AN EXAMINATION OF THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION AS THE FOCAL POINT OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1913-1917

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Kirby Garrett Holmes

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by

Kirby Garrett Holmes

AN ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT

The Punitive Expedition, led by General John J. Pershing against Francisco (Pancho) Villa, was in Mexico for a total of eleven months. It entered Mexico on March 15, 1916, six days after Villa's attack on Columbus, New Mexico, and was completely withdrawn by February 5, 1917.

Though the Punitive Expedition was the direct result of Villa's attacking an American town, it was an indirect result of certain events that happened in the preceeding five year period. It is only through the understanding of these events leading up to the attack on Columbus, New Mexico, that the relationship between Mexico and the United States, during the time of the Punitive Expedition, can be fully understood.

For the most part, this thesis is taken from original documents printed in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., Volumes 1913 through 1917. Extensive use was also made of microfilmed data taken from the files of the Adjutant General's Office, The National Archives, Washington, D.C. This microfilm was borrowed from Professor Charles C. Cumberland, Michigan State University.

When Porfirio Díaz resigned from the Presidency of Mexico in May, 1911, the next five years saw revolution and counter-revolution, such that the relations between Mexico and the United States became strained to the point of near war. Díaz resigned because of a successful revolt led by Francisco Madero. Madero became the new president and his administration lasted but a short sixteen months. The internal problems of Mexico that Madero faced were immense. He saw little political, economic, or social progress made during his administration. Relations between Mexico and the United States were blessed because of the non-intervention policy pursued by President Taft, however, rebellions against his (Madero's) government, especially those occurring in the border towns, strained these relations somewhat.

Madero was assassinated in February, 1913, the result of a successful barracks revolt led by General Victoriano Huerta. Shortly after the fall of Madero, Woodrow Wilson was elected President of the United States, and for idealistic and moralistic reasons he would not recognize the government of the usurper Huerta. Not only would he not recognize Huerta, but he used the power of his position to aid in bringing about his downfall. Because of this pressure by Wilson, and a successful revolution against him led by Venustiano Carranza, Huerta abdictated in July, 1914. The revolution was not over yet, however, as one of Carranza's generals, Pancho Villa, rose up against him, and the revolution continued for another year. Carranza's fight with Villa stretched President Wilson's patience to the limit, but finally, Carranza was recognized by Wilson in October, 1915, as having de facto control of Mexico.

Pancho Villa, still determined, was then responsible for the United States sending a punitive expedition into Mexico. He first massacred sixteen Americans at Santa Ysabel, in January, 1916, and followed this with an attack on the American town of Columbus, New Mexico, in March, 1916.

The Punitive Expedition chased Villa around northern Mexico for eleven months, finally withdrawing in February, 1917. This expedition was an unqualified failure. It failed to accomplish any aims it set out to accomplish, and only succeeded in antagonizing the Mexican populace to the point of near war.

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CHAPTER I

EXAMINATION OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION[1]

In 1876, Mexican President Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada announced that he would stand for re-election. General Porfirio Díaz, upon a platform of "effective suffrage and no re-election," started a revolution that was far more widespread than that of 1871-72, when he rebelled against Benito Juárez. Many discontented people flocked to his standards, and Díaz was successful also in recruiting volunteers and capital for his revolution from the American side of the border. Although Lerdo de Tejada's forces completely routed the Díaz rebels on two occassions, Díaz turned the tables and inflicted total defeat upon Lerdo's army in a decisive battle at Tecoac, 75 miles east of Mexico City.

On November 21, 1876, Díaz triumphantly entered the capital a few hours after Lerdo de Tejada departed for Acapulco and exile in the United States. He proclaimed himself provisional president, and was in undisputed possession of power in Mexico. He was to be elected and re-elected to the presidency for a total of eight terms, and was in continuous power[2] in Mexico from November of 1876 until he resigned in May, 1911, under pressure from the Madero revolution. This was a total of 35 years.

Formal recognition of the Díaz government was deferred by the United States because of his refusal to enter upon the

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1. Most of the material in this chapter concerning the Díaz era was taken from James Morton Callahan's American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1932. Also, the material relating to the revolution of Madero was taken in great part from Charles C. Cumberland's Mexican Revolution, Genesis under Madero, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1952.

2. In 1880-84, Manuel Gonzalez was in the presidential chair, but the authorities generally agree that Diaz was in effective control.

settlement of various pending questions. The government of the United States was concerned about the rights and protection of American citizens in Mexico, and also wanted quick action by the Mexican government "concerning the irritating occurrances on the Rio Grande border."[3]

The United States government sympathized patiently with Mexico in her struggle for republican government, and countenanced the efforts of Díaz towards a steady rule of law. Trans-boundary invasions by lawless bands of Mexicans from Tamaulipas and Chihuahua, and Indians from Coahuila, however, taxed this patience to the limit. The Mexican government admitted its inability to control these incursions upon American soil, but what was especially irritating to the United States government was that after committing depredations and crimes, these bandits and Indians found a safe asylum by recrossing the Rio Grande into Mexico. The government of the United States presented demands for redress for the depredations and crimes committed and the Mexican government treated these demands with apathy and indifference. Cooperative measures and treaty stipulations for the protection of American citizens, their property, and for punishment of the lawless were proposed, only to be refused by the Mexican government.

Besides the annoying trans-boundary raids by Mexican cattle thieves and savage Indians, there were also difficulties between the two countries because of the Mexican Free Zone. This Free Zone, which was closely associated with the cattle raids, was a belt six miles wide which originally was only along the entire length of Tamaulipas on the lower Rio Grande, but was extended by the Díaz government in 1884 to include the entire Mexican-American border. Foreign goods could be imported into this zone free of duty. It was established by the Mexican government with a view to protect the Mexican merchants from the movement of Mexican trade to American towns. The Free Zone gave to the Mexican merchant an advantage that he had

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3. Callahan, op. cit., 369.

never before enjoyed. The Free Zone was actually a boon to American industry, as ninety-five percent of all foreign goods imported into the zone were manufactured in the United States. The zone provided a portion of Mexico in which Americans could market their goods free of all duties. Though the Free Zone was a decided advantage to American businessmen, there was the misconception that it was being used as a base for smuggling foreign goods into the United States, and therefore should be abolished. This conception was false for two obvious reasons. First, because ninety-five percent of all foreign goods shipped into the zone was of American origin, and was shipped into the zone free of all duties, there would be no advantage to smuggle these goods back into the United States. Also, if all the goods comprising the remaining five percent of foreign goods shipped into the zone were smuggled into the United States, the loss of duties on these goods to the American treasury would be insignificant.[4] Because there were those who raised such a clamor for the abolishment of the Free Zone, however, the whole problem became a sizeable bone of contention between the two governments.

The Hayes administration inherited these border problems from the previous administration. At first, satisfactory solution of all was sought as prerequisite to American official recognition of the Díaz government, but the demands were soon tempered and formal recognition was given in May, 1877. The border problems continued, however, and the American War Department was forced to take drastic measures. The Secretary of War, on June 1, 1877, issued instructions to General Ord authorizing federal troops to pursue Mexican marauders across the frontier and to arrest and punish them on Mexican soil. The orders were issued against the protest of Díaz.

These instructions to Ord were used by Díaz to create a national issue, and caused the Mexican newspapers to assert

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4. Matías Romero, Mexico and the United States, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1898, Vol. I, 444-448.

that the raids and depradations had been mutual. After these orders were published by the American government, tensions increased in Mexico and Díaz was able to rally to his support all the Mexican parties by instructions that he sent to General Gerónimo Treviño of the frontier forces. He directed Treviño to:

> Immediately locate his troops with a view to the protection of the Mexican frontier and....to invite the cooperation of American military authorities if necessary but without crossing the boundary and, in case of any invasion, "to repel force with force" - acting with prudence but with due energy.[5]

By the end of Díaz' first term in office, Mexican-American relations had become more cordial. For a time the United States refused to recall the Ord instructions, but no conflict happened between the forces of the two countries and the crossing of American troops halted with the better Mexican patrol of the border. Finally, the American government withdrew the Ord instructions for crossing the border. They were satisfied with the improvements in the Díaz administration and the general prevalence of order. The Ord instructions, declared inoperative on March 1, 1880, were withdrawn on March 10.

The thirty year period from 1880 to 1910 witnessed a steady growth in Díaz' power. A rapid improvement in border conditions resulted in a growth of friendly relations between Mexico and the United States.

The problems caused by marauding Indians was finally brought to a satisfactory adjustment by the two countries in July, 1882. The American government obtained "a temporary agreement for reciprocal right to pursue savage Indians across the respective boundaries."[6] This agreement was renewed yearly for several years with slight modifications.

In February, 1899, negotiations for a new and comprehensive extradition treaty were concluded. Prior to this, the American

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5. Callahan, op. cit., 376.
6. Ibid., 404.

government had been embarrassed many times by Mexicans committing crimes and depredations in Texas and fleeing back across the border. One of the worst causes of these crimes and depredations was this easy escape of the criminals to a sanctuary where they were free from punishment and from which they were not extraditable under the treaty then in force. As in the old extradition treaty, however, the American government would not agree to "give up the right to asylum or include acts connected with political offense."[7]

Another incident of cooperation appeared in the adjustment of the Mexican Free Zone. After "representations as to frauds committed under cover of exemptions from the payment of duties," the American government was able to induce Mexico to agree to abolish this source of friction in Mexican-American relations.[8]

The largest single factor influencing American relations with Mexico in the generation after the decline of border hostilities was the heavy United States' investment in industrial and other economic interests in Mexico. This evolved slowly at first but gradually increased in momentum under the growth of a more liberal Mexican policy, made possible by the dominant executive Díaz, who was able to reduce and suppress old Mexican prejudices.

The first of these American economic interests to enter Mexico was the railroad. Railway promoters and railway builders, trained in the American west, pioneered the new industrial advance upon Mexico. These men were responsible for building a railway system in Mexico that performed a great service by replacing antiquated and dangerous methods of transportation.

The development of Mexican railroads under Díaz' first administration was practically nonexistent. Mexico's greatest need at this time was the construction of railways, and this

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7. Callahan, op. cit., 394.

8. Ibid., 450.

construction could not take place without the aid of American capital. In spite of this, the Mexican Congress in 1878 was hostile both to American corporations and to the proposed connection of the Mexican railway with the American railway system. Thus:

> The Mexican Congress, with a policy based on a natural jealousy and fear felt by a weak nation in the presence of a strong rival and with hopes of attracting Oriental trade through Mexican ports by an inter-oceanic railway route across Mexico farther south, considered a railway from Mexico City to the Pacific far more desirable than a railway connection with the Mexican-American frontier.[9]

From 1876 to the end of the first administration of Díaz, the total track mileage of Mexican railways increased from 416 to only 674 miles. This is only a fraction compared to the mileage that was being laid in the United States during the same period. By 1880, however, after attempts to promote railway construction under state concessions failed, a change of policy occurred and a plan calling for subsidized national franchises was adopted. Under this new policy, the first actual American railway construction in Mexico was begun.

> The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe interests, while advancing the American line toward the southwest, in 1879 incorporated the Sonora Railway Company, which obtained a subsidy contract with Diaz in September, 1880, and at Guaymas in the same year began the first American railway in Mexico.[10]

The railway invasion of Mexico in the period after 1880 was made possible by the "rapid extension of American railway lines to the Mexican border" during the same period.[11] By 1884, the Mexican railway mileage had increased to 3,682 miles, most of

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9. Callahan, op. cit., 485.
10. Ibid., 489.
11. Ibid., 488.

the construction being financed by United States' capital.

The railway invasion of Mexico opened the way for American capital to make inroads in other economic pursuits advantageous both to American businessmen and to Mexico. In the early eighties several Americans became interested in mining development in Mexico. Abandoned mines of an earlier period were purchased direct from their Mexican owners and operated under general Mexican laws without concessions. The development of these old mining camps was highly beneficial to the Mexican working classes. The American owners showed a consideration for the interests of the Mexican workmen, and gave gradual increases in their wages. They also brought with them the latest improved methods of mining, and this added greatly to the mineral wealth of Mexico by increasing output of the older mines, and making possible the opening of new mines. Following the development of mining interests came the establishment of smelting plants. The Guggenheim brothers, in 1888, founded the first complete silver-lead smelting works in Mexico at Monterrey, and this city to this day is Mexico's industrial capital.

In 1902, the amount of American capital invested in Mexico was over $500,000,000 by 1,117 companies, firms and individuals. Practically all of this had been invested since 1877, and half of it after 1896. Investments were constantly growing in strength, and with this growth in Mexican industries appeared a large increase in trade. In 1902, Mexico bought from the United States 56% of her imports and sold to the United States 80% of her exports. Of the total American investments, 70% were in railways in which American capital still dominated and which had led the way to the large investments in various industries. The following chart shows the chief Mexican industries in which American capital was invested in 1902.[12]

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12. Callahan, op. cit., 511.

Railways (Mexican Central and Mexican National combined)	$266,350,000
Mining	95,000,000
Haciendas, ranches and farms	28,000,000
Manufactories and foundries	10,000,000
Banks and other financial institutions	7,000,000
Assay offices and chemical laboratories, smelters and refineries	7,000,000
Public utilities - electricity, gas, telegraph, waterworks	6,000,000

This estimated value of American investments in Mexico increased from $500,000,000 (gold) in 1902 to near $1,500,000,000 by 1912 - including ownership of 78% of the mines, 72% of the smelters, 58% of the oil and 68% of the rubber business, and exceeding the total investments of all other foreigners in Mexico.[13] Among the prominent new enterprises were the oil industry, the automobile business, insurance business and the manufacture and sale of soap. By 1912, there were over 15,000 Americans in Mexico, with almost every Mexican state having some as residents.

In the decade after 1900, there once more appeared signs of anti-American feeling. This was due to the economic conditions arising out of the American railway and industrial invasion of Mexico in the preceeding ten year period, and to the increasing Mexican opposition to the Díaz administration and its policies regarding concessions to the Americans. Some Mexicans resented the fact that though thousands of miles of track were laid upon Mexican soil, the internal economy of Mexico was affected but little. The railways connected principal Mexican industrial centers to American border towns rather than Mexican towns with one another. The Mexican attitude was demonstrated by local, complicated, and often contradictory tariff regulations aimed against American railway interests. Mexican feelings against American employees on the railways was shown in

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13. Callahan, op. cit., 519.

various arrests of engineers and others in connection with train accidents, which made necessary the formulation of new treaties relating to extradition. The Díaz administration, fearing domination of Mexico by American capitalists, adopted a more restrictive railroad policy by putting the greater part of the railway mileage in Mexico under national control.

