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'33 .1. =91!" 51' ”I. =11 Wire." 11111“. 1115-3.“ ' ° 11 I" 11! 1:1." 2'13;:1t:3"r {11111211611 4‘: ‘M '11} ' 1"” " “9311111 ' ,3?- Ir’b ‘1 :3: 11'; =1 $1 " 5.81.? .I‘ 215. “=11"; 13%? 1114.3 1:531: [1&1 11.1134 111114 ”.15; {1:1 1 411153,;"1‘1‘1‘1. 3:; 1‘: 11115:: $11" 11;“; 111 {I 11: in (i1! 1‘ k l :5 ‘11] “I ‘1 1}. 8:1 E1353?» $131 1’" '1' 1,1,, 11 i, t , , 1131111114113‘2311:i1 111%? g. g ‘ 1“. 111.1% 1,, e511 11.1 2:... 1 m1: _ 't. 1.1313 11““ {.11 H 1; 1 E 1.3% 11111111, 15111 11111 : 1.“ £3! :- . ::: ‘e 2311:5111 115$ ’1‘?! 11" ’1 , ." ,{131'1' {1‘1‘19111'113112111 .szl £110.11:me 8| '11} I 111M "11134111 11.. ii W m ET‘\\\‘9 m l 3001293 till LIBRARY Michigan State University This is to certify that the thesis entitled Police Complaints Procedures in the USA and in England and Wales: Historical and Contemporary Issues presented by Paul West has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Master of Sciencedegree in Criminal Justice Major professor Date December 1. 1987 0-7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution ,. m—‘AL—Je- i# A. iViESI.} BEIURNING MATERIALS: Place in book drop to LJBRARJES remove this checkout from .—:-—. your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. ta. '_.. MN “A! V. 9- "9. ,... . . 999.4. 9 9/9 AA.“ A f.. :IJXR -L U ‘Q‘; POLICE COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES IN THE USA AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES by Paul West A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE School of Criminal Justice 1987 ABSTRACT POLICE COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES IN THE USA AND IN ENGLAND AND WALES: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES by Paul West The major purpose of this study was to identify and describe those system presently being utilizedtoinvestigatecitizencomplaints againstthepolice,bothintheUSAandinEnglandand Wales, and to chronicle the major historical events in their development. Data collection involved three distinct compments: an extensive review of both American and British literature, a number of interviews with police and Other agencies involved in complaints investigation in North America, and a mail survey circulated to the 132 US general member departments of the Police Executive Research Forum. ' An overall response rate of 75.8% was obtained with the sm'vey instrument. Univariate, bivariate and,toalesserextent, multivariatetechniques were usedinthe analysis phase ofthe study. Numerous complaints system variations were identified, many of which were considered to have policy implications for police departments when undertaking reviews of their citizen complaint procedures. Dedicated to my wife, Kate. and to our daughter, Caroline. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study of police complaints procedures would not have been possible without the cooperation. assistance and guidance offered by a great many people, and by police departments and other agencies. Overall however, had the opportunity to study and travel in the USA not been presenwd, such a study could never even have been contemplated. I am therefore especially indebted to the Commonwealth Fund of New York for awarding me a 1986 Harlmess Fellowship, and to the Chief Constable of Durham Constabulary. England, Eldred J. Boothby, Esq. Q.P.M. and the members of Durham Police Authority for enthusiastically supporting my Fellowship application and arranging formetobereleased fromoperaticnal policeduties forsineenmonthstostudyin My choice of Michigan State University School of Criminal Justice was in no small part mfluuwedbyflreadviceoffemdbyIanWamthemcmflymdredDeanofAcademic Studies atthe Police Staff College, Bramshill, Hampshire, to whom I express my appreciation. I am particularly grateful to the members of my thesis committee for their assistance and guidance in the preparation ofthis document. My chairman, John Hudzik, offered insightful criticism of the early drafts, provided many good ideas which were incorporawd into the study, andperhaps evenmoreimportantly,allowedmetouseupagreatdealofhisvahrabletimeand was always available as a source of encouragement when needed. I thank him very much. The remaining members of my committee, Tim Bynum and David Carter, also made considerable contributions. They both worked with me on the project from the start, and I am especially gratefulwdmnfortheassismncedwyoffemdmmedesignstagesofmemvey instrument. Throughout, both Tim and David offered advice and thoughtful comments ccnceming the way in whichthestudy was developing,anditistothemthat1 oweagreatdealofgratimde forthe iv strategic contacts which they made and doors which they ensured were opened to me. The early development of the study was largely built around a number interviews undertaken in various regions of North America in late 1986 and early 1987. Site visits were madebothtopolicedeparmentsandtofonnanyconstimtedextemalcivflian agencieswith responsibilities for investigating complaints against the police. Without exception, every agency visited was exceptionally helpful and forthcoming in providing useful information concerning what is, after all, an extremely controversial area of police operations. I can only hope that, if roles had been reversed and an American police officer had been studying police complaints proceduresinEnglandandWales,heorshewouldhavebeentreatedwiththesamedegreeand openness and offered the same generous and unreserved help as I was. I particularly wish to place on record my thanks to the following individuals. Sergeant Ron Clevenger and Sergeant Lynn Reed, Lansing Police Department. MI, Captain Wayne Novinger, Concord Police Department, CA, Captain Tom Johnson and Inspector Sherrie Aldinger, Berkeley Police Department, CA, Captain Phil Coleman and Lieutenant Mike Sims, Oakland Police Department, CA, Sergeant Suzanne Whalley, Hayward Police Department, CA, Frank Schober and Daniel Silva, Director and Senior Investigator respectively of the San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints, CA, Assistant Chief Richard Joyce and Sergeant Jim Hayes, Pittsburgh Department of Public Safety, PA, Lucy Edwards, Executive Director of the Washington DC. Civilian Complaint Review Board, Sergeant Bill Johnson and Sergeant Paul Storey, Alexandria Police Department, VA. Lieutenant Paul Sidell and Sergeant John Lavelle, Cleveland Police Department, OH, and Ted Singleton, Senior Investigator of the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner, Toronto, Ontario. If the early stages of this study depended heavily upon personal interviews, the latter stages were entirely dependent upon data derived from a mailed survey. Without this particular component, the research could not possibly have made a significant contribution to the body of knowledge concerning police complaints procedures. In this respect, during the second half of my study I was greatly honored and privileged to be able to work alongside the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). For this opportunity, I am indebted to the Executive Director of V PERF, Darrel Stephens, for his constant support and encouragement I sincerely trust that his confidence in my work, and its potential benefits to PERF, was not misplawd. I am also appreciative of the assistance offered by another PERF member, Chief Joe Koziol of the Portsmouth Police Department. Virginia. Not only did Joe help in the early stages of designing and refining the survey instrument, but he also provided both moral and vocal support when I presented the preliminary findings of the study at the 1987 International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference in Toronto. . Having singled out two members of PERF for a special mention, it is highly appropriate that I take this opportunity to record my sincere thanks to its general members for taking such an interest in the study thatI was able to record a final response rate of 75.8% to the survey component. Such an unusually high rate of survey returns, particularly in light of the length of the questionnaire, can only reflect well upon PERFs stated aim to exchange new ideas and promote police-based research On a more personal level, thanks are due to several people without whose support my work would never have been completed, and indeed may never even have started To my wife Kate who, not content with coming to America with a ten-month old daughter to care for, decided that the opportunity to study was too good a chance to miss, and consequently also enrolled in the Criminal Justice Master's Degree program at MSU. Her efforts and achievements over the last sixteen months, particularly in the light of her limited criminal justice background, put all of my work quite rightly in the shade. Also to our parents who suffered the temporary loss of a granddaughter graciously, and were constant somees of support borh by telephone and letter throughout our stay in Michigan. And to Dennis Banas who, in his position as Assistant to the Director of the School of Criminal Justice, in the early days used his inestimable powers of persuasiontoconvinceusthatwehadmade awisedecisionby bothenrollingintheMaster’s program, and subsequently was consistently available when needed to direct our coursework and organize the seemingly impossible with consummate ease and grace. Finally, bod: Kate and I express our deepest thanks and appreciation to John and Anne Hudzik for their constant support and friendship during our stay in Michigan. Even more vi important to us than John's academic assistance, was his and Anne's unlimited help in sorting out the many and varied problems of our temporary stay, and in easing our acclimatization in Michigan. Literally from the moment of our arrival in Lansing, they have always been available to lend us whatever help and support we have needed. We are greatly indebted to them and hope that an opportunity will present itself so that we may be able to repay some of their kindness in the future. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES xi LIST OF FIGURES xvi CHAPTER I - THE PROBLEM I Introduction 1 Purpose and Framework of the Study 4 Research Questions 5 Overview of the Study 9 CHAPTER II - THE UNITED STATES' EXPERIENCE 10 Introduction 10 External versus Internal Review - The Background 10 Investigation of Complaints in the Early 1960s 13 Civilian Review in its Infancy 14 The Philadelphia Police Advisory Board (PAB) 25 The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) 27 Polarized Opinions Begin to Emerge 19 Proposals for a Police Ombudsman 20 Police Unions and Staff Associations and External Review 22 Internal Affairs Units During the 1970s 24 Establishing and Staffing an IAU in the Mid-1970s 24 External Review During the 19705 27 Kansas City's Office of Civilian Complaints 28 San J ose's Ombudsman 28 Berkeley's Police Review Commission (PRC) 29 Detroit's Board of Police Commissioners 30 Chicago's Office of Professional Standards (OPS) 32 The Dade County (Florida) Independent Review Panel ([RP) 33 Portland's Police Internal Investigations Audit Committee (PIIAC) 34 Varieties of External and Internal Review Procedures 35 Recent Developments 37 Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) 37 International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (IACOLE) 38 Police Executive Research Forum 39 CHAPTER III - THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 41 Introduction 41 Early Developments and the Police Act 1964 43 The Police Complaints Board (PCB) and its Critics 46 The Police Complaints Authority Overview of the New Procedures Supervisory Functions of the PCA Disciplinary Functions of the PCA Informal Resolution Complaints and Discipline Departments in England and Wales Post Script - The "Holloway Road" Case CHAPTER IV - TRANSATLANTIC SIMIIARI'I'IES - A REVIEW Introduction Summary ofthe American Experience and Prospects fortlre Future Summary of the British Experience and Prospects for the Future Shared Arguments Arguments for External and Against Internal Review of Alleged Police Misconduct Arguments for Internal and Against External Review of Alleged Police Misconduct Chapter Summary CHAPTER V - DESIGN OF THE STUDY Introduction Research Questions Interview Component Interview Sample Survey Component Survey Sample Survey Measm'es Independent (Environmental and General Agency) Variables 'Dependent' (Complaints Statistics and System) Variables Survey Analysis Summary CHAPTER VI - COMPLAINTS TYPOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN Introduction Lansing's Internal Affairs Office ' Typology Implications San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) Typology Implications Pittsburgh's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) Typology Implications Washington D.C.'s Civilian Complaint Review Board Typology Implications Investigation of Complaints Against the Police in Cleveland, Ohio Typology Implications Metropolitan Toronto's Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner (OPCC) Summary and Presentation of Typology Typology Stages and Definition of Tears CHAPTER VII - ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS Introduction Univariate Analysis Departmental Background Information Overview of Complaints Procedures Overview of Internal Affairs Units Typology Stage 1 - Complaint Reception Typology Stage 2 - Recording and Classification of Complaints Typology Stage 3 - Investigation Typology Stage 4 - Finding (Determination) Typology Stage 5 - Disposition (Disciplinary Sanction) Typology Stage 6 - Appeals Typology Stage 7 - Public Information Complaints Statistics Opinions Univariate Analysis Summary Bivariate Analysis Relationships between Jurisdictional and Agency Features and Complaints Statistics and System Relationships between Complaints Statistics and Complaints Procedures Relationships between Features of Agency Citizen Complaints Systems Relationships between Police Officers' Ranks and Assignments and their Opinions concerning External Review of Complaints Procedures Bivariate Analysis Summary Multivariate Analysis Chapter Summary CHAPTER VIII - SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS Introduction Purpose and Method of the Study Findings and Conclusions Research Question 1 Current Systems within the United States of America Current System within England and Wales Research Quesrion 2 Research Question 3 Research Question 4 Research Question 5 Research Question 6 Policy Implications Policy Questions and Answers Methodological Limitations Recommendations for Future Research APPENDIX I - PERF Investigation of Complaints Against the Police Survey APPENDIX II - Creation of Combined "Openness to Accept Complaints" Variable BIBLIOGRAPHY Page 139 139 140 145 148 152 159 161 166 168 171 174 178 181 191 196 208 209 215 216 217 223 226 226 226 229 229 230 233 236 238 241 242 243 244 245 248 250 252 267 268 Table 5.1 5.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 7.15 7.16 7.17 7.18 LIST OF TABLES General Characteristics of Relevant Police Departments at Interview Sample Sites Description of Police Agency Survey Sample and Response Rates Summary of Police Agency Survey Returns Individual Respondents' Ranks and Assignments Descriptive Summary Statistics of Departmental Background Information General Qraracteristics of Departmental Complains Procedures Stability of Departmental Complains Procedures General Characteristies of Departmental Complaints Units Descriptive Summary Statistics of the Stafl‘ing of Departmental Complaints Units Selection and Training of Internal Affairs Investigators Acceptable Methods of Filing a Complaint Acceptable Complainants IncafionswhemComplainscanbeFfledmrdhdividuals whocanAcceptThem Time IimitonFilingofComplaints CombinedMeasureofOpennesstoAcceptComplains PublicityRegardingComplainsProcedmes Combined Measure of Proportion of Complains Classified as requiring a Full Investigation Notification of Complaints to Subject Officers Investigations into complains alleging criminal violations Investigations into complains alleging procedural or administrative violations Page 87 92 142 143 144 146 147 149 150 151 154 155 156 157 157 158 160 160 162 163 Table Page 7.19 Time Limits on Complaints Investigations 164 7.20 Use of Polygraph in Complains Investigations 165 7.21 Case Findings 167 7.22 Recommendations and Administrative Review of Findings 167 7.23 Case Dispositions (Disciplinary Sanctions) 169 7.24 Recommendation for and Administrative Review of Case Dispositions (Disciplinary Sanctions) 170 7.25 Appeals by officers concerning investigations, findings and dispositions 172 7.26 Appeals by complainans conceming investigations, findings and dispositions 173 7.27 Combined measure of information provided to complainans 175 7.28 Information provided to complainans 176 7.29 Publication of complains statistics 177 7.30 Combined Measure of Openness to Provide Public Inforrmtion 9 177 7.31 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Annual Complains Against the Police 179 7.32 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Annual Findings of Complains Against the Police 180 7.33 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: 'Police officers feel that internal Investigations of complaints are fair and equitable." 9182 7.34 Descriptiveummary Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: 'Citizens in the community feel that internal investigations of complaints are fair and equitable." . 183 7.35 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "External (or civilian) review of complaints tends to decrease the morale of the police, which can lead to reduced effectiveness and performance." 183 7.36 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "Internal Affairs' goals and complainants' expectations do not always correspond." 184 7.37 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Res to the Statement: 'Civilians are unqualified tou udge the propriety of police actions.‘ 184 Table Page 7.38 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: " External (or civilian) review boards for investigating complaints against the police provide an impartial and independent assessment of police practices." 185 7.39 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "Police officers are rofesdonals and are thus best able to regulate the r own conduct." 185 7.40 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: " Citizens not satisfied with internal investigation of complaints have sufficient alternative avenues to follow, the courts being just one example." 186 7.41 ptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: 'The impartiality of internal investigation of complaints depends heavily upon the integrity of senior police administrators." 186 7.42 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "Involving interested citizens in the complaint process can lead to increased public confidence and can therefore be advantageous to the police department." 187 7.43 Descri ' e Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: 'External (or civilian) involvement in the disciplinary process interferes with the authority of the Police Chief." 187 7.44 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "Involving interested citizens in the complaint process can lead to increased public confidence and can therefore be advantageous to the police department." 188 7.45 'pdve Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: 'Independent external investigation of complaints aganist the police is less likely to be biased than is internal investigation." 188 7.46 Descri 've Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: 'External interest in complaints investigation is natural and reasonable." 189 7.47 ptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: 'Civilian Review Boards have been shown to be unworkable and ineffective." 189 7.48 Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "An honest and open Internal Affairs Unit will lessen a police department's civil liability." 190 Table Page 7.49 Categorization of General Agency Factors for Bivariate Analysis 192 7.50 Categorization of Environmental Factors for Bivariate Analysis 193 7.51 Categorization of Anmral Complaints Statistics for Bivariate Analysis 194 7.52 Categorization of Complaints System Features for Bivariate Analysis 195 7.53 Categorization of Individual Respondens' Ranks and Assignmens for Bivariate Analysis 196 7.54 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Number of Complaints Filed per year by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors 199 7.55 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Existence of Internal Review by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors 200 7.56 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Existence of Internal Affairs Unit by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors 201 7.57 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Rank of Typical Internal Affairs InvestigatorbySelectedEnvironmentalandGeneralAgencyFactors 202 7.58 Descriptive Summary Statistics forthe Existence of Time Limis on Complaints Investigations by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors 203 7.59 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Agency Openness to Accept Complains by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors 204 7.60 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Agency Openness to provide Public Information by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors 205 7.61 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Proportion of Complaints Fully Investigated by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors 206 7.62 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Information Provided to Complainants by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors 207 7.63 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Existence of External Review by Other Complains System Factors 211 7.64 Descriptive Sununary Statistics for Existence of Intemal Affairs Unit by Other Complains System Factors 211 7.65 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Rank of Typical Intemal Affairs Investigator by Other Complains System Factors 212 7.66 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Existence of Time Limit on Investigations by Other Complains System Factors 212 7.67 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Agency Openness to Accept Complains by Other Complains System Factors 213 xiv Table Page 7.68 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Agency Openness to Provide Public Information by Other Complains System Factors 213 7.69 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Proportion of Complains Fully Investigated by Other Complains System Factors 214 7.70 Descriptive Summary Statistics for Information Provided to Complainans by Other Complains System Factors 214 7.71 Multiple Reyession Analysis of factors affecting the number of complains filed per year 221 7.72 Multiple Regression Analysis of factors affecting the complains ratio 221 7.73 Multiple Regression Analysis of factors affecting the percentage of . complains sustained overall 222 7.74 Multiple Regression Analysis of factors affecting opinions concerning the statement "Civilians are unqualified to judge the propriety of police actions." 222 7.75 Multiple Regression Analysis of factors affecting opinions concerning the statement "External interest in complaints investigation is natural and reasonable." 223 A.l ' Creation of the Combined "Openness to Accept Complains" Variable 267 XV LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 6.1 Functional Typology for Complains Investigation 137 xvi CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM Introduction The aim of this study is to present an in-depth examination of the various systems currently operafinginboththeUnitedStatesofAmericaandinEnglandandWales forinvestigatingcitizen complains against the police. In the context ofthe study, the term 'complaint' refers only to allegations made by citizens regarding the conduct of sworn police officers. It does not refer to disciplinary investigations initiated by officers' supervisors, nor to complains made by citizens regarding the conduct of civilian personnel employed by police agencies, nor to complains made by citizens regarding departmental policies in general. The subject of investigating complains against the police has a lengthy and controversial historyonbothsides ofthe Atlantic. Whilstthecredibilityofcomplainsprocedm'esisonlyone ofmanyfaamswhichsndwdetenmnemeextauofpubficcmfidencehrandrespectfordre police,thefrequency with which such procedures arethe subject ofheated public debate and intensemediainteresttendstoimplythatmany peopleviewthemasplayingacriticalrolein police-commrmity relations. It may be argued that one thing which is guaranteed to erode public confidenceinflrepoliceevenmoredranamediarevelatimdratcenainindividualofficershave been breaking those very laws which they have been charged with the duty of upholding, is the fact that police internal investigation procedures have been unable to identify those officers responsible for blatant tics of misconduct. Unfortunately, such disclosures have all too frequentlymadelmadfinenewsinfliepasapufiwlarlymsomeofmehrgerpoficedepmmms in 1 the United States and England and Wales. Public expectations of individual police officer conduct are extremely high. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that, despite all of their training, expertise, experience and aspirations to professional status, police officers are basically civilians in uniform. As such, they are subject to the same strains, problem and temptations which, from time to time, afflict everyone else. Additionally, although Herculean tasks are often expected of them, and even though some may attempt to deny it, police offices suffer from human failings and are not omnipotent. Given the extremely stressful, yet frequently individualized work arvironment of the rmjority of ofi'icers, it is thus unavoidable that instances of police misconduct will occur and will give rise to citizen complains. It is unfornmately also the case that police officers' work situations provide adequate fertile ground in which malicious complainans can plant their tmwelcome seeds. Taking account of the foregoing discussion, the fact that numerous citizen complains allegingvarious fonrsofmisconductonthepartofpoliceofficers arefiledeveryyearwithmost departmens should not be an tmexpected one. Indeed, what would be unusual would be a reasonably sized police agency which did not generate any complains. This unlikely situation could only be accounted for in one of two ways: either because the police department was a perfect model ofwhat a good community-conscious agency should be, is activities being fully congruent with cornrmmity expectations, or because the department‘was out of control and a law unto itself, resulting in those citizen complains which were filed not even being officially recorded. far less formally investigated. In either case and for differing reasons, the activities of suchanagencycouldbethesubjectofanentireresearchsnrdyinits ownright. Notsurprisingly few, if any sizeable complaint-free police departments exist in either the United States or in England and Wales. If it is largely unavoidable that complains against the police will continue to be made, the focus of attention should be directed away from the complains themselves and towards those pmdures which are in place to ensure that citizen complains are properly investigated. One fundamental question must then ask exactly what the major objectives ofsuch procedures are. 3 It seens likely that the principal goals of any system for investigating complaints against the police should be threefold: to ensure that complains are thoroughly and impartially investigated and disposed of, to reassure the public that improper police behavior will not escape undetected. and to act as an effective deterrent to further instances of police misconduct. Within the highly fragmented locally accountable criminal justice system in the USA, it is only to be expected that numerous variations upon the theme of complains investigations have developed during recent years. On the one hand, these may range from effectively closed systems in which investigations are carried out entirely internally with no external involvement andverylittlcdisseminationofinfomrationtothepublic,toopen systemsinwhich local govemment 'by sunshine' ensures a degree of extemal civilian involvement in investigations andresultsinthepublicationofrepors specificallyintendedtofullyinfonnthecomrmmiryofas many details of the activities of complains investigation unis as persormel legislation will allow. Onthe otherhand,they may vary fromhighly centralizedsystensinwhich autocratic police chiefs retairrthesole responsibility forallaspecs ofdecision-makingconcerningcitizen- complains, to largely decentralized structures within which personnel review boards, both internal and external, generate the involvement of a wide range of individuals in the disciplinary decision-making process. In contrast to the situation in the United States, in England and Wales although local accountability of the 43 police forces currently in existence is ensured thrwgh the involvement of local police authorities, responsible for ensuring the efficient and effective operation of forces, in budgetary and large-scale policy matters, major policing practices as laid down b0th in statutory legislation and Home Office guidelines are generally consistent throughout both countries. This is particularly true in the area of complains against the police, where individual force policies over the past two decades have been required to conform with, in turn. the Police Act 1964, the Police Act 1976, and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. ‘The opportunity afforded to a police officer from England, who's only direct experience was of policing in a context in which policies and procedures are largely standardized from one force to another. to undertake an examination and assessment of the many and various systems 4 for investigating complaints against the police which exist within the USA was one feature of this study whichmadeitsofascinatingandchallenging. Atthe same time, itishopedthatthe opportunity led to the developnrmt of a practical. worthwhile, and truly unique piece of police-related research Purpose and Framework of the Study Themajorpm'poseofthis smdyistoidentifyanddescribethevarious systems presently beinguu'lized toinvestigate complains againstthepolice,both in the United States ofAmerica andin EnglandandWales, andtochroniclethemajorhistoricalevensintheirdevelopment Second. the study seeks to identify the major argumens which have traditionally been used by both opponents and proponens of the concept of external civilian review of alleged police misconduct and, in a limited fashion, to assess present day police officers' opinions concerning the various argumens. Building upon these overall objectives, a third purpose is to develop a functional typology for complains investigations which, through structural variations upon is basic design is capable of describing all those current alternative systems found to exist. Finally, using the complains investigation functional typology as a basis, the study seeks to develop an extensive data base through which to identify those features of police organizations and their environmens which influence citizen complaint policies and procedures Overall, it is intended that the study be viewed as adopting a predominately practical approach to the examination of a difficult police management issue, the problem of developing credible systems for investigating citizen complains against the police which utilize policies and prowdures that are equally acceptable to offices. complainans and members of the general 'I'heresearchisundertakenfromtheseemingly pessimistic,butneverthelesspragmatic stancethatinstances ofpolicemisconduct, orattheveryleastallegationsofpolicemisconduct. whichresultincitizencomplains againstthepolice arephenomenawhich, otherthaninaperfect world. can never be entirely avoided. This being the case, the study makes no attempt to answer 5 thevitalquestionofhowcomplainsagainstthepolicecanbe,ifnottotallyeradicated,atleast substantiallyreduced innumber. This particularquestion opens upanentirefield ofstudy in is ownright. Personnel procedures, selection and recruitment policies, liaison with commrmity consultative groups, and training practises all may be managed to a police department's benefit in thisarea,buttheseimportanttopicsarenotwithinthetermsofreferenceofthepresentsnrdy. Tlnemphasisofthemsearchsdrusnmplawdupmhowpoficedepumrenscanmduce the nurnberof citizen complains filed, but rather, given their present rate of incidence, upon how bestmensmeMcomphmsmemvesdgatedmafahmdhnpardalmamwrtodwgreatest possible satisfaction of all parties involved. Research Questions This study is largely exploratoryin nanne, withlittle,ifany similarempiricalresearch upon whichtorely. Although itis notbasedupon formalhypotheses,theworkisguidedby a set of research questions derived primarily from is previously stated purpose and framework. As the work was developing, these research questions served to shape the literature review and to identify thosevariables forwhich measures were designed anddatawere collected laterinthe study. The research questions, which themselves underwent further elaboration in what became an iterative design process, along with a brief summary of the rationale underlying them, are liswd below: i 1) What variations in systems for investigating complaints against the police currently exist within the United States of America and England and Wales? This question is fundamental to the entire research endeavor upon which the present study isbased. Asnrenfimedpmvimsly,dnfiagrmmedcfimhaljusdcesystemmdreUSA,mgemer with the close local accountability of police agencies, ensures that significant differences exist betweenawiderangeofdepartmentalpoliciesandprocedurs. Toagreatextent,thisis particularly true in the area of investigating complains against the police. Whilst the complains systeminEnglandandWalesatanyonedmeisconsistenttluoughombothcomnies,recent 6 ftmdamentalchangesinprocedures,includingthecreation ofanewindependentcivilian Police Complaints Authority with responsibility for supervising and directing investigations and for reviewing disciplinary decisions, have brought the subject of police complains to the forefront of public andmediaattention. Ifsystems andprocedurescanvary substantially yetremain potent and efl’ective, any study which attempts to draw the various systems together, thus allowing their respective strengths and weaknesses to be assessed, is potentially of value to senior police 2) What are some of the underlying reasons which have given rise to changes and variations in systems used for investigating complaints against the police within the USA and England and Wales? - Whilst the various complains systems which presently operate are undoubwdly of primary importanceandinteresttopoliceadministrators.itisvitallyimportantthatanychangeswhichare contemplatedincurrentprocedmesareplarmedwith adequateconsideralionhavingbeengivento some ofthe majorevents andproblems which. inthepast.have eithergivenriseto or accompanied system changes. 3) What are some of the major arguments which have been used by interest groups concerning the investigation of complaints against the police within the USA and England and Wales? Traditionally,onbothsidesoftheAtlanticsorneofthemostheateddiscussionsonthe subjectofinvestigatingcomplainsagainstthepolicehavecenteredarwndthembjectofcivilian involvement in the process. In the United States, civilian review boards seemed to reach their peakduringthepermissivesocietyofthe1960sandthenfadeawayalmostasquicklyastheyhad beenintroduced. Nevertheless,some of themorerecent attemps toinvolve civilians in police disciplinaryprooesmirrtendedtoirrject visible elemens of urdependenceandunpamalrty into existing systems, have achieved longer lasting successes. Summarizing some of the major argumensrepeatedlyusedbyflmsewithdiffaingopiniorsondresubjeaofexsmalmview of albgedpoficenfiscmdwtcanarsstinmdassndmgdrenndvadmbdfindmanyofdw proposals made either for change or for retention of the status quo. 7 4) Can an empirically-derived functional typology be developed to provide a generalized framework against which structurally differing police complaints procedures can systematically be compared? Although a wide range of complaints procedures exist. certain features are common to most. Conversely, aspects of complains policies exist which are considered crucial by those administrators familiar with their use, and yet which are frequently absent from complains procedures employed elsewhere. In this context, a valuable tool to assist in examining, comparing and contrasting police complains systems would be a frmctional typology containing all of the mcessary stages to allow its use in describing any particular system as merely representing one structural alternative on a common functional basis. Gathering data on complains procedures directly from those members of police agencies who are fully conversant with the necessary administrative steps involved in correctly handling citizen complains is potentially the most likely means of eliciting the appropriate information required to develop and design such a typology. 5) Within the USA, is there a relationship between police complaints procedures and any of the following: a) agency size, level and geographical location? b) general economic conditions in police jurisdictions? c) general crime characteristics in police jurisdictions? Complains againstthepolicearenotmadeinavacuum. Whethertheyresultfromactual police misconduct, perceived police misconduct, or the malicious intentions of complainans, all complains are grounded ineitherreason ormotive. Whilstthe present studyisnotdirectly concernedwithidentifyingthecausalprocesseswhichgiverisetopolicecomplains,itdoesaim to seek out and identify associations between complains procedures and other factors. Adopting aconflictview ofsociety, itseems likely thatbothrealandperceived problems existingwithin a communitymaycreashosfileauhudestowardsmepofice,sincemmnypeopledreympresmt the most visible symbols of authority and an oppressive society. Hostile attitudes within the community, if exacerbated by seemingly impersonal and unconcerned police departmens, may generate citizen complains. Thus, ifit is to be expected that certain socioeconomic and 8 demographic features of police agency jurisdictions, examples of which are itemized in the above two research questions, will be associated with the filing of citizen complains against the police, it is also reasonable to infer that the same factors may exhibit relationships with the systems and procedures utilized in complains investigation. If certain socioeconomic and demographic features of police jurisdictions are indeed associatedwithcomplainsprocedmes,itistobeexpectedthatthose characteristics ofthe commtmity which impinge directly upon police operations will exhibit even more marked relationships with systems utilized for investigating citizen complains. In particular, an assessmentofcrimeratesandcrimetypescanpmvideboflranindication oftheoccupational challenge beingfaced by aparticularpolicy agency, andameasureoftheextentto whichis manpower resources are being stretched Both of these factors may impact upon the quality of serviceprovidedbytheagency,andthusuponcitizencomplainsandtheproceduresutilizedto investigate them 6) Within the USA, is there a relationship between police complaints procedures and any of the following: a) the number of complaints filed? b) the seriousness of complains filed? c) the proportion of complaints sustained? Finally, the most obvious features of a police agency to which it would be expected complains systems andprocedurestoberelated arethecitizencomplains themselves. Itis eminently reasonable to infer that police complains investigation procedures have developed at appropfimebvekbfifmmenumbesmdsuimsnessofcifizmwmpMstypicanyfibdwhh individual departmens. Additionally, the proportion of complains sustained. although at best an unreliable indicator of professional misconduct within a police agency, might be expected to exhibit an association with the investigative procedures preferred 9 Overview of the Study Areviewofdreliterannedividedintothreemajorsections,comprisesthesubjectmatterof thenextthreechapters. ChapterslIandllIareconcemedwiththemajorhistoricaldevelopmens indreareaofinvesrigatingcomplainsagainstthepolicewhichhaveoccurredintheUnitedStates of America and in England and Wales respectively. Chapter II clu'onicles US complains system changes fromthe early days ofInternal Affairs Unis and civilian review to the presentday. whflstChaptermpresensasinfiluwaviewofdevelopnensmBrglanddealesand conchrdeswithadetaileddesaipdonoftheactivifiesandresponsibflifiesofthenewand independent Police Complains Authority. England and Wales are singled out from the other two countrieshitheUnhedKingdom,ScodandmrdNorthemIreland,smcethelauertwohave difiauuhsmficalmdbgaluadidmswhichmakemehmchsimwimEnglandandWales inappropriate when police-related matters are under consideration. lhefisttwosecdmsonrapterNcasfinneareviewandsmmmryofpastexpefiarces cmcadngpoficecomplainsprmduresinflnUmsttassandenglandandWalesand identify several possible sources of new developmens. The majorhistorical point of similarity betweardevelopnerusincomplainsmvesdgadonhasbeenmeuadidmaluseofmesarnesetof argumens by proponents and opponents of the concept of external civilian review of alleged policemisconductonbothsidesoftheAtlantic. ThethirdsectionofChapterIVtherefore comprisesasummaryoftlwseargumensandtheirmrderlyhrgradonale. . The design of the study is fully described in Chapter V, which inchrdes abrief description ofthesurveyinstrurnentandthosemeasuresitwasdesignedtogenerateforanalysis. ChapterVI includes a detailed consideration of the stages involved in developing a functional typology for complains investigation, an endeavor which was central to the entire study. The typology, whichoncedevelopedpmvideddrebasisforthedascollecdmhtdrefinalphaseofthestudy,is presentedinpictorialforrnattheendofthechapter. Analysisanddiscussionofthedata constimtethesubjectmatterofChapterVII. Univariate.bivariateandnmltivariateanalysesare considered in mm. In the final chapter, a sununary, conclusions and policy implications are preseruedinthecontextoftheoriginalsixresearchquestions. CHAPTER II THE UNITED STATES' EXPERIENCE Introduction The power and authority which society has invested in the police ensures that officers' actions are subjected to close scrutiny by, amongst other groups. the media. lawyers, civil righs organizations andthepublicingeneral. Procedmeswhichenstuethatcitizenswhoarenot satisfiedbythestandardofserviceprovidedby individualoficersmrbythepoliceasan organization. areentitledtohavetheircomplaints investigatedexistthroughoutthe USA, althmghdetailsofdreprocedmesvaryfi'omdeparmenttodeparunent Occasionally, well-publicized flagrant abuses of power or authority by officers who appear to have escaped without prmishment cast doubt upon the integrity of complains investigation procedures. In such anenvironment, senior police managers are faced withthe problem ofdeveloping andimplementingaprocedmeforinvestigatingcitizencomplain’ts againstofficers oftheir department. Aprocsswhichisthoroughandimpartialmndyetwhichisequally acceptabletothe officers themselves, to nrembers of the public, and to local political leaders and pressure groups. External versus Internal Review - The Background EversincethefirstlntemalAffairs Units (IAUs) wereestablishedintheUSA duringthe 1940s, the subject of investigation of complains against the police has been a major topic of public debate. The controversy has nor. however, been concerned with any suggestions that investigating citizen complaints of police malpractice is an unnecessary and wasteful utilization of 10 1 1 scarce public resources. On the contrary, all interest groups and writers who have addressed themselves to the 'ssue have, without exception. agreed that citizen complains against individual officers shouldbefully investigated. 'Ihefactorwhichhascreatedthedebateis theforrnwhich this review ofan officer's actions should take. In broad terns, the debate has centered arormd whether the investigation of alleged malpractice by officers should be investigated internally within the policedepartmentorextemally by some otherbody independent ofthe police. It has been argued that. whatever the investigative procedure utilized are, public confidence, vital to an effective police department, can be fostered by a well-publicized and well-organized complains investigation system (Beral and Sisk. 1964: 500). The opposite situation occurs when an investigative unit. out of concern for the reputation of the police department, employs reprehensible tactics to discourage citizens from filing complains against officers. In the early 19605, cases were documented in which IAUs threaterwd complainans witheriminallibelinNew YorkCity,demandedthattheytakeapolyglaphtestinCleveland, and charged them with various public order offences in Philadelphia. Washington, DC. and Los Angeles. In other words, the investigative tmis behaved as if the complainans rather than the officers were on trial. (Niederhoffer, 1967: 284). Attitudes and actions such as these can naturally only do harm to police-community relations. However, without any quantitative data being available which relates police-community relations to methods utilized for investigathg citizen complains against the police, writers have only been able to express their opinions on the nature ofthe relationship between the two factors. Whilst it is logical to argue that a’good investigative system will give rise to good police-commlmity relations (Beral and Sisk. 1964: 516), the negative argument that a less than good investigative system will give rise to less titan good police-community relations is more reasonable, pragmatic and realistic. Most police departmens, aware of constant commtmity tensions, do everything which is within their power to prevent a worsening of police-community relations. A serious consideration of the ways in which their complains investigation procedures are viewed by the generalpublicisthereforeacnrcialstepinthisprocess. 12 Oneimportantpointwhichisafltoofiequerrflyovedookedisdratevenallowingforthe aggressivetacdcsdesuibedabovewhicharesomedmesufifizedbyrecipiens ofcomplaints,the volume of reported complains in most jurisdictions is not great considering the number of police involved (Barton. 1970: 450; Cray, 1972: 255-257). It might reasonably be inferred therefore that poor police-community relations arising from citizen complains against the police isnotsormrchassociatedwiththenumberofcomplainsmadeasitiswiththewayinwhich' they are investigated. Itis perhaps surprisingto discoverthat, inthe wake ofthe collapse ofthe New YorkCity Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) in 1966. after only four months' operation, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice took the apparently naive view that: 'The Police Review Board should never have been the central issue; Police Review Boards are only symptomatic of a much more serious matter, ie:- the loss of confidence by the public in some police forces. It is the loss of confidence which is the central issue in the controversy." (Field Survey V 1967: 296-297). The President's Commission did not, however totally adopt an ostrich stance on the effect of perceived shortcomings in police departments' IAUs on public confidence in the police. since it recommended, albeit reluctantly, that in those comrrnmities where it was obvious that even revised and improved internal review procedures would not restore, public confidence. measures to establish some form of external review should be taken. The development, during the late 19505 and the 1960s, of a number of external review mechanisms to monitor citizen complains against the police. either in addition to or as replacemens for existing internal review mechanisms, whatever else it achieved. certainly led to a polarization of opinions on the issue by the end of the 1960s. These opinions and their related arguments have, despite the passage of time. remained largely unchanged to the present day, and have been catalogued by a number of writers (Beral and Sisk. 1964; Cray 1972; Terrill 1982; Walker 1983). The argumens themselves are well worthy of consideration and analysis. and are presented in Chapter IV of the present study. At this stage, however, it is both useful and 13 informative to discuss the early attemps at complains investigation in the USA, followed by the major evens which gave rise to the polarization of views. Investigation of Complaints in the Early 1960s The firstmajorattempttoidentifythevarious methodsutilizedto investigatecitizen complains againstthepoliceintheUSAwas undertakenby BeralandSiskinaclassic article published in the Harvard Law Review in 1964. At the time of writing, complains against the police were only administered by civilian groups ill two cities: Philadelphia, since 1958, and Rochester. N.Y.. since 1963. Consequently, most of Beral and Sisk's discussion focused upon dnmfisencsmdworgamzadmofmtanflnechmsnsfmmmphmsmvesdgadmwhhm some 200 of the larger police departments in the USA. Three basic types of investigative mechanisms were forurd to exist - local supervisor investigation, local supervisor investigation supplemented by a specific unit within the police department (for example, Internal Affairs), and investigation exclusively by a specific unit within the police department. The advantage of local supervisor investigation was that it was believed to heighten the awareness of supervisors of the specific actions of officers under their command which tended to generateflictionandcausecitizenstocomplain; thedisadvantagewasthatitwasfeltthatmany supervisors could have a great interest in covering up violations, both to shield their friends and favored officers and to conceal their own shortcomings. Inpolicedepartmenswith anIntemalAffairsUnitaAU),invaliablyitwas foundthatall wmplainsmadeagahstofiicesofmedepamrmswemhudallyforwmdedmmeIAUfm central recording. Offices of the IAU then generally had broad discretion in deciding whether to investigate the allegation themselves, which they would normally do in potentially serious or complex cases. or whether to refer the complaint to the accused officer‘s immediate supervisor for investigation. In the latter case, the supervisor’s complesd investigation report would be returned to the IAU for examination. As an added deterrent to biased investigation, in some departmens IA officers would reinvestigate at random some of the cases which had initially been 14 refen'ed to officers' supervisors. Two advantages of this two-tiered mechanism over the simple local investigation were the degree of independence and impartiality which the IAU provided, together with is apparatus which could handle large scale investigations beyond either the capability or the time and resources of officers' immediate supervisors. Beral and Sisk's survey reporwd that in 1964 less than 5% ofthe police departmens in their sample relied exclusively upon a special unit - Internal Afl’airs - to investigate citizens complains. Arguments against IAUs were mainly based on practical problems of limited resources. Deparmnnsarguedfllatuleyfomdhdifficuhmjusdfyflleaeadmofaseparateunh which would efiectively remove a number of officers from 'real policing'. Argumens in favor of IAUs stressed the potential of a separate unit to gain investigative experience. develop more objectivity and convey to the community the impression that police departments gave serious attention to the processing of citizen complains. Civilian Review in its Infancy 'l‘heconceptofcivilian review ofcomplains againstthepoliceinthe USAdates fromthe 1950s andwas initially prompted by abeliefincertainquartersthattheexistingmeans for seeking redress against police misconduct were ineffective (Goldstein, 1977: 157). It is popularly assumed to include the participation of individuals representing a cross section of the community. and to be established and operated externally to the police departrnenr (Walker. 1983: 237). In practice,thefirstattempts atcivilianreviewvaried intype,rangingfrom civilian-dominated boards sitting extemally to the police department to committees and offices established within the police department btlt including citizen representation. The earliest Civilian Review Boards (CRBs) also operated with varying degrees of success. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of JusticecomparedfourCRBs whichhadbeenoperatingpriortothattime. Itconcludedthatthey hadgenerfllybeenseenmbetoommbodiesmamfinlepowermdmlyadvisorycapacities. The advice which they had been entitled to give had. however varied. In Philadelphia (established in 1958) and Rochester, New Jersey (established in 1963), the boards' advice could 15 include specificrecommendations fordisciplinary actiontobetaken againstofficers whohad been found guilty of malpractice. One result of this was that b0th boards were regularly involved in litigation and injunctions initiated by police officers' associations. In New York City (established ill 1966) and Washington, DC. (established in 1948), however, the boards' powers were severely limisd and they were not empowered to give views on the meris of cases. Effectively their only jurisdiction was in making recommendations regarding whether a hearing should be held or not. Indeed, Washington D.C.'s early attempt at civilian review can only very looselybedescribed assuch,sinceitwasveryheavilycriticizedforisinacdvityanditseems cleerthatthevastmajorityofthepublic. andperhapseven ofthemembers ofthe police department, were unaware of is existence (Task Force, 1967 : 200-202; US. Commission on Civil Righs, 1981: 125). Other early efforts to establish CRBs in York. Pennsylvania and in Minneapolis, Minnesota, both in 1960, never left the drawing board. Ofthe above early attempts at civilian review, two boards, those in Philadelphia and New YorkChy,pmvokedmostinterestaturedneandmosthterannesince.mdhis informativeto consider their respective histories in some detail. The Philadelphia Police Advisory Board (PAB) The Philadelphia Police Advisory Board (PAB) was formed in 1958 directly as a result of the election of a new reforming mayor. The Board members, initially five but subsequently increasedtoeight, wereallmembers ofthe public appointedby'themayor. andtheyusually included at least one sociologist, criminologist or other person with a legal background. The only salaried staff member was the executive secretary, who was responsible, amongst other things, for receiving complaints and interviewing complainans. The first executive secretary was an attorney, succeeded in 1963 by a black minister. The Board did not have is own investigative staff. Consequently, is only alternative comdwdmdflgmemvesdgadmprocesswereeimerfmmeexecudveseaetaryw attempt to resolve the matter informally. a course of action which was undertaken quite regularly (Beral and Sisk. 1964: 514), or to refer the investigation to the Philadelphia police commissioner 16 who would then direct his community relations division to look into the matter. Following an investigation undertaken by the cornrmmity relations division of the police deparnnermthecompletedpolicereportwouldbestudiedby alegal sub-committee ofthe Board whowoulddecidewhetherahealingwas warranted Ifitwas concludedthatahearingwas appropriate, then generally the complainant and the accused officer would both be represented by coursel, and the hearing would be adversary in nature. Nevertheless, effors were made to ensmethatthehearingswereasinformalas possible. andtothisendtherulesofevidencewere relaxed Thedecisionofthe Board wasbasedonamajority vote,butnormallynofonnal opinion would be written regarding the decision. Following hearings in which the case was formd proved against the officer, the Board would send is recommendation of disciplinary sanction to both the police commissioner and the mayor. The police commissioner would normally follow the Board’s recommendations, but if there was any disagreement, the mayor would informally arbitrate the decision. Effectively, then. the mayor had the final say on the disciplinary recommendation (Hudson, 1971: 530-532: Brown, 1983: 149-150). Writing in 1964. six years into the Board's life, Beral and Sisk (1964: 515) argued that the mostserious obstacletoisattempstowincitizens'confidenceinis independenceand impartialityhadbeenits necessary reliance,duemainlytobudgetary restrictions,uponthepolicej to investigate the complaints themselves. Another problem was the disappointingly low number ofcomplaintsbeinglodgedwiththeBoard, giventhatoneofthemajorreasons foris establishmenthadbeenthebeliefthatmany posntialeomplains werenotbeingmadebecause of fear ofpolice reprisals and distrust in the previous purely internal investigation procedure. Additionally, many people considered that the Board's recommendations for disciplinary sanctions were even more lenient than those which the police themselves would have initiated. Overall, however, perhaps the most fundamental weakness of the Philadelphia Advisory Board wasthatitexistedentirelyatthediscretionofthe mayor. Duringthe PAB's nineyearexistence, 20% ofcomplains werehandledthroughthe mfmmnpmetsbymeexectmveseuemyandapprommlymesanemopmsmmmma Board hearing. Ofthe cases heard by the Board, approximately one thirdresultedin afinding of 17 guilt and a disciplinary recommendation. The number of complaints made to the PAB averaged something in the region of 100 per year, a disproportionate number of which were filed by members of minority groups (Task Force, 1967: 200). During its stormy lifetime it was subjected to a number of lawsuits by police officers' associations inchrding the Fraternal Order ofPolice (FOP). One ofthese, concerned with a departmental regulation compelling personnel to submit to polygraph tests during internal investigations being canied out on behalf of the PAB, stopped the Board's activities and brought about certain procedural changes following the temporary stoppage. A second injunction effectively suspended the Board's activities indefinitely until a new mayor was elecwd. The new mayor‘s opposition to any form of civilian review of the police brought about the Board's sudden and largely unlamented demise (Hudson, 1971: 525-527; Halpem. 1974: 562-565; Brown. 1983: 150). The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) Allegations of officer misconduct in the New York City Police Department (NY CPD) dmingthe 19505reachedsudrapeakfl1at,atmepointdrelusficeDeparmemflneatemdto cmductitsowninvesfigafionofdredeparunemifthesimafiondidnotunprove. Againstthis background, in the early 19603 as the civil rights movement gained momentum the issue of police misconduct became even rrrore explosive (W alker, 1983: 237). Sensing popular dissatisfaction withthe situation, anew reforming mayorintroducedcivilianreview as an issueinhis election campaign, and subsequently founded the New York Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) in the summer of 1966. The new CCRB was effectively a transformation of a previously existing internal police review board and consequently, as a concession to police opponents of the new board, the mayor decided that its membership should not be entirely civilian. In the evemmeBoardwasnmdeupofseven members: fourcivilians appointedbythemayorandthree policeofficialsappointedbythepolicecommissioner. Civilianswerethusinamajorityonrhe new CCRB. The Board also had a strong ethnic minority representation, two blacks and one Puerto Rican being inchrded in the original four civilian appointees. All four civilians were 18 full-time salaried staff and, although they, like their counterparts in Philadelphia, had to rely upon police officers to carry out investigations on their behalf, the arrangement was unusual in the sense that the investigating officers had no other duties and worked exclusively for the Board. In effect then, rather than representing true civilian review of the complaints investigation procedure, establishment of the New York City CCRB simply resulted in jurisdiction over complaints being shifted within the police department, although civilians were now involved in the process (Brown, 1983: 151). Conciliation, undertaken by the Board's assistant director, was attempted whenever possible, usually in situations where an officer was clearly guilty of either mistaken action or neglect,butwherethedamagetothecomplainanthadbeenminimal. Wherethisconciliation process was inappropriate, an investigation would be commenced, following the conclusion of whichthe Board would meetto study the report anddecide whetherornotto hold ahearing. Hearings, similar to the arrangement in Philadelphia, were usually adversary in natme, involving counsel for both parties, but again the rules of evidence were relaxed. The mung board always consistedofanoddnumberofmembers oftheCCRB withthecivilianrnembersintlremajority. Decisions werebaseduponamajority votebuamfikePhfladelphiaifdrecasewasfoundproved against the officer, the CCRB was not empowered to recommend a specific disciplinary action Discipline was retained as being the sole responsibility of the police commissioner, in consultation with the mayor when appropriate. Hearings of cases had to be held within twenty days of the receipt by the CCRB of the completed investigation report (Hudson, 1971: 529-530). For reasons which will be discussed later, New York City's CCRB experienced a highly publicizedandstormy shortlifeofonly fourmonths,butinthattimeitreceived overfour hundred complaints, twice as many as the police department's internal complaint review board had previously bear averaging in a whole year. Nearly half of the complaints involved allegations of unnecessary force (Cray, 1972: 319). Of the 146 complaints which were fully disposed of by the Board prior to its abolition, 11 were outside of the Board's jurisdiction and were referred ekewhere, 21 were conciliated, 109 were found to be unsubstantiated after investigation. andinonecasetheofficerconcemed received areprimand. Inonly fourinstances 19 were charges against the officer recommended by the Board (Task Force, 1967: 201). As had already been the casewith the Philadelphia plus, the New York City CCRB faced constant opposition from the police. The unofficial, but extremely powerful Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) was enraged by the idea of a civilian majority on the Board and saw the activities of dreCCRBnmasacmsmrcdveauentptwimpmvecomnnndtymhdms,btnasunwamnted interference in police affairs. Their efforts and their anti-CCRB publicity, initially taking the forrnofa500,0008ignaturepetitionandapolicepicketofCiryHalLevenmallyresultedinthe issueoftheCCRBbeingputtotheballotinareferendumofthecitypopulationinNovember, 1966. The result of the referendum was a three to one vote against the Board, which was immediately abolished, after only four months of operation, and was replaced by a police-dominated review board which, with slight changes made since, continues to exist today (Cray, 1972: 319; Hudson, 1971: 524-525; Walker, 1983: 239). The success or otherwise of Philadelphia's PAB and New York City's CCRB is difficult to evaluate, particularly in the case of New York given the Board's such limited lifetime. