AN EXAMINATION OF DEPENDENCE, LEADER INFLUENCE,
AND POLITICAL SKILL FROM A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE

By
Elizabeth Petersen Karam

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Organizational Behavior – Human Resource Management
2012

ABSTRACT
AN EXAMINATION OF DEPENDENCE, LEADER INFLUENCE,
AND POLITICAL SKILL FROM A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE
By
Elizabeth Petersen Karam

Numerous scholars have noted that the ability to influence effectively is a critical role of
organizational leaders. However, research has only begun to examine how relationship
characteristics might affect how leaders attempt to influence others. Therefore, this study
examines an important and understudied relationship characteristic, stakeholder dependence,
which may impact the specific influence tactic that a leader uses with a stakeholder group.
Second, the study assesses the leader's performance and the viability of the leader's relationships
from a broad set of stakeholders including subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers.
Finally, the political skill of the leader is examined as a moderator between the leader's influence
tactics and the performance outcomes.

Copyright by
ELIZABETH PETERSEN KARAM
2012

DEDICATION
To my parents, Jim and Shirley Petersen, who supported my educational endeavors from the very
beginning; who sustained me through this process in ways too numerous to mention; and who
have always provided an example of how to live well and love deeply. There is no way to ever
say thank you enough for all you have given me. And to Jerod, the constant, caring, supportive
partner who walked by my side throughout this journey. I am forever grateful.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The old adage “it takes a village to raise a child” certainly applies to completing a doctoral
program and dissertation, and I am tremendously thankful for the assistance and support of a
number of people. First, I would like to acknowledge the members of my dissertation committee.
Fred Morgeson, my dissertation chair, provided valuable feedback, insights, and guidance
through numerous meetings, drafts, and revisions. I am privileged to have had the opportunity to
work with such a tremendous scholar. John Hollenbeck provided the inspiration for me to start
the doctoral program and gave helpful comments throughout the dissertation process. John
Schaubroeck and Brent Scott offered great advice related to both the theoretical and
methodological aspects of my dissertation. In addition, other members of MSU’s faculty,
including John Wagner, Gerry McNamara, and Don Conlon, were helpful throughout my
doctoral studies with their support, mentoring, and guidance. Several former MSU doctoral
students provided valuable counsel and training including Stephen Humphrey, Scott DeRue, and
Jennifer Nahrgang. Nikos Dimotakis provided much appreciated methodological assistance;
insights about the process; and moments of humor that only a good friend can offer. And then
there was my cohort-mate, Rob Davison… from beginning to end (and in our new job together!),
I learned as much from Rob as anyone else, and I am grateful to have had the opportunity to
travel this path with him. I would like to acknowledge and thank the helpful contacts at the
organization where I collected data: David, Donna, and Andrea. Finally, I thank my family.
From postponing Thanksgiving dinner to help stuff dissertation survey envelopes to celebrating
at the end and reminding me of the important moments in life throughout, you are all an amazing
blessing. To Jerod, my parents, my sisters, my Texas family, and sweet baby Reese (who made

v

her appearance at the end of this process), I love you all so very much. I owe you a debt that I
can never repay for your support, love, and patience through these years. Thank you.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... xxi
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Stakeholders .................................................................................................................................. 10
Subordinates ............................................................................................................................ 11
Peers…………. ....................................................................................................................... 11
Senior Managers ..................................................................................................................... 12
Customers ............................................................................................................................... 12
Stakeholder Dependence ............................................................................................................... 14
Influence Tactics ........................................................................................................................... 19
Leader Influence Tactics ......................................................................................................... 19
Additional Research on Influence ........................................................................................... 29
Present Study on Leader Influence ......................................................................................... 30
Soft Influence Tactics ............................................................................................................. 31
Rational Influence Tactics ...................................................................................................... 40
Hard Influence Tactics ............................................................................................................ 43
Political Skill................................................................................................................................. 48
Leader Outcomes .......................................................................................................................... 55
Leader Performance ...................................................................................................................... 55
Leader Viability ...................................................................................................................... 59
Method…. ..................................................................................................................................... 64
Research Setting and Sample .................................................................................................. 64
Procedure ................................................................................................................................ 66
Leader Survey ......................................................................................................................... 67
Subordinate Survey ................................................................................................................. 69
Peer Survey ............................................................................................................................. 71
Senior Manager Survey........................................................................................................... 72
Customer Survey..................................................................................................................... 73
Factor Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 75
Control Variables .................................................................................................................... 76
Results….. ..................................................................................................................................... 77
Hypotheses 1-11 (Stakeholder Dependence) .......................................................................... 77
Hypotheses 12-15 (Political Skill Moderation) ...................................................................... 81
vii

Hypothesis 12.......................................................................................................................... 81
Hypothesis 13.......................................................................................................................... 87
Hypothesis 14.......................................................................................................................... 89
Hypothesis 15.......................................................................................................................... 95
Variance analysis .................................................................................................................... 98
Supplemental Analyses ................................................................................................................. 99
Stakeholder Dependence Supplemental Analyses .................................................................. 99
Stakeholder Dependence Supplemental Results ................................................................... 101
Moderation Supplemental Analyses ..................................................................................... 103
Moderation Supplemental Results ........................................................................................ 105
Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 115
Summary of Findings ............................................................................................................ 115
Theoretical Implications ....................................................................................................... 116
Strengths and Limitations ..................................................................................................... 120
Opportunities for Future Research ........................................................................................ 124
APPENDICES …. ...................................................................................................................... 128
APPENDIX A. List of Tables ............................................................................................... 128
APPENDIX B. List of Figures ............................................................................................. 373
APPENDIX C. IRB Consent Form ....................................................................................... 431
APPENDIX D. Survey introduction ..................................................................................... 433
APPENDIX E. Leader Survey .............................................................................................. 434
APPENDIX F. Subordinate Survey ...................................................................................... 441
APPENDIX G. Peer Survey ................................................................................................. 448
APPENDIX H. Senior Manager Survey ............................................................................... 454
APPENDIX I. Customer Survey........................................................................................... 457
REFERENCES… ....................................................................................................................... 464

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1

Types of stakeholder power and leader dependence by stakeholder group .............. 128

Table 2

Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson (1980) Classification of Influence tactics ............... 129

Table 3

Yukl, Seifert, & Chavez (2008) Proactive Influence Tactics ................................... 130

Table 4

Categorization of Influence Tactics .......................................................................... 131

Table 5

Summary of Hypotheses ........................................................................................... 132

Table 6

Data collection schedule ........................................................................................... 135

Table 7

Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Subordinate-rated Influence
Tactics ....................................................................................................................... 136

Table 8

Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Peer-rated Influence Tactics .. 138

Table 9

Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Senior Manager-rated Influence
Tactics ....................................................................................................................... 140

Table 10 Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Customer-rated Influence Tactics
................................................................................................................................... 141
Table 11 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables ..................................... 143
Table 12 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Subordinate Study Variables
………………………………………………………………………………………201
Table 13 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Peer Study Variables…….. 205
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Senior Manager Study
Variables………………………………………………………………………...… 210
Table 15 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Customer Study Variables 211
Table 16 The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 203
Table 17 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 204

ix

Table 18 The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 205
Table 19 The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 206
Table 20 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate
Ratings of Task Performance .................................................................................... 207
Table 21 The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate
Ratings of Task Performance .................................................................................... 208
Table 22 The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 209
Table 23 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Subordinate
Ratings of Task Performance .................................................................................... 210
Table 24 The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 211
Table 25 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 212
Table 26 The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 213
Table 27 The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 214
Table 28 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 215
Table 29 The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 216
Table 30 The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 217
Table 31 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 218
Table 32 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings
of Task Performance ................................................................................................. 219

x

Table 33 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Senior Manager
Ratings of Task Performance .................................................................................... 220
Table 34 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Senior Manager
Ratings of Task Performance .................................................................................... 221
Table 35 The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 222
Table 36 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 223
Table 37 The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 224
Table 38 The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 225
Table 39 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Customer
Ratings of Task Performance .................................................................................... 226
Table 40 The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Customer Ratings
of Task Performance ................................................................................................. 227
Table 41 The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 228
Table 42 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Customer
Ratings of Task Performance .................................................................................... 229
Table 43 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 230
Table 44 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 231
Table 45 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 232
Table 46 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 233
Table 47 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 234

xi

Table 48 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 235
Table 49 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 236
Table 50 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings
of Task Performance ................................................................................................. 237
Table 51 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 238
Table 52 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 239
Table 53 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Task Performance ..................................................................................................... 240
Table 54 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance .............................................................................................................. 241
Table 55 The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 242
Table 56 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 243
Table 57 The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 244
Table 58 The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 245
Table 59 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Subordinate
Ratings of Viability ................................................................................................... 246
Table 60 The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate
Ratings of Viability ................................................................................................... 247
Table 61 The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 248
Table 62 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Subordinate
Ratings of Viability ................................................................................................... 249

xii

Table 63 The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 250
Table 64 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
................................................................................................................................... 251
Table 65 The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
................................................................................................................................... 252
Table 66 The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
................................................................................................................................... 253
Table 67 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 254
Table 68 The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 255
Table 69 The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
................................................................................................................................... 256
Table 70 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 257
Table 71 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings
of Viability ................................................................................................................ 258
Table 72 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Senior Manager
Ratings of Viability ................................................................................................... 259
Table 73 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Senior Manager
Ratings of Viability ................................................................................................... 260
Table 74 The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 261
Table 75 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 262
Table 76 The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 263
Table 77 The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 264

xiii

Table 78 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Customer
Ratings of Viability ................................................................................................... 265
Table 79 The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Customer Ratings
of Viability ................................................................................................................ 266
Table 80 The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 267
Table 81 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Customer
Ratings of Viability ................................................................................................... 268
Table 82 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 269
Table 83 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 270
Table 84 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 271
Table 85 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
................................................................................................................................... 272
Table 86 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 273
Table 87 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability 274
Table 88 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 275
Table 89 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings
of Viability ................................................................................................................ 276
Table 90 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 277
Table 91 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 278
Table 92 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 279
Table 93 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability .................................................................................................................... 280
xiv

Table 94 Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (SubordinateLeader models).......................................................................................................... 281
Table 95 Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Peer-Leader
models)...................................................................................................................... 281
Table 96 Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Senior Manager level
(Leader-Senior Manager models) ............................................................................. 282
Table 97 Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (CustomerLeader models).......................................................................................................... 282
Table 98 Interrater Reliability Estimates for Study Variables by Stakeholder Group............. 283
Table 99 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Collaboration .................................................................... 284
Table 100 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Consultation ...................................................................... 285
Table 101 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Exchange .......................................................................... 286
Table 102 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Ingratiation........................................................................ 287
Table 103 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Inspirational Appeal ......................................................... 288
Table 104 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Personal Appeals .............................................................. 289
Table 105 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Apprising .......................................................................... 290
Table 106 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Rational Persuasion .......................................................... 291
Table 107 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Coalition ........................................................................... 292
Table 108 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Legitimating...................................................................... 293

xv

Table 109 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Average Dependence on Pressure ............................................................................. 294
Table 110 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Collaboration ...................................................................... 295
Table 111 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Consultation ........................................................................ 296
Table 112 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Exchange ............................................................................ 297
Table 113 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Ingratiation.......................................................................... 298
Table 114 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Inspirational Appeal ........................................................... 299
Table 115 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals ................................................................ 300
Table 116 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals ................................................................ 301
Table 117 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals ................................................................ 302
Table 118 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Coalition ............................................................................. 303
Table 119 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Legitimating........................................................................ 304
Table 120 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in
Dyadic Dependence on Pressure ............................................................................... 305
Table 121 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Collaboration .................................................................... 306
Table 122 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Consultation ...................................................................... 307
Table 123 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Exchange .......................................................................... 308

xvi

Table 124 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Ingratiation........................................................................ 309
Table 125 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Inspirational Appeal ......................................................... 310
Table 126 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Personal Appeals .............................................................. 311
Table 127 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Apprising .......................................................................... 312
Table 128 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Rational Persuasion .......................................................... 313
Table 129 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Coalition ........................................................................... 314
Table 130 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Legitimating...................................................................... 315
Table 131 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in
Average Dependence on Pressure ............................................................................. 316
Table 132 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Collaboration ................................................................................... 317
Table 133 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Consultation .................................................................................... 318
Table 134 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Exchange ......................................................................................... 319
Table 135 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Ingratiation ...................................................................................... 320
Table 136 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Inspirational Appeal ........................................................................ 321
Table 137 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Personal Appeals ............................................................................. 322
Table 138 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Apprising ......................................................................................... 323

xvii

Table 139 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Rational Persuasion ......................................................................... 324
Table 140 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Coalition .......................................................................................... 325
Table 141 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Legitimating .................................................................................... 326
Table 142 Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Pressure ........................................................................................... 327
Table 143 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Collaboration Influence Tactics ................................................................................ 328
Table 144 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Consultation Influence Tactics ................................................................................. 329
Table 145 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Exchange Influence Tactics ...................................................................................... 330
Table 146 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Ingratiation Influence Tactics ................................................................................... 331
Table 147 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Inspirational Appeal Influence Tactics ..................................................................... 332
Table 148 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Personal Appeals Influence Tactics .......................................................................... 333
Table 149 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Apprising Influence Tactics ...................................................................................... 334
Table 150 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Rational Persuasion Influence Tactics ...................................................................... 335
Table 151 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Coalition Influence Tactics ....................................................................................... 336
Table 152 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Legitimating Influence Tactics ................................................................................. 337
Table 153 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Pressure Influence Tactics ........................................................................................ 338

xviii

Table 154 The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Leader Self-Monitoring on
Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance ............................................................... 339
Table 155 The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Relationship Quality on Subordinate
Ratings of Task Performance .................................................................................... 340
Table 156 The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Relationship Quality on Subordinate
Ratings of Viability ................................................................................................... 343
Table 157 The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Political Skill (Subordinate-rated) on
Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance ............................................................... 346
Table 158 The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Political Skill (Subordinate-rated) on
Subordinate Ratings of Viability .............................................................................. 348
Table 159 The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 351
Table 160 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 352
Table 161 The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 353
Table 162 The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 354
Table 163 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 355
Table 164 The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 356
Table 165 The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 357
Table 166 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 358
Table 167 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 359
Table 168 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 360

xix

Table 169 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .............................................. 361
Table 170 The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics..................................................................... 362
Table 171 The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics..................................................................... 363
Table 172 The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics..................................................................... 364
Table 173 The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics..................................................................... 365
Table 174 The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Ratings of
Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .................................................... 366
Table 175 The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Ratings of
Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .................................................... 367
Table 176 The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics..................................................................... 368
Table 177 The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Ratings of
Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics .................................................... 369
Table 178 The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics..................................................................... 370
Table 179 The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics..................................................................... 371
Table 180 The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics..................................................................... 372

xx

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1

Overall model............................................................................................................ 373

Figure 2

The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 374

Figure 3

The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 374

Figure 4

The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 375

Figure 5

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 375

Figure 6

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ........................................... 376

Figure 7

The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Subordinate-rated Task Performance
at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ................................................................. 376

Figure 8

The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 377

Figure 9

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ........................................... 377

Figure 10 The Relationship between Collaboration and Peer-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 378
Figure 11 The Relationship between Consultation and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 378
Figure 12 The Relationship between Exchange and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 379
Figure 13 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 379
Figure 14 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Peer-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 380

xxi

Figure 15 The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Peer-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 380
Figure 16 The Relationship between Apprising and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 381
Figure 17 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Peer-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 381
Figure 18 The Relationship between Consultation and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance
at High and Low Levels of Political Skill................................................................. 382
Figure 19 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Senior Manager-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ........................................... 382
Figure 20 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Senior Manager-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ........................................... 383
Figure 21 The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 383
Figure 22 The Relationship between Consultation and Customer-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 384
Figure 23 The Relationship between Exchange and Customer-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 384
Figure 24 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Customer-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 385
Figure 25 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Customer-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ........................................... 385
Figure 26 The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Customer-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 386
Figure 27 The Relationship between Apprising and Customer-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 386
Figure 28 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Customer-rated Task Performance
at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ................................................................. 387
Figure 29 The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 387

xxii

Figure 30 The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 388
Figure 31 The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 388
Figure 32 The Relationship between Coalition and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 389
Figure 33 The Relationship between Legitimating and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 389
Figure 34 The Relationship between Pressure and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 390
Figure 35 The Relationship between Coalition and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 390
Figure 36 The Relationship between Legitimating and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance
at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ................................................................. 391
Figure 37 The Relationship between Pressure and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 391
Figure 38 The Relationship between Coalition and Customer-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 392
Figure 39 The Relationship between Legitimating and Customer-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 392
Figure 40 The Relationship between Pressure and Customer-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 393
Figure 41 The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 393
Figure 42 The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 394
Figure 43 The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 394
Figure 44 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 395

xxiii

Figure 45 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 395
Figure 46 The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Subordinate-rated Viability at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 396
Figure 47 The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 396
Figure 48 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 397
Figure 49 The Relationship between Collaboration and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill ............................................................................................. 397
Figure 50 The Relationship between Consultation and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill ............................................................................................. 398
Figure 51 The Relationship between Exchange and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill ........................................................................................................ 398
Figure 52 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill ............................................................................................. 399
Figure 53 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Peer-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 399
Figure 54 The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Peer-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 400
Figure 55 The Relationship between Apprising and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill ........................................................................................................ 400
Figure 56 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Peer-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 401
Figure 57 The Relationship between Consultation and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 401
Figure 58 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Senior Manager-rated Viability at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 402
Figure 59 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Senior Manager-rated Viability at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 402

xxiv

Figure 60 The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 403
Figure 61 The Relationship between Consultation and Customer-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 403
Figure 62 The Relationship between Exchange and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill ............................................................................................. 404
Figure 63 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill............................................................................................. 404
Figure 64 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Customer-rated Viability at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 405
Figure 65 The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Customer-rated Viability at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 405
Figure 66 The Relationship between Apprising and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill ............................................................................................. 406
Figure 67 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Customer-rated Viability at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 406
Figure 68 The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill ............................................................................................. 407
Figure 69 The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 407
Figure 70 The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill ............................................................................................. 408
Figure 71 The Relationship between Coalition and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill ........................................................................................................ 408
Figure 72 The Relationship between Legitimating and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill ............................................................................................. 409
Figure 73 The Relationship between Pressure and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill ........................................................................................................ 409
Figure 74 The Relationship between Coalition and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 410

xxv

Figure 75 The Relationship between Legitimating and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill.............................................................................. 410
Figure 76 The Relationship between Pressure and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 411
Figure 77 The Relationship between Coalition and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill............................................................................................. 411
Figure 78 The Relationship between Legitimating and Customer-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 412
Figure 79 The Relationship between Pressure and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill............................................................................................. 412
Figure 80 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Self-monitoring........................................ 413
Figure 81 The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Self-monitoring ................................................................. 413
Figure 82 The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Self-monitoring .......................................................................... 414
Figure 83 The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................... 414
Figure 84 The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................... 415
Figure 85 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................... 415
Figure 86 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality ................................ 416
Figure 87 The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................... 416
Figure 88 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality ................................ 417
Figure 89 The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Relationship Quality .................................................................. 417

xxvi

Figure 90 The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................... 418
Figure 91 The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................................... 418
Figure 92 The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................................... 419
Figure 93 The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................................... 419
Figure 94 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................................... 420
Figure 95 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at
High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................... 420
Figure 96 The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................................... 421
Figure 97 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at
High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................... 421
Figure 98 The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Relationship Quality ................................................................................. 422
Figure 99 The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality ......................................................................... 422
Figure 100 The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 423
Figure 101 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 423
Figure 102 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ........................................... 424
Figure 103 The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 424
Figure 104 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task
Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill ........................................... 425

xxvii

Figure 105 The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 425
Figure 106 The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 426
Figure 107 The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 426
Figure 108 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 427
Figure 109 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 427
Figure 110 The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 428
Figure 111 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill..................................................................... 428
Figure 112 The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill .................................................................................... 429
Figure 113 The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill (Independent Effects Model) ..................................... 429
Figure 114 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill (Independent Effects Model) ..................... 430

xxviii

Introduction
A recent report on People Management published by PriceWaterhouseCoopers – the
largest of Big Four accounting firms with 170,000 employees worldwide – highlighted the
increasing challenges faced by organizational leaders. They noted that successful business
leaders today will need a different set of behaviors due to “changes that are rapidly transforming
with whom they do business” (emphasis added, PWC Report on People Management, 2008).
This is due, in part, to the fact that organizations today are more geographically dispersed;
businesses are less hierarchical; and boundaries between organizations are more permeable
(Yukl, Chavez, & Seifert, 2005). Therefore, leaders are being thrust into roles where they
manage complex networks of relationships both within and outside of their organizations
(Schneider, 2002). Further, they are interacting and communicating with individuals and teams
who may have diverse interests; yet the leader continues to bear the primary responsibility for
directing work to fulfill personal goals and organizational objectives.
Research on leadership has often noted that organizational leaders are connected to an
extensive network of individuals both within and outside of the firm. Katz and Kahn (1978)
specifically referred to the role of a leader as a "boundary function" in that the role connects
managers to employees at various levels in the organization's hierarchy as well as to others in the
external environment (p. 532). In these boundary spanning positions, leaders may also be the link
between their team or business unit to other functional areas, departments, or geographically
dispersed divisions of the organization. Further, as a point of contact for external groups, leaders
may interact with key customers, suppliers, government entities, and media organizations.
These internal and external entities represent critical organizational stakeholders in that
they "can affect or [are] affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives" (Freeman, 1984, p.

1

25). Schneider (2002) introduced a stakeholder model of leadership which incorporates the
leader's increasing reliance on intraorganizational and interorganizational stakeholders to
accomplish his or her task work. Importantly, Schneider (2002) noted that these stakeholder
relationships are often outside of the leader's formal hierarchical position, so leaders must have
the capacity to coordinate work with peers, senior managers, and external stakeholders as well as
subordinates to perform effectively in their roles.
There is a growing body of empirical evidence that highlights the increased challenges
for leaders who manage these stakeholder relationships. For example, Agle, Mitchell, and
Sonnenfeld (1999) examined executive leaders and found that certain stakeholder attributes
affect how leaders respond to them. Specifically, stakeholder power, urgency, and legitimacy
were all found to be significantly related to stakeholder salience. That is, these characteristics
impact the amount of priority that executives give to the stakeholders' competing interests. In
their findings, Agle and colleagues suggest that executives are "juggler[s] of constituencies" who
must balance the interests of many stakeholders based on the priorities of the firm (p. 520).
Wong, Ormiston, and Tetlock (2011) explored how the integrative complexity of the
firm's top management team leadership was related to their ability to address the needs of a
variety of stakeholders. Integrative complexity was described as a cognitive style whereby
leaders have the ability to tolerate different points of view and to integrate those perspectives in
decision-making. They found that the top management team's integrative complexity impacted
how the leaders collected and handled information from various stakeholders. This research
highlights the growing cognitive demands of managing stakeholders as well.
Whereas research has suggested that the demands of managing stakeholders are growing
for organizational leaders, there is also evidence that there can be positive benefits to the

2

organization when the firm's leadership manages these relationships effectively. For example,
deLuque, Washburn, Waldman, and House (2008) examined the indirect effects of stakeholder
management on perceptions of leadership and firm performance. They found that increased
attention by organizational leaders to broad stakeholder groups actually led to increased effort by
employees, which in turn, was related to higher firm performance. In another study, Chuang and
Liao (2010) explored how human resource practices which foster a climate that demonstrates a
concern for both employees and customers (two important stakeholder groups) can lead to
important outcomes. They found that those practices encouraged greater helping behaviors and
improved service performance.
As described above, organizational leaders are facing new challenges from a variety of
stakeholders, and properly managing stakeholder relationships can be particularly beneficial.
One of the ways in which leaders can manage these relationships is through effectively using
influence strategies. Although not explicitly drawing on the stakeholder paradigm, numerous
scholars have routinely noted that the ability to influence is a critical aspect of a leader's role
requirements (e.g., Day & Harrison, 2007; Yukl, Seifert, & Chavez, 2008). In fact, leadership is
often defined in terms of the ability to influence (e.g., Avolio, Sosik, Jung, & Berson, 2003;
Fleischman, 1998; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Osborn & Hunt, 1975; Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001).
There are a multitude of reasons why leaders may need to influence others to accomplish their
task work. For example, leaders may need to influence subordinates to implement a strategic
initiative or peers to coordinate work among groups. Leaders may need to influence their senior
managers to gain support for proposals or to acquire additional financial and human resources for
projects. In addition, leaders may need to influence customers to purchase specific products or
they may need to influence suppliers in a way that results in favorable contract terms for their

3

organization. Further, leaders may need to influence governmental agencies to acquire regulatory
support for firm initiatives, or they may need to influence media organizations so that the desired
image of the organization is portrayed.
Prior research has investigated the relationship between how leaders influence
stakeholders and how effective they are in their roles (e.g., Wayne, Liden, Graf, & Ferris, 1997;
Yukl et al., 2008). However, this research has typically examined leader influence by drawing
1

from the literature on power (e.g., Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Yukl, Kim, & Falbe,
1996). Yet, as organizations move away from hierarchical structures, there are several reasons
why it may be important to examine the dependence that leaders have on stakeholders in
accomplishing their task work. Dependence has often been defined as the inverse of power
(Emerson, 1962; Mainiero, 1986). Thus, the power that a stakeholder has over a leader will be
based on the leader's dependence on that stakeholder. In traditional, hierarchical working
arrangements, leaders were able to draw on their position power to influence others to
accomplish their task work. Yet, today's work environment, with its shift toward less hierarchical
structures and more fluid organization boundaries, has brought with it a shift from leaders with
tremendous power to leaders who are increasingly dependent.
Child and McGrath (2001) have argued that the traditional perspective on power, during
the manufacturing and industrial age, comes from concentrated power in the organization's
leadership. However, the power in the role of managers now, in the information-intensive
economy, is often decentralized or distributed among a variety of stakeholder groups thereby

1

Power and influence are not synonymous (Bass, 1981). Power refers to "an agent's potential
capacity to influence a target person" (Yukl, 1981, p. 18) whereas influence refers to the "actual
use of power" (Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998, p. 307). Various studies have
empirically examined and found evidence of the distinction between power and influence (e.g.,
Hinkin and Schriesheim, 1989; Yukl, Kim, & Falbe, 1996).
4

reducing the leader's power. Further, Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch (2002) assert that "the context in
which leaders operate is both radically different and diverse” (p. 798). The impact of this shift in
context can potentially impact how well leaders are able to function in their roles.
Indeed, as organizations are increasingly moving toward more "empowered forms" of
organizing which include self-managed teams and cross-functional work groups (Yukl et al.,
2005, p. 705), they are faced with more lateral and external coordination demands. Consider
leaders working in cross-functional teams. These leaders may be dependent upon their
colleagues for specialized skills or for information that is needed to complete the leaders' task
work. Therefore, these leaders are dependent on others for accomplishing their goals, and they
may find that influence tactics that draw on the position power of the leader are effective with
subordinates in a hierarchical structure yet those tactics are ineffective with peers on whom the
leader is dependent in a cross-functional team.
Further, organizational leaders are increasingly interacting with external stakeholders.
Organizations are engaging in more collaborative, knowledge-based work arrangements with
these stakeholder groups (Schneider, 2002). This may include joint ventures, strategic alliances,
or partnerships with outsourcing agencies (Yukl et al., 2005). In addition, leaders are often
responsible for managing customer relationships. Customers are the lifeblood of a firm's
revenues and continued survival, and organizations are increasingly moving toward customer
relationship management (CRM) strategies (Payne & Frow, 2005). CRM strategies involve
developing strong, long-term relationships with key customers, and organizational leaders are
often tasked with this responsibility. Therefore, leaders may need to influence external partners
as well as internal groups to achieve their goals. This could include managing customer
relationships, collaborating with research and development teams from other firms, leading a

5

team of contract employees, or coordinating work that has been outsourced to another
organization. Yet, despite the increase in interactions with stakeholders and the rise in
dependence that leaders are facing, research to date has yet to explore how these changes will
impact leaders.
Therefore, this study examines the level of task dependence that a leader has on a
stakeholder, or stakeholder dependence, which is defined as the extent to which a leader must
rely on information and support from others in the accomplishment of his or her task work. A
leader can be dependent upon a broad set of internal and external stakeholders depending on the
demands of the leader's task. Further, the level of dependence on any individual or group may
change over time as the nature of the leader's work changes. This dependence relationship is
likely to affect how a leader attempts to influence because the leader is in a position of reduced
power. Thus, a leader's dependence on key stakeholders is viewed as an antecedent to how a
leader chooses to influence these groups, and this study will consider how the dependence that
leaders have on stakeholders impacts their selection of influence tactics. By examining
stakeholder dependence, I investigate how this characteristic impacts the manner in which
leaders choose to influence others.
However, regardless of the choice of influence tactic, there may be variation in the
effectiveness of the tactic based on the leader's level of political skill (Ahearn, Ferris,
Hochwarter, Douglas, & Ammeter, 2004). Leadership scholars have consistently identified
interpersonal skills as an important component of successful performance in a managerial role
(e.g., Katz & Kahn, 1978; Mumford, Campion, & Morgeson, 2007; Mumford, Marks, Connelly,
Zaccaro, & Reiter-Palmon, 2000; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1990). Previous research has examined
several leader interpersonal skills such as interpersonal acumen (Aditya & House, 2002), social

6

skills (Riggio, 1986), self-monitoring skills (Snyder, 1974), social intelligence (Thorndike,
1920), and emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995; see Ferris, Perrewe, & Douglas, 2002, and
Heggestad & Morrison, 2008, for recent reviews of the social effectiveness construct domain).
Political skill, a newly introduced type of interpersonal skill, assesses the leader's awareness of
2

the social environment, the motivations of the target, and the leader's ability to be sincere in
their influence attempt (Ahearn et al., 2004). Leaders who are high in political skill will be more
likely to select the most appropriate influence tactic based on the motivations of the target and
the organizational context. Further, these leaders will be more likely to be perceived as sincere
and credible in their influence attempts (Ferris et al., 2005). Thus, leaders high in political skill
will ultimately be more effective in their roles because they are more effective at influencing
others. Therefore, political skill is likely to moderate the relationship between leader influence
and effectiveness such that the relationship between influence and effectiveness will be stronger
for leaders high in political skill.
Whereas the ability to influence effectively is a critical part of a leader's role set, how
effective the leader is in influencing others is likely to impact both how others perceive the
leader's performance and whether stakeholders wish to continue working with the leader in the
future. Some of the early research on leader influence focused on the reasons why leaders
attempted to influence (Yukl et al., 1996). Other research examined proximal outcomes of
influence tactics including resistance (refusing the requested action), compliance (carrying out
the requested action with minimal or average effort), and commitment (carrying out requested
action with enthusiasm and extra effort; e.g., Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Yukl et al., 1996). However,

2

Influence attempts are typically described in terms of a distinction between the leader (the
"agent") and the person who is the focus of the influence attempt (the "target"; Erez, Rim, &
Keider, 1986).
7

as suggested above, the ability to influence effectively is a critical role requirement for
organizational leaders. Because a leader is often in a boundary spanning position which includes
responsibilities for coordinating work among stakeholder groups, this study will assess the
leader's task performance as an outcome of influence attempts. Preliminary research on leader
influence tactics has examined the relationship between leader influence and effectiveness
(Johnson, Luthans, & Hennessey, 1984; Wayne et al., 1997) as well as promotability (Thacker &
Wayne, 1995; Wayne et al., 1997) and has found positive effects in support of this argument.
A second measure of leader effectiveness is leader viability. Leader viability assesses the
extent to which the stakeholder is willing to continue to work with the leader in the future. Based
on the team viability construct (Hackman, 1987; Sundstrom, De Meuse, & Futrell, 1990), leader
viability it is a future-oriented view of the dyadic relationship between leaders and stakeholders.
It assesses whether the stakeholder is willing to work with the leader in the future. This study
focuses on the level of dependence that leaders have on stakeholders and how leaders attempt to
influence those stakeholders to accomplish their task work. Leaders may use a variety of tactics
to influence others ranging from soft tactics to rational tactics to hard tactics. For example, a
leader may use a soft tactic such as collaboration which includes an offer to assist the stakeholder
with work that needs to be done. In these cases, the stakeholder may see the working relationship
as beneficial and may be more willing to work with the leader in the future. If the leader uses
rational tactics, the leader may be perceived as more credible and may develop a positive
reputation which would encourage stakeholders to collaborate on an ongoing basis.
Alternatively, the leader may use hard tactics, including pressure, which may reduce the
willingness of the stakeholder to work together with the leader in the future. Given that many
leaders are now working in more empowered organizational forms, the ability to maintain

8

effective, ongoing relationships with key stakeholders will be an important part of the leader's
effectiveness.
Thus, this study makes the following contribution to the growing literature on
dependence and leader influence tactics. First, the study explicitly examines stakeholder
dependence as an antecedent to the leader's selection of influence tactics. Second, the study
assesses both the leader's current level of performance and a future-focused measure of
performance (leader viability) from a broad range of stakeholders including subordinates, peers,
senior managers, and external stakeholders. Finally, the political skill of the leader is examined
as a potential moderator of the relationship between leader influence tactics and leader
performance outcomes as suggested by Ferris et al., (2005).

9

Stakeholders
The stakeholder model of organizational leadership emphasizes the critical role that
leaders play in interfacing with a broad set of internal and external organizational stakeholders
(Schneider, 2002). This model is based in stakeholder theory which suggests that organizations
should be managed in the interests of all stakeholders, not just in the interest of shareholders, to
achieve better performance (Freeman, 1984). As leaders throughout the organizational hierarchy
are frequently in boundary spanning roles, they are often the point of contact with many of these
stakeholders. The role of the leader in managing these stakeholder relationships requires leaders
to be flexible, to be able to work through hierarchical and organizational boundaries, and to
influence a diverse set of stakeholders to accomplish his or her task work and the organization's
objectives (Schneider, 2002). Therefore, by incorporating a stakeholder perspective in this study
on influence tactics, I highlight the ability to influence key organizational constituents as a
critical component of the leader's role responsibilities.
Prior research on leader influence has primarily focused on how leaders use influence
tactics with internal stakeholder groups. For example, Yukl and Tracey (1992) examined the
consequences of influence tactics that leaders use with subordinates (downward influence
attempts), peers (lateral influence attempts), and senior managers (upward influence attempts).
Later work by Yukl et al., (2005) assessed influence tactics aimed at subordinates and peers.
Other research has specifically examined leader's downward influence attempts (e.g., Somech &
Drach-Zahavy, 2002; Sparrowe, Soetjipto, & Kraimer, 2006) whereas Westphal and Stern (2006)
examined how top managers attempted to influence their firms' CEOs in upward influence
attempts. However, as organizations become increasing more engaged with external
stakeholders, there is a need to examine how leaders influence external groups as well as internal

10

stakeholders. Therefore, this study will focus on leader influence attempts aimed at subordinates,
peers, senior managers, and customers. Each of the stakeholder groups is described below.
Subordinates
Perhaps the most commonly examined stakeholder in leader influence studies is
subordinates. Subordinates are stakeholders that report directly to the leader. Therefore, the
leader has the ability to reward the subordinate's performance and punish the subordinate's
undesirable behavior through the organization's formal performance appraisal systems. Given the
structural, hierarchical relationship, subordinates are likely to accept influence attempts from
leaders more readily than other stakeholders. Yet, studies have found variation in how successful
leaders are in influencing subordinates despite the formal authority in this hierarchical
relationship (e.g., Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Yukl et al., 2008). As Kotter (1999) has aptly noted,
"virtually no one in modern organizations will passively accept and completely obey a constant
stream of orders from someone just because he or she is the 'boss'" (p. 100). Therefore, leaders
must be able to effectively influence this group by drawing on a variety of influence tactics
particularly when leaders are dependent on their subordinates for their own task work.
Peers
A leader's peer stakeholder group consists of individuals who are not connected via the
organization's formal hierarchy yet with whom the leader interacts to accomplish his or her
goals. This group may include individuals who perform the same task function at a different
location or individuals in other functional areas. Importantly, leaders do not have any
hierarchical authority over this group. Particularly when leaders are dependent on their peer
group for doing their work, the choice of influence tactic will be important to gain the peers'
compliance.

11

Senior Managers
Senior Managers in this study represent the person hierarchically above the focal leader.
Similar to the leader's role with subordinates, the senior manager rewards the leader's
performance and has the ability to punish the leader for poor performance because of the
hierarchical authority that the senior manager has over the leader. Given the senior manager's
formal position, they may often control important resources or have the ability to provide
information and assistance that can be critical to the leader for accomplishing his or her work.
Therefore, leaders are often highly dependent on their senior managers and must find ways to
effectively influence this stakeholder group to get their work done. Whereas numerous studies
have examined how subordinates influence senior managers (e.g., Dulebohn & Ferris, 1999;
Farmer & Maslyn, 1999; Schilit & Locke, 1982; Wayne et al., 1997), there is relatively little
research on how mid-level leaders (i.e., those leaders who have responsibilities for managing a
group of subordinates and who report to higher level executive) influence their senior managers.
A notable exception is the study by Westphal and Stern (2006) who found that managers who
were able to influence their CEOs had more career opportunities in the form of board
appointments. This study examines mid-level managers and the influence tactics that they use
with their senior managers.
Customers
As indicated above, research has yet to examine how leaders influence external
stakeholders. This is problematic given the growing importance of connections between
organizational leaders and stakeholders in the external environment. Therefore, customers will
be the final stakeholder group examined in this study. Customers are, arguably, the external
stakeholders that contribute the most to the organization's survival. Because of this,

12

organizations, and the leaders that represent the organizations to this group, have a dependence
on their customers for the continued existence of the firm (Kotter, 1977a). Therefore, it is not
surprising that many organizations focus on developing customer relationships as a key part of
their corporate strategy (Payne & Frow, 2005). This strategy is based on current marketing
theory which suggests that it is more profitable to build cooperative, long-term relationships with
existing customers than to acquire new customers (Johnson & Selnes, 2004). Therefore, I will
examine how leaders use influence tactics with customers in addition to the internal stakeholders
described above.

13

Stakeholder Dependence
Emerson's (1962) theory of power dependence suggests that there are mutual
dependencies in relationships, and this dependency makes it critical that parties are able to
influence each other's conduct to accomplish their goals. Dependency can occur because of a
motivational investment in a goal or outcome or because of a lack of availability of other sources
by which one can achieve the goal. Emerson (1962) suggested that individuals are part of "power
network[s]" within an organization whereby two or more people are connected in powerdependence relationships (p. 36). To the extent that a leader has more ways to accomplish his or
her goal, the leader is less dependent on other people within the organization. However, to the
extent that the leader depends on other individuals for information or resources to accomplish his
or her task, the leader is more dependent upon that individual.
Stakeholder dependence, as conceptualized in this study, is based on previous research
which has examined task dependence in teams. This research has focused on whether team
members need resources, knowledge, or assistance from other team members to complete their
work (e.g., de Jong, Van der Vegt, & Molleman, 2007). Given the importance of internal and
external stakeholder groups to a leader's task work, a leader may be dependent on these groups in
a similar manner to which team members are dependent upon other team members. Whereas
previous research has examined task interdependence, that research overlooks the possibility of
imbalance in the dependence relationship (i.e. asymmetrical task dependence; de Jong et al.,
2007). Further, it disregards "potentially important variance at the individual … level of
analysis" (de Jong et al., 2007, p. 1626). Therefore, by examining task dependence with multiple
stakeholder groups, I examine the potentially different levels of dependence that leaders have on
a broad range of stakeholders in accomplishing their task work. Thus, stakeholder dependence is

14

defined as the extent to which a leader must rely on information and support from others in the
accomplishment of his or her task work. Stakeholder dependence in this study can take the form
of task dependence on subordinates (subordinate task dependence), peers (peer task dependence),
senior managers (senior manager task dependence), and customers (customer task dependence).
Task dependence can exist for a variety of reasons. Kotter (1977b) suggested that leaders
are dependent on others because of the division of labor that exists in modern organizational
structures and because there are limited organizational resources to accomplish one's task work.
Bartol and Martin (1988) proposed that leaders are dependent on others who have a specialized
skill set (which the leader does not possess); who are central to the leader's task (for which there
is no readily available substitute); who have strong organizational connections; and who have
high performance visibility. For example, if the leader interacts with a peer who is wellconnected within the organization, this peer can report on the leader's performance and behaviors
without the leader's knowledge. Therefore, the leader is dependent upon the peer to maintain his
or her reputation within the organization. Further, if a leader is working for a senior manager on
a high visibility project, the leader's performance will be subjected to intense scrutiny, and the
performance on that project may impact his or her career prospects in the future. Therefore,
engaging in a high visibility project with one's senior manager increases the dependence on the
senior manager beyond the hierarchical dependence because of the future career ramifications
related to that specific project.
High levels of dependence for a leader can be problematic because individuals in
powerful positions are more likely to resist influence attempts (Mainiero, 1986). In fact, there are
several types of power that a stakeholder may have over a leader. French and Raven (1959)
introduced five of these bases of power including reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and

15

expert power. Reward power occurs when an individual has the power to give positive rewards
to another person. Conversely, coercive power exists when a person has the ability to punish
another. Legitimate power is based on an individual's right to prescribe the behavior of another
based on group norms, role prescriptions, or role specializations. Referent power is based on the
strong identification that a person has with another, and expert power is based on special
knowledge or expertise in a given area. Further research on power has expanded this
categorization to include informational power (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985; Raven,
Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998; Yukl, 2006). Informational power includes both access to
important information that is not widely available to others and control over the dissemination of
this information. Finally, Christensen and Bower (1996) describe customer power as the power
that an organization's customers have because of their significance to the organization's growth
and survival.
Power and dependence have often been described as the inverse of one another in that
power in one party leads to dependence of another party (e.g., Emerson, 1962, Mainiero, 1986).
Therefore, based on the types of power described above, there are at least seven types of
dependence that a leader can have on a stakeholder (see Table 1). For example, if stakeholder has
reward power, then the leader has reward dependence upon that person. This suggests that the
leader is dependent on that stakeholder through the organization's formal evaluation system. If a
stakeholder has coercive power, then the leader has coercive dependence. This means that the
stakeholder has the authority to punish the leader through the organization's systems for the
leader's behavior. These types of dependence will most commonly occur between the leader and
his or her senior manager.

16

However, a broader set of stakeholders could have other types of power over the leader.
For example, all internal stakeholders could have legitimate power. This could include the
leader's senior manager because of the senior manager's hierarchical position, and it can also
include peers and subordinates because of either how work is formally organized or because of
the norms that exist within the firm around cooperative work (French & Raven, 1959). Because
legitimate power is based on the organizational structure, it leads to structural dependence for the
leader (e.g., Brass, 1984; Hinings, Hickson, Pennings, & Schneck, 1974). All stakeholders also
have the potential to have referent, expert, and informational power over the leader, and this
would lead to personal/identification dependence, skill/coordination dependence, or
informational dependence respectively for the leader. Personal/identification dependence occurs
when the leader has a strong identification or relationship with the stakeholder (Lord & Brown,
2001; Sluss & Ashforth, 2008). In this case, the greater the leader's attraction to the stakeholder,
the more dependent the leader would be. Skill/coordination dependence occurs if the stakeholder
has a specialized skill set or if the stakeholder's role is central to the sequencing of the leader's
work (Bartol & Martin, 1988). Informational dependence arises if the stakeholder has access to
or control over information that is critical to the leader's task work. Finally, customer power
leads to customer dependence (Kotter, 1977a). This type of dependence is based on the revenue
that is generated from these stakeholders which contributes to the organization's continued
existence and success.
The types of dependence described above can be categorized according to whether the
leader has personal dependence or task dependence on a particular stakeholder (see Table 1).
Personal dependence is dependence which impacts the individual aspects of the leader's position,
and it includes reward, coercive, and personal/identification dependence. Task dependence, on

17

the other hand, impacts the ability of the leader to perform his or her role responsibilities
effectively. Task dependence includes structural dependence, skill/coordination dependence,
informational dependence, and customer dependence. This study focuses on the task dependence
that leaders have on stakeholders. Thus, the leader needs the cooperation of the target to
accomplish his or her task work. Given that more powerful individuals are less likely to
acquiesce to influence attempts, leaders must influence the stakeholders in a way that either
motivates them to perform, or the leader may need to find an alternative way to accomplish the
work (Emerson, 1962). Therefore, the arguments that follow focus on the types of task
dependencies and the corresponding leader influence tactics that will be used when the leader is
dependent on a powerful stakeholder group.

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Influence Tactics
Leader Influence Tactics
There has been extensive research into how leaders influence others in the workplace. In
the following section, a chronological summary of the major scholars in the area is presented.
The summaries begin with Mowday's work in the 1970s and continue through to Yukl's work in
the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, shorter summaries of research on executive influence,
influence in general, and meta-analytic support for influence are presented.
Mowday's initial research. Mowday (1978, 1979) was among the first scholars to
examine how organizational leaders attempt to influence others. His work specifically looked at
how leaders engage in upward influence attempts. In the first study, Mowday (1978) introduced
five methods of influence including threats, legitimate authority, persuasive arguments, rewards,
and manipulation to examine how leaders select the type of tactic to use and how they time the
use of the tactic. He found that leaders high in a need for power or high in self-perceptions of
power were more likely to engage in influence attempts. Further, the timing of the influence
attempt was related to whether there were "alternative influence targets" (Mowday, 1978, p.
137). Subsequently, Mowday (1979) examined four methods of influence: appeals to policies
and regulations, persuasive arguments, rewards/exchange favors, and manipulation. This study
explored how the self-confidence of the leader was related to the method of influence selected.
Mowday (1979) found that leaders who were self-confident were more likely to use persuasive
arguments and manipulation as forms of influence.
Research by Kipnis and colleagues. Subsequent research on how leaders influence has
primarily focused on the specific tactics used with others. Kipnis and colleagues (1980) were
among the first to introduce a classification of influence tactics. The authors used content

19

analysis techniques to identify eight dimensions of influence: assertiveness, ingratiation,
rationality, sanctions, exchange, upward appeals, blocking, and coalitions (see Table 2).
Assertiveness influence attempts involve demanding, ordering, and setting deadlines whereas
ingratiation influence attempts include the opposite – engaging in flattery and impression
management techniques toward the target. Rationality involves using facts and data to support an
argument. Sanctions occur when a leader uses administrative rewards and punishments to induce
compliance with a request. Exchange influence attempts involve negotiation and bargaining in
exchange for favors. Upward appeals are tactics that draw on the additional support from a
higher level in the organization. Blocking involves engaging in a work slowdown or threatening
to stop work; and finally, coalitions involve engaging others to assist with the influence attempt.
Kipnis et al., (1980) argued that the tactics were used differentially to various target groups and
that several factors led to the selection of a specific influence tactic including the leader's relative
power, the leader's objectives for using influence, and the leader's expectation of the target's
willingness to comply.
Kipnis and colleagues continued to investigate influence in three subsequent studies. In
the first study, Kipnis, Schmidt, Swaffin-Smith, and Wilkinson (1984) examined seven influence
tactics in a three-country study. They sought to explore both how frequently managers use
specific influence tactics with subordinates and supervisors and the factors that determine
influence tactic use. In all of the countries examined, leaders used rational tactics most with
supervisors and subordinates. Further, they found that tactic selection was based on three factors:
whether the goal was to benefit the organization or the leader; the expectations for successfully
influencing others; and the leader's degree of organizational power. In the second study, Kipnis
and Schmidt (1985) introduced a tripartite classification of influence strategies which included

20

hard, soft, and rational influence tactics. Soft tactics include flattery and praise and are used
frequently when the goal is to benefit one's self. Rational tactics, or relying on logic and facts
and are used most often when the goal is to benefit one's organization or one's self whereas hard
tactics, which include demanding and assertiveness, are used frequently when the person
attempting to influence expects resistance. In the third study, Last, Kipnis and Schmidt (1988)
explored how leaders use influence tactics with supervisors (i.e., upward influence attempts).
They found that upward influence tactics were related to performance evaluations and salary.
Further they found that upward influence tactics were also related to the amount of stress that
people experience at work.
Building on the research of Kipnis and colleagues, Erez and Rim (1982) explored
personal and organizational characteristics that affect the selection of influence tactic. The study
included mid-level managers and assistance managers and found that a manager's span of control
and the size of the organization impacted influence tactic selection. Managers who supervised
more than 16 employees were more likely to use negative tactics, and managers in larger
organizations were more likely to use rational influence tactics. Later, Erez, Rim, and Keider
(1986) examined influence from the perspective of both the agent and the target. They found that
managers (i.e., agents) were more likely to engage in strong tactics (e.g., assertiveness) whereas
subordinates (i.e., targets) were more likely to use weak tactics (e.g., exchange).
Somech and Drach-Zahavy (2002) also used the Kipnis et al., (1980) scale to examine a
leader's use of top-down influence tactics. The authors investigated whether leaders used
different strategies based on their perception of their own power within the organization and their
perception of their subordinates power. This investigation of "relative power" did find
differences in how leaders use influence strategies. Specifically, leaders who perceived

21

themselves as more powerful (relative to their subordinates) were more likely to use hard
strategies whereas leaders who perceived themselves as less powerful were more likely to use
soft and rational influence tactics.
Hinkin and Schriesheim influence scale. Several researchers continued the work of
Kipnis et al., (1980) in further attempts to classify influence tactics. Hinkin and Schriesheim
(1990) criticized the Kipnis et al., (1980) influence categorization for assessing influence from a
single perspective – that of the leader –which called into question the issue of self-report
response bias in the responses. Further, they questioned whether investigating the influence
behaviors of the leader are most appropriately measured from the leader's perspective (as was the
case in the Kipnis et al., 1980 scale), and they argued that the target of the influence attempt may
be more useful in examining influence tactics. Therefore, Schriesheim and Hinkin (1990)
developed an 18-item instrument to assess six of the eight dimensions in Kipnis et al., (1980)
previous work. These dimensions included ingratiation, exchange, rationality, assertiveness,
upward appeal, and coalitions. Schriesheim and Hinkin (1990) argued that the new six-factor
structure was more appropriate for two primary reasons. First, their scale assessed leader
influence attempts from subordinates, peers, and senior managers; and second, several of the
items, specifically those that measured sanctions and blocking, in the Kipnis et al., (1980) scale
did not have strong content validity, so those categories were removed.
Research by Yukl and colleagues. Yukl and Falbe (1990) also extended the work of
Kipnis et al., (1980) by introducing a classification of influence tactics. They argued that the
Kipnis et al., (1980) classification was too narrow because it was based on student responses;
and therefore, it did not capture the full spectrum of influence tactics for leaders in organizations.
Further, they also argued that there was possible self-report bias in the Kipnis and colleagues

22

(1980) scale responses. Therefore, Yukl and Falbe (1990) focused on refining the set of influence
tactics that were important for "managerial work" in organizations (p. 132). This research yielded
eight influence tactics including pressure tactics, upward appeals, exchange tactics, coalition
tactics, ingratiating tactics, rational persuasion, inspirational appeals, and consultation tactics.
This categorization did not include the sanctions and blocking categories from the Kipnis et al.,
(1980) classification, but it added inspirational appeals and consultation tactics. Inspirational
appeals occur when a leader makes an emotional request or appeals to the target's values or
ideals in an influence attempt. Consultation tactics involve seeking the target's participation in
the decision making process. In addition to the new classification of influence tactics, Yukl and
Falbe (1990) explored how managers use these tactics with subordinates, peers, and supervisors.
They found a similar pattern of influence tactic use: managers used consultation, rational
persuasion, and inspirational appeals tactics most and exchange tactics least with all three target
groups.
Yukl and Tracey (1992) continued this work by examining how a leader's use of
influence was related to task commitment and the leader's effectiveness. In this study, they
expanded the Yukl and Falbe (1990) classification of influence tactics to include legitimating
tactics. Legitimating influence tactics occur when a leader claims authority to make the request
or asserts that the request is consistent with the organization's rules or policies. They found that
consultation, rational persuasion, and inspirational appeals tactics were most related to task
commitment and ratings of leader effectiveness in subordinates, peers, and supervisors whereas
legitimating and pressure tactics were most likely to be negatively correlated with task
commitment and effectiveness ratings.

