mm Mun WW mm L 3 1293 3006 3682 113 1140- ,. ,.-.- -_-‘P4'. m -—., w} )9}; w; 1 JAIN 8 zfiizg 1 1 :41; a: "y; / -—< L; y/oi/ ABSTRACT THE EFFECTS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES UPON SELECT SITES OF NORTH AMERICA BY Jeffrey William Crause Problem The Olympics in general, have been the subject of much criticism of late. This centers on the politics, format, costs (social, environmental, as well as economic), and purpose of the Games. Based on the overall'im« pacts of the Games upon the host community, it has been suggested the Olympics be discontinued, restruCtured, held permanently in the same 10— cale, or kept as is. These points are given some attention in this thesis. The primary aim of this paper is to study the planning process undertaken by each Olympic host. The following questions were posed: l) were there existing plans at the local, state, or federal levels calling for the creation of the Olympic sites? 2) was the planning effort in each instance a part of long-range, comprehensive planning? 3) was the desire to stage the Olympics a part of community priorities? It was an important element of each chapter to determine the rationale(s) behind each host's decision to stage the Games. Methodology It was the intent of this thesis to historically review the Olympic planning process undertaken by the following five host cities: 1) Lake Placid, 1932; 2) Squaw Valley, 1960; 3) Denver (the designated host); Jeffrey William Crause 1976; 4) Montreal, 1976; and 5) Lake Placid, 1980. The effects of the Olympics upon the hosts were measured in terms of facilities constructed, land consumed, transportation systems developed, and money spent. Other variables studied included: ecological and social consequences, the effects to community services and other municipal programs, other impacts as well as the benefits (both real and intangible). Sources of information for this research included the following: journals, periodicals, texts, newspapers, direct interviews, governmental hearings, agency and committee reports and studies. It was suggested in the literature that substantial economic bene- fits accrue to the host community only when the Olympics are used as a means to achieve long-term urban development. This is the basis for developing the following hypothesis: only when the Games are used in furtherance of a community's planning priorities and long-range goals and objectives, can there be any rational justification for hosting them. Findin s The hypothesis is supported by analysis of the cases studied in this work. Lake Placid (both 1932 and 1980 examples) is the only site that can adequately justify its Olympic experiences. While there were problems with the plans, the Olympic decision was (and is today) the product of long-rang planning, citizen priorities, and multi-agency coor- dination. The facility receives continuous use today both by tourists and athletes in training. In contrast, the remaining Olympic sites used plans that were not based on comprehensive plans, policies, or priorities of the community. Jeffrey William Crause As a result, they all experienced significant degrees of trouble either before, during, or after the games: (1) Squaw Valley is a substantial tax burden on the State of California in the sense that the State must pay yearly maintenance costs for facilities which are dismantled or stand idle; (2) the perceived implications to the environment, land use, and quality of life in Denver (and Colorado) caused voters to cancel the Olympics; and (3) Montreal spent billions of dollars to build sports facilities which are admittedly "white elephants." Meanwhile, much needed community services were either postponed or canceled. These three sites have difficulty rationalizing their Olympic experiences in light of the multi-million (billion) dollar expenditures. The study recommends courses of action that future Olympic cities might find desirable. The main suggestions involve: (l) securing ade- quate Olympic endorsements from elected and nonelected officials, and the citizenry; (2) utilizing well-coordinated, comprehensive, and long-range planning, and (3) contemplating the sponsorship of the Games only if the majority of the necessary facilities exist. Recommendations were also made that apply to Olympic committees. These organizations must assume more responsibility to assure that plans are properly financed and executed. Since they choose the Olympic sites, these committees should accept some liability for the results of their decisions. THE EFFECTS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES UPON SELECT SITES OF NORTH AMERICA BY Jeffrey William Crause A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF URBAN PLANNING School of Urban Planning and Landscape Architecture 1977 Copyright by JEFFREY WILLIAM CRAUSE 1977 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am sincerely grateful and appreciative of the assistance given me by members of my thesis committee: Dr. Carl Goldschmidt, Director of the School of Urban Planning and Landscape Architecture; and Assistant Professor John Burroughs of the School of Landscape Architecture. I wish to convey my special gratitude and heartfelt thanks to my committee chairman, Dr. John R. Mullin of the School of Urban Planning. His energy enthusiasm, diligence, guidance, and inspiration made this effort tre- mendously less difficult. There are a number of organizations and agencies connected with the Lake Placid 1980 Olympics that have been extremely helpful to me in my study of that and other sites: William Dempsey and Jan Sweet Freeman of the Technical Assistance Center; the Lake Placid Olympic Transportation Committee, the New York State Highway Department; the Adirondack Park Agency; and Reverend Fell and the Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee. There are others who have contributed significantly to this end product and whose thanks I owe: Dr. Michael Lukomski; John Yeager; Paul Stuhmer; Michigan U.S. Representative Bdb Carr and staff; David Shutes; Joseph Stoniecki; and Maryanne Favreau. Thank you one and all. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 0.10 Problems Caused by the Olympics 0.20 Hypothesis 0.30 The Study 0.31 Choice of Sample 0.32 Research Materials 0.40 Summary FOOTNOTES - INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I LAKE PLACID (1932) 1.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games at Lake Placid 1.20 Facilities 1.21 Existing Facilities 1.22 Planning 1.23 Preparations 1.30 The Bobsled Run - Environmental Effects 1.40 Transportation 1.50 Other Impacts 1.60 Benefits 1.70 Conclusion 1.71 Points for Future Reference FOOTNOTES - LAKE PLACID, 1932 CHAPTER II SQUAW VALLEY (1960) 2.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games in Squaw Valley 2.20 Facilities 2.21 Existing Facilities 2.22 Planning 2.23 Preparations 2.30 Transportation 2.40 The Environment 2.50 Other Impacts 2.51 Aftermath - Post 1970 2.60 Benefits 2.70 Conclusion 2.71 Points for Future Reference FOOTNOTES - SQUAW VALLEY, 1960 CHAPTER III DENVER (1976) 3.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games at Denver 3.20 Planning 3.21 Long-Range Planning 3.22 Organization 3.23 Attempts to Integrate Olympic Plans with Community Planning Priorities and Established Plans iv \DmQO‘U'IbNH 10 13 13 13 14 18 21 22 23 25 27 29 32 33 34 34 35 36 39 42 44 46 48 49 50 52 55 56 58 58 6O 63 3.30 3.40 FOOTNOTES 3.24 Administrative Planning 3.25 Secrecy Charges and Deceptions Facilities 3.31 Existing Facilities 3.32 New Facilities The Environment 7 3.41 Involvement of Environmental Organizations 3.42 Lack of Sensitivity Towards the Environment 3.43 Ecological Ramifications Transportation Benefits The Opposition Conclusion 3.81 Points for Future Reference - DENVER, 1976 CHAPTER IV MONTREAL (1976) 4.10 4.20 4.30 4.40 4.50 4.60 4.70 4.80 FOOTNOTES CHAPTER.V 5.10 5.20 5.30 5.40 5.50 5.60 5.70 FIXTTNOTES Rationale for Hosting the Games at Montreal Planning 4.21 Planning Organization 4.22 The Nature of the Planning 4.23 Administrative Planning Facilities 4.31 Existing Facilities 4.32 New Facilities The Environment Transportation Other Impacts Benefits Conclusion 4.81 Points for Future Reference - MONTREAL, 1976 LAKE PLACID (1980) Reasons for Hosting the Games (1980) at Lake Placid Facilities 5.21 Existing Facilities 5.22 Planning The Environment 5.31 Environmental Concern 5.32 The Draft Environmental Impact Statement 5.33 Land Use Plans 5.34 The APA 5.35 Summary Other Impacts Transportation Benefits Conclusion 5.71 Points for Future Reference - LAKE PLACID, 1980 66 67 69 69 71 74 74 76 79 81 83 84 86 88 90 94 95 98 98 98 102 103 103 104 106 108 109 112 114 114 116 121 122 126 126 127 133 133 135 138 140 143 144 145 147 149 150 152 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION 7.10 Overview 7.20 Future Action - Cities 7.30 Future Action - The Games APPENDIX A List of Modern Summer and Winter Olympics and Sites APPENDIX B Squaw Valley Facilities Constructed on Federal Lands APPENDIX C Facilities Required for Squaw Valley Olympic Games APPENDIX D Author's Notes of Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 1976 Winter Olympics of Denver APPENDIX E Author's Notes of the Transportation Planning Process, Lake Placid 1980 Winter Olympics APPENDIX F' Preliminary Summary of Economic Impacts of 1980 Winter Olympics on Lake Placid Area LIST OF REFERENCES vi 156 158 162 163 167 169 170 171 175 178 180 I NTRODUCT ION Sports are important in this society. This fact can be supported by the large volume of business involving all facets of sports and rec- reation, and by the amount of media coverage devoted to sports. Many of today's heros, idols, and most recognizable faces are sports celebrities. A good deal of today's most innovative architecture involves sports stadia and structures. Sports are promoted on the basis of health, safety, welfare, and morals by officials of no lesser ranks than nation- al leaders. The effect of sports programs upon land use and land manage- ment is immense, in terms of space required (consider, for example, the land needs of a golfer, hunter, skier, or canoeing enthusiast), and the priorities that must govern the allocation of diminishing open lands. The Olympics come to mind in this discussion of sports (and their impacts upon the city) because of the heritage, the prestige, the spec- tacle, and the world-wide appeal of the Games. The lengths to which some cities have gone in preparation for the Games are quite extraordinary, especially in light of the two—week period of competition. Since this event is usually staged in different locations every Olympiad (every four years), the whole sequence of preparations and problems must be continuously re-enacted. 0.10 Problems Caused by the Olympics The biggest difficulty the games have encountered of late has in- volved the huge economic cost of outfitting a city with the facilities necessary for the staging of world-class competition. To cite recent examples, Munich's Olympics cost $760 million, and Montreal's total may exceed $2 billion. Criticisms of misplaced priorities have been raised, as well as complaints by the anti-Olympic factions, claiming the expen- ditures cannot be justified. Research has shown that since WWII (except for the 1948 London Games) the Games have lost money for the host city, and the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the benefit/cost ratio of the Olympics is "clearly less than one." 1 Alternatives have been suggested to the traditional approach of having a single city face the costs of the Games. One would involve dis- persing the events throughout one country: should the United States win the award, hold track events in Los Angeles, swimming in Florida, and so on. Another solution of equal merit would involve the selection of a single site to hold the Games every Olympiad, or the rotation of the Games among three or four permanent sites. It is felt by some critics that Moscow's staging of the 1980 Summer Games may be the last tradition— a1 hosting of the event. This feeling is based upon the enormous costs involved and the unwillingness of cities to face potential bankrupcy, because the costs expended are not likely to be recovered. In light of the drawbacks of hosting the Games (financial and otherwise) it is worth noting that there are already two cities in the U.S. alone (Los Angeles and Atlanta) that have expressed interest in the hosting of the 1984 Summer Games. Other problems to the host include transportation and accommodation of large numbers of visitors. Facilities that must be provided for the two-week event may never be used again. The construction of new facilities may result in the relocation of people living in the area to be cleared, many of whom receive negligible use from the buildings. Another problem, more often the case with Winter Olympic sites, involves the ecological consequences resulting from the use of state or forest lands. This may result in disruption of food and water chains, loss of open spaces, problems of flood and avalanche control, uncontrolled development, etc. The decision to stage the Olympic Games, with the planning and con- struction of facilities necessary to conducting two weeks of sports events, can result in the depletion of community resources. Such a de- cision, it would seem, would be the product of a thorough and carefully thought out decision-making process, one which incorporates a comprehen- sive and long-range planning document. This has not been the case, as will be seen in the case studies, and it probably explains (at least in part) the problems that host cities have experienced. The Games themselves have degenerated substantially from their ancient ideal of an international communion of men and women engaged in athletic endeavors, and have turned into forums for political, social, and religious protest. These actions have had drastic impacts upon the host community and the very future of the Games. This study seeks to a) identify the above stated problems and other effects on the host community, b) identify the guidance and planning that has been provided, c) suggest steps that should be incorporated into the planning, and d) suggest possible recommendations or guidelines for the continuence of the Olympics. 0.20 Hypothesis While the benefit to cost ratio of the games may not approach a factor of 1, it is generally agreed that there are "intrinsic" rewards that cannot be measured in dollars. Such intrinsic rewards include prestige and the "psychic income" associated with being host of the Games. Ciccarelli and Kowarsky, writing on the economics of the Olympics, note that only when the games are used as vehicles of long-term urban and regional development do they generate any sizable economic benefits to the host community.2 To mention a few examples the Games have served as catalysts for: Rome to construct new super highways and a new international airport; Tokyo to acquire 4 major roads, 25 miles of sub- way, a monorail system, the famous "fast train to Osaka," and the addition of approximately $350 million to the city's infrastructure; and Munich to construct its subway and Olympic Park.3 Using the above premise, the following hypothesis has been developed: ONLY when the games are used in furtherance of a community's planning priorities and long-range goals and objectives, can there be any ration- al justification for hostingkthem. It is recognized that preparation of the Olympic facilities results, to certain degrees, in related construc- tion. The hypothesis here, however, suggests that such infrastructure improvements can only be justified if they are a part of established long-range planning. This study seeks to determine whether or not, and to what extent, the hypothesis is supported from the evidence provided by the sample sites. 0.30 The Study The bulk of this thesis is an historical review or investigation of the planning and staging of the Games by five sample cities: 1. Lake Placid (Winter, 1932) 2. Squaw Valley (Winter, 1960) 3. Denver (Winter, 1976) 4. Montreal (Summer, 1976) 5. Lake Placid (Winter, 1980) The overall objectives that guided this study are summarized as follows: 1. to determine the factors behind each hosts' decision to seek out and stage the Games; 2. to investigate the planning used, particularly as it can be tied to pre-existing planning; 3. to analyze the aftermath as compared with the hosts' antici- pated outcomes; and, 4. to determine the impacts and the benefits. It should be noted that the term "planning" is intended to include all preparations, either pre-existing or original, undertaken by the host city. "Planners" are designated as those people engaged in the process, including state, regional, or city (urban) planners; or business persons engaged in outside professions, civic leaders, or city residents who worked on or with the Olympic organizing committees. The term "effects of the Games" is a quite encompassing one, and those of the Olympics can include many. For this reason, the study has been limited to analyzing those effects of the Games upon the host sites in terms of the following variables: 6 1. facilities -- those sport-related structures, service or support facilities, and their future uses; 2. transportation systems; 3. environmental variables, including land consumption; 4. long and short-term impacts and benefits; and, 5. the society. 0.31 Choice of Sample It was my intention to limit the number of samples to only those cities of North America, where more abundant and universally applicable data could be found. The more recent examples were chosen (post 1950), ex- cept for Lake Placid's 1932 Games. This was chosen to provide an interest- ing comparison with the 1980 Lake Placid Olympics. While Denver did not fulfill its obligation to host the 1976 Winter Games (it was selected by the International Olympic Committee, but withdrew in 1972; Innsbruck stepped in and held the 1976 Winter Games), the causes leading to its rejection of the Games and the fact that it is the only site to ever cancel out after receiving the award warrant its inclusion in this study. Limitations of time and magnitude of the research required the ex- clusion of Mexico City from the study, as well as the remaining North American sites of St. Louis (1904), and Los Angeles (1932). Also, it would certainly have been desirable to include the recent European and Asian examples, as well as an equal number of Summer and Winter Olympics. It should be found, though, that the choices provided in this research are of a diverse enough nature to raise issues and allow conclusions to be drawn in regard to the Olympic Games. 0.32 Research Materials The following sources were used in obtaining data and background information for the study: architectural, engineering, economic and business journals; periodicals and newspapers; House and Senate sub- committee hearings; planning, economic, and transportation studies; en- vironmental impact statements; television accounts; and telephone and written interviews. For the most part, I was forced to make use of such data sources as newspapers and periodicals, as very few texts appear on the topic. "Scholarly" journals were employed to the extent possible, but it followed that a great many of the articles of significant factual value concerning the Olympics and the hosts' planning efforts were reported in Sports Illustrated and the New York Times. The fact that very little information did appear in textual form was further incentive for carrying out the research. At times, citations were made from articles and accounts of a some- what "sensational" color, especially in the Denver and Montreal chapters. It should be stressed that these accounts were cited only when sufficient supporting proof was in evidence. Direct correspondence and interviews were used to supplement the material to a limited extent. Primary source contact would have been much more desirable, but limitations of time and resources prevented this. The performance of statistical tests in measuring the effects of ‘the Games upon the cities has been ruled out. It would be extremely (tifficult to collect satisfactory data for all of the sites over the neczessary time periods. Comparing host cities with comparable non-host citzies would prove troublesome both in gathering two sets of usable data, and deciding upon a "comparable" non-host city. The reliability of such- data would also be in question, as noted by the ever increasing cost projections of the Montreal Games. This study seeks to determine the attitudes of the cities towards the Games, and the Games' impact upon the citizenry. These factors would be difficult if not impossible to in- corporate into statistical tests. The tests might show how Denver, for example, would have gained economically from the Olympics, but they would not be able to deal with environmental and public concerns. While universal application of the principles and recommendations developed in this thesis is the author's intention, several proposed courses of action may be most useful in the context of North American- type planning systems. Under most of these approaches to planning, democratic processes and citizen input are essential elements. The necessity for citizen vote and involvement into the process would not be a factor for those countries that disregard citizen wishes. 0.40 Summary The study, in effect, seeks to document the planning process under- taken by each host. The following items will be isolated: a) the rationale used to bring the Games to the site and whether they were ful— filled; b) the problems that arose; c) the overall effects upon the community, d) whether the hypothesis was born out; and 9) what knowledge can be gained by future hosts based on the experiences of the study sites. The individual cases will be discussed in detail, in the separate chap- ters which follow. Finally there will be a concluding section that will discuss and compare the total experiences. It will also include a guide- linezor planning model for future cities to use should they desire to unC'iertake Olympic planning. FOOTNOTES - INTRODUCT ION 1 James Cicarelli and David J. Kowarsky, "The Economics of the Olympic Games," Business and Economic Dimensions, 9, 5, (September- October, 1973), S. 2 Ibid. 3 "The Olympic Business," The Econimist, 244, 6727, (July 29, 1972), 4-5. CHAPTER I LAKE PLACID IIIrd Winter Olympiad, 1932 "The success of the Third Olympic Winter Games has surpassed our fondest expectations. It is within the province of others to speak of the contribution to international good-will and sportsmanship. It is my duty to report on the financial aspects. True amateur sport is not operated for money, and this applies to the international Olympics more than any other branch. From the beginning we here at Lake Placid knew the gate receipts could never pay more than a fraction of the cost of putting on the games. We knew we would have to take care of our share of the expense." "Winter Olympics Drew $96,000; Lake Placid Deficit $52,468," New York Times, 81, 27052, (February 17, 1932), 27. 10 11 1.