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LEGISLATIVE STAFF AND LEGISLATOR ACCOUNTABILITY: AN EXAMINATION OF LEGISLATIVE ENTERPRISES IN MICHIGAN

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Legislative Staff and Legislator Accountability: An Examination of Legislative Enterprises in Michigan

By

John Si Nahra

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ABSTRACT

Legislative Staff and Legislator Accountability:
An Examination of Legislative Enterprises in Michigan

By

John Si Nahra

Legislator accountability is a mainstay of representative democracy. In this research, legislative staffs' impact on legislator accountability is analyzed. Accountability takes many specific forms, all of which presume that legislators are responsible for their actions. The assignment of responsibility requires knowing whose interests exert influence (are legislators in control) and how these interests combine (is staff discretion tolerable and manageable). These concerns are formalized and tested using data from the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984, supplemented by data from various secondary sources. Emphasis is placed on staff access to legislators as the indicator of staff use. Access is defined by the nature and extent of interactions with legislators reported by staff, and converted into temporal measures. The measures of staff access, attitudes, and assignment, provide the empirical bases for hypothesis testing. Remarks made by legislators in personal interviews, as well as staff comments, lend credence to the empirical findings and reaffirm that staff have been assimilated into Michigan's legislative environment without sacrificing legislator accountability.

DEDICATION

To my bride, who knew what she was getting into and encouraged me to go ahead. This is ours, too.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research could never have been completed without the assistance and advice of numerous individuals. Members of the Political Science Department at Michigan State University provided the opportunity. Frank Pinner, my early mentor, David Rohde, the Department Chairman, and Gary Miller, my dissertation committee chairman, all gave me the support and latitude needed to pursue a non-traditional academic timetable. The willingness of my employer, Symond Gottlieb, to support my academic pursuits was also critical to the commencement of this project.

The actual conduct of The Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984, required the cooperation of numerous staff who took time from their other responsibilities to complete the survey. Three people in particular were a source of valuable advice: Kevin Seitz, then with the House Fiscal Agency, Patience Drake, an analyst with the House Fiscal Agency, and William Ryan, former Speaker and Clerk of the Michigan House of Representatives. Specific legislators who gave generously of their time include Representatives Robert Emerson, Lynn Jondahl, David Hollister, Deborah Stabenow, and Senator Lana Pollack.

The patient typing and revising of text provided by Chriss Olivo and the typing of tables by Mona Torp produced this document. Their aid was indispensable.

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INTRODUCTION

Legislative staff retained by American legislatures at both the state and federal levels have matured from a cause celebre of post-World War II legislative reformers to become a burgeoning profession which, according to some contemporary observers, threatens to change the very legislative process staff were designed to serve. The rise and institutionalization of any new cadre of actors in the legislative arena is a development of considerable import. Legislative staff are no exception. To explore the implications of staff development and use, this research will describe and analyze interactions between legislators and staff in one state, Michigan. Data will come from a survey of professional staff working for the Michigan House or Senate during 1984, followed by personal interviews with legislators having high levels of reported staff contact.

The purpose of this analysis goes beyond a single state. Michigan's legislator-staff relations will be used to examine the effect of staff on legislator accountability. In the process, a view of staff and an approach to documenting their function is suggested that, if useful in Michigan, may have relevance to other legislative settings.

The utility of this approach will be assessed by how well it furthers understanding of several critical issues concerning legislator accountability.

Chapter Synopses

In Chapter 1, the definitions and logic supporting the research are elaborated. Legislators' maintenance of their accountability is seen as central to representative democracy. Various forms of legislator accountability are defined as expectations others place upon the performance of legislators. The nature of these expectations are determined by how decision making is perceived. Some look for rationality or predictability in legislative performance. The view adopted here is that it may not be reasonable to always expect rationality or predictability; but, it is reasonable to expect that legislators are responsible for creating and maintaining the interactions in which they participate. The presumption of such responsibility is the basis for all forms of accountability.

The literature on legislative staff reveals a concensus that staff do influence legislator accountability. However, sharp differences of opinion exist concerning whether this influence is positive or negative. Early proponents advocated more staff to provide legislators with the resources needed to carry out their responsibilities and

maintain accountability. Later critics have viewed the rise of staff with some alarm pointing to their independence and potential influence as threats to legislators rather than aids. Resolution of this dilemma lies at the heart of the research.

To begin this resolution, the analysis of legislative staff must emphasize relevant concerns. Placing staff in their proper historical context provides this focus. Staff are seen as a contemporary manifestation of the political advisory function found throughout history. Once this historical link is made, features of staff worth stressing emerge. Both proponents and critics of staff base their arguments on staff growth. I maintain this emphasis is misplaced. Staff growth in America's legislatures is consistent with the historic growth of political advisors. Given the proper conditions, growth in the numbers and types of advisors is to be expected and offers little evidence as to whether staff help or hinder legislator accountability. Of more direct concern to legislator accountability is the nature and extent of staff access to legislators.

In Chapter 2, the relevance of staff growth and access to legislators in the Michigan legislative environment are reviewed. The development of staff and their use are described using primary and secondary data sources compiled for this research. Different staff structures are found in the two legislative chambers. The House is characterized by

centralized staffing while the Senate has a more decentralized use of staff with staff assignment being associated with individual legislators.

Chapter 3 integrates access into an analysis of accountability through the exploration of what legislative staff scholars term the Legislative Enterprise. Under this approach legislators are not viewed as individuals, but as managers of subordinates (staff). Staff access defines the dimension of each legislator's enterprise. The nature and context of these legislator-staff interactions permit an assessment of who controls the Legislative Enterprise and how much discretion staff are permitted. Control and discretion become the principal indicators used to gauge legislator accountability. To the extent that legislators control their enterprises and the associated staff discretion, they maintain their accountability; to the extent that legislators lack control and staff discretion lacks limits, legislator accountability is threatened. This argument is formalized with three assertions, one on control and two on discretion. Hypotheses designed to test the validity of these assertions are formulated.

Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of how access is empirically defined. An approach to the measurement of interaction time for legislators and staff is devised. This chapter also offers conclusions about the hypotheses derived from statistical interpretations of the data. All three

assertions find support indicating that, at least in Michigan, legislators are able to control staff and that they find staff discretion both tolerable and manageable.

Chapter 5 reinforces these empirical findings with observations made in semi-structured interviews with the top five legislators most frequently mentioned by staff as well as comments offered by staff regarding their work.

Chapter 6 concludes the research by summarizing the insights gained here as well as their implications for future analysis of legislative functioning.

CHAPTER 1

LEGISLATOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Representative government rests on the presumption that legislators are accountable for the performance of their public duties. Elections and other electoral devices, such as primaries and recalls, act as the final arbitrators of legislator accountablity by placing periodic value judgments on legislators. These judgements presume that legislators are (or should be) accountable for the conduct and results of their public actions.

Other external agents, most notably a watchful press and media, monitor legislative performance. This scrutiny can help maintain legislator accountability by revealing its absence. However, these findings are after-the-fact. The ability to correct or redress any perceived short-coming is limited by the nature of these participants as external to the formal legislative process.

The ultimate guarantors of legislator accountability must be legislators themselves and the legislative processes they devise. Over the years, legislators have reformed and refined the legislative process both at the urging of others and on their own initiative. Each of these internal reforms

have sought to support, explicitly or implicitly, the maintenance and reinforcement of legislator accountability.

Longer and more frequent sessions as well as lengthened terms of office were two reforms designed to give legislators more time to carry out their duties. Adequate time for the performance of their functions is a key aspect of legislator accountability. The evolution of partisan leadership and the institutionalization of committee structures are two other administrative reforms legislators adopted to better structure their tasks through the delegation of duties and the division of labor. Here, changes in the legislative process developed to help improve efficiency and better define legislator accountability.

The utility of these measures are still debated in terms of legislator accountability. Have longer and more frequent sessions given legislators needed time or opened the door to extraneous activity? Have more defined institutional structures and legislator relations helped or hindered legislative performance by differentiating certain legislators from others? Various points of view on these questions define the debate over legislator accountability.

This research examines a more recent legislative reform, legislative staff, to assess its effect on the maintenance of legislator accountability. The essence of my inquiry can be stated quite simply. Legislator accountability to the

public requires staff accountability to legislators. If staff are accountable to legislators, then legislator accountability to the public is maintained even after the introduction of legislative staff reforms. If staff are not accountable to legislators, then legislator accountability itself is weakened by staff development.

To begin the research, this chapter offers a definition of legislator accountability. Staff relevance to the maintenance of legislator accountability is examined by reviewing prior assessments of staff impact on legislative functioning. Most analyses of staff have stressed growth in staff numbers. I maintain that this emphasis, while important, is incomplete. A more direct indicator of staff impact upon legislator functioning and accountability is staff access to legislators. Access delineates which staff interact with which legislators. By ascertaining who controls these interactions and the extent of staff discretion these interactions reflect, direct observations as to whether or not staff are accountable to legislators can be made. The chapter concludes with a discussion of access, control, and discretion that will guide the development of the formal research argument.

DEFINING LEGISLATOR ACCOUNTABILITY

Legislators are accountable to numerous individuals and interests. Particular stands on issues, political support,

access to influence, assistance when needed, or patronage are among the tangible expressions of accountability. Accountability, however, is no one of these things. Rather, they can all be subsumed under a more general definition. Legislator accountability consists of expectations others place on legislator decision-making.

Such expectations take three general forms. Expecting legislators to be responsible for the decisions and actions attributed to them is one type of accountability. Predictability [1] in legislative performance is a further expectation that can be placed upon legislators to gauge their accountability. Finally, various types of rationality in legislator behavior may be looked for as a part of an accountable legislator [2]. These expectations are not mutually exclusive. However, assessments of accountability can, and commonly do, emphasize one over another.

I maintain that, at a minimum, accountability requires responsibility. Without some assignment of responsibility, predictability and rationality lack substance. It is this form of accountability that my research explores.

For both legislator and staff, responsibility, and the accountability it supports, has two features which can be ascertained by answering the following questions: whose interests exert influence on legislative decisions; and how do these interests combine to produce legislative actions.

These facets of responsibility are returned to later in this chapter as, respectively, control and discretion.

While accountability requires the assignment of responsibility, the two concepts are not synonymous. This can be seen by considering how the other forms of accountability differ from responsibility. Responsibility for public policy decisions is often not predictable. The number of interests and the variety of their interactions, especially in the legislative setting, accounts for the elusiveness of predictability.

> Since policy analysis (and, therefore, legislative decision-making) is incremental, exploratory, serial, and marked by adjustments of ends to means, it is to be expected that stable long-term aspirations (i.e., predictability) will not appear as dominant critical values in the eyes of the analyst (or legislator). [3]

Similarly, responsiblity may exist without obtaining rationality in decision-making even though rationality may be a preferred choice.

> If he (the legislator) himself actually understands that, in so far as his opinion has any effect on the choice, he is a participant in partisan mutual adjustment, at the very least in partisan discussion as one form of the process (of decision-making) he may wish to tailor his role to increase his effectiveness, if that is what he desires. And, incidentally, he will come to accept certain divergence between his preferred choice of method and actual choices made as appropriate, not necessarily evidence of the foolishness (i.e., lack of rationality) of political choice. [4]

PRIOR VIEWS ON STAFF AND LEGISLATORS

The relevance of legislative staff to legislator accountability permeates the literature analyzing legislative staff. Observers of staff agree on two basic propositions. First of all, some subset of legislator functioning involves interaction between legislators and legislative staff. Secondly, as legislative staff numbers grow, this heightens the potential for legislative staff to influence legislator performance. Disagreement sets in as to whether these statements are to be viewed positively or negatively. To begin an assessment of legislative staff and its impact on legislator accountability requires an appreciation for these differing points of view.

Staff proponents argue that staff have been an aid to legislators providing them with the means to maintain legislator accountability. Critics state that staff have been deleterious to that accountability complicating the already complex tasks legislators face and further removing those tasks from legislators hands. These views of staff proponents and critics are reviewed here to gain an appreciation for the manner in which staff influence on legislator accountability has been discussed.

Proponents. Staff proponents have consistently argued that staff are a more efficient response to increasing legislative complexity; that the technical assistance they

provide is needed to exercise legislative supervision of the executive branch; and that staff help inform legislators and reflect the public concensus. Soon after World War II calls for increased legislative staffing using such arguments began to be heard. While not coordinated in any formal fashion, support for staff grew until by 1974 the following statement could be made without fear of contradiction.

> Surveys reveal that the single improvement most frequently mentioned as necessary by members of state legislatures is more professional staff. [5]

Support for legislative staff development did not follow a set pattern or timetable in the states, nor was it modelled after federal developments. However, similar arguments for legislative staff based on efficiency of administration, maintenance of legislative prerogatives, and response to growing societal demands are found throughout the 1950's and 1960's.

Since the focus of this research will be the Michigan legislature, two studies presenting reasons for staff development in Michigan will be considered. While not necessarily representative of what other states did, the arguments presented are typical of those found in other reports.

Report #11 of the Michigan Joint Legislative Committee on Reorganization of State Government dated March 1951 covers the topic of "The Legislature." This Joint Committee

(referred to as the "Little Hoover Commission" after the federal Hoover Commission) reviewed the broad array of Michigan governmental functions recommending changes felt warranted or desireable. It was strongly supportive of increased legislative staff.

At the time of the Joint Committee's Report #11 Michigan had a part-time legislature with only ten full-time staff. Another 96 staff were retained on a monthly or per diem basis during periods the legislature was in session. Of the twelve recommendations in Report #11, five related to staff or staff agencies.

The Joint Committee clearly felt that to meet growing demands on the legislature's committees, more staff were needed.

> With the insistent demand not only for more services but for more kinds of services, the need for equipping the state's important legislative committees with competent staff personnel becomes increasingly urgent. By adequate staffing, committee operations could be raised to a new level of performance. [6]

To better monitor expenditures by the executive branch, the Joint Committee also called for replacing the then elective post of Auditor General with a legislative appointed and accountable State Auditor.

> The determination of whether the money which it (the legislature) appropriates is being spent for specified purposes and whether it is being wisely expended requires competent and adequate staff facilities under the legislatures own jurisdiction. [7]

Ten years later in September of 1961, Herbert Garfinkel, then Associate Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, prepared a paper for the State's Constitutional Convention Preparatory Commission on the subject "The Constitution and The Legislature".

While not an overt advocate of legislative staffing, Garfinkel does note two advantages of legislative administration which implies, at least in part, staff involvement. The first advantage relates to the legislative process itself.

> Legislatures are perhaps less dependent than other branches of government on good administration for a satisfactory product; the substantive quality (rather than the execution) of statutes is mainly what the legislature can control. However, the efficient organization of the legislature, such that large numbers of Representatives and Senators can cope with numerous proposals of considerable complexity, entails many problems of good administration. [8]

The second advantage Garfinkel attributes to legislative administration is communication between the public and elective officials.

> Good administration of the legislative operation is more than a matter of time saving or cost reduction; it is equally a problem of enabling the legislators to help inform the public as well as reflect the popular concensus. [9]

Throughout his paper, Garfinkel reviews the pros and cons of the various issues he reviews. When he does discuss staff specifically, he notes three arguments used to oppose staff: that legislators would become rubber stamps for a new bureaucracy; that merit system employees would not fit in a political arena; and that staff costs money.

In balancing these objections, Garfinkel summarizes many of the advantages noted by others.

> In answer to (the opposition), the proponents maintain that professional staff aids are necessary precisely because the legislators cannot hope to personally research all the numerous proposals they must consider. This places them at the mercy of only too-eager-to-assist private groups, whose staff are certainly not at the direction of the legislators. Whatever difficulties may exist in maintaining control over the legislatures research aids, that is far easier than attempting, each legislator for himself, to match the expertise available to the executive branch of government and the organized groups in the community at large. [10]

Arguments such as these tended to support the establishment and expansion of legislative staff that occurred in the 1960's and 1970's. Much of the early literature on staff takes the positive attributes of staff as given and focuses instead on how staff functions are performed or might be performed better.

Such views were not universally held, however. Early critics are hard to find but did exist. Today, the staff literature reflects a much more critical perspective on staff and its influence on legislator accountability. It is to this side of the debate that we now turn.

Critics. Collectively, critics of staff point to the following issues associated with increased staff development. Staff adds to and does not reduce legislative work and complexity; legislators become dependent on staff who influence conclusions by structuring options to be considered; and, staff represent a barrier blocking direct legislator-constituent interaction.

In 1967, Norman Meller published the first systematic critique of legislative staff. His article in the Western Political Quarterly "Legislative Staff Services: Toxin, Specific, or Placebo for the Legislature's Ills" remains one of the better attempts to assess the implications of legislative staff growth. Meller assesses three assumptions made by "advocates of staff augmentation" which he finds questionable and "goes far to undermine the advisability of staff expansion". These assumptions are:

1. Augmented staff lightens the legislative burden;
2. Expanding objective expert staff of committees increases legislative efficiency; and,
3. A large personal staff for the legislature is a cure-all.

Regarding the first assumption, Meller argues that perceiving staff as a means to lighten the legislative burden is an error. In fact, the reverse is likely to occur.

> To the extent that reference bureaus, bill drafting agencies, and other comparable agencies are enabled to meet increased legislative demands by augmenting their staffs, their product adds to rather than reduces the volume of the legislators work. Indeed, there is even the suspicion that Parkinson's Law governs and work requested of legislative service agencies expands to meet growth of staff, rather than the reverse. [11]

Rather than viewing the expert committee staff as improving legislative efficiency, Meller sees them as a danger. Legislative staff cannot hope to duplicate anew executive branch budget formulations and policy initiatives; but, they can provide a critical review of executive branch actions that lead to the formulation of the legislative position. This could place staff in positions of influence. If not controlled, this influence could be used in ways not derived from legislator demands.

> This is a danger to be reckoned with, and to be guarded against by adding committee experts only as they can be kept accountable. [12]

As to the assumption that larger personal staffs will serve to improve legislative performance, Meller retorts as follows.

> The indiscriminate augmentation of personal staff could lead to the institutionalizing of the legislator and eventually to each legislator becoming the captive of his own staff. [13]

A final assessment of staff points to the risks of: interjecting between constituents and legislators a semi-autonomous bureaucracy; raising debate above the common understanding of citizens; and blocking constituent-representative contact. These could ". . . eventually subvert the fundamental processes of the legislature it (staff) serves" [14].

Other authors have elaborated one or more of Meller's concerns. We will consider two: Nachmias and Rosenbloom's Bureaucratic Government USA as well as Michael Malbin's Unelected Representatives.

Nachmias and Rosenbloom view staff development in the context of a general bureaucratization of governmental processes. Staff, for them, are a bureaucratic response to a complex legislative system with many veto points. The influence of staff is conditioned by several factors such as circumstances and staff attributes (e.g., tenure, specialization, expertise).

Nevertheless, staff exercise great power which, these authors feel, threatens to bury the legislature in paper. At a federal level, they see staff as part of a circular

phenomenon: more bills, leads to more committees, leads to more staff, leads to more bills, etc. This link between staff and committees and the basic legislative bureaucratic structure carries over into executive-legislative relations. For Nachmias and Rosenbloom, committee specialization leads to a coziness and accomodation between the executive and legislative branches. They find no evidence that staff has made legislators (in Congress, at least) less dependent on the executive branch or interest groups. Staff simply compile existing information although this does afford them some influence. By structuring the choices legislators consider via advice, alternatives, and information, staff can influence legislative conclusions.

The final author we will consider here is Michael Malbin. As the title of his book, Unelected Representatives, implies, Malbin takes the role of staff seriously. In a series of richly detailed case studies, Malbin examines the impact staff have had not only on individual members of Congress but the legislative branch as a whole. Certain positive results are identified. More, and more active, staff have enabled the legislator to maintain the role of initiating policy; much executive oversight is fostered and conducted by staff; and, staff afford an openness to non-traditional groups and ideas.

These benefits have not been without cost. For Malbin, the essence of the legislative branch is deliberation.

> For a process of legislative deliberation to function reasonably well, at least three distinct requirments must be satisfied. The members need accurate information; they need time to think about that information; and they need to talk to each other about the factual, political, and moral implications of the policies they are considering. The new use of staff undercuts each of these. [15]

Among the new uses of staff Malbin identifies are staff members persuading bosses to adopt their ideas; staff negotiating for members in various stages of the legislative process; staff to committee chairs acting on behalf of the chair to control the flow of information to committee members; staff judgments effecting what information committee chairs receive; and staff acting independently to get information to the press [16]. In short, staff acting in an independent fashion has complicated the legislative process and weakened its deliberative nature.

> The member (of Congress) . . . is becoming more of a Chief Executive Officer in charge of a medium-sized business than a person who personally deliberates with his colleagues about policy. [17]

No staff critic has offered a satisfactory alternative to further staff development. Nachmias and Rosenbloom see staff as one expression of a pervasive modern dilemma; it takes bureaucracy to control bureaucracy. Meller offers as his response a reduction in the legislative workload by delegating some legislative demands to other governmental entities [18]. Over a decade after Meller, Malbin is still calling for ways to limit the legislative agenda [19].

The prospect of legislators surrendering their current responsibilities and resources appears remote. Legislative staff are effectively a permanent part of legislative functioning in America. They need to be understood and integrated into our thinking on legislative processes. To begin this integration, the claims of staff proponents and the charges of their critics need to be carefully scrutinized.

WHY STAFF NUMBERS HAVE GROWN

Prior attempts to assess the implications of staff have centered on analysis of staff growth. Staff proponents saw more staff as the resources required to deal with modern governmental complexity, assure legislator responsibility for legislative acts and thereby maintain legislator accountability. Critics viewed the rise of numerous, new, potentially independent participants in the legislative process as actually making performance of legislative duties more difficult, further removing legislative activity from responsible legislators and weakening their accountability.

An appreciation for staff growth begins with the recognition of historical parallels. Staff are not a peculiarly modern occurrence, they are simply a contemporary manifestation of the political advisory function found throughout history. This insight helps place staff in perspective and makes many of the features associated with staff familiar. We

will be examining contemporary advisors (legislative staff) who advise identifiable decision makers (legislators) in a particular context (the Michigan State Legislature). However, the specificity of our subject should not obscure the broader context of our inquiry. Throughout history and across civilizations, advisors have been an integral part of political decision-making. [20]

Accordingly, consideration of staff growth can be best understood by proceeding from the general to the specific, reviewing first observations about advisors overall, and then legislative staff specifically.

Growth of Advisors Generally. There are certain preconditions that affect the development, growth and role of advisors. [21]. Changes in these forces have contributed to the increasing numbers of staff. The first of these forces is the size of the state. Small, homogeneous states may be governed relatively easily; but, as the state grows in size and diversity additional forms of advice and advisors are necessary to manage its governance, communications, and administration.

The number of polities involved in political discussions also influences the need for advisors. A state existing apart from others does not require the same type of advisors as one that must consider relations among states. As the

number and frequencies of these interactions increases, so too do the demands for advisors.

