STATUS INCONSISTENCY, CROSS-PRESSURES, AND VOTING: THE 1968 AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AS A TEST CASE

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation had two goals: it examined the theoretical underpinnings of the twin concepts of status inconsistency and cross-pressures and suggested improvements in the methods used to examine each. The first task involved a reconceptualization of cross-pressures along lines already suggested for status inconsistency. It also involved specification of the status inconsistency concept's applicability, spelling out the potential impact of discrepant statuses. In both cases it was suggested that previous treatments were often inappropriate because they employed each concept as fundamentally additive when the more proper interpretation was non-additive. That is, if these concepts are to be construed as variables they must be representable as separate terms in a regression equation: they must not be explainable in terms of the main effects of the status or pressure variables. The methodology to investigate these phenomena suggests itself: multiple regression. In order to cope with non-interval level measurement, dummy-variable multiple regression was employed, using multiplicative

interaction terms to represent inconsistency and cross-pressure effects. A parallel analysis of the traditional conceptualization was carried out by tabular analysis, and comparisons were drawn between the two approaches for evaluative purposes.

Departing from Lenski's work, the analysis considered two dependent variables: turnout and Wallace vote in 1968. The Survey Research Center's 1968 election study was used. It was proposed that inconsistency or cross-pressure (or the combination of both) should lead to lower levels of voting and higher levels of voting for Wallace than would be expected, given the main effects of status and pressure variables. This expectation was not uniformly confirmed. Even the expectation that status inconsistent and cross-pressured individuals would vote less and vote more often for Wallace than individuals consistent along each dimension failed to find substantial support. Finally, analysis demonstrated that the effects of status inconsistency and two types of cross-pressure, affiliative and attitudinal, were not cumulative.

It was concluded that neither the traditional nor the modified concept of cross-pressures was adequate. Status inconsistency, likewise, explained little variance in voting behavior in this case. The intuitive link between the concepts apparently does not exist. Non-voting and Wallace voting were apparently not functional alternatives for the inconsistent or cross-pressured since the two were unrelated. Cross-pressures also appears insignificant in explaining left voting in 1968.

Given these empirical conclusions, it is suggested that both concepts be re-evaluated as well as the methods by which they are investigated.

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This thesis is the outgrowth of an idea which itself grew from research begun and sustained by Professor Paul R. Abramson. His enduring interest in social structural problems and effects stimulated me before, during and after a period of joint effort, and led me to ask some of the questions contained here about the role of social marginality on political behavior. It was at this stage that a realization that status characteristics were not all uniform and that they could have a variety of effects was established, leading eventually to the focus on status inconsistency and cross-pressures as potentially explanatory variables. While this dissertation in no way solves most of the more fundamental problems involved, it does, I hope, shed some light on the meaning and utility of these twin concepts.

Such success as this research has is due in large part to the initial stimulation and continuing support of my Dissertation Advisor and Committee Chairman, Professor Paul Abramson. His analytic skills and academic judgment are not equalled here, but they served as a model for the analysis presented. Without his example, guidance and tactful but insistent prodding this project would not have been accomplished. I was constantly buoyed by his confidence and

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Finally, I think I must thank my wife and son who have experienced long periods of absence on my part. Whether they have suffered by this I leave to the more disinterested.

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CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW

The study of voting behavior has made great strides in the last few decades. We now know a good deal about the determinants of turnout and partisan preference. The relationships between these variables and dimensions of social status such as income, occupation, education and race are well documented. The importance of a person's social affiliations and attitudes are similarly known. A large amount of effort has been expended in refining our knowledge of these important relationships. And, while most were originally uncovered in American voting studies, subsequent analyses have established the universality of nearly all the findings.[1] The degree of cross-national reliability of these findings is remarkable, given the presumed and actual cultural differences.[2] When, however, political scientists cease discussing the main effects of these variables and focus on their inter-relationships, the level of agreement on effects diminishes rapidly.[3] When the expected results of several variables are not cumulative, the behavior of the individual becomes less easily predicted and understood. The effect of "inconsistency" upon the voter is still

relatively uninvestigated and the findings which do exist display a singular lack of accord. They demonstrate that, in this area, much more is unknown than known.

This situation apparently has two causes, one theoretical and one methodological. First, even a cursory scan of the literature alerts the student of inconsistency to the variety of mechanisms cited as responsible for inconsistent behavior, or at least behavior which is not deemed average or "normal" for similar, but not inconsistent individuals. In general these mechanisms can be reduced to two: a socio-psychological "balancing" approach,[4] and an "over-compensation" or "stress" model.[5] The former asserts that individuals finding themselves in inconsistent status, social or attitudinal configurations will adjust to these by rearranging the elements appropriately. In the short run their behavior will likely include withdrawal from situations which increase the salience of the inconsistency, or temporary suppression of one cue and exclusion of others. The second approach claims that inconsistency is more psychologically distressing than the first allows and that this stress resulting from inconsistency makes it unlikely that a person will balance or merely select cues. Rather, he is expected to adopt an extreme position on inconsistency-salient behavior and relieve his stress through radical and extreme cathartic action or attitudes. In this case, groups of inconsistent individuals find themselves on the periphery of socially accepted attitudes and behavior. The second

approach then sees discharge of tension as the mechanism by which persons overcome inconsistency.

In spite of the divergence of these two alternative approaches to inconsistency, the investigators of each have used very similar tools to test their hypotheses, and have been indifferent to testing the two approaches together. This is to some extent a function of the novelty of the concept and the vagueness of its applied meaning. Nevertheless, the various measures of inconsistency have rarely allowed for useful comparison of results. While the theoretical implications of some of the methods used are not totally clear, it is certain that conclusive tests of the predictions of the two approaches have not been achieved.

This dissertation has two purposes, stemming from the twin problems of theory and method in the study of inconsistency. First I shall attempt to test the relative validity of the two approaches outlined above, with an eye toward improving the theoretical coherence of the approaches and their logical results. This is essentially a process of concept clarification. Second, I will utilize overlapping methods used in previous studies. It will also involve testing hypotheses explicit in these studies, or implicit in their logic. The final product of this analysis should be a better understanding of the concept of inconsistency.

The dissertation will, then, focus primarily on the relationships between two dependent variables, voter turnout and partisan preference, and three independent variables,

status inconsistency, affiliative cross-pressures and attitudinal cross-pressures. Each of these independent variables is, of course, a combination of other variables. They are conceptually similar, at differing levels of analysis. Moreover, they are assumed to be inter-related in a causal sense, to be outlined later. The hypotheses which follow are drawn from the literature on each of the independent variables and from the two general approaches outlined above.

Status Inconsistency and Voting Behavior

Status inconsistency (or status crystallization, or status congruence) while not an entirely new concept, was given a precise definition and formulation in 1954 by Gerhard Lenski.[6] Noting that nearly all previous studies of status relationships had focused only on "vertical" ones, Lenski suggested that there might be a non-vertical dimension as well. He argued that people actually occupy positions in several vertical hierarchies simultaneously, and that these positions need not be consistent, or of the same social rank. Lenski proposed that, "apparently the individual with a poorly crystallized status is a particular type of marginal man, and is subjected to certain pressures by the social order which are not felt (at least to the same degree) by individuals with more highly crystallized status."[7] He suggested, on the basis of his analysis, that people with inconsistent statuses feel less integrated into the community and are lead to support political movements of social

change in the hope that these will lead to a restructuring of the social order and potentially a more felicitous position for themselves. Specifically, Lenski claimed that this political involvement would (and did) take the form of support for leftist parties. In a later article Lenski favorably noted Gordon's suggestion that the effects of inconsistency may be more diffuse and that we might well expect inconsistent individuals to "adopt extreme political positions, whether on the extreme left or the extreme right."[8]

Lenski's original formulation, then, appears to be ungeneralizable, or perhaps more accurately, not general enough. Rush, for example, finds that "individuals whose statuses are inconsistent are more likely to be right-wing extremists in their political attitudes than are individuals whose statuses are consistent."[9] He suggests that "right-wing extremism is a form of political expression offering simplistic, highly structured solutions to the frustrations arising from status inconsistency, and that persons suffering from status inconsistencies will be more likely to maintain this political ideology than those whose statuses are crystallized."[10] In his study he cites a body of literature which adds some support to the thesis that rightism is a possible outcome of status inconsistency. Moreover he proposes that extreme rightism and extreme leftism may be very similar events, each easily produces by status inconsistency. Kelly and Chamblis report on research indicating no relationship between inconsistency and political liberalism.[11]

Kenkel, reviewing Lenski's original data, also claims that there is no clear relationship between these two variables.[12] Jackson and Burke document a relationship between status inconsistency and symptoms of personal stress.[13] The last finding gains centrality from the importance attached to the role of stress in determining political attitudes and actions in most theoretical writings about inconsistency. Treiman states the presumed relationship well: "The status discrepancy hypothesis asserts that conflict engendered by status discrepancy is likely to lead to strain and that this strain will manifest itself in pathological behavior. . . ."[14] He comments further that, "according to the status-discrepancy hypothesis, incumbents in discrepant status configurations should, on the average, exhibit higher levels of these pathological symptoms than would be expected on the basis of the independent contributions of each of their status characteristics."[15] Herein lies the crux of Lenski's status inconsistency argument. If individuals use common psychological mechanisms, such as exclusion, and act as if only one status were relevant, then, at the aggregate level inconsistent groups will fall between the consistent groups on a given dependent variable. Some individuals will choose each attitudinal or behavioral alternative, resulting in an average choice within the bounds set by the consistent groups. If, on the other hand, the stress model of inconsistency is valid, we can expect the inconsistencies to fall into some extreme category, which may be situationally defined.

This approach assumes that the stress produced by inconsistency leads to behavior which is non-normal in that few individuals in the society choose it. Therefore, groups of inconsistents should not fall between the relevant consistent groups. Testing whether one of these approaches is more satisfactory is facilitated by framing the question in this fashion, since the statistical concepts of additivity and interaction parallel the logic of each of the arguments, respectively. Thus, deciding whether status inconsistency is a significant independent variable in explaining voting behavior falls on the relatively simple question of whether there is statistical interaction involved in the relationship. That is, is an additive model sufficient to explain the variance, or is there a non-additive relationship which may be attributed to the inconsistency effects?

Several studies have been concerned with the possible existence of statistical interaction in the relationship between status inconsistency and various dependent variables. Treiman found, in his study of prejudice, that an additive model was sufficient and that no interaction between status variables was apparent.[16] However these results are not completely satisfactory for reasons which illustrate several of the problems encountered in studying status inconsistency. First, Treiman used only two of the many possible instances of status inconsistency: education-income discrepancies and education-spouse's education discrepancies. The latter is not usually included in studies of

inconsistency. Secondly, as Treiman himself notes, his dependent variable, prejudice, is probably less sensitive to status inconsistency than other potential variables. Finally, Treiman neglected to use both ascribed and achieved statuses and thus cannot comment on the relationship between them, a relationship which Lenski, for one, considers of prime significance. On the other hand, his method allows him more precision than simple cross-tabulation techniques. This method allows the researcher to pinpoint the location of the interaction, if any. Jackson and Burke, for example, have used a similar approach to find that status inconsistency appears interactively related to symptoms of stress.[17] As Blalock notes, this technique is perhaps the best method yet devised to overcome the "identification" problem: i.e., the problem caused by overspecification of an equation.[18] Jackson and Burke overcome the problem by assuming that certain interaction coefficients equal zero. Thus they need not estimate them. In Jackson and Burke's research, a simple additive model does not explain the relationship between inconsistency and stress as well as one which allows for specific interaction combinations among the independent variables. Especially interesting, and emphasized by the somewhat conservative nature of the "dummy-variable" regression approach, is the finding that status inconsistency produces more stress than would be expected by adding the separate status effects. This means that the suggested link between status inconsistency and extreme behavior is at least

partially established empirically: individuals who are inconsistent evidence more symptoms of stress. In his research, Boyd found that there appeared to be little evidence of interaction between status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressures, a relationship to be considered here.[19] Boyd hypothesized that individuals evidencing status inconsistency would be more cross-pressured than an additive model would suggest. Since there appeared to be sound theoretical reasons for expecting this relationship to exist, Boyd was reluctant to reject his hypothesis even though the data did not support it, preferring instead to suggest alternative explanations for this failure. I am also hesitant to reject this hypothesis and have included one similar to Boyd's in this section. In his study based on the Almond and Verba five nation data, Segal found that there was interaction between status variables and both non-voting and Democratic voting preference in the United States.[20] This finding cannot be interpreted unambiguously, however, because his method consisted of cross-tabulation of statuses --a procedure which is incapable of specifying the precise nature of the relationship.[21] Portes' study of left radicalism in Chile also searched for interaction in the relationship between status inconsistency and voting behavior.[22] Portes found none, using only education-income and education-occupation inconsistency. Finally, Pool, Abelson and Popkin found, for the most part, little evidence of interaction in their United States voting study.[23] They did find, however,

a considerable degree of interaction between certain combinations of status variables, such as occupation and religion, and partisan preference. In the last instance, an interactive equation was clearly preferable to an additive one.

The conclusion suggested by this brief summary is that the correct conceptualization of status inconsistency is not yet at hand. It may well be that status variables are relevant only for a subset of conceivable related dependent variables, as Boyd and Treiman suggest. That is, status inconsistency may be important in explaining some types of behavior and not others. It may also be that one's method considerably influences, if not determines, his findings. In any case it appears that the existence of status inconsistency as an independent variable has not been conclusively demonstrated, and its presumed relationships to significant dependent variables are relatively undocumented.

Finally, although there is no way to control for or guage its effect in the present study, the problems of "clustering," first noted by Tingsten, cannot be ignored.[24] The distribution of status characteristics is not random across the United States. Clearly this means that inconsistency does not everywhere have the same meaning. When national samples are employed the likely effect of this phenomenon is to increase error and make hypotheses more easily rejected. However it may be that clustering may distort the impact of inconsistency in some systematic fashion. It is obvious neither why and how such systematic

distortion would occur, nor precisely what effect it would have. I shall assume that clustering effects do, in actuality, cancel each other and that their only impact is to weaken the relationships explored here.

However, if it is correct to conceive of the effects of status inconsistency in terms of statistical interaction, and if the relationship proposed by Lenski holds, then we may hypothesize that:

> H. 1: Status inconsistency leads to higher rates of voting for deviant parties than are predicted by an additive model using only the main effects of the status variables.

Also, if status inconsistency is operative, it seems likely that high levels of stress should lead to inordinately high rates of withdrawal among the inconsistent. If status inconsistency is seen as an inability to decide which cues to accept from one's social environment, then it may be proposed that inconsistent individuals might cut psychic costs and avoid decision altogether in greater proportion than would be expected, given their social characteristics. Thus:

> H. 2: Status inconsistency leads to higher rates of non-voting than are predicted by an additive model using only the main effects of status variables.

Cross-Pressures and Voting Behavior

Students of voting behavior have long been concerned with the "forces" which determine a voter's choice. While many of the major social determinants have been uncovered,

their inter-relationship is still a matter of concern. It has become customary to refer to situations in which major determinants would not lead to the same decision as cross-pressure cases. Lipset, for example, in Political Man discusses a number of studies illustrating the effects of cross-pressures.[25] The discussion is germane here because it demonstrates the lack of precision which often accompanies the use of the concept. Lipset uses cross-pressures to refer to conflict among nearly any and all possible attributes, regardless of their level of analysis. He cites a study by Janowitz and Marvick, for example, which used as pressures, residence, socio-economic status, religion, issue attitudes, and candidate attitudes. Using these variables which obviously represent differing levels of analysis, Janowitz and Marvick found "increasing cross-pressures regularly decreased the relevant party vote. Non-voting also increased regularly with increasing cross-pressures. . . ."[26]

Other researchers have used cross-pressures in as many ways. This thesis incorporates two of the most common: affiliative and attitudinal cross-pressures. I will follow Pinner's differentiation:

> Attitudinal conflict may occur when a person is faced with a choice between alternative beliefs or courses of action under conditions which bring into play attitudes motivating different and opposing choices. Affiliative conflict can result from a person's attachment to several groups which have preferences for different alternatives.[27]

While the mechanics of cross-pressures are apparently very similar to those of status inconsistency, it is clear that

the former operates on different levels of analysis. In fact, each type of cross-pressure represents a different level. I shall discuss affiliative and attitudinal cross-pressures in turn and present hypotheses relating each to turnout and voting preference.

In the literature on voting behavior the concept of affiliative cross-pressures represents one of the earliest attempts to explain behavior that was "non-normal." Affiliative cross-pressures represent, of course, the situation in which an individual is presented with different cues by various relevant others, usually his family, friends, and work-place associates. Lazarsfeld documented the impact of inconsistencies in preferences among a voter's relevant others on both the voting decision and partisan preference in The People's Choice.[28] While he used several variables which are here labelled status variables and not affiliative ones, Lazarsfeld did find that people who were cross-pressured were less likely to vote, more likely to change vote direction during a campaign, and more likely to postpone decision on both turnout and party preference. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee report similar findings in Voting.[29] In this study the authors found that "nominal conflicts between social categories like religion and class are associated less with delay (of vote decision) than primary group discords, and the more so the more intimate the conflict."[30] This actually reflects a comparison between the impacts of status inconsistency and affiliative

cross-pressures and amounts to a claim that the more likely an inconsistency will be salient, the more potent it will be. The authors also found clear relationships between voting change and the preferences of one's family, friends and co-workers. Unfortunately, neither the Voting study nor its predecessor offers substantial assistance in explaining these findings. Campbell and his cohorts are also mute here. After reviewing their findings on primary group influences on voting, they conclude that "the mechanisms by which the group influences the individual are exceedingly complex."[31] Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee note that "while theory regarding these cross-pressures is not yet particularly advanced, an impressive series of empirical results has accumulated over the past fifteen years of research."[32] Yet we cannot adequately comprehend the concept of cross-pressures without such theory.

The relevant question here is: Why should individuals who exhibit cross-pressures be less likely to vote, make up their minds later in a campaign and vacillate in the choice of party and candidate? Is it due to indecision over which relevant other should be given priority? Is it because individuals weight cues from each relevant other in making a choice? Or is it because the cross-pressures arising from inconsistent cues lead to stress which makes consistent behavior unlikely or impossible? These questions imply somewhat different behavior patterns and are thus susceptible to test. If we assume that cross-pressured individuals solve

their dilemma by selecting one relevant other or cue as their basis of choice, then the cross-pressured, as a group, should not exhibit lower turnout than consistent individuals, but they should be less likely to vote for the candidate of their choice. Moreover, and most important here, there should be no significant differences among the cross-pressured subgroups in terms of their turnout or deviation from their own partisan preference. That is, the existence of more cross-pressures should not lead to different kinds of behavior. On the other hand, if cross-pressures reduce consistency by increasing psychological stress, we would expect to find that increasing cross-pressures lead to increased stress and, consequently, to decreased turnout and increased deviation from own partisan preference. This means that as groups become more cross-pressured, they should exhibit less consistency. This line of argument also implies that high levels of stress produced by high cross-pressures should lead to high levels of voting for non-system parties or parties of social change, since they represent an outlet for pressures and provide a potential source of relief in a long-term sense. Perhaps cross-pressured individuals are, in some sense, released from normal restraints by the pressures on them and will be more easily recruited by radical parties than will the more socially integrated non-cross-pressured voter.

The similarity of this conceptualization of cross-pressures to the preceding conceptualization of status

inconsistency is obvious and natural. If cross-pressures have any meaning, they must have an effect independent of the individual "pressures." Thus, we may argue that the stress produced by cross-pressures does not accumulate in an additive fashion, but rather that cross-pressures combine interactively to produce higher symptom levels than might be expected under an additive assumption. This approach suggests the following hypotheses:

H. 3: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures will be less likely to vote than those without cross-pressures, and the more so the greater the cross-pressures.

H. 4: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures will be more likely to vote for marginal parties than those without cross-pressures, and the more so the greater the cross-pressures.

H. 5: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures will be less likely to vote than is suggested by an additive model utilizing only the main effects of the affiliative cues.

H. 6: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures will be more likely to vote for marginal parties than is suggested by an additive model utilizing only the main effects of the affiliative cues.

Like affiliative cross-pressures, the concept of attitudinal cross-pressures is one with a long history in the literature on voting behavior. Whereas the Columbia researchers were most concerned with affiliative cross-pressures, the Survey Research Center's group focused primarily on attitudinal ones, reflecting the basic differences in approach used by each. This is not to say that

either ignored affiliative or attitudinal cross-pressures. The Lazarsfeld group reported on them indirectly, noting that attitudes have a "strain toward consistency" during campaigns."[33] In The Voter Decides, Campbell, Gurin and Miller document the effects of family, friends and work-place peers on an individual's partisan preference.[34] In The American Voter, however, the Campbell group relies heavily on analysis of attitudes to explain voting behavior.[35]

The authors of The American Voter emphasized the critical influence of party identification on the vote of any individual. Compared to party identification, both candidate orientation and issue orientation had little predictive power. Campbell and his colleagues argue, consequently, that party identification is the variable of most concern to students of voting behavior, the one which explains the most variance, and the one which is most enduring. They present evidence that individuals rarely change party identification and that this identification is usually transmitted intergenerationally with little question, probably because it is of such low salience. This finding is of considerable relevance to this dissertation and will be reviewed below.

On the other hand, some have quarreled with the emphasis placed on party identification by the Michigan researchers and/or their interpreters. Key, for instance, in The Responsible Electorate, suggests that voters are not nearly so irrational as this blind reliance on party identification suggests.[36] He notes that earlier studies of voting behavior

were principally focused on the effect of each of these attitudinal variables, and their combinations, on voters' changes of preferences as an election drew near. Key, however, was more concerned with switches of vote between elections. His analysis supports the view that switchers are not necessarily the most incompetent voters and that they do pay considerable attention to political affairs, even basing decisions upon them. A viable theory of voting would certainly explain inter-election switches and campaign deviations as well as non-voting, a topic which Key does not investigate.

In analyzing data from the 1968 Presidential election, researchers from the University of North Carolina also accented the importance of a person's issue position for his voting decision.[37] This analysis is of particular importance here because 1968 was the first recent election featuring a significant vote for a third-part candidate, allowing the voter a choice other than Democrat and Republican. This factor probably increased the role of issues in the outcome of the election. Moreover, the work of Kovenock and his colleagues raises interesting questions about what, precisely, constitutes an issue. This question is obviously central to the study of attitudinal cross-pressures and has been too little discussed. The way one defines an "issue" may pre-determine his results, as Kovenock argues. While this problem will deserve more comment later, the point noted here is that both Key and Kovenock find issue orientation to be

more potent than previously believed, and that conflicts between party identification and issue position can cause defection from previous voting patterns.

When Campbell et al. attempt to explain individual deviations from voting preference, cross-pressures is one of their key variables. In their scheme only other attitudes mediate between an individual's partisan preference and his vote. The precise form of this mediation is not specified in The American Voter, but it does not seem unfair to infer that the relationship was assumed to be linear additive. In the case of attitudinal cross-pressures, however, there is evidence that an additive assumption is unwarranted. In his study of electoral behavior of voters in the 1956, 1960, and 1964 Presidential elections, Richard Boyd found considerable evidence of statistical interaction among the factors involved in attitudinal cross-pressures: an individual's own partisan preference, his evaluation of the candidates, and his issue position relative to the parties.[38] In short, it appears that attitudinal cross-pressures do not conform to an additive model but rather that they combine interactively to produce levels of voting defection (to use Boyd's term) above that predicted by summing the individual effects. Of course this finding is important here since it lends support to the preceding hypotheses concerning interaction in the cases of status inconsistency and especially affiliative cross-pressures. Thus, we can test the effect of attitudinal cross-pressures on turnout with the expectation that interaction

is present. From the standpoint of the theoretical outlook adopted here, this is crucial. Boyd's analysis indicates support for the stress approach: it appears that individuals defect more than would be the case if they selected one paramount value as their decision-criterion. This is the outcome suggested by the stress approach. In the light of this research, and in keeping with the arguments formulated previously, the following hypotheses are suggested:

H. 7: Individuals characterized by attitudinal cross-pressures will be less likely to vote than those without cross-pressures, and the more so the greater the cross-pressures.

H. 8: Individuals characterized by attitudinal cross-pressures will be more likely to vote for marginal parties than those without cross-pressures, and the more so the greater the cross-pressures.

H. 9: Individuals characterized by attitudinal cross-pressures will be less likely to vote than is suggested by an additive model utilizing only the main effects of the attitudinal pressures.

H. 10: Individuals characterized by attitudinal cross-pressures will be more likely to vote for their preferred party than is suggested by an additive model utilizing only the main effects of the attitudinal pressures.

Status Inconsistency, Cross-Pressures and Voting Behavior

As noted earlier, the three variables considered independent in this study, status inconsistency, affiliative cross-pressures and attitudinal cross-pressures, are presumably inter-related. Since they actually represent conceptually congruent phenomena at different levels of analysis, we should not be surprised at this relationship.

Nevertheless, the specification of the inter-relationship is relatively complex.

