AN ANALYSIS OF PRESS COVERAGE OF THE GERMAN- AMERICAN BUND BY SELECTED AMERICAN PUBLICATTONS Thesis for the Degree of M. A MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY GERALD JOSEPH McCARTAN 1976 IIIIII IIII IIII II II I III 33129 0067 719128 MSU LIBRARIES .—:—.. RETURNING MATERIALS: PTace in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. WI JAN‘ 0'" 6-2" ABSTRACT AN ANALYSIS OF PRESS COVERAGE OF THE GERMAN-AMERICAN BUND BY SELECTED AMERICAN PUBLICATIONS By Gerald Joseph McCartan " ' ‘ 0 } :E: Historians having an interest in the German- American Bund have credited the American press with advancing the importance and impact of that organization beyond its actual bounds and bringing about its downfall as well. The purpose of this study is to analyze the coverage and attitudes of selected publications in rela- tion to the Bund during its rise in the 19303 to its downfall in the early 19405. The publications selected for review include: the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the Chicago Tribune, and the San Francisco Examiner; two opinion magazines, the New RepUblic and the Nation; and two news magazines, Timg_and Newsweek. The sample news- papers were chosen to reflect differences existing in coverage between varying geographic regions while also representing, as closely as possible, the areas where Bund regional headquarters were located: New York, Gerald Joseph McCartan Chicago and Los Angeles. All the publications were examined at the Michigan State University Library, either on microfilm or in bound volumes. The analysis of press coverage is divided into three different periods in the movement's deve10pment and demise. The first section reviews forerunners of the Bund and its founding as the Friends of New Germany. The second section details the movement in its rise as the German—American Bund and the third section deals with its downfall. The study supports the view advanced by some his- torians of the period that the press, through its cover- age of the organization, initially bolstered the image of the Bund, making it appear more powerful and dangerous than it actually was. It also supports the position that later press coverage helped expose the Bund and brought about the downfall of the movement. The study does not support the contention that the press sensationalized its coverage of Bund activities. While there were a few instances of sensationalism.by the newspapers, the study found that the overall coverage was responsible, with stories handled as straight news items. The study found that many of the newsworthy events rela- ted to the Bund and covered by the press were sensa- tional in and of themselves. AN ANALYSIS OF PRESS COVERAGE OF THE GERMAN-AMERICAN BUND BY SELECTED AMERICAN PUBLICATIONS By Gerald Joseph McCartan A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS School of Journalism 1976 Accepted by the faculty of the School of Journal- ism, College of Communication Arts and Sciences, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the require- ments for the Master of Arts degree. ~// Director of Thesis // WV' “cu—t- To Helen, in thanks for her unending patience, support and encouragement. ii wet - ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Maurice R. Cullen for the guidance and criticism he offered during the research and manuscript prepa- ration of this study. iii INTRODUCTION . Chapter I. FORERUNNERS OF THE MOVEMENT AND THE FRIENDS OF NEW GERMANY . . II. THE RISE OF THE BUND III. THE DOWNFALL OF KUHN AND DECLINE OF THE BUND . . . . . . . IV. TABLE OF CONTENTS ANALYSIS OF PRESS COVERAGE AND CONCLUSIONS . BIBLIOGRAPHY . iv Page 34 75 112 119 INTRODUCTION A period of profound and protracted depres- a sion has followed in the wake of the World War. J It has been world-wide. More than 15 years have elapsed since the ending of the war, but its blighting effect upon the economic life and the morale of practically all the peoples of the world still exists. During such a period of unrest, discontent with the existing order, and a wide-spread agitation for changes in the form, character, and substance of governments has spread over the world, overturning established governments and resulting in many new and radi- cal experiments in government. Rep. John W. McCormack June 5, 1934 Willi... During the 19308, the rise of demagogues and demagoguery promoting the political and economic concepts of fascism was widespread. Such European leaders as Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany and Franco in Spain, were changing the course of their countries and ultimately the world. In the United States, as well, a number of men and movements advocated Fascistic solutions to the economic ills of the nation. The radio oratory of Father Charles E. Coughlin and the writings of Seward Collins, Lawrence Dennis and Gerald B. Winrod brought the Fascist 1U.S., Congress, House, Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report on the Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda, H. Rept. 153, 74th Cong., lst sess., 1935, pp. 3-4. gospel to the people. William D. Pelley's Silver Shirts, George W. Christians' Crusaders for Economic Liberty and George E. Deathrage's Knights of the White Camellia were all committed to employing the forces of fascism to defend the country from what they termed the Communist threat. Among the men and movements adhering to the political right, one in particular stood out due to its alien name, and to some degree its alien nature: the German-American Bund. As Sander A. Diamond points out in The Nazi Move- ment in the United States: "Many Americans believed that the Bundists intended to establish a Nazi dictatorship in the United States. In retrospect, this assertion seems ludicrous; in the context of the late 19303, how- ever--when a permanently Fascist Europe seemed possible-- the belief that a Trojan horse was being readied by Hitler's supposed agents was not considered farfetched.”2 As a result of this belief, the Bund was investi- gated by two Congressional committees during the decade. It was also watched and reported on by the Department of Justice, J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation, and assorted journalists. 