Finally, the type of political structure has a direct bearing on the number of advisors. Monolithic polities develop advisory functions differently than states with constitutional provisions for separating governmental functions and authorities. In the latter instance, each constitutional entity is an arena within which advisors act.

Each of these forces can be seen at work encouraging the growth of the political advisors being examined here, legislative staff.

Growth of Legislative Staff Specifically. Regarding growth in the size of the state, historic increases in governmental budgets as well as greatly expanded arenas of legislative activity and interest are all indicative of the growth conducive to the increase in staff advisors. These features are hallmarks of American government at both the federal and state levels during the last generation. Not only have governmental budgets grown but also the purposes for which governmental funds are allocated have expanded. Direct payments to individual citizens on a contractual, merit, or need basis greatly increased governmental outlays; public subsidies for a host of economic and social purposes are now common; and the fostering or protection of rights for various individuals and interests has become an expected role of government.

Justifying these various undertakings; garnering support for their enactment; monitoring their performance; and amending their operation were among the tasks required of America's legislatures. Each of these tasks led to greater requirements for legislative assistance in the form of more staff.

Turning to the level of interactions among governments, the American federal system fosters intergovernmental contacts among states as well as between states and the federal government. This interaction has been furthered by federal government initiatives cutting across state lines as well as the demands by municipalities and substate entities for legislation or assistance from state legislatures. This web of governmental interactions requires the attention of increasing numbers of staff advisors to monitor events and help formulate actions. The rise of single-issue interest groups and their legislative demands lead to more points of interaction that also require staff attention.

Finally, America's political structure with its separation of powers encourages legislative independence and the inclination to balance bureaucratic agency personnel with legislative staff. [22] American legislatures with their partisan divisions, committee structures, leadership roles, and direct legislator-constituent relations further fragments the governmental structure and establishes numerous niches for staff advisors. The fact that the

American experience with the growth of legislative staffs is not found in European parlimentary systems is the most direct evidence of this phenomenon. [23]

The nature of partisan competition in the American political system has been found to contribute to staff growth. Greater levels of partisan competition give rise to caucus staff and may be related to greater decentralization of staff. [24] Relatively weak party organization in single-member districts may cause staff to be used as substitutes for party agents. [25]

The importance of committees and subcommittees to legislative functioning encourages the growth of committee staff. It is here that the policy-relevant expertise that staff can provide is most needed. Such expertise has been regarded as indispensable to American legislators aspiring to attain a more professional status. [26] The power of legislative leaders has also shaped staff development. [27]

Taken together, America's growth of government generally, the myriad of interactions between its governments, and the structure of the governmental apparatus have all encouraged, if not required, the recruitment of increasing numbers of legislative staff.

ACCESS

Earlier assessments of staff stressing growth in staff numbers are incomplete. Not only is staff growth to be expected; growth only measures the magnitude of the staff phenomenon, not what staff do or how they influence legislator accountability. In this research, I pursue a different tact by arguing that the impact of staff on legislator accountability is not reflected solely, or even principally , in rising staff numbers. It is how staff are used that determines their impact on accountability.

The use of staff influences and is influenced by the legislative mileiu in which it occurs. Staff cannot be viewed alone but must be integrated into an appreciation for the priorities and processes relevant to other legislative actors. The chief legislative actor is the legislator. Staff access to legislators is the most important attribute of staff use and is central to understanding the significance of staff. An exploration of staff access will permit an assessment of issues raised regarding the maintenance of legislator accountability.

Access is the key to appreciating staff's impact on legislator accountability because it affords the most relevant indicator of staff activity and influence within the legislative process. By documenting access, networks of

legislators relating to staff and staff relating to legislators can be observed and analyzed.

What remains is to approach the discussion of staff access in a manner that can be related to legislator accountability. For this, we will draw upon works from three areas of political science. Robert Salisbury and Kenneth Shepsle's work on what they term the Legislative Enterprise provides the basis for understanding access. Barry Weingast, in his examinations of legislators relations with executive agency bureaucrats identifies control and discretion as the principle attributes for appreciating how advisory access impacts accountability. Futher, he stipulates criteria for assessing how control is exercised. Charles Lindblom in his works examining individual responsibility in political decision-making defines the parameters of discretion associated with advisory access.

Describing Staff Access. To fully appreciate staff access I will argue, with Salisbury and Shepsle, that legislators can no longer be viewed simply as individuals elected to an office [28]. Rather, they head "Legislative Enterprises" composed of ". . . personnel differentiated by political function and legal status, but nevertheless subordinate to the specific member." [29] While others have recognized this broader legislative role, [30] Salisbury and Shepsle give it the most in-depth elaboration.

Their article on staff turnover in the American Political Science Review states their point of view well.

> Each member (of Congress) has come to preside over a system of greater or lesser complexity in scope. The member of Congress may be best understood, therefore, as an enterprise and the analysis of phenomena . . . must be analyzed in terms of the dynamics within those member enterprises. . . our basic premise is that the House (Senate) is no longer best conceived of as a body of 435 (100) individuals or even as a structurally differentiated (committees, subcommittees) collection of legislators, but rather as a collection of organizations or member-centered enterprises [31] (emphasis in original).

In a subsequent publication, they define their frame of reference as "analytically superior to extant alternatives" [32] a contention they support as follows:

> The principal advantage of this perspective is that it allows us to incorporate the phenomena of congressional staff systematically with the analysis of Congress rather than awkwardly appending it to a discussion of congressmen as discrete individuals. [33]

Our analysis accepts that contention as applicable to state legislators as well. To it, we add the observation that access defines the composition of each legislator's enterprise. Those staff having access to a legislator are part of that Legislative Enterprise regardless of their formal ties to a legislator. Employment, partisan relations, committee emphases, even House or Senate affiliation offer less reliable indicators of legislator-staff relations when compared to access. With access as the criteria for deliniating each Legislative Enterprise the network of staff contacts a legislator utilizes can be

combined; legislators use of staff need not be limited to those they hire or have assigned to them. Similiarly, staff can be viewed as simultaneously participants in multiple enterprises offering their time, services, and expertise to all legislators with whom they have access.

Using access to define the Legislative Enterprise also enriches our understanding and appreciation of access. The Legislative Enterprise provides the appropriate focal point for assessing dispersed instances of staff access to legislators. The components of access such as frequency, duration, initiation and purpose can be meaningfully grouped and analyzed within the context of the Legislative Enterprise.

Relating Access to Accountability. To be used in the assessment of legislator accountability, the ability to analyze access and the Legislative Enterprises it defines requires refinement to identify those aspects of access relavant to accountability. Our earlier discussion of accountability centered on the presumption of responsibility upon which all forms of accountability rest. The assignment of responsibility was said to be a function of two factors: whose interests exert influence; and, how those interests combine to produce action.

When discussed in terms of access, these aspects of responsibility become: 1) control (the party in control

will be the party whose interests exert influence); and, 2) discretion (how interests combine in the interactions resulting from access will be determined largely by the amount of discretion allowed the party lacking control).

An examination of control and discretion in legislator-staff access provides the basis for assessing the presumption of responsibility upon which legislator accountability rests. To begin the examination of these features of responsibility we will draw upon work done by Barry Weingast regarding the relations between legislators and bureaucrats in the regulatory policy arena. [31] Weingast's research focuses on understanding the relations between federal legislators and bureaucrats. Despite the specificity of his subject, the observations drawn from his work are relevant to the analysis of the Legislative Enterprise just discussed. As noted earlier in discussing staff growth, the advisory function takes many forms. Viewed generally, executive agency bureaucrats in Weingast's regulatory context are a form of legislative advisor. Weingast stresses the importance of committee functions. This emphasis is premised on the recognition of links between legislator activities and larger legislative processes, a recognition central to the Legislative Enterprise. Further, his concern with appreciating how legislators and bureaucrats relate is consistent with our attempts to understand legislator-staff interactions. In short, Weingast's analytic framework is felt to be generalizable to

other aspects of legislative functioning, specifically the Legislative Enterprise.

In his paper prepared for the Fifth Carnegie Conference on Political Economy held in Pittsburg during 1983 [35] Weingast, drawing on economic principal-agent theory, makes several observations of direct relevance to our exploration of responsibility and the accountability it supports.

Control. Regarding the first facet of responsibility, whose interests exert influence, Weingast notes that direct legislative oversight is not always possible or desirable. But, controls do exist to assure agencies are responsive to legislators just as successful agents are responsible to their principals. Similarly, staff may frequently function outside direct legislative purview without negating the exercise of legislator control over staff.

Among the devices available to ensure legislator control, Weingast cites four:

> 1) legislators having influence over placement and promotion which can afford <u>ex post</u> sanctions (e.g., firing) as a real threat that leads to <u>ex ante</u> incentives;

2) advisors being dependent on the acceptance of legislators for their influence conditions advisory behavior and constrains options;

3) legislators being in contact with other parties whose input provides automatic checkpoints on the work of advisors;

4) legislators favoring advisors with whom they share electoral or other legislative priorities.

Each of these mechanisms helps assure that access to legislators by their advisors generally and staff specifically are controlled by legislators. With these incentives and disincentives controlling access, legislators can structure their enterprises with responsive advisors/staff.

There is a clear superior/subordinate quality to the relations between legislators and staff. The staff relationship to legislators is ultimately one of dependence [36] reinforced by unwritten norms of staff deferrence and loyalty to legislators. [37] Many of the staff are hired and fired by individual legislators. Legislators cast votes, stand for election, and relate to fellow legislators as peers; staff do not. Regardless of individual skills, experience, knowledge, or salary, legislators are in a much stronger position to control staff and their access than vice-versa.

Discretion. The second feature determining responsiblity entails understanding how interests combine to produce action. While legislators may exert influence and control over their interactions with staff, this does not negate the presence of staff interest nor opportunities for independent staff actions that might impact legislator responsibility and the accountability it supports. As Weingast notes in his paper on congressional-bureaucratic relations, the likelihood that some discretion (or "shirking" in economic terms) follows from the delegation of tasks to bureaucratic agents (or, in the terminology used here advisors and staff). This is a common phenomenon, but not necessarily intolerable or delegation would not be as readily accepted in various economic and political transactions. Weingast notes that legislators delegate when the benefits derived (e.g., completing the task, acquiring information, or extending influence via a surrogate) exceed other alternatives (e.g., performing the task, or exercising continuous oversight) even though delegation will entail discretion or shirking. We will look for a similar benefit-versus-cost logic to govern legislator delegation to staff.

To ascertain where opportunities for staff discretion exist, as well as boundaries delineating the limits to this discretion, we refer to a series of works by Charles Lindblom.

While using different terms, three works by Lindblom present the most in-depth discussion of individual discretion in political decision-making. The beginnings of his thought are found in a book co-authored with David Braybrooke, A Strategy of Decision [38]. This work is largely concerned with refuting a centralized decision-making model as unrealistic. His alternative, disjointed incrementalism, emphasizes the role of individuals and their interactions as more appropriate for understanding public policy development.

This emphasis on the individual is extensively pursued in The Intelligence of Democracy [39]. Here Lindblom elaborates his thoughts on partisan mutual adjustment. While his intent is to contrast this perspective to calls for centralized governmental control, his arguments explore the various nuances of individual discretion in political interaction. His final work in this area The Policy-Making Process [40], synthesizes his views of decision-making into a succinct examination of what he terms governmental politics.

Lindblom divides political interactions between individuals (X and Y) into five general categories: [41]

1. Partisan discussion: X changes Y's perception of given advantages and costs of a course of action,

2. Bargaining: X alters advantages and costs to Y contingent on Y's response,

3. Reciprocity: X obligates Y to respond,

4. Coercion: X unconditionally alters advantages and costs to Y of a course of action of Y,

5. Command: X authoritatively prescribes to Y.

These situations delineate control and discretion. In each instance, X is the controlling party because it is X's interests that exert influence on decisions. The five relationships between X and Y express how X uses this control and the type of discretion available to Y.

For legislators to be responsible, they must be party X or minimize the instances in which they are party Y. How responsiblity is exercised will depend on the manner in which legislators combine their interests with others using one or more of the five scenarios outlined above.

Under the first scenario, partisan discussion, individual X changes Y's perception of the advantages and costs of a course of action. Here, either the legislator or staff may be party X. While legislators can control staff access, once access is gained, staff may attempt to change a legislator's perception of a given situation. Legislator receptivity to such persuasion may vary, but assuming some

openness to discussion, staff may exercise a fair degree of discretion in the conduct of these discussions.

The second form of political interaction between individuals is bargaining. Lindblom defines bargaining as X altering the advantages and costs to Y contingent on Y's response. Staff acting alone have limited resources that might alter legislator response. However, staff acting on behalf of one legislator may be in a position to bargain with another legislator. While this may constitute a degree of staff discretion, it is discretion with definite limitations. First of all, the staff person is bargaining as a surrogate for a legislator, not as an independent political actor. The legislator on whose behalf the staff first bargains is the true party X. Should the staff person exceed his bargaining authority this legislator may renege or change the conditions of the bargain. A further limit on staff discretion in a bargaining situation is that legislator Y may supercede any bargain with a staff person by going to the legislator whose interests are involved. At this legislator-to-legislator level, staff discretion in bargaining can easily become peripheral to the bargaining between legislator peers.

Reciprocity, the third form of political interaction, occurs when X obligates Y to respond. There are few situations where staff action will place a legislator in a position

where a response is required. More often than not, legislators may ignore staff actions with few, if any, negative consequences. With the exception of the bargaining situations discussed above (where staff acting on behalf of a legislator obligates that legislator to respond by either supporting, renegging, or modifying the bargain staff struck with another legislator) staff discretion in the area of reciprocity is limited.

While staff may not be able to obligate legislator response, it may be possible for staff to unconditionally alter the advantages and costs to a legislator of a particular course of action. This is the form of political interaction that Lindblom terms coercion. For example, information provided to the media or another third party may enable staff to force a legislator to delay, avoid, or reformulate a contemplated action. This would constitute an extreme instance of staff discretion. Such discretion can be, and probably is, exercised; but, staff must be judicious in its use. Coercive acts may prompt legislators to exercise their control over staff by limiting further staff contacts or seeking the termination of staff employment. Unless the use of coercion on a legislator is sponsored and supported by another legislator (in which case that legislator and not the staff person is the coercing party) staff may find repercussions and reprimands result from their coercive acts. This undoubtedly tempers such staff discretion.

The final form of political interaction that Lindblom discusses is command where X authoritatively prescribes to Y. Staff ability to command legislators goes well beyond discretion. It negates the exercise of legislator control and renders nonexistent the maintenance of legislator responsibility and the accountability it supports. Not even the severest critic places staff in a position of commanding legislators. Staff have no basis of authority which enables them to supercede and prescribe to legislators. Therefore, the ability to command legislators must be placed outside the purview not only of staff discretion, but staff capacity.

To recapitulate, this review of the various forms of political interactions have shown that opportunities for staff discretion do exist; but, this discretion is exercised within definite limits and under specific conditions. Staff acting on behalf of a legislator have more discretion than staff relating directly to a legislator. When acting on behalf of a legislator, staff discretion must be kept to limits tolerable to the sponsoring legislator. Assuming such support, the staff person may discuss, bargain, and coerce on that legislator's behalf. When dealing one-on-one with a legislator, limits to staff discretion are set by the legislator. In either instance, legislators have the ability to curtail staff discretion. Whether they choose to use this ability will depend upon whether they view staff discretion as tolerable and subject to their influence.

SUMMARY

This chapter presents the principal components of the analysis to follow. The purpose of the analysis is to ascertain whether staff are accountable to legislators thereby supporting legislator accountability to the public. Accountability is defined as expectations placed on legislative decision-making. The most basic form of accountability, responsibility, is said to be a function of control (whose interests exert influence) and discretion (how interests combine).

Prior attempts to assess the implications of staff have stressed staff growth. While growth in staff numbers is important for understanding the staff phenomenon, it is a predictable response to historical circumstances and reveals little about how staff use impacts legislator accountability.

Staff access to legislators is a more direct indicator of staff use. Occurrences of access can be grouped to reveal Legislative Enterprises defined by staff and legislator interactions. Of even more importance, access can be related to control and discretion which are central to an appreciation of responsibility and the legislator accountability it supports. Barry Weingast's analysis of legislative-bureaucratic relations identifies features of control that can be applied to occurrences of access defining

Legislative Enterprises. Charles Lindblom in his discussion of individual decision-making delineates the parameters of discretion that determine whether staff discretion is tolerable for legislators as Weingast's work would suggest.

Each of these considerations are elaborated in the chapters that follow. Chapter 2 details the growth of staff in Michigan as a function of historic forces identified here. In addition, it describes the process used for documenting legislator-staff interactions and the Legislative Enterprises they define. Chapter 3 structures the concepts of control and discretion around considerations of access to develop a formal research argument that is empirically tested in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 reinforces the empirical findings with comments drawn from personal interviews with five Michigan legislators and written comments from that state's staff members.

CHAPTER 1: References

1
Expectations of predictability are used as a basis for determining accountability. Individual predictability is sought from legislators in the form of consistent loyalties to a party or interest. Predictability at this level is usually gauged by voting records and underlies much of the literature on roll-call analysis. Organizational accountability relies heavily on predictability as the basis for assessing decision-making at this level of analysis. An in-depth treatment of how this model relates to Congressional budgetary decision-making is Aaron Wildavsky's The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1974.

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Attempts to "rationalize" the budgetary process by explicitly structuring and scheduling the various decision points involved is one example of how rationality is sought in the legislative processes. Formal legislative oversight of executive actions based upon agreed-to roles and objectives is an effort in a similar vein. The obstacles to the implementation and on-going operation of such reforms speak to the difficulties associated with instilling rationality as the basis for legislator accountability.

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CHAPTER 2

DESCRIBING MICHIGAN STAFF: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INTERACTIONS WITH LEGISLATORS

Michigan's State Legislature is the site selected to assess staff impact on legislator accountability and responsibility. Before elaborating the formal research argument and reporting the findings it yields, the legislative setting chosen for the analysis needs to be described. This description will build upon the themes of growth and access identified in the preceding chapter.

Conditions contributing to the growth of political advisors such as staff are related to the specific experience of staff development in Michigan. A political structure stressing strong partisan leadership is found to be of particular relevance. The exercise of partisan leadership in both the House and Senate are described and compared in some detail.

Staff access to legislators is empirically defined by documenting the key features of legislator-staff interactions (i.e., frequency, duration, initiator, and setting). In addition, attributes of staff and legislators relevant to their interactions are also quantified. Staff are used as the source for identifying and describing their

interactions with legislators. The process of surveying staff and the descriptive results from the data gathered are reported. Legislator characteristics were obtained from various secondary sources which are reviewed and summarized.

STAFF DEVELOPMENT

In 1960, Michigan's legislative staff numbered 120. Their numbers grew steadily for the next twenty years, reaching a high point of 921 persons in 1980. By 1983, their ranks had fallen to 815 individuals. Forces influencing staff development have been grouped under three headings: growth in the size of the state, increased levels of interactions among polities, and the type of political structure developed. The changes observed in Michigan's legislative staff complement can be related to each of these factors. Of the three, political structure has the most direct bearing on staff.

Size of State

The relationship between the growth of government and the growth of legislative staff is more aptly described as symbiotic rather than causal. Each benefits from the other's growth without being the sole, or even principal, determinant of that occurrence. Growth of government affords greater resources that can be used to develop staff; although decisions to develop staff will be based on more than the availability of funds. Similarly, greater staff capacity can facilitate legislative handling of a larger

governmental apparatus; but, the political dynamics associated with the desirability of governmental growth goes well beyond staff's ability to influence.

This symbiosis can be observed in Michigan's history. Table 1 displays the growth in dollars available to the State of Michigan with the actual numbers of staff employed in the state legislature for various years between 1960 and 1983. [1] To permit comparison, both indicators are converted to a percent change from the previous reported year. What emerges from a comparison of the percentages is a pattern of strong growth for both measures between 1960 and 1970 followed by increasing moderation to that growth throughout the 1970's. In 1983, staff numbers declined while total revenues maintained a pattern of growth, although at a greatly reduced level.

Whether the decline in staff is a temporary aberration or a harbinger of further declines in state resources cannot be ascertained. But, the historic pattern shared by the growth in the size of the state and the size of the legislative staff complement is clear. As the state grows, staff numbers grow; and, conversely, as the size of the state moderates, staff growth slows and eventually declines.

Level of Interactions Among Governmental Entities

Michigan's legislature, like all legislatures in America, exists as part of a complex mosaic of interactions between

Table 1

A Comparison of Growth in Michigan Governmental Revenues and Growth of Michigan Legislative Staff for Various Years Between 1960 and 1983

	Governmental Revenues[1]		Number of Legislative Staff[2]	
	Actual Dollars (in 000)	% Change from Prior Period	Actual Numbers	% Change from Prior Period
1960	$1,107,927	-	121	-
1970	$3,224,408	191.0%	329	172.0%
1973	$5,021,810	56.0%	566	72.0%
1977	$7,174,696	43.0%	874	54.0%
1980	$9,518,130	33.0%	921	5.0%
1983	$11,158,538	17.0%	815	-11.5%

Sources:

[1]State of Michigan Financial Statements

[2]Legislative Staff Directories, includes all staff professional and support.

different branches of state government; other levels of government comprising the federal system; a variety of public and quasi-public bodies; and a seemingly endless array of interests ranging from private individuals to highly developed and well-financed organizations. An integral part of staff responsibilities requires an awareness of, and an ability to participate in, the varied relationships that comprise the legislative environment.

Quantifying these interrelationships cannot be done with any precision. However, some measure of the rise in governmental interactions and its implications for staff development can be gained by looking at the components of Michigan's finances since 1960. In Table 1, the total amount of revenues available to Michigan state government at various times since 1960 is reported to show how growth in the size of government was reflected in staff changes. Table 2 arrays those total revenues by their component parts (taxes, federal agency monies, local agency monies, and other) to demonstrate how the growth in government brought new levels of governmental interaction that supported staff growth.

When the components of Michigan's revenues are viewed in relative terms, as a percent of total revenues, the most noticeable change involves the proportions associated with taxes and federal agency monies. In 1960, taxes represented

Table 2

Michigan Governmental Revenues Characterized by Source,
Actual Amounts and Relative Percents, for
Various Years Between 1960 and 1983

	Total	Taxes	Federal Agency	Local Agency	Other*
1960					
Dollars (000)	1,107,927	887,220	120,429	Not	100,278
% of Total	100.0	80.1	10.9	Reported	9.0
1970					
Dollars (000)	3,224,408	2,282,917	566,723	14,470	360.298
% of Total	100.0	70.8	17.6	0.4	11.2
1973					
Dollars (000)	5,022,810	3,323,894	1,202,562	19,018	476,336
% of Total	100.0	66.2	23.9	0.4	9.5
1977					
Dollars (000)	7,174,696	4,760,007	1,840,934	29,184	544,571
% of Total	100.0	66.3	25.7	0.4	7.6
1980					
Dollars (000)	9,518,130	6,126,400	2,452,370	52,137	887,223
% of Total	100.0	64.4	25.8	0.5	9.3
1983					
Dollars (000)	11,158,538	7,333,434	2,768,773	142,491	913,840
% of Total	100.0	65.7	24.8	1.3	4.2

Source: State of Michigan Financial Statements
*Other includes service fees, licenses, permits, and miscellaneous.

