THE 1960 PRE-CONVENTION CAMPAIGN

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Florence Avakian

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ABSTRACT

THE 1960 PRE-CONVENTION CAMPAIGN

by Florence Avakian

Since 1960 was an exceptional year in American politics, the Falk Fellows in the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University had been working on research projects in this area. The pre-convention campaign can be viewed from many aspects; however, being a Falk Fellow during the 1959-1960 academic year, a mode of analysis was revealed to me in the Brookings Institution book, The Politics of National Party Conventions by Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman and Richard C. Bain. The work, in forecasting on the basis of established knowledge, sets up three generalizations which have particular significance in the development of the nominations.

In the hope of being a systematic, historical review of the events between 1956 and especially 1960, as they bear on the 1960 nominating process, this study is an application of these three generalizations to the 1960 pre-convention picture. In addition, the two critical presidential primaries in the states of Wisconsin and West Virginia have been chosen to test the accuracy of the state presidential primary results as an adequate forecaster of the results in the ensuing general election.

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In so doing, the following variables were chosen for the test: a comparison of a candidate's vote in each state's primary and general election; the relationship of the Democratic and Republican results in each state's primary and general election; and, rural-urban, Roman Catholic, Negro, voter turnout and median income relationships in each of the two states.

The study demonstrates that the following valid relationships emerged.

Those counties which Vice-President Nixon won in the Wisconsin primary and general election displayed strong Republicanism. The counties in which Senator Kennedy was victorious in Wisconsin were highly Democratic, Roman Catholic and urban.

In summary, neither the Wisconsin nor West Virginia primaries accurately forecasted the general election results in those two states, respectively.

THE 1960 PRE-CONVENTION CAMPAIGN

By

Florence Avakian

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I am indebted to Professor LeRoy C. Ferguson who as chairman of my thesis committee patiently read the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions. Grateful appreciation is expressed to Professors Joseph LaPalombara, chairman of the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University, and Charles R. Adrian who as members of the thesis committee assisted the chairman in directing the completion of this manuscript. I wish to express sincere thanks to Professor Joseph A. Schlesinger who gave me access to his useful files and who, along with Professors Ralph M. Goldman, Samuel Krislov and O. Charles Press, gave me the benefit of his significant comments.

The great assistance of the American press, particularly The New York Times, which provided such abundant detail and keen interpretation, and of Friden, Incorporated, which furnished me with the invaluable use of their calculating machines, is deeply appreciated.

As a recipient of the Falk Foundation grant, it was possible for me to attend both party national conventions in 1960 and observe the committee and convention activities at first hand. This unique opportunity made one vividly

conscious of the flavor and sentiment which pervades such a gathering. I must record my gratitude to the Falk Foundation for enabling me through a fellowship to spend a valuable year studying American political science at Michigan State University and for making possible the unforgettable trips to both conventions.

Florence Avakian

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CHAPTER I

THE THREE GENERALIZATIONS

The Brookings Institution introduced a study in 1960 offering various propositions on presidential nominations.[1] The purpose of this paper is to place the 1960 nominations within the framework of three of these propositions. In addition, since one of them deals with the importance of one of these indices of candidate popularity, namely, the primary election as a major factor in affecting the nominating process, the writer will attempt to test, with limited evidence and in spite of the pitfalls, whether the primary is an indicator of future election results. The primary vote in the states of Wisconsin and West Virginia will be tested against the behavior of these same states in the general election.

Relationship between Nominations and Polls

Since 1936, public opinion polls have made their appearance in pre-convention and post-convention campaigns. The most outstanding polling organization coming on the scene in 1935 was George Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion, which has since played a striking role in all

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[1] Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman and Richard C. Bain, The Politics of National Party Conventions (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960).

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[2] Ibid., p.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p.

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Pre-convention polls do not necessarily predict the convention nominee, but they "indicate the development of public opinion at frequent intervals throughout the four-year period of the nominating cycle," and "provide the only nationwide measures of voter preferences that become available before the convention."[2] Therefore, we can understand why the candidates act as they do during the progressing campaign, and they themselves can be guided by the results. However, over-confidence in poll results can also be ruinous, as illustrated by the much-publicized error of all the polls in 1948 which "exposed various weaknesses in survey techniques, and also made it clear that any close election is likely to be genuinely unpredictable."[3]

Preference Polls

Preference polls are published during the 'phase of latency' which list the obvious candidates in the order of their popularity within their party and among voters who are independent.[4] Frequent polls are taken to record change in voter sentiment. Respondents during the early period of

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[2] Ibid., p. 308.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 310. The 'phase of latency' is defined "as the period from one presidential election until the beginning of the active contests for the next following nomination."

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Due to the wide publicity furnished by various news media, it seems very likely that polling results are paid attention to by kingmakers, party leaders and potential candidates. When a relatively unknown figure regularly increases his percentage level, the policitians take notice. It is at times such as this that the polls may direct attention to future potential candidates.

Polls and Primaries

These pre-convention popular mandates, i.e., public opinion polls and presidential primaries, are most in use by the party faithful from March to June during the presidential year. Though scientific knowledge is not available concerning the effect polls and primaries exert on each other, a few hypotheses can be stated.

Most likely, the primaries influence the polls more directly and to a greater degree than the reverse being the case. It is very probable that the reaction that is impressed on the candidates, the party leaders, the delegates, and the voting population by the successive primaries, is reflected in the polls. However, the polls play their part in emphasizing the importance of the results and clarifying

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The process of primary results influencing poll results, which in turn affect candidates' strategies and induce professional politicians to take notice, can be described as a recurring cycle. Candidates revise their operations which influence future primaries, which in turn cause the sentiments of the voting population to be affected; this in turn is finally mirrored in the polls. Early and later primary results may differ greatly; likewise, the polls reflect this variation.

Trial Heat Polls

The preceding discussion concerns the public opinion polls which determine the rank of the various candidates in their own party. On the other hand, the trial heat poll is more pertinent to the final convention outcome.

"'Trial heat' polls attempt to discover how a specific candidate of one party would run against a specific candidate of the other if the general election were held at the time of the poll."[5] Resembling a regular election, though on a minute scale, they reflect the large number of voters who will vote for their party choice no matter who is nominated.

Generally, the candidate who leads the ranking in his own party is the one who runs best against the opposition

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[5] Ibid., p. 314.

party candidate in these contests. However, this may not always be true, since the trial heat polls include the reactions of Independents, voters who will vote for their own party, and the vote of people who will cross party lines. For these reasons, trial heats are more valuable than preference polls.

In 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower demonstrated his winning ability in the preference and trial heat polls; on the other hand, Robert A. Taft, who was the leading contender in the Republican Party for a short time, did not fare well against the Democratic candidates.

Trial heat polls, demonstrating a definite difference between two candidates for the same party nomination, are very significant, but especially so when the individuals in these polls also run poorly in the preference polls within their own party. Senator Taft in 1948 and 1952, and Adlai E. Stevenson to an extent in 1952, were in this position.

When a candidate receives a majority within his party in the preference polls, it can be said that this more nearly approaches the level of a nationwide popular mandate, taking into consideration the extremely small number of people canvassed. However, a majority does not occur when there is a contest among the candidates. This is where the trial heat polls can guide the delegates in seeking a mandate, since one of the major reasons in the selection of a nominee is his

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Delegate Polls

The final outcome as to the choice of the presidential nominee may be doubtful until its occurrence; nevertheless, in more cases than not, it can be foretold by the unofficial press polls taken of the delegates prior to and during the convention, and by ballots on other matters.

These delegate polls are very valuable for assessing delegate opinion at a given time, and can be compared to the preference polls taken of the electorate. However, in comparing the two, it must be recognized that since the final delegate polls—immediately preceding and during the convention—are usually 'all-inclusive', they are a much more valuable guide to sentiment in that group.[6] The polls taken of the voters, (even the latest ones prior to the convention), must suffer due to the small percentage scrutinized.

As is the case for the early primaries and preference polls, the early delegate questioning is not crucial. But as convention time nears, their responses may actually affect the final result. When the delegate polls reveal that a

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[6] 'All-inclusive' denotes available information concerning the division of sentiment within each delegation, mainly acquired through the chairmen of the delegations.

particular candidate is strongly ahead, the delegates assist an event which would gradually occur, "with a plurality gaining momentum as it becomes a reported majority."[7] A front-runner who attains the position of being the definite and clear choice of a majority of the delegates, as Thomas E. Dewey was in 1944, quickly wins the support of those not already on the bandwagon.

In the event that a single candidate demonstrates heavy support in the delegate polls, the pressure is put on the other potential candidates to openly declare their reserves of strength. For both candidates and delegates, efforts to maintain silence concerning their commitments are made more difficult. This overt contest situation provides for open available information which may precipitate a bandwagon movement prior to the convention balloting.

Due to the tremendous increase of mass communications in recent times, public opinion has greatly influenced the professional politicians. Therefore, all indications pointed to the presidential nominees in 1960 being the contenders who led in the primary, preference, trial heat, party leader and delegate polls.

Nominating Patterns

"In the study of presidential nominations, the analysis of recurring patterns can be most clearly

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[7] Op. cit., p. 319.

> understood by recognizing that the act of nominating a presidential candidate is primarily a choice of leadership—the formal act by which the organized political party selects or confirms the leader under whose banner it will campaign for the control of the government."[8]

Since 1831, all sixty-three major-party nominations can be classified under five types of decisions: confirmation, inheritance, inner group selection, compromise in stalemate and factional victory.[9]

Confirmation

An existing leadership within the party is confirmed when a directly elected president is renominated, as in the case of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936, 1940, 1944 and Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956; a vice-president who succeeded to the office of the presidency due to the incumbent's death is nominated for a four-year presidential term, as demonstrated by the three victorious vice-presidents since 1900—Theodore Roosevelt in 1904, Calvin Coolidge in 1924, and Harry S. Truman in 1948; and, a titular leader who was defeated in a previous election is renominated—Thomas E. Dewey in 1948 and Adlai E. Stevenson in 1956.[10]

Incumbent presidents who previously were directly elected

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[8] Ibid., p. 111.

[9] These classifications have been prepared by Brookings Institution.

[10] For purposes of clarity, the term "titular leader" in this paper will be confined to the leader of his party who is a defeated candidate.

to the office usually have been much more successful in being renominated than either of the other two types of political leader.

Inheritance

An understudy groomed by the previous leader can be chosen for inheritance. William H. Taft in 1908 fell into this category.

Inheritance can also be accomplished by an outstanding individual who is recognized by the party as the natural successor. Herbert Hoover's and Alfred E. Smith's nominations in 1928 gave validity to this concept.

Inner Group Selection

Selection by an in-group can occur from within its own people when an individual leader has not become unquestionably pre-eminent, or by forces outside this group. "The American national parties do not ordinarily have any single or genuinely cohesive inner group that is dominant for all party affairs, except in the party in power when leadership has become firmly centered in the President."[11] However, there have been times when the leaders of the different groups have pooled efforts "on a sort of federated basis."[12]

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[11] Op. cit., p. 117.

[12] Ibid.

Generally, these occasions have been in behalf of a particular presidential nominating convention and have disbanded soon after the activity concluded.

Inner group selection from its own members has taken place at times under conditions similar to "inheritance by an understudy or by a previously outstanding leader. Usually, though, a larger element of competition is involved, there being less of a previous consensus on the outstanding availability of any one possible nominee."[13] In this classification was Grover Cleveland in 1884.

When an inner group seeks someone from outside its order, the implication is present that it is powerful enough to control the party but unable to find an acceptable individual within its ranks. With election time approaching, it finds it more expedient to support a winner from the 'outside' than to lose the election. This type of selection has had little success in selecting winners and has occurred in the Democratic Party on rare occasions, mainly when the party has been exceedingly weak, as in the case of George B. McClellan in 1864 and Horace Greeley in 1872.

Compromise in Stalemate

This situation occurs when the chief figure of a minority group or a less well-known political leader is accepted as a

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[13] Ibid.

compromise figure after a stalemate has been reached, involving the major leaders favored by the dominant factions. To most of the three Republican and four Democratic compromise choices, the term "dark horse" has been applied.[14] Warren G. Harding in 1920 and John W. Davis in 1924 may be listed as so-called dark-horse nominees.

Successful Factionalism

A nomination falls into this pattern when an insurgent group by successful tactics overthrows the leadership faction, i.e., those supporting a president in office or the backers of a titular leader seeking renomination.[15] In this classification are included Franklin D. Roosevelt who defeated Alfred E. Smith in 1932, and Thomas E. Dewey who was victorious over Wendell Willkie in 1944.

Coordinate factionalism is evident when a leader of one of the many factions—none being dominant—is advanced. This type occurs most often when a retiring president is not active on the question of his successor, or when his faction has no candidate to support. The out-party finds itself in this situation when no titular leader is seeking renomination.

The different results in the several factional struggles,

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[14] Ibid., P. 119. "On its face," 'dark horse' implies "an unanticipated or minor candidate whose victory was a surprise."

[15] Ibid., p. 120. 'Faction' is defined as "a number of leaders and other adherents of a political party who are cooperating with each other for the purpose of controlling or influencing the formal behavior of the party organization as a whole."

whether they are classified as insurgent or coordinate can be further elucidated by relating the candidate to the particular faction which advanced him.

"A candidate may himself be a factional leader, or he may be an outsider, or between these two extremes he may be a subordinate leader or a relatively inactive member of the faction."[16] Woodrow Wilson and Thomas E. Dewey, as factional leaders, were the most important and representative members of their factions. On the other hand, Dwight D. Eisenhower was an outsider recruited by a group seeking a winner.

The recognized leader of a faction must overtly fight against a field of candidates. He usually is active in planning his campaign strategy. Outsiders are more likely to take minor roles and let the faction operate the bandwagon.

Factional candidates, who capture the nomination approximately within a ten-year period after achieving national prominence, "have a type of glamour that can be extremely useful in the interparty competition, particularly when it is necessary to face an incumbent president carrying the prestige of the office."[17] If the factional struggle is not extreme, the resulting publicity may be extremely advantageous to the party and candidate involved, both for the nomination and the following election.

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[16] Ibid., p. 122.

[17] Ibid., p. 126.

Due to the continuity in American national politics, the 1960 presidential picture should fall into the classifications of "confirming the existing party leadership," or that of choosing new leadership by one or another of the four different patterns of succession.

