.‘..,'.. ..‘.. ‘ ‘ ......-..+H.. ..oac.qqo.11‘l,. - . THE ADEQUACY OF THE INTERML P‘ROCES3IING: OF COMPLAINTS BY POLICE DEP‘A RTMENTS Thesis for flu Dogma OI M. 5. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY John E. AngeII 1967 ‘ MW \H\\\1\\\1‘\\1\1\W\W\1 3912 93 00672 817 .3 int??? THE ADEQUACY OF THE INTERNAL PROCESSING OF COMPLAINTS BY POLICE DEPARTMENTS By John E. Angell AN ABSTRACT Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE School of Police Administration and Public Safety 1967 APPROVED Rabi/HM] _ j‘tja/A/(W (Chairman) ’V J ABSTRACT THE ADEQUACY OF THE INTERNAL PROCESSING OF COMPLAINTS BY POLICE DEPARTMENTS ' by John E. Angell This study is an examination of the internal pro- cessing of complaints. It is built around the hypothesis that this processing is adequate to ensure that police con- sistently observe the rule of law, to guarantee that both complainants and accused individuals receive just treatment and to rid the police department of employees who seriously abuse their authority. To test the hypothesis an organizational model of disciplinary machinery, which police experts claim is neces- sary, is drawn from the literature and presented for compara- tive and analytical purposes. Then the literature is re- viewed. It indicates that: (l) The utilization of organi— zational machinery for handling complaints against the police is not widespread, (2) where complaint machinery is used, the adequacy of complaint processing also depends upon the attitudes of members of the police department, and (3) the general opinion of the :author’ is that the internal 'processing of complaints has been inadequate. John E. Angell Following the literature review, empirical case studies are presented on the administration of three munici- pal police complaint systems. These reveal wide variations in the structure and function of internal machinery, however it appears that structurally the most adequate system is that most nearly like the model machinery. Finally, based upon a national survey of police de— partments by on—site observations, interviews and mail questionnaires, the general overall situation throughout the nation is evaluated. The data obtained from this survey sup- ports the conclusions derived from the review of the litera— ture and the case studies. These are: (1) Few police de— partments have machinery for processing complaints that is structurally adequate, (2) attitudes influence the adequacy of complaints of the processing regardless of the structural arrangement, and (3) due to either (1) or (2), or both, the general processing of complaints is inadequate to meet the standards established by the hypothesis. As a result of this study, it was deemed necessary to revise the model and develop a tool for evaluating which ef- fect the adequacy of a police departments processing of com- plaints. Using these two recommendations, the original hy— pothesis was revised to indicate that by proper implementation John E. Angell and utilization of them, the internal processing of com- plaints will be adequate. The restriction of this study primarily to municipal police departments is arbitrary, however, the recommendations are felt to be equally applicable to county and state police agencies. It should be of value as a guide for communities and police administrators who are plagued with problems of controlling the abuse of authority by their police officers. THE ADEQUACY OF THE INTERNAL PROCESSING OF COMPLAINTS BY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY John E. Angell A THESIS Submitted to. Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE School of Police Administration and Public Safety 1967 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author is greatly indebted to Professor Raymond T. Galvin, Michigan State University, for the suggestion of the subject of this study and for his assistance, direction and advise throughout the course of the work. The influence and support of my family, particularly my parents, Thelma and Frank Angell, and my wife Vicki, was vital to the com- pletion of this work, and traditional expressions of love and appreciation for them seem grossly inadequate. Ex- pressions of love and gratitude must also be extended to Anna C. Bailey for without her generous assistance and en- couragement in the past this work might never have been possible. In addition, if it had not been for the efforts of fellow employees of the Xenia, Ohio, Police Department and the members of the Xenia City Government neither the fi— nancial means nor the motivation that was necessary for this would have existed. Finally, the author is indebted to the National Center on Police and Community Relations at Michigan State University and the President's Commission on Law En— forcement and Administration of Justice for the opportunity to work on the National Survey on Police-Community Relations which provided a substantial part of the data for this study. ii It also seems appropriate at this point for the author to indicate that one factor that may have indirectly influenced some aspects of the study. This factor is a back— ground of approximately nine years as a line law enforcement officer which may have caused unconscious bias in the author. However, since the author recognized this possibility, a particularly consciencious effort was made to maintain ob- jectivity and draw logical conclusions based only on the data collected. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. INTRODUCTION Purpose of Study Need for Study Hypothesis and Methodology Definitions and Thesis Organization II. MODEL DISCIPLINARY MACHINERY Objectives Supervisors Organization Complaint initiation Complaint investigation . . . Complaint adjudication Appeals . . . . . ... . . . . . Summary . . . ... III. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE Early Literature: 1800 - 1935 Modern Literature: 1935 — 1960 Contemporary Literature: 1960 - 1967 Conclusions iv Page 10 13 13 16 22 24 27 31 33 34 36 37 42 53 66 Chapter Page IV. COMPLAINT MACHINERY IN THREE MAJOR POLICE DEPARTMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Los Angeles, California . . . . . . . . . 70 Complaint initiation . . . . . . . . . 71 Complaint investigation . . . . . . . 75 Complaint adjudication . . . . . . . . 77 Appeal of complaint . . . . . . . . . 81 Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Cincinnati, Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Complaint initiation . . . . . . . . . 89 Complaint investigation .-. . . . . . 90 Cbmplaint adjudication . . . . . . . . 91 Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 New York, New York . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Complaint initiation . . . . . . . . . 101 Complaint investigation . . . . . . . 103 Complaint adjudication . . . . . . . . 106 Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . 115 V. A SURVEY OF DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS AND ' PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 The Complaint Problem . . . . . . . . . . 124 Departmental employee against the department . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Chapter Departmental employee against de— partmental employee . . . . . Citizen against the department Civilian against police officer A Study of the Processing of Complaints of Police Brutality The definition of brutality Is police brutality a problem Implications A Critique of Existing Machinery An overview Summary VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Weaknesses in Complaint Processing Supervision Reception inadequacies Investigation inadequacies Adjudication inadequacies Appeals Validity of the Hypothesis Revised Model Supervision Inspectional services Internal investigations Trial board Conclusions vi Page 126 132 133"' 137‘” 137 145 174 177' 178 191 193 193’ 194 198 200 205 206 209 210 210 214 215’ 225' 229 Chapter BIBLIOGRAPHY Evaluating Established Machinery Revision of Hypothesis and Recommen- dations for Further Research vii Page 230 233 237 Table I 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. LIST OF TABLES Types of Grievance Procedures Grievance Procedure Most Common Civilian Complaints Sources of Complaints Against Police in Two Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Police Action Perceived by Community Leaders as Police Brutality . . . . . . . . . . Police Action Perceived by Police Leaders as Police Brutality . . . . . What Constitutes Police Brutality . . . . Effect of Brutality Complaints on Community Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intra—Departmental Comparison of Excessive Force Complaints Received by Five Police Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intra~Departmenta1 Comparison of Excessive Force Complaints Sustained by Five Police Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Processing Civilian Complaints . . . Type of Units Utilized to Process Complaints Cities with Municipal or State Boards for Handling Citizen Complaints . . . . . . Cities with Internal Investigation Units for Handling Citizen Complaints . . . . . Command of Internal Complaint Processing units 0 O O O O 0 0 I 0 O 0 O 0 O O 0 viii Page 127 130 134 136' 140 142 144 145 158 161 178 180 181 182 183 Table 16. 17. 18. 19. Disposition of Citizen Complaints . . Percent of Complaints Reported to Police that are Sustained . . . . . . . . . Percent of Complaints Reported to Police that cannot be Proven True or Untrue Percent of Complaints Reported to Police that are Proven to be without Merit or False . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Page 185 186 188 190 Chart LIST OF CHARTS Model Internal Investigation Division Model Procedure for Processing a Complaint Los Angeles Internal Affairs Division Los Angeles Procedure for Processing a Complaint Cincinnati Procedure for Processing a Complaint . . . . . . . . . New York City Procedure for Processing a Complaint Recommended Complaint Machinery Recommended Procedure for Processing a Complaint Page 23' 35 72 83 95 109 216 224 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Training material which was prepared and distributed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police recently stated that: The effectiveness of any law enforcement agency is determined by the public cooperation and support it receives. If a police department cannot gain and maintain the confidence of the citizens in the com- munity, its effectiveness will be curtailed, and its integrity and ability questioned. There is nothing revolutionary about this statement, for it has been pointed out many times before by police authorities that public respect and confidence is a neces- sary requisite to effective police operations. For example, 0. W. Wilson has pointed to this fact and elaborated upon some of the repercussions that police can expect from a hos— tile public: a hostile public makes police tasks onerous and working conditions more disagreeable; the police are censured at every move, unjust charges are made against them, and their sound and progressive programs are impeded. When the activities of the police are misunderstood, and construed wrong, their morale is damaged, the maintenance of esprit de corps is made difficult, and they develop a negative mental state that causes them to be fearful of undertaking any 1International Association of Chiefs of Police, Training Key, Number 42, Washington, 1966, p. 1. constructive work. Also, faced with a critical, hostile public, the police unfortunately tend to develop a hostile attitude which worsens public relations.2 It is interesting now to consider the current atti- tudes of certain minority groups toward their police. One report said: ”Many Negroes in the area dislike and distrust the police . . ."3; another indicated: The conduct of law enforcement agencies, . . . has been subject to severe criticism by many Negroes who have appeared before the Commission as wit— nesses . . . "Police Brutality" has been a re- curring charge.4 and a third stated: “. . . mutual distrust, suspicion and hostility continues to exist between police officers and 5 The existence of such re- members of the Negro community." ports and such attitudes is not denied by the police. Quinn Tamm, who is an accepted spokesman for police administrators, recently stated: 20. W. Wilson,_§olice Administration (2nd. ed.; New York:f McGraw—Hill Book Company, 1963), p.;183. 3California Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Police—Minority Group Relations in Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area, August, 1963, p. 21. 4The Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, Violence in the Cityefiag end g£.g beginning? Los Angeles: December, 1965, p. 27. 5Civil Rights Commission, Report on Civil Rights 12‘ vestigation of Claims against Detroit PolIEe Department (Detroit: Michigan Civil Rights Commission, June, 1966). I know of no period in recent history when the po— lice have been the subject of so many unjustified charges of brutality, harassment and ineptness. It almost seems that the better we do our job of enforcing the law the more we are attacked. Assuming that the previously referred to relation- ship between public attitudes and effectiveness does exist, and that certain segments of the public are hostile to the police as suggested by the other sources; it becomes ap- parent that the effectiveness of police in certain communi- ties is not as high as it might be. The question that now becomes apparent is--what would cause the public to harbor hostility for the police? The International Association of Chiefs of Police indicates that the answer is a simple one: Public trust and support can be obtained when the citizens are confident that the police will not overstep the safeguards to individual liberty and when individual members (of the police department) demonstrate that they are interested and actively engage in promoting the public peace and welfare.7 As is the case with most generalizations, the solu— tion is not quite as simple as one would be led to believe by this statement. Since safeguarding individual liberties and maintaining societal order are the primary objectives of a police department, the implication includes a prOper functioning of the entire police department. However, 6Quinn Tamm, The Community and Racial Crises, eds. David Stahl, Frederick Sussman, and Neil Bloomfield (New 'York:. Legal Publishing Company, 1966). 7International Association of Chiefs of Police,_gp. Cit., p. 1. arrangement of the statement and the inclusion of the term "overstep'l also indicates that keeping the police officers' activities within certain limits is very important. Indeed, when the literature is viewed closely, it becomes apparent that the most frequent complaint of minority groups, who lack confidence in the police, falls within this area. Therefore, the most logical starting point for an .,——— evaluation of the problem to determine a course of action which might provide some solution, is with those administra— tive techniques, procedures and machinery that are utilized to insure the containment of police activities within ac- ceptable limits. The most salient and controversial of the methods utilized in this area is the internal system for processing citizen complaints of police misconduct. For this reason the writer has decided to evaluate the actual machinery of police departments that is designed to insure that police officers will perform within the acceptable limits. It is hoped that this work will contribute to im- proving the effectiveness of the police. I. PURPOSE OF STUDY The primary objective of this study is to determine if the contemporary police disciplinary systems--machinery, if you p1ease—-are adequate for and are adequately, receiving and processing all complaints concerning police misconduct. This mandates attention to several questions: 1. Is police misconduct a problem area? 2. Is the standard complaint processing machinery suf- ficient to justly administer to allegations concern- ing the abuse of authority or the use of unnecessary force by police officers? 3. Are police departments utilizing the standard organi- zational machinery to process citizen complaints? To what extent? 4. Are there factors outside the formal machinery for discipline that hinder the adequate operation of the machinery? If so, what are they? 5. Is there a simple tool for evaluating complaint machinery? 6. What modifications can be made to improve the com- plaint processing machinery? In addition this study should fprovide some insight into the most logical areas for additional research. II. NEED FOR STUDY Many citizens, particularly in minority communities, have been, and are presently, contending that police officerjv are failing to comply with the concept of rule of law and are abusing the public or segments of the public. They con— tend that the machinery for processing complaints against the police is inadequate, or that the machinery is not properly administered, or both. This attitude was pointed out in a 1964 study by two Harvard Law School students which said: Even where police have sought to satisfy community interests by procedural reforms . . . public dis- trust for an internal complaint review system often still exists. Such distrust is usually based upon a belief that a police—oriented perspective neces- sarily colors complaint review by police, resulting not only in concealment of officers past misdeeds but also in encouragement of further abuse of authority.8 The Colorado Anti-discrimination Commission, which was appointed by the governor in 1964, indicated that in the area of their survey there was reason for public suspicion. They pointed out that the evidence they uncovered was meager, but it was sufficient to indicate that the misbehaving po- lice officers were not being disciplined properly.9 On the other side of the coin, police officials dis- agree, generally heatedly, with these conclusions. They maintain that the police, by and large, are properly handling cases of misconduct that have come to their attention. After all, insists Quinn Tamm: Where such brutality exists, the administrators of the New York City Police Department and indeed the police of the entire Nation would want to see the perpetrators punished because there is no place in professional law enforcement for brutality.10 These statements represent the two main viewpoints regarding the problem. It should be noted that neither side 8Harold Beral and Marcus Sisk, "The Administration of Complaints by Civilians against the Police," Harvard Law Review, 77:516 (January, 1964). 9The Colorado Anti—discrimination Commission Report to Governor Love, Denver, 1964. (Mimeographed.) 10Quinn Tamm, ”Police Professionalism and Civil Rights," The Police Chief (September, 1964). has specifically mentioned the adequacy of the actual machinery. While some reports have been done concerning the pro- cessing of complaints in particular police departments, their conclusions have generally followed the reasoning of one or the other of these arguments and have tended to neglect an evaluation of the actual machinery. In addition, the reports have generally been initiated by organizations or individuals that were championing a position, and therefore have general- ly not been accepted by those holding the opposite position. As might be expected these reports have not contributed to the evaluation of the contemporary systems of processing com- plaints on any wide or noticeably objective scale. Since the effectiveness of police in the United States is suffering from either faulty complaint machinery, or erroneous beliefs on the part of some members of the public, and since either members of the public~or the police are receiving unjust treatment, depending upon which of the previous alternatives are valid; a study of this area is both necessary and important to the police field. III. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY The hypothesis around which this survey is built can be stated positively: Most police departments in the United States have internal complaint machinery that is sufficient to ensure citizens that the police will observe the rule of law, guarantee that both citizens and police officers re- ceive just treatment, and rid the police department of em— ployees who seriously abuse their authority. The accumulation of the data that constitutes the basis for this thesis was made possible by the National Center on Police and Community Relations at Michigan State University. The information was obtained to facilitate the writing of a report on police and community relations for The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Ad- ministration of Criminal Justice. Since the original ex- ploratory survey was more encompassing and extensive than this thesis, the data herein contained was extracted from the questionnaires, observations and interviews on the basis of its revelancy to this study. Four methods were utilized in obtaining information and data that is included herein: (1) A review of literature that was felt to be relevant was performed. (2) Question— naires were designed and sent to the police departments and community leaders in the largest cities in the United States. The questionnaire for the department contained one section that was to be initiated by the chief of police and dealt with his attitudes and a second section that requested sta- tistical information concerning the police department and the community. The questionniare that was sent to community leaders was identical to the attitude questionnaire intended for the chief of police. (3) Structured and unstructured interviews were used to obtain information from a purposive sampling of police, governmental and community leaders at 16 sites throughout the country. These interviews were used to probe for attitudes and opinions that would be valuable in forming conclusions and making recommendations. (4) Empiri- cal observations were made in accordance with a Data Col— lection Guide that was designed to record information con- cerning the police department. Records were researched, operations were observed, techniques were reviewed, and officers in the field were scrutinized in the 16 sites that were visited. Since this is an exploratory investigation,ll there was some flexibility in the methods used. This study also relies heavily upon intensive studies of selected systems for complaint processing, as well as of related phenomenon which the data seemed to indicate was most pertinent to an evalu— ation of the internal processing of complaints. Even though caution was exercised in the collecting and analyzing of data, the writer hastens to point out the weakness in exploratory efforts. Positive conclusions can seldom be made because of the selectivity and discretion that was used to obtain data for the study; however conclusions llClaire Selltiz, 25 a1., Research Methods in Societal Science (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Revised Edi— tion, 1965), pp. 50-53. 10 from this survey will provide more precise and better de- fined areas for the subject of future research. IV. DEFINITIONS AND THESIS ORGANIZATION Before proceeding with this survey, several terms should be defined, and the organization of the remainder of the thesis must be explained. Citizen. A member of the community who is in no formal way affiliated with the police department. Complaint. A grievance by any source concerning some alleged abuse of authority on the part of a member of the police department. Complaint Machinery. The system, procedure, and/or organizational arrangement within a police department that is controlled by the chief of police and is utilized for the purpose of processing complaints. Igiscipline. The action of a punitive nature that is utilized to enforce the obedience of police employees to laws, rules, regulations, and orders that regulate them in the performance of their duties. It includes dismissal from the police service, but does not necessarily include train- ing unless it is utilized in an ex post facto manner as punishment for improper conduct. Inspection. The activity carried on by or for the chief of police to insure that the organization and its mem- bers are generally meeting his expectations. 11 Internal Investigation Unit. An organizational group within the police department that is formally charged with the investigations of alleged employee misconduct and in some instances with other related functions related to such conduct. Supervisor. A police officer who has the responsi— bility of overseeing, inspecting, and controlling other sub— ordinate officers and employees to ensure a minimum of unac— ceptable conduct on their part. Trial Board. An administrative body consisting of police officers who conduct hearings to receive evidence and determine if accused police employees are guilty of violating departmental standards of conduct. This board serves an ad— visory capacity to the chief and can impose or recommend only departmental punishment, not criminal penalties. Organization pf the Remaining Thesis. The presen- tation of the data throughout the remainder of this thesis will be arranged in cases or intensive study blocks. In Chapter II a model will be drawn from textual ma— terial related to police administration. This model will serve as the ideal system for administering complaints and will be a point of reference for the remainder of the study. Chapter III will present a review of the literature related to the adequacy of police disciplinary machinery. Three case studies of complaint machinery used by various departments will be presented in Chapter IV. These 12 will be critiqued and compared with the model to obtain infor— mation concerning the variations in the machinery, as well as to provide some insight into particular weaknesses and strengths of the variations. Chapter V discusses the results of a national survey which depended upon observations, literature, questionnaires and interviews for information concerning complaint pro— cessing. Due to its importance to an accurate evaluation of complaint processing, an intensive study is made of the problems related to brutality complaints. Throughout the chapter generalizations concerning the present processing of complaints shall be made and some observations about areas needing improvement shall be offered. In Chapter VI conclusions about the validity of the hypothesis will be presented, recommendations concerning changes that are pertinent will be suggested, and the impli- cations for further research will be discussed. CHAPTER II MODEL DISCIPLINARY MACHINERY This chapter will present the objectives of disci— pline, and the machinery that police authorities consider the most appropriate system for administering to complaints. The objectives that are presented will remain unchanged throughout the study. However, the machinery utilized to realize the accomplishment of these objectives may be re— vised at the end of the study, if after critical evaluation and analysis it appears to be lacking. Needless to say, any revision that may occur will be initiated only when it be— comes apparent that the change will increase the relevancy of the model to its goal accomplishment. I. OBJECTIVES In its broadest sense discipline is an administrative tool of control that is utilized to discourage or eliminate employee behavior that is beyond the boundaries of accept— ability for the organization. Since this study deals strictly with processing complaints of officer misconduct, punitive or "negative" disciplinary techniques will neces- sarily receive the emphasis. While no reputable authority 14 would deny the importance of "positive” discipline, when mis- behavior is detected in an ex post facto manner, as in the case of a citizen complaint, punishment must be initiated. Raymond Fosdick acknowledged this in 1922 when he concluded that the primary purpose of discipline was generally to be the identification and punishment of personnel who violate laws, ordinances, regulations, rules and orders that are applicable to them.1 As one might suspect retribution is not the sole pur— pose of discipline. A. C. German points out that underlying the "negative" discipline concept, which at first glance ap- pears to be strictly retributive, are some persuasive reasons for discipline. He said: Effective police morale without effective discipline is impossible: in other words, mediocre discipline lg concomitant with mediocre morale. Effective police management without effective disci- pline is impossible: in other words, mediocre disci— pline is concomitant with mediocre management. Effective public relations without effective disci- pline is impossible: in other words, mediocre disci- pline_i§ concomitant with mediocre public relations.2 Implied in this author's statements is the con- clusion that if an administrator neglects his disciplinary lRaymond Fosdick, Criminal Justice 1g Cleveland (Cleveland, Ohio: The Cleveland Foundation, 1922), p. 45. 