——‘——_-_r~w‘vskv—v A? w _mA “can..- «u-~-om400¢0¢ “‘WQWW ‘ j‘%,v-fi- __ ‘ I THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE: PERSPECTIVE AND PROSPECT AND THE POLLUTION OF LAKE BAIKAL Research Papers for the Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN. STATE UNIVERSITY LeROY BARNETT 1972 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Michigansm 3 1293 00623 5646 University THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE: PERSPECTIVE AND PROSPECT BY LeRoy Barnett A RESEARCH PAPER Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Geography 1972 .e I are‘rlsior‘ l reluctance t’ .eurse, a ‘9‘ Relying upon assess t“ boreal Chan.“ innova+ F O REWO RD Not since Terence Armstrong's 1952 classic, The Northern Sea Route, has a detailed study appeared in English about shipping operations on the Northeast Passage. In the twenty years that have elapsed since the book was published, much has happened in the Soviet arctic to alter the nature of maritime activities as described by the Cambridge University scholar. Because of these modifica- tions, there is a need for an updated account of naviga- tion on the U.S.S.R.'s high-latitude seaway. Though such a revision is greatly hindered by Moscow's increasing reluctance to release information about the polar water course, a few articles have been written on the subject. Relying upon these sources, this study has been undertaken to assess the changes that have occurred along the Soviet's boreal channel in the past two decades and predict what innovations might appear there in the next ten years. ii -' I'Pfi‘jn '.' W'fi' ‘.7'&E"~ I'm—”‘— ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Probably every author who has ever written a book or an article has been moved by the wish to recognize in print those individuals who helped in the preparation of the work. But just as surely, practically every author who has tried to thank his benefactors has been frustrated by the overwhelming nature of the task. I, too, find it impossible to acknowledge all of the people who have as- sisted me in the composition of these two research papers, but some have made such significant contributions that it would be improper of me not to mention their names. To Sherman Hollander and Mary Daup I am indebted for the illustrations that appear in this volume. Their maps, charts, and graphs do much to supplement various portions of the text, and a good deal of the merit earned by these two studies will be attributable to their carto- graphic skills. To Dr. Eckehart Bandemehr and Nick Grebenschikov, both of Michigan State University, I owe a note of gratitude for their translations of the Russian- 1anguage articles that were used in this thesis. Also, I am obliged to Charles Rupert, from the University of iii ‘ 'n'W' CIA - ' In." Iilinois, for Q r a::1c.e that "“.1.4 P w ~=“VOUEOo to L *“e to M -' urfl‘ r‘ov‘ I Q Bitten, and ‘ .- ~Cr"fln «mate this Illinois, for translating the French publications con- sulted in my research, and to Dr. Rosemary Kenarny, Nazareth College, for translating to English the Italian article that appears in the bibliography. Finally, I am beholden to my parents for the many sacrifices they have made to provide me with an education. Without their sup- port and encouragement these papers would never have been written, and in appreciation for their enduring help, I dedicate this manuscript to them. iv ova” A ‘_ . “F «.3; \JF Th: 2: ~34» Chester 1‘ Irqr‘D'F-“.Y ‘A‘Vd‘ CE T01 "r q' SHIDp r4 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . Chapter I. II. III. IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE Strategic Considerations Economic Significance Source of National Pride Prestige Value Scientific Importance TRADE ALONG THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE Timber Petroleum Coal Minerals Tourists SHIPPING ON THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE The Marine Fleet The River Fleet Inefficiency Port Facilities ICEBREAKERS ON THE NORTHEAST PASSAGE Size and Numbers Ice Conditions Fuel Problems Crews Support Requirements Page vii 15 32 Chapter V. FOREIGN USE OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE . The Passage Opened to All Nations The Channel Suddenly Closed Disadvantages of the Route Dead Time Irregularity High Costs Shallow Waters Lack of Markets Outlook VI. PROSPECTS FOR THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE . The Lena River Canal Extension of the Trans—Siberian Railway BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Page 48 60 63 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Freight Shipments to Nizhne-Yansk . . . . 23 2. Materials Shipped to East-Siberian Ports, 1960-1965 . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3. Accessibility of Ports Along the Northern Sea Route . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4. Soviet Icebreakers Operating on the Northern Sea Route in 1970 . . . . . . . . 33 5. Caravans to Pevek in 1966 . . . . . . . 39 vii vm on] I.“RJU The Nor 6,333 mile-long of the Arctic OI circle (except from Murmansk i This distance c half 0f the ear Over f i the highway, b then benefit.2 Mt Of a high~ advantage .3 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION TO THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE The Northeast Passage, first opened in 1932, is a 6,000 mile-long shipping channel following the Soviet coast of the Arctic Ocean.1 Entirely poleward of the arctic circle (except for Archangel), the sea route stretches from Murmansk in the west to Provideniya Bay in the east. This distance covers an arc of about 160 degrees, nearly half of the earth's circumference. Over five million people are served by this mari- time highway, but the channel is only incidentally for their benefit.2 The primary motive for Moscow's develop- ment of a high-latitude water course is that of strategic 3 advantage. The U.S.S.R.'s naval communications between 1T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1967," Inter-Nord, No. 11 (1970), 123-24. 2R. St. J. Macdonald, ed., The Arctic Frontier (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), pp. 41—42. 3Bernard Kassell, "Soviet LOgistics in the Arctic," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 85 (1959), 89-95. UNDCLO>OH “Anya § V N .u 0 35.. c on sIlgrlt-‘LK A“ N \ K b H ‘ .. ....» .. A-.. ... ..V a utfi....\ l. 9P . cm... I 2... . Lo ... am... am. on. 2... om. I. ..4‘) nova-c. . £1: £5» Esau ‘ ...-$2.35. .. 5...»... sons-... no. 3...... ...-3. 3.4.8.. 3.3.0:. «oaaucau ‘VNQQ kabk‘ CZ ....IOI.I..O>08 2...: 8. .....ESzD 581.30 ...-3352:. |!|.. ...-.3. III- .onotzoc I :Soc. .393 III 22;: .3025: I Ohm. meBsz hmoawznumk Put/0m (Goon-O) - ....‘I‘ h. a L - AI its Atlantic a t". boreal ic straits at G: relies. '31; rational sea: as an alter; Ticrtheast pa sailing time its Atlantic and Pacific fleets, without a "canal" through the boreal ice, would be dependent upon the freedom of the straits at Gibraltar, Suez, the Oresund, and the Darda- nelles. Only the route around Africa follows inter- national seas, and its extreme length would make its use as an alternative course totally out of the question. The Northeast Passage, by comparison, requires about half the sailing time of the fastest Optional link between EurOpean waters and the Far East, and its path lies wholly within the Soviet Union's territorial limits. The boreal maritime passage offers some other tactical advantages to the U.S.S.R. External security re- quires that the Soviet government uphold a strong line of defense along its northern flank to guard against any real or imagined threats. The maintenance of such an elaborate military establishment would be impossible without a water supply route to all sectors of the arctic coast. There- fore, only by operating the Northeast Passage is Moscow able to adequately sustain nearly half a million combat and rear echelon troops along the polar margins of EurOpe and Asia. At least 50 landing fields with a total of 1,000 aircraft,4 and a complex of missile bases, are also known to be supported, in part, by the high—latitude 4T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedin s [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57-65. S 'T‘ seaway. .o " ‘ 'ICE ir..er.ere. . licht warshi' along the ma Asif Hertheast, p; strong, Cit L4 tant is the meICidl hi1 sections c 3:935 t0 5 of the re; sewed. . high‘lati possible . 1'0th 7 Seaway seaway.5 To protect the crucial artery from outside interference, the Soviet navy has stationed 3 cruisers, 25 light warships, 70 torpedo boats, and numerous submarines along the nautical transportation network.6 Aside from the strategic benefits gained from the Northeast Passage, the noted polar expert, Terence Arm- strong, cites at least four other compensations appre- ciated by the U.S.S.R. Of these, probably the most impor- tant is that of economics. The boreal sea lane is a com- mercial highway touching many otherwise inaccessible sections of the Soviet arctic. By linking these remote areas to a water tran3portation system, the mineral riches of the region can be exploited and mining communities served. The development of many resources in the Asian high-latitudes would be much more difficult, if not im- possible, without the existence of a northern maritime route.7 Pride is another factor acquired from the polar seaway project. Every victory the U.S.S.R. wins over 5P. Massajoli, "The Soviet Arctic Maritime Route,‘ Universo, 45, No. 5 (1965), 855-74. 6T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedin s [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), - . 7T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1965," Inter-Nord, No. 9 (1967), 203-206. nature is deeply felt by the country as a whole. Not surprisingly, then, the conquest of the arctic, as repre- sented by the high-latitude passage, has done much to give the Soviet citizens a sense of accomplishment and self- esteem. Indeed, Armstrong claims that the creation of the northern maritime route back in the early 1930's was justifiable on the basis of this virtue alone. Since then, however, other state endeavors--like hydroelectric dams, the virgin lands scheme, and space exploration--have re- duced the importance of the boreal channel as a source of national glory.8 Aside from bolstering the spirits of the homeland, the development of the polar navigation route has enhanced Soviet prestige abroad. Publicity from the U.S.S.R. has extolled its subjugation of the arctic as an unparalleled achievement among the countries of the world. Such a claim cannot be denied, but the secret clOak under which the channel is forced to Operate considerably diminishes its value as a subject for international distinction. As restrictions on information pertaining to the boreal pas- sage are eased, and as North American cruises continue to struggle amidst the Canadian archipelago, it can be ex- pected that the seaway will be increasingly used as a Soviet prOpaganda tool.9 8 Ibid. Ibid. Scientific education is the fourth advantage ob- tained by the U.S.S.R. from establishment of the northern maritime route. The demands of building and maintaining the boreal seaway required the Soviet government to spon- sor widespread and detailed investigations about all aSpects of the polar realm. These studies, conducted under the aegis of the Leningrad Arctic Institute, pro- vided the knowledge about the high-latitudes that has made the country today's leader in cold region research.10 It is quite certain that polar science in the U.S.S.R. would not have progressed to its present state without the stimulus of the Northeast Passage.11 10T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57-65. 11T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1965," Inter-Nord, No. 9 (1967), 203-206. The majO Route is cut-and Exepelz Over U.S.S.R. sends a forest products angel. More th. during its ten-2 ihcn. weigh anch The bul Of the total, d and Yenisey ri-J tent center wit CHAPTER II TRADE ALONG THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE The major export commodity along the Northern Sea Route is cut-and-hewn logs for the countries of Western Europe.12 Over half of the finished boards and beams the U.S.S.R. sends abroad leave from the nation's largest forest products complex, the Sprawling harbor of Arch- angel. More than 800 steamers visit the city each year during its ten-month navigation season, nearly all of whom weigh anchor with holds filled with lumber.13 The bulk of the remaining wood, about 40 per cent of the total, departs from processing points along the Ob and Yenisey rivers.14 By far the most significant ship- ment center within the two watersheds is Igarka, a 12P. Massajoli, "The Soviet Arctic Maritime Route," Universo, 45, No. 5 (1965), 855-74. 13Polar Times, No. 58 (June, 1964), 29. 143. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. _ I _ _ ook absgk S 2.0.» 01.03 024°C 00% CLOC.LOZ on: 0..) OILOU. EOL; LOOEJJ $0 .50me IIL: 0.5. 0mm. 08. mom. Com. \Il oo~ \ 00m 000 ooo \ . CON massage ... 2.8. at?! 231 com 52:32 2: as 3.32 52.. .3554 B .890 roaastead o 25vessels this inland nucleus arc from this c the ccsuy trade can I stream fer Shibbi s‘ “a “Ella,“ E. 16 1364 in Tpk 17 1e 1965 .. roadstead on the lower Yenisey capable of handling over 25 vessels at one time.15 Most of the wood loaded at this inland port is produced nearly 1,200 kilometers up- river and hauled downstream to storage facilities at the head of marine navigation. Coming to rival Igarka as a place of egress for timber packets is the sawmilling nucleus around Abalakova. The direct transport of wood from this combine just north of Krasnoyarsk eliminates the costly transfer stage downriver, and Igarka's lumber trade can be expected to diminish as craft go farther up- stream for their cargo.16 Timber exports from the Ob system did not become important until quite recently, when a shoal at the mouth of the river was finally removed.17 This natural obstacle had barred the waterway from all maritime traffic since 1930, with only small quantities of freight being ferried 18 across the bar by shallow-draft boats. But in 1966, after years of effort, the Soviets managed to dredge a 15I. L. Freiden, "Problems of Development of Shipping on the Kara Sea Through the Straits of Navaya Zemlya," Problems of the North, No. 3 (1961), 129-36. 16T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1964," Inter-Nord, No. 8 (1966), 215-18. 17Polar Record, 13, No. 84 (August, 1966), 310-11. 18T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1965," Inter-Nord, No. 9 (1967), 203-206. channel f r 19 vessels . «éfxets' 110”“ *F 'r In; 5‘59 L. -‘f‘ r “Vac: “V“tECIQ I". ‘g U. .3“ '3'" Ina .. 2l. e A Lrvble . “er “3 O 10 channel from the Ob to the sea to accommodate ocean-going vessels.19 Now lumber exports are expected to match those 20 from the Yenisey, with some authorities predicting that nearly three million cubic meters of wood will soon be leaving the region for foreign consumption.21 The past decade has seen the Northern Sea Route play a new role in the movement of timber to eastern markets.22 For some time the Siberians have floated logs down the Lena River to Tiksi for local and regional use, but in 1964 two ships each carried 9,000 tons of the high- quality wood on a trial run to Japan.23 The experiment proved that such trade was not only possible but also profitable, and by 1969 the commerce had expanded to nearly 80,000 tons of lumber.24 Buoyed by this success, the 19Polar Record, 13, No. 87 (September, 1967), 790-91. 20T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1965," Inter-Nerd, No. 9 (1967), 203-206. 218. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. 22Polar Record, 13, No. 87 (September, 1967), 790-91. 23V. Moyev, "The Great Northern," Soviet Union, No. 119 (1960), 16-20. Polar Times, No. 59 (December, 1964), 23. 24polar Record, 15, No. 95 (May, 1970), 195. ll Soviet Union has even announced plans to ship concentrated apatite from Murmansk to Japan.25 The second most important commodity shipped abroad on the polar sea lane, though at present in rather small amounts, is petroleum. Oil fields already in Operation 26 27 and on near the Finnish border, in the lower Ob Basin, Sakhalin Island are producing some liquid fossil fuels for external markets, and the future appears to hold as much promise in other areas of the north. Explorations in the U.S.S.R.'s high latitudes have shown rich deposits of black gold to be buried almost everywhere along the margins of the Arctic Ocean, particularly between Noril'sk and Khatanga. All of these reserves are quite near the boreal coast and could readily be tapped and pumped to offshore terminals for foreign distribution. Recent estimates place the amount of petroleum capable of being exported via the polar maritime route at around 50,000 tons per year. Such an extensive trade is not likely to soon develop, however, for the inferior size of Soviet tankers makes the movement of large quantities Of oil unprofitable.28 25Polar Record, 13, NO. 87 (September, 1967), 790-91. 26?. Massajoli, "The Soviet Arctic Maritime Route," 27Polar Record, 13, NO. 87 (September, 1967), 790-91. 