Status inconsistency denotes a situation in which an individual's status groups are not completely congruent. This means that status inconsistency describes a condition of holding relatively highly divergent statuses in various hierarchies. Individuals who are inconsistent may, then, be exposed to a wide variety of people, a larger range than that to which consistent individuals are ordinarily exposed. This is the traditional notion of the marginal man. Such exposure may easily lead to affiliative cross-pressures, since holding very different positions in these hierarchies is likely to result in one's family, friends and work-place cohorts being from different status levels. It is not unreasonable to expect political views encountered in this context to diverge relatively more than those nurtured in a homogeneous milieu, subjecting the individual to quite different cues. Affiliative relationships may, in turn, affect a person's attitudes. Socialization studies tell us that attitudes are learned from diverse agencies, including the family, the school, the peer group, voluntary associations, the mass media, and even broad social class.[39] If this is the case, individuals with affiliative cross-pressures may be internalizing attitudes which conflict, and/or may be more conscious of attitude conflicts already present but not necessarily salient. Thus status inconsistency should be associated with affiliative cross-pressures, which, in

turn, should be associated with attitudinal cross-pressures. There may also be a direct link between status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressures, although this relationship would probably be weaker than the other two and affected by them both.

The only evidence we have bearing on these relationships is presented by Boyd. He examined the relationship between status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressures and found that no interaction existed in the relationship.[40] Moreover, Boyd found no evidence that status inconsistency was related to attitudinal cross-pressures at all. However, he did not reject his hypothesis relating the two variables since he still felt it had considerable intuitive validity and there were several plausible alternative explanations.[41] An explanation of his failure to confirm not considered by Boyd is suggested by the above discussion: the relationship between status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressures, if any, may be operative only through the intervening variable of affiliative cross-pressures. That is, status inconsistency may affect attitudinal cross-pressures only by first affecting affiliative cross-pressures. We may represent the proposed relationship diagramatically in this way:



Figure 1: Expected Relationships Between Status Inconsistency, Affiliative Cross-Pressures and Attitudinal Cross-Pressures

It seems essential, therefore, to test the entire set of postulated relationships rather than one alone. The foregoing discussion suggests the following hypotheses:

H. 11: Individuals characterized by inconsistent statuses are more likely to have affiliative cross-pressures than those with consistent statuses.

H. 12: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures are more likely to have attitudinal cross-pressures than those not affiliatively cross-pressured.

H. 13: Individuals characterized by inconsistent statuses are more likely to have attitudinal cross-pressures than those with consistent statuses.

Although Boyd proposed that status inconsistency should interact statistically with attitudinal cross-pressures, I find no theoretical justification for this expectation and shall refrain from proposing any interactive relationships between these variables.

It may be, finally, that the effects of status inconsistency, affiliative cross-pressures, and attitudinal cross-pressures are cumulative. That is, we might expect that the more inconsistent and cross-pressured an individual becomes, the more likely he is to exhibit deviant behavior. Thus, people high on status inconsistency, and high on affiliative and attitudinal cross-pressures may refrain from voting and vote for radical parties more than people not so characterized. For simplicity's sake, and for lack of any evidence to the contrary, we can here assume an additive relationship. Thus we have two final hypotheses:

H. 14: Status inconsistency, affiliative cross-pressures and attitudinal cross-pressures have a cumulative effect on voting turn-out. Individuals high on three will turn out less than individuals high on two and individuals high on two will turn out less than individuals high on one.

H. 15: Status inconsistency, affiliative cross-pressures and attitudinal cross-pressures have a cumulative effect on partisan preference. Individuals high on three will be more likely to vote for a radical party than individuals high on two, and individuals high on two will be more likely to vote for a radical party than individuals high on only one.

The Context

The 1968 American Presidential Election may have been unique: it was certainly unusual. Both major parties experienced peculiarities in nominating candidates. Although the Republicans conformed to expectations in nominating Richard Nixon, many within that party had serious doubts concerning his ability to win and others were concerned about his strategy--the now-famous Southern strategy. The Democrats found themselves faced with a potentially fatal internal dissensus caused by the Vietnam war. Eugene McCarthy's challenge to the incumbent President over his conduct of the war was an early indication. Following the New Hampshire primary, Lyndon Johnson withdrew as a candidate for a second term with an abruptness that startled the nation. Coming late to the race, Robert Kennedy, until his assassination (itself one of the most bizarre aspects of the election) provided an attractive alternative to Hubert Humphrey. Finally, in a convention marred by ugly street riots and charges of

police brutality and convention rigging, Humphrey was annointed. He was never completely accepted by all Democrats, however, and his association with the policies of the Johnson administration and the Chicago Spectacle diminished his potential attractiveness.

The most unusual aspect of this already incredible election, however, was the emergence of a third party of respectable proportion: The American Independent Party led by George Wallace, erstwhile Governor of Alabama.[42] Labelling himself an alternative to Tweedlededum and Tweedlededee, Wallace had apparently tapped a responsive chord in the electorate and his presence threatened to make the Presidential election inconclusive, forcing a resort to the archaic process of selection by the House of Representatives. The major parties reacted to this challenge by attempting to neutralize the major Wallace Issue, law and order, and by pointing out that a vote for Wallace was a vote wasted since he could not be elected. In a society feeling itself afflicted with anarchy and a breakdown of values, the impact of the law and order issue could not be underestimated. To some extent the salience of this issue can be measured by the fact that Wallace's candidacy was the first significant minor party effort in twenty years and attracted a larger proportion of the popular vote than any third party since 1924, and a greater electoral vote total than any since 1860.[43] The Wallace effort thus makes the 1968 election different from the normal pattern of United States Presidential elections.

Students of voting behavior must, of course, investigate such discontinuities. Certainly a central question for analysis is what contributed to this unusual election. However, the topic under consideration here is a good deal more circumscribed. I am concerned primarily with the effects of status inconsistency and cross-pressures on voting behavior in the American public. In this context the anomalous nature of the 1968 election and the Wallace candidacy is an asset. Wallace offered voters an alternative clearly distinct from the two major parties. Thus, although the election was undeniably non-normal, it offers the student of inconsistency the opportunity to examine an instance in which inconsistency can well be expected to have had a visible impact. If inconsistency operates as we expect it does, then the presence of the Wallace alternative should allow inconsistent and cross-pressured individuals an outlet for their tensions. Of course we cannot expect that all such individuals will utilize this outlet. There may be reasons totally unconnected with inconsistency or cross-pressures which will lead a voter to select Wallace. It may be argued that some voters, particularly those in Alabama, do not perceive Wallace as the candidate of the third party at all, but rather view him as the legitimate Democratic party candidate.[44] Of course it may also be that some voters do not consider voting for Wallace to be a rejection of the two major parties in general, but that they see voting for Wallace as a means of expressing themselves on the issue of law and order. Presumably voters still highly

committed to either major party could choose this alternative. Other voters might consciously be using a Wallace vote to object to the tendency of the major parties to assume similar stances on most of the issues. Finally, certain inconsistent or cross-pressured individuals might be ideologically opposed to voting for Wallace in spite of a preference for changes and a rejection of the two major parties. These individuals might well be expected to obstain.[45]

While any of these explanations might aid our understanding of Wallace support, it may also be that Wallace votes are correlated with our measures of inconsistency and cross-pressures. Certainly if the theories of inconsistency and cross-pressures have any validity, we can expect them to hold in this instance. In Wallace we have a candidate who was not commonly admired, seen as a bigot by the media, presumably appealing to the lesser instincts of man. His party was portrayed in the press as a radical fringe group intent upon setting back the clock and promoting inequality. In a national sense George Wallace and his party constituted a negative valence figure. Those individuals voting for Wallace thus had to cast a ballot they knew to be outside the "mainstream" of American politics. If inconsistent and cross-pressured individuals are seen as unsatisfied with their present positions and if we assume that they view political action as a means of ameliorating these circumstances, then the Wallace candidacy should be particularly attractive since it expresses great dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs.

So the 1968 election holds advantages as well as perils for the study of inconsistency and cross-pressures. The possible pitfalls of this case may not be overlooked, however. First, in this election Wallace support was not proportional across the entire nation. Rather, it was clustered in the South, among working class voters, among protestants and among whites. It appears that Wallace's support cut into the traditional demographic strongholds of both major parties and the question of which major candidate was most adversely affected by Wallace is still being debated.[46] The uneven distribution of Wallace's support means that we must be cautious about generalizing our findings, however, since any given area or region may diverge rather greatly from such generalizations. Certainly controls for race and region seem particularly appropriate. A control for race, however, is meaningless, since, among those sampled no blacks voted for Wallace (none even supported him). Region may be a powerful factor, but so few respondents in our sample are Northern Wallace voters that comparison by region also becomes impossible. Thus, regrettably, these differences must be assumed away. That is, I shall assume that there are no differences in the way inconsistency and cross-pressures affect people's behavior in the North and South. Blacks are eliminated from consideration. Admittedly the problem of the Southern voter regarding Wallace as the legitimate candidate of the Democratic Party may still affect the results, but it should bias them in a negative direction: if it has an effect, that effect

should be to lessen the impact of inconsistency and cross-pressures on voting behavior. It will increase error and decrease the likelihood of discovering significant relationships. A second, and potentially more damaging, difficulty is related to the problem of social "clustering" originally suggested by Tingsten.[47] If inconsistency, in particular, is to have any effect, there must be some general agreement on rankings of the status variables used here: occupation, education, income and religious-ethnic prestige. At a national level, there is such a relationship. Individuals, however, do not live at the national level. They instead tend to live in clusters of socially similar people. The effect of this clustering may be to dilute the meaning and impact of inconsistency because individuals whose objective characteristics indicate inconsistency in a national sense may feel completely consistent in their micro-environment. In other words, the measure of inconsistency may be too crude. We should prefer some measure which takes into account these probable community differences in rank order of statuses. Unfortunately, there is no such measure available in our national sample. There is, in fact, a tension between the desire for accurate measurement and the desire to use a national sample. Once again, however, errors caused by this difficulty will prejudice our results against the acceptance of the inconsistency hypothesis by introducing more error. There is no reason to suspect, finally, that these errors are in any way systematic.

While the 1968 election is not flawless for the study of inconsistency, it appears that the virtue of having an alternative opposed to those usually offered presents an opportunity which ought not be passed. Voting for Wallace may be construed as a likely response to inconsistency and cross-pressures and the question of whether it really is an empirical one.

The Data Base

The data used in this thesis were gathered by the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan immediately preceding and following the election of 1968.[48] The Survey Research Center uses a multi-stage probability sample of the dwellings in the United States.[49] This procedure is commonly known as "cluster" sampling and greatly reduces the cost of the survey. At the same time, however, the method increases sampling error and violates the assumptions underlying several of the statistics employed later. Particularly the F-tests in the regression analysis must therefore be viewed with caution. It is not clear how serious this defect is, however, and the decision to utilize statistics for which the assumptions were not perfectly met was made on the conscious calculation that the power of the tests made them desirable at the level of risk implied by using a cluster instead of a simple random sample. This is not an unusual judgment, and given the fact that it is probably impossible to conduct a simple random sample of the American public, the trade-off seems altogether reasonable.

The sample has several other limitations which should be noted. First, because the sampling unit is the dwelling unit, the sample systematically under-represents the young, the poor, and the infirm (probably resulting in an under-representation of the old as well). This deficiency is of little consequence here, because none of these characteristics is particularly important to the study. At worst it impairs the generalizability of the findings, but this thesis is not particularly concerned with describing the American population. A second, and more important defect is the non-response rate. The survey has a non-response rate of 15 percent, most of which is accounted for by individuals who were not at home, even for as many as three call-backs, and those who refuse to answer. The sampling procedure does not allow for replacement, so these respondents are lost. More importantly, they show consistent biases in terms of their presumed social and economic situations. They are disproportionately poorer, probably less educated and of lower occupational status. These variables are relevant in this study and thus these groups are probably under-represented, and our results will not accurately describe the population. More important here, since our purpose is not to describe the national population, is the fact that this under-representation may systematically distort the results of our analysis, particularly that of status inconsistency. It may be that we are tapping only a certain type of inconsistent individual. Put another way, it is not inconceivable that some kinds of inconsistency lead to

refusal to respond to an interview. Although this danger is present and perhaps plausible (especially given the arguments made later concerning the effects of inconsistency), there is no way to control for this contingency and its effect, if any, must be assumed away. Of course, if such a pattern is present it will prejudice the resulting analysis against accepting the relevant hypotheses.

In spite of these likely difficulties, the 1968 Social Research Center Election Study has much to recommend it. Traditionally SRC surveys have been excellent in terms of sampling design, item construction, pre-test and validity check procedures. We have every reason to believe that this survey is as good as possible in these regards. Secondly, a national sample of this type provides a large N for analysis (total N = 1673) and hopefully is not unduly affected by regional variations. Thirdly, the SRC has refined its item sufficiently over the years so that the questionnaire used contained all the information needed for this thesis. And finally, because pre- and post-election interviews were conducted, we have the opportunity to compare attitudes with outcomes, offering a better insight into the workings of the independent variables, status inconsistency and cross-pressures.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The major studies in the United States have been reported in: Berelson, Bernard, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966); Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides, (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954); Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964); Key, V. O., Public Opinion and American Democracy, (New York: Knopf, 1967); Pool, Ithiel de Sola, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, Candidates, Issues and Strategies, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M. I. T. Press, 1964); Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political Order, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

[2]The number of studies in other nations is too large to be reviewed comprehensively here. Some representative examples are: Blondel, Jean, Voters, Parties and Leaders, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963); Converse, Philip E., and Georges Depeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," in Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order; and Janowitz, Morris, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany," The American Journal of Sociology, 64 (July, 1958).

[3]This phenomenon is particularly evident in the literature on status inconsistency. See, Lenski, Gerhard, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review, 19 (August, 1954), 405-413; Kelly, K. Dennis, and William J. Chambliss, "Status Consistency and Political Attitudes," American Sociological Review, 31 (June, 1966), 375-382; Segal, David R., "Status Inconsistency, Cross Pressures, and American Political Behavior," American Sociological Review, 34 (June, 1969), 352-358; Rush, Gary B., "Status Consistency and Right-Wing Extremism," American Sociological Review, 32 (February, 1967), 86-92.

[4]Generally, this approach was used in the voting studies executed in the 1950's. For example, see Berelson et al., Voting, and Campbell et al., The American Voter. Berelson et al. clearly adopt the view that the resolution of inconsistency is simply a matter of choosing which cue to accept. See

pp. 129-131 and pp. 200-206. More specifically, Segal, in "Status Inconsistency," bases his argument explicitly on the "balance" models of Heider and Festinger.

[5]Of course Lenski's original article implied that inconsistency effects are non-additive. Several later researchers have made this assumption explicit. See, for example, Treiman, Donald J., "Status Discrepancy and Prejudice," The American Journal of Sociology, 71 (May, 1966), 651-664; Boyd, Richard W., "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defections," American Political Science Review, 63 (June, 1969), 498-514; and, for critical comment, Blalock, Hubert M., "Status Inconsistency and Interaction: Some Alternative Models," The American Journal of Sociology, 73 (November, 1967), 305-315.

[6]Lenski, "Status Crystallization."

[7]Ibid., 412.

[8]Gerhard Lenski, "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," American Sociological Review, 21 (August, 1956), footnote 3, 459. While Lenski's original reasoning on the causes of extreme left political partisanship may be generalized to include both left and right because rightist parties as well as leftist do usually propose some kind of social change (perhaps regressive), it appears more plausible that a less clearly calculating mechanism is employed in partisan choice by inconsistents. This line of argument proposes that extremist votes result primarily from stress, at least among inconsistents, and that these votes may be either right or left depending on availability and acceptability of alternatives.

[9]Rush, "Status Consistency," 91.

[10]Ibid., 88.

[11]Kelly and Chamblis, "Status Consistency."

[12]William F. Kenkel, "The Relationship between Status Consistency and Political-Economic Attitudes," American Sociological Review, 21 (June, 1956), 365-368.

[13]Elton F. Jackson and Peter J. Burke, "Status and Symptoms of Stress," American Sociological Review, 30 (August, 1965), 556-563.

[14]Treiman, "Status Discrepancy," 654.

[15]Ibid., 654.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Jackson and Burke, "Status and Symptoms of Stress."

[18]Hubert M. Blalock, "The Identification Problem and Theory Building: The Case of Status Inconsistency," American Sociological Review, 31 (February, 1966), 52-61.

[19]Boyd, "Presidential Elections."

[20]Segal, "Status Inconsistency."

[21]For a discussion of this difficulty, see Blalock, Hubert M., "Tests of Status Inconsistency Theory: A Note of Caution," Pacific Sociological Review, 10 (Fall, 1967), 69-74.

[22]Alejandro Portes, "Leftist Radicalism in Chile," Comparative Politics, 2 (January, 1970), 251-274.

[23]Pool, Abelson and Popkin, Candidates, Issues, and Strategies.

[24]Herbert Tingsten, Political Behavior, (London, 1939).

[25]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, (New York: Doubleday, 1960).

[26]Ibid., 223.

[27]Frank A. Pinner, "Cross-Pressures," International Encyclopedia of Social Science, 3 (1968), 519.

[28]Lazarsfeld, et al., The People's Choice.

[29]Berelson, et al., Voting.

[30]Ibid., 131.

[31]Campbell, et al., The American Voter, 204.

[32]Berelson, et al., Voting, 284.

[33]Lazarsfeld, et al., The People's Choice.

[34]Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides, 202-204.

[35]Campbell, et al., The American Voter.

[36]V. O. Key, The Responsible Electorate, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1966).

[37]David M. Kovenock, Philip L. Beardsley, and James W. Prothro, "Status, Party, Ideology, Issues, and Candidate Choice: A Preliminary Theory-Relevant Analysis of the 1968

American Presidential Election," Paper presented at the Eighth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, West Germany, August 31-September 5, 1970.

[38]Boyd, "Presidential Elections."

[39]See, for example, Hyman, Herbert, Political Socialization, (New York: The Free Press, 1959).

[40]Boyd, "Presidential Elections," 506.

[41]Ibid., 506-507.

[42]The election has been analyzed several places. See Converse, Philip E., Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review, 63 (December, 1969), 1083-1105; Scammon, Richard M., and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1970); and Kovenock et al., "Status,Party, Ideology, Issues and Candidate Choice."

[43]Converse et al., "Continuity and Change," p. 1083.

[44]Kovenock, et al., "Status, Party, Ideology, Issues and Candidate Choice," p. 13.

[45]See Lenski, "Status Crystallization," p. 412, for an explanation of this phenomenon in terms of the inconsistency hypothesis.

[46]Converse, et al.,"Continuity and Change." See also Crespi, Irving, "Structural Sources of the George Wallace Constituency," Social Science Quarterly, 52 (June, 1971), 115-132.

[47]Tingsten, Political Behavior.

[48]This is the Survey Research Center 1968 Election Study (SRC S523). The Intermediate Codebook, January, 1971, was used.

[49]This procedure is described in Kish, Leslie, and Irene Hess, "The Survey Research Center's National Sample of Dwellings," Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, ISR No. 2315, (June, 1965), Mimeo.

CHAPTER II

STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

While the concept of status inconsistency as used here is a direct outgrowth of the work of Gerhard Lenski,[1] the underlying notion can be traced back at least to Weber's writings on the multiplicity of status hierarchies.[2] In fact, Bernoit-Smullyan,[3] Hughes,[4] and Adams[5] had been concerned earlier with the same problems: the behavior of individuals holding incongruent statuses in different hierarchies.

Lenski's 1954 article, however, unleashed a torrent of studies of inconsistency, presumably because he specified a method for analyzing the concept.[6] Since then disputes have raged over the content of the concept itself and especially over the various methods utilized to measure it. A brief review of each controversy will aid in relating the present study to previous research.

At a superficial level, of course, the concept of status inconsistency is clear: it is, as Lenski says, "a consistency dimension. In this dimension units may be compared with respect to the degree of consistency of the positions in the several vertical hierarchies."[7] Thus, Lenski labels inconsistency a "non-vertical dimension of social status." It is

clear also that it is completely defined by an individual's various positions. In his original article, Lenski hypothesized that inconsistents would differ in certain political attitudes from consistents, "when status differences in the vertical dimensions are controlled."[8] This type of control as Blalock notes, is not possible.[9] Realizing this, Lenski, in a later article, suggested that what is really expected of status inconsistents is a behavior not predictable from the main effects of the relevant status dimensions.[10] That is, his proposal is not that inconsistent individuals deviate because of the canceling effects of the status dimensions when taken together, but rather that they deviate more than would be expected by an examination of the additive effects of each status. Moreover, Lenski proposes that the results of status inconsistency are the same regardless of the type of inconsistency. At this point, status inconsistency detaches itself most clearly from traditional status analysis. Whether, for instance, a person is high on occupation and low on income or vice versa, his response ought to be the same. Lenski's rationale implies an intermediate psychological step between status inconsistency and behavior, and that is internal pressure or stress. Regardless of the type of inconsistency, an individual should feel some psychological stress and the stress will determine his behavior. Lenski also suggested that frequent types of political response would be left voting, and withdrawal, or non-voting.

Some have quarreled with Lenski's articulation of status inconsistency. Still others have suggested modifications while endorsing the fundamental thrust of the inconsistency thesis. Kenkel, for instance, reanalyzed Lenski's own data and found no support for the inconsistency argument.[11] He pointed out that Lenski's relationships could have been the result of only one status variable--race. Indeed, inspection of Lenski's own tables leads the reader to this conclusion. Kenkel, then, rejected the validity of the concept. His position is supported by Portes, in his analysis of left voting in Chile.[12] Portes used multiple regression methods to examine the hypothesis that inconsistent Chileans vote more left than was suggested by an additive model. The hypothesis failed. Portes noted that, in his sample, the relationship might actually be negative. Lenski has also asserted that status inconsistency may lead to right-wing as well as left-wing voting, claiming the stress produced by inconsistency leads to anti-system or anti-status quo reactions.[13]

This has not been the only suggested modification of the inconsistency hypothesis. After analyzing the Almond and Verba American Data, Segal concluded that the status inconsistency thesis was contingent upon the saliency of the statuses to the individual.[14] Only cases in which the discrepancy was clearly apparent to the individual were "true" cases of inconsistency for which the hypothesis should hold. Segal also supported Lenski's argument that the most pronounced

inconsistency effects should be found in comparisons of ascribed-achieved status conflicts. This view is also adopted by Smith and Broom and Jones.[15] To a certain extent this argument parallels the saliency proposition in that, as Segal notes, ascribed-achieved discrepancies are more likely to be salient for the individual, and as Smith suggests, these discrepancies allow for less individual control. That is, ascribed-achieved status conflicts are more likely to be perceived and less likely to be alterable than achieved-achieved conflicts. Of course, ascribed-ascribed conflicts may be salient as well, but they are often perceived as unalterable.

It is not the intent of this discussion to reiterate all the modifications which have been proposed for status inconsistency theory. Rather this abbreviated summary has been an attempt to illustrate the lack of specification surrounding the concept. While each modification may have merit, I intend to incorporate only one of them in this study. I will avoid most of Lenski's suggested procedures and depart from his early theory in examining voting behavior. I shall adopt Gordon's suggestion that status inconsistency leads to the adoption of <u>extreme</u> positions, whether left or right.[16] More specifically, I shall propose that inconsistency leads to higher levels of voting for the candidate of the "third" party in the 1968 election--George Wallace. There is already some empirical evidence that inconsistency is related positively to radical rightist attitudes, and the extension does no harm

to the essence of Lenski's original thesis. In fact, Lenski himself has allowed that rightism could be an "expected" reaction to inconsistency.[17] In this case, however, it should be clear that the prediction is based on the usual assumption that inconsistency-produced stress will lead to non-normal responses. I am defining Wallace votes as such a response: that is, a vote for Wallace is being viewed as a rejection of the traditional party system and a signal of a desire for some change, either progressive or regressive.[18]

The debate over the formulation and applicability of the status inconsistency hypothesis pales compared to scholarly exchanges regarding the appropriate methodology with which to investigate the phenomenon. Originally, Lenski constructed an "inconsistency index" which ranked individuals according to their relative distances from the means of four statuses.[19]

This method has the apparent charm of straightforward application. The charm is only apparent, however, as Treiman has shown.[20] The method is incapable of identifying interaction which Lenski allows is the crux of the consistency problem. Like simple cross-breaks, while they may be suggestive, distributions of scores cannot pinpoint inconsistency effects. This is due, of course, to the fact that cross-tabulations cannot sort out the effects of the main variables: that is, both status variables cannot be controlled simultaneously.[21]

Unfortunately all of Lenski's work, and much of that done by others, has used some form of this tabular approach.

Several researchers, however, have not. They have employed regression techniques to determine directly whether there is interaction among status variables. Jackson and Burke were the first to use this method.[22] By means of dummy-variable regression they demonstrated that an additive model was not fully adequate to explain variance in individual stress levels. They suggested several interactive relationships which better fit the data. This article was a break-through both theoretically and methodologically because it used a new and proper method to support a relationship fundamental to the analysis of inconsistency--the relationship between inconsistency and stress.

Following Jackson and Burke the same method has been used (in order) by Treiman[23] to reject hypotheses relating inconsistency and prejudice, by Boyd[24] to reject hypotheses relating inconsistency and voting defection, by Portes[25] to reject hypotheses relating inconsistency and left voting in Chile, and by Broom and Jones to test hypotheses relating inconsistency and left voting in Australia.[26] In each case the method consists of matching mean scores or cell frequencies predicted by the regression equation to the actual scores or frequencies. Treiman, Boyd, and Portes all found an additive model sufficient.

I will employ this technique to examine the relationship between status inconsistency and both turnout and vote. Both additive and interactive models will be examined; and comparisons between the two will be presented. I shall further make use

of a cross-tabulation technique suggested by Jackson in which consistent individuals are compared to progressively less consistent ones.[27] This technique suffers from some of the same limitations as those employed by Lenski. However, it is suggestive of interaction, should such exist, and it allows for a useful comparison with the more sophisticated regression method.