Relationship Between Nomination and Front-Runners

To qualify as a front-runner, a candidate must be

> "the leading preference of the voters in his party, as well as the leading choice of the delegates after information on delegate strength becomes available. A candidate who develops a strong lead in delegate strength without leading in voter preference becomes suspect, and has difficulty in maintaining a legitimate claim to the front-runner position."[18]

In foretelling the intensity and nature of the ensuing struggle for the nomination, the best gauge is the number of candidates involved and their comparative strength.

Approximately half of the front-runners entering the Democratic and Republican National Conventions since 1832 polled the required majority—50 per cent and above—on the opening ballot. In these cases, naturally, the nomination was acquired on the first ballot.

The Democratic National Conventions until 1936 operated under the two-thirds rule; therefore, it was necessary for the front-runners winning on the first ballot to have captured 66 2/3 per cent or over of the delegate votes. If the

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[18] Ibid., p. 323.

majority rule had not gone into effect when it did, Roosevelt in 1940, Truman in 1948, and Stevenson in 1956 might have faced very different outcomes.

As in the past, the ballots following the first are more likely to be influenced by strategies employed during the convention. The opening ballot always involves many prior commitments, which will not necessarily be retained if several ballots are required for the nomination.

As past convention records verify, the number of front-runners, who polled less than a majority on the first ballot but still won the nomination, decreases as the percentage they polled on this ballot is reduced.

In the Democratic conventions (under the two-thirds rule), two out of three front-runners in the 50 per cent to 66 2/3 per cent first-ballot group, and four out of five in the 40 per cent to 50 per cent category were victorious. In the group polling less than 40 per cent, Winfield Hancock, the only victorious front-runner out of six, polled 23.2 per cent on the first ballot in 1880. Estes Kefauver, the only front-runner polling less than 40 per cent of the first-ballot vote in the majority rule conventions, lost the nomination.

In the Republican conventions, two (including Eisenhower in 1952), out of four front-runners polling 40 per cent to 50 per cent of the first-ballot vote won

the nomination; in the category of those receiving less than 40 per cent, three (including Dewey in 1948), out of eight front-runners became party nominees.

> "The number of ballots required to complete a presidential nomination is related to the amount of division with which a convention opens; this in turn seems likely to be related to the basic nominating categories of leadership confirmation and succession. It could be expected that each of these categories might have its own special pattern of convention voting, influenced by the extent to which consensus has been achieved before the convention meets, by the amount of factional conflict, and by the type of decision that is made in resolving the conflict where it exists."[19]

Confirmation

In the twenty-two of the sixty-three major party nominations which involved leadership confirmation, all except that of Dewey in 1948 were first-ballot victories. Usually no other candidate polled 10 per cent of the votes cast; however, out of the twenty-two instances, five proved otherwise.

The highest degree of nominating consensus, even before the conventions meet, is provided in the confirmation of an existing leader. Naturally an incumbent president fosters this harmony to a greater degree than a titular leader.

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[19] Ibid., p. 427.

Inheritance

The six cases involving inheritance of leadership have been identical with the nominations which confirmed the existing leadership in their voting pattern. Nomination was gained on the first ballot with no other candidate receiving even 10 per cent of the vote.

Inner Group Selection

Five of the ten nominations in this category were accomplished on the first ballot, but in most cases one or two other candidates polled 10 per cent or more of the votes cast. The voting pattern here seems to indicate that some consensus is achieved before the convention meets, but that the final outcome is hinged on negotiation and adjustment during the convention.

Compromise in Stalemate

Long balloting has been the rule rather than the exception in the seven nominations where a compromise choice was selected. There were many minority candidates who polled at least 10 per cent of the vote. Most of the characteristics preceding dark-horse candidacies have been removed—the two-thirds rule of previous Democratic conventions being the most important.

The deadlock tactic was greatly encouraged by the lack of suitable information during the early period of the

convention system. In our present age of abundant news communication, the views of voters, party leaders and convention delegates are easily accessible, thereby reducing the opportunity for deadlock.

Successful Factionalism

In only two of the eighteen situations of factional struggle were the probable results so clear that they were practically assured. These involved Dewey in 1944 and William B. McKinley in 1896. A difficult struggle was expected in the remaining sixteen cases.

Long balloting, which was common in the early nominations, seems to have disappeared in favor of the recent short-ballot conventions. The great likelihood is that due to the advantages of mass media, the convention result will be foreseen beforehand.

Even if two candidates of equal strength emerge, the possibility of a drawn-out balloting session is remote. This conclusion was best borne out by the close and heated Taft-Eisenhower struggle in 1952, concluded in one ballot, and the Stevenson candidacy in 1952, accomplished in three ballots taken during the course of a single day.

The 1960 presidential picture—and especially that of the Democratic Party with its field of five major candidates—required that the front-runner enter the conventions with at least 40 per cent of the vote on the first ballot,

since prospects for success are reduced as the percentage on this crucial ballot decreases.

CHAPTER II

PREPARATIONS AFTER 1956

A brief look at the 1956 nominations and election can best pave the way for the emergence of the dramatic events which occurred in the 1960 pre-convention presidential picture.

1956 Nominating Conventions

For the first time since 1900, both major parties during the same year renominated their presidential candidates—Dwight D. Eisenhower by the Republicans, and Adlai E. Stevenson by the Democrats. The 1952 National Convention decisions were further re-enforced by the Republican renomination of Richard M. Nixon for the vice-presidency.

The Eisenhower image of a non-partisan figure who privately and publicly disliked petty political controversy had been strengthened since 1952, when he had polled the largest popular presidential vote in history—almost 34 million votes. His remarkable showing at that time had been extensively interpreted as a personal victory, in which he had cracked the traditionally Democratic Solid South and

swept every other section of the country. Though the Republicans won control of Congress by riding in on 'Ike's coattails,' the margin was very slim and in the 1954 midterm elections was upset in favor of the Democrats.

Adlai Stevenson's intellectual sophistication and ease in discussing important political issues were well known by 1956. His 1952 vote of over 27 million had provided him with enough national prestige and power for him to strengthen his titular leadership role in the party.

The 1956 Republican National Convention in San Francisco faced no serious question of issues or personality. The party was unified behind Eisenhower and Nixon. "All that remained was ratification of the decisions, performance of the rally, and launching of the campaign," a very acceptable objective in light of the prevailing conditions.[1] On the other hand, the Democratic National Convention in Chicago was open—more so because of the Truman-Stevenson struggle for control of the Democratic Party than because of the battle over the vice-presidential race. In spite of the fact that Stevenson was the obvious front-runner, the delegates had feasible alternatives from which to choose.

As an incumbent president, Dwight Eisenhower was renominated with the total unanimity which had pervaded

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[1]Charles A.H. Thomson and Frances M. Shattuck, The 1956 Presidential Campaign (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 169.

the delegates' thinking long before the convention met. Even when his availability was in doubt due to the two health crises, no Republican achieved the status of a candidate. This act of 'confirming the existing leadership' emphasized the prevalent feeling that without 'Ike,' the Republicans probably would have lost the presidency.

Adlai Stevenson, as titular leader, also was involved in an act of leadership confirmation. However, the road to the party's top prize was quite a bit rockier than his Republican counterpart's in spite of his first-ballot victory. Stevenson entered the convention as front-runner with the support of Democratic state organizations and national party leaders, coupled with his series of primary victories over Senator Estes Kefauver—particularly his landslide in California, resulting in Kefauver's withdrawal from the race and support of his rival. Even though his only other potential competitor, Governor Averell Harriman of New York, won the backing of former President Harry S. Truman, the bandwagon movement engulfed Stevenson carrying him to a unanimous decision.

Both conventions introduced innovations concerning the 1956 vice-presidential picture. "The Democrats staged a free-for-all in choosing their vice-presidential candidate," because of Stevenson's wish for an open convention.[2] On the

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[2] Ibid., p. 89.

other hand, the Republicans exhibited a session "in which the choice for Vice-President was as powerfully santioned as that of the incumbent President himself."[3]

The apparent unity, harmony and discipline of the Republican Convention was upset—but not seriously at that—by Harold E. Stassen's projection of Governor Christian A. Herter into the limelight in an unsuccessful attempt—which persisted up to and during the convention—to prevent Nixon's renomination. Perhaps the only person who could have assured an open convention, President Eisenhower, maintained a hands-off attitude refusing to endorse Nixon categorically, but yet not commenting on other individual possibilities. However, this type of presidential endorsement was sufficient, since it seemed clear that only Eisenhower's public statement of support for another candidate would prevent Nixon's nomination.

Like Harriman, Stassen had made a late beginning in his effort to influence the delegates. But Stassen had the disadvantages of opposing the recognized resolves of the party rulers, and the disadvantageous atmosphere of the President's assertion favoring an open selection but not creating the necessary conditions for one. Undoubtedly, Stassen stated a truism when he said that most of the convention delegates wanted Vice-President Nixon. With

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[3] Ibid., p. 90.

the party decision negotiated months before, they had no other choice.

The Republican balloting for the second spot on the national ticket was highlighted by: the Herter nomination of Nixon; Stassen's seconding address; and, a Nebraska vote cast for 'Joe Smith'—"a symbol of an open convention"—which, following some television publicity and a good laugh, was changed to assure the unanimous renomination of Richard M. Nixon.[4]

The Democratic vice-presidential contest, the first open struggle since 1944, brought some fresh faces into the national arena. Of these, Senator John F. Kennedy emerged as the most impressive—displaying sufficient strength on the first ballot to rise as a serious contender, attracting anti-Kefauver and Southern opposition votes. During the balloting his peak total was only 30½ votes from victory. Kefauver achieved the nomination on the second ballot, following widespread switching of votes from many delegations. Though both the Democratic presidential and vice-presidential nominations had been contested, Kefauver's support came mainly from the delegations that had championed Stevenson.

The 1956 Election

The 1956 campaign and election was a repetition of much

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[4] New York Times, Aug. 23, 1956.

that occurred in 1952. Besides the renomination of the same two major party presidential and Republican vice-presidential nominees, both parties maintained campaign tactics which in similar fashion appealed to special groups in the electorate, instead of reversing their roles of offense and defense.

The principal issues discussed (to a certain extent), by the Democrats were: the lagging foreign policy, falling farm income, prejudice within the domestic economic situation for the more affluent, lack of civil rights progress, discrimination against labor, corruption in government, and inadequate schools. To this list, nominee Stevenson introduced his controversial plea for the termination of the military draft and of the testing of hydrogen weapons.

As was to be expected, the Republicans defended their four years at the helm of government; however, neither party pinpointed the issues of the campaign very sharply. Stevenson's attempt to present seriously the key issues to his audiences and receive due consideration for them proved mostly unsuccessful. However, this is to be expected since great pressures exist during a presidential campaign to present personalities and parties to the best advantage.

The electorate reaffirmed the existing leadership by giving President Eisenhower 457 electoral votes and 35½ million votes—the greatest popular vote in history and the second greatest plurality (Franklin D. Roosevelt's being

larger in 1936). Stevenson's substantial vote of 26 million confirmed his titular leadership within his party.

Despite the President's increased margin of victory, the Democrats captured both houses of Congress and retained a majority of the governorships. This was the first time since Zachary Taylor was elected on the Whig ticket in 1848 that a president did not carry in with him at least one house of Congress. It was evident that the Republican Party did not share the President's popularity and prestige.

In relation to the 1960 political situation, the following inferences can be drawn. Due to his second place on the Republican ticket, Nixon could at best claim an uncertain vote of confidence. However, the 22nd Amendment restricted President Eisenhower to two terms; the spotlight would then be on Nixon as the occupier of the second highest office in the land, and as a man who at the time stood unchallenged for the 1960 presidential nomination. In addition, by his intensive campaigning for many Republicans, Nixon put them in his debt and emerged with the support of a unified Republican organization.

In the Democratic Party, among the individuals prominent in the contest for the vice-presidential nomination, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, Mayor Robert F. Wagner of New York City, and Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee gained in national stature, encouraging their future aspirations.

However, it was Senator John F. Kennedy who benefited the most from his brief but significant thrust into national prominence.

1958 Midterm Elections: Results

Capturing the greatest majorities since 1936, the Democrats retained their hold on both houses of Congress and the governorships in the 1958 midterm or non-presidential elections. Including Alaska's and Hawaii's—held in 1959—elections, the Democrats increased their membership from 235 to 284 in the House of Representatives, with the Republicans decreasing from 200 to 153. The Senate Democrats augmented their majority from 49 to 65, the Republicans going in the opposite direction, 47 to 35. Likewise, ten Democratic governorships were won, bringing the total to 35; the Republicans reduced their sum from 19 to 15.

The most remarkable victory in 1958 was that of Nelson A. Rockefeller who won the coveted governorship of New York by over half a million votes (which almost doubled the most optimistic Republican expectations), carrying in on his 'coattails,' the candidates of all state-wide offices except one. His victory which ran against the national Democratic trend resulted from the visible dents he made in normal Democratic pluralities within the city, in addition to his expected upstate and suburban pluralities.

Other outstanding triumphs in 1958 included the landslide wins of: Senators John F. Kennedy by the largest plurality in Massachusetts history; Edmund G. (Pat) Brown in California piling up a 1,000,000 vote majority; and, Stuart Symington in Missouri.

1958 Midterm Elections: Evaluation

This election signaled the first time in history that the party occupying the presidency had failed three consecutive times to control Congress. Judging from President Eisenhower's landslides in 1952 and 1956, it seems fair to state that very little of his popularity and prestige had been transferred to the Republican Party.

The results also had a significant bearing on the 1960 candidate picture. Rockefeller emerged as a fresh, attractive, appealing challenge to Nixon for the presidential nomination. In addition, the tremendous victory of the Democrats in California, coupled with the Republican disunity there, were further blows to Nixon's ambitions. The prominent Democratic victories in California and Alaska, following his vigorous campaigning in those states, emphasized the "can't win" charge. However, Nixon had the backing of the party organization which he further strengthened by his 1958 campaigning.

The respective triumphs gave impetus to the political

futures of Kennedy, Symington and Brown. Harriman's defeat in New York eliminated his influence in the party and threatened to intensify and bring to a head the state intra-party split between the 'regular' and 'reform' factions.

According to political experts, cited by the New York Times, the major factors which contributed to the Democratic trend were: the economic recession and severe unemployment—for which the voters tend to hold the controlling party in the White House responsible, the role of labor, the farm policy and the general feeling of lack of leadership persisting in foreign and domestic affairs. On the other hand, there were also hard-luck reasons which accounted for the failures. The Republicans were forced to defend 21 Senate seats, mainly against formidable opponents, while the Democrats defended only 13, most of them in 'safe' areas. Furthermore, as in past Congressional races, the Democrats had the advantage of running 96 candidates unopposed for election, especially in the South where 84 fell into this category; only one Republican candidate was without opposition.

