MICHIGAN’S VIEW OF THE CANADIAN
RECIPROCITY TREATY, 1854-4866

111033: 50: {he Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
David Dru-ry
I959

III/I

I I III! III/IIIIIIIIII/IIII/III II

3 1293068 2637

LIBRARY -

Michigan State
University

  
  

  

 

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of one state, Michigan, and its relation-
ship to an international agreement, the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of
185A.

From Michigan's point of view the two most important provisions
of the treaty were reciprocal free trade with Canada in most natural and
agricultural products and free navigation of the St. Iawrence River by
American vessels.

When the pact was ratified there was some caution in the state
about outright endorsement of reciprocal trade. The merchants, farmers,
and lumbermen did not know what to eXpect and were waiting to see the
effects of this provision before passing Judgment.

By 1860 reciprocal trade with Canada had become quite unpopular
in Michigan. The eastern markets were flooded with Canadian grain and
timber. This cut into the volume of Michigan exports and lowered prices
paid to the farmers and lumbermen. The wool growers were particularly
injured and they led the movement in the state to abrOgate the treaty
ias soon as possible.

On a national level protectionism was growing; the Republican
Party adOpted a protectionist plank in the 1860 platform which was
enthusiastically supported by the suffering portions of the Nfichigan
economy.

When the treaty was debated in the united States Congress
during 186h-1865 the injury done to these important economic interests

was brought up by the state's representatives. The power of these

2
arguments is evidenced by the unanimous support given by the Michigan
congressmen to the resolution to abrogate the pact.

Despite some ill—effects of the treaty it must be said that
reciprocity played a part in the general prosperity of the period.
Trade between the United States and Canada was increasingly important
and Detroit especially benefited because of its excellent location.
While the industries of the state were being depressed by reciprocity,
the commercial men were reaping large profits. It was no accident that
the Detroit Board of Trade made several pleas for retaining the commercial
agreement with Canada. The end of reciprocity would raise tariffs, cut
down the merchant's profits and reduce the volume of trade.

Another beneficial consequence of the treaty was the Opening of
the St. Lawrence River. Detroit shippers liked this direct trade route
to EurOpe, but the river was never used to any extent during the Operation
of the pact. What its future prospects were appear today in the St.
Iawrence Seaway project, but in 1865 the river had only limited value.

Thus the various economic interests of Michigan were split in
their Opinions of the treaty. The rural majority undoubtedly desired
the pact ended while the commercial men hOped for a continuation of
reciprocal trade.

During the American Civil War a new set of problems arose which
influenced many Michigan citizens to Oppose the pact. In 186h a group
of rebel spies from Canada attempted to free the Confederate prisoners
held on Johnson's Island in lake Erie.. This outrage and breach of
neutrality was universally condemned in the state, with leading news-
papers suggesting an invasion Of Canada as soon as the revolt in the

South was put down. This raid, and another soon after it on St. Albans,

3

Vermont, frightened the northern states and created animosity toward
the Canadian government for allowing the forays to occur.

In Michigan the desire for abrogation of the Reciprocity
Treaty was directly due to the economic inequalities of the pact and the
seemingly hostile attitude of the Canadian government which had given
the rebel raiders a safe base. Most Michigan citizens wanted the agreement
abrogated and Michigan congressmen obliged by voting to terminate the

pact.

MICHIGAN'S VIEW OF THE CANADIAN RECIPROCITY TREATY,
185h-1866

by

David Drury

A Thesis

Submitted to the College of Science and Arts
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for-the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of History

1959

aunatmfiL .

. I/S/dVV‘fif Iél. ./3L4n4aa\_,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is indebted to Dr. Harry Brown for his
patience and helpful advice, to the staffs of the Michigan
State University library, the Michigan State Library, and
the Burton Historical Collections for aid in securing
materials; to Dr. Madison Kuhn and Dr. Frank N. Elliott
for many useful suggestions; to Julian Rammelkamp for his
endless encouragement; and to Mrs. Reynolds for typing

the manuscript.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
Introduction .
I. The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of l85h
II. Michigan Views Reciprocity, 18h8-185h
III. Michigan and The Operation and Abrogation of the Pact
Conclusions
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

30
51
89
95
10h

Introduction

The Reciprocity Treaty of 185% was the first important pact of
its kind signed by the United States. Before l85h a few reciprocal trade
agreements had been made with other countries but the list of goods
allowed to enter duty free had been strictly limited. The signing of
the agreement with Canada was a new experiment by the American govern-
ment. This pact was with a large country and the free list included
nearly all the natural products of Canada. Furthermore, there were
other provisions in the treaty which had a marked effect on the relations
between the two countries.

Despite these important influences the treaty has never received
the notice it deserves from historians. No comprehensive account of
the pact and its Operations from an American point of view has ever
been published, although the Canadian side has attracted much interest.

This thesis is an effort to explore the effects Of the treaty on
Michigan and to present the opinions Of the pact expressed by the state's
citizens. Some parts of the treaty had little effect on the state.
Others, particularly reciprocal trade and free navigation of the St.
Lawrence, had a considerable influence on Michigan's history.

While the treaty was being negotiated the prospect of increased
imports from Canada, which would be stimulated by reciprocal trade,
aroused little interest in Michigan. In general the citizens of the state
seemed indifferent to this provision. By l86h a significant change in
Opinion had occurred. TWO important interests, lumbering and agriculture,

were definitely Opposed to free trade with Canada. The competition from

the foreign imports proved a threat to the economic security of these
groups.

The reason the state favored the pact in l85h was the inclusion
of a provision Opening the St. Iawrence to American vessels. Grandiose
visions of a trade with EurOpe were entertained. These hopes did not
materialize and in 1865 the route, though useful, was of minor im-
portance.

The Civil War also brought the treaty into disfavor. Canadian
government policy was strict neutrality, which allowed deserters from
the armies, confederate agents, and draft dodgers to congregate in the
country. Raids into the United States, organized by rebel spies,
created ill-feeling across the northern states.

During l86h-l865 abrogation of the treaty was discussed in the
United States Congress. The economic Opposition to the agreement and the
apparent laxity of Canadian officials in implementing their neutrality
policy led the Congress to pass a joint resolution terminating the pact.
In these discussions Michigan's legislators sided with the anti-treaty
forces. The only group in the state that actively favored the pact was
the Detroit Board of Trade, but it had no spokesman in washington.

The first chapter of this paper is devoted to a general dis-
cussion of the Reciprocity Treaty. The chapter is not primarily based
on original research but primary sources have been used as much as
possible to illustrate important points. The last two chapters examine
the political and economic factors in Michigan which influenced the
passage of the treaty, its Operation, and the reasons behind its

abrogation in 1865.

CHAPTER I

The beginnings of the reciprocity movement were founded in the
relationships between the British North American colonies and England
in the late 18hO's. During those years a drastic change in the colonial
policy of England was Occurring, a change which influenced the course Of
Canadian-American relations for several years to come.

The most important shift in the English colonial policy was the
repeal of the Corn Laws in 18h6. In brief, the Corn Laws granted the
colonial areas of the British Empire a preferred position in the English
grain market. Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister in 18h6,'was the
leader of the Parliament that removed the trade barriers. At that time
Ireland was in the throes of a devastating famine and large quantities
of food were needed immediately. This was the end Of the last bulwark
of English protectionism; Peel irrevocably set the course of England's
policy to international free trade.

This change in policy forced England to eliminate the whole
system of imperial preferential duties. "The practice of granting
English goods a preference in colonial markets, as well as reciprocal
advantage extended to colonial products in England,'vas incompatible
with the new commercial teneti of international free trade."2 In 18h6
the colonial legislatures were allowed to repeal any tariff acts which

1w. E. Lunt, History 9.1.". England, 3rd ed. (New York and London,
19h7), p. 667.

2
Cephas D. Allin and George M. Jones, Annexation, Preferrential
Trade, and Reciprocity (Toronto and London, 1911), p. 13.

 

2

had been imposed on them by the British Parliament, "including the
various discriminatory duties by which a preference had been hitherto
granted to British ships and products."3 Thus the colonies were given
free rein to chart their own economic destiny.

After England embarked on her new policy, its effects in Canada
proved to be disastrous. The colonies in North America went through
a severe decline in economic activity:

Temporary insolvency was the price which Canadians paid for the
triumph...of free trade. Much Of the capital of the country
was tied up in the ruined industries which the protective policy
Of the motherland had called into existence. There was but a
limited local market for the agricultural products...and, in
the neutralized market of England, the Canadian traders found
themselves exposed to the keen and merciless competition of
their American neighbours.... Piteous were the complaints which
arose from the millers and ship-owners of the province against
the injustice of the policy of England in arbitrarily withdraw-
ing the colonial preference, withogt at the same time securing
for them an alternative market.... “

The shipping interests had added reason for being displeased
with the changes in English colonial policy. Not only was the English
market Open to all, but in 18h9 the Navigation Acts were repealed,

leaving the transportation of Canada's goods to foreign markets

3Allen and Jones, p. 1h.

It is necessary to understand that England maintained control over
the external affairs of her colonies. By 18h9 most of the Provinces had
jurisdiction Over internal matters and economic decisions, but relations
with other governments had to be carried on through the Foreign Office in
England. FUrthermore, the situation was complicated because the colonies
were not united despite their geographic proximity. In l8hl the initial
step towards a single governing unit over the colonies of North America
had been made by combining Upper Canada (Ontario) with lower Canada
(Quebec). However, this still left Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, New-
foundland and Prince Edward Island as separate colonies. Therefore,
the use of the term "Canada" for this area is not technically correct.

5Allin and Jones, pp. 20—21; also see Charles C. Tansill, The
Canadian Reciprocity Treaty 9f 185k, Johns HOpkins Uhiversity Studies in
Historical and Political Science, Series XL, no. 2(Baltimore, 1922),
pp 0 29-30 0

 

 

 

3
available to whoever would Offer the lowest price.

To the Canadians the result of the repeal of the Navigation Acts
and the Corn laws was a sense of being set adrift. The close ties with
England had led to an economic dependence which, when the connection
was severed, left a legacy of depression and disillusionment. While
Great Britain had "looked beyond the restricted commerce of her colonies
to the commercial domination of the world,"7 Canada turned to her only
other hOpe for economic salvation, the United States.

The first concrete evidence of the Canadian hope for American
support was the Annexation Manifesto of 18h9. It was drawn up by the
merchants of MOntreal, the group in the North American provinces most
severely shaken by the events since 18h6. The Annexation Manifesto
was "a cry of despair” over the economic insecurity which plagued the
colony and advocated political union with the United States.

The benefits of such a union, as envisioned by the Montreal
merchants, evidenced the handicaps under which they were currently
laboring. The Manifesto read, in part:

The prOposed Uhion.would render Canada a field for American

capital, into which it would enter as freely for the prosecution

of public works and private enterprise as into any of the present

States. It would equalize the value of real estate upon both

sides of the boundry.... By giving stability to our institutions

and introducing prosperity, it would raise our public, corporate,
and private credit.... It would render our rivers and canals the
highway for immigration to, and exports from, the west, to the

incalculable benefit of our country. It would also introduce
manufactures into Canada as rapidly as they have been introduced

6
Lunt) pp. 637) 677-

7

Donald G. Creighton, The 99mmercial Empire of the St. Iawrence,
1760-1850(Toronto, New Haven and London, 1937), pp. 36ff-‘3‘6'5‘.’
BAdam Shortt, "Economic History, l8hO-l867," Canada and the
Provinces, 22 vols., (TOronto, 19lh), V, p. 23h.

 

 

 

h
into the Northern States.... Nor would the united States merely
furnish the capital for our manufactures. They would also supply
for them the most extensive market gn the world, without inter-
vention of a Customs-House officer.

Though annexation was advocated warmly by the commercial interests
in Mentreal, the united States assumed an attitude of indifference to the
overtures from the north. There were other matters of greater concern:
”The American public were too deeply concerned with domestic matters to
give due consideration to the agitation of their Northern neighbours. No
political party was ready to take up a question of such doubtful political
expediency. The South was overwhelmingly hostile to annexation; the
North, for the most part, was lukewarm and indifferent....“lo The
only voices in favor of annexation in the United States were a few of
the newspapers in the West that "had a glorious vision of the great
imperial possibilities of the Union."ll

American indifference hurt the annexation hopes Of Canada and
the movement's decline was hastened after 18h9 by the revival of business
and trade. The adjustments necessary following the abrupt decline of
English markets had run their course. Increasing prosperity removed the
apparent causes supporting a political tie with the united States. "The
[Eanadiaé] mercantile community recognized the mistake they had made,

12
and were glad to return to their former political allegiance."

9Sessional Papers, 1850(Great Britain, Cd. 1181, XXXVIII,
pp. 11-13; cited by Laster B. Shippe, Canadian—American Relations,
18h9-l87h(New Haven, TOronto, and Iondon, 1939), pp. 1-2.

 

 

lOAllin and Jones, p. 38%.
ll
Allin and Jones, p. 382.

l2Allin and Jones, p. 353.

5

While desire for political connection with America waned, the
difficulties of the merchants were not cured. Prosperity had ended the
immediate problem, but the long-range need for economic support was still
not solved. English free trade had created the problem and could promise
the Canadians nothing. However, the United States offered a possible port
of refuge from the stormy waves of economic distress. The Canadian
merchants "saw themselves distanced by the United States...and they
recognized but two means to overcome their handicap--either...they should
be put in as favorable a position, commercially, as the Uhited States,
or...the latter country should somehow be subjected to the same dis-
advantages as themselves."13

A certain way to put the merchants of the two countries on the
same footing would be to negotiate an agreement for reciprocal trade.
This would eliminate economic barriers while maintaining political
autonomy.

The Canadian hOpe for reciprocity with the United States was
based on the idea of diverting trade from the united States to the St.
Lawrence River route. The Erie Canal had been draining away MOntreal's
share Of the Great Lakes trade for twenty years. Further, the passage
of a drawback law in l8h5-18h6 by the American Congress allowed
Canadian goods to be shipped in bond across the United States for
export abroad.lh This fact had likewise reduced the traffic along
Canadian routes. This law shifted "a large part of the trade of the St.

l3J'ames L. Laughlin and Henry P. Willis, Reciprocity(New York,
1903), p. 32.

 

1h
Creighton, PP. 3h9-3503 358-359} 369-370-

6

Lawrence merchants into the hands of the New York dealers, since the
merchants of Toronto and the western districts now found it advantageOus
to import and export...through American ports, which, unlike the St.
Lawrence, were Open all year round."15

Another advantage which reciprocity with the United States could
provide Canada was a market for Canadian grain. The lowering of tariff
walls promised new areas into which Canadian bread-stuffs could be exported.
The farmers, along with the merchants of Canada West(Ontario), were
increasingly annoyed at the American restrictions on the importation of
Canadian produce.

Although the trade and market benefits Of reciprocity were
widely recognized throughout Canada, the most important reason for the
promotion of a commercial alliance with the United States was its favor
with the officials of the government. More specifically, reciprocity
was viewed as a safety valve against the surge of annexationism. The
most prominent exponent of this view was lord Elgin, Governor General of
Canada. In November, l8h9, he wrote: "If things remain on their present
footing...there is nothing before us but violent agitation ending in
convulsion or annexation...and I much fear that no measure but the
establishment of reciprocal free trade between Canada and the States...

1
will remove it."

15 .
Allin and Jones, p. 2h.

6

l Elgin-Grey Papers, h vols.(0ttawa, 1937), Misc. Papers, Paper on
"Canadian Commercial and Agricultural distress--Political Disaffection
and Annexation," III, p. ll9h-ll97.

l .
7T. Watrous, ed. Letters and JOurnals gf Lord Elgin, pp. lOO-th;
Quoted in Laughlin and Willis, pp. 31-32.

 

 

 

7
Undoubtedly Elgin's numerous dispatches and letters to the Home
‘ Government played the most significant role in advancing the idea of
reciprocity with the British Ministry. In a letter to Earl Grey, the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, on November 8, l8h9, Elgin stated:
"I have always said that I am prepared to assume the responsibility of
keeping Canada quiet, with a much smaller garrison than we have now,
and without any tax on the British consumer...if you put our trade on
as good a footing as that of our American neighbours."l

William HamiltOn MErritt also viewed reciprocity as a preferable
alternative to annexation. Merritt, a miller from St. Catherines who
represented his county in the Canadian legislature for thirty years, was
probably the first to grasp the importance of this fact. In 18h6 he
stated: "Were our products admitted into their markets...the Canadian
farmer would at all times be placed on an equal footing, in all respects
with the western farmer.... He would realize the advantages he possessed
and resist any political change."19 Merritt further observed that
reciprocity would divert much of the exports of the western United
States to the St. Lawrence route.20

Even a special American agent, Israel D. Andrews, appointed by
Secretary of State John Clayton to examine the condition of the northern

provinces, saw the danger inherent in the uneasy status of commerce in

18
Letters and Journals 9f lord Elgin, pp. 102-103; quoted in

Shippee, p. 21.

l
9S3, Catherines Journal, May 1h, l8h6; quoted by Donald C.
Masters, The Reciprocity Treaty of 185h(IOndon, New York and Toronto,

1936)) P° 9°

 

 

 

 

2OPublic Archives of Canada, Merritt Papers, vol. i, Merritt
to Elgin, May 10, 18h8; cited by Masters, p. 6.

 

8

Canada. In a letter to Clayton, Andrews concluded: "Whether these colonies
remain separate and disunited as at present, or formed into one con-
federation, they must have reciprocal free trade with the United States
21
or they will be annexed.“
The effects of the economic abandonment of Canada by England
were not wholly bad however. Despite the fears of Elgin and Merritt
caused by annexation and the uneasiness of the merchants and farmers Of
the provinces, the repeal of the Corn laws ”led to the realization
that hitherto the prosperity Of the country had been too completely
at the mercy of outside markets and the existence of British preferential
treatment. The more far-sighted realized that the British colonies
must become...economically, as well as pOlitically, more independent
and self-supporting."22
Reciprocity appeared to be the long-range answer to the
difficulties facing the commercial community north of the St. Iawrence
and to the majority of Canadians was preferable to political union with
the United States. Gilbert Tucker has concluded that "the most
generally popular of all the prOposals for restoring prosperity to the
colony.... "was reciprocal free trade with America.23
In 18h? the Toronto Board of Trade thought that the time was ripe

for advancing reciprocity with the United States. Its annual report said:

"The present time [is] most favourable for effecting through Her

21
Aug. 1, 18h9,eSpecial Agents, vol. XVI; quoted by Shippee,

 

p. 21.
22
Shortt, p. 232.

23Cilbert Tucker, The Canadian Commercial Revolution, 18u5-1851
(New Haven, 1936), p. 153.

 

9
Majesty's Government a reciprocal treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between the United States and this Colony, by means of which the Wheat
and Flour Of either country will be allowed to enter the markets of the
other, free of duty."2u

Elgin, Merritt and other Canadian leaders realized that such an
agreement would be most advantageous to their country. With this in
mind, Merritt was sent to washington early in l8h8 to "convince or
persuade” both houses of Congress to pass some sort of bill to provide
reciprocity between the two countries.

In the American capital the Canadian was greeted with a
"cordial reception" and joined in the discussions involving
reciprocity.25 Merritt appeared before the Committee on Commerce in
each house of Congress and his representations there helped break down
the resistence of many wary legislators, particularly manbers of the
House of Representatives.

The House Committee on Commerce, headed by Joseph Grinnell,
drew up a bill providing for the free admission of articles that were
grown or produced in Canada. The basis of this proposal was an ex-
change of notes between the British representative in washington, Mr.
Pakenham, and the Canadian government. Between them they worked out
a list Of goods to be included in the agreement. This list provided
the groundwork for the discussiOns in the American Congress, and a
reciprocity bill was passed in the House of Representatives without

2h

Tbronto Globe, Jan. 8, 18h8; in H. A. Innes and A. R. M. Lower,
eds., Select Documents gf_Canadian Economic History, 1783-1885(Toronot,

25

 

 

Shortt, p. 237.

