THE CONSTANCY OF THE CORE: TRENDS IN GLOBAL STRATIFICATION

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ABSTRACT

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Theoretical perspectives on international stratification include concepts involving strata or tiers of countries that have different levels of development, or different relations with the global economy. The two dominant theoretical traditions are world-systems and modernization theories. In this paper, I consider both perspectives while examining how the stratification of countries has changed since 1960. Fifty years of World Bank data on national GDP were examined and rank-ordered, tracking shifts in the positions of important countries and assessing these patterns to see whether the data were more consistent with one of these theories. The results showed a pattern in which the world's wealthiest states stably tended to constitute approximately 15% of the world's population over time. This pattern supported the idea of a "core" economic area, as defined by world-systems theory, but the distribution of states with the bottom 85% of the world's population provided evidence against other concepts of world-systems theory and was better accounted for by modernization theory. The number of states that are predominantly peripheral in character has been shrinking greatly over time, and the population within those states now constitutes a minority of the world's population, while the majority of the world now lives in what have been characterized as semi-peripheral areas. Longitudinal economic data therefore strongly suggests that the original world-systems classification schema must be revised, reconciled with, or replaced by modernization theory in order to accurately describe the 21st century world economy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION

The main goal of this paper is to empirically assess whether international economic data are well-described by the world-system framework that was originated by Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein had described modern history in terms of an expanding capitalist system, in which an economic core commodifies productive activity and proletarianizes the less-developed areas that it establishes relations with. When first proposed during the Cold War era of the 1970s, Wallerstein had provided a descriptive classification system into which various geographic and social areas could be understood as fitting into an expanding system of global capitalism. It was empirically evident to Wallerstein that this economic system had, during the course of centuries of exploration, conquest, trade, and international change, come into contact with and then heavily reshaped almost all of the inhabited areas of the world. Since that time, his basic framework has become a staple for many sociology textbooks about international development and global stratification, even within introductory sociological textbooks, which treat his classifications of "core," "semi-peripheral," and "peripheral" areas of the world economy as fundamental knowledge. (Anderson 2003: 216, 443; Wallerstein 1974, Wallerstein 1983)

After periodically examining economic data at a national and world regional level over the past few decades, I started to question whether Wallerstein's conception of a world-system is still very descriptive of more recent patterns seen in global stratification. Plenty of research continues to occur within the world-system theoretical framework, and this paper takes a systematic look at official economic data from the World Bank, as a

1

test of whether the world-system framework still feels highly relevant even though the Cold War period, in which it was first conceived, had ended over 25 years ago.

I had published some of my early thoughts in a brief article that had appeared in the Fall of 2003, bolstered by some quantitative ideas that I had employed in research about metropolitan areas a few years before. My ideas, examined in this research thesis, involved a longitudinal comparison of the economic production levels in all major countries around the world, rank-ordered and weighted by their populations so as to place the population of each country into a kind of estimated percentile ranking, and to see how the positions of these countries change over time. Albert J. Bergesen and Michelle Bata had published a 2002 article that had analyzed global stratification trends in ways that were considered generally supportive of the world-systems framework, but I felt that their approach to the subject did not provide a sufficient test of the validity of that framework. In addition, a decade of additional data seemed to be reaffirming my initial doubts about the framework's validity. (Bergesen and Bata 2002, Sobocinski 2003, Sobocinski 2000)

This thesis begins with an overview of some relevant literature and concepts that provide the underlying basis for the new research I performed, followed by an explanation of the research itself, and how I interpret the results. The primary research task involved the use of World Bank data to re-examine the kind of analysis performed by Bergesen and Bata, with a more comprehensive set of data and a new organization of that data into a stratified ranking system. Specifically, composite data on national economic trends from 1960 to 2010 were assessed in a manner similar to that performed by Bergesen and Bata, but refined by my use of a percentile-ranking technique which I

had initially employed to model urban stratification trends. I use the data to test my own idea from 2003 that a global stratification structure does exist, and persists over time, but that it tends to be limited to the testable hypothesis that "core areas" have maintained a fairly stable proportion of the world's population in recent decades, while all of Wallerstein's other classification categories have shifted markedly. Despite the constancy of the core, the historical decline in "peripheral" areas provides a strong reason for reassessing the relevance of Wallerstein's framework for today's global conditions. I now consider mainstream texts in economic development and economic geography (e.g. Perkins 2006, Dicken 2015) and even the classic "modernization" theory of Rostow to be a more accurate summary of the trends observed in the data. However, conceiving of a fairly stable portion of the world either as a "core" or as the richest and most economically central countries, is still a very useful concept consistent with both perspectives. The weakness of the world-systems framework is the impressive extent and variety of economic growth that has occurred in all regions of the world, including parts of Sub-Saharan Africa which had previously been Wallerstein's strongest argument for perceiving international exploitation (also described in Radelet 2010). In my research, I confirmed that certain nations have modernized and joined "the core," but that this seems to include only a limited percentage of the world's population, while other countries have run into at least temporary limits in their developmental progress and, although no longer "peripheral," so appear to be stuck for the foreseeable future in a partially developed, or "semi-peripheral" status. Simultaneously, many areas that Wallerstein (1983) considered essentially frozen by exploitation into a permanent peripheral status have turned out not to be, even though many do still remain ranked near the bottom of an expanding system.

One of the largest shortcomings of the type of analysis I (and others) have performed is that the chosen data deal only with national-level data, even though Wallerstein himself had asserted that a world-systems analysis should not use such a crude level of analysis (e.g. Wallerstein 2004), since core areas are more properly identified as specific production centers that tend to encompass only certain parts of most countries. National-level data tends to be used as a kind of "sample of convenience," even though the amount of information, and the ability to process it, has now reached a level that should allow researchers to progress beyond it, into greater levels of sub-national detail. Therefore, after replicating (with refinements) the kind of national-level analysis already performed by these researchers, this paper will proceed to explore the use of other patterns in national-level data that, while still conveniently accessible from sources such as the World Bank, could help to add nuance and greater explanatory potential to this type of analysis. The result might lead to improvements in the theoretical understanding of global inequality and development patterns over time. In addition, since I and many other researchers had originally been inspired by a world-systems conceptual framework, some comments will be added about the extent to which the data supports the continued use of that framework, or might be more successfully described through competing theories such as modernization theory and mainstream development economics.

CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND FOR THIS RESEARCH

In 2000, I had authored a paper for my master's research in urban and regional planning, which contained several components that greatly illuminate the ideas I later presented about the structure of global inequality in my 2003 article. Although my master's research had been focused upon the analysis of local patterns of residential stratification in American urban areas, in my 2003 article, I recognized that some of the techniques I had developed might also be applied to an assessment of global trends. The following parallels were drawn between the comparative assessment of urban neighborhoods, in my 2000 research paper, and the comparative assessment of national economic indicators, as described in my 2003 article:

(1) Many social scientists find themselves having to deal with limited amounts of time, funding, quality data sources, and technical knowledge with which to analyze that data, and that it is therefore useful to develop new techniques for processing and interpreting existing data from readily available sources, such as the U.S. Census Bureau or the World Bank.

(2) Both local neighborhood data (by census tract, block group, etc.) and national economic data share in common that they are, in essence, geographic units, and therefore should be examined in a manner that recognized and makes use of relevant geographic principles, including spatial variations within the pre-defined areas being used, contiguity and proximity between areas that may exhibit "spatial autocorrelation," and the use of boundaries that may not match well with actual development patterns that would be observed through field research.

(3) Since economic stratification can be assessed spatially, at both a local and a global level of analysis, some of the techniques that were found to be useful for assessing local stratification patterns within U.S. cities might also prove useful for assessing international stratification patterns within a global economic system. Specifically, I proposed the analytic technique of sorting spatial areas into a hierarchy that is ranked by the economic indicator for that area, weighted by the area's population, and then "stacked" so that each area's population occupies a range of percentiles within the overall structure of interest (either a metropolitan area or a world-economy).

(4) My 2000 paper described various advantages as well as shortcomings of the approach described in (3), but I proposed various ways in which these shortcomings could be reduced by the consideration of selected additional variables that are known to be associated with spatial arrangements *within* the unit of geographic analysis. For the economic analysis of pre-defined census areas within the United States, these included a consideration of housing types (group quarters, renter-occupied housing units, and owner-occupied housing units), such that information that was known to be associated with different housing types could be used to distinguish portions of the pre-defined geographic area that have housing of that type. For the analysis of inequality and development trends at a global level, distinctions could include the consideration of each country's urbanized population proportions, the ratio of a country's government size to its national production levels, the proportion of a country's production that occurs in sectors known to be higher-profit, and the use of available poverty and inequality indicators (e.g. Gini). These types of indicators are readily available or derivable, and although they are most convenient (and globally comparable) at a national level, they

6

may be creatively used to make estimates about sub-national characteristics that, in the current case, could help to more precisely define Wallerstein's "core areas" in sub-national terms and thus provide a more robust test of the relevance of world-systems theory for the most recent trends in global inequality.

The article by Bergesen and Bata had presented national-level economic information in a form that allowed global stratification patterns to be assessed and tracked longitudinally, albeit in a rather simplified form that focuses on a bifurcation of nations into "core" and "non-core" categories. This current thesis proposes and illustrates several means by which that binary classification could be improved upon. The work of Bergesen and Bata had only assessed trends through 1990, and also hadn't included a consideration of structural mobility for countries within the world-system. Instead, they had simply classified various countries at the outset as either "core" or "non-core," then pooled selected data for these two categories and tracked the selected indicators over time. Rapidly developing places such as Greece, Hong Kong, and Portugal were simply classified as "Non-Core" without recognizing that their status may have changed over the course of the 25 years from 1965 to 1990. Bergesen and Bata also did not include all of the world's countries, but only 72 of them for which certain types of data were available. They also did not weight the national-level data by population size (national data for tiny countries such as Seychelles was averaged in with national data for huge countries such as China and India), a choice that would certainly have affected some of the conclusions that they drew from their research. Certain aspects of their work were not adequately explained, such as the criteria used to categorize the 72 countries, did not specify the adjustments (or lack thereof) for purchasing power or the

standardization of economic values across time, or how certain smoothing techniques or interpolations were performed in the construction of one of their key graphs.

These two main sources, my own earlier work and that of Bergeson and Bata, share in common the use of national level data for a longitudinal analysis of global stratification, using the framework and categories of world system analysis as a theoretical guide. We both saw the modern world system as an actual system in which various forces are exerted by innumerable agents in all parts of the system, which on balance achieve a kind of structure, temporary equilibria (in terms measurable by socioeconomic indicators), and a kind of geopolitical momentum that seems to offer a kind of predictability. One of the main appeals of Wallerstein's world system theory is the testable premise that an expanding economic system had become dominant in northwestern Europe and proceeded over centuries to eventually encompass the entire human world. By combining and building upon these two basic source materials, this research paper will consider all of the world system categories (core, semi-periphery, periphery, and "external arenas"), and their relative proportions at a given moment according to size of the populations living within each type of area, rather than mere counts of the number of countries so classified. This perspective will be presented in terms of the calculated cumulative percentile values of particular countries when they are ranked in order of their per capita Gross Domestic Products. This research will consider aspects of geographic proximity and world regional groupings (defined by economic similarities, historical relationships, and contemporaneous geopolitical relations), and will include a consideration of ways that the data and its patterns could be interpreted from different theoretical perspectives.

CHAPTER 2: THE INITIAL PHASE OF EXPLORATORY RESEARCH

The enormous complexity of the topic of global stratification trends over the past fifty years quickly became clear. There are many ways to potentially measure developmental trends (or stagnation) throughout the world, and some simplifying assumptions were necessary to make the current work feasible within the timeframe that was available to accomplish it. The main simplification of this research paper is its almost exclusive reliance upon PCGDP (PPP). Admittedly, this involves the acceptance of the weaknesses, shortcomings, and limitations of this indicator, yet PCGDP is still correlated with many other indicators that are available (e.g. life expectancy, literacy rates, etc.). No assumption is here being made about any causal relationships that may or may not underlie these correlations (Sen 1999: 3-6, Stiglitz et al. 2010).

A key question involves the adequacy of economic adjustments used to standardize PCGDP figures over time, so that they may reliably be expressed in terms of constant U.S. currency. Although it would not be valid to say that the same monetary valuation could gain access to the same amount of goods in 1960 as in 2000, due to enormous changes in the technology and supplies (or scarcity) of various goods over that time frame (e.g. Dicken 1992: 110-118), there is nevertheless value for this research in crude PCGDP indicators because the consideration of changes in the overall distribution of this measure across the whole world, over time, is meant to be indicative of the *social and political relations* of wealth and poverty. Wealth and poverty tend to be defined differently across time and space, relative to particular historical and geographic frames of reference. Persons now defined as poor when compared to modern development

standards would not necessarily be so labeled if local or historical standards were instead being used (Escobar 2012, for example, describes the social construction of these concepts). However, disparities of power tend to be connected with the sheer economic might that a country (or alliance of countries) can bring to bear in promoting their own cultural and lifestyle preferences, needs, and desires. Social stratification, whether at a community level (e.g. the classic "Middletown" study) or at a global level (world systems analysis) is concerned primarily with the distribution of goods and power across the population, rather than with trying to define absolute measures to document a sense of historical progress. (An overview of world stratification concepts can be found in Kerbo 1991: 494-523.)

Still, the general correlation between PCGDP and other indicators, as well as the significance of weighting this national indicator by population size and taking a global perspective (Ferreira and Ravallion, 2008: 2-13) means that the measure does have value as an indicator. In addition, the idea of the indicator also allowing some level of comparison across time is not totally without merit. For example, when various indicators such as urbanization, fertility rates, life expectancy, infant mortality, and PCGDP are compared for different countries and regions over time, a general pattern is discernable in which the average levels of these measures of health and prosperity in the richest countries of 50 years ago are now being widely observed in "developing" countries throughout the world. For example, the fertility rate in more developed regions was 2.8 in 1950 and this rates was reached (on average) in less developed regions in the early 2000s (Bloom, 2011: 563). Similar patterns are seen for life expectancy, under-five mortality rates, and urban share of the population. Thus, although even the richest

persons and organizations in 1960 could not have used their wealth to buy access to today's technological wonders that didn't yet exist at that time, when it comes to some of the basic quality of life indicators (such as literacy or mortality), a comparison can be plausibly made—the fact that the PCGDP of the United States in the early 1960s is approximately the same as that for South Korea in the last 5 years (see Appendix I for these figures) does not mean that different conditions and inequalities within these countries at those times must be overlooked, but does turn out to be strongly suggestive of the overall health and living conditions in the two countries. It is partially on this basis a case can be made that countries like South Korea have changed their position in the world stratification system over time. South Korea today is in many ways comparable to various rich "core" countries, either as they were in the 1960s (in the case of the United States, one of the richest of the rich) or of some parts of the European Union today (such as Spain). But when "core" status is proposed for this country, later in this research, it is not based purely upon PCGDP. Consideration has also been given to the development of large global corporations by South Korea (e.g. Hyundai), its expansion of high-level trade with other core areas, and its established place within a larger geopolitical context (e.g. a vital ally of the other rich countries in maintaining a highly militarized border with a highly incompatible and sometimes belligerent nearby areas, for nearly 60 years, as summarized in Jones 2001: 491). Issues of economic development cannot be separated from issues of security, power, and force in the international arena (Russett and Starr 1985), nor from geographic differences involving natural resources, climate, wildlife and pests, and soil productivity, among others (Harrison 1984, Diamond 1999), but these factors add too many complexities for this research paper, and have been generally

handled through a recognition of general regional patterns and connections between countries throughout the world, which themselves are strongly connoted by Wallerstein's core, semi-periphery, and periphery categories of classification. (Appendix VII makes use of such geographic groupings in this research paper.)

Although the first part of the research, by using PCGDP as a purely national indicator, simplifies stratification by ignoring differences within countries, later parts of this research propose and illustrate some ways to potentially correct for that limitation. The convenient availability of national data is a strong advantage that may facilitate lower-cost, more timely analysis by an individual researcher, especially with the more powerful computing devices and software of today, as opposed to the entire teams of specialists that are necessary for creating specific development policies (Escobar 2012). The type of research performed here is not offered as a replacement for the extensive and complex techniques usable by those with sufficient time, resources, technical knowledge, and quality data, but is instead offered as a convenient, low-cost indicator that may prove useful in illuminating certain overarching patterns in recent historical conditions.

One of the interesting aspects of considering the geographic aspects of global wealth and development patterns stems from the nature of the political divisions that have been in place, and how the organization of human affairs at a national level has shaped the way that things have changed over time. One aspect of this clearly involves foreign policy and applications of force (including overt military threats and strikes) over time. Even though transportation costs have gone down over time, at least when trade and travel is able to proceed smoothly (Allen 2011: 57-58), military security is one of the considerations in which enemy locations and proximity has tended to matter a great deal.

Part of the focus in this research paper has been to keep the role of geography under consideration in the regional and international trends that the data reveals—not only the fact that extractable natural resources may favor certain countries over others, but the extent to which some countries and areas have had to adapt their policies and activities to face actual problems of internal or international conflict, or the extent to which historic proximities may have favored the establishment of early trading, resource, or power advantages whose effects still have momentum in terms of the inequalities and trends of today and the near future. Although it is not claimed that such things have a universal or readily predictable and clear-cut effect, it is strongly suggested that certain patterns become clearer when viewed from a perspective of world regional geography (as traditionally presented in such texts as that of Salter, et al, in which certain culture areas can readily be identified by various features and shared history, and then analyzed).

If a global economic "core" is at first crudely sought and defined in terms of entire countries, then the problem of defining and locating core areas seems to become fairly straightforward. For example, there is widespread agreement that rich North America, Western Europe, and some countries of the Pacific Rim are "core" areas. Wallerstein has long proposed that the start of an expanding capitalist world system was rooted in the Netherlands (Wallerstein 2004: 57), an idea that is defensible in terms of general economic histories as well, due to their central historical role in investment and banking innovations (e.g. Gordon 2005, Heilbroner and Milberg 2011). Although Wallerstein had defined the core in terms of such things as concentrated banking power that allowed for the continual reinvestment that is one of capitalism's defining features, there are many correlated aspects of capital concentration and nodal connectedness that

could similarly be used to indicate an area's status in terms of a global economic system. One productive means of observing this, for example, has been to evaluate cities in terms of a global hierarchy (Knox and Taylor 1995). Today, when the richest countries are highly urbanized, and metropolitan areas often stretch across each other, there are many cases in which it does not seem too much of a stretch to classify entire nations in terms of the defining characteristics of the most productive sectors of their economies.

We would expect the core countries to be the most productive (in terms of the standard productivity measures preferred by the capitalist system itself, such as Gross National Product or Gross Domestic Product), to tend to be highly urbanized, contain clear concentrations of wealth, and to exhibit this wealth in many ways, such as higher standards of health, higher average incomes, the formation of major new industries or corporate centers of operation, and a pattern of highly influential research and technological breakthroughs (which often stem from large-budgeted research universities, correlated with high levels of literacy and education). Although Human Development Indicators were eventually developed to more conveniently summarize some of the aspects of life quality that go beyond (or are imperfectly correlated with) mere production quantity, nevertheless there is still a significant correlation between all of these indicators and the country's level of production. In this research, this connection is used to justify the simplification of using per capita Gross Domestic Product as a convenient general indicator of a country's standing within a world economic system. The fact that GDP may be considered a purely artificial measure created by that economic system should probably not be considered a large issue for the purpose of this research, which mainly asks the question of whether production has indeed expanded over time in the manner

that proponents of capitalism (and traditional development paradigms) have claimed that it would. There is widespread agreement that global production per person has indeed expanded greatly over time (supported by data to be presented later in this paper), but there is much disagreement about why certain regions of the world have seen markedly different rates of economic expansion, or have even seen declines if measured in real per capita terms.

Therefore, this research actually started with some exploratory research about general groupings of countries that form major economic regions. If framed in terms of countries alone, whose borders may sometimes seem to have had arbitrary locations and who differ radically in size, power, and even autonomy, one might easily miss seeing the forest through the trees. The starting point of this research, therefore, was rooted in the recognition of patterns of similarity within certain regions of the world, and profound differences between these regions. If regions are composed of a collection of countries that have similarities in their economic status and the types of connections between them (e.g. trade relations), then there is an immediate plausibility for the classification of countries or entire regions within different classifications such as those used in world systems analysis: core, semi-periphery, periphery, and external areas. In my 2003 article, I stated a generally accepted idea that there really are no substantially populated areas that are external to the world system anymore. More controversially, however, I also claimed that the proportion of the world in countries with peripheral status had been declining greatly over time, while the proportion in core countries had remained relatively stable. This was interpreted as lending support to the hypothesis that

15

international class conflict would grow in importance, if inequalities between the world's many different states (weighted by population) continued to shrink.

These claims needed to be formalized, replicated, and expanded to include more data than the few decades that had been referred to in my article. Some exploratory research therefore involved an examination of the less formally processed information that had underlain my earlier research, followed by the current main research project that examines a large-scale set of national indicators over the course of 50 years, from 1960 to 2010.

Several sources of convenient information from Almanacs and the CIA World Fact Book web site had initially been compared to verify that the ways in which world regions had traditionally been defined were also matching fairly well with an economic grouping for the purpose of examining a global hierarchy of nations. Numerous sources have already presented these basic facts in regional terms (e.g. deSouza and Stutz 1994, deSouza 1990, Salter et al. 1998). However, economically-defined regions in a dynamic world system must not be assumed to be fixed and unchanging. Table 1 illustrates the results of several regional groupings of countries over time, based upon these casual convenient information sources (World Almanac, CIA World Fact Book), but dates are approximate because these sources often employed estimates or official statistics from different years, according to what was available at the time of publication or web-posting. Moreover, in this exploratory stage, various different regional grouping were used, according to what best seemed to fit the historical alliances, trading partners, and production level similarities existed within that region. As the European Union expanded, various island nations became wealthy, and other changes were noted, it

seemed plausible to classify such nations into the region in which they seemed best suited, so long as it resulted in contiguous groupings of proximate and comparable countries. For example, a tourist island nation in the Caribbean could be classified with the south in a year in which its production level was low, and with wealthy North American when it was high. The purpose was to get a feel for the kinds of annual fluctuations that were common, and to work out the most logical regional groupings to illustrate commonalities within a region and differences between regions—in other words, regional categories based upon global stratification principles.

Table 1: Initial Exploratory Groupings and Comparisons, by Region

Region	2001 World Almanac	2002 World Almanac	2003 CIA web site (World Fact Book)	2008 CIA web site (World Fact Book)
North America	313 million pop. $29,000 PCDDP	312 million pop. $32,051 PCGDP	331 million pop. $36,115 PCGDP	928 m. (W. Hemis) $23,953 PCGDP
Western Europe	390 million pop. $21,000 PCGDP	391 million pop. $21,331 PCGDP	467 million pop. $23,055 PCGDP	808 m. (N Eurasia) $23,933 PCGDP
Pacific & E. Asia (Pacific Rim)	226 million pop. $19,000 PCGDP	227 million pop. $19,489 PCGDP	231 million pop. $24,011 PCGDP	257 million pop. $28,785
Eastern Europe	338 million pop. $4,000 PCGDP	484 m (incl. CIS) $4,658 PCGDP	337 million pop. $6,652 PCGDP	Included with W. European region
Latin America	514 million pop. $6,000 PCGDP	519 million pop. $6,487 PCGDP	539 million pop. $7,074 PCGDP	Included with N. American region
W. Asia, N. Africa	437 million pop. $5,000 PCGDP	483 million pop. $3,446 PCGDP	430 million pop. $5,447 PCGDP	448 million pop. $10,036 PCGDP
Southeast Asia	394 million pop. $4,000 PCGDP	671 million pop. $3,008 PCGDP	555 million pop. $3,861 PCGDP	591 million pop. $4,751 PCGDP
Communist Asia (Chinese Realm)	1.432 billion pop. $3,000 PCGDP	1.298 billion pop. $3,731 PCGDP	1.320 billion pop. $4,463 PCGDP	1.346 billion pop. $6,208 PCGDP
South Asia	1.357 billion pop. $2,000 PCGDP	1.077 billion pop. $1,751 PCGDP	1.388 billion pop. $2,402 PCGDP	1.578 billion pop. $2,668 PCGDP
Sub-Sah. Africa	697 million pop. $1,000 PCGDP	(calculation missing)	701 million pop. $1,661 PCGDP	827 million pop. $2,148 PCGDP
World	6.198 billion pop. $6,000 PCGDP		6.299 billion pop. $7,811 PCGDP	6.790 billion pop. $10,500 PCGDP

This exercise provided an idea of the approximate (and changing) boundaries between regions over time, as certain countries changed status and were more reasonably classified as part of a different region. This could either involve economic advances or

political changes, such as the creation of a new country (e.g East Timor) or geopolitical changes. For example, the 2002 groupings included Pakistan and Afghanistan with the Arabic countries located to their west, in view of the active coordination of the United States with both countries, stemming from the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, while growing discrepancies between PCGDP in India and Bangladesh led to an experimental classification of the latter as more akin to poor Myanmar to its east. Again, the point of this exploration was not yet to make a clear comparison over time, but to better explore the variability of economic and geopolitical factors that would cause instability in any attempted classification system.