Due to the increase of northern Democrats and the sharp decrease of 'right-wing' Republicans, the composition of the new Congress appeared to shift from 'middle-of-the-road' to left. Some observers even suggested that

Rockefeller's triumph did not run counter to the trend of voting since most of the 1958 victories went to Democratic liberals and modern Republicans.[5] However, the general opinion was that this victory—which involved several examples of ticket-splitting—should be attributed to his personality, as Eisenhower's in 1952 and 1956, rather than to a Republican Party trend in New York.[6]

The large Democratic margins in Congress which gave the Democrats almost an unprecedented legislative power under a Republican president, plus the left-ward swing of Congress, foretold a session in which pressure would be exerted by the Democratic National Committee on Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson to revise his 'middle-of-the-road' leadership, and put through a program bearing a distinctive Democratic stamp.

Finally, in contemplating the 1958 midterm-election picture, the query as to whether the returns indicated a Democratic landslide or a consistent off-year trend, was frequently asked. History demonstrates that in every non-presidential election since the Civil War, except that of 1934 under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the president's party has suffered a loss of seats in either the House of Representatives or the Senate, or both. However, since the

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[5] Ibid., Nov. 5, 1960.

[6] Ibid., Nov. 5, 1958.

average loss has been between 25 and 30 seats, the Republican losses which totaled 59 were overwhelming.[7]

Looking to 1960—Democratic

As titular leader of the party, Adlai E. Stevenson had the attention of party chiefs and the electorate as to his next moves following his 1956 defeat. His reigning silence, and ensuing engrossment in his private law practice and world-wide travel, indicated to seasoned political observers that he wished to remove himself from the 1960 picture. From 1956 to 1958, he was not even considered in the Gallup Poll lists, but when he did appear in a 1958 preference poll he was the leading choice.

Among other candidate possibilities to emerge during this 'phase of latency,' Senator John F. Kennedy was the most outstanding, having achieved a remarkable display of strength in the 1956 convention and 1958 elections. His fellow senators, also prominently mentioned as potential nominees, entered the campaign with definite disadvantages: Johnson's southern identification, Symington's association with one issue—defense, and Humphrey's tag of radical liberalism and loss of popularity in the South.

Nevertheless, Kennedy's handicaps which loomed as the

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[7] Louis H. Bean, The Midterm Battle (Washington, D.C.: Business Press, Inc., 1950), pp. 4, 93, 97.

most forbidding: his Roman Catholic religion, his youth, and the fact that only one senator in the 20th Century had ever attained the White House directly from the Senate, indicated to the Democratic Party chiefs the virtual certainty of his future political doom. Because of his awareness that his only chance to win their support lay in the demonstration of his power among the voting population, Kennedy and his key strategists charted the only pre-convention action open to him—the presidential primary route. This was to be the 1960 national Democratic story prior to the convention.

Looking to 1960—Republican

Vice-President Nixon's unanimous renomination in 1956 virtually assured him as the natural successor in 1960. Furthermore, the party organization was unified in their support of him for his 1960 presidential bid due to his exhaustive campaigning in every part of the country since 1952. Thus, it was not necessary for the Vice-President to become involved in the war between the so-called conservatives and liberals within the party. He also was relieved of the burden of building a professional machine, as Senator Robert A. Taft had been forced to do in 1948 and 1952. He appeared to mold his pre-convention role into that of a non-partisan, non-political figure—a statesman.

To disrupt this air of concord and goodwill, Nelson A. Rockefeller emerged as a clear and definite challenge. When questioned about the 1960 presidential race immediately following his spectacular victory, he simply replied that he had "no plans."[8] However, he went on to state that he considered it "unwise to cross bridges ahead of time," and therefore could not unqualifiedly promise to serve his four-year term although he had "every intention" of "doing the job."[9] From this ambiguity, Rockefeller's future candidacy was predicted by the communications media, visibly noticed by the political leaders, disturbingly apprehended in the Nixon camp, and enthusiastically charted by the Rockefeller political lieutenants.

The Nixon hope for an unrippled appearance of statesmanship seemed to vanish as both camps planned their pre-convention strategies for the future campaign.

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[8] New York Times, Nov. 6, 1958.

[9] Ibid.

CHAPTER III

PRE-CONVENTION DEMOCRATIC ACTIVITIES

The pre-convention activities of the Democrats in 1960 were highlighted by the largest field of candidates since 1924; the highly organized and spectacularly successful strategy of the front-runner, Senator John Kennedy; and, the resulting campaign operations of the remaining leading contenders which were conditioned by the course of Kennedy's maneuvers. Beside Kennedy, the most prominent candidates were Adlai Stevenson, Senators Lyndon Johnson, Stuart Symington and Hubert Humphrey. The list was further lengthened by important favorite sons.

Kennedy on the Rise; Humphrey Withdraws

By keen intuition and great precision, Senator Kennedy had planned the course of his pre-convention tactics and thereby had set the pace for the Democratic contest. Though endowed liberally with intelligence, drive, personality and glamour, he had to overcome major liabilities: resentment against his Roman Catholic religion, his youth, and his vacillation on key issues, such as farm legislation.

Senator Kennedy was convinced that his best chance for capturing the presidential nomination rested on his continued high rating in the public opinion polls and on a chain of unbroken primary victories whose overwhelming momentum would put him in a position where it would be difficult, and perhaps even dangerous to refuse him the nomination. In spite of the fact that almost three-fourths of the states selected their delegates at conventions, it appeared that he was staking his claim on the proposition that primaries provide the correct measure of competition by which candidate strength should be measured.

Threatening the Kennedy strategy was a booming crop of favorite sons who for various reasons preferred to avoid a primary contest in their states. Some feared such a battle might deal lethal blows to the harmony of the state party organizations. Others attempted to prevent Kennedy from building a strong and unchallengeable lead. Still others who favored the Massachusetts Senator employed this guise in preserving their uncommitted status until convention time to escape criticism from those objecting to Kennedy because of his religion. Outstanding among the favorite sons were Governors Brown (Calif), Williams (Mich), Meyner (NJ), J. Millard Tawes (Md), George Docking (Kans), Herschel Loveless (Iowa), A.B. Chandler (Ky), and Senators George A. Smathers (Fla) and Albert A. Gore (Tenn). So

that the Humphrey forces could control the state delegation, Governor Orville L. Freeman had been instrumental in abolishing the Minnesota primary.

Though an unwritten rule of politics called for presidential contenders to stay out of such states lest they lose more from the ill will created by a primary contest than by a victory, Senator Kennedy decided to battle the favorite sons if necessary. He was determined to prevent a coalition of state organizations from blocking his convention support and elevating favorite sons to the role of kingmakers. In spite of the fact that he had been openly campaigning for months, Kennedy officially threw his hat into the presidential ring on January 2, 1960, and insisted that all potential aspirants test their strength in the primaries.

At the conclusion of the first phase of the campaign—the pre-primary period—the consensus of opinion was that Kennedy had waged an energetic and shrewd campaign; he had covered more miles in every section of the country than anyone else. His main Democratic opponents had either lost ground or failed to register any appreciable backing. His lead in preference and trial heat polls had also increased. The professional politicians in the large northern cities who previously had scoffed at his chances, seemed to be coming to the prevalent conclusion that he would receive

a sizeable Democratic vote in their cities, and therefore aid the local and state candidates. Even his bitterest enemies took notice of his noteworthy achievements.

Three power plays by Kennedy in early 1960, demonstrated to the pros that he was tough enough to play their own game and win.

In outmaneuvering his opponents in January 1960, he registered his biggest coup by winning the support of Governor Di Salle of Ohio. After being threatened by Kennedy to run against him in the primary and foreseeing his probable defeat in public opinion polls, Di Salle had reluctantly decided to run as a favorite son with his delegation pledged to Kennedy.

It was also revealed that in February, Kennedy had reached a compromise agreement with Governor Brown to stay out of the California primary—a shift in his campaign tactics—if he was represented in the make-up of the convention delegation, and if Brown maintained a position of neutrality during the campaign. It was planned that Brown would release the California delegates following a complimentary first-ballot vote for himself. Political experts, however, agreed that Brown hoped to keep the delegation intact long enough to permit California to play a strategic role in the choice of a presidential nominee. In Maryland, Governor Millard Tawes gave up his hope to run as a favorite son and threw his support to Kennedy.

Senator Kennedy was confident of a lead now; his present aim was to win sufficient early-ballot votes to precipitate a bandwagon psychology which he hoped the primaries would provide. His long-range purpose was best described by him when he said,

> "I [would say] that I had to secure sufficient support in the primaries so that I would be in a position to secure the nomination by the time I arrive in Los Angeles and not have to attempt to secure it through long, drawn-out balloting there."[1]

An early-ballot nomination was necessary since his pre-convention campaign had been based on succeeding as the popular choice, and not as a result of 'smoke-room' bargaining.

The Primary Route

Of the sixteen presidential primaries scheduled for 1960, the Massachusetts Senator had decided to enter seven.

With only minor opposition in the nation's first primary—New Hampshire—Kennedy emerged with a record-breaking showing, significantly narrowing the traditional 2 - 1 Republican margin to 3 - 2, and achieving more than twice as many votes as any previous Democrat had received. In addition, he won substantial Republican write-ins as compared to a scattering of Democratic write-in votes for

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[1] New York Times, Feb. 10, 1960.

Nixon. This performance demonstrated his remarkable vote-getting power.

The Wisconsin primary introduced Senator Hubert Humphrey into the active contests. As the first formally launched candidate, Humphrey hoped to increase public awareness of his candidacy and provide himself with a mechanism for soliciting grass roots and party backing before the race became a runaway. Badly lagging in public opinion polls and delegate strength, commanding no support in the South, and branded as an ultra-liberal, he could never be considered as a compromise choice; he was forced to take the primary route to the convention. Humphrey realized that he first must demonstrate his grass roots strength and then, if successful, deal with the professional politicians controlling the delegates.

Due to limited capital, a rigid priority of states were chosen for intensive campaigning. His strategy involved winning approximately 150 delegate votes from Minnesota, Wisconsin, and South Dakota via the primaries, as the nucleus of a Midwestern bloc. He then hoped that with the early-ballot elimination of Kennedy, most of the liberal votes would come to him rather than to Senators Johnson or Symington.

From midsummer 1959 till April 1960, Humphrey traveled and campaigned extensively in the Midwestern and Rocky Mountain states where, in addition to New York, he enjoyed

his chief backing. Lacking the professional cohesive machine and lavish finances of Kennedy, he tried by sheer energy, unlimited optimism and a largely volunteer group to match the Massachusetts Senator's momentum. The future life of his presidential campaign hinged on the crucial Wisconsin primary.

It seemed a paradox that Wisconsin, politically unrepresentative of the country, had created so much attention as the battleground which would in Senator Kennedy's words, "indicate which way the convention will go."[2] This state, which had initiated the presidential primary system in 1905, contained a 60 per cent urban and 40 per cent rural population—one-third of which was Roman Catholic. In addition, Governor Gaylord A. Nelson, in discouraging a primary fight in Wisconsin, feared that such an intense struggle would badly fracture the Democratic Party which had assumed power for the first time in twenty-five years.

The Wisconsin primary, however, which in reality was not one election, but eleven, involving a combination of one state-wide contest for ten delegates-at-large and ten district elections for twenty delegates, was important as a test of accepting a presidential image. Humphrey had chosen his own battleground and publicly challenged Kennedy.

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[2] Ibid., Jan. 22, 1960.

The exhausting campaign waged by both contenders revealed that personalities rather than issues would decide the outcome, since only minor policy differences emerged between Humphrey and Kennedy.

Humphrey's outstanding traits were his folksy manner, his ability as an orator and his appeal to minority groups. He made direct attacks on Kennedy, exploited the critical farm issue to his best advantage, and emphasized repeatedly his experience with the common people and Midwestern liberal background. His main centers of support were the Negro voters and the leadership of organized labor.

On the other hand, Kennedy created a romantic excitement with his presence. He discussed issues in very broad terms and refrained from attacking his opponent. Only after the vote count would he know how extensively religion had colored his first contested presidential primary. Polls taken by Louis Harris, Senator Kennedy's private poll analyst, demonstrated that the Kennedy strength which was running 60 - 40 in Kennedy's favor during January of 1960, had slightly fallen to 55½ per cent in March. In spite of this, Kennedy and his aides had been announcing that he was the underdog.

Kennedy bore out his pollster's results when he defeated his opponent by winning 56 per cent of the Democratic popular vote, and capturing six out of ten Wisconsin Congressional districts—giving him 20½ of its 31 votes. In industrial

cities, which he won by big margins, he especially appealed to the labor force; in some areas with a high concentration of Roman Catholics, his religion was a definite advantage. He attracted a large number of Republicans—mainly Roman Catholic—who crossed over to vote for him, a procedure permitted in Wisconsin's open primary.

Though defeated, even Humphrey led Nixon in the total vote. Some Republicans—the number being much smaller than in Kennedy's case—also voted for him, but they were mostly farmers disillusioned with the Eisenhower Administration's farm program.[3]

Senator Kennedy had shown his strength among urban voters and among Roman Catholic Republicans, but this was the precise problem that his Wisconsin victory had created. Would the Protestants make a counter-move and divide the parties according to religion? The West Virginia primary, the next and final battlefield between Kennedy and Humphrey, would answer the question. In a state where Protestants outnumbered Roman Catholics 97 to 3, Kennedy was expected to be the loser.

Between Wisconsin and West Virginia, there were seven additional primary elections, all uncontested except one. Kennedy did not enter nor campaign in the Illinois, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania primaries. Nevertheless,

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[3]Another important factor responsible for Republican crossovers was the image of Kennedy as more conservative, and therefore more acceptable.

he received the most Democratic write-ins, a sizeable Republican vote in all three, and topped Nixon's total in Massachusetts.[4]

In Indiana's "popularity contest" primary, the Republicans had feared that because of the interest in the Democratic state races, the Republicans might stay home—causing Nixon to emerge as a poor loser. Kennedy felt that a good showing here would definitely help in West Virginia. However, the May 3rd returns revealed that even though Nixon had out-polled Kennedy, the combined Democratic totals were ahead. The sensation of the primary itself was that nearly 20 per cent of the Democratic vote had been cast for two obscure opponents and more than 30,000 Democrats had made no presidential choice—a fact that seasoned political observers interpreted as reflecting opposition to Kennedy's religion. Senator Kennedy also received substantial backing in the Ohio and Nebraska primaries.