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games at Lake Placid Lake Placid is a small community of approximately 3000 residents (3000 now, in 1932 the population was closer to 4000), located in the Adirondack Mountains of upstate New York and roughly 320 miles from New York City. In the late 1800's, the area was of primary interest to tourists only during the warmer seasons. During the winter months, "any tourist who appeared in this bleak corner of upper New York State, was lost."1 In 1905, however, the Lake Placid Club (henceforth referred to as "The Club") opted to leave its clubhouse open even during the winter. Mirror Lake was cleared of snow, and hockey and skating events were staged. Speedskating competition was held in 1918; and by 1921, with its new 35 meter ski jump in operation, Lake Placid began sponsoring meets in that sport. International hockey competitions started in 1927, with the best amateur teams in the U.S. and Canada taking part. These events were mainly participant oriented, with very few spectators in attendance. Dr. Godfrey Dewey, the president of The Club and the man responsible for the 1932 Olympics being held at Lake Placid, described Lake Placid as the Winter Sports Capitol of the U.S.A. Reporter Ezra Bowen concurs, "In those days any place that put on one or more ice-and- snow events was automatically the Winter-Sports Capitol of the U.S." With this sports history, the enthusiasm of the residents and their committment to winter-sports programs and facilities, the United States Olympic Committee (henceforth, USOC) invited Lake Placid to submit a bid for the 1932 Winter Olympics. For some unknown reasons, the city fathers seemed "content to leave slow enough alone,"3 and turned down the USOC's offer. Dr. Dewey, however, realized the potential economic impact of 12 such an international event and the then depressed conditions of the Village, and undertook a campaign that resulted in Lake Placid being named the host of the IIIrd Winter Olympics. Lake Placid's bid had the support of the New York State legislature, which quickly went on record as being "willing to cooperate to the limit of its ability in the enactment of any legislation that may be found necessary to prepare the way for the holding of the 1932 Winter Games at Lake Placid."4 This legislation had the support of Governor Franklin Roosevelt, and eventuated in the following resolution being drafted:5 "Whereas the Olympic Games to be held in the Summer of 1932 have been awarded to the city of Los Angeles, California, and the Olympic Winter Games of 1932 are shortly to be awarded by the International Olympic Committee, and whereas Lake Placid, in the Adirondacks offers more complete and adequate facilities and longer and more successful experience in the holding of Winter Sports than any community in the U.S., and whereas, the Olympic Winter Sports are an inspiration and encouragement to the most wholesome and invigorating type of outdoor Winter recreation for the whole peOple,..." (the legislature went on to support the Lake Placid bid). The USOC was determined to have both summer and winter Olympics of 1932 held on American soil, and was looking for the most experienced site available for holding the winter Games. The site was Lake Placid, and this was the primary reason Lake Placid was selected. As equally important as experience, the New York legislature noted that there were other rationalizations for bringing the Olympics to the Adirondacks: "There is an abundance of ice for skating and good terrain for skiing and other varieties of winter sports." At the same time it ‘was admitted that Lake Placid "lacks a bobsled run required for Olympic Games."6 The country surrounding Lake Placid allegedly contained 75 miles of ski trails,7 and Dr. Dewey emphasized a "modest, sportsy approach... Ibeautiful climate, beautiful terrain, Olympic ideal, guarantee to provide 13 1.20 Facilities 1.21 Existing Facilities There seems to be some confusion over the pre-Olympic status of the facilities. The amenities of the area have already been noted: the good ski trails, ski jump, abundant snow and ice. In April of 1929, it was reported that many of the Olympic events had already been staged at one time or another at Lake Placid, that the central problem involved in- creasing spectator viewing at the various events.13 It was also mentioned that a total of 75 miles of ski trails existed in the vicinity. The site however, lacked a bobsled run and suitable ice arenas. The usefulness of Mirror Lake was over-emphasized, and perhaps over- rated, which may have prompted Bowen to write: "In the bleak light of May, the 'practically satisfactory' sports facilities turned out to be 14 practically nothing." In addition, there was a housing shortage, and as the Games got underway, a severe snow shortage. 1.22 Planning As with most small communities at this time, no formal planning mechanism (in terms of staff and established planning documents) existed in Lake Placid. The Village decision-makers included the following: elected officials, Lake Placid Athletic Club members, Kiwanis Club members, the Chamber of Commerce, and finally, the registered voters of Lake Placid Village. Beginning in the early 1900's, though, the Village had made it a policy to establish and upgrade its winter-sports facilities. Long-range planning in this area began with the annual staging of the various competitions and construction of the ski jump in 14 the early 1920's. While it may not have been a formally stated agreement, it is clear that a major objective of Lake Placid (through the actions of the Club and the citizens) was to create officially sanctioned winter- sports facilities and become a winter-sports capitol of the United States. With these priorities established, it is not clear why the city officials balked initially when the USOC invited them to host the Games. Once the award was accepted by Lake Placid, the town was, for the most part, in solid support of every phase of the Olympic planning. The Games were used as a means of stimulating the development of property and facilities, in complete harmony with the Village's planning goals and objectives. 1.23 Preparations The initial Olympic planning called for the staging of the follow- ing events: 1) ski jumping, 2) a 50 kilometer ski race, 3) an 18 kilometer ski race, 4) ice hockey, 5) speed skating, 6) figure skating, and 7) bobsledding. This was in April of 1929, when it was reported that "Lake Placid already has subscribed $50,000 to cover any deficit, and has listed plans for housing of from 4,500-6,500 contestants, officials, and spectators."15 Plans were also formed at this time to include an experimental event: the 25 mile dog sled race (at this early date in Winter Olympics history, events could be included on a trial basis to determine if they warranted permanent inclusion into the format). The facilities that were to be newly constructed were: 1) an indoor ice arena, 2) an outdoor ice stadium for speed skating, and 3) two bobsled runs -- one being a practice run. (There were so many difficulties arising from the bob runs that an entire section is devoted to them; 15 see section 1.30 of this chapter). In June of 1929 the Village passed a $200,000 thirty year bond issue to be used "to provide for the purchase of land used for the Olympics. The proceeds of the bonds are expected to cover all expenditures."l6 It was not until December of 1930 that a more realistic appraisal of the situation was undertaken. Arthur Daley reported that $375,000 more was sought (to bring the total to one half million dollars). The additional money, appropriated by the legislature, was to be used for the previous— ly mentioned facilities plus the creation of a ski jump arena. Dr. Dewey admitted: "We need this money for the preparation of adequate facilities, this is essential. Not only will the money go for creating a fitting atmosphere, but the facilities will be permanent...making Lake Placid an American St. Moritz."17 The creation of these facilities and atmosphere was going to cost the organizing committee substantially more than originally anticipated. By December 1931, a year prior to the Games, the total figure was set at $1,050,000. It was stressed that the facilities had to be equal to those elsewhere in the world, and that of the one million dollar plus figure, "$250,000 must be raised through private subscription to complete the fund..."18 Mr. Harris, chairman of the general fund of the State Olympic Winter Games, pointed out that "the Olympiad is a world event, and the awarding of it to the U.S. brought obligations and a distinction of his— «19 toric importance. To fulfill its obligation, the Village passed another bond issue of $150,000 to complete the financing of the indoor ice arena.20 This extra $150,000 was required because of an unusual turn of events. As previously noted, Governor Roosevelt was in full support of 16 all facilities —- Dewey again carried the day and came home a hero."8 Lake Placid was given serious, and then final consideration for sponsoring the games because it also had the support of the townsfolks. Several bond issues were passed in order to provide the necessary revenue to build facilities. Willis Wells, chairman of the finance committee, had this to say while reporting on the final status of the Games: "We looked upon what we would do as an investment into the future of our community and the Adirondack Region in general. We are happy today that we accepted this responsibility. How well we discharged it is for others to say."9 The town had seriously hoped there would be some economic profit, not just for the duration of the contests, but in the long-term as people returned to Lake Placid to use the facilities. The Olympics would "give New York a permanent Winter sports center, making Lake Placid an American St. Moritz."10 It was reported that a total of $1,050,000 was needed "for the IIIrd Winter Olympic Games if facilities are to be provided equal to those at Chamonix, France, and St. Moritz, Switzerland..."11 This continued reference to famous European Resorts, and the desire for the U.S. to be placed on equal footing in terms of prestige were important factors in the USOC's efforts to secure both Summer and Winter Olympic Games in 1932. Finally, world-wide brotherhood was cited as a possible spin-off of the Lake Placid Games. President Herbert Hoover sent a letter to Dr. Dewey, "commending the Games as fostering international good-will,"12 and congratulating the selection of Lake Placid. 17 the Games. In April of 1929, he approved a bill appropriating the initial $2000 for construction of the bob run.21 Again in April of 1930, Roosevelt signed a bill allowing $125,000 "to be used for the Olympic Games -- every aspect of planning and hosting them."22 By February of 1931, however, he had reconsidered the state's role and vetoed a $210,000 item in the budget that would have financed the indoor ice arena. He objected to such a sum that would provide for facilities "to be used for the two weeks and then turned over to the Village of Lake Placid."23 Dr. Dewey had admitted to the various civic groups in the Village, prior to the bid acceptance, that housing of the spectators and partici- pants was going to be the biggest problem in organizing the Olympics.24 As the planning progressed, the total number of people expected rose from the initial figures of 4,500 to 6,500. Participants and staff from 17 nations had accepted invitations to compete, and the town spent the three years prior to 1932 "revamping summer cottages and expanding housing facilities to accommodate the 10,000 expected,"25 Arthur Daley mentioned that hotels and boarding houses would take in 1,700 people, and "other facilities will bring the total accommodations up to the 10,000."26 In its efforts to secure ample low-cost, temporary housing for Olympic visitors, the Lake Placid Olympic Committee devised a plan of incredible simplicity and ingenuity. The Village contracted to lay 500 feet of additional trackage in order to accommodate 25 chartered pullman cars. Called a "unique construction" project, the pullmans were supplied with heat and water from the central plant and provided housing for 500 people.27 It would seem that a plan of this nature would find universal acceptance and application to major events of Olympic caliber. Housing 18 for the short-term is provided without the need for building costly projects which may remain vacant forever after (the reader is referred to the examples of Squaw Valley, Munich, and Montreal as described in this text). Housing may have been adequate for contestants in Lake Placid's 1932 Olympics, but seating at the contests had its short-comings. Ten thousand spectators, participants, and officials watched the Games from facilities with seating capacities as follows: 1) indoor arena - 3000; 2) outdoor arena - 6000; and 3) ski jump - 4000.28 In terms of total attendance, Bowen reported a figure of 80,000 for the 2-week competition. He further stated that Sonja Henie performed before 8000, and that the largest crowd numbered 14,000.29 These figures seem somewhat inflated in light of the limited housing accommodations, skating capacities, and the report of the final ticket receipts being 30 $52,468 short of the anticipated $100,000; the latter figure based upon an expected 10,000 visitors per day. 1.30 The Bobsled Run - Environmental Effects In all, approximately 100 miles of land and trails were made avail- able for ski courses, bob and dog sled runs, and ski jumps. Acreage was cleared for the indoor and outdoor stadiums, and for the expanded ski jump arena. By far, the most controversial of this land consumption in- volved the construction of the bobsled course. When Lake Placid submitted its Olympic bid to the International Olympic Committee (henceforth, IOC), the fact that a bob run was missing became the major point of concern and was the subject of the only Objection raised by the IOC. The problem arose when the organizing committee 19 planned to construct the run on state lands, part of which formed a section of a forest preserve. Naturally, the construction entailed the removal of some brush and "a limited number of trees." Under a constitu- tional provision adopted some 20 years prior to this date, however, it was established that the land remain a "preserve": "no trees can be cut nor any timber removed, not even a dead tree encumbering the ground."31 At this point, the organizing committee began to consider an alternate site located at the base of Mt. Marcy, one mile from Lake Placid. The committee had hoped that construction could be completed by the winter of 1929 so that 3 full seasons would be available to test the run. Deciding that the site on the state preserve offered the best course, the state legislature passed a law by October of 1929 authorizing the Conservation Commission to build the run on lands of the forest preserve. Realizing the ecological implications of this law, the lower court ruled it unconstitutional. In so ruling, Judge Crane saw merit in the follow- ing arguments of the proponents of the act: 1) the use of some 48 acres of a nearly 2 million acre preserve would be very slight, 2) there would be benefits to the public in staging the Olympics, of which the bobsled is a major attraction and 3) the forest preserve would be an attractive site to locate events because of the abundant snowfall and the location near the center of Lake Placid. The overiding objection to all of these issues, Judge Crane felt, was the specificity of the state constitution. Citing section 7 of Article VII: "The lands of the state...constituting the forest preserve...shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed, or destroyed."32 20 On appeal, the proponents claimed that outdoor sports do much to maintain the health, happiness, and welfare of the people of the state. These arguments were rejected and the lower court was affirmed in a powerful opinion rendered by Judge Hinman. It reads in part as follows:33 "This bobsleigh run requires the clearing of 4 or 5 acres of forest land, the cutting of 2600 trees which must unquestionably be of 'timber size,‘ and the blasting of some 50 cubic yards of rock from their natural site. If clearings of timber from lands owned by the State in the forest reserve are sanctioned for such a purpose, they are equally sanctioned for the construction of auto race tracks, tobaggon slides, golf courses, baseball diamonds and other sports, all of which are out of harmony with the forest lands in their wild state. There will be no limit to such encroach- ments that will crowd through the door if such precedent is estab- lished. As we view it, the legislature has no power to open that door." Faced with this sequence of events, The Club offered land it owned on Mt. Van Houvenberg to be used for the run. Unfortunately, The Club had a historic policy of not admitting Jews into the membership and this plan was vigorously attacked by the Jewish Tribune. It had been publicized that state funding would be used for the bob run, stadium, road develop- ment around Lake Placid, and "other development in the region." The Jewish Tribune protested “most earnestly against the State of New York being made a party toward aiding an institution (the Lake Placid Club) which is unAmerican in its practices.... we also protest the expendi- ture of taxpayers' money, some of whom are Jews, to go towards fostering a club which discriminates against citizens of this state."34 Dr. Dewey attempted to offer a compromise at this stage of the dis— pute. He said that The Club could possibly deed the land needed for the bob run to the State. The problem with this solution, according to Dr. Dewey, was that in light of the courts' rulings, the trees would still be protected and the run could not be built; if the Club granted an easement to the State, however, this difficulty would be avoided. 21 The Jewish Tribune's response to this alternative was a statement which reflects the resentment existing even today, of using state fund- ing with questionable benefit to the entire citizenry. The plan was termed a "transparent subterfuge. There is little or no likelihood that the State of New York will be further concerned with the bob run after the Olympics, and the Club authorities know full well-that this sham ease- ment will unquestionably lapse. This means that the Lake Placid Club will have the advantage of years to come of an elaborate bob run built for it through the use of State funds and serving as an enduring enhance- ment of the Club's properties."35 A peaceful settlement was finally reached when The Club transferred the deed of the bob site to the township of North Elba. Under the terms of this arrangement, if the State failed to maintain the run after the Games, the property would be turned over to the Lake Placid community, and not back to the Club. Since The Club relinquished all claim to the property, the Jewish Tribune withdrew its objections.36 1.40 Transportation Very little appeared in the research materials dealing with the transportation problems of the IIIrd Winter Olympiad. Yosemite, another site under consideration, was eliminated from the bidding prior to the selection of Lake Placid because it would have become necessary to build a road between Yosemite Valley and Glacier Point. The lack of adequate transportation thus kept a serious contender from hosting the Games. As already noted, Lake Placid is approximately 320 miles from New York City. This was a 12 hour trip, as reported in a New York Times article (4 hours from Montreal).37 Whether this time was by auto or 22 train was not specified, but there was state funding budgeted for road improvement around the Lake Placid area.38 The railroad facilities were also upgraded, but this improvement was intended for the pullmans that were to aid in housing visitors, and not in transporting them. 1.50 Other Impacts The IIIrd Winter Olympics had a dramatic social impact, after the Jewish Tribune leveled serious charges of racial prejudice against the Lake Placid Club. Financial burdens resulted from the passage of two bond issues: one (for $200,000) was to be paid off within 30 years, and the other was to be recovered through Olympic receipts. Since the profits were $52,468 less than expected, the town of North Elba was forced to absorb that deficit as well.39 Even though courts of law ruled favor- ably towards the ecology, they still could not prevent two miles of bob sled run from being "carved out of virgin forest."4O Being extremely winter-sports-oriented, the Village defeated two bond issues that would have enhanced the summer amenities of the area. At the time the $150,000 was approved by the voters to build an indoor ice arena, the following bond issues were defeated: 1) $28,000 to further develop the bathing beach facilities, and 2) $123,000 for land acquisi— tion and development of a golf course. One area of vital community ser- vice also had to take a lesser role to the Olympics: sewage treatment. A new sewage treatment plant was desperately needed, and just prior to the Olympics, the matter had to be "forced" upon the attention of the Village authorities. A new plant was out of the question, "since invest- ment in the Olympics took precedent over special expenditures." This ~ policy resulted in the engineers being forced to use the existing facility 23 as much as possible and at the least cost. A $16,258.91 remodeled plant (primary and secondary treatment of sewage) was the result. While effec- tive, the plant was not the most desired product: "The remodeled plant, in spite of some of its crudities, demonstrates what can be done with sedimentation alone to correct obvious features of sewage pollution."41 As far as the Games being used as a means of attracting more visitors and money into the area, Bowen writes that "on this Winter day (December 3, 1962) Dr. Dewey's dream resort is, comparatively speaking, only slightly less dreary and slightly more prosperous than it was in 1927."42 While the population has dropped off 1000 since 1932, Bowen's remarks may be somewhat unfair. All manner of winter sports competition, national and international including world championships, have been staged at Lake Placid (such international competition is, in fact, staged annually at Lake Placid)?3 The major freeways have made the area easily accessible from the larger centers of population, and the site is used for training the most promising amateur athletes in the U.S. 1.60 Benefits One extremely satisfying reward came to the USOC (and the U.S. in general), that being the "prestige" of sponsoring both summer and winter Olympics of 1932 in the USA. It is with extreme reluctance that the IOC will award one country both Games in the same Olympiad (this has happened only 3 times since 1924 -- France held both in 1924; the USA in 1932; and Germany in 1936 (see Appendix A). The IOC is generally under intense political pressure to enable as many countries as possible the opportunity of staging the games. 24 New York benefited by gaining not only a fully developed sports complex for winter activities, but the "really and truly winter sports capitol of the modern U.S."44 The U.S., the State of New York, the Village of Lake Placid, and in particular the Lake Placid Club all could look upon the Olympics and the facilities with praise and admiration. The U.S. was finally able to boast of a facility on par (at least in facilities, if not atmosphere) with the finest European resorts. The Village of Lake Placid and The Club could have the advantage for many years to come, of some $1 million worth of capital improvements (the majority of which were financed through county, state, or federal sources). Permanent sporting facilities were created second to none, and the road improvements helped enhance the accessibility of the Adirondack community. Imaginative planning helped Lake Placid to avoid the pitfall which other Olympic hosts have fallen into. Instead of creating "white elephant" housing projects (those buildings erected for the housing of Olympic crowds, destined to stand idle thereafter), the organizers rented rail- road cars to be used as mini hotels. This portable Olympic Village was brought in prior to the competition, and sent away with the termination of the contests. As a result, there was no lasting monument of indebted- ness for the Village to maintain and pay taxes on. Those wholesome and invigorating types of outdoor activities were given the proper promotion which the New York legislature had hoped for. Radio broadcasters transmitted the contests over the air waves in an attempt to acquaint the American public with the excitement of winter sports. The residents of Lake Placid were given the opportunity to unite themselves in support of civic goals. Bond issues were passed, and the 25 townsfolks all worked at dressing up the area for the Games. These "spiritual" benefits may not mean a great deal in light of the economic expenses, but they portray the attitude of sacrifice and hardship that must accompany the realization of any planning objective. With this infusion of money and new facilities into the Lake Placid area, one would have expected to find an economic spin-off of much more pronounced dimensions. It is found, however, that population decreased by 1000 between 1932 and the present, and the area remained economically depressed. This is partially explained by the effects of the depression, followed immediately by WWII. It is also explained by the limited amount of manufacturing in that area of the Adirondacks where Lake Placid is located, the consolidation of the small farms, and the decrease in tourism during the war years. While the facilities were abundantly capable of meeting the needs of the winter—sports enthusiasts, these factors combined with the remoteness of the Village rendered the poten- tial economic spin-offs negligible. 1.70 Conclusion Through the determination of members of the USOC to have both Summer and Winter Olympics staged on U.S. soil, Lake Placid was given the Opportunity to host the Winter contests of 1932. While it had on hand most of the facilities, and had previously staged many of the Olympic-type events, $1 million plus was required in preparing Lake Placid for the Games. Over 100 miles of land were made available for trails utilized by the various competitions. With the completion of the bobsled run, one of the finest in the world at that time, 2 years of controversy and protest were brought to an end. The Games opened in the 26 rain and mud, and closed a day later than scheduled, when enough snow finally came to finish the bobsled competition. They were labled a success by Willis Wells, chairman of the finance committee, a success beyond all expectations. More importantly, the Village officials used the IIIrd Winter Olympics as a catalyst for the realization of their planning priorities and objectives. Lake Placid had a long-standing policy to create the proper facilities for entertaining winter sportspersons. By hosting the Games, the town was able to acquire these additional facilities within a period of three years. This was over a million dollars worth of im- provements, four-fifths of which was funded by outside sources. That would have taken the community perhaps several generations to achieve on its own. (With the Depression and WWII, Lake Placid may have had to wait until the 1950's or 1960's before further action could have been taken on upgrading its sports facilities). When the Olympics are employed in such a manner as they were in Lake Placid in 1932, the utmost in terms of benefits can be derived. As Wells admitted, the profits made but a dent in the total costs of the Games. It is a premise of this thesis that in order for a community to provide the most rational justification for expending large sums of money and resources in preparation for the Olympics, the Olympic plans must somehow be incorporated into the community's long-range planning mechanism. This premise appears to find ample support in the example of Lake Placid, 1932 Winter Olympics. 