, structural organization of the prison, inmate power was much more diverse and greater in number. As mentioned by the literature, the prisoner society develops indirect opposition to the rigid, hierarchical structure of the prison. The same was true at HVMF. Many of the inmate power bases represented informal responses to a highly impersonal prison organization. In addition, these kinds of power enabled the power holders to exercise tremendous amounts of power within the organization. As an example, it was stated how religious leaders of the Muslim groups, individuals who were knowledgeable about the legal system, and those inmates who provided key resources, specifically marijuana and other forms of contraband, exercised much power in the organization.

Thus, this research lends some credence to the statement that "inmates run the joint." The argument was made that many of these types of power were only structural mutations and adaptations to an existing organizational design. It is being suggested that if the prison organization would seek to control, it would alter its current structural configuration to expand administrative forms of power.

Third, officers' bases of power, like administrative types of power were significantly weaker in comparison to inmate bases of power. It was found that the role of a correctional officer was problematic, often frustrating and always dangerous. In addition, the data revealed that many officers negotiated their own environments and relied on specific kinds of power in the accomplishment of their objectives. Therefore, the power bases exhibited by officers were coercive, reward, referent, and legitimate.

Of greater significance, however, many of these forms of power were functional reactions to an often perceived inadequate formal system. That is, these bases of social power represented adaptive mechanisms to the administrative scheme promulgated by administrators. Also, the specific types of power of reward and referent were employed by officers to maintain control; however, they also served to promote dishonesty, manipulation, and distrust on the part of inmates.

Finally, the analysis suggested that within the prison organization there was an equilibrium created by the interaction of

the bases of power among the groups. The prison organization was controlled and maintained through a recognition and acceptance of the various forms of power among the groups. While recognized by all groups in the organization, much of these behaviors were informal and susceptible to change at any moment.

This is what was problematic about the organization of this prison -- it was terribly informal without many permanent or lasting rules or regulations. As a result, there was always going to be much uncertainty in the environment, increasing the potential for a disturbance in the future. At present, it would be extremely dangerous to attempt to alter this structural arrangement, at least in the direction of diminution of inmate power. If administrators, for example, attempted to alter the power of those inmates who provided resources to the inmate society, there would be repercussions in the institutional setting.

This, in turn, would alter the existing equilibrium and produce further estrangement between administrators and inmates. Furthermore, what was existent at HVMF was a perverted sense of order and control, predicated on separation and division and perpetuated by the development of particular bases of power over others. In other words, the organization at HVMF was stabilized by the structural maintenance of particular social bases of power among administrators, officers, and inmates. In particular, however, officer and inmate power bases were created in reaction to the formal structure of the prison.

As a result, it was suggested that if the organization of the prison was rearranged to foster the development of other kinds of power, the environment would be more tractable. Currently, the bases of power employed by administrators developed other forms of power among officers and inmates, creating an atmosphere where control was accomplished; however, it was achieved in a tenuous fashion and often in opposition to the existing structure. Therefore, it was posited that more control could be realized within correctional institutions if other types of power were nurtured and developed by administrators. The specific power bases being referred to are legitimate, reward, and referent.

Focal Concerns: Measures of Control

The focal concerns examined were contraband, race relations, institutional misconducts, and homosexuality. The analysis revealed some interesting findings. First, it was found that the contraband system at HVMF was not as developed as in MBP. However, the analysis did suggest that HVMF does have "SOFT" contraband, with key inmates providing resources to the institutional environment. It was stated that these resources typically were drugs, in particular marijuana. Also, the data revealed that the contraband market at MBP was much more diverse and organized among inmates. In short, there were more contraband items and a wider variety of these commodities available to inmates at MBP. Lastly, it was hypothesized that these contraband items stabilized the prison setting and provided a modicum of control to administrators.

Second, race relations were examined at HVMF and MBP. The interpretation provided suggested that race relations took on a significant character only when the inmate organization was not experiencing some deprivational experience. The relations between the races at HVMF were quite good in comparison to MBP. Furthermore, once there was a cause which united the inmate population, then the referent power of the religious leaders lost its significance. Currently, the analysis indicated that race was not a crucial factor in understanding control at HVMF, even though there was referent power among religious leaders.

Another area examined was institutional misconducts. It was found that the issuance of a formal misconduct ticket by an officer represented more officer behavior rather than actual rule infractions on the part of the inmate. At HVMF, the decision to issue a ticket was contingent upon the perception of the officer that it was going to be disposed as guilty. In addition, it was shown that a majority of the major misconducts occurred in the detention, segregation, and protection areas, while a significant number of minor infractions were located in the general population areas. It was suggested that this was a function of the particular areas in the prison and the perceptions of officers in those areas.

It is logical for more major misconducts to occur in the detention, segregation, and protection areas, since these were where a majority of the serious rule violators were situated. While a

plausible interpretation, it was hypothesized that what was occurring was the selective enforcement of rules by officers, and that rule enforcement was used only as a last resort when other methods proved ineffective, e.g., informal avenues such as those inherent within the accommodative relationship between officer and inmate. Finally, the analysis indicated similar findings when an exploration was done between HVMF and MBP on critical incidents, i.e., they represented officer behavior and institutional reporting strategies rather than actual disruptive behavior.

The fourth and final area was prison homosexuality. HVMF exhibited fewer sexual scripts or orientations, with the typical sexual encounter being between a sissy and a jocker or stud. Also, there were fewer rapes and known homosexuals within the general population at HVMF in comparison to MBP. The hypothesis put forth was that the variation in the sexual scripts was a function of the deprivational experience of inmates. Therefore, as the sexual deprivation of inmates increased, one would expect more manifestations of various sexual roles. This was more so the case at MBP than HVMF.

The key to this discussion of focal concerns was its relation to the deprivations of inmates. Each one of these indicators of control was connected to the experience of inmates. The crux of this argument was that when inmates experienced many pains within the environment, it was much more difficult to control. In terms of power relations, it was posited that coercive power increased the pains being felt by

inmates. In turn, ironically, this made the institutional environment much less tractable. Moreover, as a consequence, administrators created organizational climates which produced bases of power which were antithetical to control.

By stressing coercive measures, the prison organization was actually making itself less controllable. Conversely, if administrators could develop other bases of power which promoted legitimacy and acceptance on the part of inmates, they would have a smoother running organization. Therefore, the key question becomes: How does one develop legitimacy among prisoners, and is this more effective in terms of controlling the prison organization?