23

The classification of leader influence tactics developed by Yukl and colleagues has been
used in a wide variety of studies. For example, Yukl and Tracey (1992) examined the
effectiveness of influence tactics with subordinates, peers, and senior managers by categorizing
outcomes of influence attempts as commitment, compliance, or resistance. Commitment occurs
when a target is enthusiastic and applies extra effort in response to an influence attempt, and
compliance was described as responding to an influence attempt with average effort. Targets
who refused influence attempts, or who argued or delayed in responding were categorized as
engaging in resistant outcomes. Yukl and Tracey (1992) found differential effectiveness for
influence tactics based on this outcome categorization. The most effective tactics were found to
be consultation and inspirational appeals. Three tactics were identified as "moderately effective"
including ingratiation, personal appeals, and exchange tactics (Yukl and Tracey, 1992, p. 65),
and the three hard tactics – coalition, legitimating, and pressure – were found to be the least
effective.
Yukl, Falbe, and Youn, (1993) explored the selection and sequencing of influence tactics.
This study purported to extend prior research by looking at differences in how leaders use
combinations of tactics and how influence tactics are used in consecutive influence attempts
(Yukl et al., 1993, p. 5). In terms of combinations of tactics, four tactics were identified as being
used most commonly in combination with other tactics. These included inspirational appeals,
consultation, ingratiation, and legitimating tactics. Further, they found that initial influence
attempts were most likely to be rational persuasion, ingratiation, or personal appeals. The most
common follow-up tactic was exchange. Leaders resorted to using coalition or pressure tactics
the least in consecutive influence attempts.

24

Yukl, Guinan and Soitolano (1995) examined how leaders use influence differently based
on the desired objective from subordinates, peers, and supervisors. The authors defined five
influence objectives including assigning work, changing behavior, receiving assistance,
garnering support, and obtaining personal benefits. They found several interesting results. First,
leaders use rational persuasion for all of the objectives. However, leaders are also likely to use
consultation, inspirational appeals, ingratiation, and legitimating tactics for assigning work
whereas leaders are likely to use consultation, ingratiation, personal appeals, and exchange for
receiving assistance. Pressure and legitimating were most likely to be used when the leader
desired to change behavior. Coalition tactics were most likely when the leader was attempting to
garner support, and personal appeals were most likely when the leader sought personal benefits.
Yukl et al., (1996) examined three "content factors" that were antecedents to influence
attempts. These content factors included the importance of the request to the task, the feasibility
of the request for the target, and whether the target would enjoy responding affirmatively to the
request. They found that when a leader used consultation, inspirational appeals, or rational
persuasion tactics, and the request was important and enjoyable, the target was more likely to be
committed to the influence request. Yukl, Kim, and Chavez (1999) extended the work of Yukl et
al., (1996) by studying two of the content factors introduced in the previous study. Here, Yukl
and colleagues (1999) found that the leader's perception of the importance of the influence
request as well as the feasibility of the request impacted which influence tactic the leader
selected. The target's commitment was then impacted by the selection of the influence tactic.
This study also suggested that there are different forms of rational persuasion (i.e., rational
persuasion-important and rational persuasion-feasible) which both have effects on target
commitment.

25

Tepper, Eisenbach, Kirby, and Potter (1998) tested the effect of interactional justice as a
mediator of the relationship between a leader's use of influence tactics and the subordinate's
resistance to the influence attempt. Using Falbe and Yukl's (1992) classification of influence
tactics, they found that leaders who use hard influence tactics, which was perceived as being
treated unfairly, also encountered greater resistance. However, when leaders used soft tactics in
combination with hard tactics, the hard tactics were "less objectionable" (Tepper et al., 1998, p.
156). The study demonstrated that perceptions of interpersonal fairness were important when
comparing the effectiveness of soft, rational, and hard influence attempts.
Seifert, Yukl, and McDonald (2003) examined how the feedback that a leader receives
impacts the use of influence tactics. Specifically, they explored whether the medium used to give
feedback to leaders impacted their future use of the core influence tactics (e.g., rational
persuasion, inspirational appeals, consultation, and collaboration) which are most related to
ratings of target commitment to influence requests. Using a quasi-experimental design, the
authors found that leaders who received feedback on their use of influence tactics in the form of
a report did not change their influence behaviors. However, leaders who received feedback on
their use of influence tactics through a report and in a feedback workshop were more likely to
increase their use of core influence tactics.
Cable and Judge (2003) explored how personality is related to leaders' upward influence
attempts. Using the Influence Behavior Questionnaire (IBQ; Yukl & Tracey, 1992), they found
that a leaders' selection of influence tactics is, in part, determined by their personality and not
just the specific task or the person that the person is trying to influence. Specifically, leaders high
in extroversion used inspirational appeal and ingratiation tactics more than others. Leaders high
in conscientiousness and emotional stability were more likely to use rational appeal tactics

26

whereas leaders high in extraversion were more likely to use inspirational appeal and ingratiation
tactics. Further, leaders high in agreeableness and openness to experience were less likely to use
hard influence tactics (e.g., coalitions, legitimatization, pressure).
Yukl et al., (2005) extended the work of Yukl and Tracey (1992) by drawing on
interpersonal influence theory to introduce two new forms of influence. These two new tactics
included collaboration and apprising. Collaboration influence tactics when a leader offers to
provide support, resources, or assistance to a target when asking to carry out a request. Yukl et
al., (2005) noted that collaboration can increase target self-efficacy and intrinsic motivation
making the target more likely to commit to the influence attempt. Apprising, on the other,
involves explaining to a target how the influence tactic can potentially benefit the individual in
his or her career. These benefits could include pay increases and promotions. Data was presented
from three studies to demonstrate the construct validity of the two new tactics and their distinct
properties from the nine other influence tactics.
Sparrowe et al., (2006) examined how a leader's downward influence attempts and
helping behavior was affected by the quality of the leader-subordinate relationship. They found
several interesting results. First, the relationship between leaders who used exchange tactics and
helping behavior was negative when their subordinates perceived low quality relationships (i.e.,
low-LMX relationships); yet this same relationship was positive when the subordinates
perceived high quality relationships. Further, the relationship between leaders who used
inspirational appeals tactics and helping behavior was also negative when subordinates perceived
low quality relationships. This research points to the importance of the relationship quality in
leader influence attempts.

27

Finally, Yukl et al., (2008) provided validation evidence for the extended Influence
Behavior Questionnaire (IBQ) and its relationship to a variety of outcomes. Data from
subordinates and peers demonstrated that leaders who use rational persuasion, consultation,
inspirational appeals and collaboration tactics are most likely to gain to target commitment. Six
of the tactics demonstrated moderate correlations with LMX (ranging from .31 to .63) including
rational persuasion, consultation, inspirational appeals, collaboration, apprising, and ingratiation.
In addition, ratings of manager effectiveness by the leaders' supervisors were highest when
leaders used the four core tactics (e.g., rational persuasion, consultation, inspirational appeal, and
collaboration).
Research on executive influence. Recently, research by Westphal and colleagues has
examined how executive leaders attempt to influence others. Westphal (1998) examined how
CEOs use ingratiation and persuasion toward board members. He drew on the work of Yukl and
Tracey (1992) to define persuasion as the use of reason or logic and ingratiation as an influence
tactic where a person attempts to make themselves look better in the eyes of others. Westphal
(1998) found that when the board of directors changed in structure, the CEO engaged in more
ingratiatory and persuasive behaviors toward board members. In turn, these behaviors "serve[d]
to offset the effect of increased structural board independence on corporate strategy and CEO
compensation policy" (Westphal, 1998, p. 511). The findings demonstrated how successful use
of influence tactics can benefit the CEO of an organization.
In later research, Westphal and Stern (2006) examined how influence behaviors of
executives can impact whether they are selected for board appointments. This study attempted to
explain how individuals who lack the typical "elite social and educational credentials" (which
commonly lead to board appointments) gain access to boards (Westphal and Stern, 2006, p. 193).

28

This research found that ingratiation tactics aimed at CEOs increase the likelihood that ethnic
minorities and women are nominated and eventually appointed to board positions. A subsequent
study by Westphal and Stern (2007) investigated how ingratiation tactics can impact additional
board appointments. The authors found that directors who use ingratiation toward their peer
board members were more likely to gain additional board appointments. These studies further
support the important role of using influence tactics effectively, even at the executive level of an
organization.
Additional Research on Influence
In additional research to the body of research that has examined how leaders influence
others, numerous scholars have explored how individuals (i.e., non-leaders) influence in
organizations. For example, Wayne and colleagues pursued research related to subordinate
influence tactics. In one study, Wayne and Ferris (1990) developed a scale of subordinate
influence tactics. They classified influence attempts into three categories: job-focused tactics,
supervisor-focused tactics, and self-focused tactics. Then, they examined how influence attempts
affect the exchange quality between subordinates and supervisors. Their findings suggest that
supervisor-focused tactics aimed at impression management were positively related to the
supervisor's liking of the subordinate. Subsequently, Thacker and Wayne (1995) explored how
subordinate influence attempts related to supervisory ratings of promotability. They found that
two tactics – ingratiation and reasoning – had significant effects on supervisors assessments of
promotability. In later research, Wayne et al., (1997) examined how subordinate upward
influence attempts were related to perceptions by managers. They found that subordinates who
used reasoning, assertiveness, and favor rendering were more likely to be rated by their

29

supervisors as having better interpersonal skills, as being well liked, and as having more
similarity to their supervisors.
Several other scholars have studied how subordinates influence their superiors. For
example, Tepper, Brown, and Hunt (1993) explored how gender affected subordinate influence
tactics. They found that men who engaged in strong upward influence tactics had higher
performance ratings whereas women who used weak upward influence tactics received more
psychosocial mentoring. Farmer and Maslyn (1999) pursued a configural approach to influence
tactics in subordinates. They found that subordinates engage in primarily three styles of
influence: shotgun, tactician, and bystander. Sparrowe and Liden (2005) examined how LMX
and social networks were related to subordinate influence. They found that both LMX and the
subordinates' advice centrality were related to subordinate influence.
Finally, meta-analytic research exists which also supports the relationships between the
use of influence tactics and a variety of outcomes. Gordon (1996) specifically examined the use
of ingratiation and how this tactic was related to judgments and evaluations of targets and
observers. He found that ingratiation was positively related to performance evaluations and
liking. Higgins, Judge, and Ferris (2003) focused their meta-analysis on the relationships
between influence tactics and work outcomes. They also found that ingratiation was positively
related to assessments of performance and extrinsic success (e.g., salaries and promotions).
Further, they found that rationality was positively related to assessments of performance and
extrinsic success whereas assertiveness was negatively related to assessments of performance.
Present Study on Leader Influence
This study will focus on the eleven leader influence tactics introduced by Yukl et al.,
(2008) because they are tactics that are specifically recognized as important for leaders in

30

organizations. Further, the influence tactics are considered to be proactive in that the leader
intentionally uses influence for specific task objectives which require coordination, cooperation,
and support from individuals both inside and outside of the organization (Yukl et al., 2005). In
addition, the tactics are designed to be assessed from the target's perspective which allow for
responses from the four stakeholder groups in this study. Leaders have the ability to select from
any of these tactics in their interactions with stakeholders. However, when leaders are dependent
on others, the leader is likely to select a tactic which they believe will be most effective.
Therefore, this study presents hypotheses in two sections. The first section addresses the
selection of the influence tactic based on the dependence relationship. That is, I hypothesize
which tactics the leader will likely use when they are dependent on others. The next section
addresses the effectiveness of the influence attempt. That is, I connect the successful use of
influence tactics to the leader's task role performance and viability and examine how this
relationship is moderated by leader political skill. Therefore, this study builds on prior research
on the directionality of influence attempts and incorporates power dependence theory to suggest
how stakeholder dependence impacts a leader's selection of influence tactics.
Soft Influence Tactics
Kipnis and Schmidt (1985) proposed that influence tactics could be classified as either
soft, rational, or hard tactics. Soft influence tactics are tactics that are used when the leader seeks
compliance in a polite and friendly manner (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). The soft tactics in this
study are consultation, collaboration, exchange, ingratiation, inspirational appeals, and personal
appeals. These tactics are typically used when the leader is at a disadvantage as is the case when
the leader is dependent upon others within and outside of the organization. In addition, the use of
soft tactics is likely to maintain and strengthen the leader's relationships and reputation – both

31

outcomes that will allow the leader to continue to influence others and perform well in his or her
role into the future. Therefore, leaders who are dependent upon stakeholders are likely to use
many of soft tactics described below.
Collaboration. Collaboration tactics occur when the leader offers task assistance or
resources if the target will comply with the influence attempt (Yukl et al., 2005). Leaders may
offer to collaborate on a task, or they may offer to redistribute work to allow the target to focus
on the request. Given that this influence tactic is relatively new to the literature on influence
tactics, research has not yet explored how collaboration will be used; however, Yukl et al.,
(2005) have suggested that leaders will be more likely to use collaboration tactics with
subordinates and peers.
Collaboration is a type of social exchange (Yukl et al., 2005). Therefore, I argue that
when leaders are dependent on any internal stakeholder (subordinates, peers, and senior
managers) for accomplishing their task work, they are likely to use collaboration influence
tactics. Emerson (1976) argues that social exchange involves an interaction that causes an
obligation. This is because individuals operate according to specific rules of exchange. One such
rule is the rule of reciprocity whereby if "a person supplies a benefit, the receiving party should
respond in kind" (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005, p. 876). Thus, when a leader offers assistance
and resources, the target is more likely to acquiesce to the influence attempt because the target
received something of value and now feels obligated to do something in return. Further, if the
leader has the ability to work with the target and gain new skills, the possibility of future
dependence on these stakeholders could be reduced. Therefore, collaboration is a viable
influence tactic when a leader is dependent on internal stakeholders.

32

Conversely, leaders who are dependent upon customers are not likely to use collaboration
influence tactics. Leaders and customers are separated by organizational boundaries. This
boundary represents the line between the organization and its environment, and leaders have
significantly more discretion to control activities within the boundaries of their organization than
to control activities outside of the organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Given the
organizational boundaries between leaders and customers, it is unlikely that a leader will be able
to offer valuable assistance or resources in the customer's task work. Therefore, a leader's
customer dependence is not likely to be related to collaboration influence tactic use. Thus, the
leader is likely to use collaboration tactics with internal stakeholder groups but not with
customers.
Hypothesis 1a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of collaboration influence tactics.
Hypothesis 1b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
collaboration influence tactics.
Hypothesis 1c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the
use of collaboration influence tactics.
Hypothesis 1d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of
collaboration influence tactics.
Consultation. Consultation tactics occur when the leader seeks the advice of the target
for a proposed activity or change in plan, or when the leader seeks suggestions for improvement
from the target (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Yukl and Falbe (1990) have suggested that consultation
tactics are most likely to be used with subordinates; however, when the leader is dependent on
any stakeholder group, I argue that the leader will engage in consultation tactics. Participative

33

management theory suggests that leaders who support involvement in decision making increase
the motivation of those who are involved with the decisions (Cohen, Ledford, & Spreitzer, 1996;
Wagner & Gooding, 1987). This is because those that are involved are able to have input about
the resources and information that affect their work. Therefore, when a leader uses consultation
influence tactics which include offers of assistance and resources, the target is more motivated to
comply with the influence attempt.
Further, Sparrowe and colleagues (2006) have argued that consultation cues "high
standing and respect" by acknowledging the target's potential contribution to decisions that affect
them (p. 1196). Therefore, by engaging in consultation influence tactics, the leader is signaling
that he or she values the input of the target and wishes to incorporate this into the plan for the
task. Leaders are able to engage in consultation tactics with any stakeholder about the work that
specifically affects that individual or group. Therefore, leaders will likely use consultation tactics
with all stakeholders.
Hypothesis 2a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of consultation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 2b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
consultation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 2c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the
use of consultation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 2d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
consultation influence tactics.
Exchange. Exchange tactics involve offering the target something that is desirable now
or in the future if the target does what the leader requests. Like collaboration, this tactic is based

34

in social exchange theory (Homans, 1958; Blau, 1964) whereby the leader and the target
negotiate an exchange which leads to anticipated reciprocity. The difference between
collaboration and exchange is that with exchange, the leader is seeking instrumental compliance.
With collaboration, the leader is attempting "to make it easier or less costly for the target person
to carry out the request" (Yukl et al., 2005, p. 709). Kipnis and Schmidt (1985) have argued that
exchange tactics actually benefit both the leader and the target directly because the leader
receives the support for the request and the target receives something of value negotiated through
the exchange.
Farmer, Maslyn, Fedor, and Goodman (1997) proposed that an exchange tactic will be
used in a variety of situations including when there is dependence in the relationship between the
leader and the target. This is because the exchange has the potential to temporarily change the
dependence in the relationship from the leader being dependent on the stakeholder to the
stakeholder being dependent on the leader for something of value. Whereas exchange is typically
used with subordinates and peers, there are likely to be opportunities for a leader to use exchange
as an influence tactic within an organization with all stakeholder groups. For example, a nursing
manager may request additional staff from a peer nursing manager during a particularly busy
time in exchange for reciprocated support in the future. Further, a mid-level manager may offer
to his or her senior manager to travel to a client's distant location to deal with a particularly
sensitive issue in exchange for having the opportunity to take an extended vacation at a desired
time in the future. Therefore, leaders are likely to use exchange influence tactics will all internal
stakeholders.
As indicated above, boundaries represent the structural space between the leader and
customer, and this space makes it more difficult for a leader to negotiate an exchange with

35

external stakeholders. However, exchange influence tactics, unlike collaboration tactics, are not
related directly to the stakeholder's task work. Therefore, the leader would be able to use
exchange tactics with customers. For example, a leader may be able to offer a customer lower
terms on a future purchase or access to new products in exchange for acquiescing to a leader's
current influence request. Therefore, the leader is likely to use exchange with customers as well
as internal stakeholders.
Hypothesis 3a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of exchange influence tactics.
Hypothesis 3b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
exchange influence tactics.
Hypothesis 3c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the
use of exchange influence tactics.
Hypothesis 3d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
exchange influence tactics.
Ingratiation. Ingratiation has a long history in social psychological research, and
scholars have suggested that ingratiation can occur via many specific tactics including flattery,
conforming to others opinions, other enhancement, favor rendering, self-promotion, or modesty
(Jones, 1964; Jones & Wortman, 1973; Gordon, 1996). For the purposes of this study and
consistent with Yukl and colleagues research in leader influence tactics (i.e., Yukl & Tracey,
1992; Yukl et al., 2005; Yukl et al., 2008), ingratiation is specifically examined as an influence
tactic which occurs when the leader flatters or praises the target in an attempt to gain compliance
to a request.

36

Ingratiation is based in part on reinforcement theory which suggests that leaders will
engage in behaviors that have been reinforced in the past by a desired outcome. Therefore,
leaders are likely to use ingratiation influence tactics because it increases the psychological
attraction that the target has for the leader and the likelihood of acquiescing to the request.
Further, one of the central motivations that drive compliance to a request is the goal of
maintaining a positive self-concept (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Thus, in addition, ingratiation
motivates targets to comply with the request to enhance and maintain their positive self-concepts.
Whereas prior research has suggested that ingratiation tactics are used most commonly
with subordinates and peers (Yukl et al., 1993), recent research has explored leaders who
successfully use ingratiation tactics toward their senior managers as well. For example, Westphal
and Stern (2006) examined top managers who engaged ingratiatory behaviors toward their CEO.
They found that those who engaged in ingratiation behaviors were more likely to receive board
appointments at firms where the CEO was also a director than those who did not engage in those
behaviors. I argue that leaders will use ingratiation tactics to all internal and external stakeholder
groups. Given that ingratiatory behaviors can enhance the self-concept of any target which in
turn, can motivate the target to comply with the request, a leader who is dependent on
subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers will likely use ingratiation tactics.
Hypothesis 4a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of ingratiation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 4b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
ingratiation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 4c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the
use of ingratiation influence tactics.

37

Hypothesis 4d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
ingratiation influence tactics.
Inspirational appeal. Inspirational appeals occur when the leader appeals to the target's
values or when the leader attempts to arouse emotions to gain commitment to a request. These
tactics have been linked to the inspirational motivation dimension of transformational leadership
(Cable & Judge, 2003; Sparrowe et al., 2006) in that they draw on the emotions of the target or
appeal to the target's ideals, thus increasing motivation toward the group's or organization's
goals.
Forgas's (1995) affect infusion model (AIM) suggests that "affectively loaded
information exerts an influence on and becomes incorporated into the judgmental process,
entering into the [target's] deliberations and eventually coloring the judgmental outcome" (p. 39).
This is in part because of the affect-priming principle which suggests that affect may directly or
indirectly influence decisions through its selected focus on certain information in the decision
process. Therefore, whereas prior research has suggested that leaders are most likely to use
inspirational appeals influence tactics with subordinates (Falbe & Yukl, 1992), I propose that
leaders who are highly dependent on others will use inspirational appeals with all stakeholder
groups because of the potential to draw on the target's emotions to increase their motivation to
comply with the request. Thus, by appealing to the target's emotions or values or by providing
meaning to the request, leader's will attempt to inspire the target, thereby reducing the
dependence in the relationship and increasing the likelihood that the target will acquiesce to the
request.
Hypothesis 5a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of inspirational appeals influence tactics.

38

Hypothesis 5b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
inspirational appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 5c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the
use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 5d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
inspirational appeals influence tactics.
Personal appeals. Personal appeals occur when the leader asks a target to carry out a
request as a personal favor or because of friendship (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). For example, a
leader may ask his or her boss to support a request for increased resources or an extended
timetable for a project by appealing to their friendship ties. Alternatively, a leader may ask a
customer to act as a reference to another potential customer as a personal favor in the leader's
attempt to obtain more business.
Whereas personal appeal influence tactics have been most commonly used with peers
within an organization (Yukl et al., 1993), leaders who are dependent on other stakeholder
groups are likely to use personal appeals with all of the stakeholders in this study. This follows
the well-established heuristic that people are more likely to respond affirmatively to a request if
they like the person who is making the request. Further, Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) have
proposed that individuals have a goal of affiliation in that they are "motivated to create and
maintain meaningful social relationships with others" (p. 598). Therefore, the goal of affiliation
makes it more likely that individuals are motivated to comply with a request. Whereas this tactic
does not change the level of power and dependence in the relationship, it allows the leader to
draw on friendships within and outside of the organization to accomplish their task work.

39

Hypothesis 6a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of personal appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 6b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
personal appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 6c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the
use of personal appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 6d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
personal appeals influence tactics.
Rational Influence Tactics
The next two influence tactics, apprising and rational persuasion, are classified as rational
influence tactics. These tactics involve the use of arguments, reason, and bargaining to
accompany a particular request (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). Rational tactics are normally used
when leaders are seeking individual or organizational benefits and when they are not expecting
strong resistance. The outcomes of rational tactics are often similar to those of soft influence
tactics including commitment to the request, maintaining strong working relationships, and
strengthening the leader's reputation. Therefore, it is likely that leaders who are dependent upon
their stakeholders will use rational influence tactics when possible.
Apprising. Apprising influence tactics occur when the leader explains how the request
will benefit the target personally or professionally (Yukl et al., 2005). The leader uses facts and
credible, logical arguments to explain why complying with the request is actually beneficial for
the target. Examples include when the leader explains how the request could lead to increased
professional skills or faster career advancement.

40

Apprising is one of two newest influence tactics identified by Yukl and colleagues
(2005). Thus, there is little empirical evidence of how this tactic will be used; however, Yukl et
al., (2005) hypothesized that apprising will be most commonly used toward subordinates. Based
on expectancy theory, I propose that leaders will use apprising with all internal stakeholders to
increase the stakeholders' motivation to comply with the request. Expectancy theory (Vroom,
1964) suggests that a leader's compelling arguments can explain how the outcome will benefit
the target (thereby increasing valence); how the target's compliance with the request will lead to
that particular outcome (thereby increasing instrumentality); and how the target's compliance
efforts will lead to a particular outcome (thereby increasing expectancy). These arguments will
emphasize the material benefits to the target thereby increasing the level of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation to comply with the request. Leaders who are dependent upon customers are unlikely
to use this tactic because of the structural boundary with this stakeholder which will likely
precludes the leader from having the information to make credible apprising influence attempts
with the customer.
Hypothesis 7a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of apprising influence tactics.
Hypothesis 7b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
apprising influence tactics.
Hypothesis 7c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the
use of apprising influence tactics.
Hypothesis 7d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of
apprising influence tactics.

41

Rational persuasion. Rational persuasion occurs when a leader uses facts and logical
arguments to show that the request is reasonable and appropriate for accomplishing a task. This
influence tactic is also based in expectancy theory in that the leader attempts to persuade the
target that the influence request is legitimate, that the target's compliance will lead to the desired
outcome, and that target's efforts are related to the outcome. Therefore, using rational persuasion
influence tactics increases the target's motivation to respond to the request. As motivating the
target to respond is one of the key means to overcoming dependence and resistance to influence
attempts, rational persuasion will be an effective influence tactic for leaders who are dependent
on stakeholders.
Prior research has found that rational persuasion was more commonly used with senior
managers than with subordinates or peers (Yukl et al., 1993), yet leaders who are dependent on
others will likely use rational persuasion with all internal and external stakeholder groups
because of the ability to increase the level of motivation in each target group. There is some
preliminary evidence to support this. For example, Yukl and Tracey (1992) found that the use of
rational persuasion tactics was related to task commitment by senior managers, peers, and
subordinates. Further, Podsakoff and Schriesheim (1985) have argued that subordinates are more
likely to comply with a leader's request because of the level of knowledge and expertise of the
leader. Therefore, to the extent that the leader is able to develop logical arguments for the
request, the leader will be more successful in motivating their acquiescence.
Hypothesis 8a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of rational persuasion influence tactics.
Hypothesis 8b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
rational persuasion influence tactics.

42

Hypothesis 8c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the
use of rational persuasion influence tactics.
Hypothesis 8d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
rational persuasion influence tactics.
Hard Influence Tactics
Hard influence tactics are tactics that involve demanding, assertiveness, and relying on
one's organizational position (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). In addition, a leader may use hard
tactics when the target has resisted past attempts because of a lack of motivation (Tepper et al.,
1993). Thus, hard tactics involve the use of authority and position power. The hard influence
tactics in this study are legitimating tactics, pressure, and coalition tactics.
There are several possible negative consequences from using hard tactics. The target may
resist the influence attempt, have a lower level of commitment to the project, or put forth less
effort in responding to the request. The leader may also be hurting his or her reputation thereby
reducing the viability of future working relationships. This could eventually lessen the ability of
the leader to perform his or her task because others are unwilling to work with the leader in the
future. Therefore, a leader is likely to use hard tactics sparingly, especially with a target upon
whom the leader is dependent for accomplishing his or her task work (Van Knippenberg, van
Knippenberg, Blaauw, & Vermunt, 1999).
Coalition tactics. Coalition tactics involve the leader gaining support from others as part
of the attempt to influence the target. This support could come from other subordinates, peers,
senior managers, or external stakeholders, or a combination of individuals from these groups.
However, the goal is to exert significant pressure so that the target complies with the leader's
request.

43

Prior research has suggested that coalition tactics are most commonly used with peers;
yet I propose that leaders will only use coalition tactics with subordinates in this study. This is
because the leader has the position power over the subordinate to make the request. This power
includes reward power which means that the leader controls the incentives for the subordinates,
and coercive power which means that the leader has the ability to punish the target. Further,
because the leader is in a position of authority, the leader has the legitimate power to direct the
behavior of the subordinate. Therefore, if a leader is dependent on a subordinate for his or her
task work, then the leader may use this tactic to gain the target’s compliance with the request.
Based in approach-avoidance motivation (Elliot, 2006; Elliot & Church, 1997), I suggest
that coalition influence tactics will provoke an avoidance orientation in other targets, including
peers, senior managers, and customers. Avoidance motivation has the potential to energize
behavior away from a negative stimulus. Therefore, this tactic will not likely motivate these nonhierarchically connected stakeholder groups, so the leader is unlikely to use coalition tactics with
peers, senior managers, and customers.
Hypothesis 9a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of coalition influence tactics.
Hypothesis 9b: Peer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of
coalition influence tactics.
Hypothesis 9c: Senior manager task dependence will be negatively related to the
use of coalition influence tactics.
Hypothesis 9d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of
coalition influence tactics.

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Legitimating tactics. Legitimating tactics occur when the leader relies on his or her
position power or authority to make a request. This tactic has been linked to authoritarian
leadership in that it is representative of a leader who gives specific instructions and does not
include others in decision making. Legitimating tactics are most commonly used with peers and
subordinates (Yukl et al., 1993).
In a study of leader influence, Falbe and Yukl (1992) concluded that "the least effective
tactics were pressure, coalition, and legitimating" (p. 650). Further, van Knippenberg and van
Knippenberg (2003) describe hard influence tactics as placing strain on the relationship between
the leader and target. However, similar to other studies, I argue that leaders will use legitimating
tactics with subordinates and peers. Again, leaders have position authority to make the request of
subordinate. Whereas there may be negative consequences to using this tactic (e.g., lower task
commitment, lower effort), the leader’s need to accomplish his or her task work may ultimately
drive the use of the tactic. Further, the leader may use legitimating tactics with peers because of
how work is structured within the organization. If the leader is dependent on sequential task
inputs from a peer, the leader may appeal to the organizational norms around workflow and
coordination to gain acquiescence from the peer for the request.
When a leader’s task work is dependent upon senior managers and customers, they are
not likely to use legitimating tactics for several reasons. First, legitimating tactics are among the
least effective and the leader does not have position authority to draw on with these groups.
Second, hard tactics are more likely to harm the relationship with the stakeholder. Given that the
leader is subject to the senior manager’s position power and to the customer’s power, these are
relationships that the leader is likely to value highly. Therefore, the leader would refrain from
using certain hard tactics which may harm the relationship. Finally, legitimating tactics are

45

unlikely to motivate senior managers and customers to comply with the influence attempt, so this
tactic is not likely to be used with these stakeholders.
Hypothesis 10a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of legitimating influence tactics.
Hypothesis 10b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
legitimating influence tactics.
Hypothesis 10c: Senior manager task dependence will be negatively related to the
use of legitimating influence tactics.
Hypothesis 10d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use
of legitimating influence tactics.
Pressure. Finally, pressure tactics include demands, threats, and persistent reminders.
This can include demands about the time within which work needs to be completed, threats
pertaining to one's employment status, and/or frequent personal or electronic reminders about a
request. This tactic can be used toward internal and external stakeholders; however research has
suggested that the tactic is most commonly used toward subordinates (Yukl et al., 1993).
Consistent with this prior research, I argue that leaders who are dependent on subordinates will
use pressure tactics. Further, I suggest that leaders may use pressure tactics with all other
stakeholders – peers, senior managers, and customers.
When a leader is dependent upon other stakeholders for task work, the leader requires
information or support from this group to accomplish his or her work. This could include
information that the leader needs to move a project forward or cooperation on a task that enables
the leader make progress on an important project. Regardless, the leader needs the assistance of
the stakeholder to perform the task responsibilities associated with his or her role. Therefore,

46

because leaders are unable to complete their work without assistance from these stakeholders, the
leader may resort to using this specific hard tactic. Whereas pressure, like the other hard tactics,
may have negative consequences, the leader may use this tactic because of the need to complete
their own work which is dependent upon the cooperation of others.
Hypothesis 11a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use
of pressure influence tactics.
Hypothesis 11b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
pressure influence tactics.
Hypothesis 11c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the
use of pressure influence tactics.
Hypothesis 11d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
pressure influence tactics.

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Political Skill
The discussion above highlights that influence tactics may be used differentially with
each stakeholder group and that the selection of tactics may be based on the level of dependence
that the leader has on the target. In addition, it is likely that not all influence tactics will be
perceived similarly or in the manner in which the leader intends (Sparrowe et al., 2006). The
breadth and variety of influence tactics presented by Yukl et al., (2008) suggests that it requires a
high degree of behavioral flexibility and social acumen to be able to influence effectively.
Political skill represents a somewhat new construct that measures this capability in influence
situations (Ferris et al., 2005). Political skill is similar to other measures of social skills or social
effectiveness, yet other measures of social effectiveness tend to capture more general social
skills. Political skill, on the other hand, focuses on the skills necessary to understand others
within organizations and use this knowledge to influence others more effectively. Yukl (1981)
has argued that "the opportunity to use forms of influence … depends more on the characteristics
of the leader than on the attributes of his position" (p. 24). Yukl (1981) also suggests that a
leader needs insight into the motives and perceptions of subordinates to influence effectively.
These characteristics are precisely those captured by political skill.
Political skill is defined by Ahearn et al., (2004) as "the ability to effectively understand
others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one's
personal and/or organizational objectives" (p. 311). Political skill has been introduced as a multidimensional construct (Ahearn et al., 2004; Ferris, Treadway, Perrewe, Brouer, Douglas, & Lux,
2007). The first dimension of political skill is social astuteness, and it captures how attuned
leaders are to social situations. This is similar to how Pfeffer (1992) conceptualizes sensitivity to
others which includes not only self-awareness, but more importantly, awareness of others in

48

social situations. The second dimension of political skill is interpersonal influence, and it
includes the behavioral flexibility required to adapt to various situations to gain desired
responses from others. Although the dimension is titled interpersonal influence, the development
and validation of the political skill inventory by Ferris and colleagues (2005) found that
"political skill is not redundant with influence tactics" (p. 138) as none of the correlations
approached a level which would indicate multicollinearity (r = .09-.25). The third dimension of
political skill is networking ability which includes the ability to develop strong networks and
coalitions within the organization, and the fourth dimension is apparent sincerity which includes
the ability to be perceived as sincere and genuine. Political skill is presented as a social
competence which captures a unique skill that leaders need to effectively influence others
(Ferris, Anthony, Kolodinsky, Gilmore, and Harvey, 2002). Therefore, leaders who are highly
politically skilled know what to do in social situations; how to behave in a way that disguises any
ulterior motive; and how to act in a way that inspires trust and confidence (Ferris et al., 2002).
Relationship to outcomes. Although a relatively new construct, early research has
demonstrated that political skill has important relationships with many outcomes. For example,
Douglas and Ammeter (2004) used subordinate ratings of leader political skill to assess its
relationship with leader effectiveness. In a sample of public school administrators and
supervisors, they found that leader political skill predicted ratings of leader effectiveness, even
after controlling for leader self-efficacy and leader self-monitoring.
Treadway et al., (2004) explored the relationship that leader political skill has on
employee reactions. The authors argued that political skill is an integral competency for leaders
in that it can positively impact their subordinate perceptions of organizational support when
utilized effectively. They found that leader political skill was related to subordinate perceptions

49

of organizational support which, in turn, positively impacted the subordinates trust in
management and job satisfaction. Further, leader political skill was negatively related to
subordinate organizational cynicism.
In a team setting, Ahearn et al., (2004) investigated whether leaders with high political
skill had higher team performance. They argued that leaders with high political skill would be
better able to manage team member interpersonal needs and allow team members to participate
in team management responsibilities. They studied casework teams in a state child welfare
system and found that leader political skill explained a significant proportion of the variance in
the performance of the casework teams.
Kolodinsky, Treadway, and Ferris (2007) examined the use of political skill in a sample
of university employees. They found that political skill was related to the use of rational
influence tactics. Further, the leader's political skill moderated the relationship between the use
of rational influence tactics and both supervisor liking of subordinates and the perceived
similarity between the supervisor and the subordinate. The results also demonstrated that
supervisor liking and perceptions of similarity were positively related to ratings of task and
contextual performance.
Gentry, Gilmore, Shuffler, and Leslie (2012) explored whether political skill was related
to promotability in managers from several countries around the world. They suggested that
political skill was critically important to leaders given the inherently political environment of
organizations. They found that political skill was related to ratings of promotability from
subordinates, supervisors, and peers.
Additional empirical evidence. Given the growing interest in social effectiveness
constructs that have been proposed as important for leadership, Semadar, Robins, and Ferris

50

(2006) engaged in a study to compare several of these constructs. They explored the relative
effectiveness of political skill, self-monitoring, leadership self-efficacy, and emotional
intelligence in the prediction of leader job performance. The results were quite interesting. First,
self-monitoring was the only variable which was not a significant predictor of leader
performance. Further, when all variables were included in a regression model, "only political
skill provided significant unique contribution to job performance" (Semadar et al., 2006, p. 454).
In fact, political skill was the only variable that provided significant incremental validity over the
other three variables.
Further, Bing, Davison, Minor and Novicevic (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of
political skill and its relationship to task and contextual performance. Using data from 17
published and unpublished studies, they found that political skill was significantly related to both
task and contextual performance. In fact, the average corrected correlation between political skill
and contextual performance was higher than that for political skill and task performance (rc = .26
vs. rc = 19). Additionally, they conducted moderator analyses and found that political skill had
stronger relationships with task performance ratings as the social demands of the job increased.
Political skill as a moderator. Whereas the research above has primarily examined
political skill as a main effect, there are reasons to suggest political skill may have a moderating
effect as well. First, scholars have consistently noted that interpersonal skills are critical for
leaders to perform well in their roles because these skills relate to interacting with others (e.g.,
Mumford et al., 2007). Political skill is an example of an interpersonal skill that specifically
assesses the extent to which a leader is aware of the social environment. As prior research has
demonstrated, the outcome of an influence request is partly determined by how appealing the
request is to the target (e.g., Yukl et al., 1996). Therefore, to the extent that the leader can
51

accurately assess the social motives of the target (a quality of a leader with high political skill),
the influence attempt will be more successful. In addition, research has demonstrated that the
choice of influence tactics, the choice of tactic combinations, and the sequencing of tactics can
have important consequences for the intended results (Yukl et al., 1993). A leader with high
political skill is more likely to be able to accurately assess which tactic is appropriate based on
social cues.
Further, the level of transparency and sincerity in an influence attempt has been identified
as important moderator of influence tactics (Gordon, 1996). Several of the soft influence tactics
in this study involve behaviors which require sincerity to be used effectively. For example, a
leader with high political skill will be more effective in using ingratiation, inspirational appeals,
and personal appeals because the leader is able to sincerely communicate flattery, inspire the
target to action, or appeal to a genuine friendship. A leader low in political skill using these same
tactics could be perceived as disingenuous or may not be able to truly inspire the target which
would make the influence attempt less effective. In addition, pressure tactics may be more
effective when used by a leader with high political skill because the leader appears sincere in the
need to continually remind the target of time demands for a legitimate reason rather than being
perceived as aggressive and battering.
Finally, social influence theory argues that those who appear sincere (i.e., highly
politically skilled) will be more likely to be effective in influence attempts than those who do not
appear sincere in their influence attempts (i.e., low politically skilled; Levy, Collins, & Nail,
1998). Ferris and colleagues (2009) have also noted how the "style of execution demonstrates a
major impact in how influence efforts are perceived" (Ferris, Liden, Munyon, Summers, Basik,
& Buckley, 2009, p. 1393). They argue that individuals high in political skill have the ability to

52

adapt their behavior to situations in a way that instills trust and sways the responses to influence
attempts in others.
Harris, Kacmar, Zivnuska, and Shaw (2007) examined political skill as a moderator
between impression management tactics and ratings of leader performance. The authors
examined five impression management tactics including intimidation, exemplification,
ingratiation, self-promotion, and supplication. Their findings demonstrated that among managers
who used impression management techniques, highly political skilled managers received better
ratings of performance than did their less politically skilled counterparts.
Also, Witt and Ferris (2003) examined social skill as a moderator of the relationship
between conscientiousness and performance. In their study, social skill was defined as
"interpersonal perceptiveness and the capacity to adjust one's behavior to different and changing
situational demands" (p. 811). This definition and the measurement of social skill in their study
(which including several items from the political skill measure) was very similar to the definition
of political skill. The study found that social skill moderated the relationship between
conscientiousness and performance such that job performance ratings were higher for employees
who had high social skill versus those that had low social skill.
Finally, Brouer, Harris, and Kacmar (2011) examined the moderating effect of leader and
subordinate political skill on the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and
several outcomes including job satisfaction, job performance, and commitment. They argued that
the negative effects of high perceptions levels of organizational politics would be moderated
(i.e., weakened) in individuals with high levels of political skill. Brouer and colleagues found
only support for the three-way interaction which suggested that when perceptions of

53

organizational politics were high, job performance and commitment was highest when
subordinate political skill was low but leader political skill was high.
Based on the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence presented above, a leader's
political skill will be presented as a moderator in the relationship between the leader's influence
attempt and the outcomes described below.

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Leader Outcomes
The outcomes presented in this study will examine both the current performance of the
leader and leader viability, which is a forward looking view of how willing the stakeholder is to
work with the leader in the future. Each is discussed below.
Leader Performance
There has been a diverse set of criteria used to evaluate leader performance in prior
research. Some scholars have argued that an appropriate measure of leader performance is a
measure of the leader's group performance or how well the leader's subordinates perform on a
particular task (Yukl & Van Fleet, 1990). Other research has examined objective performance
data (e.g., sales growth, productivity), affective responses to the leader (e.g., satisfaction with the
leader), or the leader's performance in his or her role (e.g., task performance). Indeed, several
meta-analyses on leadership have highlighted the divergence in leader performance criteria. For
example, Judge and Piccolo (2004) examined transformational and transactional leadership and
highlighted follower outcomes (i.e., follower job satisfaction, follower satisfaction with the
leader, follower motivation), leader outcomes (i.e., leader job performance, leader effectiveness),
and group-level outcomes (i.e., group performance) in these research areas.
These inconsistencies in leader performance criteria have caused scholars to call for a
more focused approach to the selection of leader performance criteria (Yukl & Van Fleet, 1990).
In this study, leader influence tactics are introduced as an essential part of the leader's role
responsibilities; and in fact, other scholars have highlighted the importance of influence in
managerial jobs. Drawing from organizational role theory, Dierdorff, Rubin, and Morgeson
(2009) have argued that managerial roles have three broad categories of work requirements:
conceptual requirements, technical/administrative requirements, and interpersonal requirements.

55

The interpersonal work role requirements include "interacting, influencing, and leading others"
(Dierdorff et al., 2009). Therefore, because influencing is a critical component of a leader's role,
the leader's task performance will be the focal measure of behavioral performance in this study.
Leader task performance in this context refers to the required aspects of the leader's task work.
Prior research has demonstrated that leaders who use soft and rational influence tactics
are more effective in their roles than leaders who use hard influence tactics. For example, soft
influence tactics generally involve seeking compliance in a polite or personal manner, and
studies have demonstrated two consistent outcomes from the use of soft tactics. First, Yukl and
colleagues (2005, 2008) found that there was a positive relationship between target commitment
and soft tactics. That is, the target of the influence attempt is more likely to acquiesce to the
request (which will enable the leader to accomplish his or her task work). Second, studies have
also demonstrated a positive relationship between soft influence tactics and ratings of managerial
performance (Yukl et al., 2005; Yukl et al., 2008). Similar patterns of relationships have been
found with leaders who use rational influence attempts. Wayne et al., (1997) found a positive
relationship between rational influence attempts and managers' performance ratings, and Yukl
and colleagues (2005, 2008) found a positive relationship between rational influence attempts
and target commitment. Therefore, leaders who use these tactics are more likely to receive higher
ratings of task performance.
Conversely, leaders who use hard tactics are likely to receive low ratings of task
performance. Hard influence tactics involve assertiveness, demanding behaviors, and pressure.
Tepper et al., (1998) found a positive relationship between hard influence tactics and resistance.
Similarly, Yukl et al., (2008) found a negative relationship between hard tactics and target

56

commitment. Therefore, when leaders use hard influence tactics to coordinate the work that they
need to complete and they encounter resistance, they will be less effective in their role.
However, given the range of behaviors in the eleven influence tactics discussed in this
study, the moderated relationship between influence tactics and leader performance is likely to
be complex. I argue that the positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and
leader performance will be even stronger for leaders high in political skill. There are several
reasons to suggest why this might be the case. First, leaders with high political skill have a better
understanding of social interactions and the social context at work (Ferris et al., 2005), and these
leaders use this understanding to select the influence tactic that is most likely to be effective
given the situation and the motivations of the target. Leaders with low political skill tend to not
have this heightened understanding and are more likely to select less effective tactics for the
situation or to not select a target which would effectively motivate the target to comply.
In addition, leaders with high political skill have a "convincing personal style" which
enables them to be more effective in influence attempts (Ferris et al., 2005, p. 129). The
literature on leader influence has identified 11 tactics, and each of these tactics requires a
different behavior. Leaders with high political skill have the ability to demonstrate the behavioral
flexibility to match the demands of the situation to influence others to meet their goals. Further,
leaders with high political skill have developed networks and are able to use these networks to
accomplish their tasks (Ferris et al., 2005). Conversely, leaders with low political skill will not
have strong social networks to draw from to accomplish their task work so they may be either
less effective at the task, or it may take them longer to complete the task.
Finally, leaders with high political skill are perceived as having higher levels of integrity
and sincerity, and they are perceived as being more honest. Ferris and colleagues (2005) argue

57

that this "strikes at the very heart of whether influence attempts will be successful because it
focuses on the perceived intentions (i.e., as assessed by the target of influence) of the behavior
exhibited" (p. 129). Leaders with high political skill instill trust and confidence with the
stakeholders with whom they interact. They appear sincere in their influence attempts, and
therefore, others are more likely to acquiesce to the requests. On the other hand, leaders with low
political skill may be perceived as having ulterior motives or as being manipulative. This will
reduce the willingness of the stakeholder to comply with the request and ultimately inhibit the
ability of the leader to accomplish his or her task work. Therefore, given that leaders use
influence tactics to accomplish their task work, the leaders with high political skill will be more
likely to have success in their soft and rational influence attempts and will subsequently receive
higher ratings of performance.
On the other hand, I argue that leaders who use hard tactics will receive negative ratings
of performance. This is because their influence attempts will be less effective, and they will be
less able to accomplish their work. This is especially true for leaders with low political skill.
These leaders will be less effective at selecting the tactic that is best for the situation, and they
may not be perceived as credible. Therefore, leaders with low political skill who use hard tactics
will receive low ratings of performance. However, leaders who have high political skill and use
hard tactics are likely to receive less negative assessments of their performance. In this situation,
political skill will act as a buffer to the hard influence tactics. For example, when a leader is
facing an important deadline, he or she may use pressure tactics with the stakeholders that are
involved in the project. If the leader does not use this tactic frequently or if he or she is able to
convey an candid sense of urgency, then the target may be more willing to acquiesce to the
influence attempt. This is an example of a leader with high political skill who recognizes the

58

context and will be more successful in their influence attempts and subsequent role performance
in the end. Therefore, the relationship between hard tactics and task performance will be
negative, but less negative for leaders high in political skill.
Hypothesis 12: The positive relationship between soft and rational influence
tactics and leader task performance as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders,
(b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer
stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the positive
relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and performance will be
more positive for leaders high in political skill.
Hypothesis 13: The negative relationship between hard tactics and leader task
performance as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders,
(c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated
by leader political skill such that the negative relationship between hard tactics
and performance will be less negative for leaders high in political skill.
Leader Viability
Given the unique boundary spanning roles that leaders occupy within organizations, they
are ideally situated to manage and influence stakeholder groups. They regularly interact with
both internal and external stakeholders as part of their role requirements; however, different
stakeholder groups may have different perceptions of how well the leader is performing in his or
her role. Further, interactions with the leader may affect the stakeholder's willingness to work
with the leader in the future. Therefore, the leader's viability in the relationship with the
stakeholder will be assessed as a future-focused metric of the leader's performance.

59

Leader viability assesses the extent to which the stakeholder is willing to work with the
leader in the future. In this sense, it captures an affective, forward-focused performance
dimension. Leader viability is based on the team viability construct (e.g., Hackman, 1987;
Sundstrom et al., 1990). Teams scholars have long recognized that performance and viability are
related, but independent, dimensions of team performance (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). For
example, in a study of consulting teams, Marrone, Tesluk, and Carson (2007) measured team
performance and team viability and found the variables to be only moderately correlated (r =
.38). They argued that viability assessed the ability to function interdependently in the future
whereas team performance represented performance on the team's task. Further, leader viability
is distinct from satisfaction with the leader. Many studies have assessed this affective
performance dimension as well (e.g., Farh, Podsakoff, & Organ, 1990; Johnson, Selenta, & Lord,
2006), yet satisfaction with leadership specifically focuses on whether an individual likes the
leader or would speak highly about the leader to others. Leader viability, on the other hand,
focuses on whether the experience working with the leader has been positive and whether the
individual is interested in working with the leader going forward.
As there is value in capturing the viability of a team, there may also be value in assessing
the viability of the leader's working relationships. Given that leaders must interact with a wide
variety of stakeholders on an ongoing basis as part of their role responsibilities, the manner in
which these interactions occur could influence the future viability of the relationships. Yukl
(1999) has explicitly referred to influence processes as "a series of dyadic interactions over time"
(p. 287), and he has argued that influence attempts offer an explanation of the attitudes of the
stakeholder toward the leader. Thus, if the interactions are rewarding to the stakeholders, then
the leader will be perceived as a person with whom the stakeholder wishes to continue to work

60

with (high leader viability). Conversely, if the interactions are unpleasant, the stakeholder may
determine that they are not willing to work with the leader (low leader viability).
Soft influence tactics include behaviors which signal respect for the target (i.e.,
collaboration, consultation) or which seek to boost the target's the commitment through
ingratiation, inspirational, personal appeals, or exchange. Rational tactics involve using logical
arguments in an influence attempt. Both of these tactics contribute to maintaining strong working
relationships and strengthening the leader's reputation. Therefore, I argue that leaders who
engage in soft and rational influence tactics will have high leader viability. In contrast, hard
tactics involve behaviors which are often unpleasant for the target. Thus, leaders who engage in
hard tactics will have low leader viability.
Yet, there are several reasons why political skill may moderate the relationship between a
leader's use of influence tactics and viability. First, a leader's political skill translates how the
leader intends the influence tactic to be perceived and the stakeholder's actual evaluation of the
interaction. Leaders with high political skill appear more authentic and open (Ferris et al., 2005).
Further, leaders with high political skill are better at making people feel comfortable and at ease
around them, and they show a genuine interest in others. This ease of interactions and level of
personal attention is likely to garner positive affective responses in stakeholders and induce the
stakeholder to be more willing to continue to work with the leader. In addition, leaders with high
political skill are focused on building relationships. Ingram and Zou (2008) have discussed the
significant benefits that can accrue to the careers of those that have business friendships. They
argue that these relationships induce strong affective motivations in addition to instrumental
motivations to carry on working relationships.

61

Leaders with low political skill, on the other hand, tend to be more focused on "getting
the work done" and they may not sense the social needs of the stakeholder with whom they are
interacting. They may not show interest or concern for stakeholders when they are attempting to
influence them. Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, and Mount (1998) have suggested that these
characteristics can threaten viability and reduce the willingness of individuals to work together in
the future. Further, leaders with low political skill are more likely to be abrupt and transactionfocused rather than relationship-focused in their influence interactions. This may reduce the
leader's viability because of the importance of attending to the social needs of the stakeholder.
Numerous scholars have highlighted the important role that leaders play in supporting the social
needs of others (e.g., Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2010; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1990). Further,
Balkundi and Harrison (2006) have explicitly referred to viability as a "more social and personrelated" performance dimension (p. 51). Therefore, the overall relationship between influence
tactics and leader viability is likely to be stronger for leaders with high political skill than for
leaders with low political skill.
Further, I argue that the relationship specifically between soft and rational influence
tactics and leader viability will likely be stronger for leaders with high political skill. Leaders
with high political skill are more likely to be embedded in and have an appreciation for the value
of social networks in an organization. They are likely to be able to sincerely convey to others that
they value their relationship. Therefore, leaders high in political skill will be less likely to engage
in tactics which will cause conflict which would reduce viability (Balkundi & Harrison, 2006).
Given that viability is primarily an affective outcome, stakeholders are more likely to be willing
to continue to work with leaders who use soft and rational tactics and who have high political
skill.

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Conversely, the relationship between hard influence tactics and leader viability is likely
to be negative. However, the relationship between the use of hard influence tactics and leader
viability will likely be less negative for leaders high in political skill. Leaders with high political
skill are more likely to recognize when it is appropriate to use a negative tactic based on the
characteristics of the target and the environment. Given that hard influence tactics tend to make
people feel pressure and less committed to the request, leaders with high political skill are likely
to use these tactics sparingly. Therefore, stakeholders will have less negative perceptions of
leaders high in political skill who use hard influence tactics.
Hypothesis 14: The positive relationship between soft and rational influence
tactics and leader viability as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer
stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will
be moderated by leader political skill such that the positive relationship between
soft and rational influence tactics and viability will be more positive for leaders
high in political skill.
Hypothesis 15: The negative relationship between hard tactics and leader viability
as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior
manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader
political skill such that the negative relationship between hard tactics and viability
3

will be less negative for leaders high in political skill.

