

**AN EXAMINATION OF DEPENDENCE, LEADER INFLUENCE,
AND POLITICAL SKILL FROM A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE**

By

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ABSTRACT

AN EXAMINATION OF DEPENDENCE, LEADER INFLUENCE, AND POLITICAL SKILL FROM A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE

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Numerous scholars have noted that the ability to influence effectively is a critical role of organizational leaders. However, research has only begun to examine how relationship characteristics might affect how leaders attempt to influence others. Therefore, this study examines an important and understudied relationship characteristic, stakeholder dependence, which may impact the specific influence tactic that a leader uses with a stakeholder group. Second, the study assesses the leader's performance and the viability of the leader's relationships from a broad set of stakeholders including subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. Finally, the political skill of the leader is examined as a moderator between the leader's influence tactics and the performance outcomes.

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DEDICATION

To my parents, Jim and Shirley Petersen, who supported my educational endeavors from the very beginning; who sustained me through this process in ways too numerous to mention; and who have always provided an example of how to live well and love deeply. There is no way to ever say thank you enough for all you have given me. And to Jerod, the constant, caring, supportive partner who walked by my side throughout this journey. I am forever grateful.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	xxi
Introduction.....	1
Stakeholders	10
Subordinates.....	11
Peers.....	11
Senior Managers	12
Customers	12
Stakeholder Dependence.....	14
Influence Tactics	19
Leader Influence Tactics	19
Additional Research on Influence.....	29
Present Study on Leader Influence	30
Soft Influence Tactics	31
Rational Influence Tactics	40
Hard Influence Tactics	43
Political Skill.....	48
Leader Outcomes	55
Leader Performance	55
Leader Viability	59
Method.....	64
Research Setting and Sample.....	64
Procedure	66
Leader Survey	67
Subordinate Survey.....	69
Peer Survey	71
Senior Manager Survey.....	72
Customer Survey.....	73
Factor Analysis	75
Control Variables	76
Results.....	77
Hypotheses 1-11 (Stakeholder Dependence).....	77
Hypotheses 12-15 (Political Skill Moderation)	81

Hypothesis 12.....	81
Hypothesis 13.....	87
Hypothesis 14.....	89
Hypothesis 15.....	95
Variance analysis	98
Supplemental Analyses	99
Stakeholder Dependence Supplemental Analyses	99
Stakeholder Dependence Supplemental Results	101
Moderation Supplemental Analyses	103
Moderation Supplemental Results	105
Discussion	115
Summary of Findings.....	115
Theoretical Implications	116
Strengths and Limitations	120
Opportunities for Future Research.....	124
APPENDICES	128
APPENDIX A. List of Tables.....	128
APPENDIX B. List of Figures	373
APPENDIX C. IRB Consent Form.....	431
APPENDIX D. Survey introduction	433
APPENDIX E. Leader Survey.....	434
APPENDIX F. Subordinate Survey.....	441
APPENDIX G. Peer Survey	448
APPENDIX H. Senior Manager Survey	454
APPENDIX I. Customer Survey.....	457
REFERENCES... ..	464

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Types of stakeholder power and leader dependence by stakeholder group	128
Table 2	Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson (1980) Classification of Influence tactics	129
Table 3	Yukl, Seifert, & Chavez (2008) Proactive Influence Tactics	130
Table 4	Categorization of Influence Tactics	131
Table 5	Summary of Hypotheses	132
Table 6	Data collection schedule	135
Table 7	Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Subordinate-rated Influence Tactics	136
Table 8	Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Peer-rated Influence Tactics..	138
Table 9	Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Senior Manager-rated Influence Tactics	140
Table 10	Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Customer-rated Influence Tactics	141
Table 11	Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables.....	143
Table 12	Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Subordinate Study Variables	201
Table 13	Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Peer Study Variables.....	205
Table 14	Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Senior Manager Study Variables.....	210
Table 15	Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Customer Study Variables	211
Table 16	The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	203
Table 17	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	204

Table 18	The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	205
Table 19	The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	206
Table 20	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance.....	207
Table 21	The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance.....	208
Table 22	The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	209
Table 23	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance.....	210
Table 24	The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	211
Table 25	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	212
Table 26	The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	213
Table 27	The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	214
Table 28	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	215
Table 29	The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	216
Table 30	The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	217
Table 31	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	218
Table 32	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance	219

Table 33	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance.....	220
Table 34	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance.....	221
Table 35	The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance	222
Table 36	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance	223
Table 37	The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance	224
Table 38	The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance	225
Table 39	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance.....	226
Table 40	The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance	227
Table 41	The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance	228
Table 42	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance.....	229
Table 43	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	230
Table 44	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	231
Table 45	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	232
Table 46	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	233
Table 47	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	234

Table 48	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance	235
Table 49	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance	236
Table 50	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance	237
Table 51	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance	238
Table 52	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance	239
Table 53	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance	240
Table 54	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance	241
Table 55	The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	242
Table 56	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	243
Table 57	The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	244
Table 58	The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	245
Table 59	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	246
Table 60	The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	247
Table 61	The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	248
Table 62	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	249

Table 63	The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	250
Table 64	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	251
Table 65	The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	252
Table 66	The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	253
Table 67	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	254
Table 68	The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	255
Table 69	The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	256
Table 70	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	257
Table 71	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability	258
Table 72	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability	259
Table 73	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability	260
Table 74	The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	261
Table 75	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	262
Table 76	The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	263
Table 77	The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	264

Table 78	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	265
Table 79	The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	266
Table 80	The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	267
Table 81	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	268
Table 82	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	269
Table 83	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	270
Table 84	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	271
Table 85	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	272
Table 86	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	273
Table 87	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability	274
Table 88	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability	275
Table 89	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability	276
Table 90	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability	277
Table 91	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	278
Table 92	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	279
Table 93	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability	280

Table 94	Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Subordinate-Leader models).....	281
Table 95	Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Peer-Leader models).....	281
Table 96	Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Senior Manager level (Leader-Senior Manager models)	282
Table 97	Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Customer-Leader models).....	282
Table 98	Interrater Reliability Estimates for Study Variables by Stakeholder Group.....	283
Table 99	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Collaboration	284
Table 100	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Consultation.....	285
Table 101	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Exchange	286
Table 102	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Ingratiation.....	287
Table 103	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Inspirational Appeal	288
Table 104	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Personal Appeals	289
Table 105	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Appraising	290
Table 106	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Rational Persuasion	291
Table 107	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Coalition	292
Table 108	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Legitimizing.....	293

Table 109	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Pressure.....	294
Table 110	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Collaboration	295
Table 111	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Consultation.....	296
Table 112	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Exchange	297
Table 113	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Ingratiation.....	298
Table 114	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Inspirational Appeal	299
Table 115	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals	300
Table 116	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals	301
Table 117	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals	302
Table 118	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Coalition	303
Table 119	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Legitimizing.....	304
Table 120	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Pressure.....	305
Table 121	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Collaboration	306
Table 122	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Consultation.....	307
Table 123	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Exchange	308

Table 124	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Ingratiation.....	309
Table 125	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Inspirational Appeal	310
Table 126	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Personal Appeals	311
Table 127	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Apprising	312
Table 128	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Rational Persuasion	313
Table 129	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Coalition	314
Table 130	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Legitimizing.....	315
Table 131	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Pressure.....	316
Table 132	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Collaboration.....	317
Table 133	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Consultation	318
Table 134	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Exchange	319
Table 135	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Ingratiation	320
Table 136	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Inspirational Appeal	321
Table 137	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals	322
Table 138	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Apprising.....	323

Table 139	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Rational Persuasion	324
Table 140	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Coalition	325
Table 141	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Legitimizing	326
Table 142	Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Pressure	327
Table 143	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Collaboration Influence Tactics	328
Table 144	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Consultation Influence Tactics	329
Table 145	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Exchange Influence Tactics	330
Table 146	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Ingratiation Influence Tactics	331
Table 147	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Inspirational Appeal Influence Tactics	332
Table 148	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Personal Appeals Influence Tactics	333
Table 149	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Apprising Influence Tactics	334
Table 150	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Rational Persuasion Influence Tactics	335
Table 151	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Coalition Influence Tactics	336
Table 152	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Legitimizing Influence Tactics	337
Table 153	Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Pressure Influence Tactics	338

Table 154	The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Leader Self-Monitoring on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	339
Table 155	The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Relationship Quality on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance.....	340
Table 156	The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Relationship Quality on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	343
Table 157	The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Political Skill (Subordinate-rated) on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance	346
Table 158	The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Political Skill (Subordinate-rated) on Subordinate Ratings of Viability	348
Table 159	The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	351
Table 160	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	352
Table 161	The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	353
Table 162	The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	354
Table 163	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	355
Table 164	The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	356
Table 165	The Moderating Effect of Appraising and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	357
Table 166	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	358
Table 167	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	359
Table 168	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	360

Table 169	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	361
Table 170	The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics.....	362
Table 171	The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics.....	363
Table 172	The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics.....	364
Table 173	The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics.....	365
Table 174	The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	366
Table 175	The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	367
Table 176	The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics.....	368
Table 177	The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics	369
Table 178	The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics.....	370
Table 179	The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics.....	371
Table 180	The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics.....	372

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	Overall model.....	373
Figure 2	The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	374
Figure 3	The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	374
Figure 4	The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	375
Figure 5	The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	375
Figure 6	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	376
Figure 7	The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	376
Figure 8	The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	377
Figure 9	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	377
Figure 10	The Relationship between Collaboration and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	378
Figure 11	The Relationship between Consultation and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	378
Figure 12	The Relationship between Exchange and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	379
Figure 13	The Relationship between Ingratiation and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	379
Figure 14	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	380

Figure 15	The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	380
Figure 16	The Relationship between Apprising and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	381
Figure 17	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	381
Figure 18	The Relationship between Consultation and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	382
Figure 19	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	382
Figure 20	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	383
Figure 21	The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	383
Figure 22	The Relationship between Consultation and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	384
Figure 23	The Relationship between Exchange and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	384
Figure 24	The Relationship between Ingratiation and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	385
Figure 25	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	385
Figure 26	The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	386
Figure 27	The Relationship between Apprising and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	386
Figure 28	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	387
Figure 29	The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	387

Figure 30	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	388
Figure 31	The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	388
Figure 32	The Relationship between Coalition and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	389
Figure 33	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	389
Figure 34	The Relationship between Pressure and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	390
Figure 35	The Relationship between Coalition and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	390
Figure 36	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	391
Figure 37	The Relationship between Pressure and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	391
Figure 38	The Relationship between Coalition and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	392
Figure 39	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	392
Figure 40	The Relationship between Pressure and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	393
Figure 41	The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	393
Figure 42	The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	394
Figure 43	The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	394
Figure 44	The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	395

Figure 45	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	395
Figure 46	The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	396
Figure 47	The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	396
Figure 48	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	397
Figure 49	The Relationship between Collaboration and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	397
Figure 50	The Relationship between Consultation and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	398
Figure 51	The Relationship between Exchange and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	398
Figure 52	The Relationship between Ingratiation and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	399
Figure 53	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	399
Figure 54	The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	400
Figure 55	The Relationship between Apprising and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	400
Figure 56	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	401
Figure 57	The Relationship between Consultation and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	401
Figure 58	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	402
Figure 59	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	402

Figure 60	The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	403
Figure 61	The Relationship between Consultation and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	403
Figure 62	The Relationship between Exchange and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	404
Figure 63	The Relationship between Ingratiation and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	404
Figure 64	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	405
Figure 65	The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	405
Figure 66	The Relationship between Apprising and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	406
Figure 67	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	406
Figure 68	The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	407
Figure 69	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	407
Figure 70	The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	408
Figure 71	The Relationship between Coalition and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	408
Figure 72	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	409
Figure 73	The Relationship between Pressure and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	409
Figure 74	The Relationship between Coalition and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	410

Figure 75	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	410
Figure 76	The Relationship between Pressure and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	411
Figure 77	The Relationship between Coalition and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	411
Figure 78	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	412
Figure 79	The Relationship between Pressure and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	412
Figure 80	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Self-monitoring.....	413
Figure 81	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Self-monitoring.....	413
Figure 82	The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Self-monitoring.....	414
Figure 83	The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	414
Figure 84	The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	415
Figure 85	The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	415
Figure 86	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	416
Figure 87	The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	416
Figure 88	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	417
Figure 89	The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	417

Figure 90	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	418
Figure 91	The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	418
Figure 92	The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	419
Figure 93	The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	419
Figure 94	The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	420
Figure 95	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	420
Figure 96	The Relationship between Appraising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	421
Figure 97	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	421
Figure 98	The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	422
Figure 99	The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality	422
Figure 100	The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	423
Figure 101	The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	423
Figure 102	The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	424
Figure 103	The Relationship between Appraising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	424
Figure 104	The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	425

Figure 105 The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	425
Figure 106 The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	426
Figure 107 The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	426
Figure 108 The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	427
Figure 109 The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	427
Figure 110 The Relationship between Apprising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	428
Figure 111 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill.....	428
Figure 112 The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill	429
Figure 113 The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill (Independent Effects Model)	429
Figure 114 The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill (Independent Effects Model)	430

Introduction

A recent report on People Management published by PriceWaterhouseCoopers – the largest of Big Four accounting firms with 170,000 employees worldwide – highlighted the increasing challenges faced by organizational leaders. They noted that successful business leaders today will need a different set of behaviors due to “changes that are rapidly transforming *with whom* they do business” (emphasis added, PWC Report on People Management, 2008). This is due, in part, to the fact that organizations today are more geographically dispersed; businesses are less hierarchical; and boundaries between organizations are more permeable (Yukl, Chavez, & Seifert, 2005). Therefore, leaders are being thrust into roles where they manage complex networks of relationships both within and outside of their organizations (Schneider, 2002). Further, they are interacting and communicating with individuals and teams who may have diverse interests; yet the leader continues to bear the primary responsibility for directing work to fulfill personal goals and organizational objectives.

Research on leadership has often noted that organizational leaders are connected to an extensive network of individuals both within and outside of the firm. Katz and Kahn (1978) specifically referred to the role of a leader as a "boundary function" in that the role connects managers to employees at various levels in the organization's hierarchy as well as to others in the external environment (p. 532). In these boundary spanning positions, leaders may also be the link between their team or business unit to other functional areas, departments, or geographically dispersed divisions of the organization. Further, as a point of contact for external groups, leaders may interact with key customers, suppliers, government entities, and media organizations.

These internal and external entities represent critical organizational stakeholders in that they "can affect or [are] affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives" (Freeman, 1984, p.

25). Schneider (2002) introduced a stakeholder model of leadership which incorporates the leader's increasing reliance on intraorganizational and interorganizational stakeholders to accomplish his or her task work. Importantly, Schneider (2002) noted that these stakeholder relationships are often outside of the leader's formal hierarchical position, so leaders must have the capacity to coordinate work with peers, senior managers, and external stakeholders as well as subordinates to perform effectively in their roles.

There is a growing body of empirical evidence that highlights the increased challenges for leaders who manage these stakeholder relationships. For example, Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld (1999) examined executive leaders and found that certain stakeholder attributes affect how leaders respond to them. Specifically, stakeholder power, urgency, and legitimacy were all found to be significantly related to stakeholder salience. That is, these characteristics impact the amount of priority that executives give to the stakeholders' competing interests. In their findings, Agle and colleagues suggest that executives are "juggler[s] of constituencies" who must balance the interests of many stakeholders based on the priorities of the firm (p. 520).

Wong, Ormiston, and Tetlock (2011) explored how the integrative complexity of the firm's top management team leadership was related to their ability to address the needs of a variety of stakeholders. Integrative complexity was described as a cognitive style whereby leaders have the ability to tolerate different points of view and to integrate those perspectives in decision-making. They found that the top management team's integrative complexity impacted how the leaders collected and handled information from various stakeholders. This research highlights the growing cognitive demands of managing stakeholders as well.

Whereas research has suggested that the demands of managing stakeholders are growing for organizational leaders, there is also evidence that there can be positive benefits to the

organization when the firm's leadership manages these relationships effectively. For example, deLuque, Washburn, Waldman, and House (2008) examined the indirect effects of stakeholder management on perceptions of leadership and firm performance. They found that increased attention by organizational leaders to broad stakeholder groups actually led to increased effort by employees, which in turn, was related to higher firm performance. In another study, Chuang and Liao (2010) explored how human resource practices which foster a climate that demonstrates a concern for both employees and customers (two important stakeholder groups) can lead to important outcomes. They found that those practices encouraged greater helping behaviors and improved service performance.

As described above, organizational leaders are facing new challenges from a variety of stakeholders, and properly managing stakeholder relationships can be particularly beneficial. One of the ways in which leaders can manage these relationships is through effectively using influence strategies. Although not explicitly drawing on the stakeholder paradigm, numerous scholars have routinely noted that the ability to influence is a critical aspect of a leader's role requirements (e.g., Day & Harrison, 2007; Yukl, Seifert, & Chavez, 2008). In fact, leadership is often defined in terms of the ability to influence (e.g., Avolio, Sosik, Jung, & Berson, 2003; Fleischman, 1998; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Osborn & Hunt, 1975; Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001). There are a multitude of reasons why leaders may need to influence others to accomplish their task work. For example, leaders may need to influence subordinates to implement a strategic initiative or peers to coordinate work among groups. Leaders may need to influence their senior managers to gain support for proposals or to acquire additional financial and human resources for projects. In addition, leaders may need to influence customers to purchase specific products or they may need to influence suppliers in a way that results in favorable contract terms for their

organization. Further, leaders may need to influence governmental agencies to acquire regulatory support for firm initiatives, or they may need to influence media organizations so that the desired image of the organization is portrayed.

Prior research has investigated the relationship between how leaders influence stakeholders and how effective they are in their roles (e.g., Wayne, Liden, Graf, & Ferris, 1997; Yukl et al., 2008). However, this research has typically examined leader influence by drawing from the literature on power¹ (e.g., Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Yukl, Kim, & Falbe, 1996). Yet, as organizations move away from hierarchical structures, there are several reasons why it may be important to examine the *dependence* that leaders have on stakeholders in accomplishing their task work. Dependence has often been defined as the inverse of power (Emerson, 1962; Mainiero, 1986). Thus, the power that a stakeholder has over a leader will be based on the leader's dependence on that stakeholder. In traditional, hierarchical working arrangements, leaders were able to draw on their position power to influence others to accomplish their task work. Yet, today's work environment, with its shift toward less hierarchical structures and more fluid organization boundaries, has brought with it a shift from leaders with tremendous power to leaders who are increasingly dependent.

Child and McGrath (2001) have argued that the traditional perspective on power, during the manufacturing and industrial age, comes from concentrated power in the organization's leadership. However, the power in the role of managers now, in the information-intensive economy, is often decentralized or distributed among a variety of stakeholder groups thereby

¹ Power and influence are not synonymous (Bass, 1981). Power refers to "an agent's potential capacity to influence a target person" (Yukl, 1981, p. 18) whereas influence refers to the "actual use of power" (Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998, p. 307). Various studies have empirically examined and found evidence of the distinction between power and influence (e.g., Hinkin and Schriesheim, 1989; Yukl, Kim, & Falbe, 1996).

reducing the leader's power. Further, Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch (2002) assert that "the context in which leaders operate is both radically different and diverse" (p. 798). The impact of this shift in context can potentially impact how well leaders are able to function in their roles.

Indeed, as organizations are increasingly moving toward more "empowered forms" of organizing which include self-managed teams and cross-functional work groups (Yukl et al., 2005, p. 705), they are faced with more lateral and external coordination demands. Consider leaders working in cross-functional teams. These leaders may be dependent upon their colleagues for specialized skills or for information that is needed to complete the leaders' task work. Therefore, these leaders are dependent on others for accomplishing their goals, and they may find that influence tactics that draw on the position power of the leader are effective with subordinates in a hierarchical structure yet those tactics are ineffective with peers on whom the leader is dependent in a cross-functional team.

Further, organizational leaders are increasingly interacting with external stakeholders. Organizations are engaging in more collaborative, knowledge-based work arrangements with these stakeholder groups (Schneider, 2002). This may include joint ventures, strategic alliances, or partnerships with outsourcing agencies (Yukl et al., 2005). In addition, leaders are often responsible for managing customer relationships. Customers are the lifeblood of a firm's revenues and continued survival, and organizations are increasingly moving toward customer relationship management (CRM) strategies (Payne & Frow, 2005). CRM strategies involve developing strong, long-term relationships with key customers, and organizational leaders are often tasked with this responsibility. Therefore, leaders may need to influence external partners as well as internal groups to achieve their goals. This could include managing customer relationships, collaborating with research and development teams from other firms, leading a

team of contract employees, or coordinating work that has been outsourced to another organization. Yet, despite the increase in interactions with stakeholders and the rise in dependence that leaders are facing, research to date has yet to explore how these changes will impact leaders.

Therefore, this study examines the level of task dependence that a leader has on a stakeholder, or *stakeholder dependence*, which is defined as the extent to which a leader must rely on information and support from others in the accomplishment of his or her task work. A leader can be dependent upon a broad set of internal and external stakeholders depending on the demands of the leader's task. Further, the level of dependence on any individual or group may change over time as the nature of the leader's work changes. This dependence relationship is likely to affect how a leader attempts to influence because the leader is in a position of reduced power. Thus, a leader's dependence on key stakeholders is viewed as an antecedent to how a leader chooses to influence these groups, and this study will consider how the dependence that leaders have on stakeholders impacts their selection of influence tactics. By examining stakeholder dependence, I investigate how this characteristic impacts the manner in which leaders choose to influence others.

However, regardless of the choice of influence tactic, there may be variation in the effectiveness of the tactic based on the leader's level of political skill (Ahearn, Ferris, Hochwarter, Douglas, & Ammeter, 2004). Leadership scholars have consistently identified interpersonal skills as an important component of successful performance in a managerial role (e.g., Katz & Kahn, 1978; Mumford, Campion, & Morgeson, 2007; Mumford, Marks, Connelly, Zaccaro, & Reiter-Palmon, 2000; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1990). Previous research has examined several leader interpersonal skills such as interpersonal acumen (Aditya & House, 2002), social

skills (Riggio, 1986), self-monitoring skills (Snyder, 1974), social intelligence (Thorndike, 1920), and emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995; see Ferris, Perrewé, & Douglas, 2002, and Heggstad & Morrison, 2008, for recent reviews of the social effectiveness construct domain). Political skill, a newly introduced type of interpersonal skill, assesses the leader's awareness of the social environment, the motivations of the target,² and the leader's ability to be sincere in their influence attempt (Ahearn et al., 2004). Leaders who are high in political skill will be more likely to select the most appropriate influence tactic based on the motivations of the target and the organizational context. Further, these leaders will be more likely to be perceived as sincere and credible in their influence attempts (Ferris et al., 2005). Thus, leaders high in political skill will ultimately be more effective in their roles because they are more effective at influencing others. Therefore, political skill is likely to moderate the relationship between leader influence and effectiveness such that the relationship between influence and effectiveness will be stronger for leaders high in political skill.

Whereas the ability to influence effectively is a critical part of a leader's role set, how effective the leader is in influencing others is likely to impact both how others perceive the leader's performance and whether stakeholders wish to continue working with the leader in the future. Some of the early research on leader influence focused on the reasons why leaders attempted to influence (Yukl et al., 1996). Other research examined proximal outcomes of influence tactics including resistance (refusing the requested action), compliance (carrying out the requested action with minimal or average effort), and commitment (carrying out requested action with enthusiasm and extra effort; e.g., Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Yukl et al., 1996). However,

² Influence attempts are typically described in terms of a distinction between the leader (the "agent") and the person who is the focus of the influence attempt (the "target"; Erez, Rim, & Keider, 1986).

as suggested above, the ability to influence effectively is a critical role requirement for organizational leaders. Because a leader is often in a boundary spanning position which includes responsibilities for coordinating work among stakeholder groups, this study will assess the leader's task performance as an outcome of influence attempts. Preliminary research on leader influence tactics has examined the relationship between leader influence and effectiveness (Johnson, Luthans, & Hennessey, 1984; Wayne et al., 1997) as well as promotability (Thacker & Wayne, 1995; Wayne et al., 1997) and has found positive effects in support of this argument.

A second measure of leader effectiveness is leader viability. *Leader viability* assesses the extent to which the stakeholder is willing to continue to work with the leader in the future. Based on the team viability construct (Hackman, 1987; Sundstrom, De Meuse, & Futrell, 1990), leader viability it is a future-oriented view of the dyadic relationship between leaders and stakeholders. It assesses whether the stakeholder is willing to work with the leader in the future. This study focuses on the level of dependence that leaders have on stakeholders and how leaders attempt to influence those stakeholders to accomplish their task work. Leaders may use a variety of tactics to influence others ranging from soft tactics to rational tactics to hard tactics. For example, a leader may use a soft tactic such as collaboration which includes an offer to assist the stakeholder with work that needs to be done. In these cases, the stakeholder may see the working relationship as beneficial and may be more willing to work with the leader in the future. If the leader uses rational tactics, the leader may be perceived as more credible and may develop a positive reputation which would encourage stakeholders to collaborate on an ongoing basis. Alternatively, the leader may use hard tactics, including pressure, which may reduce the willingness of the stakeholder to work together with the leader in the future. Given that many leaders are now working in more empowered organizational forms, the ability to maintain

effective, ongoing relationships with key stakeholders will be an important part of the leader's effectiveness.

Thus, this study makes the following contribution to the growing literature on dependence and leader influence tactics. First, the study explicitly examines stakeholder dependence as an antecedent to the leader's selection of influence tactics. Second, the study assesses both the leader's current level of performance and a future-focused measure of performance (leader viability) from a broad range of stakeholders including subordinates, peers, senior managers, and external stakeholders. Finally, the political skill of the leader is examined as a potential moderator of the relationship between leader influence tactics and leader performance outcomes as suggested by Ferris et al., (2005).

Stakeholders

The stakeholder model of organizational leadership emphasizes the critical role that leaders play in interfacing with a broad set of internal and external organizational stakeholders (Schneider, 2002). This model is based in stakeholder theory which suggests that organizations should be managed in the interests of all stakeholders, not just in the interest of shareholders, to achieve better performance (Freeman, 1984). As leaders throughout the organizational hierarchy are frequently in boundary spanning roles, they are often the point of contact with many of these stakeholders. The role of the leader in managing these stakeholder relationships requires leaders to be flexible, to be able to work through hierarchical and organizational boundaries, and to influence a diverse set of stakeholders to accomplish his or her task work and the organization's objectives (Schneider, 2002). Therefore, by incorporating a stakeholder perspective in this study on influence tactics, I highlight the ability to influence key organizational constituents as a critical component of the leader's role responsibilities.

Prior research on leader influence has primarily focused on how leaders use influence tactics with internal stakeholder groups. For example, Yukl and Tracey (1992) examined the consequences of influence tactics that leaders use with subordinates (downward influence attempts), peers (lateral influence attempts), and senior managers (upward influence attempts). Later work by Yukl et al., (2005) assessed influence tactics aimed at subordinates and peers. Other research has specifically examined leader's downward influence attempts (e.g., Somech & Drach-Zahavy, 2002; Sparrowe, Soetjipto, & Kraimer, 2006) whereas Westphal and Stern (2006) examined how top managers attempted to influence their firms' CEOs in upward influence attempts. However, as organizations become increasingly more engaged with external stakeholders, there is a need to examine how leaders influence external groups as well as internal

stakeholders. Therefore, this study will focus on leader influence attempts aimed at subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. Each of the stakeholder groups is described below.

Subordinates

Perhaps the most commonly examined stakeholder in leader influence studies is subordinates. Subordinates are stakeholders that report directly to the leader. Therefore, the leader has the ability to reward the subordinate's performance and punish the subordinate's undesirable behavior through the organization's formal performance appraisal systems. Given the structural, hierarchical relationship, subordinates are likely to accept influence attempts from leaders more readily than other stakeholders. Yet, studies have found variation in how successful leaders are in influencing subordinates despite the formal authority in this hierarchical relationship (e.g., Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Yukl et al., 2008). As Kotter (1999) has aptly noted, "virtually no one in modern organizations will passively accept and completely obey a constant stream of orders from someone just because he or she is the 'boss'" (p. 100). Therefore, leaders must be able to effectively influence this group by drawing on a variety of influence tactics particularly when leaders are dependent on their subordinates for their own task work.

Peers

A leader's peer stakeholder group consists of individuals who are not connected via the organization's formal hierarchy yet with whom the leader interacts to accomplish his or her goals. This group may include individuals who perform the same task function at a different location or individuals in other functional areas. Importantly, leaders do not have any hierarchical authority over this group. Particularly when leaders are dependent on their peer group for doing their work, the choice of influence tactic will be important to gain the peers' compliance.

Senior Managers

Senior Managers in this study represent the person hierarchically above the focal leader. Similar to the leader's role with subordinates, the senior manager rewards the leader's performance and has the ability to punish the leader for poor performance because of the hierarchical authority that the senior manager has over the leader. Given the senior manager's formal position, they may often control important resources or have the ability to provide information and assistance that can be critical to the leader for accomplishing his or her work. Therefore, leaders are often highly dependent on their senior managers and must find ways to effectively influence this stakeholder group to get their work done. Whereas numerous studies have examined how subordinates influence senior managers (e.g., Dulebohn & Ferris, 1999; Farmer & Maslyn, 1999; Schilit & Locke, 1982; Wayne et al., 1997), there is relatively little research on how mid-level leaders (i.e., those leaders who have responsibilities for managing a group of subordinates and who report to higher level executive) influence their senior managers. A notable exception is the study by Westphal and Stern (2006) who found that managers who were able to influence their CEOs had more career opportunities in the form of board appointments. This study examines mid-level managers and the influence tactics that they use with their senior managers.

Customers

As indicated above, research has yet to examine how leaders influence external stakeholders. This is problematic given the growing importance of connections between organizational leaders and stakeholders in the external environment. Therefore, customers will be the final stakeholder group examined in this study. Customers are, arguably, the external stakeholders that contribute the most to the organization's survival. Because of this,

organizations, and the leaders that represent the organizations to this group, have a dependence on their customers for the continued existence of the firm (Kotter, 1977a). Therefore, it is not surprising that many organizations focus on developing customer relationships as a key part of their corporate strategy (Payne & Frow, 2005). This strategy is based on current marketing theory which suggests that it is more profitable to build cooperative, long-term relationships with existing customers than to acquire new customers (Johnson & Selnes, 2004). Therefore, I will examine how leaders use influence tactics with customers in addition to the internal stakeholders described above.

Stakeholder Dependence

Emerson's (1962) theory of power dependence suggests that there are mutual dependencies in relationships, and this dependency makes it critical that parties are able to influence each other's conduct to accomplish their goals. Dependency can occur because of a motivational investment in a goal or outcome or because of a lack of availability of other sources by which one can achieve the goal. Emerson (1962) suggested that individuals are part of "power network[s]" within an organization whereby two or more people are connected in power-dependence relationships (p. 36). To the extent that a leader has more ways to accomplish his or her goal, the leader is less dependent on other people within the organization. However, to the extent that the leader depends on other individuals for information or resources to accomplish his or her task, the leader is more dependent upon that individual.

Stakeholder dependence, as conceptualized in this study, is based on previous research which has examined task dependence in teams. This research has focused on whether team members need resources, knowledge, or assistance from other team members to complete their work (e.g., de Jong, Van der Vegt, & Molleman, 2007). Given the importance of internal and external stakeholder groups to a leader's task work, a leader may be dependent on these groups in a similar manner to which team members are dependent upon other team members. Whereas previous research has examined task interdependence, that research overlooks the possibility of imbalance in the dependence relationship (i.e. asymmetrical task dependence; de Jong et al., 2007). Further, it disregards "potentially important variance at the individual ... level of analysis" (de Jong et al., 2007, p. 1626). Therefore, by examining task dependence with multiple stakeholder groups, I examine the potentially different levels of dependence that leaders have on a broad range of stakeholders in accomplishing their task work. Thus, *stakeholder dependence* is

defined as the extent to which a leader must rely on information and support from others in the accomplishment of his or her task work. Stakeholder dependence in this study can take the form of task dependence on subordinates (subordinate task dependence), peers (peer task dependence), senior managers (senior manager task dependence), and customers (customer task dependence).

Task dependence can exist for a variety of reasons. Kotter (1977b) suggested that leaders are dependent on others because of the division of labor that exists in modern organizational structures and because there are limited organizational resources to accomplish one's task work. Bartol and Martin (1988) proposed that leaders are dependent on others who have a specialized skill set (which the leader does not possess); who are central to the leader's task (for which there is no readily available substitute); who have strong organizational connections; and who have high performance visibility. For example, if the leader interacts with a peer who is well-connected within the organization, this peer can report on the leader's performance and behaviors without the leader's knowledge. Therefore, the leader is dependent upon the peer to maintain his or her reputation within the organization. Further, if a leader is working for a senior manager on a high visibility project, the leader's performance will be subjected to intense scrutiny, and the performance on that project may impact his or her career prospects in the future. Therefore, engaging in a high visibility project with one's senior manager increases the dependence on the senior manager beyond the hierarchical dependence because of the future career ramifications related to that specific project.

High levels of dependence for a leader can be problematic because individuals in powerful positions are more likely to resist influence attempts (Mainiero, 1986). In fact, there are several types of power that a stakeholder may have over a leader. French and Raven (1959) introduced five of these bases of power including reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and

expert power. Reward power occurs when an individual has the power to give positive rewards to another person. Conversely, coercive power exists when a person has the ability to punish another. Legitimate power is based on an individual's right to prescribe the behavior of another based on group norms, role prescriptions, or role specializations. Referent power is based on the strong identification that a person has with another, and expert power is based on special knowledge or expertise in a given area. Further research on power has expanded this categorization to include informational power (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985; Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998; Yukl, 2006). Informational power includes both access to important information that is not widely available to others and control over the dissemination of this information. Finally, Christensen and Bower (1996) describe customer power as the power that an organization's customers have because of their significance to the organization's growth and survival.

Power and dependence have often been described as the inverse of one another in that power in one party leads to dependence of another party (e.g., Emerson, 1962, Mainiero, 1986). Therefore, based on the types of power described above, there are at least seven types of dependence that a leader can have on a stakeholder (see Table 1). For example, if stakeholder has reward power, then the leader has reward dependence upon that person. This suggests that the leader is dependent on that stakeholder through the organization's formal evaluation system. If a stakeholder has coercive power, then the leader has coercive dependence. This means that the stakeholder has the authority to punish the leader through the organization's systems for the leader's behavior. These types of dependence will most commonly occur between the leader and his or her senior manager.

However, a broader set of stakeholders could have other types of power over the leader. For example, all internal stakeholders could have legitimate power. This could include the leader's senior manager because of the senior manager's hierarchical position, and it can also include peers and subordinates because of either how work is formally organized or because of the norms that exist within the firm around cooperative work (French & Raven, 1959). Because legitimate power is based on the organizational structure, it leads to structural dependence for the leader (e.g., Brass, 1984; Hinings, Hickson, Pennings, & Schneck, 1974). All stakeholders also have the potential to have referent, expert, and informational power over the leader, and this would lead to personal/identification dependence, skill/coordination dependence, or informational dependence respectively for the leader. Personal/identification dependence occurs when the leader has a strong identification or relationship with the stakeholder (Lord & Brown, 2001; Sluss & Ashforth, 2008). In this case, the greater the leader's attraction to the stakeholder, the more dependent the leader would be. Skill/coordination dependence occurs if the stakeholder has a specialized skill set or if the stakeholder's role is central to the sequencing of the leader's work (Bartol & Martin, 1988). Informational dependence arises if the stakeholder has access to or control over information that is critical to the leader's task work. Finally, customer power leads to customer dependence (Kotter, 1977a). This type of dependence is based on the revenue that is generated from these stakeholders which contributes to the organization's continued existence and success.

The types of dependence described above can be categorized according to whether the leader has personal dependence or task dependence on a particular stakeholder (see Table 1). Personal dependence is dependence which impacts the individual aspects of the leader's position, and it includes reward, coercive, and personal/identification dependence. Task dependence, on

the other hand, impacts the ability of the leader to perform his or her role responsibilities effectively. Task dependence includes structural dependence, skill/coordination dependence, informational dependence, and customer dependence. This study focuses on the task dependence that leaders have on stakeholders. Thus, the leader needs the cooperation of the target to accomplish his or her task work. Given that more powerful individuals are less likely to acquiesce to influence attempts, leaders must influence the stakeholders in a way that either motivates them to perform, or the leader may need to find an alternative way to accomplish the work (Emerson, 1962). Therefore, the arguments that follow focus on the types of task dependencies and the corresponding leader influence tactics that will be used when the leader is dependent on a powerful stakeholder group.

Influence Tactics

Leader Influence Tactics

There has been extensive research into how leaders influence others in the workplace. In the following section, a chronological summary of the major scholars in the area is presented. The summaries begin with Mowday's work in the 1970s and continue through to Yukl's work in the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, shorter summaries of research on executive influence, influence in general, and meta-analytic support for influence are presented.

Mowday's initial research. Mowday (1978, 1979) was among the first scholars to examine how organizational leaders attempt to influence others. His work specifically looked at how leaders engage in upward influence attempts. In the first study, Mowday (1978) introduced five methods of influence including threats, legitimate authority, persuasive arguments, rewards, and manipulation to examine how leaders select the type of tactic to use and how they time the use of the tactic. He found that leaders high in a need for power or high in self-perceptions of power were more likely to engage in influence attempts. Further, the timing of the influence attempt was related to whether there were "alternative influence targets" (Mowday, 1978, p. 137). Subsequently, Mowday (1979) examined four methods of influence: appeals to policies and regulations, persuasive arguments, rewards/exchange favors, and manipulation. This study explored how the self-confidence of the leader was related to the method of influence selected. Mowday (1979) found that leaders who were self-confident were more likely to use persuasive arguments and manipulation as forms of influence.

Research by Kipnis and colleagues. Subsequent research on how leaders influence has primarily focused on the specific tactics used with others. Kipnis and colleagues (1980) were among the first to introduce a classification of influence tactics. The authors used content

analysis techniques to identify eight dimensions of influence: assertiveness, ingratiation, rationality, sanctions, exchange, upward appeals, blocking, and coalitions (see Table 2). Assertiveness influence attempts involve demanding, ordering, and setting deadlines whereas ingratiation influence attempts include the opposite – engaging in flattery and impression management techniques toward the target. Rationality involves using facts and data to support an argument. Sanctions occur when a leader uses administrative rewards and punishments to induce compliance with a request. Exchange influence attempts involve negotiation and bargaining in exchange for favors. Upward appeals are tactics that draw on the additional support from a higher level in the organization. Blocking involves engaging in a work slowdown or threatening to stop work; and finally, coalitions involve engaging others to assist with the influence attempt. Kipnis et al., (1980) argued that the tactics were used differentially to various target groups and that several factors led to the selection of a specific influence tactic including the leader's relative power, the leader's objectives for using influence, and the leader's expectation of the target's willingness to comply.

Kipnis and colleagues continued to investigate influence in three subsequent studies. In the first study, Kipnis, Schmidt, Swaffin-Smith, and Wilkinson (1984) examined seven influence tactics in a three-country study. They sought to explore both how frequently managers use specific influence tactics with subordinates and supervisors and the factors that determine influence tactic use. In all of the countries examined, leaders used rational tactics most with supervisors and subordinates. Further, they found that tactic selection was based on three factors: whether the goal was to benefit the organization or the leader; the expectations for successfully influencing others; and the leader's degree of organizational power. In the second study, Kipnis and Schmidt (1985) introduced a tripartite classification of influence strategies which included

hard, soft, and rational influence tactics. Soft tactics include flattery and praise and are used frequently when the goal is to benefit one's self. Rational tactics, or relying on logic and facts and are used most often when the goal is to benefit one's organization or one's self whereas hard tactics, which include demanding and assertiveness, are used frequently when the person attempting to influence expects resistance. In the third study, Last, Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) explored how leaders use influence tactics with supervisors (i.e., upward influence attempts). They found that upward influence tactics were related to performance evaluations and salary. Further they found that upward influence tactics were also related to the amount of stress that people experience at work.

Building on the research of Kipnis and colleagues, Erez and Rim (1982) explored personal and organizational characteristics that affect the selection of influence tactic. The study included mid-level managers and assistance managers and found that a manager's span of control and the size of the organization impacted influence tactic selection. Managers who supervised more than 16 employees were more likely to use negative tactics, and managers in larger organizations were more likely to use rational influence tactics. Later, Erez, Rim, and Keider (1986) examined influence from the perspective of both the agent and the target. They found that managers (i.e., agents) were more likely to engage in strong tactics (e.g., assertiveness) whereas subordinates (i.e., targets) were more likely to use weak tactics (e.g., exchange).

Somech and Drach-Zahavy (2002) also used the Kipnis et al., (1980) scale to examine a leader's use of top-down influence tactics. The authors investigated whether leaders used different strategies based on their perception of their own power within the organization and their perception of their subordinates power. This investigation of "relative power" did find differences in how leaders use influence strategies. Specifically, leaders who perceived

themselves as more powerful (relative to their subordinates) were more likely to use hard strategies whereas leaders who perceived themselves as less powerful were more likely to use soft and rational influence tactics.

Hinkin and Schriesheim influence scale. Several researchers continued the work of Kipnis et al., (1980) in further attempts to classify influence tactics. Hinkin and Schriesheim (1990) criticized the Kipnis et al., (1980) influence categorization for assessing influence from a single perspective – that of the leader –which called into question the issue of self-report response bias in the responses. Further, they questioned whether investigating the influence behaviors of the leader are most appropriately measured from the leader's perspective (as was the case in the Kipnis et al., 1980 scale), and they argued that the target of the influence attempt may be more useful in examining influence tactics. Therefore, Schriesheim and Hinkin (1990) developed an 18-item instrument to assess six of the eight dimensions in Kipnis et al., (1980) previous work. These dimensions included ingratiation, exchange, rationality, assertiveness, upward appeal, and coalitions. Schriesheim and Hinkin (1990) argued that the new six-factor structure was more appropriate for two primary reasons. First, their scale assessed leader influence attempts from subordinates, peers, and senior managers; and second, several of the items, specifically those that measured sanctions and blocking, in the Kipnis et al., (1980) scale did not have strong content validity, so those categories were removed.

Research by Yukl and colleagues. Yukl and Falbe (1990) also extended the work of Kipnis et al., (1980) by introducing a classification of influence tactics. They argued that the Kipnis et al., (1980) classification was too narrow because it was based on student responses; and therefore, it did not capture the full spectrum of influence tactics for leaders in organizations. Further, they also argued that there was possible self-report bias in the Kipnis and colleagues

(1980) scale responses. Therefore, Yukl and Falbe (1990) focused on refining the set of influence tactics that were important for "managerial work" in organizations (p. 132). This research yielded eight influence tactics including pressure tactics, upward appeals, exchange tactics, coalition tactics, ingratiating tactics, rational persuasion, inspirational appeals, and consultation tactics. This categorization did not include the sanctions and blocking categories from the Kipnis et al., (1980) classification, but it added inspirational appeals and consultation tactics. Inspirational appeals occur when a leader makes an emotional request or appeals to the target's values or ideals in an influence attempt. Consultation tactics involve seeking the target's participation in the decision making process. In addition to the new classification of influence tactics, Yukl and Falbe (1990) explored how managers use these tactics with subordinates, peers, and supervisors. They found a similar pattern of influence tactic use: managers used consultation, rational persuasion, and inspirational appeals tactics most and exchange tactics least with all three target groups.

Yukl and Tracey (1992) continued this work by examining how a leader's use of influence was related to task commitment and the leader's effectiveness. In this study, they expanded the Yukl and Falbe (1990) classification of influence tactics to include legitimating tactics. Legitimizing influence tactics occur when a leader claims authority to make the request or asserts that the request is consistent with the organization's rules or policies. They found that consultation, rational persuasion, and inspirational appeals tactics were most related to task commitment and ratings of leader effectiveness in subordinates, peers, and supervisors whereas legitimating and pressure tactics were most likely to be negatively correlated with task commitment and effectiveness ratings.

The classification of leader influence tactics developed by Yukl and colleagues has been used in a wide variety of studies. For example, Yukl and Tracey (1992) examined the effectiveness of influence tactics with subordinates, peers, and senior managers by categorizing outcomes of influence attempts as commitment, compliance, or resistance. Commitment occurs when a target is enthusiastic and applies extra effort in response to an influence attempt, and compliance was described as responding to an influence attempt with average effort. Targets who refused influence attempts, or who argued or delayed in responding were categorized as engaging in resistant outcomes. Yukl and Tracey (1992) found differential effectiveness for influence tactics based on this outcome categorization. The most effective tactics were found to be consultation and inspirational appeals. Three tactics were identified as "moderately effective" including ingratiation, personal appeals, and exchange tactics (Yukl and Tracey, 1992, p. 65), and the three hard tactics – coalition, legitimating, and pressure – were found to be the least effective.

Yukl, Falbe, and Yoon, (1993) explored the selection and sequencing of influence tactics. This study purported to extend prior research by looking at differences in how leaders use combinations of tactics and how influence tactics are used in consecutive influence attempts (Yukl et al., 1993, p. 5). In terms of combinations of tactics, four tactics were identified as being used most commonly in combination with other tactics. These included inspirational appeals, consultation, ingratiation, and legitimating tactics. Further, they found that initial influence attempts were most likely to be rational persuasion, ingratiation, or personal appeals. The most common follow-up tactic was exchange. Leaders resorted to using coalition or pressure tactics the least in consecutive influence attempts.

Yukl, Guinan and Soitolano (1995) examined how leaders use influence differently based on the desired objective from subordinates, peers, and supervisors. The authors defined five influence objectives including assigning work, changing behavior, receiving assistance, garnering support, and obtaining personal benefits. They found several interesting results. First, leaders use rational persuasion for all of the objectives. However, leaders are also likely to use consultation, inspirational appeals, ingratiation, and legitimating tactics for assigning work whereas leaders are likely to use consultation, ingratiation, personal appeals, and exchange for receiving assistance. Pressure and legitimating were most likely to be used when the leader desired to change behavior. Coalition tactics were most likely when the leader was attempting to garner support, and personal appeals were most likely when the leader sought personal benefits.

Yukl et al., (1996) examined three "content factors" that were antecedents to influence attempts. These content factors included the importance of the request to the task, the feasibility of the request for the target, and whether the target would enjoy responding affirmatively to the request. They found that when a leader used consultation, inspirational appeals, or rational persuasion tactics, and the request was important and enjoyable, the target was more likely to be committed to the influence request. Yukl, Kim, and Chavez (1999) extended the work of Yukl et al., (1996) by studying two of the content factors introduced in the previous study. Here, Yukl and colleagues (1999) found that the leader's perception of the importance of the influence request as well as the feasibility of the request impacted which influence tactic the leader selected. The target's commitment was then impacted by the selection of the influence tactic. This study also suggested that there are different forms of rational persuasion (i.e., rational persuasion-important and rational persuasion-feasible) which both have effects on target commitment.

Tepper, Eisenbach, Kirby, and Potter (1998) tested the effect of interactional justice as a mediator of the relationship between a leader's use of influence tactics and the subordinate's resistance to the influence attempt. Using Falbe and Yukl's (1992) classification of influence tactics, they found that leaders who use hard influence tactics, which was perceived as being treated unfairly, also encountered greater resistance. However, when leaders used soft tactics in combination with hard tactics, the hard tactics were "less objectionable" (Tepper et al., 1998, p. 156). The study demonstrated that perceptions of interpersonal fairness were important when comparing the effectiveness of soft, rational, and hard influence attempts.

Seifert, Yukl, and McDonald (2003) examined how the feedback that a leader receives impacts the use of influence tactics. Specifically, they explored whether the medium used to give feedback to leaders impacted their future use of the core influence tactics (e.g., rational persuasion, inspirational appeals, consultation, and collaboration) which are most related to ratings of target commitment to influence requests. Using a quasi-experimental design, the authors found that leaders who received feedback on their use of influence tactics in the form of a report did not change their influence behaviors. However, leaders who received feedback on their use of influence tactics through a report and in a feedback workshop were more likely to increase their use of core influence tactics.

Cable and Judge (2003) explored how personality is related to leaders' upward influence attempts. Using the Influence Behavior Questionnaire (IBQ; Yukl & Tracey, 1992), they found that a leaders' selection of influence tactics is, in part, determined by their personality and not just the specific task or the person that the person is trying to influence. Specifically, leaders high in extroversion used inspirational appeal and ingratiation tactics more than others. Leaders high in conscientiousness and emotional stability were more likely to use rational appeal tactics

whereas leaders high in extraversion were more likely to use inspirational appeal and ingratiation tactics. Further, leaders high in agreeableness and openness to experience were less likely to use hard influence tactics (e.g., coalitions, legitimatization, pressure).

Yukl et al., (2005) extended the work of Yukl and Tracey (1992) by drawing on interpersonal influence theory to introduce two new forms of influence. These two new tactics included collaboration and apprising. Collaboration influence tactics when a leader offers to provide support, resources, or assistance to a target when asking to carry out a request. Yukl et al., (2005) noted that collaboration can increase target self-efficacy and intrinsic motivation making the target more likely to commit to the influence attempt. Apprising, on the other, involves explaining to a target how the influence tactic can potentially benefit the individual in his or her career. These benefits could include pay increases and promotions. Data was presented from three studies to demonstrate the construct validity of the two new tactics and their distinct properties from the nine other influence tactics.

Sparrowe et al., (2006) examined how a leader's downward influence attempts and helping behavior was affected by the quality of the leader-subordinate relationship. They found several interesting results. First, the relationship between leaders who used exchange tactics and helping behavior was negative when their subordinates perceived low quality relationships (i.e., low-LMX relationships); yet this same relationship was positive when the subordinates perceived high quality relationships. Further, the relationship between leaders who used inspirational appeals tactics and helping behavior was also negative when subordinates perceived low quality relationships. This research points to the importance of the relationship quality in leader influence attempts.

Finally, Yukl et al., (2008) provided validation evidence for the extended Influence Behavior Questionnaire (IBQ) and its relationship to a variety of outcomes. Data from subordinates and peers demonstrated that leaders who use rational persuasion, consultation, inspirational appeals and collaboration tactics are most likely to gain target commitment. Six of the tactics demonstrated moderate correlations with LMX (ranging from .31 to .63) including rational persuasion, consultation, inspirational appeals, collaboration, apprising, and ingratiation. In addition, ratings of manager effectiveness by the leaders' supervisors were highest when leaders used the four core tactics (e.g., rational persuasion, consultation, inspirational appeal, and collaboration).