2. Implications

Etzioni (1975) has maintained that individuals who are able to become morally involved in their organization show more commitment to the organization. Further research by others has come to the same conclusion. Houghland and Wood (1980) found that the amount of control exhibited in church organizations was related to the members' total commitment to the organization. Moreover, Styskal (1980) concluded that even some participation on the part of lower-level members maintained their level of commitment to the organization.

However, these past studies have tended to focus on the level of commitment within voluntary organizations, something which is not similar to the structural arrangement of prison organizations. While prisons structures are not voluntary in nature, it is still relevant

to explore how prisoners can develop, organizationally, a high level of commitment to the organization. This appears to be crucial in attempting to develop legitimacy within the institutional environment. This entails the development of legitimate power among administrators, and the acceptance of this form of power among prisoners.

It has been shown in this analysis that administrators relied on coercive means to control the institution. It was concluded that this type of power actually promoted the development of more influential forms of power among inmates, and that in effect, administrative power eroded in the process. Therefore, the actual control and stability of the institution was left up to, in large part, to the organization of inmates, specifically those inmates who were in powerful positions in the institutional setting.

To modify this organizational scheme, it was suggested that the structural arrangement of the prison be re-organized to develop other bases of power among administrators, officers, and inmates which stressed legitimacy. This, in turn, would mean that coercive measures of control would have to be modified and reduced, while at the same time including inmates more formally into the operation of the institution. This may mean the inclusion of inmates into the formal hierarchy of the prison organization.

Baunach (1981) has offered an alternative to the traditional prison structure through a model of participatory management. She

suggests that one can view institutional management models within prison as being composed of three types: Token, Quasi-Governmental, and Governmental. Each of these types represent different manifestations of power and extent of representation. Moreover, each type has an inmate council, with the councils functioning differently within the prison organization.

For example, the Token model allows the inmate council to function only in a superficial sense, limiting its power only to a "small portion of the institutions operations." Furthermore, inmate involvement is limited and the degree of representation to the formal prison structure is non-existent.

Within the Quasi-Governmental model, there is some power within the hands of inmates, particularly in relation to the determination of work assignments among inmates and the development of some roles; however, inmates are not a council to determine sanctions for violations of rules. Nevertheless, inmates are elected and do have representation within this model. This type of approach attempts to develop a closer tie between administrative officials and inmates.

The last type proposed is the Governmental model. This model comes the closest to the participatory approach; it allows inmates to make executive determinations (carrying out policies), the creation of rules via legislative action, the determination of sanctions through judicial procedures, and inmate representation through inmate participation in the formal election process. Under this approach,

inmates are empowered with specific duties and obligations in the operation of the institution.

However, this approach, as with the former two, does not allow inmates a share in the formal decision-making of the organization; it only empowers inmates to operate within the guidelines established by the formal administration and expressed through the inmate councils. In effect, this approach, while it has many powers, is only advisory in nature and much of its work may be suspended by the administration.

In response to this situation, Baunach mentions that another model does exist which emphasizes full participation; it is known as the full participation model and is currently hypothetical, since the model has not been fully operationalized to date. She states the basic tenets to this model:

The primary distinction between this model and the others is that in this model administrators, staff, and inmates collectively share the decision-making authority and responsibility for decisions made.

The value of such an approach is how the administrative organization is decentralized and power to make decisions is in the hands of administrators, officers, and inmates. In effect, by granting inmates more decision-making authority over their own destinies, one is developing a form of legitimate power. In this fashion, inmates are able to develop a normative system which allows the internalization of the institutions goals and/or objectives. In short, inmates are able to identify with the organization when there is a commitment on their part.

However, this commitment is only developed through a recognition on the part of administrators that inmates require some form of responsibility in controlling their own lives. As suggested by Fogel (1975), inmates should be allowed to "wield lawful power" within the institution. Only through this legitimization process will inmates allow control and stability to develop over time; in addition, it enables the inmate organization to develop more congruous relationships with officers and administrators.

In the past, the direction of correctional institutions has been determined by the accomodative and reciprocal bargaining arrangements between officers and prisoners. With the inclusion of administrators, officers, and inmates into the decision-making arena, the interests of all groups will be represented, and inmates can develop more legal means to accomodate themselves. Currently, the formal prison structure exhibited at HVMF and other similar correctional institutions across the country inculcate in inmates values, attitudes, and beliefs which further separate them from the administration and instill behaviors predicated on manipulation, deceit, and coercion.

These values need to be substituted with others which stress an acceptance of a shared system of governance. Also, through the development of legitimate power, one can observe how positive referent power can be nurtured by correctional officials. HVMF employed an anomalous form of referent power which accentuated give-take

relationships and compromised the authority of the officer. However, with the development and acceptance of a legitimate system one can see how the officer role would be more in tune with the interests of the prisoner. In this fashion, officers could serve as role models for inmates to emulate, and prisoners could use the officer as a referent point with which to change their own behaviors.

In addition, by gaining legitimacy among the inmate organization, administrators would be able to establish and distribute rewards more equitably within the institution. These rewards would represent attempts on the part of administrators to positively promote good behavior on the part of inmates. This reward power is considered an extension of the formal structure, which has been developed and legitimized by all groups involved, including inmates. As a result, reward power takes on a meaning and value for inmates. In this way, reward power can be used by administrators to promote the effective development of the inmate. In the past, this form of power has been employed by administrators and officers in a nefarious manner: developing symbiotic relationships which breed further alienation in the long run and serve as an impediment to any form of effective change on the part of the inmate.

Thus, the organization of the prison has been traditionally operated through measures of coercion which accentuated further division and the loss of total power in the hands of administrators and officers. As evidenced within this research, therefore, the

prison organization has been stabilized and controlled by inmate organizations which have crystallized specific and informal types of power, all being developed by a formal prison system which stressed coercive measures of control.

Ironically, these methods have proven ineffective in providing control to the organization, and if control was present, it was operating only temporarily until the formal organization attempted to restrict and constrain the bases of power of inmates. At this juncture is when the potential for prison instability is greatest. As argued by McCleery (1960), when prison administration attempted to upset the traditional lines of authority and power within the inmate hierarchy, a void was created and reacted to through violence and disturbance. Such was the case in the Hawaii prison system in the 1950's when the lines of communication were altered and no effective exchange could be conducted between key inmates and administrators. As a result, the riots represented a backlash on the part of inmates to a new line of communication between inmate leaders and administrators.

