SYRATEGEC SHQRTAGES it! THE NAZ! WAR ECGROMY Thesis f0? the Degree of M. A. MECHIQAN STATE {ENE‘JERSITY JAMES WOOD DIAMORD 19288 i l 1 Y R A R B I L Michigan State University SmiATEGIC SJORTAGES IN TfiE NAZI MAR ECONOHY 83' James Wood Diamond A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of EVIASTFJR OF ARTS Department of History 6%9432 3,:u'63 .\ . , r‘ ‘ ‘ .‘ . .‘. I...‘\4~I!..J~._Jl-‘A/~J‘ -_.‘ - I am grateful to Lrofessor fiorman Rica, my thesis director, an; I'“ .- . ‘ . ‘r -" \ "vv\‘ ', C‘ ". ,"1'. ' ‘ r 1 ~- ‘ D “'\ VH‘ ‘ ‘ -’ ' h ‘ l ' 1 to tno otaor ne.oe:o of My C3Mmltt63 Arolessn“ laul otrasaaarn a1o O .L‘ =ssor Jonald Lamaers lor uael? guidance, aid, and encour'33ment. t") L21 IL'ISKZJQNHJ I3D‘3E1':SSV“T5 I O O O O O O O 0 I O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O I O O O I O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O I O 0 Dj- Chapter I O D] .r iiODUC‘I‘ IOi‘] I O O O O O O C O O D O O O O I I O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O I I O O O O O I O 4; The Concept of the Strategic Shortage The Literature on Nazi Strategic Shortages The Course of the Nazi war Economy II. I‘R.O.J 0313.coo-coococo-cocoooooOOO'O‘0.0000000000000000...c.0007 Introduction The Evasion of the Strategic Shortage in Iron Ore The Norwegian Campaign Sequel——The Later Problems of the German Iron and Steel Industry Conclusions IIIOOEOOOOOOOOOOOOO.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO...-0001?} Introduction German Efforts to Evade the Strategic Shortage in Oil The Allied Bombing Offensive Conclusions IV. MANPOWER.....................................................34 Introduction The Evasion of the Strategic Shortage in Labor by Expansion of the Labor Fo ce The Evasion of the Strategic Shortage in Labor by Reallocation Conclusicns r11 \V‘r"! 7""); "'-. V0 $LJJE\;-IQLRJeriC/L\go.oooooooooococoooooooooooo00.000.00.-oooooo-oo/l Introduction The Elitzkrieg_Years The Post—Blitzkrieg Years Conclusions BI ELICC'IGXL IV ’ “La-00.090000000000000000.0000...000.000.00.0000000000000000*4; " VT“ .“\_",';.1 - iu.ioJosTit. The Cencc47t of th Strateric Shortage . .., 1 . n a .3 l. \_ '~‘\'_" '- "+ _' fl ‘ '|‘ Tne aim of stratefj 15 Victory at tie lULcou cost yuSSlc-e -ecing ootn powerful and relatively oloodle ss, economic warfare is tnus ..,. ° -_ , ‘ é... ' 1 .,......,.,..I’ . ‘. £3 V61; effective weagon. For tie Jelmans in tne veers gleCculn, tic 1 .Sccond aorld Jar, the most telling demonstration of the effectiveness (Of economic warfare had been the British naval blockade of German; in thorld War I. In addition to its effect upon the course of that war, it Eiad left the Jernans with terrible memories and potent lessons. Knowing 'that economic warfare had poayed a decisive role in their defeat and ‘that t e strate eic shortages upon which it had been based not only sstill existed but were in Cveneral even more serious, the Germans ._ L ‘ . ,. _ i , ° ,.0 ESou at to GaflSS chenscs a aids. GCO‘O 1c ‘3113P3. .2 ‘1 V F. \ N vv'f‘ 4" V 14“. '2 H’ ‘lq 3/" "' T.3 VI tors, .LO, celicveu s.., and lzalneu a Ibeohn. l th {we gueace be e oily maintained and "are IOU cheagly tWIPJU econonic rxeans? British reliance on the Learue and its sanctions, so fateftl 1 L‘ ' _ ,a . . ‘ R- -. .— . - \ - 7- . a - rv "\ -"~ 1 A v '- ~ ‘ ‘ J- I - 113:“ ;fiblSh rearmancnt ege- tee cominx oi mar. amen the war came L0: ’ L (J ’ EXDEDular illusion of victory through economic warfare and a static :fiéont linge ed until tie eve1ts of ha' 1?%O laii it to rest. 3 tre njely enou - , despite the imgcrtance attached to economic :uzixiare Ly'botn the victors and the vanquished cf jor‘d Jar I, the 1“. "N 0 ‘ 1 ‘ - V? v s o q oir gas i1 Liolel Halt, Stratevv, rev. ed. (Jew TOTJI Frederica A-. .Praeg er, Inc. myot), pp. 337-333- 4-: -» ' “.1 ., ‘n -. _ ,. flinch N A", H- _ - I‘Lfi'w. 3”, “1""- (‘7' iltoiatm‘c 01 the Jealo nephew-2n p.18 two was Canoe-.1112. \l- Mall} ..-- ‘-~.-. '1' -r» .L‘. L,. .. H..—'- (v,,...‘-, .‘_ ~ .- .«H m YV ‘ Yr‘ " ,‘ .-'-. - 5.311.111. 'ulCnS U3. v.13 harm Qpl'o.t'3_)lp Slorttiug,‘ . Inl'o w. J. “Lt-1‘ J8;.c':.l lLt‘Ht. . ,1 4 ,_ .I- ,- .. .L - J- ‘ ' ' ' ,.._-' , ' _,,.. .- ,. ‘p 1. . , n_ ‘1. mace an attempt at oefinition—a“ a,pallin; cianpla oi the Hufou S I)! A (U gm n. o a I '.l . ,,. ~ ' '-,. '. ..- r :-H K cts of olfic1al Jargon-without really defininL the tel» at all. As no really good formal definition exists, as Shall define a strate- gic shortage as an insufficient supply of any factor of production I .rweded by a nation to W368 war with maximum effect and efficiency. of i— the many ways of creating or worsening strategic shortages, four were particularly important for Germany: ‘In . w. . “high-IT..- 1 1)the military severance of trad3,e.g. tne blockade 2)the non-military severance of trade, e.f preclusivehuying ). 3)the conquest of sources of supplies, e.g. the loss of Petsamo u)the destruction of sources, e.g. bombing. Similarly five methods of evading strategic shortages were particu— ILarly important for Germany: 1)importation 2)instituting or increasing domestic production 3)stockpiling 4)substitution 5)reduction of requirements. The Literature on Nazi Strategic Shortage During the twelve years of Nazi rule in Germany, an extensive Zquterature arose on Germany's notorious strategic shortages problem. Cherierally the authors, starting from the premise that Hitler sought IVE117, argued that he had no doubt prepared for one ever since he took ‘3. A. Roush, Strateg c $13.1;l Book Company, Inc., 193;), pp. 6.7, 1H. t '- (v- office. Searing in mind the example of Jorld has I, they oelieved tae ensuing war would be lengthy and fought on an immense scale. They assumed hitler was preparing for such a war in a planned, orderly, and methodical way and then went on to prove that even so, because Germany lacked the necessary economic base, she could only lose. Some of these authors, e.g. Sternburg and Lajos,3 used only official German sources in support of their thesis. Since the conclusion of these authors proved to be correct, one might think their writings would be regarded as brilliant and pro- 5 phetic. Instead the discovery by the United States Strategic B mbing 9 Survey that ot until 19fl2 or 19%} had Hitler begun to prepare for a major war, discredited their works. Although far better sources for the study of the German war economy have become available since 1945 than were available to contemporary writers, very little has been written on the subject.The :reporusof the United States Strategic Bombing Survey comprise the host :inportant source in English, but they deal principally with the last goart of the war and the effects of strategic bombing, and seventy—two (If them are still classified. Largely in the basis of this evidence, ‘tteo important works on the German war economy have been written. The first was by burton H. Klein, a civilian economic historian, wh se 3 ' ‘I ‘V I r‘ o o v Fritz Sternourg, From L331 oources:Why Hitler Can't Win, (new ERDzrlvnevcr, continued its opposition and succeeded in forcing the guvern— . . . . 2 _ . 41:3111: to curtail tncse plans for domestic ore production. oven aad 9 .v . '1 -. y.) 4 1 Jl‘lo , pi). , 5 ”5+. IV ‘0 I .mv- .“ m-fi'W-"Z "1 h .. W? inis not incocnoi :nc gar ;;d]j nave been well H1ni3r an] solar: tne ies, not beg1n 1ntil 1Q_3.i, czuld have significantly "ffectec Scrlny's legendence on imported iron ore. inrsover, Jertua, 3n ore incorts fie ause t1e all steal plants, which would still 3e pro iflCl133 two—tnirds of qcruiny's steel, would receive none of tne German ore, all of union was to no reserved from the Gocrinv company's ofin, newly ouilt steel Hills. lne Wartime Situation When tne mar 3e :an, access to all of Gernuny‘s ore—oar sources of iron 0 e, other tian 31w ale n, Norway, and lX3fl‘OJ”‘ was severed. .Due to the re3iltant iron or snor age by tne 3 steel production had fallen twort} p3 cent iron the level 3 A 939. Had the British now succeeded in cutting off oerneny's ingorts .Cron Scandinavia as Gnurcuill, at tqa t time First Lord o? tne Adnir- ClltV was planning, eigntv fiV3 oercent of her renaioinz iioorts in CI" \l \J, H ‘1940 would have been cut off as well.” is a ge31lt1er iron and 3 :industry would have been reduced to operating at less than fifty 4 ;oercent of capacity. Tue German 19 aders corr,ctly decides that tre ssources available to tnem tnrougn normal traie could not nave ba;n 1‘elied upon and tnat no coniina tion of raising home production, ’3 “131;., 11o. Tnis figure grobably understate s ta3 effect or soon -2 xnove. Lucn of tne fiftee: ccrcent of Gernany’s 1?») iron or aiioorts ‘Ccuat cane from non— cm11dinavian sources, Jus douitless )otuin ed after brie: fall of France Jade French and Sgdnisn sources :1 vailable. £913, 116-1117. . fl ' n " V l D, . . . ‘\ .w ' L so)- llin , .1 we a... VL)~ 3-13rea a )L l3,aeterf bJquLoULQ. ‘ , J- .