10

significant Opposition.2

In the Senate, however, the Grinnell Bill ran into difficulties.
It was reported from the Committee on Commerce by John A. Dix of New York
on July 20, 18148.27 The measure was not debated and on December 19, l8h8,
Dix brought the bill to the attention of the law-making body. He observed
that it had been "repeatedly postponed" at the request of several senators
and had finally been "lost in consequence of the pressure of business
at the close of the session." Dix continued: "I am very desirous
that it reciprocity:lshouldbe acted upon....” The reply to this
request was to have immediate consideration voted down, 17 yeas to
26 nays.28

Two more efforts to secure consideration failed--on December 20,
18h8 and January 23, l8h9. On the latter date the measure was put off

29

"until tomorrow". TOmorrow never arrived again at that session of
Congress.

The reason most often given for the failure of the Grinnell
Bill in the Senate was ”the pressure Of business." This excuse con-
tinued to be heard even after the reciprocal trade measure had been
before the Senate during two sessions, amounting to over six months'
time.30 .

In fact, the unwillingness of the Senate to adopt reciprocity

with Canada was based on the hOpe of getting more concessions. Nest

26
Tansill, pp. 19-20, Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., lst sess., p. 923.

 

27
28

Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., lst sess., p. 96h.

 

Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 62, 68.

 

2
9Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 332.

30
Iaughlin and Willis, pp. 3h-35.

 

r““

ll

important of these was the desire for free navigation of the St.
Iawrence River and other trade privileges. Furthermore, there was fear
that the use of concurrent legislation, instead of a treaty, would
leave the country "more or less at the mercy of the Canadian Parlia-
ment."31

The failure of the Canadian attempt to secure an economic pact
with the united States was only temporary. Late in 18u9 the British
government concluded that a Special representative was needed in
America and it sent Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer to Washington with in-
structions to negotiate a treaty. Upon his arrival in January, 1850,
Bulwer found that a new reciprocity bill had been introduced in the
Congress. He thought it best not to meet with American officials until
the fate of this new measure became known.32

This second bill was introduced in the House of Representatives
by Thomas Harris of Illinois. It provided for reciprocal exchange of
most natural products and for free navigation Of the St. Iawrence River.
Bulwer had been instructed to hold Canadian control of the river if
possible, but he quickly saw that the bill had no chance if free navigation
was nOt included. In a series of notes to his government he pointed
out the probable defeat of the measure unless the water route to the
Atlantic was Opened and the English Foreign Office approved this con—
cession.

This bill was debated in the House but no action was taken on it.

31Laughlin and Willis, p. 35.

32Tansill, pp. 32-37, and Shortt, pp. 237-238.

33Tansill, pp. 35-37.

12
A similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Stephen Douglas of
Illinois on January 9, 1851. Douglas made several efforts to get the
bill discussed on the floor but each attempt was ignored or defeated.

h
3 With this failure

His last futile effort was on September 21, 1851.
any chance Bulwer had of negotiating a treaty was ended. The Senate's
position made it clear that no treaty could be ratified under the
conditions which existed at the time.

Some of the causes involved in the defeat of the 1850-1851
Reciprocity Bill were different from the causes of the Grinnell Bill
failure. One reason for the defeat of the first bill had been the
lack of a provision Opening the St. Iawrence to American commerce.

This shortcoming was eliminated in the second bill. However, the later
measure was "regarded by the protectionists as a dangerous concession

to the advocates of free trade."35 An attitude closely akin to one
expressed earlier by Daniel WebSter seemed to prevail during the dis-
cussions on reciprocity. "I do,“ said.Webster, ”entertain the strongest
belief that the principle Of reciprocity acted upon by the government

is wrong, a mistake from the beginning, and injurious to the great
interests of the country.... In my Opinion, the true principle, the
phIIOSOphy of politics on the subject, is exhibited in the old navigation
law of England."36

However, the greatest enemy of the reciprocity bills was in-

difference. There was no compelling reason for the United States to

3hCong. Globe, 3lst Cong., 2nd 5838., pp. 22, 203, 293-296, 751.
35

36

 

Tensill, p. 35.

Hunts Merchant's Magazine(New York), XII, p. 263.

 

l3
ally commercially with Canada. Considering the attacks of the pro-
tectionists and general lack of interest on the part of many of the
legislators it is not surprising that the reciprocity efforts of
Canada were unsuccessful.

From 18h6 to 1852 Canada had been in a state of transition.
Shunted out of her old preferential markets in England and pushed into
the cold world of economic realities, the Canadians had turned to
annexation with the United States, then, and more practically, to
reciprocal trade. England Offered no comfort; only the United States
was strong enough to be a crutch until the colonies could stand on
their own feet. However, in spite Of two attempts from 1848 to 1851
to secure an economic alliance, the Canadians had seen their overtures
rejected. The united States was in no economic difficulty and the
infant development of Canadian business Offered nothing to attract
the attention of the commercial interests in America. The only way
to get the United States to give serious heed to Canadian pleas would
be the possession of a "lever" on the part of the provinces. If they
had something the United States wanted it could be used to negotiate
for reciprocal exchange of goods.

In the year 1853 a new series of negotiations was begun.
William.Mercy, Secretary of State in President Pierce's cabinet, and
JOhn Crampton of the British Legation in Washington, met often to
discuss terms of a reciprocity treaty. Their talks were given added
significance by the rapidly deteriorating situation at the fishing
banks off Canada. Differences of Opinion regarding the interpretation
Of the fishing rights provision of the treaty signed after the War of

1812 had put both sides in an unfriendly frame of mind.37

37

Shippee, p. 6h.

1h

By July, 1853, CramptOn and Marcy recognized that affairs had
reached a critical state. The American fishing boats were being armed
in case of Canadian interference and the United States was readying
a squadron Of war vessels to enter the disputed area to protect
American rights.38 Neither side wanted.war, but the English refused
to waive their interpretation of the forty-year—Old treaty without con-
cessions in return. The United States government wanted to secure the
right for the Maine and Massachusetts fishermen to use the inshore
waters. Canada now had something to Offer the United States and the
bargaining position of Crampton was greatly improved.

On September 1, 1853, Marcy sent the British representative an
outline of a projected treaty which included several provisions on
which there was agreement. After more discussions the projected treaty
was sent to Iondon where meetings between the American minister, James
Buchanan, and English officials were held. However, the English
showed no great haste in negotiating further on the treaty. Buchanan
and Mercy both tried to speed the process but Cramptom, described as
"chronically indolent," did not press his country for action.39
I Finally the lack of progress began to irritate President Pierce.
The fishing dispute was still not solved and the British government
had to be pushed into reaching some agreement before outright warfare
occurred.

38Tensill, p. 59. See H92§2_Ex, 223., No. 21, 33rd Cong., lst
sess., for the official dispatches of the warships.

39Tansill, pp. 55-66. Tensill goes into considerable detail in

describing the projected treaty as well as the instructions of the various
governments involved in the negotiations.

15

The President decided the best tactic would be to convert some
of the Canadian provinces to the idea of conceding fishing rights to the
Americans. TO accomplish this Israel D. Andrews was appointed a special
agent of the government. Andrews had been employed previously as a i
United States Consul to several points in Canada and as a special agent
to watch the annexation movement in 18h9.

Despite his knowledge of the provinces, Andrews did not achieve
immediate success. He was appointed to the job in September, 1853 and
on April 10, 185%, he was forced to write Marcy: "The prospect...pre-
sented Of a successful close to the Fishery negotiation is gloomy indeed...."uo

This discouraging report from.Andrews prompted the President to
authorize the special agent to Spend five thousand dollars to promote
the American claims. By the end of April Andrews had expended most of
his money to agents who were aiding him.“1

The second financial accounting of Andrews showed disbursements
of nearly nineteen thousand dollars. Dotted through it are such ref-
erences as "Contributions to Election Expenses for Gov't Candidate,"

"To P. F. Little.... He has done this government and the Treaty good

service-—$l,150.00," and "J. P. Keefe...to take certain steps in re-

 

lation to the Fisheries in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and in Nova Scotia--
$313.00." Perhaps the most informative item is the one to "W; H.
Needham, Fredericton, lst May, 185A. For £210 paid him for certain
purposes of a government and legislative character--$8h0.00." Later

in the report Andrews described Needham as a man who "presented

0
Marcy Papers, MS., Vol. xlix; cited in Tansill, p. 67.

 

1+1Tansill, p. 69.

16

resolutions in the New Brunswick Assembly adverse to the surrender of
the fisheries.”2 After this "disbursement" had been made "Mr.
Needham's Opposition evaporated and he became an earnest supporter of
the Treaty."h3

While Andrews was softening up the Opposition in the Maritime
Provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, the
English government had finally tired of the unfruitful months of
diplomatic sparring and was willing to modify some of its demands to
reach a conclusion of the fishing dispute. A special envoy, Lord
Elgin, was sent to the united States to negotiate an agreement. Witty,
charming and with great capabilities, Elgin did not rush to the con-
ference table, an act which might have frightened Off the American
government: Instead he dined with leading Congressmen, attended teas
and receptions, and generally struck the pose of a vacationing dignitary.

After ten days of relaxation" during which Washington officials had

almost decided he had come for a visit and was not interested in any
sort Of treaty, Elgin suddenly confronted Marcy with the information
that an English-American treaty involving reciprocity with Canada could
be ratified by the Senate.M4 Marcy was greatly surprised, but within
u2Pierce Papers, Ms., vol. iv; cited by Tansill, p. 73. Shippee,
p. 76, asserts that Andrews spent over fifty thousand dollars on his
pr0paganda campaign, much of which came from his own pocket. In 1858 a

special apprOpriation by Congress reimbursed him in full, but not before
he had been in jail for debt.

h3

 

Tensill, p. 73.

c——-¢-——_—_

pp. 36-h6; cited in Tansill, pp. 77—79. Oliphant exhibited a tendency
to exaggerate but there is little doubt that his account portrays the im-
pression Elgin was trying to create during the early part of his stay in
Washington.

17
three days he and the British representative had signed the treaty and
it was on its way to the Senate for approval.

The treaty was submitted to the Senate on June 19 and was
ratified on August 2, lash, by a vote of 32 to 11.1“5 The President
signed the pact on August 5. The Canadians expressed joy at their
victory; reciprocity was theirs. The British and American governments
were satisfied; the near conflict in the North Atlantic over the
fisheries had been averted.

The Specific clause that settled the fishing dispute provided
the Americans with the right to fish the waters off the Canadian
coastline and to cure their catch on the unoccupied sections of shore-
line. In return for this the fishermen of the British North American
colonies were given the same privileges in American waters}+ ' This
clause was favorable to both sides and during the Operation of the
treaty it ended the friction which had plagued the fisherman of both
countries before 185A.

From the American point of view the Opening of the St. Iawrence
was the most important part of the treaty, especially for the Great
Lakes states. Article V stated that the canals and.waters lying within
Canadian domain would be Open to American ships subject only to tolls
which were charged to the Canadian traffic. In return Canadian vessels
were given the unrestricted use of Lake Michigan.

The Opening of the St. Lawrence was an answer to the prayers of
the shippers in the American West. The agitation for an outlet to the

h5§§g ggggg§l(washington, 1887), vol. 8x, p. 339, 376; cited by
Tensill, p. 79.

h
6The text of the treaty appears in the Appendix.

18
Atlantic had been growing steadily stronger in the years before l85h.
The merchants of Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit and the other lake ports
were enamoured by the thought of a direct route to EurOpe.h7 Typical
of the pressure brought to bear on the Congress was a petition signed
by eighty-seven "Citizens of the United States Residing in the Valley
Of the Northwestern Lakes” pointing out that ”the value of western
productions had been greatly reduced to the grower, and diet Of_
foreign greatly increased to the western consumer, by reason of the
inadequate means of transit between the agricultural...west and the
manufacturing producers of the east...." The petition further ob-
served that the Erie Canal "has been overtaxed with business...and
brought...ruin upon the shipper" on many Occasions.

The reciprocity provision placed many natural products and
agricultural commodities on the free list. The most important were
grain, flour, live animals and meats, coal, timber and all kinds of
unworked lumber, wool, ores of metals and fish and fish products.

It is interesting to note that Israel Andrews listed the major exports
of the northern colonies as "lumber, wheat, flour, vegetables, seeds,
ashes, wool, eggs, and coarse grain for distilling."h9 Every one of
these products was on the free list. Conspicuously absent were manu-
_ factured goods, but the American industrialists had been assured that
the increaSed_trade which reciprocity would create would also increase

the demand for manufactured goods in the provinces.

h
7Masters, pp. 211-212.

hBSenate Misc. Doc., No. 111, 3lst Cong., lst sess., pp. 1-2.

 

h
9Senate Ex. Doc., No. 23, 3lst Cong., 2nd sess., p. 30.

19

The treaty was to be in effect for at least ten years. After
that it could be terminated by either party on one year's notice. It
was to become binding as soon as the laws required to put it into Oper—
atiOn had been passed by the British and provincial parliaments on one
side and the Congress of the United States on the other. The legis-
lative approval was easily accomplished by the governments involved
and the treaty was in Operation early in 1855.

Several years of progress in both Canada and the united States
followed the ratification of the reciprocity treaty. Masters describes
these years as "a period of phenomenal development...where new lands
were being Opened to settlement and population was rapidly increasing,
particularly in the region bordering the Great Lakes."50

However, to ascribe this prosperity to the treaty alone would
not be the whole story. Throughout the Operation of the treaty there
were a series of abnormal events that influenced trade and made an
exact estimate of the effect of the treaty nearly impossible.

The first event which increased business activity in the
Canadian provinces and the United States was the Crimean War(l85h-l856).
England, deeply involved in the conflict, found her usual Black Sea
imports of grain completely cut off. The demand for breadstuffs in
England stimulated the agricultural regions to greater production and
promoted the expansion of the transportation system to the Atlantic

1
coast to carry the growing export trade.5 This sudden demand for

grain had a particularly strange effect on Canadian agriculture. The

50
Masters, p. 180.

1
Masters, pp. 182-183.

 

20

Canadian Merchant's Magazine noted: "Hamilton, Toronto, and other

 

Canadian cities have lately become large importers Of butter, cheese
and vegetables from the United States. The high price Of wheat has
doubtless given an undue preference to its cultivation...and at the
present time there is an excellent Opening for a large number of market
gardeners in the neighbourhood of most Canadian cities."52

Canadian prosperity, however, did not last. In 1858 the grain
harvest was poor. At the same time a financial crisis occurred in
England, a consequence of the war in the Crimea. The result for
Canada was a severe depression. This depression halted Canadian in-
vestments in canals and railroad building. The provinces suddenly
found themselves over-extended in their internal improvements and it
was necessary for the government to rescue many municipalities and
railroads through large subsidies to preserve the advances made
during the boom period.53

A depression also hit the Uhited States beginning in 1857.
Many individuals, firms and Western cities and counties went bankrupt.
Railroad construction was halted and in New York it was necessary tO
call out federal trOOps to protect the Sub-Treasury from mobs. However,
by 1860 recovery in both the United States and Canada had begun.

Barely had the effects Of the depression eased when the American

Civil war broke out. This worked to the advantage of the Canadians,

for the United States imported huge quantities of foodstuffs and raw

52
53

June, 1857; quoted in Shortt, p. 2h7.

Masters, p. 183.

21

[materials for the war effort. Particularly needed for the armies were
horses and many were sold to buyers of the Union army for cavalry
detachments.

Thus it is evident that the reciprocity treaty alone did not
influence the course Of business between the two countries. On the
other hand, the treaty cannot be dismissed as having no effect. The
natural lines of communication between the provinces and the United
States ran north and south. This geographic fact led to the use of
Canadian products in America and American goods in the provinces.5h
For example, it proved to be simple to ship Ontario's goods through
the United States for consumption or re-export rather than use the
Often ice-blocked St. Lawrence River. Similarly, much Canadian lumber
was shipped into the eastern states instead of American timber being
transported over the Appalachians to the population centers.

In summary, the general Operation Of the treaty promoted the
trade Of both countries, and with the increased markets stimulated by
two wars, provided periods of boom from 185k to 1857 and again after
the outbreak of the American Civil war. The problem which now needs
answering is why did the United States decide to abrogate the treaty
at the end Of the stipulated ten years? Apparently business and
commerce, both in Canada and America, benefited. But there were
forces which drove a wedge into the harmonious relationship and led
to the abrogation of the treaty in 1865 by the American Congress.

The first American Opposition to the treaty came in 1858 and

was based on economic considerations. The depression in Canada

5b.
Masters, pp. 185-186.

22

caused a sudden and unexpected drOp in government revenue. The
ambitious railroad construction program sponsored by the provinces
was Just beginning to show results, but the demands of interest pay-
ments were pressing. At the time when more income was needed to meet
Obligations the revenues were falling because of the economic crisis.
There was but one way to raise money and that was to increase the import
duties. Of course American goods on the free list under the reciprocity
treaty were exempt. However, any other commodity could have higher
duties put on it if the provincial legislature approved. Faced with
bankruptcy, the Canadians had no choice. In Canada(Quebec and Ontario)
for example, the duty on molasses was increased from 11 per cent in
1857 to 30 per cent in 1859; the tariff on refined sugar was raised
from 25 per cent in 1857 to #0 per cent in 1859; the duty on iron
products was increased from 15 to 20 per cent and on boots and shoes
from 17% per cent to 25 per cent.56 American exporters and manu-
facturers were hurt by these substantial increases.

American protests regarding the tariff increases were immediate.
Canada undoubtedly possessed the legal right to change the duty on
any product not on the treaty's free list. However, some American
Observers professed to see a moral issue in the situation. Israel
Hatch, a former Congressman from New York and author Of several
Treasury Department Reports, wrote: "Viewed as a question of national
integrity, the conduct of the Canadian Parliament in thus taxing the

products of American industry almost to their exclusion from the

55Masters, pp. ll3-llh.

6
House Ex. Doc., No. 96, 36th Cong., lst sess., p. 10.

23
Province must be pronounced to be a violation not only of the letter and
spirit of the treaty but of the amnity and good faith in which it was

conceived, and without which all international obligations are unavail—

57

ing.
Representative Elijah Ward Of New York also believed the
Canadian tariffs were unfair to American interests. In a speech to
'the House on May 18, 186h, Ward asserted that "the effect of the
Canadian tariffs enacted since 1855...[has] been to decrease very
materially the amount of manufactures and goods Of foreign origin
sold by the people Of this country to those of the Provinces. This
alone...[is] sufficient reason for the revision Of our mutual commercial
relations...."58
Not only were the Canadians in need Of money but there was a
growing sentiment in favor Of protection in both countries. When the
Reciprocity Treaty was ratified the freer-traders in both countries
had been dominant. Soon, however, there was a reaction in the direction
Of protection.59 In the United States, the rising influence Of the
Republican Party started the country leaning toward protection. This
was accelerated by the withdrawal Of the Southern states at the start
Of the Civil War.
57House Ex. Doc., No. 96, 36th Cong. ., lst sess. p. 15. Hatch

showed little love for the treaty at any time and was one Of the business—
men who desired to have it ended.

8
5 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst. sess., p. 2335.

59He1en G Macdonald, Canadian Public Opinion Of the American
Civil War Studies in History, Economics, and Public law, (New York,

19255 PP Sh- 55.

O
Macdonald, p. 55.

 

23
Province must be pronounced to be a violation not only of the letter and
spirit of the treaty but Of the amnity and good faith in which it was

conceived, and without which all international Obligations are unavail-

57

ing.
Representative Elijah Ward Of New York also believed the
Canadian tariffs were unfair to American interests. In a speech to
'the House on May 18, 186h, Ward asserted that "the effect of the
Canadian tariffs enacted since 1855...[has] been to decrease very
materially the amount Of manufactures and goods of foreign origin
sold by the peOple of this country to those Of the Provinces. This

.1
alone...[isJ sufficient reason for the revision of our mutual commercial

58

relations...."

Not only were the Canadians in need of money but there was a
growing sentiment in favor of protection in both countries. When the
Reciprocity Treaty was ratified the freer-traders in both countries
had been dominant. Soon, however, there was a reaction in the direction
of protection.59 In the United States, the rising influence Of the
Republican Party started the country leaning toward protection. This
was accelerated by the withdrawal Of the Southern states at the start
of the Civil War.60

57House Ex. pog., NO. 96, 36th Cong., lst sess. p. 15. Hatch

showed little 165e for the treaty at any time and was one of the business-
men who desired to have it ended.