Such would be the case at HVMF. If administrators attempted to diffuse the power of key inmates (contraband providers, religious leaders, and legal experts), many problems could be expected within the institution. What is particularly problematic is that the diffusion of power among these inmates is typically handled through coercive measures, e.g., transferring out the individual or hole

time. This only exacerbates the existing tenuous situation. The power of these individuals can only be reorganized through a restructuring of the environment to include them and other inmates in the decision-making processes of the institution.

Stastny and Tyrnauer (1982) refer to this redistribution of power as "detotalization" of the prison environment. They suggest that future prison organizations should attempt to instill more democratic values within the prisoner population. This entails the reallocation of power and the development of a more effective voice among inmates. However, as suggested by Stastny and Tyrnauer, the progress toward this goal has been extremely slow. Moreover, it seems that even when initiated superficially the final result was typically something which reified the existing organizational status quo, with no substantive change in the structural design of the organization.

As suggested by the literature on organizational change and development, the idea of "shared power" has much potential for organizations, including prison organizations. As proposed by Greiner (1978), this shared power approach enables "new surges of energy and creativity not previously imagined." to be developed. Tannenbaum (1962) further develops this notion when he states:

We assume further . . . that increasing and distributing the exercise of control more broadly in an organization helps to distribute an important sense of involvement in the organization. Members become more ego involved. Aspects of personality which ordinarily do not find expression now contribute to the motivation of the members. The organization provides members with a fuller range of experiences.

There is no reason to believe that this shared responsibility approach cannot be applied to institutional corrections.

However, it will take the commitment of all the groups involved and support from the "outside" community for such a rearrangement to succeed. Until this effort is initiated, institutional corrections will continue to exist predicated on the tenuous forms of corruption, coercion, and manipulation. What is significant is that these forms of control are bound to fail, and correctional history is replete with examples which indicate the non-utility of maintaining such a structural arrangement.

Implications for Future Research

While there are practical implications from this study valuable to the operation and control of correctional institutions, there are also theoretical, methodological, and research implications for future researchers desiring to investigate power distribution and control within correctional environments. This research has attempted to show that research into the elements of power and stability are much more diverse than previously portrayed within the literature. Past research has suggested that correctional institutions operated employing coercive measures as control mechanisms. While partially true, this research maintained that power and its variations were contingent upon the contextual arrangement of the organization. Furthermore, current formal practices implemented by administrators tended to promote powerlessness on their part, while at the same time enhanced the amount and types of power among the inmate organization.

Therefore, what was suggested was that the power of inmates was a functional response to the prison structure. However, it was much more than an adaptive reaction on the part of inmates; it was also a creation and perpetuation of types of power. In effect, not only were inmates powerful vis-a-vis the formal administrative structure, as suggested by the functional-adaptive theory of inmate socialization, but more importantly, they were powerful in specific and identifiable ways, whether it be coercive, referent, legitimate, expert, or providing of resources.

A theoretical implication for future research would be the differences in the types of power among various groups within differing correctional organizations. For example, are there differing forms of power created within treatment oriented institutions as apposed to custodial based prisons? If so, what are the varying types of power among the operating groups?

It is being suggested that these kinds of investigations will enable researchers and practitioners to understand correctional institutions more thoroughly and provide a greater degree of stability to the environments. Thus, future investigations within prison societies need to theoretically consider the variations of power and how they are tied to organizational structure. Therefore, the central thesis of this research was that contingent upon the organizational structure maintained there were observable forms of power among administrators, officers, and inmates. And as a result, recognizing

these types of power among the groups enables a deeper understanding of the nature of control in correctional environments.

While theoretical implications are important, there are also some methodological issues which need to be addressed. First, because of the nature of the research it was difficult to obtain responses from prisoners in certain areas. For example, many inmates were wary of discussing how contraband operated and who controlled the subrosa activities in the prison. Therefore, it is being suggested that future research into these topical areas recognize the problematic nature of such an investigation. In addition, researchers need to develop instruments which assess the various constructs without jeopardizing the entire study.

Second, the amount of effort, time, and resources required to complete such a study deserve some attention. Regardless of the advances made, future researchers need to be aware of the tremendous amounts of effort required to utilizing such a methodological approach. Qualitative analysis is not simple; it is arduous and often frustrating. Therefore, it would be wise for future researchers to consider the required effort before attempting to employ such an approach.

Finally, there are research implications from this study: First, as mentioned earlier, it would be interesting to see if the forms of power vary from differing types of correctional institutions. Specifically, is there a difference in the types of power employed

among the groups in treatment run institutions as opposed to custodial-punitive prison structures? This type of research would be valuable in assessing the role of various organizational structures in determining disparate forms of power among prison groups. For example, some institutions attempt to instill a therapeutic community. Does this mean legitimate authority or power is being developed? This requires further investigation.

Second, it would be helpful to supplement the qualitative method with some quantitative approach. In particular, if an objective measure of the social bases of power could be developed and employed, it would enhance our ability to grasp the constructs. In this way, the instrument may be more valid in assessing the various forms of power existing among the groups. In addition, other methods of assessing control via misconducts and critical incident reports would expand our knowledge of the stability of a particular institution.

Lastly, other research may indicate the futility of attempting to control correctional institutions employing advanced technology. As shown by this research, modern approaches in the control of prisoners mean very little if legitimacy is not given by those controlled. Computer locking systems, microwave detectors, and television cameras provide no extra control within the prison environment, and in fact, they may be too costly for what is produced. As an implication of this research, it is being suggested that the advancement in the utilization of more sophisticated hardware and technology may not

alter and enhance coercive control on the part of administrators. In effect, the employment of such technologies may create the opposite situation, where power is more diverse and concentrated in the hands of key inmates. Knowing this enables policy makers to plan more effectively and efficiently in the future construction of prison facilities.

Regardless of technology employed, control and stability can only be realized through a recognition of power utilized, suggesting that some bases of power are more amenable to control than others (legitimate vs. coercive). Therefore, future research would want to examine more thoroughly the role of modern forms of sophistication in controlling prisoner populations. At present, this research suggests that such an employment was not relevant in understanding the diversities and complexities of power among groups within prison structures. Moreover, it was tenuous at best to conclude that it made inmates more tractable rather than the traditional prison structure.