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, if they achieved norhing else, these two boards served to polarizeopinionsontheissueofinvestigationofcomplaints againstthepolicetowardstheendof the 1960s. Polarized Opinions Begin to Emerge ‘ Those whoopposedthegenerally existingintemalreviewmechanismsweredrawn mainly fromcivilrightsandcivilliberdesorganizadons,whocitedevidenceofagenerallossof cmfidmceammghrgesecdmsofmepomhdmmmeefiecuvaessofmmmmpamntal pmedmesfmmviewhgpolicelmscmdmtmsupponmehargunmmfmamombdmcedmd genuinely accountable system. Those who supported the status quo were drawn mainly from police associations of both high and low ranks, and conservative groups who occasionally hinted that their opponents were in part a manifestation of a Communist Conspiracy (Hudson. 1971: 517; Cray, 1972: 321). Despite having accepted the evidence of past failings of internal review mechanisms, these groups saw the way ahead towards redressing the balance in 20 investigations to be reliant upon improved existing internal procedures together with more professional personnel systems. (Describing internal review as the status quo in the mid-1960s is not strictly accurate since. in 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice reported that. of those departments which dealt with civilian complaints against the police, half hadnospecialtmittocarry outthis function.) Because ofthe polarizing effect which the emerging arguments were tending to have on opinions, a number of writers in the late 1960s and the early 1970s began searching for some middlegmtmdinthedebate. Theresultwasthattheysettledupontheconceptofapolice ombudsman. Proposals for a Police Ombudsman The ombudsman proposal was perhaps first put forward by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice which repomd in 1967, but was initially ignored because the entrenched polar opinions which had developed were generally concemed with CRBs and avoided the issue of an ombudsman altogether. The ombudsman proposals were originally based upon the Scandinavian system, in which theombudsmanisanexecutive officerofthehighestprestigeandintegritywhosepowersare limited to investigating and criticizing public agencies in direct response to complaints from privatecitizens.’1‘heidealpolice ombudsmanwasthaeforeseenasbeinganindividualwho would rely upon moral authority to enforce recommendations, and who would only resort to publishing such recommendations upon determining that, following an investigation. the chief executive of the police agency involved would not voluntarily adopt the course of action which hadbeensuggested. Certainwriterslrrgedthatconsiderationbegiventothecreationofan ombudsman to investigate complaints against all agencies ofgovemment, and notjust against police departments (Sharpley, 1969: 16). Others put forward proposals for an organizational ombudsman - as far as the police were concerned, merely the CRB wolf in sheep's clothing - but these proposals were not so well received. An organizational ombudsman would, it was argued. 21 lackmostoftheadvamagesofdreofficeofomhldsmanwhilstmminmgmstofdle disadvantage of the CRB. Disunity in a board comprising members of various interest groups would be cormterproductive to the requirement of impartiality in the office of ombudsman. Furthermore, a group would be lmable to apply moral authority in enforcing their meomrmrdadmswfimagmcychiefhdnsanwwayasasinghexeafiveoffidalofmgh integrity potentially could (Sharpley, 1969: 16). Thepoliceombudsman basedupontheScandinavianmodelwouldbeanadvocateofthe people; hewould have no authority to award damages, only authority to bring about reforms. Anyfinancialcompensaticn soughtwouldhavetobeobtainedthroughthecomts. The ombudsman would need to be an official above politics, widely respected and impartial, and only concemed with satisfying valid complaints through the power to effect reforms. The distinction wasmadebetweenanombudsmanwhowouldrelyonlegalauthorityandtheCRBswhichinthe past had depended upon public pressure (Cray, 1972: 327). Inthehighly polidcallychargedpublicsectorintheUSAadegreeofdlougluwasgivento the problem of how such an ombudsman would achieve independence from political control. Selectionbythelegislature,preferablynotby apartisanvotebutonthebasis ofanall-party concensus was proposed as one possibility. At city and municipal level a number of other alternatives weresuggested,eachhavingits ownuniqueandunusualfeatures. Onesuch sugggstioninvolvedtheappointrnentbeingmadebythe mayorandthecormcilforaterrn overlappingthatofthe mayor; anotherinvolvedtheappointmentbeingmadefi'omalistprovided by arespected group ofinformedcitizens, such astheheads oflocal universities orcolleges (Barton, 1970: 468). The 1970s therefore arrived with a number of variations on the theme of external review of complaints investigation having been proposed and indeed implemented with varying degrees of success. The major problem was not to invent new ideas or proposals, but how to persuade those people whose lives would potentially be affected most by the proposals, the police themselves, that the new ideas were worthy of consideration. 22 Police Unions and Staff Associations and External Review Traditionally,oppositiontoCRBs andindeedanyfonnofextemalleviewhasbeenoneof the major rallying points of police unions and associations in their efforts to organize their members. Theirvigorouscarnpaigns inthecourts, inthe political arenaand through public relations campaigns have forewarned citizen groups, police administrators and politicians who have favored external review that, if proposed, the issue would be strongly contested (Halpern, 1974: 569: Lynch and Diamond, 1983: 1164). Theirmajorargumentshavebeenbased uponthebeliefsthatpoliceomcerspossessmrique skills, training and experience which makes it impossible for civilians to make sound decisions regarding police behavior. Such beliefs can contribute towards maintaining high morale amongst officem,whichismhselfofienseurasafimdmmnmlmdicatorofanefl’ecdvepohce organization. Lineofficersdmsassertdratreviewboardsstaffedbylaymenwillseverely threatenmoraleandthatdnconsequence, officers mayfeelrestrainedfromtakingnecessaryand justifiable actions in their duties when dealing with members ofthe public (Hudson. 1971: 521). Civilian review would thus undermine officers‘ professionalism. The imions' arguments based upon their belief in police professionalism have not, however, been unique to representative bodies of the lower ranks. Police senior administrators, through the vehicle of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), have long argmd thatoneofthemajorfeatures oftheprofessionalstanlswhichdreydesirefortheirorganizadons is the autonomy of chief officers in disciplinary matters. Consequently, they have sought the typesofpmelyinternalcontrolmechanisms alreadyexerCisedbythemedicalandlegal professions (Halpem, 1974: 570; Walker, 1983: 242-243). As in any profession, they argue, discipline of deviant members comes properly and most effectively from fellow members of the pmfesm'on. Theargurnentthatadequatepublic accountabilityisaheady providedbylocally elected officials, the courts, prosecutors, the FBI and the Justice Department has also been popular (Leonard and More, 1971: 92). In this context of concerted police opposition throughout all ranks towards the notion of external review, looking back upon the demise of the New York City CCRB and the Philadelphia 23 PAB,anumberofcomparisonscanbemade. BoththeCCRBandthePAB were products of liberal reform politics, each being established at times of public concern over the use of excessive forceandtheallegeddenialsofcivilrightsby police officers. InPhiladelphia,thecreationofthe Boardwasoneofanumberofreformsintroducedto improvetheefficiency and accountability of local government following more than sixty years of one-party (Republican) rule. In New York City,onmeodrerhand,civflimreviewwasinuoducedasapohdcalissueindle 1965 mayoral carnpaigrnlargelyinanattempttocapturetheblackvote,sinceextemalreviewrepresenteda promise of an opportunity to redress long-standing grievances against the police (Hudson, 1971: 527-528; Bouza, 1985: 253). Just as similar considerations led to the establishment of the two boards, similar political decisions brought about their defeats. The opposition in both cities was a well-mobilized interest group orchestramd by the police officers' associations (Bouza, 1985: 253-254). It is certainly uuetosaythat.atleastintlrecaseofNewYorkCityandPhfladelphiainme 1960s. supporters ofcivilianreviewwereneverassingle-mindedintheirdedicationtomaintainingitasthepolice were to defeating it (Hudson, 1971: 528). The early experiences of these two cities bring into focus the major problem facing any administration mldnganyauemptathmodmmgsonefonnofextanalmviewofdlepoficefirat ofestablishingareviewmechanismwlfichwiflbeacceptablebothtotheconummityandtodle police officers involved. On the one hand, officers feel that they are betrayed when their actions arebeingscrutinizedby ornsiders,andontheodrerhand,cidzensfeelmatpolicesolidarity effectively prevents any satisfactory form of redress. In jtnisdictions within which policemnmmhymladmshavebwndmmgedmmeexmmmathulecmfidmcemdcmdibflhy is enjoyed by the existing complaints investigation procedure, any delays in introducing new procedureswhichaimtosatisfybothpartiescanonly servetomagnifytheproblemandleadtoan increased polarization ofviews. 24 Internal Affairs Units During the 19703 The increasing controversy surrounding investigation of citizen complaints against the police in the USA continued to grow during the 19705, the flames periodically being fanned by examples of police excesses apparently going unpunished, and it spawned a number of further variations on the theme of civilian review. However, those police departments which continued to strongly resist the idea of being subjected to any form of external review, the vast majority of departments in fact, were still preoccupied with increasing their professionalism, and were looking for ways to improve their internal review mechanisms, either by modifying the roles of existing IAUs or through creating new Units in departments which did not already have them (Wilson and McLaren, 1977: 212). One such attempt at increased professionalism was made in 1974 by the new Police Chief of Tampa Police Department, Florida. and consideration of the influences involved in the establishmentofanewIAUinthatdepartmenthelpstogiveanindicationoftheprevailingviews on internal review procedures at that time. Establishing and Staffing an IAU in the Mid-1970s Prior to 1974, intemal investigations within the Tampa Police Department. Florida, had, at besLbeendisorganizedandinconsistentduebothtothelackofanIAUandtheabsenceof written policies and procedures setting down investigative guidelines. Having decided that the creation of an IAU was essential, the new Police Chief undertook a survey of other departments of similar size in an effort to acquire information which would help him to create a Unit with two clear goals. First, he required a Unit which would be well organized and scrupulously fair and impartialinitsinvestigations; second,hewantedtheUnittohavethetrustandrespectboth ofthe comrmmity and the members of the police department (Territo and Smith, 1976: 66). From the research canied out with other departments, the following factors emerged, all fourofwhichweregenerallyconsideredinpolicecirelestobeessentialfeatmesintheselection process for staffing an IAU: i l) 2) 3) 4) 25 AllpersonnelservinginanIAUmustbevollmteers; thenatureand sensitivity of the work involved was generally considered to make it both unwise and unfair to assign someone to Internal Affairs duties who was not happy with the idea. Personnel nrust have demonstrated ill dreir previous police performance that they possess a high degree of investigative sldlls. Personnel must have excellent reputations amongst their peers and supervisors with regard to integrity and overall police performance; specifically, they must not themselves have been found guilty of serious official misconduct in the past. Personnel must have a knowledge and understanding of the various ethnic minorities in the local community since, for a number of complex social, political and economic reasons, past experience has shown that many citizen complaints will be initiated by members of these groups (Territo and Smith, 1976: 68). InthecaseofthenewTampaIAU,inadditiontocomplyingwiththefourgenerallyagreed essmdflahefiafismdabwefimfiudmspedficdecisimsmmnmdemdrlnlpedmshape the Unit. These are also worthy ofconsideration: a) Investigators would serve in the Unit for a maximum period oftwo b) 6) years so as to minimize the possibility of alienation ofofficers within the Unit from the rest of their colleagues, and also so as to foster acceptance and respect for the IAU through greater employee particrp' ation in it. A polygraph would be utilized in complaint cases when, following a complete investigation, a final decision was not possible because, due to the lack of independent witnesses to the event which had provoked the complaint, it could not be established which party was being untruthful. Refusal to" submit to the polygraph test on the part of the officer could lead to dismissal in a serious case, although there was no such serious potential consequence for a complainant who might refuse to submit to the test. In 1973 the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals had recommended (p. 479) that police departments should publish statistics, although not complete details, of internal discipline case disposition on a regular basis, in order to dispel allegations of disciplinary secrecy voiced in certain elements of the community. Tampa chose to act upon this recommendation by distributing a monthly summary of activities ofthe IAU both to the community and within the police department (Territo and Smith, 1976: 68). The mid-1970s thus saw the emergent race of the new IAUs. They were staffed by individuals who were involved in the work out of choice and who were committed to the ideal of 26 police professionalism. Investigators would be of unchallenged integrity with unblemished past records and would undergo training in community and race relations. Typically, they would be experienced detectives who would complete two years of service within the Units prior to being transferred back to operational duties. IAUs normally worked directly to the chiefs ofthe department, and consequently, being offered a transfer into Intemal Affairs was seen as an indication of approval of an officer by the Chief himself. His IAU staffed by such individuals, theGriefhadnodlingtofearfrompublicizingthedispositionofcasesbytheUnit,sincehewas sadsfieddrnifchalbngedmecmfldpohumthemldispmedabflideequalides andintegrity of his IAU staff in order to dispel any allegations of unprofessional'nm and dubious practices. It wasugmddmIAUsstafiedandorgmuzedalmgmesefineswemeffecdvenechmism of accountability aslongastheyhadthefullsupportoftheirchiefofficerswithregardto recomrnendationsfordisciplinary actionandpublic statements ofcomrnittmenttothoroughly investigate allegedly deviant behavior by officers. Conversely, the effectiveness of IAUs would beunderrnined inthosecases where, despite misconductbytheofficerhavingbeenproven,the chief officers chose not to impose disciplinary sanctions (Goldstein, 1976: 40-41). Thefirstnnjoratmmptatmhnemadmalsurdyofpoficecomplaianmcedmeswas undertaken in 1978, following which the writer concluded that. at least in the USA, the majority of police departments still processed complaints entirely internally (Russell. 1978). Whilst no hrdicadmwasgivenofdwpmpommofAnericanpolicedepammnmwhichcmhwd specialized IAUs or similar units exclusively used for complaints investigation, four principal variants of the internal system were identified: 1) investigadonatlocallevelinwhichdremauerisdisposedofendrelybydle localcormnander. 2) investigation at local level subject to external supervision and scrutiny by a senior officer at headquarters. 3) investigation of minor conrplaints at local level, supplemenmd by specialist department investigation of serious matters. 4) investigation exclusively by a specialist department (Russell, 1978: 40). 27 It is interesting to note that these four sub-systems are very similar, ifnor identical to the categories ofinwrnalreviewwhichhadbeenidentifiedoveradecade earlier(BeralandSisk, 1964). The indication is that. although efforts had been made over the intervening years to professionalize the staffing of IAUs, as far as the procedures thermelves were concerned very little had changed Ifthe staffingbutnot the procedtnes ofintemal review mechanisms hadchanged during the 1970s, then what changes were apparent in the field of external review? External Review During the 19703 Whilstthenumberofnewexternalboards whichwereestablishedduringthe 1970s was still minimal in comparison with the number of police departments in the USA, nevertheless some significant successes were achieved. Several of these newly created bodies have been well doamentedandaretobedescribedbelow,btnitisinteresdngtonoteatdrispointthattheir establishnrentwasnotgenerally greetedwiththeoutcryandftn'orewhichhadbeentypicalinthe 1960s. This is not, however, to be taken as an indication of reduwd police opposition. In reality, their relatively smooth inceptions were more attributable to the fact that the various boards were not such political footballs as their predecessors had been in the 1960s. Additionally, in general they were much more carefully and considerately introduced following in some cases extremely lengthy negotiations with police associations and unions. In effect. the boards of the 1970s were cm'efully legitimized priortotheircreation ratherthanhastily thrustuponhostile and resistant police departments. That they have generally continued to function to the present day is insomemeasureduetothe personalities and police chiefs involved,but,moreimportantly,is largely due to the preparatory groundwork which was undertaken prior to their establishment. A brief description of the functions and roles of the most well-known external review bodies created during the 1970s (and two during the early 1980s) follows. The agencies are listed chronologically with respect to their dates of establishment. 28 Kansas City's Office of Civilian Complaints (OCC) Kansas City's Office of Civilian Complaints (OCC), established in 1970 and staffed by five civilians, operates from an ofiice which is physically separate from the police headquarters. It acts as a central clearinghouse for all citizens‘ complaints. whether made directly to the OCC or to the police department. Following initial receipt of the complaint, the Director of the OCC may eitlrerchoosetoattemptto conciliatethematterwhich, ifcarriedoutsuccessfully,leadstothe case being closed. or he may decide to forward the case to the police department's IAU for investigation. Completed investigation reports are returned from the police department to the OCCforreviewandanalysis,andattlrisstagetheOCCDirectorisempoweredifheisnot satisfiedwiththequalityoftheinvestigation,torequirethatadditionalworkbedonebythepolice investigators. Having made a determination on the case. the OCC stafi and Director then forward their recommendation to the Police Grief. This recomrrrerrdaticn merely constitutes a suggested dispositionofthecase; authority forselectingandimposingdisciplinarysanctiorrshasremained with the Police Chief, who normally involves his police supervisory staff in the process of identifying an appropriate sanction ill cases where the complaint has been found to be sustained. Inpmcdce,dreOCCDheaorisverymmlydissadsfiedwidrdrequalhyofdrepohce investigation, and similarly the Police Grief rarely disagrees with the OCC recommendation (Perez, 1978: 319-314; US Commission on Civil Rights, 1981: 125; Walker, 1983: 239; Kerstetter, 1985: 165-166). One additional pointworthy ofnotewithrespecttotheKansas City OCCisthat,whilstthe appointment of a former police officer as OCC Director undoubtedly helped to allay police fears aboutthenew agency,thisdecisioncanhavehadlittlesuccess inconvincingthe publicoftlre Office's independence (Walker, 1983: 233). San Jose's Ombudsman An Ombudsman's office was created in San Jose in 1971, partly in response to community pressure for some form of external review of the police following a series of allegations of serious malpractice. In common with the Scandinavian model, the San Jose 29 Ombudsman's responsibilities are not rrrerely restricted to reviewing the police department, since dreofficereviewscomplaintsregardingannamicipalgovemmentagenciea Conrplaintsagainst thepolicemayeitherbefiledwiththepolicedepartment'sownIAUorwiththeOmbudsmalt In theformercase,meOmbudsmandoesnotcarryoutafullinvestigationbutisempoweredto monitortheintemalpoiiceenquiry;inthelamcaseacopyofthecomplaintisforwardedtothe IAUbydreOmhrdsnmandbmhamciescmyommallelmvesdgadms,dremsuhsofwhich inpracticeareinvariablythesame. Onlylirnitedusehasbeenmadeofthetraditionalombudsman capacity to mediate complaints (Kerstetter, 1985: 166-167). ReseuehhasslmwnmaedespitehsmdependarcefiomdlepoficedepannmndeSan JoseOmhflsmmhasnmbemabkwwueonecomrmuutyskepdcismmmmimpmfiflhy oftheoffice. Tlrenmstfikelyeutseofmisisthatdreofficeofonrbtrdsmamhavingfimited traditionintheUSAsznerallyregardedasconstitutingyetanotherbranchofrmmicipal gmeMMcmsemnnflyissemasmhsdufimwhichshwflfighdybefiewedwhhafair degree of suspicion (Perez, 1978: 383). Berkeley's Police ReviewCommissiorr (PRC) Duringthe l960s,thecarnpusofthe University ofCalifomiaatBerkeleybecame establishdas apopularnreetingcenterfordemcrrstrationsconceming awiderarrgeofissues. Riotsresultingfiomthedisintegrationofderrmstrations wereregularoccurrances,usually accompaniedby seriousinjuriessustairredby anurrrberofdemonstrators attheharrds ofthe police. The situation proved to be a fertile environment for proposals of civilian review of the policawhichwereinitiallyvotedonanddefeatedin1971bytheBerkeleyelectorate,but.with subsequentalnendments, werepassedby asecondvotein1973. Created in 1973, the Berkeley Police Review Commission (PRC) both investigates and holds hearings on citizen complaints against the police. It is a nine-member commission, each nremberofthe Berkeley CityCouncil appointingonecormnissioner. Cornnrissiorrers serve for two yearternrsand arepart-timeandunsalaried,butthePRCdoes employtwoofits own full-time salaried investigators, and therefore does n0t need to rely upon the police department for 30 the investigative process. The Berkeley Police Department has, however, retained its own WWBmaAB)somacidumhavedeopdmwmnsmmdressofdnhgriwmce using either avenue (Kerstetter, 1985: 161). In practice, citizens generally seem to favor nodfyhrgdreIABradrerthandlePRtharnmldngcomplaints.(Dunngl985andl986atotal ofapproximately100complaintswerefiledwiththePRthilstdrenumberfiledwidrIntemal Affairsinthesameperiodwasneater250.) Botlragenciesnotifyeachotlrerregarding comphhmwhichhwebeenfibdwidrdnnthnwhflstmeIABwinmvesdgamaflwmplainm regardless of where they were filed. the PRC only investigates those complaints initially filed withthem. If,however,acomplainantisnotsatisfiedwiththedispositionofacomplaintfiled withandinvestigatedbytheIAB,theycanappealtlrecasetothePRCforfurtherinvestigation. Genemfly,becauseofoperafionaladvmtagesmrdfieeaccessibflhywofficesand personnel information, which the PRC does not enjoy, the IAB tendsto complete its investigationsfirst. hrdeedorloccasiorlsdifficuldesexperiencedbydrePRChrvesdgators resultsinBerkeley's 120-daylimitoncomplaints investigations passingwithoutasatisfactory resolution having been arrived at by the PRC. Whateverdremncomeofimmvesdgadonmdheanng,Comndssimfindingsareafly advisoryforthebenefitoftlrecitymanager,theChiefofPoliceandthecitycormcil. Ifthereisa discmpamybetweenanRCfindingmdanABfindhgdmdwchymmagawinassessdw twoinvestigationsandwillthenmediatewithdreGliefofPolicewidrregardtorecommended discipline. In pmtice, such discrepancies are rare events (Terrill, 1982: 404). Detroit's Board of Police Commissioners In l974theeityofDetroitestablishedaBoardofPolice Conunissioners(BPC),thefive membersofwhicharemayoralappointees,tooverseearangeofpoliciesandprocedmesofthe police departrrrent, included amongst which was the investigation of citizen complaints. To hmdletcmphinnofpolicennscanundeammmmomceofdeauefrnvenigatm (0G). Thetwelveciviliarrs who stafftheOG performlegal, investigativeandclericaldutieson behalf of the Board. 31 The Board of Police Commissioners handle three types of citizen complaint: original complaints, reviews and appeals. All original complaints, wherever they are filed, are forwarded totheexecutivesecretary of the BPC, andtlrose which cannotberesolved informally are subsequentlyreferredtotheOCI. TheOGstaffwilltheneitherreferthecaseforinvestigationto the supervisory staff of the police officer concerned, to the police department's Professional StandardsSection(theequivalentofanIAU),ortheywillinvestigateitthemselves. Intlrecase ofmvesdgadmmwhichammfenedwdnpoficedepamentwhichmpracdcecmsdmtedw majority,theOGhasamonitoringroleintheprocedure. Complaintreviewsarecaniedoutby theOGhrcaseswhemmecomplainambefievesdrateimersomemororormssimhasaffected theoutcorneofthecase. ComplaintappealsareadministeredbytheOCIincaseswhereitis estabhsheddmdlaealemfficMgrmmdsmwammacompletereinvesdgadm. Upon completion of allthree investigative processes. the Director of the OCI decides upon case disposition and forwards, where appropriate, a recommendation on disciplinary acrion via the Board ofPolice Commissioners to the Grief of Police. The Board has the additional authoritytoreviewandeithersetasideoraffirmdisciplinarysanctimsilnposedbytheGriefCUS Commission on Civil Rights, 1981: 125-126; Terrill, 1982: M; Walker, 1983: 239-240). WhflsthmayappeardratflreDeuohBomdofPoliceComnfissimsismexuemely powerful body, it has beenpointedout that.inpractice,thepeculiarities of Detroit's present politieslsystemensmethatitspowe‘risstrictlylimited. Ononehand.theformaldisciplinary processtemhisgmmredbymewlbcdvebargainmgcmuaaesmbfislwdbawemdwchy andthe police union. Imposition of discipline can only follow aseparate fact-finding process. mmnwdmmewlbcdvebugammgageemn.wlfichguarmwesmnpmcessfmmemdividual officer(Walker, 1983: 240). Ontheotherhand.theBoardworkswellinDetroitbecauseits recommendationsmeinvanablyhrstepwidrdleviewsofbothdrepresartnuyoranddrepresem Police Grief. Thecitycharterwhich establishedtheBoardallowsthemayortoremovea commissimmmydnnformymasanmdhnnglnduefmebemgmdmmmmofdw Board are consequently restricted from making decisions ofany importance with which the mayor disagrees (Pomeroy, 1985: 186). 32 Chicago's Office of Professional Standards (OPS) TheextentofpoiicebnltalityandabuseofauthorityinChicagohadbeenamajorissue throughout the 1960s, btrt the community outcry, fuelled by nunrerous reports in the Chicago newspapers of blatant career misconduct. only really became audible to the politicians in the early 1970s. In response to these external pressmes. the Superintendent of the Gricago Police Department created the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) in the summer of 1974. The OPS was established as a civilian body, principally intended to investigate allegations of brutality and excessiveforcemadeagainstofficers ofthepolicedeparunent, althoughitalsoacts asarecipient and registrar of complaints. Less serious complaints continue to be investigated by the police department's own Internal Affairs Division. The idea of introducing civilians into the complaints process not merely to oversee the proceduresbutto actuallycarryouttheinvestigationswasauniquefeamreofthe OPS whenit was first established, but it was not without problems. If police officers were not to be involved in investigations of serious allegations of police nrisconduct. the question was from where , competentandexperiencedinvestigativestaff couldbeobtained. Intheevent,tbe Superintendentchosetostafftlre OPSwith 30civilian investigators and4supervisorsthe majority of whom were former military personnel or investigators with other govemment departments. The staffwas multi-racial and included both male and female investigators. The three senior administrative officers, one black, one white and one hisparric, were all experienced and established lawyers (Letman, 1980: 16). ' TheOPS wasestablishednotasanexternalbody,butintemallywithinthepolice department. Its staff was, and still is, answerable to the Superintendent, the idea being to avoid allegadonsoflossofamhofitybydreSupefintendemindisciplinarymauers. Thisadlninistrative arrangement, not surprisingly perhaps, brought allegations fromvarious sources ofalack ofreal independencefromrhepolicedepartmentand accusations ofawhitewash,criticisms which have continuedtobelevelledattlreOPStothepresenttime. Althouglrciviliansareemployedas investigators in the OPS. they have no input into the disciplinary process once an investigation has been completed. The responsibility for hearing complaints and recomrrrending appropriate 33 disciplinary actions to the Superintendent is that of an internal police Complaint Review Panel, whichisgenerallycomposedofalieutenant,asergeaneandanofficerofthesamerankasthe accused. Chicago's OPS has continued to operate for over a decade, but not without a number of problems,chiefamongwhichhasbeendretendencyofcivilian investigatorstosidewiththe policetosuchanextentthataccusedofficershave preferredtobeinterviewedby OPS investigators than by members of the department's Internal Affairs Division. Policies, including usingdifferentlriringandtra‘mingprocedureshavebeenintroducedinanefforttocorrectthis bias in recent years. but nevertheless the Office has struggled to establish its identity, being gerrerallyviewed asrreitlreraciviliannoratrue police organizationaretman,198(h Ietman, 1981; Terrill, 1982; Brown, 1983; Kerstetter. 1985: 165). The Dade County (Florida) Independent Review Panel (IRP) This office, fashioned after the ombudsman concept, was creamd in early 1980 following aseriouscredibilitycrisisduringwhicheventheusually supportivemembersoftheDadeComlty comrmmityweredoubtingthe ability oftheirDepartmentofPublic Safety(DPS)topolice itself. Since its inception, the R? has placed considerable emphasis upon its informal authority and has used its conciliatory and rnediatory powers widely and with a good deal ofsuccess (Kerstetter, 1985: 170). It has jlnisdiction to receive and investigate complaints against any county employee oragency,btrtittendstoactmainlyas a'watchdog' bodyirrthatitdefersits owninvestigation into complaints until after the subject agency's own intemal enquiry has been completed Where investigations are concerned, therefore, although it retains arrthority to conduct fact-finding investigations when appropriate, the IRP is primarily concerned with reviewing completed internal investigations and judging their propriety. The difliculty of establishing an ombudsman-like panel which is generally perceived as behgmflyhflependunhasbeenaddressedmdnwaymwhichnenmemofdwRPmesehcwd andappointed. Thefirfl-dnesalariedExecufiveDheaorisappohrtedbydreGriefJudgeofme county, and,oftheotlrersixpart-timelmsalariedpanel rrrembers, five arenominatedby 34 commmhymganizadmsfmappohumuubydnbomdofcmmmmissimesmdmesixmu apwmwdbymecmmymnager.1hefixxrmveDheamhasnodesigmedmdividuflmgrwp towhomheisaccountable,ratherhispostimplicitlyassumeshisaccountabilitytoallrelevant interest groups and particularly to the electorate of Dade County (Pomeroy, 1985: 185). GiticismsoftheIRPhavecenteredarormdtheunduedelayininvestigationscausedbythe . opuadmalamngemuudescfibedabmemdmsteuoinaflegadmsmaimsuccessfifl functioning depends too heavily upon the present personalities involved as Executive Director of theIRPandDirectoroftheDPS. Thesuggestionsarethatfuturepersonnelchangesirrthese executiverankscouldtlrreatenthecontinued effective operations oftheIRP(Kerstetter, 1985: 172-173). Portland's Police Internal Investigations Audit Committee (PIIAC) Theissueofcivilianreview ofcomplairrts againstthepolicewasraisedinPortland, Oregon, in 1981 following two specific incidents of police malpractice which outraged the comrmmity and received widespread publicity. In response to public discontent, the Portland city cormcilappointedathirteenmemberciviliantaskforceto analyzethepolicedepartment’s internal investigationprocedures. Inits subsequemreporedreTaskForceconchldedthattheexisting policeIntemalInvestigationDivision(IlD) wasbiasedinfavorofpoliceofl’icers overcivilians andconsequentlythatitwasnotheldinveryhighregardbythePortlandcommunity. Task Forcerecomrnendatiorrs hrcludedtheestablishmemofsomefonnofcidzenconmriueetooveme complaints investigation. Despiteopposidmfiomdwmaymfiwcitycmmcflpmvisimaflycmatedmreigmmmber dvflimsub-comndtteeofdncitycmmclmePohceIntemalInvesdgadons AuditCommittee (PlIAC),pendingtheoutcomeofpoliceunionefl’or-tsto puttheissuetoarefetendumofthe Portland community. Between May and Novenrber of 1982, events in Portland were very similar to those during thebuilduptothe1966NewYorkCityCCRBreferetrdmbmwidrtwosignificamdifferences. First, contrary to the New York experience, the mayor of Portland was opposed to civilian 35 review. and second. the police union. despite massive and costly local publicity, lost the vote and the referendum result narrowly approved the creation of the PIIAC, which subsequently commenceditsoperationinDecember, 1982. The PIIAC has three specific functions: monitoring police internal investigations of comphhusmensmedmmeyamcmducwdmaconeammmenmakingpubficmemsuhsof theirfindingsintheformofreports.andprovidinganavenueofappealforcitizenswhoare dissatisfiedwiththeoutcomeoftheircomplaintswhichhavebeenirrvestigatedbythepolice. The PIIAC is therefore not a complaint review mechanism intended to replace the police department's ownintemalprocedures.rathertheemphasisofits'responsibilitiesisuponthereviewof procedures as distinct from the resolution of individual complaints. TldsmmhofingofproceduresmdmmanindividualcasesmakesthePHAClmique. It worksontwolevels,ontheirrdividuallevelintheformofappealsmadetoitbycitizensandon theaggregatelevelintlreformofroutineauditingofcomplaimfiles. Membersofthecommittee miderdnircmmibudmwwamshnpmvurgpoficecommmhymladomwbedwprocessof kiendfymgmdrepolicethosemeasofdnhmtemalmviewpmmneswhichobsuumdre Wofmisconductandthusimplidtly reward ofi‘icerdevianceOolinandGibbons, 1984). Varieties of External and Internal Review Procedures Thedevelopmentofagenciesarrdsystems suchasthosedescribedaboveduringthepast decade andahalfhasrecently ledKerstetter(1985: 160-161) toreiteratethetlrreemodels of external review of complaints investigation which he first proposed in 197(kcivilian review. civilianinputandeivilianmonitor. AccordingtoKerstetter,civilianreview,tlre strongest mechanism. placestheauthoritytoinvestigate, adjudicate, andlecommendpunishmenttothe policechief,withintheextemalagency. CivilianinpuLnotsuchastrongrnechanism, places authorityonly forcomplaintsrecepdonandinvesdgadonindreextemalagency,whilst adjudicadmandmsciplnnhncdaemedisdmmdmmanywhhmdepohcedepmmt Finally, in the wealmst systenr. civilian monitor, the investigation. adjudication and discipline fiumdmsamafldischargedmtemaflyudmindnpohcedeparumntbmdnprocedmes aresubject 36 tosomefonnofextemalreviewregardhrgdreiradequacyandimparfiality. Withinthis three-model structure, civilian review would describe the existing arrangements in Berkeley and Denomcivflimmmfiwrwmlddescfibeflwsyswmmesascnydeucagomnchfim input thoseinSan Jose. Dade CountyandPortland. In many ways this three-tiered structure is comparable with the three broad types of police depammhuemalmvesfigafimsymennidatfifiedbyBaalandSiskmlmmddiswssed eaflier.Underdfisscinme,vdminpoficedepum\amflnmviewnwchmismcanfimbe considered to describe those systems within which investigations are carried out exclusively by anIAU. Second,meinputmechanismcanbecmsideredtodacfibedwsimaflmwhembythe respomibilityforundertalringinvestigationsisjointlysharedbyanIAUandtheaccusedofficer’s supewisoryofficers. Third,flremonitormechanismcanbeidentifiedwiththosesystemsin which supervisors are given full responsibility and discretion in complaints investigation, fldmughmeucompkwdinvesdganmmpmmmbjeammviewafiawudsbymuxfividualm ofl'iceatheadquarters. Kerstetter's model, however only relates to jurisdictions in which external review-is preseminsoneformwhflstBeralandSisk'sworkdescribedmosepolicedepartrnentswithout enemalmvbw.Ananemptwdewfibemeglobflsimafimmvolvmgbod1emnflmdmmmfl reviewmechanismswasmadebyRussell (1978) whoagainutilizedathree-tier model. Under this model, tluee types of investigative mechanism were discerned: exclusively intemal,intemalwithextemalreviewofcertaincases,andbilateral Exchrsivelyimemal mechanisms described thosejurisdictions, which were still the vast majority, in which citizen comphintswereendrelyadnfinisteredbythepolicewfinoextemalscmfiny. NewYorkand SmPrmciscomedesamedascifiumwhkhancomplainmwempmfiaflyadnmfismmdbyme police with formalextemal scrutiny ofcriminal and some non-criminal complaints. Finally, Berkeley,ChicagoaMDmohwaeidendfiedumVMgbflamrfladnfinkmfimofcmrmhmmby boththe police andaformally constinmdextemalorganizationmussell. 1978: 37). 37 Recent Developments There have been a number of significant developments in the area of complaints investigation in the USA during the 19805 which may have future wide-ranging implications for communities and police departments searching for improvements in their existing procedures. Specifically, two new agencies which take a particular interest in the investigation of complaints against the police, CALEA (Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies) and IACOLE (International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement) have been formed, whilst a third agency, PERF (Police Executive Research Forum) has become increasingly involved in researching the area and identifying future irnplicaticns for police deparnnents. To conclude this analysis of the American experience concerning police complaints systems, a brief description of each of these organizations in turn is therefore appropriate. Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) Following joint initiatives taken by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the National Sherifl’s Association, and the National Association of Black Law Enforcement Executives, CALEA was founded in 1979. Its objective is to administer an accreditation program by which law enforcement agencies at local, county and state levels can voluntarily demonstrate their compliance with exacting ‘ professional criteria. CALEA's overall purpose is, through the accreditation program, to improve the delivery of law enforcement services. Accreditation is carried out by measuring the performance of law enforcement agencies against a set of 94-4 standards of evaluation which have been drawn up. On-site assessments of agency compliance with these criteria are undertaken by assessors, generally police officers, who have been recruited, selected and trained by the Commission. AnumberofCALEAstandardsmlatemtheanaofcomplaintsagainstdwpohcemd disciplinary procedures, although since the accreditation process can only be undertaken by law enforcement agencies, internal rather than external review procedures tend to be emphasized Standards are continuously being revised, updated and amended, however and consequently it 38 can be anticipated that future moves towards greater external review of complaints investigation willbereflecwdinnewstandardsbeingsetby CALEAwithrespecttotheinter-agencyrelations between police departments and external review boards. After a lengthy period of research and planning, CALEA only commenced accepting applications for accreditation at the beginning of 1984. In the Fall of1986 it reporwd that 29 agencieshadsuccessfully achievedthedistincticn ofcompletingtheaccreditationprocessbut that, rather more significantly, a further 501 agencies from across the USA had signalled their intention of mrdertaking assessment within the next two years. At present, the largest accredited agencyisthelllinois State Policewith 3390m11-time personnel; thesmallestagency istheIndian Hill, Ohio, Police Department with 21. . Indications are that police executives, ever searching for evidence of the professional status oftheiragencies,seebeingawardeddiedistinctionofaccreditafionby CALEAasbecominga benchmark of efficiency and effectiveness in the funne. (Commission Update, Fall 1986: 5). International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (IACOLE) The formation of an association for individuals actively involved in civilian review of police agencies, rather than merely for people who are intereswd in the concept, is a relatively new ventme. IACOLE was formed in 1985 and membership is open to persons who are n0t sworn law enforcement officers and who work for or constitute agencies established by legislative authority to investigate and/or review complaints against the police. Membership of IACOLE includes officers from each of the external review bodies currently operatingintheUSAwhichweredescribedearlierinthis literaturereview, together with representatives of a number of other US civilian oversight agencies. In addition, however, itisinterestingtonotethatthe international flavoroftheAssociationintimatedby itstitleis a reality and not merely a hope. Registrants at IACOLE's second annual conference held in December, 1986 inchrded member's ofthe Association from Australia. Canada, England, Ireland. Northern Ireland and Nigeria as well as from the USA. 39 WhilstIACOLEisstillinitsearlydays ofexistence, itappearstohaveahealthyand thriving membership. 'Ihe implication would appear to be that this organization appears to have the capacity to do for external review agencies in terms of increased professionalism what CALEA is presently attempting to achieve in the area of internal review prowdures. Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Founded in 1975 following a series of informal discussions among ten police chiefs who were particularly interested ill exchanging new ideas and encouraging innovation in the management of law enforcement agencies, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) has always been associated with efforts to promore research and development in policing (Duffy, 1983: 14). The Forum‘s founders placed a great deal of emphasis upon academic learning, professionalism, and the opportunity for police chiefs to discuss mutual concerns with colleagues sharing similar crime and police problems. Consequently, general menurership of PERF is limitedtocollege-educated. leaders ofpolicedepartmentswhichhave atleastZOOmembers or‘are themainpolice agencies forjurisdictions ofatleast100,000people. The presentgeneral membershipisinexcess ofonehundred,thosemembershavingresponsibilityforthedelivery of police services to over 25% of the population of the USA. PERFs specific interest in complaints investigation began in 1981 when it identified both realandperceivedgrievances aboutcitizencomplaint investigations asbeinganearly warning signal regarding deteriorating police-commumity relations. A Forum policy committee was formed which initially reviewed and analyzed the prevailing complaints procedlnesiamongst PERF's member departments (which numbered 60 at that time), and then, utilizing the informationobtainedfromthereview,producedamodelpolicy staternentonhandlingcitizen complaints. 'I'heintentionwasthatthemodel policy couldbeusedby lawenforcementagencies acrosstheUSAand,inadditimucorfldbeusedtoestablishstandardsforflledevelopmemofnew procedures (Duffy, 1983: 12). The model policy statement covers an agency's mission, specific mechanisms to prevent misconduct,acode ofconduct, penalties andthedisciplinary process. Itemphasizesthe 4o prevention of misconduct as being the primary means of reducing and controlling it and describes anumberofmechanismswhichcanbeutilizedto achievedlegoal ofprevention. These include improved selection and recruitment procedures, training in police ethics, increased training of supervisors, and creating community outreach. With regard to the complaints system itself, the policy statement suesses that it must be accessible to all persons who wish to file a complaint, must function consistently, and must collect and analyse misconduct complaints on a monthly basis. Additionally, it argues for a 120 day limit on the disposition of all types of complaint (PERF, 1983). Theemphasisofthe model policy isthusuponcreatingincreasedpolice professionalismin anumberofareas. anditisnot simply addressedtowards those areasdirectly concerned withthe operation of IAUs. Recently, however PERF has itself questioned whether inde police departments, no matter how professional their policies and procedures, can effectively defend themselves against accusations of cover-ups without meaningful external reviews of police internalinvestigations ofcomplaints. ATaskForce whichithasestablishedfor 1987 willbe researching the question ofhow police departments can better handle (solicit, investigate, and resolve) complaints against the police, and whether there is a role for external review of police conduct. Its findings could potentially have widespread implications for the investigation of complaints againstthepoliceintheUSA fortheremainderofthe 1980s andperhaps even further. CHAPTER III THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE Introduction Concern overthe police complaints procedure is not anew phenomenonin England and Wales. Repeated calls for a fully independent investigative procedure have become almost annual events since the late 1950s, and have come from a wide range of unrelated sources. The Police Federation (the representative organization of line officers and junior marnagement), The National Council for Civil Liberties, Lord Scarman in his report on the 1981 Brixton Disorders, and both Conservative and Labour lawyers have all indicated their beliefs that nothing short of full independence of complaints investigation from the police themelves would satisfy widespread public concern (Russell, 1978: 34; Warren and Tredinnick, 1982: 18). Lord Scarman stated the problem perhaps more clearly and more succinctly than any other writer in asserting that, "The evidencehasconvinced methatthereis awidespreadanddangerous lack of public confidence in the existing system for handling complaints against the police. By and large the people do not trust the police to investigate the police." ('The Scarman Report, 1981: 62) Nevertheless, despite significant moves made towards independence, particularly in the 1970s and the 19805, the present system, which was established in April 1985, falls considerably shonofthatideaLandhasfailedtosilenceflredisquietstinvoicedhrmany sections of the community. ' Itisinterestingtonotethatthelandmarkdatesindledevelopmentofthepolicecomplaints procedure in England and Wales have shown an increasing tendency to occur more frequently during recent years. Prior to 1964 no standardized approach to the handling of complaints 41 42 erdstedalthmghprocedmesultimately linkedtoeitherprosecutinganofficerforanoffenseor taking action against him under the existing discipline code had developed on an individual basis in all forces (Police Complaints Board, 1985: 4). The Police Act of 1964 was the first legislation to officially make requirements of chief officers of police to record and investigate citizen complaints made against police officers (Meek, 1985: 1; Liddy, 1986: 1). Subsequently, the Police Act of 1976 established the Police Complaints Board (PCB), the first formally constituted independent body to participate in any active way in the'police complaints pmdure. The widespreadcriticismwhichthePCB was subjectedtoatthetimeofits inception promptedcertain writers to speculate that further developments towards independence would soon occur (Russell, 1978: 34). Such predictions proved to be wholly accurate. The disorders in Brixton in April, 1981, andtheresultantreportproducedby LordScarrnanarldquotedfromaboveaddedweigllttothe mounting pressure upon the Govemment to replace the PCB with a more powerful body. Ultimately, the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act established the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), which commenced operating on April 29th, 1985, and which remains the present day major independent element in the police complaints procedure. These significant events occurring in the years 1964, 1976, 1981 and 1984 have given rise to the belief in certain quarters that the PCA may itself soon be replaced by a fully independent system (Meek, 1985: 15; Stalker, 1987: 12). Indeed, the labour Party manifesto for the 1987 British General Ebction perhaps gave an indication of potential future developments ill the Party's pledge, if elecwd, to abolish the Police Complaints Authority and replace it with a Parliamentary Commissioner or Ombudsman for police complaints, with his or her own investigative staff (Labour Party, 1987: 14). Inthecontextofthishistoricalbackgrormd.thefuune ofthepolicecomplaints systemin England and Wales can be expected to be both controversial and uncertain. Whilst many people will undoubtedly argue for complete independence, others will continue to point to past failures of independent systems previously instituted elsewhere, largely within the USA, and sound appropriate notes of caution (Philips, 1984: 18: Police Complaints Board, 1985: 16). 43 Early Developments and the Police Act 1964 Lord Scarman's own view that "any solution falling short of a system of independent investigation for all complaints" was unlikely to be successful in achieving public confidence in the complaints system (The Scarman Report, 1981: Para. 7.21) was certainly not the first statement ofitskind. As early 8 1929, The Royal Conunission on Police Powers considered a suggestion that theDirectorofPublicProsecutionsmPP) shouldbeprovidedwithhisownindependent investigative staff for handling complaints against the police involving allegations of criminal conduct. Whilstthe Conunission rejected the proposal, and the responsibility for investigating citizerlcornplaintsremahredwithindividualdiiefofficerswithinthe contextofthepolice disciplinecode,theveryfactdlatsuchasuggesticnhadbeetlraisedindicatedmat,eveninthe 19208,therewasconcembeingexpressedinsomequartersthatthepolicecouldnotbetrustedto investigatecomplaints internallyinafairandimpartialmameraambert, 1986: 61). The next Royal Conunission on the Police sat between 1959 and 1962, part of their terms ofwfmenamqfirthmcmuidermemhfimhipbetwealflnpoliceandmepubficandthe numefmmfingMcomplfinmagainnflemlicewaebehgefiecfivelydeahwifluPofice Complaints Board, 1985: 3). In evidence presented to the Royal Commission by lawyers from bothsides ofthepofificalspecumncallswuemadeforanhldepalderupersmoruibtmalwbe establisledtoinvestigatecomplaints. WhilstthreeoftheCommisSionersreconunendedthata ‘ ComfisfimerofRighmbeapwmwdmwnsidacasespmsenwdbycompldnmdhsadsfied wimdrewaymwhichmencompmhadheenhandledmtemanymemajcmyofme ConfissimrejxwdmeproposaLhrgelymdwgrumdsmatmchmhmmafimmeduemen the morale ofthe police (Warren and Tredinnick, 1932: 18; Lambert. 1986: 62). Sincethe Royal Cornrnissicn sought to permit chief constables to remain independent and immune from outside mfhwncemldpresanemOpemfimalnmuers,dwmjorhyargunuuwasMcomphmts cmmhlgmeopemfimmddeployrmmofmdivkhmofiicemcmmmylegifinmelybe answered by chief constables thermelves (Police Complaints Board, 1985: 3). 44 Most of the recommendations of the Royal Commission were directly incorporated into the Police Act 1964 and the police discipline regulations made under it, and consequently they effectively became the first legislation in England and Wales to specifically address the problem of how citizen complaints against the police should be investigated The recommendations had beenmadeinanattempttoremove publicanxiety,despitethefactthatasurveyconductedfcrthe , Royal Commission had led them to conclude that there was very little grounds for concem amongst members of the public about the way in which complaints were being investigated at that time. In addition to introducing new procedures, SeCtions 49 and 50 of the Police Act 1964 had the advantage of standardizing the complaints system throughout England and Wales. The Act firstrequiredthatallcomplaints againstthepoliceberecordedandinvestigatedbythepolice,and thatany complaintwhich suggestedthatanofficermightbeinbreachofthedisciplinary regulations shouldbeinvestigatedby anofficeroftherankofSuperimendentorabove andfrom adifferentdivisionoftheforce. Second,theActprovidedthelocalpolice authoritiesandthe Inspectorate of Constabulary with certain powers, and with the responsibility of keeping themelves informed astothemannerinwhichcomplaintswerebeingdealtwith. Third,theAct requiredthatallcasesexcepttl'loseinwhichthechiefofficerwas satisfiedthatnocrirninal offense had been committed should be submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) following conclusion of their investigation, for the DPP to decide whether or not the officer should be prosecuted. To the present day, these three legislative innovations still remain largely unchanged and central within the complaints investigation machinery in England and Wales. More recent system changes have tended to supplement rather titan replace the provisions of the 1964 Act. Whilst the introduction of the Police Act 1964 was a major step forward in relation to the investigation of complaints against the police, public disquiet about the lack of independence from the police of the new system was not dispelled (Warren and Tredinnick, 1982: 19; Meek, 1985: 1). During the late 1960s and early 1970s presstn'e grew for the introduction of a further independent element into the complaints procedure in addition to the DPP. An All-Party Motion 45 tabled, although never debated, in the House of Commons in 1969 led to the appointment of a Working Party on the complaints system. The Working Party reported to the Home Secretary in 1971 and their recommendations, which generally constituted cosmetic changes to the existing system, although adopted by the Home Secretary, were soon themselves subject to scrutiny by the 1972 Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (Russell, 1976: 10). The report of this Committee recommended the establishment of a lay element in the complaints procedure, possibly to consider appeals by dissatisfied complainants or police officers. Parliamentary developments culminawd in a Private Member's Bill being introduced into the House ofCommons in 1973 by Mr Philip Whitehead MP, designed to establish local tribunals to review the handling of complaints. The Bill received such widespread all-party support that the government of the day agreed to establish yet anorher working group to examine the complaints system in exchange for the Bill being drOpped (Russell, 1976: 11; Police Complaints Board, 1985: 4; Lambert. 1986: 62). mm 1974, following a change in government, "The handling of complaints against the police: Report of the working group for England and Wales" was published, setting out the principles upon which members of the group believed that any system of external review should be based. Following consideration by the Home Secretary and numerous detailed consultations with police and local authority representatives, a new scheme emerged from the working group report and eventually became an integral part of the Police Act 1976. This Act amended and supplemented the 1964 procedures, most noticeably by establishing a new and independent body, the Police Complaints Board (PCB), which was given the responsibility of reviewing the manner in which chief oflicers were handling complaints investigations. Not surprisingly, chief constables were opposed to the creation of the PCB, fearful that external civilian involvement in the complaints procedure would undermine their authority (Bell, 1986: 283; Lambert, 1986: 63). In the circumstances, by the Board's own admission, in their early days the PCB were as ccncernedto showthepolicethatthey couldundertaketheirtaskobjectively asthey wereto reassuremembers ofthepublicaboutthemannerinwhichcomplaints were beingdealtwithby the police (Police Complaints Board, 1985: 5). 46 The Police Complaints Board (PCB) and its Critics With the benefit ofhindsight it is clear that the Police Complaints Board (PCB) did little to sadsfydepubficdemmflfmmcmasedmdepmdencemmewmphinEprmedummEnglmdmd Wales. The widespread criticism which greeted the commencement of its operations in June 1977 continued almost undiminished throughout the eight years of its existence to such an extent that it was sometimes referred to as "that totally discredited organization" (Bell,1986: 283). Onadeeperlevel, however, the criticismwas not so muchdirected attire PCB as abody oratitsindividualmembers,butratheratdlelegislation which,ontheonehandhadcreatedit yet, on the other, had given it very limited powers. The object of the 1976 Act was to make the police more accormtable for their actions by enslning that allegations of improper behavior were thoroughly investigated, but the PCB was only given a specific role in relation to complaints alleging misconduct by individual officers. The more serious complaints, those alleging the commission ofcrinunaloffenses,cmdnuedmbemfenedtodleDhecmrofPublichsecufims (DPP) for a acision on Whether to prosecute following completion of the investigation. Thus, whilsttheDPPremainedtheindependentelementinthesystemwithregardtocriminal allegations, the new PCB effectively assumed a similar role with regard to non-criminal cases (Warren and Tredinnick, 1982: 19; Liddy, 1986: 5). One of the major criticisms of the Board's limited powers, and one which was repeatedly pointed outta the Home Secretary by the PCB itselfin its annual reports, was thatithadno involvement in the complaints procedure until afier an investigation was completed. In particular, it had no say in what should be recorded as a Section 49 complaint and what should be considered as a complaint concerning general Force policy. If, in the view of the officer recording the complaint, it fell into the latter category, there was, for the purposes of the Act, no complaint, and the PCB would have no jurisdiction in the matter. Indwd, the Board would never evenbecorne aware ofthe allegationunderthesecircumstances, even ifitwere subjectedtoafull internal investigation by the police. Additionally, having no involvement in the initial stages of a complaint meant that the Board never had referred to them those complaints which were either withdrawn or not proceeded with by complainants. 47 Whilsttherewasnodirectevidencetosuggestthatthepolicewereimproperlypressurizing complainants not to pursue their complaints, the sizeable proportion of withdrawn complaints, over which the Board had no control, caused them to comment that "by dealing with complaints outside the system, the safeguard of independent adjudication is lost" (Police Complaints Board, 1982: Para. 24). ThecomplaintsprocedureunderthePoliceAct1976ingeneralterrmwasasfollows. All compummmdnmdmberecmdedmdmvecdgatedhydepohccmennehershmednpcshad no investigative powers. Following completion of the investigation, the Chief Officer was mquimdbcmsiderwhedermycfimhalofiensehadbeencomnfiedmddfdwmwasany iruficadonthatdtiswasdiecasenoforwardthereponofdlehlvesdgationofficertotheDPPfora decisiononwhetherornotachargeshouldbepreferred. IftheDPPdecidedthattherewas mmffidauevidmcemacasewfiudfyacumprosecudmdmmeofficuwasprevamdfiom being disciplined by his Force by the so-called "double jeopardy" rule, intended to prevent him frombeingtriedforthesameoffensetwiceManenandTredirmick, 1982: 19; Meek, 1985: 2). Interestingly,thisveryaspectofthelegislationwasconsideredbyanumberofwriterstobethe majorreason whythe Police Federation, which represents juniorrankpolice officers,unlikethe AssociationofOliefPoliceOfficers(ACPO),didnctstronglyopposetheestablishmentoftbe PCBandtheenactmentof the Police Act 1976 (Hewitt, 1982: 73;Lambert,l986: 63). Inthosecasesinwhichchiefofficersweresadsfiedthatnocriminalofl’enseshadbeen comnfiuedbeforesendingarepcrttodlePCBJheDeputyChiefConstablewouldmake obsavadmsmmecasecanemmgwhedwrhewmidemdmmdiscipfinaryofiemeshadbeen commiuedmdwhathishuendonswerewhhmgardtodisciplhiarypmceedings. Uponreceiptof the completed report. the Board would consider the Deputy Chief Constable's decision and proposalanddecidewhetherornottheyagreedwithit. Tothisend,theywerepermittedtoask forfirrtherinfonnationanddiscussthecasewiththeDeputyChiefConstableiftherewasany conflict of opinion. Additionally, they were empowered to recommend that disciplinary charges bebmuflagainstmofficaiffleyhadndaheadybemmdfiudennmeifmeDeptnyChief Constableconfinuedtodisagreedleyuldmatelycoulddhectdlatchargesbebroughtandthecase 43 heard before atribunal consisting of two Board members and achief police officer (Meek, 1985: 2; Bell, 1986: 283). In practice, disagreement rarely occurred. Indeed, one ofthe major and lasting criticisms of the PCB was that its operation was merely a giant rubber-stamping exercise (Box, 1983: 101). The 1981 Annual Report of the PCB, for example, indicates that, out of 15,198 complaints referredtoit,irlorlly138casesweredisciplinarychargespreferredbythechiefofficerpriorto notification ofthe Board. Ofthe remaining 15, 080 cases, the PCB, after considering the widuwe,mcomnendedmmmargesbepmfeuedm26caseaanddimcwdmatchargesbe broughtinone. Indeed,thiswasthefirsttimesincetheBoard'screationthattheoptiontodirect charges had been exercised. The Final Review Report of the PCB, published in 1985, presented statistics conceming thenumberofinstances inwhicheitherchargeshadbeenrecommendedordirected. crfurther requestsfmhlformadmhadbearmadedufingeachyearofmeerd’serdstence. Thenumbers werermrchlowerinthefirsttwoyears ofoperationthaninlateryears,reflectinganeedtoretain the co-operation of the police early on in order to pave the way for an effective working relationship (Police Complaints Board, 1985: 5). Overall, however, disagreements between chief officers and the Board were rare, a fact which prompted numerous differing interpretations. Mostvociferousarnongstthecritics oftheBoardwerethosewhoassertedthatthese statistics indicated that the PCB was powerless, discredited, not truly independent, and only'of marginal influence (Hewitt, 1982: 77; Moores, 1982: 7). For the Board's part, they steadfastly maintainedthatitwasonly properandtobeexpectedthatononlyveryfewoccasionsthey shctudbeinconflictwithchiefofficerseidierabomdlethormghnessofinvestigationsorabout the disciplinary decisions they arrived at. Anything more substantial by way of disagreement wouldmdicuemmuadsfactorymdmprofessimalappmadlbemgmkenmcmnplainm investigation by chief officers and would indicate a cause for great concern (Pike, 1985: 167; Police Complaints Board, 1985: 6). Criticism of the Police Complaints Board continued despite the Board's attempts to highlight the legislative restrictions upon its operations. Indeed, in 1983 these restrictions were 49 eventually heldbytheDivisionalCourttobenotsosevereashadoriginallybeenbelieved, pmdcflaflywidlrespeawmosewmplainmaflegingcnnfinaloffmsesbmdecfinedfm prosecutionbytheDPP. Bythen,however,thedamagetotheimageoftheBoardandthe complaintsprocedureingeneralhadbeenirreparablydamaged AHomeOfficecircularissuedsoonattertheenacmentofmePoliceAct 1976had informedchiefoflicers ofpolicedlacirlthosecaseswhichtheDPPhaddecidedcontained msufficientevfiawemhmdfyacnmmmmmgebemgmwwdedwhhagainnmmwsedofliw. thereshouldnormallybenodisciplinarychargeeither,ifsuchachargewouldhavebeenbased uponsubstantiallythesameevidence. Thisattempttoprotectofficersfromthethreatof"double jeopardy"ineffemwashrterpretedbyallcawunedasbemgidaldcalmanacquinalbyawmt theresultbeingthatmanyofficerssuspectedofthemostseriwsmisbehaviorwereescapingall jeopardy entirely (Hewitt, 1982: 74; Lambert. 