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Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 40106 Ph.D. 1986 PLEASE NOTE: In alt cases this material has been filmed in the best possible w ay from the available copy. Problems encountered with this document have been identified here with a check mark V 1. Glossy photographs or pages_____ 2. Colored illustrations, paper or print_______ 3. Photographs with dark background_____ 4. Illustrations are poor copy_______ 5. Pages with black marks, not original copy_______ 6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides of p a g e _______ 7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages 8. Print exceeds m argin requirements______ 9. Tightly bound copy with print lost in spine_______ . iS 10. Computer printout pages with indistinct print_______ 11. Page(s)____________ lacking when material received, and not available from school or author. 12. Page(s)____________ seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows. 13. Two pages num bered 14. Curling and wrinkled pages______ 15. Dissertation contains pages with print at a slant, filmed as received _ 16. Other____________________________________________________________________________ . Textfollows. s ' University Microfilms International LOCAL SOCIAL SERVICE INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: THEIR ENVIRONMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE DELIVERY OF SOCIAL SERVICES by Patterson Armstrong Terry A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Sociology 1986 ABSTRACT LOCAL SOCIAL SERVICE INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: THEIR ENVIRONMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE DELIVERY OF SOCIAL SERVICES by Patterson A. Terry T h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , based on d a t a from t w e l v e m e d i u m - s i z e d cities in Michigan and Ohio, about reports the derivation and the interaction of variables — at testing of propositions five l e v e l s of analysis — that bear on social service delivery. Specifically: (1) the relationship of organizational v a r iables to the formation of interorganlzational dyads; (2) content development over time in interorganlzational dyads; (3) the relationship of local social service network structure to the nature of interorganlzational dyads; (4) the relationship of local e n v i r o n m e n t characteristics to l o c a l social service network structure; (5) the relationship of links between local environments and the larg­ er (national) system to local social Specific (1) findings: Centralization, internal communication, ciency are unrelated to dyad Is d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to dyad f o r m a t i o n , Number of dyadic (2) service network structure. formalization, formation and ganizational dyads. innovativeness. Size but c o m p l e x i t y is not. ties is di-rectly related There is no consistent pattern to changes and effi­ to innovativeness. in content of interor- (3) Concentration of influence in interorganizational networks is in­ versely related to dyad density among non-influential tions and to average multiplexity for a l l dyads. tween influential and non-inf luential organiza­ Dyad density be­ organizations is d i r e c t l y related to dyad density among non-influential organizations. (4) Variables related to the concentration of political power in met­ ropolitan areas are unrelated to the concentration of influence in local social service networks. (5) The amount of contact between a metropolitan area and the national s y s t e m is u n r e l a t e d to the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of i n f l u e n c e in l o c a l social service networks. General theoretical conclusions; (1) Individual service social service organizations, organizations, are homeostatic: and networks their of social structures are unresponsive to differential environments conditions. (2) Dyads formed between social s e r v i c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s their natures networks (3) change in r e s p o n s e to pressures are a d a pt i v e : exerted in the in which they occur. Structural change in networks of social service organizations, in the f o r m of an i n c r e a s e in the n u m b e r of m a j o r r e s o u r c e centers, induces greater density and greater m u l t i p l e x i t y in interorganiza­ tional relations. For Paul, whose values forged my soul For Catherine, my staunchest defender in my wars against myself For Jon and for Eric, whose needs called me back from the abyss For Phil, whose ideas are the germ of this work and whose guidance brought it to completion For Esther, who walked with me while I defined myself For Patterson, who did the work ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I w a n t f i r s t to thank the m e m b e r s of m y d o c t o r a l g u i d a n c e committee: Frank Camilleri, Tom Conner, Craig Harris, and Phil Marcus. The blend of their skil l s and knowledge became a reservoir of support that always proved to m e e t m y needs. D u r i n g the e x t e n d e d and t o r t u o u s j o u r n e y * toward m y doctorate, direction and help each of them at various that were essential times provided particular to my completing it. Coll e c ­ ti v e l y they exhibited a remarkable patience that was also crucial to ray obtaining my degree. I also Science. want to thank Gwen Andrew, Dean of the College of Soc i a l Her quiet, continual support of me in the administrative work by w h i c h I m a d e m y l i v i n g as the d i s s e r t a t i o n w a s w r i t t e n p r o v i d e d peace of mind essential to the writing process. I w a n t e s p e c i a l l y to e m p h a s i z e m y a p p r e c i a t i o n for Phil Marcus, who chaired m y guidance committee. Phil provided such a variety of profes­ s i o n a l a n d p e r s o n a l s u p p o r t d u r i n g the e n t i r e d e g r e e p r o c e s s that I c a n n o t t h a n k h i m p r o p e r l y in a d e c e n t l y a b b r e v i a t e d a c k n o w l e d g m e n t . A m o n g the m o s t i m p o r t a n t things he p r o v i d e d w e r e the e l e m e n t s of the ideas that I shaped into m y dissertation research, unremitting reassur­ a n c e that a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e s s e s b e y o n d m y c o n t r o l w o u l d turn out properly so long as I did my part of the work, tive balance of n a g g i n g and b e n i g n n e g l e c t . and a remarkably effec­ F o r those c o u n t l e s s o t h e r types of support, and for the d e g r e e obtained under your tutelage: thank you, iii Phil. things, for I h a v e at last TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables Chapter 1. viii Introduction 1 A. The General Background of This Research 1. Systems Theory 2. Network Analysis 1 2 3 B. Boundaries around the Research 1. What Are "Social Services"? 2. What Does It Mean to "Improve the Delivery" of Social Services? 3. What Are the "Resources" of a Government Agency? 4. What Is a "Category of Constituents"? 4 4 6 9 10 The Context of Service Delivery 11 C. Chapter 2. A. A Discussion of Relevant, Previously Published Research 15 Systems Theory as an Orienting Framework 1. What Are Systems? 2. Levels of Systems 3. The Analysis of Adaptive Systems 4. What Levels of Social Systems Are What Types of System? 20 B. Social Network Analysis 1. The Basic Decisions in Network Research 2. Data Collection Issues in Network Research 3. Measures of Network Characteristics 4. The Number of Entities Considered at Once 25 26 27 29 32 C. The Interaction of Organizational Characteristics and Dyad Formation 33 D. The Development of Dyadic Interaction 40 E. The Conditioning of Dyadic Relationships by Network Characteristics 48 iv 15 16 17 18 F. G. The Effect of the Local Environment on Social Service Delivery Network the Local The Effect of the Nonlocal Environment Social Service Delivery Network on the Local Chapter 3. Data, Assumptions, Hypotheses, and Analysis 53 60 Methods of 65 A. The Data Available from the Study 65 B. General Assumptions 1. Practical Consequences 2. Theoretical Conjectures 3. The Adequacy of the Network Data 70 70 72 77 C. The and 1. 2. 3. 80 80 83 89 Interaction of Organizational Characteristics Dyad Formation Theoretical Explication Data and Method of Analysis Specific Hypotheses D. The Development of Dyadic Interaction 1. Theoretical Explication 2. The Data and Method of Analysis 3. Specific Hypothesis E. The Conditioning of Dyadic Relationships by Network Characteristics 1. Theoretical Explication 2. Data and Method of Analysis 3. Specific Hypotheses 98 98 101 106 The Effect of the Local Environment on Social Service Delivery Network 1. Theoretical Explication 2. The Data and Method of Analysis 3. Specific Hypothesis 107 107 108 111 F. G. the Local The Effect of the Nonlocal Environment on the Local Social Services Delivery Network 1. Theoretical Explication 2. Data and Method of Analysis 3. Specific Hypothesis Chapter 4. A. 92 92 94 97 Findings 112 112 113 114 115 The Interaction of Organizational Characteristics and Dyad Formation 1. The Relationship of Size to Complexity 2. The Relationship of Size to I0R Formation 3. The Relationship of Complexity to IOR Formation v 115 115 117 118 4. 5. The Relationship of Innovation to Other Variables The Relationship between IOR Formation and Internal Organizational Variables 120 122 B. The Development of Dyadic Interaction C. The Conditioning of Dyadic Relationships by Network Characteristics 1. The Effect of Relationships with Influential Organizations 2. The Relationship of Influence Concentration to the Formation of Organizational Relationships 3. The Relationship of Influence Concentration to Dyadic Multiplexity 133 The Effect of the Local Environment on the Local Social Service Network 134 The Effect of the Nonlocal Environment on the Local Social Service Delivery Network 138 D. E. Chapter 5. A. B. C. Summary of Findings and Recommendations Summary of Findings 1. Internal Organizational Variables 2. Interorganizational Dyad Development 3. The Effect of Interorganizational Networks on Dyad Formation and Content 4. The Impact of the Local Environment on Social Service Networks 5. Connection to the National Environment 6. Overall Summary Recommendations for Further Research Recommendations to Agencies Intervening to Improve Social Service Delivery List of References Appendix A-l. 127 127 131 142 142 144 145 147 148 149 149 150 152 155 Survey Instrument — Part A: Interviewer Questionnaire Appendix A-2. List of Influences on Social Appendix A-3. Survey Instrument — Part B: Additional Agency Head Perceptions Appendix A-4. 124 Survey Instrument — Service Agencies Part C: Client, Personnel, and Budget Information vi 167 185 186 200 Appendix B. Metropolitan Area Variables Available 206 Appendix C. Tables of Correlations for Cities 219 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 2C-1 The Aiken-Hage Independent Variables and Their Zero-Order Correlations with Number of Joint Programs 34 Table 2C-2 Path Coefficients in Paulson's Model 37 Table 3F-1 Variable Loadings on SES Factor 110 Table 4A-1 The Relationship of Size to Complexity 116 Table 4A-2 The Relationship of Size to I0R Formation 117 Table 4A-3 The Relationship of Complexity to IOR Formation 119 Table 4A-4 The Relationships of Innovation to Other Variables 121 The Relationships of IOR to Internal Organizational Variables 124 Table 4B-1 Guttman Scalability for Three Types of Links 126 Table 4C-1 Positive Correlations between Ties to Influentials and Ties to Non-Influentials for Non-influential Organizations 129 Positive Correlations between Ties to Influentials and Ties to Non-Influentials for Influential Organizations 130 Correlations of Influence Concentration with Density of Dyad Formation among Non-Influential Organizations 132 Regression of Population T u r n o v e r , Economic Dispersion, Ethnic Heterogeneity, and SES on Influence Concentration in Social Service Networks 135 Correlations of the Number of External Ties with Influence Concentration and Interactive Density in Social Service Networks 139 Table 4A-5 Table 4C-2 Table 4C-3 Table 4D-1 Table 4E-1 viii Tables In Appendix: Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table C-l C-2 C-3 . C4-1 C4-2 C4-3 C4-4 C4-5 Table C4-6 Table C4-7 Table C5-1 Table C5-2 Table C5-3 Table C5-4 The Relationship of Size to the Twelve Cities Complexity in The Relationship of Size to in the Twelve Cities IOR Formation The Relationship of Size to in the Twelve Cities IOR Formation 219 220 221 The Relationship of Innovation to Size in the Twelve Cities 222 The Relationship of Innovation in the Twelve Cities to Complexity 223 The Relationship of Innovation in the Twelve Cities to IOR The Relationship of Innovation In the Twelve Cities to Centralization 224 225 The Relationship of Innovation to Internal Communication in the Twelve Cities 226 The Relationship of Innovation to Formalization in the Twelve Cities 227 The Relationship of Innovation to Efficiency in the Twelve Cities 228 The Relationship of IOR Formation to Centralization in the Twelve Cities 229 The Relationship of IOR Formation to Internal Communication in the Twelve Cities 230 The Relationship of IOR Formaation to Formalization in the Twelve Cities 231 The Relationship of IOR Formation to Efficiency in the Twelve Cities 232 ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION A. During the 1960's ticularly Society" The General Background of This Research the availability of federal government money (par­ t h r o u g h the v a r i o u s p r o g r a m s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the "Great legislation enacted at contributed the urging of then-President Johnson) to a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of s o c i a l s e r v i c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and experiments with a wide variety of interorganizational arrangements for service delivery. Accompanying this increase in the number and variety of p r o g r a m s was a l a r g e amo u n t of r e s e a r c h on the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , relationships, and effectiveness of social service agencies. The gradual diminution in funds a v a i l a b l e for social service programs, and for social science research generally, curtailed research on social services drastically; by 1980 practically no such work was being pub­ l i s h e d in m a i n l i n e s o c i o l o g i c a l jo u r n a l s . I s s u e s raised in the re­ search of that period, however, were not resolved and remain important: the functioning of and interrelationships among social service agencies are of v i t a l concern to tens of mil l i o n s of Americans and hundreds of m i l l i o n s of p e o p l e w o r l d - w i d e . thought — r elevant In a d d i t i o n , two o n g o i n g str e a m s of one theoretical and the other methodological — to twenty years are directly the types of problems addressed in the research of ten to ago. 1 1. Systems Theory The t h e o r e t i c a l s t r e a m of thought, s y s t e m s theory, assumptions about the workings of social structure. is a b a c k d r o p of These assumptions are imbedded in a substantial proportion of the literature about organ­ izations and interorganizational relations. Unfortunately this liter­ ature contains more debate about the value and manner of application of "the systems approach", and more g e n e r a l l y benign nods in the direction of its jargon, than it does careful models of particular social systems (or parts of social systems) and tests of A good social those models. s y s t e m m o d e l m u s t s t ate the l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s u n d e r consideration, define the relevant variables at each l e v e l of analysis, and s p e c i f y the e x p e c t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s a m o n g the v a r i a b l e s at each l e v e l and between adjacent levels. C o n s t r u c t i n g s u c h a m o d e l for a social system of any meaningful size is o b v i o u s l y an enormous task, and this very enormity helps explain the paucity of serious attempts. That t a s k is n o n e t h e l e s s n e c e s s a r y if a t h e o r y of s o c i e t y is to be built; and this dissertation is Intended as a step in that direction. The va r iables used in this dissertation are taken from five leve l s of analysis: (1) individual organizations, relationships, local (3) networks community, (2) dyadic interorganizational of interorganizational relationships in a (4) the l o c a l community environment, and (5) larger environment (here conceived as the national system). the The major­ it y of the p r e d i c t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s a m o n g v a r i a b l e s c r o s s l e v e l s of analysis. Cross-level predictions are more central of a systems model to the development than are predictions within a single level, since 3 each level serves as the Immediate environment for operations in the l e v e l below. 2. The methodological Network Analysis stream of thought, network analysis, has developed sufficiently that it provides several useful tools for examining rela­ tionships among entities defined at any lev e l of analysis. research done ten to twenty years ago on social Most of the service agencies con­ t a i n e d a s p e c t s of n e t w o r k a n a l y s i s in at l e a s t r u d i m e n t a r y form, b e ­ cause most researchers came to realize cies were crucial to understanding that relationships among agen­ the functioning both of individual agencies and of the social service system as a whole. For a n e t w o r k a n a l y s i s to be c o n s t r u c t i v e , not m e r e l y suggestive, propositions must specify network processes, p a r t i c u l a r l y across le v e l s of a n a l y s i s . and report certain tics S p e c i f i c a l l y , for e x a m p l e , it is not e n o u g h to p re d i c t that certain organizational tendencies in dyad formation; characteristics the correlate with organizational characteris­ themselves must be interpreted in network terms so that a common fabric of explanation links phenomena internal and izations. external to organ­ S i m ilarly the local and extra-local environmental variables that are expected to relate to organizational network variables must be interpreted in network terms in the explanation of the predicted rela­ tionships variables and the obtained findings. p e r se m u s t h a v e c a r e f u l l y explicated. Variables that are not network their e f f e c t s u p o n n e t w o r k f u n c t i o n i n g In this dissertation, central to the o t h e r common the the analysis construction and levels language testing of hypotheses. of a n a l y s i s are c h o s e n and of report of findings of interorganizational explanation ties the entire networks is Variables at i n t e r p r e t e d so that a set of hypotheses and together. B. Boundaries around the Research The data reported in this dissertation were gathered federal government in response to a request for research on the coordination of mental h e a l t h s e r v i c e s to the a g ing ( N I M H g r a n t # 31898-02). gathered in the summer and f a l l of 1979, The d a t a were and analysis has been ongoing since 1980. A g e n e r a l i z e d v e r s i o n of the c o n c e r n that p r o m p t e d the p r o j e c t from which this dissertation is derived is reflected in this question: can a f e d er a l or s t a t e a g e n c y b e s t use its r e s o u r c e s to i m p r o v e the d e l i v e r y of (some) constituents? How social A careful s e r v ice(s) definition of to some c a t e g o r y (ies) of its the elements of that question w i l l delineate some boundaries for the research reported 1. here. What Are "Social Services"? The analysis in this dissertation Includes o nly individual services and not c o l l e c t i v e ones. Collective services, those defined with reference to the g e n e r a l w e l f a r e , i n c l u d e a r m e d forces, a m o n e t a r y and ban k i n g system, police and fire departments, prisons, water mains. Individual 5 s e r v i c e s , those d e f i n e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the s p e c i f i c needs of p a r ­ ticular people, i n c l u d e p r o v i s i o n of food, clothing, and s h e l t e r , haircuts, access to a counselor, enrollment in a vocational course. The distinction di v i d u a l is primarily a matter services become a c o l l ective of perspective. service, and Aggregated organizations de­ fined for co l l e c t i v e service provide individual services. tive service we c a l l a fire department, bilities, u s u a l l y provides thoroughly a collec t i v e the individual service as The collec­ in carrying out its responsi­ fire-fighting equipment if someone c a lls So in­ service of responding with to say his the armed house is on fire. forces occasionally m a k e h e a d l i n e s w h e n their f a c i l i t i e s are u s e d to h e l p c i t i z e n s with urgent personal needs. The t e r m " s o c i a l social s e r v i c e s " i m p l i e s a complementary category of "non­ services". When considering t i n c t i o n is p o i n t l e s s . individual services, such a dis­ At a p a r t i c u l a r time, in a p a r t i c u l a r place, some material good or personal service may seem so luxurious or harmful as to be c o m p l e t e l y b e y o n d the c o n n o t a t i o n of the term "social s e r ­ vices"; tives. ly but different times and places might offer different perspec­ Providing snowmobiles to Michigan hunters might seem an unlike­ project snowmobiles for the Michigan Department of Social Services; providing to Inuit hunters might be a quite sensible project for the equivalent Alaska agency. Thus w h i l e a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n w i l 1 i m p o s e l i m i t s on w h a t can be considered a social service, providing any material good or personal 6 service to individuals is potentially a social service. In this dis­ sertation, social services in any particular situation w i l l be assumed to Include the provision of a l l material goods and personal services that an intervening government agency is concerned about. 2. What Does It Mean to "Improve the Delivery" of Social Services? In this dissertation improvements in social service de l i v e r y w ill be defined on two dimensions. a. The f i rst d i m e n s i o n is the e x p a n s i o n of e x i s t i n g s e r v i c e capability, i n c l u d i n g c r e a t i o n of s e r v i c e s not c u r r e n t l y delivered. This dimension A i k e n et al. (1975, pp. is contained 10-12) c a l l in the con c e p t the c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s of programs. b. T h e s e c o n d d i m e n s i o n is i m p r o v e m e n t of a c c e s s to services; tions, it involves ease of access and the r e s p o n s i v e n e s s a n d to existing service loca­ a c c o u n t a b i l ity of s e r ­ v i c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s to c l i e n t s ( A i k e n et al., 1975, pp. 13- 14; G i l b e r t and Specht, 1977, p. 56). One apparently obvious service dimension omitted here is the quality of service -- the actual effect of services on individual p r o j e c t on w h i c h this d i s s e r t a t i o n is b a s e d could be u s e d endemic The c o n t a i n e d no d a t a that to m e a s u r e this s e r v i c e d i m e n s i o n . to research on social service clients. delivery. S u c h o m i s s i o n is After discussing the difficulties of measuring service quality, Gilbert and Specht (1977, p. 57) conclude: "In the a b s e n c e of qualitative measures of program output, funding agencies must often settle for surrogate measures as c o n c r e t e m e a s u r e s sho w i n g numbers of staff delivering such the n u m b e r s of p r o g r a m s in opera t i o n , services, numbers of clients served, and the like." A thorough search of izational data relations the literature uncovered no study of interorgan­ among social service to measure effects of resulting agencies also gathered service arrangements on clients, or even client perceptions of those effects. fects of social that Statements about the ef­ service networks on clients must therefore be based on assumed relationships between client impact variables and variables at a higher level of analysis. Aldrich provided an illustration of such an a s s u m p t i o n in one a r t i c l e on his s t u d y of m a n p o w e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s (1976b, p. 238): " A l t h o u g h I h a v e no d i r e c t m e a s u r e s of c l i e n t w e l l being, I am proceeding with the analysis on the assumption that client w e l f a r e is a f f e c t e d by the ext e n t and n a t u r e of c o o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n organizations i n v o l v e d in the manpower training system." It is signif­ icant that the effects are left undefined. The a b s e n c e of s e r v i c e q u a l i t y in m e a s u r e s suggests an Important understanding: in a service d e l i v e r y system, clients are little more than grist in a m i l l tions that process them. seling services external agency must the composed of the organiza­ After working assiduously to establish coun­ for residents of a children's c a m e to this c o n c l u s i o n : for e v a l u a t i n g prog r a m s home, "As a c o n c e p t u a l point, think of its s e r v i c e s Crow (1970, p.121) it seems that an as b e i n g offered institution as opposed to the residents of that institution." to an There is good reason to argue that clients' perceptions and reactions as individuals are immaterial to the workings of social service d e l i v ­ ery systems. Whether or not an individual of no consequence unless organization that individual likes his/her treatment is can in some way convince an that h e r / h i s o p i n i o n m a t t e r s . In g e n e r a l , u n l e s s a client's part is taken by an organizational actor (such as an organiza­ tion of c l i e n t s , a parents' o r g a n i z a t i o n , or a p o l i t i c a l group) that client's concerns have no effect. The r e l a t i v e powerlessness of individual clients stems from the organ­ ization of funding for social services in our society. Clients are the source of l i t t l e or none of the funding given social service agencies; their s a t i s f a c t i o n agency unl e s s t h e r e f o r e does not a f f e c t a funding source becomes the concerned. were funded on the basis of a voucher system, livelihood If social as Warren (1971, of an services pp. 123- 4) once suggested, aggregate client demand could become the most impor­ tant factor in determining social service d e l i v e r y policies; and indi­ v i d u a l c l i e n t s a t i s f a c t i o n p r e s u m a b l y w o u l d b e c o m e a m a t t e r of m o r e concern. U n d e r the p r e s e n t system, t h ere is no c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n to include client satisfaction as a variable. The organizations additional that allocate resources within communities have concern relevant to the concept of "better service". In any community there are typically more demands an Since than available re­ sources can meet, better service means equivalent results for less cost — and an approach that leads to the concept of integrated service delivery to coordination of agency programs. In some discus s i o n s , 9 integrated service delivery and the efficiencies it presumably provides are taken for granted. (1971), however, A stream of thought introduced by W a r r e n suggests that comprehensiveness and accessibility for c l i e n t s m a y b e g r e a t e r w h e n s e r v i c e is n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l i n t e ­ gr a ted. In t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n the a m o u n t of i n t e g r a t i o n of s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y w i l l be treated as a dependent v a r i a b l e determined by features of a community, work; its environment, and its o v e r a l l social services net­ the e f f e c t a n y p a r t i c u l a r s e r v i c e i n t e g r a t i o n has on s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y w i l l be considered in the context of each separate analysis. Finally, a government agency providing resources may be interested in the aggregate effectiveness of the service: is the l e v e l of unmet need that provoked the response diminishing as a result of the service being provided? T his d i m e n s i o n , w h i c h t o u c h e s on the i s s u e s of h o w a need b e c o m e s d e f i n e d , who d e c i d e s what r e a c t i o n s are a p p r o p r i a t e , and who judges the r e s u l t s of those r e a c t i o n s , dissertation; but its and n e t w o r k a n a l y s i s essential political is b e y o n d nature means that the scope of this the systems that u n d e r l i e this d i s s e r t a t i o n w i l l What Are the "Resources" of a Government Agency? A government agency has three resources at its disposal that to this study: it m a y g r a n t (directly, or (1) m o n e y (or r e s o u r c e s to o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; through request organization; and (3) the power by administrative means a l s o be to its analysis. 3. evant theory of that are r e l ­ that w o u l d c o s t mo n e y ) (2) the power to cr e a t e to a n o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t agency) a n e w to regulate control in existing the case organizations of — lower-level 10 g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s , and by m e a n s of l a w e n f o r c e m e n t in the case of non-governmental organizations. Governments collected, also to have the p o wer transfer wealth to tax and, among b y m e a n s of the taxes categories of persons. Although these more general powers cle a r l y can be and are used to affect social service delivery, to analyze their impact w o u l d require data not c o l ­ lected in the research project on which this dissertation is based; so such powers w i l l not be considered here. 4. What is a "Category of Constituents"? The categorization of constituents is central i z a t i o n of a social s e r v i c e s system. to the political organ­ Two d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h e s ca t e g o r i z a t i o n provide quite different bases of p o w e r to for s e r v i c e recipients. In the f i r s t a p p r o a c h , characteristics and are then specified. significance: women, a c a t e g o r y is b a s e d o n n o n - s e r v i c e - r e l a t e d the service needs of individuals in the category Such categories typically have social or political blacks, Hispanics, inhabitants of the Sixth Ward. Because of this more general social or political significance, members of the category have, or potentially have, access to centers of politi­ cal power that can require social service organizations to change their d e l i v e r y behavior. equal footing with In such a situation clients are more nearly on an the social service organizations existing organizations can serve as intermediaries that serve for them. them: u In the s e c o n d a p p r o a c h , vicers) needed. a c a t e g o r y Is d e f i n e d Typically medical services, on the basis of s e r ­ mental health and vocational services are organized on this basis. categorization l e a v e s the c l i e n t group, services, This approach to t a k e n as a w h o l e , w i t h o u t organizational ties to political centers of power. In such a situation clients have a less than equal relationship with organizations provid­ ing services, since the very structure of the situation means service organizations define clients' needs -- or at means of meeting least that the the proper them. The analysis in this dissertation does not include political systems at any level, clients. so no hypotheses directly relate to the categorization of S u c h c a t e g o r i z a t i o n w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d o n l y in p r o p o s i n g further research on the effect of the local and national environment on community social service agency networks. C. The Context of Service D e l i v e r y Earlier five levels of analysis were identified for use in this disser­ tation: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. individual organizations; relationships between organizations (organizational dyads); networks of social service organizations; the local environment of the social service network; and the larger (national) environment of the social service network. The focal l e v e l of analysis in this dissertation w i l l be the network of relations among (level 3). agencies that deliver social services in a community 12 H i g h e r l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s are not the f o c u s b e c a u s e s o c i a l s e r v i c e s must be delivered where people are. Future communication and transpor­ tation systems may make it possible to d e l i v e r services at long range, or to gather clients from great distances for service. ever, most material goods and personal For now, how­ services are directly provided by loc al organizations. It is true that organizations at many l e v e l s affect service delivery at the local level. Local organizations of a l l sorts affect social ser­ vice d e l i v e r y through economic impact and political influence. al, state, national, and international organizations strongly Region­ affect the economic and political environments that surround local communities and their social service organizations, and in many cases more directly affect the community through a local office or branch. Yet no matter how significant organizations beyond the local be, level may no matter how highly variables at some other l e v e l may correlate with service d e livery at the local level, the effects of these organ­ izations and variables will be mediated through the activities of local organizations; and the aggregate effects of local organizational activ­ ities w i l l be mediated through the activities of the specific organiza­ tions p r o v i d i n g s o c i a l services. A n y i n t e r v e n i n g agent, therefore, must understand the functioning of the local social services network in a community if intervention — no matter at what l e v e l — Is to have a reasonable chance of accomplishing the outcomes the intervenor intends. 13 Aldrich, reporting his study of manpower York cities, concluded that l evel four training organizations in New (the local environment) was the m o s t a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l of a n a l y s i s (1972, p. 16): "...[L]ocal c o n d i ­ tions are important determinants of actual manpower and related organizations. the relevant area...." level behavior of the network of These considerations of a n a l y s i s is the c o m m u n i t y , suggest that or m e t r o p o l i t a n His c o n c l u s i o n is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the focus h e r e on l e v e l three in two ways: (1) since the range of organizations he studied was m u c h n a r r o w e r than that st u d i e d for this d i s s e r t a t i o n , sidered "lo ca l conditions" included social service agencies ge ner a l l y ; what he c o n ­ the m a j o r i t y of the n e t w o r k of (2) if l o c a l conditions strongly affect social service network behavior, then intervention at that level must be informed by a careful explication of the consequences of vari­ ous local conditions for actual social service network behavior. Organizational behavior is not the focus of this dissertation because, at l e a s t for c i t i e s of the size stu d i e d , the n u m b e r of o r g a n i z a t i o n s capable of providing any given social service is large enough that the character here — of service delivery — at least on the two dimensions used depends on more than organizational characteristics. Similarly the n u m b e r of d y a d s amo ng s e r v i c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s is g r e a t e n o u g h that the effects of individual dyad charcteristics are swamped by the opera­ tion of the o v e r a l l system. Nearly two d e c a d e s ago W a r r e n i d e n t i f i e d the l o c a l network ( le v e l 3) social service as crucial to understanding social service delivery. Fo l l o w i n g research on social service d el i v e r y in three major cities, he 14 defined social the " i n t e r o r g a n i z a t l o n a l f i e l d " as a k e y s e r v i c e a g e n c y i n t e r a c t i o n (1967a, p. 308): to u n d e r s t a n d i n g "The c o n c e p t of interorganizatlonal field is based on the observation that the interaction b e t w e e n two o r g a n i z a t i o n s is a f f e c t e d , in p a r t at least, by the nature of the organizational pattern or network within which they find themselves." major This assessment was echoed by the executive manager of a project that was part of a national dinating social The analysis experiment service delivery (Buckman, in this dissertation, then, on ways of coor­ 1971, p. 30). will focuB on the network of relationships among those organizations in a community that are provid­ ing s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . To a r t i c u l a t e the fo r c e s that a f f e c t that n e t ­ w o r k a n d the e f f e c t s that n e t w o r k has, we w i l l l o o k at the impact of d y a d s on the n e t w o r k , the i m p a c t of b o t h l o c a l and non l o c a l and v i c e v e r s a , phenomena on that network, and the relationship between dyads and organizational characteristics. To provide a common framework for analysis, va r i a b l e s at a l l leve ls w i l l be interpreted in network terms. CHAPTER 2 A DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT. PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED LITERATURE The range of analysis in this dissertation is sufficiently great that a complete r e v i e w of all relevant literature w o u l d overshadow the report of the r e s e a r c h i ts e l f . The f o r m a t i o n of h y p o t h e s e s and the i n t e r ­ pretation of data i n v o l v e the orienting framework of systems theory and the methodological sizeable literature. framework of network analysis — each area having a The variables are from five l e v e l s of analysis — from individual organizations to the national system — and each leve l of analysis also encompasses an extensive literature. In m o s t of th ese s e v e n l i t e r a t u r e s o n l y one or a fe w key a r t i c l e s and/or books p r o v i d e d specific g uidance re vie w of the for this d i s s e r t a t i o n . The literature w i l l consist primarily of a detailed discus­ sion of these articles and books. Certain other articles and books will be mentioned as they relate to the central points of these key works. A. Systems Theory as an Orienting Framework The elements of a systems orientation were explored by Walter Buckley In Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (1967). A discussion of certain parts of Buckley's presentation w i l l provide the necessary introduction to the concepts used here. 15 16 1. B u c k l e y says (1967, What Are Systems? p. 41): "The k i n d of s y s t e m we are i n t e r e s t e d in m a y be d e s c r i b e d g e n e r a l l y as a c o m p l e x of e l e m e n t s or c o m p o n e n t s d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d in a c a u s a l n e t w o r k , s u c h that e ac h component is related to at least some others w a y w i t h i n a n y p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d of time." four ingredients central in a more or less stable Thi3 q u o t a t i o n sp e c i f i e s to the concept "system": (1) entities of some sort; (2) defined relations among the entities; (3) a causal quality to the relations — analysis of the effects generated in (through) the relations; (4) rel a t i v e stability to the relations. The first, se c o n d , and fou rth e l e m e n t s a re c o m m o n to a n y t h e o r e t i c a l model. D e f i n e d e n t i t i e s and r e l a t i o n s a m on g t h e m a r e n e c e s s a r y to d e s c r i b e an y p h e n o m e n a ; and r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y is a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l necessity: o n l y "relat ive ly stable" phenomena stay around long enough to be s tu d i e d , or are s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r om r a n d o m b a c k ­ ground signals to be noticed. (Obviously as observational tools im­ p r o v e in an y f i e l d , " r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y " r e q u i r e s l e s s d u r a t i o n and permits g r e a t e r variability.) The c r u c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t o r b e t w e e n a systems and a non-systems approach is ingredient three. For a model to r e p r e s e n t a system, it m u s t c o n t a i n m o r e t h a n t a x o n o m i c or c o r r e l a ­ tional connections. A systems model and explain whate ver is "going on" — must be constructed the m ot i v e forces. to describe 17 2. Buckley Identifies three Levels of Systems levels of complexity in systems models. He argues that social systems are inadequately described by the lower two levels — mechanical (equilibrium) and organlsmlc (homeostatic) models. They require Instead the most complex level: adaptive systems models. Equilibrium models, he defines, have "elements in mutual interrelation­ ships, which ma y be in a state of 'equilibrium', changes such that any moderate in the e l e m e n t s or t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s a w a y from the equilibrium position are counterbalanced by changes it" (p. 9). tending to restore T h e y d e s c r i b e "t y p e s of s y s t e m s w hic h , equilibrium point, typically lose organization, in m o v i n g to an and then tend to hold that m i ni mum l e v e l within r e l a ti vel y n arrow conditions of disturbance" (p. 40). " H o m e o s t a t i c m o d e l s a p p l y to s y s t e m s t e n d i n g to m a i n t a i n a given, r e l a t i v e l y high, level of organization against everpresent ten­ d e n c i e s to r e d u c e it" (p. 40). On the o t h e r hand, B u c k l e y says, "The c o m p l e x a d a p t i v e s y s t e m m o d e l applies to systems characterized by organization; ... they thrive on, the elaboration in fact depend on, 'variety' in the e n v i r o n m e n t " (p. 40). l e v e l s of analysis (p. 5). evolution of 'disturbances' and B u c k l e y a s s e r t s that a d a p t i v e s y s t e m s m o d e l s are nee d e d for the p s y c h o l o g i c a l , sociocultural and p h y l o g e n e t i c , and 18 3, Buckley is careful The Analysis of Adaptive Systems to say that "when we deal w i th the more open systems with a more flexible structure, the distinction between the boundaries and the environment becomes a more and more arbitrary matter, dependent on the p u r p o s e s of the o b s e r v e r " (p. 41). It is t h e r e f o r e m o r e u s e f u l to talk about an adaptive process, where a system and its environment are matched in such a way that the process becomes possible. Although a system may be capable of engaging in an adaptive process, its doing so depends on its location in an appropriate environment. H a w l e y (1981, p. 225) for e x a m p l e s u g g e s t s that the n a t u r e of a c o m ­ munity system the absence depends of change on the changeability it might be assumed approaches an equilibrium." In Buckley's of its that environment: the power distribution terms, without of the external environment the system becomes homeostatic. in his model of oligopolistic interfirm behavior, assumptions u [I]n the stimulus Similarly, Williamson's (1965) lead to an equilibrium arrangement when only his interfirm v a r i a b l e s are v ar i e d ; the e n v i r o n m e n t a l variable is the source of change in equilibrium point. Since a system cannot be determined to be adaptive s i m p l y b y e x a m i n i n g the s y s t e m i t s e l f , in Buckley's sense i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a d a p t i v e systems requires analysis of the adaptive processes that encompass both the systems and their environments. The key distinction to be made is between homeostatic and adaptive systems; so if adaptive systems cannot be identified without reference to their environments, then neither can homeostatic systems. The situation d e v o l v e s to this: if one identi- 19 fles an adaptive process, system; but if one then one has by definition found an adaptive identifies a homeostatic s y s t e m w i t h i n its e n ­ vironment, one cannot know whether the system is at best homeostatic or whether the environment contains too few "disturbances" and too little "variety" to cause the system to d isplay "the elaboration and evolution of organization" that is the defining characteristic of adaptive systems. There is also the difficulty, in trying to distinguish homeostatic from adaptive systems, of recognizing built-in d e v elo pm ent al sequences that o c c u r r e l a t i v e l y u n i f o r m l y in the p r e s e n c e of n e c e s s a r y conditions. Systems displaying such developmental sequences woul d show elaboration of organization of a sort that should be distinguished from the rela­ ti ve l y idiosyncratic development to be expected from an adaptive system in the presence of sufficient conditions. If then, one intends to make empirical distinctions between homeostatic and adaptive syst em s, k n o w l e d g e of the type of s y s t e m u n d e r s t u d y should be sufficiently advanced that some models of the developmental s e q u e n c e s of the s y s t e m h a v e a t t r a c t e d g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t am ong r e ­ searchers, ety of and that the behavior of specimens of the system in a v ar i­ environments have been described and modeled in detail (which would require some theoretical framework for specifying relevant dimen­ sions of environments). Yet the study of organizations, the level of a n a l y s i s u s e d in this d i s s e r t a t i o n that has the g r e a t e s t v o l u m e of literature, is so little advanced that it is s t i l l meaningful to write a beginning taxonomy (McKelvey, 1982). 20 For Buckley's distinctions structure, therefore, to be meaningful in an one must assume the lev e l analysis of social of system exemplified by entities at a certain le vel of analysis, and use the fruitfulness of the o v e r a l l model that Includes one's assumptions as an indirect test of the c o r r e c t n e s s of the a s s u m p t i o n s . One c a n n o t expect, at this stage of social science, to find or de v e l o p precise measures to distin­ guish examples of homeostatic and adaptive systems. 