Research on executive influence. Recently, research by Westphal and colleagues has examined how executive leaders attempt to influence others. Westphal (1998) examined how CEOs use ingratiation and persuasion toward board members. He drew on the work of Yukl and Tracey (1992) to define persuasion as the use of reason or logic and ingratiation as an influence tactic where a person attempts to make themselves look better in the eyes of others. Westphal (1998) found that when the board of directors changed in structure, the CEO engaged in more ingratiation and persuasive behaviors toward board members. In turn, these behaviors "serve[d] to offset the effect of increased structural board independence on corporate strategy and CEO compensation policy" (Westphal, 1998, p. 511). The findings demonstrated how successful use of influence tactics can benefit the CEO of an organization.

In later research, Westphal and Stern (2006) examined how influence behaviors of executives can impact whether they are selected for board appointments. This study attempted to explain how individuals who lack the typical "elite social and educational credentials" (which commonly lead to board appointments) gain access to boards (Westphal and Stern, 2006, p. 193).

This research found that ingratiation tactics aimed at CEOs increase the likelihood that ethnic minorities and women are nominated and eventually appointed to board positions. A subsequent study by Westphal and Stern (2007) investigated how ingratiation tactics can impact additional board appointments. The authors found that directors who use ingratiation toward their peer board members were more likely to gain additional board appointments. These studies further support the important role of using influence tactics effectively, even at the executive level of an organization.

Additional Research on Influence

In additional research to the body of research that has examined how leaders influence others, numerous scholars have explored how individuals (i.e., non-leaders) influence in organizations. For example, Wayne and colleagues pursued research related to subordinate influence tactics. In one study, Wayne and Ferris (1990) developed a scale of subordinate influence tactics. They classified influence attempts into three categories: job-focused tactics, supervisor-focused tactics, and self-focused tactics. Then, they examined how influence attempts affect the exchange quality between subordinates and supervisors. Their findings suggest that supervisor-focused tactics aimed at impression management were positively related to the supervisor's liking of the subordinate. Subsequently, Thacker and Wayne (1995) explored how subordinate influence attempts related to supervisory ratings of promotability. They found that two tactics – ingratiation and reasoning – had significant effects on supervisors assessments of promotability. In later research, Wayne et al., (1997) examined how subordinate upward influence attempts were related to perceptions by managers. They found that subordinates who used reasoning, assertiveness, and favor rendering were more likely to be rated by their

supervisors as having better interpersonal skills, as being well liked, and as having more similarity to their supervisors.

Several other scholars have studied how subordinates influence their superiors. For example, Tepper, Brown, and Hunt (1993) explored how gender affected subordinate influence tactics. They found that men who engaged in strong upward influence tactics had higher performance ratings whereas women who used weak upward influence tactics received more psychosocial mentoring. Farmer and Maslyn (1999) pursued a configural approach to influence tactics in subordinates. They found that subordinates engage in primarily three styles of influence: shotgun, tactician, and bystander. Sparrowe and Liden (2005) examined how LMX and social networks were related to subordinate influence. They found that both LMX and the subordinates' advice centrality were related to subordinate influence.

Finally, meta-analytic research exists which also supports the relationships between the use of influence tactics and a variety of outcomes. Gordon (1996) specifically examined the use of ingratiation and how this tactic was related to judgments and evaluations of targets and observers. He found that ingratiation was positively related to performance evaluations and liking. Higgins, Judge, and Ferris (2003) focused their meta-analysis on the relationships between influence tactics and work outcomes. They also found that ingratiation was positively related to assessments of performance and extrinsic success (e.g., salaries and promotions). Further, they found that rationality was positively related to assessments of performance and extrinsic success whereas assertiveness was negatively related to assessments of performance.

Present Study on Leader Influence

This study will focus on the eleven leader influence tactics introduced by Yukl et al., (2008) because they are tactics that are specifically recognized as important for leaders in

organizations. Further, the influence tactics are considered to be proactive in that the leader intentionally uses influence for specific task objectives which require coordination, cooperation, and support from individuals both inside and outside of the organization (Yukl et al., 2005). In addition, the tactics are designed to be assessed from the target's perspective which allow for responses from the four stakeholder groups in this study. Leaders have the ability to select from any of these tactics in their interactions with stakeholders. However, when leaders are dependent on others, the leader is likely to select a tactic which they believe will be most effective. Therefore, this study presents hypotheses in two sections. The first section addresses the selection of the influence tactic based on the dependence relationship. That is, I hypothesize which tactics the leader will likely use when they are dependent on others. The next section addresses the effectiveness of the influence attempt. That is, I connect the successful use of influence tactics to the leader's task role performance and viability and examine how this relationship is moderated by leader political skill. Therefore, this study builds on prior research on the directionality of influence attempts and incorporates power dependence theory to suggest how stakeholder dependence impacts a leader's selection of influence tactics.

Soft Influence Tactics

Kipnis and Schmidt (1985) proposed that influence tactics could be classified as either soft, rational, or hard tactics. Soft influence tactics are tactics that are used when the leader seeks compliance in a polite and friendly manner (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). The soft tactics in this study are consultation, collaboration, exchange, ingratiation, inspirational appeals, and personal appeals. These tactics are typically used when the leader is at a disadvantage as is the case when the leader is dependent upon others within and outside of the organization. In addition, the use of soft tactics is likely to maintain and strengthen the leader's relationships and reputation – both

outcomes that will allow the leader to continue to influence others and perform well in his or her role into the future. Therefore, leaders who are dependent upon stakeholders are likely to use many of soft tactics described below.

Collaboration. Collaboration tactics occur when the leader offers task assistance or resources if the target will comply with the influence attempt (Yukl et al., 2005). Leaders may offer to collaborate on a task, or they may offer to redistribute work to allow the target to focus on the request. Given that this influence tactic is relatively new to the literature on influence tactics, research has not yet explored how collaboration will be used; however, Yukl et al., (2005) have suggested that leaders will be more likely to use collaboration tactics with subordinates and peers.

Collaboration is a type of social exchange (Yukl et al., 2005). Therefore, I argue that when leaders are dependent on any internal stakeholder (subordinates, peers, and senior managers) for accomplishing their task work, they are likely to use collaboration influence tactics. Emerson (1976) argues that social exchange involves an interaction that causes an obligation. This is because individuals operate according to specific rules of exchange. One such rule is the rule of reciprocity whereby if "a person supplies a benefit, the receiving party should respond in kind" (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005, p. 876). Thus, when a leader offers assistance and resources, the target is more likely to acquiesce to the influence attempt because the target received something of value and now feels obligated to do something in return. Further, if the leader has the ability to work with the target and gain new skills, the possibility of future dependence on these stakeholders could be reduced. Therefore, collaboration is a viable influence tactic when a leader is dependent on internal stakeholders.

Conversely, leaders who are dependent upon customers are not likely to use collaboration influence tactics. Leaders and customers are separated by organizational boundaries. This boundary represents the line between the organization and its environment, and leaders have significantly more discretion to control activities within the boundaries of their organization than to control activities outside of the organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Given the organizational boundaries between leaders and customers, it is unlikely that a leader will be able to offer valuable assistance or resources in the customer's task work. Therefore, a leader's customer dependence is not likely to be related to collaboration influence tactic use. Thus, the leader is likely to use collaboration tactics with internal stakeholder groups but not with customers.

Hypothesis 1a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics.

Hypothesis 1b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics.

Hypothesis 1c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics.

Hypothesis 1d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics.

Consultation. Consultation tactics occur when the leader seeks the advice of the target for a proposed activity or change in plan, or when the leader seeks suggestions for improvement from the target (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Yukl and Falbe (1990) have suggested that consultation tactics are most likely to be used with subordinates; however, when the leader is dependent on any stakeholder group, I argue that the leader will engage in consultation tactics. Participative

management theory suggests that leaders who support involvement in decision making increase the motivation of those who are involved with the decisions (Cohen, Ledford, & Spreitzer, 1996; Wagner & Gooding, 1987). This is because those that are involved are able to have input about the resources and information that affect their work. Therefore, when a leader uses consultation influence tactics which include offers of assistance and resources, the target is more motivated to comply with the influence attempt.

Further, Sparrowe and colleagues (2006) have argued that consultation cues "high standing and respect" by acknowledging the target's potential contribution to decisions that affect them (p. 1196). Therefore, by engaging in consultation influence tactics, the leader is signaling that he or she values the input of the target and wishes to incorporate this into the plan for the task. Leaders are able to engage in consultation tactics with any stakeholder about the work that specifically affects that individual or group. Therefore, leaders will likely use consultation tactics with all stakeholders.

Hypothesis 2a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics.

Hypothesis 2b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics.

Hypothesis 2c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics.

Hypothesis 2d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics.

Exchange. Exchange tactics involve offering the target something that is desirable now or in the future if the target does what the leader requests. Like collaboration, this tactic is based

in social exchange theory (Homans, 1958; Blau, 1964) whereby the leader and the target negotiate an exchange which leads to anticipated reciprocity. The difference between collaboration and exchange is that with exchange, the leader is seeking instrumental compliance. With collaboration, the leader is attempting "to make it easier or less costly for the target person to carry out the request" (Yukl et al., 2005, p. 709). Kipnis and Schmidt (1985) have argued that exchange tactics actually benefit both the leader and the target directly because the leader receives the support for the request and the target receives something of value negotiated through the exchange.

Farmer, Maslyn, Fedor, and Goodman (1997) proposed that an exchange tactic will be used in a variety of situations including when there is dependence in the relationship between the leader and the target. This is because the exchange has the potential to temporarily change the dependence in the relationship from the leader being dependent on the stakeholder to the stakeholder being dependent on the leader for something of value. Whereas exchange is typically used with subordinates and peers, there are likely to be opportunities for a leader to use exchange as an influence tactic within an organization with all stakeholder groups. For example, a nursing manager may request additional staff from a peer nursing manager during a particularly busy time in exchange for reciprocated support in the future. Further, a mid-level manager may offer to his or her senior manager to travel to a client's distant location to deal with a particularly sensitive issue in exchange for having the opportunity to take an extended vacation at a desired time in the future. Therefore, leaders are likely to use exchange influence tactics with all internal stakeholders.

As indicated above, boundaries represent the structural space between the leader and customer, and this space makes it more difficult for a leader to negotiate an exchange with

external stakeholders. However, exchange influence tactics, unlike collaboration tactics, are not related directly to the stakeholder's task work. Therefore, the leader would be able to use exchange tactics with customers. For example, a leader may be able to offer a customer lower terms on a future purchase or access to new products in exchange for acquiescing to a leader's current influence request. Therefore, the leader is likely to use exchange with customers as well as internal stakeholders.

Hypothesis 3a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics.

Hypothesis 3b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics.

Hypothesis 3c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics.

Hypothesis 3d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics.

Ingratiation. Ingratiation has a long history in social psychological research, and scholars have suggested that ingratiation can occur via many specific tactics including flattery, conforming to others opinions, other enhancement, favor rendering, self-promotion, or modesty (Jones, 1964; Jones & Wortman, 1973; Gordon, 1996). For the purposes of this study and consistent with Yukl and colleagues research in leader influence tactics (i.e., Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Yukl et al., 2005; Yukl et al., 2008), ingratiation is specifically examined as an influence tactic which occurs when the leader flatters or praises the target in an attempt to gain compliance to a request.

Ingratiation is based in part on reinforcement theory which suggests that leaders will engage in behaviors that have been reinforced in the past by a desired outcome. Therefore, leaders are likely to use ingratiation influence tactics because it increases the psychological attraction that the target has for the leader and the likelihood of acquiescing to the request. Further, one of the central motivations that drive compliance to a request is the goal of maintaining a positive self-concept (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Thus, in addition, ingratiation motivates targets to comply with the request to enhance and maintain their positive self-concepts.

Whereas prior research has suggested that ingratiation tactics are used most commonly with subordinates and peers (Yukl et al., 1993), recent research has explored leaders who successfully use ingratiation tactics toward their senior managers as well. For example, Westphal and Stern (2006) examined top managers who engaged ingratiatory behaviors toward their CEO. They found that those who engaged in ingratiation behaviors were more likely to receive board appointments at firms where the CEO was also a director than those who did not engage in those behaviors. I argue that leaders will use ingratiation tactics to all internal and external stakeholder groups. Given that ingratiatory behaviors can enhance the self-concept of any target which in turn, can motivate the target to comply with the request, a leader who is dependent on subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers will likely use ingratiation tactics.

Hypothesis 4a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics.

Hypothesis 4b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics.

Hypothesis 4c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics.

Hypothesis 4d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics.

Inspirational appeal. Inspirational appeals occur when the leader appeals to the target's values or when the leader attempts to arouse emotions to gain commitment to a request. These tactics have been linked to the inspirational motivation dimension of transformational leadership (Cable & Judge, 2003; Sparrowe et al., 2006) in that they draw on the emotions of the target or appeal to the target's ideals, thus increasing motivation toward the group's or organization's goals.

Forgas's (1995) affect infusion model (AIM) suggests that "affectively loaded information exerts an influence on and becomes incorporated into the judgmental process, entering into the [target's] deliberations and eventually coloring the judgmental outcome" (p. 39). This is in part because of the affect-priming principle which suggests that affect may directly or indirectly influence decisions through its selected focus on certain information in the decision process. Therefore, whereas prior research has suggested that leaders are most likely to use inspirational appeals influence tactics with subordinates (Falbe & Yukl, 1992), I propose that leaders who are highly dependent on others will use inspirational appeals with all stakeholder groups because of the potential to draw on the target's emotions to increase their motivation to comply with the request. Thus, by appealing to the target's emotions or values or by providing meaning to the request, leader's will attempt to inspire the target, thereby reducing the dependence in the relationship and increasing the likelihood that the target will acquiesce to the request.

Hypothesis 5a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.

Hypothesis 5b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.

Hypothesis 5c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.

Hypothesis 5d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.

Personal appeals. Personal appeals occur when the leader asks a target to carry out a request as a personal favor or because of friendship (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). For example, a leader may ask his or her boss to support a request for increased resources or an extended timetable for a project by appealing to their friendship ties. Alternatively, a leader may ask a customer to act as a reference to another potential customer as a personal favor in the leader's attempt to obtain more business.

Whereas personal appeal influence tactics have been most commonly used with peers within an organization (Yukl et al., 1993), leaders who are dependent on other stakeholder groups are likely to use personal appeals with all of the stakeholders in this study. This follows the well-established heuristic that people are more likely to respond affirmatively to a request if they like the person who is making the request. Further, Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) have proposed that individuals have a goal of affiliation in that they are "motivated to create and maintain meaningful social relationships with others" (p. 598). Therefore, the goal of affiliation makes it more likely that individuals are motivated to comply with a request. Whereas this tactic does not change the level of power and dependence in the relationship, it allows the leader to draw on friendships within and outside of the organization to accomplish their task work.

Hypothesis 6a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics.

Hypothesis 6b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics.

Hypothesis 6c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics.

Hypothesis 6d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics.

Rational Influence Tactics

The next two influence tactics, apprising and rational persuasion, are classified as rational influence tactics. These tactics involve the use of arguments, reason, and bargaining to accompany a particular request (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). Rational tactics are normally used when leaders are seeking individual or organizational benefits and when they are not expecting strong resistance. The outcomes of rational tactics are often similar to those of soft influence tactics including commitment to the request, maintaining strong working relationships, and strengthening the leader's reputation. Therefore, it is likely that leaders who are dependent upon their stakeholders will use rational influence tactics when possible.

Apprising. Apprising influence tactics occur when the leader explains how the request will benefit the target personally or professionally (Yukl et al., 2005). The leader uses facts and credible, logical arguments to explain why complying with the request is actually beneficial for the target. Examples include when the leader explains how the request could lead to increased professional skills or faster career advancement.

Apprising is one of two newest influence tactics identified by Yukl and colleagues (2005). Thus, there is little empirical evidence of how this tactic will be used; however, Yukl et al., (2005) hypothesized that apprising will be most commonly used toward subordinates. Based on expectancy theory, I propose that leaders will use apprising with all internal stakeholders to increase the stakeholders' motivation to comply with the request. Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) suggests that a leader's compelling arguments can explain how the outcome will benefit the target (thereby increasing valence); how the target's compliance with the request will lead to that particular outcome (thereby increasing instrumentality); and how the target's compliance efforts will lead to a particular outcome (thereby increasing expectancy). These arguments will emphasize the material benefits to the target thereby increasing the level of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to comply with the request. Leaders who are dependent upon customers are unlikely to use this tactic because of the structural boundary with this stakeholder which will likely precludes the leader from having the information to make credible apprising influence attempts with the customer.

Hypothesis 7a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of apprising influence tactics.

Hypothesis 7b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of apprising influence tactics.

Hypothesis 7c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of apprising influence tactics.

Hypothesis 7d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of apprising influence tactics.

Rational persuasion. Rational persuasion occurs when a leader uses facts and logical arguments to show that the request is reasonable and appropriate for accomplishing a task. This influence tactic is also based in expectancy theory in that the leader attempts to persuade the target that the influence request is legitimate, that the target's compliance will lead to the desired outcome, and that target's efforts are related to the outcome. Therefore, using rational persuasion influence tactics increases the target's motivation to respond to the request. As motivating the target to respond is one of the key means to overcoming dependence and resistance to influence attempts, rational persuasion will be an effective influence tactic for leaders who are dependent on stakeholders.

Prior research has found that rational persuasion was more commonly used with senior managers than with subordinates or peers (Yukl et al., 1993), yet leaders who are dependent on others will likely use rational persuasion with all internal and external stakeholder groups because of the ability to increase the level of motivation in each target group. There is some preliminary evidence to support this. For example, Yukl and Tracey (1992) found that the use of rational persuasion tactics was related to task commitment by senior managers, peers, and subordinates. Further, Podsakoff and Schriesheim (1985) have argued that subordinates are more likely to comply with a leader's request because of the level of knowledge and expertise of the leader. Therefore, to the extent that the leader is able to develop logical arguments for the request, the leader will be more successful in motivating their acquiescence.

Hypothesis 8a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics.

Hypothesis 8b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics.

Hypothesis 8c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics.

Hypothesis 8d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics.

Hard Influence Tactics

Hard influence tactics are tactics that involve demanding, assertiveness, and relying on one's organizational position (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). In addition, a leader may use hard tactics when the target has resisted past attempts because of a lack of motivation (Tepper et al., 1993). Thus, hard tactics involve the use of authority and position power. The hard influence tactics in this study are legitimating tactics, pressure, and coalition tactics.

There are several possible negative consequences from using hard tactics. The target may resist the influence attempt, have a lower level of commitment to the project, or put forth less effort in responding to the request. The leader may also be hurting his or her reputation thereby reducing the viability of future working relationships. This could eventually lessen the ability of the leader to perform his or her task because others are unwilling to work with the leader in the future. Therefore, a leader is likely to use hard tactics sparingly, especially with a target upon whom the leader is dependent for accomplishing his or her task work (Van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, Blaauw, & Vermunt, 1999).

Coalition tactics. Coalition tactics involve the leader gaining support from others as part of the attempt to influence the target. This support could come from other subordinates, peers, senior managers, or external stakeholders, or a combination of individuals from these groups. However, the goal is to exert significant pressure so that the target complies with the leader's request.

Prior research has suggested that coalition tactics are most commonly used with peers; yet I propose that leaders will only use coalition tactics with subordinates in this study. This is because the leader has the position power over the subordinate to make the request. This power includes reward power which means that the leader controls the incentives for the subordinates, and coercive power which means that the leader has the ability to punish the target. Further, because the leader is in a position of authority, the leader has the legitimate power to direct the behavior of the subordinate. Therefore, if a leader is dependent on a subordinate for his or her task work, then the leader may use this tactic to gain the target's compliance with the request.

Based in approach-avoidance motivation (Elliot, 2006; Elliot & Church, 1997), I suggest that coalition influence tactics will provoke an avoidance orientation in other targets, including peers, senior managers, and customers. Avoidance motivation has the potential to energize behavior away from a negative stimulus. Therefore, this tactic will not likely motivate these non-hierarchically connected stakeholder groups, so the leader is unlikely to use coalition tactics with peers, senior managers, and customers.

Hypothesis 9a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of coalition influence tactics.

Hypothesis 9b: Peer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of coalition influence tactics.

Hypothesis 9c: Senior manager task dependence will be negatively related to the use of coalition influence tactics.

Hypothesis 9d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of coalition influence tactics.

Legitimizing tactics. Legitimizing tactics occur when the leader relies on his or her position power or authority to make a request. This tactic has been linked to authoritarian leadership in that it is representative of a leader who gives specific instructions and does not include others in decision making. Legitimizing tactics are most commonly used with peers and subordinates (Yukl et al., 1993).

In a study of leader influence, Falbe and Yukl (1992) concluded that "the least effective tactics were pressure, coalition, and legitimating" (p. 650). Further, van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg (2003) describe hard influence tactics as placing strain on the relationship between the leader and target. However, similar to other studies, I argue that leaders will use legitimating tactics with subordinates and peers. Again, leaders have position authority to make the request of subordinate. Whereas there may be negative consequences to using this tactic (e.g., lower task commitment, lower effort), the leader's need to accomplish his or her task work may ultimately drive the use of the tactic. Further, the leader may use legitimating tactics with peers because of how work is structured within the organization. If the leader is dependent on sequential task inputs from a peer, the leader may appeal to the organizational norms around workflow and coordination to gain acquiescence from the peer for the request.

When a leader's task work is dependent upon senior managers and customers, they are not likely to use legitimating tactics for several reasons. First, legitimating tactics are among the least effective and the leader does not have position authority to draw on with these groups. Second, hard tactics are more likely to harm the relationship with the stakeholder. Given that the leader is subject to the senior manager's position power and to the customer's power, these are relationships that the leader is likely to value highly. Therefore, the leader would refrain from using certain hard tactics which may harm the relationship. Finally, legitimating tactics are

unlikely to motivate senior managers and customers to comply with the influence attempt, so this tactic is not likely to be used with these stakeholders.

Hypothesis 10a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics.

Hypothesis 10b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics.

Hypothesis 10c: Senior manager task dependence will be negatively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics.

Hypothesis 10d: Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics.

Pressure. Finally, pressure tactics include demands, threats, and persistent reminders. This can include demands about the time within which work needs to be completed, threats pertaining to one's employment status, and/or frequent personal or electronic reminders about a request. This tactic can be used toward internal and external stakeholders; however research has suggested that the tactic is most commonly used toward subordinates (Yukl et al., 1993). Consistent with this prior research, I argue that leaders who are dependent on subordinates will use pressure tactics. Further, I suggest that leaders may use pressure tactics with all other stakeholders – peers, senior managers, and customers.

When a leader is dependent upon other stakeholders for task work, the leader requires information or support from this group to accomplish his or her work. This could include information that the leader needs to move a project forward or cooperation on a task that enables the leader make progress on an important project. Regardless, the leader needs the assistance of the stakeholder to perform the task responsibilities associated with his or her role. Therefore,

because leaders are unable to complete their work without assistance from these stakeholders, the leader may resort to using this specific hard tactic. Whereas pressure, like the other hard tactics, may have negative consequences, the leader may use this tactic because of the need to complete their own work which is dependent upon the cooperation of others.

Hypothesis 11a: Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics.

Hypothesis 11b: Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics.

Hypothesis 11c: Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics.

Hypothesis 11d: Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics.

Political Skill

The discussion above highlights that influence tactics may be used differentially with each stakeholder group and that the selection of tactics may be based on the level of dependence that the leader has on the target. In addition, it is likely that not all influence tactics will be perceived similarly or in the manner in which the leader intends (Sparrowe et al., 2006). The breadth and variety of influence tactics presented by Yukl et al., (2008) suggests that it requires a high degree of behavioral flexibility and social acumen to be able to influence effectively.

Political skill represents a somewhat new construct that measures this capability in influence situations (Ferris et al., 2005). Political skill is similar to other measures of social skills or social effectiveness, yet other measures of social effectiveness tend to capture more general social skills. Political skill, on the other hand, focuses on the skills necessary to understand others within organizations and use this knowledge to influence others more effectively. Yukl (1981) has argued that "the opportunity to use forms of influence ... depends more on the characteristics of the leader than on the attributes of his position" (p. 24). Yukl (1981) also suggests that a leader needs insight into the motives and perceptions of subordinates to influence effectively. These characteristics are precisely those captured by political skill.

Political skill is defined by Ahearn et al., (2004) as "the ability to effectively understand others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one's personal and/or organizational objectives" (p. 311). Political skill has been introduced as a multi-dimensional construct (Ahearn et al., 2004; Ferris, Treadway, Perrewé, Brouer, Douglas, & Lux, 2007). The first dimension of political skill is social astuteness, and it captures how attuned leaders are to social situations. This is similar to how Pfeffer (1992) conceptualizes sensitivity to others which includes not only self-awareness, but more importantly, awareness of others in

social situations. The second dimension of political skill is interpersonal influence, and it includes the behavioral flexibility required to adapt to various situations to gain desired responses from others. Although the dimension is titled interpersonal influence, the development and validation of the political skill inventory by Ferris and colleagues (2005) found that "political skill is not redundant with influence tactics" (p. 138) as none of the correlations approached a level which would indicate multicollinearity ($r = .09-.25$). The third dimension of political skill is networking ability which includes the ability to develop strong networks and coalitions within the organization, and the fourth dimension is apparent sincerity which includes the ability to be perceived as sincere and genuine. Political skill is presented as a social competence which captures a unique skill that leaders need to effectively influence others (Ferris, Anthony, Kolodinsky, Gilmore, and Harvey, 2002). Therefore, leaders who are highly politically skilled know what to do in social situations; how to behave in a way that disguises any ulterior motive; and how to act in a way that inspires trust and confidence (Ferris et al., 2002).

Relationship to outcomes. Although a relatively new construct, early research has demonstrated that political skill has important relationships with many outcomes. For example, Douglas and Ammeter (2004) used subordinate ratings of leader political skill to assess its relationship with leader effectiveness. In a sample of public school administrators and supervisors, they found that leader political skill predicted ratings of leader effectiveness, even after controlling for leader self-efficacy and leader self-monitoring.

Treadway et al., (2004) explored the relationship that leader political skill has on employee reactions. The authors argued that political skill is an integral competency for leaders in that it can positively impact their subordinate perceptions of organizational support when utilized effectively. They found that leader political skill was related to subordinate perceptions

of organizational support which, in turn, positively impacted the subordinates trust in management and job satisfaction. Further, leader political skill was negatively related to subordinate organizational cynicism.

In a team setting, Ahearn et al., (2004) investigated whether leaders with high political skill had higher team performance. They argued that leaders with high political skill would be better able to manage team member interpersonal needs and allow team members to participate in team management responsibilities. They studied casework teams in a state child welfare system and found that leader political skill explained a significant proportion of the variance in the performance of the casework teams.

Kolodinsky, Treadway, and Ferris (2007) examined the use of political skill in a sample of university employees. They found that political skill was related to the use of rational influence tactics. Further, the leader's political skill moderated the relationship between the use of rational influence tactics and both supervisor liking of subordinates and the perceived similarity between the supervisor and the subordinate. The results also demonstrated that supervisor liking and perceptions of similarity were positively related to ratings of task and contextual performance.

Gentry, Gilmore, Shuffler, and Leslie (2012) explored whether political skill was related to promotability in managers from several countries around the world. They suggested that political skill was critically important to leaders given the inherently political environment of organizations. They found that political skill was related to ratings of promotability from subordinates, supervisors, and peers.

Additional empirical evidence. Given the growing interest in social effectiveness constructs that have been proposed as important for leadership, Semadar, Robins, and Ferris

(2006) engaged in a study to compare several of these constructs. They explored the relative effectiveness of political skill, self-monitoring, leadership self-efficacy, and emotional intelligence in the prediction of leader job performance. The results were quite interesting. First, self-monitoring was the only variable which was not a significant predictor of leader performance. Further, when all variables were included in a regression model, "only political skill provided significant unique contribution to job performance" (Semadar et al., 2006, p. 454). In fact, political skill was the only variable that provided significant incremental validity over the other three variables.

Further, Bing, Davison, Minor and Novicevic (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of political skill and its relationship to task and contextual performance. Using data from 17 published and unpublished studies, they found that political skill was significantly related to both task and contextual performance. In fact, the average corrected correlation between political skill and contextual performance was higher than that for political skill and task performance ($r_c = .26$ vs. $r_c = .19$). Additionally, they conducted moderator analyses and found that political skill had stronger relationships with task performance ratings as the social demands of the job increased.

Political skill as a moderator. Whereas the research above has primarily examined political skill as a main effect, there are reasons to suggest political skill may have a moderating effect as well. First, scholars have consistently noted that interpersonal skills are critical for leaders to perform well in their roles because these skills relate to interacting with others (e.g., Mumford et al., 2007). Political skill is an example of an interpersonal skill that specifically assesses the extent to which a leader is aware of the social environment. As prior research has demonstrated, the outcome of an influence request is partly determined by how appealing the request is to the target (e.g., Yukl et al., 1996). Therefore, to the extent that the leader can

accurately assess the social motives of the target (a quality of a leader with high political skill), the influence attempt will be more successful. In addition, research has demonstrated that the choice of influence tactics, the choice of tactic combinations, and the sequencing of tactics can have important consequences for the intended results (Yukl et al., 1993). A leader with high political skill is more likely to be able to accurately assess which tactic is appropriate based on social cues.

Further, the level of transparency and sincerity in an influence attempt has been identified as important moderator of influence tactics (Gordon, 1996). Several of the soft influence tactics in this study involve behaviors which require sincerity to be used effectively. For example, a leader with high political skill will be more effective in using ingratiation, inspirational appeals, and personal appeals because the leader is able to sincerely communicate flattery, inspire the target to action, or appeal to a genuine friendship. A leader low in political skill using these same tactics could be perceived as disingenuous or may not be able to truly inspire the target which would make the influence attempt less effective. In addition, pressure tactics may be more effective when used by a leader with high political skill because the leader appears sincere in the need to continually remind the target of time demands for a legitimate reason rather than being perceived as aggressive and battering.

Finally, social influence theory argues that those who appear sincere (i.e., highly politically skilled) will be more likely to be effective in influence attempts than those who do not appear sincere in their influence attempts (i.e., low politically skilled; Levy, Collins, & Nail, 1998). Ferris and colleagues (2009) have also noted how the "style of execution demonstrates a major impact in how influence efforts are perceived" (Ferris, Liden, Munyon, Summers, Basik, & Buckley, 2009, p. 1393). They argue that individuals high in political skill have the ability to

adapt their behavior to situations in a way that instills trust and sways the responses to influence attempts in others.

Harris, Kacmar, Zivnuska, and Shaw (2007) examined political skill as a moderator between impression management tactics and ratings of leader performance. The authors examined five impression management tactics including intimidation, exemplification, ingratiation, self-promotion, and supplication. Their findings demonstrated that among managers who used impression management techniques, highly political skilled managers received better ratings of performance than did their less politically skilled counterparts.

Also, Witt and Ferris (2003) examined social skill as a moderator of the relationship between conscientiousness and performance. In their study, social skill was defined as "interpersonal perceptiveness and the capacity to adjust one's behavior to different and changing situational demands" (p. 811). This definition and the measurement of social skill in their study (which including several items from the political skill measure) was very similar to the definition of political skill. The study found that social skill moderated the relationship between conscientiousness and performance such that job performance ratings were higher for employees who had high social skill versus those that had low social skill.

Finally, Brouer, Harris, and Kacmar (2011) examined the moderating effect of leader and subordinate political skill on the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and several outcomes including job satisfaction, job performance, and commitment. They argued that the negative effects of high perceptions levels of organizational politics would be moderated (i.e., weakened) in individuals with high levels of political skill. Brouer and colleagues found only support for the three-way interaction which suggested that when perceptions of

organizational politics were high, job performance and commitment was highest when subordinate political skill was low but leader political skill was high.

Based on the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence presented above, a leader's political skill will be presented as a moderator in the relationship between the leader's influence attempt and the outcomes described below.

Leader Outcomes

The outcomes presented in this study will examine both the current performance of the leader and leader viability, which is a forward looking view of how willing the stakeholder is to work with the leader in the future. Each is discussed below.

Leader Performance

There has been a diverse set of criteria used to evaluate leader performance in prior research. Some scholars have argued that an appropriate measure of leader performance is a measure of the leader's group performance or how well the leader's subordinates perform on a particular task (Yukl & Van Fleet, 1990). Other research has examined objective performance data (e.g., sales growth, productivity), affective responses to the leader (e.g., satisfaction with the leader), or the leader's performance in his or her role (e.g., task performance). Indeed, several meta-analyses on leadership have highlighted the divergence in leader performance criteria. For example, Judge and Piccolo (2004) examined transformational and transactional leadership and highlighted follower outcomes (i.e., follower job satisfaction, follower satisfaction with the leader, follower motivation), leader outcomes (i.e., leader job performance, leader effectiveness), and group-level outcomes (i.e., group performance) in these research areas.

These inconsistencies in leader performance criteria have caused scholars to call for a more focused approach to the selection of leader performance criteria (Yukl & Van Fleet, 1990). In this study, leader influence tactics are introduced as an essential part of the leader's role responsibilities; and in fact, other scholars have highlighted the importance of influence in managerial jobs. Drawing from organizational role theory, Dierdorff, Rubin, and Morgeson (2009) have argued that managerial roles have three broad categories of work requirements: conceptual requirements, technical/administrative requirements, and interpersonal requirements.

The interpersonal work role requirements include "interacting, influencing, and leading others" (Dierdorff et al., 2009). Therefore, because influencing is a critical component of a leader's role, the leader's task performance will be the focal measure of behavioral performance in this study. Leader task performance in this context refers to the required aspects of the leader's task work.

Prior research has demonstrated that leaders who use soft and rational influence tactics are more effective in their roles than leaders who use hard influence tactics. For example, soft influence tactics generally involve seeking compliance in a polite or personal manner, and studies have demonstrated two consistent outcomes from the use of soft tactics. First, Yukl and colleagues (2005, 2008) found that there was a positive relationship between target commitment and soft tactics. That is, the target of the influence attempt is more likely to acquiesce to the request (which will enable the leader to accomplish his or her task work). Second, studies have also demonstrated a positive relationship between soft influence tactics and ratings of managerial performance (Yukl et al., 2005; Yukl et al., 2008). Similar patterns of relationships have been found with leaders who use rational influence attempts. Wayne et al., (1997) found a positive relationship between rational influence attempts and managers' performance ratings, and Yukl and colleagues (2005, 2008) found a positive relationship between rational influence attempts and target commitment. Therefore, leaders who use these tactics are more likely to receive higher ratings of task performance.

Conversely, leaders who use hard tactics are likely to receive low ratings of task performance. Hard influence tactics involve assertiveness, demanding behaviors, and pressure. Tepper et al., (1998) found a positive relationship between hard influence tactics and resistance. Similarly, Yukl et al., (2008) found a negative relationship between hard tactics and target

commitment. Therefore, when leaders use hard influence tactics to coordinate the work that they need to complete and they encounter resistance, they will be less effective in their role.

However, given the range of behaviors in the eleven influence tactics discussed in this study, the moderated relationship between influence tactics and leader performance is likely to be complex. I argue that the positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and leader performance will be even stronger for leaders high in political skill. There are several reasons to suggest why this might be the case. First, leaders with high political skill have a better understanding of social interactions and the social context at work (Ferris et al., 2005), and these leaders use this understanding to select the influence tactic that is most likely to be effective given the situation and the motivations of the target. Leaders with low political skill tend to not have this heightened understanding and are more likely to select less effective tactics for the situation or to not select a target which would effectively motivate the target to comply.

In addition, leaders with high political skill have a "convincing personal style" which enables them to be more effective in influence attempts (Ferris et al., 2005, p. 129). The literature on leader influence has identified 11 tactics, and each of these tactics requires a different behavior. Leaders with high political skill have the ability to demonstrate the behavioral flexibility to match the demands of the situation to influence others to meet their goals. Further, leaders with high political skill have developed networks and are able to use these networks to accomplish their tasks (Ferris et al., 2005). Conversely, leaders with low political skill will not have strong social networks to draw from to accomplish their task work so they may be either less effective at the task, or it may take them longer to complete the task.

Finally, leaders with high political skill are perceived as having higher levels of integrity and sincerity, and they are perceived as being more honest. Ferris and colleagues (2005) argue

that this "strikes at the very heart of whether influence attempts will be successful because it focuses on the perceived intentions (i.e., as assessed by the target of influence) of the behavior exhibited" (p. 129). Leaders with high political skill instill trust and confidence with the stakeholders with whom they interact. They appear sincere in their influence attempts, and therefore, others are more likely to acquiesce to the requests. On the other hand, leaders with low political skill may be perceived as having ulterior motives or as being manipulative. This will reduce the willingness of the stakeholder to comply with the request and ultimately inhibit the ability of the leader to accomplish his or her task work. Therefore, given that leaders use influence tactics to accomplish their task work, the leaders with high political skill will be more likely to have success in their soft and rational influence attempts and will subsequently receive higher ratings of performance.

On the other hand, I argue that leaders who use hard tactics will receive negative ratings of performance. This is because their influence attempts will be less effective, and they will be less able to accomplish their work. This is especially true for leaders with low political skill. These leaders will be less effective at selecting the tactic that is best for the situation, and they may not be perceived as credible. Therefore, leaders with low political skill who use hard tactics will receive low ratings of performance. However, leaders who have high political skill and use hard tactics are likely to receive less negative assessments of their performance. In this situation, political skill will act as a buffer to the hard influence tactics. For example, when a leader is facing an important deadline, he or she may use pressure tactics with the stakeholders that are involved in the project. If the leader does not use this tactic frequently or if he or she is able to convey an candid sense of urgency, then the target may be more willing to acquiesce to the influence attempt. This is an example of a leader with high political skill who recognizes the

context and will be more successful in their influence attempts and subsequent role performance in the end. Therefore, the relationship between hard tactics and task performance will be negative, but less negative for leaders high in political skill.

Hypothesis 12: The positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and leader task performance as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and performance will be more positive for leaders high in political skill.

Hypothesis 13: The negative relationship between hard tactics and leader task performance as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the negative relationship between hard tactics and performance will be less negative for leaders high in political skill.

Leader Viability

Given the unique boundary spanning roles that leaders occupy within organizations, they are ideally situated to manage and influence stakeholder groups. They regularly interact with both internal and external stakeholders as part of their role requirements; however, different stakeholder groups may have different perceptions of how well the leader is performing in his or her role. Further, interactions with the leader may affect the stakeholder's willingness to work with the leader in the future. Therefore, the leader's viability in the relationship with the stakeholder will be assessed as a future-focused metric of the leader's performance.

Leader viability assesses the extent to which the stakeholder is willing to work with the leader in the future. In this sense, it captures an affective, forward-focused performance dimension. Leader viability is based on the team viability construct (e.g., Hackman, 1987; Sundstrom et al., 1990). Teams scholars have long recognized that performance and viability are related, but independent, dimensions of team performance (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). For example, in a study of consulting teams, Marrone, Tesluk, and Carson (2007) measured team performance and team viability and found the variables to be only moderately correlated ($r = .38$). They argued that viability assessed the ability to function interdependently in the future whereas team performance represented performance on the team's task. Further, leader viability is distinct from satisfaction with the leader. Many studies have assessed this affective performance dimension as well (e.g., Farh, Podsakoff, & Organ, 1990; Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 2006), yet satisfaction with leadership specifically focuses on whether an individual likes the leader or would speak highly about the leader to others. Leader viability, on the other hand, focuses on whether the experience working with the leader has been positive and whether the individual is interested in working with the leader going forward.

As there is value in capturing the viability of a team, there may also be value in assessing the viability of the leader's working relationships. Given that leaders must interact with a wide variety of stakeholders on an ongoing basis as part of their role responsibilities, the manner in which these interactions occur could influence the future viability of the relationships. Yukl (1999) has explicitly referred to influence processes as "a series of dyadic interactions over time" (p. 287), and he has argued that influence attempts offer an explanation of the attitudes of the stakeholder toward the leader. Thus, if the interactions are rewarding to the stakeholders, then the leader will be perceived as a person with whom the stakeholder wishes to continue to work

with (high leader viability). Conversely, if the interactions are unpleasant, the stakeholder may determine that they are not willing to work with the leader (low leader viability).

Soft influence tactics include behaviors which signal respect for the target (i.e., collaboration, consultation) or which seek to boost the target's the commitment through ingratiation, inspirational, personal appeals, or exchange. Rational tactics involve using logical arguments in an influence attempt. Both of these tactics contribute to maintaining strong working relationships and strengthening the leader's reputation. Therefore, I argue that leaders who engage in soft and rational influence tactics will have high leader viability. In contrast, hard tactics involve behaviors which are often unpleasant for the target. Thus, leaders who engage in hard tactics will have low leader viability.

Yet, there are several reasons why political skill may moderate the relationship between a leader's use of influence tactics and viability. First, a leader's political skill translates how the leader intends the influence tactic to be perceived and the stakeholder's actual evaluation of the interaction. Leaders with high political skill appear more authentic and open (Ferris et al., 2005). Further, leaders with high political skill are better at making people feel comfortable and at ease around them, and they show a genuine interest in others. This ease of interactions and level of personal attention is likely to garner positive affective responses in stakeholders and induce the stakeholder to be more willing to continue to work with the leader. In addition, leaders with high political skill are focused on building relationships. Ingram and Zou (2008) have discussed the significant benefits that can accrue to the careers of those that have business friendships. They argue that these relationships induce strong affective motivations in addition to instrumental motivations to carry on working relationships.

Leaders with low political skill, on the other hand, tend to be more focused on "getting the work done" and they may not sense the social needs of the stakeholder with whom they are interacting. They may not show interest or concern for stakeholders when they are attempting to influence them. Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, and Mount (1998) have suggested that these characteristics can threaten viability and reduce the willingness of individuals to work together in the future. Further, leaders with low political skill are more likely to be abrupt and transaction-focused rather than relationship-focused in their influence interactions. This may reduce the leader's viability because of the importance of attending to the social needs of the stakeholder. Numerous scholars have highlighted the important role that leaders play in supporting the social needs of others (e.g., Morgeson, DeRue, & Karam, 2010; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1990). Further, Balkundi and Harrison (2006) have explicitly referred to viability as a "more social and person-related" performance dimension (p. 51). Therefore, the overall relationship between influence tactics and leader viability is likely to be stronger for leaders with high political skill than for leaders with low political skill.

Further, I argue that the relationship specifically between soft and rational influence tactics and leader viability will likely be stronger for leaders with high political skill. Leaders with high political skill are more likely to be embedded in and have an appreciation for the value of social networks in an organization. They are likely to be able to sincerely convey to others that they value their relationship. Therefore, leaders high in political skill will be less likely to engage in tactics which will cause conflict which would reduce viability (Balkundi & Harrison, 2006). Given that viability is primarily an affective outcome, stakeholders are more likely to be willing to continue to work with leaders who use soft and rational tactics and who have high political skill.

Conversely, the relationship between hard influence tactics and leader viability is likely to be negative. However, the relationship between the use of hard influence tactics and leader viability will likely be less negative for leaders high in political skill. Leaders with high political skill are more likely to recognize when it is appropriate to use a negative tactic based on the characteristics of the target and the environment. Given that hard influence tactics tend to make people feel pressure and less committed to the request, leaders with high political skill are likely to use these tactics sparingly. Therefore, stakeholders will have less negative perceptions of leaders high in political skill who use hard influence tactics.

Hypothesis 14: The positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and leader viability as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and viability will be more positive for leaders high in political skill.

Hypothesis 15: The negative relationship between hard tactics and leader viability as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the negative relationship between hard tactics and viability will be less negative for leaders high in political skill.³

³ Table 5 presents a summary of the hypotheses in this study.

Method

Research Setting and Sample

Because the dependence relationship between the leader and the stakeholder groups is a critical component of my model, it is important that the sample include leaders who interact with a broad set of internal and external stakeholders on a regular basis to accomplish their task work. Therefore, I tested the hypotheses above in a field sample of leaders from a medium-size bank headquartered in the Midwest. The leaders are well-suited for this study because they hold positions which work together frequently with all of the stakeholder groups identified in the study. The average age of the leaders is 46.28 years ($SD = 10.59$ years). The leaders average 14.93 years of work experience with their organization ($SD = 12.21$ years) and 7.66 years of work experience in their current position ($SD = 7.37$ years). In terms of highest educational achievement, 25.0 percent of the leaders have a high school diploma; 37.5 percent have attended some college; 10.0 percent have an associates degree; 25.0 percent have a bachelors degree; and 2.5 percent have a masters degree. The leader sample is 84.2 percent female. There were 120 leader responses.

The sample also included subordinates, peer co-workers, senior managers, and customers of the focal leaders. The average age of the subordinates is 36.63 years ($SD = 13.35$ years). The subordinates average 6.69 ($SD = 6.88$) years of work experience with their organization and 4.19 years in their current position ($SD = 4.63$ years). In terms of highest educational achievement, .2 percent of the subordinates have some high school education; 29.0 percent have a high school diploma; 41.5 percent have attended some college; 14.4 percent have an associates degree; 13.1 percent have a bachelors degree; 1.1 percent have a masters degree; and .2 percent have a doctorate. The subordinate sample is 94.0 percent female, and the subordinates have worked with

their leader for an average of 3.30 years ($SD = 3.77$). There were 612 subordinate responses for 130 leaders for an average of 4.71 subordinate respondents per leader.

The average age of the peer co-workers is 45.93 years ($SD = 10.52$ years). The peer co-workers average 15.50 years of work experience with the organization ($SD = 11.85$) and 7.20 years in their current position ($SD = 6.85$ years). In terms of educational achievement, .5 percent of the peers have some high school education; 22.8 percent have a high school diploma; 33.7 percent have attended some college; 9.2 percent have an associates degree; 28.8 percent have a bachelors degree; and 3.8 percent have a masters degree. The peer sample is 75.5 percent female, and the peers have worked with their leader for an average of 6.81 years ($SD = 7.52$). There were 184 peer respondents who provided 303 survey responses for 108 leaders (i.e., some peers responded to the survey for multiple leaders). The average was 2.81 peer respondents per leader.

The average age of the senior managers is 52.82 years ($SD = 3.94$ years). The senior managers average 17.52 years of work experience with the organization ($SD = 13.66$) and 6.56 years in their current position ($SD = 7.22$ years). In terms of educational achievement, 12.5 percent have a high school diploma; 37.5 percent have attended some college; 12.5 percent have an associates degree; 25.0 percent have a bachelors degree; and 12.5 percent have a masters degree. The senior manager sample is 87.5 percent female, and the senior managers have worked with the leaders for an average of 3.09 years ($SD = 4.34$). The eight senior managers provided survey responses for 130 leaders. The average was 16.25 leader respondents per senior manager.

The average age of the customers is 51.96 years ($SD = 13.43$), and they have been customers of the bank for an average of 15.62 years ($SD = 12.77$). In terms of educational achievement, 1.4 percent have some high school education; 23.1 percent have a high school diploma; 26.5 percent have attended some college; 12.2 percent have an associates degree; 19.7

percent have a bachelors degree; 14.3 percent have a masters degree; and 2.0 percent have a doctorate. The customer sample is 54.1 percent female, and the customers have worked with the leaders for an average of 6.20 years ($SD = 6.65$). There were 150 customer responses for 69 leaders for an average of 2.17 customer respondents per leader.

Procedure

This research was conducted in two phases (summarized in Table 6).⁴ The first phase began with the focal leaders receiving an email link to a web-based survey. The survey was open for two weeks, and it included the control variables and relevant constructs from the focal leader. In addition, the leader was asked to supply the name of: (a) his or her senior manager; (b) 3-5 subordinates with whom the leader interacted regularly for task-related work; (c) 3-5 peer co-workers with whom the leader interacted regularly for task-related work; and (d) 3-5 customers with whom the leader interacted regularly for task-related work. After supplying the contact information for each stakeholder, the leader responded to measures which assess the dependence that the leader has on that particular stakeholder and the interaction frequency with each stakeholder. Finally, the leader completed scales which assessed political skill, self-monitoring, and the leader's relationship quality with his or her senior manager. The full leader survey can be found in Appendix E.

Following the leader survey period, the second phase of the data collection began. In this phase, subordinates and peers received an email link to a web-based survey. I conducted individual meetings in-person with the senior managers, and customers received a paper survey from the organization. Instructions asked that the survey be completed within a two week

⁴ All research participants indicated voluntary participation by signing an acknowledgment of informed consent (see Appendix C). In addition, all surveys were preceded by an introduction (see Appendix D).

timeframe. The subordinate survey included the control variables, leader influence tactics, leader dependence (i.e., the subordinate's level of task dependence on the leader), leader political skill, relationship quality with the leader, leader task performance, and leader viability. The full subordinate survey can be found in Appendix F. The peer survey included control variables, leader influence tactics, leader dependence (i.e., the peer's level of task dependence on the leader), relationship quality with the leader, leader task performance, and leader viability. The full peer survey can be found in Appendix G. The senior manager survey included control variables, six influence tactics (i.e., consultation, inspirational appeal, rational persuasion, coalition, legitimating, and pressure) via shortened scales, leader task performance, and leader viability. The full senior manager survey can be found in Appendix H. Finally, the customer survey included control variables, leader influence tactics, relationship quality with the leader, leader task performance, and leader viability. The full customer survey can be found in Appendix I.

Leader Survey

All variables were collected via a web-based survey. The control variables included the leader's age, gender, educational level, years of work experience with the organization, and years of experience in current position. In all surveys, gender was coded such that 1= male and 2= female, and educational level was coded such that 1 = some high school, 2 = high school graduate, 3 = some college, 4 = associates degree, 5 = bachelors degree, 6 = masters degree, and 7 = doctoral degree. In addition, an item measuring interaction frequency was assessed for all stakeholders. All other measures have been previously validated and have demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliabilities in prior studies.

Stakeholder dependence. Stakeholder dependence was assessed using five modified items from the Pearce & Gregersen (1991) reciprocal interdependence scale. The scale was modified to remove items focused on interdependence and to reflect the dependence on stakeholders in this study. Sample items include “I work closely with [*name of subordinate/peer/senior manager/customer*] in doing my work”; “I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [*name of subordinate/peer/senior manager/customer*]”; and “My own performance is dependent on *receiving* accurate information from [*name of subordinate/peer/senior manager/customer*].” This scale has demonstrated acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .76$), and internal consistency reliability in the current study for subordinate task dependence ranged from $\alpha = .82$ -.90; peer task dependence ranged from $\alpha = .78$ -.87; senior manager task dependence was $\alpha = .82$; and customer task dependence ranged from $\alpha = .84$ -.90.