80% of total revenues; by 1983, this level had fallen almost 15% to 65.7%. During the same period, federal agency monies rose as a percent of total revenues by an almost equivalent percentage; from 10.9% of total revenues in 1960 to 24.8% in 1983. The fact that growth in federal monies going to Michigan follows a pattern akin to that of staff growth found in Table 1 is not surprising. The increased availability of federal funds brought with it new requirements and opportunities that staff could help legislators monitor and exploit.

Absolute growth for all of the revenue components also occurred during the period reviewed. While some portion of this growth may be attributable to a larger economic base or inflation, new sources of revenue or changes to existing sources are also factors behind this growth. The magnitude of this growth invites interaction among interested parties. Those upon whom these assessments fall will become more concious of government's receipt of their monies. Those seeking to benefit from government growth will utilize the public programs and devices financed with these additional dollars that did not exist in 1960. In both instances, legislators must be able to acknowledge and respond to the various interests. In an almost inevitable sequence of events, growth in government leads to increased demands and expectations of government that are expressed through various forms of interactions between, within, and among

governmental bodies. To keep abreast of these developments, legislators in Michigan as elsewhere have turned to staff whose numbers grew accordingly.

Political Structure

In Michigan, two words describe the political structure governing staff development, "partisan leadership". Lucinda Simon in her review of legislative staff in the fifty states uses this term to describe staffing patterns not only in Michigan but also in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. Her characterization of partisan leadership fits Michigan well.

> The partisan leadership model of legislative staffing is very hierarchical with most personnel decisions emanating from the principal legislative leaders. Generally, the majority party leaders ultimately determine the amount of salary monies that are made available to individual members, committees, other leaders and the minority party. The party leaders also decide how many staff will be employed, in which jobs and at what salaries . . . In all of the states in this grouping, staff is usually available to committess and members. Party leaders generally allow members and chairman flexibility to hire their own staff, but in some instances personnel choices may be dictated by the leadership. The management style is authoritarian rather than collegial. Legislative leaders tend to rely on principal staff advisors rather than other leaders for management decisions. The offices of House Chief Clerk or Senate Secretary are in most cases important adjuncts of the majority party, overseeing large staffs of chamber, managerial and support personnel . . . The non-partisan status of most joint agencies is almost an anomaly in these highly partisan environments. The budget and fiscal analysis staffs in these states are the only offices that are somewhat independent from the overall partisan heirarchy. In all four states, the money committees are assisted by separately-budgeted staff offices . . . In Michigan, the house and senate fiscal agencies are non-partisan offices overseen by bi-partisan governing boards. [2]

The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader are the partisan leaders who govern staff in Michigan. The influence these partisan leaders exert on staff development and use is considerable. However, their authority over staff does differ and in neither case is it absolute. Of the two, the Speaker exercises greater centralized authority over staff development while the Senate Majority Leader finds staff prerogatives dispersed to all State Senators. House and Senate rules define the power of these partisan leaders over staff. These same rules also delimit and qualify this power. Specific legislative and constitutional provisions govern certain staff agencies' relations with partisan leadership control. The overall organizational structure that results is diagrammed on the next page. Its details are discussed in the following paragraphs.

House. Growth of House staff and the Speaker's centralized partisan control over these staff is generally attributed to Representative William Ryan, a Democrat from East Detroit who served as Speaker from 1969 to 1974. During his tenure as representative and Speaker increased staff was one of a series of reforms pursued to move Michigan from a part-time, citizen's legislature to a full-time, professional legislative body.

Speaker Ryan, while continuing as a state representative, stepped aside as Speaker to be succeeded by his protege, Representative Bobby Crim, who held the Speaker's position

Figure 1: Organizational Chart for Staff Agencies of the Michigan Legislature, 1984



Figure 1 (continued)

SENATE



from 1975 to 1979. Speaker Crim furthered the development of centralized partisan staff by increasing the number of staff devoted to the Democratic and Republican caucuses. These staff, while serving the various members of their respective partisan caucuses, are accountable principally to the leadership elected by each caucus. This method of staffing serves to reinforce partisan leadership control over staffing in the House.

The current Speaker of the Michigan House, Representative Gary Owen, a Democrat from Ypsilanti, became Speaker in 1980. Once in power, he showed the continuing role of centralized partisan control over House staff. While not changing the overall structure and composition of staff, Speaker Owen took two administrative actions of significance to staff functioning. The first affected the Democratic caucus staff which represents the largest single concentration of House staff resources. Speaker Owen instituted greater reporting by these staff to his office, placing the Speaker in a position of greater control over staff actions. To reinforce this control, the Speaker took a second step that altered all staff access to the floor of the House while in session. Previously, staff had relatively unfettered access to the floor. This was changed with the requirement that staff presence on the House floor had to be approved in advance by the Speaker. The imposition of these requirments are recent examples of the

influence partisan leadership exercises over staff in the House. House rules reinforce the role of partisan leadership in controlling staff development.

House Rule 6 reads as follows:

> The Speaker shall appoint all committees except where the House shall otherwise order. He shall appoint employees of the House, except as otherwise provided, and such appointments and responsibility shall be entered in the Journal. All employees appointed by the Speaker shall be subject to his orders and to summary removal by him on failure to properly perform the duties assigned them; the reason for such removal to be reported forthwith to the House.

There are formal exceptions to this general authority of the Speaker. Those noted in the rules include delineation of certain functions assigned to the Clerk and the Sergeant-At-Arms to facilitate administration of the House. Regarding committee staff, the Clerk may appoint assistants ". . . by and with consent of the Speaker" (Rule 19). The Clerk may prescribe the duties of committee clerks with the approval of the respective committee chairs who are responsible for the work of all committee aides (Rule 31E).

Public Act 412 of 1965 Section 16A establishes the House Fiscal Agency as staff to the House Appropriations Committee. These staff are not governed by the Speaker but by a committee of three members from the appropriations committee, including the committee Chair and two members appointed by the Chair, one of whom must be a member of the minority party.

Informal exceptions to the Speaker's authority over staff also exist. Most notable of these are the delegation of minority committee appointments and staff assignments to the minority leader; and, the administration of staff agency functioning by agency heads. The fact that both these informal exceptions may be suspended by the Speaker serves to underscore the strong role played by partisan leadership over staff development in the House.

Senate. While partisan leadership's influence over staff development is operative in the Senate, its exercise is far more decentralized than in the House. This point is well illustrated in the more detailed attention given to staffing responsibilities in the Senate Rules.

Senate Rule 1.15 A under the heading of Senate Organization reads as follows. "The majority leader shall assign duties to Senate employees not specified by other rules and shall approve all expenses for the operation of the Senate except as designated by statute." The "other rules" alluded to here include a Secretary of the Senate who is an elected officer of the Senate (Rule 1.6) with responsibilities enumerated throughout the Rules. Among the Secretary's duties is the oversight of Parlimentary Procedure (Rule 1.7), the maintenance of Senate journals (Rule 1.8), and the orderly introduction and processing of bills and resolutions (Rule 1.9), along with a variety of

other administrative tasks (Rule 1.15 G-J). Supervision of the Sergeant-At-Arms under the direction of the majority leader is a further task assigned to the Secretary.

Rule 1.18 provides for a General Counsel appointed not by the majority leader but by the Senate upon recommendation of the Judiciary Committee. The General Counsel serves the Senate by providing legal advice and assistance to any Senator, the Senate's presiding officer, or the Secretary of the Senate as requested.

In preparing an annual budget for the Senate, the majority leader must discuss it with the minority leader (Rule 1.15C). Further each Senator is alloted a separate budget for staff and office operation with committee Chairs allotted additional budget amounts for their committee operations (Rule 1.15E).

These conditions on the majority leader's authority involving the minority leader and individual Senators are repeated in the portion of the Rules dealing with Senate employees. Rule 1.39 gives the majority leader power to appoint staff; however, minority staff employee appointments must be made from a list submitted by the minority leader. Specific provision for each member appointing staff directly responsible to that Senator is found in Rule 1.42. Committee Chairs appoint their clerks

from members of their staff (Rule 1.43); and, with authorization from the majority leader, may appoint additional staff (Rule 2.7).

Compensation of Senate employees must follow guidelines set by the majority leader (Rule 1.40). But, the majority leader's ability to terminate Senate employment is substantially limited by Rule 1.41, which excludes employees elected by the Senate (the Secretary and General Counsel) or employees designated under other rules (personal and committee staff).

A staff agency that is relatively independent from the majority leader is the Senate Fiscal Agency. Like its House counterpart, this non-partisan entity enjoys separate legislative authority. The Senate Fiscal Agency is established by Public Act 412 of 1965 Section 16, which sets its governance as the responsibility of the Chair of the Appropriations Committee and two Appropriations Committee members appointed by the Chair, one of whom must be a member of the minority party.

The fact that the Senate's partisan leadership's control over staff is decentralized in no way negates its exercise and influence over staff development. This point was well illustrated by the impact on staff brought about by a recent change in the Senate's partisan control. In the aftermath

of a politically divisive battle over increased state income taxes, two Democratic state Senators were recalled and replaced in special elections by Republicans. The change in these two seats was sufficient to alter the majority status in the 38-member Senate from Democratic to Republican control. This shift in the Senate's partisan leadership resulted in changes to committee composition and Chairs, as is expected. It also showed the influence of partisan leadership on staff assignments. Democratic members experienced reductions in their office staff (as well as relocation of their physical office space). Committee staff also changed with committee Chairs.

The net effect of these changes on staff are shown in Table 3. Numbers of staff (personal and committee) assigned to Democratic and Republican Senators are compared between 1983, when Democrats held majority status, and 1984, when Republicans gained partisan leadership control, for those 36 Senators serving through the period of recalls and special elections. The staff shift is noticeable. Republican Senators each gained an average of one additional staff person after the shift in partisan leadership. Democratic Senators lost an average of one-half staff person per Senator. The general distribution of Senators by number of staff in their offices reflects this overall shift. Most Republican Senators now have three or more staff members after the change in leadership as opposed to most having only one or two when they were the minority party. Of the

Table 3

A Comparison of Personal and Committee Staff Allocated to Republicans and Democrats in the Michigan State Senate Under a Democratic Majority (1983) and a Republican Majority (1984)

	Number of Senators			
	Republican		Democrat	
Number of Staff	1983	1984	1983	1984
1	2	0	0	0
2	12	4	6	6
3	2	9	5	9
4	2	3	3	3
5	0	2	3	0
Mean Number of Staff	2.2	3.2	3.3	2.8

Source: Legislative Staff Directories

eighteen Republican Senators, thirteen gained staff in the transition. For the Democrats, seven experienced a net reduction in staff, eight maintained their staffing levels through the change in leadership, and three did manage to acquire an additional staff member.

House and Senate Compared. The exercise of centralized partisan leadership control in the House and decentralized partisan leadership control in the Senate has yielded different staffing patterns between the two chambers. The historic development of various House and Senate staff entities are compared in Table 4. In 1960, the Senate had more staff than the House; by 1970 this relative position had reversed. Throughout the 1970's, House staff developed more rapidly and sustained a growth in staff numbers longer than the Senate. Senate staff numbers peaked in 1977 while the House staff complement continued to grow through 1980.

Within these overall levels, the allocation of staff to various functions show the influence of centralized versus decentralized partisan leadership on staff development. The majority of Senate staff can be related to individual Senators' personal or committee staff reflecting the decentralized character of Senate staffing. In the House, fewer than half of the staff complement are associated with specific legislators; however, a much larger number are allocated to Democratic or Republican caucuses. This

Table 4

A Comparison of Professional* Legislative Staff Arrangements in the Michigan House and Senate for Various Years Between 1960 and 1983

	1960	1970	1973	1977	1980	1983
Senate						
Personal/Committee	9	30	68	128	127	101
Caucus						
- Democratic	-	-	9	24	20	17
- Republican	-	-	6	12	11	17
Analysis Section	-	-	-	-	5	5
Fiscal Agency	-	-	12	21	26	22
Secretary	18	4	7	13	4	3
General Counsel	-	1	1	3	4	3
Total	27	35	103	201	197	168
House						
Personal/Committee	10	27	98	118	125	117
Caucus						
-Democratic	1	14	13	59	53	53
-Republican	-	8	19	28	39	39
Analysis Section	-	-	2	9	8	7
Fiscal Agency	-	-	13	17	24	24
Clerk	11	12	16	22	20	20
Total	22	61	161	253	269	260

Source: Legislative Staff Directories
*Excludes all secretarial and support staff

distribution supports the centralized partisan emphasis of the House. Both chambers have fiscal agencies of comparable size. The House Analysis Section was established prior to the Senate Analysis Section. Administratively, the House Analysis Section is an adjunct to the Speaker's office, while the Senate Analysis Section is the responsibility of the Secretary of the Senate, an arrangement that echoes the centralized versus decentralized staffing patterns that distinguishes the two chambers.

Only the Senate allocates staff for a General Counsel. Differences between the staff devoted to the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate are difficult to compare due to changes in reporting of those staff over time.

Joint agencies. In addition to staff developed for either the House or Senate, Michigan's legislature is also assisted by several joint staff agencies. The Legislative Service Bureau is the largest joint staff agency. Its history can be traced back to 1941 when it served as a legislative reference library. Over the years, its structure and responsibilities were redefined and expanded. Public Act 412 of 1965 placed the Legislative Service Bureau under the ageis of the Legislative Council established through Article 4, Section 15 of the State Constitution of 1963. Composition of the Council is defined by law in a manner that emphasizes partisan leadership control. Both

the House and Senate are given eight positions, the majority leader and seven of the majority leader's appointees (3 of whom must be from the minority party).

Current functions performed by the Legislative Service Bureau include legal editting and research, a legislative science office, library and research facilities, and a variety of administrative divisions including secretarial services, and printing and mailing capacities.

Public Act 46 of 1975 established the Office of the Legislative Corrections Ombudsman as a further staff agency overseen by the Legislative Council. This office has a small staff of six whose responsibility is to investigate complaints against the Department of Corrections.

The Joint Committee on Administrative Rules, established by Public Act 306 of 1969, consists of ten members, five from the Senate and five from the House. Committee staffing and expenses are handled jointly through appropriations from each of the two chambers. Its purpose is to review rules and regulations proposed by executive agencies to assure adherence to legislative intent.

Article 4, Section 52 of the State Constitution of 1963 provides the legal basis for a legislatively appointed Auditor General. Earlier state Constitutions had provided

for a popularly elected Auditor General. Concern over the autonomy from legislative control an elected Auditor General might exercise had been a principal concern of legislative reformers in Michigan during the 1940's and 1950's. [3] By setting the term of Auditor General for eight years; providing for his removal only by a two-thirds vote of each chamber; granting civil service status to most of the auditor's staff; and prohibiting appointment or election of the Auditor General to other state office for two years after the end of his term, the conduct of post-audits on all state financial transaction was buffered from the influence of electoral politics and partisan leadership.

LEGISLATOR-STAFF INTERACTION

Much of the theoretical and empirical arguments to follow utilize staff access to legislators. The most tangible expression of such access is said to be the degree of interaction between legislators and staff. To document such interaction a survey of legislative staff in Michigan was undertaken. Data derived from this survey described key characteristics of these interactions and various attributes of staff. Additional data describing features of legislators involved in these interactions were garnered from secondary sources. The process of staff and legislator data acquisition is outlined and descriptive results summarized in the remainder of this chapter.

Staff

In seeking to document legislator-staff interactions as the most tangible expression of access, a choice had to be made between the use of legislators or staff as the primary source for identifying and describing their interactions. Staff were chosen for three reasons. First of all, staff responses were felt to be more reliable. There are fewer and better-known legislators for staff to remember than the multiple and sometimes obscure staff that legislators meet. Secondly, staff were more likely to provide valid responses. Staff attentiveness to and ability to distinguish legislator contact with staff from other contacts is likely to be

better than a legislator who is approached by multiple individuals, interests and constituents. Finally, acquiring staff participation in a survey was more feasible. Response to surveys by legislators is at times deferred complicating completion or delegated to staff complicating interpretation.

The list of staff to be surveyed was drawn from the Michigan Legislative Telephone Directory for 1983. Support staff such as secretaries, maintenance personnel, and others in solely administrative positions were deleted from the total staff roster. A universe of 428 individuals eligible for survey participation was identified. Surveys were hand delivered to each staff person or their offices in January of 1984. Telephone follow-up was pursued for each House staff member not responding by the February 1 return date. When warranted, post card reminders were sent to those staff indicating an intention to respond.

Table 5 details the various phases of survey administration. Of the potential population of 428 individuals, 32 could not be found at the location given in the Legislative Telephone Directory and 25 were no longer employed, leaving a potential set of 371 respondents. Table 6 reports the response patterns derived from these potential respondents. A total of 74 people attempted to complete the survey for an overall response rate of 19.9%. Incomplete or missing data

Table 5

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Results of Survey Distribution

	Eligible	Not Deliverable	No Longer Employed	Potential Responses
Senate				
Personal/Committee	101	10	0	91
Caucus -Democratic	17	0	0	17
-Republican	17	0	0	17
Analysis Section	5	0	0	5
Fiscal Agency	22	0	0	22
Secretary	3	0	0	3
General Counsel	3	0	0	3
Total	168	10	0	158
House				
Personal/Committee	117	18	11	88
Caucus -Democratic	53	4	6	43
-Republican	39	0	7	32
Analysis Section	7	0	0	7
Fiscal Agency	24	0	0	24
Clerk	20	0	1	19
Total	260	22	25	213
Joint Agencies	59	0	0	59
Grand Total	428	32	25	371

Table 6

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Actual Responses, Usable Responses, and
Corresponding Response Rates

	Potential Responses	Actual Responses	Actual Response Rate	Usable Responses	Final Response
Senate					
Personal/Committee	91	15	16.5%	15	16.5%
Caucus -Democratic	17	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
-Republican	17	4	23.5%	4	23.5%
Analysis Section	5	3	60.0%	0	0.0%
Fiscal Agency	22	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Secretary	3	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
General Counsel	3	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	158	22	13.9%	19	11.3%
House					
Personal/Committee	88	19	21.6%	18	15.4%
Caucus -Democratic	43	11	25.6%	8	18.6%
-Republican	32	3	9.4%	2	6.3%
Analysis Section	7	3	42.9%	2	28.6%
Fiscal Agency	24	8	33.3%	7	29.2%
Clerk	19	2	10.5%	0	0.0%
Total	213	46	21.6%	37	14.2%
Joint Agencies	59	6	10.2%	4	6.8%
Grand Total	371	74	12.9%	60	16.2%

caused the deletion of 14 responses for a final pool of 60 responses or 16.2% of the potential population. Similar information is detailed for each staff agency. The timing of the survey (immediately following the recall election of 1983) precluded follow-up to encourage response in the Senate which may account for the lower response rate when compared to the House where follow-up was done.

Table 7 compares the percent of staff in each agency for all 371 potential respondents, the 74 actual respondents, and the 60 responses used in the analysis. Despite the low response rates the distribution of responses in the House is fairly representative of the actual agency staff complements. In the Senate, the largest group of staff (personal and committee staff) are also appropriately represented.

Reported Characteristics of Interactions. The actual survey instrument staff were asked to complete is included as Appendix A. The instrument is divided into eight parts. Part 1 asks for information detailing staff interactions with legislators. Interactions were defined as work-related discussions involving direct conversations between a staff person and a legislator related to the conduct of staff responsibilities. Specifically excluded were discussions during committee hearings, non-work-related personal conversations with legislators, or legislator contact that was social or recreational in nature. Staff were asked to

Table 7

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Percentage Comparison of Surveyed Population
and Respondent Population

	Potential Respondent Population	Actual Respondent Population	Final Respondent Population
Senate			
Personal/Committee	21.2%	20.3%	25.0%
Caucus -Democratic	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%
-Republican	4.0%	5.4%	6.7%
Analysis Section	1.2%	4.0%	0.0%
Fiscal Agency	5.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Secretary	.6%	0.0%	0.0%
General Counsel	.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	36.7%	29.7%	31.7%
House			
Personal/Committee	20.5%	25.7%	30.0%
Caucus -Democratic	10.0%	14.9%	13.4%
-Republican	7.4%	4.0%	3.3%
Analysis Section	1.6%	4.0%	3.3%
Fiscal Agency	5.6%	10.8%	11.7%
Clerk	4.4%	2.7%	0.0%
Total	49.5%	62.2%	61.6%
Joint Agencies	13.8%	8.1%	6.7%
Grand Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

identify by name those legislators with whom they had at least one such work-related discussion per month during the months of September 1983 to December 1983. If staff had such discussions with more than ten legislators during this time, they were asked to select and name the top ten; few staff identified a total of ten legislators.

For each legislator named, staff were asked to describe five features of interactions with that legislator:

1. Frequency of their discussions (ordinal response categories were daily, more than once per week, once per week, more than once per month, once per month).

2. Duration of their discussions (ordinal response categories were less than 15 minutes, 15 to 30 minutes, 30 minutes to one hour, one to two hours, over two hours).

3. Usual initiator of their discussions (nominal response categories were the staff person, the legislator, or third party).

4. Nature of their discussions (nominal response categories were private talks or group discussions).

5. Subjects covered in their discussions (nominal response categories were given for twelve different subject areas pretested on staff).

These are the basic features of access.

For the first four features describing their discussions, staff responses were constrained to selecting the one response that provided the best overall description of their typical interaction with that legislator. In reporting the subjects covered during their conversations, staff were asked to rank order the various topics by frequency of their occurrence with one being most frequent, two the next most frequenty, etcetera. Staff were also allowed to specify and rank other subjects of discussion although few took this opportunity.

Table 8 summarizes the ordinal aspects of the interactions with legislators reported by staff. A total of 313 distinct legislator-staff interactions were identified by the 60 staff respondents, or an average of 5.22 legislators reported per staff person. Most of the legislator-staff contacts (56.5%) were short, lasting less than 15 minutes; the most common level of frequency reported was more than once per month (but less than once per week) which encompassed 31.3% of all legislator-staff interactions. Overall, the frequency of meetings are more evenly distributed across the available response categories; while

Table 8

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984: Frequency and Duration of Contacts Between Legislators and Staff

Estimated Duration		Frequency: Once per Month	More than Once per Month	Once per Week	More than Once per Week	Daily	Total
Under 15 Minutes	#	40	74	34	24	5	177
	%	12.8	23.6	10.9	7.7	1.6	56.5
15 - 30 minutes	#	8	16	19	31	13	87
	%	2.6	5.1	6.1	9.9	4.2	27.8
½ - 1 hour	#	3	4	4	11	8	30
	%	1.0	1.3	1.3	3.5	2.6	9.6
1 - 2 hours	#	0	4	0	6	6	16
	%	-	1.3	-	1.9	1.9	5.1
Over 2 hours	#	0	0	0	0	3	3
	%	-	-	-	-	1.0	1.0
Total	#	51	98	57	72	35	313
	%	16.3	31.3	18.2	23.0	11.2	100.0

the reported duration of the typical meetings between legislators and staff was short with only 6.1% lasting over one hour.