Only a fraction of the information I studied has been presented in Table 1. Almanac information was considered (and often mapped out) dating back to 1989. One of the difficulties was a general trend toward the use of data that was adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), an adjustment that seems to better emphasize the international differences in production levels. Earlier data has not been presented here when it did not employ the PPP adjustments, so that the elements provided in Table 1 can more directly be compared with each other. Moreover, most years' data was only informally examined for trends at first, with only a few years further processed to produce the regional summaries just listed. These sources often official national data with estimates from different years and thus often did not merit a more precise calculation effort. These weaknesses will be addressed through the formal new research described in the next sections. Another main benefit from this informal comparison was to confirm that various proposed trends were indeed being supported by the data—global production, as well as the per capita Gross Domestic Product (PCGDP) within various

regions were definitely expanding at a rate that tended to exceed inflation (since these were American sources, all values were presented in terms of American dollars as valued at their time of publication). The formal new research that follows expresses its values in terms of constant (real) American dollars, and thus allows for defensible rather than informal comparisons.

Corresponding to the informal mapping and calculations just described, this Almanac and web site data from various years was also ranked by PCGDP and examined with respect to the proportion of the world's population that fell into various income levels. Together, this exploratory research formed the basis for my 2003 article and the hypotheses proposed within it. Two of these hypotheses will now be tested: (1) that a consistent proportion of the world's population lives in countries that are plausibly classified as within "core areas," and (2) that economic changes over time have resulted in a reduced number of persons living in peripheral areas, as those in semi-peripheral areas expands. The following additional topics will also be evaluated: (3) whether development trends in the past 50 years support the general principle of economic development, as classically defined in terms of expanded production and wealth, (4) the extent to which certain geographic regions have been favored with greater or lesser rates of economic growth or decline, (5) whether any such regions are plausibly explainable in terms of basic geographic principles, such as the proximity of developing areas to existing wealthy ones, and finally (6) the extent to which hypothesis number 1 may be connected with topic number 5.

CHAPTER 3: THE NEW RESEARCH DATA AND ITS PROCESSING

Two main sources of data were used for the truly new portion of this research paper. One was the World Bank's World Databank web site, located at http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=1&id=4, which offered data PCGNP data going back to 1960, conveniently downloadable into spreadsheets for handy processing. This information was used for a longitudinal analysis of global stratification and development trends. The other source was the CIA World Factbook, located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html, which was used for a detailed examination of the current state of the world. As part of a more detailed assessment of the role of China, 2010 information was obtained from The Economist web site at http://www.economist.com/content/all_parities_china, which presented basic population and economic information for all of China's major internal administrative divisions.

The World Bank data was downloaded for every country and for every individual year from 1960 to 2010. The data selected was in a form that had already been standardized by the World Bank so that all values were expressed in terms of constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Unfortunately, many early years had a great number of missing values, which were later imputed with the relative values for the respective regions in which those countries were located.

For ease of analysis and presentation, it was decided not to process all of the data for every year in its raw form. Instead, a first step involved the combinations of groups of years so that the mean values for blocks of approximately 5 years were used to

represent those periods of time. This was considered to be not only a convenient way of reducing the amount of data processing necessary to test the two main hypotheses, but also to be justifiable so that the periodic recessions and fluctuations in commodity prices (e.g. Moyo 2010: 19) would not be mistaken for a typical or long-term level of production value in countries which suffer from those challenges. Appendix I, at the end of this paper, presents the World Bank data after this initial processing.

Although various shortcomings and limitations of the GDP measure are now well-known (e.g. Stiglitz et al 2010), it was considered acceptable as a starting point since what is most important from a world system approach is not a precise indicator of relative living standards for the common people, as alternative national measures such as the Human Development Index endeavored to come closer to (Payne and Phillips 2010: 123-124), but tends to indicate the extent of commodification that has taken place within a country that is formally recognized by a world-economy. In other words, much of the exchange in traditional and indigenous economic systems involves informal networks, barter, and other economic behavior that can escape the monitoring of states and large-scale institutions (Wallerstein 1983: 27). Despite any invalidities in the measure itself for various other purposes, the PCGDP value should be well indicative of the status of a country within the capitalist world-system that is now in place (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996: 3).

This World Bank data had a large amount of economic information missing from the early years for many countries, including very important ones like the Soviet Union and Germany. However, it did include more general information about larger regions, such as "Europe and Central Asia," that would usually be expected to match up quite well

with the largest countries in those regions. These regional values were thus used as the basis for data imputation where important major countries were missing from particular years (and groupings of years). Some very small countries, territories, and dependencies were removed from this data entirely, when neither population nor economic data was provided for a particular year. Although this missing data certainly weakened the precision of the analysis, it was not considered so severe a problem as to prevent general development trends from being evaluated.

Further processing of the World Bank data also took place entirely in spreadsheets, and involved (1) the separation of regional and composite data from the listing for individual countries, so as to avoid a double counting problem, and to provide a means for double checking the separate lists through a comparison of column totals, (2) removal of a few minor territories for which imputation was not considered worthwhile, (3) the imputation of missing economic data, using the value from its respective region of the world (all necessary population data and regional economic data was present in the data set), (4) sorting the data so that it was in descending rank-ordered by each country's PCGDP, and (5) adding columns that tracked the cumulative population of the ranked countries, and the percentiles that correspond to the cumulative population.

The result of this processing is presented in Appendix II at the end of this paper. It can be seen that the column labeled "percentile" denotes the approximate position of the upper case within each country's population, so that as one peruses Table 4 from the bottom up, the poorest countries in terms of PCGDP are at the bottom, and the cumulative percentage of all persons within those countries are denoted as one proceeds up the table to the richest country, which is denoted as being at the 100th percentile. Due

to rounding, many small-sized countries are classified as having the same percentile value. It is obvious that this ranking procedure ignores internal differences within countries, but since a large diverse country like the U.S. is widely regarded as the modern standard by which all other countries' production levels are judged, the fact that it contains non-productive areas within it can at first be ignored, until the methodological basis for this comparison is understood. In the discussion section of this paper, possibilities will be presented for considering sub-national indicators within national level data, for a more sophisticated analysis. At this point, the basic premise is that the U.S. is widely considered to be a core area whenever information at the national level is considered, regardless of the fact that inequality, poverty, and other indicators of non-core areas within the country are widely known to exist (Pieterse 2010: 28). For example, a 1975 map showed that infant mortality levels within various sections of Detroit were comparable to some third world countries of the time (Ley 1983: 336).

At the end of Appendix II, there appear two informational summaries that provide data by world region and by World Bank income level categories, in the same format as the data had appeared for the individual country listings. Differences between the totals for these three parts of the Appendix were the result of small territories and dependencies being removed from the national data list, but also from the fact that Taiwan was missing from the World Bank data. The table of world regions was the source from which the imputed economic data was taken and applied to individual countries with missing data.

The income level classifications were included at the bottom of the listings, not because they are considered particularly useful, but to demonstrate the problem of categorizing countries in terms of a static method. The World Bank data had evidently

counted China as an "upper middle income" country, based upon its current status in 2012. But when studying 1960 data, this classification is utterly contradicted by the fact that China at that time was the poorest country for which data was available. Thus, although the exploratory research described previously may justly be criticized as being too disorganized and informal, part of its value was to find ways to try to avoid problems involving ill-fitting classifications of the type illustrated in this instance.

The schedule in which this research had to be conducted did not allow for the processing of all 10 time periods listed in Appendix I, so it was decided to compare the earliest period (1960-1965) with the latest period (2005-2010) and one intermediate period (1986-1990). The choice of intermediate period was decided in part by the greater availability of information for that time-frame, and thus, a lessened amount of data imputation. Appendix III provides the final results of the data processing for the period of 1986-1990, and Appendix IV provides the results for the period of 2005-2010.

Information from the CIA World Factbook web site was copied and entered into a spreadsheet, and the processed version of this data is provided in Appendix V. Although the CIA site did not offer a convenient historical database, it offered the benefit of containing almost a complete set of economic information for all current countries, including Taiwan. This stems from the source being willing to provide current estimates for each country, all of which were presented in 2011 U.S. dollars (and reflected purchasing power parity). A comparison of the two lists not only indicates the kind of discrepancies that can arise when comparing data from different sources, but also the fact that some countries' production value varies widely from year to year. For example, Liechtenstein was at the top of the CIA listing, with PCGDP of $141,100 in 2011. The

five-year average from the World Bank period of 2006-2010 provides a more modest figure of $81,855. Nevertheless, the correspondence between the percentiles assigned to the countries in both lists is quite strong, using the ranking technique I had developed. For example, if all the top countries in the CIA list (those at or above the label stating "Core?" in the far right column) are compared with their corresponding listings in the most recent World Bank spreadsheet, the biggest differences stem from the few cases in which data was imputed. Of the 40 top-ranked countries in the CIA list that also appear in the World Bank list, only one very minor discrepancy would result from using these two lists to define the core countries, which is that Antigua and Barbuda appears a bit lower in the CIA listings and thus didn't make its top 40. As will be described later, it is the weight of population, rather than mere ranking of countries, that helps to stabilize these lists. Small rich countries may have incomes that bounce up and down from year to year, but they still tend to stay within the top percentiles of the world's PCGDP. Less wealthy countries that have similar variation still tend to stay within a semi-peripheral realm of the global population percentiles—even more so when the 5-year averages are used to represent the average within such fluctuations. Such averages are readily amenable to longitudinal tracking.

Appendix VI displays the CIA information when supplemented with sub-national data about China, obtained from The Economist website. The Economist data was from 2010, and the CIA data I chose was from almost the same time (2011), so their totals for China were very close to each other. Some adjustments were then made to scale the respective populations slightly upward so that they were increased by the same proportion that the CIA national data had increased over the course of the subsequent

year. Thus, the total 2011 population for China was divided by the 2010 population to produce an adjustment factor of approximately 1.01776, which was then used as a factor to multiply each Chinese sub-division's population values, so that their sum would equal the total national population for 2011. The total of the adjusted 2010 data then matched the 2011 figures even more precisely, for the adjustment to population was the basis for estimated GDP values (i.e. total rather than per capita), which are included in an additional column that had not appeared in previous spreadsheets. The final data table in Appendix VII displays the same information as Appendix V, but grouped by world region and with the addition of this new GDP column, which allowed spreadsheet calculations to be made for the various custom-defined world regions that were formed by grouping economically and historically related countries. This process had been referred to informally in the Exploratory Research section of this paper, but Appendix VII explicitly lists which countries were included in particular regions. It will be argued later in this paper that these regions shift over time so that certain semi-peripheral countries can be considered to have joined one of the core regional areas that, although expanding geographically, was expected in my 2003 hypothesis to include a fairly constant proportion of the world's population.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS OF THIS RESEARCH

Page 19 of this paper had listed a number of hypotheses and topics that this research was meant to address. The relevance of all the collected data (see Appendices) for each of these topics will be described in this section. First was the hypothesis that a consistent proportion of the world's population lives within the core areas. Since it has already been stated that a flexible definition of a core area is to be preferred to a fixed definition (because of known changes in national characteristics over time), there is a real danger of this question being addressed through circular reasoning. It had already been described that world regions and core classification had been viewed not in terms of purely objective characteristics completely derivable from this data set, but rather from a broad historical and comparative consideration of the relative positions in a global economic and geopolitical system. Appendix VII presents a good suggestion for what this current classification (by global region) might be. It stemmed from the need to place *all* countries within some regional classification, and each region so formed was assessed in terms of its economic, political, and historical characteristics within the overall world-system. This aspect of the research will be described further in a moment, but it helps to describe the basis by which certain suggested cut-points between the three basic Wallerstein categories (core, semi-periphery, and periphery) have been noted in the rightmost columns of the various other information tables (Appendices II through V). The most economically important players within all of the core regions identified in Appendix VII fall within approximately the top 15% of the ranked and population-weighting listing of countries, from both the CIA source (Appendix V) and the most

recent World Bank listings (Appendix IV). The listings in Appendix II and Appendix III have similarly been marked with comparable cut-points that were not only consistent with the top 15% figure, but also with the general geopolitical significance of these players at the time—at least in the West. Although the comparison of data over time provides some support for the hypothesis, this support is clearest only from the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. Prior to that, the data is not only quite problematic to interpret, but the most significant economic and geopolitical players (as seen in Appendix II) would have to include the Soviet Union, which would involve a much larger portion of the population. It could easily be guessed that this is evidence that the capitalist world-system was not quite fully global until the end of the Cold War drew near and that although the proportion of the core within a capitalist world-system may very well have included the same 15% proportion of that system, that this proportion was of a not-fully world encompassing system, while a competing system was clearly in place. Thus, this hypothesis is judged to have received qualified support from the data, but merits further research to see whether it also held true during the Cold War period, which raises additional questions about how the capitalist world-system is properly to be defined during those times when it was not yet fully global. In tracing the history of the World System, Wallerstein identified "external arenas" that were not yet part of the system (as well as anti-systemic movements, a concept that can sometimes be used to describe various states at certain times), and how these categories would be defined in terms of this particular framework of simple economic data would clearly need to be worked out (Wallerstein 1974, Wallerstein 1983). Moreover, Wallerstein has recognized the need to reassess portions of his original framework over time, as additional information and

theoretical developments are considered by the social science community (Wallerstein 1999, Wallerstein 2011: xi-xvii).

The second hypothesis was that economic changes over time have resulted in a reduced number of persons living in peripheral areas, with a simultaneous expansion of the proportion in semi-peripheral areas. This idea is completely supported by the data for 1960 to 2010. Most prominent is the rise of China and, more recently, India. It is no longer viable to consider China to be a peripheral country, as its 1960 ranking had clearly classified it. India's status transition is somewhat less clear. Large rural parts of both countries clearly have the potential to still be called peripheral, but this argument could be applied to many of the large core countries as well, and the distinction between core and non-core becomes most clear when considering (1) the proportion of a country that lives in rural areas, and (2) the quality of the lifestyle, connectedness, and income/health characteristics of the average rural inhabitant when compared to the average urban inhabitant. The rich countries generally have a smaller proportion of rural inhabitants, and less urban/rural disparity in socio-economic indicators than is seen in developing countries. One aspect of this can be seen in the correlation between PCGDP and the Gini index of inequality, especially for large countries (Dollar 2004, Ferreira and Ravallion 2008; with disagreement from various other researchers who used different measures and techniques, such as Bergesen and Bata 2002). The fact that China is but a single country should not be a reason for dismissing the significance of its growth. Not only has it long been the largest country in the world, but it is not alone. The research data show that entire regions have seen increases in their status. Although China and India together accounted for about 37% of global population (in all three of the World Bank data

29

periods shown in Appendices II through IV), the regional data shown in both the World Bank categories as well as the Appendix VII data demonstrates that these development trends are not at all limited to just a couple of countries, despite their great importance. Rather than identifying which countries specifically have grown markedly, it is actually easier to specify the few specific areas and countries that have not. These exceptions tend to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa, and selected portions of Asia. Any other regions of the world have only very small proportions of their populations that live in countries that have not become markedly wealthier over the past 50 years. The hypothesis is considered to be solidly confirmed, in that middle-income levels now predominate globally, and the World's per capita GDP is quickly approaching levels that were seen only in the core areas back in 1960.

Additional topics had also been selected for examination, even though they were not framed narrowly as testable hypotheses. One has already been generally addressed under the question of the large shift in countries (and entire regions) from peripheral to semi-peripheral status. This turned out to already provide an answer to the third question that this research was to evaluate: whether development trends in the past 50 years had generally supported the principle that economic development, as classically defined in terms of expanded production and wealth, has indeed taken place very widely.

Greater analysis of the exception areas noted above was, in turn, the fourth topic of this research, in which regional patterns and trends in development were examined. The key data for this analysis appears in Appendix VII, although relevant information has also been presented in Table 1 (the exploratory research) and at the end of the data lists in Appendices II through IV. The World Bank's own classifications and summaries are

provided in Table 2, which presents data selected from Appendices II through IV and compares it with the new regional designations used in Appendix VII of this paper. It must be noted that the World Bank trends in this table are the ones of greatest importance, since all are presented in terms of constant U.S. dollars for the price levels of the year 2000. CIA data in the right column are presented only for casual comparison, since they use prices expressed in terms of 2011 U.S. dollars. Although not strictly comparable, and using differently defined regions, the CIA data in the table is still suggestive of continued improvements in most regions of the world. (NOTE: Two custom-defined African regions were combined for consistent presentation in Table 2.)

Table 2: World Bank Data for Three Time Periods, By Region

Region	World Bank Data 1960-1965	World Bank Data 1986-1990	World Bank Data 2005-2010	2011 CIA data Custom-defined
North America	207 million pop. $14,337 PCDDP	272 million pop. $26,452 PCGDP	338 million pop. $36,742 PCGDP	351 million $47,152 PCGDP
Western Europe	688 million pop. $4,681 PCGDP	833 million pop. $8,961 PCGDP	883 million pop. $12,757 PCGDP	517 million pop. $31,925 PCGDP
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	(included in W. Europe, above)	(included in W. Europe, above)	(included in W. Europe, above)	301 million pop. $11,851 PCGDP
Latin America	235 million pop. $2,239 PCGDP	426 million pop. $3,585 PCGDP	576 million pop. $4,828 PCGDP	596 million pop. $11,780 PCGDP
Pacific & E. Asia (Pacific Rim)	1.082 billion pop. $1,140 PCGDP	1.766 billion pop. $3,004 PCGDP	2.173 billion pop. $4,938 PCGDP	236 million pop. $33,299 PCGDP
Chinese Realm	(included in E. Asia, above)	(included in E. Asia, above)	(included in E. Asia, above)	1.379 billion pop. $8,496 PCGDP
Southeast Asia	(included in E. Asia, above)	(included in E. Asia, above)	(included in E. Asia, above)	567 million pop. $5,984 PCGDP
W. Asia, N. Africa	104 million pop. $812 PCGDP	239 million pop. $2,409 PCGDP	368 million pop. $3,616 PCGDP	470 million pop. $11,178 PCGDP
South Asia	594 million pop. $173 PCGDP	1.075 billion pop. $304 PCGDP	1.536 billion pop. $683 PCGDP	1.694 billion pop. $3,267 PCGDP
Sub-Sah. Africa	245 million pop. $449 PCGDP	486 million pop. $536 PCGDP	701 million pop. $621 PCGDP	903 million pop. $2,315 PCGDP
World	3.164 billion pop. $2,594 PCGDP	5.096 billion pop. $4,423 PCGDP	6.687 billion pop. $5,942 PCGDP	6.790 billion pop. $10,500 PCGDP

Most notable within the table is the huge expansion of the East Asian production figures in recent years. While the World Bank had combined rich and poor countries

within this region, growth is still notable from 1960 to the present, with the 2006-2010 average having growth to $4,938 in 2000 U.S. dollars. Although the 2011 dollars are not strictly comparable (according to an online inflation calculator, a dollar in 2011 is worth $1.31 in 2000 dollars: http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/) rough estimates suggest that although Southeast Asia as a region may not be quite so impressive, the Chinese area and rich Pacific Rim have boomed substantially. Splitting the World Bank region into three smaller regions still reveals overall growth in all three.

The final research questions may be addressed together: whether regional development disparities are plausibly explainable in terms of basic geographic principles, and the extent to which this may be connected with the seemingly steady proportion of the world's population in core areas. For this question, the detailed data in Appendix VII was compared with various exploratory findings, some of which were presented in Table 1. Recall that my 2003 article had proposed that the core expands geographically while maintaining a fairly consistent share of the world's population. This makes sense in terms of the much lower population growth rates exhibited by the established rich "core" countries, when compared to the relatively high growth rates in other (poorer) areas of the world. Mathematically, the only way that the core could maintain a constant proportion is to expand at about the same rate as the world's population, but since the national growth rates do not achieve, this, new countries must therefore be classified as part of the core, over time. The precise form this seems to have taken involves (1) the expansion of rich nation free-trade areas, such as EFTA and the EU, and (2) the eventual development of selected nations to a level that makes them economically comparable to

the established, traditional rich countries. Examples include numerous small nations, plus a few medium-sized ones such as Taiwan and South Korea.

In demonstrating precisely which countries have been able to take advantage of this type of "global structural mobility," World Bank longitudinal data is essential (and Appendix I provides a convenient format, without imputations, for tracking this and while recognizing some of the data limitations). Taken region by region, then, the trends affecting the expansion of the core have been as follows:

(1) In the Western Hemisphere, the two main core countries have long been the United States and Canada, and these have mainly been joined by the rapid growth in tiny island nations of the Caribbean, but as Appendix VII shows, this area taken alone is much richer than other core areas ($47,152 per capita GDP in 2011 dollars, compared to the low $30K values of Western Europe and the rich Pacific Rim.) If Mexico is included as part of the North American core area, on the basis of its recent growth trends and the establishment of NAFTA, then the North American core area average becomes a bit more modest, closer to the level of the other ones. It may be possible to closely examine other Western Hemisphere trade agreements and to pick and choose other areas that make the region's core PCGDP comparable to other core regions, but there are alternative ways of looking at these regional relationships, so the main Western Hemisphere transition has involved the elevation of the vast majority of non-rich countries (in 1960) to middle-income, semi-peripheral countries in 2011.

(2) In Europe, the clearest and most readily definable expansion of a core area has been in evidence for several decades due to the rise of the European Community concept, its implementation of a European Union and associated free trade areas and common

currency. Moreover, the transformation of the formidable Eastern Bloc and COMECON relationships has opened up vast new regions for new trade, investment, labor migrations, and geopolitical coordination. Bit by bit, Eastern Europe has become Western (so that many newly democratic countries that used to be classified as East Europe are now more properly considered as Central Europe), and this transition, which has been so important for global security as the Cold War drew to a close and the Soviet Union was split into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), has systematically involved preferential treatment, extended to country after country, causing the original European Community participants to multiply into several dozen members of an actual union of currency, migration, and trade (with some exceptions that do not nullify the basic premise). This process promises to continue for some time, with the addition of Balkan states (such as Croatia in 2013). Since 1960, when even major states such as Germany and Italy were still recovering from the destruction of World War II, and still wrestling with internal divisions (in Italy, a rich north versus a poor south; in Germany, the split until 1989 into a capitalist West versus a totalitarian East, and a divided capital separated from the West). Both of those problems were being healed by 1990, and today, although internal wealth disparities still exist, aid and free trade has successfully been able to elevate some of the historically poorer areas of the continent (e.g. Spain and Ireland) to a level of PCGDP comparable to many of the original core nations, while steadily seeing a rise in the incomes of eastern and even Balkan areas, from Estonia to Greece. The figures by 2010 are quite clear with regard to these countries. The poorest country in Europe is no longer Albania, but Moldova (formerly the Moldavian S.S.R.), since of the 15 countries of the

CIS, only the 3 Baltic states have been readily integrated into the European Union. There are political as well as economic reasons for this pattern. (Black 2005: 209-210, 235-247)

(3) In Asia and Oceania, the solidification of a rich fringe—first established by wealthy British Commonwealth members such as Australia in coordination with the United States' massive military presence in the area as a result of World War II and its already-established interests in its Pacific possessions and former colony of the Philippines (Paterson et al. 1995, Schmitz 2007). Cold War policy soon mandated a policy of containment that took place in the "far east" just as much as it had along the "Iron Curtain" in Europe, and the reconstruction of Japan and many of its former conquered areas allowed its politico-economic might to now be allied with the Western Core rather than against it (Rourke, 1989). After revolution in China, war in the Korean peninsula, and conflicts in the Indochina region, the development and strengthening of a rich Pacific Rim alliance constituted an important part of foreign policy, later complicated by the ambivalent status of the small but important Asian "tigers" and the official return of the historic colonial centers of Hong Kong and Macao to Chinese rule, albeit with special agreements in place to maintain their profitable functions (Roskin and Berry, 1999). More discussion will be given to the transitional status of China and its relationship to these two core regional areas as well as Taiwan and Singapore. In general, the core area shows signs of expanding from the mere fringe and into the heart of the region's inland territories itself, through substantial economic growth and wealth in China's coastal zones, the Malaysian-Singapore-Brunei area, and Thailand. Although the various Pacific States have not seen growth to the extent that the Caribbean micro-states

have, they have been treated here (due to their small size and political history) as part of the core Pacific area dominated by the United States and its current allies.