In spite of the suggestions provided by this type of research, it was intended to shed some light on the nature of bases of social power and how they were interwoven with control and stability of a prison setting. Only with further investigation will more knowledge be made available to researchers, practitioners, and laymen in their collective understanding of correctional environments.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Interview Guide

Appendix A

INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. How is this institution better to do time than your previous institution?
2. Is inmate behavior controlled to a greater extent here than in your former institution? If so, how is it controlled better?
3. How is the level of contraband in this institution different compared to your former institution?
4. What kind of assaultive incidents occur among inmates at this institution compared to your former institution?
5. How does the staff control assaultive behavior in the institution?
6. How much control does the staff have in determining inmates' behavior?
7. What inmate groups exercise power in the institution?
8. How do inmates exercise control in the institution?
9. How does the administration reward/punish positive/negative behavior on the part of inmates?
10. How do the guards reward/punish positive/negative behavior on the part of inmates, both formally and informally?
11. Of those inmates who are the most influential/powerful in the institution, what gives them that influence and/or power?
12. How does one become a snitch in the institution?
13. What makes an officer respected in the institution?
14. What makes an inmate respected in the institution?
15. How do blacks and whites get along in the institution?
16. How safe and secure is this institution compared to your former institution?
17. What is the level of homosexual activity among inmates compared to your former institution?

APPENDIX B

Client Release Form

Appendix BCLIENT RELEASE FORMInstructions for Staff

Release must be signed and witnessed prior to any interviews that are to be published or broadcast in part or in whole and prior to production of still and/or motion pictures and/or voice recordings and/or videotape. Separate occasions require separate release forms.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY:

I give my permission to: (Initial all that apply)

- _____ Be interviewed
- _____ Be photographed with still equipment
- _____ Be filmed with motion picture or video taping equipment
- _____ Have my voice recorded.

I understand that the resulting product can be copyrighted or sold. I waive the right to inspect and/or approve the finished product.

_____ I agree to the following uses of the product: (Initial those that apply)

- _____ Any legal use
- _____ Only for use by the Department of Corrections as it sees fit (example: Reports, brochures, films, slides, etc.)
- _____ Only for: (Please specify) _____

I understand that if I give my permission for the photographs, filming, videotaping, interviewing or voice recordings that I have given up any right to privacy and the use of the product may identify me to the general public as a client of the Department of Corrections.

I have voluntarily signed this release. I have been told that I do not have to grant permission, and that I will not be subjected to unfavorable treatment if I refuse permission.

CLIENT SIGNATURE _____ NO. _____ DATE _____

WITNESS SIGNATURE _____

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY:

APPENDIX C

Contraband Defined

APPENDIX C

CONTRABAND DEFINED

1. Prisoner clothing may include: Trousers; shirts; winter jacket or coat; lightweight jacket; sweaters; dress shoes: jogging or canvas shoes; boots or overshoes; bedroom slippers or shower shoes; pajamas; swim trunks; headgear; walking or athletic shorts; undershorts; undershirts or t-shirts; winter underwear; socks; sweatshirts; dress gloves; raincoat; bathrobe; athletic supporter; jump, athletic or jogging suit; belt.
2. Radio, one only, A.M., F.M. or A.M.-F.M. combination transistor radio, battery operated and equipped with ear plugs or earphones.
3. Cassette tape player, one only, battery operated and equipped with earplugs (must be purchased through the institution). Recorders are not allowed.
4. Cassette tapes, as available from PRISONER stores. Limit of 30.
5. Manual typewriter, one only, portable with carrying case. Electric typewriters permitted only on attrition basis (electric typewriters not permitted at Cassidy Lake and Camp Program). THIS ITEM CAN BE INCLUDED IN EXCESS OF THE DUFFLE BAG AND FOOTLOCKER REQUIREMENT.
6. Electric razor and/or clippers, one each.

7. Table lamp, one only, hobbycraft, purchased through resident store or approved vendor.
8. Watch, one only.
9. Wedding ring, or set, worn upon arrival at R&RC, one only. Must be of a design and size so as not to present potential for use as weapon. THIS ITEM SHALL ALSO BE RECORDED ON THE PRISONER PROPERTY RECEIPT FORM.
10. Jewelry: Necklace, bracelet, PAIR earrings (one each), as approved by institution. Limit of \$25 retail value. THESE ITEMS SHALL ALSO BE RECORDED ON THE PRISONER PROPERTY RECEIPT FORM.
11. Calculator, one only, limited to \$10 in retail value.
12. Musical instruments will be permitted only with prior approval of the warden or superintendent or their designee. This item can be included in excess of the duffle bag and footlocker requirement.
13. Earphones rated at 2000 ohms impedance with a standard two conductor plug measuring 1/4-inch in diameter and 1 1/4-inch in length may be purchased to substitute for state issue sets.
14. Eyeglasses and prostheses as authorized by medical staff.
15. Sunglasses, one pair, purchased through prisoner store or brought in on visits.

16. Black and white television, one only, as available through institution stores. All sets must be equipped with earplugs or earphones, limit of \$125 retail value. This item can be included in excess of the duffle bag and footlocker requirement.
17. Institutionally approved leisure time games such as playing cards, checkers, chess sets, dominoes and cribbage boards. Limit of six (6).
18. Footlockers, one only, must fit under bed.
19. Padlock, as available from prisoner store.
20. Portable sewing machine, as approved by institution, one only.
21. Recreation equipment, as specifically approved by the respective facility, such as tennis racquets, skates, golf clubs, and so forth should be stored in the recreation area. Written authorization shall be required prior to purchase if these items are to be kept in the housing unit.
22. Canteen or inmate store expendable merchandise shall not be permitted to accumulate in excess of \$45, with not more than give (5) bottles or cans of toilet articles. Whenever possible, inmate stores will sell toilet articles in plastic containers only.
23. Hobbycraft items will be limited to those approved on the hobbycraft permit in reasonable quantities authorized by the institution.

24. Reading materials in the following quantities are considered reasonable:
- a. All school books, as authorized by principal/teacher.
 - b. Up to 10 law books as needed by the prisoner for researching his/her own case; disputes to be resolved by law librarian and/or hearing officer.
 - c. Other books up to a total of ten.
 - d. Magazines, no more than ten issues in possession.
 - e. Scrap book for picture and news clippings.
 - f. Legal papers which are concerned with a prisoner's personal pending litigation. In extreme instances this may be allowed beyond the property limit.
 - g. Newspapers, ten issues.
25. Cell furnishings in addition to state issued furniture:
- a. One mirror -- glass, stainless steel or polished aluminum (as designated by the facility) except in segregation areas where mirrors will be provided by the institution.
 - b. Institutions may approve the hanging of bulletin boards on the walls except on bulletin boards. Nude pictures may be displayed only inside lockers. Items are not to exceed two feet square in size. A reasonable selection of neatly arranged pictures will be allowed on the desk, table or locker top.

