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## ABSTRACT

### THE EFFECTS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES UPON SELECT SITES OF NORTH AMERICA

By

Jeffrey William Crause

#### Problem

The Olympics in general, have been the subject of much criticism of late. This centers on the politics, format, costs (social, environmental, as well as economic), and purpose of the Games. Based on the overall impacts of the Games upon the host community, it has been suggested the Olympics be discontinued, restructured, held permanently in the same locale, or kept as is. These points are given some attention in this thesis.

The primary aim of this paper is to study the planning process undertaken by each Olympic host. The following questions were posed: 1) were there existing plans at the local, state, or federal levels calling for the creation of the Olympic sites? 2) was the planning effort in each instance a part of long-range, comprehensive planning? 3) was the desire to stage the Olympics a part of community priorities? It was an important element of each chapter to determine the rationale(s) behind each host's decision to stage the Games.

#### Methodology

It was the intent of this thesis to historically review the Olympic planning process undertaken by the following five host cities: 1) Lake Placid, 1932; 2) Squaw Valley, 1960; 3) Denver (the designated host);

1976; 4) Montreal, 1976; and 5) Lake Placid, 1980. The effects of the Olympics upon the hosts were measured in terms of facilities constructed, land consumed, transportation systems developed, and money spent. Other variables studied included: ecological and social consequences, the effects to community services and other municipal programs, other impacts as well as the benefits (both real and intangible).

Sources of information for this research included the following: journals, periodicals, texts, newspapers, direct interviews, governmental hearings, agency and committee reports and studies.

It was suggested in the literature that substantial economic benefits accrue to the host community only when the Olympics are used as a means to achieve long-term urban development. This is the basis for developing the following hypothesis: only when the Games are used in furtherance of a community's planning priorities and long-range goals and objectives, can there be any rational justification for hosting them.

### Findings

The hypothesis is supported by analysis of the cases studied in this work. Lake Placid (both 1932 and 1980 examples) is the only site that can adequately justify its Olympic experiences. While there were problems with the plans, the Olympic decision was (and is today) the product of long-rang planning, citizen priorities, and multi-agency coordination. The facility receives continuous use today both by tourists and athletes in training.

In contrast, the remaining Olympic sites used plans that were not based on comprehensive plans, policies, or priorities of the community.

As a result, they all experienced significant degrees of trouble either before, during, or after the games: (1) Squaw Valley is a substantial tax burden on the State of California in the sense that the State must pay yearly maintenance costs for facilities which are dismantled or stand idle; (2) the perceived implications to the environment, land use, and quality of life in Denver (and Colorado) caused voters to cancel the Olympics; and (3) Montreal spent billions of dollars to build sports facilities which are admittedly "white elephants." Meanwhile, much needed community services were either postponed or canceled. These three sites have difficulty rationalizing their Olympic experiences in light of the multi-million (billion) dollar expenditures.

The study recommends courses of action that future Olympic cities might find desirable. The main suggestions involve: (1) securing adequate Olympic endorsements from elected and nonelected officials, and the citizenry; (2) utilizing well-coordinated, comprehensive, and long-range planning, and (3) contemplating the sponsorship of the Games only if the majority of the necessary facilities exist.

Recommendations were also made that apply to Olympic committees. These organizations must assume more responsibility to assure that plans are properly financed and executed. Since they choose the Olympic sites, these committees should accept some liability for the results of their decisions.



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UPON SELECT SITES OF NORTH AMERICA

By

Jeffrey William Crause

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1977

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## INTRODUCTION

Sports are important in this society. This fact can be supported by the large volume of business involving all facets of sports and recreation, and by the amount of media coverage devoted to sports. Many of today's heroes, idols, and most recognizable faces are sports celebrities. A good deal of today's most innovative architecture involves sports stadia and structures. Sports are promoted on the basis of health, safety, welfare, and morals by officials of no lesser ranks than national leaders. The effect of sports programs upon land use and land management is immense, in terms of space required (consider, for example, the land needs of a golfer, hunter, skier, or canoeing enthusiast), and the priorities that must govern the allocation of diminishing open lands.

The Olympics come to mind in this discussion of sports (and their impacts upon the city) because of the heritage, the prestige, the spectacle, and the world-wide appeal of the Games. The lengths to which some cities have gone in preparation for the Games are quite extraordinary, especially in light of the two-week period of competition. Since this event is usually staged in different locations every Olympiad (every four years), the whole sequence of preparations and problems must be continuously re-enacted.

### 0.10 Problems Caused by the Olympics

The biggest difficulty the games have encountered of late has involved the huge economic cost of outfitting a city with the facilities necessary for the staging of world-class competition. To cite recent examples, Munich's Olympics cost \$760 million, and Montreal's total may exceed \$2 billion. Criticisms of misplaced priorities have been raised, as well as complaints by the anti-Olympic factions, claiming the expenditures cannot be justified. Research has shown that since WWII (except for the 1948 London Games) the Games have lost money for the host city, and the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the benefit/cost ratio of the Olympics is "clearly less than one." <sup>1</sup>

Alternatives have been suggested to the traditional approach of having a single city face the costs of the Games. One would involve dispersing the events throughout one country: should the United States win the award, hold track events in Los Angeles, swimming in Florida, and so on. Another solution of equal merit would involve the selection of a single site to hold the Games every Olympiad, or the rotation of the Games among three or four permanent sites. It is felt by some critics that Moscow's staging of the 1980 Summer Games may be the last traditional hosting of the event. This feeling is based upon the enormous costs involved and the unwillingness of cities to face potential bankruptcy, because the costs expended are not likely to be recovered. In light of the drawbacks of hosting the Games (financial and otherwise) it is worth noting that there are already two cities in the U.S. alone (Los Angeles and Atlanta) that have expressed interest in the hosting of the 1984 Summer Games.



Other problems to the host include transportation and accommodation of large numbers of visitors. Facilities that must be provided for the two-week event may never be used again. The construction of new facilities may result in the relocation of people living in the area to be cleared, many of whom receive negligible use from the buildings. Another problem, more often the case with Winter Olympic sites, involves the ecological consequences resulting from the use of state or forest lands. This may result in disruption of food and water chains, loss of open spaces, problems of flood and avalanche control, uncontrolled development, etc.

The decision to stage the Olympic Games, with the planning and construction of facilities necessary to conducting two weeks of sports events, can result in the depletion of community resources. Such a decision, it would seem, would be the product of a thorough and carefully thought out decision-making process, one which incorporates a comprehensive and long-range planning document.

This has not been the case, as will be seen in the case studies, and it probably explains (at least in part) the problems that host cities have experienced. The Games themselves have degenerated substantially from their ancient ideal of an international communion of men and women engaged in athletic endeavors, and have turned into forums for political, social, and religious protest. These actions have had drastic impacts upon the host community and the very future of the Games.

This study seeks to a) identify the above stated problems and other effects on the host community, b) identify the guidance and planning that has been provided, c) suggest steps that should be incorporated into the planning, and d) suggest possible recommendations or guidelines for the continuence of the Olympics.

0.20 Hypothesis

While the benefit to cost ratio of the games may not approach a factor of 1, it is generally agreed that there are "intrinsic" rewards that cannot be measured in dollars. Such intrinsic rewards include prestige and the "psychic income" associated with being host of the Games. Ciccarelli and Kowarsky, writing on the economics of the Olympics, note that only when the games are used as vehicles of long-term urban and regional development do they generate any sizable economic benefits to the host community.<sup>2</sup> To mention a few examples the Games have served as catalysts for: Rome to construct new super highways and a new international airport; Tokyo to acquire 4 major roads, 25 miles of subway, a monorail system, the famous "fast train to Osaka," and the addition of approximately \$350 million to the city's infrastructure; and Munich to construct its subway and Olympic Park.<sup>3</sup>

Using the above premise, the following hypothesis has been developed: ONLY when the games are used in furtherance of a community's planning priorities and long-range goals and objectives, can there be any rational justification for hosting them. It is recognized that preparation of the Olympic facilities results, to certain degrees, in related construction. The hypothesis here, however, suggests that such infrastructure improvements can only be justified if they are a part of established long-range planning. This study seeks to determine whether or not, and to what extent, the hypothesis is supported from the evidence provided by the sample sites.

0.30 The Study

The bulk of this thesis is an historical review or investigation of the planning and staging of the Games by five sample cities:

1. Lake Placid (Winter, 1932)
2. Squaw Valley (Winter, 1960)
3. Denver (Winter, 1976)
4. Montreal (Summer, 1976)
5. Lake Placid (Winter, 1980)

The overall objectives that guided this study are summarized as follows:

1. to determine the factors behind each hosts' decision to seek out and stage the Games;
2. to investigate the planning used, particularly as it can be tied to pre-existing planning;
3. to analyze the aftermath as compared with the hosts' anticipated outcomes; and,
4. to determine the impacts and the benefits.

It should be noted that the term "planning" is intended to include all preparations, either pre-existing or original, undertaken by the host city. "Planners" are designated as those people engaged in the process, including state, regional, or city (urban) planners; or business persons engaged in outside professions, civic leaders, or city residents who worked on or with the Olympic organizing committees.

The term "effects of the Games" is a quite encompassing one, and those of the Olympics can include many. For this reason, the study has been limited to analyzing those effects of the Games upon the host sites in terms of the following variables:

1. facilities -- those sport-related structures, service or support facilities, and their future uses;
2. transportation systems;
3. environmental variables, including land consumption;
4. long and short-term impacts and benefits; and,
5. the society.

#### 0.31 Choice of Sample

It was my intention to limit the number of samples to only those cities of North America, where more abundant and universally applicable data could be found. The more recent examples were chosen (post 1950), except for Lake Placid's 1932 Games. This was chosen to provide an interesting comparison with the 1980 Lake Placid Olympics. While Denver did not fulfill its obligation to host the 1976 Winter Games (it was selected by the International Olympic Committee, but withdrew in 1972; Innsbruck stepped in and held the 1976 Winter Games), the causes leading to its rejection of the Games and the fact that it is the only site to ever cancel out after receiving the award warrant its inclusion in this study.

Limitations of time and magnitude of the research required the exclusion of Mexico City from the study, as well as the remaining North American sites of St. Louis (1904), and Los Angeles (1932). Also, it would certainly have been desirable to include the recent European and Asian examples, as well as an equal number of Summer and Winter Olympics. It should be found, though, that the choices provided in this research are of a diverse enough nature to raise issues and allow conclusions to be drawn in regard to the Olympic Games.

0.32 Research Materials

The following sources were used in obtaining data and background information for the study: architectural, engineering, economic and business journals; periodicals and newspapers; House and Senate subcommittee hearings; planning, economic, and transportation studies; environmental impact statements; television accounts; and telephone and written interviews. For the most part, I was forced to make use of such data sources as newspapers and periodicals, as very few texts appear on the topic. "Scholarly" journals were employed to the extent possible, but it followed that a great many of the articles of significant factual value concerning the Olympics and the hosts' planning efforts were reported in Sports Illustrated and the New York Times. The fact that very little information did appear in textual form was further incentive for carrying out the research.

At times, citations were made from articles and accounts of a somewhat "sensational" color, especially in the Denver and Montreal chapters. It should be stressed that these accounts were cited only when sufficient supporting proof was in evidence. Direct correspondence and interviews were used to supplement the material to a limited extent. Primary source contact would have been much more desirable, but limitations of time and resources prevented this.

The performance of statistical tests in measuring the effects of the Games upon the cities has been ruled out. It would be extremely difficult to collect satisfactory data for all of the sites over the necessary time periods. Comparing host cities with comparable non-host cities would prove troublesome both in gathering two sets of usable data, and deciding upon a "comparable" non-host city. The reliability of such

data would also be in question, as noted by the ever increasing cost projections of the Montreal Games. This study seeks to determine the attitudes of the cities towards the Games, and the Games' impact upon the citizenry. These factors would be difficult if not impossible to incorporate into statistical tests. The tests might show how Denver, for example, would have gained economically from the Olympics, but they would not be able to deal with environmental and public concerns.

While universal application of the principles and recommendations developed in this thesis is the author's intention, several proposed courses of action may be most useful in the context of North American-type planning systems. Under most of these approaches to planning, democratic processes and citizen input are essential elements. The necessity for citizen vote and involvement into the process would not be a factor for those countries that disregard citizen wishes.

#### 0.40 Summary

The study, in effect, seeks to document the planning process undertaken by each host. The following items will be isolated: a) the rationale used to bring the Games to the site and whether they were fulfilled; b) the problems that arose; c) the overall effects upon the community, d) whether the hypothesis was born out; and g) what knowledge can be gained by future hosts based on the experiences of the study sites. The individual cases will be discussed in detail, in the separate chapters which follow. Finally there will be a concluding section that will discuss and compare the total experiences. It will also include a guideline or planning model for future cities to use should they desire to undertake Olympic planning.

FOOTNOTES - INTRODUCTION

<sup>1</sup> James Cicarelli and David J. Kowarsky, "The Economics of the Olympic Games," Business and Economic Dimensions, 9, 5, (September-October, 1973), 5.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> "The Olympic Business," The Economist, 244, 6727, (July 29, 1972), 4-5.

CHAPTER I LAKE PLACID

IIIrd Winter Olympiad, 1932

"The success of the Third Olympic Winter Games has surpassed our fondest expectations. It is within the province of others to speak of the contribution to international good-will and sportsmanship. It is my duty to report on the financial aspects. True amateur sport is not operated for money, and this applies to the international Olympics more than any other branch. From the beginning we here at Lake Placid knew the gate receipts could never pay more than a fraction of the cost of putting on the games. We knew we would have to take care of our share of the expense."

"Winter Olympics Drew \$96,000; Lake Placid Deficit \$52,468,"  
New York Times, 81, 27052, (February 17, 1932), 27.



### 1.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games at Lake Placid

Lake Placid is a small community of approximately 3000 residents (3000 now, in 1932 the population was closer to 4000), located in the Adirondack Mountains of upstate New York and roughly 320 miles from New York City.

In the late 1800's, the area was of primary interest to tourists only during the warmer seasons. During the winter months, "any tourist who appeared in this bleak corner of upper New York State, was lost."<sup>1</sup>

In 1905, however, the Lake Placid Club (henceforth referred to as "The Club") opted to leave its clubhouse open even during the winter. Mirror Lake was cleared of snow, and hockey and skating events were staged. Speedskating competition was held in 1918; and by 1921, with its new 35 meter ski jump in operation, Lake Placid began sponsoring meets in that sport. International hockey competitions started in 1927, with the best amateur teams in the U.S. and Canada taking part. These events were mainly participant oriented, with very few spectators in attendance. Dr. Godfrey Dewey, the president of The Club and the man responsible for the 1932 Olympics being held at Lake Placid, described Lake Placid as the Winter Sports Capitol of the U.S.A. Reporter Ezra Bowen concurs, "In those days any place that put on one or more ice-and-snow events was automatically the Winter-Sports Capitol of the U.S."<sup>2</sup>

With this sports history, the enthusiasm of the residents and their commitment to winter-sports programs and facilities, the United States Olympic Committee (henceforth, USOC) invited Lake Placid to submit a bid for the 1932 Winter Olympics. For some unknown reasons, the city fathers seemed "content to leave slow enough alone,"<sup>3</sup> and turned down the USOC's offer. Dr. Dewey, however, realized the potential economic impact of

such an international event and the then depressed conditions of the Village, and undertook a campaign that resulted in Lake Placid being named the host of the IIIrd Winter Olympics.

Lake Placid's bid had the support of the New York State legislature, which quickly went on record as being "willing to cooperate to the limit of its ability in the enactment of any legislation that may be found necessary to prepare the way for the holding of the 1932 Winter Games at Lake Placid."<sup>4</sup> This legislation had the support of Governor Franklin Roosevelt, and eventuated in the following resolution being drafted:<sup>5</sup>

"Whereas the Olympic Games to be held in the Summer of 1932 have been awarded to the city of Los Angeles, California, and the Olympic Winter Games of 1932 are shortly to be awarded by the International Olympic Committee, and whereas Lake Placid, in the Adirondacks offers more complete and adequate facilities and longer and more successful experience in the holding of Winter Sports than any community in the U.S., and whereas, the Olympic Winter Sports are an inspiration and encouragement to the most wholesome and invigorating type of outdoor Winter recreation for the whole people,..." (the legislature went on to support the Lake Placid bid).

The USOC was determined to have both summer and winter Olympics of 1932 held on American soil, and was looking for the most experienced site available for holding the winter Games. The site was Lake Placid, and this was the primary reason Lake Placid was selected.

As equally important as experience, the New York legislature noted that there were other rationalizations for bringing the Olympics to the Adirondacks: "There is an abundance of ice for skating and good terrain for skiing and other varieties of winter sports." At the same time it was admitted that Lake Placid "lacks a bobsled run required for Olympic Games."<sup>6</sup> The country surrounding Lake Placid allegedly contained 75 miles of ski trails,<sup>7</sup> and Dr. Dewey emphasized a "modest, sportsy approach... beautiful climate, beautiful terrain, Olympic ideal, guarantee to provide

## 1.20 Facilities

### 1.21 Existing Facilities

There seems to be some confusion over the pre-Olympic status of the facilities. The amenities of the area have already been noted: the good ski trails, ski jump, abundant snow and ice. In April of 1929, it was reported that many of the Olympic events had already been staged at one time or another at Lake Placid, that the central problem involved increasing spectator viewing at the various events.<sup>13</sup> It was also mentioned that a total of 75 miles of ski trails existed in the vicinity.

The site however, lacked a bobsled run and suitable ice arenas. The usefulness of Mirror Lake was over-emphasized, and perhaps over-rated, which may have prompted Bowen to write: "In the bleak light of May, the 'practically satisfactory' sports facilities turned out to be practically nothing."<sup>14</sup> In addition, there was a housing shortage, and as the Games got underway, a severe snow shortage.

### 1.22 Planning

As with most small communities at this time, no formal planning mechanism (in terms of staff and established planning documents) existed in Lake Placid. The Village decision-makers included the following: elected officials, Lake Placid Athletic Club members, Kiwanis Club members, the Chamber of Commerce, and finally, the registered voters of Lake Placid Village. Beginning in the early 1900's, though, the Village had made it a policy to establish and upgrade its winter-sports facilities. Long-range planning in this area began with the annual staging of the various competitions and construction of the ski jump in

the early 1920's. While it may not have been a formally stated agreement, it is clear that a major objective of Lake Placid (through the actions of the Club and the citizens) was to create officially sanctioned winter-sports facilities and become a winter-sports capitol of the United States.

With these priorities established, it is not clear why the city officials balked initially when the USOC invited them to host the Games. Once the award was accepted by Lake Placid, the town was, for the most part, in solid support of every phase of the Olympic planning. The Games were used as a means of stimulating the development of property and facilities, in complete harmony with the Village's planning goals and objectives.

### 1.23 Preparations

The initial Olympic planning called for the staging of the following events: 1) ski jumping, 2) a 50 kilometer ski race, 3) an 18 kilometer ski race, 4) ice hockey, 5) speed skating, 6) figure skating, and 7) bobsledding. This was in April of 1929, when it was reported that "Lake Placid already has subscribed \$50,000 to cover any deficit, and has listed plans for housing of from 4,500-6,500 contestants, officials, and spectators."<sup>15</sup> Plans were also formed at this time to include an experimental event: the 25 mile dog sled race (at this early date in Winter Olympics history, events could be included on a trial basis to determine if they warranted permanent inclusion into the format). The facilities that were to be newly constructed were: 1) an indoor ice arena, 2) an outdoor ice stadium for speed skating, and 3) two bobsled runs -- one being a practice run. (There were so many difficulties arising from the bob runs that an entire section is devoted to them; .

see section 1.30 of this chapter).

In June of 1929 the Village passed a \$200,000 thirty year bond issue to be used "to provide for the purchase of land used for the Olympics. The proceeds of the bonds are expected to cover all expenditures."<sup>16</sup> It was not until December of 1930 that a more realistic appraisal of the situation was undertaken. Arthur Daley reported that \$375,000 more was sought (to bring the total to one half million dollars). The additional money, appropriated by the legislature, was to be used for the previously mentioned facilities plus the creation of a ski jump arena. Dr. Dewey admitted: "We need this money for the preparation of adequate facilities, this is essential. Not only will the money go for creating a fitting atmosphere, but the facilities will be permanent...making Lake Placid an American St. Moritz."<sup>17</sup>

The creation of these facilities and atmosphere was going to cost the organizing committee substantially more than originally anticipated. By December 1931, a year prior to the Games, the total figure was set at \$1,050,000. It was stressed that the facilities had to be equal to those elsewhere in the world, and that of the one million dollar plus figure, "\$250,000 must be raised through private subscription to complete the fund..."<sup>18</sup> Mr. Harris, chairman of the general fund of the State Olympic Winter Games, pointed out that "the Olympiad is a world event, and the awarding of it to the U.S. brought obligations and a distinction of historic importance."<sup>19</sup> To fulfill its obligation, the Village passed another bond issue of \$150,000 to complete the financing of the indoor ice arena.<sup>20</sup>

This extra \$150,000 was required because of an unusual turn of events. As previously noted, Governor Roosevelt was in full support of

all facilities -- Dewey again carried the day and came home a hero."<sup>8</sup>

Lake Placid was given serious, and then final consideration for sponsoring the games because it also had the support of the townsmen. Several bond issues were passed in order to provide the necessary revenue to build facilities. Willis Wells, chairman of the finance committee, had this to say while reporting on the final status of the Games: "We looked upon what we would do as an investment into the future of our community and the Adirondack Region in general. We are happy today that we accepted this responsibility. How well we discharged it is for others to say."<sup>9</sup> The town had seriously hoped there would be some economic profit, not just for the duration of the contests, but in the long-term as people returned to Lake Placid to use the facilities. The Olympics would "give New York a permanent Winter sports center, making Lake Placid an American St. Moritz."<sup>10</sup>

It was reported that a total of \$1,050,000 was needed "for the IIIrd Winter Olympic Games if facilities are to be provided equal to those at Chamonix, France, and St. Moritz, Switzerland..."<sup>11</sup> This continued reference to famous European Resorts, and the desire for the U.S. to be placed on equal footing in terms of prestige were important factors in the USOC's efforts to secure both Summer and Winter Olympic Games in 1932.

Finally, world-wide brotherhood was cited as a possible spin-off of the Lake Placid Games. President Herbert Hoover sent a letter to Dr. Dewey, "commending the Games as fostering international good-will,"<sup>12</sup> and congratulating the selection of Lake Placid.

the Games. In April of 1929, he approved a bill appropriating the initial \$2000 for construction of the bob run.<sup>21</sup> Again in April of 1930, Roosevelt signed a bill allowing \$125,000 "to be used for the Olympic Games -- every aspect of planning and hosting them."<sup>22</sup> By February of 1931, however, he had reconsidered the state's role and vetoed a \$210,000 item in the budget that would have financed the indoor ice arena. He objected to such a sum that would provide for facilities "to be used for the two weeks and then turned over to the Village of Lake Placid."<sup>23</sup>

Dr. Dewey had admitted to the various civic groups in the Village, prior to the bid acceptance, that housing of the spectators and participants was going to be the biggest problem in organizing the Olympics.<sup>24</sup> As the planning progressed, the total number of people expected rose from the initial figures of 4,500 to 6,500. Participants and staff from 17 nations had accepted invitations to compete, and the town spent the three years prior to 1932 "revamping summer cottages and expanding housing facilities to accommodate the 10,000 expected,"<sup>25</sup> Arthur Daley mentioned that hotels and boarding houses would take in 1,700 people, and "other facilities will bring the total accommodations up to the 10,000."<sup>26</sup>

In its efforts to secure ample low-cost, temporary housing for Olympic visitors, the Lake Placid Olympic Committee devised a plan of incredible simplicity and ingenuity. The Village contracted to lay 500 feet of additional trackage in order to accommodate 25 chartered pullman cars. Called a "unique construction" project, the pullmans were supplied with heat and water from the central plant and provided housing for 500 people.<sup>27</sup>

It would seem that a plan of this nature would find universal acceptance and application to major events of Olympic caliber. Housing

for the short-term is provided without the need for building costly projects which may remain vacant forever after (the reader is referred to the examples of Squaw Valley, Munich, and Montreal as described in this text).

Housing may have been adequate for contestants in Lake Placid's 1932 Olympics, but seating at the contests had its short-comings. Ten thousand spectators, participants, and officials watched the Games from facilities with seating capacities as follows: 1) indoor arena - 3000; 2) outdoor arena - 6000; and 3) ski jump - 4000.<sup>28</sup>

In terms of total attendance, Bowen reported a figure of 80,000 for the 2-week competition. He further stated that Sonja Henie performed before 8000, and that the largest crowd numbered 14,000.<sup>29</sup> These figures seem somewhat inflated in light of the limited housing accommodations, skating capacities, and the report of the final ticket receipts being \$52,468 short of the anticipated \$100,000;<sup>30</sup> the latter figure based upon an expected 10,000 visitors per day.

### 1.30 The Bobsled Run - Environmental Effects

In all, approximately 100 miles of land and trails were made available for ski courses, bob and dog sled runs, and ski jumps. Acreage was cleared for the indoor and outdoor stadiums, and for the expanded ski jump arena. By far, the most controversial of this land consumption involved the construction of the bobsled course.

When Lake Placid submitted its Olympic bid to the International Olympic Committee (henceforth, IOC), the fact that a bob run was missing became the major point of concern and was the subject of the only objection raised by the IOC. The problem arose when the organizing committee



planned to construct the run on state lands, part of which formed a section of a forest preserve. Naturally, the construction entailed the removal of some brush and "a limited number of trees." Under a constitutional provision adopted some 20 years prior to this date, however, it was established that the land remain a "preserve": "no trees can be cut nor any timber removed, not even a dead tree encumbering the ground."<sup>31</sup> At this point, the organizing committee began to consider an alternate site located at the base of Mt. Marcy, one mile from Lake Placid. The committee had hoped that construction could be completed by the winter of 1929 so that 3 full seasons would be available to test the run.

Deciding that the site on the state preserve offered the best course, the state legislature passed a law by October of 1929 authorizing the Conservation Commission to build the run on lands of the forest preserve. Realizing the ecological implications of this law, the lower court ruled it unconstitutional. In so ruling, Judge Crane saw merit in the following arguments of the proponents of the act: 1) the use of some 4½ acres of a nearly 2 million acre preserve would be very slight, 2) there would be benefits to the public in staging the Olympics, of which the bobsled is a major attraction and 3) the forest preserve would be an attractive site to locate events because of the abundant snowfall and the location near the center of Lake Placid. The overriding objection to all of these issues, Judge Crane felt, was the specificity of the state constitution. Citing section 7 of Article VII: "The lands of the state...constituting the forest preserve...shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed, or destroyed."<sup>32</sup>

On appeal, the proponents claimed that outdoor sports do much to maintain the health, happiness, and welfare of the people of the state. These arguments were rejected and the lower court was affirmed in a powerful opinion rendered by Judge Hinman. It reads in part as follows:<sup>33</sup>

"This bobsleigh run requires the clearing of 4 or 5 acres of forest land, the cutting of 2600 trees which must unquestionably be of 'timber size,' and the blasting of some 50 cubic yards of rock from their natural site. If clearings of timber from lands owned by the State in the forest reserve are sanctioned for such a purpose, they are equally sanctioned for the construction of auto race tracks, tobaggan slides, golf courses, baseball diamonds and other sports, all of which are out of harmony with the forest lands in their wild state. There will be no limit to such encroachments that will crowd through the door if such precedent is established. As we view it, the legislature has no power to open that door."