Table 9 interrelates the two nominal features of the reported contacts, the nature of the meetings and who usually initiated these discussions, to describe the setting of legislator-staff interactions. Meetings between legislators and staff are most often characterized as private meetings initiated by staff. Legislators initiate a substantial minority of the discussions; these too are typically private meetings.

The subjects discussed at these meetings tend to focus on the legislative process more than constituent activities or relations with the executive branch. As Table 10 shows, backgound on legislation is the most frequently mentioned topic of legislator-staff discussion and ranks highest in priority of all the subjects mentioned. Legislative strategy, committee activities, and policy development all receive a top priority mention in over 10% of the 313 reported discussions; however, they are not mentioned as topics in over half of the legislator-staff interactions.

Written Products. Part two of the survey attempted to quantify a second form of legislator-staff interaction, written communications. Unfortunately, attempts to have

Table 9

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Initiation and Nature of Contacts Between
Legislators and Staff

Nature		Initiator: Staff	Legislator	Other	Total
Private Meeting	#	130	107	20	257
	%	41.5	34.2	6.4	82.1
Group Discussion	#	22	22	8	52
	%	7.0	7.0	2.6	16.6
Total	#	154	131	28	313
	%	49.2	41.9	8.9	100.0

Table 10

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984: Subjects Discussed in Legislator-Staff Contacts Ordered by Frequency of Mention and Priority

Subjects Discussed	Frequency	Priority 1st	2nd	3rd	Below 3rd	Not Mentioned	Total
1. Background on Legislation	#	76	50	21	26	140	313
	%	24.3	16.0	6.7	8.3	44.7	100.0
2. Legislative Strategy	#	52	43	19	36	163	313
	%	14.0	13.7	6.1	14.1	52.1	100.0
3. Committee Activities	#	42	30	33	31	177	313
	%	13.4	9.6	10.5	10.0	56.5	100.0
4. Policy Development	#	38	30	17	23	205	313
	%	12.1	9.6	5.4	7.4	65.5	100.0
5. Constituent Requests	#	29	14	13	29	228	313
	%	9.3	4.5	4.2	9.2	72.8	100.0
6. Background on Budget	#	22	19	18	17	237	313
	%	7.0	6.1	5.7	5.5	75.7	100.0

Table 10 -- Continued

Subjects Discussed	Frequency	Priority 1st	2nd	3rd	Below 3rd	Not Mentioned	Total
7. Bill Drafting	#	12	18	17	27	239	313
	%	3.8	5.7	5.4	8.7	76.4	100.0
8. Home District	#	15	11	7	22	258	313
	%	4.8	3.5	2.2	7.1	82.4	100.0
9. Executive Agency Oversight	#	5	12	10	24	262	313
	%	1.6	3.8	3.2	7.7	83.7	100.0
10. Interest Group Relations	#	3	7	9	29	265	313
	%	1.0	2.2	2.9	9.2	84.7	100.0
11. Office Admin.	#	2	8	6	10	287	313
	%	0.6	2.6	1.9	3.2	91.7	100.0
12. Speech Writing	#	4	3	1	8	297	313
	%	1.3	1.0	0.3	2.5	94.9	100.0

staff describe the types of written products proved to be too complicated for a mail survey. Many respondents noted difficulty in adequately describing the range of written products they produce and felt uncomfortable giving equal weight to seemingly similar endeavors (e.g., preparation of background reports) that may entail widely divergent expenditures of time in research and writing. Further complicating responses to this section of the survey was an attempt to associate volume indicators with the various types of communications listed. For example, letters may dominate the volume of written products generated by staff but these may be similar letters to common constituent requests that require little additional effort to produce.

Given these shortcomings, data from this portion of the survey were deleted from the analysis. The only tangible insight to be gained from an attempt to quantify staff written products was that this form of staff activity was generally requested by a legislator for his or her use. Further assessment of this form of staff activity would require some type of content analysis or a review of actual staff written products to be of value.

Work Environment. Descriptions of their working environment were elicited from staff in parts three and four of the survey. Such description is integral to understanding the context in which legislator-staff interactions occur.

One of the more important attributes of any work setting is its stability. Table 11 shows that most staff (30) came to their present job from outside government and have been employed as staff just over three years. Some internal promotion possibilities are suggested by the 24 staff members who reported their prior position as another staff position in the Michigan legislature. These respondents were employed somewhat longer in their present capacity than their colleagues. The only groups reporting appreciably longer lengths of service were those entering with other governmental experience outside Michigan's legislature; however, the number of respondents in these categories are small. House employees, both partisan and non-partisan, report longer tenure than Senate staff members.

Attributes of the staff work setting concerning their relationship with others is summarized in Table 12. To better understand the staff population being analyzed, the total pool of 74 respondents is compared to the final set of 60 staff members. The 14 responses eliminated from final analysis were predominantly those with no legislator interactions in the form of work-related discussions to report. By comparing the total respondents with those able to report legislator-staff interaction some inkling of differences between staff with and without access to legislators can be obtained.

Table 11

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Staff Tenure Categorized by Prior Experience
and Current Work Arena for
All Staff Respondents

	Number of Staff	Mean Tenure in Months	in Years
Prior Experience			
Michigan Legislature	24	49.2	4.1
Michigan Government (non-legislative)	5	75.0	6.2
Other Government (non-Michigan)	6	63.0	5.2
Non-Government	30	39.2	3.3
Education	5	44.4	3.7
Miscellaneous	4	52.2	4.3
Current Work Arena			
House, overall	18	51.9	4.3
House, Democrats	25	45.9	3.8
House, Republican	4	44.5	3.7
Senate, overall	5	41.4	3.4
Senate, Democrats	9	43.0	3.6
Senate, Republican	8	11.2	.9
House and Senate	5	38.6	3.2
Total	74	42.4	3.5

Table 12

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Characteristics of Staff Work Environment for
Total and Final Respondents

	Total Respondents		Final Respondents	
	#	%	#	%
Superior				
-Legislator	33	44.6	32	53.3
-Staff	41	55.4	28	46.7
Number of Subordinates				
None	50	67.6	41	68.4
1 - 2	9	12.2	8	13.3
3 - 5	9	12.2	8	13.3
over 5	6	8.0	3	5.0
Partisan Activity				
-Expected	32	43.2	29	48.3
-Not Expected	42	56.8	31	51.7
Legislator Identification				
-Specific Legislator	33	44.6	31	51.7
-Particular Legislator	23	31.1	19	31.7
-None	18	34.3	10	16.7
Legislator Influence on Employment				
-Most Important	44	59.4	39	65.0
-Others More Important	21	28.4	7	11.7
-Not Important	9	12.2	14	23.3

The final set of respondents are more likely to report directly to a legislator which lends credence to associating the lack of access to legislators with the elimination of the 14 respondents. The two groups are similar in terms of their relationships with subordinates; and, a majority of both groups are not expected to participate in partisan activity as part of their job. The final group of respondents are more likely to identify with a specific legislator, reinforcing the stronger presence of access in their ranks when compared to the total set of respondents. A comparison of the reported influence of legislators on each staff person's employment shows that for the final respondents legislators are either the most important influence or are not involved. Legislators discussing hiring/firing decisions with others is more common in the total respondent set.

Table 13 completes the description of the staff work environment by summarizing various personal attributes (age, education, and salary levels) for all respondents and the final set of 60 respondents. These data were requested in part seven of the survey. No substantial differences between the two respondent groups are found. Staff are young (most are under 34 years old); well-educated (85-90% are college graduates, over 40% have post-graduate degrees); and most (56.7%) earned under $24,000.

Table 13

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Summary of Staff Personal Attributes for Total
and Final Respondents

	Total Respondents		Final Respondents	
	#	%	#	%
Age				
Under 25	9	12.2	7	11.7
25 - 29	18	24.3	17	28.3
30 - 34	16	21.6	13	21.7
35 - 39	11	14.9	8	13.3
40 - 44	7	9.5	7	11.7
45 - 50	6	8.1	4	6.7
Over 50	5	6.8	2	3.3
Missing	2	2.6	2	3.3
Education				
High School	2	2.7	-	-
Some College	9	12.2	6	10.0
College	22	29.7	20	33.3
Some Post Graduate	11	14.9	8	13.3
Masters	23	31.1	21	35.6
Doctorate	2	2.7	1	1.7
Law	4	5.4	4	5.0
Missing	1	1.3	1	1.7
Salary Levels				
Under $15,000	6	8.1	4	6.7
$15,000 - $19,999	16	21.6	14	23.3
$20,000 - $24,999	20	27.0	16	26.7
$25,000 - $29,999	12	16.2	11	18.3
$30,000 - $34,999	7	9.4	3	5.0
$35,000 - $39,999	3	4.0	3	5.0
Over $40,000	7	9.5	6	10.0
Missing	3	4.0	3	5.0

Attitudes. The remaining sections of the survey instrument (parts five and six) pose questions designed to reflect staff attitudes. Most of these items are used directly in the testing of the formal argument regarding staff and legislator accountability found in Chapter 4. Their analysis is deferred until then.

LEGISLATORS

Data on legislators was compiled from secondary sources, principally the Legislative Telephone Directory for 1983, legislative rosters, and committee listings produced for legislators and their staff. Each legislator was assigned a number reflecting whether the person was a Representative or a Senator, party affiliation, and the unique identifier used to link all references to a specific legislator by any of the 60 staff respondents. Common information on all legislators was obtained reflecting tenure, number of committee assignments and types of positions held on those committees, and the number of staff assigned to a legislator's office. These variables relate not only to legislative authority and position, but also, to availability of staff, both important factors influencing levels of legislator-staff interactions. Leadership positions held were also noted; however, these data proved too difficult to interpret because most legislators in Michigan hold some leadership title and differentiating the relative authority associated with these titles is not possible.

Data on legislator tenure, committee assignments, and office staff size are summarized in Tables 14, 15, and 16 respectively. Each table compares absolute and relative numbers of legislators between all elected legislators and those mentioned by at least one staff respondent.

Overall differences are not large between the total legislator complement and those identified as a source of interaction by staff. All but thirteen House Democrats and thirteen House Republicans are mentioned at least once by staff. On the Senate side omissions are smaller still with only three Democrats and one Republican not included. The proximity of these total legislator counts do not allow for great differences between the two populations being compared and little difference is observed. Table 14 shows that for House Democrats there is a higher proportion of short tenure (under two years) legislators among the legislators mentioned by staff than legislators overall. For Senate Democrats there are fewer legislators included for analysis in the high tenure category (over ten years) than among all Senate Democrats. Committee assignments (Table 15) are comparable for both sets of legislators. Regarding reported office staff (Table 16) only House Democrats show any appreciable difference between the two groups. Relatively more legislators identified by staff had no explicitly identified office staff.

Table 14

Legislator Tenure by Chamber and Party of Actual Legislator Complement and Legislators Identified by Staff in the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984

Tenure		House				Senate			
		Democrats		Republicans		Democrats		Republicans	
		Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified
Less than 2 Years	#	20	19	23	15	4	3	11	10
	%	31.7	38.0	48.9	44.1	22.2	20.0	61.0	58.8
2 - 4 Years	#	7	5	7	5	0	0	0	0
	%	11.2	10.0	14.9	14.7	-	-	-	-
4 - 6 Years	#	9	5	6	5	4	4	5	5
	%	14.3	10.0	12.8	14.7	22.2	26.7	27.8	29.4
6 - 8 Years	#	6	6	3	1	2	2	1	1
	%	9.5	12.0	6.4	2.9	11.1	13.3	5.6	5.9
8 - 10 Years	#	6	5	4	4	3	3	0	0
	%	9.5	10.0	8.5	11.8	16.7	20.0	-	-
Over 10 Years	#	15	10	4	4	5	3	1	1
	%	23.8	20.0	8.5	11.8	27.8	20.0	5.4	5.9

Table 14 -- Continued

		House				Senate			
		Democrats		Republicans		Democrats		Republicans	
		Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified
Total	#	63	50	47	34	18	15	18	17
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 15

Number of Committees by Chamber and Party for the Actual Legislator Complement and Legislators Identified in the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984

Number of Committees		House				Senate			
		Democrats		Republican		Democrats		Republicans	
		Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified
1	#	15	12	6	5	4	4	6	6
	%	23.7	24.0	12.8	14.7	22.3	26.7	33.3	35.3
2	#	2	1	1	1	6	5	11	10
	%	3.2	2.0	2.2	32.9	33.3	3.3	61.1	58.8
3	#	2	1	8	5	6	4	1	1
	%	3.2	2.0	17.0	14.7	33.3	26.7	5.6	5.9
4	#	9	8	27	19	2	2	0	0
	%	14.3	16.0	57.4	25.9	11.1	43.3	-	-
5	#	35	28	5	4	0	0	0	0
	%	55.6	56.0	10.6	11.8	-	-	-	-
Total	#	63	50	47	34	18	15	18	17
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 16

Number of Staff Associated With Legislators by Chamber and Party for the Actual Legislator Complement and Legislators Identified by Staff in the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan - 1984

Number of Staff		House				Senate			
		Democrats		Republicans		Democrats		Republicans	
		Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified
1	#	30	21	1	1	0	0	2	1
	%	47.6	42.0	2.1	2.9	-	-	11.1	5.9
2	#	12	9	0	0	6	5	11	11
	%	19.0	18.0	-	-	33.2	33.3	61.1	64.7
3	#	1	1	1	1	5	4	3	3
	%	1.6	2.0	2.1	2.9	27.8	26.7	16.7	17.6
4	#	0	0	0	0	3	2	2	2
	%	-	-	-	-	16.7	13.3	11.1	11.8
5 or 6	#	2	2	0	0	3	3	0	0
	%	3.2	4.0	-	-	16.7	20.0	-	-
Unknown	#	18	17	45	32	0	0	0	0
	%	28.6	34.0	95.8	94.2	-	-	-	-

Table 16 -- Continued

Number of Staff		House				Senate			
		Democrats		Republicans		Democrats		Republicans	
		Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified	Actual	Identified
Total	#	63	50	47	34	18	15	18	17
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Given the close correspondence between these legislative populations, observations about legislators as a whole would appear to be applicable to the legislators included in the analysis of legislator-staff interactions. Their characteristics reinforce the importance of majority position in a legislature. Democrats have more legislators with longer tenure than Republicans in both the House and Senate (Table 14); Democrats serve on more committees than Republicans in both the House and Senate (Table 15); House Democrats are more likely to have at least one staff person than their Republican colleagues; and, at least prior to the two recall elections discussed, more Senate Democrats had large staffs than Senate Republicans (Table 16).

The difference between staffing patterns in the two chambers (Table 16) are pronounced. Most House Republicans have no staff specifically assigned to their office and a substantial minority of the House Democrats are in a similar situation. State Senators, however, all have at least one office staff member, with most having two or more. These differences echo the earlier discussion of centralized versus decentralized partisan leadership control in the House and Senate. Partisanship and the power of the majority leadership permeate not only considerations of staff development but legislators themselves.

SUMMARY

The examination of growth and access is elaborated for Michigan specifically in this chapter with consideration of staff development and legislator-staff interaction in the State legislature. Staff development in Michigan is found to be related to factors influencing advisory staff growth generally. A political structure emphasizing partisan leadership control conditions much of staff development in Michigan. Differences between the House and Senate showed different ways partisan leadership is exercised. In both instances, whether it is the centralized House approach or the Senate's decentralized use of partisan control, its presence influences staff.

Interactions with legislators reported by staff are documented as the most visible and tangible expression of access. The dimensions of access (frequency, duration, nature, initiator, and content) are quantified and described. Staff attributes are also reported to help place the interactions reported in a context. While overall staff participation in the survey used to garner these data is low, the distribution of respondents is felt to be adequately representative of the House and Senate's largest staff groupings.

Information on legislators is obtained from secondary sources to describe the key features of the legislators participating in legislator-staff interactions reported by

staff. Almost all legislators are included among the various interactions reported. Themes of partisanship and majority control permeate legislator characteristics.

All data gathered on staff from the survey instrument and legislators from secondary sources were computerized using the facilities of the Michigan Terminal System at Wayne State University. Data were entered and converted for use with the data base management package known as MICRO. Code books created from this process are found in Appendix B. Initial analyses of data were performed using MICRO. More detailed analyses were done using the Michigan Interactive Data Analysis System (or MIDAS) software package. The statistical procedures available through MIDAS provided the technical basis for using the data described in this chapter to empirically test the formal argument about legislator staff and legislator accountability presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2: References

1 The selection of these years was arrived at as follows: 1960 and 1970 offer historic reference points to guage the magnitude of current trends; 1983 is the most current year of data available for all indicators and the year reflected in staff survey responses; 1973, 1977 and 1980 are selected as roughly equivalent intervals which reflect various phases of Michigan's cyclical economy. For consistency, use of these years is maintained throughout for historical analyses.

2 Simon, Lucinda Understanding Legislative Staff Development: A Legislator's Guide to Staffing Patterns, National Conference of State Legislators, Denver, August 1979, p. 65.

3 Staff Report to the Michigan Joint Legislative Committee on Reorganization of State Government, The Legislature, Report #11, March 1951, pp. 11-54.

CHAPTER 3

ACCESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Despite the significance of staff development it does little to further our understanding of legislator accountability and the responsibility it presumes. To address these issues, staff cannot be considered apart from legislators. The nature and extent of staff access to legislators is considered central to understanding legislative staff activity and its implications for legislator accountability.

ACCESS

The emphasis placed on access is warranted for at least three reasons. First of all, levels of access reflect consumption of limited legislator time. The amount of time spent with staff will bear on a legislator's priorities and the ability to attend to other duties such as collegial deliberations. Secondly, use of staff, as evidenced in the amount of access, is indicative of the allocation and acquisition of scarce staff resources. Ascertaining who receives the greater amounts of available staff time demonstrates who benefits from legislative staff use. Finally, how staff relate to legislators during these interactions permits examining the functioning of this new cadre of legislative actors and how staff have been assimilated into the legislative process.

The raison d'etre of staff requires them to relate directly or indirectly to legislators' individual or collective needs. Legislator-staff interaction or, more simply, access is the key to understanding how legislators use their added staff resources.

Advisory Access Generally

Just as historical parallels assisted in understanding the growth of staff, so too, important insights regarding access come from considering other advisors.

> The advisory relation is decisively effected by the nature of the access that the advisor has to his principal. [1]

The dimensions of access cited to define its nature include; form (use of the spoken and/or written word), duration (brief or long), frequency (continuous or sporadic), directness (with or without intermediaries), genesis (who initiates), and exclusivity (principal/preferred source or multiple competing sources).

> Opportunities to (advise) will depend on where in the spectrum the advisor is situated with respect to each of these dimensions of access. These variations in access also affect almost all other aspects of the advisor-advisee relation and more especially the strength of the advisor's influence and the likelihood that his advise will be implemented. [2]

Other authors, while using different concepts and terms have identified additional factors that influence interactions

between advisors and their principals. For example, identifiable patterns of behavior have been associated with individuals in advisory positions. Lerner [3] in controlled laboratory analogues of expert behavior identified three behavioral types. These correspond closely to groups found by Meltsner [4] in his examination of policy analysts in the federal bureaucracy. These and other typologies include: technicians who perform a job, relating chiefly to professional peers in their advisory activity; climbers who appeal to an immediate superior or client for support often aimed at job advancement; and entrepreneurs who seek change in public policy and the allocation of resources towards some preferred end.

The differing priorities inherent in these types points to different styles and purposes associated with advisor-principal interactions. The presence of these differing attitudes among staff in Michigan was documented as part of the staff survey conducted for this research. Staff were asked to rank three statements reflecting the triad of opinions towards their work. Table 17 arrays the results. Relatively few ranked the technician role highly; most placed priority on a climber identification although the entrepreneurial emphasis was a close second.

The specificity of client demands upon advisors goes far toward determining the nature of advisory activity. Merton

Table 17

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Views of Staff Work Ranked First and Second
by Final Staff Respondents

		Statement Ranked First			
Statement Ranked Second		Technician	Climber	Entrepreneur	Total
Technician	#	-	5	10	15
	%		8.3	16.7	25.0
Climber	#	7	-	13	20
	%	11.7		21.7	33.3
Entrepreneur	#	5	20	-	25
	%	8.3	33.3		41.7
Total	#	12	25	23	60
	%	20.0	41.7	38.3	100.0

hypothesizes an inverse relation between specificity and advisor latitude.

> The earlier in the continuum of decision that the (advisor) operates, the greater his potential influence in guiding the decision. [5]

Similiarly, the degree of technical complexity influences the advisory relationship. Lerner hypothesizes a curvilinear affect with advisor influence waning beyond some point of technical intricacy set idiosyncratically by those receiving the advise. [6]

Organizational position also has a bearing on advisor access. The position of advisors within a hierarchical organization defines their autonomy in the sense that higher units may consider options presented by lower units or take a lower unit's reaction to a decision into account; similarly, lower units may anticipate reactions of upper units. In short, organizational situation conditions the advisor's involvement with a problem and its solution. [7]

Attributes of both advisor and principal have also been found to influence their relationship. The activities of advisors will differ depending upon professional training and education as well as the positions and titles they assume in an organization. [8] Viewed from the principal's perspective, different clients seek advise for different reasons; they also differ in their capacity or inclination to use and learn from advise. [9]

Staff access specifically.

The descriptive literature on legislative staff is permeated with observations on access. Staff are dependent on legislators from whom they derive their influence [10] and by whom that influence is defined [11] and limited [12]. The legislator-staff relation has been variously described as one of "love/hate" [13] or "feudal". [14] Whatever the specific characterization, all connote a bond between legislators and staff that underscores the import of staff access to and interaction with legislators.

The import of access becomes even more clear when staff activity is placed in the context of the overall legislative system. Staff are just one set of actors in a competitive market of ideas and services seeking legislator attention. Forces outside the legislature in the executive branch, political parties, and both organized and unorganized interest groups vie for legislator support. Within the legislature, legislative colleagues and legislative staff of various descriptions interact and compete with each other.

Various examinations into legislators' use of information sources show signficant staff utilization; although this performance varies across aspects of the legislative environment. In 1954, a survey of 27 congressmen found office staff, committee staff, and staff agencies to be among the top ten sources of information in terms of

frequency of use. [15] Samuel Patterson's "The Professional Staffs of Congressional Committees" [16] showed legislators relying heavily on office staff for legislative research but turning to their colleagues in preparation for floor debates and meetings. Robert Zwier's study of U.S. Representatives [17] drew a sharp distinction between specialist legislators who place great importance on staff in their information search and non-specialist who depend more on colleagues or constituents. Using the index score developed by Zwier, Robert Bradley [18] found Nevada state legislators placed their staff bureau a close second to committee hearings as the most useful source of information on technological issues.