- 26. Prescription medications.
- 27. Hair dryer, one only, as approved by institution.
- 28. Attache case, one only, as available through prisoner store.
- 29. One rug and one set of draperies, as approved by institution.
- 30. Religious items, as approved by institutional staff.

APPENDIX D

Major Misconducts Defined

Appendix D

MAJOR MISCONDUCTS DEFINED

Code	Major Rule Violations	Common Examples
001	<u>*Escape; Attempt to Escape</u> Leaving or failing to return to lawful custody without authorization. Failure to return within two hours after the designated time, or within 24 hours if assigned to community residential programs, from furlough to pass.	Leaving from hospital trip or while housed at hospital; hiding from authorities, even if still on prison property, would be attempted escape. Unauthorized change of approved furlough destination. (Except is a felony and will always be referred to the prosecutor.)
002	<u>Felony</u> Any act that would be a felony under state law is also a major misconduct violation. Reference must be made to the specific statutory citation in all cases where this charge is alleged.	Breaking and entering
010	<u>*Homicide</u> Causing the death of another person by any means.	
011	<u>*Assault and Battery</u> Physical attack on, or intentional, non-consensual touching of, another person, done either in anger, or with the purpose of abusing or injuring another. Injury is not necessary but contact is.	Attack by one or more persons; striking with feces or other objects; physical resistance of, or interference with, an employee. (Note that the victim of an assault and battery should not be charged with a violation of this rule.)
012	<u>*Threatening Behavior</u> Words, actions or other behavior expressing an intent to injure, which intends to place another in fear of being physically harmed or assaulted; includes assault and battery.	Threats of sexual assault made by one prisoner to another prisoner; writing threatening letters to person.

Appendix D

Code	Major Rule Violations	Common Examples
013	<u>*Sexual Assault</u> Sexual penetration of, or other contact with another person without that person's consent; non-consensual physical contact for sexual purposes.	Rape, intentional touching of sexual area (e.g., buttocks, breasts, genitals) without consent; kissing or embrace without consent of one who is kissed or embraced.
014	<u>*Fighting</u> Physical confrontation between two or more persons, including a swing and miss, done with anger or intent to injure.	Fight between prisoners, whether with fists, broom handles or other weapons.
020	<u>Disobeying a Direct Order</u> Refusal or failure to follow a valid, reasonable order.	Refusal to submit to a shake-down; fleeing from an officer, after being directed to stop.
021	<u>Possession of Forged Documents; Forgery</u> Knowingly possessing a falsified or altered document; altering or falsifying a document with the intent to deceive or defraud.	A fake pass, application, furlough papers, etc. which is represented to be true.
022	<u>*Incite to Riot or Strike, Rioting or Striking</u> Encouragement of action to disrupt or endanger the institution, persons or property; participation in such action.	
023	<u>Interference with the Administration of Rules</u> Acts intending to impede, disrupt or mislead the disciplinary processes for staff or prisoners.	Intimidating or tampering with an informant or witness; tampering with or destroying evidence; interfering with an employee writing a misconduct report; making false accusations of misconduct

Appendix D

Code	Major Rule Violations	Common Examples
		against another prisoner or staff which would ordinarily result in disciplinary action begin initiated against that person. (Note - should not be charged as retaliation for the writing of a grievance.)
024	<u>Bribery of an Employee</u> Offering to give or withhold anything to persuade an employee to neglect duties or perform favors.	
026	<u>Insolence</u> Words, actions or other behavior which is intended to harass or cause alarm in an employee.	Cursing; abusive language, writing or gesture directed at an employee.
027	<u>Destruction or Misuse of State Property with Value of \$10 or More</u> Any destruction, removal, alteration, tampering, or other misuse of state property which has a value of \$10 or more.	Tampering with locking device; use of door plug.
028	<u>Failure to Maintain Employment</u> Failure of a prisoner in community residential or work pass programs to immediately report to appropriate department staff any absence for illness, layoff or termination from employment or training; failure to obtain prior staff approval for planned absences from, or voluntary termination of, employment or training.	

Appendix D

Code	Major Rule Violations	Common Examples
030	<u>*Possession of Dangerous Contraband</u> Unauthorized possession of weapons, explosives, acids, caustics, materials for incendiary devices, or escape materials; possession of "critical" tools and materials as defined by policy.	Gasoline, sulphuric acid, lye, prison-made knives, pipe bomb, rope and grappling hook, anything which is intended to be used as a weapon; screwdrivers, hammers, hobbycraft knives if outside of authorized area.
031	<u>Possession of Money</u> Possession of unauthorized amounts of money or money from unauthorized sources. Money is defined as either cash or a negotiable instrument.	In institutions, any money other than 50 pennies.
032	<u>Creating a Disburbance</u> Actions or words of a prisoner which result in disruption or disturbance among others, but not endangering persons or property.	Excessive noise which causes other prisoners to react; loud arguing in the visitors' room which disturbs others.
033	<u>Sexual Misconduct</u> Consensual touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of another person, done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party; indecent exposure; imitating the appearance of the opposite sex; verbal abuse of a sexual nature directed at another person in order to harass or degrade that person.	(NOTE: the embrace authorized at the beginning of a visit is not misconduct.) Kissing, hugging, intercourse, sodomy. Wearing clothing of the opposite sex; men wearing makeup. Whistling at and making sexual remarks to another person; making propositions of a sexual nature. (NOTE: Threats of a sexual <u>assault</u> should be charged as Threatening Behavior.)