Political skill. Political skill was assessed using the 18-item measure of political skill developed by Ferris et al., (2005). The scale captures four dimensions of political skill which include networking ability, interpersonal influence, social astuteness, and apparent sincerity. Sample items include “I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others”; “I am able to communicate easily and effectively with others”; and “I try to show a genuine interest in other people.” This scale has demonstrated acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .89$ -.90), and internal consistency reliability in the current study is $\alpha = .89$.

Self-monitoring. Self-monitoring was assessed using the 18-item measure of self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Sample items include "I can only argue for ideas which I already believe"; " I would probably make a good actor"; and "I'm not always the person I appear to be." Internal consistency reliability in the current study was $\alpha = .73$.

Relationship quality. Relationship quality was assessed using a modified version of the 12-item measure of leader-member exchange (Liden & Maslyn, 1998). The scale captures four dimensions of relationship quality including affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect. Sample items include "I like [*name of senior manager*] very much as a person"; "[*Name of senior manager*] would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by others"; and "I am impressed with [*name of senior manager*]'s knowledge of his/her job." Internal consistency reliability in the current study was $\alpha = .90$.

Subordinate Survey

All variables for the subordinate were collected via a web-based survey. The control variables included the subordinate's age, gender, educational level, years of work experience with the organization, years of experience in current position, and years of experience with the leader. Also, an item measuring the subordinate's perception of interaction frequency with the leader was included. All other measures have been previously validated and have demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliabilities in prior studies.

Leader influence tactics. Leader influence tactics were assessed using the 44-item Target IBQ-G (Yukl et al., 2008). The scale includes four items to assess each of the eleven influence tactics. Sample items include "[*Name of leader*] uses facts and logic to make a persuasive case for a request or proposal"; "[*Name of leader*] offers something you want in return for your help on a task or project"; "[*Name of leader*] says that his/her request or proposal is consistent with official rules and policies"; and "[*Name of leader*] explains how the task he/she wants you to do could help your career." The scale has demonstrated acceptable reliability in previous studies (collaboration $\alpha = .70-.92$; consultation $\alpha = .77-.90$; exchange $\alpha = .83-.94$; ingratiation $\alpha = .85-.93$; inspirational appeal $\alpha = .85-.89$; personal appeals $\alpha = .81-.92$; apprising

$\alpha = .87-.92$; rational persuasion $\alpha = .73-.91$; coalition $\alpha = .65-.86$; legitimating $\alpha = .84-.92$; and pressure $\alpha = .82-.87$). Internal consistency reliabilities from the subordinate responses in the current study were: collaboration $\alpha = .94$; consultation $\alpha = .94$; exchange $\alpha = .95$; ingratiation $\alpha = .92$; inspirational appeal $\alpha = .92$; personal appeals $\alpha = .87$; apprising $\alpha = .94$; rational persuasion $\alpha = .92$; coalition $\alpha = .89$; legitimating $\alpha = .92$; and pressure $\alpha = .86$.

Leader political skill. The leader's political skill was assessed from the perspective of the subordinate using the same 18-item measure of political skill developed by Ferris et al., (2005) as described above. Sample items include “[*Name of leader*] spends a lot of time and effort at work networking with others”; “[*Name of leader*] is able to communicate easily and effectively with others”; and “[*Name of leader*] tries to show a genuine interest in other people.” Internal consistency reliability in the current study is $\alpha = .96$.

Leader dependence. Leader dependence (i.e., the subordinate's task dependence on the leader) was assessed using the same five modified items from the Pearce & Gregersen (1991) reciprocal interdependence scale (described above). Internal consistency reliability for leader task dependence from subordinates was $\alpha = .86$.

Relationship quality. The subordinate's perception of relationship quality with the leader was assessed using a modified version of the 12-item measure of leader-member exchange (Liden & Maslyn, 1998). The scale captures four dimensions of relationship quality including affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect. Sample items include "I like [*name of leader*] very much as a person"; "[*Name of leader*] would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by others"; and "I am impressed with my [*name of leader*]'s knowledge of his/her job." Internal consistency reliability was $\alpha = .91$.

Leader task performance. Leader task performance using a four-item measure (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009). Sample items include "The overall level of performance that I have observed for [*name of leader*] is outstanding"; and "My personal view of [*name of leader*] is that he or she is very effective." Internal consistency reliability from the subordinate responses in the current study was $\alpha = .93$.

Leader viability. Leader viability was assessed using a modified version of the 3-item team viability scale (Marrone et al., 2007). The scale was modified to change the referent from "team members" to the name of the focal leader. Items include "I have found working with [*this leader*] to be a very satisfying experience"; "I feel like I am learning a great deal by working with [*this leader*]"; and "I would welcome the opportunity to work with [*this leader*] again in the future." This scale has demonstrated acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .81$), and internal consistency reliability from subordinate responses in the current study was $\alpha = .94$.

Peer Survey

All variables for the peer were collected via a web-based survey. The control variables included the peer's age, gender, educational level, years of work experience with the organization, years of experience in current position, and years of experience with the leader. Also, an item measuring the peer's perception of interaction frequency with the leader was included. All other measures have been previously validated and have demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliabilities in prior studies.

Leader influence tactics. Leader influence tactics were assessed using the same 44-items from the Target IBQ-G (Yukl et al., 2008). Internal consistency reliabilities from the peer responses in the current study were: collaboration $\alpha = .94$; consultation $\alpha = .94$; exchange $\alpha =$

.95; ingratiation $\alpha = .95$; inspirational appeal $\alpha = .94$; personal appeals $\alpha = .93$; apprising $\alpha = .94$; rational persuasion $\alpha = .92$; coalition $\alpha = .91$; legitimating $\alpha = .95$; and pressure $\alpha = .89$.

Leader dependence. Leader dependence (i.e., the peer's task dependence on the leader) was assessed using the same five modified items from the Pearce & Gregersen (1991) reciprocal interdependence scale (described above). Internal consistency reliability for leader task dependence from peers was $\alpha = .91$.

Relationship quality. The peer's perception of relationship quality with the leader was assessed using the same modified version of the 12-item measure of leader-member exchange (Liden & Maslyn, 1998). Internal consistency reliability was $\alpha = .89$.

Leader task performance. Leader task performance using the same four-item measure described above (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009). Internal consistency reliability from the peer responses was $\alpha = .89$.

Leader viability. Leader viability was assessed using the modified version of the 3-item team viability scale describe above (Marrone et al., 2007). Internal consistency reliability from the peer responses was $\alpha = .83$.

Senior Manager Survey

There were eight senior managers in the organization, and I conducted individual meetings with each of them to administer their survey. The senior manager survey included the following control variables: age, gender, educational level, years of work experience with the organization, years of experience in current position, and years of experience with the leader.

Leader influence tactics. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, six of the eleven leader influence tactics were assessed using selected items from the Target IBQ-G (Yukl et al., 2008). The influence tactics included consultation (using original scale items 1, 2, and 3),

inspirational appeals (using original scale items 1, 2, and 3), rational persuasion (using original scale items 1, 2, and 4), coalition (using original scale items 1, 2, and 3), legitimating (using original scale items 1, 3, and 4), and pressure (using original scale items 1, 3, and 4). Internal consistency reliabilities from the senior manager responses in the current study were: consultation $\alpha = .86$; inspirational appeal $\alpha = .88$; rational persuasion $\alpha = .84$; coalition $\alpha = .58$; legitimating $\alpha = .83$; and pressure $\alpha = .58$.

Leader task performance. Leader task performance using the same four-item measure described above (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009). Internal consistency reliability from the senior manager responses was $\alpha = .89$.

Leader viability. Leader viability was assessed using the modified version of the 3-item team viability scale describe above (Marrone et al., 2007). Internal consistency reliability from the senior manager responses was $\alpha = .80$.

Customer Survey

This study was among the first to assess leader influence tactics from external stakeholders. Specifically, the study examined customers with whom the focal leader regularly interacted for task-related work. Given the nature of the organizational setting, it was necessary to take precautions to protect the confidentiality of the customer information. Therefore, the organization delivered paper surveys to the customers. The surveys were accompanied with a letter from the organization describing the nature of the study, and the customers were asked to return the completed surveys in a postage-paid envelope to Michigan State University.

The customer control variables included age, gender, educational level, years as a customer of the organization, and years of experience with the leader. Further, an item measuring the customer's perception of interaction frequency with the leader was included.

Leader influence tactics. Leader influence tactics were assessed using the same 44-items from the Target IBQ-G (Yukl et al., 2008). Internal consistency reliabilities from the customer responses in the current study were: collaboration $\alpha = .94$; consultation $\alpha = .94$; exchange $\alpha = .97$; ingratiation $\alpha = .94$; inspirational appeal $\alpha = .91$; personal appeals $\alpha = .91$; apprising $\alpha = .91$; rational persuasion $\alpha = .94$; coalition $\alpha = .86$; legitimating $\alpha = .95$; and pressure $\alpha = .83$.

Relationship quality. The customer's perception of relationship quality with the leader was assessed using the affect and professional respect dimensions of the leader-member exchange (Liden & Maslyn, 1998). Internal consistency reliability was $\alpha = .93$.

Leader task performance. Leader task performance using the same four-item measure described above (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Ilies, 2009). Internal consistency reliability from the customer responses was $\alpha = .93$.

Leader viability. Leader viability was assessed using the modified version of the 3-item team viability scale describe above (Marrone et al., 2007). Internal consistency reliability from the customerresponses was $\alpha = .81$.

Data Analysis

To test the hypothesized main effects (i.e., hypotheses 1-11), I examined the correlations between the variables of interest.

To test the moderation hypotheses (i.e., hypotheses 12-15), I used two-level hierarchical linear models (HLM; Raudenbush & Byrk, 2002). HLM is an statistical technique that allows for analysis when there is nesting of study participants. In this study, the stakeholders are nested within leaders, and the leaders are nested within senior managers. Therefore, four HLM models were conducted. In the first model, the level 1 variables included subordinate characteristics, and the level 2 variables included the leader characteristics. In the second model, the level 1 variables included the peer characteristics, and the level 2 variables included the leader characteristics. In the third model, the level 1 variables included the leader characteristics, and the level 2 variables included the senior manager characteristics. In the fourth model, the level 1 variables included the customer characteristics, and the level 2 variables included the leader characteristics. I used group centering of the predictor variables to remove concerns related to multicollinearity and to allow for an examination of between leader variance (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998; Raudenbush & Byrk, 2002). Finally, given that the average number of raters per leader in each stakeholder group is small, I used **random effects** multilevel models (Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, & Kashy, 2002).

Factor Analysis

To determine if there are a smaller set of influence tactics than those introduced by Yukl et al. (2008), I conducted exploratory factor analyses (EFA) by stakeholder group. The factor analyses were conducted using a principal components analysis with varimax rotation. Eigenvalues greater than one were regarded as indication of component factors (Kaiser, 1960).

The EFA from the subordinate stakeholder group yielded a ten-factor solution – only the items for rational persuasion and inspirational appeal loaded on the same factor (see Table 7). The EFA from the peer stakeholder group also yielded a ten-factor solution. Here, the items for collaboration and consultation loaded on the same factor (see Table 8). The senior manager EFA (which only contained items for six influence tactics) resulted in a five-factor solution with rational persuasion and inspirational appeal items loading on the same factor. Also, there was some cross-loading of pressure and coalition items with the legitimating items (see Table 9). Finally, the EFA from the customer stakeholder group yielded an eight-factor solution. The items for collaboration, ingratiation, and consultation loaded on the same factor, and the items for rational persuasion and inspirational appeal loaded on the same factor (see Table 10). The results from these analyses did not support a clear, highly differentiated alternative solution. Therefore, I retained the original influence tactic classification because the theory underlying the original classification is more compelling.

Control Variables

Prior research has demonstrated that a variety of demographic variables are used as controls in studies of leader influence. These variables include age (e.g., Cable & Judge, 2003), gender (e.g., Sparrowe et al., 2006), education (e.g., Thacker & Wayne, 1995), dyadic tenure (e.g., Sparrowe & Liden, 2005), and organizational tenure (e.g., Cable & Judge, 2003; Thacker & Wayne, 1995). Therefore, the following variables were used as controls in the HLM analyses: leader and stakeholder age, gender, education, position tenure, organizational tenure and dyadic tenure.

Results

Scale means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the study variables are provided in Table 7. This data is repeated and separated by stakeholder group in Table 90 (leader and subordinate variables), Table 91 (leader and peer variables), Table 92 (leader and senior manager variables), and Table 93 (leader and customer variables).

Hypotheses 1-11 (Stakeholder Dependence)

Hypotheses 1-11 concerned predictions regarding stakeholder dependence and the use of influence tactics. Yukl's (1999) theory on influence tactics explicitly describes influence in terms of dyadic interactions. That is, a leader uses influence with a specific individual. Therefore, the leader data was collected in a manner in which the leader identified individuals within each stakeholder group in response to the dependence scale. Specifically, leaders were asked to list three to five individuals within each of the subordinate, peer, and customer stakeholder groups. The instructions stated that the names listed should include both those with whom the leader regularly interacted for completing his or her task work and a diverse set of individuals who assist with the responsibilities related to the leader's position (see Appendix E for complete instructions). Then, the leaders responded to the task dependence scale for each individual listed. This data is represented in Table 7 as leader task dependence on (a) subordinates A-E; (b) peers A-E; (c) senior manager; and (d) customers A-E. The sample sizes for each of these responses vary given the structure of the survey, and this is also noted in Table 7. The results for the hypotheses will be discussed in this manner – allowing for examinations of dependencies on specific individuals that may exist within stakeholders groups.

Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics with subordinates, peers, and senior

managers whereas stakeholder dependence would be negatively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics with customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, hypothesis 1c was not tested. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of collaboration tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of collaboration tactics with peers; and was not related to the use of collaboration tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was not supported.

Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of consultation tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of consultation tactics with peers; was not related to the use of consultation tactics with senior managers; and was not related to the use of consultation tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, hypothesis 3c was not tested. As illustrated in Table 7 stakeholder dependence was negatively related to the use of exchange tactics with subordinate B ($r = -.22; p < .05$); was not related to the use of exchange tactics with peers; and was not related to the use of exchange tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, hypothesis 4c was not

tested. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of ingratiation tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of ingratiation tactics with peers; and was not related to the use of ingratiation tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 4 was not supported.

Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of inspirational appeals tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of inspirational appeals tactics with peers; was not related to the use of inspirational appeals tactics with senior managers; and was not related to the use of inspirational appeals tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 5 was not supported.

Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, hypothesis 6c was not tested. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of personal appeals tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of personal appeals tactics with peers; and was not related to the use of personal appeals tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 6 was not supported.

Hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 7a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of apprising influence tactics with subordinates, peers, and senior managers whereas stakeholder dependence would be negatively related to the use of apprising influence tactics with customers. Due to the length of the senior manager survey, hypothesis 7c was not tested. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of

apprising tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of apprising tactics with peers; and was not related to the use of apprising tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 7 was not supported.

Hypothesis 8. Hypothesis 8a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of rational persuasion tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of rational persuasion tactics with peers; was not related to the use of rational persuasion tactics with senior managers; and was not related to the use of rational persuasion tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 8 was not supported.

Hypothesis 9. Hypothesis 9a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be negatively related to the use of coalition influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of coalition tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of coalition tactics with peers; was not related to the use of coalition tactics with senior managers; and was not related to the use of coalition tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 9 was not supported.

Hypothesis 10. Hypothesis 10a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics with subordinates and peers and negatively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics with senior managers and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was not related to the use of legitimating tactics with subordinates; was not related to the use of legitimating tactics with peers; was negatively related to the use of legitimating tactics with senior managers ($r = -.23$; $p <$

.05); and was not related to the use of legitimating tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 10 was partially supported.

Hypothesis 11. Hypothesis 11a-d predicted that stakeholder dependence would be positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics with subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. As illustrated in Table 7, stakeholder dependence was negatively related to the use of pressure tactics with subordinate C ($r = -.20; p < .05$); was positively related to the use of pressure tactics with peer D ($r = .50; p < .05$); was negatively related to the use of pressure tactics with senior managers ($r = -.22; p < .05$); and was not related to the use of pressure tactics with customers. Therefore, hypothesis 11 was partially supported.

Hypotheses 12-15 (Political Skill Moderation)

The final four hypotheses (hypotheses 12-15) predicted that political skill would moderate the relationship between the use of influence tactics and leader outcomes. HLM results are described below.

Hypothesis 12

Hypothesis 12 predicted that the positive relationship between the leader's use of soft and rational influence tactics and leader task performance would be moderated by political skill such that the positive relationship would be more positive for leaders high in political skill.

Hypothesis 12a (Subordinate stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 8, and with regard to subordinate stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .03, ns$). Figure 2 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 9, the consultation-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.20, p < .05$). Figure 3 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below

the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill and suggests that the consultation-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 10, the exchange-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.27, p < .05$). Figure 4 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political skill and suggests that the exchange-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 11, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.15, ns$). Figure 5 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 12, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.19, ns$). Figure 6 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 13, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .04, ns$). Figure 7 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 14, the appraising-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .00, ns$). Figure 8 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the

centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 15, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was non-significant. Figure 9 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 12a was not supported.

Hypothesis 12b (Peer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 16, and with regard to peer stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.10, ns$). Figure 10 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 17, the consultation-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.02, ns$). Figure 11 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 18, the exchange-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.05, ns$). Figure 12 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 19, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .04, ns$). Figure 13 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 20, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.10$, *ns*). Figure 14 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 21, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.15$, *ns*). Figure 15 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 22, the apprising-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.02$, *ns*). Figure 16 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 23 the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.11$, *ns*). Figure 17 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 12b was not supported.

Hypothesis 12c (Senior manager stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 24, the consultation-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .21$, *ns*). Figure 18 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 25, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .07$, *ns*). Figure 19 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below

the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 26, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .16$, *ns*). Figure 20 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 12c was not supported.

Hypothesis 12d (Customer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 27, and with regard to customer stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.14$, *ns*). Figure 21 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 28, the consultation-political skill interaction term was non-significant. Figure 22 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 29, the exchange-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.07$, *ns*). Figure 23 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 30, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.26$, $p < .05$). Figure 24 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill and suggests that the ingratiation-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 31, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.12$, *ns*). Figure 25 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 32, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.02$, *ns*). Figure 26 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 33, the apprising-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.08$, *ns*). Figure 27 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 34 the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.11$, *ns*). Figure 28 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 12d was not supported.

To summarize, hypothesis 12 received no support. In fact, there were two models with the subordinate stakeholders where high levels of political skill weakened the relationship between use of an influence tactic and task performance (i.e., consultation, exchange). Similarly, there was one model with customer stakeholders where high levels of political skill weakened the relationship between influence tactics and task performance (i.e., ingratiation). These findings contradicted the hypothesized effects.

Hypothesis 13

Hypothesis 13 predicted that the negative relationship between a leader's use of hard influence tactics and leader task performance would be moderated by political skill such that the negative relationship would be less negative for leaders high in political skill.

Hypothesis 13a (Subordinate stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 35, the coalition tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.04$, *ns*). Figure 29 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 36, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.23$, $p < .05$). Figure 30 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and political skill and suggests that the legitimating tactics-leader task performance relationship is stronger when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 37, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.14$, *ns*). Figure 31 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 13a was not supported.

Hypothesis 13b (Peer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 38, the coalition tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.18$, *ns*). Figure 32 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 39, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.07$, *ns*). Figure 33 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 40, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.41$, *ns*). Figure 34 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 13b was not supported.

Hypothesis 13c (Senior manager stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 41, the coalition tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant. Figure 35 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 42, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .03$, *ns*). Figure 36 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 43, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .29$, *ns*). Figure 37 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 13c was not supported.

Hypothesis 13d (Customer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 44, the coalition tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .09$, *ns*). Figure 38 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 45, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.14$, *ns*). Figure 39 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 46, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .43$, *ns*). Figure 40 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 13d was not supported.

To summarize, hypothesis 13 was not supported. Further, the legitimating-political skill model with subordinate stakeholders indicated that high levels of political skill strengthened the negative relationship between influence tactics and task performance. This finding contradicted the hypothesized effect.

Hypothesis 14

Hypothesis 14 predicted that the positive relationship between the leader's use of soft and rational influence tactics and leader viability would be moderated by political skill such that the relationship would be more positive for leaders high in political skill.

Hypothesis 14a (Subordinate stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 47, and with regard to subordinate stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant

($\gamma' = -.02$, *ns*). Figure 41 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 48, the consultation-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.11$, *ns*). Figure 42 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 49, the exchange-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.15$, *ns*). Figure 43 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 50, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.07$, *ns*). Figure 44 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 51, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.08$, *ns*). Figure 45 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 52, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .02$, *ns*). Figure 46 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 53, the apprising-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .05$, *ns*). Figure 47 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 54, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.14$, *ns*). Figure 48 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 14a was not supported.

Hypothesis 14b (Peer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 55, and with regard to peer stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.12$, *ns*). Figure 49 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 56, the consultation-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.02$, *ns*). Figure 50 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 57, the exchange-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.13$, *ns*). Figure 51 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 58, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .05$, *ns*). Figure 52 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the

centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 59, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.13$, *ns*). Figure 53 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 60, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was non-significant. Figure 54 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 61, the appraising-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.02$, *ns*). Figure 55 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of appraising and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 62, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.11$, *ns*). Figure 56 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 14b was not supported.

Hypothesis 14c (Senior manager stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 63, the consultation-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .17$, *ns*). Figure 57 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 64, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .20$, *ns*). Figure 58 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 65, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .24$, *ns*). Figure 59 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 14c was not supported.

Hypothesis 14d (Customer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 66, and with regard to senior manager stakeholders, the collaboration-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.16$, $p < .05$). Figure 60 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill and suggests that the collaboration-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 67, the consultation-political skill interaction term was non-significant. Figure 61 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 68 the exchange-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.17$, $p < .05$). Figure 62 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and political skill and suggests that the exchange-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 69, the ingratiation-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.28, p < .01$). Figure 63 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill and suggests that the ingratiation-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 70, the inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.24, p < .05$). Figure 64 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 71, the personal appeals-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.02, ns$). Figure 65 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of personal appeals and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 72, the appraising-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.15, ns$). Figure 66 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of appraising and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 73, the rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.23, p < .05$). Figure 67 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

Therefore, hypothesis 14d was not supported.

To summarize, hypothesis 14 received no support. Further, in five of the models with customer stakeholders, high levels of political skill weakened the relationship between the use of an influence tactic and viability. This occurred with collaboration, exchange, ingratiation, inspirational appeal, and rational persuasion influence tactics.

Hypothesis 15

Hypothesis 15 predicted that the negative relationship between a leader's use of hard influence tactics and leader viability would be moderated by political skill such that the negative relationship would be less negative for leaders high in political skill.

Hypothesis 15a (Subordinate stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 74, the coalition tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.04$, *ns*). Figure 68 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 75, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.23$, $p < .05$). Figure 69 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and political skill and suggests that the legitimating tactics-leader viability relationship is stronger when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 76, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.21$, *ns*). Figure 70 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 15a was not supported.

Hypothesis 15b (Peer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 77, the coalition tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.18$, *ns*). Figure 71 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 78, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.07$, *ns*). Figure 72 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 79, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.26$, *ns*). Figure 73 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 15b was not supported.

Hypothesis 15c (Senior manager stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 80, the coalition tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.01$, *ns*). Figure 74 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 81 the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .06$, *ns*). Figure 75 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 82, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = .42$, *ns*). Figure 76 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the

centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 15c was not supported.

Hypothesis 15d (Customer stakeholders). As illustrated in Table 83, the coalition tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.02$, *ns*). Figure 77 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition tactics and political skill.

As illustrated in Table 84, the legitimating tactics-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.24$, $p < .05$). Figure 78 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating tactics and political skill and suggests that the legitimating tactics-leader viability relationship is stronger when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 85, the pressure tactics-political skill interaction term was non-significant ($\gamma' = -.24$, *ns*). Figure 79 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of pressure tactics and political skill.

Therefore, hypothesis 15d was not supported.

To summarize, hypothesis 15 received no support. In fact, legitimating-political skill interaction with subordinate and customer stakeholders was negative and significant. This indicates that the legitimating tactics-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower. These findings contradicted the hypothesized effects.

Variance analysis

A summary of the variance analyses for the HLM analysis above is provided in Tables 86-89. Specifically, in the first HLM model (i.e., level 1 variables were the subordinates and level 2 variables were the leaders), the proportion of within-leader variance for task performance was 31.67 percent whereas the proportion of within-leader variance for viability was 26.19 percent (see Table 86). In the second HLM model (i.e., level 1 variables were the peers and level 2 variables were the leaders), the proportion of within-leader variance for task performance was 28.16 percent whereas the proportion of within-leader variance for viability was 23.23 percent (see Table 87). In the third HLM model (i.e., level 1 variables were the leaders and level 2 variables were the senior managers), the proportion of within-senior manager variance for task performance was 2.59 percent whereas the proportion of within-senior manager variance for viability was .01 percent (see Table 88). In the fourth HLM model (i.e., level 1 variables were the customers and level 2 variables were the leaders), the proportion of within-leader variance for task performance was 15.03 percent whereas the proportion of within-leader variance for viability was 22.82 percent (see Table 89).

Supplemental Analyses

The results above demonstrate very limited support for the hypotheses in this study. Therefore, the following supplemental analyses were conducted to examine the data in greater detail.

Stakeholder Dependence Supplemental Analyses

The hypotheses in this section suggested that leader dependence would be related to specific influence tactics. This was tested by examining the correlations between the leader ratings of dependence on specific stakeholders and the stakeholder ratings of influence tactics. Whereas Yukl (1999) describes influence as a dyadic process, leaders may use influence differently when they have a strong level of dependence across a stakeholder group. If this is the case, the average level of leader dependence could be explored to determine if it is related to the leader's influence attempts. Therefore, I examined the leader's average ratings of dependence across stakeholder groups (i.e., subordinate average, peer average, and customer average) to determine if this rating is related to influence tactics.

Another possible explanation for the findings is that the survey ratings of dependence do not take into account the dependence that a stakeholder may have on the leader. That is, it may be the case that influence tactics are related to the difference in dependence between leaders and stakeholders rather than just the leader's rating of dependence. De Jong et al. (2007) describe this as individuals who are "*asymmetrically task dependent*," and they suggest that asymmetrical task dependency exists "[w]hen A's task dependence on B is greater or less than B's task dependence on A" (p. 1626). Given that I have ratings of task dependence on the leader provided by subordinates and peers, I explored this alternative explanation in two ways. First, I examined the joint perceptions of the leaders' average ratings of dependence for the subordinate and peer

stakeholder groups and stakeholder groups' average ratings of leader dependence (i.e., subordinate average difference task dependence and peer average difference task dependence). Second, I examined dyadic perceptions in dependence. That is, I examined the differences in joint perceptions of dependence from leader's ratings of specific subordinates and peers.

Prior research on difference ratings (i.e., congruence) has noted numerous problems with algebraic difference indices. These problems include unambiguous interpretation, confounding of component effects, and assigning variance beyond that associated with the component variables (Edwards, 1994). Therefore, I conducted the congruence analyses following the recommendation of Edwards (1994) using hierarchical regression and examining each dependence rating as a separate predictor. Further, I included the interaction term of the dependence variables and the quadratic terms of the dependence variables to evaluate the model. Including the interaction term allows for an examination of whether the joint perceptions of dependence have "explanatory power beyond that of their individual scales" whereas the quadratic terms establish that higher order (i.e., curvilinear) relationships do not explain the relationships in the model (Edwards, 1994; Dabos & Rousseau, 2004, p. 62).

Finally, I calculated interrater reliability estimates (ICC(1) and ICC(2) values) for all study variables where there were multiple respondents (i.e., subordinate stakeholder responses, peer stakeholder responses, and customer stakeholder responses) to determine if there was justification to aggregate to the leader level (see Table 90). The ICC(1) values generally support aggregation whereas the ICC(2) estimates are low. Given the small average group size is likely to be attenuating the ICC(2) estimates (Bliese, 1998), I aggregated stakeholder data by group to the leader level. Then, I conducted analyses to examine the independent effects of a specific influence tactic by controlling for all other influence tactics.

The results of these analyses are described below.

Stakeholder Dependence Supplemental Results

Scale means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the variables are provided in preceding Tables 12 (leader-subordinate variables), 13 (leader-peer variables), and 14 (leader-customer variables).

Leader-subordinate supplemental results. As illustrated in Table 12, the average of leader task dependence across all subordinates was not related to influence tactic use.

As illustrated in Tables 99-109, the joint perceptions of the leaders' and subordinates' average ratings of dependence had different effects vis-à-vis the influence tactics. Joint ratings of dependence were related positively to the use of collaboration (Table 99) and consultation (Table 100) tactics yet the interaction term was non-significant. Leader ratings of dependence were related positively to the use of rational persuasion (Table 106) and legitimating (Table 108) tactics yet subordinate ratings and the interaction term were non-significant. Subordinate ratings of dependence were related positively to ingratiation (Table 102), inspirational appeal (Table 103), and apprising tactics (Table 105) yet leader ratings and the interaction term were non-significant. The non-significant interaction terms indicate that joint perceptions of dependence do not provide explanatory power above that of the individual scales. Finally, a curvilinear effect was found for leader ratings of dependence and personal appeals tactics (Table 104) whereas no effects were found for joint ratings of dependence on exchange (Table 101), coalition (Table 107), and pressure influence tactics (Table 109).

As illustrated in Tables 110-120, the dyadic perceptions of the leader-subordinate dependence analysis yielded quite different results. Dyadic ratings of dependence were related positively to the use of collaboration tactics (Table 110) yet the interaction term was non-

significant. Subordinate ratings of dependence were related positively to the use of inspirational appeal (Table 114), apprising (Table 116), and rational persuasion (Table 117) tactics yet leader ratings and the interaction term were non-significant. Leader ratings of dependence were related negatively to the use of personal appeals (Table 115) and pressure (Table 116) tactics yet the subordinate ratings and interaction terms were non-significant. Here, again, the non-significant interaction terms indicate that dyadic perceptions of dependence do not provide explanatory power above that of the individual scales. The only significant interaction term occurred with dyadic ratings of dependence and coalition tactics (Table 118). Interestingly, curvilinear relationships were found for leader ratings of dependence and the use of consultation (Table 111), exchange (Table 112), ingratiation (Table 113), and legitimating (Table 119) tactics.

Leader-peer supplemental results. As illustrated in Table 13, the average of leader task dependence across all peers was not related to influence tactic use.

As illustrated in Tables 121-131, the joint perceptions of the leaders' and peers' average ratings of dependence and the use of influence tactics demonstrated similar effects across the influence tactics. Specifically, average peer ratings were related positively to the use of collaboration (Table 121), consultation (Table 122), ingratiation (Table 124), inspirational appeal (Table 125), personal appeals (Table 126), apprising (Table 127), and pressure (Table 131) tactics yet leader ratings and the interaction terms were non-significant. A curvilinear relationship was found for the relationship between peer average dependence and exchange tactics (Table 123), and no effects were found for joint ratings of dependence on rational persuasion (Table 128), coalition (Table 129), and legitimating (Table 130) tactics.

As illustrated in Tables 132-142, the dyadic perceptions of leaders' and peers' ratings of dependence and the use of influence tactics were similar to the joint perceptions of the average

ratings. Specifically, peer ratings of dependence were related to the use of nine influence tactics including: collaboration (Table 132), consultation (Table 133), ingratiation (Table 135), inspirational appeal (Table 136), apprising (Table 138), rational persuasion (Table 139), coalition (Table 140), legitimating (Table 141) and pressure (Table 142) tactics. Leader ratings of dependence were negatively related to the use of exchange tactics (Table 134) and personal appeals (Table 137) tactics. The non-significant interaction terms indicate that the dyadic perceptions of dependence do not provide explanatory power above that of the individual scales.

Independent effects of influence tactics supplemental results. As illustrated in Tables 143-153, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine the independent effects of the independent variables. As illustrated in Table 143, after controlling for the other influence tactics, stakeholder dependence was not related to collaboration influence tactics in subordinates, peers, nor in customers. The results were similar for consultation (Table 144), exchange (Table 145), ingratiation (Table 146), inspirational appeal (Table 147), personal appeals (Table 148), apprising (Table 149), rational persuasion (Table 150), coalition (Table 151), and legitimating (Table 152) tactics. With regard to pressure tactics (Table 153), stakeholder dependence was related negatively to pressure tactics after controlling for the other tactics only for the model including senior managers.

Moderation Supplemental Analyses

The hypotheses in this section suggested that political skill would moderate the relationship between a leader's use of influence tactics and two outcomes: task performance and viability. Political skill was selected as the moderator because of the theoretical (Ferris et al., 2007) and empirical (Semadar et al., 2006) support for this social effectiveness construct. Unfortunately, there was no support for these hypotheses. Therefore, I examined three additional

moderators to determine if they would impact the relationship between influence tactics and outcomes. These variables included leader-rated self-monitoring, subordinate-rated relationship quality, and subordinate-rated leader political skill.

Before I began the moderation supplemental analyses, I conducted a follow-up power analysis to determine the number of level 1 respondents necessary to test the hypotheses. Using the study's data and the Optimal Design software, I input the variance at level 2 for the four leader-stakeholder multilevel models (i.e., subordinate-leader, peer-leader, leader-senior manager, and customer-leader – see values in Tables 86-89); an alpha value of .05; the number of individuals in level 2; the effect sizes; and the range of individuals in each level 1 model. To achieve a statistical power of .80, the number of subordinate respondents per leader necessary for the subordinate-leader HLM model was 3.66-3.98 (Raudenbush, Spybrook, Congdon, Liu, & Martinez, 2011). The number of peer respondents per leader for the peer-leader HLM model was 3.70-4.00. The number of customer respondents per leader for the customer-leader HLM model was 3.72-4.00. The number of leader respondents per senior manager for the leader-senior manager model was 200. Given the number of respondents per leader from my study, I would only be able to detect effects in the subordinate-leader stakeholder relationship. Therefore, the supplemental HLM analyses for the moderation effects are conducted using only the subordinate-leader data. Consistent with the stakeholder dependence supplemental results, only significant relationships are presented in the supplemental tables and figures. Also, for ease of presentation, only the full model HLM results are presented.

In addition to the HLM analyses, I conducted hierarchical regression analyses using the aggregated data (described above) to examine the independent effects of each influence tactic in

the presence of the other tactics. That is, I controlled for the effect of influence tactics by entering them in a preceding step in the regression analyses.

The results of these analyses are described below.

Moderation Supplemental Results

Self-monitoring supplemental results. The first moderating effect that I examined was that of influence tactics and leader self-monitoring on subordinate ratings of task performance and viability. As illustrated in Table 101, there were three significant interaction terms on subordinate ratings of task performance (and no significant interaction terms on subordinate ratings of viability).

The rational persuasion-self-monitoring interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.34, p < .01$). Figure 80 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and self-monitoring and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader task performance relationship is weaker when self-monitoring is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The legitimating-self-monitoring interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.28, p < .01$). Figure 81 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and self-monitoring and suggests that the legitimating-leader task performance relationship is weaker when self-monitoring is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The pressure-self-monitoring interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.35, p < .01$). Figure 82 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and self-monitoring and suggests

that the legitimating-leader task performance relationship is weaker when self-monitoring is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

Relationship quality supplemental results. The second moderating effect that I examined was that of influence tactics and subordinate-rated relationship quality on subordinate ratings of task performance and viability. As illustrated in Table 102, there were eight significant interaction terms on subordinate ratings of task performance.

The collaboration-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.09, p < .05$). Figure 83 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and relationship quality and suggests that the collaboration-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The consultation-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.11, p < .05$). Figure 84 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and relationship quality and suggests that the consultation-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The ingratiation-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.12, p < .01$). Figure 85 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and relationship quality and suggests that the ingratiation-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The inspirational appeal-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.09, p < .01$). Figure 86 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the

centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and relationship quality and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The appraising-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.10$, $p < .01$). Figure 87 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of appraising and relationship quality and suggests that the appraising-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The rational persuasion-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.08$, $p < .05$). Figure 88 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and relationship quality and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The coalition-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.11$, $p < .05$). Figure 89 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition and relationship quality and suggests that the coalition-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The legitimating-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.09$, $p < .05$). Figure 90 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and relationship quality and suggests that the legitimating-leader task performance relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 103, there were nine significant interaction terms on subordinate ratings of viability.

The collaboration-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.12, p < .01$). Figure 91 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and relationship quality and suggests that the collaboration-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The consultation-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.15, p < .01$). Figure 92 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and relationship quality and suggests that the consultation-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The exchange-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.12, p < .01$). Figure 93 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of exchange and relationship quality and suggests that the exchange-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The ingratiation-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.16, p < .01$). Figure 94 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and relationship quality and suggests that the ingratiation-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The inspirational appeal-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.18, p < .01$). Figure 95 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and relationship quality and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The appraising-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.15, p < .01$). Figure 96 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of appraising and relationship quality and suggests that the appraising-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The rational persuasion-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.19, p < .01$). Figure 97 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and relationship quality and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The coalition-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.11, p < .05$). Figure 98 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of coalition and relationship quality and suggests that the coalition-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The legitimating-relationship quality interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.09, p < .01$). Figure 99 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and relationship

quality and suggests that the legitimating-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

Subordinate-rated political skill supplemental results. The final moderating effect that I examined was that of influence tactics and subordinate-rated political skill on subordinate ratings of task performance and viability. As illustrated in Table 104, there were six significant interaction terms on subordinate ratings of task performance.

The collaboration-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.10, p < .01$). Figure 100 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill and suggests that the collaboration-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The ingratiation-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.07, p < .05$). Figure 101 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill and suggests that the ingratiation-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.10, p < .01$). Figure 102 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The appraising-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.10, p < .01$). Figure 103 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and

the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of apprising and political skill and suggests that the apprising-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.20, p < .01$). Figure 104 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The legitimating-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.11, p < .01$). Figure 105 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and political skill and suggests that the legitimating-leader task performance relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

As illustrated in Table 105, there were seven significant interaction terms on subordinate ratings of viability.

The collaboration-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.13, p < .01$). Figure 106 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill and suggests that the collaboration-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The consultation-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.12, p < .01$). Figure 107 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of consultation and political skill and

suggests that the consultation-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The ingratiation-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.12, p < .01$). Figure 108 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of ingratiation and political skill and suggests that the ingratiation-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The inspirational appeal-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.15, p < .01$). Figure 109 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of inspirational appeal and political skill and suggests that the inspirational appeal-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The appraising-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.15, p < .01$). Figure 110 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of appraising and political skill and suggests that the appraising-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The rational persuasion-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.20, p < .01$). Figure 111 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill and suggests that the rational persuasion-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

The legitimating-political skill interaction term was negative and significant ($\gamma' = -.11, p < .01$). Figure 112 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of legitimating and political skill and suggests that the legitimating-leader viability relationship is weaker when political skill is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

Independent effects of influence tactics in moderation analyses supplemental results.

Finally, I examined the independent effects of the influence tactics using hierarchical regression analyses. These analyses were conducted across all stakeholder groups, and the full model results are presented. Tables 159-169 summarize the results for the task performance outcomes, and none of the interaction terms with leader political skill and influence tactics are significant after controlling for demographic variables and influence tactics. Tables 170-180 summarize the results for viability outcomes, and only two models have significant interaction terms. First, the interaction between leader political skill and customer-rated collaboration is negative and significant ($\beta = -.36, p < .05$) after controlling for demographic variables and other influence tactics. Figure 113 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of collaboration and political skill and suggests that the collaboration-leader viability relationship is weaker when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower. Second, the interaction between leader political skill and subordinate-rated rational persuasion is positive and significant ($\beta = .15, p < .05$) after controlling for demographic variables the other influence tactics. Figure 114 illustrates this interaction based on the low (1 SD below the centered mean) and the high (1 SD above the centered mean) values of rational persuasion and political skill and suggests that the rational

persuasion-leader viability relationship is stronger when relationship quality is higher as opposed to when it is lower.

Discussion

This study attempted to make three primary contributions to the literature on leader influence tactics. First, stakeholder dependence was examined as an antecedent to a leader's selection of influence tactics. Next, a leader's performance and viability was assessed from four stakeholder groups – subordinates, peers, senior managers, and customers. Third, the leader's political skill was examined as a moderator of the relationship between influence tactics and performance outcomes. In the discussion that follows, I summarize the findings; discuss the theoretical implications; describe the study's strengths and limitations; and suggest opportunities for future research.

Summary of Findings

The first set of hypotheses suggested that stakeholder dependence would be related to the use of influence tactics. The results were almost wholly unsupported. In fact, only hypothesis 10c was supported in the initial analysis. Therefore, supplemental analyses were conducted to further explore the data. However, again, there was limited support for the dependence hypotheses.

A second aim of the study was to examine the extent to which political skill moderated the relationship between a leader's use of influence tactics and the leader's task performance and viability. The results for these hypotheses were unsupported. Further, there were several instances where political skill either weakened the positive relationship between influence tactics and outcomes or strengthened the negative relationship between influence tactics and outcomes.

The supplemental HLM analyses found similar results. Self-monitoring weakened the relationships between rational persuasion, legitimating, and pressure influence tactics and task performance. Further, relationship quality and subordinate-rated political skill all produced

negative interaction terms between the influence tactics and performance outcomes. These findings are discussed in greater detail below in the limitations section.

Theoretical Implications

These findings raise interesting theoretical questions. Drawing on power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962), I argued that leaders would engage in influence behaviors based on their dependencies with stakeholders to manage these relationships and accomplish their task work. The initial hypothesis tests did not support these arguments; however, there was considerable empirical support when looking at asymmetric task dependence through the difference score variables with the subordinate and peer stakeholders. Asymmetric task dependence and a related concept, power asymmetry, has been explored primarily in team settings (de Jong et al., 2007; Van der Vegt, de Jong, Bunderson, & Molleman, 2010). These studies have attempted to disentangle task interdependence from asymmetric task dependence in teams and to examine its impact on helping behaviors, trust, learning, and performance. In a team context, members are often buffered from external forces, and they interact most often with other team members for accomplishing their task work. Leaders, on the other hand, are often in boundary spanning roles. They may be team leaders, but they may also be involved in the work of other leaders and on other teams – thereby increasing the amount of task dependency that they have on others within an organization. Given that there has been very limited research to date on leader task dependence, the findings in this study extend power-dependence theory by integrating the concept of asymmetric task dependence.

Another theoretical contribution of the study was in testing part of Schneider's (2002) stakeholder model of organizational leadership. Schneider (2002) posits that leaders need the capacity to work with a variety of stakeholders; yet the model does not describe the specific

behaviors (beyond broad cognitive, social, and behavioral attributes) that may be most effective with each stakeholder group. By integrating the literature on leader influence tactics, I explored how these behaviors were related to leader performance. The results suggest strong main effects between several types of influence tactics – notably, collaboration, consultation, inspirational appeal, and rational persuasion – and leader task performance. These results also seem to support the Leaderplex model proposed by Dennison, Hunt, and Dodge (1997). The Leaderplex model suggests that organizational leaders need an effective *behavioral repertoire*. That is, they need to be able to engage in a "broad portfolio of leadership roles" so that they "can perform the appropriate leadership role for a given situation and meet the expectations of a variety of stakeholders" (Dennison et al., 1997, p. 387). Further, leader self-monitoring was related to leader performance by subordinate and peer stakeholders supporting the theory's propositions related to the importance of leader social attributes. Therefore, these findings support part of the stakeholder model of organizational leadership.

This study was among the first to integrate power-dependence theory with the vast literature on leader influence tactics. As discussed in the introduction, there is considerable support for the strong, positive relationships between influence tactics and a variety of performance outcomes. In this study, numerous influence tactics were positively correlated with task performance and viability by several of the stakeholder groups. This includes collaboration ($r = .25-.54, p < .01$); consultation ($r = .25-.54$); exchange ($r = .18-.21$); ingratiation ($r = .18-.47$); inspirational appeal ($r = .18-.62$); apprising ($r = .17-.48$); rational persuasion ($r = .20-.49$); and legitimating ($r = .22-.28$) tactics. Only pressure tactics were negatively correlated with task performance and viability ($r = -.30$ to $-.34$) and only by subordinate stakeholders. To summarize, with the exception of the positive relationship between legitimating and the performance

outcomes, the findings in this study confirm the established relationships between influence tactics and task performance, and the relationships between influence tactics and viability extend research in this domain.

Previous research on influence tactics has also identified four core tactics including collaboration, consultation, inspirational appeal, and rational persuasion (Yukl et al., 2008). Whereas there is not a single overarching theory for the set of influence tactics; there are strong theories that form the basis for these four tactics. For example, collaboration tactics are based on self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1986) in that the leader can increase the target's motivation to complete the request because the target perceives that he or she will be successful by offering to collaborate (Yukl et al., 2005). Consultation tactics have been linked to participative management theory as seeking the advice of the target is also likely to increase the target's motivation to respond to influence affirmatively (Falbe & Yukl, 1992). Inspirational appeal tactics are often linked to the inspirational motivation dimension of transformational leadership because the influence request inspires targets and provides meaning for the request (Sparrowe et al., 2006). Finally, rational persuasion is based in expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) in that the target's commitment to the request increases because the target is convinced that his or her actions will have the intended outcomes (Yukl et al., 2005). These core tactics have been most related to managerial effectiveness in previous research, and the findings in this study also confirm the theories that support these strong relationships.

Practical Implications

The results of this study have several practical implications for leadership in organizations as well. First, Ployhart (2005) has discussed the staffing challenges that organizations in the 21st century face, in part, because of the greater demands in knowledge-

based work. These leadership demands include interacting with multiple stakeholders and managing the dependencies in working relationships. Therefore, the role of selecting leaders with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities, or the aptitude to develop these KSAs, is important. Whereas research has addressed the importance of personality tests in selection (Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007), other scholars have advocated developing custom selection tests specifically for jobs in organizations (Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, & Schmitt, 2007). The results of this study could be used to develop behavioral interview questions that seek information about how leaders respond to dependencies across stakeholder groups and how they might attempt to influence them.

Second, the results emphasize the increased importance of influence in leadership roles in knowledge era leadership positions. Further, the data reinforces the strong relationships between four influence tactics – collaboration, consultation, inspirational appeal, and rational persuasion – and leader task performance. Therefore, organizations can use the information for formal leadership training and development related to leadership influence. A formal leadership development intervention would include removing the leaders from their daily responsibilities to learn about the influence tactics and how they can be used in their day-to-day work. The leaders would then have the opportunity to practice these behaviors in the training setting before returning to their jobs. To maximize the transfer of this training, the organization should increase the motivation of the participants (Blume, Ford, Baldwin, & Huang, 2009) by connecting the training to the leader's performance evaluation and by measuring the effect of the training from the perspective of multiple stakeholders (Taylor, Russ-Eft, & Taylor, 2009).

Whereas the practical implications above are directly relevant to leaders within organizations, senior managers may also use the data for leadership coaching. Leadership

coaching is the dyadic relationship between a leader and a coach that is defined by the goal of making the leader more effective in his or her role (Ely, Boyce, Nelson, Zaccaro, Hernez-Broome, & Whyman, 2010). There are several key features that distinguish leadership coaching from traditional leadership development programs (described above). These include a focus on the unique needs of individual leaders, *and* the need for coaches to have strong, communication, assessment and feedback, and goal setting skills (Ely et al., 2010). Therefore, coaching has the dual benefit of providing focused developmental information to the leader as well as providing opportunities for internal senior managers/coaches to enhancing their professional capabilities. The data from this study provides a multi-stakeholder view of the leader's influence style, and it provides preliminary evidence of the influence tactics most related to leadership effectiveness by different stakeholders groups. Coaches can use this information to discuss how the leaders can overcome dependencies in the their working relationships, and ultimately, improve their performance in their roles.

Strengths and Limitations

This study had several noteworthy strengths. First, as organizations are moving away from hierarchical structures (Yukl et al., 2005), leaders are growing more dependent on others both within and outside of the organization to accomplish their task work. This study was among the first to examine the leader-stakeholder dependency relationship and how it impacts leader behaviors. Second, the multilevel design of the study with a multi-stakeholder perspective on leader influence tactics highlights the varying perspectives that individuals with whom the leaders regularly interact view their influence tactic use. Further, there were high response rates for all of the internal stakeholder groups, and all stakeholder groups had fairly long-tenured working relationships with the leaders. Finally, this study was among the first to examine how

leaders attempt to influence external stakeholders thereby incorporating a broader perspective to influence tactic research than in previous studies.

In addition to the strengths mentioned above, there are several limitations in the present research related to the sample, the data, and the findings. Most notably, the hypothesized relationships between influence tactics and performance outcomes as moderated by political skill were completely unsupported. In fact, not only was there no support for the hypotheses, but the significant effects were actually contrary to the hypotheses. That is, the influence tactics-performance outcomes relationships were weaker when political skill was higher as opposed to when it is lower. Further, the supplemental analyses found similar results when subordinate-rated political skill, self-monitoring, and relationship quality were investigated.

The theory supporting political skill as a moderator explicitly suggests that an antecedent to leader political behavior will be the power of the target (Ammeter, Douglas, Gardner, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2002). Ammeter and colleagues draw on the literature related to influence tactics and impression management to argue that the relative power of the target will impact the political behavior of the leader, and a growing body of research supports the positive impact of leader political skill on many outcomes. Therefore, given the contrary results in this study, there are at least two possible explanations for this finding. First, there could be something unique about the leaders or context of this study that caused the results to be negative. In support of this, none of the correlations between leader-rated political skill and task performance or viability were significant by any of the stakeholder groups. In previous research, Semadar et al. (2006) compared political skill and self-monitoring and found that political skill was the strongest predictor of managerial job performance. Further, self-monitoring was not related to job performance in their data. However, self-monitoring was related to the leader task performance

and viability as rated by subordinates ($r = .32, p < .01$, and $r = .23, p < .05$, respectively) and peers ($r = .25, p < .05$, and $r = .21, p < .05$, respectively) in this study. In addition, the relationship between leader and subordinate ratings of the leader's political skill was non-significant ($r = .19, ns$). Therefore, leaders in this sample may not be able to accurately self-assess their level of political skill, or the ratings may be inflated due to social desirability bias. It is possible, then, that the data captured in this study are unique to this context and have limited generalizability.

A second alternative explanation is that the theory (and the data here) fails to capture the nuances in the interaction between influence and political skill that impact performance. Upon further investigation of the interaction figures, it is clear that high levels of political skill and influence tactics are important for task performance and viability. In fact, in all of the figures, high political skill and influence tactics, plotted at 1 SD above the centered mean, result in higher ratings of task performance and viability. Therefore, it is only beyond 1 SD of the centered mean where high levels of political skill and influence tactics result in lower performance ratings than low levels of political skill. This suggests that whereas political skill does not strengthen the influence tactic-performance relationship, it also does not result in lower performance ratings except at high levels of both influence tactics and political skill.

