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Zonia, Susan Catherine

**THE DILEMMA OF UNIONIZATION: A LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY OF
FACULTY AT MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY**

Michigan State University

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THE DILEMMA OF UNIONIZATION:
A LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY OF FACULTY AT
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

by

Susan Catherine Zonia

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1983

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1983

ABSTRACT

THE DILEMMA OF UNIONIZATION: A LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY OF FACULTY AT MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

By

Susan Catherine Zonia

Unionization of faculty in American colleges and universities does not conform to most theories of collective bargaining that have focused mainly on blue-collar workers. Using a sample of five colleges at Michigan State University, we collected data in 1977, 1978 and 1981 about faculty attitudes towards collective bargaining, university administration, their communication patterns, perceptions of influence and satisfaction. In addition to investigating psychological variables, we also added to the 1981 data set structural data on department size, budget, turnover of faculty, salary and enrollments. These variables measured the impact of the work setting upon attitudes towards collective bargaining. Through regression analysis, we found the structural variables contributed little to our understanding of attitudes towards collective bargaining. One attitudinal variable, agreement with policy statements, accounted for most of the explained variance in our dependent variable. Traditional explanations of why faculty

favor collective bargaining based on age, rank, gender, job satisfaction, and patterns of influence were not supported by our data. Because these data were gathered under very different administrative and economic conditions, we think their measures are stable and show how current theories require revision to explain professional unionization.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Labor unions in the United States have had a rich and colorful history. The interested reader will find myriads of studies in any library concerning the growth and evolution of unions. In order to do justice to this history, and for our purposes here, we will confine our statements primarily to the current situations unions find themselves in.

A. Labor Unions

The history of the labor movement in the United States has largely been a blue-collar phenomenon. While unions have succeeded in organizing some groups of white-collar workers, it is in the industrial sector that unions have enjoyed their greatest success and remain concentrated today.

Unions seek bargaining effectiveness above all else. Juris and Roomkin (1980, p. 66) have noted that unions typically impose two limits in negotiations to increase their effectiveness. First, "...they deliberately limit the bargain to the term of employment". Second,

"...the unions limit themselves to a 'grieving', protective, adversary posture as being more compatible with bargaining effectiveness than comanagement,

partnership, or any other variation which puts the union in an initiating roll...The union prefers to affect employment by grieving incrementally rather than by formulating it wholesale through codecision-making."

Issues concerning wages and even job consciousness are secondary especially if they clash with union effectiveness in bargaining.

Unions had their greatest success in organizing the large, mass industries of mining, transportation, building and manufacturing (Hildebrand, 1979). While they were traditionally union strongholds, these four industries have been declining as a percentage of total employment in recent years. Table I shows how the percentage employed has decreased over the twenty-two year period. Although the national income (GNP) originating from each industry has more than doubled over this period, the number of blue-collar workers employed has not kept pace with these changes. The areas of traditional union support, greatly effected by technological changes, have become less labor intensive and more capital intensive, thereby reducing the number of workers needed.

Unions have suffered losses not only in terms of the number of dues paying members, but also they have lost a growing number of representational elections. In 1946, 79.5% of elections resulted in the establishment of collective bargaining units; in 1967, union success rate fell to 60.7%, and by 1976 this figure had dropped to 49.7%. Unions are loosing over fifty percent of all representa-

TABLE 1
NATIONAL INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES

	1963				1976				1985
	National Income Originating (in billions)	%	Employment (in thousands)	%	National Income Originating (in billions)	%	Employment (in thousands)	%	Employment Projection
Construction and Mining	30.2	6.2	3,598	5.3	87.1	6.2	4,153	4.7	6.1
Transportation and Public Utilities	40.1	8.4	3,903	5.8	106.8	7.6	4,507	5.1	4.9
Manufacturing	143.8	29.8	16,995	25.1	365.0	26.1	18,954	21.7	20.6
Services	54.1	11.2	8,325	12.3	188.2	13.4	14,602	16.7	22.1

Source: excerpted from Hervey A. Juris and Myron Roomkin (eds.) The Shrinking Perimeter: Unionism and Labor Relations in the Manufacturing Sector. (Lexington, Massachuset: Lexington Books, 1980), p. 8.

tional elections held (U.S. News and World Report, July 25, 1977). Today they represent less than 21% of non-farm workers (BLS Daily Report No. 181, 9/18/81).

Labor unions in the United States were and still are heavily concentrated in blue-collar industries employing semi-skilled, non-professionals, such as those mentioned above. They emphasize length of working day, salaries and the somewhat "arbitrary" rule of the managers over the workers. Their history of strikes, violence, walk-outs and charges of corruption have made many white-collar workers hesitant to identify with the "unions of wage earners" (Rees, 1962).

B. White-Collar Workers and Labor Unions

Blue-collar workers employed in mass production industries have been somewhat easier to organize than their white-collar counterparts precisely because of the working arrangements of blue-collar workers. Disseminating information and creating group or peer pressure and a feeling of solidarity is less difficult in a factory type setting than in isolated offices with few workers. Public sentiment also tends to be somewhat more sympathetic to manual workers walking away from their jobs and striking for better wages and working conditions. There is little sympathy for a teacher or government employee walking away from their desks for the same reason (von Hoffman, 1978; Nations Business, 1977; U.S. News and World Report, 1978).

The technical and professional class is the fastest growing group and this growth in the service sector of the economy is shown in Table I. The occupations included in this sector are of two major groups: human services (e.g., education, health and social services) and professional and technical services (research and evaluation). The service industries in 1963 represented 11.2% of the GNP and this increased by only 2.4% to 13.44% in 1976. The percentage employed, however, increased from 12.3% to 16.69% over the same period. This clearly shows that the service industries require more labor than capital investment. This implies that labor is more critical to the service sector, i.e., a change in technology is less likely to displace a large segment of the working population than in the industrial sector. Given that labor is critical to the service sector, unions must begin to make in-roads with white-collar employees if they are to survive.

One of the major barriers to organizing white-collar workers is their quasi-professional perception of their employment situation (Juris and Roomking, 1978; Smith and Hopkins, 1979). Professionals usually hold a "pro-management" orientation (Beyer and Lodahl, 1976; Dean, 1954). They view unions as employing coercion and encouraging "unprofessional" or "undignified" behavior; e.g., strikes and walk-outs. Directors of corporations who increase profits to share-holders are seen as the captains of industry while union officials who do the same for their

share-holders (members) are seen as fueling inflation. Similarly, businessmen who break the law commit "white-collar crimes" while union officials are charged with racketeering (von Hoffman, 1978).

Traditional blue-collar unions have been very effective in improving the wages of their members (Freeman, 1979). Unions stress the use of collective efforts to obtain collective salary increases and other benefits based on seniority rather than on skill (Schram, 1973; Lewis and Ryan, 1976). This runs counter to the professional's idea of behavior and advancement. As Bell (1976, p. 72) has noted, white-collar workers are recruited primarily from the middle class. Because of their social origins and:

"...in part because of the ethos of 'clean cuff occupations'" (white-collar workers were) "stubbornly determined to maintain a self-image and self-esteem that was 'middle class'".

It is not surprising then that professionals struggle to maintain distance from production workers and continue to identify unions with blue-collar workers (Goldstein, 1955).

All of this is not meant to imply that unions have completely "struck-out" in trying to organize white-collar workers. The major area of union growth over the last decade has come precisely from organizing government employees and teachers. The National Educational Association and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees are among the ten largest unions in the country.

Victories by these groups were obtained primarily for two reasons. First, and most importantly, was the passage of Executive Order 10988 in 1962 that encouraged unionism in the federal service. This clearly granted legitimacy and support to public unionism, just as, in 1935, the Wagner Act helped blue-collar industrial workers. Similarly, enabling legislation was passed in states such as Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania that granted teachers the right to bargain collectively. Secondly, in these two groups, large numbers of employees tend to work in close proximity to each other. Once the National Labor Relations Board ruled that they have a right to organize, the organizing is less problematic in these employment settings than in those with few professionals. Once organized, however, they do not always enjoy the rights and privileges of their blue-collar counter-parts. White-collar unionized workers have frequently been denied the right to strike (to wit, the air traffic controllers being fired for failure to return to work, and, teachers ordered back to the classroom). One of the major weapons of the union has been denied to public employees under some circumstances.

Smith and Hopkins (1979) and Kochan (1979) found that white-collar workers were more likely to favor unionization when they were dissatisfied with the content, scope and organization of their jobs. The issues of salaries and fringe benefits were also important, however, the researchers found dissatisfaction with working situations,

low occupational status and less involvement with the organization contributed more to promoting favorable attitudes towards unionization. White-collar workers opposed to unionization frequently cite fears of loss of autonomy. Historically, unions have not been strong proponents of worker autonomy, nor have they challenged the organization of work itself (Bell, 1976). One aspect of being a professional concerns internal, peer-review and monitoring of work as well as having some control over the work process itself. As stated earlier, unions have largely taken a grieving, protective, adversary position. Unless unions change their tactics (e.g., play up the professional, not employee, aspects of white-collar workers' jobs) it is highly unlikely that the traditional unions will be able to organize large blocks of white-collar workers in engineering, science, trade, finance, and insurance that remain virtually untouched and unlikely to organize under the current situation.

C. University and College Faculties and Labor Unions

The above discussion has attempted to show that while traditional unions have succeeded in organizing mass industries, their history and philosophy does not readily lend itself to white-collar workers. In this section, we will argue that college and university faculty constitute a special sub-category of white-collar workers and hence, pose

even more problems for organizing attempts. We will briefly explore this topic here and elaborate on it in Chapter III.

The first major drive to organize four-year colleges came in 1965 when the American Federation of Teachers sought to establish themselves as the collective bargaining agent at four California State colleges (Gerth and Haen, 1971). In their first attempt to penetrate the four-year college campuses, they had a fifty percent success rate.

As of 1978, twenty-four states had established legislation that granted faculty the right to unionize and bargain collectively (Ladd and Lipset, 1978). While other states do not expressly forbid faculties from unionizing (Brown, 1970; Johnstone, 1981), enabling legislation is critical to its success, much as earlier legislation (such as the Wagner Act) permitted the rise and growth of blue-collar and industrial unions of the 1930's.

The early 1970's saw a great flourish of organizing activities on campuses across the country. By 1976, collective bargaining units had been established in about four-hundred-thirty institutions (Garbarino et. al., 1977). However, an even higher percentage of faculty members gave verbal support for collective bargaining than actually elected a collective bargaining agent. The rush to affiliate in the early 1970's reduced to a trickle by 1977 when only thirty faculties were added to the list of those organized (Ladd and Lipset, 1978).

One of the reasons faculties at colleges and universities have been particularly difficult to organize is because of their reliance on professional associations. After long years of serving an apprenticeship in graduate school, their professional relationships often criss-cross national and international boundaries. They regard themselves as members of the academic profession and join organizations that represent the over-all profession as well as the area they practice (much as the physician who is a member of the American Medical Association as well as the American Association of Family Practitioners). These organizational affiliations lead faculty to develop a more cosmopolitan orientation than a local one (e.g., higher education teacher at a large school).

One of the criteria of being a professional, as stated before, is autonomy. There are few other types of white-collar jobs that grant the degree of autonomy that faculty members enjoy. Not only do faculty exercise considerable control over what they teach and when, but they also exercise almost complete control over the content of their courses and their research. In addition, they also exercise, through Faculty Senates (to be discussed later), considerable control over promotion, tenure, peer review and evaluation.

There is an inherent contradiction in faculty members' perception of themselves being professional and autonomous in their work situation. In the final analysis, faculty

members are employees of the college or university at which they work. It is difficult to be both an employee and autonomous at the same time (Blau, 1973, Blau and Scott:1963). Kremer and Baldridge (1975, p. 7) have argued that unionization is the choice of faculty when "...professional practices, peer judgments and faculty rights have little foothold".

Being a faculty member is a highly individualistic job granting much discretion and authority to the occupant of the role. Labor unions, on the other hand, require collective group action; they have traditionally supported obligatory union membership and closed shops in order to bar a free-ride for those who do not wish to join (Olson, 1971).

Everyone must be required to join in the agreement if collective action is to be effective. This clearly violates academics' notions of individualism and advancement in their profession.

One can reasonably argue that in the two white-collar groups unions have succeeded in organizing (AFSCME and NEA), the work done is largely routinized. This same argument cannot be made of college and university faculty. These academicians are required to update the content of their course material by keeping abreast of current literature and research in their field as well as conduct current research that will contribute to the knowledge in their field. Many academics have argued that collective bargaining and unionization would have a deleterious effect on the scope of

their work and would ultimately replace the collegial relations they now enjoy with more bureaucratic arrangements (Marshall, 1979).

Before summarizing the purpose of this study, we will first turn our attention to the enabling legislation, the unions vying to represent faculties at colleges and universities, and briefly review the history of unionization at Michigan State University.

D. Faculty Collective Bargaining Issues

1. Federal Legislation

The National Labor Relations act of 1947 excluded educational institutions from its jurisdiction.¹ Because public employment was not covered by the Act, those institutions were not subject to the federal legislation, but comprised a sub-category of public employment to be governed by state legislation. In 1959, Congress passed Section 14(c) of the National Labor Relations Act which permitted states to exercise jurisdiction when the National Labor Relations Board declined to do so. During the period from 1959 to 1970, only fifteen states had established laws to cover the needs of those employees who were denied federal relief. As a result of the slowness on the part of

¹National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. S151 (1947)

states in establishing these laws, the National Labor Relations Board, in an attempt to assure uniform application of the national labor policy, asserted jurisdiction, in 1970, over non-profit colleges and universities that met its jurisdictional standards (McHugh, 1970).

The criteria used in the industrial sector were employed by the National Labor Relations Board in order to ascertain the appropriateness of a state-wide bargaining unit. While the Board had not previously dealt with education in the past, the Board maintained that:

"We are mindful that we are entering into a hitherto uncharted area. Nevertheless, we regard the above principles as reliable guides to organization in the educational context as they have been in the industrial, and we will apply them to the circumstances of the instant case." (Cornell University, 183, NLRB No. 41, p. 74)

When faculties approve a union, they immediately place themselves in an industrial context. As Brown has noted (1970, p. 306):

"Presently there is no state public employee labor legislation which distinguishes between employees in higher education and those in elementary or secondary education. In fact, very few states distinguish between public employees in the area of education versus those employed in other sectors".

The language of the law has been responsible for much consternation and confusion for faculty. Many faculty members, who consider themselves professionals, shun comparison to primary or secondary school teachers, and avoid placement in an industrial relations model for academic governance. The language of the legislation has

led many to wonder whether or not their professional status would be diminished by placing themselves in an industrial relations context. They are also forced to consider whether the industrial relations model, with its threat of strike, is an appropriate form of academic governance.

Michigan Legislation

The Public Employee Relations Act (PERA) of 1965 gave Michigan public employees the right to bargain collectively (Brown, 1970). The faculties at all Michigan institutions of higher education are covered by this act and hence, have the right to collectively bargain. While the faculty members are considered public employees, they are not regarded as state employees, even though a large percentage of the university budget comes from state appropriations (Garbarino et. al., 1977). This distinction is important in that it removes those faculties who chose to bargain collectively from the constraints of state employee bargaining laws.

Unlike states such as New York, each institution in Michigan is considered to be constitutionally independent and therefore, retain a high degree of independence over issues of collective bargaining.

In Michigan

"...there is no state-level agency that exercises any substantial control over higher education as a state activity, and there is no state-level executive agency, such as an office of collective bargaining or other centralized bureaucracy, to develop and implement a collective bargaining policy either for state

employees as a whole or for the institutions of higher education separately or in combination" (Garbarino et. al., 1977, p. 43).

There are thirteen four-year institutions in the state of Michigan. Five of these were organized by the American Association of University Professors (Wayne State, Northern, Western, Eastern and Oakland) and four were organized by the National Educational Association (Central, Ferris, Lake Superior and Saginaw). The four schools which have not endorsed collective bargaining are: the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Michigan Technological University, and Grand Valley.