1.71 27 Points for Future Reference (This section appearing in the conclusion of this and succeeding chapters is intended to provide a "legacy" to sites contemplating the sponsorship of future Olympics. It is a short summary of experiences which may prove of value in guiding the planning process of Olympic cities and committees). 1. The planning process should have the support of the following: a. townsleaders, b. civic and business groups, c. towns residents, d. the state legislature and governor, e. U.S. congressional and appointed officials, f. the USOC, 9. national leaders, and h. interest groups (severe environmental difficulties arose in Lake Placid's planning which eventually alienated another powerful group -- the Jewish Tribune). The site should have experience (as did Lake Placid) in staging competitions at the national level, of most or all of the Olympic’ events. a. This implies the existence of all major facilities. b. Should new facilities be needed, plenty of time should be allowed for the testing of them after construction. The investigation of all possibilities of temporary housing and facilities, as was the case with the pullman cars to house visitors, should not be overlooked. Do not rely upon the use of land from a state or national forest preserve. If this land is to be used for facilities, etc., secure 28 assurances well in advance (before entering the Olympic bidding) that the land may in fact be used. (Prior to 1970, environmental impact statements were not required for major federal projects.) Assume that there will not always be universal acceptance and benificence of the Olympics (the Jewish protest here is a good example). Taxpayers from the city, state, and nation will be contributing to events which may have negligible value to them. Determine that the essential community services such as sewage treatment, are adequate prior to planning and funding Olympic- related construction. Olympic-related expenses and planning must be rationalized in light of community planning priorities, objectives, and desires previously established. This rationale is adeauate in Lake Placid's case. FOOTNOTES - LAKE PLACID, 1932 1 Ezra Bowen, "Hey - What DO You Say We Have An Olympics," Sports Illustrated, 17, 23 (December 3, 1962), M9. 2 Ibid., p. M10. 3 Ibid. 4 "State Acts To Get Winter Olympics," New York Times, 78, 25924, (January 15, 1929), 24. 5 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 7 "Lake Placid Chosen By Olympic Body," New York Times, 78, 26010, (April 11, 1929), 25. 8 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M14. 9 "Winter Olympics Drew $96,000; Lake Placid Deficit $52,468," New York Times, 81, 27052, (February 17, 1932), 27. 10 Arthur Daley, "$375,000 Sought For Winter Olympics," New York Times, 80, 26613, (December 5, 1930), 32. 11 "Winter Olympiad To Cost $1,050,000," New York Times, 80, 26710, (March 12, 1931), 6. 12 Ibid. 13 "Lake Placid Chosen," p. 25. 14 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. MlO-Mll. 15 "Lake Placid Chosen," p. 25. 16 "$200,000 Voted For Olympic Winter Sports To Be Held At Lake Placid," New York Times, 78, 26065, (June 5, 1929), 26. 17 Daley, "$375,000 Sought," p. 32. 18 "Winter Olympiad To Cost," p. 6. 19 Ibid. 2 0 "$150,000 Bond Issue For Olympic Ice Arena At Lake Placid Is Voted By Taxpayers," New York Times, 80, 26851, (July 31, 1931), 21. 21 "Lake Placid Bill Approved," New York Times, 78,26010, (April 11, 1929), 25. 29 30 22 "Roosevelt Approves Lake Placid Fund," New York Times, 79, 26388, (April-24, 1930), 22. 23 "Governor May Veto Winter Olympic's Bill," New York Times, 80, 26695, (February 25, 1931), 20. 24 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M10. 25 Arthur Daley, "Stars of 17 Nations Ready For Olympics," New York Times, 81, 27035, (January 31, 1932), X, l. 26 Ibid. 27 "Pullmans Will House 500 At Winter Olympic Games," New York Times, 81, 26930, (OctOber 18, 1931), X, 7. 28 "Lake Placid, Long Crowned Winter Sports Capitol Of America," Recreation, 25, (January 1932), 565. 29 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M15. 30 "Winter Olympics Drew," p. 27. 31 "State Acts To Get Winter Olympics," p. 24. 32 "Court Protects Forest Reserves," New York Times, 80, 26573, (October 26, 1930), XII, l6. 33 "Court Bars State Land Sled Run," New York Times, 79, 26290, (January 16, 1930), 17. 34 "Jews Protest Aid By State Club," New York Times, 80, 26585, (November 7, 1930), 25. 35 "Mosessohn Disputes Dewey's Club Reply," New York Times, 80, 26586, (November 8, 1930), 3. 36 "Lake Placid Club Ends Olympic Row," New York Times, 80, 26612, (December 4, 1930), 50. 37 "Lake Placid Chosen," p. 25. 38 "Jews Protest Aid," p. 25. 39 "Winter Olympics Drew," p. 27. 40 "Battling For Icy Honors At Lake Placid," Literary Digest, 112, 6, (February 6, 1932), 32. 41 Henry W. Taylor, "Sewage Treatment Plant FQmOdeled At Low Cost," American City, 47, (December, 1932), 53. 31 42 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M16. 43 "How's That," Forbes, 117, 11, (June 1, 1976), 54. 44 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M16. CHAPTER II SQUAW VALLEY VIIIth Winter Olympiad, 1960 "(T)hrough a dazzling display of salesmanship by one of Squaw Valley's 30 registered voters, the 1960 Winter Olympics had been given to an area which doesn't appear on most maps.... Melvin Durslag, "The Great Winter Olympics Fight," Saturday EveningyPost, 230, 34, (February 22, 1958), 35. 32 33 2.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games in Squaw Valley Apart from its magnificent mountains, fresh air, abundant snowfall, and wind-free skiing, Squaw Valley was probably one Of the most ill-suited sites available for the staging of Olympic competition. At the time the IOC granted the 1960 Winter Games to Squaw Valley, it was a "community" Of 30 registered voters, with no mayor, "no policemen, no post office, no gasoline station. It (didn't) have much of anything except some strik- ingly scenic mountains, oceans Of snow and gobs of trouble."1 Squaw Valley was an area more accustomed to the pasturing of cattle (its original use by the Indians), and in fact, "there were few people even in California who had heard of it, let alone (had) seen it."2 Squaw Valley is located on the eastern side of the High Sierra Mountains in California, adjacent to Lake Tahoe and 45 miles southwest of Reno, Nevada. It is a valley stretching 3 miles long and is a half mile wide. The primary reason for bringing the Olympic Games to this area was personal: the private advancement of one of the major property owners, Alexander Cushing. He believed that if he could put in a bid with the.USOC for the games, that fact might generate publicity for his lodge, and could conceivably make the larger newspapers.3 As it turned out, improvements were made on 6000 plus acres of land used for competi- tion, with the State of California retaining possession of only'SOO.4 Once the major participants Of the project (among them: the Federal and State governments, and Walt Disney Productions) had pledged their resources for the Olympic effort, other rationales for Squaw Valley hosting the Games were discussed. The amenities Of the region, including the powder snow were again stressed. William H. Francis Jr. (then, Assis- tant Secretary Of Defense) during the House subcommittee hearings, saw, 34 the project as a vehicle that would benefit the government as a whole, and wouLd "serve the entire west."5 It was also thought that California would be acquiring a "highly desirable sports center for the future," and the joint state-federal cooperation required by the project was given great acclaim: "It would be a great benefit and consistent with our park policy of having joint state-federal use of our federal lands in these parks (the ice arena would be built upon federal land leased to the state), and it will result in a very great long-term value to the whole Government as a very fine recreation facility."6 In fact, the pro- vision that the State of California would be taking over the facility after the Games was one Of the most "potent arguments for Squaw Valley acting as host."7 Finally, speaking for the executive branch of the Government, Francis stated that since "the U.S. will be the host nation, this oppor- tunity of having in our country so many young athletes and press from other nations will return large dividends through the opportunity it will afford to have them see and learn, at first hand, democracy in action."8 2.20 Facilities 2.21 Existing Facilities Due in great part to the superb salesmanship Of Cushing and the promise of unlimited resources from the California State Legislature, Squaw Valley was awarded the 1960 Winter Olympic Games. At the time the decision was made, the following sporting facilities existed at Squaw Valley: "a) one ski lift, b) two rope tows and c) one small lodge...the nearest place for groceries, aspirin, and mail was seven miles away, at 35 the Village of Tahoe City."9 Given this situation, J. L. Bingham Of the U.S. selection committee stated in January Of 1955 that "Squaw Valley has adequate facilities for competitors, for housing, and for staging "10 Under these initial conditions, it is curious to note that the Games. Cushing believed that a world-class sports complex could be built for one million dollars. It was the state of California that underwrote the facilities by pledging the $1 million and "whatever money may be required."11 2.22 Planning Like Lake Placid, there was no formal planning mechanism existing in Squaw‘Valley: no planning staff, no master plan Of the area, no elected decision-makers at the Valley. It was a wilderness area that only a few had discovered and exclusively enjoyed. There were limited facili- ties for recreation; as mentioned, a lodge, rope tows, and ski lift. While the developers were interested in attracting vacationers, it was to be a low-keyed Operation catering mainly to ski enthusiasts. Night activity was tO be found at nearby Lake Tahoe, or Reno. The resultant Olympic award was completely out of harmony with the atmosphere of the area and the desires Of the majority Of the property owners. What seemed a "novel" idea at first, quickly proved to be a disaster. There was no existing planning for the erection Of a city within the Valley. NO planning group (such as the Olympic Organizing Committee), no one had the slightest notion Of how to proceed. 36 2.23 Preparations The architectural firm that designed the ice arena (Corlett and Spackman, Kitchen and Hunt) undertook the role Of urban designers: "When we asked the client (the Organizing Committee, 1960 Olympic Winter Games) how many athletes were coming they had no idea. How many Of them would be women; they had no idea. They had only a rough idea Of what events would be staged."12 The architects relied almost exclusively upon the European resorts for the nature and placement Of facilities. Blythe Arena, with a seating capacity Of 8,000, was to become the main attraction Of the site and the "hub of what is virtually a small city." The 3.5 million dollar arena was constructed with federal money, and built upon lands Of the federal park system (the lands being under long-term lease to the state of California). A stipulation attached to this investment was that the arena not become a "white elephant" after the two week competition. Architect Hunt: "We were to design a permanent ice arena, partly enclosed, and partly or completely covered, suitable for the Olympic Games and suitable for use after the Games as a year- round skating facility, as a convention center, and for the holding of other miscellaneous revenue-producing events."13 The arena won a very prestigious first prize award in the 1958 Progressive Architecture design competition. It was also an engineering masterpiece, with the roof able to support the weight Of up to 6 feet Of snow. Compensation for condensation on the inside of the building caused by snow had to be included in the design process. Federal money was also used for various support services. Public Law 85-365 provided a half million dollars from the Department Of Defense budget to be used for "personnel, supplies, equipment, preparation of 37 courses, fields, rinks, avalanche control, communication and transpor- tation assistance, and snow compaction (for the parking lot)."14 Federal lands were provided for the construction of such facilities as the Olympic Village, the ice arena, and a sewage treatment plant capable of servicing a community Of 30,000 (see Appendix B). The sporting and support facilities required for the Squaw Valley Games are listed in Appendix C. Absent from the list Of sports facilities is a bobsled run (possibly one Of the main attractions Of the Winter Olympics). When the costs of the essential sports facilities were esti- mated, those Of the bob and luge runs were considered to be too great and the events were dropped from the format. The organizing committee managed the cancellation Of these events (even under threat Of being exposed as "Cheapskates" by the International Federation Of Bobsledders) by citing an Olympic Rule which stated that an event need not be staged if fewer than 12 entries were registered. This action saved the committee $750,000.15 Once the necessary land was rented, leased, or otherwise acquired, the organizing committee made every effort to complete construction of the facilities well in advance. In fact, the original plan called for "all facilities, with the exception of the highway from San Francisco, to be completed by December of 1957."16 There were several reasons for this, the most important being the short construction season. A second major consideration, also related to the heavy snowfall, involved the unique engineering and construction methods previously dis- cussed. Techniques had tO be developed, particularly for the ice arena, so that the roof might support the tremendous weight Of the snow. Engineers desired a full year or two in order to test the designs under 38 actual winter conditions. Problems of water condensation inside the structures had to be dealt with, as well as a myriad Of unexpected difficulties resulting from experimental designs. There were other "firsts" occurring at Squaw Valley demanding ade- quate trial and error periods. Squaw Valley was the first "ground up" Olympics ever planned. It was the first Games in which all of the events were within walking distance (200 yards) of each other. All of the athletes were quartered within the same Olympic Village instead of being housed in establishments throughout a town or country. The Village was to be a settlement composed of seven buildings, including a 300 room complex capable Of accommodating all Of the 1200 anticipated coaches, trainers, support personnel, and athletes.17 In keeping with the plans, reports in February Of 1959, indicated that "nearly a year in advance, everything is ready...the seven build- ings of the Olympic Village are all but complete, the trails are ready, the jumps are ready..."18 The total cost at this point (not including the $43 million for highway improvements) was determined to amount to 12 million dollars. Preparations were made for a maximum daily attendance Of 35,000. While on-site facilities were limited, projections of the organizing committee indicated that accommodations for such a number could be arranged within a 50 mile radius of Squaw Valley, with Reno and Tahoe City supplying most Of the hotel space.19 It was thought that parking facilities at the site could handle 12,000 autos, with a fleet of buses available to shuttle spectators tO and from events and hotels. The Architectual Forum's February, 1960 issue reported that "over $16 million...have gone towards transforming this High Sierra wilderness 39 into a veritable city for mountain sports, equipped with some of the best skating and skiing facilities in the world, dormitory housing for 1200 athletes and Officials, and scores of ancillary buildings ranging from restaurants and churches, tO a miniature shopping center, hospital, and social hall."20 A portion of the resulting deficit was to be recovered through ticket receipts, and in February Of 1960 the State legislature approved a one million dollar insurance fund in the event that blizzards or other natural phenomena limited ticket sales (revenue of $3 million was antici- pated from this source).21 Robert Harkness, Assistant Director of Finance for the Games, announced in March that his audit disclosed receipts of 1.8 million dollars. The additional 1.2 million was quickly appropriated by the legislature.22 With the conclusion Of the Games, the Olympic Committee was left with the business of transforming facilities for permanent use, buying out land holders and land owners, finding concessionaires willing to take over operation of Squaw Valley, and rationalizing the expenditure Of funds by reference to all of the uses of the site: convention center, year- round recreation center, training facility, etc. It was to be a difficult task of disproving that Squaw Valley would become the "white elephant" the skeptics feared. 2.30 Transportation With only eight year-a-round residents in Squaw Valley at the time Of the Olympic bid acceptance, nothing but the most basic transportation system existed in the area, and it consisted predominantly Of light—duty dirt roads. The coming Olympics, however, would bring tens Of thousands 40 of participants, reporters, spectators into the beautiful mountains; many Of whom would be arriving from such urban areas as San Francisco and Los Angeles. It was realized early on that transportation and housing would constitute the biggest problems facing the organization committee.23 In order to alleviate the transportation shortcomings, the state agreed to spend $43 million for the improvement Of approach highways. This appropriation was to be used for widening all Of the major roads leading into Squaw Valley to four lanes. It should be noted that this sum Of money is over and above the state's $8 million share of the Olympic expense, and there is no evidence that suggested the State had planned or contemplated the improvements had the Games not intervened. Even with the state's direct support and the $3.5 million federal share, the additional $43 million state expenditure was necessary for three reasons, according to Assistant Defense Secretary Francis: 1) to provide the proper facilities, 2) to help create the good-will and atmosphere Of good sportsmanship, and 3) to maintain the spirit Of the Olympic Games.24 However, priorities outlined in a comprehensive plan and not intangible ideals should be the basis for expenditures Of public funds. Determining the extent of the State's road improvements has proved somewhat difficult. The twO U.S. routes heading east from San Francisco were both four lane up to Sacramento (by the late 1950's). From Sacra- mento, U.S. 40 contained four lanes as far as Colfax, and U.S. 50 was predominantly two lanes the rest Of the way to Lake Tahoe. State Road 89 (heading south from U.S. 40 along Lake Tahoe) was a medium duty road, with two lanes. It would seem that the state would have wanted tO widen U.S. 40 the remainder Of the way from Colfax to 89, and widen U.S. 50 from Sacramento to State Road 89. State Road 89 would seemingly need to 41 be widened, and the mostly light duty dirt roads within the Valley be improved. For the Olympics, State Road 89 was improved to a heavy duty road but left at 2 lanes. U.S. 50 was improved in a few places tO four lanes, but remained unchanged in several rough stretches. In addition, U.S. 40 was not completed in time for the Games, as reported by Richard Meister in February of 1960: "...a heavy storm could close both highways leading from San Francisco. TOO, visitors should have fun driving over narrow, twisting and steep Donner Summit, one lane each way and 7,135 feet high on U.S. 40; and there's the similar dangerous Meyers Grade on U.S. 503.25 One of the risks involved in staging the competition at Squaw Valley was the extensive use of untested and new facilities. The most controversial of these new facilities was a parking lot constructed by the Navy. It was controversial in the sense that 6 feet Of snow would be compacted into a 24 inch base capable of withstanding the weight of 12,000 autos. The Navy worked three winters prior to the Games, attempt- ing to arrive at the proper formula that would support that number Of vehicles under temperatures possibly reaching 60 degrees. Skeptics feared that should the thermometer reach that point, cars would sink into the slush.26 Officials were encouraging visitors to forego the auto as much as possible, and utilize the 200 bus fleet system to shuttle spectators from lodgings to the site. The city that managed to gain the most advantage from the Olympic event was Reno, Nevada. Its close proximity to Squaw Valley made it the logical city to handle air arrivals and departures. Some fairly substan- tial improvements were made to the airport, including a runway extension 42 and a new $1.3 million airport terminal. The parking area for private planes was paved and expanded tO accommodate 150 planes. These improve- ments as reported, "were not exactly caused by the Games, but were "27 accelerated by them. The changes were needed, and the Games acted as a catalyst to spur on the implementation. 2.40 The Environment Sheehan allowed that there were two big advantages of staging the Games in Squaw Valley: all Of the athletes would be housed right on the site, and all of the events would be held within a 60 acre tract of land.28 This is somewhat misleading concerning the land acreage, as the total area encompassed by the courses, events, etc., amounted to over 6000 acres. This use of 6000 acres of strikingly beautiful and largely unde- veloped land (prior to 1960) is questioned by this author for the follow- ing reason: Reno, Nevada, which has facilities and is only 40 miles away, and Lake Tahoe which also has facilities and is only 7 miles away, both submitted bids for the 1960 Winter Olympics. Why create a new sports facility in a near but desolate area when two substantially developed facilities exist in the immediate proximity? If it was so necessary to stage the Games in that section Of the country, there was no rational explanation for building a new facility "from scratch." This decision had the effect of: a) destroying the peaceful and subdued nature Of a valley, and b) creating direct competition with previously established and developed resorts at Lake Tahoe and Reno. When he heard Of the original plans presented to the IOC in 1955, Wayne POulson (President of the Squaw Valley Land and Livestock Company, which owns 90 percent Of Squaw Valley; Poulson was also the first latter 43 day settler to the area) strongly objected and indicated that drastic changes would have to be made. The plans, Poulson feared, could "ruin the natural beauty Of this valley for all time."29 But he also welcomed the selection of Squaw Valley and indicated he would cooperate "enthusiasti- cally" with its proper development. Several other property owners feared that the development would reduce Squaw Valley to a "coney island and a tourist trap" Of hamburger joints and souvenir stands.30 They did not want their resource to be violated in such a way as the State had in mind. Two years after the initial plans were released, Poulson petitioned the courts to grant an injunction blocking the condemnation proceedings that were instituted for acquisition of 42 acres Of his land. In order to inkae eminent domain, three conditions must be met: 1) there must be a public purpose, 2) due process must be followed, and 3) there must be just compensation for the property taken. It was the contention Of Poulson that there was no public necessity for holding the games, and that the state law permitting condemnation was unconstitutional. Poulson's attorney argued that the use of eminent domain to acquire Poulson's land had the effect Of granting public powers and funds tO a private agency (the organizing committee).31 This delayed construction of facilities for a year, when the legal questions and a fair market price for the land in question were resolved between Poulson and the State. The effects of natural phenomena raised very serious considerations in using the Valley. Squaw Valley is an area that can receive upwards Of 20 feet of snow in a season. Temperatures can vary forty degrees in a single day, due tO warming Chinook winds,reaching as high as 60 degrees 44 in February. These conditions greatly increase the possibilities Of avalanches and flooding. Federal funds in the amount Of $263,000 were earmarked for flood control alone.32 This included the deepening and re- routing of Squaw Creek.33 Military personnel mounted 9mm guns at strategic peaks in order to eliminate avalanche conditions before they developed. In the event there was a shortage of snow, cloud seeding devices were located in homes throughout the area.34 These precautions assured that climatic conditions would not disrupt the Games. 