3

Table 5 presents a summary of the hypotheses in this study.
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Method
Research Setting and Sample
Because the dependence relationship between the leader and the stakeholder groups is a
critical component of my model, it is important that the sample include leaders who interact with
a broad set of internal and external stakeholders on a regular basis to accomplish their task work.
Therefore, I tested the hypotheses above in a field sample of leaders from a medium-size bank
headquartered in the Midwest. The leaders are well-suited for this study because they hold
positions which work together frequently with all of the stakeholder groups identified in the
study. The average age of the leaders is 46.28 years (SD = 10.59 years). The leaders average
14.93 years of work experience with their organization (SD = 12.21 years) and 7.66 years of
work experience in their current position (SD = 7.37 years). In terms of highest educational
achievement, 25.0 percent of the leaders have a high school diploma; 37.5 percent have attended
some college; 10.0 percent have an associates degree; 25.0 percent have a bachelors degree; and
2.5 percent have a masters degree. The leader sample is 84.2 percent female. There were 120
leader responses.
The sample also included subordinates, peer co-workers, senior managers, and customers
of the focal leaders. The average age of the subordinates is 36.63 years (SD = 13.35 years). The
subordinates average 6.69 (SD = 6.88) years of work experience with their organization and 4.19
years in their current position (SD = 4.63 years). In terms of highest educational achievement, .2
percent of the subordinates have some high school education; 29.0 percent have a high school
diploma; 41.5 percent have attended some college; 14.4 percent have an associates degree; 13.1
percent have a bachelors degree; 1.1 percent have a masters degree; and .2 percent have a
doctorate. The subordinate sample is 94.0 percent female, and the subordinates have worked with

64

their leader for an average of 3.30 years (SD = 3.77). There were 612 subordinate responses for
130 leaders for an average of 4.71 subordinate respondents per leader.
The average age of the peer co-workers is 45.93 years (SD = 10.52 years). The peer coworkers average 15.50 years of work experience with the organization (SD = 11.85) and 7.20
years in their current position (SD = 6.85 years). In terms of educational achievement, .5 percent
of the peers have some high school education; 22.8 percent have a high school diploma; 33.7
percent have attended some college; 9.2 percent have an associates degree; 28.8 percent have a
bachelors degree; and 3.8 percent have a masters degree. The peer sample is 75.5 percent female,
and the peers have worked with their leader for an average of 6.81 years (SD = 7.52). There were
184 peer respondents who provided 303 survey responses for 108 leaders (i.e., some peers
responded to the survey for multiple leaders). The average was 2.81 peer respondents per leader.
The average age of the senior managers is 52.82 years (SD = 3.94 years). The senior
managers average 17.52 years of work experience with the organization (SD = 13.66) and 6.56
years in their current position (SD = 7.22 years). In terms of educational achievement, 12.5
percent have a high school diploma; 37.5 percent have attended some college; 12.5 percent have
an associates degree; 25.0 percent have a bachelors degree; and 12.5 percent have a masters
degree. The senior manager sample is 87.5 percent female, and the senior managers have worked
with the leaders for an average of 3.09 years (SD = 4.34). The eight senior managers provided
survey responses for 130 leaders. The average was 16.25 leader respondents per senior manager.
The average age of the customers is 51.96 years (SD = 13.43), and they have been
customers of the bank for an average of 15.62 years (SD = 12.77). In terms of educational
achievement, 1.4 percent have some high school education; 23.1 percent have a high school
diploma; 26.5 percent have attended some college; 12.2 percent have an associates degree; 19.7

65

percent have a bachelors degree; 14.3 percent have a masters degree; and 2.0 percent have a
doctorate. The customer sample is 54.1 percent female, and the customers have worked with the
leaders for an average of 6.20 years (SD = 6.65). There were 150 customer responses for 69
leaders for an average of 2.17 customer respondents per leader.
Procedure
4

This research was conducted in two phases (summarized in Table 6). The first phase
began with the focal leaders receiving an email link to a web-based survey. The survey was open
for two weeks, and it included the control variables and relevant constructs from the focal leader.
In addition, the leader was asked to supply the name of: (a) his or her senior manager; (b) 3-5
subordinates with whom the leader interacted regularly for task-related work; (c) 3-5 peer coworkers with whom the leader interacted regularly for task-related work; and (d) 3-5 customers
with whom the leader interacted regularly for task-related work. After supplying the contact
information for each stakeholder, the leader responded to measures which assess the dependence
that the leader has on that particular stakeholder and the interaction frequency with each
stakeholder. Finally, the leader completed scales which assessed political skill, self-monitoring,
and the leader's relationship quality with his or her senior manager. The full leader survey can be
found in Appendix E.
Following the leader survey period, the second phase of the data collection began. In this
phase, subordinates and peers received an email link to a web-based survey. I conducted
individual meetings in-person with the senior managers, and customers received a paper survey
from the organization. Instructions asked that the survey be completed within a two week

4

All research participants indicated voluntary participation by signing an acknowledgment of
informed consent (see Appendix C). In addition, all surveys were preceded by an introduction
(see Appendix D).
66

timeframe. The subordinate survey included the control variables, leader influence tactics, leader
dependence (i.e., the subordinate's level of task dependence on the leader), leader political skill,
relationship quality with the leader, leader task performance, and leader viability. The full
subordinate survey can be found in Appendix F. The peer survey included control variables,
leader influence tactics, leader dependence (i.e., the peer's level of task dependence on the
leader), relationship quality with the leader, leader task performance, and leader viability. The
full peer survey can be found in Appendix G. The senior manager survey included control
variables, six influence tactics (i.e., consultation, inspirational appeal, rational persuasion,
coalition, legitimating, and pressure) via shortened scales, leader task performance, and leader
viability. The full senior manager survey can be found in Appendix H. Finally, the customer
survey included control variables, leader influence tactics, relationship quality with the leader,
leader task performance, and leader viability. The full customer survey can be found in Appendix
I.
Leader Survey
All variables were collected via a web-based survey. The control variables included the
leader’s age, gender, educational level, years of work experience with the organization, and years
of experience in current position. In all surveys, gender was coded such that 1= male and 2=
female, and educational level was coded such that 1 = some high school, 2 = high school
graduate, 3 = some college, 4 = associates degree, 5 = bachelors degree, 6 = masters degree, and
7 = doctoral degree. In addition, an item measuring interaction frequency was assessed for all
stakeholders. All other measures have been previously validated and have demonstrated
acceptable internal consistency reliabilities in prior studies.

67

Stakeholder dependence. Stakeholder dependence was assessed using five modified
items from the Pearce & Gregersen (1991) reciprocal interdependence scale. The scale was
modified to remove items focused on interdependence and to reflect the dependence on
stakeholders in this study. Sample items include “I work closely with [name of
subordinate/peer/senior manager/customer] in doing my work”; “I frequently must coordinate
my efforts with [name of subordinate/peer/senior manager/customer]”; and “My own
performance is dependent on receiving accurate information from [name of
subordinate/peer/senior manager/customer].” This scale has demonstrated acceptable reliability
(α = .76), and internal consistency reliability in the current study for subordinate task dependence
ranged from α = .82-.90; peer task dependence ranged from α = .78-.87; senior manager task
dependence was α = .82; and customer task dependence ranged from α = .84-.90.
Political skill. Political skill was assessed using the 18-item measure of political skill
developed by Ferris et al., (2005). The scale captures four dimensions of political skill which
include networking ability, interpersonal influence, social astuteness, and apparent sincerity.
Sample items include “I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others”; “I am
able to communicate easily and effectively with others”; and “I try to show a genuine interest in
other people.” This scale has demonstrated acceptable reliability (α = .89-.90), and internal
consistency reliability in the current study is α = .89.
Self-monitoring. Self-monitoring was assessed using the 18-item measure of selfmonitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Sample items include "I can only argue for ideas which
I already believe"; " I would probably make a good actor"; and "I'm not always the person I
appear to be." Internal consistency reliability in the current study was α = .73.

68

Relationship quality. Relationship quality was assessed using a modified version of the
12-item measure of leader-member exchange (Liden & Maslyn, 1998). The scale captures four
dimensions of relationship quality including affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional
respect. Sample items include "I like [name of senior manager] very much as a person"; "[Name
of senior manager] would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by others"; and "I am
impressed with [name of senior manager]'s knowledge of his/her job." Internal consistency
reliability in the current study was α = .90.
Subordinate Survey
All variables for the subordinate were collected via a web-based survey. The control
variables included the subordinate's age, gender, educational level, years of work experience
with the organization, years of experience in current position, and years of experience with the
leader. Also, an item measuring the subordinate's perception of interaction frequency with the
leader was included. All other measures have been previously validated and have demonstrated
acceptable internal consistency reliabilities in prior studies.
Leader influence tactics. Leader influence tactics were assessed using the 44-item
Target IBQ-G (Yukl et al., 2008). The scale includes four items to assess each of the eleven
influence tactics. Sample items include "[Name of leader] uses facts and logic to make a
persuasive case for a request or proposal"; "[Name of leader] offers something you want in return
for your help on a task or project"; "[Name of leader] says that his/her request or proposal is
consistent with official rules and policies"; and "[Name of leader] explains how the task he/she
wants you to do could help your career." The scale has demonstrated acceptable reliability in
previous studies (collaboration α = .70-.92; consultation α = .77-.90; exchange α = .83-94;
ingratiation α = .85-.93; inspirational appeal α = .85-.89; personal appeals α = .81-.92; apprising

69

α = .87-.92; rational persuasion α = .73-.91; coalition α = .65-.86; legitimating α = .84-.92; and
pressure α = .82-.87). Internal consistency reliabilities from the subordinate responses in the
current study were: collaboration α = .94; consultation α = .94; exchange α = .95; ingratiation α =
.92; inspirational appeal α = .92; personal appeals α = .87; apprising α = .94; rational persuasion
α = 92; coalition α = .89; legitimating α = .92; and pressure α = .86.
Leader political skill. The leader's political skill was assessed from the perspective of
the subordinate using the same 18-item measure of political skill developed by Ferris et al.,
(2005) as described above. Sample items include “[Name of leader] spends a lot of time and
effort at work networking with others”; “[Name of leader] is able to communicate easily and
effectively with others”; and “[Name of leader] tries to show a genuine interest in other people.”
Internal consistency reliability in the current study is α = .96.
Leader dependence. Leader dependence (i.e., the subordinate's task dependence on the
leader) was assessed using the same five modified items from the Pearce & Gregersen (1991)
reciprocal interdependence scale (described above). Internal consistency reliability for leader
task dependence from subordinates was α = .86.
Relationship quality. The subordinate's perception of relationship quality with the leader
was assessed using a modified version of the 12-item measure of leader-member exchange
(Liden & Maslyn, 1998). The scale captures four dimensions of relationship quality including
affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect. Sample items include "I like [name of
leader] very much as a person"; "[Name of leader] would come to my defense if I were
"attacked" by others"; and "I am impressed with my [name of leader]'s knowledge of his/her
job." Internal consistency reliability was α = .91.

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Leader task performance. Leader task performance using a four-item measure (Liden,
Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009). Sample items include "The
overall level of performance that I have observed for [name of leader] is outstanding"; and "My
personal view of [name of leader] is that he or she is very effective." Internal consistency
reliability from the subordinate responses in the current study was α = .93.
Leader viability. Leader viability was assessed using a modified version of the 3-item
team viability scale (Marrone et al., 2007). The scale was modified to change the referent from
“team members” to the name of the focal leader. Items include “I have found working with [this
leader] to be a very satisfying experience”; “I feel like I am learning a great deal by working
with [this leader]”; and “I would welcome the opportunity to work with [this leader] again in the
future.” This scale has demonstrated acceptable reliability (α = .81), and internal consistency
reliability from subordinate responses in the current study was α = .94.
Peer Survey
All variables for the peer were collected via a web-based survey. The control variables
included the peer's age, gender, educational level, years of work experience with the
organization, years of experience in current position, and years of experience with the leader.
Also, an item measuring the peer's perception of interaction frequency with the leader was
included. All other measures have been previously validated and have demonstrated acceptable
internal consistency reliabilities in prior studies.
Leader influence tactics. Leader influence tactics were assessed using the same 44-items
from the Target IBQ-G (Yukl et al., 2008). Internal consistency reliabilities from the peer
responses in the current study were: collaboration α = .94; consultation α = .94; exchange α =

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.95; ingratiation α = .95; inspirational appeal α = .94; personal appeals α = .93; apprising α = .94;
rational persuasion α = .92; coalition α = .91; legitimating α = .95; and pressure α = .89.
Leader dependence. Leader dependence (i.e., the peer's task dependence on the leader)
was assessed using the same five modified items from the Pearce & Gregersen (1991) reciprocal
interdependence scale (described above). Internal consistency reliability for leader task
dependence from peers was α = .91.
Relationship quality. The peer's perception of relationship quality with the leader was
assessed using the same modified version of the 12-item measure of leader-member exchange
(Liden & Maslyn, 1998). Internal consistency reliability was α = .89.
Leader task performance. Leader task performance using the same four-item measure
described above (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009). Internal
consistency reliability from the peer responses was α = .89.
Leader viability. Leader viability was assessed using the modified version of the 3-item
team viability scale describe above (Marrone et al., 2007). Internal consistency reliability from
the peer responses was α = .83.
Senior Manager Survey
There were eight senior managers in the organization, and I conducted individual
meetings with each of them to administer their survey. The senior manager survey included the
following control variables: age, gender, educational level, years of work experience with the
organization, years of experience in current position, and years of experience with the leader.
Leader influence tactics. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, six of the
eleven leader influence tactics were assessed using selected items from the Target IBQ-G (Yukl
et al., 2008). The influence tactics included consultation (using original scale items 1, 2, and 3),

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inspirational appeals (using original scale items 1, 2, and 3), rational persuasion (using original
scale items 1, 2, and 4), coalition (using original scale items 1, 2, and 3), legitimating (using
original scale items 1, 3, and 4), and pressure (using original scale items 1, 3, and 4). Internal
consistency reliabilities from the senior manager responses in the current study were:
consultation α = .86; inspirational appeal α = .88; rational persuasion α = .84; coalition α = .58;
legitimating α = .83; and pressure α = .58.
Leader task performance. Leader task performance using the same four-item measure
described above (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009). Internal
consistency reliability from the senior manager responses was α = .89.
Leader viability. Leader viability was assessed using the modified version of the 3-item
team viability scale describe above (Marrone et al., 2007). Internal consistency reliability from
the senior manager responses was α = .80.
Customer Survey
This study was among the first to assess leader influence tactics from external
stakeholders. Specifically, the study examined customers with whom the focal leader regularly
interacted for task-related work. Given the nature of the organizational setting, it was necessary
to take precautions to protect the confidentiality of the customer information. Therefore, the
organization delivered paper surveys to the customers. The surveys were accompanied with a
letter from the organization describing the nature of the study, and the customers were asked to
return the completed surveys in a postage-paid envelope to Michigan State University.
The customer control variables included age, gender, educational level, years as a
customer of the organization, and years of experience with the leader. Further, an item measuring
the customer's perception of interaction frequency with the leader was included.

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Leader influence tactics. Leader influence tactics were assessed using the same 44-items
from the Target IBQ-G (Yukl et al., 2008). Internal consistency reliabilities from the customer
responses in the current study were: collaboration α = .94; consultation α = .94; exchange α =
.97; ingratiation α = .94; inspirational appeal α = .91; personal appeals α = .91; apprising α = .91;
rational persuasion α = .94; coalition α = .86; legitimating α = .95; and pressure α = .83.
Relationship quality. The customer's perception of relationship quality with the leader
was assessed using the affect and professional respect dimensions of the leader-member
exchange (Liden & Maslyn, 1998). Internal consistency reliability was α = .93.
Leader task performance. Leader task performance using the same four-item measure
described above (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009). Internal
consistency reliability from the customer responses was α = .93.
Leader viability. Leader viability was assessed using the modified version of the 3-item
team viability scale describe above (Marrone et al., 2007). Internal consistency reliability from
the customerresponses was α = .81.

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Data Analysis
To test the hypothesized main effects (i.e., hypotheses 1-11), I examined the correlations
between the variables of interest.
To test the moderation hypotheses (i.e., hypotheses 12-15), I used two-level hierarchical
linear models (HLM; Raudenbush & Byrk, 2002). HLM is an statistical technique that allows for
analysis when there is nesting of study participants. In this study, the stakeholders are nested
within leaders, and the leaders are nested within senior managers. Therefore, four HLM models
were conducted. In the first model, the level 1 variables included subordinate characteristics, and
the level 2 variables included the leader characteristics. In the second model, the level 1 variables
included the peer characteristics, and the level 2 variables included the leader characteristics. In
the third model, the level 1 variables included the leader characteristics, and the level 2 variables
included the senior manager characteristics. In the fourth model, the level 1 variables included
the customer characteristics, and the level 2 variables included the leader characteristics. I used
group centering of the predictor variables to remove concerns related to multicollinearity and to
allow for an examination of between leader variance (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003;
Hofmann & Gavin, 1998; Raudenbush & Byrk, 2002). Finally, given that the average number of
raters per leader in each stakeholder group is small, I used random effects multilevel models
(Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, & Kashy, 2002).
Factor Analysis
To determine if there are a smaller set of influence tactics than those introduced by Yukl
et al. (2008), I conducted exploratory factor analyses (EFA) by stakeholder group. The factor
analyses were conducted using a principal components analysis with varimax rotation.
Eigenvalues greater than one were regarded as indication of component factors (Kaiser, 1960).

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The EFA from the subordinate stakeholder group yielded a ten-factor solution – only the items
for rational persuasion and inspirational appeal loaded on the same factor (see Table 7). The EFA
from the peer stakeholder group also yielded a ten-factor solution. Here, the items for
collaboration and consultation loaded on the same factor (see Table 8). The senior manager EFA
(which only contained items for six influence tactics) resulted in a five-factor solution with
rational persuasion and inspirational appeal items loading on the same factor. Also, there was
some cross-loading of pressure and coalition items with the legitimating items (see Table 9).
Finally, the EFA from the customer stakeholder group yielded an eight-factor solution. The items
for collaboration, ingratiation, and consultation loaded on the same factor, and the items for
rational persuasion and inspirational appeal loaded on the same factor (see Table 10). The results
from these analyses did not support a clear, highly differentiated alternative solution. Therefore, I
retained the original influence tactic classification because the theory underlying the original
classification is more compelling.
Control Variables
Prior research has demonstrated that a variety of demographic variables are used as
controls in studies of leader influence. These variables include age (e.g., Cable & Judge, 2003),
gender (e.g., Sparrowe et al., 2006), education (e.g., Thacker & Wayne, 1995), dyadic tenure
(e.g., Sparrowe & Liden, 2005), and organizational tenure (e.g., Cable & Judge, 2003; Thacker
& Wayne, 1995). Therefore, the following variables were used as controls in the HLM analyses:
leader and stakeholder age, gender, education, position tenure, organizational tenure and dyadic
tenure.

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Results
Scale means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the study variables are
provided in Table 7. This data is repeated and separated by stakeholder group in Table 90 (leader
and subordinate variables), Table 91 (leader and peer variables), Table 92 (leader and senior
manager variables), and Table 93 (leader and customer variables).
Hypotheses 1-11 (Stakeholder Dependence)
Hypotheses 1-11 concerned predictions regarding stakeholder dependence and the use of
influence tactics. Yukl's (1999) theory on influence tactics explicitly describes influence in terms
of dyadic interactions. That is, a leader uses influence with a specific individual. Therefore, the
leader data was collected in a manner in which the leader identified individuals within each
stakeholder group in response to the dependence scale. Specifically, leaders were asked to list
three to five individuals within each of the subordinate, peer, and customer stakeholder groups.
The instructions stated that the names listed should include both those with whom the leader
regularly interacted for completing his or her task work and a diverse set of individuals who
assist with the responsibilities related to the leader's position (see Appendix E for complete
instructions). Then, the leaders responded to the task dependence scale for each individual listed.
This data is represented in Table 7 as leader task dependence on (a) subordinates A-E; (b) peers
A-E; (c) senior manager; and (d) customers A-E. The sample sizes for each of these responses
vary given the structure of the survey, and this is also noted in Table 7. The results for the
hypotheses will be discussed in this manner – allowing for examinations of dependencies on
specific individuals that may exist within stakeholders groups.
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics with subordinates, peers, and senior

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managers whereas stakeholder dependence would be negatively related to the use of
collaboration influence tactics with customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey,
hypothesis 1c was not tested. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to
the use of collaboration tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of collaboration
tactics with peers; and was not related to the use of collaboration tactics with customers.
Therefore, hypothesis 1 was not supported.
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior
managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to
the use of consultation tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of consultation tactics
with peers; was not related to the use of consultation tactics with senior managers; and was not
related to the use of consultation tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was not
supported.
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior
managers, and customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, hypothesis 3c was not
tested. As illustrated in Table 7 stakeholder dependence was negatively related to the use of
exchange tactics with subordinate B (r = -.22; p < .05); was not related to the use of exchange
tactics with peers; and was not related to the use of exchange tactics with customers. Therefore,
hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior
managers, and customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, hypothesis 4c was not

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tested. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of ingratiation
tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of ingratiation tactics with peers; and was not
related to the use of ingratiation tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 4 was not
supported.
Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics with subordinates, peers,
senior managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not
related to the use of inspirational appeals tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of
inspirational appeals tactics with peers; was not related to the use of inspirational appeals tactics
with senior managers; and was not related to the use of inspirational appeals tactics with
customers. Therefore, hypothesis 5 was not supported.
Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior
managers, and customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, hypothesis 6c was not
tested. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of personal
appeals tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of personal appeals tactics with
peers; and was not related to the use of personal appeals tactics with customers. Therefore,
hypothesis 6 was not supported.
Hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 7a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of apprising influence tactics with subordinates, peers, and senior
managers whereas stakeholder dependence would be negatively related to the use of apprising
influence tactics with customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, hypothesis 7c
was not tested. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of

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apprising tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of apprising tactics with peers; and
was not related to the use of apprising tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 7 was not
supported.
Hypothesis 8. Hypothesis 8a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics with subordinates, peers,
senior managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not
related to the use of rational persuasion tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of
rational persuasion tactics with peers; was not related to the use of rational persuasion tactics
with senior managers; and was not related to the use of rational persuasion tactics with
customers. Therefore, hypothesis 8 was not supported.
Hypothesis 9. Hypothesis 9a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
negatively related to the use of coalition influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior
managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to
the use of coalition tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of coalition tactics with
peers; was not related to the use of coalition tactics with senior managers; and was not related to
the use of coalition tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 9 was not supported.
Hypothesis 10. Hypothesis 10a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics with subordinates and peers and
negatively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics with senior managers and
customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of
legitimating tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of legitimating tactics with
peers; was negatively related to the use of legitimating tactics with senior managers (r = -.23; p <

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.05); and was not related to the use of legitimating tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis
10 was partially supported.
Hypothesis 11. Hypothesis 11a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be
positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior
managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was negatively
related to the use of pressure tactics with subordinate C (r = -.20; p < .05); was positively related
to the use of pressure tactics with peer D (r = .50; p < .05); was negatively related to the use of
pressure tactics with senior managers (r = -.22; p < .05); and was not related to the use of
pressure tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 11 was partially supported.
Hypotheses 12-15 (Political Skill Moderation)
The final four hypotheses (hypotheses 12-15) predicted that political skill would
moderate the relationship between the use of influence tactics and leader outcomes. HLM results
are described below.
Hypothesis 12
Hypothesis 12 predicted that the positive relationship between the leader's use of soft and
rational influence tactics and leader task performance would be moderated by political skill such
that the positive relationship would be more positive for leaders high in political skill.
Hypothesis 12a (Subordinate stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 8, and with regard
to subordinate stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant
(γ' = .03, ns). Figure 2 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 9, the consultation-political skill interaction term was negative and
significant (γ' = -.20, p < .05). Figure 3 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below

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the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and
political skill and suggests that the consultation-leader task performance relationship is weaker
when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
As illustrated in Table 10, the exchange-political skill interaction term was negative and
significant (γ' = -.27, p < .05). Figure 4 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below
the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and
political skill and suggests that the exchange-leader task performance relationship is weaker
when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
As illustrated in Table 11, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.15, ns). Figure 5 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 12, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was
non-significant (γ' = -.19, ns). Figure 6 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below
the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal
and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 13, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .04, ns). Figure 7 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and
political skill.
As illustrated in Table 14, the apprising-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .00, ns). Figure 8 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the

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centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 15, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant. Figure 9 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 12a was not supported.
Hypothesis 12b (Peer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 16, and with regard to peer
stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = -.10, ns).
Figure 10 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the
high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 17, the consultation-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.02, ns). Figure 11 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 18, the exchange-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.05, ns). Figure 12 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 19, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .04, ns). Figure 13 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political
skill.

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As illustrated in Table 20, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was
non-significant (γ' = -.10, ns). Figure 14 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below
the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal
and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 21, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.15, ns). Figure 15 lustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and
political skill.
As illustrated in Table 22, the apprising-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.02, ns). Figure 16 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 23 the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.11, ns). Figure 17 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 12b was not supported.
Hypothesis 12c (Senior manager stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 24, the
consultation-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = .21, ns). Figure 18 illustrates
this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 25, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was
non-significant (γ' = .07, ns). Figure 19 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below

84

the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal
and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 26, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .16, ns). Figure 20 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 12c was not supported.
Hypothesis 12d (Customer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 27, and with regard to
customer stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' =
-.14, ns). Figure 21 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 28, the consultation-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant. Figure 22 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 29, the exchange-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.07, ns). Figure 23 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 30, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was negative
and significant (γ' = -.26, p < .05). Figure 24 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD
below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation
and political skill and suggests that the ingratiation-leader task performance relationship is
weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it islower.

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As illustrated in Table 31, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was
non-significant (γ' = -.12, ns). Figure 25 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below
the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal
and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 32, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.02, ns). Figure 26 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and
political skill.
As illustrated in Table 33, the apprising-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.08, ns). Figure 27 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 34 the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.11, ns). Figure 28 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 12d was not supported.
To summarize, hypothesis 12 received no support. In fact, there were two models with
the subordinate stakeholders where high levels of political skill weakened the relationship
between use of an influence tactic and task performance (i.e., consultation, exchange). Similarly,
there was one model with customer stakeholders where high levels of political skill weakened
the relationship between influence tactics and task performance (i.e., ingratiation). These
findings contradicted the hypothesized effects.

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Hypothesis 13
Hypothesis 13 predicted that the negative relationship between a leader's use of hard
influence tactics and leader task performance would be moderated by political skill such that the
negative relationship would be less negative for leaders high in political skill.
Hypothesis 13a (Subordinate stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 35, the coalition
tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = -.04, ns). Figure 29 illustrates this
interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 36, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was
negative and significant (γ' = -.23, p < .05). Figure 30 illustrates this interaction based on the low
(1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of
legitimating tactics and political skill and suggests that the legitimating tactics-leader task
performance relationship is stronger when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
As illustrated in Table 37, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.14, ns). Figure 31 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 13a was not supported.
Hypothesis 13b (Peer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 38, the coalition tacticspolitical skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = -.18, ns). Figure 32 illustrates this
interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.

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As illustrated in Table 39, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.07, ns). Figure 33 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and
political skill.
As illustrated in Table 40, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.41, ns). Figure 34 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 13b was not supported.
Hypothesis 13c (Senior manager stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 41, the coalition
tactics-political skill interaction term was non- significant. Figure 35 illustrates this interaction
based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean)
values of coalition tactics and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 42, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .03, ns). Figure 36 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and
political skill.
As illustrated in Table 43, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .29, ns). Figure 37 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 13c was not supported.

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Hypothesis 13d (Customer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 44, the coalition
tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = .09, ns). Figure 38 illustrates this
interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 45, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.14, ns). Figure 39 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and
political skill.
As illustrated in Table 46, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .43, ns). Figure 40 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 13d was not supported.
To summarize, hypothesis 13 was not supported. Further, the legitimating-political skill
model with subordinate stakeholders indicated that high levels of political skill strengthened the
negative relationship between influence tactics and task performance. This finding contradicted
the hypothesized effect.
Hypothesis 14
Hypothesis 14 predicted that the positive relationship between the leader's use of soft and
rational influence tactics and leader viability would be moderated by political skill such that the
relationship would be more positive for leaders high in political skill.
Hypothesis 14a (Subordinate stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 47, and with regard
to subordinate stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant

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(γ' = -.02, ns). Figure 41 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 48, the consultation-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.11, ns). Figure 42 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 49, the exchange-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.15, ns). Figure 43 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 50, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.07, ns). Figure 44 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 51, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was
non-significant (γ' = -.08, ns). Figure 45 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below
the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal
and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 52, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .02, ns). Figure 46 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and
political skill.

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As illustrated in Table 53, the apprising-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .05, ns). Figure 47 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 54, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.14, ns). Figure 48 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 14a was not supported.
Hypothesis 14b (Peer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 55, and with regard to peer
stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = -.12, ns).
Figure 49 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the
high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 56, the consultation-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' =-.02, ns). Figure 50 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 57, the exchange-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.13, ns). Figure 51 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 58, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .05, ns). Figure 52 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the

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centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 59, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was
non-significant (γ' = -.13, ns). Figure 53 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below
the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal
and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 60, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant. Figure 54 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 61, the apprising-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.02, ns). Figure 55 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 62, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.11, ns). Figure 56 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 14b was not supported.
Hypothesis 14c (Senior manager stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 63, the
consultation-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = .17, ns). Figure 57 illustrates
this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.

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As illustrated in Table 64, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was
non-significant (γ' = .20, ns). Figure 58 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below
the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal
and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 65, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .24, ns). Figure 59 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 14c was not supported.
Hypothesis 14d (Customer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 66, and with regard to
senior manager stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was negative and
significant (γ' = -.16, p < .05). Figure 60 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below
the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and
political skill and suggests that the collaboration-leader viability relationship is weaker when
political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
As illustrated in Table 67, the consultation-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant. Figure 61 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 68 the exchange-political skill interaction term was negative and
significant (γ' = -.17, p < .05). Figure 62 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below
the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and
political skill and suggests that the exchange-leader viability relationship is weaker when
political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

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As illustrated in Table 69, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was negative
and significant (γ' = -.28, p < .01). Figure 63 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD
below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation
and political skill and suggests that the ingratiation-leader viability relationship is weaker when
political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
As illustrated in Table 70, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was
negative and significant (γ' = -.24, p < .05). Figure 64 illustrates this interaction based on the low
(1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of
inspirational appeal and political skill and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader viability
relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
As illustrated in Table 71, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.02, ns). Figure 65 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and
political skill.
As illustrated in Table 72, the apprising-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.15, ns). Figure 66 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political
skill.
As illustrated in Table 73, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was
negative and significant (γ' = -.23, p < .05). Figure 67 illustrates this interaction based on the low
(1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational
persuasion and political skill and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader viability
relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

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Therefore, hypothesis 14d was not supported.
To summarize, hypothesis 14 received no support. Further, in five of the models with
customer stakeholders, high levels of political skill weakened the relationship between the use of
an influence tactic and viability. This occurred with collaboration, exchange, ingratiation,
inspirational appeal, and rational persuasion influence tactics.
Hypothesis 15
Hypothesis 15 predicted that the negative relationship between a leader's use of hard
influence tactics and leader viability would be moderated by political skill such that the negative
relationship would be less negative for leaders high in political skill.
Hypothesis 15a (Subordinate stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 74, the coalition
tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = -.04, ns). Figure 68 illustrates this
interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 75, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was
negative and significant (γ' = -.23, p < .05). Figure 69 illustrates this interaction based on the low
(1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of
legitimating tactics and political skill and suggests that the legitimating tactics-leader viability
relationship is stronger when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
As illustrated in Table 76, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.21, ns). Figure 70 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 15a was not supported.

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Hypothesis 15b (Peer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 77, the coalition tacticspolitical skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = -.18, ns). Figure 71 illustrates this
interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 78, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.07, ns). Figure 72 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and
political skill.
As illustrated in Table 79, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.26, ns). Figure 73 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 15b was not supported.
Hypothesis 15c (Senior manager stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 80, the coalition
tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = -.01, ns). Figure 74 illustrates this
interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 81 the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .06, ns). Figure 75 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and
political skill.
As illustrated in Table 82, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = .42, ns). Figure 76 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the

96

centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 15c was not supported.
Hypothesis 15d (Customer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 83, the coalition
tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant (γ' = -.02, ns). Figure 77 illustrates this
interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.
As illustrated in Table 84, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was
negative and significant (γ' = -.24, p < .05). Figure 78 illustrates this interaction based on the low
(1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of
legitimating tactics and political skill and suggests that the legitimating tactics-leader viability
relationship is stronger when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
As illustrated in Table 85, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was nonsignificant (γ' = -.24, ns). Figure 79 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and
political skill.
Therefore, hypothesis 15d was not supported.
To summarize, hypothesis 15 received no support. In fact, legitimating-political skill
interaction with subordinate and customer stakeholders was negative and significant. This
indicates that the legitimating tactics-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is
higher as opposed to when it is lower. These findings contradicted the hypothesized effects.

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Variance analysis
A summary of the variance analyses for the HLM analysis above is provided in Tables
86-89. Specifically, in the first HLM model (i.e., level 1 variables were the subordinates and
level 2 variables were the leaders), the proportion of within-leader variance for task performance
was 31.67 percent whereas the proportion of within-leader variance for viability was 26.19
percent (see Table 86). In the second HLM model (i.e., level 1 variables were the peers and level
2 variables were the leaders), the proportion of within-leader variance for task performance was
28.16 percent whereas the proportion of within-leader variance for viability was 23.23 percent
(see Table 87). In the third HLM model (i.e., level 1 variables were the leaders and level 2
variables were the senior managers), the proportion of within-senior manager variance for task
performance was 2.59 percent whereas the proportion of within-senior manager variance for
viability was .01 percent (see Table 88). In the fourth HLM model (i.e., level 1 variables were
the customers and level 2 variables were the leaders), the proportion of within-leader variance
for task performance was 15.03 percent whereas the proportion of within-leader variance for
viability was 22.82 percent (see Table 89).

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Supplemental Analyses
The results above demonstrate very limited support for the hypotheses in this study.
Therefore, the following supplemental analyses were conducted to examine the data in greater
detail.
Stakeholder Dependence Supplemental Analyses
The hypotheses in this section suggested that leader dependence would be related to
specific influence tactics. This was tested by examining the correlations between the leader
ratings of dependence on specific stakeholders and the stakeholder ratings of influence tactics.
Whereas Yukl (1999) describes influence as a dyadic process, leaders may use influence
differently when they have a strong level of dependence across a stakeholder group. If this is the
case, the average level of leader dependence could be explored to determine if it is related to the
leader's influence attempts. Therefore, I examined the leader's average ratings of dependence
across stakeholder groups (i.e., subordinate average, peer average, and customer average) to
determine if this rating is related to influence tactics.
Another possible explanation for the findings is that the survey ratings of dependence do
not take into account the dependence that a stakeholder may have on the leader. That is, it may
be the case that influence tactics are related to the difference in dependence between leaders and
stakeholders rather than just the leader's rating of dependence. De Jong et al. (2007) describe this
as individuals who are "asymmetrically task dependent," and they suggest that asymmetrical task
dependency exists "[w]hen A's task dependence on B is greater or less than B's task dependence
on A" (p. 1626). Given that I have ratings of task dependence on the leader provided by
subordinates and peers, I explored this alternative explanation in two ways. First, I examined the
joint perceptions of the leaders' average ratings of dependence for the subordinate and peer
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stakeholder groups and stakeholder groups' average ratings of leader dependence (i.e.,
subordinate average difference task dependence and peer average difference task dependence).
Second, I examined dyadic perceptions in dependence. That is, I examined the differences in
joint perceptions of dependence from leader's ratings of specific subordinates and peers.
Prior research on difference ratings (i.e., congruence) has noted numerous problems with
algebraic difference indices. These problems include unambiguous interpretation, confounding
of component effects, and assigning variance beyond that associated with the component
variables (Edwards, 1994). Therefore, I conducted the congruence analyses following the
recommendation of Edwards (1994) using hierarchical regression and examining each
dependence rating as a separate predictor. Further, I included the interaction term of the
dependence variables and the quadratic terms of the dependence variables to evaluate the model.
Including the interaction term allows for an examination of whether the joint perceptions of
dependence have "explanatory power beyond that of their individual scales" whereas the
quadratic terms establish that higher order (i.e., curvilinear) relationships do not explain the
relationships in the model (Edwards, 1994; Dabos & Rousseau, 2004, p. 62).
Finally, I calculated interrater reliability estimates (ICC(1) and ICC(2) values) for all
study variables where there were multiple respondents (i.e., subordinate stakeholder responses,
peer stakeholder responses, and customer stakeholder responses) to determine if there was
justification to aggregate to the leader level (see Table 90). The ICC(1) values generally support
aggregation whereas the ICC(2) estimates are low. Given the small average group size is likely
to be attenuating the ICC(2) estimates (Bliese, 1998), I aggregated stakeholder data by group to
the leader level. Then, I conducted analyses to examine the independent effects of a specific
influence tactic by controlling for all other influence tactics.

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The results of these analyses are described below.
Stakeholder Dependence Supplemental Results
Scale means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the variables are provided in
preceding Tables 12 (leader-subordinate variables), 13 (leader-peer variables), and 14 (leadercustomer variables).
Leader-subordinate supplemental results. As illustrated in Table 12, the average of
leader task dependence across all subordinates was not related to influence tactic use.
As illustrated in Tables 99-109, the joint perceptions of the leaders' and subordinates'
average ratings of dependence had different effects vis-à-vis the influence tactics. Joint ratings of
dependence were related positively to the use of collaboration (Table 99) and consultation (Table
100) tactics yet the interaction term was non-significant. Leader ratings of dependence were
related positively to the use of rational persuasion (Table 106) and legitimating (Table 108)
tactics yet subordinate ratings and the interaction term were non-significant. Subordinate ratings
of dependence were related positively to ingratiation (Table 102), inspirational appeal (Table
103), and apprising tactics (Table 105) yet leader ratings and the interaction term were nonsignificant. The non-significant interaction terms indicate that joint perceptions of dependence do
not provide explanatory power above that of the individual scales. Finally, a curvilinear effect
was found for leader ratings of dependence and personal appeals tactics (Table 104) whereas no
effects were found for joint ratings of dependence on exchange (Table 101), coalition (Table
107), and pressure influence tactics (Table 109).
As illustrated in Tables 110-120, the dyadic perceptions of the leader-subordinate
dependence analysis yielded quite different results. Dyadic ratings of dependence were related
positively to the use of collaboration tactics (Table 110) yet the interaction term was non-

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significant. Subordinate ratings of dependence were related positively to the use of inspirational
appeal (Table 114), apprising (Table 116), and rational persuasion (Table 117) tactics yet leader
ratings and the interaction term were non-significant. Leader ratings of dependence were related
negatively to the use of personal appeals (Table 115) and pressure (Table 116) tactics yet the
subordinate ratings and interaction terms were non-significant. Here, again, the non-significant
interaction terms indicate that dyadic perceptions of dependence do not provide explanatory
power above that of the individual scales. The only significant interaction term occurred with
dyadic ratings of dependence and coalition tactics (Table 118). Interestingly, curvilinear
relationships were found for leader ratings of dependence and the use of consultation (Table
111), exchange (Table 112), ingratiation (Table 113), and legitimating (Table 119) tactics.
Leader-peer supplemental results. As illustrated in Table 13, the average of leader task
dependence across all peers was not related to influence tactic use.
As illustrated in Tables 121-131, the joint perceptions of the leaders' and peers' average
ratings of dependence and the use of influence tactics demonstrated similar effects across the
influence tactics. Specifically, average peer ratings were related positively to the use of
collaboration (Table 121), consultation (Table 122), ingratiation (Table 124), inspirational appeal
(Table 125), personal appeals (Table 126), apprising (Table 127), and pressure (Table 131)
tactics yet leader ratings and the interaction terms were non-significant. A curvilinear
relationship was found for the relationship between peer average dependence and exchange
tactics (Table 123), and no effects were found for joint ratings of dependence on rational
persuasion (Table 128), coalition (Table 129), and legitimating (Table 130) tactics.
As illustrated in Tables 132-142, the dyadic perceptions of leaders' and peers' ratings of
dependence and the use of influence tactics were similar to the joint perceptions of the average

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ratings. Specifically, peer ratings of dependence were related to the use of nine influence tactics
including: collaboration (Table 132), consultation (Table 133), ingratiation (Table 135),
inspirational appeal (Table 136), apprising (Table 138), rational persuasion (Table 139), coalition
(Table 140), legitimating (Table 141) and pressure (Table 142) tactics. Leader ratings of
dependence were negatively related to the use of exchange tactics (Table 134) and personal
appeals (Table 137) tactics. The non-significant interaction terms indicate that the dyadic
perceptions of dependence do not provide explanatory power above that of the individual scales.
Independent effects of influence tactics supplemental results. As illustrated in Tables
143-153, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine the independent effects of
the independent variables. As illustrated in Table 143, after controlling for the other influence
tactics, stakeholder dependence was not related to collaboration influence tactics in subordinates,
peers, nor in customers. The results were similar for consultation (Table 144), exchange (Table
145), ingratiation (Table 146), inspirational appeal (Table 147), personal appeals (Table 148),
apprising (Table 149), rational persuasion (Table 150), coalition (Table 151), and legitimating
(Table 152) tactics. With regard to pressure tactics (Table 153), stakeholder dependence was
related negatively to pressure tactics after controlling for the other tactics only for the model
including senior managers.
Moderation Supplemental Analyses
The hypotheses in this section suggested that political skill would moderate the
relationship between a leader's use of influence tactics and two outcomes: task performance and
viability. Political skill was selected as the moderator because of the theoretical (Ferris et al.,
2007) and empirical (Semadar et al., 2006) support for this social effectiveness construct.
Unfortunately, there was no support for these hypotheses. Therefore, I examined three additional

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moderators to determine if they would impact the relationship between influence tactics and
outcomes. These variables included leader-rated self-monitoring, subordinate-rated relationship
quality, and subordinate-rated leader political skill.
Before I began the moderation supplemental analyses, I conducted a follow-up power
analysis to determine the number of level 1 respondents necessary to test the hypotheses. Using
the study's data and the Optimal Design software, I input the variance at level 2 for the four
leader-stakeholder multilevel models (i.e., subordinate-leader, peer-leader, leader-senior
manager, and customer-leader – see values in Tables 86-89); an alpha value of .05; the number
of individuals in level 2; the effect sizes; and the range of individuals in each level 1 model. To
achieve a statistical power of .80, the number of subordinate respondents per leader necessary for
the subordinate-leader HLM model was 3.66-3.98 (Raudenbush, Spybrook, Congdon, Liu, &
Martinez, 2011). The number of peer respondents per leader for the peer-leader HLM model was
3.70-4.00. The number of customer respondents per leader for the customer-leader HLM model
was 3.72-4.00. The number of leader respondents per senior manager for the leader-senior
manager model was 200. Given the number of respondents per leader from my study, I would
only be able to detect effects in the subordinate-leader stakeholder relationship. Therefore, the
supplemental HLM analyses for the moderation effects are conducted using only the
subordinate-leader data. Consistent with the stakeholder dependence supplemental results, only
significant relationships are presented in the supplemental tables and figures. Also, for ease of
presentation, only the full model HLM results are presented.
In addition to the HLM analyses, I conducted hierarchical regression analyses using the
aggregated data (described above) to examine the independent effects of each influence tactic in

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the presence of the other tactics. That is, I controlled for the effect of influence tactics by
entering them in a preceding step in the regression analyses.
The results of these analyses are described below.
Moderation Supplemental Results
Self-monitoring supplemental results. The first moderating effect that I examined was
that of influence tactics and leader self-monitoring on subordinate ratings of task performance
and viability. As illustrated in Table 101, there were three significant interaction terms on
subordinate ratings of task performance (and no significant interaction terms on subordinate
ratings of viability).
The rational persuasion-self-monitoring interaction term was negative and significant (γ'
= -.34, p < .01). Figure 80 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and selfmonitoring and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader task performance relationship is
weaker when self-monitoring is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The legitimating-self-monitoring interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.28,
p < .01). Figure 81 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and self-monitoring and
suggests that the legitimating-leader task performance relationship is weaker when selfmonitoring is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The pressure-self-monitoring interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.35, p <
.01). Figure 82 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and
the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and self-monitoring and suggests

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that the legitimating-leader task performance relationship is weaker when self-monitoring is
higher as opposed to when it is lower.
Relationship quality supplemental results. The second moderating effect that I
examined was that of influence tactics and subordinate-rated relationship quality on subordinate
ratings of task performance and viability. As illustrated in Table 102, there were eight significant
interaction terms on subordinate ratings of task performance.
The collaboration-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .09, p < .05). Figure 83 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and relationship
quality and suggests that the collaboration-leader task performance relationship is weaker when
relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The consultation-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .11, p < .05). Figure 84 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and relationship
quality and suggests that the consultation-leader task performance relationship is weaker when
relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The ingratiation-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .12, p < .01). Figure 85 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and relationship
quality and suggests that the ingratiation-leader task performance relationship is weaker when
relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The inspirational appeal-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant
(γ' = -.09, p < .01). Figure 86 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the

106

centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and
relationship quality and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader task performance
relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The apprising-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.10,
p < .01). Figure 87 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and relationship quality and
suggests that the apprising-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship
quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The rational persuasion-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant
(γ' = -.08, p < .05). Figure 88 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and
relationship quality and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader task performance
relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The coalition-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.11,
p < .05). Figure 89 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition and relationship quality and
suggests that the coalition-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship
quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The legitimating-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .09, p < .05). Figure 90 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and relationship
quality and suggests that the legitimating-leader task performance relationship is weaker when
relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

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As illustrated in Table 103, there were nine significant interaction terms on subordinate
ratings of viability.
The collaboration-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .12, p < .01). Figure 91 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and relationship
quality and suggests that the collaboration-leader viability relationship is weaker when
relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The consultation-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .15, p < .01). Figure 92 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and relationship
quality and suggests that the consultation-leader viability relationship is weaker when
relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The exchange-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.12,
p < .01). Figure 93 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and relationship quality and
suggests that the exchange-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is
higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The ingratiation-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .16, p < .01). Figure 94 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and relationship
quality and suggests that the ingratiation-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship
quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

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The inspirational appeal-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant
(γ' = -.18, p < .01). Figure 95 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and
relationship quality and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader viability relationship is
weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The apprising-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.15,
p < .01). Figure 96 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and relationship quality and
suggests that the apprising-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is
higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The rational persuasion-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant
(γ' = -.19, p < .01). Figure 97 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the
centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and
relationship quality and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader viability relationship is
weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The coalition-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.11,
p < .05). Figure 98 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition and relationship quality and
suggests that the coalition-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is
higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The legitimating-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .09, p < .01). Figure 99 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and relationship

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quality and suggests that the legitimating-leader viability relationship is weaker when
relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
Subordinate-rated political skill supplemental results. The final moderating effect that
I examined was that of influence tactics and subordinate-rated political skill on subordinate
ratings of task performance and viability. As illustrated in Table 104, there were six significant
interaction terms on subordinate ratings of task performance.
The collaboration-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.10, p
< .01). Figure 100 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill and
suggests that the collaboration-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political
skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The ingratiation-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.07, p <
.05). Figure 101 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and
the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill and suggests
that the ingratiation-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher
as opposed to when it is lower.
The inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' =
-.10, p < .01). Figure 102 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political
skill and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader task performance relationship is weaker
when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The apprising-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.10, p <
.01). Figure 103 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and

110

the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political skill and suggests that
the apprising-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as
opposed to when it is lower.
The rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .20, p < .01). Figure 104 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political
skill and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader task performance relationship is weaker
when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The legitimating-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.11, p
< .01). Figure 105 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and political skill and
suggests that the legitimating-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill
is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
As illustrated in Table 105, there were seven significant interaction terms on subordinate
ratings of viability.
The collaboration-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.13, p
< .01). Figure 106 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill and
suggests that the collaboration-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is
higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The consultation-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.12, p
< .01). Figure 107 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill and

111

suggests that the consultation-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher
as opposed to when it is lower.
The ingratiation-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.12, p <
.01). Figure 108 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and
the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill and suggests
that the ingratiation-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as
opposed to when it is lower.
The inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' =
-.15, p < .01). Figure 109 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political
skill and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader viability relationship is weaker when
political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.
The apprising-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.15, p <
.01). Figure 110 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and
the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political skill and suggests that
the apprising-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to
when it is lower.
The rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = .20, p < .01). Figure 111 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered
mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political
skill and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader viability relationship is weaker when
political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

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The legitimating-political skill interaction term was negative and significant (γ' = -.11, p
< .01). Figure 112 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and political skill and
suggests that the legitimating-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher
as opposed to when it is lower.
Independent effects of influence tactics in moderation analyses supplemental results.
Finally, I examined the independent effects of the influence tactics using hierarchical regression
analyses. These analyses were conducted across all stakeholder groups, and the full model results
are presented. Tables 159-169 summarize the results for the task performance outcomes, and
none of the interaction terms with leader political skill and influence tactics are significant after
controlling for demographic variables and influence tactics. Tables 170-180 summarize the
results for viability outcomes, and only two models have significant interaction terms. First, the
interaction between leader political skill and customer-rated collaboration is negative and
significant (β = -.36, p < .05) after controlling for demographic variables and other influence
tactics. Figure 113 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean)
and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill and
suggests that the collaboration-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is
higher as opposed to when it is lower. Second, the interaction between leader political skill and
subordinate-rated rational persuasion is positive and significant (β = .15, p < .05) after
controlling for demographic variables the other influence tactics. Figure 114 illustrates this
interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the
centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill and suggests that the rational

113

persuasion-leader viability relationship is stronger when relationship quality is higher as opposed
to when it is lower.