28?. Massajoli, "The Soviet Arctic Maritime Route," Universo, 45, NO. 5 (1965), 855-74. A third ; earthern sea lane Kent 40 per cent‘ serves are found Tatiana and in t}. valleys. These 5. system than to th ECO CC‘JId thus LC: ! ,. FD bereal wath "OI .. . '~-°e9d. Will pro Wins faCilitie Another c ads of We be”: ..an concentrate 12 A third item, the shipment of which along the northern sea lane is more potential than actual, is coal. About 40 per cent of all the U.S.S.R.'s bituminous re- serves are found in the nation's frigid zone,29 mainly at Vorkuta and in the Lena,3O Kolyma,31 and Yenisey river valleys. These deposits are closer to the polar navigation system than to the transportation network of the south, and could thus be more readily sent to foreign markets Via the boreal water route. The movement of coal through Soviet arctic ports to Japan and EurOpe, though now poorly de- veloped, will probably be increased soon as mining and loading facilities are improved.32 Another class of cargo to figure in the foreign trade of the boreal sea route is industrial raw materials. Iron concentrate from Murmansk,33 copper and nickel ore 34 from Noril'sk, and lead and zinc compounds from other 291bid. 30T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1966," Inter-Nord, No. 10 (1968), 200-203. 318. S. Tsenin, "Questions of Development of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 3 (1961), 137-58. 32F. Massajoli, "The Soviet Arctic Maritime Route," Universo, 45, NO. 5 (1965), 855-74. 33V. Moyev, "The Great Northern," Soviet Union, No. 119 (1960), 16-20. 34polar Record, 15, NO. 98 (May, 1971), 744. r‘“‘ _ sorts of the nor“ alcng the polar :aéities are jus that are nown t est ninerali. rites: and unexpl I“ ‘ v 1 V“ “ | :.:ther develops. is 'nprcved, e' t A. i oh... T R f v ' cutie ele.uerlbs W The last Northern Sea Rout 35359“ “991’ vessel: .. 3e . . Oveneo Within %I has bE‘; seer-.5 well—supra: 55'3" r‘e‘n- 37 Th (D In H . *EEKS ' and Visit DiCkSOn' 13 ports Of the north are products that have been exported along the polar passage in limited amounts. These com- modities are just a few of the many metallic resources that are known to occur in the Soviet arctic, one Of the richest mineralized zones in the world. As the presently mined and unexploited natural assets of the region are further developed, and as equipment for their evacuation is improved, it can be expected that greater quantities of these elements will be shipped abroad.35 The last important "commodity" carried on the Northern Sea Route is tourists. As early as 1956, two- passenger vessels Operating out of Archangel were taking the curious as far east as Pevek to view the arctic 36 scene. Within the past few years only one ship, the Tatariya, has been making such journeys, but the venture seems well-supported with about 200 passengers booked for each run.37 These polar pleasure cruises last for three weeks, and visit in succession the ports of Naryan-Mar, Dickson, Igarka, Dudinka, and Murmansk.38 35P. Massajoli, "The Soviet Arctic Maritime Route," Universo, 45, No. 5 (1965), 855-74. 36Polar Record, 8, No. 56 (May, 1957), 454-55. 37po1ar Record, 15, No. 98 (May, 1971), 744. 38Polar Record, 15, NO. 95 (May, 1970), 195. F—_ _' Ill!- In 1961 fleeting interes frsn Krasnoyarsk 333.3“ for a t: 35 Noril‘sk, ir- ‘AIL' 14 In 1961 another sight-seeing expedition began floating interested vacationers down the Yenisey and back from Krasnoyarsk to Dickson.39 Of the thousands of peOple who annually take the trip, however, most disembark at Dudinka for a three-hour train trip to the mining community of Noril'sk, instead of continuing to the Kara Sea.40 39T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1966," Inter-Nord, No. 10 (1968), 200-203. 4°po1ar Record, 15, No. 94 (January, 1970), 51-52. (I) :1: *1 >17 Movement (5-1.; V) H ‘. ‘O‘OH ......stry of t controls all func from its headquar fairs east of the. abut 4 .....er at Pevek. :..'..stry, have be gation on these 8 The .rurnansk Arc: Cent Of all cargo ‘ J’I L Zr‘hern Sea Rout ’* IDecenher, 196 42 P013? 43 a . B- s CHAPTER III SHIPPING ON THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE Movement on the Northern Sea Route is regulated by the Ministry of the Soviet Merchant Fleets.41 The agency controls all functions west of longitude 145 degrees east from its headquarters at Dickson, and guides nautical af- fairs east of that demarcation line from a maritime nerve center at Pevek.42 Two organizations, directed by the ministry, have been assigned the task Of maintaining navi- gation on these separate sectors Of the Northeast Passage. The Murmansk Arctic Steamship Authority, handling 70 per cent of all cargo carried on the polar waterway, conducts tran5portation activities on the western wing of the sea 43 lane. The Far Eastern Steamship Company, working out of 41T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57-65. 42Polar Times, No. 58 (June, 1964), 28. 433. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 9 (1966), 309-19. 15 '-.".a'iivostok r {13: 3f the i ”.36 vessels ‘ This argOSE’r Far East lir- ‘ Soviet merch 16 Vladivostok, manages freight Operations in the eastern sec- tion of the channel.44 The Murmansk line, as of 1970, had 156 vessels with a combined capacity of 660,000 tone.45 This argosy, coupled with the 50 comparable ships of the Far East line, accounts for about 10 per cent of the Soviet merchant fleet.46 Most of the freighters owned by the two arctic shipping companies are domestically-constructed, ice- strengthened (Soviet class "UL") craft of rather small 47 load-capacity. The average size of each boat is around 4,000 tons deadweight (tdw),48 sels reaching 6,500 tdw.49 These merchantmen usually serve with a few Dutch-built ves- up to 8 or 10 points per trip,50 conveying supplies and provisions for coastal stations and interior mining 44Bernard Kassell, "Soviet Logistics in the Arctic," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 85 (February, 1959), 89-95. 45polar Record, 15, NO. 95 (May, 1970), 195. 46Bernard Kassell, "Soviet Logistics in the Arctic," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 85 (February, 1959), 89-95. 47T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route, 1968- 70," Inter-Nord, No. 12 (1971). 48polar Record, 15, No. 95 (May, 1970), 19s. 49T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1963," Inter-Nord, NO. 7 (1965), 288-96. 50B. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems Of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 9 (1966), 309-19. settlements . of the trans; '1 . R £7533 In E :lEl’S' the I l7 settlements. Despite the many stOps required of them, most of the transports manage to make 2 cruises, and some even 3, before the end of the brief navigation season.51 In most years boats chartered by the U.S.S.R., and a few for- eign liners, are used to assist Soviet ships in the deliv- ery of materials to northern ports. Together, in 1969, these various freighters made over 700 voyages52 and deliv- ered nearly two million tons of goods along the polar sea lane.53 In part to insure the safety of these cargo car- riers, the U.S.S.R. began making systematic depth sound- ings along its high-latitude watercourse in 1935.54 Since that date as many as eight hydrographic ships have been busy each year charting courses along the polar littoral 55 zone. DesPite such an intense and long-term program, it was not until 1966 that the route had been surveyed and 51Polar Record, 12, No. 81 (September, 1965), 742-43. 52Farley Mowat, Sibir (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1970), p. 238. S3Bernard Kassell, "Soviet Logistics in the Arctic," Proceeding§[U.S. Naval Institute], 85 (February, 1959), 89-95. 54B. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. 55polar Record, 12, No. 31 (September, 1965), 742-43. equipped f: 12 meters. Th boats sail Lane limit Craft now to be prOf SEED. Cale). be 991310 c to be fol airplatl Stereosa l I: ECO'I g LTispcm‘l' a 0f t and 18 equipped for the passage of ships with a draft of even 12 meters.56 The restrictions imposed by such shallow water on boats sailing the near-shore channels of the boreal sea lane limit their size to 15,000 tons deadweight or less.57 Such a handicap gives the Soviets only a slight margin in which to conduct economically sound freighting operations in the arctic coastal region. It costs, for example, about 200 rubles to convey one ton of goods on the 4,000 tdw craft now used on the polar passage.58 But for shipping to be profitable on the northern maritime route, it has been calculated that vessels of at least 10,000 tdw must be employed.59 This means that if rational practices are to be followed in managing tranSport activities on the high-latitude seaway, all cargo carriers will have to weigh between 10,000 and 15,000 tdw. 56B. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the 57T. E. Armstrong,""The Northern Sea Route, 1968-70," Inter-Nord, No. 12 (1971). 588. S. Tsenin, "Questions of Development of the Economy and TranSport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role Of the Northern Sea Route," Problems Of the North, NO. 3 (1961), 137-58. 598. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the The r sage has, in building eff: structed in £13,033 t 0. are slated t1 :3: naval ar. .3,C00 tdw. 6 the arctic .c an: thus are ROI 9 .. Polar tr ICrce the U . 19 The need for larger vessels on the Northeast Pas- sage has, in part, been reflected in recent Soviet ship- building efforts. Two containerized craft, to wit, con- structed in 1967 for the Archangel-Dudinka run, put to sea at 13,000 tdw.60 More of these large-packet freighters are slated to be developed for the Igarka timber trade,61 but naval architects have decided to reduce their size to 10,000 tdw.62 The latest conventional steamers added to the arctic fleet, however, have a capacity of 7,300 tdw, and thus are still far short of the "break even" weight for polar transports.63 Time and economics will eventually force the U.S.S.R. to design bigger boats for use on the Northern Sea Route, but such a development does not appear to be forthcoming in the next decade. Since about 1952 the land areas accessible to the Ob, Yenisey, and Lena rivers have been served primarily from the south rather than by the northern sea lane.64 60Polar Record, 15, No. 98 (May, 1971), 744. 613. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems Of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 9 (1966), 309-19. 62Polar Record, 15, No. 98 (May, 1971), 744. 63T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1967," Inter-Nord, No. 11 (1970), 123-24. 64Polar Record, 15, No. 94 (January, 1970), 51-52. S. S. Tsenin,#“QuestIOns of Development of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the U.S.S.R. and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 3 (1961), 137-58. ... 51ou L-‘ {1‘ ‘ ‘ - -;_ £ ...» ‘ Listen. ' J u 3 (T\ (A) ‘ IA” ‘ INN-.11 ‘.~ A 3\3 Nli1 .‘L ‘s Q 20 Less than 3 per cent of the freight destined for Yakutia, for example, goes via the polar passage.65 And the city of Dudinka, near the mouth of the Yenisey, receives only 36 per cent of its cargo by sea with the remainder coming downstream from mid-land points.66 These shipping patterns are due to the fact that it is economical to convey goods on the boreal water route only to coastal bases or near- . . 6 shore communities. 7 To carry materials to other ports in the arctic region, the U.S.S.R. relies heavily upon the services of a large river transport fleet. The craft assigned to the rivers of the Soviet arc- tic are cargo carriers Of 2,000 to 3,000 tdw and tugboats for towing barges along the interior waterways.68 Most of the fluvile transports are manufactured in western U.S.S.R., Eastern EurOpe,69 and Finland,70 although a few of the 6ST. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1963," Inter-Nord, No. 7 (1965), 288-96. 66Polar Record, 13, NO- 87 (September, 1967)' 67T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1963," Inter-Nord, No. 7 (1965), 288-96. 688. S. Tsenin, "Questions of Development of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 3 (1961), 137-58. 69Polar Record, 15, No. 95 (May, 1970), 195. 7OPolar Record, 11, NO. 75 (September, 1963), 720. ressels destine stricted at the fhsse freighter each year in t1" principal strea , . 73 . 3.1948, 13 a 4.. . 7 ‘- L-EI Fleets, “ 5:er T . J‘ I K‘- E p 21 Vassels destined for work on the Lena River system are con- structed at the Komsomolsk yards near the Pacific Ocean.71 Those freighters built in the west assemble at Archangel each year in the late summer and depart in convoy for the principal streams of the north.72 This journey, inaugurated 73 in 1948, is annually conducted by the Ministry of the River Fleets,74 and since its inception nearly 3,000 ships have made the trip to riparian stations in the polar regions.75 More and more in the Soviet Union articles produced in the interior of the country for consumption in the arc- tic are being hauled by rail to river terminals like Berezov, Abalakova, and Kirensk. At these and other tribu- tary anchorages the commodities are transferred to riparian watercraft for movement to points of consignment in the north. The main incentives for sending freight to polar ports by river instead of by sea are a significant savings 71T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57-65. 72Polar Record, 10, No. 68 (May, 1961), 516. 73Polar Record, 12, NO. 81 (September, 1965), 742-43. 74S. S. Tsenin, "Questions of DevelOpment of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 3 (1961), 137-58. 75Polar Record, 11, No. 75 (September, 1963), 720. 22 in time and money. As an illustration, the costs of for- warding materials from Moscow to Tiksi are about equal by the marine or the rail/river arteries. However, the capital investment in the former route exceeds that of composite shipping by a factor of 3 to 2.76 Thus, attention to efficiency by national planners would dictate the use, whenever possible, of the riverine transport network for conveying goods to boreal stations. The second condition favoring composite shipping, that of faster service, can amount to a savings of up to six months over the time required to move materials via the Northern Sea Route. In Siberia, particularly, it Often takes anywhere from 12 to 18 months for goods from EurOpean U.S.S.R. to reach interior ports in the Lena, Yana, Indi- girka, or Kolyma river basins when transported on the arctic maritime highway. But only 6 to 12 months are re- quired for freight to reach the same points when shipped 77 This by the Trans-Siberial Railroad and river-craft. difference is primarily attributable to the fact that ma- rine navigation begins about one month later than that on the Lena, and sometimes ends more than two weeks after ice 76T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1963," Inter-Nord, NO. 7 (1965), 288-96. S. S. Tsenin, "Questions Of Development of the Economy and TranSport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 3 (1961), 137-58. 77T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1963," Inter-Nord, NO. 7 (1965), 288-96. L'IR'I- has closed the transportation ocean, but an} coastal bases transit for ti". ======:==:;=:::fi Dar .u Cent Of * t .3; a1 freigh enables Per to Shigged Urey-o'er w.....s enroute 0 port “C“- T. r: IrItfav \ DESplt “~IRP Wild not be I R EHJCEd On I: Q ‘ 2‘ c iresh-wa‘ yir ., 0T3R9r1t55' ‘t 4H 23 has closed the river. Therefore, not only is fresh-water transportation as much as one month longer than that in the ocean, but any seaborne cargo for inland points reaching coastal bases late in the season will likely be stored in transit for the winter (see Table 1).78 TABLE 1 Freight Shipments to Nizhne-Yansk Via Kirensk Via Murmansk Via Vladivostok Per cent of total freight 93 3.5 3.5 Roubles per ton shipped 163 132 157 Months enroute to port 6-12 12-18 12-18 Source: T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1963," Inter-Nord, No. 7 (1965), 288-96. DesPite the superiority of composite shipping over direct transport in much of the high-latitude region, it should not be concluded that maritime activities have been reduced on the Northeast Passage. To the contrary, with many fresh-water craft capable of Operating in marine en- vironments, the coastal areas of the polar seas are alive with lighters, barges, and shallow-draft boats ferrying 788. S. Tsenin, "Questions of Development of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 3 (1961), 137-58. ' .2. I. a f: s "'13" ~¢i~~ I‘M l 7. . ” Zur- 7“ I‘C I‘- a x U \ 24 supplies to ports along the shores and major tributaries.7 Indeed, on the eastern wing of the arctic nautical highway over 90 per cent of the lading is moved to its destination by elements of the river transportation fleet.80 It has been estimated that, altogether, these vessels carry be- tween six and eight million tons of freight on the boreal 81 sea lane each year. An example of the commodities in- volved in this commerce are exhibited in Table 2. TABLE 2 Materials Shipped to East-Siberian Ports, 1960-1965 (in percentages) .- _...——. ___.._—- Coal Oil Lumber General Cargo Pevek 66.6 7.2 16.7 9.5 Nizhne-Yansk 31.7 14.8 37.0 16.5 Source: S. S. Tsenin, "Questions of Development of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 3 (1961), 137-58. 79Polar Record, 8, NO. 56 (May, 1957), 454-55. 808. S. Tsenin, "Questions of DevelOpment of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 3 (1961), 137-58. 81P. Massajoli, "The Soviet Arctic Maritime Route," Universo, 45, NO. 5 (1965), 855-74. r-3 all of ne ' & river-boa - Eu J ean-: nevi. base Let‘s—rs. B. In. ' \ rV“ ~‘eq..q + C :59“, “‘s Car} \ k.“ F. «a! \‘.c C . 