- | - L . .. .222. 15.)~_1~15 fiL 9.1. L2 1.0 J. .L 2 _ - , :N J i L '- .2.) 'V “fulfil '.'\.J7.‘-< "JUL'JV The Norwegian Campaign Germany's iron ore imports from northern Sweden were transported from the Swedish port of Lulea, which was ice‘oound in winter,and of Oxelosund .which was ice free but much less importan‘t.5 When Lulea was icebound most of the ore was shipped by rail to the Norwegian port of Narvik 2.1:} thence down the Norwegian coast to Germany. This route was exposed to action by the Royal Navy which had cut it in World War I and had request ed permission to do so again. On October 3, 1939 Admiral Raeder. the Cormander-in-chief of the German Navy, requested the Naval Staff to study means of gaining naval Qases on the} Iorth Atlantic for a presentation he wished to make to Iiitler-7 On OCtOber 10. 1939, We a. 53,: L in ,1; T :der :qa; J,r an] should seek bases in Iiorway to give her a secure outlet to the E-Iorth o 8 a ' . . .‘ ' . . v . o o Atlantic. 3.1;; :‘,.1el-:.-i;nt 'Lf‘ui and Hitler, while interested. preferred to push plans for the invasion of France. 5T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norwa waL (London: Her Majesty' s Stationery Office, 1952),1 éiJij.) p' 11-16' 7“ mrl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940- 1—1950 (Wanln "6011. D. C. U. 8. Government Printing Office, 19593,”; " d 8Rear—Admiral H. .‘I‘hursfield (ed. ), rassegr’ I‘laval Annual, (Lon- ‘3I1:‘Nilliam Clowes and Sons, Ltd., 1948)— ?uchrn*naval Conference ”1‘ OctooersO,1?39. ‘ .Allied expeditionary force .p‘;._} ;, ,1; j;;;-.; would seize harvik on the way.9 In December Quisling came to Berlin and saw Rosenbelg, Faeder, and Hitler.10 As a result of these discussions a special siaj? g3: sepaalisg,3 ;g gyggf~to plan (1) a peaceful occupation fol- Ilowing a successful revolt by Quisling and (2) an invasion.11 The figggj;¢~‘ in Norwegian waters of the German naval auxiliary \\ 'vessel éltmark by H.M.$L_Cossas§ on February 17, 1940 infuriated Hitler 21nd made the British threat to the iron ore shipping route all the znore apparent. Sending for General von Falha miorst, Hitler told him he fled decided to attack Norway for three reasons: (1) to protect his I3altic coastline from British attack, (2) to gain Atlantic naval bases, ELnd (3) to protect the ore wc:te. He the: ap'Oixted Frlkenhart com— . . 12 raander of tne operation. The attack on Forum; uLC JVLliIL labs: i; ”11 ;16 Cat-n darkness Cf zipril 9, 1940. Oslo, Her en, Tr ondhe i ., Stavanger, and jarvik fell the seams day.13 The Allie: counterattack "T“ ‘Jic-tf.’ in ":zafii_: gar— Krik (Kay 23) which “a: :;:g g;n;fi:n:i .;,;;,J_ :3 heir de fe eat in Ifirance. with the signing of an armistice by Gezeral Rugs, the Norwegian 3,, , ’siemke, :. 10. J». f5 0 . , Ziemxe, r;.7-9. 11 ,. 2,- ,.. . a Brassev' s waval Annual,—p. so~£/. Pnearer naval conference of p . De » “1“ <2ew=.ber 12,1yjj. A g, ‘ I ,' ‘ ‘ .. _ 1 ‘5 - 1 1(_@:§§§jy's naval Annual,;p. 33-54. Fuenrer COflhaMG lor Pall ;LV;;- Ila—g; \ *“WA 0 Zienke, p. 1ou. -10- ,1 1+ r.~- -“ ‘LT ' .‘ ‘- r w v In L 1‘. , ~ D n < ' v- commander, one .1 ~wiai cane to a successiul conclusion on June ;. ov - v or . '1 ‘.. 1 I J.‘ _‘ "_J p 4" A w r: - u ‘\ ‘0 1- .I“ ‘ .. ‘ w uorway has nelu until the end oi the tar and Nita it bfl” .-, '7' a - 4- a . - L 0 ‘. ' . a. \ n .3... L2 1’ bu) r10 1.)") LI] '3 1': CK) 11‘} ‘ J v 3; t1) .11" 3|.) ll‘Jn i .. .1 I I‘ ‘ ‘ c I. A L 4 V a .2 A ' ‘) , 5 4. x A. ‘1 V ' "I "" ~> ‘ A\ 7 011*“- v .Jh . A A _ V- >‘,.__- v, .- , \ n I N ”1112221 .1. 1'. ‘.-»..I. -...~. . Hal, r Sequel -— The Later Problens of the German Iron and Steel Industry The solution of the strategic Shortage in iron ore did not completely insulate the German iron and steel industry from strategic shortages. lVen I 1‘... “w- .:;;r they also overcame their shortages of ferroalloys by substitution, conquest, and the reduction of need, strategic shor ages still limited 1'7 their iron and steel productic . JH?;‘7‘31F“? 11‘1“» a :2s‘:: 7 v" . . 1 . . . . ~( . . - I“ . ‘ . ' r- .' . L; ‘1 Ln .. ~' 1’" 1". V ' ‘ " " ”‘41 ‘~ * ~ an v. c «' ‘ r r - —. ' w - . ‘ . . : “”"U'-1 - - v --, . A .s -Ix-.v' .i. , .I.il ’A'.12‘.~‘=. 1~-‘. y 3.1;. l- ‘.I \ ,. .«. ‘-..i \ -’. s..t.-v.. v.1. " ‘ - ~ , w - . l L ' . t _ , . ‘ 1 " "b ' . " ~‘ “ -“ “ v) J " v- ‘ ‘ ~ ‘ | w » ‘ ‘ - . r. - . - - . - ~ v a .V 'l . . . 4 . ~. , - ‘-. .. . , , 1,.N A_ V \ , -- \s .. F e . ‘ . VII - a I1“ .LI‘.V gar-A. J. A ‘Krd .1 ..~ .!1 _|.5".‘. ._ .1‘—~. '4' 4,. 7“ - ‘-, —,,' Q LL ',‘JL 1 .‘l. . .J a»; 1,1. ; )f‘k‘l- 1--'. .... ~l~~ ‘4'. Conclusions First the German failure to evade the iron ore shortage before the war began indicates that the Nazis did not have complete control over their economy in those years and did not choose to act in their strategic shortages problem with the ruthless decisiveness they were to snow later. ‘ Second the Norwegian campaign was stages in \,A“ h: r;\ German iron ore imports, a clear case of a strategic shortage dcflectini German war strategy. Third the inability of the Germans to utilize their iron azd steel industry to the fullest e~sent was due to concealed strategic shorta es 5:3 "I , r t OV’ C) A U'\4 l , A l .l e ferroallovs Her ., ll‘Ofl ore and in H us "Q",' r)’1’\? T‘f’ V .JLL l 1‘ .L—LI “IL L Introduction Oil was the lifeblood of the a med forces enga5 ed in -;r;; -a: It. Without oil nothing could move-neither aircraft nor ships nor tanks. The more heavily motorized an army was the more helpless it was was with- out oil. It was the proud boast of the Allies that,as General Marshall said, "No [Allied] plane has failed to fly, no ship has failed to sail, 0 AI 1 n a 1 . for lack of Oil.” The nXlS powers could make no suci ooast an: -1.l$ P-‘1-~--,~ :-. 4- 1- , “2-,; , .31. 02,:- m. and a”... ..,; _2 53;.1-3. cause of 112;) ir de feat 1’ 7‘ ' V- 2" N ,A. I 1' V' . .n »J Lasi Germany suffered fron 5reat 5eo5raphic GlSGC»Qnt&D€S n re5ari to oil. In 1941 almost igvaof the world's oil came from three areas: 0) r: (0 the Ne stern Hemisphere (1,'700 million barrels per year), the sauc a and hiddle East (320 million barrels per vear), and the East Indies (60.: million barrels per year). The rest of the world produced a total of only 68 million barrels per year.2 The only major oily reducing area within reach of th Ger ans was he Caucasus and Kidd e hast. Nith the exception of the oil fields around haik¢;' in the caucasus sac never re ched any of the oil fields there. T1 us the only sup plies of natural ‘I h yzbnxnci.available to her were tiose of auroee, the most oil—poor conti- nent of all. The resultant strc te gic shortaje was perhans the res J- . ”(3’1 -" . .l1 r". 7.. ’- portantc er:-an 'eu in world uar Ii. L3 Louis L. Snyder, The war: A Concise Histor:,519°?—l?45, (gcw York: i:<)o , 1964), p. 3980 / -- i V "L . ‘1 ‘ . ' "‘1 - _ . .. . - _-.’ ~ 0 -J n -13. years. The Germans countered with intensive exploitation of all avail" “:5 . D. . 1 . - ‘ +1 . ‘f‘ ."1 . 1' - v .‘ " 1'.,I"i." 1 -r‘ aUle Oil lie 3 and Wlud svntaetic 2reduction froa 30211.no neithel LaS affected 3] tie elecnaae, tie allies so at to eli.i1atc thew a; JO“-115. Fae result was a close stra5ile 1r01*nout tic var rat; Zeraan' “;.VI uore than a few months from disaster. German Effor ts to Evade the Strata i3 3horta;e in Gil The Utilization of Euro ean Oil Fields Germany ’1 uermany had a domestic oil production of 500,000 tons a year when the Nazis assumed office. 13 vtrt of an wpn‘fear Plan they sought to raise this fi5ure through the disc very of new oil fields and increased area uction in known oil fields. So new oil fields were discovered, out production from her existing oil fields was doubled to 1,000,000 tons a year.3 Russia During the period of Nazi— Soviet co— caeration, substantial quanti- ties of oil were imported from the Soviet Union. According to the oili— cial German Statistisches Jahrbuch 1941/1942, oil imports from the Soviet Union, negligible before the war, rose to 620,000 tons in 19 0, and cox.~ I 1 ~ o LL - - prised One-taird of ;errany's Oil imports in that year. In tJS first 1: tons arrived.“ Since one i‘) 0 four months of 1941 an additional 23 ',\:’\ , UV 3Klein, p. 40. 