114

Discussion
This study attempted to make three primary contributions to the literature on leader
influence tactics. First, stakeholder dependence was examined as an antecedent to a leader’s
selection of influence tactics. Next, a leader's performance and viability was assessed from four
stakeholder groups – subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. Third, the leader's
political skill was examined as a moderator of the relationship between influence tactics and
performance outcomes. In the discussion that follows, I summarize the findings; discuss the
theoretical implications; describe the study's strengths and limitations; and suggest opportunities
for future research.
Summary of Findings
The first set of hypotheses suggested that stakeholder dependence would be related to the
use of influence tactics. The results were almost wholly unsupported. In fact, only hypothesis
10c was supported in the initial analysis. Therefore, supplemental analyses were conducted to
further explore the data. However, again, there was limited support for the dependence
hypotheses.
A second aim of the study was to examine the extent to which political skill moderated
the relationship between a leader’s use of influence tactics and the leader’s task performance and
viability. The results for these hypotheses were unsupported. Further, there were several
instances where political skill either weakened the positive relationship between influence tactics
and outcomes or strengthened the negative relationship between influence tactics and outcomes.
The supplemental HLM analyses found similar results. Self-monitoring weakened the
relationships between rational persuasion, legitimating, and pressure influence tactics and task
performance. Further, relationship quality and subordinate-rated political skill all produced

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negative interaction terms between the influence tactics and performance outcomes. These
findings are discussed in greater detail below in the limitations section.
Theoretical Implications
These findings raise interesting theoretical questions. Drawing on power-dependence
theory (Emerson, 1962), I argued that leaders would engage in influence behaviors based on their
dependencies with stakeholders to manage these relationships and accomplish their task work.
The initial hypothesis tests did not support these arguments; however, there was considerable
empirical support when looking at asymmetric task dependence through the difference score
variables with the subordinate and peer stakeholders. Asymmetric task dependence and a related
concept, power asymmetry, has been explored primarily in team settings (de Jong et al., 2007;
Van der Vegt, de Jong, Bunderson, & Molleman, 2010). These studies have attempted to
disentangle task interdependence from asymmetric task dependence in teams and to examine its
impact on helping behaviors, trust, learning, and performance. In a team context, members are
often buffered from external forces, and they interact most often with other team members for
accomplishing their task work. Leaders, on the other hand, are often in boundary spanning roles.
They may be team leaders, but they may also be involved in the work of other leaders and on
other teams – thereby increasing the amount of task dependency that they have on others within
an organization. Given that there has been very limited research to date on leader task
dependence, the findings in this study extend power-dependence theory by integrating the
concept of asymmetric task dependence.
Another theoretical contribution of the study was in testing part of Schneider's (2002)
stakeholder model of organizational leadership. Schneider (2002) posits that leaders need the
capacity to work with a variety of stakeholders; yet the model does not describe the specific

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behaviors (beyond broad cognitive, social, and behavioral attributes) that may be most effective
with each stakeholder group. By integrating the literature on leader influence tactics, I explored
how these behaviors were related to leader performance. The results suggest strong main effects
between several types of influence tactics – notably, collaboration, consultation, inspirational
appeal, and rational persuasion – and leader task performance. These results also seem to support
the Leaderplex model proposed by Dennison, Hunt, and Dodge (1997). The Leaderplex model
suggests that organizational leaders need an effective behavioral repertoire. That is, they need to
be able to engage in a "broad portfolio of leadership roles" so that they "can perform the
appropriate leadership role for a given situation and meet the expectations of a variety of
stakeholders" (Dennison et al., 1997, p. 387). Further, leader self-monitoring was related to
leader performance by subordinate and peer stakeholders supporting the theory's propositions
related to the importance of leader social attributes. Therefore, these findings support part of the
stakeholder model of organizational leadership.
This study was among the first to integrate power-dependence theory with the vast
literature on leader influence tactics. As discussed in the introduction, there is considerable
support for the strong, positive relationships between influence tactics and a variety of
performance outcomes. In this study, numerous influence tactics were positively correlated with
task performance and viability by several of the stakeholder groups. This includes collaboration
(r = .25-.54, p < .01); consultation (r = .25-.54); exchange (r = .18-.21); ingratiation (r = .18.47); inspirational appeal (r = .18-.62); apprising (r = .17-.48); rational persuasion (r = .20-.49);
and legitimating (r = .22-.28) tactics. Only pressure tactics were negatively correlated with task
performance and viability (r = -.30 to -.34) and only by subordinate stakeholders. To summarize,
with the exception of the positive relationship between legitimating and the performance

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outcomes, the findings in this study confirm the established relationships between influence
tactics and task performance, and the relationships between influence tactics and viability extend
research in this domain.
Previous research on influence tactics has also identified four core tactics including
collaboration, consultation, inspirational appeal, and rational persuasion (Yukl et al., 2008).
Whereas there is not a single overarching theory for the set of influence tactics; there are strong
theories that form the basis for these four tactics. For example, collaboration tactics are based on
self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1986) in that the leader can increase the target's motivation to
complete the request because the target perceives that he or she will be successful by offering to
collaborate (Yukl et al., 2005). Consultation tactics have been linked to participative
management theory as seeking the advice of the target is also likely to increase the target's
motivation to respond to influence affirmatively (Falbe & Yukl, 1992). Inspirational appeal
tactics are often linked to the inspirational motivation dimension of transformational leadership
because the influence request inspires targets and provides meaning for the request (Sparrowe et
al., 2006). Finally, rational persuasion is based in expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) in that the
target's commitment to the request increases because the target is convinced that his or her
actions will have the intended outcomes (Yukl et al., 2005). These core tactics have been most
related to managerial effectiveness in previous research, and the findings in this study also
confirm the theories that support these strong relationships.
Practical Implications
The results of this study have several practical implications for leadership in
organizations as well. First, Ployhart (2005) has discussed the staffing challenges that
organizations in the 21st century face, in part, because of the greater demands in knowledge-

118

based work. These leadership demands include interacting with multiple stakeholders and
managing the dependencies in working relationships. Therefore, the role of selecting leaders with
the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities, or the aptitude to develop these KSAs, is
important. Whereas research has addressed the importance of personality tests in selection (Ones,
Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007), other scholars have advocated developing custom
selection tests specifically for jobs in organizations (Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck,
Murphy, & Schmitt, 2007). The results of this study could be used to develop behavioral
interview questions that seek information about how leaders respond to dependencies across
stakeholder groups and how they might attempt to influence them.
Second, the results emphasize the increased importance of influence in leadership roles in
knowledge era leadership positions. Further, the data reinforces the strong relationships between
four influence tactics – collaboration, consultation, inspirational appeal, and rational persuasion –
and leader task performance. Therefore, organizations can use the information for formal
leadership training and development related to leadership influence. A formal leadership
development intervention would include removing the leaders from their daily responsibilities to
learn about the influence tactics and how they can be used in their day-to-day work. The leaders
would then have the opportunity to practice these behaviors in the training setting before
returning to their jobs. To maximize the transfer of this training, the organization should increase
the motivation of the participants (Blume, Ford, Baldwin, & Huang, 2009) by connecting the
training to the leader's performance evaluation and by measuring the effect of the training from
the perspective of multiple stakeholders (Taylor, Russ-Eft, & Taylor, 2009).
Whereas the practical implications above are directly relevant to leaders within
organizations, senior managers may also use the data for leadership coaching. Leadership

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coaching is the dyadic relationship between a leader and a coach that is defined by the goal of
making the leader more effective in his or her role (Ely, Boyce, Nelson, Zaccaro, HernezBroome, & Whyman, 2010). There are several key features that distinguish leadership coaching
from traditional leadership development programs (described above). These include a focus on
the unique needs of individual leaders, and the need for coaches to have strong, communication,
assessment and feedback, and goal setting skills (Ely et al., 2010). Therefore, coaching has the
dual benefit of providing focused developmental information to the leader as well as providing
opportunities for internal senior managers/coaches to enhancing their professional capabilities.
The data from this study provides a multi-stakeholder view of the leader's influence style, and it
provides preliminary evidence of the influence tactics most related to leadership effectiveness by
different stakeholders groups. Coaches can use this information to discuss how the leaders can
overcome dependencies in the their working relationships, and ultimately, improve their
performance in their roles.
Strengths and Limitations
This study had several noteworthy strengths. First, as organizations are moving away
from hierarchical structures (Yukl et al., 2005), leaders are growing more dependent on others
both within and outside of the organization to accomplish their task work. This study was among
the first to examine the leader-stakeholder dependency relationship and how it impacts leader
behaviors. Second, the multilevel design of the study with a multi-stakeholder perspective on
leader influence tactics highlights the varying perspectives that individuals with whom the
leaders regularly interact view their influence tactic use. Further, there were high response rates
for all of the internal stakeholder groups, and all stakeholder groups had fairly long-tenured
working relationships with the leaders. Finally, this study was among the first to examine how

120

leaders attempt to influence external stakeholders thereby incorporating a broader perspective to
influence tactic research than in previous studies.
In addition to the strengths mentioned above, there are several limitations in the present
research related to the sample, the data, and the findings. Most notably, the hypothesized
relationships between influence tactics and performance outcomes as moderated by political skill
were completely unsupported. In fact, not only was there no support for the hypotheses, but the
significant effects were actually contrary to the hypotheses. That is, the influence tacticsperformance outcomes relationships were weaker when political skill was higher as opposed to
when it is lower. Further, the supplemental analyses found similar results when subordinate-rated
political skill, self-monitoring, and relationship quality were investigated.
The theory supporting political skill as a moderator explicitly suggests that an antecedent
to leader political behavior will be the power of the target (Ammeter, Douglas, Gardner,
Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2002). Ammeter and colleagues draw on the literature related to influence
tactics and impression management to argue that the relative power of the target will impact the
political behavior of the leader, and a growing body of research supports the positive impact of
leader political skill on many outcomes. Therefore, given the contrary results in this study, there
are at least two possible explanations for this finding. First, there could be something unique
about the leaders or context of this study that caused the results to be negative. In support of this,
none of the correlations between leader-rated political skill and task performance or viability
were significant by any of the stakeholder groups. In previous research, Semadar et al. (2006)
compared political skill and self-monitoring and found that political skill was the strongest
predictor of managerial job performance. Further, self-monitoring was not related to job
performance in their data. However, self-monitoring was related to the leader task performance

121

and viability as rated by subordinates (r = .32, p < .01, and r = .23, p < .05, respectively) and
peers (r = .25, p < .05, and r = .21, p < .05, respectively) in this study. In addition, the
relationship between leader and subordinate ratings of the leader's political skill was nonsignificant (r = .19, ns). Therefore, leaders in this sample may not be able to accurately selfassess their level of political skill, or the ratings may be inflated due to social desirability bias. It
is possible, then, that the data captured in this study are unique to this context and have limited
generalizability.
A second alternative explanation is that the theory (and the data here) fails to capture the
nuances in the interaction between influence and political skill that impact performance. Upon
further investigation of the interaction figures, it is clear that high levels of political skill and
influence tactics are important for task performance and viability. In fact, in all of the figures,
high political skill and influence tactics, plotted at 1 SD above the centered mean, result in higher
ratings of task performance and viability. Therefore, it is only beyond 1 SD of the centered mean
where high levels of political skill and influence tactics result in lower performance ratings than
low levels of political skill. This suggests that whereas political skill does not strengthen the
influence tactic-performance relationship, it also does not result in lower performance ratings
except at high levels of both influence tactics and political skill.
Another major limitation of the study is the low power for the peer, senior manager,
customer stakeholder groups. Whereas the study was designed to survey the appropriate number
of respondents per leader to be able to detect effects, the low number of average responses per
leader are problematic. When power is low, type II error rates increase. Aguinis (1995) noted
that this is particularly problematic when examining moderation effects, and it may "lead
researchers to erroneously dismiss theoretical models that include moderated relationships" (p.

122

1141). Given the lack of support for the moderation effects, another possible explanation is that
there was simply not enough power to detect those effects.
Three additional limitations with the data are worth noting. First, there were low internal
consistency reliabilities for the senior manager ratings of coalition and pressure tactics (α =.58
for both). This is likely due to the shortened scale administered to the senior managers. In fact,
both of the full scales demonstrated high internal consistency reliability values with the
subordinate, peer, and customer stakeholder groups. Second, there are legitimate common
methods bias concerns in the supplemental analyses (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff,
2003). Whereas the original design of the study included a cross-level moderator (leader-rated
political skill and subordinate-rated influence tactics), the supplemental analyses that included
ratings of relationship quality and subordinate-rated political skill contained substantive variables
that were all assessed by the subordinates. Third, the intercorrelations among the dependent
measures are high indicating the respondents were not likely differentiating between the
measures of task performance and viability.
Finally, there were also limitations related to the sample. First, participants in the study
were not randomly selected from a population. In fact, they were all part of one organization, and
they were strongly encouraged to participate by the top executives within the organization. The
focal leaders were branch managers of a mid-sized bank with a diverse set of formal job
responsibilities that are likely consistent with other mid-level managers at organizations in other
industries. However, the findings may have limited generalizeability because of the nature of the
organization and the industry within which it operates.
One final issue related to limitations of the study is that, whereas the data from the
leaders and stakeholder groups were collected at different times, there was only one data

123

collection timeframe for each group. Therefore, the study cannot address how dependencies may
change over time. It could be expected that dependencies both within and between stakeholder
groups will change based on fluctuating job demands, transitions to new projects, and staff
turnover. Therefore, future research should address how leader behaviors change based on these
changing dependencies.
Opportunities for Future Research
Leaders continue to play a vital role in organizations; yet this role evolves as the demands
of organizational stakeholders increase. This is particularly challenging given the growing
dependency relationships. This study was among the first to explicitly examine stakeholder
dependence and how it impacts the manner in which leaders attempt to influence others. The
findings suggest preliminary support for the hypotheses, and they leave several unanswered
questions for future research.
First, whereas the focus of this study was on task dependence, the dependence that a
leader has on a stakeholder can take a variety of forms. As previously discussed (and is
illustrated in Table 1), there are at least seven types of dependencies. For example, leaders can
have structural dependence whereby they are linked through the organization's formal hierarchy
to specific stakeholders (Brass, 1984), or they could have skill/coordination dependence where
leaders rely on others who have specialized abilities (Bartol & Martin, 1988). In the cases of
different types of dependencies, leaders may use different forms of influence or different
combinations of influence tactics. Thus, there are two possible future research opportunities in
this area. First, the literature on types of dependencies is not well-integrated, and there is no
overarching theory which addresses leader dependencies on stakeholders. Therefore, one
possible area for future research would be to develop a theory of leader dependencies and to

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integrate theories which address the behaviors necessary to manage or overcome these
dependencies. Second, additional empirical studies could examine the types of leader
dependencies and how they impact leader behaviors and outcomes.
Farmer and Aguinis (2005) argue that dependence is a strong component of identity
enactment, and their recent theoretical work on subordinate-leader dyads suggests that
"[d]ependency has meaningful identity implications" (Farmer & Aguinis, 2005, p. 1071). This
research could be extended to leader-stakeholder relationships as well. For example, future
research could examine how a leader's social identity affects the manner in which a leader
attempts to influence particular stakeholder groups. In addition, this research could explore how
the stakeholder's relational or collective identity with the leader impacts their responses to
influence attempts.
Further, there is relatively little research which has examined the changing organizational
form and how it impacts organizational leaders. Yukl and colleagues (2005) have discussed how
organizations are moving toward more empowered forms of organizing; yet it is unclear what
this means for organizational leaders. Can leaders attempt to minimize these dependence
relationships? How can organizations train leaders to deal with types of dependencies? How can
organizations select individuals into leadership roles who will be more adept at managing these
relationships?
Finally, one interesting finding from this study was that the leader's relationship quality
with the senior manager was positively related to the use of consultation, inspirational appeal,
and rational persuasion influence tactics and leader performance and viability. Further,
relationship quality was negatively related to legitimating and pressure tactics. This suggests that

125

relationships may play an important role in the selection of influence tactics with senior
managers, and future research could explore this dynamic in greater detail.
Conclusion
Stakeholder management is often a primary responsibility of organizational leaders.
Further, leaders are often required to work through hierarchical and organizational boundaries to
coordinate their task work with these stakeholders. One of the goals of this study was to examine
stakeholder dependence and how it impacts the manner in which a leader attempts to influence
stakeholder groups. The results demonstrate that dependence does play a role in the selection of
influence tactics, and I hope these preliminary findings prompt future research to explore this
important dynamic.

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APPENDICES

127

APPENDIX A
List of Tables

Table 1
Types of stakeholder power and leader dependence by stakeholder group
Stakeholders
Stakeholder
Senior
power
Leader dependence
Subordinates
Peers
managers
Personal dependence
Reward
Reward dependence
√
power
Coercive
power

Personal/identification
dependence

√

Coercive dependence

Referent
power

Legitimate
power

Task dependence
Structural dependence

Customers

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

Expert power

Skill/Coordination
dependence

√

√

√

√

Informational
power

Informational
dependence

√

√

√

√

Customer
power

Customer dependence

√

128

Table 2
Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson (1980) Classification of Influence tactics
Influence Tactic
Definition
Assertiveness
Influence tactics which include demanding, ordering, and setting
deadlines
Rationality

Influence tactics which include writing detailed plans and explaining
reasons for request

Ingratiation

Influence tactics which include acting humble and making the other
person feel important

Exchange

Influence tactics involving the exchange of positive benefits (e.g.,
personal sacrifices)

Coalition

Influence tactics which include steady pressure for compliance
through the use of co-workers or by obtaining the support of
subordinates

Blocking

Influence tactics which include engaging in a work slowdown or
threatening to stop work

Sanctions

Influence tactics which involve the use of administrative sanctions to
induce compliance

Upward appeals

Influence tactics which include additional pressure for conformity by
invoking the influence of higher levels in the organization

129

Table 3
Yukl, Seifert, & Chavez (2008) Proactive Influence Tactics
Influence Tactic
Definition
Collaboration
The agent offers to provide assistance or necessary resources if the
target will carry out a request or approve a proposed change.
Most common target: hypothesized to be subordinates and peers
Consultation
The agent asks the target person to suggest improvements or help
plan a proposed activity or change for which the target person's
support is desired.
Most common target: subordinates and peers
Exchange
The agent offers something the target person wants, or offers to
reciprocate at a later time, if the target will do what the agent
requests.
Most common target: subordinates and peers
Ingratiation
The agent uses praise and flattery before or during an attempt to
influence the target person to carry out a request or support a
proposal.
Most common target: subordinates and peers
Inspirational appeals
The agent appeals to the target's values and ideals or seeks to arouse
the target person's emotions to gain commitment for a request or
proposal.
Most common target: subordinates
Personal appeals
The agent asks the target to carry out a request or support a proposal
out of friendship, or asks for a personal favor before saying what it is.
Most common target: peers
Apprising
The agent explains how carrying out a request or supporting a
proposal will benefit the target personally or help to advance the
target's career.
Most common target: hypothesized to be subordinate
Rational persuasion
The agent uses logical arguments and factual evidence to show that a
request or proposal is feasible and relevant for important task
objectives.
Most common target: supervisors
Legitimating tactics
The agent seeks to establish the legitimacy of a request or to verify
that he/she has the authority to make it.
Most common target: subordinates and peers
Pressure
The agent uses demands, threats, frequent checking, or persistent
reminders to influence the target to do something.
Most common target: subordinates
Coalition tactics
The agent enlists the aid of others, or uses the support of others, as a
way to influence the target to do something.
Most common target: peers

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Table 4
Categorization of Influence Tactics
Soft tactics
Consultation
Collaboration
Exchange
Ingratiation
Inspirational appeals
Personal appeals

Rational tactics
Apprising
Rational persuasion

131

Hard tactics
Coalition
Legitimating
Pressure

Table 5
Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of collaboration influence tactics.
Hypothesis 1b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
collaboration influence tactics.
Hypothesis 1c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to
the use of collaboration influence tactics.
Hypothesis 1d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the
use of collaboration influence tactics.
Hypothesis 2a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of consultation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 2b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
consultation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 2c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to
the use of consultation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 2d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use
of consultation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 3a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of exchange influence tactics.
Hypothesis 3b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
exchange influence tactics.
Hypothesis 3c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to
the use of exchange influence tactics.
Hypothesis 3d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use
of exchange influence tactics.
Hypothesis 4a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of ingratiation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 4b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
ingratiation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 4c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to
the use of ingratiation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 4d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use
of ingratiation influence tactics.
Hypothesis 5a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 5b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
inspirational appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 5c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to
the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 5d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use
of inspirational appeals influence tactics.

132

Supported/
Not Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not tested
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not tested
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not tested
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

Table 5 (cont'd)
Hypothesis
Hypothesis 6a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of personal appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 6b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
personal appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 6c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to
the use of personal appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 6d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use
of personal appeals influence tactics.
Hypothesis 7a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of apprising influence tactics.
Hypothesis 7b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
apprising influence tactics.
Hypothesis 7c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to
the use of apprising influence tactics.
Hypothesis 7d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the
use of apprising influence tactics.
Hypothesis 8a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of rational persuasion influence tactics.
Hypothesis 8b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
rational persuasion influence tactics.
Hypothesis 8c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to
the use of rational persuasion influence tactics.
Hypothesis 8d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use
of rational persuasion influence tactics.
Hypothesis 9a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of coalition influence tactics.
Hypothesis 9b: Peer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of
coalition influence tactics.
Hypothesis 9c: Senior manager task dependence will be negatively related to
the use of coalition influence tactics.
Hypothesis 9d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the
use of coalition influence tactics.
Hypothesis 10a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of legitimating influence tactics.
Hypothesis 10b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
legitimating influence tactics.
Hypothesis 10c: Senior manager task dependence will be negatively related to
the use of legitimating influence tactics.
Hypothesis 10d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the
use of legitimating influence tactics.

133

Supported/
Not Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not tested
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not tested
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Not supported

Table 5 (cont'd)
Hypothesis
Hypothesis 11a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the
use of pressure influence tactics.
Hypothesis 11b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of
pressure influence tactics.
Hypothesis 11c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to
the use of pressure influence tactics.
Hypothesis 11d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the
use of pressure influence tactics.
Hypothesis 12: The positive relationship between soft and rational influence
tactics and leader task performance as assessed by (a) subordinate
stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d)
customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the
positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and
performance will be more positive for leaders high in political skill.
Hypothesis 13: The negative relationship between hard tactics and leader task
performance as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer
stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders
will be moderated by leader political skill such that the negative relationship
between hard tactics and performance will be less negative for leaders high in
political skill.
Hypothesis 14: The positive relationship between soft and rational influence
tactics and leader viability as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b)
peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer
stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the positive
relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and viability will be
more positive for leaders high in political skill.
Hypothesis 15: The negative relationship between hard tactics and leader
viability as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c)
senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated
by leader political skill such that the negative relationship between hard
tactics and viability will be less negative for leaders high in political skill.

134

Supported/
Not Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

Not supported

Not supported

Not supported

Table 6
Data collection schedule
Source
Subordinate
√
√
√
√
√

Peer
√
√
√
√
√

Snr
Mgr
√
√
√
√
√

Customer
√
√
√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

Ferris et al.,
(2005)

√

√

Leader selfmonitoring

Snyder &
Gangestad
(1986)

√

Relationship
quality

Liden &
Maslyn
(1998)

√

√

√

√

√

√

Interaction
frequency

(Single item)

√

√

√

√

√

√

Leader
influence
tactics

Yukl et al.,
(2008)

√

√

√

√

√

Leader task
performance

Liden et al.,
(1993)

√

√

√

√

√

Leader
viability

Marrone et
al., (2007)

√

√

√

√

√

Construct
Demographic
information

Measure
Age
Gender
Education
Org tenure
Tenure in
position
Tenure
w/leader

Leader
√
√
√
√
√

Task
dependence

Pearce &
Gregersen
(1991)

Political skill

Time
1
√
√
√
√
√

Time
2
√
√
√
√
√
√

√

√

√

Note. Leader surveys were administered at time 1. Subordinate, peer, senior manager, and
customer surveys were administered at time 2.
135

Table 7
Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Subordinate-rated Influence Tactics
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Item
Rational persuasion item 1
.76
.04 .09 .13 .26 .03 .17 -.04 .05
Rational persuasion item 2
.81
.06 .14 .08 .20 .09 .18 -.04 -.02
Rational persuasion item 3
.84
.07 .03 .04 .21 .11 .13 .00 .06
Rational persuasion item 4
.83
.08 .12 .07 .14 .17 .14 .00 .03
Exchange item 1
.11
.87 .04 .10 .09 .08 .07 .10 .11
Exchange item 2
.13
.91 .03 .10 .09 .09 .09 .12 .13
Exchange item 3
.13
.88 .07 .07 .07 .08 .09 .15 .16
Exchange item 4
.12
.86 .06 .07 .09 .10 .09 .21 .16
Inspirational appeal item 1
.61
.18 .20 .26 .14 .26 .14 .05 .06
Inspirational appeal item 2
.70
.14 .30 .19 .11 .26 .11 .03 -.03
Inspirational appeal item 3
.67
.11 .34 .12 .11 .29 .09 -.02 .05
Inspirational appeal item 4
.65
.14 .29 .16 .09 .30 .10 -.01 .06
Legitimating item 1
.21
.12 .14 .15 .80 .11 .17 .03 .08
Legitimating item 2
.26
.12 .08 .12 .81 .16 .14 .07 .09
Legitimating item 3
.28
.04 .19 .10 .77 .18 .08 -.03 .10
Legitimating item 4
.28
.10 .13 .12 .83 .12 .10 .00 .09
Apprising item 1
.25
.13 .12 .24 .17 .77 .12 .05 .06
Apprising item 2
.33
.09 .20 .21 .18 .75 .21 .02 .10
Apprising item 3
.34
.11 .18 .22 .18 .77 .15 .05 .06
Apprising item 4
.31
.10 .22 .25 .15 .76 .15 .02 .07
Pressure item 1
-.07
.05 -.08 -.03 .08 .04 -.04 .19 .13
Pressure item 2
-.10
.01 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.03 -.07 .14 .15
Pressure item 3
-.02
.11 -.06 .02 .11 -.01 .00 .09 .14
Pressure item 4
-.09
.08 -.08 -.02 .01 -.03 -.06 .09 .12
Collaboration item 1
.26
.12 .79 .19 .14 .14 .21 .01 .00
Collaboration item 2
.32
.06 .75 .23 .15 .21 .27 -.01 .00
Collaboration item 3
.26
.02 .82 .17 .16 .17 .19 .00 -.04
Collaboration item 4
.29
.01 .78 .19 .16 .15 .24 -.06 -.01
Ingratiation item 1
.18
.09 .16 .78 .14 .20 .25 .07 .06
Ingratiation item 2
.24
.11 .26 .79 .13 .20 .16 .06 .04
Ingratiation item 3
.20
.10 .27 .80 .13 .23 .19 .07 .00
Ingratiation item 4
.11
.11 .07 .76 .12 .19 .28 .06 .09
Consultation item 1
.22
.13 .18 .27 .17 .15 .75 .10 .06
Consultation item 2
.27
.12 .22 .28 .14 .15 .78 .05 .05
Consultation item 3
.27
.08 .32 .22 .15 .16 .75 -.01 .03
Consultation item 4
.25
.11 .25 .24 .13 .16 .79 .02 .03
136

10
-.03
-.09
-.05
-.07
.06
.05
.09
.09
-.05
-.02
-.02
-.12
.06
.07
.06
.06
.06
-.02
-.03
-.03
.80
.82
.76
.87
-.06
-.08
-.07
-.17
.03
-.04
-.04
-.03
-.03
-.06
-.10
-.08

Table 7 (cont'd)
Item
Personal appeals item 1
Personal appeals item 2
Personal appeals item 3
Personal appeals item 4
Coalition item 1
Coalition item 2
Coalition item 3
Coalition item 4

1
.03
-.09
.01
.01
.05
.05
.02
.06

2
.14
.14
.13
.11
.06
.16
.14
.22

3
.02
-.01
.01
-.05
-.06
.01
.00
.02

4
.06
.04
.05
.04
.06
.07
.04
.00

Component
5
6
.06 .03
.04 .00
-.01 .01
-.03 .04
.23 -.02
.10 .06
.01 .08
.02 .09

7
.05
.09
-.02
-.01
.11
.07
-.03
-.01

8
.79
.79
.88
.82
.25
.19
.13
.25

9
.20
.14
.18
.19
.72
.85
.84
.81

10
.12
.11
.14
.15
.13
.12
.22
.17

Eigenvalues
14.97 6.20 2.57 2.32 1.88 1.70 1.53 1.45 1.29 1.02
% of variance
34.03 14.08 5.84 5.27 4.28 3.87 3.48 3.28 2.92 2.32
Note. Principal component analysis. Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization.

For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other tables, the reader is referred to
the electronic version of this dissertation.

137

Table 8
Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Peer-rated Influence Tactics
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Item
Rational persuasion item 1
.24 .11 .12 .11 -.04 .81 .20 .14 -.05
Rational persuasion item 2
.31 .15 .07 .13 -.07 .74 .29 .18 -.05
Rational persuasion item 3
.29 .20 .23 .07 -.12 .60 .31 .18 .08
Rational persuasion item 4
.27 .13 .11 .06 -.07 .68 .44 .24 .00
Exchange item 1
.10 .15 .04 .85 .17 .02 .16 .05 .14
Exchange item 2
.04 .13 .08 .90 .22 .06 .04 .06 .15
Exchange item 3
.08 .12 .08 .88 .26 .07 .04 .08 .16
Exchange item 4
.14 .07 .17 .81 .27 .13 .04 .00 .11
Inspirational appeal item 1
.21 .13 .30 .16 .09 .24 .74 .19 .05
Inspirational appeal item 2
.30 .15 .22 .08 .06 .32 .76 .15 .06
Inspirational appeal item 3
.29 .20 .20 .07 .11 .23 .75 .17 .07
Inspirational appeal item 4
.23 .24 .16 .05 .16 .25 .72 .18 .10
Legitimating item 1
.15 .83 .20 .09 .07 .14 .18 .12 .19
Legitimating item 2
.13 .81 .20 .18 .05 .17 .20 .14 .14
Legitimating item 3
.10 .85 .24 .10 .03 .11 .08 .09 .07
Legitimating item 4
.18 .85 .16 .16 .05 .11 .14 .13 .14
Apprising item 1
.17 .23 .76 .16 .08 .06 .13 .18 .20
Apprising item 2
.19 .25 .82 .06 .06 .13 .20 .08 .11
Apprising item 3
.17 .18 .86 .07 .08 .14 .17 .13 .13
Apprising item 4
.18 .19 .83 .10 .09 .13 .22 .13 .10
Pressure item 1
-.04 .10 .16 .04 .12 .03 .03 .06 .02
Pressure item 2
-.01 -.01 .09 .05 .04 -.06 -.03 -.02 .25
Pressure item 3
.09 .13 .02 -.01 .06 .03 -.01 .04 .04
Pressure item 4
-.01 -.02 .02 .00 .08 -.01 .01 -.04 .21
Collaboration item 1
.82 .09 .13 .12 -.02 .16 .28 .22 .08
Collaboration item 2
.81 .08 .17 .17 -.03 .12 .26 .24 .07
Collaboration item 3
.59 .26 .37 .21 .03 -.01 .32 .22 .10
Collaboration item 4
.83 .12 .14 .10 .01 .16 .24 .21 .05
Ingratiation item 1
.32 .20 .13 .08 .16 .19 .19 .74 .10
Ingratiation item 2
.40 .13 .19 .04 .14 .20 .22 .75 .07
Ingratiation item 3
.35 .12 .15 .08 .14 .24 .20 .78 .07
Ingratiation item 4
.31 .12 .14 .05 .09 .18 .14 .81 .09
Consultation item 1
.67 .02 .15 .00 .22 .39 .05 .24 .03
Consultation item 2
.64 .22 .07 .02 .29 .47 .11 .20 .06
Consultation item 3
.61 .17 .13 -.04 .26 .47 .05 .31 .09
Consultation item 4
.62 .23 .16 .03 .25 .44 .05 .21 .11
138

10
.00
.02
.01
.00
.02
.03
.03
.00
.00
.01
-.03
.01
.01
.08
.09
.07
.17
.09
.06
.08
.86
.85
.85
.88
.03
.08
.08
.04
.04
.03
.01
.01
-.03
-.08
-.07
-.03

Table 8 (cont'd)

Item
Personal appeals item 1
Personal appeals item 2
Personal appeals item 3
Personal appeals item 4
Coalition item 1
Coalition item 2
Coalition item 3
Coalition item 4

1
.13
.08
.08
.05
.21
.09
.03
.03

2
.02
.03
.07
.04
.19
.16
.12
.11

3
.05
.01
.11
.10
.13
.21
.08
.09

Component
4
5
6
.22 .77 -.05
.19 .81 .06
.25 .85 -.05
.28 .83 -.04
.17 .31 .01
.21 .20 .01
.13 .21 .00
.12 .22 .00

7
.11
.05
.04
.07
.09
.06
.05
.04

8
.15
.10
.09
.05
.05
.10
.03
.10

9
.22
.22
.19
.19
.66
.83
.86
.87

10
.13
.09
.07
.08
.05
.16
.21
.19

Eigenvalues
16.53 5.62 3.19 2.62 1.90 1.69 1.45 1.36 1.16 1.03
% of variance
37.57 12.77 7.24 5.96 4.32 3.85 3.29 3.09 2.63 2.34
Note. Principal component analysis. Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization.

139

Table 9
Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Senior Manager-rated
Influence Tactics
Component
Item
1
2
3
4
5
Rational persuasion item 1
.52
.39
.39
.36
-.21
Rational persuasion item 2
.65
.16
.30
.37
-.19
Rational persuasion item 3
.50
-.08
.40
.44
.03
Consultation item 1
-.03 -.06
.85
-.08
.08
Consultation item 2
.22
-.08
.86
-.06
.06
Consultation item 3
.36
.10
.78
-.13
-.13
Inspirational appeal item 1
.87
-.05
.14
.01
.12
Inspirational appeal item 2
.89
.11
.14
.02
-.01
Inspirational appeal item 3
.84
.15
-.01
.01
-.04
Legitimating item 1
.20
.79
-.20
.05
.01
Legitimating item 2
.13
.90
.09
.01
.01
Legitimating item 3
.12
.70
-.14
.37
.09
Pressure item 1
.04
.04
-.05
.00
.89
Pressure item 2
-.16
.23
.22
.37
.59
Pressure item 3
.07
.62
-.02
.17
.44
Coalition item 1
.05
.08
-.17
.87
.05
Coalition item 2
.11
.28
-.14
.78
.18
Coalition item 3
-.29
.47
.22
.05
.02

Eigenvalues
4.95 3.33 1.91 1.51
% of variance
27.50 18.53 10.59 8.41
Note. Principal component analysis. Varimax rotation with Kaiser
normalization.

140

1.17
6.49

Table 10
Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Customer-rated Influence Tactics
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Item
Rational persuasion item 1
.30 .78 .08 .01 .03 .09 .23 .02
Rational persuasion item 2
.19 .84 .08 .06 -.12 .03 .19 -.06
Rational persuasion item 3
.25 .87 .03 .02 .01 .13 .08 .04
Rational persuasion item 4
.23 .89 .04 -.02 .08 .09 .10 .06
Exchange item 1
.16 .07 .81 .23 .12 .25 .17 .15
Exchange item 2
.19 .17 .75 .16 .15 .23 .10 .36
Exchange item 3
.20 .18 .83 .21 .18 .18 .14 .12
Exchange item 4
.19 .17 .81 .23 .19 .23 .11 .13
Inspirational appeal item 1
.20 .51 .32 .16 .02 .41 .20 .16
Inspirational appeal item 2
.28 .70 .19 .12 .02 .31 .09 .13
Inspirational appeal item 3
.28 .62 .27 .05 .07 .33 .28 .06
Inspirational appeal item 4
.20 .55 .31 .10 -.01 .35 .19 .23
Legitimating item 1
.37 .41 .07 .13 .06 .14 .68 .06
Legitimating item 2
.33 .38 .22 .16 .06 .17 .73 .08
Legitimating item 3
.36 .48 .16 .11 .06 .10 .63 .13
Legitimating item 4
.35 .41 .23 .16 .04 .11 .71 .08
Apprising item 1
.34 .25 .28 .23 .14 .65 .10 -.15
Apprising item 2
.32 .26 .28 .24 .10 .71 .04 -.08
Apprising item 3
.36 .35 .29 .09 .05 .66 .20 .08
Apprising item 4
.31 .40 .17 .16 .02 .60 .12 .08
Pressure item 1
.03 -.04 .15 .16 .79 -.05 .04 -.01
Pressure item 2
.05 .01 .02 .16 .89 .10 .01 .15
Pressure item 3
.11 .08 .29 .41 .70 .05 .10 .06
Pressure item 4
.04 .01 .08 .20 .93 .10 .01 .13
Collaboration item 1
.80 .20 .02 -.01 .06 .24 .22 .16
Collaboration item 2
.79 .20 .06 .01 .07 .16 .18 .11
Collaboration item 3
.82 .31 .12 .01 .09 .17 .09 .11
Collaboration item 4
.74 .24 -.03 -.03 .05 .19 .26 .19
Ingratiation item 1
.61 .19 .41 .43 .07 .03 .08 .03
Ingratiation item 2
.64 .23 .42 .41 .04 .07 .11 -.12
Ingratiation item 3
.66 .17 .41 .39 .04 .03 .12 -.13
Ingratiation item 4
.53 .23 .47 .46 .07 -.02 -.05 -.08
Consultation item 1
.65 .13 .24 .34 .00 .13 .17 .18
Consultation item 2
.72 .26 .26 .31 .05 .13 .13 .06
Consultation item 3
.77 .31 .11 .18 .03 .20 .10 .12
Consultation item 4
.68 .31 .19 .25 .05 .23 .13 .11
141

Table 10 (cont'd)

Item
Personal appeals item 1
Personal appeals item 2
Personal appeals item 3
Personal appeals item 4
Coalition item 1
Coalition item 2
Coalition item 3
Coalition item 4
Eigenvalues
% of variance

1
.21
.11
.09
.14
.32
.32
.13
.24

2
.06
-.11
.05
.05
.20
.09
.09
.19

Component
3
4
5
.11 .75 .17
.18 .75 .24
.29 .77 .27
.11 .74 .26
.22 .51 .19
.35 .20 .25
.15 .37 .10
.36 .46 .25

6
.17
.13
.12
.17
-.12
.02
.01
-.01

7
.09
.17
.04
.11
-.17
.03
.29
.06

8
.13
.21
.10
.14
.49
.64
.67
.54

19.88 5.26 2.40 2.04 1.62 1.29 1.25 1.03
45.17 11.96 5.46 4.64 3.68 2.94 2.84 2.33

142

Table 11
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables
Variable
1. Leader age
2. Leader gender
3. Leader education
4. Leader tenure in position
5. Leader tenure with organization
6. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate A)
7. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate B)
8. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate C)
9. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate D)
10. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate E)
11. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer A)
12. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer B)
13. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer C)
14. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer D)
15. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer E)
16. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Senior manager)
17. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer A)
18. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer B)
19. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer C)
20. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer D)
21. Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer E)
22. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate A)
23. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate B)
24. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate C)
25. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate D)
26. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate E)
27. Leader task dependence (on Peer A)
28. Leader task dependence (on Peer B)
29. Leader task dependence (on Peer C)
30. Leader task dependence (on Peer D)
31. Leader task dependence (on Peer E)
32. Leader task dependence (on Senior manager)
33. Leader task dependence (on Customer A)
34. Leader task dependence (on Customer B)
35. Leader task dependence (on Customer C)
36. Leader task dependence (on Customer D)
37. Leader task dependence (on Customer E)

143

M
46.28
1.83
3.43
7.66
14.93
4.36
4.11
3.79
3.85
3.76
3.20
3.11
2.97
2.93
2.82
3.25
3.18
3.11
2.89
2.88
2.93
3.98
3.65
3.34
3.36
3.28
3.05
3.00
2.87
3.04
2.92
3.75
2.81
2.81
2.81
2.73
2.70

SD
10.59
.37
1.17
7.37
12.21
.77
.80
.81
.89
.85
.79
.80
.68
.87
1.01
.80
.73
.73
.72
.61
.83
.65
.70
.77
.73
.64
.80
.75
.74
.76
.82
.63
.82
.73
.74
.82
.87

N
104
109
109
107
109
106
105
104
46
34
100
94
95
27
17
104
89
89
83
24
14
108
107
106
48
36
102
96
97
27
17
104
90
89
85
24
14

Table 11 (cont'd)
Variable
38. Political skill (leader-rated)
39. Self monitoring (leader-rated)
40. Relationship quality with Senior manager (Leader-rated)
41. Subordinate age
42. Subordinate gender
43. Subordinate education
44. Subordinate tenure in position
45. Subordinate tenure with organization
46. Subordinate-rated tenure with Leader
47. Subordinate-rated interaction frequency (with Leader)
48. Subordinate task dependence (on Leader)
49. Collaboration (Subordinate-rated)
50. Consultation (Subordinate-rated)
51. Exchange (Subordinate-rated)
52. Ingratiation (Subordinate-rated)
53. Inspirational appeal (Subordinate-rated)
54. Personal appeals (Subordinate-rated)
55. Apprising (Subordinate-rated)
56. Rational persuasion (Subordinate-rated)
57. Coalition (Subordinate-rated)
58. Legitimating (Subordinate-rated)
59. Pressure (Subordinate-rated)
60. Task performance (Subordinate-rated)
61. Viability (Subordinate-rated)
62. Relationship quality with Leader (Subordinate-rated)
63. Political skill of Leader (Subordinate-rated)
64. Peer age
65. Peer gender
66. Peer education
67. Peer tenure in position
68. Peer tenure with organization
69. Peer-rated tenure with Leader
70. Peer-rated interaction frequency (with Leader)
71. Peer task dependence (on Leader)
72. Collaboration (Peer-rated)
73. Consultation (Peer-rated)
74. Exchange (Peer-rated)

144

M
4.00
2.69
3.85
36.63
1.94
3.18
4.19
6.69
3.30
4.17
3.20
3.43
3.21
1.81
3.17
3.42
1.59
3.20
3.64
1.62
3.25
1.52
3.75
3.92
3.92
3.96
45.93
1.78
3.58
7.20
15.50
6.81
3.09
2.49
3.05
3.15
1.68

SD
.37
.37
.55
13.35
.24
1.09
4.63
6.88
3.77
1.01
.85
1.17
1.21
1.09
1.24
1.11
.84
1.25
1.09
.84
1.23
.81
.90
.95
.61
.68
10.52
.42
1.29
6.85
11.85
7.52
.94
.94
1.33
1.28
1.02

N
105
105
105
537
611
612
580
592
510
377
583
584
583
582
584
584
581
582
583
581
584
583
577
576
574
578
277
302
302
302
302
280
287
285
285
285
285

Table 11 (cont'd)
Variable
75. Ingratiation (Peer-rated)
76. Inspirational appeal (Peer-rated)
77. Personal appeals (Peer-rated)
78. Apprising (Peer-rated)
79. Rational persuasion (Peer-rated)
80. Coalition (Peer-rated)
81. Legitimating (Peer-rated)
82. Pressure (Peer-rated)
83. Task performance (Peer-rated)
84. Viability (Peer-rated)
85. Relationship quality with Leader (Peer-rated)
86. Senior manager age
87. Senior manager gender
88. Senior manager education
89. Senior manager tenure in position
90. Senior manager tenure with organization
91. Senior manager-rated tenure with Leader
92. Consultation (Senior manager-rated)
93. Inspirational appeal (Senior manager-rated)
94. Rational persuasion (Senior manager-rated)
95. Coalition (Senior manager-rated)
96. Legitimating (Senior manager-rated)
97. Pressure (Senior manager-rated)
98. Task performance (Senior manager-rated)
99. Viability (Senior manager-rated)
100. Customer age
101. Customer gender
102. Customer education
103. Customer tenure with organization
104. Customer-rated tenure with Leader
105. Customer-rated interaction frequency (with Leader)
106. Collaboration (Customer-rated)
107. Consultation (Customer-rated)
108. Exchange (Customer-rated)
109. Ingratiation (Customer-rated)
110. Inspirational appeal (Customer-rated)
111. Personal appeals (Customer-rated)

145

M
2.94
2.82
1.65
2.11
3.23
1.49
2.44
1.14
3.74
3.87
3.80
52.82
1.88
4.01
6.56
17.52
3.09
3.31
2.92
3.31
1.37
1.59
1.20
3.46
3.81
51.96
1.54
4.03
15.62
6.20
3.23
2.57
2.22
1.55
1.98
2.53
1.37

SD
1.35
1.24
.91
1.23
1.18
.80
1.27
.46
.73
.72
.54
3.94
.32
1.27
7.22
13.66
4.34
.88
.99
.79
.49
.74
.37
.63
.65
13.43
.50
3.41
12.77
6.65
1.01
1.60
1.48
1.13
1.35
1.39
.83

N
285
285
286
285
287
285
285
285
285
286
286
93
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
119
142
148
147
147
143
147
134
132
137
133
137
135

Table 11 (cont'd)
Variable
M
SD
112. Apprising (Customer-rated)
2.15
1.33
113. Rational persuasion (Customer-rated)
3.19
1.53
114. Coalition (Customer-rated)
1.39
.80
115. Legitimating (Customer-rated)
2.50
1.51
116. Pressure (Customer-rated)
1.08
.39
117. Task performance (Customer-rated)
4.41
.69
118. Viability (Customer-rated)
4.44
.63
119. Relationship quality with Leader (Customer-rated)
4.57
.52
Note. “.a” indicates this relationship cannot be computed because of missing data.
* p < .05. ** p < .01; two-tailed

146

N
138
140
134
138
140
147
146
147

Table 11 (cont'd)
1
2
1.
2. .04
3. -.37 ** -.49 **
4. .40 ** .08
5. .55 ** .20 *
6. -.20 * -.13
7. -.43 ** -.10
8. -.38 ** .05
9. -.28
.00
10. -.43 *
.01
11. -.09
.05
12. .00
-.01
13. .14
.02
14. .11
-.31
15. -.14
-.07
16. -.16
-.08
17. -.17
.15
18. -.23 *
.14
19. -.09
-.01
20. -.24
-.06
21. .36
-.02
22. .02
.02
23. -.15
-.01
24. -.16
.08
25. .06
.03
26. -.14
.02
27. .20
.07
28. .09
-.03
29. .36 ** .00
30. .19
-.20
31. .18
-.08
32. -.11
-.03
33. .04
.07
34. .06
.12
35. .00
.01
36. -.07
.01
37. .37
-.03

3

-.23
-.43
.28
.27
.15
.25
.23
.00
.14
-.06
.05
.30
.04
-.03
-.11
-.02
.03
-.35
.15
.17
.02
.10
.01
.01
.08
-.10
-.10
.16
.11
-.09
-.17
-.06
.04
-.19

4

*
**
**
**

.55
-.09
-.37
-.29
-.34
-.37
-.14
-.14
-.03
.00
-.03
-.15
-.12
-.01
.06
-.28
-.10
-.03
-.21
-.21
-.16
-.11
-.01
-.10
-.03
-.01
-.02
-.19
-.04
.00
-.02
-.23
-.14

5

6

7

8

**
**
**
*
*

*
*

-.20
-.32
-.32
-.34
-.38
-.07
-.12
-.01
.12
.00
-.12
.10
-.05
.05
.03
.52
.03
-.06
-.14
-.04
-.01
.09
-.03
.14
.02
.04
.00
.14
.07
.00
.05
.40

147

*
**
**
*
*

.37
.27
.34
.11
.24
.23
.07
.13
-.04
.00
-.01
-.09
-.17
-.22
-.35
.57
.29
.13
.20
-.03
.15
.01
-.06
-.24
-.26
.12
-.06
-.18
-.03
-.30
-.37

**
**
*

.52
.72
.57
*
.24
*
.33
.14
.14
.25
.06
.08
-.03
-.11
-.06
-.35
** .28
** .60
.31
.41
.19
.09
.05
-.02
-.17
.11
.21
.10
.04
.10
-.07
-.24

**
**
**
*
**

**
**
**
**

*

.63
.42
.10
.25
.05
.29
-.04
.02
.29
.16
.07
.11
-.12
.09
.29
.60
.17
.04
-.02
.04
-.09
.01
.14
-.05
.24
.16
.14
.11
-.16

**
*
*

**

**
**

*

Table 11 (cont'd)
1
2
38. -.10
.00
39. -.33 ** -.34 **
40. -.24 *
.07
41. .09
-.17
42. .10
.06
43. .12
.04
44. .01
-.06
45. .07
-.05
46. .33 ** .01
47. .02
.13
48. -.04
.04
49. -.11
.06
50. -.07
-.06
51. -.16
.09
52. .07
-.09
53. -.12
-.01
54. -.20 *
.10
55. -.06
-.02
56. -.19
-.07
57. .16
.01
58. .02
.05
59. .10
-.01
60. -.16
-.07
61. -.12
-.02
62. -.08
-.03
63. -.12
-.08
64. .06
-.07
65. .11
-.17
66. -.05
-.02
67. -.11
.09
68. .05
.06
69. .18
.19
70. .09
.07
71. .05
.06
72. -.08
.19
73. .02
.07
74. -.03
.14

3
.10
.48
-.02
-.15
-.08
-.04
-.05
-.08
-.16
-.19
-.02
.14
.23
.17
.17
.16
.08
.20
.25
-.08
-.05
-.03
.12
.03
.14
.08
-.15
-.05
.24
-.09
-.28
-.28
.02
.03
-.01
.00
-.12

**

*

*
**

*
**
**

4
-.06
-.03
-.14
.04
.06
-.19
.12
.12
.47
-.12
.07
-.14
-.18
-.04
-.05
-.18
-.11
-.07
-.14
.02
-.05
.01
-.03
.04
-.03
-.06
.03
.12
-.13
-.01
.04
.24
.06
.03
.14
.21
.05

*

**

*

*

5
-.07
-.22
-.23
.14
.24
-.05
.01
.18
.47
-.04
-.03
-.14
-.26
-.19
-.12
-.20
-.12
-.19
-.23
-.01
-.09
.08
-.11
-.04
-.08
-.14
.09
.06
-.30
.02
.18
.53
-.07
-.09
.00
-.04
-.05

148

*
*
*

**

**

*

*

**

**

6
.28
.24
.07
-.16
-.17
.06
-.07
-.10
-.06
-.02
-.02
.00
.21
.09
.19
-.03
.16
-.01
.02
.17
-.01
.23
.00
.00
.04
.02
-.12
-.05
.20
-.12
-.14
-.18
.02
-.07
-.05
-.11
-.04

7
** .26 *
*
.18
.17
-.10
.04
-.01
.07
.04
-.17
-.05
-.01
.09
*
.14
-.07
-.03
.01
.06
.04
.10
.01
-.02
* -.05
.09
.05
.05
.07
-.18
-.26 *
.11
-.02
-.07
-.29 **
.16
.03
.00
-.07
-.10

8
.18
.20
.10
-.10
-.02
.10
.05
.08
-.19
-.09
.01
.15
.16
.17
.12
.10
.14
.09
.20
.09
.01
-.02
.22
.17
.20
.15
-.11
-.20
.18
.06
-.09
-.23
-.05
-.05
.03
.00
-.09

*

*

*
*

*

Table 11 (cont'd)
1
2
75. .02
.32 **
76. -.12
.13
77. .06
.18
78. -.14
.15
79. -.14
.10
80. .02
.21 *
81. .06
.17
82. .12
.08
83. -.09
.00
84. -.16
-.01
85. -.16
.04
86. -.16
-.05
87. .02
.00
88. -.16
.08
89. -.06
.02
90. .12
-.03
91. .22 *
.08
92. -.25 *
.14
93. -.18
.14
94. -.28 ** -.04
95. -.15
-.17
96. .02
-.07
97. -.09
.02
98. -.14
.13
99. -.21 *
.10
100. .19
.04
101. .13
.18
102. .20
-.15
103. .19
-.19
104. .47 ** -.09
105. -.03
.01
106. .10
.00
107. .00
-.14
108. -.19
-.06
109. .05
-.17
110. -.09
-.02
111. -.11
-.41 **

3
-.10
.07
.00
-.02
.02
-.02
-.15
-.06
.08
.03
.00
.03
.10
-.04
-.06
.06
-.15
-.12
.10
.21 *
.10
.05
.00
.10
.04
-.20
-.16
.11
-.01
-.26
-.01
.10
.16
.33 *
.18
.16
.23

4
.08
-.10
.17
.01
-.12
.05
.01
.10
.01
-.02
.10
.00
-.05
.07
-.01
.03
.27
-.19
.01
-.10
.02
-.02
-.05
.09
.01
.16
-.01
.31
.04
.47
-.01
.10
.09
.09
.14
-.02
-.13

**
*

*
**

5
.04
-.15
-.01
.02
-.10
-.12
.06
.07
-.07
.01
.07
-.18
.00
.03
-.08
-.04
.31
-.23
-.13
-.23
.07
.09
-.09
-.11
-.21
.11
.08
.20
.27
.66
.13
.06
-.02
-.15
.00
-.01
-.13

149

**
*
*

*

*
**

6
-.19
.03
-.09
.08
.03
.02
-.10
.04
.02
.07
.02
-.03
.11
.10
-.07
-.11
-.17
.01
.24 *
.20 *
.14
.05
.01
.06
.11
.06
-.06
.05
.11
.00
.06
-.05
.05
.06
-.01
-.07
.08

7
-.15
.24
-.08
.14
.19
-.05
-.09
-.19
.20
.17
.15
-.08
.09
.06
-.05
-.24
-.28
.06
.30
.29
.16
.12
.08
.20
.18
-.10
-.20
-.05
.03
-.17
.04
.00
.09
-.08
-.08
-.01
.03

8
.04
*
.15
-.22
-.02
.24
-.15
.02
-.26
.12
.06
.02
.12
.04
.05
-.03
* -.08
** -.23
.16
** .27
** .32
.24
.11
.11
*
.14
.14
-.10
.06
.12
-.20
-.22
.00
.25
.27
.22
.13
.17
.15

*
*

*

*
**
**
*

Table 11 (cont'd)
1
2
112. -.19
-.11
113. .04
-.07
114. -.12
-.18
115. -.05
-.25
116. -.08
-.34 *
117. .10
-.08
118. .00
-.11
119. .05
-.19

3
.28 *
.04
.21
.26
.21
-.01
-.01
.08

4
-.14
.13
-.06
.02
-.10
.16
.10
.15

5
-.15
.23
-.12
-.01
-.14
.08
.08
.12

150

6
.02
-.06
-.10
-.22
-.04
.09
.14
.13

7
.10
.01
-.02
.01
-.01
-.10
-.02
.06

8
.16
-.03
.10
.06
.06
.18
.12
.22

Table 11 (cont'd)
9
10
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. .73 **
11. .40 ** .32
12. .53 ** .33
13. .22
.31
14. .39
.40
15. .28
.49
16. .14
.16
17. .27
.22
18. .22
.17
19. .09
-.20
20. .35
.59 *
21. .19
.52
22. .19
.16
23. .40 ** .26
24. .25
.12
25. .52 ** .40 *
26. .28
.52 **
27. .32 *
.19
28. .38 *
.34
29. .07
.17
30. .30
.31
31. .44
.51
32. .13
.15
33. .33 *
.24
34. .25
.24
35. .11
.04
36. .10
.20
37. -.08
.23

