ASSESSMENT or me. 91:13:12me com or- ‘ sums; mm cum THROUGH THE use: or THE W _ ’- ~ Thesis for the Degree of M. A; MICHIGAN STATEBNWERSITY “mom a NEGRI . f 1934 h—nmukh .. I“ .' ' 5‘1 . .‘r a g“: I” } .~I " l-‘i '... “w ‘ "5 ' -‘ - . rs" - .1311; II {x z . é ‘ L [ J15] ';:""‘".l’" .4'xv I ‘ I 8“ f“ a 1' immvw'x‘rm" - *1. I ABSTRACT ASSESSMENT OF THE DIFFERENTIAL CONTENT OF SHAME AND GUILT THROUGH THE USE OF THE TAT By Thomas F. Negri The present study investigated the difference in the experiential content of shame and guilt, in an attempt to elucidate the part played by shame as a factor shaping personality. Early psychoanalytic theory has been called to question for its one dimen- sional assessment of shame as a manifestation of the exposure of a sexual act in childhood (Freud), and for the analytic tendency to subsume the shame experience under the more limited affective state of guilt. Contemporary theorists (Piers, Lynd, Lewis) have more broadly focused on the structure of shame and have differentiated it from guilt, suggesting that shame arises from a conflict between ego and ego-ideal, and guilt, from a conflict between ego and superego. These theorists hold that shame and guilt differ experientially. The purpose of this study was to investigate the qualitative differences between shame and guilt as a conflict between two different aspects of the superego, each involved with the ego. It was hypothesized that guilt would be manifested by the con- current experience of transgression, fear of punishment, recognition of the need for retribution and negative evaluation of the self via the Thomas F. Negri commission or omission of the act. It was expected that shame would be demonstrated by the concurrent experience of failure to achieve an idealized self-expectation, subsequent negative self evaluation for being inadequate, anxiety about having exposed a shortcoming, fear of a loss of esteem or respect in the individual's own eyes and the fanta- sized evaluation by others, and fearfiof abandonment. Additionally, it was hypothesized that some individuals would demonstrate a tendency to respond modally with one state more than the other. To assess these hypotheses a six card series of the TAT (cards l, 38M, 3 GF, 7 BM, 7GF, l7BM) was administered to 29 male and 67 female undergraduate psychology student volunteers. Story responses were evaluated by the above criteria for the presence of overt or implied shame or guilt affect. Reliability testing, based on the blind scoring of 30 protocols, demonstrated a complete agreement level of .734. With the inclusion of cases where disagreement occurred over whether the response was implied or overt, though the raters agreed on the basic emotion, an overall agreement rate of .824 was demonstrated. The results of this study show that the expected differences in experiences of shame and guilt were consistent with the hypotheses. Additionally, it was found that the overall appearance of shame was greater than that of guilt when viewed across sexes; that both shame and guilt were higher for males than for females; that a group could be isolated that responded modally with shame, and another that modally responded with guilt. Thomas F. Negri It was found that the occurrence of shame or guilt responses were expressive of two different experiences, and that some individuals tend to respond with one state more than the other. It was felt that the experiential differences in shame and guilt could be interpreted in light of developmental experience in early childhood. It was suggested that shame arises in the child as a result of early lack of parentally offered affirmation, and guilt arises from the parental setting of taboos, in order that the child learn impulse control. Freud, S.. l896. Further Remarks on the Neuro Psychoses of Defense, Standard edition, 3, 159-174, 1962. Lewis, H. B. Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. l97l, New York, Interna- tional University Press, Inc. Lynd, H. M. 0n Shame and the Search for Identity, 1958, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. Piers, G. (From Piers, G., and Singer, M. B.), Shame and Guilt. l953, Springfield, Charles C. Thomas. Thesis Committee: Bertram Karon, Chairman Arthur Seagull Dozier Thornton ASSESSMENT OF THE DIFFERENTIAL CONTENT OF SHAME AND GUILT THROUGH THE USE OF THE TAT By Thomas F: Negri A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Psychology 1974 Dedicated to the memony 06 811.8 Kea VOLUL thee Manda 6am and AoLéd, in Icéch, bhown math, and we you/L bunches Cove you, 60):. you have rimmed and suppoued us, We Ahau gnaw, having been afifix'luned by you. We Ahau give age in cdebnaxx'on 05 you. 11' ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Sue Jennings for introducing me to the topic of shame, and to the late Dr. Bill Kell, whose interest in my work and whose caring, provided support and direction in the early stages of this work. His death in June 1973 was a great loss to me, and to all of us. I would further like to acknowledge Dr. Bertram Karon, who willingly stepped into the Chairmanship of an ongoing project and who continued on with me, and to Dr. Arthur Seagull and Dr. Dozier Thornton whose suggestions were helpful in structuring and preparing this paper. Recognition must also go to Doris Neigel who helped in scoring an unending stream of protocols; to Dr. Harvey A. Tilker who, many years ago, helped me decide to enter the field of Clinical Psychology; and of course to my friend Peter, who spent two years providing support, listening patiently, and most of all caring deeply for me. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES ......................... v INTRODUCTION .......................... l The Shame Experience ................... 8 The Guilt Experience ................... 21 Review of Related Research ................ 23 PROPOSED RESEARCH ....................... 26 Selection of Stimulus and Rationale ........... 27 METHODOLOGY .......................... 30 Instruments ....................... 30 Subjects ......................... 31 Testing ......................... 31 Evaluation Procedure ................... 32 RESULTS ............................ 35 Cards 1 and l7BM ..................... 39 Cards 38M and 3GF .................... 45 Card 7GF ......................... 49 Card 7BM ......................... 51 Cards 5, 10, 12M ..................... 52 DISCUSSION ........................... 56 Shame: An Integration .................. 59 Women and Shame ..................... 7O Guiltz, A Reassessment .................. 7O Shame and Guilt ..................... 72 APPENDIX ............................ 73 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................... 84 iv Table \lO‘U‘l-bwm CLOCD LIST OF TABLES Total Responses .................... Male and Female Responses ............... Rater Reliability ................... Pilot Subjects-~Ma1e Responses ............. Experimental Subjects--Male Responses ......... Pilot and Experimental Subjects--Male Responses Pilot Subjects--Female Responses ............ Experimental Subjects--Female Responses ........ Pilot and Experimental Subjects--Female Responses Modal Responses .................... INTRODUCTION This thesis will study shame, in an attempt to assess and differentiate the experiential content of shame from that of guilt. Both shame and guilt will be explored to elucidate their dynamic structure and function. The lack of breadth and depth in the early reference to shame has prompted a return to, and reappraisal of, the experience of shame by psychological theorists and researchers. This has given rise to a climate in which previously accepted descriptions of shame are being challenged and reassessed, hopefully to give way to a more lucid, comprehensive picture of shame, its place in psychological theory, and its implications for treatment. I As has been discussed by Lynd (1958), the experience of shame has been relatively little studied. She attributes this to the tendency of researchers and theorists to subsume the shame experience under guilt. Lewis (1971) also speaks to the neglect of shame, particularly by psycho- analytic theorists, attributing it, at least in part, to the ambiguity of the position of shame within the traditional Freudian theory. Al- though discussed by Freud in the context of self reproach for a sexual act in childhood (p. 23, Lewis), the notion of shame was a relatively neglected phenomenon. Bassos (1973) suggests that the disregard of the shame experience arises from its lack of easily identifiable cues, and further, that the powerful nature of shame prompts the individual to defend against the experience by substituting more clearly limited feeling states and labels. As the present writer looks at the neglect of shame, he under- stands it as arising from early theory building, such theories being a product of their time and culture. It is thereby suggested that the early neglect of the shame experience arose as a result of the position and interest of the culture in time. The outcome of this is that the shame experience has been subsumed under the heading of guilt, based on their similarities, but their qualitative differences have not been adequately explored. As we shall see further on, the ambiguous and pervasive nature of the shame experience, and more specifically, the difficulty in its communication, makes it ripe for being subsumed under a more articulate, clearly defined and limited affective state, i.e., guilt. Lynd (1958) suggests that contemporary society, with its social dislocation and fast paced change, provides more ambiguous role models. This in turn has given rise to a heightened awareness of a need for self-definition, i.e., identity. Erikson (p. 14, Lynd, 1958) is noted as saying that identity, i.e., Who am 1?, ". . . has become in our time as strategic as sexuality was in Freud's time." With the increased interest in identity, shame with its focus on the self and involvement with identity development, has also become a phenomenon of interest. Kaufman (1973) discusses the involvement of shame with identity in the context of the individual need for affirmation of the self. He views the shame experience as a manifestation of an early established, distorted self view, influencing at each point in time, the developing identity. Although the shame experience has been discussed by several writers of psychological theory, there is in contrast to guilt, little well developed information and less actual research into the specific topic of shame. Because of this, one must look beyond the dearth of literature applying directly to shame, and entertain peripheral areas that are seemingly shame-linked and shame-based: identity, perceptual modes of