2.50 Other Impacts There were several uncertainties and "firsts" involved in staging the Games at Squaw Valley, including:35 1. the first time the Games were held in rugged terrain; 2. the first use Of that high of altitude; 3. the first extensive use of new and untested facilities; 4. the first use Of an area so remote from a large population center; and, 5. the first use of an area so much at the mercy of variable weather conditions. (While altitude problems were to redevelop to some degree during Mexico City's Summer Games of 1968, the use of untested, and unique construction techniques was to become a major catastrophy for Montreal's Summer Olympics of 1976. See p.104). When initial plans were released, many Squaw Valley property owners expressed fear that their valley would be transformed into a tourist trap. These fears were not alleviated when it was reported that film producer Walt Disney was planning the following: a choir of thousands, daytime fireworks displays, 20,000 balcons and 2000 pigeons (symbolic. 45 of world peace) to be released, and 33 statues representing athletes (costing $2000 each).36 Organizers of Lake Placid's 1980 Winter Games have expressed Opposition to these types Of spectacles. (see p.127) The City Of Reno benefitted from the Games. Not only did the City outfit itself with a new airport facility, but its hotel owners and restaurant Operators saw a marked increase in business. Rates were raised and the commercialism Of the Olympics became the rule as it has ever since.37 With this same theme is a more indirect impact: the Game's effect upon the U.S. consumer: "That $8 million figure is a rank understatement. Among other dollars supporting the Games, there is $3.5 million tossed in by the federal taxpayers, approximately $2.5 million from private industry (guess who will eventually pay that bill?) and $363,000 coughed up by Nevada."38 In discussing the aftermath of the 1960 Winter Olympic Games, Gladwin Hill noted that "the conclusion of the 1960 Winter Olympics... will mark the onset Of one of the biggest headaches ever to confront California, or any other state in the recreation field. The problem: what to do with the $11 million sports center built for international snow and ice competition."39 The big problem, according to Hill, is not the initial cost of the facilities, but the upkeep of them: "No one, at this juncture can figure out how Squaw Valley can be Operated so (it) will pay for (its) own maintenance costs; at any rate, not without the further investment Of even more millions." This problem is reduced to a simple economic consideration: how to exploit the possibilities of Squaw Valley on an economically feasible basis while still making the $400,000/year minimum payments required to 46 operate the city? NO matter how these economic possibilities are approached, the State is left with a "sewage treatment plant suitable for 30,000 (persons), dormitories, ice rinks, and 3000 meal/day cafeter- ias which all have to be maintained."40 Since the state agency in Charge Of Squaw Valley (at the time, the California State Division Of Beaches and Parks) is a land-acquiring entity and a policy-making organization, the actual operation Of a facility such as Squaw Valley is passed on to a private concessionaire. But in this instance, as Hill explains, the situation is complicated because "the valley involves a tangle Of jurisdictions, free holders and lease holders, including the National Forest Service, the State Park Service, private corporations and individuals. These land parcels would have to be integrated, at a cost Of possibly more millions before a private corporation could consider an Operating contract." In fact, those millions would be needed just to buy out Cushing and Poulson. Equally drastic implications, according to Meister, were in store for the entire parks and recreation program of California. "California, faced with a constantly expanding urban population, spends as little as $1 million a year to develOp its grossly underdeveloped park lands, yet tosses million after million into one ski area."41 2.51 Aftermath -- Post 1970 Every effort to gain direct information from State officials con- cerning the present-day use Of the Squaw Valley site has proved futile. Attempts were made to contact sources at the Departments of Tourism, and Parks and Beaches both by mail and telephone. Information derived indirectly, however, seems to prove correct the suspicions of those who 47 argued that Squaw Valley would become a white elephant. By 1971, a full eleven years after the Olympics, the State of California had still not managed to find a willing consessionaire to assume Operation Of the site. In April of this year, the New York Times reported that a bid Of only $25,000 was submitted, a bid "considerably less than what the State hoped for."42 It was further mentioned that California was losing from $175,000 to $300,000 every year on the property in its efforts to meet contractual Obligations of maintainence and upkeep. These expenses would have to be assumed by any business entity Operating the site. When Denver backed out of the 1976 Winter Games, Squaw Valley became a likely substitute. Governor Reagan, however, stated in 1972 that under no circumstances would California consider such a plan. The State had not finished paying Off its 1960 debt, and.was in no hurry to increase it.43 It was, in fact, suggested that the Squaw Valley facility had deter— iorated by this time. During Denver's 1976 congressional hearings, Clifford Buck (President Of the USOC) made this statement: "All Of the facilities at Squaw Valley have decayed and fallen down, become non- "44 Reverend Fell of the Lake existent...this is quite largely true. Placid Olympic committee also substantiated this claim. In a telephone interview with him, he mentioned to this author that neither Blythe Arena nor the ski jumps were being used today (1976), and that the Officials at Squaw Valley attempted tO sell him their 400 meter speed skating track that had been dismantled.45 48 2.60 Benefits According to the Subcommittee hearings, it was expected that the State of California would receive several long-term benefits: 1) road improvements, 2) a sports arena, and 3) a sports complex providing long- range recreational attractions. This was some $60 million in capital im- provements, the major portion Of which went for extensive development in a community of 30 residents in Placer County. The peaceful Valley was in fact converted into a new city, as California gained a new recreational center and added substantially to the tax rolls. "Today Squaw Valley is a small city standing where cattle pastured 4 years ago. It supplies its own heat, electricity, and water; it has its own sewage treatment plant and 19 miles of telephone cables and 60,000,000 feet of wire for 1200 telephones. It is everything that millions of dollars could make it."46 The area was designed and erected to become a permanent facility after the Games. The architects of the ice arena certainly provided a substantial base to work from as the design was very favorably appraised in the literature. With the press and television coverage of the Games, California gained national and world-wide exposure as a state Of more than just summer attractions. Tens of thousands of people watched the Games at 47 Tahoe City Squaw Valley and spent nearly $2 million at the site alone. and Reno businesses, fortunate in being located so Close to the Olympic site, gained significant short-term profits. Reno renovated its airport and expanded the facility, a move motivated by the Olympics. Spiritual benefits occurred, according to the Subcommittee reports, as the Eastern World witnessed democracy in action. It was an occasion marked by joint Federal-State use Of federal park lands; cooperation and 49 extensive interaction among several agencies and jurisdictions engaged in a comon effort. Even the armed forces lent their support by con- trolling floods and avalanches, constructing parking facilities, and maintaining enough personnel to assist in the event disaster should strike. In keeping with its multi—purpose use after the Games, the site was to be available for all types Of recreational use, conventions, and various other revenue producing events. Military troops were to have access to the site for training purposes, as would future U.S. ski teams. In terms of the enormous profits gained, the big benefits went to the land owners of the Valley, namely Alexander Cushing and Wayne Poulson. What started as a scheme to create publicity for a ski lodge and a couple Of lifts turned a valley into a world-Class recreational facility. Whether or not it destroyed the beauty and ecology of the valley is a question that will always be analyzed in terms of the economic ad- vantage achieved by the two men. 2.70 Conclusion While it is easy to read the reports now and declare that the 1960 Winter Olympics should never have been staged at Squaw Valley, these facts were quite obvious at the time: the creation of the facilities (the creation Of Squaw Valley) was part Of no state, regional, or local plan; 2 resorts -- already developed and established —— existed within the area. Given the fact that Colorado, Utah, and Idaho were quite firmly established as locations for excellent western skiing; it is doubtful that a market analysis would have concluded that the project was feasible. The Games did have the result of substantially upgrading private property at no cost to the owners, and allowing Reno the Opportunity to initiate 50 capital improvements. The State Of California was given the impetus to carry out highway improvements from Sacramento to Reno and Lake Tahoe. 2.71 Points for Future Reference 1. Joint Federal-State participation may be desirable in some in- stances, but with Squaw Valley it caused serious difficulties raising these questions: a. Who ultimately assumes responsibility for the credit/blame? b. How is the land ultimately consolidated for sale to con- cessionaires with the Federal/State/Private ownership of property? At what cost? The idea at Squaw Valley Of building all facilities within walking distance Of one another is a gOOd one, and probably has the best application to the Winter Games. Considerations for facilities and their construction should include: a. Assuring that all Olympic events are included in the format (bobsledding, in this case, had to be cancelled). b. That the site does not have to be built from the ground up. C. That ample time is provided for the testing Of new designs and facilities. The following techniques should be exploited, as they were for the most part in Squaw Valley: a. The extensive use of mass-transit b. An "all events" design for large facilities to be built, such as an arena Formulas ought to be either drawn up or revised for realistically estimating total costs. (The $1 million cost projection should have been seriously questioned, considering the "ground up" nature Of the plan). 51 6. Precautions taken by Squaw Valley Officials for lack Of snow were well conceived and planned. 7. Given a situation such as what existed in Squaw Valley: lack of a formalized community planning mechanism, the close proximity of established resorts, the absence of state recreational plan- ning for the Squaw Valley area; the submission Of Squaw Valley as a contender for the Games should have been seriously discour- aged. FOOTNOTES - SQUAW VALLEY, 1960 1 Melvin Durslag, "The Great Winter Olympics Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 230, 34, (February 22, 1958), 35. 2 Ibid. 3 James Stewart-Gordon, "He Brought The Winter Olympics TO Squaw Valley," Readers Digest, (February, 1960), 181. 4 Kenneth A. Hill, "Squaw Valley Prepares For The Olympics," Recreation, 52, 2, (February, 1959), 64. 5 U.S. Congress. House. Committee On Appropriations. Olympic Winter Games Stadium. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Con- struction Appropriations, House of Representatives, on House Document 373, 85th Congress, 2d Session, 1958, 41. 5 Ibid., 35. 7 Gladwin Hill, "After The Olympics," New York Times, 109, 37269, (February 7, 1960), II Part 2, l. 8 U.S. House, Olympic Stadium, p. 34. 9 Durslag, "Olympics Fight," p. 35. 10 "Coast City To Bid For Winter Games," New York Times, 104, 35414, (January 9, 1955), V, 3. 11 Richard Meister, "Squaw Valley Snow Job," The Nation, 190, 7, (February 13, 1960), 139. 12 William Corlett, and Frank Hunt, "P/A Design Awards Seminar III," Progressive Architecture, 39, 9,(September, 1958), 183. 13 Ibid. 14 U.S. House, Olympic Stadium, p. 33. 15 Durslag, "Olympics Fight, p. 74. 16 "Johnson To Seek Aid For Olympics," New York Times, 105: 35692, (October 14, 1955), 36. 17 Hill, "Squaw Valley Prepares," p. 64. 18 "On TO Squaw Valley,“ Newsweek, 53, 6, (February 9: 1959)' 86. 19 Evan Hill, "California's Olympic Bonanza," Saturday_Evening Post, 232, 33, (February 13, 1960), 103. 52 53 20 "Squaw Valley's Olympic Tent," Architectural Forum, 112, 2, (February, 1960), 104. 21 "Olympic Fund Approved," New York Times, 109, 37260, (February 4, 1960), 36. 22 "Olympic Receipts Off," New York Times, 109, 37306, (March 15, 1960), 49. 23 Joseph M. Sheehan, "Progress Is Cited By Squaw Valley," New York Times, 105, 35784, (January 14, 1956), 14. 24 U.S. House, Olympic Stadium, p. 34. 25 Meister, "Snow Job," p. 139. 26 Hill, "Bonanza," p. 104. 27 222$: 28 Sheehan, "Progress Cited," p. 14. 29 "Olympic Plans Are Hit," New York Times, 104, 35575, (June 19, 1955), V, 4. 30 "California Group Lists 1960 Plans," New York Times, 105, 35775, (January 5, 1956), 81. 31 "California's Law On Olympics Hit," New York Times, 107, 36414, (October 5, 1957), 13. 32 U.S. House, Olympic Stadium, p. 51. 33 "Olympic Land Acquired," New York Times, 107, 36411, (OctOber 2, 1957), 67. 34 "Only Snow Is Lacking For Winter Olympics," Business Week, 1583, (January 2, 1960), 20. 35 "'60 Winter Olympics - Big Spending, Big Risks," U.S. News and World Report, 48, 7, (February 15, 1960), 74. 36 Meister, "Snow Job," p. 138. 37 Hill, "Bonanza," p. 104. 38 Meister, "Snow Job," p. 138. 39 Hill, "After The Olympics," II Part 2, l. 40 SEES: 41 Meister, "Snow Job," p. 138. 54 42 "$25,000 Made In Bid For Squaw Valley," New York Times, 120, 43 Michael Straus, "California As Possible Substitute," New York Times, 122, 41943, (November 24, 1972), 54. 44 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 1976 Denver Winter Olympics. Hearings Before The Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, Senate, on S. 3531, 92d Congress, 2d Session, 1972, 168. 45 Rev. Bernard J. Fell, Telephone Interview with author, October 21, 1976. 46 Hill, "Bonanza," p. 103. 47 "Olympic Receipts Off," p. 49. CHAPTER III DENVER Originally Designated to Host XIIth Winter Olympiad, 1976 "The citizens on the street can only lose from the '76 Winter Olympics. They lose in terms of skyrocketing costs Of food and lodging caused by growth and crowding Of facilities. They lose tranquility in recreational areas they have treasured for so many years. They lose in health from the heavy increase in smog and pollution levels documented daily in Colorado. They lose in poorly spent tax dollars." Rodger F. Ewey, in the Statement Of Hon. Fred R. Harris to Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation Of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Congress, 2d Session, on S. 3531, (June 9, 1972), 16. 55 56 3.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games at Denver In the legislation that would have authorized the Secretary of the Interior to participate in the planning, design, and construction of the Olympic facilities, the major rationalization (of a sizable list Of reasons) for Colorado in general and Denver in particular playing the host was as follows: "Congress has declared it to be desirable that all American people of present and future generations be assured adequate outdoor recreational resources; and declares that the XII International Winter Olympic Games which are to be held in the United States in 1976 are in furtherance Of stimulating an awareness of outdoor recreational activities."1 In keeping with this theme, the Interior Department called the Olympic Games the "highest tradition of sportsmanship, which provide a unique opportunity to promote international goodwill and understanding. To host the Games is universally regarded as a national honor."2 The Denver Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Women, among numerous other gov- ernmental and non-governmental groups, pointed to the prestige that Colorado and the U.S. would gain. And, Governor Love carried the feeling one step further when he testified before the Senate subcommittee on Parks and Recreation (henceforth referred to as Senate): "Coloradans, like all Americans, are a proud people -- eager to show the world the natural splendor which is their birthright. The people of Colorado are eager as well to show the world -- an international community which is increasingly interested in winter sports, their innovative genius."3 These seem to be perfectly legitimate reasons until it is realized that Denver had initiated its Olympic campaign drive in 1963, a full 13 years prior to the Games that would have been staged there. Promotion . 57 of brotherhood and world peace (if these are spin—Offs Of the Olympics) is not likely to drive such an intense campaign for so long a time period. What is likely to become the moving force, as Ralph Becker (President Of the Denver Chamber of Commerce) admitted, is the "great economic im- pact Of the Games...its one of those plus factors you get when people realize we've got something going here. It makes us look like we're alive and recognized world—wide as a major city."4 The original estimate of the cost of the Games was $7 million, but this figure later rose to $35 million. The businessmen still felt that it was worth it at that price, as they expected to recover three times their original investment.5 While the Games were to create a greater awareness of physical fit- ness, they were also intended to create awareness in the nation's birth. The Denver 1976 Olympics were designated by the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission to Officially initiate the celebration of the U.S. Bicentennial. Colorado was also holding an anniversary, and the Olympics would have begun the festivities Of the state's Centennial. Under the Olympics theme (and message Of the Games to all mankind) of peaceful competition, the contests would return to the state of Colorado (in the words of Carl De Temple, president Of the Denver Olympics Committee -- DOC) "Pride, unity, and cohesiveness."6 The goal Of the Games was to show the world "quality, not flamboyancy."7 Several factors were listed by the IOC as having contributed to the selection of Denver:8 1. some of the world's best skiing; 2. magnificant scenery; 3. abundant elbow room; 58 4. Denver's recognition as a major city; and, 5. Denver Officials' submission that the Games could be staged at a cost of $14 million; and that 80% Of the facilities already existed. While Denver in fact lacked several facilities Of substantial cost and importance, the reputation of Colorado (Aspen and Vail in particular) and its amenities had a huge impact on the IOC. In the words Of Governor Love, "anyone who skis knows that our state provides much Of the best terrain in the country."9 It is important to note that this reference to outstanding skiing does not apply to Denver in particular, but Colorado on the whole. Finally, it was hOped that the Games would be a catalyst for com- munity and social improvement in Colorado. Gordon Allott, a U.S. Senator frcm Colorado: "Things Of this nature promise a better quality of life for Colorado residents. In addition, the legacy of the Olympics can be of tremendous benefit to the nation."10 Peter Dominick, the other U.S. Senator from Colorado, praised the comprehensive planning approach em- ployed by the DOC.11 3.20 Planning 3.21 Long-Range Planning Planning for the Olympic Games in Colorado Officially commenced in 1963, when Governor John Love suggested in a speech at Steamboat Springs that the city might contemplate hosting the 1976 Games. In 1964, Love appointed the Colorado Olympic Commission and charged it the task Of studying the problem. Funding was handled through the Colorado Department of Commerce and Industry. The General Assembly of Colorado appropriated 59 $25,000 to the Colorado Olympic Commission in 1966 and announced an intention to officially enter into the 1976 Olympic bidding. The state formed an advisory committee which designated Denver as the prospective host city.12 Over $100,000 was appropriated for the Olympic effort by 1967; the city of Denver allocating $26,500, and the general assembly appropriat- ing $75,000. With this financing, the DOC was formed and funded. Also at this time, the Colorado legislature pledged unanimous support of the DOC effort, the Denver city council was in total support, and the Olym- pic objective was firmly and Officially established.13 1968 was the year Of entertaining representatives of the interna- tional sports federation and showing them Colorado's splendor and facilities. A Colorado delegation attended the winter and summer Games of that year, for the purpose of learning more about the Olympics while promoting Denver at the same time. The Denver Regional Council of Gov- ernments (an organization composed of 22 municipalities and 5 counties) fully endorsed the Denver effort, as did the U.S. State Department through the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.14 More Of the same activity occurred in 1969, and in May Of 1970, the 69'th Congress Of the IOC awarded Denver the XII'th Winter Olympic Games. President Nixon had been very helpful in this effort, sending letters of support to the Mayor Of Denver and to the IOC. He promised "full cooperation from my Office and from other agencies Of the Federal Government." President Nixon also expressed "personal admiration for the high ideals exemplified by the International Olympic Movement and implemented by your committee."15 In the statement of Carl De Temple to the Senate, he admitted that over $1 million had been expended in the 60 effort to bring the Games to Denver.16 By 1972, it appeared that the Denver Olympics were in jeopardy (this point will be elaborated upon further in this chapter). Citizens of Colorado were losing confidence in the DOC, and the possibility of federal funding (contingent upon state support) was beginning to grow dim. During the Senate subcommittee hearings in June of 1972, great pains were taken to outline supporting groups. Both U.S. houses Of congress adopted resolutions reaffirming support of the continued designation Of Denver as host Of the 1976 Games. Strong support was also forthcoming from Denver Mayor William McNichols, the Denver City Council, the Univer- sity of Denver Board of Trustees (the Olympic Village was to utilize buildings on the University of Denver campus), the President of the University Of Colorado, and Officials at Metropolitan State College at Denver. Colorado U.S. Congressman James McKevitt stated for the con- gressional record that some 39 community groups were in favor of the Olympic plans; among the groups included the following: the Boyscouts, the PTA, the Denver Symphony Orchestra, the Red Cross, the Campfire Girls, various ski and recreation groups, as well as business groups.17 This all helped support the claims of the Denver Olympic Officials that the long-range planning effort had the full endorsement Of Colorado, and the money allocated for this planning had not been ill-spent. 3.22 Organization For the inter-organizational relationships of the DOC to the other Olympic committees, and to the Colorado governmental agencies, refer to Figure 1. Figure 2 depicts the organizational chart Of the DOC. These were taken from De Temple's statement to the Senate. 61 INTERNATIONAL .—-—-—-—-—- OLYMPIC : COMMITTEE UNITED STATES CITY AND COUNTY OLYMPIC COMMITTEE OF DENVER I Advisory Mayor Chairs Denver capacity Organizing Committee I to IOC and is.a Member of INTERNATIONAL I and DOC DOC Executive Council SPORTS . . » FEDERAT IONS |_ _ __ _ _ _] DENVER [ COLORADO ' ORGANIZING OLYMPIC NATIONAL 1COMITTEE I“ COMMISSION OLYMPIC ‘ ’ COMMITTEES Directly respon- Created by State ’ Legislature sible to the International Olympic Com- mittee for Staging the XII Olympic Winter Games Chairman of COC is Member of DOC Executive Council May Contract with DOC for Specific Tasks (e.g., Design Of Ski Areas for State After-Use) and Provide General Funds fOr DOC Activities A Nonprofit Corporation Represents State Of Colorado Interest in Games LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FEDERAL AGENCIES OTHER (e.g., Denver Regiona Council of Governments) Figure 1. Inter-Organizational Relationships, Denver 1976 Olympics. Source: Statement of DeTemple to Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation. 62 DENVER ORGANIZING COMMITTEE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CHAIRMAN: MAYOR OF DENVER I AUDITOR I --( \{LEGAL COUNSEL] ’ ' L EXECUTIVE COUNCIL PLANNING BOARD I.___..____.__..___. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT TRADITIONS AND LICENSING COMMITTEE FINANCE & BUSINESS RELATIONS COMMITTEE PRESIDENT (General Secretary) PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER L______. SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL A DIVISION DIVISION RTS & MARKETING DIVISION Figure 2. Organization Chart, City of Denver and DOC. Source: Statement Of DeTemple to Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation. I I I I I I I I I I I l I I I I I I I 63 3.23 Attempts to Integrate Olympic Plans with Community Planning Priorities and Established Plans Mayor McNichols testified to the Senate that existing arenas and stadiums would be modified and enhanced in order that they might accom- modate the Olympic events. Olympic funds would contribute towards improv- ing the airport, the Denver transit system, and city services. In McNichols' words: "The honor Of hosting the 1976 Olympics represents a catalyst which will inspire the construction of these needed facilities in a.much shorter time frame than they could expect to be accomplished without this thrust."18 Eric Auer, Vice President of the DOC, explained that the Games would "bring together state and federal environmental planning in Colorado for the first time. They'll be the catalyst for land use."19 When serious charges of misrepresentation and imminent en- vironmental damage were being leveled against the Olympics and the DOC, Henry Khmbrough Of the DOC argued that "we must use the Olympics as a tool to focus (on) these problems (of ecological harm, overcrowding, uncontrolled growth, and the like)."20 The city of Denver attempted to include a HUD housing application in the Olympic planning. Some 1625 units of low and medium income hous- ing were to be financed through HUD and used for the Games as press housing. The units were needed with or without the Olympics, admitted McNichols, but it was the hope that the Olympics deadline would speed up the HUD application process. It is worth noting that this idea originated within the disadvantaged and ethnic communities. Through citizen participation a highly detailed plan emerged to use the Games as a means of improving living conditions within the community.21 64 The Olympic effort was to be used as a stimulus for refurbishing the City of Denver. A new performing arts center and auditorium parking garage were to be constructed in time for the Games.22 Building improve- ments and new facilities were already scheduled, but the Olympics would have provided money and incentive to complete the projects with more haste. McNichols told the Senate: "The construction and modifications I have set forth are, without exception, improvements that would hopefully be accomplished even if it had not been for our hosting the 1976 winter Games. This designation, however, provided a catalyst which, with its time frame parameters, caused us to think in terms of a concentrated effort to achieve these projects within the next three and one half years."23 Comprehensive planning was incorporated into the planning process. De Temple noted that immediately following the selection of Denver, a comprehensive study Of the organization of the Games was commissioned through the Denver Research Institute Of the University of Denver. The DOC used this study as a blueprint to define tasks and Objectives, and to design an organizational structure for the planning and staging of the Games.24 An additional document was prepared, dealing with the staging of certain events in the Central Platte Valley. The study outlined the goals and Objectives, needs and current problems existing in the Valley. It demonstrated how the Olympics would enhance the area, how the Olympic details could be instituted into the elements Of the Platte Valley con- cept plan. The final recommendations of the report were these: "Equally important however is the consideration which would be given to using the Olympics as a catalyst for achieving the restoration and redevelopment 65 of a very significant area Of our city. At the same time, it provides an excellent site in the heart Of our community to accommodate and host our visitors from around the world."25 The State Of Colorado specifically wrote the Olympics into its Land Use Act of 1971, a portion of which reads:26 "The basic duties and reSponsibilities Of the Commission regard- ing the 1976 Winter Olympics shall be evaluation of community impact and other considerations relating thereto, potential land consumption rates, and public investment programming and planning and the Commission shall designate to the Governor and to the general assembly specific information necessary for the Commission to perform its duties and the Governor shall require the DOC or any other State agency to furnish or agree to furnish suoh information before the Governor approves the payment Of any State money to such committee or agency." This Act would appear to insure that harmful ecological and land use practices would not result from the Games. There is one bothersome aspect to all of this: even though the Olympic effort was instituted in 1963, there is no evidence that the Games were incorporated into the policies and planning priorities Of Denver as outlined in the 1967 master plan.27 There was another study released as late as 1970 involving the Denver parks and open spaces development. NO reference to the Olympics appeared in this study either: in the author's Opinion this should have been a major part of the pro- gram.28 The comprehensive or master plan Of any city is intended to plan for every phase Of the community's growth and development at least 15 years into the future. Something as important and encompassing as the Olympics should not be overlooked in a master plan. The omission in Denver's case may provide one explanation why the Games were eventually voted down. 66 3.24 Administrative Planning As section 3.30 of this Chapter will deal with the planning of facilities, this section will be devoted to those administrative features including funding and attendance figures. James Hamilton III, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, admitted that the Games would provide a major incentive for an increase in the number of foreign tourists in the U.S. At a minimum, 8,000 foreign visitors were expected to attend the contests, with perhaps as many as 10,000 making the trip. This activity was expected to generate as much as $4 million, and to help eliminate the "traveler deficit."29 A press assembly of at least 3,300 was expected, while the DOC had projected that the number ofgathletes, participants, and Officials would reach 1,600.30 It was recognized that a limitation on the maximum number of visitors would be the seating capacities Of the various arenas and stadiums.v In terms of cost, Clifford Buck (President Of the USOC) declared: "There is no place in the United States and perhaps no place in the world where the Olympics (Winter) can be properly staged at as small an expen- 31 Even when it became apparent that diture as can be done at Denver." the Games would have to be staged at various sites throughout Colorado, (Denver, Steamboat Springs, and Avon) Governor Love was still predict? ing a cost of only $35 million: $15 million to come from state and local resources including TV rights, and $19.9 million to be provided by the 32 This $19.9 million was contingent upon the State federal government. of Colorado providing its share. When the citizens Of Colorado voted not to appropriate the state's portion, federal Offerings were withdrawn and the city (Denver) could not fund the Games. 67 3.25 Secrecy Charges and Deceptions Sam Brown, the informal staff director of a stop-the—Olympics move- ment called "Citizens for Colorado's Future" (CCF) objected to the DOC's "secret" operations: "Public tax dollars will pay for much of the Games, but are now being spent at private meetings at which no records are kept." The DOC's response was that the meetings had to be private in order to prevent land speculation.33 C. Ransom Stovall, representing such groups as Protect Our Mountain Environment (POME), the Mountain Area Planning Council, The Colorado State Grange, and others, supported Brown's alle- gations in his testimony to the Senate: "I have documented to a certain extent the fact that the DOC has handled themselves in a rather secre- tive way. The hearings have not been public. The organizations which I represent have not been allowed to make any sort Of contribution or in- put into the decision-making proceSs." He further contended that "basically we feel the DOC is out of touch with the desires of the citizens Of Colorado. They are indifferent to the pleas of Coloradans living in the Front Range. The results Of Opinion polls taken by the Rocky Mountain News and the Canyon Courier amply support this conten- "34 tion. In an article appearing in the New Reppblio in January of 1972, the DOC was accused of having its own brand Of dirty tricks. The follow- ing is an excerpt from that article:35 ”The bid book was and is a magnificant piece of salesmanship. From the heavy coat of snow airbrushed by an artist onto a photo Of Mt. Sniktau, to cover potentially embarrassing bare spots, to the statement that construction Of an Olympic speed skating rink 'will begin in 1970,' the book contains a series of misrepresentations. 68 a "Denver promised 100,000 beds for tourists when only about 35,000 will be available, Norman C. Brown, DOC public affairs manager admitted. "And it promised a 45-minite drive from the Olympic Village to Mt. Sniktau, but it didn't mention that was possible by shutting off all traffic on I-70 and running six lanes Of buses up the mountains.... "Denver promised to stage Nordic ski events requiring snow- covered countryside in a rapidly growing mountain residen- tial area with a 4% chance of having enough natural snow. "And Denver promised to hold Alpine skiing on a mountain which probably wouldn't be developed except for the Olympics." The reasons for these tactics were obvious to any Denver resident: there is no snow in Denver during February; and the ski country is on the western side Of the continental divide, while Denver is on the eastern side. Under the IOC rules, every event had to be held within 45 minutes of the main site. The organizers were thus confronted with the dilemma Of either the following: 1) manufacturing all snow for the races, cutting 8-foot gaps in private backyard fences for cross country skiing, bulldozing an entire hillside for jumpers, and packing large numbers Of spectators into tiny locations;36 and/or 2) petitioning the IOC to allow them to move certain events onto more suitable sites on the western side of the divide. Naturally once the public realized the magnitude of this deception and its consequences, Opposition became widespread (see section 3.70 Of this Chapter). The New Rppublic accused the DOC Of employing what it called "slipshod" methods of planning and management. Several examples were Offered: 1) the principal owner Of a ski corporation first heard on his car radio that his property was the site for some alpine events, 2) until the DOC announced that alpine events were scheduled for parts Of the 69 Forest Service lands, the Forest Service had never been approached on the matter, 3) a study released by the University of Colorado revealed that the Sniktau site would be totally unsuitable for after-use and that it would generate the least amount Of income and revenue of all sites studied, 4) the DOC announced that the Denver Coliseum.would be used for certain events, but as of a year after the bid had been given to Denver, the Coliseum manager had not been contacted by anyone connect- ed with the Games concerning the use of the arena, 5) the chancellor Of the University Of Denver was asked by the DOC, "do you mind if we say that the Olympic Village could be at the University Of Denver?" and was not contacted again until 10 months after the bid -— the students had never been consulted about the use Of the facilities scheduled for the middle of a term, 6) the DOC (at this point) had produced no firm figures on costs; specifically, the percentage Colorado and Denver tax- payers would pay. Part of the reason for this style of planning was pro- vided by John Vanderhoof, the Lt. Governor: "They (the DOC) were pressed for time so they lied a bit."37 Carl De Temple eventually admitted that "we made some mistakes, but nothing meriting cancellation Of the Games."38 The public thought otherwise, however, expecting more integrity in local government than it was receiving at that time in Washington. 3.30 Facilities 3.31 Existing Facilities Denver's attempts to stage all Of the events within a 45 minute radius of the main site had to be aborted when public protest and 7O rational thinking prevailed. Alternative sites were sought out and plans establiShed to utilize existing structures to the extent possible. In his defense of Denver's bid for the Games, Mayor McNichols argued that "many elements which had become a very part Of the Games were in place in Denver, and had been unfairly attributed to the cost of the Games."39 These elements included highways, public buildings, and "millions of dollars Of locally funded facilities." The facilities as they existed in Denver and other sites included these: 1. the 50,000 seat Mile High Stadium - home Of the Denver Broncos, and site for the Opening and Closing ceremonies; 2. the Denver Convention Center - the press center, and proposed for cultural events usage; 3. the 9,000 seat Denver Coliseum — the proposed site of hockey and figure skating; 4. University of Denver buildings - the proposed site of the Olympic Village and 5,000 seat arena; 5. Steamboat Springs — trails for cross country skiing and a ski jump, both to be upgraded; and, 6. Avon - runs suitable for alpine skiing. It was necessary, Of course, to institute certain modifications and renovations for these structures. Mile High Stadium required a cauldron for the Olympic flame, winterized plumbing, and lighting im- provements for night colored television. The 20 year Old Coliseum needed substantially more upgrading. Colored television lights were needed, in addition to a new concrete floor for the ice surface. The original floor was cracked, and the dimensions would have had to be en- larged to accommodate international hockey. McNichols reported that the 71 convention complex required "modification." Currigan Hall, to be used to house the press, would have had to be outfitted with equipment used by electronic and print media technicians. The adjacent auditorium and theatre buildings would have required improvements as well.40 The ski areas would have had to be upgraded with new lifts, improved trails, and new snow making equipment. The City Of Denver would have been obliged to make facial repairs in anticipation of wor1d~wide exposure.41 3.32 New Facilities The following are the new facilities that would have been required for Colorado's staging of the Games: (refer to Appendix D for details) l. biathlon - Steamboat Springs; 2. nordic skiing - Steamboat Springs; 3. bobsled and luge - Doublehead Mt.; 4. ski jumping - Doublehead; 5. speed skating - Denver; 6. alpine skiing - Avon; and 7. another ice arena, 10,000 seating capacity - Denver (this was listed as a highly desirable item). Numerous support structures would have been required for each one of the above events. In response to the proposals came charges of unneeded facilities. Charles Lindley, a State representative from Colorado, testified to the Senate that he felt severe reductions in the facilities budget could be accomplished. He thought that the permanent warming buildings for the nordic and biathlon events, along with the two small stadiums for viewing the start and finish Of the cross country and shoot- 42 . . ing competitions were unnecessary. It was also hIS contention that 72 since ski jumping involved only 70 and 90 meter competition, a 5 hill complex was wasteful. There were wide-spread Objections to the bob run because Of its limited after-use potential. The DOC petitioned the IOC to allow it to combine the two-man bob and luge into the same course, and to eliminate from competition the four-man bobsled event. This would have reduced the required track by 2,000 feet.43 Representative Lindley objected to one other item on the budget: $200,000 for snow making equip- ment at Vail. "We are talking about ski country USA. This is the heart of the ski country. This is where God has endowed us with natural snow- fall that makes it all possible and just because they want the 9th degree of perfection we are going to put in $200,000 to give that ice base so they will have perfection."44 The DOC, in describing the capital facilities which would be re- quired, stated its primary Objectives as follows: "The creation of facilities of lasting value to the community, state, and nation...our prime objective is to propose the maximum potential for after-use which will assure a viable, responsible organization to develop and administer sports programs, by utilizing each facility, and thereby create a United States Winter-Sports Training Center." It was expected the facility would remain a "national legacy" to winter-sports.45_ With this in mind, the proposed all-purpose arena could be utilized for "a wide variety of sports events...it will also be utilized for meetings Of all types, for expositions and music and other cultural presentations."46 To gather support for construction of other event- sites, the DOC referred to the shortages of bob runs, ski jumps, speed skating tracks, biathlon ranges, etc., in the U.S. The DOC hoped that the Denver facilities would become major training sites, as well as 73 being available for the hosting Of competitions. De Temple did not con- sider the warming huts and viewing areas to be wasted facilities. These structures, he said, would "enhance" the area, and enhance the opportun- ity for training and participation in the Steamboat Springs area.4‘7 He further argued that the five-hill complex for ski jumping was necessary for training young jumpers, as one must work up to 70 and 90 meter jumps. As previously mentioned, the Denver Olympic Village (to be funded in part by HUD) was to revert to low and medium income housing. There are varying reports concerning the outcome of the $31.3 million project. The Saturdaleeview reported that HUD "pledged only a portion" of the money requested;48 the Engineering News-Record stated that HUD rejected the entire proposal because there was no plan for 100% federal financing Of housing projects.49 The plan was attacked locally because "the land under consideration (was) thought by city planners to be too isolated for low-income housing, although suitable for hotel development. In addition, successful development depends on cleaning out the railroad tracks there, which is highly unlikely before the Olympics because Of the lack of time and money."50 Two comments should be made at this point. First, the HUD applica- tion process is an extremely complex one in terms of paper—work and total amount of time involved. There are varying formulas that govern the combination of federal and local funding, depending to a great ex- tent upon the numbers Of units and low-income families involved. Under no circumstances would HUD have provided 100% funding. Second, while the plan for this idea originated within the community, the choice of location did not; abandoned railroad yards seldom make for ideal living 74 environments. The area was isolated from essential community services such as mass-transit lines, community centers and Offices, schools, shopping areas, etc. Opponents to the Games also questioned the DOC's use of three separate sites in Colorado, as it would have entailed the creation of three Olympic Villages. Structures at the University of Denver were to be used there, and the Village at Steamboat Springs would have been lo- cated within structures at the U.S. International University. The alpine events, planned for Avon near Vail, would have required on-site construction of lodging facilities capable of accommodating 600 persons. These improvements were to benefit the Vail community, schools, and tourist industry.51 3.40 The Environment 3.41 'Involvement Of Environmental Organizations The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through its regional office monitored the progress Of the Olympic planning process. In the statement Of Donald Dubois (Deputy Regional Administrator) to the Senate, the EPA declared that it was in frequent contact with the DOC, and that it had Offered Governor Love its full support and cooperation in environ- mental matters.52 Dubois outlined the role Of the EPA concerning plan- ning for the Games as follows: 1. continued liaison with and assistance to, the DOC, State Of Colorado, city of Denver, and many of the agencies and in- stitutions involved in the process; 5. 75 participation in planning studies to insure that necessary environmental protection factors are built into the Olympic program; lend assistance in the preparation Of a minimum Of 14 impact statements, through review of draft and final statements; assist to the extent possible with demonstration and con- struction projects for waste management facilities to be used in conjunction with the Games; and, give priority attention tO the 1976 Olympics in Denver. The Rocky Mountain Chapter Of the Sierra Club was very active in the entire Olympics campaign. As reported in the January 1, 1972 Denver Post (see volume 80, #153), the Sierra Club raised several questions concerning land use. These were mentioned during the Senate subcommittee 53 hearings and Governor Love responded to them as follows: 1. Love: Love: Love: Lack Of realistic state land use planning will result in land speculation with disasterous ecological results. 'We are one of the leaders in the nation so far as imple- menting land use programs; the facilities themselves do not represent a problem, as they were already scheduled to be built; I don't believe that the 10 day Games are going to be the reason for more land speculation.‘ Lack of implemented regional transportation plans and Denver's lack of rapid transit will encourage environmental hazardous development. 'I fail to see how this will represent any great problem.’ Staging the Games will encourage population increases. 'I believe that Colorado will continue to grow, and I do not think that a sports event Of 10 days is that important a factor compared with the other factors that are potential or have already occurred in Colorado.' The costs to Colorado would outweigh the benefits. 76 Love: 'The benefits do not represent any great commercial bonanza; rather, intangible benefits such as stimulation of land use planning, aquisition Of needed facilities, pride and unity, and others which far outweigh the costs.‘ POME (Protect Our Mountain Environment) was very instrumental in representing the ecological concerns and posing potential effects that the Games would have on one particular area Of Colorado: the Front Range. Their activities will be discussed in part 3.42 of this section. 3.42 Lack of Sensitivity Towards the Environment It would seem that the Official Stance was in favor Of staging the Games at any cost, as found in the statement of Colorado's U.S. repre- . 54 sentative, Don Brotzman: "You will hear, Mr. Chairman, from those who Oppose the Games in Colorado on the ground that they will adversely affect the environment of the state. Frankly, there is no type of human endeavor which, when improperly executed, does not pose a threat to the environment. But it need not be so, and I am con- fident that those charged with planning for the Games have gone to great lengths to assure that they will actually enhance Colorado's total environmental picture." This feeling was also found in the statement Of the chirman of the Denver Regional Council of Governments, Thomas Kristopeit. Kristopeit did not agree with the view that the Games would become a series of events with facilities that would cause and engender serious and adverse ecological impacts. "I do not believe that this view is accurate; on the contrary: 1) the Games can establish new environmental standards; and 2) the real issue is the quality Of growth, not the Games...