In addition to Wisconsin and West Virginia, the only other primary that Senator Humphrey contested was that of Washington, D.C. His victory over Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, who had the backing of the regular Democratic organization, buoyed his hopes for a West Virginia win. The surprise of the primary, however, was Adlai Stevenson's

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[4]Nixon formally entered the Illinois and Pennsylvania primaries.

strength over Morse.[5]

The purpose of the West Virginia primary for Kennedy was to prove to the Democratic leaders and to the voting public that he did not need a Catholic 'crutch'. The primary results themselves would have no binding or even advisory effect on the West Virginia delegates. However, an equal result between the two contenders would hurt Kennedy, since anything less than a decisive victory would be interpreted as a strong indication that his religion was a definite liability. In effect, West Virginia was the crucial contest in the 1960 pre-convention picture. Senator Kennedy stated its importance by understating, "West Virginia has the first chance in a hundred years to nominate a President of the United States."[6]

Contrary to the nature of his Wisconsin campaign, Senator Kennedy struck back for the first time at his opponent. This strategy was partly based on reports from his private pollster, Louis Harris, that West Virginia, previously considered safe for Kennedy, was now quite insecure. From December 1959 until March 1960, the results demonstrated an overwhelming 70 per cent for Kennedy; during April and early May, his rating, based on intensive use of

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[5]Stevenson had not been a formal entrant and had discouraged his followers from voting for him.

[6]Op. cit., May 8, 1960.

public opinion polls, had considerably decreased. Mr. Harris also reported that bias against Kennedy's religion was the outstanding reason for the shift. Emphatically denying that he would be dominated by the Roman Catholic Church, Kennedy unequivocally defended separation of church and state, and declared, "Is anyone going to tell me that I lost this primary forty-two years ago when I was baptized?"[7]

It was in this primary that the 'stop-Kennedy' movement reached its peak. Supporters of the other presidential contenders tried to form a coalition to support Humphrey and to attempt to break Kennedy's string of primary victories. Prominent anti-Kennedyites included Governors Meyner, Price Daniel (Tex), J. Lindsay Almond (Va), and Senators Johnson, Symington, Morse and Byrd (W Va). It was not difficult to get behind Humphrey in West Virginia, since he was discounted as a serious threat for the nomination.

On the eve of the primary, both aspirants espoused underdog positions. Despite continuous and enthusiastic crowds and a last minute surge for Kennedy, a victory for Humphrey was forecast by various West Virginia newspapers and private polling groups. Some observers, however, saw a possible parallel between Kennedy now and Truman in 1948 who also drew large crowds, was low in the polls, but scored an upset victory.

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[7] Ibid., April 19, 1960.

Senator Kennedy's spectacular 61 - 39 victory on May 10th marked the point at which the Kennedy nomination became a near-certainty. He had won in every section of the state, but especially in the Southern coal fields which were his opponent's stronghold. His firm statement that religion was not important was partially borne out by the increasing number of political figures who rushed to join his banner. Vice-President Nixon felt now that Kennedy's nomination was all but guaranteed.

The Kennedy strategists listed the following reasons for his triumph: the 'silent vote' which was listed as undecided in the polls; Kennedy's TV campaign in which he declared his independence from the Roman Catholic Church; the Negro vote going to Kennedy, due to 'stop-Kennedyite' Senator Robert C. Byrd's membership in the Klu Klux Klan; an extensive system of alliances with local and county leaders; and, as in Wisconsin, his attractiveness to female voters.

With his defeat, Senator Humphrey officially withdrew from the presidential race, and indicated that he hoped to hold together his supporters from Alaska, North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Washington, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia, to be used as a unit of voting strength at the convention.

Toward the end of May, the Minnesota State Convention

voted to support Humphrey as its favorite son on the first ballot. A week before the convention, however, Humphrey announced his hope that Stevenson would become an active aspirant; his apparent aim was to be instrumental in an early-ballot push for Stevenson with approximately 100 Humphrey votes as the nucleus.

The three primaries that followed West Virginia further enhanced Kennedy's position as front-runner. He captured Maryland's 24 unit-rule votes by receiving 70 per cent of the primary total. The California primary in which Governor Brown ran as a favorite son was made noteworthy by the huge vote piled up by his Democratic opponent, causing Nixon to out-poll Brown. The surprising result revealed widespread Democratic discontentment with the Governor and placed his hoped-for role as convention kingmaker in doubt.

The final primary—Oregon—was unique in that it tested the popularity of all prominent presidential hopefuls who previously refrained from campaigning in primaries. By state law, it prevented the withdrawal of any such candidate unless the individual signed an affidavit stating that he definitely would not run for president. Stevenson had been the only Democrat who took advantage of this provision, Humphrey withdrawing too late to meet the time limitation. Kennedy's strongest opponent was Morse, with Johnson and Symington as unwilling entrants. Due to the bandwagon psychology and

Morse's poor showing in the Washington, D.C. primary, Kennedy was widely favored, but, as in Wisconsin and West Virginia, he assumed the underdog role to add prestige to his victory. His decisive win in Oregon on May 20th gave Kennedy his seventh straight victory. He had polled more votes than all his rivals combined, and beat Morse by a 3 to 2 margin—forcing Morse's withdrawal from the presidential race.

Now Senator Kennedy could point to victories in the East, West, North, border states, and industrial and agricultural areas. As the front-runner, he realized the danger of being tripped up. If at any point he showed signs of faltering, the politicians would assume his inevitable failure and rush to another bandwagon.

Throughout the pre-primary and primary period of his campaign, Senator Kennedy had followed two major tactics. He had combined active battle with psychological pressure. The former was employed whenever he challenged or accepted an opponent for a primary fight, as with his short-range target, Humphrey, in Wisconsin and West Virginia. However, when well-known aspirants refused such a contest, he associated a psychological impression of timidity with the candidate.

Until January 1960, Kennedy's target in this category had been Symington, due to his general acceptance within all

sections of the Democratic Party and his strong second-choice support. But 1960 heralded a new and more formidable threat in the candidacy of Senator Johnson who had built up the second largest bloc of delegate strength. Not wishing to alienate the South which had played the major role in his 1956 vice-presidential attempt, and perhaps thinking of Johnson in terms of the vice-presidency, he refrained from challenging Johnson to enter the primary races by saying that the Majority Leader's heavy schedule would not permit such activity.

Throughout the campaign, Kennedy had emphatically declared that he would refuse the vice-presidential nomination in any situation. Some Democratic leaders interpreted this as a temporary move to protect his race for the presidential nomination. The majority who thought otherwise saw his public rejection as final, and regarded it as an ominous warning to the Democratic hierarchy not to assume that he could be rejected on religious grounds and still be included on the ticket to retain the support of his backers.

During the 1956 Democratic National Convention, Senator Kennedy had circulated a memorandum prepared by his staff purporting to demonstrate that there was a "Catholic vote" which might be instrumental in a Democratic victory if a Catholic, and especially Kennedy, was a candidate. The Democratic leaders had accepted this and were aware that

more than a majority of the Democratic Party's registered voters were located in the large Northern cities where the party's hopes of victory lay. Now that Kennedy had courageously fought in the primaries and retained his front-runner position in the polls and primaries, the professionals were beginning to fear the resentment of the Catholic population—if Kennedy was refused the presidential nomination—more than the devastating effect of the anti-Catholic vote.

There was a striking similarity between the Rockefeller and Kennedy refusals for second spot—both being deadly set against being added to the ticket for the respective strengths they would bring in as votes. However, the Kennedy case involved the much more delicate question of prejudice which might alienate—at least throughout the election—the large number of urban Catholics vitally important for a Democratic victory.

In the area of public opinion polls, Senator Kennedy, the leading Democrat, increased his rating in the preference and trial heat contests during 1960. Throughout 1958 and 1959, he had run a nip-and-tuck battle with Stevenson among a cross section of Democratic voters.

	Kennedy	Stevenson
January 1959	25	29
April 1960	28	27
May	25	26
June	26	29
July	29	25
August	26	26
September	30	26
November	27	26
December	24	26

However, by April 1960, Kennedy had acquired a commanding lead over Stevenson and the other Democratic aspirants which steadily increased during the remainder of the pre-convention period.

	Kennedy	Stevenson	Johnson	Symington	Humphrey
November 1959	27	26	11	6	4
December	24	26	14	5	4
January 1960	32	28	12	6	5
February	35	23	13	5	6
March	34	23	15	6	5
April	39	21	11	6	7
May	41	21	11	7	7
Humphrey withdraws from presidential race.....					
June	42	24	14	8	.
July	41	25	16	7	.

Paired against each Democratic candidate on a two-man basis, Kennedy won every contest. Likewise, among Independent voters, Kennedy increased his lead over his four Democratic opponents.

	Kennedy	Stevenson	Johnson	Symington	Humphrey
July 1959	25	22	11	8	5
December	33	20	9	6	3
March 1960	37	21	10	6	4

Among more than 1450 Democratic county chairmen, the Massachusetts Senator emerged as the victor in every

Gallup Poll from October 1959 to June 1960. He won in the "preference" and "likely nominee" departments, increasing his lead with each survey.

Among Democratic members of Congress, Senator Johnson had been the winner in all polls from July 1959 to June 1960. However, Senator Kennedy gradually improved his standing from fourth place in July 1959 to third place in January 1960, and finally to second place in June 1960.

The trial heat polls buttressed Kennedy's strong standing in the preference races. His lead over Nixon, which had been reversed by Nixon's Soviet trip, was not recaptured until March 1960, when he again gained his lead which he maintained until convention time.

The psychological effect of Kennedy's momentum-building campaign caused many individual delegates and state delegations to march behind his banner. These assets, however, did not insure him the nomination, as was demonstrated in the 1952 Kefauver case. The decisive element was the strong support of key Democrats in the large populous Northern states—New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, California, Michigan and New Jersey. Kennedy's post-primary period campaign was mainly concentrated among these figures.

Kennedy's stock in Ohio was secure with the entire 64-vote delegation solidly behind him. Illinois entered the Kennedy column when Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago

announced on July 11th—the day that the convention opened—that 59½ of Illinois' 69 votes would go to Kennedy.

After Michigan polls had proven Kennedy's leading position, Governor Williams who feared a Johnson or Symington nomination endorsed Kennedy, swinging Michigan's 51 votes to him. Likewise, California's Governor Brown who had hoped to play a kingmaker role at the convention decided to join the rush to the front-runner before his delegation remained at the post. In stating his support for Kennedy on July 11th, he declared that his 81-vote delegation was free to exercise its "independent judgment".[8]

The New York plan had been to defer its choice until the last vital moment, then be the major instrument for the nominee's success. A further reason for delaying a formal declaration of support had been to preserve Mayor Wagner's chances for the vice-presidency if Kennedy showed signs of weakening. The day before the convention met, Mayor Wagner announced that Kennedy would receive 104 or 105 of New York's 114 votes. There had been great support for Kennedy in New York, both in public opinion polls and among the professional leaders who felt that the front-runner could greatly help local and state Democratic candidates.

Ardent Kennedy supporters in these key delegations hoped that their backing would influence the uncommitted

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[8] Ibid., July 11, 1960.

delegates in important Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Governor David L. Lawrence, a Catholic himself, feared the effect of a Catholic presidential candidate in the rural sections of Pennsylvania. Not until a few hours before the convening of the convention did he announce that 64 of Pennsylvania's 81 votes would go to Senator Kennedy. On the other hand, Governor Meyner, one of the most fervent anti-Kennedyites, remained the only governor—apart from the governors from Southern and border states who were pledged to Senators Johnson and Symington—who actively worked against Kennedy's drive to secure the nomination before the convention. He never endorsed Kennedy though the bulk of his delegation was known to favor the Massachusetts Senator. As in New York and California, the New Jersey politicians thought Kennedy could strengthen the local Democratic ticket.

Also on July 11th, the last vestiges of the 'anti-Kennedy' campaign disappeared when Governors Herschel Loveless and George Docking, favorite sons of Iowa and Kansas, respectively, added 128 votes to the Kennedy column. The Kennedy headquarters had applied intense pressure on the uncommitted favorite sons to withdraw from the contest before the start of the convention balloting. A major aim of the anti-Kennedy forces had been to deny the delegates from these states to Kennedy

for more than one ballot with the hope of preventing an early-ballot nomination. These efforts had miserably failed due to their inability to agree on an individual to oppose the Massachusetts front-runner. Senator Kennedy had said this condition would prevail as long as each candidate thought his chance for the nomination was good.

It seemed now that the air of inevitability, which had hung around Kennedy's nomination for the past two months, was taking on the form of a stampede as various estimates of his delegate power came rushing in just before the convention. An Associated Press Poll, released on July 10th, indicated that Kennedy had 540 first-ballot votes; that day, the Kennedy forces claimed 670 votes. CBS, in an informal tally, announced the following lineup on July 11th: Kennedy-801, Johnson-435½, Symington-101, Stevenson-98, and 80 uncommitted votes—the most accurate estimate. All networks in one form or another had conceded the nomination of Senator Kennedy—probably on the first ballot. With the results of the key delegations released just prior to convention proceedings, the Kennedy hierarchy considered the battle substantially over.

Front-runner Kennedy, by an intensive and brilliant campaign, had impressed the most seasoned political

professionals and observers. He had sent his bandwagon rolling with considerable momentum: by tirelessly stumping throughout the country since 1956; by demonstrating his vote-getting ability with a string of primary victories; by wooing and winning a sizeable number of party leaders; and, by building an extensive, highly greased and lavishly financed organization.

In appealing to the centers of power which dominated the state party conventions in the non-primary states, the Kennedy strategists had displayed an almost unerring intuitive instinct in judging who the powerlords were. In states which were machine-dominated, contacts with bosses were maintained; in states where citizens' committees were most effective, there was continuous communication with the leaders. This process was meticulously organized to be transformed into election machinery immediately after the convention.

Nobody, since Franklin D. Roosevelt, had been able to muster the coalition Kennedy had succeeded in winning. In his camp were the intellectuals and pros of the North, together with the labor union and Negro leaders—a coalition almost impossible to defeat. On the eve of his nomination, the Kennedy camp radiated with a rare glow of confidence and anticipation.