Another major limitation of the study is the low power for the peer, senior manager, customer stakeholder groups. Whereas the study was designed to survey the appropriate number of respondents per leader to be able to detect effects, the low number of average responses per leader are problematic. When power is low, type II error rates increase. Aguinis (1995) noted that this is particularly problematic when examining moderation effects, and it may "lead researchers to erroneously dismiss theoretical models that include moderated relationships" (p.

1141). Given the lack of support for the moderation effects, another possible explanation is that there was simply not enough power to detect those effects.

Three additional limitations with the data are worth noting. First, there were low internal consistency reliabilities for the senior manager ratings of coalition and pressure tactics ($\alpha = .58$ for both). This is likely due to the shortened scale administered to the senior managers. In fact, both of the full scales demonstrated high internal consistency reliability values with the subordinate, peer, and customer stakeholder groups. Second, there are legitimate common methods bias concerns in the supplemental analyses (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Whereas the original design of the study included a cross-level moderator (leader-rated political skill and subordinate-rated influence tactics), the supplemental analyses that included ratings of relationship quality and subordinate-rated political skill contained substantive variables that were all assessed by the subordinates. Third, the intercorrelations among the dependent measures are high indicating the respondents were not likely differentiating between the measures of task performance and viability.

Finally, there were also limitations related to the sample. First, participants in the study were not randomly selected from a population. In fact, they were all part of one organization, and they were strongly encouraged to participate by the top executives within the organization. The focal leaders were branch managers of a mid-sized bank with a diverse set of formal job responsibilities that are likely consistent with other mid-level managers at organizations in other industries. However, the findings may have limited generalizeability because of the nature of the organization and the industry within which it operates.

One final issue related to limitations of the study is that, whereas the data from the leaders and stakeholder groups were collected at different times, there was only one data

collection timeframe for each group. Therefore, the study cannot address how dependencies may change over time. It could be expected that dependencies both within and between stakeholder groups will change based on fluctuating job demands, transitions to new projects, and staff turnover. Therefore, future research should address how leader behaviors change based on these changing dependencies.

Opportunities for Future Research

Leaders continue to play a vital role in organizations; yet this role evolves as the demands of organizational stakeholders increase. This is particularly challenging given the growing dependency relationships. This study was among the first to explicitly examine stakeholder dependence and how it impacts the manner in which leaders attempt to influence others. The findings suggest preliminary support for the hypotheses, and they leave several unanswered questions for future research.

First, whereas the focus of this study was on task dependence, the dependence that a leader has on a stakeholder can take a variety of forms. As previously discussed (and is illustrated in Table 1), there are at least seven types of dependencies. For example, leaders can have structural dependence whereby they are linked through the organization's formal hierarchy to specific stakeholders (Brass, 1984), or they could have skill/coordination dependence where leaders rely on others who have specialized abilities (Bartol & Martin, 1988). In the cases of different types of dependencies, leaders may use different forms of influence or different combinations of influence tactics. Thus, there are two possible future research opportunities in this area. First, the literature on types of dependencies is not well-integrated, and there is no overarching theory which addresses leader dependencies on stakeholders. Therefore, one possible area for future research would be to develop a theory of leader dependencies and to

integrate theories which address the behaviors necessary to manage or overcome these dependencies. Second, additional empirical studies could examine the types of leader dependencies and how they impact leader behaviors and outcomes.

Farmer and Aguinis (2005) argue that dependence is a strong component of identity enactment, and their recent theoretical work on subordinate-leader dyads suggests that "[d]ependency has meaningful identity implications" (Farmer & Aguinis, 2005, p. 1071). This research could be extended to leader-stakeholder relationships as well. For example, future research could examine how a leader's social identity affects the manner in which a leader attempts to influence particular stakeholder groups. In addition, this research could explore how the stakeholder's relational or collective identity with the leader impacts their responses to influence attempts.

Further, there is relatively little research which has examined the changing organizational form and how it impacts organizational leaders. Yukl and colleagues (2005) have discussed how organizations are moving toward more empowered forms of organizing; yet it is unclear what this means for organizational leaders. Can leaders attempt to minimize these dependence relationships? How can organizations train leaders to deal with types of dependencies? How can organizations select individuals into leadership roles who will be more adept at managing these relationships?

Finally, one interesting finding from this study was that the leader's relationship quality with the senior manager was positively related to the use of consultation, inspirational appeal, and rational persuasion influence tactics and leader performance and viability. Further, relationship quality was negatively related to legitimating and pressure tactics. This suggests that

relationships may play an important role in the selection of influence tactics with senior managers, and future research could explore this dynamic in greater detail.

Conclusion

Stakeholder management is often a primary responsibility of organizational leaders. Further, leaders are often required to work through hierarchical and organizational boundaries to coordinate their task work with these stakeholders. One of the goals of this study was to examine stakeholder dependence and how it impacts the manner in which a leader attempts to influence stakeholder groups. The results demonstrate that dependence does play a role in the selection of influence tactics, and I hope these preliminary findings prompt future research to explore this important dynamic.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

List of Tables

Table 1

Types of stakeholder power and leader dependence by stakeholder group

Stakeholder power	Leader dependence	Stakeholders			
		Subordinates	Peers	Senior managers	Customers
	<i>Personal dependence</i>				
Reward power	Reward dependence			√	
Coercive power	Coercive dependence			√	
Referent power	Personal/identification dependence	√	√	√	√
	<i>Task dependence</i>				
Legitimate power	Structural dependence	√	√	√	
Expert power	Skill/Coordination dependence	√	√	√	√
Informational power	Informational dependence	√	√	√	√
Customer power	Customer dependence				√

Table 2

Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson (1980) Classification of Influence tactics

Influence Tactic	Definition
Assertiveness	Influence tactics which include demanding, ordering, and setting deadlines
Rationality	Influence tactics which include writing detailed plans and explaining reasons for request
Ingratiation	Influence tactics which include acting humble and making the other person feel important
Exchange	Influence tactics involving the exchange of positive benefits (e.g., personal sacrifices)
Coalition	Influence tactics which include steady pressure for compliance through the use of co-workers or by obtaining the support of subordinates
Blocking	Influence tactics which include engaging in a work slowdown or threatening to stop work
Sanctions	Influence tactics which involve the use of administrative sanctions to induce compliance
Upward appeals	Influence tactics which include additional pressure for conformity by invoking the influence of higher levels in the organization

Table 3

Yukl, Seifert, & Chavez (2008) Proactive Influence Tactics

Influence Tactic	Definition
Collaboration	The agent offers to provide assistance or necessary resources if the target will carry out a request or approve a proposed change. <i>Most common target: hypothesized to be subordinates and peers</i>
Consultation	The agent asks the target person to suggest improvements or help plan a proposed activity or change for which the target person's support is desired. <i>Most common target: subordinates and peers</i>
Exchange	The agent offers something the target person wants, or offers to reciprocate at a later time, if the target will do what the agent requests. <i>Most common target: subordinates and peers</i>
Ingratiation	The agent uses praise and flattery before or during an attempt to influence the target person to carry out a request or support a proposal. <i>Most common target: subordinates and peers</i>
Inspirational appeals	The agent appeals to the target's values and ideals or seeks to arouse the target person's emotions to gain commitment for a request or proposal. <i>Most common target: subordinates</i>
Personal appeals	The agent asks the target to carry out a request or support a proposal out of friendship, or asks for a personal favor before saying what it is. <i>Most common target: peers</i>
Apprising	The agent explains how carrying out a request or supporting a proposal will benefit the target personally or help to advance the target's career. <i>Most common target: hypothesized to be subordinate</i>
Rational persuasion	The agent uses logical arguments and factual evidence to show that a request or proposal is feasible and relevant for important task objectives. <i>Most common target: supervisors</i>
Legitimizing tactics	The agent seeks to establish the legitimacy of a request or to verify that he/she has the authority to make it. <i>Most common target: subordinates and peers</i>
Pressure	The agent uses demands, threats, frequent checking, or persistent reminders to influence the target to do something. <i>Most common target: subordinates</i>
Coalition tactics	The agent enlists the aid of others, or uses the support of others, as a way to influence the target to do something. <i>Most common target: peers</i>

Table 4

Categorization of Influence Tactics

Soft tactics	Rational tactics	Hard tactics
Consultation	Apprising	Coalition
Collaboration	Rational persuasion	Legitimizing
Exchange		Pressure
Ingratiation		
Inspirational appeals		
Personal appeals		

Table 5
Summary of Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Supported/ Not Supported
<i>Hypothesis 1a</i> : Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 1b</i> : Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 1c</i> : Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics.	<i>Not tested</i>
<i>Hypothesis 1d</i> : Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of collaboration influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 2a</i> : Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 2b</i> : Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 2c</i> : Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 2d</i> : Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of consultation influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 3a</i> : Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 3b</i> : Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 3c</i> : Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics.	<i>Not tested</i>
<i>Hypothesis 3d</i> : Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of exchange influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 4a</i> : Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 4b</i> : Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 4c</i> : Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics.	<i>Not tested</i>
<i>Hypothesis 4d</i> : Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of ingratiation influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 5a</i> : Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 5b</i> : Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 5c</i> : Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 5d</i> : Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of inspirational appeals influence tactics.	Not supported

Table 5 (cont'd)

Hypothesis	Supported/ Not Supported
<i>Hypothesis 6a:</i> Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 6b:</i> Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 6c:</i> Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics.	<i>Not tested</i>
<i>Hypothesis 6d:</i> Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of personal appeals influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 7a:</i> Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of apprising influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 7b:</i> Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of apprising influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 7c:</i> Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of apprising influence tactics.	<i>Not tested</i>
<i>Hypothesis 7d:</i> Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of apprising influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 8a:</i> Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 8b:</i> Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 8c:</i> Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 8d:</i> Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of rational persuasion influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 9a:</i> Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of coalition influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 9b:</i> Peer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of coalition influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 9c:</i> Senior manager task dependence will be negatively related to the use of coalition influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 9d:</i> Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of coalition influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 10a:</i> Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 10b:</i> Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 10c:</i> Senior manager task dependence will be negatively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics.	Supported
<i>Hypothesis 10d:</i> Customer task dependence will be negatively related to the use of legitimating influence tactics.	Not supported

Table 5 (cont'd)

Hypothesis	Supported/ Not Supported
<i>Hypothesis 11a:</i> Subordinate task dependence will be positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 11b:</i> Peer task dependence will be positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 11c:</i> Senior manager task dependence will be positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 11d:</i> Customer task dependence will be positively related to the use of pressure influence tactics.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 12:</i> The positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and leader task performance as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and performance will be more positive for leaders high in political skill.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 13:</i> The negative relationship between hard tactics and leader task performance as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the negative relationship between hard tactics and performance will be less negative for leaders high in political skill.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 14:</i> The positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and leader viability as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the positive relationship between soft and rational influence tactics and viability will be more positive for leaders high in political skill.	Not supported
<i>Hypothesis 15:</i> The negative relationship between hard tactics and leader viability as assessed by (a) subordinate stakeholders, (b) peer stakeholders, (c) senior manager stakeholders, and (d) customer stakeholders will be moderated by leader political skill such that the negative relationship between hard tactics and viability will be less negative for leaders high in political skill.	Not supported

Table 6
Data collection schedule

Construct	Measure	<i>Source</i>					Time 1	Time 2
		Leader	Subor- dinate	Peer	Snr Mgr	Cus- tomer		
Demographic information	Age	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Gender	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Education	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Org tenure	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Tenure in position	√	√	√	√		√	√
	Tenure w/leader		√	√	√	√		√
Task dependence	Pearce & Gegersen (1991)	√	√	√			√	
Political skill	Ferris et al., (2005)	√	√				√	
Leader self- monitoring	Snyder & Gangestad (1986)	√					√	
Relationship quality	Liden & Maslyn (1998)	√	√	√		√	√	√
Interaction frequency	(Single item)	√	√	√		√	√	√
Leader influence tactics	Yukl et al., (2008)		√	√	√	√		√
Leader task performance	Liden et al., (1993)		√	√	√	√		√
Leader viability	Marrone et al., (2007)		√	√	√	√		√

Note. Leader surveys were administered at time 1. Subordinate, peer, senior manager, and customer surveys were administered at time 2.

Table 7

Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Subordinate-rated Influence Tactics

Item	Component									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Rational persuasion item 1	.76	.04	.09	.13	.26	.03	.17	-.04	.05	-.03
Rational persuasion item 2	.81	.06	.14	.08	.20	.09	.18	-.04	-.02	-.09
Rational persuasion item 3	.84	.07	.03	.04	.21	.11	.13	.00	.06	-.05
Rational persuasion item 4	.83	.08	.12	.07	.14	.17	.14	.00	.03	-.07
Exchange item 1	.11	.87	.04	.10	.09	.08	.07	.10	.11	.06
Exchange item 2	.13	.91	.03	.10	.09	.09	.09	.12	.13	.05
Exchange item 3	.13	.88	.07	.07	.07	.08	.09	.15	.16	.09
Exchange item 4	.12	.86	.06	.07	.09	.10	.09	.21	.16	.09
Inspirational appeal item 1	.61	.18	.20	.26	.14	.26	.14	.05	.06	-.05
Inspirational appeal item 2	.70	.14	.30	.19	.11	.26	.11	.03	-.03	-.02
Inspirational appeal item 3	.67	.11	.34	.12	.11	.29	.09	-.02	.05	-.02
Inspirational appeal item 4	.65	.14	.29	.16	.09	.30	.10	-.01	.06	-.12
Legitimizing item 1	.21	.12	.14	.15	.80	.11	.17	.03	.08	.06
Legitimizing item 2	.26	.12	.08	.12	.81	.16	.14	.07	.09	.07
Legitimizing item 3	.28	.04	.19	.10	.77	.18	.08	-.03	.10	.06
Legitimizing item 4	.28	.10	.13	.12	.83	.12	.10	.00	.09	.06
Apprising item 1	.25	.13	.12	.24	.17	.77	.12	.05	.06	.06
Apprising item 2	.33	.09	.20	.21	.18	.75	.21	.02	.10	-.02
Apprising item 3	.34	.11	.18	.22	.18	.77	.15	.05	.06	-.03
Apprising item 4	.31	.10	.22	.25	.15	.76	.15	.02	.07	-.03
Pressure item 1	-.07	.05	-.08	-.03	.08	.04	-.04	.19	.13	.80
Pressure item 2	-.10	.01	-.02	-.04	-.01	-.03	-.07	.14	.15	.82
Pressure item 3	-.02	.11	-.06	.02	.11	-.01	.00	.09	.14	.76
Pressure item 4	-.09	.08	-.08	-.02	.01	-.03	-.06	.09	.12	.87
Collaboration item 1	.26	.12	.79	.19	.14	.14	.21	.01	.00	-.06
Collaboration item 2	.32	.06	.75	.23	.15	.21	.27	-.01	.00	-.08
Collaboration item 3	.26	.02	.82	.17	.16	.17	.19	.00	-.04	-.07
Collaboration item 4	.29	.01	.78	.19	.16	.15	.24	-.06	-.01	-.17
Ingratiation item 1	.18	.09	.16	.78	.14	.20	.25	.07	.06	.03
Ingratiation item 2	.24	.11	.26	.79	.13	.20	.16	.06	.04	-.04
Ingratiation item 3	.20	.10	.27	.80	.13	.23	.19	.07	.00	-.04
Ingratiation item 4	.11	.11	.07	.76	.12	.19	.28	.06	.09	-.03
Consultation item 1	.22	.13	.18	.27	.17	.15	.75	.10	.06	-.03
Consultation item 2	.27	.12	.22	.28	.14	.15	.78	.05	.05	-.06
Consultation item 3	.27	.08	.32	.22	.15	.16	.75	-.01	.03	-.10
Consultation item 4	.25	.11	.25	.24	.13	.16	.79	.02	.03	-.08

Table 7 (cont'd)

Item	Component									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Personal appeals item 1	.03	.14	.02	.06	.06	.03	.05	.79	.20	.12
Personal appeals item 2	-.09	.14	-.01	.04	.04	.00	.09	.79	.14	.11
Personal appeals item 3	.01	.13	.01	.05	-.01	.01	-.02	.88	.18	.14
Personal appeals item 4	.01	.11	-.05	.04	-.03	.04	-.01	.82	.19	.15
Coalition item 1	.05	.06	-.06	.06	.23	-.02	.11	.25	.72	.13
Coalition item 2	.05	.16	.01	.07	.10	.06	.07	.19	.85	.12
Coalition item 3	.02	.14	.00	.04	.01	.08	-.03	.13	.84	.22
Coalition item 4	.06	.22	.02	.00	.02	.09	-.01	.25	.81	.17
Eigenvalues	14.97	6.20	2.57	2.32	1.88	1.70	1.53	1.45	1.29	1.02
% of variance	34.03	14.08	5.84	5.27	4.28	3.87	3.48	3.28	2.92	2.32

Note. Principal component analysis. Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization.

For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other tables, the reader is referred to the electronic version of this dissertation.

Table 8

Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Peer-rated Influence Tactics

Item	Component									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Rational persuasion item 1	.24	.11	.12	.11	-.04	.81	.20	.14	-.05	.00
Rational persuasion item 2	.31	.15	.07	.13	-.07	.74	.29	.18	-.05	.02
Rational persuasion item 3	.29	.20	.23	.07	-.12	.60	.31	.18	.08	.01
Rational persuasion item 4	.27	.13	.11	.06	-.07	.68	.44	.24	.00	.00
Exchange item 1	.10	.15	.04	.85	.17	.02	.16	.05	.14	.02
Exchange item 2	.04	.13	.08	.90	.22	.06	.04	.06	.15	.03
Exchange item 3	.08	.12	.08	.88	.26	.07	.04	.08	.16	.03
Exchange item 4	.14	.07	.17	.81	.27	.13	.04	.00	.11	.00
Inspirational appeal item 1	.21	.13	.30	.16	.09	.24	.74	.19	.05	.00
Inspirational appeal item 2	.30	.15	.22	.08	.06	.32	.76	.15	.06	.01
Inspirational appeal item 3	.29	.20	.20	.07	.11	.23	.75	.17	.07	-.03
Inspirational appeal item 4	.23	.24	.16	.05	.16	.25	.72	.18	.10	.01
Legitimizing item 1	.15	.83	.20	.09	.07	.14	.18	.12	.19	.01
Legitimizing item 2	.13	.81	.20	.18	.05	.17	.20	.14	.14	.08
Legitimizing item 3	.10	.85	.24	.10	.03	.11	.08	.09	.07	.09
Legitimizing item 4	.18	.85	.16	.16	.05	.11	.14	.13	.14	.07
Apprising item 1	.17	.23	.76	.16	.08	.06	.13	.18	.20	.17
Apprising item 2	.19	.25	.82	.06	.06	.13	.20	.08	.11	.09
Apprising item 3	.17	.18	.86	.07	.08	.14	.17	.13	.13	.06
Apprising item 4	.18	.19	.83	.10	.09	.13	.22	.13	.10	.08
Pressure item 1	-.04	.10	.16	.04	.12	.03	.03	.06	.02	.86
Pressure item 2	-.01	-.01	.09	.05	.04	-.06	-.03	-.02	.25	.85
Pressure item 3	.09	.13	.02	-.01	.06	.03	-.01	.04	.04	.85
Pressure item 4	-.01	-.02	.02	.00	.08	-.01	.01	-.04	.21	.88
Collaboration item 1	.82	.09	.13	.12	-.02	.16	.28	.22	.08	.03
Collaboration item 2	.81	.08	.17	.17	-.03	.12	.26	.24	.07	.08
Collaboration item 3	.59	.26	.37	.21	.03	-.01	.32	.22	.10	.08
Collaboration item 4	.83	.12	.14	.10	.01	.16	.24	.21	.05	.04
Ingratiation item 1	.32	.20	.13	.08	.16	.19	.19	.74	.10	.04
Ingratiation item 2	.40	.13	.19	.04	.14	.20	.22	.75	.07	.03
Ingratiation item 3	.35	.12	.15	.08	.14	.24	.20	.78	.07	.01
Ingratiation item 4	.31	.12	.14	.05	.09	.18	.14	.81	.09	.01
Consultation item 1	.67	.02	.15	.00	.22	.39	.05	.24	.03	-.03
Consultation item 2	.64	.22	.07	.02	.29	.47	.11	.20	.06	-.08
Consultation item 3	.61	.17	.13	-.04	.26	.47	.05	.31	.09	-.07
Consultation item 4	.62	.23	.16	.03	.25	.44	.05	.21	.11	-.03

Table 8 (cont'd)

Item	Component									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Personal appeals item 1	.13	.02	.05	.22	.77	-.05	.11	.15	.22	.13
Personal appeals item 2	.08	.03	.01	.19	.81	.06	.05	.10	.22	.09
Personal appeals item 3	.08	.07	.11	.25	.85	-.05	.04	.09	.19	.07
Personal appeals item 4	.05	.04	.10	.28	.83	-.04	.07	.05	.19	.08
Coalition item 1	.21	.19	.13	.17	.31	.01	.09	.05	.66	.05
Coalition item 2	.09	.16	.21	.21	.20	.01	.06	.10	.83	.16
Coalition item 3	.03	.12	.08	.13	.21	.00	.05	.03	.86	.21
Coalition item 4	.03	.11	.09	.12	.22	.00	.04	.10	.87	.19
Eigenvalues	16.53	5.62	3.19	2.62	1.90	1.69	1.45	1.36	1.16	1.03
% of variance	37.57	12.77	7.24	5.96	4.32	3.85	3.29	3.09	2.63	2.34

Note. Principal component analysis. Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization.

Table 9

Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Senior Manager-rated Influence Tactics

Item	Component				
	1	2	3	4	5
Rational persuasion item 1	.52	.39	.39	.36	-.21
Rational persuasion item 2	.65	.16	.30	.37	-.19
Rational persuasion item 3	.50	-.08	.40	.44	.03
Consultation item 1	-.03	-.06	.85	-.08	.08
Consultation item 2	.22	-.08	.86	-.06	.06
Consultation item 3	.36	.10	.78	-.13	-.13
Inspirational appeal item 1	.87	-.05	.14	.01	.12
Inspirational appeal item 2	.89	.11	.14	.02	-.01
Inspirational appeal item 3	.84	.15	-.01	.01	-.04
Legitimizing item 1	.20	.79	-.20	.05	.01
Legitimizing item 2	.13	.90	.09	.01	.01
Legitimizing item 3	.12	.70	-.14	.37	.09
Pressure item 1	.04	.04	-.05	.00	.89
Pressure item 2	-.16	.23	.22	.37	.59
Pressure item 3	.07	.62	-.02	.17	.44
Coalition item 1	.05	.08	-.17	.87	.05
Coalition item 2	.11	.28	-.14	.78	.18
Coalition item 3	-.29	.47	.22	.05	.02
Eigenvalues	4.95	3.33	1.91	1.51	1.17
% of variance	27.50	18.53	10.59	8.41	6.49

Note. Principal component analysis. Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization.

Table 10

Exploratory Factor Analysis Component Matrix for Customer-rated Influence Tactics

Item	Component							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Rational persuasion item 1	.30	.78	.08	.01	.03	.09	.23	.02
Rational persuasion item 2	.19	.84	.08	.06	-.12	.03	.19	-.06
Rational persuasion item 3	.25	.87	.03	.02	.01	.13	.08	.04
Rational persuasion item 4	.23	.89	.04	-.02	.08	.09	.10	.06
Exchange item 1	.16	.07	.81	.23	.12	.25	.17	.15
Exchange item 2	.19	.17	.75	.16	.15	.23	.10	.36
Exchange item 3	.20	.18	.83	.21	.18	.18	.14	.12
Exchange item 4	.19	.17	.81	.23	.19	.23	.11	.13
Inspirational appeal item 1	.20	.51	.32	.16	.02	.41	.20	.16
Inspirational appeal item 2	.28	.70	.19	.12	.02	.31	.09	.13
Inspirational appeal item 3	.28	.62	.27	.05	.07	.33	.28	.06
Inspirational appeal item 4	.20	.55	.31	.10	-.01	.35	.19	.23
Legitimizing item 1	.37	.41	.07	.13	.06	.14	.68	.06
Legitimizing item 2	.33	.38	.22	.16	.06	.17	.73	.08
Legitimizing item 3	.36	.48	.16	.11	.06	.10	.63	.13
Legitimizing item 4	.35	.41	.23	.16	.04	.11	.71	.08
Appraising item 1	.34	.25	.28	.23	.14	.65	.10	-.15
Appraising item 2	.32	.26	.28	.24	.10	.71	.04	-.08
Appraising item 3	.36	.35	.29	.09	.05	.66	.20	.08
Appraising item 4	.31	.40	.17	.16	.02	.60	.12	.08
Pressure item 1	.03	-.04	.15	.16	.79	-.05	.04	-.01
Pressure item 2	.05	.01	.02	.16	.89	.10	.01	.15
Pressure item 3	.11	.08	.29	.41	.70	.05	.10	.06
Pressure item 4	.04	.01	.08	.20	.93	.10	.01	.13
Collaboration item 1	.80	.20	.02	-.01	.06	.24	.22	.16
Collaboration item 2	.79	.20	.06	.01	.07	.16	.18	.11
Collaboration item 3	.82	.31	.12	.01	.09	.17	.09	.11
Collaboration item 4	.74	.24	-.03	-.03	.05	.19	.26	.19
Ingratiation item 1	.61	.19	.41	.43	.07	.03	.08	.03
Ingratiation item 2	.64	.23	.42	.41	.04	.07	.11	-.12
Ingratiation item 3	.66	.17	.41	.39	.04	.03	.12	-.13
Ingratiation item 4	.53	.23	.47	.46	.07	-.02	-.05	-.08
Consultation item 1	.65	.13	.24	.34	.00	.13	.17	.18
Consultation item 2	.72	.26	.26	.31	.05	.13	.13	.06
Consultation item 3	.77	.31	.11	.18	.03	.20	.10	.12
Consultation item 4	.68	.31	.19	.25	.05	.23	.13	.11

Table 10 (cont'd)

Item	Component							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Personal appeals item 1	.21	.06	.11	.75	.17	.17	.09	.13
Personal appeals item 2	.11	-.11	.18	.75	.24	.13	.17	.21
Personal appeals item 3	.09	.05	.29	.77	.27	.12	.04	.10
Personal appeals item 4	.14	.05	.11	.74	.26	.17	.11	.14
Coalition item 1	.32	.20	.22	.51	.19	-.12	-.17	.49
Coalition item 2	.32	.09	.35	.20	.25	.02	.03	.64
Coalition item 3	.13	.09	.15	.37	.10	.01	.29	.67
Coalition item 4	.24	.19	.36	.46	.25	-.01	.06	.54
Eigenvalues	19.88	5.26	2.40	2.04	1.62	1.29	1.25	1.03
% of variance	45.17	11.96	5.46	4.64	3.68	2.94	2.84	2.33

Table 11

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables

	Variable	M	SD	N
1.	Leader age	46.28	10.59	104
2.	Leader gender	1.83	.37	109
3.	Leader education	3.43	1.17	109
4.	Leader tenure in position	7.66	7.37	107
5.	Leader tenure with organization	14.93	12.21	109
6.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate A)	4.36	.77	106
7.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate B)	4.11	.80	105
8.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate C)	3.79	.81	104
9.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate D)	3.85	.89	46
10.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Subordinate E)	3.76	.85	34
11.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer A)	3.20	.79	100
12.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer B)	3.11	.80	94
13.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer C)	2.97	.68	95
14.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer D)	2.93	.87	27
15.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Peer E)	2.82	1.01	17
16.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Senior manager)	3.25	.80	104
17.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer A)	3.18	.73	89
18.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer B)	3.11	.73	89
19.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer C)	2.89	.72	83
20.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer D)	2.88	.61	24
21.	Leader-rated interaction frequency (with Customer E)	2.93	.83	14
22.	Leader task dependence (on Subordinate A)	3.98	.65	108
23.	Leader task dependence (on Subordinate B)	3.65	.70	107
24.	Leader task dependence (on Subordinate C)	3.34	.77	106
25.	Leader task dependence (on Subordinate D)	3.36	.73	48
26.	Leader task dependence (on Subordinate E)	3.28	.64	36
27.	Leader task dependence (on Peer A)	3.05	.80	102
28.	Leader task dependence (on Peer B)	3.00	.75	96
29.	Leader task dependence (on Peer C)	2.87	.74	97
30.	Leader task dependence (on Peer D)	3.04	.76	27
31.	Leader task dependence (on Peer E)	2.92	.82	17
32.	Leader task dependence (on Senior manager)	3.75	.63	104
33.	Leader task dependence (on Customer A)	2.81	.82	90
34.	Leader task dependence (on Customer B)	2.81	.73	89
35.	Leader task dependence (on Customer C)	2.81	.74	85
36.	Leader task dependence (on Customer D)	2.73	.82	24
37.	Leader task dependence (on Customer E)	2.70	.87	14

Table 11 (cont'd)

	Variable	M	SD	N
38.	Political skill (leader-rated)	4.00	.37	105
39.	Self monitoring (leader-rated)	2.69	.37	105
40.	Relationship quality with Senior manager (Leader-rated)	3.85	.55	105
41.	Subordinate age	36.63	13.35	537
42.	Subordinate gender	1.94	.24	611
43.	Subordinate education	3.18	1.09	612
44.	Subordinate tenure in position	4.19	4.63	580
45.	Subordinate tenure with organization	6.69	6.88	592
46.	Subordinate-rated tenure with Leader	3.30	3.77	510
47.	Subordinate-rated interaction frequency (with Leader)	4.17	1.01	377
48.	Subordinate task dependence (on Leader)	3.20	.85	583
49.	Collaboration (Subordinate-rated)	3.43	1.17	584
50.	Consultation (Subordinate-rated)	3.21	1.21	583
51.	Exchange (Subordinate-rated)	1.81	1.09	582
52.	Ingratiation (Subordinate-rated)	3.17	1.24	584
53.	Inspirational appeal (Subordinate-rated)	3.42	1.11	584
54.	Personal appeals (Subordinate-rated)	1.59	.84	581
55.	Apprising (Subordinate-rated)	3.20	1.25	582
56.	Rational persuasion (Subordinate-rated)	3.64	1.09	583
57.	Coalition (Subordinate-rated)	1.62	.84	581
58.	Legitimizing (Subordinate-rated)	3.25	1.23	584
59.	Pressure (Subordinate-rated)	1.52	.81	583
60.	Task performance (Subordinate-rated)	3.75	.90	577
61.	Viability (Subordinate-rated)	3.92	.95	576
62.	Relationship quality with Leader (Subordinate-rated)	3.92	.61	574
63.	Political skill of Leader (Subordinate-rated)	3.96	.68	578
64.	Peer age	45.93	10.52	277
65.	Peer gender	1.78	.42	302
66.	Peer education	3.58	1.29	302
67.	Peer tenure in position	7.20	6.85	302
68.	Peer tenure with organization	15.50	11.85	302
69.	Peer-rated tenure with Leader	6.81	7.52	280
70.	Peer-rated interaction frequency (with Leader)	3.09	.94	287
71.	Peer task dependence (on Leader)	2.49	.94	285
72.	Collaboration (Peer-rated)	3.05	1.33	285
73.	Consultation (Peer-rated)	3.15	1.28	285
74.	Exchange (Peer-rated)	1.68	1.02	285

Table 11 (cont'd)

	Variable	M	SD	N
75.	Ingratiation (Peer-rated)	2.94	1.35	285
76.	Inspirational appeal (Peer-rated)	2.82	1.24	285
77.	Personal appeals (Peer-rated)	1.65	.91	286
78.	Apprising (Peer-rated)	2.11	1.23	285
79.	Rational persuasion (Peer-rated)	3.23	1.18	287
80.	Coalition (Peer-rated)	1.49	.80	285
81.	Legitimizing (Peer-rated)	2.44	1.27	285
82.	Pressure (Peer-rated)	1.14	.46	285
83.	Task performance (Peer-rated)	3.74	.73	285
84.	Viability (Peer-rated)	3.87	.72	286
85.	Relationship quality with Leader (Peer-rated)	3.80	.54	286
86.	Senior manager age	52.82	3.94	93
87.	Senior manager gender	1.88	.32	119
88.	Senior manager education	4.01	1.27	119
89.	Senior manager tenure in position	6.56	7.22	119
90.	Senior manager tenure with organization	17.52	13.66	119
91.	Senior manager-rated tenure with Leader	3.09	4.34	119
92.	Consultation (Senior manager-rated)	3.31	.88	119
93.	Inspirational appeal (Senior manager-rated)	2.92	.99	119
94.	Rational persuasion (Senior manager-rated)	3.31	.79	119
95.	Coalition (Senior manager-rated)	1.37	.49	119
96.	Legitimizing (Senior manager-rated)	1.59	.74	119
97.	Pressure (Senior manager-rated)	1.20	.37	119
98.	Task performance (Senior manager-rated)	3.46	.63	119
99.	Viability (Senior manager-rated)	3.81	.65	119
100.	Customer age	51.96	13.43	142
101.	Customer gender	1.54	.50	148
102.	Customer education	4.03	3.41	147
103.	Customer tenure with organization	15.62	12.77	147
104.	Customer-rated tenure with Leader	6.20	6.65	143
105.	Customer-rated interaction frequency (with Leader)	3.23	1.01	147
106.	Collaboration (Customer-rated)	2.57	1.60	134
107.	Consultation (Customer-rated)	2.22	1.48	132
108.	Exchange (Customer-rated)	1.55	1.13	137
109.	Ingratiation (Customer-rated)	1.98	1.35	133
110.	Inspirational appeal (Customer-rated)	2.53	1.39	137
111.	Personal appeals (Customer-rated)	1.37	.83	135

Table 11 (cont'd)

	Variable	M	SD	N
112.	Apprising (Customer-rated)	2.15	1.33	138
113.	Rational persuasion (Customer-rated)	3.19	1.53	140
114.	Coalition (Customer-rated)	1.39	.80	134
115.	Legitimizing (Customer-rated)	2.50	1.51	138
116.	Pressure (Customer-rated)	1.08	.39	140
117.	Task performance (Customer-rated)	4.41	.69	147
118.	Viability (Customer-rated)	4.44	.63	146
119.	Relationship quality with Leader (Customer-rated)	4.57	.52	147

Note. “.a” indicates this relationship cannot be computed because of missing data.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$; two-tailed

Table 11 (cont'd)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.								
2.	.04							
3.	-.37 **	-.49 **						
4.	.40 **	.08	-.23 *					
5.	.55 **	.20 *	-.43 **	.55 **				
6.	-.20 *	-.13	.28 **	-.09	-.20 *			
7.	-.43 **	-.10	.27 **	-.37 **	-.32 **	.37 **		
8.	-.38 **	.05	.15	-.29 **	-.32 **	.27 **	.52 **	
9.	-.28	.00	.25	-.34 *	-.34 *	.34 *	.72 **	.63 **
10.	-.43 *	.01	.23	-.37 *	-.38 *	.11	.57 **	.42 *
11.	-.09	.05	.00	-.14	-.07	.24 *	.24 *	.10
12.	.00	-.01	.14	-.14	-.12	.23 *	.33 **	.25 *
13.	.14	.02	-.06	-.03	-.01	.07	.14	.05
14.	.11	-.31	.05	.00	.12	.13	.14	.29
15.	-.14	-.07	.30	-.03	.00	-.04	.25	-.04
16.	-.16	-.08	.04	-.15	-.12	.00	.06	.02
17.	-.17	.15	-.03	-.12	.10	-.01	.08	.29 **
18.	-.23 *	.14	-.11	-.01	-.05	-.09	-.03	.16
19.	-.09	-.01	-.02	.06	.05	-.17	-.11	.07
20.	-.24	-.06	.03	-.28	.03	-.22	-.06	.11
21.	.36	-.02	-.35	-.10	.52	-.35	-.35	-.12
22.	.02	.02	.15	-.03	.03	.57 **	.28 **	.09
23.	-.15	-.01	.17	-.21 *	-.06	.29 **	.60 **	.29 **
24.	-.16	.08	.02	-.21 *	-.14	.13	.31 **	.60 **
25.	.06	.03	.10	-.16	-.04	.20	.41 **	.17
26.	-.14	.02	.01	-.11	-.01	-.03	.19	.04
27.	.20	.07	.01	-.01	.09	.15	.09	-.02
28.	.09	-.03	.08	-.10	-.03	.01	.05	.04
29.	.36 **	.00	-.10	-.03	.14	-.06	-.02	-.09
30.	.19	-.20	-.10	-.01	.02	-.24	-.17	.01
31.	.18	-.08	.16	-.02	.04	-.26	.11	.14
32.	-.11	-.03	.11	-.19	.00	.12	.21 *	-.05
33.	.04	.07	-.09	-.04	.14	-.06	.10	.24 *
34.	.06	.12	-.17	.00	.07	-.18	.04	.16
35.	.00	.01	-.06	-.02	.00	-.03	.10	.14
36.	-.07	.01	.04	-.23	.05	-.30	-.07	.11
37.	.37	-.03	-.19	-.14	.40	-.37	-.24	-.16

Table 11 (cont'd)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
38.	-.10	.00	.10	-.06	-.07	.28 **	.26 *	.18
39.	-.33 **	-.34 **	.48 **	-.03	-.22 *	.24 *	.18	.20 *
40.	-.24 *	.07	-.02	-.14	-.23 *	.07	.17	.10
41.	.09	-.17	-.15	.04	.14	-.16	-.10	-.10
42.	.10	.06	-.08	.06	.24 *	-.17	.04	-.02
43.	.12	.04	-.04	-.19 *	-.05	.06	-.01	.10
44.	.01	-.06	-.05	.12	.01	-.07	.07	.05
45.	.07	-.05	-.08	.12	.18	-.10	.04	.08
46.	.33 **	.01	-.16	.47 **	.47 **	-.06	-.17	-.19
47.	.02	.13	-.19	-.12	-.04	-.02	-.05	-.09
48.	-.04	.04	-.02	.07	-.03	-.02	-.01	.01
49.	-.11	.06	.14	-.14	-.14	.00	.09	.15
50.	-.07	-.06	.23 *	-.18	-.26 **	.21 *	.14	.16
51.	-.16	.09	.17	-.04	-.19	.09	-.07	.17
52.	.07	-.09	.17	-.05	-.12	.19	-.03	.12
53.	-.12	-.01	.16	-.18	-.20 *	-.03	.01	.10
54.	-.20 *	.10	.08	-.11	-.12	.16	.06	.14
55.	-.06	-.02	.20 *	-.07	-.19	-.01	.04	.09
56.	-.19	-.07	.25 **	-.14	-.23 *	.02	.10	.20 *
57.	.16	.01	-.08	.02	-.01	.17	.01	.09
58.	.02	.05	-.05	-.05	-.09	-.01	-.02	.01
59.	.10	-.01	-.03	.01	.08	.23 *	-.05	-.02
60.	-.16	-.07	.12	-.03	-.11	.00	.09	.22 *
61.	-.12	-.02	.03	.04	-.04	.00	.05	.17
62.	-.08	-.03	.14	-.03	-.08	.04	.05	.20 *
63.	-.12	-.08	.08	-.06	-.14	.02	.07	.15
64.	.06	-.07	-.15	.03	.09	-.12	-.18	-.11
65.	.11	-.17	-.05	.12	.06	-.05	-.26 *	-.20
66.	-.05	-.02	.24 *	-.13	-.30 **	.20	.11	.18
67.	-.11	.09	-.09	-.01	.02	-.12	-.02	.06
68.	.05	.06	-.28 **	.04	.18	-.14	-.07	-.09
69.	.18	.19	-.28 **	.24 *	.53 **	-.18	-.29 **	-.23 *
70.	.09	.07	.02	.06	-.07	.02	.16	-.05
71.	.05	.06	.03	.03	-.09	-.07	.03	-.05
72.	-.08	.19	-.01	.14	.00	-.05	.00	.03
73.	.02	.07	.00	.21 *	-.04	-.11	-.07	.00
74.	-.03	.14	-.12	.05	-.05	-.04	-.10	-.09

Table 11 (cont'd)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
75.	.02	.32 **	-.10	.08	.04	-.19	-.15	.04
76.	-.12	.13	.07	-.10	-.15	.03	.24 *	.15
77.	.06	.18	.00	.17	-.01	-.09	-.08	-.22 *
78.	-.14	.15	-.02	.01	.02	.08	.14	-.02
79.	-.14	.10	.02	-.12	-.10	.03	.19	.24 *
80.	.02	.21 *	-.02	.05	-.12	.02	-.05	-.15
81.	.06	.17	-.15	.01	.06	-.10	-.09	.02
82.	.12	.08	-.06	.10	.07	.04	-.19	-.26 *
83.	-.09	.00	.08	.01	-.07	.02	.20	.12
84.	-.16	-.01	.03	-.02	.01	.07	.17	.06
85.	-.16	.04	.00	.10	.07	.02	.15	.02
86.	-.16	-.05	.03	.00	-.18	-.03	-.08	.12
87.	.02	.00	.10	-.05	.00	.11	.09	.04
88.	-.16	.08	-.04	.07	.03	.10	.06	.05
89.	-.06	.02	-.06	-.01	-.08	-.07	-.05	-.03
90.	.12	-.03	.06	.03	-.04	-.11	-.24 *	-.08
91.	.22 *	.08	-.15	.27 **	.31 **	-.17	-.28 **	-.23 *
92.	-.25 *	.14	-.12	-.19 *	-.23 *	.01	.06	.16
93.	-.18	.14	.10	.01	-.13	.24 *	.30 **	.27 **
94.	-.28 **	-.04	.21 *	-.10	-.23 *	.20 *	.29 **	.32 **
95.	-.15	-.17	.10	.02	.07	.14	.16	.24 *
96.	.02	-.07	.05	-.02	.09	.05	.12	.11
97.	-.09	.02	.00	-.05	-.09	.01	.08	.11
98.	-.14	.13	.10	.09	-.11	.06	.20 *	.14
99.	-.21 *	.10	.04	.01	-.21 *	.11	.18	.14
100.	.19	.04	-.20	.16	.11	.06	-.10	-.10
101.	.13	.18	-.16	-.01	.08	-.06	-.20	.06
102.	.20	-.15	.11	.31 *	.20	.05	-.05	.12
103.	.19	-.19	-.01	.04	.27 *	.11	.03	-.20
104.	.47 **	-.09	-.26	.47 **	.66 **	.00	-.17	-.22
105.	-.03	.01	-.01	-.01	.13	.06	.04	.00
106.	.10	.00	.10	.10	.06	-.05	.00	.25
107.	.00	-.14	.16	.09	-.02	.05	.09	.27
108.	-.19	-.06	.33 *	.09	-.15	.06	-.08	.22
109.	.05	-.17	.18	.14	.00	-.01	-.08	.13
110.	-.09	-.02	.16	-.02	-.01	-.07	-.01	.17
111.	-.11	-.41 **	.23	-.13	-.13	.08	.03	.15

Table 11 (cont'd)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
112.	-.19	-.11	.28 *	-.14	-.15	.02	.10	.16
113.	.04	-.07	.04	.13	.23	-.06	.01	-.03
114.	-.12	-.18	.21	-.06	-.12	-.10	-.02	.10
115.	-.05	-.25	.26	.02	-.01	-.22	.01	.06
116.	-.08	-.34 *	.21	-.10	-.14	-.04	-.01	.06
117.	.10	-.08	-.01	.16	.08	.09	-.10	.18
118.	.00	-.11	-.01	.10	.08	.14	-.02	.12
119.	.05	-.19	.08	.15	.12	.13	.06	.22

Table 11 (cont'd)

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.	.73 **							
11.	.40 **	.32						
12.	.53 **	.33	.40 **					
13.	.22	.31	.33 **	.53 **				
14.	.39	.40	.31	.65 **	.48 *			
15.	.28	.49	.26	.63 **	.54 *	.66 **		
16.	.14	.16	.25 *	.15	.06	.36	.59 *	
17.	.27	.22	.28 **	.18	.16	.35	.22	.20
18.	.22	.17	.04	.10	-.01	.09	.19	.35 **
19.	.09	-.20	.10	.15	.25 *	.31	-.13	.08
20.	.35	.59 *	.32	.62 **	.33	.71 **	.81 **	.50 *
21.	.19	.52	.50	.55	.34	.67 *	.55	.29
22.	.19	.16	.17	-.01	.04	.14	.25	.11
23.	.40 **	.26	.18	.07	.09	.17	.51 *	.15
24.	.25	.12	-.05	-.03	.02	.23	.20	.09
25.	.52 **	.40 *	.28	.37 *	.28	.45 *	.55 *	.17
26.	.28	.52 **	.21	.10	.24	.26	.51	.38 *
27.	.32 *	.19	.54 **	.43 **	.33 **	.53 **	.51 *	.16
28.	.38 *	.34	.39 **	.62 **	.38 **	.54 **	.59 *	.08
29.	.07	.17	.25 *	.28 **	.55 **	.29	.56 *	.04
30.	.30	.31	.30	.56 **	.45 *	.77 **	.69 **	.42 *
31.	.44	.51	.34	.60 *	.62 **	.79 **	.82 **	.27
32.	.13	.15	.30 **	.17	.15	.28	.61 **	.73 **
33.	.33 *	.24	.12	.18	.16	.12	.41	.26 *
34.	.25	.24	.05	.14	.05	.05	.31	.31 **
35.	.11	.04	.23 *	.20	.28 *	.37	.41	.32 **
36.	.10	.20	.12	.48 *	.42	.53 *	.69 *	.45 *
37.	-.08	.23	.14	.37	.44	.53	.65	.30

Table 11 (cont'd)

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
38.	.27	.25	.16	.21 *	.10	.18	.09	.19 *
39.	.03	.10	-.07	.05	.10	.15	.07	-.12
40.	.11	.01	.19	.04	-.01	.19	.47	.37 **
41.	-.03	-.12	-.05	.07	-.03	.01	.03	.15
42.	-.19	-.05	-.13	-.06	-.07	-.02	-.04	.04
43.	.11	.29	.00	.17	.26 *	.09	-.04	-.05
44.	.12	.07	-.08	-.05	-.01	-.13	.03	-.07
45.	.21	.16	.03	-.08	-.07	-.05	-.02	.00
46.	-.10	-.35	.06	-.04	.01	.20	.21	-.02
47.	-.13	-.04	-.14	.04	-.01	.01	.00	.05
48.	.07	.32	-.02	-.08	-.09	.02	.07	-.15
49.	.15	.22	.04	.07	-.01	-.10	-.18	-.03
50.	.29 *	.37 *	.02	.09	.01	-.14	-.10	-.10
51.	.17	.00	.13	.22 *	.01	.07	-.25	.05
52.	.08	.02	-.11	.17	-.01	-.12	-.29	-.09
53.	-.03	-.03	-.07	.00	-.03	.04	-.23	-.07
54.	.10	.30	.00	-.07	-.14	.27	-.27	.08
55.	.18	.20	-.07	.11	-.04	-.13	-.16	-.09
56.	.16	.06	-.05	-.02	-.09	.13	-.15	-.06
57.	.13	.00	-.02	-.04	-.10	.01	-.23	-.13
58.	.08	.12	-.03	-.08	-.12	-.10	-.37	-.12
59.	.12	.10	.20 *	.04	-.15	.26	-.07	-.04
60.	.24	.28	-.04	-.02	.08	.08	.07	-.02
61.	.10	.14	-.14	-.12	.03	-.17	-.25	-.07
62.	.19	.19	-.13	-.09	-.05	-.09	-.05	-.05
63.	.16	.22	.02	-.01	.03	.01	-.01	-.01
64.	-.11	-.24	-.02	-.17	-.15	.20	.10	.04
65.	-.12	-.11	.02	.02	.12	.06	.05	-.27 *
66.	.12	.19	.05	.03	-.01	-.13	-.30	.04
67.	.08	.27	.06	-.15	-.13	.03	.04	.03
68.	.04	.06	-.07	-.24 *	-.08	.02	.10	-.07
69.	-.13	-.21	-.09	-.16	.04	.13	.01	-.27 *
70.	.03	.36 *	.12	.27 *	.18	.39	.36	-.13
71.	-.07	.15	-.04	.17	.05	.22	-.05	-.11
72.	.03	.25	-.03	.05	.06	.29	.12	.06
73.	-.12	.20	.00	.03	.12	.44 *	.02	-.02
74.	.02	.07	-.09	.06	-.09	.57 **	.66 **	.09

Table 11 (cont'd)

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
75.	-.08	.19	-.03	.14	.14	.51 *	.37	-.06
76.	.22	.35	.07	.11	.02	.40	.30	.06
77.	.03	.12	.01	.04	-.02	.29	.46	.07
78.	.12	.34	-.05	.07	.06	.29	.21	-.06
79.	.32 *	.44 *	.12	.17	.06	.55 **	-.07	.02
80.	-.01	.03	-.08	-.04	-.05	.06	-.23	-.06
81.	.17	.38 *	-.05	.10	.25 *	.45 *	.10	-.02
82.	-.02	-.03	.08	.18	.07	.57 **	.55 *	-.08
83.	.16	.36 *	.03	.06	.07	.19	-.20	.05
84.	.09	.25	-.03	-.03	.02	.15	-.19	.08
85.	-.04	.35	-.02	-.01	.08	.38	.30	.04
86.	-.03	-.08	.07	.17	.05	.24	-.24	.04
87.	.15	-.05	-.07	-.01	.04	-.02	.12	.08
88.	.10	.15	.04	-.10	-.07	-.09	-.17	-.13
89.	-.10	-.09	.11	.10	-.03	-.05	-.25	-.08
90.	-.23	-.29	-.07	.08	.06	.13	.19	.11
91.	-.22	-.22	-.16	-.06	-.06	-.04	.02	-.12
92.	.20	.04	.08	.05	-.10	.04	-.10	.15
93.	.38 **	.20	-.01	-.11	-.17	-.13	-.04	-.05
94.	.29	.14	.02	-.01	-.16	-.26	-.02	-.01
95.	.19	.43 *	.02	.05	.04	.18	.16	.04
96.	.32 *	.34 *	-.06	.00	-.02	-.08	-.08	-.17
97.	.14	.33	-.14	.11	-.02	-.06	.12	-.11
98.	.13	-.06	.05	.04	-.14	-.10	.00	-.04
99.	.09	.00	.06	-.09	-.18	-.15	.12	.05
100.	.17	.43	.02	-.08	.01	.07	.77 *	.01
101.	-.25	-.21	-.01	.07	.05	-.28	-.40	-.05
102.	.01	.40	.13	.15	.08	.51 *	.08	.21
103.	-.02	.21	.03	-.07	-.13	.13	.69 *	-.01
104.	-.19	.00	.31 *	.12	.21	.32	.71 *	-.22
105.	-.15	-.39	-.08	.13	.07	.36	-.11	.01
106.	.16	-.21	-.10	.12	.09	.17	-.28	.14
107.	.34	-.02	.04	.02	-.02	.15	-.28	.11
108.	.03	-.03	.03	-.02	-.13	.04	.13	-.04
109.	.17	.13	-.01	-.03	.10	.37	.25	-.04
110.	.25	.20	.11	.10	.02	.09	-.07	-.01
111.	.12	.03	.01	-.09	-.01	.49	-.22	.03