(furthermore), ten, fifteen or even twenty years Of growthman- ship cannot be stopped or reversed in a year or two, nor by any single event such as the Olympics....The fact of the matter is that cities are 77 not masters Of their own destinies in many, large scale ways."55 In the opinion of the author, this view reflects a complete misunder- standing Of urban theory, and the effects Of an event such as the Olympics upon a City. Insensitivity in planning was portrayed most graphically in that area known as the "Front Range." This area does not include Denver or any Of the site cities on the western side-Of the Divide, but starts west of a series of hog backs (spined hills) and rises vertically 15 miles above the plains cities. It includes Connifer, Doublehead Mt., and the residential community of Evergreen. According to POME, major ecological impacts would occur in the mountains and not in the plains cities. POME claims the area is suited for limited population densities, recreation uses, and light grazing. The natural cover crops such as grass and trees are important to these uses. If disturbed, several gen- erations are required for growth Of replacement cover crops. Doublehead Mt., in the Front Range, was the area where ski jumping, bobsled and luge events were planned, both for the Olympics and then on a permanent basis. Cross country skiing and the biathlon were also planned for the area until residents objected quite vehemently to the plans calling for 8 foot gaps to be cut into backyard fences so that the trails could be run through the neighborhood, and, the use of the schoolyard for the shooting competition. The parents expressed fear that “biathlon competitors will gun down innocent children in their schoolyard."56 The selection of the Front Range as an Olympic site was probably the most conspicuous example Of malfeasant planning on the part of the DOC. It was a decision reflecting a complete disregard for property and Citizens' rights. While the area may have been suited for some types Of 78 recreational uses, there are several (such as the creation Of hiking trails, parks and athletic fields) that would not have required the types of environmental modifications necessary for the creation of bob- runs and ski jumps. Cross country skiing, as its name suggests, has no place in residential communities. While biathlon and cross country events were moved to Steamboat Springs, bobsledding and luge, along with ski jumping, were still planned for staging at Doublehead. POME vigororously objected on several environmental grounds: 1) there was no present level area for any run to bottom out at the site, as the meadows at the base have a 10% slope and only by massive earth movement could a level outrun be created (in fact, New Republic noted that one hill would have had to be leveled and another its top cut off for ski lifts and stands, and "that proposed sanitation facilities would have infected local wells;")57 2) temporary parking would inevitably involve trespass, with noise and fumes encroach- ment on neighboring private property; 3) proposed water storage at the site ignored the downstream rights of others to runoff water, and, additional wells would have encroached on the adjudicated water rights of others at the site, already water poor; and 4) the action proposed would have deprived adjoining landowners of their property rights to the aesthetic values of their land, their water rights, and their right to freedom from trespass without just compensation.58 As if to summarize the frustrations felt by the environmentalists, State Representative Richard Lamm remarked; "Every time I ask a question about the ecology, the Olympic people tell me, 'don't worry, we are going to take care of that.‘ But a state that has never taken down as much as a single billboard to improve the environment is not going to 79 run an Olympics that the ecologists would like."59 3.43 Ecological Ramifications John Larson, Assistant Secretary of Program Policy, U.S. Department of the Interior, offered preliminary environmental studies to the Senate. The Interior Department contended their studies did not support the view that the Games would accelerate changes (both economic and in land use) to the community in and about the Denver area. "Some marginal, but small increment in environmental effect will occur," Larson stated, but he felt that the charges of ecological damage were magnified and distorted by the media.60 According to Mayor McNichols, "environmental ramifica- tions were a key factor in determining sites in the Colorado mountains for ski competitions. It is our feeling that there will be no negative impact attributable to the Olympic Games in the alpine and nordic ski competitions."61 Olympic organizers pointed with pride to the Colorado Land Use Act of 1971, called a "model act."62 As has been discussed earlier, Olympic concerns were written into the act -- with the Commission and Governor having review powers and access to any information required in deciding land use questions arising from Olympic plans. The major environmental impact statement63 released by the Interior Department was included in the records Of the House subcommittee hear- ings (henceforth referred to as House) and has been summarized in Appendix D. It is appropriate at this point to discuss the major elements of the statement. 80 It was felt that the Games could have far-ranging environmental significance, with the ecological consequences, effects, and impacts of the Olympics greater than the sum Of the specific impacts at each of the sites. Throughout the entire document, however, appeared the dis- claimer that some of the statements and conclusions were only "reasonable judgements" based on then known facts; that more established facts were necessary; that some Of the impacts were occurring regardless Of the Olympics and it would be extremely difficult to sort out particular im— pacts attributable tO the Games. In fact, it appears that at times, the drafters of the statement would have preferred to wait until the damage was complete and all of the data available and only then assess the impact. The study identified the 5 sites, and the requirements placed upon them by the different events. It identified the nature Of the environment in general at each site. In this regard, it was noted that the magnitude Of the population increase in the Denver area was highly significant. In the Front Range it was expected that the "significant“ environmental consequence would be the rapid rise and development in the recreational and tourism industries -- due to the increase in population in the area. In one crucial area concerning the effect of the Games on popula- tion and the committment of resources, the study did not waiver. It con- cluded that increases in population, jobs, and services were all possible, and that an increase in the committment of resources could result. There was concern that uncontrolled growth encouraged by the Olympics could cause strip cities to be created. The Colorado Land Use Act of 1971 was not expected to affect in any significant way the quantity Of growth and development, the population and unemployment increases, or the Changes 81 in the state's committments Of land and water. The statement further noted that the big city problems such as noise, pollution, and loss Of open spaces, would be compounded in Denver's case by the rapid future growth (rapid growth that would not be discouraged by the Games in the least), and that the Land Use Act would only partially mitigate these problems. Obviously, one important consideration in having the Games in Colorado was exposure of the State to the U.S. and the world revealing an excellent place to vacation or live. Existing problems associated with rapid and sporadic growth would have become intensified substan- tially as a direct result of the Games. Impacts at the various sites were analyzed, with the most conse- quential expected to occur at the Doublehead Mt. and Avon sites. Social impacts of severe magnitude could have occurred in Denver, including re- location of large numbers Of people, use of scarce resources, and long- range changes in urban land resource patterns. More complete listings Of the impacts are found in the appendix; impacts that do not justify the position of Larson that the Games would not accelerate change and damage communities. 3.50 Transportation It is apparent by reading legislative reports and.plans Of the DOC that the transportation problem was not given serious thought. The Senate and House gave the matter token attention, as problems Of the environ- ment and site locations took priority. The Senate did, however, confront the Governor with the charges that had been registered concerning inade- quate transportation. Governor Love responded by claiming that the road system in Colorado was "Obviously much superior" to the transportation. 82 networks which existed in Grenoble, France and Sapporo, Japan when those cities sponsored the Olympics.64 The Governor also stated that Colorado hoped to have I-7O (part Of the nation's interstate system) completed from Denver to Avon, and this would alleviate any major problems. The highways from Denver to Steamboat Springs would remain four lanes wide, but Love stated his belief that the nordic events would not draw the large crowds and no problem would result. Mayor McNichols was questioned about the transportation system of Denver in particular, and he failed to find any major Obstacles. The Denver Broncos home football games were always sold out, McNichols stated, and there did not seem to be extraordinary difficulty with that traffic. He mentioned that "on an ordinary weekend, 40,000 skiers travel to pre- sent ski areas which are ordinarily reached by car."65 (This is not to say, however, that all 40,000 people travel to the same resort). McNichols further explained that as a result Of the Games, additional millions would be spent on improving airport and mass transit facilities. "With this additional equipment we will be able to enhance this service and have a 20% increase as against an average 6.9% decrease in other cities." Testimony Of James watt, Director of the Bureau of the Outdoors, Interior Department, reiterated the previously established position.66 The Colorado legislative committee on the Olympics went on record stating that "any new highway or mass transit facility proposed for the Olympics must be contingent upon the long-range needs of the communities or transportation corridor to be served."67 The groups opposing the Games believed that the Olympics would not cost the officially stated estimate of $35 milliont but Closer to $100 million, part of this due to the increased cost Of transportation arising 83 from the scattered locations of the sites.68 Not only would three Olympic Villages have to be erected, but the cost Of shuttling specta- tors, officials, and participants: 1) two hours by car to Avon from Denver; and 2) four hours by auto to Steamboat Springs from Denver, would result in cost becoming a factor.69 The cost of building access roads and parking facilities in the mountainous terrain Of Doublehead Mt. was estimated to be considerable because Of the nature of the land- scape and the fact that the facility would have had to accommodate the huge fleet of buses necessary to shuttle all participants and spectators to the site. 3.60 Benefits With all Of the "politics" involved in the Olympics, including pro- fessional versus amateur arguments,questionable Officiating, boycotts, commercialism tactics, and all Of the other misuses Of the Olympic ideal, it is difficult to believe that "spiritual" notions are still considered benefits. However, the Denver Olympic promoters listed spiritual items such as: the promotion Of brotherhood and understanding among men, inter- national goodwill, sportsmanship, and furtherance Of peace, as major re- wards Of hosting the Games. Somehow it was thought that the city that provided a format for this display of communion among men and women would be bestowed with great honor, no matter what it did to be awarded the Games. There is no doubt that the tourist industry in Denver, Colorado, and the nation would have been tremendously enhanced as a result of the Denver Games. More than twice the usual number of tourists were antici- pated, and the Games were to be used along with other similar events in 84 campaigns to promote the U.S. and attract 70 to 80 million foreign and local tourists.7O While private business persons would have received ample monetary compensation as a result of the Games, Denver and the state would have benefited greatly from the creation Of the facilities essential for in- ternational winter sports competition. Those facilities are scarce in the U.S., and their creation would have furthered Colorado's "winter- sports heritage." Training programs would have been established on grand scales, and competitions would have been regular features to insure continued use Of the facilities. Denver would have taken the Opportunity to upgrade and improve existing buildings, priority items that would have been accomplished much quicker and cheaper on account of the Games. 3.70 The Opposition In reading legislative and news accounts Of the Denver Olympics, it seemed to the author that the proponents of the Games chose to look askance at the growing anti-Olympic sentiment. U.S. Representative James McKevitt apparently convinced himself that public opinion on the Olympics was not widely divided, that the majority of the state citizens were concerned that the Games be "successful and a credit to the U.S. and Colorado."71 Mayor McNichols felt that it is rare for a public pro— ject not to have "dissident voices." It was his attitude, based upon the experiences Of Sapporo and Grenoble, that those who at first thought the undertaking was unwise and wasteful would finally realize that the outcome was worth the effort.72 Oklahoma Senator Fred Harris outlined the opposition stance when he inquired of the Senate regarding who was to pay and who was to profit. 85 Harris' position was that it would be the average working man and woman -- the average taxpayer -- who would pay the bill; and it would be the well- to-do businessperson, land owner, and real estate speculator who would all profit.73 Richard Lamm expressed this same view when he said: "People are tired of having the chamber Of commerce run this state, they are fed up with this 'Sell Colorado' campaign. People are starting to realize that 'big' and 'gOOd' are not necessarily the same thing."74 Harris was also disturbed by what he termed Denver's "terribly messed up and turned around set of priorities" if Denver did provide for the Games. He was referring to the priority given the Olympics above more needed social programs such as health care, care for the elderly and handicapped, and help for Colorado's migrant farm workers. "The cost of one bdbsled course is four times the Colorado state budget for air and water pollution. The cost of the speed skating track is seven times the budget for handicapped children."75 A newspaper editor reported: "I can see every needed project in this city going begging for the next 6 years."76 Richard Lamm, Colorado State Representative, was very outspoken in his opposition to the Games. He admitted to the Senate that in 1967, he along with the entire Colorado legislature supported the effort. At the time, he explained, nothing was said of state funding (it was his conten- tion that the DOC purposely misled the general assembly). In time, the original cost estimates were proven much too low, and the public's con- fidence in the DOC began to wane. At this point, Lamm told the subcommit- tee that opposition to the effort had "manifested itself in several ways which severely jeopardize Colorado's hosting the 1976 Olympics:"77 1. The Colorado House passed an Olympic appropriation by only one vote; if the future of the Games depended on 4 more state appropriations, Lamm suggested that the Games were in trouble; 86 2. several prominent people and institutions were calling for the resignation of the entire DOC (on this note, the following item appeared in the Saturday Review: "The DOC had good reason to want the Games. Its membership is composed of representatives of the industries that stand tO gain the most by the extravaganza: the airlines, the hotels and restaurants, the phone company, the real estate dealers, the Rocky Mountain ski resorts...."); 3. the CCF (Citizens for Colorado's Future) instituted a constitutional amendment to prohibit any further state funding (a group in Denver did the same thing concerning municipal funding of the Games); 4. organized labor was against the Games, and Avery Brundage (President Of the IOC) made no secret Of his Opposition to the winter Games in general. Lamm's sentiments were summarized in the following quotations: "All we are saying is that every road sign to this point has been that this is more likely to be a black eye to Colorado than an advantage;"79 "We have shown that we don't need circuses in Colorado, we need solutions to problems."80 These became the major tenets of the CCF, which was in- strumental in creating the voter awareness that resulted in the Games being turned down by Colorado residents. Two bumper stickers distributed by the COP very dramatically reflected the group's perceptions Of the Olympic-related growth: "Ski Kansas," and "Don't Californicate Colorado." The final vote demonstrated that 65% of the citizens of Colorado who voted agreed with the COP. The count was 522,000 Opposed to the Games being staged in Colorado; and 348,000 in favor.81 (Note: Richard D. Lamm was elected Governor Of Colorado in November, Of 1974). 3.80 Conclusion The DOC's efforts to incorporate the planning policies and priorities of Denver seemed genuine at times. The problem lay in the fact that it was 87 "after the fact" planning. This is to say that after the DOC and Olympic supporters became committed tO the idea Of bringing home the Games, and after the bid was awarded, occasional attempts were made to mold the planning Of the Games into housing and recreation plans that existed in Colorado. The DOC overlooked the Obvious fact that the Games and their implications were not whole-heartedly accepted by all parties concerned. The primary planning document of Denver, its master plan, made no refer- ence to involving the city in the Olympic Games. This oversight on the part Of the DOC, along with its questionable planning practices, con- tributed towards voter disillusionment and eventual rejection of the Games. Although testimony involving the environmental issue is conflict- ing, it is the author's Opinion that there would have been impacts of sizable proportions in the areas of the Front Range and Vail. It is Obvious that growth would have been stimulated and Open land consumed. Even though McNichols claimed that other community programs would not suffer on account of the Games, the city would have been forced to sac- rifice in some areas for the sake of the Olympics; the city's share would have eventually come from somewhere. The DOC attempted to treat these issues as misrepresentations and misperceptions of the public, a public that it totally underestimated and often times ignored. It is not this author's opinion that the vote in Colorado against the 1976 Olympics was a vote against all future Olympics or sports in Colorado. Rather, it was a vote against self-serving and ill-conceived planning; planning that showed limited interest on behalf of the client who would have been forced to live with the results long after the two weeks of sports ended. 88 3.81 Points for Future Reference One of the most important elements of the planning process, that of receiving the endorsements Of Officials, was demonstrated here as with Lake Placid and Squaw Valley. The use Of advocacy-type planning (from the community) should be a vital element of the process, as it was in Denver to certain points. The notion Of using the Olympics in conjunction with recreation- al and land use planning, and as a catalyst for civic improve- ment is excellent. It should, however, be initiated well in advance of the bid submission. The following signs should not be overlooked by the Olympic committees: a. A planning effort which was long-range, but not included in the master plan. b. An area which was debating the growth/no-growth issue. The application of the Olympics with major state and national programs (such as the Bicentennial) is exemplary. The fact that the organizing committee works Closely with environmental groups such as the EPA is encouraging. It im— plies, though, that there will be a demonstrated sensitivity towards environmental impacts on the part of both. It is essential that the major facilities (such as Ski jumps and bobsled runs) exist previously. When facilities already exist, formal contact must be made with the Officials in charge Of them to assure their availability. 8. 10. 89 IOC rules are very specific as to the staging of the events in relation to the main site. Rule changes should not be used to alleviate shortcomings. Residential lands (including those already developed) must never be planned to accommodate events of the nature of cross- country skiing, ski jumping, and bobsledding. Municipal and State ballots should contain items associated with the citizenry views Of the Games prior to any Official presentation of intent to the major Olympic committees. FOOTNOTES - DENVER, 1976 l U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 1976 Denver Winter Olympics. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, Senate, on S. 3531, 92d Congress, 2d Session, 1972, l. 2 Ibid., p. 2. 3 Ibid., p. 17. 4 "Denver Triumph A 7 Year Effort," New York Times, 119, 41017, (May 13, 1970), 53. 5 Drummond Ayres Jr., "Invitation TO Go Elsewhere," New York Times, 122, 41931, (November 13, 1972), IV, 5. 6 "The '76 Olympics: Quarreling Already," Business Week, 2221, (March 25, 1972), 30. 7 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 34. 8 Bill Bruns, "Will Colorado Scrap Its Own 1976 Olympics?", Life, 73, 18, (November 3, 1972), 81. 9 Michael Strauss, "Colorado Joins Olympic Bidders," New York Times, 116, 39947, (June 8, 1967), 64. 10 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 5. 11 lpl§,, p. 5-6. 12 $2383! p. 16. 13 $2193 14 Denver Organizing Committee For The XII Olympic Winter Games 1976. Statement By Carl DeTemple, President, Before the Parks and Recreation Subcommittee Of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, (June 9, 1972), l. 15 $2393! p. 2. 16 $2283! p. 3. l7 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 9—10. 18 gplg,, p. 35. 19 Jerry Kirshenbaum, "Voting TO Snuff The Torch," Spprts Illustrated, 37, 21, (November 20, 1972), 55. 90 91 20 Bruns, “Will Colorado Scrap," p. 81. 21 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 36. 22 £2i83' p. 43. 23 gplg,, p. 46. 24 lpig,, p. 73. 25 Denver Planning Office, THK Associates, Inc., and Others, Central Platte Valley Pre-Planning,Study/Denver Olympic Site, (March 5, 1971), 18. 26 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 21. 27 Denver Planning Office, Denver 1985, A Comprehensive Plan For Community Excellence, City Of Denver: Denver, Colorado, January, 1967. 28 Denver Regional Council of Governments, Parks - Recreation - Open Space Development Program Denver SMSA, Draft Report 8703, April, 1970. 29 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 11. 30 3919:! p. 36. 31 lplg,, p. 148. 32 gp;g,, p. 18. 33 Anthony Ripley, "Colorado Is Cool To Winter Games," New York Times, 121, 41637, (January 23, 1972), V, 2. 34 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 169. 35 Sam W.Brown Jr., "Snow JOb In Colorado," New Republic, 166, 5, (January 29, 1972), 16. 36 ”Olympian Snafu At Sniktau," Sports Illustrated, 34, 7, (February 15, 1971), 60. 37 Brown, "Snow Job," p. 21. 38 Drummond Ayres Jr., "Ski Town Split On Winter Olympics," New York Times, 122, 41925, (November 6, 1972), 43. 39 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 33. 4° Ibid., p. 41. 41 Ibid., p. 39. 42 Ibid., p. 63. 92 43 Ibid., p. 79. 44 Ibid., p. 65. 45 Denver Organizing Committee, Statement By DeTemple, p. 18. 46 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 38. 47 Ibid., p. 77. 48 Milton Viorst, "Bumpy Course For The Denver Olympics," Saturday Review, 55, 43, (October 21, 1972), 12. 49 "Winter Olympics '76," Engineering News - Record, 188, 25 (June 22, 1972), 50. 50 Brown, "Snow JOb," p. 18. 51 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 87. 52 Ibid., p. 12. 53 Ibid., p. 19. 54 Ibid., p. 8. 55 Ibid., p. 162. 56 Kirshenbaum, "Snuff The Torch," p. 46. 57 Brown, "Snow Job," p. 16. 58 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 170. 59 Viorst, "Bumpy Course," p. 17. 60 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 30. 61 Ibid., p. 45. 62 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 1976 Winter Olympic Games. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, House Of Representatives, on H.R. 14597, 92d Congress, 2d Session, 1972, 34. 63 Bureau Of Outdoor Recreation, Department of the Interior Draft, Environmental Statement, Proposed 1976 Denver Winter Olympic Games, Included in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House Of Representatives, 92d Congress, 2d Session, on H.R. 14597, 1972, 6-34. 64 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 22. 65 Ibid., p. 35. 66 67 68 93 U.S. House, Olympics, p. 115. U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 197. "Where Voters Battle Over The Olympics," Business Week, 2252, (October 28, 1972), 78. 69 7O 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 Viorst, "Bumpy Course," p. 12. U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 11. 2229:! p. 10. £218:' p. 44. lpi§,, p. 15. Bruns, "Will Colorado Scrap," p. 81. U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 15. "Denver Triumph," p. 53. U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 49. Viorst, "Bumpy Course," p. 14. U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 53. Kirshenbaum, "Voting To Snuff," p. 55. Anthony Ripley, "An Unknown Defeats Allcott In Colorado," New York Times, 122, 41928, (November 9, 1972), 61. CHAPTER IV MONTREAL XXIst Summer Olympiad, 1976 "Cities should not waste their resources on expenditures for a large number and variety of games, lest they exhaust themselves in futile exertion and quarrel over unreasonable desire for glory." (Attributed to Gaius Maecenas, Roman Statesman - 8 BC.) CBS Television Network, "Selling The Olympics," 60 Minutes, 8, 22, (May 23, 1976), 6. 