Faced with this sequence of events, The Club offered land it owned on Mt. Van Houverberg to be used for the run. Unfortunately, The Club had a historic policy of not admitting Jews into the membership and this plan was vigorously attacked by the Jewish Tribune. It had been publicized that state funding would be used for the bob run, stadium, road development around Lake Placid, and "other development in the region." The Jewish Tribune protested "most earnestly against the State of New York being made a party toward aiding an institution (the Lake Placid Club) which is unAmerican in its practices.... We also protest the expenditure of taxpayers' money, some of whom are Jews, to go towards fostering a club which discriminates against citizens of this state."<sup>34</sup>

Dr. Dewey attempted to offer a compromise at this stage of the dispute. He said that The Club could possibly deed the land needed for the bob run to the State. The problem with this solution, according to Dr. Dewey, was that in light of the courts' rulings, the trees would still be protected and the run could not be built; if the Club granted an easement to the State, however, this difficulty would be avoided.

The Jewish Tribune's response to this alternative was a statement which reflects the resentment existing even today, of using state funding with questionable benefit to the entire citizenry. The plan was termed a "transparent subterfuge. There is little or no likelihood that the State of New York will be further concerned with the bob run after the Olympics, and the Club authorities know full well that this sham easement will unquestionably lapse. This means that the Lake Placid Club will have the advantage of years to come of an elaborate bob run built for it through the use of State funds and serving as an enduring enhancement of the Club's properties."<sup>35</sup>

A peaceful settlement was finally reached when The Club transferred the deed of the bob site to the township of North Elba. Under the terms of this arrangement, if the State failed to maintain the run after the Games, the property would be turned over to the Lake Placid community, and not back to the Club. Since The Club relinquished all claim to the property, the Jewish Tribune withdrew its objections.<sup>36</sup>

#### 1.40 Transportation

Very little appeared in the research materials dealing with the transportation problems of the IIIrd Winter Olympiad. Yosemite, another site under consideration, was eliminated from the bidding prior to the selection of Lake Placid because it would have become necessary to build a road between Yosemite Valley and Glacier Point. The lack of adequate transportation thus kept a serious contender from hosting the Games.

As already noted, Lake Placid is approximately 320 miles from New York City. This was a 12 hour trip, as reported in a New York Times article (4 hours from Montreal).<sup>37</sup> Whether this time was by auto or

train was not specified, but there was state funding budgeted for road improvement around the Lake Placid area.<sup>38</sup> The railroad facilities were also upgraded, but this improvement was intended for the pullmans that were to aid in housing visitors, and not in transporting them.

#### 1.50 Other Impacts

The IIIrd Winter Olympics had a dramatic social impact, after the Jewish Tribune leveled serious charges of racial prejudice against the Lake Placid Club. Financial burdens resulted from the passage of two bond issues: one (for \$200,000) was to be paid off within 30 years, and the other was to be recovered through Olympic receipts. Since the profits were \$52,468 less than expected, the town of North Elba was forced to absorb that deficit as well.<sup>39</sup> Even though courts of law ruled favorably towards the ecology, they still could not prevent two miles of bob sled run from being "carved out of virgin forest."<sup>40</sup>

Being extremely winter-sports-oriented, the Village defeated two bond issues that would have enhanced the summer amenities of the area. At the time the \$150,000 was approved by the voters to build an indoor ice arena, the following bond issues were defeated: 1) \$28,000 to further develop the bathing beach facilities, and 2) \$123,000 for land acquisition and development of a golf course. One area of vital community service also had to take a lesser role to the Olympics: sewage treatment.

A new sewage treatment plant was desperately needed, and just prior to the Olympics, the matter had to be "forced" upon the attention of the Village authorities. A new plant was out of the question, "since investment in the Olympics took precedent over special expenditures." This policy resulted in the engineers being forced to use the existing facility

as much as possible and at the least cost. A \$16,258.91 remodeled plant (primary and secondary treatment of sewage) was the result. While effective, the plant was not the most desired product: "The remodeled plant, in spite of some of its crudities, demonstrates what can be done with sedimentation alone to correct obvious features of sewage pollution."<sup>41</sup>

As far as the Games being used as a means of attracting more visitors and money into the area, Bowen writes that "on this Winter day (December 3, 1962) Dr. Dewey's dream resort is, comparatively speaking, only slightly less dreary and slightly more prosperous than it was in 1927."<sup>42</sup> While the population has dropped off 1000 since 1932, Bowen's remarks may be somewhat unfair. All manner of winter sports competition, national and international including world championships, have been staged at Lake Placid (such international competition is, in fact, staged annually at Lake Placid).<sup>43</sup> The major freeways have made the area easily accessible from the larger centers of population, and the site is used for training the most promising amateur athletes in the U.S.

#### 1.60 Benefits

One extremely satisfying reward came to the USOC (and the U.S. in general), that being the "prestige" of sponsoring both summer and winter Olympics of 1932 in the USA. It is with extreme reluctance that the IOC will award one country both Games in the same Olympiad (this has happened only 3 times since 1924 -- France held both in 1924; the USA in 1932; and Germany in 1936 (see Appendix A). The IOC is generally under intense political pressure to enable as many countries as possible the opportunity of staging the games.

New York benefited by gaining not only a fully developed sports complex for winter activities, but the "really and truly winter sports capitol of the modern U.S."<sup>44</sup> The U.S., the State of New York, the Village of Lake Placid, and in particular the Lake Placid Club all could look upon the Olympics and the facilities with praise and admiration. The U.S. was finally able to boast of a facility on par (at least in facilities, if not atmosphere) with the finest European resorts. The Village of Lake Placid and The Club could have the advantage for many years to come, of some \$1 million worth of capital improvements (the majority of which were financed through county, state, or federal sources). Permanent sporting facilities were created second to none, and the road improvements helped enhance the accessibility of the Adirondack community.

Imaginative planning helped Lake Placid to avoid the pitfall which other Olympic hosts have fallen into. Instead of creating "white elephant" housing projects (those buildings erected for the housing of Olympic crowds, destined to stand idle thereafter), the organizers rented railroad cars to be used as mini hotels. This portable Olympic Village was brought in prior to the competition, and sent away with the termination of the contests. As a result, there was no lasting monument of indebtedness for the Village to maintain and pay taxes on.

Those wholesome and invigorating types of outdoor activities were given the proper promotion which the New York legislature had hoped for. Radio broadcasters transmitted the contests over the air waves in an attempt to acquaint the American public with the excitement of winter sports. The residents of Lake Placid were given the opportunity to unite themselves in support of civic goals. Bond issues were passed, and the

townsfolks all worked at dressing up the area for the Games. These "spiritual" benefits may not mean a great deal in light of the economic expenses, but they portray the attitude of sacrifice and hardship that must accompany the realization of any planning objective.

With this infusion of money and new facilities into the Lake Placid area, one would have expected to find an economic spin-off of much more pronounced dimensions. It is found, however, that population decreased by 1000 between 1932 and the present, and the area remained economically depressed. This is partially explained by the effects of the depression, followed immediately by WWII. It is also explained by the limited amount of manufacturing in that area of the Adirondacks where Lake Placid is located, the consolidation of the small farms, and the decrease in tourism during the war years. While the facilities were abundantly capable of meeting the needs of the winter-sports enthusiasts, these factors combined with the remoteness of the Village rendered the potential economic spin-offs negligible.

#### 1.70 Conclusion

Through the determination of members of the USOC to have both Summer and Winter Olympics staged on U.S. soil, Lake Placid was given the opportunity to host the Winter contests of 1932. While it had on hand most of the facilities, and had previously staged many of the Olympic-type events, \$1 million plus was required in preparing Lake Placid for the Games. Over 100 miles of land were made available for trails utilized by the various competitions. With the completion of the bobsled run, one of the finest in the world at that time, 2 years of controversy and protest were brought to an end. The Games opened in the

rain and mud, and closed a day later than scheduled, when enough snow finally came to finish the bobsled competition. They were labeled a success by Willis Wells, chairman of the finance committee, a success beyond all expectations.

More importantly, the Village officials used the IIIrd Winter Olympics as a catalyst for the realization of their planning priorities and objectives. Lake Placid had a long-standing policy to create the proper facilities for entertaining winter sportspersons. By hosting the Games, the town was able to acquire these additional facilities within a period of three years. This was over a million dollars worth of improvements, four-fifths of which was funded by outside sources. That would have taken the community perhaps several generations to achieve on its own. (With the Depression and WWII, Lake Placid may have had to wait until the 1950's or 1960's before further action could have been taken on upgrading its sports facilities).

When the Olympics are employed in such a manner as they were in Lake Placid in 1932, the utmost in terms of benefits can be derived. As Wells admitted, the profits made but a dent in the total costs of the Games. It is a premise of this thesis that in order for a community to provide the most rational justification for expending large sums of money and resources in preparation for the Olympics, the Olympic plans must somehow be incorporated into the community's long-range planning mechanism. This premise appears to find ample support in the example of Lake Placid, 1932 Winter Olympics.



## 1.71 Points for Future Reference

(This section appearing in the conclusion of this and succeeding chapters is intended to provide a "legacy" to sites contemplating the sponsorship of future Olympics. It is a short summary of experiences which may prove of value in guiding the planning process of Olympic cities and committees).

1. The planning process should have the support of the following:
  - a. townsleaders,
  - b. civic and business groups,
  - c. towns residents,
  - d. the state legislature and governor,
  - e. U.S. congressional and appointed officials,
  - f. the USOC,
  - g. national leaders, and
  - h. interest groups (severe environmental difficulties arose in Lake Placid's planning which eventually alienated another powerful group -- the Jewish Tribune).
2. The site should have experience (as did Lake Placid) in staging competitions at the national level, of most or all of the Olympic events.
  - a. This implies the existence of all major facilities.
  - b. Should new facilities be needed, plenty of time should be allowed for the testing of them after construction.
3. The investigation of all possibilities of temporary housing and facilities, as was the case with the pullman cars to house visitors, should not be overlooked.
4. Do not rely upon the use of land from a state or national forest preserve. If this land is to be used for facilities, etc., secure

assurances well in advance (before entering the Olympic bidding) that the land may in fact be used. (Prior to 1970, environmental impact statements were not required for major federal projects.)

5. Assume that there will not always be universal acceptance and beneficence of the Olympics (the Jewish protest here is a good example). Taxpayers from the city, state, and nation will be contributing to events which may have negligible value to them.
6. Determine that the essential community services such as sewage treatment, are adequate prior to planning and funding Olympic-related construction.
7. Olympic-related expenses and planning must be rationalized in light of community planning priorities, objectives, and desires previously established. This rationale is adequate in Lake Placid's case.

FOOTNOTES - LAKE PLACID, 1932

- 1 Ezra Bowen, "Hey - What Do You Say We Have An Olympics," Sports Illustrated, 17, 23 (December 3, 1962), M9.
- 2 Ibid., p. M10.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 "State Acts To Get Winter Olympics," New York Times, 78, 25924, (January 15, 1929), 24.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 "Lake Placid Chosen By Olympic Body," New York Times, 78, 26010, (April 11, 1929), 25.
- 8 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M14.
- 9 "Winter Olympics Drew \$96,000; Lake Placid Deficit \$52,468," New York Times, 81, 27052, (February 17, 1932), 27.
- 10 Arthur Daley, "\$375,000 Sought For Winter Olympics," New York Times, 80, 26613, (December 5, 1930), 32.
- 11 "Winter Olympiad To Cost \$1,050,000," New York Times, 80, 26710, (March 12, 1931), 6.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 "Lake Placid Chosen," p. 25.
- 14 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M10-M11.
- 15 "Lake Placid Chosen," p. 25.
- 16 "\$200,000 Voted For Olympic Winter Sports To Be Held At Lake Placid," New York Times, 78, 26065, (June 5, 1929), 26.
- 17 Daley, "\$375,000 Sought," p. 32.
- 18 "Winter Olympiad To Cost," p. 6.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 "\$150,000 Bond Issue For Olympic Ice Arena At Lake Placid Is Voted By Taxpayers," New York Times, 80, 26851, (July 31, 1931), 21.
- 21 "Lake Placid Bill Approved," New York Times, 78, 26010, (April 11, 1929), 25.

- 22 "Roosevelt Approves Lake Placid Fund," New York Times, 79, 26388, (April 24, 1930), 22.
- 23 "Governor May Veto Winter Olympic's Bill," New York Times, 80, 26695, (February 25, 1931), 20.
- 24 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M10.
- 25 Arthur Daley, "Stars of 17 Nations Ready For Olympics," New York Times, 81, 27035, (January 31, 1932), X, 1.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 "Pullmans Will House 500 At Winter Olympic Games," New York Times, 81, 26930, (October 18, 1931), X, 7.
- 28 "Lake Placid, Long Crowned Winter Sports Capitol of America," Recreation, 25, (January 1932), 565.
- 29 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M15.
- 30 "Winter Olympics Drew," p. 27.
- 31 "State Acts To Get Winter Olympics," p. 24.
- 32 "Court Protects Forest Reserves," New York Times, 80, 26573, (October 26, 1930), XII, 16.
- 33 "Court Bars State Land Sled Run," New York Times, 79, 26290, (January 16, 1930), 17.
- 34 "Jews Protest Aid By State Club," New York Times, 80, 26585, (November 7, 1930), 25.
- 35 "Mosessohn Disputes Dewey's Club Reply," New York Times, 80, 26586, (November 8, 1930), 3.
- 36 "Lake Placid Club Ends Olympic Row," New York Times, 80, 26612, (December 4, 1930), 50.
- 37 "Lake Placid Chosen," p. 25.
- 38 "Jews Protest Aid," p. 25.
- 39 "Winter Olympics Drew," p. 27.
- 40 "Battling For Icy Honors At Lake Placid," Literary Digest, 112, 6, (February 6, 1932), 32.
- 41 Henry W. Taylor, "Sewage Treatment Plant Remodeled At Low Cost," American City, 47, (December, 1932), 53.

42 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M16.

43 "How's That," Forbes, 117, 11, (June 1, 1976), 54.

44 Bowen, "Have An Olympics," p. M16.

CHAPTER II SQUAW VALLEY  
VIIIth Winter Olympiad, 1960

"(T)hrough a dazzling display of salesmanship by one of Squaw Valley's 30 registered voters, the 1960 Winter Olympics had been given to an area which doesn't appear on most maps...."

Melvin Durslag, "The Great Winter Olympics Fight," Saturday Evening Post, 230, 34, (February 22, 1958), 35.

## 2.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games in Squaw Valley

Apart from its magnificent mountains, fresh air, abundant snowfall, and wind-free skiing, Squaw Valley was probably one of the most ill-suited sites available for the staging of Olympic competition. At the time the IOC granted the 1960 Winter Games to Squaw Valley, it was a "community" of 30 registered voters, with no mayor, "no policemen, no post office, no gasoline station. It (didn't) have much of anything except some strikingly scenic mountains, oceans of snow and gobs of trouble."<sup>1</sup> Squaw Valley was an area more accustomed to the pasturing of cattle (its original use by the Indians), and in fact, "there were few people even in California who had heard of it, let alone (had) seen it."<sup>2</sup>

Squaw Valley is located on the eastern side of the High Sierra Mountains in California, adjacent to Lake Tahoe and 45 miles southwest of Reno, Nevada. It is a valley stretching 3 miles long and is a half mile wide. The primary reason for bringing the Olympic Games to this area was personal: the private advancement of one of the major property owners, Alexander Cushing. He believed that if he could put in a bid with the USOC for the games, that fact might generate publicity for his lodge, and could conceivably make the larger newspapers.<sup>3</sup> As it turned out, improvements were made on 6000 plus acres of land used for competition, with the State of California retaining possession of only 500.<sup>4</sup>

Once the major participants of the project (among them: the Federal and State governments, and Walt Disney Productions) had pledged their resources for the Olympic effort, other rationales for Squaw Valley hosting the Games were discussed. The amenities of the region, including the powder snow were again stressed. William H. Francis Jr. (then, Assistant Secretary of Defense) during the House subcommittee hearings, saw,

the project as a vehicle that would benefit the government as a whole, and would "serve the entire west."<sup>5</sup> It was also thought that California would be acquiring a "highly desirable sports center for the future," and the joint state-federal cooperation required by the project was given great acclaim: "It would be a great benefit and consistent with our park policy of having joint state-federal use of our federal lands in these parks (the ice arena would be built upon federal land leased to the state), and it will result in a very great long-term value to the whole Government as a very fine recreation facility."<sup>6</sup> In fact, the provision that the State of California would be taking over the facility after the Games was one of the most "potent arguments for Squaw Valley acting as host."<sup>7</sup>

Finally, speaking for the executive branch of the Government, Francis stated that since "the U.S. will be the host nation, this opportunity of having in our country so many young athletes and press from other nations will return large dividends through the opportunity it will afford to have them see and learn, at first hand, democracy in action."<sup>8</sup>

## 2.20 Facilities

### 2.21 Existing Facilities

Due in great part to the superb salesmanship of Cushing and the promise of unlimited resources from the California State Legislature, Squaw Valley was awarded the 1960 Winter Olympic Games. At the time the decision was made, the following sporting facilities existed at Squaw Valley: "a) one ski lift, b) two rope tows and c) one small lodge...the nearest place for groceries, aspirin, and mail was seven miles away, at



the Village of Tahoe City."<sup>9</sup> Given this situation, J. L. Bingham of the U.S. selection committee stated in January of 1955 that "Squaw Valley has adequate facilities for competitors, for housing, and for staging the Games."<sup>10</sup> Under these initial conditions, it is curious to note that Cushing believed that a world-class sports complex could be built for one million dollars. It was the state of California that underwrote the facilities by pledging the \$1 million and "whatever money may be required."<sup>11</sup>

## 2.22 Planning

Like Lake Placid, there was no formal planning mechanism existing in Squaw Valley: no planning staff, no master plan of the area, no elected decision-makers at the Valley. It was a wilderness area that only a few had discovered and exclusively enjoyed. There were limited facilities for recreation; as mentioned, a lodge, rope tows, and ski lift. While the developers were interested in attracting vacationers, it was to be a low-keyed operation catering mainly to ski enthusiasts. Night activity was to be found at nearby Lake Tahoe, or Reno.

The resultant Olympic award was completely out of harmony with the atmosphere of the area and the desires of the majority of the property owners. What seemed a "novel" idea at first, quickly proved to be a disaster. There was no existing planning for the erection of a city within the Valley. No planning group (such as the Olympic Organizing Committee), no one had the slightest notion of how to proceed.

### 2.23 Preparations

The architectural firm that designed the ice arena (Corlett and Spackman, Kitchen and Hunt) undertook the role of urban designers: "When we asked the client (the Organizing Committee, 1960 Olympic Winter Games) how many athletes were coming they had no idea. How many of them would be women; they had no idea. They had only a rough idea of what events would be staged."<sup>12</sup> The architects relied almost exclusively upon the European resorts for the nature and placement of facilities.

Blythe Arena, with a seating capacity of 8,000, was to become the main attraction of the site and the "hub of what is virtually a small city." The 3.5 million dollar arena was constructed with federal money, and built upon lands of the federal park system (the lands being under long-term lease to the state of California). A stipulation attached to this investment was that the arena not become a "white elephant" after the two week competition. Architect Hunt: "We were to design a permanent ice arena, partly enclosed, and partly or completely covered, suitable for the Olympic Games and suitable for use after the Games as a year-round skating facility, as a convention center, and for the holding of other miscellaneous revenue-producing events."<sup>13</sup>

The arena won a very prestigious first prize award in the 1958 Progressive Architecture design competition. It was also an engineering masterpiece, with the roof able to support the weight of up to 6 feet of snow. Compensation for condensation on the inside of the building caused by snow had to be included in the design process.

Federal money was also used for various support services. Public Law 85-365 provided a half million dollars from the Department of Defense budget to be used for "personnel, supplies, equipment, preparation of

courses, fields, rinks, avalanche control, communication and transportation assistance, and snow compaction (for the parking lot)."<sup>14</sup>

Federal lands were provided for the construction of such facilities as the Olympic Village, the ice arena, and a sewage treatment plant capable of servicing a community of 30,000 (see Appendix B).

The sporting and support facilities required for the Squaw Valley Games are listed in Appendix C. Absent from the list of sports facilities is a bobsled run (possibly one of the main attractions of the Winter Olympics). When the costs of the essential sports facilities were estimated, those of the bob and luge runs were considered to be too great and the events were dropped from the format. The organizing committee managed the cancellation of these events (even under threat of being exposed as "cheapskates" by the International Federation of Bobsledders) by citing an Olympic Rule which stated that an event need not be staged if fewer than 12 entries were registered. This action saved the committee \$750,000.<sup>15</sup>

Once the necessary land was rented, leased, or otherwise acquired, the organizing committee made every effort to complete construction of the facilities well in advance. In fact, the original plan called for "all facilities, with the exception of the highway from San Francisco, to be completed by December of 1957."<sup>16</sup> There were several reasons for this, the most important being the short construction season.

A second major consideration, also related to the heavy snowfall, involved the unique engineering and construction methods previously discussed. Techniques had to be developed, particularly for the ice arena, so that the roof might support the tremendous weight of the snow. Engineers desired a full year or two in order to test the designs under

actual winter conditions. Problems of water condensation inside the structures had to be dealt with, as well as a myriad of unexpected difficulties resulting from experimental designs.

There were other "firsts" occurring at Squaw Valley demanding adequate trial and error periods. Squaw Valley was the first "ground up" Olympics ever planned. It was the first Games in which all of the events were within walking distance (200 yards) of each other. All of the athletes were quartered within the same Olympic Village instead of being housed in establishments throughout a town or country. The Village was to be a settlement composed of seven buildings, including a 300 room complex capable of accommodating all of the 1200 anticipated coaches, trainers, support personnel, and athletes.<sup>17</sup>

In keeping with the plans, reports in February of 1959, indicated that "nearly a year in advance, everything is ready...the seven buildings of the Olympic Village are all but complete, the trails are ready, the jumps are ready..."<sup>18</sup> The total cost at this point (not including the \$43 million for highway improvements) was determined to amount to 12 million dollars.

Preparations were made for a maximum daily attendance of 35,000. While on-site facilities were limited, projections of the organizing committee indicated that accommodations for such a number could be arranged within a 50 mile radius of Squaw Valley, with Reno and Tahoe City supplying most of the hotel space.<sup>19</sup> It was thought that parking facilities at the site could handle 12,000 autos, with a fleet of buses available to shuttle spectators to and from events and hotels.

The ArchitECTual Forum's February, 1960 issue reported that "over \$16 million...have gone towards transforming this High Sierra wilderness

into a veritable city for mountain sports, equipped with some of the best skating and skiing facilities in the world, dormitory housing for 1200 athletes and officials, and scores of ancillary buildings ranging from restaurants and churches, to a miniature shopping center, hospital, and social hall."<sup>20</sup>

A portion of the resulting deficit was to be recovered through ticket receipts, and in February of 1960 the State legislature approved a one million dollar insurance fund in the event that blizzards or other natural phenomena limited ticket sales (revenue of \$3 million was anticipated from this source).<sup>21</sup> Robert Harkness, Assistant Director of Finance for the Games, announced in March that his audit disclosed receipts of 1.8 million dollars. The additional 1.2 million was quickly appropriated by the legislature.<sup>22</sup>

With the conclusion of the Games, the Olympic Committee was left with the business of transforming facilities for permanent use, buying out land holders and land owners, finding concessionaires willing to take over operation of Squaw Valley, and rationalizing the expenditure of funds by reference to all of the uses of the site: convention center, year-round recreation center, training facility, etc. It was to be a difficult task of disproving that Squaw Valley would become the "white elephant" the skeptics feared.

### 2.30 Transportation

With only eight year-a-round residents in Squaw Valley at the time of the Olympic bid acceptance, nothing but the most basic transportation system existed in the area, and it consisted predominantly of light-duty dirt roads. The coming Olympics, however, would bring tens of thousands

of participants, reporters, spectators into the beautiful mountains; many of whom would be arriving from such urban areas as San Francisco and Los Angeles. It was realized early on that transportation and housing would constitute the biggest problems facing the organization committee.<sup>23</sup>

In order to alleviate the transportation shortcomings, the state agreed to spend \$43 million for the improvement of approach highways. This appropriation was to be used for widening all of the major roads leading into Squaw Valley to four lanes. It should be noted that this sum of money is over and above the state's \$8 million share of the Olympic expense, and there is no evidence that suggested the State had planned or contemplated the improvements had the Games not intervened. Even with the state's direct support and the \$3.5 million federal share, the additional \$43 million state expenditure was necessary for three reasons, according to Assistant Defense Secretary Francis: 1) to provide the proper facilities, 2) to help create the good-will and atmosphere of good sportsmanship, and 3) to maintain the spirit of the Olympic Games.<sup>24</sup> However, priorities outlined in a comprehensive plan and not intangible ideals should be the basis for expenditures of public funds.

Determining the extent of the State's road improvements has proved somewhat difficult. The two U.S. routes heading east from San Francisco were both four lane up to Sacramento (by the late 1950's). From Sacramento, U.S. 40 contained four lanes as far as Colfax, and U.S. 50 was predominantly two lanes the rest of the way to Lake Tahoe. State Road 89 (heading south from U.S. 40 along Lake Tahoe) was a medium duty road, with two lanes. It would seem that the state would have wanted to widen U.S. 40 the remainder of the way from Colfax to 89, and widen U.S. 50 from Sacramento to State Road 89. State Road 89 would seemingly need to

be widened, and the mostly light duty dirt roads within the Valley be improved.

For the Olympics, State Road 89 was improved to a heavy duty road but left at 2 lanes. U.S. 50 was improved in a few places to four lanes, but remained unchanged in several rough stretches. In addition, U.S. 40 was not completed in time for the Games, as reported by Richard Meister in February of 1960: "...a heavy storm could close both highways leading from San Francisco. Too, visitors should have fun driving over narrow, twisting and steep Donner Summit, one lane each way and 7,135 feet high on U.S. 40; and there's the similar dangerous Meyers Grade on U.S. 50."<sup>25</sup>

One of the risks involved in staging the competition at Squaw Valley was the extensive use of untested and new facilities. The most controversial of these new facilities was a parking lot constructed by the Navy. It was controversial in the sense that 6 feet of snow would be compacted into a 24 inch base capable of withstanding the weight of 12,000 autos. The Navy worked three winters prior to the Games, attempting to arrive at the proper formula that would support that number of vehicles under temperatures possibly reaching 60 degrees. Skeptics feared that should the thermometer reach that point, cars would sink into the slush.<sup>26</sup> Officials were encouraging visitors to forego the auto as much as possible, and utilize the 200 bus fleet system to shuttle spectators from lodgings to the site.

The city that managed to gain the most advantage from the Olympic event was Reno, Nevada. Its close proximity to Squaw Valley made it the logical city to handle air arrivals and departures. Some fairly substantial improvements were made to the airport, including a runway extension

and a new \$1.3 million airport terminal. The parking area for private planes was paved and expanded to accommodate 150 planes. These improvements as reported, "were not exactly caused by the Games, but were accelerated by them."<sup>27</sup> The changes were needed, and the Games acted as a catalyst to spur on the implementation.

#### 2.40 The Environment

Sheehan allowed that there were two big advantages of staging the Games in Squaw Valley: all of the athletes would be housed right on the site, and all of the events would be held within a 60 acre tract of land.<sup>28</sup> This is somewhat misleading concerning the land acreage, as the total area encompassed by the courses, events, etc., amounted to over 6000 acres. This use of 6000 acres of strikingly beautiful and largely undeveloped land (prior to 1960) is questioned by this author for the following reason: Reno, Nevada, which has facilities and is only 40 miles away, and Lake Tahoe which also has facilities and is only 7 miles away, both submitted bids for the 1960 Winter Olympics. Why create a new sports facility in a near but desolate area when two substantially developed facilities exist in the immediate proximity? If it was so necessary to stage the Games in that section of the country, there was no rational explanation for building a new facility "from scratch." This decision had the effect of: a) destroying the peaceful and subdued nature of a valley, and b) creating direct competition with previously established and developed resorts at Lake Tahoe and Reno.