0‘ 9’3: 25 The impression should not be held, however, that all of the traffic on the boreal main will soon consist of river-boats shuttling freight. The Soviet railroad net- work, particularly the Trans-Siberian, is already Operating near capacity and is incapable of significantly increasing the flow of goods to trans-shipment points along the major northern streams. The inability of the railway system to handle a greater load means that substantial quantities of goods will continue to move to their points of consignment in ocean-going vessels. There are some commodities, too, which because of their bulk or great weight, cannot be moved by train or tug and must be carried in deep-draft steamers.82 But, ironically, the most important condition in- suring the continued vitality of marine vessels on the high- latitude maritime highway (aside from strategic considera- tions) is that of economics. Despite the fact that the boreal passage is at a competitive disadvantage with fresh- water craft over much of its length, there are still some sectors of the Soviet north that can only be efficiently served by pelagic transportation. For instance, the lift- ing of goods on the arctic sea lane from Leningrad to Anadyr and Provideniya Bay amounts to one-third the cost of that 828. S. Tsenin, "Questions of DevelOpment of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 3 (1961), 137-58. . a.-. 2n f . n I. uh.- C ya“. vafi f”.- 5‘4 \I‘ JO ]‘ a “L L. 26 by rail and water routes.83 Such an expense differential illustrates that though composite traffic may vie with deep-water carriers along much of the polar channel, their rivalry will not exclude ocean shipping from part of the arctic trade. Though the combined use of direct and composite shipping has done much to rationalize Operations on the Northeast Passage, a great deal of inefficiency still exists. Because of the preponderance of incoming supplies over outgoing freight along the sea lane, many craft traveling the arctic channel are empty half of the time.84 Vessels bound for Igarka, for instance, to load with packets of timber, usually come in ballast. And barges bringing lumber downstream to Igarka from interior saw- mills commonly return to their ports unfilled.85 Even the fluvile tran3ports in convoy to Siberian rivers from their points Of fabrication did not carry cargo enroute until 1966.86 83V. Moyev, "The Great Northern," Soviet Union, No. 119 (1960), 16-20. 84S. S. Tsenin, "Questions of Development of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast Of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 3 (1961), 137-58. 851. L. Freiden, "Problems of DevelOpment Of Shipping on the Kara Sea Through the Straits of Novaya Zemlya," Problems Of the North, NO. 3 (1961), 129-36. 86Polar Record, 13, NO. 87 (September, 1967), 790-91. 27 This uneconomical use of the northern merchant marine has seriously reduced the effectiveness of trans- portation in the polar regions of the U.S.S.R. Fortu- nately, dissatisfaction with this state of affairs has finally reached Soviet officials, and one can expect to see such wasteful practices diminish in the near future. Plans have already been develOped to fill the holds of east-bound vessels with cyanite and apatite concentrate at the port of Murmansk. These raw materials will then be unloaded at prOposed aluminum and fertilizer plants on the lower reaches of the Yenisey before the ships take on lumber at Igarka. River craft that have brought down tim- ber from the Abalakova district, and which have not filled with metal exports from Noril'sk,87 will then carry the products manufactured from the minerals upstream to the railroad for transfer to other parts of the country.88 Another concept for improving the performance of arctic navigation calls for transports returning from Eastern Siberia to load with Lena larch at Tiksi. This wood is in great demand for hydraulic construction projects, and is assured of finding a ready market either at home or 87T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1963," Inter-Nord, NO. 7 (1965), 288-96. 88B. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems Of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. vu! . on t ...E I!! i.&& an 5 an VA; 2. :u ... . a: G. A‘u AV fl» n: A...” Vela“ a...» " fiv- "V-os 3"" 28 abroad.89 These, and other recommendations, if acted upon, will not bring an end to inefficient shipping procedures on the Northern Sea Route, but they will do much to correct a problem long neglected in Soviet arctic navigation. The development of port facilities has generally failed to keep pace with other improvements along the polar sea lane,90 and the sub-standard conditions of many north- ern depots stands out as one of the major problems retard- 91 ing commerce in the Soviet arctic. With an abbreviated navigation season it is necessary for high-latitude sta- tions to handle as much cargo as possible during the few 92 months they are accessible. But inadequate terminal accommodations Often prevent the rapid transfer Of goods from ship to shore, causing delays that amount to nearly one week's Operational time for every craft on the boreal 93 transportation network. Indeed, the congestion is so bad 89Ibid. 90Ibid. 916. I. Granik, "The Transport System of Northern Yakutia and The Basic Problems of Its Development," Problems of the North, No. 3 (1961), 159-62. 923. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. 93Bernard Kassell, "Soviet LOgistics in the Arctic,’ Proceedin s [U.S. Naval Institute], 85 (February, 1959), 89-95. G. I. Granik, "The Transport System of Northern Yakutia and The Basic Problems of Its Development," Problems Of the North, No. 3 (1961), 159-62. I: $37: 2 u 1fif~ ‘chtu ~Alna «we‘- 4 w ha y alum — HP5 ’1 be. 5“ V t t RAM Hy“. a. E :4 fig. 29 at some bases that vessels have had to return unloaded to their original port of embarkation.94 One of the reasons for such gross inefficiency along some boreal waterfronts is a lack of organization. A good deal of time is lost by ships waiting for berths, goods, or tug support at their polar destinations.95 Some of these problems are attributable to the manpower shortage that plagues the Soviet north, but more often cargo car- riers are laying idle at arctic piers because of poorly systemitized freight reception. The want of mechanized wharfage is anOther factor contributing to the slow turn-over at some high-latitude depots. A dearth of stowing and unloading equipment invar- iably means that craft spend additional hours filling and emptying their holds, tying up quay facilities.96 Also, as Table 3 illustrates, many landings along the Siberian coast are incapable of handling most ocean-going vessels. Conse- quently, lighters must frequently be used to convey 94Bernard Kassell, "Soviet Logistics in the Arctic," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 85 (February, 1959), 89-95. 95Ibid. 963. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 9 (1966), 309-19. V 1"?"qu u. “I, ‘- .V \ -.-. .... C 4 a E E . rm... .... A a. v . D. n c . i C. u. n. .2 ..d 3. a .nq ...i a. v. um Aw ..I‘ 9 s a 2% «a. D. fin. RD s pvt H» mun --..Iw. 30 TABLE 3 Accessibility of Ports Along the Northern Sea Route Station Governing Depth of Water Amderma 30 foot anchorage Dickson 23 feet alongside Dudinka 24 to 40 feet alongside Igarka 40 to 43 feet alongside Nordvik 18 to 48 foot anchorage Tiksi 20 feet alongside, 26 foot anchorage Ambarchik 30 to 36 foot anchorage Pevek 28 feet alongside, 36 to 60 foot anchorage Provideniya Bay 36 feet alongside Anadyr 21 to 60 foot anchorage Source: John Sater, The Arctic Basin (Washington, D.C.: Arctic Institute of North America, 1963), pp. 226-67. supplies from anchored ships to the shore,97 and in some places the discharge of commodities must even be done by cable.98 There are a number of corrective steps that will help to solve the problems troubling the bases along the Northern Sea Route. Many improvements, like the deepening of moorings, the installation of waterside hoists, and the 97Polar Record, 14, No. 90 (September, 1968), 332-33. 98B. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. 31 enlargement of dock facilities, are already underway in most cases. But one of the most intriguing remedies being considered to promote the effectiveness of arctic depots is the installation of aerating devices to free the harbors of ice. The constant discharge of gas bubbles into the lower levels of the sea will help to circulate the warmer waters from below and keep the northern ports open in winter. By remaining accessible the year around to es- corted maritime vessels, Soviet polar stations could reduce their seasonal overcrowding, ease the tempo of work, and promote the formation of a permanent labor force. These innovations cannot be expected to appear at the more re- mote boreal havens, but such shipping aids will probably be installed soon at the principal terminals like Dudinka, Igarka, and Archangel.99 99Ibid. CHAPTER IV ICEBREAKERS ON THE NORTHEAST PASSAGE The U.S.S.R. has the largest and most modern ice- breaker fleet in the world. At least 24 ice-crushing ships are known to be Operating in the country's northern waters, two-thirds of which have been built since 1960. At least a quarter of the Soviet Union's icebreakers exceed 21,000 horsepower, and one, the Lenin, has an energy rating over twice as high (see Table 4). By contrast, the greatest icebreaker operating in the United States is the 21,000 horsepower Glacier, and nearly all of the American ice- breaker fleet predates that of the Russians.100 The immense size Of the Soviet icebreaker squadron is not only attributable to the needs of the Northern Sea Route, but also to the fact that the ships must operate throughout the year. During the summer all available escorts are needed to guide vessels along the polar pas- sage. But during the winter months intensive icebreaker 100James Guill, "The Lenin and the Soviet Grant Design for the Arctic," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 84 (July, 1958), 89-93. 32 33 TABLE 4 Soviet Icebreakers Operating on the Northern Sea Route in 1970 _— .---____..____..___._ - ._—_.... ... fl.- — i—_._—._ .. “WW—--- -~w#._ “-mfi - -.— w— --‘_——— w... —. ..——. — —————.—.“ _.—. ._ .-.— Shi Country of Year p Construction Entered Horsepower SerV1ce Krasin England 1917 10,000 Sibir U.S.S.R. 1938 10,000 Admiral Makarov U.S.S.R. 1941 10,000 Admiral Lazarev U.S.S.R. 1941 10,000 Kapitan Belousov Finland 1954 9.750 Kapitan Voronin Finland 1955 9.750 Kapitan Melekhov Finland 1956 9.750 Lenin U.S.S.R. 1959 44,000 Moskva Finland 1960 22,000 Leningrad Finland 1961 22,000 Vasiliy Pronehishehev U.S.S.R. 1962 5,400 Afanasiy Nikitin U.S.S.R. 1962 5,400 Khariton Laptev U.S.S.R. 1962 5,400 Vasiliy Poyarkov U.S.S.R. 1963 5,400 Yerofey Khabarov U.S.S.R. 1964 5,400 Ivan Kruzenshtern U.S.S.R. 1964 5,400 Vladimir Rusanov U.S.S.R. 1964 5,400 Semen Chelyuskin U.S.S.R. 1965 5,400 Yuriy Lisyanskiy U.S.S.R. 1966 5,400 Kiyev Finland 1966 26,000 Georgiy Sedov U.S.S.R. 1967 5,400 Murmansk Finland 1968 22,000 Kapitan Markov U.S.S.R. 1968 13,600 Vladivostok Finland 1969 22,000 Sources: Various issues of Inter-Nord and Polar Record. 34 assistance is also required to keep open ports like Lenin- grad and Archangel. In order to insure that this support service is not interrupted, the U.S.S.R. must have suffi- cient icebreakers to replace vessels in need of maintenance or repairs.101 Most of the large Soviet icebreakers have a draft of over 8 meters. As the maximum depth of many nearshore areas along the Northeast Passage is only 6 meters, the most powerful escort craft are obviously required to sail at a considerable distance from land.102 To work in the shallower zones Of the Arctic Ocean, the U.S.S.R. has re- cently built 10 small icebreakers of 5,400 horsepower. In addition to aiding coastal shipping in the summer, some of these vessels are wintered in Siberian ports to give the Lena River traffic earlier access to seaside communi- ties.103 Though their present icebreaker fleet is by far the most substantial and advanced in the world, the Soviets plan to make some rather impressive additions soon. Three more diesel icebreakers, each producing 36,000 horsepower, 101T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance Of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57-65. 1028. S. Tsenin, "Questions of Development of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 3 (1961), 137-58. 103Polar Record, 15, NO. 94 (January, 1970), 51—52. have been orde, Tinland, for c plated one yea , pun) ...c.ear icebre leh@, are CI ~19?ng Cdpab; But Veg if the s v u Orvlets .ne Northeast 2 in . - tResting to in H. g ...e develo “I". H‘ r (I) relatively SH: .513 handic Eticq ~ ‘ t'IIO‘wv‘» Ha‘ «e: . ‘th llmitat 'atEr 35 have been ordered from the Wartsila yards at Helsinki, Finland, for delivery by 1976.104 Scheduled to be com- pleted one year earlier at Leningrad are two additional nuclear icebreakers of the new Arktika class, capable of 105 These tremendous ice- generating 88,000 horsepower. crushing ships, designed to run five years without re- fueling, are certain to have a profound impact on the shipping capabilities of the Northern Sea Route. But vessels of even greater size will be required if the Soviets are to realize their highest ambitions for the Northeast Passage. With this fact in mind, it is interesting to note that the Wartsila-Koncernen is study- ing the develOpment of a 140,000 horsepower icebreaker.106 Such a large ship would have difficulty negotiating the relatively shallow waters of the Northern Sea Route, and this handicap has prompted some observers to predict that plans for the craft owe their origin to the needs of navi- gation through the Canadian archipelago. However, the depth limitations imposed on boats sailing the near-shore waters of the Soviet arctic would not apply to vessels Operating farther out in the polar seas. Since both the eastern and western sectors of the Northeast Passage have 104Polar Record, 15, No. 98 (May, 1971), 744. 105polar Times, No. 70 (June, 1970), 15. 106T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route, 1968- 70," Inter-Nord, NO. 12 (1971). orcbal b A.‘ar Vapor..- .n.. n“ <4 . . 1 Ru '2 .n we. 4L 5 E 2.. a. u... C. I. are c . D. a Z a c «.1 w. .1 .1 .... .... 3 C d ...» M“ We” at.“ .8 THE 1‘“ RF: I. \ 36 marked channels beyond the restricted coastal zones, it is probable that the gigantic icebreaker is being designed for use on the boreal maritime channel. Most icebreakers of the U.S.S.R., like those of other nations, proceed by running over impeding ice, crushing it with their own weight. But some of the more recent additions to the Soviet icebreaker fleet are power- ful ships with Special reinforced hulls that can cut straight through the polar ice.107 At times, though, con- ditions in the Arctic Ocean become too severe for either kind of icebreaker to Operate satisfactorily, and when this happens other techniques must be employed to clear a chan- nel. Toward this end the Soviets have frequently used bombs to fracture the ice in particularly troublesome areas of the Northern Sea Route.108 Other ice-breaking devices, applied mainly on an experimental basis, have been hot- 109 110 water hydraulic jets and resonance vibrators. The latest method of ice-breaking to be tested on the Northeast 107T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57-65. 1oapolar Record, 12, No. 81 (September, 1965), 742-43. 109T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1965," Inter-Nord, No. 9 (1967), 203-206. 110B. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 9 (1966), 309-19. 553‘. 3‘ ve- u. '3 6 —\~ n. a .C . r. v C. a r G» I. Pu. :4 ..." 3 3 a. Q r“ 37 Passage involves conveyor belts that remove the ice from ahead of a moving ship.111 In other studies, attempts have been made to pre- vent the build-up of thick ice masses that might immobilize shipping in certain sections of the Northern Sea Route. The sprinkling of coal dust on the surface of the ice pack has been shown to increase melting and permit navigation to resume earlier.112 In a few cases selected harbors in the western sector of the arctic seaway have been kept open by the use of discharge water from industrial plants or air bubbles from large compressors.113 The effects of aerators have been most impressive, and it can be ex- pected that more units will be installed in the future to keep major ports free Of ice. The ice that obstructs the Northeast Passage is primarily that formed during a single winter season, and thus seldom exceeds a thickness of more than two meters.114 Such a blanket of ice, though capable of being smashed by escort ships, could present a formidable obstacle to polar 111Polar Record, 15, No. 98 (May, 1971), 744. 112Polar Record, 10, NO. 68 (May, 1961), 516. 113B. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 9 (1966), 309-19. 114T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1964," Inter-Nord, No. 8 (1966), 215-18. IQ” IIfiuc H T ..a 3» . SEC ‘ EH.- 4 v- .4 ear; “ a éeoih '.. go”? h b 38 navigation if it remained in place. Fortunately, off- shore winds in late spring often create a thin, but lengthy, strip of Open water through much Of the sea ice on the northern maritime route.115 This ice-free zone usually extends out to about the six-meter isobath, and can be traced along most of the arctic coast.116 Freighter caravans, especially to the Laptev and East Siberian seas, usually take advantage of this lead and make early expedi- tions to marine ports at minimum risk. It would seem logical to expect that after Open water appears on the Northern Sea Route, sailing conditions would improve as the ice continues to melt. This, as Table 5 indicates, is the opposite of what really happens, for navigation actually becomes more difficult as the shipping season progresses. This seeming paradox is explained by the fact that as the polar seas begin to thaw and break up, pack ice drifts into the Open shallow waters and blocks the coastal 117 shipping lane. Other obstacles that soon appear in the 115V. N. Kupetskiy, "Shipping Conditions in the Eastern Arctic in 1967," Geograficheskoe Obshchestvo SSSR, No. 1 (January-February, 1970), 66-68. 