473“ L. P 53 5Raymond J. Sonntag and Janos S. fieddie (eds.), Easi-Soviet fielations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of The dernan Foreign foice, (JEShington, D.C.: U.J. Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 343. A memorandum by the head of Eastern European and Baltic Section of the 30:r~ercial Policy Division o .‘Tth _Gefman Forei n Office. flay 15, 194.. l L, 4-: .‘ :- TY ‘ - ‘l L a. a » \'.‘l. -- :g 5.. r‘.‘ z - -‘_‘ atta3k on the sovi1‘ cnion failcc to Secure Lo.hin5 oil Iielus IA t4: Jaucasus and secured only minor oil fields elsewhere in the U.o.:.;., oil inserts “rem the Soviet Lnion virtually cease d ust wrien tile .tt' CJ u on her greatly increased cons1 itum The Rumaniancfil field at Ploesti was the oldest and most import in Europe. ts oil was vital to Germany. mi vin: a much weake military position in the ilkans than Germany and yet own'n: and running the re— fineries at Ploesti, the Allies planned to reduce the flow of oil to Ger- many gnr urclaci:e buying and covert delaying. In the first quarter of -ii ‘ 1 1940 these measures combined with ice on the Danube cut German imports 4 4- a. -. - a. . -. - . . . to a more 50,000 tons. : gs, ,;,;;w .5 1.. .1“. 1,.» ,h ,_,. ,.n 5” .1 -. ‘ ' M --¢ -~' .1. -1. \J x‘ 1 |«__ ‘_ .- _ go ‘xa v . . A: ‘ ‘ V m, _ 4 - . . I - . 4.: -L‘ (:0 m V I"\—\ . a .- .4-- - '.. - t V" .-’ "‘ V . ‘ ~ » - '3 ‘1‘ w :A‘ ‘3' ”qr ti"; — Julia :1 u 4.1.; ’5’ ”a? j ,. ._ v .. -3 .L j T , x .. ._‘ 3.".-.‘fla . A To ”1‘51“. 8 ”(Hat U'J' ~ 8‘ k.culs could not circumvent these ta tics by s:isin: the refineries, the Allies wrote secret clauses into the Anglo-Rumanian and Franco—Rumanian military alliances providing that in the event of a German attack the re finaries \. are to be destroyed by the Allied technicans operating them. This had if 1 been done successfully in 1916, but when Paris fell the files of the '. '\.. H. " ' L" '~ .1.» o - +- DeuXieme gureau ano enih them the plans for the demolition of Ploesti_ were captured. The cermans then forestalled the Allies with a quick pre- 1 a 1 1 ' - ° ' 7 dawn attack oy the Iron Guard on the Ice; allied agents in Tloesti. Ploesti and Barbarossa Germany did not, however, feel secure in .ioesti after the Alli;zs' t‘ I. 1.. 1, " ‘ -- w. 1—7. “-1 -,..- _,. f. ‘- L- .. sabota5e plan was UlOCnOQ. In tne same month mg-.hh, c-.ai ;;:;;-; iron I 0". hilwaro, Ger man war Econo3:,pp. 49-50 7 . -- . James Duban and 1‘ 4-4- . 4 ‘ . N. J. 1. Qiuvlo Of. | (LL15; 13L; 9“!” \J‘ C) arroll SteLart, Tloest i: The Great UTOUfli—AIF (If—fly, v a] , ‘ LI 6‘ 11/: (T\ .fi F ’ LJL/ .4 .01 ‘(n :mALQOA‘I .7" Olive ’ . '1 'J‘u) ' . o s- -15- ‘0 - - C ‘ ‘~ I O . . ‘ .0 ‘ L r, I V W >‘ .‘ "l 7 ‘ I 1‘ - ." ‘51s 1 - ‘\ _ v ~ .‘ y ’ .Y‘ ,- ‘erx .. 1.‘ l . - . ('rf\ r ‘_ ‘ h. . - 'Zr“," ,1. '. ‘ ”- :-_/ o Uni y“- J-L Jo- L. U 4L\’ ‘blll‘vg ’ U . v -‘~) \7 J. .r U L . .10. A v. ~‘-»,..J~~‘v.’rvk A-r 4:.) 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J, .’ V .L‘ . .‘Y 1 f‘ :8 _ ' f ' .L - . .‘ N ‘ ‘ L ,..‘. ‘ L ,- war 3.1—1 LJLCU b’le Uo‘J.'J..~. 11;“; 11103 were 8.21- DJCO...1 13 5631!... .LJ. 1.0: 33,-" ‘; ., ' l" :‘1‘ V' 4- -. ! .0 1.x- V " _' ...— '_.‘A'.'l advi_s;€>2?s to lunania. LJG first tasx oi .aese advisers .4”, licisr _~ ‘F I - . L, . 2" haw. :_ I- . ....-.-..-:- .- -... i 3 r . omlgz~c3ci, 'to arose 0 Oil dL-cricc a lines seizure ; .aira .oeers or 6 o ., 5 QV)(‘4‘ 3..., fi't. ‘ ”"3 r‘,‘ ‘ 1,.) r ”11.. T U,‘ '_ r.\1r, ‘Ifi «'3‘ 3),: “)1“- ‘:,“.\ L‘\\"fl‘.' t, r'ml "_-,L,\ “' I J\,A\) Ll—L J La 3.01.. ‘44th tall ..}\.A.-)._.L" I ~1 (:sLALI‘3LI‘J. -Lw L'ZLIAL'ALI ULL .4. J. 01 .Lk's .1.-. by " r ""4 L '-" 1L bfi -3011 PT" ”0”) ""—‘ " "1 ”-1 r "“ T V. ‘ ' O 3‘ ""1 ‘ntrr: fir. GW‘I‘ ' A. ° war") 1"" ‘U-.’ ' LJ K~---4- ‘3 ‘ .1 Okla; ( i‘anl—J ~44 M1. 101 n \\.3~, b-JV «15‘ T.b1J.Lll-".~L.‘VL’.AJ.LI -«-~.r1r -~-~§- -- - ‘-F‘ ‘ 1,‘ ' H .. . -_.-. .‘. ,.3 r. ‘ L“: ....?le8 L0 L‘Blniol‘ce Lei“ 'a-JVZLSOI‘S . It , e ;.,-_‘. lly ... t we“ ~ gel, a , — T . , - 1 . 1 — .1 Q A v ‘ '. s- 4‘ ‘ f- , ‘ - -".\-x - -!' ‘ Y1 ‘ I.‘ D ’ ’. *7 '— aSbuuxera~ slat all ticse iOVes Jere hocivzced o- lea" the u.i.a.i. Hl,Jn I/ ‘ q ‘ I ~- ‘IO 0 o ‘ ,"‘\ .r.) .4 , ,- -. ~. - .. ,- » . In. ~\ ,. uz- .‘ aw.»« +tLOCSVl uu-Lwne acxnUinle.agcziyi-kaihsc.mr. "1‘ :‘ ’.: ~L ‘r ‘ . L "- L ‘ _3 1 ‘1‘ i. 1 4- L . _‘ _: ;.- es goricc dLlOH naturallr nrOces ea. ouch grocescs only i.- r.~;3'::t3.—«7 ‘T'J— [ ,, .. i, ,1, .j ,i :s ,7 ,- :, .. . :i,‘ .‘4 -A11 3*”, vlvev~¢~¢ .1icler s leics and these lears for J18 oil sugpli 0 may gait J32; , '3’13" “I ,l. «LA ‘ ~-. ‘ .‘rr~7 \ .‘.“" ”'1 -- -- ' ’ ~I~d 51.4231 v.3 reasons 13 attached Juoal iWO years a ‘3, a 1 , 13“", LA, .\ s .q ," ’,\. c 3“ — ~ ‘ n).- "‘. ‘A '\ 'L.~ .~ I -‘ 'fi ‘ "" " "‘ ' " ‘ ’A ‘L . V"- x'. - ‘V 9 .m L- 2.2 .: -".‘ c. a. ;' ..; 0-‘ ll-J k _. -..".~ :1. . 3 Lu -xhi . 'T' n . ‘ ‘l . r 3', v‘ , 7—. L Y. 1": 2 " -\ J". V“ "‘ ‘. ;‘ .~/— —‘ -. ,- , 3‘ ~—., in acco: “ace anti cieir glad, sic JQSSLEHS lad 439$ asle do p- > v I 0 Q ~ s u L p a ~ - .I -'- 1‘ , A rs --" > . A "‘ ‘ A .w» <~ - ~v'.- 1 '- ’- ‘fl \‘4 ~\3I“4033 our actions, it is groaaal; that “Otalhfi ”UJLR ia.e anA M.“-_‘ n ‘ 1* a. n ° 2‘ - ‘ J- . . n1. 4 rr' ('3 ¢.(‘J.l‘-. - “Y.1-:Jib. -‘..V - ‘ V -O‘lo . fl- . ‘ )D~1‘ UJ‘ . c I a 5‘ 1 ‘I‘ V . ‘L . I «L ‘F‘n' ! ~ ' 1 ~-, » " v T", ‘I. v_,o‘ ~ - r ""0 -L3- all JJ' 1034, T1101?” .1 Jud-i .’ l1. .‘Tdurl‘fi, (“On 7; I‘m . .nM '32 «in. '4 1’1 in -,.~ «1.. " ..\ r. ,. ' J~J ishers, lye; .p,. o.o~ug.. 4 ,-\ -- ‘ ’ m‘ . _._ L - .- . 7. ,4. ~ .4 .- -3 :nat I nun, . 011. in; incacion is froh a secret order lite. va'ce;1xLx.‘T' . ‘ ~¢v~ i0, I;Yv. 1.‘, ‘ . ",.-...‘. .L " n4. ' ._\ .5 . In“ . I a. - and Aytsi—otviet iGluul'.35;J. Ice—1F+, -s+-c{;. w -——-—.—-—a-.- ~ FN-L- 1 “I. - L‘, : ... . .. .1 ~ I'ILI o, J.-. ‘ ' 1 - . l ,, - v.1 QL-2 no good oJoLr drioiro. 13143, ior pig 11‘1i; ’JJE 00¢: PJJJ .. '- I. .5 .~L . 'r.._A\r .- - .. -,L1 .- '. o -- -. .. -' - -,- Sufi-3 ”‘3 I O»: JO. - LJl-"'3’)~I-l-'!-- - LAL‘U -t3 .0111 .. )‘I‘UL‘. ‘41.;- .It“~'v"'A ...:1 J 011.13 A J .3 F d. .AI-r 1.: . ‘ . " i I x ._ I f"- . - -441 4.‘ ,V L -.‘ ., '..‘. w I: , j I 3 1 1L, 7“ i, . . . on, ~32: i JI‘ 3304-54.? MIL-Lo , mlil o 1;, m in i113 .11 .' .1...‘ v J? 3.; - . ‘ ' -L'_- ..J J : . , . .- n‘a' : .“ L‘V —‘. 0'~W~‘-E -. araoia, one] woil‘ i4 oJe snoo, Jive LJJJII dil pas oil i skis o J- Lm- ,. -" .. ,‘ . ,1 .0 ._..,UI ,1 ‘2’: flag. An L: 1“ JOLl luff $3 4, m3 31021114 :1 {VS 01 .1 1 01.33me .5 , fro“. on: ‘3‘ I .LJ ‘ u- " l‘ 'v - ~,' ~ ‘~ I" - 1 - ~ “23* ‘ N L - n L ,3 n w n 1“ 3‘ "\~ A w w ‘.l f I‘ p ". 5‘" LIL-1a u '31 4“,: J -c.~. ' 00!;1'1 .5 Uv34.,‘,r ; u LID of"; ue-A 2.2:) .A. 3 r.’ L kg) U 4.. 5D I}; .; -‘Z .3 '... I, - I . J. ..., -"3 «1‘01. 0 T- . - .-. w 5 m“ 3 ~51 r‘ “ iffx 7 : *‘ - :r- " L» -'a I 3 ‘ .Jj-r.JV JL ‘hA- v"- :1 \J.&.. .n‘ M u) 1 I L) _'.~ v _ Ig‘ls- '- . «.4. ‘- . £0 L - - I U‘ 115 Oil SU“Oll”S. "' , A] .. ,3, -. : L -'- . i— . . ' ‘ a ‘ 1‘ ; N . L » ' , — r‘ - , ‘ ..13 IL'.‘ -..L.;).~‘.)I‘L UV 9, IJUer 3‘; E1\— ‘Jgd ‘20-‘11 «.14 Jul. IQ‘f-l.’ /U-( 1‘ «IA. ui-v VAV- .r‘ ‘ '4 ' “5—, 4., .-' -1. - . -VJ.-. it.-. ‘, 5‘0 ..- ‘JL \tn‘l ~ L~ U k’ 1:. I I: 7,. ‘I O\_‘ r A so. ’9 .1 ~; .lis' ‘I\) 3 I III ‘ bl 1- --. A ahl- A s “’ r'v‘~ ~1 ‘ _...-..--.._- .4... - __. .I . ‘1 - 1 ;, . ~ .2,_ I-.. ‘. .- ’ :1. ,' I i .\. 77 '~ . 7‘ ~- _, v8 " I" x. 1"4‘4' -. JUL. o LOT an 11, \ .\.-7 1 ;.L .1 Win ULL.‘. L C '4 mi '5 3‘ .‘ i J ‘ . y --' . L. u ~ - i...“ -.. ‘. i ‘ A ‘- . u s IA " . n’ ,~ . v - , m - > «_ ‘ \ . , | ‘ \ ' , \ -‘711.:3* X.) '1"LL ' Jrii" :_.»l. .111. -«4 A ,LJ’ I ~l. j“! -\ ~ i, ' ‘ a I“. -.1.§.“~- v\-4L_ '4 fi" 5.) , r .~. «g - H t" .. :1 ~-, ' v— .11 n" “‘ ..\‘v’\ .‘ 1" ‘. ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘r‘ "WI; u"l j | I: J |. I 3" r. I; '4, T; bl «J. \, :1" v.1; 1', v _ . ‘4‘ 9.. . 4.1w.i \_xX—~.. ‘- -’, .1- -‘L a .. 6 Y. k1-s~vs 1 -.-. f- :r‘. L. . .V-‘ » .1 ' ‘ . . .‘ .' -s- ‘ I .‘17~ L -. I y-) L1 1") ':-L n). '.\ ul'- ‘3. CL (A 4‘ ‘: {"11} ‘-I --~' ,_5 Q (~- ‘ILl‘. #- I; ‘. L: ~AE l.» -- - :4 L; . S K.‘ ~\ -3 O 7 ‘ ‘ I _- LJ‘ A,‘ ‘l _) l. ‘ ‘r _ _ ru '3 r- \ v! a _ . Fae eoloLOR to aouan< 11 i_wI J33 3139- 31 flaii J o; torso )¢:,I:o. ”"7 I“ P t. l- 1' A 4-' 1- t t-a 3-; 1‘ - ins LlrS 0; Jose was I his? a :1 ises 12: ion of no 3 L iv) o- t1~ w \ u H f1, 1‘ o . i "'0 ~'_ ‘ j iugu “ray. JG oelisvsi JO couli if - , 1‘ 0-,.‘.‘.." no t_ ' -.., -11Js4.;-y conizikut i- 011: H- win after a ca1gii 31:: -., n .3 H3” ’ '-‘ ”u . A I "AK, NJ...’ (9 initiqul “cone A a -. o 1 I :"fi, ' ‘_ , ‘ m 1 - — fl ~‘ N‘ tdLOH )oforo tne canpaign aeaan. 