1986: 66). In assault cases, forexample,the pmmufionmterecommendedbymeDPP'sofficepeakedataromd2%inmeeady 1970s before falling away to approximately 1.5% a decade later. Fmdrennore, on average less than half ofthoseprosecutedwereccnvicted. Theconsequenceofthiswasthatin999iroftheassault cases referred to the DPP for decision by chiefofficers ofpolice, the accused officers escaped any form of hearing or sanction (Box, 1983: 102). ThPCchsidemddremselvesbmmdbytheHoneOfficeguidancemndaMoughme Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL), andtheDPPhimselfwereopposedtotherule,itremainedinfcrcemttill983whenthe DivisionalCourtheldthat,sincethePCBhadbeencreatedasanindependentbody,itshouldbe assertingitsindependencebynotacceptingasbindinguponitthedecisionofanyoneelse,even theDPP(RvPolice Complaints Board ex parte Rhoned‘tMadden 1983 2QB 353). Although fieedfiomdreresnicdmsofdufioneOfficeguidmwe,fieedomcanemohmwrestomdle credibilityandindependentimageofthePCB. AcceptingtheshortcomingsofthesystemrmderthePoliceAct1W6,deCBitselfwas notreluctanttoproposeamendmentstotheprocedures. Initsfh'stuiermialreporcpublishedin 1980, the Board, acknowledging that complaints involving serious and unexplained injuries 50 Waflegedlyamehmflsofdwmficecwsedyeadamagemwficecomnmfitymhdom, recommended that these cases be handled by a specialist team of investigating officers. This team, it was suggested, could comprise police officers on secondment, but answerable to an experienced lawyer of high repute, preferably a former judge (Police Complaints Board, 1980: Para 69; Philips, 1984: 12). In the same report, however, the PCB rejecmd the concept of fully independent investigation ofall complaints on the grounds that such a situation was neither practicable nor desirable. This opinion was not widely shared outside the Board and consequently the Home Secretary established a working party, under the chairmanship of Lord Plowden, the then chairmanofthePCB,tocmsiderdrevafiousrecormnendadonsmadebydleBoardinitsuiemial report of 1980. The fact that the membership ofthe twelve man Plowden Report working party washeavily weightedinfavor ofthe policeassociations andalsoincludedtheDPPmadeitfairly predictable that any proposals forthcoming would tmd to oppose independent investigation and support the status quo (Hewitt, 1982: 76; Warren and Tredinnick, 1982: 20; Lambert, 1986: 69). In the event, the Plowden Report, published in March 1981, not only rejected the concept of independent investigation, but also described the innovative PCB suggestion of the specialist teamofsecondedinvestigators forassaultcasestobeborhirnpracticalandunnecessary. The only significant recommendation resulting from the report was the suggestion that chief officers shouldmakegreateruseofofficers fi'omotherforcestoinvestigateseriouscasessoasto 5 generate increased and more publicly visible impartiality in investigations (The Plowden Report, 1981: Para 20). It appeared that, for the present at least, in early 1981 the movement towards introducing anincreasedandindependentelernentintothepolicecomplaints procedureinEngland andWales hadreachedanimpasse. Organizations suchastheNationalCouncilforCivilLibertiesandthe RunneynedeTnlscaneducationalcharity establishedin 1968toresearchimmigrationandrace relations matters in the UK and the EEC (Emopean Economic Community) were united in their demands for an independent investigative body for complaints investigation. These demands werebaseduponanumberofargurnents, not least that ofprinciplethatnobodyshouldbethe 51 investigating agent for complaints made against it (Warren and Tredinnick, 1982: 22). On the other hand, all of the police associations, together with the DPP were resisting firmly any encroachment upon their responsibilities enumerated in the 1976 procedures. No one could have forseen the watershed in British policing which was to occur in April 1981 in consequence of unprecedenmd civil disturbances first in Brixton, London, and then shortly afterwards in Toxteth, Liverpool and Moss-side, Manchester. The 1981 inner-city riots once again thrust the police complaints procedure into the center of the political and public arena. Lord Scarman‘s report into the Brixton riots, a document prode in the remarkably short period of eight months, discussed the police complaints procedure at some length. His assertion that, for public confidence to be secured, the early introduction of a lay independent element into the investigation of complaints and the establishment of a conciliation process for minor complaints were vital (The Scarman Report, 1981: Para 7:28) legitimized and gave rise to a flood ofsuggestions from other sources concerning the type of independent investigative body which should be established. Such suggestions were encouraged by comments made in the House of Commons by the then Home Secretary who, in accepting Lord Scarman's criticisms, stated that the police complaints system wasinneedofsubstandalrefonnifitweretocmfinuetocommandpublic confidence (Pike, 1985 : 168). Ofgteatsignificance atthistime was amajorchangeinpolicy toWards complaints investigation adopted in November 1981 by the Police Federatibn (the representative organization of line officers and junior management), and also by the Superintendents' Association (the representative organization of senior management), when they announced that they were both now in favor of one fully independent investigative body for complaints. Foranumberofyears,the factthatmany seniorofficers ofSuperintendentrankand above were being required to spend an increasing proportion of their duty time investigating citizen complaints against the police, rather than carrying out their normal supervisory and operational duties, had caused considerable disquiet within the police service. This dissatisfaction, coupled with the potential police-community relations problems inherent in the police continuing to 52 investigate complaints internally, seemed to be the turning point as far as these two staff associations were concemed. Asserting that they had nothing to hide, the Federation were effectively inviting external scrutiny of the complaints procedure by any interested body or organization (Philips, 1984: ll). Whilst this change of policy and attitude was highly significant, not all observers were convinced that the Federation's morive was a genuine one. Cynics suggeswd that the Federation believed that the introduction of a fully independent investigative body at that time would prove unworkable and ineffective and would, in time, develop to be less successful than the existing system, thereby allowing the Federation the luxury of pointing out that their long-standing objections to external investigation of complaints had had a practical and not merely philosophical basis (Lambert, 1986: 72). Nevertheless, since 1981, despite comments such as these, the Police Federation, unlike its counterparts elsewhere ill the world, has continued to be publically in favor of a completely independent procedure for complaints investigation. Building upon the Home Secretary's comments that substantial reform of the complaints procedure in England and Wales was needed, one of the more outspoken police commitme chairmen, a county cormcillor from South Yorkshire, argued that anything less than complete civilianization of the system would be futile. Not only would a policy of civilianization release many senior police officers for operational duties, it would also promote a relationship of trust with the public. It was argued that, no matter how immaculate and thorough investigations were, the fact that police officers investigated police officers would always remain suspect when consideration was given to the minimal number of complaints substantiated (Moores, 1982: 6). The proposed new system was one in which a locally appointed Police Ombudsman or Complaints Cormnittee, together with their own civilian investigative staff and working closely with the locally elected police committee, would have sole responsibility for complaints investigation. Jurisdiction concerning citizen complaints would be entirely removed from the police themselves, to the extent that they would not even be responsible for accepting or recording complaints. 53 An alternative proposal, based upon the concept of a Parliamentary Ombudsman, rather titan a locally appointed official with similar powers, was put forward by an experienwd Conservative Member of Parliament in a booklet published by the Conservative Political Centre in November, 1982. Whilst the suggested new procedure was not particularly unusual, being based upon the legislation inherent in the Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967, What was unique was that the argument for a wholly independent investigatory system for commaints against the police was being publically voiced by a member of the traditionally "law and order" ruling Conservative Party (Warren and Tredinnick, 1982: 24). This fact, perhaps more than any other, indicates just how widespread the movement for radical change in the police complaints procedure in England and Wales was in the early 1980s. A slightly less sweeping change tothe systemwas proposed inthe same yearbythe then General Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties. Ratherthan abolish the Police ComplaintsBoard,sheproposedthatthePCB shouldberetainedbutgivenanexpandedrole, specifically including the power to carry out investigations of serious complaints itself. To this end, it should employ its own team of investigators which, although including police officers on secondment, would also comprise solicitors, barristers, and others with appropriate investigative experience (Hewitt, 1982: 77). Given the legal expertise which such a team of investigators would possess, it would than be possible to dispense Witll the involvement of the DPP in the complaints procedure. 3 Following publication of the Scarman Report and the Belstead Report, the latter being a report produced by a further working party which had been established to review the implications ofthePlowdenReport priortothe occurrence ofthecivildisturbanceswhichledtoLord Scarman's examination of policing practices, the official govemment approach to reform developed during 1982 in a three-tiered way. First, the most serious complaints were to be investigated by a senior police officer, normally from an outside force, under the supervision of an independent assessor. This assessor, responsible for ensuring that the investigation was carried out in an expeditious, thorough and impartial manner, would either be the PCB itself or a new body created specifically to fulfill that role. Second, less substantial complaints would 54 continuetobeinvestigatedinaccordancewiththeexistingSection49 procedureas amendedby the Police Act 1976, in which completed police investigation reports were forwarded to the PCB for independent review. One practical difference, however, would be that complaints involving minor criminal matters would no longer automatically be referred to the DPP. Third, a new informal procedure was to be introduced by means of which less serious complaints could be cmflimdwhhmnmemedwwmnenceamnandfonnalmvesdgadmwmenmdfiedinma, 1982: 20; Pike, 1985: 168; Lambert, 1986: 72). The proposal for a new system of informally resolving complaints was one feature of the government's strategy for change which received all round support. Two of the major criticisms of existing procedures, which had been voiced by all participants in the police complaints debate. was first that the process of investigation was excessively formal and rigid and second that it was painfully slow. _ UnderthePolice Act 1976.once an allegationhadbeenrecorded as aSection 49 complaint, if it was not subsequently withdrawn, it would automatically be subjected to a protracted investigation by a senior police officer, and ultimately be referred to the PCB, irrespective ofits seriousness (Lambert, 1986: 67). It was argued and widely agreed that in a large majority of relatively minor cases, complainants were merely melting an assurance that the accused officer’s behavior would not be repeated and perhaps hoping for some form of official apology. Very few complainants in these cases either intended or wished to set into motion an unwieldy and time-consuming formal investigation. The very formality of the system may therefore itself have acted as a deterrent to complainants once they became aware of the investigative procedure. Additionally, it was believed that, since the police themselves had responsibility for initially recording complaints, numerous genuine complaints which senior police management would have wished to have been made aware of were never officially recorded since promises to complainants that accused officers would be "seen and spoken to" regardingtheirconductnonnally satisfiedallbutthemostvociferous complainantsinrelatively minor cases. The question of whether the officers ever were "seen and spoken to" remained in doubt. Whilst such unofficial systems may well have existed, they were neither as sinister nor as 55 insidiousassornepolicecriticsmadethemouttobe. Rathentheyweretheproductsofasystem whbhbestowedupmmemcmdingoffica,whomdermeexsdngbgislafimwasmqmmdmbe anofficeroftherankoflnspectororabove,theresponsibilityofbeingthefirstlinkinan extensiveinvesdgativechainwhichcuhninatedinlondonatdreofficesofthePCB,forcases which all too frequently were of a relatively trivial nature. Closely aligned withtheformality of the systemwasitsslowness. On average,theletter fiomdtePCBmdiecomphinantnodfyingmemofmemncomeofmeinvesdgadmoftheircase. arrivedsixmonthsafterthecomplaintwasmade. Notonlywasthisunacceptableand unnecessaryasfarascornplainantswereconcemed,exceptinthemostseriousofcases,italso meantthatpoliceofficerswerehavingtowaitanaverageofsixmonthstodiscoverwhetheror notthey wouldhavetofacedisciplinaryprowdmesMarrenandTredirmick, 1982: 21). Whilstthe third tier in the government's proposed new strategy for complaints invesdgadmwasthusmdvesaflywelconeddieproposedfirstandsecondfiersinthenew systemdidliuletosafisfyorsilencethecriticsofintemalhrvesfigadomandthePCB. Although nossofcmrdmcmwermngmepmarfialfmpolicenm-coopaafimmpmvemdreanempsof mdependentmvesfigamswachieveresMsfaimrwflmwmplainmswmesmmdedmsone quarters (Box, 1983: 105),duringthesubsequentdebate thepressmeuponthegovernment to introduce a more powerful independent element into any new complains system forced them to concedeatleastsomeground. Following the General Election of June 1983 in which a Conservative government was remmedforasecorrdrerrnofofficetheirfinalplansfortheneWpolicecomplainsprocedures, whichbydfisfinshadbwanedmostmhnvimbifity,wemmvefledmdnmfonmflamdPofice andCriminalEvidence(PACE)Bmwhidhmisonginalfomhadbeenlostearlierintheyear duetodledissolutionofParliarnent. Thisnewsystemwhich.withoneortwominor amendmens,wasenactedbydlePoliceandCriminalEvidence(PACE)Act1984andcanleinto operationon 29thApril, 1985, involvedthecreation of anew Police Complaints Authority (PCA) rather than the previously proposed independent assessor. The new Authority would replace the existing PCB, which would be abolished, and would enjoy much wider powers than 56 had is predecessor, including me responsibility for closely supervising and controlling the police investigation of the more serious allegations of misconduct. In essence, creation of the PCA was therefore another major, although faltering and hesitant, step along the road towards fully independent investigation of complaints against the police in England and Wales. The Police Complaints Authority To those critics calling for just such atotally independent system of investigating complaints against the police, the Police Complaints Authority was just the Police Complains Boardslightlyrearranged. Indeed,itmustbesaidthatfuelwas addedtothisparticularfireby Parliament's insistenceupon givingthenew Authority such asimilartitletothe old Board which itwasreplaeing. Quite whatthereasoningbehindtheirchoice ofnarnewas isunclear,butit nustbesaidmathwasarmsglndedchoicembeSLandonewhichguarmweddnmeCA problems from the onset, in convincing anyone who was unaware of the details of is enabling legislationthatitwasinanywayfundamentallydifferentfromthePCBwhichhadcausedso much controversy during the previous decade. Sir Anthony Buck, amongst many others, expressedconcemaandiedtbofdleneworguuzadmthnhumeConmntteeSmge ofthe PACE Bill, and it was widely agreed that. at the very least, "independence" should have been spelt out in its title (Bell, 1986: 284). Such concerns have been proven well-founded. Many people still believe that the PCA, by reasonofistitleperhapsmorethananythingelse,ispartofthe‘policeserviceoratleasta departmentoftheHomeOffice. ItisinterestingtonotethatthePCAthemselves apparently realizedtheproblems whichthelegislatulehadcausedforthemintheirtitle, sincethey soon began refening to themselves as the "independent Police Complains Authority", and the word "independent" hasappeared,albeitinamannerwhich gives theimpressionofithavingbeen an afterthought, on the front cover of both is 1985 and is 1986 Annual Repors. In consequence, press reports of the PCA's activities following is creation in April 1985, when it was correctly referred to as the "Police Complains Authority", have subsequently been amended to the "i(lower case)ndependent PCA" and, more recently to the "I(upper case)ndependent PCA" 57 (Bell. 1986: 284). It will be interesting to see just how long it takes the Authority to officially rename thenselves and thereby correct what many observers consider to have been a glaring Parliamentary error. The London Times of29th April 1935 reported that a burst of criticism fromthe Police FederationhadgreetedthestartofoperationsofdlePCA. TheofficialFederationstancewas re-emphasized by a spokesman who was quowd as saying of the PCA that "It will not enhance public confidence in the system and will probably not improve police morale either. We remain firmly of the view that only a wholly independent system of investigation will satisfy all parties." The only other point worthy of note was that, despite the lengthy discussions and controversial period leading up to the creation of the PCA, the Times only saw fit to devote two inches of one column to is report conceming the Authority's inauguration. Perhaps that in iself was indicative of the widespread belief that, despite govemmental asstn'ances to the contrary, the PCA promised nothing new. In the two years which have passed since then, the PCA has at least made some progress inassertingitsindependenceandinconvincingcertaincritiesthatitisindeedadifferemanimal fromthe old PCB whichitreplaced. In part,thishas beendueto awell-orchestratedand subtle campaignconductedinthemedia,during whichtheOlaimlanofthePCA,SirCecilClothierQC, formerly Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and an individual of high public'esteem and considerable experience, has rarely missed an opportunity to correct imprecise and inaccurate press and media reports concerning complaints investigations and the powers of the Authority. The Chairman has cleverly tinned items of misinformation to the Authority's advantage on numerous occasions by clarifying the independent nanne of the PCA and is role. In addition, the progress made by the Authority has also resulted from several well-publicized investigations in which it has publically disagreed with disciplinary decisions made by chief officers of police. Overview of the New Procedures In simple terns, the police complains procedure in England and Wales under the PACE Act 1984 has developed into a four-tier structure, perhaps the two most cnlcial innovations being 58 the establ'shment of the concept of supervision and direction of investigations by the PCA and the introduction of the process of informal resolution. First, the most serious complains, involving death or allegations of serious injury are mandatory for the PCA to supervise. Second, the PCA has discretion in whether or not to supervise other less serious cases. Such complaints may be referred to the Authority by chief officers of police because they believe it to be in the public interest for the investigations to involve an independent element. Alternatively, the legislation empowers the Authority to direct chief officers to submit to them any complaint which does not fall into the mandatory category, . but which the Authority, attheirdiscretion, wishto supervise inthe public interest. Third,those complaints which are not refened to the PCA for supervision, and which are not suitable for informal resolution, are investigawd intemally, much as they were previously. Fourth, relatively minor complains may be handled by a process of informal resolution without recourse to a full and formal investigation. Under the new legislation, therefore, the police have retained their investigative involvement in the complains procedure. The independent involvement of the PCA ill the process can not accurately be described as being investigative in nature. Rather, the PCA exercises a supervisory role, charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the police investigations are thorough and exhaustive, but overall that they are fair and impartial. The PCA effectively has two quite different functions - supervisory and disciplinary. Whilst its disciplinary function operates in a similar way as the PCB previously did, the supervisory function is an innovation. Supervisory functions of the PCA Oneofthe moststrikingdifferences betweenthe police complains procedureunderthe Police Act 1976 and the PACE Act 1984 is the involvement of an external agency at an early stageintheinvestigationofthemoreserious allegations. Mandatorycases mustberefenedto the PCA no later than the end of the day following the receipt of the complaint. This category includes any complaints relating to the death or serious injury of some other person, any assault 59 ill which actual bodily harm is sustained, and additionally any allegation of corruption or of the commission of a serious arrestable (generally a criminal) offense. Supervision of the investigationbythePCAismandatoryinthecaseofdeathorserious injury andis atthe discretionofthePCAintheothercases referredtoit. ThePCAmustgiveitsdecisionasto supervision within one week to the chief officer of police. DiscretionaryreferralstothePCAarenotgovemed bythesamestricttimelimitsbut,in practice, as soonas achiefofficerdecides thataparticularcase,thoughnot fallingintothe mandatory category, would be in the public interest to be considered for supervision by the PCA, then the case will be referred without delay. A similar system operates with respect to those cases which, although not mandatory, the Authority requires a chief officer to submit to them for any reason. During the first eight months of their operation (until 31st December, 1985) 2,549 cases, an average of72 perweek, were referred tothe PCA for determination ofwhetherornot they should supervise the police investigation. The Authority «cided to supervise the investigation in 611 (24%) of these referrals. In 273 of these cases supervision was mandatory, the allegations involving either death or serious injury, and in the remaining 338 cases it was the Authority's judgementthatthecircumstancesrequiredthe investigationtobesupervisedinthepublicinterest (PCA Annual Report, 1985: Paras 6.4 , 6.5). During 1986, the equivalent figures were 3,687 cases at an average of 71 per week, with 681 (18.5%) of these referrals being supervised by the PCA. Ofthe 681 case supervisions, 381 were mandatory and 300 were discretional (PCA Annual Report, 1986: Paras 7.7, 7.8). In order to be able to effectively supervise investigations, the PACE Act 1984 provided the PCA with four basic powers. First, the appointment of an Investigating Officer (10) proposed by the chief officer is subject to ratification by the Authority. If the Authority does not approve theproposedIOthenanothernulstbenominatedmtiloneis agreedasacceptable. Second,the PCA can impose requiremens relating to the conducr of an investigation. Third, it can require a chief officer to expend more resources upon a particular investigation if necessary, following consultation with the Deputy Chief Constable. Fourth, following the conclusion of a case the 60 Authority issues a statement concerning the manner of the investigation. and specifically whether or not it was carried out to the Authority's satisfaction. No decision on disciplinary or criminal action canbe takenuntil such astatementhas been issued (Meek, 1985: 12; PCA Annual Report. 1985: Para 3.2; Bell, 1986: 285; Lambert. 1986: 79). In practice, the responsibility for supervising and directing an investigation is delegawd to aspecificAuthorityMember,whomaythenbecomeinvolvedasmuchoras little asnecessary depending upon the circumstances. In a serious case of public concern, an exceptionally close liaisonwiththeIO maybedemanded,necessitatingthepresenceofdlesupervisoryMemberat various stages of the investigation, and even during the interviewing of witnesses. In the majority of cases, telephone contact usually suffices, perhaps supplemented by letters and occasional meetings with the 10. Wlulstdnmidadveformdertakingdehrvesdgadmmmainswimmlnvesdgadng OfficenmdewsetmesupafisoryMenbawflldisassandagreewimmelombmadwrms ontheplanoftheinvestigationandthegenerallinesofenquiry. IncomplexcasestheIO maybe mquhedmnrbmdthuerhnreporswmesupewisoryMembercomendng'mepmgress madein the investigation, as a result of which the Authority may wish for witnesses to be re-interviewed, otherwimessestobesought,orcertainpoinstobeclarifiedbytheIO. WhilsttheAuthorityhas theformalpowertomqlnredieIOmundertakeaninvesfigadoninapardcuhrway,inpmcdce differences of opinion between the 10 and the supervisory Member tend always to be resolved through consultation and discussion (PCA Annual Report, 1985: Paras. 3.5, 3.6). Forsimilarreasons,itishighly unlikelythatthe statementissuedby thePCAfollowingthe conchrsion of an investigation will ever show that the investigation has been unacceptable. Becauseoftheopportunities whichexisttoresolvepointsofconflict, suchasituation would indicate a fundamental breakdown in the system, more than likely involving a refusal of the police to meet some requirement of the supervising Member (Bell, 1986: 285). 61 Disciplinary Functions of the PCA WhilstmenrpervisoryfiuwdmofmePCAisadisdnadepamlmfiomdremompassive approach of reviewing completed investigations formerly carried out by the PCB, it remains true thatthosecaseswhicharempervisedbythePCAareonlyasmallminorityofthetotalnumberof casesofmalpracticeallemdagainstthepolice. Thatthisminorityofcasesrepresentsthose inddalsmwhichmenmstsefimsalkgadashavebemmadempanmakesupfmmisfact For example, during 1986,0f6,646casesconsidered bythePCA, only 681 were supervised by the Authority. In other words, 5,965, or 89.7%, of all complaints which were formally investigated were investigated purely internally by the police. Of those 5,965 cases, 3,006 had firstbeenreferredtomePCAfordetenninationofwhetherornotdlepoliceinvestigationshould besupervised,andsupervisionhadbeendeclhled,andmeremaining2959caseshadbeendeah withintheinvestigativestagewithoutreferencetotheAuthority. (ThePCAl986AnnualRepon makes the important distinction between cases and complaints. Since any one complainant usuallymahsnnreMmcomphhtafishgmuofmyonehlcidencmenumberofcomplains ingeneraltendstobeconsiderablymorethantl'lenumberofcases. In1986,forexample,the 6,646casesconsideredbydlePCAcontainedatotalof15,865cmnplains,anaverageof2.3 complaints per case - Para. 7 .4.) Whenflwmvesdgadminmacomplaimiscompbtedwmmernhasbeenmpervisedm not.theIOsubnlitsareponforconsideradonbyhischiefofficer(normanytheDepmyGlief Cmsmble)whosmenmquhedmnodfymePCAofiuspmposalsmgardingmemncmmofme mwmmmdmymkmmmmbemkenagainstdnawsedofiicen Atthis nage,desecmdnnjorfimcdmofanCA,isdhdplhm-yfiumdahishmoducedinwme complains prmdure. The Authority's prime function is to decide whether, based upon the wmpbwdmponofdemvesdgadahdsdpfinarychmgesshmddbemguagamgmofficaif thisisnotalreadythechiefofficer'sinmntion. likeitspredewssorthePCBJhePCAis empoweredmfonmnquuestfindlernlfmnudmfiomchiefofficespfiormmachhlga decisiononthedisciplinaryaspecsofapardcularcase. Ultimately,theAuthoritycandirectthat chargesbebroughtinacaseinwhichagreementcannotbereached. Insuchasituation,a 62 disciplinaryhearingwillbecarriedoutbeforeatribtmalconsistingoftwoAuthorityMembers, whoarenot conversantwiththedetailsof the caseinadvance,andtherelevant Chief Constable. Whilst the Authority's disciplinary function has been characterized as following much the sameprocedmeasdratpreviouslycaniedotnbymepcsmdermepohceAct1976(1amben. 1986: 79), the PCA themselves have identified what they consider to be two significant differences in their disciplinary role from that of their predecessors. First, as has been mentioned previously, earlier legislation provided no definition of what should be considered a complaint andconsequentlythePCB,whichonlybecameinvolvedintheprowdureatthefinalstage,had toacceptthe judgement ofchief officers ofpolice-effectively the judgement ofthose junior officersresponsibleforrecordingcomplaints-concerningwhatdidorwhatdidnotconstitutea complaint. The1984Actdefinedacomplaintasonemadebyamemberofthepublicmronhis bdlaflwhhhswrmmcmsmcmdcmsequmdymelegishdmcmsiderablychnfieddemaua. In particular, the legislation now prevens the police from commencing a formal investigationinacaseirrwlrichtlrecomplainantdoesnotintendonetobecarriedormfor examplewhenawrithasbeenissuedagainstachiefofficerclaimingdamagesforacivilwrong perpetrated by one of his officers (PCA Amlual Report, 1985: Paras. 4.3, 4.4; Bell, 1986: 287). Second, the 1984 Act changed the conditions under which a completed investigation report had to be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Under previous legislation, every such reporthadtobesenttotheDPPmllesstheDeputleiefConstablewassatisfiedthatnocriminal offensehadbeenalleged. Thereasoningbehindthis,thataforceshouldnotbeseerltobe decidinguponwhetherornottoinstituteacriminalprosecutionagainstoneofisownmembers, and ratherthat such adecision should be made by an independent outside body, was sormd. In reality,however,itmeantthatlargeamormtsoftimeandeffortwerebeingexpendedinpreparing casereportsfortheDPPconcemingincidents ofafairlytrivialnatlmewhichtherewasneverany doubt the DPP would declinetoprosecute. Underthe 1984 Actthe chief officerhasdiscretion inrelation to minor matters, such as offenses ofdepositing litterorminor traffic incidents, in whichachugewmldnmnmmflybeprefenedifdnofimsehadbemconnmmbyamember ofthepublicratherthanbyapoliceofficer. Thedecidingfactorinthesecasesisthenatureofthe 63 oflense and not the quality or weight of the evidence (Meek, 1985: 8; Bell, 1986: 290). Whilst dieintentionofthelegislatorswastoavoidinvolvingthepoliceinunnecessarywork,thePCA wegivmthemspmsibilhyofemufingMchiefofficuswmenmahshgmendisaedmmy powersinthesematters.andconsequentlytheyareempoweredtodirectchiefofficerstopass casepaperswdleDPPifmeyconsidermatmeallegedofl’alseissefimsarough. DuringthefirsteightmonthsofthePCA'soperation,inwhichDepmyChiefConstables preferred disciplinary charges in 73 complains,theAuthority agreed withchief officers' recommendations in another 7,029 complaints that disciplinary charges were not appropriate. In part,thiswasduetothetrivialnatureofanumberofthecomplains,butinalargepercentageof caseshwasdmwmhlsufficiamyofevidalceweimerprovemdispmvednalbgafims concerned. Inafurther106 complaints, followingthepolice investigationandpriorto making dehdecisim,d1eAMofitymadefmrnalmquessfmfmmermformadm,msulfingmdem mommflingfldisdplharychugesafishgfiomucuesmwhichbemCMdesmbles hadinitiallyproposedtobringnodisciplinarycharge. Onlyonedirectiontoachiefofficerto preferachargehadtobennde. Duringthesametimeperiod.thePCAexercisedispowerto direcrchiefofficerstorefercasestotheDPPiftheyhavenotalreadydonesoon4l occasions, thesecasescomprising62mattersofcomplaint. Dining 1985,theaveragetimetakenbythe Authoritytoprocessthedisciplinaryaspectsofacase,fromreceiptofthecasepapersto completion ofaction. was 68days (PCA Annual Report,1985: Chapter 6). By way of comparison,during 1986, whilstDeputy Chief Constables preferred disciplinarychargesin161complains,thePCAagreedwiththeirrecormnendationsnottocharge inafurther 14,265 complaints. The Authority made 635 requests for further information. recommended56chargesalisingomof32casesinconflictwithDepmyChiefConstables'initial proposals,directedthatl6ofthese56chargesbebroughtwhentheirrecommendationwasnot accepwdbydschiefofficmsmenwdandfimdlerdimaedmancases,mmpnsMg34 mattasofcomplaint.berefenedtotheDPP. Overtheentireyear,theaveragetimetakenbythe Audloritytoprocessthedisciplinaryaspectsofacasewa856days,althoughduringthelatterpart oftheyearthishadbeenreducedto40days(PCAAnnualReport,1986:Chapter7). 64 Informal Resolution One major innovative aspect of the 1984 legislation over which the Police Complaints Amhorityhasnodirectinfluenceisdleconceptofinformalresoludon Oneofthemajor pmblemsofdlecomplainsprocedmedmingdlefifedmeofthePCB,whichdleBoardrepeamdly referredtoinitsannualrepors,wasdrelnueasmableamornuofpolicedmeandeffonspemon investigatingtrivialcomplaints. Inordertobeseentobefairtocomplainants,thepolice fiequmdycuriedmnenquhieswhidrwaemnreethsfivemddnecmsumhlgmande complaintswhich gaverisetotheinvestigations warranted (Philips, 1984: 12). Additionally. sincethePoliceAct1976hadrequiredinvesdgatingofficerstobeofmerankofSuperintendent orabove,averyseniorrankinEnglandandWales,thecomplaintsprocedmehadbecome excessively formal and unwieldy as well as proving to be extremely expensive and inefficient. nghasysmmwasmplacewiwmbyearlympmscmfldbesubminedmnmlmmsof complahrhithadfallenintodisuselargelybecauseofpolicefearsofallegationsof"whitewash" enquiries (Meek, 1985: 6; Bell, 1986: 286). Timideaofmfmmanymsolvingcemmcomplainswhhmumcansewlmgthyandfomal investigations gathered speed after the publication of Lord Scarman's Report on the Brixton Disorders in 1981, and subsequently was provided forin the 1984 legislation. The PACE Act mquhesdmdefirstacdmwldchachiefofficernmstmkeafimaconmhhusmcmdedsto consider whether it is possible for the allegation to be resolved informally. In doing so, he is assistedbycertainguidelines. First,ifthePCAhasdecidedtosuperviseaninvestigation,then undernocircumstancescanthecomplaintbeinforrnallyresolved. Second,thecomplaintmmstbe suchdnuevenifprovednodisciplinaryorcfimhlalchargeswouldensue. Third,the complainantnmstconsenttotheinformalresolutionprocedure. Whilstthereisnocorresponding mqtmememfmdnaccmedofficutocmsemmmfonnalmsohrdmmoneedngbetweendn complainant and the officercan take place without the officer's agreement (Meek, 1985: 7; Lambert, 1986: 80; Liddy, 1986: 10). Ifacomplaintisnotinformallyresolvedatthetimeitismade,thenanofficeroforabove therankonliefInspector(therankbelowSuper-intendent)maybeappointedtoassistachief 65 officer in the process of informal resolution. Indeed, the rank of the 10 in all complaints investigations wasreduwdto Grieflnspectororabove by the 1984 legislation. This innovation was a welcome development in police circles since it means that the workload of investigating complaintscannowbespreadoveragreaternumberofseniorofficersthanwasthecase previously, and in addition it provides Chief Inspectors with an insight into the complaints procedlnewhichwillbepotentiallyusefilltodlemupontheirpromotion. Hdnmfmnalmsolufimpmcesssnmcessfukmecomplaimsrecordedashavingbem disposedofandisincludedinofficialpolicestatistics,butitisnotrecordedinthesubjecr officer's personal record. If, however, the informal procedure breaks down, there are safegmrdshdhmtodnsystemwhichprmeabmhdwacwsedofficeranddncomphmm Specifically, the senior officer who attempted to resolve the complaint informally may not be appointedtocanymrtthesubsequentfullinvestigation,andallinfonnationrelatingtothefailed nlfonmlresoludmiscmsidemdpnvflegedmdcannmbedivumdmmymmquirym disciplinary proceedings. Tlesesafeguardsareintendedtoencomageaccusedofficerstopartake intheinformalprocedure,sinceiftheyweretobelievethatanythingtheysaidcouldbeusedin anylaterformalenquiry,theywouldclearlybeinhibitedfromdiscussingthematteranddlis would defeatthewholepurposeof the exercise (Meek, 1985: 7). As mentioned previously, the introduction of the process of informal resolution by the 1984Actwasprobablytheonly aspectofthelegislationwhichreceivedwidespreadsupportfrom all parties. In practice, it satisfies many complainants who are merely seeking some form of acknowledgement or explanation. Similarly, it is advantageous to ofi'rcers not to have lengthy fmmflmqunieshmgingwerdwhheadscammgsmessmldcmcempmficmmywhmmey concern relatively minor incidents. On the other hand. there is of course the possibility that some complaintswhicharenow classifiedasinfonnally resolved may eitherhavebrienrecordedas withth'awnunderthe1976legislation,or.iftheyareresolvedatthetimetheyaremadeat preserlnpreviouslytheymayneverhavebeenrecordedatali. Theconsequenteffectmay dmefmebemmafficiflsmfisdmnmymdkammappuuuumeasemcomplaimsmmtyeas when,mmahty,nwhmmcmasemaybeamibmabbwdndiffenmmcordingpracdcesin 66 existence pre and post 1985 (Bell, 1986: 287). Unfortunately, because informal resoultion is not subject to supervision by the PCA, but rather, together with a range of other matters relating to the efficiency of police forces, it is monitored by local police authorities and Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, no nationally collated statistics concerning informal resolution are available with which to analyze trends. Nevertheless, examination of individual Chief Constable's Annual Reports for 1985 and 1986 indicate that, in a significant number ofcases, opportunities are being taken to informally resolve complaints. In Durham Constabulary in the north of England, for example. during the last eight months of 1985, 326 complaints were received, of which 82, or 25%, were informally resolved. During 1986, the proportion of complaints resolved informally increased to almost 30% (Liddy, 1986:11). Complaints and Discipline Departments in England and Wales Everyoneofthe43 policeforces which presentlyexistinEnglandandWaleshasa specialist department, usually entitled the Complaints and Discipline Department or something similar, which is responsible for investigating citizen complaints against the police. Most of these departments were established during the late 1960s and early 1970s following the enactrrentofthePoliceAct 1964and,asnewlegislationhasbeenintroducedandtheir investigative responsibilities have increased. most departrrents have undergone gradual increases in establishment during the intervening years. Superintendents have traditionally been the designated investigating officers for complaints and, despite the 1984 PACE Act provision which reduces the 10's rank to Grief Inspector and above, they still remain so in the majority of forces. Consequently, Complaints and Discipline (C &D)departmentstendtobestaffedby highranlcingofficers.Mostforcesuti1izeInspectors to assist 108 in collecting evidence, interviewing witnesses and preparing case files, and, since the introduction of tie 1984 and its associated high volume of administrative duties, a number of forces have introduced Grief Inspectors into their departments in the role ofOffice Manager. Such a policy has resulted in the identification ofone individual whose sole responsibility is the 67 processing of departmental administration, and the freeing of Superintendents from administrative duties to concentrate purely on complaints investigations. Clerical support for the Office Manager may be provided either by Sergeants or Constables or, in the majority of forces, by civilian clerks. Because of the relatively small size of Complaints and Discipline departrrents in comparison to the number of cases requiring investigation, in most forces a sizeable proportion of complaints are allocaed to operational Superintendents and Grief Superintendents for investigation, with the C & D departrrents generally handling the more complicated and potentially time consuming cases. A survey carried out in 1984 by Sussex Police whose data, although collected prior to the enactrrent of the PACE Act, is the most recently available, indicated that, within the 42 provincial forces in England and Wales (ie:- excluding the London Metropolitan Police), on average 56% of citizen complaint cases were handled by C & D staff and 44% were investigated by other operational senior officers. Only four forces reported that all complaints were handled exclusively byC &Dstaff,whilstafurtherfourreportedthatC& Dinvestigatedatleast90% of allcomplaintstlremselves. Attheotherendoftlrescale,sixforcesreportedthatlesstlrar125% of complaints were investigated by C & D staff (Liddy, 1986: App. 9). Whilst the latter figure might appear sorrewhat surprising, it is worthy of note that C & D departments, as their name suggests, not only investigate citizen complaints but also are concerned with supervisor-initiated allegations of breaches of internal discipline. The large variation in the proportion of citizen complaints handled internally is therefore likely to be a function ofthe number of alleged beaclesofmemfldisdpfimnmmismgfiomcifizmcmnplainmwhichcenaindepmm are being required to investigate. Submission of the annual costs of investigating citizen complaints against the police is required by the Home Office. Figures submitted by all 43 forces in 1984 indicated a total national cost in excess of £155 million for the financial year 1983/84, an increase of 12.9% upon the previous year, which, itself, had shown an increase of 16.9% upon tle financial year 1981/82 (Liddy, 1986: App. 10). Whilst more recent figures are unavailable at present, if cost 68 increases have continued in the sane manner, the estimated costs forthe financial year 1986/87 would be ofthe order of£24 million. Given the increased resources which chief officers allocated to C & D departments following the enactrrent of the 1984 PACE Act, the true 1986/87 figure is rrrore likely to be in the region of £30 million nationally. Post Script - The "Holloway Road" Case The nrisplaced loyalty of a number of London Metropolitan police officers recently capnned widespread public and media attention in the United Kingdom following the "Holloway Road" case, in which in August 1983 forn' youths were assaulted for no apparent reason by a number ofruriformed police officers who had aliglrted from a personnel carrier (Crook, 1987: 1320; Stalker, 1987: 12). Two lengthy and detailed investigations indicated that three police Mashadbeenmdevidnhymdednebnfaibdwesmbfishfiomwmwmrdeoffims responsible forthe assaults hadcorre, because officers were unwillingto bearwitrress against their colleagues. The PCA inherited the case from the PCB in 1985, and subsequently, in Febrrrary 1986, tlreyissredastatementsayingthattherewas insufficientevidencetocharge anyonewitha criminaloffense ortoinstitute disciplinary proceedings. They furtheraskedtheMetropolitan Police to 'wam' all of the officers who might have been involved in the incident of their behavior. Although this warning was issued, the Metropolitan Police maintained that it did nbt constitute an official reprimand and that it would not affect individual officers' careers (Hilliard. 1987: 1426). After consulting the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, the PCA then decidedtopublicizethefactsofthecase,andahighlycriticalreportofboththeincidentandthe case outcome published in the magazine "Police Review" on February 7th 1986 led to the DPP offeringcriminalirmmmitytoany officerwhohadwitnessedtheassaultsbuthadnottakenpart in them (PCA Annual Report, 1986: Para 3.3; Hilliard, 1987: 1426). Following widespread publicitygiventotleofferofirnmunityandthecircumstancesofthecaseinthemedia,allof which was detrimental to the aheady battered image of the Metropolitan Police, several officers eventually offered information to the third investigation. As a result, forn' constables and one 69 sergeant were charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and additionally the constables were all charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The officers finally carre to trial in July 1987, sorre four years after the incident. One of the constables was formd not guilty ofthe assault charge but guilty ofthe conspiracy, and all of the Others were found guilty as charged. The first constable was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment, the other constables to four years' imprisonment, and the sergeant to three years' imprisonment. The London Times of July 17th 1987 reported that, in passing sentence on the officers,thejudgehad saidtlrattlreiractiorrs haddonermrchtounderminetherespect whichright thinking citizens should and do have for the police. Opinions concerning what the future should hold for those officers who eventually decided to give evidence in the case have been mixed. Whilstsomehavearguedtlrattlrey shouldleavetheservice,describingthemasbeingan embanassmentandtobetotallyuntrustworthy andunreliable,othershave indicatedthatitwould beintheinterests oftheserviceforthemtostay on,becauseitwould preventanychanceof sirnilaroffers ofirnmunity beingtakenseriouslyintlefunrreiftley wereforcedtoresign. What is clear, however, is that self-regulation in any organization, particularly one which aspirestoprofessionalstatus,isessential. Withoutit,thereis astrictlirrritonwhatcanbe achieved whatever the system (Bell, 1986: 293). Or, as has been succinctly stated by a recently retired Deputy Grief Constable who himself was the subject of a widely publicized investigation supervised by the PCA (of which he was entirely exonerated), 'Ttistobehopeddratfair-mindedpolicenenandwomenwinrealizethat they do neither themselves nor the police service any favors by exercizing misguided group loyalty to their less scrupulous colleagues." (Stalker, 1987 : 12). CHAPTER IV TRANSATLANTIC SIMILARITIES - A REVIEW Introduction Tluschaperisorganizedmdrmemainsecfions.1hefirsttwopmvidedemaderwim brief reviews and summaries of the previous two chapters of this study, in addition to identifying severalhnpficafimsfmflrefimneofpoficecomplaintsprwedrnesintheUMedSmesandin England and Wales respectively. The third section concentrates upon the major historical point of similarity to emerge from a study of developments on both sides of the Atlantic, the consistent use of the same sets of argunents by proponents and opponents of the concept of external civilian review of alleged police misconduct. Summary of the American Experience and Prospects for the Future The history of the investigation of complaints against the police in the USA is best characterized as a constant debate between two major interest groups with totally opposing opinions. On one side have been the proponents of external review, mainly comprising community groups, civil rights organizations and the media, who have argued that a system in which the police themselves carry out the investigations provides too many opportunities for cover-ups and for complainant intimidation. On the Other side have been the adherents of internal review, mainly comprising the police themselves and conservative politicians, who have argued that it is not only unfair, but also irrational for the members of a profession to be subjeced to scrutiny of their actions by amatern's who are incapable of appreciating the intricacies and difficulties of policework. 70 71 Both sides have had successes and failures. The 1960s saw predominately internal review of various types as being the Optimum method for investigating complaints. The untimely and in sone cases spectacular demise of a number of innovative civilian review boards seemed to ensure continued success for the advocates of internal affairs departments. Developnrent of the concept of police professionalism in the early 1970s added more weight to the arguments for a police monopoly on complaints investigation, but a series of heidmmhwfichpmficuhflyflagramaMsesofpowermdmnhoruybyofficemappeamdmgo unpurrished ensured that the civilian review proponents would not give up the fight easily. In response to the problem of poor police-community relations in a number of cities, and following lengthy negotiations and careful planning, several variations on the tlrene of civilian participation in complaints investigation were implemened during the 1970s, and without exception they enjoyedagreaterdegree ofsuccessthantheirpredecessors had duringthe 1960s. Tlrethreatposedby agenciessuchastleGricagoOfficeofProfessionalStandardsandthe Berkeley Police Review Comnrission caused a greater degree of thought to be given to the issue ofstaffinglntemalAffairsUnitsthanhadbeenthecasepreviously. Thepictureemergedof police chiefs relying on the indisputable abilities and irrtegrities of their IA staff to counter any outside allegations of unprofessionalism and dubious practices during complaints investigation. Even this inrage failed to satisfy the opponents of internal review, however and the 1980s have been characterized by efforts on both sides to improve the quality of the services they provide to complainants with genuine grievances. Organizations such as the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcenrent Agencies (CALEA) have established standards for the evaluation of internal review procedures. At the sane fine. the International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (IACOLE) has been created to facilitate individuals from agencies which have been established by legislative mnhorhymmviewwmplainmagamnmepoliceneefingtogahaanddiscussingnmmal concems and problenrs. Funue trends and developments into the 1990s would appear to rest upon the success or otherwise of these three agencies as they each conu'nue to search for procedures for investigating 72 dfizmcompthagainstmepoficewluchambommmoughandhnpudaLmrdyethcham equally acceptable to the officers themselves, to nembers of the public, and to local political officials and pressure groups. Summary of the British Experience and Prospects for the Future Although the Police Complaints Authority have probably asserted their independence and 'mfhenwdmmplainmmvesfigafimmmxiphnawdecisimmhngdufingdemoshonyeam oftheirexistencetoannrchgreaterdegreethandidtheirpredecessor,thePolioeComplaints Board,drningthehardreeigluyearstonnyfifefine,demanycrificsofdePCAmitigateagairrst itslongtermsurvival. Overthepasttwodecadesthereappearstohavebeenantmrelenting march towards a conrpletely independent system for investigating citizen complaints agaimt the poficethglmdmlealeemddenislinkevidueemnrggenmmdePCAismydfingm thanjustoremorestepalongthatroad. Perhaps, intime,the strongest influenceuponftrtmedevelopments may provetobethe policethernselves. Havingbeenonrecordsincel981asbeinginfavorofthecreationofafully mdepmdaumvesfiganvebodyfmcomphhrmmmdaflmmliccmfidencecmbemaimined mthesysemmepoficenaffassocianms,mdmparficuludePoliceFedemfimhave continuedtovoicetheircriticismsoftheoperationsofthePCA. Suspicionconcemingtle' motivesofmeFederafimamwidespnad,bommsidemdmusideflepoficeservice,andhnmst beconsideredunlikelythattheywouldbeanylesscriticalofafullyirrdependerrtbodyiforreever weretobecreaed. Nevertheless. officially their positionisthatthey would welcone sucha move. Incalling for a fully independent complaints body with its own investigative staff, the PohceFederafimcmcmmmmgnsalfiesnunerwsorgmizafiommideflepoficesewee. However, nrost of these organizations. including the National Council for Civil liberties, continue to propose fully independent investigations based nrore upon principle than upon any malcmvicfimmatsuchasystemwmfldbeanynwreeffecfivemmdepresemprocedmes operating under the PCA. They argue that no systenr, however elaborate, will satisfy public 73 pacepdmsmmjusficermrstbodrbedaemrdbeseentobedme,mfilhrvesfigafimof complaintsistakenoutof tlrehandsof the police themselves (Lambert, 1986: 82). Proposals for regional ombudsrnen with their own civilian investigative staff comprising expmiencedinvesfigmompahapsdrawnfiommesnflofgmemnemdeparmenmwchas CustonrsandExcise,theInlarrdRevenueortlePostOffice,willmrdoubtedlycontinuetobe made. WhatsrehpmposalsudflneedtodoinfleMneifdeymetohaveanyhnpaaupmtle legislatureistoexplainmstleyhavealltoofrequentlyfailedtodointhepast,howsomefutme mdependemhrvesdgafimcouldbmakdowndeobsmefivepoficesofidmitywhichofien Wmflemexperencedmficeofficasmdeirhwesfigafimofcomphhmagainmme policeCWaddington, 1987). Thisstatenentisnotnecessarilyanargunentagainsttleuseoflay investigators,ratheritisacautionarynotewhichhasbeenexpressedbymanywhoarefearfirl thattlrefuturefailureandcollapseofafullyindependentsystemwouldhaveseriousandlong lastingrepercussionsuponpublicconfidenceinthepolice. Somemificsofdepresentsystemfmmvesngafingcomplainmagainstdepoficem EnglandandWalesargtedratitistooheavilybiasedtowardsdenaditionalBfifishapproachof accusatorialjustice(Waddington, 1987). Whilsttheidentificationandpmecutionofspecific msmmesofmiscmdrmwmemedbyhrdividudofficusismpeMsedbydePCAmpmsmh theAuthorityhasnoresponsibilityforcorrsideringeitherpolicymattersortlreactionsofsenior officersmmmnundofsnuafions,bodrofwhichmayhrdhecflypmvokecomplaintsagainst‘ individual oflicers. Conversely,the 1981 ScannanRepoerhichnot only identified shonconungsmmdivimmofficmshnakomdicaedwiderfaflmgsMpofiwcmnnmrdm policy.hadmenormmsinrpactupmflepolicesewice,pWywimrespeamimtraining andcommunityliaisonprograms. OnenovelsuggestiorrhasbeerrtlraausingtleScannan mqfiryuamodehasmndhgwmnfineecouhbeemabfifledtomuuemtospedficmdMS or more general issues on a wider scale than is presently possible, and to report its findings to Parliament (Waddington, 1987). In 1984, the Grainnan ofthe Police Complaints Board stated that, in his opinion, the powers of the proposed new PCA, which had emerged through a process of trial and cum and 74 prolonged discussion, came close to achieving the necessary yet intricate balance between gaining public confidence and police acceptance (Philips, 1984: 19). Some three years later, although generally well accepted by those senior police officers who are charged with investigating complaints, the PCA is still far from being appreciaed by rank and file officers. Furthermore, in addition to the continuing and largely predictable voices from certain quarters calling for the removal of responsibility for complaints investigation from the police, respected police scholars and a recently retired Deputy Chief Constable have referred to the Authority as being "a crumbling irrelevance" and "almost universally unloved" (Stalker, 1987 : 12; Waddington. 1987). prublicconfidenceandpolice acceptancearetobecormtedastwoofthemajorobjectives of the PCA, it therefore remains highly debatable to what extent the Authority have succeeded in achieving either during the first two years of their operation. The PCA now consider themselves sufficierrtly knowledgeable and experienced to begin to make proposals for the improvenent of police and related practices. Whilst some relatively minor yet important anendrrents to police policies regarding the use of firearms, search warrants, and the clearer identification of police ‘ vehicles in a crisis have been introduced directly as a result of recommendations made by the Authority, some of their more recent proposals have been considerably more controversial and have received widespread nedia coverage and predictable police opposition. Perhaps more than anything else, the extent to which any such proposals made by the PCA bring them into well-publicized conflict with the police will help both to reduce public skepticism about the utility ofthe Authority and to highlight their independent status. Certainly, ifthese two public relations problemsfacingthePCA arenotoverconeinthenearfutme,the l990swillsee theBritish Government aceedingtoawidely predicted crescendoofsupportforafully independent system for investigating complaints against the police in England and Wales, a move which will signal the denrise of the Police Complaints Authority. 75 Shared Arguments ‘ T'le varying opinions and arguments concenring external review of alleged police misconductwhichenergedduringthelatel960sandtheearly1970s,bothintheUnitedStates of America and in England and Wales, have virtually remained tnrchanged ever since, and they constitute the major historical point of similarity in the experiences of the two nations. They have frequently been reiterated, both verbally and in writing, on both sides of the Atlantic during the lasttwenty years,anditis appropriateatthispointthatthemajorargunents shouldbeconsidered in sonre detail. They are reproduced in this section as ifthey were being put forward by either proponents or opponents of civilian review of police actions, and should not in any way be construed as being representative of the views of the author of this study. Arguments For External and Against Internal Review of Alleged Police Misconduct 1) External independent and impartial review of complaints is less likely to be biased than internal review. Certain reprehensible tactics occasionally utilized by police officers to dissuade complainants from pursuing their complaints, such as charging complainants with various public order offenses and demanding that they take polygraph tests (Niederhoffer, 1967: 284), coupled with complainants' fears of police reprisals (Russell, 1976: 5), constitute particularly flagrant examples of the worst kind of bias. However, equally damaging to the integrity of any intemal review process is the natural, largely unavoidable, and frequently unrealized tendency of investigating police officers to side with their own. Such action is understandable given the strong group solidarity experienced witirin police ranks which has been well documened (Kerstetter, 1985: 175). However impartial the investigating officer might wish to be, his judgenrent may be affected by feelings of loyalty and protection (Russell, 1976: 7). Further threats to the process could be introduced because biased investigations may not only conceal officers' past nrisconduct, they may also implicitly encourage further abuses of authority (Beral and Sisk, 1964: 516; Box, 1983: 102). 76 Any closed system in which those who are complained against investigate whether there aregenuinegroundsforthecomplaintandsubsequentlyconchrdethattherearenotmnstherisk of allegations of cover-up and whitewash (Robin, 1980: 85; Hewitt, 1982: 71; Walker, 1983: 237; Geller, 1984: 7; Lambert. 1986: 82). It is contrary to nann'al justice that anybody should be ajudge in their own cause (Brown, 1987: 2). Even ifthere is no cover-up, distrust for an internalsystemstillexists,andthiscanproveaseffectiveinerodingcitizencorrfiderrceintlre mechanism as a real whitewash would be (Beral and Sisk, 1964: 516; Fyfe, 1985: 83). It serious complaints were to be investigated by an external body and found to be grormdless. publicizing this fact could assist the police departrrent and could prevent insidious allegations (Barton, 1970: 463; Walker, 1983: 240). In practice, however at least in the early days ofcivilianreviewindeUSAdereislitfleevidencetoindicaedratifindeedtierehad previously been an element of bias in police departments' internal review mechanism, this had affected the outcomes of investigations (Perez, 1978: 25). The Philadelphia Police Advisory BMperhapspuflyduewhsefiommbewneacceptedbyofiicmsofflepohcedeme generallytendedtobelenienttowards accusedofficersinways whichtheIAUitselfhadnever been (Beral and Sisk, 1964: 517); in New York City, officers' fears ofappearing before the police depamnuu'sownintemaldisciphnarynechanismweregreaerthanwhenfley hadto attend hearings of the Civilian Complaint Review Board (Niedahofl’er ,1967: 189). 2) External interest in alleged police malpractice is natural and reasonable and can be utilized to the advantage of a police department through building increased public confidence. Duetotheexceptionalcoercivepowers ofthe police andtheimpactofthese powersupon mdividuflfibafies,dvflianhnaesmpoficemfivhysthnmbeuMuesnneednmmgamed as unreasonable (Beral and Sisk, 1964: 500; Lambert, 1986: 81). A citizen who is frustrated in obtaining redress through internal mechanisms may have his anger and hostility towards a police department compounded (Hudson, 1981: 518; Iolin and Gibbons, 1984: 320). Involving civilians in the procedrnes for complaints investigation would be one way of lessening the social 77 isolation of the police (Barton, 1970: 460). If, as police administrators tend to assert, the vast majority of complaints are either spurious or malicious, then opening up the complaints procedure for civilian oversight would help to build sympathy and support for the police in their duties (Walker, 1983:- 240). Civilian participation in the process could be utilized to balance public interests whilst maintaining civil liberty (Pike, 1985: 169). Rejection of this concept tends to further isolate fire police by effectively denying that they themselves are part of society (Packer, 1966: 242). 3) Internal Review goals and citizen expectations do not always correspond. Internal investigations are conducted not to provide redress for the complainant, but to enforce discipline witirin police departments. If investigation by police officers establishes the truth of the complaint, the department itself brings charges against the officer. Departmental goals do not necessarily correspond with those of complainants who are generally seeking sorre sort of satisfaction (Brown, 1983: 146). Police departments carrying out internal investigations are solely concerned with conduct which violates their own rules. There is thus a divergence of goals (Cray,1972: 312). Fruthermore, often a simple apology or an am that the complainedofbehaviorwillnotberepeatedwouldbesuflicierutosatisfyaconrplainmrtbut all mofiequenflysrehmncomesamnotwiflunflemnutofdeparmemalmmflreview mechanisms (Hudson, 1971: 518; Pike, 1985: 168; Lambert, 1986: 80; Brown, 1987: 38). 