 

8
5 Cong, Globe, 38th Cong., lst. sess., p. 2335.

 

59Helen G. Macdonald, Canadian Public Opinion of the American
Civil war, Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, (New York,

19265,??- 5h-55.

O
Macdonald, p. 55.

 

2h

The economic policy Of the Republicans was established by the
MOrrill Tariff, passed soon after the Republicans assumed control Of
Congress. Among other things, it increased the duties on iron and
wOOl(Canadian imports excepted because of the treaty) in a none-too-
secret effort to pull Pennsylvania and some of the Western states
securely into the new party.61

A few weeks after the MOrrill Act became law the Civil War
broke out. The northern states suddenly found themselves in a
position much like that of the Canadians in 1858--they needed money.
As soon as the special session Of Congress was convened in the summer
Of 1861 new customs duties were imposed, From.this time until the
end of the war the scale Of duties was increased steadily.

The need for higher government income to fight the South and
the desire Of many Republicans to protect American industry combined
to create a group of Opponents to the treaty who based their argu-
ments on economic grounds. They noted that large amounts of revenue
were being sacrificed because of the free imports from Canada. Further,
the absence of duty on goods from the provinces made it impossible
to tax the commodities on the free list which were grown in America
without danger Of pricing such products out Of their own markets.63

While Congress was shut Out Of some fields of revenue by the

treaty there was a less-evident cause for discontent among the American

6
1F. W} Taussig, The Tariff History Of the Uhited States, 8th

ed.(New York and London, 19313, pp. 158-1607‘

62
Taussig, p. 160.

 

 

6
3Masters, p. 152; Shippee, p. 159.

25
manufacturers. dhen the treaty was ratified they had been assured that
trade in duty—paying exports would increase along with the trade in
the commodities on the free list. However, by 1860 it had become
evident that this prediction had not proved accurate. The grudging
approval given by the manufacturing interests in 185k had turned to
dissatisfaction in 1860, largely because little upturn in the traffic
of finished products had been Observed.

Perhaps the best summary of the disapproval Of the manufacturing
group appeared in the Hatch Report. Hatch declared: ”The statesmanlike
ideas prevalent at the time when the treaty became law, anticipating
the removal Of all unnecessary restrictions between two neighboring
States are in strong contrast with the realities of to—day."65
Indeed, the "realities" amply illustrated that the trade barriers between
Canada and the United States were growing and only the treaty was
preventing a return to pre-l85h status between the two nations.

Not only were the industrialists Opposed to the results of
the treaty but the lumbering and agricultural interests were also
unhappy with its Operation. Competition from Canadian timber led
Senator Jacob Collamer of Vermont to ask: "Can our friends in Maine,
or in the Western country, compete with these people [Canadians at
the present price Of labor, etc., in America when they bring lumber
here free of duty from Nova Scotia and Canada? Why, sir, it is

66

impossible." The law-makers fearing that agricultural products

6h
Masters, pp. 1&8-lh9.

SHouse Ex. Doc., No. 96, 36th Cong., lst sess., p. 19.

Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., Jan. 11, 1865, p. 210.

26
from Canada hurt the western farmers pointed out that many farmers were
moving to Canada. There grain could be grown with less cost and was
assured of a market because of the Reciprocity Treaty. This migration,
it was claimed, could be stOpped by ending reciprocity.67

Accompanying the economic arguments against the treaty was
the resentment engendered by the actions Of Canada and England during
the Civil war. From the outbreak of the conflict the policy of the
foreign powers rubbed painfully on the northern states. As the war
dragged on longer than anyone had predicted the pent-up emotions Of
the North focused on the seemingly damaging performances Of England
and her North American colonies.

Resentment was first stirred up in the northern states by
England's recognition of the South as a belligerent. When the dependence
of England on the cotton of the South is considered this hardly seems
surprising. Furthermore, the wide-spread sympathy for the South that
was evident in the English press and in Parliament caused considerable
irritation in the North.

While English recognition Of southern belligerency incited the
ire Of the North, the T£§n§_affair created a wider gulf between the two
North Atlantic powers. The removal Of two Confederate representatives,
John Slidell and James Mason, from the British vessel ngnt by an
American warship met with universal approval in the North and universal

disapproval in England. England's juStifiable protests were greeted

679225- Q1222. 38th Cong , lst sess., may 19, 186A, p. 2370.

68Masters, pp. 132-133.

27
in the North with intense animosity and talk circulated that a war,
including an invasion of Canada, was imminent.69 Canada did not help
matters any because a large section of the provincial press supported
the motherland.

The feelings against England were intensified by the "loose‘
neutrality Of that country. Despite Officially proclaimed neutrality,
England still allowed the Confederates to build several warships in
English shipyards. The most famous of these was the Alabama. This
ship created a mild threat to the Northern blockade of the Southern
ports but, aside from inflaming the peOple of the North, it did little
damage.7O

Canada, along with England, soon was the object of Northern scorn.
The primary cause of this was the group Of ex-Southerners, draft dodgers
and Confederate agents that had gathered in Canada for refuge or other
purposes. "Canada, it was believed, welcomed the expatriated Rebels."71
The northern states were worried that these elements might conspire to
endanger the North.

The fears of the Northerners were proven correct when, on
October 21, 186A, the town of St. Albans, Vermont, was raided from
Canada by Southern agents. Public Opinion rose to a fever pitch.
Canada was regarded as little short Of an Outright enemy, and the
successes Of Grant near Richmond and Sherman's march to Atlanta

69Shippee, p. 116; also see James M. Callahan, American Foreigg
Policy 12 Canadian Relations(New York, 1937), pp. 273-27h.

 

 

O
7 Ephriam Douglass Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil
War, 2 vols.(Gloucester, Mass., 1957), II, pp. 116-152.

71

 

Shippee, pp. 12H-125.

28
allowed the North to speculate on the post-war fate Of Canada. Many
peOple favored an “expansionistic” move to the north by means of marching
the Union armies into Canadian territory.

In fairness to the Canadians it should be stated that the raiders
had violated no laws until they left for St. Albans. Indeed, in the
British provinces there was "much indignation...directed against the
- 73
Confederates for their attempt to use Canada as a base of Operations...."
But this was a minor sentiment compared to the spasm of fear that
swept across the states which bordered on the British possessions.

American public Opinion favored immediate retalitory action but
officials of both governments disliked the prospect Of war. Macdonald
believes that the heads Of both sides wanted peace. She declares:

To the sanity of the leadership in the governments Of these two

countries may be attributed the fact that war was averted.

Whatever accusations might, with justice, have been brought

against the individual British subject, not once did the

Canadian Government deviate from the rules enjoined upon a

neutral power. Confidential information Of...Confederate plots...

was transmitted to the American Government.... The Canadian

Government did not intend that the Confederates should abuse

the...right Of asylum, freely extended to Northerner and

Southerner alike.... The Canadian Government maintaine

throughout the American struggle a consistent policy.

The political effect of the war on the treaty, which had nearly
run its first ten years in 186k, was pronounced. Joshua Giddings wrote
to his son on January 17, 186A:

When I saw that members of the Canadian Parliament were here to

secure the renewal Of the Reciprocity treaty I...determined to
arouse our government to such a sense Of its own dignity as will

72Shippee, p. 125.

73Macdonald, p. 106.

7h
Macdonald, p. 158.

29
teach our Canadian neighbors that while England sends out her
ships under secession flags to prey upon our Commerce and
Canada sends her blockade runners to feed and clothe the rebels
and her presses are constantly slandering our President..
I think it most extraordinary for them to call on us to con- 75
tinue to hold our markets Open for their produce free of duty.
Thus the "wrongs” done by England and Canada during the Civil war,
‘the economic inequalities in the treaty that alienated the powerful
Ieastern manufacturers, the dissatisfactions of the agricultural
interests, and the rising tide of protectionism led to the intro-
duction Of a joint resolution in the American Congress for the term-
ination Of the treaty. This resolution, presented in January, 1865,76
was supported by most Of the country and in March, 1865, the earliest
possible date under the provisions of the treaty, the President announced
the abrOgation Of the pact in twelve months' time.

Laughlin and flillis think it was "astonishing" that the British
provinces would let such an advantageous agreement lapse,77 but in
reality they could have done nothing about it. The political hate and
the economic dissatisfactions in the United States were too extensive to
Overcome, even with an all-out Canadian-English campaign. The prevailing
emotional pitch was against anything English. Denial of aid and support
to the North made them enemies Of the Union. The chances for con-

tinuing the treaty in such an atmosphere were small; there was virtually

no support for it in America.

75William Overman, ed, "Some letters of Joshua R. Giddings on
Reciprocity", Canadian Historical Review, XVII (1935), p. 292.

6 .
7 Cong, Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 23h.
77

 

 

Laughlin and Willis, p. 65.

30

CHAPTER II

Michigan's views regarding reciprocity with Canada are important
in understanding that movement as a whole. The state was part of the
rapidly-growing western area. New peOple, new industries and new hOpes
were her characteristics. Settled enough to have stable and functioning
institutions, yet young enough to experience "growing pains," Michigan's
position on the issue of reciprocity is worth recording and analyzing.

If one word could be picked to describe Michigan in the years
before 1850 it would be "dynamic." The great wave Of migration had not
reached.Nuchigan until after 1825, relatively late when compared with
the states along the Ohio River. However, in twenty-five years much
of Michigan had been wrested from the forests and swamplands.

In 1850 Michigan was a product of its still rustic environment.
GeOgraphically she was isolated from the East except by the Great Lakes
route. Her pOpulation was predominantly rural and her economy was based
on the soil and natural resources Of the region.

The population Of the State in 1850 was 397,965.1 Of this number
21,0192 lived in Detroit, the only city of consequence in the state.

The rest of the population was scattered in small towns or on farms
throughout the southern part of the state. The towns served as centers
Of local trade and provided necessary goods and services to the farmers.

lMich. Sec. of State, Census and Statistics 9f_Michigan, l86h
(Lansing, 1865), p. 6H7.

 

 

2 .
U. 3. Census, 1850(Washington, 1853), p. 896.

 

31

One of the most important products of Michigan farms was bread-
stuffs, particularly wheat and corn. In 1850 the Secretary of State's
report listed wheat production at more than h,750,000 bushels and all
other grains at just over 8,000,000 bushels.3 Of course, large
quantities of vegetables and other products were grown but these were
mainly for consumption by the farmers themselves.

Another important product Of Michigan farms was wool. This
commodity had been introduced as part of the farm economy after wheat
and corn. The wool clip in 1850 was 1,77h,368 pounds compared with just
over 153,000 pounds in 18LLO.h The rising production of wool made a
significant contribution tO the export trade Of the state. In 1850
Michigan had no woolen mills and the entire clip was exported to the
eastern states.

The infant development Of industry in the state was directly tied
to the agriculture and natural products Of the area. There were 228
flour mills, some powered by horses, the majority powered by water.
These were distributed over the southern part Of the state to aid the
grain growers by grinding breadstuffs into easily-transported flour.

The lumber industry in the state was served by 730 sawmills.6
In 1850 "the ax Of the Lumberman had scarcely scarred the borders Of

the mighty forests.... Israel Andrews, in one Of his early reports

to Congress, referred to Michigan as "the chief lumber reserve of the

3Michigan Lagislature, Joint Documents, NO. h, 1850.

 

h

Michigan Legislature, Joint Doc., NO. n, 1850.
5Mich. Legislature, Joint Doc., No. 4, 1850.
6Mich. Legislature, Joint Doc., No. h, 1850.

Lawton T. Hemans, History 9£_Michi an, (Lansing, 1906), p. 215.

32
o "8 a 0
western United States. Though there was plenty of timber available
the problem was to get it out Of the remote districts. Numerous pleas
were made for better transportation into the logging areas. One example

appeared in the Detroit Free Press. A group Of "residents" Of Lapeer

 

County were asking for a plank road to reach the ‘rich and almost in-

exhaustable pineries.“9

Another industry which had just started in the state was mining.
Despite huge investments the returns had been very slight.10 The value
Of COpper ore shipped over the portage at Sault Ste. Marie in the years
l8h5-18h7 totaled only $163,000.11 In 1853 only about 2,800 tons Of ore
were moved between Lake Superior and Lake Huron.12 The output of the
iron mines was even smaller. The earliest reliable figures, those for
1855, place the amount of iron produced in Michigan at about 1,500 tons.13
Some mines, like the Jackson Iron Works on the Carp River had been
"doing a considerable business" since l8h8.11+

There was little local processing of the ores mined in the

state. Some small iron smelters were located in the iron country but

their production was limited. Much Of the COpper ore was partially

8
Sen. Ex, Doc., NO. 23, Blst Cong., 2nd sess., p. 31.

9April'23, 18h8.

For an analysis of the investments in Michigan copper see
‘William B. Gates, Jr., Michigan COpper and Boston Dollars: An Economic

Histogy of the Michigan Copper Mining IndustryICambridge, 1951).
ll

 

 

Detroit Daily Advertiser, Aug. 18, 18h8.

 

12
Detroit Free Press, March 30, 185h.

 

la , .
ensus and Statistics of Michigan, l86h, p. 1111.
1h

 

 

Detroit Free Press, JUne 6, l8h8.

 

33
processed at the mine before shipment but there was no COpper smelting.
Only in Detroit was there any notable processing of ore. There a "large"
cOpper smelter had been erected in 181915 and the Fulton Iron and Engine
Wbrks had been formed in 1851.16 However, these were of minor importance,
most Of the ore being shipped to Cleveland and other Lake Erie ports
for processing.

The transportation route to the East was the Great Lakes.
Detroit was the state's chief port handling most of the commerce in and
out of the region. The registered tonnage Of ships based at Detroit
was estimated at 29,000 tons in 181+8.l7 This figure did not include
vessels from other lake cities which normally stopped at the Michigan
city.

Within the state transportation was primarily dependent on the
railroads which had been constructed from Detroit into the interior.
The Michigan Central Railroad connected Detroit with Ypsilanti, Ann
Arbor, Jackson, Albion, Marshall, Battle Creek, Kalamazoo and, by 1852,
reached Chicago.18 The Michigan Southern ran from Detroit west through
Adrian and Hillsdale. This line was also extended to Chicago in 1852.19

The primary function Of these two railroads was to bring the grain and

other products to Detroit for shipment to the East and to take imports

1
5Detroit Daily Advertiser, Sept. 5, l8h9.
l6
Silas Farmer, The History_gf_Detroit and Michigan(Detroit,
l8hh), p. 806.

 

 

 

1
7Detroit Free Press, July 21, l8h8.

 

18Farmer, pp. 895-900.

1
9F. Clever Bald, Michigan 1g Four Centuries)New York, l95h),
pp. 2h6-2h7.

 

3A
into the agricultural regions of the state. There were several shorter
roads Operating in the state in 1850 but the through routes were the more
important.

Some indication Of Michigan's economy can be derived from the
statistics of trade from Michigan ports to foreign countries and foreign
trade entering the state. In the fiscal year l8h8—18h9 Michigan ports
exported goods valued $132,851. In the same period $98,1h0 worth Of
goods were received in the state.20 The fiscal year 1851-1852 showed
exports of $lh5,l52 of goods and imports into the state valued at
3319621121

By 1852-1853 the amounts had increased considerably. The
exports of the state were valued at $353,685 and the imports totaled
$211,230.22 MOst Of these transactions involved Canada because the St.
Iawrence River route to the Atlantic was not sufficiently developed to
allow vessels Of any size to pass from the Ocean into the Great Lakes.
Since only goods destined for Canadian ports were shipped from Detroit
the figures quoted indicate that trade between Michigan and Canada
was extensive and important to the economies Of both.

According to the ”Commerce and Navigation" reports most Of the

imports from Canada to Detroit were hay, flour, lumber, wheat and furs.

20
Report of the Secretary of the Treasury. .Of the Commerce

Navigation Of the United States, House Ex. Doc. ., NO. 15, 3lst Cong., lst
sess. ., p. 305.

21
Report of the Secretary Of the Treasury.. .Of the Commerce and

Navigation of the United States, House Ex. Doc , unnumbered, 32nd Cong. .,

 

 

 

 

 

 

2

Report of_the Secretary of the Treasury...of the Commerce and
Navigation of_the United States, House EX. Doc., unnumbered, 33rd Cong.,
lst sess., vol. 19.

 

 

 

35
HOwever, almost every article grown or produced in the provinces was
included in small amounts.

The tariff act of 18h6 was the basis of the federal economic
policy. It had been passed by the Democrats and, in general, reduced
the duties on iron and metal goods, paper, glass, leather manufactures
and wood to thirty per cent of their value. This was in contrast to
the Whig tariff of 18h2 which was a "distinctly protective" measure.21+
The 18h6 act cannot be classified as a free trade or tariff—for-revenue
measure. This enactment did nothing more than lower some of the rates,
maintaining the basically protective nature of the 18h2 law.

In Michigan the freer trade-protectionist conflict was drawn on
party lines. The Democrats of the state were in favor of reducing
tariff barriers while the Whigs wanted the infant industries protected
from foreign competition. Between the years 1837, when Michigan
became a state, and lBSh, only one Nhig served as Governor-—William

2
WOodbridge, in 18hO-18hi. 5

Thus, before the signing of the Reciprocity
Treaty Michigan had been a solid Democratic state and consequently
freer trade was an objective of her leaders.

The Detroit Free Press, the leading Democratic organ in the

 

state, never ceased taunting the Whigs on tariff policy. In 1851 the
paper printed a comparison of the tariff acts passed by the two parties.
One column was entitled "necessities" and was carefully prepared to

show the Democrats protecting the interests of the "little man.“

The article noted that plow chains were charged 100 per cent of value

23
See also Detroit Free Press, Aug. 2, 18h8.

 

2 ,
hTaussig, pp. ll3-llh.

25Hemans, p. 185.

36

by the Whigs and 30 per cent by the Democrats; anvils were assessed at
#5 per cent of value under the Whigs and 30 per cent by the Democrats;
low-priced wine was #9 per cent under the Whigs and 30 per cent under the
Democrats; sugar was charged 62 per cent duty by the Nhigs and 30 per cent
by the Democrats; and wool duties were #5 per cent under the Whigs and 30
per cent under the Democrats.26

The same article further endeavored to portray the Whigs as the
party of the wealthy aristocrats. The tariffs placed on the "luxuries
of life" were much lower under the Whigs than under the Democrats. For
example, the duty on fine liquors averaged about 9 per cent of value
under the Whigs and 30 per cent under the Democrats. Gems were
assessed at 7% per cent by the Nhigs and 30 per cent by the Democrats.
The duties in fine imported cloth were nearly doubled by the Democrats.
In short, the Democrats stood for the laboring classes and the Whigs
for the upper groups.

The Michigan Democrats seldom failed to make use of the tariff
issue during a campaign. Volumes of pronouncements on the subject
exist. The most prominent theme was that the "few" were being aided
by the Whigs: "Protective tariffs are nothing but a cunningly devised
system to cheat and rob the many for the benefit of the few. It is

time the peOple in this enlightened age should teach those class

interests, that government is not made to Oppress and rob one portion of

2
the peOple, and that by far the greatest number, to enrich another." 7
26Dec. 6, 1851.
27

Detroit Free Press, Aug. 2%, 1850.

 

37
Particularly significant in the freer-trade-protection contro-
versy in Michigan was the position Of the farmers. Undoubtedly the
Whigs were hampered by their close alliance with the manufacturing
interests. The political sense of the Democrats would not let this

fact lie quietly. Said the Free Press: "The purpose Of the Whigs is...

 

to arrange the duties primarily with reference to the Protection of

Individual interests. They act in the first place avowedly for the

 

purpose Of protecting individual manufacturers. It is but just to
say that they include the agriculturist and propose to levy heavy
28

duties on his productions."

The Free Press believed that the farmers needed more foreign

 

markets in which to sell their goods. The Democratic paper noted:
"The policy of the farmers...is to buy in the cheapest market, and
sell in the dearest. This can alone be effected by a liberal commercial
intercourse with foreign nations, and an extensive exchange of com—<
nodities peculiar to each."2

The Democrats in Michigan argued that the Whigs, by raising

import duties, would reduce the amount of foreign commerce. The

Free Press claimed that the Whigs wanted "to raise the tariff,

 

prohibit foreign commerce in order to get a market for the farmer's

 

surplus flour!--Prohibit foreign commerce in order to get a foreign

market."30

28Detroit Free Press, July 9, 1851.