Strategies of Other Leading Candidates

The pre-convention campaigns of Senators Johnson, Symington and ex-Governor Stevenson were markedly similar and reflected their great underestimation of Kennedy's chances. They had planned to evade all primaries except Oregon where they were entered automatically, and build up their support among certain state leaders in the event the convention became deadlocked. What they did not take into consideration was that this operation was only feasible for a certain type of candidate—one who did not have to overcome some disadvantage such as region identification, or weakness in polls. However, their strategy saved time, money and energy, and avoided involvement in divisive party situations. They could also conceal their strength or weaknesses until the right psychological moment.

Johnson

Though his corps of active backers were quietly working to advance his prospects and he himself had the most pledged delegates by the start of 1960, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson stubbornly contended that he had no presidential plans. Due to his official duties, he was not able to travel as Senators Kennedy, Humphrey and Symington could. He was also aware that he might be

charged with using his Senate leadership to promote his presidential ambitions. Playing a statesman role similar to Vice-President Nixon's, he became immersed in his Senate duties and aimed to build a record for the Democratic Party in Congress.

Johnson's relationship with Congress brought to the surface the dissension in the Democratic Party. Externally the Party seemed secure—there were majorities in both houses of Congress, many presidential hopefuls and a Republican president who was restricted from running again. But underneath there was the problem of who would be responsible for the party record to be presented to the voters. This conflict was practically inevitable for an 'out-party,' such as the Democrats who had no real leader but just a figurehead in Stevenson. Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler and the Democratic Advisory Council had attempted to fill this power vacuum and had failed.[9]

Partly by usurpation and partly by rare political intuition, the Congressional chieftains Lyndon Johnson and Speaker Sam Rayburn assumed this power. Calling it

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[9] The Democratic Advisory Council was created in 1956 to advise the Democratic leadership in Congress and the National Committee on legislative issues. A major reason for its appearance had been the Southern control of a majority of Senate and House committee chairmanships.

"constructive opposition", the Johnson-Rayburn policy was to cooperate and compromise with the Administration rather than precipitate a stalemate in government which would lay the Democrats open to charges of obstructionism and irresponsibility. However, the opposition charged that the Democratic Congress had failed to produce a program with a distinct Democratic stamp; the record would prove that there was little fundamental difference between the two parties.

This dispute revealed the deep division existing between the party's liberals and conservatives—the presidential and congressional wings, respectively. The leaders in Congress appeared to enjoy the temporary advantage. They would not control the 1960 Democratic National Convention, however, and it was here that the liberals—small in number, but from a bloc of populous states—would control the choice of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, and the drafting of the platform.[10] Nevertheless, to the Congressional leadership the election of a Democratic "liberal" was secondary to the wielding of their Congressional power, especially in a divided government.

Johnson's prestige as the most capable Majority Leader in the history of the Democratic Party and his

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[10]The liberal plan also called for the replacement of Speaker Rayburn as permanent chairman of the convention.

respectable showing in the preference polls during 1958 and 1959—third among Democratic voters—had projected him as a formidable presidential contender. His major drawbacks were his conservative Southern identification, and opposition from Negro and labor leaders. He had to convince the Northern liberals that he could win the industrial cities of the East, North and West. Johnson's strategy called for appearing as a Westerner, and building a foundation of Western and Rocky Mountain support.

His disassociation move with the South went so far as to include a plan by the leaders in the deep South to attack his efforts during the controversial civil rights legislation in Congress. Their assumption was that he would then receive precious votes from the Northern liberals. Theodore White in his book, The Making of the President 1960, states that in addition to Johnson's backing in the South and among certain Congressional leaders, his key supporters were to be found among the New Dealers.

> "If any candidate in the 1960 sweepstakes was the candidate for the old New Deal, it was Lyndon B. Johnson. A loose and highly ineffective coalition of aging New Dealers operated as the Northern (Washington-New York) wing of the Johnson campaign as awkwardly as did the Austin regulars."[11]

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[11]Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960, (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961), p. 45.

Johnson was expected to go to the convention with approximately 500 votes on the first ballot—mainly built on a solid bloc of Southern states—plus a few border states such as Kentucky, Arizona, Colorado, Utah and Nevada. However, it was doubtful that he would acquire additional strength since he had exhausted the areas where his main support was located. Due to this difficulty, many observers thought that Johnson would announce his official candidacy in sufficient time for him to seek extra votes.

The formality was not undertaken until July 6th, one week before convention proceedings. It was too late by then to recover the deserting delegates. His solid base in the South was threatened with the psychological effect of Kennedy's victories and the favorite son movements in Florida, Georgia, Louisiana and Arkansas; Governors John Patterson of Alabama and Luther Hodges of North Carolina had endorsed the front-runner. In addition, Kennedy had blocked the Majority Leader's efforts to organize an effective coalition in the Rocky Mountain states, and Johnson had been unable to make any serious dents in Senator Kennedy's strongholds—the East and North. Johnson's efforts to outgrow his sectional background had failed; he was still the candidate of a certain region.

As the driving force among the stop-Kennedyites, Johnson and his lieutenants had banked their hopes on a temporary deadlock and the achievement of the nomination by the third or fourth ballot. They calculated that a lengthier delay would only serve to advance the prospects of Symington or Stevenson.

Johnson's final major pre-convention strategy became evident when he engineered a Congressional recess from July 1st to August 8th, by slowing down the consideration of major bills. The theory behind this maneuver presumably was to increase his bargaining power with the delegates by emphasizing his influence over pending legislation. Obviously, Johnson had over-estimated the prestige of Congressional leaders at national conventions, which has been considerably weaker than that of gubernatorial and other state leaders.

His plans were similar to the strategy of Nixon in that he hoped to receive the dividends at the convention which he had earned over many years in Congress—political debits for favorable legislation brought to the floor, or for a bill passed. But this was where the similarity ended. Nixon's strength was widespread and solid, extending to state leaders as well as to Congressional members.

It appeared that the first phase of the post-convention campaign would be initiated in a completely

political session of Congress. Thus, Johnson and Rayburn had assumed the responsibility of being the first interpreters of the Democratic platform. As was witnessed later, this tactic could not have been better planned for Senator Kennedy, though at the time the Kennedy camp was visibly unhappy about it. While his vice-presidential partner demonstrated his legislative prowess, Kennedy could exhibit his remarkable campaigning talents.

Symington

Senator Stuart Symington, the candidate with the fewest disadvantages, was a figure, nonetheless, with an indistinct image, lacking in personality and platform performances, weak in strength among delegates and the public, and deeply identified with one campaign issue—defense. His campaign had been slow to develop and not formalized until March 24th, since it depended mainly on second-choice votes which would be released only when the front-runner faltered.

His strategy rested on the hope that Kennedy and Johnson would destroy each other, thus producing a deadlocked convention. He would then make his move before Stevenson assumed the upper hand. There appeared to be an understanding between Symington and Johnson wherein Symington backers would support Johnson

on the second ballot. However, if Johnson failed, the bulk of his support would then go to Symington who hoped for a fifth or sixth-ballot nomination—with considerable Kennedy strength from politicians fearing a Stevenson defeat.

The professional nucleus of Symington's campaign organization was heavily weighted with have-been politicians of the Truman era. Other than Missouri's unanimous backing, his strength of 100-150 first-ballot votes was scattered in the West and Midwest. On May 13th came the Truman announcement of support which had been expected in June. It was generally discounted as a factor in the presidential contest, and particularly by the Kennedy camp who used the unsuccessful Harriman push in 1956 as an example of Truman's confusing his popularity with power. Symington's campaign was greatly in need of a lift, especially following Kennedy's West Virginia triumph; Truman had hoped to stem an apparent flow of several uncommitted delegations to the Kennedy banner.

On June 29th, Truman made the shocking announcement—most of all to the Symington strategists—of his resignation as a delegate, and refusal to attend the convention due to evidence of a "prearranged affair"

by Kennedy backers.[12] He excused himself by saying, "I cannot lend myself to what is happening."[13] This was the most overt evidence of failure on the part of the stop-Kennedyites and the resulting hopelessness of the Symington battle.

Stevenson

Adlai Stevenson's pre-convention activities were highlighted by his denial of presidential ambitions and by his silent campaigning. He ran the gamut from flat rejection—"I will not be the nominee"—to stopping just short of announcing his candidacy by saying that he did not desire to be classified as a "draft-evader."[14] Kennedy and Humphrey had hoped Stevenson would make a Sherman-like statement of withdrawal and contribute the prestige of a major presidential aspirant to their causes. There was widespread speculation that if Stevenson supported Kennedy early enough in the campaign, his prospects for the post of Secretary of State in a Kennedy Administration would be greatly enhanced.

By July 1st, his position was that of renouncing his candidacy but having no objection to having his name put in nomination. And finally, just before the convention,

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[12] New York Times, July 3, 1960.

[13] Ibid., July 11, 1960.

[14] Ibid., June 14, 1959; April 11, 1960.

he stated that he would accept a draft and "do my utmost to win."[15] There was no doubt in the minds of party professionals that Stevenson had been willing and available throughout the campaign.

His assets for the presidency were outstanding: his age, competence, world travels, respect from world leaders, and experience—especially in light of the world crises. However, his obvious disadvantage was carefully appraised by the professional politicians—that of being a two-time loser with a much weaker second race even though the Democratic Party was strong enough to win control of both houses of Congress in 1956. In addition, many party leaders feared for the success of their state tickets, openly expressing doubt that Stevenson would be stronger in 1960. The professional politicians in most of the large influential states opposed him; organized labor was against him and even many of his intellectual friends had abandoned him.

However, he was still an important factor in the contest. With perhaps 60 first-ballot votes, his strategy called for delaying a drive until the convention, and hoping for a lengthy deadlock where the elimination of Senators Kennedy, Johnson and Symington, in that

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[15] Ibid., July 9, 1960.

order, would make the convention turn to Stevenson again as the candidate acceptable to all factions.

Throughout the pre-convention period, and particularly following the summit collapse, Stevenson had struck out at the Republicans but kept far from intra-party fights. His principal campaigning was performed by an army of ardent, amateur supporters attempting to impress party leaders and delegates. Their impassioned efforts had reached country-wide proportions, covering forty-two states since January 1960. The day before the convening of the national Democratic proceedings, the draft movement around the United States sent their petitions with hundreds of thousands of Stevenson signatures to the convention professionals. They desperately hoped to attain by incredible optimism and an enveloping wave of grass-roots pressure what Senator Kennedy had already accomplished by his equally incredible primary and poll victories, and triumphal bandwagon.

CHAPTER IV

PRE-CONVENTION REPUBLICAN ACTIVITIES

The tone of the Republican pre-convention campaign in 1960 was set by the seesaw activities of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, as compared with Vice-President Richard M. Nixon's solid Republican support coupled with his apparent weakness in the trial heat polls.

Rockefeller's Vacillating Presidential Plans

From his election in 1958 to the early months of 1959—the first phase of his pre-convention activities—Rockefeller was immersed in the affairs of New York State, refusing to comment on national and international issues and silent as to his future political plans. However, in the second phase, he ran the gamut from veiled desire for the nomination to overt willingness, culminated by 'complete' withdrawal.

Apart from Rockefeller's indication that he would not block the submission of his name in the New Hampshire Republican presidential primary—the first in the series—and one or two 'non-political' trips outside New York State, the Rockefeller drive was kept

in low gear by state leaders during the early fall months of 1959. His strategists believed that a stronger claim on the nomination could be made following the submission of his new program to the 1960 State Legislature in January. It was felt that in addition to his vote-getting ability, he needed a record of executive, administrative and party accomplishment before showing an active interest in the nomination.

Against this backdrop emerged Rockefeller's confidence in public opinion polls which had induced him to seek the New York gubernatorial nomination. The Rockefeller plan called for delaying the decision to run until November to see what Nixon's standing in the fall trial heat polls would be. If the results demonstrated that Nixon was losing ground and Rockefeller running stronger against the Democrats, then even if he was trailing Kennedy and Stevenson, Rockefeller could say he had a better chance of winning.

Many of his advisors argued against this reasoning, maintaining that Nixon would have the nomination sewn up by then. However, the Rockefeller conviction was that on the record of his party service, Nixon was entitled to the nomination and would fail to achieve it only if the party leaders were convinced that he "can't win"—i. e., Nixon not winning the support

of a sufficient number of Independents and Democrats to ensure victory in November, since the Republicans were the minority party in the nation—37½ million as against 56 million.

The second phase of Rockefeller's actions became more overt when he realized that his candidacy must be promoted with the professional politicians before they were irrevocably committed to the Vice-President.

Earlier the Governor has stated that his decision—determined by public polls—would be released in November, but in exercising one of the most ancient prerogatives available to politicians, he disavowed the idea of a deadline and emphasized that the polls would be only one factor in his decision. A short time before, he would have insisted that the affairs of New York State demanded his complete attention and presence.

An intensive and highly organized speaking campaign was scheduled with personal appearances in eleven states. The Rockefeller brain-trust planned to acquaint his views and magnetic personality to the electorate and Republican leaders via news conferences, TV appearances, dinners, private talks and grass roots politicking. These trips were publicized as critical barometers to help Governor Rockefeller decide whether he should enter the preferential primaries by assaying public opinion among voters and politicians.

The Rockefeller advisory in-group responsible for campaign strategy included political leaders of the New York Republican Party and outstanding individuals in the Rockefeller empire's private staff. In addition, a large and capable research staff with 'political', 'position', 'speechwriting', 'logistics', 'transportation', 'image', and 'publicity' divisions was working on important domestic and international problems.

The November tour of the far West covering California, Oregon, Idaho and Washington was rated as favorable, but the professionals were solidly for Nixon. A further tour of the Midwestern, Central and Southern area was planned for December. Rockefeller's receptions were quite warm in Indiana, Missouri and Minnesota; mixed with encouraging spots in Wisconsin; doubtful in Oklahoma and Texas; and, cool but not frosty in Florida. Despite the almost unanimous Nixon backing by the leaders, the Governor drew huge and very enthusiastic crowds during the rank and file party meetings and dinners. In states, where dissatisfaction existed with the Republican hierarchy, or where there was intra-party division, such as in Missouri, Indiana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Washington and Florida, Rockefeller was provided with ready supporters. In spite of the official

pro-Nixon position of the state organizations, many leaders professed neutrality which encouraged the Governor, since the pro-Rockefeller supporters in other states had been mostly amateurs.