4) Internal Review depends heavily upon the integrity of senior police administrators. In the internal review process, the only protection which citizens have against either faults in the system or deliberate misuse of it by lower officials rests with the senior administrators, and frequently there is no protection against abuses by tlrese commanders. The system thus relies totally upon the integrity of individual senior police officers (Hewitt, 1982: 72). There are no independentsafeguardstoensurethatalloftheavailableevidenceirracasehasbeenobtained (Pike, 1985: 166). Conversely, an independent external body can operate as a check on the 78 perfonnanceofbodrhigraswellaslowofficialswithinthedepartnent (Beral and Sisk, 1964: 517). Arguments for Internal and Against External Review of Alleged Police Misconduct 1) External Review decreases the morale of the police which can lead to reduced effectiveness and performance. Tleargumunflratcivflianmviewwinaffectdeneraeofmepoliceandflereby inhibit enforcenentofthelawisoreoftlremostpopularandfrequentlyvoiced argunerrts against external review (Barton, 1970: 460, Brown, 1987: 3) and essentially forrred the basis for the campaignliteratrneandpublicity whichresultedinthedefeatoftheNew YorkCity CCRB inthe 1966 referendum (Cray, 1972: 320). It was utilized by J. Edgar Hoover in the FBI report to the Presidentontleriots whichoccurredinninecitiesduringthesummerofl964,wlenitwas asserted that "Investigations revealedthatwherethereis anoutsidecivilianreviewboard (Philadelphia and Rochester) the restraint of the police was so great that effective action against the rioters appeared to be impossibie...In short, the police were so careful to avoid accusations of improper conduct that they were virtually paralysed." TheFBIreportwasprintedintheNew YorkTimesonSeptember27th, 1964,andits argument was rebutted in the sane paper the following day by officials of the Rochester and Philadelphia Boards. Justification for tie rebuttal cane in part from tie Piriladelphia PAB's fourthAnnualReportwhichhadbeenproducedtleprevious yearandwhichhad shown Philadelphia to have tie lowest crine rate per hundred thousand population of the five major citiesirrtleUSA,andtiehighestrateofaneststocrinescommittedinthosefivecities (Beral and Sisk, 1964: 517). Further doubt was cast upon the validity of the 'morale' argument in 1967 by the President's Commission Field Survey which found hostility towards civilian review amongst the police in cities where civilian review boards were operating, but no noticeable loss of morale. 79 2) External involvement in the disciplinary process interferes with the authority of the chief officer. Another major argunerrt against extemal or civilian involvenent in the disciplinary process is that it takes the power of discipline, which is the prerogative of managenerrt, away from the executive officers (Barton, 1970: 463; Lynch and Diamond, 1983: 1162; Fyfe, 1985: 78). This argunent tends to overlook the fact that. almost invariably when civilian review has been hrstinrtedinthepasttlefinaldecisionondisciplhehasremahedwimdepolicechief(Beraland Sisk, 1964: 517), and that review boards' functions concerning disciplinary sanctions have generally been restricted, at most, to reconrrnendations (Brown, 1983: 148; Terrill, 1982: 400). The argunent has traditionally been linked with tie notion of police professionalism. Fromtirretotime,allranksofpolice officers have arguedthatthey,likeodrerprofessional groups, are capable of . disciplining their own members (Stowell, 1977: 64; Walker, 1983: 240; Fyfe, 1985: 79). 3) Civilians are unqualified to judge police actions. Oreoftlestrongeststatementsofthisparticularpointwasmadein1977byapolicechief who wrote: "How could a civilian sit in judgement on a police officer's actions any more than he could sit injudgenent on a doctor's actions in an operating room?" (Stowell, 1977: 64) Whflstdnsmaybeanexueneexampieofdeargunencdeprennseuparwhichitis based,nanelytieinabilityofanyoreotlerthanapoliceofficertoundetstandthecomplexities anddifliculties inherentin police work. has widespread support (Barton. 1970: 462; Fyfe, 1985: 79; Lambert, 1986: 84). The argument would appear to overlook two pertinent observations. FnshacWflhnbeconesamfimoffimrafiamebfiefenofnaimnngcmAwfimmcdces arealreadysubjecttopublicscrutinybyciviliannembersofuialjtnies. Jurypanelistsingeneral knowwmlessabMpofimpmcedmesdmncivflianmvkwboadnembempmfianycmfld. yet they daily judgetlelegalityof police actiorrsinthelaw courts (Cray, 1972: 323). Gosely . 80 allied with this 'amaeurism' argument is the suggestion that civilians, unlike police officers, would lack sufficient expertise and experience both to carry out investigations (Brown, 1987: 2) andtoenable tlemto identifythose false and malicious complaints which arefrequently made (Pike, 1985: 166). 4) External review boards are likely to be biased against the police and will interfere politically in police operations. Tire earliest external review boards to be established were, in a variety of ways, responses to poor police-community relations, particularly with regard to ethnic minorities, and the nembership of the boards, perhaps not surprisingly, tended to reflect this fact (Barton, 1970: 462). The police and their supporters were concerned that appointments to the boards would continretobeofapoliticalnatlne, witlrpostsbeirrgawardedtonembers oftle mostvocalcivil liberties and civil rights groups (Cray, 1972: 325; Perez, 1978: 295). Whetler this was the case or not, the disposition of cases by both the Philadelphia and New York Boards provided little, if any, evidence of vindictive bias against the police (Terrill, 1982: 401). 5) Internal review mechanisms can investigate proactively whereas external mechanisms are exclusively reactive. Internal Affairs Units utilize police officers as investigators of complaints. These officers areinvariablyexperienceddetectives and,sincetheyhavefree aceesstotleintemal administrative system of the police department tley can operate proactively in seeking out police malpractice (Beral and Sisk, 1964: 516). Conversely, external review bodies, in order to maintain their legitimacy need to wait to receive complaints regarding nrisconduct before commencing investigations. It would be extremely difficult for an outside agency to engage in investigations withoutthe promptingofaspecificcomplaintandstillmaintaintleirindependent and impartial inrage (Geller, 1984: 7). Furthermore, external review agencies tend only to concentrate upon abuses of powers by individual officers, whereas internal mechanisms can be used to focus on departnent-wide malpractice or corruption. The responsibility for solving 81 problems underthe internal review system is therefore invested in those who are best able to cure them (Beral and Sisk. 1964: 516). Internal review can also be efl’ective in modifying individual behavior by utilizing group solidarity and peer pressure to control unwanted conduct. Both of these pressures are more effective nechanisms than outsider disapproval (Geller, 1984: 7; Kerstetter, 1985: 164). 6) Citizens not satisfied with internal review mechanisms already have sufficient alternative avenues to follow. The courts have regularly been argued to provide an effective neans of seeking redress against police malpractice, and opponents of civilian review have voiced tie opinion that introducinganotheragencyintotheareaofcomplaints investigation wouldirrtroducethethreatof double jeopardy to the officer concerned (Hudson, 1971: 521—522; Cray, 1972: 322). Extemal review would therefore represent an unnecessary duplication of existing renedies for police misconduct (Lynch and Diamond, 1983: 1163). However, suggesting that citizens should turn tothecorntsforsatisfactionimpliesthatnrostcitizens wanttosueorprosecutetlepolice. In practice, not only are many allegations inappropriate for formal courtroom proceedings, a substantialnumberofcomplainarrts arenotinterestedinseekingthatkindofredress (Terrill. 1982: 400). 7) Civilian Review Boards have been shown to be both unworkable and ineffective. Tielackofmmplainmdeyhavebemabkmsusmmhassonednesbemchedasevidarce of the ineffectiveness of civilian review boards (Hudson, 1971: 521). However, the evidence usedintlriswaytendstoequatefindings ofguiltwitheffectiveness whichashasalreadybeen indicated, is not necessarily the way complainants see the situation. As an alternative to judging complaintsprocedrnesbytheproportionofcomplaints they areabletosrrstairuasuccessful conciliation process. frequently used by the early civilian review boards in both New York and Philadelphia, may equally be considered an indicator of effectiveness (N iederhoffer, 1967: 187). 82 A perhaps more persuasive version of the argument concerning the potential ineffectiveness of extemal review nechanisne identifies the constant struggles which the early CRBs had with police unions, and particularly the events leading up to the crushing defeat of the New York City CCRB, and concludes that, even if they are effective, civilian review boards may be unworkable in the face of concerted police opposition (Hudson, 1971: 528; Box, 1983: 105). Chapter Summary Dining the past twenty five years. major developnents have occurred in the field of investigationofcomplaintsagainstthepolicebothintheUnited StatesandinEnglandandWales. TireUnited States'experiencehasbeenvaried,witlrextemalcivilianreview ofpolice misconduct being initially favored and subsequently discredited during the 1960s, only to re-energe as a police-comrmmity relations issue in tle late 1970s. In England and Wales however, developmmhavebeengradudmdhavealmostausignalbdmwenmalmdwmemfl investigationsandtheultinratecreation ofanirrdeperrdentcivilianbodyresponsible for investigatingallcomplaintsagainstthepolice. Onbotlrsides ofthe Atlantic,proponentsand opponarts of external civilian review of alleged police misconduct have tended to use and reiterate the sane set of major arguments in support of tleir respective positions. Those in favor of external review have largely argued that any closed system in which those who are complained againstinvestigate whethertlere are genuine grounds forconrplaint is, by definition, imperfect arrdtlrat involving citizens in the complaints systemnot only injects an element ofindeperrdence andimpartialityintotheprocedmes,butalsocanbeanaidto police-commrnlityrelations. Those opposedtofleideahavegenerauybasedmeiropinimsupmdecmeeptofpolice professiorralismarrdhave arguedthatthebestcourse ofactiorr forthefutruewouldbetocontinue to staff police internal investigation units with officers of unchallenged integrity and ability. T'heresultisthat, atpresenawhilsttheprocedureforinvestigatingcomplaints againsttlre police is standardized throughout England and Wales and involves an independent Police Complaints Authority, in tie United States numerous systems exist, all of which exhibit varying degrees of openness towards civilian participation and involvement. CHAPTER V DESIGN OF THE STUDY Introduction The major aims of this study are threefold: to catalogue the developments and innovations which have taken place in the field of investigation ofcomplaints against the police in the United States ofAmericaandEnglandandWales,toidentify andassessthecm'rentcomplaints procedures Operating within the United States. and to seek to discover any relationships which existbetweenthese procedures andarange oforganizationalandenvironmentaldepartmental factors which might be expected to impact upon complaints investigations. The first of these aims has been addressed in the previous chapters. The remainder of the study is probably best characterized as exploratory field research, with formal hypothesis testing being sacrificed in favor of a more descriptive approach being taken to the analysis of system variables. It is hoped that the research may yield test hypotheses whichcanthenbeexamimdinfurtherworkinthisarea. . Almwghfonnalhypomesesmenmtestedmmesmdy,datacoflecfimandanalysis were guidedbythatsetofgeneralresearchquestions firstpresented anddiscussedinChapterL In particular. the major influence upon the data collection and analysis phases ofthe study was Research Question 4, which was concerned with the development and design of an empirically-driven functional typology for complaints investigation. Since they formed the foundation ofthesmdyasawhole,theresearchquestionsarerepeated, althoughonthisoccasion without any background discussion, in the next section ofthis chapter. 83 In addition to the extensive literature review component, two other types of data collection methods were used during the study to obtain information with which to attempt to answer the 34 research questions: a number of on-site interviews and a mail survey. Following the restatement of the research questions, the interview phase of the study is discussed, because chronologically it preceded almost everything else and provided crucial input into the typology development and design phase. A brief mention of the typology, the development of which is covered in considerably more depth in Chapter VI, precedes a thorough discussion of the survey component of the study. Since this phase provided most of the empirical information and data to be examined in the analysis, considerable detail of the survey sample, survey measures and variables to be tested are presented in this section. A short discussion of the analytical methods to be used concludes the chapter. 1) 2) 3) 4) Research Questions What variations in systems for investigating complaints against the police currently exist within the United States of America and England and Wales? What are some of the underlying reasons which have given rise to changes and variations in systems used for investigating complaints against the police within the USA and England and ales. What are some of the major arguments which have been used by interest groups concerning the investigation of complaints against the police within the USA and England and Wales? Can an empirically-derived functional typology be developed to provide a generalized framework against which structurally differing police complaints procedures can systematically be compared? Within the USA, is there a relationship between police complaints procedures and any of the following: a) agency size, level and geographical location? b) general economic conditions in police jurisdictions? c) general crime characteristics in police jurisdictions? 85 6) Within the USA, is there a relationship between police complaints proceduresand any of the following: a) the number of complaints filed? b) the seriousness of complaints filed? c) the proportion of complaints sustained? Interview Component The interview component of this study had two major objectives. One was to provide detaibd qualitative information concerning those aspects of procedures for investigating complaints against the police specified in the research questions. It was hoped that this inforrnationconcemingalimitednumberofpolice agencies,takentogetherwiththatobtained from the review of the literature would provide a basis for the development of a functional “typology for the investigation of complaints against the police. The intention was for this typology to contain all of the necessary or possible system functions, and within its basic design to allow numerous structural variations upon the same theme to be constructed. Building upon this primary goal, a second objective of the interview component was to provide input into the survey portion of the study. Using the newly developed typology as a guide, interview information was used for the selection of relevant research issues, and for the design and refinement of survey questions and items. To an extent, the interviews were exploratory in nature, and their focus evolved over time, with information from earlier interviews being used to refine later ones. Procedure manuals and departmental annual reports were routinely requested and provided during interviews and proved extremely useful, particularly in the identification of important factors for exploration by the survey instrument. Interview Sample Eleven site visits and interviews (ten in the United States and one in Canada) were carried out during late 1986 and early 1987. Eight involved visits to police departments or departments of public safety, and three were undertaken at the offices of formally constituted external civilian 86 agencies with responsibilities for investigating complaints against the police. Several criteria. including financial and temporal considerations, were used to select the agencies comprise the interview sample. Purposive opportunity sampling would be one way of describing the sampling technique used, with agency sites being clustered within travel circles which permitted the maximum number of agency visits to be made while minimizing travel costs and time. However, inadditialannjorgoalwasmsampleagencieswithvafiafionnlbothdepamnentalsize and complaints investigation procedures, in an endeavor to ensure that the resultant typology was of sufficient depth and suffered from no major omissions. At the interview stage therefore, no attempt was made to achieve geographic representativeness and the interview sites cannot in any way be regarded as a random sample. All eleven agencies, whether internal or external, were concerned with investigating complaints against police officers employed irl sizeable (in excess of 100 sworn full-time personnel) city or metropolitan police departments. Of the eight police departments visited, according to the US Bureau of the Census Regions and Census Divisions (1980) one was in the South Atlantic states, one was in the Middle Atlantic states, two were in the East North Central states, and four were in the Pacific states, although all ofthelanerwereinfactinCalifomia. Ofthethreeextemalcivilianagenciesvisited,onewasin the South Atlantic states, one was in the Pacific states, and one was in the province of Ontario, Canada. I The specific agencies at which interviews were conducted are identified in Table 5.1, together with an indication of the variety in agency size of the eleven relevant police departments. At each site visit there was invariably more than one interviewee. In every one of the eight police departments the major interviewee was the senior officer in charge of Internal Affairs, or the departmental equivalent unit. These officers consisted of one Assistant Chief, two Captains, two Lieutenants and three Sergeants. In the three external agencies the major interviewee was either the agency Director or his Chief Investigator. Without exception, all interviewees were extremely forthcoming in providing useful information to assist in the development of the complaints typology. Indeed, the principal uses to 87 Table 5.1 - General Characteristics of Relevant Police Departments at Interview Sample Sites (N = 11) Number of 13mg)? sworn personnel (in 1000s) Police Departments Alexandria, VA 220 110 Berkeley, CA , 176 109 Cleveland, OH 1852 547 Concord. CA 134 109 Hayward, CA 146 105 Lansing, MI . 248 129 Oakland, CA 635 371 Pittsburgh, PA 1255 402 External Review Agencies Office of the Public Complaints 5300 2137 Commissioner, Toronto, Canada - Office of Citizen Complaints, 1900 751 San Francisco, CA Civilian Complaint Review Board, 3877 626 Washington, DC 88 which interview data were put for this study were typology design and development, together with their use in assisting to interpret and analyze mail survey responses. No quantitative analysis of the interview information was attempted, nor were the data formally analyzed qualitatively. Thetypology developmentitselfisdescribedin much greaterdetail in the nextchapterof this study, which concludes with a presentation of the seven-stage functional model in pictorial form. Survey Component ’I‘hemajoraimsofthesurveycomponentofthestudy weretoidentifytheprosent variations in systems for investigating complaints against the police in a sizeable sample of US police agencies. and to explore the relationships between these procedures and a number of internal and external considerations. Data collection and analysis within the survey component were guided by the research questions presented earlier and driven by the functional typology. Each ofthe seven stages ofthe fully deve10ped typology gave rise to a distinct section of thesurveyinstrument. Inaddition,fivefurthersections were inchlded. SectionsAandB ofthe survey instrument were concerned with general departmental backgromrd information and an overview of the complaints system, whilst Section C sought to identify which departmental unit was responsible for investigating complaints and how this lmit was typically staffed. Sections D to I were based directly upon the various typology stages. Following on from these, Section K oftheinstrumentwasusedtocollectdataregardingcomplaints statistics,andfinally Section L was designed to measure individual respondents' opinions concerning those typical arguments regularly used by both proponents and opponents ofcivilian review of alleged police misconduct which were detailed in the previous chapter of this Study. Within each of the twelve sections of the survey instrument. the research questions assisted in identifying those variables for which measures needed to be developed, and also the kinds of relationships anticipated between complaints systems and the internal and environmental departmental factors under consideration. 89 Survey Sample As is well known, the vast majority of the 17,000 or so police departments in the United States are very small, so that a large proportion of US police officers are employed within a relatively snmll number of large departments. Traditionally, Internal Affairs Units (IAUs) which, not surprisingly, developed to be the major focus of this study, have only been utilized within deparmentswhichmehrgemmlghtoaccruemfficiundfizencomphmtsmpmvide investigativeworltforatleastoneiulltimeotficer. Ingeneralterrm,thishasrestrictedIAUsto departments employing in excess of 100 sworn officers. Given that larger departments are therefore more likely to possess formal citizen complaints procedures, a survey population was sought which would meet the criterion of comprising predominately this size of agency. Atanearly stageofthe study, the writerdiscoveredthatthePoliceExecutiveResearch Forum (PERF), an agency which has always been associated with efforts to promote innovation in policing and which. since 1981, has been specifically involved in matters relating to complaintsinvestigation,wereinterestedinhiswork. 'I‘hisresultedinacommitmentfromthe Executive DirectorofPERFthatthe Forum, generalmembership ofwhichislimiwdto college-educated leaders ofpolice departments with at least 200 members or which are the main police agencies for jurisdictions of at least 100,000 people, would assist with the study. Asaresultthesurvey sample forthisstudycomprisedthe 132currentUS member departments of PERF. (Although general membership of the Forum is limited by the above criteria, subscribing membership is not. Consequently, the survey sample included. a number of agencies which were considerably smaller in size than the minimum suggested by the above figures.) The majority of agencies in the sample were city or metropolitan departments, the remainder comprising cormty departments and a very small number of special police departments. No state police agencies were represented. The smallest local police department included had 19 full time sworn officers, although over 75% of sample agencies employed in excess of 100 and 50% in excess of 250 swom personnel Even though the survey sample represents less than 1% of the total number of police agencies in the USA, its constituent agencies employ over 118,000 90 officers, approximately 25% of the nation's police personnel. Surveys were mailed to the PERF members in June, 1987, with retums requested by July 13, 1987. Accompanying the survey was a memorandum from the Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum which briefly described the project, guaranteed the confidentiality of responses, and encouraged members to participate in the study. A follow-up memorandum was sent in late July, 1987 to those PERF members who had not yet retln'rred completed surveys. This memorandum reminded members that they had been sentthesurvey,informedthemthatmany oftheircolleagueshadalreadyresponded, and assured them that, although analysis was due to commence shortly, their completed surveys could still be used. By the end ofJuly when the follow-up memorandum Was sent out, in excess of 80 conrpleted srnveyshadbeenreceivedrepresentingaresponserate atthattimeofover60%. By September 1, 1987, the date after which surveys received could n0t be included in the analysis becausecodingofthedatahadcommenced. 101 completed smveyshadbeenreceived.resulting inafinalresponserateof75.8%. The analysis ofthe surveydataisbaseduponthese 101 returns. Intheevent,noresponses were lostsincenonewerereceivedafterthebeginningof September. The response rate was extremely encouraging, particularly since PHtF members are individualofficersratherthan police agencies,andconsequently, althoughasizeable proportion of general members are police chiefs, in many cases returmd completed surveys were largely dependent upon the goodwill and co-operation of non-member chiefs. Themrmberofsamplepoliceagencies mdthesurveyresponseratesby agencylevel, geographical region, and size of organization (full-time sworn personnel) is shown in Table 5.2. Therespomeratecanbeseentovaryby agency level, sizeandregion,butonlyrarely wasitless than 50%. Thedecisiontoinclude asmallnumberofspecialpolicedepanmentsinthe survey sample wasmkenbecausehwasbefiwedmmmeyndginadoptmappromreswprwessmg citizen complaints from those traditionally taken by city and county agencies, and might therefore 91 add qualitative if not quantitative depth to the analysis. Unfortunately, in the event the only special departrrrent to respond reported having no formal citizen complaint procedures, a result which did little to vindicate the original decision regarding their inclusion. With respect to geographical regions, detailed consideration of response rates from those regions with relatively small numbers of PERF members reveals little. However, of the other regionsitisinterestingtonotethattheEastNorthCentralstates (IL,lN,MI,OH,andWI) produced a response rate well below the average. Indeed, further examination of these states' responses reveal that the regional figure is depressed largely on accormt of the surprisingly low response rate of 33.3% from police agencies in Michigan. Previous surveys which have indicated their sponsor as being the School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. have reported response rates generally to be higher for regions more proximate to the source and lower formoredistantones. 'lhiswascertainlynotthecaseinthis Smdy,afactwhich allowsthe writertheluxury ofbeingabletorefute any allegations ofamid-westbias inhisresults! The response rate for larger agencies was somewhat higher than for smaller ones, indeed only 2 of the 42 largest agencies surveyed failed to retum the questionnaire. In part, this is probably due to the presence in the larger agencies of specific units responsible for investigating complaints against the police, staffed by individuals ideally qualified to answer a detailed questionnaire on complaints prmdures. Additionally, it may result from the differing degrees of importance and relevance which large and small agencies place upon a study of citizen complaint procedures. Whilstthedifferentialresponserates by agency size clearlyresultedinan over-representation of larger agencies in the returns, this was not considered to represent a major problenr, since the purpose of the study was not to assess the extent of the existence of formal police complaints procedures within the USA, but rather to assess their variability. Similarly, the agency level and region response rates were not identified as introducing systematic bias into the returns, although it was decided to consider the single agency level response of 'special' as constituting nrissing data timing the analysis phase of the study. 92 Table 5.2 - Description of Police Agency Survey Sample and Response Rates N in N of Response Characteristics sample responses rate (%) Agency Level City 109 83 76.1 County 20 17 85.0 Special 3 1 33.3 Geographical Region New England 5 2 40.0 Middle Atlantic 6 5 83.3 Solrth Atlantic 44 36 83.7 East North Central 21 11 52.3 East South Central 2 2 100 West North Central 15 12 80.0 West South Central 8 8 100 Mountain 10 8 80.0 Pacific 21 17 81.0 Agency Size (full-time sworn) 1000 or more 22 21 95.5 500—999 20 19 95.0 100499 57 42 73.7 Under 100 .33. .12 51.3 132 101 76.5 93 Survey Measures The research questions identified several characteristics of police agencies and their environmarts for which measures had to be developed. In part, these characteristics were derived from the literature review, but irl addition they were prompted by a consideration of possible Structln'al variations upon the seven-stage flmctional typology for complaints investigations which had been developed following the interview component of the study. The survey instrument, designed around the functional typology, was successively revised throughseveraldrafts andwas pie-tested witlrthelrelp ofanumberofexperienwdpolice officers who atthetimeweredirectly involvedintheactivities ofIntemalAffairs Units. In its final form, the survey instrument contained 12 sections, comprised 78 questions in all and was 13 pages long. The survey questions were particularly designed to collect a considerable amount of information concenring the existing variations in departmental procedlnes forinvestigatingcomplaintsagainstthemlice. Almostalloftlrequestiorrs wereintendedfor quantitative analysis andconsequently these measures incorporatedintheirdesign a multiple-choice objective response type of format. In order to ensure that all possible variations had been catered for however, numerous questions inclu®d an 'other' response category and invitedspecificahemativesnotcateredfornrthesmveyinsmnnenttobewritterrintothe completed questionnaire by respondents. The survey instrument is reproduced in full as Appendix I. ' For the bivariate analysis reported in this study, based upon the research questions, 29 prinraryvariables wereused. Sorneoftheseresultedfromasinglequestioninthesrnvey instrument, odrers were created by combining several survey measures. Although causal inferences were not implied, for ease of reference the set of variables was sub-divided into two groups containing 15 'independent' and 14 'dependent' variables. Five of the independent variables were descriptive of departmental and individual respondents, six were descriptive of agency finisdictions, and forn' were combined departmental andjmisdictional variables. Ofthe dependent variables, six were derived from departmental complaints statistics and the remainder were descriptive of those complaints procedures currently being utilized by respondent 94 departments. The29variablesarepresemedandbfieflydescfibedinnnninflrefouowing subsections of this chapter. A number of the variables were continuous and thus were in need of categorization for the bivariate stage of the analysis. Details of the ways in which these variables were categorized, and a discussion of the reasons why particular value levels were selected, are more appropriate for inchrsion in the section of this Study which presents the bivariate analysis results and consequaltly are omitted at this stage. 'Independent' (Environmental and General Agency) Variables Department Size - In the context of the questionnaire, the term 'complaint' was defined as only referring to complaints made by citizens regarding the conduct of swom officers. It was emphasized that it did not refer to disciplinary investigations initiawd by officers' supervisors, nor to complaints made by citizens regarding the conduct of civilian personnel employed by the department, nor to complaints made by citizens regarding departmental policies in generaL This being the case, the departmental size survey measure used in the analysis was full-time sworn personnel, rather than any combined measure of sworn and civilian positions. Department Level - level of agency was simply classified as being either city, county. or special. As discussed earlier, no state level agencies were included in the survey sample. A 'special' agency generally was a small police department performing specialized duties concerning matters of physical security of buildings. As mentioned previously, information from the only specialdepartmenttoretumaquestionnaire was utilizedintheunivariate,butnotinthe bivariate stage of the analysis. Rank of Respondent - Although one question in the survey asked for the name of the person completing the survey (in order to assist the researcher in contacting that individual at some funne date if necessary), this question was optimal. A previous question which sought the rank of the respondent was, however obligatory and was primarily intended for use in a bivariate examination of respondents' opinions concerning the frequently voiced arguments for and against 95 external civilian review of alleged police misconduct. Respondents were classified into seven types by rank for univariate analysis: civilian, line officer, sergeant, middle manager (Lieutenant), senior manager (Captain, Major, Inspector, etc.), Police Chief, and Director of Public Safety. Assignment of Respondent - The sanre question sought the respondent‘s assignment, again in order to assist in the bivariate analysis of the opinions testing. Responses were coded in such a way as to reflect the level of involvement of individual respondents in investigating complaints against the police. Farr alternative levels of involvement were identified: not involved, actively involved as an investigator, involved as a supervisor and administrator, and involved in the capacity of Police Grief or Director of Public Safety. Population of Jurisdiction - Respondents were asked to supply approximate figures fmbmhmeresidenfiflpoplflafimmddwesfinmeddayfinepomdafimofdwnsavicemas. Addifimaflymresizeofmeservicemeahrsquarenfileswasmqlwstedmorderwallowfortlre creetionofapopulationdensityvariableifrequired. Inflreeverrcdreresidentialpopulationwas the variableusedinthebivariate analysis. Geographical Region - Departrrrents were classified into one of the nine geographical regions of the United States according to the US Bureau of the Census Regions and Census Divisions 1980: New England (Cl‘, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT), Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA), South Atlantic (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV), East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), East South Central. (AL. KY, MS, TN), West North Central (IA, KA, MN, MO, NB, ND, SD), West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX), Mountain (AZ. CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT. WY), or Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA). 96 Percentage Unemployment - In addition to the information forthcoming from the questionnaire returns, flnther ecorronric and demographic data were gathered from the 1980 US census of population (Volume 1, Characteristics of the Population), and from the 1986 FBI UniformCrimeReports. hridurfifyirrgdleappmpfiatedatatocoflemdleesfimatedresidenfial populations provided by respondents proved invaluable as guides. Forcity agencies,thepopulation figmestatedinthequestionnaire was comparedwitlr both the 1986 UCR figure (which derives from the US Bureau of the Census) and the 1980 census figure. trulmmefigmeswereconsistouwidtmteasonablehmitstnonunanysetatpms or minus 10%)thenthe l980census economic anddernographicdataregardingthe population of thecity areawasused This generally proved tobethecase. If,howeverthe1980city poptfladmfigmeseamdmappmpfiate,mepoprnafionsmtedmdwquesfimnahewasfirst compared with the 1980 census urbanized area population figure (which was subsequently adopted on three or four occasions), and then with the 1980 census SMSA - Small Metropolitan SufisficalAma-popuhfimfigme(whichwasmedmcemmice)widuldfydwappmpfiam- police jurisdiction (1980 US census of population, Volume 1, Table 56). Forcounty agencies,identifyingeconomic anddemographiccharacteristics ofthe jurisdictions did not prove to be so easy or convenient for two major reasons. First, population figures for county agencies are not reported in the Uniform Crime Reports. Second, US census populationdataforcountyareasroutinely inchldetheentirepopulation ofthe county, corrrplete withcities, ratlrerthan pmelythennal population whichpredominatelycomprisesthepublic served by county Sheriffs' departments in the United States. In the majority of cases therefore, when population comparisons were made for county agencies the 1980 census county population was clearly an inappropriate measure to use in describing particular police jurisdictions. Consequently, for most county agencies, appropriate economic and demographic data proved impossible to collect. In a small number of states however, consolidated county police departments are responsible for providing a service to the entire residential population of the area, regardless of whether individuals live in urban or rural parts of the cormty. Four or five such departments 97 were included in the sample, and examination of the 1980 census population figures allowed thesejurisdictionsandtheir appropriateeconomic anddemographic censusdatatobeidentified and included in the analysis. Having identified the apopropriate police juridictions within the 1980 census data, the percentage unemployment variable was simply an indication of the percentage of the civilian labor force unemployed (1980 US census of population, Volume 1, Table 57). Percentage Poverty - Similar to the way in which the unemployment data were colbcted. inforrnationwasgatheredconcerningthe percentage offarnilies, livingin appropriate police jurisdictions, who were assessed to have income below the poverty level. The relevant meanagefigmwasusedasamasmeofmvmywidfinhflividufldepmmalfifisdicfim (1980 US census of population, Volume 1, Table 57). Medianlncome-lenediannwonewnhmapardculmpoficejmisdicdonwasmedas anindicatorofwealthwithinthecommunity. Sincethedatawerederivedfromthe1980census, theyreflected 1979 medianincomes (1980 US census of population, Volume 1,Table 57). Population/Officer Ratio - A simple calculation involving dividing the appropriate esfimamdfifisdicfimflmmflafimsmdicawdmmemeyrespmsesbydwnumberofmn-fim sworn personnel employed within the relevant police agencies gave rise to this particular variable. Percentage of Minority Officer's - One question in the survey provided a racial profile of departmental sworn personnel by seeking percentages of white, black, hisparric and other officers employed in respondent departments. The 'percentage of minority officers' variable was derived by simple addition of the individual minority percentages. 98 Racial Diversity of Population - Similar percentages for the civilian populations of the police jurisdictions were collected from the 1980 US census ofthe population (Volume 1, Table 59). Similar to above, the racial diversity of the population nreasure was developed by simply adding together the individual minority percentages. Departmental Racial Integration - A measure of the racial integration of a particular departmentwascreatedby nrarripulatingtheabovetwovariables andthendividingthepercerrtage of white officers employed by the departrnart by the percentage of white residents in the jurisdiction. Afigureofgreaterthan 1 fortlrisratiothusindicatesthatnrinority officersare proportionately under-represented within departmental sworn personnel, whilst a figure of less than one correspondingly indicates that minorities are over-represented Crime Rate per 100,000 Population - This nreasure was computed utilizing the raw 1986 UCR figure excluding arson because, despite arson having been included in the list of index crimes since 1979, a considerable degree of inconsistency of reporting still exists. In reality, for the purposes of this Study since arson, when reported, invariably represented only a nfinlnepmporfimoftadofiensesjmexcmsimfiomdncfinnfigmeafiecwdflwcflculmw crime rate very little, if at all. For city agencies therefore. the crime rate was computed by dividingthe raw 1986 UCR figurebytheappropriate1986populationfigurealsopreeentedintheUniformCrirneReports. For the county agencies, since no population figures were provided in the UCR data, apart from in those few jurisdictions for which 1980 census population figures were available, the crime rate variable could not be calculated. Percentage of Violent Crime - The percentage of violent crinre reported in all jlnisdictions, whether city or county, was obtained by aggregating the number of reported murders and non-negligent manslaughters, forcible rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults in the 1986 UCRs, and then representing this combined figure as a proportion of the total number 99 of index offenses (including burglaries, larceny-thefts, and motor vehicle thefts) reported The violent crime percentage variable could not be calculated for any of the police departrrrents in one particularstateduetoadiscrepancyinthemarmerinwhichrapeswerereportedtotheFBIbythat state's agencies. 'Dependent' (Complaints Statistics and System) Variables Number of Complaints - One question in the survey instrument asked respondents to indicate approximately how many complaints, defined in the sarrre restricted temrs as above, were filedbyciviliansagainstswommembers ofthedepartrnentperyear. Itwasrequestedthatthe estimatedfigurebecalculatedby averagingoutthenumberofciviliancomplaints fileddurirrg each of the last five years. Whilst a number ofdepartmerrts failed to provide estimates either because they were prevented from doing so by state law or simply because such data was not systematically collected. information was provided by sufiicient respondents (89, representing 88% of returns) to ensure that analysis of the figures was worthwhile. Complaints Ratio - The number of sworn full-time personnel employed by a particular department was dividedby theestimatednumber ofcitizencomplaints fibd againsttheofficers per year to provide a measure of the relative frequency of complaints. Calculated in this way, the complaints ratio thus gives an indication of, on average, how many officers are required to generate acitizencomplaint. Aratio greaterthanoneindicatesthatmcre officers areemployedby the department than the average number of complaints filed per year. The higher the ratio therefore, the relatively scarcer complaints are. Percentage of Complaints Alleging Criminal Activity - A further survey question askedforcomplaintsfiledtobesub—classifiedintorhreetypesby percentagesuchthatthetoml added up to 100%. Whilst it was appreciated that many agencies would not necessarily have statistics iii a readily available'format to answer this question easily, it was particularly encouraging to see the efforts made by a large number of agencies to provide useful data. 100 An allegationoftlrecomnrission ofacrinrinaloffense by anofficerwasregardedasrepresenting memostserioustypeofcitizmcomplaint Percentage of Complaints Alleging Excess Force, Incivility, or Harassment ~This was acategoryofcomplaintintendedtocapnnethosecomplaints generallyregardedtobe lessserious thanthose allegingcriminalactions,yet serious enoughtobringcorrsiderable discredit and adverse publicity upon police departments. Percentage of Other Complaints - This category included the remainder of the complaints, comprising those less serious and generally procedure-related allegations of misconduct by officers. Total Percentage of Complaints Sustained - Within each of the three categories of complairrcrespondenm were askedto indicatethepercentage findings accordingtofive major classifications: sustained. not sustained, unfounded, exonerated and policy review/policy failure. Whilstthisinformationwasofparticularimerestforthemrivariate phaseoftlre analysis,forthe bivariate phase a new variable was created which gave an overall indication of the percentage of all complaints sustained. Despite problems caused by missing data, it was Still possible to calculate values for this variable for 60 of the survey respondents. ‘ Existence of a Formal External Review Mechanism - The existence within depmunaudwmphhnsMesoffomNexmrmlmviewnechmismsmaddidmwmwmal investigations was assessed in Section B of the survey instrument. For the purposes of univariate analysis, respondents were asbd to indicate the type of responsibilities held by external review bodies, if they existed. In the bivariate phase however, this variable was reduced into a dichotomous form which simply reflected either the presence or absence of sonre type of formal external review of alleged police misconduct in departmental complaints procedures. 101 Existence of an Internal Affairs Unit - Responses to one particular question in the survey, taken together with the remainder of the completed questionnaire, allowed individual departments to be classified according to whether or not they possessed an Internal Affairs or comparable unit responsible for investigating citizen complaints. Although numerous different names were found to be used by departments to describe their complains investigation units, by far the nrost popular was 'Intemal Affairs‘. For the sake of clarity and consistency therefore, the termInternalAffairs Unit(IAU)wiHbeusedthroughouttheremainderofflrisstudytodescribe departmental citizen complaints unis. According to this scheme, the IAU variable was therefore dichotomous. Typical Rank of Internal Affairs Investigator - Respondents were requested to indicate the staffing of their departmental unit responsible for investigating complains against the police by numbers, rank and position both for sworn and for civilian persormel. From this information, it was possible to identify the rank of a typical IA investigator: line officer, middle manager (Lieutenant), senior manager (Captain, Major, Inspector, etc.), or special rank. For the bivariate analysis, the 'special rank' response was included together with the 'line officer” response, since the two were equivalent in all but name. Openness to Accept Complaints - This was a global variable, created by combining responsestoanumberofitensinthesmvey instrument. Becauseoftheindividualmeasures which it incorporated, is calculation was necessmily complex, and therefore the scheme by which it was created is included in Appendix II. In its final form, this variable had a possible range of values from 1 to 10, but in the event is actual value range was only from 3 to 10. According to their scores within this range, departments were classified as being either reticent, average, or welcoming towards citizens wishing to make complaints. 102 Proportion of Complaints Fully Investigated - The complaints typology to be discussed in the next chapter identifies three distinct ways in which a complaint may be handled onceithasbeenfiled. FirsLitmaybefullyandformally va.W¢umym resolved informally without recourse to a full investigation, and third, for various reasons it may notbeproceededwithatall Twoquestionsonthesurvey instrumentwereconcemedwithtlrese altemativestoafullinvestigation, andtheresponses whichthey broughtwereusedtocreatea combined variable intended to provide an indication of the proportion of complaints fully and formally investigated. Thus, departmens which utilized neither alternative means of handling complaints were classified as fully investigating the largest proportion, those which utilized one means bllt not the other were classified as fully investigating an average proportion, and those which used both alternative means were classified as fully investigating the smallest proportion. According to this schenre therefore, a department with no official policy for utilizing informal resolutions,butwhichusedguidelines accordingtowhichcertaintypes ofcomplains (for example fiivolous or repetitive complaints) Md not be proceeded with, would be coded as falling within the 'average' category. Time Limit on Investigations - Whilst a sizeable proportion of respmdents indicated that there were no time limis in force concenring complaints investigations, many others indicated that there were. For univariate analysis, those responses which indicated the existence of time limits were coded into seven categories: 10 days or less, two weeks, 30 days, 40 days, 60 days, three months, or 120 days. For the bivariate analysis, the time limit variable was condensed intodichotomous form, simplyreflectingthe presence orabsenceofatinre limitin departmental complains procedures. Information provided to Complainants - One question towards the end of the survey instrument was concerned with the amount of information which departments routinely provide for complainants. Five items were identified as representing types of information which a complainant might consider to be both relevant and useful: written acknowledgement of the 103 complaint, an approximate conclusion date of the investigation, the finding of the case, the disposition and disciplinary action taken against the subject officer (when appropriate), and the procedureforappealifnotsatisfied witlrtlreoutcorne. No attempt was madetoranktheseitems in order of importance however, and the combined variable was created by simply summing the number of affirrnative responses provmd to the five parts ofthe question, such that its value ranged from 0 (zero) to 5. According to their scores within this range, departments were either categorized as being 'incomtnlmicative', 'average', or “very informative' with regard to their dealings with complainants. Openness to Provide Public Information - Another combined variable, intended to provide an indication of the openness of departmental citizen complaint procedures, was concerned with the public dissemination of information. It was created by combining the responses totwo questions inthe survey. The firstquestionaskedwhetherthedeparmrent systematically made effors to make the general public aware of the complaint process. The term 'systematic' was intended to imply rather more than simply notifying complainants of the procedures atthetimetlrey filedtheircomplairrs,andresponseswerecodedaccordingly. The second question asked whether statistics regarding complaints investigations were published Again, this question was intended to refer to departmental initiatives, and consequently returns which indicated that statistics were available 'upon request but were not routinely made public were coded as negative responses. In the combirwd measure, those departments which disseminated both types of information to the public were classified as 'open', those which disseminawd only one type were classified as 'average', and those which did not publicize their complaints processes in either way were classified as 'closed'. 104 Survey Analysis Analysis ofthe101 responses to the survey insuurnent was undertaken and is presented in three phases: univariate, bivariate and multivariate. In the first phase, univariate descriptive statistics are employed in the context ofthe twelve sections ofthe survey instrument and the sevenstages ofthecomplainstypology in orderto allowanassessmentto be madeofthe variety of systems for investigating complaints against the police presently operating throughout the USA. Where appropriate, for each survey measure frequency distributions and percentages, together with mean and median values, standard deviations and response ranges are presented. Atappropriate poins,sumnmrystadsncsareasopresarsdformoseeiglnvanablesmbeufifized mmebivafiasmalysiswhosevalueshadwbecalcuhtedmdwaenmdwmfomdimcdy available from the survey responses. Because of the large amount of data forthcoming from the questionnaire renn'nS, presentation of the univariate analysis represens a large proportion of the discussion of the results. mcomparisommesecmdandmudphasesofflnanalysis,cmwmnedwimmva multivariate relationships, are less exhaustive, detailed and ambitious. Nevertheless, a full range of bivariate relationships are explored. The majority of the variables involved in the bivariate analysis constitute either ordinal or interval level measures. Consequently, the zero-order relationships are primarily exanrined with the nonparametric Chi-square statistic, utilized to identify the existence of statistically significant relationships between data sorted into several cells, and Gamma. a measure which ranges between -1 and +1 and which provides an indication of the direction and strength of any bivariate relationship found to exist between continuous ordinal variables which have, for the sake of analysis, been sub-divided arbitrarily into categories. Several nrultivariate analyses are also performed. This phase ofthe research isdecidedly exploratory in name Since, to the writer's knowledge nothing Similar has ever been attempted before in the field of investigation of complains against the police. Nevertheless, it was performedinordertoexploretherelativeimportance ofdifferentfactorsinthedeveloprnent of complains systems and to test the exploratory power of ses of variables. 105 Summary This study is intended to represent a relatively large scale assessment of current systems and procedures for the investigation of complains against the police both in the United States of AmericaandinEnglandandWales. Theresearchisbuiltarormdanumberofflmdamental research questions and is driven by the concept of a functional typology for complains investigation. Data collection for the study conrprised three distinct componens: a literature review, a number of interviews with police and other agencies involved in complains investigation in North Anrerica, and a mail sruvey which was sent to the 132 US general nrember departmens of the Police Executive Research Forum. MWmviewproducedagreatdealofbackgromldmfonmfimcmcemmgdn historicaldevelopmens inthe areaofcomplains againsttlre police orrbothsides ofthe Atlantic. It also included a detailed presentation of the current system operating in England and Wales under the supervision of the Police Complains Authority. The interview sample comprising eight police departments or departments of public safety and three formally constituted extemal civilian agencies with responsibilities for investigating complains againsttlre police was selecsd mainly soastoberepresentative ofawidevariety of complains systems. Building upon the literature review component, the interviews were used to clarifyissuesarrdtorefinethemailsruvey instrument,butmoreimportantthey formedthebasis of the development and design of a seven stage flnlctional typology for complaints investigation whichistobepresentedintlrenextchapter. A It was this typology which was at the heart of the twelve section survey instrument, with additional data being collecsd concerning opinions. complains statistics, and certain social and demographic factors of the jurisdictions of respondent police departmens. The survey sample included predominately larger police departmens, 75% of the agencies Slnveyed employing in excess of 100 full-time sworn personnel. An overall response rate of 75.8% was achieved with the survey, a figlne which in itself emphasizes the genuine comnritrrrent to police-related research shared by general members of the Police Executive Research Forum. Response rates by agency 106 level, Size and geographical region were rarely less than 50%. Although the 101 respondent departmens constitute less than 1% of all police agencies in the USA, they employ almost 23% of US police personnel. and provide police service to almost 43 million citizens, afigurewhich represens almost20% ofthe total populationoftheUnited States. Guided by the research questions, twenty nine variables were drawn from the survey data. Twenty one of these were available directly from either the survey responses, the US census data for 1980, or the FBI Uniform Crime Repors for 1986. Of the other eight variables, half were creasd by simple computer calculations and the remainder were composite measures developed from the responses to several questions in the survey instrument. Analysis of the survey data was perforrrred using univariate, bivariate and multivariate statisticalteclmiques. Whilstthelmivariatephase constitutedmostofthedataanalysis,the bivafiasmdnmlfivafiasneammswaecmsidaedvnflfeannesofmesmdyshwethey representedthernostindepth attempttoexploretherelativeirnportanceofanurnberofdifferent factors in the development of police complaints procedures ever undertaken. CHAPTER VI COMPLAINTS TYPOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN Introduction Dming the last twenty years, changes in the procedures for investigating complaints againmmepolbemEnglmddeabshaveappeuedtosimfiydnwmmalmdfiwvnabk introduction of a fully independent system, in which the responsibility for complaints investigation will be removed entirely from the police. Whilst such a system has not yet arrived, many peoplebelievethatitisonly amatteroftimebeforeitdoes. 'IhefragmentedcriminaljusticesystemintheUSA,togetherwithitsvastnumberofpolice agencies, many of which are extremely small, makes direct comparison with the system in England and Wales difficult. Nevertheless, from a British police officer's perspective a study to determine whether the advances made towards independence of the police complaints prowdtn'e in England and Wales have been mirrored on this side ofthe Atlantic promised to‘be ofvalue. At the outset, the intention was to visit numerous police departments in North America - including at least one in Canada - in order that an understanding ofthe various systems for investigating complaints against the police presently being operated could be developed. Through undertaking these visits, it was h0ped that a functional typology for complaints investigation, which would provide a generalized framework against which structurally differing complaints procedures could systematically be compared. could be developed. The typology would then form the basis for the remainder of this study. A Eleven site visits were carried out during late 1986 and early 1987. Information obtained from these visits, taken together with the supplementary information gained from the literature 107 108 reviewled,ashadbeenhoped,tothedevelopmentoftheftmctionaltypology. Theintentionin thischapterthereforeistodescribethedevelopmentofthattypologythroughthepresentationof sorneoftheinformationobtainedfmmseveral specific sitevisits. Sinceanumberofaspects of thesystermoperatinginmanyofthesiteswerefoundtobeverysimilar,ramerthanmerely reportingtheresults ofeveryvisit,asmallnumberofunique procedures which were discovered diningfiveofthevisitsareselectivelypresentedandcontrastedwithonesystemwhichadoptsa rathermoretraditionalapproachtocomplaintsinvestigation. The locations of the eleven on-site interviews were previously identified in Table 5.1. In thischapter,thesixsite visitstobediscussedindetailarelansing (Michigan), San Francisco (California), Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania), Washington D. C., Cleveland (Ohio), and Toronto (Ontario). Each of the last five sites enjoy systems which are uniquein at least some respects, anddresearednfeaunesofmeirpmcedunswhichwfllbedesmibedmmostdaail Eachvisitin itsownparficularwayhelpedtomorecleaflydefinemefuncfionaltypologymndonaccountof thismemrviewsitesamdiscussedduonologicaHyindnorderinwlnchmeywerevisited. Whflstmdhectmferencesuemadecmmhrgflremfhlemeofflwrecmflymuodmed mwcomplaianmcedmeshEnglmflandWales(desaibedindaaflm(mapmrm)mme typology, indirectly they played a major role in its development In particular, the need to include Informal Resolution and the two-branch 'Investigation' stage, the latter to allow for differing ueaunartsofnfinorandseriomaflegafims,wererecogrfizedfiomfltemrtset. Lansing's Internal Affairs Office ThecityofLansing,Michigan.haswhatcouldbedescribedasafairly typicalsystemfor investigating complaints against the police in a mid-size US police department. It is a city with a residential population of 130,000 and a police department stafied by almost 250 sworn personnel and 100 civilians. On average, approximately 150 citizen complaints concerning officers' behaviorarefiledeachyear. Any employeeofthedepartrnentis authorizedtoreceiveandrecord citizen complaints, but whenever possible complainants are mm to either a sworn police supervisor or to Internal Affairs (IA). Complaints are sub-divided into two categories: official 109 and unofficial. The responsibility for wding into which category a particular complaint falls is that of the recording officer. Unofficial complaints are normally anonymous complaints which do not allege a crime and which appear at the outset either to be invalid or impossible to follow up due to lack of specific information. All other complaints are recorded as official Official complaints may eitherbe resolved tothe satisfaction ofcomplainants atthetime they are made or fully investigated. Informally resolved official complaints are recorded on a complaint form, together with the method used to resolve them, and are then forwarded to IA for filing; official complaints not suitable for informal resolution are recorded on a complaint form and forwarded to IA for allocation. Investigations are allocawd by Internal Affairs generally in accordance with a three-tiered structure. In short. the most serious cases, namely those involving allegations of criminal offenses, will be investigamd both by a supervisory officer from the detective bureau and by an Internal Affairs (IA) muncriminalinvestigation beingkept separate anddistinctfi'omthe administrative investigation. Other serious or potentially complicated and time-consuming cases which nevertheless do not involve the commission of crimes, are investigated by IA alone, whilst minor complaints are investigated exclusively by subject officers' immediate supervisors. Recommendations forcasefindings areinitiallymadebytheinvestigators and arethen subjectto review by IA prior to ultimate confirmation by the Deputy Chief. In cases in which complaints have been found to be sustained, case papers are forwamd to subject officers' chains of command for recommendations for appropriate disciplinary sanctions to be made. Responsibility for final selection of disciplinary sanctions rests with the Deputy Chief. Following the case outcome,ifnotsatisfiedwiththeresult.thesubjectofficerhasarightofappealtothePolice Chief. ‘I'hemostsrriitingfeatureoflansing's system,andtheonewhichperhapsismosttypical of the system in many other US police departments of similar size, is the powerful central role of thelntemalAfl’airsOfficeincomplaintsinvestigation. TheIAOfficeinLansingisstaffedbytwo sergeants. Whilsmotallcomplaintsaredirectly investigatedbyIAstaff,theOfficehasa supervisory responsibility for ensuring that all cases are thoroughly and impartially investigated. 1 10 In this role, they report direct to the Police Chief. All complaints are registered in IA prior to allocation for investigation, and those minor cases which are referred back to subject officers' immediate supervisor's for investigation, and which in reality constitute the majority of complaints, are subject to review by IA staff prior to being forwarded for consideration by senior management. 