 

29
march 9, 1852.

30July 15, 1851.

38
Similarly, the advocates of freer trade could point Out that
the Whigs were likely to push the cost of important products imported
from abroad to higher levels by imposing increased duties. They observed
that the Whigs would ”Rai§e_the duties on sugar, in order to make
sugar cheaper to the farmerll! In other words, they would charge two

cents a pound, specific duty, when it is now admitted for three-fourths

of a cent a pound, in order that the farmer might have his sugar

31
cheaper."

William Anderson, a "plain unlettered farmer" from Ann Arbor,

 

wrote in 1853 to the Secretary of the Treasury, James Guthrie, con-
cerning the high cost Of goods to the farmers. He said: "The
agricultural community of the West are glad to learn that the duties on
imported goods are to be reduced.... The laboring class Of our country
have had a heavy load of taxes to pay for a long series of years,
through the workings of high tariffs."32
Anderson's letter however, contained one direct contradiction
to his stand for free trade. Being a farmer he was loath to see the
duty on wool reduced. He noted that "the manufacturers...intend
besieging Congress to repeal the duty on wool. To this the farmer is
decidedly Opposed.... we ask only equal rights with other farmers, we
‘Vill not object to the duty being reduced as much on wool as foreign
(dry—goods, but no more. The masses of the people will not allow them-

:3e1ves to be longer rode down by bloated corporations. Taxing the

Ixeople for the benefit Of the few is not the way to make the country

31
Detroit Free Press, July 15, 1851.

 

32
Senate Ex. Doc., NO. 7%, 33rd Cong., lst sess., pp. h3-h5.

39

prosperous and happy."33

Thus the stand of the Michigan farmers presents a curious
spectacle. On general tariff policy they sided with the Democrats in
desiring freer trade, but when wool duties were involved they were
_Whigs, ardently hoping that the tariffs would be kept at a high level to
protect them from the competition of foreign wool.

As far as industry was concerned the Democrats believed there
was no need for a protective tariff. They held that "there is now no
industrial interest in the United States that EEEQE protection--needs
it we mean, according to the idea of those protectionists who advocate
prohibitionary duties 'for the encouragement of American industry.'"3h

Of course the tariff act of 18h6, a Democratic measure, was held

to be beneficial to the state. The Detroit Free Press commented in

 

18h9: "The successful Operation of the democratic anti-Protective
Tariff, under the management and control Of the late administration, has
exceeded our most sanguine hOpes."35
The Michigan Whigs experienced difficulty in combatting the
arguments of the Democrats. The farmers could see no reason for high
tariffs to protect industry. 'The only obvious result of raising import
duties on textiles was increased prices for dry goods. Furthermore,

the early 1850's was a time Of prosperity and many feared that tampering

with the tariff act might end this situation. On the whole, the most

33§§2§Eg_§5. 223., N0. 7h, 33rd Cong., lst sess., pp. h3-h5.

h
3 Detroit Free Press, Aug. 20, 1853.

 

35June 1, 18h9; also see Detroit Free Press, May 29, Sept.
20, 1851.

 

ho

important reasons for the farmers to desire freer trade were the
Opportunities to develop foreign markets and the desire to keep prices
on manufactured goods at a low level.

The opinions in the state on reciprocity were naturally colored
by the general adherence to the Democratic Party's hOpe for freer trade.
As would be expected, party divisions played a prominent role in the
arguments on the problem. The exchanges between the two Detroit papers,

the Whig Daily Advertiser and the Democratic Free Press, pointed up the

 

 

controversy.
When the first reciprocity bill was introduced in the united

States Congress the Detroit Free Press did not immediately Jump to its

 

support. In February, l8h8, the paper quoted the TOronto Colonist.

 

The Canadian paper noted: "It appears that the markets of the United
States will be Opened for the sale of Canadian products. We are in-
formed that, in anticipation of the introduction of our produce into
the united States free of duty, some of our enterprising neighbors are

6
now purchasing wheat in Canada...."3 In May, 18h8, the Free Press

 

Quoted the OswegO(New York) Times in regard to the reciprocal trade bill.
The eastern paper contained a favorable editorial on the reciprocity

37
bill, recommending the prOposal for prompt action in the Congress. In

Ju1y the editor of the Free Press acknowledged the receipt of a COpy
38

 

Of the commercial Offer from Canada. In August it commented

editorially: "The trade of our Canadian neighbors with this city is

36
Feb. 7, lane.

37
Detroit Free Press, May 20, l8h8.
38

 

July 18, 18u8.

hl
greatly increasing.... The reciprocal trade bill that was lately passed
[hy the House of Representatives]...will in great measure affect our
interest, but whether for good or evil we are not prepared to Judge at
present."39
In the summer Of l8h9 the paper attacked the President, Zachary
Taylor, for misunderstanding the agricultural issues involved in
reciprocity. It stated: "We have always heard that the General
understood agriculture very well.... On a late occasion a.gfintleman
from one of the provinces...called upon Gen. Taylor, and after being
introduced, engaged with conversation with him on the subject of
reciprocal duties between the provinces and the United States--'Yes',
said the Second washington, 'reciprocity.’ Have the potatoes in your
country got the rot?--See Clayton about reciprocity. Let us talk of
agriculturefl'hO While this story was probably exaggerated the fact

that it appeared indicated the interest in reciprocity on the part of

the Free Press as well as the significant place of agriculture in any

 

agreement that might be drawn up between the United States and Canada.
As the prospects of a reciprocity pact became more promising in

1853 the Free Press carried a report Of the House Committee on Commerce

 

given bvaepresentative Seymour of New York. This report was highly
favorable to a reciprocity agreement on the grounds that it would aid
the commercial centers, provide free navigation Of the St. Iawrence,
help the farmers, and eventually increase the revenues through increased

trade in duty—paying goods. After summarizing this report the paper
39Aug. 2, l8h8.»

hOJuly 25, 18h9.

#2

added its views on the impact the prOposed measure would have on the
state: "This movement is one of very deep interest to all the Northern
States, and in this interest Michigan has a full share. Her close
contiguity to the Canadian border, and her easy access to the lines of
transit-~both canal and railroad--which are already, and soon will be,
completed in the Provinces, serve to make our citizens watch narrowly

1+1

every step that is taken toward reciprocal trade with our neighbors."

In early 185% the Free Press definitely supported a reciprocal

 

trade arrangement with Canada, emphasizing the benefits which the
commercial community of Detroit would receive. It commented:
"Reciprocal trade with Canada, and the free navigation of the St.
Iawrence, are measures Of international policy Of deep interest...
in which Michigan has full share. With a treaty between the governments
of Great Britain and the United States establishing these measures and
with a ship canal around the Falls of Niagara, Detroit and all the
other lake cities would be, to all intents and purposes, ocean ports,
between which and the whole world a trade...direct and profitable could
be carried on...."l‘l2
This theme was repeated in another article which appeared two
months later. This column pointed out that "under a system of reciprocal
trade, the Canadas would buy of the United States rather than go abroad.
We can now compete successfully with Great Britain in almost all kinds of
manufactures. We have but to buy Canadian products to induce Canada to

”#3

buy ours....

theb. 18, 1853.
l‘2.£.pril l3, 185M.

h3June l, l85h.

”3

While the Free Press was advocating reciprocity and giving

 

support to freer trade, the Detroit Daily Advertiser was endeavoring

 

.to slow the trend toward revenue tariffs and reciprocity with Canada

in the state. It should be noted that its attacks were neither
vitriOlic nor frequent. Apparently the paper was aware that its
influence was not strOng, except with the politically weak manufacturing
interests.u# Furthermore, after the election of 18h8 the Whig Party

was disintegrating, a fact which left the Advertiser without significant

 

support as it tried to promote the protectionistic philOSOphy.
The Whig paper did defend one interest that would be hurt by
a reciprocity agreement, the lumber industry. In the fiscal year

l8h8-l8h9 over $150,000 worth of lumber had been imported.from.Canada

1+5

into the United States. The Advertiser pointed Out that "the admission

 

Of Canada lumber to the States, free of duty, will Operate hard against
the lumber interest of our State. At present, a large amount arrives
annually on this side by paying duty.... let the duty be withdrawn and
it will be sensibly felt in this State, by the competition we shall
find in our Eastern markets with the Canadian article...."l+6

1 However, between 1850 and 185M the Whig paper gave up its
attacks on the reciprocity efforts and confined its statements to

LA
Hemans, p. 206. The Free Press, March 8, l8h9, assailed the
Advertiser for not supporting the Grinnell Bill. The Democratic paper

 

 

accused the Whig organ of being the only paper Opposing the measure
"through the whole extent of more than 1500 miles of frontier.“

ASBEEEEE.2£,the Secretary g£_the Treasury...of the Commerce and
Navigation g£_the United States, House §§° Doc., No. 15, 3lst Cong.,
lst sess. .

A6

 

 

 

 

Feb. 20, 18h9.

Ah

terse, factual accounts of the progress being made. The Advertiser

 

noted that such an arrangement would help the commercial position Of the
Provinces: "Canada is now earnestly looking towards the United States
for relief from her pressing political evils, and the enactment Of a
reciprocity bill will throw around the countries a golden chain, which
will bind them together more firmly than any other condition of [bid]

. "1+7

Circumstance.

The signing of the Reciprocity Treaty in l85h brought a favorable

reaction from the Advertiser. Instead of condemning the pact it took

 

a cautious, though optimistic, view of its possible results. It stated:

"...Many advantages will result from...reciprocity if it be properly

guarded.... The benefits whichaccrue, however, will depend, somewhat,
h8

upon the circumstances varying with the changes of the market."

Of course the Free Press greeted the signing of the treaty with

 

joy. "Altogether, the treaty strikes us as a favorable one," said the
paper On July 19, 185%. "We could have wished that the list of articles
to be reciprocally admitted free of duty had been more extended, em-
bracing manufactures; but perhaps we shall sell as many of these to the
Provinces, under the trade that will inevitably spring up under the
treaty.... Locally, the peOple Of our city will be greatly benefited
by its Operation, in that our markets will be more largely and freshly
supplied.with the garden products of our neighbors across the river."
While the two papers were commenting on reciprocity in their

4
columns, the Michigan members of Congress had been strangely quie' on

hYJan . 28, 18 50. \-.

June 1h, 185k.

“5
the subject. During the debates on the Grinnell Bill in 18h8 no
Nfichigan representative Spoke on the measure. The vote in the House

Of Representatives was not recorded in the Congressional Globe or the

 

House Journal so the position of the State's representatives cannot be

 

ascertained.

The second reciprocity bill which was debated in the House of
Representatives in 1850-1851 never reached a vote and none of the
Michigan members entered into the debate on it. In the Senate, this
bill was never brought to the floor for discussion.

In fact, the only time a Michigan representative made any
statement regarding reciprocal trade was in 1853. David Stuart
attempted on March 1 and March 3 to have a reciprocity bill brought to
the floor Of the House for debate.h9 He was unsuccessful in his
endeavor and the proposal died.

However, Alexander Buel Of Detroit did perform a notable service
for Michigan's interests in the House of Representatives. He became
the spokesman for the western areas that desired free navigation of
the St. lawrence River. This agitation for another route to the markets
Of the East and to EurOpe had been rising in the years immediately
preceeding 185M.

Buel, a Democrat, had been a well-known Detroit lawyer and local

50

politician. He was elected to the House of Representatives in l8h9.

“9
Cong. Globe, 32nd Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 978, 112M.

50U. S. Congress, Joint Committee tn Printing, Biographical
Directory of the American Congress: l77u—l927, U. s. Gov't Printing
OfficeIl9287, 69th Cong., 2nd sess., House Doc. NO. 783.

 

 

h6
Here he was placed on the Committee on Commerce and quickly began
promoting the free use Of the St. Iawrence.

Buel‘s leadership in this matter appeared soon after he assumed
office. When the second reciprocity bill was referred to the Committee
on Commerce, Buel insisted that free navigation of the St. Lawrence be
included in its provisions. In the House on February 28, 1851, he
presented an amendment to the bill requiring that the St. Lawrence
be Opened to American shipping before any reciprocal trade with Canada
could be carried on.51 This prOpOsal however, never reached a vote.

At the same time Buel presented the Committee report on the
bill. The Committee thought that "the simple fact that the free
navigation of the St. Iawrence is earnestly desired by the Northwest
is sufficient answer to the arguments which have been presented against
the impOrtance of this navigation.... Anyone...who reflects that the
Northwest is advancing at a rate which will give it, in half a century,
nearly thirty millions of peOple..."52 must realize the significance Of
this proposal.

In another speech delivered in the House Buel reiterated the
importance of providing new routes to the East, adding a "natural
rights" concept of his own. He thought that the St. Lawrence was
"a national highway, and the right to navigate it is the right to use
it, to apply it to those purposes for which it was designed by the God

"53

of nature. _ In other words, the river should be Open to the United

1
5 Cong, Globe, 3lst Cong., 2nd sess., p. 751.

 

2
5 House Reports, NO. h, 32nd Cong., 2nd sess., p. 23.

53House Reports, No. R, 32nd Cong., 2nd sess., speech Of
Alexander Buel, p. 8.

 

 

1+7
States because it drained some Of the natural waterways of the country.
While the Canadians no doubt regarded such an argument as without legal
foundation, the West loudly applauded Buel's pronouncement.

Buel continued the fight to get the river Open to the Atlantic
until his term of office ended in 1851. On his last day as represen-
tative, March 3, 1851, he presented a resolution stating: "... The
free navigation of the St. Lawrence River, for commercial purposes,
demands the earnest attention of the American Government: and...it
is highly desirable that it be secured to American commerce at an early
date." This resolution was defeated by the House in an unrecorded
vote.5)4

With Buel's view of the need for new routes to the East in mind,
it is not surprising that the provision of the Reciprocity Treaty which
secured free use of the St. Lawrence was greeted with satisfaction

in Michigan. Many considered this article the best part of the pact

for the state. The Detroit Free Press commented: “... By far the most

 

important provision Of the treaty, to the Lake country is that permitting
the free navigation of the St. Lawrence. Under it, a large direct

trade must spring up with foreign ports. NO obstruction will exist to
vessels sailing from Detroit to Liverpool, Harve, Shanghai, Yedo

[TokyO], and every where else. The time may not be far distant when

the flags of all nations will be flying at our docks.'"55

While reciprocity and new routes to the East were important in

Canadian-Michigan relations there remains one other significant factor

51l’Cong. Globe, 3lst Cong., 2nd sess., p. 787.
55

 

July 19, 185h; see also June 1, l85h, for a similar comment.

A8

to be examined--annexation. This movement influenced Michigan because
Of the close geographic connection between the state and Canada.

In the years before the signing of the treaty the Canadians
across the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers were viewing enviously the
prosperity Of the Michigan farmers and traders. The contrast between
the two countries was marked and the Canadians, who were obviously in
a poorer position, tended to blame their difficulties on the colonial
status of the Provinces. Allin and Jones sum up the discontent of the
Canadian farmers: "They were as moral, industrious, and intelligent
as their American cousins, yet they did not reap the same reward for their

"56

labours. This sentiment in Ontario helped to sharpen interest in
the annexation movement in Michigan.

In general, Michigan believed Canada would, sooner or later,

be annexed. The Free Press thought that "the poorer classes--the

 

.. 57

Oppressed--of Canada, are unquestionably in favor of annexation....

The Detroit Daily Advertiser observed that "the present feeling existing

 

in Canada on the question of annexation...is the exponent of a strong,
58
practical, and overbearing sense of her own insignificance...."
The efforts of the Canadians to promote a reciprocity agreement

with the United States was recognized in Michigan as an attempt to avoid

annexation. The Lake Superior JOurnal noted: "Reciprocity is now

 

favored by the Opponents in Canada to the annexation movement, judging,

as we think they do, very correctly, that reciprocal free trade will

56p. 32h.

57April 9, 18u9.

58Nov. 21, 18h9.

1+9
check for a time the movement in favor of annexation. Of the ultimate
success of these annexation movements they probably do not entertain

much doubt, but if they can put Off the evil day, it will be so much

Early in 185% the idea that annexation would eventually come

was still advanced. The Free Press stated: "We cannot conceive of

 

a valid objection against reciprocal trade with the British Provinces.
We should sell them vastly more than we should buy Of them. We shall
by and by want their lumber...and we want their fish and fisheries;
and their money; and we want to sell them our manufactures.... We

want to 'dicker' with them generally; and we want to prepare them for

60

 

annexation."

 

This thought was based on the observation that Canada was being

drawn closer to America. An editorial in the Free Press noted:

 

"Canada is becoming Americanized, and England knows it; and she knows
that the new avenues of communication which are uniting the commercial
interests of the Provinces and the States must make the Yankee element
predominant in Canadian society and politics,--and within a period of

‘ .61 ‘

a few years.

Furthermore, it appeared that the treaty would lead to commercial

annexation of Canada even if political unity was not achieved. Many viewed

reciprocal trade with Canada as "tantamount to...annexation. Political

connections we should not have, but pecuniary connections would be as

59may 1, 1850.'
6QApril 13, 185%.

61Feb. 7, 185A.

50
. 62
close between the several states."

The view that annexation would be inevitable was not universal.

The Daily Advertiser thought that the Reciprocity Treaty ended any

 

hOpe of merging the two countries: "We cannot but view this treaty

as removing all temptation to annexation, should such exist, in
Canada, for why should the provinces wish a better position than...
perfectly free intercourse with the two greatest commercial nations in
othe world.... She may be tempted by ambition to look for independence,
but, we think, scarcely for annexation under present circumstances.“

The conclusion can be drawn that many people in Michigan in the
years between 18h8 and 185A were agreed on their reactions toward
»Canada and reciprocity. The freer-trade forces of the Democratic
Party controlled state politics; almost everyone wanted free navigation
of the St. Lawrence; and there was wide belief-that Canada would be
annexed to the United States, commercially if not politically. It was
obvious that the state was going to benefit through the effects of the
treaty and there was no manifest Opposition to its passage among most of
Michigan's citizens. Some were inclined to view it more cautiously than
others, but the attitude was one of waiting to see the results of the

treaty rather than of hostility to the new pact.

6
2Detroit Free Press, June 1, l85h.

 

63Sept. 19, 185M.

51

CHAPTER III

The effect of the Reciprocity Treaty on Michigan is difficult
to determine because the Crimean War, the 1857 depression and the
American Civil War Occurred during its Operation. During this period
the stimulus to Michigan trade was quite extensive. By l863-186h the
trade between Canada and Michigan ports totaled over $3,500,000. However,
there were political and economic changes in the state that were
causing rising discontent among large segments of the state's inhabitants.
These naturally affected the treaty and Michigan's attitude toward the
pact shifted slowly to one of hostility.

The decay of the Whig Party in Michigan after the election of
18h8 left the Democrats unchallenged for a few years. However, the
need for a new party was obvious to many. The Whigs had lost contact
with the peOple and the Democrats were divided by the slavery issue.

In the l85h election a new party appeared, the Republican. This
political organization was immediately successful, Kinsley S. Bingham
being elected governor in the first contest in which the party partici-
pated.

The Republicans were united on only one subject-—slavery.

During the early years of the party's existence this issue was the only
force holding the Old-line Whigs, Free Democrats, Free Soilers and
numerous splinter groups in a single organization.1 This resulted in

a tendency to ignore many problems facing the state to avoid splitting

the party.

lBLJd, pp. 258-259.

52
The early tariff views in the Republican Party are an excellent
example of the inability of the various wings of the party to agree.
One Office seeker wrote to Governor Bingham: "A high tariff I regard
as a high attempt to dictate to us what business we shall pursue, & a
violation of our natural & political rights. I am in favor of univer-

sal freedom--free soil, free speech, free labor, a free press, & free

 

men--aye, & free trade, too, as soon as it can be gradually effected,
' 2

without causing too sudden a change in the business of our country....
Meanwhile, Old-guard Whigs still spoke favorably of a high tariff to
protect business. Thus, the differences within the party prevented

a united stand on tariff policy.