2Sander A. Diamond, The Nazi MOvement in the United States: 1922—1941 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 19757. P- 21- Historians writing about the movement have stated that the press made the Bund appear far more important, powerful and dangerous than it was while also ultimately bringing about its destruction. Diamond notes: "The newspaper coverage and newsreels afforded the Bund initially aided the movement but eventually harmed it."3 Much the same sentiment was voiced by Ralph F. Bischoff in Nazi Conquest Through German Culture: "The Bund attracted much more attention than it warranted, and it received far too much free publicity. Neverthe- less, it did illustrate the dangers which are inherent in the idea of a German cultural nation of one-hundred millions."4 Detailing his charges, Diamond said that the publicity afforded the Bund by the press reinforced the view held by "millions of Americans" that "Hitler had an undetermined but alarmingly large number of followers in the United States." Even a cursory examination of several widely circulated journals published in the late 19308 suggests that the Bundists were catapulted into the national limelight at the very moment when the Fascist or fascoid regimes and Nazi Germany were threatening the already weakened inter- national structure. The Bund's inner machinations 3 4Ralph F. Bischoff, Nazi Conquest Through German Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I9525, pp. 178-179. Diamond, The Nazi Movement, pp. 208-209. made for interesting reading--intrigue is inher- ent in oath-bound organizations owing allegiance to a foreign power--but few writers attempted to assess the movement's broader connotations. Bund "fuehrer" Fritz Kuhn exercised supreme authority over the organization during its rapid rise to notoriety between 1936 and its peak at the time of the Madison Square Garden rally in February, 1939. Diamond noted that Kuhn's overwhelming desire for publicity thrust both the man and the movement into the limelight after 1936. Newspaper and magazine writers attempted to provide the inside story on the Bund. In addition to acquainting the public with the Bund, the publicity also had an unintended effect: Their articles were a reflection of the pub- lics desire to know more about fascism and about what one writer referred to as the 'new barbarian invasion' . . . . The unintended result of this publicity was to attribute to the Bund a fag greater influence than it actually exerted. The Foreign Policy Association in 1935 noted the role played by the press in building the Bund's image: "Having failed in its aim to unify the German-American societiescntNational Socialist principles, the Bund is today merely a small dissident element. Some observers believe that the spotlight constantly thrown on it by 5Diamond, The Nazi MOvement, pp. 38-39. 61bid., pp. 206-207. hostile politicians and newspapers now constitutes its only strength."7 This study will assess the coverage and attitude of selected newspapers and news and.opinion magazines to the Bund during its rise in the 19305 to its downfall in , the early 19403. It will review chronologically, within I the limitations oftflmipaper, the activities of the Bund as reported and commented upon by the selected publica- tions. The New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, Chicago Tribune, and San Francisco Examiner were chosen to reflect differences existing in coverage between vary- ing geographic regions and to examine press coverage in areas where Bund regional headquarters were located: New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. The Timg§_was selected, additionally, due to its high reputation for fairness and accuracy. The news magazines, Time and Newsweek, and the opinion magazines, the New Republic and the Nation, were selected to represent the national magazine press of the era. The study is divided into four sections, each of the first three dealing with a different period in the movement's existence, and the fourth presenting 7New York Times, July 18, 1938, p. 5. conclusions about press coverage of the Bund by the pub- lications studied. The first section reviews forerunners of the Bund, the founding of the Bund itself and its activities as the Friends of New Germany. The second section will detail the movement as it grew after offi- cially adopting the name German-American Bund to its peak at the time of the Madison Square Garden Rally in 1939. The bulk of materials from the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities investigation and the trials of Bund fuehrers Fritz Kuhn and G. W. Kunze will be dealt with in the third section on the downfall of the movement. The final section will analyze and present conclusions on press coverage of the Bund. CHAPTER I FORERUNNERS OF THE MOVEMENT AND THE FRIENDS OF NEW GERMANY While, historically, the largest immigration of Germans to the United States occurred in the late 19th century, more than 411,000 German nationals came to the 1 As did all ethnic United States between 1922 and 1931. groups migrating to America, these individuals organized themselves into numerous religious groups, choral soci- eties and athletic clubs in order to carry on the tradi- tions and customs of the "old country." Among the ethnic organizations forming at this time was the "Teutonia Association," founded by Friedrich (Fritz) and Peter Gissibl, Alfred Ex and Frank von Friedersdorff on October 12, 1924, in Detroit.2 With unofficial links to the National Socialist German Workers Party in Germany, "Teutonia's mission was to transplant the 'National Socialist idea' to America,--not to all America, not even 1The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to fhe Present (New York: Horizon Press, 1965), pp. 56-577 2Diamond, The Nazi Movement, p. 92. to all German-Americans, but . . . to newly arrived Ger- man national elements living in the United States."3 In an interview with the New York Times datelined Chicago, March 26, 1932, Fred (Fritz) Gissibl outlined the aims of Teutonia: 'We are working against the Versailles and other treaties which are responsible for Ger- many's present economic dilemma,‘ he said. 'We have no official connection with the Hitler party. Nothing we do or write is done in the name of the Hit er leaders. We are entirely independent.