Table 11 (cont'd)

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
112.	.45 *	.21	.10	.15	.03	.03	.23	-.04
113.	.06	-.11	-.08	.12	.00	.26	-.04	-.05
114.	-.02	.05	.11	-.19	-.11	.17	-.09	.04
115.	.22	.17	-.03	-.04	-.04	.16	.01	.15
116.	.11	-.04	-.07	-.03	-.03	.06	.a **	-.03
117.	.10	.53 *	.06	.17	.25	.40	.52	.16
118.	.07	.33	.10	.15	.17	.52 *	.53	.14
119.	.06	.31	.02	.09	.20	.64 *	.66	.15

Table 11 (cont'd)

	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
1.								
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17.								
18.	.46 **							
19.	.28 *	.21						
20.	.25	.48 *	.34					
21.	.39	.12	.23	.68 **				
22.	-.05	-.14	-.03	-.02	.03			
23.	.03	-.08	.03	.11	.03	.54 **		
24.	.09	.04	.06	.19	.14	.29 **	.60 **	
25.	-.05	-.10	-.12	.40	.34	.44 **	.65 **	.55 **
26.	.01	.09	-.17	.57 *	.45	.37 *	.48 **	.66 **
27.	.22 *	.03	.19	.44 *	.64 *	.36 **	.32 **	.22 *
28.	.11	-.02	.22	.68 **	.62 *	.05	.15	.14
29.	.07	-.11	.14	.37	.66 *	.20 *	.26 *	.28 **
30.	.24	.17	.22	.72 **	.60	-.21	-.04	.16
31.	.10	-.19	.04	.75 **	.65	.27	.49 *	.43
32.	.10	.16	-.01	.30	.08	.29 **	.38 **	.13
33.	.54 **	.31 **	.10	.29	.52	.04	.14	.25 *
34.	.39 **	.42 **	.05	.46 *	.42	.02	.17	.26 *
35.	.30 **	.17	.31 **	.35	.50	.24 *	.18	.23 *
36.	.08	.17	.36	.67 **	.51	.09	.22	.31
37.	.08	.00	.29	.55 *	.65 *	.03	.19	.22

Table 11 (cont'd)

	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
38.	.07	.14	.12	.05	.22	.29 **	.26 **	.05
39.	-.05	-.07	.14	-.21	-.31	-.06	.04	-.01
40.	.05	.12	.15	.08	.24	.20 *	.29 **	.09
41.	-.04	.14	-.15	.30	-.05	-.24 *	-.14	-.08
42.	.00	.10	-.04	-.04	-.02	.04	.13	.04
43.	-.19	-.34 **	-.16	-.02	.27	-.05	-.09	-.01
44.	-.01	.00	-.17	.20	.29	-.11	-.06	.04
45.	.19	.03	-.14	.24	.17	-.08	-.02	.08
46.	.10	-.13	-.04	.26	.18	-.03	-.11	-.08
47.	-.18	.06	-.02	.37	.16	-.03	-.13	-.03
48.	.02	.06	.07	.13	.32	.05	-.01	.06
49.	.02	-.07	.26 *	.10	-.02	.13	.04	.11
50.	-.03	-.04	.13	.07	-.05	.14	.09	.11
51.	.11	.00	.27 *	.06	-.09	-.08	-.22 *	-.06
52.	-.10	-.11	.10	.03	-.23	.09	-.09	.03
53.	.02	-.19	.11	-.08	-.15	.07	-.07	.06
54.	.08	-.06	.19	.18	.05	.15	.03	.01
55.	-.01	-.14	.13	.07	.08	-.05	-.06	-.01
56.	.06	-.14	.16	-.04	-.09	.02	-.02	.12
57.	-.17	-.12	.16	-.14	.10	.08	.01	-.04
58.	-.15	-.07	.14	-.23	.21	.01	-.10	.02
59.	-.02	.02	.00	-.01	-.21	.05	-.10	-.20 *
60.	.14	.01	.22 *	.19	.44	.08	-.01	.15
61.	.11	.02	.20	-.12	-.17	.09	-.03	.14
62.	.04	-.02	.11	-.08	.00	.17	.09	.22 *
63.	.09	.03	.20	.07	.36	.15	.05	.14
64.	.07	.15	.07	-.07	-.04	-.09	-.20	-.17
65.	-.05	.00	.13	.05	.55	-.07	-.27 **	-.24 *
66.	-.16	-.14	-.16	-.45 *	-.57	.10	.08	.14
67.	.13	.29 **	-.06	.31	-.05	.04	-.08	.03
68.	.13	.17	.05	.18	-.12	-.08	-.17	-.13
69.	.23 *	.17	.32 **	.49 *	.45	-.02	-.06	-.04
70.	-.23 *	-.18	.07	.35	.25	.14	.05	-.02
71.	-.32 **	-.37 **	-.07	.06	.20	-.04	-.09	-.08
72.	.03	-.11	.16	.00	-.31	-.02	.07	.07
73.	.07	-.13	.33 **	.12	.16	.01	-.01	.00
74.	.02	.08	.01	.27	.15	-.12	-.12	-.13

Table 11 (cont'd)

	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
75.	.14	.04	.22	.42	.32	-.11	-.04	.03
76.	.03	-.04	.18	.17	.27	.05	.20	.02
77.	-.05	.07	.14	.26	.13	.02	-.02	-.15
78.	-.01	.04	.11	.45 *	.31	.07	.20	.01
79.	.13	-.12	.20	.19	.38	-.04	.12	.04
80.	.02	.10	.06	-.23	-.59 *	.02	-.07	-.13
81.	.00	-.02	.05	.32	.16	-.07	-.04	.00
82.	.13	-.02	.07	.19	.23	-.04	-.24 *	-.25 *
83.	-.07	-.35 **	.13	-.05	.14	.08	.27 **	.14
84.	-.12	-.25 *	.12	.14	.18	.16	.30 **	.13
85.	-.11	-.22	.04	.30	.26	.13	.31 **	.18
86.	-.08	-.14	.21	.40	-.18	-.01	.04	.15
87.	.07	.26 *	-.10	-.06	-.02	.06	-.03	-.06
88.	-.04	-.16	.04	-.08	-.14	.13	.16	.14
89.	-.11	-.28 **	.07	.02	-.06	-.10	.02	.01
90.	.10	.21	.14	.09	-.11	-.05	-.26 **	-.19 *
91.	.01	-.06	-.13	-.12	-.24	-.12	-.25 *	-.21 *
92.	.10	.18	.15	-.08	.15	-.04	.02	.05
93.	.13	.10	.02	-.40	-.32	.19 *	.21 *	.10
94.	-.04	.03	.00	-.22	-.21	.11	.27 **	.19
95.	-.02	-.02	.11	.42 *	.37	.12	.15	.24 *
96.	-.05	-.04	-.06	-.16	.23	-.22 *	.01	.01
97.	.00	-.03	-.01	.07	.16	-.17	-.02	.08
98.	.11	-.01	.10	-.44 *	-.34	.10	.16	.04
99.	-.01	.07	.02	-.30	-.12	.15	.19	.07
100.	.25	.10	-.08	.67 *	.57	.17	.09	.02
101.	.13	.08	.16	.05	-.63	-.09	-.12	.08
102.	-.03	.02	-.02	-.13	.15	.15	.04	.12
103.	.02	.05	-.26	.45	.63	.23	.12	-.08
104.	.07	-.19	-.10	.31	.a **	.01	-.04	-.15
105.	.25	-.06	.03	-.37	-.68	-.14	-.12	-.06
106.	.10	.06	.28	-.31	-.75	-.08	.00	.16
107.	.00	.02	.19	-.53	-.48	-.18	-.06	-.02
108.	.00	-.12	.15	-.24	-.26	-.12	-.14	-.04
109.	.09	-.09	.21	-.24	-.32	-.20	-.22	-.11
110.	.09	.02	.07	-.22	-.51	-.21	-.21	-.07
111.	-.01	-.02	.10	-.45	.a **	-.03	-.07	-.16

Table 11 (cont'd)

	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
112.	.05	.05	.03	-.10	-.30	-.13	-.19	-.22
113.	-.07	-.06	.07	-.36	-.61	-.12	-.13	-.12
114.	-.04	-.11	.18	-.30	-.31	-.05	-.06	-.15
115.	.00	-.11	.10	-.28	-.47	-.32 *	-.26	-.22
116.	-.06	-.02	.12	-.45	.a **	-.09	.02	-.07
117.	.08	.08	.24	.40	.43	.10	.04	.17
118.	.08	.08	.12	.27	.44	-.02	-.10	-.03
119.	.20	.08	.17	.49	.40	.04	.12	.20

Table 11 (cont'd)

	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
1.								
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19.								
20.								
21.								
22.								
23.								
24.								
25.								
26.	.76 **							
27.	.50 **	.29						
28.	.44 **	.27	.66 **					
29.	.38 *	.41 *	.63 **	.64 **				
30.	.50 *	.37	.64 **	.78 **	.59 **			
31.	.77 **	.57 *	.61 **	.79 **	.63 **	.89 **		
32.	.30 *	.45 **	.40 **	.25 *	.27 **	.31	.28	
33.	.38 *	.37 *	.30 **	.26 *	.25 *	.35	.39	.22 *
34.	.34 *	.42 *	.21	.17	.12	.31	.30	.24 *
35.	.29	.34	.29 **	.23 *	.32 **	.55 **	.54 *	.32 **
36.	.40	.39	.33	.58 **	.42	.69 **	.76 **	.25
37.	.38	.35	.40	.52	.59 *	.64 *	.76 *	.08

Table 11 (cont'd)

	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
38.	-.05	-.10	.15	.01	.06	-.06	.07	.20 *
39.	-.15	-.12	-.22 *	.03	-.15	-.18	-.05	-.07
40.	.00	-.04	.06	.04	.02	.19	.41	.39 **
41.	-.09	.05	-.18	.01	.00	.15	-.06	.07
42.	-.25	-.09	-.03	.01	.07	-.15	-.34	.06
43.	.14	.09	.01	.09	.14	.09	.26	-.08
44.	-.14	-.17	-.11	-.10	.05	-.01	.08	-.12
45.	.07	.08	-.10	-.11	.00	-.08	.00	-.07
46.	.06	.00	.04	-.06	.02	.15	.25	-.06
47.	.16	.17	-.07	.06	-.01	-.09	.00	.00
48.	.24	.36 *	.10	.10	.02	-.01	.09	-.18
49.	.08	.12	.22 *	.15	.07	-.16	-.11	.05
50.	.23	.18	.15	.14	.10	-.31	-.06	-.05
51.	-.09	-.18	-.01	.19	-.06	-.15	-.27	-.11
52.	.11	.10	.06	.11	.05	-.33	-.26	-.03
53.	.01	.05	-.01	.01	-.01	-.21	-.15	.01
54.	-.03	.09	-.08	-.05	-.15	.00	.07	.02
55.	.21	.28	.03	.13	.01	-.17	-.03	-.04
56.	.03	-.01	-.01	-.04	-.05	-.08	-.08	-.09
57.	.08	-.03	-.09	-.07	-.13	-.15	.02	-.20 *
58.	.07	.22	-.01	.04	-.02	-.14	-.07	-.03
59.	-.05	-.05	.06	-.01	-.26 *	.19	.03	-.02
60.	-.04	.05	.07	.06	.08	-.06	.10	-.04
61.	-.07	.01	.00	-.05	.06	-.28	-.22	-.10
62.	.09	.17	.02	-.01	.09	-.29	.01	-.06
63.	-.05	.01	.07	.04	.07	-.20	.00	-.02
64.	-.15	-.05	-.19	-.12	-.17	.12	.23	-.08
65.	-.23	-.17	-.08	-.07	.03	-.08	-.02	-.16
66.	.11	.09	.14	-.05	.02	-.11	-.20	.07
67.	-.01	.27	-.13	-.10	-.18	-.09	.14	.03
68.	-.11	.04	-.30 **	-.18	-.14	.00	.08	-.16
69.	-.12	-.09	-.06	-.04	-.01	.01	.06	-.17
70.	.16	.21	.22 *	.19	.14	.10	.49	-.07
71.	.17	.12	.01	.17	-.01	.12	.29	-.12
72.	.05	.26	.01	-.05	-.05	.12	.31	.00
73.	-.07	.16	.09	.03	.08	.11	.35	-.07
74.	-.29	-.26	.03	-.16	-.14	.28	.32	.02

Table 11 (cont'd)

	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
75.	-.02	.18	.02	.13	.05	.31	.47	-.06
76.	-.01	.01	.07	-.05	-.04	.09	.17	.01
77.	-.07	.06	.07	-.08	.01	.07	.24	.09
78.	.16	.28	.04	-.10	-.11	-.12	-.02	.01
79.	.13	.14	.08	.12	.00	.37	.41	-.05
80.	-.22	-.11	.06	-.15	-.10	-.20	-.31	-.01
81.	-.02	.15	.07	.07	.10	.16	.10	.07
82.	.05	-.05	.17	.17	.05	.50 *	.40	-.06
83.	.28	.20	.01	.08	.05	.01	.25	.07
84.	.32 *	.27	-.04	-.01	-.01	-.20	-.04	.12
85.	.32 *	.37 *	.08	.05	.12	.19	.56 *	.14
86.	.27	.22	.10	.28 *	.01	.16	.09	.11
87.	-.07	.07	-.12	-.23 *	-.10	-.06	-.08	-.01
88.	.20	.06	.06	-.03	-.08	-.26	-.02	-.03
89.	.07	-.18	.08	.23 *	-.01	-.03	.02	.00
90.	-.45 **	-.28	-.04	.01	.02	.15	.02	.05
91.	-.11	.03	-.17	-.05	.03	.07	.05	.01
92.	-.07	-.16	-.01	-.04	-.13	-.08	-.10	.13
93.	.02	-.07	-.10	-.28 **	-.22 *	-.41 *	-.20	-.08
94.	.15	.15	-.11	-.18	-.17	-.44 *	-.11	.01
95.	.25	.48 **	.07	.00	.02	.26	.30	.00
96.	.25	.26	-.18	-.11	-.12	.10	.07	-.23 *
97.	.03	.16	-.12	.01	-.12	.00	.19	-.22 *
98.	-.01	-.12	.06	-.06	-.09	-.35	-.17	-.03
99.	-.02	.01	-.07	-.18	-.17	-.34	-.11	-.02
100.	.01	.26	.02	.05	.03	.09	.63	-.08
101.	.01	.16	.17	.07	.14	.34	-.42	-.02
102.	.07	.14	.23	.11	.07	.07	.23	.19
103.	-.13	.11	.08	-.04	.03	-.21	.20	.10
104.	-.21	-.14	.32 *	.13	.11	.07	.16	.01
105.	-.18	-.56 *	.19	.18	.17	.34	-.20	-.01
106.	.24	-.15	.09	.08	.04	.04	-.04	-.03
107.	.19	-.09	-.02	.03	-.10	-.06	-.11	.04
108.	.00	-.09	-.14	-.05	-.28 *	.02	.69 *	-.25
109.	.02	-.03	-.07	-.03	-.06	.10	.53	-.20
110.	.22	.14	.05	.10	-.14	.18	.44	-.10
111.	-.20	-.36	-.21	-.24	-.18	-.18	-.15	-.07

Table 11 (cont'd)

	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
112.	.27	-.04	.00	.05	-.20	.08	.63	-.11
113.	.00	-.17	.13	.07	-.06	.06	-.08	-.10
114.	.05	-.02	-.18	-.11	-.14	.00	.54	-.13
115.	.10	.06	-.14	-.04	-.25	.13	.39	-.11
116.	-.05	-.15	-.14	-.10	-.09	-.26	.a **	-.10
117.	.10	.12	.32 *	.28 *	.30 *	.16	.43	.09
118.	-.02	-.15	.25	.21	.12	.15	.24	.02
119.	-.15	-.08	.32 *	.16	.17	.28	.70	.06

Table 11 (cont'd)

	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.								
11.								
12.								
13.								
14.								
15.								
16.								
17.								
18.								
19.								
20.								
21.								
22.								
23.								
24.								
25.								
26.								
27.								
28.								
29.								
30.								
31.								
32.								
33.								
34.	.82 **							
35.	.65 **	.66 **						
36.	.67 **	.66 **	.77 **					
37.	.80 **	.64 *	.85 **	.93 **				

Table 11 (cont'd)

	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
38.	-.07	-.01	.02	-.03	-.07			
39.	-.11	-.12	-.09	-.10	-.16	.16		
40.	.06	.12	.21 *	.27	.39	.41 **	.02	
41.	.09	.20	.06	.16	.09	-.11	-.14	-.01
42.	.05	.15	-.01	-.22	-.17	.01	-.12	.01
43.	-.05	-.15	.01	.36	.40	-.06	-.01	-.20 *
44.	-.09	.06	.01	-.02	.01	.00	-.20 *	-.09
45.	.17	.22 *	.02	-.15	-.22	-.01	-.11	-.03
46.	.20	.18	.06	.08	.09	-.14	-.08	-.16
47.	.01	.04	-.11	.47	.39	-.02	.04	-.24
48.	.16	.03	-.02	.05	-.07	-.03	.06	-.23 *
49.	.08	.03	.18	.24	.06	.13	.11	-.19
50.	.08	.10	.10	.12	.05	.13	.20 *	-.15
51.	-.02	-.11	.01	.07	-.09	-.04	.27 **	-.06
52.	.05	.01	.08	.14	-.14	.18	.18	-.18
53.	-.02	-.01	.07	.06	-.14	.11	.22 *	-.01
54.	-.06	-.07	.08	.18	.12	.07	.09	.06
55.	.12	.06	.14	.15	.03	-.01	.18	-.17
56.	.02	.03	.05	.04	-.12	.19	.29 **	-.02
57.	-.02	-.10	-.06	.08	.14	.14	.09	.05
58.	-.07	-.08	-.08	-.14	-.07	.13	.14	.04
59.	-.05	-.21 *	-.23 *	-.07	-.14	-.01	-.05	.04
60.	.15	.14	.18	.25	.24	.12	.32 **	-.10
61.	.14	.11	.17	.02	-.22	.06	.23 *	-.13
62.	.10	.05	.10	-.01	-.23	.17	.24 *	-.09
63.	.11	.14	.19	.12	.08	.19	.30 **	.00
64.	-.05	.00	.07	-.01	.02	.04	-.06	.14
65.	-.18	-.16	.00	-.24	-.04	-.09	.07	-.15
66.	.07	-.06	-.09	-.02	-.05	-.03	.02	-.07
67.	-.02	.08	.03	.05	-.07	.05	-.05	.04
68.	-.16	-.11	-.08	-.23	-.26	-.04	-.12	.10
69.	.01	-.02	-.03	.39	.44	-.18	-.10	-.16
70.	-.23 *	-.14	-.09	.24	.33	.25 *	.11	.03
71.	-.22	-.20	-.19	.01	.23	.02	.10	-.04
72.	-.12	-.19	-.19	.21	.15	.03	.07	-.04
73.	-.09	-.16	-.13	-.05	-.13	.10	.09	-.03
74.	-.06	-.07	-.21	.05	-.03	.03	-.12	-.10

Table 11 (cont'd)

	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
75.	-.06	-.12	-.11	.25	.22	-.06	-.05	-.06
76.	-.14	-.14	-.18	-.06	.02	.16	.05	.03
77.	-.17	-.06	-.14	.05	-.10	.02	-.08	-.03
78.	-.11	-.07	-.25 *	.09	.09	.06	.07	-.08
79.	.01	-.12	-.09	.10	.18	.17	.03	-.01
80.	-.36 **	-.18	-.19	-.39	-.54	.11	-.11	.02
81.	-.12	-.14	-.27 *	-.20	-.30	.03	-.06	-.09
82.	-.16	-.07	-.05	-.05	.06	.07	.10	.05
83.	-.05	-.09	-.19	-.03	.04	.11	.25 *	.13
84.	-.03	-.07	-.18	.05	.17	.06	.21 *	.14
85.	.04	.00	-.05	.34	.39	.06	.16	.09
86.	.14	.14	.14	.18	-.16	-.17	.22 *	.01
87.	-.16	-.13	-.10	-.14	-.23	.08	-.03	-.07
88.	.06	.06	.00	-.13	-.07	.02	.13	.03
89.	.12	.11	.06	.11	.15	-.09	.08	.06
90.	-.07	-.06	.06	.14	-.04	.07	-.03	.05
91.	-.02	-.06	-.16	-.18	-.48	-.10	-.04	.07
92.	-.01	.10	.05	-.16	-.11	.12	.01	.49 **
93.	-.04	.01	-.08	-.42 *	-.42	.24 *	.12	.26 **
94.	-.06	.00	-.06	-.26	-.40	.08	.22 *	.26 **
95.	.10	.15	.14	.28	.13	.08	.14	-.15
96.	-.04	-.08	-.21	-.09	.13	-.10	.05	-.28 **
97.	.06	.05	-.09	.08	-.07	-.05	.12	-.23 *
98.	.04	.02	.03	-.36	-.35	.14	.03	.35 **
99.	-.04	.02	.01	-.18	-.14	.06	-.04	.37 **
100.	.07	.16	.13	.23	.33	.03	-.24	-.03
101.	.25	.19	.12	.07	-.50	-.10	-.20	-.21
102.	.22	.17	.30 *	.47	.85 *	.27	.03	.02
103.	-.18	-.19	-.23	.01	.14	.17	-.24	-.08
104.	.01	-.03	-.18	-.02	.01	-.13	-.06	-.16
105.	.14	-.04	-.15	-.52	-.80	-.19	.06	-.19
106.	.09	.09	.09	-.08	-.46	.05	.13	-.09
107.	.17	.16	.08	-.17	-.24	.10	.43 **	-.02
108.	.00	-.11	-.08	.06	.08	-.02	.44 **	-.04
109.	.07	.03	.00	-.23	-.46	-.07	.33 *	-.27
110.	.09	.11	-.06	-.02	-.06	-.08	.25	-.19
111.	-.02	-.03	-.08	-.33	.a	.04	.29 *	.08

Table 11 (cont'd)

	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
112.	.05	.05	-.01	-.10	-.17	-.02	.16	-.21
113.	.04	-.04	-.16	-.29	-.52	-.10	.20	-.19
114.	.01	.08	.17	.18	.63	.01	.37 **	.10
115.	.09	.02	-.07	.09	.17	-.17	.27 *	-.23
116.	.02	.01	-.13	-.33	.a	-.05	.21	.03
117.	.19	.17	.21	.63 *	.91 *	.13	.05	-.13
118.	.20	.12	.05	.38	.76	.15	.08	-.12
119.	.14	.07	.04	.30	.41	.15	.07	-.15

Table 11 (cont'd)

	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
38.								
39.								
40.								
41.								
42.	.20 **							
43.	-.20 **	-.16 **						
44.	.51 **	.13 **	-.16 **					
45.	.57 **	.14 **	-.22 **	.76 **				
46.	.33 **	.08	-.12 **	.40 **	.55 **			
47.	.06	.07	-.02	-.05	.04	.04		
48.	.00	.01	.00	-.09 *	.03	.04	.46 **	
49.	-.07	.00	.00	-.13 **	-.07	.00	.31 **	.37 **
50.	-.09	-.01	.01	-.07	.02	-.03	.28 **	.34 **
51.	-.12 **	-.05	.03	-.04	-.07	-.10 *	.06	.13 **
52.	-.07	.03	.01	-.04	.03	.00	.26 **	.34 **
53.	-.08	.00	-.04	-.09 *	-.06	-.07	.18 **	.26 **
54.	-.12 **	-.09 *	-.01	.02	-.04	-.05	.02	.11 **
55.	-.17 **	.01	-.03	-.12 **	-.09 *	-.07	.21 **	.26 **
56.	-.04	-.03	-.06	-.08	-.01	-.04	.17 **	.23 **
57.	-.09	-.08 *	.05	.00	-.02	-.03	-.06	.11 *
58.	-.10 *	-.03	.03	-.08	-.06	-.07	.14 **	.26 **
59.	-.01	-.08	.02	.02	-.01	.03	-.15 **	.02
60.	-.03	-.04	.00	-.09 *	-.07	-.01	.23 **	.29 **
61.	-.03	-.06	-.01	-.13 **	-.08	-.02	.26 **	.31 **
62.	-.02	-.05	.03	-.07	.00	.04	.28 **	.38 **
63.	-.03	-.06	.03	-.13 **	-.08 *	-.09 *	.22 **	.30 **
64.	.15 *	-.05	-.10	.07	.06	.07	-.13	-.01
65.	.01	.09	.01	.14 *	.06	.03	-.04	.07
66.	.01	-.09	.01	-.08	.01	-.01	.14	.01
67.	.08	.00	-.07	.02	.08	.10	.02	.04
68.	.04	.02	.01	.04	.08	.04	-.14	.03
69.	-.04	-.11	.02	-.08	-.03	.16 *	-.20 *	-.11
70.	-.10	-.03	.02	-.08	-.11	-.07	-.03	.03
71.	.03	-.05	.06	-.12	-.07	-.11	.01	.04
72.	.01	-.07	-.03	-.07	-.04	.00	-.01	.08
73.	.02	-.01	-.10	-.06	-.01	.00	-.06	.13
74.	.12	-.05	-.12	.05	.07	.14	.06	.06

Table 11 (cont'd)

	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
75.	.03	.01	-.02	-.02	-.01	-.05	-.05	.10
76.	.02	.03	-.01	-.11	-.10	-.11	-.05	.00
77.	.12	-.02	-.12	.04	.07	.22 **	.08	.12
78.	-.05	-.06	-.02	-.11	-.18 **	-.10	-.01	-.07
79.	-.04	-.09	-.01	-.13 *	-.10	-.12	.00	.10
80.	-.05	-.01	-.02	.04	-.10	-.07	-.07	-.06
81.	.09	-.05	.06	-.01	-.06	.00	.06	-.08
82.	-.11	.03	-.02	-.06	-.02	.06	.00	-.01
83.	-.02	-.02	.03	-.08	.01	.03	-.02	-.02
84.	-.07	-.11	-.02	-.12	-.06	-.04	-.01	-.04
85.	.03	-.07	.02	-.06	-.01	.05	-.03	-.09
86.	-.03	-.21 *	.11	-.22 *	-.12	.03	.16	.06
87.	-.03	.09	-.15	.11	.02	-.09	-.04	-.06
88.	-.12	-.17	.02	-.06	-.06	.07	-.06	-.05
89.	.04	-.22 *	.21 *	-.13	-.07	.10	.10	.02
90.	.12	.13	-.05	.01	-.03	-.06	.09	.00
91.	.09	.06	.02	-.07	-.04	.16	-.10	-.15
92.	-.08	.00	-.06	-.01	.01	-.21 *	.04	-.09
93.	-.18	-.01	-.22 *	.01	.07	-.13	-.13	.01
94.	-.11	-.11	-.06	-.09	-.01	-.11	-.15	-.05
95.	.01	.00	-.05	.13	.13	.05	-.10	.03
96.	.07	-.04	.15	.08	.12	.01	-.16	-.01
97.	.05	-.04	.11	-.06	.01	-.04	.08	.12
98.	-.17	-.02	-.20 *	-.08	.01	.00	-.08	.03
99.	-.25 *	-.07	-.24 **	-.07	-.05	-.10	.04	.04
100.	.17	-.03	-.09	.00	.15	.08	-.23 *	-.03
101.	-.04	.02	-.04	-.11	-.19 *	-.09	.07	.19 *
102.	-.11	.01	-.10	-.06	-.03	.02	-.02	.03
103.	-.13	.00	-.04	-.14	-.03	-.06	.01	-.05
104.	-.02	.05	-.06	-.08	.16	.43 **	-.04	-.02
105.	.22 *	.09	.00	.00	.15	.14	-.09	-.05
106.	.07	.08	.01	.02	.14	.12	.16	.03
107.	.06	.02	.13	.02	.14	.21 *	.21	.08
108.	-.04	-.08	.02	-.07	-.06	.10	.07	.01
109.	.02	-.01	.13	.10	.19 *	.25 *	.09	.05
110.	.02	-.01	.10	-.08	.03	.09	.15	.05
111.	.12	.06	.03	.19 *	.09	.18	-.04	.02

Table 11 (cont'd)

	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
112.	.02	.05	.10	-.07	-.02	.01	.09	.07
113.	-.02	.16	.07	-.06	.05	.13	.35 **	.17
114.	.00	-.01	.09	.09	.03	.05	.04	.03
115.	.06	.04	.06	.05	.11	.14	.26 *	.05
116.	-.02	.05	-.03	.03	-.03	-.07	-.23 *	-.18
117.	-.06	-.11	.05	.01	.02	.04	-.09	-.02
118.	.04	-.11	.06	-.03	.00	.03	-.07	-.04
119.	-.02	-.09	.04	-.01	.00	.05	-.12	-.11

Table 11 (cont'd)

	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56
38.								
39.								
40.								
41.								
42.								
43.								
44.								
45.								
46.								
47.								
48.								
49.								
50.	.63 **							
51.	.20 **	.30 **						
52.	.56 **	.64 **	.30 **					
53.	.62 **	.57 **	.32 **	.53 **				
54.	.00	.11 **	.34 **	.16 **	.05			
55.	.56 **	.54 **	.32 **	.61 **	.65 **	.11 **		
56.	.52 **	.50 **	.25 **	.40 **	.71 **	-.01	.55 **	
57.	.04	.16 **	.38 **	.17 **	.14 **	.47 **	.20 **	.12 **
58.	.45 **	.46 **	.29 **	.43 **	.50 **	.10 *	.50 **	.52 **
59.	-.19 **	-.13 **	.18 **	-.05	-.13 **	.33 **	-.03	-.14 **
60.	.57 **	.45 **	.13 **	.41 **	.57 **	-.07	.42 **	.49 **
61.	.60 **	.48 **	.15 **	.40 **	.59 **	-.07	.44 **	.50 **
62.	.54 **	.47 **	.21 **	.47 **	.55 **	.05	.42 **	.46 **
63.	.54 **	.47 **	.18 **	.40 **	.57 **	-.07	.40 **	.47 **
64.	-.05	-.04	-.10	-.10	-.03	.07	-.04	.02
65.	-.07	-.04	.03	.02	-.05	.02	-.01	-.04
66.	.09	.06	.00	.06	.04	-.01	.03	-.02
67.	.12	.10	-.07	.09	.11	.07	.10	.07
68.	.00	-.02	-.14 *	-.06	.01	-.02	-.01	.02
69.	-.07	-.12	-.11	-.09	-.06	-.04	-.06	-.05
70.	.13	.11	.19 **	.03	.13 *	-.01	.05	.09
71.	.08	.01	.16 *	-.02	.13	-.05	.09	.16 *
72.	.13 *	.12	.20 **	.04	.19 **	.01	.07	.15 *
73.	.10	.09	.22 **	.05	.20 **	.07	.05	.15 *
74.	.06	.06	.01	.04	.09	.00	.02	.10

Table 11 (cont'd)

	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56
75.	.08	.05	.18 **	-.02	.13 *	.02	.05	.09
76.	.09	.05	.12	-.05	.14 *	-.03	-.01	.13
77.	.14 *	.13 *	.07	.09	.09	.04	.04	.09
78.	-.04	-.02	.05	-.07	.05	-.04	-.01	.09
79.	.05	.09	.14 *	-.03	.08	.12	.06	.10
80.	-.03	.06	.04	.00	.07	.00	-.01	.03
81.	.01	.02	.04	.01	.06	.08	-.03	.04
82.	.11	.16 *	.00	.04	.12	-.04	.15 *	.13 *
83.	.09	.05	.15 *	-.03	.12	-.01	.07	.14 *
84.	.03	.01	.14 *	-.04	.08	-.02	.05	.12
85.	.04	-.04	.00	-.08	.01	-.01	-.07	.05
86.	.18	.12	.12	.14	.13	.04	.22 *	.11
87.	-.10	.00	.04	-.04	-.04	-.07	-.09	-.09
88.	.02	.04	-.12	-.02	.06	.10	.07	.07
89.	.10	.01	.02	.04	.04	.11	.11	.06
90.	.04	.00	.13	.09	.11	-.06	.02	.03
91.	-.14	-.16	.00	.01	.06	-.10	.04	-.04
92.	-.04	.06	.01	.05	-.01	.04	-.13	-.08
93.	.02	.17	-.04	.09	.09	.02	.05	.07
94.	.05	.19 *	.00	.17	.12	-.02	.12	.06
95.	.08	.16	-.09	.10	-.03	.04	.09	.09
96.	-.09	.09	-.07	.05	-.19 *	.03	-.06	-.15
97.	.09	.07	-.01	.14	-.10	.03	.06	-.10
98.	.01	.08	.07	.08	.05	.06	.00	.02
99.	.00	.00	.09	.02	.03	.06	-.03	-.01
100.	-.02	-.03	-.18	-.08	.01	-.07	.00	-.01
101.	.17	.07	-.02	.10	.09	.07	.13	.03
102.	-.14	.03	.29 **	.03	.11	.07	-.01	.08
103.	.03	.07	-.14	.07	.12	-.13	.13	.03
104.	.01	-.01	-.07	.07	-.04	-.16	.04	-.09
105.	-.10	-.16	-.03	-.10	-.13	-.01	-.14	.00
106.	.01	.10	.19	.10	-.08	-.11	.04	-.03
107.	-.13	.03	.23 *	.12	-.17	.03	-.01	-.10
108.	-.12	-.01	.22 *	.00	-.14	.11	.05	-.12
109.	-.06	.06	.25 **	.12	-.12	.03	.10	-.07
110.	-.07	.04	.14	.06	-.09	.11	-.01	-.10
111.	-.14	.02	.14	.09	-.03	.00	.07	-.05

Table 11 (cont'd)

	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56
112.	.02	.10	.23 *	.14	.01	-.02	.14	.04
113.	.01	.08	.09	.20 *	.00	.04	.07	-.02
114.	-.16	.04	.17	.01	-.10	.15	.06	-.06
115.	-.07	.07	.23 *	.09	.00	.02	.07	.06
116.	-.20 *	-.09	-.02	-.07	-.10	-.05	-.02	-.06
117.	-.02	.18	.08	.22 *	-.02	.07	.04	.01
118.	-.04	.09	.06	.13	-.08	.10	-.05	.00
119.	-.07	.05	.05	.06	-.11	.03	-.01	-.03

Table 11 (cont'd)

	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64
38.								
39.								
40.								
41.								
42.								
43.								
44.								
45.								
46.								
47.								
48.								
49.								
50.								
51.								
52.								
53.								
54.								
55.								
56.								
57.								
58.	.27 **							
59.	.37 **	.09 *						
60.	-.03	.26 **	-.34 **					
61.	-.02	.27 **	-.40 **	.89 **				
62.	.03	.26 **	-.30 **	.78 **	.82 **			
63.	-.01	.28 **	-.34 **	.83 **	.79 **	.76 **		
64.	-.02	.08	.11	-.08	-.05	-.08	-.11	
65.	.01	.05	-.03	-.02	.01	-.04	-.01	.10
66.	-.07	-.08	.00	.07	.01	.07	.09	-.31 **
67.	.02	.14 *	.08	.06	.08	.04	.09	.35 **
68.	.01	.08	.06	-.03	.05	-.04	-.05	.61 **
69.	.02	.00	.13	-.03	-.04	-.12	-.05	.35 **
70.	.04	.03	-.03	.14 *	.12	.14 *	.20 **	-.16 **
71.	.01	.04	-.06	.07	.06	.12	.13 *	-.22 **
72.	.04	.05	.07	.16 *	.14 *	.17 *	.23 **	-.19 **
73.	.10	.03	.02	.17 *	.15 *	.17 *	.17 *	-.17 **
74.	.01	.11	.13	.03	.03	.01	.03	-.11

Table 11 (cont'd)

	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64
75.	.07	.02	.08	.13	.12	.13	.15 *	-.09
76.	.05	-.02	.06	.11	.06	.07	.11	-.24 **
77.	.00	.08	-.05	.13 *	.16 *	.12	.16 *	-.09
78.	-.01	.00	-.01	.06	-.01	-.04	.03	-.17 **
79.	.07	-.01	.03	.09	.09	.08	.09	-.13 *
80.	-.04	.08	.01	.04	.05	.00	.07	-.12
81.	.06	.08	.07	.10	.04	.05	.09	-.09
82.	-.06	.14 *	-.01	.12	.11	.07	.12	-.12
83.	.14 *	-.02	.00	.10	.08	.08	.14 *	-.23 **
84.	.10	-.05	-.04	.11	.08	.08	.12	-.25 **
85.	.05	-.09	-.09	.09	.09	.05	.10	-.16 **
86.	-.18	.00	-.09	.11	.13	.09	.15	-.22
87.	.11	.03	.05	.02	-.01	.01	-.06	.13
88.	-.06	.00	-.14	.13	.17	.06	.13	-.27 **
89.	-.10	-.01	-.04	-.02	.00	-.02	.08	-.20
90.	.03	.05	.13	-.04	-.11	-.03	-.04	.43 **
91.	-.02	.13	-.02	-.10	-.04	-.09	-.10	.21
92.	-.13	-.03	-.16	-.03	-.04	-.06	.07	.10
93.	.15	.09	-.02	.18	.17	.20 *	.20 *	.04
94.	.06	.11	-.14	.21 *	.24 *	.19 *	.22 *	-.21
95.	-.02	.00	-.06	.14	.17	.14	.07	-.26 *
96.	.14	.01	.11	-.07	-.04	.00	-.08	-.12
97.	-.02	-.04	.02	.02	.06	.06	.03	-.08
98.	.14	-.02	-.03	.11	.04	.16	.19 *	.10
99.	.14	.04	-.05	.08	.07	.13	.15	-.05
100.	-.23 *	-.02	.05	.08	.02	.00	-.04	.06
101.	.02	.10	.06	.03	.10	.07	.04	.14
102.	.11	-.01	-.05	-.07	.04	.00	.07	-.17
103.	-.24 **	.14	.02	.04	.03	.07	-.07	.19 *
104.	-.23 *	-.07	.12	-.05	-.04	-.09	-.09	.09
105.	-.08	-.14	.02	-.07	-.07	-.10	-.13	-.04
106.	-.02	-.07	-.03	-.03	-.01	.08	-.01	.05
107.	.05	-.07	.03	-.08	-.10	.03	-.04	.01
108.	-.02	-.09	-.08	-.01	-.01	-.03	.01	-.10
109.	.01	-.06	.02	-.12	-.11	-.07	-.06	-.01
110.	.03	-.07	-.02	.00	-.01	.08	-.05	-.13
111.	.00	-.03	-.11	.07	.03	.05	.07	.11

Table 11 (cont'd)

	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64
112.	.00	.01	-.08	.02	.02	.11	.03	-.02
113.	.05	.02	-.01	.07	.05	.19 *	.04	-.07
114.	.04	-.01	.03	-.05	-.07	-.04	.03	.10
115.	.14	.01	-.05	.05	-.01	.12	-.01	.04
116.	.04	-.04	.10	-.11	-.16	-.13	-.10	.06
117.	-.01	-.16	-.12	.05	-.01	.08	.06	-.03
118.	.01	-.16	-.01	-.03	-.07	-.04	-.03	.01
119.	-.11	-.21 *	-.08	-.02	-.08	-.05	-.08	-.02

Table 11 (cont'd)

	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72
38.								
39.								
40.								
41.								
42.								
43.								
44.								
45.								
46.								
47.								
48.								
49.								
50.								
51.								
52.								
53.								
54.								
55.								
56.								
57.								
58.								
59.								
60.								
61.								
62.								
63.								
64.								
65.								
66.	-.45 **							
67.	-.04	-.16 **						
68.	.16 **	-.40 **	.50 **					
69.	.06	-.23 **	.28 **	.52 **				
70.	-.03	.07	.00	-.18 **	.00			
71.	-.17 **	.16 **	-.18 **	-.24 **	-.07	.52 **		
72.	-.14 *	.10	-.21 **	-.27 **	-.05	.34 **	.37 **	
73.	-.11	.13 *	-.18 **	-.25 **	-.06	.44 **	.40 **	.70 **
74.	-.02	.22 **	.00	-.12 *	.01	.15 *	.09	.32 **

Table 11 (cont'd)

	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72
75.	-.06	-.02	-.08	-.13 *	.00	.32 **	.32 **	.67 **
76.	-.10	.11	-.21 **	-.26 **	-.12	.33 **	.33 **	.63 **
77.	.03	.13 *	.08	-.03	.02	.17 **	.09	.26 **
78.	-.02	-.03	-.14 *	-.27 **	.00	.44 **	.31 **	.53 **
79.	-.14 *	.08	-.20 **	-.17 **	.01	.32 **	.34 **	.62 **
80.	-.09	.14 *	-.02	-.13 *	-.05	.21 **	.18 **	.31 **
81.	-.04	.03	-.08	-.18 **	-.04	.31 **	.23 **	.45 **
82.	-.09	-.12 *	.05	.00	-.01	.06	.16 **	.11
83.	-.09	.27 **	-.11	-.28 **	.00	.39 **	.38 **	.47 **
84.	-.06	.20 **	-.19 **	-.30 **	.00	.41 **	.37 **	.47 **
85.	-.15 *	.25 **	-.13 *	-.27 **	.04	.41 **	.33 **	.38 **
86.	.14	.12	-.02	-.23 *	-.10	.10	.09	.06
87.	-.03	.01	.05	.10	.07	-.08	-.04	.08
88.	.00	.12	.09	-.15	.03	.13	.00	.04
89.	.03	.09	-.08	-.21 *	-.11	.10	.12	-.04
90.	.13	-.07	.05	.13	.00	-.21 *	-.11	-.07
91.	.01	-.12	-.01	.19	.15	-.17	-.05	.03
92.	.10	-.04	.02	.06	-.11	.07	-.02	-.01
93.	-.16	.13	.18	.05	-.09	.03	-.06	.14
94.	-.04	.15	.04	-.17	-.21 *	.02	-.12	.09
95.	.04	-.01	.06	-.07	.03	.06	-.02	.16
96.	.00	.09	-.06	-.01	.15	-.05	.04	.20
97.	-.03	-.03	-.02	-.04	.14	.09	.02	.29 **
98.	-.15	.15	.11	-.08	-.21 *	.05	-.06	.13
99.	-.06	.09	.06	-.14	-.34 **	.06	-.06	.07
100.	-.07	-.12	.26 **	.16	-.01	.09	-.11	-.10
101.	-.02	-.01	-.08	-.08	-.07	-.21 *	-.04	-.05
102.	-.27 **	.38 **	.08	-.25 **	-.17	.16	.25 **	.14
103.	-.04	-.10	.36 **	.32 **	.13	.06	.05	-.12
104.	.05	.04	.12	.09	.21 *	.15	.02	.07
105.	.03	-.02	-.12	-.14	.07	.00	-.17	.00
106.	.08	-.08	-.09	-.11	.04	-.08	.04	-.06
107.	.11	.01	-.11	-.16	.02	-.05	-.07	.04
108.	.09	.09	-.08	-.22 *	.03	-.03	.08	.06
109.	.14	-.01	-.09	-.10	.08	-.11	-.04	.00
110.	.07	.06	-.03	-.21 *	-.11	-.05	-.03	-.01
111.	.12	-.01	-.04	.00	-.05	-.11	-.13	-.16

Table 11 (cont'd)

	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72
112.	.08	.01	-.07	-.20 *	-.13	-.11	-.03	-.07
113.	.12	-.04	-.11	-.17	-.08	-.03	.02	.04
114.	.14	-.07	-.01	-.06	-.03	-.03	.02	.00
115.	.08	.09	-.12	-.17	-.05	-.09	.07	-.01
116.	.10	-.03	-.11	-.12	-.06	-.15	-.17	-.12
117.	.02	-.02	.01	-.11	.08	.04	-.15	.07
118.	.07	-.07	-.04	-.05	.06	.00	-.14	.00
119.	.05	.00	.05	-.14	.08	.09	-.10	-.02

Table 11 (cont'd)

	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
38.								
39.								
40.								
41.								
42.								
43.								
44.								
45.								
46.								
47.								
48.								
49.								
50.								
51.								
52.								
53.								
54.								
55.								
56.								
57.								
58.								
59.								
60.								
61.								
62.								
63.								
64.								
65.								
66.								
67.								
68.								
69.								
70.								
71.								
72.								
73.								
74.	.28 **							

Table 11 (cont'd)

	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
75.	.68 **	.27 **						
76.	.59 **	.32 **	.59 **					
77.	.32 **	.52 **	.33 **	.26 **				
78.	.44 **	.33 **	.48 **	.57 **	.28 **			
79.	.63 **	.23 **	.57 **	.66 **	.08	.43 **		
80.	.29 **	.44 **	.32 **	.30 **	.56 **	.41 **	.14 *	
81.	.42 **	.35 **	.43 **	.49 **	.23 **	.54 **	.44 **	.40 **
82.	.03	.10	.10	.07	.21 **	.23 **	.02	.32 **
83.	.48 **	.17 **	.34 **	.50 **	.10	.36 **	.47 **	.00
84.	.45 **	.18 **	.34 **	.49 **	.11	.48 **	.42 **	.03
85.	.45 **	.21 **	.38 **	.48 **	.17 **	.44 **	.41 **	.11
86.	.22	.07	.06	-.07	.08	.03	.06	-.19
87.	-.16	.02	.06	.13	.01	.12	.05	.19
88.	.08	.05	-.09	-.06	.03	.24 *	.01	-.01
89.	.15	.03	-.05	-.13	.03	-.06	.00	-.13
90.	-.06	.13	.09	-.05	.09	-.21 *	-.19	.08
91.	-.09	-.02	-.03	-.25 *	-.02	-.09	-.08	-.08
92.	-.05	.09	.03	-.04	.06	.06	.02	.16
93.	-.06	.07	-.01	.24 *	.11	.12	.07	.21 *
94.	-.03	.00	.00	.15	.14	.07	.10	.11
95.	.16	-.05	-.02	.13	-.02	.12	.24 *	-.16
96.	.03	-.01	.06	.23 *	-.03	.08	.31 **	.01
97.	.24 *	.20	.12	.29 **	.08	.15	.31 **	.00
98.	.03	.08	.12	.20	.21 *	.04	.01	.19
99.	-.03	.01	.08	.18	.15	.06	-.04	.12
100.	.13	-.07	.08	.09	.00	.06	.04	.09
101.	-.10	-.17	.02	-.12	-.12	-.04	-.14	-.03
102.	.25 *	.13	.08	-.01	.16	-.05	.11	.01
103.	-.11	.10	-.03	.06	.12	.03	-.09	.08
104.	-.03	.14	-.07	-.09	.09	-.06	-.05	-.07
105.	.07	.22 *	-.01	-.01	.03	.00	-.08	-.09
106.	.01	.01	-.06	.01	.07	-.03	-.11	.04
107.	.14	.07	-.01	.02	.14	.00	-.03	.05
108.	.07	-.06	-.10	-.05	.00	-.07	.02	-.09
109.	.10	.02	-.06	-.01	.09	-.16	-.06	-.04
110.	.11	-.02	-.01	.03	.06	-.01	-.04	.04
111.	.00	-.02	-.16	.04	.02	-.08	-.03	-.03

Table 11 (cont'd)

	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
112.	.04	-.10	-.09	.04	-.09	-.02	-.01	-.08
113.	.11	.03	.00	-.01	.06	-.02	-.04	-.02
114.	.06	-.10	-.01	.04	.02	-.03	-.09	.05
115.	.16	.01	-.03	.02	.02	-.04	-.02	.04
116.	-.17	-.01	-.14	-.03	-.06	-.05	-.23 *	-.01
117.	.10	.01	-.01	.04	-.10	.10	.07	-.04
118.	.07	.02	-.04	.05	-.05	.11	.04	-.02
119.	.08	.03	-.11	.03	-.01	.13	.01	.01

Table 11 (cont'd)

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
75.								
76.								
77.								
78.								
79.								
80.								
81.								
82.	.17 **							
83.	.23 **	-.08						
84.	.22 **	-.10	.83 **					
85.	.28 **	-.08	.71 **	.73 **				
86.	.08	-.12	.24	.30 *	.22			
87.	.08	.07	-.10	-.14	-.11	-.77 **		
88.	.09	-.03	.21	.31 **	.25 *	.57 **	-.57 **	
89.	-.05	-.08	.20	.20	.16	.83 **	-.94 **	.61 **
90.	.03	.17	-.20	-.32 **	-.26 *	-.38 **	.44 **	-.76 **
91.	.09	.13	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.13	.13	-.15
92.	-.02	.11	-.02	.09	-.01	.13	-.10	.13
93.	.01	.10	.17	.07	-.05	-.42 **	.41 **	.14
94.	-.04	-.05	.18	.15	.07	.15	.02	.28 **
95.	.05	-.15	.16	.13	.19	.28 **	-.06	.31 **
96.	.03	-.11	.10	.03	.05	-.26 *	.21 *	-.05
97.	.11	-.05	.14	.05	.11	.16	-.15	.13
98.	-.07	.07	.17	.09	.06	-.16	.07	.04
99.	-.07	-.13	.08	.13	.03	-.14	.15	-.10
100.	.06	.19	-.08	-.11	.01	-.14	-.05	.10
101.	-.05	-.04	-.12	-.18	-.17	.01	.03	-.12
102.	-.11	.14	.11	.11	.17	.26	-.21	.21
103.	.18	.21 *	-.13	-.08	.02	-.13	.07	-.04
104.	.04	.13	-.03	-.02	.02	.20	-.20	.19
105.	-.05	-.08	.18	.11	.05	.15	-.24	.08
106.	-.09	-.03	.02	-.05	-.12	-.01	.18	-.08
107.	-.07	-.07	.06	.04	-.06	.02	.07	-.03
108.	-.21 *	-.04	.18	.18	.05	.06	.05	.10
109.	-.11	-.05	.08	.03	-.06	-.01	.10	-.16
110.	-.09	-.07	.15	.08	-.03	.18	-.03	.09
111.	-.08	.04	.03	-.05	-.04	-.15	.12	-.09