In 1860 however, the Michigan Republicans finally agreed on
protectionism as part of their economic platform. Undoubtedly the Last
remnants of the Whigs in the party led the move in this direction,
but the other segments were willing to stand or fall on this issue if

necessary. The Detroit Free Press, still holding to its free trade

 

belief, challenged the Michigan Republicans to make a high tariff an
issue in the 1860 campaign.3 The Republicans jumped at the Opportunity.
At the convention in the first Congressional district held in Ann

ArbOr, a strong resolution was brought forward favoring a protective
tariff. The nominee for that Congressional seat boldly asserted:

"The peOple Of Michigan must unavoidably become, sooner or later,

2
Philip Mason, ed., "Apologia of a Republican Office Seeker, 185M,"
Michigan History, vol. bl, p. 79.

3Detroit Free Press, June 22, 1860. Also see Thomas Pitkin,
"Western Republicans and the Tariff in 1860," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XXVII, pp. h10-h20.

 

 

 

 

53

decided and active protectionists, and I feel perfectly willing to risk my
personal success and future prosperity upon that platform""
One of the leading protectionists of Michigan was Eber B.
Ward, a shipowner and iron manufacturer in Detroit. He published
several short pamphlets advancing this philOSOphy. The titles of

ward's works include, Reasons Why the Northwest should have a Protective

 

 

Tariff and Why the Republican Party ia the Safest Party_tg_Trust with the

 

 

 

Government, Protection 13’ Free Trade, Natural Wealth XE: National

 

 

 

 

Poverty, and British Free Trade, a Delusion.5

Ward favored a high tariff, believing it would stimulate home
manufacturing. In his pamphlet on British free trade he declared:
"All the world's eXperience and the present condition of nations show
the protective policy to be the only safe and wise means for national
growth and the highest culture; that is, where it is carried to the
extent of simply fostering home industry, and stOps short of efforts
to monOpolize and crush down all industry elsewhere."

Ward believed that protective tariffs would promote the growth
Of industry in Michigan. In 1860 he noted that "Michigan is by nature,
the richest state in the world. She has the best iron and COpper mines,
inexhaustible beds Of plaster, the best salt wells, coal, lumber, marble,

pine lands, good climate, unequalled lakes of fresh water,

h
Detroit Free Press, Aug. 2, 1860.

5
p. 726.

 

Floyd Benjamin Streeter, Michigan BibliOgraphy(Lansing, 1921),

 

British Free Trade, a_Delusion: To the Farmers, Mechanics,

Laborers, and all voters 9f the Western §_Northwestern StateszDetroit,
1865), p. h.

 

 

 

 

 

5h
. . .. .7
and a beautiful commerClal pOSltlon. Nevertheless, ward concluded,
Michigan was poor. She needed to develOp her manufactures and the
8
surest way to do this was through a protective tariff. Echoing this

statement the Detroit Advertiser decLared: "The difference between the

 

Democratic party and the Republican party is simply this: they would
have all the labor done in England, while the Republicans would have it
done here at home, by our neighbors."9

Ward's reputation was widespread and his efforts for protection
of home industry and for the Republican Party Of Michigan were un-
ceasing. Giles B. Stebbins, a nationally known publicist and lobbyist
for the protectionist interests, later lauded ward for his work: "Pro-
tection of home industry as Opposed to the British free-trade policy, he
advocated and helped, with steady persistence and in a large way that
made him felt and known all over the land; his advocacy based on a deep
conviction that a fairly protective tariff policy was best for the
peOple."lO

It is evident from the leadership given protectionism by ward

and the stand Of the Republican Party in 1860 that thhigan had moved

away from its previous desire for free trade. Now industry was to be

7Chicago Journal, Sept. h, 1860; quoted by Pitkin, pp. Al3-hlh.

 

8
Chicago Journal, Sept. h, 1860; cited by Pitkin, pp. hl3-ulh.

 

9Aug. 1h, 1860.

loUpward Steps of Seventy Years(New York, 1890), p. 170.
Stebbin's book, an autobiOgraphy, is a curious conglomeration of anti-
slavery sentiments, religious pronouncements and crass supernaturalism.
He arrived at his belief in protection thusly: ”When our Civil war
began, I saw that slavery and free trade were the cornerstones Of the
Confederate Constitution; and when it ended, I saw them both broken to
pieces." p. 19h.

 

55

protected, and American producers given a preferred position in American

markets. Republican control Of the state until long after the Civil war
1

made protection the dominant economic belief of Michigan. 1

Of course, the free traders were not silent while this change was

 

Occurring. The Adrian Daily Watchtower commented acidly: "It is urged
by the friends of a tariff for protection that duties on imported goods
should be increased to guard against the necessity of taxing the people.
In this they exhibit a preference for a mode Of taxation by which the
peOple are made to support the government without suspecting the money
12

came from their pockets."

Likewise the DetrOit Free Press held firm in its denial of

 

protection as the prOper policy. It claimed that "the fallacy of the
doctrine of protective tariffs for this country is perfectly illustrated
by the Operation Of the duty on wool, levied since l8h6. Its purpose
was...to stimulate the production of American wool. Its effect has
been, at the expiration of ten years, that less wool is produced...

than prior to 18A6, that we consume more than we produce; and that our
manufacturers are breaking down under the state of things."

Despite these protests, the free trade sentiment, so strong in
l85h, had gradually evaporated before the onslaught Of the young and
vigorous Republican Party. By 1860 the protectionists were in power
and the freer traders were disorganized.and removed from any position

of control over economic affairs.

llPitkin, p. Alt.
12June 28, 1858.

13Dec. 9, 1856.

56

This change of Opinion in Michigan had a significant effect on
the Reciprocity Treaty. Free trade was regarded as dangerous to the
continuing development of the state. It was now believed best to keep
foreign goods from coming into market competition with Michigan products.

The farmers Of Michigan were particularly Opposed to the entry
of Canadian products free of duty. When the treaty was signed there
was no Opposition manifest against it from the farmers.11+ Their
attitude was one Of watchful waiting to determine what effect the pact
would have on the agricultural interests. By 186A the effects had been

noted and Opinion had crystalized. The Michigan Farmer asserted:

 

"The Reciprocity Treaty with Great Britain which admits all the products

 

of Canada free, is directly adverse to the interests of the farmers of
Michigan. Their products compete most ruinously with those Of this
State."15
One Of the articles which the farmers ardently desired protected
from foreign competition was wool. In Michigan the production Of this
commodity had increased steadily during the 1850's. The state's wool
Clip in 185A was 2,680,000 pounds.16 The United States Census of 1860
gave the amount gathered in that year as 3,929,000 pounds,17 and an
unofficial tabulation in 1862 placed the figure at A,O62,000 pounds.18

This rapid increase made wool one of the valuable eXports of the state.

1A
Laughlin and Willis, p. A2.

lSApril, 186A, p. A39.

6 -
1 Census and Statistics gf_Michigan, 186A, p. xi.

 

17Census and Statistics E: Michigan, 186A, p. 637.
18

 

Detroit Free Press, Dec. 31, 1862.

 

57

The rise of protectionism among the Michigan wool growers is best

traced through the pages of The Michigan Farmer . The significance

 

of this change is shown by the editorial policy of the paper. NO other
problem with political implications was even discussed in the journal
during the period of the Reciprocity Treaty.

In 1855 the farm paper was not settled in its Opinion of pro-
tective tariffs. In that year it was noted that "the subject was
brought before Congress at the last session, and will probably come
up again; it is proper therefore that it should be reflected upon
carefully by the wool growers in this State, and..{:whether:isuch a change
[abolition of all import duties on wool] in the tariff is required by
the true interests of the wool growers in Michigan...."19 In a later

issue the Michigan Farmer presented an article in which both sides of

 

the Controversy were discussed and analysed.20 NO effort was made to
editorialize in the two columns.

Nine years later, however, the Farmer declared its stand on pro-
tective tariffs. It observed: runited effort will undoubtedly be made
by the wealthy manufacturing interest of the East to keep the tariff
[On wooI] at a low figure, and to place a very high tariff on manu-
factured articles. They have succeeded heretofore."21 The article
further noted that such legislation would be harmful to the farmer‘s

interests.

19May, 1855, p. 130.

20June, 1855, p. 162.

2laprii, 186A, pp. u3a-u39.

58

The Opposition of the Farmer to the importation of wool from
Canada was well founded. The quantity of wool imported into the United
States from Canada, according to the most reliable statistics available,
was 2,13A,000 pounds in 1859, l,0A9,000 pounds in 1860, 1,059,000 pounds
in 1861. In l86A-1865 1,30A,7l7 pounds of wool came in free of duty
from Canada.22 This wool came into direct competition with the Michigan
product in the eastern markets.

The primary aim Of the journal was to apply pressure on the
United States Congress for a change in the tariff structure. The

Michigan Farmer asserted that it "behooves the farmers to be at once

 

active in urging their interests upon the attention of their members
of Congress. County agricultural societies throughout the whole West
should meet, pass res[o]1utions, and appoint their most influential

and able men as delegates to washington to urge the adOption of some

H 23

protective measure for domestic wool. The publication even printed

a sample petition to be used:

The undersigned farmers and citizens Of the county Of[blank] in
the State of [blank] respectfully petition that a duty of at_least
20 cents per po Ound may be placed upon all imported foreign W001.
The small duty from about one cent to three cents per pound,
imposed by the present tariff is very unfair, and unjust to the
W001 growing interest of the United States. Our taxes are
doubled; the cost of farm labor is double, the cost of most
of the dry goods and groceries we are compelled to purchase are
quadrupled, yet, we are compelled to compete with the products of
foreign countries, admitted free or at a nominal duty.

NO large fortunes are made“ by farming. Agricultural interests
have never received fair protection, or encouragement from

 

22Senate Ex. DOC. , No. 10, 37th Cong. , 2nd sess. ., pp. 2— —3; Report
2: the Secretary of the Treasury. .on the Commerce and Navigation of the
United States, House Ex. Doc. ., unnumbered, 39th Cong. ., 2nd sess.

 

 

 

 

23April, 186A, p. A38.

59

Congressional Legislation. The powerful combinations of the

manufacturing interests of the East have so controlled legis-

lation, as to compel the sales of our products at barely living

prices, while the manufacturing interests are largely protected,

and immense fortunes are made from a few years attention to

business. Our sons do not desire to continue to be farmers.

They see that it is a life of toil without adequate results.

We ask that the Reciprocity Treaty which admits Canadian W001...

free may be annulled, and that the above duty of at least 20

cents per pound be placed on all foreign Wool imported.2

This appeal for petitions to pressure the legislators wsis acted
upon by many groups in the state. Senator Chandler presented to the
Senate three petitions from citizens of Michigan "praying that a duty
of not less than 10 cents per pound be levied on all wool of foreign
production imported into the United States." Later a similar request
from Livingston County was presented by Chandler. On May 2, 186k,
Senator Howard presented another petition from Livingston County. This
petition asked for a duty of 15 cents per pound on all imported wool.
Howard also brought to the attention of the Senate a petition from
Jackson County asking for a 20 cent per pound duty on imported wool}5

These petitions, along with others from every wool-producing
state, apparently influenced the House of Representatives. Represen-
tative Fernando Beaman from Adrian presented a resolution on March
21, l86h: "Resolved, that the Committee of ways and Means be instructed
to inquire into the expediency of increasing the tariff on low grades
of Foreign wool." While no action was taken on Beaman's prOposal,
within a short time the tariff on wool had been raised. On June h, 1864,

the House passed a tariff bill which increased the duties on many

articles, including wool. Representatives Driggs, Kellogg, longyear

24April, 186h, p. h39.

2
5Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., pp. 1522, l8hO, 201%, 2171.

 

w

\J

\

60
and Upson voted for the measure. The votes of Representatives Baldwin
and Beaman were not recorded. This bill was passed by the Senate on
June 17, l86h, but both Senator Chandler and Senator Reward were listed

26

as absent.

Not only were the farmers displeased with the free imports of wool
from Canada, but a similar feeling was noticeable regarding the wheat
trade. The amount of Canadian grain brought into the Uhited States

was very large. In 1860 the total imports from Canada were 8,171,000
bushels, about 3,000,000 more than in 1859. During 186u-1865 1,30h,717
bushels of wheat were imported free of duty from Canada.27 In 1861,
Michigan produced 8,732,000 bushels of wheat.28 In short, there was
considerable competition between Canadian and Michigan.wheat. In the
year 1857, for example, both Canada and the United States had bumper
crops of wheat. The Canadian excess was about 8,000,000 bushels. The
result was that the grain growing regions of the American West, including
thhigan, had no market for their wheat, especially from the Canadian
nilling business which had previously purchased large quantities for
shipment to EurOpe.29 This situation continued to exist in the years
after the poor crOps of 1858-1859.30

Barley sales also were affected adversely by the treaty. The

Michigan Farmer stated in l86h "that before the making of the Treaty,

26
Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., pp. 1217, 2751, 3053, 3368.
2
7Senate Ex. Doc., No. 10, 37th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 2-3.
28
Census and Statistics 23 Michigan, 186M, p. 636.

29Toronto Colonist, n.d.; cited from Detroit Free Press,
Jan. 1h, 1858.

 

30Detroit Free Press, May 11, 1858; Michigan Farmer, 1859.

 

61

the price of Barley was generally from $2 to $2.50 per 100 lbs. in
Detroit. After its adOption the price fell to about one—half that
sum, and so continued until last year when a flood of paper money-—
the unwillingness of Canadian farmers to receive it, and the high
price of all course 316] grains brought Barley upon [sic] again
to its former price."31 This statement is substantiated by the
Lansing market quotations. On April 1, 1863, the price of barley
was two dollars per hundred pounds, remaining near that level for the
next three years.32

Thus, the shift of the grain and wool growers to disapproval
of reciprocity was important in the overall Opinion of the state
regarding the 185% pact. The stiff competition from Canadian imports
and the resulting decline in prices paid for most agricultural eXports
was sufficient reason for the farmers to turn against the treaty and
speak out for its abrogation.

The farmers were not the only Michigan interest Opposed to
the continuation of the treaty; the lumbermen were also displeased
with its operation. After 1858 the Canadians were sending roughly nine
million dollars worth of timber to the United States yearly.33

This competition was placing a considerable strain on the lumber

industry of Michigan. The Chicago Tribune claimed that ”the lumber

 

interest of Michigan is the largest single interest the State possesses.

3;April, 186A, p. A39.
32

Lansing State Republican. It must be remembered that the period
of the American Civil Jar was one of inflation. The two dollar price
paid for barley was less in purchasing power in 1863 than it was in l85h.

33

 

Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 213.

 

62

Uhder 'reciprocity' the Canadian lumbermen inflict a loss of
millions a year on the Michigan lumber interests by the competition
in the American market." In 1862 the lumbermen of Saginaw declared
the treaty's provisions to be "unequal and unjust” and during the
following years joined hands with the spruce manufacturers of Maine
to bring about the abrogation of the agreement.35

Two other interests in Michigan.were affected by the Reciprocity
Treaty: mining and fishing.. The fishing industry may be dismissed
as being rather unimportant. In 18h7 a total of 68,000 barrels were
taken. MOst of this was for local consumption. There was no marked
increase in this amount since none of the official statistical
sources indicated large exports or imports of fish.

Mining presents a different situation because its production
was increasing rapidly. The amount of iron ore mined showed
consistent growth during the years of the Reciprocity Treaty. From
only l,hh7 tons in 1855 it rose to 65,650 tons in 1859 and to 2h8,000
tons in 1861;.37 This business, however, had no Canadian competition.
The protection of its markets for the future seems to have been the
only cause for desiring a high tariff. COpper production was below
that of iron. Most of the mines were just beginning to pay off on

the original investments.

h
3 Quoted from the Detroit Free Press, Aug. 3, 1865.

 

35Robert c. Johnson, "Logs for Saginaw: An Episode in Canadian-
American Tariff Relations," Michigan History Magazine,XXXIV, pp. 213-21h;
"unequal and unjust" from Resources and Prospects of the Saginaw Valley
(n.p., 1862), p. 12; quoted by Johnson. ——

36

 

 

 

Detroit Free Press, Feb. 7, l8h8.

 

37Census and Statistics of Michigan, l86h, p. LIII; see also Detroit
Advertiser and Tribune, Dec. 8: 1863. The Daily Advertiser and the
Detroit Tribune merged in 1863, the name being changed to include both
papers.

 

 

63

The economic effects of the treaty on Michigan were outlined in
the debates in the United States Congress when the first ten years of
the treaty had nearly expired. Two Michigan legislators, Senator
Zachariah Chandler and Representative Francis J. Kellogg from Grand
Rapids, were particularly vocal in their wish to see the pact abro-
gated as soon as possible.

Chandler, one Of the Senate's most influential Republicans,
claimed he had always been against the Reciprocity Treaty. He
declared: "The peOple of Michigan are engaged in agriculture, in
mining, in lumbering and in fishing; and every one of these interests
is directly injured by the continuance of this treaty."38

However, the main emphasis of Chandler's speech was placed on
the damage the treaty was doing to the lumber industry. He said
"Canadian lumber, as is well known, comes in direct competition
with the production of our mills, from one end of our border to the
other, and more particularly is it injurious in its effect on the
State of Michigan, which is perhaps more largely engaged in the
lumber interest than any other State in the Union."39

Opposing Chandler's view was Senator Timothy Howaof Wisconsin.
HOwe pointed out that the importation of Canadian timber apparently

had not slowed the development of the lumber industry in the United

States, Concluding his speech with long lists of statistics to

8
3 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 230.

 

3900ng. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 230. "Chandler is
strongly sustained here in the lobby by the commercial and lumber
interests," Wilkins Papers, vol. 201, p. 105, cited by Floyd Benjamin
Streeter, Political Parties in Michigan, 1837-1860(Lansing, 1918), p. 255.

I r

 

 

 

6h
ho
prove his argument. But Chandler was speaking for the Michigan
timber interests. He was far too shrewd a politician not to grasp
the importance of the anti-treaty mood among his constituents.
Representative Kellogg, a lumberman himself, similarly was
opposed to the treaty because of its effects on the timber industry.

He attacked the theory that Canadian lumber had no influence on the

American market: "The gentleman from New York[:Mr. Davis] asserts

that we have not lumber enough in the country for our own consumption....

I do not agree with him, for I believe that we have an abundant
supply for all our wants for centuries to come.... We ought to
derive a large revenue from its[:Canadian lumber's] sale."h1

Kellogg was also concerned with providing the wool growers with
a better market. "In the production of wool Michigan is now the
third State in the Union," commented Kellogg, "and the farmers of
every part of the country are turning their attention more and more
to the growing of wool for our own consumption. In 1863 our manu-
facturers imported 70,000,000 pounds of wool, and most of it came
in duty free. Our farmers consider this just cause for complaint...
and I hOpe we shall not adjourn without doing all we can for their
protection.“+2

Furthermore, Kellogg declared that the St. Iawrence River was

'not the best route to the Atlantic. He noted that "we must have

'more outlets to the Ocean from the west, but I would have them on

1+0

hl
Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., Appendix, p. 120.

Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 213.

 

 

h2
Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., Appendix, p. 119.

 

65

our own territory, under the protection of our own government,
where we could reap the benefit of them ourselves, and where no
treaties with a foreign power were necessary."1+3

Thus it appears in the debates in Congress that the Michigan
representatives were primarily concerned with protecting the
economic interests of the state. This desire was indicated by
the votes on the joint resolution "authorizing the President of the
United States to give the Government of Great Britain the notice
required for the termination of the Treaty of reciprocity of the

'hh As would be expected, most of the

5th day of June, A. D. l85h.‘
Michigan law-makers voted in favor of the measure.

In the Senate, Chandler voted for the resolution to end the
treaty, while Senator William A. Howard's vote was not cast.h5
However, that Howard favored the abrogation of the pact is
evidenced by a speech given at a meeting of the Detroit Board of

Trade in February, l86h. This Speech, summarized in the Detroit Free

 

Press, noted the need for protection of the lumber and wool interests

h6
of the state.

3Cong, Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., Appendix, p. 120. Senator
Jacob Collamer of Vermont proclaimed that the "navigation of the St.
Iawrence is not good for anything to anybody and never was. It is
frozen up six months of the year...and in the next place is so
dangerous from icebergs...that...the rate of insurance is from 1 to

 

 

 

 

2 per cent higher than from any...port in America...." Cong. Globe,
38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 210.
hh
Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 32—33.
h
5Cong, Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 23h.
h6

Feb. 10, 186k.