11

.40
.33
.31
.26
.25
.28
.04
.10
.32
.50
.17
.18
-.05
.28
.21
.54
.39
.25
.30
.34
.30
.12
.05
.23
.12
.14

12

**
**

*
**

**
**
*

**

*

.53
.65
.63
.15
.18
.10
.15
.62
.55
-.01
.07
-.03
.37
.10
.43
.62
.28
.56
.60
.17
.18
.14
.20
.48
.37

13

**
**
**

**

*
**
**
**
**
*

*

.48
.54
.06
.16
-.01
.25
.33
.34
.04
.09
.02
.28
.24
.33
.38
.55
.45
.62
.15
.16
.05
.28
.42
.44

151

14

*
*

*

**
**
**
*
**

*

.66
.36
.35
.09
.31
.71
.67
.14
.17
.23
.45
.26
.53
.54
.29
.77
.79
.28
.12
.05
.37
.53
.53

15

16

**

**
*

*
**
**
**
**

*

.59
.22
.19
-.13
.81
.55
.25
.51
.20
.55
.51
.51
.59
.56
.69
.82
.61
.41
.31
.41
.69
.65

*

**

*
*
*
*
*
**
**
**

*

.20
.35
.08
.50
.29
.11
.15
.09
.17
.38
.16
.08
.04
.42
.27
.73
.26
.31
.32
.45
.30

**
*

*

*
**
*
**
**
*

Table 11 (cont'd)
9
10
38. .27
.25
39. .03
.10
40. .11
.01
41. -.03
-.12
42. -.19
-.05
43. .11
.29
44. .12
.07
45. .21
.16
46. -.10
-.35
47. -.13
-.04
48. .07
.32
49. .15
.22
50. .29 *
.37 *
51. .17
.00
52. .08
.02
53. -.03
-.03
54. .10
.30
55. .18
.20
56. .16
.06
57. .13
.00
58. .08
.12
59. .12
.10
60. .24
.28
61. .10
.14
62. .19
.19
63. .16
.22
64. -.11
-.24
65. -.12
-.11
66. .12
.19
67. .08
.27
68. .04
.06
69. -.13
-.21
70. .03
.36 *
71. -.07
.15
72. .03
.25
73. -.12
.20
74. .02
.07

11
.16
-.07
.19
-.05
-.13
.00
-.08
.03
.06
-.14
-.02
.04
.02
.13
-.11
-.07
.00
-.07
-.05
-.02
-.03
.20 *
-.04
-.14
-.13
.02
-.02
.02
.05
.06
-.07
-.09
.12
-.04
-.03
.00
-.09

12
.21
.05
.04
.07
-.06
.17
-.05
-.08
-.04
.04
-.08
.07
.09
.22
.17
.00
-.07
.11
-.02
-.04
-.08
.04
-.02
-.12
-.09
-.01
-.17
.02
.03
-.15
-.24
-.16
.27
.17
.05
.03
.06

*

*

*
*

13
.10
.10
-.01
-.03
-.07
.26 *
-.01
-.07
.01
-.01
-.09
-.01
.01
.01
-.01
-.03
-.14
-.04
-.09
-.10
-.12
-.15
.08
.03
-.05
.03
-.15
.12
-.01
-.13
-.08
.04
.18
.05
.06
.12
-.09

152

14
.18
.15
.19
.01
-.02
.09
-.13
-.05
.20
.01
.02
-.10
-.14
.07
-.12
.04
.27
-.13
.13
.01
-.10
.26
.08
-.17
-.09
.01
.20
.06
-.13
.03
.02
.13
.39
.22
.29
.44 *
.57 **

15
.09
.07
.47
.03
-.04
-.04
.03
-.02
.21
.00
.07
-.18
-.10
-.25
-.29
-.23
-.27
-.16
-.15
-.23
-.37
-.07
.07
-.25
-.05
-.01
.10
.05
-.30
.04
.10
.01
.36
-.05
.12
.02
.66 **

16
.19
-.12
.37
.15
.04
-.05
-.07
.00
-.02
.05
-.15
-.03
-.10
.05
-.09
-.07
.08
-.09
-.06
-.13
-.12
-.04
-.02
-.07
-.05
-.01
.04
-.27
.04
.03
-.07
-.27
-.13
-.11
.06
-.02
.09

*
**

*

*

Table 11 (cont'd)
9
10
75. -.08
.19
76. .22
.35
77. .03
.12
78. .12
.34
79. .32 *
.44
80. -.01
.03
81. .17
.38
82. -.02
-.03
83. .16
.36
84. .09
.25
85. -.04
.35
86. -.03
-.08
87. .15
-.05
88. .10
.15
89. -.10
-.09
90. -.23
-.29
91. -.22
-.22
92. .20
.04
93. .38 ** .20
94. .29
.14
95. .19
.43
96. .32 *
.34
97. .14
.33
98. .13
-.06
99. .09
.00
100. .17
.43
101. -.25
-.21
102. .01
.40
103. -.02
.21
104. -.19
.00
105. -.15
-.39
106. .16
-.21
107. .34
-.02
108. .03
-.03
109. .17
.13
110. .25
.20
111. .12
.03

*
*
*

*
*

11
-.03
.07
.01
-.05
.12
-.08
-.05
.08
.03
-.03
-.02
.07
-.07
.04
.11
-.07
-.16
.08
-.01
.02
.02
-.06
-.14
.05
.06
.02
-.01
.13
.03
.31 *
-.08
-.10
.04
.03
-.01
.11
.01

12
.14
.11
.04
.07
.17
-.04
.10
.18
.06
-.03
-.01
.17
-.01
-.10
.10
.08
-.06
.05
-.11
-.01
.05
.00
.11
.04
-.09
-.08
.07
.15
-.07
.12
.13
.12
.02
-.02
-.03
.10
-.09

13
.14
.02
-.02
.06
.06
-.05
.25 *
.07
.07
.02
.08
.05
.04
-.07
-.03
.06
-.06
-.10
-.17
-.16
.04
-.02
-.02
-.14
-.18
.01
.05
.08
-.13
.21
.07
.09
-.02
-.13
.10
.02
-.01

153

14
.51
.40
.29
.29
.55
.06
.45
.57
.19
.15
.38
.24
-.02
-.09
-.05
.13
-.04
.04
-.13
-.26
.18
-.08
-.06
-.10
-.15
.07
-.28
.51
.13
.32
.36
.17
.15
.04
.37
.09
.49

15
*
.37
.30
.46
.21
** -.07
-.23
*
.10
** .55
-.20
-.19
.30
-.24
.12
-.17
-.25
.19
.02
-.10
-.04
-.02
.16
-.08
.12
.00
.12
.77
-.40
*
.08
.69
.71
-.11
-.28
-.28
.13
.25
-.07
-.22

*

*

*
*

16
-.06
.06
.07
-.06
.02
-.06
-.02
-.08
.05
.08
.04
.04
.08
-.13
-.08
.11
-.12
.15
-.05
-.01
.04
-.17
-.11
-.04
.05
.01
-.05
.21
-.01
-.22
.01
.14
.11
-.04
-.04
-.01
.03

Table 11 (cont'd)
9
10
112. .45 *
.21
113. .06
-.11
114. -.02
.05
115. .22
.17
116. .11
-.04
117. .10
.53 *
118. .07
.33
119. .06
.31

11
.10
-.08
.11
-.03
-.07
.06
.10
.02

12
.15
.12
-.19
-.04
-.03
.17
.15
.09

13
.03
.00
-.11
-.04
-.03
.25
.17
.20

154

14
15
16
.03
.23
-.04
.26
-.04
-.05
.17
-.09
.04
.16
.01
.15
.06
.a
** -.03
.40
.52
.16
.52 *
.53
.14
.64 *
.66
.15

Table 11 (cont'd)
17
18
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18. .46 **
19. .28 *
.21
20. .25
.48 *
21. .39
.12
22. -.05
-.14
23. .03
-.08
24. .09
.04
25. -.05
-.10
26. .01
.09
27. .22 *
.03
28. .11
-.02
29. .07
-.11
30. .24
.17
31. .10
-.19
32. .10
.16
33. .54 ** .31 **
34. .39 ** .42 **
35. .30 ** .17
36. .08
.17
37. .08
.00

19

20

.34
.23
-.03
.03
.06
-.12
-.17
.19
.22
.14
.22
.04
-.01
.10
.05
.31 **
.36
.29

.68
-.02
.11
.19
.40
.57
.44
.68
.37
.72
.75
.30
.29
.46
.35
.67
.55

21

22

23

24

**

*
*
**
**
**

*
**
*

.03
.03
.14
.34
.45
.64
.62
.66
.60
.65
.08
.52
.42
.50
.51
.65

155

*
*
*

*

.54
.29
.44
.37
.36
.05
.20
-.21
.27
.29
.04
.02
.24
.09
.03

**
**
**
*
**

.60
.65
.48
.32
.15
*
.26
-.04
.49
** .38
.14
.17
*
.18
.22
.19

**
**
**
**
*
*
**

.55
.66
.22
.14
.28
.16
.43
.13
.25
.26
.23
.31
.22

**
**
*
**

*
*
*

Table 11 (cont'd)
17
18
38. .07
.14
39. -.05
-.07
40. .05
.12
41. -.04
.14
42. .00
.10
43. -.19
-.34 **
44. -.01
.00
45. .19
.03
46. .10
-.13
47. -.18
.06
48. .02
.06
49. .02
-.07
50. -.03
-.04
51. .11
.00
52. -.10
-.11
53. .02
-.19
54. .08
-.06
55. -.01
-.14
56. .06
-.14
57. -.17
-.12
58. -.15
-.07
59. -.02
.02
60. .14
.01
61. .11
.02
62. .04
-.02
63. .09
.03
64. .07
.15
65. -.05
.00
66. -.16
-.14
67. .13
.29 **
68. .13
.17
69. .23 *
.17
70. -.23 * -.18
71. -.32 ** -.37 **
72. .03
-.11
73. .07
-.13
74. .02
.08

19
.12
.14
.15
-.15
-.04
-.16
-.17
-.14
-.04
-.02
.07
.26
.13
.27
.10
.11
.19
.13
.16
.16
.14
.00
.22
.20
.11
.20
.07
.13
-.16
-.06
.05
.32
.07
-.07
.16
.33
.01

*
*

*

**

**

20
.05
-.21
.08
.30
-.04
-.02
.20
.24
.26
.37
.13
.10
.07
.06
.03
-.08
.18
.07
-.04
-.14
-.23
-.01
.19
-.12
-.08
.07
-.07
.05
-.45 *
.31
.18
.49 *
.35
.06
.00
.12
.27

21
.22
-.31
.24
-.05
-.02
.27
.29
.17
.18
.16
.32
-.02
-.05
-.09
-.23
-.15
.05
.08
-.09
.10
.21
-.21
.44
-.17
.00
.36
-.04
.55
-.57
-.05
-.12
.45
.25
.20
-.31
.16
.15

156

22
23
.29 ** .26 **
-.06
.04
.20 *
.29 **
-.24 * -.14
.04
.13
-.05
-.09
-.11
-.06
-.08
-.02
-.03
-.11
-.03
-.13
.05
-.01
.13
.04
.14
.09
-.08
-.22 *
.09
-.09
.07
-.07
.15
.03
-.05
-.06
.02
-.02
.08
.01
.01
-.10
.05
-.10
.08
-.01
.09
-.03
.17
.09
.15
.05
-.09
-.20
-.07
-.27 **
.10
.08
.04
-.08
-.08
-.17
-.02
-.06
.14
.05
-.04
-.09
-.02
.07
.01
-.01
-.12
-.12

24
.05
-.01
.09
-.08
.04
-.01
.04
.08
-.08
-.03
.06
.11
.11
-.06
.03
.06
.01
-.01
.12
-.04
.02
-.20 *
.15
.14
.22 *
.14
-.17
-.24 *
.14
.03
-.13
-.04
-.02
-.08
.07
.00
-.13

Table 11 (cont'd)
17
18
75. .14
.04
76. .03
-.04
77. -.05
.07
78. -.01
.04
79. .13
-.12
80. .02
.10
81. .00
-.02
82. .13
-.02
83. -.07
-.35
84. -.12
-.25
85. -.11
-.22
86. -.08
-.14
87. .07
.26
88. -.04
-.16
89. -.11
-.28
90. .10
.21
91. .01
-.06
92. .10
.18
93. .13
.10
94. -.04
.03
95. -.02
-.02
96. -.05
-.04
97. .00
-.03
98. .11
-.01
99. -.01
.07
100. .25
.10
101. .13
.08
102. -.03
.02
103. .02
.05
104. .07
-.19
105. .25
-.06
106. .10
.06
107. .00
.02
108. .00
-.12
109. .09
-.09
110. .09
.02
111. -.01
-.02

**
*

*
**

19
.22
.18
.14
.11
.20
.06
.05
.07
.13
.12
.04
.21
-.10
.04
.07
.14
-.13
.15
.02
.00
.11
-.06
-.01
.10
.02
-.08
.16
-.02
-.26
-.10
.03
.28
.19
.15
.21
.07
.10

20
.42
.17
.26
.45
.19
-.23
.32
.19
-.05
.14
.30
.40
-.06
-.08
.02
.09
-.12
-.08
-.40
-.22
.42
-.16
.07
-.44
-.30
.67
.05
-.13
.45
.31
-.37
-.31
-.53
-.24
-.24
-.22
-.45

*

*

*
*

21
.32
.27
.13
.31
.38
-.59 *
.16
.23
.14
.18
.26
-.18
-.02
-.14
-.06
-.11
-.24
.15
-.32
-.21
.37
.23
.16
-.34
-.12
.57
-.63
.15
.63
.a
**
-.68
-.75
-.48
-.26
-.32
-.51
.a
**

157

22
-.11
.05
.02
.07
-.04
.02
-.07
-.04
.08
.16
.13
-.01
.06
.13
-.10
-.05
-.12
-.04
.19 *
.11
.12
-.22 *
-.17
.10
.15
.17
-.09
.15
.23
.01
-.14
-.08
-.18
-.12
-.20
-.21
-.03

23
-.04
.20
-.02
.20
.12
-.07
-.04
-.24
.27
.30
.31
.04
-.03
.16
.02
-.26
-.25
.02
.21
.27
.15
.01
-.02
.16
.19
.09
-.12
.04
.12
-.04
-.12
.00
-.06
-.14
-.22
-.21
-.07

*
**
**
**

**
*
*
**

24
.03
.02
-.15
.01
.04
-.13
.00
-.25
.14
.13
.18
.15
-.06
.14
.01
-.19
-.21
.05
.10
.19
.24
.01
.08
.04
.07
.02
.08
.12
-.08
-.15
-.06
.16
-.02
-.04
-.11
-.07
-.16

*

*
*

*

Table 11 (cont'd)
17
18
112. .05
.05
113. -.07
-.06
114. -.04
-.11
115. .00
-.11
116. -.06
-.02
117. .08
.08
118. .08
.08
119. .20
.08

19
.03
.07
.18
.10
.12
.24
.12
.17

20
-.10
-.36
-.30
-.28
-.45
.40
.27
.49

21
22
-.30
-.13
-.61
-.12
-.31
-.05
-.47
-.32 *
.a
** -.09
.43
.10
.44
-.02
.40
.04

158

23
-.19
-.13
-.06
-.26
.02
.04
-.10
.12

24
-.22
-.12
-.15
-.22
-.07
.17
-.03
.20

Table 11 (cont'd)
25
26
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26. .76 **
27. .50 ** .29
28. .44 ** .27
29. .38 *
.41
30. .50 *
.37
31. .77 ** .57
32. .30 *
.45
33. .38 *
.37
34. .34 *
.42
35. .29
.34
36. .40
.39
37. .38
.35

27

*
*
**
*
*

.66
.63
.64
.61
.40
.30
.21
.29
.33
.40

28

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

.64
.78
.79
.25
.26
.17
.23
.58
.52

29

**
**
**
*
*
*
**

.59
.63
.27
.25
.12
.32
.42
.59

159

30

**
**
**
*
**
*

.89
.31
.35
.31
.55
.69
.64

31

32

**

**
**
*

.28
.39
.30
.54 *
.76 **
.76 *

.22 *
.24 *
.32 **
.25
.08

Table 11 (cont'd)
25
26
38. -.05
-.10
39. -.15
-.12
40. .00
-.04
41. -.09
.05
42. -.25
-.09
43. .14
.09
44. -.14
-.17
45. .07
.08
46. .06
.00
47. .16
.17
48. .24
.36 *
49. .08
.12
50. .23
.18
51. -.09
-.18
52. .11
.10
53. .01
.05
54. -.03
.09
55. .21
.28
56. .03
-.01
57. .08
-.03
58. .07
.22
59. -.05
-.05
60. -.04
.05
61. -.07
.01
62. .09
.17
63. -.05
.01
64. -.15
-.05
65. -.23
-.17
66. .11
.09
67. -.01
.27
68. -.11
.04
69. -.12
-.09
70. .16
.21
71. .17
.12
72. .05
.26
73. -.07
.16
74. -.29
-.26

27
.15
-.22
.06
-.18
-.03
.01
-.11
-.10
.04
-.07
.10
.22
.15
-.01
.06
-.01
-.08
.03
-.01
-.09
-.01
.06
.07
.00
.02
.07
-.19
-.08
.14
-.13
-.30
-.06
.22
.01
.01
.09
.03

*

*

**
*

28
.01
.03
.04
.01
.01
.09
-.10
-.11
-.06
.06
.10
.15
.14
.19
.11
.01
-.05
.13
-.04
-.07
.04
-.01
.06
-.05
-.01
.04
-.12
-.07
-.05
-.10
-.18
-.04
.19
.17
-.05
.03
-.16

29
.06
-.15
.02
.00
.07
.14
.05
.00
.02
-.01
.02
.07
.10
-.06
.05
-.01
-.15
.01
-.05
-.13
-.02
-.26 *
.08
.06
.09
.07
-.17
.03
.02
-.18
-.14
-.01
.14
-.01
-.05
.08
-.14

160

30
-.06
-.18
.19
.15
-.15
.09
-.01
-.08
.15
-.09
-.01
-.16
-.31
-.15
-.33
-.21
.00
-.17
-.08
-.15
-.14
.19
-.06
-.28
-.29
-.20
.12
-.08
-.11
-.09
.00
.01
.10
.12
.12
.11
.28

31
.07
-.05
.41
-.06
-.34
.26
.08
.00
.25
.00
.09
-.11
-.06
-.27
-.26
-.15
.07
-.03
-.08
.02
-.07
.03
.10
-.22
.01
.00
.23
-.02
-.20
.14
.08
.06
.49
.29
.31
.35
.32

32
.20 *
-.07
.39 **
.07
.06
-.08
-.12
-.07
-.06
.00
-.18
.05
-.05
-.11
-.03
.01
.02
-.04
-.09
-.20 *
-.03
-.02
-.04
-.10
-.06
-.02
-.08
-.16
.07
.03
-.16
-.17
-.07
-.12
.00
-.07
.02

Table 11 (cont'd)
25
26
75. -.02
.18
76. -.01
.01
77. -.07
.06
78. .16
.28
79. .13
.14
80. -.22
-.11
81. -.02
.15
82. .05
-.05
83. .28
.20
84. .32 *
.27
85. .32 *
.37 *
86. .27
.22
87. -.07
.07
88. .20
.06
89. .07
-.18
90. -.45 ** -.28
91. -.11
.03
92. -.07
-.16
93. .02
-.07
94. .15
.15
95. .25
.48 **
96. .25
.26
97. .03
.16
98. -.01
-.12
99. -.02
.01
100. .01
.26
101. .01
.16
102. .07
.14
103. -.13
.11
104. -.21
-.14
105. -.18
-.56 *
106. .24
-.15
107. .19
-.09
108. .00
-.09
109. .02
-.03
110. .22
.14
111. -.20
-.36

27
.02
.07
.07
.04
.08
.06
.07
.17
.01
-.04
.08
.10
-.12
.06
.08
-.04
-.17
-.01
-.10
-.11
.07
-.18
-.12
.06
-.07
.02
.17
.23
.08
.32 *
.19
.09
-.02
-.14
-.07
.05
-.21

28
.13
-.05
-.08
-.10
.12
-.15
.07
.17
.08
-.01
.05
.28
-.23
-.03
.23
.01
-.05
-.04
-.28
-.18
.00
-.11
.01
-.06
-.18
.05
.07
.11
-.04
.13
.18
.08
.03
-.05
-.03
.10
-.24

*
*
*

**

29
.05
-.04
.01
-.11
.00
-.10
.10
.05
.05
-.01
.12
.01
-.10
-.08
-.01
.02
.03
-.13
-.22 *
-.17
.02
-.12
-.12
-.09
-.17
.03
.14
.07
.03
.11
.17
.04
-.10
-.28 *
-.06
-.14
-.18

161

30
.31
.09
.07
-.12
.37
-.20
.16
.50 *
.01
-.20
.19
.16
-.06
-.26
-.03
.15
.07
-.08
-.41 *
-.44 *
.26
.10
.00
-.35
-.34
.09
.34
.07
-.21
.07
.34
.04
-.06
.02
.10
.18
-.18

31
.47
.17
.24
-.02
.41
-.31
.10
.40
.25
-.04
.56 *
.09
-.08
-.02
.02
.02
.05
-.10
-.20
-.11
.30
.07
.19
-.17
-.11
.63
-.42
.23
.20
.16
-.20
-.04
-.11
.69 *
.53
.44
-.15

32
-.06
.01
.09
.01
-.05
-.01
.07
-.06
.07
.12
.14
.11
-.01
-.03
.00
.05
.01
.13
-.08
.01
.00
-.23 *
-.22 *
-.03
-.02
-.08
-.02
.19
.10
.01
-.01
-.03
.04
-.25
-.20
-.10
-.07

Table 11 (cont'd)
25
26
112. .27
-.04
113. .00
-.17
114. .05
-.02
115. .10
.06
116. -.05
-.15
117. .10
.12
118. -.02
-.15
119. -.15
-.08

27
.00
.13
-.18
-.14
-.14
.32 *
.25
.32 *

28
.05
.07
-.11
-.04
-.10
.28 *
.21
.16

29
-.20
-.06
-.14
-.25
-.09
.30 *
.12
.17

162

30
.08
.06
.00
.13
-.26
.16
.15
.28

31
.63
-.08
.54
.39
.a
**
.43
.24
.70

32
-.11
-.10
-.13
-.11
-.10
.09
.02
.06

Table 11 (cont'd)
33
34
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34. .82 **
35. .65 ** .66 **
36. .67 ** .66 **
37. .80 ** .64 *

35

.77 **
.85 **

36

37

.93 **

163

38

39

40

Table 11 (cont'd)
33
34
38. -.07
-.01
39. -.11
-.12
40. .06
.12
41. .09
.20
42. .05
.15
43. -.05
-.15
44. -.09
.06
45. .17
.22 *
46. .20
.18
47. .01
.04
48. .16
.03
49. .08
.03
50. .08
.10
51. -.02
-.11
52. .05
.01
53. -.02
-.01
54. -.06
-.07
55. .12
.06
56. .02
.03
57. -.02
-.10
58. -.07
-.08
59. -.05
-.21 *
60. .15
.14
61. .14
.11
62. .10
.05
63. .11
.14
64. -.05
.00
65. -.18
-.16
66. .07
-.06
67. -.02
.08
68. -.16
-.11
69. .01
-.02
70. -.23 * -.14
71. -.22
-.20
72. -.12
-.19
73. -.09
-.16
74. -.06
-.07

35
.02
-.09
.21 *
.06
-.01
.01
.01
.02
.06
-.11
-.02
.18
.10
.01
.08
.07
.08
.14
.05
-.06
-.08
-.23 *
.18
.17
.10
.19
.07
.00
-.09
.03
-.08
-.03
-.09
-.19
-.19
-.13
-.21

36
-.03
-.10
.27
.16
-.22
.36
-.02
-.15
.08
.47
.05
.24
.12
.07
.14
.06
.18
.15
.04
.08
-.14
-.07
.25
.02
-.01
.12
-.01
-.24
-.02
.05
-.23
.39
.24
.01
.21
-.05
.05

37
-.07
-.16
.39
.09
-.17
.40
.01
-.22
.09
.39
-.07
.06
.05
-.09
-.14
-.14
.12
.03
-.12
.14
-.07
-.14
.24
-.22
-.23
.08
.02
-.04
-.05
-.07
-.26
.44
.33
.23
.15
-.13
-.03

164

38

39

.16
.41 ** .02
-.11
-.14
.01
-.12
-.06
-.01
.00
-.20 *
-.01
-.11
-.14
-.08
-.02
.04
-.03
.06
.13
.11
.13
.20 *
-.04
.27 **
.18
.18
.11
.22 *
.07
.09
-.01
.18
.19
.29 **
.14
.09
.13
.14
-.01
-.05
.12
.32 **
.06
.23 *
.17
.24 *
.19
.30 **
.04
-.06
-.09
.07
-.03
.02
.05
-.05
-.04
-.12
-.18
-.10
.25 *
.11
.02
.10
.03
.07
.10
.09
.03
-.12

40

-.01
.01
-.20 *
-.09
-.03
-.16
-.24
-.23 *
-.19
-.15
-.06
-.18
-.01
.06
-.17
-.02
.05
.04
.04
-.10
-.13
-.09
.00
.14
-.15
-.07
.04
.10
-.16
.03
-.04
-.04
-.03
-.10

Table 11 (cont'd)
33
34
75. -.06
-.12
76. -.14
-.14
77. -.17
-.06
78. -.11
-.07
79. .01
-.12
80. -.36 ** -.18
81. -.12
-.14
82. -.16
-.07
83. -.05
-.09
84. -.03
-.07
85. .04
.00
86. .14
.14
87. -.16
-.13
88. .06
.06
89. .12
.11
90. -.07
-.06
91. -.02
-.06
92. -.01
.10
93. -.04
.01
94. -.06
.00
95. .10
.15
96. -.04
-.08
97. .06
.05
98. .04
.02
99. -.04
.02
100. .07
.16
101. .25
.19
102. .22
.17
103. -.18
-.19
104. .01
-.03
105. .14
-.04
106. .09
.09
107. .17
.16
108. .00
-.11
109. .07
.03
110. .09
.11
111. -.02
-.03

35
-.11
-.18
-.14
-.25 *
-.09
-.19
-.27 *
-.05
-.19
-.18
-.05
.14
-.10
.00
.06
.06
-.16
.05
-.08
-.06
.14
-.21
-.09
.03
.01
.13
.12
.30 *
-.23
-.18
-.15
.09
.08
-.08
.00
-.06
-.08

36
37
.25
.22
-.06
.02
.05
-.10
.09
.09
.10
.18
-.39
-.54
-.20
-.30
-.05
.06
-.03
.04
.05
.17
.34
.39
.18
-.16
-.14
-.23
-.13
-.07
.11
.15
.14
-.04
-.18
-.48
-.16
-.11
-.42 * -.42
-.26
-.40
.28
.13
-.09
.13
.08
-.07
-.36
-.35
-.18
-.14
.23
.33
.07
-.50
.47
.85 *
.01
.14
-.02
.01
-.52
-.80
-.08
-.46
-.17
-.24
.06
.08
-.23
-.46
-.02
-.06
-.33
.a

165

38
-.06
.16
.02
.06
.17
.11
.03
.07
.11
.06
.06
-.17
.08
.02
-.09
.07
-.10
.12
.24 *
.08
.08
-.10
-.05
.14
.06
.03
-.10
.27
.17
-.13
-.19
.05
.10
-.02
-.07
-.08
.04

39
-.05
.05
-.08
.07
.03
-.11
-.06
.10
.25
.21
.16
.22
-.03
.13
.08
-.03
-.04
.01
.12
.22
.14
.05
.12
.03
-.04
-.24
-.20
.03
-.24
-.06
.06
.13
.43
.44
.33
.25
.29

40
-.06
.03
-.03
-.08
-.01
.02
-.09
.05
*
.13
*
.14
.09
*
.01
-.07
.03
.06
.05
.07
.49
.26
*
.26
-.15
-.28
-.23
.35
.37
-.03
-.21
.02
-.08
-.16
-.19
-.09
** -.02
** -.04
* -.27
-.19
*
.08

**
**
**
**
*
**
**

Table 11 (cont'd)
33
34
112. .05
.05
113. .04
-.04
114. .01
.08
115. .09
.02
116. .02
.01
117. .19
.17
118. .20
.12
119. .14
.07

35
-.01
-.16
.17
-.07
-.13
.21
.05
.04

36
37
-.10
-.17
-.29
-.52
.18
.63
.09
.17
-.33
.a
.63 *
.91 *
.38
.76
.30
.41

166

38
-.02
-.10
.01
-.17
-.05
.13
.15
.15

39
40
.16
-.21
.20
-.19
.37 ** .10
.27 * -.23
.21
.03
.05
-.13
.08
-.12
.07
-.15

Table 11 (cont'd)
41
42
38.
39.
40.
41.
42. .20 **
43. -.20 ** -.16
44. .51 ** .13
45. .57 ** .14
46. .33 ** .08
47. .06
.07
48. .00
.01
49. -.07
.00
50. -.09
-.01
51. -.12 ** -.05
52. -.07
.03
53. -.08
.00
54. -.12 ** -.09
55. -.17 ** .01
56. -.04
-.03
57. -.09
-.08
58. -.10 * -.03
59. -.01
-.08
60. -.03
-.04
61. -.03
-.06
62. -.02
-.05
63. -.03
-.06
64. .15 * -.05
65. .01
.09
66. .01
-.09
67. .08
.00
68. .04
.02
69. -.04
-.11
70. -.10
-.03
71. .03
-.05
72. .01
-.07
73. .02
-.01
74. .12
-.05

43

**
**
**

*

*

44

-.16 **
-.22 **
-.12 **
-.02
.00
.00
.01
.03
.01
-.04
-.01
-.03
-.06
.05
.03
.02
.00
-.01
.03
.03
-.10
.01
.01
-.07
.01
.02
.02
.06
-.03
-.10
-.12

.76
.40
-.05
-.09
-.13
-.07
-.04
-.04
-.09
.02
-.12
-.08
.00
-.08
.02
-.09
-.13
-.07
-.13
.07
.14
-.08
.02
.04
-.08
-.08
-.12
-.07
-.06
.05

45

**
**
*
**

*
**

*
**
**
*

46

47

.55 **
.04
.03
-.07
.02
-.07
.03
-.06
-.04
-.09 *
-.01
-.02
-.06
-.01
-.07
-.08
.00
-.08 *
.06
.06
.01
.08
.08
-.03
-.11
-.07
-.04
-.01
.07

.04
.04
.00
-.03
-.10 *
.00
-.07
-.05
-.07
-.04
-.03
-.07
.03
-.01
-.02
.04
-.09 *
.07
.03
-.01
.10
.04
.16 *
-.07
-.11
.00
.00
.14

.46
.31
.28
.06
.26
.18
.02
.21
.17
-.06
.14
-.15
.23
.26
.28
.22
-.13
-.04
.14
.02
-.14
-.20
-.03
.01
-.01
-.06
.06

167

48

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*

.37
.34
.13
.34
.26
.11
.26
.23
.11
.26
.02
.29
.31
.38
.30
-.01
.07
.01
.04
.03
-.11
.03
.04
.08
.13
.06

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
*
**
**
**
**
**

Table 11 (cont'd)
41
42
75. .03
.01
76. .02
.03
77. .12
-.02
78. -.05
-.06
79. -.04
-.09
80. -.05
-.01
81. .09
-.05
82. -.11
.03
83. -.02
-.02
84. -.07
-.11
85. .03
-.07
86. -.03
-.21 *
87. -.03
.09
88. -.12
-.17
89. .04
-.22 *
90. .12
.13
91. .09
.06
92. -.08
.00
93. -.18
-.01
94. -.11
-.11
95. .01
.00
96. .07
-.04
97. .05
-.04
98. -.17
-.02
99. -.25 * -.07
100. .17
-.03
101. -.04
.02
102. -.11
.01
103. -.13
.00
104. -.02
.05
105. .22 *
.09
106. .07
.08
107. .06
.02
108. -.04
-.08
109. .02
-.01
110. .02
-.01
111. .12
.06

43
-.02
-.01
-.12
-.02
-.01
-.02
.06
-.02
.03
-.02
.02
.11
-.15
.02
.21
-.05
.02
-.06
-.22
-.06
-.05
.15
.11
-.20
-.24
-.09
-.04
-.10
-.04
-.06
.00
.01
.13
.02
.13
.10
.03

*

*

*
**

44
-.02
-.11
.04
-.11
-.13 *
.04
-.01
-.06
-.08
-.12
-.06
-.22 *
.11
-.06
-.13
.01
-.07
-.01
.01
-.09
.13
.08
-.06
-.08
-.07
.00
-.11
-.06
-.14
-.08
.00
.02
.02
-.07
.10
-.08
.19 *

45
-.01
-.10
.07
-.18 **
-.10
-.10
-.06
-.02
.01
-.06
-.01
-.12
.02
-.06
-.07
-.03
-.04
.01
.07
-.01
.13
.12
.01
.01
-.05
.15
-.19 *
-.03
-.03
.16
.15
.14
.14
-.06
.19 *
.03
.09

168

46
-.05
-.11
.22
-.10
-.12
-.07
.00
.06
.03
-.04
.05
.03
-.09
.07
.10
-.06
.16
-.21
-.13
-.11
.05
.01
-.04
.00
-.10
.08
-.09
.02
-.06
.43
.14
.12
.21
.10
.25
.09
.18

47
-.05
-.05
** .08
-.01
.00
-.07
.06
.00
-.02
-.01
-.03
.16
-.04
-.06
.10
.09
-.10
*
.04
-.13
-.15
-.10
-.16
.08
-.08
.04
-.23 *
.07
-.02
.01
** -.04
-.09
.16
*
.21
.07
*
.09
.15
-.04

48
.10
.00
.12
-.07
.10
-.06
-.08
-.01
-.02
-.04
-.09
.06
-.06
-.05
.02
.00
-.15
-.09
.01
-.05
.03
-.01
.12
.03
.04
-.03
.19 *
.03
-.05
-.02
-.05
.03
.08
.01
.05
.05
.02

Table 11 (cont'd)
41
42
112. .02
.05
113. -.02
.16
114. .00
-.01
115. .06
.04
116. -.02
.05
117. -.06
-.11
118. .04
-.11
119. -.02
-.09

43
.10
.07
.09
.06
-.03
.05
.06
.04

44
-.07
-.06
.09
.05
.03
.01
-.03
-.01

45
-.02
.05
.03
.11
-.03
.02
.00
.00

169

46
.01
.13
.05
.14
-.07
.04
.03
.05

47
48
.09
.07
.35 ** .17
.04
.03
.26 *
.05
-.23 * -.18
-.09
-.02
-.07
-.04
-.12
-.11

Table 11 (cont'd)
49
50
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50. .63 **
51. .20 ** .30
52. .56 ** .64
53. .62 ** .57
54. .00
.11
55. .56 ** .54
56. .52 ** .50
57. .04
.16
58. .45 ** .46
59. -.19 ** -.13
60. .57 ** .45
61. .60 ** .48
62. .54 ** .47
63. .54 ** .47
64. -.05
-.04
65. -.07
-.04
66. .09
.06
67. .12
.10
68. .00
-.02
69. -.07
-.12
70. .13
.11
71. .08
.01
72. .13 *
.12
73. .10
.09
74. .06
.06

51

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

.30
.32
.34
.32
.25
.38
.29
.18
.13
.15
.21
.18
-.10
.03
.00
-.07
-.14
-.11
.19
.16
.20
.22
.01

52

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*
**
*
**
**

.53
.16
.61
.40
.17
.43
-.05
.41
.40
.47
.40
-.10
.02
.06
.09
-.06
-.09
.03
-.02
.04
.05
.04

53

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

.05
.65
.71
.14
.50
-.13
.57
.59
.55
.57
-.03
-.05
.04
.11
.01
-.06
.13
.13
.19
.20
.09

170

54

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*
**
**

.11
-.01
.47
.10
.33
-.07
-.07
.05
-.07
.07
.02
-.01
.07
-.02
-.04
-.01
-.05
.01
.07
.00

55

56

**
.55
** .20
*
.50
** -.03
.42
.44
.42
.40
-.04
-.01
.03
.10
-.01
-.06
.05
.09
.07
.05
.02

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

.12
.52
-.14
.49
.50
.46
.47
.02
-.04
-.02
.07
.02
-.05
.09
.16
.15
.15
.10

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*
*
*

Table 11 (cont'd)
49
50
75. .08
.05
76. .09
.05
77. .14 *
.13 *
78. -.04
-.02
79. .05
.09
80. -.03
.06
81. .01
.02
82. .11
.16 *
83. .09
.05
84. .03
.01
85. .04
-.04
86. .18
.12
87. -.10
.00
88. .02
.04
89. .10
.01
90. .04
.00
91. -.14
-.16
92. -.04
.06
93. .02
.17
94. .05
.19 *
95. .08
.16
96. -.09
.09
97. .09
.07
98. .01
.08
99. .00
.00
100. -.02
-.03
101. .17
.07
102. -.14
.03
103. .03
.07
104. .01
-.01
105. -.10
-.16
106. .01
.10
107. -.13
.03
108. -.12
-.01
109. -.06
.06
110. -.07
.04
111. -.14
.02

51
.18
.12
.07
.05
.14
.04
.04
.00
.15
.14
.00
.12
.04
-.12
.02
.13
.00
.01
-.04
.00
-.09
-.07
-.01
.07
.09
-.18
-.02
.29
-.14
-.07
-.03
.19
.23
.22
.25
.14
.14

**

*

*
*

**

*
*
**

52
-.02
-.05
.09
-.07
-.03
.00
.01
.04
-.03
-.04
-.08
.14
-.04
-.02
.04
.09
.01
.05
.09
.17
.10
.05
.14
.08
.02
-.08
.10
.03
.07
.07
-.10
.10
.12
.00
.12
.06
.09

53
.13 *
.14 *
.09
.05
.08
.07
.06
.12
.12
.08
.01
.13
-.04
.06
.04
.11
.06
-.01
.09
.12
-.03
-.19 *
-.10
.05
.03
.01
.09
.11
.12
-.04
-.13
-.08
-.17
-.14
-.12
-.09
-.03

171

54
.02
-.03
.04
-.04
.12
.00
.08
-.04
-.01
-.02
-.01
.04
-.07
.10
.11
-.06
-.10
.04
.02
-.02
.04
.03
.03
.06
.06
-.07
.07
.07
-.13
-.16
-.01
-.11
.03
.11
.03
.11
.00

55
.05
-.01
.04
-.01
.06
-.01
-.03
.15 *
.07
.05
-.07
.22 *
-.09
.07
.11
.02
.04
-.13
.05
.12
.09
-.06
.06
.00
-.03
.00
.13
-.01
.13
.04
-.14
.04
-.01
.05
.10
-.01
.07

56
.09
.13
.09
.09
.10
.03
.04
.13 *
.14 *
.12
.05
.11
-.09
.07
.06
.03
-.04
-.08
.07
.06
.09
-.15
-.10
.02
-.01
-.01
.03
.08
.03
-.09
.00
-.03
-.10
-.12
-.07
-.10
-.05

Table 11 (cont'd)
49
50
112. .02
.10
113. .01
.08
114. -.16
.04
115. -.07
.07
116. -.20 * -.09
117. -.02
.18
118. -.04
.09
119. -.07
.05

51
.23 *
.09
.17
.23 *
-.02
.08
.06
.05

52
.14
.20 *
.01
.09
-.07
.22 *
.13
.06

53
.01
.00
-.10
.00
-.10
-.02
-.08
-.11

172

54
-.02
.04
.15
.02
-.05
.07
.10
.03

55
.14
.07
.06
.07
-.02
.04
-.05
-.01

56
.04
-.02
-.06
.06
-.06
.01
.00
-.03

Table 11 (cont'd)
57
58
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58. .27 **
59. .37 ** .09
60. -.03
.26
61. -.02
.27
62. .03
.26
63. -.01
.28
64. -.02
.08
65. .01
.05
66. -.07
-.08
67. .02
.14
68. .01
.08
69. .02
.00
70. .04
.03
71. .01
.04
72. .04
.05
73. .10
.03
74. .01
.11

59

*
**
**
**
**

*

-.34
-.40
-.30
-.34
.11
-.03
.00
.08
.06
.13
-.03
-.06
.07
.02
.13

60

**
**
**
**

.89
.78
.83
-.08
-.02
.07
.06
-.03
-.03
.14
.07
.16
.17
.03

61

**
**
**

*
*
*

.82
.79
-.05
.01
.01
.08
.05
-.04
.12
.06
.14
.15
.03

173

62

**
**

*
*

.76
-.08
-.04
.07
.04
-.04
-.12
.14
.12
.17
.17
.01

63

64

**

*
*
*

-.11
-.01
.09
.09
-.05
-.05
.20
.13
.23
.17
.03

.10
-.31
.35
.61
.35
** -.16
* -.22
** -.19
* -.17
-.11

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

Table 11 (cont'd)
57
58
75. .07
.02
76. .05
-.02
77. .00
.08
78. -.01
.00
79. .07
-.01
80. -.04
.08
81. .06
.08
82. -.06
.14 *
83. .14 * -.02
84. .10
-.05
85. .05
-.09
86. -.18
.00
87. .11
.03
88. -.06
.00
89. -.10
-.01
90. .03
.05
91. -.02
.13
92. -.13
-.03
93. .15
.09
94. .06
.11
95. -.02
.00
96. .14
.01
97. -.02
-.04
98. .14
-.02
99. .14
.04
100. -.23 * -.02
101. .02
.10
102. .11
-.01
103. -.24 ** .14
104. -.23 * -.07
105. -.08
-.14
106. -.02
-.07
107. .05
-.07
108. -.02
-.09
109. .01
-.06
110. .03
-.07
111. .00
-.03

59
.08
.06
-.05
-.01
.03
.01
.07
-.01
.00
-.04
-.09
-.09
.05
-.14
-.04
.13
-.02
-.16
-.02
-.14
-.06
.11
.02
-.03
-.05
.05
.06
-.05
.02
.12
.02
-.03
.03
-.08
.02
-.02
-.11

60
.13
.11
.13 *
.06
.09
.04
.10
.12
.10
.11
.09
.11
.02
.13
-.02
-.04
-.10
-.03
.18
.21 *
.14
-.07
.02
.11
.08
.08
.03
-.07
.04
-.05
-.07
-.03
-.08
-.01
-.12
.00
.07

61
.12
.06
.16 *
-.01
.09
.05
.04
.11
.08
.08
.09
.13
-.01
.17
.00
-.11
-.04
-.04
.17
.24 *
.17
-.04
.06
.04
.07
.02
.10
.04
.03
-.04
-.07
-.01
-.10
-.01
-.11
-.01
.03

174

62
.13
.07
.12
-.04
.08
.00
.05
.07
.08
.08
.05
.09
.01
.06
-.02
-.03
-.09
-.06
.20 *
.19 *
.14
.00
.06
.16
.13
.00
.07
.00
.07
-.09
-.10
.08
.03
-.03
-.07
.08
.05

63
.15
.11
.16
.03
.09
.07
.09
.12
.14
.12
.10
.15
-.06
.13
.08
-.04
-.10
.07
.20
.22
.07
-.08
.03
.19
.15
-.04
.04
.07
-.07
-.09
-.13
-.01
-.04
.01
-.06
-.05
.07

*
*

*

*
*

*

64
-.09
-.24
-.09
-.17
-.13
-.12
-.09
-.12
-.23
-.25
-.16
-.22
.13
-.27
-.20
.43
.21
.10
.04
-.21
-.26
-.12
-.08
.10
-.05
.06
.14
-.17
.19
.09
-.04
.05
.01
-.10
-.01
-.13
.11

**
**
*

**
**
**

**
**

*

*

Table 11 (cont'd)
57
58
112. .00
.01
113. .05
.02
114. .04
-.01
115. .14
.01
116. .04
-.04
117. -.01
-.16
118. .01
-.16
119. -.11
-.21 *

59
-.08
-.01
.03
-.05
.10
-.12
-.01
-.08

60
.02
.07
-.05
.05
-.11
.05
-.03
-.02

61
.02
.05
-.07
-.01
-.16
-.01
-.07
-.08

175

62
.11
.19 *
-.04
.12
-.13
.08
-.04
-.05

63
.03
.04
.03
-.01
-.10
.06
-.03
-.08

64
-.02
-.07
.10
.04
.06
-.03
.01
-.02

Table 11 (cont'd)
65
66
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66. -.45 **
67. -.04
-.16
68. .16 ** -.40
69. .06
-.23
70. -.03
.07
71. -.17 ** .16
72. -.14 *
.10
73. -.11
.13
74. -.02
.22

67

**
**
**
**
*
**

.50
.28
.00
-.18
-.21
-.18
.00

68

**
**
**
**
**

.52
-.18
-.24
-.27
-.25
-.12

69

**
**
**
**
**
*

.00
-.07
-.05
-.06
.01

176

70

.52
.34
.44
.15

71

**
**
**
*

.37 **
.40 **
.09

72

.70 **
.32 **

Table 11 (cont'd)
65
66
75. -.06
-.02
76. -.10
.11
77. .03
.13
78. -.02
-.03
79. -.14 *
.08
80. -.09
.14
81. -.04
.03
82. -.09
-.12
83. -.09
.27
84. -.06
.20
85. -.15 *
.25
86. .14
.12
87. -.03
.01
88. .00
.12
89. .03
.09
90. .13
-.07
91. .01
-.12
92. .10
-.04
93. -.16
.13
94. -.04
.15
95. .04
-.01
96. .00
.09
97. -.03
-.03
98. -.15
.15
99. -.06
.09
100. -.07
-.12
101. -.02
-.01
102. -.27 ** .38
103. -.04
-.10
104. .05
.04
105. .03
-.02
106. .08
-.08
107. .11
.01
108. .09
.09
109. .14
-.01
110. .07
.06
111. .12
-.01

*

*
*
**
**
**

**

67
-.08
-.21
.08
-.14
-.20
-.02
-.08
.05
-.11
-.19
-.13
-.02
.05
.09
-.08
.05
-.01
.02
.18
.04
.06
-.06
-.02
.11
.06
.26
-.08
.08
.36
.12
-.12
-.09
-.11
-.08
-.09
-.03
-.04

**
*
**

**
*

**

**

68
-.13
-.26
-.03
-.27
-.17
-.13
-.18
.00
-.28
-.30
-.27
-.23
.10
-.15
-.21
.13
.19
.06
.05
-.17
-.07
-.01
-.04
-.08
-.14
.16
-.08
-.25
.32
.09
-.14
-.11
-.16
-.22
-.10
-.21
.00

*
**
**
**
*
**
**
**
**
*

*

**
**

*
*

69
.00
-.12
.02
.00
.01
-.05
-.04
-.01
.00
.00
.04
-.10
.07
.03
-.11
.00
.15
-.11
-.09
-.21
.03
.15
.14
-.21
-.34
-.01
-.07
-.17
.13
.21
.07
.04
.02
.03
.08
-.11
-.05

177

*

*
**

*

70
.32
.33
.17
.44
.32
.21
.31
.06
.39
.41
.41
.10
-.08
.13
.10
-.21
-.17
.07
.03
.02
.06
-.05
.09
.05
.06
.09
-.21
.16
.06
.15
.00
-.08
-.05
-.03
-.11
-.05
-.11

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*

*

71
.32
.33
.09
.31
.34
.18
.23
.16
.38
.37
.33
.09
-.04
.00
.12
-.11
-.05
-.02
-.06
-.12
-.02
.04
.02
-.06
-.06
-.11
-.04
.25
.05
.02
-.17
.04
-.07
.08
-.04
-.03
-.13

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**

72
.67
.63
.26
.53
.62
.31
.45
.11
.47
.47
.38
.06
.08
.04
-.04
-.07
.03
-.01
.14
.09
.16
.20
.29
.13
.07
-.10
-.05
.14
-.12
.07
.00
-.06
.04
.06
.00
-.01
-.16

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**

Table 11 (cont'd)
65
66
112. .08
.01
113. .12
-.04
114. .14
-.07
115. .08
.09
116. .10
-.03
117. .02
-.02
118. .07
-.07
119. .05
.00

67
-.07
-.11
-.01
-.12
-.11
.01
-.04
.05

68
-.20 *
-.17
-.06
-.17
-.12
-.11
-.05
-.14

69
-.13
-.08
-.03
-.05
-.06
.08
.06
.08

178

70
-.11
-.03
-.03
-.09
-.15
.04
.00
.09

71
-.03
.02
.02
.07
-.17
-.15
-.14
-.10

72
-.07
.04
.00
-.01
-.12
.07
.00
-.02

Table 11 (cont'd)
73
74
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74. .28 **

75

76

77

179

78

79

80

Table 11 (cont'd)
73
74
75. .68 ** .27
76. .59 ** .32
77. .32 ** .52
78. .44 ** .33
79. .63 ** .23
80. .29 ** .44
81. .42 ** .35
82. .03
.10
83. .48 ** .17
84. .45 ** .18
85. .45 ** .21
86. .22
.07
87. -.16
.02
88. .08
.05
89. .15
.03
90. -.06
.13
91. -.09
-.02
92. -.05
.09
93. -.06
.07
94. -.03
.00
95. .16
-.05
96. .03
-.01
97. .24 *
.20
98. .03
.08
99. -.03
.01
100. .13
-.07
101. -.10
-.17
102. .25 *
.13
103. -.11
.10
104. -.03
.14
105. .07
.22
106. .01
.01
107. .14
.07
108. .07
-.06
109. .10
.02
110. .11
-.02
111. .00
-.02

75
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*

.59
.33
.48
.57
.32
.43
.10
.34
.34
.38
.06
.06
-.09
-.05
.09
-.03
.03
-.01
.00
-.02
.06
.12
.12
.08
.08
.02
.08
-.03
-.07
-.01
-.06
-.01
-.10
-.06
-.01
-.16

76
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

.26
.57
.66
.30
.49
.07
.50
.49
.48
-.07
.13
-.06
-.13
-.05
-.25
-.04
.24
.15
.13
.23
.29
.20
.18
.09
-.12
-.01
.06
-.09
-.01
.01
.02
-.05
-.01
.03
.04

77

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*
*

*
**

.28
.08
.56
.23
.21
.10
.11
.17
.08
.01
.03
.03
.09
-.02
.06
.11
.14
-.02
-.03
.08
.21
.15
.00
-.12
.16
.12
.09
.03
.07
.14
.00
.09
.06
.02

180

78

79

80

**
**
**
**

**

*

.43
.41
.54
.23
.36
.48
.44
.03
.12
.24
-.06
-.21
-.09
.06
.12
.07
.12
.08
.15
.04
.06
.06
-.04
-.05
.03
-.06
.00
-.03
.00
-.07
-.16
-.01
-.08

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*
*

.14
.44
.02
.47
.42
.41
.06
.05
.01
.00
-.19
-.08
.02
.07
.10
.24
.31
.31
.01
-.04
.04
-.14
.11
-.09
-.05
-.08
-.11
-.03
.02
-.06
-.04
-.03

*
**
**
**
**

*
**
**

.40 **
.32 **
.00
.03
.11
-.19
.19
-.01
-.13
.08
-.08
.16
.21 *
.11
-.16
.01
.00
.19
.12
.09
-.03
.01
.08
-.07
-.09
.04
.05
-.09
-.04
.04
-.03

Table 11 (cont'd)
73
74
112. .04
-.10
113. .11
.03
114. .06
-.10
115. .16
.01
116. -.17
-.01
117. .10
.01
118. .07
.02
119. .08
.03

75
-.09
.00
-.01
-.03
-.14
-.01
-.04
-.11

76
.04
-.01
.04
.02
-.03
.04
.05
.03

77
-.09
.06
.02
.02
-.06
-.10
-.05
-.01

181

78
-.02
-.02
-.03
-.04
-.05
.10
.11
.13

79
-.01
-.04
-.09
-.02
-.23 *
.07
.04
.01

80
-.08
-.02
.05
.04
-.01
-.04
-.02
.01

Table 11 (cont'd)
81
82
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82. .17 **
83. .23 ** -.08
84. .22 ** -.10
85. .28 ** -.08
86. .08
-.12
87. .08
.07
88. .09
-.03
89. -.05
-.08
90. .03
.17
91. .09
.13
92. -.02
.11
93. .01
.10
94. -.04
-.05
95. .05
-.15
96. .03
-.11
97. .11
-.05
98. -.07
.07
99. -.07
-.13
100. .06
.19
101. -.05
-.04
102. -.11
.14
103. .18
.21 *
104. .04
.13
105. -.05
-.08
106. -.09
-.03
107. -.07
-.07
108. -.21 * -.04
109. -.11
-.05
110. -.09
-.07
111. -.08
.04