4. What Levels of Social Systems Are What Types of System? In g e n e r a l , tended s o c i o l o g i s t s ' c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s of s o c i a l to be homeostatic. Hawley, for example, sys t e m s h a v e says (1981, p. 3A0): "It Is important to recognize, moreover, that a social system is a l o o s e l y k n i t fab r i c of r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In c o n s e q u e n c e there is a certain amount of independent varia bil it y among the interdependent parts. But fl exibility of this nature should not be t a k e n for c h a n g e a b i l i t y . On the c o n t r a r y , it is just that flex ibi li ty which enables a structure of relationships to withstand random shifts and pressures. Too great a rigidity wo u l d subject a system to a continuous risk of destruction in an unstable environment." At the organizational 150) n o t e level th ree c u r r e n t s of analysis, of th o u g h t on changes in populations of organizations: Hannan and Freeman (1984, structural that individual organizations change little; which assumes that individ ual o r g a n i z a t i o n s o r d e r to a d a p t to their e n v i r o n m e n t s ; assumes that individual organizations response to their environments. behavioral (1) population ecology, which assumes that changes occur because new organizations and and p. replace old ones, (2) rational change change, s i g n i f i c a n t l y in and (3) r a n d o m change, w h i c h change significantly but not in Only the second of these is consistent with the v i e w that organizations can be adaptive systems. 21 The first view, tions are which is consistent with an assumption that organiza­ homeostatic Stinchcombe (1965), systems, is supported by diverse writers. examining the pattern of organizational founding in recent history, concluded, "The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n v e n t i o n s t ha t c a n be m a d e at a p a r ­ ticular time in history depend on the social technology a v a i l ­ a b l e at the time. Organizations which h av e purposes that can be efficiently reached with the s o c i a l l y p o s s i b l e o r g a n i z a ­ t i o n a l f o r m s tend to be f o u n d e d d u r i n g the p e r i o d in w h i c h they have become possible. Then, both because they can func­ tion e f f e c t i v e l y with those organizational forms, and because the forms tend to become institutionalized, the basic struc­ ture of the organization tends to remain r e l a t i v e l y stable" (p. 133). E m e r y a n d T r i s t (1965), h a v i n g s t u d i e d firms and individual they op e r a t e d farmers in postwar Great Britain, in a " t u r b u l e n t " e n v i r o n m e n t : p r o p e r t i e s a r i s e no t s i m p l y organizations, the d i f f i c u l t i e s of c a n n i n g but also one itself"; so that in w h i c h " dy n a m i c f r o m the i n t e r a c t i o n from the field concluded of the c o m p o n e n t that for organiza­ tions in the e n v i r o n m e n t , "[tjhe c o n s e q u e n c e s w h i c h f l o w f r o m their a c t i o n s l e a d off in w a y s that b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y u n p r e d i c t a b l e ..." (p. 275). They further c o ncluded that o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the m o d e r n w o r l d c a n n o t p o s s i b l y o b t a i n e n o u g h i n f o r m a t i o n to p r e d i c t the con­ s e q u e n c e s of thei r a ct i o n s , and that the s t a b i l i z a t i o n of o r g a n i z a ­ tional beha vio r w i l l val u e s which w i l l institutionalize have to come from the develo pme nt of a new set of relate organizations the organizations to the wider society and thus (p. 279). E m e r y an d Trist's c o n c l u s i o n is e c h o e d by H a n n a n and F r e e m a n t h e m ­ selves: favors "Selection in populations of organizations in modern societies forms with high reliability of performance and high levels of 22 a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " (1984, p. 154). T h e y go on to c o n t e n d (p. 155) that M [s] e l e c t i o n w i t h i n p o p u l a t i o n s of organizations in modern societies favors organizations whose structures have high inertia." Such a perception apparently underlay one of the most sophisticated models of organizational behavior developed to date, that of Hummon, Doreian, and T e u t e r (1975); f o r t h ei r m a t h e m a t i c a l m o d e l b u i l d s in an e x p l i c i t l y homeostatic process. Work consistent with the assumption that organizations are homeostatic systems does not represent a single research stream. Hannan and Freeman's particular theoretical framework has, however, precipitated a s i z e a b l e a m o u n t of r e p o r t e d r e s e a r c h in the p a s t d e c a d e ( F r e e m a n and Hannan, 1975, Hannan Brittain and Freeman, Carroll, 1983; and 1977; Hannan 1980; Carroll and Delacroix, 1983; Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan, and Carroll, and Freeman, 1982); 1978; Delacroix and 1983; Freeman and Hannan, 1984). The second perspective, just Freeman, that organizations d eli be r a t e l y change to ad­ to t h e ir e n v i r o n m e n t s , is c o n s i s t e n t with an a s s u m p t i o n that o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e a d a p t i v e systems. D i l l (1958) c o n d u c t e d an e a r l y study examining e n v i r o n m e n t a l e f f e c t s on o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e and functioning. The two businesses he studied both confronted significant c h a n g e s in t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t s , but one f l o u r i s h e d and the o t h e r d e ­ clined. Dill detailed several factors in the environments and struc­ tures of the two organizations that interacted results; his a n a l y s i s suggested to produce the different that management practices contribute greatly to an organization's ability to react to its environment. 23 This theme was elaborated by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in their report of th e i r 1963 s t u d y of some U. S. f i rms in the p l a s t i c s , s t a n d a r d i z e d container, and consumer food industries. They rejected the notion that there is a single best way to organize, and their data supported their contention that different organizational practices and best suited to different environments (in their study, a whole stood for the environment). Although structures are the industry as their data did not v i d e a n y b a s i s for s e l e c t i n g a r a t i o n a l c h o i c e m o d e l population ecology model rational choice model to explain their results, -- contingency theory — pro­ r a t h e r than a they did develop a which assumed that or­ g a n i z a t i o n s c o u l d and w o u l d use i n f o r m a t i o n to a d a p t t h e m s e l v e s to their environments. C h i l d (1972) e l a b o r a t e d b a s i c c o n t i n g e n c y theory with his concept of "strategic choice": in a n the deliberate o r g a n i z a t i o n as to w h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n o u g h t to be. choices of the "dominant coalition" the s t r u c t u r e a n d p r e f e r e n c e of the His d e s c r i p t i o n of c o a l i t i o n a l st r u g g l e , however, an example Freeman, does not tie the outcome to conditions in the environment. The weight of the third perspective identified by Hannan and of e v i d e n c e to d a t e is that o r g a n i z a t i o n s in d i f f e r e n t environments differ significantly, but there is no decisive evidence to compel a choice between a homeostatic and an adaptive systems model of organizations. W ha t can be said is that no research demonstrates p a t t e r n s of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e that c a n n o t be e x p l a i n e d by a homeostatic model, and that the most active current stream of research on the relationship between organizational variables and organizational 24 environment is grounded in a theory (population ecology) that presumes organizations are not adaptive systems. No research on organizational dyads provides a good test of the useful** ness of a homeostatic versus an adaptive systems model. Most research i n v o l v i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d y a d s u s es th eir p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e as a varia bl e in studies focussed on other l e v e l s of analysis. Individual s t u d i e s f o c u s s i n g on d y a d s as the o b j e c t of r e s e a r c h c o n t a i n a s s u m p ­ tions m o r e particular n e a r l y consistent with one m o d e l studies relevant or th e other, to this dissertation w i l l have and the those as­ sumptions identified in the discussion of those studies. The s i t u a t i o n is o n l y a l i t t l e b e t t e r w i t h r e s p e c t organizations. to n e t w o r k s of W h i l e some s t u d i e s consider the environments of net­ works, there are none that directly test hypotheses about the relation­ ship between network characteristics and environmental variables. The conclusion from one study of interrelationships among government agen­ ci e s in n i n e M i s s o u r i c o u n t i e s c o n t a i n e d this interesting statement, however (Benson et al., pp. 124-5): "[ I j t s h o u l d n o t be a s s u m e d that a s y s t e m of i n t e r a g e n c y relationships (even the relative ly small one studied here) is s u b j e c t , to any l a r g e degree, to r a t i o n a l m a n i p u l a t i o n and control. Clearly, some of the variables we have identified are s u s c e p t i b l e to some de gr e e of r a t i o n a l manipulation.... H o w e v e r , it s eems l i k e l y that the l i m i t s of s u c h r a t i o n a l manipulation and control are quite restrictive.... If we take too n a r r o w a v i e w of the p r o b l e m we m a y o v e r e s t i m a t e our capacities as social analysts and change-agents." A h o m e o s t a t i c sy stem, no m a t t e r what its c o m p l e x i t y , is u l t i m a t e l y understandable and rationally c o nt ro lla ble because its operations are 25 finite. Benson and his colleagues therefore point toward the conclu­ sion that networks of organizations can be considered adaptive systems. The q u e s t i o n of the l e v e l of s y s t e m m o d e l a p p r o p r i a t e to l o c a l and national environments need not be investigated for this dissertation. Sinc e the f o c a l l e v e l of a n a l y s i s is the n e t w o r k of s o c i a l s e r v i c e agencies in a community, whether the entities at the lev el s above are h o m e o s t a t i c or a d a p t i v e has no b e a r i n g on t h e i r e ff e c t on the foc al level. The only issue is the complexity of those environments relative to the local social service networks, and that issue must be addressed I n d i v i d u a l l y for each city. B. Social Network Analysis The concept "network" Is intuitively straightforward: "a set of units (or nodes) of some kind and the relations of specific types that occur among them" (Alba, 1982, p. 42). Some version of the concept is inevi­ t a b l e in the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of any type of p h e n o m e n o n at any l e v e l of analysis once the focus of research turns from the characteristics of entitles to the nature of connections among the entities. Social network analysis has two u n d e r p i n n i n g tradit ion s. The first, sociometry, was introduced by Moreno (1934) and d eveloped over the next 25 years primarily In the context of small group analysis. Advanced mathematical approaches to the data were introduced as early as 1949 by Festinger. group l e v e l The beginning of social network analysis beyond the small Is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h Barnes' r e p o r t of his 195 2-3 st u d y of 26 the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e of a N o r w e g i a n i s l a n d p a r i s h (1954). earlier writers are cited (particularly Siramel (1908)), Although Barnes' article initiated anthropological work in which the metaphor of a network began to take s h a p e as a w o r k i n g tool. graph theory (Harary, A d e c a d e l a t e r , the a p p l i c a t i o n of Cartwright, and Norman, 1965) and the exploration of bias parameters in comparing random networks (Fararo and Sunshine, 1964) had laid to actual network data a met hodological foundation for systematic sociological exploration. 1. The Basic Decisions in Network Resarch The most basic decision in undertaking a network analysis is the defin­ ition of boundaries. The world populations of persons and organiza­ tions are c o m p le tel y linked, as illustrated by Milgrara's "small world" research (Milgram, 1970). 1967; Travers and Milgram, G i v e n this complete linkage, 1969; Korte and Milgram, any social network analysis must be b a s e d on a s u b n e t w o r k : a s u b p o p u l a t i o n of e n t i t i e s d e f i n e d on the basis of one or more characteristics, or a subset of linkages chosen on the basis of one or more criteria. beginning; population, describing Barnes recognized this issue in the the interpersonal he observed (1954, connections linking his study pp. 43-44): "A n e t w o r k of this k i n d has no e x t e r n a l b o u n d a r y , n o r has it a n y c l e a r - c u t i n t e r n a l divisions.... C e r t a i n l y there are c l u s t e r s of p e o p l e w h o are m o r e c l o s e l y l i n k e d than others, but in general the limits of the clusters are vague." The underlying danger, discussed at some 45) and by Laumann, Marsdon, length by A l b a (1982, pp. 43- and Prensky (1983), is that arbitrary se­ l e c t i o n of e n t i t i e s and l i n k s for s t u d y c a n e a s i l y o m i t o t h e r s w h o se 27 importance to the subnetwork is greater than many of those selected. primary responsibility of a network researcher, then, A is to show that the subnetwork selected for study is m e a n i n g f u l l y bounded for purposes of the study. The second pivotal is sue in n e t w o r k r e s e a r c h (strandedness) of relationships: entities. the number and The m ul ti p l e x i t y of relationships is the m u l t i p l e x i t y types of links between is worth studying in its o w n right, s i n c e it p r o v i d e s a c l u e to the o v e r a l l s t r e n g t h of ties b e t w e e n e n t i t i e s ( K a p f ere r, 1969; G r a n o v e t t e r , 1973); but in g e n e r a l the problem is choosing what links to record in order best to study the phenomena on which the research is focussed. tion relating the particular linkages A well-re as one d explica­ chosen to the substance of the r e s e a r c h is rare in the s o c i a l n e t w o r k l i t e r a t u r e ; in the a b s e n c e of such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n it is d i f f i c u l t to k n o w just what it is that has been measured. determining Bu rt (1983) has d e t a i l e d a p r e t e s t i n g t e c h n iq ue, for o ve r l a p in linkage concepts within individual human sub­ p o p u l a t i o n s , t ha t p e r m i t s the s e l e c t i o n of q u e s t i o n s m o s t l i k e l y to obtain the information wanted by a researcher. 2. Data Collection Issues in Network Research Once a subpopulation among which to examine pects of relationships lems relationships, to be measured, h a v e been defined, in the collection of data must be addressed. One and the as­ knotty prob­ central concern is the source of data: typically social network data have been gathered by asking participants in the network to provide information. K i l l w o r t h and Bernard have done a series of studies, however, that call 28 into serious question how c losely linkages correspond and Bernard, 1976; Informants' attributions of network to objective measures of those linkages (Killworth Bernard and Killworth, 1977; Kilworth and Bernard, 1979; B e r n a r d , K i l l w o r t h , and S ai l e r , 1980; Be r n a r d , K i l l w o r t h , and Sailer, 1981). structural tive data features are the same sets underscores untenable data sets, Burt and Bittner (1981) reason convincingly that basic that Kill wor th the fact that earlier naive and Bernard analyzed; but and objec­ the exchange the Kill wor th and Bernard research has made assumptions and has forced more tions under which attributional tive in both the attributional about the isomorphism of sophisticated assessment of the two the condi­ can safely be used in place of objec­ data. A second, r e l a t e d m a j o r c o n c e r n is the w o r k i n g d e f i n i t i o n of a l i n k between two entities. When objective measures are used, this concern is p r i m a r i l y a m a t t e r of d e f i n i t i o n ; but w h e n i n f o r m a n t s are used to identify the relationships in which they are involved, tion of reciprocity becomes problematic: does a network link exist if e i t h e r p a r t y r e p o r t s it, or o n l y if b o t h do? Fararo and Sunshine, 1964) use the interpreta­ Some s t u d i e s (such as the proportion of reciprocated choices as d a t a in its o w n right; b u t mo st n e t w o r k r e s e a r c h does not i n v o l v e s u c h q u e s t i o n s , and the d e c i s i o n on u n r e c i p r o c a t e d c h o i c e s is ofte n made with no particular justification and without regard to the dangers shown by Bernard and Killworth's research. In this dissertation, t i c u l a r c h o i c e s to use one or the o t h e r d e f i n i t i o n w i l l (and explained answered. par­ be b as e d on in the context of) the particular question that must be This concern w i l l prove important in the study of very large 29 n e t w o r k s w h o s e siz e r e q u i r e s s a m p l i n g ; e x p l o r a t i o n of this a r e a has o n l y recently begun (Granovetter, Erickson and Nosunchuck, 1976; B e n i g e r , 1976; Burt, 1981; 1983). A t h i r d m a j o r d e c i s i o n is the level of d a t a to be c o l l e c t e d . The s o c i a l n e t w o r k r e s e a r c h l i t e r a t u r e a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y c o n s i s t s of studies based on binary data — or it doesn't — although a link between entities either exists some major computer n e t w o r k a n a l y s i s ( N E G O P Y (Richards, permit a range of values data are o b v iou sl y programs to be associated with network links. that differ drastically in duration, for 1975) and STRUCTURE (Burt, 1977)) poor measures of relationships. frequency -- to name av a i l a b l e volume Binary They equate links of resource exchange, and three dimensions that o b v i o u s l y affect the actual workings of any social network. Binary data, nevertheless, are simpler to collect; and the lev el of graph theory that has provided many of the mathematical t o o l s for n e t w o r k a n a l y s i s result, most studies (including based), use binary data. 3. a s s u m e s b i n a r y data. As a the one on which this dissertation is Measures of Network Characteristics A n u m b e r of m e a s u r e s of n e t w o r k s c a n be s u b s u m e d u n d e r the c o n c e p t connectedness. When the focus is on an individual refers to the existence (and length) of chains of entity, this concept connections between that e n t i t y a n d o t h e r e n t i t i e s of i n t e r e s t (an e g o c e n t r i c network). When comparing entire networks, one compares them on the distribution of chains relating pairs of entities or types of entitles. Many early social network studies dealt with egocentric networks and their zones: 30 first-order focussed (those entities second-order zones linked directly the entity to the entity f o c u s s e d on v i a e n t i t i e s in the f i r s t - o r d e r zone), etc. (See Barnes' discussion Mitchell (1969).) of network Such work (those entities to linked (1969) on), z ones analysis is less and the various frequent now. studies Measures in relevant to c o n n e c t e d n e s s i n c l u d e the d i a m e t e r (the g r e a t e s t n u m b e r of l i n k s necessary to connect two entities in a network), average distance (the m e a n n u m b e r of l i n k s b e t w e e n p airs of e n t i t i e s in the network), and density (the number of direct links divided by the number of pairs of en tities). An i m p o r t a n t s t r e a m of r e s e a r c h on p a t t e r n s in c o n n e c t e d n e s s has i n ­ volved the d e f i n i t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n of v a r i o u s network formation. forms of bias in The concept of bias refers in general to a tendency for certain types of linkage patterns to occur more often than would be expected if network links were generated in simple random fashion. A, B, and C represent entities in a network, If then: — r e c i p r o c i t y b i a s is a t e n d e n c y for c h o i c e s accompanied by choices from B to A; from A to B to be -- transitivity bias is a tendency for choices from A to B and from B to C to be accompanied by choices from A to C; — sibling bias Is a tendency for choices from A to B and from A to C to be accompanied b y choices from B to C and C to B; — inbreeding bias is a tendency for members of predefined aggregates of e n t i t i e s to c h o o s e othe rs w i t h i n t h e i r a g g r e g a t e rat h e r than those outside it. Fararo and Sunshine (1964) provided a good description of bias general­ l y (PP* 11-30), and of r e c i p r o c a t i o n and s i b l i n g bias in p a r t i c u l a r (pp. 25-27). bias. Fararo (1981) discussed both of these and also inbreeding 31 Another category centrality. of Important network measures W i t h r e s p e c t to an i n d i v i d u a l is measures of e nt i t y , the c o n c e p t of centrality is Intuitively obvious, although examination has shown that there are m u l t i p l e m e a s u r e s w i t h d i f f e r e n t i m p l i c a t i o n s . In ent ire n e t w o r k s , m e a s u r e s of c e n t r a l i t y h a v e to do w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n of centrality measures for entities. Linton Freeman (1977, the basic exploration of measures of centrality, at 1979) has done length concluding that betweenness (placement on chains of links between other entities) is the best (Freeman, Hoede, and Mulho lla nd, 1980). A l a r g e l i t e r a t u r e has d e v e l o p e d a r o u n d the c o n c e p t of p o s i t i o n and m e t h o d s of d e t e r m i n i n g e n t i t i e s network. that share a common position The first wide ly used algorithm for detecting in a jointly occu­ pied p o s i t i o n s in n e t w o r k s was p u b l i s h e d by H a r r i s o n W h i t e (White, Boorman, and Breiger, 1976; been explored in detail Boorman and White, 1976). The concept has in numerous articles by Burt (see Burt, 1982, for a summary of his initial work and a complete bibliography), and has provoked a plethora of methodological basic concept and substantive is that entities with identical work are eq uiv ale nt for purposes of analysis. articles. sets of links The in a net­ Methodological work has focussed on efficient mechanisms for detecting such sets of equivalent entities, and on the consequences of relaxing in linkage required at describing to define equivalence. the equivalence s o r t e d networks. structures the degree of similarity Substantive work has aimed (called blockmodels) of as­ 32 4. The Number of Entities Considered at Once In general, network studies are concentrated in two levels of analysis: the dyadic link that is the basic unit of information, s t r u c t u r e of the n e t w o r k u n d e r consideration. n or m a l l y are based on statistical tional counts. than two, measures and the ove r a l l Whole network studies derived from dyadic rela­ Networks could be examined using entity subsets larger however, and in fact a great deal of work has been done with triads. The advantage to using larger subsets than pairs is that they provide much greater complexity for examining network data. For binary, ti a l l y reciprocal nection, relations, a dyad has four possible states: asymmetric connection in one direction, poten­ no con­ asymmetric connection in the o t h e r d i r e c t i o n , a n d s y m m e t r i c c o n n e c t i o n . These four states r e p r e s e n t t hree c o m b i n a t i o n s of types of tie (no tie, one a s y m m e t r i c tie, and one symmetric tie), and three sets of structurally equivalent states. For t r i a d s in the same states, 10 c o m b i n a t i o n s of type of tie, an d 16 s e t s of s t r u c t u r a l l y equivalent states. For tet r a d s type of data, there are 64 p o s s i b l e t here are 4,096 p o s s i b l e states, 28 combinations of type of tie, and over 200 sets of structurally equiva­ l e n t states. (The l a s t set of n u m b e r s h e l p s expl a i n why work with entity sets larger than three has been v i r t u a l l y nonexistent). The basis for triad research lies in the fact that in a random network, triads in different e q u a l l y common. states but with the same number of links would be Given a probability for forming any gi ven link, the e x p e c t e d f r e q u e n c y of e a ch of the 16 s t r u c t u r a l types of triads in a 33 r a n d o m net ca n thus be computed. To the ext ent, then, that a re­ sea rc h e r ' s q u e s t i o n c a n be p os e d as a bias In f a v o r of c e r t a i n triad configurations, a network can be analyzed and the departure from random tested for statistical significance. Summaries of triad g i v e n in Davis (1979) and Hol la nd and Leinhardt (1983). research are O bviously the r e s e a r c h on bias p a r a m e t e r s in n e t w o r k s m e n t i o n e d e a r l i e r o v e r l a p s s u b s t a n t i v e l y w i t h triad a n a l y s i s ; but the two h a v e b e e n d e v e l o p e d p a r a l l e l to each other without theoretical combination. C. The Interaction of Organizational Characteristics and Dyad Formation The l o w e s t l e v e l of a n a l y s i s in this d i s s e r t a t i o n is that of the i n ­ d i v i d u a l organization. The first a n a l y s i s of i n t e r e s t c o n c e r n s the relationships among variables at the organizational lev el and variables at the l e v e l of d y a d i c i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The m o s t o f t e n c i t e d e m p i r i c a l s t u d y of this sort is the one done by A i k e n and Hage (1968). their original Subsequent work has been replication and elaboration of research. Aiken and Hage found that organizations participating in larger numbers of joint programs with other organizations complex, (b) to be more innovative, were likely (a) to be more (c) to h av e more active internal communication channels, and (d) to h a v e m o r e d e c e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n ­ making structures (although this result was not statistically signifi­ cant). T h e y had a l s o e x p e c t e d to find an i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w it h formalization, but their data were inconsistent with this expectation. 34 T h e i r data, g a t h e r e d in 1967, w er e o b t a i n e d f rom s i x t e e n " h e a l t h and w e l f a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s in a l a r g e m i d w e s t e r n m e t r o p o l i s [ M i l w a u k e e , Wisconsin] (pp. 376-7). ... that p r o v i d e ... s e r v i c e s for the m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d " Their dependent measure was the number of joint programs in w h i c h an o r g a n i z a t i o n p a r t i c i p a t e d that r e q u i r e d a c o m m i t m e n t of resources. Their independent measures, the zero-order Pearson correla­ tions w i t h the d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e , and the s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l s , are shown in table 2C-1. Table 2C-1 The Aiken-Hage Independent Variables and Their Zero-Order Correlations with Number of Joint Programs variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. correlation Complexity -- Index of professional training — index of professional activity -- number of occupations .15 .60 .87

.10) Cp < .05)

.10) C p > .10) .13 -.06 -.06 Cp > .10) Cp > .10) Cp > .10) Degree — — — of formalization index of job codification index of rule observation index of specificity of job B e c a u s e A i k e n and Hage s t u d i e d o n l y 16 o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a true m u l t i ­ variate' analysis was not possible with their data; but they examined 35 several possible sources of error. Nonparametric zero-order correla­ tions were compared to their Pearson correlations to test the possibil­ ity that the results dent variable; used stemmed from a skewed distribution of the results were equivalent. to control for type of organization, Partial size, the depen­ correlations were source of funding, and routineness of work activity (considered a technology variable); none showed a significant change from the zero-order correlations. A i k e n a n d Hage a l s o u s e d p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n to e x a m i n e p a t t e r n s of relationships among their independent variables. that both measures of internal Their results showed communication (number of committees and f r e q u e n c y of mee tin g s ) , o ne m e a s u r e of c o m p l e x i t y ( e x t e r n a l p r o f e s ­ sional ac t i v i t y by staff), a nd i n n o v a t i o n (n u m b e r of n e w p r o g r a m s introduced), were all strongly interrelated. Aiken and Hage postulated that effects f l o w both from organizational v a r i a b l e s to d y a d i c i n t e r a c t i o n , and f r o m the d y a d i c i n t e r a c t i o n to organizational more tions variables complex organizations create a need f or through interdependencies dencies, trol, ized (pp. however, 374-376). decision-making, resources that can but best with other organizations. to increased and interpretation are more innovative, increase problems thereby leading Their of internal internal that the (or o n l y ) These that innova­ be met interdepen­ coordination and con­ communication, reduced formalization. was Finally, decentral­ the inter­ dependencies themselves increase the c o m p l e x i t y of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , completing the feedback loop. This model represents the interaction of an organization with one aspect of its environment as an adaptive, not 36 a homeostatic, would process: the model specifies no internal mechanism that limit the Increase of complexity and thus halt the growth of the process. A possible explanation of the unexpected results for formalization is provided by a study of sixteen general service hospitals done by Morse (1977). He broke down the concept of formalization into 10 different measures: 6 having to do with the generation of information, coordination of processes within the hospital, of financial of expenditures. information Morse's generation and results financial 2 with the and 2 with the control showed that formalization expenditure correlated positively with innovation, while formalization of process coordination correlated negatively. He concluded that formalization cannot be con­ sidered a single dimension in studying organizational behavior. Upon close examination, it is clear Aiken and Hage's measures of for­ malization do not separate the three dimensions Morse Identifies: each of the o p i n i o n q u e s t i o n s u s e d in e a c h of t h ei r three m e a s u r e s c o u l d apply to a n y or a l l of Morse's three d i m e n s i o n s . This failure to separate dimensions may explain the absence of a statistically signifi­ cant relationship between formalization tions in Aiken and Hage's data, hypothesized, but statistically and interorganizational and also rela­ the tendency (counter to that insignificant) for organizations with more new programs to show greater formalization. Aiken and Hage's work, based on so few cases and thus supporting only a rudimentary analysis, was more suggestive than compelling. A clearer 37 test of their ideas required a study that could support a more complex analysis. cies In 1974 Paulson reported a study of 138 public health agen­ in Iowa. To the v a r i a b l e s u s e d by A i k e n a nd H a g e in their 1968 study he added four others used by Hage in a 1965 article proposing an a x i o m a t i c t h e o r y of o r g a n i z a t i o n s : satisfaction, and effectiveness. stratification, efficiency, job An initial correlational analysis of these data replicated Aiken's and Hage's basic findings. Paulson assumed that organizational var iab les explained the development of interorganizational relations — an asymmetric model rather than the reciprocal one suggested by Aiken and Hage. He therefore established a c a u s a l o r d e r i n g a m o n g the ten v a r i a b l e s and c a r r i e d o ut an i n i t i a l , f u l l y r e c u r s i v e , p a t h an a l y s i s . P a t h s w i t h p r o b a b i l i t i e s l e s s than 0.15 in the initial analysis were eliminated; "job satisfaction" was dropped. in a second path analysis. (Paulson, as a result the variable The remaining paths were then examined The matrix of resulting path coefficients 1974, p. 327) is g i ve n in Table 2C-2. Table 2C-2 Path Coefficients in Paulson's Model comp complexity stratification centralization formalization communication efficiency effectiveness innovation — — — -— — — -- stra cent form comm efcy efct inno .04 — — — — — — — .19 — — — — — — — .13 — .17 — — — — — — — .27 .16 — — — -- — — .14 — — — — -- — .12 -.18 — — — — -- — .12 .12 — — .15 .30 -- TOR .27 — -.21 — . 19 -.25 — .19 38 As the table shows, involvement variables Paulson found large in i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l (complexity, direct relationships r e l a t i o n s an d e a c h of the four centralization, communication, and for which Aiken and Hage had gotten large correlations. correlation for centralization is c o n s i s t e n t , innovation) The negative s i nc e P a u l s o n m e a s u r e d centralization in the opposite sense from Aiken and Hage. A i k e n and like between Also, like Hage, P a u l s o n fou nd f o r m a l i z a t i o n to h a v e no e ffect; and, theirs, h i s m e a s u r e c o n f o u n d s the d i m e n s i o n s Ho r s e ' s r e s e a r c h suggests must be separated. Of the additional vari abl es Paulson introduced, ratio of administrative positions I m p o rta nt. preliminary, only efficiency (the to expenditures) proved particularly J o b s a t i s f a c t i o n o c c u r r e d on no s i g n i f i c a n t p a t h s in the f u l l y recursive path analysis; stratification showed only w e a k I n d i r e c t e f f e c t s on the f o r m a t i o n of i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e l a ­ tions; tion, effectiveness showed a stronger indirect effect but no direct effect. Paulson's analysis, alth ou gh m eth o d o l o g i c a l l y more Aiken and Hage's and i n v o l v i n g more variables, of o r g a n i z a t i o n - e n v i r o n m e n t the dyadic relationships variables than assumed a simpler model formed by an organization to affect the work­ nor did he specify any other environ­ that condition the organization's behavior. is therefore an equilibrium model — tem. sophisticated inter act io n. He posited no mechanism for ings of the organization itself, mental through innova­ While his findings are useful Paulson's the lowe st- le vel model of a sys­ for confirmation and extension of Aiken and Hage's initial work, his mo del has no utility. 39 K l o n g l a n et al. (1976), at state, district, using data obtained from from 156 organizations and county l e v e l s of health organizations in Iowa, replicated the findings of the 1968 Aiken and Hage study. They suspec­ ted that there w o u l d be dissimilarities among levels, however, and sep­ arately analyzed the three levels. the o v e r a l l results They found (p. 684), in fact, were not duplicated at any level. that the processes that lead to interorganizational that They concluded relationships can­ not be a s s u m e d to be the same for o r g a n i z a t i o n s at d i f f e r e n t h i e r a r ­ chical levels. model, A l t h o u g h K l o n g l a n et al. do not p r o p o s e a s p e c i f i c their conclusion izations; supports an adaptive interpretation of organ­ for it implies differing reactions in differing environments. A startling aspect of a l l three of these studies is the absence of size as an independent variable. 67, Blau (Blau and 183-185) firmly established the strong Schoenherr, 1971, model. 62- relationship between staff size and the number of types of organizational positions — of complexity used by Aiken and Hage, pp. and a central the measure variable in their While Blau's results were published after the initial Aiken and H age a r t i c l e , the later studies were c a r r i e d out a f t e r that time. Aiken and Hage did use size as a control vari abl e in a partial correla­ tion and found no effect; but a partial test for the importance of a potential correlation does not properly independent variable. Clearly any further research in this area must include size as a variable. Of the v a r i a b l e s used in these stud ies , organizational complexity showed the strongest and most consistent relationship to the formation of interorganizational relations; internal communication was also fair­ 40 ly consistent, displayed but its relationship was not as strong; an e r r a t i c relationship, centralization with Paulson finding the largest. The r e s u l t s w i t h these v a r i a b l e s h a v e b e e n s t r o n g e n o u g h to r e q u i r e their inclusion in any further analyses along the same lines. Formal­ ization never showed the statistically s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h IOR f o r m a t i o n that was p r e d i c t e d for it; but a m e a s u r e tak i n g Morse's distinction into account has not yet been tried, and should be included in f u r t h e r work. E f f i c i e n c y , u s e d o n l y b y P a u l s o n , s h o w e d a strong e n o u g h d i r e c t ef f e c t on I O R f o r m a t i o n to w a r r a n t its use in fu tu re analyses. The part played by the variable innovation seems anomalous. The zero- o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h I O R f o r m a t i o n was c o n s i s t e n t l y present, Paulson's analysis on it by s e v e r a l showed a r e l a t i v e l y weak direct effect and effects other variables. In a d d i t i o n , a s t u d y by C z e p i e l (1975) of innovation adoption in 26 steel more employees in v o l v e d in e x t e r n a l firms showed that firms with p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s (one of A i k e n and Hage's m e a s u r e s of c o m p l e x i t y ) were l e s s l i k e l y early. but (Such fi rms tended to be the l a r g e r ones, size as a crucial variable.) to a do p t again i m p l i c a t i n g The results to date suggest that a better e x p l a n a t i o n is n e e d e d of the p l a c e of i n n o v a t i o n in the i n t e r a c t i o n between organizational D. variables and IOR formation. The Development of Dyadic Interaction S t u d i e s of d y a d i c i n t e r a c t i o n a mo n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s , often been imbedded in research that examined the w h i l e they h a v e larger environment, 41 have not theoretically articulated relationships between environmental and dyadic variables. Models of dyadic interaction, not been models of adaptive systems, therefore, hav e although some are consistent with the assumptions needed to model an adaptive system. A l d r i c h (1972, pp. 26-31), f o l l o w i n g M a r r e t t (1971), i d e n t i f i e d four dimensions to organizational dyadic relationships, each with two sub- dimensions : (1) formalization: (a) agreement (contracts), (designated boundary personnel); and (b) structural (2) intensity: (a) size of resource investment, and (b) frequency of interaction; (3) r e c i p r o c i t y : (a) r e s o u r c e recip roc ity , and (b) definitional reciprocity — mutuality of agreement; (4) s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n : (a) unit s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n (of exchanged), and (b) procedural standardization. the things In a l a t e r a r t i c l e (1976b, p. 239) on r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n m a n p o w e r o r ­ ganizations and the Aldrich hypothesized local Employment Service in Ne w Y o r k cities, the causal order of these four variables as they a f f e c t c o o p e r a t i o n to be f o r m a l i z a t i o n , i n t e ns ity , r e c i p r o c i t y , and standardization. dering, He interpreted his results and concluded (p. 260) that " 'cooperation' is [not] that can be relied on in future transactions." same year on the to substantiate relations between manpower service organizations g e n e ral ly (1976a), and perceived a resource In another article the organizations he concluded tion drives intensity, intensity feeds back on itself, standardization, this or­ that and social formaliza­ intensity drives cooperation is a function of the value of resources invested in the relationship (one dimension of intensity). 42 Aldrich's propositions define only an Incomplete system, for no feed­ b ack m e c h a n i s m s are s u g g e s t e d w i t h i n the dyad ( o t h e r than the s e l f increasing nature ment. His of intensity) nor propositions between are consistent, st a t i c or an a d a p t i v e s y s t e m m od e l . serving the dyad and its environ­ however, with either a homeo­ Added organizational v a r iables to limit growth of the dyad would be consistent with Aiken and Hage's c o n t e n t i o n that d y a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s a re e n t e r e d into to m eet i n t e r n a l n e e d s ( h o m e o s t a t i c model). could serve to limit Added env i r o n m e n t a l v a r i a b l e s the resources a v a i l a b l e or control the level of formalization (adaptive model). Benson et al. studied the relationships formed among the county-level o f f i c e s of four g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s in a n i n e - c o u n t y a r e a of r u r a l Missouri (Benson et al, 1973; Benson, 1975). They tested the hypothe­ sis that the following four variables should be at roughly equivalent le v e l s (see page 51 tional measures). for precise definitions, The variables are pp. listed in 56-58 for the opera­ the causal order pos­ tulated by Benson et al.: (1) domain consensus (agreement as to each other's turf); (2) ideological consensus ( a g r e e m e n t r e g a r d i n g the undertaken and the approaches to use on them); (3) evaluation (of each organization by the other); (4) work coordination. tasks to be Benson's p r o p o s i t i o n s c l e a r l y sug g e s t a h o m e o s t a t i c m o d e l of d y a d i c interaction. The balancing mechanisms are not specified, but there is a clear assumption that an imbalance among the four components provokes some sort of adjustment. 43 The models suggested by these two studies are complementary. Benson et al. permeated studied a system where conflict and potential the situation (Benson et. al, 1973. pp. v, vi) — conflict hence their emphasis on contextual agreements (boundaries and goals) and interorganizational e v a l u a t i o n as p r e c u r s o r s to w o r k c o o r d i n a t i o n . system with minimal Aldrich studied c o n f l i c t (1976b, p. 234), and hi s v a r i a b l e s ca n easily be interpreted as a differentiation of Benson's — a fourth variable w o r k coordination. A homeostatic model ies would include of dyadic interaction synthesized from these stud­ conflict-moderating coordination of work; the processes processes to make possible the the coordination then wou ld de v e l o p (according to specified by Aldrich) to a point r e l a t i v e l y w i t h (and i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to) the l e v e l of c o n f l i c t . systems model would add variables in balance An a d a p t i v e from the larger environmental system to affect the dyadic system's conflict-moderating processes and in turn be affected by work coordinated by the dyad. The studies discussed of Interaction, (1976). above contain no propositions about the content an area addressed by Rogers (1974) and K l o n g l a n et al. Rogers interviewed heads of ten public and five private organ­ i z a t i o n s in s i x t e e n Iowa c o u n t i e s — countywide o r g a n i z a t i o n s c h o s e n for their r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and i n v o l vem ent in development programs. Since not a l l agencies had offices in each county, interviews. there were only 116 In each interview Rogers asked the agency head the f o l l o w ­ ing six q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the o t h e r a g e n c i e s w i t h o f f i c e s c o u n t y (p. 64): in the same 44 1. Are you acquainted with the director of agency X? 2. Have you met with the director of agency X in the past year? 3. Is agency X on your agency's mailing list, or vice versa? 4. Has your agency shared, loaned, or provided resources to in the past two years, or vice versa? 5. agency X Does a n y o n e f r om a g e n c y X s e r v e on your B o a r d of D i r e c t o r s , or vice versa? 6. Does your unit have any written agreements with agency X? Rogers used Guttman scaling on his one-time data to test for a uniform progression to the content of dyadic highly reproducible 1 , moderately v a r i o u s l e v e l s of r e l a t i o n s h i p — relationships. scalable 2 His results -- a Guttman scale for the s u p p o r t e d his p r o p o s i t i o n that a dyadic relationship an any given l e v e l of commitment would be li kel y to exist only if a relationship at the next lower l evel of commitment had previously existed. * 2 In G u t t m a n s c a l i n g , one m e a s u r e s h o w n e a r l y I n v a r i a n t a set of binary items is in the order of their occurrence. If item 2 only occ u r s w h e n i t e m 1 is pres ent , i t e m 3 o n l y o cc u r s w h e n i t e m 2 is prese nt , a n d so on, t h e n the i tems f or m a p e r f e c t G u t t m a n scale. The r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y of the s c a l e f orm e d b y any set of items is 1 m i n u s the r a t i o of i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s p o n s e s to t o t a l re spo nse s. Reproducibility can therefore range from 0 to 1 in value. Repro­ ducibility is 1 if the items form a perfect scale (no inconsistent responses). A reproducibility of 0.9 or better is u s u a l l y taken to m e a n that the items form a v a l i d s c a l e (Nie et a l , 1975, pp. 532, 533). Scalability is a ratio. Its numerator is the difference between the reproducibility for the scale formed by a set of items and the minimum reproducibility possible for that set of items g iv e n the number of positive responses to each item. The denominator is the difference between 1 and that lowest possible l evel of reproduci­ bility. Scalability is thus the proportion of improvement a set of items p r o v i d e s o v e r the l o w e s t r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y p o s s i b l e for that set of data. L i k e r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y , s c a l a b i l i t y m a y range between 0 and 1. Scalability is no r m a l l y considered adequate only if it e x c e e d s 0.6 (Nie et al, 1975, p. 533). 