By 1910 opposing forces in Mexico were planning to terminate the long executive tenure of Díaz. In almost 35 years, Díaz had established internal order and peace and had contributed to his country's prosperity by the use of American men, money and machinery. This did not mean, however, that everyone in Mexico was content with the existing situation. Mexico, to the outsider looking in, reflected peace and prosperity, but in actuality there were many thousands of people living in incredible squalor. Four pesos and rations was the monthly salary of hacienda workers. In the middle of the Díaz rule the average daily agricultural wage was thirty-six centavos a day, valued in United States money then at about eighteen cents.[14] To be sure, Díaz' encouragement to American enterprise, immigration and investment brought many millions of dollars into Mexico, but these dollars were going for the purpose of lining the pockets of a very select few. The Díaz administration placed power in the hands of large landholders. Small landholdings were incorporated into these large estates, until a point was reached where the rural peon was in a condition of complete servitude.

The American government watched with apprehensive interest the rising revolutionary tide which began late in 1910 with the opposition led by Francisco Madero. Actually, the revolution can be said to have begun in late January, 1909, when Madero

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14. Hudson Strode, Timeless Mexico, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1944, 211.

published a book he had been working on for over a year. The book, The Presidential Succession in 1910, emphasized the evils of the present Mexican government. It dealt little with social and economic conditions in Mexico, but rather criticised harshly the evils of the Díaz administration. Madero wanted to do away with the re-election of high public officials, and emphasize freedom of suffrage rather than revolution as a means for bringing about change. "Madero's work was one of the major contributory causes of the growth of the tidal wave which engulfed the Díaz administration and swept it from power."[15]

Madero, after publication of his book, worked ardently towards the development of an antire-electionist party and began making democratic speeches all over Mexico. At first Díaz refused to take him seriously, even when in April, 1910, the antire-electionists nominated him to run for the Presidency. It was not long, however, before Díaz recognized that Madero's following was reaching dangerous proportions. So in order to be on the safe side, and in a fashion typical of Díaz in the past 35 years, Madero was thrown in the prison of San Luis Potosí on the charge of plotting a rebellion. Here his zeal was allowed to cool. In September, when Congress announced the election results, Díaz for the eighth time emerged victorious.

Madero, free on bail since July 22 though restricted to the confines of San Luis Potosí, now decided to lead an insurrection against Díaz.[16] On October 6, Madero jumped bail by boarding a train that would take him to Nuevo Laredo and Texas, where at San Antonio he published his call for revolution. This call for revolution, Madero's famous Plan of San Luis Potosí, declared the recent elections fraudulent and therefore null and

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15. Cumberland, op. cit., 55.

16. Stanley Ross, Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy, Columbia University Press, New York, 1955, 109.

void, and also proclaimed Madero the provisional president of Mexico. November 20 was set as the date for the rebellion.

When the day for the revolution came, Madero crossed the border with high hopes. The army which was supposed to have met him, however, had failed to materialize. Madero, disillusioned, returned to the United States. While at New Orleans, he learned of a successful insurrection in Chihuahua where a small revolutionary band, led by the soon-to-be-famous bandit Pancho Villa, defeated state troops. This success in Chihuahua, stimulating uprisings in other parts of Mexico, caused Madero to re-enter Mexico a second time in February, 1911, and join the rebel forces in the north.

> Before his return to Mexico, he and his advisors had drafted a plan of campaign which envisaged the capture of some of the smaller towns in northern Chihuahua, the isolation and defeat of small units of the federal army, destruction of communications between the state capital and Ciudad Juárez, and the ultimate capture of the border city.[17]

Madero laid siege to Ciudad Juárez on April 19. A majority of his officers and men favored immediate attack, but Madero, fearing international complications should stray bullets land in El Paso, entered upon negotiations with the enemy. Negotiations lasted until May 7, when the actual attack upon the city began, and on May 10 the enemy capitulated.

The capture of Ciudad Juárez brought about the resignation of Díaz a short 15 days later. For with the capture of the city Madero had a port of entry through which he could import arms and ammunition. It was the psychological factor that was important, however, as the morale of the rebel forces improved greatly because of the victory. Hundreds of small groups and others not so small were under arms in every state. "With thousands of men in open rebellion against him, and with

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17. Cumberland, op. cit., 130-31.

implements of war available to the rebels, Díaz was doomed."[18] On the night of May 21, the official document ending the revolution, the treaty of Ciudad Juárez, was signed. Porfirio Díaz recognized his inability to continue his administration in defiance of the elements against him which he could not overcome. Four days later, on May 25, 1911, 15 days after the fall of Ciudad Juárez, and at the age of 80, Díaz resigned the Presidency.

Part of the treaty of Ciudad Juárez stipulated that Francisco León de la Barra was to become the ad interim president of Mexico upon the resignation of Porfirio Díaz, and also that De la Barra was to hold a presidential election in October, 1911. Madero was elected president and sworn into office in November, but:

> The government Madero was sworn to uphold was anything but stable and the country far from peaceful....For Madero, who had insisted on the ad interim government in order to obviate criticism that he had seized power through a military operation, the period from May to November was disastrous. Without official status and therefore powerless and unwilling to determine government policy, he was nevertheless held responsible for every ill-judged action of the government. More important still, by his own actions he had lost popularity tremendously and now, when he needed the support of all elements of society, he found that a large proportion were either apathetic or openly hostile to him.[19]

During his entire administration as president we see these conditions prevalent, for, "although Díaz was defeated on the battlefield, the capitulation was conditional, a compromise which left most of the old elements firmly entrenched in the governmental and economic life of the nation."[20] Madero,

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18. Cumberland, op. cit., 145.
19. Ibid., 170-71.
20. Ibid., 244.

because he could never fully control this element representative of the Díaz regime, saw little political, economic, social, or material progress made during his administration. It was not only the pro-Díaz office holders who were blocking progress, however, for many Maderistas in the intellectual classes were blind to the fact that Mexico needed reforms in such fields as agrarian policy, labor, and education.

Another factor hindering the Madero administration was the ever present rebellions occurring in all parts of Mexico. Most of these were small and had no chance of succeeding from their very beginnings, but others were not so small. Led by men with political ambitions or for other selfish reasons, they presented a constant threat to the administration. The national treasury was drained of precious revenue combatting these rebellions when it could have been spent on far more valuable reform measures.

> Baited and fought bitterly and viciously by groups who had destructive rather than constructive ideas, constantly confronted with emergencies, the Madero government served out its short sixteen months. Considering all factors, the wonder is not that so little was accomplished, but that anything at all was done and that Madero retained the presidency for slightly more than a year.[21]

The rebellions that occurred during Madero's administration, besides creating a drain on the national treasury, also strained relations with the government of the United States. Fights between Maderistas and rebel forces, especially in the border towns of Ciudad Juárez, Agua Prieta, and Nogales, moved the War Department of the United States to issue orders sending troops to these areas. It was hoped that their mere presence would help in diminishing the number of stray bullets and shells that were crossing into towns on the American side of the border[22]. President Taft considered ordering American troops across

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21. Cumberland, op. cit., 243.

22. Acting Sec. of State, Huntington Wilson, to Henry Lane Wilson, September 12, 1912, Documents Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912, 366, hereinafter referred to as FR, 1912.

the line, as a police measure, to disarm and drive away any fighting forces that would threaten life in El Paso.[23] It was the opinion of at least one high Mexican official that if such a move were made by American troops Americans in Mexico City "would be generally massacred."[24] Though the policy of the United States was that of nonintervention with the internal political affairs of Mexico, feeling ran high in some quarters that perhaps this policy should be changed to direct intervention.

When anti-Maderistas, in behalf of Emilio Vásquez Gómez, captured Ciudad Juárez (opposite El Paso) in late February, 1912, the Madero administration sought assistance from the government of the United States. If the United States would refuse to allow the passage of arms from El Paso into Ciudad Juárez, the Madero government could more easily quell the rebellion. If the United States persisted in allowing the passage of arms between the two towns, she was violating her neutrality laws.[25] The United States denied any such claim and was quick to point out the similarity of this rebellion to that of Madero's against Díaz during the previous year.[26] The United States permitted arms to pass into Mexico during Madero's revolution, and was forced by her own interpretation of her neutrality laws to continue this policy. President Taft, however, desiring peaceful conditions to return to Mexico, issued a proclamation on March 14, 1912, prohibiting arms and ammunition to enter Mexico from the United States.[27]

Rebellions affecting the border towns were not the only ones that gained attention of the American government. The

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23. Acting Sec. of State, Huntington Wilson, to Henry Lane Wilson, February 24, 1912, FR 1912, 724-25.

24. H. L. Wilson to Sec. of State, February 27, 1912, FR 1912, 727.

25. See Mexican Ambassador to Acting Sec. of State, March 5, 1912, FR 1912, 737-38.

26. The Acting Sec. of State to Mexican Ambassador, February 29, 1912, FR 1912, 729.

27. Published in FR 1912, 745.

rebellion of Félix Díaz in Vera Cruz in October of 1912 created anxious moments for both governments. Expecting support that never materialized, Díaz found himself surrounded and isolated in the city. The only way that the Madero forces could dislodge Díaz was through a full scale attack, and this was impracticable because of foreign interests and foreign residents in the city. Destruction of American property and lives, Madero feared, would bring about intervention. The appearance of the American cruiser Des Moines in the harbor only strengthened his apprehension. Díaz, perhaps seeing the uselessness in holding out, capitulated rather easily, however, and thus relieved Madero of his fears.

Under existing rules of International law, Americans in Mexico were entitled to the same rights and treatment accorded by the Mexican government to its own citizens, and a government which has reason to believe that its citizens in a foreign country have been discriminated against was authorized to intervene in their behalf.[28] The State Department, because of the involvement of American lives and property during the constant turmoil during the Madero administration, was consistently having to seek protection in their behalf. The situation got so bad at one time that the American Colony in Mexico City undertook to arm themselves for purposes of self protection. With the help of the American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, they got the American government to lift the ban on importation of arms and munitions, and procured from the United States 1000 rifles and a million cartridges.[29] A similar incident occurred when American employees of the Southern Pacific Railroad in northern Mexico procured 600 guns and 120,000 cartridges for their self protection.[30] Needless to say, actions such as this

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28. Acting Sec. of State to H.L. Wilson, March 14, 1912, FR 1912, 746.

29. H.L. Wilson to Acting Sec. of State, March 25, 1912, FR 1912, 758.

30. Acting Sec. of State to American Consul at Nogales, April 14, 1912, FR 1912, 789.

by Americans with advice and consent of their government did little to improve anti-American feeling among the Mexicans. Animosity was constantly building up and was soon to come to a head.

Nowhere is this animosity shown better than in the feeling of Mexicans towards American citizens employed on Mexican railroads. Madero's administration was in the process of encouraging the use of Mexicans on the National Railway Lines of Mexico, and over 1000 American employees, mostly engineers and conductors, were faced with the problem of losing their jobs. The problem was especially acute because both parties felt discriminated against. The Mexican employees complained that several American department heads placed obstacles in the way of their advancement.[31] The chief causes of complaint by the American employees were because of the Mexican government's determination to enforce the use of the Spanish language in all train orders, and to give examinations in Spanish.[32] Also, they complained that they were being discharged for minor infractions of the company's rules, whereas similar offenses by Mexicans were being overlooked.[33]

Because the Mexican National Railway refused to grant any of their demands, as a final recourse over 600 American engineers and conductors went on strike in April of 1912.[34] The problems were great for both American and Mexican governments.

Besides this discrimination shown American railway employees, the American government had to deal with problems of

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31. Published in "The Railroad Policy of the Mexican Government," see, the American Charge d'Affaires (Dearing) to Sec. of State, August 16, 1911, FR 1912, 912-913.

32. H.L. Wilson to Sec. of State, March 12, 1912, FR 1912, 916,

33. see also, Wilson to Sec. of State, January 16, 1912, sub-inclosure, FR 1912, 916.

34. Wilson to Sec. of State, April 8, 1912, FR 1912, 918-919, also, Representatives of the Railway Men to Ambassador Wilson, April 16, 1912, FR 1912, 922.

confiscatory taxation and forced loans placed upon American citizens and their property by rebel forces. American mine owners were forced to pay taxes to the rebel forces that they would ordinarily pay to the Madero government. The larger mines could stand double payment in case of the failure of the rebel movement, but small owners could not.[35] An American citizen in Chihuahua was forced to pay rebels $100,000 and a million cartridges. In addition, his estate, consisting of nearly a million acres, was completely stripped and laid waste by these rebels.[36] The Madero government advised Americans that his administration would not attempt a second collection of taxes paid rebel forces, but only after pressure was applied by American authorities.[37]

Mexican-American relations were a bit strained during the Madero administration in many instances. Considering the many problems that confronted Madero, however, and the fact that he was blessed with an American administration that favored non-intervention, relations could have been much worse.

The greatest gain made by Mexico as a result of the Madero revolution was the "change in spirit and outlook" of the Mexican people. "Political parties operated openly - and on occasion viciously - for the first time in 50 years."[38] Agrarian and labor reform along with social legislation would have to wait for a later date before any real contributions could be made, but at least the people recognized the need for reform, and even though the gains were small during Madero's time in office, the seeds were at least planted.

Madero was assassinated in February, 1913, the result of a barracks revolt led by Victoriano Huerta, and partly instigated by the United States' Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson.

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35. American Consul at Chihuahua to Sec. of State, March 23, 1912, FR 1912, 907.

36. Same to Same, April 24, 1912, FR 1912, 909.

37. See, Acting Sec. of State to H.L. Wilson, March 27, 1912, also, same to same, April 16, 1912, and H.L. Wilson to Sec. of State, August 21, 1912, all in FR 1912, 908-910.

38. Cumberland, op. cit., 249.

Wilson was not only the representative of the United States government in Mexico, but also used his position as representative of the American government to favor a group of American investors in Mexico. "He feared reform, since reform would inevitably mean a lessening of American influence and fewer special advantages for American interests."[39] Wilson resented the Madero administration from its inception and everything it stood for. He desired Mexico to return to the feudalistic government that prevailed under Díaz, and with the death of Madero, and the success of the Huerta coup d'etat, Wilson thought Mexico would return to the Díaz system. But what he failed to reckon with was the new "attitude" of the populace, and that there could never be such a return.