When he heard of the original plans presented to the IOC in 1955, Wayne Poulson (President of the Squaw Valley Land and Livestock Company, which owns 90 percent of Squaw Valley; Poulson was also the first latter



day settler to the area) strongly objected and indicated that drastic changes would have to be made. The plans, Poulson feared, could "ruin the natural beauty of this valley for all time."<sup>29</sup> But he also welcomed the selection of Squaw Valley and indicated he would cooperate "enthusiastically" with its proper development. Several other property owners feared that the development would reduce Squaw Valley to a "coney island and a tourist trap" of hamburger joints and souvenir stands.<sup>30</sup> They did not want their resource to be violated in such a way as the State had in mind.

Two years after the initial plans were released, Poulson petitioned the courts to grant an injunction blocking the condemnation proceedings that were instituted for acquisition of 42 acres of his land. In order to invoke eminent domain, three conditions must be met: 1) there must be a public purpose, 2) due process must be followed, and 3) there must be just compensation for the property taken. It was the contention of Poulson that there was no public necessity for holding the games, and that the state law permitting condemnation was unconstitutional. Poulson's attorney argued that the use of eminent domain to acquire Poulson's land had the effect of granting public powers and funds to a private agency (the organizing committee).<sup>31</sup> This delayed construction of facilities for a year, when the legal questions and a fair market price for the land in question were resolved between Poulson and the State.

The effects of natural phenomena raised very serious considerations in using the Valley. Squaw Valley is an area that can receive upwards of 20 feet of snow in a season. Temperatures can vary forty degrees in a single day, due to warming Chinook winds, reaching as high as 60 degrees

in February. These conditions greatly increase the possibilities of avalanches and flooding. Federal funds in the amount of \$263,000 were earmarked for flood control alone.<sup>32</sup> This included the deepening and re-routing of Squaw Creek.<sup>33</sup> Military personnel mounted 9mm guns at strategic peaks in order to eliminate avalanche conditions before they developed. In the event there was a shortage of snow, cloud seeding devices were located in homes throughout the area.<sup>34</sup> These precautions assured that climatic conditions would not disrupt the Games.

#### 2.50 Other Impacts

There were several uncertainties and "firsts" involved in staging the Games at Squaw Valley, including:<sup>35</sup>

1. the first time the Games were held in rugged terrain;
2. the first use of that high of altitude;
3. the first extensive use of new and untested facilities;
4. the first use of an area so remote from a large population center; and,
5. the first use of an area so much at the mercy of variable weather conditions.

(While altitude problems were to redevelop to some degree during Mexico City's Summer Games of 1968, the use of untested, and unique construction techniques was to become a major catastrophe for Montreal's Summer Olympics of 1976. See p.104).

When initial plans were released, many Squaw Valley property owners expressed fear that their valley would be transformed into a tourist trap. These fears were not alleviated when it was reported that film producer Walt Disney was planning the following: a choir of thousands, daytime fireworks displays, 20,000 balloons and 2000 pigeons (symbolic ,

of world peace) to be released, and 33 statues representing athletes (costing \$2000 each).<sup>36</sup> Organizers of Lake Placid's 1980 Winter Games have expressed opposition to these types of spectacles. (see p.127)

The City of Reno benefitted from the Games. Not only did the city outfit itself with a new airport facility, but its hotel owners and restaurant operators saw a marked increase in business. Rates were raised and the commercialism of the Olympics became the rule as it has ever since.<sup>37</sup>

With this same theme is a more indirect impact: the Game's effect upon the U.S. consumer: "That \$8 million figure is a rank understatement. Among other dollars supporting the Games, there is \$3.5 million tossed in by the federal taxpayers, approximately \$2.5 million from private industry (guess who will eventually pay that bill?) and \$363,000 coughed up by Nevada."<sup>38</sup>

In discussing the aftermath of the 1960 Winter Olympic Games, Gladwin Hill noted that "the conclusion of the 1960 Winter Olympics... will mark the onset of one of the biggest headaches ever to confront California, or any other state in the recreation field. The problem: what to do with the \$11 million sports center built for international snow and ice competition."<sup>39</sup> The big problem, according to Hill, is not the initial cost of the facilities, but the upkeep of them: "No one, at this juncture can figure out how Squaw Valley can be operated so (it) will pay for (its) own maintenance costs; at any rate, not without the further investment of even more millions."

This problem is reduced to a simple economic consideration: how to exploit the possibilities of Squaw Valley on an economically feasible basis while still making the \$400,000/year minimum payments required to

operate the city? No matter how these economic possibilities are approached, the State is left with a "sewage treatment plant suitable for 30,000 (persons), dormitories, ice rinks, and 3000 meal/day cafeterias which all have to be maintained."<sup>40</sup>

Since the state agency in charge of Squaw Valley (at the time, the California State Division of Beaches and Parks) is a land-acquiring entity and a policy-making organization, the actual operation of a facility such as Squaw Valley is passed on to a private concessionaire. But in this instance, as Hill explains, the situation is complicated because "the valley involves a tangle of jurisdictions, free holders and lease holders, including the National Forest Service, the State Park Service, private corporations and individuals. These land parcels would have to be integrated, at a cost of possibly more millions before a private corporation could consider an operating contract." In fact, those millions would be needed just to buy out Cushing and Poulson.

Equally drastic implications, according to Meister, were in store for the entire parks and recreation program of California. "California, faced with a constantly expanding urban population, spends as little as \$1 million a year to develop its grossly underdeveloped park lands, yet tosses million after million into one ski area."<sup>41</sup>

#### 2.51 Aftermath -- Post 1970

Every effort to gain direct information from State officials concerning the present-day use of the Squaw Valley site has proved futile. Attempts were made to contact sources at the Departments of Tourism, and Parks and Beaches both by mail and telephone. Information derived indirectly, however, seems to prove correct the suspicions of those who

argued that Squaw Valley would become a white elephant.

By 1971, a full eleven years after the Olympics, the State of California had still not managed to find a willing concessionaire to assume operation of the site. In April of this year, the New York Times reported that a bid of only \$25,000 was submitted, a bid "considerably less than what the State hoped for."<sup>42</sup> It was further mentioned that California was losing from \$175,000 to \$300,000 every year on the property in its efforts to meet contractual obligations of maintenance and upkeep. These expenses would have to be assumed by any business entity operating the site.

When Denver backed out of the 1976 Winter Games, Squaw Valley became a likely substitute. Governor Reagan, however, stated in 1972 that under no circumstances would California consider such a plan. The State had not finished paying off its 1960 debt, and was in no hurry to increase it.<sup>43</sup>

It was, in fact, suggested that the Squaw Valley facility had deteriorated by this time. During Denver's 1976 congressional hearings, Clifford Buck (President of the USOC) made this statement: "All of the facilities at Squaw Valley have decayed and fallen down, become non-existent...this is quite largely true."<sup>44</sup> Reverend Fell of the Lake Placid Olympic committee also substantiated this claim. In a telephone interview with him, he mentioned to this author that neither Blythe Arena nor the ski jumps were being used today (1976), and that the officials at Squaw Valley attempted to sell him their 400 meter speed skating track that had been dismantled.<sup>45</sup>

## 2.60 Benefits

According to the Subcommittee hearings, it was expected that the State of California would receive several long-term benefits: 1) road improvements, 2) a sports arena, and 3) a sports complex providing long-range recreational attractions. This was some \$60 million in capital improvements, the major portion of which went for extensive development in a community of 30 residents in Placer County.

The peaceful Valley was in fact converted into a new city, as California gained a new recreational center and added substantially to the tax rolls. "Today Squaw Valley is a small city standing where cattle pastured 4 years ago. It supplies its own heat, electricity, and water; it has its own sewage treatment plant and 19 miles of telephone cables and 60,000,000 feet of wire for 1200 telephones. It is everything that millions of dollars could make it."<sup>46</sup> The area was designed and erected to become a permanent facility after the Games. The architects of the ice arena certainly provided a substantial base to work from as the design was very favorably appraised in the literature.

With the press and television coverage of the Games, California gained national and world-wide exposure as a state of more than just summer attractions. Tens of thousands of people watched the Games at Squaw Valley and spent nearly \$2 million at the site alone.<sup>47</sup> Tahoe City and Reno businesses, fortunate in being located so close to the Olympic site, gained significant short-term profits. Reno renovated its airport and expanded the facility, a move motivated by the Olympics.

Spiritual benefits occurred, according to the Subcommittee reports, as the Eastern World witnessed democracy in action. It was an occasion marked by joint Federal-State use of federal park lands; cooperation and

extensive interaction among several agencies and jurisdictions engaged in a common effort. Even the armed forces lent their support by controlling floods and avalanches, constructing parking facilities, and maintaining enough personnel to assist in the event disaster should strike. In keeping with its multi-purpose use after the Games, the site was to be available for all types of recreational use, conventions, and various other revenue producing events. Military troops were to have access to the site for training purposes, as would future U.S. ski teams.

In terms of the enormous profits gained, the big benefits went to the land owners of the Valley, namely Alexander Cushing and Wayne Poulson. What started as a scheme to create publicity for a ski lodge and a couple of lifts turned a valley into a world-class recreational facility. Whether or not it destroyed the beauty and ecology of the valley is a question that will always be analyzed in terms of the economic advantage achieved by the two men.

## 2.70 Conclusion

While it is easy to read the reports now and declare that the 1960 Winter Olympics should never have been staged at Squaw Valley, these facts were quite obvious at the time: the creation of the facilities (the creation of Squaw Valley) was part of no state, regional, or local plan; 2 resorts -- already developed and established -- existed within the area. Given the fact that Colorado, Utah, and Idaho were quite firmly established as locations for excellent western skiing; it is doubtful that a market analysis would have concluded that the project was feasible. The Games did have the result of substantially upgrading private property at no cost to the owners, and allowing Reno the opportunity to initiate

capital improvements. The State of California was given the impetus to carry out highway improvements from Sacramento to Reno and Lake Tahoe.

#### 2.71 Points for Future Reference

1. Joint Federal-State participation may be desirable in some instances, but with Squaw Valley it caused serious difficulties raising these questions:
  - a. Who ultimately assumes responsibility for the credit/blame?
  - b. How is the land ultimately consolidated for sale to concessionaires with the Federal/State/Private ownership of property? At what cost?
2. The idea at Squaw Valley of building all facilities within walking distance of one another is a good one, and probably has the best application to the Winter Games.
3. Considerations for facilities and their construction should include:
  - a. Assuring that all Olympic events are included in the format (bobsledding, in this case, had to be cancelled).
  - b. That the site does not have to be built from the ground up.
  - c. That ample time is provided for the testing of new designs and facilities.
4. The following techniques should be exploited, as they were for the most part in Squaw Valley:
  - a. The extensive use of mass-transit
  - b. An "all events" design for large facilities to be built, such as an arena
5. Formulas ought to be either drawn up or revised for realistically estimating total costs. (The \$1 million cost projection should have been seriously questioned, considering the "ground up" nature of the plan).



6. Precautions taken by Squaw Valley officials for lack of snow were well conceived and planned.
7. Given a situation such as what existed in Squaw Valley: lack of a formalized community planning mechanism, the close proximity of established resorts, the absence of state recreational planning for the Squaw Valley area; the submission of Squaw Valley as a contender for the Games should have been seriously discouraged.

FOOTNOTES - SQUAW VALLEY, 1960

- <sup>1</sup> Melvin Durslag, "The Great Winter Olympics Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 230, 34, (February 22, 1958), 35.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>3</sup> James Stewart-Gordon, "He Brought The Winter Olympics To Squaw Valley," Readers Digest, (February, 1960), 181.
- <sup>4</sup> Kenneth A. Hill, "Squaw Valley Prepares For The Olympics," Recreation, 52, 2, (February, 1959), 64.
- <sup>5</sup> U.S. Congress. House. Committee On Appropriations. Olympic Winter Games Stadium. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, House of Representatives, on House Document 373, 85th Congress, 2d Session, 1958, 41.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., 35.
- <sup>7</sup> Gladwin Hill, "After The Olympics," New York Times, 109, 37269, (February 7, 1960), II Part 2, 1.
- <sup>8</sup> U.S. House, Olympic Stadium, p. 34.
- <sup>9</sup> Durslag, "Olympics Fight," p. 35.
- <sup>10</sup> "Coast City To Bid For Winter Games," New York Times, 104, 35414, (January 9, 1955), V, 3.
- <sup>11</sup> Richard Meister, "Squaw Valley Snow Job," The Nation, 190, 7, (February 13, 1960), 139.
- <sup>12</sup> William Corlett, and Frank Hunt, "P/A Design Awards Seminar III," Progressive Architecture, 39, 9, (September, 1958), 183.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> U.S. House, Olympic Stadium, p. 33.
- <sup>15</sup> Durslag, "Olympics Fight, p. 74.
- <sup>16</sup> "Johnson To Seek Aid For Olympics," New York Times, 105, 35692, (October 14, 1955), 36.
- <sup>17</sup> Hill, "Squaw Valley Prepares," p. 64.
- <sup>18</sup> "On To Squaw Valley," Newsweek, 53, 6, (February 9, 1959), 86.
- <sup>19</sup> Evan Hill, "California's Olympic Bonanza," Saturday Evening Post, 232, 33, (February 13, 1960), 103.

20 "Squaw Valley's Olympic Tent," Architectural Forum, 112, 2, (February, 1960), 104.

21 "Olympic Fund Approved," New York Times, 109, 37260, (February 4, 1960), 36.

22 "Olympic Receipts Off," New York Times, 109, 37306, (March 15, 1960), 49.

23 Joseph M. Sheehan, "Progress Is Cited By Squaw Valley," New York Times, 105, 35784, (January 14, 1956), 14.

24 U.S. House, Olympic Stadium, p. 34.

25 Meister, "Snow Job," p. 139.

26 Hill, "Bonanza," p. 104.

27 Ibid.

28 Sheehan, "Progress Cited," p. 14.

29 "Olympic Plans Are Hit," New York Times, 104, 35575, (June 19, 1955), V, 4.

30 "California Group Lists 1960 Plans," New York Times, 105, 35775, (January 5, 1956), 81.

31 "California's Law On Olympics Hit," New York Times, 107, 36414, (October 5, 1957), 13.

32 U.S. House, Olympic Stadium, p. 51.

33 "Olympic Land Acquired," New York Times, 107, 36411, (October 2, 1957), 67.

34 "Only Snow Is Lacking For Winter Olympics," Business Week, 1583, (January 2, 1960), 20.

35 "'60 Winter Olympics - Big Spending, Big Risks," U.S. News and World Report, 48, 7, (February 15, 1960), 74.

36 Meister, "Snow Job," p. 138.

37 Hill, "Bonanza," p. 104.

38 Meister, "Snow Job," p. 138.

39 Hill, "After The Olympics," II Part 2, 1.

40 Ibid.

41 Meister, "Snow Job," p. 138.

<sup>42</sup> "\$25,000 Made In Bid For Squaw Valley," New York Times, 120, 41364, (April 25, 1971), 52.

<sup>43</sup> Michael Straus, "California As Possible Substitute," New York Times, 122, 41943, (November 24, 1972), 54.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 1976 Denver Winter Olympics. Hearings Before The Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, Senate, on S. 3531, 92d Congress, 2d Session, 1972, 168.

<sup>45</sup> Rev. Bernard J. Fell, Telephone Interview with author, October 21, 1976.

<sup>46</sup> Hill, "Bonanza," p. 103.

<sup>47</sup> "Olympic Receipts Off," p. 49.

### CHAPTER III DENVER

Originally Designated to Host XIIth Winter Olympiad, 1976

"The citizens on the street can only lose from the '76 Winter Olympics. They lose in terms of skyrocketing costs of food and lodging caused by growth and crowding of facilities. They lose tranquility in recreational areas they have treasured for so many years. They lose in health from the heavy increase in smog and pollution levels documented daily in Colorado. They lose in poorly spent tax dollars."

Rodger F. Ewey, in the Statement of Hon. Fred R. Harris to Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Congress, 2d Session, on S. 3531, (June 9, 1972), 16.

### 3.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games at Denver

In the legislation that would have authorized the Secretary of the Interior to participate in the planning, design, and construction of the Olympic facilities, the major rationalization (of a sizable list of reasons) for Colorado in general and Denver in particular playing the host was as follows: "Congress has declared it to be desirable that all American people of present and future generations be assured adequate outdoor recreational resources; and declares that the XII International Winter Olympic Games which are to be held in the United States in 1976 are in furtherance of stimulating an awareness of outdoor recreational activities."<sup>1</sup>

In keeping with this theme, the Interior Department called the Olympic Games the "highest tradition of sportsmanship, which provide a unique opportunity to promote international goodwill and understanding. To host the Games is universally regarded as a national honor."<sup>2</sup> The Denver Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Women, among numerous other governmental and non-governmental groups, pointed to the prestige that Colorado and the U.S. would gain. And, Governor Love carried the feeling one step further when he testified before the Senate subcommittee on Parks and Recreation (henceforth referred to as Senate): "Coloradans, like all Americans, are a proud people -- eager to show the world the natural splendor which is their birthright. The people of Colorado are eager as well to show the world -- an international community which is increasingly interested in winter sports, their innovative genius."<sup>3</sup>

These seem to be perfectly legitimate reasons until it is realized that Denver had initiated its Olympic campaign drive in 1963, a full 13 years prior to the Games that would have been staged there. Promotion

of brotherhood and world peace (if these are spin-offs of the Olympics) is not likely to drive such an intense campaign for so long a time period. What is likely to become the moving force, as Ralph Becker (President of the Denver Chamber of Commerce) admitted, is the "great economic impact of the Games...its one of those plus factors you get when people realize we've got something going here. It makes us look like we're alive and recognized world-wide as a major city."<sup>4</sup> The original estimate of the cost of the Games was \$7 million, but this figure later rose to \$35 million. The businessmen still felt that it was worth it at that price, as they expected to recover three times their original investment.<sup>5</sup>

While the Games were to create a greater awareness of physical fitness, they were also intended to create awareness in the nation's birth. The Denver 1976 Olympics were designated by the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission to officially initiate the celebration of the U.S. Bicentennial. Colorado was also holding an anniversary, and the Olympics would have begun the festivities of the state's Centennial. Under the Olympics theme (and message of the Games to all mankind) of peaceful competition, the contests would return to the state of Colorado (in the words of Carl De Temple, president of the Denver Olympics Committee -- DOC) "Pride, unity, and cohesiveness."<sup>6</sup> The goal of the Games was to show the world "quality, not flamboyancy."<sup>7</sup>

Several factors were listed by the IOC as having contributed to the selection of Denver:<sup>8</sup>

1. some of the world's best skiing;
2. magnificent scenery;
3. abundant elbow room;

4. Denver's recognition as a major city; and,
5. Denver officials' submission that the Games could be staged at a cost of \$14 million; and that 80% of the facilities already existed.

While Denver in fact lacked several facilities of substantial cost and importance, the reputation of Colorado (Aspen and Vail in particular) and its amenities had a huge impact on the IOC. In the words of Governor Love, "anyone who skis knows that our state provides much of the best terrain in the country."<sup>9</sup> It is important to note that this reference to outstanding skiing does not apply to Denver in particular, but Colorado on the whole.

Finally, it was hoped that the Games would be a catalyst for community and social improvement in Colorado. Gordon Allott, a U.S. Senator from Colorado: "Things of this nature promise a better quality of life for Colorado residents. In addition, the legacy of the Olympics can be of tremendous benefit to the nation."<sup>10</sup> Peter Dominick, the other U.S. Senator from Colorado, praised the comprehensive planning approach employed by the DOC.<sup>11</sup>

### 3.20 Planning

#### 3.21 Long-Range Planning

Planning for the Olympic Games in Colorado officially commenced in 1963, when Governor John Love suggested in a speech at Steamboat Springs that the city might contemplate hosting the 1976 Games. In 1964, Love appointed the Colorado Olympic Commission and charged it the task of studying the problem. Funding was handled through the Colorado Department of Commerce and Industry. The General Assembly of Colorado appropriated



\$25,000 to the Colorado Olympic Commission in 1966 and announced an intention to officially enter into the 1976 Olympic bidding. The state formed an advisory committee which designated Denver as the prospective host city.<sup>12</sup>

Over \$100,000 was appropriated for the Olympic effort by 1967; the city of Denver allocating \$26,500, and the general assembly appropriating \$75,000. With this financing, the DOC was formed and funded. Also at this time, the Colorado legislature pledged unanimous support of the DOC effort, the Denver city council was in total support, and the Olympic objective was firmly and officially established.<sup>13</sup>

1968 was the year of entertaining representatives of the international sports federation and showing them Colorado's splendor and facilities. A Colorado delegation attended the winter and summer Games of that year, for the purpose of learning more about the Olympics while promoting Denver at the same time. The Denver Regional Council of Governments (an organization composed of 22 municipalities and 5 counties) fully endorsed the Denver effort, as did the U.S. State Department through the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.<sup>14</sup>

More of the same activity occurred in 1969, and in May of 1970, the 69'th Congress of the IOC awarded Denver the XII'th Winter Olympic Games. President Nixon had been very helpful in this effort, sending letters of support to the Mayor of Denver and to the IOC. He promised "full cooperation from my office and from other agencies of the Federal Government." President Nixon also expressed "personal admiration for the high ideals exemplified by the International Olympic Movement and implemented by your committee."<sup>15</sup> In the statement of Carl De Temple to the Senate, he admitted that over \$1 million had been expended in the

effort to bring the Games to Denver.<sup>16</sup>

By 1972, it appeared that the Denver Olympics were in jeopardy (this point will be elaborated upon further in this chapter). Citizens of Colorado were losing confidence in the DOC, and the possibility of federal funding (contingent upon state support) was beginning to grow dim. During the Senate subcommittee hearings in June of 1972, great pains were taken to outline supporting groups. Both U.S. houses of congress adopted resolutions reaffirming support of the continued designation of Denver as host of the 1976 Games. Strong support was also forthcoming from Denver Mayor William McNichols, the Denver City Council, the University of Denver Board of Trustees (the Olympic Village was to utilize buildings on the University of Denver campus), the President of the University of Colorado, and officials at Metropolitan State College at Denver. Colorado U.S. Congressman James McKeivitt stated for the congressional record that some 39 community groups were in favor of the Olympic plans; among the groups included the following: the Boy Scouts, the PTA, the Denver Symphony Orchestra, the Red Cross, the Campfire Girls, various ski and recreation groups, as well as business groups.<sup>17</sup> This all helped support the claims of the Denver Olympic officials that the long-range planning effort had the full endorsement of Colorado, and the money allocated for this planning had not been ill-spent.

### 3.22 Organization

For the inter-organizational relationships of the DOC to the other Olympic committees, and to the Colorado governmental agencies, refer to Figure 1. Figure 2 depicts the organizational chart of the DOC. These were taken from De Temple's statement to the Senate.




Figure 1. Inter-Organizational Relationships, Denver 1976 Olympics.

Source: Statement of DeTemple to Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation.




Figure 2. Organization Chart, City of Denver and DOC.

Source: Statement of DeTemple to Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation.

### 3.23 Attempts to Integrate Olympic Plans with Community Planning Priorities and Established Plans

Mayor McNichols testified to the Senate that existing arenas and stadiums would be modified and enhanced in order that they might accommodate the Olympic events. Olympic funds would contribute towards improving the airport, the Denver transit system, and city services. In McNichols' words: "The honor of hosting the 1976 Olympics represents a catalyst which will inspire the construction of these needed facilities in a much shorter time frame than they could expect to be accomplished without this thrust."<sup>18</sup> Eric Auer, Vice President of the DOC, explained that the Games would "bring together state and federal environmental planning in Colorado for the first time. They'll be the catalyst for land use."<sup>19</sup> When serious charges of misrepresentation and imminent environmental damage were being leveled against the Olympics and the DOC, Henry Kimbrough of the DOC argued that "we must use the Olympics as a tool to focus (on) these problems (of ecological harm, overcrowding, uncontrolled growth, and the like)."<sup>20</sup>

The city of Denver attempted to include a HUD housing application in the Olympic planning. Some 1625 units of low and medium income housing were to be financed through HUD and used for the Games as press housing. The units were needed with or without the Olympics, admitted McNichols, but it was the hope that the Olympics deadline would speed up the HUD application process. It is worth noting that this idea originated within the disadvantaged and ethnic communities. Through citizen participation a highly detailed plan emerged to use the Games as a means of improving living conditions within the community.<sup>21</sup>

The Olympic effort was to be used as a stimulus for refurbishing the City of Denver. A new performing arts center and auditorium parking garage were to be constructed in time for the Games.<sup>22</sup> Building improvements and new facilities were already scheduled, but the Olympics would have provided money and incentive to complete the projects with more haste. McNichols told the Senate: "The construction and modifications I have set forth are, without exception, improvements that would hopefully be accomplished even if it had not been for our hosting the 1976 winter Games. This designation, however, provided a catalyst which, with its time frame parameters, caused us to think in terms of a concentrated effort to achieve these projects within the next three and one half years."<sup>23</sup>

Comprehensive planning was incorporated into the planning process. De Temple noted that immediately following the selection of Denver, a comprehensive study of the organization of the Games was commissioned through the Denver Research Institute of the University of Denver. The DOC used this study as a blueprint to define tasks and objectives, and to design an organizational structure for the planning and staging of the Games.<sup>24</sup>

An additional document was prepared, dealing with the staging of certain events in the Central Platte Valley. The study outlined the goals and objectives, needs and current problems existing in the Valley. It demonstrated how the Olympics would enhance the area, how the Olympic details could be instituted into the elements of the Platte Valley concept plan. The final recommendations of the report were these: "Equally important however is the consideration which would be given to using the Olympics as a catalyst for achieving the restoration and redevelopment

of a very significant area of our city. At the same time, it provides an excellent site in the heart of our community to accommodate and host our visitors from around the world."<sup>25</sup>

The State of Colorado specifically wrote the Olympics into its Land Use Act of 1971, a portion of which reads:<sup>26</sup>

"The basic duties and responsibilities of the Commission regarding the 1976 Winter Olympics shall be evaluation of community impact and other considerations relating thereto, potential land consumption rates, and public investment programming and planning and the Commission shall designate to the Governor and to the general assembly specific information necessary for the Commission to perform its duties and the Governor shall require the DOC or any other State agency to furnish or agree to furnish such information before the Governor approves the payment of any State money to such committee or agency."

This Act would appear to insure that harmful ecological and land use practices would not result from the Games.

There is one bothersome aspect to all of this: even though the Olympic effort was instituted in 1963, there is no evidence that the Games were incorporated into the policies and planning priorities of Denver as outlined in the 1967 master plan.<sup>27</sup> There was another study released as late as 1970 involving the Denver parks and open spaces development. No reference to the Olympics appeared in this study either: in the author's opinion this should have been a major part of the program.<sup>28</sup> The comprehensive or master plan of any city is intended to plan for every phase of the community's growth and development at least 15 years into the future. Something as important and encompassing as the Olympics should not be overlooked in a master plan. The omission in Denver's case may provide one explanation why the Games were eventually voted down.

### 3.24 Administrative Planning

As section 3.30 of this chapter will deal with the planning of facilities, this section will be devoted to those administrative features including funding and attendance figures.

James Hamilton III, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, admitted that the Games would provide a major incentive for an increase in the number of foreign tourists in the U.S. At a minimum, 8,000 foreign visitors were expected to attend the contests, with perhaps as many as 10,000 making the trip. This activity was expected to generate as much as \$4 million, and to help eliminate the "traveler deficit."<sup>29</sup> A press assembly of at least 3,300 was expected, while the DOC had projected that the number of athletes, participants, and officials would reach 1,600.<sup>30</sup> It was recognized that a limitation on the maximum number of visitors would be the seating capacities of the various arenas and stadiums.