Staff are used; but that use is conditioned by a variety of factors. There are functional constraints on access in the sense that certain functions are called upon as needed while others may entail more regular contact. Normative constraints also define operating rules that channel staff activity and contact with legislators. [19]

Staff access is frequently discussed in organizational terms with organization expressed as staff position relative to legislators. Meller in his review of legislative staff services [20] suggested placing staff in a "legislative service matrix" defined by two axes, clientele and personal identification. The clientele axis expresses whether a staff person identifies with a specific legislator at one

extreme or the legislature as a whole at the other. The polls of the personal identification axis range from personal involvement to anonymous objectivity. Leonard Saxe [21] groups staff into two categories. Direct staff are those who work for a member or committee chair; support staff are other staff agencies. Fox and Hammond document three staff office structures, hierarchical, coordinative, and individualistic. [22] Each is defined by staff proximity to legislators.

Attributes of legislators and staff also condition staff access. Legislator ability to delegate to and then manage professional staff is a key feature. [23] Further, legislators' perception of the role they play will condition the use made of staff. Staff types have been repeatedly identified as explaining why staff seek access to legislators. These types echo the characterizations of Lerner and Meltsner reviewed earlier. The professional or technical staff person emphasizes performance of a task in a neutral fashion; access for these staff depends upon the need for their expertise. Entrepreneurial staff seek out legislators in hopes of realizing certain objectives. Policy entrepreneurs seek implementation of public policies they support; political entrepreneurs seek career furtherance for both themselves and a legislator.

SUMMARY

Both staff advocates and critics have based their observations on staff growth. Advocates called for more staff to aid beleaguered legislators in carrying out their responsibilities. Critics witnessed the rapid rise in staff numbers with alarm viewing the influx of these new actors in the legislative arena as an additional burden to legislators already hard-pressed to meet their responsibilities. The growth of advisors such as staff is a recurring historical phenomenon that is a response on the part of decision makers to the growth in the size of states, the level of interactions across polities, and the complexity of political structures. All these factors have been operative in post-World War II America, contributing to the growth in legislative staff. Increases in the number of staff were to be expected and are not indicative of staff's success or failure in responding to legislator's needs. The impact of staff depends on how staff have been used.

The most direct and meaningful indicator of staff activity is the level of access staff have to legislators. To either positively or negatively impact legislator responsibility requires staff to have access to legislators. The importance of access to the advisory function has been stressed by various authors and is a common observation found in the descriptive literature on legislative staff.

The various dimensions of staff access (form, duration, frequency, directness, genesis, and exclusivity) can be defined. In this research, they will be quantified, and used in an analysis of legislator responsibility, and the accountability it supports.

FORMAL ARGUMENT

To empirically examine staff access to ascertain staff effect on legislator accountability requires development of a formal argument from which hypotheses can be derived and tested. The essential question being researched is whether staff have helped or hindered legislator accountability. Legislator accountability takes many forms based on various expectations of legislator performance. All these expectations of accountability are said to rest on the presumption that legislators are responsible for their official acts. To determine if staff negate this presumption of responsbility (and, therefore, undermine legislator accountability) certain assertions about key features of legislator-staff relations are put forward for examination.

The first feature of legislator-staff relations relevant to this inquiry is control. A strong indicator that legislators maintain their accountability in the presence of staff is legislator control of staff. The first assertion is that legislators control staff. The second feature of

legislator-staff relations is the extent of discretion available to staff. Even if staff are found to be controlled by legislators, opportunities for staff discretion are likely to occur. How such discretion occurs is less important than its impact on responsbility and the accountability it supports. In this regard it is asserted that staff discretion exists, but is 1) tolerable and 2) manageable by legislators.

To see if these assertions are credible, a series of hypotheses are outlined. If the hypotheses prove correct, the three assertions will be supported which, in turn, reinforces the presumption of legislator responsibility upon which legislator accountability rests. Should they prove false, credence would be given to concerns that staff may not further legislator accountability because they undermine the assignment of responsibility for legislative acts which accountability requires.

Legislators Control Staff

The first set of hypotheses regarding the assertion of control are based upon our earlier review of the devices for control Weingast suggests are available to legislators. The assertion and its associated hypotheses can be stated as follows:

ASSERTION 1. Controls exist to assure that staff are responsive to legislators.

HYPOTHESIS 1. If legislators control a responsive staff, then legislators will be the main source of decisions to hire and retain staff.

HYPOTHESIS 2. If legislators control a responsive staff, then staff attitudes will reflect a service orientation.

HYPOTHESIS 3. If legislators control a responsive staff, then staff attitudes will reflect a lack of staff control.

HYPOTHESIS 4. If legislators control a responsive staff, those staff having more direct working relations with legislators will have greater levels of access to legislators.

Hypotheses 1 through 3 entail descriptive analyses of the legislator-staff employment relationship, as well as staff attitudes towards their work and their relative influence. Hypothesis 4 is the first direct inquiry involving staff access and the Legislative Enterprises it defines. By joining legislators and staff according to access patterns and quantifying the levels of access, these levels can be statistically compared to see if significant differences are observed between staff with direct and indirect working

relationships with legislators. Several dimensions of direct or indirect legislator-staff working relations will be examined including: reporting responsibility (staff reporting directly to legislators versus those reporting through an intermediary); personal identification (staff identifying personally with a specific legislator versus those without such identification); and, partisanship (staff who routinely participate in partisan politics as part of their job versus those who do not).

Staff Discretion is Tolerable

The second assertion and its associated hypotheses begins to address staff discretion. Discretion is an expected part of the legislative-staff relation. The initial question about discretion is not whether it exists, but is its existence tolerable. If we assume legislators act in their best interests, staff discretion can be said to be tolerable if legislators use staff in a way that indicates staff benefit outweighs staff cost (including the costs of staff discretion).

Legislators in positions of authority can use that authority to acquire more staff; because of their authority these legislators are also more likely to be sought out by staff. Should these legislators take advantage of their ability to acquire staff assistance, then their view of staff will be characterized as tolerating the costs associated with staff

discretion. Should they not capitalize on their opportunities to use staff, it may be that this reluctance is due, at least in part, to the consequences of staff discretion being intolerable. This argument can be stated as follows:

> ASSERTION 2. Legislator behavior will be consistent with the point of view that the benefits legislators derive from staff outweigh the cost of staff discretion.
>
> > HYPOTHESIS 5. Assuming legislators act in their best interests, if the benefits of staff outweigh the cost of staff discretion, then the number of staff allocated to legislators will relate to existing sources of legislative authority.
> >
> > HYPOTHESIS 6. Assuming legislators act in their best interests, if the benefits of staff discretion outweigh the cost of staff discretion, then the amount of access legislators permit staff will relate to existing sources of legislative authority.

Hypothesis 5 employs the number of staff formally assigned to a legislator as the basis for defining legislator-staff relations. Hypothesis 6 utilizes the Legislative Enterprise defined by legislator-staff access as the basis for its

measurement. The hypotheses are identical in their logic, but these differing measurement techniques will permit a comparison between results from the traditional approach of counting staff as compared to findings derived from an examination of the Legislative Enterprise as defined by access. With both hypotheses those legislators in positions with authority will be statistically compared to legislators who lack or have lesser authority to ascertain whether levels of staff use are significantly different across these various groups. Sources of legislator authority that will be examined include those belonging to the majority party, legislators holding at least one committee chair, and legislators arrayed by tenure with authority presumably increasing as tenure increases.

Authority was not defined by formal legislative offices for two reasons. First of all, most legislators (at least in Michigan) hold some title either as partisan leaders, floor operatives, or caucus members making any comparison group too small for useful statistical analysis. Secondly, no reliable method could be found for differentiating the relative authority associated with various titles (e.g., does a Majority Floor Whip have more or less authority than the Caucus Chair; or, do all Whips have equal authority). While analysis of authority in these terms proved problematic, the expressions of authority included in the analysis should be adequate for assesing Assertion 2.

Staff Discretion is Manageable

Assertion 3 continues with the examination of staff discretion. Given the existence of discretion, is its exercise subject to legislator influence. Assertion 3 answers this query affirmatively. The two hypotheses associated with this assertion each posit an instance of staff discretion and the countervailing expression of staff management. Both are based upon legislator enterprises defined by legislator-staff access.

> ASSERTION 3. Opportunities for staff discretion exist; but, are tempered by legislator influence.
>
> > HYPOTHESIS 7. Both legislators and staff initiate their contacts reflecting some degree of staff discretion; but, more access will be attributable to contacts initiated by legislators.
> >
> > HYPOTHESIS 8. Staff discretion is evidenced in personal work orientation; but, these varying orientations will be unrelated to levels of staff access.

Hypothesis 7 recognizes that one form of staff discretion is staff ability to initiate contacts with legislators. One management response available to legislators to temper this form of staff discretion is limiting the duration of staff

initiated interactions and devoting more time to those that the legislator initiaties. Statistical comparisons of time devoted to staff-versus-legislator initiated contacts can ascertain whether this management technique is utilized.

Hypothesis 8 derives from the body of literature that identifies various personal motivations underlying advisory and staff behavior. [12] These motivations represent forms of staff discretion. Three types are identified: technicians who want to perform a specific job; climbers who want to use their present job as a means for professional advancement; and entrepreneurs who seek to take advantage of their job situation to influence public policy. While staff members will prioritize these roles differently, such discretion will not influence legislator availability or access. Legislators will interact with staff in a manner unrelated to personal staff priorities.

SUMMARY

Earlier discussions of legislator accountability are focused on several key concepts which are then structured into a formal argument amenable to empirical analysis. Legislator-staff access and the Legislative Enterprises it defines provides a focus for the examination of staff's impact on accountability.

Maintenance of legislator accountability is premised on legislators being responsible for their actions.

Legislators are responsible for their enterprises if they exercise control over a responsive staff. Even with legislative control, some degree of staff discretion is likely to occur. Such discretion has limits and need not negate legislators being responsible for their actions and the actions of their enterprises provided the discretion is tolerable (i.e., its costs do not outweigh the benefits of staff use) and subject to legislative influence.

A series of three assertions (one for control, discretion being tolerable, and discretion being manageable) are then put forth. Hypotheses related to each assertion will be used as the basis for supporting or refuting the assertions and the observations regarding responsbility and the legislator accountability they support.

The next chapter gives these hypotheses empirical expression that can be statistically tested within the context of the Michigan State Legislature.

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CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Data on the Michigan Legislature will be used to empirically test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 3. The sources of these data include the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984, conducted as part of this research and supplementary data from secondary sources. These data, described in Chapter 2, provide the basis for assessing staff impact on legislator accountability in one legislative setting.

To test the hypotheses and assess accountability necessitates the development of a measurement technique for gauging legislator-staff contact. By using summary descriptions provided by staff of the frequency and duration of their meetings with legislators, an estimated amount of interaction time (expressed as hours per month) that legislators devote to staff and staff spend with legislators is derived. The calculation of this measure is explained in the data analysis plan that follows.

The value of interaction time as the measure of access and the quantifier of the Legislative Enterprise is shown in the analysis of data derived from the hypothesis testing. The first three hypotheses use staff descriptions of attitudes to assess control; the remaining five use one of three levels of analysis the measure of interaction time affords. How this measure of time complements more traditional methods of legislator-staff linkage are shown in a direct comparison of statistical results derived from the two measures when Hypotheses 5 and 6 are analyzed.

DATA ANALYSIS PLAN

Measuring Interaction Time

The preceding discussions of access have stressed its importance to accountability and its utility in defining the Legislative Enterprise. Interaction is proposed here as the empirical expression of access and the quantifier of the Legislative Enterprise. Table 18 details the conversions and calculations involved in the development of interaction time measures. As part of the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984, staff were asked to identify by name those legislators with whom they had work-related discussions more than once per month in the preceding three months. For each legislator staff named they characterized the frequency and duration of their interactions with

Table 18

Calculation of Legislator-Staff Interaction Times

Aspect of Interaction	Original Survey Question	Respondent-Selected Ordinal Scores	Temporal Conversion
Frequency	For each legislator listed, indicate the overall frequency of your discussions.	5 = Daily	30 days per month
		4 = More than once p/w.	8 days per month
		3 = Once per week	4 days per month
		2 = More than once p/m.	3 days per month
		1 = Once per month	1 day per month
Duration	For each legislator listed, indicate the usual length of time your discussions lasted.	5 = Over two hours	120 minutes
		4 = One to two hours	90 minutes
		3 = One-half to one hour	45 minutes
		2 = Fifteen to thirty min.	22 minutes
		1 = Under fifteen minutes	10 minutes

Minimum legislator-staff interaction
(1 day per month) x (10 minutes) = 10 minutes per month
or .17 hours per month.

Maximum legislator-staff interaction
(30 days per month) x (120 minutes) = 3600 minutes per month
or 60 hours per month.

legislators by checking one of five mutually-exclusive ordinal scores. Frequency of staff interaction with legislators was scored according to days per month or week; duration scores took the form of minutes/hours devoted to the "typical" interaction. Temporal expressions for frequency and duration were devised. Frequency descriptions were standardized to the approximate number of days per month a particular staff person and a particular legislator had a work-related discussion. The usual length of these interactions are expressed in minutes. By multiplying frequency times duration, an estimate is derived for the number of minutes per month consumed by each legislator-staff pair. Division by sixty converts the minutes into hours per month, the final empirical measure of interaction time. The minimum interaction time is ten minutes (or .17 hours) per month; one day per month times ten minutes per meeting. The multiplication of thirty days per month by 120 minutes per meeting results in 3,600 minutes (or 60 hours) per month devoted to interactions by a legislator and a staff advisor as the maximum amount of interaction time.

The distributions of the frequency and duration measures as well as the interaction times from their multiplication are shown in Table 19. Frequency of meetings shows ample distribution across all five points while 84.3% of all duration responses are in the two lowest points (22 minutes or ten minutes per interaction). The combination of these

Table 19

Frequency Distributions for the Components of Legislator-Staff Interactions and Resulting Interaction Times from the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984

	Frequency			Duration	
	#	%		#	%
30 days per month	35	11.2	120 minutes	3	1.0
8 days per month	72	23.0	90 minutes	16	5.1
4 days per month	57	18.2	45 minutes	30	9.6
3 days per month	98	31.3	22 minutes	87	27.8
1 day per month	51	16.3	10 minutes	177	56.5
Total	313	100.0		313	100.0

Legislator-Staff Interaction Times (in Hours per Month)

Time	#	%	Time	#	%
.17	40	12.8	3.00	4	1.3
.37	8	2.6	4.50	4	1.3
.50	74	23.6	5.00	5	1.6
.67	34	10.9	6.00	11	3.5
.75	3	1.0	11.00	13	4.2
1.10	16	5.1	12.00	6	1.9
1.30	24	7.7	22.50	8	2.6
1.47	19	6.1	45.00	6	1.9
2.25	4	1.3	60.00	3	1.0
2.93	31	9.9			
			Total	313	100.0

two temporal scores into interaction times results in 50.9% of the total 313 interactions between legislators and staff consuming under one hour per month.

At the initial level of the 313 individual interactions reported by sixty staff with 118 legislators, certain features of the Legislative Enterprise are revealed. Most obviously, they are results of selective interactions. Each of the 60 staff respondents were able to report up to a total of ten legislators with whom they interacted on at least a monthly basis. If each respondent had named ten legislators, 600 interactions would have been identified; if each had named but one, only sixty would have been identified. The fact that just over half the potential number of interactions were identified indicate that staff have ready access to more than one legislator but that some staff have access to a broader spectrum of legislators either by their own selection or the selection of legislators.

Table 20 displays the distribution of the sixty staff and legislators according to the actual number of reported legislator-staff interactions with which they were associated. Overall, each staff member interacted with an average of 5.22 legislators although the largest proportion of staff are at the two extremes of contact levels (28.3% reported one contact, 21.7% named nine legislators). Legislators, however, tend to concentrate at the low end of

Table 20

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Number of Legislator Contacts Reported by
Staff and Number of Staff Contacts
Associated with Legislators

Number of Contacts	Reported by Staff (with Legislators)		Involving Legislators (with Staff)	
	#	%	#	%
1	17	28.30	43	36.44
2	3	5.00	29	24.58
3	2	3.33	18	15.25
4	2	3.33	16	13.56
5	8	13.33	2	1.69
6	2	3.33	3	2.54
7	3	5.00	2	1.69
8	7	11.67	1	.84
9	13	21.67	-	-
10	3	5.00	4	3.38
Total	60	100.00	118	100.00
Mean Number of Contacts	5.22		2.65	

contact frequency; 61% were mentioned by only one or two staff people which is close to the average for each legislator of 2.65 reported staff interactions.

When the 313 distinct interaction times are summed for each legislator and each staff person the interaction times arrayed in Table 19 and the distribution of legislator and staff contact reflected in Table 20 combine to form two further levels of interaction times described in Table 21; each legislator's interaction time with all sixty staff and each staff member's total interaction time with the 118 legislators identified. Because there are more legislators than staff, interaction times are typically shorter for legislators than for staff. The summary statistics reported at the bottom of Table 21 support this observation as does the percent distribution of legislators by their interaction times when compared to the distribution of staff.

Linking Interaction Time Levels to Hypotheses

The ability to identify three levels of analysis from a measure of interaction time is one of the immediate benefits associated with this approach to quantifying access and the Legislative Enterprises they define. Each of the three levels is used to test at least one of the eight hypotheses put forward for testing.

Table 21

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Estimated Total Time per Month Spent
Interacting with Staff (for Legislators)
and with Legislators (for Staff)

Overall Interaction Time	Legislators with Staff #	Legislators with Staff %	Staff with Legislators #	Staff with Legislators %
Less than 1 Hour	34	28.8	4	6.7
1 - 2 Hours	18	15.3	6	10.0
2.1 - 3 Hours	9	7.6	5	8.3
3.1 - 4 Hours	3	2.5	1	1.7
4.1 - 5 Hours	5	4.2	5	8.3
5.1 - 6 Hours	5	4.2	2	3.3
6.1 - 7 Hours	5	4.2	1	1.7
7.1 - 8 Hours	3	2.5	1	1.7
8.1 - 9 Hours	0	-	1	1.7
9.1 - 10 Hours	2	1.7	0	-
10.1 - 15 Hours	11	9.3	8	13.3
15.1 - 20 Hours	5	4.2	9	15.0
20.1 - 30 Hours	5	4.2	5	8.3
30.1 - 40 Hours	3	2.5	4	6.7
40.1 - 50 Hours	5	4.2	3	5.0
50.1 - 60 Hours	2	1.7	1	1.7
60.1 - 70 Hours	2	1.7	1	1.7
70.1 - 80 Hours	1	0.9	0	-
Over 80 Hours	0	-	3	5.0
Total	118	100.0	60	100.0

Table 21 -- Continued

Summary Statistics		
Minimum	10 minutes/month	20 minutes/month
Maximum	77 hours/month	163 hours/month
Mean	10 hours/month	20 hours/month
Median	3 hours/month	15 hours/month

Level 1, the 313 individual legislator-staff interactions, permits testing of Hypothesis 7 which compares interaction times according to who initiates the interactions. Level 2, the accumulated interaction times for each legislator is used to defined Legislative Enterprises from the legislator's point-of-view and assess the relationship of legislator authority to the time devoted to interactions with staff (Hypothesis 6). Level 3 quantifies the Legislative Enterprise from staffs' perspective by summing interaction times for each staff person; this serves as the basis for testing whether staff working relationships with legislators (Hypothesis 4) and staff work priorities (Hypothesis 8) are related to levels of interaction time staff spend with legislators.

Use of these measures, as well as other data for Hypotheses 1 through 3 and 5, is pursued in the remainder of this chapter. With half the hypotheses dependent on the measures of interaction times, the utility of this measurement approach to the quantification of the Legislative Enterprise and the assessment of legislator accountability is evident.

Because each of the levels of interaction times have decidedly non-normal distributions, assumptions underlying the use of parametric statistics for hypothesis testing may be violated. The parametric statistics used (the Two-Sample T-Test, regression, and ANOVA F-Test) for observing differences between means for various groups are rather

robust and may be sufficient for the analysis. However, to fully assess the data and the hypotheses they test, non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney U, Kruskall-Wallis, and the Median Test) which use the distribution of interaction times as their criteria, are also employed to augment the more traditional parametric tests.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING

Legislator Control

In Chapter 1, four devices available to legislators to ensure their control over staff were identified based on Weingast's observations regarding legislator relations with executive agency bureaucrats. Hypotheses 1 through 4 each express one of these forms of control.

Hypothesis 1 states that one form of legislator control is their being the main source of decisions concerning staff hiring and retention. Data in Table 22 tend to support the existence of this form of control. A majority of staff (65.0%) report in response to survey item IV.C that legislators are the most important influence on employment decisions affecting staff in their positions. Important exceptions to this overall pattern are observed when legislator involvement in staff hiring and retention is categorized by staff superiors (item III.A.3) and staff

Table 22

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984: Legislator Involvement in Staff Hiring and Retention Categorized by Staff Superiors and Staff Identification with Legislators

		Legislator Involvement in Staff Hiring and Retention			
Staff Superior		Legislator Most Important	Other More Important	Legislator Not Important	Total
Legislator	#	28	2	2	32
	%	71.8	28.6	14.3	53.3
Other Staff	#	11	5	12	28
	%	28.2	71.4	85.7	46.7
Staff Identification with Legislators					
Identified with Specific Legislator	#	27	2	2	31
	%	69.2	28.6	14.3	51.7
Identified with Group of Legislators	#	10	0	9	19
	%	52.6	-	47.4	31.7
Not Identified with Any Legislator	#	2	5	3	10
	%	20.0	50.0	30.0	16.7
Total	#	39	7	14	60
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

identification with legislators (item IV.D). Those staff with non-legislator superiors are more likely to be removed from direct legislator influence on their employment. Staff identifying with groups of legislators as opposed to a specific legislator have a higher proportion of their numbers with no reported legislator involvement in their hiring and retention.

The second feature of control highlights staff dependence on legislators for their influence. If staff are in positions of dependence, their attitudes should reflect a service orientation to their work. A series of Likert-type questions were posed to staff concerning their level of agreement/disagreement with several statements about staff activity (section 3 of the survey). Results obtained are shown in Table 23. Staff attitudes are consistent with a service orientation. When given statements reflecting a lack of service orientation (i.e., staff hinders legislator deliberation and staff are able to act on their own) over 80% of the respondents disagreed with sizable minorities noting strong disagreement. In response to more neutral or positive questions, staff attitudes reflected support for providing useful information but not necessarily new ideas. They agreed by quite a majority (73.4%) that staff case work helps legislators be more responsive to their constituents.