(4) The West Asian and North African region has also see a substantial boom in development. Although this growth has long been dismissed as "merely" oil driven prosperity, and long-standing claims and assumptions have held that this commodity would merely be a temporary boon that could rapidly be depleted and thus restore the region to poverty, this does not seem to be the case, as the most recent PCGDP figures should demonstrate (Simon 1995: 22-26, 287-293). It is quite true that inequalities in this region are starkly defined by the presence of small countries that appear (only at first glance) as if they were carved out explicitly to make easier the exporting of their products to the Western powers that temporarily had dominion there after World War I. Although the actual history does not support such an *ex-post facto* interpretation, the current geopolitical function of these states lends support to these relationships as a latent though not a manifest function of the European subdivision of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent maneuverings during and after World War II. (Hahn 2005, Axelrod 2009) Moreover, it must be noted that many countries in this region are proximate to the European Core, and event those who do not enjoy substantial oil riches often have economic and migration networks that relate them economically to the European Union, as well as some colonial connections maintained from the past.

(5) The South Asian area remains predominantly peripheral, although large sections of India have been able to achieve semi-peripheral status. A breakdown by the sub-national states within India was considered for this research, but the internal diversity between its states was not nearly as striking as that measured in China. Despite well-

heralded recent development efforts in provinces like Kerala, the traditional PCGDP measurement finds that area to be quite undistinguished, with the richest (most globally integrated) parts of the subcontinent's economy instead seen in its north (e.g. Chandigarh). (Economist n.d.)

(6) Sub-Saharan Africa had at first appeared almost as gloomy as had been described by authors like Wallerstein (1983) and Moyo (2010), but an unexpected bright spot seemed to appear in the most recent trends. In Appendix VII, this was identified as a proposed new region that runs from the South African realm up the southwest coast of the continent to include Equatorial Guinea. With the exception of small segment of coastline held by Congo-Kinshasa (surrounded by lands under Angolan control), the nations in this area are significantly above the averages for the traditional Sub-Saharan region, and thus might eventually receive wider recognition as one of the region's success stories. Before this can occur, however, extreme levels of internal inequality would have to be addressed. Namibia's PCGDP looks far less impressive when it is revealed that the country ranks first as having the highest Gini index in the entire world (CIA 2011). Nevertheless, this is the most prominent advance in the continent in recent records, although it is also noted that gradual increases in the West African area just north and northwest of this area (e.g. Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana) have also exhibited a quieter level of growth that, due to the greater population and less unequal distributions of its production wealth, may eventually become the more influential area of economic growth advancement, and semi-peripheral production, trade relations, and investments.

Regarding the unique role of China as the most populous country, now grown to have the second-largest economy in the world, an additional assessment was included in

which various subdivisions of the country were placed into the global analysis as if they were separate countries. The sheer scale of China's richest cities alone amounts to the size of a major European county, and the richer coastal areas of China contain total populations as large as the entire European Union! This information has been provided in Appendix VI. Despite some fairly wealthy areas, and a few very rich cities such as Hong Kong and Macao (which technically are Chinese, but previously would have best been considered part of the rich "Pacific Rim" of capitalism, and "communist containment"), the country's richer areas do not yet quite reach the level of wealth that normally designates core status. Some of them do seem comparable, however, to the Central European countries that are currently being integrated into the European Union core. Repeating this type of analysis in another ten years, if development patterns for that area persist, could be very instructive. It is too early yet to tell whether much beyond the richest of Chinese port cities could properly be considered part of the "core," or whether the country is generally too large to be incorporated, except perhaps for a few selected provinces, into the core, proper (following my principle of a core that expands only enough to make up the difference in growth rates between rich and poorer areas of the world). Geopolitically, it seemed to make great sense for development and economic ties to occur with China (since for example, the West had agreed to return the areas of Macao and Hong Kong, and followed through peacefully on their promise). At the moment, an expanding core appears more likely to select the most proximate areas accessible to the historical core, for further expansion, such the Balkans, Mexico, Malaysia, etc. as these regions show signs of continuing to develop. (Mexico, however, has become very large;

its incorporation into the core would likely mean substantial delays for other areas, if my hypothesis holds true in the future.)

It is possible that the whole history of development since World War II could be interpreted in terms of a juggling act, with some balls being kept in the air while others are allowed to drop, in accordance with various geopolitical priorities as they change. Working out the details of this ideas would require an extensive amount of additional research, however, and it is possible that the idea is too simple and impractical to yield much practical value, except perhaps to explain why some areas failed to develop, in terms of global political patterns, rather than because of a compulsion toward pure greed or hegemony on the part of the rich. (Levine, 1983: 31-46, 115-151, 341-352)

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH RESULTS

This research, although perhaps helpful as a general guide, should nevertheless be interpreted as reinforcing the complexity of global trends in development, wealth, and inequality. Many of the initial research questions had been inspired by critical theoretical frameworks and commentators, as well as ambitious new historical interpretations, while attempting to reconcile these views with more traditional (and specialized) paradigms that have come out of fields such as developmental economics, international relations, military history, economic geography, economic history, and foreign policy (e.g. Allen 2011, Arrighi 1994, Dicken 2007, Gillis et al 1996, Grandin 2010, Levine 1983: 379-393, McMichael 2012). These initial intentions were far too ambitious, and it became clear that the most that could be hoped for was an unsteady effort to balance the most critical perspectives with the most traditional ones, through a comparison with actual historical data sets. In general, a strong case can be made that traditional modernization theory has proven correct within the terms that it established for itself, and when the geopolitical imperatives of the last 50 or more years are taken into account. An examination of specific cases, however, reveals that much of the critical ideas are also factually supportable. In both cases, the overall context and perspective in which the facts exist and are tied together become the means by which these subjects must be evaluated by researchers, activists, and theorists, and yet the sheer number of variables and disciplines that tie into the subjects can be quite overwhelming. It would probably take many years for even teams of specialists to piece together all the available data and try to reconcile disparate theoretical frameworks into a coherent whole, but more credit should probably

be given to the traditional approaches of development economics (as in Gillis et al. 1996), which do show an honest (and highly sophisticated) effort to tie together environmental, health, and equity issues into a coherent whole, and to make things actually happen in the field. While such integration may be seen by some as mere cooption, critics should be heartened to some extent by the effect they have actually had on policy. Although environmental economics (e.g. Goodstein 1995) presents a series of plausible (on their face) mechanisms by which pollution problems might be capped and ultimately reduced, it does appear that these mechanisms would be too few and too late to prevent large-scale changes over the next century (UNHDI Report 2011). On the other hand, critics should not be too quick to downplay the substantial role that intra-national and international conflict has played in disrupting actual development programs, through no intentions of the assisting countries and agencies.

The challenge for each individual contemplating these matters may ultimately rest in one's choice of which level to focus upon at a given time and for a given purpose. It is probably unfair, from the perspective of an overall understanding, for critics from the left to consistently seek and publicize all flaws and inequalities within each country, and the system as a whole, but a progressive philosophy really demands no less—in order to make progress, one has to identify flaws and injustices and figure out how they arose. On the other hand, the actual threats from nuclear proliferation, hostile states, and disruptive terrorist attacks are very real, and should not be lightly dismissed. Enough failings have been seen in recent U.S. history and policy that it cannot be assumed that Western hegemony is all-powerful, or even capable of the kind of consistent domination that it is sometimes accused of. On the other hand, an interesting idea worth considering is that,

regardless of their original origins or intentions, certain forms of alternative development may end up being promoted (or tacitly accepted) for its possible latent functions of slowing economic growth in areas of the world that the world-system is not yet able to structurally accommodate. Each person and agency must struggle with the possibility that certain outcomes may be beyond their control, or that in a complex system, there is no "good" that cannot also be viewed as having a "bad" side to it, for someone, somewhere. Nevertheless, it should be very clear that warfare has often been a great inhibitor of economic growth, except perhaps in cases involving semi-peripheral countries that throw their weight around and end up becoming accommodated into the core in the end, as with Germany, Italy, Japan, and perhaps Russia in the future (Sobocinski 2003). The sheer extent of warfare as a disruptor of development around the world must be taken seriously, however (Kidron and Smith 1991: 12-15). In an unpublished research paper from 2013, I compared the effects of several types of crisis upon national GDP growth, and found that civil war hindered growth more severely, on average, than natural disasters, political coups, or humanitarian crises (Sobocinski 2014).

A final note of interest, with regard to the problems seen in Africa's relative lack of development success, may be to refer to the possibility of some form of racist effect, even if only of an aversive (unintentional or passively neglectful) form. If the world is truly becoming a gigantic system, in which international social classes and stratification continue to develop, then the world must necessarily be viewed as a multicultural system. Sociological research on race and ethnicity has shown that wherever substantial inequalities of wealth and power exist between different racial-ethnic groups, recognized and socially constructed as such, an ethnic hierarchy tends to develop. Such a hierarchy

might be perceived in the relatively low status of Sub-Saharan Africa, and the great inequalities within it. (Marger 2012: 457-488)

On the other hand, purely economic and geographic explanations can also be offered for disparities in different regions, with great plausibility (Allen 2011, Diamond 1999, Harrison 1984). It is probable that the questions under consideration here ultimately encompass the entirety of the social sciences.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Wallerstein's world-system framework has often been cited for its conceptually appealing characterization of recent economic history in terms of an economic core (which actually includes multiple geographic areas), expanding its wealth through its role at the head of an expanding global capitalist system, in which semi-peripheral areas serve a set of mediating functions with respect to less-developed peripheral areas, all of which have particular functions within a system that has been characterized as fairly stable with respect to the presence of these three fundamental types of areas. My research demonstrates a huge decline in the populations that live in peripheral areas during the past half-century. Although this huge portion of the world's population now lives in countries with predominantly semi-peripheral characteristics, rather than reaching a state of the highest economic development, the economic trends have nevertheless been most consistent with the classic ideas of modernization theory—economic development— rather than the fixed and exploitative relationship that has tended to characterize the critical world-systems framework. Moreover, as an increasing number of the most critical regions within developing states, such as China, become similar in character to core areas through the expansion of their middle classes and their most advanced cities, the increasingly international nature of production suggests that stratification within these countries may be gradually headed toward patterns observed historically in the core. The most advanced areas in developing states have more recently been characterized within a tiered world-city system rather than in the vaguer terms which Wallerstein had used (Sassen 2006, Chen 2013: 288).

A truly surprising phenomenon has been the growth in China from the very bottom of the 1960 rankings, to instead take up the bulk of the middle of the world's economic strata. Although modernization theory can offer explanations for this, starting with the beneficial effect of Chinese reforms that began in the late 1970s, Wallerstein had not foreseen such a shift, any more than Marx had foreseen that "communist" revolutions would occur in poor countries rather than the most advanced ones. The current trends suggest that the world-systems "periphery" might similarly disappear entirely, within a matter of decades, unless the term comes to refer, equivocally, only to the poorest areas within otherwise industrialized and even rich states. Such a shift would belie the fact that, characteristic of industrial and post-industrial economies, the extractive economic sectors which had served as a key, defining characteristic of peripheral areas, would provide the livelihood of ever-smaller percentages of the world's population. Moreover, political and social advances have indeed accompanied many economic improvements. Although problems such as corruption and poverty remain widespread, nevertheless the World Bank has noted large declines in poverty and its correlated problems, as described by the United Nations' Millenium Development Goals (e.g. see Beaudet 527). The new importance of ecological problems, terrorist actions, and budgeting problems stemming from aging populations, all suggest a new phase in an admittedly global system, but not one that is specifically the kind of stratified world economy that Wallerstein had described as if it would be an enduring structure expected to persist as long as capitalism does. Economists increasingly emphasize multiple "capitalisms," in the plural (e.g. Heilbroner and Milberg 2011), to the extent that the broad and vaguely disparaging

concept of "capitalism" is even still considered to be appropriate for formal use outside of a critical-conflict context.

A superior theoretical framework seems to exist by drawing upon fields outside of sociology, however. Wallerstein himself (1996) had advocated working toward more cross-disciplinary and even trans-disciplinary theory. One form of unification has been offered by critical, Marx-derived frameworks, which are not limited to sociology, but which are certainly vulnerable to many types of critique, and have certainly had their faults analyzed by sociologists (e.g. Sanderson 2012, Elwell 2013, Elwell 2016). A more complex form of advanced theory can certainly come from sociologists who are able to develop a strong working knowledge of multiple interconnected fields such as international relations, international business, global economics, economic geography, and of course, history itself, as a traditional unifier of facts that have stemmed from diverse forms of research. The prominent sociologist Peter Berger, as far back as 1993, decried the trends he saw in which many sociologists gave up the very idea of Weber's "value free" research ideal, in favor of "partisan advocacy" in which "large numbers of sociologists now proudly announce their non-objectivity" (Berger 1993: 12). After long thought, I find that I agree wholeheartedly with Berger's concerns with this trend. Perhaps the world-systems framework has now come to resemble the sort of "Grand Theory" that C. Wright Mills (1959) had criticized, in which abstracted ideas accumulate faster than is empirically defensible. Could it be that sociology's original set of grand questions are currently being more productively researched by persons in the fields of political science, economics, and history?

I believe that the current era, in which critical theory has dominated sociology, must come to an end in favor of newer, less politically motivated, and more promising research techniques and questions. The evidence that I have examined in this paper, which contradicts not only the world-systems framework but also the dependency theory framework which so many sociologists have also held dear, as a distinctive product of sociology, is not the only evidence that calls for a dramatic shift toward a less critical, more mainstream and multidisciplinary approach. Even among sociological theorists, there are promising alternatives to critical Marx-derived theories, and the extent to which sociologists such as Theda Skocpol have been able to receive recognition within other fields such as political science could be taken as a useful indicator of quality. Science is not just about how well one's research fits into one's own particular field, but how well it stands up to the empirical scrutiny of anyone who sees fit to question it, including other fields of science (e.g. Jared Diamond, who was trained as a biologist but did productive work in what should have been the realm of macrosociology), or even non-scientist lay persons.

Although I feel that sociological theorists such as Gerhard Lenski offer respectable frameworks which could accommodate additional data and research questions that advance the field, I fear that advances in demonstrably valid sociological theory have been slowed because the current sociological curriculum does not yet mandate sufficient study of the other social sciences, especially those dealing with those most fundamental societal institutions involving the economy and politics (i.e. property and power). The fundamental frameworks of modern power deserve to be understood from their own perspectives, even though these are classified as the distinctive realms of economics and

political science, and not merely by obsessing over inequalities and a critical-conflict paradigm.

Marx had keenly perceived historical revolutions as predominantly just the replacement of one ruling class by another, yet he presumed that a new socialist system might somehow become an exception. Social scientists today should realize the necessity of incremental progressivism, and the impossibility of a revolution that somehow would require an instantaneous mass re-education of society's members and mass reorganization of its institutions and the habits and worldviews of their constituent individuals. The history of such efforts has been extremely clear. Sudden massive social change results in oppression, death, injustice, and usually the change of the initiative social movement into new forms that are often unrecognizable and inconsistent with the ideals originally intended by the most active reformers. Despite this, a full generation after the end of the Cold War, the predominant visible approach that sociologists often take as a theoretical framework (and therefore teach to students) is that the field demands a Marxian sense of *praxis*, that "capitalism" and other aspects of social systems are so strongly entrenched that radical activism is not only warranted but even to be actively encouraged (especially in poorer areas of the world that have the greatest instability, conflict, and poverty). I consider such overconfidence to be dangerous and unflattering to the original ideas of sociology as a science, which *does not* originate with Karl Marx despite his rote characterization as one of the founding figures of sociology. In addressing one of the foundational questions of sociology, what makes society possible, Emile Durkheim proposed that the answer lies in shared norms and values. As we see new kinds of political change which threaten to reverse progressivism in so many ways, this

foundational insight of Durkheim's must receive new and urgent emphasis within a new generation of sociologists, and not ignored by presumptuous and reckless assumptions that current systems are simply evil and readily replaceable. History has shown the evils that arise from large-scale breakdowns and changes in social systems, some of which are readily characterizable as regressive and therefore should serve as a warning for those who may not realize the paucity and fragility of sociology's actual, demonstrable accomplishments, compared with the ease with which reactionary political rhetoric and policies can arise when social changes threaten the understanding and livelihoods of large portions of society.

I earnestly hope that my research forms part of a growing movement to question politicized and critical theoretical frameworks that have outgrown their empirical basis, and to strive to establish sociology in more Weberian terms as a social science that seeks understanding, as an objectively (now intersubjectively) defensible product of mostly dispassionate research in which personal motives and political ideologies, while obviously present in researchers as individuals, are merely informed by the results of research rather than seen as necessarily the main driving force behind it, as the critiques of postmodern deconstructionism seem to have concluded. Instead of a sociology that specializes in applied topics that appear to be geared toward political activism (especially forms of activism that have noticeably partisan implications), sociology must instead return to its earlier aspirations to advance scientific theories that can transcend contemporary politics through their empirical verifiability and primary goals of understanding rather than changing social systems—endeavoring to understand all of

society and societies both in the ways in which they have worked well and of course the ways in which they arguably haven't.

One analogy might be made with medicine, in which various treatments might be painful but over time have mandated a growing set of principles regarding ethics, pain alleviation, and the ideal of "doing no harm." In this era in which trust in western social institutions has declined while the academic and political tone of sociology has been predominantly critical and in many ways seemingly eager to assist that decline, perhaps because of an overconfidence that the "decline of capitalism" is natural and inevitable, and would necessarily lead to a better system. Such a view must be strongly challenged on the basis of historical evidence, the insights found in other social sciences, and of course the current political trends which appear to be connected with a polarization that echoes that found within the social sciences—between those (in whatever field) who are comfortable with accepting and studying social systems as they currently exist and have existed, and those who feel that mere study is insufficient and impossible to divorce from immediate application through political advocacy, whether in classrooms, in the media, or in the field. Sociological ethics must today remain keenly aware of the real harms that arise from a breakdown in social systems, and to many of those actors who had advocated too radical of reforms for their society or its government to tolerate. Activism has met with severe failure as well as progressive reforms. Their success is neither certain nor in all cases demonstrably worth the costs. The potentially severe costs of either success or failure must not be discounted through an undue emphasis upon the mere prospects for possible success in achieving some sort of reform, nor a too-hasty presumption that the attempt is mandated wherever suffering exists. It is vital to recognize the actual harms

and pain that are sometimes caused by a disproportionately critical approach to our subject matter. Theories that are too politically loaded and no longer well-substantiated by current arrays of empirical data must be replaced or greatly revised. We should also learn eagerly from other fields such as history, economics, and political science, and how they have dealt with essentially sociological topics through their use of markedly different theories.

APPENDICES

Table 3: Partially Processed Data from the World Bank

Part One of Table (1960 to 1985 averages)

GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) Country Name	1960-65avg	1966-70avg	1971-75avg	1976-80avg	1981-85avg
Afghanistan (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Albania (from 1980)	--	--	--	1,061	1,087
Algeria	1,123	1,283	1,507	1,822	1,957
American Samoa (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Andorra (from 1970)	--	18,256	18,767	17,867	15,114
Angola (from 1985)	--	--	--	--	796
Antigua and Barbuda (from 1977)	--	--	--	4,168	5,465
Arab World	--	--	1,974	2,308	2,307
Argentina	5,367	6,144	6,993	7,136	6,633
Armenia (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Aruba (from 1987)	--	--	--	--	--
Australia	9,788	11,604	13,119	14,005	14,936
Austria	8,174	10,130	12,779	14,984	16,398
Azerbaijan (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Bahamas, The	11,649	14,746	12,739	12,587	15,032
Bahrain (from 1980)	--	--	--	11,128	9,429
Bangladesh	268	274	241	251	260
Barbados	3,835	5,341	6,386	7,072	7,322
Belarus (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Belgium	8,345	10,279	12,862	14,643	15,795
Belize	983	1,117	1,414	1,718	1,849
Benin	263	288	291	285	316
Bermuda	22,190	29,733	34,695	42,909	45,143
Bhutan (from 1981)	--	--	--	--	286
Bolivia	945	998	1,023	1,113	949
Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 1994)	--	--	--	--	--
Botswana	261	338	672	991	1,408
Brazil	1,540	1,761	2,567	3,255	3,220
Brunei Darussalam (from 1974)	--	--	23,188	29,456	23,136
Bulgaria (from 1980)	--	--	--	1,294	1,431
Burkina Faso	127	137	139	153	161
Burundi	93	111	125	138	143
Cambodia (from 1993)	--	--	--	--	--
Cameroon	513	491	529	657	863
Canada	10,195	12,385	14,256	16,117	17,195
Cape Verde (from 1981)	--	--	--	--	684
Cayman Islands (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Central African Republic	347	343	351	354	308
Chad	248	224	205	187	165
Channel Islands (from1998)	--	--	--	--	--
Chile	1,924	2,157	2,171	2,205	2,343
China	87	105	135	163	236
Colombia	1,243	1,388	1,667	1,907	2,004
Comoros (from 1980)	--	--	--	412	428

Table 3 (cont'd)

Congo, Dem. Rep.	321	329	340	276	251
Congo, Rep.	639	658	813	852	1,319
Costa Rica	1,818	2,192	2,699	3,124	2,820
Cote d'Ivoire	615	768	904	1,021	810
Croatia (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Cuba (from 1970)	--	1,778	1,991	2,426	3,261
Curacao (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Cyprus (from 1975)	--	--	3,846	5,783	7,430
Czech Republic (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Denmark	12,743	15,429	17,430	19,156	20,969
Djibouti (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Dominica (from 1977)	--	--	--	2,210	2,723
Dominican Republic	947	1,017	1,450	1,714	1,847
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels)	1,140	1,621	1,996	2,269	2,556
East Asia & Pacific (developing only)	134	159	199	247	324
Ecuador	836	880	1,082	1,314	1,306
Egypt, Arab Rep.	477	540	574	768	968
El Salvador	1,581	1,839	1,985	2,129	1,546
Equatorial Guinea (from 1985)	--	--	--	--	621
Eritrea (from 1992)	--	--	--	--	--
Estonia (from 1980)	--	--	--	3,428	3,685
Ethiopia (from 1981)	--	--	--	--	137
Euro area	7,092	9,120	11,217	12,818	13,814
Europe & Central Asia (all income levels)	4,681	5,716	6,777	7,576	8,023
Europe & Central Asia (developing only)	--	--	--	--	--
European Union	6,705	8,274	9,907	11,162	11,971
Faeroe Islands (2000 only)	--	--	--	--	--
Fiji	1,123	1,227	1,592	1,773	1,727
Finland	8,142	9,881	12,527	14,079	16,303
France	8,391	10,547	13,057	14,949	16,127
French Polynesia (from 1965)	8,676	8,872	9,360	10,271	11,858
Gabon	2,257	2,933	4,716	6,373	5,224
Gambia, The (from 1966)	--	275	291	337	334
Georgia (from 1965)	860	1,019	1,285	1,712	2,094
Germany (from 1970)	--	11,895	12,989	14,999	16,284
Ghana	285	273	284	245	203
Gibraltar (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Greece	4,056	5,807	7,938	9,234	9,199
Greenland (from 1970)	--	9,242	11,137	14,402	15,292
Grenada (from 1977)	--	--	--	2,180	2,334
Guam (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Guatemala	1,018	1,179	1,381	1,609	1,505
Guinea (from 1986)	--	--	--	--	--
Guinea-Bissau (from 1970)	--	173	168	162	161
Guyana	667	725	782	821	700
Haiti (from 1991)	--	--	--	--	--
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)	295	312	327	339	319
High income	9,119	11,634	13,736	15,599	16,934
High income: non-OECD	--	4,539	6,490	8,930	9,519
High income: OECD	9,348	11,953	14,088	15,968	17,400
Honduras	767	876	930	1,087	1,053