66

In the House four Michigan Representatives, Augustus Baldwin,
Fernando Beaman, Francis Kellogg, and Charles Upson voted to terminate
the treaty. Baldwin, a Union Democrat from Pontiac, probably voted
for the resolution because of the pressures applied by the agricultural
interests. Beaman, one of the men who founded the Republican Party
"under the oaks" at Jackson, was from Adrian. This was an important
agricultural district in the State. UpsOn, also a Republican, was
from Goldwater. In this area too, the wool and wheat growers were
very strong.h7

The votes of two representatives, John B. Driggs and JOhn‘W.
Longyear, were not recorded. However, the next day, December 1h,
l86h, both men went on record as favoring the resolution to abrogate
the treaty. Driggs was a Republican and an officer in the Civil
war. He represented the area around Saginaw, the center of the
Michigan lumber industry. Longyear, a lawyer from.Iansing, was a
Republican. There was no reason for him to favor the treaty,
particularly since the wool farmers around the state capital were
loud in their demands for a protective tariff.

Iongyear's stand on the subject may be further indicated by
a vote in Congress on May 26, 186A. A motion was presented calling
for a commission to try to negotiate a new treaty, removing the
offending provisions or modifying them to make the pact Operate in
a more equal manner. At this polling Iongyear voted against the

7 .
Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 32. Biographical
information from Biographical Directory g£_the American Congress.

 

 

See the Lansing State Republican, June 2h, 1863, for an
example of this sentiment.

67
motion, as did all the other Michigan representatives except Driggs,
whose vote was not recorded};9

In conclusion, it is evident that the Michigan legislators
favored ending the treaty. The manifest reason, protection of the
lumber and agricultural interests of the state, was presented in the
debates in both houses of Congress. The Republican Party, which
controlled the state during the entire Operation of the treaty, had
moved gradually toward a high protective tariff. The Reciprocity
Treaty was in direct Opposition to this trend.

Though economic factors played a prominent role in Michigan's
desire to see the Reciprocity Treaty abrogated, the reaction of the
State's inhabitants to the acts of EngLand and Canada during the
American Civil War was equally important.

England managed to get herself into diplomatic difficulty
with the United States almost as soon as the war broke out. The
British government proclaimed itself to be neutral, though she
recognized the South as a belligerent. This action incited the ire
of the North. The North wanted the disturbance classified as an
internal one, a civil matter, which was of no concern to a foreign
power.

Soon after the initial friction occurred a larger problem, the
.EIEEE affair, arose. TWO confederate diplomats, Slidell and Mason,

were taken off the British vessel Trent by an American warship.SO

9Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., p. 2508. This motion
was overwhelmingly defeated, 5h favoring, 97 Opposing.

SOAdams, pp. 116-152.

68
England, supported by Canada, raised an outraged cry of "piracy.”
The bitterness of the Canadian papers attracted the attention of
the Michigan press and the possibility of war between England and

the United States was obvious. The Free Press commented:

 

we are at a loss to understand why any portion of the press
or any of the people of Canada are in favor of a war between
England and the United States. Can it be that the Province is
desirous of sharing in the plunder of the territory of a
friendly government?

Upon no other hypothesis can we account for the extreme
bitterness of the Canadian press. Before this idea becomes
too firmly rooted, it may be prudent for the Canadian government
to remember that we are twenty millions of peOple after losing
the South; that we now have under arms more men than there are
in Canada between the ages of fifteen and sixty, and that we can
double the number bgiore a vessel can pass from America to
England and return.

Canada also was involved in the problems created by the neutrality
laws. When Colonel Rankin, a member of parliament from Windsor,

offered his services to the American government the Detroit Free

 

Pie§§_commented: "One of the immediate effects of...[the] sympathy
between the peOple of Canada and...Michigan, is the announcement that
Col. Rankin...has tendered his services...with the proffer of raising
a regiment of Lancers to serve during the war....‘We welcome him as
we would any other real friend, whose sympathy we appreciated, whose
courage we could rely on."52

A short time later however Rankin was arrested for violating the

neutrality laws. The amiable attitude of the Free Press was quickly

 

changed to one of hostility: "The arrest of Colonel Rankin at

Toronto at the instigation of the Canadian Ministry, for an alleged

51Detroit Free Press, Dec. it, 1861.

SESept. 1h, 1861.

69

breach of the neutrality laws of England, for prOposing to enter the
service of the United States...during the present war, is one of those
acts which marks a period in the history of a nation."53

Senator Chandler was also outspoken in his criticism of English
policy. Wilmer Harris, in his work on Chandler, has summed up the
position the Senator took: "Mr. Chandler's hatred of Great Britain
fell little short of a mild mania on the subject. For years, upon
the stump and in the Senate, he never failed to 'twist the lion's
tail' upon every possible Occasion. He attacked Great Britain for
issuing the Neutrality Proclamation, [and] for lax enforcement of
her neutrality laws...."51+

A sample of Chandler's biting rhetoric aimed at England is
sufficient to illustrate the point. In a speech in the Senate,
June 16, 186A, he assailed the British: "If I had my way, I would
raise a wall of fire between this nation and Great Britain.... She
has sent out cruisers, English ships, built with English timber,
manned by Englishmen, provisioned with English provisions, sailing
under British colors, to prey upon our commerce, until she has
virtually driven it from the face of the earth."55

While the feelings against England were growing in Michigan,
the Canadians were also getting themselves into bad graces with the
people of the state. The northern provinces became, soon after the

outbreak of the war, places of refuge for American draft-dodgers,

deserters, Confederate sympathizers and rebel spies. The proximity

53Detroit Free Press, Oct. 16, 1861.

5A

 

Public life of Zachariah Chandler, 1851-1875(Lansing, 1917), p. 82.

55Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., p. 3008.

70
of Canada to Michigan frightened many who could see the possibility
of military forces coming across the St. Clair River into the state.
The most prominent "Confederate sympathizer" in Canada was

Clement Vallandigham. Vellandigham'was a "cOpperhead" from Ohio.

He had been forcibly sent to the South because of his stand against
the arbitrary suspension of many of the rights guaranteed in the
Constitution. Later he went to Windsor, Canada, and carried on a

political campaign for the governorship of Ohio. The Detroit Free

 

Press, a Democratic paper, noted the arrival of Vallandigham in
1863: "Mr. Vallandigham arrived at Windsor...on Manday evening.

The fact soon became known to our citizens, and...on Tuesday
afternoon a numerous delegation waited upon him to express their
sentiments and feelings in regard to his manly and undeviating course
. . "56

as an American Cltlzen.

Such accolades were not found in the Republican papers however.

The Detnoit Advertiser and Tribune printed a letter signed "x" which

 

said: "Mr. Editor, these attempts to awaken sympathy for the rebel

cause by calling Vallandigham meetings, are not only malicious but

 

ridiculous. NO true, loyal man, be he Republican, Democrat, or
Abolitionist can attend them. Mr. Vallandigham has suffered no wrong;
he has been tried, and I hOpe he will be punished...and I hOpe that

should the Free Press succeed in getting up a sympathizing vallandigham

"57

 

meeting, no loyal man will attend, even as a spectator.

On other occasions the Advertiser and Tribune printed denunciations
6
5 Aug. 26, 1863.

57May 23, 1863.

71

of Vallandigham. One, an editOrial whose headline read "Vallandigham
in perfect Harmony with Benedict Arnold," was a lengthy repetition
of the evils which the "exiled" politican had supposedly perpe-
trated.58 A little over a week after this attack the paper published
a list Of 578 persons who had signed a petition favorable to Vallandigham.
They were termed "Vallandigham supporters--constitutional supporters
of free speech--freedom from arrest," all phrased in derogatory terms.
After the list of names the paper attacked those peOple for being
disloyal to the Union.59

Many of the people of Michigan believed Vallandigham was a
traitor and his stay in Canada represented a threat to the security
of the area. TO the intensely loyal Republicans, Vallandigham's
political campaigning from Windsor appeared to be an abuse of asylum.
FUrthermore, there were fears that bands of Confederates were being
organized to invade the state under vallandigham's leadership. Thus
in Michigan "radical persons poured out vindicative phrases against
Windsor's laxity in not enforcing what Detroiters thought Canadian

60

law should contain."

Despite the fears of Detroit and Michigan, Vallandhgham proved
to be quite pacific, his most disloyal acts being to uphold the
constitution as he saw it and to attack the Republicans for temporariiy

ending many civil rights. On the whole the affair appears rather

ludicrous when viewed almost a century later. HOwever, the emotional

58
Oct. h, 1863.

59Oct. 15, 1863.

0
Martin J. Havran, ”Windsor and Detroit Relations During
the Civil War," Michigan History Magazine, XXXVIII, p. 389.

72
factors involved in the war were enough to condemn Vallandigham for
his transgressions and his presence kept Detroit on edge and watchful
for military advances from Canada.61
Vallandigham was not the only possible source of trouble in
Windsor. One informed Republican source noted that the Canadian

city was filled with Americans. In a letter signed "Anon." printed

in the Detroit Advertiser and Tribune these Americans were described

 

as "deserters from the rebel or Union armies, rebel agents, spies and

62

sympathizers, political enemies of the United States Government....

Michigan's fears of being attacked from Canadian territory were
not groundless. The Southern government had sent several agents to
the British provinces to stir up trouble and divert attention from
the main area of fighting. In November, 1863, the rebels in Canada
apparently contemplated an attack on the Great lakes area. Though
this raid did not occur for many months it created a considerable
psychological impression on‘MiChigan. From this time the idea that
an "invasion" might be successful haunted the state until the Civil
war ended.

The first tangible statement that trouble might occur was on

November 12, 1863. On that date the Advertiser and Tribune

 

described the rumored plot:

We have for some days been in possession of information that
a rebel raid of a peculiar character was meditated upon Lake Erie.
The scheme...is to pass several gunboats, which have been
prepared in the Lower St. Iawrence, through the Welland Canal,
and.with these ravage upon the commerce and put the cities of the
lakes under...contrition....

It is further understood that a part of this plot included

61
Havran, p. 385.

62may 27, 186M.

73

the release of prisoners on Johnson's Island, who were to form,

in conjunction with such rebel refugees in Canada as are ripe for

a deSperate entggprise of this kind, the land support of the

rebel cruisers.

After outlining the alleged plans of the rebels the paper hastened
to assure its readers that all was prepared to give the raiders a warm
reception. It declared there was no cause for alarm as "all necessary pre-
cautions are being taken. The Government is fully informed of any such
rebel movements, if any such exist, and will not be caught unawares."6u

Despite the reassurances, Detroit was genuinely frightened by the
prospect of a raid. A special session of the Common Council was called and
it "Resolved, that the Mayor of the City, be, and is hereby clothed with
full power to take and enforce all such measures and actions as in his
judgment shall seem prOper, under the now existing circumstances, or such as

"65

may arise... Three days later a group of one hundred men formed a

company of militia and placed itself at the command of the Mayor in case it

was needed to defend the town.66
These precautions proved unnecessary at this time because the raid

did not occur. However, there continued to be faint whispers from

Canada of new plots which kept the state in suspense.

On September 19, 186h, the long-feared attack occurred. Some

Southern agents captured the steamer Philo Parsons just below Detroit.

 

Then they sailed toward Sandusky Bay near Sandusky, Ohio, with obvious
intent of freeing the prisoners on Johnson's Island. On the way to

liberate the internees they also boarded the Island Queen, probably to

 

provide transportation for the freed prisoners. H0wever, as they neared

63
Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, Nov. 12, 1863.

6”Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, Nov. 12, 1863.

 

 

6
5Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, Nov. 13, 1863.

 

66Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, Nov. 16, 1863.

 

0U

71.
the prison location, they discovered that their intentions had become
known and the garrisons in the area had been strengthened. Discretion
proved to be the better part of valor and the rebels withdrew to Canada
without accomplishing their mission. The incident created intense
excitement and fear along the border.

This breach of neutrality by Canada and the threat to the

entire west created by the raid prompted the Michigan papers to assail

 

the Confederates in stinging editorials. The Advertiser agd Tribune

said: "The destruction of the Island Queen and the robbery of the

 

steamer Parsons by rebel pirates from Canada shows the real spirit
of the slaveholders rebellion.... It would as soon destroy all our
lake commerce and lay Detroit...in ashes, as it would take the life of
a Simon—pure Democrat in front of Petersburg or Atlanta."

The tensions created by this raid continued to keep the state
jittery and apprehensive of further incidents. In December, 186h,

the Free Press said: "we are no alarmist, but we desire to see our city

 

safe and secure from the plunderings of the raider and the torch of

the rebel incendiary. Without a sufficient police force the city is
not safe. Its proximity to the Canada border, where are congregated

so many evil spirits, renders its position more insecure than any other
. . .69

of our Northern Cities.

No doubt this article referred to the communication sent from the

commander of the Michigan Military District to the Mayor of Detroit which

7
Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, Sept. 22, 186M; Hemans, p. 219.

 

Sept. 22, 186M.

69 Dec. 8, 1861;.

75
noted that new invasions of the state might be expected. "I have the
honor to report," wrote Lieutenant Colonel B. H. Hill, "that from
information derived from various sources I have become confident that a
raid is being projected by rebel refugees in Canada against this city,
and I recommend that immediate measures be taken to organize and arm

"70 .
a regiment of militia for local protection. The Free Press describer

 

this communication as I'another strong appeal...from headquarters to

rouse our citizens into activity and a just estimate of the imminent

71
peril in which the city stands."

This new plot against Detroit never materialized but the Vermont
town of Rt. Albans was raided by Confederate agents. The participants
in this foray retired to the British provinces, pursued by American
tr00ps, and finally were taken prisoners by Canadian officials. However,
on December 1h, 186h, they were released by the Canadian government.

One Michigan journalist assessed the problems of international law
inherent in this situation:

If Canada would adOpt what we believe to be the true rule of
international law on this subject, and declare that whenever
these refugees abandoned their own country, and came upon
neutral soil, they from that moment cease to be "belligerents",
but subject to punishments as individuals for all crimes they
committ, we shall have no more fear of raids from Canada} but if,
on the contrary, the Canadian government adOpt a policy which
will protect every one of these men...we can but repeat what

we have already said...that an active and real war, where we can
follow our foes to their places of concealment is far better....
We care not which govgrnment punishes these men, but one or the
other must do it.... Q

70Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, Dec. 7, 186A.

 

71Dec. 8, last.

2
7 Detroit Free Press, Dec. 1h, 186M.

 

a"
‘44

76
The effect of the release of the Confederates involved in the

St. Albans raid was best summarized by the Advertiser and Tribune. The

 

paper observed: "No event of the year has excited more interest and
discussion in the country than the release of the...St. Albans raiders."73
On the same day that the southern agents were released in
Canada for want of jurisdiction, Zachariah Chandler presented a resol-
ution in the Senate to protect the northern border. This resolution

"1
l’;

was couched in Chandler's typical language: ihereas...the peOple of
the British Provinces seem disposed to protect these thieves, robbers,
incendiaries, pirates and murderers, not only in their individual
capacity but by the quibbles of the law: Therefore, Resolved, that
the Committee on Military Affairs be directed to inquire into the

expediency of immediately enlisting an Army Corps to watch and defend

r7
"'

our territory.... No action was taken on this resolution, but its

reflection of the feelings in the country and Michigan is indisputable.
The cumulative influence of these raids, both real and threatened,

was to keep the border areas, including Michigan, in a state of tension.

Andrew Renfrew in his study of Detroit-Canadian relations during the

Civil war concludes: "The psychological results of this subversive

activity in the region of Detroit were perhaps even more important

than the physical results. The fear which seemed to grip the peOple

of the border region during the last two years of the war was a matter

of far reaching significance. The threat of raids from Canada constantly

limited the ability of the people of this region to devote themselves

73Dec. 19, 186h.

7hCong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. h96-h97.

 

77
to the...war and caused the growth of a widespread feeling of depression
. -- . "75
and dissatisfaction.
Canada's position was not helped by the expansion of its army
during the war. In 1861 Great Britain transferred 22,600 troops to

North America.76 These reinforcements did nothing to soothe touchy

Americans. Said the Free Press:

 

An announcement that large reinforcements of tr00ps have been
dispatched to Canada, and fleets ordered to our coast by
England requires some explanation.... If there exists a hostile
feeling on the part of England against the United States it is
far better we should know it than to remain in fancied security
when there is real danger.... Why...these reinforcements?

They are of no possible use unless intended for the purpose of
irritating the public mind, and thus rende77it more feasible

to precipitate the two countries into war.

FUrthermore, increased military spending was necessary to support
the growing army. In 1861 the defense costs were nearly $85,000 and
the next year they jumped to over $600,000.78 All this only worried
the Americans more, and Detroit, being one of the most lOgical points
of any English invasion, was constantly concerned over the American-
British frictions.

Thus the actions of the Canadians caused much apprehension in
Michigan, particularly around Detroit. At the same time the raids were
being launched from Canada the debates in the Congress on the Reciprocity

Andrew w. Renfrew, "COpperheads, Confederates, and Conspiracies
on the Detroit-Canadian Border,” unpublished Master's thesis, Wayne
State University, 1952, pp. l33-l3h. Renfrew gives a very detailed account
of the raid on Johnson's Island and a lengthy description of the Con-

federate organization in Canada.

76. . .
Adrian Daily ExpOSitor, Sept. 10, 1861.

 

77Detroit Free Press, July 6, 1861.

 

78Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, May h, 1863.

 

78
Treaty were being carried on. Lester Shippee conjectures that the treaty
might have been renewed had it not been for the war:

Whether reciprocity uncomplicated by issues raised by the war

between the States would have passed through its stipulated

ten years with no more grumbling that had been heard down to

1861, and then, with modifications to meet some of the plaints

of the discontented, have been renewed for another period of years,

is one of those things which belongs to the realm of prOphecy

and not of history. One cannot help guessing, however, that the

chances for its continuation were relatively good, and that,

on the whole, the malcontents were far less numerous than

those who beléeved there was more good than evil in the

arrangement.

Michigan was affected by the actions of the Canadians more than
any other region of the West. The state had good reason, economically,
to see the treaty abrogated and the events during the Civil war added
more arguments against the pact. After all, what right did Canada
have to expect favorable commercial treatment after allowing the raid
on Johnson's Island? Had not the British provinces permitted Vallandigham
to remain unmolested in Windsor? In short, since the United States
received no considerations from the Canadians, why should the Americans
favor the continuation of the Reciprocity Treaty?

While the Protectionists were advancing their arguments against
the treaty and the politicians were raging against the Canadians for
their "neutral" stand during the Civil war, there were peOple in
Michigan who still believed the Reciprocity Treaty was a valuable
asset and should be retained if possible. This sentiment was not

widespread but its definite presence complicated the efforts of those

desiring the pact ended.

79p. 159.

79
The Detroit Board of Trade was the leader of the anti-abrogation
forces. In 1860 the controversy over the treaty had become sufficiently
pronounced that the Board of Trade appointed a committee to study and
report on the matter. This committee reported that it was "convinced...

that the interests of Detroit and Michigan demand that the treaty be
80

very essentially modified, though not abrogated altogether....'
At meetings of the Detroit Boeri of Trade early in l86h, there

was a series of votes taken on the question of ending the agreement.

The first vote, in January, favored the abrogation of the treaty.

However, the next month this decision was reconsidered. On February 10,

it was voted ”nearly unanimously" to end the agreement but the next

day this decision was reversed by a "decisive vote."82

The resolutions that were finally adopted outlined precisely the
position of the Board of Trade. In part they read:

Resolved, That they [Detroit Board of Trade] are of the
Opinion that the operation of said treaty be beneficial to the
United States as well as Canada, and the other British pro-
vinces of North America, and that they see no reason to desire
abrogation.

Resolved, That they believe further, that if the respective
governments interested would inaugurate a system of moderate
duties on manufactured goods, it would impart additional force
and efficiency to the treaty itself.

Resolved, That inasmuch as we are united geographically, and
by numerous lines of railway inter-communication, as well as
by the other ties of relationship, language, and religion,
we should ever cherish and manifest those fraternal feeléggs,
which we hope sooner or later will prevail in the world.