83

84

.83 **
.71 **
.24
-.10
.21
.20
-.20
-.02
-.02
.17
.18
.16
.10
.14
.17
.08
-.08
-.12
.11
-.13
-.03
.18
.02
.06
.18
.08
.15
.03

.73
.30
-.14
.31
.20
-.32
-.04
.09
.07
.15
.13
.03
.05
.09
.13
-.11
-.18
.11
-.08
-.02
.11
-.05
.04
.18
.03
.08
-.05

85

**
*
**
**

86

.22
-.11
-.77 **
.25 * .57 **
.16
.83 **
-.26 * -.38 **
-.04
-.13
-.01
.13
-.05
-.42 **
.07
.15
.19
.28 **
.05
-.26 *
.11
.16
.06
-.16
.03
-.14
.01
-.14
-.17
.01
.17
.26
.02
-.13
.02
.20
.05
.15
-.12
-.01
-.06
.02
.05
.06
-.06
-.01
-.03
.18
-.04
-.15

182

87

-.57
-.94
.44
.13
-.10
.41
.02
-.06
.21
-.15
.07
.15
-.05
.03
-.21
.07
-.20
-.24
.18
.07
.05
.10
-.03
.12

88

**
** .61
** -.76
-.15
.13
** .14
.28
.31
* -.05
.13
.04
-.10
.10
-.12
.21
-.04
.19
.08
-.08
-.03
.10
-.16
.09
-.09

**
**

**
**

Table 11 (cont'd)
81
82
112. -.10
-.07
113. -.02
.01
114. -.20 * -.06
115. .02
.00
116. -.12
-.06
117. .10
-.11
118. .09
-.05
119. .03
-.15

83
.06
.07
.19
.10
.01
.09
.04
.14

84
.04
.05
.13
.03
.01
.13
.07
.18

85
-.08
-.10
.03
-.03
.05
.02
.00
.09

183

86
87
.04
.11
.27
-.04
-.04
.06
-.10
.23
-.08
.07
.43 ** -.24
.40 ** -.24
.25
-.09

88
-.04
.11
-.05
-.12
-.03
.35 **
.29 *
.28 *

Table 11 (cont'd)
89
90
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90. -.45 **
91. -.14
.29
92. .12
-.08
93. -.39 ** -.12
94. .01
-.30
95. -.01
-.45
96. -.18
-.32
97. .16
-.21
98. -.09
-.01
99. -.16
-.01
100. -.06
.03
101. -.05
.13
102. .17
-.06
103. -.19
.07
104. .10
.00
105. .24
-.06
106. -.15
.19
107. .04
.13
108. .05
.16
109. -.04
.28
110. .15
.03
111. -.10
.29

91

92

93

94

95

96

**

**
**
**
*

*

.04
.02
.27 **
-.03
.40 **
-.14
-.13
-.10
-.04
-.10
.02
-.01
.28 **
-.10
.26 **
.03
.02
.23
-.22
-.18
-.03
.07
.04
.30 * -.05
-.06
-.11
-.15
-.26
-.12
-.19
-.03
-.23
-.04
-.39 **
-.15
-.36 **
.05
.03

.59
.09
.22
.02
.62
.54
.04
-.03
-.10
-.08
-.20
-.08
.16
.17
.14
.03
.01
.10

**
*
**
**

184

.27
.29
.14
.45
.49
-.02
-.16
-.01
-.16
-.12
-.04
-.07
-.01
.14
-.16
-.05
.00

**
**
**
**

.43 **
.41 ** .44 **
-.12
-.04
-.16
-.07
-.07
-.25
.09
.09
.36 ** .09
-.07
-.10
.03
-.13
-.08
.07
.11
.06
.05
.20
.06
.09
.05
.14
.15
.23
-.16
-.10

Table 11 (cont'd)
89
90
112. .00
.18
113. .07
-.01
114. -.01
.20
115. -.14
.17
116. -.09
.20
117. .21
-.19
118. .25
-.14
119. .09
-.15

91
-.14
-.18
-.09
-.11
-.01
-.20
-.21
-.21

92
-.41 **
-.33 *
-.08
-.32 *
-.03
-.05
-.03
-.15

93
.01
.00
.20
.13
.10
.06
.01
.17

185

94
-.11
-.06
.05
.00
.02
.15
.00
.09

95
96
-.06
-.02
.20
.19
.03
.07
.04
.26
-.09
-.07
.42 ** .12
.29 *
.09
.39 ** .10

Table 11 (cont'd)
97
98
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98. -.07
99. -.13
.77 **
100. -.13
-.13
101. .12
-.05
102. .19
.16
103. -.08
-.21
104. -.06
-.14
105. .11
.07
106. .18
.22
107. .24
.18
108. .24
.12
109. .31 * .07
110. .28 * .09
111. -.12
-.05

99

100

-.10
-.05
-.01
-.15
-.20
-.13
.01
-.01
.06
.03
-.07
-.04

-.22
-.31
.34
.17
-.11
-.14
-.21
-.16
-.09
-.09
-.06

101

**
**
**
*

*

102

.02
-.21 ** .00
-.13
-.04
.06
-.05
-.11
.00
-.18 *
.02
-.11
.00
-.14
.02
-.03
.01
-.19 *
.02

186

103

104

.39 **
-.21 *
-.04
-.14
-.18 *
-.10
-.12
-.06

.06
.04
.03
-.04
.06
-.05
.02

Table 11 (cont'd)
97
98
112. .02
-.06
113. .25
.13
114. .08
.14
115. .12
.11
116. -.05
.08
117. .25
.11
118. .23
.05
119. .21
.11

99
-.03
.01
.05
.02
.02
.04
-.05
.04

100
101
-.09
-.03
-.15
-.08
-.23 ** -.08
-.12
-.13
-.10
-.11
-.01
-.02
.03
-.03
.08
-.05

187

102
-.03
-.02
.05
-.01
-.03
.10
.08
.09

103
-.10
.04
-.11
-.07
-.09
-.04
-.03
-.02

104
-.07
.14
-.06
.00
-.02
.14
.13
.19 *

Table 11 (cont'd)
105
106
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106. .16
107. .24 ** .72
108. .12
.39
109. .23 ** .62
110. .27 ** .56
111. .07
.31

107

**
**
**
**
**

.54
.78
.61
.46

108

**
**
**
**

.62 **
.57 **
.47 **

109

.57 **
.56 **

188

110

.28 **

111

112

Table 11 (cont'd)
105
106
112. .29 ** .58
113. .24 ** .57
114. .04
.40
115. .20 *
.64
116. .09
.15
117. .21 *
.21
118. .21 *
.25
119. .29 ** .23

**
**
**
**
*
**
**

107
.65
.51
.54
.66
.28
.22
.23
.20

**
**
**
**
**
*
**
*

108
.59
.34
.58
.49
.42
.03
.05
.13

**
**
**
**
**

109
.58
.40
.55
.55
.34
.17
.18
.19

189

**
**
**
**
**
*
*

110
.71
.71
.45
.70
.20
.18
.24
.18

**
**
**
**
*
*
**
*

111
.41
.11
.57
.34
.49
.00
.00
.06

112
**
**
**
**

.52
.35
.63
.26
.15
.17
.16

**
**
**
**
*

Table 11 (cont'd)
113
114
115
116
112.
113.
114. .27 **
115. .64 ** .44 **
116. .06
.45 ** .22 **
117. .19 *
.07
.11
-.05
118. .25 ** .11
.14
-.02
119. .20 *
.09
.17
-.02

117

.88 **
.68 **

190

118

.73 **

Table 12
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Subordinate Study Variables
Variable
M
SD
1. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate A)
3.98
.65
2. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate B)
3.65
.70
3. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate C)
3.34
.77
4. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate D)
3.36
.73
5. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate E)
3.28
.64
6. Leader task dependence (Subordinates A-E average)
3.60
.58
7. Political skill (leader-rated)
4.00
.37
8. Self monitoring (leader-rated)
2.69
.37
9. Collaboration (Subordinate-rated)
3.43
1.17
10. Consultation (Subordinate-rated)
3.21
1.21
11. Exchange (Subordinate-rated)
1.81
1.09
12. Ingratiation (Subordinate-rated)
3.17
1.24
13. Inspirational appeal (Subordinate-rated)
3.42
1.11
14. Personal appeals (Subordinate-rated)
1.59
.84
15. Apprising (Subordinate-rated)
3.20
1.25
16. Rational persuasion (Subordinate-rated)
3.64
1.09
17. Coalition (Subordinate-rated)
1.62
.84
18. Legitimating (Subordinate-rated)
3.25
1.23
19. Pressure (Subordinate-rated)
1.52
.81
20. Subordinate task dependence (on Leader)
3.20
.85
21. Task performance (Subordinate-rated)
3.75
.90
22. Viability (Subordinate-rated)
3.92
.95
23. Relationship quality with Leader (Subordinate-rated)
3.92
.61
24. Political skill of Leader (Subordinate-rated)
3.96
.68
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

191

N
108
107
106
48
36
108
105
105
584
583
582
584
584
581
582
583
581
584
583
583
577
576
574
578

Table 12 (cont'd)
1
2
1.
2. .54 **
3. .29 ** .60
4. .44 ** .65
5. .37 *
.48
6. .69 ** .86
7. .29 ** .26
8. -.06
.04
9. .13
.04
10. .14
.09
11. -.08
-.22
12. .09
-.09
13. .07
-.07
14. .15
.03
15. -.05
-.06
16. .02
-.02
17. .08
.01
18. .01
-.10
19. .05
-.10
20. .05
-.01
21. .08
-.01
22. .09
-.03
23. .17
.09
24. .15
.05

3

**
**
**
**
**

*

.55
.66
.80
.05
-.01
.11
.11
-.06
.03
.06
.01
-.01
.12
-.04
.02
-.20
.06
.15
.14
.22
.14

4

**
**
**

*

*

.76 **
.86 **
-.05
-.15
.08
.23
-.09
.11
.01
-.03
.21
.03
.08
.07
-.05
.24
-.04
-.07
.09
-.05

5

.81 **
-.10
-.12
.12
.18
-.18
.10
.05
.09
.28
-.01
-.03
.22
-.05
.36 *
.05
.01
.17
.01

192

6

.22 *
-.07
.10
.13
-.17
.01
.02
.06
.00
.06
.00
-.02
.01
.08
.05
.03
.16
.09

7

8

.16
.13
.13
-.04
.18
.11
.07
-.01
.19
.14
.13
-.01
-.03
.12
.06
.17
.19

.11
.20
.27
.18
.22
.09
.18
.29
.09
.14
-.05
.06
.32
.23
.24
.30

*
**
*

**

**
*
*
**

Table 12 (cont'd)
9
10
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. .63 **
11. .20 ** .30
12. .56 ** .64
13. .62 ** .57
14. .00
.11
15. .56 ** .54
16. .52 ** .50
17. .04
.16
18. .45 ** .46
19. -.19 ** -.13
20. .37 ** .34
21. .57 ** .45
22. .60 ** .48
23. .54 ** .47
24. .54 ** .47

11

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

.30
.32
.34
.32
.25
.38
.29
.18
.13
.13
.15
.21
.18

12

13

14

**
** .53 **
** .16 ** .05
** .61 ** .65 ** .11
** .40 ** .71 ** -.01
** .17 ** .14 ** .47
** .43 ** .50 ** .10
** -.05
-.13 ** .33
** .34 ** .26 ** .11
** .41 ** .57 ** -.07
** .40 ** .59 ** -.07
** .47 ** .55 ** .05
** .40 ** .57 ** -.07

193

15

16

**
.55
** .20
*
.50
** -.03
** .26
.42
.44
.42
.40

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

.12
.52
-.14
.23
.49
.50
.46
.47

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

Table 12 (cont'd)
17
18
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18. .27 **
19. .37 ** .09
20. .11 * .26
21. -.03
.26
22. -.02
.27
23. .03
.26
24. -.01
.28

19

*
**
**
**
**
**

.02
-.34
-.40
-.30
-.34

20

**
**
**
**

.29
.31
.38
.30

21

22

23

**
** .89 **
** .78 ** .82 **
** .83 ** .79 ** .76 **

194

Table 13
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Peer Study Variables
Variable
M
SD
1. Leader task dependence (on Peer A)
3.05
.80
2. Leader task dependence (on Peer B)
3.00
.75
3. Leader task dependence (on Peer C)
2.87
.74
4. Leader task dependence (on Peer D)
3.04
.76
5. Leader task dependence (on Peer E)
2.92
.82
6. Leader task dependence (Peers A-E average)
2.98
.69
7. Political skill (leader-rated)
4.00
.37
8. Self monitoring (leader-rated)
2.69
.37
9. Peer task dependence (on Leader)
2.49
.94
10. Collaboration (Peer-rated)
3.05
1.33
11. Consultation (Peer-rated)
3.15
1.28
12. Exchange (Peer-rated)
1.68
1.02
13. Ingratiation (Peer-rated)
2.94
1.35
14. Inspirational appeal (Peer-rated)
2.82
1.24
15. Personal appeals (Peer-rated)
1.65
.91
16. Apprising (Peer-rated)
2.11
1.23
17. Rational persuasion (Peer-rated)
3.23
1.18
18. Coalition (Peer-rated)
1.49
.80
19. Legitimating (Peer-rated)
2.44
1.27
20. Pressure (Peer-rated)
1.14
.46
21. Task performance (Peer-rated)
3.74
.73
22. Viability (Peer-rated)
3.87
.72
23. Relationship quality with Leader (Peer-rated)
3.80
.54
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

195

N
102
96
97
27
17
103
105
105
285
285
285
285
285
285
286
285
287
285
285
285
285
286
286

Table 13 (cont'd)
1
2
1.
2. .66 **
3. .63 ** .64
4. .64 ** .78
5. .61 ** .79
6. .88 ** .87
7. .15
.01
8. -.22 *
.03
9. .01
.17
10. .01
-.05
11. .09
.03
12. .03
-.16
13. .02
.13
14. .07
-.05
15. .07
-.08
16. .04
-.10
17. .08
.12
18. .06
-.15
19. .07
.07
20. .17
.17
21. .01
.08
22. -.04
-.01
23. .08
.05

3

**
**
**
**

4

.59 **
.63 ** .89 **
.86 ** .90 **
.06
-.06
-.15
-.18
-.01
.12
-.05
.12
.08
.11
-.14
.28
.05
.31
-.04
.09
.01
.07
-.11
-.12
.00
.37
-.10
-.20
.10
.16
.05
.50 *
.05
.01
-.01
-.20
.12
.19

5

6

.90 **
.07
.12
-.05
-.14
.29
.08
.31
.02
.35
.12
.32
-.07
.47
.10
.17
.07
.24
.01
-.02
.00
.41
.12
-.31
-.03
.10
.08
.40
.15
.25
.06
-.04
-.05
.56 *
.10

196

7

.16
.02
.03
.10
.03
-.06
.16
.02
.06
.17
.11
.03
.07
.11
.06
.06

8

9

.10
.07 .37 **
.09 .40 **
-.12
.09
-.05
.32 **
.05 .33 **
-.08
.09
.07 .31 **
.03 .34 **
-.11
.18 **
-.06
.23 **
.10 .16 **
.25 * .38 **
.21 * .37 **
.16 .33 **

Table 13 (cont'd)
10
11
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11. .70 **
12. .32 ** .28 **
13. .67 ** .68 **
14. .63 ** .59 **
15. .26 ** .32 **
16. .53 ** .44 **
17. .62 ** .63 **
18. .31 ** .29 **
19. .45 ** .42 **
20. .11
.03
21. .47 ** .48 **
22. .47 ** .45 **
23. .38 ** .45 **

12

.27
.32
.52
.33
.23
.44
.35
.10
.17
.18
.21

13

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

.59
.33
.48
.57
.32
.43
.10
** .34
** .34
** .38

14

**
**
**
**
**
**

.26
.57
.66
.30
.49
.07
** .50
** .49
** .48

15

**
**
**
**
**

.28
.08
.56
.23
.21
** .10
** .11
** .17

16

17

18

.14
.44
.02
.47
.42
.41

*
** .40 **
.32 **
** .00
** .03
** .11

**
**
**
**

**

197

.43
.41
.54
.23
.36
.48
.44

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

Table 13 (cont'd)
19
20
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20. .17 **
21. .23 ** -.08
22. .22 ** -.10
23. .28 ** -.08

21

22

.83 **
.71 ** .73 **

198

Table 14 (A)
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Senior Manager Study Variables
Variable
M
SD
N
1. Leader task dependence (on Senior manager)
3.75
.63
104
2. Political skill (Leader-rated)
4.00
.37
105
3. Self monitoring (Leader-rated)
2.69
.37
105
4. Relationship quality with Senior manager (Leader-rated)
3.85
.55
105
5. Consultation (Senior manager-rated)
3.31
.88
119
6. Inspirational appeal (Senior manager-rated)
2.92
.99
119
7. Rational persuasion (Senior manager-rated)
3.31
.79
119
8. Coalition (Senior manager-rated)
1.37
.49
119
9. Legitimating (Senior manager-rated)
1.59
.74
119
10. Pressure (Senior manager-rated)
1.20
.37
119
11. Task performance (Senior manager-rated)
3.46
.63
119
12. Viability (Senior manager-rated)
3.81
.65
119
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

Table 14 (B)
1
2
3
4
5
6
1.
2. .20 *
3. -.07
.16
4. .39 ** .41 ** .02
5. .13
.12
.01
.49 **
6. -.08
.24 * .12
.26 ** .27 **
7. .01
.08
.22 * .26 ** .40 ** .59
8. .00
.08
.14 -.15
-.13
.09
9. -.23 * -.10
.05 -.28 ** -.04
.22
10. -.22 * -.05
.12 -.23 * .02
.02
11. -.03
.14
.03
.35 ** .28 ** .62
12. -.02
.06 -.04
.37 ** .26 ** .54

7

8

9

10

11

**
.27
* .29
.14
** .45
** .49

199

**
** .43 **
.41 ** .44 **
** -.12
-.04 -.07
** -.16
-.07 -.13 .77 **

Table 15
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Customer Study Variables
Variable
M
SD
N
1. Leader task dependence (on Customer A)
2.81
.82
90
2. Leader task dependence (on Customer B)
2.81
.73
89
3. Leader task dependence (on Customer C)
2.81
.74
85
4. Leader task dependence (on Customer D)
2.73
.82
24
5. Leader task dependence (on Customer E)
2.70
.87
14
6. Leader task dependence (Customers A-E average)
2.81
.70
90
7. Political skill (Leader-rated)
4.00
.37
105
8. Self monitoring (leader-rated)
2.69
.37
105
9. Collaboration (Customer-rated)
2.57
1.60
134
10. Consultation (Customer-rated)
2.22
1.48
132
11. Exchange (Customer-rated)
1.55
1.13
137
12. Ingratiation (Customer-rated)
1.98
1.35
133
13. Inspirational appeal (Customer-rated)
2.53
1.39
137
14. Personal appeals (Customer-rated)
1.37
.83
135
15. Apprising (Customer-rated)
2.15
1.33
138
16. Rational persuasion (Customer-rated)
3.19
1.53
140
17. Coalition (Customer-rated)
1.39
.80
134
18. Legitimating (Customer-rated)
2.50
1.51
138
19. Pressure (Customer-rated)
1.08
.39
140
20. Task performance (Customer-rated)
4.41
.69
147
21. Viability (Customer-rated)
4.44
.63
146
22. Relationship quality with Leader (Customer-rated)
4.57
.52
147
Note. ".a" indicates this relationship cannot be computed because of missing data.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

200

Table 15 (cont'd)
1
2
1.
2. .82 **
3. .65 ** .66
4. .67 ** .66
5. .80 ** .64
6. .92 ** .91
7. -.07
-.01
8. -.11
-.12
9. .09
.09
10. .17
.16
11. .00
-.11
12. .07
.03
13. .09
.11
14. -.02
-.03
15. .05
.05
16. .04
-.04
17. .01
.08
18. .09
.02
19. .02
.01
20. .19
.17
21. .20
.12
22. .14
.07

3

4

5

6

**
** .77 **
* .85 ** .93 **
** .86 ** .90 ** .94 **
.02
-.03
-.07
-.09
-.10
-.16
.09
-.08
-.46
.08
-.17
-.24
-.08
.06
.08
.00
-.23
-.46
-.06
-.02
-.06
-.08
-.33
.a
-.01
-.10
-.17
-.16
-.29
-.52
.17
.18
.63
-.07
.09
.17
-.13
-.33
.a
.21
.63 * .91 *
.05
.38
.76
.04
.30
.41

7

8

-.03
-.14
.11
.13
-.07
.01
.03
-.05
.03
-.07
.06
.00
.01
.20
.16
.12

.16
.05
.10
-.02
-.07
-.08
.04
-.02
-.10
.01
-.17
-.05
.13
.15
.15

.13
.43
.44
.33
.25
.29
.16
.20
.37
.27
.21
.05
.08
.07

201

9

10

** .72 **
** .39 ** .54
* .62 ** .78
.56 ** .61
* .31 ** .46
.58 ** .65
.57 ** .51
** .40 ** .54
* .64 ** .66
.15
.28
.21 * .22
.25 ** .23
.23 ** .20

11

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
*
**
*

.62
.57
.47
.59
.34
.58
.49
.42
.03
.05
.13

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

Table 15 (cont'd)
12
13
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13. .57 **
14. .56 ** .28 **
15. .58 ** .71 **
16. .40 ** .71 **
17. .55 ** .45 **
18. .55 ** .70 **
19. .34 ** .20 *
20. .17
.18 *
21. .18 * .24 **
22. .19 * .18 *

14

.41
.11
.57
.34
.49
.00
.00
.06

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

**
.52
** .35
** .63
** .26
.15
.17
.16

**
** .27 **
** .64 ** .44 **
** .06
.45 ** .22 **
.19 * .07
.11
-.05
* .25 ** .11
.14
-.02
.20 * .09
.17
-.02

202

.88 **
.68 ** .73 **

Table 16
The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.69 **
3.69 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.24 †
-.25 †
Leader education
-.04
-.10
-.10
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.01
.01
Subordinate age
.00
.01
.01
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.24
-.24
Subordinate education
-.04
-.04
-.04
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02 *
.02 *
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.03 **
-.03 **
Collaboration
Political skill

.32 **
.42 *

Collaboration X Political skill

.42 **
.31 *
.03

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.10

.10

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.43
.43
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

203

Table 17
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.69 **
3.70 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.17
-.16
Leader education
-.04
-.10
-.10
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.01 †
.01
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.22
-.22
Subordinate education
-.04
-.05
-.05
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.03 †
.03 *
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.03 **
-.03 **
Consultation
Political skill

.28 **
.35 *

Consultation X Political skill

.29 **
.41 **
-.20 *

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.17

.17

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.48
.48
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

204

Table 18
The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.71 **
3.71 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.12
-.12
Leader education
-.04
-.07
-.07
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.02 †
.02 †
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.08
-.06
Subordinate education
-.04
-.04
-.05
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.02 *
-.02 *
.08 †
.44 **

Exchange
Political skill
Exchange X Political skill

.08 †
.50 **
-.27 *

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.24

.24

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.53
.52
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

205

Table 19
The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.72 **
3.72 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.19
-.19
Leader education
-.04
-.09
-.10
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.02 †
.02 †
Subordinate age
.00
.01
.01
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.16
-.18
Subordinate education
-.04
-.04
-.05
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02 *
.02 *
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.03 **
-.03 **
Ingratiation
Political skill

.24 **
.40 **

Ingratiation X Political skill

.24 **
.43 **
-.15

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.19

.18

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.49
.49
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

206

Table 20
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.74 **
3.74 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.19
-.17
Leader education
-.04
-.11
-.11
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.01
.01
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.02
-.03
Subordinate education
-.04
-.01
-.01
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.03 *
.03 *
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.03 **
-.03 **
Inspirational appeals
Political skill

.42 **
.30 *

Inspirational appeals X Political skill

.41 **
.31 *
-.19

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.12

.12

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.42
.41
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

207

Table 21
The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.72 **
3.72 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.03
-.02
Leader education
-.04
-.05
-.05
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
-.01
-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.18
-.18
Subordinate education
-.04
-.05
-.05
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.02 *
-.02 *
Personal appeals
Political skill

-.14 **
.41 *

Personal appeals X Political skill

-.14 **
.40 *
.04

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.22

.22

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.53
.54
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

208

Table 22
The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.72 **
3.72 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.18
-.18
Leader education
-.04
-.11
-.11
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.01 †
.01 *
Subordinate age
.00
.01
.01
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.07
-.07
Subordinate education
-.04
.00
.00
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02
.02 †
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.02 *
-.02 *
Apprising
Political skill

.28 **
.39 *

Apprising X Political skill

.28 **
.39 *
.00

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.21

.21

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.44
.44
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

209

Table 23
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings
of Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.73 **
3.74 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.13
-.10
Leader education
-.04
-.09
-.09
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.11
-.11
Subordinate education
-.04
-.02
-.03
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02
.02 †
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.03 *
-.02 *
Rational persuasion
Political skill

.34 **
.33 *

.33 **
.34 *
-.23 †

Rational persuasion X Political skill
Tau (τ)

.26
2

.15

.16

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.46
.45
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

210

Table 24
The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.74 **
3.74
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
-.02
-.02
Leader education
.13 *
.09 †
.09
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 *
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.01 *
.02
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.27 *
.26
Peer education
.05
.08 *
.08
Peer position tenure
-.01
.00
.00
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01
Collaboration
Political skill

.26 **
.19

Collaboration X Political skill
.15
2

.06

.06

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.32
.32
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

211

†
*
*
*
†

.26 **
.20
-.10

Tau (τ)

**

Table 25
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.72 **
3.72
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.04
.04
Leader education
.13 *
.09 *
.09
Leader position tenure
.02
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 *
.02
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.19 †
.19
Peer education
.05
.07 †
.07
Peer position tenure
-.01
.00
.00
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01
Consultation
Political skill

.25 **
.16

Consultation X Political skill
.15
2

.08

.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.31
.31
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

212

*

*

†

.25 **
.16
-.02

Tau (τ)

**

Table 26
The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.72 **
3.72
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.07
.06
Leader education
.13 *
.12 *
.12
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 †
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.03 **
.03
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.12
.12
Peer education
.05
.02
.02
Peer position tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01 *
-.01
Exchange
Political skill

.10 *
.24

Exchange X Political skill
.15
2

.14

.13

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.36
.36
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

213

*
†
**

*

.10 *
.23
-.05

Tau (τ)

**

Table 27
The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.73 **
3.73
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.00
.00
Leader education
.13 *
.12 *
.12
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 †
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 **
.02
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.22 †
.22
Peer education
.05
.08 †
.08
Peer position tenure
-.01
.00
.00
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01
Ingratiation
Political skill

.18 **
.23

Ingratiation X Political skill
.15
2

.10

.10

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.35
.35
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

214

*
†
†
**
†
†

.18 **
.22
.04

Tau (τ)

**

Table 28
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.72 **
3.73 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.00
.01
Leader education
.13 *
.08 †
.08 †
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 *
.02 **
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.01
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 †
.02 †
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.19
.17
Peer education
.05
.06
.06
Peer position tenure
-.01
.01
.01
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01 *
-.01 *
Inspirational appeals
Political skill

.31 **
.18

Inspirational appeals X Political skill

.31 **
.19
-.10

Tau (τ)

.15
2

.06

.05

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.30
.30
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

215

Table 29
The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.73 **
3.73 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.09
.08
Leader education
.13 *
.13 *
.12 *
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 †
.02 †
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.03 **
.03 **
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.15
.15
Peer education
.05
.04
.04
Peer position tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01 *
-.01 †
Personal appeals
Political skill

.03
.22

Personal appeals X Political skill

.03
.22
-.15

Tau (τ)

.15
2

.14

.13

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.37
.37
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

216

Table 30
The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.73 **
3.73
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.04
.05
Leader education
.13 *
.11 *
.11
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 *
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 *
.02
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.19
.19
Peer education
.05
.07
.06
Peer position tenure
-.01
.00
.00
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
.00
.00
Apprising
Political skill

.20 **
.18

Apprising X Political skill
.15
2

.12

.12

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.33
.33
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

217

*
*
*

.20 **
.17
-.02

Tau (τ)

**

Table 31
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.72 **
3.73 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.03
.04
Leader education
.13 *
.09 †
.09 †
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 **
.02 **
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.01
.01
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.25 *
.24 *
Peer education
.05
.08 *
.08 †
Peer position tenure
-.01
.01
.00
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01 *
Rational persuasion
Political skill

.29 **
.17

Rational persuasion X Political skill

.28 **
.18
-.11

Tau (τ)

.15
2

.08

.07

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.31
.31
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

218

Table 32
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.40 **
3.39 **
3.38 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.35 †
.33 †
.34 †
Leader education
.11 †
.15 *
.15 *
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.02 *
.02 *
Leader organizational tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01
Leader tenure with senior manager
.00
.00
.00
Senior manager age
-.06
-.06
-.06
Senior manager gender
-.33
-.40
-.46
Senior manager education
.11
.08
.06
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
-.02
-.02
Senior manager organization tenure
.00
.00
.00
Consultation
Political skill

.22 **
.04

Consultation X Political skill

.19 **
.05
.21

Tau (τ)

.00
2

.00

.00

.37
.34
.34
Sigma-squared (σ )
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

219

Table 33
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Senior Manager
Ratings of Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.40 **
3.44 **
3.43 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.35 †
.08
.07
Leader education
.11 †
.07
.07
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
-.01 †
.00
.00
Leader tenure with senior manager
.00
.00
.00
Senior manager age
-.06
.00
-.01
Senior manager gender
-.33
-.88
-.90
Senior manager education
.11
-.13
-.14
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
.00
.00
Senior manager organization tenure
.00
.00
.00
Inspirational appeals
Political skill

.53 **
-.09

Inspirational appeals X Political skill

.53 **
-.09
.07

Tau (τ)

.00
2

.00

.00

.37
.21
.21
Sigma-squared (σ )
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

220

Table 34
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Senior Manager
Ratings of Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.40 **
3.42 **
3.41 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.35 †
.30 †
.28
Leader education
.11 †
.06
.06
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.02 †
.02 †
Leader organizational tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01
Leader tenure with senior manager
.00
-.01
-.01
Senior manager age
-.06
-.07 †
-.08 †
Senior manager gender
-.33
-.57
-.56
Senior manager education
.11
.06
.06
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
-.01
.00
Senior manager organization tenure
.00
.01
.01
Rational Persuasion
Political skill

.43 **
.02

Rational Persuasion X Political skill

.42 **
.00
.16

Tau (τ)

.00
2

.00

.00

.37
.27
.27
Sigma-squared (σ )
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

221

Table 35
The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.40 **
4.40 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.18
-.20
Leader education
-.04
-.06
.08
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.04 **
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.21
.20
Customer education
.00
.01
.01
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.01
-.01

Collaboration
Political skill

.11 **
.26

Collaboration X Political skill

.11 **
.30
-.14

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.07

.07

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.38
.38
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

222

Table 36
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.40 **
4.39 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.16
-.20
Leader education
-.04
-.07
-.11
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.04 **
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.34 †
.29
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.01
-.01

Consultation
Political skill

.15 **
.31

.14 **
.36 *
-.16 †

Consultation X Political skill
Tau (τ)

.08
2

.05

.04

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.38
.39
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

223

Table 37
The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.40 **
4.40 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.21
-.20
Leader education
-.04
-.06
-.06
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.05 **
.05 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.10
.10
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02
-.02 †

Exchange
Political skill

.02
.27

Exchange X Political skill

.02
.28
-.07

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.08

.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.40
.40
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

224

Table 38
The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.40 **
4.38 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.18
-.21
Leader education
-.04
-.08
-.13
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.04 **
.05 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.22
.17
Customer education
.00
.01
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.01
-.02 †

Ingratiation
Political skill

.12 **
.32

Ingratiation X Political skill

.12 *
.41 *
-.26 *

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.06

.03

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.39
.40
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

225

Table 39
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.40 **
4.39 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.23
-.24
Leader education
-.04
-.07
-.08
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.01
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.04 **
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.22
.21
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.01
-.01

Inspirational appeals
Political skill

.11 **
.29

Inspirational appeals X Political skill

.11 **
.36 †
-.12

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.05

.04

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.40
.41
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

226

Table 40
The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.41 **
4.41 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.22
-.22
Leader education
-.04
-.06
-.06
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.05 **
.05 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.06
.06
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 †
-.02 †

Personal appeals
Political skill

-.02
.27

Personal appeals X Political skill

-.02
.27
-.02

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.08

.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.40
.40
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

227

Table 41
The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.40 **
4.39 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.21
-.21
Leader education
-.04
-.08
-.08
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.01
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.04 **
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.20
.20
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.01
-.02

Apprising
Political skill

.10 *
.30

Apprising X Political skill

.11 *
.34
-.08

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.07

-.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.39
.39
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

228

Table 42
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.40 **
4.39 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.16
-.17
Leader education
-.04
-.05
-.06
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.04 **
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.20
.16
Customer education
.00
.01
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 †
-.02 †

Rational persuasion
Political skill

.10 *
.29

Rational persuasion X Political skill

.10 *
.32
-.11

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.07

.06

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.39
.39
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

229

Table 43
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.72 **
3.72 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.07
-.07
Leader education
-.04
-.06
-.06
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
-.01
-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.02 †
.02 †
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.11
-.11
Subordinate education
-.04
-.04
-.04
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.02 *
-.02 *
Coalition
Political skill

-.06
.42 *

Coalition X Political skill

-.06
.43 *
-.04

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.23

.23

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.54
.54
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

230

Table 44
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.72 **
3.72 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.14
-.12
Leader education
-.04
-.06
-.06
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.12
-.11
Subordinate education
-.04
-.04
-.04
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.03 *
-.02 *
Legitimating
Political skill

.15 **
.42 **

Legitimating X Political skill

.15 **
.47 **
-.23 *

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.22

.21

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.52
.52
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

231

Table 45
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.72 **
3.72 **
3.72 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
-.05
-.04
-.03
Leader education
-.04
-.07
-.07
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
-.01
-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 †
.02 †
.02 †
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.23
-.23
Subordinate education
-.04
-.03
-.03
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.02
-.02 †
Pressure
Political skill

-.30 **
.34 *

Pressure X Political skill

-.31 **
.34 *
-.14

Tau (τ)

.26
2

.17

.17

Sigma-squared (σ )
.54
.52
.52
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

232

Table 46
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.73 **
3.73
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.11
.10
Leader education
.13 *
.13 *
.12
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 †
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.03 **
.03
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.16
.16
Peer education
.05
.05
.05
Peer position tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01
Coalition
Political skill

-.04
.22

Coalition X Political skill

-.03
.22
-.18

Tau (τ)

.15
2

.15

.15

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.36
.36
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

233

**

*
†
**

†

Table 47
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.72 **
3.72
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.06
.05
Leader education
.13 *
.12 *
.11
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 *
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 **
.02
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.18
.18
Peer education
.05
.05
.04
Peer position tenure
-.01
.00
.00
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01
Legitimating
Political skill

.14 **
.22

Legitimating X Political skill
.15
2

.14

.14

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.34
.34
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

234

†
*
**

.14 **
.22
-.07

Tau (τ)

**

Table 48
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.73 **
3.73 **
3.73
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.11
.10
.11
Leader education
.13 *
.13 *
.12
Leader position tenure
.02
.02 †
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.03 **
.03
Peer age
.00
.00
.00
Peer gender
.16
.15
.16
Peer education
.05
.04
.04
Peer position tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Peer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01
Pressure
Political skill

-.05
.23

Pressure X Political skill

-.01
.21
-.41

Tau (τ)

.15
2

.15

.14

Sigma-squared (σ )
.37
.36
.36
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

235

**

*
†
**

†

Table 49
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.40 **
3.39 **
3.38 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.35 †
.28
.27
Leader education
.11 †
.11
.11
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.02 †
.02
Leader organizational tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01
Leader tenure with senior manager
.00
.00
.00
Senior manager age
-.06
-.03
-.03
Senior manager gender
-.33
-.29
-.34
Senior manager education
.11
.09
.10
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
-.03
-.03
Senior manager organization tenure
.00
-.01
-.01
-.34 †
.16

Coalition
Political skill

-.35 †
.15
.18 †

Coalition X Political skill
Tau (τ)

.00
2

.00

.00

.37
.36
.36
Sigma-squared (σ )
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

236

Table 50
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Task Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.40 **
3.40 **
3.40 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.35 †
.35 †
.35 †
Leader education
.11 †
.11 †
.12 †
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.02 †
.02 †
Leader organizational tenure
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01 †
Leader tenure with senior manager
.00
.00
.00
Senior manager age
-.06
-.06
-.06
Senior manager gender
-.33
-.22
-.22
Senior manager education
.11
.08
.08
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Senior manager organization tenure
.00
.00
.00
Legitimating
Political skill

-.05
.08

Legitimating X Political skill

-.05
.08
.03

Tau (τ)

.00
2

.00

.00

.37
.37
.38
Sigma-squared (σ )
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

237

Table 51
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.40 **
3.40 **
3.40 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.35 †
.35 †
.36 †
Leader education
.11 †
.11
.12 †
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.02 †
.02 †
Leader organizational tenure
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01 †
Leader tenure with senior manager
.00
.00
.00
Senior manager age
-.06
-.06
-.06
Senior manager gender
-.33
-.30
-.30
Senior manager education
.11
.10
.10
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Senior manager organization tenure
.00
.00
.00
Pressure
Political skill

-.04
.09

Pressure X Political skill

-.05
.06
.29

Tau (τ)

.00
2

.00

.00

.37
.37
.37
Sigma-squared (σ )
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

238

Table 52
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.40 **
4.40 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.20
-.20
Leader education
-.04
-.06
-.05
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.05 **
.05 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.10
.12
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 †
-.01

Coalition
Political skill

.08
.26

Coalition X Political skill

.08
.25
.09

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.07

.07

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.40
.40
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

239

Table 53
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.40 **
4.39 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.18
-.19
Leader education
-.04
-.06
-.07
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.04 *
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.20
.21
Customer education
.00
.01
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.01
-.01

Legitimating
Political skill

.07
.28

Legitimating X Political skill

.07 †
.34
-.14

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.06

.06

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.41
.40
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

240

Table 54
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task
Performance
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.41 **
4.41 **
4.41 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.19
-.22
-.21
Leader education
-.04
-.06
-.05
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.05 **
.05 **
.05 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.08
.08
.09
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 †
-.02

Pressure
Political skill

-.05
.26

Pressure X Political skill

.04
.28
.43

Tau (τ)

.08
2

.08

.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.40
.41
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

241

Table 55
The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.87 **
3.87 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
-.14 †
-.14 †
Leader education
-.04
-.10
-.10
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.01
.01
Subordinate age
.00
.01
.01
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.29
-.29
Subordinate education
-.09
-.08 †
-.08 †
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.03 **
-.03 **
Collaboration
Political skill

.48 **
.23 †

Collaboration X Political skill

.48 **
.23 †
-.02

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.06

.06

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.48
.48
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

242

Table 56
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.87 **
3.88
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
-.06
-.05
Leader education
-.04
-.11
-.11
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.01
.01
Subordinate age
.00
.01 *
.01
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.28 †
-.28
Subordinate education
-.09
-.10 †
-.10
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.03 **
-.03
Consultation
Political skill

.35 **
.26 †

Consultation X Political skill

**

†
†
†
**

.35 **
.29 †
-.11

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.14

.14

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.54
.54
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

243

Table 57
The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.89 **
3.89 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
-.02
-.02
Leader education
-.04
-.08
-.08
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.09
-.08
Subordinate education
-.09
-.08
-.08
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 †
-.02 †
Exchange
Political skill

.15 **
.38 *

Exchange X Political skill

.15 **
.41 *
-.15

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.23

.22

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.61
.61
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

244

Table 58
The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.90 **
3.90 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
-.07
-.07
Leader education
-.04
-.09
-.10
Leader position tenure
.01
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.01
.01
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.19
-.20
Subordinate education
-.09
-.09
-.09
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.03 **
-.03 **
Ingratiation
Political skill

.27 **
.32 *

Ingratiation X Political skill

.27 **
.34 *
-.07

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.17

.17

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
0.57183
0.57315
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

245

Table 59
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings
of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.92 **
3.93 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
-.08
-.07
Leader education
-.04
-.12 †
-.12 †
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.01
.01
Subordinate age
.00
.01
.00
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.03
-.04
Subordinate education
-.09
-.04
-.05
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02 †
.03 †
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 *
-.02 *
Inspirational appeals
Political skill

.48 **
.21 †

Inspirational appeals X Political skill

.48 **
.22 †
-.08

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.08

.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.47
.47
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

246

Table 60
The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.90 **
3.90 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
.10
.10
Leader education
-.04
-.05
-.05
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.19
-.19
Subordinate education
-.09
-.10
-.09
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 †
-.02 †
-.12 †
.34 *

Personal appeals
Political skill
Personal appeals X Political skill

-.12 †
.34 †
.02

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.20

.20

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.64
.64
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

247

Table 61
The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.91 **
3.91 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
-.07
-.07
Leader education
-.04
-.12
-.12
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.00
.00
Subordinate age
.00
.01 †
.01 †
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.08
-.08
Subordinate education
-.09
-.04
-.03
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 *
-.02 *
Apprising
Political skill

.34 **
.31 *

Apprising X Political skill

.34 **
.30 †
.05

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.19

.19

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.49
.49
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

248

Table 62
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings
of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.91 **
3.92 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
-.01
.01
Leader education
-.04
-.09
-.09
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.02
.01
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.14
-.14
Subordinate education
-.09
-.07
-.07
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 *
-.02 *
Rational persuasion
Political skill

.38 **
.24 †

Rational persuasion X Political skill

.38 **
.25 †
-.14

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.14

.14

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.52
.52
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

249

Table 63
The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.86 **
3.86 **
Leader age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Leader gender
.02
-.09
-.09
Leader education
.12 *
.08 †
.08 †
Leader position tenure
.01
.01 *
.01 *
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 *
.02 *
Peer age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Peer gender
.04
.15
-.01
Peer education
-.04
.00
-.01
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.01 †
-.01 †
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01
-.01
Collaboration
Political skill

.24 **
.13

Collaboration X Political skill

.24 **
.14
-.12

Tau (τ)

.13
2

.05

.04

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.34
.34
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

250

Table 64
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.85 **
3.85 **
Leader age
-.01
-.01 *
-.01 *
Leader gender
.02
-.03 †
-.03 †
Leader education
.12 *
.08
.08
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.01 †
.01 †
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 *
.02 *
Peer age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Peer gender
.04
.07
.07
Peer education
-.04
-.01
-.01
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.01 †
-.01 †
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01
-.01
Consultation
Political skill

.23 **
.10

Consultation X Political skill

.23 **
.10
-.02

Tau (τ)

.13
2

.07

.07

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.33
.33
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

251

Table 65
The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.84 **
3.84
Leader age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Leader gender
.02
-.02
-.03
Leader education
.12 *
.11 *
.10
Leader position tenure
.01
.01 †
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.03 **
.03
Peer age
-.01
.00
.00
Peer gender
.04
-.01
-.02
Peer education
-.04
-.07
-.07
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.02 **
-.02
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01 *
-.01
Exchange
Political skill

.12 **
.17

Exchange X Political skill
.13
2

.12

.11

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.36
.37
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

252

*
†
**

**
*

.11 *
.16
-.13

Tau (τ)

**
†

Table 66
The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.85 **
3.85 **
Leader age
-.01
-.01 *
-.01 *
Leader gender
.02
-.08
-.08
Leader education
.12 *
.10 *
.11 *
Leader position tenure
.01
.01 †
.01 †
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.01
.01 *
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 **
.02 **
Peer age
-.01
.00
.00
Peer gender
.04
.10
.10
Peer education
-.04
-.01
-.01
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.02 *
-.02 *
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01 *
-.01
Ingratiation
Political skill

.18 **
.16

Ingratiation X Political skill

.18 **
.16
.05

Tau (τ)

.13
2

.08

.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.35
.35
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

253

Table 67
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.85 **
3.85
Leader age
-.01
-.01 *
-.01
Leader gender
.02
-.07
-.06
Leader education
.12 *
.07 †
.07
Leader position tenure
.01
.02 *
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.01 *
.01
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 *
.02
Peer age
-.01
.00
.00
Peer gender
.04
.06
.04
Peer education
-.04
-.02
-.03
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.01
-.01
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01 *
-.01
Inspirational appeals
Political skill

.29 **
.12

Inspirational appeals X Political skill
.13
2

.05

.05

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.32
.32
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

254

*
†
*

*

.28 **
.14
-.13

Tau (τ)

**
*

Table 68
The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.84 **
3.85
Leader age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Leader gender
.02
-.01
-.02
Leader education
.12 *
.11 *
.10
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.03
.03
Peer age
-.01
.00
-.01
Peer gender
.04
.02
.02
Peer education
-.04
-.05
-.05
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.02 **
-.02
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01 *
-.01
Personal appeals
Political skill

.06 **
.16

**

*

**

**
†

.06
.15
-.21 †

Personal appeals X Political skill
Tau (τ)

.13
2

.13

.12

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.37
.37
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

255

Table 69
The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.85 **
3.85
Leader age
-.01
-.01 †
-.01
Leader gender
.02
-.06
-.06
Leader education
.12 *
.09 *
.09
Leader position tenure
.01
.01 *
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.01 †
.01
Peer age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Peer gender
.04
.08
.08
Peer education
-.04
-.01
-.01
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.01 *
-.01
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
.00
.00
Apprising
Political skill

.27 **
.09

Apprising X Political skill
.13
2

.09

.09

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.29
.29
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

256

*
*
†

*

.27 **
.09
-.02

Tau (τ)

**
†

Table 70
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.85 **
3.85
Leader age
-.01
-.01 *
-.01
Leader gender
.02
-.04
-.03
Leader education
.12 *
.08 †
.08
Leader position tenure
.01
.02
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 †
.02
Peer age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Peer gender
.04
.11
.11
Peer education
-.04
-.01
-.02
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.01
-.01
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01 *
-.01
Rational persuasion
Political skill

.24 **
.12

Rational persuasion X Political skill
.13
2

.08

.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.33
.34
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

257

†
*
†

*

.24 **
.13
-.11

Tau (τ)

**
*

Table 71
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.79 **
3.79 **
3.78 **
Leader age
-.01 †
-.01
-.01
Leader gender
.26
.27
.28
Leader education
.01
.07
.07
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.03 *
.03 *
Leader organizational tenure
-.02 *
-.02 *
-.02 *
Leader tenure with senior manager
.01
.00
.01
Senior manager age
-.04
-.04
-.04
Senior manager gender
-.13
-.21
-.23
Senior manager education
-.07
-.09
-.10
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Senior manager organization tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Consultation
Political skill

.30 **
-.08

Consultation X Political skill

.28 **
-.07
.17

Tau (τ)

.01
2

.13

.13

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.35
.35
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

258

Table 72
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Senior Manager
Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.79 **
3.83 **
3.81 **
Leader age
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01 *
Leader gender
.26
.01
-.01
Leader education
.01
-.03
-.03
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
-.02 *
-.01
-.01
Leader tenure with senior manager
.01
.00
.01
Senior manager age
-.04
.01
.01
Senior manager gender
-.13
-.66
-.71
Senior manager education
-.07
-.29 †
.01 †
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
.01
.00
Senior manager organization tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Inspirational appeals
Political skill

.50 **
-.12

Inspirational appeals X Political skill

.49 **
-.10
.20

Tau (τ)

.01
2

.01

.01

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.27
.27
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

259

Table 73
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Senior Manager
Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.79 **
3.81 **
3.81 **
Leader age
-.01 †
-.01
-.01 †
Leader gender
.26
.22
.18
Leader education
.01
-.04
-.04
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.02 †
.02 †
Leader organizational tenure
-.02 *
-.01 †
-.01 †
Leader tenure with senior manager
.01
.00
.00
Senior manager age
-.04
-.05
-.06
Senior manager gender
-.13
-.42
-.39
Senior manager education
-.07
-.11
-.11
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
.00
.00
Senior manager organization tenure
-.01
.00
.00
Rational Persuasion
Political skill

.47 **
-.05

Rational Persuasion X Political skill

.45 **
-.07
.24

Tau (τ)

.01
2

.03

.04

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.29
.29
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

260

Table 74
The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.43 **
4.43 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.21
-.20
-.22
Leader education
-.08
-.10
-.12
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.03 *
.03 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.29
.27
Customer education
.00
.01
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01

Collaboration
Political skill

.11 **
.27

Collaboration X Political skill

.11 **
.32 *
-.16 *

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.06

.06

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.29
.29
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

261

Table 75
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.43 **
4.42 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.21
-.18
-.22
Leader education
-.08
-.11
-.15
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.03 *
.04 *
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.42 *
.37 †
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01

Consultation
Political skill

.15 **
.33 †

.15 **
.38 *
-.17 †

Consultation X Political skill
Tau (τ)

.09
2

.06

.04

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.28
.28
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

262

Table 76
The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.44 **
4.43 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.21
-.23
-.22
Leader education
-.08
-.09
-.10
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.04 **
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.18
.19
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.02 *

Exchange
Political skill

.03
.29

Exchange X Political skill

.04
.32 †
-.17 *

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.08

.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.30
.30
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

263

Table 77
The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.43 *
4.41
Leader age
.01
.01
.00
Leader gender
-.21
-.19
-.22
Leader education
-.08
-.12
-.16
Leader position tenure
.00
-.01
-.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.04 *
.04
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.30
.25
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01

Ingratiation
Political skill

.13 **
.34 †

Ingratiation X Political skill

**

†

**

†

.13 **
.43 **
-.28 **

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.06

.04

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.29
.29
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

264

Table 78
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.42 **
4.41 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01 †
Leader gender
-.21
-.26
-.27
Leader education
-.08
-.11
-.13
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
-.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.04 *
.04 *
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.32
.31
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01

Inspirational appeals
Political skill

.13 **
.31 †

Inspirational appeals X Political skill

.14 **
.46 **
-.24 *

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.04

.01

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.31
.32
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

265

Table 79
The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.44 **
4.44 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.21
-.23
-.23
Leader education
-.08
-.09
-.09
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.04 *
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.14
.14
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01 †

Personal appeals
Political skill

-.01
.29

Personal appeals X Political skill

-.01
.29
-.02

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.09

.09

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.30
.30
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

266

Table 80
The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.43 **
4.42 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.21
-.22
-.23
Leader education
-.08
-.12
-.12
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.01
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.04 *
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.28
.28
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01

Apprising
Political skill

.11 **
.32 †

Apprising X Political skill

.12 **
.41 *
-.15

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.07

.06

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.29
.29
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

267

Table 81
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.43 **
4.42 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.21
-.17
-.19
Leader education
-.08
-.09
-.10
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
-.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.03 *
.03 †
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.30
.22
Customer education
.00
.01
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01 †

Rational persuasion
Political skill

.12 **
.31

Rational persuasion X Political skill

.13 **
.37 †
-.23 *

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.06

.05

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.29
.29
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

268

Table 82
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.72 **
3.72 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
-.07
-.07
Leader education
-.04
-.06
-.06
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
-.01
-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.02 †
.02 †
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.11
-.11
Subordinate education
-.09
-.04
-.04
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.02 *
-.02 *
Coalition
Political skill

-.06
.42 *

Coalition X Political skill

-.06
.43 *
-.04

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.23

.23

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.54
.54
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

269

Table 83
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.72 **
3.72 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
-.14
-.12
Leader education
-.04
-.06
.00
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.12
-.11
Subordinate education
-.09
-.04
-.04
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.03 *
-.02 *
Legitimating
Political skill

.15 **
.42 **

Legitimating X Political skill

.15 **
.47 **
-.23 *

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.22

.21

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.52
.52
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

270

Table 84
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.90 **
3.91 **
3.90 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.09
.11
.12
Leader education
-.04
-.07
-.07
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.13
-.30 †
-.30 †
Subordinate education
-.09
-.06
-.07
Subordinate position tenure
.01
.02
.01
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 †
-.01
-.01
Pressure
Political skill

-.40 **
.23

Pressure X Political skill

-.42 **
.24
-.21

Tau (τ)

.24
2

.14

.14

Sigma-squared (σ )
.63
.58
.58
Note. N = 329 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

271

Table 85
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.73 **
3.73
Leader age
-.01
.00
.00
Leader gender
.02
.11
.10
Leader education
.12 *
.13 *
.12
Leader position tenure
.01
.02 †
.02
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.03 **
.03
Peer age
-.01
.00
.00
Peer gender
.04
.16
.16
Peer education
-.04
.05
.05
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.01
-.01
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01 †
-.01
Coalition
Political skill

-.04
.22

Coalition X Political skill

-.03
.22
-.18

Tau (τ)

.13
2

.15

.15

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.36
.36
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

272

**

*
†
**

†

Table 86
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.72 **
3.72 **
Leader age
-.01
.00
.00
Leader gender
.02
.06
.05
Leader education
.12 *
.12 *
.11 †
Leader position tenure
.01
.02 *
.02 *
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.00
.00
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.02 **
.02 **
Peer age
-.01
.00
.00
Peer gender
.04
.18
.18
Peer education
-.04
.05
.04
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
.00
.00
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01
-.01
Legitimating
Political skill

.14 **
.22

Legitimating X Political skill

.14 **
.22
-.07

Tau (τ)

.13
2

.14

.14

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.34
.34
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

273

Table 87
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.85 **
3.85 **
3.85
Leader age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Leader gender
.02
.02
.03
Leader education
.12 *
.11 *
.11
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader tenure with peer
.03 **
.03 **
.03
Peer age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Peer gender
.04
.01
.01
Peer education
-.04
-.05
-.05
Peer position tenure
-.02 **
-.02 **
-.02
Peer organization tenure
-.01 *
-.01 †
-.01
Pressure
Political skill

-.17
.17

Pressure X Political skill

-.15
.16
-.26

Tau (τ)

.13
2

.13

.13

Sigma-squared (σ )
.36
.36
.36
Note. N = 247 observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

274

**

*

**

**
†

Table 88
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.79 **
3.78 **
3.78
Leader age
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01
Leader gender
.26
.17
.17
Leader education
.01
.02
.02
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.02 †
.02
Leader organizational tenure
-.02 *
-.02 *
-.02
Leader tenure with senior manager
.01
.01
.01
Senior manager age
-.04
.00
.00
Senior manager gender
-.13
-.02
-.02
Senior manager education
-.07
-.09
-.09
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
-.02
-.02
Senior manager organization tenure
-.01
-.02
-.02
Coalition
Political skill

-.50 **
.16

Coalition X Political skill

**
†

†
*

-.50 **
.16
-.01

Tau (τ)

.01
2

.03

.03

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.38
.38
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

275

Table 89
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.79 **
3.80 **
3.80 **
Leader age
-.01 †
-.01
-.01
Leader gender
.26
.25
.25
Leader education
.01
.02
.03
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.02 †
.02 †
Leader organizational tenure
-.02 *
-.02 *
-.02 *
Leader tenure with senior manager
.01
.01
.01
Senior manager age
-.04
-.04
-.04
Senior manager gender
-.13
.17
.16
Senior manager education
-.07
-.13
-.13
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
.00
.00
Senior manager organization tenure
-.01
-.02
-.02
Legitimating
Political skill

-.16
.03

Legitimating X Political skill

-.15
.03
.06

Tau (τ)

.01
2

.01

.00

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.40
.41
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

276

Table 90
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
3.79 **
3.79 **
3.80
Leader age
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01
Leader gender
.26
.25
.27
Leader education
.01
.01
.02
Leader position tenure
.02 †
.02 †
.02
Leader organizational tenure
-.02 *
-.02 *
-.02
Leader tenure with senior manager
.01
.01
.01
Senior manager age
-.04
-.04
-.04
Senior manager gender
-.13
-.09
-.08
Senior manager education
-.07
-.09
-.08
Senior manager position tenure
-.01
-.01
.00
Senior manager organization tenure
-.01
-.01
-.01
Pressure
Political skill

-.24
.05

Pressure X Political skill

**
†

†
*

-.25
.01
.42

Tau (τ)

.01
2

.00

.00

Sigma-squared (σ )
.40
.41
.41
Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1.
Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

277

Table 91
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.43 **
4.43 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.21
4.43
-.21
Leader education
-.08
-.09
-.09
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.04 **
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.18
.18
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01

.11 †
.27

Coalition
Political skill
Coalition X Political skill

.11 †
.27
-.02

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.08

.08

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.30
.31
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

278

Table 92
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of
Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.43 **
4.42 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.21
-.19
-.20
Leader education
-.08
-.10
-.12
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
-.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.04 **
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.31
.33
Customer education
.00
.00
-.01
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01
-.01

Legitimating
Political skill

.09 *
.30

Legitimating X Political skill

.10 *
.42 *
-.24 *

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.06

.05

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.31
.30
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

279

Table 93
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Controls
Intercept
4.44 **
4.44 **
4.44 **
Leader age
.01
.01
.01
Leader gender
-.21
-.23
-.23
Leader education
-.08
-.09
-.09
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with customer
.04 **
.04 **
.04 **
Customer age
.00
.00
.00
Customer gender
.15
.15
.15
Customer education
.00
.00
.00
Customer organization tenure
-.01 †
-.01 †
-.01 †

Pressure
Political skill

.00
.29

Pressure X Political skill

-.05
.27
-.24

Tau (τ)

.09
2

.09

.09

Sigma-squared (σ )
.30
.30
.30
Note. N = 117 observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

280

Table 94
Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Subordinate-Leader
models)
Customer-level variance
(Level 1)
Dependent variable
Task performance
Viability

Leader-level variance
(Level 2)
τ00

2

σ
.53
.63

Proportion of variance at
Leader-level
ρ = τ00 / (τ00 + σ )
31.67%
26.19%

2

.25
.22

2

Note. The variance components are obtained from one-way ANOVA with random effects HLM models. σ =
customer-level (level 1) variance in the dependent variable. τ00 = leader-level (level 2) variance in the dependent
2

variable. Proportion of variance at the level of the leader is computed as ρ = τ00 / (σ + τ00) (Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002).