2A. C. Germann, Police Personnel Management (2nd printing; Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, Publisher, 1963), P. 172. 15 role, the organization will suffer from poor morale and ef- ficiency internally and related public relations externally. Therefore, he has focused attention on three basic goals or objectives of discipline: (1) improve morale, (2) improve organizational efficiency, and (3) improve public relations. 0. W. Wilson says the same thing in a different manner. He believes that the objectives of the processing of citizen complaints involves detecting errors and weaknesses in the personnel and the organization so that these can be corrected, and administering proper discipline to insure the public of the administrator's desire to eliminate officers who misbehave from the organization and thereby cultivate public confidence, respect, and support for the department and its activities.3 These statements of objectives are good as broad out— lines, but they lack specificity. In fact, it could almost be said that these objectives might be appropriate goals for the police organization as a whole, if they are stated only in this broad sense. Therefore, to facilitate evaluation of the complaint machinery, it is important that the goals be stated more specifically. Quinn Tamm has suggested what he characterizes as "the immediate objectives of the disciplinary process."4 3Wilson, 29. cit., pp. 110—111 and 120—121. 4Quinn Tamm, "Discipline and Performance Appraisal," The Police Chief (September, 1962), p. 6. 16 These he presents in the following manner: 1. Produce a change in thinking and actions on the part of the individual to bring his efforts in— to line with departmental standards. 2. Improve the performance of the group as a whole by deterring its members from engaging in dere— lictions or disapproved practices. 3. Raise and maintain the prestige of the depart— ment by going on public notice that compliance is uniformly insisted upon from all members of the force.5 These statements by Tamm summarize and encompass all the alternatives that are offered by other authorities on police discipline, yet they are more concise and simple. Therefore, they appear to be appropriate objectives which adequate disciplinary machinery should be achieving. They will be utilized in this study to evaluate the adequacy of the complaint machinery by determining the extent that they are being realized in the police field today. II. SUPERVISORS Confucius is credited with having said, "The suc— cessful administration of government depends entirely upon the selection of proper men." Nowhere is this statement more valid than in the area of law enforcement, and par— ticularly in the administrative and supervisory positions of law enforcement agencies. However, not only must the proper SIbid. 17 men be selected, but they must be obligated with definite responsibilities and held accountable for them. It is an accepted axiom of administration that the chief administra— tion is responsible for controlling his organization and its personnel. One text explains quite definitely: The Chief of Police should be, and must be, held responsible for the operation of his department and for the action of every man in it.6 Simply holding a chief responsible in this area does not expand his ability, and he can only obtain a limited amount of information concerning all the activities of his department on his own. Therefore, in all but the smallest departments, the chief must arrange to ensure the realization of his responsibilities by providing subordinates with re— responsibilities and authority, and by establishing pro— cedures and systems to assist them. The more the chief de- pends upon subordinates to assume part of his supervisory function, the more important they are to the maintenance of proper discipline. Germann has said that: The key to effective discipline is in the hands of the supervisor--at all ranks. The most im— portant link in the disciplinary chain is the first line supervisor, the sergeant, for he works closely with the men, and must constantly evaluate their competency and integrity.7 6A. C. Germann, Frank D. Day, and Robert J. Gallati, Introduction to Law Enforcement (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, Publishers, 1966), p. 215. 7Germann,_c_>_p. cit., pp. 169-170. 18 All other authorities in the police field would probably agree with this statement, and most have said it in different ways. For instance V. A. Leonard writes: General Pershing when asked to identify the most important rank in army organization replied without hesitation-—the Sergeant! The same can be said with reference to police organization. No administration can achieve its objectives without effective super- vision of men. . . . The rank of Sergeant is the point at which direct supervision of the officer oc— curs, and the grade of supervision delivered by him exercises an important influence upon the efficiency of the department. Hence, it is necessary that a large part of the supervisory and command training be focused upon the preparation of Sergeants for their work.8 0. W. Wilson supports this reasoning to the limit. He has written: Discipline is the responsibility of supervising officers and cannot be expected to develop from the level of patrolmen up through the ranks. . Sergeants play a more important role as department disciplinarians than any other rank.9 It is uncontestibly apparent that authorities con- sider supervisors to be the primary and most crucial element in the disciplinary activity. The officers are empowered to liandle complaints and personnel misbehavior constantly be- <=ause they are closest to the problems and have the greatest Cupportunities for receiving information related to the area. 8V. A. Leonard, Police Organization and Management (31nd.ed.; Brooklyn, NRY.: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1964) , P. 120. 9Wilson,.9_p. cit., p. 174. l9 Supervisors, and particularly first line supervisors, must be properly performing their disciplinary functions, if the disciplinary machinery is to be adequate; because they are the analogous "motor” or "brain" of the disciplinary machinery. Supervisors can only enforce discipline to the ex- tent that they have authority, or think they have authority. This means that their disciplinary actions can be limited by a lack of understanding of their powers and/or the disciplin— ary procedures, or by the commanders above them. While the former instance should never be the case, most police authorities agree that the supervisors and commanders should be limited in the severity of discipline that they can ad— minister on their own. Certainly there is no question each complaint should be vigorously and fairly investigated and appropriate action be taken regardless of its severity, but this does not mean that this entire procedure should be the responsibility of the immediate supervisors of the misbe— having officer. Wilson suggests that the responsibilities of the inmnediate.supervisor be limited to performing three functions. 1. discover the weaknesses, deficiency, failure, or overt act of a subordinate that indicates the need for corrective action; 2. analyze all the factors involved in order to de- cide the most suitable action; and 20 3. initiate and, in most instances, to carry out the disciplinary action. In his police department Wilson specifically itemizes thirty-one areas where an immediate supervisor can initiate summary punishment. These areas include only minor trans— gressions such as improper uniform, failure to initiate re- ports, inattention to duty, and smoking in public. The supervisor is provided with specific instructions concerning the precise amount of disciplinary authority he has and how he can use it: The summary punishment which may be effected under the provisions of this order is limited to ex— cusing the member for that one day, without pay, where he is unfit for duty, or to requiring the of— fending member to work one or two relief days with- out compensation.ll In his text, Police Administration, Wilson is more specific regarding administrative controls that should be imposed upon the supervisor's power to discipline: -Such actions in contrast to oral reprimands, should be reported to the internal investigation division for review to ensure their justification and for processing so that they may be recorded in the personnel file. In event that an action is found to be unjuStified, it should be rescinded by the Chief; and the officer compensated for any loss he may have sustained.12 lOIbid. 11Chicago Police Department, "General Order Number 63-16," Internal Investigative and Disciplinary Procedures, 1963. (Mimeographed.) 12Wilson,.9_p. cit., p. 122. 21 Hence it is felt to be desirable to limit the super- visor's authority to discipline without formal approval to oral reprimands, written reprimands, and one or two days off for minor offenses. In addition, superviSOrs should have the power to suspend officers who are accused of crimes until a more complete investigation can be done. This power is intended to prevent officers from continuing on the organi- zation when this might damage the image or reputation of the department. Supervisors should be required to forward reports to a central point within the department when they observe a serious violation, or when a citizen complains to them about an officer. Unless the supervisor is given specific in- structions to continue with the complaint or serious vio— lation, it becomes the responsibility of another party, and further action will be initiated by that party. The function of the supervisor, then, should be limited to detecting deviate behavior, reporting major in— fractions of rules and laws and citizen complaints against officers, and punishing officers for minor incidents or in- fractions which he observes. In SOme instances the scope of the investigation may be beyond his ability for various reasons, and he should be able to receive assistance from the chief or a specialized unit. Even considering the limi— tations on his formal powers and ability, the first line supervisor is basic to adequate discipline. 22 III. ORGANIZATIONl3 In addition to the disciplinary activities that the supervisors perform for the chief, most authorities agree that the chief should establish an organizational arrange- ment to assist him in performing his disciplinary role. Since this machinery is designed to handle the more serious and sensitive instances of misconduct on the part of police personnel, it should be placed in a position near the chief so that he can maintain close contact with it. Through this contact he should be able to maintain a ”thumb on the pulse” of complaint processing (See Chart 1). The literature related to complaint machinery has traditionally separated its area of activity into four cate- gories. These functions are considered vital to the proper execution of the administration of complaints and the ac—~ complishment of the objectives of the machinery; therefore, they will be presented individually. These activities are: 13The development of this model machinery relies heavily upon the text, Police Administration, by O. W. Wilson (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw—Hill, 1963), Chapters 7 and 9. Since Wilson is presently Police Superintendent in Chicago, Illinois, he has applied these techniques to his organization. Therefore, elaboration on the textual ma- terial will be drawn from the Chicago Police Procedures. This system was chosen as a model because it is a detailed formalized method that is most often referred to in the police literature as acceptable and adequate. 23 .Aooma mum::mbv coamfl>an coflummflumm>cH HmchDCH .ucmsuummon ooflaom wflocHHHH .ommoHSU Eoum ooumoods H Bummo momoomm _ 3mw>mm sumo A mBZqumSOU ZOHedoHBmm>ZH ZOHedeBmm>ZH ZOHemoHBmm>ZH MB¢UO>Q¢ QmHmHmmHQ wonafiwHBmm>zH QfizmmBzH moaommHQ Dfiflfibm meH>mmm AdZOHBUMQmZH _ WMHEU {ZOHmH>HQ ZOHBdeBmm>ZH AflZMMBZH ANGOE Bmmmm qH>Ho o illliv oa mammmmm m Amv. o W azmzmm Hzom wEmoom szmzmmstm w r» . oszmmm . _m ammpomm mmoHomo m Adv mozmoH>m mmmmm .H waq J . 4 omozoom .a . manazmmmm onaomm . momoomm .m HmmHmovAonmoqozoo VfimmemoHsmm>zH .amm>zH . onemzmomzH . mmHmHaoz . onommzo m .# .omm monmma .H omemmmzoxm .m .t omozoomzo .Ht 1+ 2032 V BDOEBHZ mmHEwHQ BZHdAmSOU ¢ UZHmmmvomm mom WMDQmuomm QWQOZ MOMH>mmmDm F .1 mmmo aszqmzop gamszmolr Hammad F mMQZQ< .Bmma ZOHBUMM ZOHH<0HBWW>ZH mmOB¢UHBmm>ZH Monaomm ozHamom ..mm a. momoomm _ _ ZOHEOmw mZflBmwm I L ZOHBUmm mUHBmHedfim >I| ZOHBUWm mUH>mmm hhflfiw J ZOHBUmm mmmu 10mm ZOHBzH g _ _ r _ mmozszzoo 1. flu meZHD onmH>Ha onmH>HQ mmHHQ mumdmm onmH>HQ ZOHBHQ moHs muHmmo mmmszDm muszHQAmBzH Im< AdZKMBzH INK w oszz¢Am _ ImOEZH UquDm ._ m>HBHQ mmHflhhfl AflszBZH wmflfl02< mad Hmflmm.mmumqmmmqmmm. 73 structured to include information such as the following:3 Date and time reported . Complainant's name and address Type of complaint Location of occurrence Date and time of occurrence 'Specific allegation Officer(s) involved, his detail, and division Witnesses CDQO‘U'I-FUJNH When the report has been completed with this infor- mation and a detailed description of the alleged incident, the report is then forwarded "without delay" to the commander of the division where it was received, or to the Internal Affairs Division if the division commander is not available. If it goes to a division commander he must send it to the In— ternal Affairs Division after reviewing it. When the In— ternal Affairs Division is closed, such as at night, the com- plaint must be sent to the officer in charge of the Business Office Division, who will forward it to the Internal Affairs Division upon its opening. The Internal Affairs Division, which eventually re— ceives all serious complaints, is responsible to the Bureau of Administration Commander, a deputy chief of police, and the chief of police. It is therefore a staff unit and it is commanded by a Captain who has under his control 2 lieu- tenants, who are chief investigators, a lieutenant, who is 3 . . . . Note: an except1on 18 made to record1ng requ1re- ments when the complaint is of such a confidential nature that a written report might jeopardize further investigation. 74 the department advocate; several sergeants, who are investi- gators; and other necessary clerical personnel. While officially designated a "staff" unit, the In- ternal Affairs Division nevertheless maintains functional supervision over all complaints that are called to the at— tention of the Division. When complaints are forwarded to this Division, they are assigned numbers from a chronologi— cal sequence, a copy of the complaint is sent to the Chief of Police, and a case file is initiated for the papers which will be important in development of the case. A member of Internal Affairs acting for the Division Commander then de- termines who should do the investigation on each case. In some instances, depending upon the complaint, two experienced officers from Internal Affairs will be assigned to conduct the investigation; in others the complaint will be sent back to the commander of the division wherein the officer works for investigation. Assignment of each case depends upon the seriousness of the alleged conduct and the discretion of the Internal Affairs Commander. In addition to this procedure for registering com- plaints, the Board of Police Commissioners, which consists of five community leaders who are appointed by the mayor to administer to the police department and has the power to "administer" and "discipline" the police department, has pro— vided a procedure for registering complaints directly with 75 its staff. Such a complaint can be initiated by mail or in person with a personal representative of the board, a Los Angeles policewoman. The complaint is recorded on a Person- nel Complaint Report and reviewed by the Board of Police Com— missioners at a regularly scheduled Board Meeting. The Board decides upon the appropriate action consisting of, but not limited to:4 l. Referral to the Chief of Police for information only: 2. Referral to the Chief of Police for investigation and appropriate action; 3. Referral to the Chief of Police for investigation and report to the Board; 4. Referral to a Hearing Examiner for an administra— tive hearing and report to the Board; or 5. Instituting an administrative hearing directly be- fore the Board. The board has the separate power to rule upon the merits of the complaint and can instruct the Chief of Police to carry out disciplinary action that is appropriate and proper. However, it has only a small staff of sworn police officers, and therefore relies upon the Internal Affairs Di— vision to investigate all cases. Complaint Investigation. The commander of the In— ternal Affairs Division, or his representative, assigns the complaints that have been initiated for investigation. The 4Samuel wm. Yorty, "Rules Governing Personnel Com- plaint Procedures," News Release, May 12, 1964, p. 2. 76 commanders of divisions who are given complaints for investi- gation are not required to conduct a formal investigation in every instance. For example, if an accused officer is in agreement with the facts presented by the complainant, and agrees to accept discipline, the commander may wish to fore- go an investigation. However, when a formal investigation is necessary, the division commander assigns two supervisory officers to conduct it. Upon completion of their work, the commander is given their report that includes: 1. A statement of the complaint or specific action taken that constituted the complaint. 2. A detailed summary of the investigation of the complaint. 3. Recommendations for corrective action or other disposition of the case. In addition, specific reports, statements and other materials related to the case are forwarded to the case file of the Internal Affairs Division where they are filed. Investigations that are assigned to investigators in Internal Affairs Division follow a similar pattern. The com— mander of the division gives the complaints to the Chief In- vestigator who provides two sergeants for the investigation. These officers investigate the complaint and forward their investigation reports and recommendations to the Division Commander who reviews them and forwards them to the Deputy Chief in Charge of the Bureau of Administration who adds his recommendations. They are then sent to the Chief of Police. 77 Any of these officials can make changes in the recommen- dations, but generally they concur with the recommendations of the investigating officers. The recommendations that are made by the investi— gators are evaluations that place the complaint in one of five categories: 1. Unfounded——when the investigation indicates that the acts complained of did not occur; 2. Exonerated——when the investigation disclosed the act occurred, but was justified, lawful and proper; 3. Not Sustained--when the investigation indicates there is insufficient evidenCe to prove or dis— prove the allegations; 4. Sustained—-when the investigation discloses that the act complained of did occur; or 5. Misconduct Not Based upon the Complaint--when the investigation discloses misconduct that is not part of the original complaint. Investigations ended by findings of Not Sustained, Unfounded, or Exonerated are not filed in the officer's personnel jacket, but are filed in the miscellaneous file maintained in and open to only the Internal Affairs Division. However, when misconduct is sustained by investigation, the records become a part of the officer's personnel jacket, and remain a part of it throughout his career. Complaint Adjudication. For all practical purposes, the decision on the validity of the complaint is made by the investigating officers, whether they be members of Internal 78 Affairs Division or of the division wherein the accused officer works. The judgments made by these officers are reviewed several times as they are passed through the Inter- nal Affairs Division chain—of—command to the Chief of Police, who makes the final judgment in each instance. Sentences can be made in a summary fashion, subject to appeal to the Board of Rights, by the Chief for up to thirty (30) days. Suspensions without pay of between thirty (30) days and six months duration must be heard by the Board of Rights in all cases. No suspension without pay can be over six months in length, and dismissal from the department is the only other punishment that can be used for more serious offenses. In minor cases originating from within the depart— ment, the division commander can impose a penalty, with the accused officer's consent, of not more than four days off without pay. However, if the officer wishes this is re— viewed by the Chief of Police or the Board of Rights. One of the unique aspects of the Los Angeles disci- plinary machinery is Board of Rights, which is a trial board that serves in the stead of a civil service commission. The Los Angeles City Charter, which provides that a policeman has a property right to his job and cannot be summarily removed,5 establishes this board. 5Charterpf the City pf Los Angeles, Article XIX, Section 202. 79 The Charter requires the board to be composed of three police officers who are above the rank of captain. If an accused officer wishes a hearing on most offenses, he can obtain it by filing a request with the Chief of Police or the Police Commission within a certain specified period of time after being notified of the intent to punish him. In addition, an officer cannot be fired by the department with— out first being found guilty by the Board of Rights. The selection of officers to serve for a trial is done by the accused officer who draws six names from a box containing all eligible officers. Then from these six names, he is permitted to select three commanders who will serve as judges for his hearing. The hearing is conducted in ac- cordance with the normal trial procedures, except rules of evidence are not strictly adhered to and the evidence neces— sary for a "guilty" finding is merely a preponderance. The department's case is prosecuted by an officer titled the "Department Advocate." This officer is charged with a multitude of duties including preparing a case and the charges, serving the papers and subpeonas, advising the accused of his rights, supervising the drawing of the names for the Board, arranging for a reporter for the trial, ad- vising the Board on the procedural aspects of the Los Angeles Charter and the laws that govern the trial, and pre- senting the decision of the Board to the Chief of Police. 80 Witnesses who testify are called by the department or the accused, and no person has a right to be heard in the trial. The Board has the authority to issue subpeonas and to swear in witnesses for testifying. The trial is open to the public unless the members of the Board decide different- ly, and this is generally the case. For all practical pur— poses the trial is closed to the public because usually one of the parties involved requests a closed hearing and the Chairman of the Board generally rules in favor of the request. After hearing all the evidence and testimony pre- sented for both parties, the trial board votes upon innocence or guilt. A simple majority of the votes are necessary for a decision, although the dissenting member may write a minority report. Only after the decision of guilt or innocence can the Board consider the record of the accused officer, how— ever this is felt to be important in determining an appropri— ate sentence. After the sentence has been agreed upon by a majority of the Board members, the recommendations are sent to the Chief of Police for review and initiation. These recommended sentences represent the maximum that the Chief can impose; however he is free to initiate a lesser penalty or revise the sentence in any manner as long as he does not increase it to more than that decided upon by the Board of Rights. 