Table 3 (cont'd)

Hong Kong SAR, China	3,829	5,440	7,405	10,432	13,621
Hungary (from 1965)	1,809	2,179	2,870	3,606	4,034
Iceland	11,214	13,285	16,647	20,637	23,375
India	158	202	211	227	250
Indonesia	201	211	272	349	433
Iran, Islamic Rep. (from 1965)	965	1,232	1,840	1,948	1,489
Iraq (from 1997)	--	--	--	--	--
Ireland (from 1970)	--	7,335	8,089	9,518	10,575
Isle of Man (from 1984)	--	--	--	--	8,219
Israel	6,778	8,443	11,433	12,111	13,403
Italy	6,676	8,585	10,394	12,240	13,632
Jamaica (from 1966)	--	2,967	3,570	2,958	2,703
Japan (from 1960)	9,545	15,180	19,676	22,621	25,699
Jordan (from 1975)	--	--	1,119	1,588	2,006
Kazakhstan (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Kenya	255	298	382	411	417
Kiribati (from 1970)	--	1,218	1,692	1,350	712
Korea, Dem. Rep. (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Korea, Rep.	1,236	1,721	2,349	3,199	4,033
Kosovo (from 2000)	--	--	--	--	--
Kuwait (from 1995)	--	--	--	--	--
Kyrgyz Republic (from 1986)	--	--	--	--	--
Lao PDR (from 1984)	--	--	--	--	209
Latin America & Caribbean (all income levels)	2,239	2,573	3,097	3,542	3,566
Latin America & Caribbean (developing only)	2,200	2,518	3,035	3,476	3,496
Latvia (from 1965)	1,557	1,777	2,446	2,959	3,477
Least developed countries: UN classification	--	--	--	--	259
Lebanon (from 1988)	--	--	--	--	--
Lesotho	154	178	207	276	282
Liberia	647	751	802	763	620
Libya (from 1999)	--	--	--	--	--
Liechtenstein (from 1970)	--	32,622	32,475	35,649	38,771
Lithuania (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Low & middle income	492	581	695	805	859
Low income	232	245	244	243	243
Lower middle income	269	315	355	407	439
Luxembourg	14,494	16,174	19,235	20,305	22,023
Macao SAR, China (from 1982)	--	--	--	--	10,562
Macedonia, FYR (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Madagascar	401	409	405	359	301
Malawi	102	122	142	158	150
Malaysia	888	1,071	1,334	1,724	2,113
Maldives (from 1995)	--	--	--	--	--
Mali (from 1967)	--	167	176	214	188
Malta (from 1970)	--	1,827	2,268	3,857	4,793
Marshall Islands (from 1981)	--	--	--	--	1,882
Mauritania	368	476	485	461	432
Mauritius (from 1976)	--	--	--	1,685	1,741
Mayotte (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Mexico	2,665	3,289	3,820	4,485	5,079
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. (from 1986)	--	--	--	--	--

Table 3 (cont'd)

Middle East & North Africa (all income levels)	--	1,581	2,167	2,754	2,662
Middle East & North Africa (developing only)	812	905	1,162	1,368	1,352
Middle income	525	624	750	874	937
Moldova (from 1980)	--	--	--	826	895
Monaco (from 1970)	--	50,458	56,044	63,261	65,378
Mongolia (from 1981)	--	--	--	--	463
Montenegro (from 1997)	--	--	--	--	--
Morocco	660	723	833	993	1,011
Mozambique (from 1980)	--	--	--	203	168
Myanmar (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Namibia (from 1980)	--	--	--	2,263	2,102
Nepal	141	145	141	145	152
Netherlands	9,216	11,645	13,874	15,415	15,929
New Caledonia (from 1965)	7,554	8,528	10,749	10,673	9,143
New Zealand (from 1977)	--	--	--	10,258	11,017
Nicaragua	1,074	1,296	1,369	1,270	976
Niger	343	329	264	252	224
Nigeria	291	279	401	416	324
North America	14,337	17,314	19,156	21,458	23,009
Northern Mariana Islands (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Norway	11,761	14,213	16,917	20,702	23,801
Not classified	--	--	--	--	--
OECD members	8,646	10,973	12,839	14,455	15,642
Oman	1,065	2,857	4,138	4,791	5,943
Pakistan	208	263	288	316	375
Palau (from 1991)	--	--	--	--	--
Panama	1,965	2,519	2,995	3,090	3,353
Papua New Guinea	476	602	713	665	612
Paraguay	690	747	873	1,182	1,365
Peru	1,802	2,033	2,192	2,244	2,142
Philippines	726	798	895	1,047	1,042
Poland (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Portugal	2,726	3,907	5,518	6,083	6,587
Puerto Rico	4,449	6,162	7,659	8,484	8,908
Qatar (from 2000)	--	--	--	--	--
Romania (from 1980)	--	--	--	1,844	2,005
Russian Federation (from 1989)	--	--	--	--	--
Rwanda	200	198	204	238	264
Samoa (from 1982)	--	--	--	--	1,145
San Marino (from 1970)	--	13,112	14,327	16,281	16,998
Sao Tome and Principe (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Saudi Arabia (from 1968)	--	7,233	12,297	15,728	11,745
Senegal	603	563	526	525	503
Serbia (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Seychelles	2,410	2,518	3,217	4,171	4,123
Sierra Leone	234	262	290	285	292
Singapore	2,500	3,758	6,023	8,140	10,878
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Slovak Republic (from 1984)	--	--	--	--	5,023
Slovenia (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Solomon Islands (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--

Table 3 (cont'd)

Somalia (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
South Africa	2,387	2,938	3,234	3,326	3,397
South Asia	173	213	219	236	263
South Sudan (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Spain	4,602	6,225	7,930	8,719	8,933
Sri Lanka	279	316	344	399	479
St. Kitts and Nevis (from 1977)	--	--	--	3,049	3,574
St. Lucia (from 1980)	--	--	--	2,316	2,308
St. Martin (French part) (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1,339	1,274	1,472	1,516	1,853
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels)	449	502	570	584	558
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only)	449	503	570	583	558
Sudan	281	261	257	304	276
Suriname (from 1975)	--	--	2,490	2,633	2,381
Swaziland (from 1970)	--	577	695	736	856
Sweden	12,764	15,292	17,544	18,806	20,209
Switzerland (from 1980)	--	--	--	28,554	28,940
Syrian Arab Republic	556	559	741	987	1,074
Tajikistan (from 1985)	--	--	--	--	457
Tanzania (from 1988)	--	--	--	--	--
Thailand	352	466	565	722	872
Timor-Leste (from 1999)	--	--	--	--	--
Togo	220	295	311	333	307
Tonga (from 1981)	--	--	--	--	1,383
Trinidad and Tobago	3,886	4,461	4,906	6,146	6,533
Tunisia (from 1961)	702	858	1,144	1,390	1,547
Turkey	1,664	2,035	2,348	2,684	2,726
Turkmenistan (from 1987)	--	--	--	--	--
Turks and Caicos Islands (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Tuvalu (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Uganda (from 1982)	--	--	--	--	185
Ukraine (from 1987)	--	--	--	--	--
United Arab Emirates (from 1975)	--	--	56,038	56,023	50,065
United Kingdom	10,600	12,018	13,518	14,786	15,683
United States	14,749	17,819	19,669	22,030	23,637
Upper middle income	721	862	1,057	1,247	1,351
Uruguay	4,140	4,170	4,365	5,134	4,844
Uzbekistan (from 1987)	--	--	--	--	--
Vanuatu (from 1979)	--	--	--	1,157	1,272
Venezuela, RB	5,722	6,104	6,164	6,311	5,135
Vietnam (from 1984)	--	--	--	--	200
Virgin Islands (U.S.) (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
West Bank and Gaza (1994-2005 only)	--	--	--	--	--
World	2,594	3,139	3,559	3,896	4,051
Yemen, Rep. (from 1990)	--	--	--	--	--
Zambia	546	581	567	507	441
Zimbabwe	399	433	568	492	527

Table 3 (cont'd)

Part Two of Table (1986 to 2010 averages)

GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) Country Name	1986-90avg	1991-95avg	96-2000avg	2001-05avg	2006-10avg
Afghanistan (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Albania (from 1980)	1,046	746	1,044	1,391	1,771
Algeria	1,880	1,699	1,743	1,963	2,172
American Samoa (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Andorra (from 1970)	15,393	14,709	16,508	19,868	21,678
Angola (from 1985)	832	616	638	756	1,275
Antigua and Barbuda (from 1977)	8,557	9,685	10,177	10,956	13,241
Arab World	2,097	2,281	2,449	2,635	3,032
Argentina	6,180	6,976	7,844	7,249	9,745
Armenia (from 1990)	795	481	557	885	1,365
Aruba (from 1987)	15,912	18,243	19,864	19,282	--
Australia	16,698	17,749	20,437	23,001	24,954
Austria	18,195	20,056	22,480	24,649	26,673
Azerbaijan (from 1990)	1,251	782	562	899	2,047
Bahamas, The	17,020	15,420	17,132	18,721	17,188
Bahrain (from 1980)	9,265	11,086	11,961	14,149	13,320
Bangladesh	273	297	340	403	509
Barbados	8,403	8,019	9,054	9,057	9,642
Belarus (from 1990)	1,410	1,150	1,128	1,568	2,422
Belgium	17,626	19,331	21,392	23,337	24,662
Belize	2,127	2,876	2,974	3,588	3,649
Benin	308	303	331	357	371
Bermuda	47,075	45,989	53,005	61,446	70,361
Bhutan (from 1981)	400	543	693	868	1,189
Bolivia	846	914	1,001	1,030	1,170
Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 1994)	--	437	1,292	1,684	2,128
Botswana	2,012	2,443	2,917	3,643	4,110
Brazil	3,509	3,424	3,650	3,808	4,395
Brunei Darussalam (from 1974)	19,979	19,213	18,574	18,602	17,994
Bulgaria (from 1980)	1,712	1,484	1,460	1,919	2,512
Burkina Faso	171	174	204	233	261
Burundi	153	145	113	111	113
Cambodia (from 1993)	--	221	260	360	521
Cameroon	849	611	616	676	705
Canada	19,290	19,346	21,783	24,551	25,784
Cape Verde (from 1981)	834	913	1,101	1,318	1,751
Cayman Islands (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Central African Republic	293	252	252	237	236
Chad	187	183	175	232	285
Channel Islands (from1998)	--	--	42,386	41,830	44,110
Chile	2,796	3,755	4,733	5,257	6,120
China	360	538	830	1,225	2,034
Colombia	2,205	2,451	2,566	2,633	3,108
Comoros (from 1980)	420	390	365	362	344
Congo, Dem. Rep.	238	144	101	86	98
Congo, Rep.	1,199	1,107	1,025	1,064	1,163

Table 3 (cont'd)

Costa Rica	3,008	3,422	3,848	4,239	5,082
Cote d'Ivoire	702	610	652	590	579
Croatia (from 1990)	5,261	3,872	4,572	5,530	6,501
Cuba (from 1970)	3,441	2,441	2,541	3,050	4,132
Curacao (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Cyprus (from 1975)	9,531	11,179	12,538	14,062	15,226
Czech Republic (from 1990)	5,351	4,816	5,337	6,085	7,355
Denmark	23,761	25,245	28,511	30,517	31,658
Djibouti (from 1990)	1,174	996	790	767	853
Dominica (from 1977)	3,621	4,147	4,632	4,948	5,933
Dominican Republic	1,913	2,034	2,550	2,905	3,708
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels)	3,004	3,465	3,794	4,185	4,938
East Asia & Pacific (developing only)	438	623	866	1,173	1,804
Ecuador	1,290	1,328	1,335	1,438	1,672
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1,093	1,193	1,379	1,539	1,838
El Salvador	1,525	1,787	2,107	2,330	2,571
Equatorial Guinea (from 1985)	570	586	1,676	5,269	8,167
Eritrea (from 1992)	--	166	202	170	140
Estonia (from 1980)	3,937	2,964	3,662	5,321	6,722
Ethiopia (from 1981)	131	111	123	135	192
Euro area	15,559	17,146	18,774	20,397	21,396
Europe & Central Asia (all income levels)	8,961	9,447	10,443	11,730	12,757
Europe & Central Asia (developing only)	2,161	1,747	1,665	2,067	2,708
European Union	13,567	14,744	16,486	18,351	19,551
Faeroe Islands (2000 only)	--	--	23,224	--	--
Fiji	1,709	1,874	2,030	2,216	2,280
Finland	18,907	18,242	21,519	25,088	27,699
France	17,726	19,102	20,651	22,339	23,153
French Polynesia (from 1965)	13,813	14,002	13,870	--	--
Gabon	4,471	4,563	4,521	4,026	4,102
Gambia, The (from 1966)	316	310	310	327	337
Georgia (from 1965)	1,990	703	639	858	1,201
Germany (from 1970)	18,332	20,664	21,962	23,309	25,011
Ghana	214	232	251	277	332
Gibraltar (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Greece	9,491	9,812	10,668	12,799	14,285
Greenland (from 1970)	16,888	15,472	17,342	19,157	21,255
Grenada (from 1977)	3,172	3,591	4,289	5,204	5,578
Guam (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Guatemala	1,410	1,523	1,662	1,740	1,859
Guinea (from 1986)	357	340	359	395	414
Guinea-Bissau (from 1970)	171	189	185	157	158
Guyana	646	755	964	995	1,127
Haiti (from 1991)	--	445	424	396	387
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)	304	273	282	300	343
High income	19,498	21,378	23,795	26,046	27,563
High income: non-OECD	10,191	12,501	14,103	15,674	17,883
High income: OECD	20,138	22,017	24,538	26,888	28,448
Honduras	1,054	1,089	1,129	1,212	1,396
Hong Kong SAR, China	18,559	22,962	24,305	27,274	33,999
Hungary (from 1965)	4,362	3,796	4,203	5,176	5,777

Table 3 (cont'd)

Iceland	26,421	25,510	28,939	33,116	36,469
India	294	340	422	519	725
Indonesia	526	712	799	848	1,049
Iran, Islamic Rep. (from 1965)	1,222	1,405	1,499	1,758	2,107
Iraq (from 1997)	--	--	969	748	728
Ireland (from 1970)	12,310	15,273	21,940	28,183	29,550
Isle of Man (from 1984)	11,155	12,844	17,493	23,493	28,537
Israel	14,768	16,429	18,659	19,285	21,658
Italy	15,697	17,098	18,522	19,726	19,613
Jamaica (from 1966)	2,886	3,515	3,524	3,636	3,774
Japan (from 1960)	30,554	34,923	36,335	37,600	39,562
Jordan (from 1975)	1,898	1,639	1,725	1,946	2,437
Kazakhstan (from 1990)	1,612	1,226	1,109	1,680	2,346
Kenya	438	421	414	411	456
Kiribati (from 1970)	680	649	750	807	783
Korea, Dem. Rep. (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Korea, Rep.	5,971	8,397	10,441	12,812	15,384
Kosovo (from 2000)	--	--	1,088	1,406	1,726
Kuwait (from 1995)	--	21,085	20,384	21,444	25,067
Kyrgyz Republic (from 1986)	431	311	261	306	365
Lao PDR (from 1984)	213	247	302	372	493
Latin America & Caribbean (all income levels)	3,585	3,722	4,010	4,141	4,828
Latin America & Caribbean (developing only)	3,505	3,633	3,907	4,019	4,686
Latvia (from 1965)	3,950	2,552	2,895	4,236	5,609
Least developed countries: UN classification	259	248	268	306	379
Lebanon (from 1988)	3,278	4,345	4,658	4,931	5,906
Lesotho	287	331	365	402	458
Liberia	456	99	137	161	151
Libya (from 1999)	--	--	6,423	6,476	7,737
Liechtenstein (from 1970)	46,221	52,527	68,325	72,695	81,855
Lithuania (from 1990)	4,291	2,975	3,028	4,159	5,525
Low & middle income	930	981	1,110	1,288	1,686
Low income	246	235	249	274	326
Lower middle income	480	512	573	656	839
Luxembourg	28,982	35,886	41,192	49,247	54,016
Macao SAR, China (from 1982)	12,108	14,774	14,470	17,812	28,252
Macedonia, FYR (from 1990)	2,059	1,705	1,669	1,777	2,144
Madagascar	288	254	246	239	251
Malawi	136	137	156	147	170
Malaysia	2,324	3,153	3,855	4,219	4,962
Maldives (from 1995)	--	1,690	2,074	2,660	3,753
Mali (from 1967)	184	190	205	242	262
Malta (from 1970)	5,841	7,477	9,187	9,908	10,834
Marshall Islands (from 1981)	2,176	2,313	2,128	2,307	2,410
Mauritania	421	405	410	415	468
Mauritius (from 1976)	2,319	2,889	3,511	4,100	4,823
Mayotte (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Mexico	4,746	5,059	5,401	5,799	6,168
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. (from 1986)	1,859	2,074	2,081	2,204	2,127
Middle East & North Africa (all income levels)	2,409	2,655	2,882	3,129	3,616
Middle East & North Africa (developing only)	1,300	1,369	1,499	1,645	1,895

Table 3 (cont'd)

Middle income	1,020	1,083	1,234	1,441	1,901
Moldova (from 1980)	972	554	363	438	564
Monaco (from 1970)	67,876	69,652	71,982	78,868	99,400
Mongolia (from 1981)	532	426	458	539	727
Montenegro (from 1997)	--	--	1,567	1,677	2,166
Morocco	1,128	1,175	1,254	1,443	1,733
Mozambique (from 1980)	169	184	219	281	358
Myanmar (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Namibia (from 1980)	1,911	1,950	2,029	2,211	2,606
Nepal	169	192	215	232	254
Netherlands	17,719	19,661	22,596	24,603	26,625
New Caledonia (from 1965)	11,560	13,523	12,913	--	--
New Zealand (from 1977)	11,472	11,526	12,828	14,506	15,071
Nicaragua	767	652	730	806	915
Niger	201	176	171	169	175
Nigeria	328	364	366	403	496
North America	26,452	27,981	31,822	35,100	36,742
Northern Mariana Islands (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Norway	27,147	30,098	35,812	39,074	40,944
Not classified	--	--	--	--	--
OECD members	17,893	19,442	21,532	23,463	24,771
Oman	6,737	7,248	8,250	9,512	10,744
Pakistan	430	479	503	544	646
Palau (from 1991)	--	6,349	6,616	6,134	6,402
Panama	3,037	3,372	3,758	4,079	5,446
Papua New Guinea	605	722	714	624	683
Paraguay	1,346	1,433	1,421	1,330	1,485
Peru	2,008	1,760	2,045	2,187	2,871
Philippines	950	957	1,030	1,114	1,303
Poland (from 1990)	3,101	3,090	4,052	4,835	6,126
Portugal	7,866	9,227	10,665	11,564	11,793
Puerto Rico	10,761	12,665	14,926	16,794	--
Qatar (from 2000)	--	--	30,053	31,883	33,876
Romania (from 1980)	2,076	1,621	1,685	2,015	2,625
Russian Federation (from 1989)	2,648	1,960	1,611	2,137	2,864
Rwanda	245	220	213	246	314
Samoa (from 1982)	1,230	1,165	1,310	1,609	1,804
San Marino (from 1970)	18,492	20,774	26,554	29,613	31,464
Sao Tome and Principe (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Saudi Arabia (from 1968)	8,804	9,287	9,275	9,169	9,409
Senegal	494	462	474	515	552
Serbia (from 1990)	1,444	852	808	944	1,172
Seychelles	4,970	6,081	7,081	7,106	8,161
Sierra Leone	261	220	171	214	257
Singapore	13,818	18,372	22,124	25,430	30,535
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Slovak Republic (from 1984)	5,379	4,331	5,143	6,098	8,110
Slovenia (from 1990)	8,362	7,641	9,232	11,093	13,029
Solomon Islands (from 1990)	1,101	1,274	1,275	943	1,098
Somalia (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
South Africa	3,190	2,956	3,003	3,194	3,697

Table 3 (cont'd)

South Asia	304	349	420	504	683
South Sudan (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Spain	10,440	11,722	13,327	15,208	15,942
Sri Lanka	539	640	797	918	1,175
St. Kitts and Nevis (from 1977)	5,387	6,771	8,533	8,628	9,760
St. Lucia (from 1980)	3,132	4,214	4,572	4,548	5,148
St. Martin (French part) (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	2,449	2,855	3,393	4,060	4,898
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels)	536	501	510	541	621
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only)	536	501	509	537	615
Sudan	271	291	338	397	497
Suriname (from 1975)	2,000	1,958	1,942	2,156	2,556
Swaziland (from 1970)	1,063	1,205	1,294	1,455	1,560
Sweden	22,827	22,829	25,718	29,583	32,324
Switzerland (from 1980)	31,760	32,298	33,386	35,075	37,565
Syrian Arab Republic	959	1,126	1,235	1,272	1,455
Tajikistan (from 1985)	449	240	128	182	255
Tanzania (from 1988)	297	289	296	346	424
Thailand	1,161	1,736	1,961	2,161	2,575
Timor-Leste (from 1999)	--	--	359	313	328
Togo	294	257	288	273	281
Tonga (from 1981)	1,526	1,667	1,832	2,055	2,040
Trinidad and Tobago	5,069	4,931	5,724	7,873	10,580
Tunisia (from 1961)	1,591	1,783	2,088	2,471	2,994
Turkey	3,235	3,577	4,087	4,333	5,217
Turkmenistan (from 1987)	1,074	765	530	1,035	1,773
Turks and Caicos Islands (all missing)	--	--	--	--	--
Tuvalu (from 1990)	1,144	1,260	1,412	1,663	1,730
Uganda (from 1982)	176	201	246	282	353
Ukraine (from 1987)	1,428	963	605	831	1,070
United Arab Emirates (from 1975)	33,712	33,903	33,815	34,033	25,905
United Kingdom	18,563	19,663	23,261	27,088	28,647
United States	27,237	28,933	32,918	36,246	37,936
Upper middle income	1,480	1,585	1,837	2,186	2,952
Uruguay	5,167	5,903	6,936	6,478	8,257
Uzbekistan (from 1987)	676	562	529	621	839
Vanuatu (from 1979)	1,282	1,338	1,418	1,331	1,500
Venezuela, RB	4,934	5,191	4,982	4,569	5,678
Vietnam (from 1984)	213	271	368	480	654
Virgin Islands (U.S.) (all data missing)	--	--	--	--	--
West Bank and Gaza (1994-2005 only)	--	1,237	1,369	1,039	--
World	4,423	4,655	5,049	5,456	5,942
Yemen, Rep. (from 1990)	461	458	516	548	566
Zambia	400	352	322	339	398
Zimbabwe	516	518	555	431	319