Table 95
Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Peer-Leader models)
Customer-level variance
(Level 1)
Dependent variable
Task performance
Viability

Leader-level variance
(Level 2)
τ00

2

σ
.39
.41

Proportion of variance at
Leader-level
ρ = τ00 / (τ00 + σ )
28.16%
23.23%

2

.15
.13

2

Note. The variance components are obtained from one-way ANOVA with random effects HLM models. σ =
customer-level (level 1) variance in the dependent variable. τ00 = leader-level (level 2) variance in the dependent
2

variable. Proportion of variance at the level of the leader is computed as ρ = τ00 / (σ + τ00) (Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002).

281

Table 96
Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Senior Manager level (Leader-Senior
Manager models)
Customer-level variance
(Level 1)
Dependent variable
Task performance
Viability

Leader-level variance
(Level 2)
τ00

2

σ
.40
.45

Proportion of variance at
Leader-level
ρ = τ00 / (τ00 + σ )
2.59%
0.01%

2

.01
.00

2

Note. The variance components are obtained from one-way ANOVA with random effects HLM models. σ =
customer-level (level 1) variance in the dependent variable. τ00 = leader-level (level 2) variance in the dependent
2

variable. Proportion of variance at the level of the leader is computed as ρ = τ00 / (σ + τ00) (Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002).

Table 97
Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Customer-Leader
models)
Customer-level variance
(Level 1)
Dependent variable
Task performance
Viability

Leader-level variance
(Level 2)

Proportion of variance at
Leader-level

2

τ00

ρ = τ00 / (τ00 + σ )

.41
.31

.07
.09

15.03%
22.82%

σ

2

2

Note. The variance components are obtained from one-way ANOVA with random effects HLM models. σ =
customer-level (level 1) variance in the dependent variable. τ00 = leader-level (level 2) variance in the dependent
2

variable. Proportion of variance at the level of the leader is computed as ρ = τ00 / (σ + τ00) (Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002).

282

Table 98
Interrater Reliability Estimates for Study Variables by Stakeholder Group
Subordinates
Peers
Customers
Variable
ICC(1) ICC(2)
ICC(1) ICC(2)
ICC(1) ICC(2)
Influence tactics
Rational persuasion
.11
.38
.04
.11
.09
.17
Exchange
.09
.33
.01
.02
.05
.09
Inspirational appeal
.14
.42
.07
.17
.08
.16
Legitimating
.11
.36
.00
-.01
.14
.25
Apprising
.08
.29
.02
.04
.18
.32
Pressure
.14
.43
.00
.01
.00
.00
Collaboration
.22
.57
.13
.29
-.01
-.03
Ingratiation
.09
.30
.07
.18
.21
.37
Consultation
.12
.39
.05
.14
.12
.23
Personal appeals
.05
.21
-.05
-.16
.02
.04
Coalition
.04
.17
-.01
-.01
.19
.34
Outcomes
Task performance
.34
.71
.28
.53
.21
.36
Viability
.29
.66
.22
.44
.30
.48
Other
Relationship quality
.24
.60
.17
.37
.21
.37
Task dependence
.02
.08
.20
.41
Leader political skill
.36
.72
Note. ICC = intraclass correlation coefficient. Average group size for subordinates is 4.71; for
peers is 2.81; and for customers is 2.17.

283

Table 99
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Collaboration
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader

.28 **
.95 **

.28 **
.95 **

1.03
2.36

Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence

-.01

-.03

Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

-.11
-.20

F
ΔR

29.07 **
.36 **

2

19.19 **
.00

11.82 **
.01

2
.35
.34
.34
Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

284

Table 100
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Consultation
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader

.25 *
.66 **

.26 *
.66 **

-.10
.72

Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence

-.02

-.02

Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

.05
-.01

F
ΔR

12.31 **
.19 **

2

8.16 **
.00

4.83 **
.00

2
.18
.17
.15
Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

285

Table 101
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Exchange
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

-.14
.18

-.01
.13

-1.17
-.76

-.25

-.23

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader
Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence
Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

.13
.17

F
ΔR

1.40
.03

2

5.05 **
.10 **

3.33 **
.01

2
.01
.10
.10
Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

286

Table 102
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Ingratiation
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader

-.01
.49 **

.03
.48 **

.31
.69

Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence

-.07

-.08

Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

-.04
-.03

F
ΔR

5.60 **
.10 **

2

4.07 **
.01

2.41 *
.00

2
.08
.08
.06
Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

287

Table 103
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Inspirational Appeal
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader

.12
.46 **

.11
.46 **

-.94
1.71

Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence

.01

.01

Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

.15
-.19

F
ΔR

5.65 **
.10 **

2

.08

2

3.75 *
.00

2.78 *
.02

.07

.08

Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

288

Table 104
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Personal Appeals
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

-.01
.04

.06
.01

-1.58 *
-.33

-.12 *

-.10

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader
Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence
Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

.24 *
.04

F
ΔR

.07
.00
2

1.75
.05 *

2.19
.05

-.02

2

.02

.05

Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

289

Table 105
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Apprising
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader

.01
.37 *

.01
.37 *

-1.05
-1.78

Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence

-.01

.02

Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

.15
.31

F
ΔR

2.61
.05
2

1.73
.00

1.55
.02

.03

2

.02

.03

Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

290

Table 106
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Rational Persuasion
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader

.47 **
.14

.48 **
.13

1.20
-1.26

Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence

.01

.01

Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

-.11
.20

F
ΔR

6.50 **
.11 **

2

.09

2

4.31 **
.00
.09

3.21 *
.03
.10

Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

291

Table 107
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Coalition
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

-.02
-.05

-.03
-.01

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader

-.72
-.90

Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence

-.07

Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

.10
.13

F
ΔR

.22
.00
2

.99
.02

.99
.02

-.02

2

.00

.00

Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

292

Table 108
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Legitimating
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader

.55 **
-.03

.56 **
-.05

-.65
-1.25

Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence

.04

.06

Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

.17
.17

F
ΔR

6.36 **
.11 **

2

.09

2

4.30 **
.00
.09

2.92 *
.02
.08

Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

293

Table 109
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average
Dependence on Pressure
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

-.17
-.13

-.16
-.13

-.77
-1.19

.01

.02

Step 1
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader
Step 2
Leader avg dependence X
Subordinate avg dependence
Step 3
Leader avg dependence squared
Subordinate avg dependence squared

.08
.15

F
ΔR

2.14
.04
2

1.43
.00

1.27
.02

.02

2

.01

.01

Adjusted R
df
2, 103
3, 102
5, 105
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

294

Table 110
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Collaboration
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
.20 *
.19 *
-.89
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.49 **
.49 **
.26
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
-.02
-.05
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
.16
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
.04
F
ΔR

24.13 **
.16 **

2

16.06 **
.00

10.38 **
.01

2
.15
.15
.15
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

295

Table 111
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Consultation
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
.17
.16
-1.67 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.49 **
.49 **
.34
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
-.08
-.12
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
.26 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
.02
F
ΔR

21.28 **
.14 **

2

14.56 **
.00

10.78 **
.03 *

2
.13
.13
.16
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

296

Table 112
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Exchange
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
-.22 *
-.22 *
-2.10 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.17 *
.18 *
.93
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
-.01
-.04
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
.27 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
-.12
F
ΔR

4.62 *
.03 *

2
2

3.08 *
.00

4.75 **
.05 **

Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

297

Table 113
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Ingratiation

Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared

.03
.41 **

.03
.41 **
-.06

Step 3
(Quadratic)
-2.36 **
-.16
-.13

.34 **
.09

F
ΔR

Step 2
(Interaction)

11.57 **
.08 **

2

7.93 **
.00

7.96 **
.05 **

2
.07
.07
.12
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

298

Table 114
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Inspirational Appeal
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
.02
.01
-.97
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.24 **
.24 **
.10
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
-.05
-.07
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
.14
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
.02
F
ΔR

4.69 *
.03 *

2

3.26 *
.00

2.53 *
.01

2
.03
.02
.03
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

299

Table 115
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Personal Appeals
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
-.15 *
-.16 *
-.62
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.06
.07
.38
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
-.05
-.05
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
.07
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
-.05
F
ΔR

2.74
.02

2

2.07
.00

1.62
.01

2
.01
.01
.01
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

300

Table 116
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Personal Appeals
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
-.01
-.02
-1.04
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.30 **
.31 **
-.06
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
-.07
-.10
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
.15
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
.06
F
ΔR

5.85 **
.04 **

2

4.15 **
.00

3.02 *
.01

2
.04
.03
.04
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

301

Table 117
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Personal Appeals
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
.10
.10
-1.10
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.29 **
.29 **
.36
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
.01
-.02 *
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
.17
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
-.01
F
ΔR

8.79 **
.06 **

2

5.84 **
.00

4.44 **
.02

2
.06
.05
.06
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

302

Table 118
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Coalition
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
-.12
-.13 *
-.97 *
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.09
.10
.43
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
-.12 *
-.13 *
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
.12
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
-.05
F
ΔR

2.28
.02

2

3.13 *
.02 *

2.81 *
.02

2
.01
.02
.03
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

303

Table 119
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Legitimating
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
-.12
-.14
-1.88 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.37 **
.38 **
.75
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
-.12
-.15
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
.25 *
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
-.06
F
ΔR

7.74 **
.06 **

2

5.92 **
.01

5.09 **
.03 *

2
.05
.05
.07
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

304

Table 120
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Pressure
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate
-.15 *
-.15 *
.48
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader
.01
.01
.39
Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
-.01
.01
Subordinate dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
-.09
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared
-.06
F
ΔR

2.40
.02

2

1.62
.00

1.48
.01

2
.01
.01
.01
Adjusted R
df
2, 263
3, 262
5, 260
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

305

Table 121
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Collaboration
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
-.15
-.15
-1.00
Peer average dependence on Leader
.55 **
.58 **
1.95 *
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
-.06
-.01
Peer average dependence
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
.16
Peer average dependence squared
-.28
F
ΔR

9.03 **
.15 **

2

6.08 **
.00

4.56 **
.03

2
.14
.13
.15
Adjusted R
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

306

Table 122
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Consultation
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
.04
.04
-.04
Peer average dependence on Leader
.44 **
.47 **
1.24
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
-.06
-.02
Peer average dependence
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
.02
Peer average dependence squared
-.16
F
ΔR

7.92 **
.14 **

2

5.36 **
.00

3.44 **
.01

2
.12
.11
.11
Adjusted R
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

307

Table 123
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Exchange
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
-.09
-.09
.86
Peer average dependence on Leader
.26 *
.28 *
1.50 *
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
Peer average dependence
-.04
.03
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
-.15
Peer average dependence squared
-.24 *
F
ΔR

3.49 *
*
.07

2
2

2.37

2.60 *

.00

.05

Adjusted R
.05
.04
.07
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

308

Table 124
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Ingratiation
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
.03
.03
-.86
Peer average dependence on Leader
.45 **
.40 **
1.55
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
Peer average dependence
.08
.12
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
.16
Peer average dependence squared
-.23
F
ΔR

6.42 **
**
.11

2
2

4.46 **
.01

3.36 **
.03

Adjusted R
.10
.09
.10
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

309

Table 125
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Inspirational Appeal
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
-.06
-.05
.48
Peer average dependence on Leader
.39 **
.32 *
1.01
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
Peer average dependence
.13
.17
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
-.09
Peer average dependence squared
-.14
F
ΔR

4.62 *
*
.08

2
2

3.59 *

2.35 *

.01

.01

Adjusted R
.07
.07
.06
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

310

Table 126
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Personal Appeals
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
-.09
-.09
.62
Peer average dependence on Leader
.17 *
.17 *
1.01
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
Peer average dependence
.00
.04
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
-.12
Peer average dependence squared
-.16
F
ΔR

2.44
2

1.79

.05

2

1.61
.00

.04

Adjusted R
.03
.02
.04
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

311

Table 127
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Apprising
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
-.06
-.06
-.51
Peer average dependence on Leader
.33 **
.25 *
1.33
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
Peer average dependence
.17
.21
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
.09
Peer average dependence squared
-.22
F
ΔR

4.26
2

.08
2

3.94
*

2.97

.03

.03

Adjusted R
.06
.08
.09
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

312

Table 128
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Rational Persuasion
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
.03
.03
.05
Peer average dependence on Leader
.36
.37
.68
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
Peer average dependence
-.03
-.01
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
.00
Peer average dependence squared
-.06
F
ΔR

6.06 **
**
.11

2
2

4.03 **
.00

2.42 *
.00

Adjusted R
.09
.08
.07
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

313

Table 129
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Coalition
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
-.01
-.01
.20
Peer average dependence on Leader
.11
.07
.45
Step 2
.07
Leader average dependence X
Peer average dependence
.09
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
-.03
Peer average dependence squared
-.08
F
ΔR

1.11
2

.92

.02

2

1.25
.01

.01

Adjusted R
.00
.01
.00
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

314

Table 130
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Legitimating
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
.06
.06
.24
Peer average dependence on Leader
.26
.19
.16
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
Peer average dependence
.14
.14
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
-.03
Peer average dependence squared
.01
F
ΔR

2.77
2

1.49

.05

2

2.53
.02

.00

Adjusted R
.03
.04
.02
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

315

Table 131
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average
Dependence on Pressure
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Predictor
(Main effect)
(Interaction)
(Quadratic)
Step 1
Leader average dependence on Peer
.02
.01
-.15
Peer average dependence on Leader
.10 *
.11 *
-.10
Step 2
Leader average dependence X
Peer average dependence
-.02
-.03
Step 3
Leader average dependence squared
.03
Peer average dependence squared
.04
F
ΔR

2.67
2

1.25

.05

2

1.87
.00

.01

Adjusted R
.03
.02
.01
df
2, 100
3, 99
5, 97
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

316

Table 132
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Collaboration
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

-.08
.57 **

-.08
.57 **

-.36
1.24 **

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence

.00

.04

Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

.05
-.13

F
ΔR

23.38 **
.15 **

2

15.53 **
.00

9.90 **
.01

2
.14
.14
.14
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

317

Table 133
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Consultation
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

.02
.56 **

.02
.56 **

.13
.75

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence

-.01

.01

Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

-.02
-.04

F
ΔR

26.40
.17

2

17.54
.00

10.50
.00

2
.16
.16
.15
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

318

Table 134
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Exchange
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

-.24 **
.12

-.24 **
.13

.60
.49

-.07

.00

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

-.14
-.07

F
ΔR

4.33 *
.03 *

2

3.26 *
.00

2.50 *
.01

2
.02
.02
.03
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

319

Table 135
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Ingratiation
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

.08
.43 **

.08
.43 **

.20
1.27 **

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence

.02

.10

Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

-.02
-.17

F
ΔR

14.35 **
.10 **

2

9.57 **
.00

6.48 **
.01

2
.09
.09
.09
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

320

Table 136
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Inspirational Appeal
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

-.09
.45 **

-.09
.45 **

.33
.70

-.01

.04

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

-.07
-.05

F
ΔR

15.77 **
.11 **

2

10.47 **
.00

6.38 **
.00

2
.10
.10
.09
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

321

Table 137
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Personal Appeals
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

-.18 *
.11

-.18 *
.11

.79
.41

-.03

.04

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

-.17
-.06

F
ΔR

3.46 *
.03 *

2

2.43
.00

2.27 *
.01

2
.02
.02
.02
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

322

Table 138
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Apprising
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

-.19
.43 **

-.19
.42 **

-.84
1.06 *

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence

.06

.07

Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

.12
-.13

F
ΔR

14.78 **
.10 **

2

10.05 **
.00

6.84 **
.01

2
.01
.09
.10
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

323

Table 139
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Rational Persuasion
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

.01
.44 **

.01
.44 **

.00
.69

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence

-.04

-.02

Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

.00
-.05

F
ΔR

17.94 **
.12 **

2

12.03 **
.00

7.26 **
.00

2
.11
.11
.10
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

324

Table 140
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Coalition
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

-.08
.13 *

-.08
.13 *

.36
.30

.04

.07

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

-.08
-.03

F
ΔR

3.31 *
.02 *

2

2.39
.00

1.67
.00

2
.02
.02
.01
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

325

Table 141
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Legitimating
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

.06
.31 **

.06
.29 **

.94
.08

.06

.09

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence
Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

-.15
.04

F
ΔR

7.61 **
.05 **

2

5.30 **
.00

3.57 **
.01

2
.05
.05
.05
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

326

Table 142
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic
Dependence on Pressure
Predictor

Step 1
(Main effect)

Step 2
(Interaction)

Step 3
(Quadratic)

Step 1
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader

-.01
.08 *

-.01
.08 *

.02
.19

Step 2
Leader dyadic dependence X
Peer dyadic dependence

-.02

-.01

Step 3
Leader dyadic dependence squared
Peer dyadic dependence squared

.00
-.02

F
ΔR

3.00
.02

2

2.20
.00

1.41
.00

2
.01
.01
.01
Adjusted R
df
2, 265
3, 264
5, 262
Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding
scale.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

327

Table 143
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on
Collaboration Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Consultation
.36 **
.23 *
.51 *
Exchange
.00
.11
-.16
Ingratiation
.21 *
.23 *
.07
Inspirational appeal
.33 *
.21
.03
Personal appeals
.06
-.06
.14
Apprising
-.13
.22 *
.04
Rational Persuasion
-.06
.20 *
-.02
Coalition
-.05
-.09
.04
Legitimating
.10
-.12
.20
Pressure
-.16 *
.14 *
.01
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
.10
-.10
.02
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.58
106

328

.68
103

.60
57

Table 144
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Consultation
Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
.33 **
.20 *
.21 *
Exchange
.02
-.02
.09
Ingratiation
.28 **
.24 **
.57 **
Inspirational appeal
.19
.11
.08
-.28 *
Personal appeals
.19
.28 **
-.30 *
Apprising
.07
-.01
.24 *
Rational Persuasion
.07
.34 **
.43 **
.10
Coalition
.01
-.03
-.32 **
.39 **
Legitimating
.01
-.06
-.06
.11
Pressure
.05
-.10
.11
-.12
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
.11
.09
.13
.00
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.66
106

329

.73
103

.26
112

.84
57

Table 145
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Exchange
Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
.00
.15
-.11
Consultation
.05
-.03
.14
Ingratiation
.03
-.21
.16
Inspirational appeal
.13
.04
.32
Personal appeals
.35 **
.65 **
.43 **
Apprising
.12
-.06
-.05
Rational Persuasion
.01
.14
.00
Coalition
.16
.02
.13
Legitimating
.04
.20 *
-.25
Pressure
-.05
.00
.26 *
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
-.13
.01
.01
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.33
106

330

.57
103

.74
57

Table 146
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Ingratiation
Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
.20 *
.27 *
.03
Consultation
.30 **
.33 **
.68 **
Exchange
.02
-.18
.12
Inspirational appeal
-.13
-.08
.33 *
Personal appeals
.08
.25 *
.28 *
Apprising
.49 **
-.01
-.15
Rational Persuasion
.11
.12
-.09
Coalition
-.04
.01
-.36 **
Legitimating
-.09
.27 **
.08
Pressure
.00
-.03
.09
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
-.11
.04
.00
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.63
106

331

.63
103

.81
57

Table 147
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Inspirational
Appeal Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
.19 *
.22 *
.02
Consultation
.12
.14
.06
-.33 *
Exchange
.04
.03
.24
Ingratiation
-.08
-.08
.34 *
Personal appeals
-.01
.14
-.32 *
Apprising
.21 **
.32 **
.36 *
Rational Persuasion
.47 **
.28 **
.63 **
.43 **
Coalition
-.02
.05
-.05
.32 *
Legitimating
.08
-.02
.05
.09
Pressure
-.13 *
-.17 *
-.07
-.14
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
-.04
.01
-.14
.09
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.78
106

332

.67
103

.44
112

.81
57

Table 148
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Personal
Appeals Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
.10
-.06
.09
Consultation
-.09
.32 **
-.49
Exchange
.30 **
.48 **
.43
Ingratiation
.13
.21 *
.38
Inspirational appeal
-.03
.13
-.42
Apprising
.09
-.02
.37
Rational Persuasion
-.20
-.38 **
.06
Coalition
.36 **
.25 **
.45
Legitimating
-.01
-.05
.02
Pressure
.20 *
.05
.03
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
.10
-.08
-.12
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.44
106

333

.69
103

.74
57

**
**
*
*
**
**

Table 149
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Apprising
Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
-.12
.29 *
.03
Consultation
.07
-.02
.45 *
Exchange
.06
-.06
-.06
Ingratiation
.47 **
-.01
-.24
Inspirational appeal
.34 **
.39 **
.58 **
Personal appeals
.05
-.02
.45 **
Rational Persuasion
-.03
-.17
-.22
Coalition
.01
-.01
-.62 **
Legitimating
.18 *
.41 **
.33
Pressure
-.02
.16 *
.14
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
.00
-.03
.02
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.65
106

334

.59
103

.69
57

Table 150
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Rational
Persuasion Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
-.05
.22 *
-.01
Consultation
.06
.42 **
.27 **
.19
Exchange
.00
.11
.00
Ingratiation
.09
.10
-.14
Inspirational appeal
.67 **
.28 **
.52 **
.68 **
Personal appeals
-.11
-.41 **
.07
Apprising
-.02
-.14
-.22
Coalition
.08
.07
.22 **
-.19
Legitimating
.16 *
.14
.11
.41 *
Pressure
.02
.01
-.01
-.05
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
.07
.00
.07
-.10
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.69
106

335

.66
103

.54
112

.69
57

Table 151
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Coalition
Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
-.09
-.16
.03
Consultation
.03
-.06
-.27 **
.61
Exchange
.15
.03
.13
Ingratiation
-.06
.02
-.48
Inspirational appeal
-.05
.08
-.05
.43
Personal appeals
.39 **
.45 **
.44
Apprising
.01
-.02
-.51
Rational Persuasion
.15
.12
.30 **
-.16
Legitimating
-.01
.22
.22 *
.21
Pressure
.25 *
.22 *
.33 **
.20
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
-.01
-.01
.15
.03
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.38
106

336

.36
103

.37
112

.74
57

Table 152
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Legitimating
Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
.14
-.17
.12
Consultation
.03
-.09
-.05
.15
Exchange
.03
.21 *
-.23
Ingratiation
-.13
.32 **
.10
Inspirational appeal
.20
-.02
.06
.11
Personal appeals
-.01
-.07
.02
Apprising
.27
.44 **
.25
Rational Persuasion
.28
.19
.16
.31 *
Coalition
-.01
.17
.23 *
.19
Pressure
.27
-.02
.33 **
.09
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
-.07
.05
-.10
-.05
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.47
106

337

.50
103

.34
112

.77
57

Table 153
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Pressure
Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1:
Collaboration
-.26 *
.33 *
.01
Consultation
.10
-.26
.10
-.34
Exchange
-.04
.00
.46 *
Ingratiation
.00
-.05
.22
Inspirational appeal
-.36 *
-.38 *
-.08
-.32
Personal appeals
.21 *
.12
.04
Apprising
-.03
.30 *
.21
Rational Persuasion
.05
.02
-.02
-.08
Coalition
.25 *
.29 *
.34 **
.35
Legitimating
.31 **
-.03
.33 **
.17
Step 2:
Stakeholder dependence
-.05
.13
-.19 **
.07
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.40
106

338

.25
103

.35
112

.54
57

Table 154
The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Leader Self-Monitoring on Subordinate
Ratings of Task Performance
Influence Tactic
Rational
Variables
persuasion
Legitimating
Pressure
Controls
Intercept
3.74 **
3.73 **
3.72 **
Leader age
.00
.00
.00
Leader gender
.01
.00
.08
Leader education
-.08
-.07
-.09
Leader position tenure
.01
.01
.01
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.09
-.10
-.17
Subordinate education
-.03
-.04
-.01
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.02
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.03 **
-.02 *
-.02
Influence tactic
Self-monitoring

.32 **
.24

Influence tactic X Self-monitoring
Tau (τ)

-.34 **
.21

2

.13 **
.27

-.32 **
.35 *

-.28 *

-.35 *

.28

.17

Sigma-squared (σ )
.43
.50
.52
Note. N = 327 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1.
Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

339

Table 155
The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Relationship Quality on Subordinate
Ratings of Task Performance
Influence Tactic
Variables

Collaboration

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

3.76
.00
-.33
-.11
.00
.00
.00
.00
-.02
-.01
.02
-.03

Influence tactic
Relationship quality

Consultation
**
**
**

**

.16 **
.94 **

3.76
.00
-.31
-.11
.00
.00
.00
.00
.01
-.01
.02
-.03

Ingratiation
**
**
**

**

3.77
.00
-.32
-.11
.00
.00
.00
.00
.04
-.01
.02
-.03

**
**
**

**

2

-.11 *

-.12 **

.03

Tau (τ)

.05
1.04 **

-.09 *

Influence tactic X Relationship quality

.07 *
1.05 **

.04

.04

Sigma-squared (σ )
.26
.27
.27
Note. N = 327 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

340

Table 155 (cont'd)
Influence Tactic
Variables

Inspirational
appeal

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

3.77
.00
-.30
-.12
.00
.00
.00
.00
.07
.00
.02
-.03

Influence tactic
Relationship quality

Rational
persuasion

Apprising
**
**
**

**

3.77
.00
-.31
-.12
.00
.00
.00
.00
.02
.01
.02
-.02

**
**
**

**

3.76
.00
-.30
-.11
.00
.00
.00
.00
.03
-.01
.02
-.03

**
**
**

**

.16 **
.94 **

Tau (τ)

.13 **
1.01 **

-.09 **

Influence tactic X Relationship quality

.09 **
1.01 **
-.10 **

-.08 *

.03

341

.03

.26

2

Sigma-squared (σ )

.05
.26

.27

Table 155 (cont'd)
Influence Tactic
Variables

Coalition

Legitimating

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

3.74
.00
-.29
-.11
.00
.00
.00
.00
.03
.00
.01
-.02

Influence tactic
Relationship quality

-.09 **
1.15 **

.04
1.09 **

Influence tactic X Relationship quality

-.11 *

-.09 *

.03

.04

.27

.28

Tau (τ)
2

Sigma-squared (σ )

342

**
**
**

*

3.75
.00
-.32
-.11
.00
.00
.00
.00
.06
-.01
.01
-.02

**
**
**

**

Table 156
The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Relationship Quality on Subordinate
Ratings of Viability
Influence Tactic
Variables

Collaboration

Consultation

Exchange

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

3.95
.00
-.25
-.11
.00
.00
.00
.01
-.03
-.06
.01
-.02

Influence tactic
Relationship quality

.17 **
1.04 **

.11 **
1.14 **

.04
1.25 **

Influence tactic X Relationship quality

-.12 **

-.15 **

-.12 **

Tau (τ)

.02
2

**
**
**

*

**

3.96
.00
-.22
-.12
.00
.00
.00
.01
-.01
-.06
.02
-.03

.02

**
*
**

*
*
**

3.94
.00
-.23
-.11
.00
.00
-.01
.00
.05
-.06
.01
-.02

.02

Sigma-squared (σ )
.24
.24
.26
Note. N = 327 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

343

**
*
**

**

Table 156 (cont'd)

Variables

Influence Tactic
Inspirational
appeal

Ingratiation

Apprising

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

3.97
.00
-.23
-.12
.00
.00
.00
.00
.05
-.06
.03
-.02

Influence tactic
Relationship quality

.05
1.17 **

.18 **
1.03 **

.13 **
1.11 **

Influence tactic X Relationship quality

-.16 **

-.18 **

-.15 **

Tau (τ)

**
*
**

*
**

3.99
.00
-.21
-.12
.00
.00
.00
.00
.06
-.05
.02
-.02

**
*
**

**

3.97
.00
-.23
-.13
.00
.00
.00
.00
.02
-.04
.01
-.02

.03

344

.03

.25

2

Sigma-squared (σ )

.02
.23

.22

**
*
**

*

*

Table 156 (cont'd)
Influence Tactic
Variables

Rational
persuasion

Coalition

Legitimating

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

3.98 **
.00
-.21
-.12 **
.00
.00
.00
.00
.02
-.06
.02
-.02 **

3.93
.00
-.21
-.12
.00
.00
.00
.00
.04
-.05
.01
-.02

Influence tactic
Relationship quality

.14 **
1.10 **

-.06
1.29 **

.04 *
1.09 **

Influence tactic X Relationship quality

-.19 **

-.11 *

-.09 **

Tau (τ)

**
*
**

**

3.75
.00
-.32
-.11
.00
.00
.00
.00
.06
-.01
.01
-.02

.02

345

.04

.24

2

Sigma-squared (σ )

.02
.27

.28

**
*
**

**

Table 157
The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Political Skill (Subordinate-rated)on
Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance
Influence Tactic
Inspirational
Variables
Collaboration
Ingratiation
appeal
Controls
Intercept
3.76 **
3.75 **
3.78 **
Leader age
-.01
.00
-.01
Leader gender
-.12
-.10
-.08
Leader education
-.07
-.06
-.07
Leader position tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader organizational tenure
.00
.00
.00
Leader tenure with subordinate
.02 *
.02 **
.02 *
Subordinate age
.00
.00
.00
Subordinate gender
-.10
-.08
-.04
Subordinate education
-.03
-.02
-.02
Subordinate position tenure
.02
.01
.02
Subordinate organization tenure
-.02 *
-.02 *
-.02 *
Influence tactic
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)

.12 **
.95 **

Tau (τ)

.10 **
.96 **

-.10 **

Influence tactic X Leader political skill
(Subordinate-rated)

.06
1.03 **

-.07 *

-.10 **

.04
2

.05

.05

Sigma-squared (σ )
.20
.21
.20
Note. N = 327 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

346

Table 157 (cont'd)

Variables

Apprising

Influence Tactic
Rational
persuasion

Legitimating

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

3.76 **
-.01
-.11
-.07
.00
.00
.02 **
.00
-.06
-.01
.01
-.02 *

3.98 **
.00
.07
-.07
.00
.00
.02
.00
-.06
-.07 *
.02
-.01

3.75 **
-.01
-.07
-.06
.00
.00
.02 *
.00
-.06
-.02
.01
-.01

Influence tactic
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)

.09 **
1.33 **

.16 **
.91 **

.04
1.07 **

Influence tactic X Leader political skill
(Subordinate-rated)

-.10 **

-.20 **

-.11 **

Tau (τ)

.05

347

.05

.20

2

Sigma-squared (σ )

.04
.29

.21

Table 158
The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Political Skill (Subordinate-rated) on
Subordinate Ratings of Viability
Influence Tactic
Variables

Collaboration

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

Consultation

Ingratiation

3.94 **
.00
-.04
-.07
.00
.00
.01
.00
-.14
-.08 **
.01
-.02 *

Tau (τ)

.14 **
.94 **

.09 **
.98 **

-.13 **

Influence tactic X Leader political skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.94 **
.00
.00
-.07
.00
.00
.02
.00
-.09
-.07 *
.01
-.02 *

.21 **
.84 **

Influence tactic
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)

3.94 **
.00
.02
-.07
.00
.00
.02
.00
-.12
-.08 *
.02
-.02 *

-.12 **

-.12 **

.02
2

.04

.03

Sigma-squared (σ )
.29
.31
.32
Note. N = 327 observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader
variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

348

Table 158 (cont'd)

Influence Tactic
Variables

Inspirational
appeal

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

Apprising

Rational
persuasion

3.98 **
.00
.02
-.08
.00
.00
.01
.00
-.02
-.07
.02
-.01

Tau (τ)

.16 **
1.40 **

.16 **
.91 **

-.15 **

Influence tactic X Leader political skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.98 **
.00
.07
-.07
.00
.00
.02
.00
-.06
-.07 *
.02
-.01

.20 **
.83 **

Influence tactic
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)

3.96 **
.00
.00
-.09
.00
.00
.02
.00
-.06
-.05
.01
-.01

-.15 **

-.20 **

.03

349

.04

.29

2

Sigma-squared (σ )

.04
.28

.29

Table 158 (cont'd)

Influence Tactic
Variables

Legitimating

Controls
Intercept
Leader age
Leader gender
Leader education
Leader position tenure
Leader organizational tenure
Leader tenure with subordinate
Subordinate age
Subordinate gender
Subordinate education
Subordinate position tenure
Subordinate organization tenure

3.93 **
.00
.04
-.06
.00
.00
.02
.00
-.08
-.07
.01
-.01

Influence tactic
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)

.08 **
1.03 **

Influence tactic X Leader political skill
(Subordinate-rated)

-.11 **

Tau (τ)

.03
2

Sigma-squared (σ )

.32

350

Table 159
The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.00
.04
.16
Leader gender
-.17 *
-.02
-.15
Leader education
-.19 *
.14
-.40
Leader position tenure
.13
.08
-.17
Leader organizational tenure
-.12
.29 *
.24
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.17
-.15
-.16
Stakeholder age
-.03
-.02
.03
Stakeholder gender
.00
.18
-.24
Stakeholder education
.04
.29 *
.23
Stakeholder position tenure
-.10
.13
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.08
-.04
-.27
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Consultation
-.04
.09
-.23
Exchange
-.09
-.02
-.21
Ingratiation
.10
-.09
.41
Inspirational appeal
.37 **
.24
-.01
Personal appeals
.07
.11
-.13
Apprising
-.13
.16
.54
Rational Persuasion
.13
.19
.24
Coalition
.06
-.08
.21
Legitimating
.04
-.14
-.44
Pressure
-.31 **
-.12
-.08
Step 3: Main effects
Collaboration
.29 *
.22
-.12
Political Skill
.01
.10
.15
Step 4: Interaction
Collaboration X Political Skill
.08
-.02
-.37
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

351

.63
95

.46
58

Table 160
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.02
.04
-.03
.19
Leader gender
-.16
-.02
.16
-.09
Leader education
-.19 *
.14
.10
-.32
Leader position tenure
.12
.08
.20 *
-.20
Leader organizational tenure
-.11
.29 *
-.10
.26
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.18
-.14
-.07
-.20
Stakeholder age
-.03
-.02
.30
.07
Stakeholder gender
.01
.18
-1.32 *
-.25
Stakeholder education
.04
.29 *
.07
.29
Stakeholder position tenure
-.09
.13
-1.86 *
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.09
-.04
-.50
-.31
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.28 *
.22
.11
Exchange
-.09
-.02
-.27
Ingratiation
.11
-.09
.45
Inspirational appeal
.37 **
.24
.73 **
-.14
Personal appeals
.07
.11
-.06
Apprising
-.13
.17
.37
Rational Persuasion
.16
.19
.26 *
.22
Coalition
.06
-.09
-.06
.18
Legitimating
.03
-.14
-.26
-.41
Pressure
-.30 **
-.12
.01
-.06
Step 3: Main effects
Consultation
-.05
.09
-.14
-.09
Political Skill
.02
.10
-.07
.10
Step 4: Interaction
Consultation X Political Skill
.06
-.04
.03
-.03
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

352

.63
95

.70
84

.40
58

Table 161
The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.04
.04
.20
Leader gender
-.15
-.04
-.08
Leader education
-.19
.12
-.31
Leader position tenure
.12
.08
-.20
Leader organizational tenure
-.09
.27 *
.27
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.17
-.14
-.21
Stakeholder age
-.01
-.02
.07
Stakeholder gender
.00
.16
-.25
Stakeholder education
.03
.28 *
.30
Stakeholder position tenure
-.09
.13
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.10
-.06
-.32
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.28 *
.21
.12
Consultation
-.05
.06
-.09
Ingratiation
.11
-.07
.44
Inspirational appeal
.38 **
.22
-.14
Personal appeals
.07
.14
-.06
Apprising
-.11
.17
.36
Rational Persuasion
.13
.19
.22
Coalition
.06
-.08
.17
Legitimating
.03
-.16
-.41
Pressure
-.31 **
-.11
-.06
Step 3: Main effects
Exchange
-.10
-.02
-.27
Political Skill
.03
.09
.09
Step 4: Interaction
Exchange X Political Skill
.03
-.10
-.01
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

353

.63
95

.40
58

Table 162
The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.04
.05
.17
Leader gender
-.15
-.01
-.09
Leader education
-.18
.20
-.38
Leader position tenure
.11
.07
-.21
Leader organizational tenure
-.08
.30 *
.25
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.18
-.17
-.21
Stakeholder age
-.01
-.03
.07
Stakeholder gender
.01
.21
-.26
Stakeholder education
.02
.31 **
.26
Stakeholder position tenure
-.09
.12
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.11
.01
-.29
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.28 *
.24
.03
Consultation
-.05
.09
-.21
Exchange
-.10
-.02
-.29
Inspirational appeal
.38 **
.24
-.12
Personal appeals
.08
.11
-.10
Apprising
-.11
.13
.35
Rational Persuasion
.13
.19
.25
Coalition
.06
-.05
.22
Legitimating
.03
-.13
-.36
Pressure
-.32 **
-.14
-.06
Step 3: Main effects
Ingratiation
.10
-.08
.56
Political Skill
.04
.10
.14
Step 4: Interaction
Ingratiation X Political Skill
-.02
.13
-.18
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

354

.64
95

.42
58

Table 163
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.02
.03
-.04
.21
Leader gender
-.17 *
-.02
.16
-.09
Leader education
-.18
.11
.09
-.33
Leader position tenure
.12
.08
.20 *
-.25
Leader organizational tenure
-.09
.29
-.10
.26
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.16
-.14
-.07
-.19
Stakeholder age
-.02
-.03
.33
.08
Stakeholder gender
.00
.17
-1.38 *
-.21
Stakeholder education
.04
.27
.11
.23
Stakeholder position tenure
-.10
.14
-1.96 *
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.08
-.08
-.51 *
-.31
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.26 *
.20
.15
Consultation
-.04
.10
-.15
-.17
Exchange
-.10
-.02
-.22
Ingratiation
.11
-.07
.61
Personal appeals
.08
.09
-.12
Apprising
-.12
.16
.31
Rational Persuasion
.15
.16
.27 *
.27
Coalition
.05
-.08
-.08
.20
Legitimating
.03
-.15
-.25
-.44
Pressure
-.31 **
-.12
.01
-.08
Step 3: Main effects
Inspirational appeal
.39 *
.26
.72 **
-.22
Political Skill
.02
.11
-.06
.20
Step 4: Interaction
Insp appeal X Political Skill
.07
-.10
.04
-.19
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

355

.63
95

.70
84

.40
58

Table 164
The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.05
.04
.20
Leader gender
-.15
-.02
-.08
Leader education
-.18 *
.14
-.30
Leader position tenure
.13
.08
-.19
Leader organizational tenure
-.09
.28 *
.26
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.16
-.14
-.21
Stakeholder age
-.01
-.02
.07
Stakeholder gender
.03
.18
-.24
Stakeholder education
.03
.29 *
.31
Stakeholder position tenure
-.08
.14
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.11
-.04
-.31
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.29 *
.22
.13
Consultation
-.04
.08
-.05
Exchange
-.10
-.02
-.26
Ingratiation
.08
-.09
.41
Inspirational appeal
.39 **
.24
-.14
Apprising
-.10
.16
.36
Rational Persuasion
.10
.19
.21
Coalition
.07
-.08
.16
Legitimating
.03
-.14
-.42
Pressure
-.30 **
-.12
-.03
Step 3: Main effects
Personal appeals
.07
.11
-.06
Political Skill
.03
.10
.09
Step 4: Interaction
Pers appeals X Political Skill
.08
-.04
.05
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

356

.63
95

.40
58

Table 165
The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.03
.04
.19
Leader gender
-.15
-.02
-.07
Leader education
-.18
.15
-.32
Leader position tenure
.11
.08
-.17
Leader organizational tenure
-.08
.30 *
.25
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.18
-.15
-.22
Stakeholder age
-.02
-.02
.07
Stakeholder gender
.00
.19
-.28
Stakeholder education
.01
.30 *
.32
Stakeholder position tenure
-.08
.13
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.11
-.03
-.32
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.27 *
.22
.09
Consultation
-.05
.09
-.08
Exchange
-.10
-.02
-.25
Ingratiation
.10
-.09
.40
Inspirational appeal
.38 **
.24
-.15
Personal appeals
.08
.11
-.05
Rational Persuasion
.13
.20
.23
Coalition
.06
-.08
.14
Legitimating
.03
-.14
-.36
Pressure
-.32 **
-.13
-.04
Step 3: Main effects
Apprising
-.12
.16
.40
Political Skill
.03
.10
.06
Step 4: Interaction
Apprising X Political Skill
-.02
-.01
.10
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

357

.63
95

.41
58

Table 166
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Ratings of Task
Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.02
.04
-.03
.20
Leader gender
-.18 *
-.02
.16
-.08
Leader education
-.18 *
.15
.10
-.31
Leader position tenure
.12
.08
.20 *
-.20
Leader organizational tenure
-.09
.29 *
-.11
.26
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.16
-.15
-.08
-.21
Stakeholder age
-.02
-.02
.30
.07
Stakeholder gender
.01
.18
-1.30 *
-.25
Stakeholder education
.05
.29 *
.08
.30
Stakeholder position tenure
-.14
.13
-1.82
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.05
-.04
-.49
-.32
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.25 *
.22
.12
Consultation
.01
.08
-.13
-.08
Exchange
-.10
-.02
-.27
Ingratiation
.09
-.09
.44
Inspirational appeal
.40 **
.24
.72 **
-.14
Personal appeals
.05
.11
-.05
Apprising
-.13
.16
.36
Coalition
.06
-.09
-.07
.17
Legitimating
.03
-.14
-.26
-.41
Pressure
-.29 **
-.12
.01
-.06
Step 3: Main effects
Rational Persuasion
.14
.20
.26 *
.21
Political Skill
.02
.10
-.07
.09
Step 4: Interaction
Rational Pers X Political Skill
.13
-.03
.00
-.01
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.77
93

358

.63
95

.70
84

.40
58

Table 167
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.03
.04
-.03
.17
Leader gender
-.15
-.01
.16
-.10
Leader education
-.18
.16
.10
-.36
Leader position tenure
.11
.08
.20 *
-.18
Leader organizational tenure
-.09
.30 *
-.11
.22
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.18
-.15
-.08
-.19
Stakeholder age
-.02
-.01
.30
.09
Stakeholder gender
.00
.19
-1.30 *
-.23
Stakeholder education
.02
.30 *
.08
.26
Stakeholder position tenure
-.09
.13
-1.82
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.11
-.03
-.49
-.29
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.27 *
.22
.05
Consultation
-.05
.09
-.13
-.14
Exchange
-.10
-.02
-.19
Ingratiation
.11
-.09
.52
Inspirational appeal
.39 **
.25
.72 **
-.21
Personal appeals
.07
.11
-.14
Apprising
-.12
.16
.45
Rational Persuasion
.13
.20
.26 *
.28
Legitimating
.03
-.14
-.26
-.43
Pressure
-.31 **
-.13
.01
-.10
Step 3: Main effects
Coalition
.06
-.08
-.07
.17
Political Skill
.03
.10
-.07
.11
Step 4: Interaction
Coalition X Political Skill
-.01
.01
.00
-.15
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

359

.63
95

.74
84

.41
58

Table 168
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.03
.05
-.04
.21
Leader gender
-.15
-.01
.16
-.04
Leader education
-.18
.18
.10
-.30
Leader position tenure
.12
.08
.20 *
-.17
Leader organizational tenure
-.09
.30
-.10
.29
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.18
-.17
-.08
-.24
Stakeholder age
-.02
-.01
.31
.05
Stakeholder gender
.01
.19
-1.32 *
-.33
Stakeholder education
.02
.30
.10
.32
Stakeholder position tenure
-.09
.12
-1.86
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.11
-.01
-.48
-.34
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.27 *
.24
.11
Consultation
-.05
.09
-.14
-.07
Exchange
-.10
-.01
-.30
Ingratiation
.11
-.09
.34
Inspirational appeal
.38 **
.25
.71 **
-.16
Personal appeals
.08
.10
-.03
Apprising
-.12
.17
.45
Rational Persuasion
.13
.20
.27
.25
Coalition
.06
-.07
-.10
.16
Pressure
-.31 **
-.13
.03
-.03
Step 3: Main effects
Legitimating
.03
-.16
-.22
-.37
Political Skill
.03
.10
-.06
.05
Step 4: Interaction
Legitimating X Political Skill
-.01
.07
.07
.15
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

360

.63
95

.70
84

.41
58

Table 169
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.04
.04
-.03
.20
Leader gender
-.16
-.02
.16
-.07
Leader education
-.19
.14
.10
-.31
Leader position tenure
.11
.08
.20 *
-.18
Leader organizational tenure
-.09
.29 *
-.11
.25
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.18
-.14
-.08
-.20
Stakeholder age
-.02
-.04
.29
.07
Stakeholder gender
.01
.19
-1.27 *
-.25
Stakeholder education
.02
.29 *
.08
.30
Stakeholder position tenure
-.09
.14
-1.76
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.11
-.04
-.46
-.32
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.28 *
.22
.14
Consultation
-.05
.08
-.13
-.07
Exchange
-.10
-.03
-.28
Ingratiation
.10
-.09
.41
Inspirational appeal
.38 **
.25
.71 **
-.13
Personal appeals
.08
.13
-.04
Apprising
-.11
.13
.36
Rational Persuasion
.13
.21
.27 *
.21
Coalition
.07
-.07
-.08
.16
Legitimating
.03
-.14
-.23
-.43
Step 3: Main effects
Pressure
-.31 **
-.12
.01
.02
Political Skill
.03
.09
-.08
.11
Step 4: Interaction
Pressure X Political Skill
.03
-.06
.03
.07
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.76
93

361

.63
95

.70
84

.40
58

Table 170
The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling
for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.03
-.11
.19
Leader gender
-.10
-.07
-.11
Leader education
-.21 *
.17
-.46 *
Leader position tenure
.13
.06
-.18
Leader organizational tenure
-.09
.44 **
.15
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.12
-.20
-.10
Stakeholder age
-.01
-.01
-.01
Stakeholder gender
-.06
.24 *
-.28
Stakeholder education
.03
.33 **
.23
Stakeholder position tenure
-.16
.09
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.07
.05
-.21
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Consultation
.09
.09
-.27
Exchange
-.11
.09
-.23
Ingratiation
-.04
.01
.23
Inspirational appeal
.48 **
.25
.08
Personal appeals
.09
-.01
-.11
Apprising
-.08
.28 *
.72 *
Rational Persuasion
-.01
.09
.37
Coalition
.03
-.13
.36
Legitimating
.03
-.11
-.51
Pressure
-.34 **
-.20 *
-.04
Step 3: Main effects
Collaboration
.28 **
.12
-.13
Political Skill
-.05
.04
.19
Step 4: Interaction
Collaboration X Political Skill
.07
-.03
-.36 *
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