81 Appeal pf Complaint. A citizen who initiates a com- plaint has available the direct access to the Board of Police Commissioners, if he does not obtain satisfaction from the police department, or if he choses to by-pass the police department completely. An officer who has obtained a hearing before the Board of Rights still has access to the civil and criminal courts if he believes his case was improperly handled. In addition, the Charter makes provisions for allowing the officer to appeal to any legally constituted body which may be established in the future to protect an officer's rights. Critique. Excepting a few minor differences, the disciplinary machinery of Los Angeles follows relatively closely the design of the model presented in Chapter II. It involves the use of two major units: (1) an internal in— vestigation unit, and (2) a departmental trial board. These units are used to supplement the supervisor's ability to handle the discipline, but they do not entirely replace the supervisor's investigative rights and discretion in this area. The internal investigation unit (Internal Affairs) has the responsibility of recording all complaints that are made to the department. It exercises functional supervision over minor disciplinary activities in each division by as— signing the investigation to the appropriate commander, \FV It I a Fifi F‘U a CA! a ~1\w \Fu 82 reviewing the investigation, assisting commanders with services that they could not perform themselves, and per— forming the investigations that are of a sensitive nature. The departmental trial board (Board of Rights) is a adjudicating body that insures the officer that his case will not be handled in a summary fashion and acts as a re— straint on rash disciplinary actions by the Chief or supervisors. In addition, the Police Commission is available for appeals or as original recipients of complaints by civilians. This provides members of the public with other recourse aside from the police department and legal action. This is a feature not present in the model machinery, and should work to the advantage of the public, therefore resulting in more public confidence in the police. The critical factor here, however, is how the board uses its complaint hearing rights. Even though this machinery follows closely the ac- ceptable model, criticism has been leveled at it by a number of very authoritative sources in recent years. The California Advisory Committee to the United States Civil Rights Commission reported upon the attitudes of minority group members who testified before it in September 1963:6 6Police-Minority Group Relations in Los Angeles _gp. cit., p. 13. EMS q sma:o qma mmmonmezzou _ . moHaoa a no omzH .H H 1|. . mmHanm< .emm>zH _ qszmmazH mom monmm< .m 4 MHIIIJ omozson .e manazmmmm 5-. mmHzH : ZOHWH>HQ 4 .0mm mZOHmm< .H . m _ amzmmozoo zm>omazs .m -I r 1 mmozHo _ r11 mmonmo o _ omamowH>mmaom 1.: .ammo >z< . o FZHéquOU 4 OZHmmMUOmm mom mmDQmUOmm mmqucz¢ mOA 84 They stated that IAD (and apparently the divi- sion) was unsympathetic to complaints of racial dis- crimination and the use of excessive force, that the investigators were out to protect the police, were hostile to the complainants, and intimidated com- plainants by threatening persecutions if complaints were not sustained, and by harassing complainants at their homes and jobs. One witness stated that the complaint procedure was fruitless because most Negroes feared making such complaints or did not think that the complaints would come to anything. In many instances, Negro workers could not take a day off the job to make a complaint. (Chief Parker had stated that the Department would not take com- plaints except in person.) The president of the local branch of the American Civil Liberties Union stressed that most lawyers advised against filing complaints because they do not believe anything would come of them and feared that complainants might be harassed on account of such filings. Two individual witnesses stated they had been harassed by investi- gators from IAD. The Community Service Organization indicated that it had no confidence in the procedures. In another publication, which was written approxi- mately the same time as the above report of The Civil Rights Commission, the author provides forty-five (45) pages of documentation of allegedly police abusive conduct, and then draws his conclusion: This memorandum has sought, by the foregoing discussion to demonstrate through cases and experi- ence some of the causes for anti-police tension in the Los Angeles Community. There is yet another-- perhaps,~in a sense the most important of all. It is that in Los Angeles there is no effective public forum before which an injured citizen can vindicate the loss or abridgment of his constitutional rights. The effect of this is two fold. It instills in the minority community a feeling of frustration and utter hopelessness that abuses by concealing from the public the true nature and extent of lawless law enforcement. The result, obviously, is that tensions between the police and the minority com— munity are reaching a dangerous climax. The public 85 at large, and particularly, the white community, has no real idea of what is happening. This booklet was written before the Los Angeles Watts Area Riot and accurately predicted a riot for Los Angeles. Following the Watts Riot, the reports continue to appear with little or no rebuttal from the police. Among the first was Police Malpractice and the Watts Riot,8 which reviews some sixty pages of sworn statements concerning in— stances of police discrimination and abuse. In concluding the report points out:9 The American Civil Liberties Union receives a minimum of two letters a month complaining of po- lice malpractice and asking for legal assistance. Other organizations—-G. I. Forum, the N. A. A. C. P., CORE, the Urban League-—all receive reports. . . . Lacking effective remedy and disdainful of what appears to be unequal justice, most victims never make formal complaints. But by recountings which grow more and more distorted with every re- telling, each incident, real 2; imaginary, is broad- cast in the ghetto. The Southern California Chapter of Americans for Democratic Action also issued a report following the Watts Riot that only indirectly tackled the topic of complaint administration, and left no doubt that this organization 7Hugh R. Manes, A Report pp Law Enforcement and the Negro Citizen ip Los Angeles (Hollywood, Calif., The Brief Shop, Legal Printers, 1962), p. 46. 8A report by the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (mimeographed), Los Angeles, 1965. 91bid. 86 considered the machinery to be inadequate. It is interesting that police professor, and learned student of police disci— pline, A. C. Germann was listed as one of the authors on the report, which read in part:10 We contend there was little likelihood of such an uprising occurring at all had the Police been maintaining a proper relationship with the minority communities. We contend that whether "police bru- tality" ever existed in fact makes little difference if officials did not try to correct such an appre— hension. Fear is fear whether it is of the real or the unreal. And sometimes fear of the unreal is worse. Nevertheless, those wishing to examine affidavits and depositions relative to instances of police mal- practice may contact the Los Angeles office. In regard to the effectiveness of the Police Com- mission's complaint arrangement, the ADA said: A further instance of the manner in which the present Police Commission responds to the need of the people is illustrated by the procedure under which a citizen, or group of citizens must operate. The position, grievance, or petition must be pre- sented in writing to the Police Commission. It then, at its next meeting, votes to determine whether or not it wishes to hear the citizen at a later meeting. This cumbersome procedure necessari- ly discourages citizens from presenting grievances. Nevertheless, some grievances are heard by the Com- mission. However, this body then refers the com- plaint to the police for investigation, which cer- tainly limits the confidence a citizen may have in fair resolution of his grievance. The only other avenue for redress of the citizen's complaint is through a civil suit for damages. loWalter Colby, g; 21., A Proposal_pg Initiate and Implement Police Reform (Los Angeles: ADA, 1966). 87 This effective closing of avenues of redress creates the frustration that leads to violent out— breaks against the police.11 The ADA report challenges the adequacy of the Police Commission and its complaint procedure. It also implies that the police complaint machinery is inadequate, however, there has been little, aside from a public lack of confi— dence, mentioned in this report to indicate why the depart- mental machinery is inadequate. The McCone Commission was appointed to investigate the Watts Riot, and its final report discussed the Los Angeles system of administering complaints: The Commission has concluded that there are several deficiencies in this existing procedure. We believe that division commanders and those in the command structure should not conduct investi- gations of complaints with respect to their sub- ordinate officers. Moreover, existing procedures are not sufficiently visible to or understood by the public. Finally, we do not think there should be a difference, as there now is, in the handling of a complaint depending solely upon whether it was filed with the Board or the Police Department.12 The Report recommended the establishment of an in— spector general to correct the weaknesses of the present system. In all of the material reviewed the nearest thing that could be found to a defense of the Los Angeles system, 11Ibid., p. 2. 12The Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riot, Violence ip the City-1gp end 9; g beginning? (Los Angeles: Jeffries Booknote Company, 1965), p. 32. 88 was the McCone Commission report which said that the impres— sion that is so widespread among the civilians that com— plaints go unnoticed is not consistent with fact.l3 Statements made by Chief William Parker defend the present machinery by using reverse logic. He held that criticism and complaints of police brutality must stop be— cause they will lead to a breakdown of law and order which will result in an overthrow of the American system of govern- ment. He failed to deal with the accuracy of the charges that the system is inadequate. He never admitted publicly that the police machinery might be inadequate or in need of improvement. One thing becomes relatively obvious, whether or not the machinery is inadequate, there is a large number of persons in both minority and majority populations of the Los Angeles area that believe it to be inadequate. Merely the weight of related material alone indicates that the system has some weaknesses that cannot be dismissed as fantasies existing only in the minds of a small group of articulate aggitators. II. CINCINNATI, OHIO This city is representative of a majority (see the following Chapter) of the cities in the United States as it l3Ibid. 89 has no special unit for processing complaints against its police officers. The administrators of the department have indicated that they firmly believe that the disciplinary function should rest with the supervisors rather than a special unit. The coordination of major disciplinary activi- ty is the responsibility of the Assistant Chief in charge of Personnel. Complaint Initiation. Any citizen can initiate a complaint by calling any district commander, the Chief of Police or the Public Safety Director. Complaints can be initiated by any method, but later the complainant must put the complaint in writing. Officers who are contacted by a citizen with a complaint are under no obligation to refer the complainant to the proper channels or to advise him of the procedure. However, the department has published the entire contents of the Cincinnati Division of Police, Pro— cedure Manual, related to the processing of citizen com— plaints.14 This brochure is allegedly available to all citizens. Officers receiving a citizen cOmplaint can, upon their own initiative, prepare a "Complaint Form" which is a standard form utilized for any request for services or report l4”Citizen Complaints" is a pamphlet that repeats ver- batum section 17.025 of the Cincinnati Procedure Manual, January 1, 1965. 90 that is given to an officer by a citizen. This form is as— signed the next number from those assigned all requests for service and complaints, and if a supervisor believes that it is an important and/or legitimate allegation he can assign investigators to it to work until he is satisfied with their investigation. When he is satisfied, he initials the in; vestigation report and it is filed with all other complaint forms. Other than this standard method of filing all citi- zen requests for service and miscellaneous complaints, there is no standard or particular place for filing complaints in one central docket that is reserved exclusively for com- plaints against police officers, nor is there any method of accounting for all citizen complaints. Complaint Investigation. The emphasis is upon settling the complaints at the lowest possible level in the chain—of—command. There are no specific guidelines upon who has authority in what situation, and the officer receiving information concerning a complaint from a citizen has con— siderable discretion in deciding whether he should handle the complaint, or if it is serious enough to notify his superior. Complaints that are made to the Chief, Public Safety Director or a district commander are referred to the district commander who is in charge of the area where the accused officer works for investigation. This commander 91 generally assigns the complaint to a subordinate to investi— gate. This assignment is entirely up to the individual dis- trict commanders, although his superiors can offer sug- gestions or orders in individual situations. If a district commander decides that a complaint will be handled by the immediate supervisor of the accused officer, or for that matter the accused officer's patrol partner, such superior is expected to investigate the complaint and initiate disci- plinary action for minor infractions or recommend appropriate action in other situations. In instances where a case could result in complications, it may be discussed among top staff members either informally or in a regular staff meeting be— fore disciplinary action is taken by the district commander. Complaint Adjpdication. After the completion of any investigation, the accused officer's immediate supervisor, or any other officer up the chain-of-command can impose punishment that he deems appropriate. This is subject only to review by officers higher up the chain—ofvcommand. Ordi— narily, the district commander is the highest reviewing officer, and if he is satisfied, the report is filed in the general complaint file and a disposition notice is sent to the personnel officer for review and filing in the accused officer's personnel jacket. .According to departmental procedures, if the investi— gation shows that grounds for reasonable assumption of 92 misconduct on the part of the police officer exists, it will present the case to the Pdlice Board of Inquiry. In actual practice, this procedure is not followed in most cases. Under ordinary circumstances, if the complainant can be satisfied prior to holding a formal departmental hearing then none will be held and the complaint will be disposed of. If, however, the complainant, or at times the officer in— volved, is not satisfied and insists on a formal trial be- fore the Board of Inquiry it is arranged. In 1965, five Boards of Inquiry were held. The Board of Inquiry is composed of the Commander of the Personnel Bureau, who is the Chairman and conducts the hearing; a commander of a district other than the one in which the accused officer works; a lieutenant or sergeant‘ also from another district; and a patrolman. It is not re— quired to follow any trial procedure, but must base its de— cision upon a review of investigative reports, testimony volunteered by witnesses, and evidence which may be pre— sented by the department, witnesses, or the accused. The board has no power to command witnesses to ap- pear before it to testify. Several persons have failed to or refused to appear, and this is their right. Complainants appearing before the Board have a right to review statements taken by the police prior to the hear- ing, to retain counsel who can appear with them, and to 93 cross-examine witnesses who have been permitted to testify by the Board. The Board is not required to hear all witnesses, although it has never refused anyone permission to testify. The Board examines all witnesses as they appear, and can cross—examine anyone who appears for either party. Since rules of evidence are not applicable, the Board can approach the hearing in any manner they choose and strike or limit any questions or testimony. When appropriate the Board of Inquiry can assess a penalty up to and including removal, however, any decision is advisory to the Chief of Police and he can amend it or change it in any manner he desires. Appeals. Citizens, until the past year, had no re— course other than civil action. This was changed in early 1966 to allow for an appeal to the Safety Director, the civilian head of the police and fire departments, who is an ex—assistant chief of the Cincinnati Police Department. If this official decides to afford a complainant a hearing, it is conducted "de novo'' with all interested parties present. Testimony is taken under oath, and when possible the as— sistant city manager and the city solicitor sit at the hear— ing. This group of officials have the power to determine the disposition of any case that comes before them, and their decision can only be overruled by: (l) the civil service commission; or (2) civil courts. This appellate right of a citizen had not been utilized prior to mid—1966. 94 The police officer has the right to appeal to the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission, and this group can overrule any disciplinary action that has been taken by any commander of the officer.15 Critique. The Cincinnati system has little in the way of special machinery solely for processing complaints. Chief Stanley Schrotel indicated that he has avoided develop- ing a special unit for this work because it tends to "polar- ize” the situation. He believes that the disciplinary function should rest with the supervisors rather than a special unit. Complaints of a serious nature are always referred to the district commanders of the accused officer for in- vestigation and disposition. This commander assigns them to any officer he wishes. There is no numbering system ex— clusively for complaints against police officers. Therefore accurate knowledge about complaints, as well as control over them, is of questionable adequacy. Since supervisors are responsible, they see no reason why they should relay complaints to higher commanders unless they are of such a serious nature that bad publicity for the department might result. This emphasis on settling complaints at the lowest level of command, plus the 15Certain minor punishments are not appellate in nature and can be issued by the Chief summarily. 95 mmummw 1 qH>Ho .9J4mmm<§ AmmmDm m.QmmDUU( WEHBOZ r mmmZDz FZHmmmDm fiZfl BZHmm JdeS .H ZOHBUI OZHmQMI mZOHBU¢ 2 . ..ulus . I111! QQQZWZZOUmm WQ7HPPOUHK mMHmHQOZ If I 7 //// / 3mH>um 3mw>mm M ZOHBZH mmfimd OZHMQmI BZMQmemDZH mmZOHmmHZEOU WBDQMQ .H m0 ZOHmH>mmmDm mZUHmm¢ ZOHBZH MZB BZHfiquOU < UZHmmmUOmm mom mmDQMUOmm xmow 3mz QmmDUU¢ EzmzmmHZDm r ZEROHmmHEEOU mUHAOQ XOHBéJHBmm Van mZOHmwd :1 CK H. ZOHBéz IZOLZH mZHdEmO H 0mm mZOHmW( I xmue AZHédeOU m.ZMNHEHU fl .mQOE mUHQOA w2¢ .x. 110 The feature of the Model Machinery that requires the recording of all complaints and assigning numbers to them is also present in this system. The regulations concerning com— plaints require a unit, Citizens Complaint Review Board, to receive, number, record, and assign for investigation of all complaints that it receives. This Board's name would cause most laymen to assume a couple of false impressions. First, one might assume that the Board is external to the police department. This is certainly not correct as the Board is an internal administrative board that has only police per- sonnel among its membership. Second, one would probably as- sume from the title that this Board is a trial board which makes evaluations to determine the validity of complaints and the responsibility of the accused officer so that it can either impose or recommend appropriate punishment to the re- sponsible superior officer. This assumption is also wrong. This Board is purely for supervising the recording of all, and the administration of certain phases of some, complaints. After the Board reviews a complaint and decides that it is valid the department still must conduct a departmental trial to determine what action should be taken. While officially the Citizens Complaint Review Board is responsible for supervising certain types or classes of complaints, it appears that its most important function is the psychological effect of its name on laymen. It was 111 established during a period when the City Counsel was investi- gating the department's handling of misconduct charges, and no one claims that the selection of the name was without purpose. Aside from providing a name that is calculated to solicit support from certain minority groups and providing a feature that can be used to control complaint administration; the Citizens Complaint Review Board serves only to duplicate the activities of the Chief Inspector who supervises all com- plaints which do not fall within his jurisdiction. It is a classic example of ineffective complex bureaucratic barrier being used to replace inadequate machinery of the past. As one law enforcement researcher has noted: "The Civilian Com— plaint Review Board with its partial jurisdiction over disci- plinary matters appears to complicate the already involved disciplinary process."24 Investigations are performed by supervisors who are within the command of the accused officer's unit. They are chosen by the officer in charge of the command, and in some cases are subject to the orders of their supervisor as well as the directiOn of the Board. During the preparation of a case on the basis of an accusation, hearings can be held by the investigating officer. 24Bruce C. Young, "An Evaluation of the Formal Disci— plinary Procedures of Three Metropolitan Police Departments with a Recommended Procedure Guide" (unpublished Masters thesis, Michigan State University, 1963), p. 94. 112 Following the hearing the investigator can make recommen— dations concerning disposition of the complaint. The Board or the investigator's superiors, depending upon who has jurisdiction over the complaint, then review his work and endorse it or require him to modify his recommendations in some way. If the reviewing officials decide that the com— plaint is without merit, the process ends there and the com— plainant has recourse only to the courts. If the reviewing authority determines that the case may be valid, it orders the investigating officer to file charges and the case goes before the departmental trial board for another hearing. While the extensive formalities involved in getting a complaint before a trial board certainly work to provide protection for an accused officer, they probably only serve to discourage any complainant, who is not truly inflamed over the misconduct of an officer. In addition, the machinery has been criticized by a spokesman for the Social Action Committee of the Community Church of New York because of inherent self-protectionism: The administrative remedy within the Police De— partment is inherently inequitable. A totally sub- jective procedure in which police personnel investi— gate, hear, and determine citizen complaints against themselves, their profession, the efficacy of their command, is highly suspect of self—protectionism. Such self-review is by its very nature contrary to the dictates of justice and fair play in a democracy. 25Marjorie M. Friedlander, The Need for Effective _Independent Civilian Review pf Citizen Complaints pf Police Misconduct 13 New York City (New York: Community Church of New York, January, 1966), p. 3. 113 This criticism is one that is often made by citizens who are interested in ensuring that citizen complaints are adequately administered. To answer such a charge, the po- lice administrator must permit public access to the cases that involve citizen complaints. The public is strictly pro— hibited by this department from obtaining any information concerning a case unless the member requesting the infor- mation is personally involved. Even though hearings are con— sidered to be public, in actuality they are never open to the public. If the hearing supervisors so decide even the complainant may be excluded from a hearing or trial. Statistical information concerning the alledged total number of complaints is made available by the Civilian Complaint Review Board, but the public has no access to spe— cific cases and cannot obtain information concerning dispo— sitions or findings. One New York Police Sergeant pointed out that this conclusion was wrong. He claimed that since these cases were departmental records that anyone could go to court and get a court order to see the records, if they really wanted to see them: The New York County Lawyers Association reviewed the machinery in New York City recently and offered the following: Because of the inadequacy of public information on the processing«of individual complaints, it is impossible to assess the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of present procedures in investigating and acting upon particular complaints. It is possi- ble, however, to see that the over—all procedure for 114 handling civilian complaints has failed to earn full public confidence, and that the result is damaging to the effectiveness of the Police Department and its work. The Young Democratic Club called the New York ma— chinery inadequate. The report explained some of its reasons as follows: The fear of harassment, the complete absence of any element of independent civilian representation, the lack of any public hearings prior to the rare departmental trial, the absence of any requirement for holding of even a non-public hearing, the lack of a right to cross—examine witnesses (in the event the Police Department representatives decide in their discretion to hold a non—public hearing), are some of the factors which prevent the fair and impartial handling of civilian complaints.27 It is apparent that not only does this machinery differ extensively from the model machinery that was de— veloped in Chapter II, it is also different from either of the other systems that have been reviewed. Complexity is its weakness. It is laden with a proliferation of procedures and red tape that serves only to benefit misbehaving police officers without regard for the rights and convenience of the citizenry. This type of bureaucracy not only fails to improve the adequacy of the department's administration of complaints, it may even serve to make it less adequate. 26Quoted in Report and Recommendations pp Proposed Independent Civilian Complaint Review Board, New York Young Democratic Club, May 19, 1965, p. 14. 27Ibid., p. 16. 