experiencing, self-esteem, internality-externality, body image, ego ideal and sex roles. The writer will now discuss what we mean by shame, including a review of related research and literature that this writer and others view as linked to the shame experience. II As has been noted, Freud (1896) proposed that shame arises from the exposure to others of a sexual act in childhood. He later expanded this theory, citing shame as nearly synonymous with disgust and loathing, and acting as a force to oppose the voyeuristic, and more generally, sexual drives (l905). He suggests that in order for a shame reaction to be established, the presence of the disapproving 'other' is necessary. Once established, shame could be evoked in the absence of others. Fur- ther elaboration (1914) prompted the differentiation between a "sense of guilt" and the "dread of conscience,“ the latter of which was linked to shame, functioning to insure narcissistic satisfaction by seeing that the ego measured up to the ego-ideal. Fenichel (1945) presented shame as ". . . the specific force directed against uretral-erotic temptation" (p. 69), and counterposed it to ambition which fought against this shame. The shame experience was attributed to severe humiliation during bladder training. Shame is also said to be related to sexual impulse by Levin (1967), particularly as linked with overexposure and subsequent rejec- tion by significant others. He projects further that this fear of exposure prompts individuals to take on a "chameleon-like" quality, in which these persons develOp the ability to 'read' their environment and change themselves to suit and satisfy those p0pulating their sur- roundings, relying on repression, poise, and facade to do so. These theorists provide a view of the early characterization of shame, grounded in psychoanalytic theory. These viewpoints, while grasping some aspects of the shame experience, do not fully recognize the essential dynamic structure and implications of shame. Gerhart Piers (1953), a major contributor to the literature on shame, suggested that ". . . only Erikson and Alexander have ascribed to shame an importance equal to'guilt' in human pathology" (p. 11). He refers to Franz Alexander's paper (1938) in which the latter dis- cusses the experience of 'inferiority feelings.‘ Although Alexander attributes both guilt and inferiority feelings to tension between the ego and ego-ideal, he suggests ". . . that they are fundamentally different psychological phenomena, and as a rule their dynamic effect on behavior is opposite" (p. 10, Piers). Piers adds that ". . . it would seem imperative that emotions phenomenologically and dynamically so different would also differ structurally" (p. 10). Erikson (1950), in presenting his ego development sequence, recognizes the development of a sense of shame as a potential hazard arising during that period in which we note the beginning of autonomy in the child. He discusses the implications of this in early and later development. Among his most salient points, which later contributed to the work by Piers (1953), are the use of the phrase 'a sense of shame,‘ implying a state that both pervades 'surface and depth, consciousness and unconscious' (p. 251). It is also noted that '. . . senses are at the same time, ways of experiencing, accessible to introspection; ways of behaving, observable by others; and unconscious inner states, deter- minable by tests and analyses' (p. 251, Erikson). These two factors are valuable in that they broaden the focus with which to view the shame phenomenon, and further, they attribute to shame particular perceptual, experiential and behavioral components, which create a three dimensional system, as opposed to the previously accepted single dimension, relating shame to sexual impulse. More specifically, Erikson describes the shame experience as coupled with doubt, and counterposed to autonomy. He discusses the development of this stage in terms of the move toward autonomous functioning and learning to 'let go.I This is an extension and abstraction paralleling the physical development and muscular maturation of the child, and in Western society parallels too, the task of learning sphincter control over bowel movement. Erikson attributes importance to the parenting agent at this stage, who may show respect for the child's IONS autonomy, while acting as a vigilant protector against shame and doubt \yfingax producing failures. This approach communicates to the child a recognition of separateness; the availability of the parent of the child; and facilitates the child's recognition of self—worth and competency, as well as discretion. When this is not followed, and further, when active 'shaming' or exposure of the child's shortcomings occurs, the child.experiences a sense of badnessfithat seems all perva- ,EIXS- Weigel (1974) suggests that active shaming by parents prompts the child to feel that he is different and 'bad' because of his short- comings. This then causes the child to hold himself responsible, not because he did (or did not do) a particular act, but because he is a certain way. This gives rise to self-doubt and shame in the individual. Piers (1953) presents shame and guilt as forms of intrapsychic tension, each quality equally important in the manifestation of pathol- ogy and in ego development. More specifically, he differentiates between shame and guilt, attributing shame to a tension between ego and ego-ideal, and guilt to a tension between ego and superego. Further, guilt arises at those points where the superego boundary is touched or transgressed, and shame occurs when there is a failure to meet or reach a goal as set by the ego-ideal. Simply put, guilt arises of transgres- sion; shame, of failure. Piers (1953) speaks to the exper1ent1al ..