94 95 4.10 Rationale for Hosting the Games at Montreal The primary reason the IOC selected Montreal over its competitors for the 1976 Summer Olympics had little to do with logical considerations such as the ability to stage and the ability to finance the Games. Rather, it was a decision caught up in politics. When it came time to Choose the site, the U.S. and Russia (represented by Los Angeles and' Moscow) were the only other contenders that could afford the Olympics. Eager to avoid involvement in East-West political skirmishes, the IOC gratefully chose neutral Canada.1 To justify its decision, the IOC claimed it was impressed by Mon- treal's idea Of a ”more modest, less expensive setting," a return of the Games to a "human scale." Jean Drapeau, Mayor of Montreal, appeared before the IOC "with tears in his eyes and holes in his pockets," claim- ing the history Of Montreal was guarantee enough the Games would be staged as promised. He indicated that the discussions of cost and the ability to finance plans had no place in decisions concerning the Olympics and what they stand for.2 Drapeau's personality, and the fact that he and his associates "carefully plotted to wean, cajole, influence, impress and win over almost all members of the IOC" resulted in his victory. The earlier Expo '67, with its big success, was highly regarded by the IOC, most of whose members were "expensively wined and dined" there. This fact alone may have been the decisive factor in the Choice of Montreal.3 When Drapeau was interviewed just prior to the opening of the Games, he referred to "the incentive for youth to love and participate in amateur sports" as one of the main reasons for bringing the Games to Canada.4 He intended to make the Games "an event with charm" and of such 96 "modest and human scale" that even poor countries would be encouraged to host future Olympics.5 The Montreal Games were to be staged with "sim— plicity, dignity, and a real grandeur of friendship Of peoples."6 Montreal was to assume its "symbolic role of promoting a healthy, bi— cultural Canadianism and the city's image within the international community.”7 The Montreal delegation was convinced that politics could be elimr inated from the Games if the IOC awarded Canada the Games. Mayor Drapeau explained, "in extending its invitation, Montreal is simply seeking the privilege of serving mankind."8 Drapeau called Montreal the "potential savior" of the Olympics,9 an idea expounded upon by writer/ athlete Bruce Kidd: "For the community which hosts them, there is a 'contact high' from international games... In its highest form, sports creates such beauty that it can transcend ideological and chauvinistic rivalries and bring peoples from many different countries together."10 The intensity of the Canadian effort was summed up in the words of Bill Cox, Vice President Of the Canadian Olympic Association: "Short of a world war, there is no bigger forum for our country than the Olympics."11 Cox was referring to the potential economic gain attributable to the Games. Economic considerations, however, were presented almost immediate- ly as expenditures rather than gains: "Without Offering a.dime in financial guarantees, with no stadium and few other athletic facilities, Mayor Drapeau had won the Games for Montreal; for the first time in their history, they were to be held on Canadian soil."12 As with other Olympics discussed, there is generally one factor that proves to be the motivating force behind a city's desire to host the Games. Although laudable notions, promotion of sportsmanship, 97 brotherhood, etc., do not fully account for the Cities' extended cam- paigns (in Montreal's case, one of 13 years) for the Games. The primary motivation of Montreal was suggested by a resident who referred to Mayor Drapeau's megalomania.13 Forbes Magazine also suggested this in an April 15, 1976 article: "Both (Olympic stadium and village) will stand as monuments to Jean Drapeau and as a constant reminder Of Drapeau's belief that people must be inspired to build great structures."14 Bruce Kidd wrote that Drapeau's Olympic plans indicated a deliberate preference "for political monuments rather than social betterment."15 The fact that the Olympic stadium in Montreal was to be the "grandest" of all the domed stadiums16 would seem to provide support to this theory (especially in light of Drapeau's promises for modest Games and human scale). Nick Auf der Maur -- opposition member Of Montreal's city council -- left no doubt with this explanation of Drapeau: "He feels there are only a few men in a generation capable of stirring that imagination, of lift- ing a people to great heights. This is the stuff of greatness, the men who have a rendezvous with destiny, the pyramid builders. Their legacies are the cathedrals and other monuments to grandeur. History remembers them, the people are grateful to them. Their critics are short-sighted, incapable Of understanding that these leaders incarnate the people's yearning for greatness."17 The inspiration for this came from one desire: the Mayor's ambition d."18 to make Montreal "The First City Of the worl Drapeau stated that "there is no challenge too great for Montreal...Montreal is en route to becoming The City of the world. Twenty years from now, no matter what happens, it will have achieved this position, and it will be referred "19 to in all parts of the world as The City. With this in mind, it became 98 Obvious to Drapeau that the "only suitable encore to Expo '67 was the Olympiad,"20 4.20 Planning 4.21 Planning Organization Olympic protocol dictates that every country hosting the Olympics form an Olympic canmittee. This committee must be a non-profit organiza- tion responsible for the organization and staging Of the Games. Under curious circumstances, the Canadian Olympic Association became respon- sible for the Games, and immediately delegated the task to COJO (Comite Organisateur des Jeux Olympiques). COJO then moved its operation into a building next door to City Hall, because "if anyone had imagined that the Mayor would turn over the Olympics to a bunch of amateur sports officials," they were mistaken. "Whoever controlled the organizing committee controlled the Games, and Drapeau controlled it absolutely."21 When the federal and provincial governments announced that they would not lend financial assistance to Montreal, the Mayor introduced the "self financing" plan of the Olympics. The result: "Many people realized that this gave the Mayor complete freedom of action, no questions asked." 4.22 The Nature of the Planning From the start the Mayor's attitude in planning the Games was based upon insensitivity and veiled secrecy. Commenting on his grand plan for the Olympic Village and stadium, Drapeau said: "The ugliness of the slums in which people live doesn't matter if you can make them stand to lock in wonder at things they understand."22 Drapeau's policy' 99 towards Openness with press and the public was as follows: "I don't like to be specific if it can be avoided...it is better."23 As late as two years before the Games, the Mayor still had no clear idea of the form that the Olympic Village would take; in fact "not even a pencil sketch existed."24 One writer critiquing the Montreal Olympic plans could not understand the need for COJO's secrecy regarding the Game's cost: "Who really knows? My guess is that no one really knows, no one at all."25 Auf der Maur wrote that "C000 and the city had operated according to the style and custom that Jean Drapeau had developed over the years: total secrecy -- don't tell the press and public a thing un- less it suits your purpose."26 Very little data was released concerning the Olympic plans. As a result COJO, the press, and the public seemed driven by speculation and blind faith. Yvan Dubois (Director of the Olympic Village) was uncon- cerned with the lack Of firm planning for the Village: "It will be ready, I am certain."27 There was a general sense that "Drapeau will bring it Off somehow," and with COJO confident in its figures, "we simply will do the Olympics as we have promised."28 Drapeau's working philosophy was as follows: "Problems are solved en route." Commenting on this style Of planning, Frank Deford was reminded of what Muhammad Ali used to say: "If I tell you a fly can pull a plow, hitch him up."29 Serious problems developed as a result of Drapeau's secrecy and "cost be damned" approach to planning the Games. He referred to the estimated $800 million deficit as a "gap," not a deficit. "As long as you have all of the bills in but not all Of the revenue, it is a gap."30 When Mike Wallace attempted to get a firm cost projection from Drapeau, Drapeau responded: "It will go to what we will know when it's all over."31 100 This attitude was also reflected in the actions of Drapeau's Parisian architect, Roger Taillibert. (Taillibert allegedly Charged a $40 million fee for designing the major Olympic facilities -- four times the highest fee ever paid to an architect in North American history and more than the entire 1200 member Quebec Order of Architects made in 1974; his fee alone was $9 million more than the total cost Of Houston's Astrodome.)32 Taillibert told reporters, "Don't ask me about costs. I only care for concrete."33 One writer described the Olympic planning of Montreal in this fashion: "Picture yourself planning a dinner party and then falling asleep 6 hours before the guests are due to arrive."34 Drapeau was called "the greatest con artist Canada had ever produced." He was de- termined to "enrich Montreal at the expense of the rest Of Canada."35 John Robertson was slightly more kind in his appraisal of the COJO planning methodology: "Sometimes I think its a ship of fools run by Captain Kangaroo and walter Mitty. They won't tell anyone anything... These guys operate like the politicians of Paris: have some wine, have some conversation, things run themselves, open another bottle Of wine, everyone bring a brick, and -- there! We've built a stadium."36 The self-financing plan for the Games was instituted, as mentioned, in order to avoid direct citizen approval Of projects. Money was to be raised through 1) sales Of television and commercial rights to the Games, 2) an Olympic lottery, and 3) the implementation of a coin and stamp program. The Olympic funding sources did not initially include increased taxes according to Drapeau, because of the following: 1) the Olympic Village would be converted to 4000 units of low-income housing (a substantial government subsidy was expected), 2) capital investments 101 running into the hundreds of millions would not be necessary for such things as new highways and transportation systems; 3) the Metro was al- ready going to be extended; 4) Olympic events would be held all over the 37 With the use islands (in existing buildings) including Expo islands. Of money from existing municipal programs it was expected that the above- mentioned financing programs would insure no increase in taxes nor problems for Montreal or Canada. The original estimate for the total cost Of the Games was $124 38 million, and final cost estimates have reached as high as $2 billion39 (it is still too early to speculate what the ultimate costs will be). Reasons for this sizable difference include:40 1) poor planning; 2) need- less early delays; 3) unfamiliar construction techniques; 4) labor prob- lems; and, 5) galloping inflation. According to Auf der Maur, "Labor problems and strikes did add cost and necessitate revised schedules, but in the overall scheme of things it was not as great a contributing fac- tor as many Of those responsible would like to make of it." The major problem was described as: "constant confusion as to the chain of author- ity, resulting in administrative and technical chaos...a total collapse of administration."41 The lottery went very well, as did the other programs. Drapeau stated that "if the tap Of Olympic revenues continue to flow until the bath is full, there can be no deficit." It was noted in reference to this that "the faucet flowed fine, but somebody forgot to put the plug in the bathtub."42 One Drapeau critic suggested that "even if the lottery continues after the Games (it has been given a 3 year extension) the maximum revenue it can generate ($30 - $40 million per year) will pay only the interest charges on the deficit."43 Seemingly it will then be 102 he citizens Of Montreal, Quebec Province, and Canada who will eventually pay Off the deficit.44 COJO originally had three goals in mind for Montreal's Olympic Games, all of which failed:45 1. self finance; 2. a budget of only one third to one half of that spent at Munich (Munich spent $760 million, two thirds of which financed the subway construction); and, 3. structures to be designed for North American sports to last from 80-100 years (an electrician on the site of the stadium construction stated: "It's a racket. Too many people with connections. They're just gluing it together now, cutting corners all over the place. You'll see a lot Of big defects showing up in a couple of years."46 By mid-November, 1975, COJO had confessed to being months behind schedule and nearly out of funds. The Quebec Provincial Assembly, at this point, assumed responsibility for administration, funding, and construction of the Olympic facilities. A pediatrician, Dr. Victor Goldbloom, was put in charge. 4.23 Administrative Planning Montreal's ambitious plans allowed for the presence Of 11,150 athletes representing 132 countries of the world.47 The main Olympic site was designed to accommodate the needs of 100,000 spectators, par- ticipants and Officials.48 It was reported by the end of March (1976), that housing reservations were filling up rapidly, as were orders for the 4.7 million tickets that had been printed.49 Nearly $100 million 103 was budgeted for security, to include: bomb disposal squads, 12,000 police and soldiers (more security personnel than athletes), a field hospital and morgue, sharpshooters and anti-sniper squads, border vigils, night patrols in full combat gear, high powered rifles, harbor and air- port watches, canine patrols and armored vehicles. Assisting agencies included the Royal Mounted Police, police of Quebec, Ontario, Interpol, 50 the U.S. FBI and CIA. All of this effort and.money was expended only to discover "that terrorists were within."51 In an attempt to put the enormous Olympic cost in perspective, the follOwing illustration is submitted: The St. Lawrence Seaway cost the equivalent of $1.23 billion in 1975 dollars; the Trans Canada pipeline (2,200 miles) cost $970 million in 1976 dollars; Quebec's greatest single undertaking since 1970 -- the nationalization of the hydro-electric companies, cost $600 million. By comparison, Montreal spent more than the cost of any of these projects for 2 weeks Of sports and some facilities. Parenthetically it can be noted that the 70,000 seat foot— ball stadium in Foxboro, Massachusetts was built for the New England Patriots football team at a coSt Of $6 million. It has been calculated that more than 100 such stadiums could have been constructed in Montreal for the cost Of the one Olympic stadium.52 4.30 Facilities 4.31 Existing Facilities The Engineering News-Record compared facilities and plans Of Denver with those Of Montreal in a June, 1970 issue: "Of the two cities, Montreal must start from scratch."53 Mayor Drapeau claimed contemporan- eously that "we have many swim pools and covered arenas for training 104 purposes, as well as track and field installations."54 In reality the facilities were limited to two gymnasium—auditoriums (including the Montreal Forum) and a swimming pool at the main Olympic site.55 Arthur Daley described the situation in this manner: "For the 1976 Olympics, the city that gave the world Expo '67 will have to start from scratch. It has virtually nothing in the way of proper facilities. Los Angeles has them. SO has Moscow. But Montreal has the Olympic Games."56 4.32 New Facilities The plans for a "simple" Olympics gave way tO the extraordinary design for facilities costing over $1 billion to be constructed at 21 competitive sites. The stadium was planned to have a 50 story mast rising above it, so that a contractable roof could be lowered over the stadium like an umbrella. The mast was to contain 15 floors of training rooms, 2 floors of restaurant, and two Olympic sized pools, and a div- ing tank at the base. The Village was to consist Of four 19 story buildings shaped like half-pyramids and containing 982 units. The vello- drome (bicycling track) was an elaborate building Of the same "flying saucer" design as the pool. A myriad of questionable circumstances have been cited concerning the acquisition Of land and construction of nearly every one of the Parc Maisonneurve facilities (the main site), as well as at the other sites near Montreal.57 Because of strikes, technical prOblems, etc., the stadium construction did not begin until late in the summer of 1974. It was ready in time for the Games, with only the bare essentials. The mast construction had to be "postponed" until a later date. The latest cost projections of the stadium are on the order of $800 million.58 105 The vellodrome story is an interesting one. It was intended to cost $8 million, but the cost escalated to $70 million. It was to be completed in time for the cycling world championships of 1974. When the date neared and the facility was far from finished, a $400,000 vellodrome was built at the University of Montreal and "it was thought to be a very good one."59 Like the Olympic stadium, the Village pyramids (latest estimate is $100 million)60 were not ready in time for the Games. While they were to be air conditioned and contain colored televisions, they were to house up to a dozen athletes per room (with one bathroom being shared by the twelve.61 It has been suggested that they will not be used for low and medium-income housing as planned, or for any other use. One writer suggested that the apartments would follow the same course as "Habitat," the housing project designed by Moshe Safdie for Expo. Habitat was expected to be the award winning answer to low-income, high-density housing. When Habitat's high construction cost (caused by unique tech- niques and the limited number of units built) together with its fame increased the price, only upper-medium to high-income families could afford to live there. It is expected that after August, 1976, only the wealthy will be able to pay the $20 - $60,000 price for the Olympic Village apartments.62 One other serious problem with the Village design relates to prac- ticality. Designers followed a Southern-French Mediterranean design rather faithfully, omitting indoor corridors in the buildings. Since Montreal generally experiences harsh winters, the design is somewhat dysfunctional.63 If Montreal's plan meets with the same lack Of success as Munich's Olympic Village housing approach, the units will still be 106 half-vacant four years after the Olympics.64 The after-life of the facilities is anticipated to have importance to sports in Montreal and Canada. It is planned that the stadium will accommodate professional baseball and possible football franchises of Montreal, as well as future track and field competition and other athletic meets. Should the other plans fail, it has been suggested that the stadium be transformed into a shopping center and the remainder of the facilities be sold to the government for use as part of the University of Quebec.65 By way of a postscript, however, it appears that Olympic facilities are in danger of following the same path as those of Expo (the neglected Expo facilities cost the city $6 million annually).66 Claude Charron, Sports Minister of Quebec commented in January of 1977 that "the stadium is a white elephant, and if you throw in the velodrome and swimming pool, you have to say that I'm in charge of a herd of white elephants."67 One idea discussed but not implemented is as ingenius a plan as that devised for Lake Placid's 1932 Olympics (involving the use of pull- man cars for temporary housing, see 17). This plan provided for 8—10 luxury ocean liners to dock in the St. Lawrence Seaway, at the moorings by the Expo site. This "floating village" was proposed as possible press lodgings, and could have provided all of the housing and entertainment needs of the visitors without creating "white elephan " structures.68 4.40 The Environment The Olympic Village site consumed 100 acres of land within two miles of the stadium. Critics, planners, and environmentalists worried about the loss of green spaces. Many residents complained that too many of the Victorian mansions were being torn down as a result of Olympic-' 107 related projects.69 Drapeau's reply to these criticisms was this: "If you want to see the country, you go to the country." On the subject of pollution the Mayor noted: "It's going down all of the time, but it's only reported when it goes up."70 Nonetheless, Montreal's pollution has been a topic of much discus- sion. "Montreal is an island surrounded by the polluted St. Lawrence River. Only 3% of Montreal's sewage is processed, and there is even more raw sewage floating down from the rest of La Belle Province. The petroleum refineries in the eastern end of the town assault the city with smells that not even New Jersey would accept."71 As a direct result of city spending on the Olympics, Montreal will continue to dump its raw sewage (460 million gallons worth per day) into the St. Lawrence,72 despite the fact that the effluent is killing the river.73 One city official remarked: "We're the last major city in North America that dumps its raw sewage straight into rivers. It's untreated. And because of the Olympic debt, our waste disposal plant, which is under construc- tion, has been delayed until 1984.”4 There is some irony in all of this, as related in the following incident: Queen Elizabeth of England planned to sail to Canada in the Royal yacht, Brittania. When it was discovered that the yacht's waste disposal facilities did not conform to Canadian standards ("We don‘t want ships to dump raw sewage into Canadian waters"), it was arranged that a barge would take on the royal waste, and ship it to Montreal. At Montreal, the sewage would be brought ashore and dumped into the Montreal sewage disposal plant -- which would simply pump it directly into the river.75 108 4.50 Transportation As mentioned previously, many of the Olympic-related projects in— volved transportation systems. In total, nearly a billion dollars were budgeted for these infrastructure items:76 1. a 12 mile subway extention - $200 million (part of the 25 mile expansion of the subway; total cost of the project - $500 million; 2. relocation and extension of Trans Canada Highway System - $100 million; and 3. construction of the first phase of Mirabel Airport - $350 million (total cost of the airport is a half billion dollars. COJO also allocated $41.2 million for underground parking at the site, and the sum of $12.7 million for "a simple overpass built to provide security for the athletes."77 This viaduct was an exclusive walkway built So the athletes would be isolated from crowds. By 1976, its cost had risen to between 14 and 15 million dollars -- a questionable expen- diture in light of the fact that it is 50% more than the city's annual road budget.78 Since Lake Placid will host the Olympics in 1980, representatives were sent to Montreal to study the transportation system utilized for the 1976 Games. A program information report was issued by the Lake Placid Olympic Committee.79 This report indicated that while Lake Placid's primary concern was for the transportation program developed for "Olym- pic family members," other aspects of Montreal's "elaborate program" were discussed. These included COJO's system of providing speedy and impressive arrivals and departures at the airport and other ports of entry. A huge fleet of automobiles was assembled (through dealings with 109 the Big Three auto makers), and COJO relied upon the Montreal taxi system as a backup. Shuttle buses, part of a fleet of 1,900, transported athletes, coaches, and press from lodgings to site areas, with 100 special routes instituted. The last detail of the report dealt with transporting cargo and equipment. General Motors Corporation provided trucks for that purpose. 