1168. S. Tsenin, "Questions of Development of the Economy and Transport Facilities in the Northeast of the USSR and the Role Of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, NO. 3 (1961), 137-58. 117V. N. Kupetskiy, "Shipping Conditions in the Eastern Arctic in 1967," Geograficheskoe Obshchestvo SSSR, NO. 1 (January-February, I970), 66-68. f‘. AWY1 LVAI v I u—h b“:-i~ ‘..‘ ‘1 2 3 4 :14 6 . v- ‘9)- u y ..C '1 fl (‘7‘. PF .V nae 39 TABLE 5 Caravans to Pevek in 1966 Number of Convoy Dates of Hours in pistance .Speed Number Expedition Movement (in miles) (in knots) 1 June 26-28 41 345 8.4 2 July 3-4 45 350 3 July 8—9 45 350 4 July 12—15 68 395 5 July 16-20 100 340 6 July 17-22 97 355 3.6 Source: V. N. Kupetskiy, "Shipping Conditions in the Eastern Arctic in 1967," Geograficheskoe Obsh- chestvo SSSR, No. 1 (January-FeEruary, 18705, €8;€8. passage-way are glacier masses from Severnaya Zemlya that move with northwest winds into the ice-free areas.118 Such onshore breezes also carry heavy ice from the Arctic Ocean into the lead zone, further choking the once-clear channel.119 These factors all serve to impede ship move— ments on the Northern Sea Route, and thus account for the progressively slower convoy speeds in the Soviet arctic. In the past ten years the average escort time re— quired for each vessel on the Northern Sea Route has 118T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1964," Inter-Nord, No. 8 (1966), 215-18. 119T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1965," Inter-Nord, No. 9 (1967), 203-206. 40 dropped from 2.2 to nearly 1.5 support days.120 With operational costs for an icebreaker running over $6,000 per day, this decrease represents a significant cut in expenditures.121 Such a substantial reduction in the number of hours spent shepherding freighters is primarily attributable to the larger icebreakers that have joined the arctic fleet during the interim decade. Prior to the arrival of the great ice-crushing ships, the common method of navigation was to force winding channels along the easiest path. With the arrival of the 22,000 horsepower series and the atomic-fueled £3232, it became possible to cut straight courses through the ice for faster convoy movement.122 As an example of the improved efficiency of the Soviet ice-breaking argosy, the Eenin_can maintain a speed 123 of 10 knots through ice over one meter thick. It can apparently proceed "without serious difficulty" through 1203. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. 12lPolar Times, No. 54 (June, 1962), 27. 1223. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. 123Polar Times, No. 58 (June, 1964), 27. 1 n 138 - . ‘V‘ a .9 . A: v... 2m a. A: 2.. ins Y1 n u TM .3 . a .31.. In” v . a A: ‘ ~ at he Ah. .H c Q Kw. 41 ice two meters thick,124 twice as massive.125 A ship with such capabilities would and negotiate old sea ice nearly obviously be in much demand on the frozen Northeast Pas- sage, requiring it to maintain almost constant support service. The Egginfs nuclear fission reactor, in need of refueling every two years,126 enables it to fulfill the needs of transarctic shipping by providing the boat with maximum range and endurance. The Egginfs long Operational capacity contrasts sharply with that of the diesel-powered icebreakers. Conventionally-prOpelled escort craft need refueling once a month,127 a requirement which takes 10 per cent of their working time and places a great deal of strain on the arctic-bunkering facilities.128 Consequently, a "large percentage" of the traffic along the Northeast Passage is engaged in tranSporting petroleum supplies to way stations 1241‘. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1964," Inter-Nord, No. 8 (1966), 215-18. 125"Smashing Through the Ice," Soviet Life, No. 4 (April, 1966), 38. 126Polar Times, No. 70 (June, 1970), 15. 127James Guill, "The Lenin and the Soviet Grand Design for the Arctic," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 84 (July, 1958), 89-93. 128P. Massajoli, "The Soviet Arctic Maritime Route," Universo, 45, No. 5 (1965), 855-74. along the of fossil route by Port craf ern Sea R the [£89 0 42 along the frigid Asian coast.129 This substantial import of fossil fuel for icebreakers and transports seriously subtracts from the shipping potential of the polar sea route by appropriating large numbers of tankers and sup- port craft. To solve the fuel supply problem along the North- ern Sea Route, one might expect the U.S.S.R. to emphasize the use of more atomic energy in its icebreakers and re- inforced freighters. But Soviet experiences with reactor engines in the Lenin have been far from satisfactory, and seem to have discouraged them from constructing a nuclear- powered fleet.130 Instead, it appears that the Russians will try to alleviate the poor bunkering situation along the polar passage by building fuel pipelines to the arctic coast from fields nearby and farther south. Oil and gas reserves are being "extensively developed" in the lower Ob region,131 for instance, and other large deposits have already been tapped in the areas south of Murmansk.132 At 129James Guill, "The Lenin and the Soviet Grand Design for the Arctic," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 84 (July, 1958), 89-93. 13oPolar Record, 15, No. 95 (May, 1970), 195. Polar Record, 15, No._98 (May, 1971), 744. T. E. Arm- strong,flThe Northern Sea Route, 1968-70," Inter-Nord, NO. 12 (1971). 131Polar Record, 13, NO- 87 (September, 1967)’ 790-91. 132P. Massajoli, "The Soviet Arctic Maritime Route," Universo, 45, No. 5 (1965), 855-74. :9 221:..." least 0:. to be uncle In the eas that ripai 332"?) fuel tasse on m“Ell. if r ‘ “042‘ 8r 3 43 least one conduit for carrying petroleum products is known to be under construction to a terminal near Noril'sk.133 In the eastern section of the northern seaway, it is likely that riparian tankers will be increasingly relied upon to move fuel supplies to regional marine ports. If the sailors on the Lenin are characteristic of those on other icebreakers, then the arctic mariner is well— off even by American standards. Judging from the personnel manning the flagship of the polar fleet, about 85 per cent of the bluejackets serving on the Northern Sea Route are under 30 years of age. Their salaries range from $222 per month for a regular seaman to $777 for a ship captain,134 with each crew working only six months out of the year.135 Such generous benefits are designed to compensate for the harsh working environment along the Northeast Passage, but even these incentives have failed to hold seafarers to their jobs. A high rate of labor turn-over has perenially troubled arctic maritime operations because ship and shore specialists are unwilling to remain long in such an in- hospitable climate. This manpower instability can be ex- pected to continue in the north until the Soviet government 133Polar Record, 15, No. 94 (January, 1970), 51—52. l34poiar Times, No. 54 (June, 1962), 27. 135Polar Times, No. 58 (June, 1964), 27. can provid able as t‘: 01 an the po -‘ ‘ q “ ‘Se cnanos \) {a (L booby :0 saili: 51312.1(: 0 We”Drier: l965,~ . :.C$. wIsle, '4' “v- ~ ~V*tner 33 (1" ‘ ‘b ‘=E3 n I \\ 44 can provide working and living conditions there as agree- able as those in any other area of the country.136 One of the major difficulties confronting vessels on the polar sea route is that of severe environment.137 The channel is frequently buffeted by sudden and vicious winds, blanketed with heavy fog, bitten by low temperatures, and booby-trapped with packs of ice. To reduce the hazards to sailing posed by such an adverse climate, the U.S.S.R. supports a broad network of weather stations, buoys, and other nautical aids along the length of the boreal pas- sage.138 Well over 100 observation positions have been established139 on the coasts, islands, and ice floes of the Arctic Ocean to gather information about atmospheric phenomena, note marine conditions and give routing instruc- 140 tions. At least twenty-five of these radicrmeteorological 136T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1965," Inter-Nord, No. 9 (1967), 203-206. 137Bernard Kassell, "Soviet Logistics in the Arctic," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 85 (February, 1959), 89-95. 138T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedin s [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57-65. 139T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1963," Inter-Nord, No. 7 (1965), 288-96. 140T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57-65. in sites are pe fixing the s :mitoring d these outpos figh-latitut has done mu: - ‘1 ..01' J1 . :du faCSi'fi 'ESSels 1‘; 45 sites are permanently staffed,141 others are manned only during the shipping season,142 and many are automatic monitoring devices adrift on the sea or ice.143 Together, these outposts collect a large quantity of data useful to high-latitude science and navigation, and their maintenance has done much to promote maritime activities in the Soviet north. Aeronautical reconnaissance is an important adjunct to the boreal meteorological Operations. HelicoPter sup- port from ship- and shore—based units is frequently em- ployed to help guide convoys through difficult areas of the high-latitude icefields.l44 The assisting aircraft are equipped with transmitters for relaying television pictures and facsimile maps of channel conditions to the escort vessels,145 enabling them to quickly find the easiest path through the glacial seas. 141Bernard Kassell, "Soviet Logistics in the Arctic," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 85 (February, 1959), 89-95. 142T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57-65. 143Polar Record, 11, No. 71 (May, 1962), 194-95. 144Polar Record, 11, No. 75 (September, 1963), 720. 145Polar Record, 9, No. 62 (May, 1959), 461. '-.: al.11- Fix U.S.S.R. o‘r. passage. f squadron 0 coverage 0 wing flies miles long time hiCh'. (f) 46 Fixed—wing machines are also used to help the U.S.S.R. observe develOpments over the frozen arctic passage. The polar aviation division of Aeroflot, with a squadron of approximately 30 planes, provides comprehensive coverage of ice movements along the entire route.146 The wing flies daily a number of 8-hour sorties, each 1,500 miles long, that offer complete surveillance of the mari- time highway every week and a half during the navigation season.147 Since 1961148 the Soviet air force has expanded its remote sensing service to include, for forecasting purposes, a monthly inSpection of winter ice conditions throughout the Siberian coastal region.149 Since 1970 the U.S.S.R. has been using airborne "Toros" radar to scan ice situations along the boreal mari- time route. The surveys are flown at an altitude of 6,000 meters, and thus give practically a synoptic picture of navigation conditions at any one time in the high latitudes. Satellite photography, with a resolution of about 3 kilo- meters, is also becoming increasingly popular as a method 146T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedings [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), 57465. 147Polar Times, No. 58 (June, 1964), 28. 1488. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. 149Polar Times, No. 58 (June, 1964), 28. for examini little more ‘nrn V .idfietrer ' bé "St as t}: The Soviet reinforced be able tC the conti: 47 for examining the arctic ice pack. This technique can do little more than supplement the radar reconnaissance, however, because cloud and ng interference obscures much of the view from space.150 Ironically, these SOphisticated modes of monitoring the polar seas have been introduced just as the need for ice maps and forecasts is diminishing. The Soviet's modern icebreaker fleet, particularly when reinforced with the ships now under construction, will soon be able to operate under nearly any circumstances, making . . . . . 151 the continuous scrutiny of ice conditions unnecessary. 150T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route, 1968- 70," Inter-Nord, No. 12 (1971). 151T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1964," Inter-Nord, No. 8 (1966), 215-18. lations Was against in: Elsie;- the C 5 «'Or tn efi 3f the ar~ \— CHAPTER V FOREIGN USE OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE Late in 1965 the Soviet government introduced a series of laws designed to reduce inefficient activities on the national scene. The primary objective of the regu- lations was to make state agencies balance expenditures against income and show a profit in their Operations. Under the new management policy, icebreakers in the polar seas were required to function on a cost-accounting basis for the first time, as were many other services in support of the arctic transportation network. While such an emphasis on strict bookkeeping produced dividends in other sectors of the economy, the shipping season of 1966 con- vincingly proved that the Northeast Passage could not on its own be solvent and that other methods would have to be found to make the route a paying prOposition. To achieve financial responsibility, the ministry in charge of the seaway decided to try and earn foreign currency by charging other nations for the same assistance it provided its own marine fleet. With that goal in mind, the U.S.S.R. 48 rim 1— n— announced tl Ocean would The to the tint Passage we; 49 announced that in 1967 its water highway through the Arctic Ocean would be open to non—Communist vessels.152 The news that foreign shippers would have access to the Northern Sea Route for the first time in history was released in a brochure issued at the close of the 1966 season. The circular stated that charges for use of the passage would be based on the size of the vessel, its ice- worthiness, and the time of year.153 The rates to be assessed, set forth in the graph on the following page, paid for icebreaker and pilot services, weather reports, and navigation information. Fuel and provisions, not included in the fees, could presumably be procured from facilities along the length of the route.154 Though the sums to be levied on those sailing the Northeast Passage were not unduly high, no foreign shippers accepted the Soviet tender to travel the polar sea lane in 1967. Whether western maritime interests would eventually find the route attractive remained academic, for the offer 152In 1964 vessels from East EurOpean countries were allowed to use the boreal maritime route. T. E. Arm- strong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1966," Inter-Nord, No. 10 (1968), 200-203. 153poiar Record, 14, NO. 90 (September, 1968). 332-33. 154T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1966," Inter-Nord, No. 10 (1968), 200-203. ..u. wnjm, (v e no F‘— COM PAR 50 COMPARATIVE SHIPPING DISTANCES .. , .‘.;/fl'dl'dfl .- .‘ ' ' Ocean . ' o' mus_ Loo \' ‘ A ‘ ' - ‘s ' . inns: mm m “"---—----.\_-~‘;---' ’_ _ Louoou 3’3.” ' ' m7“. . . OSLO ms an a..." m, ..., CHARGES FOR ICEBREAKER all PILOT HELSINKI 4.0!? "" .__, SERVICES on NORTHERN SEA ROUTE " "" PAYABLE av NON-SOVIET saws no. samu- m. unencu- mm: mm 7°: . . z ‘ __ . . . . ..... t 8.0031!“ LONDON E s an : s.sss ml 1 °‘ " "’ OSLO : IO don : SJ“ MI HELSINKI : um. ° - " ~ ° - u at m . . . It.“ m m m 4000 m m 7000 w - sun E23 "0.11m." 3“ mg [:3 some? cuss ‘UL' - sows? cuss 'L" M ' E in. t a an" ..e e d-L Cf" u‘vA . , fifisv‘. ‘- d-aoi ‘ b1 .1. .3 “I“ C\ five 51 to use the waterway was withdrawn late that same year.155 Some experts have given a concern about military security as the reason for the U.S.S.R.'s sudden retraction of its navigation prOposal.156 But most observers agree that the invitation was rescinded at the insistence of Moscow's friend, Egypt.157 After the Arab/Israeli war in 1967, and the sub- sequent obstruction of the Suez Canal, the potential value of polar transportation increased immensely as an alterna- tive course between the Atlantic and Pacific. Realizing that the arctic seaway could become an important rival to the Suez system, and thus remove pressure on the inter- national community to resolve the Middle East conflict, Nassar imposed on the Soviet Union to close the Northeast Passage to foreign shipping lines. To insure that the interests of its Arab allies were not harmed, the U.S.S.R. declared the Northern Sea Route Off-limits to all alien vessels.158 Even before the closing of the Suez Canal, the most attractive feature of the Northern Sea Route was a 155Polar Record, 15, No. 94 (January, 1970), 51-52. 156T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route, 1968- 70," Inter-Nord, No. 12 (1971). 157Polar Record, 15, No. 94 (January, 1970), 51—52. 158T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route, 1968- 70," Inter-Nord, No. 12 (1971). n 4' pg: . A-— reduction ages. Th the U.S.S Northeast reproduce be gainec the pola: uSually . travel t 52 reduction of the sailing distance on long east/west voy- ages. This fact was set forth in the flyer released by the U.S.S.R. encouraging foreign shippers to use the Northeast Passage. Calculations by the Soviet authorities, reproduced on page 50, showed that up to two weeks could be gained on journeys from EurOpe to Asia by those taking the polar seaway.159 As Operating costs for a vessel are usually computed on a day-to-day basis, such a decrease in travel time could represent a substantial savings in money. Since it ostensibly made good business sense to send freight via the Northern Sea Route, it may seem strange that no foreign craft chose to sail the arctic course in 1967. The reason for their disinclination was that a number of complicating factors tended to offset the advantages shippers could gain by using the Soviet's boreal seaway. Though such drawbacks would not be as likely to restrain marine transports from using the Northeast Passage now that the Suez Canal has been closed, they are still important enough to strongly influence the economics of polar navigation. One of the major hindrances facing boats on the northern seaway is that of "dead time." It has been esti- mated that the hours lost or spent waiting on an average voyage through the boreal route would total the equivalent 159T. E. Armstrong, "The Northern Sea Route in 1966," Inter-Nord, No. 10 (1968), 200—203. Iv—I‘.