---- “-1 “an" ”mm-fl" component offieach, yiewing the anxiety arising in guilt as the fear of castration, and the anxiety arising in shame as fear of abandonment ' The ostensible separation of the superego and ego-ideal by Piers is resolved and elaborated by Lewis (1971), who views the superego con- struct as having multiple functions. Of these, she specifically speaks of the superego as a psychic monitoring device, which has as its purpose the regulation of the individual's self-evaluation, in an attempt to maintain stasis. “. . . Guilt and shame are among the psychological states evoked by the monitoring agency" (p. 19). In this view the superego then acts both to regulate human drives, and is active as an integrative force dealing with the development of human values and ideals. Further, Lewis (1971) speaks to the Freudian hypothesis that superego development involves an identification phenomenon. The internalization of the moral code can occur due to castration threat, / 4’4 _~ and is likened by Lewis to negative or avoidance conditioning, as 4* fi/‘Mfl- “ demonstrated by parental attachment of negative consequences to certain impulses, prompting these impulses to be viewed as 'wrong' by the child. A second route of identification is through the imitation of the beloved/respected parent, giVing riSe to a poSitive model1ng of that .., man—«ad ‘ “‘ WW figure, and fac1l1tat1ng the early development of the ego-ideal. This -vx— ... -.u direct involvement of the child with the model involves the threat of loss of parental love and hence, as far as modelling has occurred, self-love and the loss of esteem in the eyes of the valued other. Lewis describes these identification patterns as non:mutually excls Both may exist with few differences evident, often one overriding and/or modifying the other, as each is likely experienced at one time or another by the child. This writer views shame as arising from early lack of demon- strated caring by significant others. This in turn prompts a conflict between the ego, and ego-ideal aspects of the superego, experienced as inadequacy and inferiority. The basis of shame is the feeling of 'not being enough to gain positive response.‘ It suggests an early A‘f—j {M .4." ,5 ,a’ N"‘ lv' V I,’ r: f u f, I T r established fear of abandonment, and rejection, by those from whom affirmation is most needed, i.e., parental figures. Thus the experience of shame has early developmental roots. The shame-prone individual has unreasonably high needs_for achievement with a concurrently high fear of failure. This is an expression of a need to arrive at the idealized self view. Subsequent failure or inability to live up to the ego-ideal, manifests itself as an acutely negative evaluation of the self,anxiety about exposure, and loss of esteem, regard and respect in the eyes of the individual and in the fantasized evaluation by others, i.e., shame. III This section will discuss additional ways of describing the experiences of shame and guilt, and will provide a framework with which to discuss other aspects of the problem, particularly those concerning the differential content of the experience of shame and guilt. The Shame Experience It is suggested by Lynd (p. 18) ". . . that one may transgress no code, commit no proscribed act, meet all the standards of society and the experts in personality and yet feel a meanness and inadequacy which violates the core of oneself." Piers chooses the use of the word shame to imply an experience that transcends the focus on comparison with external figures that is connoted by "inferiority feelings," as described by Alexander. This is not in an attempt to negate the importance of such figures, but to allow for the inclusion and recognition of a more internalized tension between the ego and ego-ideal. Writers in this area have also attempted to recognize in shame, something more than shame as linked to sexuality. That shame ". . . is not to be ashamed of loving on account of exposing or surrendering of the body, but to be ashamed that love is not complete . that something inimicable in oneself keeps love from reaching completion and perfection" (Hegel, p. 18, from Piers). Linguistically, a tracing of the sources and definitions of each word provides additional information as to their qualitative differences. Guilt, having its derivation in Old English, focuses on: “a transgression; a crime; a violation of a specific taboo or boundary." The shades of meaning imply a specificity of offense and subsequent penalty or debt. Shame, having an Old English root, but appearing in all Germanic languages, carries the meaning of: "a wound or exposure thereof." It includes a self reference, more acutely focused than in guilt, and can imply "self-degradation; a wound to ones self-esteem; unworthiness in ones own eyes, as well as in the eyes of others." There is no act of repayment or legal reference, as in guilt, nor is there necessarily transgression of a code (Webster