4.60 Other Impacts The deepest concerns of those who opposed Montreal's Olympics were with the consequences to other city programs. One critic wrote that "although Drapeau has concentrated on projects that bring prestige and pleasure to Montreal, he has shown less active interest in some acute social problems that afflict his city."80 Montreal is a city of 1.4 million residents, over twenty percent of whom live in "dire poverty... and some of the worst housing conditions in North America."81 Jacques Couture, an opposition member who ran against Drapeau, accused the Mayor of neglecting the citizens' basic necessities. "The biggest issue is how we are going to have a city with citizens' priorities first, not grandiose projects."82 It was no surprise when Drapeau announced his plans to pay for part of the Games by reducing the city's "already meager" social services budget. His indifference to the needs of his constituents was reflected in his intentions to clear a low-income area of Montreal for the Village. Local residents preferred rehabilitation to clearance: "If only they (the residents of the area) could get a few dollars to make improvements "83 and minor repairs. But no matter. Drapeau further provoked citizen antagonism when he explained a part of his Olympic financing scheme as. 110 follows: "Suppose our recreation budget is $6 million per year. That gives us $36 million over 6 years and we give the Olympics priority."84 This meant that, beginning in 1970, "all of the municipal recreational programs, the arts, adult education, little league hockey -- go hungry. If the Olympics mean the devastation of the community and a precious natural resourCe (the St. Lawrence River) are they worth having?"85 Kidd leveled the harshest criticism of Drapeau when he wrote, "the Montreal Mayor has callously abandoned his people to squalor and disease."86 One writer, commenting on the effect the Games would have on the city, called the stadium construction a "kind of universal power plant, sucking in money and spewing out concrete. As the giant mechanism pumps away, few city services -- or few Montrealers -- can escape its effect. Everything from park maintenance to teachers' salaries has been affected by the price of the Olympics, and still the frightening drain on the city budget continues."87 The concensus is that Drapeau became "carried away by the grandeur of his dream of putting Montreal on the map." "There is something disturbing," wrote Frank walker, "about the people of a city waiting on visiting athletes to get a good roof over their heads (referring to Olympic Village reverting to lowbincome housing)."88 Auf der Maur contended that “we're going to have to pay every day of our lives for a two week party most of us can't even attend."89 It has been suggested that as a direct result of the Games, "Olympic-spurred inflation has seriously affected other municipal pro- jects." To support this contention, it was pointed out that subway extensions had tripled in cost in the space of one year. "There's no excuse except that the Olympics have created a sellers' market in Mon- treal's construction industry."90 111 In November of 1972, Canadians began to have second thoughts, after watching the horrors at Munich (where Arab guerillas siezed and killed several members of the Israel Olympic team), and after learning of Colorado's negative vote on the Games. They feared: high prices, use of public monies, the threat of violence, and the fact that Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had vowed not to help Montreal out financially. "And naturally," according to Mike Wallace, "(tax) money spent on the Olympics won't be spent elsewhere."91 It will be spent to cover the nearly one billion dollar Olympic debt. One other impact touching Canadian pride occurred in the course of Olympic planning. Jim Proudfoot, a Toronto writer, called it a "jolting image problem. To be a Canadian at an international athletic gathering is towish for a false beard and dark glasses, for at that point we qualify as the champion of fools of 1976."92 Former Canadian Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, worried that Canada would be forever known as the "country which broke its word" when it seemed that the facilities would not be completed in time.93 The Canadian image was not enhanced when one hundred million dollars was spent on a security system that failed to keep terrorists out (fortunately, there were no headline-making occurrences at Montreal). Montreal became an "armed camp," with police and military outnumbering contestants.94 Of course Canada was simply responding to the dictates of world and political realities, had acted in a manner it felt necessary to protect the athletes. The most consequential of all of Canada's image crises occurred when Canada refused to admit the Taiwan delegation into the country. As it happens, Canada only recognizes mainland China. Taiwan could not, 112 then, be allowed to call itself the "Republic of China." A previous state- ment issued to the IOC by Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State of External Affairs appears to reflect a breach of contract on the part of Canada: "I would like to assure you that all parties representing the National Olympic Committees and international Sports Federations recognized by the IOC will be free to enter Canada pursuant to the normal regulations." Presumably, the last five words of the statement ("legalistic curlicue") were the means by which Taiwan was expelled from the Games.95 The Montreal Olympics were the unfortunate victims of a boycott by several black nations, coinciding with the Taiwan problem. Because New Zealand had a rugby club that played a game in South Africa, Tanzania would not enter the Games unless New Zealand withdrew. New Zealand stayed, while 24 countries, mostly African, chose to boycott; 90 nations remained to compete.96 This reflected the state of the art in world diplomacy, racial policy, and the image which the Olympic Games have developed over the years. It was part of the Montreal Games, however, with Montreal being the innocent victim. 4.70 Benefits The Games have been referred to as the "biggest forum" for Canada, short of world war. This was presumably a reference to all benefits of the Olympics, economic as well as spiritual. Robert Bourassa, the Premier of Quebec, predicted that the Olympics would help to "relaunch the Quebec economy."97 Drapeau told one commentator that the billions of dollars worth of publicity and world recognition would adequately com- pensate for the expense of the Games. He emphasized that the value of . . . . 8 the Games could not possibly be determined in two weeks of competition.9 113 Drapeau was more concerned with gaining recognition for Montreal, and was usually vague on the topic of economic gain. He used general terms in reference to "what the Olympics will do for all of Quebec, all of Canada, and all of the world."99 It was his hope that the Olympic flame and spirit would keep burning in Montreal: "I did not dedicate 13 years of my life to two weeks of competition. The spirit of the Olympics will stay with us, stay with Montreal, stay with Quebec, stay with Canada." Deford noted, "God help them all if it does."100 Not all benefits were spiritual; there were numerous infrastructure improvements. As a result of Expo and the Olympics, Montreal is one of the most traffic-free cities in the world.101 Should the stadium remain intact, it will be a welcome addition to Montreal's other sports facili- ties, as will the other facilities constructed for the Games. All of these improvements have helped Montreal to become, in one writer's estimation, ”one of the few pleasant cities left in this part of the world...there is that small dignity and pleasure left for every citizen here."102 Other benefits involved private bonanzas to all architects, engin- eers, and anyone connected with the Olympic construction. Roland Desourdy received $3 million worth of improvements to his property at Bromont (where the equestrian competition took place). "It's like throwing a “103 These huge economic gains big party and not having to pay the bills. may prove to be short lived if, 1) inflation is not controlled, 2) workers insist on going on strike, and 3) the fears of higher taxes and ruined city programs and services reach fruition. 114 4.80 Conclusion Montreal's handling of the Olympics is a prime example of the de- gree of disaster that can befall a community that fails to utilize community priorities and comprehensive planning in its process. While Montreal's effort was long-range (13 years in the planning) it was not the product of community policies, goals, or Objectives. Had it been, the city would not have had to initiate construction of nearly all facil- ities 2 years prior to the event. Priorities of the Montreal residents reflected the need for adequate housing, more green spaces, sewage treat- ment, and the continuence of social programs previously established. For Montreal to justify the Games, the solutions to these prdblems should have been incorporated into the Olympic plans. 4.81 Points for Future Reference 1. Some form of financial guarantee should be required by the IOC to assure that the Games will be carried out as planned. The plans and designs (as well as cost projections) should be pre- sented to the IOC at the bidding in a somewhat finalized form. 2. A self-financing plan for sponsoring the Games is commendable if you accept the complete commercialization of the Olympics, and if the plan meets all expenses. 3. Unlike Lake Placid, the Olympic planning effort must be the product of sound planning theory, comprehensive planning, and citizen priorities. (This assumes a public vote, in advance of the bid.) 4. It would seem that the support of the national government would be essential to the process. 5. 115 The plans must be sympathetic to citizen desires: such as more housing, pollution control, etc. While an Olympic Village/low- income housing project concept seems to reflect citizen desires of increased housing, final plans must reflect the original intent. In terms of the facilities: a. A "ground-up" approach should never be allowed by the IOC. b. Unique or untested construction techniques should be care- fully studied if they are to be used, and should be initiated well in advance of the deadline ( 2 years, as was the case in Montreal, does not satisfy this requirement). While Montreal's mass-transit facility was previously in existence, its Olympic program of bus and taxi transit was highly commendable. Political considerations should not be the final criteria from which the Olympic sites are selected. FOOTNOTES - MONTREAL, 1976 1 Dean Peerman, "Canada's Coming Olympics: Boon Or Boondoggle?" The Christian Century, 92, 40, (December 3, 1975), 1148. 2 William Johnson, "Montreal's Motto: Have Fun," Sports Illustrated, 40, 22, (June 3, 1974), 31. 3 Nick Auf Der Maur, "A Running Account of Jean Drapeau and The Great Olympic Game," Last Post, 5, 4, (April, 1976), 22. 4 ABC Sports, "The Games of the XXI Olympics," ABC Sports Special, (July 17, 1976). 5 Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1148. 6 Michael Katz, "Montreal Gets 1976 Summer Olympics, Denver Is Awarded Winter Games," New York Times, 119, 41017, (May 13, 1970), 53. 7 "Montreal Elated As Mayor Pulls Off Another Spectacular," New York Times, 119, 41017, (May 13, 1970), 53. 8 Desmond Smith, "Olympic Superdome, Montreal Goes For Broke," Nation, 221, 21, (December 20, 1975), 652. 9 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 23. 10 Bruce Kidd, "Canadian Athletes Should Support Olympics and Help Defeat Jean Drapeau," Canadian Dimension, 9, 4, (March, 1973), 8. 11 John McMurtry, "A Case For Killing the Olympics," MacLeans, 86, 1, (January, 1973), 34. 12 Smith, "Superdome," p. 652. 13 CBS Television Network, "Selling The Olympics," 60 Minutes, 8, 22, (May 23, 1976), 3. 14 "The Billion Dollar Olympics," Forbes, 117. 8: (April 15: 1976), 48. 15 Bruce Kidd, "Olympics," Canadian Dimension, 7, 1-2, (June-July, 1970), 10. 16 Smith, "Superdome," p. 653. 17 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 22. 18 Jerry Kirshenbaum, "Once More With Charm," Sports Illus- trated, 45, 3, (July 19, 1976), 93. 19 Frank Deford, "Run It Up The Flagpole, Johnny," Sports Illustrated, 33, 13, (September 28, 1970), 76. 116 117 20 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 22. 21 Smith, "Superdome," p. 652. 22 "Billion Dollar Olympics," p. 48. 23 Johnson, "Montreal's Motto," p. 31. 24 Ibid., p. 32. 25 Ibid., p. 31. 26 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 25. 27 Johnson, "Montreal's Motto," p. 32. 28 Ibid., p. 28—31. 29 Deford, "Flagpole," p. 24. 30 "Billion Dollar Olympics," p. 47. 31 CBS, "Selling," p. 2. 32 Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1149. 33 CBS, "Selling," p.4. 34 Steve Cady, "Montreal Olympics: A Billion Dollar Photo Finish," New York Times, 125, 43163, (March 28, 1976), V, l. 35 Smith, "Superdome," p. 653. 36 Johnson, "Montreal's Motto," p. 31. 37 "Montrealers Elated," p. 53. 38 William N. Wallace, "Olympics '76 Is The Word In Montreal," New York Times, 121, 41714, (April 9, 1972), V, 6. 39 Smith, "Superdome," p. 651. 40 Sarah Pileggi, "Olympic Nightmare For Montreal," Spprts Illustrated, 44, 6, (February 9, 1976), 62. 41 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 27. 42 CBS, "Selling," p.3. 43 Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1149. 44 Cady, "Photo Finish," p. V l, and 6. 45 Design, 313, 46 47 48 49 50 51 Illustrated, 52 53 118 Pamela Ferguson, "Montreal Olympics, Prestige Politics," (January, 1975), 30. ‘ Cady, "Photo Finish," p. V l. Pileggi, "Nightmare," p. 62. Ferguson, "Prestige Politics," p. 30. Cady, "Photo Finish," p. V l, and 6. Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1149. Frank Deford, "More Dark Clouds Over Montreal," Sports 45, 3, (July 19, 1976), p. 32. Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 30. "Two Cities Plan Construction For 1976 Olympic Games," EngineeringANews - Record, 184, 23, (June 4, 1970), 15. 54 "Can Montreal Afford The Olympics? Drapeau Replies To The Critics," Financial Post, 64, (April 18, 1970), Q12. 55 56 Johnson, "Montreal's Motto," p. 31. Arthur Daley, "Surprise Package," New York Times, 119, 41019, (May 15, 1970), 25. 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1975), 92. 66 67 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 23—30. CBS, "Selling," p. 3. Ipi§,, p. 64. £218: Deford, "Dark Clouds," p. 36. Ferguson, "Prestige Politics, p. 31 CBS, "Selling," p. 4. "Billion Dollar Olympics," p. 51. "The Selling Of The Olympics," Forbes, 115, 6, (March 15, Ferguson, "Prestige Politics," p. 30, Robert W. Creamer, "They Said It," Sports Illustrated, 46, 3, (January 17, 1977), 8. 119 68 Johnson, "Montreal's Motto," p. 34. 69 Kirshenbaum, "With Charm," p. 73, and Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 26. 70 Kirshenbaum, "With Charm," p. 100. 71 1' ll Deford, Flagpole, p. 81. 72 "Billion Dollar Olympics," p. 51. 73 Bruce Kidd, "What Will The Montreal Olympics Do To Canada?" Saturday Night, 86, 2, (February, 1971), 13. 74 CBS, "Selling," p. 6. 75 Ibid. 76 "Two Cities Plan," p. 15. 77 Smith, "Superdome," p. 653. 78 Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee Observation Team, XXI Olympic Summer Games Montreal 1976, PIR No. 2.5, September 15, 1976. 79 CBS, "Selling," p. 5. 80 Claude Ryan, "Jean Drapeau: Man of Montreal," Saturday Review/WOrld, 2, 4, (November 2, 1974), 16. 81 Ferguson, "Prestige Politics," p. 30. 82 William Borders, "Montreal Mayor Is Set To Win Again," New York Times, 124, 42658, (November 9, 1974), 8. 83 Kidd, "What Will The Olympics Do," p. 13. 8 4 ' II ' " Kidd, Olympics, p. 10. 85 Ibid. 86 Kidd, "Canadian Athletes Should Support," p. 8. 87 Smith, "Superdome," p. 654. 88 Deford, "Flagpole," p. 83. 89 Michael Ruby, "The Olympics: Paternity Suit," Newsweek, 86, 25, (December 22, 1975), 57, 81. 90 Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1148. 91 CBS, "Selling," p. 5. 120 92 Robert Trumbull, “Summer Olympics' Turmoil Hurts Canada," New York Times, 125, 43118, (February 13, 1976), 44. 93 Deford, "Dark Clouds," p. 34. 94 Ibid., p. 38. 95 Ibid., p. 33. 96 Pat Putnam, "It Was A Call To Colors," Sports Illustrated, 45, 4, (July 26, 1976), 16. 97 "Montreal Wins '76 Olympics," Canadian News Facts, 4' 9' (May 19, 1970), 445. 98 ABC, "The Games," July 17, 1976. 99 "Recalling Munich Killing and Colorado Vote, Some In Montreal Oppose Being Host To '76 Olympics," New York Times, 122, 41945, (November 26, 1972), 13. 100 Deford, "Dark Clouds," p. 38. 101 Deford, "Flagpole," p. 83. 102 Ibid., p. 84. 103 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 29. CHAPTER V LAKE PLACID XIIIth Winter Olympiad, 1980 "All these elements are working to clear the way for the 1980 Games at Lake Placid. Indeed, if the environmentalists continue to be tough, and the Lake Placid committee decides to take their criticisms as a potential force for good, instead of as an attack on something sacred, this might be a battle in which both sides win." William 0. Johnson, "Placid Is Not Peaceful," Sports Illustrated, 46, 1, (January 3, 1971), 51. 121 122 5.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games (1980) at Lake Placid The civic leaders of Lake Placid seem to have expended the majority of their energies and resources since 1932 (as will be discussed in de- tail below) toward the attainment of one goal: the return of the Winter Olympics to Lake Placid. (The reader is encouraged to refer periodically to Chapter I, dealing exclusively with the 1932 Winter—Olympics at Lake Placid. The parallel section starts at p. 11). Why has Lake Placid fought so doggedly to play host to an event that has the potential to disrupt and indeed bankrupt a community? The prime motivating factor can be found in the words of Rev. J. Bernard Fell as he addressed the House subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, hence~ forth referred to as the House. (This hearing will be referenced fre- quently as it contains a rich source of information concerning the planning of Lake Placid for the Olympics): "(T)he Opportunity to conduct the Olympic Games has been, and is a matter of deep national pride for 1 The Village of Lake Placid is many countries throughout the world." burning with this sense of pride, and the townsfolks firmly believe that with their facilities, surroundings, and intentions, their home is the "perfect" place for the Olympics.2 Rev. Fell submitted seven "vital credentials" to bolster the claim that Lake Placid is the best suited site available anywhere. The first involved the town's "Olympic tradition." Going on, Rev. Fell pointed out, "Lake Placid is a community whose people have years of experience conducting major national and international winter sports competitions (including the Olympic Games of 1932) in every one of the Winter Olympic events. This includes more world championships in winter events than anywhere else in the world, and Lake Placid has provided more winter 123 Olympic competitors than any other community, regardless of its size, throughout the whole world."3 Lake Placid's Winter Olympic heritage can be traced as far back as 1924, when the first Winter Games were staged at Chamonix, France. Charlie Jewtraw, of Lake Placid, won the first gold medal ever awarded in winter competition. The area has supplied U.S. Olympic teams with 64 members over the years, 10 of whom have won gold medals. William Johnson wrote that Lake Placid has the "largest instructional program in figure skating in the world; the town boasts more accredited world judges or experts on ski jumping, figure skating, bobsledding and speed skating per capita...than anywhere outside of a real Olympic Village...."4 In short, Lake Placid's record of conducting Olympic-type meets is quite remarkable. Luke Patnode, publicity director for Essex County was quoted: "There is not much we don't know about the ins and outs of Olympics -- politically, technically, aesthetically. It has been a way "5 The citizens have an intense desire of life for most of us for years. to treat the world to winter-sports excellence and display their hospi- tality. The other credentials provided by Rev. Fell are as follows:6 2. A community whose citizens have voted in favor of hosting the Winter Olympics on three separate occasions in slightly more than one year; 3. A community where almost all the facilities required to conduct a Winter Olympics, located in areas zoned and developed for recreational use, and already in existence; 4; The fullest support and cooperation of the State of New York, its Governor, Legislature and Department of 124 Environmental Conservation, Commerce and Transportation; 5. The already voted pledge of cooperation and support from the Senate of the United States; 6. A letter of support to the President of the IOC from the President of the United States; and, 7. An ecology and environmental minded community and State pro- tected by the most comprehensive and regulatory local and State land use and zoning controls that can be found in any similar area in the United States. It is interesting to note that several of the above-stated points seem to reflect an effort to avoid Denver's shortcomings. While Denver's 1976 Olympic campaign did have the support of numerous civic groups, the general assembly, and Congressional and Presidential support, the issue had not appeared on municipal or State ballots prior to the award of the Games. The effort of Denver also lacked the endorsement of en- vironmental groups (see Chapter 3, p. 84). Not only does the Lake Placid bid have the support of those agencies noted by Rev. Fell, but backing has been secured from the following environmental groups: the Sierra Club, the Adirondack Mountain Club, and the New York Environmental Controls Commission.7 Former President Nixon sent the following note to the IOC: "On behalf of the American people, I cordially invite the IOC to stage the XIII Winter Olympic Games in Lake Placid, New York. As a small, mountainous, winter sports community and as site of the 1932 Winter Games and numer- ous world championships, Lake Placid has both the rich tradition and demonstrated ability to conduct the 1980 Winter Games with quality and distinction...."8 President Gerald Ford has backed legislation to pro- vide federal funding of $28 million to be used for facilities and 125 preparations (even though it has been repeatedly stressed that the nec- essary Federal funding must approach $50 million).9 President Ford was impressed with the idea that the site could be used after the Games as a training center for future athletes. New York's Governor Hugh Carey has also gone on record in support of Lake Placid's endeavors. He sup— ports the contention that the Olympics will prove "a dividend to the environment and not a detriment."10 Unless there is an extremely strong mandate from their constituents (as was the case in Denver), very few elected officials will want their records to be construed as opposing sports. Thus, both houses of the federal government passed joint resolu- tions "endorsing and pledging support for the bid of Lake Placid for the 1980 Winter Olympics Games."11 U.S. Representative Robert McEwen from New York supported Lake Placid's Olympic bid, noting that the Adirondack Village was the best choice "both from the standpoint of cost and from the standpoint of ecology, because of what is in place now...Lake Placid meets the required standards." McEwen even went to the extreme of asserting: "Lake Placid is probably the only site in the country where it can be done with the 12 least environmental impact and the least cost." It is worth mentioning that when Lake Placid was selected to host the 1980 Games, it was "the7 only place in the world that wanted the job."13 The economic conditions of the Lake Placid area offer further rationale for the Village's desire to restage the Games. In 1974, unem— ployment ranged from 13-18%.14 It is the firm belief and hope of the planners that the Olympics can be planned to generate long-range pay- offs in terms of increased employment and economic development. 126 Finally, Rev. Fell and the citizens of the Lake Placid community are "dedicated to the concept that the Winter Olympics must be returned to the small mountain areas where most of the required facilities are already in place, where the construction of new facilities will be min- imal and that those facilities will be used for general sports and rec- reational activity in the years to come, and where the emphasis of the Olympic Games will be directed toward the individual athlete and not toward a maximum, eye-catching drama designed to please the spectator and to excel the sites of former Olymic contests."15 5.20 Facilities 5.21 Existing Facilities One of Lake Placid's strongest arguments for hosting the Games was that nearly all of the required facilities are in existence (all within 8 miles of the Village). As previously mentioned, every one of the Olym- pic events of winter format has been staged at least once during nation- al or international competition at Lake Placid. Rev. Fell provided the House with the following list of existing facilities:16 1. internationally approved alpine ski trails; 2. internationally approved cross country ski trails; 3. the only biathlon range and trail system in the U.S.; 4. one of the finest bob runs in the world; 5. a 70, 40, 25, and 15 meter ski jump complex; 6. a figure skating and hockey arena-convention hall complex with two refrigerated ice surfaces; and, 7. a 400 meter speed skating stadium. 127 5.22 Planning Refer to Figure 3 for the organizational relationships between the Lake Placid organizing committee and the other Olympic and state agen- cies. Lake Placid has long had plans to upgrade and improve its winter- sports facilities and host competitions in those sports (refer to Chapter 1, p.11). The town has demonstrated its willingness to further these planning objectives with a history of supporting the funding of these types of projects, including passage of bond issues, and with favorable votes concerning the 1980 Games. In short, the effort is a culmination of long-range planning initiated in the early 1900's, and in complete accordance with community desires and priorities. The planning effort for the upcoming Olympics has been truly comprehensive in approach, involving such groups as: the New York State Transportation Department, the Technical Assistance Center (involving economic projections; this center is located at Plattsburg -- the State University of New York), the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Environmental Council, the Archi- tectural Council, the Adirondack Park Agency (henceforth referred to as the APA, the agency in charge of planning and land use for the park, of which Lake Placid is a portion -- see p.140 of this Chapter), the town and village organizations, as well as the Olympic organizations. The major priority of those charged with planning the 1980 Games concerns the scale of the event. Well aware of the spectacle that both Summer and Winter Games have become, the organizers and Rev. Fell in particular will seek to cater to the athlete-participant. "Television is the way people see the Olympics. 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