Operationalizations and Procedures

In this chapter, percent voting for Wallace and percent not voting in the 1968 United States Presidential election will be dependent variables. They are relatively straightforward. Percent voting for Wallace is merely the proportion of the voters in my sample who claim to have voted for George Wallace. Percent non-voters is the proportion of respondents who answered no to a question inquiring if they had voted, excluding "don't knows," "no answer," and "no answer available" codes.

The independent variable is status inconsistency. Status inconsistency is presented in several forms by simultaneously considering sets of two status variables. Four variables are employed: religious-ethnic prestige, occupation, income, and education.

Following Jackson[28] and Boyd[29] religious-ethnic prestige was measured by assigning individuals to categories based on their religious affiliation and ethnic background. Thus Rank I, the highest, consisted of Old English or Old American Protestants; Rank II consisted of Northwest European,

Protestant or Catholic; Rank III, the lowest, consisted of Eastern and Southern European and Jews. Everyone else was excluded. Individuals were first classified on their own ethnic status. If they had none, the classification progressed to father's origin and grandfather's origin. Failing this, perceived origin of family was employed. Since no Blacks voted for Wallace, they were all excluded.

The measure of occupation used was adapted from the Survey Research Center's Political Behavior Code and corresponds roughly to that of the NORC study of occupational prestige.[30] Rank I, the highest, includes professional and business occupations; Rank II consists of clerical, white-collar workers and skilled laborers; and Rank III includes semi-skilled, unskilled and service occupations. Doubtful occupations were either excluded or coded in the middle category.

Income groups were divided roughly into thirds by cutting at the following points: Rank I (high), over $10,000 per year; Rank II, $6,000 to $9,999; and Rank III, $5,999 and under. On the assumption that family income most fairly represents the level of affluence assigned to an individual by his peers, total family income was employed.

Finally, education was measured, following Lenski's suggestion, by establishing different criteria for those over and under forty-five years of age.[31] For those over forty-five the categories are: High equals a college education or attended college; medium equals high school graduate and attended high

school; low means eight years of schooling. For younger respondents, those who attended high school and had no non-college training were also assigned to the low education category.

In order to test the hypotheses presented in this chapter, cross-tabulations of the statuses and a dummy-variable regression were used. The cross-tabulations were straightforward and no tests of significance were attached, since some of the sub-samples were not independent.

The regression was obtained by the use of a computer routine.[32] The dummy variable regression procedure is identical to that used by Jackson and Burke, Treiman, and Portes. Dummy variables were established, treating each category of a status variable as a distinct variable with a value of zero or one. The additive equation follows the form $W = a_1 + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + c_1y_1 + c_2y_2$, where $\underline{a}$ is a constant, $\underline{b}_1$ is the coefficient of the first category of $\underline{x}$ (x_1), and so forth. This equation is used to generate a set of expected cell proportions which is then compared to the observed proportions to check for inconsistency effects. It should be noted that this equation is only additive and not necessarily linear. Its shape is contingent upon the distribution of the status variables. This technique avoids the complications of identification present in the cross-tabulation. Its interpretation is also more straightforward. Finally, although the independent status variables are correlated, the strength

of the correlations is quite low (under 0.50) which effectively dismisses the potential difficulty of multi-collinearity.[33]

In the comparisons of the models examined, F-tests and significance levels are presented to assess the explanatory power of the interactive terms added. The size and significance of individual coefficients are not reported, since there is no way to report the impact of the middle category. It is always summed into the constant term and thus, depending upon the choice of categories used in the regression, it would be possible to alter these coefficients. In all cases the middle category is assimilated into the constant so that inconsistencies between polar groups could be examined.

Status Inconsistency and Wallace Vote

Of the several cross-tabulation methods for investigating status inconsistency relationships, Elton Jackson's suggested approach is probably the clearest and most intuitively satisfying.[34] In this procedure individuals are grouped according to whether they are consistent, whether they deviate from consistency by one rank, or whether they deviate by two ranks. Thus persons who are high and high, medium and medium, or low and low on two given dimensions of social status are consistent. The combinations high-medium, and low-medium are labeled one rank deviates, and the extreme permutations high-low and low-high are two rank deviates. These groups are then compared with each other on some dependent variable. In this case, the variable is vote for Wallace.

Hypothesis 1, from Chapter I states:

> Status inconsistency leads to higher rates of voting for deviant parties than are predicted by an additive model using only the main effects of the status variables.

Jackson's argument suggests that, if the proportion of those voting for Wallace increases as the inconsistency increases, inconsistency effects may be present.

More importantly, according to Jackson, if the inconsistent vote for Wallace in proportions exceeding the range established by the consistent, we can infer the presence of inconsistency effects.

Table 2.1 presents this relationship. Proportions in the body of the table are percent Wallace vote. Inconsistency level is as previously described. Type of inconsistency refers to the two possible situations for each diadic status relationship: for example, R/O means cases in which religious-ethnic prestige is higher than occupation, and O/R refers to the inverse. Underlined values are those which fall outside the range bounded by the most extreme consistent groups.

Inspection of the table leads to the impression that there is no relationship between inconsistency and Wallace vote. Most of the two rank deviates fall within the bounds of the consistent groups. Of those which don't, more are <u>below</u> the range (3) than are above (2). In the case of one rank deviates, the predicted relationship occurs only twice out of twelve opportunities, although the R/E relationship is particularly deviant. The overall impression gleaned from the table, then, is of little or no relationship.

TABLE 2.1: % WALLACE VOTE BY LEVEL AND TYPE OF INCONSISTENCY

Inconsistency Type	Two Rank Deviates	One Rank Deviates	Consistents	
$R/O	20.7	11.2*	HH	7.3
			MM	9.5
O/R	5.1	8.7	LL	3.1
R/I	6.9	11.0	HH	8.4
			MM	9.1
I/R	5.3	9.6	LL	11.5
R/E	7.5	16.9	HH	5.1
			MM	8.2
E/R	2.5	8.1	LL	4.8
O/I	10.3	10.6	HH	8.8
			MM	13.5
I/O	20.5	13.0	LL	19.3
O/E	13.0	15.2	HH	6.6
			MM	13.6
E/O	11.5	14.2	LL	11.5
I/E	15.4	15.1	HH	6.5
			MM	14.5
E/I	2.0	11.7	LL	21.9

*Underlined proportions indicate outside bounds established by consistent groups.

$R/O refers to cases in which Religious Ethnic Prestige is higher than Occupation. This code is employed for all combinations. R = Religious Ethnic Prestige, O = Occupation, I = Income, and E = Education.

However, even if the data in the table had appeared to indicate interaction, we would be compelled to use extreme caution in interpreting the results for several reasons. First, the method represents only a rough test of whether relatively large inconsistency effects are present. Values close to the boundaries are not considered significant, although they might well be so. By corollary, the table does not allow unambiguous simultaneous interpretation of scores which are either "too high" or "too low." That is, we cannot say that very low scores by inconsistents represent a "liberal" or "pro-status-quo" or "pro-system" response, even though the table suggests that some inconsistents vote less for Wallace than their social characteristics might warrant. Clearly, not voting for Wallace is not the conceptual complement to voting for him. Secondly, the table has the common cross-tabular difficulty of grouping inconsistents who are substantially different. Within the one-rank deviate category are contained both high-medium and medium-low inconsistents. There is no theoretical reason to expect these two groups to act identically. Actually, we should expect them to act somewhat differently if only because the marginal distribution of respondents do not show equal numbers of Wallace voters in each status subgroup. Thus the marginal distributions cannot be ignored in interpreting the table. A third and important qualification of the results of the table also concerns the marginal distributions. If the marginals are not both roughly linear, interpretation of the table becomes even more complex.

In this case it is not necessarily proper to expect the consistent cells to set the extreme bounds for the table. It may well be that some inconsistent configuration would be expected to be the most (or least) extreme group, merely on the basis of the marginals. In this case the table distorts the data in the worst possible manner: toward confirmation of an hypothesis which may not be correct. In fact, the marginal relationships are not all linear here.[35] Only occupation and education are. Thus both of the high values displayed by the two rank deviates are probably artifacts of their distributions, although even this knowledge of the marginals does not entirely eliminate ambiguous interpretation. It is worth noting, in this context, that the only cross-tabulation of variables with linear additive marginals (occupation vs. education) shows no evidence of extraordinary interaction effects. Finally, if it is clear that this cross-tabulation cannot confirm the inconsistency hypothesis, it is also clear that it cannot disconfirm it. The table, under the best circumstances, can only <u>suggest</u> the presence of interaction and inconsistency effects: it can never <u>deny</u> their presence. For this task a more sophisticated technique is required.

Multiple regression is a statistical approach which allows us to sort out the effects of status inconsistency more adequately. By examining the added explanatory power of interaction terms in additive equations, we can test the hypothesis more precisely. If it is correct to conceive of status

inconsistency as interaction of status variables over ranges of a dependent variable, then multiple regression with the addition of interaction terms is a proper technique for its analysis.

Tables 2.2 through 2.7 present the results of the dummy-variable multiple regression analysis for sets of two independent status variables. Reading from the left, the tables display the observed proportions of Wallace vote for each combination of statuses, the expected proportion given an additive model, and the differences between the expected and observed proportions. Positive deviations indicate larger proportions than would be expected by a consideration only of the individual status variable main effects. If the status inconsistency argument holds, we should expect to find such positive deviations from the expected proportions in the inconsistent cells. These have been marked with an asterisk.

In Table 2.2 we do indeed find such a relationship. Both the high R/O and the high O/R inconsistents vote for Wallace in larger numbers than predicted. This can be taken as tentative evidence that interaction is significant here. It is especially impressive to note that the relationship holds for both types of inconsistency, since Lenski's original thesis disregarded type. In Table 2.3 results are mixed, and both differences are small. Although in Table 2.4 results are again mixed, the differences are quite large. The largest difference in any of our tables occurs here for the medium religious-ethnic prestige--low education group. This is

TABLE 2.2: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % WALLACE VOTE FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE AND OCCUPATION

Occupational Rank	Religious Ethnic Prestige Rank								
	Observed Proportions			Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	6.4 (109)	10.3 (107)	5.3 (38)	8.9	9.0	1.8	-2.5	1.3	3.5*
Medium	8.7 (92)	9.7 (72)	2.8 (36)	9.3	9.4	2.1	-0.6	0.3	0.7
Low	21.1 (57)	12.9 (62)	3.2 (31)	15.4	15.5	8.3	5.7*	-2.6	-5.1

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $w = 8.29+7.14R_1+7.24R_2-6.530_1-6.180_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 604

TABLE 2.3: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % WALLACE VOTE, FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE AND INCOME

Income Rank	Observed Proportions			Religious Ethnic Prestige Rank Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	8.5 (117)	13.8 (94)	5.6 (54)	11.1	11.4	4.4	-2.6	2.4	1.2*
Medium	15.1 (86)	9.4 (96)	0.0 (31)	11.2	11.5	4.5	3.9	-2.1	-4.5
Low	7.3 (55)	7.8 (51)	5.0 (20)	8.1	8.4	1.4	-0.8*	-0.6	3.6

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $w = 1.36+6.72R_1+7.03R_2+2.99I_1+3.08I_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 604

TABLE 2.4: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % WALLACE VOTE, FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE AND EDUCATION

Educational Rank	Observed Proportions			Religious Ethnic Prestige Rank Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	3.8 (105)	9.3 (97)	2.8 (36)	6.8	7.1	-0.2	-3.0	2.2	3.0*
Medium	17.2 (122)	9.1 (110)	5.9 (51)	13.2	13.5	6.2	4.1	-4.4	-0.3
Low	6.5 (31)	20.6 (34)	0.0 (18)	12.2	12.5	5.2	-5.7*	8.1	-5.2

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $w = 5.22+7.01R_1+7.33R_2 -5.42E_1+-.92I_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 604

TABLE 2.5: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % WALLACE VOTE, FOR OCCUPATION AND INCOME

Income Rank	Occupational Rank: Observed Proportions			Occupational Rank: Predicted Proportions$			Occupational Rank: Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	8.2 (146)	8.3 (84)	20.0 (35)	8.7	9.3	16.0	-0.5	-1.0	4.0*
Medium	7.8 (77)	9.3 (75)	14.8 (61)	8.1	8.7	15.4	-0.3	0.6	-0.6
Low	6.5 (31)	4.9 (41)	9.3 (54)	3.9	4.5	11.2	2.6*	0.4	-1.9

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $w = 11.15 - 7.35O_1 - 6.77O_2 + 4.85I_1 + 4.21I_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 604

TABLE 2.6: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % WALLACE VOTE, FOR OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION

Educational Rank	Occupational Rank: Observed Proportions			Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	5.8 (154)	4.7 (64)	10.0 (20)	5.9	4.6	9.8	-0.1	0.1	0.2*
Medium	10.6 (85)	11.3 (106)	14.1 (92)	11.2	9.9	15.1	-0.5	1.4	-1.0
Low	13.3 (15)	3.3 (30)	15.8 (38)	9.5	8.2	13.4	3.8*	-4.9	2.4

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $w = 13.43-3.95O_1-5.19O_2 -3.60E_1+1.71E_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 604

TABLE 2.7: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % WALLACE VOTE, FOR INCOME AND EDUCATION

Educational Rank	Income Rank: Observed Proportions			Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	6.4 (141)	7.2 (69)	0.0 (28)	6.7	5.8	1.9	-0.3	1.4	-1.9*
Medium	14.0 (107)	10.9 (119)	10.5 (57)	13.4	12.5	8.6	0.6	-1.6	1.9
Low	11.8 (17)	16.0 (25)	7.3 (41)	13.5	12.6	8.7	-1.7*	3.4	-1.4

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $w = 8.70+4.76I_1+3.89I_2 -6.76E_1-0.12E_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 604

surprising, particularly since assignment of rank was done in such a way as to increase error in the middle group. The results of Table 2.5 are particularly impressive given the relative "hardness" of our measure of income and occupation. In all comparisons using religious-ethnic prestige, the results are best taken with some caution because of the necessity of grouping relatively diverse individuals in this measure. However in the case of occupation and income, differences may have more validity. They are fairly strong and in the predicted direction. Likewise, Table 2.6 shows positive relationships for occupation and education although in the low occupation-high income cell the difference is practically nil. Again these results are drawn from relatively "hard" data. That fact makes Table 2.7 all the more puzzling. Here both relationships are negative, though small. Perhaps the low income--high education deviation can be explained by noting that no one in this cell voted for Wallace and the cell frequently was small. Nevertheless, the high-income--low education group is less pro-Wallace than it ought to be, both in terms of status inconsistency theory and the conventional wisdom. I shall attempt a tentative explanation of this relationship later.

Overall, eight of twelve inconsistent cells are in the predicted direction and only one negative result is of any magnitude. Across the twelve cells, the average difference is +1.16: for the eight "correct" predictions, it is +1.74. While these averages have no direct interpretation they

indicate, as does inspection of the table, that interaction may well be present. Of course the algebraic sum for deviations in consistent cells is negative ($\bar{x}$ + -1.24) as it must be to accommodate these differences. However it is notable that the medium (one rank) inconsistents also have a mean which is positive (0.49). Thus the inconsistent groups have mean differences which are in the predicted direction, and which increase as the severity of inconsistency does.

We have already shown that the data presented in Table 2.1 may be construed neither as tentative proof of status inconsistency effects nor as disconfirmation of them. Although it ostensibly is a test of hypothesis one, the cross-tabulations fails to do this adequately. The contrast with the regression analysis is impressive. The dummy-variable technique found a good deal of evidence supporting the hypothesis, although the overall results were somewhat mixed. This pattern is not unusual in the studies of inconsistencies and may be an outgrowth of the indirect methods applied.[36] Ideally we would prefer to establish a link between inconsistency and intrapersonal behavior. Here the intervening link is omitted and we focus only on the direct relationship. Theoretically this relationship should be smaller and less constant than the two direct links. The lack of very powerful differences is, therefore, understandable. On the other hand, the net differences across inconsistent cells are in the predicted direction and this holds for both types of inconsistency. This suggests, at least, that the hypothesis not be rejected.

Of course, the evidence is too weak to justify confirmation of the hypothesis. It appears that interaction is often present and that adding an interaction term to the additive model can produce a better fit to the data. However, this procedure does not usually increase the explanatory power of the model significantly.

Tables 2.8 to 2.11 display the residual frequencies of Wallace vote for combinations of three independent variables. The cell entries are differences between observed frequencies and those predicted by an additive model combining the three variables. In these tables there are six highly inconsistent cells, marked by an asterisk.

In these tables we again expect, if our hypothesis is correct, that the highly inconsistent cells will have positive entries. In Table 2.8 five of the six cells meet our expectation. However, across all four tables this pattern does not recur. In fact, of twenty-four highly inconsistent cells, half are not in the predicted direction, one is precisely zero and the remaining eleven are positive. Certainly this pattern cannot be taken as confirmation of the hypothesis. There appears to be no consistent relationship in any of these four tables. The distribution of residuals has no pattern to it. Yet this absence of a pattern may be merely an artifact of some of the small cell frequencies encountered when the sample of 604 is broken into twenty-seven cells. Perhaps a more accurate and meaningful test of the hypothesis would ask if the addition of interaction terms to the equations

TABLE 2.8: RESIDUAL PROPORTIONS OF WALLACE VOTE FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE, OCCUPATION, AND INCOME$

Income Rank	Religious Ethnic Prestige Rank								
	High Occupation			Medium Occupation			Low Occupation		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	-8.0	-0.5	+8.4*	+7.1	-3.0	-9.0	+0.9*	+1.6	+9.5*
Medium	+5.2	-6.8	+13.6	+6.2	+3.5	-3.1	-1.3	-2.2	-9.3
Low	+2.6*	-0.1	-3.8*	-4.7	+0.3	+0.9	+17.4*	+2.0	-5.1

* Highly Inconsistent Cells

$ The table is based on a total N of 604

TABLE 2.9: RESIDUAL PROPORTIONS OF WALLACE VOTE FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE, OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION$

Education Rank	Religious Ethnic Prestige Rank								
	High Occupation			Medium Occupation			Low Occupation		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	-4.0	-2.0	0.0*	+3.0	+0.6	+5.5	+4.6*	+1.5	-3.8*
Medium	+2.5	+2.0	+9.8	-2.9	+1.2	-11.3	+1.7	+0.9	-3.3
Low	+3.5*	-9.7	-5.9*	+3.4	+1.3	+12.7	-3.5*	-2.4	-7.7

* Highly Inconsistent Cells

$ The table is based on a total N of 604

TABLE 2.10: RESIDUAL PROPORTIONS OF WALLACE VOTE FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE, INCOME, AND EDUCATION$

Education Rank	Religious Ethnic Prestige Rank								
	High Occupation			Medium Occupation			Low Occupation		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	-4.6	+0.5	-2.5*	+3.3	+2.0	-2.9	+3.3*	+0.9	+4.8*
Medium	+3.0	+5.4	+6.5	+0.4	-6.5	-9.9	+0.5	-6.1	-2.2
Low	-15.3*	+8.3	-10.0*	+4.3	+15.3	+7.2	-8.0*	-6.6	-2.7

* Highly Inconsistent Cells

$ The table is based on a total N of 604

TABLE 2.11: RESIDUAL PROPORTIONS OF WALLACE VOTE FOR OCCUPATION, INCOME, AND EDUCATION$

Education Rank	Occupation								
	High Income			Medium Income			Low Income		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	+0.1	-0.3	-11.3*	-2.9	+3.5	-0.1	+2.5*	+9.6	-6.0*
Medium	-1.4	-1.7	-4.5	+2.0	+2.0	-1.0	+5.2	-5.2	+0.3
Low	+12.8*	+5.9	-16.7*	-11.3	-9.9	+1.6	-0.5*	+14.2	-2.3

* Highly Inconsistent Cells

$ The table is based on a total N of 604

which generated the predicted cell frequencies would significantly increase the explanatory power of the models.

Table 2.23 presents F-tests and levels of significance for the impact of selected additional interaction terms. The interaction terms represent corrections for each of the highly inconsistent cells in Tables 2.8 through 2.11. They exhaust, therefore, the inconsistent categories thought to be most important in inconsistency theory. If the inconsistency hypothesis is valid, these terms, or at least some of them, should add significantly to our ability to explain variance in Wallace vote. That is, the F-tests should reveal significant gains in explanatory power when these terms are added to the models. Actually the results do not support the hypothesis. In only one case, that in which occupation is either higher or lower than religious-ethnic prestige and income, is the additional variance explained significant. This itself might have occurred by chance in the twelve comparisons available. The table clearly shows that the addition of interaction terms for inconsistent individuals does not significantly increase our ability to predict or explain their behavior. On this basis, we must tentatively reject Hypothesis One. There is no convincing evidence of inconsistency effects in the case of vote for Wallace.

Finally, some specific findings warrant comment. Earlier I noted that the high-income--low-education cell in the two-variable comparison, votes less for Wallace than its individual characteristics suggest it will. This is particularly puzzling,

since in more traditional analyses, Wallace support is found to be stronger in this group. It appears that the conventional wisdom may be distorted at this point, for it is possible for Wallace to be strong among this group, but still not as strong as he ought to be, given the characteristics of this group. This is indeed the case. In inconsistency terms we might suggest that this instance is one of those which may require modification of the thesis. Others have suggested that a useful distinction exists between achieved and ascribed statuses, that conflicts between achieved statuses are not as likely to be salient or important to inconsistent individuals as are ascribed-achieved conflicts. This modification fits the data fairly well. Another possible explanation is that voting is only one of a number of potential political responses to inconsistency. Another is non-voting. We find later (Table 2.18) that the high income, low education group does vote less than expected. Perhaps, in this case, the costs of gathering information and actually voting are too much for this group and non-voting is a functional alternative to Wallace vote. In the conclusion of this chapter this proposition will be examined in more detail.

Status Inconsistency and Non-Voting

In this analysis of inconsistency and non-voting, I shall again begin with the cross-tabular technique suggested by Jackson. In this case, as Table 2.12 shows, there is apparently less support for the inconsistency thesis. Since the limitations

TABLE 2.12: % NON-VOTERS BY LEVEL AND TYPE OF INCONSISTENCY

Inconsistency Type	Two Rank Deviates	One Rank Deviates	Consistents
R/O	28.0	22.6	HH 13.4
			MM 23.8
O/R	14.6	9.8*	LL 28.3
R/I	30.8	27.1	HH 12.3
			MM 15.3
I/R	11.9	9.6	LL 38.6
R/E	40.0	23.9	HH 16.9
			MM 17.2
E/R	17.3	12.6	LL 40.5
O/I	22.9	23.1	HH 9.7
			MM 21.2
I/O	14.8	17.2	LL 43.8
O/E	25.8	25.1	HH 13.6
			MM 16.0
E/O	21.6	18.8	LL 43.4
I/E	32.5	15.2	HH 11.2
			MM 18.0
E/I	27.7	22.5	LL 46.9

*Underlined proportions indicate outside bounds established by consistent groups.

of the table are now clear, it is possible simply to note that this table constitutes no test of the second hypothesis, which is (from Chapter I):

> H. 2: Status inconsistency leads to higher rates of non-voting than are predicted by an additive model using only the main effects of status variables.

The only unusual entries in the table are below the bounds, but may not indicate excessively high turnout even in these instances. We shall return to the table later, in comparing its results with those generated by the regression analysis.