2. Types of Faculty Unions

Currently three national unions vie for the opportunity to represent faculties on college and university campuses. While all three groups have been involved in formal bargaining and negotiating contracts for faculties, important differences emerge in their respective orientations to organizing these groups.

The American Federation Teachers (AFT)

The AFT, organized in 1916, is an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor. Historically, the AFT focused its recruitment drives almost exclusively on public school teachers, treating college membership as incidental. The AFT has increased its pursuit of college and university

faculty and now has over one hundred locals at the college level. Their current total membership is 475,000 (Yakes and Akey, 1980).

The AFT (more than any other organization we will discuss) stresses the "employee" relationship of faculty members, rather than professional or collegial relations. Representatives of this group maintain that teachers, regardless of the level at which they teach, are the same as any other public employee. They liken the board of trustees of colleges and universities to the board of directors, and deans to managers (Kugler, 1968). It is this group, (i.e., the board of directors and managers) that constitute the decision making body of the university, leaving faculty to provide only an advisory role. Academic senates, faculty senates and committees are viewed by AFT representatives as a sort of camouflage to reinforce a false notion of professionalism. Since senates and committees are advisory in nature, they deny faculty real control over salaries, work load and working condition (Kugler, 1968). The AFT favors collective bargaining as the most appropriate form of faculty governance and through bargaining, attempts to achieve uniform conditions of employment, increased salaries and decreased work loads. The AFT maintains that faculties should have the same rights as other public employees and this includes the use of sanctions and strikes.

The National Educational Association (NEA)

The NEA, founded in 1857, is the oldest professional organization of teachers in the United States. It is also largest, with a membership of 1.7 million (Yakes and Akey, 1980). For the first one hundred years of its organizational life, the NEA was largely a professional teachers association and represented elementary and secondary school teachers (Wesley, 1957). However, since the early 1960's the policies of the NEA have increasingly become more militant. The organization has evolved into a full-fledged union supporting the right of faculties to participate in decision and policy making procedures at all levels, and the use of professional grievance procedures, mediation and arbitration to settle disputes.

The change in the NEA's position on collective bargaining was largely due to the success the AFT was having in recruiting faculty (Moskow, 1966), and to insure its position on campuses, the NEA began to pattern itself after its counterpart, the AFT. While the NEA became more radical in terms of its demands for faculty rights to participate in decision-making and collective bargaining, it also distinguished itself from the AFT by stressing the professional, collegial relationships of faculty and administrators. The NEA has consistently opposed any attempt to lessen professional identity and its concomitant

status. The NEA has not endorsed the use of strikes, but when they do occur, the NEA has offered its services to mediate the grievance.

The American Association of University Professors (AAUP)

The AAUP was founded in 1915 as a professional organization designed to protect and develop academic freedom. Current membership is 68,000 (Yakes and Akey, 1980) and since virtually all members are employed in higher education, the AAUP is the major spokesperson for college and university faculty.

While the AAUP consistently attempted to strengthen areas of job security, salaries, and academic freedom, it tended to do so through existing forms of academic governance, such as faculty and academic senates.

In the case of Michigan, the law grants the right of exclusivity to a representational unit (Brown, 1970). This right has been opposed by the AAUP because, as a professional organization, they would be denied access to the internal governing mechanisms of the university. The AAUP maintains that exclusive representation would grant the bargaining unit jurisdiction over issues previously disposed of by faculty senates, leaving the senate an impotent committee. Both the AFT and the NEA endorse the right of exclusivity.

In the last ten years, dissension has arisen within the organization as to whether or not the AAUP should continue as a professional association or begin to focus on economic issues and working conditions. While the dominant faction stresses the professional aspects of the association and the need to work differences out through the academic senate, since 1968, the AAUP has nevertheless begun to compete with both the AFT and the NEA for the right to represent faculty in collective bargaining.

Recent activities of the AAUP certainly give the appearance of this organization resembling a union more than a professional association. The AAUP, like its counterparts, also supports the use of strikes by faculty members. However, their enthusiasm for this type of response is even less positive than that of the NEA, or certainly that of the AFT. The AAUP endorses the use of strike only over academic matters and not for economic issues. Where the AAUP has been designated as the representational unit at a campus, the AAUP endeavors to develop and strengthen internal mechanisms for handling disputes and does not attempt to employ a trade-union approach.

These three unions on the national level try to represent the faculty at colleges and universities, but only two have been successful in gaining ground at Michigan State University. The AFT which, as stated above, has its largest

constituency in primary and secondary schools, has not become a viable contender among Michigan State University faculty as a representational unit.

3. Attempts to Organize the Faculty at Michigan State University

The first attempt to organize the faculty at Michigan State University was instigated by the faculty in the University College, a large, non-degree granting unit with liberal admission standards. Compared to other units at Michigan State University, the University College had high teaching loads, low salaries, and had little involvement in research (Perlstadt, 1975).

In 1970, it petitioned the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) to establish a collective bargaining unit for the college. MERC denied the petition, upholding the University's argument that University College faculty were a part of the entire faculty unit and thus, could not be treated as a separate entity (Lozier, 1972).

1971 witnessed an increased effort to unionize the Michigan State University faculty. This time, the MSU Faculty Associates, who affiliated with NEA, announced its intention to obtain authorization cards from faculty in order to petition MERC for an election. Following this announcement by the MSU Faculty Association, the local

chapter of the AAUP also voted to seek authorization cards to insure a position on the ballot, should an election actually take place.

In order to petition as a faculty collective bargaining agent, the prospective agent must obtain authorization cards from 30% of the faculty. The MSU Faculty Associates were successful in garnering the necessary percentage of authorization cards by March, 1972, when the constituency of the proposed faculty bargaining unit was decided. The MSU Faculty Associates, in conjunction with the administration, established the criteria of voter eligibility. Because the AAUP lacked the necessary authorization cards, they could only have their organization placed on the ballot and could not make recommendations relative to the bargaining unit. The bargaining unit was comprised of all regular and part-time faculty and librarians, but excluded department and associate chairpersons, assistant, associate and college deans, head coaches and clinical adjunct faculty (Perlstadt, 1975).

The election, conducted by MERC, took place October 23 and 24, 1972. The results were 280 for the AAUP, 438 for the MSU Faculty Associates (the NEA affiliate) and 1,213 for no union (Lozier, 1972). Approximately 80% of the faculty eligible to vote turned out for the election.

A second attempt to unionize the faculty took place in 1978. The MSU Faculty Associates were successful in obtaining authorization signatures from 30% of the

2,800 faculty members and petitioned MERC for an election to be held. The AAUP was only successful in obtaining authorization votes from 10% of the faculty. Once again, it was the MSU Faculty Associates who, in negotiation with the administration, decided on the constituency of the bargaining unit, leaving the AAUP with the sole option of intervening which would give them a place on the ballot. The election was held May 24 and 25, 1978. Of the 2006 ballots cast, 289 were in support of the AAUP, 476 for the MSU Faculty Associates and 1,097 for no representation, with 144 ballots contested (The Bureau of National Affairs, 1978). The percentage of faculty favoring no agent declined from 63% in 1972 to 59% in 1978 while the percentage favoring the AAUP rose from 14% to 15%, and those favoring the MSU Faculty Associates also increased from 23% to 26% during the two election periods. Regardless of these increases, the majority of the faculty favored no representation and unionism was rejected for the second time.

A third attempt to establish collective bargaining at Michigan State University took place in 1982. A change took place in the composition of the bargaining unit in this election. This time the unit also included tenure track counselors from the counseling center, tenured coaches, intramural sports faculty, and teaching specialists (Bureau of National Affairs, 1982). The election, held November 17 and 18, 1982 resulted in the following ballots being cast: 400 votes favoring the AAUP, 252 in support of the MSU

Faculty Associates and 939 for no representation. The AAUP received significantly more votes than it had previously garnered (25% in 1980 as opposed to 15% in 1972 and 1978) while MSU Faculty Associates clearly lost ground (16% in 1980 compared to 26% in 1978 and 63% in 1972; see Table 2).

TABLE 2
ELECTION RESULTS

UNION	YEAR		
	1972	1978	1982
AAUP	280 (14.5%)	289 (15.5%)	400 (25.1%)
MSUFA	438 (22.7%)	476 (25.6%)	252 (15.8%)
No Union	1213 (62.8%)	1096 (58.9%)	939 (59.1%)
TOTAL	1931 (100%)	1861 (100%)	1591 (100%)

In the 1972 and 1978 elections, the unions focused primarily on the issue of salaries as a rallying point to muster votes. The AAUP and MSU Faculty Associates stressed the lag in university salaries with the cost of living and the low ranking, in the Big Ten, of full and associate professors' salaries at Michigan State University. While salaries remained a critical issue in the 1982 election, this election also focused on faculty's concerns about academic governance and their ability to have a voice in determining policies, procedures, academic tenure and academic freedom. The issue of "powerlessness" was greater this time around than at any previous time (State News, Vol.75, Nos. 161, 162 and 193). One could reasonably argue that these feelings of powerlessness, which were frequently expressed in university newspapers, were a natural response to the significant and dramatic changes taking place on the campus. Programs were being deleted, department budgets were being cut, salaries frozen, some older and tenured faculty were asked to take early retirements and their newly vacated positions were frozen. While these changes led to a large group of dissatisfied faculty, the majority nevertheless favored no representation over the two unions seeking a certification as the bargaining agent. The faculty at Michigan State University have rejected unionization attempts three times in the last decade. Thus,

the faculty, along with student employees, remain the only two major groups of employees at Michigan State University who have not collectively organized.

E. Purpose of the Study

Theories of collective bargaining, and indeed, the history of unionization, have traditionally focused on blue-collar workers. These propositions do not provide us with viable explanations of the problems encountered when the subjects are white-collar workers and professionals in the service sector (Wolman, 1916; Bass and Mitchell, 1976).

Since the establishment of state and federal law granting college and university faculty the right to organize (mid 1960's), national collective bargaining organizations have actively supported local campus groups in their attempts to unionize. The growth of unions has often been attributed to workers reactions to high unemployment, recession and reduction and/or stagnation in wages (Dunlop, 1948). Wyte (1944) proposed that workers join unions in order to improve their economic and working conditions as well as improve human relations problems associated with their jobs. Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) argued that workers were more likely to join a union when their bargaining position in the labor market declined. Ladd and Lipset (1975), Brown (1970) and Johnstone (1981) have argued that, (in the case of college and university faculty)

professionals join unions to protect their freedoms. These researchers have stated that where academic freedom and prerogatives are unclear or undefined (e.g., new schools and community colleges) there is a greater tendency to turn to unions for protection. While many explanations have been postulated on why workers join unions, there is little consensus among researchers on this phenomena, be it for blue-collar, white-collar or professional workers.

The early 1970's was a period of unprecedented growth and prosperity on many college campuses. Today, universities and colleges are faced with declining enrollments, a slowing of the economy and hence, their operating budgets, depressed academic job markets, and changes in faculty job security and tenure. While conditions appear to be ripe for unionization, the trend toward expanded unionization has slowed down. (Ladd and Lipset, 1975).

In order to ascertain whether or not macro level changes in the job market, budgets and political climate have had any impact on collective bargaining, one can look at their reflection in the micro sphere. This study, based on longitudinal data, will provide us with the unique opportunity to analyze attitudinal changes. Have faculty attitudes about the effectiveness of collective bargaining and the impact it has on university and college education remained the same, or has there been a reassessment of the impact of collective bargaining in higher education? Does

the current crisis in academia regarding budget and job security lead faculty to be more predisposed to unionization attempts or less so? With these questions to guide us, we will study five colleges and their respective departments at Michigan State University. Our major hypothesis is that the greater the perceived influence of faculty members, particularly as it relates to job security and economic rewards, the less faculty will favor the establishment of a collective bargaining unit.

II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

In this chapter, we will explore the effects faculty characteristics have on perceptions of influence. We will attempt to establish that perceptions of influence will effect the perceived impact of collective bargaining, and the perceived impact of collective bargaining will affect voting behavior. First we will review the literature on the organization of the university and faculty unionization. Then we will discuss some key sociological concepts, such as power and influence, reference groups, and communication. This will be followed by a discussion of recent changes on university and college campuses. After each section, research hypotheses, derived from the literature, will be proposed.

A. The University Organization

The university campus represents one of the largest single units of professionals working together. Faculty members can best be characterized using the traditional model of professionalism with its assumption of autonomy and independent decision making, with norms of service and peer control guiding the actor (Kadish, 1968; Scott, 1966). As Scott has pointed out (1981), the role of the professional and that of the bureaucrat overlap on issues concerning the

criteria of work performance, commitment to the work process and the extensive training based upon achievement norms. The selection of people into the job and career advancement for both the bureaucrat and the professional is based on merit. The bureaucrat, however, operates under an "administrative principle" (Friedson, 1973) in that the organizational hierarchy determines the division of labor, scope of work and tasks to be performed, and the method of performance. The professional operates, according to Friedson (1973), on an "occupational principle": the professional obtains the right to perform a particular type of work, exercises control over the entrance to the profession and training of apprentices, and controls the determinants and evaluation of the work performed.

The use of peer review and control, rather than hierarchical review and control, perhaps best distinguishes professional from bureaucratic forms of employment. Brown (1970) argues that for the professoriate, this is certainly the case. Economic aspects of teaching have historically been less important for faculty than participation in campus government and ability to exercise some control over curriculum, scholastic standards and degree requirements.

Perhaps the best forum for professional self-government and peer review on campus has been the faculty senate. Although many forms of academic senates exist, it most frequently is composed of all faculty above a certain rank who then elect a smaller group to actually transact the

business (Brown, 1970; Johnstone, 1981). Ideally, the senate is an elected body composed of representatives from a broad range of disciplines who, as a group, represent the larger body of faculty. In addition to handling grievances and tenure review, the senate also acts as an advisory group to the administration.

Opposition to the senate system has been growing in recent years. Johnstone (1981) notes that universities are becoming ever more bureaucratic. The amount of paper work needed to cover the myriads of governmental regulations (e.g., affirmative action, filing for state and federal matching funds, administration of grants and handling student loans) has resulted in a dramatic growth of the administrative hierarchy. This has led to an increased centralization of decision making and promoted many faculty to conclude that:

"...the collegial process has been betrayed, that academic freedoms and professional integrity are threatened severely, and that the distinctiveness of an academic community of scholars is fading as the university becomes just another big business" (Johnstone, 1981, p. 9).

Brown (1970) has noted that where faculty senates are strong and active, there has been little movement towards collective bargaining. This idea is supported by Ladd and Lipset (1975, p. 256) who stated that support for reform (as opposed to complete change) of academic governance system is greater at upper-tier schools

"...where objectively the situation is better in the sense that decisions are more collegial and less hierarchical than at colleges of the lower range".

B. Power and Influence

The existing rules and regulations of an organization reflect the power structure of the groups within the organization. In universities, especially large ones, the stages of faculty as professionals are clearly recognized in the use of peer as opposed to administrative review. It would be erroneous to generalize that one group (administrators or faculty) is more powerful than another. The question must be addressed: who has power over what types of issues? The administration exercises almost complete control over budgets while faculty are autonomous in academic matters. Clearly there is an overlap between the two: i.e., if the administration withholds or cuts back on departmental funding, the faculty in that department may not be able to offer as many courses as they would like, or may have to increase enrollment and cut back on the number of sections offered. Both administrators and faculty wield a considerable amount of power and influence, but in different spheres.

Parsons (1960) identified three levels in the hierarchical structure of complex organizations: the technical core (i.e., those who are directly involved in carrying out the actual processes of the organization), the managerial level (those involved in the organization's internal affairs and decision making processes), and the institutional level (those involved in the mediating structures between the technical and managerial level and

the larger community interests). The administrators linking the organization with the environment become ever more critical to organizational survival when there is a lessening of environmental munificence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Perhaps more than any other single group at the university, those working at the institutional level are engaged in reducing uncertainty (Crozier, 1963). These individuals try to gain support for the university through foundations, accrediting agencies, industry and the government, and simultaneously fend off pressures from these outside groups so that the university has enough autonomy to design its own future.