Appendix D

Code	Major Rule Violations	Common Examples
034	<u>Substance Abuse</u> Possession, use, selling of providing to others, or under the influence of, any intoxicant, inhalant, controlled substance (as defined by Michigan statutes), alcoholic beverage, marijuana or any other substance which is used to cause a condition of intoxication, euphoria, excitement, exhilaration, stupification or dulling of the senses or nervous system; unauthorized possession of restricted medication; possession of narcotics paraphernalia; failure or refusal to voluntarily submit to testing, including but not limited to urinalysis, blood analysis, or breath testing, which is requested by the Department for the purpose of determining the presence in the prisoner of any substance included in this charge.	Narcotics paraphernalia includes such items as needles, syringes, etc. (that is, items used to administer narcotics), but does not include such items as "roach clips," pipes and cigarette papers.
035	<u>Unauthorized Occupation of Cell or Room</u> Being in another prisoner or prisoners' cell or room without specific authorization from staff; being present in any cell, room or other walled area, with another prisoner or prisoners, without staff authorization.	Two prisoners in a "one-person" cell; three prisoners in a "two-person" room; two prisoners in a restroom stall.
036	<u>Out of Place or Bounds/AWOL</u> Being anywhere without the proper authorization; being absent from where required to be; breaking "toplock" without authorization.	"Skating" in another block; no pass or I.D. card; missing count; failure to return on time from furlough but returned within two hours of

Appendix D

Code	Major Rule Violations	Common Examples
		deadline. ("Skating" in own housing unit during the day is a minor violation?? unless on toplock status.) Failure to be where required by detail.
037	<u>Theft</u> Any unauthorized taking of another person's property	
038	<u>Gambling; Possession of Gambling Paraphernalia</u> Playing games or making bets for money or anything of value; possession of gambling equipment, or other materials commonly associated with wagering.	Possession of dice or betting slips.

*These are offenses considered "non-bondable."

Source: Michigan Department of Corrections. Policy Directive:
"Prisoner Disciplinary Policy," No. PD-DWA-60.01.

APPENDIX E

Minor Misconducts Defined

Appendix E

MINOR MISCONDUCTS DEFINED

<u>Minor Rule Violations</u>	<u>Common Examples</u>
<u>Misdemeanor</u> Any act that would be a misdemeanor if prosecuted under Michigan law is also a minor misconduct violation, unless specified elsewhere as a major. Reference must be made to the specific statutory citation in all cases where this charge is alleged.	Larceny under \$100.
<u>Abuse of Privileges</u> Intentional violation of any department or institutional regulation dealing with resident privileges, unless it is specified elsewhere as a major.	
<u>Contraband</u> Possession or use of nondangerous property which a resident has no authorization to have, where there is no suspicion of theft or fraud.	Unauthorized items; anything with someone else's name or number on it; excessive store items.
<u>Health, Safety or Fire Hazard</u> Creating a health, safety or fire hazard by act or omission.	Dirty cell; smoking in unauthorized areas; lack of personal hygiene.
<u>Temporary out of Place/Bounds</u> In own housing unit, during the day. Out of place for a brief time or adjacent to where supposed to be.	Tardy for count or assignment: on gallery outside own cell. ("Skating" in own housing unit if on top lock status is a major.)
<u>Unauthorized Communications</u> Any contact, by letter, gesture or verbally, with an unauthorized person or in an unauthorized manner.	Love letters to another resident; passing property on a visit either directly or through a third person.

Appendix E

<u>Minor Rule Violations</u>	<u>Common Examples</u>
<u>Violation of Posted Rules</u> Violation of rules of community residential programs, housing units, dining room, furlough, work or school assignment which is not covered elsewhere.	Violation of kitchen sanitary regulations; wasting food; excessive noise in housing unit, playing TV or radio without earphone; unauthorized driving of motor vehicle; failure to report income to CRP.
<u>Horseplay</u> Any physical contact, or attempted physical contact, between two or more persons, done in a prankish or playful manner without anger or intent to injure or intimidate.	Towel snapping at others in showers; playful body punching; playing "grab-ass."
<u>Lying to an Employee</u> Knowingly provide false information to an employee.	Giving a false name, number or room/cell assignment. (Note that making false accusations of misconduct is included under the major violation of interference with administration of rules.)
<u>Destruction or Misuse of State Property with Value of Less than \$10</u> Creation of sound, whether by use of human voice, a raid, TV or any other means, at a level which could disturb others.	Playing TV above allowable level when others are trying to sleep; banging objects against cell bars.

Source: Michigan Department of Corrections. Policy Directive:
 "Prisoner Disciplinary Policy," No. PD-DWA-60.01.

APPENDIX F

Critical Incidents Defined

Appendix F

CRITICAL INCIDENTS DEFINED

The Michigan Department of Corrections defines a critical incident as follows:

1. Any resident mutiny, group uprising, threat of demonstration, strike, riot, or collective insubordination.
2. Any serious incident of violence and/or injury to any employee or citizen by a client or clients.
3. Any incident of homicide or suicide at a Department of Corrections facility regardless of the circumstances.
4. Escapes and/or attempted escape from inside any walled or fenced institution, or escape and/or attempted escape of a prisoner from such and institution while in transit.
5. Escapes from trusty assignments when hostages (employee or citizen) are taken or there is any reported violence.
6. Incidents involving use of Mace or tear gas.
7. Excessive use of force by staff in violation of PD-DWA-32.02. The institution head will ensure that each employee involved submits a complete and accurate written report to the institution head which includes the amount and kind of force used. It must include the exact holds used, if blows were delivered, methods of restraint, areas of the body

struck and if weapons were used. The report must also cover the presence of others, both residents and employees and their participation in the incident which involved use of force. The report will also include verbal orders given during the incident, conversation, and if profanity or racial epithets were used by employees and/or residents.

The following are also considered critical incidents but do not need to be reported by phone. A critical incident report must, however, be completed and forwarded to the appropriate deputy director through the institution head and the regional administrator.

8. Employee use of any force against a resident/client.
9. Any assault of a resident by another resident or residents resulting in serious injury.
10. Any discharge of firearms (except for training purposes) by an on-duty employee.
11. Accident where injury resulting in hospital admittance occurs.
12. Fires that lead to injury or more than \$500 damage.
13. Other unusual incidents, emergencies, and/or controversial situations not previously defined.

The following incidents do not need to be reported by phone nor do they require that a critical incident report be filed for each incident. They shall be reported in summary form on a monthly basis and forwarded to the BCF deputy director through the institution head and the regional administrator.

1. Vandalism damage over \$100.
2. Substance abuse, possession and/or use, including all situations where a resident is hospitalized as a result of an overdose.
3. Extortion/strongarming. This refers to serious physical abuse or verbal threats of a nature that intimidate a resident so seriously that he/she performs an act against his/her will for fear or reprisal.
4. Smuggling dangerous contraband as defined in the Hearings Handbook, Major and Minor Misconduct Definitions.
5. Reported cell and/or other theft of property over \$50.
6. Possession of U.S. currency as defined in the Hearings Handbook, Director's Office Memorandum, December 11, 1979, 031.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, Elizabeth. "New prison administrators and the court: New directions in prison law," Texas Law Review, 56, pp. 963-1008, 1978.

Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.

Arrow, Kenneth. "Organizations and information," in The Limits of Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton, 1974.

Bacharach, Samuel B. and Lawler, Edward J. Power and Politics in Organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980.

Baunach, Phyllis Jo. "Participatory management: Restructuring the prison environment," in Fogel, David and Hudson, Joe (eds.) Justice as Fairness: Perspectives on the Justice Model. Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Company, 1981.

Berk, Bernard. "Organizational goals and inmate organization," American Journal of Sociology, 71, (March):522-534, 1966.

Bierstedt, Robert. "An analysis of social power," American Sociological Review, 15, No. 6, (December):730-738, 1950.

Blau, Peter M. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964.

Bowker, Lee H. Prisoner Subcultures. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath, 1977.

Buckley, Walter F. Sociology and Modern Systems Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.

Carroll, Leo. Hacks, Blacks, and Cons. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974.

Cloward, Richard A. "Social control in prison," in Hazelrigg, Lawrence, (ed.), Prison Within Society. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960.

Cressey, Donald. "Contradictory theories in correctional group therapy programs," Federal Probation, 18, (June):20-26, 1954.

----- "The nature and effectiveness of correctional techniques," Law and Contemporary Problems, 23, (Autumn):754-777, 1958.

----- "Contradictory directives in complex organizations, the case of the prison," Administrative Science Quarterly, 4, (June):1-19, 1959.

----- "Limitations of organization of treatment," in Cloward, Richard et al. (eds.), Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison. New York: Social Science Research Council, pp. 78-110, 1960.

----- "Prison organizations," in March, James G. (ed.), Handbook of Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, pp. 1036-48, 1965.

Crouch, Ben M. The Keepers: Prison Guards and Contemporary Corrections. Springfield, Illinois: Charles Thomas, 1980.

Crozier, Michael. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Cyert, Richard and March, James. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

Dahl, Robert. "The concept of power," Behavioral Science, 2, No. 3, (July):201-215, 1957.

Dalton, Melville. Men Who Manage. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 1959.

Dubin, Robert. "Power, function, and organization," Pacific Sociological Review, pp. 16-24, 1963.

Duffee, David. Correctional Policy and Prison Organization. Beverly Hills, California: Sage-Halsted, 1975.

----- Correctional Management: Change and Control in Correctional Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980.

Emerson, R. E. "Power-dependence relations," American Sociological Review, 27, pp. 31-41, 1962.

Etzioni, Amitai. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. New York: The Free Press, 1961.

----- A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (rev. ed.). New York: The Free Press, 1975.

Fogel, David. We are the Living Proof. Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Company, 1975.

Fox, James G. The Organizational Context of the Prison. Sacramento: American Justice Institute, 1980.

French, John R. P. and Raven, Bertram. "The bases of social power," in Cartwright, Dorwin and Zander, Alvin (eds.) Group Dynamics (3rd ed.). New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Gandz, J. and Murray, V. "The experience of workplace politics," Academy of Management Journal, 23, pp. 237-251, 1980.

Garabedian, Peter G. "Social roles and the processes of socialization in the prison community," Social Problems, 11, (Fall):140-152, 1963.

Goffman, Erving. Asylums. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961.

Goldfarb, Ronald L. and Singer, Linda R. After Conviction. New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 364-369, 1973.

Greiner, Larry E. "Patterns of organization change," in Natemeyer, Walter E. (ed.) Classics of Organizational Behavior. Oak Park, Illinois: Moore Publishing Company, Inc., 1978.

Grosser, George H. "External setting and internal relations of the prison," in Cloward, Richard A. et al. (eds.) Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison. New York: Social Science Research Council, pp. 130-145, 1960.

Grusky, Oscar. "Role conflict in organizations: A study of prison camp officials," in Hazelrigg, Lawrence (ed.) Prison Within Society. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969.

Hall, Richard H. Organizations: Structure and Process. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982.

Haney, Craig, Banks, Curtis, and Zimbardo, Phillip. "Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison," International Journal of Criminology and Penology, 1, (February):69-97, 1973.

Hawkins, Gordon. The Prison: Policy and Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

Hickson, D., Hinnings, C., Lee, C., Schenck, R. and Pennings, J. "A strategic contingencies theory of intraorganizational power," in Scott, William Edgar and Cummings, L. L. (eds.) Readings in Organizational Behavior and Human Performance. Homewood, Illinois: R. D. Irwin Publishers, 1973.

Hinings, Christopher R., Pugh, Derek, S., Hicksen, David J., and Turner, Christopher. "An approach to the study of bureaucracy," Sociology, pp. 11-32, 1967.

Houghland, James G., Shepard, Jon M., and Wood, James R. "Discrepancies in perceived organizational control: Their decrease and importance in local churches," The Sociological Quarterly, 20, No. 1 (Winter):63-76, 1979.

Houghland, James G., and Wood, James R. "Control in organizations and commitment of members," Social Forces, 59, No. 1 (September):85-105, 1980.

Huff, Donald C. "Prisoner militancy and politicization: The ohio prisoner's union movement," in Greenberg, David E. (ed.) Corrections and Punishment. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Press, pp. 247-264, 1977.

Irwin, John, and Cressey, Donald. "Thieves, convicts, and the inmate culture," Social Problems, 10, No. 2, (Fall):142-155, 1962.

Irwin, John. "The changing social structure of men's prison," in Greenberg, David (ed.) Corrections and Punishment. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Press, pp. 21-40, 1977.

----- Prisons in Turmoil. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, 1980.

Jacobs, James B., and Retsky, Harold G. "Prison guard," Urban Life, Vol. 4,, No. 1, (April):5-29, 1975.

Jacobs, James B. Stateville: The Penitentiary in Mass Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.

Jacobs, James B., and Crotty, Norma M. Guard Unions and the Future of the Prisons. Ithaca, New York: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1978.

Julian, Joseph. "Compliance patterns and communication blocks in complex organizations," American Sociological Review, 31, No. 3, (June):382-389, 1966.

Kalinich, David B. The Inmate Economy. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1980.

Kaufman, Herbert. "Organization theory and political theory," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 5-14, 1964.