APPENDIX II: PROCESSED WORLD BANK DATA FOR 1960-1965

Table 4: Processed World Bank Data for 1960-1965

World Bank Data Country Name	1960-1965 average PCGDP	1960-1965 average Population	Cumulative pop	Percentile	
Bermuda	22,190	47,200	3,145,855,340	99%	
United States	14,749	187,722,333	3,145,808,140	99%	
Luxembourg	14,494	324,150	2,958,085,807	93%	
Greenland	14,337	35,733	2,957,761,657	93%	
Sweden	12,764	7,593,500	2,957,725,924	93%	
Denmark	12,743	4,666,667	2,950,132,423	93%	
Norway	11,761	3,652,333	2,945,465,757	93%	
Bahamas, The	11,649	124,474	2,941,813,424	93%	
Iceland	11,214	184,333	2,941,688,950	93%	
United Kingdom	10,600	53,406,333	2,941,504,617	93%	
Canada	10,195	18,793,502	2,888,098,284	91%	
Australia	9,788	10,834,413	2,869,304,782	91%	
Japan	9,545	96,132,762	2,858,470,370	90%	
Netherlands	9,216	11,886,605	2,762,337,608	87%	
French Polynesia	8,676	85,792	2,750,451,003	87%	
France	8,391	48,218,594	2,750,365,211	87%	
Belgium	8,345	9,266,833	2,702,146,617	85%	Core?
Austria	8,174	7,151,167	2,692,879,784	85%	
Finland	8,142	4,503,000	2,685,728,617	85%	
New Caledonia	7,554	86,132	2,681,225,617	85%	
Israel	6,778	2,334,837	2,681,139,485	85%	
Italy	6,676	51,109,117	2,678,804,648	85%	
Venezuela, RB	5,722	8,307,748	2,627,695,532	83%	
Argentina	5,367	21,463,333	2,619,387,784	83%	
Albania*	4,681	1,739,320	2,597,924,451	82%	
Andorra*	4,681	15,899	2,596,185,131	82%	
Armenia*	4,681	2,036,169	2,596,169,232	82%	
Azerbaijan*	4,681	4,233,705	2,594,133,063	82%	
Belarus*	4,681	8,398,767	2,589,899,358	82%	
Bosnia and Herzegovina*	4,681	3,290,705	2,581,500,591	82%	
Bulgaria*	4,681	8,041,001	2,578,209,886	81%	
Channel Islands*	4,681	112,091	2,570,168,885	81%	
Croatia*	4,681	4,215,311	2,570,056,794	81%	
Cyprus*	4,681	577,499	2,565,841,484	81%	
Czech Republic*	4,681	9,687,667	2,565,263,985	81%	
Estonia	4,681	1,252,728	2,555,576,318	81%	
Faeroe Islands	4,681	35,385	2,554,323,590	81%	
Germany	4,681	74,175,000	2,554,288,205	81%	
Gibraltar	4,681	22,343	2,480,113,205	78%	
Ireland	4,681	2,845,333	2,480,090,862	78%	
Isle of Man	4,681	49,170	2,477,245,529	78%	
Kazakhstan	4,681	10,987,503	2,477,196,359	78%	
Kosovo	4,681	1,009,500	2,466,208,856	78%	
Kyrgyz Republic	4,681	2,368,534	2,465,199,356	78%	
Liechtenstein	4,681	17,603	2,462,830,822	78%	
Lithuania	4,681	2,874,783	2,462,813,219	78%	

Table 4 (cont'd)

Macedonia, FYR	4,681	1,434,390	2,459,938,437	78%
Malta	4,681	321,666	2,458,504,047	78%
Moldova	4,681	2,688,833	2,458,182,381	78%
Monaco	4,681	22,485	2,455,493,548	78%
Montenegro	4,681	487,832	2,455,471,063	78%
Poland	4,681	30,533,000	2,454,983,231	78%
Romania	4,681	18,736,333	2,424,450,231	77%
Russian Federation	4,681	123,295,644	2,405,713,898	76%
San Marino	4,681	16,410	2,282,418,254	72%
Slovak Republic	4,681	4,260,710	2,282,401,844	72%
Slovenia	4,681	1,613,753	2,278,141,135	72%
Switzerland	4,681	5,618,166	2,276,527,382	72%
Tajikistan	4,681	2,293,143	2,270,909,216	72%
Turkmenistan	4,681	1,740,139	2,268,616,073	72%
Ukraine	4,681	44,087,291	2,266,875,935	72%
Uzbekistan	4,681	9,382,640	2,222,788,643	70%
Spain	4,602	31,239,859	2,213,406,004	70%
Puerto Rico	4,449	2,476,773	2,182,166,144	69%
Uruguay	4,140	2,617,628	2,179,689,371	69%
Greece	4,056	8,452,167	2,177,071,744	69%
Trinidad and Tobago	3,886	869,481	2,168,619,577	69%
Barbados	3,835	233,020	2,167,750,097	69%
Hong Kong SAR, China	3,829	3,345,384	2,167,517,077	69%
Portugal	2,726	9,038,917	2,164,171,693	68%
Mexico	2,665	41,634,501	2,155,132,776	68%
Singapore	2,500	1,770,333	2,113,498,275	67%
Seychelles	2,410	44,605	2,111,727,942	67%
South Africa	2,387	18,660,682	2,111,683,337	67%
Gabon	2,257	493,369	2,093,022,655	66%
St. Kitts and Nevis	2,239	49,843	2,092,529,285	66%
St. Lucia	2,239	89,907	2,092,479,443	66%
St. Martin (French part)	2,239	4,591	2,092,389,536	66%
Suriname	2,239	310,831	2,092,384,945	66%
Turks and Caicos Islands	2,239	5,727	2,092,074,114	66%
Virgin Islands (U.S.)	2,239	37,733	2,092,068,387	66%
Antigua and Barbuda*	2,239	57,066	2,092,030,654	66%
Aruba*	2,239	56,161	2,091,973,588	66%
Cayman Islands*	2,239	8,437	2,091,917,427	66%
Cuba*	2,239	7,531,018	2,091,908,990	66%
Dominica*	2,239	62,485	2,084,377,972	66%
Grenada	2,239	92,574	2,084,315,488	66%
Haiti	2,239	4,067,129	2,084,222,914	66%
Jamaica	2,239	1,693,528	2,080,155,785	66%
Panama	1,965	1,215,176	2,078,462,257	66%
Chile	1,924	8,152,886	2,077,247,081	66%
Costa Rica	1,818	1,457,124	2,069,094,195	65%
Hungary	1,809	10,073,834	2,067,637,072	65%
Peru	1,802	10,682,843	2,057,563,238	65%
Turkey	1,664	30,001,716	2,046,880,395	65%
El Salvador	1,581	3,003,725	2,016,878,679	64%
Latvia	1,557	2,197,422	2,013,874,954	64%

Table 4 (cont'd)

Brazil	1,540	78,511,227	2,011,677,531	64%
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	1,339	83,586	1,933,166,304	61%
Colombia	1,243	17,258,035	1,933,082,718	61%
Korea, Rep.	1,236	26,790,592	1,915,824,683	61%
American Samoa*	1,140	21,615	1,889,034,091	60%
Brunei Darussalam*	1,140	89,385	1,889,012,477	60%
Cambodia*	1,140	5,776,040	1,888,923,092	60%
Korea, Dem. Rep.	1,140	11,618,991	1,883,147,052	60%
Lao PDR	1,140	2,258,311	1,871,528,061	59%
Macao SAR, China	1,140	186,787	1,869,269,751	59%
Marshall Islands	1,140	15,891	1,869,082,964	59%
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	1,140	48,244	1,869,067,073	59%
Mongolia	1,140	1,030,691	1,869,018,829	59%
Myanmar	1,140	22,120,322	1,867,988,138	59%
New Zealand	1,140	2,503,167	1,845,867,816	58%
Northern Mariana Islands	1,140	10,620	1,843,364,650	58%
Palau	1,140	10,241	1,843,354,030	58%
Samoa	1,140	118,416	1,843,343,789	58%
Solomon Islands	1,140	127,338	1,843,225,373	58%
Timor-Leste	1,140	523,019	1,843,098,035	58%
Tonga	1,140	67,787	1,842,575,016	58%
Tuvalu	1,140	6,464	1,842,507,229	58%
Vanuatu	1,140	68,933	1,842,500,765	58%
Vietnam	1,140	36,507,485	1,842,431,832	58%
Algeria	1,123	11,335,873	1,805,924,347	57% Semi-periph?
Fiji	1,123	428,766	1,794,588,475	57%
Nicaragua	1,074	1,915,343	1,794,159,708	57%
Oman	1,065	592,746	1,792,244,365	57%
Guatemala	1,018	4,455,826	1,791,651,619	57%
Belize	983	99,414	1,787,195,793	56%
Iran, Islamic Rep.	965	23,497,229	1,787,096,380	56%
Dominican Republic	947	3,597,838	1,763,599,150	56%
Bolivia	945	3,550,121	1,760,001,312	56%
Malaysia	888	8,858,945	1,756,451,191	56%
Georgia	860	3,786,250	1,747,592,246	55%
Ecuador	836	4,784,233	1,743,805,996	55%
Bahrain*	812	174,442	1,739,021,763	55%
Iraq	812	7,904,279	1,738,847,321	55%
Jordan	812	977,822	1,730,943,042	55%
Kuwait	812	366,362	1,729,965,220	55%
Lebanon	812	2,057,103	1,729,598,858	55%
Libya	812	1,481,551	1,727,541,756	55%
Qatar	812	59,252	1,726,060,205	55%
Saudi Arabia	812	4,399,522	1,726,000,953	55%
United Arab Emirates	812	116,546	1,721,601,431	54%
Yemen, Rep.	812	5,371,696	1,721,484,885	54%
Honduras	767	2,173,120	1,716,113,189	54%
Philippines	726	28,283,575	1,713,940,069	54%
Tunisia	702	4,407,727	1,685,656,495	53%
Paraguay	690	2,038,336	1,681,248,768	53%
Guyana	667	599,861	1,679,210,432	53%

Table 4 (cont'd)

Morocco	660	12,457,013	1,678,610,572	53%
Liberia	647	1,186,756	1,666,153,559	53%
Congo, Rep.	639	1,083,685	1,664,966,803	53%
Cote d'Ivoire	615	4,017,221	1,663,883,118	53%
Senegal	603	3,268,504	1,659,865,897	52%
Syrian Arab Republic	556	4,961,881	1,656,597,393	52%
Zambia	546	3,284,161	1,651,635,512	52%
Cameroon	513	5,719,369	1,648,351,351	52%
Egypt, Arab Rep.	477	29,814,056	1,642,631,982	52%
Papua New Guinea	476	2,059,784	1,612,817,926	51%
Angola*	449	5,195,688	1,610,758,142	51%
Cape Verde*	449	224,935	1,605,562,454	51%
Comoros*	449	202,288	1,605,337,519	51%
Djibouti*	449	99,746	1,605,135,232	51%
Equatorial Guinea	449	260,054	1,605,035,486	51%
Eritrea	449	1,519,244	1,604,775,433	51%
Ethiopia	449	23,974,084	1,603,256,189	51%
Gambia, The	449	392,100	1,579,282,105	50%
Guam	449	71,478	1,578,890,005	50%
Guinea	449	3,677,090	1,578,818,527	50%
Guinea-Bissau	449	596,760	1,575,141,437	50%
Kiribati	449	42,741	1,574,544,677	50%
Mali	449	5,418,923	1,574,501,937	50%
Mauritius	449	708,116	1,569,083,014	50%
Mayotte	449	27,225	1,568,374,898	50%
Mozambique	449	8,050,598	1,568,347,673	50%
Namibia	449	641,501	1,560,297,075	49%
Sao Tome and Principe	449	64,434	1,559,655,574	49%
Somalia	449	2,990,651	1,559,591,140	49%
Swaziland	449	370,037	1,556,600,489	49%
Tanzania	449	10,859,703	1,556,230,452	49%
Uganda	449	7,380,919	1,545,370,749	49%
Madagascar	401	5,426,533	1,537,989,831	49%
Zimbabwe	399	4,079,602	1,532,563,298	48%
Mauritania	368	917,729	1,528,483,696	48%
Thailand	352	29,504,133	1,527,565,967	48%
Central African Republic	347	1,573,425	1,498,061,834	47%
Niger	343	3,501,047	1,496,488,409	47%
Congo, Dem. Rep.	321	16,422,869	1,492,987,363	47%
Nigeria	291	48,507,241	1,476,564,494	47%
Ghana	285	7,283,054	1,428,057,253	45%
Sudan	281	12,278,361	1,420,774,199	45%
Sri Lanka	279	10,607,420	1,408,495,839	45%
Bangladesh	268	53,824,631	1,397,888,419	44%
Benin	263	2,506,908	1,344,063,788	42%
Botswana	261	558,330	1,341,556,880	42%
Kenya	255	8,784,824	1,340,998,550	42%
Chad	248	3,118,820	1,332,213,726	42%
Sierra Leone	234	2,278,182	1,329,094,906	42%
Togo	220	1,626,431	1,326,816,724	42%
Pakistan	208	48,873,003	1,325,190,293	42%

Table 4 (cont'd)

Indonesia	201	97,909,725	1,276,317,290	40%
Rwanda	200	2,991,408	1,178,407,566	37%
Afghanistan*	173	10,170,266	1,175,416,158	37%
Bhutan*	173	241,804	1,165,245,892	37%
Maldives	173	96,455	1,165,004,088	37%
India	158	460,403,646	1,164,907,633	37%
Lesotho	154	891,391	704,503,987	22%
Nepal	141	10,209,662	703,612,596	22%
Burkina Faso	127	5,077,339	693,402,934	22%
Malawi	102	3,743,933	688,325,595	22%
Burundi	93	3,074,162	684,581,662	22%
China	87	681,507,500	681,507,500	22% Periphery/ext.
Serbia**		--		
South Sudan**		--		
West Bank and Gaza**		--		

* Data was missing; estimates were used from the regional categories below:

** Data not added when no population information was given (e.g. South Sudan was part of Sudan)

North America	14,337	206,563,035	3,155,800,244	100%
Europe & Central Asia (all income levels)	4,681	687,671,301	2,949,237,209	93%
Latin America & Caribbean (all income levels)	2,239	235,366,951	2,261,565,909	71%
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels)	1,140	1,082,451,811	2,026,198,958	64%
Middle East & North Africa (developing only)	812	104,365,974	943,747,146	30%
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels)	449	244,954,286	839,381,172	27%
South Asia	173	594,426,886	594,426,886	19%
World	2,594	3,164,165,616		
High income	9,119	768,393,799	3,164,165,616	100%
Upper middle income	721	1,216,970,883	2,395,771,817	76%
Lower middle income	269	925,897,624	1,178,800,935	37%
Low income	232	252,903,311	252,903,311	8%
		3,164,165,616		

APPENDIX III: PROCESSED WORLD BANK DATA FOR 1986-1990

Table 5: Processed World Bank Data for 1986-1990

World Bank Data Country Name	1986-1990 average PCGDP	1986-1990 average population	cumulative	percentile	
Monaco	67,876	29,978	5,077,877,628	100%	
Bermuda	47,075	58,700	5,077,847,650	100%	
Liechtenstein	46,221	28,246	5,077,788,950	100%	
United Arab Emirates	33,712	1,614,940	5,077,760,704	100%	
Switzerland	31,760	6,595,400	5,076,145,764	100%	
Japan	30,554	122,569,800	5,069,550,364	99%	
Luxembourg	28,982	374,790	4,946,980,564	97%	
United States	27,237	244,672,600	4,946,605,774	97%	
Norway	27,147	4,206,700	4,701,933,174	92%	
Iceland	26,421	249,280	4,697,726,474	92%	
Denmark	23,761	5,130,200	4,697,477,194	92%	
Sweden	22,827	8,451,400	4,692,346,994	92%	
Brunei Darussalam	19,979	238,506	4,683,895,594	92%	
Canada	19,290	26,963,800	4,683,657,088	92%	
Finland	18,907	4,950,000	4,656,693,288	91%	
United Kingdom	18,563	56,947,215	4,651,743,288	91%	
Hong Kong SAR, China	18,559	5,626,680	4,594,796,073	90%	
San Marino	18,492	23,579	4,589,169,393	90%	
Germany	18,332	78,379,400	4,589,145,814	90%	
Austria	18,195	7,615,056	4,510,766,414	89%	
France	17,726	57,574,858	4,503,151,358	88%	
Netherlands	17,719	14,759,600	4,445,576,500	87%	
Belgium	17,626	9,907,880	4,430,816,900	87%	
Bahamas, The	17,020	247,487	4,420,909,020	87%	
Greenland	16,888	54,660	4,420,661,533	87%	
Australia	16,698	16,538,800	4,420,606,873	87%	
Aruba	15,912	61,743	4,404,068,073	86%	
Italy	15,697	56,643,600	4,404,006,330	86%	
Andorra	15,393	50,481	4,347,362,730	85%	Core?
Israel	14,768	4,457,600	4,347,312,248	85%	
Singapore	13,818	2,866,400	4,342,854,648	85%	
French Polynesia	13,813	186,980	4,339,988,248	85%	
Ireland	12,310	3,526,800	4,339,801,268	85%	
Macao SAR, China	12,108	335,186	4,336,274,468	85%	
New Caledonia	11,560	160,532	4,335,939,281	85%	
New Zealand	11,472	3,355,600	4,335,778,749	85%	
Isle of Man	11,155	67,832	4,332,423,149	85%	
Puerto Rico	10,761	3,473,590	4,332,355,318	85%	
Spain	10,440	38,684,600	4,328,881,728	85%	
Cyprus	9,531	738,025	4,290,197,128	84%	
Greece	9,491	10,050,600	4,289,459,103	84%	
Bahrain	9,265	462,011	4,279,408,503	84%	
Bosnia and Herzegovina*	8,961	4,299,790	4,278,946,491	84%	
Channel Islands*	8,961	137,684	4,274,646,701	84%	
Faeroe Islands*	8,961	47,104	4,274,509,017	84%	
Gibraltar*	8,961	26,711	4,274,461,913	84%	

Table 5 (cont'd)

Kosovo*	8,961	1,790,000 4,274,435,202	84%
Montenegro*	8,961	593,524 4,272,645,202	84%
Saudi Arabia	8,804	15,023,317 4,272,051,678	84%
Antigua and Barbuda	8,557	63,022 4,257,028,361	84%
Barbados	8,403	257,569 4,256,965,338	84%
Slovenia	8,362	1,993,540 4,256,707,769	84%
Portugal	7,866	9,961,140 4,254,714,229	83%
Oman	6,737	1,734,049 4,244,753,089	83%
Argentina	6,180	31,727,906 4,243,019,041	83%
Korea, Rep.	5,971	41,996,600 4,211,291,135	83%
Malta	5,841	353,900 4,169,294,535	82%
St. Kitts and Nevis	5,387	42,313 4,168,940,635	82%
Slovak Republic	5,379	5,268,180 4,168,898,322	82%
Czech Republic	5,351	10,354,000 4,163,630,142	82%
Croatia	5,261	4,753,200 4,153,276,142	82%
Uruguay	5,167	3,068,860 4,148,522,942	81%
Trinidad and Tobago	5,069	1,200,762 4,145,454,082	81%
Seychelles	4,970	68,893 4,144,253,320	81%
Venezuela, RB	4,934	18,837,868 4,144,184,427	81%
Mexico	4,746	81,016,608 4,125,346,559	81%
Gabon	4,471	872,819 4,044,329,951	79%
Hungary	4,362	10,447,103 4,043,457,132	79%
Lithuania	4,291	3,647,600 4,033,010,029	79%
Latvia	3,950	2,662,140 4,029,362,429	79%
Estonia	3,937	1,558,200 4,026,700,289	79%
Dominica	3,621	71,859 4,025,142,089	79%
Cayman Islands*	3,585	23,534 4,025,070,230	79%
Haiti*	3,585	6,832,152 4,025,046,696	79%
St. Martin (French part)*	3,585	24,510 4,018,214,545	79%
Turks and Caicos Islands*	3,585	10,650 4,018,190,035	79%
Virgin Islands (U.S.)*	3,585	104,793 4,018,179,385	79%
Brazil	3,509	144,410,005 4,018,074,592	79%
Cuba	3,441	10,364,467 3,873,664,587	76%
Lebanon	3,278	2,901,868 3,863,300,121	76%
Turkey	3,235	52,270,452 3,860,398,253	76%
South Africa	3,190	33,694,684 3,808,127,801	75%
Grenada	3,172	98,064 3,774,433,117	74%
St. Lucia	3,132	130,380 3,774,335,053	74%
Poland	3,101	37,812,760 3,774,204,673	74%
Panama	3,037	2,319,911 3,736,391,913	73%
Costa Rica	3,008	2,917,252 3,734,072,002	73%
American Samoa*	3,004	43,995 3,731,154,750	73%
Cambodia*	3,004	8,888,626 3,731,110,755	73%
Guam*	3,004	128,190 3,722,222,129	73%
Korea, Dem. Rep.*	3,004	19,565,961 3,722,093,938	73%
Myanmar*	3,004	38,030,130 3,702,527,977	73%
Northern Mariana Islands*	3,004	38,574 3,664,497,848	72%
Palau*	3,004	14,511 3,664,459,274	72%
Timor-Leste*	3,004	708,593 3,664,444,763	72%
Jamaica	2,886	2,361,540 3,663,736,170	72%
Chile	2,796	12,741,383 3,661,374,630	72%

Table 5 (cont'd)

Russian Federation	2,648	146,734,400	3,648,633,248	72%
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	2,449	106,374	3,501,898,848	69%
Iraq*	2,409	17,161,447	3,501,792,473	69%
Kuwait*	2,409	1,994,508	3,484,631,026	68%
Libya*	2,409	4,158,506	3,482,636,519	68%
Qatar*	2,409	438,161	3,478,478,013	68%
West Bank and Gaza*	2,409	1,978,248	3,478,039,852	68%
Malaysia	2,324	17,207,076	3,476,061,603	68%
Mauritius	2,319	1,040,840	3,458,854,527	68%
Colombia	2,205	31,915,137	3,457,813,686	68%
Marshall Islands	2,176	43,896	3,425,898,549	67%
Belize	2,127	179,520	3,425,854,653	67%
Romania	2,076	23,035,200	3,425,675,133	67%
Macedonia, FYR	2,059	1,875,190	3,402,639,933	67%
Botswana	2,012	1,301,616	3,400,764,743	67%
Peru	2,008	20,796,302	3,399,463,127	67%
Suriname	2,000	393,771	3,378,666,825	66%
Georgia	1,990	4,768,800	3,378,273,053	66%
Dominican Republic	1,913	6,908,032	3,373,504,253	66%
Namibia	1,911	1,304,490	3,366,596,221	66%
Jordan	1,898	2,952,800	3,365,291,731	66%
Algeria	1,880	24,030,900	3,362,338,931	66%
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	1,859	92,090	3,338,308,031	66%
Bulgaria	1,712	8,900,800	3,338,215,941	66%
Fiji	1,709	723,144	3,329,315,141	65%
Kazakhstan	1,612	16,127,490	3,328,591,997	65%
Tunisia	1,591	7,829,619	3,312,464,507	65%
Tonga	1,526	94,659	3,304,634,888	65%
El Salvador	1,525	5,193,122	3,304,540,229	65%
Serbia	1,444	7,586,000	3,299,347,107	65%
Ukraine	1,428	51,515,200	3,291,761,107	65%
Guatemala	1,410	8,529,252	3,240,245,907	64%
Belarus	1,410	10,130,600	3,231,716,655	63%
Paraguay	1,346	4,024,231	3,221,586,055	63%
Ecuador	1,290	9,792,415	3,217,561,825	63%
Vanuatu	1,282	139,605	3,207,769,410	63%
Azerbaijan	1,251	6,984,000	3,207,629,805	63%
Samoa	1,230	159,303	3,200,645,805	63%
Iran, Islamic Rep.	1,222	51,685,814	3,200,486,502	63%
Congo, Rep.	1,199	2,263,642	3,148,800,688	62%
Djibouti	1,174	498,519	3,146,537,046	62%
Thailand	1,161	55,287,180	3,146,038,526	62%
Tuvalu	1,144	8,881	3,090,751,346	61%
Morocco	1,128	23,813,718	3,090,742,465	61%
Solomon Islands	1,101	292,980	3,066,928,747	60%
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1,093	54,402,067	3,066,635,766	60%
Turkmenistan	1,074	3,484,106	3,012,233,700	59%
Swaziland	1,063	800,197	3,008,749,594	59%
Honduras	1,054	4,620,012	3,007,949,397	59%
Albania	1,046	3,177,920	3,003,329,385	59%
Moldova	972	3,654,000	3,000,151,465	59%

Table 5 (cont'd)