Table 23

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984: Staff Attitudes Reflecting a Service Orientation

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	No Opinion	Agree	Strongly Agree	Missing	Total
Staff hinders legislator deliberation	#	25	27	3	1	2	2	60
	%	41.7	45.0	5.0	1.7	3.3	3.3	100.0
Staff able to act on own	#	12	37	3	5	1	2	60
	%	20.0	61.7	5.0	8.3	1.7	3.3	100.0
Staff should generate new ideas	#	0	28	11	13	6	2	60
	%	-	46.7	18.3	21.7	10.0	3.3	100.0
Casework helps constituent and legislators	#	2	5	3	33	14	3	60
	%	3.3	8.3	5.0	55.0	23.3	5.0	100.0
Staff should provide useful information	#	2	4	7	34	10	3	60
	%	3.3	6.7	11.7	56.7	16.7	5.0	100.0

Hypothesis 3 speaks to legislator control by examining lack of staff control. As only one participant in a crowded legislative arena, staff ability to influence legislators has limits. When asked to compare staff influence to that of other parties involved in the legislative process (item VI.H) staff lack of control comes into clear view. Table 24 presents these attitudes on relative influence. Those perceived by staff respondents as more influential than legislative staff include other legislators, the governor, voters, and lobbyists, in that order. Opinions of relative influence were split on the press and interest groups. Staff of both party organizations, executive agency personnel and the governor's staff were perceived as less influential than legislative staff.

The first use of the interaction time measures discussed previously in this chapter is found with Hypothesis 4. Weingast's observations that legislators will favor advisors with whom they are in accord is said to find expression in the amount of time staff spend with legislators being related to their working relationship with legislators. Those staff with a direct legislator working relationship (item III.A.3), those identifying with a specific legislator or legislators (item IV.D), and those for whom partisan activity is an expected part of their job (item IV.A) were used to define close legislator-staff working relationships indicative of accord between the two parties. Weak support for Hypothesis 4 is found. Table 25 presents

Table 24

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984: Staff Attitudes Comparing Staff Influence to Influence of Other Legislative Participants

	Influence Compared to Staff						
	Much Less	Less	Same	More	Much More	No Opinion	Total
Other Legislators	1 1.7%	5 8.3%	11 18.3%	25 41.7%	15 25.0%	3 5.0%	60 100.0%
Voters	3 5.0%	9 15.0%	12 20.0%	23 38.3%	11 18.3%	2 3.3%	60 100.0%
Lobbyists	1 1.7%	12 20.0%	16 26.7%	21 35.0	7 11.7%	3 5.0%	60 100.0%
Interest Groups	1 1.7%	15 25.0%	18 30.0%	18 30.0%	5 8.3%	3 5.0%	60 100.0%
Democratic Party Staff	13 21.7%	18 30.0%	10 16.7%	13 21.7%	2 3.3%	4 6.7%	60 100.0%
Republican Party Staff	15 25.0%	19 31.7%	12 20.0%	5 8.3%	1 1.7%	8 13.3%	60 100.0%
Bureaucracy	6 10.0%	22 36.7%	13 21.7%	15 25.0%	1 1.7%	3 5.0%	60 100.0%
Governor's Staff	8 13.3%	20 33.3%	15 25.0%	14 33.3%	1 1.7%	2 3.3%	60 100.0%

Table 24 -- Continued

Comparison Groups	Much Less	Less	Same	More	Much More	No Opinion	Total
Press	8	17	11	18	4	2	60
	13.3%	28.3%	18.3%	30.0%	6.7%	3.3%	100.0%
Governor	2	7	11	27	11	2	60
	3.3%	11.7%	18.3%	45.0%	18.3%	3.3%	100.0%

Table 25

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Comparison of Mean Staff Time Devoted to
Legislator-Staff Contacts Categorized by
Working Relationship

Attributes of Legislator-Staff Working Relationship	Measures Related to Means				Test-Statistics
	N	Mean	Variance	Std. Dev.	
a. To whom Staff Report	60				T = 1.38
- Legislator	32	25.05	741.06		δ F = 58
- Staff	28	14.76	943.01		Sig. = .17
b. With whom Staff Identify	60				
- Specific Legislator	31	24.45	793.31	28.17	F = 1.31
- Group of Legislators	19	20.15	1,302.50	36.09	Sig. = 28
- No specific Legislator	10	7.41	63.74	7.98	
c. Partisan Activity Expected of Staff	60				T = 1.43
- Yes	29	25.75	1,572.30		δF = 58
- No	31	15.10	185.09		Sig. = .16

the parametric results obtained from comparisons of group means formed by the three variables defining legislator-staff working relationships. Group means are in the expected direction with those staff having more direct reporting relationships, identification, or partisan involvement with legislators being those staff with higher mean interaction times. However, the differences are not statistically significant. When the distributions of the interaction times for these staff groups are compared using non-parametric statistics significant differences are observed (Table 26). Staff reporting to legislators are more likely to have interaction times above the median than staff reporting to other staff. Differences in the distribution of staff interaction times according to staff identification with legislators approaches significance at the .11 level.

Based on the results of Hypotheses 1 through 4, the forms of legislator control identified by Weingast are found to be operative in the legislator-staff relationships observed in Michigan.

Table 26

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Comparison of Distributions for Staff Time
Devoted to Legislator-Staff Contacts
Categorized by Attributes of the
Legislator-Staff Working
Relationship

Attribute of Legislator-Staff Working Relationship	N	Distributions Avg. Rank	N<	N>	N=	Median	Test Statistics
a. To whom Staff Report	60					11.00	Mann-Whitney U = 272.00
- Legislator	32	36.00	8	19	5		Sig. = .01
- Staff	28	24.21	18	10	0		Sig. of M Test = .00
b. With whom Staff Identify	60					16.00	Kruskall-Wallis = 4.39
- Specific Legislator	21	34.08	10	17	4		Sig. = 11
- Group of Legislators	19	29.74	9	9	1		Sig. of M Test = .11
- No Specific Legislator	10	20.85	7	3	0		
c. Partisan Activity Expected of Staff	60					11.00	Mann-Whitney
- Yes	29	30.74	14	11	4		U = 442.50
- No	31	30.27	12	18	1		Sig. = .92
							Sig. of M Test = .31

Discretion Being Tolerable

The existence of some degree of staff discretion is taken as a given. The question is whether such discretion is both tolerable and manageable. Hypotheses 5 and 6 examine whether discretion is tolerable; hypotheses 7 and 8 assess evidence of management response to opportunities for staff discretion.

Hypotheses 5 and 6 take two complementary view of legislator-staff relations. Hypothesis 5 uses a technique of linking legislators with staff by formal assignment. This approach reviews legislative staff rosters (in this instance the Michigan Legislative Telephone Directory) to identify those staff assigned to a legislator's office either as personal or committee staff. A count of the number of staff assigned to each legislator is derived. This is the more traditional approach used by various staff researchers to measure legislator-staff relations. [1] Hypothesis 6 employs legislator interaction times as the dependent variable. Both hypotheses array their respective measures according to various attributes of legislator authority.

The logic behind both these hypotheses is as follows. If we assume legislators act in their best interest, those in authority positions will use their authority to acquire more

staff resources (either in terms of numbers of staff or amount of interaction time) only if staff discretion is tolerable (i.e., the benefits of staff use outweight the cost of staff use such as discretion). For both hypotheses, the expressions of legislator authority used in the analysis include majority/minority standing, committee position held (defined as Committee Chair, Co-Chair, Minority Chair, or Appropriations Subcommittee Chair) and tenure.

Results for Hypothesis 5 using the number of staff assigned to legislators are summarized in Tables 27 through 29. Table 27 presents parametric results for the first two attributes of legislator authority with Table 28 displaying the comparable non-parametric measures. In both tables findings are consistently significant only for Senators. This pattern is attributed to the dependent measure used (number of staff assigned to legislators). Chapter 2 contrasted the centralized nature of staffing in the House with the decentralized nature of Senate staffing. In a centralized staff structure, many individual legislators, such as members of the Michigan House, will not have specifically identified staff formally assigned to them. This eliminates many representatives from the analysis dropping the N to 35 or less in the House for both tables. The Senate, however, with its decentralized assignment of staff to specific legislators shows a pattern of staff

Table 27

Comparison of Mean Number of Staff Assigned to Legislators Categorized by Various Attributes of Legislator Authority

Attributes of Legislator Authority	Measures Related to Means				Test Statistics
	N	Mean	Variance	Std. Dev.	
a. Majority/Minority Standing					T = .56
- House Majority	33	1.56	1.06		δF = 33
- House Minority	2	2.00	2.00		Sig. = .58
- Senate Majority	15	3.40	1.83		T = - .72
- Senate Minority	17	2.35	.62		δF = 30
					Sig. = . 01
- Total Majority	48	2.15	2.00		T = .49
- Total Minority	19	2.32	.67		δF = 65
					Sig. = .63
b. Committee Position					
- House Chair	27	1.70	1.22	1.10	F = .38
Co-Chair	1	1.00	-	-	Sig. = .69
Minor.Ch.	0	-	-	-	
Appropr.	1	1.00	-	-	
- Senate Chair	9	3.78	2.19	1.48	F = 3.20
Co-Chair	1	2.00	-	-	Sig. = .04
Min.Ch.	11	2.27	.62	.79	
Appropr.	5	3.00	1.00	1.00	
- Total Chair	36	2.22	2.33	1.49	F = .41
Co-Chair	2	1.50	.50	.71	Sig. = 75
Min.Ch.	11	2.77	.62	.79	
Appropr.	6	2.67	1.47	1.21	

Table 28

Comparison of Distribution for Number of Staff Assigned to Legislators Categorized by Various Attributes of Legislator Authority

Attribute of Legislator Authority	N	Avg. Rank	Distributions N<	N>	N=	Median	Test Statistics
A. Majority/Minority Status						1.00	Mann-Whitney U = 25.60
-House Majority	33	17.76	0	12	21		Sig. = 1.00
-House Minority	2	22.00	0	1	1		Sig. of M Test = 1.00
						2.00	
-Senate Majority	15	20.43	0	10	5		Mann-Whitney
-Senate Minority	17	13.03	1	5	11		U = 68.50 Sig. = .02 Sig. of M Test = .53
						2.00	
-Total Majority	48	31.81	21	13	14		Mann-Whitney
-Total Minority	19	39.53	2	6	11		U = 351.00 Sig. = 12 Sig. of M Test = .01
b. Committee Position						1.00	
- House Chair	27	15.44	0	12	15		Kruskall-
Co-Chair	1	9.00	0	0	1		Wallis = 1.07
Minority Chair	-	-	-	-	-		Sig. = .59
Appropriations	1	9.00	0	0	1		Sig. of M Test = 1.00
						2.50	
-Senate Chair	9	18.06	2	7	0		Kruskall-
Co-Chair	1	7.50	1	0	0		Wallis = 6.54
Minority Chair	11	9.77	8	3	0		Sig. = .09
Appropriations	5	14.70	2	3	0		Sig. of M Test = .11
						2.00	
-Total Chair	36	26.35	15	10	11		Kruskall-
Co-Chair	2	19.25	1	0	1		Wallis = 2.47
Minority Chair	11	31.50	1	3	7		Sig. = .48
Appropriations	6	34.42	1	3	2		Sig. of M Test = .17

Table 29

Results of Bivariate Regressions for Members of House and Senate Regressing Number of Staff Assigned to Legislators by Legislators Tenure

	Variable	Partial	Coefficient	Std. Error	T	Sig.
House						
	Constant		1.28	.28	4.63	.00
	Tenure	.25	.04	.03	1.45	.15
					F	Sig. R^2
					2.12	.15 .06
Senate					T	Sig.
	Constant		2.48	.30	8.18	.00
	Tenure	.29	.07	.04	1.64	.11
					F	Sig. R^2
					2.67	.11 .08

assignment consistent with the hypothesized relationship to authority. Those Senators with greater authority have more staff.

Table 29 presents the results of the regression testing the relationship between the number of staff assigned legislators and the final feature of legislator authority examined, tenure. No significant relationship is observed for either the House or Senate.

Tables 30 through 32 document findings for Hypothesis 6 using interaction time as the dependent measure. The amount of interaction time spent on members of the majority in the House is significantly different from minority members interaction time for both parametric (Table 30) and non-parametric (Table 31) indicators. House committee position also shows significant differences in interaction time across both statistical approaches. Support for the relationship in the Michigan House between legislator authority and amount of interaction time is also found in Table 32. Here interaction time is regressed against legislator tenure. The constant, coefficient, and total regression are all significant; however, the amount of variance explained is small indicating the presence of factors other than tenure influencing levels of legislator interaction time.

Table 30

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Comparison of Mean Legislator Time Devoted to
Legislator-Staff Contacts Categorized by
Various Attributes of Legislator Authority

Attributes of Legislator Authority	N	Measures Related to Means: Mean	Variance	Std.Dev.	Test Statistics
a. Majority/Minority Standing					T = 3.53
-House Majority	50	12.87	302.68		∂F = 82
-House Minority	34	2.20	9.27		Sig. = .00
-Senate Majority	15	11.91	306.65		T = .82
-Senate Minority	17	17.67	461.13		∂F = 30
					Sig. = .42
-Total Majority	65	12.65	278.98		T = -1.76
-Total Minority	51	7.36	207.90		∂F = 114
					Sig. = .08
b. Committee Position					
-House Chair	27	15.88	335.86	18.33	F = 15.77
Co-Chair	14	3.93	21.51	4.64	Sig. = .00
Minority Chair	23	2.47	11.98	3.46	
Appropriations	1	76.76	-	-	
Senate Chair	9	6.62	126.61	11.25	F = 2.92
Co-Chair	1	60.00	-	-	Sig. = .06
Minority Chair	11	16.62	506.28	22.50	
Appropriations	5	11.83	178.82	13.37	
-Total Chair	36	13.57	294.97	17.17	F = 2.06
Co-Chair	15	7.67	229.54	15.15	Sig. = .11
Minority Chair	34	7.04	206.55	14.37	
Appropriations	6	22.65	845.75	29.08	

Table 31

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984: Comparison of Distributions for Legislator Time Devoted to Legislator-Staff Contacts Categorized by Various Attributes of Legislator Authority

Attributes of Legislator Authority	N	Avg. Rank	Distributions N<M	N>M	N=M	Median	Test Statistics
a. Majority/Minority Standing						2.84	Mann-Whitney U = 365.00
- House Majority	50	52.20	18	32	0		Sig. = .00
- House Minority	34	28.23	24	10	0		Sig. of M Test = .00
						5.61	
- Senate Majority	15	15.47	8	7	0		Mann-Whitney U = 112.00
- Senate Minority	17	17.41	8	9	0		Sig. = .56
							Sig. of M Test = .50
						2.93	
- Total Majority	65	47.28	23	39	3		Mann-Whitney U = 1085.50
- Total Minority	51	67.30	31	18	2		Sig. = .00
							Sig. of M Test = .01
b. Committee Position						2.75	
- House Chair	27	41.78	8	18	1		Kruskall-Wallis = 16.36
Co-Chair	14	31.64	8	6	0		Sig. = .00
Minority Chair	23	22.13	16	7	0		Sig. of M Test = .03
Appropriations	1	65.60	0	1	0		
						5.21	
- Senate Chair	9	11.06	6	3	0		Kruskall-Wallis = 3.37
Co-Chair	1	25.00	0	1	0		Sig. = .34
Minority Chair	11	13.82	6	5	0		Sig. of M Test = .29
Appropriations	5	14.90	1	4	0		

Table 31 -- Continued

Attributes of Legislator Authority	N	Avg. Rank	Distributions N<M	N>M	N=M	Median	Test Statistics
						2.93	
- Total Chair	36	53.07	13	22	1		Kruskall-Wallis = 8.97
Co-Chair	15	44.50	8	6	1		Sig. = .03
Minority Chair	34	36.51	21	12	1		Sig. of M Test = .07
Appropriations	6	61.08	1	5	0		

Table 32

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984: Results of Bivariate Regressions for Members of the House and Senate Regressing Time Spent by Legislators in Legislator-Staff Contacts by Legislator Tenure

	Variable	Partial	Coefficient	Std.Error	T	Sig.	
House							
	Constant		5.20	2.19	2.37	.02	
	Tenure	.23	.61	.29	2.15	.03	
					F	Sig.	R^2
					4.64	.03	.05
					T	Sig.	
Senate							
	Constant		16.45	5.18	3.17	.00	
	Tenure	-.07	-.27	.70	-.39	.70	
					F	Sig.	R^2
					.15	.70	.00

The ability to analyze legislator-staff relationships in the centralized staff setting of the Michigan House is made possible by the quantification of legislator-staff interaction time. This measurement technique complements the more traditional approach of assigning staff to legislators that performs well in decentralized staff structures such as is found in the Michigan Senate. Both lend support to the hypotheses and reinforce the assertion that the presence of staff discretion is tolerable.

Discretion Being Manageable

Given the existence of staff discretion and the presence of legislator controls over staff, the question arises as to whether legislators attempt to influence or manage staff discretion. If legislators do seek to manage staff discretion, this may help explain the tolerability of staff discretion. Alternatively, staff may temper their use of discretion and make it tolerable for legislators without necessitating legislator management intervention.

Documenting the presence or absence of legislator management of staff is difficult especially when the data available reflect only staff perceptions. However, some sense of the issue is obtained by positing instances of staff discretion that staff describe and looking for evidence of legislator

influence indicative of management. That is the tack pursued in Hypotheses 7 and 8.

Hypothesis 7 notes as the instance of discretion staff ability to initiate contacts with legislators. Data reported earlier noted the close split between the number of contacts initiated by legislators and staff, so it is known that staff do initiate some portion of their legislator contacts. Legislator exercise of management control over their staff sessions may be looked for in the length of time devoted to their interactions with staff. If legislators manage staff interactions, the amount of time devoted to interactions the legislator initiates can be expected to be greater than the amount of time devoted to staff initiated contacts. Table 33 shows this to be the case. The average level of monthly interaction between a legislator and a staff person is 2.5 hours longer if a legislator initiates the interactions than if they are usually initiated by staff. The non-parametric comparison of distributions is less conclusive but not contradictory to this finding.

A second manifestation of staff discretion is the differing orientations and priorities they associate with their staff work. These orientations were initially defined in a manner consistent with an historic triad of advisory roles discussed in Chapter 1. Their prioritization was incorporated into the survey questioning (item V). The association of a specific legislative management response to

Table 33

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Comparison of Mean Times and Distributions for
Time Devoted to Legislator-Staff Contacts
Categorized by Initiator of Contact

		Measures Related to Means			Test
Initiator	N	Mean	Variance	Std.Dev.	Statistics
Legislator	131	5.56	135.60		T = 2.24 DF = 283
Staff	154	3.06	48.11		Sig. = .03

		Distributions				Test
Initiator	N	Avg. Rank	N	N	N=	Median	Statistics
Legislator	131	146.03	58	62	11	1.10	Mann-Whitney U = 9689.50
Staff	154	140.42	77	73	4		Sig. = .56 Sig. of M Test = .20

each staff priority is not possible since the staff priorities are an artifact of this research. However, the presence of a countervailing legislative management response may be inferred if it is found that staff priorities bear no relation to the amount of interaction time consumed by staff. This is the thrust of Hypothesis 8 the results of which are reported in Tables 34 and 35. The lack of significance found for both parametric and non-parametric tests supports the hypothesis and lends credence to the notion that staff relationships with legislators must consider more than staff priorities and orientations.

Summary

All three assertions put forward in Chapter 3 are supported in the empirical analysis reported here. Legislators exercise control over staff in a variety of forms. Even with this control, some staff discretion is likely to occur; however, levels of staff discretion are both tolerable and subject to legislator management.

These summary observations are derived from parametric and non-parametric tests for a series of eight hypotheses. In addition to direct descriptive and attitudinal questions posed to staff, a measure of legislator-staff interaction time was developed and used to quantify Legislative Enterprises from both the legislator and staff perspective.

Table 34

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Comparison of Mean Staff Time Devoted to
Legislator-Staff Contacts Categorized
by Staff Personal Work Orientations

Attributes of Staff Personal Work Orientations by Priority	Measures Related to Means				Test Statistics
	N	Mean	Variance	Std.Dev.	
-Climber Entrepreneur	30	18.33	798.51	28.26	F = 1.01
-Entrepreneur Climber	13	24.72	770.47	27.76	Sig. = .42
-Entrepreneur Technician	10	35.25	2170.40	46.59	
-Technician Climber	7	10.50	176.88	13.30	
-Technician Entrepreneur	5	10.72	88.97	9.43	
-Climber Technician	5	9.41	88.96	9.43	

Table 35

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984:
Comparison of Distributions for Staff Time
Devoted to Legislator-Staff Contacts
Categorized by Staff Personal
Work Priorities

Attributes of Staff Personal Work Orientations by Priority	N	Avg. Rank	Distributions N<	N>	N=	Median	Test Statistics
_ Climber, Entrepreneur	20	28.05	9	9	2	11.00	Kruskall-Wallis=5.62
- Entrepreneur Climber	13	33.69	5	7	1		Sig.= .34 Sig. of M Test = .40
- Entrepreneur Technician	10	40.35	2	8	0		
- Technician, Climber	7	25.14	5	1	1		
- Technician, Entrepreneur	5	25.90	2	2	1		
- Climber Technician	5	24.40	3	2	0		

Legislator interaction times were found to be a superior method for gauging staff use in the centralized staff structure of the House when compared to the traditional approach of linking legislators to staff by formal assignment. The traditional approach did prove of use in the setting of the Senate with its decentralized staffing patterns.

CHAPTER 4: References

[1] E.g. Salisbury, Robert H. and Shepsle, Kenneth A. "Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-that-Bind", American Political Science Review, vol. 75, no. 2, June 1981; or, Shiff, Steven H. and Smith, Steven S., "Generational Change and the Allocation of Staff in the U.S. Congress", Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. VIII, no. 3, August 1983, pp. 457-467.

CHAPTER 5

LEGISLATOR AND STAFF OBSERVATIONS

The empirical findings reviewed in the preceding chapter are buttressed by personal observations made by both Michigan's legislators and members of their staff. Legislator comments were obtained through a series of semi-structured interviews with the five legislators most frequently mentioned by staff in the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984. Staff remarks were voluntarily offered by most of the 74 staff respondents who completed an open-ended request for additional observations that concluded the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984.

Comments from both groups are summarized here to lend credence to the argument explored in this research that legislators control staff and that staff discretion is both tolerable as well as manageable. In the process, the priorities that legislators and staff associate with their interactions come in to view and point out new directions and issues in need of exploration.

Legislator Comments

Each of the five legislators contacted was a willing participant in the interview process and gave generously of their time. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and one hour. To each of the legislators (Representatives

Robert Emerson, Lynn Johndahl, David Hollister, and Deborah Stabenow as well as Senator Lana Pollack) I extend my thanks and appreciation for their cooperation.