115 IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS These three case studies illustrate the wide vari— ations in complaint processing machinery. Comparing all of these systems to the model machinery, it is immediately ap- parent that Los Angeles most nearly conforms to the ideal type. Cincinnati with no special machinery and few regu- lations, and New York City with complex machinery and compli— cated procedures, would occupy the two extremes if all of these systems were placed on a continum with the model. The absence of machinery in Cincinnati should not be interpretated as an administrative oversight. The chief of this police department believes that the commanders and supervisors in the chain—of-command should have extensive authority and practically complete responsibility in disci— plining their subordinates. However, this approach has been contested by most experts on administration becauSe of the a peer groups and informal relationships that develop among men who work together. These relationships cause a tendency, conscious or unconscious, toward protectionism and may re— sult in lax discipline. In addition, since the numbering of complaints is not strictly required, the chief of police, who is ultimately responsible for disciplining his employees, cannot maintain the close control over the system he otherwise might. He has no way of determining how many legitimate complaints are 116 discouraged by well-meaning officers, and therefore he can— not be certain that appropriate discipline is always administered. The rudimentary machinery that exists offers little in which the average complainant will have confidence. There are practically no formal regulations concerning the procedure which is followed in disposing of complaints, and those existing are not usually made available to complainants nor the general public. The complainant has to rely upon moving someone in the department, rather than following regu— lations, to get action on his complaint. In some instances he may be given the run—around, stalled, and even threatened with prosecution when complaining to the department. All complaint processing depends upon the desires of police officers and their supervisors, for the procedures are suf- ficiently vague to afford first line personnel and their supervisors practically complete discretion. The Los Angeles machinery faces criticism of a different nature. Even though it is established and defined by elaborate regulations that provide a relatively simple procedure to be followed, large segments of the public ap— pear to lack confidence in the department's processing of complaints. One of the major causes of the lack of confidence in this department's handling of complaints is the administra— tion's, and particularly the chief's, suspicious and 117 unsympathetic attitude toward minority group members. This attitude appears to have permeated the organization, and even officers in the specialized complaint processing unit, Internal Affairs, are accused by minorities of being antaga— nistic to racially related complaints. To re-enforce the suspicions of minority group members, the department refuses in most cases to make public anything other than the general findings concerning a complaint. This means that neither a complainant nor the public has any way of knowing the spe— cific punishment administered and therefore important evi- dence needed to evaluate the department's handling of com- plaints is missing. The Chief of Police is able to exercise close control over this system because all supervisors are required to re— port all citizen complaints for recording with a special unit which investigates or supervises investigations of them. However, he still does not possess the control that is possi- ble with the model system which requires all police employees to report all complaints to a centralized booking point. This complaint procedure is complicated because the Board of Police Commissioners also accepts complaints which may not be reported to the police department. Unless the Board de- cides to forward a complaint it receives to the police de- partment, the Chief has no way of knowing of its existence. This means that the department might be criticized for not taking action when it may not even be aware of the complaint. 118 Since some complaints are assigned to supervisors for investigation, and since investigative personnel are actually only field officers who are rotated in and out of the Internal Affairs Division, some citizens claim that these facts result in the watchmen being overly concerned with protecting the employees they are suppose to investi— gate. They contend that the close association between of- ficers causes investigating officers to attempt to prove their fellow officers innocent rather than only seeking the facts surrounding the complaint. While this criticism can also be made of the model machinery, it is less reasonable because of the relatively permanent status of investigators and the requirement that the investigator be removed from personal contact with the accused employee. The trial itself has been criticized because the complainant has no assurance that he will be able to partici— pate in the cross—examination of the accused, present evi- dence, be at the hearing, or know if a penalty has been accessed. Some people believe these things have an important effect upon the confidence that citizens will bestow upon the system. In New York City the machinery is supported by elabo— rate regulations, however they are misleading to the average citizen and contradictory when carefully read. The 119 publicity of the system that is distributed to the citizenry appears to be designed in a manner that will solicit the most favorable attitudes from them. This includes such things as naming one internal unit the "Civilian Complaint Review Board"-—providing the erroneous impression that it possesses the power to determine appropriate disciplinary action for accused employees. Responsibility for supervising complaint investi— gations is divided to the extent of assigning the complaints registration numbers from two separate series. Different rules for investigation are used depending on who supervises the investigation. For instance, complaints alleging graft or corruption fall within the jurisdiction of the Chief In- spector and are accepted by telephone or any other mans of communication. However, complaints concerned with an offi— cer using unnecessary force must be made in writing before a departmental employee who is not even permitted to render as- sistance to the complainant in preparing his longhand report. To illustrate the bureaucratic red tape involved in obtaining redress for abuse by a police officer, a citizen might be required to appear before as many as three formal hearings of one sort or another, each conducted by a sworn member of the department, for one complaint. Regulations concerning this system are complex and unintelligible to a large proportion of the population. 120 Excessive procedural complexities make them appear as if they were deliberately designed to create an administrative maze that will deprive some citizens of their rights. This machinery has all of the weaknesses of the Los Angeles machinery plus others. However, it is made more ac— ceptable to the citizenry than it would otherwise be by Madison Avenue verbal gimmicks. These case studies make one fact apparent: None of the cities studied utilize machinery that strictly follows the model presented in Chapter II. This means that some of the systems may be inadequate, or conversely that different systems can be effective in administering to complaints. A disciple of the principles approach to administration would likely maintain that " . . . examining a large department is equivalent to viewing the small department under a magnify— ing glass"; therefore might conclude that some or all of the systems presented are inadequate. This review indicates that none of the three departments have machinery that is free from legitimate criticism. However, the criticism that was made of Los Angeles revolved more around the personali— ties and attitudes within the organization than the actual machinery. Nevertheless weaknesses, which could result in inadequate complaint processing, were found even in this department's machinery. 121 In order to better appreciate the nationwide situ- ation, the following Chapter will present some special problems in the administration of complaints and the results of a national survey of procedures and conditions will be evaluated. CHAPTER V A SURVEY OF DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES The material contained in this chapter was drawn from a survey of communities throughout the United States and their police departments. Three methods of data col- lection were utilized to obtain this informatiOn: (1) mail questionnaires were sent to selected community and police leaders in all cities over 100,000 population and to se- lected community and police leaders in a random sampling of cities with populations in the 10,000 and 100,000 range; (2) site visitations were made to sixteen purposive sampled cities to conduct structured interviews and observe the po— lice department; and (3) related literature was considered and utilized at times to explain findings or facilitate value judgments. The selection of cities for mail questionnaires was particularly objectively accomplished, but there are several criticisms that can be legitimater made about other aspects of the handling of the distribution, the collection, and the tabulation of data from these questionnaires. For instance, some questionnaires were sent directly to police departments for distribution to appropriate police leadership; others 123 were sent to local officers of the N.C.C.J. for distribution to community leaders. Consequently, the distribution was left to the discretion of a number of persons who may not have been in agreement on a definition of "leader." There is no method of determining how seriously this influenced the responses to the questionnaires. The percentage of returns was low. Out of 300 com— munities that were mailed questionnaire forms, returns were received from both community and police leaders in only 63 communities.1 This represents a return of approximately twenty—one percent. The selection of cities for on—site visitations was based upon a consideration of the situation in eachtcommunity. Hence, cities were selected in this instance by a purposive sampling rather than randomly. No claim of representative- ness is made, naturally. The interviewees and situations that were selected for attention in each city had some information or character- istic that cuased them to be chosen. This was necessary be— cause of the demands of time and the need for certain types of information, however every effort was made at obtaining a balanced selection from each city. The author is painfully aware of the fact that this study, as other exploratory studies, is based upon selective— ly obtained data. Even though an attempt was made to use as ¥ 1Responses were received from community leaders in ap- Proximately 90 additional cities but they could not be uti— lized because of no corresponding police responses. 124 broad a base as possible for gathering opinions and making observations, and even though the data and conclusions were compared with as much of the previously completed related research as possible; the methodology and, therefore, the data is not sufficient for positive conclusions. Therefore, this study, as other empirical research, can only attempt to reflect reality as accurately as possible and present a best judgment conclusion that will facilitate further testing and more adequate future experimentation. The remainder of this chapter will deal with the re— sults of the survey. The first section explores the problem of classification of complaints and relies heavily upon the literature related to this subject; the second section pre— sents an evaluation of the problems of police brutality com- plaints because of the importance of this area; and the last section critiques in a general manner the existing internal complaint machinery in United States police agencies. I. THE COMPLAINT PROBLEM Due to the attention that has been focused upon cer- tain types of civilian complaints, police officials tend to think in terms of a narrowly defined concept while in reality the problem is not so limited. Their mental set is such that when the term "complaint" is mentioned, they begin to discuss civilian complaints of police brutality. The 125 significance of the civilian complaint cannot be denied, and it merits detailed attention, but it is only one kind of com- plaint that concerns the police. During the course of this survey, it became apparent that there was a need for classi- fying complaints and defining the classifications. The following areas were felt to be most appropriate for police administrators. Departmental Employee Against the Department. Com- plaints related to this category involve internal depart- mental problems attributable to the organization and af- fecting its individual members. They are generally related to "unfair" procedures and regulations, working conditions, organizational policies, or employee treatment. There is a growing belief that a police department has an obligation to provide channels through which all its employees can offer criticism and initiate changes in the department. With the continual improvement in the caliber of low ranking personnel will come the need for more sophisticated methods for deal— ing with them, and this includes providing ample opportuni- ties for expressing complaints and grievances. The Municipal Yearbook of 1966 indicates that only '75% of 1181 reporting cities have any type (formal or in— iformal) of grievance system.2 "54%: of the cities over 2"Municipal Personnel Data," 1966 Munieipal Yearbook (Chicago: ICMA, 1966), pp. 179-80. 126 100,000 population compared with 30% of the cities between 10,000 and 100,000 have formal written grievance pro- cedures."3 Twenty-six percent of the cities between 10,000 and 100,000 are entirely without grievance procedures com- pared with 15% of those over 100,000 population. There is a need for an adequate system of handling grievances or complaints from within the organization. If properly utilized by the administrator, this can be a most useful tool for improving the organization. The establish— ment of such a system should result in an improvement in the morale of the department which will ultimately improve the public's opinion of the police. Departmental Employee Against Departmental Employee. This category includes three general types of complaints: (1) those made by a superior officer about a subordinate; (2) those made by a subordinate about a superior; and (3) those made by any employee about another employee of equal rank. While police departments respect the right of super— visors to voice complaints against subordinates, there is seldom any established procedure for complaints of the last two types. The importance of providing machinery for these types of complaints cannot be overstressed. 3Ibid. 127 .HmA .Q .xoonumow.HmQAoAaoz oomH "mouooms mam 0H0 Hm mmm HmH.H mA¢BOB mmA mam mm mmA Ham 000.m~ ou 000.0H mm 0AA mm mm mmm 000.0m ou 000.mN hm Am m we ema 000.00H on 000.0m NA NA m mg on 000.0mm ou 000.00H A m A 0A mm 000.00m on 000.0mm 0 0H m 0H mm 000.com Ho>0 ouspmooum mudooooum owumadfinom maucouuso chuHomom msouw GOAumaomom oz wocm>mAH0 chwm mmAqu HmEHomcH mo .02 ousomooum HmEHom smMMDQMUOMA MUZ¢>WHMG ho mmmMB A mung 128 Subordinates with complaints about illegal or im— proper activities on the part of superiors often risk re— prisal if the attempt to formally express these complaints. This fact contributed substantially to the development of situations such as the police scandals in Denver, Chicago, and Indianapolis in recent years. For example, one source says of the Denver scandal of 1960-61: The cop who reported (criminal companions) to his superiors found himself ostracized. More often than not, he found himself stripped of privileges, walking a boondock beat—-or harried out of a job. Even before he turned to active crime, Jerry Sanford investigated a supermarket safecracking, found a night stick on the floor. 'I picked it up and put it in my car. I'm not going to fink'. Mort Stern says essentially the same thing: So the rookie, full of pride and high spirit, his head full of partially learned information, is turned over to a more experienced man for breaking in. He is on probation for six months . . . The older man stops at a bar, comes out with some packages of cigarettes. He does this several times. He explains that this is part of the job, getting cigarettes free from proprietors to resell, and that as a part of the rookie's training, it is his turn to 'make the butts.‘ So he goes in to a skid row bar and stands un— comfortably at the end waiting for the bartender to . . . toss him two packages of butts. The feeling of pride slips away and a hint of shame takes hold. But he tells himself this is unusual, that he will say nothing that will upset his pro- bation standing. In six months, after he gets his commission, he will be the upright cop he meant to 4Time,(November 3, 1961), p. 17. 129 be . . . The rule book forbids all this. But it isn't enforced. It is winked at at all levels.5 Whatever good can be said about the quasi—military design of American police organizations, it certainly does not facilitate the initiation of complaints in this category by line personnel. Nearly every organization contacted made it extremely difficult both formally and informally for a patrolman to inform higher officials of improper activities on the part of his fellow officers or his supervisors. The departments nearly always require an exhaustion of the chain of command before pressing a complaint elsewhere. The ICMA information6 indicates that 86% of the cities with formal and 37% of those with informal grievance procedures require an officer to follow the chain of command. Certainly requiring strict adherence to the chain- of-command will prevent an administrator from receiving com— plaints that might be valuable to him. Most police rules have a section similar to the one in Tucson, Arizona. It says: Complaints against supervisory officers by subordi- nates shall pp made t9 the supervisor and if satis— faction is not forthcoming, he may resort to the 5An Ex—policeman as told to Mort Stern, "Why Cops Go ‘WTong," The Dayton Daity News, Dayton, Ohio, N0vember 26, 1961, p. 10. 6 1966 Municipal Yearbook, pp. cit., p. 181. 130 .HmA .0 .xoonummw Hmmwuflcsz 000A "muusom. m m. 1 mm mm ..Hm s m M m MWH MMA Hmfimmwmw 000.0m on 000.m~ m m W mm MW ..AMWWMW 0...... .. ...... M M m MW WW HmwmmmmW 000.0mm on 000.00A M m m MA MA AmwmmWMw_ 000.00m on 000.0mm m m m M MM Amwmmwmw 000.com Hm>o szuo some ucmsuummmn osmEEoo moAuAU ousooooum mafio mo owuuAEEoo Housemnom mo cAmzo mo .02 moouw GOAumaomom pom: onsowooum mmDQmuomm mmUZ<>MHMO «m mamas 131 prescribed procedure going on up the chain of command.7 How does a patrolman go about telling his supervisor that he suspects the supervisor is being paid off by organ— ized crime? He could violate the rules, but it's easier to remain quiet and not take the chance on being dismissed for such a procedural violation until such time as there is enough evidence to positively support his claim. This time seldom comes for the-patrolman. On the other hand departmental regulations often re— quire that complaints made by supervisors about patrolmen by—pass the chain-of-command and go directly to the Chief. Tucson's Manual says: Complaints in writing may be made to the Chief of Police by commanding officers or heads of divisions, or by officers of a higher rank against any subordi- _pate member or civilian employee of the department for alleged violation of these rules and regulations or of good order, efficiency and discipline. It is difficult to visualize the reasons behind the differ- ences in procedures. The New York Police Survey of 1952 emphasized one of the results, however, when they noted that Very few charges are brought against sergeants and almost none against lieutenants or officers of 7"Complaints, Suspensions, Resignations, Dismissals and Disciplinary Action,“ Chapters 6—8, Police Manual (Tucson: Police Department, no date). 8Ibid. 132 higher rank, unless and'until criminal proceedings are initiated against them by other public agencies. Even though no statistical data was found with which to docu— ment this conclusion, from the conversations with police personnel officers it is apparent that this is the present case in most police organizations throughout the country. Seldom are command officers disciplined. No officer should be forced to make a complaint con— cerning a superior to that same superior, nor should any em- ployee suffer repercussions because of a complaint about any other officer unless it was deliberately malicious. Employee complaints against other employees should be kept strictly confidential, unless action is taken against one of the in- volved parties and because of this action it becomes neces— sary to reveal the identity of the complainant. Citizen Against the Department. All complaints initiated by members of the public against the police de— partment are included in this category. The most common in this area allege unfair, discriminatory, improper, and/or inefficient practices on the part of the police organization. For example, the use of police dogs offends some people, and they may have complaints about the policy of the organization “that uses dogs. Or, some areas have a large proportion of g 9Mayor's Committee on Management, New York Police jiggyey (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1952), pp. 7-8. 133 the community who believe the department has implicit regu- lations that force discriminatory hiring practices, and these groups want to submit this complaint and their evi- dence to a fair, impartial investigation and hearing. The nature of these complaints require a public air— ing. An administrator who refuses to acknowledge them will only compound the problem by making it appear that the organization has something to hide. The consequences of failing to provide methods for handling this type of com- plaint can be severe, and it is imperative that police ad- ministrators immediately initiate action to provide for the handling of it;: Civilian Against Police Officer. This classification of complaints is the most common, as well as the most press— ing current problem area for the police. Involved is a citizen complainant who alleges an individual officer (or group of officers) committed some act or omission that either violates the law or departmental policy. The complaint may be the result of any of a number of situations, but the most frequent, according to the survey data, is discourtesy which was listed by 42 out of the 63 police departments that re- sponded to the questionnaire. The second most frequent com— plaint overall was the use of unnecessary force. Beyond these first two types there was little consensus. A large proportion of the respondent's answers could not be 134 .opm .maxoflsw mHHmo Ho3wcm ou mHSHAmw .wansonp UAmeEoo .coEo3 .mpso mmo chchuo .munoo poonm mucAmamEoo SHAHmEAHm moosaoca mA£B*« .molc .mmuAmGGOAummsv AAME >o>usm "monsome m.¢A m Hw3mc< oz 0.0m SA 0.0a NA m m.mm em . eamhozuo Han 0HH A 0nd A coflpmafleflnumfln A.m m H.m N .ouo .ummuUIGOApmsuuoo A.m m 0.0 0 0.0a 0 0.0m AA umxofla.oflmmmua m mcflapcmsmfiz 0.0 0 0.0 0 mam. 0A 0.0m mm mouom mnmm Imoooccp mo mm: m.0 0 m.mm 0A 0.0m mm 0.00 we pooemwumflo 0cm hmwuuooomAn .x. . 02 X . 02 R. . 02 .x. . oz MGAmHQEOU ucAmamsoo DCAMHQEOU Eoo ucAmAmEoo :oE ACAMHQEOU GOE GOEEOU ¢ 1500 umoz tum IEoo umoz pom usoo umoz umA mmcflxcmm.amucofiuummon mH mflna wuosz .mumon Mo .02 mBZHflflmEOU ZHU 202200 BmOE ..m momma 135 classified because of their diversity. Relatively few de— partments reported that complaints of dishonesty are a. problem. Information related to the race of complainants was difficult to obtain. Only two departments were able and willing to provide such information on a confidential basis, and a comparison of the limited data obtained is presented in Table 4. Although the populations of the cities are simi— lar both in number and racial composition, it is interesting that the racial characteristics of the complainants are not represented in the same proportions. In fact, the complaints of excessive force portray practically the opposite racial source patterns. One fact that these statistics point out is that it is erroneous to attribute all complaints, or even most complaints, about police conduct to Negroes for it is obvious that a significant number are lodged by Caucasians. One common characteristic of the complainants that was observed during on—site visitations was the likelihood that the complainant would be from the lower socio-economic class. Although several instances of misconduct were ob- served, in none did the abused citizen appear to be from the upper—middle or upper social—economic classes. A high ranking officer from one department may have linintentionally disclosed why this is true. While talking afloout the difficulties involved in returning traffic vio— ldators who have been observed violating the law in the city 136 but could not be apprehended until they were in the adjoining state, he acknowledged the serious problem involved. He indicated that in most instances the violator is simply re— turned to the city without formal legal procedures being followed, but such action is a discretionary matter for the individual officer involved. He said the officer has to be careful whom he arrests under such circumstances. When pressed for the criteria utilized to determine who would ordinarily be arrested he said, "It depends upon how he (the suspect) looks!" TABLE 4* SOURCES OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE IN TWO DEPARTMENTS 1964 City A 1964-65 City B Complaint Cauc. Negro Cauc. Negro Excessive Force 63 42 35 71 Unwarranted Action 11 24 Conduct Unbecoming 117 34 43 34 Dishonesty 8 14 ll 6 Intoxication 4 1 Neglect of Duty 31 10 22 10 Sex 8 0 ' Other 3 l *Source: These statistics were taken from confi- dential department records in two cities of the same popu— lation class and represent total number in each category. After realizing he may have said the wrong thing the <>fficer became quite embarrased. 