The most surprising facet of Rockefeller's trips was his strategy in fighting where he was weak, the professional party organizations, and not where his strength lay, among the public. The pattern here was that of the professionals versus the amateurs. The only path open to Rockefeller seemed to be that of overwhelming the voting public with his personal appeal and campaigning talents for the purpose of starting a groundswell at the grass roots level—the citizen group. Theodore White calls this group the "liberal-progressive wing of the Republican Party, the citizen wing, the wing that lies dormant three and a half years out of four and then, in the fourth year, erupts to choose a Willkie or an Eisenhower."[1] The regular wing of the Republican Party was safely in Nixon's possession, but how much of this crucial citizen wing had he captured? If Rockefeller was to beat Nixon, it was necessary to engage him in the primaries where the people rather than the politicians hold the power.

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[1]White, op. cit., p. 71.

Among various Republican political leaders who publicized their unequivocal support for Governor Rockefeller were Senators Homer E. Capehart (Ind) and Jacob Javits (N Y); Representatives Stuyvesant Wainwright (N Y), Chester E. Merrow (N H), Alvin E. O'Konski (Wisc), and, the 1956 'Dump-Nixon' leader, Harold E. Stassen. In addition, grass roots and amateur organizations had sprung up in every section of the country.

Few new personalities had ever entered such a monumental struggle with a tougher assignment. Rockefeller lacked experience in elective office; he had started late against a well-established politician holding a secure and not easily-challengeable hold on the party organization; he had not stated his policy differences; and, he was taking time out from his official duties to campaign for another position which he originally said he would not do before 1960.

Nevertheless, his attributes, which were not available to his opponent, balanced the disadvantages to a great extent: boldness, freshness, appeal to all segments of the electorate, occupier of the top office in a powerful state, and the fact that he was fortunate in his opponents—the professional politicians and Republican newspapers which could not be regarded as

the electorate's best friends.

In the Gallup preferential polls, the Governor sharply cut Nixon's lead by his spectacular win in 1958, but understandably ran a poor second when he presented his program to increase New York State taxes. Thereafter his percentage gradually and persistently decreased throughout 1959. However, private polls taken during the summer months of 1959 demonstrated the substantial number of Independent voters who preferred Rockefeller to Nixon.[2] Later in the year a poll of Western states found Nixon the overwhelming choice of Republicans; in contrast, Rockefeller demonstrated great success in winning Independent and Democratic votes.[3]

Against the leading Democratic candidates, Governor Rockefeller increased his percentage as 1959 progressed, in spite of the fact that he did not have the advantage of the similar vote-getting opportunities as Nixon's Soviet trip. In the race against Adlai Stevenson, he led the poll results in December 1958, trailed him during the summer, but had recaptured his lead by September.

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[2] New York Times, July 5, 1959.

[3] Ibid., Dec. 19, 1959.

	Rockefeller	Stevenson
December 1958	53	47
July 1959	44	56
September	51	49
November	53	47

With the Democratic front-runner, Senator Kennedy, as his opponent, Rockefeller was always trailing, but again made a stronger showing by September which he maintained throughout the winter of 1959 and spring of 1960, despite his withdrawal from the race.

	Rockefeller	Stevenson
December 1958	41	59
July 1959	37	63
September	43	57
November	45	55
May 1960	43	57

Among Independent voters, Rockefeller led Stevenson but fell behind Kennedy. However, it must be noted that just before his withdrawal in December, Rockefeller had almost pulled up evenly with Kennedy.

	Rockefeller	Stevenson	Rockefeller	Kennedy
September 1959	55	45	41	59
November	61	39	49	51
May 1960	..	..	38	62

These figures illustrated that Stevenson would pose as a minor problem; on the other hand, Kennedy loomed as a potential threat—but not an insurmountable one. Judging from his phenomenal success in 1958, it was altogether possible that with a well-organized campaign,

Rockefeller not only could improve his standing but also be projected as the obvious leader in the trial heat polls.

Rockefeller's Withdrawal from the Race

The final chapter of the Rockefeller campaign's second phase was written when the Governor, in announcing his withdrawal from the presidential race on December 26, 1959, said,

> " ... I believe ... that the great majority of those who will control the Republican convention stand opposed to any contest for the nomination. ... Therefore, any quest on my part for the nomination would entail a massive struggle in primary elections throughout the nation demanding so greatly of my time and energy that it would make impossible the fulfillment of my obligations as Governor of New York. ... My conclusion, therefore, is that I am not, and shall not be, a candidate for the nomination for the Presidency. The decision is definite and final."[4]

The most interesting section of the statement was the former. Rockefeller had finally come face to face with the impenetrable and massive bloc of Nixon organizational strength. As was the case with Stevenson, practically all of the professional politicians were opposed to him. His personal appearances had made only minute dents in the Republican hierarchy which Nixon had won over the years and whose support was crucial for the nomination. In addition,

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[4] Ibid., Dec. 27, 1959.

Republican leaders in Michigan, California, Ohio and Wisconsin where the party was trying to make a comeback after smashing defeats, told the Governor that a Nixon-Rockefeller contest would so split their following that neither would win.

Other reasons which weighed heavily in the final outcome included Nixon's gains in the trial heat polls by the end of 1959, and the time needed to wage primary campaigns. The latter would possibly result in the destruction of the 'winner' and 'serious official' image he had created until now. By removing himself honorably from combat at this early date, he would not be blamed for a possible Nixon defeat at the polls due to party division. Most important, if Nixon was defeated in 1960, Rockefeller—if a victor in the 1962 New York gubernatorial election—would emerge unscathed as a strong 1964 presidential contender.

The immediate and concrete results of his action were most clearly seen in Albany where the legislators were friendlier to his program. This was an excellent opportunity to strengthen his national image as a forceful, well-intentioned leader coming to grips with and devising practical solutions for basic issues. His political staff knew the value of keeping these achievements in the national spotlight to garner support for future political hopes. Furthermore, a major Rockefeller role was expected both in shaping the 1960 Republican platform and in determining the

nature of the ensuing campaign.

The Rockefeller withdrawal also pleased some Democratic leaders, among them, Governors Brown and Williams who feared that Rockefeller—less partisan and more progressive—would be unbeatable against any Democrat, but that Nixon could be defeated with his combination of unpopularity with and lack of appeal to Democrats.

The second phase of Rockefeller's pre-convention campaign had come to a close with little warning of the surprising trend his activities would assume in the third phase.

Nixon's Strength

The end of 1958 found Vice-President Richard Nixon in the righful position of 'legitimate successor.' Maintaining an intimate alliance with the Eisenhower name, he shared in the glory surrounding any Administration success. More important, he enjoyed at his command the supreme advantages of his position: having all the information and much of the chief personnel of the Federal Government. Therefore, Nixon's goal was to create a self-image of a non-partisan, hard working official, with special attention focused on his role as a mediator for international peace—the paramount issue with the public.

Governor Rockefeller's official withdrawal from the presidential race had ensured his role as statesman and wiped away his earlier pre-convention worries. He no

longer had to bargain with any faction of the Republican Party which might result in intraparty warfare—destructive for the difficult campaign ahead. Time and finances did not have to be wasted during the pre-convention period. It was not necessary to enter any primaries. He could continue to operate with his small, well-organized staff of key men, and postpone as long as he wished the public declaration of his candidacy. And finally, the Republican National Committee could abandon its position of neutrality and begin organizing the final campaign—a precious time advantage denied to the Democrats. In the meantime, he restrained his supporters from overtly organizing too soon; vestiges of a closed convention had to be concealed from the public.

During this phase, efforts were made to consolidate the support of the electorate for the purpose of buttressing the almost unanimous professional backing he commanded in the Republican organizations. Grass roots groups were formed to channel Nixon sentiment outside the party structure and to galvanize the bipartisan support necessary for attracting Independent and Democratic voters. Vice-President Nixon had virtually sewn up his nomination, and only the unlikely development among Republican officials of a widespread conviction, that Nixon could not win against the various Democratic contenders, could deny him the

convention's top prize.

In spite of his advantages, there were definite obstacles on his smooth path. Nixon would be a target for Democratic attacks—not as a candidate, but a party symbol—for almost a year until the election. The Democrats, knowing the main Republican candidate, could choose their ticket accordingly. And, the Republican convention, following that of the Democratic would be dull, lending no impetus to the party, workers or voting public.

President Eisenhower, in training his successor had provided him with an education not afforded to any other vice-president in many years. In regularly attending Cabinet, National Security Council and plenary administrative group meetings, Nixon had been given the opportunity to preside over them in the President's absence. He had been sent on delicate and difficult missions to many areas of the world. This was a unique apprenticeship in which administrative and political activities had been skillfully combined.

Two singular events performed at the request of the President greatly enhanced Nixon's stature with Independent and Democratic voters during the latter phase of 1959. The Vice-President's trip to Soviet Russia and Poland in late July provided him "with an excellent political platform even before the official opening of his campaign for the

Presidency."[5] It was widely felt that in addition to his role as politician, he had built up his claim as a leader for world peace. In addition, his part in helping the steel workers win a contract in January 1960, following a long stalemate, increased his acceptability among the officials and members of the labor world.

On the other hand, the controversial and political Eisenhower announcement, that Nixon would attend the 1960 Summit Conference in Paris if the President was recalled by "domestic requirements", incurred the wrath of many Democrats who raised the cry, "political."[6] This clumsy move was precipitated by Nixon's lack of publicity and drop in the trial heat polls during the spring of 1960, and indicated that the Administration was more interested in furthering the Vice-President's political ambitions than in educating him for the presidency. It also heightened the prevalent feeling that Nixon was always covertly maneuvering for his political advantage. However, for the time being, Nixon could bask in the glory of being chosen 'alternate president.'

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[5] Ibid., July 27, 1959.

[6] If the Summit Conference had survived, Eisenhower most likely would have remained, since Nixon neither was experienced in negotiating with the Russians nor acceptable to Khrushchev.

The greatest threat that Nixon faced throughout the pre-convention period was the opinion among many political leaders that he could not win because of his lack of appeal to Independents and Democrats. In the early spring of 1959, private polls financed by friends of the Vice-President showed Rockefeller leading. However, by the summer of 1959, Nixon's standing was much improved by his trip to Russia; his important role in the steel settlement early in 1960 caused another upsurge in his popularity.

The following figures illustrate the gradual increase of Nixon over Rockefeller among Republican voters in 1959.[7]

	Nixon	Rockefeller
March 1958	64	..
November	51	31
January 1959	56	27
April	56	23
May	58	17
June	63	20
July	61	18
August	65	19
October	68	18
November	67	19
December	66	19

The aftermath of the Rockefeller withdrawal was:

	Nixon	Rockefeller
January 1960	84	..
May	75	13
June	72	14
July	75	12

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[7]The results do not reflect the impact of Rockefeller's trips to the Pacific Coast and Midwest in November and December of 1959.

Among the Independents, Nixon gained during 1959, with Rockefeller maintaining a steady percentage. However, from May until convention time, Nixon lost slightly while Rockefeller improved his position, demonstrating a stronger pulling power with Independents than with voters of his own party.

	Nixon	Rockefeller
July 1959	36	23
August	45	22
December	49	22
May 1960	48	22
July	45	27

Within Congress, 61 per cent of the Republican membership responded to a Congressional Quarterly Poll which also demonstrated Nixon's secure position within the party.

	Nixon	Rockefeller
January 1959	78	17
July	84	14

Likewise, out of 1806 Republican county chairmen questioned in October 1959, 1515 gave their mandates to Nixon. The same overwhelming result was evident in November, as 1586 out of 1895 Republican leaders voted for the Vice-President.

In addition, with more than 3400 county leaders from both parties voting in a Gallup survey from October 1959 to June 1960, Vice-President Nixon consistently polled more than 60 per cent on the question whether Nixon or Kennedy

would win in the election. Paired against every other Democratic contender, Nixon won with more than 62 per cent of the vote. In like manner, Rockefeller polled 55 per cent against Kennedy's 45 per cent in the same surveys during 1959, and more than 58 per cent against every other Democratic aspirant.

Buttressing his strong showing in the Republican Party, Nixon entered nine primaries unopposed and with no personal campaigning; he outpolled the 1956 Eisenhower vote in the New Hampshire, Indiana and Pennsylvania preferential primaries. Since there was no contest on the Republican side, the primaries became newsworthy, primarily as comparisons—though inconclusive—between the Republican and Democratic candidates.

Three contests produced significant results: Nixon surprisingly outpolled Kennedy in Indiana, in spite of the fact that most of the interest was in the Democratic state races; Senator Kennedy reduced the 2-1 margin of Republicans over Democrats to 5-4 in New Hampshire; and, the great percentage of Republicans who crossed party lines to participate in the Kennedy-Humphrey battle in Wisconsin, caused Nixon to trail even the loser, Senator Humphrey.

As early as March 1960, Vice-President Nixon had been convinced that Kennedy would not only win the nomination, but achieve it on the first ballot. With the May results

of the West Virginia primary known, Nixon and his staff began preparing campaign material with the Massachusetts Senator as their target man.

On January 16th, 1960, Nixon formally opened his drive; in his efforts to maintain party unity, he stated that his campaign—which would not begin until the Republican National Convention—would be based on the record of the Administration. Even though his standing in the trial heat polls had dropped by March and April, he barred a more active race on his part, preferring to continue in his bipartisan role. By the end of May, a count based on the primaries, state conventions, and instructed and individual delegates, showed that Nixon had won the nomination on 'paper'. Now, only the convention's official confirmation remained.

Eisenhower's Support

From the summer until the end of 1959, when Rockefeller was an unofficial contender, President Eisenhower adhered to his announced neutrality in the 1960 Republican presidential race. However, his January 1960 indication that Nixon was his choice was formalized by his statement in March, with an offer of help in the ensuing campaign.

Several reasons might have been responsible for the President's late move. One might have been that it was

unrealistic to keep on pretending that Nixon was not the certain nominee. An impetus was also needed for the Nixon campaign which was lagging due to the Democratic monopoly of the headlines.

Before Eisenhower's announcement, Nixon, in stating generalities and assuming all credit and no responsibility, had appealed to Independents. No other presidential aspirant had been blessed with this advantage. Now that he had been given a free hand to formulate new policies which would inevitably alienate some sections of the electorate, the public, and particularly Nelson A. Rockefeller, were waiting to hear his ideas.

Rise and Fall of Nixon Against Certain Democratic Candidates

In July 1959, a Gallup Poll survey of a cross section of the American voting public was published, showing a result of 56 per cent for a Stevenson-Kennedy ticket as opposed to 44 per cent for one of Nixon-Rockefeller. Four months earlier, each slate had polled 50 per cent. This gave new ammunition to anti-Nixonites and somber warning to the Nixon camp who attributed the outcome to Kennedy's presence on the ticket, since they regarded Stevenson as one of the least formidable Democratic candidates. However, by June 1960, the Nixon-Rockefeller slate had captured the lead with a 51 to 49 percentage.