'IheIAsergeantsareempoweredtoretmnacasefiletoasupervisoriftheyarenot satisfied with the way in which the investigation has been carried out, or alternatively to direct the investigator to carry out certain other steps. Their supervisory role, however, is limited to consideration of investigations and their findings. Disciplinary recommendations are the preserve of subject officers' supervisory chains of command. Another aspect ofIansing's Internal Affairs Office which is characteristic ofIA generally throughout the United States is the relatively closed nature of their operation. Whilst the City Govemment has a Human Relations Department to which complaints carceming alleged malneaunernofrninoritiesarrdfemalescanbemfenedthe overwhelmingmajority ofcomplains against the police are handled exclusively internally by the police department. At the conclusion ofaninvestigationthecomplainantisnotimdofthefindinginthecasednotherwords whether or not the complaint was proven, but personnel records legislation prevents public disclosrn'e of any disciplinary action taken. The police department uses no systematic method to make the citizens of Lansing aware of its citizen complaint procedures, neither does it disseminate any statistics relating to complaints investigation to the public. Perhaps partly in consequence of this, most complainants initially know very little about the system and need to have it fully explained to them. Nevertheless, Lansing’s closed system of operation has not resulted in any documented instances of complainant dissatisfaction with the results of investigations, arguably indicating that thereisnoevidencetosuggestalackofcitizenconfidenceinthesystem Typology Implications As far as development of the complaints typology was concerned, Lansing's system, representingasitdoesafairlytypicalsetoflntemalAffairs operatingprocedures, was of assistance in the early stages of typology design. Particularly useful was the early inclusion in 11 1 the typology of a recording and classification stage which was capable of classifying citizen complaints into three types: those which were not proceeded with, those which were informally resolved, and those which were formally investigated. Additionally, it became clear that it was important for complaints involving allegations of criminal behavior to be considered separately in the typology fi'om other alleged procedural violations, since. the likelihood was that most police departments would investigate the two types of complaints differently. San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) The concept of civilian review of police misconduct was frequently discussed in San Francisco dining the late 1970s and early 1980s, mainly due to the fact that the police department's own Internal Affairs Office very rarely found fault with accused officers, even when there was widespread belief of officers' guilt. In addition, two particular incidents which occurred in late 1978, neither of which were initially directly associated with the police, sent shock waves throughout the entire city and caused a lengthy period of close examination of San Francisco's political structm'e. First, news of the mass suicide of more than 700 members of Rev. Jim Jones' Peoples Temple in Jonestown, Guyana, on 18 November devastated the city since Jones' religious cult had originatedintheSanFranciscoarea, andthevastmajority ofthosetodiewereSanFranciscans. Second, just over one week later, on 27 November, the Mayor of San Francisco, George Moscone, who was a champion of minority rights groups, and district supervisor Harvey Milk, the first avowed gay elected political official in the United States, were both fatally shot by former supervisor Dan White. Although the two events affected the city in different ways, initial shocked reaction to both was generally peaceful. Several months later, however, on 21 May, 1979, following the conviction of White on two counts of second degree manslaughter, rather than murder, the large San Franciscan gay comrmmity was outraged. Thousands of people marched on City Hall, their protest turned to violence, and considerable damage was caused to the building. A few hours later, the police, who had been hopelessly caught in the middle of the whole affair, retaliated in the Castro district 112 ofthecity. Oneoftheresultsoftheensuingviolencewasthatthesubjectofextemalreview of police behavior once more came tothe forefront of public debate. Problem for the police department culminated in 1981 when, following the success of the San Francisco 49ers in the Superbowl, two million people swamped the streets of San Francisco to celebrate. The celebrations eventually turned to riots in some sectors of the city, and the publicity giventotheriotinglefttheSanFranciscocomnnmityinnodoubtthattheirpolice department had not been entirely blameless. Despite this, however, the subsequent Internal Affairs investigation of the police department's handling of the riots found not one single complaintagainstofficersmgardinghrjunescmrsedmcifizmswbesustained Pmssandmdiamportsofdresefindhrgsanddreresulmmwbficdisquietabmtme situation led to a proposal for acivilian Office of Citizen Complaint (OCC), to be responsible for investigating citizen complaints against the police, being put to the ballot in November, 1982 in a referendum of the San Francisco electorate. The proposal was passed by 61% of the voters, resulting-in the creation of the OCC and the commencement of its operations in August, 1983. Thefeaturewhich,atthetirne,madetheSanFranciscoOCleiqueandwhichsetitapart fromallpreviousattemptsatcivilianreviewintheUnitedStateswasthatitwasestablishedin place ofthepolicedeparmient'slntemalAffairsratherdlaninadditiontoit. Inaugurationofthe new Office of Citizen Complaints coincided with the abolishion of Intemal Affairs, which was replaced by a Management Control Department. This department, however, has no jurisdiction regarding citizen complaints and is concerned solely with internal discipl'mary matters, invariably initiated by supervisors within the police department. The staff of the OCC comprises a Director, an Executive Officer, a Statistical Analyst and six line investigators. The Director is of equal status to the Police. Chief, borh individuals being answerable to a five-member City Police Conunission, whose officers are appointed by the mayor. The emphasis during stafl’ recruitment is upon hiring individuals with proven academic qualitiesratherthanuponrecmitingpeoplemerelybecausetheyareirrterestedintlreconceptof civilian oversight of police activities. All staff are full-time salaried officers of the OCC. The present Director, a Harvard MPA graduate, was a career military man for twenty years, 113 complednghisserviceascmmmndhrggureralofmeCafifomiaNadmalGumd;fine investigators typically have either Law degrees or PhDs. None of the staff have previous experienceinlawenforcement. Oneofthemostfiequardyvoicedopposifionstoflrecreafionofextemalreviewboardsof police misconduct is based upon the argument of cost-effectiveness. Given existing internal reviewmechanisms,itispresumedtobermrchmorecostlytoreplacethemwithnewagencies than simply to allow them to continue to function, albeit possibly ineffectively and inefficiently. Inthis contextitis interesting to note that, even with full-time salaried staff,the San Francisco OCCpresentlyoperatesinrealwrrmmonlyGO%ofthebudgetwhichwaspreviously earmmdforlntemalAffairswithinthepolicedepmnt. WhilstitisstillinitsearlystagesofdevelopmenmheOCChasalreadyestablisheda posifivemediahnageandagoodreptnadonwhhintheSananciscocomnnmhy. TheDirector ofthe Office, inthe same way as police chiefs have traditionally done, places great emphasis on thepmfessionalismofhisstaff,theirpersonalqualifiesandabiiifies. The hiringofaStatistical Analystlerrdsfurthersupporttothisirnage. Thedataandinformationwhichheprocessesis madeavaihblewdnsemmmamgmofdrepohcedepamwnwassistmemmamgeof personnelmatters. Althoughthe San Francisco Police Officers' Association is opposedtothe OCCinevery way,theDhectmofdreOCCiscmvinceddrattheOffice'sfair,irnpardalandaboveall professional approach to complaints investigation will win them over eventually. The San chiscoMethodorSFMasthestaffoftheOfficeliketocallit,forcomplaintsinvestigation hasapositive objectivewhichdiffersfi'ommostoftheusuallntemalAffairs investigations. As such,it is based not solely on apunishment pattern, but rather on a management information function which seeks, through careful gathering of information on complaints by sornee, mcidentwamhofficerandmnwdetunumumdsandpanmrsamnbommmdividual officersandintmitsofthedepartment. Insimpleterms,theDirectoroftheOCCexplainsthatthe SFM does not seek ways to hang officers more effectively, rather it seeks ways to improve their behavior. 1 14 OneofthemanyhmovafimswhichdreOCChasmuodtwedmassisthsmanagement information function is the application of case screening to all complaints which are filed Once a complaint has been fully recorded on the appropriate forms, certain circunmances sru'rounding the making of the complaint are transferred to the Investigation Solvability Analysis Control and Evahration Street. Aspects of the case such as the timeliness of maln'ng the complaint, the availability ofwitnesses,thecredibility offlrecomplainanctlreexisterrceofdocumentationto support any claimed injuries, the interest the complainant showed in pursuing the complaint further, whether the complainant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident, and the overall seriousness of the complaint are addressed on the form. Responses to each of these questions are made on a numerical scale, certain questions scoring negative points, others scoring positive points. Following completion of the form, the points are totalled and this total is compared with a predetennined cut-off score. This process is termed a directed investigation. If thedirecwdinvestigationindicatesthatthere is sufficientevidencetoproceed, irrotherwords if thepointstotalexceedsthecut-offscore,thenthecasewillbeassignedtoanOCCinvestigator for a detailed investigation. If the points total is insufficient to warrant a detaibd investigation, thenthe caseis closed with nofurtheraction and acopy ofthe complaintformisforwardedtOthe subject officer's commanding officer for information purposes only. As is the case with many case screening systems, the cut-off score is not always a definitive test of whether or not a particular case merits full investigation. Certain complaints which scorelessthanthecut-offscoreonthescreening maystillbeassignedfordetaibd investigationatthediscretionofthe Directorofthe OCCifheconsiders tlrattheparticular circumstances smrormdingthecomplaintindicate tlratsuch acourse ofaction wouldbe appropriate- Following the filing of complaints with the OCC, a letter is sent to every complainant. whedrerdreircomplaintislikelytobeonewhichwinbescreenedomornot. Init,theDirector explains the problems involved in undertaking an investigation in which the investigator must assumethatwhatthecomplainanthas saidis true, andthatwhattheaccused officerwillsay when interviewed will also be true. The letter concludes with a paragraph specifically addressed 1 15 tothecomplainantwhosecomplaintwill ultimatelybe screenedout: "Ifitturns ou'tthatwelackevidencetoprocwdwithafurtherandmore detailed investigation of your case...all is not lost. We will record the information of your complaint on a permanent record maintained by the department. If the officer continues the action you have complained of and if patterns of improper behavior are noted in his or her activity, corrective action will be taken by the San Francisco Police Department." (OCC Letter to Complainants, 1985). In practice, following the application of case screening, detailed investigations are carried out in only about 15% of complaints. This fact has giver rise to criticism of the OCC by the San Francisco Bar Association, who have argued that since, in their opinion, there is a lack of follow-up and serious investigation of anything but the most flagrant incidents to which there are eyewitnesses, citizens are beginning to realize that very little happens when they file a complaint. TheDirectoroftheOCCdisagreeswiththisviewpoint. Hearguesthatthestatisticalanalysis which is undertaken with respect to directed investigation reports is invaluable. Information obtairwd from this analysis allows the OCC to identify to both the police departrrrent and to the Police Commission those officers with complaint patterns which merit immediate official attention, those officers responsible for more than an average share of complaints, and also those exemplary officers with a high number of recorded citizen contacts but a low number of complaints. Indeed, the results of a study canied out during 1986 by the OCC Statistical Analyst contradicted the commonly held belief that the most active officers can be expected to incur the most complaints. Surprisingly, it was discovered that, in general, the busiest officers had the fewest complaints. Furthermore, 53% of officers were found to have no complaints alleged against tlrenr, whilst 4% (88 officers out of a police department of almost 2,000 sworn) were identified as being responsible for one third of the complaints. Despite advances made in recent years towards greater individual accormtability, problems of police malpractice in San Francisco have not abated. The San Francisco Police Department Still receives more citizen complaints than any other department in California. In 1984, for example, whilst 2,300 citizen complaints were fibd in San Francisco (approximately one per officer on average), only 700 were filed in Los Angeles, even though the Los Angeles Police Department is 116 morethanthreetimesaslarge. A secondary mission of the OCC is therefore to recommend policy changes to the Police Chief and the Police Commission that will reduce the incidence of complaints. To this end. one of the alternative case findings which they have at their disposal is termed 'policy failure'. A 'policy failure’ findinginacasemreanstlrattheevidenceprovesthattheofficer'sactionswerejustifiedby departrnentalpolicy orprowdmes,brudrat,inlightofdns,theOCCrecommendsachangeinthe relevant policy, procedure or regulation. Under direction from the Police Commission, the OCC compiles and publishes monthly summaries and quarterly reports of complaints statistics, in addition to preparing and publishing quarterly recommendations concerning policies and practices of the police department. Furthermore, it produces an extremely well-designed and informative quarterly public newsletter, "The Professional", which is freely distributed both throughout the City and to any individual or agency whowishestobeplawdontheOCCmailinglist. Operatinginaclosedenvironmentisnot somrething of which the San Francisco OCC could justly be accused. Typology Implications The contrast between the San Francisco Method (SFM) for investigating complaints againsttlrepolice andtheproceduresutilizedinthemajority ofmajorUScitiesis startlingin manyrespects,nonemoresothandrefactdrataflcifizarcomplaintsaminvesngatedbycivflians employed by an agency operating externally from the police department. Allegations of criminal activity, however, are naturally still the preserve of police investigators, a feature of the San Francisco system which underlines the importance for typology developmrent of a structure in which citizen complaints alleging crimes can be considered separately from those alleging procedural irregularities. Several other aspects of the San Francisco site visit were relevant considerations for the typology design. First, the use of case screening highlighted the question of whether all complaints should be deemred worthy of detailed and formal investigations. Second, the 'policy review’ category was considered an important alternative case finding in a complaint 1 17 investigation, since it encompasses an admission ofthe possibility ofgeneral departmental failure in contrast with the traditional approach of always seeking to find fault with individual officers' actions. Third, sincetheOCCcanfindacasetobe sustainedbuthasnojurisdiction concenring disciplinary sanctions, the importance of including two separate typology stages for findings and dispositions of cases was emphasized. Finally, the positive media and public image of the OCC, achieved through its reports, newsletter, and its heavy reliance upon the collection, analysis and publication of statistics, indicated the need for a final stage to be included in the typology concerning the dissemination of information to the public. Such information may either concern case outcomes and dispositions or may simply indicate how a complaint may be filed and what constitutes inappropriate action by a police officer, but the potential value of opemress in police complaints procedures was seen to be of relevance to typology development. Pittsburgh's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) OneofdreresultsofamajorreorganizationoftheDeparmremofPublic Safetyin Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which took place during 1986, was the trarrsferral of the responsibility forenslmingthatcitizencomplaints againstthepoliceareinvestigatedfi'omthe Bureau of Police to a newly created Office of Professional Responsrbility (OPR). The Pittsburgh OPR operates from within the Departmrent of Public Safety, but is external to the Bureau of Police. It has Department wide jurisdiction and is responsible for conducting investigations into matters relating to employees in the Department of Public Safety, and also for reviewing all disciplinary action taken against Public Safety employees. The senior executive officer of the OPR, who is a civilian lawyer despite holding the rank of Assistant Chief, is responsible to the DeputyDirectorandultimatelytheDirectorofPublic Safety,inthesamewayasistheChiefof Police. The sevenmemberinvestigative staffoftheOPR constitute oneparticulariy interesting feature of its operation, since three of them are sworn police officers seconded to the CPR from the Bureau ofPoliceandtheotherfourarecivilians. Because ofthe relativeinfancy ofthe Office, the police investigators presently on the staff were all previously members of the Internal 1 18 Affairs Office of the Bureau of Police, which was discontinued following the 1986 reorganization. Four major types of police cases, all of which may originate from different sources, are handbd by the OPR: citizen corrrplaints investigated by the OPR, citizen complaints investigated by the Bureau of Police and reviewed by the OPR, Bureau complaints initiated by swom officers which are reviewed and, if necessary, investigated by the OPR, and special investigations which are generally initiated by the OPR. Of these categories of cases, citizen complaints investigated by the OPR constitute more than half of the Office's police related workload. Approximately 75% of all citizen complaints against Bureau of Police personnel are investigated by the OPR, including all comrplaints alleging physical abuse or undue force. Additionally, allegations of wrongful detention and verbal abuse will be investigawd by the OPR ifdwcuwmstmcesmggwtmaomammmasbeymdmehnmediawfacmdacasemaybeof concern. When'a case is assignedto an OPR investigator, either policeorcivilian, the final reportwillnomnallybeduewithintwerrty days. AlthoughnoequivalentoftheSanFrancisco Office of Citizen Complaints' case screening system is utilized by the Pittsburgh OPR, assigned casesamgivenanummicalpfiofityvahwbasedupmbflimpoflmceandhvesdgafive difficulty. These values range from one to five, with five being the mrost important and most difficult. Forexample, althoughabrutalitycasemaybevery importamrthefacts in aparticular case may be fairly easy'to prove, and consequently the value assigned may only be a three. Conversely,atheftcasemaybebothimportantandalsodifficulttoproveandthereforemaybe assigned a higher value. Instructions are given that cases should be pursued with an awareness of their value, but not at the expense of delaying the completion of other investigations. Given his mixed civilian and police investigative staff, the present Assistant Grief of the OPR assigns cases more upon the basis of individual investigators' characters and personalities than upon the basis of their past histories. Furthermore, his prior belief that police officers do not enjoy a monome on investigative ability and competence has been confirmed through his experience in command of a mixed police and civilian staff. Since the Office's inception, no problems have bear experienced by the civilian investigators in being accepted by their police 1 l9 officer colleagues. Furthermore, in practice the OPR case conferences, in which all staff members are encouraged to actively participate, have helped to establish good working relationships among the variorrs investigators. Citizen complaints containing serious allegations are thus investigated by the OPR staff. On the other hand. allegations of less serious offenses, including rudeness or the use of foul language, are refemed to the Grief of Police for assignment to a Zone Supervisor (usually either a Lieutenant or a Sergeant) for investigation and recommendation. Upon completion, these investigative reports are referred back to the OPR for review. In each of the form types of case handled by the OPR, citizen complaint investigation, citizen complaint review, Bureau complaint, and special investigation, the initial recommendation forfindinganddisciplinary action (ifnecessary) is madeby theinvestigator,whetherhebe a swornofficerorcivilianmemberoftheOPRstafforamemberoftheBureauofPolice. The recommendations are then reviewed by the Grief of Police prior to being forwarded to the Assistant Grief of the OPR for approval. Under the authority of the Deputy Director of Public Safety, the OPR will approve all disciplinary actions before discipline is imposed. Any adjusmnartsmtheGriefsmconmrendadmmarecommmnicatedmhimpnmtobeing implemented. The OPR is then responsible for implementing and monitoring the discipline and, in a citizen complaint case, for informing the complainant of the results of the investigationand the action taken. Whilstultirnateconfirmationoffindinganddisciplinary actionistheresponsibility ofthe Deputy Director of Public Safety, Pittsburgh's CivilServiceStatuteensmesthatno police ' officer, other than one who has been convicted of a felony, may be discharged, reduced in rank, reducedinpay,orsuspendedforaperiodexceedingtendaysunlessthecasehasfirstbeenheard by a Trial Board. Additionally, an employee who is likely to be suspended for a period of ten days orless may alsorequestaTrialBoardhearing. Thus, whilstTrial Board decisions mustbe approved by the Mayor, it is quite conceivable that the recommendations of the Grief of Police, the Assistant Chief ofthe OPR, and even the Deputy Director ofPublic Safety may be disregarded once a case comes to a Trial Board hearing. 120 In practice, most officers under threat of a short suspension exercise their option to request a hearing, and consequently the majority of serious cases are heard by Trial Boards. This would nornormallybeaproblemwereitnot forthe somewhatbizarremannerinwhichthetlnee members oftheBoardareappointedinaparticularcase. InmddheTrialBoardregulations constitute one of the major problems currently threatening the effectiveness of Pittsburgh's OPR. ThisisnottosuggestthattheregulationsareanewproblenrhowevermincetheT‘rialBoard legislation was previously a constant thorn in the side of the Bureau of Police's Internal Affairs Office following the enactment of Pittsburgh's Civil Service Statute in 1951. Indeed, there is a widely held belief in Pittsburgh that the legislation, imposed upon a traditionally labour-oriented Democratic cityby aRepublican State legislatureintheearly 19503, atthetirnewas aretributive measureintendedtoptmishthecity's executiveofficersfortheirconstantrequests overtheyears for more employee-centered disciplinary procedures. Section? ofthePittsburgh Civil Service Statute, concerningthe composition ofT‘rial Boardsinpolicedisciplimry procwdingsiscertainlyamiquepieceoflegislationwhichis difficult to believe if not directly quoted from: "The persons composing said (Trial Board) shall be selected as follows: Thedirectorofthe departmentofpublic safetyshallinthepresenceofthe . employee charged and his brother officer or the attomey-at-law acting as his counsel, cause the names of at least fifty employees of the bureau of police who hold a position in the competitive class equal or superior in rank to the employee charged, to be written upon separate slips of paper of the same size, color and textme, and folded or rolled so that the names thereon cannot be distinguished until drawn as hereinafter provided. Said fifty names so deposited shall be provided as follows: The director of the department of public safety shall supply twenty-five thereof and the employee charged shall supply twenty-five thereof. When said harms shall have been so deposited in the box or receptacle, the same shall be thoroughly shaken by some disinterested person until the slips of paper have been thoroughly mixed, and thereupon such disinterested person shall draw therefrom singly and by law seven names, and the director of the department of public safety andflrepersonchargedshaneachinorderbeenfitledtoexercisealtemate challengesuntilthenames ofthreepersons are left, andsaidthreepersons shall compose the (Trial Board)." Inotherwords,thenamesof500fficers,halfofwhichareprovidedbydreOPSandhalf bytheaccusedofficer,areplacedintoahat,shaken,andthensevenaredrawnoutby some impartialobserver. TheOPSandthesubjectofficerthenrejecttwo ofthenarneseach,leaving 121 only three. These three individuals then constitute the membership ofthe Trial Board. Given sucharandomsystemofselectiorfltseerm reasonabletoinferdraninallbutthemostcleercut ofcases,themembershipofdreTrialBoard,perhapsmoredranthefactsofthecase,willbe inflwntialindetenniningtheevenuraloutcomeoftheheanng. AldroughtheCityGovernmentof Pittsburgharepresently attemptingtolobby forchangesinthe'l‘rial Board legislation, sincethe necessarychangeswouldhavetobemadeatStateleveLtheyhoidoutverylittlehopethattheir effortswillbesucwssfulatleastintheimmediatefrmrre. Typology Implications ThesitevisittoPittsburghdidnotprovideanyinfonnationwhichnecessitatednewstages oradditiorralfunctionstobeinchrdedindrecomplaintstypology,afactwhich,initselfconfirmed that the typology was developing in a systematic and logical manner. However, several of the mimnfeaunuofflnfiushnghsyscmfmmwsdganngcomplainmagammemficeprwfied exanrplesofsmofflwpossibksmwnnalvmiadmswhichcwdexistwimmthewemn frmctionaltypology. Inparticrflar,flreudlizationofaconrbirredpoliceandcivilianstafl’for mvesdgadngsefimscidnnmmplainmwasasyswmfeannewhichhadnmpmfimnlybeen encounteredatfirsthand,aswasthefactthattheGriefofPolice'sdisciplinaryrecommendation inanypardcuhrcasewasnotfimlandwassubjeamreviewandpossiblealterafionbyan external agency. Finally, the Trial Board input intothe disciplinary process underlinedthe importance of separating the 'finding' Stage frornthe 'disposirion‘ stage inthe typology, and Pittsburgh's novel selection procedures provided yet another truly unique strucnn'al alternative forthesetwotypologystages. Washington D.C.'s Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) No examination of systems for investigating complaints against the police in the USA wouldbecompletewithoutavisittoWashingtonD.C.,drecity inwhichdreamsofcivilian review of police practices, or nightmares depending upon one's perspective, first became reality through the creation of a Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) in 1948. History appears to 122 indicate that this largely powerless body, which had no investigative capability of its own and consequently functioned as a review agency for completed internal police investigations, was universally unloved. The CCRB eventually disbanded in the mid-1960s, frustrated by its lack of influence. the outgoing members recommending to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia the creation of a truly independent board with its own investigative staff. This recommendation was shelved by the Govemment of the District of Columbia for severalyears,butcontinuingcomrmmity concemduringthe late l9’708thattherebecivilian review of alleged police misconduct led to a new Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) being created by DC. Law 3-158 of March 5, 1981. Tire cru'rent CCRB subsequently became operational in mid-1982 and, although it shares the same name as its predecessor, it was given greatly enlarged powers. Underthe 1981 legislation, the Board is authorized to hear and investigate citizen complaintsconcerningmisconductby officers oftheMetropolitanPolice Deparunentandthe Special Police employed by the DC. Government. when such complaints allege police harassrrrent, excessive use of force, or abusive language. In practice, the number of complaints nndemgmdingflnSpedflPolicenmkeupaverysnmnpercenmgeofdntomlnumberof complaintsreferredtotheBoard. No complaintmaybefiledwiththeBoardmorethansix monthsafteracomplainant,usingreasonablediligence,hasbecome aware oftherighttofilea complaint. In support of the CCRB's activities, its nine-member staff is responsible for receiving and investigating complaints and for preparing case papers for Board hearings. The Board's staff comprises an Executive Director, a senior investigator, four investigators, an attorney, a staff assistantandaclerktypist. Allofthe investigators areciviliansandtheCCRB's preferencein appointing investigators is to select individuals with no prior police experience, in order to retain the Board's independent image. The CCRB itself is made up of seven individuals. The Mayor and the DC. Council together appoint five members, all of whom are civilians, and the Police Grief and the Fratemal Order of Police (POP) each appoint one police officer member. The chairperson, who is one of 123 the Mayoral appointees, must be a lawyer. Board members are appointed to serve three-year temrs. The Washington DC. CCRB is thus one of the very few external police review agencies to include police officers among its membership. With regard to this mixed membership, the chairperson of the Board, Goler T. Butcher, an attorney and professor at Howard Law School, points out that, in her experience, there has been no tendency forthepoliceofficermemberstoacceptaccusedofficers‘ versions ofevents offered in hearings in any irrational manner. Equally, there have been no Board members who have felt obligedtoside withcomplairrants allofthe time. Interestingly,onalmostalloccasimsthe Board's findings following a hearing are anived at unanimously. This fact appears to cast doubt upon two frequently voiced arguments against civilian review of complaints against the police: firsnthatextemalreview is likely tobebiased againstthe police. andsecond.thatcivilians are lmqualified mindset!» propriety of police actions» AcomplaintmaybefiledwiththeCCRBinperson,byletter,orbytelephone,andmaybe accepwdfiomanmmymmrssomceaslongashcmtaimmffidartfacmalinfonan warrant an investigation. From its inception in mid-1982 until the end of 1985, the Board had accepted 1,184 cases for consideration, an average of approximately one per day. These cases contained a total of 2,686 complaints, of which 37% alleged police harassment, 30% excessive force, 19% irrrproper language, and 14% other nrisconduct. Any complaint received which, following assessment, is deemedto be within the jurisdiction ofthe Board, and not to be frivolous, is assigned to an investigator for a full investigation. Frivolous complaints and those outside the jurisdiction of the CCRB are brought before the Board forsumrnary dismissal. Dming1985, 15% ofthe complaints lodged with the Board were dismissed in this way. Whenaninvestigatiorliscompletethecaseisscheduledforahearing. Bystatute hearings, which must be held for all complaints which have been investigated by the Board's stafl',areopentothepublic. Thecomplainanncivilianandpolicewitnessesmndthesubject police ofiiceraresubpoenaedmamndmrdinvesfigadvempmtsareservedmmepardes in advance ofthehearing. Testimonyistakenunderoath,andbothpartieshavetherightto 124 representation, to call and examine witnesses, and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. The Board, perhaps not surprisingly, has enjoyed a stormy relationship with the Metropolitan FOP. An official boycott of CCRB hearings was held during 1985, although the ultimate step of removing the POP member from the Board was never taken. However, since once a subpoena has been served, hearings are held whether or not the subject officer is present, the FOPconcludedthatitsactions wereprovingtobecounterproductiveandnotinits members' interests, and the boycott was terminated in 1986. 1 In addition, financial problems for the FOP have not helped in its dealings with the Board. WhentheCCRB wascreawdin1982,theFOPconsidereditimportantthatsubjectofficers should be represented by an attorney in every hearing. At an average of approxirrrately one hearing per week, this soon proved to be an extremely expensive business, and eventually FOP member's decided to opt for representation by a non-attomey as a cost-saving exercise. In practicedrenon-attorneyrepresentative whousuallyattendshearingsirradditiontotlresubject officer is a Metropolitan Police Detective. Duringthetwohearings whichwereheldontheday ofthesitevisitmeidrercomplainant was represented, resulting in a somewhat one-sided cross-examination of witnesses taking place. Indeed, at times, with the officers' detective representative in frrll flow, it was difficult to reconciletheprweedingswhhflwfactmatitwasthembjectofficermndnathecomplainann who was effectively on trial. Certainly, the consequence of the sitrratiorr was that the officers' versions of events were presented in a much more professional manner than were those of the complainants. The problem caused by unrepresented complainants being effectively at a disadvantage during hearings, and the question of whether or not complainants should be entitled to some form of legal aid to assist them in presenting their cases, are cmrently being considered by the Board. Following a hearing, the CCRB will find complaints to be either sustained, not sustained, ordisrrrissed, andwillthenissueaformal opinion, corrtainingasumrnaryofthetestirnony and settingoutdrefinding,thevoteandthereconunendationoftheBoard Acopyofthisfindingis forwarded to the complainant, the subject officer and the Chief of Police. Decisions of the Board 125 are based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard If it sustains a complaint, then by stannedeCCRBismquimdmmakeadisdpfinarymconnmndafimwdreGfiefofPofice. The Griefthenhasthinydaysinwhichweitheracceptormjectflremcomnendadm Ifherejectsit, thecaseisreferredtotheMayorwhohasafurtherthirtydayperiodinwhichtoupholdeitherthe Board‘s recommendation or the Chiefs proposal, or to order a compromise. Onerecentcasepresentedtothe Washington DC. Public Employees Review Board bythe FOPresultedinadecisionbeingismedtotheeffectthattheCCRBActtookprecedenceoverthe corm'actwhichtheFOPhadnegotiatedwiththeMayor. Thisdecisiontherebyeffectivelyratified theMayor'spowertodirecttheGrieftoadoptarecommendationoftbeCCRB,evenifitisin conflict with the Chiefs own proposal for discipline. Duringl985,theCCRB held48hearings. In250f the hearings (52%),theBoard voted nottosustainanyoftheallegationsinthecase,irré(13%)theyvotedtodisrnissallofthe allegations,andin17(35%)theyvotedtosustainatleastoneallegationinthecase. OneofthestatedobjectivesoftheWashingtonD.C.CivilianComplaintReviewBoardis moperacefiwdvelymwuddehnprovenemofpohcecommmutymhficnsmdueespedfic ways. First, by providing aforum forthe airing of legitimate grievances, second, by affordinga mhmhmfmddmnsmaeekrodremMrespeamspedficcmnphhusagammmdividufl oficers,andthird,byenablingthepublictobecomebetteracquaintedwithgeneralpolice procedures. Inthecontextofthesemajorgoals,Boardmembersarerealisticinacceptingthat‘a aedibbconmhhrmmvesdgafimprocedmeisaflyomofmanycamibuwryfaamstowmds achieving a police department which enjoys thefull support arrdconfidence of its cormnunity. TheyamcmvincedhoweverJhatmychangesmademmepmcedmesformvesfigafing wmplainmagahstdnwficewMChresuhmdwsyswmbwonunngHmawessibhmdkss mnnudanngmnnnmemofmepubficwimkgidmaEgrbvmesmmomybebmeficiaLbomm thecomrnurrityandforitspolicedepartrnent. TheirbeliefthattheWashingtonD.C.CCRB providesjust such accessibility for genuine complainants satisfies Board members that they are performingaworthwhileserviceonbehalfofthecitizensoftheDistrictofColumbia. 1 26 Typology Implications The site visit to Washington DC. served to further emphasize the importance ofthe inclusion of several features in the complaints typology. First, the Board's system of summarily dismissing frivolous complaints was seen as presenting further evidence of the need to include a 'not proceeded with' category at an early stage of the typology. Second, the holding of Board hearings which are open to the public again raised the question of how open complaints prowdures should be and highlighted the existence of the 'public inforrnation' typology stage. Finally, the fact that only particular types of complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the CCRB, whilst all others continue to be investigated internally by the relevant police department, underlined the need for the typology to be capable of processing different types of complaint in different ways. The only difficulty which appeared to be developing was whether the 'investigation' stage of the typology should contain three separate branches, representing complaints concenring criminal behavior, other serious non-criminal matters, and minor incidents, or simply two branches representing criminal and non-criminal cases. Since it was believed likely that police departments woulddifferintheiropinims as towherea dividinglineshouldbedrawn between serious and minor non-criminal allegations, the decision was made to include only two branches, representing criminal and non-criminal, or procedural allegations. In addition to its ease of definition, it was considered probable that the criminal/non-Climinal distinction would be regularly used in practice by police departments in assigning complaint cases for investigation. Investigation of Complaints Against the Police in Cleveland, Ohio Further support for the decision to include only two branches, criminal and prmdural, in the 'investigation' stage of the complaints typology was provided by the site visit to the city of Cleveland, Ohio. Following a public ballot held in November, 1984, during the last three years a civilian oversight agency staffed by Mayoral appointees, the Investigative Standards Section (188), has been evolving within the structure of the Cleveland Department of Public Safety. The Board's 127 jrnisdiction and powers are yet to be fully establislwd, however, and in consequence, at present drecitycontinuestorelyprimarilyupontheintemalinvestigativeprocedtuesofthepolice department. These procedures in themselves are somewhat unique, since two distinct offices currently exist within the police department with responsibility for processing citizen complaints. The Professional Conduct and Internal Review Unit (PCIR), established in 1976, is responsible for investigating incidents involving the use of deadly force and citizen complaints alleging the commission of crimes by sworn departmental personnel. In addition, the Complaint Investigation Unit (CIU), established one year prior to the PCIR, is responsible for investigating allexcessiveforceallegations notinvolvingtlreuse ofdeadly force, andtherernainderofcitizen complaints not handled by the PCIR, which in practice constitute the vast majority. Whilst the PCIRreportsdirecttodreGuefofPolice,drelietuerlarucormnanderofdreCIUreportstothe Captain of the Bureau of Inspection. Staffing of the CIU was scaled down following the establishmentofthePCIR suchthatsergeantsnow investigatemostcitizencomplaintsagainstthe police in Cleveland, rather than lieutenants as was the case prior to 1976. On average, approximately 300 complaints are handled by the CIU each year, ofwhich in theregion of25% are investigated by the Unit,theremainderbeing forwardedto Bureau and Districtcommandersforinvestigation. OveralLabout 10% ofCIUcomplaintstendtobe sustained, the remainder being either withdrawn (approximately 30%), proven unfourmd, or found to include insufficient evidence to support a decision either way. No figures are available for cases handled by the PCIR. Perhaps one of the reasons for the relatively high proporticxr of withdrawn complaints is that the Cleveland system appears to be excessively formal and rigid, a feature which it shares with numerous other police jurisdictions throughout the United States. No effective procedures exist under which complaints can be informally resolved, and all complaints, regardless of how minor they may be, are subject to full investigation. Unlike many other police departments, however, the rigidity of the system in Cleveland does not create bureaucratic delay, since the time limit for complaints investigation by the CIU is ten working days. 128 The exiswnce of two separate units specifically created to investigate complaints against the pofimaMaflegedoffimrnnlpracdcewimmmesanepoficedepmmniscutaiMymusuaL Fortunately for the department, the press in Geveland have, thus far at least, managed to resist thetemptationto publicizedresituationinsuchaway astomakethecommtmity wonderwhether policemalpracticeisendemicandoutofcontrolintheircity. Although the presence of the two units has been given relatively little media coverage. opponents of police internal review in Cleveland are well aware of the situation. In practice, however,thernaintargetoftheircriticismhastendedtobetheCIU,whichhasbeerrdescribedas bothrmresponsiveandmrprofessional, whilstthePCthasgenerallybeenagreedtooperate effectively. Apartfromthedangers ofattractingadversepublicitythroughthecreationofaunitcharged wimdwwhmspmsibifiqofmvesdgafingflbgedainunalofimsesmmnfiuedbynembasof mepoficedepmflmampmmnflopaafimfldifliwlfiesauachedmdemlicydedsim FhstofficuswhhhsmhamrhwflalmostinevhablyacqrfimbadlyMshedviewsofme mmahulerofdndeparunwnuxlmayexpefiameprobhnnhrmadfindngmfimuopaafimfl duties. Second, a tense working relationship may possibly develop between the unit and those other officers who are responsible for investigating less serious conrplaints against the police. Whilst members of the unitresponsible forcrinrinalinvestigations may considertheircolleagues whohantlleressseriousincidentstobewastingmeirtittteonmtintpottantcases,moseofiicets resporrsibleforthelattertypeofcasesmayvisualizedrecrimeunitstaffasbeingover-zealous headhunters. Withcharrgesinproceduresbeirrgastrongpossibilityinthenearfuture,itwillbe interesting to see how the role and responsibilities of the propomd new civilian oversight agency in Cleveland develop, and what implications its establishrrrent will have for both the PCIR and the CIU. 129 Typology Implications In addition to those site visits described in some detail above, interviews were carried out in five other police departments in the United States: Alexandria, VA, and Berkeley, Concord, Hayward and Oakland, CA Whilst Berkeley and Oakland both have an element of external civilian involvement in their complaints procedures, Alexandria, Concord and Hayward operate traditional and exclusively internal systems. Following all of the site visits in the US, which were concluded by the visit to Cleveland, andtlrereviewoftheliteranrreconcernirrgcomplaints againstthepolice,acomplaintstypology containing seven distinct functional stages had developed. The first stage, 'complairrt reception', was followed by a three-branch 'recording and classification' stage, which, in nun, led to a two-branch 'investigation' stage. As discussed previously, the three alternative recording and classification branches were 'full investigation reqrrired', 'informally resolved', and 'not proceeded with'; the two alternative investigation branches were 'alleged criminal violation' and 'alleged adrrrinistrative or procedural violatiorr'. Stage four of the typology, 'finding', preceded the 'disposition' stage, and then an 'appeal' stage was followed by the final 'public information' stage. Whilstinforrnationobtainedfromthe sitevisitshaddirectly supportedtheexistence of every other stage and branch of the typology, the 'appeal' stage had largely been included ' intuitively as a result of due process considerations. The final site visit, which was undertaken wideneUnnedSmtesaaossthehmdermCmdamovidedemdydetypeofhnmdm which had been sought in support of the presence of an 'appeal' stage in the completed typology. Metropolitan Toronto's Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner (OPCC) Since 1981, the members of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force have been subject to a system for investigating citizen complaints which differs markedly from that operating elsewhere inOntarioandsetoutinthe 1980Police Act. Theirrnovativesystemoperatedinitiallyas atlrree year pilot scheme under the Metropolitan Police Force Complaints Project Act. 1981, and was subsequently extended and formalized under the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force Complaints 130 Act, 1984. The 1981 legislation created the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner (OPCC), an agency independent of the police force and staffed and directed by civilians. Whilst the OPCC has its own investigative capabilities, the major responsibilities of the Commissioner are to monitorthe policeinternalinvestigation ofallcivilian complaints and to review the decision ofthepoliceinspecificcases attherequestofdissatisfiedcomplainants. Inaddition, the Commissioner has the power to recommend changes in any police policies and procedures which appear to give rise to citizen complaints. Following the review of a case, the Commissioner may, ifhebelieves ittobeindrepublicinterest,orderaheafingbyacivflianBoardofInquiry. This Board, which constitutes probably the most unique aspect of the Toronto system, has the power to impose discipline up to and including dismissal directly upon the subject officer, even though tlreirchoice ofdisciplirre may differfromthatrecommendedbytheGriefofPolice. Thestatutory obligationupondreOPCCtoreinvesfigateandreviewfindingsincaseswhen complainants aredissatisfiedwiththedispositions issuedbytheGriefofPolice wasthefeature oftheOffice'soperations whichdirectly supportedtheirrclusionofan'appeal' stageinthe complaints typology. Furthermore, certain of the other procedures followed in Toronto gave addeddepthtothetypologyby providingrrew structm'alvariations upontheexisting functional base. CidzencomplaintsagainstdreMeuopolitanToromoPoliceForcebecame anratterof comrmmityconcernduringthe 1970s. Thecriticalfocuswasupontheclosednatureofdre complaintprocess itself. Concemscentereduponthe lackofdocumentationincitizencomplaints and the unavailability of information concerning investigations and disciplinary action b0th for complainants and for the general public. The comrmmity held a widespread belief that the police attitude toward citizen complaints was unnecessarily overprotective. Nevertheless, the Police Force was generally held in very high regard in Metropolitan Toronto, and consequently a balanced piece of legislation, sufficient to satisfy the critics of the existing system yet not so extreme as to remove the responsibility for complaints investigation entirely from the hands of the police, was sought. The result was the Metropolitan Police Force Complaints Project Act, 1981. 131 The rmjor philosophy behind the Act was that the police should have the initial opportunity to investigate and resolve a complaint to the satisfaction of the complainant, and that, in doing so, they should act in an open manner. This philosophy was backed up by the powers of the newly created OPCC to reirrvestigate and review cases under appropriate circumstances or upon request bythecomplainant. Todleeantdratpolicemanagememispreparedtoinifiateandeffect discipline itself without the intervention of the OPCC, the system serves to promote police-community relations. Conversely, to the extent that the involvement of the Commissioner isnewssaw,mesystemisswnmprovidednmcessarychxksMbahncesmpmcedmes which were previously considered to be closed and partial. A member of the public wishing to make a complaint concenring any of the 5,300 sworn officers of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force may file their complaint at any police station, at the Public Complaints Investigation Bureau (PCIB) of the police, or at the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner. Increasingly, largely as a result of a continuing public education programinstitutedbydre OPCC,an increasingnumberof complainantsarebecomingaware of its activities and are attendingthe Officeforthe purpose offilingtheircomplaint. During 1985, 37% of complainants did so. The civilian Commissioner receives a copy of every complaint no matter where it is filed, as does the officer in charge ofthe PCIB, who holds the rank of Staff Inspector. All complaints are investigated initially by the PCIB, a police unit staffed with sergeants and staff sergeants, all of whom are experienced investigators. ThepoliceofficerfromthePublic ComplaintslnvestigationBureauassignedtoaparticular casenrayfirstattempttoirrfomrallyresolveflrecomplainabutonlyifthecomplainantandthe subjectofiiceragleeinwritingtothiscoruseofaction. 'lheprosesscontemplates someformof mediafimleadingmbmhpardesmachinganaccoflmdbehlgcmummmemanergono frn'ther. Approximately one third of all complaints are handled in this way. Informal resolutions are reviewed by the Commissioner who may, if ire is of the opinion that a particular resolution wasobtainedas aresuhofanusmrderstandhrg,athmatormherhnpmperpressme,mqrfimdrat theinfomralresohrtionbesetasideandafullinvestigationofdreincidentbecarriedout. One indication ofthe professionalmannerinwhichthePCIB approachtheprocess ofirrforrrral 132 resolution is that, to date, this has never happened In cases where informal resolution is clearly not possible at the outset, the PCB will commence a formal investigation, during which the Bureau is required to provide interim written reports concerning its progress every thirty days. Copies of these reports are sent to the complainant, the Chief of Police, the subject officer and the Public Complaints Commissioner. In exceptional circumstances, the Corrurrissioner may decide to conduct his own investigation immediately upon receipt of a complaint, or alternatively he may commence an investigation at the requestoftheGliefofPolice. TheOPCC alsohasthepower,atanytime30daysormoreafter a complaint has been filed, to carry out an investigation of any case it chooses, although this prowdure is only very rarely followed. At the end of a PCB investigation, an extensive written report is forwarded to the complainant, the Chief of Police and the OPCC. The Grief of Police then reviews the report and isrequiredtosendawrittendecisionorrfindinganddispositiorrofthecasetoboththe complainant and the OPCC. The Chiefs disposition can take on various forms. He can decide thatacrirninalprosecution shouldtake place, orthatintemaldisciplinary actionunderthePolice Act is more appropriate. Alternatively, he can decide to summarily discipline the officer, usually by way ofareprimand, orto refertlre case to acivilian Board ofInquiry. He may also decide to take no further action. Complainants who are not satisfied with the decision of the Grief of Police have the right to request the Public Complaints Commissioner to review their complaints further. This request occurs in approximately 15% of all cases handled by the OPCC and gives rise to the majority of their investigations. The Public Complaints Commissioner and his staff have broad powers to review andreinvestigate cases,but adecision aboutaparticularconrplaintmustbe madeonthe basis of the available evidence. To this end, the OPCC can demand the production of documents, subpoena individuals for questioning, and apply to a Justice of the Peace for a search warrant. Usually, however, the internal investigation carried out by the PCB will have been thorough and consequently there will not be a great deal of additional investigation for the OPCC to undertake. 133 At the end ofthe review process, iftlre Commissioner agrees with the decision ofthe Chief of police, a review report is written and sent to the complainant. the subject officer and the Chief of Police. Alternatively, and rather more uniquely, if he is in disagreement with the Grief of Police, the Commissioner may order a case to be publically heard before a civilian Board of Inqrfiryifhefeelsdratsudracmnseofacfionwouldbemflrepublicinterest Whetherthe Commissioner agrees or disagrees with the Grief, he may make recomnrendations concerning police policies and procedures aimed at preventing the problem encountered by the complainant from recruring. Such recommendations must be responded to in writing within 90 days by the Board of Police Commissioners. Once the review process is completed and the Commissioner has issued his decision, he has no further powers or involvement in a particular case. A Board of Inquiry may be convened in one of three ways. As outlined above, either the Public Complaints Comnrissioner or the Grief of Police may consider a Board hearing to be in the public interest. Alternatively, a subject officer may use the Board as a source of appeal following an adverse finding in a Police Act disciplinary proweding. If the hearing is to consider eitheranappealby asubjectofi’icer,oracaseofserious allegedrrriscorrductreferredbytlre Conurrissiorrerorthe GliefofPolice,theBoard mustcomprisethree members andbechailed by a lawyer. Conversely, if the hearing is to consider an allegation of minor misconduct the Board comprises only one person, always a lawyer. Given the circumstances under which a case would normally reach the Board of Inquiry stage, a three-person panel is the most usual Board In total, twenty four individuals, divided into three groups of eight, are available for selection as Board members, one member being chosen from each group of eight in order to complete a three-person panel. One ofthe groups is appointed on the joint recommendation of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association (the line officels' union) and the Metropolitan Board of Commissioners of Police, Toronto's civilian police governing body. Another group is appointed on the recommendation ofthe Metropolitan Toronto Mimicipal Council. The third group, which comprises the lawyers who chair Board hearings, is recommended for appointment jointly by the Attorney General and the Solicitor General for Ontario. Members of this group 134 mustbemembersoftheIawSociety ofUpperCanada. SincethestandardofproofatBoardofInquiry hearings isthecriminalstarrdardofbeyond reasonable doubt, although administrative rules of evidence and the rules of natural justice apply, great attempts are made to follow, as closely as possible, the criminal rules of evidence. To this end, the complainant may choose to be represented by his or her own lawyer, the Ministry of the AttomeyGeneralwillprovidecormseltopresentthecasetotheBoard.andallhearingsareopen to the public. . Oneoftlrereasonsforthehigh standard ofproof, which was negotiawd priortothe passage of the OPCC's enabling legislation, is that the civilian Board of Inquiry has the power to impose discipline directly upon the subject officer, up to and including dismissal. It is this feature of the legislation which is particularly unusual and which, perhaps not Stupr'isingly. has created most friction between the police officers' union, the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association (MTPA), arrdboththe OPCC andtheBoard ofInquiry. TheMTPAinfactplayed a major role in creating the legislation which gave rise to the OPCC, and, in doing so, offered significant compromises on behalf of its membership. However, since a Board of Inquiry ordered a police officer to resign in 1985 following a finding of guilt in a relatively minor case of assamLmeAssodafimhashmchedanauackupmfleBoaMthrqmryconcethndmm upon the entire legislation. The Association's challenge to the existing system, which has been pmsentedbommdecmutsmdmrwghacmwenedcmnpaignmdwnediaisatpresent unresolved. ‘ It is interesting to note, however, that the case which provoked the wrath of the MTPA was referredtoaBoard ofInquiry bythe GriefofPoliceratherthenbythePublic Complaint Commissioner. Furthermore, it involved an officer with a previously bad disciplinary record which included, amorrgstothertlrings, aconvictionforaserious assaultuponacivilian whilston duty, forwhichthe officerhadbeensentencedtothirtydays in acorrectional facility. Qaitehow hemanagedtoavoiddisrnissalonthatoccasionremainsmrclear! 135 Summary and Presentation of Typology The final site visit to Toronto having provided support for the inclusion of an 'appeal' stage in the functional typology for investigating complaints against the police, the seven stage typology was now fully deveIOped. The basic structurelof the typology had been arrived at through an extensive review of Unisd States literatrne on the subject of complaints against the police and several site visits to US police departments, such as Lansing, Michigan, which operate basically traditional internal and clmd citizen complains procedru'es. Further depth had subsequentlybearaddedtothetypology as aresultofinforrnationobtairredduringanumberof site visits to other North American cities, chosen for certain unique featrrres of their systems for investigating complaints against the police. The civilian Office of Citizen Complaint in San Francisco, in addition to providing an insight into a solvability factor-based case screening system used to classify complaints, emphasized the need for the complaints typology to be capable of handling criminal and non-criminal cases in different ways. This requirement was further underlined by the discovery that the police department in Geveland, Ohio, contains two different unis, each with a particular responsibility for complains investigation. The Pittsburgh Office of Professional Responsibility, staffed jointly by police officers and civilians and commanded by a civilian lawyer, and currently struggling to exert is influence in the city despite the existence ofbizarre Trial Board legislation offered several structural variations on the theme of investigation of complains against the police not previously encountered. ' The traditional uneasy coexistence of police departmens in North America with civilian review boards was typified by the problems currently being experienced by the Washington DC. Civilian Complaint Review Board and the Office of the Public Complains Comrrrissioner in Toronto. Visis to these two cities nevertheless provided crucial information concerning both the need for the 'findirrg' stage of the typology to be distinct from the 'disposition' stage, and the necessity for the completed typology to include an 'appeal' stage. 136 Finally, the enthusiasm of the three agencies ill San Francisco, Washington DC, and Toronto to promote a positive public and media image through their reliance upon public newsletters, statistical analysis and regular repors underlined the need for the inclusion of a 'public information' stage. The end result of the information gained from the various site Visis was the fully developed furrcticnal typology for investigating complains against the police presented in the following two pages. A pictorial display of the typology’s functional framework is followed by a brief overview of is seven stages and definitions of a number of temrs used. As indicated earlier, it was this seven-stage typology which provided the basis for the extensive data collection and analysis phase of the study, a description of which constitutes the subject matter of the next chapter. Figure 6.1 - Functional Typology for Complaints Investigation 137 Not proceeded with I I Complm'nt received I j; Resolved at time j Alleged criminal violation Alleged procedural or administrative violation Investigator appointed Investigator appointed I Investigation I I Investigation I l— J I Sustained I Disposition Appeal by officer ' r Not suStained, unfounded, exonerated, etc. [Appeal by complainant I J I Public information I 138 Typology Stages and Definition of Terms Stage 1 - Complaint Reception - Reception of complains involves the initial acceptance and recording of details of citizens' allegations. Stage 2 - Complaint Recording and Classification - This stage describes the central collation of all complains, to be subsequently handled in one of tluee ways: informally resolved, not procwded with or fully investigated. Tnforrnal resolution' implies some formofmediation(althoughnotnecessarily afacetofaceconfrontation) betweenthe complainant and the accused officer, and an explanation of both parties' Ms of view such that the complainant is satisfied with the action taken. 'Not proceeded with' describes those cases which are initially recorded, but which for various reasons may not be followed up. All other complains not dealt with in either of these two ways will be fully and formally investigated Stage 3 - Investigation - This is the central feature of the typology around which every other stage is built. Typically, an investigation will be carried out in different ways depending upon the seriousness of the allegation. Stage 4 - Finding - 'Finding' (or determination) refers to the outcome of an investigation and specifically is concerned with whether or nor a complaint is sustained. Stage 5 - Disposition - 'Disposition' (or disciplinary sanction) refers to the alternative means of disciplining an officer against whom a complaint has been found to be sustained Stageo- Appeais-prermittcd. anappealby anofficermay typicallybemadeconceming either the finding or the disposition of a case or bodr. In general however, a complainant who is allowed to appeal may challenge the finding, but only rarely the disposition. Stage 7 - Public Information - Information may be disseminated to the public concerning complains procedures, complains statistics, or both. CHAPTER VII ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS Introduction In this chapter the findings of the study are. presented within the framework of the complains typology and in the general context of the research questions in three sections: univariate, bivariate and multivariate. Whilst the univariate analysis phase is relatively straightforward, the bivariate and multivariate phases are decidedly exploratory ill nature since, to the writer’s knowledge, no similar quantitative studies have previously been attempted in analyzing police complains procedures. Data for the univariate phase of the results were derived either from questionnaire returns, the 1980 US census of the population, or from the 1986 FBI Uniform Crime Repors. Survey responses forthe29 measuresintroducedinChapterVareexamined,as areanswersto the individual questions which were used to create the composite variables and responses to the ’ remainder of the survey items. Frequency distributions, percentages and descriptive summary statistics are presented. Duetotheexploratory natrrre oftheremainderoftire analysis, preciseestimatiorr and hypothesis testing are not an issue. Of the 29 variables utilized in the bivariate analysis, twenty onewere availabledirectly fromtheabovethreesources,buttheremainingeight werecreated either by simple computer calculations or by aggregating responses to survey items in order to produce combined measures. The nonparametric Chi—square statistic is used as the primary test for the existence of zero-order relationships between the various factors under consideration. These relationships provide a certain amount of the evidence required to explore the effecs of a 139 140 numberofdifiauuarvirmnentalmdagemyfeauuesupmdwdevelopmemofpofice complaints procedures. Those variables which appeared to exhibit the strongest associations with featm'es of both complaints statistics and complaints systems in the bivariate phase were selected for inclusion as possible explanatory factors in the multivariate analysis. Multiple regression is the primary statisticalteclmiqueutilizedduringthisphaseofthe study. Univariate Analysis The presentation of frequency distribution and descriptive statistics for the survey measures isdividedintotwelve sectionsbaseddirectlyuponthedesignofthesurvey instrument. Thefirsttlueesectionsdiscussgeneralbackgroundcharacteristics ofrespondentdepartrnents and theircomplaints procedures. Insections fourtoten survey responses are presented inthecontext of the seven sections of the complaints typology: 'Complaint Reception', 'Recording and Classification of Complaints', 'Investigation', 'Finding (Determination)', Disposition (Disciplinary Sanction)’, 'Appeals', and 'Public Information'. The final two sections present, in turn, numerical data regarding complaints and the opinions of individual respondents concerning those regularly used arguments regarding external review of alleged police misconduct which were first introduced in Chapter IV. Departmental Background Information Information concerning respondent departments, individual respondents and a range of jmisdictional socioeconomic and demographic features is presented in Tables 7.1 to 7.3. Whilst Table 5.2 indicated that response rates were generally consistently high when analyzed by agency level. size and geographical location. it is clear from Table 7.1 that. due to the differential distribution of Police Executive Research Forum general members throughout the USA,noclaimscanbemadethatthesampleupon whichthequantitativeresultsofthissmdyis based is proportionately representative of the entire population of police agencies within the United States. More than half (52.4%) of respondent departments, for example were either from 141 the South Atlantic or the Pacific states. Nevertheless, as was indicated in Chapter V, the survey sample was sizeable with respondent departments employing approximately 23% of US police personnel and providing police service to almost 43 million citizens, a figure which represents nearly 20% of the total population of the United States. Summary statistics fortheratiomeasurewhichwascreatedtoreflecttheracialintegration of respondent departments are displayed in Table 7.3. The actual response range for this variable indicates that some departments continue to employ proportimately almost twice as many white officers as they would do were they fully integrated. Although affirmative action programs may have influenced the hiring policies of police agencies with respect to minority applicants in recent years, the mean value of 1.2 for dris variable indicates that there is still some progress to be made. Forexample,the figure indicates that, onaverage, in an areawith a30% minority population. the police department is currently 84% white. 