The increase in the number of students from less well-to-do families has led to an increased dependence on financial aide to cover tuition costs. Nothing has accelerated the growth of bureaucracy at the university more than the increased dependence on financial aid, making the university subject to federal regulations. Also, as universities move from educational institutions to research institutes, more and more grant money flows through the finance office, requiring increased and more precise

accountability of funds.¹ This has resulted in increased centralization of decision making at the institutional level on financial matters and a concomitant decrease in influence at the managerial level (chairpersons and deans) and the technical core (faculty).

While the institutional level has become the critical link between the university and its environment (and this link is especially important during enrollment and financial declines) not all decisions are made by this group. As Blau and Schoenherr (1971) pointed out, large size and complexity creates pressures to decentralize authority. The day-to-day activities of faculty member, (i.e., their teaching and research) are not directly supervised by an administrative staff. Selective recruitment of technically qualified personnel and internal control mechanisms provide faculty with guidelines for fulfilling their role within the broad framework of the university. In addition, most personnel decisions are made by departmental faculties because senior administrators rarely have the expertise to do so.

"Nevertheless, senior administrators control the direction in which universities are moving and the work that is being done in the long run, because they

¹The take-over of the Alumni Association at MSU is a clear example of this type of increase in bureaucracy. The reason for the take-over was to make the Alumni Association a major vehicle in obtaining private funding. There was also a need to make the Association financially more accountable to the University. As a result, the University had to hire more administrative staff to try and capture this market and increase the accountability of the association.

allocate the funds that determine which fields can expand and which ones must contract" (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971, p. 351).

Unlike workers in other organizations, faculty have direct input into some of the major goals of the organization, namely teaching and research (Etzioni, 1964). The administration exercises considerable indirect control over departments (allocation of funds) and over the university's long-term goals. Administrative positions in the university were once held almost exclusively by former faculty members (Johnstone, 1981). Today, these positions are increasingly occupied by professional administrators whose values and loyalties come not from the institution or academic disciplines, but from basic principles of administration. This has created much animosity between faculty and administrators and feelings of being "disowned" because it is no longer former colleagues who are making the decisions (Johnstone, 1981). This has led some faculty to conclude that they have less power. While they may no longer be able to exercise influence (or at least think they do!) over former colleagues who are now administrators, the question that should be asked is: over time, have the professional prerogatives diminished? We would argue that where faculty senates are well-defined and the division of labor and spheres of influence between faculty and administrators are clear, faculty prerogatives and power have not declined. Nevertheless, it is over the issue of

indirect control and future directions of the university that administrators and faculty most often clash.

While the faculty senate ideally represents all faculty on campus, studies indicate that faculties do not view power and influence as variables that are equally distributed among them (Brown, 1970). The establishment of a collective bargaining system may be viewed as an alternative to traditional academic governance systems with heavy reliance on academic senates. However, research indicates that most faculty do not want the academic governance system completely abolished (Ponak and Thompson, 1979). Rather, the collective bargaining system is to supplement the more traditional governance, especially in the areas of budgets, salaries and fringe benefits --- areas that the traditional system is viewed as being ineffective in dealing with.

Bigoness (1978) states that adherence to professional values is viewed by some as incompatible with collective bargaining. The faculty in more prestigious colleges and universities are less likely to look towards collective bargaining as a means of securing their interests (Ladd and Lipset, 1975). This is due, presumably, to the superior bargaining power these individuals exercise in their institutions and that they earn more money than their colleagues at less prestigious schools. On the other hand dissatisfaction with administration, insufficient pay and lack of opportunities for promotion, particularly for those in the lower ranks, are said to lead to militant attitudes

towards employers (Feuille and Blandin, 1975, Thompson, 1967).

Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) examined the power of various subunits at the University of Illinois, Urbana, and asked department directors to rate their department on overall quality and its members participation on key committees. The researchers concluded that the more powerful the subunit (in terms of its representation on committees and quality), the greater the unit's advantage in obtaining resources. Even when the researchers controlled for work load, national rank, and faculty size, they found that the proportion of the budget received by a department was related to the departmental power.

Lyons and Lyons (1973), in a survey of faculty at Florida State University and the University of Wisconsin at Madison, got surprisingly similar results on their questions of "who should" and "who does" have power. Regarding who does have power, the regents, legislature and university administrators were seen as having a great deal of power while faculty rated themselves as only having "some" power.

Similarly, in a survey by Kenen and Kenen (1978), the researchers found significant differences in perceptions of power by rank. Senior faculty claimed more influence and power over educational policies and appointments than junior faculty. Indeed, junior faculty perceived all others, including trustees, to have more influence than they did. Of all the characteristics the researchers investigated

(rank, sex, race and chairpersonship), rank had the greatest effect on the perceptions of influence and power.

There have been numerous studies conducted concerning various aspects of job satisfaction and propensity to unionize. Bigoness (1978) and Allen and Keaveny (1981) found that faculty members' status was strongly associated with attitudes toward collective bargaining. Tenured faculty expressed less need and desire for union representation than non-tenured faculty. Regardless of rank, the researchers found that older faculty members were less predisposed to unionization attempts than younger faculty.

Blau (1973) found that the larger the size of an academic institution, the greater the senior faculty members' authority and influence, as a group, on certain aspects of the decision making process (i.e., appointment procedures and tenure). While the large size of an institution increased the amount of influence of the faculty as a collective, Blau found that it reduced the influence of individual members. Power is divided among more individuals at larger institutions than at smaller ones. An individual's influence, according to Blau, is dependent on the individual's academic position and formal qualifications. Given that older faculty have had a longer period of time to establish themselves academically, and are more likely to have tenure than younger faculty, senior faculty, in general, wield more power and influence than their junior colleagues. The issue of influence has been found to be

critical to collective bargaining (Hammer and Berman, 1981). Individuals that feel powerless are more likely to favor the establishment of an organization such as a union, that would give them more input in decision making.

Based on the above discussion of power and influence in the university structure, we put forth the following proposition:

Proposition #1: Individuals who themselves or whose peers (in academic rank) participate in organizational decision making perceive themselves to be influential.

In order to examine this proposition, we will test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis #1: The higher the academic rank, the higher the personal influence.

Hypothesis #2: Non-tenured faculty will perceive group influence to be higher than personal influence.

Hypothesis #3: The lower the personal influence, the higher the perceived impact of a collective bargaining unit on issues of salaries, decision making and job security.

C. Reference Groups and Communication

The research on reference groups helps us to understand the informal stratification within the university structure. The term "reference group" was first coined by Hyman (1942) to explain the importance of group membership in shaping an actor's attitudes and conduct. In Hyman's work, reference groups were points of comparison used by actors to evaluate their status, and estimates were found to vary according to

the group the actors compared themselves with.

"...reference group theory aims to systematize the determinants and consequences of those processes of evaluation and self-appraisal in which the individual takes the values or standards of other individuals and groups as a comparative frame of reference" (Merton and Kitt, 1950, pp. 50-51).

A reference group, then, provides a frame of reference to the actor in the organization of his perceptual field. The adoption of a particular outlook of a group becomes part of the actor's repertoire or orientation to the world and proves a frame of reference, a guide if you will, to understanding new situations (Shibutani, 1955).

In the university setting, one reference group for faculty is that of their profession. Professional reference groups provide guides of conduct, judgement and evaluation as well as social support for those striving for these standards (Blau and Scott, 1963). Professional associations representing the numerous disciplines in higher education have traditionally provided these guides. Novices quickly learn guides of "professional" behavior at annual conferences, and this includes making sacrifices (e.g., salary and time) for scholarly pursuits.

Gouldner's seminal work on cosmopolitans and locals (1957) found that faculty with a high commitment to professional skills and an orientation to outside reference groups had little loyalty to the organization which employed them. These professionals adopt what Gouldner has called a "cosmopolitan" orientation which is characterized by high

participation in professional societies, interest in professional journals and research, and little reluctance to taking a new job. The counterpart of the cosmopolitan is the "local" who is characterized by a reluctance to leave the organization, a belief in employee unity, and an intellectual stimulation acquired from colleagues (London et.al, 1977; Goldberg, 1976; Rotondi, 1977). The professional reference group is perhaps the most important external reference group for faculty.

Another external reference group for faculty (which we have no data on, but is worth noting) would be other professionals working outside the university, such as engineers, lawyers, and physicians. This external reference group becomes important when faculty expectations do not keep pace with rewards. For example, faculty may be dissatisfied with their salaries, but they get to choose their own working hours, and are entitled to sabbaticals or summers off. We think that most faculty obtain satisfaction by comparing themselves to others who suffer more unemployment, regulation, job dissatisfaction, arbitrary supervision, and fewer social and economic rewards.

In smaller schools, the internal reference groups include not only colleagues in one's own department or discipline, but also colleagues in other disciplines and sometimes even students. With these groups, the focus is not on shared interests in a particular academic field or research in general, but rather upon teaching concerns.

Employing Gouldner's terminology again (1957), these faculty members can be characterized as "locals". These individuals are oriented more to the university in general and to their internal department than are the professional-cosmopolitans.

Another source of internal reference for faculty is the university itself. The university, as employer, also provides sets of rules, philosophies and orientations for faculty to use as behavioral guides. Again, because of the prevailing orientation to the department and university, this reference group can also be characterized as "local" in nature.

While we have identified two external and two internal sources of reference groups, we do not mean to imply that faculty must be of one type or another. Rather, we would expect to find that faculty members' attitudes, values, and self-appraisals are based, in some part, on all four types. However, we would expect one reference group or orientation to dominate the other three in the faculty member's frame of reference.

Reference groups are not simply randomly chosen collectivities of individuals but rather, are socially identifiable groups. The concept is useful only if these reference groups can be readily identified with structural divisions in society. Academic rank represents one such structural division. We will now investigate whether faculty differ according to rank in terms of their reference groups. More specifically, we will use communication

patterns as an expression of reference group preference and explore differences that may exist by rank.

Communication

Hall (1972) has noted that communication in organizations is a dynamic process as new actors and definitions are constantly entering the scene. members of an organization are the carriers of its subculture which they transmit to new members (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Social interaction and communication provides participants with an opportunity to test out their ideas. Blau and Scott (1963) found that communication has a significant impact on problem solving in groups because it furnishes a form of social support to individual members. While the free flow of communication is an integral part of problem solving and testing ideas, this flow creates problems by promoting social differentiation and hierarchical dependence. Extensive communication with diverse components of the organization's environment promotes differentiation and Blau (1973, p. 269) cites as an example of this, the fact that

"...the establishment of new departments, which manifests differentiation in process, is more likely if the faculty is not so committed to the local institution that they lose touch with colleagues in their various disciplines outside and if they have much contact with bright graduate students, who may be considered a demanding environment".

Similarly, size of an organization has also been found to effect the flow of communication. In the university, large size promotes the development of new specialities

(Blau, 1973). The presence of a large number of scholars provides fertile ground for the exchange of ideas as well as promote communication among individuals that have common interests in an emerging speciality. This differentiation into specialities makes faculty ever more independent to pursue teaching and research and hence, weakens their over-all integration. The more specialized the departments in the university become, the more difficult it is for faculty to communicate across discipline lines on scholarly matters or some other common ground that could integrate them.

While faculty are horizontally independent of one another, they are not hierarchically independent. Hierarchical dependence has also been found to create obstacles to communication and is well documented in the literature (Blau, 1963; Hage, Aiken and Marrett, 1971; Rogers and Rogers, 1976; Katz and Kahn, 1966). Individuals do not turn to supervisors or superiors to discuss ideas and problems for fear of being judged or revealing their ignorance. While hierarchical dependence disinclines faculty to engage in communication with superiors, it does, however, promote communication among peers. Blau and Scott (1963) found that the highest frequency of communication occurs between individuals that are relative equals in both formal and informal status. As Katz and Kahn (1966, p. 244) have stated:

"The mutual understanding of colleagues is one reason for the power of the peer group. Experimental findings

are clear and convincing about the importance of socio-emotional support for people in both organized and unorganized groups. Psychological forces always push people toward communication with peers: people in the same boat share the same problems."

Interpersonal linkages play a key role in reducing uncertainty in organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Individuals prefer to interact and conduct their business with others that are familiar to them. The sharing of common characteristics makes communication more likely.

In general, higher ranked faculty are better linked into the hierarchy of the university organization (e.g., higher ranked faculty are more likely to sit on committees such as tenure and finance, inter-departmental committees, and university senate). Higher ranked faculty have, more often than not, been at the university longer than lower ranked faculty. The amount of time spent in the organization has provided them with a history of contact with faculty in other departments and programs, plus more of an opportunity to develop contacts with university administrators (who, at one point may have been colleagues). Lower ranked faculty tend to be younger than those of higher rank. Because of the short amount of time spent in their position, these novices have had little opportunity to be elected or appointed to committees that would bring them into contact with other faculty and administrators. Indeed, a major part of their time and energy is concentrated on establishing themselves in their discipline. We would therefore expect:

Proposition #2: Length of employment affects an individual's identification with the university.

The hypothesis we will investigate, based on this proposition, is:

Hypothesis #4: The longer the faculty member's length of employment at the university, the higher the identification with the university.

Likewise:

The shorter the length of employment at the university, the higher the identification with the discipline.

Based on the previous discussion of communication, we would also expect:

Proposition #3: The closer faculty members are in academic rank, the more likely they are to interact.

In order to test the validity of this proposition, we will test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis #5: The higher the academic rank, the more the communication with administrators and the less the communication with graduate students and union representatives.

Because of the differences in status of the various unions (the AAUP is viewed as a more professional association when compared to the MSUFA), we would expect that:

Hypothesis #6: Faculty who communicate with AAUP representatives have a higher academic rank than those faculty who discuss ideas with MSUFA representatives.

D. Changes on University Campuses

Colleges and universities have, since the early 1970's, been faced with erratic enrollment patterns. After more than a decade of unprecedented growth on campuses across the country, these organizations are now faced with dramatic declines in enrollment as well as their finances. Currently, universities face an extremely uncertain future.

The literature on faculty unionization contains a plethora of factors that are adduced to account for the drive toward unionization. Steiner et.al. (1972) have argued that the deterioration in the purchasing power of faculty salaries and compensation forces faculty members to turn to unions for protection. Indeed, the move toward unionization is viewed by some researchers to be the result of dissatisfaction with rewards and managements' ability to satisfy employee desires (Walker and Lawler, 1979; Feuille and Blandin, 1976).

Some researchers (Morgan and Kearney, 1977; Mortimer and Lozier, 1973; Birnbaum, 1974) argue that collective bargaining improves the economic position of faculty. Other researchers (Marshall:1979; Brown and Stone:1977) report that there is little if any difference between salary increases in union and non-union institutions. While some faculty believe that a collective bargaining arrangement is the only reasonable response to recent declines in the university's ability to reward them, either monetarily or psychologically (Birnbaum, 1974; Garbarino et.al., 1977;

Morgan and Kearney, 1977), others draw the opposite conclusion (Lewis and Ryan, 1976, 1977). Faculties that do reject collective bargaining appear to do so on the grounds that individually, their rewards will not be significantly improved under the new system (Feuille and Blandin, 1974; Bigoness, 1978).

Hirschman's work on responses to declines in organizations (1970) provides us with a key to understanding why some universities unionize and others do not. When significant changes take place in an organization, participants have three options: they can exit by severing their employment and taking a job elsewhere; they can voice their position on the current situation and by working through the established channels, try to effect change; or, because of their strong identification and loyalty to the organization, they can simply accept the situation as the new status quo. We would argue that where the exit option is strong, faculty can demand a greater voice in the university. These individuals can use the threat of leaving (exit and voice) to improve their bargaining position. Therefore, they have little need for collective bargaining.

When the job market is tight (where mobility is low and there is a vast supply of Ph.D.'s) the exit option becomes less viable and the voice option becomes the primary mode for handling disagreements and dissension. However, the individual voice option is weakened without the exit option to back it up. It is with this group (those having voice

but no exit) that we would expect to see the strongest move toward unionization. This is consistent with Thompson's (1967) argument that when the job ceiling is low (i.e., demarcations between entry level and highest level are few), individuals will turn to forms of collective action to protect and enhance their occupation.