In terms of cost, Clifford Buck (President of the USOC) declared: "There is no place in the United States and perhaps no place in the world where the Olympics (Winter) can be properly staged at as small an expenditure as can be done at Denver."<sup>31</sup> Even when it became apparent that the Games would have to be staged at various sites throughout Colorado, (Denver, Steamboat Springs, and Avon) Governor Love was still predicting a cost of only \$35 million: \$15 million to come from state and local resources including TV rights, and \$19.9 million to be provided by the federal government.<sup>32</sup> This \$19.9 million was contingent upon the State of Colorado providing its share. When the citizens of Colorado voted not to appropriate the state's portion, federal offerings were withdrawn and the city (Denver) could not fund the Games.



### 3.25 Secrecy Charges and Deceptions

Sam Brown, the informal staff director of a stop-the-Olympics movement called "Citizens for Colorado's Future" (CCF) objected to the DOC's "secret" operations: "Public tax dollars will pay for much of the Games, but are now being spent at private meetings at which no records are kept." The DOC's response was that the meetings had to be private in order to prevent land speculation.<sup>33</sup> C. Ransom Stovall, representing such groups as Protect Our Mountain Environment (POME), the Mountain Area Planning Council, The Colorado State Grange, and others, supported Brown's allegations in his testimony to the Senate: "I have documented to a certain extent the fact that the DOC has handled themselves in a rather secretive way. The hearings have not been public. The organizations which I represent have not been allowed to make any sort of contribution or input into the decision-making process." He further contended that "basically we feel the DOC is out of touch with the desires of the citizens of Colorado. They are indifferent to the pleas of Coloradans living in the Front Range. The results of opinion polls taken by the Rocky Mountain News and the Canyon Courier amply support this contention."<sup>34</sup>

In an article appearing in the New Republic in January of 1972, the DOC was accused of having its own brand of dirty tricks. The following is an excerpt from that article:<sup>35</sup>

"The bid book was and is a magnificent piece of salesmanship. From the heavy coat of snow airbrushed by an artist onto a photo of Mt. Sniktau, to cover potentially embarrassing bare spots, to the statement that construction of an Olympic speed skating rink 'will begin in 1970,' the book contains a series of misrepresentations.

"Denver promised 100,000 beds for tourists when only about 35,000 will be available, Norman C. Brown, DOC public affairs manager admitted.

"And it promised a 45-minute drive from the Olympic Village to Mt. Sniktau, but it didn't mention that was possible by shutting off all traffic on I-70 and running six lanes of buses up the mountains....

"Denver promised to stage Nordic ski events requiring snow-covered countryside in a rapidly growing mountain residential area with a 4% chance of having enough natural snow.

"And Denver promised to hold Alpine skiing on a mountain which probably wouldn't be developed except for the Olympics."

The reasons for these tactics were obvious to any Denver resident: there is no snow in Denver during February; and the ski country is on the western side of the continental divide, while Denver is on the eastern side.

Under the IOC rules, every event had to be held within 45 minutes of the main site. The organizers were thus confronted with the dilemma of either the following: 1) manufacturing all snow for the races, cutting 8-foot gaps in private backyard fences for cross country skiing, bulldozing an entire hillside for jumpers, and packing large numbers of spectators into tiny locations;<sup>36</sup> and/or 2) petitioning the IOC to allow them to move certain events onto more suitable sites on the western side of the divide. Naturally once the public realized the magnitude of this deception and its consequences, opposition became widespread (see section 3.70 of this chapter).

The New Republic accused the DOC of employing what it called "slipshod" methods of planning and management. Several examples were offered: 1) the principal owner of a ski corporation first heard on his car radio that his property was the site for some alpine events, 2) until the DOC announced that alpine events were scheduled for parts of the

Forest Service lands, the Forest Service had never been approached on the matter, 3) a study released by the University of Colorado revealed that the Sniktau site would be totally unsuitable for after-use and that it would generate the least amount of income and revenue of all sites studied, 4) the DOC announced that the Denver Coliseum would be used for certain events, but as of a year after the bid had been given to Denver, the Coliseum manager had not been contacted by anyone connected with the Games concerning the use of the arena, 5) the chancellor of the University of Denver was asked by the DOC, "do you mind if we say that the Olympic Village could be at the University of Denver?" and was not contacted again until 10 months after the bid -- the students had never been consulted about the use of the facilities scheduled for the middle of a term, 6) the DOC (at this point) had produced no firm figures on costs; specifically, the percentage Colorado and Denver taxpayers would pay. Part of the reason for this style of planning was provided by John Vanderhoof, the Lt. Governor: "They (the DOC) were pressed for time so they lied a bit."<sup>37</sup>

Carl De Temple eventually admitted that "we made some mistakes, but nothing meriting cancellation of the Games."<sup>38</sup> The public thought otherwise, however, expecting more integrity in local government than it was receiving at that time in Washington.

### 3.30 Facilities

#### 3.31 Existing Facilities

Denver's attempts to stage all of the events within a 45 minute radius of the main site had to be aborted when public protest and

rational thinking prevailed. Alternative sites were sought out and plans established to utilize existing structures to the extent possible.

In his defense of Denver's bid for the Games, Mayor McNichols argued that "many elements which had become a very part of the Games were in place in Denver, and had been unfairly attributed to the cost of the Games."<sup>39</sup> These elements included highways, public buildings, and "millions of dollars of locally funded facilities." The facilities as they existed in Denver and other sites included these:

1. the 50,000 seat Mile High Stadium - home of the Denver Broncos, and site for the opening and closing ceremonies;
2. the Denver Convention Center - the press center, and proposed for cultural events usage;
3. the 9,000 seat Denver Coliseum - the proposed site of hockey and figure skating;
4. University of Denver buildings - the proposed site of the Olympic Village and 5,000 seat arena;
5. Steamboat Springs - trails for cross country skiing and a ski jump, both to be upgraded; and,
6. Avon - runs suitable for alpine skiing.

It was necessary, of course, to institute certain modifications and renovations for these structures. Mile High Stadium required a cauldron for the Olympic flame, winterized plumbing, and lighting improvements for night colored television. The 20 year old Coliseum needed substantially more upgrading. Colored television lights were needed, in addition to a new concrete floor for the ice surface. The original floor was cracked, and the dimensions would have had to be enlarged to accommodate international hockey. McNichols reported that the

convention complex required "modification." Currigan Hall, to be used to house the press, would have had to be outfitted with equipment used by electronic and print media technicians. The adjacent auditorium and theatre buildings would have required improvements as well.<sup>40</sup> The ski areas would have had to be upgraded with new lifts, improved trails, and new snow making equipment. The City of Denver would have been obliged to make facial repairs in anticipation of world-wide exposure.<sup>41</sup>

### 3.32 New Facilities

The following are the new facilities that would have been required for Colorado's staging of the Games: (refer to Appendix D for details)

1. biathlon - Steamboat Springs;
2. nordic skiing - Steamboat Springs;
3. bobsled and luge - Doublehead Mt.;
4. ski jumping - Doublehead;
5. speed skating - Denver;
6. alpine skiing - Avon; and
7. another ice arena, 10,000 seating capacity - Denver (this was listed as a highly desirable item).

Numerous support structures would have been required for each one of the above events. In response to the proposals came charges of unneeded facilities. Charles Lindley, a State representative from Colorado, testified to the Senate that he felt severe reductions in the facilities budget could be accomplished. He thought that the permanent warming buildings for the nordic and biathlon events, along with the two small stadiums for viewing the start and finish of the cross country and shooting competitions were unnecessary.<sup>42</sup> It was also his contention that

since ski jumping involved only 70 and 90 meter competition, a 5 hill complex was wasteful. There were wide-spread objections to the bob run because of its limited after-use potential. The DOC petitioned the IOC to allow it to combine the two-man bob and luge into the same course, and to eliminate from competition the four-man bobsled event. This would have reduced the required track by 2,000 feet.<sup>43</sup> Representative Lindley objected to one other item on the budget: \$200,000 for snow making equipment at Vail. "We are talking about ski country USA. This is the heart of the ski country. This is where God has endowed us with natural snow-fall that makes it all possible and just because they want the 9th degree of perfection we are going to put in \$200,000 to give that ice base so they will have perfection."<sup>44</sup>

The DOC, in describing the capital facilities which would be required, stated its primary objectives as follows: "The creation of facilities of lasting value to the community, state, and nation...our prime objective is to propose the maximum potential for after-use which will assure a viable, responsible organization to develop and administer sports programs, by utilizing each facility, and thereby create a United States Winter-Sports Training Center." It was expected the facility would remain a "national legacy" to winter-sports.<sup>45</sup>

With this in mind, the proposed all-purpose arena could be utilized for "a wide variety of sports events...it will also be utilized for meetings of all types, for expositions and music and other cultural presentations."<sup>46</sup> To gather support for construction of other event-sites, the DOC referred to the shortages of bob runs, ski jumps, speed skating tracks, biathlon ranges, etc., in the U.S. The DOC hoped that the Denver facilities would become major training sites, as well as

being available for the hosting of competitions. De Temple did not consider the warming huts and viewing areas to be wasted facilities. These structures, he said, would "enhance" the area, and enhance the opportunity for training and participation in the Steamboat Springs area.<sup>47</sup> He further argued that the five-hill complex for ski jumping was necessary for training young jumpers, as one must work up to 70 and 90 meter jumps.

As previously mentioned, the Denver Olympic Village (to be funded in part by HUD) was to revert to low and medium income housing. There are varying reports concerning the outcome of the \$31.3 million project. The Saturday Review reported that HUD "pledged only a portion" of the money requested;<sup>48</sup> the Engineering News-Record stated that HUD rejected the entire proposal because there was no plan for 100% federal financing of housing projects.<sup>49</sup> The plan was attacked locally because "the land under consideration (was) thought by city planners to be too isolated for low-income housing, although suitable for hotel development. In addition, successful development depends on cleaning out the railroad tracks there, which is highly unlikely before the Olympics because of the lack of time and money."<sup>50</sup>

Two comments should be made at this point. First, the HUD application process is an extremely complex one in terms of paper-work and total amount of time involved. There are varying formulas that govern the combination of federal and local funding, depending to a great extent upon the numbers of units and low-income families involved. Under no circumstances would HUD have provided 100% funding. Second, while the plan for this idea originated within the community, the choice of location did not; abandoned railroad yards seldom make for ideal living

environments. The area was isolated from essential community services such as mass-transit lines, community centers and offices, schools, shopping areas, etc.

Opponents to the Games also questioned the DOC's use of three separate sites in Colorado, as it would have entailed the creation of three Olympic Villages. Structures at the University of Denver were to be used there, and the Village at Steamboat Springs would have been located within structures at the U.S. International University. The alpine events, planned for Avon near Vail, would have required on-site construction of lodging facilities capable of accommodating 600 persons. These improvements were to benefit the Vail community, schools, and tourist industry.<sup>51</sup>

### 3.40 The Environment

#### 3.41 Involvement of Environmental Organizations

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through its regional office monitored the progress of the Olympic planning process. In the statement of Donald Dubois (Deputy Regional Administrator) to the Senate, the EPA declared that it was in frequent contact with the DOC, and that it had offered Governor Love its full support and cooperation in environmental matters.<sup>52</sup> Dubois outlined the role of the EPA concerning planning for the Games as follows:

1. continued liaison with and assistance to, the DOC, State of Colorado, city of Denver, and many of the agencies and institutions involved in the process;



2. participation in planning studies to insure that necessary environmental protection factors are built into the Olympic program;
3. lend assistance in the preparation of a minimum of 14 impact statements, through review of draft and final statements;
4. assist to the extent possible with demonstration and construction projects for waste management facilities to be used in conjunction with the Games; and,
5. give priority attention to the 1976 Olympics in Denver.

The Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Sierra Club was very active in the entire Olympics campaign. As reported in the January 1, 1972 Denver Post (see volume 80, #153), the Sierra Club raised several questions concerning land use. These were mentioned during the Senate subcommittee hearings and Governor Love responded to them as follows:<sup>53</sup>

1. Lack of realistic state land use planning will result in land speculation with disastrous ecological results.

Love: 'We are one of the leaders in the nation so far as implementing land use programs; the facilities themselves do not represent a problem, as they were already scheduled to be built; I don't believe that the 10 day Games are going to be the reason for more land speculation.'

2. Lack of implemented regional transportation plans and Denver's lack of rapid transit will encourage environmental hazardous development.

Love: 'I fail to see how this will represent any great problem.'

3. Staging the Games will encourage population increases.

Love: 'I believe that Colorado will continue to grow, and I do not think that a sports event of 10 days is that important a factor compared with the other factors that are potential or have already occurred in Colorado.'

4. The costs to Colorado would outweigh the benefits.

Love: 'The benefits do not represent any great commercial bonanza; rather, intangible benefits such as stimulation of land use planning, aquisition of needed facilities, pride and unity, and others which far outweigh the costs.'

POME (Protect Our Mountain Environment) was very instrumental in representing the ecological concerns and posing potential effects that the Games would have on one particular area of Colorado: the Front Range. Their activities will be discussed in part 3.42 of this section.

### 3.42 Lack of Sensitivity Towards the Environment

It would seem that the official stance was in favor of staging the Games at any cost, as found in the statement of Colorado's U.S. representative, Don Brotzman:<sup>54</sup>

"You will hear, Mr. Chairman, from those who oppose the Games in Colorado on the ground that they will adversely affect the environment of the state. Frankly, there is no type of human endeavor which, when improperly executed, does not pose a threat to the environment. But it need not be so, and I am confident that those charged with planning for the Games have gone to great lengths to assure that they will actually enhance Colorado's total environmental picture."

This feeling was also found in the statement of the chirman of the Denver Regional Council of Governments, Thomas Kristopeit. Kristopeit did not agree with the view that the Games would become a series of events with facilities that would cause and engender serious and adverse ecological impacts. "I do not believe that this view is accurate; on the contrary: 1) the Games can establish new environmental standards; and 2) the real issue is the quality of growth, not the Games...(furthermore), ten, fifteen or even twenty years of growthmanship cannot be stopped or reversed in a year or two, nor by any single event such as the Olympics....The fact of the matter is that cities are

not masters of their own destinies in many, large scale ways."<sup>55</sup> In the opinion of the author, this view reflects a complete misunderstanding of urban theory, and the effects of an event such as the Olympics upon a city.

Insensitivity in planning was portrayed most graphically in that area known as the "Front Range." This area does not include Denver or any of the site cities on the western side of the Divide, but starts west of a series of hog backs (spined hills) and rises vertically 1½ miles above the plains cities. It includes Connifer, Doublehead Mt., and the residential community of Evergreen. According to POME, major ecological impacts would occur in the mountains and not in the plains cities. POME claims the area is suited for limited population densities, recreation uses, and light grazing. The natural cover crops such as grass and trees are important to these uses. If disturbed, several generations are required for growth of replacement cover crops.

Doublehead Mt., in the Front Range, was the area where ski jumping, bobsled and luge events were planned, both for the Olympics and then on a permanent basis. Cross country skiing and the biathlon were also planned for the area until residents objected quite vehemently to the plans calling for 8 foot gaps to be cut into backyard fences so that the trails could be run through the neighborhood, and, the use of the schoolyard for the shooting competition. The parents expressed fear that "biathlon competitors will gun down innocent children in their schoolyard."<sup>56</sup>

The selection of the Front Range as an Olympic site was probably the most conspicuous example of malfeasant planning on the part of the DOC. It was a decision reflecting a complete disregard for property and citizens' rights. While the area may have been suited for some types of

recreational uses, there are several (such as the creation of hiking trails, parks and athletic fields) that would not have required the types of environmental modifications necessary for the creation of bobsleds and ski jumps. Cross country skiing, as its name suggests, has no place in residential communities.

While biathlon and cross country events were moved to Steamboat Springs, bobsledding and luge, along with ski jumping, were still planned for staging at Doublehead. POME vigorously objected on several environmental grounds: 1) there was no present level area for any run to bottom out at the site, as the meadows at the base have a 10% slope and only by massive earth movement could a level outrun be created (in fact, New Republic noted that one hill would have had to be leveled and another its top cut off for ski lifts and stands, and "that proposed sanitation facilities would have infected local wells;")<sup>57</sup> 2) temporary parking would inevitably involve trespass, with noise and fumes encroachment on neighboring private property; 3) proposed water storage at the site ignored the downstream rights of others to runoff water, and, additional wells would have encroached on the adjudicated water rights of others at the site, already water poor; and 4) the action proposed would have deprived adjoining landowners of their property rights to the aesthetic values of their land, their water rights, and their right to freedom from trespass without just compensation.<sup>58</sup>

As if to summarize the frustrations felt by the environmentalists, State Representative Richard Lamm remarked; "Every time I ask a question about the ecology, the Olympic people tell me, 'don't worry, we are going to take care of that.' But a state that has never taken down as much as a single billboard to improve the environment is not going to

run an Olympics that the ecologists would like."<sup>59</sup>

### 3.43 Ecological Ramifications

John Larson, Assistant Secretary of Program Policy, U.S. Department of the Interior, offered preliminary environmental studies to the Senate. The Interior Department contended their studies did not support the view that the Games would accelerate changes (both economic and in land use) to the community in and about the Denver area. "Some marginal, but small increment in environmental effect will occur," Larson stated, but he felt that the charges of ecological damage were magnified and distorted by the media.<sup>60</sup> According to Mayor McNichols, "environmental ramifications were a key factor in determining sites in the Colorado mountains for ski competitions. It is our feeling that there will be no negative impact attributable to the Olympic Games in the alpine and nordic ski competitions."<sup>61</sup>

Olympic organizers pointed with pride to the Colorado Land Use Act of 1971, called a "model act."<sup>62</sup> As has been discussed earlier, Olympic concerns were written into the act -- with the Commission and Governor having review powers and access to any information required in deciding land use questions arising from Olympic plans.

The major environmental impact statement<sup>63</sup> released by the Interior Department was included in the records of the House subcommittee hearings (henceforth referred to as House) and has been summarized in Appendix D. It is appropriate at this point to discuss the major elements of the statement.

It was felt that the Games could have far-ranging environmental significance, with the ecological consequences, effects, and impacts of the Olympics greater than the sum of the specific impacts at each of the sites. Throughout the entire document, however, appeared the disclaimer that some of the statements and conclusions were only "reasonable judgements" based on then known facts; that more established facts were necessary; that some of the impacts were occurring regardless of the Olympics and it would be extremely difficult to sort out particular impacts attributable to the Games. In fact, it appears that at times, the drafters of the statement would have preferred to wait until the damage was complete and all of the data available and only then assess the impact.

The study identified the 5 sites, and the requirements placed upon them by the different events. It identified the nature of the environment in general at each site. In this regard, it was noted that the magnitude of the population increase in the Denver area was highly significant. In the Front Range it was expected that the "significant" environmental consequence would be the rapid rise and development in the recreational and tourism industries -- due to the increase in population in the area.

In one crucial area concerning the effect of the Games on population and the commitment of resources, the study did not waiver. It concluded that increases in population, jobs, and services were all possible, and that an increase in the commitment of resources could result. There was concern that uncontrolled growth encouraged by the Olympics could cause strip cities to be created. The Colorado Land Use Act of 1971 was not expected to affect in any significant way the quantity of growth and development, the population and unemployment increases, or the changes

in the state's commitments of land and water. The statement further noted that the big city problems such as noise, pollution, and loss of open spaces, would be compounded in Denver's case by the rapid future growth (rapid growth that would not be discouraged by the Games in the least), and that the Land Use Act would only partially mitigate these problems. Obviously, one important consideration in having the Games in Colorado was exposure of the State to the U.S. and the world revealing an excellent place to vacation or live. Existing problems associated with rapid and sporadic growth would have become intensified substantially as a direct result of the Games.

Impacts at the various sites were analyzed, with the most consequential expected to occur at the Doublehead Mt. and Avon sites. Social impacts of severe magnitude could have occurred in Denver, including relocation of large numbers of people, use of scarce resources, and long-range changes in urban land resource patterns. More complete listings of the impacts are found in the appendix; impacts that do not justify the position of Larson that the Games would not accelerate change and damage communities.

### 3.50 Transportation

It is apparent by reading legislative reports and plans of the DOC that the transportation problem was not given serious thought. The Senate and House gave the matter token attention, as problems of the environment and site locations took priority. The Senate did, however, confront the Governor with the charges that had been registered concerning inadequate transportation. Governor Love responded by claiming that the road system in Colorado was "obviously much superior" to the transportation .

networks which existed in Grenoble, France and Sapporo, Japan when those cities sponsored the Olympics.<sup>64</sup> The Governor also stated that Colorado hoped to have I-70 (part of the nation's interstate system) completed from Denver to Avon, and this would alleviate any major problems. The highways from Denver to Steamboat Springs would remain four lanes wide, but Love stated his belief that the nordic events would not draw the large crowds and no problem would result.

Mayor McNichols was questioned about the transportation system of Denver in particular, and he failed to find any major obstacles. The Denver Broncos home football games were always sold out, McNichols stated, and there did not seem to be extraordinary difficulty with that traffic. He mentioned that "on an ordinary weekend, 40,000 skiers travel to present ski areas which are ordinarily reached by car."<sup>65</sup> (This is not to say, however, that all 40,000 people travel to the same resort). McNichols further explained that as a result of the Games, additional millions would be spent on improving airport and mass transit facilities. "With this additional equipment we will be able to enhance this service and have a 20% increase as against an average 6.9% decrease in other cities." Testimony of James Watt, Director of the Bureau of the Outdoors, Interior Department, reiterated the previously established position.<sup>66</sup> The Colorado legislative committee on the Olympics went on record stating that "any new highway or mass transit facility proposed for the Olympics must be contingent upon the long-range needs of the communities or transportation corridor to be served."<sup>67</sup>

The groups opposing the Games believed that the Olympics would not cost the officially stated estimate of \$35 million, but closer to \$100 million, part of this due to the increased cost of transportation arising



from the scattered locations of the sites.<sup>68</sup> Not only would three Olympic Villages have to be erected, but the cost of shuttling spectators, officials, and participants: 1) two hours by car to Avon from Denver; and 2) four hours by auto to Steamboat Springs from Denver, would result in cost becoming a factor.<sup>69</sup> The cost of building access roads and parking facilities in the mountainous terrain of Doublehead Mt. was estimated to be considerable because of the nature of the landscape and the fact that the facility would have had to accommodate the huge fleet of buses necessary to shuttle all participants and spectators to the site.

### 3.60 Benefits

With all of the "politics" involved in the Olympics, including professional versus amateur arguments, questionable officiating, boycotts, commercialism tactics, and all of the other misuses of the Olympic ideal, it is difficult to believe that "spiritual" notions are still considered benefits. However, the Denver Olympic promoters listed spiritual items such as: the promotion of brotherhood and understanding among men, international goodwill, sportsmanship, and furtherance of peace, as major rewards of hosting the Games. Somehow it was thought that the city that provided a format for this display of communion among men and women would be bestowed with great honor, no matter what it did to be awarded the Games.

There is no doubt that the tourist industry in Denver, Colorado, and the nation would have been tremendously enhanced as a result of the Denver Games. More than twice the usual number of tourists were anticipated, and the Games were to be used along with other similar events in

campaigns to promote the U.S. and attract 70 to 80 million foreign and local tourists.<sup>70</sup>

While private business persons would have received ample monetary compensation as a result of the Games, Denver and the state would have benefited greatly from the creation of the facilities essential for international winter sports competition. Those facilities are scarce in the U.S., and their creation would have furthered Colorado's "winter-sports heritage." Training programs would have been established on grand scales, and competitions would have been regular features to insure continued use of the facilities. Denver would have taken the opportunity to upgrade and improve existing buildings, priority items that would have been accomplished much quicker and cheaper on account of the Games.

### 3.70 The Opposition

In reading legislative and news accounts of the Denver Olympics, it seemed to the author that the proponents of the Games chose to look askance at the growing anti-Olympic sentiment. U.S. Representative James McKeivitt apparently convinced himself that public opinion on the Olympics was not widely divided, that the majority of the state citizens were concerned that the Games be "successful and a credit to the U.S. and Colorado."<sup>71</sup> Mayor McNichols felt that it is rare for a public project not to have "dissident voices." It was his attitude, based upon the experiences of Sapporo and Grenoble, that those who at first thought the undertaking was unwise and wasteful would finally realize that the outcome was worth the effort.<sup>72</sup>

Oklahoma Senator Fred Harris outlined the opposition stance when he inquired of the Senate regarding who was to pay and who was to profit.

Harris' position was that it would be the average working man and woman -- the average taxpayer -- who would pay the bill; and it would be the well-to-do businessperson, land owner, and real estate speculator who would all profit.<sup>73</sup> Richard Lamm expressed this same view when he said: "People are tired of having the chamber of commerce run this state, they are fed up with this 'Sell Colorado' campaign. People are starting to realize that 'big' and 'good' are not necessarily the same thing."<sup>74</sup>

Harris was also disturbed by what he termed Denver's "terribly messed up and turned around set of priorities" if Denver did provide for the Games. He was referring to the priority given the Olympics above more needed social programs such as health care, care for the elderly and handicapped, and help for Colorado's migrant farm workers. "The cost of one bobsled course is four times the Colorado state budget for air and water pollution. The cost of the speed skating track is seven times the budget for handicapped children."<sup>75</sup> A newspaper editor reported: "I can see every needed project in this city going begging for the next 6 years."<sup>76</sup>

Richard Lamm, Colorado State Representative, was very outspoken in his opposition to the Games. He admitted to the Senate that in 1967, he along with the entire Colorado legislature supported the effort. At the time, he explained, nothing was said of state funding (it was his contention that the DOC purposely misled the general assembly). In time, the original cost estimates were proven much too low, and the public's confidence in the DOC began to wane. At this point, Lamm told the subcommittee that opposition to the effort had "manifested itself in several ways which severely jeopardize Colorado's hosting the 1976 Olympics:"<sup>77</sup>

1. The Colorado House passed an Olympic appropriation by only one vote; if the future of the Games depended on 4 more state appropriations, Lamm suggested that the Games were in trouble;

2. several prominent people and institutions were calling for the resignation of the entire DOC (on this note, the following item appeared in the Saturday Review:<sup>78</sup>

"The DOC had good reason to want the Games. Its membership is composed of representatives of the industries that stand to gain the most by the extravaganza: the airlines, the hotels and restaurants, the phone company, the real estate dealers, the Rocky Mountain ski resorts....");

3. the CCF (Citizens for Colorado's Future) instituted a constitutional amendment to prohibit any further state funding (a group in Denver did the same thing concerning municipal funding of the Games);
4. organized labor was against the Games, and Avery Brundage (President of the IOC) made no secret of his opposition to the winter Games in general.

Lamm's sentiments were summarized in the following quotations: "All we are saying is that every road sign to this point has been that this is more likely to be a black eye to Colorado than an advantage;"<sup>79</sup> "We have shown that we don't need circuses in Colorado, we need solutions to problems."<sup>80</sup> These became the major tenets of the CCF, which was instrumental in creating the voter awareness that resulted in the Games being turned down by Colorado residents. Two bumper stickers distributed by the CCF very dramatically reflected the group's perceptions of the Olympic-related growth: "Ski Kansas," and "Don't Californicate Colorado." The final vote demonstrated that 65% of the citizens of Colorado who voted agreed with the CCF. The count was 522,000 opposed to the Games being staged in Colorado; and 348,000 in favor.<sup>81</sup> (Note: Richard D. Lamm was elected Governor of Colorado in November, of 1974).

### 3.80 Conclusion

The DOC's efforts to incorporate the planning policies and priorities of Denver seemed genuine at times. The problem lay in the fact that it was

"after the fact" planning. This is to say that after the DOC and Olympic supporters became committed to the idea of bringing home the Games, and after the bid was awarded, occasional attempts were made to mold the planning of the Games into housing and recreation plans that existed in Colorado. The DOC overlooked the obvious fact that the Games and their implications were not whole-heartedly accepted by all parties concerned. The primary planning document of Denver, its master plan, made no reference to involving the city in the Olympic Games. This oversight on the part of the DOC, along with its questionable planning practices, contributed towards voter disillusionment and eventual rejection of the Games.