137 Both the literature and opinions of citizens inter- viewed tended to indicate that this economic discrimination exists elsewhere also. The surprising thing is that the Caucasians in the lower economic groups are not generally recognized as also being dissatisfied with the police con— duct. Perhaps this is attributable to the fact that the Negro generally tend to disapprove of the police more often. As indicated earlier, nearly all studies rated Negro atti- tudes toward the police lower than Caucasian. Perhaps this is one more reason why these groups lack confidence in the police. It is one more reason why they do not believe in internal disciplinary procedures. II. A STUDY OF THE PROCESSING OF POLICE BRUTALITY COMPLAINTS Police brutality is the most explosive and widely disputed complaint made against police officers. With the extensive recent literature that has been addressed to the topic, it might be assumed that there would be consensus among the police and the public upon at least its definition, but there is not. In fact, this contributes to the problem. The Definition pf Brutality. The interview phase of the field survey indicated that, while there were some dis— cernible differences between members of the public over the Construction of the term police brutality, no detectable 138 .wige diversity of opinion along racial lines became apparent.10 Even though there was a similar wide range of opinion among police officials, they tended to support a more limited definition of the term than other community leaders who were interviewed in the same area. Practically universal agreement existed between police officers and the public on one fact; both groups felt that the use of_gp— necessary physical force to the point of injury or bloodshed should be considered police brutality. The noticeable differences between the police official's and the community leader's definitions occurred in the area outside of physi- cal force. Although a sizeable proportion of the inter- viewees were unsure if verbal and psychological abuse should be considered brutality, the police officials were more likely than the community leaders to insist that these actions should never be considered as brutal. 10The sample drawn for this survey consisted of formally recognized community leaders, who were by—andllarge from the upper—middle class. Occupationally they were gener— ally doctors, lawyers, college professors, ministers, priests, rabbis, and governmental supervisors--both elected and civil service. However, even though the staff is aware of the in- herent weaknesses of this survey method and the need for further experimentation using more controlled conditions, the extensiveness of this survey, the degree of similarity in the conclusions reached by the different teams of workers, and the considerable support that is provided by related special— ized studies of a more limited and scientifically precise nature, indicate that the results of this survey are more than valid enough to support the conclusions that are presented. 139 It was also noticed that most police officials recognized that minority groups were not in agreement with them on this limited definition and in several instances interviewers were told by these officials that the diction— ary definition of brutality only includes physical force. Even though this is a widespread belief in the police field, it is an erroneous one. The most commonly accepted authority on semantics says: brutal, . . . of or pertaining to a brute; brutish; hence, savage; cruel; also coarse; gross brutality, . . . A brutal act.ll This definition is obviously far broader than the con— struction entertained by most police officials and some mem— bers of the public. This certainly merits some consider- ation by police before they completely reject the possibility of non-physical brutality. However, the definition does not eliminate the as- sumption of some police that a majority of their citizens do not believe that anything but violent physical force can be brutal. The returns from the mail questionnaires were uti— lized to check the validity of this belief. The responses before Tables 5, 6, and 7). Were~quite significant and definitely point out a wide variance between the police chief's conception of brutality and that of the community llwebster's New Collegiate Dictionary (2nd ed.). (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. and C. Merriam Company, Publishers, 1956), p. 108. 140 leaders. As stated previously, practically all of the re- spondents, both police and public feel that unnecessary force, to the point of bloodshed or injury, is brutal. Similarly a large proportion of the respondents classified rough handling as brutality, although about 25% of the re- spondents in each group did not believe this action to be within the meaning of the term. TABLE 5* POLICE ACTION PERCEIVED BY COMMUNITY LEADERS AS "POLICE BRUTALITY” Percentage of Each Group** v. V , Caucasian Negro Police Action N=l30 N=54 l. Unnecessary use of force to point of injury, bloodshed, etc. 96.9 126 96.2 52 2. Rough Handling 73.0 95 75.9 41 3. Verbal abuse (name calling, pro- fane language, etc.) 65.3 85 85.1 46 4. Rudeness (sarcasm, ridicule, curtness, disrespect) 54.6 71 70.3 38 5. Other*** 9.2 12 12.9 7 6. No Answer 3.0 4 0 O * I l I Source: Mail Quest1onna1res. **Rounded off to nearest tenth of one percent. ***Primarily constitutional rights violations and dis- crimination mentioned. 141 The wide variations between the classes of respon- dents in regard to labeling verbal abuse brutality makes the point of conflict apparent. Although 85.1% of all Negroes answering the questionnaire indicated that name calling and profane language by a policeman is brutal, only 45.0% of the Caucasian police chiefs held a similar point of view. The significant point which should be considered is that the Negro respondents were not without support for their position for a substantial majority of 65.3% of Caucasian community leaders responses also construed brutality to include verbal abuse. The category of rudeness is equally telling, because of the total number of police officials a mere 28.3% felt that such things as police sarcasm, ridicule, curtness, and disrespect should be considered under the definition of bru- tality. On the other hand, 54.6% of the Caucasian leaders and 70.3% of the Negro leaders maintained that this type of conduct by police officers constitutes police brutality. The situation therefore, can be summarized as follows: (1) the field interviews established only that citizens are generally more likely than the police to define the use of verbal and psychological abuse as brutality; (2) the diction- ary definitely defines brutality in broad terms that would certainly include such actions as verbal abuse and even rude- ness; and (3) the returned mail questionnaires indicate that 142 a large majority of the total respondents believe verbal abuse such as name calling is brutal. In addition, slightly over 50% of the whites and 70% of the Negroes responding went as far as to classify rudeness, sarcasm, and disrespect by a policeman under the term. TABLE 6* POLICE ACTION PERCEIVED BY POLICE LEADERS AS "POLICE BRUTALITY" Percentage of Each Group** . . Caucasian Negro Police Action N = 60 N = 2 % No. % . No. l. Unnecessary use of force to point of bloodshed, injury, etc. 98.3 59 100*** 2 2. Rough Handling 73.3 44 0 0 3. Verbal abuse (name calling, profane language, etc.) 45.0 27 0 O 4. Rudeness (sarcasm, ridicule, . curtness, disrespect) 28.3 17 0 0 5. Other**** 11.7 7 o o 6. No Answer 1.7 l 0 0 *Source: Mail Questionnaires. **Rounded off to the nearest tenth of one per cent. ***Note this very unreliable because of the very small number of Negro responses (2). * l I I I I o I o I ***Discr1mination and Violations of constitutional rights primarily mentioned. 143 The 55% of the police chiefs then, who do not be- lieve verbal abuse can be brutal, disagree with the majority of the community leaders. Additionally, the authority of the dictionary definition fully supports the public in this battle. The construction that should be placed upon the term ”police brutality" is apparent. In order to improve police and community relation— ships appreciable, police administrators should recognize that brutality can include both physical and verbal acts. Verbal brutality should be viewed as closely related to the concept of mental cruelty, which is serious enough in the civil courts of most states to provide grounds for a divorce. Certainly when semantics can incite and anger a segment of the community to violence, the police must consider such terminology in the same category. If brutality is approached within this frame of reference, there can be no doubt that it exists in a larger number of police organizations today. The point that should be crystal clear is that, in order to determine what does and what does not constitute brutality, the police administrator, to some extent, should view the situation through the eyes of the average man in the group that is affected. The study has found no evidence to indicate that words, deeds, motions, activities, threats, intimidation, sarcasm, differential treatment, and force pap— not constitute brutality. Whether it does or does not '144 .wcoAuwosv meow umBmEm uoc 0A0 mucmocommmu 050m owsmoon mumAxw wocmmwnoon wEOm "@802 .mouamcCOAumoso HA0: "monsoms Auoummou ImAQ .mmwcuusu A>uAcmmoum mad cm oonmoooam Hwnuo .oasvoAm .Emmo .mCAHHmo wEmzv .stom .hHDflCH .wouom Inmmv mmmcoodm omsnm Hmnum> n m mumwmmoocc TOAHomumAAA>AQooAAom *mAHAAVAUwUAAom "TEAL/AU oUAAom ATAAANVAO oUAHom._.. MASK/Au .x. . . . . - ‘ u w . 1 mwv . mvv mmwu “ “ mmu “ n u “ \\\ \\\ . . .\\. . u n . r0A “““ “““ ‘ “ \\\ 0 \ \ u ““0 \\\ u . “v“ u “ “ . \\\ \\\ . “ \\\ u . . “ -0m \ \ u . \ u m u “ \ N u N W 1 “ m m .0. u \ m m \ u m m m \\ “ “ \ m m u n -00 m m \. m n m m m n \ u m m “ -0... u n \ u u 0 u .00 n M “u“ u u m u \\\1 u u 0 u . u L m “ ION. 0 \ u m A00 ‘ \ u u u u n 00 mcmAAA>Ao “ u Vm .TUAHOQ mus. onmoz r00A mcmAHA>Ao 0mH an“ cmflmmusme .moAAoc 00uc . X. NWEHflmfibmm WUHQOQ mMBDBHBmZOU 8433 h mqm<6 145 depends upon the situation and the individual affected. Rules and regulations to control the conduct of officers should be established in accord with a definition appropri- ate to these conclusions. lg Police Brutality_A Problem? The mail question- naires reveal that both the community leaders and the police feel that some police-community relations problems are cre— ated because of police brutality (see Table 8). In addition to the communications difficulties just discussed, the staff observed several other problems related to the area. -TABLE 8* EFFECT OF BRUTALITY COMPLAINTS ON COMMUNITY RELATIONS Caucasian Negro In the Respondent's N = 130 N = 60 N = 54 Community Some Aspect Community Police Community of Brutality Leaders ' Leaders % No. % No. % No. I§ causing PCR Problems 61.5 80 58.3 35 79.6 43 _l§ NOT causing PCR Problems 35.3 46 38.3 23 16.6 9 No Answer 3.0 4 3.3 2 3.7 2 * . . . Source: Mail Questionnaire. 146 A survey of the literature is sufficient to indicate a serious controversy between the police and some members of the public over whether or not police brutality actually ex- ists in the United States.12 The police literature main- tains that the problem is seriously over-emphasized. For example, in a recent article Mr. Quinn Tamm, Executive Director, International Association of Chiefs of Police, wrote: I know of no period in recent history when the po- lice have been the subject of so many unjustified charges of brutality, harassment and ineptness. It almost seems that the better we do our job of en- forcing the law the more we are attacked.1 Police Chief Harold Dill of Denver, Colorado, was recently quoted as expressing a belief which characterizes the attitudes of many law enforcement officers interviewed by the staff. He said his men very rarely find any evidence to substantiate a claim of brutality. We feel that most complaints are made by persons trying to beat a court rap for some offense.l4 12See Davis Stahl,_et_§l., The Community and Racial Crises (New York: Practising Law Institute), 1966; George MacMillan, Racial Violence and Law Enforcement (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council), 1964; J. Edgar Hoover, "Police Brutality — How Much Truth, How Much Fiction?"_gn§. News_apd World Report (September 27, 1965), pp. 116-119; and Robert C. Byrd, "Police Brutality or Public Brutality," The Police Chief (February, 1966), pp. 7—10. 13"Professionalism and Civil Rights," The Police Chief (September, 1964). 14"Charges of Police Brutality Thoroughly Probed, Dill says," Rocky Mountain NEWS, February 27, 1966. 147 Following these statements, both men utilized the proof of an absence of brutality that has become traditional in the police field. They cited the reports vs. conviction statistics of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the area of civil rights violations by police. Mr. Tamm points out that in 1963 less than 1% of total allegations of civil rights violations handled by the U.S. Department of Justice were even indicted. upon completion of the FBI investigation. There can be no doubt if this is representative of the pro— portion of brutality claims that are actually valid, it would be difficult to content that police brutality is in reality a problem. The specific law utilized by the Department of Justice in cases involving alleged police brutality reads Whoever, under the color of any law, statute, ordi- nance, regulation, or custom willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im- munities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punish- ments, pains, or penalties on account of such inhabi- tant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citi- zens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or im- prisoned not more than one year, or both.15 In order to determine the value of utilizing con- viction rates based on this law as a gauge for estimating the extent of its enforcement, the investigation and con- clusions of the United States Civil Rights Commission in E 15United States Criminal Code (Title 18), Section 242. 148 196116 and 196517 are useful. In these two reports, the in- adequacy of the above statute for handling even flagrant cases of brutality is reviewed. They attributed this in- adequacy primarily to the requirement that the official charged must have acted with specific intent to deny his victim Federal rights. The Commission said: Due primarily to the difficulties of prosecution which these statutes present and an adequate staff, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has brought only a few prosecutions under these acts. An expanded staff and administrative reorganization promise a more aggressive handling of these cases, but the problems cannot be fully met without a revision of the statutes to elimi- nate existing deficiencies.18 Two statements are presented in the notes of the 1961 report that merit attention. In the first, written in 1946, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover explains the difficulty involved in properly enforcing Federal civil rights laws and he sug- gests that the FBI should not be burdened with this responsi— bility. He continues: The responsibility for the solution and prosecutive action in these cases and the jurisdiction for the accomplishment of these ends are in the State Courts. Under the present circumstances it appears that the work_gf the department_and the Bureau-lg completely l6U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Justice (Washing— ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 45-55. l7U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Law Enforcement (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 118—119. 18 Ibid. 149 ineffective, both ppig deterrent and pp p punitive force.* Regardless of whether we like it, it is a fact that Federal Statutes penalizing violations of civil liberties are inadequate weapons for efficient enforcement by the Department and I think, conse- quently, that it is a mistake of policy for the De- partment to accept for investigation so many cases in which, as I have indicated, there is no proba- bility of federal prosecutive action and in which the Bureau and the Department are merely assessed in the public mind with a responsibility which is neither discharged nor executed.19 The second statement recorded in the Commission's notes is much more recent than that made by Mr. Hoover, and it indicates that at least one former agent considered some human reasons that work to the disadvantage of a complainant. The report indicates that: In 1961 a Commission staff member interviewed a former FBI agent who had served with that agency for many years, but who, in his capacity at the time of the interview, handled certain complaints of civil rights violations, including police bru— tality. The Commission staff member's field notes state: I asked him why he did not refer the complaints to the FBI, especially since he was formerly a spe- cial agent. Mr. (name withheld) stated that he does not turn civil rights cases over to the Bureau, be- cause they don't like them. .He explained that it jg very embarrassing_tp agents_tg have tg investi— ,gate police department officials ip the morning and then attempt t9 enlist their cooperation pp other cases_ip the afternoon:T He stated that the Bureau distributed a monthly bulletin to police departments all over the country and makes no secret therein of the sort of information in which the FBI is inter- ested, i.e., kidnapping, bank robberies, but never civil rights. He stated that the Bureau feels that 'civil rights shouldn't be in there.‘20 lglhi§-: 99- 214—215. *Emphasis added. ZQIEEQ-: P: 219. *Emphasis added. 150 Tying the preceding together it appears that: (l) The Federal Statute used by the FBI to investigate brutality charges against local police officers is apparently inef- fective, and, therefore, convictions arising from it are un- reliable as an indication of the total number of complaints that are legitimate or false; (2) the Director of the FBI ap- parently also believes the Statute to be ineffective, which adds support to the preceding conclusion; and (3) there may be some psychological and personal limitations on a complete- ly objective pursuit of the facts surrounding alleged bru- tality which might restrict the usually aggressive investi- gation that is characteristic of the FBI. In addition to these conclusions, no notice has been afforded the fact that the construction of this law does not include verbal brutality. Certainly, as previously dis— cussed, this is an important aspect of brutality, and failure to include charges of this type would likely cause a grave distortion of conclusions based upon such an incomplete picture. Therefore, it may be reasonably concluded that the Justice Department's small number of convictions for police brutality in proportion to the high number of alleged inci- dents, is completely inadequate as evidence that a high per- cent of the brutality charges are false of uncalled for. In fact, the only thing this information reveals is that there 151 are several allegations of brutality for every conviction obtained by the Justice Department. Whether police brutality is a widespread phenomena or not, the study disclosed that many people honestly believe it to be. In several of the cities studied, one or more com- munity leaders were able to provide documentation of in- stances of police conduct which they considered brutal.21 The staff analyzed and evaluated such reports and cases,-considering available related material from official police and government records and reports, whenever possible, to determine their implications. Several conclusions became apparent: (1) there is no doubt that the claims of brutality are deliberately false in some instances; (2) in other cases the charges of brutality resulted from misunderstandings; (3) some reports did not lend themselves to proof or dis— proof; and (4) in some cases the evidence supports con— clusions about the existence and extent of brutality that are unfavorable to the police. In these latter instances, the 21Among the reports used to support these contentions were Police Malpractice and the Watts Riot,_A Report py.tpe American Civil Liberties Union_gf Southern California, October, 1965; Joseph Fichter, Police Handling pf Arrestees, (New Orleans: Loyola University of the South, 1964); U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Justice, 1961; American Civil Liber- ties Union, Petition for Investigation pf the Seattle_2e— partment (Seattle, Washington AFFILIATE, Date unknown); and The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission, Report tg Governor John Love pp Hearingg on Excessive Use pf Force py Denver Police, Denver,rColorado, 1964. 152 community often has sufficient reason to suspect the police of tolerating and sometimes even condoning unnecessary force by police officers. The following is some of the evidence which indicates the existence of some brutality, and tends to point out that allegations of police brutality are not al- ways receiving proper attention by local police agencies. Returning again to the 1961 report of the United States Civil Rights Commission, it states that although ”most police officers never resort to brutal practices police brutality is still a serious problem throughout the United States."22 While it is not necessary to review here- in all of their supporting data, it appears sufficient to justify such a conclusion. On the basis of mass media documentation, a large portion of the population have come to accept, rightly or wrongly, that police brutality, particularly against the civil rights workers and Negroes, is widespread in the South.23 One report says: The demoralizing nature of (a Negro's day-to—day contact with police) is summed up in a Negro's en- counter with two southern policemen as recounted by Claude Sitton in the New York Times. The en— counter . . . might be called routine intimidation, the kind that every Negro dreads. 22U.S. Civil Rights Commission, gp. cit., pp. 2—8. 23Southern Regional Council, Southern Justice: _Ap Indictment (Atlanta, Georgia: October 18, 1965), p. 24. 153 'Where're you going, nigger?‘ demanded the driver. 'Home,‘ replied the man. 'Let me see your identification.I He fished out a longshoreman's card and handed it to the policeman. 'Take off your hat, nigger,‘ ordered the policeman, still looking at the card. Before the command could be carried out he snatched the hat from the man's head and threw it to the pavement. 'What's that in your pocket?’ 'Nothing.’ The policeman thrust a lighted match into the lapel pocket of the man's coat. Striking a second match, he held it to the card, which curled and blackened in yellow flame. ‘You go on now, nigger,I said the policeman. And he and his partner strode back to the police car and drove away. The truth in this specific report is not as important as the fact that it is typical of a large number of the ac— counts regarding southern 1aw enforcement officers' treat- ment of Negroes and citizens who are outspoken for equal rights. Many southern publications are among those that have expressed a belief that this is true. The Greenville, 24See Enforcement: .2 report pp egual protection ip the south (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; Department of Racial and Cultural Relations, Intimidation, Reprisal‘and Violence 1p the South's Racial Crisis (New York: National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of Ameri— ca, 1960); George McMillan, Racial Violence and Law_§p— forcement (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, May, 1964), and Southern Regional Council, Law Enforcement_ip Mississippi (Atlanta, July, 14, 1964). 154 Mississippi, Delta Democrat Times is one such newspaper. In an editorial on April 22, 1964, the following observation was made: With monotonous regularity, civil rights activists in Mississippi claim that they have been beaten either by law Officers or prisoners bribed by the officers to attack them in various jails. Some of these pro- tests can be discounted . . . But too many are not fabrications. Too many are the simple truth. (It) is more than a coincidence that the only prisoners who are consistently coming out of jail with bruises and black eyes are civil rights activists. While many southern police administrators are consci- enciously striving to eliminate such conduct, it still is a serious problem. For example, the following was witnessed I. by a member of our staff: An older Negro in an old model sedan was approaching an intersection where a motorcycle policeman was di- recting traffic at about dusk. The light conditions made it difficult to see the traffic officer and the old man was near the policeman before he became aware of his presence and swerved to avoid driving into him. The officer stopped directing traffic, mounted his motorcycle and pursued the Negro. He rode up along the left side of the old man's vehicle and pulled his pistol, and pointed it directly at the citizen, telling him to stop or he would 'kill' him. The old man stopped his vehicle and sat motionless looking straight ahead. The officer stopped his cycle as the car stopped, holstered his weapon, and put the kickstand down to support the motorcycle. He then again drew his pistol and threatened the old man, sometimes holding the weapon within inches of the Negro's head. After a minute or so of this the officer holstered the pistol, Opened the car door and physically pulled the Negro to the street, abusing him physi- cally and verbally. Leaving him for a minute the 155 officer walked to the rear of the auto for a short time, then returned, picked up the old man, half- carried him to the back of another auto parked near- by and placed him upon its truck. After verbally abusing him for several minutes, the patrolman cautioned him never to repeat his negligent conduct and released him with no further action. A detective with the staff member apologized for the misconduct of his fellow officer, and added that neither he nor the other officers on the organization approved of such conduct. However he made no report of the incident so that disciplinary action could be initiated. Certainly the citizen, who was victimized, will have little difficulty rationalizing a contempt for the police. To expect that he or his associates can conceive of this incident as an isolated event is fantasy. Any future re- ports of police brutality, whether true or not, will probably be accepted as reality by them, and it will take more than mere words from policemen to convince them that the police merit confidence and support. The reports of police brutality obtained in northern urban areas indicate that if brutality exists it is not as open as in some southern communities. A majority of the members of the public and nearly all of the police officials of the North feel that the use of unnecessary force by police- men is seldom an intentional act. Generally they are charac- terized by the Philadelphia Police Inspector who indicated that the deliberate use of " . . . too much force is a thing 156 of the past. This problem has been practically overcome through improved police education and discipline. The prOblems the police should concentrate on now are in the verbal areas - disrespect and verbal abuse." Certainly verbal misconduct is a police problem, but this survey indicates police officials who assume that the rise of unnecessary force does not represent a serious problem simply because they receive more complaints about discourtesy and verbal degradation are making a serious mis- take. It appears that intentional verbal abuse and the use of unnecessary force are closely related and vary in.a posi— tive correlation. Although the survey provided only limited empirical support for such a conclusion, it follows logical reasoning because policemen whose feelings are so strong that they violate policy and regulations by intentionally antagonizing certain people are more likely to utilize more extreme physical methods of emotional expression than are officers who do not violate regulations by deliberately antagonizing citizens. Additionally, organizations in which verbal abuse is not tolerated are also more apt to be in- tolerant of physical abuse than those that are not seriously concerned with how its officers express themselves. Most police departments have little in the way of statistical data related to excessive use of force. The most common method of recording such charges is an entry in the 157 individual's personal folder. In those cities where sta- tistical reports were tabulated, these reports are generally treated confidentially and are available only to certain members of the department. Departmental reports or partial reports related to civilian complaints were obtained,from six major cities. Table 9 presents a comparison of the information dealing with the unnecessary use of force based upon the reports that were complete enough for our purposes. The number of manhours for each excessive force complaint varies consider— ably between departments. City B had approximately one com- plaint for every 59,775 manhours by sworn officers while in City A there was one for every 36,885 manhours. If these records are accurate the odds that an officer will be ac- cused of using excessive force once every 18 years if he works in City A, once every 30 years if he works in City B, once every 19 years in City C, once every 23 years in City D, and once every 29 years in City E.25 A generalization made solely on these figures would likely support the position that complaints of excessive force are not a problem. However, further consideration raises the question of why a wide variation exists between the statistics of the different departments? Are they solely 25These figures should not be construed as completely accurate since there are differences in recording methods which would cause some variation. 