‘ Gissibl, who was identified as the leader of the Chicago group, reported Teutonia's total membership at "upward of 1,000 in New York, Chicago, Detroit, Phila- delphia, Rochester, Cleveland and Milwaukee."5 When disbanded later that year, Teutonia appeared to have made little headway in enlisting support from the German- American community. In one respect, Teutonia did serve an important purpose, that of a nurturing ground for many of the future leaders of the Friends of New Germany and the German- American Bund. Among those were Walter Kappe, Fritz Gissibl, later a leader of the Friends; Sepp Schuster, 3Diamond, The Nazi MOvement, p. 92. 4 New York Times, March 27, 1932, p. 10. 51bid. leader of the uniformed service of the Friends; and Heinz Spanknoebel, early leader of the Friends.6 During the intervening period between the end of Teutonia in 1932 and the founding of the Friends of New Germany in July, 1933, many former members of Teutonia joined "Gau-USA," the American division of Hitler's National Socialist Party.7 In an article on March 23, 1933, the New York Times quoted Paul Manger, identified as chief of the New York office of Gau-USA, as estimating the membership of the group at more than 1,000, two-hundred of whom resided in New York City. Manger noted that Gau-USA was limited to Germans who had not renounced their German allegiance. This was necessary, he said, "to avoid any criticism that the organization was interfering or even able to inter- fere through voting participation in American politics." Manger also identified Heinz Spanknoebel as leader of the organization.8 Gau—USA had a short life span, and the German National Socialist Party ordered the group to disband in April, 1933. The New York Times, on April 27, quoted the German Consulate in New York as saying that "it was 6Leland V. Bell, In Hitler's Shadow (Port wash— ington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1973), pp. 7-8. 7Diamond, The Nazi Movement, p. 101. 8New York Times, March 23, 1933, p. 11. 10 realized, and I think wisely, that political organizations should stay at home." But a local spokesman for Gau-USA underscored the possibility of another organization, unrelated to the Nazi Party in Germany, being formed.9 The founding of another pro-Nazi Germany group was net long in coming. The Friends of New Germany held its first annual convention in Chicago in late July, 1933. Addressing members of the Friends, Heinz Spanknoebel announced the beginning of the National Socialist move- ment in the United States. With the formation of the Friends of New Germany, the Bund was born. Although the name of the group was not officially changed to the German-American Bund until 1936, the organizational structure and membership of the Friends provided the basic structure for the later Bund. It was at the founding of the Friends that members began referring to themselves as Bundists, a title which would survive the organization and be used until the downfall of the German-American Bund in 1941. Spanknoebel divided the nation into three administrative regions with a director for each, a structure which would be utilized later by the Bund. Finally, Spanknoebel adopted the title of "Bundesleiter,' or national leader, and estab-' lished the administrative procedure of the 9New York Times, April 27, 1933, p. 10. 11 or leadership principle, as the 10 "fuehrerprinzip,' Friends' guiding policy. This same leadership prin- ciple would become a crucial part of the defense in the trial of German-American Bund leader Fritz Kuhn. Almost from its beginning, the Friends of New Germany was the center of controversy and Congressional investigation. The Friends became embroiled in their first con- flict in mid September; l933,when they attempted to interject Nazi German flags and speakers into the annual German Day celebration in New York City. Sponsored annually by the United German Socities of the city, Ger- man Day was an ethnic festival honoring the heroes, homeland and culture of all German immigrants. The dis- pute erupted at a meeting of the Societies on September'l8, 1933, when a resolution which called for the raising of the Nazi flag was adopted. The New York Herald Tribune reported that twenty representatives of the Federation of German-Jewish Societies walked out of the meeting to pro- test the presence of thirty-five Nazi delegates, up from four delegates at the previous meeting. The additional Nazi delegates provided the margin for a favorable vote on the resolution regarding the use of the Nazi flag at the festivities.11 10Diamond, The Nazi Movement, p. 115. 11New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 19, 1933, p. 21. 12 WhiletflmaSocieties remained divided between the pro and anti-Nazi factions, the question of German Day was finally decided by New York Mayor John P. O'Brien on October 21 when he announced his decision to prohibit the meeting on the grounds that violence might erupt. In a letter to Dr. William Poepke, acting director of the Societies, O'Brien said he had been "advised the occasion would be seized by alien agitators . . . who in no way represent the sentiments of the great masses of citizens of German origin. . . ." O'Brien said that he had been warned of the possibility of violence by a delegation of the Jewish War Veterans of America: "New York is not the soil in which the Nazi weeds of intolerance and religious hatred can flourish.”12 Reaction to the mayor's decision came two days later when the Societies decided to send representatives to attempt to persuade O'Brien that the celebration would not take the form of a Nazi propaganda meeting and there would be no violence on the part of the Friends. The Times quoted Heinz Spanknoebel as stating that "no one knew better than he that a Nazi state or storm troopers had no place in the United States and that he and his associated Friends of New Germany were not disturbers. 12New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 22, 1933, p. 1. 