142 Table 7.1 - Summary of Police Agency Survey Reun'ns (N=101) Agency Characteristics N % Agency Level City 83 82.2 County 17 16.8 Special 1 1.0 Geographical Region" New England 2 2.0 Middle Atlantic 5 5.0 South Atlantic 36 35.6 East North Central 11 10.9 East South Central 2 2.0 West North Central 12 11.9 West South Central 8 7 .9 Mountain 8 7 .9 Pacific 17 16.8 Agency Size (full-time sworn) 1000 or more 21 20.8 500-999 19 18.8 100-499 42 41.6 Under 100 19 18.8 " Geographical Region - Departments were classified into one of the nine geographical regions of the United States according to the US Bureau of the Census Regions and Census Divisions 1980: New England (Cl‘, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT), Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA), South Atlantic (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV), East North Central (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), East South Central, (AL, KY, MS, TN), West North Central (IA, KA, MN, MO, NB, ND, SD), West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX), Mountain (A2, C0, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, WY), or Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA). 143 Table 7.2 - Individual Respondent's Ranks and Assignments (N varies due to missing data) Oraracteristic N % Rank (N=99): Line/Sergeant 20 20.2 Lieutenant 33 33.3 Captain/Major/lnspector 33 33.3 Chief/Director of Public Safety 9 9.2 Civilian 4 4.0 Assignment (N=96): Non-complaints 15 15.5 Complaints investigator 42 43.8 Complaints administrator 30 31.3 Chief/Director of Public Safety 9 9.4 144 Table 7.3 - Descriptive Summary Statistics"I of Departmental Background Information (N varies due to missing data) Actual Standard Response Characteristics Mean Median Devn Range N Number of sworn officers 1098 330 3130 27-27599 101 Number ofcivilian glimmer 341 116 961 1-8902 101 Residential population 426 190 819 12-7072 99 (1000s) Population/Officer ratio 579 567 196 217-1073 98 Percentage of minority 14.7 13.5 10.6 1-49 92 officers in department Percentage of minorities 25.7 24.0 17.4 2-68 86 in population Racial integration 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.8-1.9 78 of department Percentage unemployment 6.1 5.0 2.7 2-19 86 Percentage of families at 9.3 8.5 4.6 2-24 86 or below poverty level Median income (1979) 20.5 20.0 4.2 14-34 86 ($1000s) “ Crimer'ate per 8090 7903 2995 3248-16481 82 100.000 population Percentage violent crime 10.1 10.0 4.9 1-24 95 * Duemainlytothemesenceofoneparticularlylargeandseveralvery smallagenciesinthe sample, a considerable degree of skewness is associated with the some of the characteristics presented above. In these circumstances, the preferable measure of central tendency is the median. Additionally, more detailed information concerning the distribution of agency and jurisdictional characteristics within the sample can be obtained from Tables 7.49 and 7.50. 145 Overview of Complaints Procedures The general clmracteristics of departmental complaints procedures and their stability are presented in Tables 7.4 and 7.5. As the survey sample was consituted of predominately larger police departments, it was not surprising that the vast majority of respondents reported utilizing a specialist unit for investigating citizen complaints. A perhaps more surprising finding was that almost 15% of agencies reported that their citizen complaint procedures were subject to some type of formal extemal review. However, in morethanhalfofthesecasestheinvestigativemponsibilityhadbeenfullyretainedbythepolice agency. Table 7.5 indicates that police departments subject their citizen complaint procedtnes to frequent review. More than half (53.1%) reported that their systems had only been operating without substantial change for less than ten years, and the majority of these (28.1%) had experienced system changes within the last five years. Four departments reporwd currently being in the process of undertaking major syStenr reviews. , The reasons for system changes were many and varied, but management preferences were ofprimeirnportanceandinsomeinstanceswereclearlyinconflict Ontheonehand,anumber ofdepartmentshadrecentlyestablished centralizedInternalAffairs Unitsbecauseofthe long delays and inconsistencies in reporting standards experienced when individual supervisors had been responsible for complaints investigations. On the other hand, several departments reported recentdecentralization ofcitizen complaints procedures in ordertogivemore authority to supervisory officers in investigating and disciplining the officers under their command Overall, internal administrative convenience ratherthanthe effect ofextemalinfluencewas the major motivating factor behind system changes. 146 Table 7.4 - General Characteristics of Departmental Complaints Procedures (N varies due to missing data) Characteristic N % General system overview (N=101): Purely internal utilizing Internal Affairs 76 75.2 or a similar complaints unit Purely internal without a specific 10 9.9 complaints urtit Internal investigations supplemented 15 14.8 by some form of external involvement Involvement of external agencies (N=93): No external agency involvement 78 83.9 External agency solely responsible for 4 4.3 investigating specific types of complaint External agency shares responsibility for 2 2.2 invesngann’ ' g specrfic‘ types of complaint ' with police department Enema] agency has no investigative 9 9.7 responsibility, but is empowered to review completed police investigations 147 Table 7.5 - Stability of Departmental Complaints Procedures (N varies due to missing data) Characteristic N % Number of years present complaints system has been in operation without substantial change (N=96): 20 years or more 4 4.2 10-19 years 41 42.7 5-9 years 24 25.0 Less than 5 years 27 28.1 Reasons for substantial system changes during the past five years (N=29): (Multiple responses possible) Management decision 20 69.0 Arrival of new police chief 4 13.8 Mandate of city council 2 6.9 Union contract 3 10.3 Accreditation standards 5 17.2 Citizen dissatisfaction with procedm'es 3 10.3 Media campaign . 1 3.4 Influence of community groups 5 17.2 148 Overview of Internal Affairs Units Tables 7.6 to 7 .8 provide a general overview of those units within police departments which are responsible for investigating citizen complaints. One question in the survey instrument askedwhednragardesufifizedmmmmalAfiahsaA)mshrfihrmhmdwhcifizmcomplaim procedures. Asmenfimedinflrapteerlflroughnumerwsdiffemmnamwwerefamdmbe used by departments to describe their complaints investigation units, by far the most popular was 'Internal Affairs'. For the sake of clarity and consistency therefore, the term Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) isusedduoughmnmemnmhrderofmisdiscussimmdescfibedepmtalcifizen complaints units. On average, IAUs are staffed by sworn officers and civilians in the ratio of 3:1. Most of the civilians are employed as clerical support staff however, and only a very small minority have investigative responsibilities. In those departments with no IAU, the majority of which in the survey returns were the smaller agencies, investigative responsibility is typically assigned directly by the Police Chief to a senior officer of the rank of Lieutenant or above. A sizeable proportion (37.9%) of those agencies with IAUs staff them only with volunwer officers, although within this limitation a number of other sebction criteria are routinely applied. The most frequently reported of these were consistent with those characteristics of Internal Affairs officers previously identified in the literatrne review section ofthis study: personal integrity, credibility and reliability, overall past work history, investigative experience, and ' proven writing. and oral skills. In addition, loyalty to the police administration, minority representation, and polygraph qualifications were other selection criteria occasionally identified 149 Table 7.6 - General Characteristics of Departrrrental Complains Unit (N varies due to missing data) Graracteristic _ N % Existence of Internal Affairs (IA) or similar unit responsible for investigating citizen complaints (N=101): Yes 89 88.1 No 12 11.9 Rank of head of Internal Affairs (N=87): Sergeant 14 16.1 Lieusnant 28 32.2 Captain/Major or above 45 51.7 Head of Internal Affairs reports to (N=87): - Chief 56 64.4 Deputy/Assistant Chief 12 13.8 Captain/Major 19 21.8 Rank of typical Internal Affairs investigator (N=87): Line 1 1 12.6 Sergeant 55 63.2 Lieutenant 16 18.4 Captain/Major 5 5.7 150 Table 7.7 - Descriptive Summary Statistics" of the Staffing of Departrrrental Complains Units (N varies due to missing data) Actual Standard Response Characteristics Mean Median Devn Range N Number of sworn personnel 6.5 3.0 11.9 1-81 87 Number of civilians 2.0 1.0 7 .0 0-65 89 *Median is the preferable measure of central tendency due to skewness Table 7.8 indicates that the majority (77.2%) of agencies with IAUs ensure that their Unis'staffundergospecializedlntemalAffairstraining. Almostalloftheseagenciesutilize specialized external training establishmens either wholly or in part in their IA training schedule. Ofmeexsmalagendswluchamauerdedmwmostpoprflmmdfiequmflynpomdwemme IPTM (Institute of Police Technology and Management) and the IACP (International Association of Chiefs of Police) Internal Affairs workshops, POST (Police Officer Standards and Training) state-sponsored Internal Affiars schools, the ABLE (Americans for Effective Law Enforcement) seminar on police civil liability, and a number of individual imiversities offering specialist Internal Affairs training courses. In addition, several of the smaller agencies indicated that their newly appointed IA investigators undertake short work experience internships with IAUs in neighboring larger police departmens. 151 Table 7.8 - Selection and Training of Internal Affairs Investigators (N varies due to rrrissing data) Characteristic N % Method of appointing IA investigators (N=87): Use volunteers only 33 37.9 Transfer officers through 10 11.5 no choice of their own Combination of both approaches ‘ 44 50.6 Does past official misconduct disqualify officers from an IA posting (N=82): Yes 24 29.3 No 58 70.7 Length of assignment to IA (N=88): 2 years or less 19 21.6 3 years 13 14.8 4 years or nrore 4 4.5 No predetermined length 52 59.1 Source of IA training (N=92): Departmental only 10 10.9 An external training establishment 25 27.2 Both 36 39.1 No specialized training undertaken 21 22.8 152 Typology Stage 1 - Complaint Reception Amrgeofdeparmenmlpmcedurescmcemhrgthemcepdmofciflzmcomplaursare presented in Tables 7.9 to 7.14. A signed statement represens by far the most acceptable means of filing a complaint, although most departmens will accept complains verbally and the vast nrajority (96.0%) will accept anonymous complains at least with some other supportive information. Although the resuls are not tabulated, 69% of agencies routinely warn complainans againstmakingfalsestatemens,usually atthetimetheyinitially seektomakeacomplaintor whentheyarereqturedmsignmrywrittenstatememwhichmayhavebeenskenfiomdlem EventhoughthelnternalAffairsofficewasapopularlocationforagenciestoidentifyat which complaints could be filed, the overwhelming majority (96%) indicated that when IA oflicerswerenmmdmycomphhrscmddbefileduhausadaywidrodrerdepamnuual employees. The offices of formally constituted external civilian review agencies were acceptable locations at which to file complains in only 8 of the police jurisdictions surveyed, although as discussed earlier 15 of the police departmens were subject to sortie form of external review of their procedures. The implication is thus that only 8 ofthe 15 external review agencies identimd take an active role in the early stages of complains investigations. Responses in the 'Other' category in Table 7.11 generally indicated complainans' horrres or businesses, or simply on the street as being other locations at which complains could be filed AtfirstsightitmightappearfromthesameTablethatsupervisors canorrly accept complains in approximately three quarters of the agencies surveyed. However, the response 'Any sworn officer' necessarily implicitly includes the response 'Any supervisory officer'. Clearly,sincethisisdrecasemepmbabilityisthatinalmostaninstancesasupervisorisdle preferable choice of an individual to accept and initially record citizen complains. Whilst only a small proportion (21.8%) of departmens routinely specify a time linrit on the filing of complains, the most popular cut-off poiru identified was 30 days after the occurrence which had provoked the citizen's concern. 153 Respondent departmens' classifications within the combined measure of openness to accept citizen complains are presented in Table 7.13. Scores of 3, 4 or 5 on the scale defimd in Appendix II resulted in a classification of 'Reticent', scores of 6, 7 or 8 corresponded with an 'Average' classification, whilst 'Welcoming' resulted from a score of either 9 or 10. A reasonable amount of variance was achieved in the creation of the 'openness to accept complains' variable, which was trichotomized according to this schenre due to its mean and median values being 7.4 and 8 respectively. In is continuous form, the most frequently recorded score was 9, which was assigned to 25.7% of departmens, and the least frequently recorded scores were 4 and 6, each of which were allocated to 5.9% of departmens. Agencies were almost equally split with regard to their policies for publicizing the complaint process. However, those who took the initiative to provide public information regarding their citizen complaint processes more frequently used brochures available at police ssfimsmmmyodsrneansmussfinnecsshadngdwmrdmofpmenfialconmhhmrsm police stations to acquaint themselves with the procedures. Table 7.9 - Acceptable Methods of filing a complaint (N varies due to missing data) 154 Type of notification N % Verbal by telephone (N=99): Acceptable 74 74.7 Not acceptable 25 25.3 Verbal in person (N=94): Acceptable 72 76.6 Not acceptable 22 23.4 Written (unsigned) (N=100): Acceptable 72 72.0 Not acceptable 28 28.0 Signed statement (N=100): Acceptable 98 98.0 Not acceptable 2 2.0 Anonymous (N=101): Acceptable as a matter of routine 37 36.6 Acceptable if there is other supportive 60 59.4 information Not acceptable 4 4.0 155 Table 7 .10 - Acceptable Complainans (N varies due to missing data) Type of notification N % The person who considers he was wronged (N=101): Acceptable 101 100 Not acceptable 0 0 Any person with the written consent of the above (N=73): Acceptable 29 39.7 Not acceptable 44 60.3 Any person with the verbal consent of the above (N=74): Acceptable ' 29 39.2 Not acceptable 45 60.8 Anyone (for example a witness to an event) (N=101): Acceptable 83 82.2 Nor acceptable 18 17.8 156 Table 7.11 - Locations where Complains can be Filed and Individuals who can Accept Them (N varies due to missing data) Type of notification N % Locations where complaints can be filed (‘with mean percentage filed at each location indicated in parentheses): (Multiple responses possible) At certain govemment offices 39 (4.6%)* 39.4 (for example City Hall) At all police stations 47 (27 .5%)"I 46.5 At police headquarters 83 (41 .2%)* 83.8 At the Internal Affairs office 68 (52.6%)' 68.7 At an external complaint agency 8 (17.6%)"' 8.2 (for example CCRB) Other 20 (11.3%)* 20.4 Individuals who can accept complaints: (Multiple responses possible) Any departmental employee 10 10.1 (sworn or civilian) Any sworn officer 39 39.8 Any supervisory officer 71 72.4 Any person working in Internal Affairs 28 28.0 (sworn or civilian) ' Any sworn officerinInternalAffairs 11 11.2 157 Table 7.12 - Time Limit on filing of complains Policy N % Is a time linrit specified (N=101): Yes 22 21.8 No 79 78.2 Duration of time limit (N=22): Thirty days 13 59.1 Three months 3 13.6 One year 1 4.5 Tluee years 5 22.7 Table 7.13 - Combined Measure of Openness to Accept Complains (N=101) Policy N % Welcoming 38 37.6 Average 41 40.6 Redeem 22 21.8 158 Table 7.14 - Publicity Regarding Complains Procedures (N=99 due to missing data) Policy ' N % Is there a systematic method by which the general public is made aware of the complaints process: Yes 5 3 53.5 N o 46 46.5 Methods utilized to publicize complaints process (N=53): (Multiple responses possible) Brochures available at police stations 42 79.2 Officers carry complaint information 17 32.1 with them on patrol Brochures available at other govemment 16 30.2 offices (for example City Hall) Police speak at neighborirood meetings 8 15.1 Notices in local newspapers 6 11.3 Television/radio commercials 5 9.4 Posters distributed throughout the 2 3.8 city/county 159 Typology Stage 2 - Recording and Classification of Complaints As indicated in the previous chapter, the complains typology which was deve10ped during this study included a three-branch 'Recording and Classification' stage at which complains could either be classified as informally resolved, n0t proceeded with. or in need of full and formal investigation. Table 7.15 indicates that the vast majority of departmens (81.9%) use at least one alternative means of disposal of complains other than full investigations. Nevertheless, a sizeable minority (18.1%) reported that all complains filed with them are fully and formally investigated, regardless of their content. Methods of recording informally resolved complains vary considerably. Whilst more than half (61.7%) of the agencies with informal resolution policies either require a report or memorandum to be submitted by the resolver or maintain some form of card index in IA, 16.6% maintain no permanent record of such cases. In those agencies which utilized IAUs, invariably the responsibility for maintaining a record and filing complains was that ofthe Unit. In other departmens, the most frequently reponedodrerlocaficnforcennafizedcomplaintrecordhrgmdfilingwasdre police chiefs office. Anumberofdepartmens indicatedthattheirpolicies fornotifyinganofficerofthedetails ofacomplaintdependuponthecircumstances ofparticularcases. Inparticular,ifitisconsidered likely that such notification could seriously prejudice an enquiry, for example in a case alleging the continuing commission of crimes by an officer, then the subject officer is generally not notified of the investigation at all. In cases when nodfication is made however, the majority of agencies notify the officer or officers involved at an early stage, and nodfication is typically made (in 68.7% of departmens) in writing. 160 Table 7.15 - Combined Measure of Proportion of Complains Classm as requiring a Full Investigation (N=94 due to missing data) Category Definition N % Most No procedures for informal 17 18.1 resolution nor for the disposal of complains without recourse to a full and formal investigation utilized Average Prowdures either for informal 65 69.1 resolution or for the disposal of complains without ‘ recourse to a full and formal investigation utilized Least Procedures for both informal 12 12.8 resolution and for disposing of complains without recourse to a full and formal investigation utilized Table 7.16 - Notification of Complains to Subject Offices (N=101) Policy N % Immediately upon receipt of complains 4 4.0 Within 24 hours after complaint nrade 3 3.0 As soon as reasonably possible 52 ’ 51.5 Only when the investigator is ready to interview 32 31.7 When the case is assigned to an investigator 4 4.0 Other 6 5.9 161 Typology Stage 3 - Investigation The complaints typology presented in Chapter VI identified a two-branch Investigation stage within which citizen complains could be investigated according to different procedlues depending upon whether they were alleging criminal or other activities on the part of subject officers. Tables 7 . 17 and 7.18 provide a direct means of comparing and contrasting departmental policies for investigating the two types of complaint. Thus, complains alleging crimes are generally investigated by either an officer from Internal Affairs or from the Detective Bureau, or indeed in many agencies by both. Typically, when criminal and administrative investigations are commenwd contemporaneously, the two investigations are kept separate. In this situation, the responsibility of those undertaking the crirninalirrvestigationistodeterrninewhetherthe allegedcrirneorcrimeshaveindeedbeen committed; the responsibility of those undertalo'ng the administrative investigation is to determine whether any departmental regulations have been transgressed Since criminal complains are generally regarded as constituting the most serious type of allegation, the investigator in a criminal case, whose rank is frequently not predetermined. is appointed in the majority (54.5%) of agencies directly by the police chief. The chief is therefore made fully aware of any criminal cases involving his offices at an early stage. Conversely, in administrative and less serious cases, there is typically very little involvement from the Detective Bureau. The police chief is not routinely notified at such an early stage in the proceedings and the investigator, usually appointed by a senior officer from the subject officer’s division, is likely to hold the rank of sergeant and to be either the subject officer's immediate supervisor an Internal Affairs officer. 162 Table 7 . 17 - Investigations into complains alleging criminal violations (N varies due to missing data) Policy N % Individual typically appointed to investigate (N=101): (Multiple responses possible) Subject officer's irnnrediate supervisor 2 2.0 Sworn officer from Internal Affairs 56 55.4 Sworn officer from the Detective Bureau 60 59.4 Senior officer from the subject 5 5.0 officer's division An external civilian investigator 1 1.0 DA's Office/Another law enforcement agency 9 8.9 Rank of typical investigator (N=96): (Multiple responses possible) Senior officer (Lieutenant and above) 21 21.9 Atleastonerankhighertlranthesubject 20 20.8 Sergeant 19 19.8 Detective 17 17.7 No rank stipulation 32 33.3 Investigator appointed by (N=101): Police Chief ' 55 54.5 Deputy/Assistant Chief 3 3.0 Senior officer from the subject 5 5.0 officer's division Head of Internal Affairs 21 20.8 Head of Detective Bureau 17 16.8 163 Table 7.18 - Investigations into complains alleging prowdtual or administrative violations (N varies due to missing data) Policy ‘ N % Individual typically appointed to investigate (N=100): (Multiple responses possible) Subject officer's immediate supervisor 35 35.0 Sworn officer from Internal Affairs 83 83.0 Sworn officer from the Detective Bureau 4 4.0 Senior officer from the subject 4 4.0 officer's division A civilian investigator employed by 2 2.0 the police department _ An external civilian investigator 1 1.0 Rank of typical investigator (N=99): (Multiple responses possible) Senior officer (Lieutenant and above) 25 25 .3 At least one rank higher than the subject 24 24.2 Sergeant 38 38.4 Detective 16 16.2 No rank stipulation 13 13.1 Investigator appointed by (N=100): Police Chief 32 32.0 Deputy/Assistant Chief 1 1.0 Senior officer from the subject 55 55.0 officer‘s division Head of Internal Affairs 12 12.0 164 Table 7 .19 - Time Limits on Complains Investigations Policy N % Is a time limit specified (N=101): Yes 65 64.4 No 36 35.6 Duration of time linrit (N=62): 10 days or less 8 12.9 2 weeks . 5 8.1 30 days 35 56.5 40 days 4 6.5 60 days 8 12.9 3 months 1 1.6 120 days 1 1.6 Theexistence orotherwiseofatimelimitincomplains proceduresiStobeutilizedasa variableintlrebivariateanalysissincetimelimiscanbeexpectedtorelateinsomewaytothe number of complains which agencies are required to process. In this context, it is interesting to note that, of those agencies with time linris in force, more than three quarters (77.5%) require investigations to be concluded within one month. The apparent widespread use of polygraphs in citizen complains investigations was not anticipated. In part, the responses may have resulted from the failure of the survey to identify those types of complaint in which the polygraph is typically used by police agencies. Nevertheless, Table 7 .20 gives an indication of the frequency with which the instrument is used at least in certain, presurrrably the more serious, complaint cases. 165 Table 7.20 - Use of Polygraph in Complains Investigations (N varies due to missing data) Policy N % Is the polygraph used when interviewing officers (N=100): Yes 65 65.0 No 35 35.0 If used, is it optional or mandatory (N=59): Optional 41 69.5 Mandatory 18 30.5 Is the polygraph used when interviewing complainants (N=98): Yes 70 71.4 No 28 28.6 If yes, are complainants warned that their case may not he proceeded with if they fail to take a test (N=65): Yes 23 35.4 No 42 64.6 166 Typology Stage 4 - Finding (Determination) The various case findings or determinations available to respondent agencies are tabulated in Table 7.21. Whilst almost all departmens use the four major altematives, 'Sustained', 'Not sustained', 'Unfounded' and 'Exonerated‘, the finding 'Policy Review/Policy Failure' (ie: the allegation is proven but the accused officer acted within existing policy, hence the policy should be reviewed) is less popular. Whilst this discovery was not surprising, it was a little disappointing. As indicated in the previous chapter, it seems reasonable that police complains procedures should have within them the means of identifying those faults in departmental policies in addition to those in individual officers. Other case findings available inchlded Misconduct not based on complaint' and 'Officer not involved'. Of those departmens which utilize the 'Policy review‘ category, a number of policies were mpmwdmhavebemmieweddhwflyasmemsmtofmeomcomofmgafimshuodfinn complains. Those mentioned by several agencies included non-specific emergency and pursuit driving r¢gulations, firearms policies including off duty regulations regarding weapons, procedures regarding the handling of female inforrnans, and evidence and prisoner property regulations. Table 7.22 suggess that the most popular administrative route for recommendations of casefindingstotakewithinmspondentagencies is fromtheinvestigator,tiuoughthesubject officer's chain of command, to the police chief for final confirmation. Indeed, when individual responses were examined this was found to be the case. The 'Other' category in the review and continuation stages invariably reflected the fact that. in many departmens of public safety the police chief is responsible for reviewing recommendations whilsttire public safetydirectorretainsthe authoritytoultimately confirrncase findings. Given due process considerations, it was somewhat surprising to discover how infrequently some form of internal trial board in involved in the disciplinary process in respondent departrrrens. Their use seens predominately to be reserved for the appeal stage in citizen complaint cases, as will be indicated later in this discussion. 167 Table 7.21 - Case Findings (N=101) Alternative case findings available (Multiple responses possible) N % Sustained 101 100 Not sustained 100 99.0 Unfounded 98 97.0 Exonerated 96 95.0 Policy Review/Policy Failure 28 27.7 om 25 24.8 Table 7 .22 - Recommendations and Administrative Review of Findings (N varies due to missing data) Policy N % Initial recommendation for finding made by (N= 100): Head of Internal Affairs 21 21.0 Senior officer from subject officer’s division 8 8.0 The investigator 40 40.0 Subject officer's immediate supervisor 23 23.0 Other ' , 8 8.0 Recommendation reviewed by (N=84): Deputy Chief 7 8.3 Head of Internal Affairs 16 19.0 Subject officer’s chain of command 47 56.0 Internal trial board 2 2.4 Other 12 14.3 Recommendation ultimately confirmed by (N=101): City Manager/Police Board 10 9.9 Police Chief 75 74.3 Internal trial board 3 3.0 Hearing at which the subject officer is present 2 2.0 Other 1 1 10.8 168 Typology Stage 5 - Disposition (Disciplinary Sanction) The differential use ofa wide range of disciplinary sanctions by respondent departmens in indicated in Table 7.23. A negative response to the Criminal charges' alternative disposition was difficult to interpret, but was presumed to imply that, in those agencies which favor undertaking two distinct and separate criminal and administrative investigations into alleged crinres by offices. if illegal conduct is found to have taken place then the formulation of any criminal charges will be the responsibility of the Detective Blneall. The 'Extra duty without pay' sanction represens a novel alternative to the widespread use of suspensions. In comparing Table 7.24 with Table 7.22, it is interesting to note the difi’erent administrative routes which recommendations for case disposition and case finding tend to take. Whilstthereview andultimateconfimiation adrrrinistrativestagesoftlretwotypes of mcomnendafimamfimanyidarflcdmudaldisdpfinuymcommrdafimsmmbemadeby accused officers' supervisors rather than by case investigators, who generally are responsible for maln'ng initial recommendations for case finding. The closer involvement of local divisional command staffininitialdisciplinary as comparedwithcase findingrecomrrrendationsis furtha highlighted by the frequency with which senior officers from accused officers' divisions make disciplinary recommendations. Over all, more than half (56.7%) of agencies seek initial disciplinary recommendations from divisional supervisory staff. The general policy is presumably based upon the theory that disciplinary outcomes of citizen complaint cases should be mdifiduflizedmmrmmpmdesmmdmacmsequaflymmemdividuflsbestposifimed to make appropriate recommendations are subject officers' supervisors. 169 Table 7.23 - Case Dispositions (Disciplinary Sanctions) (N=101) Alternative disciplinary sanctions available (Multiple responses possible) N % Criminal charges 83 82.2 Dismissal 100 99.0 Reduction in rank 95 94.1 Suspension 99 98.0 Pine 21 20.8 Punitive transfer 34 33.7 Written reprimand 101 100 Verbal reprimand 87 86.1 Supervisory counselling 90 89.1 Training 6 5.9 Extra duty without pay 4 4.0 Medical/Psychological referral 4 4.0 170 Table 7.24 - Recommendation for and Administrative Review of Case Dispositions (Disciplinary Sanctions) (N varies due to missing data) Policy N % Initial recommendation for disposition made by (N=97): Head of Intenral Affairs 14 14.4 Senior officer from subject officer’s division 21 21.6 The investigator 12 12.4 Subject officer's immediate supervisor 34 35.1 Other 16 16.5 Recommendation reviewed by (N=76): Deputy Chief 9 11.8 Head of Internal Affairs 3 3.9 Subject officer's chain of command 46 60.5 _ Intemal trial board 5 6.6 Other 13 17.1 Recommendation ultimately confirmed by (N=101): City Manager/Police Board 12 11.9 Police Chief 77 76.2 Internal trial board 3 3.0 Other 9 8.9 171 Typolosy sum 6 - Appeals The rights of subject officers and complainans to appeal against the resuls of complaint investigations, and the sources to which they may direct their appeals, if allowed, may be compared in Tables 7.25 and 7.26. Civil Service Boards were identified as the external appellate bodies most frequently used by subject officers, but invariably officers are only entitled to take their cases to such Boards if they have been subject to a disciplinary sanction exceeding suspension for a predetermirwd length of tinre, often 10 days or more. Complainansareentitledtoappealtlreresultoftheircaseswithirrthecontextofthelarge proportion (80.2%) of respondent departmens' citizen complains policies. In the vast majority of instances however, they must appeal to the police chief, to some individual within the city adrninisuation(suchasdrecitymanager)ortoalocalgovemmembody (suchasthepol'me board). Nevertheless, almost 10% of agency policies allow complainans to take their cases before either an independent arbitrator or an independent review panel. The city or county attorney was identified as an individual who often becomes involved in citizerrcomplairrtcases attheappealstage. OveralLdreservicesoftheattomeyareutilizedinthe complains process by 59% of respondent agencies, frequently for advice upon legal matters in complaint cases which allege the commission of crirrres by officers. Other legal considerations which were identified as having an impact upon the investigation of complaints against the police included a Police Officers’ Bill of Rights (in 70.2% of agencies), a union contract (in 54.8% of agencies), and general city and county personnel procedures. 172 Table 7.25 - Appeals by officers concerning investigations, findings and dispositions (N varies due to rrrissing data) Policy N % Does the officer have a right of appeal (N=100): Yes 98 98.0 No 2 2.0 Source of appeal for officer (N=98): (Multiple responses possible) City Manager/Police Board 54 55.1 Police Chief 47 48.0 Personnel Board 10 10.2 Civil Service Board 24 24.5 Public Safety Director 3 3.1 Union grievance procedure 9 9.2 Independent arbitrator/Review board 5 5.1 District/Federal Court 3 3.1 173 Table 7.26 - Appeals by complainans concerning investigations, findings and dispositions (N varies due to missing data) Policy % Does the complainant have a right of appeal (N=101): Yes No Source of appeal for officer (N=81): (Multiple responses possible) City Manager/Police Board Police Chief Personnel Board Civil Service Board Public Safety Director City Attorney Independent arbitrator/Review board District/Federal Court 19.8 #Ot PPPNPHPP coouqnpq 174 Typology Stage 7 - Public Information One question in the survey instrument sought to discover how many items of information. from a given list of five, respondent agencies routinely provide for complainans: a written acknowledgment of receipt of the complaint, an approximate conclusion date of the investigation, the finding of the case, the disciplinary action taken (when applicable), and the procedure for appeal ifdissatisfied with the result ofthe investigation. Their individual responses were combined to provide the data presented in Table 7.27. Accordingly, 25 departrnens were classified as being 'Uncommunicative' (scores of 0, 1 or 2). 57 as 'Average' (a score of 3), and 19 as 'Very informative (scores of 4 or 5) towards complainans. Although an overwhelming majority of departmens acknowledge complaints in writing and, following the investigation provide complainans with details of case findings (92.9% and 95% respectively), policies vary considerably concerning the other elemens of information considered either necessary or appropriate to provide for complainans. The nrost contentious itemofinforrnationinacase appears tobethedeterrnination (disciplinarysanction). Ofthose agencies which do not furnish this routinely to complainans, nrany reported that they are prevented fromdoingsoby eitherstate orcity personnel legislation. A furthersizeable proportion indicawd that, whilst they do not specify the disciplinary sanctions in particular cases, they routinely inform complainans that "appropriate disciplinary action has been taken" Having ascertained how much information is routinely provided for complainans, a further question in the survey irrstrunrent sought details of agency policies concerning the publication of statistical information regarding citizen complains. A wide range of responses resulted in departmens being almost equally divided between those who do publish statistical information and those who do not. Reasons for not publishing complains statistics ranged from being prevented from doing so by state law, through departmental policy not allowing any negative publicity because of is potential threat to officer morab and efficiency, to a small number of instances in which no numerical data concerning citizen complains is even collected for departrrrental internal use. 175 However, of those agencies who fail to publish statistical information. 19% indicated that such information has never before been requessd. and a further 17% will fumish statistical data upon request. Responses to this survey item were combined with those to the item concenring the publication of general information regarding complains procedures to generate a measure of openness to provide public information. Table 7.30 indicates that a substantial degree of variance was associatedwithagency scores onthisparticularscale. Table 7.27 - Combined measure of information provided to complainans (N=101) Number of items of information N % None A 2 2.0 One 5 5 .0 Two 18 17.8 Three 24 23.8 Four 33 32.7 Five 19 18.8 176 Table 7.28 - Infomration provided to complainans (N varies due to missing data) Type of information N % Acknowledgement/Receipt of complaint (N=99): Yes 92 92.9 No 7 7 .1 Approximate conclusion date of investigation (N=97): Yes 59 60.8 No 38 39.2 Finding of the case (N=100): Yes 95 95 .0 No 5 5.0 Disposition and disciplinary action taken (when applicable) (N=100): Yes 46 46.0 No 54 54.0 Procedure for appeal by complainant (N=86): Yes 48 55.8 No 38 44.2 Table 7.29 - Publication of complains statistics (N varies due to missing data) 177 Number of items of information N % Are complains statistics disseminated to the public (N=101): Yes 54 53.5 No 47 46.5 Method of publication of statistics (N=51): (Multiple responses possible) Special report published annually 20 39.2 Included in Police Chiefs Annual Report 22 43.1 Press release 14 27.5 Reported to state Department of Justice 4 7.8 Reported to external review agencies 3 5.9 Table 7.30 - Combined Measure of Openness to Provide Public Information (N=99 due to missing data) Policy Definitim N % Open Publishes information 35 35 .4 regarding both complains procedures and complains statistics Average Publishes information 35 35 .4 regarding either complains procedures or complains statistics Closed Publishes no information 29 29.3 178 Complaints Statistics Descriptivesumrnary statistics ofcomplains againstthe police andtheirfindings are displayed in Tables 7.31 and 7.32. The item in the survey instrument concerning the number of incidens giving rise to complains every year (ie: frequently a citizen will make a number of different complains, all of which are docurrented, but which all arose from the sane incident) was, for sorrre reason widely nrisunderstood. Nevertheless, in those 42 agencies which interpreted to question in the way in which it was intended, the indication was that overall, a case investigation often involves more than one complaint. As mentioned in Chapter V, a small nunrber ofresporrdent agencies clearly do not collect systematic data regarding citizen complains, and many others do not break down tleir statistics in the way in which they were requested in the srn'vey instrument. Nevertheless, the majority of agencies ensured that they contributed at least some useful statistical information. The result was that 88.1% of respondens provided details of the number of complains filed against their offices per year and, on average, 75.6% indicated the proportions in which these complains were divided between criminal allegations, excess force, incivility and harassrneru cases, and odlerallegedproceduraloradministrativeviolations. Thefactthatoneagencypointedoutdrat theentire survey instrumenthadtakeneleven and ahalfmanhours to complete (sornewhatin excess of the writer's rather ambitious, yet intentionally encouraging thirty minute estimate) did notgounnoticed,andwasinnosmallpartduetoisefforsirrthisparticularsectionofthe questionnaire! ' The figure of 26.1%, representing the average proportion of all complains sustained, may be slightly misleading in the sense that responses ranged from 2.3% to 79.2% in a sample of only 60. Given this variation, the strong possibility of the data being skewed by a number of outliers suggess that a more reasonable measure of central tendency is the median, or 21.1%. Nevertheless, the apparent wide range in sustained rates between agencies requires sorre explanation. The likelihood is that differing interpretations of what constitues a 'sustained' complairu (although the term was defined in the survey instrument), failure of agencies to distinguish clearly between 'cases' and 'complains', and varying policies concerning recording 179 and screening out complains for full investigations all contribute to the high degree of variance identified.Itwashopedthatmorelightcouldbeshedonthisparticularmatterirrthebivariateand nmltivariatephasesofthe analysis. Table 7.31 - Descriptive Summary Statistics" of Annual Complains Against the Police (N varies due to missing data) Actual Standard Response Complains statistic Mean Median Devn Range N Complains filed per year 340 75 1015 4-6300 89 Cases per year , 118 60 170 2-770 42 Complains ratio 5.4 4.3 4.2 0.5-21.5 89 Percentage of complains 6.3 3.0 11.5 0-80 74 alleging crirre Percentage ofcomplains 38.2 37.0 21.5 1-93 77 alleging excess force, etc. Percentage of complains 54.7 55.5 23 .4 0-99 78 alleging other procedural or administrative violatiors *Median is the preferable measure ofcentral tendency due to skewness. 180 Table 7.32 - Descriptive Summary Statisrics“ of Annual Findings of Complains Against the Police (N varies due to missing data) Actual Standard Response Complains statistic Mean Median Devn Range N Percentage sustained overall 26.1 21.1 18.6 2.3-79.2 60 Crime complaints % sustained 25.0 16.5 28.3 0-99 58 % not sustained 24.4 15.0 27.3 0—99 57 % unfounded 35.2 24.5 33.5 0—99 56 % exonerated 12.5 4.5 20.5 0-97 54 % policy review/failure 1.6 0.0 5.1 0-27 54 Excess force etc. complaints % sustained 13.1 10.0 13.9 0-79 70 % not sustained 34.6 25.0 28.5 0—98 69 % unfounded 26.9 24.0 23.9 0-98 68 % exonerated 25.3 16.0 25.9 0-99 67 % policy review/failure 0.5 0.0 2.1 0-15 64 Other administrative or procedural complaints % sustained 37.4 27.0 26.3 2-91 67 % not sustained 24.6 20.0 20.9 0-98 66 % unfounded 21.6 15.0 20.1 0-80 * 65 % exonerated 15.6 10.0 17.7 0-80 65 % policy review/failure 1.7 0.0 5.7 0-40 61 I"Medianisthepreferablenreasureofcentraltendencyduetoskewness 181 Opinions The final section of the survey instrument was concerned with testing the opinions of individual respondens regarding argurnens frequently voiced when external review of alleged police miscondrrct is the subject of discussion. Respondenswerepresentedwithasetofsixteenstatenens andwereaskedtorepresent theirownpersonalviewsconcemingeachwithinanumericalrangeofl to7,suchthata response of '1' would indicate strong agreement and a response of '7' strong disagreement with a particular statement. Within the numerical range, each integer value was assigned a'specific level of either agreement or disagreenrerrt. In addition, it was emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers. T‘lesetofstatemenscontained l3comrrensgenerallycorsideredtobeeithertypically 'pro' or 'anti' the concept of external civilian review of alleged p030: misconduct. randomly orderedsuchdratthesurveywouldnotappearbiasedonewayordeother. Inaddition,thefirst twostatenensinthesetwereconcerredwithrespondens'opinionsonhowfairandequitable policeoflicers andciviliansconsiderintemalcomplaints investigationstobe, andthefinal statementtoucledupontheissueofpolicecivilliability. Descriptive summary statistics of responses to the staterrens are presented in Tables 7.33 to 7.43. The statement upon which there was the greatest degree of shared opinions was that "Citizens not satisfied with intemal investigation of complains have sufficient alternative avenues to follow, the cours being just one example". Respondens generally agreed,'although once more it should be pointed out that many complains are not suitable for formal hearings, even if dissatisficdcomplainanswishtotaketheircasestocolnt. Conversely, the statement upon which there was the greatest degree of mixed opinions was that "Internal Affairs' goals and complainans' expectations do not necessarily correspond", but with the benefit of hindsight, this statement was perhaps sorrewhat confusing and open to a variety of interpretations. In the context of this study however, it is interesting to note that the statement upon which opinions differed second most widely was concerned with involving citizens in the complaint process in order to improve public confidence in the police. Further 182 examination of opinions regarding this statement thus promised to be ofinterest in the bivariate phase of the analysis. The statement which individual respondens were over all most in agreement with was that "The impartiality of internal investigation of complaints depends heavily upon the integrity of police administrators". Traditionally, this argument has been used by opponens of purely internal complains procedures to highlight the potential for abuse which such systems inherently possess. On this occasion however, the indication was that police officers generally accept this argument to be valid. At the other extreme, most general disagreement was registered, perhaps not surprisingly, towards the statement that "External review boards for investigating complains against the police ‘ provide an impartial and independent assessment of police practices". With regard to police and citizen satisfaction with internal investigations, opinions were divided,humgueralrespmdausmdicaedmm0fficermdcifizencmfidmcesmhuanal systens were evenly matcled, with neither giving particular cause for concern. Finally, respondens generally were in agreement that an honest and open Internal Affairs Unit will lessen a police department's civil liability. Table 7 .33 - Descriptive Sununary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "Police officers feel that internal investigations of complaints are fair and equitable." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 2.96 2.50 1.39 1-6 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree . 3 = Not sure but probably agree 4 = Neither agree ordlsagree 5=Notsurebut probablydisagree 6=Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree 183 Table 7.34 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "Citizens in the community feel that internal investigations of complaints are fair and equitable." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 2.91 3.00 1.20 1-6 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3 =Not sure but probably agree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 5=Notsurebutprobablydisagree 6=Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree Table 7.35 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: " External (or civilian) review of complaints tends to decrease the morale of the police, which can lead to reduced effectiveness and performance.’ Standard Actual ‘ Mean _ Median Deviation Response Range N 2.37 2.00 1.41 1-6 97 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3=Notsurebutprobablyagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 5=Notsurebutprobably disagree 6=Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree 184 Table 7.36 - Descriptive Surnrrrary Statistics of Responses to the Statenent: " Internal Affairs' goals and complainans' expectations do not always correspond." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 3.22 2.00 1.71 1-7 96 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3=Notsurebutprobablyagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 5=Notsurebutprobablydisagree 6=Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree Table 7.37 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statenent: " Civilians are unqualified to judge the propriety of police actions." ‘7’ Standard ' Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 3.27 3.00 1.62 ‘ 1-7 98 Key: 1=Stronglyagree 2=Aglee 3=Notsurebutprobablyagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 5=Notsurebutprobablydisagree 6=Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree 185 Table 7.38 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "External (or civilian) review boards for investigating complaints against the police provide an impartial and independent assessment of police practices." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 5.20 6.00 1.27 2-7 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3 = Not sure but probably agree 4 = Neither agree or disagree 5=Notsurebutprobablydisagree 6=Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree Table 7.39 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Staterrent: " Police officers are'professionals and are thus best able to regulate their own conduct. Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 2.64 2.00 1.32 1-6 ' 98 Key: 1 = Strongly 2 = Agree 381'” 3 = Not sure but probably agree 5 = Not sure but probably disagree 7 = Strongly disagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 6=Disagree 186 Table 7.40 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Staterrent: " Citizens not satified with internal investigation of complaints have sufficient alternative avenues to follow, the courts being just one example." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 2.33 2.00 1.10 1-6 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3=Notsurebutprobablyagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 5=N0tsurebutprobablydisaglee 6=Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree Table 7.41 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Staterrent: "The impartiality of internal investigation of complaints depends heavily upon the integrity of senior police administrators." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 1.81 2.00 1.16 1-6 98 Key: 1 = Strongly 2 = Agree 381°C 3=N0tsurebutprobably agree 5 = Not sine but probably disagree 7 = Strongly disagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 6=Disagree 187 Table 7.42 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "Involving interested citizens in the complaint process can lead to increased public confidence and can therefore be advantageous to the police department." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 4.14 4.00 1.64 1-7 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 3 = Not sure but probably agree 5=Notsurebutprobablydisagree 7 = Strongly disagree Table 7.43 - Descriptive Sunrrnary Statisties of Responses to the Staterrent: "External (or civilian) involvement in the disciplinary process interferes with the authority of the Police Chief." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 2.47 2.00 1.39 1-7 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3=Notsurebutprobablyagree 5 = Not sure but probably disagree 7 = Strongly disagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 6=Disagree 188 Table 7.44 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: "One advantage which internal review systems have over external review systems is that, under internal review, officers can actively seek out malpractice within the police department, whereas under external review a citizen must first make a complaint before anything can be done." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 1.81 2.00 1.16 1-6 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3=Notsurebutprobablyagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 5=Not surebut probably disagree 6: Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree Table 7.45 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Staterrent: "Independent external investigation of complaints against the police is less likely to be biased than is internal investigation." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 3.05 2.00 1.61 1-7 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree . 3 = Not sure but probably agree 4 = Neither agree or disagree 5=Notsurebutprobablydisagree 6=Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree 189 Table 7.46 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Staterrent: "External interest in complaints investigation is natural and reasonable." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 3.05 2.00 1.61 1-7 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3=Notsurebutprobablyagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 5 = Not sure but probably disagree 6 = Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree Table 7.47 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Statement: " Civilian Review Boards have been shown to be unworkable and ineffective." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 3.30 3.00 1.22 1-6 97 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3=Notsrnebutprobablyagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 5=Notsurebut probably disagree 6=Disagree. 7=Stronglydisagree 190 Table 7 .48 - Descriptive Summary Statistics of Responses to the Staterrent: "An honest and open Internal Affairs Unit will lessen a police department's civil liability." Standard Actual Mean Median Deviation Response Range N 2.30 2.00 1.47 1-6 98 Key: 1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3=Notsurebutprobablyagree 4=Neitheragreeordisagree 5=Notsurebutprobablydisagree 6=Disagree 7 = Strongly disagree Univariate Analysis Summary The univariate analysis of survey returns produced a considerable amount of infomration concerning the citizen complaint procedures of respondent police agencies. Certain aspecs of systems were found to be generally consistent throughout. Procedln'al changes typically result from management decisions, Intemal Affairs investigators generally are selected on the basis of their reputation for ability and integrity, and a supervisor is the person most likely to initially record a complaint, which can invariably be filed 24 hours a day. Furthermore, the same general set of alternative case findings and dispositions is used by most agencies, and only very rarely are subject officersnotentitled to appealtlreresultoftheircases. Although many similarities exist however, there are also substantial and significant differences in certain aspecs of departmental complains policies. In the context of this study, perhaps the most noteworthy difference is that some departrnens are subject to external civilian review of their procedures whereas others operate traditional intenral systems. Whilst many agencies favor the use of the polygraph as an investigative aid in complains investigations, 191 numerous other departrrrens either choose not to use it or are prevented from doing so by state law. The typical rank of a complaint investigator varies widely between departmens, as do official policies regarding the informal resolution of complains and the publication of information regarding b0th complains procedtues and statistics. Furthermore, differences exist between the proportion of all complains sustained in certain agencies as compared with others. As identified in Tables 7.33 to 7.48, individual officers also vary in their opinions on a range of argunens traditionally concemed with the subject of external review of alleged police misconduct. It is towards a further examination of some of the more substantial differences in both policies and opinions which the bivariate analysis to be presented in the next section ofthis chapter is directed Bivariate Analysis In this section. a variety of bivariate relationships are examined in fun distinct stages: relationships between jurisdictional and agency factors and both complains statistics and features of complains systerrs, relationships between the statistics produced by complains systems and the systems themselves, associations between different aspecs of complains procedures, and relationships between police officers' ranks and assignmens and their opinions concerning external review of complains procedures. Allofthe29neasluesdiscussedinChapterVwereusedasvariablesfordtebivariate analysis, with the exception of 'Geographical location'. In part due to sample skewness, the Chi-square test was primarily utilized, and consequently it was necessary for the variables to be ordinal in nature and capable of categorization into several meaningful levels for the sake of analysis. Because of the way in which respondent agencies were distribued throughout the USA, this could not be achieved with the 'Geographical location' variable, since it was felt that aggregating agencies into such categories as 'North‘, 'South', 'East' and 'West' was neither reasonable nor likely to reveal anything of value. For the only other nominal variable, 'Agency level', the use of a statistical tool primarily intended for analyzing ordinal data did not present a 192 problem since the 'Agency level' variable was dichotomous, thereby allowing Chi-square resuls to be interpreted correctly. The remaining 27 variables, of which 11 were concerned with environmental or general agency factors, 6 with complains statistics, 8 with features of citizen complaint systems, and 2 with characteristics of individual respondents were categorized for the purpose of analysis according to the schemes presented in Tables 7.49 to 7.53. The majority of the variables whose vahles were in the form of raw data were divided into four categories, whilst most of the specially created measures were trichotomized. Table 7.49 - Categorization of General Agency Factors for Bivariate Analysis (N varies due to missing data) Factor Value Definition N Number of sworn officers (N=101) Low Under 100 19 Medium 100 - 499 42 Intemediate 500 - 999 . 19 High 1000 or more 21 Population/Officer ratio (N=98) Low Under 500 34 Medium 500 - 749 45 High , 750 or more 19 Percentage of minority officers (N=92) Low Under 10 34 Medium 10 - 19 30 High 20 or nrore 28 Racial integration (N=78) Excellent Under 1.03 16 Good 1.03 - 1.09 20 Fair 1.10 - 1.25 23 Poor 1.26 or more 19 193 Table 7.50 - Categorization of Environmental Factors for Bivariate Analysis (N varies due to missing data) Factor Value Definition N Residential Population (10003) (N=99) Small Under 100 16 Medium 100 - 499 46 Internediate 500 - 999 12 Large 1000 or more 15 Racial Diversity (Percentage of minorities in population) Low Under 15 28 =86) Medium 15 - 30 24 High Over 30 34 Percentage unemployment (N=86) Low Under 5 24 Medium 5 - 9 54 High 10 or more 8 Percentage of families at or below poverty level Low Under 5 12 (N=86) Medium 5 - 9 37 High 10 or rrrore 37 Median income (1979) ($10005) (N=86) Low Under 20 38 Medium 20 - 24 36 High 25 or more 12 Crime rate/100,000 population - (N =82) Low Under 5000 12 Medium 5000 - 7499 26 Intermediate 7500 - 9999 26 High 10000 or more 18 Percentage violent crime (N=95) Low Under 5 14 Medium 5 - 9 31 Internediate 10 - 14 33 High 15 or more 17 194 Table 7.51 - Categorization of Annual Complains Statistics for Bivariate Analysis (N varies due to missing data) Statistic Vahre Definition N Complaints filed per year (N=89) Low Under 50 25 Medilun 50 - 99 23 Interrrediate 100 - 199 16 High 200 or more 25 Complaints ratio (N=89) Poor Under 2.00 15 Fair 2.00 - 4.99 40 Good 5.00 - 9.99 25 Exoellerrt 10.00 or rrrore 9 Percentage of complaints alleging crime Low Under 3 35 (N=74) Average 3 - 9 26 High 10 or more 13 Percentage of complaints alleging excess force, etc. Low Under 25 23 (N=77) Average 25 - 49 30 High 50 or more 24 Percentage of complaints alleging other rocedurai Low Under 30 12 or administrat ve violations Average 30 - 59 31 (N=78) High . 60 or more 35 Percentage sustained overall (N= 60) Low Under 20 26 Average 20 - 39 22 High 40 or more 12 195 Table 7.52 - Categorization of Complains System Features for Bivariate Analysis (N varies due to missing data) System feature Value Definition N Existence of formal external review (N=93) Yes - 15 No - 78 Existence of Internal Affairs or similar complaints unit Yes - 87 =101) No - 14 Rank of typical IA investigator (N=87) Line - 11 Sergeant - 55 Lieutenant - 16 Captain/Major - 5 Existence of time limit on complaints investigations Yes - 65 (N=101) No - 36 Openness to accept complaints (N=101) Reticent 3 - 5 poins“ 22 Average 6 - 8 poins“ 41 Welcoming 9 -10 poins" 38 Openness to provide public information (N=99) Open See Table 7 .30 35 Average See Table 7.30 35 _ Closed See Table 7.30 29 Proportion of complaints fully investigated (N=94) Most See Table 7.15 17 Average See Table 7.15 65 least See Table 7.15 12 Items of information provided to complainans (N=101) Least 2 or fewer" 25 Average 3 or 4“ 57 Most 5“ 19 *Poins scores refer to schedule detailed in Appendix II "Numbers refer to items of information listed in Table 7.28 196 Table 7.53 - Categorization of Individual Respondents' Ranks and Assignments for Bivariate Analysis (N varies due to missing data) Characteristic Value N Rank (N=95) Line or Sergeant 20 Lieutenant 33 Captain or Major 33 Chief or Director of Public Safety 9 Assignment (N =96) Not involved in complaints 15 Complaints investigator 42 Complaints administrator 30 Chief or Director of Public Safety 9 Relationships between Jurisdictional and Agency Features and Complaints Statistics and Systems Tables 7.54 to 7.62 indicate that very few statistically significant relationships were found to exist between either jurisdictional or agency characteristics and complaints statistics, apart from those which were intuitively obvious. 