Table 11 (cont'd)

	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88
112.	-.10	-.07	.06	.04	-.08	.04	.11	-.04
113.	-.02	.01	.07	.05	-.10	.27	-.04	.11
114.	-.20 *	-.06	.19	.13	.03	-.04	.06	-.05
115.	.02	.00	.10	.03	-.03	-.10	.23	-.12
116.	-.12	-.06	.01	.01	.05	-.08	.07	-.03
117.	.10	-.11	.09	.13	.02	.43 **	-.24	.35 **
118.	.09	-.05	.04	.07	.00	.40 **	-.24	.29 *
119.	.03	-.15	.14	.18	.09	.25	-.09	.28 *

Table 11 (cont'd)

	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96
75.								
76.								
77.								
78.								
79.								
80.								
81.								
82.								
83.								
84.								
85.								
86.								
87.								
88.								
89.								
90.	-.45 **							
91.	-.14	.29 **						
92.	.12	-.08	.04					
93.	-.39 **	-.12	.02	.27 **				
94.	.01	-.30 **	-.03	.40 **	.59 **			
95.	-.01	-.45 **	-.14	-.13	.09	.27 **		
96.	-.18	-.32 **	-.10	-.04	.22 *	.29 **	.43 **	
97.	.16	-.21 *	-.10	.02	.02	.14	.41 **	.44 **
98.	-.09	-.01	-.01	.28 **	.62 **	.45 **	-.12	-.04
99.	-.16	-.01	-.10	.26 **	.54 **	.49 **	-.16	-.07
100.	-.06	.03	.03	.02	.04	-.02	-.07	-.25
101.	-.05	.13	.23	-.22	-.03	-.16	.09	.09
102.	.17	-.06	-.18	-.03	-.10	-.01	.36 **	.09
103.	-.19	.07	.07	.04	-.08	-.16	-.07	-.10
104.	.10	.00	.30 *	-.05	-.20	-.12	.03	-.13
105.	.24	-.06	-.06	-.11	-.08	-.04	-.08	.07
106.	-.15	.19	-.15	-.26	.16	-.07	.11	.06
107.	.04	.13	-.12	-.19	.17	-.01	.05	.20
108.	.05	.16	-.03	-.23	.14	.14	.06	.09
109.	-.04	.28	-.04	-.39 **	.03	-.16	.05	.14
110.	.15	.03	-.15	-.36 **	.01	-.05	.15	.23
111.	-.10	.29 *	.05	.03	.10	.00	-.16	-.10

Table 11 (cont'd)

	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96
112.	.00	.18	-.14	-.41 **	.01	-.11	-.06	-.02
113.	.07	-.01	-.18	-.33 *	.00	-.06	.20	.19
114.	-.01	.20	-.09	-.08	.20	.05	.03	.07
115.	-.14	.17	-.11	-.32 *	.13	.00	.04	.26
116.	-.09	.20	-.01	-.03	.10	.02	-.09	-.07
117.	.21	-.19	-.20	-.05	.06	.15	.42 **	.12
118.	.25	-.14	-.21	-.03	.01	.00	.29 *	.09
119.	.09	-.15	-.21	-.15	.17	.09	.39 **	.10

Table 11 (cont'd)

	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104
75.								
76.								
77.								
78.								
79.								
80.								
81.								
82.								
83.								
84.								
85.								
86.								
87.								
88.								
89.								
90.								
91.								
92.								
93.								
94.								
95.								
96.								
97.								
98.	-.07							
99.	-.13	.77 **						
100.	-.13	-.13	-.10					
101.	.12	-.05	-.05	-.22 **				
102.	.19	.16	-.01	-.31 **	.02			
103.	-.08	-.21	-.15	.34 **	-.21 **	.00		
104.	-.06	-.14	-.20	.17 *	-.13	-.04	.39 **	
105.	.11	.07	-.13	-.11	.06	-.05	-.21 *	.06
106.	.18	.22	.01	-.14	-.11	.00	-.04	.04
107.	.24	.18	-.01	-.21 *	-.18 *	.02	-.14	.03
108.	.24	.12	.06	-.16	-.11	.00	-.18 *	-.04
109.	.31 *	.07	.03	-.09	-.14	.02	-.10	.06
110.	.28 *	.09	-.07	-.09	-.03	.01	-.12	-.05
111.	-.12	-.05	-.04	-.06	-.19 *	.02	-.06	.02

Table 11 (cont'd)

	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104
112.	.02	-.06	-.03	-.09	-.03	-.03	-.10	-.07
113.	.25	.13	.01	-.15	-.08	-.02	.04	.14
114.	.08	.14	.05	-.23 **	-.08	.05	-.11	-.06
115.	.12	.11	.02	-.12	-.13	-.01	-.07	.00
116.	-.05	.08	.02	-.10	-.11	-.03	-.09	-.02
117.	.25	.11	.04	-.01	-.02	.10	-.04	.14
118.	.23	.05	-.05	.03	-.03	.08	-.03	.13
119.	.21	.11	.04	.08	-.05	.09	-.02	.19 *

Table 11 (cont'd)

	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112
75.								
76.								
77.								
78.								
79.								
80.								
81.								
82.								
83.								
84.								
85.								
86.								
87.								
88.								
89.								
90.								
91.								
92.								
93.								
94.								
95.								
96.								
97.								
98.								
99.								
100.								
101.								
102.								
103.								
104.								
105.								
106.	.16							
107.	.24 **	.72 **						
108.	.12	.39 **	.54 **					
109.	.23 **	.62 **	.78 **	.62 **				
110.	.27 **	.56 **	.61 **	.57 **	.57 **			
111.	.07	.31 **	.46 **	.47 **	.56 **	.28 **		

Table 11 (cont'd)

	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112
112.	.29 **	.58 **	.65 **	.59 **	.58 **	.71 **	.41 **	
113.	.24 **	.57 **	.51 **	.34 **	.40 **	.71 **	.11	.52 **
114.	.04	.40 **	.54 **	.58 **	.55 **	.45 **	.57 **	.35 **
115.	.20 *	.64 **	.66 **	.49 **	.55 **	.70 **	.34 **	.63 **
116.	.09	.15	.28 **	.42 **	.34 **	.20 *	.49 **	.26 **
117.	.21 *	.21 *	.22 *	.03	.17	.18 *	.00	.15
118.	.21 *	.25 **	.23 **	.05	.18 *	.24 **	.00	.17 *
119.	.29 **	.23 **	.20 *	.13	.19 *	.18 *	.06	.16

Table 11 (cont'd)

	113	114	115	116	117	118
112.						
113.						
114.	.27 **					
115.	.64 **	.44 **				
116.	.06	.45 **	.22 **			
117.	.19 *	.07	.11	-.05		
118.	.25 **	.11	.14	-.02	.88 **	
119.	.20 *	.09	.17	-.02	.68 **	.73 **

Table 12

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Subordinate Study Variables

Variable	M	SD	N
1. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate A)	3.98	.65	108
2. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate B)	3.65	.70	107
3. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate C)	3.34	.77	106
4. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate D)	3.36	.73	48
5. Leader task dependence (on Subordinate E)	3.28	.64	36
6. Leader task dependence (Subordinates A-E average)	3.60	.58	108
7. Political skill (leader-rated)	4.00	.37	105
8. Self monitoring (leader-rated)	2.69	.37	105
9. Collaboration (Subordinate-rated)	3.43	1.17	584
10. Consultation (Subordinate-rated)	3.21	1.21	583
11. Exchange (Subordinate-rated)	1.81	1.09	582
12. Ingratiation (Subordinate-rated)	3.17	1.24	584
13. Inspirational appeal (Subordinate-rated)	3.42	1.11	584
14. Personal appeals (Subordinate-rated)	1.59	.84	581
15. Apprising (Subordinate-rated)	3.20	1.25	582
16. Rational persuasion (Subordinate-rated)	3.64	1.09	583
17. Coalition (Subordinate-rated)	1.62	.84	581
18. Legitimizing (Subordinate-rated)	3.25	1.23	584
19. Pressure (Subordinate-rated)	1.52	.81	583
20. Subordinate task dependence (on Leader)	3.20	.85	583
21. Task performance (Subordinate-rated)	3.75	.90	577
22. Viability (Subordinate-rated)	3.92	.95	576
23. Relationship quality with Leader (Subordinate-rated)	3.92	.61	574
24. Political skill of Leader (Subordinate-rated)	3.96	.68	578

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 12 (cont'd)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.								
2.	.54 **							
3.	.29 **	.60 **						
4.	.44 **	.65 **	.55 **					
5.	.37 *	.48 **	.66 **	.76 **				
6.	.69 **	.86 **	.80 **	.86 **	.81 **			
7.	.29 **	.26 **	.05	-.05	-.10	.22 *		
8.	-.06	.04	-.01	-.15	-.12	-.07	.16	
9.	.13	.04	.11	.08	.12	.10	.13	.11
10.	.14	.09	.11	.23	.18	.13	.13	.20 *
11.	-.08	-.22 *	-.06	-.09	-.18	-.17	-.04	.27 **
12.	.09	-.09	.03	.11	.10	.01	.18	.18
13.	.07	-.07	.06	.01	.05	.02	.11	.22 *
14.	.15	.03	.01	-.03	.09	.06	.07	.09
15.	-.05	-.06	-.01	.21	.28	.00	-.01	.18
16.	.02	-.02	.12	.03	-.01	.06	.19	.29 **
17.	.08	.01	-.04	.08	-.03	.00	.14	.09
18.	.01	-.10	.02	.07	.22	-.02	.13	.14
19.	.05	-.10	-.20 *	-.05	-.05	.01	-.01	-.05
20.	.05	-.01	.06	.24	.36 *	.08	-.03	.06
21.	.08	-.01	.15	-.04	.05	.05	.12	.32 **
22.	.09	-.03	.14	-.07	.01	.03	.06	.23 *
23.	.17	.09	.22 *	.09	.17	.16	.17	.24 *
24.	.15	.05	.14	-.05	.01	.09	.19	.30 **

Table 12 (cont'd)

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.	.63 **							
11.	.20 **	.30 **						
12.	.56 **	.64 **	.30 **					
13.	.62 **	.57 **	.32 **	.53 **				
14.	.00	.11 **	.34 **	.16 **	.05			
15.	.56 **	.54 **	.32 **	.61 **	.65 **	.11 **		
16.	.52 **	.50 **	.25 **	.40 **	.71 **	-.01	.55 **	
17.	.04	.16 **	.38 **	.17 **	.14 **	.47 **	.20 **	.12 **
18.	.45 **	.46 **	.29 **	.43 **	.50 **	.10 *	.50 **	.52 **
19.	-.19 **	-.13 **	.18 **	-.05	-.13 **	.33 **	-.03	-.14 **
20.	.37 **	.34 **	.13 **	.34 **	.26 **	.11 **	.26 **	.23 **
21.	.57 **	.45 **	.13 **	.41 **	.57 **	-.07	.42 **	.49 **
22.	.60 **	.48 **	.15 **	.40 **	.59 **	-.07	.44 **	.50 **
23.	.54 **	.47 **	.21 **	.47 **	.55 **	.05	.42 **	.46 **
24.	.54 **	.47 **	.18 **	.40 **	.57 **	-.07	.40 **	.47 **

Table 12 (cont'd)

	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
1.							
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.							
12.							
13.							
14.							
15.							
16.							
17.							
18.	.27 **						
19.	.37 **	.09 *					
20.	.11 *	.26 **	.02				
21.	-.03	.26 **	-.34 **	.29 **			
22.	-.02	.27 **	-.40 **	.31 **	.89 **		
23.	.03	.26 **	-.30 **	.38 **	.78 **	.82 **	
24.	-.01	.28 **	-.34 **	.30 **	.83 **	.79 **	.76 **

Table 13

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Peer Study Variables

Variable	M	SD	N
1. Leader task dependence (on Peer A)	3.05	.80	102
2. Leader task dependence (on Peer B)	3.00	.75	96
3. Leader task dependence (on Peer C)	2.87	.74	97
4. Leader task dependence (on Peer D)	3.04	.76	27
5. Leader task dependence (on Peer E)	2.92	.82	17
6. Leader task dependence (Peers A-E average)	2.98	.69	103
7. Political skill (leader-rated)	4.00	.37	105
8. Self monitoring (leader-rated)	2.69	.37	105
9. Peer task dependence (on Leader)	2.49	.94	285
10. Collaboration (Peer-rated)	3.05	1.33	285
11. Consultation (Peer-rated)	3.15	1.28	285
12. Exchange (Peer-rated)	1.68	1.02	285
13. Ingratiation (Peer-rated)	2.94	1.35	285
14. Inspirational appeal (Peer-rated)	2.82	1.24	285
15. Personal appeals (Peer-rated)	1.65	.91	286
16. Apprising (Peer-rated)	2.11	1.23	285
17. Rational persuasion (Peer-rated)	3.23	1.18	287
18. Coalition (Peer-rated)	1.49	.80	285
19. Legitimizing (Peer-rated)	2.44	1.27	285
20. Pressure (Peer-rated)	1.14	.46	285
21. Task performance (Peer-rated)	3.74	.73	285
22. Viability (Peer-rated)	3.87	.72	286
23. Relationship quality with Leader (Peer-rated)	3.80	.54	286

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 13 (cont'd)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.									
2.	.66 **								
3.	.63 **	.64 **							
4.	.64 **	.78 **	.59 **						
5.	.61 **	.79 **	.63 **	.89 **					
6.	.88 **	.87 **	.86 **	.90 **	.90 **				
7.	.15	.01	.06	-.06	.07	.12			
8.	-.22 *	.03	-.15	-.18	-.05	-.14	.16		
9.	.01	.17	-.01	.12	.29	.08	.02	.10	
10.	.01	-.05	-.05	.12	.31	.02	.03	.07	.37 **
11.	.09	.03	.08	.11	.35	.12	.10	.09	.40 **
12.	.03	-.16	-.14	.28	.32	-.07	.03	-.12	.09
13.	.02	.13	.05	.31	.47	.10	-.06	-.05	.32 **
14.	.07	-.05	-.04	.09	.17	.07	.16	.05	.33 **
15.	.07	-.08	.01	.07	.24	.01	.02	-.08	.09
16.	.04	-.10	-.11	-.12	-.02	.00	.06	.07	.31 **
17.	.08	.12	.00	.37	.41	.12	.17	.03	.34 **
18.	.06	-.15	-.10	-.20	-.31	-.03	.11	-.11	.18 **
19.	.07	.07	.10	.16	.10	.08	.03	-.06	.23 **
20.	.17	.17	.05	.50 *	.40	.15	.07	.10	.16 **
21.	.01	.08	.05	.01	.25	.06	.11	.25 *	.38 **
22.	-.04	-.01	-.01	-.20	-.04	-.05	.06	.21 *	.37 **
23.	.08	.05	.12	.19	.56 *	.10	.06	.16	.33 **

Table 13 (cont'd)

	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1.									
2.									
3.									
4.									
5.									
6.									
7.									
8.									
9.									
10.									
11.	.70 **								
12.	.32 **	.28 **							
13.	.67 **	.68 **	.27 **						
14.	.63 **	.59 **	.32 **	.59 **					
15.	.26 **	.32 **	.52 **	.33 **	.26 **				
16.	.53 **	.44 **	.33 **	.48 **	.57 **	.28 **			
17.	.62 **	.63 **	.23 **	.57 **	.66 **	.08	.43 **		
18.	.31 **	.29 **	.44 **	.32 **	.30 **	.56 **	.41 **	.14 *	
19.	.45 **	.42 **	.35 **	.43 **	.49 **	.23 **	.54 **	.44 **	.40 **
20.	.11	.03	.10	.10	.07	.21 **	.23 **	.02	.32 **
21.	.47 **	.48 **	.17 **	.34 **	.50 **	.10	.36 **	.47 **	.00
22.	.47 **	.45 **	.18 **	.34 **	.49 **	.11	.48 **	.42 **	.03
23.	.38 **	.45 **	.21 **	.38 **	.48 **	.17 **	.44 **	.41 **	.11

Table 13 (cont'd)

	19	20	21	22
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				
18.				
19.				
20.	.17 **			
21.	.23 **	-.08		
22.	.22 **	-.10	.83 **	
23.	.28 **	-.08	.71 **	.73 **

Table 14 (A)

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Senior Manager Study Variables

Variable	M	SD	N
1. Leader task dependence (on Senior manager)	3.75	.63	104
2. Political skill (Leader-rated)	4.00	.37	105
3. Self monitoring (Leader-rated)	2.69	.37	105
4. Relationship quality with Senior manager (Leader-rated)	3.85	.55	105
5. Consultation (Senior manager-rated)	3.31	.88	119
6. Inspirational appeal (Senior manager-rated)	2.92	.99	119
7. Rational persuasion (Senior manager-rated)	3.31	.79	119
8. Coalition (Senior manager-rated)	1.37	.49	119
9. Legitimizing (Senior manager-rated)	1.59	.74	119
10. Pressure (Senior manager-rated)	1.20	.37	119
11. Task performance (Senior manager-rated)	3.46	.63	119
12. Viability (Senior manager-rated)	3.81	.65	119

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 14 (B)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1.											
2.	.20 *										
3.	-.07	.16									
4.	.39 **	.41 **	.02								
5.	.13	.12	.01	.49 **							
6.	-.08	.24 *	.12	.26 **	.27 **						
7.	.01	.08	.22 *	.26 **	.40 **	.59 **					
8.	.00	.08	.14	-.15	-.13	.09	.27 **				
9.	-.23 *	-.10	.05	-.28 **	-.04	.22 *	.29 **	.43 **			
10.	-.22 *	-.05	.12	-.23 *	.02	.02	.14	.41 **	.44 **		
11.	-.03	.14	.03	.35 **	.28 **	.62 **	.45 **	-.12	-.04	-.07	
12.	-.02	.06	-.04	.37 **	.26 **	.54 **	.49 **	-.16	-.07	-.13	.77 **

Table 15

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Leader and Customer Study Variables

Variable	M	SD	N
1. Leader task dependence (on Customer A)	2.81	.82	90
2. Leader task dependence (on Customer B)	2.81	.73	89
3. Leader task dependence (on Customer C)	2.81	.74	85
4. Leader task dependence (on Customer D)	2.73	.82	24
5. Leader task dependence (on Customer E)	2.70	.87	14
6. Leader task dependence (Customers A-E average)	2.81	.70	90
7. Political skill (Leader-rated)	4.00	.37	105
8. Self monitoring (leader-rated)	2.69	.37	105
9. Collaboration (Customer-rated)	2.57	1.60	134
10. Consultation (Customer-rated)	2.22	1.48	132
11. Exchange (Customer-rated)	1.55	1.13	137
12. Ingratiation (Customer-rated)	1.98	1.35	133
13. Inspirational appeal (Customer-rated)	2.53	1.39	137
14. Personal appeals (Customer-rated)	1.37	.83	135
15. Apprising (Customer-rated)	2.15	1.33	138
16. Rational persuasion (Customer-rated)	3.19	1.53	140
17. Coalition (Customer-rated)	1.39	.80	134
18. Legitimizing (Customer-rated)	2.50	1.51	138
19. Pressure (Customer-rated)	1.08	.39	140
20. Task performance (Customer-rated)	4.41	.69	147
21. Viability (Customer-rated)	4.44	.63	146
22. Relationship quality with Leader (Customer-rated)	4.57	.52	147

Note. ".a" indicates this relationship cannot be computed because of missing data.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 15 (cont'd)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1.											
2.	.82 **										
3.	.65 **	.66 **									
4.	.67 **	.66 **	.77 **								
5.	.80 **	.64 *	.85 **	.93 **							
6.	.92 **	.91 **	.86 **	.90 **	.94 **						
7.	-.07	-.01	.02	-.03	-.07	-.03					
8.	-.11	-.12	-.09	-.10	-.16	-.14	.16				
9.	.09	.09	.09	-.08	-.46	.11	.05	.13			
10.	.17	.16	.08	-.17	-.24	.13	.10	.43 **	.72 **		
11.	.00	-.11	-.08	.06	.08	-.07	-.02	.44 **	.39 **	.54 **	
12.	.07	.03	.00	-.23	-.46	.01	-.07	.33 *	.62 **	.78 **	.62 **
13.	.09	.11	-.06	-.02	-.06	.03	-.08	.25	.56 **	.61 **	.57 **
14.	-.02	-.03	-.08	-.33	.a	-.05	.04	.29 *	.31 **	.46 **	.47 **
15.	.05	.05	-.01	-.10	-.17	.03	-.02	.16	.58 **	.65 **	.59 **
16.	.04	-.04	-.16	-.29	-.52	-.07	-.10	.20	.57 **	.51 **	.34 **
17.	.01	.08	.17	.18	.63	.06	.01	.37 **	.40 **	.54 **	.58 **
18.	.09	.02	-.07	.09	.17	.00	-.17	.27 *	.64 **	.66 **	.49 **
19.	.02	.01	-.13	-.33	.a	.01	-.05	.21	.15	.28 **	.42 **
20.	.19	.17	.21	.63 *	.91 *	.20	.13	.05	.21 *	.22 *	.03
21.	.20	.12	.05	.38	.76	.16	.15	.08	.25 **	.23 **	.05
22.	.14	.07	.04	.30	.41	.12	.15	.07	.23 **	.20 *	.13

Table 15 (cont'd)

	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
1.										
2.										
3.										
4.										
5.										
6.										
7.										
8.										
9.										
10.										
11.										
12.										
13.	.57 **									
14.	.56 **	.28 **								
15.	.58 **	.71 **	.41 **							
16.	.40 **	.71 **	.11	.52 **						
17.	.55 **	.45 **	.57 **	.35 **	.27 **					
18.	.55 **	.70 **	.34 **	.63 **	.64 **	.44 **				
19.	.34 **	.20 *	.49 **	.26 **	.06	.45 **	.22 **			
20.	.17	.18 *	.00	.15	.19 *	.07	.11	-.05		
21.	.18 *	.24 **	.00	.17 *	.25 **	.11	.14	-.02	.88 **	
22.	.19 *	.18 *	.06	.16	.20 *	.09	.17	-.02	.68 **	.73 **

Table 16

The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.69 **	3.69 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.24 †	-.25 †
Leader education	-.04	-.10	-.10
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.01	.01
Subordinate age	.00	.01	.01
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.24	-.24
Subordinate education	-.04	-.04	-.04
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02 *	.02 *
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.03 **	-.03 **
Collaboration		.32 **	.42 **
Political skill		.42 *	.31 *
Collaboration X Political skill			.03
Tau (τ)	.26	.10	.10
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.43	.43

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 17

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.69 **	3.70 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.17	-.16
Leader education	-.04	-.10	-.10
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.01 †	.01
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.22	-.22
Subordinate education	-.04	-.05	-.05
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.03 †	.03 *
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.03 **	-.03 **
Consultation		.28 **	.29 **
Political skill		.35 *	.41 **
Consultation X Political skill			-.20 *
Tau (τ)	.26	.17	.17
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.48	.48

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 18

The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.71 **	3.71 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.12	-.12
Leader education	-.04	-.07	-.07
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.08	-.06
Subordinate education	-.04	-.04	-.05
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Exchange		.08 †	.08 †
Political skill		.44 **	.50 **
Exchange X Political skill			-.27 *
Tau (τ)	.26	.24	.24
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.53	.52

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 19

The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.19	-.19
Leader education	-.04	-.09	-.10
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Subordinate age	.00	.01	.01
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.16	-.18
Subordinate education	-.04	-.04	-.05
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02 *	.02 *
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.03 **	-.03 **
Ingratiation		.24 **	.24 **
Political skill		.40 **	.43 **
Ingratiation X Political skill			-.15
Tau (τ)	.26	.19	.18
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.49	.49

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 20

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.74 **	3.74 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.19	-.17
Leader education	-.04	-.11	-.11
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.01	.01
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.02	-.03
Subordinate education	-.04	-.01	-.01
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.03 *	.03 *
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.03 **	-.03 **
Inspirational appeals		.42 **	.41 **
Political skill		.30 *	.31 *
Inspirational appeals X Political skill			-.19
Tau (τ)	.26	.12	.12
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.42	.41

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 21

The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.03	-.02
Leader education	-.04	-.05	-.05
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	-.01	-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.18	-.18
Subordinate education	-.04	-.05	-.05
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Personal appeals		-.14 **	-.14 **
Political skill		.41 *	.40 *
Personal appeals X Political skill			.04
Tau (τ)	.26	.22	.22
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.53	.54

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 22

The Moderating Effect of Appraising and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.18	-.18
Leader education	-.04	-.11	-.11
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.01 †	.01 *
Subordinate age	.00	.01	.01
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.07	-.07
Subordinate education	-.04	.00	.00
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02 †
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Appraising		.28 **	.28 **
Political skill		.39 *	.39 *
Appraising X Political skill			.00
Tau (τ)	.26	.21	.21
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.44	.44

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 23

The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.73 **	3.74 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.13	-.10
Leader education	-.04	-.09	-.09
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.11	-.11
Subordinate education	-.04	-.02	-.03
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02 †
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.03 *	-.02 *
Rational persuasion		.34 **	.33 **
Political skill		.33 *	.34 *
Rational persuasion X Political skill			-.23 †
Tau (τ)	.26	.15	.16
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.46	.45

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 24

The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.74 **	3.74 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	-.02	-.02
Leader education	.13 *	.09 †	.09 †
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 *	.02 *
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.01 *	.02 *
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.27 *	.26 *
Peer education	.05	.08 *	.08 †
Peer position tenure	-.01	.00	.00
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Collaboration		.26 **	.26 **
Political skill		.19	.20
Collaboration X Political skill			-.10
Tau (τ)	.15	.06	.06
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.32	.32

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 25

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.04	.04
Leader education	.13 *	.09 *	.09 *
Leader position tenure	.02	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 *	.02 *
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.19 †	.19
Peer education	.05	.07 †	.07 †
Peer position tenure	-.01	.00	.00
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Consultation		.25 **	.25 **
Political skill		.16	.16
Consultation X Political skill			-.02
Tau (τ)	.15	.08	.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.31	.31

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 26

The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.07	.06
Leader education	.13 *	.12 *	.12 *
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.03 **	.03 **
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.12	.12
Peer education	.05	.02	.02
Peer position tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01 *	-.01 *
Exchange		.10 *	.10 *
Political skill		.24	.23
Exchange X Political skill			-.05
Tau (τ)	.15	.14	.13
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.36	.36

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 27

The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.73 **	3.73 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.00	.00
Leader education	.13 *	.12 *	.12 *
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00 †
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 **	.02 **
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.22 †	.22 †
Peer education	.05	.08 †	.08 †
Peer position tenure	-.01	.00	.00
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01
Ingratiation		.18 **	.18 **
Political skill		.23	.22
Ingratiation X Political skill			.04
Tau (τ)	.15	.10	.10
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.35	.35

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 28

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.72 **	3.73 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.00	.01
Leader education	.13 *	.08 †	.08 †
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 *	.02 **
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.01	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 †	.02 †
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.19	.17
Peer education	.05	.06	.06
Peer position tenure	-.01	.01	.01
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01 *	-.01 *
Inspirational appeals		.31 **	.31 **
Political skill		.18	.19
Inspirational appeals X Political skill			-.10
Tau (τ)	.15	.06	.05
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.30	.30

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 29

The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.73 **	3.73 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.09	.08
Leader education	.13 *	.13 *	.12 *
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.03 **	.03 **
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.15	.15
Peer education	.05	.04	.04
Peer position tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01 *	-.01 †
Personal appeals		.03	.03
Political skill		.22	.22
Personal appeals X Political skill			-.15
Tau (τ)	.15	.14	.13
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.37	.37

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 30

The Moderating Effect of Appraising and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.73 **	3.73 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.04	.05
Leader education	.13 *	.11 *	.11 *
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 *	.02 *
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 *	.02 *
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.19	.19
Peer education	.05	.07	.06
Peer position tenure	-.01	.00	.00
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	.00	.00
Appraising		.20 **	.20 **
Political skill		.18	.17
Appraising X Political skill			-.02
Tau (τ)	.15	.12	.12
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.33	.33

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 31

The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.72 **	3.73 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.03	.04
Leader education	.13 *	.09 †	.09 †
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 **	.02 **
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.01	.01
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.25 *	.24 *
Peer education	.05	.08 *	.08 †
Peer position tenure	-.01	.01	.00
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01 *
Rational persuasion		.29 **	.28 **
Political skill		.17	.18
Rational persuasion X Political skill			-.11
Tau (τ)	.15	.08	.07
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.31	.31

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 32

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.40 **	3.39 **	3.38 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.35 †	.33 †	.34 †
Leader education	.11 †	.15 *	.15 *
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.02 *	.02 *
Leader organizational tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Leader tenure with senior manager	.00	.00	.00
Senior manager age	-.06	-.06	-.06
Senior manager gender	-.33	-.40	-.46
Senior manager education	.11	.08	.06
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	-.02	-.02
Senior manager organization tenure	.00	.00	.00
Consultation		.22 **	.19 **
Political skill		.04	.05
Consultation X Political skill			.21
Tau (τ)	.00	.00	.00
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.34	.34

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 33

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.40 **	3.44 **	3.43 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.35 †	.08	.07
Leader education	.11 †	.07	.07
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	-.01 †	.00	.00
Leader tenure with senior manager	.00	.00	.00
Senior manager age	-.06	.00	-.01
Senior manager gender	-.33	-.88	-.90
Senior manager education	.11	-.13	-.14
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	.00	.00
Senior manager organization tenure	.00	.00	.00
Inspirational appeals		.53 **	.53 **
Political skill		-.09	-.09
Inspirational appeals X Political skill			.07
Tau (τ)	.00	.00	.00
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.21	.21

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 34

The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.40 **	3.42 **	3.41 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.35 †	.30 †	.28
Leader education	.11 †	.06	.06
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Leader tenure with senior manager	.00	-.01	-.01
Senior manager age	-.06	-.07 †	-.08 †
Senior manager gender	-.33	-.57	-.56
Senior manager education	.11	.06	.06
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	-.01	.00
Senior manager organization tenure	.00	.01	.01
Rational Persuasion		.43 **	.42 **
Political skill		.02	.00
Rational Persuasion X Political skill			.16
Tau (τ)	.00	.00	.00
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.27	.27

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 35

The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.40 **	4.40 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.18	-.20
Leader education	-.04	-.06	.08
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.04 **	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.21	.20
Customer education	.00	.01	.01
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.01	-.01
Collaboration		.11 **	.11 **
Political skill		.26	.30
Collaboration X Political skill			-.14
Tau (τ)	.08	.07	.07
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.38	.38

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 36

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.40 **	4.39 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.16	-.20
Leader education	-.04	-.07	-.11
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.04 **	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.34 †	.29
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.01	-.01
Consultation		.15 **	.14 **
Political skill		.31	.36 *
Consultation X Political skill			-.16 †
Tau (τ)	.08	.05	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.38	.39

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 37

The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.40 **	4.40 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.21	-.20
Leader education	-.04	-.06	-.06
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.05 **	.05 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.10	.10
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02	-.02 †
Exchange		.02	.02
Political skill		.27	.28
Exchange X Political skill			-.07
Tau (τ)	.08	.08	.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.40	.40

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 38

The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.40 **	4.38 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.18	-.21
Leader education	-.04	-.08	-.13
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.04 **	.05 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.22	.17
Customer education	.00	.01	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.01	-.02 †
Ingratiation		.12 **	.12 *
Political skill		.32	.41 *
Ingratiation X Political skill			-.26 *
Tau (τ)	.08	.06	.03
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.39	.40

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 39

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.40 **	4.39 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.23	-.24
Leader education	-.04	-.07	-.08
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.01
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.04 **	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.22	.21
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.01	-.01
Inspirational appeals		.11 **	.11 **
Political skill		.29	.36 †
Inspirational appeals X Political skill			-.12
Tau (τ)	.08	.05	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.40	.41

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 40

The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.41 **	4.41 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.22	-.22
Leader education	-.04	-.06	-.06
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.05 **	.05 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.06	.06
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 †	-.02 †
Personal appeals		-.02	-.02
Political skill		.27	.27
Personal appeals X Political skill			-.02
Tau (τ)	.08	.08	.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.40	.40

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 41

The Moderating Effect of Appraising and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.40 **	4.39 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.21	-.21
Leader education	-.04	-.08	-.08
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.01
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.04 **	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.20	.20
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.01	-.02
Appraising		.10 *	.11 *
Political skill		.30	.34
Appraising X Political skill			-.08
Tau (τ)	.08	.07	-.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.39	.39

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 42

The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.40 **	4.39 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.16	-.17
Leader education	-.04	-.05	-.06
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.04 **	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.20	.16
Customer education	.00	.01	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 †	-.02 †
Rational persuasion		.10 *	.10 *
Political skill		.29	.32
Rational persuasion X Political skill			-.11
Tau (τ)	.08	.07	.06
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.39	.39

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 43

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.07	-.07
Leader education	-.04	-.06	-.06
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	-.01	-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.11	-.11
Subordinate education	-.04	-.04	-.04
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Coalition		-.06	-.06
Political skill		.42 *	.43 *
Coalition X Political skill			-.04
Tau (τ)	.26	.23	.23
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.54	.54

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 44

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.14	-.12
Leader education	-.04	-.06	-.06
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.12	-.11
Subordinate education	-.04	-.04	-.04
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.03 *	-.02 *
Legitimizing		.15 **	.15 **
Political skill		.42 **	.47 **
Legitimizing X Political skill			-.23 *
Tau (τ)	.26	.22	.21
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.52	.52

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 45

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.72 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.05	-.04	-.03
Leader education	-.04	-.07	-.07
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	-.01	-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.23	-.23
Subordinate education	-.04	-.03	-.03
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.02	-.02 †
Pressure		-.30 **	-.31 **
Political skill		.34 *	.34 *
Pressure X Political skill			-.14
Tau (τ)	.26	.17	.17
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.54	.52	.52

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 46

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.73 **	3.73 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.11	.10
Leader education	.13 *	.13 *	.12 *
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.03 **	.03 **
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.16	.16
Peer education	.05	.05	.05
Peer position tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01 †
Coalition		-.04	-.03
Political skill		.22	.22
Coalition X Political skill			-.18
Tau (τ)	.15	.15	.15
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.36	.36

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 47

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.06	.05
Leader education	.13 *	.12 *	.11 †
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 *	.02 *
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 **	.02 **
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.18	.18
Peer education	.05	.05	.04
Peer position tenure	-.01	.00	.00
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Legitimizing		.14 **	.14 **
Political skill		.22	.22
Legitimizing X Political skill			-.07
Tau (τ)	.15	.14	.14
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.34	.34

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 48

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.73 **	3.73 **	3.73 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.11	.10	.11
Leader education	.13 *	.13 *	.12 *
Leader position tenure	.02	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.03 **	.03 **
Peer age	.00	.00	.00
Peer gender	.16	.15	.16
Peer education	.05	.04	.04
Peer position tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Peer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01 †
Pressure		-.05	-.01
Political skill		.23	.21
Pressure X Political skill			-.41
Tau (τ)	.15	.15	.14
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.36	.36

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 49

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.40 **	3.39 **	3.38 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.35 †	.28	.27
Leader education	.11 †	.11	.11
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.02 †	.02
Leader organizational tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Leader tenure with senior manager	.00	.00	.00
Senior manager age	-.06	-.03	-.03
Senior manager gender	-.33	-.29	-.34
Senior manager education	.11	.09	.10
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	-.03	-.03
Senior manager organization tenure	.00	-.01	-.01
Coalition		-.34 †	-.35 †
Political skill		.16	.15
Coalition X Political skill			.18 †
Tau (τ)	.00	.00	.00
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.36	.36

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 50

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.40 **	3.40 **	3.40 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.35 †	.35 †	.35 †
Leader education	.11 †	.11 †	.12 †
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01 †
Leader tenure with senior manager	.00	.00	.00
Senior manager age	-.06	-.06	-.06
Senior manager gender	-.33	-.22	-.22
Senior manager education	.11	.08	.08
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Senior manager organization tenure	.00	.00	.00
Legitimizing		-.05	-.05
Political skill		.08	.08
Legitimizing X Political skill			.03
Tau (τ)	.00	.00	.00
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.37	.38

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 51

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.40 **	3.40 **	3.40 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.35 †	.35 †	.36 †
Leader education	.11 †	.11	.12 †
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01 †
Leader tenure with senior manager	.00	.00	.00
Senior manager age	-.06	-.06	-.06
Senior manager gender	-.33	-.30	-.30
Senior manager education	.11	.10	.10
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Senior manager organization tenure	.00	.00	.00
Pressure		-.04	-.05
Political skill		.09	.06
Pressure X Political skill			.29
Tau (τ)	.00	.00	.00
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.37	.37	.37

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 52

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.40 **	4.40 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.20	-.20
Leader education	-.04	-.06	-.05
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.05 **	.05 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.10	.12
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 †	-.01
Coalition		.08	.08
Political skill		.26	.25
Coalition X Political skill			.09
Tau (τ)	.08	.07	.07
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.40	.40

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 53

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.40 **	4.39 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.18	-.19
Leader education	-.04	-.06	-.07
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.04 *	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.20	.21
Customer education	.00	.01	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.01	-.01
Legitimizing		.07	.07 †
Political skill		.28	.34
Legitimizing X Political skill			-.14
Tau (τ)	.08	.06	.06
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.41	.40

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 54

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.41 **	4.41 **	4.41 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.19	-.22	-.21
Leader education	-.04	-.06	-.05
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.05 **	.05 **	.05 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.08	.08	.09
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 †	-.02
Pressure		-.05	.04
Political skill		.26	.28
Pressure X Political skill			.43
Tau (τ)	.08	.08	.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.40	.41

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 55

The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.87 **	3.87 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	-.14 †	-.14 †
Leader education	-.04	-.10	-.10
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.01	.01
Subordinate age	.00	.01	.01
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.29	-.29
Subordinate education	-.09	-.08 †	-.08 †
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.03 **	-.03 **
Collaboration		.48 **	.48 **
Political skill		.23 †	.23 †
Collaboration X Political skill			-.02
Tau (τ)	.24	.06	.06
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.48	.48

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 56

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.87 **	3.88 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	-.06	-.05
Leader education	-.04	-.11	-.11
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.01	.01
Subordinate age	.00	.01 *	.01 †
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.28 †	-.28 †
Subordinate education	-.09	-.10 †	-.10 †
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.03 **	-.03 **
Consultation		.35 **	.35 **
Political skill		.26 †	.29 †
Consultation X Political skill			-.11
Tau (τ)	.24	.14	.14
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.54	.54

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 57

The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.89 **	3.89 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	-.02	-.02
Leader education	-.04	-.08	-.08
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.09	-.08
Subordinate education	-.09	-.08	-.08
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 †	-.02 †
Exchange		.15 **	.15 **
Political skill		.38 *	.41 *
Exchange X Political skill			-.15
Tau (τ)	.24	.23	.22
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.61	.61

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 58

The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.90 **	3.90 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	-.07	-.07
Leader education	-.04	-.09	-.10
Leader position tenure	.01	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.01	.01
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.19	-.20
Subordinate education	-.09	-.09	-.09
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.03 **	-.03 **
Ingratiation		.27 **	.27 **
Political skill		.32 *	.34 *
Ingratiation X Political skill			-.07
Tau (τ)	.24	.17	.17
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	0.57183	0.57315

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 59

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.92 **	3.93 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	-.08	-.07
Leader education	-.04	-.12 †	-.12 †
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.01	.01
Subordinate age	.00	.01	.00
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.03	-.04
Subordinate education	-.09	-.04	-.05
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02 †	.03 †
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 *	-.02 *
Inspirational appeals		.48 **	.48 **
Political skill		.21 †	.22 †
Inspirational appeals X Political skill			-.08
Tau (τ)	.24	.08	.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.47	.47

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 60

The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.90 **	3.90 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	.10	.10
Leader education	-.04	-.05	-.05
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.19	-.19
Subordinate education	-.09	-.10	-.09
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 †	-.02 †
Personal appeals		-.12 †	-.12 †
Political skill		.34 *	.34 †
Personal appeals X Political skill			.02
Tau (τ)	.24	.20	.20
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.64	.64

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 61

The Moderating Effect of Appraising and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.91 **	3.91 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	-.07	-.07
Leader education	-.04	-.12	-.12
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.00	.00
Subordinate age	.00	.01 †	.01 †
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.08	-.08
Subordinate education	-.09	-.04	-.03
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 *	-.02 *
Appraising		.34 **	.34 **
Political skill		.31 *	.30 †
Appraising X Political skill			.05
Tau (τ)	.24	.19	.19
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.49	.49

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 62

The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.91 **	3.92 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	-.01	.01
Leader education	-.04	-.09	-.09
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.02	.01
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.14	-.14
Subordinate education	-.09	-.07	-.07
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 *	-.02 *
Rational persuasion		.38 **	.38 **
Political skill		.24 †	.25 †
Rational persuasion X Political skill			-.14
Tau (τ)	.24	.14	.14
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.52	.52

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 63

The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.86 **	3.86 **
Leader age	-.01	-.01	-.01
Leader gender	.02	-.09	-.09
Leader education	.12 *	.08 †	.08 †
Leader position tenure	.01	.01 *	.01 *
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 *	.02 *
Peer age	-.01	-.01	-.01
Peer gender	.04	.15	-.01
Peer education	-.04	.00	-.01
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.01 †	-.01 †
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01	-.01
Collaboration		.24 **	.24 **
Political skill		.13	.14
Collaboration X Political skill			-.12
Tau (τ)	.13	.05	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.34	.34

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 64

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.85 **	3.85 **
Leader age	-.01	-.01 *	-.01 *
Leader gender	.02	-.03 †	-.03 †
Leader education	.12 *	.08	.08
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.01 †	.01 †
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 *	.02 *
Peer age	-.01	-.01	-.01
Peer gender	.04	.07	.07
Peer education	-.04	-.01	-.01
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.01 †	-.01 †
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01	-.01
Consultation		.23 **	.23 **
Political skill		.10	.10
Consultation X Political skill			-.02
Tau (τ)	.13	.07	.07
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.33	.33

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 65

The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.84 **	3.84 **
Leader age	-.01	-.01	-.01 †
Leader gender	.02	-.02	-.03
Leader education	.12 *	.11 *	.10 *
Leader position tenure	.01	.01 †	.01 †
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.03 **	.03 **
Peer age	-.01	.00	.00
Peer gender	.04	-.01	-.02
Peer education	-.04	-.07	-.07
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.02 **	-.02 **
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01 *	-.01 *
Exchange		.12 **	.11 *
Political skill		.17	.16
Exchange X Political skill			-.13
Tau (τ)	.13	.12	.11
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.36	.37

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 66

The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.85 **	3.85 **
Leader age	-.01	-.01 *	-.01 *
Leader gender	.02	-.08	-.08
Leader education	.12 *	.10 *	.11 *
Leader position tenure	.01	.01 †	.01 †
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.01	.01 *
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 **	.02 **
Peer age	-.01	.00	.00
Peer gender	.04	.10	.10
Peer education	-.04	-.01	-.01
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.02 *	-.02 *
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01 *	-.01
Ingratiation		.18 **	.18 **
Political skill		.16	.16
Ingratiation X Political skill			.05
Tau (τ)	.13	.08	.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.35	.35

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 67

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.85 **	3.85 **
Leader age	-.01	-.01 *	-.01 *
Leader gender	.02	-.07	-.06
Leader education	.12 *	.07 †	.07
Leader position tenure	.01	.02 *	.02 *
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.01 *	.01 †
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 *	.02 *
Peer age	-.01	.00	.00
Peer gender	.04	.06	.04
Peer education	-.04	-.02	-.03
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.01	-.01
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01 *	-.01 *
Inspirational appeals		.29 **	.28 **
Political skill		.12	.14
Inspirational appeals X Political skill			-.13
Tau (τ)	.13	.05	.05
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.32	.32

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 68

The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.84 **	3.85 **
Leader age	-.01	-.01	-.01
Leader gender	.02	-.01	-.02
Leader education	.12 *	.11 *	.10 *
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.03	.03 **
Peer age	-.01	.00	-.01
Peer gender	.04	.02	.02
Peer education	-.04	-.05	-.05
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.02 **	-.02 **
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01 *	-.01 †
Personal appeals		.06 **	.06
Political skill		.16	.15
Personal appeals X Political skill			-.21 †
Tau (τ)	.13	.13	.12
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.37	.37

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 69

The Moderating Effect of Appraising and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.85 **	3.85 **
Leader age	-.01	-.01 †	-.01 †
Leader gender	.02	-.06	-.06
Leader education	.12 *	.09 *	.09 *
Leader position tenure	.01	.01 *	.01 *
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.01 †	.01 †
Peer age	-.01	-.01	-.01
Peer gender	.04	.08	.08
Peer education	-.04	-.01	-.01
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.01 *	-.01 *
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	.00	.00
Appraising		.27 **	.27 **
Political skill		.09	.09
Appraising X Political skill			-.02
Tau (τ)	.13	.09	.09
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.29	.29

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 70

The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.85 **	3.85 **
Leader age	-.01	-.01 *	-.01 *
Leader gender	.02	-.04	-.03
Leader education	.12 *	.08 †	.08 †
Leader position tenure	.01	.02	.02 *
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 †	.02 †
Peer age	-.01	-.01	-.01
Peer gender	.04	.11	.11
Peer education	-.04	-.01	-.02
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.01	-.01
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01 *	-.01 *
Rational persuasion		.24 **	.24 **
Political skill		.12	.13
Rational persuasion X Political skill			-.11
Tau (τ)	.13	.08	.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.33	.34

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 71

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.79 **	3.79 **	3.78 **
Leader age	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Leader gender	.26	.27	.28
Leader education	.01	.07	.07
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.03 *	.03 *
Leader organizational tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Leader tenure with senior manager	.01	.00	.01
Senior manager age	-.04	-.04	-.04
Senior manager gender	-.13	-.21	-.23
Senior manager education	-.07	-.09	-.10
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Senior manager organization tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Consultation		.30 **	.28 **
Political skill		-.08	-.07
Consultation X Political skill			.17
Tau (τ)	.01	.13	.13
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.35	.35

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 72

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeals and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.79 **	3.83 **	3.81 **
Leader age	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01 *
Leader gender	.26	.01	-.01
Leader education	.01	-.03	-.03
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	-.02 *	-.01	-.01
Leader tenure with senior manager	.01	.00	.01
Senior manager age	-.04	.01	.01
Senior manager gender	-.13	-.66	-.71
Senior manager education	-.07	-.29 †	.01 †
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	.01	.00
Senior manager organization tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Inspirational appeals		.50 **	.49 **
Political skill		-.12	-.10
Inspirational appeals X Political skill			.20
Tau (τ)	.01	.01	.01
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.27	.27

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 73

The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.79 **	3.81 **	3.81 **
Leader age	-.01 †	-.01	-.01 †
Leader gender	.26	.22	.18
Leader education	.01	-.04	-.04
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	-.02 *	-.01 †	-.01 †
Leader tenure with senior manager	.01	.00	.00
Senior manager age	-.04	-.05	-.06
Senior manager gender	-.13	-.42	-.39
Senior manager education	-.07	-.11	-.11
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	.00	.00
Senior manager organization tenure	-.01	.00	.00
Rational Persuasion		.47 **	.45 **
Political skill		-.05	-.07
Rational Persuasion X Political skill			.24
Tau (τ)	.01	.03	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.29	.29

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 74

The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.43 **	4.43 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.21	-.20	-.22
Leader education	-.08	-.10	-.12
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.03 *	.03 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.29	.27
Customer education	.00	.01	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Collaboration		.11 **	.11 **
Political skill		.27	.32 *
Collaboration X Political skill			-.16 *
Tau (τ)	.09	.06	.06
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.29	.29

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 75

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.43 **	4.42 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.21	-.18	-.22
Leader education	-.08	-.11	-.15
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.03 *	.04 *
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.42 *	.37 †
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Consultation		.15 **	.15 **
Political skill		.33 †	.38 *
Consultation X Political skill			-.17 †
Tau (τ)	.09	.06	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.28	.28

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 76

The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.44 **	4.43 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.21	-.23	-.22
Leader education	-.08	-.09	-.10
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.04 **	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.18	.19
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.02 *
Exchange		.03	.04
Political skill		.29	.32 †
Exchange X Political skill			-.17 *
Tau (τ)	.09	.08	.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.30	.30

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 77

The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.43 *	4.41 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.00
Leader gender	-.21	-.19	-.22
Leader education	-.08	-.12	-.16 †
Leader position tenure	.00	-.01	-.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.04 *	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.30	.25
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01 †
Ingratiation		.13 **	.13 **
Political skill		.34 †	.43 **
Ingratiation X Political skill			-.28 **
Tau (τ)	.09	.06	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.29	.29

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 78

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.42 **	4.41 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01 †
Leader gender	-.21	-.26	-.27
Leader education	-.08	-.11	-.13
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	-.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.04 *	.04 *
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.32	.31
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Inspirational appeals		.13 **	.14 **
Political skill		.31 †	.46 **
Inspirational appeals X Political skill			-.24 *
Tau (τ)	.09	.04	.01
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.31	.32

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 79

The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.44 **	4.44 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.21	-.23	-.23
Leader education	-.08	-.09	-.09
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.04 *	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.14	.14
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01 †
Personal appeals		-.01	-.01
Political skill		.29	.29
Personal appeals X Political skill			-.02
Tau (τ)	.09	.09	.09
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.30	.30

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 80

The Moderating Effect of Appraising and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.43 **	4.42 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.21	-.22	-.23
Leader education	-.08	-.12	-.12
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.01
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.04 *	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.28	.28
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Appraising		.11 **	.12 **
Political skill		.32 †	.41 *
Appraising X Political skill			-.15
Tau (τ)	.09	.07	.06
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.29	.29

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 81

The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.43 **	4.42 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.21	-.17	-.19
Leader education	-.08	-.09	-.10
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	-.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.03 *	.03 †
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.30	.22
Customer education	.00	.01	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01 †
Rational persuasion		.12 **	.13 **
Political skill		.31	.37 †
Rational persuasion X Political skill			-.23 *
Tau (τ)	.09	.06	.05
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.29	.29

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 82

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	-.07	-.07
Leader education	-.04	-.06	-.06
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	-.01	-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.02 †	.02 †
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.11	-.11
Subordinate education	-.09	-.04	-.04
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.02 *	-.02 *
Coalition		-.06	-.06
Political skill		.42 *	.43 *
Coalition X Political skill			-.04
Tau (τ)	.24	.23	.23
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.54	.54

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 83

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	-.14	-.12
Leader education	-.04	-.06	.00
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.12	-.11
Subordinate education	-.09	-.04	-.04
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.03 *	-.02 *
Legitimizing		.15 **	.15 **
Political skill		.42 **	.47 **
Legitimizing X Political skill			-.23 *
Tau (τ)	.24	.22	.21
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.52	.52

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 84

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.90 **	3.91 **	3.90 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.09	.11	.12
Leader education	-.04	-.07	-.07
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.13	-.30 †	-.30 †
Subordinate education	-.09	-.06	-.07
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.01
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 †	-.01	-.01
Pressure		-.40 **	-.42 **
Political skill		.23	.24
Pressure X Political skill			-.21
Tau (τ)	.24	.14	.14
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.63	.58	.58

Note. $N = 329$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 85

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.73 **	3.73 **
Leader age	-.01	.00	.00
Leader gender	.02	.11	.10
Leader education	.12 *	.13 *	.12 *
Leader position tenure	.01	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.03 **	.03 **
Peer age	-.01	.00	.00
Peer gender	.04	.16	.16
Peer education	-.04	.05	.05
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.01	-.01
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01 †	-.01 †
Coalition		-.04	-.03
Political skill		.22	.22
Coalition X Political skill			-.18
Tau (τ)	.13	.15	.15
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.36	.36

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 86

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.72 **	3.72 **
Leader age	-.01	.00	.00
Leader gender	.02	.06	.05
Leader education	.12 *	.12 *	.11 †
Leader position tenure	.01	.02 *	.02 *
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.00	.00
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.02 **	.02 **
Peer age	-.01	.00	.00
Peer gender	.04	.18	.18
Peer education	-.04	.05	.04
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	.00	.00
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01	-.01
Legitimizing		.14 **	.14 **
Political skill		.22	.22
Legitimizing X Political skill			-.07
Tau (τ)	.13	.14	.14
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.34	.34

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 87

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Peer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.85 **	3.85 **	3.85 **
Leader age	-.01	-.01	-.01
Leader gender	.02	.02	.03
Leader education	.12 *	.11 *	.11 *
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader tenure with peer	.03 **	.03 **	.03 **
Peer age	-.01	-.01	-.01
Peer gender	.04	.01	.01
Peer education	-.04	-.05	-.05
Peer position tenure	-.02 **	-.02 **	-.02 **
Peer organization tenure	-.01 *	-.01 †	-.01 †
Pressure		-.17	-.15
Political skill		.17	.16
Pressure X Political skill			-.26
Tau (τ)	.13	.13	.13
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.36	.36	.36

Note. $N = 247$ observations for 102 leaders. Peer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 88

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.79 **	3.78 **	3.78 **
Leader age	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01 †
Leader gender	.26	.17	.17
Leader education	.01	.02	.02
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Leader tenure with senior manager	.01	.01	.01
Senior manager age	-.04	.00	.00
Senior manager gender	-.13	-.02	-.02
Senior manager education	-.07	-.09	-.09
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	-.02	-.02
Senior manager organization tenure	-.01	-.02	-.02
Coalition		-.50 **	-.50 **
Political skill		.16	.16
Coalition X Political skill			-.01
Tau (τ)	.01	.03	.03
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.38	.38

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 89

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.79 **	3.80 **	3.80 **
Leader age	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Leader gender	.26	.25	.25
Leader education	.01	.02	.03
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Leader tenure with senior manager	.01	.01	.01
Senior manager age	-.04	-.04	-.04
Senior manager gender	-.13	.17	.16
Senior manager education	-.07	-.13	-.13
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	.00	.00
Senior manager organization tenure	-.01	-.02	-.02
Legitimizing		-.16	-.15
Political skill		.03	.03
Legitimizing X Political skill			.06
Tau (τ)	.01	.01	.00
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.40	.41

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 90

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Senior Manager Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.79 **	3.79 **	3.80 **
Leader age	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01 †
Leader gender	.26	.25	.27
Leader education	.01	.01	.02
Leader position tenure	.02 †	.02 †	.02 †
Leader organizational tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Leader tenure with senior manager	.01	.01	.01
Senior manager age	-.04	-.04	-.04
Senior manager gender	-.13	-.09	-.08
Senior manager education	-.07	-.09	-.08
Senior manager position tenure	-.01	-.01	.00
Senior manager organization tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Pressure		-.24	-.25
Political skill		.05	.01
Pressure X Political skill			.42
Tau (τ)	.01	.00	.00
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.40	.41	.41

Note. N = 105 observations from 8 senior managers. Leader-level variables are at level 1. Senior manager variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 91

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.43 **	4.43 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.21	4.43	-.21
Leader education	-.08	-.09	-.09
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.04 **	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.18	.18
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Coalition		.11 †	.11 †
Political skill		.27	.27
Coalition X Political skill			-.02
Tau (τ)	.09	.08	.08
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.30	.31

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 92

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.43 **	4.42 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.21	-.19	-.20
Leader education	-.08	-.10	-.12
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	-.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.04 **	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.31	.33
Customer education	.00	.00	-.01
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01	-.01
Legitimizing		.09 *	.10 *
Political skill		.30	.42 *
Legitimizing X Political skill			-.24 *
Tau (τ)	.09	.06	.05
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.31	.30

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 93

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Customer Ratings of Viability

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	4.44 **	4.44 **	4.44 **
Leader age	.01	.01	.01
Leader gender	-.21	-.23	-.23
Leader education	-.08	-.09	-.09
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with customer	.04 **	.04 **	.04 **
Customer age	.00	.00	.00
Customer gender	.15	.15	.15
Customer education	.00	.00	.00
Customer organization tenure	-.01 †	-.01 †	-.01 †
Pressure		.00	-.05
Political skill		.29	.27
Pressure X Political skill			-.24
Tau (τ)	.09	.09	.09
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.30	.30	.30

Note. $N = 117$ observations for 60 leaders. Customer-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 94

Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Subordinate-Leader models)

	Customer-level variance (Level 1)	Leader-level variance (Level 2)	Proportion of variance at Leader-level
Dependent variable	σ^2	τ_{00}	$\rho = \tau_{00} / (\tau_{00} + \sigma^2)$
Task performance	.53	.25	31.67%
Viability	.63	.22	26.19%

Note. The variance components are obtained from one-way ANOVA with random effects HLM models. σ^2 = customer-level (level 1) variance in the dependent variable. τ_{00} = leader-level (level 2) variance in the dependent variable. Proportion of variance at the level of the leader is computed as $\rho = \tau_{00} / (\sigma^2 + \tau_{00})$ (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).