3 bJVlOUSlY tie COnQJsot of '13 3.3.3.1. Iicrili bring imlinso ailitrry and 'cononic gains. lot only wouli tier» 3:3 110 threat of a ”stab 1d the Jack“, out the taral rcsourcss of tie J.- ‘.3.1. would be fully 1319 to n’m. Ives more inportan“, oerdafis, *fi3rne the iicoiogisal satisfactions: I again esl spiritually free. Tie partnership with tie Soviet ”316?, in ovitc of t”: cowplete Sines rit" of tlo efforts to glijg aoouv a Linal conciliuoion, was neverti-i less ofta very irkson; \ .-_.— ‘- 4 A .1 “dolf Iitler, Hitler's Secret Cooversationsi,1741-14$4, trans. As or?" rm f. '1! r _1_ ‘ \v Q 1 ‘0 4— v K ’ ’ xx): ~1513 3a.s ron and A. d. JCtVJHS, (hem forx: oiénst Jooxs, 1751), y.+b?. lxrezrsation of Kay 13, 1942 at supper. 13, . h1:lfl,r3. .;I~I: , 159—195. ‘- — -. -1 Are — v ‘ ‘ i .‘A > a J". v“ I ' to re, for in ounfl 4a] or ouner 1t sea1:l to no to be 0,- w, —. w . vi ‘. ~ '\ .‘ -:- fl 0‘ '3 ,v ,n, r\ - ~\ . . «1‘ rt I my whole or151n, u1y tonccgts, ana .; 1orner 0a111¢¢t1 ~ ‘ ' v v “ ‘. . ‘- ‘ ' ‘4A 1“" .- r" ' ‘ nagp; non to as ElicVe tz1ese LsLudl agonies. 77 T“ '"lJan‘L. ~w '~ .- \ 3' v‘ t no 3" mm MTW ' - '1' r~ ecl' v1 finno LO. UiAvD~l ‘5C1L‘10' at} («1:11. VivaX -JL~LH;Jal&381 b‘v’is 3511 v J ai; vav I -' . -’~J‘- ex" I . >¢‘ ' ‘1 V ‘t . ‘ . fi ‘A-~- L. . 1 y. ' unetner a w 1cer ca1paiqn wouLd aare oeen is sonetnin) we {1tler s un‘erestimatiOq of tn #1:,r 31 the Soviet Union was the 1'. :1; 1.1131"; ‘ ‘ ‘; 3 ;‘ '::.‘.-: ‘11.? in ”1“ ’2. Le sac ‘ re ' 1o f trlt i. 3&1 was the singularlv unattractive T1 a 0nd aso1 1 3101‘ n 1 3 d nature of his alternatives. The reasons Coeration 3m L:_on ould not 33 mounte’ in 1940 held with renewed force. Goering’s; moaosed congle st of the editerra anean was too indirec for nis ta L . 1 ° .L‘ r 'afiv‘l. 7.0" .\ C)» J; .494.< vaL' A 1‘ - 15" 7‘ ‘J 1:}. .L m’. .p‘- q, ,3 - .-1.' ‘4. -rL/IA‘-)l.’ .,‘_ L; v Q ‘ “V: ‘ P-l' -:1 'r 9.0!; 1Uv \J‘Ad O stes and had too remote a chance of iefeatin; tne U.1. to satis1y nin. Finall" Jmaoxt warfareceulfl promise no inwediate results. all 33 tlj liv‘rhjtlv 3 t: &‘ eittaek or inn: 3.3.3 o; Fugffllfpj L 33 11.?‘4f to 3:3 ’.1 51¢ ; , *fi1ere1zs an eight werxs yon;u-:t 1? ts: V.-.3.I. ‘ru.ie;i {JlCK r- , D 13f grr1t1n81L11t a lo;;r_121u. -1us fl tether 11L111t‘vns a! 11“” 1:3v drsirtio‘e 3C .11 fr. The third reason he featit in 1941 .13 his 1311?: 1.; 5's“ 4° 4 scruSnt pea: , Stalin would attack him as soon as it 1-: : “tsicge one. at on11* Q1: ;1?;;1k1isturfi'c;? ELVirt fi1iiii :. ', L zalusrb some specific evidence, especially an alleged speecn 3y Stalin, \n .\ 4 4 \A a LL my" .3 v --A. 1.08 c?‘ O was indee confirm that this By no treaty or pact can a lasting neutrality of woviet Russi1 3e 'nsured with safety. At present all reasons seeak against Russia's _,_ 'fflasi-Soviet Relations, p.353. Closing lines of tne letter from ‘15t3L63r to b. ussolini exlla ininr the decision to attack Russia. Dated June 21,1941. 1F‘l'wer'iar J r”‘1 “n‘sii 1t Vw« 4:41 104“ (T«~ r «b- =n « R .:_ 79’, 1. 1...”; , [£331 , 110s t 1.111, nj .- 41g, no.1 101. . .m )H. 3012...), 1,5) :1). 133-130. -13.- ‘~-- - ' 9‘ 'L. . R 4"“4- of. (“‘1 . ' V 'P "I .‘ . “~‘A~‘:“ I“ , ‘_ *v H 4 11:3:‘7111‘14‘11'8 .1301; uzllo SL.<.‘.o*3 01. neutrailgj. .Lfl eiujt .-J.\./1; 311.3 , O1.” 4. 31-x: , o a ‘ a -. . .- . . ..__ - .1 ‘1 4. A or scieral rears c11- may 30 alteroa. U A .‘ ‘ —' X - t 1“; -‘I‘L" ,1- 1.1 {ea naen ne did oeca1se he uncerestinateu tie [1 Thus flitler attac 1attractive alternatives, and consiaarea E U) trength of the Red Army, nad s is the sa “3 ('f' :3 PI the struggle inevitable. In none 0 4. oil fields a major consi:3ration, though on the other hand the 1irst and last reasons certainly incluae then. Oil, unlike iron ore, 1:3 .cc ea: ran ' 4 n7" — 1A. a of. ‘> -| ‘ “\w ' ‘ _‘ to a muJOl ea ension 01 the J3? J; itse1f. r111, Y1 ‘ ’.. .L' ‘ 1‘ T‘. ‘L!. +‘ ‘ ,‘.. .L.‘ .. 113 otll “scion o1 orntnctic Irodacolou ———JJ — _ mum-c ‘ o The Germans also turned to the syntactic production of oil from coal in spite of the fact synthetic Oil cost 400} to 5303 as much a: natural oil because,even with all of Runania's oilqsnc Jtlll was short by 25:. fl”ilc production rose rapidly, it never rose rapiilv e1oufh to :wet the ; als set for it and these goals were themselves set far too low.18 Jorst of all the German oil industry was centered in only one hundred plants of which several hufe facilitixswcre dom'nant. Isis concentration in so few ulants, :ailc douatless ”ore “‘Sic eat at a time when efficiency was vita , was to prove a fatal aefect when the bombing raies as an in earncst. flgfll‘gzthor‘s of Evasion Stockpilinb ‘isi:ally soeakin: garwarr navor hai any stookjiles of oil. 1e? ‘3 1 1 ..’_’I ". ,. _‘ r‘ ,_ _ A 1" E .D _ __ ." V ,v,‘ ,.,~ -u1locx, p. 5uw. Lenorandun r»;d to the heaas o1 tne arnea SEIulCua on Cctobcr 10, 1939. 17 TR .( .. 7‘.1 ‘ .34 . .ly- ‘ lsLeL. , :31; . / 4 ’ "1 I.. _ n u :0 1L1 0 . - '0‘ . I. a «r‘ vvr ' ‘3" . ‘ '“ ~ 'x‘.r:_ r. A (.1 - 1.... LA -‘~ r‘ supplies and acr needs nJTJ too CloselJ calanccd 1o: ,1; Luggg bu 43 ,b_ : a 0 .— I ~ '_ - L I s- r‘. '1 ~ 2 - _’ ’3 ‘1} ‘1‘— fig", . , l cumulated in wartime and in acacetihc SAC lacxea the CsTaLSlue 1urcipn - -.- . 1' .-,4. v . . .1- w, excaange. lluallj tne nature of 5- -itzxrir.>: as an coon L13 "salon W13? - mv n~ aql ff 1» 0 3-331“ yv~-‘,'~‘e 4‘) h a large stod coiles unnecessa r and so no rw e ort 1. as 3111 Mai t1 a3— cmmflate.urn O O Substitution Substitutiores a method of overcoming 11c oil sh ta ;e was never very promisi ;. Some effort was ..ade to use wood to propel civiliaz .. ”0 vehicles“ and vas s.) :3 (3 Mp llant was also used, but baSi icall" suostit:ti 1‘1 3 -- b" was not possible encept at a loss in efficien ;,C-$. the use of horses in Wehrmacht'supply columns. meduction of Requirements In soite of extensive imp ortatior and synthetic production by the hazis, they found reduction of consumption an equally necessarv technique. In applying it the; were helped by the fa ct Germany had always la;ged far behind the other industrial nations in the consun‘o tion of oil ar d tius had relatively low neccs to begin with-dcs;ite the Nazis best efforts to dissim te this adveltage with their notorization erSTafi in the 2 ——L 1930's The use of glitskriee tactics further assisted them by reducing the length and extent of the really heavy fighting and 1enc e the oil re- quired for it- In *9@3~1941. the tgro full; ears where,>litzkriee was " . Q ~ rv ~ A - — ” .-- . .2 .5 ..,‘. .‘ I \K {'1‘ .. ’1‘ (‘4' -: \vw doninant, Gcrnang used only 9.1 .1ll1on tons of I1sol1nc 1JUb ?GalobL0u of need was perhaps the must i fortant gathod of all. 1p / £11 . pops—59. v-‘ r1 1L1 .. .4 ,v . . '. 'T' D . ,ofu‘ -,-':'fi'1-1 eSOh Glesin ger, hazi31n the 1000 11 e: nitlcr's Plot 1or ~vv3~vetz 1 1 w u :‘ a .,..3 s a . mu .1 Raw'naterials,(new lore: Th e sooosmfier ill tenoanj, 1;L ,, 3. ~~~~v- A1 f‘," .. T ‘;'“"T' 4, 3 A" iflglfl, p. 32. 7;) 3.2.5.313) p. ,7)" .NM ‘11! e r‘. W. ., 6‘5 ..L'.z‘v; ._\). ,. jl“ V‘. Lyn. 34.3], p... Rail icin; ' that tilanJr of the sources of Gerrany's oil suszlies cor not he c.nture1 in time to produe a \ ni icant Mf‘ect on the ceirse of the war, the Allies tried to destroy them instead. With the exee~tions of the Russian ;1e str uetioncfi‘fiaikc, and various lesser fielcl and the Allies' atte .ite:1 sabotag e of Ploesti, satotaae we never an important ~. '3 ,,.. 9,, allied nea:CH ier ."x (‘0 8 ,.J U) 0 Fe (.1. O S T.) H (,0 p) (I) *3 H J.) I...) 0‘ O (_ >11 DJ C) :1 ('T‘ w (" O to U) P" O I ' ‘ " ‘ J.- J‘ ‘ ‘H* .I 3 A ’u-l‘ ‘ ‘ ; $ .’- the QCSUFUCblOU of Germany's sources of Oil, was used abalnSD eoth her . . ._ _ ‘ ,..L - a .1” .A- 1. . re“ synthetic sue lies in UDLJRUJ are 2:. The first attempt to rail Ploesti Ines by R.A.F. Hing Commanccr J" 7“ 4‘ fl .1 .- ,3, '1, 0 H A ~ ”' . ‘w , 1" g“ COUDb reiaes in earl; 1941. [e we 0 refused pern1551on a; the a-, . ,L iovernznent to use th 18 Gre eh Eases his two— exigined e012ers had to have It) to reach Ploesti on tha grounds the t Gree er was not at war with Zunania. ’ Nevertheless fear of such a raid caused Hitler to se hd€1.LrliTCTJ s rooes l" ( r O Q (J (J) C-r H. F.) -nd may have been one of the causes of his Balkan caxja' 3n in f.‘ o the spring of 19¢}.2w u.en Ru.81a was attacked, she launched three a attacks on Ploesti within a week; none effected more the n minor damage. When the United States entered the war, her first bombing attack in Europe was on oesti (J m1e 12 , lOti). Thereafter no efforts xere made to bomb Ploesti until the ill-fated American air attack of fugust 1 19%) began a series of twenty-two heavy sensing attacks lasting until Au; ust 13. 