'I'hus,thenumberofoomplaints was foundtobestrongly relatedtothepopulationofthe jurisdiction.theagency size,thecrinerateandthepereemageofviolenterimereportedcrable 7.54). All ofthese relationships were indicated to be statistically significant at the .001 error level. with Gamma ranging between 0.41 and 0.79 thus indicating the existence of strong relationships. Clearly, this is a result which could have been anticipated since the four variables concerned could be expected to be strongly irrterconelated. Large urban areas, requiring sizeable police departments, traditionally have m from a relatively higher incidence of both general and violent crime than have more rural police jurisdictions. The indicated associations therefore anaresuggestiveofthesamesnaightfomardfact-thelargerandless safeacitybecomes,the 197 greateristheneedforpolice officers, andthereforethehigherwillbecometheincidence of citizen complaints Interestingly, when ratios rather than raw figures are considered, they are found to be unrelated to complaints statistics. The population/officer ratio, for example was not significantly associated with any of the complaints statistics, including the number of complaints, in the zero-orderrelationships. nrereisnoindicationdrereforethatchangesirrthenumberofpolice officers available to serve a given population will influence the number of citizen complaints filed Similarly, the complaints ratio, a measure which indicates the number of officers required to generate a single complaint, was not related to any of the jurisdiction or agency size variables ortotheirrcidenceandtypeofcrime. Thissuggeststhatchangesinpopulationoragencysizeor mmepananofwmnfissimofcfimeswiflunagivenjmisdicfimwmnabeassodmedwhh changes inthe relative incidence ofcomplaints againstthe police. With one exception, none of the economic or population diversity measures, nor those variabhsdesignedtoreflecttheracialdiversity and integrationofagencbsmxhibitedstatistically significant relationships with any ofthe complaints statistics under consideration. The one assodafimwhichwasmdicawdwasbeMeenmepeMgeofmnmlainmodnrmmuimem excess forcecases andthepercentageofminoritiesinthepopulation. Sincethethreedifferent categories ofcomplaintweregenerally foundnottobe associatedeitherwithfeatures of jurisdictions orwith mtemalandextemar characteristics ofrespondent agettctes despite being significant at the .01 level this result was treated as spurious. Additionallymeitherthecomplaints ratio northe overallpercentage ofcomplaints sustained wereassociatedwithanyofthe agency orjurisdictionalfactorsincludedinthisstageofthe analysis. The indication was therefore that the large variance in the overall percentage of complaints sustained. which waits identified during the univariate analysis, was due to factors other than general agency and environmental factors. Finally, although the number of complaints filed was strongly associated with departmental size, it exhibited no association with agency level. City and county departments therefore appear wshmemesmmprobbmsmgardmgflremcidenceofcidzmcomplaintsagamstdr police. 198 The majority of those relationships discovered between both jurisdictional agency characteristics and complaints statistics were thus relatively predictable. However, the corresponding analysis substituting features of complaints systems for complaints statistics, in addition to resulting in a number of comparable findings produced some results of interest The existence of both external review of complaints procedures and of Internal Affairs units were generally indicated to be related to those four agency and jurisdictional factors discussed above which were most strongly associated with the number of complaints filed: population of jurisdiction, agency size, crirrre rate and percentage of violent crime reported (Tables 7.55 and 7.56). For those relationships which were statistically significant, Gamma ranged from -0.24 to -0.72 (the negative sign being introduced because of the way in which the datawerecoded)indicatingthatexternalreviewandtheuseofIAUsarebothstronglyassociated with size and crime considerations. From the same Tables, there was no indication that city or county agencies different significantly in their involvement with either of these two features of complaints investigation systems. City and county agencies did differ, however in their policies concerning the appropriate rank for investigators of citizen complaints. The 'Rank of Typical IA Investigator’ variable also exhibited a statistically significant relationship with agency size (Table 7.57). For both associations, Gamma took on an intermediate negative value (-0.49 and -0.43 respectively) indicating relationships of moderate strength. This suggests that, among agencies with IAUs, both smaller agencies and city departments tend to favor the use of senior officers (Lieutenants and above) as complaints investigators, whereas larger agencies and county departments are more likely to use line officers or sergeants. 199 Table 7.54 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Number of Complaints Filed per year by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of sworn officers 5876*" 0.79 City or County agency 3.65 0.35 Residential population 4225*“ 0.77 Unemployment 7.78 0.32 Poverty 9.12 0.40 Median income 5.68 -0.17 Population/Officer ratio 10.93 036 Percentage of minority officers 11.16 0.38 Racial diversity of population 9.48 0.36 Racial integration of agency 13.73 N 0.27 Crime rate 2995*" 0.58 Percentage ofviolentcrime 4 2732*"- 0.41 *p<.05; **p<.01; *“p<.001 Table 7.55 - Descriptive Summary Statisties for Existence of External Review by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of sworn officers 1896*" -0.7 2 City or County agency 0.01 0.18 Residential population 7.12 -0.56 U! :.rrployment 4.36 -0.55 Poverty 3.05 -0.32 Median income 3.22 -0.13 Population/Officer ratio 6.05“ 0.55 Percentage of minority officers 3.26 -0.37 Racial diversity of population 7 .41* -0.59 Racial integration of agency 3.51 024 Crime rate 1039* -0.48 Percentage of violent crime 5.00 ’ -0.35 *p<.05; **p<.01; “*p<.001 201 Table 7.56 - Descriptive 8 Statistics fm' Existence of Internal Affairs Unit by Selected Envimnmental and Agency Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of sworn officers 15.11" -0.71 City or County agency 0.10 -0.37 Residential population 12.09“ -0.63 Unemployment 0.35 . 0.17 Poverty _ 0.87 -0.26 Median income 0.22 -0.14 Population/omen ratio 3.16 0.43 Percentage ofrninority officers 4.57 -0.35 Racial diversity of population 2.17 -0.39 Racial integration of agency 4.46 -0.34 Crime rate 3.25 ‘ i 041 Percentage ofviolent crime 13.18" -0.24 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 202 Table 7 .57 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Rank of Typical Intemal Affairs Investigator by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of sworn officers 18.35“ 049 City or County agency ' 8.26“ on Residential population 13.05 -0.37 Unemployment 3.33 -0.05 - Poverty 4.87 0.01 Median income 1.91 -0.08 Population/Officer ratio 6.24 0.06 Percentage of minority officers 5.73 -0.01 Racial diversity of population 3.38 -0.12 Racial integration of agency 4.46 -0.03 Crime rate 11.43 033 Percentage of violent crirrre 8.89 -0.19 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 203 Table 7.58 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for the existence of Time Limits on Complaints Investigations by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of sworn officers 4.36 -0.25 City or County agency 0.09 0.16 Residential population 5.15 -0.27 ' Unemployment 2.25 -o.3o Poverty 0.39 -0.08 Median income 1.07 -0.04 Population/Officer ratio 2.21 0.24 Percentage of minority ofi‘icers 2.31 -0.24. Racial diversity of population 1.34 -0.20 Racial integration of agency 0.77 ' 0.88 Crime rate 0.47 0.01 Percentage of violent crime 1.47 -0.16 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 Table 7.59 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Agency Openness to Accept Complaints by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of sworn officers 4.72 «0.10 City or County agency 3.68 -0.29 Residential population 7.37 -0.05 Unemployment 1.79 0.17 Poverty 3.83 0.08 Median income 1082* -0. 15 Population/Officer ratio 1.34 0.10 Percentage of minority officers 1.45 0.13 Racial diversity of population 5.17 0.05 Racial integration of agency 4.62 0.13 Crime rate 6.42 0.05 Percentage of violent crime 3.53 0.16 *p<.05; “p<.01;*“p<.ml 205 Table 7.60 - Descriptive Surmnary Statistics for Agency Openness to provide Public Information by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of sworn officers 12.06 -0.28 City or County agency 3.20 0.07 Residential population 12.07 -0.25 Unemployment 7.52 -0.36 Poverty 6.98 -0.20 Median income 6.88 0.16 Population/Officer ratio 3.33 0.18 Percentage of minority officers 13.55" -0.47 Racial diversity of population 8.96 -0.38 Racial integration of agency 1325* -0.24 Crime rate 8.25 -0.24 Percentage of violent crime 15.23“ —0.28 *p<.05; Mp<.01; ***p<.001 Table 7.61 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Proportion of Complaints Fully Investigated by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of sworn officers 3.65 -0.16 City or County agency 0.68 0.13 Residential population 8.39 -0.23 Unemployment 12.77“ -0.24 Poverty 2.15 -0. 10 Median income 3.39 -0.09 Population/Officer ratio 3.54 0.19 Percentage of minority officers 1.50 -0.05 Racial diversity of population 7.96 -0.16 Racial integration of agency 11.20 -0.44 Crime rate 11.13 -0.45 Percentage of violart crime 1225* -0.36 *p<.05; "p<.01; mp<.001 Table 7.62 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Information Provided to Complainants by Selected Environmental and General Agency Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of sworn officers . 5 .79 -0.13 City or County agency 1.47 -0.27 Residential population 4.13 -0.15 Unemployment 3.24 0.12 Poverty 2.76 -0.10 Median income 1.66 0.05 Population/Officer ratio 1.94 -0.12 Percentage of minority officers 0.39 0.06 Racial diversity of population _ 3.10 _ -0.23 Racial integration of agency 3.86 007 Crime rate 6.18 -0.15 Percentage of violent crime 3.69 -0.15 *p<.05; **p<.01; "*p<.001 208 hrgetmldreremainingcharacteristicsofagencycitizencomplaints systems failedto exhibit systematic relationships withanyoftheenvironmentalorextemalagency featureslmder consideration, with one notable exception. Opetmess to provide public information was indicated to be associated at the .05 error level with departmental racial integration and at the .01 error level with the percentage of minority officers employed (Table 7.60). Interestingly, for both relationships Gamma took on negative values, indicating on the one hand that the worse an agency'sracialilrtegr'atiorr,dremoreopenittendstobewithrespecttopublicizirrgcitizen complaints information, and on the other hand that the fewer the percentage of minority officers employed by a department. the more closed it tends to be. These apparently conflicting results may arise from the way in which the 'openness' variable was created, since there was no means of ascertaining whether one of the two forms of public information was playing a major role in defining relationships. Nevertheless, the results appear to indicate that racial considerations may play a part in shaping departmental policy regarding publicizing the complaints process. Relationships between Complaints Statistics and Complaints Procedures Very few statistically significant relationships were found to exist between complaints statistics andthe systems which giverisetothem. In particular,none ofthethreepercentage categories of complaint nor the complaints ratio exhibited associations with any of the eight procedural variables under consideration. The presence ofexternal review mechanisms and IAUs were both indicated to be strongly associated in zero-order relationships with the number of complaints filed (Table 7.63), findings which again reflected the close correlation of the latter variable with population and agency size. A relationship which had been anticipawd and which was found not to exist was that betweentheexistenceofanagencypoficyregardhrgfimefinfitsmhrvesfigafimsandthe complaints ratio. It seems reasonable to infer that the busier agency personnel are in investigating citizen complaints, the more likely senior management are to institute time limits, in order to ensure that no investigations are inadvertently being overlooked. In practice, this proves not to be the case, suggesting that positive management initiatives, rather than simple necessity, tend 209 generally to give rise to investigative time limits in citizen complaints procedures. Finally, departmental openness to accept complaints was indicated to be negatively related to the overall percentage of complaints sustained, although the association was very weak (Gamma = -0.10). The suggestion is therefore that a slight tendency exists for agencies which are reticent with regard to initially accepting complaints to tend to sustain a greater proportion of mosewlucharefibdmanagarcieswhichammomwelconungmwardscomplainants. Thisisan interesting finding which could result from the policies of 'reticent' agencies being more effective in initially screening out those complaints which are unlikely to be sustained than the policies of 'welcoming' agencies. Relationships Between Features of Agency Citizen Complaints Systems The examination of the internal associations between the eight aspects of agency citizen complainm procedures under consideration gave rise some of the most interesting results discovered during the bivariate phase of the analysis. Inthecorltextofthisstudy,itisparticularly ofinterestthattheexistenceofsomeformof external review was the feature of agency complaints system which was most closely associated with other citizen complaint policies and procedures (Table 7 .64). Openness to provide public information, the specification of time limits on investigations, and the rank of a typical investigator were all associated at the .05 error level or lower with the presence of external review, with Gamma taldng on values of 0.62, 0.82 and 0.79 respectively, indicating the existence of extremely strong relationships. Thus, police agencies which are subject to some formofextemalreviewtendtobethosewhicharemore openinproviding irrforrnationtothe public regarding citizen complaints, those which specify time limits on their investigations, and those which use lower ranking officers to investigate complaint cases. With regard to the latter finding, as discussed earlier the use of senior officers as . investigators is favored by smaller city departnrents, which tend not to be subject to external review, and so these two results are consistent. With regard to the former two findings, whilst causalrelationships werenotintendedasthe focus ofthis study,itisdifficultto irnaginehow 210 policies of departmental openness and time limits on investigations could result in decisions being made to subject police agency citizen complaint procedures to external scrutiny. Conversely however, it seems reasonable to suggest that the presence of an external review agency may make a police department more aware of the requirements borh for timeliness and openness in its processing of citizen complaints. On the subject of disseminating information regarding complaints pmdures, the provision of information for complainants was found to be strongly associated (Gamma = 0.63) at the .05 error level with the existence of IAUs (Table 7.64). However, closer examination of the crosstabulation indicated that departments with Internal Affairs Units are less likely rather than more likely to provide information to complainants than are departments with no specialized investigators. This was the only significant relationship exhibited by IAUs with respect to other features of agency complaints systems and could, ill part be associated with their traditional tendency to be reluctant to provide any infomation regarding details of their activities. Departmental openness to accept complaints was found to be significantly associawd with the proportion of complaints fully investigated. For this particular relationship, Gamma took on a moderate negative value {-0.29) which, because of the way in which the data was coded, indicated that the more open agencies are to accept complaints, the more likely they are to fully and formally investigate all reports. This result appears to highlight one of the reasons for the wide discrepancies discovered in agency rates of sustained complaints. It is to be expected that agencies which nor only favor openness to accept all complaints, irrespecrive of source and content, but also fully investigate all such reports will achieve lower sustained rates than agencies which are selective in both accepting and investigating complaints. In addition to being related to the existence of external review mechanisms, the specification of time limits on investigations was also associated with the provision of information both to the general public and to complainants in particular (Table 7.66). Again, it seerm reasonable that the more control which senior managenrent have over the timely processing of complaints, the better placed they will be to provide relevant and recent information to those groups or individuals in the community they are seeking to keep informed. 211 Table 7.63 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Existence of Extemal Review by Other Complaints System Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number ofcomplaints filed 12.43“ -0.71 Existence of Internal Affairs Unit 0.00 -0.02 Typical investigatorrank 808* 0.79 Existence of time limit 5.44“ 0.82 Openness to accept complaints 3.11 0.32 Openness to provide public information 11.10" 0.62 Proportion fully investigated 1.51 0.34 Information provided to complainants 1.63 -0.20 *p<.05; **p<.01: ***p<.001 Table 7.64-Descriptive Srunrnary Statistics forExistenceofInternalAffairs Unitby Other Complaints System Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square ' Garrrrna Number of complaints filed 8.00* -0.48 Existence of External Review 0.00 -0.02 Typical investigator rank Existence of tine limit 2.04 0.49 Openness to accept complaints 2.86 0.44 Openness to provide public information 2.22 0.06 Proportion fully investigated 0.98 0.13 Information provided to complainants 9.05* 0.63 *p<.05; **p<.01: ***p<.001 212 Table 7.65 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Rank of Typical Internal Affairs Investigator by Other Complaints System Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of complaints filed 15.93 -0.27 Existence of External Review 808* 0.79 Existence of Internal Affairs Unit Existence of time limit 3.01 0.31 Openness to accept complaints 8.49 0.35 Openness to provide public information 8.07 0.40 Proportion fully investigated 4.16 028 Information provided to complainants 1.38 0.12 *p<.05; *‘fp<.01: ***p<.001 Table 7 .66 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Existence of Time Limit on Investigations by Other Complaints System Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of complaints filed 4.35 - -0.27 Existence of External Review 689* 0.82 Existence of Internal Afiairs Unit 2.04 0.49 Typical investigatorrank 3.01 0.31 Openness to accept complaints 0.42 0.11 Openness to provide public information 10.32" 0.51 Proportion fully investigated 0.06 -0.01 Information provided to complainants 6.69" -0.44 *p<.05; "p<.01: "*p<.001 213 Table 7.67 - Descriptive Summary Statisties for Agency Openness to Accept Complaints by Other Complaints System Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of complaints filed 5.55 0.12 Existence of External Review 3.11 0.32 Existmce of Internal Affairs Unit 2.86 0.44 Typical investigator rank 8.49 0.35 Existence of time limit 0.42 0.11 Openness to provide public information 0.91 -0.02 Proportion fully investigated 11.68“ 029 Information provided to complainants 2.17 0.17 *p<.05; l""‘p<.01: ***p<.001 Table 7.68 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Agency Openness to Provide Public Information by Other Complaints System Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of complaints filed ' 7.98 ' -0.19 Existence ofExtemal Review 11.10" 0.62 Existence of Internal Affairs Unit 2.22 0.06 Typical investigator rank 8.01 0.23 Existence of time limit 10.32" 0.51 Openness to accept complaints 0.91 -0.02 Proportion fully investigated 2.06 0.11 Information provided to complainants 7 .33 -0.32 *p<.05; **p<.01: ***p<.001 214 Table 7.69 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Proportion of Complaints Fully Investigated by Other Complaints System Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor - Chi-square Gamma Number of complaints filed 6.93 -0.20 Existence of External Review 1.51 0.34 Existence of Internal Affairs Unit 0.98 0.13 Typical Investigator rank 4.16 -0.28 Existence of time limit 0.06 -0.01 Openness to accept complaints 11.68* —0.29 Openness to provide public information 2.06 0.11 Information provided to complainants 5.56 0.08 *p<.05; **p<.01: ***p<.001 Table 7 .70 - Descriptive Summary Statistics for Information Provided to Complainants by Other Complaints System Factors (N varies due to missing data) Factor Chi-square Gamma Number of complaints filed 5.54 -0.05 Existence of External Review 1.63 020 Existence of Internal Affairs Unit 9.05* 0.63 Typical investigator rank 1.38 0.12 Existence of time limit 669* -0.44 Openness to accept complaints 2.17 0.17 Openness to provide public information 7.33 -0.32 Proportion fully investigated 5 .56 0.08 *p<.05; **p<.01: ***p<.001 215 Relationships between Police Officers' Ranks and Assignments and their Opinions concerning External Review of Complaints Procedures Offlwsixteenstatennntscmcanhngexwmalcivflianmviewofanemdpofice misconduct and the activities of IAUs which were described in the rnrivariate analysis, several gave rise to such widespread consistency between individual respondents' opinions that bivariate examination of them was impractical. However, of the staterrrents upon which respondents varied in their opinions, responses to five of those concerned with external review exhibited significant relationships with either the ranks or assignments of those individuals who had completed the questionnaire. In particular, opinions regarding the statement that "Civilians are unqualified tojudge the propriety ofpoliceactions" wererelatedbothtorankandassigrrment, suchthatthemoresenior arrofficer, orthegleaterhis involvementin amanagernent capaciryincitizencomplaint investigations,themorelikely washetoregisterdisagleementwiththestatement. Inbothcases. Gamma took on the value of 0.26 indicating relatively weak relationships, although for rank the association was indicated to exist at the .001 error level and for assignment at the .01 error level Rank of individual respondent was found to be statistically significantly related to opinions held on only one otherofthesetofstatements. Sirnilarto above,itwasdiscoveredthatsenior officers were more prepared to accept the potential involvement of citizens in the complaint processthanweteofficers oflesserrank Ontllis occasion, opinions ofjrmiorand senior officers differed on whether external interest in complaints investigation is natural and reasonable. Assignment and level of irrvolvenrent in the complaint process was discovered to be significantly associated with three further statements regarding external review of alleged police misconduct, although again the values of Gamma suggested the presence of weak relationships. Oncemore,oneachoccasiontheindicationwasthatthemoreapolice officerbecornes involved in the management aspects of complaints investigations, ill general the rrrore favorably he tends to view the concept of external civilian involvement in the complaints system. Thus, complaints administratorsmdpoficeclfiefsturdedtoagreemomfiequenflymandiddroseofficerseidrernm 216 directly involved in complaints investigations or involved as investigators, that involving mtaeswdcifizemmdnwmplaintprwesscmleadtomcmasedpubliccmfidencemdcm therefore be advantageous to the police department. Similarly, they tended to disagree more than their subordinates with the statements "External (or civilian) involvement in the disciplinary process interferes with the authority of the Police Chief," and "Extemal (or civilian) review of complaints tends to decrease the morale ofthe police which can lead to reduced effectiveness and performance." Bivariate Analysis Summary Overall, inthecontextoftheresearchquestionsstatedinthisstudythebivariateanalysis produced some findings which were of interest and others which were considerably more predictable. Thus, while the number of complaints filed was consistently related both to jufisdicfimdsinmainudmaaaisficsadeepammsin,meqpesofcmnpmfled arrdtheoverallpercentageofcomplaints sustainedexhibitednosuchrelationships. Very few differences in citizen complaints investigation and disposition were found betweurchyandcmlntyagenciesodwrmmmemdicafimmmmmmoseagawieswim InternalAffairs Units,city agenciestendtouseseniorofficets (Lieutenantsandabove)as investigators relatively more frequently than do cormty agencies. Populationandagencysizefactorsalsotendtobepositivelyrelatedtotheexistencebothof external review mechanism and Internal Affairs Units, but ethnographic and socioeconomic features of agency jurisdictions generally exhibit no association with either complaints statistics or departmental citizen complaint policies. There is sorrre evidence that policies which result in departments appearing less welcoming to complainants result in a number of those complaints which are unlikely to be sustained being screened out and not recorded, thus raising rates of sustained complaints. In addition, there is radermoreevidencedratthesfiprflafionoffimelinfitsoncomplahrts investigaticnstendstobea management initiative associated with a desire to operate timely and relatively open citizen complaint procedures. Conversely, tinre limits and system openness may be forced upon 217 unwilling police departments by external review agencies. . Finally, senior officers and individuals who are concerned with citizen complaint procedrrresmmanagenentcapacifiestendtobemomsympammcwwardsm'gmmtsmfavmof extemalcivilianreview ofalleged police misconductthandojuniorofficers and those notdirectly involved in complaints investigations. Multivariate Analysis The bivariate analysis was concerned with examining fourdistinct sets ofrelationships: those betweenjurisdictional and agency factors and both complaints statistics and features of complaints system, those between different aspects of complaints prowdures, and those between police officer’s ranks and assignments and their opinions concerning external review of complaints procedrues. Multivariate analysis provided an opporurnitytoexploreinrathermoredepththefactors whkmtakentogethercontributetowards sormofthedifferencesbothincomplaints statistics and inopinionsconcemingextemalreviewwhichwereidentifiedintheprevioustwophasesofthe analysis. Thenudfivuiatemalysis,wlfichusednuddplemgressimasinrhmrysmfisdcal technique, was only exploratory, if not unashamedly speculative in nature. Nevertheless, it was a heuristic extension of the bivariate phase. Five regression analyses were undertaken. Two analyses were intended to provide mfomafimconcemmepowuofcutainjmismicdmalmdagamyfaamsmkaw predicttlrenumberofcitizencomplaints filed,onewasconcernedwithexplainingthevariancein drepemmgeofcomplaintsmsminedmdafirrdrertwowemdesigmdmem officers' opinions concerning external review while taking into account certain characteristics ofthe agmcies in which they work. Since multiple regression was used, it was necessary to select independent and dependent variables which were at least ordinal, and preferably continuous and interval in nature. All of the variables utilized in the regression analysis were therefore interval in nature with the exception of respondents' ranks and assignments (ie: the extent of their involvement in the complaints 218 process) which were ordinal Although care was taken to ensure that the independent variables utilizeddidnotexhibitany significantintercorrelations capable ofconfusingtheresultsofthe analyses, they were primarily selected using an exploratory theory-based approach: adopting a conflict view of society, it seems likely that both real and perceived problerm existing within a communitycancreatehostileattitudestowardsthe police, whichmay ultimatelybeassociated with the filing of citizen complaints. Thus, in addition to departmental size, other factors which were examined for their predictive power with respect to the number of complaints filed were unemployment and crime rates, degree of departmental racial integration, and jurisdictional median income. In anticipation of the discovery of a strong relationship between agency size and number of complaints filed, a secondanalysis attemptedtocontrolagencysizeinadifferentwaybyutilizingthecomplairrtratio (a measure of the relative frequency of filing of complaints) as the dependent variable. Thedfirdmalysismawemedwimmepemalmeofcomphinmarstmexammwme mhfimshipbetweenthisfigmemdbommenumberofcomplainmfiledanddepamnuual openness to accept complaints. Tire major reason for the choice ofregressors on this occasion wasmmdwbivanmemalysishadmdicmedmamosedepamnmwhichamlessopenw complainants, and which are effectively more selective in the types of complaint they are prepared to record for investigation, tend to sustain fewer complaints than those departments which accept and investigate everything Finally, for the last two analyses, it was considered likely that the views of individual officers mightbeinfluencednotonly bytheirmnkandassiglrmarcbutalsobytheextentoftheir department's involvement with citizen complaints. In particular, officers employed by an agency which rarely attracts complaints may be expected to hold difiefing opinions on the subject of complaints investigations than those held by officers from agencies whose employees are regularly complained against. Responses to two of the arguments upon which individual respondents had exhibited the widest difference of opinions were therefore examined by taking into accountnot orrlytlleirrankorassigrlnrenebutalsodreirdepartmentalsize arrdtlrerelative frequency with which officers in their department were the subject of citizen complaints. 219 The results of the five analyses are presented in Tables 7.71 to 7.75, the statistics reported in which benefit from a short explanation. The standardized regression coefficient indicates the change inthe dependentvariable which accompanies aunitchange in the regressor, ifall other regressors remain constant. Similarly, the level of significance of the regression coefficient reflects the existence or otherwise of a statistically significant relationship between the regressor and the dependent variable while all other regressors are held constant. R Squared (the multiple coefficient of determination) indicates the proportion ofvariance ill the dependent variable that is explained by all of the regressors taken together. Finally, the F statistic, to which the level of significancereported atthefoot ofeach table relates, representstlreratioforrrred by dividingthe variance explained by the regression equation by the unexplained variance. Table 7.71 thus indicates that, with all other regressors held constant, the single factor wmchismebeupmdictmofdenumberofcifizenwmphhlmfibdisdepamnanalsize. This result is, naturally, only to be expected, but the overwhelming influence of the 'departmental size' factor is indicated by the fact that. not only is it the only factor to exhibit a significant regression coefficient, but the vahle of its coefficient is 0.82. Given the reported value of R Squared, departmental size therefore makes a major contribution towards explaining 68% of the variance irl reported complaint rates. Conversely, when departmental size is held constant, none ofthe economic, racial, orcrime factors which nrightbe expected to give rise to community. dissatisfaction and hostility are found to be significantly related to the number of complaints filed. This finding is emphasized by the results of the analysis presenwd in Table 7.72, which shows that when complaints are considered in terms of a complaint ratio which indicates the relative frequency with which complaints are filed, no statistically significant relationships exist between economic, racial or crime characteristics of jmisdictions and the filing of complaints against the police, even when other factors are held constant. Differential rates of sustaining complaints are examined in Table 7.73. Taken together, the number of complaints fibd and departmental openness to accept complaints were found to be significantly related to the percentage of complaints sustained (F = 3.20), although they only explained a small proportion (10%) of the variance exhibited in agency rates of sustaining 220 complaints. When considered alone with the other factor held constant however, the number of complaints exhibited nruch the stronger association with the percentage of complaints sustaimd. An initial indication was thus that the percentage of complaints sustained may exhibit a simple relationship with the number of complaints filed, an association which had not been addressed during the earlier bivariate phase of the analysis. Consequently, a crosstabulation was undertaken between these two variables, with the perhaps surprising result that they failed to exhibit a statistically significant zero-order relationship. The implication of all these results taken together is that, when policies concerning the acceptance and recording of complaints are taken into account, the percentage of complaints sustained is related to the number of complaints recorded. The most simple explanation for this is that in those selective departments which screen out cases or are more reluctant to record complaints initially, a complaint is more likely to be sustained than in those departments which accept and investigate all allegations, inespective of their content or method of filing. Tables 7 .74 and 7.75 display the results of the multivariate analyses concerning individual respondents' opinions concerning two of the traditional arguments which have been used by proponents of external review of alleged police misconduct. Interestingly, the bivariate and multivariate analyses of responses to these two arguments gave rise to very similar results, implying that departmental size and the relative frequency with which complaints are filed against ofl'icers in individual respondents' agencies do not influence opinions to any noticeable extent Thus, with both agency size and the complaints ratio held constant. opinions were still found to vary considerably depending upon either an individual respondents' rank or assignment ' Specifically, the higher a respondent's rank, the more likely he or she was to register disagreement with the statement "Civilians are unqualified to judge the propriety of police actions," and the more involved the respondent was in the complaints process, the greater was the likelihood of him or her agreeing with the statement "External interest in complaints investigation is natural and reasonab 221 Table 7 .71 - Multiple Regression Analysis of factors affecting the number of complaints filed per year (N = 64) Standardized Regression Factors Coefficient Number of sworn officers 082*“ Racial integration of department 0.31 Percentage unemployment -0. 13 Median income 0.06 Crime rate 0.07 Multiple R 0.83 R Squared 0.68 F 24.78 Significance 0.00 *p<.05; **p<.01; *"*p<.001. Table 7 .72 - Multiple Regression Analysis of factors affecting the complaints ratio (N = 64) Standardized Regression Factors Coefficient Racial integration of department 0.10 Percentage unemployment 0.17 Median income -0.00 Crime rate -0. 13 Multiple R 0.23 R Squared 0.05 F 0.83 Significance 0.51 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 222 Table 7.73 - Multiple Regression Analysis of factors affecting the percentage of complaints sustained overall (N = 60) Standardized Regression Factors Coefficient Number of complaints filed per year 0.30““ Departmental openness to accept complaints -0.06 Multiple R 0.31 R Squared 0.10 F 3.12 Significance 0.05 *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Table 7.74 - Multiple Regression Analysis of factors affecting opinions concerning the statement "Civilians are unqualified to judge the propriety of police actions." (N = 60) Standardized Regression Factors Coefficient Rank of respondent 0.26* Number of sworn officers 0.16 Complaints ratio 0.17 Multiple R 0.34 R Squared 0.12 F 3.41 Significance 0.02 *p<.05; I""'p<.01; ***p<.001. 223 Table 7 .7 5 - Multiple Regression Analysis of factors affecting opinions concerning the statement "External interest in complaints investigation is natural and reasonable." (N = 60) Standardized Regression Factors Coefficient Assignment of respondent -0.31** Number of sworn officers -0.09 Complains ratio -0.11 Multiple R 0.32 R Squared 0.10 F 3.02 Significance 0.03 *p<.05; **p<.01; “*p<.(X)l. Chapter Summary The analysis reported in this chapter was undertaken in three distinct phases: univariate, bivariate and multivariate. Of these, the univariate phase represented the major component of the data analysis, with the bivariate and. in particular, the multivariate phases being considerably less exhaustive. In addition to highlighting many similarities between departmental citizen complaints procedures, the univariate phase of the analysis identified numerous features of complaints systems with respect to which agency policies varied considerably. The typical rank and assignment of a complains investigator varies widely between departmens, as do official policies regarding which employees may initially record complains, whether informal resolution may beusedas an altemativeto afulland formal investigation, whethertimelimits shouldbe specified on investigations, and whether the polygraph is an appropriate investigative tool. Significant differences also exist in the amount of publicity given to the complains process by 224 police departmens, both ill the form of public information concerning policies and procedures and by way of periodic statiStical repors. In addition, although individual respondents generally sharedsimilarviews onanumberofthetraditionalargurnensconcerningtheconcept ofextemal review of alleged police misconduct, they also exhibited a wide variety of opinions on some of the others. In particular, opinions were mixed on whether involving interested citizens ill the complains process can lead to increased public confidence and can therefore be advantageous to the police department, and on whether civilians are unqualified to judge the propriety of police actions. The bivariate phase of the analysis was undertaken in order to enquire further into some of the more substantial variations in systems, procedures, statistics and opinions which had been identified in the univariate analysis. Specifically, the intention was to identify any underlying relationships which existed between features of complains systems and other jurisdictional and Very few systematic differences were found to exist between city and county agencies otherthantheindicationthat.withinthose agencieswithlntemalAffairs Units,cityagenciestend touse seniorofficers (Lieutenans and above) as investigators morefrequentlythandocormty agencies. The bivariate analysis indicated, not surprisingly, that the number of complaints filed was consistently relatedbothtojurisdictional sizeandcrirnecharacteristicsandtoagencysire,but there was no indication that either the types of complaint filed or the overall percentage sustained exhibited similar relationships. Furthermore, there was no evidence of associations between ethnographic and socioeconomic features of agency jurisdictions and either complaints statistics or departrwltal citizen complaint prowdures. Multiple regression analysis confirmed some of these findings. First, agency size overshadowed all other jurisdictional and agency characteristics under consideration as possible predictors of the incidence of citizen complains. Even with other factors held constant, none of the economic, racial or crime characteristics were found to be associated with the number of complaints filed. irrespective of whether raw complains figures or a ratio indicating their relative frequency were the dependent variable. 225 One further suggestion which derived from the resuls of the bivariate analysis was that policies which result in departmens being more selective and appearing less welcoming to complainants result ill a number of those complaints which are lmlikely to be sustained being screened out at an early stage, and thereby give rise to a higher rate of sustained complains. The results of the multivariate analysis provided fln'ther evidence in support of this argument, although it was emphasized that, taken alone, the number of complains filed is not systematically related to the percentage sustained. Time limits on investigations failed to exhibit any associations with external jurisdictional or general agency factors, although within specific agency systems, time linris tended to be found ill those agencies which were more prepared to disseminate information both to complainants and to the general public. The suggestion was therefore that the stipulation oftime linrisoncomplains mvesfigafiorstendstobeamanagememhrifiafiveassociatedwithadesireto operate timely and relatively open citizen complaint procedures. Thebivaliateandmultivariate analyses producedconsistentresultswhenindividual respondents' opinions concenring the concept of external review of alleged police misconduct were examinedinmoredetail. Seniorofficers andthosewhoareconcernedwithcitizen complaint procedures in management capacities tend to be more sympathetic towards argurnens in favor of external civilian review than do junior officers and those not directly involved in complains investigations, even when departmental size and the relative fiequency with which complains are filed are tam into account Perhaps this final result is one from which present day proponents of civilian review can deriveatleastsorneconsolation. Ofallofthestatementsupon whichopinionsweretested,the onewhichindividualrespondens were overallmostinagleementwithwasthat "The impartiality of internal investigation of complains depends heavily upon the integrity of senior police administrators." It is therefore interesting to note that these senior administrators, upon whom purely internal complains systems are generally agreed to rely, are the very officers who tend to be more sympathetic and appreciative of the arguments of those in favor of external involvement in the complains process. CHAPTER VIII SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS Introduction Inthischaptertllemainfeaurresoftlresurdyarereviewcd.itsfindirrgs aresummarized and, in the context of the research questiors, conclusions and policy implications are presented anddiscussed. Thefirstsectionisasurmnaryofthepurposeandmethodofthesuldy. Irrthe nexttwosections,thefindings andtheresults ofdredasanalysisarereviewedalongwith conclusions drawn from them, and then a number of policy implications are discussed within the framework of the complains typology. The penultimate section includes a discussion of some of thelimitations ofthe study, andisfollowedinthe lastsectionby anurnberofrecornrnendatiorrs for future research. Purpose and Method of the Study The purpose of the study was to identify and describe the various systerrs presently being utilized to investigate complains against the police, both in the United States of America and in England and Wales, and to chronicle the major historical evalts in their development. The term 'complaint' was defined as referring only to allegations made by citizens regarding the conduct of sworn police officers. In the context of the study, it did not refer to disciplinary investigations initiated by officers' supervisors, nor to complains made by citizens regarding the conduct of civilian personnel employed by police agencies, nor to complains made by citizens regarding departmental policies in general. 226 227 Asecondobjectivewastoidentify andcxaminethemajorargumenswhichhave traditionally been used by both proponents and opponens of the concept of external civilian review of alleged police misconduct. Building upon these overall objecfives, a third purpose was to develop a functional typology for complains investigations, for use as a generalized framework against which structurally differing citizen complaint procedures could systematically be compared. One of the major problems facing present day senior police executives is that of developing systems for investigating citizen complaints which are both thorough and impartial, and yet which are equally acceptable to the ofiicers themselves, to members of the public, and to those elected politicalofficials whoarecharged withtheresponsibility ofensulingthatpolice agencies areeffectively andefficiently managed Whilstthecredibilityofcomplainsprocedulesis only oneofmany factorswhichtendtodeterminetheextentofpublicconfidenceinandrespectforthe police, the fiequerrcy with which such procedures are the subject ofheated public debate and intensemediainterestsuggeststhatmany peopleviewtlwmasplayingacriticallyimportantrole ill police-community relations. OveralLitwasintendedthatthesuldy shouldadoptapredominatelypracticalapproachto exammhlgacmmoversialpoficennnagenentissue,andtodfisendmemethodofthestudy was best characterized as exploratory field research. Research questions were used, rather than hypotheses, because of the absence of a well-developed theoretical framework. In part, this was duetothelackofany previoussurdiesofcomplainsagainstthe policewhichhadadoptedbotha qualitative and quantitative approach to the subject. The exploratory approach assiss ill identifyingirnportantorrelevantvariables andinexaminingandunderstandingtheir inter-relatedness. It consequently is a valuable enterprise which particularly helps to clarify those areas and issues worthy of further research. Data collection for the study involved three distinct componens: an extensive review of both American and British literature, a number of interviews with police and other agencies involved in complaints investigation in North America, and a mail survey. 228 The literature review generated a great deal of background information regarding historical developmentsinthe areaofriomplaintsagainstthepoliceonbothsidesoftheAtlanticand inchrdedanin-depdrexaminafionofthecurrentsystemoperatinginEnglandandWalesunderthe supervision of the independent Police Complaints Authority. The interview sample was selected so as to be representative of a wide variety of complaints systems currently operating within North America. Interviews were used to clarify issuesandtorefinetheniaflmweyhtsnmtrentbtnmoreimponanflydieyfonneddrebasisofflre development and design of the seven stage functional typology for complaints investigation, whichwasattheheartoftheremainderofdtestudy. The survey sample constituted the 132 US general member departments of the Police Executive Research Forum. As such, it consisted predominately of larger city and county police departments, 75% of the agencies surveyed employing in excess of 100 full-time sworn personnel. No state level agencies were represented. The sample was intentionally biased towards larger agencies for two major reasons. First. these agencies traditionally have utilized lntemalAffairs Unitshrdreinvesfigafionofcomplaintsandgeneraflyhavetendedtopossess formal citizen complaint policies to a much greater extent than have smaller agencies. Second, larger agencies disproportionately accormt for a substantial number of US police employees. Thus, even though the sample included less than 1% of the police agencies in the United States, it included approximately 25% of the nation's police personnel. The intentional biasing of the sample in no way threatened the applicability of results, since the objective of the survey component was simply to identify the major variations in systems for investigating complaints against the police which presently operate in the US. rather than to discover the relative frequency with which they each exist. An overall response rate of 75.8% was obtained with the survey, with rates for agency level, size and geographical location rarely being less than 50%. The 101 agencies which responded to the questionnaire provide police service to almost 43 million citizens, a figure which represents almost 20% of the total population of the United States. 229 Guided by the research questions, twenty nine variables were drawn from either the survey data. the US census data for 1980, or the FBI Uniform Crime Reports for 1986, and were used in the analysis. Univariate, bivariate and, to a lesser extent multivariate techniques were uwd in the analysis phase of the study. Findings and Conclusions Inthissectiontheprincipalfindingsandconclusionsofthestudy arereviewedand discussed within the framework of the research questions. Based upon these findings, in the final part of the section some conclusions and policy irnplications conceming the investigation of complaints against the police are presenwd. Research Question 1 - What variations in systems for investigating complaints against the police currently exist within the United States of America and England and Wales? WithintheUSAatpresent,ashasgenerallybeenthecaseinthepast,awidevariety of systems and procedures for investigating complaints against the police exist, ranging from 'open' systems which are biased in favor of civilian involvement and citizen awareness, to 'closed' systems in which investigating units operate ptnely internally within police agencies and disseminate little, if any, information regarding their activities to the public.The highly fragmented criminal justice system in the USA. together with its traditional highly localized accountability, mitigates against any large scale future moves towards consistency in complaints procedures, and indeed in police policies generally, even if such consistency were to be preferred. Conversely, in England and Wales, each of the 43 independent police forces operate within the same statutory legislation concerning the investigation of complaints agaimt the police. Furthermore, Home Office guidance ensures that complaints procedures are consistent from force to force. In consequence, whilst a citizen complaint regarding alleged police malpractice filed withanagencyintheUnitedStateswfllbeinvesfigatedhraccordancewithlocalcityorcounty policies, a similar allegation filed in either England or Wales, irrespective of which of the 43 forces are involved, will be handled ill accordance with identical prmdures throughout. 230 Current Systems within the United States of America - Broadly speaking, police complaints procedures in the USA may be classt in accordance with a three-tiered model. within which two further tluee-tiered structures can be described. Within the overall three-tiered framework. the types of investigative mechanism which can be discerned are exclusively internal, internal with external review of certain cases, and bilateral. First, exclusively internal mechanism describe those jmisdictions in which citizen complaints are entirely administered by the police with no external scrutiny. The second tier represents the systems in those agencies which partially administer all complaints intemally but whose decisions are subject to formal external scrutiny in certain cases. Finally, bilateral systems are those in which complaints are administeredby bodldlepolicedepaltmemandaformaflycmstinnedextemalagency. Within this general framework, the two Other three-tiered structtn'es describe the varying forms which internal and external review of citizen complaints may take. Thus, internal review of complaints may be undertaken either exclusively by an independent specific unit within the police department, on a local level by an officer's supervisor, or by a combined approach in which local supervisor investigation is supplemented by the involvement of an independent specific unit in those cases which are either more serious, potentially complicated or extremely time consuming. The three levels of external review of complaints are civilian review, civilian input and civilian monitor. Ofthese, the strongest in a descriptive sense is pure civilian review, under which the authority to investigate, adjudicate and recommend punishment to the police chief is placed in the external agency. Civilian input. not such a strong mechanism, places the authority only for complaints reception and investigation in the external agency, whilst adjudication and discipline functions are discharged intemally within the police department. Finally, in the weakest system, civilian monitor, the investigation, adjudication and discipline functions are all discharged internally within the police department but the procedtn'es are subject to some form of external review regarding their adequacy and impartiality. Within the overall three-tiered framework, the vast majority of police jurisdictions in the United States utilize exclusively internal mechanisms for investigating complaints against the 23 1 police. Internal with external review of certain cases is used in relatively few jurisdictions, examples being cities such as Berkeley, CA, Kansas City, MO, and Portland, OR. Finally, bilateral systems are the least common, although they tend to be prefened in some larger cities such as Washington, DC, and Detroit, MI, and in San Francisco, CA, perhaps the home of the purest form of civilian review currently operating within the United States, since 1983 the independentOfficeofCitizen Complainthasassumedfromthepolicedepartmenttheentire responsibility for investigating citizen complaints. Within the survey sample utilized in the present study, 83.9% of respondents indicated that their complaints systems were exclusively internal, 9.7% reported internal systems with external review of certain cases, and 6.5% were involved in bilateral systems. An Internal Affairs or similar unit responsible for investigating citizen complaints was possessed by the overwhelming majority (88.1%) of respondent agencies, those without such a unit generally tending to use senior officers (Lieutenants or above) directly appointed by the police chief as investigators, rather than subject officers' immediate supervisors. N 0 systems were identified in which all internal investigations are carried out entirely by Internal Affairs Units. Nevertheless, although a sizeable majority of respondent agencies operate exclusively internal complaints systems, utilizing both Internal Affairs officers and local supervisors as investigators, their procedures have at least as many substantial differences as sirrrilarities. At the initial stage of the complaints process, policies vary concenring the preferred method of filing a complaint and the persons who are considered acceptable as complainants, although almost all departments (96%) reported that they investigate anonymous complaints, if not as a matter of routine, then if there is any other supportive information. Whilst the overwhelming majority of agencies prefer the initial report to be taken by a supervisor, a sizeable proportion allow line officers to record complaints, and 10% are satisfied if the report is taken by a civilian employee of the department. Having recorded citizen complaints, 18% of sample police agencies fully and formally investigate all allegations, irrespective of their content, whilst the remainder may either informally resolve some complaints or not proceed with others, or use both alternative means of disposal. 232 The rank and assignment of a complaint investigator typically depends upon the nature and seriousness of a particular allegation, with the majority of departments following different guidelines forappoindnganinvesfigatorifdlecaseiscfinfinalratherfllanpmcedmalor administrative in nature. Either a sworn officer from the Detective Bureau or from Internal Affairs is the most likely investigator in a criminal case, frequently his or her rank not being stipulated. Indeed, a sizeable proportion of agencies initiate two distinct and separate investigations ill such a case, with a dewctive being responsible for the criminal aspects of the allegation and for formulating any necessary charges, and an IA officer being responsible for the administrative aspects, in particular whether any specific departmental disciplinary rules of conduct have been broken. Conversely, in a less serious procedural case, the most likely investigator is either an IA officer or the subject officer's immediate supervisor. Because of the involvement of supervisors, themostusualrankofaninvestigatorinsuchacaseis Sergeant. Despite many common procedures concerning investigations, overall a wide range of investigators are used. More than half of the agencies with an IAU (63%) typically use Sergeants to investigate. but 13% use line officers and, at the other extreme 18% use lieutenants and 6% Captains or other senior ranln’ng officers. In a small number of those jurisdictions with external review agencies, civilians are responsible for investigating complaints, and equally in a handful of agencies. civilian employees of the police department are utilized as investigators. Once completed, a complaint file containing the investigator's report may take a variety of administrative routes prior to final decisions on case finding and disposition being made. The most popular route for the initial recommendation for case finding (ie: sustained, not sustained, exonerated. etc.) to take is from the investigator through the subject officer‘s chain of command to the police chief. Conversely, the initial recommendation for disposition (disciplinary sanction) following a complaint being sustained typically passes from the subject officer's immediate supervisor through the chain of command to the police chief. Ill galeral. therefore the investigator tends not to be directly involved in the disciplinary aspects of a case, unless of course he is also the subject 233 officer's immediate supervisor, which frequently occurs in procedural investigations. Whflstmmmaluialboardsmemflymmlyufifizedinmefindingmddisposifimsmgesof complaints investigations (in only 3% of agencies). 10% of respondent departments reported their use in hearing appeals from officers dissatisfied with case outcomes. Agencies consistently allow both officers and complainants the right of appeal, although whereas an officer may appeal both the finding and disposition in a particular case, complainants are generally restricted to appealing against the finding alone. Finally, departments tend to vary widely regarding their policies for disseminating information concerning citizen complaints systems both for complainants and for the general public. This is particularly true with respect to publishing information conceming complaints procedures and complaints statistics. Agencies were found to be almost equally divided between those which publish both types of information (35%), those which publish one but not the other (35%), and those which publish neither (29%). In some instances. these variations are due to stateandlocalperscnnellegislation,butinthevastmajorityofcasesdifferencesaresirnply reflective of agency policies. Current System within England and Wales - Whilst a wide range of policies and procedures aleutilizedthroughout the USA. as indicawd earlierthe presentcomplaillts systemin England and Wales is consistent throughout both countries and was established in the 1934 Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act. In simple terms, the new procedures constitute a four-tiered structure. First, the most serious citizen complaints, involving death or allegations of serious injury are mandatorily referred to the independent Police Complaints Authority (PCA) for supervision. Second, the PCA has discretion in whether or not to supervise other less serious cases. Such complaints may bereferredtotheAuthoritybychiefofficers ofpolicebecausethey believeittobeinthepublic interest for the investigations to involve an external independent element. Altematively,the PCA may direct chief officers to submit to them any complaint which does not fall into the mandatory category, but which the Authority, at their discretion wish to supervise in the public interest. 