Although testimony involving the environmental issue is conflicting, it is the author's opinion that there would have been impacts of sizable proportions in the areas of the Front Range and Vail. It is obvious that growth would have been stimulated and open land consumed. Even though McNichols claimed that other community programs would not suffer on account of the Games, the city would have been forced to sacrifice in some areas for the sake of the Olympics; the city's share would have eventually come from somewhere. The DOC attempted to treat these issues as misrepresentations and misperceptions of the public, a public that it totally underestimated and often times ignored.

It is not this author's opinion that the vote in Colorado against the 1976 Olympics was a vote against all future Olympics or sports in Colorado. Rather, it was a vote against self-serving and ill-conceived planning; planning that showed limited interest on behalf of the client who would have been forced to live with the results long after the two weeks of sports ended.

## 3.81 Points for Future Reference

1. One of the most important elements of the planning process, that of receiving the endorsements of officials, was demonstrated here as with Lake Placid and Squaw Valley.
2. The use of advocacy-type planning (from the community) should be a vital element of the process, as it was in Denver to certain points.
3. The notion of using the Olympics in conjunction with recreational and land use planning, and as a catalyst for civic improvement is excellent. It should, however, be initiated well in advance of the bid submission.
4. The following signs should not be overlooked by the Olympic committees:
  - a. A planning effort which was long-range, but not included in the master plan.
  - b. An area which was debating the growth/no-growth issue.
5. The application of the Olympics with major state and national programs (such as the Bicentennial) is exemplary.
6. The fact that the organizing committee works closely with environmental groups such as the EPA is encouraging. It implies, though, that there will be a demonstrated sensitivity towards environmental impacts on the part of both.
7. It is essential that the major facilities (such as ski jumps and bobsled runs) exist previously. When facilities already exist, formal contact must be made with the officials in charge of them to assure their availability.

8. IOC rules are very specific as to the staging of the events in relation to the main site. Rule changes should not be used to alleviate shortcomings.
9. Residential lands (including those already developed) must never be planned to accommodate events of the nature of cross-country skiing, ski jumping, and bobsledding.
10. Municipal and State ballots should contain items associated with the citizenry views of the Games prior to any official presentation of intent to the major Olympic committees.

FOOTNOTES - DENVER, 1976

- <sup>1</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 1976 Denver Winter Olympics. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, Senate, on S. 3531, 92d Congress, 2d Session, 1972, 1.
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 2.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 17.
- <sup>4</sup> "Denver Triumph A 7 Year Effort," New York Times, 119, 41017, (May 13, 1970), 53.
- <sup>5</sup> Drummond Ayres Jr., "Invitation To Go Elsewhere," New York Times, 122, 41931, (November 13, 1972), IV, 5.
- <sup>6</sup> "The '76 Olympics: Quarreling Already," Business Week, 2221, (March 25, 1972), 30.
- <sup>7</sup> U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 34.
- <sup>8</sup> Bill Bruns, "Will Colorado Scrap Its Own 1976 Olympics?", Life, 73, 18, (November 3, 1972), 81.
- <sup>9</sup> Michael Strauss, "Colorado Joins Olympic Bidders," New York Times, 116, 39947, (June 8, 1967), 64.
- <sup>10</sup> U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 5.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 5-6.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 16.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> Denver Organizing Committee For The XII Olympic Winter Games 1976. Statement By Carl DeTemple, President, Before the Parks and Recreation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, (June 9, 1972), 1.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 2.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 3.
- <sup>17</sup> U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 9-10.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 35.
- <sup>19</sup> Jerry Kirshenbaum, "Voting To Snuff The Torch," Sports Illustrated, 37, 21, (November 20, 1972), 55.



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- 31 Ibid., p. 148.
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- 58 U.S. Senate, Olympics, p. 170.
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- 74 Bruns, "Will Colorado Scrap," p. 81.
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CHAPTER IV MONTREAL

XXIst Summer Olympiad, 1976

"Cities should not waste their resources on expenditures for a large number and variety of games, lest they exhaust themselves in futile exertion and quarrel over unreasonable desire for glory." (Attributed to Gaius Maecenas, Roman Statesman - 8 BC.)

CBS Television Network, "Selling The Olympics," 60 Minutes, 8, 22, (May 23, 1976), 6.

#### 4.10 Rationale for Hosting the Games at Montreal

The primary reason the IOC selected Montreal over its competitors for the 1976 Summer Olympics had little to do with logical considerations such as the ability to stage and the ability to finance the Games. Rather, it was a decision caught up in politics. When it came time to choose the site, the U.S. and Russia (represented by Los Angeles and Moscow) were the only other contenders that could afford the Olympics. Eager to avoid involvement in East-West political skirmishes, the IOC gratefully chose neutral Canada.<sup>1</sup>

To justify its decision, the IOC claimed it was impressed by Montreal's idea of a "more modest, less expensive setting," a return of the Games to a "human scale." Jean Drapeau, Mayor of Montreal, appeared before the IOC "with tears in his eyes and holes in his pockets," claiming the history of Montreal was guarantee enough the Games would be staged as promised. He indicated that the discussions of cost and the ability to finance plans had no place in decisions concerning the Olympics and what they stand for.<sup>2</sup> Drapeau's personality, and the fact that he and his associates "carefully plotted to wean, cajole, influence, impress and win over almost all members of the IOC" resulted in his victory. The earlier Expo '67, with its big success, was highly regarded by the IOC, most of whose members were "expensively wined and dined" there. This fact alone may have been the decisive factor in the choice of Montreal.<sup>3</sup>

When Drapeau was interviewed just prior to the opening of the Games, he referred to "the incentive for youth to love and participate in amateur sports" as one of the main reasons for bringing the Games to Canada.<sup>4</sup> He intended to make the Games "an event with charm" and of such

"modest and human scale" that even poor countries would be encouraged to host future Olympics.<sup>5</sup> The Montreal Games were to be staged with "simplicity, dignity, and a real grandeur of friendship of peoples."<sup>6</sup> Montreal was to assume its "symbolic role of promoting a healthy, bi-cultural Canadianism and the city's image within the international community."<sup>7</sup>

The Montreal delegation was convinced that politics could be eliminated from the Games if the IOC awarded Canada the Games. Mayor Drapeau explained, "in extending its invitation, Montreal is simply seeking the privilege of serving mankind."<sup>8</sup> Drapeau called Montreal the "potential savior" of the Olympics,<sup>9</sup> an idea expounded upon by writer/athlete Bruce Kidd: "For the community which hosts them, there is a 'contact high' from international games... In its highest form, sports creates such beauty that it can transcend ideological and chauvinistic rivalries and bring peoples from many different countries together."<sup>10</sup>

The intensity of the Canadian effort was summed up in the words of Bill Cox, Vice President of the Canadian Olympic Association: "Short of a world war, there is no bigger forum for our country than the Olympics."<sup>11</sup> Cox was referring to the potential economic gain attributable to the Games. Economic considerations, however, were presented almost immediately as expenditures rather than gains: "Without offering a dime in financial guarantees, with no stadium and few other athletic facilities, Mayor Drapeau had won the Games for Montreal; for the first time in their history, they were to be held on Canadian soil."<sup>12</sup>

As with other Olympics discussed, there is generally one factor that proves to be the motivating force behind a city's desire to host the Games. Although laudable notions, promotion of sportsmanship,

brotherhood, etc., do not fully account for the cities' extended campaigns (in Montreal's case, one of 13 years) for the Games. The primary motivation of Montreal was suggested by a resident who referred to Mayor Drapeau's megalomania.<sup>13</sup> Forbes Magazine also suggested this in an April 15, 1976 article: "Both (Olympic stadium and village) will stand as monuments to Jean Drapeau and as a constant reminder of Drapeau's belief that people must be inspired to build great structures."<sup>14</sup> Bruce Kidd wrote that Drapeau's Olympic plans indicated a deliberate preference "for political monuments rather than social betterment."<sup>15</sup> The fact that the Olympic stadium in Montreal was to be the "grandest" of all the domed stadiums<sup>16</sup> would seem to provide support to this theory (especially in light of Drapeau's promises for modest Games and human scale). Nick Auf der Maur -- opposition member of Montreal's city council -- left no doubt with this explanation of Drapeau: "He feels there are only a few men in a generation capable of stirring that imagination, of lifting a people to great heights. This is the stuff of greatness, the men who have a rendezvous with destiny, the pyramid builders. Their legacies are the cathedrals and other monuments to grandeur. History remembers them, the people are grateful to them. Their critics are short-sighted, incapable of understanding that these leaders incarnate the people's yearning for greatness."<sup>17</sup>

The inspiration for this came from one desire: the Mayor's ambition to make Montreal "The First City of the world."<sup>18</sup> Drapeau stated that "there is no challenge too great for Montreal...Montreal is en route to becoming The City of the world. Twenty years from now, no matter what happens, it will have achieved this position, and it will be referred to in all parts of the world as The City."<sup>19</sup> With this in mind, it became

obvious to Drapeau that the "only suitable encore to Expo '67 was the Olympiad,"<sup>20</sup>

#### 4.20 Planning

##### 4.21 Planning Organization

Olympic protocol dictates that every country hosting the Olympics form an Olympic committee. This committee must be a non-profit organization responsible for the organization and staging of the Games. Under curious circumstances, the Canadian Olympic Association became responsible for the Games, and immediately delegated the task to COJO (Comite Organisateur des Jeux Olympiques). COJO then moved its operation into a building next door to City Hall, because "if anyone had imagined that the Mayor would turn over the Olympics to a bunch of amateur sports officials," they were mistaken. "Whoever controlled the organizing committee controlled the Games, and Drapeau controlled it absolutely."<sup>21</sup> When the federal and provincial governments announced that they would not lend financial assistance to Montreal, the Mayor introduced the "self financing" plan of the Olympics. The result: "Many people realized that this gave the Mayor complete freedom of action, no questions asked."

##### 4.22 The Nature of the Planning

From the start the Mayor's attitude in planning the Games was based upon insensitivity and veiled secrecy. Commenting on his grand plan for the Olympic Village and stadium, Drapeau said: "The ugliness of the slums in which people live doesn't matter if you can make them stand to look in wonder at things they understand."<sup>22</sup> Drapeau's policy



towards openness with press and the public was as follows: "I don't like to be specific if it can be avoided...it is better."<sup>23</sup> As late as two years before the Games, the Mayor still had no clear idea of the form that the Olympic Village would take; in fact "not even a pencil sketch existed."<sup>24</sup> One writer critiquing the Montreal Olympic plans could not understand the need for COJO's secrecy regarding the Game's cost: "Who really knows? My guess is that no one really knows, no one at all."<sup>25</sup> Auf der Maur wrote that "COJO and the city had operated according to the style and custom that Jean Drapeau had developed over the years: total secrecy -- don't tell the press and public a thing unless it suits your purpose."<sup>26</sup>

Very little data was released concerning the Olympic plans. As a result COJO, the press, and the public seemed driven by speculation and blind faith. Yvan Dubois (Director of the Olympic Village) was unconcerned with the lack of firm planning for the Village: "It will be ready, I am certain."<sup>27</sup> There was a general sense that "Drapeau will bring it off somehow," and with COJO confident in its figures, "we simply will do the Olympics as we have promised."<sup>28</sup> Drapeau's working philosophy was as follows: "Problems are solved en route." Commenting on this style of planning, Frank Deford was reminded of what Muhammad Ali used to say: "If I tell you a fly can pull a plow, hitch him up."<sup>29</sup>

Serious problems developed as a result of Drapeau's secrecy and "cost be damned" approach to planning the Games. He referred to the estimated \$800 million deficit as a "gap," not a deficit. "As long as you have all of the bills in but not all of the revenue, it is a gap."<sup>30</sup> When Mike Wallace attempted to get a firm cost projection from Drapeau, Drapeau responded: "It will go to what we will know when it's all over."<sup>31</sup>

This attitude was also reflected in the actions of Drapeau's Parisian architect, Roger Taillibert. (Taillibert allegedly charged a \$40 million fee for designing the major Olympic facilities -- four times the highest fee ever paid to an architect in North American history and more than the entire 1200 member Quebec Order of Architects made in 1974; his fee alone was \$9 million more than the total cost of Houston's Astrodome.)<sup>32</sup> Taillibert told reporters, "Don't ask me about costs. I only care for concrete."<sup>33</sup>

One writer described the Olympic planning of Montreal in this fashion: "Picture yourself planning a dinner party and then falling asleep 6 hours before the guests are due to arrive."<sup>34</sup> Drapeau was called "the greatest con artist Canada had ever produced." He was determined to "enrich Montreal at the expense of the rest of Canada."<sup>35</sup> John Robertson was slightly more kind in his appraisal of the COJO planning methodology: "Sometimes I think its a ship of fools run by Captain Kangaroo and Walter Mitty. They won't tell anyone anything... These guys operate like the politicians of Paris: have some wine, have some conversation, things run themselves, open another bottle of wine, everyone bring a brick, and -- there! We've built a stadium."<sup>36</sup>

The self-financing plan for the Games was instituted, as mentioned, in order to avoid direct citizen approval of projects. Money was to be raised through 1) sales of television and commercial rights to the Games, 2) an Olympic lottery, and 3) the implementation of a coin and stamp program. The Olympic funding sources did not initially include increased taxes according to Drapeau, because of the following: 1) the Olympic Village would be converted to 4000 units of low-income housing (a substantial government subsidy was expected), 2) capital investments

running into the hundreds of millions would not be necessary for such things as new highways and transportation systems; 3) the Metro was already going to be extended; 4) Olympic events would be held all over the islands (in existing buildings) including Expo islands.<sup>37</sup> With the use of money from existing municipal programs it was expected that the above-mentioned financing programs would insure no increase in taxes nor problems for Montreal or Canada.

The original estimate for the total cost of the Games was \$124 million,<sup>38</sup> and final cost estimates have reached as high as \$2 billion<sup>39</sup> (it is still too early to speculate what the ultimate costs will be). Reasons for this sizable difference include:<sup>40</sup> 1) poor planning; 2) needless early delays; 3) unfamiliar construction techniques; 4) labor problems; and, 5) galloping inflation. According to Auf der Maur, "Labor problems and strikes did add cost and necessitate revised schedules, but in the overall scheme of things it was not as great a contributing factor as many of those responsible would like to make of it." The major problem was described as: "constant confusion as to the chain of authority, resulting in administrative and technical chaos...a total collapse of administration."<sup>41</sup>

The lottery went very well, as did the other programs. Drapeau stated that "if the tap of Olympic revenues continue to flow until the bath is full, there can be no deficit." It was noted in reference to this that "the faucet flowed fine, but somebody forgot to put the plug in the bathtub."<sup>42</sup> One Drapeau critic suggested that "even if the lottery continues after the Games (it has been given a 3 year extension) the maximum revenue it can generate (\$30 - \$40 million per year) will pay only the interest charges on the deficit."<sup>43</sup> Seemingly it will then be

he citizens of Montreal, Quebec Province, and Canada who will eventually pay off the deficit.<sup>44</sup>

COJO originally had three goals in mind for Montreal's Olympic Games, all of which failed:<sup>45</sup>

1. self finance;
2. a budget of only one third to one half of that spent at Munich (Munich spent \$760 million, two thirds of which financed the subway construction); and,
3. structures to be designed for North American sports to last from 80-100 years (an electrician on the site of the stadium construction stated: "It's a racket. Too many people with connections. They're just gluing it together now, cutting corners all over the place. You'll see a lot of big defects showing up in a couple of years."<sup>46</sup>

By mid-November, 1975, COJO had confessed to being months behind schedule and nearly out of funds. The Quebec Provincial Assembly, at this point, assumed responsibility for administration, funding, and construction of the Olympic facilities. A pediatrician, Dr. Victor Goldbloom, was put in charge.

#### 4.23 Administrative Planning

Montreal's ambitious plans allowed for the presence of 11,150 athletes representing 132 countries of the world.<sup>47</sup> The main Olympic site was designed to accommodate the needs of 100,000 spectators, participants and officials.<sup>48</sup> It was reported by the end of March (1976), that housing reservations were filling up rapidly, as were orders for the 4.7 million tickets that had been printed.<sup>49</sup> Nearly \$100 million

was budgeted for security, to include: bomb disposal squads, 12,000 police and soldiers (more security personnel than athletes), a field hospital and morgue, sharpshooters and anti-sniper squads, border vigils, night patrols in full combat gear, high powered rifles, harbor and airport watches, canine patrols and armored vehicles. Assisting agencies included the Royal Mounted Police, police of Quebec, Ontario, Interpol, the U.S. FBI and CIA.<sup>50</sup> All of this effort and money was expended only to discover "that terrorists were within."<sup>51</sup>

In an attempt to put the enormous Olympic cost in perspective, the following illustration is submitted: The St. Lawrence Seaway cost the equivalent of \$1.23 billion in 1975 dollars; the Trans Canada pipeline (2,200 miles) cost \$970 million in 1976 dollars; Quebec's greatest single undertaking since 1970 -- the nationalization of the hydro-electric companies, cost \$600 million. By comparison, Montreal spent more than the cost of any of these projects for 2 weeks of sports and some facilities. Parenthetically it can be noted that the 70,000 seat football stadium in Foxboro, Massachusetts was built for the New England Patriots football team at a cost of \$6 million. It has been calculated that more than 100 such stadiums could have been constructed in Montreal for the cost of the one Olympic stadium.<sup>52</sup>

#### 4.30 Facilities

##### 4.31 Existing Facilities

The Engineering News-Record compared facilities and plans of Denver with those of Montreal in a June, 1970 issue: "Of the two cities, Montreal must start from scratch."<sup>53</sup> Mayor Drapeau claimed contemporaneously that "we have many swim pools and covered arenas for training

purposes, as well as track and field installations."<sup>54</sup> In reality the facilities were limited to two gymnasium-auditoriums (including the Montreal Forum) and a swimming pool at the main Olympic site.<sup>55</sup> Arthur Daley described the situation in this manner: "For the 1976 Olympics, the city that gave the world Expo '67 will have to start from scratch. It has virtually nothing in the way of proper facilities. Los Angeles has them. So has Moscow. But Montreal has the Olympic Games."<sup>56</sup>

#### 4.32 New Facilities

The plans for a "simple" Olympics gave way to the extraordinary design for facilities costing over \$1 billion to be constructed at 21 competitive sites. The stadium was planned to have a 50 story mast rising above it, so that a contractable roof could be lowered over the stadium like an umbrella. The mast was to contain 15 floors of training rooms, 2 floors of restaurant, and two Olympic sized pools, and a diving tank at the base. The Village was to consist of four 19 story buildings shaped like half-pyramids and containing 982 units. The velodrome (bicycling track) was an elaborate building of the same "flying saucer" design as the pool. A myriad of questionable circumstances have been cited concerning the acquisition of land and construction of nearly every one of the Parc Maisonneuve facilities (the main site), as well as at the other sites near Montreal.<sup>57</sup> Because of strikes, technical problems, etc., the stadium construction did not begin until late in the summer of 1974. It was ready in time for the Games, with only the bare essentials. The mast construction had to be "postponed" until a later date. The latest cost projections of the stadium are on the order of \$800 million.<sup>58</sup>

The vellodrome story is an interesting one. It was intended to cost \$8 million, but the cost escalated to \$70 million. It was to be completed in time for the cycling world championships of 1974. When the date neared and the facility was far from finished, a \$400,000 vellodrome was built at the University of Montreal and "it was thought to be a very good one."<sup>59</sup>

Like the Olympic stadium, the Village pyramids (latest estimate is \$100 million)<sup>60</sup> were not ready in time for the Games. While they were to be air conditioned and contain colored televisions, they were to house up to a dozen athletes per room (with one bathroom being shared by the twelve.<sup>61</sup> It has been suggested that they will not be used for low and medium-income housing as planned, or for any other use. One writer suggested that the apartments would follow the same course as "Habitat," the housing project designed by Moshe Safdie for Expo. Habitat was expected to be the award winning answer to low-income, high-density housing. When Habitat's high construction cost (caused by unique techniques and the limited number of units built) together with its fame increased the price, only upper-medium to high-income families could afford to live there. It is expected that after August, 1976, only the wealthy will be able to pay the \$20 - \$60,000 price for the Olympic Village apartments.<sup>62</sup>

One other serious problem with the Village design relates to practicality. Designers followed a Southern-French Mediterranean design rather faithfully, omitting indoor corridors in the buildings. Since Montreal generally experiences harsh winters, the design is somewhat dysfunctional.<sup>63</sup> If Montreal's plan meets with the same lack of success as Munich's Olympic Village housing approach, the units will still be

half-vacant four years after the Olympics.<sup>64</sup>

The after-life of the facilities is anticipated to have importance to sports in Montreal and Canada. It is planned that the stadium will accommodate professional baseball and possible football franchises of Montreal, as well as future track and field competition and other athletic meets. Should the other plans fail, it has been suggested that the stadium be transformed into a shopping center and the remainder of the facilities be sold to the government for use as part of the University of Quebec.<sup>65</sup>

By way of a postscript, however, it appears that Olympic facilities are in danger of following the same path as those of Expo (the neglected Expo facilities cost the city \$6 million annually).<sup>66</sup> Claude Charron, Sports Minister of Quebec commented in January of 1977 that "the stadium is a white elephant, and if you throw in the velodrome and swimming pool, you have to say that I'm in charge of a herd of white elephants."<sup>67</sup>

One idea discussed but not implemented is as ingenious a plan as that devised for Lake Placid's 1932 Olympics (involving the use of pull-man cars for temporary housing, see 17). This plan provided for 8-10 luxury ocean liners to dock in the St. Lawrence Seaway, at the moorings by the Expo site. This "floating village" was proposed as possible press lodgings, and could have provided all of the housing and entertainment needs of the visitors without creating "white elephant" structures.<sup>68</sup>

#### 4.40 The Environment

The Olympic Village site consumed 100 acres of land within two miles of the stadium. Critics, planners, and environmentalists worried about the loss of green spaces. Many residents complained that too many of the Victorian mansions were being torn down as a result of Olympic-



related projects.<sup>69</sup> Drapeau's reply to these criticisms was this: "If you want to see the country, you go to the country." On the subject of pollution the Mayor noted: "It's going down all of the time, but it's only reported when it goes up."<sup>70</sup>

Nonetheless, Montreal's pollution has been a topic of much discussion. "Montreal is an island surrounded by the polluted St. Lawrence River. Only 3% of Montreal's sewage is processed, and there is even more raw sewage floating down from the rest of La Belle Province. The petroleum refineries in the eastern end of the town assault the city with smells that not even New Jersey would accept."<sup>71</sup> As a direct result of city spending on the Olympics, Montreal will continue to dump its raw sewage (460 million gallons worth per day) into the St. Lawrence,<sup>72</sup> despite the fact that the effluent is killing the river.<sup>73</sup> One city official remarked: "We're the last major city in North America that dumps its raw sewage straight into rivers. It's untreated. And because of the Olympic debt, our waste disposal plant, which is under construction, has been delayed until 1984."<sup>74</sup>

There is some irony in all of this, as related in the following incident: Queen Elizabeth of England planned to sail to Canada in the Royal yacht, Brittania. When it was discovered that the yacht's waste disposal facilities did not conform to Canadian standards ("We don't want ships to dump raw sewage into Canadian waters"), it was arranged that a barge would take on the royal waste, and ship it to Montreal. At Montreal, the sewage would be brought ashore and dumped into the Montreal sewage disposal plant -- which would simply pump it directly into the river.<sup>75</sup>

#### 4.50 Transportation

As mentioned previously, many of the Olympic-related projects involved transportation systems. In total, nearly a billion dollars were budgeted for these infrastructure items:<sup>76</sup>

1. a 12 mile subway extension - \$200 million (part of the 25 mile expansion of the subway; total cost of the project - \$500 million;
2. relocation and extension of Trans Canada Highway System - \$100 million; and
3. construction of the first phase of Mirabel Airport - \$350 million (total cost of the airport is a half billion dollars.

COJO also allocated \$41.2 million for underground parking at the site, and the sum of \$12.7 million for "a simple overpass built to provide security for the athletes."<sup>77</sup> This viaduct was an exclusive walkway built so the athletes would be isolated from crowds. By 1976, its cost had risen to between 14 and 15 million dollars -- a questionable expenditure in light of the fact that it is 50% more than the city's annual road budget.<sup>78</sup>

Since Lake Placid will host the Olympics in 1980, representatives were sent to Montreal to study the transportation system utilized for the 1976 Games. A program information report was issued by the Lake Placid Olympic Committee.<sup>79</sup> This report indicated that while Lake Placid's primary concern was for the transportation program developed for "Olympic family members," other aspects of Montreal's "elaborate program" were discussed. These included COJO's system of providing speedy and impressive arrivals and departures at the airport and other ports of entry. A huge fleet of automobiles was assembled (through dealings with

the Big Three auto makers), and COJO relied upon the Montreal taxi system as a backup. Shuttle buses, part of a fleet of 1,900, transported athletes, coaches, and press from lodgings to site areas, with 100 special routes instituted. The last detail of the report dealt with transporting cargo and equipment. General Motors Corporation provided trucks for that purpose.

#### 4.60 Other Impacts

The deepest concerns of those who opposed Montreal's Olympics were with the consequences to other city programs. One critic wrote that "although Drapeau has concentrated on projects that bring prestige and pleasure to Montreal, he has shown less active interest in some acute social problems that afflict his city."<sup>80</sup> Montreal is a city of 1.4 million residents, over twenty percent of whom live in "dire poverty... and some of the worst housing conditions in North America."<sup>81</sup> Jacques Couture, an opposition member who ran against Drapeau, accused the Mayor of neglecting the citizens' basic necessities. "The biggest issue is how we are going to have a city with citizens' priorities first, not grandiose projects."<sup>82</sup>

It was no surprise when Drapeau announced his plans to pay for part of the Games by reducing the city's "already meager" social services budget. His indifference to the needs of his constituents was reflected in his intentions to clear a low-income area of Montreal for the Village. Local residents preferred rehabilitation to clearance: "If only they (the residents of the area) could get a few dollars to make improvements and minor repairs. But no matter."<sup>83</sup> Drapeau further provoked citizen antagonism when he explained a part of his Olympic financing scheme as.

follows: "Suppose our recreation budget is \$6 million per year. That gives us \$36 million over 6 years and we give the Olympics priority."<sup>84</sup> This meant that, beginning in 1970, "all of the municipal recreational programs, the arts, adult education, little league hockey -- go hungry. If the Olympics mean the devastation of the community and a precious natural resource (the St. Lawrence River) are they worth having?"<sup>85</sup> Kidd leveled the harshest criticism of Drapeau when he wrote, "the Montreal Mayor has callously abandoned his people to squalor and disease."<sup>86</sup>

One writer, commenting on the effect the Games would have on the city, called the stadium construction a "kind of universal power plant, sucking in money and spewing out concrete. As the giant mechanism pumps away, few city services -- or few Montrealers -- can escape its effect. Everything from park maintenance to teachers' salaries has been affected by the price of the Olympics, and still the frightening drain on the city budget continues."<sup>87</sup> The concensus is that Drapeau became "carried away by the grandeur of his dream of putting Montreal on the map." "There is something disturbing," wrote Frank Walker, "about the people of a city waiting on visiting athletes to get a good roof over their heads (referring to Olympic Village reverting to low-income housing)."<sup>88</sup> Auf der Maur contended that "we're going to have to pay every day of our lives for a two week party most of us can't even attend."<sup>89</sup>

It has been suggested that as a direct result of the Games, "Olympic-spurred inflation has seriously affected other municipal projects." To support this contention, it was pointed out that subway extensions had tripled in cost in the space of one year. "There's no excuse except that the Olympics have created a sellers' market in Montreal's construction industry."<sup>90</sup>

In November of 1972, Canadians began to have second thoughts, after watching the horrors at Munich (where Arab guerillas siezed and killed several members of the Israel Olympic team), and after learning of Colorado's negative vote on the Games. They feared: high prices, use of public monies, the threat of violence, and the fact that Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had vowed not to help Montreal out financially. "And naturally," according to Mike Wallace, "(tax) money spent on the Olympics won't be spent elsewhere."<sup>91</sup> It will be spent to cover the nearly one billion dollar Olympic debt.