Although the five legislators contacted had little foreknowledge as to the content of the interviews, it was evident that all had given staff functioning and their relationships with staff considerable thought on their own. None of the five interviewees were surprised at their selection. This was evident in their responses to the first question: "Based on my survey of legislative staff, you are one of the top five most frequently contacted legislators mentioned by staff; does that surprise you?"

Their reactions to their reported levels of staff use revealed a conscious effort to utilize staff resources. Specific comments spoke to the import of staff recruitment ("I take staff recruiting very seriously. Legislators don't need to know everything, but they must be able to use staff resources at their disposal."); an openness to staff contact ("I know many staff and have maintained those relationships; therefore, I tend to use them. I know what they can do and find it easy to interact with them."; "I know most staff so I see them and talk to them and call on them for background."); and the connection between being an active legislator and using staff ("Legislator-staff relations are a two-sided exchange. I use staff as much as possible.

Staff who are interested in substance look for interested and hard-working legislators.")

When asked to assess Michigan's current legislative staff complement, compliments to the competency of staff were the dominant theme in all five interviews.

> I have a good deal of respect for staff. They have a deeper and broader knowledge in their area of specialization than legislators on their own. I look to staff for information and background but not political judgements.
>
> I depend on staff expertise and the skills of people I view as capable and credible. I try to get the maximum effort from people and find the limits of their ability.
>
> Staff are an important resource for information and information is power for a legislator.
>
> I use staff I have confidence in and rely on staff that I think are competent.
>
> Overall, staff are excellent and competent thanks largely to the efforts of Speakers starting with Bill Ryan.

The only serious misgiving about current staffing patterns expressed by this group of legislators was the need for more staff generally: "If I had two more staff I could double my effectiveness."; or for more staff with specific skills "I could use access to more legal staff." "I think each legislator should get one more staff person for constituent work."

Most of the time devoted to these interviews was spent discussing the formal argument explored in this research. Each of the five legislators were first asked to react generally to the potential impact staff may have on legislator accountability. In each interview the legislator was asked to indicate whether the following statement had any relevance to Michigan's legislature. "Some observers of the federal Congress feel that the growth of staff in Washington has complicated the federal legislator's job. They say that staff have become too independent and may be eroding legislative accountability." None felt this statement applied to Michigan, although several noted that it may be true for Congress given the different legislative dynamics at the federal level.

Moving from hypothetical comparisons to observations on the Michigan legislative environment, each interview included questions on legislator ability to control staff and assessments as to whether staff discretion was tolerable and manageable.

Regarding legislator control of staff, the views of the five legislators can be summarized with the following observation. "Staff are only out of control if legislators want them to be." Others elaborated this theme with comments such as the following.

> Use of staff is as diverse as legislators. Some hold staff captive; others use staff better. For example, the goal of a committee Chair sets the tone for the staff role. Those who want no conflict set a different role for staff than those who don't mind conflict at meetings; but, in these different roles, staff are responding to legislators.
>
> Committee staff reflect the discretion of the Chair. Personal staff reflect the legislator's predilections. Partisan staff are not used to their potential because some legislators are lazy and use them poorly.

All five legislators acknowledged the existence of staff discretion, but such discretion was seen as tolerable.

> Staff do know more on particular subjects but the discretion this involves is controlled by prior negotiations between legislators and staff based on trust.
>
> Discretion has limits set in a variety of ways such as technical skills, personal rapport, and the history of the working relationship. Some staff make decisions, but a minority. My staff work on my agenda and within my limits.
>
> Staff do not have great discretion or excessive power. If staff withold information or give it out arbitrarily, then staff might have too much power; but I don't see that.
>
> The level of discretion is set somewhat by the Speaker and who he hires to run the staff agencies. But, there are limits to discretion. Staff know how far they can go. Central staff go only as far as the Chair or legislator wants them to go. Discretion is molded by how much the legislator wants to be involved.

To gauge the extent of legislator involvement in controlling staff discretion, each of the five legislators was asked whether they and their peers were able to manage staff activities. As a common reference point, management was

characterized as a superior-subordinate relationship in which the subordinate (staff) did what the superior (legislators) wanted. The different management styles they use to describe their relationships with staff point to the many forms legislator management of staff may take.

> Yes, I manage staff in the sense of getting them to do what I want; but thirty to forty percent of the time staff come to me with ideas. My management is not a superior-subordinate relation but one of resource sharing.
>
> Yes, I manage staff, especially pool (caucus) staff; but, with my office staff the personal relationship is more important.
>
> There is a superior-subordinate quality to legislator-staff relations. Staff reflect legislators. A weak legislator equals weak staff.
>
> I manage my office staff; with other staff I act more as a member of a board of directors. For example, the head of the fiscal agency is the president of a corporation, the legislator is a member of the board.

One surprising observation volunteered by several of the legislators interviewed was the perception that most legislators make little use of staff beyond maintenance of office correspondence and administration. Some even went so far as to hazard an estimate of the percentage of legislators that make extensive use of staff. Estimates fell in the fifteen to twenty percent range. Table 36 shows that these educated guesses may not be too far off the mark. When legislators are arrayed by the total amount of interaction time staff attributed to them, we find that the top 16% (or 18 legislators) accounted for 65% of the

Table 36

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984: Comparison of the Percent of Total Interaction Time and Percent of Total Legislator-Staff Contacts Reported by Staff Attributable to Various Groups of Legislators Arrayed by Total Time Devoted to Legislator-Staff Contacts

Groups of Legislators Arrange by Total Interaction Time	Percent of Total Interaction Time	Percent of Total Contacts
Top 16%	65	27
Next 16%	21	23
Next 16%	9	21
Next 16%	4	14
Next 16%	1	9
Next 16%	<1	6

estimated interaction time and over one-quarter of all reported legislator-staff contacts. The five legislators interviewed represented 4% of all legislators identified by staff, but 14% of reported interaction time and 17% of reported contacts. This heavy concentration of staff use among a minority of legislators reinforces the theme expressed throughout the remarks garnered in these five interviews. Legislator use of staff varies depending on a legislator's willingness and ability to use staff resources. A similar theme is among the points made by staff in their personal observations.

Staff Comments

The last page of the Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984, offered staff the opportunity to make whatever comments they wished. Most took advantage of this option. Their remarks covered three subjects: 1) the time period of the survey, 2) the influence of legislators on staff roles, and 3) the amount of time staff spend on non-legislator activity.

Regarding the survey's timing, the period immediately following the recall of two senators is atypical. But, from one perspective, that is advantageous. In addition to normal demands of the legislative calendar, this period was also one awaiting the executive budget. Recall concerns complicated matters in the Senate, but probably heightened

legislators' electoral and constituent concerns. The coincidence of legislative, budgetary, and electoral activity may be atypical, but for reviewing legislator use of staff, it was an ideal time.

The importance of legislator influence on staff functioning was stressed by respondents in their comments. Observations such as the following were typical: "The role of legislative staff is entirely dependent on legislators." "Your duties vary depending on what office you work in and who you work for. A staff aide in one office may have a completely different set of responsibilities than a staff aide in another office." "The usefullness of staff depends on the individual legislator's ability and willingness to delegate responsibility and to trust their staff." Recognizing the key role legislators play in the use of staff is central to this research. As noted at the outset, maintenance of legislator accountability is ultimately the responsibility of legislators themselves.

Several staff emphasized that they devote most of their energies to dealings with non-legislators (e.g. other staff, executive agency staff, lobbyists and interest group representatives, constituents, etc.). It is undoubtedly true that much (if not most) of staff time is not spent with legislators. In fact, survey results support this observation. However, the intent of this research is not to

assess staff activity generally; but to analyze one facet of staff activity, their interactions with legislators and its implications for legislator accountability.

In pursuit of this end, a number of insights were gained into the analysis of legislative staff that may prove of use in future research. These are reviewed in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 6

INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS

This research centers on a single question. Have legislative staff helped or hindered legislator accountability to the public? The views of staff proponents and critics reviewed earlier reveal the dimensions of the debate about legislative staff's effect on legislator accountability. Proponents praise staff as the best response for assisting legislators in their increasingly complex duties. Critics warned of an independent staff bureaucracy that would exacerbate rather than relieve the complexity of the modern legislator's role.

The resolution to this conflict is surprisingly simple. It lies in the recognition that not all legislators use staff equally. Those legislators making extensive use of staff do so consciously and in a manner that leaves them in control while limiting staff discretion to tolerable levels. At the same time, there are legislators whose priorities, interests, and information sources lead them to make little or no use of staff.

To oversimplify, it would appear that Michigan's legislators have headed of the advice Machiavelli gave in The Prince;

> The Prince ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes, not when others wish; on the contrary, he ought to discourage absolutely attempts to advise him unless he asks it . . . It is an infallible rule that a prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised.

Legislators, the modern-day "princes", take staff counsel; but when they wish, not as staff dictates.

Not all legislators benefit equally from the use of staff. The claims of staff proponents must be tempered by this fact; any positive results of staff development and use accrue to a minority of legislators. For those legislators who do make extensive use of staff, it appears that, at least in Michigan, the fears of staff critics have not materialized. Legislators are in control of staff and keep staff discretion to acceptable levels through a variety of approaches to handling the legislator-staff working relationship. In either instance, staff do not loom as a threat to the assignment of legislator responsibility and the public accountability it supports.

In coming to these conclusions, other insights were obtained regarding legislative staff and the legislators they serve. These insights and their meaning, not only for this research but subsequent inquiry, are reviewed in the remainder of this chapter.

STAFF AS ADVISORS

The first insight gained into legislative staff is that, despite their relatively recent rise in American legislatures, they are hardly a new political phenomenon. Throughout history and across civilizations, advisors have been an integral part of politics. The positions held have included tutor and mentor, personal confidante, professional counsellor, soothsayer, religious leader, close friend, and relative of various political leaders. Their bases of advice have ranged from personal charisma to social standing, from formal education to practical experience and training. [1] Legislative staff are a contemporary manifestation of this historic political constant.

The making of this historical link helps place staff growth, viewed with alarm by some, in its proper context. Advisory growth generally and staff growth specifically is a normal political response to growth in the size of government, more frequent occasions for governmental interactions, and the complexity of political structures.

Giving staff a history also gives them relatives. What is known about other advisory relationships has potential applicability to legislative staff; and, conversely, what we learn of legislative staff may be relevant to appreciating other advisors as well. Nowhere is the potential for this exchange of knowledge better illustrated than in the use of access to define and interpret advisory functioning.

Access to decision makers is the hallmark of advisory influence. Without access, advisors are peripheral participants in political discussion; with access, advisors become key actors in the dynamic of political decision making. This research uses as its principal analytic tool documenting and analyzing staff access to legislators. The insights gained through the analysis of access have import not only for legislative staff in Michigan but other staff and advisors as well.

THE IMPORT OF ACCESS

Access is used here to join principal-agent theory with research on Legislative Enterprises enriching both and providing opportunities for future inquiry. Principal-agent theory has its roots in economic research seeking to explain the behavior of firms. This theoretical approach has been found to have broader applicability to political relationships between superiors and subordinates. Weingast's use of principal-agent theory for examining legislators relations with executive bureaucrats in regulatory agencies is the most fully developed example of applying the tools of principal-agent theory to political relationships. [2]

In this research we extend the logic of principal-agent theorizing to the legislator-staff relationship. Our findings can even be restated in terms consistent with

principal-agent theory logic. Legislators will delegate to staff only when the benefits of such delegation (e.g. more complete information, opportunities for identifying political allies, etc.) exceed those of alternative mechanisms (i.e. doing all the work without staff) even though such delegation implies some staff discretion. Further, specialized institutions (i.e. explicit or implicit employment contracts, rewards related to acceptable staff activity, or norms that temper staff behavior) evolve to mitigate staff discretion.

However, we do not simply borrow from principal-agent theory; but also, add to it with the introduction of access as the most direct expression of principal-agent relationships in a political context. Access provides the means of identifying how principals and agents interrelate individually and collectively. In so doing, it details the extent of legislator/principal delegation to their staff/agent and the networks through which various institutional arrangements function to control or mitigate staff/agent behavior.

The idea that legislators and staff weave a web of networks through their various relationships is the basic premise of work on Legislative Enterprises. [3] However, use of the Legislative Enterprise as an approach for analyzing legislator-staff relationships has been limited theoretically and empirically. The theoretical uses of the

Legislative Enterprise widen markedly once it is recognized that legislators sitting at the center of a network of staff and other advisors called the Legislative Enterprise are simply principals delegating to agents in a fashion similar to that found in economic firms. The empirical handicap of being able to define a legislator's enterprise only from secondary sources (usually telephone books or staff directories) is removed with the measurement technique developed as part of this research for documenting and quantifying access.

Measuring access and using that measure in analyzing legislator-staff relations are the major innovations of this research. By documenting the main features of access (frequency of contact, duration of meeting, typical setting, and usual initiator) legislator-staff interactions can be converted into statistically meaningful expressions.

The worth of the measure has already been shown. As demonstrated here, it reveals relationships between legislators and staff not reflected in traditional secondary sources and does so in a manner that is more comprehensive and practical logistically than personal observation or maintenance of logs on legislator-staff interactions. Standardizing the approach to measuring access also permits comparing the various interactions observed. Finally, we see that by associating characteristics of legislators and

staff with their access patterns, we can begin the process of characterizing and understanding these patterns.

The measure of access also has a potential yet to be realized. It represents the first real opportunity for interstate comparisons of staff development and use. Further it can be extended to other legislative agents (e.g. Weingast's regulatory bureaucrats) or to others for whom legislator access is key (e.g. lobbyists). Interactions between others in the legislative arena (e.g. staff-to-staff or lobbyist-to-staff) can be quantified in a similar fashion yielding the potential for reconstructing fairly elaborate forms of Legislative Enterprises linked by access points. Finally, the measure can be applied to other political relationships outside legislatures (e.g. relationships within executive agencies).

There are, however, limits to this approach that must be recognized and, where possible, overcome. Improvements to the actual measurement of access itself are possible. The current approach is somewhat simplistic since it gives respondents only one choice among several mutually exclusive categories describing their interactions. One desirable refinement could be to apportion instances of access across various response categories. There is also a need to better characterize what occurs during access. Currently, we can document overall instances of access, but insights into the

import of what occurs is indirect and inferred from the magnitude of time devoted to access. As a first step, this is acceptable; but, a conclusive examination of legislator control and staff discretion or other features of the workings of the Legislative Enterprise cannot rely solely on indirect observation. Ways of attaching value to what transpires during the interactions associated with access need to be devised. This might occur as a refinement to the survey measurement approach used here; or, the survey could be used as a first step in identifying interactions and relationships for more detailed observation using other techniques.

Both the inherent potential and opportunities for improvement associated with the analysis of access argue strongly for its further use. A beginning has been made here. Further development will require the interest and involvement of legislative observers and legislators alike.

CHAPTER 6: References

[1] Goldhamer, Herbert, The Adviser, Elsevier, New York, 1978.

[2] Weingast, Barry R. "A Principal-Agent Perspective on Congressional-Bureaucratic Relations," Fifth Carneigie Conference on Political Economy, Carneigie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, June 1983.

[3] Salisbury, Robert H. and Shepsle, Kenneth A. "U.S. Congressmen and Enterprise" Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. VI, no. 4, November 1981.

APPENDIX A:

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984

Instrument

Michigan State University
Department of Political Science

To: Staff of the Michigan House and Senate

From: Si Nahra

Subject: Survey of Legislative Staff

As a staff member of the Michigan Legislature, you are invited to participate in a first-of-its-kind study of legislative staff. Much has been written about legislative staff; but, until now, a general survey of a legislature's staff members to find out about their work and attitudes has never been done.

There are several reasons why I've undertaken this survey. It's most immediate use will be as part of my doctoral dissertation in political science at Michigan State University. Further, as a former staff member in two state legislatures (Michigan and Virginia) I had the opportunity to observe the workings of staff and gain an appreciation for and continuing interest in the kind of work you do. Finally, and perhaps of most importance, staff need to be heard. Each year more is written about the role of staff and its implications for how legislatures work. It is important to add the staff perspective to these other views. This survey is one way of doing that.

Your participation is entirely voluntary. No one in the legislature or State government will see your answers or require your response. Use of the data collected will be limited to my doctoral research. I value your participation and will treat your answers as confidential.

Each survey has a code number on the last page that enables me to identify who has and has not responded. I will keep a single master list of who was mailed which survey. Once data collection is complete (in February or March, 1984), that list and the last page of all returned surveys will be destroyed thereby assuring your anonymity.

A group of your fellow staff members already completed the survey. It took them about 30-45 minutes. The survey is designed so that it need not be completed all at once. Each section of the survey can be answered independently, if that is more convenient for you.

Please complete the survey and return your response in the enclosed envelope by February 1, 1984. Send the survey to:

Si Nahra
Department of Political Science
S. Kedzie Hall
M.S.U.
East Lansing, Michigan 48824

Should you have any questions, I can be reached between 9:00 and 5:00 in Detroit at (313) 963-4990.

Anyone completing this survey is entitled to an executive summary of the results. If you would like to receive this summary, please write your name and address in the space provided at the end of the survey.

Thank you for your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Si Nahra

Si Nahra

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART I

In this section of the survey you are asked to summarize your work-related discussions with legislators from September 1983 to December 1983 by answering several questions. To make sure your responses are comparable to other staff members, please read and observe the following definitions and directions.

DEFINITION: A work-related discussion is a direct conversation between you and a legislator related to the carrying out of your staff responsibilities. Please do not include: (1) discussions occurring during committee hearings; (2) personal conversations not related to work; or (3) contacts with legislators that are social or recreational in nature.

DIRECTION FOR PART A

In the first column on the next page write the names of those legislators with whom you had work-related discussions at least once per month from September 1983 to December 1983.

If you had such discussions with more than ten legislators during this time, select and list only the top ten with whom you had the most frequent contact.

DIRECTION FOR PART B

For each legislator you listed in Part A, indicate the overall frequency of your discussions from September 1983 to December 1983.

It is likely that the frequency of your contacts varied during this three month period. Try to "average" or summarize these experiences by selecting the one response that best approximates your level of contact with each legislator appearing in the first column.

DIRECTION FOR PART C

For each legislator you listed in Part A, indicate the usual length of time your discussions lasted.

Again, it is likely that you had conversations of varying length. Select the one response that best typifies the most common occurrence.

DIRECTION FOR PART D

For each legislator you listed in Part A, indicate who usually initiated these discussions. While each of the three parties presented as options might have initiated some of these contacts, check the one who did so most often.

DIRECTION FOR PART E

For each legislator you listed in Part A, indicate whether these were more commonly private talks or group discussions.

DIRECTION FOR PART F

For each legislator you listed in Part A, describe the subjects covered in your discussions. Place a 1 for the most frequent topic discussed, a 2 for the next most frequent, a 3 for the next, and so on. Topics not covered, leave blank. Describe and number other topics in the last column.

I. In this section of the survey you are asked about your work-related discussions with legislators from September 1983 to December 1983. Please read the definition and directions on the preceding page before filling out this page.

☐ IF YOU HAD NO WORK-RELATED DISCUSSIONS WITH LEGISLATORS AS DEFINED ON THE PRECEDING PAGE, CHECK THE BOX AT THE LEFT AND GO TO THE NEXT PAGE.

A.	B.											C.			D.				E.										F.					
Names of legislators with whom you had work-related discussions	Daily	More than Once Per Week	Once Per Week	More than Once Per Month	Once Per Month	Less than 15 Minutes	15 to 30 Minutes	30 Minutes to 1 Hour	1 to 2 Hours	Over 2 Hours	Yourself	The Legislator	A Third Party	Private Talks	Group Discussions	Bill Drafting	Background on Legislation	Background on Budget	Legislative Strategy	Policy Development	Executive Agency Oversight	Committee Activities	Home District	Constituent Requests	Interest Group Relations	Speech Writing	Office Administration	Other: Please Specify

II. In this section of the survey you are asked about the major written products you prepared for legislators or others as part of your legislative staff duties from September 1983 to December 1983. Such products may include bills, speeches, reports, analyses, letters, memoranda or other communications.

☐ IF YOU PREPARED NO WORK-RELATED WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS, CHECK THE BOX AT THE LEFT AND GO TO THE NEXT PAGE.

A.	B.	C.				
Please describe the most common types of written products you produced as part of your legislative duties	For each item describe in Part A, estimate the number of original communications of this type you prepared from 9/83 to 12/83	Take the total number from Part B and estimate how many of this total belong in the following categories. Legislators requested primarily for their direct use	Legislators requested primarily for use by others	Persons other than legislators requested	You initiated work for use primarily by legislators	You initiated work for use primarily by non-legislators
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						

III. This page of the survey concerns information on you as a professional. Please provide the information requested in the first column as it applies to your present position and in Column B the work you performed prior to this.

Descriptive information requested	A. In this column please provide the information requested as it applies to your present position	B. In this column please provide the information requested as it applies to the job you held prior to your present position
1. Job Title		
2. Time in position (to nearest month)		
3. Title of your immediate supervisor		
4. Number of persons reporting to you		
5. Name of office agency, or organization		

IV. The four questions on this page provide further background on your present position

A.

Is participation in partisan electoral activities an expected part of your job?

(check the most appropriate response)

___ Yes

___ No

B.

Where is the principle location of the legislators (or legislator) for whom you work?

(check the most appropriate response)

___ Entire House
___ House Democrats
___ House Republicans
___ Entire Senate
___ Senate Democrats
___ Senate Republicans
___ Both House and Senate

C.

Which of the following statements best characterizes legislator influence concerning the hiring and firing of persons in your position?
(check the most appropriate response)

___ single, most important influence

___ important, but other non-legislators are more important

___ not involved

D.

Which of the following statements comes closest to stating your degree of involvement with legislators?

(check the most appropriate response)

___ I am not identified with any particular legislator or group of legislators.

___ I tend to be identified with a particular group of legislators.

___ I tend to be identified with a specific legislator.

V. In this section of the survey are three possible views of legislative staff work. You are asked to indicate the one you identify with <u>most</u> closely and the one that is <u>least</u> like your feelings towards your legislative staff work

	Place an "x" in each of the two columns	
	Indicate here the statement you identify with the most	Indicate here the statement you identify with the least
<u>Statement 1</u>: I am a specialist with a particular set of skills and expertise that I use in my legislative employment. If I did not work for the legislature, I would be performing the same functions for another organization.		
<u>Statement 2</u>: My legislative employment is an important part of my overall career development. The experience I gain as a legislative staff member is going to help me advance professionally either within or outside the legislature.		
<u>Statement 3</u>: The opportunity to influence and shape public policy is what matters to me. Participating in the legislature's activities enables me to address issues and ideas of importance to the State.		