Dictionary, 1950). In addition to the qualitative differences in meaning, there exists a difference in focus. Of particular importance is the self referent present in shame, the self acting as the registrant of activ— ities, attitudes, and feelings, recognized by the person as his own. Lewis (1971) suggests that in shame there exists more "self" conscious- ness than in guilt. The primary focus in the experience of shame is directly about the self, and the evaluation of the self. In guilt, TO the self is not the central focus, but rather, is the "act" or "thing done." The self may be negatively evaluated in connection with this, but is not itself the focus of the experience. Lynd (1958) expands on this premise, describing shame as an experience ". . . that affects and is affected by the whole self . . and that discrete acts or incidents, including those of seemingly extreme triviality, have importance. Because in this moment of 'self- consciousness,‘ the self stands revealed" (p. 49), and to himself, the individual is exposed for what he is, and is not. Again, this refers back to an acute momentary awareness of discrepancy between ego and ego-ideal. It brings to light a factor of major importance in the shame experience, thatflofflexposure, particularly unexpected exposure. In relating this to his developmental sequence, Erikson describes shame as an experience of complete self-consciousness, complete exposure, and an awareness of being wholly visible, both for one's external being, and internal life and thoughts; visible "for all one's badness," whether an audience is present or absent. This speaks of not only exposure to others, but of a sudden awareness of some incongruously negative aspect of the self, an exposure in one's own eyes. Erikson has best described this as ". . . a wish to sink, then and there, into the ground" (p. 252). Early experienced shame is, according to Erikson, primarily rage turned against the self, arising from the exposure of an inadequacy or failure, by some "significant other." Ideally, the shamed individual would like to force the "eyes" to look away, but must retreat into his own invisibility and denial of self. Erikson suggests that in shame 11 the superego 'sees,‘ and shame is manifested by feelings of extreme 1"", r o o o I. 115‘. ‘ ,,z“smallness 1n relat1on to others' as well as one's own ego-1deal. :-n . ,. I"' W'- , Kell (1973) further suggests a discrimination between primary and secondary shame. As described by Bassos (1973), ". . . primary shame experiences occur at that point where some previously unsuspected or neturally evaluated part of the self becomes associated with shame for the first time. Secondary shame occurs when some aspect of the self that had previously been labeled shameful is suddenly exposed" (11.1). Kell (1973) describes the genesis of the shame experience in a developmental model within the family structure. He suggests that when a need (for attention, contact, care, love) or expectation is expressed directly or indirectly (for a child this may be magical thoughts of parental fbreknowledge), and this need is ignored,flshamg_ may occur for having had the need. Further, if such happens and the “a v “ “—— individual to whom the request was made later realizes and attempts to respond to the need, the shamed individual will experience a secondary shaming and rage, based on the exposure of the primary shame. It is suggested that within the shame experience, the individual directs rage at the self for having expressed a need, wish or attitude that could go without response from another. That as such, the individual recognizes not the ignorance of the beloved or respected figure, but demeans the self for having had this need, and having had the audacity to express it. There is an assumption that in order to be loved and to gain response the individual must be like the beloved object, and if an expression of 12 need goes without receiving a response, the individual experiences this as a deviation from the ego-ideal, which may have been modeled on the beloved individual. In doing so, he sees the need as illegitimate, the self as imperfect and "not enough" to be loved. In this sense, shame, and the anxiety arising from it, relate to the terror of interpersonal disdain, and when internalized, the ongoing fear of abandonment for having had or expressed any need, thereby risking the rejection of the beloved figure. Kell (1973) also suggests that in addition to giving permission to an individual to have and express needs, that if one responds to a need late, i.e., after.an initial shame reaction occurs, that the late- ness of the response and the initial insensitivity to the request be communicated. This, then, allows the individual the need; recognizes the shame; removes the stigma of its having been requested; and re- establishes the interpersonal bond, often lost (with the loss of trust) as a result of the shame experience. When such a "mending“ does not occur, the shame experience can be integrated as a testament to one's lack of worth and badness. ‘It may} become unattached from the actual situation and held as a non-verbalized self experience. This internal conflict may occur in the absence of I others and be carried on as a primary mode of perceiving and experiencing in adulthood. Another view of the genesis of primary shame has been offered by Bassos (1973). He bases his discussion on a split brain concept, attributing to the left cerebral function, a reflective capacity, enabling man to ". . . predict, control and manipulate his environment" 13 (p. 3). To the right cerebral function is attributed a non-reflective capacity, which is characterized as non-verbal, spontaneous and "uncon- scious." He suggests that the non-reflective mode is experienced as "an effortless being," in contrast to the "doing" quality of the reflective mode. In the reflective doing mode one experiences an objectified self, whereas in the non-reflective state one is 'at one with' or absorbed with the experience of the moment. It is further suggested that each of these modes are aspects of the self, and that both modes of consciousness are simultaneously involved in the experience of shame. On the basis of these yet untested assumptions, Bassos (1973) differentiates between objectified and non-objectified relationships. The former are viewed as "I—you" or "I-it" relations, where there is an objectified self and many "not 1" objects. Here the reflective mode predicts and controls the distance between the objectified self and the object. Inherent in this type of relationship is a recognition of separateness. In the non-reflective mode, non-objectified relationships are experienced. Bassos finds "at oneness" more suitable than "rela— tionship" here, for ". . . there is no discrimination of a self or other, no attempt to control or predict the self, other, or the psycho- logical distance . . . the individual being filled with the other and focusing intently on that" (p. 4). With regard to primary shame, the stage is set when an indi- vidual in a non-reflective state approaches another individual. The shame experience occurs when the individual is not received and 14 experienced in that same mode, but is met with a "finger pointing" response to some aspect of his being (which he is not aware of while in the non-reflective spontaneous state). It is suggested that this causes a startling "self" awareness and a desperate search of the self for the cause of the finger pointing of others. He becomes the focus of all attention, including his own; sees himself as responsible and feels himself objectified; alone and denied "at oneness." This is described as an undesired separation via objectification. The result is a jarring back into reflective activity, with an awareness that one has just been out of (self) control. This is the (reflective) self now objectifying the (non-reflective) self. The final outcome is an inabil- ity to organize behavior, helplessness and discimination, until the reflective capacity is fully restored. Bassos (1973) further suggests that developmentally, shame arising from a rejection of the child's need for "at oneness" (non- reflective relationship), prompts a feeling of power; power to cause rejection by others. To the child's mind the rejection is the outcome of his being in a non-reflective state. Essentially he experiences his "being" as rejected. In an attempt to control his world and see to it that his needs are met in the future, the individual (in the reflective mode) plans and behaves in ways to regain the lost love. Yet the indi- vidual in doing so gives up "being" in non-reflective state, and any response he gets will be to his "doing" reflective mode. The outcome may be a sense of futility and impotence, to affect those around him, as it is he who causes others rejection, yet cannot cause others to accept him. 15 Modigliani (1968) lends further support to the disorganizing effect of the shame experience on behavior, finding that shame- embarrassment are highly correlated with inadequacy. He suggests that exposure of some incongruity or socially inappropriate expression throws off the interactive continuity, giving rise to momentary identity loss and loss of role consistency. The descriptions of early theorists act as a structure on which Kell (1973) and Bassos (1973) have developed ways of viewing the early establishment, subsequent occurrence and predisposition to shame experience. When viewed developmentally, they suggest that shame can arise from active shaming behaviors on the part of the parents, e.g., ridicule, showing contempt for the child, indicating disappointment in or dislike of the child as a person. Additionally, shame may arise from natural or inadvertent disregard for the child's immediate needs. If not remedied, this can set the stage for the development of an individual who will view the self (particularly the non-reflective or "non-doing" self) as unworthy of response or regard, and engender an introjected rage resulting from the perceived parental withholding of "at oneness," closeness and affection. In the psychotherapy setting this may be seen in individuals who describe all parentally offered affection as contin- gent on accomplishment, to the exclusion of simple loving regard for the youngster as a person. The subsequent fear of exposure of the already established shame, can give rise to secondary shame if exposure does occur. Often this is seen in a client's refusing to allow himself needs or the expression thereof. This expresses both the fear of 16 exposure, and the recalling of the initial shame and self label of unworthy, as well as the unexpressed rage at the parent, for the lack of response to the original need. The outcome