80 ,
Detroit Free Press, July 18, 1860.

 

81
Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, Jan. 18, 186k.

82Detroit Advertiser and Tribune, and Detroit Free Press, Feb. 11,

186A. '__'

 

 

 

8
3Detroit Free Press, Feb. 9, 186A.

 

80

In December, 186%, this group again passed a motion stating its
opinion thatthe treaty should be retained. The only reservation.was
that the reciprocal trade provision be broadened to include more goods.

Throughout the West other boards of trade were taking similar
stands. The commercial groups of St. Paul and.Nfilwaukee desired to
see the treaty modified somewhat, while the boards of trade in Cleveland
and Chicago came out in favor of reciprocal exchange of all products.

The key to the support given the Reciprocity Treaty by the
Detroit Board of Trade is found in the profits derived by the shipping
interests of the city. The annual report of the Board of Trade for
186A estimated that "on three hundred thousand bushels of Canadian
wheat imported at Detroit and eventually eXported at New York, American
merchants were paid $108,296 of which eighty thousand were expended
after transfer of wheat at Buffalo."86 In simple terms, the commercial
men of Detroit were making large profits and any tariff regulations
between the two countries would automatically slash their gains and
impose new costs on their shipments.

The support of the treaty by the Detroit Board of Trade put
Senator Chandler in a peculiar position during the Congressional debates.
Chandler, a former Detroit businessman and member of the Board of Trade,
was attacked for his opposition to the treaty by Senator John Hale of
New Hampshire. Hale criticized the Michigan Senator by pointing out

the discrepancy in Chandler's views and interests:

8h
Detroit Free Press, Dec. 8, 186k.

 

8
5Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., p. 2h77.

86
The Globe, Toronto, Dec. 10,186h; cited in Masters, pp. 219- -220
Neither of the Detroit newspapers published the complete report--only gen3
eral statements and paraphrasings.

 

81
I take it that in all that relates to the interests of the trade
in the great city of Detroit, much the largest city in the State
of Michigan...that Etna] board of trade understand the interest
of commerce in their locality. The board of trade of Detroit...
are explicit in the expression of their Opinion in favor of the
treaty; and they represent the aggregated Opinion of the
commercial men of Detroit, saving and excepting the honorable
Senator from Michigan [Chandlefi].... Since he has withdrawn from
the active pursuits of commercial life...it would not be
strange, if, while he has gone into more enlarged spheres of
action, some younger men, attending to smaller things, have come
forward and are quite as competent to speak of the commerciag7
interests of the State of Michigan as the honorable Senator.
Chandler defended his position by insisting that the largest
interests of the state were Opposed to the treaty. He correctly pointed
out in his reply to Howe "that [the Detroit] board of trade does not
represent the State of Michigan, or the interests of the State of Michigan.
The gentlemen composing it are engaged mostly in the forwarding and
commission business and the receipt of produce. It is undoubtedly for
the interest of many of these gentlemen to continue this intercourse
with Canada, and the reception of Canadian produce, but, sir, the
people of the State of Michigan have no such interest."
In actuality all three, Chandler, Hale and the Detroit Board of
Trade, were right. The Michigan senator voted against the treaty as
the major interest groups in the state desired. Hale accurately pointed
out Chandler's somewhat unexpected, though politically expedient, position.
And finally, the members of the Detroit Board of Trade noted that the

"treaty had stimulated the commerce between the United States and the

" . . 89
Prov1nces,' and hOped for a continuation of this arrangement.

87
Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 231.

 

88
89

Cogg. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 230.

 

Detroit Free Press, March 9, 1859.

 

82

Not only did the forwarding interests fear losing their markets
because of the end of the treaty with Canada but they also feared the
loss of one of their routes to the East, the St. Iawrence River.
Between 1857 and 1859 thirty-seven vessels had used this outlet to sail
to Europe. In 1862-1863 only one American vessel went to the Atlantic
through the St. Iawrence and in 186h—1865 only five ships from American
ports used this route.90 While this number was not as large as
expected, it still represented a start toward a direct trade with the
EurOpean markets.

Furthermore, the improvements that were being made in the
transit facilities in both Canada and the United States promised a
healthy competition for the western trade, a fact which would reduce the
expense of shipping. If the St. Lawrence was closed the lake Erie-Erie
Canal route would have a monopoly and the shippers could charge any

price they desired without fear of losing business. The Free Press saw

 

the advantages of having both routes available:

Canada and New York have both inaugurated a system of canals

and railroads far beyond their own wants, and looking for
patronage to the West, and it is for the interest of the West
that there should be all possible competition for carrying her
great staple products to the seaboard. Cheap transportation from
the West to the Atlantic benefits our great interests. The
agriculturist, the great producer, and the consumer, is
benefitted, although a few commission men in New York city,

and the defeated lines of commerce, might suffer by not being
able to monOpolize, at our eXpense, our great staples of pro-
duction. The peOple of the State of Michigan do not sufgir

by this treaty; the great majority are benefitted by it.

v

90

Report gf the Secretary of the Treasury...og the Commerce and
Navigation 2: the United States, House EE' Doc., unnumbered, 37th Cong.,
2nd sess.

91

 

 

 

 

 

Detroit Free Press, Jan. 30, 186h.

 

83

During the debates in Congress concerning the treaty, Repre-
sentative Arnold of Illinois constantly pointed out that the loss of
the St. Lawrence route would hamper the movement of goods to the Eist.
"For years past," Arnold declared, "the West has been struggling to
increase facilities for transporting her produce to market. In the face
of these efforts, in the face of the peculiar reasons existing at the
present time for increasing such efforts, it is prOposed to shut up
one great avenue the West has to the ocean by the abrogation of the
treaty."92

Significantly missing, however, was any support from the Michigan
representatives in favor of keeping the St. Lawrence open to American
ships. The vigorous support for this route, led by Representative
Alexander Buel in the early 1850's, had vanished before more important
economic and political considerations. Only the commercial community
of Detroit stood firm in their hOpe of keeping the St. Iawrence route
in operation.

The end of the free exchange of goods and the abrupt closure of
one avenue of the East could be viewed only as a disaster by the shippers
of Michigan. However, their interest was small compared to that of the
farmers and lumbermen who pictured themselves on the edge of financial
ruin because of the treaty.

While Senator Chandler may be criticised for many of his state-
ments in relation to the treaty, he must be respected for his political

understanding of the grass-roots desires of his constituents. Chandler

2
9 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., p. 2368.

 

8h

voted as be believed his fellow citizens wanted him to vote. This vote

undoubtedly injured the commercial interests Of Detroit, but it is

' equally certain he expressed the sentiments of the majority of the

state's interest groups.

One event, the Detroit Commercial Convention, held after the
treaty had been abrogated, showed that the commercial men of Michigan
and of the West had benefited from the pact. This gathering of
representatives from the boards of trade of many of the lake cities and
also certain eastern centers such as New York, Boston and Philadelphia, was
called to discuss the state of commerce and communications in the West.

The convention was held in mid-July of 1865. Detroit's contri-
bution to the meeting involved the Reciprocity Treaty. Mbst of the
city's delegates were in favor of the treaty and one of them, James

93

Joy, was appointed chairman of the Committee on Reciprocity. In

this capacity Joy strongly urged the negotiation of a new treaty to
9k
replace the one that had been abrogated.

The Committee on Reciprocity presented a resolution to the

convention calling for the negotiation of another treaty. This

} resolution was unanimously adOpted. It read, in part:

Resolved, that this convention do respectfully request the
President of the United States to enter into negotiations with
the government of Great Britain, having in view the execution

of a Treaty between the two countries for reciprocal commercial
intercourse...based on principles which shall be just and
equitable to all parties and with reference to the present
financial condition of the United States and which shall include
the free navigation of the St. Iawrence and the other rivers

of British North America, with such improvements of the rivers

93Detroit Free Press, Ju1y 12, 1865.

 

9“See William Stocking, "Detroit Commercial Organizations,"
Michigan History Magazine, IV, pp. h35-h77.

 

85

and the enlargements of the canals as shall render them adequate
for the requirements of the west in communicating with the ocean.

.The overwhelming victory of the treaty resolution in the convention
was due primarily to Joseph Howe, the main speaker at the meeting.
Howe, a Canadian politician of wide reputation, spoke with such force-
fulness to the group that he changed the feelings toward the prospect
of a new treaty "from sullen indifference to cheering enthusiasm."96
One reason for the new enthusiasm engendered by Hewe was his
skillful presentation of the benefits the increased commercial traffic
had brought to the United States. The Canadian noted that the industrial
results of the treaty "any fair-minded and dispassionate man must admit
have far surpassed the utility and value, all that could have been

97

hOped by the most sanguine advocates of the measure in 185h." Howe
continued:

The trade of the United States and of the Provinces, feeble,
restricted, slow of growth and vexations before, has been
annually swelled by mutual exchanges and honourable competition,
till it is represented by a grand total of $A56,350,39l, in
nine years. This amount seems almost incredible, but who can
hazard an estimate of the figure which this trade will be
expressed ten or twenty years hence, if this wise adjustment of
our mutual interests be not disturbed?.... In the interests of
peace and honest industry, we should thank Providence for the
blessing and confidently rely upon the wisdom of our statesmen
to see that it is preserved. 8

Howe argued that the lumber imterests of the United States were
not being injured by the Canadian product. He claimed that there was

no evidence that timber from the north had lowered the price of the

95Stocking, p. hug.

96Masters, p. 155.

97JOSeph A. Chisholm, ed., The Speeches and Public Letters 9:
Joseph Howe, 2 vols. (Halifax, 1909), II, p. th.

98

 

 

 

Speeches and Public Letters 9: Joseph HOwe, II, pp. huh.

 

 

86

American lumber and "the price of lumber last year was very high, and.I
know that since this treaty...the peOple of Bangor have all got rich."
Howe further maintained that the price of lumber would always be high:
"There are causes at work over the face of this continent that mmst
always keep up the price of lumber. Nobody plants a tree except for
shade, and everybody is cutting them down."99

On the subject of the Civil war, Howe ably pointed out that
large numbers of Canadians served in the Union armies. In fact, one
of his sons served under Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. Howe said:
"All the personal benefit that I have derived from the Reciprocity
Treaty, or hOpe to derive from its renewal will never compensate me or
that boy's mother for the anxiety we have had with regard to him...."100

Howe was asked the question whether or not Canada was building
fortifications in its territory. He replied.with candor: ".... After
so many threats from NOrthern newspapers, that so soon as the rebellion
has been put down and Mexico attended to, the face of the army would
be turned towards Canada, it is not to be wondered at that the mother
country should become a little anxious about her children...and send
out an experienced officer to report on the situation."101

wae's Opinions had not been formulated for the benefit of the
Convention. In 1862 he had written to c. B. Adderly, M. P.: "The
Northern States are our immediate neighbours, and, next to the mother

country, ought to be our fast friends and firm allies." later in the

same letter he admitted, that "a good deal of irritation has arisen out

99Speeches and Public letters pf Joseph Howe, II, p. hh9.

 

 

lOOSpeeches and Public letters g£_Joseph Howe, II, p. hSA.

 

 

101speeches and Public Letters g: Joseph Howe: 11: P° “5“'

 

 

87
of the civil war, but I rely on the frank admission of the Northern
people...that for this they themselves were to blame. The Provinces,
at its commencement, deeply deplored the outbreak of that war..." He

concluded by observing that "our material interests and everyday

thoughts and feelings are in accord with those Lpf the Northern States...."102

One point of major emphasis in Howe's Speech was in answer to
the common notion that the end of reciprocity would force Canada's
annexation to the United States. Howidisposed of the matter thusly:

I know that is has been asserted by some, and I have heard
it uttered since I came to the convention, that if the Reciprocity
Treaty is annulled the British Provinces will be compelled to
seek annexation to the United States. I beg to be allowed to
say on that point that no man knows better the feeling of the
lower Provinces, and I believe I am well enough acquainted with
the Canadians to speak for them also, and I speak for them all...
when I make the assertion that no consideration of finance,
no question of balance for or against them, upon interchange of
commodities, can have any influence upon the loyalty of the
inhabitants of the British Provinces, or tend in the slightest
degree to alienate the affections of the peOple from their
country their institutions, their Government and their

, Queen. 03

James JOy, in one of his speeches before the convention,
expressed the same view regarding annexation as Howe. He said the
motive was unworthy of a great nation, not to mention the absurdity of
the idea in itself. Furthermore, he feared that the old fisheries
problem might be reOpened and that we should "acquire a war instead of
an addition of states."lou

Joy and HOwe, by illustrating the effects the old treaty had on

the commercial class of the Great lakes region, stimulated desire for

O
l 2Speeches and Public letters 9: Joseph Howe, II, pp. h09-h10.

 

 

10
3Speeches and Public Letters g£_Joseph Howe, II, p. #53.
10h

 

 

Stocking, pp. hh7—hh8.

88
a new reciprocity treaty. HOwever, as far as Michigan was concerned
the convention merely heightened the conflict between the farming-
lumbering interests and the commercial community of Detroit. The
passage of the resolution calling fOr a new pact probably convinced
the wool producers and grain growers that they might be sacrificed
to the shipping interests. The commercial men were not strong enough
to have any important influence on the federal government and no

Official action was taken concerning negotiation of another pact.

CONCLUSION

The answers to two questions will summarize the material which
has been presented. These questions are: what were the effects of
the treaty on Michigan and what were the basic causes behind Michigan's
favoring the end of the pact in 1865?

The greatest contribution of the treaty was the increase in
trade which stimulated economic development and led to improved
transportation facilities. Detroit's location naturally made it a
commercial city and the large intercourse in Canadian products en-
hanced the port's position.

It is impossible to determine the exact effect of reciprocal
trade on the commerce of Michigan. The period was one of rapid
expansion and there were other factors that played a part in the
prosperity of the 1860's. However, the fact that the Detroit Board
Of Trade, favored the commercial agreement with Canada testifies to
the treaty's importance in enlarging Michigan's trade.

A second stimulus to the economic growth of the state was the
Opening of the St. Lawrence River to American shipping. The prospect
of a direct route to Europe with its lucrative markets was the chief
reason for Michigan's support of the treaty in l85h, but the use of
this route never reached the prOportions hOped for at the signing of
the pact. Still, the Opening of the river to the Atlantic did bolster
the confidence of the Great Lakes merchants and a few ships did take

advantage of the new route.

90

Despite the advantages derived from the treaty there were
significant reasons for the citizens Of the state to favor abrOgation.
The intense competition from Canadian agricultural products in the
east made the Michigan farmers fearful that they might be pushed from
their own markets. Likewise, the lumbermen shuddered at the prospect
of the huge timber resources of Canada being dumped into the American
markets. They saw themselves undersold and outproduced by the Canadian
lumber industry and concluded the best way to preserve their position
was to end reciprocity and promote a protective tariff.

The abrogation proceedings brought into the Open the conflict
between the Detroit shippers and rural districts. In 1865 the commercial
men were overpowered by the agricultural-lumbering interests, a fact
clearly evidenced by the "defection” of Senator Chandler from the stand
of the Detroit Board of Trade. This antagonism between Detroit and
the out-state area has continued to influence Michigan history to the
present day.

The difficulties with Canada during the Civil war were a second
reason Michigan desired to see the treaty abrogated. While it is
difficult to assess the effects of the Canadian neutrality policy it
cannot be questioned that the raid on Johnson's Island, the interruption
of commerce, and the discontent over Vallandigham's sojourn in Windsor,
frightened and annoyed many Michigan citizens. These difficulties
brought closer to home the dissatisfactions regarding the treaty.
Though the Canadians were scrupulously correct in their actions,
Michigan residents wanted revenge for the supposed wrongs inflicted

on them by the Canadian government.

91

The statement of two reasons for the abrogation of the treaty
requires an estimate of the relative importance of each. The economic
Opposition to the treaty had been heard for some time. It began when the
Canadians increased the tariffs on manufactured goods in 1858. This
was perfectly legal, but not within the "spirit" of the treaty. In
the early 1860's the growing competition from Canadian natural products
alienated the Michigan farmers and lumbermen. This continuing dis-
satisfaction with the results of the pact was the foundation for the
anti-treaty sentiments.

While the economic consequences of the treaty were the basis
of Opposition to the pact, the ill-feeling toward Canada caused by
the Civil war added to the abrOgation arguments. Undoubtedly the
Canadian difficulties directly touched more peOple in the state than
did the economic motives. Raids in the area were easier to understand
than Eber Ward's protectionist tracts or the statistic-studded balance
of trade theories advanced during the debates on the treaty in 186h-1865.

Thus the conclusion may be drawn that the economic effects of
the treaty were the most important cause for desiring abrOgation,
while the Canadian situation increased pOpular support for the abrogation
movement. It seems highly improbable that the political feeling
against Canada could have brought about the termination of the pact.
The end of the war stopped rebel threats from Canada and the trade
advantages of the agreement would have been stoutly defended by the
Detroit merchants.

A third argument which was advanced against the treaty must be

discussed although its validity is questionable. During the debates on

92
abrOgation the use of the St. Lawrence River was attacked by one Michigan
legislator. The grounds for the protests were the lack of any con-
sistent use of the route and the belief that a line of transportation
through a foreign territory was extremely insecure.

Statistics prove that the route was not as useful as enthusiastic
Michiganders had predicted in 185h. Despite this there were some ships
plying the river to the ocean and the potential of the route, which
could be develOped by larger locks and channel improvements, was
limitless.

The necessity of a treaty with a foreign power to use the St.
Lawrence is a more valid argument but shows no COgnizance of current
political facts. Canada wanted to retain reciprocity and would have
gladly allowed further use of the river in return for a continuation
of the treaty. There had been no threats to close the Canadian sections
of the route by the Canadian government since 1854 and the desire for
harmonious relations with the United States precluded any stoppage of
American traffic.

Thus it is evident that the arguments Opposing the use of the St.
Iawrence were without foundation. It would appear that Opposition to
the route was voiced to add another damaging charge against the treaty.
Political eXpediency was the basis for protesting the St. Lawrence
route; certainly the manifest reasons were short-sighted and without good
understanding of the situation.

I In summary, the economic consequences of the treaty, re-enforced
by the fear of invasions from Canada during the Civil war, led Michigan

to desire abrogation of the pact. Despite the benefits of the treaty

93

to the economy of the state, two important interests,
agriculture, were seriously injured by its Operation.

the Michigan legislators for abrOgation expressed the

large and powerful segments of the state's pOpulation.

lumbering and
The votes of

sentiments of

APPENDIX
Reciprocity Treaty Between the United States and Great
Britain1

Her Majesty, the Queen of Great Britain, being equally desirous
with the Government of the United States to avoid further misunder-
standing between their respective Subjects and Citizens, in regard to
the extent of the right of Fishing on the Coasts of British North
America, secured to each by Article I, of a Convention between the
United States and Great Britain, signed at london on the 20th day of
' October, 1818, and being also desirous to regulate the Commerce and
Navigation between their respective Territories and PeOple, and more
especially between Her Majesty's Possessions in North America and the
United States in such manner as to render the same reciprocally
beneficial and satisfactory, have resLectively named Plenipotentiaries
to confer and agree thereupon, that is to say: Her Majesty, the Queen
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, James, Earl of
Elgin and Kincardine, Lord Bruce, and Elgin, a Peer of the United
Kingdom, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle,
and Governor General in and over all Her Britannic Majesty's Provinces
on the Continent of North America, and in and over the Island of Prince
Edward; and the President of the United States of America, William L.
Marcy, Secretary of State of the United States, who, after having
communicated to each other their respective full Powers, found in good
and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

lunited States Statues at Large, X, pp. 1089—1092. The original
also contains the Proclamation of the President which is ommitted here.

 

96

Article I

It is agreed by the High Contracting Parties, that in addition
to the liberty secured to the United States fishermen by the above-
mentioned Convention of October 20, 1818, of taking, curing, and drying
fish on certain Coasts of the British North American Colonies therein
defined, the inhabitants of the United States shall have in common with
the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, the liberty to take fish of every
kind, except shell-fish on the sea coast and shores, and in the bays,
harbors, and creeks of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince
Edward's Island, and of the several Islands thereunto adjacent, without
being restricted to any distance from the shore; with permission to land
upon the coasts and shores of those Colonies and the Islands thereof,
and also upon the Magdalen Island for the purpose of drying their nets
and curing their fish; provided that in so doing, they do not interfere
with the rights of private prOperty or British fishermen in the peaceable
use of any part of the said coast in their occupancy for the same
purpose.