One other impact touching Canadian pride occurred in the course of Olympic planning. Jim Proudfoot, a Toronto writer, called it a "jolting image problem. To be a Canadian at an international athletic gathering is to wish for a false beard and dark glasses, for at that point we qualify as the champion of fools of 1976."<sup>92</sup> Former Canadian Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, worried that Canada would be forever known as the "country which broke its word" when it seemed that the facilities would not be completed in time.<sup>93</sup>

The Canadian image was not enhanced when one hundred million dollars was spent on a security system that failed to keep terrorists out (fortunately, there were no headline-making occurrences at Montreal). Montreal became an "armed camp," with police and military outnumbering contestants.<sup>94</sup> Of course Canada was simply responding to the dictates of world and political realities, had acted in a manner it felt necessary to protect the athletes.

The most consequential of all of Canada's image crises occurred when Canada refused to admit the Taiwan delegation into the country. As it happens, Canada only recognizes mainland China. Taiwan could not,

then, be allowed to call itself the "Republic of China." A previous statement issued to the IOC by Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State of External Affairs appears to reflect a breach of contract on the part of Canada: "I would like to assure you that all parties representing the National Olympic Committees and international Sports Federations recognized by the IOC will be free to enter Canada pursuant to the normal regulations." Presumably, the last five words of the statement ("legalistic curlicue") were the means by which Taiwan was expelled from the Games.<sup>95</sup>

The Montreal Olympics were the unfortunate victims of a boycott by several black nations, coinciding with the Taiwan problem. Because New Zealand had a rugby club that played a game in South Africa, Tanzania would not enter the Games unless New Zealand withdrew. New Zealand stayed, while 24 countries, mostly African, chose to boycott; 90 nations remained to compete.<sup>96</sup> This reflected the state of the art in world diplomacy, racial policy, and the image which the Olympic Games have developed over the years. It was part of the Montreal Games, however, with Montreal being the innocent victim.

#### 4.70 Benefits

The Games have been referred to as the "biggest forum" for Canada, short of world war. This was presumably a reference to all benefits of the Olympics, economic as well as spiritual. Robert Bourassa, the Premier of Quebec, predicted that the Olympics would help to "relaunch the Quebec economy."<sup>97</sup> Drapeau told one commentator that the billions of dollars worth of publicity and world recognition would adequately compensate for the expense of the Games. He emphasized that the value of the Games could not possibly be determined in two weeks of competition.<sup>98</sup>

Drapeau was more concerned with gaining recognition for Montreal, and was usually vague on the topic of economic gain. He used general terms in reference to "what the Olympics will do for all of Quebec, all of Canada, and all of the world."<sup>99</sup> It was his hope that the Olympic flame and spirit would keep burning in Montreal: "I did not dedicate 13 years of my life to two weeks of competition. The spirit of the Olympics will stay with us, stay with Montreal, stay with Quebec, stay with Canada." Deford noted, "God help them all if it does."<sup>100</sup>

Not all benefits were spiritual; there were numerous infrastructure improvements. As a result of Expo and the Olympics, Montreal is one of the most traffic-free cities in the world.<sup>101</sup> Should the stadium remain intact, it will be a welcome addition to Montreal's other sports facilities, as will the other facilities constructed for the Games. All of these improvements have helped Montreal to become, in one writer's estimation, "one of the few pleasant cities left in this part of the world...there is that small dignity and pleasure left for every citizen here."<sup>102</sup>

Other benefits involved private bonanzas to all architects, engineers, and anyone connected with the Olympic construction. Roland Desourdy received \$3 million worth of improvements to his property at Bromont (where the equestrian competition took place). "It's like throwing a big party and not having to pay the bills."<sup>103</sup> These huge economic gains may prove to be short lived if, 1) inflation is not controlled, 2) workers insist on going on strike, and 3) the fears of higher taxes and ruined city programs and services reach fruition.

#### 4.80 Conclusion

Montreal's handling of the Olympics is a prime example of the degree of disaster that can befall a community that fails to utilize community priorities and comprehensive planning in its process. While Montreal's effort was long-range (13 years in the planning) it was not the product of community policies, goals, or objectives. Had it been, the city would not have had to initiate construction of nearly all facilities 2 years prior to the event. Priorities of the Montreal residents reflected the need for adequate housing, more green spaces, sewage treatment, and the continuence of social programs previously established. For Montreal to justify the Games, the solutions to these problems should have been incorporated into the Olympic plans.

#### 4.81 Points for Future Reference

1. Some form of financial guarantee should be required by the IOC to assure that the Games will be carried out as planned. The plans and designs (as well as cost projections) should be presented to the IOC at the bidding in a somewhat finalized form.
2. A self-financing plan for sponsoring the Games is commendable if you accept the complete commercialization of the Olympics, and if the plan meets all expenses.
3. Unlike Lake Placid, the Olympic planning effort must be the product of sound planning theory, comprehensive planning, and citizen priorities. (This assumes a public vote, in advance of the bid.)
4. It would seem that the support of the national government would be essential to the process.



5. The plans must be sympathetic to citizen desires: such as more housing, pollution control, etc. While an Olympic Village/low-income housing project concept seems to reflect citizen desires of increased housing, final plans must reflect the original intent.
6. In terms of the facilities:
  - a. A "ground-up" approach should never be allowed by the IOC.
  - b. Unique or untested construction techniques should be carefully studied if they are to be used, and should be initiated well in advance of the deadline ( 2 years, as was the case in Montreal, does not satisfy this requirement).
7. While Montreal's mass-transit facility was previously in existence, its Olympic program of bus and taxi transit was highly commendable.
8. Political considerations should not be the final criteria from which the Olympic sites are selected.

FOOTNOTES - MONTREAL, 1976

<sup>1</sup> Dean Peerman, "Canada's Coming Olympics: Boon Or Boondoggle?" The Christian Century, 92, 40, (December 3, 1975), 1148.

<sup>2</sup> William Johnson, "Montreal's Motto: Have Fun," Sports Illustrated, 40, 22, (June 3, 1974), 31.

<sup>3</sup> Nick Auf Der Maur, "A Running Account of Jean Drapeau and The Great Olympic Game," Last Post, 5, 4, (April, 1976), 22.

<sup>4</sup> ABC Sports, "The Games of the XXI Olympics," ABC Sports Special, (July 17, 1976).

<sup>5</sup> Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1148.

<sup>6</sup> Michael Katz, "Montreal Gets 1976 Summer Olympics, Denver Is Awarded Winter Games," New York Times, 119, 41017, (May 13, 1970), 53.

<sup>7</sup> "Montreal Elated As Mayor Pulls Off Another Spectacular," New York Times, 119, 41017, (May 13, 1970), 53.

<sup>8</sup> Desmond Smith, "Olympic Superdome, Montreal Goes For Broke," Nation, 221, 21, (December 20, 1975), 652.

<sup>9</sup> Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 23.

<sup>10</sup> Bruce Kidd, "Canadian Athletes Should Support Olympics and Help Defeat Jean Drapeau," Canadian Dimension, 9, 4, (March, 1973), 8.

<sup>11</sup> John McMurtry, "A Case For Killing the Olympics," MacLeans, 86, 1, (January, 1973), 34.

<sup>12</sup> Smith, "Superdome," p. 652.

<sup>13</sup> CBS Television Network, "Selling The Olympics," 60 Minutes, 8, 22, (May 23, 1976), 3.

<sup>14</sup> "The Billion Dollar Olympics," Forbes, 117, 8, (April 15, 1976), 48.

<sup>15</sup> Bruce Kidd, "Olympics," Canadian Dimension, 7, 1-2, (June-July, 1970), 10.

<sup>16</sup> Smith, "Superdome," p. 653.

<sup>17</sup> Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 22.

<sup>18</sup> Jerry Kirshenbaum, "Once More With Charm," Sports Illustrated, 45, 3, (July 19, 1976), 93.

<sup>19</sup> Frank Deford, "Run It Up The Flagpole, Johnny," Sports Illustrated, 33, 13, (September 28, 1970), 76.

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- 21 Smith, "Superdome," p. 652.
- 22 "Billion Dollar Olympics," p. 48.
- 23 Johnson, "Montreal's Motto," p. 31.
- 24 Ibid., p. 32.
- 25 Ibid., p. 31.
- 26 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 25.
- 27 Johnson, "Montreal's Motto," p. 32.
- 28 Ibid., p. 28-31.
- 29 Deford, "Flagpole," p. 24.
- 30 "Billion Dollar Olympics," p. 47.
- 31 CBS, "Selling," p. 2.
- 32 Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1149.
- 33 CBS, "Selling," p.4.
- 34 Steve Cady, "Montreal Olympics: A Billion Dollar Photo Finish," New York Times, 125, 43163, (March 28, 1976), V, 1.
- 35 Smith, "Superdome," p. 653.
- 36 Johnson, "Montreal's Motto," p. 31.
- 37 "Montrealers Elated," p. 53.
- 38 William N. Wallace, "Olympics '76 Is The Word In Montreal," New York Times, 121, 41714, (April 9, 1972), V, 6.
- 39 Smith, "Superdome," p. 651.
- 40 Sarah Pileggi, "Olympic Nightmare For Montreal," Sports Illustrated, 44, 6, (February 9, 1976), 62.
- 41 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 27.
- 42 CBS, "Selling," p.3.
- 43 Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1149.
- 44 Cady, "Photo Finish," p. V 1, and 6.

- 45 Pamela Ferguson, "Montreal Olympics, Prestige Politics," Design, 313, (January, 1975), 30.
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- 47 Pileggi, "Nightmare," p. 62.
- 48 Ferguson, "Prestige Politics," p. 30.
- 49 Cady, "Photo Finish," p. V 1, and 6.
- 50 Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1149.
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- 52 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 30.
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- 56 Arthur Daley, "Surprise Package," New York Times, 119, 41019, (May 15, 1970), 25.
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- 58 CBS, "Selling," p. 3.
- 59 Ibid., p. 64.
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- 61 Deford, "Dark Clouds," p. 36.
- 62 Ferguson, "Prestige Politics," p. 31
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- 65 "The Selling Of The Olympics," Forbes, 115, 6, (March 15, 1975), 92.
- 66 Ferguson, "Prestige Politics," p. 30,
- 67 Robert W. Creamer, "They Said It," Sports Illustrated, 46, 3, (January 17, 1977), 8.

- 68 Johnson, "Montreal's Motto," p. 34.
- 69 Kirshenbaum, "With Charm," p. 73, and Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 26.
- 70 Kirshenbaum, "With Charm," p. 100.
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- 72 "Billion Dollar Olympics," p. 51.
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- 80 Claude Ryan, "Jean Drapeau: Man of Montreal," Saturday Review/World, 2, 4, (November 2, 1974), 16.
- 81 Ferguson, "Prestige Politics," p. 30.
- 82 William Borders, "Montreal Mayor Is Set To Win Again," New York Times, 124, 42658, (November 9, 1974), 8.
- 83 Kidd, "What Will The Olympics Do," p. 13.
- 84 Kidd, "Olympics," p. 10.
- 85 Ibid.
- 86 Kidd, "Canadian Athletes Should Support," p. 8.
- 87 Smith, "Superdome," p. 654.
- 88 Deford, "Flagpole," p. 83.
- 89 Michael Ruby, "The Olympics: Paternity Suit," Newsweek, 86, 25, (December 22, 1975), 57, 81.
- 90 Peerman, "Boondoggle," p. 1148.
- 91 CBS, "Selling," p. 5.

92 Robert Trumbull, "Summer Olympics' Turmoil Hurts Canada," New York Times, 125, 43118, (February 13, 1976), 44.

93 Deford, "Dark Clouds," p. 34.

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95 Ibid., p. 33.

96 Pat Putnam, "It Was A Call To Colors," Sports Illustrated, 45, 4, (July 26, 1976), 16.

97 "Montreal Wins '76 Olympics," Canadian News Facts, 4, 9, (May 19, 1970), 445.

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99 "Recalling Munich Killing and Colorado Vote, Some In Montreal Oppose Being Host To '76 Olympics," New York Times, 122, 41945, (November 26, 1972), 13.

100 Deford, "Dark Clouds," p. 38.

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103 Auf Der Maur, "Running Account," p. 29.

CHAPTER V LAKE PLACID

XIIIth Winter Olympiad, 1980

"All these elements are working to clear the way for the 1980 Games at Lake Placid. Indeed, if the environmentalists continue to be tough, and the Lake Placid committee decides to take their criticisms as a potential force for good, instead of as an attack on something sacred, this might be a battle in which both sides win."

William O. Johnson, "Placid Is Not Peaceful," Sports Illustrated, 46, 1, (January 3, 1971), 51.

### 5.10 Reasons for Hosting the Games (1980) at Lake Placid

The civic leaders of Lake Placid seem to have expended the majority of their energies and resources since 1932 (as will be discussed in detail below) toward the attainment of one goal: the return of the Winter Olympics to Lake Placid. (The reader is encouraged to refer periodically to Chapter I, dealing exclusively with the 1932 Winter Olympics at Lake Placid. The parallel section starts at p. 11). Why has Lake Placid fought so doggedly to play host to an event that has the potential to disrupt and indeed bankrupt a community? The prime motivating factor can be found in the words of Rev. J. Bernard Fell as he addressed the House subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, henceforth referred to as the House. (This hearing will be referenced frequently as it contains a rich source of information concerning the planning of Lake Placid for the Olympics): "(T)he opportunity to conduct the Olympic Games has been, and is a matter of deep national pride for many countries throughout the world."<sup>1</sup> The Village of Lake Placid is burning with this sense of pride, and the townsfolks firmly believe that with their facilities, surroundings, and intentions, their home is the "perfect" place for the Olympics.<sup>2</sup>

Rev. Fell submitted seven "vital credentials" to bolster the claim that Lake Placid is the best suited site available anywhere. The first involved the town's "Olympic tradition." Going on, Rev. Fell pointed out, "Lake Placid is a community whose people have years of experience conducting major national and international winter sports competitions (including the Olympic Games of 1932) in every one of the Winter Olympic events. This includes more world championships in winter events than anywhere else in the world, and Lake Placid has provided more winter



Olympic competitors than any other community, regardless of its size, throughout the whole world."<sup>3</sup>

Lake Placid's Winter Olympic heritage can be traced as far back as 1924, when the first Winter Games were staged at Chamonix, France. Charlie Jewtraw, of Lake Placid, won the first gold medal ever awarded in winter competition. The area has supplied U.S. Olympic teams with 64 members over the years, 10 of whom have won gold medals. William Johnson wrote that Lake Placid has the "largest instructional program in figure skating in the world; the town boasts more accredited world judges or experts on ski jumping, figure skating, bobsledding and speed skating per capita...than anywhere outside of a real Olympic Village...."<sup>4</sup>

In short, Lake Placid's record of conducting Olympic-type meets is quite remarkable. Luke Patnode, publicity director for Essex County was quoted: "There is not much we don't know about the ins and outs of Olympics -- politically, technically, aesthetically. It has been a way of life for most of us for years."<sup>5</sup> The citizens have an intense desire to treat the world to winter-sports excellence and display their hospitality.

The other credentials provided by Rev. Fell are as follows:<sup>6</sup>

2. A community whose citizens have voted in favor of hosting the Winter Olympics on three separate occasions in slightly more than one year;
3. A community where almost all the facilities required to conduct a Winter Olympics, located in areas zoned and developed for recreational use, and already in existence;
4. The fullest support and cooperation of the State of New York, its Governor, Legislature and Department of

- Environmental Conservation, Commerce and Transportation;
5. The already voted pledge of cooperation and support from the Senate of the United States;
  6. A letter of support to the President of the IOC from the President of the United States; and,
  7. An ecology and environmental minded community and State protected by the most comprehensive and regulatory local and State land use and zoning controls that can be found in any similar area in the United States.

It is interesting to note that several of the above-stated points seem to reflect an effort to avoid Denver's shortcomings. While Denver's 1976 Olympic campaign did have the support of numerous civic groups, the general assembly, and Congressional and Presidential support, the issue had not appeared on municipal or State ballots prior to the award of the Games. The effort of Denver also lacked the endorsement of environmental groups (see Chapter 3, p. 84).

Not only does the Lake Placid bid have the support of those agencies noted by Rev. Fell, but backing has been secured from the following environmental groups: the Sierra Club, the Adirondack Mountain Club, and the New York Environmental Controls Commission.<sup>7</sup> Former President Nixon sent the following note to the IOC: "On behalf of the American people, I cordially invite the IOC to stage the XIII Winter Olympic Games in Lake Placid, New York. As a small, mountainous, winter sports community and as site of the 1932 Winter Games and numerous world championships, Lake Placid has both the rich tradition and demonstrated ability to conduct the 1980 Winter Games with quality and distinction...."<sup>8</sup> President Gerald Ford has backed legislation to provide federal funding of \$28 million to be used for facilities and

preparations (even though it has been repeatedly stressed that the necessary Federal funding must approach \$50 million).<sup>9</sup> President Ford was impressed with the idea that the site could be used after the Games as a training center for future athletes. New York's Governor Hugh Carey has also gone on record in support of Lake Placid's endeavors. He supports the contention that the Olympics will prove "a dividend to the environment and not a detriment."<sup>10</sup> Unless there is an extremely strong mandate from their constituents (as was the case in Denver), very few elected officials will want their records to be construed as opposing sports. Thus, both houses of the federal government passed joint resolutions "endorsing and pledging support for the bid of Lake Placid for the 1980 Winter Olympics Games."<sup>11</sup>

U.S. Representative Robert McEwen from New York supported Lake Placid's Olympic bid, noting that the Adirondack Village was the best choice "both from the standpoint of cost and from the standpoint of ecology, because of what is in place now...Lake Placid meets the required standards." McEwen even went to the extreme of asserting: "Lake Placid is probably the only site in the country where it can be done with the least environmental impact and the least cost."<sup>12</sup> It is worth mentioning that when Lake Placid was selected to host the 1980 Games, it was "the only place in the world that wanted the job."<sup>13</sup>

The economic conditions of the Lake Placid area offer further rationale for the Village's desire to restage the Games. In 1974, unemployment ranged from 13-18%.<sup>14</sup> It is the firm belief and hope of the planners that the Olympics can be planned to generate long-range pay-offs in terms of increased employment and economic development.

Finally, Rev. Fell and the citizens of the Lake Placid community are "dedicated to the concept that the Winter Olympics must be returned to the small mountain areas where most of the required facilities are already in place, where the construction of new facilities will be minimal and that those facilities will be used for general sports and recreational activity in the years to come, and where the emphasis of the Olympic Games will be directed toward the individual athlete and not toward a maximum, eye-catching drama designed to please the spectator and to excel the sites of former Olympic contests."<sup>15</sup>

## 5.20 Facilities

### 5.21 Existing Facilities

One of Lake Placid's strongest arguments for hosting the Games was that nearly all of the required facilities are in existence (all within 8 miles of the Village). As previously mentioned, every one of the Olympic events of winter format has been staged at least once during national or international competition at Lake Placid. Rev. Fell provided the House with the following list of existing facilities:<sup>16</sup>

1. internationally approved alpine ski trails;
2. internationally approved cross country ski trails;
3. the only biathlon range and trail system in the U.S.;
4. one of the finest bob runs in the world;
5. a 70, 40, 25, and 15 meter ski jump complex;
6. a figure skating and hockey arena-convention hall complex  
with two refrigerated ice surfaces; and,
7. a 400 meter speed skating stadium.

## 5.22 Planning

Refer to Figure 3 for the organizational relationships between the Lake Placid organizing committee and the other Olympic and state agencies.

Lake Placid has long had plans to upgrade and improve its winter-sports facilities and host competitions in those sports (refer to Chapter 1, p.11). The town has demonstrated its willingness to further these planning objectives with a history of supporting the funding of these types of projects, including passage of bond issues, and with favorable votes concerning the 1980 Games. In short, the effort is a culmination of long-range planning initiated in the early 1900's, and in complete accord with community desires and priorities. The planning effort for the upcoming Olympics has been truly comprehensive in approach, involving such groups as: the New York State Transportation Department, the Technical Assistance Center (involving economic projections; this center is located at Plattsburg -- the State University of New York), the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Environmental Council, the Architectural Council, the Adirondack Park Agency (henceforth referred to as the APA, the agency in charge of planning and land use for the park, of which Lake Placid is a portion -- see p.140 of this Chapter), the town and village organizations, as well as the Olympic organizations.

The major priority of those charged with planning the 1980 Games concerns the scale of the event. Well aware of the spectacle that both Summer and Winter Games have become, the organizers and Rev. Fell in particular will seek to cater to the athlete-participant. "Television is the way people see the Olympics. We don't want a million people to come to our town to see the Games...we're not going to have a lot of big




Figure 3. 1980 Lake Placid Olympic Planning Organization

source: Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Organizing Committee

black cars and cocktail parties, we're not able to entertain on the scale of the Roman Emperors, which is what some IOC people see as the purpose of Olympics."<sup>17</sup>

Even though all "frills" had been excluded from the budget, the first cost estimate was somewhat low. In 1973, Rev. Fell predicted that a total of \$22 million would prepare all facilities.<sup>18</sup> During the House hearings, this figure rose to "between 32 and 38 million dollars,"<sup>19</sup> and by May of 1976, a more realistic \$70 million was the approximation.<sup>20</sup> Forbes Magazine interviewed Ronald MacKenzie, President of Lake Placid's organizing committee, in an early June issue of 1976. MacKenzie explained the changing figure this way: "When we first started with this we asked for \$25 to \$30 million at the federal level. Our engineers built in the inflation factors. You have been given the inflated figures (a budget of \$75 million), so don't blow them up any more."<sup>21</sup>

Whatever the costs, the federal government will fund new structures while the major portion of the State of New York money will be spent on the improvement of current facilities, and administration. These commitments are itemized below:

Federal Participation

1. construction of a 9,000 seat field house;
2. construction of a 70 and 90 meter ski jumps;
3. construction of a luge run;
4. refrigeration of outdoor speed skating rinks; and,
5. construction of the Olympic Village.

State Participation

1. improvements of cross-country and alpine ski trails;
2. local administrative expenditures;
3. purchase of snow making equipment;
4. renovation of ski lifts; and
5. improvements in other existing facilities.

By way of footnotes to the above plans: a) project designers of the field house are attempting to achieve a plan that would develop the existing arena and field house into a complex that would function as a single building; b) planning on the ski jump complex has been criticized by the APA and environmental groups because of "visual pollution" created by the proposed structure; c) efforts are underway to refrigerate both the luge and bobsled runs; d) Lake Placid High School has been named a potential site for the press center; and e) an estimated \$1,130,000 improvement in the community's utility system will be instituted, with nearly \$1,000,000 directly related to the Olympics.

The Olympic Village is intended to house all of the 1,500 athletes, coaches, and officials expected for the competition. There are two minor questions concerning the Village that have been raised in the House hearings. First, is the Olympic Village to be a newly constructed facility. MacKenzie noted the possibility of using the Raybrook Sanitarium. This is an unoccupied state-owned facility that could house 1,600 people. However, Norman Hess of the Olympic bid committee, indicated during the House investigation that a new facility is to be constructed.<sup>23</sup>

The second point involves the permanence of the Village (should one be constructed). Hess discussed the possibility of designing the Village along the lines of a small college facility, with continued use after



the Games as an ice arena and/or dormitory cafeteria. But he also stated for the record that it would be feasible to erect the buildings on a temporary basis and remove them after the Games. Rev. Fell stated repeatedly, and under persistent questioning by committee members, that "it is our strong hope that none of the facilities would need to be dismantled."<sup>24</sup> Thus it is not clear whether the Village is planning the construction of a permanent structure, the construction of a removable structure, or the use of the existing sanitarium facility.

As in 1932, it is theorized that having the Olympics will result in the creation and improvement of sports facilities at Lake Placid. Some of the facilities were scheduled to be built as part of the State's recreational program, and the Olympics will hasten and further stimulate this development. The Games will aid the Village in receiving the funding and proper attention which might not have otherwise been the case.

In keeping with the original plans of a somewhat limited attendance, the Olympic organizers are planning for a total attendance of approximately 450,000; or some 25,000 to 35,000 spectators daily.<sup>25</sup> Of this number, less than half (roughly 12,000) will have accommodations provided in the Lake Placid community. The remainder will be transported from neighboring villages to the site. By shuttling 20,000 visitors to and from Lake Placid, the organizing committee will conserve resources and thus eliminate the need to construct housing that would probably remain vacant after the two week competition. By maintaining the lack of abundant housing and the present road conditions for deterrent purposes, the organizers intend to keep the populace at home with televisions instead of in the Adirondacks. This limited visitor approach is somewhat unusual compared to the planning for Denver, Montreal, Innsbruck, Munich,

and other more recent Olympiads.

Jack Shea (former gold medal Olympian and member of the organizing committee commented on the future of Lake Placid and its facilities: "We want to return sports to the athlete, we want to return the Olympics to the athlete. We aren't just trying to get a one-shot, one-week show from our Olympics, we're tying our whole future to it."<sup>26</sup> Shea hopes the facilities will be utilized after the Games as a full scale winter-sports training center. "There'll be nothing like it in the country, maybe not in the world." (This approach has, of course, been in operation in Eastern European countries for some time; notably Russia and E. Germany). Johnson has suggested the possibility that the IOC may some day decide to rotate the Olympics every fourth Olympiad (there would be four cities hosting the Games, so that the same city would host the Games every 16 years). If so, it could be expected that Lake Placid would be one of those chosen to entertain the Games on a rotating basis.

Lake Placid officials are also attempting to arrange programs with the colleges in the area after the Games. Several courses could be offered using the Lake Placid facilities. These courses would deal with the psychology of competition, physical training, proper nutrition, and related areas. The officials feel that the atmosphere of the Adirondacks, with clean air and water, beautiful vistas, etc., will enhance educational experiences and "will add to the economy of the area."<sup>27</sup> Overtures have also been made by Lake Placid organizers to the New York Departments of Education and Health. The buildings making up the Olympic Village might be used as educational facilities, or as suggested by Rev. Fell, perhaps as a 4-county hospital.<sup>28</sup> It is quite apparent, however, that the facilities will not be left idle after the Games of 1980.

### 5.30 The Environment

#### 5.31 Environmental Concern

Apparent from House hearings and other literature concerning the 1980 Winter Games is the concern of those involved in planning that the environmental impact of the Games on the region be the most important consideration in the planning process. During Lake Placid's 1932 Games, delays and lengthy court battles resulted from the seeming insensitivity of the planners (the organizing committee wanted to use lands of a forest preserve to construct the bob run. See p.18 of Chapter 1). One of the primary factors in the voters' decision to cancel the Olympics scheduled for Denver was the perceived ecological danger to Colorado (see p.76 of Chapter 3). Montreal, although equipped with sports facilities costing at least one and a half billion dollars (a conservative estimate), still dumps raw sewage into the St. Lawrence for want of a sewage treatment plant (see Chapter 4, p.107). It is not difficult to understand Lake Placid's willingness to appease the environmentalists in its planning for the 1980 Olympic Games.