234 Third, those complaints which are not referred to the PCA for supervision, and which are not suitable for informal resolution. are investigated internally by the relevant police force. Fourth. relatively minor complaints may be handled by the police using a process of informal resolution without recourse to a full and formal investigation. The Police Complaints Authority is a single, nationally organized external independent civilian body. Its members, who are generally individuals ofhigh public esteem and considerable experience, are all full time salaried officials. None have previous law enforcement experience. Their involvement in the police complaints process in England and Wales, can not accurately be described as investigative ill nature. Rather, they exercise a supervisory role, chargedwhhflmresponsibflhyofmmrmgmmdepoficehlvesfigafimmmmoughmd exhaustive, but overall tint they are fair and impartial. Although having no investigative responsibility or capability of their own. the PCA is empowered to direct and closely supervise investigations to such an extent that, in a particularly serious case of public concern, the supervisory Member may be present with the investigating police officer at various stays during the investigation and even when interviewing witnesses. In addition to their supervisory function in serious cases, the Police Complaints Authority has a quite separate and distinct disciplinary ftmction. When the police investigation into a complaint is completed, whether it has been supervised or not. the Deputy Grief Constable cf the relevant police force notifies the PCA of his proposals regarding the outcome of the investigation and any possible disciplinary action to be taken against the subject officer. The Authority's prime function is then to decide whether, based upon the completed report of the investigation, disciplinary charges should be brought against an officer ifthis is not already the chief officer's intention. Ultimately, they can direct that such a course of action be taken if agreement cannot be reached. Ill such a situation, a disciplinary hearing will held before a tribunal consisting of two Authority Members, who are not conversant with the details of the case ill advance, and the appropriate Chief Constable. As indicated above, in all but the most serious of cases, the police have retained their independence to investigate citizen complaints internally. They are also responsible for initially 235 recording complaints and, except in those cases supervised by the PCA, for notifying complainants of case outcomes. Citizen complaints may only be initially recorded by officers of the rank of Inspector or above, and can be informally resolved or investigated by Chief Inspectors, although most forces generally employ Superintendents (the equivalent of Captains) as investigating officers. Each ofthe43 policeforcesinEnglandandWales haveaspecialistdepartment, usually entitled the Complaints and Discipline (C & D) Department or something similar, which is responsible for investigating citizen complaints against the police. However, because of the relatively small size of many of these departments, in most forces a sizeable proportion of complaints are allocated to operational Superintendents and Chief Superintendents for investigation, with the C & D departments generally handling the more complicated and potentially time consuming cases. Unlike the situation in the United States, local supervisor involvement in the citizen complaint process is not favored in England and Wales, the rationale being that close involvement of subject officers' supervisors reduces the credibility and integrity of an investigative system which strives to promote an image of impartiality. Consequently, the operational senior officers to whom complaints are allocated for investigation always work ill different divisions from those in which subject officers perform their duties. Subject officers' supervisiors are also excluded from reviewing case recommendations and proposed disciplinary sanctions. Indeed, the chain of command is not involved in any way, all initial recommendations passing from the investigator, through the head of the Complaints and Discipline Department, to the Deputy Chief Constable who is ultimately responsible for confirming case recommendations. The subject officer may appeal the result to the Chief Constable. Dissemination of information regarding the police complaints system in England and Wales is strictly limited. Whilst most, if not all, forces include complaints statistics in their Chief Constable's Annual Report, they rarely provide any information other than basic details of numbers of complaints filed and percentage findings. Furthermore, forces typically do not indulge in publicizing the complaints process itself, other than by providing complainants with 236 explanatory leaflets at the time they file their complaints. The most noteworthy contribution made towards publicizing complaints procedures takes the form of the Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority, but at a cost of £7.50 (approximately $12) per copy, the publication can hardly claim mass readership. Research Question 2 - What are some of the underlyin reasons which have given rise to changes and variations in systems for investigating complaints against the police within the USA and England and Wales? The history of investigating complaints against the police in the USA is best characterized as a constant debate between two major interest groups with diametrically opposing opinions. On one side have been the proponents of external review, mainly comprising community groups, civil rights organizations and the media. On the other side have been the adherents ofintemal review, mainly comprising the police themselves and conservative politicians. Both sides have had successes and failures. The civil rights movement and the 'permissive' society of the late 1950s and early 1960s spawned a number of generally well-intentioned but poorly planned civilian review boards in several major US cities. Their untimely and in somecases spectaculardemise seemedtoensure continuedsuccess forthe advocates of Internal Affairs Units which, by the end of the 1960s, were well established in the majority of large US police departments. - Development of the concept of police professionalism in the early 19705 added more weight to the arguments in favor of a police monopoly on complaints investigation, but a series of incidents in which particularly flagrant abuses of power and authority by officers appeared to go unpunished ensured that those in favor of civilian review would not give up the fight easily. In response to the problem of poor police-community relations in a number of cities, and following lengthy negotiations and careful planning, several variations on the theme of civilian participation ill the complaints process were implemented during the 1970s. In general. each system was reflective of local community and agency needs and preferences, and without exception they enjoyed a greater degree of success than their predecessors had during the 1960s. 237 The perceived increased threat posed by a number of the more successful external review agenciescaundagleaterdegreeofthoughttobegiventotheissueofstaffinglntemalAffairs Units than had been the case previously. The picture began to emerge of police chiefs staffing their IAUs with officers of indisputable ability and integrity, whose very involvement in the complaints process could counter any outside allegations of improfessionalism and dubious practices. Even this image failed to satisfy the opponents of internal review, and the 1980s have been characterized by the efforts made by both sides to improve their respective public images. Organizations such as the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the Commission on - Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) have established standards for the evaluation of internal review procedures. At the same time, the International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (IACOLE) has been created to facilitate individuals from formal extenlal review agencies meeting together and discussing mutual concerns and problems. IfdleAmeficanexpefialcedurhlgdlepasttwoandahalfdecadeshasbeenmeof seesawing fortunes for the two major interest groups, ill England and Wales there appears to have been an unrelenting march towards a completely independent system for investigating complaints against the police. Against such a historical background, there is little evidence to suggest that the new independent Police Complaints Authority (PCA) is anything more than just one more step along that road. Prior to 1964, no standardized approach to the handling of complaints existed in England and Wales. This situation was overcome by the Police Act of 1964, which was the first statutory legislation to officially nrake requirements of chief officers of police to record and investigate citizen complaints. Subsequently, the Police Act of 1976 established the Police Complaints Board (PCB), the first formally constituted independent body to participate in any active way in the police complaints procedure. The inception of the PCB provoked widespread criticism from all sides. The police were unhappy at losing their monopoly on the disciplinary process, whilst the proponents of external review of complaints characterized the activities of the Board as a giant rubber-stamping 238 exercise. The disorders in Brixton in April, 1981, the resultant report produced by Lord Scarman. and the change of policy announwd in November of the same year by both the Police Federation (the representative organization ofline officers andjunior management), and the Superintendents' Association (the representative organization of senior management) who since thatdatehave officially andpublicallybothbeeninfavorofthe creation ofafully independent investigative body for complaints, all added lrlounting pressure upon the Govemmalt to replace the PCB with a more powerful body. Ultimately, the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act established the Police Complaints Authority (PCA). which commenced operating ill April, 1985. The PCA now consider themselves sufficiently knowledgeable and experienced to begin to make proposals for the improvement of police and related practices. Some of their more recent suggestions have been controversial and have received widespread media coverage and police opposition. Perhaps morethananythingelse,theextentto which any such proposals madebythePCAbringthem into well-publicized conflict with the police will help both to reduce tatblic skepticism about their utility and to highlight their independent status. Research Question 3 - What are some of the major arguments which have been used by interest groups concerning the investigation of complaints against the police both within the USA and England and Wales? The major historical point of silnilarity between the experiences of the two nations ill police complaints investigations has been the consistent use of the same two general sets of argtunents by proponents and opponents of the concept of external civilian review of alleged police misconduct. The majority of these arguments were first developed ill the 19605 and, apart from the introduction of the police professionalism debate in the 19705, have largely remained unchanged ever since, although they have frequently been repeated since, both verbally and in writing. Those in favor of external review have largely argued that any closed system ill which those who are complained against investigate whether there are genuine grounds for complaint 239 contravenes the rules of natural justice and is, by definition, imperfect. Even if there is no inherent bias, distrust for a purely internal system persists, and this can erode citizen confidence in the police in general. Conversely, they argue, involving citizens in the complaints system not only injectsanelementofindependenceandimpaltiality intotheprocedules,butalsocanbean aid to police-community relations. After all, it is surely reasonable that those who pay the wages of the police should have some say in the quality of the service provided. Furthermore, not only do internal systems depend heavily upon the integrity of senior police administrators. their goals and citizens expectations do not always correspond. Civilian involvement can ensure that systerrrs develop which are not merely structured arormd internal departmental regulations, but which are reflective of community needs. ' Those Opposed to the idea of external review have largely based their arguments for the retention of exclusively internal systems upon the threat to police morale which civilian review has traditionally represented, and the concept of police professionalism. Not only does external involvement threaten the morale of line officers, it also interferes with the authority of chief officers who, like their fellow executive officers in other professions, are capable of disciplining their own staff. Furthermore, citizens not satisfied with internal review mechanisms already have sufficient alternative avenues to follow, the courts being only one example. It is argued that the early experiences with civilian review boards showed board members not only to be biased ' against the police and politically motivated, but to be unqualified to judge the propriety of police actions and incapable of carrying out satisfactory investigations. Consequently, civilian review boards have been shown to be both unworkable and ineffective. In addition to ensuring professional investigative standards, internal review units have the advantage of being able to take the initiative and operate proactively in seeldng out and identifying police malpractice. Conversely, external review bodies, ill order to maintain their legitimacy, need to wait to receive complaints regarding rrrisconduct before commencing investigations. Although not specifically mentioned in the research question, through me inclusion of a specific section in the survey instrument, the opportunity was taken during the study to test the opinions of police employees concerning some of the most frequently voiced argunrents both in 240 favor of and opposed to the concept of external civilian review of alleged police misconduct. Whilst no claim were rrrade that the individuals corrcenred were in any way representative of police agencies generally, it was considered to be potentially interesting and of value to assess the perceived relevance of the nrost popular historical arguments to contemporary police agencies. T'hestaterrlerltwithwhichthegleatestdegreeofsharedopinions wasexhibitedwas cmcanedwimdfizwsnmsaflsfiedwimmalmvesdgafimofconmhMmhavmgsuffidau alternative avenues to follow, the courts being just one example. Respondents were generally in agreement. Conversely, the statement upon which there was the greatest degree of mixed opinionswas concemedwithinvolvingcifizensinfllecomphmtprocessinordertohnpmve public confidence in the police. Overall, the statement with which individual respondents were most in agreerrrent with was that "The impartiality of internal investigation of conrplaints depends heavily upon the integrity of police administrators." At the other extreme, most general disagreement was registered towards the statenrent that "External review boards ftx' investigating conrplaints against the police provide an impartial and independent assessment of police practices." Under bivariate analysis, responses to a sufficient number of statements were formd to exhibit significant relationships with either officers' ranks or assignments that a distinct trend couldbeidentified. Specifically,serriorofficers andthosewhoareconcemedwithcitizen complaintsinmanagernentcapacitieswndtobe moresympathetictowards argumentsinfavorof external civilian review than do junior officers and those not directly involved ill complaints investigations. Furthermore, multivariate analysis provided an indication that this general trend is unaffected either by the size of agencies ill which officers work or by the relative frequency with which their agencies attract citizen complaints. 241 Research Question 4 - Can an empirically-derived functional typology be developed to provide a generalized framework against which structurally differing police complaints procedures can systematically be compared? Thevarious nrethods ofdatacollectionutilizedduringthecourse ofthis study ledtothe development of a seven-stage functional typology for the investigation of complaints against the police (Figure 6.1). The basic structure was arrived at through direct experience of the new complaints system recently introduced ill England and Wales, combirwd with an extensive literatmeleview andsevelalsitevisitsto US policedepartmentswhichoperatebasically traditional internal and closed citizen complaints procedrrres. Plrrtller depth was subsequently added to the typology as a result of information obtained during a number of site visits to other North American cities, chosen for certain unique features of their systerm for investigating complaints against the police. The first typology stage, 'complaint reception' was followed by a three-branch 'recording and classification' stage, which, in turn, led to a two-branch 'irrvestiption‘ stage. The three - alternative recording and classification branches were 'full investigation lequired', 'informally resolved', and 'not procwded with'; the two alternative investigation branches were 'alleged criminal violation' and 'alleged administrative or procedural violation'. Stage four of the typology, 'finding' (or determination) preceded the 'disposition' (or disciplinary sanction) stage. and then an 'appeal' stage was followed by the final 'public information' stage. ‘ Inordertotesttheutilityand applicability ofthetypologyasageneralizedfiamework against which structurally differing police complaints procedures could be compared, the survey instrumentusedhrflrestudywasspecificaflydesignedwithdretypologyasitsdfivingforce, such that seven of the twelve sections in the questionnaire were derived directly from the seven typology stages. The result was tirat, whilst considerable variance was discovered within each of the seven stages, this was generally catered for by the alternate typology branches, and no structural systerm were identified which clearly failed to fall within the overall functional framework 242 Research Question 5 - Within the USA, is there a relationship between police complaints procedures and any of the following: a) agency size, level and geographical location? b) general economic conditions in police jurisdictions? c) general crime characteristics in police jurisdictions? Information concenring this research question was predominately obtained from the bivariate and nrrrltivariate analyses of the survey responses. Due to the differential dispersion of respondent agencies throughout the USA, neither of these analyses employed the 'geographical location' variable, and consequently it was not possible to conclude quantitatively whether it exhibited systematic associations with certain features of agency complaints procedm'es. Nevertheless, all of the survey returns were examined on a qualitative level during the comse of data coding, and no clear links between system characteristics and geographical location had been apparent. The bivariate and multivariate analyses did, hOWever allow the remainder of this research question to be addressed in sonre detail. Thus, the existence of both external review of complaints procedures and Internal Affairs Units were generally strongly and positively related to four specific agency and jurisdictional factors: population of jurisdiction, agency size, crime rate and percentage of violent crime reported. No real systematic differences between the complaints policies adopted by city and county departments were identified, although there was an indication that, among those agencies with Intemal Affairs Units, the use of senior officers as complaints investigators was more likely in smaller city than in larger county departments. Economic factors were found not to exhibit any relationships with featlnes of citizen complaints systenrs, nor in general were racial considerations associated with departmental policies. Fmtlremrore, the crime characteristics of jurisdictions also failed to exhibit any systematic relationships with complaints procedures. 243 Research Question 6 - Within the USA, is there a relationship between police complaints procedures and any of the following: a) the number of complaints filed? b) the seriousness of complaints filed? c) the proportion of complaints sustained? Very few statistically significant relationships were found to exist between complaints statistics and the systems which gave rise to them. In particular, neither the seriousness of complains, nor the relative frequency with which complaints are filed, exhibited associations with any of the featlnes of complaints systerrs under consideration. The presence of external review mechanisms and Internal Affairs Units were both indicated to be strongly associated in zero-order relationships with the number of complaints filed, findings which again reflected the close correlation of the latter variable with population and agency size. In the bivariate analysis, departmental openness to accept complaints was found to be negatively related to the overall percentage of complaints sustained, although the association was very weak. This was an interesting finding which was further examined ill the multivariate analysis, with the result that, when policies concenring the acceptance of complaints are controlled. the number of complains filed becomes a more powerful predictor of the percentage of complains sustained than it is when it is taken alone. In other words, the indication is that those departments which are more selective in accepting complains for investigation tend to sustain a greater proportion of complaints than those agencies which accept and investigate all complaints, irrespective of their source and content. Overall therefore, it appears that complains systems and complains statistics exhibit very few systematic relationships with either external or intemal agency features, other than the clear association which would be expected between certain system features and increasing agency size. Thus, the larger the agency, the higher is the number of complains filed, and the greater is both the need for specific intemal unis to investigate these complaints, and the desire in sorrre jurisdictions for the internal investigations to be subject to some form of external review. 244 Whilst many of those relationships which were identified during the course of the bivariate and multivariate analyses had been anticipated. a number of other associations which, based upon the conflict theory approach, had been expected to exist were not found. In many ways , however, with the benefit of hindsight, the failure to identify some of the expected associations is far from surprising, particularly since one of the major variables utilized ill the analysis, the number of complaints filed, is subject to widely varying interpretations. Frequently assumed to provide a measure of police performance, the complains rate is one of the most badly abused police-based statistics. Thus, an increasing number of complaints filed with a particrrlar agency may not reflect a deterioration in standards of officer behavior, but could be interpreted as indicating a sign of increasing citiun confidence in the complains system. Conversely, complains figures may be no real reflection of confidence because the majority of people with genuine grievances fail to complain. and most of those who do act in ignorance of the system (Brown, 1987: 3). Policy Implications Analysis of responses to the mail survey instrument indicated that almost 30% of agencies had implemented substantial changes in their citizen complaint procedures within the last five years, and that more than halfhad done the same during the last ten years. These figures indicate that police complains policies are, in general. subject to frequent review and reassessment. Indeed, at the time the questionnaire was completed, four departments reported currently beingin the process of undertaking major system reviews. At an early stage during this study, it had become clear that any attempt to generate an ideal or model system for investigating complaints against the police would be fraught with difficulties and, particularly in the context of the highly fragmented and closely locally accountable criminal justice system ill the USA, would be of dubious utility. Consequently, rather than designing the research around the idea of an overall ideal model for complains investigation. the concept of a functional typology was inu'oduced. This typology was then utilized as a generalized framework against which structurally differing complains 245 systens and procedrues could systematically be compared Accepting that structural variations reflecting present departmental preferences are widespread. this section therefore is not concerned with putting forward recomnrerrdatiorrs based upon a subjective opinion regarding what constitutes an 'ideal' system for investigating complaints against the police. Rather, ill the context of the functional typology, which provides a convenient framework to highlight. one stage at a tinre, some ofthe policy issues to emerge from the data analysis, a number of policy alternatives which are believed to be worthy of consideration during system and procedure reviews are presented in the form ofa set of questions and answers. The list of questions is not necessarily exhaustive, but includes the majority of those policies and procedures which. during the course of the study, were found to exhibit considerable variance throughout police departments in the United States. Whilst the writer has hsomopmimscmmgeadrofdwismesmispusmalbiasesmeonuuedsincefle intention is not to impose views but rather to promote discussion. Consequently, the answers providedtothequestionsalebaseduponthegenerallmivariatefindings ofthestudy,andassuch they represent the policy decisions most frequently taken ill response to each of the issues within a sample of 101 contemporary US police departmens. Naturally,thisisnotmeanttoimply tlratthosecurrent US complainsprocedrnes highlighted in the following list necessarily represent the optinrurn solutions to the various police management issues that they address. Rather, in the context of departmental citizen complaint policy reviews, they should rrrerely be seen as providing Convenient focal points for policy discussions. Policy Questions and Answers Which departmental employees should be permitted to initially accept complaints and what forms of notification should he considered sufficient? Typically, supervisors are preferred as acceptors of complains, although 40% of agencies indicated that any sworn officer and 10% that any civilian employee can take the initial report. 246 The majority of departments take both verbal and written repors, although the most papular form of notification is a signed statement. Nevertheless, an overwhelming proportion (96%) of agencies accept and investigate anonymous complains, if not as a matter of course then with other supportive information. Once accepted, should all complaints be fully investigated, irrespective of their content, or should an official process of informal resolution be utilized? If so, which departmental employees should be permitted to attempt to resolve complaints informally, and how should the outcome of complaints dealt with in this way be recorded? Furthermore, can certain types of complaints legitimately be not proceeded with? More than three quarters af agencies (78%) reported operating informal resolution procedures. generally the responsibility for attenrpting to resolve a complaint beingthatoftheofficeroriginally takingtlrereport. T'hemostusualmethodofrecording informally resolved complains is either by way of a report or an entry made in a card index filed in Internal Affairs. The vast majority ofagencies (84%) proceed with all complains once they are recorded. What is the appmpriate rank and assignment for an investigating officer? To what extent should investigations be centralized, or are there advantages to be gained from devolving responsibility for investigation to subject officers' supervisors? If local investigation is preferred, should an immediate supervisor or a more senior officer be utilized? Policies vary depending upon the nature of the allegation. In criminal cases, typically there is very limited local supervisor involvement in an investigative capacity. Detectives or officers from Internal Affairs (IA) are the rrrost usual investigators, and although the use of senior officers (Lieutenans and above) is marginally preferred over sergeans, frequently the investigator rank is net specified. In prowdural or administrative cases, local supervisiors are utilized to a much greater degree, generally to supplement the activities of IA officers, with sergeant being the most usual investigator rank 247 Overall, could police-community relations be enhanced by including some form of external review of the investigation in complaints procedures? Whilst officers' individual opinions concerning the potential benefits of external review were found to vary, both with their rank and their involvement in complains investigations, the overwhelming majority of police agencies in the US continue to operate purely internal complains systems. Should time limits be specified on complaints investigations? Most departmens (64%) specify time linris on investigations, and of these agencies, more than half operate a 30 day limit. What is an appropriate balance between local supervisor input and investigator input into recommendations both for case finding and case disposition? Investigators provide initial recommendations for case findings twice as often as do local supervisors (in 40% and 23% of agencies respectively), but for case dispositions the roles are reversed and local supervisors supply initial recommendations for case dispositions three times as often as do investigators (in 35% and 12% of agencies respectively). 15 there an appropriate place in complaints procedures for a 'Policy Review' finding, which implicitly acknowledges the possibility of general departmental failure? A 'Policy Review' alternative finding is employed by only 28% of police agencies. Finally, to what extent should the complaints process be publicized? Specifically, how much information should be provided for complainants both during the course of, and following the conclusion of, an investigation? Furthermore, what information is appropriate for dissemination to the public, and what form should this publicity take? Information concerning case finding is routinely supplied to complainants, although in a sustained case the majority of departrrrens do 248 not notify complainans of the disciplinary action taken. Slightly more than half (54%) of agencies disseminate information concerning the complains process to the public, and the same percentage (although not necessarily the same agencies) publish complains statistics. The most popular ways in which procedural information is disseminated is through brochures available at police stations or carried by officers on patrol. and at neighborhood community relations or crime prevention public meetings. Statistics are most usually made public ill the police chiefs annual 1313011 Methodological Limitations This study of police complains procedures in the United States and in England and Wales represens one ofthefilstauenqlsmadetoundenakebothaqualitativeandquantitative approach tothe subjectofinvestigatingcomplaints againstthepolice. Assuch,ithas alimitedtlreoretical basis, and its quantitative content suffers from a number of methodological limitations which need to be acknowledged. Although an extensive literature review was undertaken, most of the previous work on police complains procedures was found to have been descriptive in nature and devoid of quantification. The small number of prior studies to have adopted a quantitative approach to the subject wereundertakenadecade. ifnottwo decades ago and were therefore oflittleuse as adata base to develop a line of enquiry. Consequently, a survey instrument built around a newly-created functional typology had to be developed and designed specifically for the study. Although the survey instrunrent was pre-tested and dealt with largely objective issues, many terns associated with police complains procedures are susceptible to differing interpretations, and consequently the instrument's reliability and validity were, to an extent, unknown. In the event, it was apparent that the responses to a small number of the questions on the survey instrument were indicative either of respondent nrisinterpretations, or lack of clarity ill design. Although sonre of these discrepancies could be treated as rrrissing data when coding responses, it is possible that certain other sources of inaccuracies were not identified thus leading to an imperfect dataset. I 249 The study was not designed with the idea of gerreralizeability ill mind From the outset, the intention was for the survey instrument primarily to identify the various systems which crurently operate in the USA for investigating complains against the police. rather than to specify with what frequency each type of system exiss. Since there was no intention of generalizing resuls, a sample was selected which it was believed would provide a considerable degree of variance in complains systems, but which ill a strict sense could not be considered representative of the vast majority of police agencies in the United States. As noted earlier, although the survey sample included less than 1% of all US police departmens, the departmens surveyed employ almost 25% of tie nation's police personnel. Furthermore, survey responses were noticeably biased in favor of the larger agencies within the sample. Concentrating upon generally sizeable agencies means that the extent to which the findings of the study are applicable to the numerous very small agencies in the US is not known. Nevertheless, although small agency responses to the problem of administering citizen complains may differ from those reported in this study, it is considered likely that any system not directly discussed in the present study could be described ill terms of one more structural variation on the basic functional typology. Throughout the study, two issues which consistently recurred in the context of police-comrmmity relations were those of external review of alleged police misconduct and public dissemination of information concenring complaints systems. Still utilized ill only a very small number of police jurisdictions in the United States, civilian review is disproportionately reported in the literature concenring police complaints procedures. Additionally, an assessment of departmental openness to publish information concerning both complaint systemrs and complaints statistics was made on the basis of the survey returns. It is to be expected that those departments which are predisposed towards operating 'open' complaints procedures would also be more likely to respond to an external request for information concerning them. These factors taken together may have resulwd in the concepts of system openness and external review being overemphasized ill importance and relevance throughout the study. Given recent developmens in police complains procedures in England and Wales however. it was considered appropriate that these two system features should represent major sources of discussion and analysis. 250 Recommendations for Future Research Whilst some recommendations for future research follow directly from the above discussion of methodological limitations. others are intended as suggestions for work which could supplement the body of knowledge concenring police complains procedures which this study represens. Although citizen complains perhaps do not create such an administrative problem for smaller police agencies, simply because of tleir relative ilrfrequency, it would be of benefit to study the approaches taken to their investigation by small police departments in the USA. The means of injecting an element of impartiality and independence into the complains procedures ' operated by the smallest of US police departmens, ill which every officer works closely with all of his colleagues. potentially represens a problem. Ore indication of the present study was that smaller agencies within the survey sample tended only very infrequently to be subject to review by formally constituted external agencies. It would be interesting to discover the extent of formal external review of the smallest of US police departmens. Very few reasons for variations in the relative frequency with which complains are filed and the rate with which complains are sustained were identified in the present study. Indeed, it was emphasized that different departmens adopting differing attitudes towards officially recording complains, and following various policies concerning which complaints are worthy of formal investigations, makes inter-agency statistical comparisons nOt only difficult but frequently inappropriate. Nevertheless, it is potentially of value to police managers to discover any underlying causal factors for citizen complaints. The present study adopted predomrinately a conflict view of society, utilizing external measures of racial diversity, economic disparity, and incidence of crime as possible predictors of citizen dissatisfaction and hostility towards the police. Future studies could adopt rather more direct approaches, being designed to collect data concenring citizen general satisfaction with the police at the same time as gathering complains statistics. Alternatively, it would be of interest to take an internal organizational dynamic approach to the subject of citizen complaints, based upon the theory that the key to substantive differences ill systemrs lies ill the way ill which they are organized, and specifically depends upon 25 l the mechanisms and dynanrics of their internal and environmental interrelations (Buckley, 1967). In reviewing their procedures, if a major goal of police departments is to generate citizen satisfaction with the complains system, then one important contribution which future research could provide would be to build upon the opinions testing approach of part of this study. Whilst opinions concenring police complaints procedures were tested during the course of the present study, a one-sided approach was adopted since the only people who were surveyed were police officers. A recent study published in England was undertaken from a similar biased view in the sense that it was only concerned with complainans Opinions regarding the adequacy of police complains procedures (Brown, 1987). Rather than solely considering the views of interest groups, future research should therefore concentrate upon general public opinions, perhaps in part by making use of the ses of arguments concerning police complains procedures which were identified during the course of the present study. Furthermore, it may be useful to consider citizen concerns regarding the investigation of complaints against a wide range of public employees, rather than restricting future studies to focus solely upon the police. As was highlighted earlier in this study, the credibility of police complaints procedures is only one of many factors which tend to determine the extent of public confidence in and respect for the police. If police managers are to review their complaints procedures with the intention of building this community confidence, future studies will have to provide them with answers to at least two specific questions. First, just how critical a role do systems for investigating citizen complains play ill police-community relations in comparison with Other potential sources of citizen dissatisfaction? Second, putting to one side the views of the major interest groups, do members of the general public feel that police complains procedures are unfair or inequitable, and if so, in what respects? It is to be hoped that the resuls of this study provide a framework within which a number of the above issues may be addressed APPENDICES APPENDIX I 7.300 M srrtrrr N. w sums 910 A BARREL w. STEPHENS msumcmu. nc 20037 txrcurrvr DIRECTOR (202) res-m0 POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM TO: PERF Members FRON: Darrel N. Stephens. Executive Director SUBJECT: PERF INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE SURVEY Rele Requested by July 13, l987 The Police Executive Research Form is conducting a study of variations in systems for investigating citizen complaints against the police. The objective of the study is to develop a comprehensive picture of existing investigative units. their structure. organization and procedures. Information is being sought by PERF regarding both internal units which investigate citizen complaints from within police departments. and external units which operate outside police departments and which have been established with the intention of introducing an independent aspect into the process for investigating citizen complaints against the police. It is anticipated that analysis of this information will assist PERF in addressin such issues as: How can the police better handle (solicit. investigate. and resolve? complaints against the police? How can the police be more open and directed toward building citizen confidence? Is there an appropriate role for an outside review of police conduct? Although the questionnaire at first sight may appear lengthy, most of the questions involve a simple description of the complaint process and as such we would estimate that it would take approximately 30 minutes to complete. Responses will be kept confidential and. following analysis. it is intended that a sanitary of overall results and findings will be circulated to PERF members for their information. Toward these ends. PERF is being assisted by Inspector Paul Nest and Michigan State University School of Criminal Justice in tabulating findings. This project represents one of the most detailed studies yet carried out in this important area and your department can greatly assist by filling out and returning the questionnaire in the enclosed pee-paid envelope b Jul l3 1987. The time spent on questionnaire completion will help us to produce a report Which should be of interest and benefit to you in the future. 252 3&53 INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE SURVEY Rank and Assignment of person completing the survey: Phone number of person completing the survey: Name (optional) Name of department: Address of department: A) DEPARTMENTAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION l) Size of Department: Number of sworn officers Number of civilian personnel 2) Profile of Department: Sworn officers: Hhite Black Hispanic Other Total Male Female Total Civilian personnel: Hhite Black Hispanic Other Total Male Female Total 3) Profile of Your Jurisdiction: Service Area (square miles) Residential population of Service Area Estimated daytime population of Service Area 2£h4 a) CONPLAINTs INVESTIGATION BACKGROUND INFORMATION Important Definition: Throughout this questionnaire. the term 'cqlaint' refers only to mlaints Ida by citizens regarding the conduct of sworn officers. It does 593_ refer to disciplinary investigations initiated by officers' swervisors. nor to mlaints made by citizens regarding the conduct of civilian personnel employed by the department. nor to complaints made by citizens regarding departmental policies in genera . 4) Please provide a very brief description of your department's system for investi- gating citizen complaints against the police. And attach a copy of departmental citizen complaint procedures to the completed questionnaire. 5) Hhich of the following statements best describes your department's system in general terms? [I [I [I [J I] All citizen complaints are processed purely internally and are investigated by a specific unit within the police department. All citizen complaints are processed purely internally but there is no specific unit responsible for their investigation. A specific unit within the police department first investigates citizen complaints and then completed investigation reports are subject to review by an external agency. Citizen complaints are first investigated by the police department. without a specific unit. and then completed investigation reports are subject to review by an external agency. All citizen complaints are processed purely externally and the police depart- ment has little. if any. responsibility for their investigation. 6) If a formally constituted external agency (for example. a Citizen Complaint Board established by City Law) has a responsibility for complaints investigation. what typically is that agency's responsibility?(Check all that apply) [I [ I [J [I I] H 7) If such a formal external agency does exist. what is it called? Sole responsibility for investigating all complaints Dual responsibility with the police department for investigating all complaints Sole responsibility for investigating only particular types of complaints (please specify) Dual responsibility with the police department for investigating only particular types of complaints (please specify) No investigative responsibility of its own. Bit empowered to direct the police investigation No investigative responsibility of its own. but empowered to review completed police investigations to ensure satisfaction with them Other (please specify) No such formal external agency exists and please attach documents or a statement describing its make up and functions to the completed questionnaire. 255 8) Approximately how long has the present system for investigating citizen complaints been in operation without substantia changes? Please identify any problems experienced with the present system and offer any suggestions you might have for overcoming them. 9) If an informally constituted external body (for example. a self-appointed local ”watch-dog" group) plays a role in complaints investigation. what typically is that body's role? [] Undertakes independent investigations of all complaints referred to it. Undertakes independent investigations of only particular types of complaints referred to it. (please specify) Other (please specify) No such informal external body exists. I [ I 10) If such an informal external body does exist. what is it called? ll) If there has been a substantial change in the system for handling citizen complaints in the last five years. in what respects is the current system different from the previous one? 12) If there has been a substantial change in the system for handling citizen complaints in the last five years. what reason(s) were instrumental in that change? (Check all that apply) [] Solely a management decision - Mandate of police commission . Mandate of city council Court mandate [ Union contract E Citizen dissatisfaction with previous system Media campaign [ Influence of communit groups [ Other (please specify C) STAFFING l3) Does your department have an Internal Affairs or comparable unit responsible for investigating complaints? [] Yes If es. please continue with question l4 and answer all of the other quest ons. []No If 52, who is responsible for investigating complaints? Please complete questions 14 and l5 as they apply to whoever is responsible and then s ip to question Zl. 256 l4) Please indicate the staffing of this unit by numbers. rank and position. 15) l6) I7) 18) 19) 20) Sworn Officers Civilian Personnel To whom does the head of this unit report? (Please give rank and Division/Bureau of Assignment of that individual) In assigning officers to Internal Affairs. does the department: [ Use officers who volunteer only? [ Transfer officers through no choice of their own? [ Use a combination of both approaches? Does past official misconduct disqualify an officer from assignment to Internal Affairs? [1 Yes [1 No Are any other predetermined selection criteria used for selecting officers for Internal Affairs assignments? [] Yes [1N0 If yes. please specify Is an officer's assignment to Internal Affairs generally limited to a designated period of time? [] Yes []No If yes. how long? Do assigned officers undergo special Internal Affairs training? [ Yes [ No If yes. is that training presented by: [ Another source (please specify) [ Both [} Your department And. briefly. what does the training include? 257 O) COMPLAINT RECEPTION Zl) A complaint by a citizen against an officer will be investigated after: (Check 22) 23) 24) 25) 26) 27) l that apply) Verbal notification by telephone Verbal notification in person Hritten notification (unsigned) Hritten notification comprising a signed statement Other (please specify) f—fl—‘u—‘f—‘fl'fi a HI...) —o From whom can a complaint be accepted? (Check all that apply) [ The individual who considers he was wronged [ Any person with the written consent of the above [ Any person with the verbal consent of the above [ Anyone (for example. a witness to an event) [ Other (please specify) Are complainants warned against making false statements? [1 Yes [1 No If yes. when is this warning given? Are anonymous complaints accepted for investigation? Yes. as a matter of routine Yes. if there is other supportive information No. anonymous complaints are not investigated F—lr—DH By whom can a complaint be accepted? (Check all that apply) [] Any person working in a place designated for the acceptance of complaints (for example. a clerk in Internal Affairs) [] Only sworn officers working in a place designated for the acceptance of complaints Any sworn officer Any supervisory officer Other (please specify) where can a complaint be accepted? (Check all that apply and estimate the percentage of complaints received at each location per year. averaged over the last five years.) [i 1 At certain government offices (for example. City Hall) [ 1 At all police stations E] 1 At police headquarters % At the office responsible for their investigation within the police department (for example. Internal Affairs) [J x At the office responsible for their investigation external to the police department (for example. Civilian Complaint Board) [] 1 Other (please specify) At what times may a citizen file a complaint? [ 24 hours a day. seven days a week [ Generally only during office hours. Monday to Friday [ By appointment only [ Other (please specify) 28) 29) 258 Is there a limit on the time elapsed between the alleged incident taking place and the complaint being filed. after which a complaint will not be accepted? [3 Yes [1 No If yes. what is the allowed time? Is there a systematic method by which the general public is made aware of the complaint process? H If yes. how is the public notified? (Check all that apply) [] Brochures available at police stations Brochures available at other government offices (for example. City Hall) Advertisements in newspapers Advertisements on television/radio Posters distributed throughout the city/county Officers carry complaint information with them on patrol Other (please specify) Hf—If—Whflfi E) RECORDING AND CLASSIFICATION OF COMPLAINTS 30) 31) 32) 33) Hhich agency unit is primarily responsible for maintaining a record of the number of complaints filed by citizens? [] The investigating unit (for example. Internal Affairs) [ Community Relations/Community Affairs department E Management services/management information department No specific department [ Other (please specify) Are those employees who can accept complaints officially empowered to informally resolve them at the time? (For example. through mediation between complainant and accused officer in situations where complainants are clearly not seeking formal investigations.) a r If yes. how are such complaints and their resolutions documented? Are all complaints which are not informally resolved subjected to a formal investigation? [ Yes [ No If go. under what circumstances might a complaint be recorded but not formally investigated? At what point is the accused officer notified that he or she is to be the subject of an investigation? [] Immediately upon receipt of the complaint ] Hithin 24 hours after the complaint was made As soon as is reasonably possible Only when the investi ator is ready to interview the officer Other (please specify) HMO—'9 H 34) 259 Is notification made to the officer in writing? Ei F) INVESTIGATION 35) 36) 37) 38) In the case of an alleged criminal violation. who would be appointed to investigate? The accused officer's immediate supervisor A sworn officer from the detective bureau A sworn officer from internal affairs A civilian investigator employed by the police department A civilian investigator employed by an external agency Other (please specify) If this investigator is a sworn officer. what would be his/her rank? E A senior officer (lieutenant and above) At least one rank higher than the accused officer [ A sergeant [ A detective [ Internal Affairs has a special rank for investigators [ There is no rank stipulation Hho is responsible for appointing the investigating officer in a criminal case? [ The head of internal affairs [ A senior officer from the accused officer‘s division [1 The head of the external agency responsible for the investigation [] Other (please specify) [1 The Police Chief In a criminal case. is the accused officer typically fonmally interviewed by the investigating officer regarding the allegation? ii is: If no. how is the accused officer's version of the events elicited from him or her? In the case of an alleged procedural or administrative violation (for example. excessive force or conduct unbecoming an officer). who would be appointed to investigate? [I The accused officer's immediate supervisor [ A sworn officer from the detective bureau [] A sworn officer from internal affairs [ A civilian investigator employed by the police department E A civilian investigator employed by an external agency Other (please specify) If this investigator is a sworn officer. what would be his/her rank? [] A senior officer (lieutenant and above) [ At least one rank higher that the accused officer E A sergeant A detective [] Internal Affairs has a special rank for investigators [ There is no rank stipulation 260 39) Nho is reSponsible for appointing the investigating officer in an administrative 40) 41) 42) 43) 44) 45) case? [ The Police Chief [ The head of internal affairs [ A senior officer from the accused officer's division E] The head of the external agency responsible for the investigation Other (please specify) In an administrative case. is the accused officer typically formally interviewed by the investigating officer regarding the allegation? E] I? If no. how is the accused officer's version of the events elicited from him or her? Is there a time limit on complaints investigations? a If yes. what is the allowed time? Are administrative rights (similar to Miranda) offered to officers who are the subject of an internal investigation? [] Yes [1N0 If yes. please attach a copy to the completed questionnaire. Is the polygraph used in investigating complaints when interviewing officers? [J Yes [1N0 If yes. is it: [I Optional [ Mandatory Is the polygraph used in investigating complaints when interviewing complainants? Ei If yes. are complainants notified that the complaint may not be proceeded with if they do not agree to take a polygraph? a Are any units in your department immune. by nature of their work. from normal investigations? [} Yes (please specify) [ No If yes. who investigates allegations of misconduct against these officers? 261 46) Are written guidelines in existence regarding the circumstances under which an officer may be suspended from duty pending the outcome of an investigation? [] Yes I] No If yes. please attach a copy to the completed questionnaire. G) FINDING (DETERMINATION1) 47) what alternative findings are there following investigation of the case? (Check all that apply) 48) 49) 50) H [1 no he 1 ] who [ B I] l—IHHHH ('9 Hho I [1 e Sustained (i.e.. allegation is proven) Not sustained (i.e.. not sufficient evidence either to prove or disprove the allegation) Unfounded (i.e.. allegation is proven to have been false or not based on valid facts) Exonerated (i.e.. the incident which provoked the complaint is proven to have occurred. but the accused officer acted lawfully and properly) Policy review/policy failure (i.e.. the allegation is proven but the accused officer acted within existing policy. hence the policy should be reviewed) Other (please specify) makes the initial reconnendation for finding following investigation of case? The head of internal affairs A senior officer from the accused officer's division The investigator The accused officer's inmediate supervisor Other (please specify) reviews this recommendation? The Deputy Chief The head of internal affairs The accused officer's chain of command Some form of internal trial board (please specify how constituted Other (please specify) ultimately confinns the finding? A government official or body (e.g.. city manager or police board) The Police Chief Some form of internal trial board (please specify how constituted) A hearing at which the accused officer is present Other (please specify) 262 H) DISPOSITION (SANCTION)) 5l) Hhat alternative disciplinary sanctions are there if the cOmplaint is sustained? (Check all that apply) [ Criminal Charges Dismissal Reduction in Rank Suspension Fine Punitive Transfer Hritten reprimand Verbal reprimand Supervisory Counselin Other (please specify l—1 Fifi f—‘f—V—IHr-‘H 52) If the complaint is sustained. who makes the initial recommendation for discipline? The head of internal affairs A senior officer from the accused officer's division The investigator The accused officer‘s immediate supervisor Other (please Specify) 53) who reviews this recommendation? [ The Deputy Chief [ The head of internal affairs [ The accused officer's chain of command [] Some form of internal trial board (please specify how constituted) [] Other (please specify) 54) who ultimately confirms the recommendation for discipline? [] A government official or body (e.g.. city manager or police board) [% The Police Chief [ Some form of internal trial board (please specify how constituted) A hearing at which the accused officer is present Other (please specify) . A f—il—T e_.aa_.| I) APPEALS/MISCELLANEOUS 55) If not satisfied with the outcome of an investigation. does the complainant have the right of appeal? [1“ Yes If yes. to when can he/she appeal? (check all that apply) [] A Wgovernment) official or body (for example. the city manager or the ice board) [I The Police Chief Other (please specify) 263 56) If not satisfied with the outcome of an investigation. does the accused officer have the right of appeal? [] Yes [1'40 If yes. to when can he/she appeal? (Check all that apply) [] A government official or body (for example. the city manager or the police board) E The Police Chief Other (please specify) 57) Does the city/county attorney normally become involved in complaints investigation at any stage? [1 Yes [ No If yes. at what stage. in what way. and for which kinds of complaint? 58) Hhat other documents or systems affect the investigation of complaints from a legal point of view? [] Officer's Bill of Rights [% Union Contract I Other (please specify) J) PUBLIC INFORMATION 59) Having made a complaint. is the complainant notified of the: Receipt of the complaint? [ Yes [ No Approximate conclusion date of the investigation? _ E] Yes No Finding of the case? [] Yes No Disposition and disciplinary action taken against the accused officer (when applicable)? [i I? Procedure for appeal by the complainant if not satisfied with the outcome? [] Yes I] No 264 60) Are statistics relating to complaints investigation disseminated to the public? ii If En Why not? If as. in what on [J In a separate specific report published annually In the Police Chief‘s Annual Report By way of a press release (e.g.. newspaper article) Other (please specify) Please attach a copy of the most recent report to the completed questionnaire. K) COMPLAINTS STATISTICS 6T) Please respond to each part of this question with estimated figures averaged over the last five years: A) Number of complaints made by citizens against sworn officers per year 1 Number of incidents giving rise to these complaints per year (i.e.. frequently a citizen wi l make a number of different complaints. all of which are documented. but which all arose from the same incident) 8) Percentage of complaints alleging crimes per year Percentage of complaints alleging excess force. incivility. harassment. etc.. per year Percentage of complaints alleging other procedural or administrative violations (for example. conduct unbecoming an officer. lack of ser- vice. etc.) per year 2 Total 'TOOT C) Yearly findings (averaged over the last five years): Percentage of crime allegations sustained 1 not sustained I unfounded I exonerated _—‘ policy review/policy failure I (See 0. 47 for definitions) Total “TIRE! Percentage of excess force. etc.. allegations sustained 1 not sustained I unfounded ___-I l exonerated I policy review/pa icy failure 1 Total TOO! Percentage of other administrative allegations sustained not sustained 2 unfounded -__-I exonerated I policy review/policy failure 1 Total 135! 62) For those complaints in the policy review/policy failure cate ry above (See Question 47 for definition.) Uhat type of internal systemic departmental) defects or policy failures have. in the past. given rise to officer wrongdoing which has provoked citizen complaints? 265 L) OPINIONS The following. and final. set of questions is designed to measure opinions. rather than facts. regarding investigation of complaints against the police. There are therefore no right or wrong answers. The questions are in the form of statements to which you are asked to respond on a numerical scale ranging from l to 7 depending upon the extent to which you either agree or disagree with each statement. In responding. place the number that best represents your views in the space provided next to each statement. For example. if you strongly agreed with a statement. you would respond wdth a l. whilst if you were not sure but felt that you probably disagreed with it. you would respond with a 5. Please respond to questions 63 and 64 specifically with regard to your de artment only. and to the remainder of the questions with regard to investigation 0 citizen complaints against the police in general. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree Net Sure But Neither Not Sure But Disagree Strongly agree probably agree agree nor probably disagree disagree disagree 63) [ ] “Police officers feel that internal investigations of complaints are fair and equitable." 64) [ ] "Citizens in the community feel that internal investigations of complaints are fair and equitable.” 65) [ ] “External (or civilian) review of complaints tends to decrease the morale of the police. which can lead to reduced effectiveness and performance.“ 66) [ ] "Internal Affairs' goals and complainants' expectations do not necessarily correspond.II 67) [ ] “Civilians are unqualified to judge the propriety of police actions.“ 68) [ ] ”External (or civilian) review boards for investigating complaints against the police provide an impartial and independent assessment of police practices.‘ 69) [ ] “Police officers are professionals and are thus best able to regulate their own conduct.“ 70) [ ] "Citizens not satisfied with internal investigation of complaints have sufficient alternative avenues to follow. the courts being just one example.“ 7l) [ ] 'The impartiality of internal investigation of complaints depends heavily upon the integrity of senior police administrators.“ 72) [ ] “Involving interested citizens in the citizen complaint process can lead to increased public confidence and can therefore be advantageous to the police department.“ 73) [ ] "External (or civilian) involvement in the disciplinary process interferes with the authority of the Police Chief." 74) [ ] “One advantage which internal review systems have over external review systems is that. under internal review. officers can actively seek out malpractice within the police department. whereas under external review a citizen must first make a complaint before anything can be done.” 75) [ ] 'Independent external investigation of complaints against the police is less likely to be biased than is internal investigation." 76) [ ] “External interest in complaints investigation is natural and reasonable." 77) [ ] 'Civilian Review Boards have been shown to be unworkable and ineffective.” 78) [ ] “An honest and open Internal Affairs Unit will lessen a police department's civil liability." Continued on next page. 266 Finally. may we take this opportunity to remind you of our requests for capies of departmental procedures and published reports relating to investigation of citizen complaints to be attached to this completed questionnaire and to thank you once again for taking the time to respond. Ne are confident that your response will help us to produce a summary report which will be both informative and interesting and which will be of use to you and your department. 267 APPENDIX II Creation of the Combined " Openness to Accept Complaints" Variable A combined measure of agency openness to accept complaints was created by combining departmental responses to a number of questions on the survey instrument in accordance with the following scoring system: Table A.l - Creation of the Combined "Openness to Accept Complaints" Variable Policy Score A complaint will be investigated after: a) Verbal notification by telephone 1 b) Verbal notification in person 1 c) Written notification (unsigned) 1 (1) Written notification comprising a signed statement 1 A complaint will be accepted from anyone (for example, a witness to an event) 1 Complainants are not routinely warned against making false statements 1 Anonymous complaints are investigated as a matter of routine ’ 3 Anonymous complaints are investigated if there is other supportive information 2 Anonymous complaints are not investigated 1 Nofimitisspecifiedmdicfimcchpsodbemcmdicaucgedincidcntmkingplacc and the complaint being filed, after which a complaint will not be accepted 1 Maximum Possible = 10 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Barton, P. 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