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39. Cumberland, op. cit., 235.

CHAPTER II

THE POLICY OF WOODROW WILSON TOWARDS MEXICO

> The story of Madero's fall is one of the blackest in the long history of political intrigue and betrayal in Mexico. It plunged Mexico into a period of civil war that was to last for nearly a decade. Ambassador Wilson's part in it is one of the old scores that Mexican can - and does - charge against us.[1]

Félix Díaz, whose uprising against Madero at Vera Cruz was crushed, started his second revolt on February 9, 1913 in Mexico City. His first attack on the National Palace, though a failure, resulted in the wounding of General Lauro Villar, one of Madero's most loyal and trustworthy generals. With Villar incapacitated, Madero gave Victoriano Huerta complete charge of the Federal forces. This was the most ill-thought act of his entire administration, for Huerta's loyalty was questionable at this time.[2] Huerta, while pretending to wage battle with Diaz, actually was plotting Madero's downfall, and even notified Henry Lane Wilson of his intentions.[3] During the afternoon of February 18, Huerta arrested Madero and his cabinet, "in order to prevent further bloodshed,"[4] and that night it was agreed by Huerta, Díaz, and Wilson, in the famous "pact of the Embassy," that Huerta was to assume the provisional presidency

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1. Virginia Prewett, Reportage on Mexico, E. P. Dutton Company, New York, 1941, 54.
2. H.L. Wilson to Sec. of State, February 10, 1913, FR 1913, 701.
3. Same to same, February 17, 1913, FR 1913, 718.
4. Same to same, February 19, 1913, FR 1913, 722.

until an "election" could be held to place Díaz in the presidency.[5]

All during the "tragic ten days" of the sham battle between Huerta and Díaz, Wilson was doing his best to discredit the Madero administration in the eyes of the United States government. He sent numerous communications to Washington telling of the weakness of the Madero administration and the imminence of its fall.[6] At one point he overreached his bounds and sent the Spanish Ambassador to advise Madero to resign. Madero, naturally, refused.[7] Also, once the Huerta coup d'etat was successful, Ambassador Wilson wasted no time sending communications to Washington urging formal recognition of the Huerta provisional government by the United States. Wilson was quick to point out the constitutionality of the Huerta government,[8] and, although the Department of State actually felt "disposed" to recognize the legality of the Huerta government,[9] any hopes that Wilson, Huerta, and Díaz had for quick, formal recognition were shot down along with President Madero. Undaunted, Wilson tried to impress upon the American government the fact that all was peaceful once more in Mexico, and that all warring factions had thrown in with Huerta. He claimed that Emiliano Zapata in the South had announced his adherence to the Huerta government,[10]

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5. H.L. Wilson to Sec. of State, February 18, 1913, FR 1913, 720-21, see also, same to same, February 19, 1913, FR 1913, 722-23.

6. Wilson to Sec. of State, February 9, 1913, FR 1913, 699-700, also see, same to same, February 19, 1913, FR 1913, 701, February 11, 1913, 702, and February 12, 1913, 706-7.

7. Mexican Charge d'Affairs to Sec. of State, February 15, 1913, FR 1913, 710-11, also see Wilson to Sec. of State, February 15, 1913, 711.

8. Wilson to Sec. of State, February 20, 1913, FR 1913, 725, also see, same to same, February 26, 1913, 741.

9. Sec. of State to H.L. Wilson, February 21, 1913, FR 1913, 728.

10. Wilson to Sec. of State, February 27, 1913, FR 1913, 743.

and that Venustiano Carranza submitted "unconditionally" to the provisional government.[11] Either Wilson did not bother to check his information very closely before passing it on to Washington, or, because he was so eager to obtain United States' recognition, he submitted to outright prevarication. Although many did jump aboard the Huerta band-wagon, Zapata, Carranza, and José Maytorena were predominant among those who held aloof. Carranza, constitutional governor of Coahuila, personally notified President Taft as to his attitudes towards the "villainous" Huerta government,[12] and Maytorena, constitutional governor of Sonora, though "on leave" in the United States at this time, in a telegram to the Department of State, announced "armed opposition" to Huerta.[13]

Victoriano Huerta was president of Mexico from February 19, 1913, to July 15, 1914. The famous "pact of the Embassy", in which Huerta was supposed to back Félix Díaz for the Presidency in the upcoming elections, was dissolved when the latter was made Ambassador and sent on a special mission to Japan. Though Díaz stated with much emphasis that his journey to Japan had no political significance whatever,[14] the fact remains that with him out of the picture, Huerta was in complete power for

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11. Wilson to Sec. of State, March 1, 1913, FR 1913, 750. The United States was of the belief that Carranza had officially submitted to the Huerta administration on February 21, but after the murder of Madero on February 23, Carranza notified the President of the United States on February 26, that he would not submit to Huerta. Wilson should have had this information by March 1, as certainly the American State Department did.

12. Venustiano Carranza to President Taft, February 26, 1913, FR 1913, 742.

13. José Maytorena to Sec. of State, March 7, 1913, FR 1913, 759.

14. Nelson O'Shaughnessy, Charge d'Affaires to Sec. of State, July 18, 1913, FR 1913, 813.

seventeen months.[15] For Huerta, those seventeen months presented constant frustrations. Huerta discovered, as did Madero, that there were factions within Mexico ready to revolt against the existing administration at the slightest provocation. In spite of opposition from Carranza and Maytorena in the north and Zapata in the south, however, Huerta established a dictatorship patterned after that of Porfirio Díaz.[16]

The greatest frustration encountered by Huerta was the refusal by the United States government to recognize his de facto administration. Huerta depended upon the influence of Henry Lane Wilson to obtain recognition from the United States, but any hopes that he might have had for recognition were killed with the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency of the United States a scant nine days after Madero's assassination.

It is conceivable that the efforts of Ambassador Wilson for American recognition of Huerta would have been successful, had not the American government been going through the process of an executive change at this time. The nonintervention policy of the Taft administration certainly lent itself towards recognition as being the next logical step by the American government, especially once Huerta could demonstrate his ability to maintain law and order. Also, despite the fact that President Taft left the problem of Huerta's recognition to the incoming administration, President Wilson still might have recognized

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15. General Díaz did return to Mexico in September, and that he feared that Huerta was plotting against him at this time is attested to by the fact that he sought, and was given asylum on board the U.S.S. Wheeling at Vera Cruz. See Sec. of State to Sec. of the Navy, October 28, 1913, FR. 1913, 854.

16. October 10, 1913, was the date used by President Wilson when it became necessary to establish an official date for the beginning of Huerta's dictatorship. On this date, Huerta took over the Mexican Congress, arresting 110 of its members on the spot, because they dared speak out against him.

Huerta if it was not for the brutal assassination of Madero, and the questioned constitutionality of the Huerta government. Edith O'Shaughnessy, wife of the American Charge d'Affaires to Mexico, and one of Huerta's most ardent admirers, viewed the constitutionality of his provisional government as follows:

> Francisco I. Madero, Constitutional President, José María Pino Suárez, Constitutional Vice-President, their resignations, demanded and given three days before their death, were accepted by Pedro Lascuraín, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who became President by operation of the law. He was President but some twenty minutes, which allowed him time, however, to appoint Victoriano Huerta Minister of Gobernación (interior). After Lascuraín's resignation, given, it is understood, with alacrity, automatically by operation of the law, the executive power fell to Huerta with a provisional character and under constitutional promise to call special elections.
>
> This is the technical manner of Huerta's accession to power, and according to the Mexican Constitution by which it must be judged, there are no doubts about its complete legality.[17]

It is true that this was the manner in which the Presidency evolved upon Victoriano Huerta, but it is questionable whether this manner was completely legal according to the Mexican Constitution. What Mrs. O'Shaughnessy fails to mention is how much pressure was applied upon Madero and Pino Suárez for their resignations. She fails to mention whether a majority of Congress approved all resignations and appointments, and whether or not pressure was applied upon them also. The American government questioned the constitutionality of the Huerta provisional government because of the resignations of Madero and Pino

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17. Edith O'Shaughnessy, Intimate Pages of Mexican History, George H. Doran Company, New York, 1920, 200-201. See also, reply of Sec. of Foreign Affairs, Señor Gamboa, to American proposals conveyed to Mexican government by John Lind, August 16, 1913, FR 1913, 826. (States practically same thing verbatum).

Suárez under duress.[18] Also, because President Wilson had "no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests,"[19] a policy of open opposition against Huerta was declared. The United States planned to "isolate General Huerta entirely; to cut him off from foreign sympathy and aid and from domestic credit....and to force him out."[20]

As if the idealistic and moralistic attitudes of President Wilson were not enough for Huerta to contend with, the situation in the north became more serious as the dictator's army was consistently outfought in battle by the revolutionary forces. Carranza, with his "Army of the Constitutionalists," gained control of the northern state of Coahuila, and the bandit general, Pancho Villa, with his "Army of the North," became undisputed military leader in the northern state of Chihuahua.

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18. Sec. of State to H.L. Wilson, February 28, 1913, FR 1913, 748. See also, Provisional Governor of Sohora to President Taft, February 28, 1913, FR 1913, 749. Governor Pesqueira states that there was no quorum present and the majority of members present were intimidated and coerced into approval by the display of soldiers and armed forces. See also, Declaration and Decree Issued by General Carranza at Vera Cruz on December 12, 1914, published in FR 1914, 629-33. Carranza states that murder and duress by Huerta cancelled the constitutionality of his actions, ergo leaving himself as sole constitutional body in Mexico.

19. Wilson statement, March 11, 1913, published in American Journal of International Law, VII, 331, as cited in C.C. Cumberland, manuscript. Also published in Buehrig, Edward H., editor, Wilson's Foreign Policy in Perspective, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1957, 120-21. See also, Charge d'Affaires O'Shaughnessy to Sec. of State, October 28, 1913, FR 1913, 853-54. General Huerta, in a document to the governor of Puebla, gives detailed instructions as to the method of conducting elections, for the purpose of having the results declared null and void later on, thereby perpetuating his stay in office.

20. Sec. of State to Charge d'Affaires, O'Shaughnessy, November 24, 1913, FR 1913, 443.

In early February, 1914, President Wilson issued a proclamation lifting the ban on exports of arms and munitions into Mexico.[21] The policy of "watchful waiting" by the United States had come to an end. The embargo was lifted so that the enemies of Huerta could procure all the arms and munitions necessary to conduct a successful campaign and "force Huerta out."[22]

Fully armed, and in complete control of the northern part of Mexico, the two armies of Carranza and Pancho Villa started their southward drives toward Mexico City. Emiliano Zapata, also, with his "Agrarian Army," was approaching the capital from the south. Huerta, sensing the outcome, resigned and left for Vera Cruz and exile in Spain on July 15, 1914. Huerta's resignation however, and Carranza's occupation of Mexico City the following month,[23] did not bring the complete peace that President Wilson had hoped for. Pancho Villa and Carranza immediately began arguing over the formation of a new government which resulted in a complete break between them. This split prolonged the civil war in Mexico for another year.

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21. February 3, 1914, published in Foreign Relations, 1914, 447-48.

22. Sec. of State to all diplomatic missions of the United States, January 31, 1914, FR 1914, 447-48.

23. Upon Huerta's resignation, Francisco Carbajal, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, assumed the provisional presidency. He in turn, dissolved his government and delivered Mexico City to Carranza's able general, Alvaro Obregón, on August 13, 1914. Carranza entered Mexico City on August 20, 1914. See, Brazilian Minister to Sec. of State, July 15, 1914, FR 1914, 563. Also, same to same, August 13, 1914, FR 1914, 585, and, Vice Consul Silliman to Sec. of State, August 20, 1914, FR 1914, 588.

CHAPTER III

AN EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS PROBLEMS AFFECTING MEXICAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION

In April, 1914, a petty incident developed in Tampico that was magnified by the American government into an international issue. Because of it, American troops were sent into Mexico, and much ill-feeling was created in Mexico by the Wilson administration.

On the morning of April 9, 1914, Huerta's Colonel Ramón Hinojosa and a squad of his men arrested the paymaster of the U.S.S. Dolphin, together with seven men composing the crew of the whaleboat of the Dolphin. At the time of arrest, the officer and his men were unarmed and engaged in the loading of gasoline aboard the whaleboat. When this incident was brought to the attention of the commanding general of the Huertista forces in Tampico, General Ignacio Morelos Zaragosa, the men were set free and allowed to return to their ship. General Zaragosa sent his apologies to Admiral Mayo aboard the Dolphin, regretting the incident and stating that it was committed by an ignorant officer. The time between the arrest and release of the men was about an hour. The affair should have ended with Zaragosa's apology, but Admiral Mayo sent an ultimatum to Zaragosa demanding a more formal apology and the severe punishment of the officer responsible. He also demanded that Zaragosa "publicly hoist the American flag in a prominent position on shore and salute it with twenty-one guns, which salute will be duly returned by this ship."[1]

President Wilson did not hesitate in throwing the full power of the United States in support of the Admiral's action. For a week the two governments sent proposals back and forth, those of Washington magnifying the petty incident into "a deliberate affront to the honor of the United States."[2] On

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1. Admiral Mayo to General Zaragosa, April 9, 1914, FR 1914, 448.
2. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-17, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1954, 122-23.

April 18, Wilson sent an ultimatum to Huerta, stating that if Huerta did not yield to the demands of Admiral Mayo, he would take the matter before Congress.[3] Huerta, still stalling, then proposed that he would fire the twenty-one gun salute if the United States in return would do likewise, and he wanted a signed protocol between the two countries as to this effect.[4] Wilson refused, as such an agreement "could be construed by Huerta as recognition of his government."[5] Huerta, having refused to comply unconditionally with Mayo's demand for a salute, caused President Wilson on April 20, before a joint session of Congress, to ask for authority to "use the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an extent....to obtain.. ..fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States."[6]

That very night a message was received in Washington to the effect that the German ship Ypiranga was approaching Vera Cruz loaded with 200 machine guns and 15,000,000 rounds of ammunition.[7] Wilson fearing they might get into Huerta's hands, after consultation by telephone with Secretary of State Bryan and Secretary of the Navy Daniels ordered the seizure of the

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3. Sec. of State to certain American diplomatic missions, April 18, 1914, FR 1914, 469.