Dr. Theodore J. Hullar (Professor of Medicinal Chemistry, State University of New York at Buffalo; Chairman of the Atlantic Chapter of the Sierra Club) was one of the main speakers at the House hearings. He spoke at length about the Adirondack Park, characterizing it as the largest park space in the U.S. Dr. Hullar described this park as follows: "The quality of land in the Adirondacks is about as high as you will ever see. The Village of Lake Placid...is a delightful place to visit and made even more delightful by the astounding quality of the most unique peaks of the Adirondack Park, namely, the high peaks areas. It is also one of the most biologically and ecologically fragile areas, as

well as being an area of great beauty."<sup>29</sup> Congressman McEwen referred to Lake Placid's long-standing concern for the ecology, a consciousness that began "before it became a popular nationwide concern...I think we are going in the right direction, and I am very hopeful, I am convinced that the Olympic Games can be held in that area of the Adirondack Park still maintaining this concept."<sup>30</sup>

Contrary opinions do exist. Apparently skeptical of these intentions, the New York State Legislature cut all but \$158,000 from a \$1.6 million request for facilities preparations in March of 1975. The special state panel that issued the report had this to say: "The Games provide the potential for economical and environmental disaster which could feature haphazard development of white elephants large and small, cast in concrete which would remain long after the Games are gone."<sup>31</sup>

The Sierra Club, on the other hand, "commended the people from Lake Placid for what is clearly a proposal different from those normally seen. It does not ring with commercial exploitation, taking advantage of a situation to the detriment of the environment."<sup>32</sup> But Dr. Hullar admitted that there are also "very real possibilities for very serious environmental damage that may arise out of situations over which we have absolutely no control." He mentioned four "beliefs or propositions" that, in his opinion, should be used to judge this particular type of project:<sup>33</sup>

1. there must be absolutely no adverse environmental impact on the general or specific parts of the region for any project;
2. if economic development is to arise from the Games, it must be for the long-term, and for those people now in the area (as opposed to opportunists who might only come in, make a profit, and then leave);

3. wise land use policies already adopted should not be eroded by massive outside forces (the Olympics can become the source of massive outside forces over which planners have no control); and,
4. it must be recognized that any project of a public nature does have a major effect on public policy.

To comment briefly on these propositions, it is doubtful whether the first proposition is possible: there probably will never be a construction project in which "absolutely no adverse impacts" will result. Of course there will be adverse impacts; the mandate of ecological planning is to either minimize them to the extent possible or move the project. While the economic implications suggested by policy number two may be well intentioned, no one may be excluded from the market place as long as the U.S. operates on the free enterprise system. And, if the land use policies already adopted are wise and effective, they will not be eroded by outside forces such as the Olympics.

### 5.32 The Draft Environmental Impact Statement

Reverend Fell testified to the House that if the net result of the Games would be "construction of multiple-lane access highways, massive public works projects, multi-million dollar one-time sports facilities, or the commencement of an environmental and ecological destruction, then Lake Placid does not want to be a candidate for the Winter Games."<sup>34</sup> This was in May of 1974, before the IOC chose Lake Placid as host, and before the release of the impact study.

While the Lake Placid Olympic project is claimed to be one with strong environmental considerations that guide and influence the decision-

making process, it is somewhat disturbing that the environmental impact statement (EIS) was not completed much earlier (it has been over 3 years since the announcement of the Lake Placid selection, and the most recent EIS is still in draft form).

The study was compiled by the consulting firm of Sasaki Associates, of Watertown, Massachusetts, and was reviewed critically in an article by William Johnson.<sup>35</sup> The document, nearly 6 inches thick, has been praised by several environmentalists (among them, Peter Berle, Commissioner of the New York Department of Environmental Conservation) for its comprehensiveness and thoroughness. But has also been challenged by "37 New York State organizations and 10 national groups" as being inadequate on two grounds: 1) failure to address the issues, and 2) failure to consider alternatives.

The main issue of the debate (an issue also addressed in the EIS) centers on aesthetics and with it the preservation of the character of the region against any "violent changes" that might be caused by the Olympics. The argument involves a 260 foot-high ski jump the organizing committee has proposed for construction. It is the contention of environmentalists that the jump would mar the view of hikers on nearby peaks, destroy the beauty and isolated atmosphere of the high peaks area of the Adirondacks, and as one critic explained, amount to the visual equivalent of "putting an illuminated 26-story apartment building in the wilderness."<sup>36</sup>

Also, the Environmental Planning Lobby is concerned with the responsibility of contractors in construction of facilities. The lobby argues that performance bonds will have to be posted in order to assure minimum damage and clean-up afterwards, and that safeguards will have to be

imposed. The problem is complicated by the fact that many of the construction projects have no final designs: the 90 meter ski jump, the Olympic Village, road construction and a detailed transportation plan have yet to be presented in finalized forms.<sup>37</sup>

The Olympic Committee of Lake Placid is concerned because any of the above complaints could result in time-consuming (if not fatal) litigation. The APA must issue permits for construction of the facilities (see p.141), and these decisions could also be grounds for legal entanglements. It is Johnson's opinion, though, that the Olympics in Lake Placid will not have to be abandoned because the environmentalists are not opposed to the Olympics per se, as was the case with Denver (see Chapter 3). What the environmentalists are striving to do, in this author's opinion, is to hold Reverend Fell and the organizing committee true to their promises of preserving the environment at all costs. The organizers have made concerted efforts to solicit the views of environmental groups, and have incorporated their views into the planning process. Now, as active members of that process, the view of these groups is that the present design poses problems to the environment because of visual pollution. Their view is that the ski jump will constitute the "commencement of environmental and ecological destruction," that Reverend Fell promised would not occur. It is hoped the Olympic organizers will not interpret these charges as the personal attacks of the "nut fringe" of the conservationists, but rather seek out adequate alternatives, alternatives the EIS may be deficient in omitting.

### 5.33 Land Use Plans

The Sierra Club wanted to influence land use thinking and planning for the Games by stressing the impact of three existing documents that currently guide such decisions in New York;<sup>38</sup> 1) the State Constitution, that says the forest lands of the state shall be kept forever wild; 2) the state lands master plan; and 3) the plan for private lands. In the plan for private lands, all lands have been catalogued by the capacity to sustain impact, whether biological, human, or technical. The lands have been surveyed in terms of present use and ownership (whether public or private). Dr. Hullar equated this with the concept of any community's zoning ordinance, mentioning that as with any local ordinance, the authority over the land rests with the local community.

The major concern of Dr. Hullar and the Sierra Club is this: a good portion of the land proposed to be consumed for Olympic facilities exists either within or adjacent to state lands -- lands that have been rated in the master plan as possessing "very high value," but ultimately subject to local control. These lands, such as Whiteface Mountain (suitable for alpine skiing), Mt. Van Hoevenberg (bobsledding), and the lands of the cross-country ski trails are "almost entirely surrounded by state lands in the most valuable category of wilderness lands." This could lead to two major consequences: 1) development of these sensitive lands might erode the quality of the state lands, and 2) the highways in the area might become subject to massive development. "We in the Sierra Club have a long history of being concerned about highways, as I am sure all of you know, and we are not at all confident that good intentions can stop construction of environment-wrecking 4-lane highways."<sup>39</sup>



Dr. Hullar admitted that the roads, as they now exist in the area, are "some of the most delightful roads that we have in all of the East, and for there to be any change whatsoever in the quality of those roads, would mean real destruction of the area."<sup>40</sup> While he is pleased with the "intentions" of Rev. Fell and the others on the organizing committee (intentions of not creating environmental upheaval), he feels there is a need for creating a mechanism that would implement those assurances. This mechanism would be formed by the following paragraph, proposed for inclusion in all federal legislation dealing with the Games at Lake Placid:<sup>41</sup>

"It is the intent of Congress to provide support, monetary and otherwise, only for Olympic activities and plans which in all respects fit within the present laws, currently adopted State plans, and current rules and regulations respecting the entirety of the Adirondack Park, and that Congress not support any activity or plans which are in conflict with the letter or spirit of those laws...or which would require any modification of them."

This insertion is vital to the protection of the environment of the park because it would force administrative agencies to accept only those Olympic plans that conform to current state plans, the most important of which is the State Lands Master Plan. The land use map accompanying this plan shows that much of the land bordering the Lake Placid community is designated as wilderness land. According to the plan, wilderness land "is an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammelled by man -- where man himself is a visitor who does not remain...a state of land or water having a primeval character, without significant improvements or permanent human habitation...which has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation."<sup>42</sup> Structures that are permitted in this type of area include trails, lean-tos, certain types of dams and foot bridges,

informational and directional signs.

The other main classification of land buffering the Village and the wilderness lands, is the "wild forest" lands. This land "lacks the sense of remoteness of the wilderness, primitive, or canoe areas and which permits a wide variety of extensive outdoor recreation."<sup>43</sup> The basic guidelines for managing this type of land include these:

1. protection of the natural wild forest setting, and the establishment of those types of outdoor recreation that will afford public enjoyment without impairing the wild forest atmosphere;
2. the discouragement of the use of motor vehicles and the discouragement of any material increase in the mileage of roads and trails open to motorized use; and,
3. the designation of specific and separate areas for incompatible uses such as snowmobiling and ski-touring, or horseback riding and hiking.

Given these guidelines, the wording the Sierra Club insists accompany all legislation, and the stance of environmentalists, the Lake Placid Olympic committee has the potential for planning one of the most environmentally sound projects of its scope and magnitude. However, it must use these restrictions, checks and balances to the benefit of the land and not avoid them as Olympic-deterrent obstacles.

#### 5.34 The APA

Further assurances of the sanctity of the region's environment were offered by Robert Courtney Jones, Chairman of the Adirondack Foundation and Vice President of the Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks. Jones wholeheartedly supported Lake Placid's bid because

"it does not imply such an (adverse environmental) impact because of the reduced scale of activity it suggests."<sup>44</sup> He also explained the nature of the land use plans, planning mechanisms, and their effects upon the area in question: a) any substantial alteration of the existing facilities and land will come under close scrutiny and review of the local zoning boards, the State Department of Environmental Conservation, and the APA; b) any project deemed by the APA to have a potential regional impact may not commence until the agency has granted a permit; c) the Park Agency has already assigned its Assistant Director and most competent natural resources analyst as a liaison with the community in its Olympic planning; and d) parties in interest (including conservation groups) will be afforded the right to testify at all public hearings held in connection with project applications. "In other words, given the avowed intention of Lake Placid to stage the Winter Games with minimum environmental impact, and given the existence of a park agency to make sure that good intentions don't pave their normal path, I feel reasonably secure as a conservationist that the Games can help demonstrate the Adirondack Park's capacity to accommodate different kinds of land use to the eventual benefit of us all."<sup>45</sup>

The APA is an extremely powerful organization for two reasons: 1) it has review and processing duties over every application for a construction permit that is within the jurisdiction of the Adirondack Park; 2) the park jurisdiction extends to over 6 million acres of land, of which all Olympic sites are included. Since the APA is such an influential and powerful agency, it should be noted that the APA has been cast in a slightly different light in the September, 1976 issue of the ASPO Journal of Planning.<sup>46</sup> Sylvia Lewis reported that local park residents

have charged the agency with incompetence, harassment, and over-regulation. They accuse the APA of making them "feudal slaves," with its "tyrannical" imposition of regional plans. The League for Adirondack Citizens Rights, with its claimed 16,000 members, has made the abolition of the APA its goal.

In its endeavor to manage the park, the APA's actions have appeared to infringe on local residents' rights. Court cases have ensued, based on residents' charges that the APA had taken property rights without just compensation, and violated due process rights (the citizens accused the agency of not affording them proper input into the decision-making process).

As mentioned previously, the APA has planned for private as well as public lands. This has resulted in two problems for the agency and local governments. The first involves enforcement. The agency was levying criminal penalties (up until July of 1976) for the violation of its regulations. Now, more reasonable civil penalties are imposed, with maximum fines of \$500.

The second problem is that local governments have resisted the development of local land use plans. Of the 92 towns and 15 villages within the park, only two have APA approved plans that include zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, and sanitary codes. This lack of cooperation has arisen because of lack of funds, lack of expertise to develop the plans, and general dislike for the agency. Many of the local communities' planning boards wouldn't adopt the plans if they had them; "most elected officials view the agency as an infringement on local authority."<sup>47</sup>

The APA has insisted that it has been misunderstood and its regulations misconstrued by the residents. It is apparent there is an image problem as is indicated by the lengths taken by the APA in the March 4, 1976 issue of The Lake Placid News.<sup>48</sup> The entire second section, a full eight pages of print and charts, was devoted to informing the reader of the history behind the park and the agency, including the review and appeal procedures for permit and project applications. In an effort to explain itself, the agency deluged the readers with a barrage of planning jargon, charts and timetables, facts and figures.

To be fair to the APA, it must be pointed out that the APA has attempted to make itself more flexible within the last year. Its controls have made the park the largest comprehensively planned region in the country. And it is the considered opinion of environmentalists (notably Courtney Jones) that the controls have saved the park and the Adirondacks.

### 5.35 Summary

The planning process at Lake Placid appears sound, even taking into account environmental concerns. The ecological concern of the organizers may be genuine, but distrust by conservationists is beginning to set in. The organizers fear another reoccurrence of Denver (in which Denver was forced to abandon its Olympic plans after accepting the bid; see Chapter 3), and the cancellation of many years of intensive planning and effort. The Sierra Club on the other hand, through Dr. Hullar, has stated that if "properly planned and executed," the Olympics could be carried out without adverse ecological impact.<sup>49</sup> He also made clear the Club's position: "I want to make it clear that the Sierra Club has taken no position on whether this Olympic project should be here or not. What we

have taken a position on is that the state constitution, master plan, and land use and development plan not be altered in any way because of the Games."<sup>50</sup>

#### 5.40 Other Impacts

Not every citizen of Lake Placid welcomes the Olympics with the eagerness displayed by its organizers. Paul Montgomery wrote in 1974: "Most of those resisting the idea were older people on fixed incomes who remember that it took the city 30 years to pay off the \$250,000 bond issue that financed the 1932 Games. Some also spoke of the intrusion that big crowds would make on their tranquil existence."<sup>51</sup> They fear that the organizing committee, faced with demands for bigger and bigger capacities, will renege on its promise of modest plans. (This fear is not totally unjustified, since both Squaw Valley and Montreal originally planned "modest" Games). This theme was reiterated in an editorial appearing in the New York Times, expressing the reader's worry of commercialism of the "last unspoiled area of the state. The Adirondack Park is fortunate enough in being spared the stripping of its mountains for skiing and the ruining of its villages to accommodate vacation homes. The town cannot possibly survive unmarred the onslaught of the Winter Olympics....Do we need to spend millions to foster the decimation of beautiful wilderness areas? Let us follow Colorado's example and give the Olympics back to the IOC to find an area, I hope in another country, that feels it needs the expansion and exploitation of mankind."<sup>52</sup>

The Olympic planners, on the other hand, are confident that their planning is sound. They see no possibility of crowds ravaging the countryside. In fact, as Rev. Fell explained during House hearings, they do not

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even anticipate an increase in Lake Placid's population as a result of the Games. "The economy, again, is based upon tourists, resorts, sports business and it will support a certain level (population level). Our experience has been that that level, regardless of what might happen in the community will go back to the same base."<sup>53</sup>

There is also the obvious dis-economy of scale that must be dealt with, as suggested in another New York Times editorial: "Small wonder that the village of Lake Placid is rejoicing at the prospect of having the Games. What village with a population of 2,731 would not like to have \$44 million (now closer to \$75 million) spent locally? But how about the taxpayers from whom this amount must come, and for which they get nothing? And it will be a safe bet that the final cost will be nearer to \$100 million than \$44 million."<sup>54</sup> There is the counter argument to this, equally as valid. Any community that has the opportunity to gain over \$70 million in capital improvements provided for by state and federal governments ought not to decline the offer. The real issue involves the degree of commitment that the nation desires to make to its sports and physical fitness programs.

#### 5.50 Transportation

If testimony given by Lake Placid officials to the House holds true, very little will be done to the existing transportation network in the Lake Placid area. Rev. Fell stated that "without question," there would be no expansion to the roads.<sup>55</sup> The transportation loads anticipated would be no greater than those presently experienced during the heavy summer periods.<sup>56</sup> In its bid to the IOC, Lake Placid identified Montreal as the port of entry for athletes and officials, with Albany and New



York being secondary ports. An extensive program of shuttling the crowd to the site via buses will then be initiated, and traffic will hopefully be kept at an absolute minimum.<sup>57</sup> It was further noted that one of the two existing regional airports, the Saranac facility, has already undergone improvements. Lake Placid's airport would be left as it is, since geographic constraints prohibit further expansion.

The New York State Transportation Department has cooperated extensively with Lake Placid officials, and several plans have already been released. They are summarized in Appendix E. It is worth noting here the parameters governing all of the transportation decisions:<sup>58</sup>

1. any new or improved permanent facilities will be minor in nature, in keeping with the low-keyed construction philosophy;
2. while facilities will be constructed with the smooth functioning of Lake Placid's Olympics in mind, they will also be developed with the post-Olympic period in mind;
3. only those transportation techniques, equipment, and facilities with proven reliability will be used; and
4. all transportation work will be carried out with extreme sensitivity to the environmental impacts.

The report also stressed two major objectives of planners: vehicular traffic is to be strictly controlled in the area, and, a high level of service is to be maintained through the use of a shuttle bus system. The transportation inventory<sup>59</sup> anticipates no problems in securing an adequate number of vehicles for bus transit. The area is presently served by Greyhound and Trailways bus lines, and school buses remain as "attractive alternatives" that are being explored. A preliminary report of mass transit needs estimates that 451 buses would be the maximum number

required to accommodate the transit needs of spectators and participants.<sup>60</sup>

The transportation planning process discussed above, involves three major components:<sup>61</sup> inventory, passenger-vehicular demand/analysis/forecast, and program development. The inventory of populations, lodging accommodations, transportation network capacities, and seating capacities at the various facilities, has enabled planners to draw reasonable assumptions from which to forecast the use of the system. The gravity model is being employed, an approach widely used by transportation planners and which seems to offer high reliability in forecasting travel demands.<sup>62</sup>

A team of transportation officials from Lake Placid attended the Montreal Games of 1976 in an effort to study the preparations undertaken by Montreal. A report of this activity was issued<sup>63</sup> and has been discussed in the Montreal Chapter (see p.108). This report also stressed the need to de-emphasize the private use of autos, but made no suggestions (nor have any of the reports) as to how this might be accomplished. One is reminded of the 1969 rock concert at Woodstock, New York, where several hundred thousand more visitors than expected were in attendance and paralyzed that portion of the state. While the Olympics will be staged during the winter with ice and snow that should sufficiently discourage a reoccurrence of Woodstock, this point requires more serious attention.

#### 5.60 Benefits

Olympic planner Jack Shea had this to say about the results of the Lake Placid Games of 1932: "We would have been a wide spot in the road ,

had it not been for the Games...Lake Placid has been living and thriving for more than 40 years on our reputation from 1932."<sup>64</sup> Proponents of the Games claim that the Games will "revitalize the whole area, and Lord knows we can use it!"<sup>65</sup> They point out that Lake Placid's contributions towards the cost of the Olympics will be within the town's current tax base; that the resultant facilities will become a permanent part of Lake Placid's resort attractions. "I haven't heard one word of complaint since the announcement," was the reaction of John Wilkins (the town's leading real-estate dealer). "People can't help (but) realize the tremendous benefits the Olympics are going to have here." (Real-estate asking prices increased 20% in the week following the announcement of Lake Placid's winning the bid).<sup>66</sup>

As a matter of fact, intensive study on the economic impact of the Games is being undertaken by the Technical Assistance Center at the State University at Plattsburg. Their preliminary findings and projections are itemized in Appendix F. One of the major premises is that the effects of the Games will be of such proportion that the pre-Olympic and Olympic periods of impact will merely be "the tip of the iceberg."<sup>67</sup> The study refers to the "very definite and sizable impact which goes along with the glamor of the actual Olympics." Prestige and publicity, it is felt, could turn out to be substantial factors in the over-all scheme: "Large numbers of summer tourists and winter sports enthusiasts can be expected to visit Lake Placid for no other reason than to say they viewed or used Olympic-level facilities."<sup>68</sup> One point made seems to lend credence to Shea's "wide spot" theory: it wasn't until the 1932 Games that large numbers of recreationers began drifting into the area.

"Every indication is that the revitalization affects derived by hosting the 1980 Games would be magnified tremendously."<sup>69</sup>

The study notes other significant sources of indirect benefit as well. These include such items as revenue from sales and property taxes that accrue to the state, county, town and village. This lone item is expected to yield \$2 million between the present and 1990.<sup>70</sup> Other sources of indirect benefit the economic planners anticipate include the following: reduced unemployment and welfare expenditures, Olympic-spurred investment in the area, an improved balance of payments between the Lake Placid area and the rest of the state, and increased tourism to the state and area.<sup>71</sup>

Johnson has noted there are some critics who question the magnitude of the economic gains. Others have predicted that the possible increase of prices and taxes will nullify economic profits, and that if the influx of visitors into the area is as great as expected, the wilderness character of the area will be ruined. Johnson points out, though, that the economic conditions of the Lake Placid region are "so bleak that any organization responsible for killing the Olympics would also be at least symbolically responsible for cutting off hundreds of jobs and \$70 million in state and federal funds from several thousand people who are now close to a bare-bones poverty level."<sup>72</sup>

#### 5.70 Conclusion

Many of the elements of the 1980 Lake Placid Olympic planning process should be studied closely by those cities contemplating such an endeavor. The plan emerges from the Village's long-range planning mechanism. The issue was subjected to town vote well in advance.

Environmental and economic considerations appear to be of equal motivation and weight in the process (as opposed to Denver's "environment be damned, Olympics at any cost" approach).

It is somewhat troublesome that of this late date, all plans have not been firmed up, and the EIS is in draft form. Of late Lake Placid's organizers have become somewhat apprehensive, as ecologists have raised some substantial questions concerning various aspects of the plan. As any well thought out planning process should allow for continued feedback of information and incorporation of input from outside sources into the system, it is hoped that mutually agreeable solutions will be found, solutions that will maintain the environment intact.

#### 5.71 Points for Future Reference

1. The Olympic endorsement by officials, interest groups, and state agencies is exceptional. The fact that several votes were held on the Olympic question prior to the bidding is equally commendable.
2. The fact that this plan was generated from long-range planning, that the scheme has been integrated into a comprehensive approach utilizing the resources of many state and governmental departments is also worthy of note.
3. The idea of maximizing resources by choosing a completely furnished site reflects great wisdom on the part of the U.S. and International Olympic Committees.
4. The sports history of Lake Placid supports the contention that new facilities will not remain idle after the Games. The proposal to integrate the facilities with the curricula

of higher learning establishments has much merit.

5. As with Montreal, it is disturbing to note that the designs of some facilities are still not finalized at such a late date. These should be established well in advance.
6. The EIS should be submitted for comment and debate at a very early date. Lake Placid's present difficulties center upon the fact that the controversies caused by the statement leave very little time for reconciliation.

FOOTNOTES - LAKE PLACID, 1980

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Congress. House. Committee On Foreign Affairs. Lake Placid, New York, As The Site Of The 1980 Winter Olympics. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, House of Representatives, on H. Con. Res. 443 and 444, 93d Congress, 2d Session, 1974, 3.

<sup>2</sup> William O. Johnson, "Back Where The Games Belong," Sports Illustrated, 41, 19, (November 4, 1974), 29.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. House, Lake Placid, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Johnson, "Back Where," p. 29-30.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. House, Lake Placid, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Johnson, "Back Where," p. 32.

<sup>8</sup> "Lake Placid Receives Nixon's Support," New York Times, 123, 42402, (February 26, 1974) 81.

<sup>9</sup> David Binder, "Ford Asks Funds For Lake Placid," New York Times, 125, 43204, (May 8, 1976), 17.

<sup>10</sup> Linda Greenhouse, "Carey Sets Up Olympics Commission," New York Times, 124, 42937, (August 15, 1975), 58.

<sup>11</sup> Alfonso N. Narvaey, "Olympics," New York Times, 123, 42381, (February 5, 1974), 24.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. House, Lake Placid, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Johnson, "Back Where," p. 29.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. House, Lake Placid, p. 14.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Johnson, "Back Where," p. 37.

<sup>18</sup> "Lake Placid Olympic Fund: \$22 Million," New York Times, 123, 42265 (October 12, 1973), 53.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. House, Lake Placid, p. 20.

<sup>20</sup> Binder, "Ford Asks Funds," p. 17.

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- 59 Lake Placid Transportation Committee, and Transportation Task Force. The Transportation Inventory, Second Report, August, 1975, 119.
- 60 Robert G. Knighton, Gerald S. Cohen, and Richard D. Albertin. Travel Demand At The 1980 Winter Olympics, Estimation and Analysis, PRR 100, June, 1976, 40.
- 61 Transportation Committee, Planning Process, p. 7.
- 62 Transportation Committee, Inventory, p. 1-125.
- 63 Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee Observation Team, XXI Olympic Summer Games Montreal 1976, PIR No. 2.5, September 15, 1976.
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## CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION

Planning can be described as a process by which problems are identified, defined, analyzed, and solved. Planners spend a great deal of time researching problems, gathering pertinent data, designing, and testing solutions to them. Frequently this process becomes documented in formalized plans both long and short-range, comprehensive and specific.

This process is an extremely tedious and time consuming one, as new data always becomes available with time and plans must be updated. The creation of these formalized plans is vital to the community, however, for it allows a record of past, present, and desired activity for public consumption. It provides the basis upon which decisions can be made and either justified or revised, accepted or rejected. The community's existence is charted in this continuous process.

One purpose of this thesis was to determine whether or not the application of this type of methodology was employed in planning for the Olympic Games. In other words, the question became one of whether the staging of the Games had reached fruition through some formalized process (such as that described above), or rather was based upon decisions completely external to the established process and desires of the community.

It seems reasonable that a project of the magnitude and scope of the Olympics both in terms of cost and community impact, would have been the product of such intensive planning activities as a matter of course. As it turns out, this has not always been the case. Taking into

consideration those sites analyzed in this study, only Lake Placid's Olympics achieved realization through a long-range planning process that took into account community priorities and goals. This is substantially different from the examples of the other sites, that attempted to use the Games as a means of creating the conditions necessary for future long-range activities. The community must have demonstrated years in advance (as did Lake Placid), its willingness to create Olympic-related sports facilities. (If Denver's intent to host the Olympics was of a genuine and long-standing nature, for example, then there should have been a ski jump, bob run, and possibly speed skating track within the immediate vicinity. These should have been built years prior to Denver's Olympic bid).

Since Lake Placid is the only site that planned the Games based on long-range planning and priorities, it is also the only site that is able to offer a reasonable justification for hosting them. This is in accordance with the hypothesis set forth in the introduction, that appears to be supported in all cases. While it is always a subjective judgement that governs whether or not "justification" can be provided for such an event, consider the following cases and the points which must accompany any possible justification:

1. Squaw Valley - Product of no comprehensive, long-range planning. Result: Approximately \$60 million in new facilities and road improvements for now abandoned facilities. The major facilities are closed up or dismantled, the site is a "white elephant" for the State of California, as millions of tax dollars have been spent since 1960 just to maintain the site. No revenue producing events have taken place.

2. Denver - Product of no comprehensive, long-range planning.

Result: Ecological, social, monetary, and other concerns dictated the cancellation of the Games. It was feared that major facilities proposed for construction (such as the ski jump complex, luge and bob runs, and speed skating track) would have minimal or zero use after the contests.

3. Montreal - Product of no comprehensive long-range planning.

Result: Billions of dollars of new and unwanted facilities were created that are believed to be "white elephants" already. Sewage treatment, housing, loss of open space, pollution, the blight on the future of current city programs, and other problems remain in existence.

4. Lake Placid - Product of comprehensive and long-range

planning. Result: The facilities already standing are being improved for the Games, facilities which in combination with new structures have been continuously used for training and competition. These have enhanced the attraction of the area for tourists, and sizable economic impacts of a favorable nature are projected as a result of 1980 Games.

#### 7.10 Overview

A concise overview of the Games for all sites is provided in Table 1. This Table is intended to facilitate comparison of the planning styles, support or non-support, finances, and impacts for all of the study sites.