Syrian Arab Republic	959	11,618,786	2,996,497,465	59%
Philippines	950	58,577,303	2,984,878,679	59%
Cameroon	849	11,500,290	2,926,301,375	57% Semi-periph?
Bolivia	846	6,368,425	2,914,801,085	57%
Cape Verde	834	339,682	2,908,432,660	57%
Angola	832	9,814,529	2,908,092,978	57%
Armenia	795	3,490,284	2,898,278,449	57%
Nicaragua	767	3,947,681	2,894,788,165	57%
Cote d'Ivoire	702	11,700,770	2,890,840,485	57%
Kiribati	680	69,286	2,879,139,715	56%
Uzbekistan	676	19,566,961	2,879,070,429	56%
Guyana	646	733,898	2,859,503,468	56%
Papua New Guinea	605	3,962,317	2,858,769,571	56%
Equatorial Guinea	570	351,370	2,854,807,254	56%
Sri Lanka	539	16,893,720	2,854,455,884	56%
Eritrea*	536	3,033,812	2,837,562,164	56%
Mayotte*	536	83,192	2,834,528,353	56%
Sao Tome and Principe*	536	111,069	2,834,445,161	56%
Somalia*	536	6,494,594	2,834,334,091	56%
Mongolia	532	2,091,686	2,827,839,497	55%
Indonesia	526	177,958,068	2,825,747,811	55%
Zimbabwe	516	9,840,636	2,647,789,743	52%
Senegal	494	6,824,721	2,637,949,107	52%
Yemen, Rep.	461	11,006,046	2,631,124,386	52%
Liberia	456	2,182,047	2,620,118,340	51%
Tajikistan	449	5,015,533	2,617,936,293	51%
Kenya	438	21,905,751	2,612,920,760	51%
Kyrgyz Republic	431	4,251,600	2,591,015,009	51%
Pakistan	430	105,304,286	2,586,763,409	51%
Mauritania	421	1,893,894	2,481,459,123	49%
Comoros	420	417,107	2,479,565,229	49%
Bhutan	400	536,626	2,479,148,122	49%
Zambia	400	7,430,412	2,478,611,496	49%
China	360	1,101,258,000	2,471,181,084	48%
Guinea	357	5,359,379	1,369,923,084	27%
Nigeria	328	92,767,653	1,364,563,705	27%
Gambia, The	316	886,489	1,271,796,052	25%
Benin	308	4,504,113	1,270,909,563	25%
Afghanistan*	304	18,263,135	1,266,405,450	25%
Maldives*	304	206,447	1,248,142,315	24%
Tanzania	297	23,965,650	1,247,935,868	24%
India	294	815,642,600	1,223,970,218	24%
Togo	294	3,471,005	408,327,618	8%
Central African Republic	293	2,810,202	404,856,613	8%
Madagascar	288	10,653,675	402,046,410	8%
Lesotho	287	1,579,595	391,392,736	8%
Bangladesh	273	100,050,953	389,813,140	8%
Sudan	271	25,312,188	289,762,188	6%
Sierra Leone	261	3,829,995	264,450,000	5%
Rwanda	245	6,844,472	260,620,005	5%
Congo, Dem. Rep.	238	34,076,119	253,775,533	5%

Table 5 (cont'd)

Ghana	214	14,019,524	219,699,414	4%
Lao PDR	213	3,966,604	205,679,889	4%
Vietnam	213	63,210,540	201,713,285	4%
Niger	201	7,348,927	138,502,745	3%
Chad	187	5,651,721	131,153,818	3%
Mali	184	8,392,502	125,502,096	2%
Uganda	176	16,497,874	117,109,595	2%
Guinea-Bissau	171	977,415	100,611,721	2%
Burkina Faso	171	8,845,928	99,634,306	2%
Nepal	169	18,197,285	90,788,378	2%
Mozambique	169	13,402,201	72,591,092	1%
Burundi	153	5,312,969	59,188,892	1%
Malawi	136	8,567,613	53,875,923	1%
Ethiopia	131	45,308,309	45,308,309	1% Periphery/ext.
South Sudan**		--		

* Data was missing; estimates were used from the regional categories
below:

** Data not added when no population information was given (e.g. South Sudan was part of Sudan)

North America	26,452	271,695,100	5,096,020,488	100%
Europe & Central Asia (all income levels)	8,961	832,915,281	4,824,325,388	95%
Latin America & Caribbean (all income levels)	3,585	425,905,749	3,991,410,107	78%
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels)	3,004	1,766,218,503	3,565,504,358	70%
Middle East & North Africa (all income levels)	2,409	238,534,227	1,799,285,856	35%
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels)	536	485,656,577	1,560,751,629	31%
South Asia	304	1,075,095,052	1,075,095,052	21%
World	4,423	5,096,020,488		
High income	19,498	964,724,984	5,096,020,488	100%
Upper middle income	1,480	1,974,032,427	4,131,295,504	81%
Lower middle income	480	1,677,587,196	2,157,263,076	42%
Low income	246	479,675,881	479,675,881	9%
		5,096,020,488		

APPENDIX IV: PROCESSED WORLD BANK DATA FOR 2005-2010

Table 6: Processed World Bank Data for 2005-2010

World Bank Data Country Name	2006-2010 avg. PCGDP	2006-2010 avg. population	cumulative	percentile	
Monaco	99,400	35,336	6,664,076,450	100%	
Liechtenstein	81,855	35,517	6,664,041,114	100%	
Bermuda	70,361	64,200	6,664,005,597	100%	
Luxembourg	54,016	488,979	6,663,941,397	100%	
Channel Islands	44,110	151,609	6,663,452,418	100%	
Norway	40,944	4,770,402	6,663,300,809	100%	
Japan	39,562	127,647,841	6,658,530,407	100%	
United States	37,936	304,121,163	6,530,882,566	98%	
Switzerland	37,565	7,650,360	6,226,761,402	93%	
Iceland	36,469	313,732	6,219,111,042	93%	
Hong Kong SAR, China	33,999	6,966,440	6,218,797,311	93%	
Qatar	33,876	1,381,829	6,211,830,871	93%	
Sweden	32,324	9,225,173	6,210,449,041	93%	
Denmark	31,658	5,491,913	6,201,223,868	93%	
San Marino	31,464	31,164	6,195,731,955	93%	
Singapore	30,535	4,778,740	6,195,700,792	93%	
Ireland	29,550	4,396,665	6,190,922,052	93%	
United Kingdom	28,647	61,399,227	6,186,525,386	93%	
Isle of Man	28,537	81,765	6,125,126,160	92%	
Macao SAR, China	28,252	518,458	6,125,044,394	92%	
Finland	27,699	5,314,176	6,124,525,936	92%	
Austria	26,673	8,334,032	6,119,211,760	92%	
Netherlands	26,625	16,463,198	6,110,877,728	91%	
United Arab Emirates	25,905	6,145,079	6,094,414,530	91%	
Canada	25,784	33,357,010	6,088,269,451	91%	
Kuwait	25,067	2,546,126	6,054,912,440	91%	
Germany	25,011	82,071,511	6,052,366,315	91%	
Australia	24,954	21,509,880	5,970,294,804	89%	
Belgium	24,662	10,711,857	5,948,784,924	89%	
France	23,153	64,174,219	5,938,073,067	89%	
Andorra	21,678	82,476	5,873,898,848	88%	
Israel	21,658	7,330,560	5,873,816,372	88%	
Greenland	21,255	56,503	5,866,485,812	88%	
Italy	19,613	59,765,037	5,866,429,309	88%	
Brunei Darussalam	17,994	384,656	5,806,664,272	87%	
Bahamas, The	17,188	333,565	5,806,279,615	87%	
Spain	15,942	45,308,254	5,805,946,051	87%	
Korea, Rep.	15,384	48,596,400	5,760,637,797	86%	
Cyprus	15,226	1,076,484	5,712,041,397	85%	
New Zealand	15,071	4,273,080	5,710,964,913	85%	
Greece	14,285	11,236,025	5,706,691,833	85%	Core?
Bahrain	13,320	1,044,183	5,695,455,808	85%	
Antigua and Barbuda	13,241	86,856	5,694,411,625	85%	
Slovenia	13,029	2,027,759	5,694,324,769	85%	
Faeroe Islands*	12,757	48,595	5,692,297,009	85%	
Gibraltar*	12,757	29,264	5,692,248,414	85%	
Portugal	11,793	10,618,083	5,692,219,150	85%	
Malta	10,834	410,732	5,681,601,067	85%	
Oman	10,744	2,636,669	5,681,190,335	85%	

Table 6 (cont'd)

Trinidad and Tobago	10,580	1,330,989	5,678,553,666	85%
St. Kitts and Nevis	9,760	51,104	5,677,222,677	85%
Argentina	9,745	39,716,212	5,677,171,573	85%
Barbados	9,642	272,188	5,637,455,361	84%
Saudi Arabia	9,409	26,145,488	5,637,183,172	84%
Uruguay	8,257	3,334,789	5,611,037,684	84%
Equatorial Guinea	8,167	662,711	5,607,702,895	84%
Seychelles	8,161	86,082	5,607,040,184	84%
Slovak Republic	8,110	5,409,480	5,606,954,101	84%
Libya	7,737	6,136,838	5,601,544,621	84%
Czech Republic	7,355	10,407,980	5,595,407,783	84%
Estonia	6,722	1,341,162	5,584,999,804	84%
Croatia	6,501	4,432,648	5,583,658,642	84%
Palau	6,402	20,235	5,579,225,994	83%
Mexico	6,168	110,627,917	5,579,205,759	83%
Poland	6,126	38,145,335	5,468,577,842	82%
Chile	6,120	16,793,390	5,430,432,506	81%
Dominica	5,933	68,194	5,413,639,116	81%
Lebanon	5,906	4,164,766	5,413,570,922	81%
Hungary	5,777	10,039,338	5,409,406,156	81%
Venezuela, RB	5,678	27,933,400	5,399,366,818	81%
Latvia	5,609	2,265,578	5,371,433,418	80%
Grenada	5,578	103,742	5,369,167,839	80%
Lithuania	5,525	3,357,585	5,369,064,097	80%
Panama	5,446	3,406,093	5,365,706,511	80%
Turkey	5,217	70,915,712	5,362,300,419	80%
St. Lucia	5,148	170,294	5,291,384,707	79%
Costa Rica	5,082	4,521,246	5,291,214,412	79%
Malaysia	4,962	27,497,970	5,286,693,167	79%
American Samoa*	4,938	66,225	5,259,195,197	79%
French Polynesia*	4,938	264,491	5,259,128,972	79%
Guam*	4,938	175,500	5,258,864,481	79%
Korea, Dem. Rep.*	4,938	24,120,362	5,258,688,981	79%
New Caledonia*	4,938	246,378	5,234,568,620	78%
Northern Mariana Islands*	4,938	63,090	5,234,322,242	78%
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	4,898	109,152	5,234,259,151	78%
Aruba*	4,828	105,312	5,234,150,000	78%
Cayman Islands*	4,828	55,136	5,234,044,687	78%
Curacao*	4,828	140,650	5,233,989,552	78%
Puerto Rico*	4,828	3,953,704	5,233,848,901	78%
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)*	4,828	39,036	5,229,895,197	78%
St. Martin (French part)*	4,828	29,350	5,229,856,161	78%
Turks and Caicos Islands*	4,828	35,716	5,229,826,811	78%
Virgin Islands (U.S.)*	4,828	109,805	5,229,791,096	78%
Mauritius	4,823	1,267,814	5,229,681,291	78%
Brazil	4,395	191,498,520	5,228,413,477	78%
Cuba	4,132	11,264,265	5,036,914,957	75%
Botswana	4,110	1,954,358	5,025,650,692	75%
Gabon	4,102	1,450,823	5,023,696,335	75%
Jamaica	3,774	2,684,800	5,022,245,512	75%
Maldives	3,753	307,643	5,019,560,712	75%
Dominican Republic	3,708	9,663,872	5,019,253,069	75%
South Africa	3,697	48,818,540	5,009,589,197	75%
Belize	3,649	322,577	4,960,770,657	74%

Table 6 (cont'd)

West Bank and Gaza*	3,616	3,933,203	4,960,448,080	74%
Colombia	3,108	45,000,707	4,956,514,876	74%
Tunisia	2,994	10,334,120	4,911,514,170	73%
Peru	2,871	28,467,495	4,901,180,050	73%
Russian Federation	2,864	142,030,000	4,872,712,554	73%
Romania	2,625	21,514,115	4,730,682,554	71%
Namibia	2,606	2,200,685	4,709,168,439	70%
Thailand	2,575	68,233,834	4,706,967,754	70%
El Salvador	2,571	6,131,680	4,638,733,920	69%
Suriname	2,556	514,922	4,632,602,240	69%
Bulgaria	2,512	7,622,127	4,632,087,318	69%
Jordan	2,437	5,789,600	4,624,465,191	69%
Belarus	2,422	9,606,800	4,618,675,591	69%
Marshall Islands	2,410	53,002	4,609,068,791	69%
Kazakhstan	2,346	15,741,465	4,609,015,788	69%
Fiji	2,280	843,982	4,593,274,323	69%
Algeria	2,172	34,428,993	4,592,430,341	69%
Montenegro	2,166	629,229	4,558,001,349	68%
Macedonia, FYR	2,144	2,052,174	4,557,372,119	68%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2,128	3,772,524	4,555,319,946	68%
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	2,127	110,398	4,551,547,422	68%
Iran, Islamic Rep.	2,107	72,283,531	4,551,437,024	68%
Azerbaijan	2,047	8,764,866	4,479,153,494	67%
Tonga	2,040	102,865	4,470,388,627	67%
China	2,034	1,324,647,902	4,470,285,762	67%
Guatemala	1,859	13,701,429	3,145,637,860	47%
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1,838	78,334,121	3,131,936,431	47%
Samoa	1,804	181,867	3,053,602,311	46%
Turkmenistan	1,773	4,920,151	3,053,420,444	46%
Albania	1,771	3,180,935	3,048,500,293	46%
Cape Verde	1,751	487,256	3,045,319,358	46%
Morocco	1,733	31,324,134	3,044,832,102	46%
Tuvalu	1,730	9,783	3,013,507,967	45%
Kosovo	1,726	1,795,400	3,013,498,185	45%
Ecuador	1,672	14,054,495	3,011,702,785	45%
Swaziland	1,560	1,151,071	2,997,648,290	45%
Vanuatu	1,500	228,124	2,996,497,219	45%
Paraguay	1,485	6,230,915	2,996,269,095	45%
Syrian Arab Republic	1,455	19,645,775	2,990,038,180	45%
Honduras	1,396	7,305,955	2,970,392,405	44%
Armenia	1,365	3,080,033	2,963,086,450	44%
Philippines	1,303	90,181,187	2,960,006,417	44%
Angola	1,275	18,042,145	2,869,825,231	43%
Georgia	1,201	4,406,740	2,851,783,086	43%
Bhutan	1,189	700,846	2,847,376,346	43%
Sri Lanka	1,175	20,467,446	2,846,675,500	43%
Serbia	1,172	7,351,350	2,826,208,054	42%
Bolivia	1,170	9,618,383	2,818,856,704	42%
Congo, Rep.	1,163	3,835,973	2,809,238,322	42%
Guyana	1,127	751,495	2,805,402,349	42%
Solomon Islands	1,098	510,397	2,804,650,854	42%
Ukraine	1,070	46,295,860	2,804,140,457	42%
Indonesia	1,049	234,923,376	2,757,844,597	41%
Nicaragua	915	5,638,230	2,522,921,221	38%

Table 6 (cont'd)

Djibouti	853	855,915	2,517,282,991	38%
Uzbekistan	839	27,318,952	2,516,427,076	38%
Kiribati	783	96,536	2,489,108,124	37%
Iraq	728	30,205,077	2,489,011,587	37%
Mongolia	727	2,668,757	2,458,806,511	37%
India	725	1,140,169,751	2,456,137,753	37%
Cameroon	705	18,766,222	1,315,968,003	20% Semi-periph?
Papua New Guinea	683	6,550,424	1,297,201,780	19%
Afghanistan*	683	32,543,010	1,290,651,357	19%
Myanmar*	683	47,267,161	1,258,108,347	19%
Vietnam	654	85,123,493	1,210,841,186	18%
Pakistan	646	167,497,786	1,125,717,693	17%
Mayotte*	621	191,986	958,219,907	14%
Sao Tome and Principe*	621	160,019	958,027,922	14%
Somalia*	621	8,930,794	957,867,903	14%
Cote d'Ivoire	579	19,009,513	948,937,109	14%
Yemen, Rep.	566	22,648,477	929,927,596	14%
Moldova	564	3,572,039	907,279,119	14%
Senegal	552	11,794,385	903,707,080	14%
Cambodia	521	13,824,909	891,912,695	13%
Bangladesh	509	145,502,176	878,087,786	13%
Sudan	497	41,437,552	732,585,610	11%
Nigeria	496	150,773,480	691,148,057	10%
Lao PDR	493	6,021,599	540,374,577	8%
Mauritania	468	3,295,058	534,352,978	8%
Lesotho	458	2,127,924	531,057,921	8%
Kenya	456	38,491,296	528,929,997	8%
Tanzania	424	42,325,085	490,438,700	7%
Guinea	414	9,575,495	448,113,615	7%
Zambia	398	12,367,051	438,538,120	7%
Haiti	387	9,736,282	426,171,069	6%
Benin	371	8,358,385	416,434,787	6%
Kyrgyz Republic	365	5,278,264	408,076,402	6%
Mozambique	358	22,336,910	402,798,138	6%
Uganda	353	31,368,426	380,461,228	6%
Comoros	344	697,344	349,092,802	5%
Gambia, The	337	1,636,970	348,395,458	5%
Ghana	332	23,272,672	346,758,488	5%
Timor-Leste	328	1,080,667	323,485,816	5%
Zimbabwe	319	12,501,578	322,405,149	5%
Rwanda	314	10,018,262	309,903,571	5%
Chad	285	10,654,797	299,885,310	4%
Togo	281	5,777,843	289,230,513	4%
Mali	262	14,470,639	283,452,670	4%
Burkina Faso	261	15,530,356	268,982,031	4%
Sierra Leone	257	5,604,922	253,451,675	4%
Tajikistan	255	6,696,501	247,846,753	4%
Nepal	254	28,900,994	241,150,252	4%
Madagascar	251	19,558,302	212,249,259	3%
Central African Republic	236	4,241,123	192,690,956	3%
Ethiopia	192	79,459,110	188,449,834	3%
Niger	175	14,468,003	108,990,724	2%
Malawi	170	14,026,595	94,522,720	1%
Guinea-Bissau	158	1,454,557	80,496,125	1%

Table 6 (cont'd)

Liberia	151	3,655,885	79,041,568	1%
Eritrea	140	4,948,719	75,385,683	1%
Burundi	113	7,935,846	70,436,964	1%
Congo, Dem. Rep.	98	62,501,118	62,501,118	1% Periphery/ext.
South Sudan**		--		

* Data was missing; estimates were used from the regional
categories below:
** Data not added when no population information was given (e.g. South Sudan was part of
Sudan)

North America	36,742	337,542,374	6,686,992,707	100%
Europe & Central Asia (all income levels)	12,757	883,304,396	6,349,450,333	95%
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels)	4,938	2,172,771,244	5,466,145,937	82%
Latin America & Caribbean (all income levels)	4,828	575,878,146	3,293,374,694	49%
Middle East & North Africa (all income levels)	3,616	367,725,216	2,717,496,548	41%
South Asia	683	1,536,089,651	2,349,771,332	35%
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels)	621	813,681,682	813,681,682	12%
World	5,942	6,686,992,707		
High income	27,563	1,111,767,455	6,686,992,707	100%
Upper middle income	2,952	2,418,757,871	5,575,225,251	83%
Lower middle income	839	2,392,069,363	3,156,467,381	47%
Low income	326	764,398,018	764,398,018	11%
		6,686,992,707		

APPENDIX V: PROCESSED CIA FACTBOOK DATA FOR 2011

Table 7: Processed CIA Factbook Data for 2011

PCGDP PPP in 2011 U.S. dollars: Ranked World Listings
(Source: CIA World Fact Book web site, April 2012)

	PCGDP	Population	Cumulative pop	Percentile
Liechtenstein	$141,100	36,713	7,015,992,197	100%
Qatar	$102,700	1,951,591	7,015,955,484	100%
Luxembourg	$84,700	509,074	7,014,003,893	100%
Bermuda	$69,900	69,080	7,013,494,819	100%
Singapore	$59,900	5,353,494	7,013,425,739	100%
Norway	$53,300	4,707,270	7,008,072,245	100%
Brunei	$49,400	408,786	7,003,364,975	100%
(Hong Kong)	$49,300	7,153,519	7,002,956,189	100%
United Arab Emirates	$48,500	5,314,317	6,995,802,670	100%
United States	$48,100	313,847,465	6,990,488,353	100%
Switzerland	$43,400	7,655,628	6,676,640,888	95%
Netherlands	$42,300	16,730,632	6,668,985,260	95%
Austria	$41,700	8,219,743	6,652,254,628	95%
Australia	$40,800	22,015,576	6,644,034,885	95%
Kuwait	$40,700	2,646,314	6,622,019,309	94%
Sweden	$40,600	9,103,788	6,619,372,995	94%
Canada	$40,300	34,300,083	6,610,269,207	94%
Denmark	$40,200	5,543,453	6,575,969,124	94%
Ireland	$39,500	4,722,028	6,570,425,671	94%
Finland	$38,300	5,262,930	6,565,703,643	94%
Iceland	$38,000	313,183	6,560,440,713	94%
Germany	$37,900	81,305,856	6,560,127,530	94%
Taiwan	$37,900	23,113,901	6,478,821,674	92%
Belgium	$37,600	10,438,353	6,455,707,773	92%
Andorra	$37,200	85,082	6,445,269,420	92%
San Marino	$36,200	32,140	6,445,184,338	92%
United Kingdom	$35,900	63,047,162	6,445,152,198	92%
France	$35,000	65,630,692	6,382,105,036	91%
Monaco*	$35,000	30,510	6,316,474,344	90%
Japan	$34,300	127,368,088	6,316,443,834	90%
(Macau)	$33,000	578,025	6,189,075,746	88%
South Korea	$31,700	48,860,500	6,188,497,721	88%
Israel	$31,000	7,590,758	6,139,637,221	88%
Bahamas	$30,900	316,182	6,132,046,463	87%
Spain	$30,600	47,042,984	6,131,730,281	87%
Italy	$30,100	61,261,254	6,084,687,297	87%
Vatican City*	$30,100	836	6,023,426,043	86%
Cyprus	$29,100	1,138,071	6,023,425,207	86%
Slovenia	$29,100	1,996,617	6,022,287,136	86%
New Zealand	$27,900	4,327,944	6,020,290,519	86%
Greece	$27,600	10,767,827	6,015,962,575	86%
Bahrain	$27,300	1,248,348	6,005,194,748	86% Core?