4. Charge d' O'Shaughnessy to Sec. of State, April 18, 1914, FR 1914, 469-70.

5. Sec. of State to Charge'O'Shaughnessy, April 19, 1914, FR 1914, 477.

6. Address of the President to joint sessions of Congress, published in FR 1914, 374-376.

7. Consul Canada to Sec. of State, April 20, 1914, FR 1914, 477.

customhouse in Vera Cruz.[8] After acquiring authority to use the forces of the United States, Wilson exercised this authority the very next day. The Ypiranga was stopped outside Vera Cruz, and after some brief encounters with Mexican naval cadets and local citizens, the city was completely in American hands by April 22.

The whole Tampico - Vera Cruz incident was a political farce. The Wilson administration had no effective answer as to why it took the port of Vera Cruz. If it were to enforce a salute of the flag by General Huerta, it failed because Huerta never did salute the flag, and if it were to prevent the guns and munitions aboard the Ypiranga from reaching Huerta, it again failed because the cargo was unloaded at the port of Puerta Mexico in the latter part of May, and some did reach the Huerta forces.[9]

Carranza, in a letter to President Wilson, described the occupation of Vera Cruz as a "violation of national sovereignty," and said that if the American forces did not evacuate immediately, he might be forced to enter into war with the United States.[10] Pancho Villa told Wilson that Carranza was speaking only for himself, and that the majority of Mexicans desired peace with the United States.[11] Previously, Villa had stated that as far as he was concerned "the United States could keep Vera Cruz and hold it so tight that not even water could get in to Huerta."[12] This was the beginning of the split between Carranza and Villa.

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8. Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years of Peace- 1910-17, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1946, 192-93.

9. The arms and ammunition never did reach the northern fighting front in any significant amounts. Most of it was handed over to Carranza with the capitulation of the Federal government in August.

10. Venustiano Carranza to President Wilson, via Special Agent Carothers to Sec. of State, April 22, 1914, FR 1914, 463-64.

11. Pancho Villa to President Wilson, via Special Agent Carothers to Sec. of State, April 25, 1914, FR 1914, 468.

12. Special Agent Carothers to Sec. of State, April 23, 1914, FR 1914, 485.

Before relations became too strained, the Brazilian Ambassador and the Argentine and Chilean Ministers offered to mediate the dispute.[13] The American delegates, and those representing Huerta, met with the mediators at Niagara Falls, Canada, from May 18, to July 2, 1914.[14] Absolutely nothing was accomplished as the American delegates kept insisting on the complete elimination of Huerta, and the establishment of a provisional government controlled by the Constitutionalists.[15] The representatives of Huerta naturally refused such demands by the American delegates.[16] Further, when the Carranza delegation finally arrived on June 16, they stated that the Constitutionalists did not want American help, and that they "would not accept as a gift anything which the Mediators could give them, even though it was what they were otherwise seeking; that they would not take it on a silver platter."[17] Carranza could very easily take this stand, for as the representatives of both countries were meeting in Niagara Falls, the armies of Carranza and Villa were getting nearer and nearer to Mexico City. With the

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13. Brazilian Ambassador, Argentine and Chilean Ministers to Sec. of State, April 25, 1914, FR 1914, 488-89.

14. Carranza had been asked by the Mediators to send representatives. Because the Mediators asked for suspension of all hostilities during the mediation, and Carranza, recognizing that "such suspension would only accrue to the benefit of Huerta," the mediation conferences started without any delegates representing Carranza. See correspondence between Mediators and Carranza, April 29, to May 3, 1914, FR 1914, 517-18. Carranza finally appointed his delegates on June 11, 1914. See, Carranza to Mediators, via Zubaran Capmany to Mediators, June 11, 1914, FR 1914, 534.

15. Sec. of State to the Special Commissioners, June 3, 1914, FR 1914, 522-24.

16. See "The Mexican delegation to the American delegation," inclosed in Special Commissioner Lamar to Sec. of State, June 12, 1914, FR 1914, 527-29.

17. The Special Commissioners to Sec. of State, June 16, 1914, FR 1914, 538.

abdication of Huerta on July 15, we see the end of the mediation conferences.[18]

From the beginning of the Tampico affair to the abdication of Huerta, the United States displayed a knowledge of International law that was inconsistent to say the least. The United States had refused to recognise the Huerta government, yet on two different occasions it dealt with the Huerta government on high international levels. President Wilson's intervention at Vera Cruz after the Tampico affair, and the resultant mediations at Niagara Falls, did not hasten the downfall of Huerta by even one day. Had Wilson left the course of events alone in Mexico the results would have been the same, as the forces of Carranza had things well under control. Two things Wilson did accomplish were to make the United States look quite foolish, and he added to anti-American feelings then prevalent in Mexico.

Other problems affecting Mexican-American relations during the Wilson administration arose over the thinly patrolled boundary separating the two countries. During the first year and a half of the Wilson administration, conditions along the Mexican-American border were peaceful. This was because the population in the northern states of Mexico, under the leadership of either Carranza or Villa, focused their entire attention towards Mexico City to the south, and the eventual ousting of the dictator, Victoriano Huerta. The abdication of Huerta, followed by the almost immediate split of Carranza and Villa into two camps, however, saw the northern part of Mexico then become a battleground with the border cities being the principle points of contention between the two armies. The next year and a half saw repeated violations of the American frontier by

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18. The ABC Mediators left on July 2, leaving further discussion in the hands of the Huerta and Carranza delegations. See the Mediators to the United States Special Commissioners and the Delegates of General Huerta, July 1, 1914, enclosed in Secretary Dodge to the Sec. of State, July 3, 1914, FR 1914, 554.

these two armies, culminating, finally, in the raid by Villa on Columbus, New Mexico, and thus precipitating the Punitive Expedition of General John J. Pershing into the very heart of Mexico.

In October, 1914, there developed a battle between the troops of Villa and Gutiérrez, led by governor Maytorena of Sonora, and the Constitutionalist troops of Carranza, led by General Benjamin Hill, at the border town of Naco. Naco is a town that lies half in Sonora, Mexico, and half in Arizona. The troops of General Hill dug in at Naco, Sonora with their backs against the American half of the town, and for two months waged a defensive battle with the troops of Maytorena. Losses of American life and property mounted as stray bullets and shells from Maytorena's army entered Naco, Arizona. American authorities, alarmed at the extent of damage accruing in the American half of the town, warned both Carranza and Gutiérrez to see to it that further violations did not happen, and that if they could not prevent the firing of shots across the border, the government of the United States would send troops into Mexico.[19]

Gutiérrez, eager to maintain good relations with the United States, telegraphed Maytorena immediately ordering him to suspend the attack, if necessary, in order to prevent further damage to American property.[20] Carranza on the other hand, maintained the same stolid position that he held eight months previously when the United States occupied Vera Cruz. He made it clear "that any use whatsoever of force which the government of the United States might attempt to make on Mexican territory, although with the object of protecting the lives of Americans, would....be considered.... as an act of hostility and as an

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19. Sec. of State to Consul Canada, December 9, 1914, FR 1914, 649.

20. President Gutiérrez to Governor Maytorena, via Vice Consul Silliman to Sec. of State, December 11, 1914, FR 1914, 649-50.

attack against the sovereignty of Mexico."[21]

The American government sent General Hugh Scott to Naco, to confer with the contending parties, and to achieve a peaceful solution satisfactory to both. On January 11, 1915, after some give and take by both parties, an agreement was signed that was to alleviate the border situation for a while.[22] The agreement called for both armies to evacuate the area of Naco, and that henceforth that Port was to be neutral. Further the troops of Maytorena were to go to Nogales, Sonora, and those of Calles[23] were to go to Agua Prieta, and that in the future, no battle would be fought that would create a reoccurrance of the situation at Naco. With the signing of this treaty, as far as the border towns were concerned, the situation was relatively peaceful for about six months. During this time, Villa was preoccupied in waging war against the forces of Carranza further south. When Villa's army was crushed in battle by the army of Obregon, however, the tide suddenly turned in favor of Carranza, and he ordered General Calles and his forces in Sonora to once more move against the army of Maytorena. By late summer of 1915, all of northern Mexico was in the hands of the Constitutionalists, even though Villa and a few other diehards refused to concede the field to Carranza.

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21. General Carranza to Consul Canada, via Consul Canada to Sec. of State, December 13, 1914, FR 1914, 651-52.

22. Agreement of January 11, 1915, between Governor Maytorena and General Calles, published in FR 1915, 789-90.

23. General Plutarco Elías Calles had replaced Benjamin Hill in command of the Constitutionalist forces in Sonora.

Problems arising from American oil and mining interests were also many during the Wilson administration. Anti-American feelings ran high in Mexico because of the Tampico affair in April, 1914, and they were only magnified when United States' marines occupied Vera Cruz two weeks later.[24] The Department of State advised all American citizens to leave the country immediately, and an act of Congress was passed appropriating $500,00 for the purpose of assisting destitute Americans that desired to leave.[25] Thousands of Americans left the interior for the Gulf ports and transportation to the United States.[26] With the exodus of Americans reaching such large proportions, both Carranza and Huerta became worried. Regardless of how high anti-American feeling ran, they realized that American know-how was needed if the mines and oilfields in Mexico were to continue producing. Therefore they gave assurances of protection to induce Americans to return to their jobs.[27]

The American government was also concerned, but for different reasons. Because so many Americans were driven from the Tampico region, oil properties, representing millions of dollars of American investment, were being left in charge of subordinate

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24. Rampant destruction of American property by mobs is described quite vividly by Consul Canada to Sec. of State, April 24, 1914, FR 1914, 673.

25. Act of Congress for Relief of Americans in Mexico, published in FR 1914, 673.

26. In one instance a private steamer was hired at $400.00 gold a day to take Americans from the ports of Frontera, Carmen, Campeche and Progreso, see Consul Canada to Sec. of State, April 24, 1914, and Sec. of State to Consul Canada, April 24, 1914, FR 1914, 674-675. In another instance, the British cruiser Hermione, alone took 1241 Americans from Tampico, see Charge'O'Shaughnessy to Sec. of State, April 27, 1914, FR 1914, 678.

27. Sec. of State to Brazilian Minister, May 4, 1914, FR 1914, 682, also, Consul Letcher to Sec. of State, May 17, 1914, FR 1914, 688.

and inexperienced Mexican employees. The American government tried to obtain from Carranza and Huerta an agreement in writing making the great oil producing area of Tampico a neutral zone. The American government argued that the nature of the oil properties was such that the wells could not be shut in, but needed the most constant and careful attention by men of the greatest experience, and as a result of the expulsion of Americans, the wells were running wild. There was great loss of valuable oil, and great danger of fires which would devastate the entire region. Most important, the American government argued was that the tracts would be exhausted, resulting in the loss to American owners, as well as the loss to Mexico of one of its greatest natural resources.[28]

Carranza refused to neutralize the area, arguing that there was no need to as his forces dominated the region, and that if he assented to the desires of the United States, "others would have the right to expect the same privilege causing great damage to the speediness of our triumph."[29]

Another problem, not only confronting American interests, but those of England and the Netherlands as well, was the possible loss by bona fide owners of interests in oil properties in Mexico. The owners were threatened with cancellation and confiscation of their rights because of their failure to meet contractual obligations (the payment of rentals on leased property). Because this failure resulted only from their being forced to leave the country because of the military operations and disturbed political situation in Mexico, the three countries agreed by exchange of notes to preserve the status quo as of April 20, 1914. Anyone who acquired any right, title, or interest in oil

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28. Sec. of State to Special Agent Carothers, April 28, 1914, FR 1914, 690-91.

29. Carranza to Special Agent Carothers, quotes in Special Agent Carothers to Sec. of State, May 1, 1914, FR 1914, 695.

properties because of the political situation in Mexico after April 20, would not receive diplomatic support from their respective country.[30]

Another similar problem, but far more serious, was created in July, by General Cándido Aguilar, governor of the State of Vera Cruz. He issued a decree that declared null and void, without legal value, all the leases, concessions, and contracts celebrated during the administration of Victoriano Huerta.[31] During this period American investment ran into millions of dollars, and if this decree were enforced it would mean great financial loss in money and valuable property acquired during this period.[32] American investors sought redress through the State Department and communications flew back and forth between the United States and General Aguilar. As if this were not enough to perplex American oilmen, Venustiano Carranza issued a decree in January, 1915, ordering the immediate cessation of all development of oil lands. He contended, as did Aguilar, that foreign investors were defrauding the Mexican nation of their just benefits, and that the foreign investors were the only ones benefiting from the exploitation of the oil lands.[33] American investors again ran to the State Department seeking redress.

These two acts, however, were only preliminary to the one that was to raise the greatest complaint by American investors.

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30. Sec. of State to the British Ambassador, and Netherlands Minister, June 2, 1914, FR 1914, 707, also, the British Ambassador to the Sec. of State, and the Netherlands Minister to Sec. of State, both on June 2, 1914, FR 1914, 708.

31. This decree is enclosed in Vice Consul Bevan to Sec. of State, August 27, 1914, FR 1914, 711-12.

32. Ibid., 711.

33. This decree is enclosed in Vice Consul Bevan to Sec. of State, January 14, 1915, FR 1915, 872-73.

A convention met in Querétaro in November of 1916 for the purpose of revising the Mexican Constitution of 1857. By this time, "Pershing's Punitive Expedition had whipped up a surge of nationalism and made the Mexican populace eager for anti-foreign and anti-conservative legislation."[34] When the new Constitution was promulgated in February of 1917, it was the beginning of the end for American exploitation of Mexican oil. Article 27, of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, reserved to the Mexican nation all subsoil minerals, and was responsible for twenty-one years of litigation between the two countries. The whole problem was solved only when in 1938, Mexico expropriated all oil properties and then there was no problem at all.

American investors in Mexican mining enterprises were faced with much the same problems as were their oilmen counterparts, the only difference being the fact that mining investors were bombarded by decrees issued by Pancho Villa as well as by Carranza. Villa issued a decree stating that if American owners either suspended work for ninety days, abandoned work completely, or did not work hard enough, they would forfeit their property to the Conventionist government.[35] Both Villa and Carranza issued decrees of taxation, and both expected the American mine owners to pay.[36] A decree was passed by Carranza, similar to that passed against the oilmen, making null and void all mining titles acquired during Huerta's administration.[37]

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34. Hudson Strode, Timeless Mexico, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1944, 255.

35. Mining decree issued by Francisco Villa at Monterrey, March 19, 1915, published in Foreign Relations, 1915, 984-85.

36. Mining decree issued by Carranza at Vera Cruz, March 1, 1915, FR 1915, 900-901, as amended by decree issued August 31, 1915, FR 1915, 942. See also, Villa's ore tax decree, March 19, 1915, FR 1915, 905-906.