45 The G u t t m a n s c a l e r e s u l t i n g f r o m the 1119 r e s p o n s e sets h a d a r e p r o ­ d u c i b i l i t y of 0.91, a n d a s c a l a b i l i t y of 0.66 (p. 66). Seventy-four p e r c e n t of the r e s p o n s e s c o n f o r m e d to the o r d e r i n g pre dic t e d . Exam­ i n a t i o n of the e x c e p t i o n s (p. 66) s h o w e d (1) that o v e r l a p p i n g b o a r d s could w e l l have been another dimension and thus deleted from the scale; and (2) that r e s o u r c e and i n f o r m a t i o n e x c h a n g e ( l e v e l s 3 a n d 4) were almost interchangeable the data omitting l e vel as to which occurred first. A re-analysis of five and combining levels three and four would be expected to show higher reproducibility and much higher scalability. Kl o n g l a n et al. (1976) performed the same type of study and data anal­ ysis on 156 Iowa h e a l t h o r g a n i z a t i o n o f f i c e s at the state, d i s t r i c t , and county levels. Organization managers at each l e v e l were asked to identify the relationships between their own and other agencies at the same l e v e l in the same area. Two r e l a t i o n a l c o n t e n t q u e s t i o n s w er e a d d e d to the six R o g e r s h a d used: (1) a w a r e n e s s of A g e n c y X, i n s e r t e d be low Rogers' first question; Agency X, (2) participation in joint programs with Inserted between Rogers' questions 5 and 6. K l o n g l a n et al. e x p e c t e d to find r e s u l t s s i m i l a r to Rogers' at e a ch l e v e l (state, d i s t r i c t , county); b e l o w 0.9 for the state -le ve l i n s t e a d their r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y was offices and 0.6 for b o t h the state and county, offices. dropped their scalability was below To e x p l o r e fu r t h e r , they their a priori assumptions about the ordering of the items and obtained the best empirical ordering at each level. The best empirical o r d e r i n g s did not p r o v i d e an a c c e p t a b l e s c a l e at e i t h e r the st ate or county level, however; only the district l e vel data showed scalable 46 responses. The best orderings, moreover, varied among levels. Unfor­ tunately Kl o n g l a n et al. did not analyze cases with responses inconsis­ tent w i t h the s ca l e , items Is weakest. study, so there is no w a y to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h of t h e i r It is therefore not possible, as it was with Rogers' to predict if the deletion of certain items and the combination of others would produce an acceptable scale. Three items retained their theoretically predicted order in each of the empirical orderings: director awareness of Agency X (lowest), acquaintance with the director of Agency X (next to lowest), ten a g r e e m e n t s with Agency X (highest). boards was consistently ordered n ex t than its theoretically predicted In a d d i t i o n , director and writ­ overlapping to h i g h e s t (one p o s i t i o n h i g h e r ordering). The o t h e r four items showed no consistency among le ve ls of organization nor with their the­ or eti ca lly predicted ordering. In light of their findings, Kl o n g l a n et al. m o d i f i e d t heir a p p r o a c h and s u g g e s t e d (pp. 685-6) basic component of interorganizational interaction nition and acquaintance) varies they concluded, with the level. (after basic recog­ At the exchange of information precedes at the district level, that the m o s t the state level, other exchanges; Joint programming precedes other exchanges; and at the county level , exchange of resources precedes other exchanges. The f i n d i n g s of R o g e r s and of K l o n g l a n et al. appear to c o n t r a d i c t Aldrich, for the formal agreements that Aldrich claims d rive the d e v e l ­ o p m e n t of i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s s h o w up in Rogers' and Konglan's data as r e l a t i v e l y rare final products after a developmental sequence of several steps. The disparity almost certainly stems from 47 the d i f f e r e n c e in o r g a n i z a t i o n s studied. The r a i s o n d'etre of the r e l a t i v e l y n e w m a n p o w e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s A l d r i c h s t u d i e d r e q u i r e d the development of relations with the local employment service, mandates of these various organizations overlapped (Aldrich, 237-238). and the 1976b, pp. The government and community organizations studied by Rogers (1974, p. 63) w e r e m o s t l y w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e i r tasks w e r e no t d e ­ f i ned in ways that d e m a n d e d r e l a t i o n s w i t h the oth ers, and th ere was r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e o v e r l a p in their d e f i n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . health-related organizations included more recently studied by K l on gl an et al. (1976, formed organizations and much more The p. 678) overlap in defined responsibilities, but those r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s did no t r e q u i r e relations with the others. model can be assumed The findings are complementary: to apply to dyadic interaction Aldrich's in an environment w h e r e there is a l r e a d y l a r g e n u m b e r of f o r m a l i z e d dyads, Rogers' and Klonglan's in an environment where there is not. Rogers' r e s u l t s s u p p o r t a h o m e o s t a t i c interpretation — tional developments tend toward an invariant sequence. dyadic rela­ A synthesis of Aldrich's and Benson's findings invites an adaptive systems interpreta­ tion: political considerations (themselves variables in the rangements w i l l larger condition whether or not working occur and what their nature w i l l be. Kl o n g l a n et al. also the relative level) of the type of exchange that is most crucial dyadic relations. adaptive What would systems model would have to be added ar­ The findings support an adaptive systems model: ment (as determined by tions system) p r e s u m a b l y c o n d i t i o n e d by of the environ­ an organization condi­ to the development of to d e v e l o p a complete be a description of the mechanisms that 48 per mit a d y a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p to adapt to e n v i r o n m e n t a l c h ang es ; and such a model w o u ld require longitudinal data to test. E. The Conditioning of Dyadic Relationships by Network Characteristics The two basic categories of effects that a network of relationships can have on particular relationships within the network are the determina­ tion of (1) which relationships w i l l occur, particular relationships will be. and (2) what the content of Research releva nt to this section, then, m u s t e x p l o r e what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an e x i s t i n g set of r e l a ­ tionships affect the p r o b a b i l i t y of a n o n e x i s t e n t tie c o m i n g into existence, or an existing tie going out of existence, or the adding or subtracting of relational content in an existing relationship, and what those various effects are. Three particular case studies illustrate different facets of the impact of local networks on organizational relationships. Paul (1963) d e s c r i b e studied. Levine, White, and an o r g a n i z a t i o n established in a community they A l t h o u g h the o r g a n i z a t i o n b e g a n w i t h a l l the i n t e r n a l re­ sources one w ou l d expect to be needed, no mechanism for relating it to other organizations in the community were provided and the organization did not seek out such ties. Its effectiveness dropped, and the organ­ ization itself e v e n t u a l l y withered. The case outlined in the previous paragraph contrasts sharply with the b e h a v i o r and fate of the T e n n e s s e e V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y , Selznick in his study of that organization (1949). d o c u m e n t e d by To achieve its ends 49 the T V A was impelled The nature of those to seek links with existing local links sub stantially determined organizations. the details of T V A s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y to farme rs , w h i l e r e m o v i n g m u c h of th e m o s t p o t e n t resistance to T V A at the local level. Selznick circumspectly decries the c h a n g e in s e r v i c e fo cus e n f o r c e d by the l o c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s -- testimony to the difficulty of bypassing an existing local network in d e l i v e r i n g s e r v i c e s , and to the fact that o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , not their individual clients, are the predominant environmental factor for organizations. Finally, Maniha and Perrow (1965) reported the case of an organization that was formed against the wishes of many powerful ganizations in a community. social service or­ Despite the best efforts of most concerned officials to keep the new organization out of any meaningful activity, a series of coincidences caused it to become thoroughly imbedded in the local network during its second year of existence. Maniha and Perrow c o n c l u d e d that the i m b e d d i n g o f f e r e d a g o o d p r o g n o s i s for c o n t i n u e d survival. Research on interorganizational networks among social service agencies has emphasized that exchange is essential of interaction. In one to understanding the patterns of the earliest such research projects, Levine and White studied 22 health-related organizations and their interrela­ tions in one New England city of 200,000, and 55 similar organizations in a n o t h e r a r e a c i t y of a b o u t the same size. T h ei r work, c a r r i e d out in the late 1950's, later (Levine and White, was published a few years 1961; L e v i n e , Wh ite , and P aul, 1963). T h e y l ai d the g r o u n d w o r k for 50 emphasis on exchange in interorganizational networks, identifying three dimensions to e x c h a n g e : r e s o u r c e s ( like c l i e n t s and staff), organ­ izational objectives, and domain consensus (agreement over location and content of services to be offered). B e n s o n and his a s s o c i a t e s s t u d i e d the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s a m o n g four s p e c i f i c g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s in nine M i s s o u r i c o u n t i e s in 1969. In the ir r e p o r t and a n a l y s i s of t h eir w o r k (Benson et al.,1973; Ben so n, 1975) they described mies, with resources given turf — interorganizational networks as political and a u t h o r i t y (the r e c o g n i z e d econo­ r i g h t to w o r k a another name for domain consensus) as the "coins" in the economy. Aldrich (1976a), reporting on the networks formed among manpower organ­ izations in several New York cities, emphasized the central role of ac­ tual resources In i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l exchange networks; such dimen­ sions as domain consensus, tual resource exchange he concluded, structure formal authority to be a crucial its importance organizations, stemming partly are deriva ti ve established (p. 423). from the ac­ He also found resource among service organizations, from the fact that for social service "...their m a r k e t ... is not c l e a r l y d e f i n e d and their p r o d u c t is d i f f i c u l t f o r c o n s u m e r s to e v a l u a t e " (p. 422). He did not add that a l m o s t the o n l y b u y e r s are o t he r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , s i nce in­ dividuals are seldom empowered to negotiate their own social services. Cook (1977) explored expected results of unequal power distributions in networks. She i d e n t i f i e d four c o u r s e s of a c t i o n o p e n to an e n t i t y 51 faced with dependence on one or more other entities for resources: (1) w i t h d r a w a l , (2) e x t e n s i o n of its n e t w o r k to i n c l u d e ne w e n t i t i e s , (3) increasing the v a lue of the resources (4) forming It could offer in exchange, coalitions with other entities. She predicted and that organ­ i z a t i o n s w i t h c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e s o u r c e s w o u l d be l i k e l y to e s t a b l i s h exchange relations, and that organizations with similar resources would be more likely to form coalitions. Laumann and Marsden (1982), distilling the resource dependence perspec­ tive, suggested several consequences interorganizational networks the organizations. In p a r t i c u l a r of arrangements for the formation of they i d e n t i f i e d of resources relationships these three in among prin­ ciples as governing interorganizational interaction (pp 331334): 1. resource inequality -- the resources not uniformly a v a i l a b l e to all. 2. r e c i p r o c i t y of r e s o u r c e t r a n s f e r — to a v o i d d e p e n d e n c e , organizations attempt to enter into mutual exchanges of sim­ i l a r r e s o u r c e s ( l i k e e x c h a n g e s of i n f o r m a t i o n , or c l i e n t r e f e r r a l s ) or b a l a n c e d a s y m m e t r i c e x c h a n g e s of d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e s ( l i k e i n f o r m a t i o n e x c h a n g e d for o r g a n i z a t i o n a l support). 3. redundancy — to protect important relationships that provide needed resources, organizations build mu l t i p l e links, such as a d d i n g an e x c h a n g e of d i r e c t o r s to their o r d i n a r y r e s o u r c e exchange. On the basis of their reasoning and earlier research findings, and Marsden predicted the foll owi ng (pp. 1. organizations need are Laumann 334-336): mutual exchange (exchange involving similar resources) w i l l be m o s t c o m m o n w h e r e there is the l e a s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n of resources; 52 2. balanced asymmetric exchange (exchange of one resource for a different one) w i l l be most common where there is the least concentration of resources. 3. m u l t i p l e x i t y in relations w i l l be most common where there is the least concentration of resources. Laumann and Marsden's c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l homeostatic with respect to the behavior they identify. dyads is Organizations a i m to a c h i e v e c e r t a i n s t a t e s ( a d e q u a c y of r e s o u r c e s , l a c k of d e p e n ­ dence, redundancy), the e n v i r o n m e n t and the dyads ( de g r e e conditions outcomes, ficiency — of they form reflect resource these aims. concentration While in the network) the e n v i r o n m e n t is b a s i c a l l y a m a t t e r of s u f ­ given sufficiently diffuse resource concentration, a char­ acteristic pattern deve lop s in dyadic interactions. In the presence of relative resource concentration, expect to find interorganizational we would relations o v e r w h elm in gly dominated by those a g e n c i e s w i t h the m o s t resources. would have much to trade, however, S i n c e few o r g a n i z a t i o n s most would have to compete for the resources a v a i l a b l e from the well-endowed, and hence would h ave little incentive to d evelop relations with each other. with well-endowed To the extent that relationships o r g a n i z a t i o n s are developed, however, they should provide resources for further exchange with other organizations. A resource dependence perspective, then, as interpreted by Laumann and Marsden, leads us to expect that: 1. formation of relationships among organizations with few re­ sources depends on formation of relationships between those organizations with few resources and those with many; 53 2. networks with less resource concentration generate more rela­ tionships ; 3. networks with less resource concentration generate more multiplexity in relationships. F. The Effect of the Local Environment on the Local Social Service Delivery Network The term "local environment", in its most general sense, is used here to r e f e r to e v e r y a s p e c t of the m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a in w h i c h a l o c a l social services network exists. With regard to direct impact on that ne t w o r k , h o w e v e r , the l o c a l e n v i r o n m e n t c o n s i s t s of o t h e r o r g a n i z a ­ tions. Variables of other sorts, like basic changes in the character of the local population (the l e v e l of poverty, the l e v e l of education, the l e v e l of p h y s i c a l and m e n t a l he a l t h ) af f e c t the n e t w o r k of s e r ­ vices; but b e c a u s e p a y m e n t of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s is r o u t i n e l y b r o k e r e d t h r o u g h o r g a n i z a t i o n s r a t h e r than m a n a g e d th r o u g h a v o u c h e r system, such changes would still ganizational interaction. environment w i l l have their effects mediated For purposes of this study, through interor­ then, the local be understood primarily to be those organizations the metropolitan area that are not in the social services network, in and the network(s) formed among them and with social service agencies. No research has specifically related the nature of a social network to the larger network of organizations around studies have it; examined features of cities' organizational services but structures as they af fe c t o u t c o m e s that w o u l d bear on the a c t i v i t y of the s e r v i c e s network. several social Some of these st u d i e s s uggest u s a b l e c o n j e c t u r e s 54 about the a r t i c u l a t i o n of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s n e t w o r k s w i t h their l o c a l organizational environments. A i k e n (1969, 1970) and A i k e n a n d A l f o r d (1970a, series of a r t i c l e s on t h ei r r e s e a r c h on f e d e r a l States cities. In 1970b) published a p r o g r a m s in U n i t e d their report on urban renewal (1970a) they reported the results of testing several standard hypotheses about the variables that af f e c t e v e n t s in cities. On the basis of t h e i r f i n di ng s, th ey rejected these hypotheses and suggested an alternative interorganizational in terms of the n e t w o r k w i t h i n the cities (pp. 661-663): large cities were more they had more effective lik el y to participate in urban networks: (I) more stable renewal older, because organizational nets and a concomitant higher state of knowledge about the community system among organizational actors; and (2) a larger and more diverse set of special-purpose organizations that served as multi pl e centers of power. They c o n c l u d e d that m u l t i p l e c e n t e r s of po w e r are i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e they m a k e it m o r e l i k e l y that a c o a l i t i o n of r e s o u r c e s a d e q u a t e to a given political task can be formed — tion that a b s o l u t e determinant size, not r e l a t i v e of a c t i o n Involvement in federal in such p ow e r share, systems. Their a n a l y s i s 1970b, pp. 863-4). of d a t a on 1970, the same The same pattern of present in their research on Model Poverty programs (Aiken, is the c r u c i a l programs for public housing supported conclusions (Aiken and Alford, results was also a conclusion based on the assump­ Cities and War on p. 513). A little earlier Clark (1968) had studied decisions u r b a n r e n e w a l p r o g r a m s in 51 U. S. cities. to participate He c o n c l u d e d in (pp. 587-8) 55 that "fragile" issues, the community's those without a significant prior structure, are more easily vetoed imbedding in in a decentralized p o wer s t r u c t u r e b e c a u s e there a r e m o r e c e n t e r s of power. However, w h e n once a p r o g r a m h a s b e c o m e imbed ded , he su g g e s t e d , it tends to be harder to uproot in a decentralized power structure because several of th ose same m u l t i p l e c e n t e r s of p o w e r n o w h a v e a v e s t e d i n t e r e s t in m a i n t a i n i n g the n e w program. His f i n d i n g s ar e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h A i k e n and A l f o r d ' s w i t h r e s p e c t to p a r t i c i p a t i o n in u r b a n r e n e w a l (p. 587); but he p o i n t e d o ut (pp. 58 7-88) that e a r l i e r r e s e a r c h e r s had g o t t e n different results, and concluded that urban renewal programs had during the meantime become more im b e d d e d -Aiken and Alford's) e x p l a i n i n g his o w n (and thereby results. Clark's d a t a s h o w e d (1968, p. 587) that the z e r o - o r d e r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n c o m m u n i t y p o v e r t y l e v e l a n d u r b a n r e n e w a l e x p e n d i t u r e s w as r e l a tiv ely low, — but that the path coefficient was considerably higher an i n d i c a t i o n that p r i m a f a c i e "need" is not a s t r o n g p r e d i c t o r of program participation unless Hage's data showed erty and l ev e l the same other c o n d i t i o n s are met. lo w correlations between measures of program participation in three of they s t u d i e d (Aiken, A i k e n and 1970, p. 513). 1960's on 130 A m e r i c a n cities, the four of pov­ programs T u r k (1970), u s i n g d a t a f r o m the f o u n d that m e a s u r e s of the e x t e n t of poverty in a city predicted the amount of federal funding obtained for poverty programs in those cities but not in those less organized. that were fairly strongly organized, He concluded (pp. 14-16) that level of involv eme nt in the poverty programs was a m u l t i p l i c a t i v e function of need (poverty) and capacity (interorganizational integration). Writing 56 later about a wider range of city government functions and activities, T u r k (1977, p. 186) g e n e r a l i z e d his c o n c l u s i o n to the f u l l r a n g e of needs a city might address. These studies a l l suggest that the effectiveness of a city in m o b i l ­ izing resources to meet individual human needs depends primarily on the presence of a well -i nte gra te d interorganizational network with m u l t i p i e c e n t e r s of power. better-integrated It s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e to c o n c l u d e , the o v e r a l l network in a metropolitan area, resources its social services network wil l have. to this question: then, what conditions that the the more That conclusion leads in metropolitan areas encourage the development and maintenance of well-integrated networks with m u l t i p l e c e n t e r s of pow e r ? Three t y p e s of v a r i a b l e s h a v e those that a f f e c t the s t a b i l i t y of the netw or k, been identified: t hose that provide resources to build a l ter nat iv e loci of power in the Interorganizational ne t w o r k , and tho se that a f f e c t the m a n n e r in w h i c h the d y a d i c m i c r o strostructure network w i l l li k e l y be built up. A i k e n and A l f o r d (1970a, pp. 654, 657-8, 662) i d e n t i f i e d I n - m i g r a t i o n as a principal factor i z a t i o n a l netw ork . that can reduce the stability of an interorgan­ R a p i d p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h in a m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a provides a basis for new organizations in any case. a function of in-migration, When the growth is the new population brings with It ties to other organizations and demands for particular organizational arrange­ ments. The result organizations. is c h a n g e s Unfortunately, in the p a t t e r n of c o n n e c t i o n s they did not explore a mong the opportunities for n e w c e n t e r s of p o w e r that g r o w t h in the n u m b e r of o r g a n i z a t i o n s 57 would provide, nor how the effects of these opportunities interact with the instability in the o v e r a l l network. Clark (1968, pp. found between 588-9) was startled by the very large the percentage of Catholic population in a city and its u r b a n r e n e w a l and g e n e r a l b u d g e t exp end i t u r e s . plausible explanation, Catholics to be f a v o r a b l y disposed he was tivities and more extensive ev er, reported a profile populations: by attitude toward studies increased of the c o m m u n i t i e s w i t h Northeastern this is exactly impressed In his s e a r c h for a U. S., fairly high showing governmental welfare state activities. slightly more industrialized, He also, ac­ ho w­ largest Catholic population d en sit y, somewhat less educated populations. But the type of city with the largest v ari ety of ethnicity and the largest proportion of foreign-born population, diversity is a principal A l f o r d (1970a, relationship he p. 660; and this ethnic component of the heterogeneity that Aiken and 1970b, p. 859) cite as p r e d i c t i v e of g r e a t e r in volvement in urban renewal and public housing projects. A i k e n and Alford economic power as (1970a, pp. 660-1) also test ed a predictor of involvement the d i s p e r s i o n in urban renewal. of They fo und that the n u m b e r of m a n u f a c t u r i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s of size 100 or more and the number of independent banks with assets of fifty m i l l i o n dollars or more were each significantly correlated with in v o l v e m e n t in u r b a n r e new al. The p e r c e n t of p l a n t w o r k e r s u n i o n i z e d a l s o s h o w e d significant relationship with some of their measures. 58 H a w l e y (1963) r e p o r t e d that the s m a l l e r the p r o p o r t i o n of m a n a g e r s , proprietors, and officials in a city's population, was to h a v e p a r t i c i p a t e d in u r ba n renewal. the more like ly it He I n t e r p r e t e d the " M P O r a t i o 11, as he n a m e d it, as a m e a s u r e of c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p o w e r in a city, a r g u i n g (p. number of 466) that such positions the n u m b e r of such p e r s o n s needed. reflect His findings supported his tion (p. 465) that a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power is n e e d e d the supposi­ to foc us the resources required to initiate programs like urban renewal. Aiken (1970, pp. 502-505), like Hawley, reported that the M P O ratio in cities was I n v ers ely re lated to in volvement in urban renewal (and other federal welfare) programs. He t e s t e d Hawley's s u p p o s i t i o n , however, that the MPO ratio is indicative of greater concentration of power, c o r r e l a t i n g it w i t h his i n d e x of d i f f u s i o n of p o l i t i c a l power. by The correlation was negative, and Aiken argued that the M PO ratio therefore measures power concentration d i r e c t l y , rather than i nv e r s e l y as Hawley had reasoned. Aiken's f i n d i n g s s u g g e s t that the M P O ra tio is p e r h a p s b e t t e r i n t e r ­ p r e t e d as a d e m o g r a p h i c than a s t r u c t u r a l variable, i n d i c a t i v e of higher average socioeconomic status among city inhabitants. Aiken and A l f o r d (1970a, p. 658; 1970b, p.859) s h o w e d that two o t h e r m e a s u r e s of SES — median family income and percent of adult population graduated high school — - were housing and urban renewal ratio. Although these related to i n v o l v e m e n t to p a r t i c i p a t i o n in f e d e r a l programs in exactly the same way as the MPO results in related that had suggest the federal that higher SES programs studied, is negatively Clark (1968) 59 provides evidence to the contrary. He also found the negative correla­ tion b e t w e e n a m e a s u r e of SES ( p r o p o r t i o n of h i g h l y e d u c a t e d p o p u l a ­ tion) and urban renewal his study, expenditures; but he used a path analysis and the path coefficient between those two variables was as strongly positive as the zero-order coefficient was negative (p. A higher l e v e l correspond for to a of average socioeconomic lower level of need, status in a city w o u l d surely and the zero-order correlations fou nd a re t h e r e f o r e h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g ; argue that higher SES w i l l tion and m o r e c e n t e r s but there is a l s o r e a s o n to lead to better lnterorganizational of power. 587). integra­ G r a n o v e t t e r (1973) i n t r o d u c e d c on c e p t of the " w e a k tie" in ne tworks. the He a r g u e d that r e l a t i o n s h i p s that are less frequent, intensive, and intimate provide the connections that link disparate primary groups into a broader social personal contacts that connectedness network is dependent on such ties. leading tention empirically; together; consequently, integration His study of to jobs in Boston (1974) supported Fararo (1981) demonstrated in a net the logical his con­ necessity is greater when inbreeding bias (the ten­ d e n c y for e n t i t i e s to be c o n n e c t e d to o t h e r s in the same c a t e g o r y as t h e m s e l v e s ) is less. But it is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of h i g h e r SES p e r s o n s that they m a i n t a i n a g r e a t e r 1982). It is reasonable p r o p o r t i o n of w e a k ties ( G r a n o v e t t e r , to expect, then, that the interpersonal net­ work structure of a city w i l l be better connected the higher the a ve r­ age SES. Since organizational leaders tend to be higher SES persons in g e n e r a l , this t e n d e n c y s h o u l d be e v e n s t r o n g e r in the i n t e r p e r s o n a l connections that link organizations. 60 In summary, p r i o r r e s e a r c h l e a d s to the e x p e c t a t i o n that c i t i e s w i t h r e l a tiv ely high average socioeconomic status, r e l a t i v e l y l o w in-migration, heterogeneity in ethnic stock, power w i l l be better integrated the metropolitan area w i l l and m u l t i p l e centers of economic in the sense that the organizations in have greater density of interaction. This b e t t e r o v e r a l l i n t e g r a t i o n , s i n c e it has b e e n s h ow n to be r e l a t e d to higher l ev e l s of participation in federal government expected to lead to higher l e v e l s of resources, programs, can be from more sources, for the local social services network. G. The Effect of the Nonlocal Environ»ent on the Local Social Service Delivery Network Research demonstrating the effect of varied U. S. national environments on l o c a l m e t r o p o l i t a n e n v i r o n m e n t s is sparse, a r e s u l t of the s m a l l number of cases and the short longevity of researchers compared to that of the cases being studied. Instead the relevant literature consists m o s t l y of a b s t r a c t a s s e r t i o n s about the na t u r e of e n v i r o n m e n t s g e n ­ erally, illustrated by specific features of national (or international) environments. Aldrich (1972) listed se ven dimensions to organizational environments, of w h i c h two i n v o l v e n o n l o c a l i n f l u e n c e s : the c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y of (quantity of which resources in) the o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the U n i t e d organizations; and i n a l l y defined the environment, for social service St ate s c l e a r l y is a f f e c t e d by n a t i o n a l turbulence of the environment, by E m e r y and Tr i s t (1965), results which, as orig­ f r o m the g l o b a l 61 Interlock of i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l " f i e l d " (1967) w r i t large). ties (Warren's I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l The s e two d i m e n s i o n s e n c o m p a s s the s u b ­ stance of other literature relevant Two e m p i r i c a l analysis. to this topic. findings are s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l e v a n t to this l e v e l of T u r k (1970) s h o w e d that the l e v e l of c o n n e c t e d n e s s in a metropolitan area is strongly related to the number of external connec­ tions — as measured by ters In the area. the number of national A i k e n (1970, organization headquar­ p. 498) ad ded his own f i n d i n g s to a long list of prior research that shows that the proportion of absentee ownership In a local economy is inversely related to the centralization of the local political decision-making process. T h e s e f i n d i n g s c a n be I n t e r p r e t e d environment h ave the effect of to m e a n that ties to the e x t e r n a l providing variety (turbulence) local environment, encouraging adaptive behavior. in the Certainly additional ties to the external environment would Increase the number of indepen­ dent s o u r c e s of p o w e r and re s o u r c e s , diminishing tendencies c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of p o w e r in the l o c a l system. E v a n (1965) c o n t e n d e d that as the Input of resources is more concentrated, In a more turbulent environment, to war d authority Is too. then, we could expect decentralization in local systems. Clark (1965), interpreting the relations among institutions of higher e d u c a t i o n and the g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s that a ff e c t t h e m in the U n i t e d States, noted that the r e s u l t i n g Interorganizational network did not display the tight control mechanisms of a standard bureaucracy; instead 62 d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s a n d s u p e r v i s o r y f u n c t i o n s ar e r e l a t i v e l y d e c e n t r a l i z e d and n o t a u t h o r i t a r i a n . Poucke's (1980) between His d i s t i n c t i o n r e s e m b l e s v a n interest and power networks: interest networks generate informal control mechanisms based on the interests of the par­ ties; p o w er n e t w o r k s (he u s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s as the p r o t o t y p e ) h a v e a formal central control mechanism that orients the parties regardless of [in addition to?] organizational their interests. networks To the extent that national inter­ operate as interest networks, greater numbers of ties to them in a local area should bring that local network to look more nearly like the national one. Roy (1983), analyzing the interlocks in the directorates of 12 United States industries between 1886 and 1905, uncovered a reve al ing pattern. The years studied are significant because, as Roy pointed out (p. 248), these two d e c a d e s s p a n the time w h e n the U. S. e c o n o m y s h i f t e d f r o m a p r i m a r i l y n o n - c o r p o r a t e to a p r i m a r i l y c o r p o r a t e s t r u c t u r e . analysis shows g rap hi c a l l y how the interlocking of directorates Roy's over this twenty year period began with domination by three core industries and gradually spread out to i n v o l v e interlocks between many industries not in that core. He cites Mizruchi's (1982) study of corporate inter­ l o cks o v e r the f o l l o w i n g 70 y e a r s as e v i d e n c e ization, t h o u g h g r a d u a l , h a s b e e n conti nui ng . that the d e c e n t r a l ­ These studies suggest that the phenomenon C l ar k d e s cr ibe d in h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n has o c c u r r e d within the industrial sector of the economy as well. E m e r y and T r ist (1965) a r e g e n e r a l l y cite d as the o r i g i n a t o r s of the concept of a turbulent environment. They used as their example a firm 63 In Britain that, continuing in what had been a highly successful man­ ner, was t o t a l l y u n d o n e by c i r c u m s t a n c e s it c o u l d n o t h a v e fo reseen. They concluded that the extent of interconnection among organizations in the m o d e r n w o r l d ha s m a d e it i m p o s s i b l e to f o r e c a s t the e f f e c t s which ripple through those interconnections. Their conclusions ma y considered. stem in part from the size of organization they Wile nsk y (1967), using much larger organizations as exam­ p l e s ( p r i m a r i l y the U n i t e d S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t , and o c c a s i o n a l l y some other governments), was much more optimistic about the capability of organizations to obtain the information they need to operate ef fective­ ly in their environments. In any case, an organization's information-gathering regardless of apparatus, the adequacy of it seems reasonable to assume that in a turbulent environment organizations with more con­ tact points in the network of organizations around them w i l l be better able to foresee coming events and better able to fashion effective res­ pon se s to them. ments, F r o m this we can c o n j e c t u r e that t u r b u l e n t e n v i r o n ­ g e n e r a t e d by the i n t e r l o c k i n g of o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the f irst place, w i l l induce pressures for even more Interconnection. Haire (1959) presaged later arguments about the effect of the environ­ m e n t on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l analogy, he c o n t e n d e d l a b o r specialization. Pursuing an organlsmic that o r g a n i z a t i o n s w o u l d b u i l d up p e r s o n n e l positions in places where they are stressed. In a turbulent environ­ ment, pressures from the environment are particularly severe, and would be reflected in the development of many externally-oriented positions. The existence of many such positions in many local organizations would 64 in and of i t s e l f c o n t r i b u t e to the d e v e l o p m e n t of because the personnel w o u l d al rea dy be present tionships. We should therefore works in m e tro politan areas expect local networks, to carry on the rela­ the best connected local net­ that have the most contact with the exter­ nal environment. In summary, there is evidence to suggest that the interorganizational s t r u c t u r e of the e n t i r e U n i t e d St ate s has g r o w n m o r e d i f f u s e in its decision-making patterns. There is even stronger evidence to suggest that the nature of the national system tends to induce a similar nature in l o c a l systems. T h e r e is g o o d r e a s o n to expect, then, t h a t in the U n i t e d S ta t e s m o r e ties to the n a t i o n a l s ys t e m w i l l r e s u l t in a l ess centralized decision-making s t r u c t u r e at the l o c a l level. In the United States this means that more ties to the external environment re­ sult in less centralized decision-making structures at the local level. CHAPTER 3 DATA, ASSUMPTIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS A. The Data Available fraa the Study The data analyzed In this dissertation were gathered federal government request In response to a for research on the coordination of mental h e a l t h s e r v i c e s to the a g i n g ( N I M H g r a n t if 31898-02). The d e s i g n of the study i n v o l v e d the selection of 12 cities, 6 each from Michigan and Ohio, w i t h p o p u l a t i o n s in the ran g e of 100,000 to 500,000. Project staff visited each of the cities to gather information, meet with local pe r s o n s at the c e n t e r of co operation. Telephone the social services ne t w o r k , and request d i r e c t o r i e s , printed Information from United W a y offices , and i n t e r v i e w s w it h k n o w l e d g e a b l e p e r s o n s w e r e u s e d to compile a list of the social service agencies in each city. F r o m the l i s t of a g e n c i e s d e f i n e d for I n t e r v i e w . I d e n t i f i e d In e a c h c i t y a p o p u l a t i o n was In g e n e r a l , a g e n c i e s w e r e i n c l u d e d that had five or more permanent paid staff positions, an independent board, and direct provision of social services to clients. Physical he alt h was not I n c l u d e d In the w o r k i n g d e f i n i t i o n o f " s o c i a l s e r v i c e s " , so h o s ­ p i t a l s and o t h e r a g e n c i e s c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h p h y s i c a l h e a l t h w e re excluded. State facilities to d i a l in-patient or located in a city, services that h a d gained provided cus­ o n l y o n a s t a t e w i d e b a s is mental hospitals), were also excluded. Included but that A handful (prisons, of p r o g r a m s c o m m u n i t y r e c o g n i t i o n in their own were rig ht d e s p i t e p l a c e m e n t w i t h i n l a r g e r i n s t i t u t i o n s ( l i k e a u n i v e r s i t y or 65 66 hospital). a gr e e d to Of 527 take agencies part In in the identified the study* d e c l i n i n g to take part s h o w e d An populations, examination of 479 the (90.9%) agencies that there was no c o n s i s t e n t pattern a m o n g the c i t i e s w i t h r e s p e c t to the p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s or the types of o r g a n i z a t i o n s selection process, th at did de c l i n e . Specific details of the lists of organizations, and other information r e la­ t ive to the d a t a - g a t h e r i n g p r o c e s s can be found in the f i n a l prepared for this project (Marcus and Sheldon, report 1982). Du ri n g i n t e r v i e w s an e x p a n d e d l i s t of o r g a n i z a t i o n s was used to a s k agency directors about city. t h e i r agencies' I n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h i n the The expanded list included a l l agencies in the original popula­ tion targeted for interview, certain general categories of public agen­ cies (courts, hospitals, schools), and certain specific u mb r e l l a organ­ i z a t i o n s p r o v i d i n g no d i r e c t s e r v i c e s but c o o r d i n a t i n g or p r o v i d i n g money to others (United Way, Ment al Health Boards). dissertation is limited to actual organizations, Analysis in this excluding the general categories but Including the um b r e l l a organizations not interviewed. The r e s e a r c h team a s s e m b l e d three s u r v e y i n s t r u m e n t s to g a t h e r data from the i n t e r v i e w e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and c o m p i l e d a l a r g e a m o u n t of a r c h i v a l d a t a on the c o u n t i e s c o n t a i n i n g the t w e l v e c i t i e s studied. The county-level data (a list of these variables is give n in Appendix B) included updated v a l u e s of the variables used by Turk (1970, 1973b, 1977) in his e a r l i e r s t u d y of 130 A m e r i c a n cities. survey instruments were completed, Opinion Research, was hired Once a private organization, to conduct interviews and prepare 1973a, the Market the raw 67 data base. Interviews were carried out In the s umme r and early fall of 1979. The first instrument was a questionnaire administered by interviewers from M O R during interviews with agency heads or their designates. The second i n s t r u m e n t w a s l e f t b e h i n d w i t h the p e r s o n i n t e r v i e w e d to be fil led out and returned at his/her convenience soon after. The third Instrument was left to be f i l l e d out by that person in the organization most k n o w l e d g e a b l e agency. records, about the personnel and b u d g e t aspects of the Budget and personnel Information can be assumed to be based on but a n s w e r s to o t h e r q u e s t i o n s r e p r e s e n t the p e r c e p t i o n s agency heads. Items in the Interview instrument are almost uniformly p re s e n t In the d a t a base, instruments left of bu t behind were had not r e s p o n d e d w e r e u s e d the o r i g i n a l 77%. r e t u r n rates Telephone c a l l s on the to agencies which to o b t a i n c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n , return rates to 86% at worst — two and 93.5% in one case — raising for the items pursued. The first, relevant interview, to analyses i n s t r u m e n t contained the following Information in this dissertation. The entire instrument is contained in Appendix A-i. 1. 2. A 3-point scale of Increase or decrease over past five years in: a. number b. number c. amount d. number e. number Proportions of of of of of of clients served; services/programs offered; funding (after controlling for inflation); sources of funds; service locations. clients referred in and referred out. 68 3. A 2-point scale of addition, in the past three years, of: a. b. c. d. 4. new programs mandated by outside organizations; new programs not mandated; client groups mandated by outside organizations; client groups not mandated. 21 questions about relations with other agencies: a. 5 questions about similarity to own agency: (1) similar services provided, (2) similar clients served, (3) similar sources of funds, (4) compete for resources, (5) compete for clients; b. 4 attributions about other agencies: (6) have influence over own agency, (7) good opinion is important to own agency, (8) h ave influence over human services decisions in the community, (9) have prestige in the community; c. 12 questions about interaction with other agencies: (10) other agency provides cooperation and support, (11) conflict with other agency in past few years, (12) other agency refers clients, (13) own agency refers clients to other agency, (14) exchange opinions, Information and ideas with other agency, (15) own agency on same community committees and p lan ­ ning task forces as other agency, (16) r e l y o n o t h e r a g e n c y to d e l i v e r own agency's s e r ­ vices , (17) have cooperative informal relationship, (18) have formal relationship: run program(s) for other agency, (19) h a v e f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p : o t h e r a g e n c y r u n s p r o ­ grams for own agency, (20) have formal relationship: operate joint program, (21) have formal relationship: other kind. In addition, respondents were asked to name a contact person for formal programs, and these Individuals were asked inde­ pendently to list agencies involved. U l t i m a t e l y these re­ s u l t s and t h o s e for q u e s t i o n s 18 t h r o u g h 20 were c o m b i n e d , and question 21 eliminated. Analysis suggested that respon­ dents did not adequately discriminate among the first three typ es of p r o g r a m s , a n d sho w e d that no "ot her" type w a s c o r ­ roborated by the contact person except where it had already been listed as a different type. 69 5. The A m a t r i x of m o s t i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e s of i n f l u e n c e o v e r 10 d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n a r e a s ( l i s t of d e c i s i o n areas on page 16, Appendix A-l; list of sources of influence given in Appendix A-2. se co n d i n s t r u m e n t , left behind to be f i l l e d out by the p e r s o n interviewed, contained the following information relevant to this dis­ sertation (the complete instrument is in Appendix A-3): 1. a m a t r i x of 8 c a t e g o r i e s of staff i n v o l v e d tional decision areas (p. 3 in Appendix A-3); 2. a 5 - p o i n t s c a l e of us e of w r i t t e n c r i t e r i a organizational work; 3. a 5 - p o i n t s c a l e of us e of p e r m a n e n t staff c o m m i t t e e s for 8 organizational decision areas. The third instrument, in 7 o r g a n i z a ­ in 9 a r eas of left behind to be filled out by an administrator knowledgeable about budget and personnel, formation relev ant to contained the following in­ this dissertation (the complete instrument is in Appendix A-4): 1. the number of full-time-equivalent positions of paid staff; 2. the number tions; of full-time-equivalent paid administrative posi­ 3. a c o u n t of the n u m b e r of p r o f e s s i o n a l specialties employed by the organization; 4. the total d o l l a r income in the most recent complete year prior to the interview. and occupational fiscal 70 B. 1. General Assumptions Practical Consequences The p r a c t i c a l a i m of the a n a l y s i s in this d i s s e r t a t i o n is to o b t a i n results that could guide government agencies wishing to intervene improve service d e l i v e r y in one or more metropolitan areas. to Because the study on which this dissertation is based collected no data direct­ l y r e l a t e d to the q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y , we m u s t m a k e some a s ­ sumptions about better service the type of conditions that can be expected delivery. These assumptions are not to lead open even to to in­ direct testing with the data from which this dissertation is drawn, so their accuracy w i l l have to be shown (or disproved) in other research. The first assumption is that service provision through the cooperation of agencies, whether on an informal or a formal basis, service delivery. services beyond the Such cooperation should lead resources of any single leads to better to the de velopment of organization to develop, and that w o u l d t h e r e f o r e no t o t h e r w i s e be a v a i l a b l e to c l i e n t s ; should result in additional allow small organizations service it locations because joint operations to p r o v i d e services that can compete with those offered by larger organizations. The presence of cooperative programming among agencies, then, will be assumed to increase the qu ality of service delivery in both ways iden­ tified as relevant to this dissertation in Chapter lr increased numbers of services and improved access to existing services. tion is correct, it becomes important to look If this assump­ for intervention 71 strategies that encourage such cooperative programming with of e f f o r t o n the p a r t of an i n t e r v e n i n g agency. a minimum Mandating such pro­ grams may be an efficient way to meet specific demands, but it is inor­ dinately expensive in administrative terms to analyze a w h o l e network and m a n a g e it b y m a n d a t i n g a br o a d s p e c t r u m of c o o p e r a t i v e projects. It w o u l d t h e r e f o r e be m o r e u s e f u l to d e v e l o p g u i d e l i n e s for r o u t i n e resource input into a system that w i l l likely lead to more cooperative programming, and reserve mandatory procedures for select situations. The se con d a s s u m p t i o n is that c lient s' needs are b e s t m e t w h e n a d i f ­ ferent organization particular type in of the social service service network is devoted offered. Warren's (1967) argument that va lu e s resented in the social to them. This assumption [types of service] is a each based on need to be rep­ service network in order to have resources flow So l o n g as a s e r v i c e is o n l y one part of e x i s t i n g o r g a n ­ izations, it is subject to i n t e r n a l priority-setting mechanisms, and thus not as a v a i l a b l e to the c o m m u n i t y p r i o r i t y - s e t t i n g m e c h a n i s m s . The existence of an organization dedicated vice presumably provides a better se. likelihood of service deliv er y per To the ex te n t that s u c h an o r g a n i z a t i o n has the r e s o u r c e s vite cooperative programming with other agencies, and to a particular type of ser­ in other cooperative avai lab le to clients. very well-endowed. essential the and establish client referral results should be service arrangements Ideally, that make at more mechanisms locations service more readily then, such a new organization would be S i n c e that Is o f t e n not the case, h o w e v e r , it is to i d e n t i f y c o n d i t i o n s of c r e a t i o n that c a n h e l p organization to make to i n ­ the most use of the resources it has. su ch an 72 The third a s s u m p t i o n is that a g e n e r a l l y h i g h l e v e l of e x c h a n g e of information and client referrals within a local social services network is a d v a n t a g e o u s in b o t h w a y s d e f i n e d to be of i n t e r e s t — organizations know about exchange client each other, referrals, and the more wil l i n g the m o r e likely it is that the m o r e they are to individual c l i e n t s c a n l o c a t e the s e r v i c e they w a n t (need) and the e a s i e r it is for them to do so, a nd th e m o r e l i k e l y it is that n e e d s not c u r r e n t l y being addressed w i l l be identified and programs begun It t h e r e f o r e is i m p o r t a n t to address to i d e n t i f y c o n d i t i o n s that w i l l them. lead to greater l e v e l s of exchange of information and clients within a social services network; specifically, it is important to identify feasible interventions that can foster those conditions. 