Michigan State University has recently been going through some dramatic changes as a result of the dire financial position of the state's economy resulting in programmatic deletions and an over-all cut back in departmental budgets. Our earlier surveys (and indeed, the literature in general) have revealed a polarization by rank of faculty groups favoring collective bargaining. The instructors and assistant professors have been more favorable to collective bargaining than the associate or full professors. While the tenure system has historically been sacrosanct and tenured faculty have not been favorable to unions, we expect a change to have occurred with these recent cut-back proposals. Senior, tenured faculty are expensive investments for any school. When these individuals lack the exit option, we would argue that they would be more disposed to unionization. In the wake of actual and potential budget cuts that might affect all faculty, faculty are expected to "close ranks".

Proposition #4: Changes in job security and dissatisfaction of faculty with administrative procedures and decisions will lead both tenured and non-tenured faculty to be more likely to seek job protection from

organizations outside of the university.

To test this proposition, we propose:

Hypothesis #7: The differences between the various faculty groups' (i.e., rank, college and age) attitude towards collective bargaining will narrow between 1978 and 1981.

III. DATA COLLECTION

Introduction

As stated earlier, the purpose of this study is to measure the effects of the perceived influence of faculty members, particularly as it is related to job security and economic rewards, upon their attitudes towards collective bargaining. In addition to exploring the effects of this central variable, namely perceived influence, we will also look at faculty rank, communication and interactions patterns, to see their contribution to understanding faculty attitudes towards collective bargaining.

This chapter will include a description of the research methods used in this study, development of the survey instruments, the data collection procedures and the population sample.

A. Methods

This study is based on three surveys of faculty at Michigan State University, a large, public, midwestern university. The survey instrument was a close-ended questionnaire (Appendix A). In addition to the surveys conducted in 1977, 1978 and 1981, we will also draw upon an Omnibus Study conducted in 1970, which contains similar demographic questions concerning the respondents' college of primary appointment, academic rank, age and sex, plus a

question regarding collective bargaining (to be discussed in more detail below).

The University contains seventeen colleges. Rather than survey the faculty in all seventeen colleges, the original researchers (Stonewater, 1977) selected a smaller number that would represent the larger organization and still be diverse enough to permit some comparisons among units. One of the first criteria used to aide in choosing the colleges to be studies was that the researchers were only interested in degree-granting units that offered both undergraduate and graduate programs. From the inception of the study, the three medical units, the three undergraduate residential colleges as well as the lower division non-degree colleges were eliminated. This reduced the pool to ten colleges.

The researchers then used the four structural variables that Blau (1973) found affect faculty perceptions of power and influence: size of faculty and student body, salary level, differentiation of the units within the college, and the ratio of clerical staff to faculty. The University's Office of Institutional Research provided these data.

The researchers also wanted to study units that were dissimilar. The colleges were divided into two groups: those that were primarily professional colleges and those that were discipline oriented colleges. This division, coupled with the data discussed above on structural variables, further reduced the pool of colleges to five:

Arts and Letters, Communication Arts, Engineering, Human Ecology and Social Sciences. These five colleges, and all their respective departments, offer a mix of theoretical versus applied fields (Ladd and Lipset, 1975), a mix of small versus large colleges with various degrees of differentiation (Blau, 1973; Baldrige et. al., 1976) and, from what we know from the literature, provide us with colleges and departments that have varied historically in their level of opposition to unionization (Ladd and Lipset, 1975; Nixon, 1975; Rhodes, 1977; Wences and Abramson, 1970).

B. Development of the Survey Instruments

There were many steps involved in the development of the survey instrument. While the instrument used in the first survey (1970) provided the researchers with considerable amounts of useful information, the instrument nevertheless had to be tailored to tap more current issues and problems that had developed on campus over time. Unfortunately, a survey instrument designed in 1970 does not (usually) address all the issues researchers are interested in a decade later! Just as the organization under study has gone through many changes over the last ten years, so too did our instrument. Each survey instrument leading up to the 1981 study will be described in detail below.

The 1970 Survey ¹

The Urban Survey Research Unit of Michigan State University administered an Omnibus Survey in 1970. The survey was sent to approximately 500 administrators, 500 faculty and 2500 students. (Only those respondents who were faculty members from the five colleges listed above will be reported here.) The instrument was designed to probe opinions and attitudes of the respondents on a very wide range of issues which were important at that time at Michigan State University. The survey instrument included one item on collective bargaining, one on departmental emphasis, and four demographic items (i.e., college of primary appointment, academic rank, age and sex). The original researchers were primarily concerned with exploring faculty's perceptions of power and influence and their attitudes towards collective bargaining. With little interest in many of the other issues addressed in the Omnibus Study, the researchers decided not to replicate the original study but to use the item about collective bargaining and build a new, more focused instrument.

¹The 1970 study is discussed here only to provide background information on how and why the survey instrument designed and used in 1977, 1978 and 1981 came about. The study at hand will focus on these last three studies and draw on the 1970 study only to provide background data. Dr. Philip M. Marcus was involved in the collection of data at all stages and provided some continuity in study design and execution.

The 1977 Survey

In this survey, questions probed the perceptions of faculty influence. Other items addressed issues concerning faculty's perceptions of their own and other's satisfaction, departmental prestige, and the respondent's agreement with various university policies. The 1977 survey instrument provided the real base for subsequent investigation. Indeed, few changes were made in the 1978 and 1981 instrument.

The 1978 Survey

While no deletions were made in the 1977 survey, the researchers did add some items. In 1978, faculty at Michigan State University had a second opportunity to vote on whether or not they wanted a collective bargaining unit established on campus.² Because of the salience of unionization at this time, the researchers included an item about the respondents' participation in the election, and whether or not their choice was AAUP, MSUFA, or neither. An item concerning the legitimacy of a strike by faculty was also included, as was a set of questions concerning communication patterns of faculty and factors they considered most important when choosing another position.³

²The first election took place in 1972.

³The author of this research was involved in both the 1978 and 1981 surveys.

The 1981 Survey

A referendum was not held in 1981 at Michigan State University and so the two questions concerning this issue were omitted. Added was an item concerning what the priorities of collective bargaining should be, and whether the respondent favored a referendum on collective bargaining at that time. Some additional items were added to the set of questions on communication and agreement (see Appendix A).

In addition to the perceptual data collected, the researchers also included information on structural variables such as faculty salaries, enrollment (Both undergraduate and graduate), department size, department budgets, and length of time in current position. These data were provided by the Office of Planning and Budget and cover the years 1977 to 1980.

C. Data Collection and Procedures

As stated before, this study is based on three surveys of faculty at Michigan State University. The survey instrument was a close-ended questionnaire. Approximately ten days after the first mailing, respondents received a follow-up letter and an additional copy of the questionnaire. In 1978, it was not possible to send out a follow-up because a collective bargaining referendum was held late in the Spring of 1978. The researchers wanted the survey to go out immediately following the election so as to

be able to probe attitudes towards collective bargaining and the perceived effect it might have. Due to the lateness in the academic year of the referendum, and hence, also the survey, a follow-up was not possible.⁴

D. The Population Samples and Response Rates

In all studies, mailing labels, obtained from data processing through the Office of the Provost, listed every full-time tenure track faculty member. This, then, was the population used in 1977.

In subsequent studies (1978 and 1981) a slight modification of the sample was employed: ranks used remained the same, however, the researchers included faculty with joint appointments. Excluded from all three studies were all faculty with administrative titles or those who were included on the University's list of designated administrators (Appendix B).

In 1977, 627 full-time faculty in the five colleges received questionnaires with follow-up, of whom 55 percent responded (N=347). The second survey, conducted in Spring, 1978 (and two weeks after a MERC election) was sent to 700 full and part-time faculty in the five colleges. Only 36 percent (N=250) responded to the second survey. The third

⁴Comparisons of early and late responders in 1981 and 1977 show no differences. The researchers assumed that a follow-up mailing in 1978 would have made no difference in the overall results.

survey, with follow-up, was sent to 844 faculty in Spring, 1981. In this survey, 44 percent (N=372) responded (see Tables 3 and 4).

In Table 3, which compares faculty respondents by college to the five college population, we see that the percent of faculty responding to the survey was fairly consistent with the larger five-college population. In 1978 and 1981, we had an under-representation of faculty respondents from Arts and Letters; in 1978 and 1981 we had an over-representation of faculty from Social Sciences.

When we compare our respondents to the five college population by rank, the similarity is quite strong (Table 4). In 1981, we had a slight under-representation of instructors in our respondent population; in 1978 we had an over-representation of professors.

Generally, the respondents appeared to be similar to the population on these two major demographic variables (i.e., rank and college). The consistency between the respondents and the five-college population was high enough that inferences about the population could be made from the respondents' data.

TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF FACULTY RESPONDENTS WITH THE
FIVE-COLLEGE POPULATION

	Faculty Respondents						College Population					
	1977 N	%	1978 N	%	1981 N	%	1977 N	%	1978 N	%	1981 N	%
Arts and Letters	127	37	71	28	147	40	265	38	365	46	337	45
Communication Arts	31	9	22	9	19	5	53	8	53	7	50	7
Engineering	49	14	33	13	60	16	95	14	89	11	93	12
Human Ecology	37	11	21	8	23	6	73	10	58	7	49	6
Social Science	103	30	103	41	123	33	214	31	229	29	220	29
Total	347	100	250	100	372	100	700	100	794	100	749	100

College Population figures were taken from the "University Data Book" (March 23, 1983) supplied by the Office of Planning and Budget.

TABLE 4
SAMPLE AND POPULATION BY RANK, 1977, 1978 AND 1981

Academic Rank	Faculty Respondents						Five-College Population						University Population					
	1977		1978		1981		1977 ¹		1978 ²		1981		1977		1978		1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Instructor	6	2	18	8	16	4	13	2	57	8	64	8	32	2	214	8	232	8
Assistant Professor	82	27	50	20	85	24	149	24	168	24	219	26	432	21	587	22	647	23
Associate Professor	78	25	54	22	96	27	169	27	171	24	207	25	570	28	632	24	629	23
Professor	143	46	123	50	159	45	289	47	304	44	354	42	1014	49	1190	45	1280	46
Total	309	100	245	100	356	100	620	100	700	100	844	100	2048	100	2623	100	2788	100

¹In 1977, the only population data that could be secured were for tenure track faculty. For comparability purposes with the five-college population, we have omitted 38 cases under faculty respondents in this table as they were not tenure-track.

²These figures represent all faculty (both tenure and non-tenure).

IV. ANALYSIS

One of the first procedures used to analyze the data was to subject all block questions to an exploratory factor analysis. Factor analysis assumes the presence of some smaller number of underlying factors (i.e., smaller than the number of observed variables) that are responsible for the covariation among the observed variables. Kim (1978, p. 9) has stated that factor analysis:

"...may be used as an expedient way of ascertaining the minimum number of hypothetical factors that can account for the observed covariation, and as a means of exploring the data for possible data reduction."

While factor analysis assumes interval level data and our data are ordinal, we still used factor analysis to identify underlying dimensions and help to select variables. For consistency purposes, we later used Pearson's r as correlation coefficients on the new index variables. This procedure of using interval level measures on ordinal data is well documented in the literature (Blau, 1973; Cohen and Cohen, 1975).

Based on the orthogonal factor loadings (which assumes the items are uncorrelated) we selected the variables listed in Table 5 for the construction of new composite or index variables. These new items were created by adding all their respective scores together.

TABLE 5
QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED TO CONSTRUCT NEW INDEX VARIABLES¹

Index Variable	Items Included in Index Variables
Collective Bargaining Impact	Collective Bargaining would: improve the economic status of faculty; acquire additional funds from the legislature; give faculty greater involvement in decision making; provide greater job security.
Policy Agreement	Agreement with university policies: procedures for reappointment of faculty are fair; the university is dealing with its current budgeting problems in the most reasonable way possible; current grievance procedures for faculty are adequate.
Group Influence	Areas faculty as a group have influence on: curriculum; hiring new faculty; development of faculty personnel policies; selection of department chairperson and academic dean.
Personal Influence	Faculty respondents have influence on: curriculum; hiring new faculty; development of faculty personnel policies; selection of department chairperson and academic dean.
Satisfaction	Both personal and perception of other faculty members' satisfaction.
Communication	Respondents discuss ideas with: department chairperson; faculty in their department; chairpersons of special departmental committees.
Undergraduate Emphasis	Emphasis should be placed on: instruction of undergraduate majors; advisement of undergraduate majors; instruction of undergraduate non-majors.
Graduate Emphasis	Emphasis should be placed on: instruction of graduate students; advisement of graduate majors.

¹Appendix C contains a complete listing of the variables included in the new index variables and their factor loading scores.

The items that loaded well (approximately .5 or better) remained the same over the three survey periods. The only exception to this case was for Question 5 regarding Policy Statements. In 1981, the item, "in the long run, establishment of a faculty bargaining agent will lower the quality of faculty at MSU" was added to this question. While it also loaded well, for comparability sake, we have not included it in the index variable Policy Agreement. Throughout this chapter we will rely primarily on these newly constructed index variables to explore our hypotheses.

Proposition 1: Individuals who themselves or whose peers (in academic rank) participate in organizational decision making perceive themselves to be influential.

Hypothesis 1: The higher the academic rank, the higher the personal influence.

Table 6 shows the mean scores, by academic rank, on perceived personal influence items (PPI). Within each year, the mean score for PPI increases slightly with rank. Faculty gave the highest scores to influencing curriculum, hiring of new faculty and the selection of department chairperson. The items scoring the lowest amount of PPI were department budget allocation and selection of an academic dean. Faculty responding to our questionnaires perceived themselves as exercising a slight to moderate amount of influence on every item asked, and few faculty reported extreme responses of no influence at all or a great deal of influence.

TABLE 6
PERCEIVED PERSONAL INFLUENCE, BY RANK, 1977, 1978, 1981 (MEANS)

Influence over:	Instructor			Assistant Prof.			Associate Prof.			Full Prof.			All Ranks		
	1977	1978	1981	1977	1978	1981	1977	1978	1981	1977	1978	1981	1977	1978	1981
Curriculum	1.6	2.5	2.1	2.1	2.8	2.6	2.2	2.8	2.9	2.2	3.1	3.0	2.0	2.9	2.7
*Hiring of new faculty	1.5	2.6	1.8	1.8	2.5	2.3	2.0	2.7	2.7	2.0	3.0	2.8	1.8	2.8	2.4
*Development of faculty personnel policies	1.4	1.9	1.4	1.6	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.5	2.0	2.9	2.8	1.7	2.5	2.2
*Selection of Dept. chairpersons	1.6	2.1	1.6	1.9	2.5	2.2	1.9	2.4	2.6	2.1	2.9	2.8	1.9	2.7	2.3
Department budget allocations	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.9	1.7
Faculty load determination	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.8	2.0	2.1	1.9	2.4	2.2	1.7	2.1	2.0
Selection of academic dean	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.2	1.9	1.7	2.0	1.7
Mean	1.5	1.9	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.6	2.5	1.8	2.4	2.1

Scale: Great deal of influence = 4 Moderate amount = 3 Slight amount = 2 No influence at all = 1

*Used in Scale of Personal Influence

The zero-order correlation between the index variable personal influence and academic rank showed similar results that were consistent over the three survey periods. Table 7 show these correlations over the three survey periods (see Appendix E for the complete matrix).

TABLE 7
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RANK AND TWO TYPES OF
INFLUENCE OVER TIME

Years	Types of Influence	
	Personal	Other
1977	.37	.27
1978	.33	.26
1981	.37	.15

That PPI increases with rank was also confirmed by using analysis of variance (not shown) which showed significant differences between mean perceived personal influence scores of each academic rank. That higher ranked faculty report more perceived personal influence is not surprising. Higher ranked faculty are more likely to have a longer "institutional history" which has enabled them to develop contacts not only within their own department and/or college but also within the university organization. Higher ranked faculty are better integrated into the university organization as can be inferred from their communication

patterns (to be discussed in more detail under hypothesis 5).

Based on the above findings, we accept hypothesis 1, that PPI increases with academic rank.