Table 7 (cont'd)

Oman	$26,200	3,090,150	6,003,946,400	86%
Czech Republic	$25,900	10,177,300	6,000,856,250	86%
Malta	$25,700	409,836	5,990,678,950	85%
Seychelles	$24,700	90,024	5,990,269,114	85%
Saudi Arabia	$24,000	26,534,504	5,990,179,090	85%
Barbados	$23,600	287,733	5,963,644,586	85%
Slovakia	$23,400	5,483,088	5,963,356,853	85%
Portugal	$23,200	10,781,459	5,957,873,765	85%
Antigua and Barbuda	$22,100	89,018	5,947,092,306	85%
Trinidad and Tobago	$20,300	1,226,383	5,947,003,288	85%
Estonia	$20,200	1,274,709	5,945,776,905	85%
Poland	$20,100	38,415,284	5,944,502,196	85%
Hungary	$19,600	9,958,453	5,906,086,912	84%
Equatorial Guinea	$19,300	685,991	5,896,128,459	84%
Lithuania	$18,700	3,525,761	5,895,442,468	84%
Croatia (EU/core status in 2013)	$18,300	4,480,043	5,891,916,707	84%
Argentina	$17,400	42,192,494	5,887,436,664	84%
Russia	$16,700	138,082,178	5,845,244,170	83%
St. Kitts and Nevis	$16,400	50,726	5,707,161,992	81%
Botswana	$16,300	2,098,018	5,707,111,266	81%
Chile	$16,100	17,067,369	5,705,013,248	81%
Gabon	$16,000	1,608,321	5,687,945,879	81%
Lebanon	$15,600	4,140,289	5,686,337,558	81%
Malaysia	$15,600	29,179,952	5,682,197,269	81%
Latvia	$15,400	2,191,580	5,653,017,317	81%
Uruguay	$15,400	3,316,328	5,650,825,737	81%
Mexico	$15,100	114,975,406	5,647,509,409	80%
Mauritius	$15,000	1,313,095	5,532,534,003	79%
Belarus	$14,900	9,542,883	5,531,220,908	79%
Turkey	$14,600	79,749,461	5,521,678,025	79%
Libya	$14,100	6,733,620	5,441,928,564	78%
Dominica	$13,600	73,126	5,435,194,944	77%
Panama	$13,600	3,510,045	5,435,121,818	77%
Bulgaria	$13,500	7,037,935	5,431,611,773	77%
Grenada	$13,300	109,011	5,424,573,838	77%
Kazakhstan	$13,000	17,522,010	5,424,464,827	77%
St. Lucia	$12,900	162,178	5,406,942,817	77%
Venezuela	$12,400	28,047,938	5,406,780,639	77%
Romania	$12,300	21,848,504	5,378,732,701	77%
Iran	$12,200	78,868,711	5,356,884,197	76%
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	$11,700	103,537	5,278,015,486	75%
Brazil	$11,600	205,716,890	5,277,911,949	75%
Costa Rica	$11,500	4,636,348	5,072,195,059	72%
Montenegro	$11,200	657,394	5,067,558,711	72%
South Africa	$11,000	48,810,427	5,066,901,317	72%
Serbia	$10,700	7,276,604	5,018,090,890	72%

Table 7 (cont'd)

Macedonia	$10,400	2,082,370	5,010,814,286	71%
Azerbaijan	$10,200	9,493,600	5,008,731,916	71%
Colombia	$10,100	45,239,079	4,999,238,316	71%
Peru	$10,000	29,549,517	4,953,999,237	71%
Cuba	$9,900	11,075,244	4,924,449,720	70%
Thailand	$9,700	67,091,089	4,913,374,476	70%
Tunisia	$9,500	10,732,900	4,846,283,387	69%
Suriname	$9,500	560,157	4,835,550,487	69%
Dominican Republic	$9,300	10,088,598	4,834,990,330	69%
Jamaica	$9,000	2,889,187	4,824,901,732	69%
Maldives	$8,400	394,451	4,822,012,545	69%
China	$8,400	1,343,239,923	4,821,618,094	69%
Belize	$8,300	327,719	3,478,378,171	50%
Ecuador	$8,300	15,223,680	3,478,050,452	50%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	$8,200	4,622,292	3,462,826,772	49%
Palau	$8,100	21,032	3,458,204,480	49%
Albania	$7,800	3,002,859	3,458,183,448	49%
El Salvador	$7,600	6,090,646	3,455,180,589	49%
Turkmenistan	$7,500	5,054,828	3,449,089,943	49%
Tonga	$7,500	106,146	3,444,035,115	49%
Guyana	$7,500	741,908	3,443,928,969	49%
Namibia	$7,300	2,165,828	3,443,187,061	49%
Ukraine	$7,200	44,854,065	3,441,021,233	49%
Algeria	$7,200	35,406,303	3,396,167,168	48%
Kosovo	$6,500	1,836,529	3,360,760,865	48%
Egypt	$6,500	83,688,164	3,358,924,336	48%
Kiribati	$6,200	101,998	3,275,236,172	47%
Bhutan	$6,000	716,896	3,275,134,174	47%
Samoa	$6,000	194,320	3,274,417,278	47%
Jordan	$5,900	6,508,887	3,274,222,958	47%
Angola	$5,900	18,056,072	3,267,714,071	47%
Sri Lanka	$5,600	21,481,334	3,249,657,999	46%
Paraguay	$5,500	6,541,591	3,228,176,665	46%
Armenia	$5,400	2,970,495	3,221,635,074	46%
Georgia	$5,400	4,570,934	3,218,664,579	46%
Swaziland	$5,200	1,386,914	3,214,093,645	46%
Syria	$5,100	22,530,746	3,212,706,731	46%
Morocco	$5,100	32,309,239	3,190,175,985	45%
Nauru	$5,000	9,378	3,157,866,746	45%
Guatemala	$5,000	14,099,032	3,157,857,368	45%
Vanuatu	$4,900	227,574	3,143,758,336	45%
Bolivia	$4,800	10,290,003	3,143,530,762	45%
Indonesia	$4,700	248,216,193	3,133,240,759	45%
Fiji	$4,600	890,057	2,885,024,566	41%
Congo - Brazzaville	$4,600	4,366,266	2,884,134,509	41%
Mongolia	$4,500	3,179,997	2,879,768,243	41%
Honduras	$4,300	8,296,693	2,876,588,246	41%

Table 7 (cont'd)

Philippines	$4,100	103,775,002	2,868,291,553	41%
Cape Verde	$4,000	523,568	2,764,516,551	39%
Iraq	$3,900	31,129,225	2,763,992,983	39%
India	$3,700	1,205,073,612	2,732,863,758	39%
Moldova	$3,400	3,656,843	1,527,790,146	22%
Tuvalu	$3,400	10,619	1,524,133,303	22%
Uzbekistan	$3,300	28,394,180	1,524,122,684	22%
Vietnam	$3,300	91,519,289	1,495,728,504	21% Semi-periph?
Solomon Islands	$3,300	584,578	1,404,209,215	20%
Nicaragua	$3,200	5,727,707	1,403,624,637	20%
East Timor	$3,100	1,201,255	1,397,896,930	20%
Ghana	$3,100	25,241,998	1,396,695,675	20%
Sudan	$3,000	34,206,710	1,371,453,677	20%
(West Bank and Gaza Strip)	$2,900	4,332,801	1,337,246,967	19%
Pakistan	$2,800	190,291,129	1,332,914,166	19%
Laos	$2,700	6,586,266	1,142,623,037	16%
Nigeria	$2,600	170,123,740	1,136,036,771	16%
Djibouti	$2,600	774,389	965,913,031	14%
Yemen	$2,500	24,771,809	965,138,642	14%
(Western Sahara)	$2,500	522,928	940,366,833	13%
Papua New Guinea	$2,500	6,310,129	939,843,905	13%
Marshall Islands	$2,500	68,480	933,533,776	13%
Kyrgyzstan	$2,400	5,496,737	933,465,296	13%
Cambodia	$2,300	14,952,665	927,968,559	13%
Cameroon	$2,300	20,129,878	913,015,894	13%
Micronesia	$2,200	106,487	892,886,016	13%
Mauritania	$2,200	3,359,185	892,779,529	13%
The Gambia	$2,100	1,840,454	889,420,344	13%
Tajikistan	$2,000	7,768,385	887,579,890	13%
Sao Tome and Principe	$2,000	183,176	879,811,505	13%
Senegal	$1,900	12,969,606	879,628,329	13%
Chad	$1,900	10,975,648	866,658,723	12%
North Korea	$1,800	24,589,122	855,683,075	12%
Bangladesh	$1,700	161,083,804	831,093,953	12%
Kenya	$1,700	43,013,341	670,010,149	10%
Cote D'Ivoire	$1,600	21,952,093	626,996,808	9%
Zambia	$1,600	14,309,466	605,044,715	9%
Benin	$1,500	9,598,787	590,735,249	8%
Burkina Faso	$1,500	17,275,115	581,136,462	8%
Tanzania	$1,500	43,601,796	563,861,347	8%
Lesotho	$1,400	1,930,493	520,259,551	7%
Nepal	$1,300	29,890,686	518,329,058	7%
Myanmar	$1,300	54,584,650	488,438,372	7%
Mali	$1,300	14,533,511	433,853,722	6%
Uganda	$1,300	35,873,253	419,320,211	6%
Rwanda	$1,300	11,689,696	383,446,958	5%
Haiti	$1,200	9,801,664	371,757,262	5%

Table 7 (cont'd)

Comoros	$1,200	737,284	361,955,598	5%
Guinea	$1,100	10,884,958	361,218,314	5%
Guinea-Bissau	$1,100	1,628,603	350,333,356	5%
Ethiopia	$1,100	93,815,992	348,704,753	5%
Mozambique	$1,100	23,515,934	254,888,761	4%
Afghanistan	$1,000	30,419,928	231,372,827	3%
Togo	$900	6,961,049	200,952,899	3%
Malawi	$900	16,323,044	193,991,850	3%
Madagascar	$900	22,585,517	177,668,806	3%
Sierra Leone	$800	5,485,998	155,083,289	2%
Niger	$800	17,078,839	149,597,291	2%
South Sudan*	$800	10,625,176	132,518,452	2%
Central African Republic	$800	5,057,208	121,893,276	2%
Eritrea	$700	6,086,495	116,836,068	2%
Somalia	$600	10,085,638	110,749,573	2%
Zimbabwe	$500	12,619,600	100,663,935	1%
Liberia	$400	3,887,886	88,044,335	1%
Burundi	$400	10,557,259	84,156,449	1%
Congo - Kinshasa	$300	73,599,190	73,599,190	1% Periphery
WORLD TOTAL:	$11,324	7,015,992,197		

* Economic data was not provided for Monaco or Vatican City, so the figures for surrounding France and Italy were substituted.

South Sudan economic data was not available, so info for the adjacent Central African Republic was substituted. Various small territories and dependencies were not included. The effect of their exclusion is considered trivial here.

APPENDIX VI: CIA FACTBOOK DATA WITH CHINA SUBDIVISIONS

Table 8: CIA Factbook Data with China Subdivisions

PCGDP PPP in 2011 U.S. dollars: Ranked world listings, including a breakdown of Chinese subdivisions
(Source: CIA World Fact Book web site, April 2012, except for Chinese subdivisions - see bottom)

	PCGDP	Population	product GDP x pop	Cum. Pop.	Percentile
Liechtenstein	$141,100	36,713	$5,180,204,300	7,008,260,653	100%
Qatar	$102,700	1,951,591	$200,428,395,700	7,008,223,940	100%
Luxembourg	$84,700	509,074	$43,118,567,800	7,006,272,349	100%
Macau	$72,110	610,656	$44,034,413,175	7,005,763,275	100%
Bermuda	$69,900	69,080	$4,828,692,000	7,005,152,619	100%
Singapore	$59,900	5,353,494	$320,674,290,600	7,005,083,539	100%
Norway	$53,300	4,707,270	$250,897,491,000	6,999,730,045	100%
Brunei	$49,400	408,786	$20,194,028,400	6,995,022,775	100%
United Arab Emirates	$48,500	5,314,317	$257,744,374,500	6,994,613,989	100%
United States	$48,100	313,847,465	$15,096,063,066,500	6,989,299,672	100%
Hong Kong	$45,580	7,226,097	$329,365,523,111	6,675,452,207	95%
Switzerland	$43,400	7,655,628	$332,254,255,200	6,668,226,109	95%
Netherlands	$42,300	16,730,632	$707,705,733,600	6,660,570,481	95%
Austria	$41,700	8,219,743	$342,763,283,100	6,643,839,849	95%
Australia	$40,800	22,015,576	$898,235,500,800	6,635,620,106	95%
Kuwait	$40,700	2,646,314	$107,704,979,800	6,613,604,530	94%
Sweden	$40,600	9,103,788	$369,613,792,800	6,610,958,216	94%
Canada	$40,300	34,300,083	$1,382,293,344,900	6,601,854,428	94%
Denmark	$40,200	5,543,453	$222,846,810,600	6,567,554,345	94%
Ireland	$39,500	4,722,028	$186,520,106,000	6,562,010,892	94%
Finland	$38,300	5,262,930	$201,570,219,000	6,557,288,864	94%
Iceland	$38,000	313,183	$11,900,954,000	6,552,025,934	93%
Germany	$37,900	81,305,856	$3,081,491,942,400	6,551,712,751	93%
Taiwan	$37,900	23,113,901	$876,016,847,900	6,470,406,895	92%
Belgium	$37,600	10,438,353	$392,482,072,800	6,447,292,994	92%
Andorra	$37,200	85,082	$3,165,050,400	6,436,854,641	92%
San Marino	$36,200	32,140	$1,163,468,000	6,436,769,559	92%
United Kingdom	$35,900	63,047,162	$2,263,393,115,800	6,436,737,419	92%
France	$35,000	65,630,692	$2,297,074,220,000	6,373,690,257	91%
Monaco*	$35,000	30,510	$1,067,850,000	6,308,059,565	90%
Japan	$34,300	127,368,088	$4,368,725,418,400	6,308,029,055	90%
South Korea	$31,700	48,860,500	$1,548,877,850,000	6,180,660,967	88%
Israel	$31,000	7,590,758	$235,313,498,000	6,131,800,467	87%
Bahamas	$30,900	316,182	$9,770,023,800	6,124,209,709	87%
Spain	$30,600	47,042,984	$1,439,515,310,400	6,123,893,527	87%
Italy	$30,100	61,261,254	$1,843,963,745,400	6,076,850,543	87%
Vatican City*	$30,100	836	$25,163,600	6,015,589,289	86%
Cyprus	$29,100	1,138,071	$33,117,866,100	6,015,588,453	86%
Slovenia	$29,100	1,996,617	$58,101,554,700	6,014,450,382	86%
New Zealand	$27,900	4,327,944	$120,749,637,600	6,012,453,765	86%
Greece	$27,600	10,767,827	$297,192,025,200	6,008,125,821	86%
Bahrain	$27,300	1,248,348	$34,079,900,400	5,997,357,994	86%
Oman	$26,200	3,090,150	$80,961,930,000	5,996,109,646	86%
Czech Republic	$25,900	10,177,300	$263,592,070,000	5,993,019,496	86%
Malta	$25,700	409,836	$10,532,785,200	5,982,842,196	85%
Seychelles	$24,700	90,024	$2,223,592,800	5,982,432,360	85%
Saudi Arabia	$24,000	26,534,504	$636,828,096,000	5,982,342,336	85%
Barbados	$23,600	287,733	$6,790,498,800	5,955,807,832	85%

83

Table 8 (cont'd)

Slovakia	$23,400	5,483,088	$128,304,259,200	5,955,520,099	85%
Portugal	$23,200	10,781,459	$250,129,848,800	5,950,037,011	85%
Shanghai	$22,983	19,744,548	$453,788,947,656	5,939,255,552	85%
Antigua and Barbuda	$22,100	89,018	$1,967,297,800	5,919,511,004	84%
Beijing	$20,841	17,505,476	$364,831,616,644	5,919,421,986	84%
Trinidad and Tobago	$20,300	1,226,383	$24,895,574,900	5,901,916,511	84%
Estonia	$20,200	1,274,709	$25,749,121,800	5,900,690,128	84%
Poland	$20,100	38,415,284	$772,147,208,400	5,899,415,419	84%
Hungary	$19,600	9,958,453	$195,185,678,800	5,861,000,135	84%
Equatorial Guinea	$19,300	685,991	$13,239,626,300	5,851,041,682	83%
Tianjin	$19,284	12,518,451	$241,405,800,655	5,850,355,691	83%
Lithuania	$18,700	3,525,761	$65,931,730,700	5,837,837,240	83%
Croatia (EU/core status 2013)	$18,300	4,480,043	$81,984,786,900	5,834,311,479	83%
Argentina	$17,400	42,192,494	$734,149,395,600	5,829,831,436	83%
Russia	$16,700	138,082,178	$2,305,972,372,600	5,787,638,942	83%
St. Kitts and Nevis	$16,400	50,726	$831,906,400	5,649,556,764	81%
Botswana	$16,300	2,098,018	$34,197,693,400	5,649,506,038	81%
Chile	$16,100	17,067,369	$274,784,640,900	5,647,408,020	81%
Gabon	$16,000	1,608,321	$25,733,136,000	5,630,340,651	80%
Lebanon	$15,600	4,140,289	$64,588,508,400	5,628,732,330	80%
Malaysia	$15,600	29,179,952	$455,207,251,200	5,624,592,041	80%
Latvia	$15,400	2,191,580	$33,750,332,000	5,595,412,089	80%
Uruguay	$15,400	3,316,328	$51,071,451,200	5,593,220,509	80%
Mexico	$15,100	114,975,406	$1,736,128,630,600	5,589,904,181	80%
Mauritius	$15,000	1,313,095	$19,696,425,000	5,474,928,775	78%
Belarus	$14,900	9,542,883	$142,188,956,700	5,473,615,680	78%
Turkey	$14,600	79,749,461	$1,164,342,130,600	5,464,072,797	78%
Libya	$14,100	6,733,620	$94,944,042,000	5,384,323,336	77%
Jiangsu	$13,714	78,876,416	$1,081,711,171,058	5,377,589,716	77%
Dominica	$13,600	73,126	$994,513,600	5,298,713,300	76%
Panama	$13,600	3,510,045	$47,736,612,000	5,298,640,174	76%
Bulgaria	$13,500	7,037,935	$95,012,122,500	5,295,130,129	76%
Grenada	$13,300	109,011	$1,449,846,300	5,288,092,194	75%
Nei Monggol (inland territory)	$13,108	24,833,349	$325,515,539,794	5,287,983,183	75%
Kazakhstan	$13,000	17,522,010	$227,786,130,000	5,263,149,834	75%
St. Lucia	$12,900	162,178	$2,092,096,200	5,245,627,824	75%
Zhejiang	$12,876	53,432,411	$687,995,723,253	5,245,465,646	75%
Venezuela	$12,400	28,047,938	$347,794,431,200	5,192,033,235	74%
Romania	$12,300	21,848,504	$268,736,599,200	5,163,985,297	74%
Iran	$12,200	78,868,711	$962,198,274,200	5,142,136,793	73%
Guangdong	$12,074	100,045,828	$1,207,953,333,095	5,063,268,082	72%
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	$11,700	103,537	$1,211,382,900	4,963,222,254	71%
Brazil	$11,600	205,716,890	$2,386,315,924,000	4,963,118,717	71%
Costa Rica	$11,500	4,636,348	$53,318,002,000	4,757,401,827	68%
Montenegro	$11,200	657,394	$7,362,812,800	4,752,765,479	68%
South Africa	$11,000	48,810,427	$536,914,697,000	4,752,108,085	68%
Shandong	$10,914	95,364,132	$1,040,804,131,451	4,703,297,658	67%
Liaoning	$10,772	43,865,465	$472,518,788,770	4,607,933,526	66%
Serbia	$10,700	7,276,604	$77,859,662,800	4,564,068,061	65%
Macedonia	$10,400	2,082,370	$21,656,648,000	4,556,791,457	65%
Azerbaijan	$10,200	9,493,600	$96,834,720,000	4,554,709,087	65%

Table 8 (cont'd)

Colombia	$10,100	45,239,079	$456,914,697,900	4,545,215,487	65%
Peru	$10,000	29,549,517	$295,495,170,000	4,499,976,408	64%
Fujian	$9,969	37,453,576	$373,374,695,833	4,470,426,891	64%
Cuba	$9,900	11,075,244	$109,644,915,600	4,432,973,315	63%
Thailand	$9,700	67,091,089	$650,783,563,300	4,421,898,071	63%
Tunisia	$9,500	10,732,900	$101,962,550,000	4,354,806,982	62%
Suriname	$9,500	560,157	$5,321,491,500	4,344,074,082	62%
Dominican Republic	$9,300	10,088,598	$93,823,961,400	4,343,513,925	62%
Jamaica	$9,000	2,889,187	$26,002,683,000	4,333,425,327	62%
Maldives	$8,400	394,451	$3,313,388,400	4,330,536,140	62%
Jilin	$8,346	27,581,302	$230,193,543,543	4,330,141,689	62%
Belize	$8,300	327,719	$2,720,067,700	4,302,560,388	61%
Ecuador	$8,300	15,223,680	$126,356,544,000	4,302,232,669	61%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	$8,200	4,622,292	$37,902,794,400	4,287,008,989	61%
Palau	$8,100	21,032	$170,359,200	4,282,386,697	61%
Albania	$7,800	3,002,859	$23,422,300,200	4,282,365,665	61%
El Salvador	$7,600	6,090,646	$46,288,909,600	4,279,362,806	61%
Turkmenistan	$7,500	5,054,828	$37,911,210,000	4,273,272,160	61%
Tonga	$7,500	106,146	$796,095,000	4,268,217,332	61%
Guyana	$7,500	741,908	$5,564,310,000	4,268,111,186	61%
Namibia	$7,300	2,165,828	$15,810,544,400	4,267,369,278	61%
Hebei	$7,276	71,752,095	$522,068,240,962	4,265,203,450	61%
Ningxia Huizu	$7,205	6,411,889	$46,197,662,498	4,193,451,355	60%
Ukraine	$7,200	44,854,065	$322,949,268,000	4,187,039,466	60%
Algeria	$7,200	35,406,303	$254,925,381,600	4,142,185,401	59%
Shaanxi	$7,187	37,351,800	$268,447,384,063	4,106,779,098	59%
Chongqing	$7,171	29,616,822	$212,382,231,017	4,069,427,298	58%
Hubei	$7,009	58,215,884	$408,035,130,385	4,039,810,476	58%
Heilongjiang	$6,777	37,962,456	$257,271,562,767	3,981,594,592	57%
Shanxi	$6,581	35,418,055	$233,086,221,607	3,943,632,136	56%
Kosovo	$6,500	1,836,529	$11,937,438,500	3,908,214,081	56%
Egypt	$6,500	83,688,164	$543,973,066,000	3,906,377,552	56%
Hunan	$6,474	64,933,101	$420,376,897,775	3,822,689,388	55%
Henan	$6,402	94,549,923	$605,308,609,332	3,757,756,287	54%
Kiribati	$6,200	101,998	$632,387,600	3,663,206,363	52%
Hainan	$6,117	8,956,290	$54,785,624,912	3,663,104,365	52%
Qinghai	$6,117	5,699,457	$34,863,579,490	3,654,148,076	52%
Xinjiang Uygur	$6,046	21,881,844	$132,297,631,725	3,648,448,618	52%
Bhutan	$6,000	716,896	$4,301,376,000	3,626,566,774	52%
Samoa	$6,000	194,320	$1,165,920,000	3,625,849,878	52%
Jordan	$5,900	6,508,887	$38,402,433,300	3,625,655,558	52%
Angola	$5,900	18,056,072	$106,530,824,800	3,619,146,671	52%
Jianxi	$5,671	43,763,689	$248,183,880,090	3,601,090,599	51%
Sri Lanka	$5,600	21,481,334	$120,295,470,400	3,557,326,910	51%
Paraguay	$5,500	6,541,591	$35,978,750,500	3,535,845,576	50%
Armenia	$5,400	2,970,495	$16,040,673,000	3,529,303,985	50%
Georgia	$5,400	4,570,934	$24,683,043,600	3,526,333,490	50%
Sichuan	$5,350	82,642,129	$442,135,389,718	3,521,762,556	50%
Anhui	$5,261	60,454,956	$318,053,525,499	3,439,120,427	49%
Swaziland	$5,200	1,386,914	$7,211,952,800	3,378,665,471	48%
Syria	$5,100	22,530,746	$114,906,804,600	3,377,278,557	48%
Morocco	$5,100	32,309,239	$164,777,118,900	3,354,747,811	48%
Guanxi Zhuangzu	$5,011	48,954,266	$245,309,827,038	3,322,438,572	47%
Nauru	$5,000	9,378	$46,890,000	3,273,484,306	47%

Table 8 (cont'd)