—..u qr n of five ful gate the S< would have establishe about ten caravan's knots per fermation and ridir the Pola: 1685 to t' k it? Of that th period 53 of five full days.160 Foreign vessels wishing to navi- gate the Soviet's arctic marine course, for example, would have to anchor at Murmansk until a convoy could be established by their escorts. Once an expedition of about ten ships had been assembled and departed, the caravan's speed could average little better than five knots per hour161 due to the problems of maintaining formation, dodging ice hazards, penetrating heavy fog, and riding out storms.162 It has been determined that the polar channel must be navigable in twenty days or less to attract foreign shippers, and at the moment such timely passage cannot be assured by the U.S.S.R.163 Further reluctance by foreign interests to travel the Northeast Passage can be attributed to the irregular- ity of traffic on the arctic seaway. Aside from the fact that the navigation season is restricted to a four-month period (see graph on page 54), the unpredictable nature 16oA. Stromme Svendsen, "The Northern Trade Route and the Atlantic-Pacific Link," Contributions [Paris, Institute for Finno-Scandinavian Studies], No. 2 (1963), 55-58. 161T. J. LaForest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," Proceedin s [U.S. Naval Institute], 93 (December, 1967), - . 162A. Stromme Svendsen, "Trends in World Sea-borne Trade," Norwegian ShippingNews (June, 1967), 91-99. 163B. F. Shapalin, "Economic and Technological Problems of the Northern Sea Route," Problems of the North, No. 9 (1966), 309-19. 23: com 52:32 2: co {on or» B .888 9.33% 2: B 533 nl.rlr ulul-rl il- 54 £338,333335o8. 338.5.8.8.§8.8.u.82 1-, C _ ..wn ... in" 1+ . .... . . h .u... . ....- ...-w. . ....u... s . . . . . .I . .. .. .. .. . ..s .O «Amt... . um. .. $35.... . 3 .uuunmuuuunu... . . . . . . Anufimfixw as. n- u. - kw. u. . . . .. . ..- nnnnnnnnnnnn 600 : .. xu>Wt <¥¢ .0. Water Temperature 9 Fluctuations by Depth in Meters CENTIIETERS ’30 r w r «o r Average Annual Composmon of the m , Water Balance 20 ’ IO > INFLOW O ....SEDIMENT LOAD EVAPORATION "0 ’ OUTFLOW -20 . LAKE LEVEL -30 > -40 I '50 -w 1 1 l A J. I l 1 L !__A . ' Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug 509: Oct. my, Doc. From Sorkrslon and Rossolino A oscillations of approximately one meter, a direct conse- quence of this unstable delivery, are also well exhibited on the diagram. Precipitation received by the lake. perennially amounting to over 9 cubic kilometers, is bal- anced by evaporation according to the figures shown in Table 1.7 About 87 per cent of all the water entering Baikal exits through the Angara River at an average rate of 2,140 cubic meters per second.8 The regimen of this river, un- usually steady from the reservoir-compensating action of the lake, produces evenly-working cascades for hydro- electric stations downstream. This regular flow prompted the construction of a power-generating plant at Irkutsk in 1956, the erection of which raised Baikal's level two meters.9 The "water temperature" chart was prepared to demonstrate the thermal stability of Lake Baikal. Though fluctuating widely in its upper parts, the temperature of the inland sea remains constant at 4°C. below a depth of 200 meters. In addition to its vertical thermal differ— eences, the lake also experiences latitudinal variations. g 7N. T. Mirov, Geography of Russia (New York: VViley & Sons, 1959). 8Mikhail Kozhov, Lake Baikal and Its Life (Hague: W. Junk, 1963) . 9Current Digest of the Soviet Press. XIX NC). 48 (December, 1967), 6-8. TABLE la Water Supply in Baikal Sources of Supply Layer in m.m. Volume in k.m.3 Per cent Precipitation 294 9.26 13.2 Superficial Inflow 1834 57.77 82.4 Underground Inflow 99 3.12 4.4 Total Supply 2227 70.15 100.0 TABLE lb Water Loss in Baikal Means of Loss Layer in m.m. Volume in k.m.3 Per cent Outflow 1933 60.89 86.8 Evaporation 294 9.26 13.2 Total Losses 2227 70.15 100.0 TABLE 1c Area in Depth Zones of Baikal Depth in Meters Area in 100 hectares Per cent of Total Zero to 250 250 to Bottom Total Area 610 2550 3160 19.03 80.97 100.0 Source: Mikhail Kozhov, Lake Baikal and Its Life (Hague: W. Junk, 1963). Surface temperatures average 4.5°C. in the southern part of the basin as opposed to 3°C. in the north.10 Lake Baikal, though over a mile in depth, is well aerated throughout. Oxygen levels average 98 to 100 per cent of saturation in its upper horizons and over 75 to 80 per cent in the deepest zones, both values fluctuating with the intensity of biological consumption. The pre- vailing wind patterns over the lake induce a strong verti- cal circulation movement embracing the entire hydrospheric mass down to the bottom. These currents, directed off- shore in the surficial layers and shoreward at the lower levels, constantly stir and aerate the lake's water.11 Chemically, Baikal is an oligotrophic lake. The mineral content of the water is a scant 0.1 grams per liter, a figure 25 to 50 per cent less than that of average lacustrine bodies.12 Such a low level of dis- solved nutrients is mainly attributable to the unusual nature of Baikal's watershed area. Throughout much of the lake's basin bedrock, rather than soil, is the charac- teristic type surface. The fact that most of the ele- ments are locked up in stone, instead of easily-weathered 10EncycloPedia Britannica, II (1967), 1045-46. llKozhov, op. cit., footnote 8. 12Sennikov, op. cit., footnote 2, 17-20. unconsolidated material, means that fewer minerals reach Baikal than enter most other fresh-water seas.13 In addition to its uncommon chemical composition, the water of Lake Baikal is exceptionally clean and clear. For example, in early spring when visibility is at its best, a white object can be seen at depths of up to 40 meters. During the summer, however, the transparency of the lake sharply diminishes because of the development of plankton.14 The high quality Of the Balkalian hydrOSphere, said to be almost as pure as distilled water, is due to the fact that nearly 400 years are required to completely change the contents of the lake.15 This lengthy replace- ment period, attributable to the great reservoir capacity of the Baikal basin, primarily accounts for its distin- guishing characteristics.l6 But such an extended turn— over rate can be a detriment to the lake, for it also means that pollutants dumped into Baikal stay there an average of 400 years. This would allow contaminants to 13Marshall Goldman, "The Pollution of Lake Baikal," New Yorker (June 19, 1971), 58-66. 14Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, 17-20. 15New York Times, August 1, 1966, 2. 16Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, 17-20. accumulate in the water, with severe consequences for aquatic life.17 The climate of the Baikal region, approximating that of Edmonton, Canada, is continental with long, dry winters and short, relatively cool summers. Normal July temperatures around the inland sea reach 15 to 18°C., with the January mean falling between -12 to -15°C.18 This range, quite small for Siberia, is largely a product of the lake itself, for, in the words Of one enthusiastic writer, no fresh-water body "in the world so profoundly affects the weather of the surrounding terrain."19 The ability of Baikal to modify the weather, though indeed impressive, is mainly restricted to a limited zone adjoining its shores. Consequently, most climatic characteristics are fairly uniform throughout its basin.20 Rainfall, for instance, averages a meager 33 centimeters over most of the lake's domain,21 an amount nearly three times less than that received by many 17New York Times, July 2, 1967, Be. 18Philip Pryde, "The First Soviet National Park," National Parks Magazine, XLI, No. 235 (April, 1967), 20-23. 19Ferdinand Lane, The World's Great Lakes (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday and Company, 1948). 20Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, 17-20. 21Kozhov, Op. cit., footnote 8. 10 Black Sea resorts. As is often the case in areas of low rainfall, the weather near Baikal is predominantly sunny. Total insolation in the region averages 2,583 hours, af- fording the lake district fewer cloudy days and more sun heat than some parts of southern Ukraine.22 Because large lacustrine bodies are slow to change temperature, Baikal functions as a giant heat reservoir. Consequently, in summer the relatively warm and humid air above Baikal is chilled by the cold water below, con- densing to form a thin veil of mist that sometimes shrouds the lake for days on end.23 By late autumn, however, the hydrOSpheric temperature has become much greater than that of the atmospheric aloft. This thermal contrast some- times changes the area's prevailing westerly and north- westerly winds into gales of hurricane force that often uproot trees, tear Off roofs, and carry along big stones.24 The heat—sink effect of Siberia's aquatic levia- than is manifested in other ways too. Temperatures in Irkutsk, for instance, only 50 kilometers away, are not infrequently warmer or colder by 10°C. than those regis- 25 tered near the water. On account of this thermal 22Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, l7-20. 23Lane, op. cit., footnote l9. 24Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, l7-20. 25Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. ll stability, the warmest month around the lake is not July, as in the neighboring territory, but one month later.26 And though temperatures in the region often fall below freezing by September, the surface of Baikal does not re- flect the fact until well into winter.27 The freezing of Lake Baikal begins in late Novem- ber on the more sheltered areas of the coast, but the open water does not become "frost bound" before the mid- dle of December.28 Once frozen Baikal remains encrusted with a frigid mantle, except where the Upper Angara River flows into the lake or currents bring warmer water up- welling from the depths.29 The ice-blanket covering most of the lake attains a thickness of 70 to 113 centimeters, and as soon as it acquires sufficient strength, winter roads are built across the surface for trucks. These vehicles maintain the movement of many materials ordinarily conveyed by ships during the navigation season. This supplementary mode of transportation continues until around April, by 26Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, l7-20. 27Goldman, op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 28Mirov, op. cit., footnote 7. 29Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, l7-20. 12 which time the ice is too weak to safely support the tractors and their heavily-laden trailers.30 About the end of April, the break-up begins, and by May most of the ice has vanished, allowing maritime activities to replace vehicular traffic. Shipping is an important means of transportation on Lake Baikal and its tributaries. Watercraft, for example, ply the Barguzin and Selenga rivers carrying commodities upstream from Irkutsk. And for six months out of each year ocean-going steamers move cargoes of minerals, supplies, lumber, and fish from port to port along the lake's shores.31 Not all of the vessels on Baikal's waters are freighters, however. Some cater to a growing tourist trade, taking vacationers on regular five-day runs around the lake to see some newly-created nature areas. Parts of the Baikal area have recently been set aside as national parks. These public pleasuring grounds, now covering approximately 8,000 square kilometers of the lake's margins, are expected to triple in area soon. Al- though one reason for establishing the sanctuaries was to preserve the lands within their borders, tourism and recreation will undoubtedly be stressed. Camps, hotels, and hunting lodges are slated for construction to 3oIbid. 31Ibid. l3 TRANSPORTATION NETWORK -—~—-— RAILWAYS -~v~h-ROADS (Ust' ..... ......... .......... ........ ..... /’\.a/ l/ ’ Nizhniy (I I/ Angorsk 3 .»-""80rguzin l I I, \.~ ................ ....... .......... ................ ........... .......... ..... ....... mmm Minimal Land Use Moderate Land Use - Maximum Land Use Slate Preserves - National Parks LAND USE INTENSITY LAKE BAIKAL DRAINAGE BASIN . . . . u . _ . ........... ......... - s s . , o . . . . . . ... .... ...... ----- ...... ...... ..... ..... ...... ----- ..... ... ...... ...... ......... ........ .......... MONGOUA ; 1 I” L #00 “I. After Shipunov l4 accommodate the more than 500,000 visitors who are annually expected to enjoy the parks' attractions.32 A number of health resorts are also projected to be built. These spa-type facilities will be based upon the sulphur, radon, and carbon dioxide mineral wells that abound throughout the region. Such hot springs have been found to be suitable for a variety of healing purposes, and are Meccas even now for many Siberian citizens.33 Management of these retreats has been entrusted to a Special administrative body with jurisdiction over the parks, the lake, and the entire surrounding territory. Under the direction of this agency it is felt that the interests of the region and the Soviet people will best be served.34 The first known visitors to Baikal were Russian explorers who arrived in 1643. Their "discovery" and sub- sequent tales of the world's oldest lake generated an in- tense curiosity about its history and character that has continued to this day. Within the past few decades a good deal of the mystery surrounding this awesome lacustrine 32"Lake Baikal," Soviet Life (March, 1952): 28‘35° 33Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, 17-20. 34Pryde, Op. cit., footnote 18, 20-23. 15 colossus has been stripped away and much of its 25,000,000 year past revealed.35 Many of the new disclosures concern the organisms residing in Baikal. The flora and fauna inhabiting Siberia's inland sea make the water body a museum of existing fossils. Of the nearly 600 different plant and 1,200 distinct animal Species dwelling in the lake, more than 70 per cent are found nowhere else on earth. This aquatic life was considered to have such scientific in- terest that the Soviet Academy of Sciences established a special research station (now a limnological institute) on Baikal's shores in 1929. The sole purpose of the facility has been to study in detail the lake and its unique occupants.36 The work of the university has shown that many denizens of Baikal have inhabited the lake since the Mesozoic Era. Though there is still much conjecture as to how these various life forms reached their present home, it is theorized by some that they migrated upstream to Baikal along rivers that flowed into the Arctic Ocean. Others have postulated that over its long history, Baikal 35B. Galkina, "Glorious Lake Baikal," Culture and Life (1968), 46-47. 36Philip Micklin, "The Baikal Controversy: A Resource Use Conflict in the U.S.S.R.," Natural Resources Journal, VII (October, 1967), 485-98. 16 itself could have develOped and protected its living antiques.37 Whether of marine or fresh-water origin, the animal pOpulation of Baikal is genetically and ecologi- cally composed of two different faunal complexes. The one comprising the fewest species is the Euro-Siberian assemblage, whose elements are for the most part similar to those found in ordinary shallow lacustrine environ- ments. The more abundant population, called indigenous Baikalian, resides in all realms of the lake and repre- 38 sents an ancient biotic world. One of the exotic animals endemic to Baikal is the Nerpa, the only fresh-water seal in the world.39 Irrational hunting practices nearly wiped out this mam- mal a century ago, but through conservation efforts its 40 pOpulation has now reached 35,000. To stabilize the Nerpa's number near this level, 2,000 of the seals are allowed to be harvested annually.41 37Kozhov, Op. cit., footnote 8. 38Ibid. 39 Galkina, Op. cit., footnote 35, 46-47. 40New York Times, op. cit., footnote 15, 2. 41Galkina, op. cit., footnote 35, 46-47. l7 Baikal's most numerous fish in terms of biomass 42 is a scaleless fish, the Golomyankas. This curiosity gives birth just before death to living young, instead 43 About 34 per cent of the viviparous of producing eggs. creature's body weight is comprised of an oil rich in Vitamin A, which has been found to have valuable medic- inal prOperties.44 Because of their high fat content, quantities of these fish are caught each year and their 45 The lipids processed into drugs and lubricants. Golomyankas lives at depths below which sunlight can penetrate so it, like all other deep-dwelling fish in Baikal, is albino.46 Baikal is a bountiful storehouse of commercially- valuable fish, yielding 100,000 tons, or 35 per cent of Siberia's annual catch.47 This finned crOp, processed locally, consists primarily of perch, pike, sturgeon, trout, fresh-water salmon, and a unique anadromous 42Sennikov, op. cit., footnote 2, l7-20. 43New York Times, Op. cit., footnote 17, 8e. 44Galkina, op. cit., footnote 35, 46-47. 45Lane, Op. cit., footnote 19. 46New York Times, Op. cit., footnote 15, 2. 