VI. On the following two pages are a series of items concerning your opinions.

(For each statement, check appropriate response)

Statements to Consider	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	No Opinion	Agree	Strongly Agree
A. In general, legislative staff are able to act on their own without regard to reactions from legislators					
B. In order to talk to their legislator, constituents find they must first go through staff					
C. The time demands staff place on legislators deprives legislators the opportunity to deliberate with their colleagues					
D. The most important staff functions is to provide legislators with information they would use if they had the time to find it					
E. Most legislative staff react after the fact to executive agency policies and initiatives					
F. The main job of a good staff person is to generate new ideas for legislative debate					
G. Staff casework helps legislators be responsive to their constituents without getting into details					

H. This question has you compare the overall ability of all legislative staff to influence legislators with other legislative participants. For each of the comparison groups, pick the statement that best compares that group's influence to legislative staff influence:

Comparison Groups	Statements: Much More Influence	More Influence	About the Same	Less Influence	Much Less Influence
Other State legislators					
Voters					
Lobbyists					
Special interest groups					
State Democratic Party Staff					
State Republican Party Staff					
Executive Agency Personnel					
Governor's Staff					
Press					
Governor					

I. How do you view the work done by legislative staff? (check the one best response)

___ of great value
___ a practical necessity
___ limited usefulness
___ irrelevant

J. How do you think Michigan's State Senators view the work done by legislative staff? (check the one best response)

___ of great value
___ a practical necessity
___ limited usefulness
___ irrelevant

K. How do you think Michigan's State Representatives view the work done by legislative staff? (check the one best response)

___ of great value
___ a practical necessity
___ limited usefulness
___ irrelevant

VIII. In conclusion, please provide the following background information.

A.

How old are you now?

___ Age

B.

Please indicate your personal political identification:

___ Democrat

___ Republican

___ Independent

___ Libertarian

___ Other (please describe:

_____)

C.

What was the highest grade you completed in school?

(check the applicable response)

___ Grade school or less

___ Some high school

___ High school graduate

___ Some college

___ College graduate

___ Some graduate school

___ Graduate degree (Please specify highest _____)

D.

Which category contains your approximate salary before taxes in 1983

(check the closest approximation)

___ Under $15,000

___ $15,000 - $19,999

___ $20,000 - $24,999

___ $25,000 - $29,999

___ $30,000 - $34,999

___ $35,000 - $39,999

___ Over $40,000

IX. Closing Notes

If you have additional thoughts, comments or observations you would like to pass along, I would be most interested in reading what you have to say:

If you would like a copy of the summary of this survey please write your name and address below. It will be provided free of charge for those completing the survey:

Name _____
Address _____
City _____
State _____

APPENDIX B:

Survey of Legislative Staff in Michigan, 1984

Codebooks

FOR: CONTACT
DICTIONARY LOCATION: XTWK:CONTACT#
DATE: JUN 7, 1984

THIS DATASET CAN BE DESTROYED
THIS DATASET CAN BE REPLACED
USE COUNT: 99

DATA SET DESCRIPTION:
LEGISLATOR-STAFF CONTACTS N=313 XTWK/06-06-84

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(1)	STAFF.ID	SID	REQUIRED	STAFF NUMBER
F(2)	LEG.ID	LID	REQUIRED	LEGISLATOR IDENTIFIER
F(3)	FREQUENCY	FREQ		FREQUENCY OF LEG-STAFF CONTAC
	CATEGORIES			
	DAILY	DALY	5	DAILY CONTACT
	MT.1.WK	MTIW	4	MORE THAN ONCE PER WEEK
	ONCE.WK	1.WK	3	ONCE PER WEEK
	MT.1.MTH	MTIM	2	MORE THAN ONCE PER MONTH
	ONCE.MTH	1.MH	1	ONCE PER MONTH
F(4)	DURATION	DURA		DURATION OF CONTACT
	CATEGORIES			
	LT.15.MIN	LTIS	1	LESS THAN 15 MINUTES
	15.30	1530	2	15 TO 30 MINUTES
	30.60	3060	3	30 TO 60 MINUTES
	1.2.HOURS	1.2H	4	1 TO 2 HOURS
	MT.2.HR	MT2H	5	MORE THAN 2 HOURS
F(5)	INITIATOR	INIT		INITIATOR OF CONTACT
	CATEGORIES			
	STAFF	STF	1	STAFF
	LEGIS	LEG	2	LEGISLATOR
	OTHER	OTH	3	OTHER
F(6)	NATURE	NAT		NATURE OF CONTACT
	CATEGORIES			
	PRIVATE	PRIV	1	PRIVATE MEETING
	GROUP	GRP	2	GROUP DISCUSSION
F(7)	DRAFTING	DRTG		DRAFTING
F(8)	LEG.BCKGRD	LBGD		LEGISLATIVE.BACKGROUND
F(9)	BUD.BCKGRD	BBGD		BUDGET.BACKGROUND
F(10)	LEG.STRAT	LSTR		LEGISLATIVE.STRATEGY
F(11)	POL.DEV	POLD		POLICY.DEVELOPMENT

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(12)	EXEC.OVER	EXOV		EXECUTIVE.OVERSIGHT
F(13)	COMM.ACT	COMM		COMMITTEE.ACTIVITIES
F(14)	HOME.DIST	HOME		HOME.DISTRICT
F(15)	CONSTIT.REQ	CREQ		CONSTITUENT.REQUESTS
F(16)	INT.GROUP	INTG		INTEREST.GROUPS
F(17)	SPEECHES	SPCH		SPEECH.WRITING
F(18)	OFFICE.ADMIN	ADMN		OFFICE.ADMINISTRATION
F(19)	ADDITIONAL	ADD		OTHER.TASKS.NAMED
F(20)	PREDESIGNATION CATEGORIES	DES		CODER.ASSIGNMENT.OF.TASKS
	LOR	LOR	1	LOR
	LO	LO	2	LO
	LR	LR	3	LR
	OR	OR	4	OR
	L	L	5	L
	O	O	6	O
	R	R	7	R
	NONE	NONE	8	NONE

FOR: STAFF
DICTIONARY LOCATION: XTWK:STAFF#
DATE: JUN 18, 1984

THIS DATASET CAN BE DESTROYED.
THIS DATASET CAN BE REPLACED.
USE COUNT: 99

DATA SET DESCRIPTION:
STAFF SURVEY RESPONSES AND WRITTEN PRODUCTS REPORTED N=74 XTWK/06-07-84

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(1)	STAFF.ID	SID		STAFF IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
F(2)	NO/WRIT.PROD	WRIT		NUMBER OF WRITTEN PRODUCTS
F(3)	PERC.LEG.LEG	L.L		PERCENT REQUESTED BY LEG FOR LEG
F(4)	PERC.LEG.OTH	L.O		PERCENT REQUESTED BY LEG FOR OTHER
F(5)	PERC.OTH.OTH	O.O		PERCENT REQUESTED BY OTHER FOR OTHER
F(6)	PERC.STF.LEG	S.L		PERCENT REQUESTED BY STAFF FOR LEG
F(7)	PERC.STF.OTH	S.O		PERCENT REQUESTED BY STAFF FOR OTHER
F(8)	TENURE	TEN		TENURE IN MONTHS
F(9)	SUPERIOR	SUP		STAFF SUPERIOR
	CATEGORIES			
	LEGISLATOR	LEG	1	LEGISLATOR
	STAFF	STFF	2	STAFF
	OTHER	OTHR	3	OTHER
F(10)	SUBORDINATES	SUB		NUMBER OF SUBORDINATES
F(11)	WORKPLACE	WKPL		PLACE OF WORK
	CATEGORIES			
	REP.OFF	R.OF	1	REPRESENTATIVES OFFICE
	SEN.OFF	S.OF	2	SENATORS OFFICE
	H.REP.STFF	HRSF	3	HOUSE REPUBLICAN STAFF
	H.DEM.STFF	HDSF	4	HOUSE DEMOCRATIC STAFF
	S.REP.STFF	SRSF	5	SENATE REPUBLICAN STAFF
	S.DEM.STFF	SDSF	6	SENATE DEMOCRATIC STAFF
	HFA	HFA	7	HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY
	LSB	LSB	8	LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BUREAU
	CONSUM.COUN	COCO	9	CONSUMERS COUNCIL
	LEG.RETIRE	LGRE	10	LEGISLATIVE RETIREMENT
	SEN.ANAL	SAS	11	SENATE ANALYSIS SECTION
	ENROLL.OFF	ENRL	12	ENROLLING OFFICE
	HSE.ANAL	HAS	13	HOUSE ANALYSIS SECTION
	CLERK	CLK	14	CLERKS OFFICE

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(12)	PRIOR.POS	PPOS		PRIOR POSITION_HELD
	CATEGORIES			
	OTH.LEG.MI	MILG	1	OTHER MI LEGISLATURE
	OTH.GOV.MI	MIST	2	MI STATE GOVERNMENT
	OTH.GOV	OTGV	3	OTHER GOVERNMENTAL
	NON.GOV	PRIV	4	NON GOVERNMENT
	EDUCATION	EDUC	5	EDUCATION
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(13)	ELECTION.WRK	ELEC		ELECTION WORK EXPECTED
	CATEGORIES			
	YES	YES	1	YES EXPECTED
	NO	NO	2	NOT EXPECTED
F(14)	LEGIS.LOCUS	LOCA		LOCATION OF EMPLOYMENT
	CATEGORIES			
	HOUSE	HSE	1	HOUSE
	HSE.DEM	HDEM	2	HOUSE DEMOCRATS
	HSE.REP	HREP	3	HOUSE REPUBLICANS
	SENATE	SEN	4	SENATE
	SEN.DEM	SDEM	5	SENATE DEMOCRATS
	SEN.REP	SREP	6	SENATE REPUBLICANS
	HSE.SEN	H.S	7	HOUSE AND SENATE
F(15)	HIRE.FIRE	BOSS		ROLE OF LEG IN EMPLOYMENT
	CATEGORIES			
	LEG.IMP	LGIM	1	LEGISLATOR IMPORTANT
	LEG.N.IMP	LGNI	2	LEGISLATOR NOT IMPORTANT
	OTH.IMP	OTIM	3	OTHER MORE IMPORTANT
F(16)	IDENTIFY	IDEN		STAFF-LEG IDENTIFICATION
	CATEGORIES			
	NOTID	NOT	1	NOT IDENTIFIED WITH LEGISLATOR
	ID.GRP	GRP	2	IDENTIFIED WITH GROUP OF LEGISLATORS
	ID.LEG	LEG	3	IDENTIFIED WITH PARTICULAR LEGISLATOR
F(17)	ORIENTATION	ORIN		MELTSNER ORIENTATION TYPES
	CATEGORIES			
	123	123	1	TECH.POL.ENTRE
	132	132	2	TECH.ENTRE.POL
	231	231	3	POL.ENTRE.TECH
	213	213	4	POL.TECH.ENTRE
	312	312	5	ENTRE.TECH.POL
	321	321	6	ENTRE.POL.TECH
F(18)	ACT.ON.OWN	VI.A		STAFF CAN ACT ON OWN
	CATEGORIES			
	STRG.DIS	SDIS	1	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	DISAGREE	DIS	2	DISAGREE
	NO.OPIN	NOP	3	NO OPINION
	AGREE	AGRE	4	AGREE
	STR.AGR	SAGR	5	STRONGLY AGREE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(12)	PRIOR.POS	PPOS		PRIOR POSITION_HELD
	CATEGORIES			
	OTH.LEG.MI	MILG	1	OTHER MI LEGISLATURE
	OTH.GOV.MI	MIST	2	MI STATE GOVERNMENT
	OTH.GOV	OTGV	3	OTHER GOVERNM,ENTIENT
	NON.GOV	PRIV	4	NON GOVERNMENT
	EDUCATION	EDUC	5	EDUCATION
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(13)	ELECTION.WRK	ELEC		ELECTION WORK EXPECTED
	CATEGORIES			
	YES	YES	1	YES EXPECTED
	NO	NO	2	NOT EXPECTED
F(14)	LEGIS.LOCUS	LOCA		LOCATION OF EMPLOYMENT
	CATEGORIES			
	HOUSE	HSE	1	HOUSE
	HSE.DEM	HDEM	2	HOUSE DEMOCRATS
	HSE.REP	HREP	3	HOUSE REPUBLICANS
	SENATE	SEN	4	SENATE
	SEN.DEM	SDEM	5	SENATE DEMOCRATS
	SEN.REP	SREP	6	SENATE REPUBLICANS
	HSE.SEN	H.S	7	HOUSE AND SENATE
F(15)	HIRE.FIRE	BOSS		ROLE OF LEG IN EMPLOYMENT
	CATEGORIES			
	LEG.IMP	LGIN	1	LEGISLATOR IMPORTANT
	LEG.N.IMP	LGNI	2	LEGISLATOR NOT IMPORTANT
	OTH.IMP	OTIM	3	OTHER MORE IMPORTANT
F(16)	IDENTIFY	IDEN		STAFF-LEG IDENTIFICATION
	CATEGORIES			
	NOTID	NOT	1	NOT IDENTIFIED WITH LEGISLATOR
	ID.GRP	GRP	2	IDENTIFIED WITH GROUP OF LEGISLATORS
	ID.LEG	LEG	3	IDENTIFIED WITH PARTICULAR LEGISLATOR
F(17)	ORIENTATION	ORIN		MELTSNER ORIENTATION TYPES
	CATEGORIES			
	123	123	1	TECH.POL.ENTRE
	132	132	2	TECH.ENTRE.POL
	231	231	3	POL.ENTRE.TECH
	213	213	4	POL.TECH.ENTRE
	312	312	5	ENTRE.TECH.POL
	321	321	6	ENTRE.POL.TECH
F(18)	ACT.ON.OWN	VI.A		STAFF CAN ACT ON OWN
	CATEGORIES			
	STRG.DIS	SDIS	1	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	DISAGREE	DIS	2	DISAGREE
	NO.OPIN	NOP	3	NO OPINION
	AGREE	AGRE	4	AGREE
	STR.AGR	SAGR	5	STRONGLY AGREE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(19)	STAFF.INTER	VI.B		CONSTITUENTS MUST GO THROUGH STA
	CATEGORIES			
	STRG.DIS	SDIS	1	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	DISAGREE	DIS	2	DISAGREE
	NO.OPIN	NOP	3	NO OPINION
	AGREE	AGRE	4	AGREE
	STR.AGR	SAGR	5	STRONGLY AGREE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(20)	NO.DELIB	VI.C		STAFF PREVENT LEG DELIBERATION
	CATEGORIES			
	STRG.DIS	SDIS	1	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	DISAGREE	DIS	2	DISAGREE
	NO.OPIN	NOP	3	NO OPINION
	AGREE	AGRE	4	AGREE
	STR.AGR	SAGR	5	STRONGLY AGREE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(21)	PROV.INFO	VI.D		MOST IMP STAFF FUNCTION IS INFO
	CATEGORIES			
	STRG.DIS	SDIS	1	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	DISAGREE	DIS	2	DISAGREE
	NO.OPIN	NOP	3	NO OPINION
	AGREE	AGRE	4	AGREE
	STR.AGR	SAGR	5	STRONGLY AGREE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(22)	REACT.AFTER	VI.E		STAFF REACT TO EXEC
	CATEGORIES			
	STRG.DIS	SDIS	1	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	DISAGREE	DIS	2	DISAGREE
	NO.OPIN	NOP	3	NO OPINION
	AGREE	AGRE	4	AGREE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(23)	GEN.IDEAS	VI.F		STAFF JOB IS GENERATE NEW IDEAS
	CATEGORIES			
	STRG.DIS	SDIS	1	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	DISAGREE	DIS	2	DISAGREE
	NO.OPIN	NOP	3	NO OPINION
	AGREE	AGRE	4	AGREE
	STR.AGR	SAGR	5	STRONGLY AGREE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(24)	CASEWORK	VI.G		STAFF CASEWORK HELPS LEG

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
	CATEGORIES			
	STRG.DIS	SDIS	1	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	DISAGREE	DIS	2	DISAGREE
	NO.OPIN	NOP	3	NO OPINION
	AGREE	AGRE	4	AGREE
	STR.AGR	SAGR	5	STRONGLY AGREE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(25)	OTHER LEG	CLLG		OTHER LEGISLATORS VS STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	LESS	LESS	2	LESS
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	MORE INFL	MORE	4	MORE INFLUENCE
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISS
F(26)	VOTERS	VOTE		INFLUENCE OF VOTERS VS STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	LESS	LESS	2	LESS
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MORE INFL	MORE	4	MORE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(27)	LOBBYISTS	LOBY		INFLUENCE OF LOBBYISTS VS STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	LESS	LESS	2	LESS
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	MORE	MORE	4	MORE
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(28)	INT.GROUPS	INGR		INFLUENCE OF INT GRPS VS STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	LESS	LESS	2	LESS
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	MORE	MORE	4	MORE
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(29)	DEM.PTY.STF	DEM		INFLUENCE OF DEM PTY STF VS STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	LESS	LES	2	LESS
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	MORE	MORE	4	MORE
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(30)	REP.PTY.STF	REPB		INFLUENCE OF REP PTY STF VS STAF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	LESS	LESS	2	LESS
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	MORE	MORE	4	MORE
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISS
F(31)	EXEC.AGENCY	EXEC		INFLUENCE OF EXEC AGENCY VS STAF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	LESS	LESS	2	LESS
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	MORE	MORE	4	MORE
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(32)	GOV.STAFF	GOST		INFLUENCE OF GOV STAFF VS STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MORE	MORE	4	MORE
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	LESS	LESS	2	LESS
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(33)	PRESS	PRES		INFLUENCE OF PRESS VS STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	LESS	LESS	2	LESS
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	MORE	MORE	4	MORE
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(34)	GOVERNOR	GOV		INFLUENCE OF GOVERNOR VS STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	MUCH LESS	MLES	1	MUCH LESS
	LESS	LESS	2	LESS
	SAME	SAME	3	SAME
	MORE	MORE	4	MORE
	MUCH MORE	MMOR	5	MUCH MORE
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(35)	SELF OPIN	SELF		STAFF OPINION OF SELF
	CATEGORIES			
	GR.VALUE	GR.V	1	GREAT VALUE
	PRAC NEC	PRAC	2	PRACTICAL NECESSITY
	LIMITED	LMTD	3	LIMITED USEFULNESS
	IRRELEV	IRRL	4	IRRELEVANT
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(36)	OPIN.SEN	OSEN		SENATORS OPINION OF STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	GR.VALUE	GR.V	1	GREAT VALUE
	PRAC\NEC	PRAC	2	PRACTICAL NECESSITY
	LIMITED	LMTD	3	LIMITED USEFULNESS
	IRRELEV	IRRL	4	IRRELEVANT
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(37)	OPIN.REP	OREP		REPS OPINION OF STAFF
	CATEGORIES			
	GR.VALUE	GR.V	1	GREAT VALUE
	PRAC\NEC	PRAC	2	PRACTICAL NECESSITY
	LIMITED	LMTD	3	LIMITED USEFULNESS
	IRRELEV	IRRL	4	IRRELEVANT
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(38)	AGE	AGE		AGE IN YEARS
F(39)	PARTY.ID	P.ID		PARTY IDENTIFICATION
	CATEGORIES			
	DEMOCRAT	RDEM	1	DEMOCRAT
	REPUBLICAN	RREP	2	REPUBLICAN
	INDEPENDENT	IND	3	INDEPENDENT
	LIBERTARIAN	LIB	4	LIBERTARIAN
	OTHER	OTR	5	OTHER
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(40)	SCHOOLING	SCHL		LEVEL OF EDUCATION ACHIEVED
	CATEGORIES			
	GR.SCH	ELEM	0	ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
	SOME\HS	LTHS	1	SOME HIGH SCHOOL
	HIGH.SCHL	HS	2	HIGH SCHOOL
	SOME\COLL	SCOL	3	SOME COLLEGE
	COLLEGE	COLL	4	COLLEGE GRAD
	SOME\GRAD	SGRD	5	SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL
	MA	MA	6	MASTERS
	PHD	PHD	7	DOCTORATE
	LAWYER	LAW	8	LAWYER
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING
F(41)	SALARY	SAL		SALARY LEVELS
	CATEGORIES			
	LT15	LT15	1	LESS THAN 15000
	15.19	1519	2	15000-19000
	20.25	2025	3	20000-25000
	25.30	2530	4	25000-30000
	30.35	3035	5	30000-35000
	35.40	3540	6	35000-40000
	GT40	GT40	7	OVER 40000
	MISSING	MISS	9	MISSING

FOR: LEGIS
DICTIONARY LOCATION: XTWK:LEGIS*
DATE: JUN 18, 1984

THIS DATASET CAN BE DESTROYED.
THIS DATASET CAN BE REPLACED.
USE COUNT: 99

DATA SET DESCRIPTION:
LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS N=146 XTWK/06-15-84

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(1)	LEGISLATOR.ID	LID		LEGISLATOR IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
F(2)	CHAMBER	CMBR		LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER
	CATEGORIES			
	HOUSE	HSE	1	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
	SENATE	SEN	2	SENATE
F(3)	PARTY	PRTY		LEGISLATOR PARTY
	CATEGORIES			
	REPUBLICAN	REP	1	REPUBLICAN
	DEMOCRAT	DEM	2	DEMOCRAT
F(4)	LEADERSHIP	LDSP		LEADERSHIP POSITION HELD
~~F(5)~~	~~DISTRICT~~	DIST		ELECTORAL DISTRICT
F(6)	H.TERM.BEGIN	HBGN		YEAR HOUSE TERM BEGAN
F(7)	H.TERM.END	HEND		YEAR HOUSE TERM ENDS
F(8)	P.TERM.BEGIN	PBGN		YEAR PRIOR TERM BEGAN
F(9)	P.TERM.END	PEND		YEAR PRIOR TERM ENDED
F(10)	S.TERM.BEGINS	SBGN		YEAR SENATE TERM BEGAN
F(11)	S.TERM.ENDS	SEND		CURRENT YEAR OF SENATE TERM
F(12)	COMMITTEE.1	COM1		COMMITTEE 1
F(13)	POSITION.1	POS1		POSITION 1
F(14)	COMMITTEE.2	COM2		COMMITTEE 2
F(15)	POSITION.2	POS2		POSITION 2
F(16)	COMMITTEE.3	COM3		COMMITTEE 3
F(17)	POSITION.3	POS3		POSITION 3
F(18)	COMMITTEE.4	COM4		COMMITTEE 4

F(#)	FIELD NAME	ABBR	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
F(19)	POSITION.4	POS4		POSITION 4
F(20)	COMMITTEE.5	COM5		COMMITTEE 5
F(21)	POSITION.5	POS5		POSITION 5
F(22)	COMMITTEE.6	COM6		COMMITTEE 6
F(23)	POSITION.6	POS6		POSITION 6
F(24)	NO.COMMITTEES	NCOM		NUMBER OF COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS
F(25)	NO.POSITIONS	NPOS		NUMBER OF COMMITTEE POSITIONS HELD
F(26)	NO.STAFF	NSTF		NUMBER OF STAFF MATCHED TO LEGISLATOR

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