1944, just before Ploesti fell to the Russians. The attackers flew 7.173 SOFtiGS. drogped 13,709 tons of bombs, and reduced output ei percent, but the cost was hi h: 32% heavy bombers and 2.v35 men-L (fir) ~_/. . Dugan and Stewart, p. 26. :3, q JOIN Rooert lengtson. $131 We“ Aims: The rlans for the Thousana ‘ , A ,/, {eathg ch, (Roec Island lu;j ustana College ress, 19o? , a. 3%. 25 ,,, - __ ~ ’ . _/ .‘l‘ u -, ,.~1 - DJ” {In 811.30 ‘4~ Vv .Flrt, p. 20-279‘ 1' 313.. P ’ L :1. .5 ‘/, _ -<-_ ”1'” .' ‘ , .1 m. I -4“- L- ‘ ‘1 ‘ .. .1 ’"L r'fi m If )'\ ‘1351, 1‘, , r (H (‘vv‘ . f a 1 fi’. 0 ‘ J‘. n c \r ‘“ L.1C flu va.-..J :11 U‘v-L-AL-o-.flx ‘J L) LlU .‘-J‘U4_‘. OZ. :1: :‘DIJ,’ Q glitz.“ o. __)_L..J__ 2,1,4, I . u o J. ‘ ,‘ 'i 'r ' ti‘ u-I 1,. L‘- vy 1‘ A: a: .‘97 )1 1‘ 11‘0“. \‘ ‘ OP‘K'I C. .1‘q-OH 115 U0?” .1?me 5.31211} 1.“, 1’»; well vile“, CJ-k’-1.L‘C/V‘4m TU.) .2 ..‘ lU-ls '«1-‘:-JT;.J dull. U - . . _ I ,1 n .. . . .- r. ' ‘s .- vw '\.I “' AuguSt. 19+4 M1en Ploesti fell en} German '3 u33unucnte uacn .W\ D ‘t‘v -’-‘~ :. ..fi .’ .0 “\ J-‘L ‘ ‘- “~‘- an . tile _or '-c1;, VAC Allied air lorces were not asle to auUQCK t1; gasses oil plants inikll force um 11 the su er of Ififld. 9y Sefl3 cmyer 11 they U U\. ~- ,1 3 n -. - 1°. . L' . -.- ~ mad rcuuceo uermaa av1ation res Droductic_ +3 5;;113- n1" ‘3. 4‘, L‘, .1 ._ ; 21:1..- --_‘1_.,v/1;__M 1 , a .. ~ 1- . 1. - . ,1. :- 1”; .1 .41: .319 1111,,; so p3”. allogeo proouction to rise enou31 to leak 37 'L.‘ 'fi ‘ '* ‘ 1 - 4“ w H‘ ‘ - 3“, «‘3‘ "v‘ “~ ' tne uerman war economy iron ozplete colla se. Ewen txouLJ a GOA let; collaose was oerel" averted, fuel shortages made the plulned use of the Lufttreffe and ‘tmi mecalni ed units of the J011.uc1t 11o0351jle e°ter 93 J ~‘./ c s ~ I O ‘ ' ‘ 1 '- ' .. January, 1945. 011 tnus was tn: strategic ssortage wh1ca provea tie . w a -. - . ~ : ' olalms of+ he stra te3i o oomoin;1LGorisVut :‘Aucvet 1‘24, “W~n *u4“° \J ‘ . I » u 1 l _ - v .3513 1" 333 3‘7. 7:3. ._:2*;'1:~.::‘.: , the“, 1:111" $5,155 air/3‘5“ 31333;“, Qonclusiors Cil was per1aos the most critical of Gergary's strrte3ic Shortif&s and the lack of assured and arequate suoolies a Nevertllele $3 the tremendous oottntial a determined moie3m state has to evade even the worst strategic shorta es was sufficient to enable her to evafle it until so late in the war that her failure was mostly a: 33‘- demic question. Then the Allied air of GIlSiVB, COJpled 1.1th tne ajvance of the Red Army, crifpled her by cutting off virtually all of her Oil supplies. 011 was the classic 3 roof of strategic bombing, but it was A “3 0; L33 ‘- Lt - “I "‘ joy th “an- ‘1 .‘A V I — -‘ acruany's defeat die 0 C l;f&SlOH U‘a‘u of t? ta‘Hmtmfiy Although not ultimate li'rlitimj perhaps / 0. 014 Thus a condition of ,000 the UE' their economy on a began t" '7.- D ‘I a (' K.‘ <11 11 alt full ,fi v .ost three “T DV1".j If U 5‘1A ‘ .Jsu V 3-: ' "3,", r? 12“.“- VuiJ.L L. , . ,L ' Inoroiaction a ran material, ner* .' n1- ' - b 1n a nation's war 61 .c. ‘71 1C ver-full war footing. Th e looner "i fort employment - j.“ ‘ eiore tne f‘ a ”we '3.“ .- ‘1‘ .I.C f‘ n.) 1 n O existed even 3 YafilS 1“ '_ - d»; A 1 to n“. labor shor a- C -L ' qfi ‘ -. ~ P r.‘\" , H 1 "\ 'V'. hJ'w' 14 bag-‘3 131 TKCLNE Qw'fil , (171:3 18...; .LS puSp‘SJ. C41 ask-30311. L‘JéISth/LOI‘. , |-‘ f" r“ ' " ' " ‘ ‘ ’\ ‘.I L A ~ h ‘L P ' r ‘1 J“ 0" H H, . rfi'L' “‘ '1 . rs ~ ¥~“”“I retu~ll‘-ldvtfl: in?“ 1 Cu a 13 J SJOFuu 3 Cilaubi la ""“" 1 ' N n —-V -- . - “r - - LA',_T' \nvf“.‘ ;.“ ' .2“ ‘-‘ A'~\ Ljhdr lswtor‘lis li‘fi‘ij LC? “.1311 hi). . 5:14.... Viv/"JX a'kJ 4;-1 t-A‘. !.. .‘«‘2 C‘- ’2‘ A. ...A . ' . - , qj‘) #7 / unemglOJed. By July 1939 this had seen reduced to Jo, 3(9. f‘fofir‘ \/ out one of tie Jazis proudest boasts in the prewar 'ears, was the basis of one C? 4 their nerve ”-rslme stretebic morta es. F0“ the Germans there were two possiole methods of evasion: reallocation and expansion of the la or Force. The Evasion Cf the Strategic so" a:e in Leooe E;_jxg-n sien of the Lab r Force U'tilizatiOl‘l Of 33 I‘LLZLFS :{19 1?”, 90 10"}. a: , , . - ,, . . .1 , 1 Slaude d. Guillebaud, The Jeononie Recovery of xtrnen" From 13;} to the Incorgpration of Austria in March 1g33, (London: Kant..;jt;1 :nd r , . K 30. :(A, 1239), 1304‘»). 3Jur‘ en Kue z;rnski, ”ermanv'r"o“01i an Labor Conditions unfier u I"v\‘ _ _’"‘ laseisfl, (Lew Yo Mrcz Intm1ationel PUDliS em‘ , 19+3/, p. luJ. I Raul Eia en (psoud. ), Hill Cornea“ Crack? A Feetuel Eegort on a W, , -- .- \ - . "V" beimagi, trans. by Anna Co; es, (rev IOFK: serper and Crown rs, l;+¢,, 2 , p. ' ‘ L .- - n “ CI P I" J I" A‘v‘w :7 F-1v ‘- v... x~r r212. .504 '-r . L' on .~.._ t .« — 1 ‘ . ‘ —- 3-3 7L - [no haulVC Urrdflfl lacor lore: coulo as 3 send supanouo nov oily o. «'L‘ H . V r L . y . «N -r m‘r ~ ., :~ - ,--.- +1 «v- , , ‘1' -~/ ‘vr r Qllccu recrU1tmant, out also b; ouuonon133 one worx wee\ au- b; luto- 4. .., In... .L .4. - . 4-“, . 132° 1. J- —. mauin- 1o: greausr outpio Us)” JOF ke‘. In one years orscsoinb uh: WU; § ' A ‘u‘ f -~ ._ ~ c 1‘ n U ‘ V‘ |_ s ,. ‘ v- ‘ ,.. y ‘ r~ 1‘ v A. ‘ m 7 ..— bu: LdLlS c1111gl a; -riWCKLL} U11 tare; tnian. 10 fPO‘f de a 1 391 ' « «w- 1 r.,- ‘1 . — v .1 A1 . '. «p d . \ u L’wr 3‘ o‘ L -O oa31s .st pas 3a a s1; fil‘ Ss“l¢S oi laws ' H011 him; 116 r13zus cl “/3? 3‘ . -t. ‘ -‘.~ 4 3.31 - 1".-.’5 , .W worxsrs YA ca culm1u1tes in ts; law 01 case 12, y/u cljossr1n3 in; government e! 13”r€ t office to conscript for an indefinite goriod ,4 ‘1 a.“ v 'A' -— o :‘u ‘L‘ fi . 1 t“ --'\r L-A";'v ‘ 1 any emgloyaolo “a“ or homan in use 39134 lor 31y joo “liss;z.-z. - -. ‘ - . 'f‘ Y ‘ r - ; ~‘ ’L -»u r r . ‘ ". ‘3' In reality, JOMCVST, tn; PSFCSJoGQC of an of 1:orkin: age it lxjn . ° .. * . -.«. A} ..K .I.'- ._-‘ f‘ . _,‘ L .L ,. n .. ,. 1‘ ., '- ‘ .-, ' :aqul' 1r C...Jlo r: ' was 1c: mm. in 1 11.1: on, o o: ..o.:a.-::1 no ..1 - V 9 ~ 5 I. N: ‘r . . »- 1L . H A ,1 p . A r‘ 'L .‘fl Ll“ r' .fl ' - —- 7- ‘V ‘ , Jane t.e 312; of oJ; grass 1 rams am. who 4 E’JCPc oi-.s 01 th 3011:“— 1131 gas +-n Po”tv acne a 1v in t" »a - v t‘*~ .“113 Li'wIZL-I (an-LAM U11‘1 ‘-‘AA #318161 incre CsLJVs— yr: on'l oukJ jls iv‘urlOJ.’ 3‘0 . . .1'..L-..J 't‘.l‘\s,‘_ "fiO’fj. ‘1" “--.‘rl . -‘- «V‘ :33 nqa‘ .y-‘r; qqarx . \ Lix‘fi ‘-'(\~,-v--‘v--1 q“. "n o“ ,L 9‘ L L 'J :4 bl'ka ~7 —¢C~U- :‘ct 14;?) U-rv m. L~L-J 1&3 vrvfius :1 ll; {vi-1'4 [AV-L .lLk 1L. 5-3-4 ’ _ b-1‘z .\ w J' ‘ . . r. "I 4- . -~’ 0 v A . r- o w-- \- 1aoor fo:cu“ .Zeoaor,tac inousurial laoor lorco gas rplathulJ Smallbf. V77 ‘ l V ' K . l‘ h“ Q '3, -I‘. ‘ 1" ' ‘ U . ‘. -‘l“- ‘_1 P A P! ' ' “" j "‘ 1 \ ‘ ~'. ‘ +- { TAle LIK'UL1C-;:)U Alkh-;‘~' --r Of .IOLIrS 1:1 t~1K3 uoOI‘o’i 11‘3'3‘. IGQJ’e gllljr ttjrec L'.QC';I‘UO ('1‘ - .rr- - ..\ ..,....\ ’) h 0 ha. a. ‘_ - ‘ F‘ ’Lo :--- . 103 1‘;1tion&11;ut10n movsnsnt clasefl in 1933. hourly ‘TOJUCplvl J in general did not rise at all in 1933- 939. 3; c agarison it ross tnirt; I .A . - - 5,. .. .. . . . .. 1n tao porios 1923-1933. Tans use ”3213, ".1119 bTLDSIMS use German economy to over—full employment in the j:w~uar years, M; o; tac- less did not allev'atc the resultant 1a; or shorta3e 3y ex‘aniiu3 their labor force. ”t3 Hathan, The 1321 ..c on omic Svstem: Germay's Mobilization for r A ‘ 1533, (Durham, North Larolina: Dune University Press, 1944 , p. 200. o . ,1 ” . . 31,.1 Klo1n, p. co. Isld., p. 90. 1:;l., p. 70—71 7‘ ‘1 :"‘ " A _. S "J p. 3 t_Jq (.7 (L c '7: C. F g H J J (J ..1 "'3 f “I c. :51 H -D 1' 5+ :3 5 1:“ O f '-1- C) I“) women “as only 58,05U above the July 1939 level. Ir th of? period the n mber of German males in the industrial l1ter force ”ell “f 2 800 000.9 Lv n the lenfth of the work week onlv increase? 1.1 Hours ’ / , ._; u in the first thre veers of the her. Finally the*e were efforts at ' fl incre351n5 efiicien1' in the war—essential industries which raised 1 0y sixty tereent, but this e; no means eliminated the 1 1 u 10'. ,1 1 - uua laoor snortages as output tripled. Fae 1.rma* laser for1e tags ”1; prod etivity not grow during the wer but rather contracted. A larje leoor fo reserve exists” . - .r\ . .~A '9 u- -- -- v9. ‘ r- L -. D. D . Av- ' s q, QSpGClullJ la “omen, alon5 “ltd VdSb 01-1eiel gowers to emgloy it, but i:1 f: ct c01red cf 0 6+ :5- (D ’3 O "D {1 (1 most nothing; 1113 dons. Utilization of Jen-Germans T119 "eason for this apperently fooli31 inertia lies ‘n t1e extow sive importation f forcig lp~ ... . .‘ ‘ ‘ A. +_ .o. - _ ‘ Lfl I .L-l L‘.l L1,...) 