Tables 2.13 through 2.18 present the results of the regression analysis. These tables are interpreted the same as were tables 2.2 to 2.7, except that positive differences now indicate more non-voters than expected by additive assumptions. In these tables, only seven of the twelve inconsistent cells are in the predicted direction. Differences are not large, with the exception of the negative 17.6 found in the high-occupation--low education cell. This is also the largest deviation found in the entire set of tables. It indicates that the individuals in this cell voted in greater numbers than are expected under additive assumptions. This finding is contrary to that predicted by our hypothesis. It is especially noteworthy when balanced with the high-education--low occupation group, which is in the predicted direction. There is no easy explanation for this divergence. Ordinarily, we would expect high education to result in high turnout. This table suggests that, relative to occupation, the opposite is the case for inconsistent individuals. The finding is more surprising when

TABLE 2.13: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % NON-VOTERS FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE AND OCCUPATION

Occupational Rank	Religious-Ethnic Prestige Rank								
	Observed Proportions			Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	13.5 (126)	8.4 (119)	13.0 (46)	12.6	11.0	8.7	0.9	-2.6	4.3*
Medium	20.8 (120)	24.2 (99)	10.0 (40)	21.7	20.1	17.8	-0.9	4.1	-7.8
Low	28.4 (81)	25.9 (85)	27.3 (44)	28.6	27.0	24.7	-0.2*	-1.1	2.6

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $\hat{T} = 24.71+3.87R_1+2.31R_2 -16.000_1-6.930_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 760

TABLE 2.14: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % NON-VOTERS FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE AND INCOME

Income Rank	Observed Proportions			Religious-Ethnic Prestige Rank Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	10.5 (133)	8.4 (107)	12.5 (164)	11.3	9.3	9.4	-0.8	-0.9	3.1*
Medium	23.2 (112)	16.2 (117)	11.1 (36)	19.6	17.6	17.7	3.6	-1.4	-6.6
Low	30.5 (82)	35.4 (79)	33.3 (30)	34.1	32.1	32.2	-3.6*	3.3	1.1

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $\hat{T} = 32.16+1.95R_1-0.03R_2 -22.80I_1-14.48I_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 760

TABLE 2.15: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % NON-VOTERS FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE AND EDUCATION

Educational Rank	Religious-Ethnic Prestige Rank								
	Observed Proportions			Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	15.3 (124)	13.2 (114)	13.3 (45)	15.3	13.8	11.8	0.0	-0.6	1.5*
Medium	15.1 (146)	15.7 (134)	13.6 (59)	16.3	14.7	12.7	-1.2	1.0	0.9
Low	42.1 (57)	36.4 (55)	30.8 (26)	39.0	37.4	35.4	3.1*	-1.0	-4.6

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $\hat{T} = 35.41+3.57R_1+2.01R_2 -23.64E_1-22.69E_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 760

TABLE 2.16: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % NON-VOTERS FOR OCCUPATION AND INCOME

Income Rank	Occupational Rank								
	Observed Proportions			Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	7.9 (164)	11.3 (97)	16.3 (43)	6.8	13.1	16.5	1.1	-1.8	-0.2*
Medium	12.3 (90)	20.8 (96)	21.5 (79)	13.4	19.6	23.0	-1.1	1.2	-1.5
Low	21.6 (37)	33.3 (66)	37.5 (88)	26.4	32.6	36.0	-4.8*	0.7	1.5

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $\hat{T} = 36.04 - 9.66O_1 - 3.44O_2 - 19.54I_1 - 13.03I_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 760

TABLE 2.17: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % NON-VOTERS FOR OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION

Educational Rank	Occupational Rank								
	Observed Proportions			Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	12.8 (180)	13.5 (74)	24.1 (29)	11.2	17.8	23.1	1.6	-4.3	1.3*
Medium	8.5 (94)	14.8 (128)	20.5 (117)	8.4	15.1	20.4	0.1	-0.3	0.1
Low	11.8 (17)	42.1 (57)	40.6 (64)	29.4	36.0	41.4*	-17.6	6.1	-0.8

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $\hat{T} = 41.35-11.96O_1-5.31O_2 -18.21E_1-20.98E_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 760

TABLE 2.18: PREDICTED, OBSERVED AND RESIDUAL % NON-VOTERS FOR INCOME AND EDUCATION

Educational Rank	Income Rank: Observed Proportions			Predicted Proportions$			Observed-Predicted Proportions		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	8.8 (160)	17.4 (86)	29.7 (37)	9.7	17.0	27.3	-0.7	0.4	2.4*
Medium	8.4 (119)	14.3 (140)	26.2 (80)	7.8	15.2	25.6	0.6	-0.9	0.6
Low	28.0 (25)	35.9 (39)	41.9 (74)	26.0	33.5	43.8	2.0*	2.4	-1.9

$Predicted proportions were generated by this equation: $\hat{T} = 43.83 - 17.80I_1 - 10.34I_2 - 16.49E_1 - 18.26E_2$

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

Total N = 760

we recall that this high-occupation--low-education cell was more pro-Wallace than expected. These inconsistents both vote more often and vote more for Wallace than is expected. Earlier we suggested that this would not be the case, that non-voting and Wallace support would coincide. Actually, this relationship does not exist in the data. A slightly negative tendency is observed, seven of twelve comparisons being inverted. This finding will be discussed more thoroughly later.

Considered as a set, Tables 2.13 through 2.18, then, do not provide support for the inconsistency hypothesis. For the inconsistents, the average deviation is actually negative, both for moderate (-0.53) and extreme groups (-0.73). Conversely the consistents average less turnout than is expected (+0.2). This is, of course, precisely the opposite pattern from that which is predicted. It appears then that the hypothesis cannot be accepted, and should, in fact, be inverted, as inconsistency seems to produce marginally higher turnout rates than expected. Perhaps this is a more logical extension of the original Lenski formulation as well. If inconsistency leads to stress, presumably voting is one way of relieving that stress. If Lenski's argument concerning desire to change the social order has any merit, voting might appear a logical result of inconsistency.[37]

It should also be noted that inconsistency effects are more likely to occur among the cells generated by ascriptive-achievement status comparisons. This fits well with the findings on Wallace voting, but is, of course, overturned if

the hypothesis is reformulated. The results can be viewed either as evidence of the need for reformulation or as mixed results indicating the importance of achieved-ascribed status differences. No final determination can be made here.

As with Wallace vote, we can examine the residual proportions of observed minus expected voters for combinations of three independent variables. This relationship is presented in Tables 2.19 through 2.22. The results of this analysis for turnout parallel those for Wallace vote. Again the hypothesis predicts positive residuals in the highly inconsistent cells. However, this expectation is not consistently confirmed in the tables. In fact only half the residuals are in the predicted direction, not an inspiring result. It seems, then, that inconsistency is no more strongly related to turnout than it is to Wallace vote, and in neither case is the relationship significantly other than random. Of course, these tables often suffer from small cell sizes, but even where cell frequencies are sizable, the predictions are not consistently supported. There is also no discernable pattern to the positive or negative residuals, i.e., no particular sets of statuses seem to operate in the expected fashion more frequently than others.

Earlier we suggested that there might be an inverse relationship between Wallace vote and turnout and that for inconsistency types which do not fit our expectations on vote we could expect to find that they would fit on turnout, since Wallace vote and non-voting may be functionally alternative

TABLE 2.19: RESIDUAL PROPORTIONS OF TURNOUT FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE, OCCUPATION, AND INCOME$

Income Rank	Religious-Ethnic Prestige								
	High Occupation			Medium Occupation			Low Occupation		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	- 1.8	-3.1	-12.8*	-8.5	+3.8	-1.6	-1.2*	+7.3	+36.4*
Medium	- 6.1	+5.4	+ 9.0	-6.6	-0.4	-3.0	+2.5	-9.8	- 4.0
Low	-14.3*	-6.1	+ 0.5*	-9.8	+8.8	+5.3	-1.9*	-2.5	+10.0

$This table is based on a total N of 760

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

TABLE 2.20: RESIDUAL PROPORTIONS OF TURNOUT FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE, OCCUPATION, AND EDUCATION$

Education Rank	Religious-Ethnic Prestige								
	High Occupation			Medium Occupation			Low Occupation		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	+ 2.1	+5.8	+ 9.1*	- 0.5	- 1.2	- 0.6	+ 4.9*	-15.0	+ 5.1
Medium	+ 4.2	-0.7	+32.3	- 3.3	+ 4.4	+13.1	+ 1.5	- 7.7	+13.0
Low	-31.7*	+5.0	-31.8*	+16.5	+14.4	+5.2	+23.4	+ 5.9	-26.3

$This table is based on a total N of 760

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

TABLE 2.21: RESIDUAL PROPORTIONS OF TURNOUT FOR RELIGIOUS-ETHNIC PRESTIGE, INCOME, AND EDUCATION$

Education Rank	Religious-Ethnic Prestige								
	High Income			Medium Income			Low Income		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	+0.3	+ 1.2	+5.7*	-5.2	+2.4	+6.8	+ 4.2*	-15.7	+ 7.3
Medium	-1.6	+ 1.0	-3.2	-1.4	-1.9	+7.7	+ 7.3	- 2.8	- 7.5
Low	+1.3*	+15.3	-4.4*	+8.0	-2.7	-3.0	-24.8*	-14.0	+44.1

$This table is based on a total N of 760

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

TABLE 2.22: RESIDUAL PROPORTIONS OF TURNOUT FOR OCCUPATION, INCOME, AND EDUCATION$

Education Rank	Occupation								
	High Income			Medium Income			Low Income		
	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low
High	0.0	+ 4.1	+ 5.5*	- 7.4	- 5.7	+10.9	+12.1*	+2.4	-12.2*
Medium	+2.9	- 4.3	+ 0.2	- 0.8	- 1.1	+ 1.7	+ 0.9	+0.8	+ 0.5
Low	-1.3*	-13.4	-37.3*	+12.0	+17.1	- 4.0	-14.3*	-7.4	+ 3.2

$This table is based on a total N of 760

*Highly Inconsistent Cells

reactions to status inconsistency. A comparison of tables 2.8 through 2.11 with tables 2.19 through 2.22 lends no support to such a thesis, in spite of its intuitive plausibility. This hypothesis describes only half of the cases. Again there is no pattern to the residuals which fit the hypothesis. It appears that any combination of statuses may or may not fit the hypothesis.

Finally, we may ask whether the addition of interaction terms aids the explanation of variance in turnout in 1968. Table 2.23 presents this relationship. Here only two of the twelve F-tests evidenced a significance additional explanation of variance by the interaction terms added to the additive model. While the probabilities here are generally lower than in the case of Wallace vote, there is still little ground for accepting interaction as an important variable in determining turnout. Knowledge of a person's particular pattern of inconsistency does not help much in predicting whether he will vote. In general, adding interactive terms to a model in order to gain explanatory power was fruitless. It appears that the inconsistency hypothesis does not hold here or in Wallace voting and that the relation of our status variables to these two dependent variables is essentially linear, and not particularly strong.

TABLE 2.23: F-TESTS AND LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR REDUCTION OF UNEXPLAINED VARIANCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ADDITION OF SELECTED INTERACTION TERMS[a]

Additive Equation[b]	Interaction Terms	Turnout	Wallace Vote
$R_1 + R_2 + O_1 + O_2 + I_1 + I_2$	$+R_1O_1I_2+R_2O_2I_1$	F=3.738; P=0.024	F=0.440; P=0.650
	$+R_1O_2I_1+R_2O_1I_2$	F=1.556; P=0.210	F=3.304; P=0.036
	$+R_2O_1I_1+R_1O_2I_2$	F=0.214; P=0.810	F=0.321; P=0.731
$R_1 + R_2 + O_1 + O_2 + E_1 + E_2$	$+R_1O_1E_2+R_2O_2E_1$	F=2.677; P=0.068	F=0.142; P=0.868
	$+R_1O_2E_1+R_2O_1E_2$	F=0.393; P=0.681	F=0.010; P=0.991
	$+R_2O_1E_1+R_1O_2E_2$	F=1.747; P=0.173	F=0.976; P=0.621
$R_1 + R_2 + I_1 + I_2 + E_1 + E_2$	$+R_1I_1E_2+R_2I_2E_1$	F=0.128; P=0.880	F=0.853; P=0.570
	$+R_1I_2E_1+R_2I_1E_2$	F=0.753; P=0.525	F=0.224; P=0.802
	$+R_2I_1E_1+R_1I_2E_2$	F=0.719; P=0.508	F=2.435: P=0.086
$O_1 + O_2 + I_1 + I_2 + E_1 + E_2$	$+O_1I_1E_2+O_2I_2E_1$	F=0.616; P=0.545	F=9.832; P=0.561
	$+O_1I_2E_1+O_2I_1E_2$	F=0.944; P=o.608	F=0.013; P=0.988
	$+O_2I_1E_1+O_1I_2E_2$	F=3.371; P=0.034	F=0.210; P=0.812

[a] In all cases the interaction terms reduced the number of degrees of freedom two (2) degrees (to 751).

[b] R_1 denotes the high category of Religious-Ethnic Prestige, R_2 denotes the low category. The same labelling procedure applies to each independent variable.

Summary and Conclusions

The most obvious comment on these status inconsistency data is that very little evidence of the expected effect exists. None of the multiple regressions, including that with all four independent variables, was able to explain more than 8.7% of the variance in Wallace vote. There was no expectation that a great deal of variance would be explained, but 8.7% is still very little. More important, of course, is the fact that interaction terms, when added to the additive equations, failed to increase the explained variance measurably. Although the process of dummy variable regression makes the interpretation of significance tests for beta-coefficients a very delicate procedure, very few of these tests attained significance. Only rarely did an interaction term matter, and there were sufficient numbers of them so that this result could easily have happened by chance.

From a methodological viewpoint, the analysis demonstrated that tabular presentation of these data is usually uninformative, can be misleading and even when essentially correct cannot be relied upon. This method is crude, imprecise and throws out useful information. Obviously the multiple-regression procedure is more accurate and reliable. Although a four-independent variable multiple regression equation was run, it was not reported, principally because the number of cells required made cell frequencies low or zero in too many cases (the table has 162 cells and the N was only 760). Its results paralleled those already reported.

Moreover, while the three-independent variable multiple regression runs are reported, the problem of small cell sizes may have been significant here as well. There is no way to be sure of this, of course, but patterns found in the two-variable regression runs cease to exist in the three-variable case. This may be a result of small cell frequencies in the latter. Needless to say, these comments do not apply to the F-tests in Table 2.23 which are not related to cell sizes. Nevertheless, the two-variable regression runs should not be viewed as inferior to the three-variable case and may, in fact, be more appropriate tests of the hypothesis.

The theoretical significance of the findings is clear: they lend little support to the inconsistency hypothesis. For the most part, there is no evidence of inconsistency effects. A possible exception to this generalization is the case of ascribed vs. achieved status. As Segal and others note, conflicts between ascribed and achieved statuses might be expected to show inconsistency effects more clearly.[38] Both the two-variable and three-variable regressions indicate that this sub-hypothesis may have merit. The two-variable finding was previously discussed. In the three-variable case, that is where religious-ethnic status was either higher or lower than any two other status variables, there is a consistent relationship. When REP is higher, Wallace vote is lower. For combinations of occupation, education and income, higher than religious-ethnic prestige individuals vote for Wallace more than they ought, assuming these characteristics have an

additive effect. This finding lends some support to Segal's argument. It is somewhat puzzling, however, if one recalls that this group consists mainly of Eastern European Catholics and Jews. The conventional wisdom does not include this group among Wallace stalwarts, but they vote more for Wallace than they ought. The other group, with achieved statuses above REP would be more conventionally thought of as heavy Wallace supporters, but actually they provide less than they ought. This is not to say that the first group has a larger proportion of Wallace voters than the second: it does not. It does, however, support Wallace more than it ought, given its characteristics. The ability of this approach to discover such anomalies is another of its virtues.

Finally, we must note that although there is little evidence of interaction effects here, the hypothesis may still be correct. This is possible, of course, because of the indirect test being attempted here. Supposedly the relationship between inconsistency and vote is not a direct one. If it is not, there is no a priori reason to expect that a strong relationship will exist between these two variables. A definitive answer to this problem awaits the analysis of data containing stress and voting information.

For the most part the findings on turnout parallel those on Wallace voting. Very little variance is explained by any regression. No remarkable patterns of inconsistency appear in the residual tables. The ascribed-achieved relationship found for Wallace vote is not reiterated in the turnout data.

Although it was originally proposed that non-voting might be a functional alternative to Wallace voting among groups of inconsistents, this hypothesis had to be discarded. There was no relationship of any kind between non-voting and Wallace vote. Groups which supported Wallace more than they should have were neither more nor less likely to vote. Hypothesis II, then, has to be rejected in a less qualified way than Hypothesis I. There is no support in the data for it, and only little for Hypothesis I.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review, 19 (August, 1954), 405-413.

[2]H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), sep. chapter 7.

[3]Benoit-Smullyan, "Status, Status Types and Status Interrelationships," American Sociological Review, 9 (1944), 151-61.

[4]Everett C. Hughes, "Social Change and Status Protest: An Essay on the Marginal Man," Phylon, X (First Quarter, 1949), 58-65.

[5]Stuart Adams, "Status Congruency as a Variable in Small Group Performance," Social Forces, 32 (1953), 16-22.

[6]Lenski, "Status Crystallization."

[7]Ibid., 405.

[8]Ibid., 406.

[9]Hubert M. Blalock, Tests of Status Inconsistency Theory: A Note of Caution, Pacific Sociological Review, 10 (Fall, 1967), 69-70.

[10]Gerhard E. Lenski, "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," American Sociological Review, 21 (August, 1956), 459.

[11]William F. Kenkel, "The Relationship between Status Consistency and Politico-Economic Attitudes," American Sociological Review, 21 (June, 1956), 365-368. See also Lenski's reply immediately following in which he suggests the interactive approach to inconsistency.

[12]Alejandro Portes, "Leftist Radicalism in Chile," Comparative Politics, 2 (January, 1970), 251-274.

[13]Lenski, "Social Participation."

[14]David R. Segal, "Status Inconsistency, Cross-Pressures, and American Political Behavior," American Sociological Review, 34 (June, 1969), 352-358.

[15]Thomas Smith, "Structural Crystallization, Status Inconsistency and Political Partisanship," American Sociological Review, 34 (December, 1969), 907-921. Broom, Leonard and F. Lancaster Jones, "Status Consistency and Political Preference: The Australian Case," American Sociological Review, 35 (December, 1970), 989-1001. Broom and Jones suggest that status inconsistency may occur only in certain societies, and only when structural characteristics permit. Australia does not seem to be such a society.

[16]Milton Gordon, in a conversation with Lenski, reported in Lenski, "Social Participation."

[17]Lenski, "Social Participation."

[18]For a similar interpretation, see Crespi, Irving, "Structural Sources of the Geroge Wallace Constituency," Social Science Quarterly, 52 (June, 1971), 114-132.

[19]Lenski, "Status Crystallization."

[20]Donald J. Treiman, "Status Discrepancy and Prejudice," American Journal of Sociology, 71 (May, 1966), 652.

[21]Blalock, "Tests of Status Inconsistency Theory." See also Blalock, Hubert M., "Status Inconsistency, Social Mobility, Status Integration, and Structural Effects," American Sociological Review, 32 (October, 1967), 790-801 especially. Also see Hyman, Martin D., "Determining the Effects of Status Inconsistency," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (Spring, 1966), 120-129, for a discussion of some flaws in cross-tabulation analysis of inconsistency.

[22]Elton Jackson and Peter J. Burke, "Status and Symptoms of Stress," American Sociological Review, 30 (August, 1965), 556-563.

[23]Treiman, "Status Discrepancy," 651-664.

[24]Richard W. Boyd, "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1969).

[25]Portes, "Leftist Radicalism."

[26]Broom and Jones, "Status Consistency."

[27]Elton Jackson, "Status Consistency and Symptoms of Stress," American Sociological Review, 27 (August, 1962), 469-480.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Boyd, "Presidential Elections."

[30]See Survey Research Center 1968 Election Study, Intermediate Codebook, July, 1969.

[31]Lenski, "Status Crystallization," 407.

[32]See North Texas State University Statistical User's Guide, Version II, September 1, 1971.

[33]Hubert M. Blalock, "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity," Social Forces, 42 (December, 1963), 233-237.

[34]Jackson, "Status Consistency."

[35]For Religious-Ethnic Prestige the rank order of frequencies is Middle, High and Low for the High, Medium and Low categories. For occupation the ranks are identical. For income the ranks are arranged as they are for Religious-Ethnic Prestige. And for Education the rank order of frequencies is Low, Medium and High for the High, Medium and Low categories.

[36]See, for example, Jackson and Burke, "Status and Symptoms of Stress."

[37]Lenski, "Status Crystallization," 412. For empirical comment of preference for social among inconsistents, see Goffman, Irwin W., "Status Consistency and Preference for Change in Power Distribution," American Sociological Review, 22 (June, 1957), 275-281.

[38]Segal, "Status Inconsistency." See also Smith, "Structural Crystallization."

CHAPTER III

CROSS-PRESSURES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The Concept of Cross-Pressures

Previously I argued that status inconsistency and cross-pressures were conceptually similar. According to this thesis they differ only in the level of analysis involved: status inconsistency refers to demographic characteristics of individuals while cross-pressures has been used alternately to signify non-cumulative associational cues or non-cumulative attitudinal orientations. While the level of analysis clearly differs, the underlying dynamics of inconsistency resolution appear to be the same. That is, for each variable, the inconsistent are expected to resolve their non-cumulative "pressures" in one of two ways: by tension release, "cathartic" behavior, or by a decision which "balances" the forces and decides on the strongest. This approach was tested for status inconsistency in the last chapter. In this chapter I turn to the analysis of affiliative and attitudinal cross-pressures.

Before presenting the analysis, however, an extended digression is necessary. The conceptualization of status inconsistency presented in Chapter II differed from previous studies primarily in the method used to investigate it. This is not the case with cross-pressures. There is a logical

disagreement with previous research at the core of the reconceptualization of cross-pressures to be presented. This difference can best be seen if we examine the assumptions underlying previous uses of the cross-pressure variable. A brief review of these studies reveals, first, that cross-pressures has been applied in various ways. Usually it concerns the "factors" influencing an individual's vote. These may all dispose a person to vote but one way, or they may not. If not all the factors disposing a person to vote lead to the same conclusion, he is said to be cross-pressured. The People's Choice was the first study to use the cross-pressure notion.[1] In the investigation of the 1940 election in Erie County, Ohio, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues defined cross-pressures as, "the conflicts and inconsistencies among the factors which influence vote decision."[2] The factors which constituted the stuff of cross-pressures in this study were: religion, socio-economic status, occupation, community group identification, 1936 vote, 1940 vote, family political orientation, friend's political orientation, attitudes toward business and government and party preference. This list includes variables which are here labelled status: occupation and socio-economic status; others which are labelled affiliative: family political orientation, friend's political orientation; and others still which are (or would be) labelled attitudinal: community group identification, attitudes toward business and government, and party preference. The tendency in cross-pressure analysis to lump very different characteristics

together is both frequent and unfortunate. While The People's Choice generally confines its cross-pressure analysis to cases which operate at the same level of analysis this is not always the case and the failure to separate levels is no doubt attributable to the inadequate conceptualization of cross-pressures.[3] The reader gains the impression that these factors have equal potency and may be paired regardless of level of analysis differences, which are never explicitly noted. In fact, the authors of The People's Choice leap levels when contrasting associational cues and party preference. Nowhere are the relationships between levels discussed. If a person is cross-pressured at one level, it might be reasonable to expect cross-pressures at other levels. This expectation draws no attention. Of course The People's Choice was a pioneering effort and it is no doubt too much to ask that new findings such as those produced by this study be integrated into a coherent theory. We must not, however, overlook the implicit assumption embodied in this conception of cross-pressure and its effect on later studies. Cross-pressures here, as later in Voting, referred to structures of contradictory cues, presenting an individual with a "choice" (presumably non-cross-pressured voters had not this choice --their vote was effectively determined by the cue they had). This view assumed the adoption of a linear additive model of cross-pressure effects--one which approximates vector analysis of voting "pressures." This assumption was not clearly articulated, nor were its implications. Neither was it

recognized, apparently, that cross-pressure behavior could have more than one explanation or that it might have needed no special treatment.

The sequel to The People's Choice, Voting, is intentionally more theoretically oriented.[4] This study of the 1948 election in Elmira, New York, led the research team (essentially unchanged from the Erie County group) to the same general findings about cross-pressures. People experiencing cross-pressures once again had difficulty deciding for whom to vote and more often decided not to vote (or at least did not vote as often--these may not be equivalent statements).[5] In this case, the level of analysis question is further muddied by the conceptual disregard of these levels and the equation of within-level effects with between-levels ones.[6] The authors note that men appear to have a built-in "strain toward consistency which accounts for the difficulties found by the cross-pressured."[7] When faced with inconsistent cues, the argument apparently is, voters are deprived of this consistency and this results in tension they wish to avoid. This argument bears a resemblance to that proposed for status inconsistency effects, although it is not so explicit and, perhaps, not so justified, as we shall see. The concept of priority variables introduced by Berelson et al. are also suggestive, since they represent the first attempt to differentiate between more and less important factors.[8] It might appear that this concept is crucial to an understanding of cross-pressures, and recently Sperlich has argued precisely

that.[9] Later I will take the position that if a linear additive assumption is maintained, this distinction has little meaning. In Voting, the assumption is implicitly made.

A final point must be noted in discussing The People's Choice and Voting. Neither study has any measure of the magnitude of the cross-pressures involved. The only way magnitude can be assessed is by examining the change in the dependent variables. This method is, of course, tautological and therefore untenable. Magnitude, however, may be thought significant, especially if a vector model is conceived as appropriate, or even if linear additive assumptions are made. Cross-pressure predictions come to hinge on the magnitudes of the forces involved. The failure to note or attempt to measure this potential factor would appear important if either model mentioned applies. If either model is applied, however, the magnitude of the cross-pressures may be measured by their effects, as will be shown later, and the problem is hidden. Later it will be shown that magnitude is a concept which is automatically measured by the approach proposed here.

The bulk of the Columbia Group's energy was devoted to assessing the impact of avowedly "social" factors--group memberships, family ties, occupational status--on the political behavior of the voter. A different tack was taken by the Survey Research Center's group. In two volumes and several articles they emphasized the importance of intra-psychic space --the voter's attitudes. In The Voter Decides, Campbell, Gurin and Miller report findings which parallel those of the

Columbia group: "When the three motivating factors were not congruent people were less clear in their choice of candidates, they were not so likely to vote, and those who did showed the conflict in their motivations by a greater incidence of vacillation, postponement, and divided votes."[10]

Campbell, et al., assume the same conflict model apparently accepted in Voting.[11] Although the authors of The Voter Decides recognize that reactions to cross-pressure may be quite varied, they nonetheless expect them to conform to this basic model of tension and conflict avoidance. In The American Voter, the SRC group did not expand this conceptualization.[12] Their findings were by then routine and the explanation has become widely accepted.

The level of analysis is much more explicit here: Campbell et al. are concerned almost solely with attitudinal variables (what they call "proximate" causes). They, moreover, attempt to illuminate the links between affiliative and status cross-pressures and these attitudinal ones, although their treatment here is mainly illustrative.[13] Finally, they add a dimension of magnitude to their analysis and attempt to assess its effect.[14] Thus the analysis in The American Voter represented the most advanced yet in the study of cross-pressures.