It is understood that the above-mentioned liberty applies solely
to the sea fishery, and that the salmon and shad fisheries, and all
fisheries in rivers, and the mouths of rivers, are hereby reserved
exclusively for British fishermen.

And it is further agreed, that in order to prevent or settle any
disputes as to the places to which the reservation of exclusive right
to British fishermen contained in this Article, and that of fishermen of
the United States contained in the next succeeding Article, apply, each

of the High Contracting Parties, on the application of either to the

97

other, shall, within six months thereafter, appoint a Commissioner.
The said Commissioners before proceeding to any business, shall make and
subscribe a solemn declaration that they will impartially and carefully
examine and decide to the best of their judgment, and according to
justice and equity, without fear, favor or affection to their own
country, upon all such places as are intended to be reserved and excluded
from the common liberty of fishing under this and the next succeeding
Article; and such declaration shall be entered on the record of their
proceedings. The Commissioners shall name some third person to act as
an Arbitrator or Umpire in any case or cases, on which they may them—
selves differ in opinion. If they should not be able to agree upon
the name of such third person, they shall each name a person, and it
shall be determined by lot which of the two persons 30 named shall be
the Arbitrator or Umpire in cases of difference or disagreement between
the Commissioners. The person so to be chosen to be Arbitrator or
Umpire shall, before proceeding to act as such in any case, make and
subscribe a solemn declaration in a form similar to that which shall
already have been made and subscribed by the Commissioners, which shall
be entered on the record of their proceedings. In the event of the
death, absence, or incapacity of either of the Commissioners or of the
Arbitrator or Umpire, or of their or his omitting, declining or ceasing
to act as such Commissioner, Arbitrator or Umpire, another and different
person shall be appointed or named as aforesaid, and shall make and
subscribe such declaration as aforesaid.

Such Commissioners shall proceed to examine the Coasts of the

North American Provinces and of the United States embraced within the

98
provisions of the first and second Articles of this treaty, and shall
designate the places reserved by the said Articles from the common rights
of fishing therein.

The decision of the Commissioners and of the Arbitrator or Umpire
shall be given in writing in each case, and shall be signed by them
respectively.

The High Contracting Parties hereby solemnly engage to consider
the decision of the Commissioners conjointly, or of the Arbitrator or
Umpire, as the case may be, as absolutely final and conclusive in each

case decided upon by them or him, respectively.

Article II

It is agreed by the High Contracting Parties that British
subjects shall have, in common with the citizens of the United States,
the liberty to take fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on the
Eastern sea coasts and shores of the United States, North of the 36th
parallel of North Latitude, and on the shores of the several Islands
thereunto adjacent, and in the bays, harbors, and creeks of the said
sea coasts and shores of the United States and of the said Islands,
without being restricted to any distance from the shore, with permission
to land upon the said coasts of the United States and of the Islands
aforesaid for the purpose of drying their nets and curing their fish;
provided that in so doing they do not interfere with the rights of
private prOperty, or with the fishermen of the United States in the
peaceable use of any part of the said coasts in their occupancy for
the same purpose.

It is understood that the above-mentioned liberty applies

solely to the sea fishery, and that salmon and shad fisheries, and

'99
all fisheries in rivers and mouths of rivers are hereby reserved

exclusively for fishermen of the United States.

Article III
It is agreed, that the Articles enumerated in the Schedule
hereunto annexed, being the growth and produce of the aforesaid British
Colonies or of the United States, shall be admitted into each Country

respectively free of duty:

Schedule
Grain, flour, and breadstuffs of all kinds.
Animals of all kinds.
Fresh, smoked, and salted meats.
Cotton-wool, seeds and vegetables.
Undried fruits, dried fruits.
Fish of all kinds.
Products of fish and of all other creatures living in the water.
Poultry, eggs.
Hides, furs, skins or tails, undressed.
Stone and marble in its crude or unwrought state.
Slate.
Butter, cheese, tallow.
Lard, horns, manures.
Ores of metals of all kinds.
Coal.
Pitch, tar, turpentine, ashes.
Timber and lumber of all kinds: round, hewed, and sawed; unmanufactured

in whole or in part.

Firewood.

Plants, shrubs, and trees.

Pelts, wool.

Fish-oil.

Rice, broom-corn, bark.

Gypsum, ground or unground.

Hewn or wrought or unwrought burr or grindstones.
Dye-stuffs.

Unmanufactured tobacco.

Rags.

Article IV

It is agreed that the citizens and inhabitants of the United
States shall have the right to navigate the river St. Lawrence and the
canals in Canada, used as the means of communicating between the Great
Lakes and the Atlantic Ocean, with their vessels, boats and crafts,
as fully and freely as the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, subject
only to the same tolls and other assessments as now are or may hereafter
be exacted of Her Majesty's said subjects, it being understood, however,
that the British Government retains the right of suspending this
privilege on giving due notice thereof to the Government of the United
States.

It is further agreed that if at any time the British Government
should exercise the said reserved right, the Government of the United
States shall have the right of suspending, if it think fit, the Operation
of Article III, of the present treaty in so far as the Province of

’

Canada is affected thereby, for so long as the suspension of the free

lOl
navigation of the river St. Iawrence or the Canals may continue.

It is further agreed that British subjects shall have the right
freely to navigate Lake Michigan with their vessels, boats and crafts,
so long as the privilege of navigating the river St. Iawrence secured to
American citizens by the above clause of the present Article shall
continue, and the Government of the United States further engages to
urge upon the State Governments to secure to the subjects of Her
BritannflzMajesty, the use of the several State Canals on terms of
equality with the inhabitants of the United States.

And it is further agreed that no Export duty or other duty
shall be levied on lumber or timber of any kind cut on that portion of
the American territory in the State of Maine, watered by the river St.
John and its tributaries and floated down that river to the sea, when
the same is shipped to the Uhited States from the Province of New

Brunswick.

Article V

The presenttreaty shall take effect as soon as the laws
required to carry it into Operation shall have been passed by the
Imperial Parliament of Great Britain and by the Provincial Parliaments
of those of the British North American Colonies which are affected by
this treaty on the one hand, and by the Congress of the United States
on the other. Such assent having been given, the treaty shall remain
in force for ten years for the date at which it may come into Operation,
and further until the expiration of twelve months after either of the
High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to
terminate the same; each of the High Contracting Parties being at liberty

to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of ten

102
years, or at any time afterwards.
It is clearly understood, however, that this stipulation is not
intended to affect the reservation made by Article IV, of the present
treaty with regard to the right of temporarily suspending the Operation

of Articles III and IV thereof.

Article VI
And it is hereby further agreed that the provisions and

stipulations of the foregoing Articles shall extend to the Island of
Newfoundland, so far as they are applicable to that Colony. But if

the Imperial Parliament of Newfoundland, or the Congress of the United
States shall not embrace in their laws enacted for carrying this treaty
into effect, the Colony of Newfoundland, then this Article shall be of
no effect, but the omission to make provision by law to give it effect,
by either of the legislative bodies aforesaid, shall not in any way

impair the remaining Articles of this treaty.

Article VIII
The present treaty shall be duly ratified and the mutual
exchange of ratification shall take place in Washington within six
months from the date thereof, or earlier if possible.
In faith whereof, We, the respective Plenipotentiaries have
signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our Seals.
Done in triplicate, at washington, the Fifth day of June,
Anno Domini, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four.
(Signed) EIGIN AND KINCARDINE,
L. S.

w. L. MARCY,

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Primary Sources

 

Government Documents

 

United States

 

A valuable source of information is the Congressional Globe.
It contains the debates on the Reciprocity Treaty and the various
tariff measures which were acted upon by Congress. Particularly im-
portant are the abrogation proceedings in lB6h-1865.

The entire Congressional debates and all documents relating to

the Reciprocity Treaty have been published in Senate Executive Document

 

number 80, volume 1, sixty-second Congress, first session. The most

important federal document is House Executive Document number 96, thirty-

 

sixth Congress, first session. This is the report of Israel T. Hatch
and James W. Taylor on the Operation of the treaty. Another official

document which has been utilized is Senate Executive Document number 7h,

 

thirty-third Congress, first session. It includes a letter from.William
Anderson of Ann Arbor to the Secretary of the Treasury concerning tariffs.

Other valuable sources are Senate Miscellaneous Document number 111,

 

thirty-first Congress, first session, which concerns the navigation of the

St. Lawrence; Senate Executive D0cument number 23, thirty-first Congress,

 

first session, which is an early report by Israel Andrews on the state
of the Canadian provinces; and the report of the House Committee on

Commerce concerning the second reciprocity bill appearing in House Reports

 

number A, thirty-second Congress, second session.

105

Statistical information is taken from the U S. Census, 1850

 

(Washington, 1853), and the various Reports of_the Secretary 9£_the

 

Treasury...gn the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. These

 

 

Reports appear annually in the House Executive Documents and have infor-

 

mation on the types of goods imported to Michigan ports from Canada and

the value of trade between Canada and the United States.

Michigan Documents

 

Two Michigan documents were utilized as statistical sources. One

indispensable source is Census and Statistics g£_Michigan, 186h(Lansing,

 

 

1865). This document contains complete statistics from all state and

federal censuses through 186A. Another document is the Statistical

 

Report which appears in the Joint Documents of the Michigan Legislature,

 

number h, 1850.

Newspapers and Periodicals

 

For this paper considerable use has been made of the newspapers

of the period. The most prominent are the Detroit Advertiser and

 

Tribune, a Republican paper and the Detroit Free Press, a Democratic

 

organ. These two papers were interested in the reciprocity and tariff
issues. Many editorials and articles appeared on these subjects, as
well as information on Michigan politics and economic development.

Other newspapers consulted were the Lansing State Republican,

 

which yielded useful general information and market quotations; the

Michigan Expositor, a Republican paper published in Adrian; the Adrian

 

Daily Watchtower, a Democratic paper; and the lake Superior News and

 

 

Miners Journal, which was excellent background reading on the mining

 

industry of the state.

106

The Michigan Farmer, published monthly, contains material on the

 

wool tariff controversy. No other political discussions appeared in

the Farmer however.

Other Primary Sources

 

Eber Ward's pamphlet, British Free Trade, A_Delusion: To the

 

Farmers, Mechanics, Laborers, and all voters of_the Jestern §_North-

 

 

 

 

Western States(Detroit, 1865), sets forth some of his tariff and free-

 

trade views. Also useful was an "Apologia of a Republican Office Seeker,

18st," edited by Philip Mason, Michigan History, volume #1, pages 76-90.

 

Three published works of primary materials involving Canadian

history were helpful. Select Documents ig_Canadian Economic History,

 

 

1783-1885, edited by Harold A. Innis and Arnold R. M. Lower(Toronto,

1933), is a well-rounded collection of materials. The Speeches and

 

Public Letters 2: Joseph Howe, edited by Joselh A. Chisholm, 2 volumes

 

 

(Halifax, 1909), is valuable background material on Canadian-American
relations as well as for direct quotations from Howe's speech to the
Detroit Commercial Convention in the summer of 1865. Finally, the

Elgin—Grey Papers: 18h6-1852, edited by Sir Arthur G. Doughty(0ttawa,

 

1937), is useful in understanding Elgin's stand on reciprocity and

annexation.

Secondary Sources

 

The best work on the Reciprocity Treaty is Donald G. Masters,

The Reciprocity Treaty 2: 185h(Iondon, New York, and Toronto, 1936).

 

This book provides a comprehensive outline of the treaty negotiations,
its Operation and its eventual abrogation. The American point of view,

however, receives only passing consideration. The diplomatic moves

07
leading to the signing of the pact have been studied by Charles Tansill,

The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of lBSh, Johns HOpkins Studies in

 

Historical and Political Science, series XL, number 2 (Baltimore, 1922).
Another book on reciprocity is Cephas D. Allin and George M. Jones,

Annexation, Preferential Trade and Reciprocity(Toronto and London, 1911).

 

This book is now dated and in need of major revision. Other books con-

sulted were L. Ethan Ellis, Reciprocity 1911, A_Study in Canadian—American

 

 

Relations(New Haven, 1939), and James L. Laughlin and Henry P. Willis,

Reciprocity(New York, 1903). An article by William D. Overman, "I. D.

 

Andrews and Reciprocity in lBSh: An Episode in Dollar Diplomacy,"

Canadian Historical Review, XV, pages 2h8-263, was also helpful.

 

The best outline of the relations between Canada and the United

States from 185h-1866 is Iester Shippee, Canadian-American Relations:

 

18h9—1871(New Haven, Toronto, and London, 1939). Hugh Keenleyside,

Canada and the Uhited States(New York, 1929) is a more general study and

 

James Callahan, American Foreign Policy i2 Canadian Relations(New York,

 

 

1937) is an interesting and well-written volume which contains a good
discussion of the Reciprocity Treaty.

The general studies of Canadian and English history used in this
thesis are J. M. S. Careless, Canada: A_§tg£y_gf_a Challenge «Lambridge,
Eng., 1953), and w. E. Lunt, History 93 En land, 3rd edition (New York
and Iondon, l9h7).

Three excellent books on Canadian economic history are Donald G.

Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-185C(Toronto,

 

 

New Haven and London, 1937); Gilbert N. Tucker, The Canadian Commercial

 

Revolution, 18h5-1851(New Haven, 1936); and Adam Shortt, "Economic History,

 

18h0-1867," Canada and the Provinces, 22 volumes(TOronto, l9lh), volume 5,

 

pages 185-257.

108
Other works which have been consulted are Donald G. Barnes,

5 History of the English Corn laws from 1660-18A6(New York, 1930);

 

J. Bartlet Brebner, "Joseph Howe and the Crimean War Enlistment Contro-

versy between England and the United States,' Canadian Historical Review,

 

XL, pages 300-327; Percy E. Corbett, The Settlement 23 Canadian-American

 

 

Disputes(New Haven, 1937); Archibald w. Currie, The Grand Trunk Railway

 

g£_Canada(Toronto, 1957); Sir Robert Falconer, The United States a§>a

 

Neighbor(Cambridge, Eng., 1925); and Edgar W. McInnis, The Unguarded

 

Frontier(Garden City, 19h2).

Frank W. Taussig's Tariff History_g£_the United States, 8th

 

 

edition(New York and London, 1931), was utilized as a basic source of
information on tariffs.
Two excellent books on American relations with England and Canada

during the Civil war are Ephriam D. Adams, Great Britain and the

 

American Civil War, 2 volumes(Gloucester, 1957), and Helen G. Mac-

 

donald, Canadian Public Opinion of the American Civil War, Columbia

 

 

University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law(New York, 1926).
The organization of the southern activities in Canada has been summarized

by Wilfred Bbvey, "Confederate Agents in Canada during the American Civil

H

War, Canadian Historical Review, II, pages h6-57.

 

Other studies of American history consulted are Percy W. Bidwell

and John J. Falconer, Histogy 9£_Ag§iculture in the Northern United

 

 

States: 1620-1860(New York, l9h1); George A. Cuthbertson, Freshwater

 

(New York, 1931); James E. Defenbough, History 93 the Lumber Industry of

 

America, 2 volumes (Chicago, 1906); Arnold R. M. Lower, The North

American Assault on the Canadian Forest(Toronto, New Haven, and London,

 

1938); Wilbur H. Siebert, The Underground Railroad from Slavery to

 

109

Freedom(New York, 1898); Frank H. Taussig, Free Trade, the Tariff and

 

Reciprocity(New York, 1920); and Chester Whitney wright, WOol-Growing

 

 

and the Tariff(Cambridge, Nhss., 1910).

 

The best general history of Michigan is F. Clever Bald,

Michigan in Four Centuries(New York, l95h). Silas Farmer, The History

 

 

9: Detroit and Michigan(Detroit, 188k), is valuable to the historian

 

because of its huge mass of facts. Floyd Benjamin Streeter, Michigan

BibliOgraphy(Lansing, 1921), provided many leads to published materials.

 

Also of some use was Lawton T. Hemans, History Of Michigan(Lansing, 1906).
The political history of the state during the period of the
Reciprocity Treaty has been well outlined by Floyd Benjamin Streeter,

Political Parties in_Michigan, 1837-1860(Lansing, 1918). Other general

 

 

studies are James V. Campbell, Outline of the Political History of_

 

Michigan, 2 volumes (Detroit, 1876), and Harriette M. Dilla, The

Politics g£_Michigan, 1865-1878, Columbia University Studies in History,

 

Economics and Public Law, XLVIII, number 1(New York, 1912).
Research on the tariff issue in 1860 has been done by Thomas

Pitkin, "Western Republicans and the Tariff in 1860," Mississippi Valley

 

Historical Review, XXVII, pages filo-420; Richard Hofstadter, "The

 

Tariff Issue on the Eve of the Civil war," American Historical Review,

 

XLIV, pages 50-55; and William E. Dodd, ”The Fight for the Northwest,

1860," American Historical Review, XLV, pages 77h-788.

 

Several biographies have been helpful to the author. The

Detroit Post and Tribune, Zachariah Chandler: An Outline Sketch of His

 

 

Life and Services(Detroit, 1880), provides a detailed though somewhat

 

superficial view of the Senator. Chandler's political views have been

analysed by Hilmer Harris, Public Life of Zachariah Chandler: 1851-1875

 

 

110
(Lansing, 1917). Othensof value are Andrews McLaughlin, Lewis Cass
(Boston and New York, 1891), and Martha Bigelow, "The Political Services

of William Alanson H0ward," Michigan History, volume M1, pages 1-22.

 

Two journal articles were utilized in studying Michigan
commercial conditions. William Stocking, "Detroit Commercial Organ-

izations," Michigan History, volume A, pages h35-h77, contains a large

 

section on the Detroit Board of Trade. George M. Brown, "Opening the

St. Lawrence to American Shipping," Canadian Historical Review, VIII,

 

pages h—l2, traces the develOpments to the Opening of the route to the
Atlantic.

The relations between Michigan and Canada during the Civil War
has been the subject of two particularly good pieces of research. Andrew
W. Renfrew, "COpperheads, Confederates, and Conspiracies on the Detroit-
Canadian Border," an unpublished Master's thesis, Wayne University,

1952, stresses the fears raised by the raids and threatened raids from
Canada. Martin J. Havran, "Windsor and Detroit Relations during the

Civil War," Michigan History, volume 38, pages 371-389, is a defense of

 

the Canadian actions and policies.

Several good studies of Michigan's economic development have been
written. This is especially true of the copper industry. The early
efforts to exploit the cOpper resources of the state are outlined by

H

Lew A. Chase, "Early COpper Mining in Michigan, Michigan History,

 

volume 29, pages 22-50, 169-179 and A79-h88. A history of the Calumet
and Hecla Mine is C. Harry Benedict, Red Metal: The Calumet and Hecla
Stg£y(Ann Arbor, 1952). The investments made in Michigan mines hss

been studied by William B. Gates, Jr., Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars:

£2 Economic History 22 the Michigan COpper Industry(Cambridge, Mass., 1951).

 

 

111

The beginnings of the mining interest's desire for protective tariffs is

noted by Alfred Lindley, "The COpper Tariff of 1869," Michiran Histor
L l)

 

volume 35, pages 1-31.

The lumber industry of thhigan has provided a tOpic for many
authors but unfortunately only limited research has been done on lumber
tariffs. The one notable exception is Robert Johnson, "Logs for
Saginaw: An Episode in Canadian-American Tariff Relations," Michigan
History, volume 3h, pages 213-223. Useful background material is found

in William Rector, LOg Transportation in the Lake States Lumber Industry

 

 

(Glendale, 1953), and Ormond Danford, "The Social and Economic Effects

of Lumbering on Michigan," Michigan History, volume 26, pages 3h6-36h.

 

Finally, Joseph Duncan, “The Michigan Farmer--A Century of

 

Agricultural Journalism: 18h3—l9h3," unpublished Master's thesis,
Michigan State University, 1950, is a useful guide to the content and

editorial policies of the paper.

$06115, ‘3 ::.~