Polls taken of Nixon against individual Democrats were fairly discouraging in early 1959, but he gained during the summer. Prior to his visit to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1959, both Kennedy and Stevenson—the two candidates considered by their party's rank and file to be the top choices for the 1960 nomination—were leading Nixon by a wide margin. However, the Vice-President surged ahead in the fall and winter, increasing his lead.

Pre-Moscow	Nixon	Stevenson	Nixon	Kennedy
December 1958	..	..	41	59
January 1959	49	51	41	59
April	..	..	43	57
May	..	..	43	57
July	44	56	39	61
Post-Moscow				
August	51	49	48	52
September	54	46	51	49
November	56	44	53	47

Following on the heels of this optimistic fall 1959 Nixon picture came the surprise Rockefeller withdrawal and the start of the hotly contested and publicity-winning Democratic primaries. Against Stevenson, the Vice-President maintained his lead up to the convention.

	Nixon	Stevenson
January 1960	55	45
March	55	45
April	52	48
May	53	47
June	56	44

This trend was not repeated with the Democratic front-runner, Senator Kennedy. With the intensification of his campaign activity in early 1960, Kennedy quickly closed the gap on Nixon. From the primary period until the conventions in July, Kennedy was ahead of Nixon except for a brief relapse at the time of the Summit collapse in late May.

	Nixon	Kennedy
January 1960	53	47
March	50	50
New Hampshire primary.....		
April	47	53
Wisconsin primary.....		
Early May	46	54
West Virginia primary.....		
Late May	49	51
Summit collapse.....		
June	51	49
July	48	52

It was obvious that Nixon could not maintain his lead after a short while following his Soviet trip and the Summit collapse; the same pattern had occurred in 1958 when he returned from his tour of South America. Without these needed extraordinary boosts, Nixon appeared to make a poor showing in the trial heat polls.

It was also evident that besides securing the solid support of the Republican organization and voters, he also needed President Eisenhower's personal popularity. Nixon was constantly faced with fighting the prevailing image among many Independents and most Democrats of being

a cold and calculating politician, always maneuvering for his political gain.

Rockefeller's Willingness for a Draft

The third phase of Rockefeller's pre-convention campaign—public statements on crucial national and international issues—went into full force after the adjournment of the New York State Legislature in March 1960. The main purposes of this move were to keep the Governor and his concern with important policies in the public eye; more important, it aimed to influence the architects of the Republican platform and to give the leaders of the party a blueprint for its future.

Rockefeller, in challenging Nixon to advance fresh policies or risk defeat in November, acted as a freer agent and was less obliged to defend all the actions of the Administration. The Vice-President, on the other hand, as a member of the official family was confronted with the problem of defending the Administration while establishing a 'Nixon position.' If he accepted the challenge, there would be a possibility of deepening the split in the campaign. However, if he ignored the issue, a mass of voters necessary for election might be forever alienated. One month before the convention, Nixon announced, "only when I become the nominee can I

appropriately express independent views."[8]

Governor Rockefeller's sincerity in believing that while President Eisenhower's popularity was at an all-time high, the Administration's program in certain fields had not been the wisest, provided an effective national forum for the examination of old policies and the consideration of realistic proposals for the future. He brought life into the unexciting Republican campaign and awareness to the public of the imminent problems facing the United States and the world. His topics ranged from civil rights, education, housing, agricultural surpluses, economic growth, and more defense needs—to world trade, nuclear tests and the Summit debate. Politically, a massive closing of Republican ranks behind Nixon was produced by the Republican organization who viewed Rockefeller's action as harmful to party harmony.

Rockefeller's challenge to Nixon, his critical remarks about the Eisenhower Administration—especially his entrance into the U-2 debate, his repeated withholding of an outright endorsement of Nixon, his April trips to Pennsylvania, Illinois and North Dakota, and his verbal refusal to attend the convention—while at the same time reserving living accommodations for a great number of his key supporters, led many to believe that the New York

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[8] Op. cit., June 12, 1960.

Governor's hat was again actively in the ring. This belief was strengthened by Rockefeller announcements in April 1960, in which he twice repeated his disinterest in the nomination. However, he refused to state, as he had done in the past, that he would not accept the phenomenon of politics—a draft.[9] In his speeches he emphasized the importance of nominating a candidate who, in addition to Republican support, could attract Independent and Democratic votes.

The drop in Nixon's poll ratings during March and April 1960, caused some Republicans to take a second look at the Governor. Though Rockefeller was no longer in the race, he had achieved a sizeable number of write-in votes in all the primaries. In addition, many of the grass roots citizens' groups that had sprung up for him continued to operate up to the opening of the convention. Two of the largest newspapers, The New York Post and The Denver Post, also endorsed him.

In the early part of May, it was disclosed that Rockefeller had been offered the job either of keynoter or permanent chairman of the Republican National Convention. It appeared to be both Nixon's and National Republican

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[9]Ibid., May 29, 1960. A draft can be defined as a spontaneous movement, finally joined in by all convention delegates to nominate by acclamation a fellow partisan who has stoutly discouraged all such suggestions from everyone until a draft has become a certainty. In modern times, it only occurred once—Stevenson in 1952.

Chairman Thruston Morton's desire to have the Governor play a prominent role at the convention, since neither Rockefeller nor the New York State organization had endorsed Nixon. They wanted to paint a picture of unanimous party support for the Vice-President.

On May 15th, Rockefeller declared that he would not assume any convention role nor attend its proceedings, so that any doubt which remained concerning his refusal of the vice-presidential nomination would be irrevocably removed. It seemed to most people that he was serious about disassociating himself from Nixon's backers and policies.

The vacillating pattern of Rockefeller's intentions pervaded the Republican political atmosphere throughout May and June. In January, one week after his official withdrawal from the presidential race, he announced he would be present; then came his refusal in May; on June 1st, he announced his decision to attend, which was reversed on June 2nd, and again stated in the positive on June 8th.

The absolute refusal to accept the vice-presidential nomination, which he had been voicing since the start of the presidential campaign, reached its climax with Nixon's offer of the position to him. Nixon said,

> " ... a number of party leaders, Republican leaders, believe that Governor Rockefeller has a very strong pull among voters generally and would add strength to the ticket. ... [He] certainly has all the qualities of national

> leadership and would—if he should indicate a desire—add very great support to the ticket."[10]

Up to the convention and throughout its proceedings, Rockefeller remained adamant, taking the Sherman stand, "I will not accept if nominated and will not serve if elected."[11] He felt that if he was possessed with such pulling power, he should be awarded the first prize and not be added to the ticket just to win votes for Vice-President Nixon. Furthermore, he considered the vice-presidency secondary to that of his present position.

On May 26th, 1960, Governor Rockefeller declared that he was not a candidate, but was available for a presidential draft which he would not encourage. He also stated that the New York Republican State Committee had unanimously voted to send its 95-vote delegation uncommitted to the convention. As a coincidence, this declaration was made just after the Vice-President had acquired the nomination on 'paper'. What were Rockefeller's motives in declaring his availability for a draft, which in his opinion was "so remote I don't think it's even worth speculating about."[12] Since it has been a truism in politics that

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[10] New York Times, May 5, 1960.

[11] Ibid., July 24, 1960.

[12] Ibid., May 26, 1960.

a candidate, especially one of an in-party, cannot run successfully as his party's nominee unless he runs on its record, most politically seasoned observers concluded that the Governor was not aiming for the presidential nomination, except under rare circumstances—a domestic or international crisis. It was also known that unless Nixon withdrew as a candidate before the balloting, there would be no draft.

By keeping control of the powerful New York delegation and future campaign support in New York—a state necessary for victory—he could influence the Republican platform, the choice of the vice-presidential candidate and the campaign position of Nixon. It would also serve to polarize the sizeable bloc of anti-Nixon forces within the party who at present had nowhere to go. This group could develop into a potential nucleus of support for Rockefeller's possible candidacy in 1964. Furthermore, the convention would be injected with a badly needed element of suspense—necessary after the exciting Democratic proceedings.

What was happening to the goodwill and harmony which had pervaded the Republican pre-convention picture? Was an intraparty split to occur just before the convention which might lose the powerful support of New York's Governor and therefore, the state itself?

The answer to these questions tormented Vice-President Nixon and led to the unexpected meeting with Rockefeller just prior to the convention.

CHAPTER V

CRUCIAL ISSUES FOR PLATFORM AND OTHER CONVENTION COMMITTEES

"It is as big a mistake to underrate the party's platform as it is to take it literally."[1] Though these assertions of party philosophy are never completely fulfilled, they are significant in that they set the general trend of the campaign and establish a yardstick by which to judge the party.

The evolution of the two major parties in recent times has been revealed more clearly through the platforms than through the national candidates. This is especially true for the Republicans. In 1952, the basic issue was the wide differences in attitude toward foreign affairs. Today, the fundamental battle is involved with internal rather than external matters—the political and economic conservatives against the relatively more liberal individuals, i.e., the Goldwaters against the Rockefellers.

It has also been true for the Democrats whose differences in civil rights action ranged from the 1948 Dixiecrat convention walkout to the 1960 ultraprogressive platform plank. Of course, no one believed that the Southern

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[1] New York Times, July 26, 1960.

Democrats would rush to give validity to the liberal philosophy, but it was also incredible that they could totally ignore this supremely critical commitment of the party.

In 1960, both Republican and Democratic platform activities departed from tradition.

For the out-party, usually Congressional leaders dominated over platform formulation. The Democratic National Committee appointed Representative Chester Bowles of Connecticut—a freshman member of Congress and a supporter of Senator Kennedy—as chairman of the Committee on Platform and Resolutions, much to the dismay of anti-Kennedy forces.

The basic outlines of the 20,000-word Democratic "something for everybody" statement had been worked out by Bowles in April and May, following discussion with party leaders, subcommittees of the Democratic Advisory Council and presidential candidates.[2] The actual drafting was initiated a few weeks before its submission in printed form to a 20-member drafting group—only four members being Southerners—which made minor changes. It then went before the full 108-member platform committee on July 9th, which heard seventy witnesses in four days of public hearings, and then made appropriate language (rather than substance),

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[2] Ibid., July 13, 1960.

substitutions.

For the Republicans, Charles H. Percy, Chicago businessman and Republican leader, assumed the chairman's mantle. Closely resembling the Democratic Advisory Council, the Republican Committee on Program and Progress—a creation of the Republican National Committee—was a significant platform advisor. It appeared, however, that the initial draft of the platform had been drawn up by Administration officials; during these pre-convention sessions the Vice-President had also been represented. By convention time a blueprint was ready, but the customary public hearings were held nonetheless. In improving upon the Democratic procedure, the 100-member platform committee was divided into eight subcommittees dealing with the major planks. Governor Rockefeller, who had previously submitted his platform goals to Percy in a 6,000-word summary, flew to Chicago to afford his views which were plainly in variance with those of Nixon in four areas—defense, economic growth, health insurance for the aged, and civil rights. Following his return to New York, he kept in touch with the platform drafters and vocally expressed his dissatisfaction with the results.

The long-held tradition, which usually leaves to the incumbent of the in-party the presentation of the party platform, was radically upset when Vice-President Nixon initiated his spectacular meeting with Governor Rockefeller

in New York. The famous fourteen points which emerged were eventually incorporated into the final draft, but not until Nixon had threatened to fight for the proposals on the convention floor and had dealt with the committee members personally.

The Nixon-Rockefeller statement demonstrated that both figures had compromised. In general, Nixon withdrew from the White House position that the world picture was rosy, and Rockefeller moved away from his explicit demands which would have embarrassingly drawn the line sharply between Nixon and the President.

Aside from the customary criticisms of the in-party by the Democrats, the two policy accounts revealed real differences as well as broad areas of agreement.

Civil Rights

The similarities in this plank were more outstanding than the disagreements. Most significantly, both parties wrote the strongest civil rights planks in their history.

Each party, in denouncing discrimination, stressed the need for equal opportunity to all citizens and supported the Supreme Court decision to eliminate segregation in the schools. Each emphasized the necessity of guaranteeing the right to vote and of ending discrimination in employment and federally subsidized housing. Each promised to extend federal aid to integrated school districts and each implicitly endorsed the

"sit-in" demonstrations.

However, there were important differences. On the question of voting, the Democrats urged an end to literacy tests and, in a hazy fashion, proposed "further powers" for the Attorney General if needed. The Republicans, on the other hand, flatly advocated legislation to make six years in school as "conclusive evidence of literacy for voting purposes"—a much more practical suggestion.

Concerning education, the Democrats stated that every Southern school district be required to submit a plan providing for the beginning of desegregation by 1963; this was condemned by the Republicans as an idea inviting delay. The Republicans proposed that the Attorney General have the power to initiate school integration suits, while the Democrats extended the power to the total field of civil rights.

On employment, the Republicans vaguely mentioned the ending of discrimination, while the Democrats advocated the Federal Fair Employment Practices Commission. However, the Republicans promised to outlaw discrimination against Negroes in labor unions unless the unions promptly eliminated it themselves, and also pledged to oppose the use of federal funds "for the construction of segregated community facilities"—two points ignored by the Democrats.

Both planks contained proposals to revise and tighten Rule twenty-two of the Senate, which demands a two-thirds

vote to close filibuster—the traditional Southern weapon against civil rights legislation.

On the Republican side, the militant plank was the visible evidence of Rockefeller's influence on the Administration philosophy.

For the Democrats, the Southern Democrats revolted in the form of an angrily-worded minority report filed by ten Southern states—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Senator Johnson's home state, Texas, was the only Southern state which refrained from backing the report. It apparently was believed that such action would endanger his prospects for the presidential nomination. His unique position had helped to polarize the Southern delegates and to remove the zone of compromise.

Foreign Policy

In basic essentials, both parties were fundamentally alike on this vital subject, but the Republican plan revealed a tougher and more military-minded approach.

The G. O. P. no longer questioned the involvement of America into the world community; isolationist policies were not in evidence. The parties, however, differed on the best methods to pursue and strengthen the international position of the United States.

Both planks pledged to support the United Nations, with

the Democrats alone promising to repeal the Connally amendment which permitted the United States to decide when it could be sued in the World Court. Both parties advocated hemispheric solidarity, but the Republicans more specifically mentioned regional groupings in underdeveloped countries for the purpose of advancing "economic and educational development"—a definite attenuation of Governor Rockefeller's original "confederation" idea.