Guatemala	$5,000	14,099,032	$70,495,160,000	3,273,474,928	47%
Vanuatu	$4,900	227,574	$1,115,112,600	3,259,375,896	47%
Bolivia	$4,800	10,290,003	$49,392,014,400	3,259,148,322	47%
Indonesia	$4,700	248,216,193	$1,166,616,107,100	3,248,858,319	46%
Fiji	$4,600	890,057	$4,094,262,200	3,000,642,126	43%
Congo - Brazzaville	$4,600	4,366,266	$20,084,823,600	2,999,752,069	43%
Tibet (Zizang)	$4,583	3,053,281	$13,993,185,105	2,995,385,803	43%
Mongolia	$4,500	3,179,997	$14,309,986,500	2,992,332,522	43%
Honduras	$4,300	8,296,693	$35,675,779,900	2,989,152,525	43%
Yunnan	$4,280	46,613,418	$199,505,427,085	2,980,855,832	43%
Philippines	$4,100	103,775,002	$425,477,508,200	2,934,242,415	42%
Gansu	$4,031	26,868,870	$108,308,412,958	2,830,467,413	40%
Cape Verde	$4,000	523,568	$2,094,272,000	2,803,598,543	40%
Iraq	$3,900	31,129,225	$121,403,977,500	2,803,074,975	40%
India	$3,700	1,205,073,612	$4,458,772,364,400	2,771,945,750	40%
Moldova	$3,400	3,656,843	$12,433,266,200	1,566,872,138	22%
Tuvalu	$3,400	10,619	$36,104,600	1,563,215,295	22%
Guizhou	$3,335	39,081,992	$130,338,443,324	1,563,204,676	22%
Uzbekistan	$3,300	28,394,180	$93,700,794,000	1,524,122,684	22%
Vietnam	$3,300	91,519,289	$302,013,653,700	1,495,728,504	21%
Solomon Islands	$3,300	584,578	$1,929,107,400	1,404,209,215	20%
Nicaragua	$3,200	5,727,707	$18,328,662,400	1,403,624,637	20%
East Timor	$3,100	1,201,255	$3,723,890,500	1,397,896,930	20%
Ghana	$3,100	25,241,998	$78,250,193,800	1,396,695,675	20%
Sudan	$3,000	34,206,710	$102,620,130,000	1,371,453,677	20%
(West Bank and Gaza Strip)	$2,900	4,332,801	$12,565,122,900	1,337,246,967	19%
Pakistan	$2,800	190,291,129	$532,815,161,200	1,332,914,166	19%
Laos	$2,700	6,586,266	$17,782,918,200	1,142,623,037	16%
Nigeria	$2,600	170,123,740	$442,321,724,000	1,136,036,771	16%
Djibouti	$2,600	774,389	$2,013,411,400	965,913,031	14%
Yemen	$2,500	24,771,809	$61,929,522,500	965,138,642	14%
(Western Sahara)	$2,500	522,928	$1,307,320,000	940,366,833	13%
Papua New Guinea	$2,500	6,310,129	$15,775,322,500	939,843,905	13%
Marshall Islands	$2,500	68,480	$171,200,000	933,533,776	13%
Kyrgyzstan	$2,400	5,496,737	$13,192,168,800	933,465,296	13%
Cambodia	$2,300	14,952,665	$34,391,129,500	927,968,559	13%
Cameroon	$2,300	20,129,878	$46,298,719,400	913,015,894	13%
Micronesia	$2,200	106,487	$234,271,400	892,886,016	13%
Mauritania	$2,200	3,359,185	$7,390,207,000	892,779,529	13%
The Gambia	$2,100	1,840,454	$3,864,953,400	889,420,344	13%
Tajikistan	$2,000	7,768,385	$15,536,770,000	887,579,890	13%
Sao Tome and Principe	$2,000	183,176	$366,352,000	879,811,505	13%
Senegal	$1,900	12,969,606	$24,642,251,400	879,628,329	13%
Chad	$1,900	10,975,648	$20,853,731,200	866,658,723	12%
North Korea	$1,800	24,589,122	$44,260,419,600	855,683,075	12%
Bangladesh	$1,700	161,083,804	$273,842,466,800	831,093,953	12%
Kenya	$1,700	43,013,341	$73,122,679,700	670,010,149	10%
Cote D'Ivoire	$1,600	21,952,093	$35,123,348,800	626,996,808	9%
Zambia	$1,600	14,309,466	$22,895,145,600	605,044,715	9%
Benin	$1,500	9,598,787	$14,398,180,500	590,735,249	8%
Burkina Faso	$1,500	17,275,115	$25,912,672,500	581,136,462	8%
Tanzania	$1,500	43,601,796	$65,402,694,000	563,861,347	8%
Lesotho	$1,400	1,930,493	$2,702,690,200	520,259,551	7%

Table 8 (cont'd)

Nepal	$1,300	29,890,686	$38,857,891,800	518,329,058	7%
Myanmar	$1,300	54,584,650	$70,960,045,000	488,438,372	7%
Mali	$1,300	14,533,511	$18,893,564,300	433,853,722	6%
Uganda	$1,300	35,873,253	$46,635,228,900	419,320,211	6%
Rwanda	$1,300	11,689,696	$15,196,604,800	383,446,958	5%
Haiti	$1,200	9,801,664	$11,761,996,800	371,757,262	5%
Comoros	$1,200	737,284	$884,740,800	361,955,598	5%
Guinea	$1,100	10,884,958	$11,973,453,800	361,218,314	5%
Guinea-Bissau	$1,100	1,628,603	$1,791,463,300	350,333,356	5%
Ethiopia	$1,100	93,815,992	$103,197,591,200	348,704,753	5%
Mozambique	$1,100	23,515,934	$25,867,527,400	254,888,761	4%
Afghanistan	$1,000	30,419,928	$30,419,928,000	231,372,827	3%
Togo	$900	6,961,049	$6,264,944,100	200,952,899	3%
Malawi	$900	16,323,044	$14,690,739,600	193,991,850	3%
Madagascar	$900	22,585,517	$20,326,965,300	177,668,806	3%
Sierra Leone	$800	5,485,998	$4,388,798,400	155,083,289	2%
Niger	$800	17,078,839	$13,663,071,200	149,597,291	2%
South Sudan*	$800	10,625,176	$8,500,140,800	132,518,452	2%
Central African Republic	$800	5,057,208	$4,045,766,400	121,893,276	2%
Eritrea	$700	6,086,495	$4,260,546,500	116,836,068	2%
Somalia	$600	10,085,638	$6,051,382,800	110,749,573	2%
Zimbabwe	$500	12,619,600	$6,309,800,000	100,663,935	1%
Liberia	$400	3,887,886	$1,555,154,400	88,044,335	1%
Burundi	$400	10,557,259	$4,222,903,600	84,156,449	1%
Congo - Kinshasa	$300	73,599,190	$22,079,757,000	73,599,190	1%
World total (adjusted mixed data):	$11,351	7,008,260,653	$79,551,036,287,486		
World total from CIA data only:	$11,324	7,015,992,197	$79,451,552,857,000		

* Economic data was not provided for Monaco or Vatican City; figures for surrounding France and Italy were substituted.

South Sudan economic data was not available so info for the adjacent Central African Republic was substituted.

BELOW: Additional information for China's political subdivisions (2010 data)
Source for data on China: The Economist web site: http://www.economist.com/content/all_parities_china
(see note)
Richer Chinese provinces and special cities (those that are above the national average):

Macau	$72,110	600,000	$43,266,000,000	South-C
Hong Kong	$45,580	7,100,000	$323,618,000,000	South-C
Shanghai	$22,983	19,400,000	$445,870,200,000	East
Beijing	$20,841	17,200,000	$358,465,200,000	North
Tianjin	$19,284	12,300,000	$237,193,200,000	North 56.6m core?
Jiangsu	$13,714	77,500,000	$1,062,835,000,000	East
Nei Monggol (inland territory)	$13,108	24,400,000	$319,835,200,000	North
Zhejiang	$12,876	52,500,000	$675,990,000,000	East
Guangdong	$12,074	98,300,000	$1,186,874,200,000	South-C
Shandong	$10,914	93,700,000	$1,022,641,800,000	East
Liaoning	$10,772	43,100,000	$464,273,200,000	Northeast
Fujian	$9,969	36,800,000	$366,859,200,000	East
Richer area subtotal:	$13,476	482,900,000	$6,507,721,200,000	EU sized total!

NOTE: Although grouped together here and mostly composing China's coastal areas, these subdivisions are distributed across most (4 out of 6) of China's traditional internal regions, as marked in one of the columns above.

Table 8 (cont'd)

Other Chinese provinces and territories (all below the national average):

Hebei	$7,276	70,500,000	$512,958,000,000
Jilin	$8,346	27,100,000	$226,176,600,000
Heilongjiang	$6,777	37,300,000	$252,782,100,000
Shanxi	$6,581	34,800,000	$229,018,800,000
Shaanxi	$7,187	36,700,000	$263,762,900,000
Ningxia Huizu	$7,205	6,300,000	$45,391,500,000
Henan	$6,402	92,900,000	$594,745,800,000
Anhui	$5,261	59,400,000	$312,503,400,000
Hubei	$7,009	57,200,000	$400,914,800,000
Chongqing	$7,171	29,100,000	$208,676,100,000
Hunan	$6,474	63,800,000	$413,041,200,000
Jianxi	$5,671	43,000,000	$243,853,000,000
Hainan	$6,117	8,800,000	$53,829,600,000
Guanxi Zhuangzu	$5,011	48,100,000	$241,029,100,000
Guizhou	$3,335	38,400,000	$128,064,000,000
Sichuan	$5,350	81,200,000	$434,420,000,000
Yunnan	$4,280	45,800,000	$196,024,000,000
Tibet (Zizang)	$4,583	3,000,000	$13,749,000,000
Gansu	$4,031	26,400,000	$106,418,400,000
Qinghai	$6,117	5,600,000	$34,255,200,000
Xinjiang Uygur	$6,046	21,500,000	$129,989,000,000
Less rich area subtotal:	$6,024	836,900,000	$5,041,602,500,000
CHINA Grand Total (Economist):	$8,751	1,319,800,000	$11,549,323,700,000
CHINA Grand Total (CIA):	$8,400	1,343,239,923	$11,283,215,353,200
Ratio of CIA 2011 total to Econ 2010 total:		1.017760 (adjustment factor for population data)	

APPENDIX VII: CIA FACTBOOK DATA IN REGIONAL GROUPINGS

Table 9: CIA Factbook Data in Regional Groupings

PCGDP PPP in 2011 U.S. dollars: Regional groupings and summaries
Source: CIA World Fact Book web site, April 2012

	PCGDP	Population	product GDP x pop
Core region: Rich Europe (EU, EFTA, etc.)			
Finland	$38,300	5,262,930	$201,570,219,000
Sweden	$40,600	9,103,788	$369,613,792,800
Norway	$53,300	4,707,270	$250,897,491,000
Iceland	$38,000	313,183	$11,900,954,000
Ireland	$39,500	4,722,028	$186,520,106,000
United Kingdom	$35,900	63,047,162	$2,263,393,115,800
Denmark	$40,200	5,543,453	$222,846,810,600
Germany	$37,900	81,305,856	$3,081,491,942,400
Netherlands	$42,300	16,730,632	$707,705,733,600
Belgium	$37,600	10,438,353	$392,482,072,800
Luxembourg	$84,700	509,074	$43,118,567,800
Austria	$41,700	8,219,743	$342,763,283,100
Liechtenstein	$141,100	36,713	$5,180,204,300
Switzerland	$43,400	7,655,628	$332,254,255,200
France	$35,000	65,630,692	$2,297,074,220,000
Andorra	$37,200	85,082	$3,165,050,400
Spain	$30,600	47,042,984	$1,439,515,310,400
Portugal	$23,200	10,781,459	$250,129,848,800
Monaco*	$35,000	30,510	$1,067,850,000
Italy	$30,100	61,261,254	$1,843,963,745,400
San Marino	$36,200	32,140	$1,163,468,000
Vatican City*	$30,100	836	$25,163,600
Malta	$25,700	409,836	$10,532,785,200
Greece	$27,600	10,767,827	$297,192,025,200
Cyprus	$29,100	1,138,071	$33,117,866,100
Slovenia	$29,100	1,996,617	$58,101,554,700
Czech Republic	$25,900	10,177,300	$263,592,070,000
Hungary	$19,600	9,958,453	$195,185,678,800
Slovakia	$23,400	5,483,088	$128,304,259,200
Poland	$20,100	38,415,284	$772,147,208,400
Estonia	$20,200	1,274,709	$25,749,121,800
Latvia	$15,400	2,191,580	$33,750,332,000
Lithuania	$18,700	3,525,761	$65,931,730,700
Bulgaria	$13,500	7,037,935	$95,012,122,500
Romania	$12,300	21,848,504	$268,736,599,200

* Economic data were not provided for Monaco or Vatican City, so the figures for surrounding France and Italy were substituted.

TOTAL REGION:	$31,925	516,685,735	$16,495,196,558,800

Semi-peripheral region: Central & East Europe, Central Asia (CIS, former communist):			
Croatia (EU/core status in 2013)	$18,300	4,480,043	$81,984,786,900

Table 9 (cont'd)

Bosnia-Herzegovina	$8,200	4,622,292	$37,902,794,400
Serbia	$10,700	7,276,604	$77,859,662,800
Montenegro	$11,200	657,394	$7,362,812,800
Kosovo	$6,500	1,836,529	$11,937,438,500
Macedonia	$10,400	2,082,370	$21,656,648,000
Albania	$7,800	3,002,859	$23,422,300,200
Moldova	$3,400	3,656,843	$12,433,266,200
Ukraine	$7,200	44,854,065	$322,949,268,000
Belarus	$14,900	9,542,883	$142,188,956,700
Russia	$16,700	138,082,178	$2,305,972,372,600
Azerbaijan	$10,200	9,493,600	$96,834,720,000
Armenia	$5,400	2,970,495	$16,040,673,000
Georgia	$5,400	4,570,934	$24,683,043,600
Kazakhstan	$13,000	17,522,010	$227,786,130,000
Uzbekistan	$3,300	28,394,180	$93,700,794,000
Turkmenistan	$7,500	5,054,828	$37,911,210,000
Kyrgyzstan	$2,400	5,496,737	$13,192,168,800
Tajikistan	$2,000	7,768,385	$15,536,770,000
TOTAL REGION:	$11,851	301,365,229	$3,571,355,816,500

Semi-peripheral region: West Asia and North Africa

Iran	$12,200	78,868,711	$962,198,274,200
Turkey	$14,600	79,749,461	$1,164,342,130,600
Syria	$5,100	22,530,746	$114,906,804,600
Lebanon	$15,600	4,140,289	$64,588,508,400
Israel	$31,000	7,590,758	$235,313,498,000
(West Bank and Gaza Strip)	$2,900	4,332,801	$12,565,122,900
Jordan	$5,900	6,508,887	$38,402,433,300
Iraq	$3,900	31,129,225	$121,403,977,500
Kuwait	$40,700	2,646,314	$107,704,979,800
Yemen	$2,500	24,771,809	$61,929,522,500
Saudi Arabia	$24,000	26,534,504	$636,828,096,000
Bahrain	$27,300	1,248,348	$34,079,900,400
Qatar	$102,700	1,951,591	$200,428,395,700
United Arab Emirates	$48,500	5,314,317	$257,744,374,500
Oman	$26,200	3,090,150	$80,961,930,000
Egypt	$6,500	83,688,164	$543,973,066,000
Libya	$14,100	6,733,620	$94,944,042,000
Tunisia	$9,500	10,732,900	$101,962,550,000
Algeria	$7,200	35,406,303	$254,925,381,600
Morocco	$5,100	32,309,239	$164,777,118,900
(Western Sahara)	$2,500	522,928	$1,307,320,000
Cape Verde	$4,000	523,568	$2,094,272,000
TOTAL REGION:	$11,178	470,324,633	$5,257,381,698,900

Peripheral and semi-peripheral region: South Asia:

Maldives	$8,400	394,451	$3,313,388,400

Table 9 (cont'd)

Sri Lanka	$5,600	21,481,334	$120,295,470,400
Pakistan	$2,800	190,291,129	$532,815,161,200
Afghanistan	$1,000	30,419,928	$30,419,928,000
India	$3,700	1,205,073,612	$4,458,772,364,400
Nepal	$1,300	29,890,686	$38,857,891,800
Bhutan	$6,000	716,896	$4,301,376,000
Bangladesh	$1,700	161,083,804	$273,842,466,800
Myanmar	$1,300	54,584,650	$70,960,045,000
TOTAL REGION:	$3,267	1,693,936,490	$5,533,578,092,000
Semi-peripheral region: Southeast Asia:			
Indonesia	$4,700	248,216,193	$1,166,616,107,100
Philippines	$4,100	103,775,002	$425,477,508,200
Malaysia	$15,600	29,179,952	$455,207,251,200
Brunei	$49,400	408,786	$20,194,028,400
Singapore	$59,900	5,353,494	$320,674,290,600
Thailand	$9,700	67,091,089	$650,783,563,300
Cambodia	$2,300	14,952,665	$34,391,129,500
Laos	$2,700	6,586,266	$17,782,918,200
Vietnam	$3,300	91,519,289	$302,013,653,700
TOTAL REGION:	$5,984	567,082,736	$3,393,140,450,200
Semi-peripheral region: East Asia:			
Mongolia	$4,500	3,179,997	$14,309,986,500
North Korea	$1,800	24,589,122	$44,260,419,600
China	$8,400	1,343,239,923	$11,283,215,353,200
(Macau)	$33,000	578,025	$19,074,825,000
(Hong Kong)	$49,300	7,153,519	$352,668,486,700
TOTAL REGION:	$8,496	1,378,740,586	$11,713,529,071,000
Core region: Pacific Rim including Oceania:			
Taiwan	$37,900	23,113,901	$876,016,847,900
South Korea	$31,700	48,860,500	$1,548,877,850,000
Japan	$34,300	127,368,088	$4,368,725,418,400
Australia	$40,800	22,015,576	$898,235,500,800
New Zealand	$27,900	4,327,944	$120,749,637,600
East Timor	$3,100	1,201,255	$3,723,890,500
Papua New Guinea	$2,500	6,310,129	$15,775,322,500
Palau	$8,100	21,032	$170,359,200
Micronesia	$2,200	106,487	$234,271,400
Marshall Islands	$2,500	68,480	$171,200,000
Nauru	$5,000	9,378	$46,890,000
Solomon Islands	$3,300	584,578	$1,929,107,400
Vanuatu	$4,900	227,574	$1,115,112,600
Kiribati	$6,200	101,998	$632,387,600
Tuvalu	$3,400	10,619	$36,104,600
Fiji	$4,600	890,057	$4,094,262,200

Table 9 (cont'd)

Samoa	$6,000	194,320	$1,165,920,000
Tonga	$7,500	106,146	$796,095,000
TOTAL REGION:	$33,299	235,518,062	$7,842,496,177,700

Core region: Rich North America and small island countries:

United States	$48,100	313,847,465	$15,096,063,066,500
Canada	$40,300	34,300,083	$1,382,293,344,900
Bahamas	$30,900	316,182	$9,770,023,800
Bermuda	$69,900	69,080	$4,828,692,000
Antigua and Barbuda	$22,100	89,018	$1,967,297,800
St. Kitts and Nevis	$16,400	50,726	$831,906,400
Dominica	$13,600	73,126	$994,513,600
St. Lucia	$12,900	162,178	$2,092,096,200
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	$11,700	103,537	$1,211,382,900
Barbados	$23,600	287,733	$6,790,498,800
Grenada	$13,300	109,011	$1,449,846,300
Trinidad and Tobago	$20,300	1,226,383	$24,895,574,900
TOTAL REGION:	$47,152	350,634,522	$16,533,188,244,100

Semi-peripheral region: Central and South America and larger Caribbean countries

Mexico	$15,100	114,975,406	$1,736,128,630,600
Cuba	$9,900	11,075,244	$109,644,915,600
Jamaica	$9,000	2,889,187	$26,002,683,000
Haiti	$1,200	9,801,664	$11,761,996,800
Dominican Republic	$9,300	10,088,598	$93,823,961,400
Belize	$8,300	327,719	$2,720,067,700
Guatemala	$5,000	14,099,032	$70,495,160,000
El Salvador	$7,600	6,090,646	$46,288,909,600
Honduras	$4,300	8,296,693	$35,675,779,900
Nicaragua	$3,200	5,727,707	$18,328,662,400
Costa Rica	$11,500	4,636,348	$53,318,002,000
Panama	$13,600	3,510,045	$47,736,612,000
Colombia	$10,100	45,239,079	$456,914,697,900
Venezuela	$12,400	28,047,938	$347,794,431,200
Ecuador	$8,300	15,223,680	$126,356,544,000
Peru	$10,000	29,549,517	$295,495,170,000
Bolivia	$4,800	10,290,003	$49,392,014,400
Paraguay	$5,500	6,541,591	$35,978,750,500
Chile	$16,100	17,067,369	$274,784,640,900
Argentina	$17,400	42,192,494	$734,149,395,600
Uruguay	$15,400	3,316,328	$51,071,451,200
Brazil	$11,600	205,716,890	$2,386,315,924,000
Suriname	$9,500	560,157	$5,321,491,500
Guyana	$7,500	741,908	$5,564,310,000
TOTAL REGION:	$11,780	596,005,243	$7,021,064,202,200

Table 9 (cont'd)

Peripheral and Semi-peripheral region: South Africa and coastal western countries:

South Africa	$11,000	48,810,427	$536,914,697,000
Swaziland	$5,200	1,386,914	$7,211,952,800
Lesotho	$1,400	1,930,493	$2,702,690,200
Botswana	$16,300	2,098,018	$34,197,693,400
Namibia	$7,300	2,165,828	$15,810,544,400
Angola	$5,900	18,056,072	$106,530,824,800
Congo - Brazzaville	$4,600	4,366,266	$20,084,823,600
Gabon	$16,000	1,608,321	$25,733,136,000
Equatorial Guinea	$19,300	685,991	$13,239,626,300
TOTAL REGION:	$9,400	81,108,330	$762,425,988,500

Peripheral region: Sub-Saharan Africa and nearby microstates:

Sao Tome and Principe	$2,000	183,176	$366,352,000
Cameroon	$2,300	20,129,878	$46,298,719,400
Nigeria	$2,600	170,123,740	$442,321,724,000
Benin	$1,500	9,598,787	$14,398,180,500
Togo	$900	6,961,049	$6,264,944,100
Ghana	$3,100	25,241,998	$78,250,193,800
Cote D'Ivoire	$1,600	21,952,093	$35,123,348,800
Liberia	$400	3,887,886	$1,555,154,400
Sierra Leone	$800	5,485,998	$4,388,798,400
Guinea	$1,100	10,884,958	$11,973,453,800
Guinea-Bissau	$1,100	1,628,603	$1,791,463,300
The Gambia	$2,100	1,840,454	$3,864,953,400
Senegal	$1,900	12,969,606	$24,642,251,400
Mauritania	$2,200	3,359,185	$7,390,207,000
Mali	$1,300	14,533,511	$18,893,564,300
Burkina Faso	$1,500	17,275,115	$25,912,672,500
Niger	$800	17,078,839	$13,663,071,200
Chad	$1,900	10,975,648	$20,853,731,200
Sudan	$3,000	34,206,710	$102,620,130,000
Eritrea	$700	6,086,495	$4,260,546,500
Djibouti	$2,600	774,389	$2,013,411,400
Somalia	$600	10,085,638	$6,051,382,800
Ethiopia	$1,100	93,815,992	$103,197,591,200
Kenya	$1,700	43,013,341	$73,122,679,700
Tanzania	$1,500	43,601,796	$65,402,694,000
South Sudan*	$800	10,625,176	$8,500,140,800
Central African Republic	$800	5,057,208	$4,045,766,400
Congo - Kinshasa	$300	73,599,190	$22,079,757,000
Uganda	$1,300	35,873,253	$46,635,228,900
Rwanda	$1,300	11,689,696	$15,196,604,800
Burundi	$400	10,557,259	$4,222,903,600
Zambia	$1,600	14,309,466	$22,895,145,600
Zimbabwe	$500	12,619,600	$6,309,800,000
Malawi	$900	16,323,044	$14,690,739,600

Table 9 (cont'd)

Mozambique	$1,100	23,515,934	$25,867,527,400
Comoros	$1,200	737,284	$884,740,800
Madagascar	$900	22,585,517	$20,326,965,300
Mauritius	$15,000	1,313,095	$19,696,425,000
Seychelles	$24,700	90,024	$2,223,592,800

* South Sudan economic data not available; info for adjacent Central African Republic was substituted.

TOTAL REGION:	$1,611	824,590,631	$1,328,196,557,100
WORLD TOTAL:	$11,324	7,015,992,197	$79,451,552,857,000

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