158 .1000A .«on "oomoAnuv.xoom Hmow HmmHoAcsz one Eoum cmxmu mump coma comma mA mA£BAA .quAAQmHAm>m mo omsmoon chwum> .momH Ho @00A 00 muuommn HmoAumAumum Eoum mum moAumAumpm ommnp Ham .oouoommmu on mmooam mflnu umnp o>AumquEA uA Hmom 03 com .maoAHQsQ Emzu mwmoaou ou no: omoowam mHoQEmE mumpw may Houmm waco manomwu HATE“ oommmaon mucosunmmmo TUAHOQ 039 .HmAucwoAmcoo oTHwUAm Icoo mum coxmu ouo3 moApmAumum omonu mo oEOm EUAQS Eoum muuooom "EUOZE mummm mm mums» mm mums» 0A mnmwm 0m mumom ma sumo How DGHMHMWMWMWM woo woo mom moo Hod one you moo Hon mco mucwsvmmw oouoomxm . . . . . usflmaoeoo mom ohm mm 000 00 mow mm own mm 000 mm musozcms .02 mm Amm mm 0mm 00A A00u00 0>Ammmox00 mpcAmHoEoo oz . h........wnonmamza ooo.o¢o.A oom.mAm.0A ooo.ohm.A ooo.vm>.oa ooo.oam.m cuoBm mo musoncms mammoh wumEAxoqum m G U m < Auflo suflo Auflo muflo mhflo smfizmzfimmmmn MUHAOQ m Nm Qm>Hm0mm MBZHdflmzov mumom m>HmmmUNm m0 ZOmHmmmZOU A482MSBfi¢NHDImz o 0 mm m .muw 0N0 me 0:0 N.m NH Hmm Q .mum mma me mco H.NH g mm 0 .mum mama Mom moo m.H 0 0mm m 2*.mum ham Hon moo m.m m o 0 00A a HTUAMMO sumo X .02 X. .02 owonom m>Ammexmv .ume now ucAmAmEoo mom» 1|1. mucAmAmEou .oz TUAHom mflnu ocAcAmumSm .uoon EOAUAmommAQ mucAmaoEoo Hmuoa mo mocwsvoum nouoomxm chocmm oocflmumsm smBZWSHMmNMQ NUHQOA.m Hm QWZHKBMHm mBZH(AMZOU MUMOM.M>HmmmUNm m0 zomHm¢NZOU AdHZflSHMdeflfflmBZH 0H mamHn m.¢® hm moaaom mo mmfizo «.ma S A.ummnv Unmom HmHHB mUHHom m.m m mwflso um>o pumom moaaom m.m N Houomnfln mummmw Uflanfim m.oa o H.6m mm m.om mm o.s v ,m.m m n.5m. om S.H a .>oo mo 0>Husowxm mowzo «a .02 AR. .02 w» .02 AR. .02 X .02 X .02 , an .02 HMHUHMMO omuflsflq 02 Exam» .mcm .oz 3 oz . may mmunomwm soflummflumw>cH ou mmmo cofluflmommfln mo mcowpflwommfla Ill! Ill| Il tom m>mm UAHQDm may moon .0 CTHMHDOZ HomchHQEoo mH ”m 0H mqm<8 Hmcfim mocHEHmumn 0:3 .m *mBZH44m200 ZNNHBHU m0 ZOHBHmOmmHQ T 186 Tables.l7, 18, and 19, contain a summary of the over- all validity of complaints as reported by police departments. The graphs are broken down by the number of departments re- porting percentages within lO—point ranges in the areas of complaints proven to be valid and therefore sustained, proven to be without basis and false, or not subject to proof or disproof, therefore unsustained. TABLE 17 PERCENT OF COMPLAINTS REPORTED TO POLICE THAT ARE SUSTAINED* No. of Departments 20 - 18 — l6 - l4 - 12 - 10 - 8 _ 6 — , 4 _ 2‘ l l ‘% Sustained 0-9 10-19 20—29 30-39 40-49 50—100 * . . . Source: Mail Questionnaires. 187 As in the previous section on brutality, the sta— tistics show a wide range of distribution in each area. Ap- proximately 5% of the reporting departments indicated that around 40 to 50 of every 100 complaints they received are found to be based on merit and sustained. However, approxi— mately 50% of the responding departments indicated that less than 10 out of every 100 complaints they received were 37 The wide range of difference causes doubt and sus- valid. picion about how adequately police departments are disposing of complaints. Tables 18 and 19 support the same reasoning as Table 17 since the variations are interdependent. There are many indications some police departments are not only not interested in removing officers who abuse certain segments of the public, but deliberately discourage persons who complain about them. Some of these have been re- ferred to earlier in the preceding section on supervision, 37These figures can be criticized from a scientific perspective for several reasons: (1) they are based on re- ports from departments which may be guesses rather than actual facts; (2) they are from a small number of depart- ments that may not be representative of all departments; and (3) departments may have differing methods of recording com- plaint statistics which would cause some of the variations. However, this is the most complete data available and it is the same type of data that the public must rely upon for its conclusions and, therefore, it is useful for this study. 188 .mmHHmCGOHumoso Hflmz "wousoms ooauom mmlom mulch moloo mmnom mvuo¢ mmlom mNION maloa mlo cw>oum x |- [IN 1 v v o 1 m w OH 1 NH 1 ¢H . 1 0H 1 ma mucwEuHmmwn mo .02 *MDmBZD m0 MDMH. Zm>0mm mm 8027.20 Bah. MUHAOA OB Quamommm mBZHfimeAOU .mO .HZWUmmm ma mflmdB L [.ll 189 but one other report is very illustrative of another practice.38 According to this report in 1962 the Washington, D.C. Police Department filed charges against 40% of all persons who attempted to complain of police misconduct or abuse. The charge used was filing a false report with the police, and out of 41 complaints filed with the police 16 persons were arrested. At the same time Citizens alleged that crimes had been committed on 33,593 occasions and only 101 of these complainants were arrested. This equals .003 per- cent of the total complaints of crimes where the complainant was arrested. Some people wonder if the 40% figure in the first instance was deliberately high to discourage complaints about policemen. The indications of lack of discipline are apparent in the differences in the number of citizen complaints sustained by police departments. Administrators who believe that generally the discipline is firm enough in most cities should look at the situation in England. a 1960 document reports: Proceedings . . . were brought against 945 members of county and borough police forces during the year, including 6 policewomen: 845 were found guilty. The majority of these cases were for comparatively minor offenses, such as unpunctuality or neglect of duty; 38National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union,_A_g£g- posed Revision of the System for Processing Civilian Com- 'Elaints Against Police Misconduct in the District of Columbia, Washington, June, 1964, p. 17. (Mimeographed.) 190 .mmHNDCGOHummso Ham: "wousoms ooauom mmlom which moloo mmlom owlov mmlom mNION maloa mlo wmamm x ———w.N _— —— r v 1 o I 1 m w 1 OH 1 NH 1 OH 1 0H 1 ma mucmEunmmwn mo .02 *mmqam mo aHmmz esomst mm OB zm>omm NEE same HOHAOA OP omsmommm mazHaqmzoo mo szmommm ma WAMGB 191 317 (including 4 policewomen) were dealt by caution: 177 by reprimand; and 261 by fine. Of the remaining 90 cases, 19 were punished by reduction of pay, 4 by reduction in rank, 34 by being required to resign as an alternative to dismissal, and 33 (including one policewoman) by dismissal.39 One author points out an interesting fact about the British Policemen that sets them apart from their American counterparts: several chief constables and a majority of policemen would in fact welcome them (independent Civilian advisory boards) to convince the public that justice is being seen to be done. The chief constable, who holds the inquiry under the present system, is in the invidious position of being at the same time judge and jury and of having initiated the prosecution, as well as begin a quasi-defendent be- cause he is responsible for the state of the force. Some police officers would prefer the inquiry to have an independent Chairman because a chief constable often has personal views on each of his men. One cannot help but wonder how much the high con- viction rate influenced the English officers' preference for civilian review boards rather than departmental hearings. Summa y. Several observations are made apparent by this overview of existing machinery: 1. There appear to be about an equal number of de- partments that have and do not have internal 39Home Office, Report.gf Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, 1960 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1961), p. 10. 40Ben Whitaker, Police (Middlesex, England: Cox and Wyman, Ltd., 1964), p. 150. 192 units for processing citizen's complaints against the police. More departments indicated the existence of some type of advisory group for processing certain types of complaints against them than had actual specialized internal investigation units whose only function is the processing of Citizen complaints. One-half of the departments with external ads visory units also had internal investigation ‘ units which indicates the two can function together. The chief of police decides what the final dispo— sition of complaints will be in only 64.9% of the departments. Records concerning complaints are only open to the public in about 36% of the departments, and only in a few departments (5.2%) is the complain- ant permitted to see the records of the investi- gator or receive information of the disposition of his complaint. There is such a wide variation in the disposition of complaints that the public at times has cause to suspect that the police may not always be handling their complaints properly. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS This chapter will present: (1) A summary of the findings about departmental complaint processing machinery; (2) the conclusions regarding the value of the original hy— pothesis; (3) a recommended model for complaint processing; (4) a recommendation of a tool for evaluating existing in— ternal complaint machinery; and (5) a modified hypothesis for future research. Discussing these in the above order, attention is focused upon the conclusions about the com- plaint machinery. I. WEAKNESSES IN COMPLAINT PROCESSING There seems to be two basic methods of obtaining de— sired employee conduct: First, through education by cor— recting, explaining, and/or training; and, second, by a sys- tem of rewards for‘good behavior and punishment for imprOper conduct. Education and training and the use of rewards is considered by most authorities to be the most desirable ap- proaches because these methods cause the least frustration and conflict therefore are less taxing on the individual_ supervisor than the technique of punishment. However, not 194 only do the desirable approaches require considerably longer periods of time to be effective, their utilization is also limited to post facto of misconduct. The use of punishment, if only as retribution, is necessary in ex post facto cases. In order to justly administer to complaints, police departments must have formalized, definitely defined ma— chinery specifically for this purpose. This machinery must be designed to accomplish the goals of commanding conformity to acceptable patterns of behavior; administering retributive punishment to the misbehaving and eliminating the extreme of— fenders from the organization; and enhancing the public confidence and support of the organization by providing evi- dence of just, appropriate disciplinary action in response :fo citizen complaints. The most important part of this ma— chinery to the realization of these goals is the role of supervisors. Supervisors in United States police departments are the biggest cause of inadequate complaint processing machinery. Supervision. This study indicated serious weaknesses in the quality of supervision in most, if not all, municipal police agencies studied. This seems to be attributable to an attitude of acceptance on the part of supervisors, par- ticularly and primarily sergeants, of misconduct. Even though this has been previously documented, the following situations are presented to further illustrate some of the 195 instances of misconduct that were observed during this study. These are representive of the extreme in inadequate super— vision, but they are only a few of the many instances that were observed. This case was observed about 9:30 p.m. in a large City police station. A subject about 22 years of age was brought handcuffed into the station. He was protesting the fact that one of the police officers who arrested him had 'sapped' him unneces- sarily. In very abusive terminology, he called them 'brutal' and indicated that they were the type of people who have sexual relations with their mothers. His head was bleeding from a slight cut at the tem— ple, and the blood was dripping onto his shirt. About five or six police officers (approximately evenly divided--Caucasian and Negro) gathered around the subject. One pushed him back against the wall, and told him to "shut up, and stand there." The subject continued to expend verbal abuse at the officers, but stood against the wall. The officers taunted the handcuffed man and challenged him to step out from the wall. This went on for about five minutes with a Negro shift commander looking on from a distance, and even though no physical violence was inflicted upon the subject, the situation was tense. The police appeared concerted in agitating the al- ready irate prisoner. Finally, the commanding officer called one of the Negro officers down for using the term "mother f----r," and the other patrolmen moved back to doing their paperwork. At this point, the staff member left the room. There can be little doubt that the arrestee's con— duct in this case was trying for the police officers, but that does not excuse the supervisor's negligence in per— mitting the officers to misbehave. The situation could have become very serious, even resulting in injury to either the citizen or one of the officers if the subject had charged 196 into the policemen swinging, or if he had grabbed for one of the officer's weapons. In a second case the police apprehended a juvenile and transported him to the police station. The boy was taken to a private room in the police precinct headquarters and interrogated by an officer. During the questioning the policeman put on a glove and slapped the boy intermittently. A ranking officer entered the room, and his only comment was, "Who's that?" His primary concern was not that the police- man was illegally beating the boy, but that an out— sider, the staff worker, was watching the situation. The staff member was called aside by the ranking officer, after the policeman had explained his pres- ence and said he was "okay." The officer let him know that while such conduct was not strictly ”ac— cording to the book," it is sometimes necessary. At no time was the abusive officer criticized nor was he ordered to stop by the commander. Another case may be dismissed as accidental, but it dramatized negligence that supervisors must strive to avoid. The reporter was with a patrolman when they came upon a crowd of people around a large Negro, apparently intoxicated, who was lying on the ground. The patrolman broke two capsules of some type of stimulant, presumably spirits of hartshorn (ammonia), and insertedcmmain each of the Negro's nostrils. The man jumped to his feet immediately, blood streamed from his nose down the front of his shirt, and the observer indicated that the crowd re- ceived a "good laugh." Certainly supervisors should be alert for prisoners who bear signs of abuse, but sometimes, such as in this case, they are not concerned even when they witness gross mis- behavior on the part of their officers. Along with neglecting to detect and tolerating mis— conduct, some supervisors attempt to protect their 197 subordinates from disciplinary action. One Chief indicated this very fact, when he noted the difficulties " . . . of getting sergeants to stand up in a POlice Trial and testify that a policeman was indeed intoxicated on duty." An instance of such protection by a sergeant of a large Southern department was observed. In this case a Negro stopped the police supervisor with whom our staff mem— ber was riding. The Negro indicated that two officers had mistreated him earlier in the night and he wanted to make a formal complaint. Even though the department requires all officers to report complaints of misconduct, the supervisor suggested to the complainant that he was just going to cause everybody a lot of trouble. He recommended the whole thing be dropped because if it was not the complainant would have to miss a lot of work, etc., to pursue it. After listening to the supervisor, the complainant went on his way, and as far as could be determined, the complaint never received further attention. Another example of discouraging complaints came out at the U.S. Civil Rights Commission hearing in Cleveland in April, 1966. A Cleveland Police Inspector was testifying be— fore the Commission when a Commission Counsel inquired whether he ever asked complainants to take a lie detector test when he attempts to make a complaint against a police officer. The Inspector replied, "No." 198 The Commission Counsel indicated he had a documen- tation from a member of the Commission's staff which alleged that the Inspector said he told complainants that he ex- pected them to take a lie test along with the police officer, and whoever appears to be lying would be punished. The Counsel asked, "Did you say that?" The Inspector acknowledged that he had, but Claimed he was only "joshing." It appears from a report made to the Commission that the Inspector was not completely honest. It should be expected’that the threat of going to jail on the basis of a police administered lie detector test would cause many allegedly aggrieved to drop their complaints. There- fore, officers who should be disciplined for misconduct are not even investigated in some instances. It is apparent that one of the weakest links in the internal control of the conduct of police personnel is the supervision, but negligence in the control of personnel is not exclusively the fault of lower supervisors. In some in- stances the administrative levels have contributed equally by establishing improper procedures and organizational structures. Reception Inadequacies. Departments handling the disciplinary function without a centralized unit for re- ceiving, recording, investigating, and adjudicating com— plaints against their officers may be operating on a 199 theoretically sound administrative concept by charging the supervisor with as much disciplinary authority and discre— tion as is possible so that he can carry out his responsi- bilities. However, in practice human nature causes this method to have weaknesses which have a detrimental impact upon community relations. In cities where the police department had no require— ments regarding the centralized recording of complaints, re— cords concerning complaints were skimpy and/or inaccurate. Neither the administration of the departments nor the public could make any accurate appraisal of the adequacy of the system. As an example, in one department on several oc— casions records of known disciplinary actions that had been initiated in the recent past were missing from the personnel folders or other places where they were supposed to have been filed. In one specific instance an officer had shot a juvenile who had committed a misdemeanor in his presence. The supervisor who investigated the incident noted in his report that the shooting was "unjustified" and yet no record could be located that indicated any disciplinary action and the officer was still working in the same position. The annual report for this organization contained a section con— cerning the use of force and shots fired. It says, "No abuse indicated on the part of any officer." 200 In organizations with central reception points, as well as those without, where the procedure was vague or un— enforced, there is a tendency to discourage complaints against police officers. The techniques used for this range from suggesting that if the complaint was proven to be false the complainant would be prosecuted, to openly advising the complainant that if he refused to take a polygraph exami- nation administered by the department that his complaint would not be accepted nor investigated. In most cases the department required that the complaint be written in the hand of the accuser as well as sworn to by him. An organi— zation that has a policy that results in the discouragement of complaints is ensuring the inadequate processing of complaints. Investigation Inadequacies. It is apparent that the investigation of complaints is handled in several ways de- pending upon the organization. As previously indicated ap- proximately one-half of the organizations do not have a special unit for investigating complaints of police mis- conduct. This was due in some instances to the size of the organization, where such a unit simply could not be justi— fied, but in some larger departments, administrators indi— cated that they believed that the assignment of this function should be to a line supervisor or to the detective unit. Such assignment, however, is not adequate, even in the 201 smallest departments, because of its arbitrary and bureau— cratic nature, which tends to cause a toleration of improper conduct, and to result in the neglect of the investigation of legitimate civilian complaints. In those departments where it was utilized, there were few accurate records re— garding the number or the nature of the complaints that the department received. This made research and analysis in the area unwieldy, if not impossible. The value of this system is also more limited than that of an internal unit, or one person specifically assigned as in some small departments, because of the relationship be- tween officers who may be performing the work. For example, an investigator assigned from a line agency to investigate a complaint about an officer of equal rank cannot avoid an awareness of the fact that the officer whom he is investi- gating may be doing an investigation on a complaint about him in the future. Even if the investigation is performed with total objectivity, the system lends itself to more sus— picion than a system utilizing a specialized unit or person for the same purpose. Aside from these reasons, such a system makes secrecy, sometimes needed when investigating employees, very difficult. For example, in cases involving dishonest em- ployees, who does the chief assign to investigate? How does the chief maintain close supervision over the investigation 202 if he must involve the usual chain—of—commanders? What hap- pens when the chief pulls an officer out of a unit and places this officer in a position reporting directly to him-- Is it likely to cause speculation and rumors throughout the department? One undesirable practice is to assign the investi- gation to officers who work days only. This means that if the complainant is unfortunate enough to work days, too, he will probably be contacted at his place of employment on several occasions. This can cause repercussions and in some instances has resulted in the complainant losing his job. While it may be exaggerated to claim this happens often, the effect of two police officers calling on a complainant and removing him from his work on four or five different oc- cations, particularly if they refuse to disclose to the em— ployer why they are questioning him, certainly would dis- courage complaints and injure the police reputation. In at least one city this practice is made more offensive by the investigators using marked police automobiles to call on the complainants at their homes. This also can be used in reverse. In some places the police, immediately upon receipt of a complaint, call upon the officer involved and inform him of the complaint. This means that the officer is caused immediate worry over a com— plaint that may be false. In addition, it is Claimed that 203 it provides him with an Opportunity to think about excuses, intimidate witnesses and to arrange a false story to con— ceal his guilt. The accused officer might well be contacted only after completing other investigative phases, thereby removing some of these possibilities for criticism. One fact that is made apparent by the previously pre- sented material is that in most organizations there exists a considerable amount of differences between the organization- al procedures and the actual procedures used by the people in the organization. Therefore, it is imperative that strict observance of departmental regulations should be enforced at all times, and particular attention should be given to pro- cedural and supervisional aspects in the complaint investigation. The review of the literature indicated that in re- gard to the question of who should investigate complaints against the police, there are conflicting views. One con— tention is that the investigators of police misconduct should be civilians who are not responsible to the police depart- ment. Another view is that the police be responsible for the investigation. As far as can be determined all depart- ments provided the investigators for the original investi- gation of complaints. The caliber of work done varies in Objectivity from organization to organization, with some of it completely inadequate and some excellent. This