Since 1960 several attempts have been made to refine further the concept of cross-pressures. Three of these deserve special consideration. The first is that of Boyd.[15] In his study of voting defection (whether or not a person

votes according to his partisan preference) Boyd, in effect, reconceptualized attitudinal cross-pressures. He first tested cross-pressures in the standard fashion, by assessing the impact of more and more pressures. His findings here parallel those of the American Voter (some of the data overlap those used in that study) and are not surprising. He notes that this test assumes that cross-pressures operate in an additive fashion. His second test drops the additive assumption and argues that certain cross-pressure combinations lead to non-additive results. This hypothesis is not completely confirmed. Thus Boyd's analysis supports the original conception of cross-pressures, at least to the extent that cross-pressures do not always lead to effects greater than an additive model suggests. Boyd does not, however, completely recognize the damage done to the implicit meaning of cross-pressures by this reconceptualization.

Sperlich, in another attempt at reconceptualization, argues that cross-pressures as traditionally defined and measured do not produce the results usually claimed.[16] His analysis of the 1960 election in the traditional manner showed no evidence of cross-pressure effects. The expected, and by now common, relationships between delay, non-voting and split-ticket voting did not materialize. The reason for this, Sperlich argues, is improper and vague conceptualization of cross-pressures. Particularly, the concept was based upon faulty assumptions about the "natural" tension and conflict avoidance mechanism in man and it did not sufficiently consider

either the "centrality" (salience) or the magnitude of the cross-pressures. Moreover, says Sperlich, cross-pressure analysis never really demonstrated that cross-pressures lead to any more tension than normal, or that presumed cross-pressures were actually felt.

All of these cavils are apparently worthwhile. Certainly the psychological mechanisms presumed operative in cross-pressure situations were simplistic and crude. However, Sperlich himself does not investigate whether these are in fact operative, or whether some non-tension reducing behavior might be important. While he notes that some reactive behavior might be merely "task solving" (choosing between cues), he fails to test whether this alternative or another (like tension reduction) is actually more common. Further, he never questions the additive assumptions commonly made, and incorporates them in his own analysis. Of course this makes his failure to find cross-pressure effects all the more interesting, but it means that his reconceptualization is very limited indeed, amounting to the specification of intervening variables (third factors, as he calls them).

In this sense a more promising approach is that made by Horan.[17] In his article on cross-pressures he rejects the utilization of an additive model as having no theoretical value. In an argument very similar to that made here in Chapter I, he proposes two models for cross-pressures, one additive, the other interactive. He claims that if the additive model holds, then cross-pressures is a meaningless

concept since it has no existence outside of the main effects of the "pressures".[18] He finds that an interactive model explains no more than an additive one. This finding is, however, more relevant for Chapter II than here, since Horan's cross-pressures refer to variables I label status ones (again demonstrating the sloppy usage invited by the term cross-pressures). On the other hand, his effort represents a bridge between the congruent notions of status inconsistency and cross-pressures and further sensitizes us to their commonalities. Another interesting aspect of his study is that it involves reanalysis of the Elmira study and refutes the findings presented there. The major contribution made by Horan, however, is his recognition that the conceptualization made originally in The People's Choice was ambiguous. It allowed for strikingly different interpretations, in fact, assuming one model of behavior, while apparently utilizing one quite different. This ambiguity has, for the most part, been accepted and maintained by other researchers.

Hopefully this review has sufficiently illustrated the major previous conceptualizations of cross-pressures. Earlier I noted that the difference in the conceptualization to be presented here and that provided originally by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet is primarily a logical one. Basically the argument is that if the cross-pressure variable is used as Lazarsfeld et al. suggest, then it is not a variable. If by cross-pressures they mean merely that the additive effects of the relevant pressures should be considered, then they

have invented a term essentially without meaning. Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz, for example, point to four mechanisms which "explain" political participation. They are: 1) the degree to which interests are involved in government policies, 2) access to information about the relevance of government policies, 3) group pressures to vote, and 4) cross-pressures.[19] If we accept the Lazarsfeld conceptualization there is no need for the cross-pressure variable: it is already contained in group pressures to vote. On the other hand, if we follow Horan and Boyd, cross-pressures take on new meaning, since we now must expect non-additive behavior from individuals experiencing them. Now we are forced to decide whether cross-pressures exist or not, in a fashion very similar to that of the status inconsistency analysis. The key question becomes: "will an additive model suffice?" If so we need only know an individual's characteristics to predict his behavior--so special configurations will lead to aberrant behavior. If not, our universe is more complex than previously suspected. If so, cross-pressures do not exist: if not, they do.

This distinction may be illustrated graphically by the use of a typical tabular presentation. In this idealized case we have a table with three dichotomous variables which may represent any of the factors mentioned above.

		Factor C: D		Factor C: R	
		Factor B: D	Factor B: R	Factor B: D	Factor B: R
Factor A	D	I	II	II	III
	R	III	II	II	I

Figure 2: Idealized Cross-Pressure Table

In this table cell entries refer to diffent degrees of cross-pressure. I means no cross-pressures, II means moderate cross-pressures and III means severe cross-pressures, assuming, as is customary, that Factor A is the most "central" variable (e.g. party orientation). The traditional cross-pressure hypothesis regarding turnout, for example, would propose that turnout declines from Type I to Type III, probably monotonically although this stipulation may be ignored. Thus Type I has high turnout, Type II less, and Type III the least. The posture adopted here suggests, on the other hand, that relative turnout is of little consequence. What matters is whether an additive model will explain such a table. In this conception of cross-pressures we would only claim to have found cross-pressures effects if, for instance, Type III individuals were less likely to vote than expected, given their characteristics (Factors A through C). This formulation rescues the concept from the conceptual muddle currently surrounding it. Perhaps this is the usage originally intended. Whether it is or not is of little consequence, since, as has been demonstrated, it is not the one usually applied. The argument here is that the

normal usage presents cross-pressures as a descriptive term: i.e. one which refers only to certain configurations of factors. In no way is this usage consonant with the present one which suggests that cross-pressures be used as a variable.

A final disclaimer is necessary here. None of this, of course, represents an effort to measure cross-pressures. An inferential leap is necessary to accept the existence of cross-pressures (or deny it) in any case, since we have no direct measure of them. Cross-pressures in this conception becomes a state of mind, akin to attitudes, but perhaps even less susceptible to measurement.

Operationalizations and Procedures

This chapter presents an analysis of three dependent variables: voting turnout, Wallace vote, and major party vote. The first two have already been described. The last is included here to allow for a better comparison of the results of the reconceptualization of cross-pressures with previous studies. It is simply the percentage of the sample voting Republican for President (it could as easily have been percent Democrat). This variable excludes all voters choosing another party or candidate, as well as those who didn't vote or refused to answer.

There are two independent variables, or sets of them. The first section deals with affiliative cross-pressures. How a person was told to vote by his spouse, his relative(s) or his friend(s) are the core variables. All permutations

of these variables are employed, and they are presented in two distinct fashions, one strictly tabular and one based on a dummy-variable multiple-regression analysis. These variables were measured directly by means of an item which asked, "Who (sic) did your spouse (relative, friend) tell you to vote for."[20] The variables were trichotomized to indicate Democratic--Humphrey, American Independent--Wallace, or Republican--Nixon cues. Wallace suggestions were assumed not to mean Democrat as well, since the respondent had that choice independently presented and could not choose two alternatives simultaneously.

Attitudinal cross-pressures were measured by means of a series of ten questions asked on party and candidate preferences and by selection of ten important issues in 1968 and the individual's perceived partisan stands on these. This procedure parallels that of Boyd, so results should be comparable.[21] Scores ranged from -10 to +10 on each variable and were then trichotomized for use in the analysis.

The regression analysis presented in this chapter is identical with that used in Chapter II, although it is simpler since fewer variables are involved. The tabular presentations are different, reflecting the different approach taken by students of cross-pressures. Tests of hypotheses employ both methods and an attempt is made to distinguish standard from non-standard hypotheses and tests.

Finally, in the case of affiliative cross-pressures, the lack of a sufficient number of respondents necessitated

dropping three way cross-tabulations. This does not affect the analysis significantly, since the first two hypotheses are testable in two-way cross-breaks and the second two rely on a dummy-variable multiple-regression analysis for which the N is ample.

Affiliative Cross-Pressures and Voting Behavior

The concept of affiliative or associational cross-pressures is not a new one. As conventionally employed it asks whether the cross-pressured are more likely not to vote, delay voting decisions, etc. The effect of cross-pressures is usually established by comparing individuals or groups of individuals with inconsistent characteristics with those having consistent ones. The first hypothesis in this chapter is representative.

> H. 3: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures will be less likely to vote than those without cross-pressures, and the more so the greater the cross-pressures.

Evidence to test this hypothesis is then presented in tabular form. Table 3.1 is such a table. The entries in Table 3.1 are percentages of non-voters in 1968. The N's on which these percentages are based are given in parentheses. The hypothesis expects that individuals with consistent cues will rarely fail to vote, individuals with slightly inconsistent cues will vote less, and individuals with strongly inconsistent cues will most often be non-voters. Table 3.1 lends some support to this hypothesis. Individuals with two Democratic cues are relatively unlikely to vote, as are slightly

TABLE 3.1: AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY SPOUSE AND RELATIVE CUES*

Spouse	Relative		
	Democrat	Wallace	Republican
Democrat	23.1 (13)	25.0 (4)	25.0 (4)
Wallace	0.0 (5)	0.0 (4)	0.0 (2)
Republican	10.0 (10)	0.0 (2)	0.0 (17)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which the percentages are based.

cross-pressured individuals who were urged to vote for Wallace by either their spouse or relative. Strongly cross-pressured individuals, those urged to vote for both major parties differ markedly in their turnout. Here, as in all the affiliative cross-pressure tables, we must exercise caution in interpretation because of the small cell sizes. In any event an explanation of these differences is not essential. The most important aspect of the table is the apparent proclivity for the cross-pressured, on the average, to vote less. This can be measured by borrowing a procedure from the analysis of status inconsistency. If we subtract the percent of non-voters in the non-cross-pressured cells from the percent of non-voters in the cross-pressured cells we have a crude

measurement of the effect of cross-pressures, traditionally conceived. In this case this index is 11.9.

Performing a similar analysis on Tables 3.2 and 3.3 yields essentially the same result: for spouse-friend cross-pressures the index is 14.2, and for relative-friend cross-pressures, the index is 44.7. The last value is particularly high, presumably indicating a strong cross-pressure effect.

TABLE 3.2: AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY SPOUSE AND FRIEND CUES*

Spouse	Friend		
	Democrat	Wallace	Republican
Democrat	15.0 (20)	0.0 (1)	37.5 (8)
Wallace	0.0 (3)	25.0 (4)	0.0 (1)
Republican	0.0 (9)	0.0 (4)	8.3 (12)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which the percentages are based.

Inspection of Table 3.3 reveals that it is somewhat unusual. Although it has no zero-^{N} cells, only the consistent and highly cross-pressured cells contain percentage entries. However, it fits the cross-pressure hypothesis very well, since the cross-pressured cells have high proportions of non-voters relative to the consistent cells. Tables 3.1

through 3.3, then, appear to support H.3. Cross-pressured cells have, on the average, proportionately more non-voters.

TABLE 3.3: AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY RELATIVE AND FRIEND CUES

Relative	Friend		
	Democrat	Wallace	Republican
Democrat	8.3 (24)	0.0 (2)	27.3 (11)
Wallace	0.0 (4)	0.0 (10)	0.0 (4)
Republican	22.2 (18)	0.0 (5)	6.3 (16)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

An interesting sidelight of these tables is the apparent effect of Wallace cues. A Wallace cue was conceptualized as a stimulus intermediate between Republican and Democratic cues. Although these tables do not display the direction of the vote, it appears that a Wallace cue was particularly potent in sending an individual to the polls. This phenomenon is most striking in Table 3.3, in which no one with even one Wallace cue failed to vote (N=25). Perhaps this is an instance in which the magnitude of a pressure is significant. I shall return to this possibility in the later regression analysis. Conceivably, a Wallace cue is perceived differently than a

Democratic or Republican suggestion. However, the hypothesis still seems to hold, especially if we center attention only on major party cues.

A second interesting aspect of these tables is the emergence of an expected relationship. Consistent Democratic cues are associated more strongly with higher levels of non-voting than consistent Republican cues, in all cases. Since we know Democrats are less likely to vote than Republicans, this finding reassures us as to the validity of the tables.

The second hypothesis must be approached even more carefully. A straight-forward interpretation is impossible because of the confounding of independent variables to a necessary degree. The hypothesis states:

> H. 4: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures will be more likely to vote for marginal parties than those without cross-pressures, and the more so the greater the cross-pressures.

One level of cross-pressures, however, suggests precisely that a person votes for the candidate of a marginal party. We would expect that, in cells cued for Wallace, Wallace vote would rise. Tables 3.4 through 3.6 confirm this expectation. Thus the analysis of cross-pressures centers here on Republican-Democrat and Democrat-Republican cross-pressures only.

Only one person in all six cross-pressured cells across the three tables voted for Wallace (N=48). In the consistent cells all of six people selected Wallace in 1968 (N=92). This indicates that fewer people, proportionally, voted for

TABLE 3.4: AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT WALLACE VOTERS, BY SPOUSE AND RELATIVE CUES*

Spouse	Relative		
	Democrat	Wallace	Republican
Democrat	0.0 (10)	0.0 (3)	0.0 (3)
Wallace	33.3 (3)	100.0 (4)	50.0 (2)
Republican	0.0 (9)	0.0 (2)	5.9 (17)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

TABLE 3.5: AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT WALLACE VOTERS, BY SPOUSE AND FRIEND CUES*

Spouse	Friend		
	Democrat	Wallace	Republican
Democrat	(17)	0.0 (1)	0.0 (5)
Wallace	33.3 (3)	100.0 (3)	100.0 (1)
Republican	0.0 (9)	25.0 (4)	18.2 (11)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

TABLE 3.6: AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT WALLACE VOTERS, BY RELATIVE AND FRIEND CUES*

Relative	Friend		
	Democrat	Wallace	Republican
Democrat	4.5 (22)	50.0 (2)	0.0 (8)
Wallace	0.0 (4)	40.0 (10)	25.0 (4)
Republican	7.1 (14)	20.0 (5)	13.3 (15)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

Wallace among the cross-pressured than among those whose cues were consistent Democrat or Republican. The hypothesis suggests exactly the opposite outcome. Again the small cell sizes dictate prudence, but the evidence strongly suggests that people having inconsistent affiliative cues for major parties did not increase support for the marginal Wallace effort in 1968. On the other hand, analysis of data presented later shows that individuals cross-pressured among major parties follow the pattern expected with regard to vote for either major party. That is, when the same analysis uses percent Democrat or percent Republican as the dependent variable the traditional cross-pressure hypothesis is largely confirmed. This would seem to mean that the Wallace vote hypothesis is a deviant case.

The Wallace vote case has another anomaly associated with it: individuals with consistent Republican cues are more often willing to vote for Wallace than are those with consistent Democrat cues. This is surprising when we recall that Wallace was occasionally, especially in some Southern states, viewed as the "real" Democratic candidate. We would then expect that more Democrats than Republicans would select Wallace. Further, other analyses of the 1968 election have demonstrated Wallace's appeal to the least educated, least affluent segments of the society--the working class. These people again are most likely to be Democrats. It would seem that a vote for Wallace would be a greater effort for an individual with consistent Republican cues. This anomaly occurs again the case of attitudinal cross-pressures and will be discussed further there.

Apparently hypothesis four, then, must be rejected. It is contradicted by the data. Cross-pressures do not appear to increase the vote for marginal parties.

The preceding analysis has followed the pattern traditionally applied--investigation of differences between cross-pressured and consistent cells. Now the analysis shifts to an investigation of whether cross-pressure effects amount to a non-additive phenomenon. In this analysis for affiliative cross-pressures, I am handicapped by small cell sizes and the possibility of distortion in comparisons between observed and expected frequencies generated by an additive dummy-variable regression equation. Therefore this section deletes these

comparisons, although they have been made. Where their inclusion seems useful they will be mentioned.

The first hypothesis to suggest other than additive effects is:

> H. 5: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures will be less likely to vote than is suggested by an additive model utilizing only the main effects of the affiliative cues.

Since we must avoid direct comparison of additive results with observed ones, this analysis focuses on two elements: F-tests between additive and interactive models, and beta-weights of additive and interactive dummy-variables. Table 3.7 presents the F-tests for interactive versus additive models of the

TABLE 3.7: AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURES, F-TESTS BETWEEN ADDITIVE AND INTERACTIVE EQUATIONS, FOR TURNOUT

Affiliative Combination	R-Squared	F-Value	P
Spouse-Relative	Add: 0.0966 Int: 0.1006	0.1350	0.8740
Spouse-Friend	Add: 0.0935 Int: 0.1048	0.3916	0.6776
Relative-Friend	Add: 0.0370 Int: 0.0962	3.0801	0.0506

affiliative cross-pressures utilized. For the spouse-relative and spouse-friend combination the F-values are not large and the probabilities are no where near significant, in any sense.

In these cases the R-squared for the interactive model is higher than that of the additive one, but the added explanatory power is offset by the loss of degrees of freedom.

A different picture emerges in the case of relative-friend cross-pressures. The F-value is large, and the R-squared generated by the interactive equation is significantly higher than the additive R-squared. Apparently in this case the additive equation can be improved by considering interaction--this relationship supports the hypothesis.

The results of inspection of beta-weights for additive and interactive terms in the dummy-variable regression analysis are similar to the F-test results. None of the interactive terms approaches significance. However, only rarely do the additive terms achieve statistical significance. Usually these are on the same order of magnitude as the interactive terms. This suggests that affiliative cross-pressures have little explanatory meaning. Also it appears that affiliative cues in general have little effect on turnout. Again the case of relative-friend is deviant but even here beta-weights for cross-pressure terms are not significant. Certainly analysis of the results of the regression analysis provide no consistent support for H. 5: there is little evidence that cross-pressures lead to lower levels of turnout than an additive model would predict. Neither is there any evidence that an additive model is particularly useful. The case of relative-friend cross-pressures does not fit the pattern, and suggests that in some circumstances affiliative cross-pressures may

exist. It must be noted that the relative-friend regression had more degrees of freedom than the others, and this may affect the outcome.

The analysis for H. 6 follows the same order. Comparisons of tables observed and expected may be misleading (in fact, they suggest interaction) because of the small N. The analysis is more appropriately based on the regression results alone. H. 6 stipulates:

> H. 6: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures will be more likely to vote for marginal parties than is suggested by an additive model utilizing only the main effects of the affiliative cues.

Table 3.8 presents the results of the F-tests for each interactive versus additive model combination. Clearly adding

TABLE 3.8: AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURES, F-TESTS BETWEEN ADDITIVE AND INTERACTIVE EQUATIONS, FOR WALLACE VOTE

Affiliative Combinations	R-Squared	F-Value	P
Spouse-Relative	Add: 0.5580 Int: 0.5605	0.1521	0.8593
Spouse-Friend	Add: 0.4829 Int: 0.5107	1.5311	0.2255
Relative-Friend	Add: 0.1234 Int: 0.1544	1.5405	0.2202

interaction terms has little effect on the amount of variance explained in the case of the spouse-relative models. For the

other two combinations the relationship is also not significant. However it is much closer to significance. The beta weights for spouse-friend and relative-friend show interactive terms at significance levels similar to the additive ones. While not statistically significant they indicate that interaction effects may be at least as important as the additive ones. On the other hand it cannot be said that the gain in R-squared provided by the addition of interaction terms adequately compensates for the loss of degrees of freedom: We cannot accept the hypothesis on the basis of these data. While they do not completely contradict the hypothesis they provide only the weakest support: the gains in explanatory power could have happened by chance. An additive model apparently is sufficient. In the first two cases the R-square is respectable, suggesting that the dimensions included are important predictors. Wallace vote is, thus, little affected by affiliative cross-pressures, as a variable.

Attitudinal Cross-Pressures and Voting Behavior

Presumably because data on them are more easily gathered attitudinal cross-pressures have been studied in considerably more depth than affiliative or associational ones. Again, however, the mode of analysis most often applied involves comparisons of cross-pressured individuals with consistent ones. In the case of affiliative pressures this amounted to assumption of an additive relationship and likewise in the case of attitudinal cross-pressures an additive assumption is

normally implicit. In this case the tests are considerably more reliable, due to a much larger N and perhaps more adequate measurement.

The investigation of attitudinal cross-pressures proceeds in essentially the same fashion as that of affiliative cross-pressures. First, standard hypotheses are examined. Then interactive characteristics are investigated by means of comparisons of observed and expected values, F-tests between models and beta-weight significance tests. The larger N here, it should be noted, makes it considerably easier for an F-value to be significant. Nevertheless, the results may legitimately be compared with those of affiliative cross-pressures. It must be remembered also, that confirmation of traditionally stated hypotheses in no way affects the potential confirmation of the reconceptualized hypotheses. Finally, the measurement of attitudinal cross-pressures does not involve Wallace preferences, simplifying interpretation.

The first attitudinal cross-pressure hypothesis parallels that in the affiliative section:

> H. 7: Individuals characterized by attitudinal cross-pressures will be less likely to vote than those without cross-pressures, and the more so the greater the cross-pressures.

Data relating to this hypothesis are presented in tables 3.9 through 3.11. Interpretation of these tables is, presumably, straightforward. The hypothesis predicts that as we move from totally consistent cells to totally cross-pressured ones, cross-pressure effects become more visible, and cross-pressured

TABLE 3.9: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY PARTY AND CANDIDATE ORIENTATIONS*

Party Orientation	Candidate Orientation		
	Democrat	No Preference	Republican
Democrat	20.1 (309)	27.8 (144)	25.0 (44)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	36.8 (87)	38.3 (227)	25.0 (120)
Republican	18.8 (32)	25.8 (132)	17.3 (393)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

TABLE 3.10: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY PARTY AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS*

Party Orientation	Issue Orientation		
	Democrat	No Preference	Republican
Democrat	20.5 (303)	30.3 (132)	17.7 (62)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	38.0 (100)	37.7 (223)	24.3 (111)
Republican	22.2 (81)	20.9 (191)	17.5 (285)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

TABLE 3.11: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY CANDIDATE AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS*

Candidate Orientation	Issue Orientation		
	Democrat	No Preference	Republican
Democrat	22.2 (252)	26.8 (112)	21.9 (76)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	30.1 (143)	37.7 (244)	22.4 (132)
Republican	21.3 (89)	22.1 (190)	17.3 (310)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

have higher proportions of non-voters than consistent ones. Although differences are small, the cross-pressure index constructed in the previous section and adapted from status inconsistency analysis shows consistently higher proportions of non-voters in the cross-pressured cells. The net advantages of the cross-pressured cells are, for Tables 3.9 to 3.11 respectively, 6.4, 1.9, and 3.7. These are not large differences, but they are consistent. They support the first part of the hypothesis.

The expected effect of the progression from zero to very strong cross-pressures does not materialize, however. Moderate cross-pressures appear to lead to higher levels of non-voting than strong cross-pressures. At this point the

possible effect of intensity of attitude must be recalled. Attitudes toward each of our elements, party, candidate and issue were measured in such a way that medium responses almost necessarily include an element of apathy. Thus people with medium cross-pressures are more often little involved, so one might well expect that these cross-pressures lead to high levels of non-voting. There was no way, in these data, to measure intensity adequately, however, so this interpretation must remain tentative.

So, while the second half of the hypothesis cannot be either confirmed or disconfirmed definitely, the first has at least consistent support. The cross-pressured vote less often. Note also that the data in Tables 3.9 to 3.11 show a familiar pattern: consistent Democrats are more likely not to vote than consistent Republicans. This is expected and lends validity to the cross-pressure findings.

As a secondary check on the hypothesis, the three attitudes were merged in a three-way table. (See Table 3.12) The pattern noted in the two-way cross-breaks re-emerges here. On the average, those in the highly cross-pressured cells are likely to vote, but the highest non-voting rates occur among those in the medium cross-pressured cells. In some highly cross-pressured cells, however, non-voting is quite low. The pattern here is not so consistent as in the two-way tables. This may be due to the fact that a three-way cross-break means that strong cross-pressures include two pressures in one direction and one in another, whereas the two-way tables

TABLE 3.12: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT NON-VOTERS BY PARTY AND CANDIDATE AND ISSUE ORIENTATION*

Party Orientation	Issue Orientation: Democrat Candidate			Candidate			Republican Candidate		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	19.8	18.7	37.5	23.4	40.7	21.4	15.2	26.7	14.3
	(212)	(75)	(16)	(64)	(54)	(14)	(33)	(15)	(14)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	39.4	43.8	21.1	34.2	43.1	27.3	37.5	20.4	23.9
	(33)	(48)	(19)	(38)	(130)	(55)	(16)	(49)	(46)
Republican	14.3	40.0	16.7	20.0	23.2	19.8	20.0	23.1	16.1
	(7)	(20)	(54)	(10)	(60)	(121)	(15)	(52)	(218)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

have a more stark contradiction. The important fact of Table 3.12 is, of course, that it largely reiterates the findings of Tables 3.9 to 3.11.

None of this, of course, asks whether cross-pressures lead to non-voting at rates significantly higher than are to be expected, given the marginal distributions of attitudes. These findings may, therefore, be artifacts of the marginals. We know, for example, that Republican orientations toward any of the objects result in lower non-voting rates. Investigation of this possibility occurs in H. 9.