Hypothesis 2: Non-tenured faculty will perceive group influence to be higher than personal influence.

Table 8 shows the mean score by academic rank on the perceived group influence items (PGI). The items that scored the highest means were the same as in PPI (i.e., curriculum, hiring of new faculty and the selection of department chairperson). Similarly, the items scoring the lowest were also the same (selection of academic dean and department budget allocations).

The zero-order correlations (Table 7) between PGI and academic rank were .27 in 1977, .26 in 1978 and .15 in 1981. In 1981, academic rank was a weaker predictor of group influence than at previous times. When we compare these correlations between academic rank and PGI to those between academic rank and PPI, we see that faculty rank is a better predictor of the individual's perception of their own influence than their perception of faculty group influence.

Comparisons of Tables 6 and 8 show that the differences by academic rank are less clear for PGI than for PPI. Only full professors scored consistently higher on PGI than any other faculty rank. In general, faculty have higher means for PGI than for PPI. Faculty see themselves

TABLE 8
PERCEIVED FACULTY GROUP INFLUENCE, BY RANK, 1977, 1978, 1981 (MEANS)

Influence over:	Instructor			Assistant Prof.			Associate Prof.			Full Prof.			All Ranks		
	1977	1978	1981	1977	1978	1981	1977	1978	1981	1977	1978	1981	1977	1978	1981
Curriculum	3.4	3.3	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7
*Hiring of new faculty	3.0	2.8	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.3
*Development of faculty personnel policies	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.9	2.8	2.9	3.2	3.4	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.8
*Selection of Dept. chairpersons	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.2	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.0
Department budget allocations	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.0
Faculty load determination	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.3	1.9	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.4
Selection of academic dean	2.3	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.6	2.6	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.1
Mean	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8

Scale: Great deal of influence = 4 Moderate amount = 3 Slight amount = 2 No influence at all = 1

*Used in Scale of Group Influence

as being more influential as a group than as individuals, yet as rank increases, the disparity between PPI and PGI decreases. For instructors, the differences in means range from .6 in 1978 to 1.1 in 1977 and 1981. For full professors, the differences range from 1.0 in 1977, .5 in 1978 and .4 in 1981.

Because lower ranked faculty consistently scored higher means on PGI than PPI, we accept hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3: The lower the personal influence, the higher the perceived impact of a collective bargaining unit on issues of salary, decision making and job security.

In Appendix F we have shown zero-order correlations between the index variables of personal and group influence and the block item (Question 3) concerning the perceived impact of collective bargaining on the reduction of merit salary increases (Table 9). Those faculty who reported high personal influence viewed a collective bargaining unit as having a considerable effect on eliminating merit as a basis or justification for salary increases and, perhaps, pushing instead for across-the-board increases regardless of merit.

TABLE 9

CORRELATION BETWEEN IMPACT OF COLLECTION BARGAINING
WOULD REDUCE MERIT AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR RAISES
AND TYPES OF INFLUENCE OVER TIME.

Years	Types of Influence	
	Personal	Other
1977	.16	.09
1978	.29	.27
1981	.21	.24

Faculty reporting high PPI are not of the opinion that a collective bargaining unit would improve their economic status, give them greater involvement in decision making or give them greater job security. This is hardly surprising. These faculty members already perceive themselves as exercising a great deal of personal influence and they do not envision a collective bargaining unit as increasing their well-being. If anything, we would argue that this group would anticipate a collective bargaining unit as diminishing their personal influence by attempting to spread out the resources.

Faculty members with low PPI reported that a collective bargaining unit would improve their economic status, give them greater involvement in decision making and provide greater job security. In 1978, we added the item "improve current grievance procedures for faculty". In both 1978 and 1981, the zero-order correlations between PPI and

improvement of current grievance procedures were only moderately strong ($-.47$ and $-.20$ respectively).

The strongest correlations between PPI and the collective bargaining impact items (Appendix F) were observed in 1978. We must remind the reader that the 1978 survey was conducted one week after a collective bargaining referendum was held at Michigan State University. Because of this heightened sensitivity, the correlations may be unusually strong. Nevertheless, we see the same direction and significance between the correlation items in 1977 and 1981, when no election preceded the survey.

In general, we find that PPI is a good predictor of collective bargaining impact. Those faculty reporting low PPI report that collective bargaining would improve their economic status and job security as well as give them greater involvement in decision making. We therefore accept hypothesis 3.

Proposition 2: Length of employment affects an individual's identification with the university.

Hypothesis 4: The longer the faculty member's employment at the university, the higher the identification with the university.

Likewise, we would expect:

The shorter the faculty member's employment at the university, the higher the identification with the discipline.

While the question concerning reference group was asked in both the 1978 and 1981 survey, only in 1981 did we ask a question concerning the respondents length of employment at the university. Before we look at the relationship between length of employment and reference group, we will first examine their relationship with other key variables.

In Table 10 we see the frequencies and percent distributions of academic rank and length of time in current position. The majority of instructors and assistant professors have been employed at the university from one to four years, associate professors have been employed five to ten years and full professors ten to twenty years. Almost half of our sample has been employed at the same institution for ten to twenty years. The mean differences by rank were significant at the $p < .05$ level.

As we showed earlier (Appendix E) there is a strong positive correlation between age and academic rank ($r=.65$ in 1977, $r=.49$ in 1978 and $r=.63$ in 1981) which indicates that the higher the academic rank, the older the occupant of that rank.

In Table 10 we see that almost seventy-five percent of the professors and twenty-eight percent of the associate professors have been in their current position ten to twenty years. From this we feel it reasonable to assume that higher ranked faculty are both older and have been in their current position longer than lower ranked faculty. With this assumption in mind, we will now examine Tables 11 and

TABLE 10

FREQUENCIES AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF
LENGTH OF TIME IN CURRENT POSITION BY ACADEMIC RANK: 1981

Years	Instructor		Assistant Professor		Associate Professor		Professor		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
< - 1	2	12	13	15	2	3	2	3	19	6
1 - 4	11	69	44	54	15	17	11	7	81	24
5 - 10	3	19	23	27	48	51	21	14	95	28
10 - 20	0	0	3	4	27	28	117	75	147	43
Total	16	100	83	100	92	100	151	100	342	100

$P < .001$

$\chi^2 = 202.8$

Degrees of Freedom = 12

12 which gives the frequencies and percentages of reference group by academic rank. For both years, instructors reported that the department was their reference group while assistant and associate professors viewed the discipline as their reference group, and professors are split between the two (discipline and department).

In order to understand these distributions, we must reflect on our earlier discussion of reference group theory and communication patterns. Instructors, as a group, are much younger than those individuals occupying other faculty ranks. Given their age and rank, it would not be unreasonable to assume that this might be their first full-time faculty appointment. Because they are novices in the academic profession, we would expect them to turn to their department colleagues for information and guidance. In doing so, they are attempting to establish themselves within the departmental setting.

Assistant professors, on the other hand, have to some degree established themselves in their department and are now coming closer to tenure decision which will affect them. They and associate professors (who already have tenure but desire promotion to full professor) are likely, as groups, to be involved in research that would help them in obtaining these promotions. We would expect them to turn to their discipline as their major reference group, to evaluate their status and to better establish their credentials within their department.

TABLE 11
REFERENCE GROUP BY ACADEMIC RANK: 1978

Reference Group	Instructor		Assistant Professor		Associate Professor		Professor		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Discipline	7	39	20	41	27	52	49	41	103	43
Department	10	56	19	39	14	27	48	40	91	38
University	1	6	10	20	11	21	23	19	45	19
Total	18	100	49	100	52	100	120	100	239	100

$P > .38$

$\chi^2 = 6.4$

Degrees of Freedom = 6

TABLE 12
REFERENCE GROUP BY ACADEMIC RANK: 1981

Reference Group	Instructor		Assistant Professor		Associate Professor		Professor		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Discipline	8	50	44	54	49	54	68	45	169	50
Department	8	50	35	43	37	41	64	43	144	43
University	0	0	3	4	5	6	19	13	27	8
Total	16	100	82	100	91	100	151	100	340	100

$P > .15$

$\chi^2 = 9.5$

Degrees of Freedom = 6

A fair percentage of professors reported that the university served as their major reference group (19% in 1978 and 13% in 1981). Indeed, in 1981, the majority of those who reported that the university was their reference group clearly came from the rank of full professors.

In 1978 an almost equal percentage of assistant professors, associate professors and full professors identified the university as their reference group. However, the over-all percentage of faculty who reported the university was their reference group declined from 19% in 1978 to 8% in 1981. There has been a considerably drop across all ranks in the percentage of faculty identifying the university as their reference group. While we have no data to verify our assumptions, we would argue that the dramatic change in the university's economic situation and over-all dissatisfaction with administrative decisions made in light of these circumstances had a significant affect on viewing the university as a major reference group.

In Table 13 we see that across the categories of length of time in current position, 50% of the faculty respondents identified their discipline as their reference group; 42% identified their department and 8% identified the university. While the χ^2 significance indicated little difference in reference group by length of employment ($p > .07$) we subjected the data to an analysis of variance to obtain a pooled mean for discipline and department and compared it to the university reference group mean. The

pooled mean for the discipline/department reference group was 2.97 (or slightly less than five years on the job) and for the university reference group it was 3.46 (or slightly less than eight years on the job). When we contrasted the reference groups discipline/department versus university, the T score was -2.4, $p < .02$. Earlier (Table 10) we established that lower ranked faculty had been in their current position for a shorter period of time than higher ranked faculty. These results, coupled with the information in Table 13 that length of employment does influence reference group, leads us to accept hypothesis 4.

TABLE 13

LENGTH OF TIME IN CURRENT POSITION BY REFERENCE GROUP: 1981

Time in Current Position	Discipline		Department		University		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
< - 1	11	58	7	37	1	5	19	100
1 - 4	42	51	36	43	5	6	83	100
5 - 10	50	54	41	44	2	2	93	100
10 - 20	68	46	59	40	20	14	147	100
Total	171 (50%)		143 (42%)		28 (8%)		342	100

$P > .07$

$\chi^2 = 11.4$

Degrees of Freedom = 6

Proposition 3: The closer faculty members are in academic rank, the more likely they are to interact.

Hypothesis 5: The higher the academic rank, the more the communication with administrators and the less the communication with graduate students and union representatives.

Hypothesis 6: Faculty who communicate with AAUP representatives have a higher academic rank than those faculty who discuss ideas with MSUFA representatives.

Communication with Administrators

In 1978 and 1981, we included in the survey instrument an item concerning faculty communication patterns. Two administrative positions were used to test this hypothesis: department chairpersons and university administrators. Table 14 gives the mean scores for each item. In 1978 there were virtually no differences by rank in communication patterns. Indeed, the largest difference in mean score was on the item concerning university administrators; assistant professors had a mean of 1.4 and professors a mean of 1.9.

In 1981, we again witnessed little variance in mean scores by academic rank. The two items with the most variance by rank concerned chairpersons of special department committees (instructors had a mean of 1.8 and professors a mean of 2.5) and faculty in other departments or units (instructors' mean was 1.2 and assistant and associate professors had a mean of 2.0).

In order to test hypothesis 5, we will again use simple zero-order correlations (Table 15, also see Appendix G for

TABLE 14
FACULTY COMMUNICATION, BY RANK, 1978, 1981 (MEANS)

	Instructor		Assistant Prof.		Associate Prof.		Full Prof.		All Ranks	
	1978	1981	1978	1981	1978	1981	1978	1981	1978	1981
*Chairperson of own department	3.1	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	2.9	3.0	2.9
*Faculty in own department	3.4	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
*Chairpersons of special dept. committees	2.6	1.8	2.5	2.1	2.6	2.4	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.2
Graduate students	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.0	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.3
Faculty in other depts. or units	2.1	1.2	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.9	2.1	1.8
University administrators (e.g., president, provost, dean)	1.6	1.0	1.4	1.2	1.7	1.4	1.9	1.5	1.7	1.3
Mean	2.5	2.0	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.3

Scale: Great extent = 4 Some extent = 3 Slight extent = 2 No extent at all = 1

*Used in Scale of Communication

the complete matrix). The correlation between academic rank and communicate with chairperson of the department was .05 in 1978, and -.01 in 1981. In general, in 1978, academic rank was a very weak predictor of communication patterns with the exception of discussing ideas with university administrators ($r=.16$, $p<.05$).

TABLE 15
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ACADEMIC RANK
AND COMMUNICATION ITEMS; 1978 & 1981

Communication with:	Year	
	1978	1981
Chairperson	.05	-.01
Faculty in own department	.01	-.03
Chairpersons of Special department Committees	.02	.17
Graduate Students	-.07	-.11
Faculty in Other Departments	-.01	.08
University Administrators	.16	.21
AAUP	NA*	.12
MSUFA	NA*	.09

*Not asked in 1978

As stated above, academic rank was a weak predictor of communicating with one's chairperson in 1978 and 1981. However, there is a significant positive correlation in both years between academic rank and communication with university administrators indicating that higher ranked

faculty discuss their ideas with university administrators more often than do lower ranked faculty.

Based on the zero-order correlations, we partially reject hypothesis 5: frequency of communication with chairperson is not related to academic rank but frequency of communication with university administrators is related to academic rank.

Communication with Graduate Students

In Table 15 we saw that the zero-order correlations between academic rank and communication with graduate students was $-.07$ in 1978 and $-.11$ in 1981. While only the 1981 correlation was significant at the $p < .05$ level, only a .4 separates the two sets of correlations and both show a low and consistently negative pattern.

Clearly the department chairperson sits in a middle position between university administrators and graduate students, and no rank appears to have a disproportional communication access. Obviously, the low relationships do not give strong support to our hypothesis. Nevertheless, lower ranked faculty communicating with graduate students and higher ranked faculty communicating with university administrators tends to support hypothesis 5.

Communication with Union Representatives

In 1981, we added the AAUP and MSUFA to the list of groups that faculty members communicate with. The

zero-order correlations (Table 15) were .12 for academic rank and communication with AAUP representatives, and .09 between academic rank and communication with representatives of the MSUFA. Both correlations were significant at the $p < .05$ level. So the higher ranked faculty, and not the lower, as we had originally hypothesized, communicate with union representatives. The correlations also indicate that more higher ranked faculty discuss ideas with representatives of the AAUP than the MSUFA.

A number of possible explanations come to mind for this significant positive correlation. Perhaps many of the union representatives are senior, tenured faculty members. If so, our third proposition, the closer faculty members are in academic rank the more likely they are to interact, would cover this finding.

Another possibility, if union representatives are lower ranked faculty, would be the involvement of senior faculty in department and university affairs. Senior faculty may be more committed to intervene and try to persuade lower ranked staff who hold opposing views on collective bargaining. In either case, we have no data on union representatives ages and other researchers will have to pursue this finding.

Irrespective of age, union strategy might dictate how to make inroads to gain support from faculty, and win over senior faculty members who have historically been unfavorable to unionization attempts. Associate and full professors made up 69% of the university population in 1981

(Table 4). From our data, we cannot tell who initiated the contact, and our sample of high ranked faculty in 1981 may have reported that they communicate with union representatives not because the faculty members sought out the union representatives, but because the union representatives sought out the faculty members and their opinions as a way of making contact with this group and perhaps, developing more support. Knowing the proportion of senior faculty, their influence in academic affairs, and their historic bias against collective bargaining, such a union strategy of initiating contact would make good sense.

While these intervening variables help us to reconcile conceptually the positive correlations, we must nevertheless reject those parts of hypothesis 5 concerning higher ranked faculty discussing ideas with chairpersons and not discussing with union representatives. We can accept that higher ranked faculty do discuss ideas with university administrators and not graduate students. We can also accept hypothesis 6, that more higher ranked faculty discuss ideas with AAUP representatives than with MSUFA representatives.

Prior to our analysis, we had expected academic rank to be the best predictor of communication patterns, and it is a good predictor with two of the six groups in 1978 (graduate students and university administrators) and five of the eight groups in 1981 (chairperson of special departmental committees, graduate students, university administrators,

AAUP and MSUFA representatives). But an even better over-all predictor of faculty communication and indeed, where we obtained our strongest zero-order correlations, was the item concerning faculty in their own department. Those faculty who discuss ideas with the faculty in their own department are of high academic rank and also discuss ideas with all the other groups listed in this question (Table 16).