Table 2 provides a listing of the major Olympic facilities and notes whether or not the site had the facility on hand, and if improve-

TABLE 1. OVERVIEW OF STUDY SITES

SITE	ENDORSEMENTS	OPPOSITION	FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS		
LAKE PLACID ('32)	Towns, state, national officials Citizens of village Civic groups and clubs	Civic leaders (at first) Jewish Tribune	State and federal appropriations Village bond issues		
SQUAM VALLEY	National, state, & local officials Prominent land owner of valley	Land owners of valley	State and federal appropriations Sale of tickets		
DENVER	Key elected officials Several business and community groups	Some elected officials Key environmental groups Several citizen groups	Federal, state, local appropriations Revenue from ticket sales, TV rights		
MONTREAL	Key city officials Citizens of city and Canada	Citizens of Montreal & Canada City officials Media and athletes	Self financing concept - lotteries, stamps, coins, tickets, TV & commercial rights City and Provincial tax increase		
LAKE PLACID ('80)	National, state, & local officials Environmental organizations State economic planners Citizens of area, civic & business groups	Environmentalists Elderly residents of Village Isolated citizens of state	Federal and state appropriations Sale of tickets and TV rights		
SITE	PLANNING MECHANISM			IMPACTS	
	M.P.*	C.I.P.*	R.P.*		DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
LAKE PLACID ('32)	No	Yes	Yes	Grass-roots approach, involving state, national, & international agencies No preliminary vote, but citizen support demonstrated through passage of bond issues	Improvement of sports facilities and establishment of L.P. as world-class tourist facility 30 years were required to pay off bonds
SQUAM VALLEY	No	No	No	Very informal process, involving land owners, architects, state & national officials No local or state votes taken State & federal coop. demonstrated	New town was built from the ground up which has ever since been a white elephant and financial burden of state
DENVER	No	No	No	Secretive and deceptive planning Minimal citizen input No preliminary state or local vote	Possible mass relocation of citizens Possible environmental damage, loss of open space, uncontrolled development Possible indebtedness
MONTREAL	No	No	No	Secretive planning, with only a select number of people involved No local, provincial or national vote on issue No citizen involvement whatsoever	Wide-spread resentment of citizens for using money from other programs Severe fiscal crises may develop Creation of white elephant facilities
LAKE PLACID ('80)	No	Yes	Yes	Several local votes passing Olympic plans Involvement of wide-ranging agencies & groups within comprehensive planning process	So far, very active ecological concern that facilities may prove damaging to land Large scale economic development predicted

\* M.P. = Master Plan; C.I.P. = Capital Improvement Plan; R.P. = Recreation Plan

TABLE 2. AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

<u>Existence of Facilities</u>	<u>Lake Placid</u>	<u>Squaw Valley</u>	<u>Denver</u>	<u>Lake Placid ('80)</u>
WINTER OLYMPICS				
1. Ice Arena	No	No	Yes	I
2. Olympic Village	No	No	*	*
3. Ski Courses				
a. Nordic	I	I	I	I
b. Alpine	X	I	I	I
4. Ski Jumps				
a. 70 meter	Yes	No	No	Yes
b. 90 meter	No	No	No	No
5. Bob/Luge Runs	No	No	No	Yes
6. Speed Skating Track	Yes	No	No	Yes
7. Biathlon Range	X	No	I	Yes
8. Additional Ice Surface	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

## SUMMER OLYMPICS

Montreal

1. Stadium	No
2. Olympic Village	No
3. Track/Field	No
4. Swim Pools	No
5. Gymnasiums	Yes
6. Rowing Basin	No
7. Equestrian Stadium	No
8. Shooting/Archery Ranges	Yes
9. Cycling Track	No

I - Improvements necessary

\* - Undecided: options are to convert existing structures or build new ones

X - Was not an Olympic Event at the time

TABLE 3. COST VARIATIONS OF SAMPLE OLYMPICS

	(A) Original Cost <u>Estimate</u>	(B) Final Cost	% Increase	Time Span A→B
Lake Placid ('32)	\$ 200,000	\$1,050,000	525%	2 Years
Squaw Valley	\$ 1,000,000	*\$16,000,000	1600%	5 Years
Denver	\$ 7,000,000	**\$35,000,000	500%	2 Years
Montreal	\$124,000,000	***\$2 Billion	1613%	4 Years
Lake Placid ('80)	\$ 22,000,000	\$75,000,000	340%	3 Years

\* Does not include \$43 million for road improvements.

\*\* While the official projection was \$35 million, other estimates predicted a final cost of \$100 million or more; or a 1430 % increase.

\*\*\* The latest cost estimate is \$2 billion; this may not be the final cost.

(Average % increase is 916%)



ments were necessary. It is apparent from Table 2 that Lake Placid was (and is for 1980) the best equipped and prepared site to host the Games. Squaw Valley had virtually nothing to recommend it but terrain. Denver would have been in much the same condition had it not been for the alternate site locations within Colorado. Given its lack of facilities, it is no wonder that Montreal's Games became so costly and controversial.

There is always a potential for some degree of disparity between estimated and final costs with any major project. Table 3 portrays this difference quite dramatically. If these figures are any indication of current Olympic trends, a more concerted effort to advance realistic cost appraisals on the part of Olympic organizations is called for.

#### 7.20 Future Action - Cities

While some writers have predicted the termination or metamorphosis of the Olympic format, this has not as yet been substantiated by evidence. Moscow has been actively planning the 1980 Summer Games, and at least two United States sites have announced intentions to enter into the 1984 bidding. Lake Placid and Innsbruck have expressed willingness to host the Winter Games whenever asked. Some timely advice may be offered to these and future sites, based on the experiences of the study cities:

1. Seek the consent of the populace.
2. By assuring that the Olympic Games and facilities have been the culmination of long-range, comprehensive planning, the guarantee of maximum utilization of facilities after the Games will be achieved.
3. The planning should be conducted in the open, with the maximum of citizen input.

4. The majority of the facilities should already be in existence, including all of the major facilities.
5. There should be some mechanism in operation to assure financial commitments are guaranteed.
6. Ecological consequences such as those forcing cancellation of the Denver Games and difficulties in Lake Placid should be anticipated well in advance, before a bid is offered.
7. The Games should not be the means by which:
  - a. city sports programs are revitalized or established (these programs should already be established and well provided); or,
  - b. low and medium income housing is provided (this approach has traditionally failed).

If these factors are accounted for in the pre-planning, many of the major difficulties of the Olympics can be avoided and the maximum justification achieved. Major transportation improvements and other long-term infrastructural developments can be written into the Games planning. The Olympics will then become the catalyst or means by which these projects may be implemented.

#### 7.30 Future Action - The Games

The study of five Olympics can hardly be the basis upon which to pass judgement on the future of the Games. Certain strong suggestions can be made, however, and several of them involve the actions of the national and international Olympic committees:

1. Research of city, regional, and state plans is essential in order to adequately appraise the site's bid;
2. Substantial endorsements of elected and non-elected officials

- of all levels, including some form of community-wide vote should precede all bids;
3. Only those sites of a reasonably furnished nature should be given consideration;
  4. The committees should make an effort to derive formulas or procedures for more accurately predicting the ultimate costs of staging the Games;
  5. Some form of financial guarantee should be required to assure that the plans are carried out as proposed;
  6. The committees should be skeptical of those sites promising a "modest" approach to the Games. They should be equally suspicious of those potential sites endeavoring to revitalize sports programs (an invalid rationale unless mentioned in the community's long-range plans);
  7. A thorough research of all sites encompassing every major element of a master plan such as: the environment, land use, transportation, economics, facilities and services, and housing should be conducted in order to ascertain the feasibility of the projects. (A thorough study of Lake Placid, for instance, would have made officials aware of the problems encountered during the construction of facilities for the 1932 Games. The problem involved the use, or non-use of lands of the state forest preserve; a crisis which is at present threatening the 1980 Olympics); and,
  8. In order to assist all countries in preparation for the Olympics (it is not inconceivable that even well-off Third World countries, with no proper facilities, will be inticed by the Olympic prestige and wish to host the Games), the IOC

should set down some detailed guidelines concerning:

- a. the total costs;
- b. what is required of the host in the way of facilities, infrastructure, etc.;
- c. what studies and guarantees need be conducted in advance; and,
- d. what the implications of hosting the Olympics are.

This criteria should be required in advance of the formal bidding.

In other words, the committees should assume more responsibility to assure "white elephants" are not constructed, and only proper sites are selected. The decision should not be based upon the elaborateness of the presentation, political turmoil in the world, etc.

The committees should never have chosen Squaw Valley or Montreal, sites that had little in the way of proper facilities. Some amount of investigation would have caused serious doubts to be raised concerning the suitability of Denver. Because this indepth research was not undertaken by the committees, severe repercussions resulted. It was ultimately the communities, then, and not the Olympic committees, that were forced to live with the unfortunate results. If the committees were under some form of obligation to the cities to financially (or otherwise) be liable in the event that adverse consequences develop, then perhaps greater care would be taken to insure only the best equipped areas be designated to host Olympic competition.

Perhaps the most practical solution would be to allow only those sites to host the Games that 1) have staged the Games previously, or 2) have all of the facilities on hand. This might entail either using the same site for every time, or "recycling" the sites every 3rd, 4th, or 5th Olympiad. It would insure maximum usage of existing sites and

facilities, and would minimize the danger of creating potential "white elephant" structures every 4 years. Under such an arrangement, it would seem reasonable to expect each competing country to contribute a share of the expenses to the host. The maintenance of the site(s) would be assured, and the host would not be faced with the depletion of its resources. At any rate, further research is warranted concerning the feasibility of these alternatives.

Many of the problems involving the administration of the Olympics could be eliminated by thorough investigation and application of planning concepts on the part of Olympic committees and hosts. The committees must assume more responsibility and control of the Games preparations or the Olympics will not survive. With the potential for violent political protests, the political considerations which color every aspect of the Olympics, and other disruptive forces, the Games can ill-afford to be the product of such poor management and planning that was exemplified by the examples of Squaw Valley, Denver, and Montreal.

## APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LIST OF MODERN SUMMER AND WINTER OLYMPICS AND SITES

Source: Schaap, Richard. An Illustrated History of the Olympics, 2d ed., New York: Knopf, 1967.

## APPENDIX A

### LIST OF MODERN SUMMER AND WINTER OLYMPICS AND SITES

#### Summer Games

<u>Olympiad</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Year</u>
I	Athens	1896
II	Paris	1900
III	St. Louis	1904
IV	London	1908
V	Stockholm	1912
VI	Berlin*	1916
VII	Antwerp	1920
VIII	Paris	1924
IX	Amsterdam	1928
X	Los Angeles	1932
XI	Berlin	1936
XII	Intervention of World War II	
XIII		
XIV	London	1948
XV	Helsinki	1952
XVI	Melbourne	1956
XVII	Rome	1960
XVIII	Tokyo	1964
XIX	Mexico City	1968
XX	Munich	1972
XXI	Montreal	1976
XXII	Moscow	1980

\* World War I intervened and the Berlin Games were cancelled.



Winter Games

<u>Olympiad</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Year</u>
I	Chamonix	1924
II	St. Moritz	1928
III	Lake Placid	1932
IV	Garmisch-Partenkirchen	1936
V	St. Moritz	1948
VI	Oslo	1952
VII	Cortina d'Ampezzo	1956
VIII	Squaw Valley	1960
IX	Innsbruck	1964
X	Grenoble	1968
XI	Sapporo	1972
XII	Innsbruck*	1976
XIII	Lake Placid	1980

\* Denver was selected to stage the 1976 Games. The Colorado voters, however, turned down the necessary funding in 1972; Innsbruck became the last-minute choice.

APPENDIX B

SQUAW VALLEY FACILITIES CONSTRUCTED ON FEDERAL LANDS

Source: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Olympic Winter Games Stadium. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, House of Representatives, on House Document 373, 85th Congress, 2d Session, 1958, 51.

APPENDIX B

SQUAW VALLEY FACILITIES CONSTRUCTED ON FEDERAL LANDS

Facilities

1. Ski Lifts
2. 3 Ski Jumps
3. A Water System
4. A Sewage-Disposal System
5. 4 Athletes Housing Buildings
6. Athletes' Center Building
7. A Press Building
8. A Reception Building
9. A Maintenance Building
10. An Administration Building
11. 2 Service Buildings
12. Roads, Bridges, Parking
13. 4 Public Toilet Buildings
14. 2 Alpine Warming Huts
15. A Spectator Center Restaurant
16. A First-Aid Building
17. Flood Control and Grading
18. Refrigeration and Rinks

APPENDIX C

FACILITIES REQUIRED FOR SQUAW VALLEY OLYMPIC GAMES

- Sources:
1. House Congressional Hearings, p. 51
  2. "Out of the Wilderness: A Winter Olympic Area," Architectural Record, 121, 2, (February, 1957), 334-6.
  3. "Buildings Ready for Winter Olympics," Progressive Architecture, 41, 1, (January, 1960), 47-8).

APPENDIX C

FACILITIES REQUIRED FOR SQUAW VALLEY OLYMPIC GAMES

Sporting Facilities

1. Blythe Arena
2. 3 Ski Jumps
3. 1 Speed Skating Track
4. 3 Hockey Rinks
5. Alpine Courses (Downhill and Slalom)
6. Nordic Courses (Biathlon and Cross-country)

Support Facilities

- |                                     |                                      |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Athletes' Village                | 7. Ski Lodge                         |
| 2. Spectator Center                 | 8. Medical Center                    |
| 3. Administration Building          | 9. 9 Outlying First-aid Stations     |
| 4. Officials' Housing               | 10. 2 Chapels (Protestant, Catholic) |
| 5. Athletes' Reception Center       | 11. Sewage Treatment Facility        |
| 6. Athletes' Lounge and Dining Room | 12. Press Building                   |

APPENDIX D

AUTHOR'S NOTES OF DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

1976 WINTER OLYMPICS OF DENVER

Source: Department of the Interior Draft, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, June 8, 1972. This draft was included in the House Subcommittee Hearings, (as referenced in Chapter 3).

## APPENDIX D

### AUTHOR'S NOTES OF DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

#### 1976 WINTER OLYMPICS OF DENVER

The study is general in nature, intended to cover the overall and cumulative impacts of holding the Games in Colorado.

Summary: Although the money requested is only for 5 facilities occupying a relative small area, the overall effect may be broader in scope and importance. Therefore, while the Olympics are intended to be neither an environmental improving nor degrading project, it may have far-ranging environmental significance. The environmental impacts fall into 6 areas:

1. Specific site alterations associated with facility development;
2. Economic growth and development -- the publicity surrounding the events may accelerate (by a small incremental amount) current growth patterns and impacts of growth. Growth impacts are reflected by: a) increasing numbers of people and jobs, and b) increasing commitments of land and water resources to serve those people;
3. General environmental and land use relationships;
4. Related public works expenditures and facilities;
5. Legislative and administrative action; and,
6. International.

It is felt that the environmental consequences, effects, and impacts of the Olympics may be greater than the sum of the specific impacts at each of the 5 facility site locations. This is a possibility because the widest publicity and fanfare will accompany the planning leading to the events, and the events themselves. This publicity and the expected visitation at the Games may generate secondary and tertiary actions with considerable environmental consequences. (A full analysis based upon sound facts will not likely be possible until several years after the Games. Therefore, without more established facts, some of the conclusions are to be treated as reasoned judgements and subject to continued scrutiny and later updating and revision).

The statement covers the overall and cumulative effects in general terms. A separate study for each of the sites and facility areas is called for. The following is a description of the five site areas, the events to be held there, and the land needs of the events:

1. Biathlon: The event consists of cross-country skiing and rifle shooting. The range consists of an area 700 x 1000 feet with trails radiating in the form of loops out from the range (approximately 2 square miles is required). 6300 square feet of area are to be covered by temporary facilities for athletes, press, and officials. The event was planned for Steamboat Springs.
2. Bobsledding and luge: These two were to be combined into one refrigerated, iced track; the run equaling 5000 ft. by 15 ft., cast in reinforced concrete and recessed into the ground. Limited parking facilities are required at both ends of the track, along with lighting for night operation. Because of the refrigeration, ponds or water storage tanks with 75-100,000 gallon capacity are necessary. The event was planned for Doublehead Mountain.
3. Nordic skiing: Cross-country skiing requires 50 miles of ski trails, 8 ft. wide, with several buildings at the central staging area. A 70 meter ski jump is also required, including support buildings on the 150 acre city park. Steamboat Springs was the planned site.
4. Ski jumping: Two jumps are needed for actual competition (70 and 90 meters), the width of each being 80 ft. An over-run area is required, along with numerous support structures: snow-making equipment, hill structures -- platforms, take-offs, judging towers, stairs, measuring platforms, and an amphitheatre. Doublehead Mt. was to be the site, the same 95 acre site to be used for the bob and luge run.
5. Speed skating: An enclosed, oval, speed skating rink is required. The track is 400 meters around, measuring 230 x 600 ft., occupying 240,000 sq. ft. Parking is needed for 2000 cars, with spectator capacity of 8500. Denver was to be the site.

#### Description of the environment

General: The area of influence (the geographic limits of the environment) is thought to be bounded by the Front Range cities of Central Colorado on the east, and westward by a half circle radius of approximately 150 miles from Denver. It is this area which has undergone the most development, growth, and land use changes in the past decade. (Front Range cities include Pueblo, Colorado Springs, Denver, Fort Collins, and Boulder along with the central Rockies).

Denver: The city grew from a population of 930,000 in 1960, to 1.2 million in 1970. (This is the Denver SMSA). It was the 7th most rapid growing large metropolitan area in the nation during that decade. The area has been growing at a greater rate than either the rest of Colorado or the nation (in the last decade, this was twice the national average).

Projected growth for the period 1960 to 1980: metropolitan Denver will increase in size by one-third to one-half. This represents a substantial conversion of land to more intensive uses.



The area west of the continental divide, and the Front Range have been subjected to environmental changes of significant nature within the past decade. Major reasons for this are due to the rapid rise and development of the recreation industry, and tourism. Concurrent with this has been the resort and residential development of the same lands.

(Note: the above elements of the projected environment are occurring, according to the draft, irregardless of the Olympics.)

#### Environmental Impact of the Olympics

- A. Economic growth and development of the area of influence: this would affect the Front Range to some extent, with the continued growth and development "slightly more than what would be expected without the Games." Growth and development are measured within 2 categories: 1) increase in population, jobs, and services; and, 2) increase in commitment of resources -- the worry is that the uncontrolled growth will lead to strip cities developing between Ft. Collins and Pueblo (all of the signs of sprawl seem to be appearing). It is thought that the Colorado Land Use of 1971 will not significantly affect the quantity of growth and development, population and unemployment increases, or changes in the state's commitments of land and water.
- B. General environmental and land use relationships: because of the impossibility of separating potential Olympic impacts from the total impact, only a small degree of the total is considered potentially attributable to Olympic influences.
- C. Human resources:
  1. Increased congestion - short-term congestion caused by the Games could be particularly acute (traffic congestion, housing, sewage and water pose potentially serious problems for the ability of those systems to adequately handle visitor impacts);
  2. Tourism - the Colorado State Plan for Outdoor Recreation states that the Olympics may attract 15 million visitors instead of the 7 million presently. This would necessitate the construction of numerous facilities needed to provide services;
  3. Local and regional services - these would all have to increase;
  4. Changes in the urban infrastructure - this could be particularly significant, resulting in increases in services and taxes. Shortages in low-income housing may intensify because of increased and more intense land use; and,
  5. Intensification of environmental land use problems - these problems include increased noise levels, increased air and water pollution, loss of open space and recreation values, destruction of natural area habitat, traffic congestion, etc. These will be compounded by predicted rapid future growth, and will only be partially mitigated by the Colorado Land Use Act of 1971.

D. Specific site alterations:

1. Biathlon and Nordic - The alteration of the landscape for trails will be minimal; but the shooting range area, 2 stadium facilities, and roads from Steamboat Springs to the events will require almost complete alteration of areas they occupy. The greatest impact is attributable to the spectators; by holding down the number attending, for example 2500 to 5000, events could be held without gross impairments. Long-term effects on community and vicinity are not considered to be significant.
2. Ski jump and bob run - Site alterations for this complex would be more significant than any other site. Much of the hillside would have to be altered by the removal of present vegetation, and soil displacement. All base area facilities would require similar landscape changes. Mass transit plans to bring 35-50,000 people with new access roads would further add to disruption of hill. Because of present residential growth patterns, the long-term Olympic impact is not considered significant. Water availability was cited as the most critical problem, but estimates show that it might be obtained without disturbing the present water flow.
3. Speed skating - Because of the development of the area, disruption would not likely be significant. But, the opportunity would be lost to develop the area as parkland within conjunction of the nearby school and parklands.
4. Other - Alpine skiing is to be held at Avon near Vail. Long-range impacts are thought to be fairly significant because the designation of the still undeveloped area may provide the impetus to create additional development (unplanned) in the vicinity. Other impacts such as those anticipated for Doublehead Mt. would also likely occur.

E. Related general public works development and expansion

While Olympic-related construction would occur, sociological and other impacts might be considerable; such as: the relocation of large numbers of people, long-range changes in urban land resource patterns, the use of scarce city resources -- both land and money -- for certain projects in lieu of others, etc.

APPENDIX E

AUTHOR'S NOTES OF THE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING PROCESS

LAKE PLACID 1980 WINTER OLYMPICS

Sources: Lake Placid Transportation Committee. The Transportation Planning Process, First Report, March, 1975.

Lake Placid Transportation Committee, and Transportation ask Force. The Transportation Inventory, Second Report, August, 1975.

## APPENDIX E

### AUTHOR'S NOTES OF THE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING PROCESS

#### LAKE PLACID 1980 WINTER OLYMPICS

##### General Notes

1. Topography is rugged, with lakes and mountains, that has restricted development of the transportation facilities.
2. Highway access to the region is limited to 3 main corridors.
3. Railroad trackage to Lake Placid was abandoned in 1972; the nearest train is in Westport, 45 miles away (limited parking and freight handling facilities exist in Lake Placid).
4. Two airports exist in the area, with the larger being capable of handling some of the larger aircraft.

##### Program Parameters

1. Keeping with the Lake Placid Olympic philosophy, any new or improved permanent facilities must be minor in nature.
2. While the facilities will be constructed with the smooth functioning of the Games in mind, they will be developed with the post-Olympic period in consideration.
3. Concerning transportation techniques, only facilities and equipment with proven reliability will be used.
4. All transportation work will be carried out with "extreme sensitivity" to environmental impacts.

##### Transportation Region

1. The primary area encompasses 130 sq. miles; with 38 miles of State, 37 miles of County, and 67 miles of town and municipal highways.
2. The secondary area includes areas for possible park-and-ride facilities, information centers, and comfort stations. It encompasses 1,170 sq. miles.
3. A high level of service in the region will be maintained through the use of shuttle buses.

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4. Vehicular use will be strictly controlled in the area.
5. The area outside of the Olympic transportation region will not generally require special transportation attention.

The transportation process here included 3 main categories: inventory; passenger and vehicular demand, analysis, and forecast; and program development.

- A. Inventory - Includes: overnight lodging, on and off-site parking, freight terminal and storage facilities, customs and immigration capabilities, highway conditions and capacities, maintenance facilities and equipment, traffic signs and controls, and airport and rail facilities.
- B. Demand, analysis, and forecast - Many critical assumptions will have to be made, based upon inventory information, numbers of participants and spectators.
- C. Program development - Based upon the information from A and B above, the planners will be able to develop policies and "precisely" define the variables, and develop the program budgets and programs.

A major result of any transportation plan is the determination of the traffic generation, and generators. This is based upon 3 factors: local population, lodging accommodations, and event capacities.

1. Local population - Summer averages 25-30,000; winter averages 12-15,000 (the above populations due to tourists and weekend skiers).

Demographic projections show a 6% increase in the populations of the area towns by 1980; a 22% increase by 2000.

2. Commercial lodgings - There are 8700 spaces within the three largest population centers in the primary area: Lake Placid, Saranac Lake, and Wilmington; the secondary area contains 6600 capacity.

Lodging can be increased to account for boarding houses, schools, and private homes by 25%; to bring a total of 19,000 spaces within the transportation region.

3. Olympic events - Capacities range from 2600 at the Olympic arena, to 16,000 at Intervale (ski jumping). The location of the 2 most significant traffic generators: the opening and closing ceremonies, and the Olympic Village has yet to be determined (opening ceremonies could generate a crowd of 20,000; the Village will generate traffic continuously).

The Bus Fleet

Trailways and Greyhound bus lines service the area, and no problem is anticipated in securing the required number of buses during the Games. (School buses remain an attractive alternative, but the law is clear concerning adult use of them; the possibility will be explored).

It is expected that 451 buses can adequately handle the transportation needs of the area during the Games.

APPENDIX F

PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF  
1980 WINTER OLYMPICS ON LAKE PLACID AREA

Source: Maxwell, John F., Raymond J. Richardson, and Patricia S. Olin.  
The Economic Impact on the Lake Placid Area of Hosting the  
1980 Winter Olympic Games, The Technical Assistance Center,  
State University of New York, Plattsburg, New York, March, 1974).



## APPENDIX F

### PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF 1980 WINTER OLYMPICS ON LAKE PLACID AREA

#### The Economic Benefits

A. Capital investment - \$15,305,000 is the projection of anticipated capital investment and construction/improvement of all facilities (this figure was derived by estimating the cost of all construction in terms of: cost, labor, materials, and the use of "a very conservative" multiplier of 1.6).

#### B. Special events and additions to on-going activities

1. Visitor man-days at special events projected at \$1,348,000 (this figure was derived by estimating the overnight visitors, non-overnight, competitors, coaches, and officials; multiplied by various expenditures/man-day formulas; to arrive at total expenditures of visitors).
2. Additional on-going activities were projected to bring in an annual revenue of \$943,000.

Note: these are projections of what the economic impact could be; it is still too early to speculate what the schedule of events will include, etc.

#### C. The Olympic Games

1. Total economic impact of the pre-Olympic period is projected at \$1,765,000. (This figure was derived at by the number of people on hand, and man-days; the amount each would spend at the site per day; and using a multiplier of 2.5).
2. Total economic impact of the Olympic period is projected at \$9,690,000.
3. Total economic impact of the "wind-dound" period is projected at \$143,000. (This figure takes into account original construction and labor costs; plus the percentage of facilities to be dismantled and labor costs).

#### D. Post-Olympic Period - (Note: page numbers provided here refer to the text of the Economic Impact report.)

1. The pre-Olympic period is "only the tip of the iceberg" in terms of economic impact (p. 27). On-going activities are estimated to net \$943,000 annually (see section 2 of B above) which equals, over a ten year period, \$9,430,000.

2. Prestige and publicity could account for as much as one-quarter of the on-going figure, or \$3,370,000, for the decade following the Games.

#### E. Olympic Prestige

1. "Although a significant portion of the economic impact occurs during the period of preparation before and continues for an indefinite period after the Games, there is a very definite and sizable impact which goes along with the glamor of the actual Olympics." (p. 21)
2. Prestige: "Large numbers of summer tourists and winter sports enthusiasts can be expected to visit Lake Placid for no other reason than to say that they viewed or used Olympic-level facilities." (p. 28)
3. Lake Placid will be revitalized as a resort: "It was not until 1932 Olympics that large numbers of vacationers began migrating to the Lake Placid area...there is every indication that the revitalization affects derived by hosting the 1980 Games would be magnified tremendously." (p. 29)

#### F. Other Rewards

1. "New York State can clearly expect to benefit from other significant expenditures, such as sales tax income which will accrue to the state, county, town, and village." (p. 35-6) The estimated sales tax revenue will come to nearly \$2 million between the present and 1990.
2. "It is clear that there would be a tremendous economic boost to the Lake Placid area and to the region and state from hosting the Winter Olympic Games. While investment in people, capital funds, and operating expenses is unquestionably large, either the immediate or long-term benefits would seem to warrant support of the bid." (p. 36)
3. Indirect benefits include: a) reduced unemployment and welfare payments, b) increased sales tax and property tax revenues, c) Olympic-spurred investment in the area, d) balanced payments between the area and the rest of New York, and e) increased tourism in the area.

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