First we focus on the presumed effect of attitude cross-pressures on Wallace vote, in conventional terms. Although

no previous research has investigated this variable, the expected relationship is stated in H. 8:

> H. 8: Individuals characterized by attitudinal cross-pressures will be more likely to vote for marginal parties than those without cross-pressures, and the more so the greater the cross-pressures.

Tables 3.13 through 3.15 present data bearing on this hypothesis. Table 3.13 is particularly edifying. It shows the classic cross-pressure pattern: both high cross-pressure cells contain greater proportions of Wallace voters than either consistent cell. Clearly the difference between the cross-pressured and consistent cells is large and in the predicted direction (18.6). The other tables are less ideal,

TABLE 3.13: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT WALLACE VOTERS, BY PARTY AND CANDIDATE ORIENTATIONS*

Party Orientation	Candidate Orientation		
	Democrat	No Preference	Republican
Democrat	2.9 (245)	2.0 (102)	16.1 (31)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	11.5 (52)	22.2 (126)	27.9 (86)
Republican	15.4 (26)	8.2 (97)	10.0 (321)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

TABLE 3.14: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT WALLACE VOTERS, BY PARTY AND ISSUE ORIENTATION*

Party Orientation	Issue Orientation		
	Democrat	No Preference	Republican
Democrat	0.8 (237)	4.4 (91)	16.0 (50)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	5.5 (55)	26.9 (130)	25.3 (79)
Republican	9.5 (63)	7.4 (149)	11.6 (232)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

TABLE 3.15: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT WALLACE VOTERS, BY CANDIDATE AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS*

Candidate Orientation	Issue Orientation		
	Democrat	No Preference	Republican
Democrat	1.0 (193)	11.2 (80)	12.0 (50)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	5.3 (94)	13.8 (145)	15.1 (86)
Republican	5.9 (68)	14.5 (145)	16.0 (225)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

perhaps, but the cross-pressure index is positive in each case, 13.1 and 0.9 respectively. These data support the first half of H. 8.

The findings on the second part are more complicated. The pattern found among non-voters is not so clearly evident: medium cross-pressures are not associated with consistently higher Wallace voting than strong cross-pressures. Only in Table 3.15 is the relationship found in the case of non-voting reiterated for Wallace vote. It would be illegitimate to conclude from this that the hypothesis be confirmed, but equally overzealous to reject it. The data give it some support.

Table 3.16 combines the effects of the three attitudinal variables. The pattern of this table is similar to that found in the two-way splits. The average Wallace vote among highly cross-pressured cells is larger than among the consistent cells as before. Medium cross-pressures here are characterized by the highest rates of Wallace voting. Perhaps once again the effect of apathy is present, but this interpretation is not unambiguous.

Two further findings merit comment. Both the two- and three-way cross-breaks indicate higher Wallace voting among consistent Republicans than among consistent Democrats. This finding duplicates that discovered in the analysis of affiliative cross-pressures. It also runs counter to what we might expect, given the regional and social class basis of Wallace support as reported elsewhere. The source of this

TABLE 3.16: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT WALLACE, BY PARTY, CANDIDATE AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS*

Party Orientation	Issue Orientation: Democrat Candidate			Candidate			Republican Candidate		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	0.6	0.0	11.1	4.2	3.1	9.1	14.3	9.1	27.3
	(169)	(59)	(9)	(48)	(32)	(11)	(28)	(11)	(11)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	0.0	13.0	0.0	20.8	22.1	39.5	10.0	28.6	26.5
	(18)	(23)	(14)	(24)	(62)	(38)	(10)	(35)	(34)
Republican	16.7	16.7	6.7	25.2	8.9	5.2	8.3	5.0	13.3
	(6)	(12)	(45)	(8)	(45)	(96)	(12)	(40)	(180)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

phenomenon cannot be isolated here. Perhaps Wallace supporters, while nominal Democrats, found their candidate and issue preferences more Republican than usual in 1968. To some extent this interpretation is supported by Table 3.13 to 3.15 in which the candidate-issue cross-break produces the highest Wallace vote among Republicans. This explanation cannot be more than speculative, however, as a complete investigation would take us too far afield.

A second observation, relevant later, is that cross-pressure effects are more visible when partisan orientation is involved. Both the two and three-way cross-tabulations evidence this. Of course, this is not unexpected, given the

findings of The American Voter. In this case it may mean that when individuals experience attitudes contradicting their party preference they are freed to vote for third parties more than if only candidate and issue preferences conflict. Again this interpretation is, at best, only tentative, but the finding is interesting.

So far the analysis has proceeded in traditional terms. I have argued, however, that accepting hypotheses such as H. 7 and H. 8 does not establish the existence of attitudinal cross-pressures. To do this requires propositions concerning cross-pressures as a separate variable. The ninth hypothesis is such a proposition:

> H. 9: Individuals characterized by attitudinal cross-pressures will be less likely to vote than is suggested by an additive model utilizing only the main effects of the attitudinal pressures.

Tables 3.17 through 3.19 present data on this hypothesis. These tables contain the observed frequencies, the expected frequencies assuming an additive model, and the differences between the two. The hypothesis predicts that the differences in the highly cross-pressured cells will be positive. That is, observed frequencies will exceed expected frequencies if cross-pressure effects are present. In five of six cases, this expectation is fulfilled, the exception occurring in the case of Democratic party orientation and Republican candidate orientation. Only in the opposite cross-pressure instance is the difference large, however. For the most part, then, the data fit the expectation. It is difficult to set limits

TABLE 3.17: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: OBSERVED, EXPECTED AND RESIDUAL PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY PARTY AND CANDIDATE ORIENTATIONS

Party Orientation	Candidate Orientation: Observed			Expected			Observed-Expected		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	20.1	27.8	25.0	21.2	27.4	17.9	-1.1	0.4	7.1
Weak Identifier or No Preference	36.8	38.3	25.0	32.0	38.2	28.7	4.8	0.1	-3.7
Republican	18.8	25.8	17.3	20.3	26.4	27.0	-1.5	-0.6	-9.7

TABLE 3.18: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: OBSERVED, EXPECTED AND RESIDUAL PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY PARTY AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS

Party Orientation	Issue Orientation: Observed			Expected			Observed-Expected		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	20.5	30.3	17.7	22.4	26.0	17.6	-1.9	4.3	0.1
Weak Identifier or No Preference	38.0	37.7	24.3	33.6	37.4	26.9	4.4	0.4	-2.6
Republican	22.2	20.9	17.5	20.6	24.3	15.8	1.6	-3.4	1.7

TABLE 3.19: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: OBSERVED, EXPECTED AND RESIDUAL PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY CANDIDATE AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS

Candidate Orientation	Issue Orientation								
	Observed			Expected			Observed-Expected		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	22.2	26.8	21.9	22.6	27.6	19.0	-0.4	-0.8	2.9
Weak Identifier or No Preference	30.0	37.7	22.4	30.4	35.4	26.8	-0.3	2.3	-4.4
Republican	21.3	22.1	17.3	19.6	24.5	16.0	1.7	-2.4	1.3

on what proportion of "correct" differences constitutes the support for the hypothesis. At the least the data do not suggest rejection.

In Table 3.20 differences between observed and expected values are presented for an expanded analysis using all three variables. In this case three of the six highly cross-pressured cells are negative. This result could, of course, easily have happened by chance no matter what criteria are applied. However the expanded table also defines cross-pressures somewhat differently than the two-way cross-break and thus may not be strictly comparable. This phenomenon was noted above. While these results must make us even more cautious, they do not allow rejection yet. A more precise analysis is necessary.

TABLE 3.20: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: RESIDUAL PERCENT NON-VOTERS, BY PARTY, CANDIDATE AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS

Party Orientation	Issue Orientation: Democrat Candidate			Candidate			Republican Candidate		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	-1.2	-6.0	19.2	-0.8	10.9	0.0	-1.7	4.2	0.1
Weak Identifier or No Preference	7.8	6.6	-7.8	0.5	2.7	-4.7	10.5	-12.7	0.8
Republican	-6.7	13.3	-1.6	-4.1	6.6	1.6	3.1	0.6	1.9

Table 3.21 represents such an analysis: it presents F-tests for the differences in explanatory power of several additive and associated interactive models. If the hypothesis is correct we would expect that adding interaction terms would increase the explanatory power of an additive model significantly. In two of the four comparisons, the test is significant. However, in the party/issue comparison, the R-squared of the additive model is higher than that of the interactive one. The same occurs for party/candidate, although the difference is not significant. The hypothesis finds no support here. Nor does an inspection of the beta-weights for individual interaction terms yield support for H. 9. The beta-weights in almost all cases could have occurred by chance. The ones which achieve significance are

TABLE 3.21: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: F-TESTS BETWEEN ADDITIVE AND INTERACTIVE EQUATIONS, FOR TURNOUT

Attitudinal Combinations	R-Squared	F-Value	P
Party-Candidate	Add: 0.0285 Int: 0.0270	1.1282	0.3224
Party-Issue	Add: 0.0268 Int: 0.0220	3.7102	0.0246
Candidate-Issue	Add: 0.0216 Int: 0.0328	8.6022	0.0002
Party-Candidate-Issue	Add: 0.0297 Int: 0.0355	1.4725	0.1835

so few that their occurrence is not unsurprising: an occasional significant beta-weight is also to be expected under random conditions. This hypothesis, then, must be rejected. It appears that an additive equation explains the relationship between attitudinal cross-pressures and non-voting as well as or better than an interactive one. There is no consistent evidence that interaction exists. Of course, the amount of variation explained is miniscule in either case. Thus cross-pressures remains as it was, a descriptive term and not a variable, although it may be that the cross-pressure relationship may take some other form not specified. What shape that might be is not easily imagined, however, especially given the results of this analysis.

Perhaps, as others have suggested, cross-pressures are relevant only for some dependent variables. The procedure just utilized for the analysis of turnout will now be applied to vote for preferred party in 1968--voting defection. In this instance our concern is with whether cross-pressures result in higher rates of defection from party preference than an additive model suggests. First, for the sake of completeness, we analyze the relationship in the traditional manner.

Tables 3.22 through 3.24 display the two-way cross-tabulations for percent Republican for each combination of cross-pressures. We expect to find deviation from

TABLE 3.22: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT REPUBLICAN VOTERS, BY PARTY AND CANDIDATE ORIENTATIONS*

Party Orientations	Candidate Orientations		
	Democrat	No Preference	Republican
Democrat	2.1 (238)	12.0 (100)	23.1 (26)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	19.6 (46)	42.9 (98)	75.8 (62)
Republican	72.7 (22)	91.0 (89)	94.8 (289)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

TABLE 3.23: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT REPUBLICAN VOTERS, BY PARTY AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS*

Party Orientations	Issue Orientations		
	Democrat	No Preference	Republican
Democrat	3.8 (235)	9.2 (87)	14.3 (42)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	28.8 (52)	48.4 (95)	62.7 (59)
Republican	82.5 (57)	92.8 (138)	95.6 (205)

*Numbers in parentheses indicat N on which percentages are based.

TABLE 3.24: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: PERCENT REPUBLICAN VOTERS, BY CANDIDATE AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS*

Candidate Orientation	Issue Orientations		
	Democrat	No Preference	Republican
Democrat	4.7 (191)	11.3 (71)	29.5 (44)
Weak Identifier or No Preference	21.3 (89)	52.8 (125)	68.5 (73)
Republican	67.2 (64)	87.1 (124)	93.1 (189)

*Numbers in parentheses indicate N on which percentages are based.

Republican vote as cross-pressures increase, and as we move from consistent Republican to consistent Democrat. These expectations are confirmed. The lowest percent Republican in all cases occurs among consistent Democrats, the highest among consistent Republicans. The relationship appears basically to be additive. The index of cross-pressures is negative in all three cases, indicating that attitudinal cross-pressures lead to a surplus of Democratic voting. In the three-way cross-break essentially the same results emerge. This resembles Lenski's results for status inconsistency. These differences are small, however, and unconvincing. They gain in interest when it is recalled that the Wallace analysis suggested a tendency for attitudinal cross-pressures to lead to right-wing responses. This is puzzling, but it is not inconceivable that both suggestions are correct (they may both be incorrect as well). The type of analysis employed may generate these results consistently and it would be easy to exaggerate their significance. Our major concern here, however, lies with testing the presumed and apparent additive nature of this relationship.

The hypothesis in this case encourages us to look for evidence of non-additivity in this relationship. If cross-pressures are a factor, in themselves, in increasing voting defection, then the relationship ought to be interactive. A voter could not have preferred the American Independent Party in this case, so analysis is restricted to Democratic and Republican defection. Hypothesis ten specifies the relationship:

H. 10: Individuals characterized by attitudinal cross-pressures will be more likely to vote for their preferred party than is suggested by an additive model utilizing only the main effects of the attitudinal pressures.

Data bearing on H. 10 are presented in Tables 3.25 through 3.27. These tables again display observed, expected and residual proportions of Republican voters. If interaction is present and operates in the predicted direction differences in the cross-pressured cells should be positive. Half of them are. The tables indicate that party orientation is the most significant variable affecting vote, and candidate

TABLE 3.25: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: OBSERVED, EXPECTED AND RESIDUAL PERCENT REPUBLICAN, BY PARTY AND CANDIDATE ORIENTATIONS

Party Orientation	Candidate Orientation								
	Observed			Expected			Observed-Expected		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	2.1	12.0	23.1	0.1	15.1	30.0	2.0	-3.1	- 6.9
Weak Identifier or No Preference	19.6	42.9	75.8	31.7	46.6	60.7	-12.1	-3.7	15.1
Republican	72.7	91.0	94.8	68.4	83.4	97.5	4.3	7.6	- 2.7

TABLE 3.26: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: OBSERVED, EXPECTED AND RESIDUAL PERCENT REPUBLICAN, BY PARTY AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS

Party Orientation	Issue Orientation								
	Observed			Expected			Observed-Expected		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	3.8	9.2	14.3	2.1	12.0	18.2	1.7	-2.8	-3.9
Weak Identifier or No Preference	28.8	48.4	62.7	38.4	48.3	54.5	-9.6	0.1	8.2
Republican	82.5	92.8	95.6	81.0	91.0	97.2	1.5	1.8	-1.6

TABLE 3.27: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: OBSERVED, EXPECTED AND RESIDUAL PERCENT REPUBLICAN, BY CANDIDATE AND ISSUE ORIENTATIONS

Candidate Orientation	Issue Orientation								
	Observed			Expected			Observed-Expected		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	4.7	11.3	29.5	1.0	20.3	31.3	3.7	-9.0	-1.8
Weak Identifier or No Preference	21.3	52.8	68.5	30.9	50.2	61.2	-9.6	0.6	7.3
Republican	67.2	87.1	93.1	65.2	84.5	95.5	2.0	2.6	-2.4

orientation is second. They do not indicate support for the cross-pressure hypothesis. Likewise, the expanded table (3.28) presents results which fail to support the hypothesis. In both the two- and three-way cross-breaks the relationship appears roughly additive. But, of course, appearances can be deceiving. The results of the regression analysis allow a less biased judgment.

TABLE 3.28: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES: RESIDUAL PERCENT REPUBLICAN, BY PARTY, CANDIDATE AND ISSUE ORIENTATION

Party Orientation	Issue Orientation: Democrat Candidate			Candidate			Republican Candidate		
	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep	Dem	N P	Rep
Democrat	5.1	- 4.1	-11.7	- 3.0	-2.7	-12.2	-10.0	6.3	0.5
Weak Identifier or No Preference	-14.5	- 9.2	- 2.6	-17.8	0.0	17.7	6.9	-7.1	23.6
Republican	- 0.9	15.5	3.9	- 2.2	5.3	0.8	8.0	7.3	3.9

Table 3.29 presents the results of F-tests for differences in explanatory (R-squared) between associated additive and interactive models. All are significant. This, however, fails to confirm the hypothesis since in the first two cases (Party/candidate, and Party/issue) the additive model has a higher R-squared than the interactive one. While in every case the differences are significant, only in two are they

TABLE 3.29: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES, F-TESTS BETWEEN ADDITIVE AND INTERACTIVE EQUATIONS, FOR PERCENT REPUBLICAN

Attitudinal Combinations	R-Squared	F-Value	P
Party-Candidate	Add: 0.6213 Int: 0.6023	35.2679	0.0000
Party-Issue	Add: 0.6017 Int: 0.4675	186.6176	0.0000
Candidate-Issue	Add: 0.4671 Int: 0.6296	324.8076	0.0000
Party-Candidate-Issue	Add: 0.6222 Int: 0.6320	6.5736	0.0000

in the predicted direction. Both the additive and interactive equations employing all three variables explain about 63 percent of the variance. By the standards of status inconsistency and affiliative cross-pressure analysis this is high, but the important fact here is that an additive model is as useful as an interactive one. While the difference between these last two models is statistically significant, this is doubtless due more to the copious degrees of freedom than to the magnitude of the absolute difference.

The individual beta-weight F-tests present the same profile. The additive terms are all significant in every model, while no interactive term in any model approaches

significance. Obviously the addition of these terms has little effect on the ability of any model to predict the actual values of percent Republican. These results reinforce the interpretation of the model vs. model F-tests. There are no important interaction effects. Thus H. 10 must be rejected.

Summary and Conclusions

In general, then, this chapter has provided support for the concept of cross-pressures as a descriptive term, but not as a variable, at least under the conditions specified. In the case of affiliative cross-pressures, H. 3, relating cross-pressures to non-voting, was largely confirmed. Individuals who were cross-pressured voted less than those who were not. In the case of H. 4, relating affiliative cross-pressures to Wallace support, the hypothesis was not supported. In fact the data suggested that non-cross-pressured individuals were more likely to vote for Wallace than cross-pressured ones. Of course Wallace cues uniformly increased the likelihood of a vote for Wallace. Medium cross-pressures do not fit the expected pattern. In the case of turnout medium cross-pressures were associated with very low levels of non-voting. This was not expected, but perhaps it is due to the salience of a Wallace cue. Certainly being urged to vote for a small, ostensibly radical party may indicate higher politicization and it may be that the magnitude (force) of such a cue is greater than one for a major party.

None of the findings relating to H. 3 and H. 4 prove or disprove the existence and/or effect of cross-pressures as

a variance. For this task F-tests and beta-weights for the dummy-variable multiple-regression were analyzed. For both dependent variables, turnout and Wallace vote (H. 5 and H. 6) the results were identical: there was little support for the non-additive hypothesis. The only exception to the general pattern occurred in the impact of relative-friend cross-pressures on turnout. Here an interactive model was clearly more potent than an additive one. While interesting, this finding alone could not save the hypothesis. All of the results of the affiliative cross-pressure analysis must, of course, remain tentative since the N's involved were small, varying from 51 to 94. A more convincing test of these hypotheses awaits better data.

The traditionally formulated hypotheses regarding attitudinal cross-pressures were largely supported. Tests of H. 7 and H. 8 indicate that the cross-pressured are less likely to vote and more likely to vote for Wallace than their consistent cohorts. In the turnout case medium cross-pressures again failed to fit the expected pattern: those characterized by medium cross-pressures were most likely not to vote. This deviation from the prediction was attributed to the method used in constructing cross-pressures, which probably includes apathy in the middle categories.

The analysis of attitudinal cross-pressures as a variable again evidenced little support for H. 9 and H. 10. Apparently an additive model is sufficient to explain the relationship between attitudinal cross-pressures, and turnout

and vote for preferred party: in some cases the additive model is significantly more potent. In no case were the interaction terms significant. They contribute nothing to reducing the unexplained variance. Cross-pressures as a variable is apparently a chimera.

What does this mean for cross-pressure theory? At least two points are clear. First, we cannot accept completely even the use of cross-pressures as a descriptive term. The evidence only partially supports this view. Cross-pressures do not always have the prescribed effects in the limited sense implied by traditional analysis. Secondly, the non-additive conception of cross-pressures is unwarranted. Conceived as as an interactive variable, cross-pressures apparently does not exist. There are alternative ways of conceptualizing cross-pressures as a non-additive function, but an additive model seems to be the most appropriate. This means that only the main effects of the pressures need to be considered in explaining and predicting behavior. For the present, at least, we can avoid complicating research in this area.

From a conceptual standpoint this analysis has, hopefully, demonstrated the need for clearly articulated concepts, ones which are susceptible to unambiguous interpretation and validation. The original cross-pressures formulation was not such a concept. A related question concerns the measurement of cross-pressures. A proper conceptualization implies a means of measurement and test. Regarding measurement, it is

fair to say that cross-pressures have only been measured indirectly and that any real test of their effects would require a more direct method of measurement. Such precision seems impossible at this time.

The method of dummy-variable multiple-regression employed here seems particularly suited for the study of cross-pressures, and that of voting behavior in general. Other similar methods, such as multiple classification analysis (tree analysis) or probit analysis may prove even more useful under specific conditions. These methods help greatly in the specification of concepts and in the analysis of the main effects of variables. They may, thus, be very useful in the development of theory.

Several incidental points deserve comment here. The conceptual problem of studying cross-pressures' effect on voting when there are more than two parties has not received sufficient attention. The analysis of affiliative cross-pressures above was no doubt affected by this. Assumptions have to be made about the position of third or minor parties, assumptions which may distort results. Cross-pressures may have a different meaning in these circumstances. Likewise decisions must be made concerning the possibility of partisan identification toward new parties. In other polities this could be a critical factor, and it may have influenced the analysis of attitudinal cross-pressures. A last point concerns the difficulties involved in an analysis using dependent and independent varibles as closely related as

vote and party orientation. The problem of multi-collinearity inevitable in this analysis is compounded here by use of a dependent variable not totally distinct from an independent one. We may, in some instances, be predicting a variable from itself in another form.

Finally, this analysis has, I think, demonstrated that theory and method go hand in hand. Students of voting behavior must become more rigorous in the development of their conceptual tools and pay more attention to selecting the most appropriate technique for testing their hypotheses. Concepts such as cross-pressures, hand-me-downs from another era, largely untested and occasionally untestable, abound in the literature. Systematic evaluation of these notions is essential to the development of a sound approach to voting behavior. Hopefully this analysis has been a step, however small, in that direction.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

[2]Ibid., p. 53.

[3]Ibid., p. 61-64. The analysis presented here uses cross-pressures without regard to levels of analysis.

[4]Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966). See especially Part IV, the conclusion, in which theory is stressed.

[5]Ibid., p. 284.

[6]Ibid., especially pp. 130-131.

[7]Ibid., p. 285.

[8]Ibid., p. 286-7.

[9]Peter Werner Sperlich, Cross-Pressure and Conflict in Political Behavior, (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1966), pp. 135-148. For an expanded version of this thesis see Sperlich, Peter Werner, Conflict and Harmony in Human Affairs: A Study of Cross-Pressures and Political Behavior, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1971).

[10]Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides, (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), p. 183.

[11]Berelson et al., p. 183.

[12]Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald F. Stokes, The American Voter, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964).

[13]Ibid., pp. 46-48.

[14]Ibid., pp. 72-79.

[15]Richard W. Boyd, "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection," American Political Science Review, 63, no. 2 (June, 1969), pp. 498-514.

[16]Sperlich, op. cit., pp. 1-2 and chapter 3.

[17]Patrick M. Horan, "Social Positions and Political Cross-Pressures: A Re-Examination," American Sociological Review, 36 (August, 1971), pp. 650-660.

[18]On this important point see, Blalock, Hubert M., Jr., "The Identification Problem and Theory Building: The Case of Status Inconsistency," American Sociological Review, 30 (June, 1965), pp. 374-380.

[19]Seymour Martin Lipset, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Allen H. Barton, and Juan Linz, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), pp. 1124-1175; see especially pp. 1126-1134.

[20]Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, The SRC 1968 American National Election Study (August, 1971 Codebook), p. 235.

[21]Boyd, "Presidential Elections," pp. 501-502.

CHAPTER IV

STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND CROSS-PRESSURES

The previous two chapters have analyzed, in turn, the effects of status inconsistency and two variations of cross-pressures on voting behavior. In Chapter I, I suggested that these are parallel concepts and that they might well be expected to be inter-related. This suggestion is not entirely new. On the other hand, the possible relationships between these variables have never been studied systematically. This chapter presents such an analysis, subject to the limitations of the data.

We suspect, on the basis of previous research and to a lesser extent in view of the data previously presented here, that status inconsistency, affiliative cross-pressured and attitudinal cross-pressures are related in the fashion suggested in the first chapter. This logic concerns levels of analysis and social interaction patterns. Reasoning that social categories imply social milieus, that inconsistent categories imply inconsistent milieus and that inconsistent milieus imply inconsistent social cues, I proposed that status inconsistency and affiliative cross-pressures ought to be related. More precisely highly inconsistent statuses should breed affiliative cross-pressures. Similarly I reasoned that inconsistent social

cues might either lead directly to contradictory attitudes or make them more salient to the individual. Affiliative cross-pressures should lead to attitudinal ones. Finally I argued that inconsistent social categories might well lead to attitudinal inconsistency directly through intra-psychic comparisons of relative status positions and associated attitudinal dimensions. Presumably this last relationship ought to be less pronounced than the others.

Not necessarily implicit in this argument was the suggestion that, for both turnout and Wallace vote, the effects of these three independent variables would be cumulative. That is, in the same fashion that descriptive cross-pressures predict lower turnout among the cross-pressured, we might expect that those who are status inconsistents and cross-pressured both affiliatively and attitudinally would vote less and for Wallace more often than those who are consistent and without cross-pressures. This is not an interactive proposition; there is no reason, theoretical or empirical, to expect interaction.