47New York Times, Op. cit., footnote 17, 8e. l8 grayling, the Omul.48 Many of the prized aquatic re- sources of the lake reproduce in the tributary rivers, most of which are now befouled with a variety of wastes and debris.49 As the roe and fry stages of most fish are particularly sensitive phases of develOpment, the contaminants in the breeding streams have had a pro- nounced effect on hydrobiologic life. The tainted - 1 Selenga, for example, is the spawning ground for nearly 50 .-n. 60 per cent of Baikal's Omul. Owing to the results of pollution in this waterway and poor harvesting tech- 5 niques, the catch of the tasty Whitefish has declined 55 per cent in the past twelve years.51 Those fish that leave the riparian nurseries and reach the lake have not escaped a defiled environment, however. As will be seen in greater detail later, the noxious effluents from coastal cellulose plants have seriously poisoned some parts of Siberia's inland sea. Apparently as a consequence of these emissions, some denizens of Baikal have been killed and people have been reported stricken by eating locally-captured fish.52 48Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, 17-20. 49New York Times, op. cit., footnote 17, 8e. soGoldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 51Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 52Mowat, op. cit., footnote 1. 19 Aside from suffering harmful effects from the toxic wastes of pulp mills, many creatures of the lake face danger from thermal pollution. An increase in water temperature, raised in the vicinity of factory discharge pipes, is seen likely to permit the invasion of predators heretofore kept out of Baikal by its frigidity. Such an occurrence will result in the anni- hilation of hundreds of organisms peculiar to the lake.53 Scientists at the limnological institute have also studied the geology of the lake. Some of their late discoveries show that Baikal's basin is a colossal continental trough plunging up to 10 kilometers below 54 Into this ancient abyss over the the earth's surface. centuries have washed tons of sediments from the ad- jacent lepes, accumulating in places to thicknesses of 6,000 meters.55 Towering nearly 4,000 meters above these alluvial deposits are the upper walls of the rift which the ages have dissected into a girdle of lofty 56 mountain peaks. The more than 1,500 meters of water 53New York Times, Op. cit., footnote 1?, 8e. 54Galkina, op. cit., footnote 35, 46-47. 55Yu. A. Zorin, The Deep Structure of the Lake Baikal Depression According to Geophysical Findings, translated by E. R. Hope (Ottawa: Defense Research Board of Canada, 1967). 56Ye. V. Pavlovski, The Problems of the Origin of the Lake Baikal Depression, translatediby E. R. Hope (Ottawa: Defense Research Board of Canada, 1967). 20 tzriapped within this graben, until a few million years ago, IEJJDWEd north to the Lena River. But tectonic activity in geologically-recent time raised the northern Siberian §>lxatform, causing Baikal's drainage to break through what .iss now the Angara Valley toward the Yenisei. Since then, <>rily tongues of cordilleran glaciers, products of the ice éaqye, have managed to have a significant physiographical .ianact on the lake. One of the geologists who studied the origin of the I3aiikal depression called the lake's basin a rich "treasure- llcause of major resources of great economic importance for 1:11e country."58 His assessment of the region's potential VVEIS not exaggerated, for the area does, indeed, possess a J—C3rng list of natural blessings. Fertile soils, particularly in the Selenga, Bar- EillJzin, and Upper Angara valleys, have permitted a modest (SJEEXIelOpment Of agricultural activities deep within Siberia. 35¥1-1:hough a variety of crOps are grown in the cultivated E331—c3ts, grains and vegetables--along with pastures for beef elr‘l-tidairy stock--are predominant in the farmers' fields.59 Trapping often supplements the income Of those who ‘tleILl the land, and the Baikal territory is well-known as ..‘___¥ 57Kozhov, Op. cit., footnote 8. 58Pavlovski, Op. cit., footnote 56. 59Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, l7-20. \Q‘ ’_‘ 21 21 tnildlife breeding and hunting zone. Paramount among the kinds of game common to the area is the Barguzin sable, a mammal which once gave the fur-treasures of the region svc1rld-wide fame. The weasel-like creature was nearly (easterminated in pre-revolutionary days, but under careful Inexnagement its numbers have grown significantly. Now the g earlimal, along with the squirrel and muskrat, again plays sari important role in the local economy.60 i The bounty of the region also includes a vast num- IDeer of commercially-valuable minerals. Placer gold, for :izastance, is obtained from the lake as well as from many C315 the valleys that descend into Baikal. Mica, too, is ifcrund in deposits of exploitable magnitude, and is exten- ESLiNJely mined near the town of Slyudyanka. Building stone 5—53 another profitable product of the district, with over a nuiiflllion tons of white marble, and undetermined quantities (Diff slate quarried each year.61 Other minerals found in the EBEizikal neighborhood, though not yet of economic signifi- cz‘Elrlce, are hard coal, graphite, cobalt, zinc,62 manganese, 'i-l?<>n ore, ceramic materials, and--beneath the lake's east ssh-<'.>re--oil.63 Given the factors of exceptionally clean .._~__p 60Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, 17—20. IQ 61Anatoli Filatov, "On Lake Baikal," Soviet Life, C3. 8 (August, 1970), 49-54. 62Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, 17—20. 63Pavlovski, op. cit., footnote 56. 22 water, good climate, and abundant resources, it is easy to see why the Soviet Union is beginning to develop Baikal's many potentials . At the moment, however, few of the enterprises in the Baikal basin are extractive industries; and those that are present an insignificant threat to the environment of the area. Most of the mills within the lake's watershed are businesses that use and process local biotic re- sources, and it is these facilities that pose the greatest menace to the future of Baikal. _ l7_9 Over the past few decades more than fifty factories have been built along the banks of the Selenga and its tributaries. Many of these establishments, based on exPloiting the region's plant and animal wealth, are dis- r‘lleting the delicate ecology of the province in their qUest for raw materials.65 Furthermore, of the numerous Sl‘iops operating in the Selenga drainage basin, only a ighteen have developed installations to purify their wa stes; and most of these works are reported to be in- chplete.66 Because of these insults to the local balance of nature, the rise of manufacturing in the vicinity of 64Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XX (Decem- ber, 1968), 24. 65Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 66Current Digest of the Soviet Press, op. cit., footnote 64,— 24 . 23 Baikal has had a deleterious effect on the lake and its surroundings. To properly judge the severity of this impact it is necessary to examine a few of the Offending industries in some detail. P“.Z.nmv I! I)?!“ , CHAPTER II THE PULP PLANTS In 1958 it was announced by the Ministry of Timber, Paper, and Woodworking that two pulp-manufacturing 67 jplants would be fabricated on the shores of Lake Baikal. 'Ihe factories were to be built at undeveloped sites along ‘the lake's southern margins, with each mill having its (own housing complex, a port for handlingllog rafts, and a sspur track from the Trans-Siberian Railway for shipping Eind receiving products. Both facilities, nearly identi- C=al.in capacity, were designed to process about 320,000 ‘txons of timber each year into 200,000 tons of high-quality E>L11p. One of the installations was designated to be Gilrected at the mouth of the Solzan River near a newly- IPILanned community called Baikalsk. The second cellulose <2Ombine was slated for construction on the Selenga River, 51 short distance upstream from the lake. Its associated \ 67Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 68New York Times, Op. cit., footnote 17, 8e. 24 25 city, also still in the blueprint stage, was a future town named Selenginsk.69 Surficially, the reasons for building the pulp plants on the shores of Lake Baikal seemed to rest on firm foundations. The Soviet Union required substantial quantities of "super, super cellulose" for manufacturing Ffi the cord used in aircraft and automobile tires.70 The country did not produce enough of this fiber to satisfy domestic requirements and was forced to buy the material from North American corporations at high prices. In the .interests of national security and economy, it was decided ‘that the U.S.S.R. should become self-sufficient in the {production of this pulp. The preparation of "super, super <2ellulose" for cord required an abundance of extremely czlean water, of which Baikal could supply unlimited Eirnounts. Furthermore, the best raw materials for the 115.gh-grade product, larch and pine, were species common Ileaar the lake but mostly absent at other potential sites. UPIIerefore, it appeared that Baikal was the best place to c3<>nstruct the two new pulp mills.71 A few scientists and writers, however, examining Illie situation in more detail, exposed some uncomfortable \ 69Micklin, op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 7oGoldman, op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 71Micklin, op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 26 weaknesses in this proposal. First, they noted that cel- lulose cord was rapidly losing its place to nylon, a syn- thetic fiber derived from oil. With the need for viscose pulp declining, they said it was foolish to build plants for making more of the material.72 As an example, the critics pointed out that factories manufacturing "super, _fi super cellulose" in Canada had all closed down from lack of demand for their produce.73 Secondly, the Opponents of the mills, seeking to loreserve Siberia's aquatic giant, observed that North ZNmerican installations did not have access to water com- ;parable to that in Baikal and yet they were quite capable (of producing high-quality cellulose. They suggested that 1:his same technology be used in the Soviet plants and tzhat the "ultra-pure water" of the lake be spared. The prOponents of the pulp combines quickly tried ‘t() check their antagonists. They denounced the pro- 1leestors as "reactionary sentimentalists" trying to ob- EStruct the progress of the Soviet State. And lest impugn- ing their adversaries' patriotism not be enough to sup- IPJTess them, the authorities responsible for planning the <2eellulose mills also resorted to threats. Some Of the 721bid. 73Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 74Ibid. 27 more prominent citizens who disapproved of the project were "told they would get into trouble if they did not keep quiet."75 Such intimidation by the pulp mills' proponents subdued most of the attacks upon their project while con- struction of the combines proceeded. They enjoyed this reprieve from Open criticism until the mid—sixties, when the Ministry of Timber, Paper, and Woodworking decided to change the objectives of the two Baikal plants. After the installations had been partially erected, it was an- rm 'I nounced that the Baikalsk complex would make ordinary paper in addition to "super, super cellulose." The need for high-quality viscose material had declined, the .Ministry observed, and the facility on the Solzan River Tfiould be partially converted to the manufacture of less- Irefined pulp products.76 Under the new proposals, the Selenga factory also EEXperienced a "qualitative metamorphosis." The directing government agency determined that the mill would not only E>rocess cellulose, as originally planned, but also heavy (Zardboard and rough paper. None of the new products Silated to be made at the Baikal pulp plants required the IJnusually pure water of the lake or the particular Species (bf trees in its basin. Facilities for turning out such Mm 75Mowat, op. cit., footnote 1. 76Goldman, op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 28 commodities could just as readily use water of normal standards and nearly any kind of wood.77 These changes in the purpose of the Baikal com- bines made it clear that both factories could have been built at practically any site in the country, and that their threat to the lake could have easily been averted. This knowledge once again galvanized opposition to the 'rfi pulp mills, but what had earlier been a few grumbles of protest became, in 1965, a growing thunder of public outrage.78 A broad Spectrum of Soviet citizens--writers, % artists, scientists, and workers--demanded that the plan- ners of the pulp mills acknowledge their mistakes, that 'the capital investment be written off, and that the 79 Iplants be prevented from ever operating. In addition tub insisting that the entire undertaking be scrapped, a rtumber of powerful conservation groups demanded that tihose responsible for the misconceived enterprise "be n‘lade to pay for their gross errors and oversights."80 flihe lack of reason in developing the nation's resources Idad been allowed to continue for too long, they said, x 77Micklin, Op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 78New York Times, op. cit., footnote 17, 8e. 79New York Times, June 13, 1966, 38. 8°New York Times, August 25, 1966, 36. 29 and the time had come to check such practices "in the most decisive fashion."81 In support of their case, the forces Opposing the Baikal pulp combines cited a long list of deceptive and incompetent acts on the part of the project's designers. For example, critics of the mills noted that at least one of the experts originally testifying in favor of the cel- lulose industries was actually a consultant for the Minis- 'try of Timber, Paper, and Woodworking receiving 100,000 :rubles a year. Furthermore, it was exposed that the bdinistry deliberately underestimated the building costs c>f the two installations by nearly 22,000,000 rubles (about a third of the true sum) in order to win approval for the plants . 82 It was also brought out by adversaries of the nniglls that Lake Baikal, particularly its southern and Gaéistern shores where the two pulp plants were located, is (Drle of the most active seismic areas on the globe. More t1“lanl,500 earthquakes are recorded in the region each EVEEar, some of which register nine or more on the Richter magnitude scale.83 Partially as a result of such powerful \ 81Sennikov, Op. cit., footnote 2, l7-20. 82Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 836. I. Reisner, Multi-disciplinary Research on iihe Baikal Rift Zone (Moscow: Vestfiik Akademy Nauk 53.8.S.R., 1966). 3O LAKE BAIKAL BASIN EARTHQUAKES 0 Epicenters of magnitude <6 0 Epicenters of magnitude >6 After Bu/masov 1’ ‘9 C) ‘2. 0 g“ Irkutsk '-a! 0 s \ =~ ' . . Q 'i~<--:: ... “eri‘s-l " :- s ' " . I. .‘ .. . ._.. ' o . \ O o O Dz/n'da H’— v"”— l’,iz” \uqu.‘ 0 so IOO l . A ¥I'nl. or; C C o (I _. 9f' . 0;.- s _ ..- 0.53.. 3" s. 's f.' ' .- h .,_.':w ’r/Sfo 6' ss- 0 a 9.. . 'l o C C I} Ulan Ude C, C O 0 ,9 fl e‘ 9 1 "’7e, 0 E>. q \"A Angola UPP° r0"° uda K"“°“ Chino, 31 tremors, the western shore of the lake has sunk nearly half a meter in the past ten years.84 Such severe shocks are also capable of destroying buildings, and the pulp-mills' Opponents showed that the Baikalsk plant was directly situated on the major fault running through the tectonically-unstable zone. The site chosen for the Selenginsk factory, while not so precar- ious, was observed to be only five meters away from the epicenter of a quake recorded just a few years before.85 The failure of Officials in the Ministry Of Timber, Paper, and Woodworking to recognize this hazard prior to con- struction of the plants left them Open to additional criticism. The groups objecting to the presence of pulp mills (on the shores of Lake Baikal found other weaknesses to rattack in their struggle against the plants. They dis- <:overed that the local resources of timber, which the tgovernment planners said would sustain cellulose pro- r the Baikalsk combine, and to stifle the protests of Skaviet conservationists, the government allocated in 1966 nrillions of rubles to build a giant sanitation facility fear the installation's fluid wastes.94 The purification unit, which cost 10 per cent of the factory's total con- SVtruction price to build,95 was by far the largest such 90Micklin, Op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 91Goldman, op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 92Micklin, op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 93Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 94Micklin, op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 95Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVII, No. 39 (Cbctober, I965), 32-33. 35 96 . . This enormous enterprise covered complex in the world. an area many times greater than that needed for the mill's production structures, auxiliary shops, and warehouses, and required a staff of 235 to Operate. Functionally, the system was designed to use a three-stage chemical, mechan- ical, and biological cleansing process. All sewage passing from the cellulose plant was programmed to be treated with a variety of neutralizing substances, reduced by micro- organisms, and then sand-filtered to remove impurities.97 Finally, to insure an adequate oxygen content, all pufified effluent was held for oxygenation in special aerating ponds before being released back into the lake at a depth of 43 meters.98 Such an advanced purification plant would seem capable of handling any liquid wastes generated by the Baikalsk combine and returning them to the lake in a satis- factory state. Such, to the embarrassment of many govern- ment officials, was found not to be the case when the in— 99 stallation began operations early in 1967. The 96Ron Richardson, "Even in Siberia It's the Age of Ecology," American Forests, LXXVII, No. 3 (March, 1971), 58. 