TABLE 16

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH CHAIRPERSON
AND OTHER COMMUNICATION ITEMS: 1978 AND 1981

Communication with:	Year	
	1978	1981
Faculty in own department	.51	.41
Chairpersons of Special department Committees	.39	.37
Graduate Students	.30	.19
Other Faculty	.24	.09
University Administrators	.36	.24

Proposition 4: Changes in job security and dissatisfaction of faculty with administrative procedures and decisions will lead both tenured and non-tenured faculty to be more likely to seek job protection from organizations outside the university.

Hypothesis 7: The differences between the various faculty groups' (i.e., rank college and age) attitude toward collective bargaining will narrow between 1978 and 1981.

Rank

The question concerning the extent to which faculty favor the establishment of a collective bargaining unit at the university was a single item question that could be scored from "greatly favor" (4), to "do not favor at all" (1). Table 17 gives the percentages and means, by rank, of faculty favoring collective bargaining. The lowest mean for favoring collective bargaining was reported by full professors in 1978 ($\bar{X}=1.7$), and the highest by instructors in 1970 ($\bar{X}=3.0$). In 1981, assistant professors reported the highest mean for favoring collective bargaining ($\bar{X}=2.8$) and full professors reported the lowest ($\bar{X}=2.4$).

Between 1978 and 1981, the mean scores of faculty favoring collective bargaining has increased for every rank (an average of .4). We would argue that, in 1981, there are no differences by rank in favoring collective bargaining. This argument is further supported when we look at the zero-order correlations between academic rank and favor collective bargaining (Table 18). In 1977, the zero-order correlation between these two variables was $-.19$, in 1978 it was $-.18$, but by 1981 it was $-.09$. The correlation in 1981 was not significant at the .05 level which leads us to conclude that academic rank has little influence on attitudes towards collective bargaining.

TABLE 17
PERCENTAGE OF FACULTY FAVORING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, BY RANK, 1970, 1977, 1978, 1981

	Instructor				Assistant Professor				Associate Professor				Full Professor			
	'70	'77	'78	'81	'70	'77	'78	'81	'70	'77	'78	'81	'70	'77	'78	'81
Greatly Favor	36	19	22	31	47	24	23	30	21	27	22	27	28	12	11	25
Somewhat Favor	41	31	28	19	17	32	29	36	25	22	26	27	21	20	11	24
Slightly Favor	9	15	6	19	10	20	10	18	13	22	13	11	21	20	18	16
Do Not Favor At All	14	35	44	31	27	25	38	17	42	30	39	35	31	48	60	35
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Mean	3.0	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.8	2.5	2.4	2.8	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.0	1.7	2.4
N	22	26	18	16	30	92	48	84	24	79	54	93	39	142	121	158

Scale: Greatly favor = 4 Somewhat favor = 3 Slightly favor = 2 Do not favor at all = 1

TABLE 18
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ACADEMIC RANK AND FAVOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OVER TIME

<u>Year</u>	<u>Favor Collective Bargaining</u>
1977	-.19
1978	-.18
1981	-.09

College

In 1981, the rank order of the five colleges from most favorable to least favorable on collective bargaining is as follows: Arts and Letters, Social Sciences, Communications, Engineering and Human Ecology (Table 19). However, this rank ordering does not apply to the findings in previous years. Indeed, the data yields no consistent pattern of ordering; even over the 1977 - 1978 survey period there is little similarity. While the mean scores of college faculty favoring collective bargaining vary, in general, 1970 was the highest. The means decline in 1977 and 1978, but rise again in 1981.

A one-way analysis of variance revealed that the differences among colleges in the extent to which they favored collective bargaining were not significant in 1970

TABLE 19
MEAN SCORE OF FACULTY FAVORING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
BY COLLEGE, 1970, 1977, 1978, 1981

	Arts and Letters				Communication				Engineering				Human Ecology				Social Science				5 Colleges			
	'70	'77	'78	'81	'70	'77	'78	'81	'70	'77	'78	'81	'70	'77	'78	'81	'70	'77	'78	'81	'70	'77	'78	'81
MEAN	2.9	2.4	2.1	2.9	2.7	2.2	2.0	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.1	2.7	2.0	1.8	1.8	2.5	2.5	2.1	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.0	2.5
N	43	121	67	144	9	31	21	18	13	49	33	59	10	37	21	22	40	102	101	118	115	340	243	361

Scale: Greatly favor = 4 Somewhat favor = 3 Slightly favor = 2 Do not favor at all = 1

($p > .16$) or 1978 ($p > .41$). There were, however, significant differences in 1977 ($p > .01$) and 1981 ($p > .001$). In 1977, Engineering was the college with the lowest mean score for favoring collective bargaining ($\bar{X} = 1.8$) while in 1981, it was Human Ecology that scored the lowest mean ($\bar{X} = 1.8$). It is interesting to note that one of our applied colleges, namely Engineering, is more favorable to collective bargaining in 1981 than in previous years. Indeed, in 1981, Engineering is not statistically different from the other colleges, but does differ from Human Ecology. Human Ecology and Communication have declined over the 1970 - 1981 period in the extent their faculties favor collective bargaining. The extent to which faculty in the five colleges favor collective bargaining is not as homogeneous as we had anticipated. While there is little difference by college and favoring collective bargaining 1981, examination of Table 19 shows that colleges were more alike in 1978 ($\bar{X}$'s range between 1.8 to 2.1 versus 1.8 to 2.9 in 1981). Given the high degree of variability in college and favor collective bargaining, we would argue that college may not be a good predictor variable.

Age

Table 20 gives the mean score, by age of faculty favoring collective bargaining for all survey years. In 1970, there were clear differences in support for collective bargaining by age. The means are higher for all groups

under age 44 than for all age groups 45 and over. A similar, but weaker, pattern was observed in 1978. In 1977, faculty under age 34 had a slightly higher mean than all other respondents, but again, the differences are small. By 1981, there were no longer clear differences in reported support for collective bargaining by age. Only respondents under age 29 had a higher mean than all other groups.

In Table 21 we see that the zero-order correlations between favoring collective bargaining and age was $-.10$ in 1977, $-.11$ in 1978 and $.03$ in 1981. While the correlations were significant in 1977 and 1978, they were not significant in 1981. Examination of the mean distributions and zero-order correlations leads us to conclude that there is little, if any, correlation between age and favoring of collective bargaining.

Summarizing our findings for hypothesis 7 then, we conclude that differences in attitudes towards collective bargaining by age and rank have decreased considerably between 1978 and 1981. There is an assumption in the faculty unionization literature that higher ranked faculty have more job security and prerogatives which distinguishes them from younger and lower ranked faculty. This supposedly makes them less likely to favor collective bargaining. Our data suggest that differences between younger/older and low/high academic rank on favoring collective bargaining have decreased by 1981. We would argue that as a result of changes on campus, older, tenured faculty feel as insecure

TABLE 20

MEAN SCORES OF FACULTY FAVORING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
BY AGE, 1970, 1977, 1978 AND 1981

Age	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	All Years $\bar{X}$	N
under 25	0	0	1.0	1	0	0	0	0	1.0	1
25-29	3.2	20	2.5	24	1.9	13	3.2	11	2.7	68
30-34	2.7	18	2.5	56	2.1	30	2.4	41	2.4	145
35-39	2.9	16	2.2	67	2.4	49	2.4	60	2.5	192
40-44	2.8	16	2.2	45	2.2	40	2.6	54	2.5	155
45-49	2.1	16	2.1	42	1.7	33	2.7	47	2.2	138
50-54	2.1	14	2.3	31	2.0	23	2.5	43	2.2	111
55-59	2.8	5	2.1	37	1.9	29	2.4	42	2.3	113
60+	2.2	10	2.1	31	1.6	26	2.5	37	2.1	104
	2.3	115	2.1	334	1.8	243	2.3	335	2.2	1027

Greatly favor = 4 Somewhat favor = 3 Slightly favor = 2
Do not favor at all = 1

TABLE 21

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FAVOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND AGE OVER TIME

Year	Age
1977	-.10
1978	-.11
1981	.03

as formerly only young, non-tenured did.

Further support for this argument can be seen by examining the zero-order correlations between academic rank and agreement with administrative policies (Table 22). The declines in the zero-order correlations, from .27 in 1977 to .13 in 1981, suggests that faculty as a group have become more homogeneous in their judgement of administrative policies. At the same time, agreement with administrative policies has become a better predictor of favor collective bargaining and collective bargaining impact, suggesting that antagonism to the administration is no longer confined to particular ranks (Table 23).

TABLE 22
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ACADEMIC RANK AND
POLICY AGREEMENT OVER TIME

<u>Year</u>	<u>Policy Agreement</u>
1977	.27
1978	.16
1981	.13

TABLE 23
CORRELATION BETWEEN POLICY AGREEMENT, FAVOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IMPACT OVER TIME

<u>Year</u>	<u>Favor Collective Bargaining</u>	<u>Collective Bargaining Impact</u>
1977	-.41	-.30
1978	-.61	-.59
1981	-.58	-.50

Another indicator of increasing homogeneity among faculty of different ranks is the fact that PGI no longer clearly distinguishes faculty ranks. Being a full professor in 1981 no longer provides advantages in terms of group influence. While the correlation between rank and PPI has been fairly constant, PGI has declined considerably (Table 7). This is due mainly to the decline in full professors perception of their group influence (Table 8). In 1981, 45% of our sample were full professors. High ranked faculty, comparing themselves to those of lower rank, perceive themselves in 1981 as still having more personal influence than these others. But, the declining correlation in PGI and rank indicates that higher ranked faculty no longer perceive themselves as having an advantage as a group.

Differences by college have not shown the same pattern. In 1970, 1977 and 1978, the College of Engineering reported the lowest support for collective bargaining while the others reported higher levels of support. In 1981, the college with the lowest mean score on reported support for collective bargaining was Human Ecology. This time (1981) Arts and Letters, Communication, Engineering and Social Sciences all reported higher levels than Human Ecology on support for collective bargaining. We can only accept that part of hypothesis 7 referring to increased homogeneity by age and rank in reported support for collective bargaining. We reject the idea that colleges are becoming more

homogeneous in the reported support for collective bargaining.

Use of Multiple Regression to Determine Predictors of Support for Collective Bargaining

In the above analysis, we concentrated on zero-order correlations to test our hypotheses. The question remains, however, whether any of the predictors we have chosen exercise an independent influence on support for collective bargaining, taking all other predictors into account.

Through stepwise multiple regression, we first identified "favor collective bargaining" as the dependent variable. In 1977, 1978, and 1981 (Tables 24 through 27) we see that when the collective bargaining impact index variable is entered as an independent variable,¹ collective bargaining impact consistently accounts for more than fifty percent of the variance in favor of collective bargaining. Indeed, the contributions, in terms of the percent of the variance explained, of all other independent variables is minute compared to collective bargaining impact. There are two interpretations of why collective bargaining impact is such a powerful predictor of favor collective bargaining. First, it could be argued that there is a causal relationship between these two variables. The anticipated impact of collective bargaining leads individuals to favor

¹Collective Bargaining impact was not asked in 1970.

TABLE 24
FAVOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - 1970

	<u>Beta</u>	<u>R²</u>
Age	-.16	.06
Undergraduate Emphasis	.15	.07
Sex	-.13	.08
Rank	-.12	.08
Graduate Emphasis	-.07	.09

TABLE 25
FAVOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - 1977

	<u>Beta</u>	<u>R²</u>
** Policy Statement	-.38	.16
** Satisfaction	-.13	.18
Group Influence	.15	.19
** Rank	-.22	.20
Age	.13	.21
Sex	-.11	.22
Graduate Emphasis	-.05	.22
Personal Influence	-.06	.22
Undergraduate Emphasis	-.03	.23

FAVOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (WITH COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IMPACT) - 1977

** Collective Bargaining Impact	.66	.53
** Policy Statement	-.22	.58
Graduate Emphasis	-.04	.58
Sex	-.04	.58
Satisfaction	-.03	.58
Group Influence	-.03	.58
Rank	-.02	.59
Undergraduate Emphasis	-.01	.59
Personal Influence	-.01	.59

* P < .05

** P < .01

TABLE 26

FAVOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - 1978

	<u>Beta</u>	<u>R²</u>
** Policy Statement	-.49	.37
** Rank	-.20	.40
Sex	-.11	.42
Group Influence	-.10	.42
Age	.09	.43
Graduate Emphasis	-.06	.43
Personal Influence	-.07	.44
Satisfaction	-.03	.44
Communication	.03	.44
Undergraduate Emphasis	.02	.44

FAVOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IMPACT) - 1978

** Collective Bargaining Impact	.62	.60
** Policy Statement	-.19	.63
* Rank	-.11	.65
* Sex	-.09	.66
Personal Influence	-.06	.66
Communication	.04	.66
Graduate Emphasis	-.03	.66
Age	-.02	.66
Undergraduate Emphasis	-.02	.66
Group Influence	.01	.66
Satisfaction	-.01	.66

* P < .05

** P < .01

TABLE 27

FAVOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - 1981

	<u>Beta</u>	<u>R²</u>
** Policy Statement	-.44	.31
* Satisfaction	-.12	.33
Group Influence	-.10	.35
Graduate Emphasis	-.09	.35
Undergraduate Emphasis	.09	.36
Age	-.06	.36
Sex	-.07	.36
Rank	-.05	.37
Communication	-.04	.37
Personal Influence	-.01	.37

FAVOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IMPACT) - 1981

** Collective Bargaining		
Impact	.58	.54
** Policy Statement	-.23	.59
Satisfaction	-.07	.60
Sex	-.05	.60
Communication	-.04	.60
Undergraduate Emphasis	.04	.60
Rank	-.02	.61
Graduate Emphasis	-.02	.61
Age	-.01	.61
Personal Influence	-.01	.61
Group Influence	.01	.61

FAVOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (WITHOUT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IMPACT, BUT INCLUDING DEPARTMENT DATA) - 1981

** Policy Statement	-.45	.28
* Demand	-.19	.34
* Turnover	-.16	.36
Group Influence	-.08	.38
Sex	-.11	.39
Personal Influence	-.07	.40
Graduate Emphasis	-.07	.40
Satisfaction	-.05	.40
Support	-.05	.40
Age	-.06	.41
Rank	-.05	.41
Undergraduate Emphasis	.02	.41
Communication	-.01	.41

* P < .05

** P < .01

or oppose collective bargaining (i.e., ideas determine actions). A second argument could be made, consistent with sociological assumptions (Durkheim:1915) that actions determine ideas (i.e., it is not so much favorable attitudes that determines support for unions, but rather, support for unions leads to favorable attitudes. It may well be that both (attitudes determine ideas and vice versa) tap the same attitudinal dimension.

The question still remains of identifying which variables account for favorable attitudes towards collective bargaining. In an attempt to investigate this further, we constructed a new index variable, Pro-Union. This new variable is a composite of "favor collective bargaining" and "collective bargaining impact". Table 28 gives the r^2 values for this new index variable. Over all three years, the index variable "policy statement" explains the greatest amount of variance in the Pro-Union dependent variable. The r^2 values were .11 in 1977, .40 in 1978² and .28 in 1981.

In 1981, we obtained departmental data on enrollments, budgets, classroom size, credit hours taught, turnover of faculty and faculty salaries (Appendix D). Using factor

²Again, we must remind the reader that all 1978 figures may be somewhat inflated due to the timing of the survey; i.e., one week after a referendum vote.