'vk)‘. KI ”:5. .2 .1 i1": v.1- .1 Allied countries there the civilian laser for ee 133 r1aintai11ed er u51ng w nzn and other prewar non-workers, by leréthening the work ‘V“Ll '— “ ‘ V‘ ‘0 N1 R .' w‘ \-1- 'L' F‘ 4' . . ‘ ‘ 'L "W“ 1 LCCS, 81d si:.ilar measures, 11 German,:1ttes msineiin or 'He iuAer— ’ i "’. f‘fi D h ‘nz I“ ‘ ’L O o N '1' .1 w‘ ..I‘F‘. w 'L‘- . taLlOu o1 101ei31lauor. IV is a Singular vrioute to ”“11 LGquCS Of ad11,1111istratio:1 that l’lC 37:31\1;‘w;,1_1 A'fiv-i“l £1,111.13; 3513ng {15 3:) t"); 4'1 I ‘ "‘1‘ W n v - 1' fl 1 ,.—. “ m‘ C‘ 1".“ 1‘ u ' p ~fl ".. ... t. ‘ nimu:r oi Joruers tne; izq orted. .Je U.s. strete51c JOJQIEO survey fiilwerd193. 40-47 10 ”.3 “Milward, p. 97. Klein,)p.133, 215-217. “-4 fi< In 0 ,1L 1++. / ’3 -93- 3?, 103? and t1at this n‘mbzr inere we ste1C1ly ever the next 1 'cars to 7,130,000 cf whom 1,330,000 were prisoners of war.’ it gas tnese 1orker who had to make up for the loss of industr'al workers in roughly the same period and to prom use 11: aidi— tional outgut required ov tle 11eon1tut of -1it3kr es. Cf these E ,3 O“ (o 3 (.0 d. 5 1D RUMJC r of workers inserted was Hot rreatly in ‘xeess of .a \..) l‘l _ ‘ -ermen reelee-ememt 1chu . 09.1-.-. -. 1,1,1- - 1 - L ,1‘ - u 1. v .-_ -' .4 C. 1‘ ' vv‘ ‘ M V ‘ 1’1“ f" "' “ 4' , . 110.1_ 1se was made of tnese fore1An mor1ers eieepe as physical laborers, one virtHally no at em1 its made at ela351f cation 1 by sr“ or by exierienee re euired in tb1e1r home countries . juogtaze ‘ I ‘ ,-J ‘1 --.' w - «4’: . A59. 1.; 1...“-.. --- J». ‘ \ U... \ _, .fl _ v.‘ 0 1-1 )1‘ 1‘. n 1 1 ‘ (fl-’1: a. 1\ A._L _~v.L\.-.‘.A i » UL- A ,~ [-4'. .. . k, 4 A- M] L - L] 4L 9 '1 a . L \~ ‘ - “.3— -§ v , “1— .1 3 ms“- - Iv‘ sarco'nmw \'. 4’11 ,. 1.r‘"' J F L V] ““ “:1" >1 ’f‘ J: kaj l’~QuJ.VV .L‘fl-y-l‘. ... g‘J‘ Lac .4 \‘ls‘.’ - .Av» V.Lv *.. -- bat! -1 1. A» a A n 1‘ 4 I 1 J. r | o "‘ 1 ' “°‘ ‘ \,+ ' 1 1 " ’ ‘- 7) .f‘V“ 1 r1 ~ Q n ‘3 u< fl -‘ '\,. '3 " ib‘~ .\‘_"r J Akv. .u. U 1.).‘_L- ‘J.Il\ ti‘ )1 J. 5" ; \- VL‘- V I l. .1 -J ‘1 a 0 F11 1 «J- L ' ‘“ J... 0 ‘1 1 -\ . . . - 5"; r \ + _. 1 _ “n- ._ ---1 '1 -1- n ,- H qv ,, ..'.- .- r T v *Jv— W~3101 of.1c Dvxvvou+u saorv .v 11 Lasor 11 “as location The Pre-Ner Years ’ 1‘ In 1939 he oeeuo1tional J~istr1tutior1 of the erm1r labor force ('5‘— diifered si'ni ioaetly from the occupation? l distributi01 of 925 1 n y two sectors: Agricultural employment fell from 30. 52 of the work P 4" P) 7 I n "b' we 4- a- ..- -- a ’I " ’ ’ . ioree b0 ~4.Qg. UOV3lnmenu enelojment 1083 from 4.22 to 12.21. Tan . 11~1'3 \ I g . | ) A U U l c _..L ..L \ £1 o t-! K I I‘J \ § -27- I“ 4. ‘,'.n.t. .. e ., . , .. T ‘_ .-‘ . 'J- , ller Of tl“S SulLUS mOo OJlf T83 ~‘1nqy\g J} bAG hauls, lu U33 '2" rv-fi" . . ' ‘ _‘fl “ '4 " CL unset 11f s has u’e nae “a1 conscguense oi tn: Jar f cureau1rc1_, 4.1- . ,. !. - °.., ,,:3 .1 ,3 p 1 , J.‘ - .. , gm, 0 4-1 .. ., -. ....,1 one greatly increasea arnee lore 3, de greets 01 use boxerran--ciL buxeaucrac , and the new caramilitary forces. The proportion of the l- 9 - I‘ 4- -~.. 1.,- D 1‘ A (x ’-' 15 term iorce in manuiac uring ctaall 1ell My c.;;. lln HU“ULQCDUC1JH, however, a shift away _1on the con umer goodssector (c -syr:cially textiles and clothing industry and tne ca er \ -~ . production indust13~to tne metal fabr1cat1cn and cheuical industr1es I ‘ occurred. This Shift though,becomcs much less marked when the finures for 1929 a more prosperous year thanl 1925, are consi mr ed. hith small exception,}1ere were no shifts 'n the allocation of the German .1 “'pe_la or force in the pre.Jer vears due to the Naz' s: 3; Casi .1! ‘ 1 '. - 5 “ul— ,7 ,. ' 1. , ‘ ’ . .fl legal powers u: “callocaue tne availaele laJor force in lavor of T‘q 13‘ -Tp 7" Van ”a This failure to re alloca (I:- the labor force continued deep into (D the war. Feur years — mt r the rcr began, employment in war— ‘D industries nad risen only ei .1t can percent. Tie amount of s ack ( 9 H: {J O (' #- renaining due to the labor reallocation is shown by th "\ . L. . “ l _ o 0‘ laborers and the least essential sub-secto1 of all, dOIxeSth SCTfle, only nine percent. In conparison to the United Kingdom tncse fir ures pa I 19 4 1r ' I) a . 9 _, n *1 - ‘ - r7 Alvlnt F‘ 7~° l‘11.1;:° 74-r'o V._ . ‘- Lt iL'..‘ 5" the ‘1 ’1 "HT! v ‘ v '3', A1“.... n V + U 1'. K4 ,, M ._ .,_','L ,ACH—gssau‘lhl :3 .30}; "1 l firmanr “Q vu'AVu / v 1 Jo fl 4 ;. 3v -“¢7.f‘“ ~Jvu4 A A a '\ .L 8.30 led to use i I‘d, ..M ‘5‘ 7" u“ U anA . ut G: 1A L) tor, b. I Vb- ‘ ";1 l v‘ \ 4'. CL; A ‘ ROOFOTS l 3 OK; kill“' A‘ ‘1. S 3 rte n; v 5 i .J‘SY‘G v4. w 'L 1. r— .1. ..--§'_.-\— r. r: 8.3 O V \ 'H'El"? 11 t (—~ t as . hrnac' r‘ v o the d v 10, r~ CLUII.‘ ‘3 -'—1\ v. '44 b for Id CVCI‘ a1: ‘15. S v § 11] 511 'l ‘\’l‘ ,- ‘ bL‘JAA ‘ .\ ‘uA (fi'-. (44“. .36 TN“ f tne a V v” C V I Jean t ..L, eu- ict b \ 0nd t DC 3 D ‘ '/\. LOI'CVS (AS 0 anpower nos .1 ”l 518 COHJ. Jich - 4 V I c L 11730?! O a _ «4- (3.11:) uI‘lfBS \A L. i 1'58 1‘ .18 u f t d3 0 ‘3‘“ \4J "f 4.1‘ ULL'B I 1 rfl'fl n' I". ’ )UU , v" ‘4 J ; - ,1 5 3d Force L ,a IA A n. 13 ‘ ufl‘ «L ; WM. .3 r" atel iéqu r‘ Cs y resolv ‘ L r-wah 1: 14.40 '1 ,r O \-\ ‘en from nu (rem w ‘ J. 3. ; 1 collen.“ n9 0' - J. . .1" gas luS3l; n ‘ ‘14 ‘ga, L 'st “f. Vol“ —‘ \J V A .1 .L. L; ~to A w l. 1 Q .3 at! 5 f7 fi‘yV—h ”.1“ M A‘. ”I, ‘3VIPI ~7/)11."\ £40.; .IVJ- 0 up; 4 3101’] 0‘31u A . n u ...“. wt .15 .L . L! to 5" V‘J for JOI‘ ‘ a lo- V C... ‘Y b natl acir L‘. LIL Cf- P‘IHFI '“AJ.K4&-’\* n'x 5‘- ver 3: A \J l"; 3 bermans d .1. Hr First on. -/'T7-\ 7‘ *Ugh’. w 4 0 6-101: \ J .- \ i V‘. ' l~ at war} ,1 1 L-l idw~LKA’L‘"i/. 1, I 05 ha L. x L." . 1&0! “.S 7.13»: v-n ..ku 71 P' .L J w ‘W n V JV; c L O! . 1 Lb \.~ laporers. 21d tn." S it“.po:‘t: \A n . "\J. OJ ... . .n.‘ C «r. f0 8. bl V lievn ‘5 ‘ L w‘vkr § ‘ «.- f‘ ‘ l )4. L ,xflj ‘0‘ ' r" DO I‘LJ-L.:LOVV.U'~.3 ]-(.1»J\, .L O’f'u u n O . u..,... l. . 4*- V‘Hr‘ ‘7 C~4s -l n“ S .’\ mnv'y ‘- k'l -‘o(~.a‘ G ‘1 fl - y‘a'. .LL...‘ ‘.J\.~ -\ a 1-». r I mpn n-L ‘1 \JLCL"/"OA . ll 1 fLOIZS ,F' i \ .II A ~-.1‘.. "~34 D‘\a-‘ ‘VN .0 do A”; l. U ‘ - L A ,‘V r\ r. SIUJ. VOL V“) x) r‘1 U ‘3 fi 3 0‘" ‘AU _ ‘ 1)): -A (.A--\4‘ nelass . .L ~Nh‘ -..‘ ‘ nA‘JVkJ’. LI I‘M‘. v -,—‘ .4\! 3‘, v v / | 1. 3‘ U; dh’ ed. matter I s nxv'. _ «‘1 1r [‘JmJLl'I AIL—‘5 J ADI-11‘: Io"? RATIO; Introduction The administration of the German war economy, never a clear and well-organized organization. shifted radicall; during tug may, There were at least ten distinct and conflicting organizations charged with responsibility for its management in the glitzkrig; period: 1) the three armed forces all determined their requirements independent both of one another and of the economy as a whole. 2) The Labor Ministry under Robert Bar nad yrifigry respon— siblity for manpower requirements. 3) The Economics Ministry under walther Funk handled raw material allocation. 4) The Reich Commissioner for Building, Fritz Todt, was responsible fer all construction. 5) The Economic General Council under Goering's chairman— ship theoretically_hald supreme power but in practice p Seldom use; it in Germany proper. 6) The Four Year Plan Office also under Goering was supposed to have prepared the German economy for war and to be a co-ordinating agency. 7) The Armed Fbrces' war Economy and Armament Office under General Thomas was the OKL's economic planning and con ordinating staff. 8) The Ministry of Armament and Munitions under Fritz Todt. dealt only with army supply problems in this early period. 9) In aiditlgn the 71.1nce Ministry. the Jeich Price commissioner, tho forty-three Gauleitor, the SS. and sundry other agencies were involved in the management of the war economy. 103 Finally at the top Adolf nitlsr had to coordinate all . ‘ ~ 7 ‘ r q r, . .. J. . -. u- _ ,.‘." " y 'f ‘71 ‘ 1 »— .'-v .'. ,s . ‘ . ‘ ‘ . "".