The Relationships Among Status Inconsistency and Cross-Pressures

These hypotheses are not startling, especially in the light of previous research. I have earlier noted that The People's Choice and Voting both used "factors" influencing voters which overlap the levels employed here.[1] Each of these studies reported cross-pressure effects. Lipset, in Political Man, reports similar instances.[2] In The American

Voter, the SRC group found both affiliative and attitudinal cross-pressures operating.[3] Pool, Abelson and Popkin, again mixing levels found only marginal evidence of cross-pressures.[4] Clearly the most germane research here is that conducted by Boyd.[5] He explicitly analyzed the relationship between status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressures. Boyd was interested in whether inconsistency increased cross-pressures above the level expected by an additive model. He found that they did not. He further discovered that even an additive model did not fit the data well. He concluded, "there is no additive relationship between the dimensions of status and political cross-pressures." His measures were nearly identical to those employed here. His finding is not particularly alarming given the relationship hypothesized here. Boyd himself suggested several reasons for his failure to discover this expected relationship.[6] He did not, however, consider the possibility that affiliative cross-pressures may act as an intervening variable here. I shall test this potentiality.

The first relationship to be examined here is formalized as:

> H. 11: Individuals characterized by inconsistent statuses are more likely to have affiliative cross-pressures than those with consistent statuses.

This relationship is easily tested by means of a simple cross-tabulation. Table 4.1 presents these results. In this table status inconsistency has been trichotomized. Individuals whose statuses are completely congruent are highly consistent.

TABLE 4.1: STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURE COMBINATIONS

Affiliative Cross-Pressures		Status Inconsistency		
		Highly Consistent	Intermediate	Highly Inconsistent
Spouse-Relative	Consistent Cues	60.0	45.2	20.0
	Intermediate	20.0	29.0	60.0
	Inconsistent Cues	20.0	25.8	20.0
	Total	100.0 (25)*	100.0 (31)	100.0 (5)
Spouse-Friend	Consistent Cues	56.0	46.9	60.0
	Intermediate	24.0	21.9	0.0
	Inconsistent Cues	20.0	31.3	40.0
	Total	100.0 (25)	100.1+ (32)	100.0 (5)
Relative-Friend	Consistent Cues	51.4	38.8	25.0
	Intermediate	29.7	22.4	37.5
	Inconsistent Cues	18.9	38.8	37.5
	Total	100.0 (37)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (8)

*N's for each category of status inconsistency are in parentheses.
+Does not sum to 100% due to rounding error.

Individuals who have any combination of extreme status positions except total consistency are labeled highly inconsistent. The middle groups, the largest, contains all others who have a position on all four hierarchies. A more complex, but similar, method generated the trichotomy for each affiliative cross-pressure dyad. For the three affiliative dimensions, high cross-pressures refers to individuals with only Democratic or Republican cues of which one was not congruent. Highly consistent individuals were those whose cues were all either Democrat or Republican. Those who had experienced a Wallace cue with either a Democratic or Republican cue were ranked intermediately. Consistent Wallace cues did not exist.

Table 4.1 is easily interpreted. Sixty percent of the status inconsistents also have inconsistent affiliative cues from their spouse and relatives. On the other hand only twenty percent of the highly status inconsistents also have inconsistent spouse-relative cues. This is the same frequency that exist among the status consistents. The spouse-relative affiliative cross-pressure comparison with status inconsistency, then, presents a picture of semi-fulfilled proposition. In the spouse-relative and relative-friend cases, the hypothesis gains more substantial support. Here the occurrence of consistent-consistent high frequencies and of inconsistent-inconsistent high frequencies is more common. Yet the association is not perfect: none of the chi-squares for the three sub-tables is significant. Of course, the N's are small in all cases, and the middle categories for both status inconsistency and affiliative cross-pressures probably

increases error. Apparently there is a relationship, albeit a weak one, between status inconsistency and affiliative cross-pressures. There also is a relationship, and a strong one, between status consistency and the absence of cross-pressures, which is, of course, the obverse of the inconsistency--cross-pressure expectation. In all three cases the status consistent were also individuals with consistent affiliative cues. Perhaps this finding can also be interpreted as support for H. 11.

If status inconsistency and affiliative cross-pressures are related, are affiliative are attitudinal cross-pressures also associated? The twelfth hypothesis proposes:

> H. 12: Individuals characterized by affiliative cross-pressures are more likely to have attitudinal cross-pressures than those not affiliatively cross-pressured.

Here attitudinal cross-pressures have been combined into a single index. Non-cross-pressured individuals hold attitudes on parties, candidates and issues which are highly congruent, either all pro-Democrat or pro-Republican. Highly cross-pressured individuals are those whose orientations are all extreme, but one of which contradicts the others. The intermediate group consists of all other combinations (those not all highly Democrat or Republican). Affiliative cross-pressures are applied in the fashion described above.

Table 4.2 presents the data on this relationship. Again the analysis is hindered by small cell sizes. In no case, however, are our expectations fulfilled. Individuals not characterized by affiliative cross-pressures are apparently

TABLE 4.2: AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURE COMBINATIONS AND ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES

Attitudinal Cross-Pressures	Affiliative Cross-Pressures								
	Spouse - Relative			Spouse - Friend			Relative - Friend		
	Consistent Cues	Intermediate	Inconsistent Cues	Consistent Cues	Intermediate	Inconsistent Cues	Consistent Cues	Intermediate	Inconsistent Cues
Highly Consistent	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Intermediate	55.6	85.7	85.7	71.4	100.0	71.4	71.4	100.0	100.0
Highly Inconsistent	44.4	14.3	14.3	28.6	0.0	28.6	28.6	0.0	0.0
	100.0 (9)[a]	100.0 (7)	100.0 (7)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (8)	100.0 (7)	100.0 (40)	100.0 (25)	100.0 (29)

[a]N's for each category of affiliative cross-pressure are in parentheses.

more likely to experience attitudinal cross-pressures than their cross-pressured cohorts. In the relative-friend case the chi-square is significant: the relationship could not easily have occurred by chance. Inspection of this sub-table yields the same impression. The entire table also shows that the affiliatively consistent are no more or less likely to experience no cross-pressures than anyone else. No one in this group of 146 was attitudinally consistent. This finding supports previous research into the cognitive constraint among the mass of Americans, but does not support the hypothesis.[7] While we must be cautious here, of course, the hypothesis draws so little support from these data that it must be at least tentatively rejected. Combining affiliative cross-pressures into one index further reduces the N, but the findings mirror those in Table 4.2. Apparently the expected link between affiliative and attitudinal cross-pressures does not exist. Of course, given these data it may be premature to assert no relationship. Better data, perhaps even allowing for a time lag, might reverse this finding. The data here, however, do not support the hypothesis.

While the linkage between status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressures seems not to operate through affiliative cross-pressures, there may still be a direct relationship. Perhaps status inconsistency results in attitudinal cross-pressures without the mediation of affiliative cross-pressures. It may well be that persons who have inconsistent statuses are more likely to be characterized by

contradictory attitudes or perhaps be more aware of them. A great body of sociological literature suggests this, although Boyd disputes it.[8] The expected relationship here is:

> H. 13: Individuals characterized by inconsistent statuses are more likely to have attitudinal cross-pressures than those with consistent statuses.

Table 4.3 presents data bearing on this hypothesis. In this case, although the chi-square is not significant, interpretation of the table may be accomplished with more confidence, since the cell sizes are adequate. The table shows that status inconsistent individuals are less likely to be attitudinally cross-pressured. Moreover, even status inconsistents are ten times more likely to be highly cross-pressured than consistent. The hypothesis expects the opposite. The relationship found is in the wrong direction. The status inconsistent are not significantly more likely to be non-class-pressured than the inconsistent. These data indicate unequivocal rejection of the hypothesis. While the data show that people with attitudinal cross-pressures are more likely to be status inconsistents, the obverse is not true. There is apparently no link between status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressures. Like Boyd, I am vexed by this finding and agree that it might be reversed under other circumstances (i.e. with other data). However, I am even more suspicious of the potential validity of the argument with which this chapter began. There is little reason to believe, on the basis of

TABLE 4.3: STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURES

Attitudinal Cross-Pressures	Status Inconsistency		
	Highly Consistent	Intermediate	Highly Inconsistent
Highly Consistent	2.4	2.5	1.6
Intermediate	71.3	75.1	82.8
Highly Inconsistent	26.2	22.4	15.6
TOTAL	99.9+ (164)*	99.9 (393)	100.0 (64)

*N's for each category of Status Inconsistency are in parentheses.
+Does not sum to 100% due to rounding error.

these data, that status inconsistency, affiliative and attitudinal cross-pressures are systematically related. While the proposed relationship had intuitive appeal it is not confirmed by the data, especially the last two links, which appear to operate in precisely the opposite fashion. Reversing the linkages would be absurd, however, for it is difficult to imagine that attitudinal cross-pressures lead to status inconsistency. All that can properly be said is that the proposed inter-relationships do not exist, but a more convincing test of their validity would require more and better data.

The Cumulative Effects of Status Inconsistency and Cross-Pressures

The final propositions to be examined in this dissertation concern the possible cumulative effects of status inconsistency and both types of cross-pressures on the two major dependent variables employed in this study. In chapters two and three we analyzed the effects of each independent variable on the dependent ones. In this chapter I have restructured each variable in a trichotomous fashion. When these trichotomies are run against turnout and Wallace vote findings parallel to those reported in the last two chapters emerge. The status inconsistent vote less frequently than the consistent, and support Wallace more often. The same relationship occurs in the attitudinal cross-pressures case. In the affiliative cross-pressures case the relationship is more complicated and Wallace cues upset the pattern, as noted in Chapter III. Here

we are concerned with the possibility that these relationships are cumulative. More precisely:

> H. 14: Status inconsistency, affiliative cross-pressures and attitudinal cross-pressures have a cumulative effect on voting turnout. Individuals high on three will turn out less than individuals high on two and individuals high on two will turn out less than individuals high on one.

The difficulty of evaluating H. 14 is compounded somewhat by the small N's available for affiliative cross-pressures. When two control variables are added zero cells predominate, increasing the possibility of results being influenced by a very few observations. Even in the case of a single control, cell sizes become small. Table 4.4 is such a table. It displays the cumulative effect on turnout of status inconsistency and spouse-relative affiliative cross-pressures. There was only one person both highly inconsistent and highly cross-pressured. He didn't vote. Of those with either high inconsistency or high cross-pressures 9% (2 of 22) didn't vote, while of those with neither high inconsistency nor high cross-pressures 11.6% (5 of 43) did not vote. Confirmation or rejection of the hypothesis based on these data would be a precarious undertaking. While this table fits the expected pattern fairly well others do not, and in all cases N's are very small, except for the status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressure comparison. In this last instance the hypothesis is not confirmed either: all nine of those who were highly inconsistent and highly cross-pressured actually voted.

TABLE 4.4: SPOUSE-RELATIVE AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURES AND VOTING TURNOUT, BY STATUS INCONSISTENCY

Turnout	Status Inconsistency: Consistent			Intermediate			Inconsistent		
	Spouse-Relative Affiliative Cross-Pressures								
	No Cross-Pressure	Inter-Mediate	Highly Cross-Pressured	No Cross-Pressure	Inter-Mediate	Highly Cross-Pressured	No Cross-Pressure	Inter-Mediate	Highly Cross-Pressured
Voted	93.3	80.0	100.0	85.7	88.9	87.5	100.0	100.0	0.0
Did Not Vote	6.7	20.0	0.0	14.3	11.1	12.5	0.0	0.0	100.0
	100.0 (15)*	100.0 (5)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (9)	100.0 (8)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (3)	100.0 (1)

*N's for each category of cross-pressures are in parentheses.

Thus while the evidence suggests that H. 14 be rejected, the data do not allow us the confidence of a firm statement.

The final hypothesis reiterates H. 14, but for Wallace vote:

> H. 15: Status inconsistency, affiliative cross-pressures and attitudinal cross-pressures have a cumulative effect on partisan preference. Individuals high on three will be more likely to vote for a radical party than individuals high on two, and individuals high on two will be more likely to vote for a radical party than individuals high on only one.

Testing this hypothesis has all the difficulties inherent in testing H. 14 plus one. In the case of affiliative cross-pressures one cue, it will be recalled, was a suggestion to vote for Wallace. For status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressures, the zero-order relationship between them and Wallace vote is as expected: inconsistency and cross-pressures are associated with high Wallace voting relative to consistency and absence of cross-pressures. For affiliative cross-pressures the opposite is true, probably due to the confounding influence of Wallace cues. Affiliative cross-pressure effects are also difficult to assess because of the small N. For the status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressure relationship the same finding emerges as for turnout. All nine individuals high on both inconsistency and cross-pressures did not vote for Wallace. It appears that for Wallace vote, as for turnout, the effects of inconsistency and cross-pressures are not cumulative. The individual cross-tabulations show inconsistency and cross-pressures leading to higher Wallace vote

and lower turnout, but when controls are added the relationship is reversed. Again conclusions must be tentative but the pattern is very consistent: there appears no empirical justification for either H. 14 or H. 15. Not only is there no systematic relationship among the independent variables, but their effect appears also to be non-cumulative.

Summary and Conclusions

This thesis had a dual purpose: concept clarification and methodological innovation in the study of status inconsistency and cross-pressures. I have argued that these concepts are essentially similar at different levels of analysis. Each, at its level, assumes the same psychological dynamics and each has been characterized by considerable conceptual ambiguity. I have adapted recent methodological advances in the study of status inconsistency to the study of cross-pressures. Thus the conceptualization presented here for each variable was congruent with that for the others. The method applied throughout was dummy-variable regression analysis.

A basic distinction was drawn in chapter one. Two alternative means of reducing presumed tension from status inconsistency and cross-pressures were outlined: either a person would "balance" the cues confronting him, selecting the one most prior in his cognitive universe in a task-solving manner, or he would react cathartically, choosing action falling outside that normally to be expected, given his cues. The first behavior pattern, it was argued, could easily be

explained by the main effects of an additive model. Behavior corresponding to that suggested by the second would require an interactive model for adequate explanation. Conceptually the first approach involved no change from past approaches. The latter, however, required that a new variable be created so that it seemed proper to speak of status inconsistency or cross-pressures as an independent phenomenon only if the second approach obtained. This view was a considerable departure from the usual approach, especially in the case of cross-pressures. I argued that previous conceptions of cross-pressures actually only described specific configurations of attributes and therefore did not represent a variable in the same sense that, for instance, party orientation was a variable. Testing whether status inconsistency or cross-pressures existed as a variable, then, involved a reconceptualization of both notions.

It also involved specifications of the concepts in operational terms. Thus a method for investigating their effects was essential, one that could differentiate between the two competing approaches just outlined. The method chosen, because of its utility, flexibility and availability, was dummy-variable multiple-regression. The results of this method were consistently compared with results of more standard analyses of each concept. The dummy-variable regression analysis made possible a more explicit definition of status inconsistency and cross-pressures and allowed rejection of at least one behavior pattern model. It was noted that traditional cross-tabulation analysis was incompetent for this purpose.

A final aspect of this thesis concerned the relationships between the independent variables, each representing a different level of analysis. A logical set of inter-relationships was generated, based on such data as were available. It was also proposed that these variables might well be cumulative in their effects on dependent variables, and an investigation of this potentiality was undertaken. This effort was essential if order was to prevail in an area of traditional confusion. Nowhere else had the levels of analysis problem been confronted systematically. Here the principal thrust was exploratory.

In brief the findings presented here are these: The cross-tabulation approach, both to status inconsistency and cross-pressures was found to lack the capacity to test properly hypotheses about either as a variable. Even the relatively sophisticated tabular analyses used in status inconsistency analyses were unable to distinguish between additive and non-additive relationships. Their application to cross-pressures was equally futile. On the other hand, the dummy-variable multiple-regression analyses clearly differentiated between the relative explanatory power of various models. When interaction terms were added to additive models, in an attempt to include the cross-pressure or status inconsistency variable in the analysis, the near-universal finding was that they had no appreciable effect. Changing a model from $T=X_1 +X_2 +Y_1 +Y_2$ to $T=X_1 +X_2 +Y_1 +Y_2 +X_1Y_2 +X_2Y_1$, for example, did not appreciably increase its explanatory potentials. Yet

previous theoretical formulations lead us to expect such an increase.[9] The last two terms of the second model represent interaction terms which supposedly can be equated with inconsistency effects, i.e., strain from status inconsistency or cross-pressures. The status inconsistency hypotheses had to be rejected: there was no evidence that inconsistency effects existed, if they are properly conceived as interactive in nature.

For cross-pressures the tabular analysis followed a similar pattern, except that here previous research had accepted the existence of cross-pressures if it were found that the cross-pressured voted less often or more often selected marginal or radical parties than did their consistent peers. Even hypotheses stated in these terms, however, were not universally confirmed. Apparently the traditional view of cross-pressures is not a rigid empirical reality, especially in the realm of associational cues. When the cross-pressure notion was reconceptualized to parallel the status inconsistency approach, no evidence to support it could be found. Apparently cross-pressures, both affiliative and attitudinal, is not an interactive phenomenon. This was interpreted to mean that, as a variable, cross-pressures does not exist.

The status inconsistency analysis accounted for at best only 8.7% of the variance in either dependent variable, mainly through the main effects of the status dimensions. The affiliative cross-pressure analysis, on the other hand "explained" up to 55% of the variance, again almost solely

through the main effects. And the attitudinal analysis accounted for as much as 62% of the variance, for both dependent variables. This pattern is precisely what one would expect, given the levels of analysis. It also implies a comment on those studies which have mixed levels. If they confound levels, their ability to account for variation may decline precipitously, especially if the status dimension is included, as is customary. Perhaps this is one source of confusion contributing to the wide range of reported findings in both areas of cross-pressures and status inconsistency.

The argument, however logical, that the three levels, status inconsistency, affiliative and attitudinal cross-pressures are systematically related appears to have little empirical basis. While there was a minor relationship between status inconsistency and affiliative cross-pressures the other two links were not confirmed. The expected pattern did not exist. The hypotheses here must be only tentatively rejected, however, since the data to test them more precisely were not available. Finally, the proposed cumulative effects of the three levels did not materialize. Again this test was mitigated by the limits of the data, but the relationship was strongly negative at times, reinforcing our confidence in the rejection of the last two hypotheses.

From the standpoint of reorienting research in the field of voting behavior these findings have several clear implications. First, status inconsistency as a potential variable needs to be reconceptualized completely. Although Rush found

a relationship between status inconsistency and radical rightism, no relationship between inconsistency and Wallace Vote was discovered here.[10] The difference in method is probably the key to this apparent discrepancy, since Rush used only cross-tabulations. More important is the fact that interaction effects did not occur systematically in chapter two. There may have been several reasons for this. It is possible, as Boyd notes, that status inconsistency is only relevant for some variables.[11] Yet we have no a priori way of distinguishing behavior susceptible to inconsistency from that which isn't. Further Lenski's original thesis points out the logical tie between inconsistency and, at the very least, turnout.[12] It is possible also that the conceptualization presented here is improper. This seems unlikely given Lenski's writings and those of later students of the concept. It may be, however, that status inconsistency is only relevant in more hierarchical societies. Some research indicates that this limitation may have empirical support.[13] A final potentiality, and one which needs great thought, is the operational definition of the concept. This thesis shares in this difficulty by defining status hierarchies in the now accepted fashion and then labelling inconsistent those individuals who have non-congruent rankings. This approach pays little attention to some relevant social realities. At times apparently contradictory statuses may be quite normal and acceptable, not likely to lead to strain of any kind. This method, by using rankings established nationally, ignores

potentially significant regional and local ranking deviations. It fails to ask as well whether the combination in question is frequent or anomolous in society. It also ignores the salience problem: do people realize the discrepancy? A better method might take social context into account first, and then assign individuals to inconsistent or consistent categories on the basis of the frequency of occurrence of their configurations in society generally. This would define inconsistency in terms of statistical deviance and might more accurately reflect the original meaning of the concept.[14] To a certain limited extent the procedure employed here embodied this principle, but there was too much room for error. The salience problem can only be solved by better instrument design, but the social acceptability of specific status configurations can be more accurately determined within the framework of present data.

Of course dummy-variable multiple-regression analysis itself may not be the most preferable analysis technique in all cases. For example the recent development of Probit analysis allows one to avoid the homoscedacity problem encountered in the use of dichotomous dependent variables.[15] It amounts, essentially, to a refinement of the approach used here. To date its use has been limited, but the results produced parallel those obtained with dummy-variable multiple-regression.[16] Another promising technique is Multiple Classification Analysis, sometimes referred to as "tree analysis," which selects the most important variables in a least squares addition fashion

but doesn't require interval level data. These techniques, of course, cannot replace better data, and a first concern of the student of status inconsistency must be obtaining better data. Particularly these data must allow testing the link between inconsistency and stress. Present evidence on this relationship is meager and contradictory.[17]

While status inconsistency has a durable intuitive appeal, as the voluminous literature attests, the concept needs much serious work if it is to play an important role in the analysis of voting behavior.

The findings on cross-pressures also merit some conclusions. The most obvious is that using cross-pressures in the traditional sense does not itself explain anything. Most statements about the social world imply additivity and this one is no different. The descriptive use of the term is intrinsically harmless, but the tendency to use it as a variable is not. The attempt made here to re-define the concept in terms similar to those used in the study of status inconsistency failed to uncover evidence of cross-pressure as a variable. Perhaps this approach was incorrect in the form of non-additive relationship specified: a non-multiplicative configuration is a possible alternative. More likely the failure to discover interaction effects resulted either from their non-existence or from the inadequacy of the data. Clearly a better instrument is required for an adequate test of cross-pressures, especially affiliative ones. The data presented here, while suggestive, cannot be considered

definitive. They do indicate, however, that a further investigation may be fruitless, since the cross-pressure universe seems to be essentially additive. Moreover, the amount of variance explained by the main effects is considerable, necessarily relegating cross-pressures to a minor role. This was not the case with status inconsistency: the main effects explained relatively little, prompting a search for other factors. While research which will establish the impact or existence of cross-pressures is definitely needed, we should not expect anything startling from it. If any, the role of cross-pressures is certain to be small.

More and better data is again the answer in the search to specify the relationships among status inconsistency and the types of cross-pressures, as well as their potential cumulative effects. In this case it may be that analysis of a national sample is not appropriate, and a select universe ought to be sampled. Clearly a localized universe may yield samples less diverse and therefore with greater agreement on evaluative criteria to be applied to status dimensions. They also would allow greater interview depth, a necessary step in establishing the link between psychological stress and any variety of inconsistency. This logic would lead to the use, for instance, of a highly stratified community as a data base. A more explicit theoretical approach might also aid in specification of the conditions under which the relationships outlined earlier in this chapter might obtain. The theoretical question here is prior, as it should be in the discrete cases of status inconsistency and cross-pressures.

If prescription is necessary at this point, the rather obvious one emerging from this study is: students of voting behavior must eschew over-empiricism and re-assess theoretically some major notions generated over the past two decades. Hopefully this dissertation has demonstrated some considerable confusion in an area long thought established. For concepts with content more attention must be paid to theory, especially in the design of research.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). Berelson, Bernard, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William McPhee, Voting, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966).

[2]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963), especially pp. 207-229.

[3]Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964).

[4]Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson and Samuel Popkin, Candidates, Issues and Strategies, (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), chapter four.

[5]Richard W. Boyd, "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defections," American Political Science Review, 63 (June, 1969), 498-514.

[6]Ibid., pp. 506-508.

[7]Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-256.

[8]For the sociological literature see, for example, Lenski, Gerhard E., "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," American Sociological Review, 21 (August, 1956), and Treiman, Donald J., "Status Discrepancy and Prejudice," The American Journal of Sociology, 71 (May, 1966), 651-664. For Boyd's comments see Boyd, "Presidential Elections," p. 504.

[9]On this point see Treiman, "Status Discrepancy," pp. 653-656.

[10]Gary B. Rush, "Status Consistency and Right-Wing Extremism," American Sociological Review, 32 (February, 1967), 86-92.

[11]Boyd, "Presidential Election," pp. 506-508.

[12]Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," American Sociological Review, 19 (August, 1954), pp. 405-413.

[13]Leonard Broom and F. Lancaster Jones, "Status Consistency and Political Preference: The Australian Case," American Sociological Review, 35 (December, 1970), 989-1001. Broom and Jones argue that the concept of inconsistency may be entirely inappropriate for nations such as Australia and even the United States.

[14]Exactly this approach is suggested in Jackson, Elton F., and Richard F. Curtis, "Conceptualization and Measurement in the Study of Social Stratification," in Blalock, Hubert M., and Ann Blalock, Methodology in Social Research, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 112-149.

[15]D. J. Finney, Probit Analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962).

[16]An illustrative treatment is Blydenburgh, John C., "Probit Analysis: A Method for Coping with Dichotomous Dependent Variables," Social Science Quarterly, 51 (March, 1971), 889-899.

[17]Jackson found evidence of stress, Boyd did not. See Jackson, Elton F., "Status Consistency and Symptoms of Stress," American Sociological Review, 27 (August, 1962), 469-480; and see Boyd, Richard W., A Theory of Voting Defections: Attitudinal Cross-Pressures and Political Alienation, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, 1967).