2. Theoretical Conjectures The analytic distinction between homeostatic and adaptive p l i e s a neat t y p o l o g y that does not c o r r e s p o n d sy s t e m s (perh aps a l l example, to e x p e r i e n c e ; l i v i n g syst em s) c o n t a i n e l e m e n t s of both. the human body is c l e a r l y a homeostatic system; being includes a psychological t i v e (1967, p. 5). systems but im­ many For the human system which Buckley maintains is adap­ If one Is g o i n g to study h u m a n be i n g s , does one assume the system to be bounded by the homeostatic body or freed by the adaptive psychological component? Rel ati v e l y narrow studies s o l ve this dilemma by concentrating on subsets of the human being that are consis­ tent. Many philosophical difficulties in grasping the nature of entire human beings stem precisely from the interplay that results from tre­ m e n d o u s l y c o m p l e x s y s t e m s at two l e v e l s being c o n j o i n e d in a s i n g l e entity. One advantage of such an arrangement, however, is that e n vi­ 73 ronmental processes can provide operant conditioning to shape init ial ly non-homeostatic processes part of the homeostatic into d e p e nd ab le responses that thus become system of the entity and Increase the range of environmental conditions within which that homeostatic system can func­ tion effectively. Any living s y s t e m is b u i l t fro m the h o m e o s t a t i c c o m p o n e n t s l o w e r - l e v e l s t r u c t u r e s that c o m p o s e it, components of the l o w e r - l e v e l complexity. s t r u c t u r e s are, related Any it can incorporate the homeostatic structures into Itself and thus gain in adaptive components of such at the p o i n t of i n c o r p o r a t i o n , m e r e to the u s e f u l n e s s the i r When a higher-level system provides the needed normal operating environment, homeostatic the for it is tho s e c o m p o n e n t s that can be c o u n t e d o n to p e r f o r m in p r e d i c t a b l e w a y s w i t h i n normal operating environments. of lower-level tag-alongs un­ of th ose s t r u c t u r e s to the h i g h e r - l e v e l system. The nature of this point. a higher-level entity's environment becomes crucial at To the e x t e n t that the h o m e o s t a t i c s y s t e m in the h i g h e r - lev el entity (built from the homeostatic components of Its l o w e r - l e v e l structures) is adequate the adaptive components to cope with the exigencies of the environment, of the lo wer-level the h o m e o s t a t i c are not u s e f u l -- structures inherited with e it h e r to the u p p e r - l e v e l e nti ty , w h i c h is c o p i n g w e l l a l r e a d y , or to the l o wer l e v e l en t i t y , w h i c h is now incorporated in an environment that is relatively stable; t h e r e f o r e tend to w i t h e r away. tities in a relatively simple they will This is the p r o c e s s by w h i c h the e n ­ environment grad ual ly become strictly 74 homeostatic. E ve n before they have, detect adaptive behavior because an observer would not be able to the environment requires nothing from the entities in it that their homeostatic systems cannot provide. If the environment of the u p p e r -l ev el entity, however, makes demands that cannot be met by the homeostatic system of that entity, t i v e c o m p o n e n t s m a y b e c o m e usa b l e . the adap­ If their f u n c t i o n i n g p e r m i t s an effective response to the environment, and if they interlock dependably with any other components of the upper-level entity, they w i l l be added to the upper -le ve l homeostatic system. Since such components were not part of the original homeostatic system, responses based on them entail changes in the o v e r a l l structure of the upper-level entity, and it is by this mechanism that fundamental changes in the homeostatic system of the entity can be made. E v e n in a v e r y c o m p l e x e n v i r o n m e n t , h o w e v e r , become strictly homeostatic. E v e ry time an entities w i l l adjustment in the tend to homeo­ st a t i c s y s t e m of an e n t i t y is m a d e by c o n v e r t i n g a p r e v i o u s l y n o n homeostatic component, two things happen. The first is that the flex­ i b i l i t y of the h o m e o s t a t i c s y s t e m is i m p r o v e d , so that f e w e r c i r c u m ­ stances will now require responses not a v a il abl e system. reduced. from the homeostatic The second is that the store of possible adaptive responses is In the l o n g run, t h e r e f o r e , the p r o c e s s e s d e s c r i b e d s h o u l d for ev ery entity either produce a homeostatic system capable of meeting every environmental exigency, or exhaust the store of non-homeostatic components and leave the entity at mortal risk when the next unexpected change in the environment arrives. 75 There are two ways in which this seemingly inevitable result is pre ven ­ ted. T h e firs t is that e v e r - l a r g e r e n t i t i e s k e e p f o r m i n g f r o m the incorporation of sm a l l e r ones. In the social sphere, for example, this ha s r e s u l t e d in g i g a n t i c e n t i t i e s b u i l t up from many, m a n y l a y e r s of lower-level structures; but by itself such a process w o uld u lti ma tel y p r o d u c e o n l y o n e s t r i c t l y h o m e o s t a t i c s oc i a l s y s t e m o v e r the e n t i r e earth. As living systems become more and more complex, appear to reach a point where onmental" variation. they they become their own sources of "envir­ That is to say, systems contain internal however, sufficiently complex contradictions that, by providing living continuing c h a l l e n g e s to one or a n o t h e r c o m p o n e n t , e n s u r e the g e n e r a t i o n of n e w non-homeostatic components. Presumably it is such types of systems that Buckley had in mind when he talked about adaptive systems. Whether on" or " de p e n d on" e n v i r o n m e n t a l m u c h b e t t e r a b le , in the in fact such systems "thrive v a r i a t i o n , they c e r t a i n l y w o u l d be l o n g run, to s u r v i v e in an e v e r - c h a n g i n g environment than could any strictly homeostatic system -- no matter how complicated. It is not aut omatically true, however, that upper-level systems whose l o w e r - l e v e l s t r u c t u r e s a re a d a p t i v e in the s ense j ust d e s c r i b e d are themselves vo l v e s adaptive. the homeostatic — stituent structures, those l ower-level entity. Since the basic process of system-formation not the non-homeostatic — elements in­ of con­ there is no assurance that the adaptive nature of structures w i l l have any effect on the upper- lev el Su ch an o u t c o m e d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r the h o m e o s t a t i c sy ste m 76 constructed is adequate to meet the u p p e r - l e v e l system. that the lower- lev el the vicissitudes of the environment of The o ne d i f f e r e n c e in s u c h a c a s e w o u l d be structures provide an ever-ready source of vari­ ety; u p p e r - l e v e l e n t i t i e s b u i l t from s u c h s t r u c t u r e s w o u l d not l ose their adaptive potential in a simple environment. With Buckley we w i l l assume that human beings are genuinely adaptive e n t i t i e s w i t h re g a r d to t heir s o c i a l and m e n t a l processes. T his a s ­ sumption means that any social system, at any level, has a never-ending so ur c e of n o n - h o m e o s t a t i c c o m p o n e n t s . homeostatic behavior, we must If such an e n t i t y s h o w s o n l y conclude that its environment does not r e q u i r e m o r e than the e x i s t i n g h o m e o s t a t i c s y s t e m of the e n t i t y for effective response. We s h a l l a s s u m e that U n i t e d S t a t e s s o c i e t y is a g e n u i n e l y a d a p t i v e system; but that no level of s o c i a l s y s t e m w i t h i n it is ( a l t h o u g h computerization and communication linkages may soon lead to much smal­ l e r a d a p t i v e s o c i a l systems). O r g a n i z a t i o n s , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l dyads, networks of social service organizations, and the entire Interorganiza­ tional networks of metropolitan areas we shall assume to be homeostatic with a never-ending source of non-homeostatic components. Such systems will then display more or less adaptive behavior in response environments. The practical question that results to their is how to distin­ guish homeostatic from adaptive responses. We s h a l l treat as h o m e o s t a t i c r e s p o n s e s those that are a l l or none. Although this is certainly a great simplification, it depends on the 77 notion that a homeostatic response occurs are pre s e n t in the e n v i r o n m e n t . if the necessary conditions W h e r e a set of r e s p o n s e s c a n be d e s ­ c ri b e d as a s m o o t h f u n c t i o n (in the cases of our a n a l y s e s , a linear function) of environmental variables, we w i l l conclude that an adaptive pr o c e s s in ongo ing . systems over time; I d e a l l y we w o u l d f o l l o w the p r o c e s s in s i n g l e instead we must here assume that the set of organi­ z a t i o n s (and sets of h i g h e r - l e v e l systems) s t u d i e d a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y similar in their construction that one-time data across the set can be substituted for longitudinal data. 3. The Adequacy of the Network Data The organizations examined in this study are a subset of entire m e t ro­ politan area interorganizational nets; indeed, since physical health, criminal justice, and educational o r g a n i z a t i o n s were e x c l u d e d d u r i n g data-gathering, the organizations examined are subsets of local health and welfare agencies. Trying to draw conclusions about mental such a subset requires caution, since to organizations outside the sets studied are a major influence on the processes reflected sons, however, meaningful First, there are no data to determine if links in the data actually gathered. to a s s u m e that There are two rea­ the o r g a n i z a t i o n s studied do m a k e a subset. the development of United Way organizations has regularized the g a t h e r i n g of p r i v a t e f u n d i n g for s o c i a l United Way funded organizations that met sets of organizations Similarly, studied. ceive state and federal mental service purposes, and a l l the size criterion are in the the organizations health and social that re­ services funding for 78 local community services are uniformly in our subsets. complete sets of organizations, Secondly, the o r g a n i z a t i o n s therefore, We have nearly defined by funding. in o u r sets are the t o t a l i t y of t h os e which, at the l o c a l l e v e l , s u b s t i t u t e o f f i c i a l l y for i n t e r p e r s o n a l networks that are inadequate. Wh ile schools and hospitals obviously dispense a form of social service, and while their c l i e n t e l e o b v i o u s l y include persons with profound social needs, they are organized primar­ ily to provide a service to the entire community that anyone might be e x p e c t e d to need. The c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system, w h i l e it c o n t a i n s a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n of p e r s o n s w i t h p r o f o u n d s o c i a l needs, is o r g a n i z e d primarily to protect others from its clients — themselves. It is the not to help the clients organizations we are studying that are specif­ i c a l l y d e s i g n e d to h e l p t h o s e w h o s e i n t e r p e r s o n a l adequate to meet the needs of their lives. i z a t i o n s s t u d i e d (the Red Cross, nearly "normal" clientele, n e t w o r k s are I n ­ Although some of the organ­ the Boy Scouts) are a i m e d at m o r e their Inclusion (given their common funding sources) should have lit tle effect on ov erall Interpretations. The next concern is the objectivity of the data collected ganizational links. tions, The data are al l gathered from agency head percep­ w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of f o r m a l within a project with a m a n a g e r be ca m e on interor­ relationships separate manager — a source of i n fo rm ati on. that In which case As took p l a c e the project the r e v i e w of n e t w o r k literature made clear, such attributional data cannot be assumed isomorphic with actual relationships. actional To minimize links are routinely considered the problem, to exist only if both to be inter­ parties 79 to the potential link reported it. This does not co m p l e t e l y eliminate bias, s i n c e the same c o n d i t i o n s that c a u s e one a g e n c y h e a d to n a m e a particular agency may work in reverse for the head of the other agency. More damaging, social processes may the omission of agencies introduce a systematic from those with whom links are bias reported; into and given our criterion, u n i l a t e r a l behavior could eliminate an actual link from consideration. We shal l have to assume, without adequate support th ere fo re, that the i n t e r a c t i o n a l l i n k a g e s d i s c o v e r e d by u s i n g o n l y mutual reporting properly reflect the actual social services network. A number of u m b r e l l a agencies which dispensed or coordinated funding were on the list of o r g a n i z a t i o n s that c o u l d be c hosen, but w e r e not interviewed themselves. social services, Because these agencies did not d e l i v e r direct t h ere is g o o d r e a s o n to b e l i e v e that i n t e r a g e n c y interaction related to actual service delivery is properly r eflected in the ties among the remaining agencies. Again, without proper support, we sh all have to assume that this is true, and also that the handful of direct-service agencies who chose not to participate in this study did not bias the results. A final concern is that the data collected are binary, relationships that may be quite different in volume to the o v e r a l l network. and thus equate and in importance We w i l l assume that the differences in organ­ ization size in the cities under consideration are not large enough to render any organization co mp let ely unimportant; and our hypotheses w i l l be fra m e d a r o u n d the d e g r e e of c o n n e c t e d n e s s in n e t w o r k s r a t h e r than the volume of interaction between various pairs. If our assumption is 80 corre ct , the n a t u r e of o u r h y p o t h e s e s m a y ens u r e that the findings point in the proper direction. C. The Interaction of Organizational Characteristics and Dyad Formation 1. Since Theoretical Explication the l e v e l of a n a l y s i s s e r v i n g as the p r i m a r y f o c u s dissertation is the network of social the importance of organizational th e i r e f f e c t s on t h e service organizations characteristics for in a city, as va ria ble s relationships with from doing so, lies in f o r m a t i o n of interorganizational relationships. If organizational processes impel some social service agencies out this other organizations, to seek but hinder other agencies then intervenors wishing to alter the network of social service agencies in a city must pay attention to the nature of the in­ dividual organizations in the network, and use their resources a l t e r e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s (or c r e a t e n e w ones) that w i l l form the d e s i r e d relationships. If, on to help to be of the type the other hand, social service organizations g e n e r a l l y tend to form relationships as a r e a c t i o n to e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r i n t e r n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , t h e n it w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y for an i n t e r v e n o r to put its resources into environmental changes. If both l e v e l s of processes a f f e c t the outco me, a t h o r o u g h k n o w l e d g e of the i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n lev els is essential to permit an intervenor for the resources available. to obtain the most effect 81 A handful of a s s u m p t i o n s w i l l h e l p g u id e us b a c k t h r o u g h traversed by Aiken and Hage and by Paulsen. the a r e a The first is that organi­ za t i o n s tend to f o r m r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i th o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . relationships are u s e d to o b t a i n re so urc es, to p r o t e c t These themselves through building alliances, and to provide a means for gaining informa­ tion about and c on tro l l i n g their environment — which consists primar­ ily of other organizations. A second assumption is that organization size is a crucial include in any study relating other and to variables at other organizational levels va r i a b l e to characteristics of analysis. Besides to each the fact that a strong relationship between size and complexity has been empir­ i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e n u m b e r of e m p l o y e e s an o r g a n i z a t i o n has o b ­ vi ously affects the v o l u m e of relationships it can carry on, one assumes the effect is linear or some other function. whether (Haire (1959) assumed that the effect depends on the number of positions allo ca ted to external relations, the sq u a r e of size.) the total which he concluded increases as the cube root of It is e s s e n t i a l to d e t e r m i n e the p r o p o r t i o n of variance size accounts for, and not simply to test (as Aiken and Hage did) w h e t h e r the c o r r e l a t i o n re m a i n s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y l a r g e after size is controlled. A third assumption is that innovation is a byproduct of the interaction between an organization and its environment, explanatory power in its own right. To and not a vari abl e with the extent that certain types of innovations directly affect either internal processes or interorgan­ izational contacts, those types of innovations should be separated as 82 particular variables, While the not treated as indices of innovation generally. creation of new programs may stimulate internal demand for a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s , as A i k e n and Hage a s s u m e (1968, p. 372), s u c h a measure hardly serves to represent the effects of all types of innova­ tions. The assumption here w i l l be that new programs serve as a m ec h­ anism by which an organization increases in size and/or complexity, and by which it forms relations with other organizations to help control its environment, and therefore reflect demand for resources rather than generate it. A fourth assumption is that the internal functioning of an organization is not related to the tions. formation of relationships with other S ince we c o n c e i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s to be h o m e o s t a t i c organiza­ systems, their internal workings should be r e l a t i v e l y buffered from the external environment. External r e l a t i o n s h i p s s h o u l d depend, r ather, on the capabilities and pressures that increasing size and complexity entail. The enabling aspect of size was discussed earlier. Complexity, ceived as variety in the types of positions in an organization, con­ repre­ sents the v a r i e t y in the ties to o t her o r g a n i z a t i o n s that e m p l o y e e s ' past h i s t o r i e s b r i n g to an a g e n c y and the b r e a d t h of ties that t h e r e ­ fore may be activated by the staff of an agency. In summary, then: (I) On the basis of e s t a b l i s h e d findings, a g e n c y staff size is e x ­ p e c t e d to be s t r o n g l y and d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d too r g a n i z a t i o n a l complexity as measured by the number of types of positions in the agency. 83 (2) Because of its enabling function in the development of interorgan­ izational relationships, agency size is expected to be strongly and directly related to the number of such relationships formed. (3) Because of its enabling function in the development of interorgan­ izational relationships, a g e n c y c o m p l e x i t y is e x p e c t e d to be strongly and directl y related to the number of such relationships formed. (A) Because the tendency of agencies to develop new programs reflects a complicated interaction between the capacity of the organization and demands of the environment, innovation is expected to show no relationship to the f o r m a t i o n of i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l relation­ ships, size, or complexity if the other two are controlled; nor is it e x p e c t e d to s h o w a r e l a t i o n s h i p to i n t e r n a l organizational variables when size, complexity, and IOR are controlled. (5) Since organizations are assumed to be homeostatic, interorganiza­ tional relations are assumed to be (from the perspective of organ­ izations) a t oo l therefore expected in m a i n t a i n i n g thei r functioning. There is to be no relationship between dyadic and intra- organlzatlonal vari abl es when size and complexity are controlled. 2. Data and Method of Analysis Bel ow are the working definitions of the variables used in this part of the analysis: 1. Size — * the square root of the total number of ful 1 - time-equiva­ lent paid positions. 2. Complexity -- number of occupational agency. specialties employed Agency heads were asked to list the occupational by the special- ties by their agencies project and the entries were later counted staff. Innovation — years, employed, A g e n c y h e ad s w e r e a s k e d wh e t h e r , i n the la st f i v e their agency had: (a) begun new programs because they were legally mandated; (b) begun new programs that were not legally mandated; (c) o f f e r e d s e r v i c e to new c l i e n t g r o u p s b e c a u s e of l e g a l m a n ­ date; (d) offered dated; (e) i n c r e a s e d the t o t a l n u m b e r of s e r v i c e s and p r o g r a m s it o f ­ fered. service to new cl ien t groups where not l e g a l l y man ­ A n s w e r s to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s w e r e used to form an i n d e x w i t h p o s ­ sible val ues ranging from 0 to 5. Centralization — S e v e n d i f f e r e n t areas of decision-making were s p e c i f i e d (see l i s t in A p p e n d i x A-3, p. 3), and a g e n c y h e a d s w e r e asked to identify those categories of employees (from a list which participated in the decision-making in each area. of 8) One point was added each time senior professional staff, junior professional staff, or p a r a p r o f e s s i o n a l staff were l i s t e d for an area. resulting index ranged from 0 (none of the three groups p ati n g in d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g in a n y area) to 21 ( a l l participating in decision-making in a l l then subtracted from 21 so that high 7 areas). scores would The partici­ three g r o u p s This score was indicate r ela ­ tive centralization of decision-making. Formalization — * agency heads were asked to identify, on a 5-point scale, the extent to which written criteria were used in each of 9 ar eas of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l op er ati on. distinctions among substantive Observing Mor s e ' s types of formalization, (1977) o n l y those 6 areas that direc tl y related to the work content of professional staff were used to form the Index (see list in Appendix B-3). The r e s u l t i n g i n d e x w a s c o n s t r u c t e d to ra nge in v a l u e f r o m 0 to 24. The c o n s t r u c t i o n of this m e a s u r e p e r m i t s a b e t t e r test of A i k e n and Hage's fifth hypothesis than t h eir ow n did, and predicts results in the same direction. Internal Communication — a g e n c y h e a d s w e r e a s k e d to iden ti fy, from a l i s t of e i g h t (see l i s t in A p p e n d i x 4), agency decision-making for which permanent staff those areas of committees were used, and the e x t e n t to w h i c h the c o m m i t t e e s w e r e u s e d (5-p oi nt scale). Th e r e s u l t i n g i n d ex w a s c o n s t r u c t e d to r a n g e in v a l u e from 0 to 32. Interorganlzational relations (IOR) — identify other organizations Agency heads were asked in their city for whom they to carried out p r o gr am s, w h o c a r r i e d out p r o g r a m s for them, a n d w i t h w h o m they had formal joint programs. In addition, where joint programs w e r e i d e n t i f i e d , t he n a me of a key a d m i n i s t r a t o r in the p r o g r a m was i d e n t i f i e d , and s e p a r a t e q u e s t i o n n a i r e s w e r e sent persons to obtain complete information on the nature to these of the pro­ g r a m and the l i s t of o r g a n i z a t i o n s p a r t i c i p a t i n g in it. with other sp on s e organizations to the three resulting questions from mutual on the selection questionnaire, Li nks in re­ or b e i n g identified by a program administrator in the special joint-pragram survey, were counted for each organization. The resulting v a ri­ a b l e v a l u e Is the n u m b e r of o r g a n i z a t i o n s to w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r organization is linked by formal agreement. 86 8. Efficiency — The agency budget: divided by the number of adminis­ trative positions. COMPARISON OF THE DATA TO AIKEN AND HAGE'S AND TO PAULSON'S DATA 1. Size. Paulson did not use this variable. Aiken and Hage did not specify how their measure of size was obtained, and they used rank o r d e r r a t h e r than a c t u a l makes the measure s ize as the v a r i a b l e (p. suspect as a control in a partial 391), which correlation. In addition, they only used it as a control variable. 2. Complexity. Aiken and Hage had a more careful version of the same thing: they counted specialties themselves based on the employees' descriptions of their work (p. 381). Paulson had a quite differ­ ent measure: number of administrative positions with title of (or s i m i l a r to) " a s s i s t a n t " (p. 334). 3. Innovation. T h e m e a s u r e u sed in this s t u d y is v e r y weak. Aiken and Hage obtained a count of the number of successfully implement­ ed n e w p r o g r a m s in the e i g h t years b e f o r e their s t u d y (p.385). Paulson used a count of the major changes in geographical location and service activities over the past five years and anticipated in the coming 4. five Centralization. used here. years (p. 335). A i k e n and Hage's m e a s u r e is s i m i l a r to the one The four d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a r e a s they u s e d w e r e w er e among those used here. In addition, rat her than a g e n c y h e a d e s t i m a t e s they used mean employee in f o r m i n g their responses i n d e x (p. Paulson's description of his measure is vague: "Composite: 388). frequency of n e w p r o g r a m i n i t i a t i o n by u n i t p l u s l e v e l of a u t o n o m y in d e c i s i o n ­ m a k i n g w h i c h a f f e c t s unit" (p. 334). 87 5. Formalization* A i k e n and H a g e had three m e a s u r e s of f o r m a l i z a ­ tion, n o n e of w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d c l o s e l y to ours. The c l o s e s t is the one they c a l l "specificity of job" which was formed by combin­ ing answers to 6 questions about the strictness of job procedures (p. 390). Paulson formed his measure from the frequency of use of w r i t t e n p r o c e d u r e s and the l e v e l of d e t a i l in w r i t t e n p o l i c i e s (p. 334). 6. Internal communication. Our measure to either of Aiken and Hage's: does not exactly correspond number of committees and number of n u m b e r of c o m m i t t e e m e e t i n g s per m o n t h (p. 386). P a u l s o n uses only the number of committee meetings per month (p. 334). 7. IOR. Aiken and Hage consider only formal joint programs (pp. 379- 80). Paulson Includes both the giving and receiving of resources and participation 8. E f fic ie ncy . in joint programs (p.335). A i k e n and Hage did not use this v a r i a b l e . Paulson used the m u l t i p l i c a t i v e inverse of the variable as it is defined he r e (p. 334). The p r e s e n t s t u d y p r o v i d e s th ree a d v a n t a g e s o v e r the e a r l i e r ones. First of all, the number of organizations examined is much greater: 272 a g e n c i e s p r o v i d e d d a t a on a l l v a r i a b l e s . Secondly, organizations the is much greater, encompassing s e r v i c e and m e n t a l h e a l t h o r g a n i z a t i o n s . from twelve cities, range of social F i n a l l y , d a ta ar e p r e s e n t providing twe lve case studies that can be double­ checked against the o v e r a l l drawbacks full the v a r i e t y o f to e a r l i e r w o r k data. Unfortunately, is p r e s e n t a b s e n c e of l o n g i t u d i n a l data. one of the greatest in this s t u dy as w e l l — the It is not p o s s i b l e to test the basic 88 mech a n i s m proposed here — that i n c r e a s i n g size and its correlate, i n c r e a s i n g d i v e r s i t y b o t h e n a b l e a g r e a t e r n u m b e r of i n t e r o r g a n i z a tional relations, and that each is in turn augmented by an increase in organizational relations (up to some limit set by a v a i l a b l e resources) — without such data. As a consequence, only the existence of a rela­ tion between each pair can be tested for. The m e t h o d of a n a l y s i s to be u s e d w i l l be c o r r e l a t i o n a l . thesis to be tested specifies the effects of controls on a zero-order Pearson correlation between two variables. u s ing o r d i n a r y p a r t i a l correlation, v a r i a n c e r e m a i n i n g to be e x p l a i n e d , variables, Each h y p o ­ Control w ill be carried out which shows the p r o p o r t i o n of a f te r c o n t r o l l i n g for a set of that a particular other independent variable accounts for (Nie et al., 1972, pp. 332-334). The use of size as a variable raises the q u e s t i o n of w h a t f o r m a t i o n of it (if any) is a p p r o p r i a t e for the a n a l y s i s . Schoenherr (1971) used ity. trans­ B l a u and the logarithm of size to compare it to com plex­ H a i re (1959) u s e d the s q u a r e of the cube root of size to c o m p a r e it to the n u m b e r of p o s i t i o n s w i t h e x t e r n a l contact. T h e us e of the square root transformation here is based on the fact that the number of r e l a t i o n s h i p s a m o n g a set of e n t i t i e s I n c r e a s e s as the s q u a r e of the n u m b e r of entities. If the e n t i r e staff of an a g e n c y is c o n s i d e r e d a v a i l a b l e for maintaining external relations, therefore, IOR should be related to the square root of staff size. Our data are not adequate to support fine distinctions in the exponent applied to size for analysis. We w i l l assume that the square root is an adequate approximation. With twelve subsets (our cities) contained within the ov e r a l l z a t i o n s it is p o s s i b l e set of organi­ to test w h e t h e r the p h e n o m e n a we p r e d i c t are w i d e s p r e a d , or w h e t h e r the r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d in the c o m b i n e d d a t a set simply reflect v e r y strong results in certain cities. The probability of obtaining correlations of a given sign in sets of data uted b i n o m i a l l y w i t h a p r o b a b i l i t y of 0.5. positive correlation, therefore, nificances of the correlations, the correlations in cities is distrib­ If e n o u g h c i t i e s h a v e a regardless of the s t a t i s t i c a l we can reject the null hypothesis that like ours are not positive. The number of cities in a sample of 12 that must have positive correlations binomial probability to drop be low 0.05 is of Harvard University, (a) For a l l 10 (Computation for the Laboratory 1952, p. 404). 3. 1. sig­ Specific Hypotheses organizations, agency size w i l l have a significant positive zero-order Pearson correlation with agency c omplex­ ity. (b) When partial correlation is used to control of IOR and of agency centralization, for the effects formalization, communication, and efficiency, agency size w i l l internal still have a significant positive correlation with agency complexity. (c)* Positive zero-order and partial correlations (as specified in parts (a) and (b) above) w i l l occur in the organizations of at least 2. (a) For a l l sets ten of the twelve cities studied. organizations, agency size will have a significant positive zero-order Pearson correlation with IOR. (b) When partial of correlation is used agency complexity, to control centralization, for the effects formalization, inter­ n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d e f f i c i e n c y , a g e n c y size w i l l s t i l l have a significant positive correlation with IOR, (c) Positive zero-order and partial correlations (as specified in parts (a) and (b) above) w i l l of at least (a) occur in the organization sets ten of the twelve cities studied. For a l l organizations, agency complexity will have a signif­ icant positive zero-order Pearson correlation with IOR, (b) When partial correlation is used of agency size, centralization, munication, and efficiency, to control for the effects formalization, internal the partial correlation com­ between agency c omp lexity and IOR, agency complexity w i l l still have a significant positive correlation with IOR. (c) Positive parts (a) zero-order and partial correlations (as specified in and (b) above) will occur in the organizations sets of at least ten of the twelve cities studied. G i v e n as a d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e a g e n c y i n n o v a t i o n , and g i v e n as Independent var ia ble s the size, complexity, and IOR count of the a g e n c y (set 1); and the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , i n t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , formalization, and efficiency of the agency (set 2): (a) when partial correlation is used to control for the effects of the other va riables in set 1, each variable in set 1 w i l l fail to h a v e a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h the dependent variable; (b) when partial correlation of the v a r i a b l e s is used in set to control for the effects 1, e a c h of the v a r i a b l e s in set 2 w i l l fail to have a significant positive correlation with the dependent variable; (c) the partial correlations specified in (a) and (b) above, examined separately e a c h case n ot for the twelve cities studied, be s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o r e of one s i g n when will in than the other. G i v e n as d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s the centralization, formalization, internal communication and efficiency of an agency, as an indepen­ dent variable the IOR count of the agency, bles the complexity and size of the agency: (a) when partial c o r r e l a t i o n the control variables, and as control is used to c o n t r o l the e f f e c t s of the independent variable w i l l have a significant positive varia­ fail to c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h e a c h of the dependent v a r i a b l e s ; (b) the partial correlation specified in (a) above, when examined s e p a r a t e l y for the o r g a n i z a t i o n sets of the t w e l v e c i t i e s studied, sign will than the in each case not be significantly more of one other. 92 D. The Development of Dyadic Interaction 1. Theoretical Explication A replication of Rogers' and Klonglan's method provides a very general test for the relative complexity of the environment in which organiza­ tional dyads are formed. Since organizational dyads are here assumed to be adaptive systems, they should show adaptive behavior in env iron­ ments complex enough to evoke it. In environments too simple to evoke adaptive behavior, adaptive systems would be expected to show behavior indistinguishable from homeostatic systems. In network terms, Rogers and Kl o n g l a n et al. studied the development of m u l t i p l e x i t y in o r g a n i z a t i o n a l dyads. A d y ad can be I n t e r p r e t e d to "grow" simply by increasing frequency of contact or volume of exchange along a single dimension. detected without N o t h i n g a b o u t s u c h g r o w t h p a t t e r n s can be longitudinal data. Dyadic "growth" can also a d d i t i o n of t ypes of l i n k s to those a l r e a d y existing. this type of growth sequence, dyads however, observed the D e t e c t i o n of in a single dyad also requires longitudinal In a population of dyads, invariant mean data. if the addition of links follows an at any point in time w i l l exhibit the p r e s e n c e of a g i v e n type of l i n k o n l y if the types of l i n k s that ar e p r e c u r s o r s are presen t. It thus b e c o m e s p o s s i b l e w i t h o n e - t i m e data to test hypotheses about one aspect of dyadic growth over Two aspects of the environments of the dyads studied here lead time. to the p r e d i c t i o n that they are c o m p l e x e n o u g h to e v o k e a d a p t i v e b e h a v i o r . The first is the v a r i e t y of r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e : 51 % of the a g e n c i e s 93 I n d i c a t e d that their s o u r c e s of f u n d i n g had i n c r e a s e d o v e r five years. Ninety-six percent of the organizations the past providing data on the question reported more than one source of funding, and 77% reported more than two. While funding is fairly concentrated in many organiza­ tions, o v e r 40% got at l e a s t 25% of their f u n d i n g from o u t s i d e their pr i m a r y source. The second condition leading us to predict that environments are com­ plex enough to evoke adaptive behavior is the amount of change in the networks providing resources to and controlling the organizations form­ ing the dyads. M o s t of the o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o m p o s i n g the n e t w o r k s are r e l a t i v e l y young: the majority came into existence in the two decades be f o r e this s t u d y was d one in r e s p o n s e to g r o w i n g d e m a n d for m e n t a l h e a l t h s e r v i c e s and s e r v i c e s to the aging, minority groups; fore, most are also still relationships to women, and to e t h n i c that make up the networks, r e l a t i v e l y new. there­ The relative newness of most of each network, combined with other sources of change, have resulted in a f er m e n t of s e r v i c e - r e l a t e d c han ge s: 85% of the o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t e r ­ viewed indicated changes in sources of funds, or services they had been mandated 3 y e a r s p r i o r to the study. circumstances 56% indicated changes dyad and 31% to serve new client groups in the O n l y 5% i n d i c a t e d no c h a n g e on any of and 54% indicated changes on three or more. surrounding loca­ to participate in new over the three years prior to the study, indicated that they had been mandated these parameters, programs, 48% indicated changes in number of service tions, 41% indicated that programs in number of formation and existence have state of flux along several dimensions for several years. Thus the been in a 94 Since an invariant sequence to the building of multiplexity in dyads is evidence of homeostatic behavior; since it is assumed here that organ­ izational dyads are adaptive systems, and thus w ill display homeostatic behavior only in environments an d sin ce the e n v i r o n m e n t s too simple of to evoke adaptive the d y a d s h e r e s t u d i e d a p p e a r complex enough to evoke adaptive behavior in dyads; m e n t of m u l t i p l e x i t y in this variable. Specifically, behavior; to be then the de v e l o p ­ p o p u l a t i o n of d y a d s s h o u l d be h i g h l y a t t e m p t s to s c a l e types of l i n k s b e t w e e n organizations should fall. 2. The Data and Method of Analysis The data useful for scaling relational components are the responses the t w e l v e n e t w o r k q u e s t i o n s to that describe interaction between agen­ cies : 1. other agency provides cooperation and support; 2. conflict in past few years; 3. other agency refers clients; 4. own agency refers clients 5. e x c h a n g e opinions,information, and ideas; 6. s e r v e on same forces; 7. rely 8. have cooperative informal relationship; 9. have community to other agency; committees and planning task on other agency to de l i v e r own agency's services; formal relationship: run program(s) for other agency; 10. have formal relationship: own agency; other agency runs programs 11. have formal relationship: operate joint program; 12. have formal relationship: other kind. for 95 This l i s t as a w h o l e is not u s a b l e for the a n a l y s i s here. S i nc e a r e l a t i o n s h i p has b e e n d e f i n e d to oc cur o n l y if a c k n o w l e d g e d by b o t h p a r t i c i p a n t s , items 1 a n d 7 c a n n o t be used at a l l since n e i t h e r has a complementary question. Mut ual acknowledgment of conflict (item 2) and of e a c h of the four t ypes of f o r m a l a r r a n g e m e n t s (items 9 t h r o u g h 12) is so rare that the resulting data sets are unusable for scaling. The referral of clients (items 3 and 4) can be verified in each direction; the i n t e r s e c t i o n of those two sets, h o w e v e r , w h i c h p r o v i d e s a m u t u a l relationship, is likewise too small to be usable for scaling. T h e o n l y three items l e f t a r e the e x c h a n g e of o pinions, i n f o r m a t i o n , and ideas (it em 5); m u t u a l cooperative relationships g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p (i tem 6); and (item 8). informal A fourth item can be constructed however, from the union of the very small data sets created from mutual responses to i tems 9 t h r o u g h project managers 12, adding for joint programs. in the dyads i d e n t i f i e d by The resulting type of link (for­ mal cooperative relationship) is a set large enough to use for scaling. The construction of the links identified was different in one signif­ i c a n t w a y from the d a t a that R o g e r s and that K l o n g l a n a n a l y z e d . each of their studies, In the actual responses of agency heads were a n a l ­ yzed, so that they a c t u a l l y m e a s u r e d the t e n d e n c y of a g e n c y h e a d s to report given patterns rather than the actual patterns. work by Russell and Bernard established, two are i somorphic. it cannot be assumed that the S i nc e the i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l study are based on mutual reports, As the reviewed tie d a t a in this they should more nea rly correspond to the a c t u a l p a t t e r n of ties in the sets of o r g a n i z a t i o n s , an d thus 96 m o r e a d e q u a t e l y test the p r o p o s i t i o n s that Ro ger s a nd K l o n g l a n put forth. Any differences In findings here compared with theirs may be in part or in total a result of the difference in measures. Si n c e the h y p o t h e s i s h e r e is that s c a l i n g s h o u l d not occur, the m o s t e x a c t i n g test p o s s i b l e is to s c a l e o n l y three items, an d to use be s t e m p i r i c a l ordering r a t h e r than any p r e - c h o s e n one. scale cannot be formed with fewer than three items; the A Guttman to use three items is the most exacting test because each added item increases the likel i­ hood that irregularities in the data will reduce scalability. To use the best e m p i r i c a l o r d e r i n g is m o s t e x a c t i n g b e c a u s e no t h e o r e t i c a l ordering can do better. items Preliminary scaling runs showed that the three that are prima facie candidates for a scale of progressive com­ m i t m e n t to r e l a t i o n s h i p ou t of the four p o s s i b l e , a l s o s h o w h i g h e s t scaling potential. These three items are: — exchange opinions, information , and ideas — have cooperative informal relationship — have formal cooperative relationship The links to be analyzed in this study were not chosen to correspond to those used by Rogers and Klonglan. "Exchange of opinions, information, and ideas" is m u c h m o r e i n c l u s i v e than the e x i s t e n c e of an a g e n c y o n another's mailing and Klonglan. the sharing, list — the closest equivalent item used A "cooperative informal relationship" by Rogers probably includes lo a n i n g , a n d p r o v i d i n g of r e s o u r c e s u sed as an i t em by R o g e r s and by K l o n g l a n ; but it a l s o may i n c l u d e j o int p r o g r a m m i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s that h a v e not b e en f o r m a l i z e d in w r i t i n g — a category 97 that is included by K l o n g l a n (who does not distinguish between and informal joint program arrangements). Finally, "formal gra m s " i n c l u d e s both the c o n c e p t of joint p r o g r a m m i n g — item on Klonglan's list — and formal written agreement, formal joint pro­ a separate which is the topmost leve l of relationship for both-Rogers and Klonglan. Clearly, then, the analysis here replicates Rogers and/or K l o n g l a n very generally, not in any specific th ei r s t u d i e s need comment. (and, sense. First, Two additional contrasts with the populations of organizations presumably, dyads) in this study more nearly resemble Klonglan's county-level set than Rogers' set in being providers of direct services to clients. There is therefore oretical reasons already given, scalability of items) rather items). Second, some empirical reason, beyond to expect results like Klonglan's (low than Rogers' (much higher the a g e n c i e s s t u d i e d here ar e a l l ganizations equivalent the the­ scalability of l o c a l - l e v e l or­ to the county l e v e l in Klonglan's study. There is therefore no reason to expect the wide variability in best empirical ordering that he linked to differential administrative level. 