“ " t.)o e L¢~ ‘ ‘_'_ J .. .9 . £‘ t klA ‘-‘. v J.] ' , _ . ~‘_ 9 . kl I v y’ ,‘ _ a- I ‘ .q ”a- | K; 1"‘L ~A ‘ A ~zh but also on daily matters cocauso no one else had the power to do this. It was this surplus of administration and shortage of coordination that was to hinder all pro-1942 German efforts to solve her strategic shortages. Later, after the filitzkriog period ended. the Speer Minis- try to a large extent sclvcithis problem by taking over almost complete control of the economy. The Blitzkrieg Years In the first three years of the war the German economy was run by various conflicting agencies with relatively little central planning or control. The one: fiercriccd below arc the mozt ihjcrtant. Adolf Hitler Basically powor to enforce a decision on conflicting agencies and authority to make economic plans was held by no one beneath Adolf Hitler. Consequently he was not only the court of last resort. but the court of first resort as well. That this made excessive demands on his time was recognized by tho Nazis in theory. Consequently the economy was split into two sectors. Over the civil sector first Schacht and than Funk presided as Plsntipotentiary foriflieEconomy. Over the mili- tary sector Goering presided as Plontipotentiary for the war Economy. Over the two sectors combined was the Economic General Council under Gocring. In practice Funk was a nonontity who was gradually sheared Of his powers as the war progressed. Gooring overempjasifiii f1: nnq:u (u r ...) O H (‘0 k k...‘ 8) O .... H L H O :Y’ L.) f) \ r H .J t p $ ‘4 (I- U) (U H {L Q) :1 :23 (2.. Li {II <: C; *3 . 1 . .. . . u used its powozn Thus in practice Hitler remained tne sole co-ordin— ator of the economy. Hitler's Josition as the o-erational head of the German econom‘ l P - are “.‘ —.r ‘. 3—“ ,_‘_ ‘_‘L1 st unmiss c,.;u;e Ilbi' . I , - . - also uanSU cccsus: J: D 0 '. -. - ‘ 1 , - i ,. rms a Singularlr cad economic leader. It ens - 1 e - a ' .A 4» 1- r o 218 rum: a8 . ,‘ -.‘L »\Y ye ‘- l'.‘ ‘ (- ’I In“ - L ... -“‘ n “I: ’I"! ,,. Ls~Ld ...:‘lJ 4&4»!de ~“L‘J—x—Ly-l C) .4 Lb J4" (1 leader. He not only had no understanding of modern economic thasry; he did not even comprehend the existence of the basic problem with which economics seek to deal. the allocation of limited resources among unlimited needs. When once asked by Spear about the priorites to be used if everything required could not be produced simultaneously he typically answered: But everything can be! Finally Hitler combined an incredible interest in matters of detail. especially technical problems and army problems, with an almost total lack of interest in economic problems of a general nature. He found time to discuss tank production in all its details, but he never found time to look into the chaotic steel rationing process.2 Nevertheless in the .litzkrier period Hitler alone exercised central control of the economy. The Ministry of Economics The decline in the power of the Kinietry of Economics from the time of Schacht to the time of Funk is the classic example of how the power of a Nazi ministry rested not on its legal pesition, but on the ability of its head. In theory Funk as Plenipotentiary for the Economy was in charge of the ministries of Economics, Labor. Finance. Fool, 3 and Forestry. In reality these ministries went their own way and Funk 1Klein.;1>o.150, 152, 169. 2K1ein,..3p. 169-171. “\3lranz Neumann, BehemothzThe Structure_and Practice oleational Socialism, 2nd ed. (New York:0ctagon Books.1963), p. 253. only controlled trade and conme~cc, banking, an forig; exchange. Only in so far as the Kinistry of Economics controlled the importation and allocation of raw materials did it directly affect the German war 4 economy. Nevertheless its lack of power did not discourage it from engaging in empire—building and empire—maintainance. Especially it sought to prevent any decline in consumer goods production with thercsult that valuable ningoxar and natcrial were coaicd ?:r ingusorie; which needed them. In the -gitzkrieg years consumer goods groiuxzi;n actually rose and in addition there were heavy imports from the con- quered areas.5 The control of raw materials was exercised through the twenty- seven Reichstellen each of which controlled a group of raw materials. The Reichstellen were substantially autonomous and of markedly varying efficiency.6 The board for non-ferrous metals did excellent work, for instance, while the steel board functioned very badly.7 To obtain needed raw materials an armaments factory first exaggerated and then reported its needs for the next three months to the procurement office of the armed service which had placed the weapons' order creating the need. The procurement offices of each service totaled these requests and padded the total generously before passing it on 4Milward. p. 21. 5Milward,pp. 28-29. 6Nathan ,3) p. 47-49 e 7Klein,pp. 162—163. , -34... '3 the OKW's War Economy and Armanents Office which then negotiated with the Ministry of Economics for the requested raw materials. If necessary the Four Year Plan Office or Hitler arbitrated. The 33333— stellen were then informed ho: Ker-FlTeed amounts were to b: izfiTibuLCd' Whether the plants ever got the raw materials they had requistionod then depended on the competence of the relavant Reichstellen. No one ever checked to see what the actual. as opposed to the stated needs, were or oven whether the need for the requested new material still existed after the bureaucracy got through processing the order. Thus if the weapons order was cancelled or modified as often happened the original requisition was still sent. Or rather it was supposed to be sent; often the required quantities of one crucial raw material in a program requiring several raw materials would never arrive at all.8 The Ministry of Labor Although theoretically under the control of Funk, in practice the Ministry of Labor was wholy autonomous. As we saw in Chapter IV. the Ministry had extraordinary legal powers to meet the manpower needs of the war-essential industries, but it made little use of them. It did, however, maintain Comb-out Commissions under each of the three hundred local Labor Offices to remove unneeded workers from any plant, mili- tary or civil. and reassign them where they were needed. Both the armed forces and the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions bittenL; resented this interference in the management of the plants producing for them and consequently set up competing commissions to prove their need for labor. However, on the whole this activity of the Ministry of A 810.0111,Pp. 163-164. g 9 of babor was beneficial. To obtain needed labor form the Ministry of Labor an armaments plant merely applied to the local Labor Office. The Labor Office then supplied the needed men from those locally available. Usually in tim3eyears. this worked. When it did not, the war Economy and Arma- ments Office would ask the Ministry of Labor to relocate workers from some other district. Disputes would then arise on the existence of the need and/or on its importance relative to other claims. Again there was no one below Fitlcrwho could arbitrate such disagreements.1O Fortunately. however, in these years there was enough slack in the supply of labor to keep this from being too serious. The Foe Year Plan Office As Goering's secretariat, the Four Year Plan Office had consi- derable theoretical authority; but never tried to use it. Far from aiding Goering direct the economy, it merely settled a few raw mater- ial allocation disputes and regulated the factories entrusted to it by the original Four Year Plan.11 The Ministry of Armaments and Munitions The Ministry of Armaments and Munitions was created in February 1940 as a result of Hitler's dissatisfaction with the military's 9Nathan.pp. 196-199. Klein. p. 165. 10Klein,pp. 165-166. 11 Neumanngpp. 219-250, 595. Klein, p. 169. - c. O‘\ I handling of economic affairs. It dealt only with army procurement and was designed to assist and not to replace the army's own pro- curement agency.12 Thus it was not very important for most of the economy; however. from it Speer's Ministry for Armaments and war Production was to arise. ‘ The Armed Forces' war Economy and Armaments Office The Armed Forces' war Economy and Armaments Office had relatively little power because (1) Hitler preferred civilian advisers and (2) its advice was unpleasant to Hitler. Specifically it had a much better idea than he of.Allied production possibilities, especially witn ye gr; to the 0.5. and the U.S.S.R. Therefore it recommended going over to a total war economy as soon as the war began. This advice was most unpopular in high Nazi circles and consequently the war Economy and Armament Office never received the power to do more than assist the wholhrautenomous procurement agencies of the three armed services. It could not control or even co-ordinate these agencies, let alone lead the war economy itself; Moreover its duties were considered technical and "uh-military" by the offices of all three services with the1§esult that the good officers often sou 5: t3 373;; ““ignmsnt to it. “DO The Procurement Agencies of the Armed Forces Arie: Army procurement was the responsibility of Colonel-General Fromm, Chief of Army Equipment and Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Army. In practice he was directly responsible, not to the OKH or the 12- . 