Table 95

Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Peer-Leader models)

	Customer-level variance (Level 1)	Leader-level variance (Level 2)	Proportion of variance at Leader-level
Dependent variable	σ^2	τ_{00}	$\rho = \tau_{00} / (\tau_{00} + \sigma^2)$
Task performance	.39	.15	28.16%
Viability	.41	.13	23.23%

Note. The variance components are obtained from one-way ANOVA with random effects HLM models. σ^2 = customer-level (level 1) variance in the dependent variable. τ_{00} = leader-level (level 2) variance in the dependent variable. Proportion of variance at the level of the leader is computed as $\rho = \tau_{00} / (\sigma^2 + \tau_{00})$ (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).

Table 96

Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Senior Manager level (Leader-Senior Manager models)

	Customer-level variance (Level 1)	Leader-level variance (Level 2)	Proportion of variance at Leader-level
Dependent variable	σ^2	τ_{00}	$\rho = \tau_{00} / (\tau_{00} + \sigma^2)$
Task performance	.40	.01	2.59%
Viability	.45	.00	0.01%

Note. The variance components are obtained from one-way ANOVA with random effects HLM models. σ^2 = customer-level (level 1) variance in the dependent variable. τ_{00} = leader-level (level 2) variance in the dependent variable. Proportion of variance at the level of the leader is computed as $\rho = \tau_{00} / (\sigma^2 + \tau_{00})$ (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).

Table 97

Proportion of Task Performance and Viability Variance at Leader level (Customer-Leader models)

	Customer-level variance (Level 1)	Leader-level variance (Level 2)	Proportion of variance at Leader-level
Dependent variable	σ^2	τ_{00}	$\rho = \tau_{00} / (\tau_{00} + \sigma^2)$
Task performance	.41	.07	15.03%
Viability	.31	.09	22.82%

Note. The variance components are obtained from one-way ANOVA with random effects HLM models. σ^2 = customer-level (level 1) variance in the dependent variable. τ_{00} = leader-level (level 2) variance in the dependent variable. Proportion of variance at the level of the leader is computed as $\rho = \tau_{00} / (\sigma^2 + \tau_{00})$ (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).

Table 98

Interrater Reliability Estimates for Study Variables by Stakeholder Group

Variable	Subordinates		Peers		Customers	
	ICC(1)	ICC(2)	ICC(1)	ICC(2)	ICC(1)	ICC(2)
<i>Influence tactics</i>						
Rational persuasion	.11	.38	.04	.11	.09	.17
Exchange	.09	.33	.01	.02	.05	.09
Inspirational appeal	.14	.42	.07	.17	.08	.16
Legitimizing	.11	.36	.00	-.01	.14	.25
Apprising	.08	.29	.02	.04	.18	.32
Pressure	.14	.43	.00	.01	.00	.00
Collaboration	.22	.57	.13	.29	-.01	-.03
Ingratiation	.09	.30	.07	.18	.21	.37
Consultation	.12	.39	.05	.14	.12	.23
Personal appeals	.05	.21	-.05	-.16	.02	.04
Coalition	.04	.17	-.01	-.01	.19	.34
<i>Outcomes</i>						
Task performance	.34	.71	.28	.53	.21	.36
Viability	.29	.66	.22	.44	.30	.48
<i>Other</i>						
Relationship quality	.24	.60	.17	.37	.21	.37
Task dependence	.02	.08	.20	.41		
Leader political skill	.36	.72				

Note. ICC = intraclass correlation coefficient. Average group size for subordinates is 4.71; for peers is 2.81; and for customers is 2.17.

Table 99

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Collaboration

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	.28 **	.28 **	1.03
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	.95 **	.95 **	2.36
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		-.01	-.03
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			-.11
Subordinate avg dependence squared			-.20
<i>F</i>	29.07 **	19.19 **	11.82 **
ΔR^2	.36 **	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.35	.34	.34
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 100

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Consultation

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	.25 *	.26 *	-.10
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	.66 **	.66 **	.72
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		-.02	-.02
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			.05
Subordinate avg dependence squared			-.01
<i>F</i>	12.31 **	8.16 **	4.83 **
ΔR^2	.19 **	.00	.00
Adjusted R^2	.18	.17	.15
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 101

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Exchange

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	-.14	-.01	-1.17
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	.18	.13	-.76
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		-.25	-.23
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			.13
Subordinate avg dependence squared			.17
<i>F</i>	1.40	5.05 **	3.33 **
ΔR^2	.03	.10 **	.01
Adjusted R^2	.01	.10	.10
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 102

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Ingratiation

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	-.01	.03	.31
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	.49 **	.48 **	.69
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		-.07	-.08
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			-.04
Subordinate avg dependence squared			-.03
<i>F</i>	5.60 **	4.07 **	2.41 *
ΔR^2	.10 **	.01	.00
Adjusted R^2	.08	.08	.06
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 103

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Inspirational Appeal

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	.12	.11	-.94
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	.46 **	.46 **	1.71
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		.01	.01
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			.15
Subordinate avg dependence squared			-.19
<i>F</i>	5.65 **	3.75 *	2.78 *
ΔR^2	.10 **	.00	.02
	.08	.07	.08
Adjusted R^2			
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 104

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Personal Appeals

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	-.01	.06	-1.58 *
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	.04	.01	-.33
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		-.12 *	-.10
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			.24 *
Subordinate avg dependence squared			.04
<i>F</i>	.07	1.75	2.19
ΔR^2	.00	.05 *	.05
	-.02	.02	.05
Adjusted R^2			
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 105

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Appraising

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	.01	.01	-1.05
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	.37 *	.37 *	-1.78
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		-.01	.02
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			.15
Subordinate avg dependence squared			.31
<i>F</i>	2.61	1.73	1.55
ΔR^2	.05	.00	.02
	.03	.02	.03
Adjusted R^2			
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 106

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Rational Persuasion

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	.47 **	.48 **	1.20
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	.14	.13	-1.26
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		.01	.01
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			-.11
Subordinate avg dependence squared			.20
<i>F</i>	6.50 **	4.31 **	3.21 *
ΔR^2	.11 **	.00	.03
	.09	.09	.10
Adjusted R^2			
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 107

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Coalition

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	-.02	-.03	-.72
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	-.05	-.01	-.90
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence			-.07
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			.10
Subordinate avg dependence squared			.13
<i>F</i>	.22	.99	.99
ΔR^2	.00	.02	.02
	-.02	.00	.00
Adjusted R^2			
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 108

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Legitimizing

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	.55 **	.56 **	-.65
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	-.03	-.05	-1.25
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		.04	.06
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			.17
Subordinate avg dependence squared			.17
<i>F</i>	6.36 **	4.30 **	2.92 *
ΔR^2	.11 **	.00	.02
	.09	.09	.08
Adjusted R^2			
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 109

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Average Dependence on Pressure

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader avg dependence on Subordinate	-.17	-.16	-.77
Subordinate avg dependence on Leader	-.13	-.13	-1.19
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader avg dependence X Subordinate avg dependence		.01	.02
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader avg dependence squared			.08
Subordinate avg dependence squared			.15
<i>F</i>	2.14	1.43	1.27
ΔR^2	.04	.00	.02
	.02	.01	.01
Adjusted R^2			
<i>df</i>	2, 103	3, 102	5, 105

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 110
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Collaboration

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	.20 *	.19 *	-.89
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.49 **	.49 **	.26
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.02	-.05
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.16
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			.04
<i>F</i>	24.13 **	16.06 **	10.38 **
ΔR^2	.16 **	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.15	.15	.15
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 111

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Consultation

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	.17	.16	-1.67 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.49 **	.49 **	.34
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.08	-.12
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.26 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			.02
<i>F</i>	21.28 **	14.56 **	10.78 **
ΔR^2	.14 **	.00	.03 *
Adjusted R^2	.13	.13	.16
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 112

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Exchange

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	-.22 *	-.22 *	-2.10 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.17 *	.18 *	.93
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.01	-.04
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.27 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			-.12
<i>F</i>	4.62 *	3.08 *	4.75 **
ΔR^2	.03 *	.00	.05 **
Adjusted R^2			
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 113

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Ingratiation

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	.03	.03	-2.36 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.41 **	.41 **	-.16
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.06	-.13
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.34 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			.09
<i>F</i>	11.57 **	7.93 **	7.96 **
ΔR^2	.08 **	.00	.05 **
Adjusted R^2	.07	.07	.12
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 114

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Inspirational Appeal

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	.02	.01	-.97
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.24 **	.24 **	.10
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.05	-.07
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.14
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			.02
<i>F</i>	4.69 *	3.26 *	2.53 *
ΔR^2	.03 *	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.03	.02	.03
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 115

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	-.15 *	-.16 *	-.62
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.06	.07	.38
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.05	-.05
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.07
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			-.05
<i>F</i>	2.74	2.07	1.62
ΔR^2	.02	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.01	.01	.01
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 116

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	-.01	-.02	-1.04
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.30 **	.31 **	-.06
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.07	-.10
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.15
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			.06
<i>F</i>	5.85 **	4.15 **	3.02 *
ΔR^2	.04 **	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.04	.03	.04
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 117

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	.10	.10	-1.10
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.29 **	.29 **	.36
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		.01	-.02 *
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.17
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			-.01
<i>F</i>	8.79 **	5.84 **	4.44 **
ΔR^2	.06 **	.00	.02
Adjusted R^2	.06	.05	.06
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 118

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Coalition

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	-.12	-.13 *	-.97 *
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.09	.10	.43
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.12 *	-.13 *
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.12
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			-.05
<i>F</i>	2.28	3.13 *	2.81 *
ΔR^2	.02	.02 *	.02
Adjusted R^2	.01	.02	.03
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 119

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Legitimizing

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	-.12	-.14	-1.88 **
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.37 **	.38 **	.75
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.12	-.15
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.25 *
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			-.06
<i>F</i>	7.74 **	5.92 **	5.09 **
ΔR^2	.06 **	.01	.03 *
Adjusted R^2	.05	.05	.07
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 120

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Subordinate Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Pressure

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Subordinate	-.15 *	-.15 *	.48
Subordinate dyadic dependence on Leader	.01	.01	.39
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Subordinate dyadic dependence		-.01	.01
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			-.09
Subordinate dyadic dependence squared			-.06
<i>F</i>	2.40	1.62	1.48
ΔR^2	.02	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.01	.01	.01
<i>df</i>	2, 263	3, 262	5, 260

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 121

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Collaboration

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	-.15	-.15	-1.00
Peer average dependence on Leader	.55 **	.58 **	1.95 *
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		-.06	-.01
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			.16
Peer average dependence squared			-.28
<i>F</i>	9.03 **	6.08 **	4.56 **
ΔR^2	.15 **	.00	.03
Adjusted R^2	.14	.13	.15
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 122
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Consultation

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	.04	.04	-.04
Peer average dependence on Leader	.44 **	.47 **	1.24
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		-.06	-.02
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			.02
Peer average dependence squared			-.16
<i>F</i>	7.92 **	5.36 **	3.44 **
ΔR^2	.14 **	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.12	.11	.11
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 123
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Exchange

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	-.09	-.09	.86
Peer average dependence on Leader	.26 *	.28 *	1.50 *
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		-.04	.03
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			-.15
Peer average dependence squared			-.24 *
<i>F</i>	3.49 *	2.37	2.60 *
ΔR^2	.07 *	.00	.05
Adjusted R^2	.05	.04	.07
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 124
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Ingratiation

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	.03	.03	-.86
Peer average dependence on Leader	.45 **	.40 **	1.55
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		.08	.12
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			.16
Peer average dependence squared			-.23
<i>F</i>	6.42 **	4.46 **	3.36 **
ΔR^2	.11 **	.01	.03
Adjusted R^2	.10	.09	.10
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 125

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Inspirational Appeal

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	-.06	-.05	.48
Peer average dependence on Leader	.39 **	.32 *	1.01
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		.13	.17
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			-.09
Peer average dependence squared			-.14
<i>F</i>	4.62 *	3.59 *	2.35 *
ΔR^2	.08 *	.01	.01
Adjusted R^2	.07	.07	.06
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 126
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Personal Appeals

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	-.09	-.09	.62
Peer average dependence on Leader	.17 *	.17 *	1.01
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		.00	.04
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			-.12
Peer average dependence squared			-.16
<i>F</i>	2.44	1.61	1.79
ΔR^2	.05	.00	.04
Adjusted R^2	.03	.02	.04
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 127
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Appraising

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	-.06	-.06	-.51
Peer average dependence on Leader	.33 **	.25 *	1.33
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		.17	.21
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			.09
Peer average dependence squared			-.22
<i>F</i>	4.26	3.94	2.97
ΔR^2	.08 *	.03	.03
Adjusted R^2	.06	.08	.09
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 128
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Rational Persuasion

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	.03	.03	.05
Peer average dependence on Leader	.36	.37	.68
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		-.03	-.01
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			.00
Peer average dependence squared			-.06
<i>F</i>	6.06 **	4.03 **	2.42 *
ΔR^2	.11 **	.00	.00
Adjusted R^2	.09	.08	.07
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 129

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Coalition

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	-.01	-.01	.20
Peer average dependence on Leader	.11	.07	.45
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		.07	.09
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			-.03
Peer average dependence squared			-.08
<i>F</i>	1.11	1.25	.92
ΔR^2	.02	.01	.01
Adjusted R^2	.00	.01	.00
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 130
Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Legitimizing

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	.06	.06	.24
Peer average dependence on Leader	.26	.19	.16
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		.14	.14
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			-.03
Peer average dependence squared			.01
<i>F</i>	2.77	2.53	1.49
ΔR^2	.05	.02	.00
Adjusted R^2	.03	.04	.02
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 131

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Average Dependence on Pressure

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader average dependence on Peer	.02	.01	-.15
Peer average dependence on Leader	.10 *	.11 *	-.10
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader average dependence X Peer average dependence		-.02	-.03
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader average dependence squared			.03
Peer average dependence squared			.04
<i>F</i>	2.67	1.87	1.25
ΔR^2	.05	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.03	.02	.01
<i>df</i>	2, 100	3, 99	5, 97

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 132

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Collaboration

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	-.08	-.08	-.36
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.57 **	.57 **	1.24 **
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		.00	.04
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.05
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.13
<i>F</i>	23.38 **	15.53 **	9.90 **
ΔR^2	.15 **	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.14	.14	.14
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 133

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Consultation

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	.02	.02	.13
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.56 **	.56 **	.75
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		-.01	.01
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			-.02
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.04
<i>F</i>	26.40	17.54	10.50
ΔR^2	.17	.00	.00
Adjusted R^2	.16	.16	.15
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 134

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Exchange

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	-.24 **	-.24 **	.60
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.12	.13	.49
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		-.07	.00
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			-.14
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.07
<i>F</i>	4.33 *	3.26 *	2.50 *
ΔR^2	.03 *	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.02	.02	.03
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 135

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Ingratiation

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	.08	.08	.20
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.43 **	.43 **	1.27 **
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		.02	.10
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			-.02
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.17
<i>F</i>	14.35 **	9.57 **	6.48 **
ΔR^2	.10 **	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.09	.09	.09
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 136

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Inspirational Appeal

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	-.09	-.09	.33
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.45 **	.45 **	.70
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		-.01	.04
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			-.07
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.05
<i>F</i>	15.77 **	10.47 **	6.38 **
ΔR^2	.11 **	.00	.00
Adjusted R^2	.10	.10	.09
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 137

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Personal Appeals

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	-.18 *	-.18 *	.79
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.11	.11	.41
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		-.03	.04
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			-.17
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.06
<i>F</i>	3.46 *	2.43	2.27 *
ΔR^2	.03 *	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.02	.02	.02
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 138

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Appraising

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	-.19	-.19	-.84
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.43 **	.42 **	1.06 *
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		.06	.07
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.12
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.13
<i>F</i>	14.78 **	10.05 **	6.84 **
ΔR^2	.10 **	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.01	.09	.10
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 139

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Rational Persuasion

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	.01	.01	.00
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.44 **	.44 **	.69
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		-.04	-.02
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.00
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.05
<i>F</i>	17.94 **	12.03 **	7.26 **
ΔR^2	.12 **	.00	.00
Adjusted R^2	.11	.11	.10
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 140

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Coalition

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	-.08	-.08	.36
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.13 *	.13 *	.30
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		.04	.07
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			-.08
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.03
<i>F</i>	3.31 *	2.39	1.67
ΔR^2	.02 *	.00	.00
Adjusted R^2	.02	.02	.01
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 141

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Legitimizing

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	.06	.06	.94
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.31 **	.29 **	.08
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		.06	.09
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			-.15
Peer dyadic dependence squared			.04
<i>F</i>	7.61 **	5.30 **	3.57 **
ΔR^2	.05 **	.00	.01
Adjusted R^2	.05	.05	.05
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 142

Hierarchical Regression Examining the Effects of Leader-Peer Congruence in Dyadic Dependence on Pressure

Predictor	Step 1 (Main effect)	Step 2 (Interaction)	Step 3 (Quadratic)
<i>Step 1</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence on Peer	-.01	-.01	.02
Peer dyadic dependence on Leader	.08 *	.08 *	.19
<i>Step 2</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence X Peer dyadic dependence		-.02	-.01
<i>Step 3</i>			
Leader dyadic dependence squared			.00
Peer dyadic dependence squared			-.02
<i>F</i>	3.00	2.20	1.41
ΔR^2	.02	.00	.00
Adjusted R^2	.01	.01	.01
<i>df</i>	2, 265	3, 264	5, 262

Note. Values are unstandardized regression coefficients. Squared = the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 143

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Collaboration Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Consultation	.36 **	.23 *		.51 *
Exchange	.00	.11		-.16
Ingratiation	.21 *	.23 *		.07
Inspirational appeal	.33 *	.21		.03
Personal appeals	.06	-.06		.14
Appraising	-.13	.22 *		.04
Rational Persuasion	-.06	.20 *		-.02
Coalition	-.05	-.09		.04
Legitimizing	.10	-.12		.20
Pressure	-.16 *	.14 *		.01
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	.10	-.10		.02
R^2	.58	.68		.60
N	106	103		57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 144

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Consultation Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	.33 **	.20 *		.21 *
Exchange	.02	-.02		.09
Ingratiation	.28 **	.24 **		.57 **
Inspirational appeal	.19	.11	.08	-.28 *
Personal appeals	.19	.28 **		-.30 *
Apprising	.07	-.01		.24 *
Rational Persuasion	.07	.34 **	.43 **	.10
Coalition	.01	-.03	-.32 **	.39 **
Legitimizing	.01	-.06	-.06	.11
Pressure	.05	-.10	.11	-.12
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	.11	.09	.13	.00
R^2	.66	.73	.26	.84
N	106	103	112	57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 145

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Exchange Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	.00	.15		-.11
Consultation	.05	-.03		.14
Ingratiation	.03	-.21		.16
Inspirational appeal	.13	.04		.32
Personal appeals	.35 **	.65 **		.43 **
Apprising	.12	-.06		-.05
Rational Persuasion	.01	.14		.00
Coalition	.16	.02		.13
Legitimizing	.04	.20 *		-.25
Pressure	-.05	.00		.26 *
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	-.13	.01		.01
R^2	.33	.57		.74
N	106	103		57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 146

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Ingratiation Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	.20 *	.27 *		.03
Consultation	.30 **	.33 **		.68 **
Exchange	.02	-.18		.12
Inspirational appeal	-.13	-.08		.33 *
Personal appeals	.08	.25 *		.28 *
Appraising	.49 **	-.01		-.15
Rational Persuasion	.11	.12		-.09
Coalition	-.04	.01		-.36 **
Legitimizing	-.09	.27 **		.08
Pressure	.00	-.03		.09
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	-.11	.04		.00
R^2	.63	.63		.81
N	106	103		57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 147

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Inspirational Appeal Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	.19 *	.22 *		.02
Consultation	.12	.14	.06	-.33 *
Exchange	.04	.03		.24
Ingratiation	-.08	-.08		.34 *
Personal appeals	-.01	.14		-.32 *
Appraising	.21 **	.32 **		.36 *
Rational Persuasion	.47 **	.28 **	.63 **	.43 **
Coalition	-.02	.05	-.05	.32 *
Legitimizing	.08	-.02	.05	.09
Pressure	-.13 *	-.17 *	-.07	-.14
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	-.04	.01	-.14	.09
R^2	.78	.67	.44	.81
N	106	103	112	57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 148

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Personal Appeals Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	.10	-.06		.09
Consultation	-.09	.32 **		-.49 **
Exchange	.30 **	.48 **		.43 **
Ingratiation	.13	.21 *		.38 *
Inspirational appeal	-.03	.13		-.42 *
Apprising	.09	-.02		.37 **
Rational Persuasion	-.20	-.38 **		.06
Coalition	.36 **	.25 **		.45 **
Legitimizing	-.01	-.05		.02
Pressure	.20 *	.05		.03
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	.10	-.08		-.12
R^2	.44	.69		.74
N	106	103		57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 149

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Appraising Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	-.12	.29 *		.03
Consultation	.07	-.02		.45 *
Exchange	.06	-.06		-.06
Ingratiation	.47 **	-.01		-.24
Inspirational appeal	.34 **	.39 **		.58 **
Personal appeals	.05	-.02		.45 **
Rational Persuasion	-.03	-.17		-.22
Coalition	.01	-.01		-.62 **
Legitimizing	.18 *	.41 **		.33
Pressure	-.02	.16 *		.14
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	.00	-.03		.02
R^2	.65	.59		.69
N	106	103		57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 150

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Rational Persuasion Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	-.05	.22 *		-.01
Consultation	.06	.42 **	.27 **	.19
Exchange	.00	.11		.00
Ingratiation	.09	.10		-.14
Inspirational appeal	.67 **	.28 **	.52 **	.68 **
Personal appeals	-.11	-.41 **		.07
Apprising	-.02	-.14		-.22
Coalition	.08	.07	.22 **	-.19
Legitimizing	.16 *	.14	.11	.41 *
Pressure	.02	.01	-.01	-.05
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	.07	.00	.07	-.10
R^2	.69	.66	.54	.69
N	106	103	112	57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 151

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Coalition Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	-.09	-.16		.03
Consultation	.03	-.06	-.27 **	.61
Exchange	.15	.03		.13
Ingratiation	-.06	.02		-.48
Inspirational appeal	-.05	.08	-.05	.43
Personal appeals	.39 **	.45 **		.44
Apprising	.01	-.02		-.51
Rational Persuasion	.15	.12	.30 **	-.16
Legitimizing	-.01	.22	.22 *	.21
Pressure	.25 *	.22 *	.33 **	.20
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	-.01	-.01	.15	.03
R^2	.38	.36	.37	.74
N	106	103	112	57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 152

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Legitimizing Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	.14	-.17		.12
Consultation	.03	-.09	-.05	.15
Exchange	.03	.21 *		-.23
Ingratiation	-.13	.32 **		.10
Inspirational appeal	.20	-.02	.06	.11
Personal appeals	-.01	-.07		.02
Apprising	.27	.44 **		.25
Rational Persuasion	.28	.19	.16	.31 *
Coalition	-.01	.17	.23 *	.19
Pressure	.27	-.02	.33 **	.09
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	-.07	.05	-.10	-.05
R^2	.47	.50	.34	.77
N	106	103	112	57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 153

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses Examining the Independent Effects on Pressure Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1:</i>				
Collaboration	-.26 *	.33 *		.01
Consultation	.10	-.26	.10	-.34
Exchange	-.04	.00		.46 *
Ingratiation	.00	-.05		.22
Inspirational appeal	-.36 *	-.38 *	-.08	-.32
Personal appeals	.21 *	.12		.04
Apprising	-.03	.30 *		.21
Rational Persuasion	.05	.02	-.02	-.08
Coalition	.25 *	.29 *	.34 **	.35
Legitimizing	.31 **	-.03	.33 **	.17
<i>Step 2:</i>				
Stakeholder dependence	-.05	.13	-.19 **	.07
R^2	.40	.25	.35	.54
N	106	103	112	57

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 154

The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Leader Self-Monitoring on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Rational persuasion	Legitimizing	Pressure
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.74 **	3.73 **	3.72 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.01	.00	.08
Leader education	-.08	-.07	-.09
Leader position tenure	.01	.01	.01
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	-.01
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.09	-.10	-.17
Subordinate education	-.03	-.04	-.01
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.03 **	-.02 *	-.02
Influence tactic	.32 **	.13 **	-.32 **
Self-monitoring	.24	.27	.35 *
Influence tactic X Self-monitoring	-.34 **	-.28 *	-.35 *
Tau (τ)	.21	.28	.17
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.43	.50	.52

Note. $N = 327$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1.

Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 155

The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Relationship Quality on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Collaboration	Consultation	Ingratiation
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.76 **	3.76 **	3.77 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.33 **	-.31 **	-.32 **
Leader education	-.11 **	-.11 **	-.11 **
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.02	.01	.04
Subordinate education	-.01	-.01	-.01
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.03 **	-.03 **	-.03 **
Influence tactic	.16 **	.07 *	.05
Relationship quality	.94 **	1.05 **	1.04 **
Influence tactic X Relationship quality	-.09 *	-.11 *	-.12 **
Tau (τ)	.03	.04	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.26	.27	.27

Note. $N = 327$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 155 (cont'd)

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Inspirational appeal	Appraising	Rational persuasion
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.77 **	3.77 **	3.76 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.30 **	-.31 **	-.30 **
Leader education	-.12 **	-.12 **	-.11 **
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	.07	.02	.03
Subordinate education	.00	.01	-.01
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.02	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.03 **	-.02 **	-.03 **
Influence tactic	.16 **	.09 **	.13 **
Relationship quality	.94 **	1.01 **	1.01 **
Influence tactic X Relationship quality	-.09 **	-.10 **	-.08 *
Tau (τ)	.03	.05	.03
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.26	.26	.27

Table 155 (cont'd)

Variables	Influence Tactic	
	Coalition	Legitimizing
<i>Controls</i>		
Intercept	3.74 **	3.75 **
Leader age	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.29 **	-.32 **
Leader education	-.11 **	-.11 **
Leader position tenure	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.00	.00
Subordinate age	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	.03	.06
Subordinate education	.00	-.01
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.01
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.02 **
Influence tactic	-.09 **	.04
Relationship quality	1.15 **	1.09 **
Influence tactic X Relationship quality	-.11 *	-.09 *
Tau (τ)	.03	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.27	.28

Table 156
The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Relationship Quality on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Collaboration	Consultation	Exchange
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.95 **	3.96 **	3.94 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.25 **	-.22 *	-.23 *
Leader education	-.11 **	-.12 **	-.11 **
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.00	.00	-.01
Subordinate age	.01 *	.01 *	.00
Subordinate gender	-.03	-.01	.05
Subordinate education	-.06	-.06 *	-.06
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.01
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 **	-.03 **	-.02 **
Influence tactic	.17 **	.11 **	.04
Relationship quality	1.04 **	1.14 **	1.25 **
Influence tactic X Relationship quality	-.12 **	-.15 **	-.12 **
Tau (τ)	.02	.02	.02
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.24	.24	.26

Note. $N = 327$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 156 (cont'd)

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Ingratiation	Inspirational appeal	Appraising
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.97 **	3.99 **	3.97 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.23 *	-.21 *	-.23 *
Leader education	-.12 **	-.12 **	-.13 **
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00 *
Subordinate gender	.05	.06	.02
Subordinate education	-.06 *	-.05	-.04
Subordinate position tenure	.03	.02	.01
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 **	-.02 **	-.02 *
Influence tactic	.05	.18 **	.13 **
Relationship quality	1.17 **	1.03 **	1.11 **
Influence tactic X Relationship quality	-.16 **	-.18 **	-.15 **
Tau (τ)	.03	.02	.03
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.25	.23	.22

Table 156 (cont'd)

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Rational persuasion	Coalition	Legitimizing
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.98 **	3.93 **	3.75 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.21	-.21 *	-.32 *
Leader education	-.12 **	-.12 **	-.11 **
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	.02	.04	.06
Subordinate education	-.06	-.05	-.01
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.01	.01
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 **	-.02 **	-.02 **
Influence tactic	.14 **	-.06	.04 *
Relationship quality	1.10 **	1.29 **	1.09 **
Influence tactic X Relationship quality	-.19 **	-.11 *	-.09 **
Tau (τ)	.02	.02	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.24	.27	.28

Table 157

The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Political Skill (Subordinate-rated) on Subordinate Ratings of Task Performance

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Collaboration	Ingratiation	Inspirational appeal
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.76 **	3.75 **	3.78 **
Leader age	-.01	.00	-.01
Leader gender	-.12	-.10	-.08
Leader education	-.07	-.06	-.07
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 *	.02 **	.02 *
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.10	-.08	-.04
Subordinate education	-.03	-.02	-.02
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.01	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Influence tactic	.12 **	.06	.10 **
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	.95 **	1.03 **	.96 **
Influence tactic X Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	-.10 **	-.07 *	-.10 **
Tau (τ)	.04	.05	.05
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.20	.21	.20

Note. $N = 327$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 157 (cont'd)

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Appraising	Rational persuasion	Legitimizing
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.76 **	3.98 **	3.75 **
Leader age	-.01	.00	-.01
Leader gender	-.11	.07	-.07
Leader education	-.07	-.07	-.06
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02 **	.02	.02 *
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.06	-.06	-.06
Subordinate education	-.01	-.07 *	-.02
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.01
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.01	-.01
Influence tactic	.09 **	.16 **	.04
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	1.33 **	.91 **	1.07 **
Influence tactic X Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	-.10 **	-.20 **	-.11 **
Tau (τ)	.05	.04	.05
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.20	.29	.21

Table 158

The Moderating Effect of Influence Tactics and Political Skill (Subordinate-rated) on Subordinate Ratings of Viability

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Collaboration	Consultation	Ingatiation
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.94 **	3.94 **	3.94 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	-.04	.02	.00
Leader education	-.07	-.07	-.07
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.14	-.12	-.09
Subordinate education	-.08 **	-.08 *	-.07 *
Subordinate position tenure	.01	.02	.01
Subordinate organization tenure	-.02 *	-.02 *	-.02 *
Influence tactic	.21 **	.14 **	.09 **
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	.84 **	.94 **	.98 **
Influence tactic X Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	-.13 **	-.12 **	-.12 **
Tau (τ)	.02	.04	.03
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.29	.31	.32

Note. $N = 327$ observations for 99 leaders. Subordinate-level variables are at level 1. Leader variables are at level 2. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 158 (cont'd)

Variables	Influence Tactic		
	Inspirational appeal	Appraising	Rational persuasion
<i>Controls</i>			
Intercept	3.98 **	3.96 **	3.98 **
Leader age	.00	.00	.00
Leader gender	.02	.00	.07
Leader education	-.08	-.09	-.07
Leader position tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00	.00	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.01	.02	.02
Subordinate age	.00	.00	.00
Subordinate gender	-.02	-.06	-.06
Subordinate education	-.07	-.05	-.07 *
Subordinate position tenure	.02	.01	.02
Subordinate organization tenure	-.01	-.01	-.01
Influence tactic	.20 **	.16 **	.16 **
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	.83 **	1.40 **	.91 **
Influence tactic X Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	-.15 **	-.15 **	-.20 **
Tau (τ)	.03	.04	.04
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.29	.28	.29

Table 158 (cont'd)

Variables	Influence Tactic
	Legitimizing
<i>Controls</i>	
Intercept	3.93 **
Leader age	.00
Leader gender	.04
Leader education	-.06
Leader position tenure	.00
Leader organizational tenure	.00
Leader tenure with subordinate	.02
Subordinate age	.00
Subordinate gender	-.08
Subordinate education	-.07
Subordinate position tenure	.01
Subordinate organization tenure	-.01
Influence tactic	.08 **
Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	1.03 **
Influence tactic X Leader political skill (Subordinate-rated)	-.11 **
Tau (τ)	.03
Sigma-squared (σ^2)	.32

Table 159

The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.00	.04		.16
Leader gender	-.17 *	-.02		-.15
Leader education	-.19 *	.14		-.40
Leader position tenure	.13	.08		-.17
Leader organizational tenure	-.12	.29 *		.24
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.17	-.15		-.16
Stakeholder age	-.03	-.02		.03
Stakeholder gender	.00	.18		-.24
Stakeholder education	.04	.29 *		.23
Stakeholder position tenure	-.10	.13		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.08	-.04		-.27
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Consultation	-.04	.09		-.23
Exchange	-.09	-.02		-.21
Ingratiation	.10	-.09		.41
Inspirational appeal	.37 **	.24		-.01
Personal appeals	.07	.11		-.13
Apprising	-.13	.16		.54
Rational Persuasion	.13	.19		.24
Coalition	.06	-.08		.21
Legitimizing	.04	-.14		-.44
Pressure	-.31 **	-.12		-.08
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Collaboration	.29 *	.22		-.12
Political Skill	.01	.10		.15
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Collaboration X Political Skill	.08	-.02		-.37
R^2	.76	.63		.46
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 160

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.02	.04	-.03	.19
Leader gender	-.16	-.02	.16	-.09
Leader education	-.19 *	.14	.10	-.32
Leader position tenure	.12	.08	.20 *	-.20
Leader organizational tenure	-.11	.29 *	-.10	.26
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.18	-.14	-.07	-.20
Stakeholder age	-.03	-.02	.30	.07
Stakeholder gender	.01	.18	-1.32 *	-.25
Stakeholder education	.04	.29 *	.07	.29
Stakeholder position tenure	-.09	.13	-1.86 *	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.09	-.04	-.50	-.31
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.28 *	.22		.11
Exchange	-.09	-.02		-.27
Ingratiation	.11	-.09		.45
Inspirational appeal	.37 **	.24	.73 **	-.14
Personal appeals	.07	.11		-.06
Apprising	-.13	.17		.37
Rational Persuasion	.16	.19	.26 *	.22
Coalition	.06	-.09	-.06	.18
Legitimizing	.03	-.14	-.26	-.41
Pressure	-.30 **	-.12	.01	-.06
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Consultation	-.05	.09	-.14	-.09
Political Skill	.02	.10	-.07	.10
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Consultation X Political Skill	.06	-.04	.03	-.03
R^2	.76	.63	.70	.40
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 161

The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.04	.04		.20
Leader gender	-.15	-.04		-.08
Leader education	-.19	.12		-.31
Leader position tenure	.12	.08		-.20
Leader organizational tenure	-.09	.27 *		.27
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.17	-.14		-.21
Stakeholder age	-.01	-.02		.07
Stakeholder gender	.00	.16		-.25
Stakeholder education	.03	.28 *		.30
Stakeholder position tenure	-.09	.13		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.10	-.06		-.32
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.28 *	.21		.12
Consultation	-.05	.06		-.09
Ingratiation	.11	-.07		.44
Inspirational appeal	.38 **	.22		-.14
Personal appeals	.07	.14		-.06
Apprising	-.11	.17		.36
Rational Persuasion	.13	.19		.22
Coalition	.06	-.08		.17
Legitimizing	.03	-.16		-.41
Pressure	-.31 **	-.11		-.06
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Exchange	-.10	-.02		-.27
Political Skill	.03	.09		.09
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Exchange X Political Skill	.03	-.10		-.01
R^2	.76	.63		.40
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 162

The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.04	.05		.17
Leader gender	-.15	-.01		-.09
Leader education	-.18	.20		-.38
Leader position tenure	.11	.07		-.21
Leader organizational tenure	-.08	.30 *		.25
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.18	-.17		-.21
Stakeholder age	-.01	-.03		.07
Stakeholder gender	.01	.21		-.26
Stakeholder education	.02	.31 **		.26
Stakeholder position tenure	-.09	.12		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.11	.01		-.29
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.28 *	.24		.03
Consultation	-.05	.09		-.21
Exchange	-.10	-.02		-.29
Inspirational appeal	.38 **	.24		-.12
Personal appeals	.08	.11		-.10
Apprising	-.11	.13		.35
Rational Persuasion	.13	.19		.25
Coalition	.06	-.05		.22
Legitimizing	.03	-.13		-.36
Pressure	-.32 **	-.14		-.06
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Ingratiation	.10	-.08		.56
Political Skill	.04	.10		.14
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Ingratiation X Political Skill	-.02	.13		-.18
R^2	.76	.64		.42
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 163

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.02	.03	-.04	.21
Leader gender	-.17 *	-.02	.16	-.09
Leader education	-.18	.11	.09	-.33
Leader position tenure	.12	.08	.20 *	-.25
Leader organizational tenure	-.09	.29	-.10	.26
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.16	-.14	-.07	-.19
Stakeholder age	-.02	-.03	.33	.08
Stakeholder gender	.00	.17	-1.38 *	-.21
Stakeholder education	.04	.27	.11	.23
Stakeholder position tenure	-.10	.14	-1.96 *	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.08	-.08	-.51 *	-.31
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.26 *	.20		.15
Consultation	-.04	.10	-.15	-.17
Exchange	-.10	-.02		-.22
Ingratiation	.11	-.07		.61
Personal appeals	.08	.09		-.12
Apprising	-.12	.16		.31
Rational Persuasion	.15	.16	.27 *	.27
Coalition	.05	-.08	-.08	.20
Legitimizing	.03	-.15	-.25	-.44
Pressure	-.31 **	-.12	.01	-.08
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Inspirational appeal	.39 *	.26	.72 **	-.22
Political Skill	.02	.11	-.06	.20
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Insp appeal X Political Skill	.07	-.10	.04	-.19
R^2	.76	.63	.70	.40
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 164

The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.05	.04		.20
Leader gender	-.15	-.02		-.08
Leader education	-.18 *	.14		-.30
Leader position tenure	.13	.08		-.19
Leader organizational tenure	-.09	.28 *		.26
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.16	-.14		-.21
Stakeholder age	-.01	-.02		.07
Stakeholder gender	.03	.18		-.24
Stakeholder education	.03	.29 *		.31
Stakeholder position tenure	-.08	.14		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.11	-.04		-.31
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.29 *	.22		.13
Consultation	-.04	.08		-.05
Exchange	-.10	-.02		-.26
Ingratiation	.08	-.09		.41
Inspirational appeal	.39 **	.24		-.14
Apprising	-.10	.16		.36
Rational Persuasion	.10	.19		.21
Coalition	.07	-.08		.16
Legitimizing	.03	-.14		-.42
Pressure	-.30 **	-.12		-.03
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Personal appeals	.07	.11		-.06
Political Skill	.03	.10		.09
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Pers appeals X Political Skill	.08	-.04		.05
R^2	.76	.63		.40
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 165

The Moderating Effect of Appraising and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.03	.04		.19
Leader gender	-.15	-.02		-.07
Leader education	-.18	.15		-.32
Leader position tenure	.11	.08		-.17
Leader organizational tenure	-.08	.30 *		.25
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.18	-.15		-.22
Stakeholder age	-.02	-.02		.07
Stakeholder gender	.00	.19		-.28
Stakeholder education	.01	.30 *		.32
Stakeholder position tenure	-.08	.13		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.11	-.03		-.32
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.27 *	.22		.09
Consultation	-.05	.09		-.08
Exchange	-.10	-.02		-.25
Ingratiation	.10	-.09		.40
Inspirational appeal	.38 **	.24		-.15
Personal appeals	.08	.11		-.05
Rational Persuasion	.13	.20		.23
Coalition	.06	-.08		.14
Legitimizing	.03	-.14		-.36
Pressure	-.32 **	-.13		-.04
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Appraising	-.12	.16		.40
Political Skill	.03	.10		.06
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Appraising X Political Skill	-.02	-.01		.10
R^2	.76	.63		.41
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 166

The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.02	.04	-.03	.20
Leader gender	-.18 *	-.02	.16	-.08
Leader education	-.18 *	.15	.10	-.31
Leader position tenure	.12	.08	.20 *	-.20
Leader organizational tenure	-.09	.29 *	-.11	.26
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.16	-.15	-.08	-.21
Stakeholder age	-.02	-.02	.30	.07
Stakeholder gender	.01	.18	-1.30 *	-.25
Stakeholder education	.05	.29 *	.08	.30
Stakeholder position tenure	-.14	.13	-1.82	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.05	-.04	-.49	-.32
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.25 *	.22		.12
Consultation	.01	.08	-.13	-.08
Exchange	-.10	-.02		-.27
Ingratiation	.09	-.09		.44
Inspirational appeal	.40 **	.24	.72 **	-.14
Personal appeals	.05	.11		-.05
Apprising	-.13	.16		.36
Coalition	.06	-.09	-.07	.17
Legitimizing	.03	-.14	-.26	-.41
Pressure	-.29 **	-.12	.01	-.06
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Rational Persuasion	.14	.20	.26 *	.21
Political Skill	.02	.10	-.07	.09
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Rational Pers X Political Skill	.13	-.03	.00	-.01
R^2	.77	.63	.70	.40
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 167

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.03	.04	-.03	.17
Leader gender	-.15	-.01	.16	-.10
Leader education	-.18	.16	.10	-.36
Leader position tenure	.11	.08	.20 *	-.18
Leader organizational tenure	-.09	.30 *	-.11	.22
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.18	-.15	-.08	-.19
Stakeholder age	-.02	-.01	.30	.09
Stakeholder gender	.00	.19	-1.30 *	-.23
Stakeholder education	.02	.30 *	.08	.26
Stakeholder position tenure	-.09	.13	-1.82	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.11	-.03	-.49	-.29
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.27 *	.22		.05
Consultation	-.05	.09	-.13	-.14
Exchange	-.10	-.02		-.19
Ingratiation	.11	-.09		.52
Inspirational appeal	.39 **	.25	.72 **	-.21
Personal appeals	.07	.11		-.14
Apprising	-.12	.16		.45
Rational Persuasion	.13	.20	.26 *	.28
Legitimizing	.03	-.14	-.26	-.43
Pressure	-.31 **	-.13	.01	-.10
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Coalition	.06	-.08	-.07	.17
Political Skill	.03	.10	-.07	.11
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Coalition X Political Skill	-.01	.01	.00	-.15
R^2	.76	.63	.74	.41
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 168

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.03	.05	-.04	.21
Leader gender	-.15	-.01	.16	-.04
Leader education	-.18	.18	.10	-.30
Leader position tenure	.12	.08	.20 *	-.17
Leader organizational tenure	-.09	.30	-.10	.29
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.18	-.17	-.08	-.24
Stakeholder age	-.02	-.01	.31	.05
Stakeholder gender	.01	.19	-1.32 *	-.33
Stakeholder education	.02	.30	.10	.32
Stakeholder position tenure	-.09	.12	-1.86	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.11	-.01	-.48	-.34
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.27 *	.24		.11
Consultation	-.05	.09	-.14	-.07
Exchange	-.10	-.01		-.30
Ingratiation	.11	-.09		.34
Inspirational appeal	.38 **	.25	.71 **	-.16
Personal appeals	.08	.10		-.03
Apprising	-.12	.17		.45
Rational Persuasion	.13	.20	.27	.25
Coalition	.06	-.07	-.10	.16
Pressure	-.31 **	-.13	.03	-.03
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Legitimizing	.03	-.16	-.22	-.37
Political Skill	.03	.10	-.06	.05
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Legitimizing X Political Skill	-.01	.07	.07	.15
R^2	.76	.63	.70	.41
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 169

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Ratings of Task Performance, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.04	.04	-.03	.20
Leader gender	-.16	-.02	.16	-.07
Leader education	-.19	.14	.10	-.31
Leader position tenure	.11	.08	.20 *	-.18
Leader organizational tenure	-.09	.29 *	-.11	.25
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.18	-.14	-.08	-.20
Stakeholder age	-.02	-.04	.29	.07
Stakeholder gender	.01	.19	-1.27 *	-.25
Stakeholder education	.02	.29 *	.08	.30
Stakeholder position tenure	-.09	.14	-1.76	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.11	-.04	-.46	-.32
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.28 *	.22		.14
Consultation	-.05	.08	-.13	-.07
Exchange	-.10	-.03		-.28
Ingratiation	.10	-.09		.41
Inspirational appeal	.38 **	.25	.71 **	-.13
Personal appeals	.08	.13		-.04
Apprising	-.11	.13		.36
Rational Persuasion	.13	.21	.27 *	.21
Coalition	.07	-.07	-.08	.16
Legitimizing	.03	-.14	-.23	-.43
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Pressure	-.31 **	-.12	.01	.02
Political Skill	.03	.09	-.08	.11
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Pressure X Political Skill	.03	-.06	.03	.07
R^2	.76	.63	.70	.40
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 170