13 He charges that the disturbance came from the Jewish side."13 October 26 was a momentous day for both the Friends of New Germany and Spanknoebel. At a meeting that day, representatives of the Societies, with Spanknoebel noticeably absent, failed to persuade O'Brien to rescind his ban of the event. Spanknoebel had failed in his attempt to inject Nazi German flags and speakers into the annual celebration and furthermore had lost any support he may have been receiving from the Nazi Party in Germany. In a short article following the story on O'Brien's decision, the Times said that it had received a disclaimer concerning Spanknoebel from Paul Joseph Goebbels, Nazi propaganda chief. The "emphatic dis- claimer" denied Spanknoebel held any mandate from the Hitler government or from the National Socialist Party and stated he held no official commission of any kind. It also asserted that the German government had cabled orders forbidding Spanknoebel to indulge in any propa- ganda activities.14 No doubt the timing of this disclaimer was prompted, in. part, by the uproar Spanknoebel and the 13 14 New York Times, Oct. 24, 1933, p. 11. New York Times, Oct. 26, 1933, p. 8. 14 Friends had caused in relation to German Day. Probably an even greater factor had been increased Congressional interest in both Spanknoebel and the Friends displayed by a Democratic Congressman from New York, Representative Samuel Dickstein, one of the earliest and most vocal opponents of pro-Nazi Germany groups. On October 10, Dickstein had announced he would use his position as chairman of the House Committee on Immigration to launch an unofficial investigation of Nazi propaganda efforts in America. The Times gave front-page coverage to the announcement, quoting Dickstein's strongly worded reasons for conducting the investigation. The Congressman cited charges that German aliens were entering the country to form a brand of Hitler's government here, with racial and religious hatred and bigotry. He said that he had information that 300 persons, sent personally by German Minister of Propaganda Goebbels, had entered the United States as employees of the German Consulate. He con- tinued: Information has reached me that the Nazi government maintains a propaganda bureau which is heavily financed by resources of the German government. The objective of the bureau and its activities consist of spreading Nazi propaganda in the United States, with the ultimate object of overthrowing our government and installing in its place a dictatorship on the Nazi model.l lSNew York Times, Oct. 10, 1933, pp. 1, 11. 15 The Timee reported that Bernard Ridder, a prospective witness against Spanknoebel and publisher of the German language newspaper Staats-Zeitung in New York, said that he had been visited by Spanknoebel, ”who showed him credentials from the German government as leader in establishing pro-Nazi organizations in America."16 On October 17, the Timee reported that Dick- stein had visited Secretary of State Cordell Hull the previous day to discuss the proposed investigation and solicit the State Department's cooperation. The article also noted Dickstein's charge that 300 Ger- mans had entered the country to work at German con- sulates had been received with some skepticism at the State Department: "Records there showed only ninety-one visas granted for the first eight months of this year for diplomats, consular agents and their servants. In the same period of 1932, 113 such visas were granted."17 Skepticism regarding the often overblown and sometimes preposterous charges of Dickstein became more common throughout his crusade against the German-American Bund. Such doubt, however, did 16 17 New York Times, Oct. 10, 1933, p. 11. New York Times, Oct. 17, 1933, p. 17. 16 not silence the Congressman either in 1933 or later years. Spanknoebel's disappearance was the cause of much speculation in New York City in late October, 1933. On October 27, the Timee published a report which said: ". . . It was admitted definitely by several of his associates in private that he had been recalled to Germany to explain to Nazi headquarters the situation that led Mayor O'Brien to prohibit the annual celebration of German Day. The article went on to say that Spanknoebel had sailed from New York Wednesday night on the Hamburg American Liner "Deutschland," on orders from Berlin.18 The Herald Tribune printed a story the same day which challenged the Timee' account. While not— ing that his friends were silent on the disappearance, it stated: "In the German American district it was doubted that Spanknoebel had hastened to Europe on the Hamburg American Liner Deutschland. ."19 On October 27, one day after his disappear- ance, a federal warrant was issued for the arrest of Spanknoebel, charging him with "acting, or purport- ing to act, as an agent of the German government in l8 19 New York Times, Oct. 27, 1933, p. 10. New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 27, 1933, p. 9. 17 the United States without notifying the State Depart- 20 ment." The following day, a federal grand jury con— vened to question witnesses:hn what had become known as the "Spanknoebel Affair." It finally indicted Spanknoe- bel on November 10, on the basis of Ridder's testimony regarding his use of German credentials. His where- abouts went undiscovered, however, until a New York Times dispatch on December 8, 1933, from Berlin placed him in Germany.21 The San Francisco Examiner carried a Uni- versal Service dispatch datelined Berlin, October 28, in which Adolf Hitler repudiated Spanknoebel and emphatically disavowed charges that Nazi organizers were actively working in the United States: In an exclusive interview with the Universal Service correspondent Chancellor Hitler said: 'There is no authorized representative of myself or the German National Socialist Party active in America. 'If any German national who is a member of our party is engaged in propaganda or political activity in the United States, I will expel him from the party immediately that proof is sub- mitted to me. 'I have given strictest orders that not even lecturescn:speeches on National Socialism.are to be given in America by members of my party. 'Violation of that order will be follgmed immediately by expulsion from the party.‘ 20 21 22 New York Times, Oct. 28, 1933, p. 1. New York Times, Dec. 9, 1933, p. 9. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 29, 1933, p. l. 18 Despite denials from Hitler and Goebbels that any relationship existed between the Friends of New Germany and the German Nazi Party, Representative Dick- stein went ahead in November with his informal investi- gation of Nazi activities in America. Editorial comment regarding the investigation was sparse, with only the Herald Tribune and New Republic devoting space to the tOpic. The New Republic, in mid October, was wholeheartedly in support of the inquiry, outlining Dickstein's charges of excessively large con- tingents of German consular employees entering the country and recounting the Spanknoebel incident with Bernard Ridder. It then went on to outline evidence presented in the Daily Worker, the Communist Party paper published in New York City, alleging that a letter was sent by Spanknoebel to the address of the Berlin police. It purportedly requested Nazi agents be sent to America on a German liner. The New Republic, while admitting that the letter may have been a forgery as Spanknoebel contended, said that under the circumstances some sub- stantiation was needed: ”Obviously, a searching investi- gation by the United States government, such as Mr. Dickstein is planning, is imperatively necessary to find out just what the German Nazis are doing in this country and to what extent , if any, they are violating American law ."23 23New Republic, October 18, 1933, p. 264. 19 The Herald Tribune, on November 1, published an editorial commenting on the disappearance of Spanknoebel, noting: . Alien propagandists who believe it to be the 'duty' of all naturalized citizens to 'stand up for their native country should it be dishonored and boy- cotted' are plainly among those who will never be missed." It did not, however, see the need for a Congressional investigation of Nazi propaganda activities. The edito- rial noted that the last official German prOpaganda effort in this country had not been successful. It con- cluded with an example of the limitations of the propa- ganda technique: . At the most, perhaps, propaganda might, if sufficiently clever, sway an opinion absolutely neutral, or attract an opinion ready, for rea- sons within itself, to take up something new. That is why people who go into a panic over the propaganda menace seem always to be confes- sing some weakness in their own position--or else a rather naive misunderstanding of what propaganda can really accomplish. 4 The committee opened hearings in Washington, D.C., on November 14, in what an Associated Press dis- patch in the Examiner described as "crammed with all the elements of an oriental mystery story, even to a Mr. X who appeared in person to testify. . . ." The report further noted that Mr. X's testimony tended to confirm Representative Dickstein's earlier allegations regarding 24Editorial, New York Herald Tribune, Nov. 1, 1933, p. 16. 20 the entry of numerous German nationals into the country, including seamen smuggling "inflammatory material urg- ing an absolute dictatorship in the United States."25 The remainder of the committee's inquiry was conducted almost exclusively in executive session with little or no press coverage until the release of the com- mittee report. On January 20, 1934, the committee issued a majority report urging a full Congressional investiga- tion of Nazi propaganda activities in the United States. Of this the Herald Tribune reported: The committee said that the German govern- ment 'undoubtedly' was behind the activities of Nazi propagandists in this country, despite dis- avowals from Berlin. The committee said that Nazi activities were concentrated on promotion of antagonism of racial groups in this country, 'particularly directing them all into one channel of hatred against the Jewish people.‘ 'Everyghing else is subordinate to this aim,' it said. Response to the committee's recommendation came two months later on March 20, 1934, when the House voted to begin an immediate investigation of Nazi and Communist propaganda. The commmittee consisted of seven House mem- bers. The chairmanship was first offered to Representa- tive Dickstein, who declined the post but did serve as a member of the committee. Representative John W. McCormack (Democrat, Massachusetts) was named chairman. 25 26 San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 15, 1933, p. 2. New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 21, 1934, p. 13. 21 In response to the coming investigation, the Friends announced a leadership change on March 27, 1934, with the appointment of Reinhold Walter, an American, to replace Fritz Gissibl, who had assumed the position fol- lowing Spanknoebel's disappearance. The Timee reported that Gissibl explained the change by stating that the German government had issued a decree barring members of the German Nazi Party who were in America "from membership as well as leadership" in the Friends.27 The change was purely cosmetic, however, and the McCormack Committee's final report noted that Gissibl remained the real head of the movement.28 Executive sessions of the McCormack Committee Opened in New York on June 17, 1934. Coincidentally, the Friends of New Germany held a rally that evening in Madison Square Garden to protest the boycott of German goods organized by Jewish groups throughout the nation. The Herald Tribune described the scene: They reproduced in accurate detail a gather- ing of Nazi throngs in Berlin's Sportspalast with long lines of their own unsmiling ushers bearing the swastika. armband, continued cries of 'Heil Hitler' accompanied by the upraised arm of the Nazi salute, and a thunderous roar of 'Ja' to a 27New York Times, March 28, 1934, p. 19. 28U.S., Congress, House, Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Report on the Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda, H. Rept. 53, 74th Cong., lst Sess., 1935, p. 5. 