41.319.“ p. 152. ”£1,933. 150-151, 156. w “37. OKN, but to Hitler personally. In army planning, moreover, supply officers were ignored by the officers in charge of operational planning thus creating an internal lack of liason.M Air Force Due to the power of Goering air force procurement remained the most independent and least co-ordinated of the armed forces' procure— ment agencies until the last year of the war. Due to 3233;1-‘3 Srvguunt CliifCJ in his criers. it also remained the worst run. It frequently . specified changes in design that made mass production almost impos- sible. Moreover it took up a far larger share of Germany's munitions output than was justifiable and never settled on production pri- orities among the various types of aircraft it wanted duilt.15 flagz The OKM's procurement agency was relatively small and was the first armed service procurement agency to be turned over to the Speer Ministry.16 Summary These agencies and the minor ones listed but not described ran the German war economy in a remarkably inefficient manner and yet the German war economy was never more successful than it was in these years . This system, ramshackle though it was, was quite adequate for the reduced requirementScf'B.itzkrieg. Ihe_fost-Blitzkrieg>Years Following the defeat before Moscow in late l9#1. Hitler decided b : . 1 “tea. p. 157. 159-160. :Efllég’ F. 157° l3}5., p. 157; Milward,pp.82-83. 1'. Q-D ...) _“-- T7 can: re :1 a iklfl isn‘u:;xUJlf. 3s 051’s Ti istr; .f Munitions to which he then entrusted much of the central direction of the war economy. Todt, however, was killed on February 8, 1942,in an airplane crash. His successor, Albert Spoor. continued the process 0 e 17 of reform and centralization. Graiually tyne: toga ovcr control of most of the agencies dis- cussed above even though tQBTB zero curtain key :xcsgtiunq :nicn managed to hold out for quite a long time. however. Luftwaffe pro- curement did not come under his control until March, 1944; the pro- curement of labor, while taken from the Labor Ministry and given to Sauckelas Plenipotentiary for Labor on March 19. 1942 never did come under Speer's control; the Economics Ministry was not completely stripped of its powers until November, 1943; and the 35's economic empire remained independent and inefficient to the very end.18 The new line of command in all its essentials was established by May, l9h2. At the top was Hitler. At frequent conferences with Spoor, he made the most important decisions. Speer, functioning as Minister of Armaments and war Production, held the daily reSponsi— bilities. Beneath him was the network of Committees and Rings begun by Todt. For each major type of armaments 035. tanks, ships, etc.) a Main Committee existed. For an as:enti:l we‘33n?nt {e.:. c411— bearings) used by several Main Committees a Ring existed. The Com- mittee and Rings were staffed by young technicians and were quite efficient.19 '7 4 O v P V‘ «a :I" - - ~~ - ‘ ‘- — I , ‘-' ID~v-.;y- u;_y; l)1b.,3p. 31—:2, 1jg~1j). ...—o- ' ...—“'n-t- 19Neumann,pp. 589-59h. 1 When necessary they were supplemented by special ag‘hgg Staffs created to deal with individual crises. These included the Fighter Staff set up to raise fighter production in 1944, the Ruhr Staff set up when the Ruhr was cut off by Allied bombing, the Ball-bearing Staff set up after the Allied air raids on that industry, and the Synthetic Oil Staff: also born of Allied air raids. Finally raw ma- terial allocation was centralized in a new office, Central Planning. Ostensively under the Four Year Plan Office and Goering, actually it amounted to regular fortnightly meetings of Spoor and Milch to allo— cate raw materials among all claimants. 20 Summary The new administrative arrangements raised production greatly as we saw in Chapter I. But even until the end of the war enough administrative disunity persisted to Hflifi : ch: wmrIirzgo angrily 59?4&HY. inanolithic and totalitarian . uzvsr azaLqun the efficient economic structure of her democratic opponents in the west. Conclusions First the German war economy was characteriz«l by extreme internal disunity and infighting during the 'flitzkrieg years. Second the increased needs foil Jinx tne vni of :;;;;-;;_u made this an impossible luxury and that therefore the Ministry of Armaments and Nunitions was efljcxorsi to unifg -dc rcnne'y. 20I lilWE’J‘dflOp. 83‘860 -40- Third the centripetal tendencies of Nazi administration continued until the end and thus reduced the effectiveness of the Speer Minis— try. Fourth at all levels and times Nazi economgr administration tended to be a matter of creating special agencies with vaguely de— fined authority in reaction to emergency situations rather than a matter of rational future- rientated planning. BIJLIOCYAI”Y Books A Member of the German Freedom Party, Hitler Calls This Living} trans. by Munroe Fraves. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd.. 1939. By a German emigre. Inaccurate an: .rcliable. Basch, Antonin. The Danu£§IQLghiand.the German Economic Sphere. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. By a wech diplomat. Argues that fall of . zechoslovakia led to Germ. dominance in Balkans. Downgrades German suc— cesses there earlier. Weak on oil. 8., A.J. Europe Under Hitler: In Prospect and in Practice. London: Oaiford University Press for The doyal Institute of Interna— national Affairs, 1941. Pamphlet on German ”“ew Order". Sees much more skill and organization than there actually was. Bauer, Wilhelm. German Economic Policy. Berlin: Terramare Publication, Inc. 1939. Nazi propaganda. Bengtson, John Robert. Nazi her Aims: The Plans for the Thousand Year Reich. Rock Island, Illinois: Augustana College Library, 19 2. A summary of Naz i history 1933-1335 coupled with cuota- tions from Nein Kampf and Table Talk on the fate of +10 T-erld after a Nazi victory. No new evidence is adduced. 115 1:31-;7l3ls I n. 4 . ... ..L.‘»." I,,ll_« Borkin, Joseph, and welsh, Charles A. Germany's Easter Plan: The Stogy of an Industrial Offensive. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943. By the chief specialist on foreign cartels of the Anti- trust Division of the Justice Department and another cartel specialist, it sees a vast plot going on for decades by German cartels to weaken our defenses by monopolistic arrange- ment with American firms. Brassey}s Naval Annual, Rear-Admiral H.G. Thursfield (ed.).Vcl. LIX. London: William Clowes and Sons, Ltd. 1948. Contains the Navy's records of the Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs for the war years. Bruck, w.F. Social and Ecangmic History of Germany from William II to flitlery 1888-1938: A Comparative Study. Oxford:0xford University Press, 1938. Sees "Camenilism, the peculiar German type of Mercantil- ism" as the key to the last 200 years of German socio-econonic history. Sullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. rev. ed. New York: He rper and Row, Publishers, 1934. in excellent biography with an :r;n; $34313 . '1 poliL.m Llhistory at the expense of ccoromic hiseo1y. Derry, T.K. Tye Campaign in Norway. London: Her 1m jesty's Stationery Office, 1952. Part of the United Kingdom's official history, it argues that while British action to cut the iron ore traffic was inevitable so wasa German reaction and covc‘udec +hat Brit‘" could not possibly have heldi' Iorway. A vcrr gooi esca. Dugan, James and Stewart Carroll. Ploesti: The Great Ground-Air Battle of 1gAugust 1943. New York: Random House, l9c3. Contains little information of a general nature as it is concerned exclusively with the battle and the warriors and not with general economic problems. Germanicus (pseui.) (ed.), German LThe Last Four Years: An Indepen- dent anmination of the Results of National SociaLism, Boston: The Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937. A collection of articles in the February 1937 number of The Bank r,a London banking magazine. More sympathetic to the Nazis and less emotional than most of the other books of this period, it emphasizes the alleged fiscal unsoundness of the regime and ur gently recommends ag gainst UK loans to Ceriany and against a policy of appeasement. Glesinger, Egon. Nazis in the Woodgil - EIitler' 3 Plot for Essenti=gL RaW'Naterial. New Y) k: The Bobbs—Kerrill Co. 1942. By the Secretary-General of the Comite International du Sois. Exa~cerates the impor ance of wood cri the suc::;s of the T