3. Specific Hypothesis A Guttman scaling procedure a p pl ie d interaction — exchange of opinions, to these three types of d y a d i c information, and ideas; informal cooperative relationships; and formal cooperative relationships — even if using the best empirical ordering, w i l l fall to produce a scale with both reproducibility greater than 0.9 and a s c a l a b i l i t y g r e a t e r 0.6. This f a i l u r e w i l l cities, than o c c u r b o t h for a l l dy ads a c r o s s the t w e l v e and for the dyads in each particular city. 98 E. The Conditioning of Dyadic Relationships by Network Characteristics 1. Theoretical Explication A network concept u s e f u l l y r e l e v a n t to the l i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w e d on interorganizational networks is c e n t r a l i t y . The r e s o u r c e d e p e n d e n c e p e r s p e c t i v e d e f i n e s n e t w o r k s as a set of exc ha nge s, in w h i c h o r g a n ­ i z a t i o n s w i t h m a n y r e s o u r c e s h a v e the p o t e n t i a l to f o r m ( n e g o t ia te) more relationships than organizations with few resources. The relative number of relationships of an organization is one aspect of centrality — The one L. Freeman c a l l s degree (1979, pp. 219-221). larger number of direct sources to ex c h a n g e , relations of organizations with many re­ c o m b i n e d w i t h t heir i m p o r t a n c e as a s o u r c e of resources within the network generally, make them likely to be very few exchange links away from any other organization and thus to have a very l o w a v e r a g e d i s t a n c e f r o m o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the network. The average distance is a second aspect of centrality, which Freeman labels closeness (pp. 224-226). Finally, the greater number with many resources, of direct combined with links formed the wider by organizations variety of relationships those resources are likely to enable, w i l l tend to make those organiza­ tions s e r v e as tr a d i n g hubs, rectly. Existence on the indirect links joining other organizations is a third aspect of c e n t r a l i t y , 121-124). linking many other organizations indi­ w h i c h F r e e m a n l a b e l s b e t w e e n n e s s (pp. 99 Th ese three a s p e c t s of i n d i v i d u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c e n t r a l i t y c a n be generalized to measures of centralization (Freeman, 1979, pp. 226-231). the sum of differences other organization, in an entire network E a c h is g e n e r a l i z e d in the same way: as between the most central organization and each divided by the maximum possible such sum given number of organizations In the organizational the in the network. networks we are studying, n o r m a l l y c o mes from o u t s i d e the net works; network is going to stem primarily organizations more endowed with legal coercive power so that power w i t h i n the from resource availability. resources would be expected Then to become most central; and centralization in the entire network would be expect­ ed to d i m i n i s h as the n u m b e r of o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l re­ sources of their own increases. If we start with a fai rly centralized network with a certain number of relations, there are three ways to change the le vel of centralization: (1) replace ties to a central node with ties between two nodes that are not c e n t r a l ; (2) add ties to the n e t w o r k that are d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y between non-central nodes; (3) subtract disproportionately from those i n v o l v i n g Marsden (1983, ties from the network that are central nodes. L a u m a n n and pp. 334-336) maintain that networks with less concentra­ tion of resources will generate more exchange ties. It is consistent w i t h b o t h their s u b s t a n t i v e a s s e r t i o n a nd the l o g i c a l one a b o v e to p r o p o s e this: if n e w c e n t e r s of r e s o u r c e s are a d d e d to a n e t w o r k (by inserting new organizations, number of ties dev elo ped or b e t t e r e n d o w i n g e x i s t i n g ones), the between relatively poorly endowed organiza- 100 Cions w i l l vo l v i n g increase r e l a tiv ely This proposition, venor desiring — proportionately more wel l- endowed if true, to increase than organizations the number (a mu lti p l i e r would provide useful guidance the rate of of in­ effect). to an inter- interconnection among for example to encourage joint programming as a way ties agencies to provide more services to clients. F o r any s i n g l e o r g a n i z a t i o n in a netwo rk, h o w e v e r , r e g a r d l e s s of its le vel of endowment, the network analysis above shows that it w i l l be most central (at least in the sense of closeness and betweenness) if it has connections (in an y sense). to one or more organizations that are already central This p o i n t is c r u c i a l to the p l a n n i n g for n e w o r g a n ­ izations in social service networks. d e s c r i b e w h a t occ u r s in a c t u a l If the logical argument proves to n e t w or ks, an i n t e r v e n o r p l a n n i n g to create a new organization for providing certain services would be w ell advised to mandate relationships to it by those organizations already central in the network. F i n a l l y , w h e n o n l y a fe w o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e r es our c e s , no t o n l y the basic exchange relationships but o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s (the r e d u n d a n c y that L a u m a n n and M a r s d e n r e f e r to (p. 336)) are l i k e l y to be c o n c e n ­ trated on the well-endowed organizations. however, Contrary to their assertion, this mult ipl exi ty should diminish when resource concentration and its consequent network centralization is reduced. Redundancy (seen from the perspective of an individual organization) can be achieved by multiplexity, but it can also be achieved by mu l t i p l e simplex relation­ ships. The c h o i c e b e t w e e n m u l t i p l e x i t y and m u l t i p l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s 101 should u ltimately depend on w h i c h is the m o r e costly (this is an analogue of Williamson's contention that internal hierarchies are built as alternatives to external market [exchange] the r e l a t i v e c osts of e a c h (1975, pp. 8-10). m u l t i p l e relationships relationships based on In at l e ast some cases, should prove advantageous, and thus reduce the o v e r a l l multiplexity of the network. In summary, we are predicting that: 1. organizations with ties to central organizations in a network w i l l h a ve more exchange relationships generally; 2. n e t w o r k s w i t h m o r e c e n t e r s of r e s o u r c e c o n c e n t r a t i o n w i l l have a higher density of ties between non-central organiza­ tions ; 3. n e t w o r k s w i t h m o r e c e n t e r s of r e s o u r c e c o n c e n t r a t i o n w i l l tend to have a lower o ve r a l l le vel of multiplexity. 2. Data and Method of Analysis The a n a l y s i s for this s e c t i o n r e q u i r e s a w o r k i n g d e f i n i t i o n of those organizations that are "centers of resource concentration". The study on which this dissertation is based contains no measures of the resour­ ces directly a v a i l a b l e for exchange that various organizations have. The re are data on b u d g e t s a n d s t a f f sizes, a nd these m i g h t m a k e a d e ­ quate substitute measures; missing data showed but an analyis of the bias among cases with that any analyses based on organizational charac­ t e r i s t i c s (such as b u d g e t and s t a f f size) w o u l d be h i g h l y s u s p e c t if they depended on the a v a i l a b l e data to estimate the actual distribution of those characteristics in the entire set. 102 Aldrich maintains (1976b, p. 423), however, literature generally echoes the contention, of resource ava il abi lit y w i l l network. measure W hi l e and the resource dependency that predominance in terms result in general the data a v a i l a b l e of resource availability, predominance within a do not provide an adequate they do include responses direct to three separate attributive questions that can provide indirect measures: 1. What agencies community? have the most 2. What agencies have the most influence over social service decisions in this community? 3. What agencies influence the decisions it makes? what prestige your in this agency does and The degree of centrality an organization has in the resource a llo cat ion system of a local network should be reflected in the proportion of al l choices made in any of these influence dimensions that o r g a n i z a t i o n . influence S i n c e the t h ree q u e s t i o n s differently, however, address the i s s u e of it is unl i k e l y various agencies' pro­ p o r t i o n s w i l l be the s a m e on each. strength, however, that are directed at T h is d i f f e r e n c e can be u s e d as a by combining the three into a single index. Preliminary analysis showed that, for any given question, using 5% as the criterion leve l provided a usable result: in a l l cities the number of o r g a n i z a t i o n s m e e t i n g that c r i t e r i o n was at leas t two and at m o s t eight on each dimension. A clo se examination of cases showed that many organizations showed up as influential on two dimensions, on three; that a handful but very few of organizations barely meeting the criterion on one dimension received almost no choices on the other two; and that a few organizations almost but not quite met the criterion on a l l three 103 d ime ns i o n s . The c o n s t r u c t e d m e a s u r e was d e s i g n e d to take a l l t h ese f a c t s Into accoun t: a n o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s d e f i n e d to be c e n t r a l if the sum of its proportions of choices received across the three questions e x c e e d e d 10%. Next it was necessary to construct a measure of ove r a l l centralization at the c i t y l e v e l . I d e a l l y such a var i a b l e would have a sufficient ra n g e of v a l u e s that the t w e l v e c i t i e s w o u l d e a c h h a v e a d i f f e r e n t value. The number of organizations defined as central (as given above) proved much ring. less than ideal, An alternative, tion in a network is with only eight different val u e s occur­ related way to examine to approach measuring centraliza­ the number of organizations necessary to a c c u m u l a t e a c e r t a i n p e r c e n t of the c h o i c e s m ad e in r e s p o n s e to a give n question. This measure also has the value that it reflects the a c t u a l n u m b e r of c e n t e r s of power, r a t h e r than the p r o p o r t i o n those centers are of the total number of organizations. Within the range of network size in our cities (38 to 66), we assume the absolute number of c e n t e r s to be m u c h m o r e c r u c i a l than the p r o p o r t i o n they are of a l l organizations. T h e m e a s u r e c o n s t r u c t e d w a s the sum of the n u m b e r s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s n e e d e d to a c c u m u l a t e 50% of the c h o i c e s r e c e i v e d in r e s p o n s e three questions separately. The resulting to the values ranged from 4 to 25, and there were 10 different valu es among the 12 cities* The measures defined provide a way to distinguish influential from noninfluential organizations, and to m e a s u r e the overall level of 104 concentration of influence in a city's social service network. It is st il l necessary to define the density and multiplexity measures for our networks. basis There are four dimensions of interaction that can serve as a for these measures. They are represented by the following five questions: W i t h w h i c h a g e n c i e s d o e s yours exchange opinions, information, and ideas? With which agencies does yours informal cooperative relationships? With which agencies does yours have formal cooper­ ative relationships? Which agencies send people to your agency for ser­ vices? To which agencies does your agency send people for services? In this case our Interest is in actual relationships, not attributions; so a relationship w i l l not be counted unless it is acknowledged by both parties. The e x c e p t i o n to this Is w i t h f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s : w h e r e directors of joint programs named p a r t i c i p a n t s , assumed to exist without regard the r e l a t i o n s h i p was to responses of the participants. The referral of clients from one agency to another was assumed to occur if the one reported receiving and the other reported sending. The d e n s i t y of r e l a t i o n s h i p s in a n e t w o r k is s i m p l y the n u m b e r that occur divided by the number that can occur. ties (like exchange of information, and formal equal cooperative In the case of reciprocal informal cooperative relationships, relationships), the number of possible ties is to (N x (N-l))/2, where N Is the number of organizations. In the 105 case of asymmetric ties, (like the referral ization to another), section, of clients from one organ­ the number of possible ties is N x (N-l). In this since we are concerned with density of ties among non-central organizations, N is the number of organizations that did not meet the criterion for inclusion In the set of central organizations. The same set of q u e s t i o n s s e r v e s as the basis for the d e f i n i t i o n of multiplexity. For any dyad, the multi ple xi ty any of these: ships, and formal cooperative relationships. problem. exchange of information, One the one hand, score had one added for informal cooperative relation­ Client referral posed a to give a full point for exchange in either direction seemed out of proportion, since organizations sending clients both ways would then add two points to their dyad multiplexity score; but r e q u i r i n g r e f e r r a l b o t h d i r e c t i o n s In o r d e r to add to the scor e se em e d u n d u l y r e s t r i c t i v e . Referral in e i t h e r direct io n, t h e n was counted as half a point, so that referral in both would count as a full point. For an entire network, average m u l t i p l e x i t y was defined as the total of multiplexity scores, for those dyads with any of the defined relation­ s h i p s , d i v i d e d by the n u m b e r of s u c h dyads. This d e f i n i t i o n was m a d e s p e c i f i c a l l y to p r e v e n t c o n f o u n d i n g the d e n s i t y v a r i a b l e ( w h i c h is concerned with the actual existence of a link) with the mu lti plexity variable (which is concerned with the content of the link). 3. Specific Hypotheses The more influential organizations a non-influential organization is r e l a t e d to, on a n y or a l l below, three d i m e n s i o n s p e c i f i e d the more relations it w i l l have with other non-inf luential organizations on all — — — of the three dimensions. exchange of opinions information, and ideas informal cooperative relationships formal cooperative relationships The less c o n c e n t r a t e d the s t u c t u r e of i n f l u e n c e is in a s o c i a l services network, as measured by the sum of the numbers of organ­ iza t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to a c c u m u l a t e 50% of the c h o i c e s m a d e in r e ­ sp o n s e to the thre e q u e s t i o n s l i s t e d be low , the g r e a t e r w i l l be the density of relationships among non-influential organizations on the three dimensions listed in hypothesis 1 above. — — W hat a g e n c i e s h a v e the m o s t p r e s t i g e ? W h a t a g e n c i e s h a v e the m o s t i n f l u e n c e o v e r s o c i a l s e r v i c e decisions? W h a t a g e n c i e s i n f l u e n c e w ha t y our a g e n c y d o e s and the decisions it makes? — The less concentrated the s t r u c t u r e of i n f l u e n c e service network, as defined in hypothesis 2 above, in a s o c i a l the lower w ill be the average mult ipl ex ity of those relationships that exist in the network, where m u l t i p l e x i t y is defined over the following four dimensions: — — — — exchange of opinions information, and ideas; informal cooperative relationships; formal cooperative relationships; referral of clients. 107 F. The Effect of the Local Environment on the Local Social Service Delivery Network 1. The data collected Theoretical Explication for this project contain no direct measures of the degree of integration of the various metropolitan areas, m e n t to be f o l l o w e d m u s t be ind ire ct . important cated demographic in the earlier preconditions research: M e a s u r e s are p r e s e n t of some of metropolitan average so the argu­ integration indi­ socioeonomlc status of inhabi­ tants, e c o n o m i c d i s p e r s i o n , l e v e l of i n - m i g r a t i o n , and d i v e r s i t y of ethnic We stock. begin by assuming, consistent with the research reviewed in Chapter 2, that higher average SES of inhabitants, greater economic dispersion, a lesser proportion of in-migration, and greater diversity of ethnic stock are conditions that lead to more stable, politan n e t w o r k s with m u l t i p l e centers of power. interorganizational We next assume that the condition of the social reflect the condition of the better connected metro­ services network w il l larger metropolitan network: that w e l l - connected social services networks with m u l ti ple centers of power w ill be found in similar metropolitan networks, and connected social tions w i l l service networks dominated that r e l a t i v e l y poorly by one or a few organiza­ be found in cities with similar networks. This assumption requires some explanation. F o r p u r p o s e s of d e l i v e r i n g s o c i a l s e r v i c e s to i n d i v i d u a l s , we h a v e considered the social service organizations a proper network in its own 108 right; for, by definition, ot her organizations cannot form r e l a t i o n ­ s h i p s w i t h the s o c i a l s e r v i c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s for p u r p o s e s of s e r v i c e delivery. however, For the g a t h e r i n g of f u n d i n g an d the s e t t i n g of p o l i c i e s , the social service organizations are c lo s e l y tied to a w h ole r a n g e of o r g a n i z a t i o n s of o t h e r sorts. from organizational campaigns M u c h U n i t e d W a y m o n e y comes carried out by large employers. Public f u n d i n g comes f r o m s e v e r a l l a y e r s of g o v e r n m e n t s and is a f f e c t e d by lobbying on behalf of a wide range of organizational interests. extent that there are m u l t i p l e the m e t r o p o l i t a n n e t w o r k , opportunities to build To the power centers (sources of resources) social in s e r v i c e s agencies w i l l have better power and resource bases independent of others. The same forces operating to link organizations g e n e r a l l y in the larger network will link them within any subnet as well. In g e n e r a l , then, preconditions work, the b a s i c h y p o t h e s i s here is that the b e t t e r the for an integrated the better integrated in the sense of its o v e r a l l centers metropolitan the social interorganizational services network w i l l be, net­ both l e v e l of c o n n e c t i o n and in the n u m b e r of of power. 2. The Data and Method of Analysis The dependent variable for this section is the concentration of in flu­ ence in the social services network. The measure for the varia ble w i l l be the one d e s c r i b e d in s e c t i o n D, w h i c h c o m b i n e s i n f o r m a t i o n a bout a g e n c y head sions. perceptions of i n f l u e n t i a l organizations on three dimen­ 109 There are four independent variables: population turnover, degree of economic dispersion, ethnic diversity, and average socioeconomic status of residents. Population turnover is measured by the proportion of the 1970 p o p u l a t i o n of e a c h c o u n t y c o n t a i n i n g one of the c i t i e s s t u d i e d that migrated into the county between of in-migration are considered 1965 and 1970. to generate High proportions instability in a met r o p o l ­ itan n et w o r k , but o u t - m i g r a t i o n is not (A i k e n and A l f o r d , 1970a), so actual in-migration rather than net migration is the measure used. The m e a s u r e of e c o n o m i c d i s p e r s i o n is the n u m b e r of e c o n o m i c o r g a n ­ izations in the county w i t h 100 or m o r e e m p l o y e e s , which measures dispersion in the sense of the number of centers of power. It assumes an absolute rather than a re l a t i v e interpretation of power; the latter would be better measured by the Gini coefficient of organization size. A Gini coefficient, however, woul d equate cities with only small organ­ izations except for a handful of larger ones and cities with many large organizations but a handful of v ery large ones. It is our contention that the s m a l l city w o u l d h a v e a t r e m e n d o u s c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p o wer s i n c e o n l y a few o r g a n i z a t i o n s w o u l d be lar g e e n o u g h to s e r v e as a resource base; whereas in the second city, although a few organizations might have disproportionate power, there w ould be many organizations large enough to serve as a resource base. Ethnic heterogeneity is measured by the percent of the non-black pop­ u l a t i o n w i t h b o t h p a r e n t s b o r n in the U n i t e d S t a t e s — complement of heterogeneity. a c t u a l l y the The proportion of Hispanic population in e a c h city was q u i t e s m a l l , a nd s h o u l d c o n t a i n a l a rg e p r o p o r t i o n of 110 persons with parents born outside constructing the U. S., and so was not u s e d in this measure. T he m e a s u r e of s o c i o e c o n o m i c s t a t u s is an index based on w o r k d o n e by B e r r y (1972). In his f a c t o r a n a l y t i c s t u d y of U.S. cities, tained a strong factor that he 12 v a r i a b l e s (p. 22). he o b ­ labeled socioeconomic status containing S e v e n of thes e v a r i a b l e s are i d e n t i c a l to or n ear l y the same as the asterisked variables in Table 3F-1 below, taken from the data gathered for this project. TABLE 3F-1 Variable Loadings on SES Factor Variable Loading of equivalent variable in Berry (p.22) First stage loading Second stage loading Third stage loading Fourth stage loading 0.998 0.999 0.990 0.994 0.805 *% of HS graduates 0.950 in over-25 pop. *% of families -0.759 with annual income < $3000 per capita value 0.870 of real property ♦median family 0.839 income *% of families 0.799 with annual income > $10000 *% of employed that 0.841 are white-collar % of employed that 0.929 are prof-tech ♦percent of over-16 0.620 p o p . employed ratio of suburban -0.566 to central city per capita income per capita value of 0.201 all bank deposits 0.948 0.929 0.938 0.834 -0.762 -0.778 -0.747 -0.747 0.865 0.844 0.851 0.844 0.861 0.860 0.876 0.801 0.819 0.814 0.897 0.841 0.834 0.833 0.783 0.935 0.929 0.945 0.617 0.638 -0.514 — ■ *median education — — — — — — -0.553 j j . i_ i ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ Ill To obtain an SES index, all variables in Table 3F-1 were forced into a single f a c t o r du r i n g a f a c t o r a n a l y s i s , lowest l o a d i n g was dropp ed. This and the v a r i a b l e w i t h the p r o c e s s was r e p e a t e d u n t i l each remaining variable had at least half its variance accounted for by the f a c t o r ( l o a d i n g g r e a t e r than 0.707). The r e s u l t s of the steps, and a comparison with Berry's results, are shown in the table. last step, factor Following the factor scores were prepared for each city by m ult ip lyi ng the l o a d i n g of e a c h v a r i a b l e for the variable, times that city's standardized score and summing the products (Nie et al., 1975, pp. 487- 489). If the four independent variables a d e q u a t e l y measure the underlying c o n c e p t s t h e y r e p r e s e n t , and if the c o n c l u s i o n s d r a w n from e a r l i e r research are correct, then a m u l t i p l e regression using the four varia­ b l e s s h o u l d pr e d i c t e a c h d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e q u i t e w e l l . With only twe lv e cases, it w i l l require a large m u l t i p l e R to obtain a probabil­ it y less than or e q u a l to 0.05; that criterion will serve as an adequate test of the theoretical construction. 3. Specific Hypothesis In a m u l t i p l e regression of the dependent variable specified b elow on the independent variables listed below, the m u l t i p l e R will statistically significant. Independent variables (all containing the city): a. b. variables refer to the county n u m b e r of i n - m i g r a n t s , 1965-70, d i v i d e d by 1970 population; n u m b e r of e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s e m p l o y i n g 100 or more persons; be 112 c. d. 1970 population minus black population minus persons with either parent born outside the U. S., divided by the total 1970 population; SES factor score constructed as detailed above. Dependent variable: The sura of the numbers of organizations necessary to a c c u m u l a t e 50% of the r e s p o n s e s to the que st ion s: ,fWhat agencies h a ve influence over what your agency does and the decisions it makes"; "What agencies have the most influence o v e r social service decisions in this community"; an d "Wha t a g e n c i e s h a v e the m os t prestige?" G. The Effect of the Nonlocal Environment on the Local Social Services Delivery Network 1. As in s e c t i o n F, Theoretical Explication the a r g u m e n t h e r e m u s t be m a d e in m u l t i p l e step s because no data on metropolitan networks were collected in the study on which this dissertation is based; to test predictions about the l o c a l e n v i r o n m e n t . analysis, however, it is therefore not possible directly the effect of the extralocal environment on A c h a i n of r e a s o n i n g across three l e v e l s of l e ads to the c o n c l u s i o n that the e f f e c t s of the extralocal environment on the local metropolitan area will have conse­ quences for the social services network in that metropolitan area; this chain of reasoning provides a hypothesis Based on the research cited, and to test. we assume (1) that the environment of the United States is r e l a t i v e l y decentralized with respect to its relation to l o c a l m e t r o p o l i t a n e n v i r o n m e n t s ; contact a metropolitan area has with and (2) that the m o r e p o i n t s of the extralocal environment, the 113 more decentralized the o v e r a l l interorganlzatlonal network In the local metropolitan area w i l l be. Since we have already predicted that less c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p o w er in o v e r a l l n e t w o r k s w i l be r e f l e c t e d in l ess concentration of influence in social service networks, it follows that the m o r e po int s of c o n t a c t b e t w e e n the e x t r a l o c a l e n v i r o n m e n t an d a metropolitan interorganlzatlonal ne t w o r k , the less concentrated the influence structure of the social services network w i l l be. ly, Similar­ since we expect a strong negative relationship between the concen­ tration of influence and the density of interaction in social service n e t w o r k s , m o r e p oi n t s of c o n t a c t w i t h the n a t i o n a l s y s t e m s h o u l d be positively related to interaction density. 2. Data and Method of Analysis There are two measures of the independent variable in the data c o l l e c t ­ ed for this study: the n u m b e r of v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h their h e a d q u a r t e r s in the city, and the n u m b e r of F o r t u n e o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the city. 1000 i n d u s t r i a l B e c a u s e none of the cit i e s s t u d i e d had a large number of either, a single independent measure, formed by summing the two, has been constructed. There are two types of dependent variables. The first is the concen­ tration of influence in the local social services network. The measure of concentration described in section D and used there and in section E w i l l be u s e d h e r e as w e l l . sures along informal The sec o n d type is a set of d e n s i t y m e a ­ the same dimensions as used cooperative relationships, the union of those three dimensions, in section E: formal cooperative communication, relationships, and the referral of clients. The 114 earlier measures, however, were restricted to links among non-inf luen- t i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; in this p a r t of the a n a l y s i s , the d e n s i t i e s i n ­ cluding both Influential and non-influential organizations w i l l measures. As before, existence be the of a link between agencies Is assumed o nly if both agencies reported it. 3. Specific Hypothesis The zero-order correlations between the sum of volu nta ry organizations with headquarters the number of national in a city and the number of Fortune 1000 industrials in that city, and the following list of depen­ dent measures, w i l l have the signs Indicated and w i l l be statistically significant: (1) the concentration of influence in the social services network (negative); (2) the d e n s i t y (positive); (3) the density of informal (positive); cooperative ties among organizations (4) the d e n s i t y of f o r m a l (positive); cooperative ties among organizations (5) the density of the union of communication, informal cooper­ a t i v e , an d f o r m a l c o o p e r a t i v e ties a m o n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s (positive); (6) the d e n s i t y (positive). of of communication client ties referral a m o ng among organizations organizations Chapter 4 FINDINGS A. The Interaction of Organizational Characteristics and Dyad Formation In g eneral, the expected findings in this section are: (1) a strong positive relationship between size and complexity; (2) a strong positive relationship between size and IOR; (3) a strong positive relationship between complexity and IOR; (4) no relationshipbetween innovation and any other variable w h e n size, c o m p l e x i t y and IOR are c o n t r o l l e d , nor b e t w e e n i n n o ­ vation and size or innovation and complexity if the other v a r ia ble and IOR are controlled; (5) no relationship between IOR and any Internal organizational varia­ bles when size and complexity are controlled. The specific hypotheses w i l l be repeated one at a time, and the find­ ings relevant to them shown and discussed Immediately afterward. I. (a) For all The Relationship of Size to Complexity organizations, agency size will have a significant posi­ tive zero-order Pearson correlation with complexity. (b) When partial correlation is used to control and of tion, agency centralization, and efficiency, agency for the effects of IOR formalization, size w i l l still positive correlation with agency complexity. 115 internal communica­ have a significant (c) P o s i t i v e z e r o - o r d e r an d p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (as s p e c i f i e d in parts (a) and (b) above) w i l l occur in the organization sets of at least ten of the twelve cities studied. T a b l e 4A-1 s u m m a r i z e s correlation values of the r e s u l t s f r o m the d a t a a n a l y s i s . the organization sets in the For the individual cities see Table C-l in Appendix C. TABLE 4A-1 The Relationship of Size to Complexity zero-order correlation and significance for all cases* 0.4865 p < 0.001 number of cities with positive correlations** 11 p = 0.003 partial correlation and significance for all cases* 0.4281 p < 0.001 number of cities with positive partial correlations** P = 0.003 * ** 11 N of organizations = 272 N of cities = 12 A l l correlations are based on those organizations for which all variables are present. A l l probabilities are one-tailed. As Tabl e 4A-1 shows, the data o v e r w h elm ing ly confirm earlier findings that organization size and complexity are strongly related. The o v e r ­ a l l finding is supported in almost every city, and the level of statis­ tical significance is very high. Controlling for every other variable used the proportion of variance that size in the study bar ely affects and complexity account for in each other. 117 2. (a) For all The Relationship of Size to IOR Formation organizations, agency size will have a significant posi­ tive zero-order Pearson correlation with IOR. (b) W h e n par t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n is used to c o n t r o l for the eff ect s of agency complexity, centralization, formalization, internal commun­ ication, and efficiency, agency size w ill still have a significant positive correlation with IOR. (c) Postive zero-order and partial correlations (as specified in parts (a) and (b) above) will occur In the organization sets of at least 10 of the 12 cities studied. T a b l e 4A-2 s u m m ar iz es the r e s u l t s from the data analysis. correlation values of the organization sets in the individual For the cities see Table C-2 in Appendix C. TABLE 4A-2 The Relationship of Size to IOR Formation zero-order correlation and significance for all cases* 0.2847 p < 0.001 number of cities with positive correlations** p =» 0.003 partial correlation and significance for all cases* 0.2426 p < 0.001 number of cities with positive partial correlations** p = 0.003 * ** 11 U N of organizations = 272 N of cities = 12 A l l correlations are based on those organizations for which all variables are present. All probabilities are one-tailed. 118 Overall as the hypothesis is strongly supported, although not as strongly the previous one. The correlations are smaller and the proportion of reduction in explained variance in the parital correlation is great­ er here than for the first hy pothesis. N o n e t h e l e s s , the s t a t i s t i c a l significance of every result is far beyond 0.05. 3. (a) For all The Relationship of Complexity to IOR Formation organizations, agency complexity will have a significant positive zero-order Pearson correlation with IOR. (b) When p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n is used to c o n t r o l for the ef f e c t s of a g e n c y size, c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , formalization, internal communica­ tion, and efficiency, agency complexity will still have a signif­ icant positive correlation with IOR. (c) P o s i t i v e z e r o - o r d e r and p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (as s p e c i f i e d in parts (a) and (b) above) w i l l occur in the organization sets of at least ten of the twelve cities studied. T a b l e 4A-3 su m m a r i z e s the r e s u l t s correlation values from the data analysis. of the organization sets in the individual see Table C-3 in Appendix C. For the cities 119 TABLE 4A-3 The Relationship of Complexity to IOR Formation zero-order correlation and significance for all cases* p = 0.007 number of cities with positive correlations** p = 0 .1 9 4 partial correlation and significance for all cases* 0.0087 p s 0 .4 4 4 number of cities with positive partial correlations** 3 p «* 0 .0 7 3 * ** 0 .1 4 8 3 8 N of organizations =» 272 N of cities = 12 A l l correlations are based on those organizations for which all variables are present. Al l probabilities are one-tailed. The results are almost un equivocally contrary to prediction. The over­ all zero-order correlation is statistically significant, but the amount of variance accounted for is barely above 2%. The partial correlation is very close to zero, showing that complexity has practically no pre­ dictive power unshared with other variables; specifically, when size is controlled, almost no predictive power remains to complexity. The num­ ber of cities with positive zero-order correlations is not statistical­ ly significant; most of the the cities have negative partial correla­ tions, and none of them has a significant positive partial correlation. The h y p o t h e s i s is t h e r ef ore d i s con fi rme d. predictive power w h e n size is c o n t r o l l e d . aspect of the research of Aiken and Hage, C o m p l e x i t y has a l m o s t no T hese r es u l t s c a l l Paulson, one and Klonglan et al. into s erious question: a l l of these s tu d i e s used c o m p l e x i t y but not size as an independent variable. The repeated finding of a relation­ ship b e t w e e n c o m p l e x i t y and IO R f o r m a t i o n must, in the light of the 120 r e s u l t s here, be i n t e r p r e t e d as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between size and IOR formation. 4. The Relationship of Innovation to Other Variables The basic prediction is that no internal organizational variable will correlate with innovation if size, complexity, and IOR formation are controlled; and that none of those three variables will correlate with innovation if the other two are controlled. fliven as a d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e a g e n c y i n n o v a t i o n , and g i v e n as independent variables the size, complexity, and IOR count of the ag e n c y (set 1); and the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , i n t e r n a l c om mun ic ati on, formalization, (a) and efficiency of the agency (set 2): when partial correlation is used to control for the effects of the other variables in set 1, each variable in set 1 w i ll fail to h a v e a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h the dependent variable; (b) w h e n p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n is u sed to c o n t r o l the eff e c t s of the v a r i a b l e s in set I, each of the v a r i a b l e s in set 2 w i l l fail to h a v e a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h the dependent variable; (c) the partial correlations specified in (a) and (b) above, examined separately for the twelve cities studied, when will in each case not be s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o r e o ften of one sign than the other. 121 The z e r o - l e v e l c o r r e l a t i o n s s u g g e s t d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s of some v a r i a b l e s with i n n o v a t i o n , th o u g h none are v e r y strong. In k eep ing with previous findings, there is a statistically significant zero-order r e s u l t for IOR formation. C o m p l e x i t y a l s o shows a s i g n i f i c a n t zeroorder result, and internal communcatlon comes close. The summaries of results Correlations for for each variable are given in Table 4A-4. the o r g a n i z a t i o n sets in e a c h c i t y are g i v e n in T a b l e C4-1 to C4-7 in Ap p e n d i x C. TABLE 4A-4 The Relationships of Innovation to Other Variables zero-order correl.* (signif.) partial correl.* (signif.) size 0.0941 (p=0.122) 0.0067 (p=0.914) 7 (p=0.774) 7 (p=*0.774) complexity 0.1197 (p=0.048) 0.0842 (p=0.168) 10 (p=0.039) 6 (p=l.000) IOR 0.1570 (p=0.010) 0.1360 (p=0.026) 9 (p=0.146) 8 (p=0.388) centralization -0.0713 (p=0.242) -0.0574 (p=0.348) 5 (p=0.774) 5 (p=0.774) internal communication 0.1055 (p=0.082) 0.0985 (p=0.106) 10 (p=0.039) 9 (p=0.146) formalization 0.0107 (p=0.862) 0.0001 (p=0.998) 7 (p=0.774) 7 (p=0.774) efficiency 0.0632 (p=0.298) 0.0313 (p=0.610) 5 (p=0.774) 4 (p=0.388) Variable * ** n of cities** with positive zero-order cor. (signif.) n of cities** with positive partials (signif.) N of organizations = 272 N of citites => 12 A l l correlations are based on those organizations for which all variables are present. A l l probabilities are two-tailed. 122 The resul ts , wi th the e x c e p t i o n of IOR, c o n f o r m to the predictions. The partial correlation for IOR with innovation remains significant at the 0.05 l e v e l ; m o r e o v e r , o n l y one of the nine cities with p o s i t i v e zero-order correlations between IOR and innovation had a negative par­ tial. Although the number of cities with positive partial correlations b e t w e e n IOR and i n n o v a t i o n Is not s i g n i f i c a n t at the 0.05 l e v e l , the l a c k of change f o l l o w i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n of c o n t r o l s supp ort s still-significant overall partial correlation. the Although the amount of variance accounted for Is less than 3%, there clearly is a relationship between innovation and IOR formation that cannot be explained away by size and complexity. Aside from that one exception, the predicted absence of relationship is obvi ous . It is impo rta nt variable external to note that the one e x c e p t i o n (IOR) to the organization; retains a significant relationship no organization-level is a variable to innovation (by either criterion) after controls are In place. 5. The Relationship between IOR Formation and Internal Organizational Variables The basic prediction is that any relationship between IOR formation and the internal workings of an organization is an artifact of the size and c o m p l e x i t y of the o r g a ni za tio n, and w i l l variables are controlled. d i s a p p e a r w h e n those two The specific predications are given below: 123 Given as dependent variables the centralization, formalization, internal communication and efficiency of an agency, as an indepen­ dent variable the IOR count of the agency, and ascontrol varia­ bles the complexity and size of the agency: (a) is used to c o n t r o l the e ff e c t s of w h e n pa r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n the control variables, the independent variable will fail have a significant positive to c o r r e l a t i o n w it h each of the dependent variables; (b) the partial correlations specified in (a) above, when exam­ ined s e p a r a t e l y for the o r g a n i z a t i o n s sets of the t w e l v e cities studied, will in each case not be significantly more often of one sign than the other. S u m m a r i e s of the r e s u l t s for e a c h v a r i a b l e are g i v e n in T a b l e 4A-5. The correlations for the organizations sets in each city are given in Tables C5-1 to C5-4 in Appendix C. None of the internal variables even approaches statistical significance in its zero-order correlation with IOR formation — contrary v i o u s fin d i n g s for i n t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n and efficiency. to pre­ Earlier findings with regard to centralization were not uniformly statistically signi fi can t; the r e s u l t s here lead to the c o n c l u s i o n that the true state of affairs is a lack of relation, that requires a large sample to detect. not just a low-level Finally, relation since the measure of f o r m a l i z a t i o n used here c a r e f u l l y takes a cc o u n t of Morse's d i s t i n c ­ tions, the absence of a significant result suggests that formalization in any sense is not related to IOR. The overall hypothesis that there 124 TABLE 4A-5 The Relationships of IOR to Internal Organizational Variables Vs liable centralization internal communication formalization efficiency * ** zero-order correl.* (signif.) partial correl.* (signif.) 0.0142 (pa0.816) 0.0304 (p“ 0.618) (p=0.774) (p=0.774) 0.0360 (p=0.584) 0.0058 (p=>0.924) (p=1.000) (p=0.774) 0.0100 (p=0.870) 0.0064 (p=0.916) (p=0.774) (p=0.774) 0.0709 (p=0.244) 0.0435 (p°0.476) (p=0.388) (p=1.000) n of cities** with positive zero-order cor. (signif.) n of cities** with positive partials (signif.) N of organizations =» 272 N of citites =* 12 A l l correlations are based on those organizations for which all variables are present. All probabilities are two-tailed. Is no systematic relationship between internal organizational variables and IOR is definitely supported. B. The Development of Dyadic Interaction The general theoretical expectation for this section is that the vari­ ety and change In the environments of the dyads studied, their ass umed a d a p t i v e s ys t e m nature, would lead development of multiplexity in dyadic interaction. thesis to be tested in this section is: combined with to i d i o s y n c r a t i c The specific hypo­ 125 A Guttman scaling procedure applied to these three types of d y a d i c i n t e r a c t i o n - - e x c h a n g e of I nfo rmation, ideas, and opinions; informal cooperation; formal joint programs — even if using the best empirical ordering, w i l l fail to produce a s c a l e w i t h both a r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y g r e a t e r than 0.9 and a scalability greater than 0.6. This failure will occur both for all dyads in the twelve cities and for the dyads in each particular city. T a b l e 4B-1 shows the r e s u l t s of the G u t t m a n S c a l e an alysis. It is c l e a r the e x p e c t a t i o n s s p e c if ied by the h y p o t h e s i s are a l l met. Be­ cause by far the largest number of dyads had no links, and they and the handful of dyads with all three types of link are by definition consis­ tent with any scaling, the reproducibility is exceptionally high every­ where. The scalability score depends on those dyads with only one or two links; and as the table shows, the highest scalability attained was 0.4426 — far b e l o w the 0.6 l e v e l n o r m a l l y set as a r e q u i r e m e n t for a d e q u a t e scaling. (The n e g a t i v e v a l u e s for scalability result from instances where the default empirical ordering, order of the frequency of their occurrence, which places items in does not work well because the p a t t e r n of links among dyads w i t h o n l y one link is i n c o n s i s t e n t with the pattern of links among dyads with two.) An e x a m i n a t i o n of c o l u m n s 3 and 4 suppo rts the s c a l a b i l i t y scores. Column three shows the number of dyads with either one or two types of link. Column four shows the number and percent of those dyads with one or two l inks in w h i c h the l inks w e r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the m o st com mon ordering. As the p e r c e n t a g e s m a k e c le a r , in no city did an o r d e r i n g encompass even 2/3 of the dyads with 1 or 2 links. 