22 call for confidence in the leaders of the boy- cott against the Jews. . . . Madison Square Garden presented a military appearance with the concentration of police and the arrival of sev- eral hundred membegg of the Ordnungs Dienst (orderly service). The Herald Tribune account noted, however, that the speakers emphasized that the rally was an American affair with no connections to foreign governments or political parties. The Timee account also mentioned the Nazi-German aura of the Garden and the speakers' denials of links with the German government. George Sylvester Vierech, pro-German writer and publicist, was quoted in the Timee as saying that the boycott of German goods interfered with President Roosevelt's efforts to lift America from the depression. We Americans of German descent are Americans before we are German sympathizers. We resent the boycott not merely because it harms Germany. We resent it primarily because it interferes with the revival of American prosperity and lays the basis for racial strife in the United States. The Chicago Tribune ran a two-paragraph account of the rally while the Examiner gave it no coverage at all. Editorial reaction to the rally came solely from the Herald Tribune. Commenting on the Nazi policy regard- ing Jews, the lengthy editorial called the issue a 29New York Herald Tribune, May 18, 1934, p. 1. 30New York Times, May 18, 1934, p. 3. 23 "European affair." It noted that the American character of the rally was somewhat questionable, considering the Nazi German trappings in evidence. The editorial did, however, congratulate the organizers on the generally peaceful demeanor of the participants. It further stated: There was no suggestion in any speech that the political and social system which Adolf Hit- ler has made the German national culture was in any way superior to American democracy, that any feature of Hitlerism should be introduced here, or that anti-Semitism should be an American or even German-American article of faith. Such ideas were, indeed, explicitly disavoged by sev- eral of the principal speakers. . . In conclusion, the editorial questioned the concern expressed for the American economy, considering the plans to continue a Friends sponsored counter- boycott against the Jews: "It can yield this community and this country nothing but the acerbation of a feud for which we have no room on American soil."32 The McCormack Committee hearings during June and July, 1934, were the main items of news interest in rela- tion to the Friends that summer. Covering the opening session in Washington on June 6, all the publications included in the study ran Associated Press accounts of testimony which revealed that a former German consul 31Editorial, New York Herald Tribune, May 19, 1934, p. 10. 32 Ibid. 24 general in New York, Dr. Otto Kiep, had retained the firm of Carl Byoir and Associates for assistance in obtaining newspaper publicity. Carl Dickey, a partner in the firm, testified that he had received $4,000 over eighteen months for providing assistance with press releases and revealed that the firm had obtained a contract with the German Tourist Information Office for $6,000 a month for "giving advice, counsel and getting together material for travel information.”33 The following day, the committee heard testimony which indicated the German consuls in New York, Chicago and St. Louis had allegedly assisted in the organization of the Friends. The highlight of the day was the testi- mony of Fritz Gissibl and Reinhold walter acknowledging the existence of Friends chapters in twenty-one cities and estimating the total membership at 5,000.34 On the final day of hearings, Frank Mutschinski, ' a German veterans a former commander of the "Stahlhelm,' organization, testified that members had drilled in New York in smuggled German army uniforms and with rifles obtained from Germany and the New York National Guard. He also said that Nazi agents masqueraded as crew members 33 34 Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1934, p. 7. New York Times, June 7, 1934, p. 13. 25 on Germanliners, avoided immigration officials and gained entry into the United States. In other testi- mony, Reinhold Walter admitted that he was ”merely a straw man" in the Friends and that Fritz Gissibl was the real leader of the movement.35 The McCormack Committee held public hearings in New York City on July 9 at which Hubert Schnuch, newly elected leader of the Friends, testified that the orga- nization had grown to forty local units. With a banner headline reading ”Nazi Efforts in U.S. Told," the Chicago Tribune recounted Schnuch's testimony: He maintained that an American citizen of German origin properly could shout 'Heil Hitler' or salute the swastika flag as the Friends of New Germany do, without incurring the reproach of 'double allegiance.’ He said the Friends had nothing to hide; that they were not affiliated with the Nazi Party in Germany, but were proud to say they are 'sympathizers. . . .' Mr. Schnuch said the example of the Nazi Party in 'excluding all of non-Aryan blood' from membership in Ger- many had been followed here by the Friends of New Germany. Testimony revealed that Schnuch had no more power in the organization than his predecessor, Reinhold Walter. The Timee coverage noted that Schnuch had been nominated by Gissibl and that immedately after Schnuch's election he had appointed Gissibl leader of the Middle West district. In defending the appointment from the 35 36 New York Times, June 8, 1934, p. 1. Chicago Tribune, July 10, 1934, p. l. 26 charge that members of the German Nazi Party were to stay clear of the Friends, Gissibl notified the committee that he had resigned from the party and had filed an application for American citizenship.37 One of the most astounding revelations to surface during the hearings came on July 11 when testimony taken by the committee in executive session in May was read into the record. It revealed that Ivy Lee, the public relations adviser, had been retained at $25,000 a year by the German Dye Trust. Lee had testified that within three months after Hitler came to power as German Chancel- lor his firm had been working continuously "giving advice and suggesting policies for the guidance of the German government in its relations with the American people.”38 The Universal Service report in the Examiner called Lee the "'master mind' behind some of the German government's most critical maneuvers." It stated: ”He earned his fee, according to the deposition, by advising the Nazi government on the disarmament question, the Jewish problem and its handling of foreign debts."39 The testimony given before the committee prompted the Examiner to run an editorial on July 12 blasting the Friends. It recounted membership and drilling activities 37New York Times, July 10, 1934, p. 16. 