362

.64
95

.56
58

Table 171
The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for
other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.03
-.11
-.18
.20
Leader gender
-.10
-.07
.10
-.07
Leader education
-.22 **
.17
-.02
-.42 *
Leader position tenure
.12
.06
.19
-.22
Leader organizational tenure
-.10
.44 **
-.14
.15
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.14
-.20
.00
-.13
Stakeholder age
-.02
-.01
-.07
.03
Stakeholder gender
-.05
.25 *
-.19
-.28
Stakeholder education
.04
.33 **
-.72 **
.26
Stakeholder position tenure
-.14
.10
.09
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.08
.05
-.45
-.24
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.27 **
.12
.08
Exchange
-.11
.09
-.29
Ingratiation
-.04
.01
.31
Inspirational appeal
.48 **
.25
.51 **
-.05
Personal appeals
.09
-.01
-.08
Apprising
-.09
.28
.57 *
Rational Persuasion
.04
.09
.39 **
.36
Coalition
.02
-.13
-.21
.36
Legitimating
.02
-.10
-.42 **
-.48
Pressure
-.33 **
-.20 *
.05
-.01
Step 3: Main effects
Consultation
.09
.09
-.05
-.19
Political Skill
-.05
.04
-.07
.16
Step 4: Interaction
Consultation X Political Skill
.09
-.04
-.01
-.11
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

363

.64
95

.64
84

.51
58

Table 172
The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for
other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.01
-.12
.24
Leader gender
-.09
-.07
-.04
Leader education
-.20 *
.17
-.39 *
Leader position tenure
.12
.07
-.25
Leader organizational tenure
-.06
.43 **
.18
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.13
-.20
-.16
Stakeholder age
.00
-.01
.03
Stakeholder gender
-.05
.24 *
-.30
Stakeholder education
.02
.33 **
.27
Stakeholder position tenure
-.15
.09
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.10
.05
-.26
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.26 *
.12
.09
Consultation
.08
.08
-.20
Ingratiation
-.04
.02
.31
Inspirational appeal
.50 **
.24
-.07
Personal appeals
.09
.00
-.06
Apprising
-.08
.27 *
.53
Rational Persuasion
.00
.10
.36
Coalition
.04
-.13
.35
Legitimating
.01
-.11
-.43
Pressure
-.34 **
-.20 *
-.04
Step 3: Main effects
Exchange
-.11
.09
-.29
Political Skill
-.03
.04
.16
Step 4: Interaction
Exchange X Political Skill
-.02
-.03
-.09
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

364

.64
95

.50
58

Table 173
The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for
other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.01
-.11
.20
Leader gender
-.09
-.06
-.05
Leader education
-.21 *
.21
-.45 *
Leader position tenure
.13
.06
-.23
Leader organizational tenure
-.07
.45 **
.16
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.13
-.22
-.16
Stakeholder age
.00
-.02
.02
Stakeholder gender
-.06
.27 *
-.30
Stakeholder education
.03
.34 *
.25
Stakeholder position tenure
-.15
.08
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.09
.09
-.22
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.26 *
.13
.01
Consultation
.08
.09
-.27
Exchange
-.11
.09
-.31
Inspirational appeal
.49 **
.25
-.03
Personal appeals
.08
-.01
-.08
Apprising
-.07
.25 *
.53
Rational Persuasion
-.01
.10
.38
Coalition
.04
-.11
.37
Legitimating
.02
-.09
-.42
Pressure
-.34 **
-.22 *
-.01
Step 3: Main effects
Ingratiation
-.03
.02
.39
Political Skill
-.03
.04
.18
Step 4: Interaction
Ingratiation X Political Skill
.02
.09
-.21
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

365

.65
95

.52
58

Table 174
The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.02
-.12
-.20
.25
Leader gender
-.10
-.07
.09
-.06
Leader education
-.21 *
.15
-.02
-.42 *
Leader position tenure
.12
.06
.18
-.31
Leader organizational tenure
-.06
.43 **
-.13
.16
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.12
-.20
.01
-.12
Stakeholder age
-.01
-.03
-.03
.04
Stakeholder gender
-.06
.24 *
-.30
-.21
Stakeholder education
.03
.31 **
-.68 **
.17
Stakeholder position tenure
-.16
.10
-.10
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.07
.03
-.49
-.23
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.25 *
.10
.17
Consultation
.09
.10
-.07
-.28
Exchange
-.12
.09
-.20
Ingratiation
-.03
.03
.57
Personal appeals
.09
-.03
-.16
Apprising
-.08
.27 *
.44
Rational Persuasion
.01
.07
.39 **
.45
Coalition
.03
-.13
-.23
.38
Legitimating
.02
-.11
-.41 **
-.53
Pressure
-.34 **
-.20 *
.05
-.05
Step 3: Main effects
Inspirational appeal
.50 **
.26
.51 **
-.21
Political Skill
-.04
.05
-.06
.33
Step 4: Interaction
Inspirational appeal X Political Skill
.07
-.09
.06
-.34
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

366

.65
95

.64
84

.55
58

Table 175
The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
-.01
-.11
.23
Leader gender
-.09
-.07
-.04
Leader education
-.21 *
.17
-.37
Leader position tenure
.13
.06
-.22
Leader organizational tenure
-.06
.44 **
.17
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.12
-.21
-.16
Stakeholder age
.01
-.01
.02
Stakeholder gender
-.04
.25 *
-.29
Stakeholder education
.02
.33 **
.30
Stakeholder position tenure
-.15
.09
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.10
.06
-.25
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.27 **
.12
.11
Consultation
.09
.09
-.12
Exchange
-.12
.09
-.28
Ingratiation
-.05
.01
.25
Inspirational appeal
.50 **
.25
-.06
Apprising
-.07
.27 *
.54
Rational Persuasion
-.02
.10
.35
Coalition
.04
-.12
.32
Legitimating
.02
-.10
-.48
Pressure
-.34 **
-.20 *
-.01
Step 3: Main effects
Personal appeals
.09
.00
-.04
Political Skill
-.03
.04
.13
Step 4: Interaction
Personal appeals X Political Skill
.04
-.01
.00
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

367

.64
95

.50
58

Table 176
The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for
other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.00
-.11
.23
Leader gender
-.09
-.07
-.04
Leader education
-.21 *
.18
-.37
Leader position tenure
.13
.06
-.22
Leader organizational tenure
-.07
.44 **
.17
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.13
-.21
-.16
Stakeholder age
.00
-.01
.02
Stakeholder gender
-.05
.25 *
-.29
Stakeholder education
.02
.33 **
.30
Stakeholder position tenure
-.15
.09
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.09
.06
-.25
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.27 *
.12
.11
Consultation
.08
.09
-.12
Exchange
-.11
.09
-.28
Ingratiation
-.04
.01
.25
Inspirational appeal
.49 **
.25
-.06
Personal appeals
.09
.00
-.03
Rational Persuasion
-.01
.10
.35
Coalition
.04
-.12
.31
Legitimating
.02
-.10
-.47
Pressure
-.34 **
-.20 *
-.01
Step 3: Main effects
Apprising
-.07
.27 *
.54
Political Skill
-.03
.04
.13
Step 4: Interaction
Apprising X Political Skill
.01
.00
.01
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

368

.64
95

.50
58

Table 177
The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.02
-.11
-.19
.21
Leader gender
-.12 *
-.06
.09
-.10
Leader education
-.22 *
.17
-.02
-.39 *
Leader position tenure
.13
.06
.19
-.25
Leader organizational tenure
-.07
.44 **
-.14
.15
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.11
-.20
.00
-.10
Stakeholder age
-.01
-.01
-.07
.05
Stakeholder gender
-.06
.25 *
-.20
-.21
Stakeholder education
.05
.33 **
-.71 **
.26
Stakeholder position tenure
-.21
.10
.08
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.03
.05
-.45
-.22
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.23 *
.11
.13
Consultation
.15
.09
-.06
-.15
Exchange
-.11
.09
-.30
Ingratiation
-.05
.01
.38
Inspirational appeal
.51 **
.24
.51 **
.05
Personal appeals
.06
-.01
-.06
Apprising
-.09
.28 *
.44
Coalition
.03
-.14
-.22
.36
Legitimating
.02
-.10
-.40 *
-.52
Pressure
-.32 **
-.20 *
.05
-.03
Step 3: Main effects
Rational Persuasion
.00
.10
.39 **
.24
Political Skill
-.04
.04
-.07
.15
Step 4: Interaction
Rational Persuasion X Political Skill
.15
-.04
.04
-.19
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.82
93

369

.64
95

.64
84

.52
58

Table 178
The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for
other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.02
-.11
-.18
.18
Leader gender
-.08
-.07
.10
-.07
Leader education
-.20 *
.17
-.01
-.44 *
Leader position tenure
.11
.06
.19
-.19
Leader organizational tenure
-.07
.44 **
-.14
.11
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.15
-.21
.00
-.13
Stakeholder age
.00
-.02
-.05
.04
Stakeholder gender
-.07
.25 *
-.20
-.26
Stakeholder education
.01
.33 **
-.71 **
.24
Stakeholder position tenure
-.15
.10
.04
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.10
.06
-.48
-.21
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.26 *
.12
.02
Consultation
.08
.08
-.05
-.21
Exchange
-.10
.09
-.18
Ingratiation
-.03
.00
.37
Inspirational appeal
.50 **
.25
.52 **
-.16
Personal appeals
.08
.00
-.16
Apprising
-.08
.26 *
.66 *
Rational Persuasion
-.01
.09
.39 **
.44
Legitimating
.01
-.10
-.43 **
-.50
Pressure
-.35 **
-.20 **
.06
-.07
Step 3: Main effects
Coalition
.04
-.12
-.21
.33
Political Skill
-.02
.04
-.08
.17
Step 4: Interaction
Coalition X Political Skill
-.05
-.03
-.02
-.21
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

370

.64
95

.64
84

.52
58

Table 179
The Moderating Effect of Legitimating and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for
other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.00
-.11
-.18
.23
Leader gender
-.09
-.06
.10
-.04
Leader education
-.21 *
.19
-.01
-.37
Leader position tenure
.12
.06
.19
-.21
Leader organizational tenure
-.06
.44 **
-.14
.18
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.13
-.21
.00
-.16
Stakeholder age
.00
-.01
-.07
.02
Stakeholder gender
-.06
.25 *
-.20
-.31
Stakeholder education
.02
.33 **
-.70 **
.30
Stakeholder position tenure
-.15
.09
.06
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.09
.07
-.45
-.26
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.27 *
.12
.11
Consultation
.08
.09
-.05
-.12
Exchange
-.11
.10
-.29
Ingratiation
-.04
.01
.23
Inspirational appeal
.50 **
.25
.50 **
-.06
Personal appeals
.09
-.01
-.03
Apprising
-.07
.27 *
.56
Rational Persuasion
-.01
.10
.40 **
.35
Coalition
.04
-.12
-.23
.32
Pressure
-.34 **
-.21 *
.06
.00
Step 3: Main effects
Legitimating
.02
-.11
-.39 *
-.47
Political Skill
-.03
.04
-.07
.13
Step 4: Interaction
Legitimating X Political Skill
.02
.03
.04
.03
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

371

.64
95

.64
84

.50
58

Table 180
The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for
other Influence Tactics
Senior
Variables
Subordinate
Peer
Manager
Customer
Step 1: Controls
Leader age
.01
-.12
-.18
.25
Leader gender
-.08
-.07
.10
.00
Leader education
-.20 *
.17
-.01
-.36
Leader position tenure
.13
.06
.19
-.14
Leader organizational tenure
-.06
.44 **
-.14
.09
Leader tenure with stakeholder
.12
-.20
.00
-.13
Stakeholder age
.01
-.02
-.08
-.01
Stakeholder gender
-.06
.26 *
-.17
-.31
Stakeholder education
.02
.33 **
-.71 **
.28
Stakeholder position tenure
-.15
.10
.13
Stakeholder organization tenure
-.09
.06
-.43
-.28
Step 2: Influence Tactics
Collaboration
.26 *
.12
.21
Consultation
.08
.09
-.05
-.09
Exchange
-.11
.09
-.34
Ingratiation
-.04
.01
.14
Inspirational appeal
.50 **
.25
.51 **
.00
Personal appeals
.09
.00
.01
Apprising
-.07
.26 *
.53 *
Rational Persuasion
-.01
.10
.39 **
.33
Coalition
.04
-.12
-.22
.28
Legitimating
.02
-.10
-.40 *
-.57
Step 3: Main effects
Pressure
-.35 **
-.20 *
.05
.35
Political Skill
-.03
.04
-.08
.24
Step 4: Interaction
Pressure X Political Skill
-.02
-.03
.02
.35
2

R
N
Note. All coefficients standardized.
* p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).

.81
93

372

.64
95

.64
84

.51
58

APPENDIX B
List of Figures

Figure 1
Overall model
Leader
Political
skill

Leader influence tactics

Stakeholder
dependence

Soft:
Collaboration
Consultation
Exchange
Ingratiation
Inspirational appeal
Personal appeals

Leader Outcomes by Rater
Internal-subordinate:
Leader task performance
Leader viability
Internal-peer:
Leader task performance
Leader viability

Rational:
Apprising
Rational persuasion

Internal-supervisor:
Leader task performance
Leader viability

Hard:
Coalition
Legitimating
Pressure

External-customer:
Leader task performance
Leader viability

373

Figure 2
The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

Figure 3
The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Consultation

High Consultation

374

Figure 4
The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Exchange

High Exchange

Figure 5
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

375

Figure 6
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

Figure 7
The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Personal Appeals

High Personal Appeals

376

Figure 8
The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Apprising

High Apprising

Figure 9
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

377

Figure 10
The Relationship between Collaboration and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

Figure 11
The Relationship between Consultation and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Consultation

High Consultation

378

Figure 12
The Relationship between Exchange and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Exchange

High Exchange

Figure 13
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

379

Figure 14
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

Figure 15
The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Personal Appeals

High Personal Appeals

380

Figure 16
The Relationship between Apprising and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Apprising

High Apprising

Figure 17
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

381

Figure 18
The Relationship between Consultation and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Consultation

High Consultation

Figure 19
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

382

Figure 20
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

Figure 21
The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

383

Figure 22
The Relationship between Consultation and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Consultation

High Consultation

Figure 23
The Relationship between Exchange and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Exchange

High Exchange

384

Figure 24
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

Figure 25
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Customer-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

385

Figure 26
The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Personal Appeals

High Personal Appeals

Figure 27
The Relationship between Apprising and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Apprising

High Apprising

386

Figure 28
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Customer-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

Figure 29
The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Coalition

High Coalition

387

Figure 30
The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

Figure 31
The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Pressure

High Pressure

388

Figure 32
The Relationship between Coalition and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Coalition

High Coalition

Figure 33
The Relationship between Legitimating and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

389

Figure 34
The Relationship between Pressure and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Pressure

High Pressure

Figure 35
The Relationship between Coalition and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Coalition

High Coalition

390

Figure 36
The Relationship between Legitimating and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

Figure 37
The Relationship between Pressure and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Pressure

High Pressure

391

Figure 38
The Relationship between Coalition and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Coalition

High Coalition

Figure 39
The Relationship between Legitimating and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

392

Figure 40
The Relationship between Pressure and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Pressure

High Pressure

Figure 41
The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

VIability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

393

Figure 42
The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Consultation

High Consultation

Figure 43
The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Exchange

High Exchange

394

Figure 44
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

Figure 45
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

395

Figure 46
The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Personal Appeals

High Personal Appeals

Figure 47
The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Apprising

High Apprising

396

Figure 48
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

Figure 49
The Relationship between Collaboration and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

397

Figure 50
The Relationship between Consultation and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Consultation

High Consultation

Figure 51
The Relationship between Exchange and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Exchange

High Exchange

398

Figure 52
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

Figure 53
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

399

Figure 54
The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Personal Appeals

High Personal Appeals

Figure 55
The Relationship between Apprising and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Apprising

High Apprising

400

Figure 56
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5

Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

Figure 57
The Relationship between Consultation and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Consultation

High Consultation

401

Figure 58
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

Figure 59
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

402

Figure 60
The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

Figure 61
The Relationship between Consultation and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Consultation

High Consultation

403

Figure 62
The Relationship between Exchange and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Exchange

High Exchange

Figure 63
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

404

Figure 64
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

Figure 65
The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Personal Appeals

High Personal Appeals

405

Figure 66
The Relationship between Apprising and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Apprising

High Apprising

Figure 67
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

406

Figure 68
The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Coalition

High Coalition

Figure 69
The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

407

Figure 70
The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Pressure

High Pressure

Figure 71
The Relationship between Coalition and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political
Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Coalition

High Coalition

408

Figure 72
The Relationship between Legitimating and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

Figure 73
The Relationship between Pressure and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political
Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Pressure

High Pressure

409

Figure 74
The Relationship between Coalition and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Coalition

High Coalition

Figure 75
The Relationship between Legitimating and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

410

Figure 76
The Relationship between Pressure and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Pressure

High Pressure

Figure 77
The Relationship between Coalition and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Coalition

High Coalition

411

Figure 78
The Relationship between Legitimating and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

Figure 79
The Relationship between Pressure and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5
Low Political
Skill

3.0

2.5
2.0
Low Pressure

High Pressure

412

Figure 80
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Self-monitoring
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Selfmonitoring

3.5

Low Selfmonitoring

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

Figure 81
The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Self-monitoring
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Selfmonitoring

3.5

Low Selfmonitoring

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

413

Figure 82
The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Self-monitoring
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Selfmonitoring

3.5

Low Selfmonitoring

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Pressure

High Pressure

Figure 83
The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

414

Figure 84
The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Consultation

High Consultation

Figure 85
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

415

Figure 86
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

Figure 87
The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Apprising

High Apprising

416

Figure 88
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

Figure 89
The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Coalition

High Coalition

417

Figure 90
The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

Figure 91
The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

418

Figure 92
The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Relationship Quality
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Consultation

High Consultation

Figure 93
The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Relationship Quality
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Exchange

High Exchange

419

Figure 94
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Relationship Quality
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5
Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

Figure 95
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5
Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

420

Figure 96
The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Relationship Quality
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Apprising

High Apprising

Figure 97
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Relationship Quality
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5
Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5

2.0
Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

421

Figure 98
The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Relationship Quality
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5

Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Coalition

High Coalition

Figure 99
The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Relationship Quality
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Relationship
Quality

3.5
Low Relationship
Quality

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

422

Figure 100
The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5

Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

Figure 101
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5

Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

423

Figure 102
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at
High and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5

Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

Figure 103
The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5

Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Apprising

High Apprising

424

Figure 104
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High
and Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill
(Subordinaterated)

3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

Figure 105
The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and
Low Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Task Performance

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5

Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

425

Figure 106
The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5

Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

Figure 107
The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5

Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Consultation

High Consultation

426

Figure 108
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5
Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Ingratiation

High Ingratiation

Figure 109
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5
Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Inspirational
Appeal

High Inspirational
Appeal

427

Figure 110
The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of
Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5

Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Apprising

High Apprising

Figure 111
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5
Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

428

Figure 112
The Relationship between Legitimating and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.5
Low Political Skill
(Subordinate-rated)

3.0
2.5
2.0
Low Legitimating

High Legitimating

Figure 113
The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels
of Political Skill (Independent Effects Model)
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5

Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Collaboration

High Collaboration

429

Figure 114
The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low
Levels of Political Skill (Independent Effects Model)
5.0

Viability

4.5
4.0

High Political
Skill

3.5

Low Political
Skill

3.0
2.5
2.0

Low Rational
Persuasion

High Rational
Persuasion

430

APPENDIX C
IRB Consent Form
Consent
You are being asked to participate in a research study. Researchers are required to provide a
consent form to inform you about the study, to convey that your participation is voluntary, and to
explain risks and benefits of participation.
Study Title:
Leadership and Organizational Culture
Researchers & Titles:
Dr. Frederick P. Morgeson, Professor
Elizabeth Karam, Doctoral Candidate in Organizational Behavior
Department & Institution:
Department of Management
The Eli Broad Graduate School of Management
Michigan State University
Contact information:
475 Business College Complex
East Lansing, MI 48824
lizkaram@msu.edu
This research study is designed to investigate leadership and culture within your organization. If
you choose to participate, you will be asked to complete a series of survey questions. The survey
will include questions assessing demographic information, leadership, and the culture of your
organization.
You must be 18 or older to participate in this research study, and your participation in the
research is completely voluntary. The survey should take approximately 20-30 minutes in total.
You are free to decline to answer any questions or to terminate your participation at any time
without penalty.
Risks associated with participating in this study are very low as your privacy will be protected to
the maximum extent allowable by law. Only the researchers listed above and the Human
Research Protection Program will have access to the responses that you provide. Your data will
be included in a summary report along with the data from others to your organization; however,
the report will not include any information that will allow anyone to identify any of your
individual responses. In addition, the data is stored on a password-protected server, which will be
accessible only by the research team. The data will be kept for at least 5 years in accordance with
American Psychological Association guidelines.

431

Benefits associated with participating in this study are the enhanced learning that occurs from
understanding how leaders work with and influence others within and outside of the
organization, and how organizational culture impacts the performance of the organization. In
addition, all study participants will be entered into a drawing for a $50 gift certificate to
Amazon.com. Twenty participants will be randomly selected to win one of these prizes.
If you have concerns or questions about this study, such as scientific issues, how to do any part
of it, or to report an injury, please contact the researcher: Frederick P. Morgeson at 517-4323520, or email morgeson@msu.edu, or regular mail at: N475 North Business Complex, MSU,
East Lansing, MI 48824. If you have questions or concerns about your role and rights as a
research participant, would like to obtain information or offer input, or would like to register a
complaint about this study, you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the Michigan State
University’s Human Research Protection Program at 517-355-2180, Fax 517-432-4503, or email irb@msu.edu or regular mail at 207 Olds Hall, MSU, East Lansing, MI 48824.
Check the box below to agree to participate and continue with the survey.
I voluntarily agree to participate in this research study.
Please provide validation information for prize notification purposes.
Type First and Last Name
Email Address
Today's Date (mm/dd/yyyy)

432

APPENDIX D
Survey introduction
Welcome to the [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] survey!
The purpose of this survey is twofold. First, we would like to learn more about how leaders
interact with internal and external stakeholders to coordinate their work. Second, we intend to
examine how leadership and organizational culture affect these interactions. Your responses are
very valuable to our research team, and we thank you for participating!
The survey begins by asking a few short demographic questions. Then, you will be asked to
respond to questions in three sections. The first section assesses the extent to which you depend
on others for completing your work. The second section asks questions about personal
characteristics and values, and the final section includes questions about how well your branch
performs.
It is important that you respond candidly and honestly when answering the questions. There are
no right or wrong answers, please simply indicate your judgments. Do not spend too much time
on any one question. Simply respond with your initial reaction. Keep in mind that no individual
data will be reported back to Chemical Bank, and no information will be given which
specifically describes or identifies any individual respondent. All responses will be grouped, and
a feedback report will be created based on the aggregated responses. Your responses are
confidential.
The survey contains primarily multiple-choice questions, and it should take approximately 20-30
minutes to complete. If you do not have time to answer all of the survey questions at once, you
may return to the survey using the link provided. Your previous answers will be saved as long as
you are responding from the same computer. All participants who complete the survey will be
entered into a drawing to win one of twenty $50 Amazon.com gift certificates.
Your responses are very important to this process. If you have any questions, feel free to contact
me at lizkaram@msu.edu.
I sincerely appreciate your time and honest responses. Thank you again for your participation!
Elizabeth P. Karam
Doctoral Candidate in Organizational Behavior
The Eli Broad Graduate School of Management
Michigan State University
475 North Business Complex
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824-1121

433

APPENDIX E
Leader Survey
Demographic Information
Please provide the following demographic information.
Please indicate your gender.
_____ Male
_____ Female
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate your age.
_____ Years
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed.
_____ Some high school
_____ High school diploma
_____ Some college
_____ Associates degree
_____ Bachelors degree
_____ Masters degree
_____ Doctorate
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate your total work experience (round to the nearest year).
_____ years with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]
_____ years in current position

SECTION 1: Working with Others
Task Dependence: Section Overview
In the following questions, you will be asked to list individuals with whom you regularly interact
for completing your work. After listing names in each stakeholder category (i.e., subordinates,
peers, supervisor, and customers), you will be asked to respond to the same set of questions for
each individual that you have listed. This repetition allows us to make comparisons about how
your work is connected to others within the organization. Therefore, please note the name of the

434

specific person that the questions are referring to in the instructions and respond according to
how you work with that particular individual.
Task Dependence - Subordinates
Instructions: Please list the names and email addresses of 3-5 subordinates with whom you
regularly interact for completing your work. Subordinates include individuals who report directly
to you via the organization's hierarchical structure. The list should contain a diverse set of
subordinates who assist with the responsibilities related to your position. It should not include
only those with whom you have close personal friendships.
[Leaders responded by listing 3-5 subordinate names and email addresses]

5

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your working relationship with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I work closely with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE].
3. My own performance is dependent on receiving accurate information from [NAME OF
SUBORDINATE].
4. I rely on the support of from [NAME OF SUBORDINATE] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE] fairly frequently.
During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE]?
Response scale:
1 = Never
2 = Rarely
3 = Sometimes
4 = Often
5 = Very often
Task Dependence - Peer Co-Workers

5

The subordinate/peer/supervisor/customer name pre-fills on the survey based on the leader's
responses. The leader responded to the same questions (i.e., stakeholder dependence scale and
interaction frequency item) for each name entered.
435

Instructions: Please list the names and email addresses of 3-5 peer co-workers with whom you
regularly interact for completing your work. This may include other individuals who perform the
same function as you at a different location or individuals from other areas of the organization.
This list should include individuals that you are not formally connected to via the organization's
hierarchy. The list should contain a diverse set of peers who assist with the responsibilities
related to your position. It should not include only those with whom you have close personal
friendships.
[Leaders responded by listing 3-5 peer names and email addresses]
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your working relationship with [NAME OF PEER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I work closely with [NAME OF PEER] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF PEER].
3. My own performance is dependent on receiving accurate information from [NAME OF
PEER].
4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF PEER] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF PEER] fairly frequently.
During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF PEER]?
Response scale:
1 = Never
2 = Rarely
3 = Sometimes
4 = Often
5 = Very often
Task Dependence – Supervisor
Instructions: Please select your supervisor from the drop-down list below. Your supervisor is the
person that you directly report to via the organization's hierarchical structure.
[Senior manager names appeared in a drop down box.]
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your working relationship with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER].

436

Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I work closely with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER].
3. My own performance is dependent on receiving accurate information from [NAME OF
SENIOR MANAGER].
4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] fairly
frequently.
During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER]?
Response scale:
1 = Never
2 = Rarely
3 = Sometimes
4 = Often
5 = Very often
Task Dependence - Customers
Instructions: Please list the names of 3-5 customers with whom you regularly interact for
completing your work. In addition, select the type of relationship that the organization has with
this customer. Customers should include individuals outside of your organization. The list should
contain a diverse set of customers who assist with the responsibilities related to your position. It
should not include only those with whom you have close personal friendships.
[Leaders responded by listing 3-5 customer names and their respective relationships.]
Customer relationship response scale:
1 = Retail customer
2 = Commercial customer
3 = Retail and commercial customer
4 = Other
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your working relationship with [NAME OF CUSTOMER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
437

3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I work closely with [NAME OF CUSTOMER] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF CUSTOMER].
3. My own performance is dependent on receiving accurate information from [NAME OF
CUSTOMER].
4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF CUSTOMER] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF CUSTOMER] fairly frequently.
During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF CUSTOMER]?
Response scale:
1 = Never
2 = Rarely
3 = Sometimes
4 = Often
5 = Very often
SECTION 2: Personal Characteristics and Values
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes how much you agree with each statement about yourself.
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others.
I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me.
I am able to communicate easily and effectively with others.
It is easy for me to develop a good rapport with most people.
I understand people very well.
I am good at building relationships with influential people at work.
I am particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.
When communicating with others, I try to be genuine in what I say and do.
I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work whom I can call on
for support when I really need to get things done.
10. At work, I know a lot of important people and am well connected.
11. I spend a lot of time at work developing connections with others.
12. I am good at getting people to like me.
13. It is important that people believe I am sincere in what I say and do.
438

14. I try to show a genuine interest in other people.
15. I am good at using my connections and network to make things happen at work.
16. I have good intuition or savvy about how to present myself to others.
17. I always seem to instinctively know the right things to say or do to influence others.
18. I pay close attention to people's facial expressions.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes how much you agree with each statement about yourself.
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1.
2.
3.
4.

I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no
information.
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
6. I would probably make a good actor.
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
10. I'm not always the person I appear to be.
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or
win their favor.
12. I have considered being an entertainer.
13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your relationship with your [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
439

4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I like [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] very much as a person.
2. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] is the kind of person one would like to have as a
friend.
3. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] is a lot of fun to work with.
4. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] defends my work actions to others, even without
complete knowledge of the issue in question.
5. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by
others.
6. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] would defend me to others in the organization if I
made an honest mistake.
7. I do work for [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] that goes beyond what is specified in
my job description.
8. I am willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally required, to further the
interests of my work group.
9. I do not mind working my hardest for [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER].
10. I am impressed with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER]'s knowledge of his/her job.
11. I respect [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER]'s knowledge of and competence on the job.
12. I admire [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER]'s professional skills.

440

APPENDIX F
Subordinate Survey
Demographic Information
Please provide the following demographic information.
Please indicate your gender.
_____ Male
_____ Female
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate your age.
_____ Years
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed.
_____ Some high school
_____ High school diploma
_____ Some college
_____ Associates degree
_____ Bachelors degree
_____ Masters degree
_____ Doctorate
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate your position and experience at [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] (round to the
nearest year).
_____ Number of years with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]
_____ Job title in current position
_____ Number of years in current position
Please select the name of your branch manager:
[Branch manager names appeared in a drop down box.]
Please indicate how long you have worked with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
_____ Years working with branch manager

441

SECTION 1: Leader Behavior Influence
Instructions: The purpose of these questions is to learn more about the different ways people try
to influence each other in organizations. Please describe how much [NAME OF BRANCH
MANAGER] uses each type of behavior in an effort to influence you. For each question below,
select one of the following response choices.
Response scale:
1 = I can't remember him/her ever using this tactic with me
2 = He/she very seldom uses this tactic with me
3 = He/she occasionally uses this tactic with me
4 = He/she uses this tactic moderately often with me
5 = He/she uses this tactic very often with me
If an question does not apply to your situation, then use the #1 response. Please try to avoid
letting general impressions of the person bias your answers. Before you begin it is helpful to look
over the 11 different types of influence tactics listed below so that you do not get them confused
with each other.
[NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]...
Rational Persuasion
1. Uses facts and logic to make a persuasive case for a request or proposal.
2. Explains clearly why a request or proposed change is necessary to attain a task objective.
3. Explains why a proposed project or change would be practical and cost effective.
4. Provides information or evidence to show that a proposed activity or change is likely to
be successful.
Exchange
1. Offers something you want in return for your help on a task or project.
2. Offers to do something for you in exchange for carrying out a request.
3. Offers to do a specific task or favor for you in return for your help and support.
4. Offers to do something for you in the future in return for your help now.
Inspirational appeal
1. Says a proposed activity or change is an opportunity to do something really exciting and
worthwhile.
2. Describes a clear, inspiring vision of what a proposed project or change could
accomplish.
3. Talks about ideals and values when proposing a new activity or change.
4. Makes an inspiring speech or presentation to arouse enthusiasm for a proposed activity or
change.
Legitimating
1. Says that his/her request or proposal is consistent with official rules and policies.
2. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with a prior agreement or contract.
442

3. Verifies that a request is legitimate by referring to a document such as a work order,
policy manual, charter, bylaws, or formal contract.
4. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with prior precedent and established practice.
Apprising
1. Explains how the task he/she wants you to do could help your career.
2. Describes benefits you could gain from doing a task or activity (e.g., learn new skills,
meet important people, enhance your reputation).
3. Explains how a proposed activity or change could help you attain a personal objective.
4. Explains why a proposed activity or change would be good for you.
Pressure
1. Demands that you carry out a request.
2. Uses threats or warnings when trying to get you to do something.
3. Repeatedly checks to see if you have carried out a request.
4. Tries to pressure you to carry out a request.
Collaboration
1. Offers to help with a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
2. Offers to provide resources you would need to do a task for him/her.
3. Offers to show you how to do a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
4. Offers to provide any assistance you would need to carry out a request.
Ingratiation
1. Says you have the special skills or knowledge needed to carry out a request.
2. Praises your past performance or achievements when asking you to do a task for him/her.
3. Praises your skill or knowledge when asking you to do something.
4. Says you are the most qualified person for a task that he/she wants you to do.
Consultation
1. Asks you to suggest things you could do to help him/her achieve a task objective or
resolve a problem.
2. Consults with you to get your ideas about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants
you to support or implement.
3. Encourages you to express any concerns you may have about a proposed activity or
change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
4. Invites you to suggest ways to improve a preliminary plan or proposal that he/she wants
you to support or help implement.
Personal appeals
1. Appeals to your friendship when asking you to do something.
2. Says he/she needs to ask for a favor before telling you what it is.
3. Asks you as a friend to do a favor for him/her.
4. Asks for your help as a personal favor.

443

Coalition
1. Mentions the names of other people who endorse a proposal when asking you to support
it.
2. Gets others to explain to you why they support a proposed activity or change that he/she
wants you to support or help implement.
3. Brings someone along for support when meeting with you to make a request or proposal.
4. Asks someone you respect to help influence you to carry out a request or support a
proposal.

As a follow-up to the previous questions about influence tactics, please respond to the following
three questions.
Response scale:
1 = Never
2 = Rarely
3 = Sometimes
4 = Often
5 = Very often
1. During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF BRANCH
MANAGER]?
2. How often does [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] successfully influence you to do
things?
3. How often do influence attempts by [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] result in your
complete commitment (e.g., strong enthusiasm and special effort beyond what is
normally expected)?

SECTION 2. Leader Characteristics
The next set of questions asks questions about the leadership and effectiveness of [NAME OF
BRANCH MANAGER].
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your working relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your working relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
444

Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I work closely with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
3. My own performance is dependent on receiving accurate information from [NAME OF
BRANCH MANAGER].
4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] fairly
frequently.
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes how much you agree with each statement about [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] spends a lot of time and effort at work networking
with others.
2. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is able to make most people feel comfortable and at
ease around me.
3. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is able to communicate easily and effectively with
others.
4. It is easy for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to develop a good rapport with most
people.
5. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] understands people very well.
6. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is good at building relationships with influential
people at work.
7. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is particularly good at sensing the motivations and
hidden agendas of others.
8. When communicating with others, [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] tries to be
genuine in what he/she says and does.
9. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] has developed a large network of colleagues and
associates at work whom he/she can call on for support when he/she really needs to get
things done.
10. At work, [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] knows a lot of important people and is
well connected.
445

11. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] spends a lot of time at work developing connections
with others.
12. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is good at getting people to like him/her.
13. It is important that people believe [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is sincere in what
he/she says and does.
14. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] tries to show a genuine interest in other people.
15. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is good at using his/her connections and network to
make things happen at work.
16. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] has good intuition or savvy about how to present
himself/herself to others.
17. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] always seem to instinctively know the right things
to say or do to influence others.
18. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] pays close attention to people's facial expressions.
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes how much you agree with each statement about [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is superior (so far) to other branch managers that I
have worked with before.
2. The overall level of performance that I have observed for [NAME OF BRANCH
MANAGER] is outstanding.
3. My personal view of [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is that he/she is very effective.
4. Overall, I feel that [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] has been effectively fulfilling his
or her roles and responsibilities.
5. I have found working with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to be a very satisfying
experience.
6. I feel like I am learning a great deal by working with [NAME OF BRANCH
MANAGER].
7. I would welcome the opportunity to work with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]
again in the future.
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
446

5 = Strongly agree
1. I like [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] very much as a person.
2. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is the kind of person one would like to have as a
friend.
3. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is a lot of fun to work with.
4. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] defends my work actions to others, even without
complete knowledge of the issue in question.
5. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by
others.
6. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] would defend me to others in the organization if I
made an honest mistake.
7. I do work for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] that goes beyond what is specified in
my job description.
8. I am willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally required, to further the
interests of my work group.
9. I do not mind working my hardest for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
10. I am impressed with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s knowledge of his/her job.
11. I respect [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s knowledge of and competence on the
job.
12. I admire [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s professional skills.

447

APPENDIX G
Peer Survey
Demographic Information
Please provide the following demographic information.
Please indicate your gender.
_____ Male
_____ Female
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate your age.
_____ Years
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed.
_____ Some high school
_____ High school diploma
_____ Some college
_____ Associates degree
_____ Bachelors degree
_____ Masters degree
_____ Doctorate
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate your position and experience at [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] (round to the
nearest year).
_____ Number of years with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]
_____ Job title in current position
_____ Number of years in current position
Please select the name(s) of the branch manager(s) you were asked to evaluate.
[Branch manager names appeared in a drop down box.]
Please indicate how long you have worked with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
_____ Years working with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

448

SECTION 1: Leader Behavior Influence
Instructions: The purpose of these questions is to learn more about the different ways people try
to influence each other in organizations. Please describe how much [NAME OF BRANCH
MANAGER] uses each type of behavior in an effort to influence you. For each question below,
select one of the following response choices.
Response scale:
1 = I can't remember him/her ever using this tactic with me
2 = He/she very seldom uses this tactic with me
3 = He/she occasionally uses this tactic with me
4 = He/she uses this tactic moderately often with me
5 = He/she uses this tactic very often with me
If an question does not apply to your situation, then use the #1 response. Please try to avoid
letting general impressions of the person bias your answers. Before you begin it is helpful to look
over the 11 different types of influence tactics listed below so that you do not get them confused
with each other.
[NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]...
Rational Persuasion
1. Uses facts and logic to make a persuasive case for a request or proposal.
2. Explains clearly why a request or proposed change is necessary to attain a task objective.
3. Explains why a proposed project or change would be practical and cost effective.
4. Provides information or evidence to show that a proposed activity or change is likely to
be successful.
Exchange
1. Offers something you want in return for your help on a task or project.
2. Offers to do something for you in exchange for carrying out a request.
3. Offers to do a specific task or favor for you in return for your help and support.
4. Offers to do something for you in the future in return for your help now.
Inspirational appeal
1. Says a proposed activity or change is an opportunity to do something really exciting and
worthwhile.
2. Describes a clear, inspiring vision of what a proposed project or change could
accomplish.
3. Talks about ideals and values when proposing a new activity or change.
4. Makes an inspiring speech or presentation to arouse enthusiasm for a proposed activity or
change.
Legitimating
1. Says that his/her request or proposal is consistent with official rules and policies.
2. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with a prior agreement or contract.
449

3. Verifies that a request is legitimate by referring to a document such as a work order,
policy manual, charter, bylaws, or formal contract.
4. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with prior precedent and established practice.
Apprising
1. Explains how the task he/she wants you to do could help your career.
2. Describes benefits you could gain from doing a task or activity (e.g., learn new skills,
meet important people, enhance your reputation).
3. Explains how a proposed activity or change could help you attain a personal objective.
4. Explains why a proposed activity or change would be good for you.
Pressure
1. Demands that you carry out a request.
2. Uses threats or warnings when trying to get you to do something.
3. Repeatedly checks to see if you have carried out a request.
4. Tries to pressure you to carry out a request.
Collaboration
1. Offers to help with a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
2. Offers to provide resources you would need to do a task for him/her.
3. Offers to show you how to do a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
4. Offers to provide any assistance you would need to carry out a request.
Ingratiation
1. Says you have the special skills or knowledge needed to carry out a request.
2. Praises your past performance or achievements when asking you to do a task for him/her.
3. Praises your skill or knowledge when asking you to do something.
4. Says you are the most qualified person for a task that he/she wants you to do.
Consultation
1. Asks you to suggest things you could do to help him/her achieve a task objective or
resolve a problem.
2. Consults with you to get your ideas about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants
you to support or implement.
3. Encourages you to express any concerns you may have about a proposed activity or
change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
4. Invites you to suggest ways to improve a preliminary plan or proposal that he/she wants
you to support or help implement.
Personal appeals
1. Appeals to your friendship when asking you to do something.
2. Says he/she needs to ask for a favor before telling you what it is.
3. Asks you as a friend to do a favor for him/her.
4. Asks for your help as a personal favor.

450

Coalition
1. Mentions the names of other people who endorse a proposal when asking you to support
it.
2. Gets others to explain to you why they support a proposed activity or change that he/she
wants you to support or help implement.
3. Brings someone along for support when meeting with you to make a request or proposal.
4. Asks someone you respect to help influence you to carry out a request or support a
proposal.

As a follow-up to the previous questions about influence tactics, please respond to the following
three questions.
Response scale:
1 = Never
2 = Rarely
3 = Sometimes
4 = Often
5 = Very often
1. During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF BRANCH
MANAGER]?
2. How often does [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] successfully influence you to do
things?
3. How often do influence attempts by [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] result in your
complete commitment (e.g., strong enthusiasm and special effort beyond what is
normally expected)?

SECTION 2. Leader Characteristics
The next set of questions asks questions about the leadership and effectiveness of [name of
branch manager].
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your working relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your working relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
451

Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I work closely with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
3. My own performance is dependent on receiving accurate information from [name of
branch manager].
4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] fairly
frequently.
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes how much you agree with each statement about [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is superior (so far) to other branch managers that I
have worked with before.
2. The overall level of performance that I have observed for [NAME OF BRANCH
MANAGER] is outstanding.
3. My personal view of [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is that he/she is very effective.
4. Overall, I feel that [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] has been effectively fulfilling his
or her roles and responsibilities.
5. I have found working with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to be a very satisfying
experience.
6. I feel like I am learning a great deal by working with [NAME OF BRANCH
MANAGER].
7. I would welcome the opportunity to work with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]
again in the future.
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
452

3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I like [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] very much as a person.
2. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is the kind of person one would like to have as a
friend.
3. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is a lot of fun to work with.
4. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] defends my work actions to others, even without
complete knowledge of the issue in question.
5. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by
others.
6. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] would defend me to others in the organization if I
made an honest mistake.
7. I do work for [Name Of Branch Manager] that goes beyond what is specified in my job
description.
8. I am willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally required, to further the
interests of my work group.
9. I do not mind working my hardest for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
10. I am impressed with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s knowledge of his/her job.
11. I respect [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s knowledge of and competence on the
job.
12. I admire [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s professional skills.

453

APPENDIX H
Senior Manager Survey
Demographic information
Please indicate your total work experience (round to the nearest year).
_____ Years in current position
_____ Years with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]
Please indicate your age:
_____ Years
_____ Prefer not to answer
Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed:
_____ Some high school
_____ High school diploma
_____ Some college
_____ Associates degree

_____ Bachelors degree
_____ Masters degree
_____ Doctorate
_____ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate how long you have worked with each branch manager (round to the nearest year):
[Senior Manager responded by indicating how long they have worked with each branch
manager.]
PART 1: Branch Manager Effectiveness

6

Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. This branch manager is superior (so far) to other branch managers that I have worked
with before.
2. The overall level of performance that I have observed for this branch manager is
outstanding.
3. My personal view of this branch manager is that he/she is very effective.
4. Overall, I feel that this branch manager has been effectively fulfilling his or her roles and
responsibilities.
6

Senior manager surveys were administered in person. Instructions were given orally.
454

PART 2: Viability of the Working Relationship
Response scale:
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
1. I have found working with this branch manager to be a very satisfying experience.
2. I feel like I am learning a great deal by working with this branch manager.
3. I would welcome the opportunity to work with this branch manager again in the future.

PART 3: Leader Behavior Influence Questionnaire
Response scale:
1 = I can't remember him/her ever using this tactic with me
2 = He/she very seldom uses this tactic with me
3 = He/she occasionally uses this tactic with me
4 = He/she uses this tactic moderately often with me
5 = He/she uses this tactic very often with me
This branch manager...
Rational Persuasion
1. Uses facts and logic to make a persuasive case for a request or proposal.
2. Explains clearly why a request or proposed change is necessary to attain a task objective.
3. Provides information or evidence to show that a proposed activity or change is likely to
be successful.
Consultation
1. Asks you to suggest things you could do to help him/her achieve a task objective or
resolve a problem.
2. Consults with you to get your ideas about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants
you to support or implement.
3. Encourages you to express any concerns you may have about a proposed activity or
change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
Inspirational appeal
1. Says a proposed activity or change is an opportunity to do something really exciting and
worthwhile.
2. Describes a clear, inspiring vision of what a proposed project or change could
accomplish.
3. Talks about ideals and values when proposing a new activity or change.
455

Legitimating
1. Says that his/her request or proposal is consistent with official rules and policies.
2. Verifies that a request is legitimate by referring to a document such as a work order,
policy manual, charter, bylaws, or formal contract.
3. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with prior precedent and established practice.
Pressure
1. Demands that you carry out a request.
2. Repeatedly checks to see if you have carried out a request.
3. Tries to pressure you to carry out a request.
Coalition
1. Mentions the names of other people who endorse a proposal when asking you to support
it.
2. Gets others to explain to you why they support a proposed activity or change that he/she
wants you to support or help implement.
3. Brings someone along for support when meeting with you to make a request or proposal.

456

APPENDIX I
Customer Survey
November 8, 2010

Dear Valued [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] Customer:
You are being asked to participate in a research study that is part of a collaboration between
[NAME OF ORGANIZATION] and Michigan State University. The purpose of this survey is to
learn more about how leaders interact with internal and external stakeholders to coordinate their
work. The research is being conducted as part of a larger study investigating leadership and
organizational culture, and as a respected customer, your responses are very valuable to the
organization and our research team.
The survey begins by asking a few short demographic questions. Then, you will be asked to
respond to questions in three sections. The first section assesses how branch managers influence
others. The second section asks questions about other leadership characteristics of branch
managers. The third section includes questions about your satisfaction with [NAME OF
ORGANIZATION].
It is important that you respond candidly and honestly when answering the questions. There are
no right or wrong answers, please simply indicate your judgments. Do not spend too much time
on any one question. Simply respond with your initial reaction. Keep in mind that no individual
data will be reported back to [NAME OF ORGANIZATION], and no information will be given
which specifically describes or identifies any individual respondent. All responses will be
grouped, and a feedback report will be created based on the aggregated responses. Your
responses are confidential.
The survey contains primarily multiple-choice questions, and it should take approximately 20
minutes to complete. When you have completed the survey, please mail it back to Michigan
State University using the enclosed postage-paid envelope. All participants who complete the
survey will be entered into a drawing to win one of twenty $50 Amazon.com gift certificates.
Your responses are very important to this process. If you have any questions, feel free to contact
me at lizkaram@msu.edu.
I appreciate your time and honest responses. Thank you for your participation.
Sincerely,

Elizabeth P. Karam
457

SECTION 1. Demographic information.
1. Please indicate your gender:
_____ Male

_____ Female

_____ Prefer not to answer

2. Please indicate your age:
_____ Years

_____ Prefer not to answer

3. Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed:
_____ Some high school
_____ High school diploma
_____ Some college
_____ Associates degree
_____ Bachelors degree
_____ Masters degree
_____ Doctorate
_____ Prefer not to answer
4. Please write the name of your branch manager:

________________________

5. Please indicate how long you have been a customer of [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] (round
to the nearest year):
_____ years
6. Please indicate how long you have worked with this branch manager (round to the nearest
year):
_____ years

SECTION 2. Leader Behavior Influence Questionnaire
Instructions: The purpose of this questionnaire is to learn more about the different ways people
try to influence each other in organizations. Please describe how much the branch manager
(listed in question 4 above) uses each type of behavior in an effort to influence you. For each
question, select one of the following response choices.
Response choices:
1 = I can't remember him/her ever using this tactic with me
2 = He/she very seldom uses this tactic with me
3 = He/she occasionally uses this tactic with me
4 = He/she uses this tactic moderately often with me
458

5 = He/she uses this tactic very often with me
If a question does not apply to you, please use the #1 response. Please try to avoid letting general
impressions of the person bias your answers, and please respond only with how often the
manager uses each type of behavior. Before you begin it might be helpful to look over the 11
different types of influence tactics (e.g., Rational Persuasion, Exchange, Inspirational Appeal,
etc.) to familiarize yourself with them.
This branch manager...
Rational Persuasion
1. Uses facts and logic to make a persuasive case for a request or proposal.
2. Explains clearly why a request or proposed change is necessary to attain a task objective.
3. Explains why a proposed project or change would be practical and cost effective.
4. Provides information or evidence to show that a proposed activity or change is likely to
be successful.
Exchange
1. Offers something you want in return for your help on a task or project.
2. Offers to do something for you in exchange for carrying out a request.
3. Offers to do a specific task or favor for you in return for your help and support.
4. Offers to do something for you in the future in return for your help now.
Inspirational appeal
1. Says a proposed activity or change is an opportunity to do something really exciting and
worthwhile.
2. Describes a clear, inspiring vision of what a proposed project or change could
accomplish.
3. Talks about ideals and values when proposing a new activity or change.
4. Makes an inspiring speech or presentation to arouse enthusiasm for a proposed activity or
change.
Legitimating
1. Says that his/her request or proposal is consistent with official rules and policies.
2. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with a prior agreement or contract.
3. Verifies that a request is legitimate by referring to a document such as a work order,
policy manual, charter, bylaws, or formal contract.
4. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with prior precedent and established practice.
Apprising
1. Explains how the task he/she wants you to do could help your career.
2. Describes benefits you could gain from doing a task or activity (e.g., learn new skills,
meet important people, enhance your reputation).
3. Explains how a proposed activity or change could help you attain a personal objective.
4. Explains why a proposed activity or change would be good for you.

459

Pressure
1. Demands that you carry out a request.
2. Uses threats or warnings when trying to get you to do something.
3. Repeatedly checks to see if you have carried out a request.
4. Tries to pressure you to carry out a request.
Collaboration
1. Offers to help with a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
2. Offers to provide resources you would need to do a task for him/her.
3. Offers to show you how to do a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
4. Offers to provide any assistance you would need to carry out a request.
Ingratiation
1. Says you have the special skills or knowledge needed to carry out a request.
2. Praises your past performance or achievements when asking you to do a task for him/her.
3. Praises your skill or knowledge when asking you to do something.
4. Says you are the most qualified person for a task that he/she wants you to do.
Consultation
1. Asks you to suggest things you could do to help him/her achieve a task objective or
resolve a problem.
2. Consults with you to get your ideas about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants
you to support or implement.
3. Encourages you to express any concerns you may have about a proposed activity or
change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
4. Invites you to suggest ways to improve a preliminary plan or proposal that he/she wants
you to support or help implement.
Personal appeals
1. Appeals to your friendship when asking you to do something.
2. Says he/she needs to ask for a favor before telling you what it is.
3. Asks you as a friend to do a favor for him/her.
4. Asks for your help as a personal favor.
Coalition
1. Mentions the names of other people who endorse a proposal when asking you to support
it.
2. Gets others to explain to you why they support a proposed activity or change that he/she
wants you to support or help implement.
3. Brings someone along for support when meeting with you to make a request or proposal.
4. Asks someone you respect to help influence you to carry out a request or support a
proposal.

460

SECTION 2. Leader Behavior Influence Follow-up
Instructions: As a follow-up to the 44 questions in the Leader Behavior Influence Questionnaire
above, please respond to the following three questions. Please mark an "X" in the appropriate
box below.
Response scale:
1 = Never
2 = Rarely
3 = Sometimes
4 = Often
5 = Very often
1. During a typical work week, how often do you interact with this branch manager?
2. How often does this branch manager successfully influence you to do things?
3. How often do influence attempts by this branch manager result in your complete
commitment (e.g., strong enthusiasm and special effort beyond what is normally
expected)?
SECTION 3. Leader Characteristics
Instructions: This section contains questions relating to the leadership and effectiveness of your
branch manager. Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes how much you agree with each statement about your branch manager.
1. This branch manager is superior (so far) to other branch managers that I have worked
with before.
2. The overall level of performance that I have observed for this branch manager is
outstanding.
3. My personal view of this branch manager is that he/she is very effective.
4. Overall, I feel that this branch manager has been effectively fulfilling his or her roles and
responsibilities.
5. I have found working with this branch manager to be a very satisfying experience.
6. I feel like I am learning a great deal by working with this branch manager.
7. I would welcome the opportunity to work with this branch manager again in the future.
Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best
describes your relationship with the branch manager.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

I like this branch manager very much as a person.
This branch manager is the kind of person one would like to have as a friend.
This branch manager is a lot of fun to work with.
I am impressed with this branch manager's knowledge of his/her job.
I respect this branch manager's knowledge of and competence on the job.
I admire this branch manager's professional skills.
I get along well with this branch manager.
461

8. Working with this branch manager is a pleasure.
9. I think this branch manager would make a good friend.

462

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463

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