126 Table 4B-1 Guttman Scalability for Three Types of Links Unit all dyads N of dyads all dyads with 1 or 2 links dyads with I or 2 consistent links Reproducibility Scalability 9453 946 (10.0%) 447 (47.3%) 0.9648 0.2227 city 1 666 50 (7.5%) 23 (46.0%) 0.9730 0.1429 city 2 1081 99 (9.2%) 59 (59.6%) 0.9753 0.3651 city 3 703 89 (12.7%) 57 (64.0%) 0.9697 0.3905 city 4 703 92 (13.1%) 46 (50.0%) 0.9564 0.3381 city 5 861 79 (9.2%) 35 (44.3%) 0.9659 0.0737 city 6 946 86 (9.1%) 51 (55.3%) 0.9753 0.4118 ci ty 7 946 109 (11.5%) 61 (56.0%) 0.9662 0.4286 city 8 496 18 (3.6%) 7 (38.9%) 0.9852 -0.2222 city 9 820 75 (9.1%) 32 (42.7%) 0.9650 0.2321 city 10 465 88 (18.9%) 54 (61.4%) 0.9513 0.4426 city 11 946 89 (9.4%) 45 (50.6%) 0.9690 0.3231 city 12 820 72 (8.7%) 27 (37.5%) 0.9634 -0.0345 Ill The data therefore overwhelmingly the general conclusion support the specific hypothesis and that dyad formation among social service agen­ cies does not fol low a consistent pattern. C. 1. The Conditioning of Dyadic Relationships by Network Characteristics The Effect of Relationships with Influential Organizations The first h y p o t h e s i s greater number of ties is that n o n - i n f l u e n t i a l to influential o r g a n i z a t i o n s with a organizations will also have a greater number of ties to other non-influential organizations. Specif­ ically: The more influential organizations a non-influential organi­ zation is r e l a t e d to, on any or a l l of the three d i m e n s i o n specified below, the more relations it wi ll have with other non-influential organizations on all three dimensions. — — — exchange of opinions, information, and ideas informal cooperative relationships formal cooperative relationships An influential organization is defined to be one that received a total of ten p e r c e n t a g e points of r e s p o n s e s to three d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n s about relative influence in a network of social service agencies: w h i c h o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e i n f l u e n c e o v e r your own agency; (1) (2) w h i c h agencies have the most influence over human services decisions in this co mmu ni ty; prestige. and (3) w h i c h a g e n c i e s in this community have the m o st 128 Be c a u s e ag e n c i e s w it h o u t di re ct s e r v i c e viewed, the United Way offices, mental to c l i e n t s were not i n t e r ­ health boards, Area Offices on Aging, and h e a l t h p l a n n i n g ag e n c i e s were not amon g the i n t e r v i e w e d agencies; and yet these organizations are 4 of the 5 most influential (averaged across all cities) by the measure used here. Since the types of linkages used to test the hypothesis are constructed from reciprocal mentions, they are therefore limited to the interviewed agencies; and the n u m b e r of i n t e r v i e w e d i n f l u e n t i a l a g e n c i e s is so s m a l l in some cities as to reduce variability drastically in the number of possible relationships fewer than five dropped to i n f l u e n t i a l influential organizations. organizations from this part of the analysis. were The six cities in which interviewed have been In addition, since the number of interviewed influential agencies differs in most cities (4 different numbers in the six cit ies a n a l yz ed) , and since the number of non- i n f l u e n t l a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s v a r i e s in e v e r y city, the res u l t s are not combined — each city is analyzed as a separate case. There are four separate measures of ties: (1) exchange of information, opinions, an d ideas (COMM); (2) I n f o r m a l c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s (INF); (3) f o r m a l l y n e g o t i a t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s (FORMAL); union of the three previous sets (UNION). and (4) the There are therefore 16 sets of correlations: the correlations between each type of link with influ­ ential agencies and each type of link with non-inf luential agencies. The hypothesis Is tested by comparing the number of positive and nega­ tive correlations. relatively If the h y p o t h e s i s is true, few negative correlations. then there s h o u l d be Table 4C-1 shows positive correlations for each comparison. the count of 129 TABLE 4C-1 Positive Correlations between Ties to Influentials and Ties to Non-Inf luential s for Non-influential Organizations COMM ties INF ties FORMAL ties UNION of to nonto nonto nonties to noninfluential influential influential influential COMM ties to influentials 6 5 3 5 INF ties to influentials 4 6 5 6 FORMAL ties to influentials 2 2 6 6 UNION of ties to influentials 4 6 5 6 N of cities = 6 C e r t a i n p a t t e r n s are diagonal i m m e d i a t e l y n o t i c e a b l e in the table: cells are positive for every city; (1) the (2) the number of ties of any sort to i n f l u e n t i a l s is p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to the nu m b e r in the union of ties to non-inf luential s in all but one case; (3) the number in the u n i o n of ties to i n f l u e n t i a l s is p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to each specific type of tie in more than half the cities* On the o t h e r hand, the r e l a t i o n s h i p s are not a l t o g e t h e r general: in none of the six off-diagonal cells involving the three types of inter­ action is the relationship positive in all six cities, and in only half these ce lls is the relationship positive in more than half the cities. If we hypothesized the absence of a tendency toward the posited pattern in relationship formation, it would take positive correlations in all six cities to reject that assumption (Computation Laboratory of Harvard 130 University, clude that 1955, p. 403). There is t h e r e f o r e no basis here to c o n ­ a relationship of one sort with influential organizations leads to relationships of other sorts with non-influentials; but clear­ ly relationships of the sorts examined here occur more frequently with non-influentials if they occur more frequently with influentials. These results by themselves cannot distinguish the hypothesis proposed here — that influential ties to influential organizations — organizations generate ties to non- from a simpler one: that organizations v a r y in their p r o p e n s i t y to form r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and that those that tend to form relationships of a particular kind do so indiscriminately with respect to the influence of their partners. thesis were true, however, If this simpler hypo­ one would expect it to be true for influen­ tial organizations also; but that is not the case. A comparison of the TABLE 4C-2 Positive Correlations between Ties to Influentials and Ties to Non-Inf luentials for Influential Organizations COMM ties INF ties FORMAL ties UNION of to nonto nonto nonties to nonlnfluential influential Influential influential COMM ties to influentials INF ties to influentials FORMAL ties to influentials UNION of ties to influentials N of cities = 6 131 e q u i v a l e n t data for i n f l u e n t i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( Ta b l e 4C-2) with the data for non-influential organizations (Table 4C-1) shows a lower level of relationship in every cell. statistical None of the cells in Table 4C-2 reaches significance. Apparently, then, although the data are not as favorable as could have be e n hoped for, there is e v i d e n c e for a pro cess that m a t c h e s the d e s ­ cription given — that ties to influential organizations by non-influ- entials tend to produce more ties to non-inf luentials as well; but the same process does not seem to occur for influentials. 2. The Relationship of Influence Concentration to the Formation of Organizational Dyadic Relationships The se con d h y p o t h e s i s is that w h e n i n f l u e n c e is c o n c e n t r a t e d in an interorganlzatlonal network, it tends to inhibit the formation of dyads — particularly among non-influential organizations. The les s concentrated the s t u c t u r e of Specifically: influence is in a social s e r v i c e s network, as m e a s u r e d by the sum of the n u m ­ bers of organizationsnecessary choices made in response the greater w i l l influential hypothesis — to a c c u m u l a t e 50% of the to the three questions listed below, be the density of relationships among non- organizations on the three dimensions listed in 1 above. What agencies have the most prestige? — What agencies have service decisions? the most — What agencies influence the decisions it makes? influence over social what your agency does and 132 C o n c e n t r a t i o n of i n f l u e n c e in a c it y is m e a s u r e d by the sum of the n u m b e r s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s ne ede d to r e ac h 50% of the total c ho ic es on ea ch of three d i m e n s i o n s li st e d in the hypoth esi s. val ues produce a reasonable variable: The r e s u l t i n g the range of values is from four to twenty-five, and there are ten values out of the twelve cities. The sum d e s c r i b e d is a c t u a l l y the o p p o s i t e of c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power: in ord er to get a di rec t r a t h e r than an i n v e r s e measur e, e a c h v a l u e has been subtracted from 26 (the largest value) values range from 1 (least concentrated) To carry out so that the r e s u l t i n g to 22 (most concentrated). the analysis for this section, the variable just defined was with the densities of five measures of interaction: (1) exchange of information, ideas, and opinions (COMM); (2) informal cooperative rela­ t i o ns hip s (INF); (3) f o r m a l l y n e g o t i a t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s (FORMAL); the union of these three (UNION); and (5) referral (4) of clients (REFER). R e f e r r a l of c l i e n t s was not c o m b i n e d with the othe rs b ecause it was measured asymmetrically: referral was counted in either direction sepa­ rately, whereas the other three type of relationships were counted only when a link was acknowledged in both directions. The results are shown in Table 4C-3. TABLE 4C-3 C o r r e l a t i o n s of I n f l u e n c e C o n c e n t r a t i o n with D en s i t y of Dyad F o r m a t i o n among Non-Influential Organizations variable correlation significance COMM -.5861 .023 INF -.6183 .016 FORMAL UNION REFER -.5493 -.6299 -.4692 .014 .062 .032 133 The results strongly support the hypothesis. All the correlations are strongly negative, as predicted, and the probability of all but one is less than 0.0S 3. The Relationship of Influence Concentration to Dyadic Multiplexity The hypothesis tested here is that in networks with greater concentra­ tion of influence, organizations will focus more energy on their most important relationships; whereas in networks with less concentration of influence, relational mult ipl e relations. control will more commonly be obtained through Specifically: The less concentrated the structure of influence in a social service network, as defined in hypothesis 2 above, the lower w i l l be the average multiplexity of those relationships that exist in the network, where multiplexity is defined over the following four dimensions: — — — — exchange of opinions, information, and ideas; informal cooperative relationships; formal cooperative relationships; referral of clients. The c o n c e n t r a t i o n section 2. of I n f l u e n c e In a n e t w o r k is de f i n e d here as in The measure of multiplexity Is the average number of ties (among four possible) In those dyads for which there is any tie at all. E x c h a n g e of in for m a t i o n , ideas, and opinions; I n f o r m a l relationships; cooperative and formal cooperative relationships each counted as 1. Referral of clients in either direction counted as 0.5; if clients were referred in both directions, to the total. then, client referral could contribute 1 134 The correlation has been predicted to be positive: we have concluded e a r l i e r that in c r e a s e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n of influence is associated with increased multiplexity of relationships. ever, is strongly negative, -0.7541, The actual correlation, with probability 0.002. how­ The results clearly refute the hypothesis proposed here, supporting instead the c o n t e n d i n g n o t i o n that r e l a t i o n s h i p s once formed tend to be pro­ tected by the development of m u l t i p l e x i t y : for g r e a t e r m u l t i p l e x i t y accompanies the greater tendency to build dyadic relationships that is associated with lesser concentration of influence. D. The g e n e r a l The Effect of the Local Environment on the Social Service Network. t h e o r e t i c a l e x p e c t a t i o n for this s ec tio n was that in a m e t r o p o l i t a n area, co nd it i o n s that foster a stable, w e l l - c o n n e c t e d network of interorganizational relations with mul t i p l e centers of power throughout the area will lead to networks among social service agencies that ence. are also better connected and show less concentration of influ­ The specific hypothesis is given below: In a mult ip le regression of the dependent variable specified b e l o w on the Independent variables listed below, the multiple R will be statistically significant. I n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s (all v a r i a b l e s containing the city): a. number of ln-migrants, tion; refer to the county 1965-70, divided by 1970 popula­ 135 b. number of economic organizations persons in 1966; employing 100 or more c. 1970 p o p u l a t i o n m i n u s b l a c k p o p u l a t i o n m i n u s persons with either parent born o u t s i d e the U. S., d i v i d e d by the total 1970 population; d. SES factor score. Dependent variable: The sum of the n um b e r s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to accumulate 50% of the responses to the questions: "What agencies have influence over what your agency does and the decisions you make?"; "What agencies have the most influence over social services decisions in this com­ munity?"; "What agencies have the most prestige?" The basic statistics of the regression are shown in table 4D-1. Table 4D-1 Regression of Population Turnover, Economic Dispersion, Ethnic Heterogeneity, and SES on Influence Concentration in Social Service Networks Multiple R 0.189 overall F Multiple R 2 0.036 significance variable F to enter or remove slgnif. 0.065 0.990 simple r Beta ethnic heterogeneity 0.178 .682 -0.132 0.091 in-migration 0.032 .862 -0.107 -0.263 socioeconomic status 0.061 .811 0.036 0.193 number of large firms 0.054 .823 0.029 -0.093 The results make obvious that the proposed hypothesis is overwhelmingly rejected. None of the independent variables has a significant F at its 136 e n t r y into the equation. The o v e r a l l m u l t i p l e R is so s m a l l that it w o u l d be v e r y u n l i k e l y to o b t a i n in a set of r a n d o m data. Moreover, for o n l y one of the v a r i a b l e s , e thn i c h e t e r o g e n e i t y , is the s i m p l e correlation in the expected direction; and only for economic disperson (number of large firms) is the beta weight in the expected direction. On the p o s s i b i l i t y that this m e a s u r e was s i m p l y a poor one, the den­ sities of the v a r i o u s ties used in the last se c t i o n we re s u bst itu te d into the regression equation. to be significant, In a l l five cases, the multi ple R failed each individual variable failed to be significant, and at least three of the simple correlations and at least two of the beta weights had signs opposite Moreover, c e r t a i n f i nd in gs to that expected. from the e ar l i e r studies reviewed proved unsubstantiated for the cities studied here. Socioeconomic status was overwhelmingly and postively correlated with the proportion of in-mi­ g r a t i o n (r= 0.838, p. < 0.001). icantly, 0.307) It was n e g a t i v e l y , though not s i g n i f ­ c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the n u m b e r of l a rge and w i t h ethnic firms (r= -0.163, p = h e t e r o g e n e i t y (r = -0.269, p = 0.199). The proportion of in-migration was even more strongly correlated with these two variables: with number of large firms the correlation was -0.322 (p = 0.153) and w i t h e t h n i c h e t e r o g e n e i t y it was -0.397 (p = 0.101). A p p a r e n t l y in these cities in -m igr ati on, w he r e it occurs, is p r e d o m ­ inantly the influx of higher SES persons into the county. Such persons would tend to be white and middle class, and they would be more likely to move to a less ethnically heterogeneous place in the first place and 137 would by their moving make it less so anyway. negative correlations nowhere resulted However, given that the in a significant F for a vari­ able in any of the regression equations, the whole set of variables has proven irrelevant to the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of i n f l u e n c e in the so cia l services networks in the cities studied. As e x p l a i n e d e a r l i e r there are two st eps of r e a so nin g lea d i n g to the single test in this section: (1) that the independent variables direct­ ly affect the concentration of power in the overall interorganizational network in a city, an d (2) that the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power in the o v e r a l l network w i l l be reflected in the concentration of influence in the soc ial s e r v i c e s subnetwork. ficult to interpret the failure The r e s u l t is that it is more d i f ­ to obtain significant results. It is p o s s i b l e that the i n d e p e n d e n t m e a s u r e s ch o s e n are not adequate, but their similarity to measures used in prior research argues against this interpretation. ap p r o p r i a t e ; It is also possible but its performance against this interpretation. that the dependent measure is not as expected in s ec t i o n D arg u e s It could be argued that the small number of cases makes the level of significance difficult to meet; but in this a n a l y s i s the v a l u e of the o v e r a l l variance accounted for so little F is so s m a l l that and the negative the amount of results cannot so easily be discounted. It seems m o s t likely, then, that one of the two steps of reasoning l e a d i n g to the p r e d i c t i o n is faulty. Of these, the first step has fairly solid grounding in prior research work; so It seems most reason­ able to conclude that the second step of reasoning — that the concen­ 138 tration of power In the overall will be r e f l e c t e d services network — interorganizational network in a city in the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of i n f l u e n c e in its social is the one that has failed. Pe rhaps the basic structures of social services networks are not particularly affected by their environments once they are established. Although it seems un­ l i k e l y that the na t u r e of a s u b n e t w o r k c o u l d a v o i d str ong i n f l u e n c e f ro m its l a r g e r c o n t e x t d u r i n g the time of its ini t i a l c onstruction; perhaps once in p l a c e its o r i g i n a l change. This interpretation, works once established are structure which suggests relatively is m o r e that social homeostatic r e s ist ant to service net­ in their behavior, will be taken up at greater length in the concluding chapter. E. The general of external The Effect of the Nonlocal Environment on the Local Social Service Delivery Network hypothesis tested in this section is that a larger number ties to the larger (national) environment w i ll generate a le s s c o n c e n t r a t e d p o w e r s t r u c t u r e in a m e t r o p o l i t a n area, and thus a less concentrated influence structure and greater density of interac­ tion in its social services network. Specifically: The zero-order correlations between the sum of the number of national voluntary organizations with headquarters in a city and the n u m b e r of F o r t u n e 1000 i n d u s t r i a l in that city, and the following list of dependent measures, w i l l have the signs indicated and will (1) be statistically significant: the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of i n f l u e n c e in the s oc i a l s e r v i c e s network (negative); 139 (2) the density of communication ties (COMM) z ations (positive); among organi­ (3) the d e n s i t y of i n f o r m a l c o o p e r a t i v e ties (INF) among organizations (positive); (4) the density of formal cooperative organizations (positive); (5) the d e n s i t y of the u nion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n f o r m a l cooperative, and formal cooperative ties (UNION) among organizations (positive); (6) the density of client referral (REFER) among organiza­ tions (positive). ties (FORMAL) among Since the results reported in section D shoved no relationship between local environmental variables and the network variables measured, we would now expect to find no relationship here; and that is exactly the result. The correlation between the number of external connections in a city and the concentration of Influence in the social service network is negligibly small and in the opposite direction from that predicted. None of the correlations with density variables approaches significance at the 0.05 l e v e l , and four of the f i v e are in the d i r e c t i o n o pposite to that predicted. Table 4E-1 shows the specific results. TABLE 4E-1 Correlations of the Number of External Ties with Influence Concentration and Interactive Density in Social Service Networks variable Influence concentration COMM correlation 0.040 -0.254 significance 0.451 0.213 INF FORMAL -0.122 0.234 0.353 0.232 UNION REFER -0.181 -0.113 0.287 0.364 140 As in s e c t i o n D, it is tempting to try to e x p l a i n the inadequacy of variables or the small number of cases. ever, r e s u l t s by As there, how­ the use of the independent variables in earlier research and the success of the dependent variables in a lower l e v e l of analysis in this research argue against blaming results the variables; and the persistence of in the opposite direction from that expected points to a the­ oretical problem, not the small sample size. The first step of the reasoning, that the n a t i o n a l sys tem g e n er ate s similarity effects in a local metropolitan area, dence in the literature reviewed; however, is supported by evi­ given that the cities stud­ ied h e r e are a l l in one s ect ion of the country , it is p o s s i b l e that those composite findings obscure significant regional se c o n d step of the reasoning, that the n a t u r e of the o v e r a l l network is reflected in the social services network, suspect variations. in sec t i o n D, and these r e s u l t s The lo cal was identified as do n o t h i n g to suggest the contrary. The zero-order correlations between the independent variable and metro­ politan area variables provide support for the first step of the rea­ son in g on w h i c h this section's g e n e r a l hypothesis was based. number of external ties has a positive correlation with all The four local area variables used in section D: proportion of in-migration, economic diversity, e t h n i c h e t e r oge nei ty , correlations w i t h SES (r = 0.791, migration (r = 0.640, and the SES index. Of these the p < 0.001) and p r o p o r t i o n of in- p = 0.013) are highly significant. 141 The results of this section, the structures of local therefore, social underscore the likelihood that service networks are not strongly in­ fluenced by the structure of the o verall interorganizational network of the ir m e t r o p o l i t a n areas. W h i l e there is some e v i d e n c e that l o c a l metropolitan areas function as adaptive systems within the environment of the national evoke adaptive natively, system, behavior of course, strongly homeostatic. they may not provide from their social the s o c i a l sufficient diversity service services component. to Alter­ c o m p o n e n t may s i m p l y be CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. Summary of Findings On a v e r y g e n e r a l l e v e l , the data a n a l y s i s in this d i s s e r t a t i o n was designed to show that: a. internal organizational variables do not affect the likelihood of formation of interorganizational dyads in any systematic way, but organizational size and complexity do; b. the substantive development of interorganizational dyads does not f oll o w any systematic pattern; c. structural features of interorganizational networks significantly condition the rate at which dyads are formed among the organiza­ tio ns in the network, w h i c h d yads are formed and the extent to which dyads will be multiplex in nature; d. characteristics of local metropolitan environments nature of their interorganizational netwo rk s, and condition the these effects are r e f l e c t e d in subnet wor ks such as those formed among social service agencies; and e. the ext ent of c o n n e c t i o n to the national environment conditions l o c a l m e t r o p o l i t a n e n v i r o n m e n t s and thus the n a t u r e of l o c al interorganizational networks and their social service agency sub­ networks. The d e s i g n of the a n a l y s i s was g u i d e d by a s ystems a p p r o a c h to the various levels of analysis i n v olv ed. 142 Buck ley 's d i s t i n c t i o n b et wee n 143 h o m e o s t a t i c and a d a p t i v e systems p r o v i d e d a basi s for p rop os i t i o n s about system-environraent interactions at each level, and these proposi­ tions guided the development of predictions. The most crucial proposi­ tion is that for the three lowest levels of analysis in this disserta­ tion — o r g a n i z a t i o n s , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l dya ds, an d n e t w o r k s of social service organizations — the entities invo lv ed are capable of more than homeostatic behavior, but will not d i s p l a y a d a p t i v e behavior unless their environments are sufficiently variable to require it. is c o n s i d e r e d h o m e o s t a t i c if it is a l l - o r - n o n e Behavior in the pres enc e of necessary conditions, adaptive if it is a smoother function of environ­ m e n t a l dema nds ; this d i s t i n c t i o n p ermits the use of c o r r e l a t i o n and r e g r e s s i o n to d ete c t a d a p t i v e beh avi or. Th e e n t i t i e s s tu d i e d were assumed to be sufficiently similar that one-time data on them could be substituted for longitudinal data on fewer cases. tions, the s p e c i f i c a n a l y s e s were d e s i g n e d Within these assump­ to s h o w the pres enc e or absence of adaptive behavior at various levels. The a n a l y s i s was a l s o u n d e r t a k e n w it h the a s s u m p t i o n that a l o c al network of social service organizations provides the most crucial level of analysis for understanding and intervening in the d elive ry of social services to individuals. port this assumption; several The findings taken as a whole strongly sup­ both the findings that confirm predictions, that do not, underscore the central nature of the local social s e r v i c e n e t w o r k in d e t e r m i n i n g the d e l i v e r y of s o c i a l c lients. and services to 144 1. Internal Organizational Variables Past research has suggested that complexity, centralization, level of internal communication, and administrative e f f i c i e n c y are r e l a t e d the development of interorganizational izations. of links in social service organ­ A hypothesized relation between formalization and formation IOR l i n k s has a l s o been r e p e a t e d l y sought, Finally, to the innovativeness t h o u g h n e v e r found. of organizations had been suggested as a key e l e m e n t in any m o d e l l i n k i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n i n g to the external environment. One assumption underlying the present analysis was are p r e d o m i n a n t l y homeostatic, leading relationships previously found (or hoped that organizations to the c o n c l u s i o n for) between that the internal organ­ izational variables (centralization, internal communication, formaliza­ tion, and efficiency) and IOR formation would disappear when organiza­ tion size and complexity were controlled. Similarly, innovation was expected to show no relation to any variable at any l e v e l once size and complexity were controlled. Size and complexity of organizations were expected to show strong relationships to IOR formation because of their enabling role in the formation of such links. The findings, with two exceptions, confirmed c o n t r a d i c t s e v e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s in past work. the predictions made and No i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a ­ tional variable showed a statistically significant zero-order correla­ tion with the number of interorganizational relationships, nor did any of them show a significant partial correlation when size and complexity were controlled. Innovation similarly lacked any relationship to size, 145 c o m p l e x i t y , or I n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s . Size showed its traditionally established relationship to complexity, and its predicted relationship to the number of interorganizational relationships. A statistically significant relationship between innovation and number of IOR links, h o w e v e r , remain ed e v e n a fter con tr ols . result is contrary to prediction, it reinforces A l t h o u g h this the importance of the social services network for determining social service programming: number of external contacts is the only variable the that shows a persis­ tent impact on the development of new programs. The expected relationship between organizational complexity and number of IOR links appeared in the zero-order w h e n size was c o n t r o l l e d . tion. correlation, but disappeared This result, too, was c o n t r a r y to pr edi c­ It strongly underscores the original tions are h o m e o s t a t i c in their be h a v i o r . assumption that organiza­ O n l y size, a v e r y c l e a r e n a b l i n g v a r i a b l e in forming ties to other o r g a n i z a t i o n s , shows an impact on IOR formation. 2. Interorganizational Dyad Development Previous research has suggested that there is a pattern to the d eve lop ­ ment of interorganizational dyads; that relationships requiring greater d e g r e e s of c o m m i t m e n t and f o r m a l i z a t i o n are b u i l t on e a r l i e r stages i nvolving lesser commitment and formalization. using more objective criteria for the existence The present research, of relationships previous work, and involving larger numbers of organizations, the c o n c l u s i o n that such a process is not u n i v e r s a l . than leads to The e a r l i e r 146 research, conducted in rural settings, may simply demonstrate a conten­ tion on which this resarch is based: in a relatively placid environ­ ment, d y a d s m a y d i s p l a y h o m e o s t a t i c b e h a v i o r that is not present in more tumultuous environments like the cities studied here. r e f l e c t the fact that e a r l i e r a n a l y s e s u n i l ate ral ly reported links, while It may also l o o k e d for pa t t e r n s o n l y in this study relied on mutually re­ ported links. The prediction that dyads would show adaptive behavior was based on the variegated environment formed within them. social service networks provide for the dyads The analysis strongly confirmed the prediction — there was no d i s c e r n i b l e pa ttern to the d e v e l o p m e n t of s u b s t a n t i v e content of dyadic relationships in our data. Although the results of this portion of the analysis were quite convin­ cing, the inverse nature of the hypothesis (that statistically signif­ icant results would not occur) and the findings leave open the question of whether any systematic patterns may exist in the development of the content of Interorganizational dyads, and under what conditions. Defin­ i t i v e r e s e a r c h on this q u e s t i o n w o u l d h a v e to be l o n g i t u d i n a l , and based on objective measures of organizational interaction; but while fu tu r e r e s e a r c h m a y f r u i t f u l l y pursue the c i r c u m s t a n c e s und er w h i c h such patterns might occur, that they will be present. there can no longer be a simple assumption 147 3. The Effect of Interorganizational Networks on Dyad Formation and Content The r e s o u r c e e xc h a n g e p e r s p e c t i v e on i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l rel a t i o n s emphasizes the importance of resource control tern of interaction. in determining Since organizations with the most the pat­ resources are assumed to dominate interaction, the larger the number of organizations in a network that has substantial resources, interoganizational ever, the links that can be expected. g r e a t e r nu mbers of reso ur ce ce nters larger the number of Most importantly, how­ s h o u l d g e n e r a t e gre ate r I n t e r a c t i o n among those o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h f ew resour ces ; and a re­ source-poor organization with ties to more resource-rich organizations should show relationships to more of its fe llo w resource-poor organiza­ tions. Where there are many centers of resource control, moreover, the use of multiplexity in relationships as a way to protect them was pre­ dicted to decline, because in such an environment alternative relation­ ships provide equivalent interactional control. The prediction of increased density of i n t e r a c t i o n was ported by the data; cies, however, the expectation for individual was only weakly supported; m u l t i p l e x i t y was v e r y s t r o n g l y refuted: relationships accompanying wid er greater multiplexity in the s t r o n g l y sup­ resource-poor agen­ and the prediction regarding the i n c r e a s e in number of reso urc e d i s p e r s i o n a l s o i n v o l v e d relationships formed. One possible impli­ cation of these results is that greater resource dispersion in a system has its effects because of the greater availa bi lit y of resources (re­ s o u r c e - p o o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s do not h a v e to co m p e t e so v i g o r o u s l y for relationships with one or a few organizations), not through changes in 148 relationship-formation at the le v e l of Individual organizations; but f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h w i l l be r e q u i r e d to d e t e r m i n e the e x act m e c h a n i s m s involved. 4. The Impact of the Local Environment on Social Service Networks Since the social service network in any city is a subset of the overall interorganizational network in that metropolitan area, it was predicted that a greater number of centers of power in the o ver all network would be reflected in a similar dispersal of influence in the social services subnetwork. Since there were no direct measures work, however, for the overall net­ four substitute variables were used that had been shown in previous research to be predictive of greater resource dispersion in metropolitan areas. The results were four variables social exceptionally unsupportive together accounted of for almost service network influence dispersion. the prediction — none of the variance the in Since the variables used had been shown to h a v e the e x p e c t e d eff e c t on o v e r a l l m e t r o p o l i t a n networks, the proposition most seriously c all e d into question by the results of the analysis was that the nature of the overall reflected in the social services network. network is The conclusion from these results is that the social services networks in the cities studied are predominantly homeostatic — their environments. relatively unresponsive to differences in 149 5. Connection to the National Environment The results and conclusion from the last section were reinforced by the a bs e n c e of a n y eff ect of the nu m b e r of ties to the l a r g e r (national) system within metropolitan areas their social services networks. on the assumption reflected to the concentration of influence in Again the chain of reasoning depended that the structure of the o v e r a l l in the soc ial s e r v i c e s network. local network is The o t he r parts to the argument — — the variables used, and the proposition that more external ties lead to g r e a t e r power d i f f u s i o n in the o v e r a l l n e t w o r k — sufficiently supported by past research to make the local ov er all network and the social were the connection between services network the suspect link in the reasoning. 6. Overall Summary There are two general conclusions from these analyses implications for u n d e r s t a n d i n g or i n t e r v e n i n g in social service de­ l i v e r y systems. lev el that have strong The first is that the p a t t e r n of r e s u l t s from e v e r y strongly underscores the centrality of the social services net­ work in the process of social service delivery. ses are u n r e l a t e d Organizational proces­ in any s y s t e m a t i c way to dyad formation, w h ere as network processes are strongly related. Variables that have been shown to affect the interorganizational networks of entire metropolitan areas are not related to social service network structure, suggesting that those networks are able to function homeostatically in their surround­ ings, relative ly unaffected in their basic structure by environmental variation. 150 B. Recommendations for Further Research The chief deficiency in research on organizational networks generally and social service networks in particular is the lack of longitudinal data. A l t h o u g h some studies h a v e been c a r r i e d out o v e r two or three years, the processes which were the subject of this dissertation occur over decades. If r e s e a r c h on i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o c e s s e s is to advance our knowledge of those processes significantly, of the same systems must be maintained for several the manner of the major studies that have knowledge humans. about ongoing studies decades — much in established a groundwork of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of l i f e s t y l e to h e a r t at tacks in Different studies by different researchers in different places in different years is no substitute for genuine longitudinal research. A second m a j o r d e f i c i e n c y of i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e f l o w s are not documented. been available; research is that In m a n y c a s e s the data h a v e not in all cases it has been (and will always be) simpler to collect binary data on the existence of contact. It will be impos­ si b l e , h o w e v e r , to d e v e l o p r e a l i s t i c m o d e l s of i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s y s t e m s so long, for exampl e, as a f l o o d of c l i e n t r e f e r r a l s bet w e e n major agencies has the same value in analysis as an occasional between small ones; trickle or so long as attributions of influence must sub­ stitute for direct measures of economic power. tion of b u d g e t a r y and e x p e n d i t u r e r ec o r d s Increasing computeriza­ in the p u b l i c sector is ushering in an age when the technical work of retrieving and analyzing the d a t a w i l l no l o n g e r be a f o r m i d a b l e barrier. developing projects to use them. It is time to begin 151 A third major deficiency in interorganizational research in social service networks, research, particularly is the absence of information on the interface between subnetworks and the larger networks of which they are a part. trate, As some of the find ing s in the p r e s e n t r es ear ch i l l u s ­ it can n o t s i m p l y be as sum ed that a s u b n e t w o r k r e f l e c t s l a r g e r e n t i t y in w h i c h it is imbedded. the T e c h n i q u e s for this sort of research have been developed and applied in interpersonal networks, but the tremendous expense and effort involved in gathering equivalent data for organizations has inhibited the a p p l i c a t i o n of the t e c h ni qu es at that level. ever, Without the information such projects can provide, how­ it w i l l be i m p o s s i b l e to e xa m i n e h o w s o c i a l s e r v i c e networks actu all y are affected by (or avoid being affected by) their environ­ ments, or to i d e n t i f y conditio ns under w h i c h f i n d i n g s d i f f e r e n t from those obtained in this research should be expected. An area of research that would be extremely interorganizational fruitful structures on dyadic to pursue is the effect of tent. As the p re s e n t res e a r c h has shown, the ef f e c t s are strong, but the m e c h a n i s m s are not clear. and a clearer formation and con­ An u n d e r s t a n d i n g of these m e c h a n i s m s , understanding of the effects themselves, any theoretical grasp of modern advanced societies. is central to Again, techniques have been developed and applied in the study of interpersonal networks; they need to be used in interorganizational research as well. F i n a l l y , an a rea of cr u c i a l c on c e r n to the d e s i g n of social s e r v i c e delivery is the relationship of client satisfaction to other variables. The research needed is not a simple assessment of the levels of 152 satisfaction related to certain delivery variables, but rather the way c l i e n t s a t i s f a c t i o n a ff e c t s s e r v i c e arrangements in different struc­ tural configurations for service delivery. the basis for definition of clients: tom-based; political groupings versus symp­ a sec ond important area for i n v e s t i g a t i o n is the use of voucher systems, money. One important dimension is where individual clients control the actual flow of Research in each area that treats client satisfaction seriously can a n s w e r q u e s t i o n s about eff ects on the r e l a t i v e power of c l i e n t s vis-a-vis providers, the effectiveness of service when measured objec­ tively, and the integration of service deli ver y into the larger politi­ cal system that generates demand for it. C. Recommendations to Agencies Intervening to Improve Social Service Delivery The key understanding relevant to intervention in social service sys­ tems that derives from the present research is that multip le centers of resource concentration generate system-wide effects in social service networks in the form of more joint programming and greater density of communication and client referral. The first principle of intervention should thus be, do not funnel money through existing major agencies in attempts to change the system. Not only is such a strategy likely to r e i n f o r c e w h a t e v e r patte rn s of i n t e r a c t i o n a l r e a d y exist, but the administrative effort required to harness the resulting resource flows into desired channels will be horrendous. 153 Instead, if intervention is intended to change the functioning of the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s system, r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d be f u n n e l e d to new or pre­ v i o u s l y u n i m p o r t a n t o rga nizations. organizations must be s u b s t a n t i a l The r e s o u r c e s p r o v i d e d to such enough that they become centers of influence and thus increase the number of such centers in the network. It may be necessary, to achieve specific ends, to mandate the formation of certain relationships between agencies in a social service network. What is important is to avoid overusing such a tactic. Since increas­ ing the number of centers of influence will generate denser interaction t h r o u g h t the net w o r k anyway, the cost re q u i r e d to a d m i n i s t e r and e n ­ force a host of m a n d a t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s w o u l d supplementing mandating of be b e t t e r a p p l i e d to the r e s o u r c e s of potential new influence centers. interaction, then, can be reserved for crucial The connec­ tions that show continued resistance to more indirect encouragements. Also, it is e s s e n t i a l not to waste e f f o r t a t t e m p t i n g to adjust the environment of social service systems in the vain hope that they will adapt in specified ways. While future research may uncover connections that make such projects feasible, the evidence of the present research is that the structure of social service systems (in medium-sized U. S. cities, at least) is relatively impermeable to environmental variation. 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Evan, Interorganizational Relations: Selected Readings, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978. 1975 M a r k e t s and Hierarchies: New York: The Free Press. A n a l y s i s and Antitrust Implications. APPENDIX A-l Survey Instrument -- Part A Interviewer Questionnaire 1 ____________ f rom H a rk e t O pin io n Research. I am H e llo , I ' m a s s is tin g tn e Department o t S o c ia l Science a t Hlchtgan S ta te U n iv e r s ity and th e Departm ent o f S o ciolo gy a t Wayne S ta te U n iv e r s ity . These two departm ents are j o i n t l y conducting a study o f v o lu n ta ry and p u b lic agencies In M ichigan and O hio. You should have re c e iv e d a l e t t e r o r have been to ld about th is research p r o je c t . ( I F RESPONDENT HAS NOT RECEIVED LETTER, SHOW YOUR COPY CF LETTER AND ALLOW RESPONDENT TO READ). As th e l e t t e r says, any answers you g iv e us w111 be kept s t r i c t l y c o n f id e n t i a l . As you may know, u n iv e r s it y re s e a rc h p ro je c ts funded by th e fe d e ra l government a re re q u ire d to g e t perm ission from respondents p r i o r to In te r v ie w . Would you sign t h is re le a s e form f o r me. A g ain , I p o in t o u t th a t n e ith e r your name nor the name o f your agency w111 e v e r be used 1n re p o rtin g the r e s u lts o f t h is re s e a rc h . RECORD INTERVIEW START TIME 168 C4 1 THESE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO GIVE “DON’ T KNOW" OR NO RESPONSE ANSWERS. IF THEY 0 0 , ALWAYS PROBE FOR BEST ESTIMATE/GUESS FROM ANSWER CODES. 1. What a re th e m ajor s e rv ic e s a n d /o r programs o ffe r e d by th is agency? (RECORD ALL MENTIONS) 1 s t mention 2 0 -2 2 VI 2nd mention 23 -25 V2 3rd mention 26 -28 V3 4th mention 29-31 V4 5th mention 3 2 -3 4 V5 3 5 -3 7 V6 38 -40 V7 (PROBE FOR ADDITIONAL MENTIONS) .