38 39 New York Times, July 12, 1934, p. 1. San Francisco Examiner, July 12, 1934, p. 2. 27 and called them amazing. Outlining the ”absolute leader" principle of command, it noted the role played by Gissibl in Schnuch's election and his hurried application for citizenship during the committee hearings. In conclusion it asked rhetorically: Was ever anything attempted--so stupid as this organization of Nazi Friends? Was there ever a more clumsy piece of alien vanity and self-assertion,-—more offensive to American ideas, more clearly in violation of the duties implicit in permitted residence in this country, to say nothing of American citizenship. The whole thing is almost unbelievable! The Congressional Committee . . . has done a useful service in exposing this organization and the grotesque and vicious propaganda, carried on by it in our midst. There should be no difficulty in putting an end to it and there should be no delay in doing so! Apparently the lesson must be taught ONCE MORE that American soil is not to be used as a battle-ground for the conflicts of European or other foreign parties or factions. Americans will not tolerate alien emblems and alien allegiances--whether the emblem be the swastika and disloyalty finds voice in Heil Hit- ler, or anytzing else of the same type or description. After the July hearings, the committee turned to study other foreign influences until reopening hearings on the Friends in mid October. Meeting in New York City on October 16, the com- mittee heard from Fredrich Karl Kruppa, a former officer in the Friends. The Herald Tribune reported that Kruppa 40Editorial, San Francisco Examiner, July 12, 1934, p. 16. 28 had testified that military units of the Friends were drilling on Long Island and in New Jersey and that the Nazi movement in this country had identical aims to that which swept Germany. The witness also testified on the disappearance of Heinz Spanknoebel, stating that Spanknoebel was kidnapped from the home of Dr. Ignatz T. Griebl by an attache of the German Ministry of Propa- ganda. According to the witness, Spanknoebel was abducted on October 27, 1933, by Hellmuth von Feldman and sailed to Germany aboard the liner Europa the next day. Kruppa said that both Von Feldman and Spanknoebel had become officials in Germany.41 The hearings closed the next day amid shouts of "Heil Hitler" when two hundred members of the Friends packed the hearing room and caused general uproar, cutting radio transmission wires outside the hearing room and nearly clashing with a group of Jewish spectators. After hearing several hundred witnesses and com- piling over 4,000 pages of testimony in public hearings and executive sessions, the McCormack Committee released its final report in Washington on February 15, 1935. The findings detailed both Fascist and Communist propa- ganda efforts found to be underway in the country and recommended legislation to Congress to curb further 41New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 17, 1934, p. 6. 29 activities. In relation to German propaganda, the Herald Tribune reported: Nazi propaganda included 'gigantic mass meetings, literature of the vilest sort' and use of short wave radio, the report asserted. It charged one 'transaction' involved the Ger- man Embassy itself, while there was 'indisput- able evidence' that certain German consuls engaged in 'Xicious and un-American propaganda activities.‘ Recommendations of the committee included: 'empowering the Secretary of Labor to cut short visa per- mits for anyone engaged in propaganda, requiring all foreign propagandists to register with the Secretary of State, and passing legislation making it unlawful to advocate the overthrow of the government by force. Editorial comment on the report was voiced by the Times, Herald Tribune and the New Republic, with none being congratulatory of the committee's work. The Timee, reflecting that the committee had found "that we are much exposed to 'foreign propaganda'," also noted that much of the evidence obtained in the investigation was of an "alarmist nature." Admitting that "a great deal of significant and ominous testimony" was presented, the Timee faulted the committee's report for placing so much emphasis on foreign sources of propa- gynnda, pointing to the abundance of American demagogues. It: concluded that "a few doses of old—fashioned American ¥ 42New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 16, 1935, p. l. 30 prosperity would do the complaining patient a bit of good."43 The Herald Tribune reacted to the report three days after its release in an editorial entitled "Big_ Guns for Small Game." Commenting that the committee had "secured much free publicity for the movements under investigation, the editorial was critical of the recom- mended legislation: This is not only superfluous, for the reason that there is no state in which the local authorities could not penalize subversive propa- ganda of a really dangerous character under the 'riot act,‘ but it is the kind of legislation that would dignify and advertise by outlawing what is certainly the least dangerous form of revolt against traditional democracy--Red soap- box oratory--and divert attention from the sugar-coated forms of subversion which all con- servative Americans most fear and to which the committee has been most discreetly blind. The New Republic described the committee's report as a "curious document.” The article claimed the legis- lative recommendations "appear to be aimed almost entirely at curbing the activities of alien revolutionaries of the Marxian school. It sounds almost as though the men who wrote the proposed legislation had not read the report, or had done their work before the committee's hearings began."45 43Editorial, New York Times, Feb. 16, 1935, p. 12. 44Editorial, New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 18, 1935, p. 14. 45"The Week," New Republic, March 6, 1935, p. 86. 31 While the committee had uncovered Nazi German links to the Friends, no charges against any member of the organization were ever made and the legislative recommendations offered were largely ignored. The com- ndttee's work did, however, ultimately have an effect on the Friends and their ties to the German government. As Sander Diamond notes, anti-German sentiment, prevalent to some degree since Hitler's rise to power, was intensified in the months following the report: . . Findings, by providing support for the allegations of the liberal community helped to make the word 'Bund' synonymous with German intrigue and treachery. 