97Current Digest of the Soviet Press, op. cit., footnote 9, 6-8. 8Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Op. cit., footnote 95, 32-33. 99New York Times, Op. cit., footnote 3, 1. 36 treatment system selected for use at the mill was so new that it had never functioned under actual production con- ditions. Once forced to serve under such circumstances, it was found that the cleansing facility was woefully in- adequate to perform the tasks expected of it. For example, though the water that emerged from the last stage of the purification cycle could be consumed by human beings, it was yellowish in color, slightly malodorous, and unaccept- ably high in sulphur compounds and mineral salts. With 60,000,000 cubic meters of this "purified" water scheduled to be released into Baikal each year, its potential for contaminating the lake was great.100 The design of the cleansing facility for the Baikalsk installation was functionally deficient in other crucial reSpects. The plant's treatment process, relying in part on the use of bacteria to purify liquid factory emissions, required cultures that were nearly impossible to keep alive in the below-freezing temperatures that chill the region for up to eight months of the year.101 Furthermore, it was discovered that the bacteria which fed on the cellulose wastes died if production was interrupted. The activated sludge required heated water at a constant temperature to Operate properly, and since unstable timber 100Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XIX, No. 51 (January, 19683, 12. 101Micklin, op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 37 deliveries forced the pulp-manufacturing complex to close on several occasions, new cultures often had to be re— established.102 Even when the treatment complex was working prOperly and at full capacity, an infrequent occurrence, the processed effluent it released was only 97 per cent pure.103 And despite the immense size of the mill's sani- tation system, it was never able to handle more than two- thirds of the factory's liquid wastes.104 These difficul- ties were encountered when the cellulose combine was op— erating at only one-fourth of its designed capacity and when only soda pulp was being produced. The preparation of "super, super cellulose," when finally mastered, would contribute even greater amounts of harmful substances to the plant's sewage which would have to be removed.105 Ob- viously, the elaborate purification scheme was a failure. But even with these problems, the officials of the timber industry were reluctant to concede that the water— cleansing facilities at Baikalsk were unsatisfactory. Once the sanitation works had ironed out its bugs, they 102Goldman, Op} cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 103Current Digest of the Soviet Press, op. Cit-I footnote 100, 12. 104Goldman, op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 105Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Op. cit., footnote 9, 6—8. 38 maintained, the purified waters leaving the system would be comparable to those of Baikal itself. Most of those who had faith in Soviet technolOgy felt that this claim was true, for the mill had begun production before the personnel in the treatment plant had completed their training. Also, other difficulties—-like a malfunctioning filter, blocked pipes, and broken aerator--had at times plagued the facility during its early operational stages.106 If the claim of the bureaucrats were correct, noted conservationists, and the treated effluent leaving the Baikalsk plant would eventually be as pure as Baikal's waters, then the waste could be circulated through the factory again instead of being dumped into the lake. This recommendation undermined the position of the mill's de- fenders, for they were forced to admit that the recycled fluids would not be clean enough for pulp manufactur- ing.107 This concession forced the Ministry of Timber, Paper, and Woodworking to approve, in early 1968, 2,500,000 rubles for the building of supplementary treat- ment facilities at the Baikalsk factory. The money was allocated for the construction of seven additional sedi— mentation pools which, it was felt, would correct many 106Goldman, op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 107New York Times, op. cit., footnote 1?, 8e. 39 defects of the original purification system.108 Other im- provements within the plant, to be made concurrently, would cost the government an additional 1,500,000 rubles.109 While these repairs were being made to the Baikalsk purification plant, wastes from the still-operating mill were diverted to retaining reservoirs about 11 meters from Baikal. Shortly after this holding practice began, the toxic fluids in the storage ponds started seeping into Siberia's inland sea at an estimated rate of 34.5 liters per second. These escaping effluents, composed mainly of fatty acids, organic sulphides, and methane, rapidly created a film of black slime on the surface of the lake.110 The plant managers were either unable or unwill- ing to stem the flow of these pollutants, so by the middle of 1968, 383 tons of sewage had percolated into Baikal and formed islands of alkaline waste up to 30 kilometers long, 5 kilometers wide, and 700 meters deep.111 Conservationists expressed alarm that such accumu— lations of poisonous chemicals would have adverse effects on lacustrine life. Their fears were confirmed when 108New York Times, op. cit., footnote 3, l. 109Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58—66. lloIbid. lll Theodore Shabad, "Measures to Halt Pollution of Lake Baikal," Soviet Geography: Review and Translation, X, No. 3 (MarchT’l969), I45. 40 studies by the local limnological institute showed that the plants and animals within the zone of contamination had been reduced by up to 50 per cent.112 But despite the deleterious impact of this sewage on the aquatic ecology along Baikal's southern shore, the pulp complex was allowed to remain in production. Throughout 1969 noxious com- ~ pounds continued to leak from the factory's settling ponds Ehmi 113 into the adjacent lake, and over 1,000 Operational mis- haps within the mill released additional wastes into the water.114 J The unloading of these pollutants into the lake soon had an affect on the very facility that was reSponsi- ble for the contamination. The circulation of water within Baikal is in the form of counterclockwise gyros. Because of this circular movement, any material dumped into the lake is not dispersed but remains concentrated in a zone that corresponds with the current patterns.115 Consequently, the wastes released from the Baikalsk plant eventually worked their way back to the factory's intake 112Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XXI, No. 7 (March, 1969), 28. 113Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 114Newsweek, November 22, 1971, 52. 115Micklin, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. . not: .wlb‘ .... 41 Nizhniy Angorsk SOU RC ES OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION OF LAKE BAIKAL Bolsho ya Rechko 0 wow PROCESSING A EISII PROCESSING o MEAT PROCESSING 3k LEATHER TANNING ‘- EFFLUENT PIPELINE (PROPOSED) After Micklin and Sennikov 42 pipe, seriously reducing the quality of the mill's water 116 supply. To eliminate this contamination of the lake, it was proposed by many concerned individuals that a diver- sionary pipe—line be built to carry treated effluents from the Baikalsk mill to the Irkut River to the west. Such a scheme would require 67 kilometers of large diameter con- duit and a pumping station capable of lifting the plant's sewage over a 200 meter pass to the neighboring valley.117 The idea, while seeming to offer a solution to the difficulty of safe waste diSposal, met with opposition from both sides of the Baikal controversy. The industrial interests pointed out that the estimated cost of the project--over 40,000,000 rubles--made it economically pro- hibitive to develOp. Some of the pulp-mill Opponents Ob- jected that such a bypass would alleviate the problem of sewage emissions only from the Baikalsk factory, since the Plant at Selenginsk was too far away to connect up to the same outlet. They were also quick to note that rerouting the effluent to the Irkut River would not solve the pollu— tion issue but simply pass it along to another water body.118 —¥ 116Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 117New York Times, Op. cit., footnote 1?, 8e. 118Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. CHAPTER III THE LUMBER INDUSTRY The problems of pollution and environmental de— struction also troubled the forestry industry providing raw materials to the new pulp plants. Approximately 70 per cent of the valleys and mountain slopes around Baikal are blanketed with towering stands of virgin timber.119 Primary among the species growing in the vicinity are larch and pine, with some Siberian cedar, spruce, silver fir, birch, and aspen in evidence. Exploiting this natural resource is a major industry in the area, with roughly a third of the total work force employed in lumbering.120 Prior to the construction of the cellulose com- bines, most logging was done in the southern parts of the Baikal region near to the smaller processing plants. But with the Opening of the pulp mills, wood—cutting activities increased alarmingly in accordance with the demand. 119F. I. Shipunov, "Will the Mountains Continue to Exist?" Priroda, No. 9 (September, 1969), 82-90. 120Micklin, op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 43 44 FOREST TYPES LAKE BAIKAL DRAINAGE BASIN U. S.S.R. Spruce - Larch Cedar Birch Fir E Unforested SEE IIIIII a.- MONGOUA U.S.S. R. the From: ATLAS of 45 Leveling of the taiga proceeded all along the eastern shore of Baikal--particularly through the Barguzin, Turka, and Kika river basins--and in some places had reached re- sort areas or moved to within a few kilometers of the lake. The removal of trees had even spread north to the Upper Angara watershed and along parts of the western coast.121 This rapidly—extending cancer of deforestation produced [Phi such a number of protests that the lumbering interests were again forced to limit their cutting to the southern I districts of Baikal.122 In spite of prohibitions against such activities, L”-- the forestry trades continued to clear-cut over much of the Baikal basin. The practice of strip-harvesting woods lands usually removes large areas of timber at once, often robbing the entire watersheds of some small streams of their trees. With the protective cover of vegetation gone, the exposed earth is easily attacked by wind and rain, and erosion invariably ensues. This problem has been particu- larly acute around Siberia's inland sea, where lumbering Operations are believed to cause an annual loss of over 400,000 tons of soil. Most of the displaced material is washed away by water flowing downSIOpe over denuded ter- rain. As a result of this fluvial action, some drainage 121Sennikov, op. cit., footnote 2, 17-20. 122Mowat, Op. cit., footnote 1. 46 LOGGING ”" in the LAKE BAIKAL BASIN Present logging areas [Hm Areas where logging will be increased Areas where logging will be initiated 0,903,), After flick/in 10"“) ?p O -\ O - "E’Ud'a- IRKUTSK Baykalsk _.E::::::::I:I:I:I‘c'n'ikOYZ a... ._.;22:2:3:2:522:2:2:2:2:s-‘ \., _.;.3:fzf:f:f:f:f:f:f:f:f:f:f:f:f:- ::: \..\“ ....................................... L 47 ways are carrying up to seven times more sediment than normal and are moving large quantities of silt down- stream.123 This increase in the loads transported by some of Baikal's tributaries has built up harmful deposits of alluvium in the rivers and in the lake.124 The precipi— tation of suspended materials onto the beds of streams has jFflfi destroyed many fish-breeding grounds, and the aquatic life of Baikal has almost certainly been injured by the rise of particulate matter in its water.125 The removal of trees from territory bordering Baikal has adversely affected the underlying soil in another fashion. Much of the forest cover of the region has develOped on ancient sand dunes, and the vegetation has long managed to hold the poorly-anchored landforms in check. Timber cutting to the southeast of the lake, how- ever, eXposed large expanses of loose-grained material to the fierce Balkalian gales, reactivating many of the dune complexes. Some observers have recently warned that the shifting sands will soon be linking up with those of the Gobi Desert, just over the border in Mongolia. If this happens, the unconstrained dunes will likely sweep 123Pryde, op. cit., footnote 18, 20-23. 124Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 125Micklin, op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 48 far into Siberia, destroying much of Lake Baikal and its surroundings.126 Problems with blowing dust have also been reported from territory outside of the Old sand dune region. The wind loss of soil on eroded and tilled lands near Baikal has grown "catastrOphically" in the past few years.127 To prevent this destructive deflation from increasing, protective forest strips are to be planted in the dis- turbed areas in an attempt to tame the restless earth.128 There is some question if such measures will prove ef- fective, though, for once leveled it is doubtful if plant growth can be regenerated in such an arid, windswept, and unstable environment.129 The baring of slopes by logging, and the conse- quent loss of soil cover, has upset the Baikalian ecology in another way. When unconsolidated surface material is washed away, the land is less able to retain the moisture it receives as precipitation. Because of the displace- ment of great quantities of earth, nearly a third of Baikal's drainage basin has lost its normal water- regulating capacity. Many streams in the region now 126Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 127Shipunov, op. cit., footnote 119, 82-90. 128Filatov, op. cit., footnote 61, 49-54. 129Micklin, Op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 49 flood during spring thaw and are extremely shallow for much of the rest of the year. During the past few decades nearly 130 creeks and natural fountains around the lake have dried up completely. This change in the hydrologic regimes of Baikal's tributaries has noticeably affected the lake's chemical makeup. There has been a conspicuous rise in the amounts of chlorides, sulphates, magnesium hydroxides, and nitrates in its waters. These increases, say scientists, are mainly attributable to the leveling of surrounding forests and the erosion of minerals from un- covered slopes to the lake.130 The logging industries have also contributed to the decrease of Baikal's fish harvests. Large quantities of timber are floated down tributary streams each year to processing plants along the shores of the lake. Though this is the cheapest means of moving trees from stump to mill, it can be ecologically expensive to the waterways themselves. For example, approximately 10 per cent of the logs sent downstream in the Baikal district have sunk during transport. Over the years this submerged timber has accumulated on the bottoms of many rivers, until it is now estimated that 1,500,000 cubic meters of wood are rotting on the beds of Baikal's tributaries. The boles, chips, and bark resting on the water channels--in some places to depths of three or four meters--have made it 130Shipunov, op. cit., footnote 119, 82-90. 50 increasingly difficult for fish to use them as Spawning grounds. As a result, in the past decade about 50 streams have been eliminated as breeding sites for aquatic life.131 Even after the logs have been rafted downstream to the sorting pens, their threat to the survival of Baikal remains. At the lower reaches of the Selenga River much of the timber is classified and assembled for tranSport to industries along the southern coast of the lake. Large quantities of wood are lashed tOgether and then towed by boat to a variety of saw mills and pulp— processing plants. Violent storms, a common occurrence in the region, often scatter these "cigars" of timber, casting their contents on the leeward shores. As a con— sequence of such disasters, the beaches of eastern Baikal are covered for hundreds of kilometers with logs that have sought refuge from the turbulent waters. This jumble of wood scraps stranded along the lake's borders-- resembling a ring of filth around a bathtub--has seriously depreciated the area's aesthetic appeal.132 But some effects of the wood-rafting practices are not so apparent to the eye. As was true with the timber drives down many local rivers, parts of the 131Goldman, op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 132Sennikov, op. cit., footnote 2, l7-20. 51 tree-harvests sink on their journey across Baikal. The drowned logs in the streams and the lake are attacked and broken down into inorganic substances by fresh-water biota. By this reduction method supplies of oxygen in the environment are consumed, causing a loss which may 133 prove injurious to aquatic flora and fauna. Also during the decomposition process tannic acid and other products of decay are released into the water. These toxic compounds, washed downriver or produced within the 134 ‘ '4 a I E E 1 h. lake, have already begun to contaminate Baikal. if To halt the effects of log pollution in Baikal and its tributaries, the lake's wood-processing industries agreed to cease rafting their timber supplies. They pro- posed instead to transport their raw materials by rail. This plan, unfortunately, has yet to be fulfilled, for such a form of transit entails a considerable number of flatcars and a substantial increase in costs. Since neither additional funds or rolling stock have been pro- duced, the logs are still conveyed by water and still do damage to the lake.135 133Micklin, Op. cit., footnote 36, 485-98. 