TABLE 28
PRO-UNION - 1977

	<u>Beta</u>	<u>R²</u>
** Policy Statement	-.29	.11
Personal Influence	-.09	.13
** Group Influence	.20	.14
* Satisfaction	-.16	.16
** Rank	-.30	.17
* Age	.18	.19
Sex	-.10	.20
Undergraduate Emphasis	-.04	.20
Graduate Emphasis	-.03	.20

PRO-UNION - 1978

** Policy Statement	-.50	.40
Group Influence	-.16	.42
** Age	.17	.44
** Rank	-.17	.46
Graduate Emphasis	-.06	.46
Undergraduate Emphasis	.05	.46
Sex	-.05	.47
Satisfaction	-.04	.47
Personal Influence	-.03	.47
Communication	-.01	.47

PRO-UNION - 1981

** Policy Statement	-.40	.28
** Group Influence	-.17	.31
* Graduate Emphasis	-.12	.32
Satisfaction	-.11	.33
Undergraduate Emphasis	.09	.34
Age	-.10	.35
Rank	-.05	.35
Sex	-.03	.35
Communication	-.02	.35

* P < .05

** P < .01

analysis, we identified four major department level index variables: Demand, Turnover, Support Services, and Size/Supply (Table 29). When we used these new department level index variables as independent variables in the multiple regression, we find that the attitudinal "policy statement" index variable still explains the largest percentage of the variance in Pro-Union (Table 30). From this we can conclude that the best predictor of favorable attitudes towards collective bargaining and perceiving collective bargaining as having an impact, is whether or not respondents agree with administrative policies and decision making.

TABLE 29

ITEMS USED TO CONSTRUCT DEPARTMENT INDEX VARIABLES: 1981

<u>Index Variable</u>	<u>Items Included in Department Index Variables</u>
Demand	1980 department fall enrollment, lower division undergraduate; 1980 department fall enrollment, upper division under-graduate.
Turnover	Associate professors not present in 1981, present in 1978; assistant professors not present in 1981, present in 1978.
Support Services	1980 general fund budget for labor, supplies, and equipment.
Size/Support	1980 department fall enrollment doctoral students; 1980 department general fund budget for salary and total budget.

TABLE 30

PRO-UNION (WITH DEPARTMENT LEVEL VARIABLES) - 1981

	<u>Beta</u>	<u>R²</u>
** Policy Statement	-.39	.24
Support	-.16	.29
* Group Influence	-.14	.32
Graduate Emphasis	-.10	.33
Turnover	-.08	.34
Sex	-.09	.34
Satisfaction	-.06	.35
Personal Influence	-.06	.35
Age	-.06	.35
Undergraduate Emphasis	.04	.35
Size	-.02	.36
Demand	-.02	.36
Communication	-.01	.36
Rank	-.01	.36

* P < .05

** P < .01

Summary

This study has tried to identify predictor variables of why faculty unionize. We have taken cues from the literature on faculty unionization and investigated those variables identified in this body of literature. Data we have collected during four survey periods have shown that the best predictor of favorable attitudes towards collective bargaining are faculty's agreement with administrative/university policy issues. All other variables, whether attitudinal or structural, contribute little to the amount of variance explained in favor collective bargaining.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In the beginning of this research, we attempted to show that theories of collective bargaining, which have traditionally focused on blue-collar workers, do not provide us with viable explanations of the problems encountered when the subjects are white-collar workers and professionals in the service sector. Topics of concern for blue-collar workers (e.g., length of working day and the rule of managers) have little similarity to work-issues and problems confronting professionals.

There have been numerous studies conducted concerning various aspects of job satisfaction and propensity of faculty to unionize. Allen and Keaveny (1981) and Bigoness (1978) found that status was highly correlated with attitudes towards collective bargaining. Tenured faculty members, who supposedly have higher status and enjoy more prerogatives, expressed less need and desire for union representation than non-tenured. Similarly, Feuille and Blanding (1976) found that dissatisfaction with administration, insufficient pay, and lack of opportunities for promotion (especially for those in the lower ranks), led to militant attitudes towards employers that may be expressed in terms of ratifying a collective bargaining contract.

Hammer and Berman (1981) and Johnstone (1981) found the issue of influence to be critical to collective bargaining. Individuals who felt powerless were found to be more favorable to the establishment of a collective bargaining unit, which would presumably give them more input into decision-making, than those who did not report feelings of powerlessness.

Alternative explanations concerning why faculty join unions have been offered by Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) who argued that workers were more likely to join a union when their bargaining position in the labor market declined, and Ladd and Lipset (1975), Brown (1970) and Thompson (1967) have argued that professionals join unions to protect and insure their professional freedoms.

While many explanations have been proposed of why professionals (or indeed, any group) join unions, there is little consensus among researchers on this phenomena.

During the last ten years, there have been three attempts to unionize the faculty at Michigan State University (1972, 1978 and 1982). Given the lack of consensus in the literature on why faculties choose collective bargaining, the researchers were interested in probing the attitudes of faculty to try and identify predictor variables of favor collective bargaining. Using a sample of five colleges at this university, data were collected in 1977, 1978 and 1981 about faculty attitudes towards collective bargaining, university administration,

faculty communication patterns, perceptions of influence and satisfaction. We were also able to draw on a 1970 Omnibus study that tapped a few of these dimensions.

In addition to investigating psychological variables, we also used structural (department level) variables in our analysis of professional behavior. These variables were introduced because it was believed that the work setting (e.g., teaching loads, budgets, salary, and faculty turnover) would have an impact on the desire for a collective bargaining unit. We did not find this to be the case. Of the department level data, Support/Services accounts for four percent of the explained variance in the Pro-Union index variable. The others, Demand, Size/Support and Turnover, accounted for trivial amounts.

The initial investigation, relying primarily on zero-order correlations, led us to accept most of our hypotheses (Table 31). Of the two hypotheses that were rejected, one dealt with communication patterns and one dealt with attitudinal differences by college. Our analysis, in all other cases, led us to clearly accept our hypotheses as stated. However, when the major predictor variables were used in a multiple regression only the index variable "policy agreement" consistently, and across all survey periods, explained a large percentage of the variance in our dependent variables. The other predictor variables contributed little in explained variance.

TABLE 31
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Hypothesis	Accept	Reject
H ₁ The higher the academic rank, the higher the personal influence.	X	
H ₂ Non-tenured faculty will perceive group influence to be higher than personal influence.	X	
H ₃ The lower the personal influence, the higher the perceived impact of a collective bargaining unit on issues of salary, decision making and job security.	X	
H ₄ The longer the faculty members; length of employment at the university, the higher the identification with the university. Likewise: The shorter the faculty member's length of employment at the university, the higher the identification with the discipline.	X X	
H ₅ The higher the academic rank, the more the communication with administrators and the less the communication with graduate students and union representatives.	X (university administrators & graduate students)	X (chair-person & union representatives)
H ₆ Faculty who communicate with AAUP representatives have a higher academic rank than those faculty who discuss ideas with MSUFA representatives.	X	
H ₇ The differences between the various faculty groups' (i.e., rank, college and age) attitudes toward collective bargaining will narrow between 1978 and 1981.	X (rank and age)	X (college)

Our study has resulted in identifying a key predictor variable in favoring collective bargaining which has seldom been explored in any depth in the literature, namely policy agreement. When faculty view the university administration as being competent in their procedures for reappointing faculty, handling grievance procedures and dealing with budgeting problems, they are not likely to favor collective bargaining. While these individuals may not agree wholeheartedly with administrations' decision, they nevertheless exhibit enough confidence in administrative decisions that they do not want these areas turned over to an "outside" group, such as a negotiating unit. Rank, age, sex, personal and group influence, reference group and communication patterns are insignificant in explaining why faculty favor collective bargaining. Also insignificant in their explanatory power are organization level data such as turnover, salary, enrollments and budgets. What are significant are the perceptions of legitimacy and competency of university administrators by faculty.

Why do we find that agreement with university policy issues has an ability to account for a large and significant amount of the variance? We think that faculty will vote for a collective bargaining unit when they think it has the opportunity to change the conditions of their employment in a manner that is meaningful to them. We think job security and salary are probably the two most important issues for which faculty will vote to place a bargaining unit in an

academic setting. During the 1970's, when faculty in many colleges and universities were voting in agents, they did so with the expectations that their salaries would rise faster and the younger faculty believed they could obtain job security (Birnbaum, 1974; Brown and Stone, 1977). Many colleges and universities that ratified collective bargaining agreements were relatively new schools that grew quickly. Few norms existed for either faculty or administrators (Brown, 1970; Johnstone, 1981). We think this created a sufficient amount of personal anxiety and social disruption; faculty at these institutions chose a collective bargaining agent in the belief that a contract would help stabilize the situation and one could make better predictions as to the types of appropriate behavior.

The larger, more prestigious universities, such as those in the Big Ten, have consistently rejected the opportunity to have a collective bargaining agent represent them. The faculty attracted to these universities, we would argue, still view themselves as academics on par with the high prestige northeastern schools. Indeed, over fifty percent of our respondents reported that their department was in the top ten percent of the departments in their discipline nationwide (question 14, Appendix A). Faculty believe their own merit will help them rise through the ranks and secure tenure and that their salaries will rise with continued effort. These norms sustained them through

the 1970's and they have consistently rejected collective bargaining agents.

Within the university, there are clear divisions, by college, in attitudes towards collective bargaining: humanities and social sciences tend to be more favorable to collective bargaining than applied/professional schools like business, engineering, and the natural sciences. We would argue that in the applied/professional schools, there is an elastic supply of employees. Faculty in these schools are likely to be sensitive to slight fluctuations in wages, fringe benefits and teaching loads. When these do not meet their expectations, they have the exit option by either going to another university or taking their skills to industry or business.

This is not the case in the humanities. While faculty in this college may also be quite sensitive to wages and teaching loads, because of inelastic supply, they lack an exit option and must rely primarily on voice to show their dissatisfaction. When the resources needed for either career advancement, or to meet expectations of the occupation are lacking,

"...the last hope for bringing achievements into line with needs is through efforts to protect and enhance the occupation itself...Under these conditions, collective action becomes the characteristic strategy for career building" (Thompson, 1967, p. 109).

Based on our data, however, we would argue that collective bargaining organizations will have little appeal, and not attract a majority vote if they continue to stress

faculty dissatisfactions and lack of influence, the arbitrary and authoritarian ineptitude of administrators, the lack of communication and deprivation that pervade disenchanted faculty. First of all, most of the faculty in our study do not manifest great dissatisfaction or feelings of anomie, or any other negative psychological reactions that are attributed to them. While faculty members' personal satisfaction has declined over the survey periods of 1977 to 1981, we still find that over sixty-three percent of those surveyed reported very high to fairly high satisfaction (Appendix H). Second, we would argue that faculty gain feelings of influence from belonging to a loosely structured group that represents their interests in councils and senates. We think that most faculty, like many other professionals, obtain satisfaction by comparing themselves to others who suffer more unemployment, more job dissatisfaction, more arbitrary supervision, and fewer social and economic rewards. For these reasons, collective bargaining is rejected.

Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research

One of the major problems with the study we conducted had to do with issues of comparability. As we pointed out in Chapter III, a survey instrument designed in 1970 is seldom sensitive to issues facing a particular population eleven years later. Only five items from the 1970 data set

were comparable to the 1977, 1978 and 1981 data sets. While the latter three survey periods shared more similarities in questions asked, we have, each year, added items to the block questions. While some of these new items loaded well in 1981, we could not include them in the newly created index variables because of the problem of comparability.

This study relied on respondents' current attitudes towards collective bargaining at four points in time. Current attitudes are the accumulation of past attitudes and experiences. Hence, another weakness of this study is that we lack past history on respondents. Because the study guaranteed the anonymity of respondents, we have no way of knowing how individual faculty members entered the university or where they came from. If we had information on where the respondent received his or her Ph.D., we could investigate the possible affects this might have on attitudes towards collective bargaining. Are individuals who receive their Ph.D. from schools ranked lower than Michigan State University in the university ratings more or less favorable to collective bargaining? What about individuals who clearly move several notches down in prestige from where they studied to where they work; are they more or less likely to favor collective bargaining?

We were able to track, over time, a few demographic variables such as age, sex and rank. However, these variables contributed little to our understanding of

attitudes towards collective bargaining. In addition to needing information on where the respondents studied and received their advanced degrees from, we also need to know their publication record and history of research grants received and research activities. We think that individuals coming from prestigious schools who have active research and publication records would have what Hirschman (1970) calls an "exit" option, and would be less likely to favor collective bargaining than those having only a voice option.

Guaranteeing respondent anonymity posed yet another problem in this research. While we were able to obtain department level data, these are aggregate, not individual data. So for example, we know what the average associate professor in College X makes but we don't know what a particular associate professor in College X makes. The questions we would pose if we did have this data are: what is this individual's reference group; what is this individuals' salary; how does it compare to his/her reference groups' salary? We would expect that individuals whose salary is not consistent with their reference group would be favorable to collective bargaining. While reference group and aggregate salary explained little variance, we would argue that obtaining this information on an individual basis may well make a difference and explain a larger percent of the variance.

In summary, we would suggest that researchers interested in pursuing this topic identify a cohort within

colleges, such as we have chosen, and track them over time. Guarantees of respondent anonymity are always sensitive issues. However, it is precisely these "personal" data that we find to be critical to understanding faculty attitudes towards collective bargaining. Information on where advanced degrees were obtained, publication records, grants received, committees individuals serve on, and salaries can only be obtained by knowing who the respondents are. Until this information can be obtained, or imaginative ways to obtain this information indirectly are discovered, many determinants of why faculty vote for or reject collective bargaining will remain unknown.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
FACULTY QUESTIONNAIRE -- 1981

APPENDIX A
FACULTY QUESTIONNAIRE -- 1981

1. Which group SHOULD HAVE the most influence and which group ACTUALLY HAS the most influence with respect to each of the following items?

Administration

Faculty

- a. appointing a department chairperson
- b. Appointing an academic dean
- c. Creating new educational programs
- d. Determining faculty salaries
- e. determining tenure for faculty members
- f. determining internal university budget allocations
- g. determining university tuition and fees
- h. hiring new faculty members

2. What impact do you feel the establishment of a collective bargaining unit would have on the following?

Great impact Some impact Slight impact No impact

- a. Equalizing faculty salaries across units
- b. Improving the overall economic status of faculty
- c. Reducing the merit basis of salary increases
- d. Acquiring additional funds from the legislature
- e. Giving faculty greater involvement in decision making
- f. Providing greater job security
- g. Improving current grievance procedures for faculty

3. To what extent do you favor a collective bargaining unit for MSU faculty members?

To a great extent To some extent
To a slight extent Do not favor at all

4. Which one of the following should have the highest priority for a faculty collective bargaining unit?

- a. salaries
- b. fringe benefits
- c. working conditions
- d. tenure

5. To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?

Agree to a great extent Agree to some extent
 Agree to a slight extent Do not agree at all

- a. Procedures for reappointment of faculty are generally fair to the faculty members involved.
- b. The major function of a faculty union should be striving for higher faculty salaries.
- c. The university is dealing with its current budgetary problems in the most reasonable way possible.
- d. The current grievance procedures for faculty are adequate.
- e. In the long run, establishment of a faculty bargaining agent will lower the quality of the faculty at MSU.
- f. There should be greater university coordination of programs, even if it means loss of unit autonomy.
- g. A faculty union would provide better protection against dismissal than the tenure system.
- h. Keeping as many faculty as possible on the job is more important than giving faculty a pay raise.
- i. In times of financial crisis tenured faculty should be the last to be fired.
- j. There is a lack of faculty input into the current budgetary decisions.
- k. The current financial problems of the university are less severe than they are portrayed.
- l. MSU needs a major reorganization at both the college and department levels.

6. In general, how much influence do University faculty have over the following matters?

A great deal of influence A moderate amount of influence
 influence A slight amount of influence
 No influence at all

- a. curriculum
- b. hiring of new faculty
- c. development of faculty personnel policies (reappointment, promotion, tenure)
- d. selection of a department chairperson
- e. department budget allocations
- f. faculty load determination
- g. selection of an academic dean

7. Do you feel that there are circumstances in which a strike of faculty would be a legitimate means of collective action?

Definitely yes Probably yes Probably not
 Definitely not

8. Compared to other faculty in your department how much influence do you feel you have on the following department matters?

A great deal of influence A moderate amount of influence
influence A slight amount of influence
No influence at all

- a. curriculum
- b. hiring of new faculty
- c. development of faculty personnel policies (reappointment, promotion, tenure)
- d. selection of a department chairperson
- e. department budget allocations
- f. faculty load determination
- g. selection of an academic dean

9. a. How would you describe your personal satisfaction as a faculty member?