37. Circular No. 1, Department of Fomento, September 3, 1914, FR 1914, 724.

The protests of American investors, in Washington, were loud and vigorous. They were hostile to the taxation decrees issued in 1914-1916. They were hostile because each new decree seemed to them to be more unequitable than the previous one. Carranza's side to the story, however, was quite simple. American investors in Mexico had been draining Mexico of her wealth ever since the heyday of Porfirio Díaz, and all the legislation and decrees issued by the Carranza government against American investors was only the beginning of an attempt to see that Mexico, from then on, got a bigger slice of the pie.

Problems concerning confiscatory taxation and forced loans imposed upon Americans also affected Mexican-American relations during the Wilson administration. Whereas the taxation decrees issued by Carranza tended to be uniform in their purpose, there were other decrees, issued by State governors and local Jefes Políticos, that had no purpose behind them whatsoever other than enriching the individuals who were passing them. Decrees were promulgated demanding that taxes be paid, regardless of whether or not they had been paid to some other faction, and if American businessmen refused they were threatened with confiscation of their property. The various factions, needing money to carry on their struggle, decided to have everyone in Mexico foot the bills, Americans included. American businessmen sought aid from Washington but were told that their only recourse was to pay, "making protest as a matter of record if possible and taking receipts."[38] That the State Department was helpless is reflected in a note by the governor of Colima in reply to a telegram by an American making official protest against taxation of American citizens. He states, "Replying to your telegram. This government does not recognize the right of foreigners to protest against laws of this country

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38. This is an often quoted phrase that the Sec. of State, Bryan, used in ending various communications to Americans in Mexico during this trying period.

that as in this case are not contrary to international rules, therefore please abstain from making unjustifiable protest."[39]

Forced loans, just like the confiscatory taxation decrees, were imposed upon all persons in Mexico, Mexicans as well as foreigners. These were tough times, and revolutions are expensive. Whereas confiscatory taxation decrees primarily affected the mine owners and oilmen in Mexico, forced loans imposed by the various factions included all types of businesses. The mine owners and oilmen were still hit the hardest, but this was only because they represented the most wealth and had the most to lose if they did not pay. For example, the petroleum interests were at one time threatened with national expropriation if they did not loan money to General Huerta's administration.[40] No sooner did the oilmen pay Huerta than he was kicked out of Tampico by the Carranza forces and they were faced with another forced loan to Carranza.[41] This was the picture for the three years of 1913-1915. Some bankers and merchants closed their doors, putting their stocks and establishments under seal, and turned their keys over to the American consul, rather than pay.[42]

Forced loans imposed upon American citizens by the various factions for the purpose of obtaining funds to carry on their struggle were treated by the State Department in much the same way as complaints of confiscatory taxation. The State Department, in reply to letters of irate American citizens in Mexico, as often as not came up with the stock reply, "pay, making protest as a matter of record if possible and secure a receipt." Not much else could be done.

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39. Vice Consul Stadden to Sec. of State, February 26, 1914, FR 1914, 734-35.

40. Charge' O'Shaughnessy to Sec. of State, undated, received October 1, 1913, FR 1914, 762.

41. Sec. of State to Special Agent Carothers, May 16, 1914, FR 1914, 775.

42. The Brazilian Minister to Mexico to Sec. of State, February 22, 1915, FR 1915, 985.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPLIT BETWEEN VILLA AND CARRANZA

Nobody was really surprised when, in September, 1914, Francisco Villa completely disavowed allegiance to Venustiano Carranza as "First Chief" of the Constitutionalist Army. Hostilities had been building up between the two rivals from the moment of their first meeting.[1] At the start of the revolt against Huerta, in 1913, there was no bond between the various revolutionary leaders in northern Mexico except their common hatred for Huerta. The nominal recognition of Carranza as First Chief and acceptance of his Plan of Guadalupe by most of the rebel chiefs gave them a degree of political unity. Villa became the most powerful individual rebel leader of them all, and relations between him and Carranza became increasingly strained the more his prestige mounted.[2]

The first real break came in April, 1914, during the Tampico-Vera Cruz incidents. Carranza took the stand that the United States had no right to interfere with the problems of Mexico, and that the occupation of Vera Cruz could very well mean war.[3] Villa, on the other hand, took the opposite viewpoint and condoned the action of the United States. "Carranza was an

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1. Villa, in relating his first meeting with Carranza, commented that Carranza left him cold, and that the differences in their social classes was obvious. Villa was a peon, while Carranza was of the aristocracy. Villa claimed that Carranza played on this difference, never treating him as an equal. Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915, The Convention of Aguascalientes, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1960, 18.

2. Ibid., 26.

3. Carranza to Sec. of State, via Special Agent Carothers, April 22, 1914, FR 1914, 483-84.

experienced politician, a man with expert civilian advisers, and, above all, he had the spirit of an overloaded burro rebelling at the goad. He would not be moved by Wilson to do anything he did not desire to do. In Carranza, who resembled Wilson in many respects, the American president met his match."[4] Villa's attitude was that "Carranza may write pretty notes from Chihuahua but that he /Villa/ is here to do the work."[5] Villa's outright approval of the American occupation of Vera Cruz won him praise from the Wilson administration, while the truculent stand of Carranza was looked on with disfavor. Actually Carranza never really opposed the action of the United States in occupying Vera Cruz, though he never publicly altered his stand.

Later, in June, 1914, a more serious rupture occurred between the two. Carranza was disturbed at the possibility that Villa might reach Mexico City before him, and he tried to escape from the quandary by breaking up Villa's command. Villa refused to let this happen, and during a telegraphic conference he impulsively, because of anger, tendered his resignation as commander of the Division of the North. Carranza, after a mock show of reluctance, quickly accepted it. Carranza then ordered the subordinates of Villa to choose a new commander from among themselves, but they refused, pledging allegiance to Villa as their only commander.[6] Carranza, still determined to reach Mexico City before Villa, ordered Alvaro Obregón, then in Guadalajara, to march upon the city; and, to punish Villa for his insubordination, he cut off the shipments of coal and ammunition to

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4. Quirk, op. cit., 46.

5. Special Agent Carothers to Sec. of State, April 23, 1914, FR 1914, 485-86.

6. Quirk, op. cit., 30-32.

Villa's forces.[7] The cleavage had begun in the ranks of the Constitutionalists, and Huerta was still not defeated.

An attempt was made to heal this second breach when delegates representing the two factions met in Torreon in late June and early July, 1914. They worked out an agreement that they hoped would settle all difficulties between Villa and Carranza. This agreement is known as the Pact of Torreon.[8] In it was stated that Villa was to continue to recognize Carranza as First Chief of all the Constitutionalist forces, while he in turn was to retain his command of the Division of the North. Carranza was to furnish Villa with coal and ammunition, and Villa would leave all things administrative up to Carranza. A list of names was submitted from which Carranza was to select his cabinet, and the method was outlined in which a convention was to be set up to discuss and determine the date for elections, and other topics of national interest.[9] Except for the temporary restoration of relations between Villa and Carranza, the conference at Torreon had few immediate results. When the pact was submitted to Carranza for his consideration he rejected it maintaining that "matters of such great importance cannot be discussed or approved by such a small group of persons."[10]

From April to July, despite the dangerous cleavage in the revolutionary ranks caused by the wrangling of Villa and Carranza, Huerta's military position deteriorated. Huerta abdicated on

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7. Quirk, op. cit., 33-34.

8. Published in Foreign Relations, 1914, 559-60.

9. Carranza had already determined to hold such a convention. The Pact of Torreon simply re-emphasized it.

10. Quirk, op. cit., 43.

July 15, turning the Presidency over to his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francisco S. Carbajal.[11] Carbajal left Mexico one month later, delivering the capital to the governor of the Federal district, Eduardo Iturbide.[12] Iturbide, in turn, delivered the city to Alvaro Obregón and the Constitutionalists on August 13.[13] Carranza made his triumphal entry into the city on August 20, 1914,[14] and two days later assumed the executive authority of the Mexican republic.[15] On September 5, he issued a call for a convention of governors and generals for October 1, in accordance with his Plan of Guadalupe.[16]

"Under the Plan of Guadalupe, Carranza should have assumed the office of provisional president upon his occupation of the capital."[17] This is what Villa and most revolutionaries had expected him to do, but Carranza made it most clear that he had not assumed the office of President and that his proper address was "First Chief in charge of the Executive Authority."[18] "The significance of his refusal to declare himself provisional president, lay in his determination to become the legally elected president, for in Mexico interim officials could not succeed themselves in permanent office."[19]

Villa was convinced that Carranza was determined to be another dictator, and, furthermore, he did not believe Carranza

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11. Brazilian Minister to Sec. of State, July 15, 1914, FR 1914, 563.
12. Same to same, August 13, 1914, FR 1914, 585.
13. Same to same, August 13, 1914, FR 1914, 586.
14. Vice Consul Silliman to Sec. of State, August 20, 1914, FR 1914, 588.
15. Same to same, August 23, 1914, FR 1914, 589.
16. Special Agent Fuller to Sec. of State, September 5, 1914, FR 1914, 594.
17. Quirk, op. cit., 61-62.
18. Vice Consul Silliman to Sec. of State, August 24, 1914, FR 1914, 590.
19. Quirk, op. cit., 62.

would permit an honest convention.[20] The convention that Villa wanted to see was the one called for in the original Pact of Torreon. This provided for delegates, one for each thousand soldiers, to be elected by senior officers, subject to approval by the respective division commanders.[21] By this means, Villa hoped to command a goodly number of delegates, and if he could combine his delegates with those of Emiliano Zapata's, between them they could command the convention. This is exactly what Carranza feared and was the reason he would not allow it. Instead he submitted a provision that the delegates be the generals and governors of the states, most governors being appointed by Carranza and therefore loyal to him.[22]

Alvaro Obregón, Carranza's most able general, conferred with Villa for the purpose of working out an agreement for restoration of peace in Mexico. Together they telegraphed their

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20. Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1961, 115.

21. Ibid., 117.

22. This might look good, but in fact is dubious reasoning. Governors loyal to Carranza were limited (no more than 15), while the more informal military organizations of Villa and Zapata accounted for a larger number of generals on a per capita basis. Assuming both Carranza and Villa to have armies totaling 40,000 troops each, and the ratio of generals to troops was 1 per 500 in Villa's army and 1 per 800 in Carranza's; the representation under the Pact of Torreon would be 40 delegates each, while under Carranza's system the representation would be 80 generals for Villa versus 50 generals plus 15 governors for Carranza. This does not even take into consideration Zapata's generals that had an even higher per capita number of generals than Villa, and would join Villa.

On the face of it one would assume Carranza would want representation under the Pact of Torreon. It was not this simple, however, as nobody knew then, and they don't even know now, just how many troops each general had. It would have been an easy matter to pad the ranks, and perhaps it was this that Carranza feared.

protests to Carranza against a convention of generals and governors which did not represent all factions. They accused Carranza of seeking to control the proposed assembly by his authority to designate governors and to confer rank upon the generals.[23] Carranza did not yield, however, and on September 22 Villa notified Carranza that he disowned him as "First Chief," and, furthermore, that he would not attend the convention.[24]

The convention met, as scheduled, in Mexico City on October 1, 1914. There were no delegates representing either Villa or Zapata, so it adjourned on October 5 to reconvene in Aguascalientes five days later, thinking that this was more neutral territory and therefore Villa delegates would attend. Also they sent a special committee to extend a personal invitation for Zapata to send delegates.[25]

It soon became apparent that Carranza's power over the convention was fading. The convention declared itself a sovereign body,[26] and formally asked for Carranza's resignation. Carranza refused, stating "that he will deliver Executive Power only to the President who shall have been elected by the people."[27] "Away from the atmosphere of Mexico City, delegates who had been regarded as Carranza stalwarts began to show a degree of independence. Some began to share Villa's views that Carranza planned to turn himself into another Porfirio Díaz."[28]

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23. Quirk, op. cit., 78-79.

24. Vice Consul Silliman to Sec. of State, September 23, 1914, FR 1914, 605.

25. Special Agent Canova to Sec. of State, October 2, 1914, FR 1914, 608, also same to same, October 15, 1914, FR 1914, 610-11, also Clendenen, op. cit., 124-25.

26. Same to same, October 14, 1914, FR 1914, 610.

27. Same to same, October 23, 1914, FR 1914, 612.

28. Clendenen, op. cit., 126-27.

When the Villa and Zapata delegates arrived it was but a short time before they joined forces and elected General Eulalio Gutiérrez as provisional president of Mexico, with Villa placing his army at the disposal of the convention.[29] Villa had his army in force at Aguascalientes and paraded it under the noses of the delegates. Quite a few Carrancista delegates were "persuaded" to switch over to Villa. It was because of this coercion that Carranza disowned the convention and ordered his generals to retire and take charge of their commands.[30] Along with lesser generals, Carranza's two stalwarts, Obregón and Pablo Gonzáles, tried by peaceful means to reconcile the differences between the two antagonists. They cooperated with the Villa-Zapata majority and even tried to persuade Carranza to resign, but when they were placed in a position in which they had to choose between Villa or Carranza, they unhesitatingly repudiated the convention and sided with Carranza.[31] The break was now complete. Carranza was summarily declared in rebellion by the convention and Pancho Villa was placed in command of the "army of the convention."[32] Carranza made Vera Cruz his new capital and the civil war in Mexico was to be prolonged for another year.

Carranza's main military strength was the army division commanded by Alvaro Obregón. It was this army that was the primary concern of Pancho Villa once the rupture between Carranza and himself had become final. Everybody knew that a showdown

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29. Special Agent Canova to Sec. of State, November 2, 1914, FR 1914, 617.

30. Vice Consul Silliman to Sec. of State, November 9, 1914, FR 1914, 618.

31. Link, Arthur S., Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-17, Harper Brothers, New York, 1954, 131.

32. Special Agent Canova to Sec. of State, November 10, 1914, FR 1914, and, Vice Consul Silliman to Sec. of State, November 13, 1914, FR 1914, 620.

was inevitable between the two forces, but for the first three months of 1915, outside of a few small skirmishes between the two factions, the main armies had not met. The showdown came in the first week of April, 1915, at Celaya, a small city about 150 miles northwest of Mexico City.[33]

On April 3 Obregón's army occupied Celaya and dug in. "Celaya possessed in its many canals and drainage ditches an excellent terrain for defense."[34] Between April 4 and 6 Villa concentrated his troops in Irapuato, a small city 35 miles west of Celaya, preparing for the battle. On the morning of April 6 Villa attacked. He had superior cavalry and greater numbers, but the defensive tactics of Obregón carried the battle. The battle took shape in helter-skelter fashion, with the commanders of Villa's army throwing their forces into a massed frontal attack, only to be driven back by Obregón's machine guns. Villa's plan was simply to drive the enemy back by sheer force, regardless of his own losses. "It was a costly and ruinous tactic."[35] The battle raged for a full day and a half with little let up, and by the evening of April 7 the forces of Villa were back in Irapuato licking their wounds. The first round belonged to Obregón.