“ • 5 i s r oNL\ m sE s™ i® a . ______ b. c. 1. J. d. k. usu w e. f. 01 2 6 . W ith which agencies 1s your agency In v o lve d on community committees and p lann ing tas k fo rces? (WRITE IN ID NUMBER, RECORD ONLY THOSE SPONTANEOUSLY MENTIONED) V? 50 V I 51 , V I52 V153 V154 V155 V156 a. b. c. d. e. f. 9- J. 1. 6 6 -7 4 B lk Cd 7 1 -1 9 a s l ,»■ •O th e r (RECORD NAMES AS OPEN ENO). . . . . . . 80 . None. ............................. 90 No response............................... 99 A ll (0 0 NOT ACCEPT AS ANSWER, PROBE FOR TOP SEVEN) h. V I 41 64-65 g. _____ KP More than 7 ,77 ONLY mentions 1. 50-63 20-33 VI49 34-35 36 -4 9 KP More than 7 ONLY mentions .77 •O th e r (RECORD NAMES AS OPEN ENO)............. 88 None.............................................. go No response. ......................59 A ll (0 0 NOT ACCEPT AS ANSWER, PROBE FOR TOP SEVEN) f V I 57 50-51 176 10 Z7. Which agencies does y o u r agency r e l y on to d e l iv e r yo u r own s e rv ic e s / programs to c lie n ts ? (WRITE IK 10 NUMBER. RECORD ONLY THOSE SPONTANEOUSLY MENTIONED) V I 58 V I 59 V I 60 V I 61 V I 62 V I 63 V I 64 a. — *>• _ _ _ » c* d, e. f. g ._______ h. 1. k. j. Cd 7 KP More than 7 ONLY mentions .77 1. 52 -65 •O th e r (RECORD NAMES AS OPEN ENO)...............................88 None............................................... 90 No response...............................99 A l l (00 NOT ACCEPT AS ANSWER, PROSE FOR TOP SEVEN) 2 9 . Whlcn agencies a r e most l i k e l y Co g e t money from th e same sources as yo u r Vfggncy? ( ^ IN I D ^ B E R , R E f l ^ ONLY S P O N T A ^ S L Y MEN^ONED) b. c. d. e. 1. J. k. 1-. f. V I65 66-67 68-74 81 k Cd 8 1-19 as 1 g. KP More than 7 ONLY mentions .7 7 -O th e r (RECORD NAMES AS OPEN END)...............................88 None. .............................90 No response...............................99 A ll (DO NOT ACCEPT AS ANSWER, PROBE FOR TOP SEVEN) 20-33 V I 73 34 -35 2 9 . We are In te r e s te d 1n knowing about any in fo rm al c o o p e ra tiv e r e la t i o n ­ ships your agency has w ith o th e r agencies In th is comnunlty (HAND YELLOW CARD). T h is card l i s t s some o f th e conroon types o f c o o p e ra tiv e re la tio n s h ip s s o c ia l s e rv ic e s agencies develop on an in fo rm a l b a s is . By Info rm al r e la tio n s h ip s we mean r e la tio n s h ip s th a t have no form al b a s i s . . . th a t I s , th e re I s n ' t a w r i t t e n agreement o r c o n tr a c t, pro bably v e ry l i t t l e , . I f an y, money changes hands and most o f th e problems t h a t a r is e o r changes th a t a re made are worked o u t by mutual ad ju s tm e n t. Using the l i s t on th e y e llo w card as examples o f In te r-a g e n c y c o o p e ra tio n , p lease I d e n t if y any agencies w ith which yo u r agency works on any s o rt o f In fo rm al c o o p e ra tiv e b a s is . (AFTER RESPONDENT IDENTIFIES AGENCIES, PROBE TO REVIEW COMPREHENSIVE­ NESS OF LIST USING TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS IDENTIFIED ON YELLOW CARD . «fHp) 10 NUI V I 76 c. V I 77 V I 78 e. V I 79 V180 f. 36 -49 J. mentions -O th e r (RECORO NAMES AS OPEN END)...............................aa None............................................... SO No response............................... 99 A ll (00 NOT ACCEPT AS ANSWER, PROBE FOR TOP SEVEN) V I 81 50-51 177 11 Now, we w ant to ask you about ag en cies w ith which yo u r o rg a n iz a tio n has any k in d o f form al c o o p e ra tiv e r e la t io n s h ip s . (HAND BLUE CARD — TYPES OF FORMAL COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS. USE FOR 0 .3 0 -3 3 } 3 0 a.A re th e re any agencies you run any No (GO TO Q .3 1 ) ...........................1 typ e o f program fo r? Yes...................................................... 2 30b.W hat a re th e agencies f o r w hich you run programs? BELOW) Cd 9 1 -1 9 as 1 20 V I 86 (RECORD IN COLUMN ONE 30c. (ASK FOR EACH AGENCY NAMED IN Cl.30b) What Is the program? (RECORQ IN COLUMN TWO’ BELOW) 30d.W hat o th e r ag en cies a re In v o lv e d 1n th e program? (RECORD IN COLUMN THREE BELOW) 30 e .U h a t person should we c o n ta c t f o r d e t a i l s about th e way I t operates? RECORD TN COLUMN FOUR BELOW) 30 f.W h ere co u ld we c o n ta c t them? (RECORD IN COLUMN FIVE BELOW - 1 . (30b) Agency ID o r Name Program 7131^6 o r Topic RECORD NAME/PLACE TO CONTACT) 3 . (3Qd) O th e r Agencies In v o lve d s .(3 0 f) Name/Place to Contact V194 ' ____________ V187 _____________ V188 _______ _ M 30e) , Person to C ontact V195 vi ag V196 V I 90 V I 97 V I 91 V I98 V199 35-Afl 21-34 More than 6 m e n tio n s 77 (CONTINUE RECORDING 2EL0H) V193 More than 6 m e n tio n s 4 9 -7 4 B lk 77 (CONTINUE RECORDING BELOW) V200 178 12 Cd 10 1 -1 9 as 1 USE BLUE CARD 31 a .A re th e re any agencies t h a t run programs f o r yo u r agency? No (GO TO Q . 3 2 ) , ........................ 1 j - — Yes.................................................. 2 20 V201 31b.W hat a re th e names o f th e agencies t h a t run programs f o r yo u r agency? (ENTER 10 NUMBERS OR NAMES - RECORD IN COLUMN ONE BaOH) (ASK FOR EACH AGENCY NAMED) 31c.W hat Is the program? (RECORD IN COLUMN TWO BELOW) 31d.What o th e r agencies are In v o lv e d 1n th e program? BELOW) (RECORD IN COLUMN THREE 31t.W h a t person should we c o n ta c t f o r d e t a i l s about th e way I t operates? (RECORD IN COLUMN FOUR BELOW) 3 If.W h e re co u ld we c o n ta c t them? (RECORD IN COLUMN FIVE BELOW — RECORD NAME/PUCE TO CONTACT) 1 .0 1 b ) Aaency ID o r Name Program ^Name o r T op ic V 31d> O th e r Agencies In v o lv e d V202 V209 V203 V210 V204 V211 V205 V212 V206 V213 5 - (31 f ) Name/Place to C ontact B M 3T<0 Person to C o n tact * V207 21-J4 Mere than 6 m entio ns............ 77 (CONTINUE RECORDING BELOW) V208 < V214 35 -4 8 More than 6 m entlcn s.............. 77 (CONTINUE RECORDING BELOW) V215 49 -74 31k 179 Cd 11 1-T9 as 1 13 USE BLUE CARD 32a.How about any j o i n t programs . . . No (GO TO Q .3 3 ) ..................1 t mean programs you o p e ra te w ith a n o th e r____ Yes.................................................. 2 agency. Is t h is agency In v o lve d In any form al J o V .t programs? 32b.W hat a re th e names o f th e agencies 1n th e J o in t program? NUMBERS OR NAMES — RECORD LEFT IH FIRST COLUMN BELOW} 20 V216 (ENTER ID (ASK FOR EACH AGENCY NAMED) 32c. What 1s th e program? (RECORD IN COLUMN TWO BELOW) 32d.What o th e r aoencles are In v o lve d In th e program? BELOW) (RECORD IN COLUMN THREE 32e.W hat person should we c o n ta c t fo r d e t a ils about th e way 1 t operates? (RECORD IN COLUMN FOUR BELOW) 3 If.W h e re co u ld we c o n ta c t them? (RECORD IN COLUMN FIVE BELOW — RECORD NAME/PUCE TO CONTACT) l.C 3 2 h ) Aaencv ID o r Name 2 . (32C ) Program Name o r Tonic 3- (32d) O th e r Agencies In v o lv e d V217 V224 V218 V225 V219 V226 V220 V227 V221 V228 V222 2 1 -3 4 4 _ 4 .0 2 a ) Person to C o n tact 5. (3 2 f) Name/Place to C o n tact V229 35 -48 • More than 6 m e n tio n s............77 (CONTINUE RECORDING BELOW) V223 More than 6 m entio ns..........77 (CONTINUE RECORDING BELOW) V230 * 9 -7 4 gjf; 180 14 Cd 12 USE BLUE CARO 1 -1 9 as 1 33'a .H c v about any o th e r ty p e s .o f form al c o o p e ra tiv e r e la tio n s h ip s l i s t e d .on th e card • • such as fo rm a liz e d arrangements to share s t a f f o r f a c i l i t i e s o r in fo rm a tio n about c lie n t s o r any o th e r form al r e la t io n s h ip s . Is th is agency in v o lv e d In any programs r e la t e d to those top1cs7 Ho {GO TO Q.34)..................... 1 20 Tes......................................................2 33b.What a re the names o f th e agencies? RECORD LEFT IN FIRST COLUMN BELOW) V231 {ENTER ID NUMBERS OF NAMES — (ASK FOR EACH AGENCY NAMED) 33c.W hat is th e program? {RECORD IN COLUttl TWO BELOW) 33d.What o th e r agencies a re In v o lve d In the program? BELOW) (RECORD IN COLUMN THREE '3io .W h a t person should we c o n ta c t f o r d e t a i l s about th e way I t operates? {RECORD IN COLUMN FOUR BELOW) 33f.W here cn u ld we c o n ta c t them7 (RECORD IN COLUMN FIVE BELOW — RECORD NAME/PLACE TO CONTACT) 2. 1. Agency ID o r Name Program (33^1 Name o r T oo ic {33c]'t 3 - (3 3 d ) O th e r Agencies In v o lv e d _____________ V232 _____________V239 _____________ V233 V240 V234 V241 V235 V242 V236 V243 V244 V237 “ ZT3T _ “ 3E-40 More than 6 m entio ns 77 (CONTINUE RECORDING BELOW) V23S ( TAKE BACK BLUE CARD More than 6 m entio ns 77 CONTINUE RECORDING BELOW) V245 Persofi3;3d* to C o n ta c t Hame/?1 ace to C o n tact 181 15 Cd 12 34. Which agencies compete w ith yours f o r resources? V246 V247 b. a. V248 V249 V251 V250 f. e. d. c. (RECORD ID NUHBERS) V252 949 -6 2 J. 1. h. KF More tnan 7 DULY m entions 1. It. .77 •O th e r (RECORD HAKES AS OPEN EflO)............................... 58 None. . .................................. 90 No response............................... 99 A l l (DO NOT ACCEPT AS ANSWER, PROBE FOR TOP SEYEIl) V253 53-64 d 5-74 5 Cd 13 1 -1 3 as 1 35. Which agencies compete w ith your agency f o r c lie n ts ? V2S4 V255 V256 a. b. e. h . ___ _ 1 . ___ _ j - ___ _ V258 V257 d. k. e. ___ CRSCORD ID NUMBERS) V259 f. — 1. ____ V260 9- _ KP More tnan 7 ONLY m entions 20-33 .77 O th e r (RECORD NAMES AS OPEN E N D ) .............................aa None..............................................>90 No response................................99 A ll (DO NOT ACCEPT AS ANSWER, PROBE FOR TOP SEVEN) (TAKE BACK Q.TS LIST OF AGENCIES CARD) 34 -35 V261 m Cd ST 1-19 as 1 16 3 6 ; Here 1s a l i s t o f persons, groups and th ln g sw trlch may have an In flu e n c e o ver d e c is io n s In yo u r agency. (HAND CARO 0 .3 6 TO RESPONDENT). As I read each type o f d e c is io n , p lease t e l l me th e persons, groups o r th in g s o th e r than y o u r s e lf .w h ich most In flu e n c e t h a t d e c is io n . I w i l l reco rd th e numoers from yo u r c a rd . (.IF RESPONDENT NAMES "OTHER,M RECORD AS OPEN END) a . O ectslons In v o lv in g agency's conrnltment o f money and r e la te d resources such as s t a f f , equipm ent, use o f b u ild in g , e t c . (RECORD HOUSERS) VZ62 V263 V264 V265 V266 V267 V26B V269 1-35 b. D ecisio ns about changing o r m o d ifyin g e x is t in g programs o r s e rv ic e s . V27O(REC0RD^ ‘f ERS' VZ72 VZ73 V274 V275 V276 V277 1-50 1 -6 5 O eclslo n s about p ro v id in g new o r d if f e r e n t s e rv ic e s o r programs. (HECORO NUMBERS V2B6 V287 V28B V289 V290 V291 V292 16-74 31k d. Cd w / X -19 as i V293 20-35 e. D ecisio ns about s e rv in g d i f f e r e n t o r a d d itio n a l groups o f p eople. (RECORD NUMBERS) V294 V295 VZ96 ■ V297 V298 V299 V300 V301 f. 36 -50 D e cisio n s about seeking funds from new o r d i f f e r e n t sources o r seeking money V30z1n tt. ^ORO ^ ^ ^ 51-65 D e cisio n s about c o o p e ra tiv e proorams o r s e rv ic e s o r j o i n t programs w ith o th e r a e e n c le s . (RECORD NUMBERS) V310 V311 V312 V313 V314 V315 V316 V317 6 5 -7 4 J T g. CdW/;” 1 >19 as 1 2 0 -3 5 h. D ecisio n s co n cerning a d m in is tr a tiv e and p ro fe s s io n a l s t a f f , e . g . , d ecid in g . . . . promot e o r demote, h ir e o r d isch arge them. (RECORD NUMBERS) V318 V319 V320 V321 V322 V323 V324 V325 3 6 -5 0 1. D ecisio ns concerning p a ra p ro fe s s lo n a l and c l e r i c a l s t a f f , e . g . , d ec id in g to promote o r demote, h ir e o r disch arge them. (RECORD NUMBERS) V326 V327 V328 V329 V330 V331 V332 V333 51-65 j. D ecisio n s about w orking c o n d itio n s and agency procedures such as work lo a d , jo o c la s s i f i c a t i o n s o r o th e r ru le s and re g u la tio n s about th e workings o f V 3 3 4 the 49aG 5 & Nl;MEE^ 3 7 V338 V339 V340 6 6 ;7 4 J ' Cd f t ” , -1 9 as ’ V341 20 -3 5 183 Cd 16 17 37. C o n sid e rin g th e e l d e r ly In th is com nunlty, do s e n io r c it iz e n s have any s p e c ia l s e rv ic e needs? (ASK AS OPEN END) What a re these? V342 V347 V343 V348 V344 V349 V345 V346 3 6 - 5 9 V350 60-61 KP ONLY More than 8 mentions a. Which o f these a re th e th re e most p ressin g needs? (CIRCLE ABOVE TOP THREE NEEDS IDENTIFIED 0Y RESPONDENT) CO NOT PROBE FOR NEEDS_________________ ___________ 38. 39. V351 V352 V353 From your p e rs p e c tiv e ., how e f f e c t i v e Is p lann ing f o r s e rv ic e s f o r th e e ld e r ly In t h is comnunlty? (ASK AS OPEN END. DO NOT READ RESPONSES BUT CIRCLE ONE CLOSEST TO OPINION RESPONDENT GIVES) Not e f f e c t i v e .............................1 S l ig h t ly e f f e c t i v e .................2 Somewhat e f f e c t i v e ................. 3 Very e f f e c t i v e .......................... 4 E xtrem ely e f f e c t i v e ...............5 D o n 't Know................................... 8 _________________________ No response 9 62-70 71V3S4 And what Is y o u r o p in io n about p la n n in g f o r s e rv ic e s f o r th e m e n ta lly tro u b le d o r m e n ta lly 111. How e f f e c t i v e Is 1t? (ASK AS OPEN END. DO NOT READ RESPONSES BUT CIRCLE ONE CLOSEST TO OPINION RESPONDENT GIVES) Not e f f e c t i v e .......................... 1 S l ig h t ly e f f e c t i v e ............... 2 Somewhat e f f e c t i v e ............... 3 Very e f f e c t i v e ...................... .4 E xtrem ely e f f e c t i v e .............S D o n 't know................................. 8 No response............................ . 9 72 V35S 184 Cd 16 18 I want to thank you f o r p a r t ic ip a t in g In t h ls In te r v ie w . The research team from Wayne S ta te U n iv e r s ity and M ichigan S ta te U n iv e r s ity does need some a d d itio n a l In fo rm a tio n . In o rd e r to conserve your tim e , we'd l i k e to le a v e w ith you a q u e s tio n n a ire which you,can f i l l o u t w ith in th e next few days and m all back In t h is envelope to Market Opinion Research. Tour co o p e ra tio n w i l l be g r e a t ly a p p re c ia te d . O f c o u rs e , th e In fo rm a tio n In the q u e s tio n n a ire w i l l a ls o be c o n fid e n tia l j u s t as th e In fo rm a tio n from our In te r v ie w 1s. (LEAVE PART I I QUESTIONNAIRE WITH ENVELOPE) This study p r o je c t a ls o needs some In fo rm a tio n about t h is agency's c l i e n t s , s t a f f in g p a tte rn s and some f in a n c ia l In fo rm a tio n . Is th e re a fin a n c ia l o f f i c e r who should p ro v id e t h is in fo rm a tio n , o r are you th e person o r Is th e re someone e ls e who should p ro vid e 1t? (RECORD NAME OF PERSON WHO SHOULD PROVIDE CLIENT, STAFF, FINANCIAL INFORMATION) I'm going to ask you to g iv e t h is f i n a l q u e s tio n n a ire to (NAME RECORDED ABOVE). H e re 's an envelope f o r m a ilin g 1 t back to Wayne S ta te U n iv e r s ity . (LEAVE PART I I I QUESTIONNAIRE AND ENVELOPE) 4 0. Race: 4 1 . Sex: (3Y OBSERVATION) (BY OBSERVATION) W h ite 1 Non-wh1te........................................2 ,, H a le ...................................................1 fo"''.................2 *51? 75-76 Cd # 77 -80 Job * 1 APPENDIX A-2 List of Influences on Social Service Agencies 185 1 SOUUCI.S 01 I H n tlLIIM i Ul. ASSISIAIir Oil A5SUC1A1C UIHECTUHS '* I)'/. HOAKU Oil liOVclUMIIU UUUY OF AtiEHUY (11. ELLIUlAL OU ILCtlHirAC STAFF 04. U.IEHT CnUUPS US. CUMMI1IIIIY UllOUl'S (SUCH AS LAIIUII, HLLMilltUS, H1ISIHL55, WOHEH’ S MUIUItlTY) 00. ULMIUMLIIT UHIMII.AII5 - 0 /. IHIHXTUIIS UF O llllll AliEHCItS ; Hit. I IIUItUAl IUIIS (10. LiltlLltAl.. I'UULIC III. GOVLIIHHLNT OFFICIALS (ANY LEVEL) II. LAOS AND llUilll.A) II1IIS I i’ . LllliUt ECIILLUH ritlll'ESSIUHAL STAIT 1.1. IKHII.Y U. 1’AIIA I'UUI tSStUKAI. STAFF Hi. I'l ttSUllllEL OF LOCAL 064^ _ ___ llltliAHIMriOHS AHU/UU I'ltOUI.CH-OlllEMTLI) CUIYHTILLS III. PHOIESSIOHAL STAHIIAHOS. i/. m ijuiiilklhis or fuiitmiti our.ah i/aiinns III. SLIIlOIl I'llOl ISSIOHAL STA11 10. Sl'UIISOItir. OltliAMI/AT IOil lilt PAULIII AlllNt'.Y ?n. sfai r nr ( H u m aufhcifs. l APPENDIX A-3 Survey Instrument — Part B: Additional Agency Head Perceptio MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY iajt uwuno . mchkuh « ui W0* Cd 1 S Very G rea t C om oetitlon 44 V381 Hew much d if fe r e n c e o f o p in io n e x is ts between the a d m in is tr a tiv e and p ro fe s s io n a l s t a f f in yo u r agency about each o f th e fo llo w in g ? (CHECK OHS BOX FOR EACH ITEM) 1 None At A ll a. b. c. d. e. 2 3 4 s Very Some S lig h t G reat G reat D iffe r e n c e D iffe r e n c e D iffe re n c e D iffe re n c e Fund r a is in g and seeking g ra n ts and c o n tra c ts C3 C3 C3 C o o rd in a tin g s e rv ic e s w ith o th e r agencies C3 C3 e3 . C3 [ ] V3B4 £3 C] V385 A llo c a tin g money and o th e r r e reso urces ( e . g . , s t a f f , eq u ip ­ m ent, space f o r s e rv ic e s or programs. t3 C3 C3 C3 [ ] V386 M o d ifyin g e x is t in g programs o r s e rv ic e s E3 C3 C3 C3 C3 V387 £3 C3 E3 E3 £ 3 C3 C3 C3 C] C3 V388 [ ] [ ] [ ] Changing s e rv ic e o r program p r io r itie s V f. S ervin g new c l i e n t groups 9- Personnel p o lic ie s and procedures ( e . g . , how promotions are d e t e r m ineo, work lo a d , jo b c l a s s i f i ­ c a t io n s , s a la ry in c re a s e s , e t c . ) [ ] V389 V390 47-53 191 Cd 1 11. Some coirm unltles a re t r y in g to p ro v id e s p e c ia l p re v e n tiv e s e rv ic e s f o r the aging and s e rv ic e s f o r th e e ld e r ly who a re m e n ta lly Im p a ire d . In yo u r o p in io n , how much o f a problem Is each o f th e fo llo w in g In p ro v id in g s e rv ic e s f o r th e e ld e r ly ? (CHECK ONE BOX FOR EACH ITEM) 1 2 3 4 5 Very No S lig h t Some G rea t G reat Problem Problem Problem Problem Problem c C3 C3 E I C3 E3 E3 C3 55 There is a low ccsmwnlty re c o g n i­ tio n o f th e need f o r such s e rv ic e s c E3 C E3 E3 56 V393 People fin d i t d i f f i c u l t to work w ith th e e ld e r ly c C3 C C3 E3 57 V394 H ig h e r p r i o r i t y Is g iv en to needs o f . p ro d u c tiv e members o f th e co im u n lty c C3 E C3 E3 53 V39E T ra n s p o rta tio n Is u n a v a ila b le o r c o m p licated t C3 E E3 EI 59 V396 People d i s l i k e being In v o lve d w ith th e e ld e r ly c [3 E3 C3 60 V397 There a re few rewards to any agencies t h a t p ro v id e such s e rv ic e s c C3 e E3 E3 61 V398 c C3 [ E3 E3 62 V39S B e lie fs th a t not much can be done to h elp the e ld e r ly who a re m e n ta lly im p aired c C3 c E3 C3 63 V4QC F in d in g lo c a tio n s f o r se rv in g the e l d e r ly E c E c E3 E3 V401 S p ec ia l s e rv ic e s a re too c o s tly E3 E3 64 1. C3 C3 65 V4Q2 m. E ld e r ly a re not an e f f e c t i v e pressure group c C3 E C 3 E3 £6 vdo: O ld er people f e a r loss o f Indepen­ dence and d ig n ity I f th ey use s e rv ic e s c C3 E C 3 E3 67 V4Q- a. S p e c ia lly tr a in e d s t a f f Is re q u ire d c b. Funds a re n o t a v a ila b le c. d. e. f. 9- h. 1. J. k. n. Host people who a re o ld e r do n o t need s p e c ia l s e rv ic e s (need Is not g re a t) . c 54 V391 V39Z 68-75 B U 75 Cd 4 77-30 Job ■* 192 Cd 3 1 -1 9 as 1 12. To what e x te n t do each o f th e fo llo w in g a f f e c t th e coordina o r agency c o lla b o ra tio n ? (CHECK ONE BOX OR EACH I H) on o f s e rv ic e s 3 Some E x te n t 4 G reat E x te n t C] C] C] C3 Cl C3 1 ] ; C] C3 E3 ] 22 V463 S t a f f l i k e to work in c o lla b o r a tiv e programs [3 ci [i ] 23 V464 P re v io u s ly unhelped c l i e n t s re c e iv e s e rv ic e s C] C] C3 ] 24 V465 Coimsunity reso urces a r e u t i l i z e d in a b e t t e r way [] C] C3 ] 25 V466 We cann o t g e t c o o p e ra tio n from ' o th e r ag en cies C] C3 C3 3 26 V4S7 C o lla b o ra tio n would mean o ur . f a c i l i t i e s would be o ver-used by o th e r ag en c ie s' c l i e n t s E] C3 El ] 27 V46B O th e r ag en cies do n o t need the the s e rv ic e s we p ro vid e C3 C3 E3 ] 28 V469 1s e a s ie r to expand yo u r own agency th an to work o u t j o i n t programs w ith o th e r o rg a n i­ z a tio n s [] C3 C3 3 29 V470 Saves o u r agency1s money and s t a f f tim e C] C3 C3 ] 30 V471 1,. We la c k c o n tro l o ver o th e r agency's s ta ff C] C3 C3 3 31 V472 m. C o o rd in a tio n h elps us serve o u r c lie n ts b e tte r r] E3 [3 3 32 V473 Our agency re c e iv e s new funds f o r c o lla b o r a tin g C3 C3 [3 ;] 33 V474 C3 t ] C3 C3 C3 C3 3 3 2 Not C o o rd in a tio n /C o lla b o ra tio n G e n e ra lly a. C o lla b o ra tio n ta k e s to o much tim e b .. F in a n c ia l co s ts a re to o g re a t c. It d. e. f. 9- h. i. k. it. o. p. It is d i f f i c u l t f o r s t a f f from d i f f e r e n t agencies to work to g e th e r C o lla b o ra tio n means o th e r agencies may nave too much say o v e r how th in g s a re done in t h is agency Good f o r p u b lic r e la t io n s 1 S lig E x te n t Very G rea t E xte n t 34 V475 35V476 193 13. How much o f a problem to yo u r agency Is each o f th e fo llo w in g ? {CHECK ONE BOX FOR EACH ITEM) 1 2 3 4 5 No Problem S l ig h t Some G rea t Very G reat A t A ll Problem Problem Problem Problem b. c. d. e. C3 3 C3 3 C3 36 V477 P o lic ie s Mental Board, H e a lth E3 3 C3 3 C3 37 V47E P o lic ie s and a c tio n s o f lo c a l w e lfa r e o r s o c ia l s e rv ic e departm ent C3 3 C3 36 V479 P o lic ie s and a c tio n s o f lo c a l a rea o f f i c e on aging C3' 3 C3 3 E3 39 V4B0 C3 [3 3 3 C3 C1 3 3 E3 E3 40 V481 41 V4B2 t3 C3 3 3 C3 C3 3 3 C3 E3 42 V483 43 V4Q4 C3 E3 1 i C3 C3 3 3 C3 C3 44 V48E 45 V486 and a c tio n s o f lo c a l H e a lth Board (A c t 646 O hio; Ccomunlty Mental Board, M ichigan} P o lic ie s and a c tio n s o f lo c a l U n ited Way f. A ttitu d e s o f o th e r agencies g. C o o rd in atio n o f s e rv ic e s w ith e th e r o rg a n iz a tio n s h. F in a n c ia l shortages 1. In te g r a tio n o f s e rv ic e s th e co n nu n lty J. ( L im ite d range o f s e rv ic e s 1n eomnunity to meet p e o p le 's needs In A ttitu d e s o f comnunlty le a d e rs i—i a. 194 Cd 3 14. What changes do you th in k a re needed f o r each o f th e fo llo w in g In th is commmlty? (CHECK ONE BOX FOR EACH ITEM) Should Be Decreased S u b s t a n tia lly a. Amount o f money s e t as id e f o r s e rv ic e s d evelop ­ ment and new s e rv ic e s [ ] b. C l i e n t advocacy programs c. e. f. h. Decreased Somewhat 3 Should Stay Same 4 Should Be Increased Somewhat Should Be Increased Substantially C] C3 C3 E3 C3 [ ] [] C] S ta te Involvem ent 1n lo c a l p la n n in g fo r human s e rv ic e s [ ] C] C3 C3 [ ] V48‘ Amount o f fe d e r a l money a v a ila b le f o r human s e rv ic e s [ ] C] C3 C3 [ ] V49C J o in t p u b lic -v o lu n ta r y agency p la n n in g f o r p a r t i c u l a r c l i e n t groups. (Exam ple, abused c h ild r e n , v o c a tio n a l­ ly d is a d v a n ta g e d , e l d e r ly , rape v ic tim s , b a tte re d women, e t c . [, ] C] C3 C3 [3 R egional planning- f o r the c o n s o lid a tio n o f s e p a ra te human s e rv ic e s systems (Example: p h y sica l h e a lth , m ental h e a lt h , w e lfa r e / Income s u p p o rt, personal s o c ia l s e rv ic e s [ 3 C3 [ ] V49E Funds fo r In te ra g e n c y pro­ grams and g ran ts and c o n tra c ts [ ] C3 -[ ] V49? Amount o f money ra is e d by U n ited Waycanpalgns [ ] C3 C ] V494 V4b : 1 3 V48r V491 46-53 195 10 Cd 3 15. How trtucK a re you pressured by each o f the fo llo w in g to develop a n d /o r p a r t ic ip a t e In c o lla b o r a t iv e p ro je c ts w ith o th e r agencies? {.CHECK ONE 50X FOR EACH ITEM) 1 2 3 4 No Pressure A t A ll S lig h t Pressure Local U n ited Way o rg a n iz a tio n C 3 c 3 C 3 L C 3 V49E Area O ff ic e on Aging C3 c 3 C 3 C C 3 V49E M ental h ealth , p la n n in g o rg a n iz a tio n C3 c 3 C 3 C C 3 V497 Local community a c tio n o rg a n iz a tio n {CAC/CAP) [ 1 c 3 C 3 C C l V498 Local d e p a rtn e n t o f w e lfa re o r s o c ia l s e rv ic e s C 1 c 3 C 3 C C 3 V499 Local ca m tu n lty development p lann ing o rg a n iz a tio n o r c i t y / county human s e rv ic e s d e p a rt­ ment. C I c 3 C 3 C C 3 V50Q O th e r agency d ir e c to r s and s ta ff C3 c 3 C 3 C C 3 V501 ^ h. ft 1. C lie n t groups LI L3 t 3 C 3 V502 S t a f f o f y o u r agency C ] C 3 C 3 C C 3 V503 ^ Board o r governing body o f th is agency I 3 I 3 C 3 E C 3 V504 Community e o o ia ltte es C 3 C 3 L C C 3 V505 1 a. 7 C. '■d. t - e* f. 'N 9- s' ]• Some Pressure 3 G reat Fressure 5 Very G reat Pressure C 54-64 65-75 01k 76 Cd # 77 -6 0 Job# 196 11 16. Cd 4 1*19 as I For each o f th e fo llo w in g s e rv ic e s p lease e s tim a te th e le v e l o f unmet need in t h is c o m ru n lty . (CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER FOR EACH SERYICE) u nh et need LEVEL C M O 3 Moderate 4 G reat 5 V ery G reat V506 Low Moderate G reat Very Great VS07 None Low Moderate G rea t Very G reat V508 C o o rd in ated p lann ing f o r new and improved s e rv ic e s None Low Moderate G reat Very G reat V509 C ounseling f o r c h ild re n and youth None Low Moderate G reat Very G reat V510 C ounseling f o r a d u lts and fa m ilie s ' None -Low Moderate G reat Very G reat V511 3* C r is is In te r v e n tio n s e rv ic e s None Low Moderate G rea t Very G reat V512 h. Oay c a re fo r a d u lts None Low M oderate G re a t Very G re a t V513 1. Oay c a re fo r c h ild re n None Low Moderate G reat V ery G reat V514 J. Emergency a s s is ta n c e None Low Moderate G rea t* Very G reat V51S k. Employment s e rv ic e s None Low . M oderate G reat Very G re a t V516 1. F am ily p la n n in g and programs None Low Moderate G rea t Very G rea t V517 m. Food and n u t r it i o n None Low Moderate G reat Very G reat V518 n. F r ie n d ly v i s i t i n g programs None Low Moderate G reat Very G reat V519 0. H elp f o r s e n io r c it iz e n s None Low Moderate G rea t Very G reat V520 P. Home h e a lth care None Low Moderate . G reat Very G reat V521 q. Homemaker s e rv ic e s None Low Moderate G re a t Very G reat V522 r. In fo rm a tio n and r e f e r r a l s e rv ic e s None Low Moderate G reat Very G reat V523 s. Legat s e rv ic e s f o r poor None Low Moderate G reat Very G reat V524 t. Long-term f in a n c ia l assista n c e (Incom e m aintenance) None Low Moderate G rea t Very G reat V525 M ental h e a lth tre a tm e n t programs None Low Moderate G reat Very Great V526 Neighborhood development s e rv ic e s None Low Moderate G reat Very G reat V527 a. Advocacy 1 None b. A lco h olism and substance abuse program None c. CHORE s e rv ic e s d. e. f. u. V. j 20-41 197 12 Cd 4 UNMET NEED LEVEL (Continued.) w. O u tp a tie n t m edical c a re 1 None 2 Low Moderate 4 G reat S V ery G reat V52a X. Programs f o r th e re ta rd e d None Low Moderate G reat V ery G reat V529 y. P r o te c tiv e s e rv ic e s f o r c h ild re n None Low Moderate G re a t Very G re a t V530 P r o te c tiv e s e rv ic e s f o r a d u lts None Low Moderate G rea t V ery G reat V531 R e c re a tio n a l programs fo r o ld e r a d u lts None Low Moderate G rea t Very G re a t V532 R e h a b ilit a t io n s e rv ic e s f o r handicapped -and d is a b le d None Low Moderate G rea t Very G reat V533 R e s id e n tia l s e rv ic e s f o r s p e c ia l groups None Low Moderate G rea t Very G rea t V534 S o c ia l ad ju s tm e n t and In fo rm a l ed u catio n fo r c h ild re n and youth None S • O M oderate G reat Very G reat V535 S o c ia lIz a t lo n (re s o e ia liz a tlo n ) None Low Moderate G re a t Very G reat V536 S p ec ia l tra n s p o rta tio n programs None Low M oderate G rea t Very G reat V537 gg. V o c a tio n a l co u nselin g Hone Low Moderate G rea t V ery G rea t V538 hh. V o c a tio n a l t r a in in g None Law Moderate G rea t Very G rea t V539 z. u . bb. ce. 3 i dd. ee. ff. 42 -5 2 ( 198 Cd 4 13 DEMOGRAPHICS 17. Which group d e s c rib e s yo u r age? (CHECK ONE BOX) r ‘ Less than 29 30 -39 f 40 -4 9 f 1 SO-59 60-69 r ' IS . What Is th e h ig h e s t degree you hold? 1 2 3 4 5 53 (CHECK ONE BOX) Some c o lle g e 9A o r BS Some graduate M irk M a s te r's degree Coursework beyond M a s te r's Ph.D . 19. V540 What was y o u r m ajor d u rin g the work f a r yo u r mast re c e n t degree? 1 2 3 * 5 6 54 V541 (CHECK CHE 3CX) S o c ia l Work S o c ia l Science Business and Economics A rts and L e tte r s 1 2 3 4 55 V542 C ] O ther (PLEASE SPECIFY) 20. Are you a member o f any p ro fe s s io n a l o rg a n iz a tio n s ? Yes No H a. 2 1 56 V543 i ( I F YES) How many? (W R lft IN NUMBER) b. How many tim es In th e p ast y e a r have you atte n d ed p ro fe s s io n a l meetings and conferences? (WRITE IN NUMBER) 21. 57-5 What community s o d a ! s e rv ic e p la n n in g committees do you serve on? §544 59 -60 V545 61 -752 (WRITE IM NAMES) 199 14 22. What agency boards o r com m ittees do you serve on? (WRITS IN NAMES) 23. What s o c ia l s e rv ic e p la n n in g co o m lttaes do you serve on? (WRITS IN NAMES OF COMMITTEES) Thant you ve ry much f o r c o n tr ib u tin g to our study o f d e liv e r in g mental h e a lth s e rv ic e s to the a g in g . In the space below would you p le as e t e l l us what a d d itio n a l In fo rm a tio n we need to know about Im proving s e rv ic e s In yo u r community? Thank you again — Please re tu r n yo u r completed q u e s tio n n a ire In th e s e l f addressed envelope we have provided or m all to : M arket O pinion Research 28 W. Adams D e t r o it , MI 48226 ( APPENDIX A-4 Survey Instrument ™ Part C: Client, Personnel, and Budget Information 200 PART I I I In te rag e n c y D e liv e ry o f Mental H ealth To The Aging 1-15 Label goes here 10 15- 19 Our study o f s e rv lc a d e liv e r y systems a t the lo c al la v e l focuses upon the re la tio n s h ip s among d if f e r e n t community agen cies, perceptions o f the agency d ir e c to rs toward c o lla b o r a tiv e e f f o r t s , and the Impact o f d if f e r e n t types o f s tru c tu re s In the t o ta l human services network. You have been suggested as a person who has g re a t knowledge about your agency s t r ic t u r e , and we would a p p rec iate your com pleting the attached form , and m a ilin g I t back to our o f f ic e fo r processing and a n a ly s is . 