My personal satisfaction is: Very high Fairly high
Fairly low Very low

- b. How would you describe the satisfaction of other faculty members you know?

The satisfaction of other faculty seems to be: Very high Fairly high Fairly low
Very low

10. To what extent do you discuss your opinions and ideas about the department with each of the following?

To a great extent To some extent
To a slight extent Do not favor at all

- a. the chairperson of your department
- b. faculty in your department
- c. chairpersons of special departmental committees
- d. graduate students
- e. faculty in other departments or units
- f. university administrators (e.g., provost, president, dean)
- g. representatives of the AAUP
- h. representatives of the MSUFA

11. What is your academic rank?

Professor Associate Professor Other
Assistant Professor Instructor

12. Compared with other academic departments in your discipline nationwide, how do you rank your department overall?

In the top 5%	Top 10%	Top 25%
Top 50%	Bottom 50%	Bottom 25%

13. How much emphasis should be placed on each of the following areas within your particular department?

A great emphasis	Some emphasis
A slight emphasis	No emphasis at all

- a. instruction of undergraduate majors
- b. instruction of graduate majors
- c. advisement of graduate majors
- d. advisement of undergraduate majors
- e. basic research
- f. applied research
- g. instruction of undergraduate non-majors

14. In general, do you think of yourself primarily as a member of your university, department, or discipline?

University	Department	Discipline
------------	------------	------------

15. To what extent do you favor a referendum at this time on the establishment of a collective bargaining agent for MSU faculty?

To a great extent	To some extent
To a slight extent	Do not favor at all

16. What is your sex? Female Male

17. How old were you on your last birthday?

Under 25	25 to 29	30 to 34
35 to 39	40 to 44	45-49
50 to 54	55 to 59	60 and over

18. In which department is your primary appointment?

Write In _____

19. Do you have more than 25% administrative responsibilities other than departmental committee work?

Yes No

20. What is your title?

Instructor Assistant Professor Associate Professor
Professor Department Administrator (Chair, Director,
Assoc/Asst C/D)
College Administrator (Dean, Assoc/Asst Dean)

21. How long have you been in your current position at MSU?

Less than one year 1-4 years
5-10 years 10-20 years

22. What do you consider to be your primary responsibility?

Administration Research Teaching

APPENDIX B
FACULTY EXCLUDED FROM THE STUDY

APPENDIX B
FACULTY EXCLUDED FROM THE STUDY

Faculty excluded from the study were:

Vice President
Assistant Vice President
Assistant to the Vice President
Associate Vice President
Provost
Associate Provost
Assistant Provost
Assistant to the Provost
Registrar
Associate Registrar
Assistant Registrar
Dean
Associate Dean
Assistant Dean
Director
Associate Director
Assistant Director
Chairperson
Associate Chairperson

APPENDIX C

VARIABLES USED TO CONSTRUCT NEW INDEX VARIABLES AND THEIR FACTOR LOADINGS

APPENDIX C

VARIABLES USED TO CONSTRUCT NEW INDEX VARIABLES AND THEIR FACTOR LOADINGS

	1970	1977	1978	1981
<u>Collective Bargaining Impact</u> (Question 2)				
B. Improving the overall economic status of faculty.	NA	.76	.72	.78
D. Acquiring additional funds from the legislature.	NA	.67	.72	.60
E. Giving faculty greater involvement in decision-making.	NA	.83	.60	.77
F. Providing greater job security.	NA	.68	.26	.79
<u>Policy Agreement</u> (Question 5)				
A. Procedures for reappointment of faculty are generally fair to the faculty members involved.	NA	.59	.74	.60
C. The university is dealing with its current budgeting problems in the most reasonable way possible.	NA	.50	.69	.44
D. The current grievance procedures for faculty are adequate.	NA	.80	.75	.72
<u>Group Influence</u> (Questions 6)				
A. Curriculum.	NA	.46	.55	.47
B. Hiring of new faculty.	NA	.72	.67	.66
C. Development of faculty personnel policies.	NA	.73	.76	.74
D. Selection of department chairperson.	NA	.75	.73	.74
G. Selection of academic dean.	NA	.62	.67	.57

NA = not asked

APPENDIX C

VARIABLES USED TO CONSTRUCT NEW INDEX VARIABLES
AND THEIR FACTOR LOADINGS

page two

	1970	1977	1978	1981
<u>Personal Influence (Question 8)</u>				
A. Curriculum.	NA	.52	.68	.66
B. Hiring of new faculty.	NA	.72	.75	.79
C. Development of faculty personnel policies.	NA	.64	.82	.80
D. Selection of department chairperson.	NA	.63	.78	.79
G. Selection of academic dean.	NA	.60	.63	.60
<u>Satisfaction (Question 9)</u>				
A. Personal satisfaction.	NA	(Factor scores not necessary when combining two simple variables)		
B. Other satisfaction.	NA			
<u>Communication (Question 10)</u>				
A. The chairperson of your department.	NA	NA	.68	.51
B. Faculty in your department.	NA	NA	.68	.62
C. Chairpersons of special departmental committees.	NA	NA	.59	.66
<u>Undergraduate Emphasis (Question 13)</u>				
A. Instruction of undergraduate majors.	.50	.48	.62	.57
B. Advisement of undergraduate majors.	.96	.87	.83	.97
G. Instruction of undergraduate non-majors.	.44	.43	.58	.47
<u>Graduate Emphasis (Question 13)</u>				
B. Instruction of graduate students.	.75	.66	.66	.87
C. Advisement of graduate majors.	.55	.44	.66	.67

APPENDIX D
VARIABLES USED TO CONSTRUCT DEPARTMENT INDEX
VARIABLES AND THEIR FACTOR
LOADINGS, 1981

APPENDIX D

VARIABLES USED TO CONSTRUCT DEPARTMENT INDEX VARIABLES AND THEIR FACTOR LOADINGS, 1981

	<u>Factor Score</u>
<u>Demand</u>	
1980 Department Fall enrollment, Lower Division, Undergraduate	.69
1980 Department Fall Enrollment, Upper Division Undergraduate	.80
<u>Turnover</u>	
Associate Professor not present in 1981, present in 1978	.67
Assistant Professor not present in 1981, present in 1978	.66
<u>Support Services</u>	
1980 Department General Fund Budget - Labor	.71
1980 Department General Fund Budget - Supplies and Services	.57
1980 Department General Fund Budget - Equipment	.66
<u>Size/Supply</u>	
1980 Department Fall Enrollment Doctoral Students	.87
1980 Department General Fund Budget - Salary	.97
1980 Department General Fund Budget - Total	.96

APPENDIX E

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN
INDEX VARIABLES: 1977

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN
INDEX VARIABLES: 1978

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN
INDEX VARIABLES: 1981

APPENDIX E

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEX VARIABLES: 1977

	Favoring CB	CB Impact	Group Influence	Personal Influence	Policy Agreement	Undergrad. Emphasis	Graduate Emphasis	Satis- faction	Acad. Rank	Age
Favoring of CB		.72*	-.13*	-.22*	-.41*	-.09	-.11*	-.28*	-.19*	-.10*
CB Impact			-.08	-.23*	-.30*	-.05	-.06	-.25*	-.17*	-.05
Group Influence				.37	.46*	.14*	.01	.36*	.27*	.22*
Personal Influence					.33*	.01	.03	.30*	.37*	.17*
Policy Agreement						.12*	.08	.39*	.27*	-.28*
Undergraduate Emphasis							.34*	.09	.01	.14*
Graduate Emphasis								.15*	-.02	.05
Satisfaction									.07	.03
Academic Rank										.65*

Coefficients are based on, at least, N=307

* P<.05

APPENDIX E

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEX VARIABLES: 1978

	Favoring CB	CB Impact	Group Influence	Personal Influence	Policy Agreement	Undergrad. Emphasis	Graduate Emphasis	Satis- faction	Acad. Rank	Age	Communi- cation
Favoring of CB		.77*	-.48*	-.41*	-.61*	-.05	-.15*	-.42*	-.18*	-.11*	-.22*
CB Impact			-.48*	-.37*	-.59*	.00	-.09*	-.40*	-.16*	-.04	-.23*
Group Influence				.58*	.58*	.14*	.12*	.50*	.26*	.25*	.31*
Personal Influence					.46*	.07	.16*	.44*	.33*	.30*	.40*
Policy Agreement						.12*	.12*	.54*	.16*	.23*	.30*
Undergraduate Emphasis							.21*	.07	.06	.22*	.07
Graduate Emphasis								.11*	.03	.09*	.12*
Satisfaction									.16*	.13*	.28*
Academic Rank										.49*	.04
Age											.02

Coefficients are based on, at least, N=263

* P<.05

APPENDIX E

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEX VARIABLES: 1981

	Favoring CB	CB Impact	Group Influence	Personal Influence	Policy Agreement	Undergrad. Emphasis	Graduate Emphasis	Satis- faction	Acad. Rank	Age	Communi- cation	Length of time in current Position
Favoring of CB		.74*	-.28*	-.26*	-.58*	-.09	-.14*	-.35*	-.09	.03	-.22*	-.05
CB Impact			-.30*	-.19*	-.50*	.09*	-.12*	-.26*	-.06	.03	-.15*	-.12*
Group Influence				.42*	.37*	.01	.06	.36*	.15*	.05	.23*	.03
Personal Influence					.33*	.01	.01	.36*	.37*	.20*	.52*	.20*
Policy Agreement						-.06	.03	.44*	.13*	-.05*	.26*	.05
Undergraduate Emphasis							.07	-.06	.03	.13*	.11*	.13*
Graduate Emphasis								.11*	-.05	.00	.07	.00
Satisfaction									.11*	-.04	.35*	-.02
Academic Rank										.63*	.06	.47*
Age											.03	.60*
Communication												-.01

Coefficients are based on, at least, N=290

* P<.05

APPENDIX F

**ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IMPACT ITEMS, RANK AND PERSONAL AND
GROUP INFLUENCE INDEX VARIABLES: 1977**

**ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IMPACT ITEMS, RANK AND PERSONAL AND
GROUP INFLUENCE INDEX VARIABLES: 1978**

**ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IMPACT ITEMS, RANK AND PERSONAL AND
GROUP INFLUENCE INDEX VARIABLES: 1981**

APPENDIX F

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IMPACT ITEMS, RANK AND PERSONAL AND GROUP INFLUENCE INDEX VARIABLES: 1977

	Academic Rank	Personal Influence	Group Influence	Equalize Faculty Salaries	Improve Economic Status	Reduce Merit Basis of Salary Increases	Acquire Additional Funds	Greater Involvement in Decision Making	Job Security	Improve Grievance Procedures
Academic Rank		.37*	.27*	.02	-.19*	.12*	-.09*	-.15*	-.13*	N/A
Personal Influence			.37*	-.13*	-.16*	.16*	-.14*	-.21*	-.22*	N/A
Group Influence				-.05	-.10*	.09	-.02	-.08	-.06	N/A
Equalize Faculty Salaries					.36*	.07	.26*	.29*	.33*	N/A
Improve Economic Status						-.20*	.57*	.59*	.48*	N/A
Reduce Merit Basis of Salary Increases							-.19*	-.28*	-.10*	N/A
Acquire Additional Funds								.54*	.42*	N/A
Greater Involvement in Decision Making									.63*	N/A
Job Security										N/A

Coefficients are based on, at least, N = 318

* P<.05

APPENDIX F

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IMPACT ITEMS, RANK AND PERSONAL AND GROUP INFLUENCE INDEX VARIABLES: 1978

	Academic Rank	Personal Influence	Group Influence	Equalize Faculty Salaries	Improve Economic Status	Reduce Merit Basis of Salary Increases	Acquire Additional Funds	Greater Involvement in Decision Making	Job Security	Improve Grievance Procedures
Academic Rank		.33*	.26*	.02	-.13*	.18*	-.24*	-.13*	-.06	-.20*
Personal Influence			.58*	-.03	-.30*	.29*	-.30*	-.39*	-.21	-.47*
Group Influence				-.05	-.35*	.27*	-.39*	-.43*	-.33*	-.50*
Equalize Faculty Salaries					.27*	.04	.26*	.23*	.15*	.16*
Improve Economic Status						-.28*	.67*	.67*	.42*	.58*
Reduce Merit Basis of Salary Increases							-.33*	-.37*	-.19*	-.33*
Acquire Additional Funds								.62*	.38*	.51*
Greater Involvement in Decision Making									.48*	.68*
Job Security										.63*

Coefficients are based on, at least, N = 231

* P<.05

APPENDIX F

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IMPACT ITEMS, RANK AND PERSONAL AND GROUP INFLUENCE INDEX VARIABLES: 1981

	Academic Rank	Personal Influence	Group Influence	Equalize Faculty Salaries	Improve Economic Status	Reduce Merit Basis of Salary Increases	Acquire Additional Funds	Greater Involvement in Decision Making	Job Security	Improve Grievance Procedures
Academic Rank		.37*	.15*	-.02	-.08	.11*	-.00	-.12*	-.00	-.08
Personal Influence			.42*	.07	-.22*	.21*	-.10*	-.20*	-.10*	-.20*
Group Influence				.00	-.30*	.24*	-.17*	-.25*	-.26*	-.23*
Equalize Faculty Salaries					.16*	.27*	.06	.04	.17*	.07
Improve Economic Status						-.30*	.55*	.58*	.58*	.58*
Reduce Merit Basis of Salary Increases							-.18*	-.34*	-.24*	-.26*
Acquire Additional Funds								.48*	.46*	.40*
Greater Involvement in Decision Making									.58*	.62*
Job Security										.67*

Coefficients are based on, at least, N = 333

* P<.05

APPENDIX G

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION
ITEMS AND ACADEMIC RANK: 1978

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION
ITEMS AND ACADEMIC RANK: 1981

APPENDIX G

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION ITEMS AND ACADEMIC RANK: 1978

	Academic Rank	Chairperson	Faculty in Own Dept.	Chairpersons Special Committees	Graduate Students	Other Faculty	University Administrators
Academic Rank		.05	.01	.02	-.07	-.01	.16*
Chairperson			.51*	.39*	.30*	.24*	.36*
Faculty in Own Dept.				.44*	.18*	.31*	.31*
Chairpersons of Special Committees					.26*	.23*	.28*
Graduate Students						.28*	.15*
Faculty in Other Depts.							.34*

Coefficients are based on, at least, N = 241

* P<.05

APPENDIX G

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION ITEMS AND ACADEMIC RANK: 1981

	Academic Rank	Chairperson	Faculty in Own Dept.	Chairpersons Special Committees	Graduate Students	Other Faculty	University Administrators	AAUP	MSUFA
Academic Rank		-.01	-.03	.17*	-.11*	.08	.21*	.12*	.09*
Chairperson			.41*	.37*	.19*	.09*	.24*	-.00	-.08*
Faculty in Own Dept.				.40*	.23*	.37*	.19*	.05	.06
Chairpersons of Special Committees					.33*	.27*	.29*	.00	-.04
Graduate Students						.27*	.22*	.06	-.02
Faculty in Other Depts.							.35*	.22*	.15*
University Administrators								.13*	.06*
AAUP									.71*

Coefficients are based on, at least, N = 299

* P<.05

APPENDIX H

**FACULTY SATISFACTION, 1977, 1978, 1981:
ONE'S OWN AND PERCEIVED OF OTHERS**

APPENDIX H

FACULTY SATISFACTION, 1977, 1978, 1981: ONE'S OWN AND PERCEIVED OF OTHERS

	Personal Satisfaction (%)			Perception of Satisfaction of other Faculty (%)		
	'77	'78	'81	'77	'78	'81
Very high	26	28	17	6	3	2
Fairly high	48	52	46	56	70	45
Fairly low	21	17	25	36	25	46
Very low	5	3	11	2	2	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Mean	2.9	3.0	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.5
N	337	244	351	326	236	343

Scale: Very high = 4 Fairly high = 3 Fairly low = 2 Very low = 1