It was six days later before Villa decided to give it another try. On April 11 he sent Obregón a message trying to entice him to fight in the open, but Obregón refused, knowing that Villa's cavalry and infantry would make short work of his numerically weaker forces. Besides, Obregón "had learned from the European war what Villa seemingly had not -- massed attacks could not succeed against trenches, machine guns, and barbed wire".[36] On April 13 Villa attacked again and the second battle

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33. The entire account of this battle is taken from Quirk, op. cit., 220-226.
34. Ibid., 221.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 224.

patterned itself after the first. Villa mounted attack upon attack, determined to ram through the enemy lines. Again Obregón beat him off, inflicting heavy and irreplaceable losses upon his forces.

Beaten for the second time within a week, Villa beat a hasty retreat north. For the next six weeks Villa tried to recoup his losses and rebuild his army, but the twin defeats at Celaya were a crippling blow such that Villa never again possessed the powerful army he once had. Still, Villa prepared to battle Obregón once more and on June 1, 1915, he attacked Obregón between the towns of León de las Aldamas and Silao.[37] Victory lay once more with the Constitutionalists, however, and with this victory the fortunes of Carranza were in the ascendant. Carranza's hand was strengthened in his dealings with the United States, and ultimate victory was now certain.[38]

"All the world loves to be on the side of a winner, but as soon as he begins to lose, all the fainthearted, the timid, and the lukewarm sheer away."[39] This is what happened to Villa. During the six months immediately following his defeat by Obregón at León, his popularity and power declined rapidly. In spite of this, however, he still reigned supreme in a large part of Mexico, and the "United States was forced to acknowledge tacitly, if not formally, that he was the actual head of a real and operative government."[40]

In June, 1915, the United States took a different position in its relations with Mexico. President Wilson issued a

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37. Actually, in the León battle, Villa had more men than he had at Celaya. Men alone, however, don't make a powerful army. What Villa never replaced was the guns and other equipment necessary for a powerful and efficient army.

38. Quirk, op. cit., 261.

39. Clendenen, op. cit., 175.

40. Ibid., 182.

statement to the effect that his administration was tired of the turmoil in Mexico, and that the time had come for the United States to "lend its active moral support to some man or group of men."[41] He further stated that the factions must unite soon or the American government would have to decide on the means necessary to end the dispute. This was clearly a threat of United States' intervention. Villa, in a lengthy reply, showed his willingness to reconcile his differences with Carranza.[42] Carranza, on the other hand, still as bull-headed as ever, replied that "under no circumstances would he treat with Villa."[43]

Undaunted, the American government tried again. On August 11 a message was drafted to be sent to a large number of influential people in Mexico. Signed by the American Secretary of State and the Ambassadors and Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala, this message was an appeal for the waring factions to meet and reconcile their differences.[44] Again Villa's reply was affirmative while that of Carranza was negative.[45] In a conference held on September 18 between the Secretary of State and the Latin American diplomats, for the purpose of recognizing one of the two factions,

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41. Statement by the President, June 2, 1915, FR 1915, 694-95.

42. Special Agent Carothers to Sec. of State, June 11, 1915, FR 1915, 701-703.

43. Special Agent Silliman to Sec. of State ad interim, June 22, 1915, FR 1915, 718-719.

44. The message was drafted on August 11 and sent out on August 13 and 14. See Sec. of State to: Mr. Parker, representing American interests in Mexico, and to Consul General Hanna, both on August 13; same, to Consul Canada, and other representatives of the United States in Mexico, August 14, 1915, FR 1915, 735-737.

45. For Villa's reply see, Confidential Agent of the Provisional Government of Mexico to Sec. of State, August 19, 1915, FR 1915, 737-38. For Carranza's reply see, Special Agent Silliman to Sec. of State, September 10, 1915, FR 1915, 746-48.

the various replies to the message of August 11 were considered.[46] An outstanding feature of the various replies was that all those received from Carrancistas stated that the matter was one for the "First Chief" alone to decide, while many Villistas answered independently of their leader.[47] The inference that the Secretary of State and the Latin American diplomats drew, of course, was that there was central authority behind the Carranza government while the Villistas "were a loose federation of independent caudillos."[48] Villa's governmental machinery was not as well organized as Carranza's. The government of Villa was only as strong as Villa himself, but though his power and prestige had declined considerably, he was still a force to be reckoned with.

The conferees decided they needed more information and therefore both factions were requested to send briefs for further consideration.[49] Three weeks later they reached their decision and on October 11 they released the following to the press:

> The Conferees, after careful consideration of the facts, have found that the Carrancista party is the only party possessing the essentials for recognition as the de facto government of Mexico, and they have so reported to their respective governments.[50]

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46. For a complete list of the replies to the message of August 11, 1915, see FR 1915, 753-54. A complete stenographic report of the conference is also printed. See, Conference on Mexican Affairs, September 18, 1915, FR 1915, 754-62.

47. Ibid., 755.

48. Clendenen, op. cit., 189.

49. For Carranza's reply see the Confidential Agent of the Constitutionalist Government of Mexico to the Sec. of State, October 7, 1915, FR 1915, 763-65. For the Villista reply see, The Confidential Agent of the Provisional Government of Mexico to the Sec. of State, October 8, 1915, FR 1915, 765-66.

50. Sec. of State to the principal American Missions in Europe, October 11, 1915, FR 1915, 767.

President Wilson extended formal recognition to the Carranza government on October 19, 1915,[51] His decision was greatly influenced by the"recommendation of the diplomats, based upon the visible increase in Carranza's political and military strength after the battles of Celaya and León."[52] With Carranza's recognition the virtual eclipse of Villa in political matters was practically assurred, but Villa was to remain a thorn in the sides of both countries for a while longer.

At the time of Carranza's recognition, Villa was busy readying his troops for an assault on the border town of Agua Prieta, opposite Douglas, Arizona. The only port of entry he had was Ciudad Juarez, opposite El Paso, Texas, and if he could capture Agua Prieta, this would not only give him another port of entry, but would also destroy "the only vestige of Carranza's authority in northern Sonora."[53]

The United States, once having recognized Carranza as being the man to restore peace in Mexico, was ready to back him to the limit. Consequently, a request by Carranza to reinforce Agua Prieta with soldiers, munitions, and equipment, via the United States and Douglas, was approved by President Wilson. Agua Prieta was made almost impregnable before Villa arrived.[54]

On November 1, when Villa arrived and immediately attacked the result was the same as at Celaya and León. Villa had not learned yet that frontal attacks against barbed wire and machine guns were futile. Villa, soundly beaten, pulled his remaining troops out and moved southwest toward Hermosillo, the capital

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51. Sec. of State to the Confidential Agent of the de facto Government of Mexico, October 19, 1915, FR 1915, 771.

52. Clendenen, op. cit., 193-94.

53. Ibid., 208.

54. Ibid., 209.

of Sonora. Here again he waged battle with Carranza's troops, and here again he was beaten. "The attack on Agua Prieta resulted in defeat -- the attack on Hermosillo was a disaster. The Villista army began to disintegrate. By the end of November, Villa was finished as a major factor in Mexican politics."[55] Villa and the remnants of his troops took to the Sierra Madre mountains and were relatively quiet for nearly two months. Outwardly, Mexico showed appearances of becoming peaceful once more, but in mid-January, 1916, news reached the United States of the cold-blooded murder of sixteen Americans near Santa Ysabel.

On January 10, a Mr. Watson, chairman of the Mine and Smelter Operators Association, of Chihuahua, and general manager of the Cusihuiriachic Mining Company, with 15 of his associates, all representative Americans, while en route from Chihuahua to their mines were taken off the train 40 miles west of Chihuahua City, at the small cattle station of Santa Ysabel. Revolutionaries, commanded by Colonel Pablo López, but under the direction of Pancho Villa, shot these men down in cold blood. Those who voluntarily left the train were killed while trying to make their escape, while others were taken off the train and shot. After the massacre the bandits robbed the train and stripped the bodies of all clothing. Santa Ysabel is in the heart of the territory under control by Villa, and it was stated that these men, because they were Americans, were killed in accordance with the general policy publicly announced by Villa. This policy was that all Americans were to be put to death and their property destroyed.[56]

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55. Clendenen, op. cit., 214.

56. This account of the Santa Ysabel Massacre was taken from Sec. of State to Special Agent Silliman, and Collector Cobb to Sec. of State, both dated January 12, 1916, FR 1916, 652-53. Also, Clendenen, op. cit., 221-253. Another reason given for the massacre was that because the Americans had been given safe-conduct by Carranza, Villa used this method to show his contempt for Carranza, and to prove that he was still "boss" in this area.

The Santa Ysabel affair threatened to provoke a major crisis. The American government sent communications demanding that immediate action be taken by Carranza's government to apprehend the bandits, and to assure protection of Americans still in Mexico.[57] Carranza immediately gave orders for pursuing the bandits and issued a formal decree placing Villa and López outside the law, and further, "that any citizen may apprehend and execute them, the only formality being their identification."[58]

General John J. Pershing, commander of American troops at El Paso, Texas, agreed with Carranza that the sole purpose of the massacre was to provoke United States' intervention.[59] Carranza feared intervention and took such action as he could, but failed to apprehend the murderers. This, however, was not because he did not try, but rather that he just did not have sufficient troops to send to this part of Mexico.[60] This was unfortunate for both countries. Even though Villa was a hard man to catch, if Carranza had immediately instituted a vigorous campaign to rid the territory of Villa and his followers, the attack on Columbus, New Mexico, might never have occurred, and a far more serious problem between the two countries might have been avoided.

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57. Sec. of State to Special Agent Silliman, January 13, 1916, FR 1916, 656, also, Sec. of State to Consul Edwards, January 25, 1916, FR 1916, 662, and, Sec. of State to Consul Hostetter, February 24, 1916, FR 1916, 665.

58. Special Agent Silliman to Sec. of State, January 19, 1916, FR 1916, 465. Villa was a bandit only in the eyes of the United States government and Carranza. He still considered himself a "revolutionary".

59. Special Agent Silliman to Sec. of State, January 16, 1916, FR 1916, 659, also, General Pershing to General Funston, enclosed in Sec. of War to Sec. of State, January 25, 1916, FR 1916, 662-63.

60. Clendenen, op. cit., 229.

The raid by Villa on Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, 1916, was not by any means unprecedented. Raids had been occurring along the lower Rio Grande Valley for many months prior to Villa's attack.[61] None of them were of the magnitude of the Columbus attack, nor did they precipitate action by the United States compared to what Villa's attack was to bring. Conditions between the two countries had changed. The raids along the lower Rio Grande, though creating much apprehension on the American side, and causing American troops to be rushed to the area, were ostensively for the purpose of robbing and looting. It must be remembered that the Columbus attack was precipitated for the sole purpose of bringing about intervention, and that it was because of a personality, Villa, that the United States rose to the bait.

The Columbus attack began about four o'clock on the morning of the ninth. The Mexicans followed a definite plan. They made simultaneous attacks on the army camp and the town itself. "Their familiarity with the terrain argues that the plan was based on accurate information and had been made well in advance."[62] The battle raged hot and furious for little more than an hour, when, due to the ability of the American army to organize themselves rapidly and inflict heavy losses on the raiders, the Mexicans withdrew.[63]

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61. Charles C. Cumberland, "Border raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley - 1915," The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, The Texas State Historical Association, Austin, Texas, Vol. LVII, No. 3, January, 1954, 285-311.

62. Clendenen, op. cit., 240. Papers lost by the Villistas in their retreat from Columbus and recovered by the Americans, showed that the attack was planned as early as January 6, Ibid., 244.

63. Ibid., 241.

The attack was over almost before it began, but in that short period Villa had tried to do enough damage and to kill enough Americans, so that the American government would be infuriated to such an extent they would send the United States army after him. It was intervention by the United States that Villa was seeking, and it was intervention he got. The American army immediately sent troops into Mexico in hot pursuit, and it was to be almost a year before they were to leave Mexico.

CHAPTER V

THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION INTO MEXICO 1916-1917

On March 10 President Wilson issued a statement that American troops would enter Mexico "in pursuit of Villa with the single object of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays".[1] Carranza, recognizing that tempers were flaring in the United States, and not wanting war between the two countries to result from the Columbus raid, on the same day proposed through his Department of Foreign Relations that an agreement be reached between the two nations providing for reciprocal crossing of the border in pursuit of bandits. Such agreements, he said, earlier had achieved "happy results for both countries." He further stated that American troops could enter Mexico if the raid at Columbus should "unfortunately be repeated at any other point on the border."[2] Carranza's message strongly implied that American troops could enter Mexico only in the event of "future raids," but it was not so interpreted by the Department of State.

The government of the United States, on March 13, readily granted permission for Mexican troops to pursue bandits onto American soil, on the understanding that it would have reciprocal rights to pursue bandits onto Mexican soil. Further, in view of its agreement to this reciprocal arrangement proposed by Carranza, the American government considered that no more "interchange of views" between the two countries was necessary

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1. Sec. of State to all American Consular Officers in Mexico, March 10, 1916, FR 1916, 484.

2. Special Agent Silliman to Sec. of State, March 10, 1916, FR 1916, 485.

on the subject, and proceeded to outfit its army in preparation to pursue Villa into Mexico.[3]

On March 15 the Punitive Expedition entered Mexico, and made a rapid advance southward toward the city of Casas Grandes in Chihuahua.[4] The American government requested that Carranza issue necessary orders to the Chihuahua authorities permitting the United States government to use Mexican railways for the purpose of supplying the Expedition. In making this request, the American government reminded Carranza of the many times that he was allowed to use the railways of the United States.[5] This note caused the Mexican government to feign surprise. It had not until then received any official notice from the government of the United States that American troops had crossed into Mexican territory, or that they were at or near Casas Grandes.[6] Carranza, however, must have known of the crossing three days before.