The Moderating Effect of Collaboration and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.03	-.11		.19
Leader gender	-.10	-.07		-.11
Leader education	-.21 *	.17		-.46 *
Leader position tenure	.13	.06		-.18
Leader organizational tenure	-.09	.44 **		.15
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.12	-.20		-.10
Stakeholder age	-.01	-.01		-.01
Stakeholder gender	-.06	.24 *		-.28
Stakeholder education	.03	.33 **		.23
Stakeholder position tenure	-.16	.09		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.07	.05		-.21
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Consultation	.09	.09		-.27
Exchange	-.11	.09		-.23
Ingratiation	-.04	.01		.23
Inspirational appeal	.48 **	.25		.08
Personal appeals	.09	-.01		-.11
Apprising	-.08	.28 *		.72 *
Rational Persuasion	-.01	.09		.37
Coalition	.03	-.13		.36
Legitimizing	.03	-.11		-.51
Pressure	-.34 **	-.20 *		-.04
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Collaboration	.28 **	.12		-.13
Political Skill	-.05	.04		.19
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Collaboration X Political Skill	.07	-.03		-.36 *
R^2	.81	.64		.56
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 171

The Moderating Effect of Consultation and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.03	-.11	-.18	.20
Leader gender	-.10	-.07	.10	-.07
Leader education	-.22 **	.17	-.02	-.42 *
Leader position tenure	.12	.06	.19	-.22
Leader organizational tenure	-.10	.44 **	-.14	.15
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.14	-.20	.00	-.13
Stakeholder age	-.02	-.01	-.07	.03
Stakeholder gender	-.05	.25 *	-.19	-.28
Stakeholder education	.04	.33 **	-.72 **	.26
Stakeholder position tenure	-.14	.10	.09	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.08	.05	-.45	-.24
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.27 **	.12		.08
Exchange	-.11	.09		-.29
Ingratiation	-.04	.01		.31
Inspirational appeal	.48 **	.25	.51 **	-.05
Personal appeals	.09	-.01		-.08
Apprising	-.09	.28		.57 *
Rational Persuasion	.04	.09	.39 **	.36
Coalition	.02	-.13	-.21	.36
Legitimizing	.02	-.10	-.42 **	-.48
Pressure	-.33 **	-.20 *	.05	-.01
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Consultation	.09	.09	-.05	-.19
Political Skill	-.05	.04	-.07	.16
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Consultation X Political Skill	.09	-.04	-.01	-.11
R^2	.81	.64	.64	.51
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 172

The Moderating Effect of Exchange and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.01	-.12		.24
Leader gender	-.09	-.07		-.04
Leader education	-.20 *	.17		-.39 *
Leader position tenure	.12	.07		-.25
Leader organizational tenure	-.06	.43 **		.18
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.13	-.20		-.16
Stakeholder age	.00	-.01		.03
Stakeholder gender	-.05	.24 *		-.30
Stakeholder education	.02	.33 **		.27
Stakeholder position tenure	-.15	.09		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.10	.05		-.26
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.26 *	.12		.09
Consultation	.08	.08		-.20
Ingratiation	-.04	.02		.31
Inspirational appeal	.50 **	.24		-.07
Personal appeals	.09	.00		-.06
Apprising	-.08	.27 *		.53
Rational Persuasion	.00	.10		.36
Coalition	.04	-.13		.35
Legitimizing	.01	-.11		-.43
Pressure	-.34 **	-.20 *		-.04
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Exchange	-.11	.09		-.29
Political Skill	-.03	.04		.16
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Exchange X Political Skill	-.02	-.03		-.09
R^2	.81	.64		.50
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 173

The Moderating Effect of Ingratiation and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.01	-.11		.20
Leader gender	-.09	-.06		-.05
Leader education	-.21 *	.21		-.45 *
Leader position tenure	.13	.06		-.23
Leader organizational tenure	-.07	.45 **		.16
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.13	-.22		-.16
Stakeholder age	.00	-.02		.02
Stakeholder gender	-.06	.27 *		-.30
Stakeholder education	.03	.34 *		.25
Stakeholder position tenure	-.15	.08		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.09	.09		-.22
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.26 *	.13		.01
Consultation	.08	.09		-.27
Exchange	-.11	.09		-.31
Inspirational appeal	.49 **	.25		-.03
Personal appeals	.08	-.01		-.08
Apprising	-.07	.25 *		.53
Rational Persuasion	-.01	.10		.38
Coalition	.04	-.11		.37
Legitimizing	.02	-.09		-.42
Pressure	-.34 **	-.22 *		-.01
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Ingratiation	-.03	.02		.39
Political Skill	-.03	.04		.18
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Ingratiation X Political Skill	.02	.09		-.21
R^2	.81	.65		.52
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 174

The Moderating Effect of Inspirational Appeal and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.02	-.12	-.20	.25
Leader gender	-.10	-.07	.09	-.06
Leader education	-.21 *	.15	-.02	-.42 *
Leader position tenure	.12	.06	.18	-.31
Leader organizational tenure	-.06	.43 **	-.13	.16
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.12	-.20	.01	-.12
Stakeholder age	-.01	-.03	-.03	.04
Stakeholder gender	-.06	.24 *	-.30	-.21
Stakeholder education	.03	.31 **	-.68 **	.17
Stakeholder position tenure	-.16	.10	-.10	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.07	.03	-.49	-.23
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.25 *	.10		.17
Consultation	.09	.10	-.07	-.28
Exchange	-.12	.09		-.20
Ingratiation	-.03	.03		.57
Personal appeals	.09	-.03		-.16
Apprising	-.08	.27 *		.44
Rational Persuasion	.01	.07	.39 **	.45
Coalition	.03	-.13	-.23	.38
Legitimizing	.02	-.11	-.41 **	-.53
Pressure	-.34 **	-.20 *	.05	-.05
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Inspirational appeal	.50 **	.26	.51 **	-.21
Political Skill	-.04	.05	-.06	.33
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Inspirational appeal X Political Skill	.07	-.09	.06	-.34
R^2	.81	.65	.64	.55
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 175

*The Moderating Effect of Personal Appeals and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics*

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	-.01	-.11		.23
Leader gender	-.09	-.07		-.04
Leader education	-.21 *	.17		-.37
Leader position tenure	.13	.06		-.22
Leader organizational tenure	-.06	.44 **		.17
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.12	-.21		-.16
Stakeholder age	.01	-.01		.02
Stakeholder gender	-.04	.25 *		-.29
Stakeholder education	.02	.33 **		.30
Stakeholder position tenure	-.15	.09		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.10	.06		-.25
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.27 **	.12		.11
Consultation	.09	.09		-.12
Exchange	-.12	.09		-.28
Ingratiation	-.05	.01		.25
Inspirational appeal	.50 **	.25		-.06
Apprising	-.07	.27 *		.54
Rational Persuasion	-.02	.10		.35
Coalition	.04	-.12		.32
Legitimizing	.02	-.10		-.48
Pressure	-.34 **	-.20 *		-.01
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Personal appeals	.09	.00		-.04
Political Skill	-.03	.04		.13
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Personal appeals X Political Skill	.04	-.01		.00
R^2	.81	.64		.50
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 176

The Moderating Effect of Apprising and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.00	-.11		.23
Leader gender	-.09	-.07		-.04
Leader education	-.21 *	.18		-.37
Leader position tenure	.13	.06		-.22
Leader organizational tenure	-.07	.44 **		.17
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.13	-.21		-.16
Stakeholder age	.00	-.01		.02
Stakeholder gender	-.05	.25 *		-.29
Stakeholder education	.02	.33 **		.30
Stakeholder position tenure	-.15	.09		
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.09	.06		-.25
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.27 *	.12		.11
Consultation	.08	.09		-.12
Exchange	-.11	.09		-.28
Ingratiation	-.04	.01		.25
Inspirational appeal	.49 **	.25		-.06
Personal appeals	.09	.00		-.03
Rational Persuasion	-.01	.10		.35
Coalition	.04	-.12		.31
Legitimizing	.02	-.10		-.47
Pressure	-.34 **	-.20 *		-.01
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Appraising	-.07	.27 *		.54
Political Skill	-.03	.04		.13
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Appraising X Political Skill	.01	.00		.01
R^2	.81	.64		.50
N	93	95		58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 177

*The Moderating Effect of Rational Persuasion and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability,
Controlling for other Influence Tactics*

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.02	-.11	-.19	.21
Leader gender	-.12 *	-.06	.09	-.10
Leader education	-.22 *	.17	-.02	-.39 *
Leader position tenure	.13	.06	.19	-.25
Leader organizational tenure	-.07	.44 **	-.14	.15
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.11	-.20	.00	-.10
Stakeholder age	-.01	-.01	-.07	.05
Stakeholder gender	-.06	.25 *	-.20	-.21
Stakeholder education	.05	.33 **	-.71 **	.26
Stakeholder position tenure	-.21	.10	.08	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.03	.05	-.45	-.22
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.23 *	.11		.13
Consultation	.15	.09	-.06	-.15
Exchange	-.11	.09		-.30
Ingratiation	-.05	.01		.38
Inspirational appeal	.51 **	.24	.51 **	.05
Personal appeals	.06	-.01		-.06
Apprising	-.09	.28 *		.44
Coalition	.03	-.14	-.22	.36
Legitimizing	.02	-.10	-.40 *	-.52
Pressure	-.32 **	-.20 *	.05	-.03
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Rational Persuasion	.00	.10	.39 **	.24
Political Skill	-.04	.04	-.07	.15
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Rational Persuasion X Political Skill	.15	-.04	.04	-.19
R^2	.82	.64	.64	.52
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 178

The Moderating Effect of Coalition and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.02	-.11	-.18	.18
Leader gender	-.08	-.07	.10	-.07
Leader education	-.20 *	.17	-.01	-.44 *
Leader position tenure	.11	.06	.19	-.19
Leader organizational tenure	-.07	.44 **	-.14	.11
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.15	-.21	.00	-.13
Stakeholder age	.00	-.02	-.05	.04
Stakeholder gender	-.07	.25 *	-.20	-.26
Stakeholder education	.01	.33 **	-.71 **	.24
Stakeholder position tenure	-.15	.10	.04	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.10	.06	-.48	-.21
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.26 *	.12		.02
Consultation	.08	.08	-.05	-.21
Exchange	-.10	.09		-.18
Ingratiation	-.03	.00		.37
Inspirational appeal	.50 **	.25	.52 **	-.16
Personal appeals	.08	.00		-.16
Apprising	-.08	.26 *		.66 *
Rational Persuasion	-.01	.09	.39 **	.44
Legitimizing	.01	-.10	-.43 **	-.50
Pressure	-.35 **	-.20 **	.06	-.07
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Coalition	.04	-.12	-.21	.33
Political Skill	-.02	.04	-.08	.17
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Coalition X Political Skill	-.05	-.03	-.02	-.21
R^2	.81	.64	.64	.52
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 179

The Moderating Effect of Legitimizing and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.00	-.11	-.18	.23
Leader gender	-.09	-.06	.10	-.04
Leader education	-.21 *	.19	-.01	-.37
Leader position tenure	.12	.06	.19	-.21
Leader organizational tenure	-.06	.44 **	-.14	.18
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.13	-.21	.00	-.16
Stakeholder age	.00	-.01	-.07	.02
Stakeholder gender	-.06	.25 *	-.20	-.31
Stakeholder education	.02	.33 **	-.70 **	.30
Stakeholder position tenure	-.15	.09	.06	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.09	.07	-.45	-.26
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.27 *	.12		.11
Consultation	.08	.09	-.05	-.12
Exchange	-.11	.10		-.29
Ingratiation	-.04	.01		.23
Inspirational appeal	.50 **	.25	.50 **	-.06
Personal appeals	.09	-.01		-.03
Appraising	-.07	.27 *		.56
Rational Persuasion	-.01	.10	.40 **	.35
Coalition	.04	-.12	-.23	.32
Pressure	-.34 **	-.21 *	.06	.00
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Legitimizing	.02	-.11	-.39 *	-.47
Political Skill	-.03	.04	-.07	.13
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Legitimizing X Political Skill	.02	.03	.04	.03
R^2	.81	.64	.64	.50
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 180

The Moderating Effect of Pressure and Political Skill on Ratings of Viability, Controlling for other Influence Tactics

Variables	Subordinate	Peer	Senior Manager	Customer
<i>Step 1: Controls</i>				
Leader age	.01	-.12	-.18	.25
Leader gender	-.08	-.07	.10	.00
Leader education	-.20 *	.17	-.01	-.36
Leader position tenure	.13	.06	.19	-.14
Leader organizational tenure	-.06	.44 **	-.14	.09
Leader tenure with stakeholder	.12	-.20	.00	-.13
Stakeholder age	.01	-.02	-.08	-.01
Stakeholder gender	-.06	.26 *	-.17	-.31
Stakeholder education	.02	.33 **	-.71 **	.28
Stakeholder position tenure	-.15	.10	.13	
Stakeholder organization tenure	-.09	.06	-.43	-.28
<i>Step 2: Influence Tactics</i>				
Collaboration	.26 *	.12		.21
Consultation	.08	.09	-.05	-.09
Exchange	-.11	.09		-.34
Ingratiation	-.04	.01		.14
Inspirational appeal	.50 **	.25	.51 **	.00
Personal appeals	.09	.00		.01
Apprising	-.07	.26 *		.53 *
Rational Persuasion	-.01	.10	.39 **	.33
Coalition	.04	-.12	-.22	.28
Legitimizing	.02	-.10	-.40 *	-.57
<i>Step 3: Main effects</i>				
Pressure	-.35 **	-.20 *	.05	.35
Political Skill	-.03	.04	-.08	.24
<i>Step 4: Interaction</i>				
Pressure X Political Skill	-.02	-.03	.02	.35
R^2	.81	.64	.64	.51
N	93	95	84	58

Note. All coefficients standardized.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

APPENDIX B

List of Figures

Figure 1
Overall model




Figure 2

The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 3

The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 4

The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 5

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 6

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 7

The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 8

The Relationship between Appraising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 9

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 10

The Relationship between Collaboration and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 11

The Relationship between Consultation and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 12

The Relationship between Exchange and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 13

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 14

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 15

The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 16

The Relationship between Appraising and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 17

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 18

The Relationship between Consultation and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 19

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 20

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 21

The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 22

The Relationship between Consultation and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 23

The Relationship between Exchange and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 24

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 25

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 26

The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 27

The Relationship between Appraising and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 28

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 29

The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 30

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 31

The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 32

The Relationship between Coalition and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 33

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 34

The Relationship between Pressure and Peer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 35

The Relationship between Coalition and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 36

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 37

The Relationship between Pressure and Senior Manager-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 38

The Relationship between Coalition and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 39

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 40

The Relationship between Pressure and Customer-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 41

The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 42

The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 43

The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 44

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 45

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 46

The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 47

The Relationship between Appraising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 48

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 49

The Relationship between Collaboration and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 50

The Relationship between Consultation and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 51

The Relationship between Exchange and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 52

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 53

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 54

The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 55

The Relationship between Appraising and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 56

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 57

The Relationship between Consultation and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 58

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 59

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 60

The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 61

The Relationship between Consultation and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 62

The Relationship between Exchange and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 63

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 64

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 65

The Relationship between Personal Appeals and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 66

The Relationship between Appraising and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 67

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 68

The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 69

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 70

The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 71

The Relationship between Coalition and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 72

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 73

The Relationship between Pressure and Peer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 74

The Relationship between Coalition and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 75

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 76

The Relationship between Pressure and Senior Manager-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 77

The Relationship between Coalition and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 78

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 79

The Relationship between Pressure and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 80

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Self-monitoring




Figure 81

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Self-monitoring




Figure 82
The Relationship between Pressure and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Self-monitoring




Figure 83
The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 84
The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 85
The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 86
The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 87
The Relationship between Appraising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 88

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 89

The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 90

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 91

The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 92

The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 93

The Relationship between Exchange and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 94

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 95

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 96

The Relationship between Appraising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 97

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 98

The Relationship between Coalition and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 99

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Relationship Quality




Figure 100

The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 101

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 102

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 103

The Relationship between Appraising and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 104

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 105

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Task Performance at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 106

The Relationship between Collaboration and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 107

The Relationship between Consultation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 108

The Relationship between Ingratiation and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 109

The Relationship between Inspirational Appeal and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 110

The Relationship between Appraising and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 111

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 112

The Relationship between Legitimizing and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill




Figure 113

The Relationship between Collaboration and Customer-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill (Independent Effects Model)





Figure 114

The Relationship between Rational Persuasion and Subordinate-rated Viability at High and Low Levels of Political Skill (Independent Effects Model)



APPENDIX C

IRB Consent Form

Consent

You are being asked to participate in a research study. Researchers are required to provide a consent form to inform you about the study, to convey that your participation is voluntary, and to explain risks and benefits of participation.

Study Title:

Leadership and Organizational Culture

Researchers & Titles:

Dr. Frederick P. Morgeson, Professor

Elizabeth Karam, Doctoral Candidate in Organizational Behavior

Department & Institution:

Department of Management

The Eli Broad Graduate School of Management

Michigan State University

Contact information:

475 Business College Complex

East Lansing, MI 48824

lizkaram@msu.edu

This research study is designed to investigate leadership and culture within your organization. If you choose to participate, you will be asked to complete a series of survey questions. The survey will include questions assessing demographic information, leadership, and the culture of your organization.

You must be 18 or older to participate in this research study, and your participation in the research is completely voluntary. The survey should take approximately 20-30 minutes in total. You are free to decline to answer any questions or to terminate your participation at any time without penalty.

Risks associated with participating in this study are very low as your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowable by law. Only the researchers listed above and the Human Research Protection Program will have access to the responses that you provide. Your data will be included in a summary report along with the data from others to your organization; however, the report will not include any information that will allow anyone to identify any of your individual responses. In addition, the data is stored on a password-protected server, which will be accessible only by the research team. The data will be kept for at least 5 years in accordance with American Psychological Association guidelines.

Benefits associated with participating in this study are the enhanced learning that occurs from understanding how leaders work with and influence others within and outside of the organization, and how organizational culture impacts the performance of the organization. In addition, all study participants will be entered into a drawing for a \$50 gift certificate to Amazon.com. Twenty participants will be randomly selected to win one of these prizes.

If you have concerns or questions about this study, such as scientific issues, how to do any part of it, or to report an injury, please contact the researcher: Frederick P. Morgeson at 517-432-3520, or email morgeson@msu.edu, or regular mail at: N475 North Business Complex, MSU, East Lansing, MI 48824. If you have questions or concerns about your role and rights as a research participant, would like to obtain information or offer input, or would like to register a complaint about this study, you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the Michigan State University's Human Research Protection Program at 517-355-2180, Fax 517-432-4503, or e-mail irb@msu.edu or regular mail at 207 Olds Hall, MSU, East Lansing, MI 48824.

Check the box below to agree to participate and continue with the survey.

_____ I voluntarily agree to participate in this research study.

Please provide validation information for prize notification purposes.

Type First and Last Name _____
Email Address _____
Today's Date (mm/dd/yyyy) _____

APPENDIX D

Survey introduction

Welcome to the [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] survey!

The purpose of this survey is twofold. First, we would like to learn more about how leaders interact with internal and external stakeholders to coordinate their work. Second, we intend to examine how leadership and organizational culture affect these interactions. Your responses are very valuable to our research team, and we thank you for participating!

The survey begins by asking a few short demographic questions. Then, you will be asked to respond to questions in three sections. The first section assesses the extent to which you depend on others for completing your work. The second section asks questions about personal characteristics and values, and the final section includes questions about how well your branch performs.

It is important that you respond candidly and honestly when answering the questions. There are no right or wrong answers, please simply indicate your judgments. Do not spend too much time on any one question. Simply respond with your initial reaction. Keep in mind that no individual data will be reported back to Chemical Bank, and no information will be given which specifically describes or identifies any individual respondent. All responses will be grouped, and a feedback report will be created based on the aggregated responses. Your responses are confidential.

The survey contains primarily multiple-choice questions, and it should take approximately 20-30 minutes to complete. If you do not have time to answer all of the survey questions at once, you may return to the survey using the link provided. Your previous answers will be saved as long as you are responding from the same computer. All participants who complete the survey will be entered into a drawing to win one of twenty \$50 Amazon.com gift certificates.

Your responses are very important to this process. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me at lizkaram@msu.edu.

I sincerely appreciate your time and honest responses. Thank you again for your participation!

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APPENDIX E

Leader Survey

Demographic Information

Please provide the following demographic information.

Please indicate your gender.

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female
- ☐ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate your age.

- ☐ Years
- ☐ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed.

- ☐ Some high school
- ☐ High school diploma
- ☐ Some college
- ☐ Associates degree
- ☐ Bachelors degree
- ☐ Masters degree
- ☐ Doctorate
- ☐ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate your total work experience (round to the nearest year).

- ☐ years with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]
- ☐ years in current position

SECTION 1: Working with Others

Task Dependence: Section Overview

In the following questions, you will be asked to list individuals with whom you regularly interact for completing your work. After listing names in each stakeholder category (i.e., subordinates, peers, supervisor, and customers), you will be asked to respond to the same set of questions for each individual that you have listed. This repetition allows us to make comparisons about how your work is connected to others within the organization. Therefore, please note the name of the

specific person that the questions are referring to in the instructions and respond according to how you work with that particular individual.

Task Dependence - Subordinates

Instructions: Please list the names and email addresses of 3-5 *subordinates* with whom you regularly interact for completing your work. Subordinates include individuals who report directly to you via the organization's hierarchical structure. The list should contain a diverse set of subordinates who assist with the responsibilities related to your position. It should not include only those with whom you have close personal friendships.

*[Leaders responded by listing 3-5 subordinate names and email addresses]*⁵

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your working relationship with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE].

Response scale:

1 = *Strongly disagree*

2 = *Disagree*

3 = *Neutral*

4 = *Agree*

5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I work closely with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE].
3. My own performance is dependent on *receiving* accurate information from [NAME OF SUBORDINATE].
4. I rely on the support of from [NAME OF SUBORDINATE] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE] fairly frequently.

During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF SUBORDINATE]?

Response scale:

1 = *Never*

2 = *Rarely*

3 = *Sometimes*

4 = *Often*

5 = *Very often*

Task Dependence - Peer Co-Workers

⁵ The subordinate/peer/supervisor/customer name pre-fills on the survey based on the leader's responses. The leader responded to the same questions (i.e., stakeholder dependence scale and interaction frequency item) for each name entered.

Instructions: Please list the names and email addresses of 3-5 *peer co-workers* with whom you regularly interact for completing your work. This may include other individuals who perform the same function as you at a different location or individuals from other areas of the organization. This list should include individuals that you are not formally connected to via the organization's hierarchy. The list should contain a diverse set of peers who assist with the responsibilities related to your position. It should not include only those with whom you have close personal friendships.

[Leaders responded by listing 3-5 peer names and email addresses]

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your working relationship with [NAME OF PEER].

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*
- 5 = *Strongly agree*

- 1. I work closely with [NAME OF PEER] in doing my work.
- 2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF PEER].
- 3. My own performance is dependent on *receiving* accurate information from [NAME OF PEER].
- 4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF PEER] to do my work.
- 5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF PEER] fairly frequently.

During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF PEER]?

Response scale:

- 1 = *Never*
- 2 = *Rarely*
- 3 = *Sometimes*
- 4 = *Often*
- 5 = *Very often*

Task Dependence – Supervisor

Instructions: Please select your supervisor from the drop-down list below. Your supervisor is the person that you directly report to via the organization's hierarchical structure.

[Senior manager names appeared in a drop down box.]

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your working relationship with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER].

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*
- 5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I work closely with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER].
3. My own performance is dependent on *receiving* accurate information from [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER].
4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] fairly frequently.

During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER]?

Response scale:

- 1 = *Never*
- 2 = *Rarely*
- 3 = *Sometimes*
- 4 = *Often*
- 5 = *Very often*

Task Dependence - Customers

Instructions: Please list the names of 3-5 *customers* with whom you regularly interact for completing your work. In addition, select the type of relationship that the organization has with this customer. Customers should include individuals outside of your organization. The list should contain a diverse set of customers who assist with the responsibilities related to your position. It should not include only those with whom you have close personal friendships.

[Leaders responded by listing 3-5 customer names and their respective relationships.]

Customer relationship response scale:

- 1 = *Retail customer*
- 2 = *Commercial customer*
- 3 = *Retail and commercial customer*
- 4 = *Other*

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your working relationship with [NAME OF CUSTOMER].

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*

- 3 = *Neutral*
4 = *Agree*
5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I work closely with [NAME OF CUSTOMER] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF CUSTOMER].
3. My own performance is dependent on *receiving* accurate information from [NAME OF CUSTOMER].
4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF CUSTOMER] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF CUSTOMER] fairly frequently.

During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF CUSTOMER]?

Response scale:

- 1 = *Never*
2 = *Rarely*
3 = *Sometimes*
4 = *Often*
5 = *Very often*

SECTION 2: Personal Characteristics and Values

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes how much you agree with each statement about yourself.

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
2 = *Disagree*
3 = *Neutral*
4 = *Agree*
5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others.
2. I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me.
3. I am able to communicate easily and effectively with others.
4. It is easy for me to develop a good rapport with most people.
5. I understand people very well.
6. I am good at building relationships with influential people at work.
7. I am particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.
8. When communicating with others, I try to be genuine in what I say and do.
9. I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work whom I can call on for support when I really need to get things done.
10. At work, I know a lot of important people and am well connected.
11. I spend a lot of time at work developing connections with others.
12. I am good at getting people to like me.
13. It is important that people believe I am sincere in what I say and do.

14. I try to show a genuine interest in other people.
15. I am good at using my connections and network to make things happen at work.
16. I have good intuition or savvy about how to present myself to others.
17. I always seem to instinctively know the right things to say or do to influence others.
18. I pay close attention to people's facial expressions.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes how much you agree with each statement about yourself.

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*
- 5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
6. I would probably make a good actor.
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
10. I'm not always the person I appear to be.
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.
12. I have considered being an entertainer.
13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your relationship with your [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER].

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*

4 = *Agree*

5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I like [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] very much as a person.
2. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] is the kind of person one would like to have as a friend.
3. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] is a lot of fun to work with.
4. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] defends my work actions to others, even without complete knowledge of the issue in question.
5. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by others.
6. [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] would defend me to others in the organization if I made an honest mistake.
7. I do work for [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER] that goes beyond what is specified in my job description.
8. I am willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally required, to further the interests of my work group.
9. I do not mind working my hardest for [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER].
10. I am impressed with [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER]'s knowledge of his/her job.
11. I respect [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER]'s knowledge of and competence on the job.
12. I admire [NAME OF SENIOR MANAGER]'s professional skills.

APPENDIX F

Subordinate Survey

Demographic Information

Please provide the following demographic information.

Please indicate your gender.

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female
- ☐ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate your age.

- ☐ Years
- ☐ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed.

- ☐ Some high school
- ☐ High school diploma
- ☐ Some college
- ☐ Associates degree
- ☐ Bachelors degree
- ☐ Masters degree
- ☐ Doctorate
- ☐ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate your position and experience at [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] (round to the nearest year).

- ☐ Number of years with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]
- ☐ Job title in current position
- ☐ Number of years in current position

Please select the name of your branch manager:

[Branch manager names appeared in a drop down box.]

Please indicate how long you have worked with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

- ☐ Years working with branch manager

SECTION 1: Leader Behavior Influence

Instructions: The purpose of these questions is to learn more about the different ways people try to influence each other in organizations. Please describe how much [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] uses each type of behavior in an effort to influence you. For each question below, select one of the following response choices.

Response scale:

- 1 = *I can't remember him/her ever using this tactic with me*
- 2 = *He/she very seldom uses this tactic with me*
- 3 = *He/she occasionally uses this tactic with me*
- 4 = *He/she uses this tactic moderately often with me*
- 5 = *He/she uses this tactic very often with me*

If an question does not apply to your situation, then use the #1 response. Please try to avoid letting general impressions of the person bias your answers. Before you begin it is helpful to look over the 11 different types of influence tactics listed below so that you do not get them confused with each other.

[NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]...

Rational Persuasion

1. Uses facts and logic to make a persuasive case for a request or proposal.
2. Explains clearly why a request or proposed change is necessary to attain a task objective.
3. Explains why a proposed project or change would be practical and cost effective.
4. Provides information or evidence to show that a proposed activity or change is likely to be successful.

Exchange

1. Offers something you want in return for your help on a task or project.
2. Offers to do something for you in exchange for carrying out a request.
3. Offers to do a specific task or favor for you in return for your help and support.
4. Offers to do something for you in the future in return for your help now.

Inspirational appeal

1. Says a proposed activity or change is an opportunity to do something really exciting and worthwhile.
2. Describes a clear, inspiring vision of what a proposed project or change could accomplish.
3. Talks about ideals and values when proposing a new activity or change.
4. Makes an inspiring speech or presentation to arouse enthusiasm for a proposed activity or change.

Legitimizing

1. Says that his/her request or proposal is consistent with official rules and policies.
2. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with a prior agreement or contract.

3. Verifies that a request is legitimate by referring to a document such as a work order, policy manual, charter, bylaws, or formal contract.
4. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with prior precedent and established practice.

Apprising

1. Explains how the task he/she wants you to do could help your career.
2. Describes benefits you could gain from doing a task or activity (e.g., learn new skills, meet important people, enhance your reputation).
3. Explains how a proposed activity or change could help you attain a personal objective.
4. Explains why a proposed activity or change would be good for you.

Pressure

1. Demands that you carry out a request.
2. Uses threats or warnings when trying to get you to do something.
3. Repeatedly checks to see if you have carried out a request.
4. Tries to pressure you to carry out a request.

Collaboration

1. Offers to help with a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
2. Offers to provide resources you would need to do a task for him/her.
3. Offers to show you how to do a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
4. Offers to provide any assistance you would need to carry out a request.

Ingratiation

1. Says you have the special skills or knowledge needed to carry out a request.
2. Praises your past performance or achievements when asking you to do a task for him/her.
3. Praises your skill or knowledge when asking you to do something.
4. Says you are the most qualified person for a task that he/she wants you to do.

Consultation

1. Asks you to suggest things you could do to help him/her achieve a task objective or resolve a problem.
2. Consults with you to get your ideas about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
3. Encourages you to express any concerns you may have about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
4. Invites you to suggest ways to improve a preliminary plan or proposal that he/she wants you to support or help implement.

Personal appeals

1. Appeals to your friendship when asking you to do something.
2. Says he/she needs to ask for a favor before telling you what it is.
3. Asks you as a friend to do a favor for him/her.
4. Asks for your help as a personal favor.

Coalition

1. Mentions the names of other people who endorse a proposal when asking you to support it.
2. Gets others to explain to you why they support a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or help implement.
3. Brings someone along for support when meeting with you to make a request or proposal.
4. Asks someone you respect to help influence you to carry out a request or support a proposal.

As a follow-up to the previous questions about influence tactics, please respond to the following three questions.

Response scale:

- 1 = *Never*
- 2 = *Rarely*
- 3 = *Sometimes*
- 4 = *Often*
- 5 = *Very often*

1. During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]?
2. How often does [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] successfully influence you to do things?
3. How often do influence attempts by [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] result in your complete commitment (e.g., strong enthusiasm and special effort beyond what is normally expected)?

SECTION 2. Leader Characteristics

The next set of questions asks questions about the leadership and effectiveness of [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your working relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*
- 5 = *Strongly agree*

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your working relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Response scale:

1 = *Strongly disagree*

2 = *Disagree*

3 = *Neutral*

4 = *Agree*

5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I work closely with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
3. My own performance is dependent on *receiving* accurate information from [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] fairly frequently.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes how much you agree with each statement about [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Response scale:

1 = *Strongly disagree*

2 = *Disagree*

3 = *Neutral*

4 = *Agree*

5 = *Strongly agree*

1. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] spends a lot of time and effort at work networking with others.
2. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me.
3. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is able to communicate easily and effectively with others.
4. It is easy for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to develop a good rapport with most people.
5. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] understands people very well.
6. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is good at building relationships with influential people at work.
7. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.
8. When communicating with others, [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] tries to be genuine in what he/she says and does.
9. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] has developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work whom he/she can call on for support when he/she really needs to get things done.
10. At work, [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] knows a lot of important people and is well connected.

11. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] spends a lot of time at work developing connections with others.
12. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is good at getting people to like him/her.
13. It is important that people believe [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is sincere in what he/she says and does.
14. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] tries to show a genuine interest in other people.
15. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is good at using his/her connections and network to make things happen at work.
16. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] has good intuition or savvy about how to present himself/herself to others.
17. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] always seem to instinctively know the right things to say or do to influence others.
18. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] pays close attention to people's facial expressions.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes how much you agree with each statement about [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*
- 5 = *Strongly agree*

1. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is superior (so far) to other branch managers that I have worked with before.
2. The overall level of performance that I have observed for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is outstanding.
3. My personal view of [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is that he/she is very effective.
4. Overall, I feel that [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] has been effectively fulfilling his or her roles and responsibilities.
5. I have found working with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to be a very satisfying experience.
6. I feel like I am learning a great deal by working with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
7. I would welcome the opportunity to work with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] again in the future.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*

5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I like [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] very much as a person.
2. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is the kind of person one would like to have as a friend.
3. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is a lot of fun to work with.
4. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] defends my work actions to others, even without complete knowledge of the issue in question.
5. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by others.
6. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] would defend me to others in the organization if I made an honest mistake.
7. I do work for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] that goes beyond what is specified in my job description.
8. I am willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally required, to further the interests of my work group.
9. I do not mind working my hardest for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
10. I am impressed with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s knowledge of his/her job.
11. I respect [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s knowledge of and competence on the job.
12. I admire [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s professional skills.

APPENDIX G

Peer Survey

Demographic Information

Please provide the following demographic information.

Please indicate your gender.

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female
- ☐ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate your age.

- ☐ Years
- ☐ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed.

- ☐ Some high school
- ☐ High school diploma
- ☐ Some college
- ☐ Associates degree
- ☐ Bachelors degree
- ☐ Masters degree
- ☐ Doctorate
- ☐ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate your position and experience at [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] (round to the nearest year).

- ☐ Number of years with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]
- ☐ Job title in current position
- ☐ Number of years in current position

Please select the name(s) of the branch manager(s) you were asked to evaluate.

[Branch manager names appeared in a drop down box.]

Please indicate how long you have worked with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

- ☐ Years working with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

SECTION 1: Leader Behavior Influence

Instructions: The purpose of these questions is to learn more about the different ways people try to influence each other in organizations. Please describe how much [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] uses each type of behavior in an effort to influence you. For each question below, select one of the following response choices.

Response scale:

- 1 = *I can't remember him/her ever using this tactic with me*
- 2 = *He/she very seldom uses this tactic with me*
- 3 = *He/she occasionally uses this tactic with me*
- 4 = *He/she uses this tactic moderately often with me*
- 5 = *He/she uses this tactic very often with me*

If an question does not apply to your situation, then use the #1 response. Please try to avoid letting general impressions of the person bias your answers. Before you begin it is helpful to look over the 11 different types of influence tactics listed below so that you do not get them confused with each other.

[NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]...

Rational Persuasion

- 1. Uses facts and logic to make a persuasive case for a request or proposal.
- 2. Explains clearly why a request or proposed change is necessary to attain a task objective.
- 3. Explains why a proposed project or change would be practical and cost effective.
- 4. Provides information or evidence to show that a proposed activity or change is likely to be successful.

Exchange

- 1. Offers something you want in return for your help on a task or project.
- 2. Offers to do something for you in exchange for carrying out a request.
- 3. Offers to do a specific task or favor for you in return for your help and support.
- 4. Offers to do something for you in the future in return for your help now.

Inspirational appeal

- 1. Says a proposed activity or change is an opportunity to do something really exciting and worthwhile.
- 2. Describes a clear, inspiring vision of what a proposed project or change could accomplish.
- 3. Talks about ideals and values when proposing a new activity or change.
- 4. Makes an inspiring speech or presentation to arouse enthusiasm for a proposed activity or change.

Legitimizing

- 1. Says that his/her request or proposal is consistent with official rules and policies.
- 2. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with a prior agreement or contract.

3. Verifies that a request is legitimate by referring to a document such as a work order, policy manual, charter, bylaws, or formal contract.
4. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with prior precedent and established practice.

Apprising

1. Explains how the task he/she wants you to do could help your career.
2. Describes benefits you could gain from doing a task or activity (e.g., learn new skills, meet important people, enhance your reputation).
3. Explains how a proposed activity or change could help you attain a personal objective.
4. Explains why a proposed activity or change would be good for you.

Pressure

1. Demands that you carry out a request.
2. Uses threats or warnings when trying to get you to do something.
3. Repeatedly checks to see if you have carried out a request.
4. Tries to pressure you to carry out a request.

Collaboration

1. Offers to help with a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
2. Offers to provide resources you would need to do a task for him/her.
3. Offers to show you how to do a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
4. Offers to provide any assistance you would need to carry out a request.

Ingratiation

1. Says you have the special skills or knowledge needed to carry out a request.
2. Praises your past performance or achievements when asking you to do a task for him/her.
3. Praises your skill or knowledge when asking you to do something.
4. Says you are the most qualified person for a task that he/she wants you to do.

Consultation

1. Asks you to suggest things you could do to help him/her achieve a task objective or resolve a problem.
2. Consults with you to get your ideas about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
3. Encourages you to express any concerns you may have about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
4. Invites you to suggest ways to improve a preliminary plan or proposal that he/she wants you to support or help implement.

Personal appeals

1. Appeals to your friendship when asking you to do something.
2. Says he/she needs to ask for a favor before telling you what it is.
3. Asks you as a friend to do a favor for him/her.
4. Asks for your help as a personal favor.

Coalition

1. Mentions the names of other people who endorse a proposal when asking you to support it.
2. Gets others to explain to you why they support a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or help implement.
3. Brings someone along for support when meeting with you to make a request or proposal.
4. Asks someone you respect to help influence you to carry out a request or support a proposal.

As a follow-up to the previous questions about influence tactics, please respond to the following three questions.

Response scale:

- 1 = *Never*
- 2 = *Rarely*
- 3 = *Sometimes*
- 4 = *Often*
- 5 = *Very often*

1. During a typical work week, how often do you interact with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]?
2. How often does [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] successfully influence you to do things?
3. How often do influence attempts by [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] result in your complete commitment (e.g., strong enthusiasm and special effort beyond what is normally expected)?

SECTION 2. Leader Characteristics

The next set of questions asks questions about the leadership and effectiveness of [name of branch manager].

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your working relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*
- 5 = *Strongly agree*

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your working relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Response scale:

1 = *Strongly disagree*

2 = *Disagree*

3 = *Neutral*

4 = *Agree*

5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I work closely with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
3. My own performance is dependent on *receiving* accurate information from [name of branch manager].
4. I rely on the support of [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to do my work.
5. My work requires me to consult with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] fairly frequently.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes how much you agree with each statement about [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Response scale:

1 = *Strongly disagree*

2 = *Disagree*

3 = *Neutral*

4 = *Agree*

5 = *Strongly agree*

1. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is superior (so far) to other branch managers that I have worked with before.
2. The overall level of performance that I have observed for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is outstanding.
3. My personal view of [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is that he/she is very effective.
4. Overall, I feel that [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] has been effectively fulfilling his or her roles and responsibilities.
5. I have found working with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] to be a very satisfying experience.
6. I feel like I am learning a great deal by working with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
7. I would welcome the opportunity to work with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] again in the future.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your relationship with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].

Response scale:

1 = *Strongly disagree*

2 = *Disagree*

3 = *Neutral*
4 = *Agree*
5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I like [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] very much as a person.
2. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is the kind of person one would like to have as a friend.
3. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] is a lot of fun to work with.
4. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] defends my work actions to others, even without complete knowledge of the issue in question.
5. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by others.
6. [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER] would defend me to others in the organization if I made an honest mistake.
7. I do work for [Name Of Branch Manager] that goes beyond what is specified in my job description.
8. I am willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally required, to further the interests of my work group.
9. I do not mind working my hardest for [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER].
10. I am impressed with [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s knowledge of his/her job.
11. I respect [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s knowledge of and competence on the job.
12. I admire [NAME OF BRANCH MANAGER]'s professional skills.

APPENDIX H

Senior Manager Survey

Demographic information

Please indicate your total work experience (round to the nearest year).

_____ Years in current position
_____ Years with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]

Please indicate your age:

_____ Years
_____ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed:

_____ Some high school	_____ Bachelors degree
_____ High school diploma	_____ Masters degree
_____ Some college	_____ Doctorate
_____ Associates degree	_____ Prefer not to answer

Please indicate how long you have worked with each branch manager (round to the nearest year):

[Senior Manager responded by indicating how long they have worked with each branch manager.]

PART 1: Branch Manager Effectiveness⁶

Response scale:

1 = *Strongly disagree*
2 = *Disagree*
3 = *Neutral*
4 = *Agree*
5 = *Strongly agree*

1. This branch manager is superior (so far) to other branch managers that I have worked with before.
2. The overall level of performance that I have observed for this branch manager is outstanding.
3. My personal view of this branch manager is that he/she is very effective.
4. Overall, I feel that this branch manager has been effectively fulfilling his or her roles and responsibilities.

⁶ Senior manager surveys were administered in person. Instructions were given orally.

PART 2: Viability of the Working Relationship

Response scale:

- 1 = *Strongly disagree*
- 2 = *Disagree*
- 3 = *Neutral*
- 4 = *Agree*
- 5 = *Strongly agree*

1. I have found working with this branch manager to be a very satisfying experience.
2. I feel like I am learning a great deal by working with this branch manager.
3. I would welcome the opportunity to work with this branch manager again in the future.

PART 3: Leader Behavior Influence Questionnaire

Response scale:

- 1 = *I can't remember him/her ever using this tactic with me*
- 2 = *He/she very seldom uses this tactic with me*
- 3 = *He/she occasionally uses this tactic with me*
- 4 = *He/she uses this tactic moderately often with me*
- 5 = *He/she uses this tactic very often with me*

This branch manager...

Rational Persuasion

1. Uses facts and logic to make a persuasive case for a request or proposal.
2. Explains clearly why a request or proposed change is necessary to attain a task objective.
3. Provides information or evidence to show that a proposed activity or change is likely to be successful.

Consultation

1. Asks you to suggest things you could do to help him/her achieve a task objective or resolve a problem.
2. Consults with you to get your ideas about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
3. Encourages you to express any concerns you may have about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or implement.

Inspirational appeal

1. Says a proposed activity or change is an opportunity to do something really exciting and worthwhile.
2. Describes a clear, inspiring vision of what a proposed project or change could accomplish.
3. Talks about ideals and values when proposing a new activity or change.

Legitimizing

1. Says that his/her request or proposal is consistent with official rules and policies.
2. Verifies that a request is legitimate by referring to a document such as a work order, policy manual, charter, bylaws, or formal contract.
3. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with prior precedent and established practice.

Pressure

1. Demands that you carry out a request.
2. Repeatedly checks to see if you have carried out a request.
3. Tries to pressure you to carry out a request.

Coalition

1. Mentions the names of other people who endorse a proposal when asking you to support it.
2. Gets others to explain to you why they support a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or help implement.
3. Brings someone along for support when meeting with you to make a request or proposal.

APPENDIX I

Customer Survey

November 8, 2010

Dear Valued [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] Customer:

You are being asked to participate in a research study that is part of a collaboration between [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] and Michigan State University. The purpose of this survey is to learn more about how leaders interact with internal and external stakeholders to coordinate their work. The research is being conducted as part of a larger study investigating leadership and organizational culture, and as a respected customer, your responses are very valuable to the organization and our research team.

The survey begins by asking a few short demographic questions. Then, you will be asked to respond to questions in three sections. The first section assesses how branch managers influence others. The second section asks questions about other leadership characteristics of branch managers. The third section includes questions about your satisfaction with [NAME OF ORGANIZATION].

It is important that you respond candidly and honestly when answering the questions. There are no right or wrong answers, please simply indicate your judgments. Do not spend too much time on any one question. Simply respond with your initial reaction. Keep in mind that no individual data will be reported back to [NAME OF ORGANIZATION], and no information will be given which specifically describes or identifies any individual respondent. All responses will be grouped, and a feedback report will be created based on the aggregated responses. Your responses are confidential.

The survey contains primarily multiple-choice questions, and it should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. When you have completed the survey, please mail it back to Michigan State University using the enclosed postage-paid envelope. All participants who complete the survey will be entered into a drawing to win one of twenty \$50 Amazon.com gift certificates.

Your responses are very important to this process. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me at lizkaram@msu.edu.

I appreciate your time and honest responses. Thank you for your participation.

Sincerely,

Elizabeth P. Karam

SECTION 1. Demographic information.

1. Please indicate your gender:

_____ Male _____ Female _____ Prefer not to answer

2. Please indicate your age:

_____ Years _____ Prefer not to answer

3. Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed:

_____ Some high school
_____ High school diploma
_____ Some college
_____ Associates degree
_____ Bachelors degree
_____ Masters degree
_____ Doctorate
_____ Prefer not to answer

4. Please write the name of your branch manager: _____

5. Please indicate how long you have been a customer of [NAME OF ORGANIZATION] (round to the nearest year):

_____ years

6. Please indicate how long you have worked with this branch manager (round to the nearest year):

_____ years

SECTION 2. Leader Behavior Influence Questionnaire

Instructions: The purpose of this questionnaire is to learn more about the different ways people try to influence each other in organizations. Please describe how much the branch manager (listed in question 4 above) uses each type of behavior in an effort to influence you. For each question, select one of the following response choices.

Response choices:

- 1 = *I can't remember him/her ever using this tactic with me*
- 2 = *He/she very seldom uses this tactic with me*
- 3 = *He/she occasionally uses this tactic with me*
- 4 = *He/she uses this tactic moderately often with me*

5 = *He/she uses this tactic very often with me*

If a question does not apply to you, please use the #1 response. Please try to avoid letting general impressions of the person bias your answers, and please respond only with how often the manager uses each type of behavior. Before you begin it might be helpful to look over the 11 different types of influence tactics (e.g., Rational Persuasion, Exchange, Inspirational Appeal, etc.) to familiarize yourself with them.

This branch manager...

Rational Persuasion

1. Uses facts and logic to make a persuasive case for a request or proposal.
2. Explains clearly why a request or proposed change is necessary to attain a task objective.
3. Explains why a proposed project or change would be practical and cost effective.
4. Provides information or evidence to show that a proposed activity or change is likely to be successful.

Exchange

1. Offers something you want in return for your help on a task or project.
2. Offers to do something for you in exchange for carrying out a request.
3. Offers to do a specific task or favor for you in return for your help and support.
4. Offers to do something for you in the future in return for your help now.

Inspirational appeal

1. Says a proposed activity or change is an opportunity to do something really exciting and worthwhile.
2. Describes a clear, inspiring vision of what a proposed project or change could accomplish.
3. Talks about ideals and values when proposing a new activity or change.
4. Makes an inspiring speech or presentation to arouse enthusiasm for a proposed activity or change.

Legitimizing

1. Says that his/her request or proposal is consistent with official rules and policies.
2. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with a prior agreement or contract.
3. Verifies that a request is legitimate by referring to a document such as a work order, policy manual, charter, bylaws, or formal contract.
4. Says that a request or proposal is consistent with prior precedent and established practice.

Apprising

1. Explains how the task he/she wants you to do could help your career.
2. Describes benefits you could gain from doing a task or activity (e.g., learn new skills, meet important people, enhance your reputation).
3. Explains how a proposed activity or change could help you attain a personal objective.
4. Explains why a proposed activity or change would be good for you.

Pressure

1. Demands that you carry out a request.
2. Uses threats or warnings when trying to get you to do something.
3. Repeatedly checks to see if you have carried out a request.
4. Tries to pressure you to carry out a request.

Collaboration

1. Offers to help with a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
2. Offers to provide resources you would need to do a task for him/her.
3. Offers to show you how to do a task that he/she wants you to carry out.
4. Offers to provide any assistance you would need to carry out a request.

Ingratiation

1. Says you have the special skills or knowledge needed to carry out a request.
2. Praises your past performance or achievements when asking you to do a task for him/her.
3. Praises your skill or knowledge when asking you to do something.
4. Says you are the most qualified person for a task that he/she wants you to do.

Consultation

1. Asks you to suggest things you could do to help him/her achieve a task objective or resolve a problem.
2. Consults with you to get your ideas about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
3. Encourages you to express any concerns you may have about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or implement.
4. Invites you to suggest ways to improve a preliminary plan or proposal that he/she wants you to support or help implement.

Personal appeals

1. Appeals to your friendship when asking you to do something.
2. Says he/she needs to ask for a favor before telling you what it is.
3. Asks you as a friend to do a favor for him/her.
4. Asks for your help as a personal favor.

Coalition

1. Mentions the names of other people who endorse a proposal when asking you to support it.
2. Gets others to explain to you why they support a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to support or help implement.
3. Brings someone along for support when meeting with you to make a request or proposal.
4. Asks someone you respect to help influence you to carry out a request or support a proposal.

SECTION 2. Leader Behavior Influence Follow-up

Instructions: As a follow-up to the 44 questions in the Leader Behavior Influence Questionnaire above, please respond to the following three questions. Please mark an "X" in the appropriate box below.

Response scale:

- 1 = *Never*
- 2 = *Rarely*
- 3 = *Sometimes*
- 4 = *Often*
- 5 = *Very often*

1. During a typical work week, how often do you interact with this branch manager?
2. How often does this branch manager successfully influence you to do things?
3. How often do influence attempts by this branch manager result in your complete commitment (e.g., strong enthusiasm and special effort beyond what is normally expected)?

SECTION 3. Leader Characteristics

Instructions: This section contains questions relating to the leadership and effectiveness of your branch manager. Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes how much you agree with each statement about your branch manager.

1. This branch manager is superior (so far) to other branch managers that I have worked with before.
2. The overall level of performance that I have observed for this branch manager is outstanding.
3. My personal view of this branch manager is that he/she is very effective.
4. Overall, I feel that this branch manager has been effectively fulfilling his or her roles and responsibilities.
5. I have found working with this branch manager to be a very satisfying experience.
6. I feel like I am learning a great deal by working with this branch manager.
7. I would welcome the opportunity to work with this branch manager again in the future.

Instructions: Using the following 5-point response scale, please select the response that best describes your relationship with the branch manager.

1. I like this branch manager very much as a person.
2. This branch manager is the kind of person one would like to have as a friend.
3. This branch manager is a lot of fun to work with.
4. I am impressed with this branch manager's knowledge of his/her job.
5. I respect this branch manager's knowledge of and competence on the job.
6. I admire this branch manager's professional skills.
7. I get along well with this branch manager.

8. Working with this branch manager is a pleasure.
9. I think this branch manager would make a good friend.

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