9ased on our previous re s e a rc h , we know almost a l l o f the data requested is re a d ily a v a ila b le and has been used in o th e r re o o rts you com plete; th is In s tn m e n t w il l re o u lre very l i t t l e o f your tim e and w i l l provide us w ith much needed In fo rm atio n about your agency's formal s tru c tu re . A ll In fo rm atio n gathered In t h is study w i l l remain c o n fid e n tia l and no In d iv id u a l oerson o r agency w i l l av er be Id e n t if ie d In any r e p o rt. I f you have any questions about our research p r o je c t, please do not h es1 t3te to c a ll and we s h a ll be hapoy to answer your In q u ir ie s . Thank you In advance fo r c o n trib u tin g to our*.study; we s in c e re ly ap p reciate your p a r t ic ip a tio n . S in c e re ly , ' S& uU P h il i p M. M arcus, D ir e c t o r S o c ia l Science Research Bureau M ich ig an S ta te U n iv e r s it y Ann W. Sheldo n , A s s is ta n t Departm ent o f S o c io lo g y Wayne S ta te U n iv e r s it y P ro fe s s o r 201 Cd 1 -21. About how many people { In d iv id u a ls o r f a m ilie s ) use th e s e rv ic e s o r programs o f your aqency each month? ______________________ VS46 (WRITE IN NUMBER OR ESTIMATE) 2. V547 V548 What types o f c l i e n t s Is th e agency c u r r e n t ly (19 79 ) serving? (We a re n o t in te r e s te d 1n e l i g i b i l i t y , but in those a c t u a lly using the agency” t h is y e a r . ) (CHECK ALL THAT- APPLY TO YOUR AGENCY} Males _ ____Females _____ W hite V553 _____ Black V554 25 -39 1“ Y 0-N V549 C h ild re n and youth Spanish background V550 Young a d u lts (under 30) American In d ia n V551 M idd le age a d u lts (3 0 -5 9 * O th e r r a c i a l / e t h n i c group V552 O ld er a d u lts (6 0 and o ld e r ) Low income vrw V556 V558 P h y s ic a lly handicapped V559 M e n ta lly tro u b le d o r i l l Unemployed 3. ,n Z0“ Z4 V550 V5G1 In g e n e ra l, how s im ila r a re th e people ( in d iv id u a ls o r f a m ilie s ) who use o r a re e l i g i b l e to use yo u r agen cy's s e rv ic e s and programs? (CHECK ONE) Not a t a l l J lig h tly s im ila r 1 s im ila r 2 Somewhat s im ila r 3 G re a tly s im ila r 4 Very g r e a t ly s im ila r 5 40 V562 41 51k I 202 Cd 1 -3 4. What p ro p o rtio n o f the In d iv id u a ls o r f a m ilie s usinq your agency a re 1n each o f th e fo llo w in g c a te g o rie s ? (WRITE IN APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGES FOR EACH CATEGORY. IF YOUR AGENCY OOES NOT SERVE SUCH CLIENTS PLEASE WRTTE IN "NONE.**) a. Need t r a in in g o r r e - t r a i n in g o f some s o rt 5 42-43 V563 Have m u ltip le problems ( I . e . re q u ire a v a r i e t y o f s e rv ic e s ] 5 44-45 V564 c. R equ ire counsel1nq o f some s o r t 5 46-47 V565 d. Are not. tro u b le d in some way ( i . e . want to use some s e rv ic e you p ro vid e such as using f a c i l i t i e s , be a group member, re c e iv e some s p e c if ic a id (n u r s in g , fo od , e t c . ) , ta k e a c la s s , e t c . ) 5 46 -49 V566 b. 5. How many p a id s t a f f p o s itio n s does yo u r agency have? Please express p a r t -tim e p o s itio n s 1n f u l l - t i m e e q u iv a le n ts . (WRITE IN NUMBER) a. T o ta l number o f emolovee D o s itlo n s 50-52 V567 b. How many o f these a re a d m in is tr a tiv e o a s ltio n s ? 53-55 VS6S c. How manv a re P ro fe s s io n a l o a s ltio n s ? 56-56 V569 d. How many a re p a ra -p ro fe s s io n a l oos1t1cns7 59-61 V570 t. How many a re c l e r i c a l - t e c h n i c a l p o s itio n s ? 62-64 V571 f. O ther p o s itio n s (PLEASE SPECIFY) 65-67 V572 6. I f yo u r agency r e l i e s on v o lu n te e rs as s t a f f , ap p ro xim ately how many v o lu n te e r hours a re c o n trib u te d each month? 68-72 V573 73-74 V574 (WRITE IN HOURS) 7. What p ro p o rtio n o f the ag en cy's s t a f f were newly employed by th e agency d u rin g th e p ast year7 m lih lT E T N PERCENTAGE 75 B 203 Cd 2 -4' 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 1-19 as 1 A re y o u r s t a f f re p re s e n te d by a union o r s t a f f a s s o c ia tio n ? No 1 Yes 2 (CHECK ONE) 20 V575 21 V576 22-23 V577 24-25 V578 26 -2 7 V579 Has th e re been any s t r ik e o r work stoppage o f yo u r s t a f f d u rin g th e p a s t th re e years? (CHECK ONE) No 1 Yes 2 P lease g iv e us a 1 1 s t o f jo b t i t l e s f o r yo u r agency ( 1 f p o s itio n 1s budgeted b u t n o t c u r r e n t ly f i l l e d , p le as e In c lu d e on 1 1 s t ) . (PLEASE LIST JOB TITLES BELOW OA ATTACH INFORMATION) What d if f e r e n t p ro fe s s io n a l and o c cu p atio n al s p e c ia lt ie s does your agency employ? (PLEASE LIST SPECIALIZATIONS BELOW OR ATTACH INFORMATION) How many d i f f e r e n t departm ents ( o r work u n its w ith a s u p e rv is o r) does th e agency have? (Wftl'ffi IN nuKbBIJ 204 “5‘ 13. Cd 2 We need In fo rm a tio n about how th e work o f yo u r o rg a n iz a tio n Is done, and s p e c i f i c a l l y , how s t a f f members who work w ith the aciency's users and c l i e n t s do t h e i r work. For each o f th e fo llo w in g ways o f w orking w ith p eo p le, please w r it e In th e ap p ro xim ate p ro p o rtio n o f agency users o r c l i e n t s served by each way o f w o rkin g . I f th e approach l i s t e d 1s In a p p ro p ria te f o r your agency, p lease w r it e In none. a. b. c. d. 14. S t a f f members work to g e th e r as a team. (WRITE IN PERCENT OF INDIVIDUALS OR FAMILIES SERVED BYTHIS WAY OF WORKING) ______ % V5E0 S everal d if f e r e n t s t a f f members p ro vid e s e rv ic e to the u s e r / c l ie n t b u t th ey work p r e t t y In d ep en d en tly o r 1n seauence. (WRITE IN PERCENT OF INDIVUALS OR FAMILIES SERVED BY THIS WAY OF WORKING) ? 3 {M ] One s t a f f member p ro vides th e s e r v ic e . (WRITE IN PERCENT OF INDIVIDUALS OR FAMILIES SERVED BYTHIS WAY OR WORKING) 5 32 -33 V582 O th e r way o f w orking (PLEASE DESCRIBE BRIEFLY) 5 34 -35 V583 What p ro p o rtio n o f the people who use yo u r agency s e rv ic e s a n d /o r programs o r a re c l ie n t s o f your agency have th e same problems? ____________5 {wrT tl I n pe M e n T) 15. V5S1 36-37 V584 38 -3 9 V585 40-41 V586 What p ro p o rtio n o f yo u r s t a f f do th e same work w ith th e agency's users o r c lie n t s ? 0 (WRITE IN PERCENT) 16. What p ro p o rtio n o f yo u r c lie n t s need s p e c ia liz e d te s tin g ? i (WRITE IN PERCENT) 205 Cd23 .6. 17, P le a s e a tta c h an o r g a n lia tio n c h a rt I f one ts a v a ila b le . I f n o t, p le as e use the space below to sketch the a d m in is tr a tiv e s tr u c tu r e o f th e agency. Woi 13. c o A?l What was th e t o t a l Income o r revenue o f yo u r agency f o r the ca len d a r y e a r 1978 ( o r th e most re c e n t y e a r)? Please e n te r th e to ta l amount o f a l l Income and revenue from any source In c lu d in g fe e s , c o n tra c ts , e tc . I f e x a c t fig u re s a re n o t a v a l l a h le , p lease e s tim a te as c lo s e ly as p a s s ib le . Omit funds fo r c l i e n t income m aintenance, t G t w A °i A ^ i U O O O Q O O O O Q - RST Nc» r u » p s * « * 1 *1 *1 5 (WRITE IN HUMBER) 18 b F u n d in g s o u rc e s 1 " M e n tio n O " ll o t m e n t i o n e d C i t y fu n d s S t a t e fu n d s F e d e r a l fu n d s U n i t e d Way f u n d s A g e n c ie s fu n d s F o u n d a t io n fu n d s B u s in e s s f u n d s G ifts .s a le s .fe e s o th e r . . ■ 51 V588 . 5 2 V589 53 V590 54 V591 55 V592 56 V593 57 V594 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 4^*50 18c M a jo r s o u rc e s o f fu n d s P u b lic U n i t e d 'W a y '5 9 A g e n c ie s F o u n d a tio n s B u s in e s s G ifts /o th e r t •. Ho I n f o r m a t i o n • , 18d 1 o f b u d g e t 0 0 -9 7 A c tu a l 9 8 -1 0 0 -9 8 Ho r e s p o n s e 9 9 V596 60-61 V597 , - 5 8 V595 19 E a r m a r k e d f u n d s 1 M e n tio n 0 H o t m e n t io n e d 62 V598 43-ns- Qiic. 14* SO VS 87 APPENDIX B Metropolitan Area Variables Available 206 COItEBOOK - COMMUNITY STRUCTURE (All Vara at COUNTY level, unless Indicated) O COLUMN VAR. DESCRIPTION 1,2 III State, 11— 12— 13— 14— 15— 16— Clty-County Ann Arbor/Washtenaw Flint/Genesee Grand Rapldo/Kent Kalamazoo /Kalamazoo Lansing/Ingham Sag!now /Saginaw 21— 22— 23— 24— 25— 26— Akron /Sununl t Canton/Stark Dayton/Montgomery Lima /Allen Toledo /Lucas Youngstown/Mahoning I I 3.4 Card Card Number 01 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 5-10 I VI' 11-15116-20 21-25 26-30 31-3536-4U 41-44 I t 1' 4S-4B V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 vtt V9 4U-5J VII) Distribution of Employees by Occupation - 1970. I'rotcsulonal, technical and Kindred wprKcrs Managers and administrators (deludes selT-empld: Sales workers excludes farm) Clerical and kindred workers Craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers Operatives, transport equipment operatives Laborers, except farm Other (Farmers, farm managers; farm laborers; private household workers) Service workers (except private household) V1L V12 V13 VI4 Vl5 V16 Distribution of Employees by Industry - 1970 Agricultue, forestry and fisheries Hlning Construction Manufacturing Triinsportatlon (Includes RR service, trucking) Communications * Total employed 16.years and older. . 54-57 5H-60 61-64 65-69 711-73 74-77 11' !' t; i END OF CARD 01 BEGINNING OF CARD 02 1,2 3.4 II) Card 5-N 9-12 13-17 VI7 VIM VIM State/Clty-Caunty Card Number 02 Utilities nnd snnltary services Wholesale trade Retail trade 207 .2 o 18-21 V20 22-2S 2G-30 11-35 V21 V22 V23 36-39 60-63 66-6B ' ' v26 V 2 r) VZ6 . 69-52 v27 53-57 58-61 62-65 bb-70 71-75 7 40-41 42-43 44-45 46-47 4H-49 511-51 52-53 54-55 1956 MINING 1-3 employees 4-7 B-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500 plus V47 V4H V49 V5U V51 V52 V53 V44 1956 56,57,5a 59,6U,61 62,67,64 65-66 67-6B 69-70 71-72 7J— 74 V55 V56 V57 V58 V59 VfiO V6I V62 CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION 1-3 employees 4-7 employees B-19 employees 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500 plus KND OF CARD -3 DKG INN INC OF CAItl) 04 1.2 II) J.4 C.iril 5,6.7 H.9.IO 11,12,13 14,15,16 17-lfl 19-20 21-22 23-24 V63 V64 V65 V66 V67 V6B V69 V70 25,26,27 28-29 30-31 32-33 34-35 36-37 3B-39 4(1-41 V71 V72 V73 V74 V75 V76 V77 V7U 42,43,44 45,46,47 48,49,50 51-52 V79 VHO VB1 VB2 VH7 VH4 VH5 v86 57-54 45-4(i 47-48 59-60 1956 MANUFACTURING 1-3 employees 4-7 employees 8-19 employees 20-49 employees 50-99 100-249 250-499 500 plus 1956 PUBLIC UTILITIES 1-3 employees 4-7 employees 8-19 employees 20-49 employees 50-99 100- 249 250-499 500 plus 1956 WHOLESALE TRADE 1-3 employees 4-7 employees 8-19 employees 20-49 employees 50-99 100 - 249 250-499 500 plus 209 4 61,62,63,64 65,66,67 68,69,70 71,72,73 74-75 76-77 70-79 00 V87 V08 V89 V90 V91 V92 V93 V94 1956 RETAIL TRADE 1-3 employees 4-7 employees B-19 employees 20-49 employees 50-99 100-249 250-499 500 plus END OF CARD 04 BEGINNING OK CARD 05 1,2 3,4 ID Curd 5,6.7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 Sd-19 20-21 V95 V96 V97 V98 V99 V100 VIOl V 102 1956 FINANCE, INSURANCE 1-3 employees 4-7 8-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500 plus 22,23,24,25 2b,27,20 29,30,31 32-33 34-35 36-37 30-39 40-41 VI03 V104 VI05 V106 V107 V 1(IH V 11)9 V I 10 1956 SERVICES 1-3 employees 4-7 employees 8-19 employees 20-49 50-99 • 100-249 250-499 500 plus 42,43,44 45-46 47-48 49-50 51-52 53-54 55-56 57-58 VIII V I 12 V113 V I 14 V115 V116 V117 V118 195 6 {HEALTH SERVICES - i 1-3 employees 4-7 8-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500 plus V119 V12Q V121 VI 22 VI 23 V 124 V 12 5 V I 26 Type of establlshme: 1966 AGRICULTURE 1-3 employees 4-7 employees 8-19 employees 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500 pluH 59-60 61-62 63-64 65-66 67-60 69-70 71-72 7 1-74 KM) OK CAHI) 05 210 . 5 BEGINNING OF CARD 06 ( 1,2 m 3 (4 Curd Card No. 06 1966 IIIHI Ni: l-t entpluyuew 4-7 8-19 • 20-49 ■ 50- ro © go w w * * l l 1 I - * ►- B ro ro roe- r— ►-* © ♦ Oi U u U N ^ I t I t I t I* ^I'JULJUlkJM ut u M O O' bO • SI MMMGO ro ■O t* CD O X-^S' U'^O'OmOLH Ul/ IiU MlO 1 I I I I* * O'Q'O'mmls'isi-E* «-roO&Bi~0'o m m f* X- i- 33 > M C 3 I U « N vOUI I I I I- * - X«X>^UUULie) uiWM'Ocruco' lj u* to ro •o x* e- K}tgwhMH0U< -P.t 1o —i M*ioM«* iiMj-> Mr *- S O' r>J N • m i'NOtty'MHM ■ - oM- H O' bJ MJMr'COOO^ <<<<<<<< O'C'O'O'O'O'O't* O'i/'-fi^u-roe-O'O li <<<<<<<< << < < < < < < _M H »5 S M — ►— m M ; 00 QQ Q *0 v| n I *J sj i -OdAMirui \0 CO CD 09 (D QD 0930*1 O r > O 'O Q9"0O't* X*bJG- X 2 n a > 33 O 3 -o <<<<<<<- %DO' O' *“—: w.7"nTx»;£ C ^ ?1 r k a i *= %c a x ■» o2 x o x xt X c *n< *i *: nit < 5 X ft 33 c ^x x x 1 a 'j" c = T f " £ c C CI » — -si — r £: i i >c c coo X ~2 S <£■ X 5 f X i• * f 7 i “ 7 T i *; ^ — : c S • •< < t* ^s c c «: c x x x

x a 211 -"s 7 ^ 7^ i i«cS ' -* g" " ^ o O' O' O' es 212 7 43-44 43-46 47 48 49 5U 51 52 61 V199 V200 V2(Jl V202 V203 V204 V206 V200 V2D7 T ype of establishment by size of work force-1976. 1976 AGRICULTURE 1-4 employees 5-9 employees 10-19 empluyees 20-49 employees 30-99 employees 100-249 employees 250-499 employees 500-999 employees 1000 plus 54-56 56-57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 V208 V209 V210 V21I V212 V2IJ V214 V215 V216 1976 HLNlNli . 1-4 employees 5-9 employees 10-19 20-49 50-99 10(1-249 250-499 500-999 1000 plus END OR CARD 0.8 iu:oiNnm: ok card 09 1 ,2 111 J,4 Card 5,6,7 8,9,10 11,12,13 14-16 16-17 IH-I'J 2(1-21 22-23 24-25 V217 V218 V219 V22U V221 V222 V223 V224 V225 26,27,28 29,30,31 32,33,34 35,36,37 18-19 40-41 42-4 3 44-45 46-47 V226 V227 V228 V229 V23II V21I V232 9211 V214 Card No. 09 1976 CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION 1-4 employees 5-9 employees 10-19 employees 20-49 50-99 1(10-249 250-499 . 500-999 ‘ 1000 plus 1976 MANUFACTURING 1-4 employees 5-9 employees 10-19 employees 20-49 employees 50-99 100-249 250-499 500-999 1000 plus 213 u 48,49,50 51-52 53-54 55-5,i(>, 17 20-21 22-2 1 24-2 '\ 26-27 O.ird Number 11 1976 SERVICES 1-4 employees 5-9 employees 10-19 employees 20-49 employees 50-99 100-249 * 250-499 500-999 1000 plus 1976 28,29,30 ■J1.32.J3 14-13 >6-17 JU-39 A 0-41 42-4 t 44-43 40-4 7 V280 V2HI V2H2 V2H 1 V2H4 V2B5 V2H0 V2H7 V2KH 38 3'l 00 V2K9 V29U V2'J1 V292 V 2*1 J V294 V295 V29h V2't7 01-62 V2'J8 48-4'l Stl-bI 32-3 1 34-33 30 37 I'NO (IP CAHO 11 {HEALTH SERVICES)-Subcategory of SERVICES 1-4 employees 5-9 employees 10-19 employees 20-49 employees 50-99 100-249 250-499 500-999 1000 piun 1976 (SOCIAL SERVICES -SuhcateRory of SERVICES) 1-4 employees 5-9 employees 10-19 employees 20-49 employees 50-99 employees 100-249 250-499 500-999 loon plus NUHIIKH OP LABOR OHflANIZAT10NS— listed lit City pliunu litreelory— each local counted separately (1978) 215 10 BEGINNING OP CARD 12 . 3.4 tn Card Card Number 12 POPULATIONS CHARACTERISTICS 5,ft.7 ,8,9,10 V299 Population far central county - 1970 11 ,1 2 ,13,14,15.16 V300 Population for Central County - 1975 17, IB ,19,20 V301 Population Density (per aq, mile) - 1970 21-22 V302 Papulation Change 1960-1970 In percent 21,24 ,25 V301 Not migration 1960-1970 (In percent, tenths) 2 f t - 11 V304 Actual IN HIGRATION 1965-1970 12-17 V305 Actual OUT HIGRATION 1965-1970 1H,1'( ,40 Vlflfi Karclgn Stack - 1970 (In percent, tenths) 41,42 ,43 V307 Foreign Stock - 1960 (In percent, tenths) 44-45 V10H Spanish Heritage 1970 (In percent, tenths) 4fi-50 V309 Black population - 1970 51,52 ,41 VllO 54,.55 ,5(> 57-58 5‘J,ftl) ,ftl V II1 V312 62,61 ,64 V3I4 . V113 Change in Black population 1960-1970 (percent In tenths) Educations persons'2S yearn plua In 1970 Hud Inn years (In tenths) Less than 5 years (percent In tenths) High School graduate or more (percent In tenths) Four years college or more (percent In tenths) HN1) CAUI) 12 IIK.CINNING OK CAUI) 13 1.2 3,4 II) Card 5-9 10-15 V315 16—2.1 V317 V318 V319 V120 22-27 2H-32 11-37 V316 Card Number 13 Age of Population. 1970 Under 5 years of age Under IB years of ag£) 16 years and. over _ % 21 years and aver 60 years thru 64 .years 65 years and older.. 216 11 P overty Status of Population - 1969. jB-'jy V321 40,41,42 V322 43,44,45 V323 46,47,4H V124 4‘ J,50,51 V325 52,53,54,55 56-60 hi-65 V326 VI2 7 V328 6h-69 V329 Percent families with Income leas than poverty, (tenths) Percent persons with Income less than poverty, (tenths) Percent families with Income less than 125X poverty, (tenths) Percent^ persons with income less than 125Z' povurty. (tenths) Percent perBDns below law Income level, 65 years and over, (tenths) Recipients of Old Age Assistance (1972). Recipients of A.D.C. (1972) WHITE Median Family Income - 1969. BI.ACK Median Family Income - 1969, END OF CARD 13 IIKCl NNlNli OF CARD 14 1.2 1,4 III Cord Card Number 14 COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS 5.6 V33II Humber of Suburban Governments. 7,a VTII Suburbanization of high income population; (ratio In tenths). Figure less than 1,00 lndlcntes that the high Income population Is concentrated In the city. 9,10,11 12,13,14 V332 V333 15-16 V334 17-18 V335 'CITY Age (based on first census year city reached papulation of 50,000 plus)-l975. 19,20,21,22 V 136 CHIME RATE (pec 100,01)0 papulation residing In COUNTY July 1, 1975). 23,24,25,26 V 337 Assessed Value of REAI, Property subject to local general property taxation for COUNTY - 1971. (In Hllllons of Dollars) 27,28.29, 10 11,32,33 V33B V339 Bank Deposits - Total, June 1970 (Hllllons) Bonk Deposits - Time, June 1970 (Millions) Population Concentration, City/central e.ouncy (In tenths) Clcy/SMSA (In tenths) COUNTY Age (based on first census year to reach population of 100,000 plus) as of 197 217 34-35 V34() Intergovernmental for 1967 (Z of General Kuvcnuu) 16-37 V341 Travel B u m s - 1978. 38-39 V342 Number of Catholic Churches In County - 1971. 40,41,42 V343 Catholic percentage of population- 1971.(tent! V344 Vote m a t 4'), 50,51 V345 Votufor Leading Party (percent In tenths) 52 V346 Number of Chamber* of Commerce in 1978-county 5J.54,55 V347 Number of Federal Grants - 1977. 56,57,58,59,60,61,62 V 148 Local United Way money raiaed In 1975. 4 1,44,45,46,47,48 for prcaldent, 1968. KNI) OF CAHO 14 BEGINNING OK CAUI) 15 1,2 >,4 ,6,7 ,8 11) Card Card Numher 15 V349 CITY employees - 1972. 9-13 V 350 Local Government employment - 1972. '14-18 V351 Federal Government employment - 1970. 19,20,21 VI92 22-23 V353 General public expenditure - 1971/72 (In millions of dollars) Welfare expenditure 1971-72 (percent In tcntln 24,25,26 V344 Health Expenditure 1971-72 (percent In tenths) 27,28,29 V355 General expenditure CITY government 1969-70, (in Kllllonu of dollars) fin tenths) i 218 8/ 10/79 -13- Addondum to COMMUNITY STRUCTURE COnEDnOK. (tiiliinji V;tr [able 30 V356 FORH OF CITY COVERNMENT Mayor and council R o u e m m e n c . 1972 U**nu 1-yus 3t VI57 Cnuncil-Mannnor. 1972 0-no 1-yes 32 V35B Reform L’overnment. 1972.1976. Four point scale scoring one eacli Cor non-pnrtlsan elect Ions (1976), city manager system (1972), anti at-large election of councilman (1972). 33-34 V359 National Headquarters -Voluntary Associations, 1972-73. 33 - l(i VH.O National Headquarters - Voluntary Associations, 1978-79. (99-HOT AVAILABLE) J/,38,19 VMil lltflclal Unemployment of Labor Force J6 years and older, 1970 (in percent, tenths) 60,61,62,61,66,66 46,47,43,49,50,51 V362 V363 1961) Votes for President. HepubIlean Democratic 52,53,54,55,56,57 611, 59,(.0,61 ,62,6 1 VI64 V'165 1968 Votes for President, Republican llcmucralic 64,65.66,67,6B.69 70,71,72,73,74,75 V366 V3b7 1976 Votes for President Republican Democratic APPENDIX C Tables of Correlations for Cities 219 TABLE C-l The Relationship of Size to Complexity in the Twelve Cities City N zero-order correlation and significance (one-tailed)** partial correlation* and significance (one-tailed)** 20 0.6863 p < 0.001 0.7016 p =» 0.003 2 26 0.4938 p => 0.005 0.5236 p = 0.009 3 21 0.3960 p = 0.038 0.4226 p = 0.058 4 24 0.3684 p « 0.038 0.4272 p = 0.039 5 23 0.4249 p - 0.022 0.5153 p = 0.017 6 24 0.4307 p - 0.018 0.4731 p = 0.024 7 21 Or 6374 p < 0.001 0.7745 p < 0.001 8 21 -0.0520 p = 0.589 -0.0008 p = 0.501 9 25 0.7190 p < 0.001 0.7672 p < 0.001 10 22 0.5145 p » 0.007 0.5061 p = 0.023 11 25 0.4347 p - 0.015 0.3493 p « 0.071 12 20 0.5608 p = 0,005 0.6009 p = 0.012 1 * , controlling for IOR, centralization, formalization, internal communication, and efficiency ** based on prediction of positive correlation 220 TABLE C-2 The Relationship of Size to IOR Formation In the TWelve Cities City 1 20 2 26 3 4 5 6 12 P 0.6278 < 0.001 0.7367 p < 0.001 p 0.1597 » 0.245 -0.1319 p = 0.680 p 0.6137 < 0.001 0.7961 p < 0.001 p 0.5332 = 0.004 0.4887 p = 0.023 p 0.0430 = 0.421 0.2046 p = 0.208 -0.0237 p - 0.541 0.0244 p = 0.466 24 21 11 0.5651 p = 0.018 23 8 p 0.3037 = 0.090 p p 0.5065 = 0.005 0.1026 p = 0.338 0.5450 p “ 0.004 0.4080 = 0.058 25 22 partial correlation* and significance (one-tailed)** 0.4849 p = 0.015 24 21 10 zero-order correlation and significance (one-tailed)** 21 7 9 * N 25 p 0.1874 = 0.252 p 0.1496 = 0.238 0.0003 p = 0.499 p 0.2953 = 0.149 0.2817 p =» 0.165 20 controlling for complexity, centralization, formalization, internal communication, and efficiency ** based on prediction of positive correlation 221 TABLE C-3 The Relationship of Complexity to IOR Formation in the Twelve Cities City N 20 zero-order correlation and significance (one-tailed)** partial correlation* and significance (one-tailed)** 0.1363 p = 0.283 -0.1956 p ** 0.749 0.0222 26 8 p =* 0.457 -0.4055 p = 0.962 21 0.3226 p » 0.077 0.0659 p = 0.408 24 0.3187 p = 0.065 -0.1727 p = 0.753 23 -0.0661 p = 0.618 -0.3670 p = 0.926 24 -0.1536 p « 0.763 -0.1559 p - 0.732 21 -0.0331 p = 0.557 -0.0358 p = 0.550 21 0.0111 p = 0.519 -0.1704 p = 0.728 - 9 25 0.4967 p = 0.006 0.2038 p = 0.201 10 22 0.2521 p = 0.129 -0.1361 p = 0.792 11 25 0.2370 p = 0.127 0.2240 p = 0.178 12 20 0.1570 p = 0.254 -0.0663 p = 0.589 * controlling for size, centralization, formalization, internal communication, and efficiency ** based on prediction of positive correlation 222 TABLE C4-1 The Relationship of Innovation to Size in the Twelve Cities City N zero-order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 1 20 0.0877 p =* 0.714 -0.2521 p = 0.312 2 26 0.0822 p = 0.690 0.1340 p - 0.532 3 21 0.1109 p = 0.632 0.1910 p = 0.434 4 24 -0.1389 p = 0.518 -0.5046 p = 0.016 5 23 0.5876 p = 0.004 0.3502 p = 0.120 6 24 -0.0730 p ** 0.734 0.0748 p = 0.740 7 21 -0.1679 p = 0.466 -0.3413 p = 0.152 8 21 -0.0071 p = 0.976 -0.1061 p - 0.666 9 25 -0.3337 p = 0.104 -0.5981 p < 0.001 10 22 0.3945 p = 0.070 0.3947 p = 0.084 11 25 0.5728 p < 0.001 0.5927 p < 0.001 12 20 0.5956 p = 0.006 0.5558 p = 0.016 * controlling for complexity and IOR 223 TABLE C4-2 The Relationship of Innovation to Complexity in the Twelve Cities City 1 N 20 zero-order correlation and significance (two-tailed) 0.1496 P - 0.528 2 26 0.0223 partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 0.2577 p = 0.302 P = 0.914 -0.0652 p - 0.762 3 21 -0.1634 p - 0.480 -0.2947 p = 0.220 4 24 0.5215 p - 0.008 0.6189 p < 0.001 5 23 0.3070 p = 0.154 0.1503 p = 0.516 6 24 -0.2657 p = 0.210 -0.2981 p = 0.178 7 21 0.1298 p - 0.574 0.3315 p = 0.166 8 21 0.2141 p = 0.352 p 0.2256 =* 0.354 9 25 0.1237 p = 0.556 0.5481 p = 0.006 10 22 0.0854 p = 0.706 -0.1525 p = 0.520 11 25 0.0981 p =• 0.640 -0.2392 p = 0.272 12 20 0.2549 p = 0.278 -0.1195 p = 0.636 * controlling for size and IOR 224 TABLE C4-3 The Relationship of Innovation to IOR Formation the Twelve Cities City N zero-order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 20 0.3433 p = 0.138 0.4061 p =* 0.094 26 -0.0172 p = 0.934 -0.1080 p = 0.616 3 21 0.1916 p “ 0.406 0.2596 p - 0.284 4 24 0.1657 p = 0.438 0.3122 p - 0.158 23 0.4190 p 3 0.046 p » 0.384 0.2000 6 24 -0.1542 p - 0.472 -0.2123 p = 0.342 7 21 0.2791 p - 0.220 0.3016 p = 0.210 21 0.3183 p = 0.160 0.3433 p = 0.150 25 -0.0827 p = 0.694 -0.0205 p = 0.926 10 22 0.1607 p = 0.476 -0.0774 p ° 0.746 11 25 0.2028 p = 0.332 0.1915 p = 0.382 12 20 0.1610 p = 0.498 p = 0.930 * controlling for size and complexity 0.0222 225 TABLE C4-4 The Relationship of Innovation to Centralization In the Twelve Cities City N zero-order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 20 0.0605 p = 0.800 0.1123 p =* 0.668 26 -0.2028 p = 0.320 -0.2246 p » 0.302 3 21 -0.0650 p = 0.780 -0.2191 p ** 0.382 4 24 -0.2258 p =» 0.288 0.0193 p = 0.934 5 23 0.0343 p ** 0.876 -0.1446 p = 0.544 6 24 -0.0087 p = 0.968 -0.0904 p = 0.696 7 21 0.0907 p = 0.696 0.0264 p » 0.918 8 21 -0.2269 p => 0.322 -0.0959 p = 0.706 25 -0.2519 p = 0.224 -0.0868 p = 0.700 10 22 0.0567 p = 0.802 0.2736 p = 0.256 11 25 0.1195 p = 0.570 0.1284 p = 0.568 12 20 -0.0803 p =■ 0.736 -0.0244 p a 0.926 * controlling for size, complexity, IOR, formalization, internal communication, and efficiency 226 TABLE CA-5 The Relationship of Innovation to Internal Communication in the Twelve Cities City N zero— order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 1 20 0.3190 p 0.170 0.3031 p - 0.236 2 26 0.0825 p = 0.688 0.0655 p = 0.766 3 21 0.0932 p = 0.688 -0.0235 p = 0.926 A 2A -0.1808 p = 0.398 -0.1090 p = 0.638 5 23 0.293A p « 0.17A 0 . 13AA p = 0.572 6 2A 0.2706 p = 0.200 0.1171 p = 0.61A 7 21 0.08A0 p = 0.718 0.1299 p = 0.608 8 21 0.0671 p = 0.772 0.0666 p = 0.792 9 25 0.2568 p = 0.216 0.3737 p = 0.086 10 22 -0.2205 p 0.32A -0.2977 p =216256 11 25 0.A500 p = 0.02A 0.3129 p = 0.156 12 20 0.1096 p » 0.6A6 0.0918 p = 0.726 * controlling for size, complexity, IOR, centralization, formalization, and efficiency 227 TABLE C4-6 The Relationship of Innovation to Formalization in the Twelve Cities City N zero— order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 20 -0.0845 p = 0.722 0.0479 p = 0.856 26 -0.0074 p = 0.972 -0.0005 p = 0.998 0.0120 p =* 0.660 -0.1191 p = 0.638 24 -0.0498 p “ 0.818 -0.1980 p = 0.390 23 -0.3058 p = 0.156 -0.4894 p = 0.028 24 0.1127 p = 0.600 0.0893 P = 0.700 21 0.2857 p = 0.210 0.5098 p = 0.030 21 0.0322 p = 0.890 -0.0711 p = 0.780 25 0.0801 p = 0.704 0.0354 p = 0.876 10 22 0.0057 p = 0.980 0.1826 p = 0.454 11 25 0.1282 p = 0.524 0.0980 p a 0.664 12 20 0.0670 p = 0.778 0.1764 p = 0.498 21 * - controlling for size, complexity, IOR, centralization, internal communication, and efficiency 228 TABLE C4-7 The Relationship of Innovation to Efficiency in the Twelve Cities City N zero-order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 20 -0.3845 p = 0.094 -0.4474 p - 0.072 26 -0.0780 p = 0.706 -0.0516 p = 0.814 21 0.2627 p = 0.250 0.2137 p = 0.394 4 24 0.2272 p = 0.286 -0.1238 p - 0.592 5 23 -0.2501 p = 0.250 -0.0507 p = 0.832 6 24 -0.2151 p = 0.312 -0.2384 p = 0.298 7 21 -0.0018 p = 0.994 -0.0945 p - 0.710 8 21 0.2013 p => 0.382 0.2089 p = 0.406 25 0.1614 p - 0.440 -0.1086 p = 0.630 10 22 -0.2185 p » 0.328 -0.2184 p * 0.370 11 25 0.0664 p ■ 0.752 0.3252 p = 0.140 12 20 -0.1795 p = 0.448 0.2524 p = 0.328 * controlling for size, complexity, IOR, centralization, internal communication, and formalization 229 TABLE C5-1 The Relationship of IOR Formation to Centralization in the Twelve Cities City N zero-order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 1 20 0.1780 p 0.452 0.0589 p = 0.816 2 26 0.1620 p = 0.430 0.0417 p = 0.846 3 21 -0.0685 p = 0.768 0.0274 p = 0.912 4 24 -0.0109 p =* 0.960 0.0262 p = 0.908 5 23 -0.0455 p ** 0.836 -0.3614 p = 0.108 6 24 0.0088 p = 0.968 -0.0388 p - 0.864 7 21 0.1813 p = 0.216 0.1794 p = 0.462 8 21 -0.3186 p 0.160 -0.2757 p = 0.254 9 25 -0.1955 0.350 -0.2031 p = 0.342 P = 10 22 -0.1443 p = 0.522 0.1336 p » 0.574 11 25 0.3058 p 0.138 0.3390 p = 0.114 12 20 -0.1522 p » 0.522 -0.1419 p = 0.574 * controlling for size and complexity 230 TABLE C5-2 The Relationship of IOR Formation to Internal Communication In the Twelve Cities City N zero-order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 1 20 0.0866 p = 0.716 0.0254 p = 0.920 2 26 -0.1914 p = 0.350 -0.3043 p = 0.148 3 21 0.2615 p = 0.252 0.2317 p = 0.340 4 24 -0.0726 p = 0.736 -0.0375 p => 0.868 5 23 0.4629 p = 0.026 0.2715 p = 0.234 6 24 0.1245 p = 0.562 -0.0087 p - 0.970 7 21 -0.2328 p => 0.310 -0.2321 p = 0.338 8 21 -0.1172 p = 0.612 -0.0537 p = 0.828 9 25 -0.0189 p = 0.928 -0.1547 p = 0.480 10 22 0.1689 p =* 0.452 0.0919 p = 0.700 11 25 0.1568 p = 0.454 0.1173 p =»0.594 12 20 -0.3193 p = 0.170 -0.3479 p = 0.158 * controlling for size and complexity 231 TABLE C5-3 The Relationship of IOR Formation to Formalization in the Twelve Cities City N zero-order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 1 20 -0.2214 p “ 0.348 -0.3735 p ■* 0.126 2 26 0.0179 p = 0.930 p 0.0274 « 0.898 0.4935 p = 0.024 p 0.4094 = 0.082 0.0156 p = 0.942 p 0.3022 ** 0.172 0.1802 p = 0.410 p 0.0614 = 0.792 3 4 5 21 24 23 6 24 -0.0525 p ° 0.808 -0.0659 p = 0.770 7 21 0.0228 p 0.922 p 0.0245 = 0.920 0.0145 p = 0.950 p 0.0637 = 0.796 8 21 9 25 -0.1012 p =* 0.630 -0.1751 p = 0.424 10 22 -0.2084 p = 0.352 -0.1187 p =■0.618 11 25 0.1499 p =■ 0.474 JJ.0815 p « 0.712 12 20 -0.0172 p = 0.942 -0.0222 p = 0.930 * controlling for size and complexity 232 TABLE C5-4 The Relationship of IOR Formation to Efficiency in the Twelve Cities City N zero-order correlation and significance (two-tailed) partial correlation* and significance (two-tailed) 20 -0.1862 p « 0.432 0.0269 p = 0.916 26 0.0787 p = 0.702 0.2048 p ** 0.338 21 -0.1390 p = 0.548 24 0.0388 p ** 0.858 0.5800 p =» 0.004 5 23 -0.1479 p a 0.500 0.1241 p = 0.592 6 24 0.3334 p = 0.102 0.3466 p “ 0.114 7 21 -0.0929 p = 0.688 -0.1450 p = 0.554 8 21 -0.1738 p = 0.452 -0.0488 p = 0.842 25 -0.4967 p = 0.012 -0.3734 p “ 0.080 10 22 -0.3061 p = 0.166 -0.2159 p = 0.360 11 25 -0.0487 p => 0.818 -0.0019 p = 0.994 12 20 0.0022 0.1821 p *» 0.470 p = 0.992 * controlling for size and complexity 0.0211 p - 0.932 -