for the developing child is one of having a frag- mented, non-affirmed sense of self; who would believe that 'being' (in the non-reflective sense) must be controlled or avoided for fear of secondary exposure of the initial primary shame. This may further generalize into evaluating the self as worthless, and all needs as illegitimate, having the power to drive away or cause the loss of the _| beloved object. (I H \_~,,..,— The continuance of shame experiences (primary and secondary), suggests a development and accumulation of such non-affirming experi- ences, festering more and more desperate attempts to please (the parent or parent symbol) and accomplish, in order to get the earlier deprived love. It also gives rise to the description by Levin of a chamelon-like individual, whose "other-directedness" is an attempt to control both the self (avoiding non-reflective experience) and the environment, in order to avoid further shame. In being "what the environment demands" there is an attempt to gain affirmation. This is further discussed by Guntrip (1969) who, in his work on schizoid phenomena, describes the development of the schizoid personal- ity in terms of early experienced deprivation and lack of affirmation. He suggests that once this pattern is established, an individual may desperately attempt to please others, in hope of regaining the love missed as a child. At the same time he fears that 'letting go' 17 (Erikson, Bassos) into true union with another, will be overwhelming and devastate the brittle sense of self. Hence an "in-out programme" becomes established where the individual approaches relationships out of need, but must recoil out of fear of exposure; fear of emotional insatiability; and fear of the expression of early experienced rage. _ Insatiability of emotional needs is a major concern of shame experi- encing individuals, and is tightly controlled, because of the early experience that the expression of any need causes pain, frustration, lack of fulfillment and ultimately, loss of the other, and abandonment. Jennings (1972) suggests that shame experiences and the inabil- ity to be less than perfect, may arise in the individual who's childhood has been characterized by a symbiotic relationship with the parent(s). Additionally, in these cases the child has usually been viewed as a responsible adult who must look after the parents, and whose needs have been secondary to the protection and care of the parental figures. It is as if these individuals have not been given permission to ask for gratification from others, and that such requests would be responded to with shaming of their weakness and lack of independence. Lynd (1958) suggests that shame can also be felt for other individuals, and points out that shame for one's parents, or loved ones is oftentimes more hurtful than shame for oneself. Again this seems to be based on the individual's experiencing the parents or some inconsist- ency or incongruity in their behavior, as a deviation from the individ- ual's ideally viewed assumption of them. This too, prompts a shaking of the individual's faith in his own perceptions, prompting a shame response. 18 It has been this author's purpose to trace the roots of the intrapsychic shame structure as described by Piers, Lynd, and Lewis, and to provide a developmental set with which to view the possible genesis of the shame experience. Four basic characteristics arise to describe the shame experience: unexpected exposure, involvement of the whole self, incongruity and inappropriateness, threat to trust (Lynd, 1958). With the self as the focus of evaluation, we see the shame experience as sudden and total, yet its basis in early interaction with significant others, and subsequent integration as a deviation from the idealized self view or ego-ideal, allows us to appreciate that one's entire life may act as a preparation for the continuing manifestation of just such startling experiences. As dealt with here, the shame response is seemingly attributed to interpersonal interaction, but once integrated the shame experience is also an exposure of the self to oneself, and being so, whether others are present or absent, can have the same intensely dramatic effect. Within an established shame-prone system, incongruity, loss of or threat to trust, or unfulfilled expectation may bring to the fore acute feelings of unworthiness and failure, experienced as shame by the individual. The oftentimes trivial nature of those occurrences provide the additional problem of communicating the shame experience. Lynd suggests that shame, as it occurs, is a wordless, emotionally and physically preoccupying state. The difficulty in its communication involves several factors. First, there is a loss of trust in the self as an accurate monitor of reality, and an acute awareness of having 19 built on false assumptions about one's self or others. Second, there may be a loss of trust for those populating the environment, either based on a fear of "being seen through," at a time when the essence of the self is exposed, or based on a realization of having misplaced one's confidence, or of having falsely anticipated some particular response that is not manifested. Third, the nature of the shame experience, being one of momentary implosion of the self, via self f rage and disdain, prompts a need to move away from others, retreating )V“