Kassebaum, Gene, Ward, David A., and Wilner, Daniel M. (eds.) "Why group counseling does not reduce parole violations and what of it?," in Prison Treatment and Parole Survival. New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971.

Killinger, George G., et al. Issues in Corrections and Administration: Selected Readings. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1976.

Krantz, Sheldon. The Law of Corrections and Prisoners' Rights: Cases and Materials. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1977.

Lawler, E. E. "Control in organizations," in Dunnette, M. D. (ed.) Handbook of Industrial/Organizational Psychology, pp. 1247-1287, 1976.

Lawrence, Paul R., and Lorsch, Jay W. "Differentiation and integration in complex organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 12, pp. 1-47, 1967.

Leger, Robert G., and Stratton, John R. (eds.). Sociology of Corrections. New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1977.

Lewis, Anthony. Gideon's Trumpet. New York, New York: Random House Publishing, 1966.

Lodahl, Janice, and Gordon, Gerald. "Funding the sciences in university departments," Educational Record, 54, pp. 74-82, 1973.

Lofland, John. Analyzing Social Settings. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Press, 1971.

Lord, Robert G. "Functional leadership behavior: Measurement and relation to social power and leadership perceptions," Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 22, (March):114-132, 1977.

March, James G., and Simon, Herbert A. Organizations. New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958.

March, James G. "The business firm as a political coalition," Journal of Politics, Vol. 24, pp. 662-678, 1962.

McCleery, Richard. "Communication patterns a bases of systems of authority and power," in Cloward, Richard et al. (eds.) Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison. New York, New York: Social Science Research Council, pp. 49-77, 1960.

McCorkle, Lloyd and Korn, Richmond. "Resocialization within the walls," in Johnson, Savitz, and Wolfgang (eds.). The Sociology of Punishment and Corrections. New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., pp. 409-414, 1954.

Michels, Robert. Political Parties. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949.

Moos, Rudolph. Evaluating Correctional and Community Settings. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975.

Ohlin, Lloyd. "Conflicting interest in correctional objectives," in Cloward, Richard A. et al. (eds.) Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison. New York, New York: Social Science Research Council, pp. 111-129, 1960.

Pandarus, P. "One's own primer of academic politics," American Scholar, Vol. 42, pp. 569-592, 1973.

Patton, Michael Q. Qualitative Evaluation Methods. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publishing, 1980.

Perrow, Charles. "Departmental power and perspective in industrial firms," in Zald, Mayer (ed.) Power in Organizations. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970.

Pettigrew, A. M. The Politics of Organizational Decision-Making. London, England: Tavistock, 1973.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Salancik, Gerald R. "Organizational decision-making as a political process: The case of a university budget," Administrative Science Quarterly, 19, No. 2, (June):135-51, 1974.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey. "Power and resource allocation in organizations," in Staw, Barry and Salancik, Gerald R. (eds.) New Directions in Organizational Behavior. Chicago, Illinois: St. Clair Press, 1977.

----- Power in Organizations. Marshfield, Massachusetts: Pitman Publishing, Inc., 1981.

Porter, L. W. "Organizations as political animals," Presidential Address, Division of Industrial Organizational Psychology, American Psychological Association 84th Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., 1976.

Prelesnik, John. An Investigation of the Inmate Liaison Role in the Informal Communication Structure in a Maximum-Security Psychiatric Clinic. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1972.

Rhine, Edward E. Law, Social Control, and Due Process in a Maximum-Security Prison. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1981.

Rothschild-Whitt, Joyce. "The collectivist organization: An alternative to rational bureaucratic models," American Sociological Review, 44, No. 4, (August):519, 1979.

Shover, Neal. A Sociology of American Corrections. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1979.

Stastny, Charles, and Tyrnauer, Gabrielle. Who Rules the Joint: The Changing Political Culture of Maximum-Security Prisons in America. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1982.

Street, David. "The inmate group in custodial and treatment settings," American Sociological Review, 30, pp. 40-55, 1965.

Street, David, Vinter, Robert D., and Perrow, Charles. Organization for Treatment. New York, New York: Free Press, 1966.

Styskal, Richard A. "Power and commitment in organizations: A test of the participation thesis," Social Forces, 57, No.4, (June):925-943, 1980.

Sykes, Gresham. Society of Captives. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958.

Sykes, Gresham, and Messinger, Sheldon L. "The inmate social system," in Cloward, Richard A. et al. (eds.) Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison. New York, New York: Social Science Research Council, pp. 5-19, 1960.

Tannenbaum, Arnold S. "Control in organizations: Individual adjustment and organizational performance," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 236-257, 1962.

Thompson, James D. Organizations in Action. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967.

Tifft, Larry L. "Control systems, social bases of power and power exercise in police organizations," in Munro, Jim (ed.) Classes, Conflict, and Control: Studies in Criminal Justice Management. Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Company, 1976.

Tittle, Charles R. "Prisons and rehabilitation: The inevitability of failure," Social Problems, 21, pp. 385-394, 1974.

Walmsky, G., and Zald, M. The Political Economy of Public Organizations. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973.

Wamsley, Garry L. "Power and the crisis of the universities," in Zald, Mayer N. (ed.) Power in Organizations. Nashville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1970.

Ward, David A., and Schoen, Kenneth. Confinement in Maximum Custody. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1981.

Warren, Donald I. "Power, visibility, and conformity in formal organizations," American Sociological Review, 33, No. 6, (December):951-970, 1968.

Warwick, Donald P. A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Weber, G. H. "Conflicts between professional and non-professional personnel in institutional delinquency treatment," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 48, pp. 26-43, 1957.

Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by A. M. Parsons and T. Parsons. New York, New York: The Free Press, 1947.

Wheeler, Stanton. "Socialization in correctional communities," American Sociological Review, Vol. 26, (October):697-712, 1961.

Wilson, Thomas. "Patterns of management and adaptation to organizational goals: A study of prison inmates," American Sociological Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, (September):146-157, 1968.

Wooden, Wayne S. and Parker, Jay. Men Behind Bars: Sexual Exploitation in Prison. New York, New York and London, England: Plenum Press, 1982.

Wright, Kevin. Correctional Effectiveness: A Case for an Organizational Approach. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Pennsylvania State University, College Park, Pennsylvania, 1977.

Zald, Mayer N. "Organizational control structures in five correctional institutions," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68, (November):335-345, 1962.