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF VARIABLES, VARIABLE LOCATIONS, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION, AND ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

As noted in Chapter Two, the data used in this dissertation are those gathered in the Survey Research Center's 1968 Election Study. The strengths and limitations of the survey procedures were discussed previously. Here I would like to catalogue the sources of all the variables extracted from that study. In all cases reference is to the SRC 45523 Codebook, First Printing, August, 1971, available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Table One provides the page number and variable number of each variable employed. Marginal frequency distributions are provided in the codebook for most of these variables.

Table Two presents the marginal frequencies for the three dependent variables used in the analysis. Wallace vote and Republican vote are merely different combinations of the same source, vote in 1968. In the analysis, other, don't know, and not available responses were deleted.

Table Three presents the marginals for all combinations of the status variables: Religious-Ethnic Prestige, Occupation,

TABLE A1: VARIABLE NAMES, NUMBERS, AND LOCATIONS*

Variable Name	Variable No.	Page Number
Vote in 1968	0316	174
Turnout	0310	171-172
Occupation (Pol. Beh. Code)	0161	87
Income (of Household head)	0261	132-133
Education (of Respondent)	0156	82
Race (of Respondent)	0264	134
Religion (of Respondent)	0213	113-115
Ethnicity:		
Own	0243	126
Father's	0245	126
Father's Side	0247	127
Subjective Nationality	0249	128
Age (year of Birth)	0145	78
Partisan Preference (Respondent)	0119	62
Spouse's Partisan Suggestion	0410	235
Relative's Partisan Suggestion	0412	236
Friend's Partisan Suggestion	0414	237
Fellow-Worker's Partisan Suggestion	0416	238-239
Good and Bad Points about Parties		
Like about Democrats	0028	11
Dislike about Democrats	0029	12
Like about Republicans	0030	13
Dislike about Republicans	0031	13
Good and Bad Points about Candidates		
Like about Humphrey	0032	13
Dislike about Humphrey	0033	15
Like about Nixon	0034	15
Dislike about Nixon	0035	15
Like about Wallace	0036	16
Dislike about Wallace	0037	17

Table A1 (cont'd.)

Variable Name	Variable No.	Page Number
Attitudes on Issues		
Domestic		
Health Care	0064	30
	0065	31
Guaranteed Wage	0066	31
	0067	32
Education	0060	28
	0061	29
Civil Rights, Equality		
Equal Job Opportunity	0073	35
	0074	36
Integrate Schools	0075	36
	0077	39
Integrate Hotels, Restaurants	0078	40-41
	0079	41
Foreign Policy		
Foreign Aid	0096	47
	0097	48
Settle Differences With Communists	0098	48
	0099	49
What Should We Do in Vietnam	0105	51-53
	0106	53-54
Chance of War	0016	60
	0117	60

*Source: SRC 45523 Codebook, August, 1971.

TABLE A2: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Dependent Variables		
Turnout	Yes	1118
	No	370
	DK, NA	185
	TOTAL	1673
Wallace Vote:	Dem. or Rep.	970
	Wallace	116
	Other, DK, NA	587
	TOTAL	1673
Republican Vote:	Dem.	478
	Rep.	492
	Other, DK, NA	703
	TOTAL	1673

TABLE A3: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR STATUS VARIABLE COMBINATIONS$

Status Inconsistency Marginals					
Variable Comb.	Freq.	Variable Comb.	Freq.	Variable Comb.	Freq.
$-R_1O_1I_1$	68	$\#R_1O_1I_2$	42	$+R_1O_2I_3$	29
$\#R_2O_1I_1$	62	$\#R_2O_1I_2$	43	$\#R_2O_2I_3$	30
$*R_3O_1I_1$	34	$+R_3O_1I_2$	5	$\#R_3O_2I_3$	7
$\#R_1O_2I_1$	45	$+R_1O_1I_3$	16	$+R_1O_3I_2$	24
$\#R_2O_2I_1$	31	$+R_2O_1I_3$	14	$\#R_2O_3I_2$	36
$+R_3O_2I_1$	21	$*R_3O_1I_3$	7	$\#R_3O_3I_2$	19
$*R_1O_3I_1$	20	$\#R_1O_2I_2$	46	$*R_1O_3I_3$	37
$+R_2O_3I_1$	14	$-R_2O_2I_2$	38	$\#R_2O_3I_3$	35
$*R_3O_3I_1$	9	$\#R_3O_2I_2$	12	$-R_3O_3I_3$	16
$-R_1O_1E_1$	82	$\#R_1O_1E_2$	37	$+R_1O_2E_3$	26
$\#R_2O_1E_1$	68	$\#R_2O_1E_2$	43	$\#R_2O_2E_2$	20
$*R_3O_1E_1$	30	$+R_3O_1E_2$	14	$\#R_3O_2E_3$	11
$\#R_1O_2E_1$	30	$*R_1O_1E_3$	7	$+R_1O_3E_2$	45
$\#R_2O_2E_1$	37	$+R_2O_1E_3$	8	$\#R_2O_3E_2$	49
$+R_3O_2E_1$	7	$*R_3O_1E_3$	2	$\#R_3O_3E_2$	23
$*R_1O_3E_1$	12	$\#R_1O_2E_2$	64	$*R_1O_3E_3$	24
$+R_2O_3E_1$	9	$-R_2O_2E_2$	42	$\#R_2O_3E_3$	27
$*R_2O_3E_1$	8	$\#R_3O_2E_2$	22	$-R_3O_3E_3$	13

Table A3 (cont'd.)

Variable Comb.	Freq.	Variable Comb.	Freq.	Variable Comb.	Freq.
$-R_1I_1E_1$	72	$\#R_1I_1E_2$	54	$+R_1I_2E_3$	18
$\#R_2I_1E_1$	56	$\#R_2I_1E_2$	36	$\#R_2I_2E_3$	10
$*R_3I_1E_1$	32	$+R_3I_1E_2$	29	$\#R_3I_2E_3$	11
$\#R_1I_2E_1$	36	$*R_1I_1E_3$	7	$+R_1I_3E_2$	34
$\#R_2I_2E_1$	43	$+R_2I_1E_3$	15	$\#R_2I_3E_2$	34
$+R_3I_2E_1$	7	$+R_3I_1E_3$	3	$\#R_3I_3E_2$	12
$*R_1I_3E_1$	16	$\#R_1I_2E_2$	58	$*R_1I_3E_3$	32
$+R_2I_3E_1$	15	$-R_2I_2E_2$	64	$\#R_2I_3E_3$	30
$*R_3I_3E_1$	6	$\#R_3I_2E_2$	18	$-R_3I_3E_3$	12
$-O_1I_1E_1$	114	$\#O_1I_1E_2$	45	$+O_1I_2E_3$	7
$\#O_2I_1E_1$	35	$\#O_2I_1E_2$	49	$\#O_2I_2E_3$	18
$*O_3I_1E_1$	11	$+O_3I_1E_2$	25	$\#O_3I_2E_3$	14
$\#O_1I_2E_1$	49	$*O_1I_1E_3$	5	$+O_1I_3E_2$	15
$\#O_2I_2E_1$	29	$+O_2I_1E_3$	13	$\#O_2I_3E_2$	30
$+O_3I_2E_1$	8	$*O_3I_1E_3$	7	$\#O_3I_3E_2$	35
$*O_1I_3E_1$	17	$\#O_1I_2E_2$	34	$*O_1I_3E_3$	5
$+O_2I_3E_1$	10	$O_2I_2E_2$	49	$\#O_2I_3E_3$	26
$*O_3I_3E_1$	10	$\#O_3I_2E_2$	57	$-O_3I_2E_3$	43

$Notation: R = Religious-Ethnic Prestige
O = Occupation
I = Income
E = Education
Subscripts proceed from high (1) to low (3).

* = Highly Inconsistent, + = Moderately Inconsistent,
# = Mildly Inconsistent, - = Consistent

Education, and Income. The construction of each of these variables was described in Chapter Two. In each case the subscript 1 indicates a high score on the variable and the subscript 3 indicates a low score. It is interesting from a theoretical viewpoint that inconsistent individuals are relatively infrequent. In fact, as inconsistency increases the frequency of observations increases. Table Four demonstrates this in another fashion. Of course this is the relationship which would be expected if inconsistency has its presumed effects. That is, if inconsistency is not an unusual social situation it would hardly be appropriate to expect sharp differences in behavior as a result of these status discrepancies, since individuals could be expected to perceive that many others were in similar incongruent situations. It is interesting to note, in this context, that others using these same data have defined inconsistency in such a way as to include as inconsistent significantly large numbers and proportions of respondents.[1] Such classification raises some obvious theoretical questions.

Tables Five and Six present the frequency distribution for the Attitudinal Cross-pressure combinations. The subscript 1 here indicates a pro-Democratic party attitude and the subscript 3 indicates a pro-Republican party attitude. The middle category, as explained in Chapter Three, consists of individuals not strongly for one or the other party.

As with status inconsistency, we find in Table Six that non-cross-pressured individuals are considerably more numerous

TABLE A4: DISTRIBUTION OF INCONSISTENCY TYPES$

Type	of Inconsistency	Frequency	Number of Categories	Ave. Frequency per Category
ROI	Strongly Inconsistent	123	(6)	20.5
ROI	Moderately Inconsistent	107	(6)	17.8
ROI	Mildly Inconsistent	408	(12)	34.0
ROI	Consistent	122	(3)	40.7
ROI	TOTAL	760	(27)	28.1
ROE	Strongly Inconsistent	83	(6)	13.8
ROE	Moderately Inconsistent	109	(6)	18.1
ROE	Mildly Inconsistent	431	(12)	35.9
ROE	Consistent	137	(3)	45.7
ROE	TOTAL	760	(27)	28.1
RIE	Strongly Inconsistent	96	(6)	16.0
RIE	Moderately Inconsistent	118	(6)	19.7
RIE	Mildly Inconsistent	398	(12)	33.2
RIE	Consistent	148	(3)	49.3
RIE	TOTAL	760	(27)	28.1
OIE	Strongly Inconsistent	55	(6)	9.2
OIE	Moderately Inconsistent	78	(6)	13.0
OIE	Mildly Inconsistent	421	(12)	35.1
OIE	Consistent	206	(3)	68.7
		760	(27)	28.1

$Notation (See Table A3)

TABLE A5: ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION$

Two-Dimensional Cross-Pressures					
Variable Combination	Frequency	Variable Combination	Frequency	Variable Combination	Frequency
$-P_1C_1$	350	$+P_1C_2$	167	$*P_1C_3$	50
$+P_2C_1$	96	$-P_2C_2$	260	$+P_2C_3$	139
$*P_3C_1$	34	$+P_3C_2$	148	$-P_3C_3$	429
$-P_1I_1$	344	$+P_1I_2$	149	$*P_1I_3$	74
$+P_2I_1$	112	$-P_2I_2$	251	$-P_2I_3$	132
$*P_3I_1$	88	$+P_3I_2$	211	$-P_3I_3$	312
$-C_1I_1$	284	$+C_1I_2$	120	$*C_1I_3$	76
$+C_2I_1$	161	$-C_2I_2$	282	$+C_2I_3$	132
$*C_3I_1$	99	$+C_3I_2$	209	$-C_3I_3$	310
Three-Dimensional Cross-Pressures					
$-P_1C_1I_1$	240	$\#P_1C_1I_2$	69	$+P_1C_2I_3$	17
$\#P_2C_1I_1$	36	$\#P_2C_1I_2$	40	$\#P_2C_2I_3$	56
$*P_3C_1I_1$	8	$+P_3C_1I_2$	11	$\#P_3C_2I_3$	59
$\#P_1C_2I_1$	87	$*P_1C_1I_3$	41	$+P_1C_3I_2$	17
$\#P_2C_2I_1$	53	$+P_2C_1I_3$	20	$\#P_2C_3I_2$	60
$+P_3C_2I_1$	21	$*P_3C_1I_3$	15	$\#P_3C_3I_2$	132
$*P_1C_3I_1$	17	$\#P_1C_2I_2$	63	$*P_1C_3I_3$	16
$+P_2C_3I_1$	23	$-P_2C_2I_2$	151	$\#P_2C_3I_3$	56
$*P_3C_3I_1$	59	$\#P_3C_2I_2$	68	$-P_3C_3I_3$	238

$Notation: P=Party Orientation, C=Candidate Orientation, I=Issue Orientation. Subscripts proceed from strong Democratic preference (1) to Strong Republican Preference (3).

* = Highly Cross-Pressured, # = Mildly Cross-Pressured, + = Moderately Cross-Pressured, - = Consistent

TABLE A6: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ATTITUDINAL CROSS-PRESSURE TYPES$

Type of Cross-Pressure		Frequency	Number of Categories	Ave. Frequency per Category
PC	Inconsistent	84	(2)	42.0
PC	Moderately Inconsistent	550	(4)	137.5
PC	Consistent	1039	(3)	346.3
PC	TOTAL	1673	(9)	184.8
PI	Inconsistent	162	(2)	81.0
PI	Moderately Inconsistent	604	(4)	151.0
PI	Consistent	907	(3)	302.3
PI	TOTAL	1673	(9)	184.8
CI	Inconsistent	175	(2)	87.5
CI	Moderately Inconsistent	622	(4)	155.5
CI	Consistent	876	(3)	292.0
CI	TOTAL	1673	(9)	184.8
PCI	Strongly Inconsistent	156	(6)	36.0
PCI	Moderately Inconsistent	109	(6)	18.2
PCI	Mildly Inconsistent	779	(12)	65.0
PCI	Consistent	629	(3)	209.7
PCI	TOTAL	1673	(27)	62.0

$Notation (See Table A5)

than cross-pressured ones. However, in the case of individuals whose cross-pressures are only moderate the frequency is even lower than for the strong inconsistents. This may be merely a labelling difficulty, since moderate cross-pressures in this case may be even more stressful than those defined as strong. Moderate cross-pressures refers to 1-2-3 combinations (Democrat, non-identifiers, Republican), while any totally extreme combination is labelled a strong cross-pressure situation (1-1-3, or 3-3-1, for example). One might argue that the labels ought to be reversed, but the usage here is consistent with Lenski's procedure and, in any case, the matter is of little significance since either combination is relatively infrequent and inconsistent statuses are not defined this way in the analysis. The marginals do indicate the expected pattern of cross-pressure frequencies and demonstrate that the population probably conforms to the usual conception in this regard.

Tables Seven and Eight show the marginal frequencies for combinations of affiliative cross-pressures. Of course the N's here are small, but as Table Eight demonstrates the expected pattern holds: cross-pressures are less frequent than strong ones. This occurrence has no easy explanation, since affiliative cross-pressures have a Wallace cue as the middle category. Apparently the social universe is such that Wallace cues rarely exist in combination with other standard ones. Again it is not particularly important

TABLE A7: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURE COMBINATIONS$

Variable Combination	Frequency	Variable Combination	Frequency	Variable Combination	Frequency
$-S_1R_1$	13	$+S_1R_2$	4	$*S_1R_3$	4
$+S_2R_1$	5	$-S_2R_2$	4	$+S_2R_3$	2
$*S_3R_1$	10	$+S_3R_2$	2	$-S_3R_3$	17
$-S_1F_1$	20	$+S_1F_2$	1	$*S_1F_3$	8
$+S_2F_1$	3	$-S_2F_2$	4	$+S_2F_3$	1
$*S_3F_1$	9	$+S_3F_2$	4	$-S_3F_3$	12
$-R_1F_1$	24	$+R_1F_2$	2	$*R_1F_3$	11
$+R_2F_1$	4	$-R_2F_2$	10	$+R_2F_3$	4
$*R_3F_1$	18	$+R_3F_2$	5	$-R_3F_3$	16

$Notation: S = Spouse's cue; R = Relative's cue; F = Friend's cue.

TABLE A8: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR AFFILIATIVE CROSS-PRESSURE TYPES$

Type of Inconsistency		Frequency	Number of Categories	Ave. Frequency per Category
SR	Inconsistent	14	(2)	7.0
SR	Moderately Inconsistent	13	(4)	3.2
SR	Consistent	34	(3)	11.3
SR	TOTAL	61	(9)	6.8
SF	Inconsistent	17	(2)	8.5
SF	Moderately Inconsistent	9	(4)	2.2
SF	Consistent	36	(3)	12.0
SF	TOTAL	62	(9)	6.9
RF	Inconsistent	29	(2)	14.5
RF	Moderately Inconsistent	15	(4)	3.8
RF	Consistent	50	(3)	16.6
RF	TOTAL	62	(9)	10.4

$Notation: (See Table A7)

since the consistent are more frequent than either type of cross-pressured individuals.

In Chapter Four the three independent variables were summed into single indexes. The frequencies for these indexes are presented in Table Nine. The status inconsistency and attitudinal cross-pressure variables have similar distributions, with a large middle group and relatively small consistent and inconsistent groups. The construction of these indexes, and that of affiliative cross-pressures, was described in Chapter Four. In the case of affiliative cross-pressures it was impossible to create a single summary measure and retain an adequate N, as Table Nine shows. The variable was, therefore, constructed for each dependent variable by pairs of affiliative cues. This resulted in several frequency distributions. Only the turnout frequencies are shown. They are representative of the general pattern, with the exception of the combination of all cues which has more cross-pressured than consistent individuals. This all-cue combination could not be used in the analysis.

Analysis Techniques, Assumptions, Restrictions

Two modes of analysis are presented in this dissertation: cross-tabulation and dummy-variable multiple-regression. The presentation of the cross-tabulation results is uncomplicated by tests of significance or association. Tests of significance were considered unnecessary since the investigation concerned patterns within the tables rather than whether the tables could have occurred by chance. Inspections

TABLE A9: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN TRICHOTOMOUS FORM

I. Status Inconsistency		II. Attitudinal Cross-Pressures	
Consistent	15	Consistent	478
Intermediate	465	Intermediate	1039
Inconsistent	141	Inconsistent	156
Total	621	Total	1673

III. Affiliative Cross-Pressures$	
On Turnout	SRF = 38
	SR = 61
	RF = 94
	SF = 62
On Wallace	SR = 51
	RF = 84
	SF = 54
On Republican Vote	SR = 46
	RF = 73
	SF = 46

IV. Frequency Distribution of Affiliative Cross-Pressures on Turnout

SR	Consistent	30	SF	Consistent	32
	Intermediate	17		Intermediate	13
	Inconsistent	14		Inconsistent	17
RF	Consistent	40	SRF	Consistent	12
	Intermediate	25		Intermediate	9
	Inconsistent	29		Inconsistent	17

$Notation (See Table A7)

of the tables by considering the patterns in them was, then, the method of analysis. An attempt was made to assess the extent and dimensions of the patterns, although this attempt was necessarily ad hoc since I know of no reliable statistical test appropriate for this endeavor.

The most significant technique used here was, of course, dummy-variable multiple regression. This procedure is not particularly well-known or commonly used. It differs marginally from standard multiple regression usage and therefore merits some attention.

Building on Blalock,[2] this dissertation has assumed that inconsistency theories represent applications involving, in a rather straightforward way, the notion of statistical interaction. Thus a technique which could assess the existence and magnitude of interaction was necessary. Several such techniques fill this need, but dummy-variable multiple regression was chosen because of its suitability and availability. It is a relatively simple adaptation of standard multiple regression.[3] Instead of using variables in their raw form, the procedure used trichotomized configurations. Three variables are created for each original one. The new variables take a value of either zero or one, depending on which category the respondent falls into on the raw variable. Since an individual can have but one score on any set of three trichotomous variables (one score per original variable), only two categories need be included in the analysis, the residual category being included in the constant term. This

procedure generates an equation of the form, $W=a+x_1+x_2+y_1+y_2$ instead of the traditional W=a+x+y. The purpose, of course, is to identify the effects of each category (called main effects) and, more importantly, the effects of combinations of categories. In this procedure the marginal distribution is allowed to influence the outcome in order that the main effects might be considered. Interaction effects can be identified precisely by generating interaction terms and adding them to the equations. From these equations tables are generated. The procedure employed here always dropped the middle category of the raw variable from consideration in the equation. Thus a table was produced by substituting the appropriate values in the model matrix:

Variable 2	Variable 1 y_1	y_2	y_3
x_1	$W=a+x_1+y_1$	$W=a+x_1$	$W=a+x_1+y_3$
x_2	$W=a+y_1$	$W=a$	$W=a+y_3$
x_3	$W=a+x_3+y_1$	$W=a+x_3$	$W=a+x_3+y_3$

Figure 3: Model Matrix for Additive Relationship

Entries represent expected percentages of the dependent variable. Three way tables were more complicated, of course, but followed the same rules of combination. Interaction was inferred by comparing these expected proportions with the actual ones. Tests of significance regarding the differences

between the two tables are inappropriate since both tables come from the same sample.

This procedure is not without limitations, despite its clear applicability to the problem. In multiple regression analysis, like analysis of variance, independent variables are most properly of an interval nature. The dummy-variable technique skirts this assumption by defining variables as interval level (either zero or one for any dummy variable). As Suits notes, this procedure is entirely acceptable and does no harm to the assumption.[4] Secondly, the technique is subject to difficulties arising from multi-collinearity perhaps even more so than standard multiple regression. When the independent variables are highly intercorrelated misleading results may occur. The intercorrelations of the raw variables were not particularly high (always less than .5), indicating an acceptable level of multi-collinearity. It is not certain, however, that the same criteria necessarily apply for inter-correlations among dummy-variables. Two dummy variables completely determine the third. However the routine only includes two dummy variables at a time so that the correlations among them are not unity. In fact intercorrelations among dummy variables are also rarely above .5, so that there is little apparent reason to fear multicollinearity here either. Thirdly, the technique necessitated dichotomization of the dependent variables in this study. Dichotomous dependent variables violate three assumptions of the regression model.[5] Error terms, first, are not normally distributed, except in the case of nearly equal proportions. For Turnout

and Wallace Vote proportions were highly unequal. Thus error terms were not normally distributed for these variables. Large samples, however, allow some safety against distortion due to this occurrence. Secondly, the expected value of the residuals is not zero. Thus regression coefficients may be (and in this case probably are) biased. This bias was unavoidable and is minimized by the size of the sample. Finally, the dependent variable is assumed to have a constant variance across all levels of the independent variables. Of course this assumption is also not met by the dichotomous variables, but its effect is only to bias the sample parameters as estimates of population parameters. This estimation is not important to the present study. The use of dichotomous dependent variables, then, is not without drawbacks. These burdens are overcome by the size of the sample in most cases and, in the others I would argue that the power of the technique provide sufficient rationale for its use, limitations notwithstanding. Fourthly, the regression model assumes that error terms are uncorrelated. In our sample, a weighted one, this is not true. Some individuals were included twice. However these individuals, all Blacks, were dropped from the analysis of status inconsistency so that, for that chapter the assumption is met, but the relevant universe for the sample becomes the adult, white population. For the cross-pressures sections the error remains. Only 116 of 1673 individuals were counted twice. Finally, the regression model assumes a simple random sample. While the SRC sample

is a cluster sample, the increase in error is insignificant and non-systematic, making it impossible to speculate on the direction of possible bias, but we may be certain it is small.

Clearly the technique employed here has limitations. Other techniques might be more suitable for future analyses. These include the newly developed Probit analysis which better copes with dichotomous dependent variables,[6] and Multiple Classification Analysis which may not be appropriate theoretically but does overcome some parametric difficulties.[7] On the whole dummy-variable multiple regression serves well, as evidenced by its frequent use in this area.

The particular regression routine used here provides information on sums of squares, r's, beta-weights, r^2, and F-tests.[8] Occasionally the analysis referred to the magnitude of the beta-weights. It was necessary to be cautious in interpreting these otherwise useful figures since their values could be manipulated in this case by altering the selection of categories used in the equations. More useful was r^2, the amount of variance explained by any particular model. This was used straightforwardly as a measure of the performance of each model. The F-tests between models allowed a precise evaluation of the impact of interaction terms regardless of changes in the sums of squares. F-tests are clearly the most suitable criteria for choosing among competing models, especially when interaction effects are expected. Although Pool, Abelson and Popkin employed F-tests liberally, this dissertation marks their initial use in the status

inconsistency literature or for this conceptualization of cross-pressures.[9] These methods allowed, in sum, the maximum discrimination among models as well as the most precise procedure for locating possible interaction effects.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Lawrence M. Hynson, and Don Clelland, "Status Inconsistency, Organizational Participation and the Wallace Movement," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association, San Antonio, Texas, March 30-April 1, 1972.

[2]Hubert M. Blalock, "The Identification Problem and Theory Building: The Case of Status Inconsistency," American Sociological Review, 31 (February, 1966), pp. 52-61.

[3]For a description of the process and its relation to standard multiple-regression see Gudmund R. Iversen, Applied Statistics, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, 1971), especially chapters 3 and 5.

[4]Daniel B. Suits, "Use of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 58 (1957), pp. 548-551.

[5]For a detailed account of the assumptions involved see John C. Blydenburgh, "Probit Analysis: A Method for Coping with Dichotomous Dependent Variables," Social Science Quarterly, 51 (March, 1971), pp. 889-899.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Multiple Classification Analysis is sometimes referred to as Automatic Interaction Detection Analysis or Tree Analysis. The best description of the process is J. A. Sonquist and J. N. Morgan, The Detection of Interaction Effects, Monograph No. 35, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

[8]See North Texas State University Computing Center Statistical User's Guide, Version II, September 1, 1971, ST004, pp. 26-28, for a description of the procedure and its output.

[9]Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, Candidates, Issues, and Strategies, (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), esp. chapter 4.