'All these elements which go to make up public opinion,‘ wrote Ambassador Hans Luther shortly after the appear- ance of the report, '. . . are, however, out- weighed by the predominately hostile attitude toward Nazi Germany established here, especially in the press.‘ With no legal action forthcoming, the Friends seemed to adopt an even stronger phiIOSOphical line when they met for their third annual convention in early September, 1935. The Times reported that newly-elected national leader Fritz Gissibl had declared that the Friends no longer needed the assistance of other organiza- tions and were ready to begin "'a year of renewed battle for the purpose of uniting the German elements in the country into one block in support of the . . . (Nazi philosophy) which will preserve the nation in which we 46Diamond, The Nazi Movement, p. 176. 32 I O O O C 47 live and in Wthh most of our members are Citizens.” This convention also marked the rise of Fritz Kuhn, future leader of the German—American Bund, to a position of power as Middle West district head. Before the new battle was able to begin, however, the German government stepped in to initiate the collapse of the Friends. On October 6, the Timee noted that the publicity resulting from the actions of the Friends had annoyed Nazi officials in Germany to the point where they issued another emphatic denial of links with the organiza- tion. Finally, on December 24, 1935, the Friends acknowledged that the German Foreign Office, in October, had ordered all German nationals in the United States to give up membership in the organization. The Timee reported that the order ”was in accord with Hitler's earlier declaration that National Socialism is not a German export article,” and with other statements by Nazi officials terming the Friends a nuisance to the National Socialist movement because of the hostility they created between the United States and Germany. While the withdrawal of German nationals was not sufficient to put an end to German-American political 47 48 New York Times, Sept. 4, 1935, p. 13. New York Times, Dec. 25, 1935, p. 2. 33 organizations, it did result in the end of the Friends of New Germany and apparently caused enough disruption within the organization to make it relatively inactive in its final months. CHAPTER II THE RISE OF THE BUND Many men and movements appeared in these years, offering to solve the pressing and per- plexing problem of privation in the midst of plenty in affluent America. These men were true demagogues. Stirring up the prejudices and pas- sions of the population by tricks of rhetoric and sensational charges, by specious arguments, catchwords and cajolery, the demagogue tried to play on discontents and to intensify the origi- nal irrational elements within them. By doing so he sought to seduce his followers into an emotional attachment to his person that would effectively block any group awareness of either the real sources of unhappiness or the real means of solution. ‘,,1 Wm . IE‘11... . . This definition of the demagogue accurately reflects the character of Fritz Julius Kuhn, the first leader of the German—American Bund and the most famous German-American anti-Semite of the 1930s. Sander Diamond notes: "For many Americans, Kuhn represented the essence of un-Americanism: his thick for- eign accent, his Nazi-style uniform, his repeated state- ments of allegiance to Hitler, and above all, his apparent . O O C C I C 2 1misuses of his recently acqu1red American Citizenship." ¥ 1David H. Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,41969), P. 4w 2Diamond, The Nazi Movement, p. 204. 34 35 But while he might have been the symbol of un-Americanism to some Americans, Kuhn was a true dema— gogue in the eyes of his followers. Whether attacking Jews and Communists, or degrading ”President Rosenfeld and his Jewish Cabinet," Kuhn had a certain flair which appealed to a fringe element of the American populace and was not restricted solely to those of German heritage. Describing Kuhn's manner, Diamond writes that Kuhn injected his own personality into the organization, with the result that "during the Fritz Kuhn years the American Nazi Bund changed from a factionalized and ineffective group to the instrument of an active move— ment."3 Born in Munich on May 15, 1896, Kuhn served in the German Army as a machine-gunner in France during World War I. Following the war he returned to Germany to fight against the Communists and Socialists in Munich, after which he studied chemical engineering at the uni- versity there. Kuhn emigrated to Mexico in 1923, and came to the United States in 1927, where he was natural- ized in December, 1934.4 Kuhn first came to a position of power in the Friends when he was appointed Middle West leader by 3Diamond, The Nazi Movement, p. 205. 4Ibid., p. 211. 36 Fritz Gissibl at the 1935 convention. When Gissibl was forced to renounce his position as national leader in December, to comply with a German government order ban- ning German nationals, he turned power over to Kuhn, an American citizen. The group held its fifth national con- vention in New York in late March, 1936. An Associated Press dispatch in the Timee reported the only information to leak from the tightly guarded meeting was the re-election of Kuhn as national leader. On April 1, the Timee reported that the Friends of New Germany had issued an official statement changing their name to the German-American League (Bund).* The account stated that the league's official purpose was: "To combat the Moscow-directed madness of the Red world menace and its Jewish bacillus-carriers." The report also noted the group's objective of establishing a German-American voting bloc.6 On April 18, Kuhn outlined the policy of the ‘newly-formed Bund at a rally in New York City. He called .for the organization of labor groups, training schools .fbr speakers, education for youth, an extension of the 5New York Times, March 30, 1936, p. 9. *The term "Bund" was derived from the German name