134Mowat, Op. cit., footnote 1. 135Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58—66. CHAPTER IV PROTECTIVE MEASURES From the preceding accounts it can readily be seen that the provisions of the 1960 law designed to protect Lake Baikal had been thoroughly ignored. The measures taken to preserve Siberia's lacustrine giant had proven to be ineffective or unenforced, and additional steps were deemed necessary to insure the lake's survival. With that purpose in mind, the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union again approved a comprehensive plan to regulate the use of Lake Baikal and its surrounding territory. The February 1969 directive declared the lake and its entire drainage basin136 a water conservation zone in which re- sources and industry were to be subject to strict govern- ment control.137 136Part of Baikal's drainage basin lies within the Mongolian PeOple's Republic. Though the conservation measures enacted by the Council of Ministers would not necessarily apply in that country, the Soviets could ex- pect their neighbor's COOperation in the project. 137Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XXI, No. 6 (February, 19697, 36. 52 53 Receiving close attention under the new decree were the lumbering activities that had been responsible for so many of the pollution problems plaguing Lake Baikal. While incorporating many of the same provisions found in the 1960 resolution, the 1969 law also established nearly 60,000 square kilometers of protected zones where all timber-cutting was prohibited.138 Those tracts guarded against the axe included tree-covered steppe lands sus- ceptible to erosion, forests in state preserves, and wood- lands near resort areas. In those regions where lumbering Operations were still permitted, loggers were required to use aerial cableways for removing felled trees rather than the customary drag tractors which severely disturbed the soil.139 The legacy of earlier lumbering activities also came under the eyes of the Soviet government. Its new regulations stipulated that river channels in the Baikal basin were to be dredged to remove wood waste and other debris left from logging operations. Unsightly log— rafting scraps were likewise to be removed from the banks of the rivers and from the shores of the lake.140 138Goldman, op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 139Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Op. cit., footnote 137, 36. 14°Ibid. . inj I» 54 Perhaps the most stringent edicts from the Council of Ministers were those measures designed to curb the dis- charge Of harmful effluents. Under the new regulations, the construction of manufacturing concerns likely to taint the air or water in the Baikal drainage basin was pro- hibited, as was the expansion of established enterprises presenting such hazards. To stem contamination of the FIR environment from existing sources of pollution, all munici- palities and industrial plants situated in the Baikal watershed were ordered to build treatment facilities to prevent the release of unpurified wastes into the lake or its tributaries. The Council specifically instructed that rebuilt water-cleansing installations, and shOps for the utilization of industrial by-products, be completed at the Baikalsk factory by the end of the year. The second pulp mill, still wrapped in scaffolding at Selenginsk, was ordered not to begin production until its waste-treatment plant was ready for operation.141 In an effort to repair the damage done to some of the creatures of Lake Baikal by pollution and over- exploitation, the 1969 directive charged the Ministry Of Fisheries with the duty of conserving and replenishing the water body's finned inhabitants. Toward this end all fishing in the northern half of the lake was banned for five years, and similar activity prohibited in the 141Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Op. cit., footnote 137, 36. 55 southern section for a period of seven years. To further accelerate the revival of selected Baikal denizens, a number of fish hatcheries were ordered built to help re- stock the lake with species of commercial value.142 The burden of enforcing the statutes passed by the Council of Ministers was entrusted to three govern- . 143 ment agenCies. The Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources was assigned to monitor waste emissions and prevent untreated effluents from being discharged into the Baikal basin. The Hydrometeorological Service was given the task of regularly analyzing the mineral content of Lake Baikal and studying the effects of sewage upon the chemical composition of the water. Finally, the People's Control Committee, a sort of "watchdog" organization with representatives in every factory, was enlisted to insure that all ministries charged with implementing certain con- servation programs fulfilled their reSpective oglitations. Those individuals or departments ignoring their responsi- bilities were to be called to "strict account."144 Though quite capable of restoring and preserving the pristine nature of Baikal, the results of the 1969 142Mowat, Op. cit., footnote 1. 143New York Times, February 8, 1969, 7. 144Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Op. cit., footnote 137, 36. S6 directives were comparable to those of the earlier laws. The new regulations were ignored or circumvented by those to whom they applied, and the lake continued to be sullied by pollution. The indiscriminate removal of nearby ever- greens proceeded as before, leaving a stump-scarred land- scape where there had once been forests. The rafting of * timber persisted on local waterways, choking spawning grounds with sunken logs and covering shorelines with wood I debris. And neighboring communities, particularly Ulan Ude with its pOpulation of 250,000, failed to abate their discharge of raw sewage into Baikal's drainage basin, further disrupting its delicate ecology.145 Perhaps most aggravating of all, the noxious wastes of the Baikalsk cellulose plant continued to bubble into Siberia's inland sea.146 The purification facility of the installation remained inadequate to handle the mill's effluents. And though the combine Operated at only one-third of its rated capacity in an effort to limit con- tamination of Baikal,147 such precautions were offset by numerous industrial accidents. Early in 1970, for example, nearly 20,000 cubic meters of pure alkali flowed into the 145Newsweek, pp, cit., footnote 114, 52. 146Ibid. 147New York Times, March 2, 1970, 6. 57 lake when a valve burst in the factory.148 Indeed, a re- port issued later in the year concluded that abuse of Baikal had increased, rather than decreased, since enact- ment of the 1969 decree.149 Though adequate regulations had been passed to control such misuse of Baikal and its resources, no one in a position of power seemed willing to call other minis- ters to task for violations. This reluctance by most authorities to punish the transgressions of fellow offi- cials created a lax attitude toward nearly all of the pro- tective laws passed by the Council. Without fear of prosecution for ignoring the conservation edicts, the pol- lutors had no incentive to discontinue their harmful practices. Despite the consequences of their actions, a cer- tain amount of sympathy must be extended to the bureau- crats who were responsible for so many of the problems plaguing Lake Baikal. The success of a Soviet factory manager is usually judged in terms of increased yield, not on how well he preserves the local milieu. With a great deal of pressure placed on these men to fulfill out- put quotas at all cost, it is not difficult to understand why they disregarded the consequences of waste and 148Newsweek, Op. cit., footnote 114, 52. 149Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58-66. 58 pollution. Since there is no place on administrative performance charts for protection of the environment, natural resources in the U.S.S.R. are often abused. Within the Ministry of Timber, Paper, and Woodworking, for instance, emphasis is placed on good manufacturing indices per ruble of capital investment. Usually, the only way these economic goals can consistently be met is if all funds are devoted to developing plant production and nothing is diverted for conservation. This approach to industrial management has meant that little attention is given to the national welfare, and the despoliation of Baikal is simply an example of that fact. It was claimed by many concerned observers that without strong enforcement of the measures safeguarding Baikal, deterioration of the lake region would continue. But whether or not conditions actually did progressively degenerate around Siberia's inland sea soon became a mystery, for late in 1970 the Soviet government placed a ban on the open discussion of the country's environmental conflicts. The state had been sorely embarrassed by the publicity of its resource development errors, its pollu— tion troubles, and its inability to COpe with either prob— lem. Accordingly, the publication of articles dealing with such difficulties was ordered suspended, and the subject disappeared from the national press.150 150New York Times, August 23, 1970, 2. 59 The blackout on environmental issues remained until the middle of 1971, when emphasis on pollution matters again appeared in Soviet papers and journals. Indeed, such was the reversal of publishing policies that hardly a day went by without items appearing in the media about abuses to the nation's natural resources and what was being done to correct them. The renewed public inter- A I est in preserving the country's physical heritage could not long ignore the continuing rape of Baikal, and atten- tion soon focused on the tarnish of Siberia's lacustrine ~ 151 Elm jewel. A reexamination of the Baikal situation in the state press, and revelations that the edicts governing the use of the lake's assets had not been implemented, again aroused the anger and impatience of many Soviet citizens. To mollify public opinion and h0pefully rectify a protracted problem, the government issued on Sep- tember 24, 1971, a series of tough-sounding edicts de— signed to protect the fresh-water giant. The proclamation addressed itself to many of the same matters covered by the earlier decrees, but it set new time limits for exe— cuting some of the conservation measures. The Baikalsk pulp mill, for example, was directed to finish building its waste-treatment plant by the end of the year, since an earlier order to complete the job by 1970 had gone 1511bid. 60 unheeded. The second cellulose mill at the mouth of the Selenga, scheduled to Open in 1972, was warned not to begin production until its water-purification system is capable of functioning properly. Since it has been re- ported that the factory will recycle its waste fluids, it is probably impossible for the installation to Operate until its water-cleansing facilities are ready anyway.152 The pulp manufacturing combines were not the only polluters given notice in the new regulations. The log- ging and transport interests were allowed just one more year to float wood supplies on the lake before all timber 153 All in- movements would be confined to road or rail. dustries along the Selenga River, Baikal's major tribu- tary, were given a similar time period in which to install sanitation systems for treating their effluents. And the metrOpolitan center of Ulan Ude was required to complete its sewage processing plant before the end of 1973.154 By all appearances, the 1971 ordinance defending Baikal differed little, if any, from earlier laws enacted by the government to protect the inland sea. But unlike past directives, the new decree carried the additional weight of the Communist Party's Central Committee. This 152New York Times, op. cit., footnote 5, 4. 153Newsweek, op. cit., footnote 114, 52. 154New York Times, Op. cit., fOOtnOte 5' 4' 61 support from the top Soviet leadership was viewed by most observers as a triumph for those who had campaigned to save the lake. However, some conservationists were less opti- mistic. Aside from citing the dismal history of prior legislation aimed at preserving the Baikal region, the skeptics noted that Moscow had not prescribed any punish- ments for those who failed to obey the edict.155 Appar- ently only existing penalties would guarantee compliance with the law, and under prevailing statutes pollution- offenders could receive no more than a fifty-ruble fine. Such a minor levy, most concede, is not likely to force violators to cease their illegal activities. And since there are no provisions for closing down municipal or industrial Operations that endanger the environment, the conclusion is that the lake will continue to suffer.156 155Newsweek, Op. cit., footnote 114, 52. 156Current Digest of the Soviet Press, op. cit., footnote 100, 12. CHAPTER V FUTURE AND CONCLUSIONS There are many reasons for believing that the re- cent decrees to protect Baikal will fail to insure its survival. Even if the new regulations are followed, and there is little evidence from the past to suggest that such will be the case, the lacustrine leviathan faces a host of additional threats. Such enormous water reserves, for instance, have not gone unnoticed in the more arid sections of the country. Huge aqueducts, carrying Baikal's fluid surpluses thousands of miles to the western U.S.S.R., are seen as distinct possibilities in the future.157 A similar proposition has been made, but fortunately not yet accepted, to artificially increase the lake's discharge in order to accelerate the accumulation of water behind res- 158 ervoirs along the Angara River. These plans, if ever brought to fruition, would obviously cause a drOp in the 157New York Times, op. cit., footnote 5, 4. 158Goldman, Op. cit., footnote 13, 58—66. 62 63 level of Baikal. The consequences of such actions, though less readily apparent, would almost surely follow the pat- tern of prior development schemes in the region by causing further damage to the lake. The proposals to remove water from the Baikal basin would probably be less likely to harm the environment than would continued pollution from commercial wastes. But ER} even with the help of recent edicts designed to preserve L1 the lake, it does not yet seem immune from the menace of I I becoming an industrial cesspool. Certain government I "i ministries, to wit, have recently voiced interest in de- L”; velOping chemical plants on the shores of Siberia's inland sea and in the use of its waters. And the Ministry of Timber, Paper, and Woodworking, apparently failing to learn from its earlier mistakes, is reported to have in the advanced blueprint stage at least one other cellulose manufacturing factory planned for the Baikal area.159 These projects indicate a lack of commitment on the part of many Soviet authorities to prevent the degrada- tion of Baikal's sensitive ecology. If their position, despite the many strict government resolutions, is the prevailing attitude within the country's ruling circles, then the world will soon discover if it is possible to preserve the lake and exploit its natural resources. But many people feel that the past has impressively 159Ibid. 64 demonstrated that the two ends are not compatible. They believe experience shows that unless harmful industrial activities soon cease within the basin, much of the lake and its surroundings will be destroyed. This confronta- tion between Soviet manufacturers and conservationists over the use of Baikal's assets is a controversy that has been raging for over twelve years. Considering the riches at stake, it is safe to assume that the conflict is far from resolved. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Bulmasov, A. P. Magnetic and Gravitational Fields of the Bgikal Region as Related to Its Seismicity. Translated by E. R. Hope. Ottawa: Defense Re- search Board of Canada, 1967. Current Digest of the Soviet Press. XVII, No. 39 (October, 419655, 32-33. XIX, No. 48 (December, 1967), 6-8. . XIX, No. 51 (January, 1968), 12. XX, No. 49 (December, 1968), 24. XXI, No. 6 (February, 1969), 36. . XXI, No. 7 (March, 1969), 28. 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November 22, 1971, 52. Pavlovski, Ye. V. The Problem of the Origin of the Lake Baikal Depression. Translatediby E. R. Hope. Ottawa: Defense Research Board of Canada, 1967. Pryde, Philip. "The First Soviet National Park." National Parks Magazine, XLI, No. 235 (April, 1967), 20-23. Reisner, G. I. Multi—disciplinary Research on the Baikal Rift Zone. Moscow: Vestnik Akademy Nauk S.S.S.R., I966. Richardson, Ron. "Even in Siberia It's the Age of Ecology." American Forests, LXXVII, No. 3 (March, 197IY, 58. Rossolino, Leonid. Baikal. Moscow, 1966. Sarkisian, S. C. Baikal. Moscow, 1955. 67 Sennikov, V. A. "Lake Baikal." Geografiya v Shkole, No. 5 (September-October,TI968T, 17—20. Shabad, Theodore. "Measures to Halt Pollution of Lake Baikal." Soviet Geography: Review and Transla- tion, X, NO. 3 (March, 1969), 145. Shipunov, F. I. "Will the Mountains Continue to Exist?" Priroda, No. 9 (September, 1969), 82-90. Zorin, Uy. A. 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