The Mexican government replied that in no way could its note of March 10 be construed as "tolerating or permitting any expeditions into the national territory." Also, it made clear that no expeditions would be permitted until a mutual agreement providing for reciprocal crossing of the border was "definitely and concisely fixed."[7]

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3. Sec. of State to Special Agent Silliman, March 13, 1916, FR 1916, 488.

4. General Funston to the Adjutant General, undated; received at the War Department, March 17, 1916, FR 1916, 492.

5. Acting Sec. of State to Special Representative Rodgers, March 18, 1916, FR 1916, 492.

6. Special Representative Rodgers to Sec. of State, March 19, 1916, FR 1916, 497.

7. Mr. Arredondo to Sec. of State, March 18, 1916, FR 1916, 493, and, Aguilar to Sec. of State, via Special Representative Rodgers to Sec. of State, March 19, 1916, FR 1916, 497-98.

The American government, in a reply the next day, sincerely regretted the "misunderstanding", stating that it was under the impression, after the exchange of notes on March 10 and 13, that it had permission to pursue Villa. The United States was under this impression simply because it would not consider anything else at this time. Pancho Villa had attacked an American town and the United States was out to get him. The American government further stated in its reply that it wouldbe glad to receive suggestions from the Mexican government that would help to clear up the "misunderstanding".[8]

The Mexican government submitted a draft of a proposed protocol between the two countries that provided for reciprocal crossing of troops. The draft included such specifics as the places for crossing; how far troops could enter; provisions for cooperation between the two countries in chasing bandits; the size and type of forces that could cross the boundary; how long they could stay; and provisions for punishing individuals if they should commit crimes and offenses against citizens of the country they were in.[9] The American government tentatively accepted the proposal, stating that only minor details needed to be studied in order to render the draft more acceptable.[10] The matter of using Mexican railways in Chihuahua was again mentioned. The American government pointed out that if they were deprived of the use of the railways their stay in Mexico would only be prolonged.[11] Carranza was in sympathy with the purpose of the Expedition, but for political reasons did not wish to give open consent to American use of Mexican railroads. Instead, he suggested that the government of the United States designate civilian consignees for military supplies to the

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8. Acting Sec. of State to Mr. Arredondo, March 19, 1916, FR 1916, 494-95.

9. Copy of this draft printed in FR 1916, 495-96.

10. Acting Sec. of State to Special Representative Rodgers, March 20, 1916, FR 1916, 499-500.

11. Sec. of State to Special Representative Rodgers, March 28, 1916, FR 1916, 503-504.

Pershing forces.[12] Newspaper men then with Pershing's forces were utilized for this purpose.[13]

During the last two weeks of March, while the proposed protocol was being drafted and redrafted by the two countries, General Pershing's expedition was penetrating farther and farther into Mexico. On April 4 the American government submitted its final redraft of the proposed protocol and attached a formal note that was to exempt Pershing's expedition from the agreement. The American viewpoint was that much time, effort, and money had been spent on its part, and that the withdrawal of the Pershing forces at that time would be "impracticable and unwise" as the capture of Villa seemed imminent. The American government further stated that a Mexican assent to this note was "a necessary condition" if it were to agree to the proposed protocol.[14]

The Mexican government, in a lengthy reply on April 12, showed its disgust toward the whole situation, contending that it was "useless" to discuss a reciprocal crossing agreement unless the Pershing expedition be included. As it was quite obvious that the American government would not include the Pershing expedition, the Mexican government advised the suspension of all discussion on the matter, and proposed instead, "to treat with the government of the United States upon the subject of /complete/ withdrawal of its forces from /Mexican/ territory".[15]

Oral representations were made to the Mexican government on this subject by Special Representative Rodgers, to the effect

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12. Special Representative Rodgers to Sec. of State, March 28, 1916, FR 1916, 503.

13. Sec. of War to Sec. of State, March 29, 1916, FR 1916, 504-505.

14. Sec. of State to Mr. Arredondo, April 4, 1916, FR 1916, 507-508.

15. Mr. Arredondo to Sec. of State, April 13, 1916, FR 1916, 515-517.

that the American forces would withdraw from Mexico only "as soon as the object of the expedition is accomplished", and that this could be hastened if the de facto government of Carranza would throw enough troops into the region where Villa was hiding to insure his speedy capture.[16] Representative Rodgers reported to Washington that "every high official of the de facto government insisted on immediate withdrawal," and that "Carranza and Obregon were determined to secure withdrawal at once."[17] During the first month of the Expedition's stay in Mexico, Carranza, privately, was in sympathy with its purpose. For obvious political reasons he could not publicly condone its violation of Mexican sovereignty. But when it became apparent that the Expedition could not capture Villa, and that the American government, in spite of this, insisted on penetrating farther into Mexico, Carranza started clamoring for its recall.

This attitude of the Mexican government was no doubt enhanced by an incident that occurred at Parral on April 12. On that day, Major Frank Tompkins, at the head of a 140 man column, entered the city of Parral for the purposes of buying supplies. He was cordially received by both the military and civilians of the city, but while leaving later in the day, his column was attacked by Mexican troops and civilians, who jeered, threw stones, and fired on the column. Major Tompkins and his column retreated northward, and for fifteen miles he was compelled to beat off attacks by the Mexicans. Forty Mexican soldiers and

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16. Sec. of State to Special Representative Rodgers, April 14, 1916, FR 1916, 518-519.

17. Special Representative Rodgers to Sec. of State, April 15, 1916, FR 1916, 519.

one civilian were killed, while the American casualties consisted of but two soldiers killed and six wounded.[18]

Anti-American feeling ran high immediately following the Parral incident,[19] such that the Department of State suggested that a conference between General Scott and General Obregón or some other high military officer, at some convenient place near the border, might be of real value as it would prevent misunderstandings and make possible real cooperation between the forces of the two governments.[20] The Mexican government was eager for such a conference, and Obregón left immediately for Juárez, opposite El Paso, Texas.[21]

Generals Scott and Funston were sent to El Paso to meet with Obregón. They had full power to discuss and agree upon all points raised which related purely to the military situation, including questions of lines of supply and use of railways. If, however, Obregon's attitude "should be a peremptory command for the immediate withdrawal of the American troops across the border," they were to tell him that that was a matter to be worked out through diplomatic channels.[22]

The first conference took place at Juárez on April 30, and after two hours ended in deadlock. Obregón refused to discuss anything but the immediate withdrawal of American troops.

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18. This account of the Parral incident was taken from several documents, all printed in FR 1916, 514-527.
19. Special Representative Rodgers to Sec. of State, April 20, 1916, FR 1916, 525. Rodgers describes conditions in the six states of Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, Durango, and Chihuahua.
20. Sec. of State to Special Representative Rodgers, April 22, 1916, FR 1916, 527-28.
21. Special Representative Rodgers to Sec. of State, April 24, 1916, FR 1916, 527-28.
22. Adjutant General to General Scott and General Funston, April 26, 1916, files of the Adjutant General's Office, The National Archives, Washington, D.C., hereinafter referred to as AGO 2394312.

He claimed that Villa was dead or, if alive, innocuous.[23]

In a report to the Secretary of War, Scott and Funston stated that certain Mexican generals felt that they could cope successfully with the Pershing forces, and unless they retired immediately, such would be the case.[24] Special Agent Carothers reported from El Paso that the situation was critical, and anticipated immediate action against the American troops in Mexico by Generals Gutiérrez and Calles, if after termination of the conferences the decision was against withdrawal.[25] Also, General Scott claimed that he heard from inside sources that a certain Mexican general had been instructed "to be fully prepared to crush or annihilate the American forces in Mexico in case of nonwithdrawal."[26]

The first few meetings were unsatisfactory partly because they were held in a formal way "before a hostile audience which General Obregón must satisfy and carry with him."[27] Obregón requested to meet General Scott privately and secretly to discuss the situation alone. They met on May 2 in the hotel room of one J. H. McQuatters, and:

> An agreement was reached....after a continuous struggle of twelve hours duration which was not equaled by any similar struggle with the wildest and most exasperated Indian heretofore encountered. /The/ conference was usually amicable throughout. Papers were drawn up in English and Spanish, agreed and disagreed to, changed again and again, hours being expended, in apparent interminable argument on every subject, the main object being to have a time limit placed upon our stay in Mexico. This was amicably thwarted with great difficulty. McQuatters drew the papers in order to permit General Scott to keep General Obregón from going away and falling under hostile influence awaiting in /the/ hallway.

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23. Generals Scott and Funston to Sec. of War, April 30, 1916, Ibid.

24. Generals Scott and Funston to the Sec. of War, May 1, 1916, AGO 2394312.

25. Special Agent Carothers to Sec. of State, May 1, 1916, FR 1916, 536.

26. General Scott to Sec. of War, May 1,1916, AGO 2394312.

27. Generals Scott and Funston to Sec.of War, May 3,1916, Ibid.

> The agreement is not altogether satisfactory but if circumstances are considered it will be recognized that it has not been easy to avert a war with Mexico which all believed was imminent. The agreement is submitted for approval.[28]

The agreement provided for the gradual withdrawal of American forces to begin immediately. The decision of the American government to continue the gradual withdrawal of the troops of the Punitive Expedition from Mexico was inspired by the belief that the Mexican government was then in a position to prevent further incursions upon American territory. The withdrawal was only to be prevented if any occurrance arose in Mexico which tended "to prove that such belief was wrongly founded."[29] The agreement was submitted to the two governments, and on May 8 Carranza gave his answer. He would not ratify the agreement "on the grounds that no date was set for complete withdrawal and the agreement was therefore too indefinite and a danger to Mexico".[30] Also, the ambiguous clause which stated that the termination of the withdrawal of American forces will only fail, if there should occur in Mexico something which might tend to demonstrate that American faith in Mexico was without foundation, was ill-thought of by Carranza. "To accept this clause would be sanctioning beforehand the indefinite stay of American forces in Mexico, should anything happen that was unforeseen and for which the Mexican government was not responsible."[31]

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28. Generals Scott and Funston to Sec. of War, May 3, 1916, AGO 2394312.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., May 8, 1916.

31. General Obregón to General Scott, enclosed in General Scott to Sec. of War, May 9, 1916, AGO 2394312.

Scott and Funston were convinced that the Mexicans were acting on bad faith. They thought that Mexico desired to keep the United States troops quiet until Mexican troops were in position to drive them out of Mexico by force. They expected many attacks along the entire border, and recommended that the militia of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona be called out at once.[32]

On May 5, while the Scott-Obregón conferences were being held, the Columbus raid was repeated at Glen Springs, and Boquillas, Texas. Mexican bandits estimated to number 200 men entered Glen Springs, Texas, some twenty miles from the border, killing three soldiers, a nine year old boy, and wounding two others. After the raid they returned toward the border and attempted to raid Boquillas, Texas, on the next night, but were driven off by armed employees of the mining company at that place.[33] When asked by Obregón if these raids would prevent ratification of the agreement then being studied by both governments, Scott and Funston answered that though the raids proved Mexican inability to protect the border, the American government would still ratify the agreement.[34] General Funston, however, had given orders that American troops were to "cross to the Mexican side if it becomes necessary" in their chase of the bandits.[35] The Governor of Coahuila stated that he would consider such penetration "exceedingly grave, since in the absence of other instructions, his present instructions from Mexico /City7

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32. Generals Scott and Funston to Sec. of War, May 8, 1916, AGO 2394312.

33. Vice Consul Blocker to Sec. of State, May 8, 1916, FR 1916, 544-45.

34. Generals Scott and Funston to Sec. of War, May 7, 1916, AGO 2394312.

35. General Funston to Sec. of War, May 7, 1916, FR 1916, 542.

would oblige him to opposition."[36] No conflict resulted, however, as orders were presumably sent to the commander of the Mexican forces in that area not to attack the American forces.[37]

The end of the Scott-Obregón conferences saw a general movement of de facto government troops north to Chihuahua and Coahuila.[38] Obregón said the troops were only moving north to fulfill Mexican promises for protection of the border,[39] but American troops, penetrating 168 miles into Coahuila in chase of the Glen Springs bandits, did not encounter a single Carrancista soldier. This indicated to the American government that the Mexican government was not doing "all possible" to avoid further raids.[40] Also, Luis de la Rosa, a well known leader of border raids, was known to be recruiting in Monterrey, and his recruits openly asserted that they were going to rob and burn border towns in Texas, and massacre Americans.[41] It was believed that De la Rosa had full sanction of the Carranza government for his actions.[42] The bands of De la Rosa made several raids in the vicinity of Laredo, Texas, in early June, 1916. The leader of one of the raids was wearing a Carrancista

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36. Special Agent Silliman to Sec. of State, May 15, 1916, FR 1916, 548.

37. Special Representative Rodgers to Sec. of State, May 22, 1916, FR 1916, 563-64.

38. Vice Consul Blocker to Sec. of State, May 15, 1916, FR 1916, 547.

39. Special Representative Rodgers to Sec. of State, May 19, 1916, FR 1916, 551.

40. Sec. of State to Sec. of Foreign Relations of the de facto government of Mexico, June 20, 1916, FR 1916, 590.

41. Sec. of State to Special Representative Rodgers, June 10, 1916, FR 1916, 572-73. See, same to same, June 5, 1916, FR 1916, 567.

42. General Funston to Sec. of War, June 7, 1916, FR 1916, 568-69. See also, Consul Garrett to Sec. of State, June 7, 1916, FR 1916, 569.

uniform when killed, and others were known to be Carrancista's.[43]

An exchange of notes between General Pershing and General Treviño on June 16 indicated plainly that an engagement between the armies of the two countries was not outside the realm of possibility. General Treviño wired Pershing:

> I have orders from my government to prevent, by the use of arms, new invasions of my country by American forces and also to prevent the American forces that are in this State from moving to the south, east or west of the places they now occupy. I communicate this to you for your knowledge for the reason that your forces will be attacked by the Mexican forces if these instructions are not heeded.[44]

Pershing, in reply, stated:

> you are informed that my government has placed no such restrictions upon the movements of the American forces. I shall therefore use my own judgement as to when and in what direction I shall move my forces in pursuit of bandits or in seeking information regarding bandits. If under these circumstances the Mexican forces attack any of my columns the responsibility for the consequences will lie with the Mexican government.[45]

The clash between troops of the two countries occurred on June 21, at Carrizal. Troops "C" and "K" of the 10th Cavalry, under command of Captain Charles T. Boyd, engaged Mexican troops under command of General Felix U. Gómez. Captain Boyd

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43. Sec. of State to Special Representative Rodgers, June 13, 1916, FR 1916, 575. Also, Consul Garrett to Sec. of State, June 17, 1916, FR 1916, 576.