is 204 primarily dependent upon the attitudes of the supervisors and the investigators. There is little evidence to support the conclusion that a group of investigators external to the police department would perform the job any more objectively. However, there is considerable evidence that indicates that most organizations need to improve the supervision of in- vestigators to ensure that the complaints will be handled more adequately. Throughout this study the seriousness of Civilian complaints about the police has been stressed because of their effect upon the contemporary community relations situ- ation. Since this is one of the pressing problems, in fact probably the most pressing in some larger cities, it must re- ceive special handling from the administrator. If, while members of certain segments of the community are strongly attesting to the fact that they do not trust the available organizational machinery for controlling police personnel, the administration continues to insist on maintaining the status_guo for complaint machinery, serious trouble may be in store for the organization. Yet this appears to be ex- actly what is happening in a number of police organizations. With the existing minority group distrust, disrespect, and lack of confidence in the police, and with the most common criticism of the police being their failure to properly in- vestigate and discipline their own, police administrators 205 who continue to insist that the familiar traditional way is the ultimate are only contributing to increased friction and tension and to deteriorating community relations. Adjudication Inadequacies. The previously presented material reveals a widespread distrust of the internal police trial procedures by the major minority groups around the country. This lack of confidence is present primarily in communities composed of Negroes, Latin Americans, migrants from rural and foreign areas, and lower economic groups of the country. The police must, therefore, make a special ef— fort to design the trial procedure to ensure a system that will eliminate any cause for a lack of confidence on the part of these groups. One of the most common weaknesses discovered in this phase of the process is the power of the departmental trial unit to arbitrarily deny a complaining citizen the right to a hearing without providing any justification or reason why this is being denied. In most instances where the citizen is afforded the opportunity to present his complaint and supporting evidence to a departmental trial board, he is required to provide his own counsel at his own expense or, as an alternative, attempt to present the case himself. He is often restricted by the right of the hearing board to decide what witnesses they wish to hear, and in some departments, the boards can Choose 206 to hold a trial without allowing the person claiming to have been offended to testify. The influences of such practices on the complainant's conception of the system are apparent. It is not surprising that one citizen asked, "How in the heck can I get a fair hearing when I can't even explain what happened to the board?” Many departments make a practice of holding secret trials. Although there are rationalizations for such practices, the public is left to speculate on what the facts were and why the decision was reached. While rumors multiply and conflict develops, the department can only insist that their findings were fair and the community should trust them. The complainant is afforded the advantageous position of presenting his concept of what was proven, and the public tends to accept this one-sided explanation because they be- lieve that otherwise the police would have no reason for keeping the facts secret. The departmental trial in one organization was very inadequate. It lacked subpoena powers, and appeared to be utilized only as a last resort to quiet a complainant. The Personnel Bureau Commander could not recall any officer above a sergeant being tried by the Board, and the one sergeant tried within the past five years was accused of mis— conduct while off duty. 207 The records of one officer reviewed indicated that he had been promoted to sergeant recently. His file also contains the following accumulated over an eight year span: Commendations: 6 — for services he provided the public (letters primarily). 4 - for excellent arrests. Complaints: 2 — violations of departmental rules and a law. 1 — use of undue force. 4 - allegations of discourtesy. 2 - failure to pay bills. Boards of Inquiry: 2 - both from above complaints. No disposition re— corded in the file. One of the things that makes this unusual is that the odds for an officer ever appearing before a Board of Inquiry are tremendous since only approximately five are held each year and since there are over 600 officers on the department, yet this officer appeared twice without it affecting his Chance for promotion. Additionally it is amazing that no record of the dispositions of the cases was in his file. It appears that providing fair and impartial hear- ings are not in and of themselves sufficient either. In some places the machinery is quite adequate, but the compli— cated procedures and time—consuming red tape is as real a barrier to complainants as would be the total absence of a system. There are several reasons for this: (1) The 208 organizational arrangements are complex, both geographically, and in some cases, structurally; (2) information about the system may be denied the general public; (3) there may be excessive procedural complexities; and/or (4) there may be a lack of supervision in the system. Any of these factors may be sufficient to discourage a complainant and convince him that the organization really does not wish to give him a realistic, impartial hearing. Appeal. It appears that a substantial minority of the police departments have formal arrangements that permit a dissatisfied complainant to appeal to a higher administra— tive authority such as a police board or a representative of the chief executive of the jurisdiction. By and large these appeal agencies do not attend to this role, and complainants are for all practical purposes deprived of any administrative appeals and have only legal recourse in the courts. On the other hand, accused police officers almost inevitably could appeal a departmental decision to another administrative agency such as a civil service commission or police board. Statutary limitations dictated that the offi- cer’s appeal would receive attention within a certain period of time and in a certain manner. There seems to be a need for more equality in the administration of appeals by citizens and police officers. 209 II. VALIDITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS Based upon the data it appears that contrary to the hypothesis most police departments fail to process complaints in a manner sufficient to ensure citizens that police will observe the rule of law, to guarantee that both citizens and police officers receive just treatment, and to assure Citi— zens that employees who seriously abuse their authority will be removed from the police agencies. Therefore, the author must conclude that the internal processing of complaints against the police is generally inadequate in the United States of America. The inadequacy does not stem from serious weaknesses in the model machinery (see Chapter II), but it is caused by: (l) A complete absence of complaint machinery in a sub- stantial percentage of the police departments; (2) a failure to strictly adhere to the model in other departments; (3) human weaknesses and inadequacies in the personnel who are a part of, and responsible for, the machinery; and/or (4) minor weaknesses in the model machinery. To improve the internal processing of complaints, action must be initiated to: (1) correct the minor weak— nesses in the model; (2) formulate a tool for determining if the machinery is accomplishing its objectives (this would reveal human weaknesses that need correcting); and (3) imple- ment the model and make its existance public. While 210 implementation of the model is a problem beyond the scope of this study and therefore will not be discussed, the follow- ing sections will recommend a revised model and an appropri- ate tool for evaluating the adequacy of complaint processing in a particular department. I I I . REVISED MODEL This model is a modification of the original that was presented in Chapter II. Its Changes are intended to: (l) strengthen the administrator's control over his sub— ordinates; (2) improve the efficiency of the system; and (3) eliminate excessive red tape and suspicion provoking procedures. These recommendations are based upon the con— tention that the police administrator, not the public, must initiate the first steps if public confidence and respect for the department is to be improved. Supervision. The everyday task of supervising in the police field includes attending to the many minor in— fractions and mistakes committed by subordinates. These are often noticed by, or called to the attention of, the vio- lator's immediate supervisor, and in most instances they can be handled by this supervisor or through the Chain of com- mand. Such supervisory authority is vital to any police organization. Supervisors should and must have sufficient authority to correct minor transgressions and require 211 obedience to their commands. However, they must be held strictly accountable for the use of their authority and their responsibility. Many departments do not have regulations that define the supervisors' roles and provide them with sufficient knowledge about their duties. In these organizations the supervisor must arbitrarily determine the limits to his disciplinary power in each case and it is practically im- possible to determine his precise authority. This means that holding him responsible for not exercising it is equal— ly difficult. To improve the disciplinary machinery directives must be initiated which spell out the supervisors' responsi— bility and authority in a precise and well defined manner. The limitations that are placed upon a supervisor's power will be influenced by such factors as the size and organi- zation of the department, the size and composition of the community, the amount of confidence the administrator has in his supervisors, the time and manpower the administrator can devote to disciplinary activities, the importance placed on particular categories of complaintsl--particularly in regard to the community's opinions about which is most important—— and the possible repercussions that might result from inap— propriate action by a supervisor. The types of violations 1See Chapter V, I'The Complaint Problem," p. 124. 212 that should ordinarily be the responsibility of first line supervisors are: Minor rule violations that affect the organization to a greater extent than they affect members of the public, e.g., out of uniform, unshined shoes, failure to report on time, neglect of minor duties, improper initiation of reports, etc. These are violations that can best be handled at the time of detection by counseling or an oral reprimmand, provided that the violation is not the type that will cause serious community repercussions. In those areas where strong community feelings exist, the administrator should give serious consideration to requiring at least an immediate review by another authority. The'administrator should remember that conditions may develop which create a need for a different method of handling incidents that are ordinarily minor, and in some instances, the power to discipline should be taken from the immediate supervisor. The implication here is that there should be a constant analysis of the disciplinary procedure to detect weaknesses. Rule and law violations that are of a more serious nature should be subjected to investigation and evaluation by officials further up the hierarchy and/or outside the normal channels of supervision. Even in these instances, though, the immediate supervisor has a role to play. If he is aware of the violation he should be responsible for 213 requesting that action of a more serious nature be initiated by the unit commander, in some instances, and by a trial board or the chief administrator in other more serious cases. In addition to the methods available to the immediate super— visor, the unit commander should have the authority to punish by written reprimand, ordering retraining, and/or ac— cepting the voluntary surrender of time off. The Chief of police should have the ultimate authori- ty in disciplining subordinates to the extent of terminating an officer's service, however his powers should not be with- out limitations. There should be: (1) regulations requiring him to have the support of the administrative head of the jurisdiction before applying a severe sanction, and (2) a Civil service or external administrative board that will ac- cept appeals made by disciplined subordinates. However, such boards should have only the power to review the chief's action and publicize their findings, and they should not have the power to overrule his action. In some instances the board should have the authority to initiate investi- gations of the department's disciplinary machinery and action and publicize their findings. This should be sufficient to control capricious action by the chief. Regulations should make it crystal clear that all members of the organization can and are expected to call all improper conduct by other departmental employees to the 214 attention of their immediate supervisor, their unit com- mander, the chief or the internal investigation unit. These regulations should make it mandatory for all members of the department to report all violations of rules and regulations to an appropriate person or unit regardless of whether the officer personally observed the violation or only had it called to his attention by word of mouth. In all cases where a report of misconduct is made to an officer by a Citizen, the officer should be held responsible for forward- ing such report to the appropriate location regardless of his personal suspicions as to its seriousness or validity. Departmental rules must prohibit officers from attempting to discourage any person from making a complaint and these must be strictly enforced. An unnecessary delay in comply- ing with any of these regulations including the transmission of a complaint should be grounds for severe discipline. While these suggestions only modify the same area of the model system of Chapter II slightly, they are neverthe- less important to improving the adequacy of the original model. Inspectional Services. The Chief should establish a method for constant inspection and investigation aside from the chain of command to ensure himself that the members of the organization are functioning in compliance with the ex- pectations. While this was not mentioned in the original 215 model, it is apparent that it is a necessary part of any internal system for processing citizen complaints. The most logical method for commanding this unit is requiring its supervisor to report directly to the chief. This ensures that the chief can be constantly in touch with the discipline level of his organization. In most depart- ments this role will require a small specialized unit, in others one person can be assigned this responsibility, and in small organizations the Chief may personally perform the functions. In a department of over 100 employees, this role will require bureau status. It should be made up of di- visions for internal inspections, investigations, and trial activities (see Chart 7). The Chief should be able to de— pend upon it to keep him informed concerning tOtal discipline in the department. From the standpoint of complaint process- ing, probably the most important of the three divisions of this bureau is the internal investigation division. Internal Investigations. Organizationally this activity should be the responsibility of a division that is established along lines similar to the original model, how— ever modifications are necessary to provide the chief with increased control and further ensure that the administration of complaints is adequate. 216 h BMflEU onaomm onaomm onsomw onaomm ZOHaomm mamoo>n< ona mommmmmm momoomm MMwmwmw zmwwmmm momoomm oz<. qmazms nommmzH nzm 3mH>mm azHHo onmH>Ho onmH>Ho ZOHBflOHBmm>ZH mZOHfiummmZH QMflom AdzmmBzH madam AdeE ommmom mmoH>mmm AfiZOHBUWQmZH 1.1.1. onmmszOO — maHmo*. 1* mn¢mmm4 NKMZHm04E BZHflHmSOU amnzmzzcomm Emmmu ZOHBQNHZNGMO 217 All departments should have Clear, positive pro- visions for recording complaints and handling complaint in- vestigations. Material explaining these procedures should be readily available to members of the department as well as the public. As previously discussed, in small departments the Chief may establish formal procedures in which he indi- cates that he will be solely responsible for recording and investigating all complaints, or he may designate one rank— ing officer to perform these duties. Even so, the system should be formally spelled out in simple terms for anyone who wishes the information. In larger departments the Chief should maintain Close relations with the Division, and he should be able to communicate directly with its members whenever this is im— portant. If possible, the Chief should take part in the se— lection of staff members and they should be selected on the basis of their investigative competency and impartiality. The rank of this Division's commander should be sufficient to afford him equal footing with other senior commanders, thereby emphasizing the importance of the unit's work. Naturally he should have access to the chief and should con- sider himself and his unit to be the organizational eyes and ears of the chief. The duties of the Internal Investigation Division include: (1) Recording and investigating complaints 218 originating either internally or externally that cannot be handled by line supervisors due to the seriousness of the alleged conduct or some other reason; (2) initiating activity to prevent and detect misbehavior by employees of the organi— zation; (3) assisting in the prosecution of employees before departmental trials and criminal courts; and (4) reviewing cases of supervisory disciplinary action throughout the organization, as well as researching problems related to discipline, and reporting its finding periodically to the Chief. It should investigate all complaints concerning em— ployees received from any source without concern for whether the complainant reveals his identity or wishes to remain anonymous. Before any complaint is assigned to an investigator for investigation, a time limit should be assigned by the Records Section. If the investigator has not completed the case within this established limit, he should be required to initiate a report concerning his progress and either show justification for an extension or be required to return the case for reassignment or filing. This is to prevent unneces— sary delays in the investigation of complaints. Additionally, 2Since special problems exist in this area, the In- ternal Investigation Section Commander should have the authority to determine when not to investigate and when to terminate an investigation of an anonymous complaint. How— ever, a report containing reasons for these actions should be filed with the case reports. 219 the investigator should submit daily reports on his progress, and at the end of the investigation he should prepare a com— plete summary of the investigation and his findings. Pro- cedures should ensure that the complainant will be occasion— ally advised and consulted about the progress of the investigation. Rules should be written to ensure that a record of the complaints received will be entered in chronological order in a bound record book with non-removable pages spe- cifically designed for this purpose. This will prevent any revising of an entire page to remove a particular case. As with the original model the following information should be recorded about each complaint to facilitate control: (1) Name and address of complaining person; (2) the date and time the complaint was made; (3) the nature of the complaint; (4) how the complaint was received, i.e., in person, relayed by second party, telephone, etc.; (5) the location, data, and time of the alleged incident; (6) identification of persons accused; and (7) the case number assigned to the complaint. The Records Sections should also have the responsi— bility of maintaining security on all complaints and related reports. Each complaint should have a file containing all reports, statements, and related material concerning it. These records should be retained for a minimum of fifty years, either as original or on microfilm. 220 The Review and Research Section should use these records as source material for improving the organization's discipline. It should keep a constant Check on complaints to determine where the problem areas are, and initiate re— ports to the chief that will enable him to make evaluations concerning training and administrative actions. In some instances the Review and Research Section will find it beneficial to conduct attitude surveys, both within and outside the police department, to determine the weaknesses in the discipline. Therefore, among its personnel should be people knowledgeable in research methodology. The Review and Research Section is also responsible for one other function, Checking the appropriateness of minor disciplinary actions that have been initiated by supervisors and commanders and reporting its findings to the chief. This does not mean that it should second—guess supervisors, rather it should keep the chief informed concerning the uni- formity of supervisor administered discipline throughout the organization. Its reports can be used by the chief to de— tect gross neglect on the part of supervisors. Ordinarily they should be employed only as an administrative tool to indicate the need for Change and/or training. For the Section to carry out this responsibility, supervisors must be required to forward a listing of all disciplinary action taken each day to it. These lists 221 should contain only the name of the officer disciplined, a one or two word description of the rule violated or improper act committed and the action taken; e.g., verbal correction, oral reprimand, written reprimand, etc. From this list, the unit should select several incidents by regular random sampling, and these should be investigated to determine pre— cisely what was involved in each. The cases will be written into a report that should be sent to the Chief as each in- vestigation is completed. By reviewing these investigation reports periodically, the Chief administrator can be sure that the supervisors are carrying out their function, or if they are not, he can determine where weaknesses exist. The next function of this Division has little to do with the usual type complaint investigation. It is an in- telligence activity performed by the Investigation Section, which involves placing investigators in positions where they will be able to detect and/or observe misconduct on the part of other officers. Information so obtained may be used both to prosecute, in serious instances, and as an indicator of organizational weaknesses and training needs. This role man— dates that investigators be placed in situations where they can obtain information about alleged improper police conduct, as well as determine the validity of complaints initiated, to ensure appropriate discipline. 222 The records kept on this intelligence activity differ to some extent from those kept when the investigation is based upon a normal complaint. Therefore, for recording the everyday activities of investigatiors doing this work, there should be an activity report that contains a summary of how each man spent his working time. However, when an officer finds evidence of misconduct on the part of some po- lice employee, he then becomes a complainant and the com- plaint is recorded in the same manner as serious supervisory and citizen complaints. The incident should be assigned a case number and a case file should be developed and housed with other complaint cases. The Department Advocate Section of this Division as— sists in the prosecution of alleged misconduct before a de- partmental trial board. When an investigator completes an investigation by establishing at least a preponderance of evidence for the innocence or guilt of the accused, he drafts a summary and sends this along with the rest of the investi- gation report to the commander of the investigation unit. This summary should contain recommendations and conclusions concerning the future disposition of the case. If the pre- ponderance of evidence points to guilt, the commander should formally endorse the Charges made by the complainant and pre- sent them to the department's trial board. Additionally, incidents that are also violations of criminal law should be 223 forwarded to the criminal prosecuting official of the juris- diction for criminal Charges. If it appears that the evidence does not support the allegations, the investigator has several alternatives from which to choose--although such a choice should be made only after consulting with his supervisor and the Departmental Advocate Section. He can: (1) notify the complainant-- personally or through the accused's supervisor—-of the insuf- ficient evidence; (2) request additional time to continue the investigation; (3) recommend that another investigator be assigned to continue the case; and/or (4) recommend that the complainant be prosecuted for making a false and mali— cious complaint.3 Should he decide to inform the complainant that the evidence is insufficient, he can contact the accusor in person or through the supervisor of the accused officer. Re- gardless a report should be sent to the accused officer at the same time. In such cases the complainant should be in- formed orally and in writing that he is not required to drop the complaint (see Chart 8). If he so chooses he should have an opportunity to pursue the prosecution of the case be— fore an administrative board on his own. This means either 3This does not mean that a special effort be made to prosecute a complainant. Prosecution of a complainant is a serious matter because of its influence upon public confi- dence. A prosecution of this type Which results in a not guilty verdict may result in Charges of harassment that will damage the department's reputation. 222%4 m sm<:o E1 O m H > onao< n24 m r onwHoao _ m Hmong _ m 1 a m .11.- H 7owwo< onao< no m. l. . was...“ EEO m>ommza .m u m H w m onmmm .m a a w omozsomz: H.4111- a oszmmoomm mom w m m z “onmHomo o aHzHa mzHa 9mm .w m T11 w ¢ H 41. 11 4 H z.-- 0 a A mqumHomHo s fimoxoomm a m a c .1. E 2 mo q<>ommm< o omoomm .m a z o m zopaumm aaomq w mmmzpp .m m m o o mw4o m m quo Ema Ease z n o m > h m f [IA 1111 _ m H m mmonmo z 11 z . muz¢mo ammzsoo s o 411 mo 44mmHzmHo .H H 1 azHmm A492m2 %. mom 4. 1am¢mmo mqumHomHo onmH>Ho H mnzmzzoomm omaom anms onwmomo m qammm< o onmmszoo l 1111111111 mq¢mmm< mZOHmHqu EHAmDm BZHSQZOU < OZmemUONE mom mmDQmUOmm QHQZMEZOUmm 225 the Trial Board Division or an Appeals Commission should be required to provide him with such an opportunity. The philosophy of the personnel making up the In- ternal Investigation Division should emphasize that their only concern is with obtaining true facts and making just de— cisions concerning complaints. They should have no interest in finding anyone innocent or guilty. Their judgments should be reserved until the investigation is complete, and only after becoming convinced that all evidence is in should a conclusion be made. It should not be necessary to point out that during the course of the investigation the investigating officers should avoid unnecessarily inconveniencing any of the parties involved. Contacts should be made at the time and place most convenient to the person being contacted. When it is possible, accused employees should be contacted While they are on duty. On the other hand, care should be taken to avoid contacting a complainant at his place of work. In— vestigators should be restricted from conducting themselves in any way that will unnecessarily discourage or harass a complainant. It should be recognized that the complainant is doing the department a favor by telling them of an officer who may not be worthy of trust. Trial Board. Trial boards are useful to the Chief, but the decision to establish one should rest solely with 226 him. He should keep in mind that if such a board is not es- tablished he will normally have the responsibility for de- termining appropriate action in all serious cases of al- leged police misconduct. In fact, one of the most important advantages of the board in large cities is the burden it re- moves from the Chief because at the close of a hearing he has only to read the transcript and the recommendations and decide if he agrees that the disciplinary action recommended is appropriate. It is also wise to establish a trial unit because the collective judgment of several men is generally sounder and more acceptable to a civil service commission or a court should the action be appealed. In establishing or redesigning machinery for depart— mental trials, pains should be taken to free the system of structural defects that would cause members of the public to regard it as unfair. Even though little can be done that will cause all the peOple of the community to believe that the members of the board will be fair and impartial, by in— corporating the following features into the system, the weak- nesses in the machinery itself will be reduced facilitating Citizen confidence and respect: 1. The board should be an extension of the office of the Chief of the police department, and its function should be to decide upon the fairest and best action :fiizéew of the evidence and recommend this to the 2. It should be composed of members appointed by the Chief, with no member having a rank of less than the 227 person being tried. However, the accused employee should have the right to demand an officer of his own rank be placed on the board, and this demand should be respected. 3. The board should not have the power to refuse to hear a complaint made by a citizen against an offi- cer, although it does have the power to refer a com- plaint to the Internal Investigation Division in an effort to obtain additional information about the situation. When a case is referred in this manner, it should not be a stalling action, and to prevent this a time limit should be enforced. 4. Any citizen or police employee who complains of mis- conduct on the part of a police employee, should be assured of support in prosecuting the complaint if the Investigation Section finds sufficient evidence to support the complainant. 5. On the opposite side, no police employee should have to face the board without counsel, and if the request is made, the board should have the power to assign legal assistance to a defendant. 6. The board and both parties involved should have the right to subpoena witnesses. The board should not have the power to refuse to hear a witness that one of the parties feels is important unless it can sup— port this with specific justification. 7. All hearings should be open to the general public. Only the chief of police should have the authority to orderaiclosed hearing and on such occasions ade— quate explanation should be given in a public statement. 8. The trial and departmental rules and procedures should be printed and available to anyone who wishes copies. They should include a listing of the rights and duties of both parties. 9. No case should be heard without a complainant. If the person who initiated the complaint is unknown, 4Departmental rules should be available to the public for if a Citizen claims that an officer violated a rule, he should be able to determine if there is in fact such a rule. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 228 someone must endorse the complaint before it is heard. An accused officer should be entitled to a copy of the accusations against him prior to the trial. Therefore, there should be an arraignment of sorts prior to the trial process. At this arraignment the accused should receive a copy of the charges and be advised of his rights and the maximum penalty for the offense. Both parties should be given an opportunity to call, examine and cross—examine witnesses. A preponderance of evidence,_ngt proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in accordance with the definition used in Civil actions should be sufficient to sup- port a conviction. The decision of the board should be only advisory to and not binding upon the chief. The final decision on the appropriate action rests entirely with him. The complainant and the accused should both be al- lowed an appeal to an agency outside the organization if they are not satisfied with the Trial Board ruling. However, agencies for hearing appeals should not have the power to overrule the decision of the chief administrator, but they should be empowered to publicize all findings. All parties involved are entitled to free transcripts of the proceedings; and the records of the investi— gation case details, and recommendations that are" forwarded to the Chief should also be available to the parties and in most cases the public. The objective of improved confidence in the disci— plinary machinery will be improved by insisting that all hearings be open to the public and encouraging the public to attend. Decisions made in secret hearings or based upon confidential reports are likely to be suspected by the public and must be avoided. When facts are not presented in the 229 open, rumors will fill the void, and such rumors, generally, will not place the police in a favorable light. All hearings should be transcribed in their entirety and the proceedings published. This will benefit the de- partment by providing the community with an actual account of what transpired. Additionally, the cases may have con— siderable value for future training and educational programs. Conclusion. Police administrators can win the confi- dence of all segments of the community and build a good com— munity relationship, only by improving their internal ad- ministrative control of the department through the implemen— tation of certain proven techniques and machinery. There- fore they should: (1) Improve and firm up supervision for more positive control in achieving equal protection for all members of the community; (2) implement and/or strengthen the Inspectional Service Bureau; (3) encourage all Citizen complaints and investigate them fairly and properly; (4) es— tablish and/or improve both the departmental trial process and the public distribution of information related to it; and (5) support administrative action or legislation to es— tablish an appeal system for complainants and officers who are not satisfied with the administration of their cases. 230 IV. EVALUATING ESTABLISHED MACHINERY The model presented in the preceeding section is designed to fill the needs of typical police departments. Nevertheless, police departments with a different arrange- ment for complaint processing may also have an adequate sys— tem. The social, economic, and demographic characteristics of communities vary and thus may require differences in the procedures and structures that can be utilized. The size of the community and the department, the type and kind of person- nel on the department, and the budget of the department is different than in other jurisdictions; and these factors may make differences in complaint systems acceptable or even ap— propriate. Finally, historical and legal conditions differ from area to area and may mandate variations in the complaint machinery that can be used. Therefore, it is not incon— ceivable that adequate complaint processing is possible even when the department's machinery does not precisely correspond with the model. Conversely, strict adhearance to the model will not automatically guarantee adequacy in complaint processing. Rather than immediately adopt the model, an admini- strator should evaluate the adequacy of the present machinery in his department. It may well be that the present machinery is satisfactory or that simple modifications may improve the effectiveness of the machinery without extensive and costly 231 revisions in the entire organization. In order to initiate such an evaluation, an administrator needs a tool which will provide objective, reliable information and yet be inex- pensive and simple to use. A simple questionnaire that would be distributed to a random sampling of all citizens in the area serviced by 5 With this the the police department, might be such a tool. police could obtain representative opinions from the com- munity, including police officers, which would be useful as an indication of the adequacy of complaint processing. If the questionnaire is properly designed, it could also indi- cate some of the precise weaknesses in the existing machinery. The following questions should be included to obtain a minimal amount of information that would be necessary for such evaluations: 1. Is there policy or law requiring that all com- plaints reported be recorded at a central point to insure proper control and future retrieval? 2. IS there policy or law that prohibits all em— ployees from attempting to discourage anyone from making acomplaint? 3. Does the department make deliberate attempts to cause complainants a minimum of inconvenienCe and embarrassment? 5Larger departments may find it beneficial to divide their jurisdiction into communities since the attitudes in different areas might vary. With the jurisdiction divided into communities, there would be less likelihood that the overall results would conceal pertinent information related to individual areas. 232 4. Is the machinery for hearing and processing com— plaints adequate, in the sense of fair, im— partial, objective, etc.? 5. Is the machinery adequately publicized and in- terpreted so that all citizens know of it and can get further assistance if they need it? 6. Are all complaints adequately investigated? 7. Are reports made to the complainant so that he is kept aware of developments from the time he initiates the complaint until it is disposed of? 8. Does the department have a reputation for in— tegrity with the entire community? (Do all members of the community consider it their community?) 9. Is there an avenue for a formal appeal of de- partment decisions regarding a complaint? Using only the above questions it should be possible for an administrator to determine the attitudes of people in his community concerning the department's processing of complaints. Relatively speaking, the higher proportion of positive responses, the more adequate the complaint pro— cessing. Inversely, the greater the negative responses, the greater the probability of the system being inadequate. Tabulation of responses to particular questions should be useful in determining the weak points in the disciplinary machinery. Should the questionnaire indicate that citizens be- lieve the machinery to be structurally unsound, when in fact it is not, the department will have to deal seriously with educating the public to reality. If, on the other hand, the 233 department does not have fairly sound machinery and the public is aware of this situation, the only answer is to reorganize. The questions that are suggested above are certainly not exhaustive of all the would be useful on such a question- naire, instead they serve only to illustrate the type of information that would be important in evaluating existing complaint machinery. Individual departments should include other questions that will improve the instrument and increase its value to them. As crude and simple as this tool might seem, it is an improvement upon the past method of evaluating the adequacy of complaint processing by relying almost en— tirely upon common sense and strictly uniform, standard organizational arrangements. V. REVISION OF HYPOTHESIS AND RECOM- MENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH In light of this study, the original hypothesis must be revised. In order to increase its validity, it should be modified to read: After using the recommended Evaluation Tool and subsequently implementing necessary.features from the Recommended Complaint Machinery, a police de— partment will have internal complaint machinery that is adequate to ensure Citizens that police will not violate the law, to guarantee both the ac- cused and accusor justice, and to rid the depart— ment of individuals who seriously abuse their authority. 234 However, after stating this it is again necessary to call attention to the fact that this conclusion is based upon information in this study drawn from empirical observations, purposive sampled opinions and material, and in some in- stances arbitrary judgments. Therefore, this conclusion is, at best, a clarification of the problem that will facilitate further testing. One approach to further validation of it is by con— trolled experiment. This might be done by selecting several cities and administering the Evaluation Tool to a randomly selected sample of the population in each. Then some cities should be sampled from the group and used as the experi— mental Cities. The remainder would, naturally, serve as the control cities. In the experimental cities those features of the Recommended Complaint Machinery that the Evaluation Tool indi- cated were needed should be implemented and used in the manner suggested earlier in this Chapter. No changes should be made in the control Cities' complaint processing. After this situation exists for a period of time, another evalu- ation should be done to determine any changes that have oc- curred, and, if possible, the affect of the machinery. In addition to the possibilities for controlled ex— perimentation such as just suggested, this study points out the dire need for research in the area of supervision and 235 discipline. This might be designed to determine how super- visors and subordinates view their disciplinary relationship and how this effects the adequacy of the complaint machinery. Or a design might be developed to determine and rank spe— cific supervisory weaknesses that might cause otherwise ade- quate complaint machinery to be ineffective. Still a third feasible endeavor related to supervision, might involve re— search to determine the effect of supervisory training and education upon the adequacy of the organization's complaint processing and discipline. Another area which this study suggests might be fertile for research would involve determining the social and psychological factors that influence police conduct that re- sults in complaints. For example, one might ask if the den- sity of the population influences an officer's behavior to- ward citizens, or if salary has any effect upon an officer's conduct. On the other hand, it would be valuable to know if the use of psychological testing could eliminate some of the severe disciplinary problems for police departments. Finally, the survey suggests that there is a need for more research to develop appropriate administrative tools to be used, in controlling the people who perform the police functions. There is a critical need for equipment to evalu— ate the performance of these persons and the organization. Therefore, a study might be undertaken to redesign and 236 modify the Evaluation Tool and make it more useful or de- velop other similar tools. These possibilities are only a few of the many that were pointed out by the study. Therefore, it should be obvious that this study can serve only as a beginning and not an end. There is much more planning, implementation, and evaluation that needs to be completed before absolute statements can be made-—if, indeed, absolute statements will ever be possible in this area. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. BOOKS Fosdick, Raymond B. American Police Systems. New York: The Century Company, 1920. Fosdick, Raymond B. Criminal Justice_in Cleveland. Cleve— land, Ohio: The Cleveland Foundation, 1922. Fuld, Leonard. Police Administration. New York: Macmillan, 1909. Germann, A. C., Frank D. Day, and Robert J. Gallati. Intro- duction £9 Law Enforcement. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1966. Germann, A. C. Police Personnel Management. Second print- ing. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1963. Gourley and Bristow. Patrol Administration. Chicago, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1965. Graper, Elmer. American Police Administration. New York: Macmillan, 1921. Harrison, Leonard V. Police Administration in Boston. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Lee, Alfred McClung. Race Riot. New York: The Dryden Press, 1947. Leonard, V. A. Police Organization and Management. Second edition. Brooklyn, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1964. McAdoo, William. Guardinq_§ Great City. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1906. ”Municipal Personnel Data," 1966 Municipal Yearbook. Chicago, Illinois: ICMA, 1966. 238 Municipal Police Administration. Chicago, Illinois: Inter- national City Managers' Association. First edition (1939), second edition (1943), third edition (1950), and fourth edition (1954). Selltiz, Claire, gt 21. Research Methods in Social Science. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Revised edition. 1965. Smith, Bruce. The State Police. New York: The National Institute of Public Administration, 1925. Smith, Bruce, Police Systems_in the United States. New York: Harper Brothers, 1949. Stahl, Davis, §t_§1. The Community and Racial Crises. New York: Practising Law Institute, 1966. Tamm, Quinn. The Community and Racial Crises. (Edited by David Stahl, Frederick Sussman, and Neil Bloomfield.) New York: Legal Publishing Company, 1966. Whitaker, Ben. Police. Middlesex, England: Cox and Wyman, Ltd., 1964. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. Second edition. Springfield, Massachusetts: G. and C. Merriam Company, 1956. Wilson, 0. W. Police Administration. Second edition. New York: McGraw—Hill, 1963. Wilson, 0. W. Police Planning. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C.Thomas. Second edition. 1957. Woods, Arthur. The Policeman and the Public. New Haven, Connecticut: Harvard University Press, 1919. B. PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, LEARNED SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS American Civil Liberties Union. Petition for Investigation 2; the Seattle Dgpartment. Seattle, Washington: AFFILIATE, date unknown. Broderick, Vincent L. General Order N9. 28. (Amendment to the N.Y. Police Rules and Procedures, Chapter 21.) September 13, 1965. 239 Bureau of Governmental Research. "San Francisco Police De- partment Survey Report," The City. Vol. XVII, No. 3, July, 1937. California Advisory Committee. Police-Minority Group Re- lations_in the Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area, California. San Francisco: United States Commission on Civil Rights, August, 1963. Charter_gf the City 9f Los Anqgles. Article XIX. Section 202. Chicago Police Department. "Complaint, Disciplinary and Summary Punishment Procedures," General Order_N9. ééfilé. December 30, 1963. "Citizen Complaints," Cincinnati Procedure Manual. January 1, 1965. Colby, walter, gt El. .5 Propgsal_tg Initiate and Implement Police Reform. Los Angeles, California: Americans for Democratic Action, 1966. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission, The. Report 59 Governor John Love _c_>_r_1 Hearings g Excessive Use _c_>_f_ Force by Denver Police. Denver, Colorado: 1964. Committee on Civil Rights. "Civilian Complaints Against the Police Report." Bar Bulletin New York County Lawygrs Association, 22 (5). 1964. 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Chicago Police Department Police Evalu- ation. Washington, D.C.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1964. International Association of Chiefs of Police. Training Key. No. 42. Washington, D.C.: 1966. Law Enforcement: .g report pp ggual protection ;p the South. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government printing office, 1965. by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Law Enforcement Task Force. Report to Mayor-Elect John V. Lindsay. New York: December 13, 1965. MacMillan, George. Racial Violence and Law Enforcement. Atlanta, Georgia: Southern Regional Council, 1964. MacNamara, Donal. .A Survey_gf the Princeton, New Jersgy.gp- lice Department. New York: New York Institute of Criminology, 1959A MacNamara, Donal. New Jersey Police Survey, Trenton: N.J. Law Enforcement Council, 1958. Maines, Hugh R. A Report on Law Enforcement and the Negro Citizen Ln Los Angeles. Los Angeles, California: The Brief Shop, 1963. Manual 9; Los Angeles_§glice Department. 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Cleveland, Ohio: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, April, 1966. ”Police Malpractice and the Watts Riot,"_A Report py Egg American Civil Liberties Union 9; Southern Cali- fornia. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of— fice, October, 1965. Pope, H. G. Public Safety Services in Lower Merion Township, Pennsylvania. Chicago, Illinois: Public Administra- tion Service, 1965. President's Commission on Crime in D.C., Report pp Washing- ton's Metropolitan Police Department. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966. Report_gp Recommendations pp Prgposed Indgpendent Civilian CompLaint Review Board. New York: Young Democratic Club, May 19, 1965. Smith, Bruce. 'A Survey pf the Bureau_g§ Police, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. New York: Institute of Public Ad- ministration, 1937. Smith, Bruce,_gp_a;. The New York Police Survey.' New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1952. Southern Regional Council. Law Enforcement_;p Mississippi.- Atlanta, Georgia: July, 14, 1964. Southern Regional Council. Southern Justice: .Ap Indictment. Atlanta, Georgia: October 18, 1965. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Justice. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Law Enforcement. Washing- ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965. U.S. Criminal Code. "Title 18." Washington, D.C.: Govern— ment Printing Office (Date unknown). 242 Yorty, Samuel William. ”Rules Governing Personnel Complaint Procedures," News Release, Los Angeles: May 12, 1964. Weitzman, David. _A Proposed Revision pf the System for Pro— cessing Citizen Complaints in Q29. Washington, D.C.: Capital City Civil Liberties Union (Mimeographed), June 12, 1964. C. PERIODICALS Beral, Harold and Marcus Sisk. "The Administration of Com— plaints by Civilians Against the Police," Harvard Law Review. 77 (1), January, 1964. Byrd, Richard C. "Police Brutality or Public Brutality," The Police Chief. February, 1966. Coxe, Spencer. "Police Advisory Board: The Philadelphia Story," Connecticut Bar Journal. June, 1961. Davis, Kenneth Culp. "Ombudsman in America," University pf Pennsylvania Law Review. 109 (2). March-April, 1961. Elam, Jerry. "Close Ranks . . . March," Law and Order. 10 (2), February, 1962. Elam, Jerry. "Wake Up," National F2923. Journal. 44 (3). July, 1961. Fulk, Gerhard J. "The Public's Prejudice Against the Police," American Bar Association Journal. 50 (6). 1964. Gourley, G. D. "Recognition and Status for Rank and File Policeman," Journal g; Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science. 40 (1). May-June, 1949. Hoover, J. Edgar. "Police Brutality - How Much Truth, How Much Fiction?" _ya§. News and World Report. September 27, 1965. International Association of Chiefs of Police. "Copsules," The Police Chief. June, 1965. Keller, John E. "A Penetrating Study of Police Review Boards," Law and Order. 13 (10). September 1965. Krefetz, Gerald. "Philadelphia: Policing the Police," The Reporter. 27 (39). July 19, 1962. 243 Moore, NOrman. "Police Review Boards," California Peace Officer. November—December, 1960. “Professionalism and Civil Rights,” The Police Chief. September, 1964. Tamm, Quinn. ”Discipline and Performance Appraisal," The Police Chief. September, 1962. Tamm, Quinn. ”Police Professionalism and Civil Rights," The Police Chief. September, 1964. D. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS Eastman, George D. The Bureau Lf Police Lf the i ty Lf mn,Rochelle, New York. Unpublished survey.C l1957. Friedlander, Marjorie M. The Need for Effective Independent Civilian Review Lf Citizen Complaints Lf Police Mis- conduct. Unpublished speech to City Council, September, 1965. Grant, Melvin James. "Evaluation of the New York City Po— lice Department's Civilian Complaint Review Board in the Field of Civil Rights." Unpublished Master's thesis, The City University of New York, June, 1962. Jones, Thomas. "The Handling of Citizen Complaints Against the Police," Unpublished Master's thesis, School of Police Administration, Michigan State University, 1966. Snook, Russell A. "Police Discipline." Louisville: Southern Police Institute, 1957. (Mimeographed lecture.) Young, Bruce C. "An Evaluation of the Formal Disciplinary Procedures of Three Metropolitan Police Departments with a Recommended Procedure Guide." Unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1963. E. NEWSPAPERS Cincinnati Inquirer. Cincinnati, Ohio: September 10, 1966. New York Times. New York: February 17, 1953. March 3, 1953 and March 5, 1953. 244 New York WOrld-Telegram. New York: February 16, 1953 and February 17, 1953. Wall Street Journal. New York: November 28, 1960. Dayton Daily News. Dayton, Ohio: June 28, 1961. Cleveland Plain Dealer. Cleveland, Ohio: August 19, 1966. "ITllfilfll'fllllfllfllllflllITS