44. General Funston to Sec. of War, June 17, 1916, FR 1916, 577.

45. Ibid.

had requested permission to pass through the town of Carrizal, but General Gómez refused the request, and also stated that the only direction Boyd could go was north. Captain Boyd then proceeded to deploy his troops for action, and the Mexicans reciprocated by opening fire. Captain Boyd's troops returned the fire, killing General Gómez. Later, Captain Boyd was also killed, and the American troops, leaderless, fell back in defeat. Troop "C" lost six killed, four wounded and eight prisoners, while Troop "K" lost five killed, six wounded, and fifteen prisoners.[46] The British Consul at Chihuahua reported that these prisoners were being sufficiently fed and well treated, and that there was no danger for their lives.[47]

On June 25 the United States demanded the immediate release of the prisoners, together with any property of the United States taken with them,[48] and the Mexican government complied with this demand three days later on June 28.[49] The Mexican government stated that the prompt release of the prisoners was proof of its sincerity to reach a "peaceful and satisfactory settlement of the present difficulties."[50] This is why, on July

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46. H.A. Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, The Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Penn., 1935, 77. Also, General Funston to Sec. of War, June 25, 1916, FR 1916, 596.

47. British Consul at Chihuahua to British Embassy, June 27, 1916, FR 1916, 597.

48. Sec. of State to Special Representative Rodgers, June 25, 1916, FR 1916, 595.

49. Special Representative Rodgers to Sec. of State, June 28, 1916, FR 1916, 597.

50. Mr. Arredondo to Sec. of State, July 4, 1916, FR 1916, 599.

12, the Mexican government suggested to the United States the idea of appointing three commissioners to represent each government for the purpose of:

> arriving at an early solution of the question relative to the evacuation of the American forces at present in Mexico, the drafting and approval of a protocol or convention for the reciprocal crossing of forces into either country, and also tracing to their source the incursions that have taken place up to date so as to be able to fix the responsibilities and finally settle the differences that are now pending or may arise between the two countries from this or a like cause; all of which to be subject to the approval of both governments.[51]

The American government replied that it would "accept the proposal of the Mexican government in the same spirit of frank cordiality in which it /was/ made."[52] On August 4 the Mexican government notified Washington that Luis Cabrera, Ignacio Bonillas, and Alberto Pani were to be the three commissioners representing that government.[53] The American commissioners appointed by President Wilson were Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, Mr. George Gray, and Dr. John R. Mott.[54] The Mexican-American Joint Commission held their first meeting at New London, Connecticut, on September 6, 1916, with the immediate withdrawal of American troops being the first topic discussed.[55]

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51. Mr. Arredondo to Sec. of State, July 12, 1916, FR 1916, 601.
52. Acting Sec. of State to Mr. Arredondo, July 28, 1916, FR 1916, 604.
53. Mr. Arredondo to Sec. of State, August 4, 1916, FR 1916, 606.
54. President Wilson to Mr. Franklin K. Lane, Sec. of Interior, August 31, 1916, FR 1916, 607-608.
55. Special Commissioner Lane to Sec. of State, September 6, 1916, FR 1916, 608.

The two governments realized after the Carrizal incident that what was needed was a cooling off period, hence the quick acceptance, by both, of the Mexican-American Joint Commission. The Commission held a series of conferences for the next four and a half months, when, on January 15, 1917, they adjourned. During this time the six men comprising the Commission achieved the same result as did the Scott-Obregón meetings - a standoff. The Commission adjourned with the Mexican delegates insisting on immediate withdrawal, and the United States delegates arguing for the safeguarding and patrolling of the border. The two countries still could not agree.[56]

For the seven months that separated the Carrizal incident from the adjournment of the Mexican-American Joint Commission, the Punitive Expedition more or less acted as a police force in Mexico. By June, 1916, the various actions of the American forces "had scattered the Villistas into a few small, swiftly moving detachments under subordinates of no consequence,"[57] and, as a basis for the eventual withdrawing of the Punitive Expedition, General Pershing installed a district system of policing the country. He:

> organized the territory into separate districts with intelligence agents to furnish a service of information. A system of guides and interpreters was established. Swift detachments were on call to strike suddenly upon any information being acquired as to the bandits' operations.[58]

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56. For a complete report on the proceedings of the Commission, see, American Commissioners to Sec. of State, April 26, 1917, FR 1917, 916-938.

57. Toulmin, op. cit., 113.

58. Ibid.

In the fall of 1916, Villa again made his presence known. In late September he attacked the city of Chihuahua.[59] He attacked the city again in November, only this time he drove the Carrancista troops out and occupied it for twelve days.[60] In December he drove the Carrancistas out of Torreon and occupied that city.[61] Generals Pershing and Funston, fearing that Villa's power was again rising, urged the Secretary of War for authorization to deliver "a quick decisive blow" against him.[62] Pershing, because of the Joint Commission conferences being held, was marking time in Mexico.

On January 8, Consul General Hanna suggested that the Punitive Expedition withdraw from Mexico and "place the responsibility for restoring order in Mexico on the de facto government where it belongs."[63] When the Joint Commission adjourned a week later, with nothing accomplished, the United States government thought well of this advice, and on January 30, 1917, the Punitive Expedition started its withdrawal from Mexico.[64] By February 5 the last American troops had left Mexico,[65] and the problem of Pancho Villa, from then on, rested with Venustiano Carranza.

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59. General Funston to the Sec. of War, September 20, 1916, FR 1916, 609-610.

60. Funston to Sec. of War, December 2, 1916, FR 1916, 618, also, Consul Edwards to Sec. of State, December 5, 1916, FR 1916, 619.

61. Collector Cobb to Sec. of State, December 23, 1916, and Special Agent Carothers to Sec. of State, December 24, 1916, both published in FR 1916, 624.

62. Funston to Sec. of War, December 9, 1916, FR 1916, 623.

63. Consul General Hanna to Sec. of State, January 8, 1917, FR 1917, 904.

64. Sec. of War to Sec.of State, January 30,1917, FR 1917, 907.

65. Funston to Adjutant General of the Army, February 6, 1917, FR 1917, 908.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

From the resignation of Porfirio Díaz to the recognition by the United States of Carranza, Mexico was faced with four and a half years of bloody revolution. All during this period the primary concern of the United States was the protection of American life and property. This concern was not limited to just the border towns. Millions of dollars of American capital invested in various industries throughout Mexico demanded protection of the American government. The primary concern of Carranza, on the other hand, was winning the revolution he was fighting. Carranza realized that losses to American businessmen were large, but he also realized that revolutions are expensive in more ways than one, and considered losses to Mexicans and Mexico much greater.

It was for the preservation of its own interests that the United States desired peace to return to Mexico. It was for this reason that Carranza's government was finally given de facto recognition. It was hoped that he could end the years of bloody turmoil, and that the two countries could return to the status quo that prevailed during the heyday of Porfirio Díaz.

Times had changed by March, 1916. Venustiano Carranza had been recognized as "First Chief" of a de facto government, and, having recognized Carranza, the American government was set on backing him to the limit in restoring Mexico to peace once more. Pancho Villa, once looked on by the United States with favor, but viewed as a bandit since the Santa Ysabel massacre, was an obstacle in the way of both countries in their quest for this peace.

The de facto government of Carranza had many internal problems to cope with, and the rebel Villa was but one of these

problems. Carranza sent troops after Villa, but northern Mexico is too vast, and the troops were too few to be of much good. Border raids by Mexican bandits along the lower Rio Grande in late 1915 caused the American government to demand of Carranza that steps be taken to remedy such acts. It was not long before the American government became convinced that the de facto government of Carranza could not control the border bandits, nor the activities of Pancho Villa in northern Mexico. The massacre at Santa Ysabel only confirmed these convictions. Consequently, when Villa made his raid at Columbus, the time was ripe for American intervention. If Carranza could not stop Villa the United States would.

The Punitive Expedition was sent into Mexico, not because an American town had been attacked by bandits that murdered Americans and destroyed American property, but rather, it was because these bandits were led by Pancho Villa. Border incursions by Mexicans were nothing new to the United States, but because the Columbus raid was led by the personage of Villa, and followed quick on the heels of the Santa Ysabel massacre, the United States construed this raid as being different. The Columbus raid was an attempt by Villa to provoke the United States into intervention, whereas prior incursions into American territory were primarily for the purpose of robbing and pillaging. In this respect the raid was different. The Punitive Expedition was the culmination of almost five years of frustration on the part of the United States. Mexico had been given ample opportunity to settle its own internal affairs, but the raid at Columbus, New Mexico, proved to be the last straw.

The United States should have been able to predict the outcome of a punitive expedition in Mexico. It knew what kind of man Carranza was, and how hard he was to deal with. From the time the first American soldier set foot in Mexico, Carranza asserted that the sovereignty of Mexico was being violated, and demanded immediate withdrawal of all American troops. That such

would be the attitude of Carranza should have been obvious to the American government. This was his attitude during the Tampico-Vera Cruz fiasco and it had not changed any during all subsequent dealings with the United States. To expect that Carranza would do anything but oppose such an expedition would be sheer folly on the part of the United States, and yet it did expect Mexican aid in its chase of Villa.

The Punitive Expedition, as an attempt to remove Pancho Villa from the scene, and thereby aid the return of peaceful conditions to Mexico, was a complete failure. It was totally unsuccessful in accomplishing the aims that it set out to do. It was unsuccessful partly because of the refusal of Carranza to make the chase of Villa a joint effort. Even if Carranza had assented to the Expedition, and cooperated wholeheartedly with the United States in a joint pursuit of Villa, it is highly unlikely that they would have caught him. Northern Mexico is large, and Villa knew the Sierra Madre mountains like he knew the back of his hand. The Punitive Expedition, instead of aiding peaceful conditions, antagonized the Mexican populace to the extent that more harm was done than good.

Some good, however, did arise out of the Expedition. It was just a matter of time before the United States would be dragged into World War I then being waged in Europe. The eleven months that the Expedition chased Villa around northern Mexico, though costly in dollars at the time, proved to be an excellent training ground for whipping the American army into shape for the ensuing battle in Europe. The cost proved to be well worth the money.

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I. Bibliographical Aids.

The New York Times Index proved useful in locating material dealing with this period, as did also the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature. Also, Charles C. Cumberland's, "The United States-Mexican Border: A Selective Guide to the Literature of the Region," printed by Rural Sociology, June, 1960, should be thoroughly familiar to all students of Mexican-American relations.

II. Primary Sources.

Most of the material from which this thesis is taken can be found in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Government Printing Office, Volumes 1913-1917. These bound documents are selected, and unfortunately, they were oftentimes found to be lacking. Use was also made of microfilmed data taken from the Files of the Adjutant Generals Office, National Archives, Washington, D.C. This microfilm is the private property of Professor Charles C. Cumberland, Michigan State University, and was especially useful in collecting data pertaining to the Scott-Obregón meetings. Manuscript material from Professor Cumberland's forthcoming book on the Mexican revolution was also found to be useful.

III. Secondary Sources.

A. Books

The material in the first chapter dealing with the administration of Porfirio Díaz, and which served as an introduction to the revolutionary period of 1911-17, was taken from James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, The MacMillan Company, New York (1932). Charles C. Cumberland Mexican Revolution, Genesis Under Madero, Univ. of Texas Press, Austin, (1952), was used for material relating to

the administration of Francisco Madero, as was also Stanley Ross, Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, (1955).

Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution 1914-1915, The Convention of Aguascalientes, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington, (1960), is perhaps the best work in English that deals with the split between Villa and Carranza. This, and Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy, Cornell Univ. Press, New York, (1961), were used heavily in writing chapter IV of this study.

Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive era 1910-17, Harper & Brothers, New York, (1954), was excellent for an overall picture of Wilson's foreign policy in spite of Link's anti-Wilson bias. George Creel, Wilson and the Issues, The Century Co. New York, (1916), Edward H. Buehrig, Editor, Wilson's Foreign Policy in Perspective, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington, (1957), and John Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality, Little, Brown & Company, Boston, (1956), were all useful in gaining a picture of Wilson the man, and the problems he faced in dealing with Mexico. Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years of Peace 1910-1917, Univ. of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, (1946), was used primarily for its handling of the Tampico-Vera Cruz incidents. Daniels was Wilson's Secretary of the Navy at this time, and the role he played in the formation of Wilsons policy is brought out.

Hudson Strode, Timeless Mexico, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, (1944), was used as a general history. Though lightly written, it was excellent in placing the era under discussion in its proper perspective. Romero Matías, Mexico and the United States, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, (1898), is an excellent reference book that comes in two volumes. It deals with all matters, but tends to lean towards things economic in nature. Volume one was used for its handling of the Mexican Free Zone.

Virginia Prewett, Reportage on Mexico, E.P. Dutton & Company, New York, (1941), though primarily a book dealing with the Cárdenas revolution, has a good chapter dealing with the Revolution of 1910. Edith O'Shaughnessy, Intimate Pages of Mexican History, George H. Doran Company, New York, (1920), and, A Diplomats Wife in Mexico, Harpers Brothers, (1916), are two very interesting books written by the wife of Nelson O'Shaughnessy, American Charge d'Affaires. Mrs. O'Shaughnessy was pro-Díaz and pro-Huerta, and very much prejudiced against the Mexican Revolution and American foreign policy during this period. H.A. Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, The Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, Penn., (1935), traces the Punitive Expedition throughout Mexico. Colonel Toulmin was with Pershing at this time, and his book is an excellent manual on cavalry tactics. I. Thord-Gray, Gringo Rebel, Mexico 1913-1914, Univ. of Miami Press, Coral Gables, (1960), is the account of an Englishman who purports to have served with General Obregón's army in the revolution against Victoriano Huerta. It is exciting and interesting, but not of much historical value.

B. Periodicals & Newspapers

Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley - 1915," printed in The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Texas State Historical Association, Austin, Vol. LVII, No. 3, January, 1954, gives an excellent picture of border conditions prior to the Columbus raid. There are many periodicals that one can use in locating material concerning Mexican-American relations during this period. Outlook, Independent, and Literary Digest, various volumes covering the years 1913-17, were especially good in their reporting on the Mexican Revolution and the Punitive Expedition. The New York Times was also used, and like the above periodicals, were used primarily for the purpose of trying to obtain a first-hand "feeling" for the five year period discussed in this study.