Both planks promised a continuation of foreign aid, but the Democrats went further in emphasizing the non-military aspects, and both pledged adherence to existing treaty provisions. The Republicans emphasized the status quo, while the Democrats stated they would be mindful of changing conditions in a changing world—i. e., the uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa.

Neither party expressed a change in their policy of nonrecognition of Communist China and membership in the United Nations, but the Democrats said they hoped for positive evidence to alter this situation. Both stressed the need for resisting Communist aggression; but while the Republicans urged the position of "firmness", the Democrats declared that the basic issue "is not the desire to be firm, but the capability to be firm."

Also, both parties endorsed a firmer immigration policy and, in principal, the reciprocal trade program. Within this

plank, Rockefeller proposals were considerably watered down.

The Economy

The Republicans and Democrats both recognized the necessity and importance of economic growth in America, but a main area of difference arose around the question of what the government should do about it.

On the subject of purposes, there was a substantial degree of agreement. The Democratic plank set "an average rate of 5 per cent annually," as its goal; the Republicans claimed that this rate had already been accomplished, but agreed that it had to be improved—a Rockefeller insertion. They also agreed that economic growth involved the expansion of the American system of free enterprise.

In differing on the methods of stimulating growth in this system, the Democrats declared that the first step should be by the President putting "an end to the present high-interest, tight-money policy"—a statement which implied presidential control of the Federal Reserve System. Then to avoid inflation, the Democrats promised "monetary and credit policies properly applied, budget surpluses in times of full employment, and action to restrain 'administered price' increases" in industries controlled by a few individuals.

The Republicans, on the other hand, "rejected the concept of artificial growth forced by massive new Federal spending and loose money policies," and proposed to stimulate

the economy by such policies as "broadly based tax reform ... including realistic incentive depreciation schedules." The latter was to be accomplished by labor's and business' elimination of "featherbedding practices," and by monetary and fiscal programs intended to prevent both inflation and depression—these last points having been contributed by Governor Rockefeller.

Agriculture

In sharply disagreeing with the Democratic counterpart, the Republican plank conformed to the Benson philosophy and advocated no governmental interference in the farm economy; it condemned promises of "specific levels of price support." On the other hand, the Democrats called a return to the high, fixed price support of 90 per cent of parity for basic commodities. They also included other devices such as direct subsidies to producers for the purpose of maintaining farm income.

Both parties favored a great increase in the retirement of land from farm production through the Soil Bank.

Labor

The Democrats advocated a rise in the minimum wage to $1.25 per hour, nationwide minimum standards for state unemployment insurance, and repeal of a federal law which allowed the individual states to prohibit union shops. They

also expressed disapproval of the "anti-labor" characteristics of the Taft-Hartley and 1959 Labor Reform laws.

The Republicans also stated the need for an increase in the minimum wage, but did not set a figure. Without specifying, they favored a "strengthening" of unemployment insurance.

Education

The Republican education plank endorsed federal support for school construction, but stood firmly opposed to any aid for teachers' salaries, calling it federal interference with local control of education.

The Rockefeller-Nixon statement had favored a greatly expanded plan of aid to higher education. In eliminating this proposal, the plank only pledged the continuation of loans to college housing.

The Democrats supported aid both to school construction and teachers' salaries. In addition, they called for college loans and scholarships, and assistance for the construction of all types of university buildings.

Health

Governor Rockefeller generally favored the Democratic plank of mandatory medical care benefits for the aged as part of the Social Security system. However, he added a provision allowing the aged to take advantage of private

health insurance, if desired. Nixon favored a much more limited plan on a voluntary basis. The Nixon-Rockefeller statement, in evading the issue and not mentioning Social Security, said that the aged could benefit from insurance "on a sound fiscal basis through a contributory system." In following this reasoning, the Republican platform added the Nixon qualification that this service would be given only to the aged "needing it."

In an attempt to alleviate the doctor-shortage problem, both parties pledged federal aid to medical school construction and financial help to medical students.

Elsewhere in the domestic field, both platforms called for increased federal activity in housing, old-age security, development of natural resources, conservation of soil, relief to depressed areas, and aid to urban localities in their slum and sewage clearance programs.

Other Convention Committees

In 1960, nothing of importance occurred in the other convention committees of the in-party; the Democratic camp was also fairly quiet, except for a few minor skirmishes.

The Democratic Loyalty Issue

Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler, in aiming to curb a party revolt, succeeded in influencing the Democratic National Committee to readopt the party "good faith" rule—adopted unanimously at the 1956 convention.

It committed the South to place the 1960 national nominees on the state ballots and choose electors pledged to their support.

By March 1960, when the free-elector movement was gaining prominence, Butler demanded a loyalty pledge from the delegates in Southern states where such rebellion was appearing; he emphatically stated that only 'loyal' elements from these areas would be seated. However, by the time the convention met, these difficulties had considerably subsided and there was a feeling of harmony among Democrats of all persuasions. The convention, without any negative votes, ratified the loyalty compromise rule on the recommendation of its Rules Committee.

Credentials Committee

Two minor disputes came before the Democratic Credentials Committee.

One, dealing with Puerto Rico's delegation, involved a dispute over intraparty politics and carried no implication of a major political question. The Committee, in a spirit of compromise, recommended that representation be split between the two rival factions.

The second controversy was also resolved when the challenge to the credentials of a Virginia delegate, Frank

Vaughan, was withdrawn. Another Virginia delegate had sought to bar Vaughan because he had actively campaigned for the 1952 and 1956 Republican presidential tickets; he retracted it when he received assurance that the contested delegate would support the 1960 Democratic national ticket. This controversy posed the sole threat of a Southern walkout due to the party loyalty issue. The forces of Senator Kennedy were credited for having prevented similar challenges to the credentials of other Southerners—Governor Price Daniel (Tex) and Senator Strom Thurmond (SC). Kennedy strategists regarded a credentials battle as an unnecessary evil which might weaken his support if he became the presidential nominee.

Rules Committee

A pre-convention struggle, which was finally averted when no action was taken on it, involved a proposal which would prevent a state from changing its vote on the nominating roll call. It obviously had been forwarded by anti-Kennedy forces to preclude the withdrawal of obscure candidates and to forestall a victory for the front-runner on the first ballot.

Another rule change included an attempt by Butler to increase the prestige of national committee members—thus weakening Southern influence in the convention. Under its authority granted in 1956 to alter the number

and distribution of delegates for the purpose of increasing their effectiveness, the National Committee proposed to grant to every member a ½ convention vote and stipulated that they would not be bound by the voting of their delegations.

The major furor to this proposal did not involve the subject of why these individuals should receive a vote, but was voiced by the Southern delegates who were worried about the application of these votes. When the question was put to a vote, it was decided that each committeeman and committeewoman would receive a ½ vote which would be subject to the wishes of their state delegations.

And finally, the Democrats, in acting against Southern appeals, bowed to progress and agreed to limit nominating and seconding speeches in hopes of attracting the largest possible television audience.

Compared with past convention committees, both Republicans and Democrats in 1960 had settled their differences with moderate strife. Vice-President Nixon and Senator Kennedy had both played vital roles in these pre-convention proceedings. The nominating function would determine whether this good will would continue throughout the convention period.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CANDIDATE ACTIVITIES - DEMOCRATIC

Despite the overwhelming support of Senator Kennedy, the other announced contenders continued to strive personally to upset the prevalent feeling that the Massachusetts Senator would win on an early ballot.

Democratic National Chairman Paul Butler called the Democratic National Convention to order at 5:14 p.m. (Los Angeles time), on Monday, July 11th, 1960, in the Los Angeles Memorial Sports Arena. The floor was crowded with milling delegates and communications media representatives, but the spectators' gallery was sparsely populated—this pattern running fairly constant throughout the sessions. Following routine opening festivities and welcoming addresses, Mr. Butler delivered his farewell talk, defending his record as symbolic of the "right to disagree;" in welcoming dissent, he denied that unity was the sole duty of his position.[1]

The only event which created a little excitement in the first session was the keynote speech by Idaho's young and dynamic Senator Frank Church. Unlike previous keynote speeches,

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[1] New York Times, July 12, 1960.

the address was uniquely brief and recited from memory. But, it certainly was not a reflection of former political speeches which have inspired national conventions. The delegates listened unenthusiastically, with occasional applause, as he sharply lashed out at the Eisenhower Administration's failures and accused it of rising unemployment, decreased farm income and foreign policy blunders which he said resulted in replacing "showmanship" for "statesmanship."[2]

The Washington, D.C. delegation on Tuesday, July 12th, voted to award its nine delegates under the unit rule to Senator Kennedy. Two more governors, Orville Freeman (Minn) and Stephen McNichols (Col), joined the Kennedy bandwagon. Also, on that day, the Minnesota delegation voted again to nominate Senator Humphrey for the presidency in spite of his previously releasing the delegation of such an obligation. This maneuver was an effort to withhold a large bloc of votes from Kennedy and increase the pressure on the Kennedy forces to further Governor Freeman's prospects for the vice-presidential nomination.

Adlai Stevenson acted more like an eager draftee and appeared before state caucuses possessing latent Stevenson sentiment. He won an outstanding triumph in winning 31½ of California's 81 votes, with only 30½ going to Kennedy. Governor Brown's inability to transfer support to Kennedy—who suffered one of his few convention setbacks by this

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[2] Ibid.

action—in spite of his control of the California delegation, was a definite blow to his prestige within the party and a surprise to many Democrats.

The outstanding occurrence of candidate activities of the day was the dramatic, nationally televised face to face Kennedy-Johnson debate before a joint session of the Texas and Massachusetts delegations, in which Johnson criticized his opponent for his Senate absenteeism, and farm and natural resources records. However, more compliments than insults were exchanged in the banter, in which Senator Kennedy again had the last word by declaring, "I strongly support him [Johnson] for Senate majority leader."[3]

Tuesday's convention meeting commenced with moderate Florida Governor LeRoy Collins' assumption of the major post of permanent chairman. The session was far less apathetic than that of opening day and was highlighted by the roaring reception tendered Adlai Stevenson when he appeared before the convention in a planned effort to evoke sentimental emotion and advance his presidential prospects. "We want Stevenson," chanted the galleries and delegates.[4] The whole demonstration, including Stevenson's appreciative remarks, lasted approximately eighteen minutes, but there was no evidence that the spontaneous showing had altered his tail-end position in the race.

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[3] Ibid., July 13, 1960.

[4] Ibid.

A special shortened version of the platform read by Chester Bowles concluded the unusual session. Southern opposition on the convention floor was relatively mild and resulted in the platform being adopted by voice vote. Supporters of Senator Johnson were generally credited with having prevented a serious desertion over the ultraliberal plank.

On Wednesday, July 13th, Senator Humphrey switched his support from Kennedy to Stevenson though Minnesota Governor Freeman remained in the front-runner's camp. The delegates, undecided on the question of who to back, resolved to cast a first-ballot vote for Humphrey.

Wednesday was also nomination day—the climactic event of the convention. Wild cheers and well-organized floor demonstrations greeted the formal placing in nomination of, and seconding speeches for the various presidential contenders on the roll call of the states: Senator Kennedy by Governor Freeman; Senator Johnson by Speaker Rayburn; Senator Symington by Governor James Blair (Mo); and, Adlai Stevenson by Senator Eugene McCarthy (Minn).

In the most outstanding speech of the convention, Senator McCarthy made an all-out attack on Senator Kennedy and declared, "Let it go to a second ballot when all of the delegates will be free of instructions."[5] He added by pleading, "do not

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[5] Ibid., July 14, 1960.

reject this man who is not the favorite son of one state, but is the favorite son of fifty states and of every country on earth."[6] The wild demonstration that followed was the loudest of the session—dominated by the packed Stevenson galleries and by the parading groups of outsiders; however, the great majority of delegates did not join the exhibition.[7] Since Wendell L. Willkie had triumphed over other Republican contenders at Philadelphia in 1940, this was the first major attempt on the part of the galleries to blitz a national convention.

A number of nonserious favorite son candidates were also placed in nomination—among them, Senator George Smathers (Fla), and Governors Ross Barnett (Miss)—a new and unexpected action, Meyner (N J), Loveless (Iowa) and Docking (Kans)—the latter two withdrawing before the start of the balloting.[8]

The nominating roll call, proceeding in alphabetical order, went about as expected, with Johnson winning practically

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[6] Ibid.

[7] Stevenson was probably stronger in Southern California than in any other area in the country.

[8] Governor Meyner finally ended his lengthy holdout on Wednesday, and cast his vote for Kennedy in the New Jersey caucus which promised to give 31½ to 36½ votes to Kennedy at the propitious moment. New Jersey hoped that its votes would put the Massachusetts Senator over the top and decided to leave the timing of Meyner's withdrawal up to his discretion. This action restored a surface appearance of harmony to the New Jersey delegation, but Kennedy triumphed without their help.

all of the Southern votes, and Symington, Humphrey and Stevenson receiving scattered support. Kennedy maintained his strength in the Northeast, Middle West and West, and won unexpected votes here and there. Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey and Texas gave their votes to favorite sons.

By the time Governor DiSalle of Ohio had delivered his state's 64 votes for Kennedy, the Massachusetts Senator's floor manager, Governor Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut and floor calculators were certain of a first-ballot victory for their man. They estimated that Wyoming would be the crucial state which would make the nomination a reality. Following Pennsylvania'a addition of 68 votes and Wisconsin's contribution of 24, the total stood at 750—11 votes shy of the required majority. Tension was at a peak, but Wyoming had only 10 votes for the Senator. Robert Kennedy, Senator Kennedy's brother, put the pressure on Wyoming's chairman, Tracy S. McCracken, by shouting above the roar of anticipation, "Ten won't do it, but eleven will!"[9] McCracken threw up his hands and bellowed, "Let 'em all go."[10] That clinched Senator Kennedy's first-ballot triumph.

Kennedy's strength at the conclusion of the roll call was 806 delegate votes, (Appendix, pp. 190 - 191). Wild

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[9] New York Times, July 15, 1960.

[10] Ibid.

cheering and general bedlam greeted nominee Kennedy as he put in an unexpected appearance at the convention hall, during which he expressed his gratitude and pledged a hard fight to the finish.

—The vice-presidential nomination, usually anticlimactic, retained most of the excitement of the presidential fight in 1960. Several names had been suggested during the pre-convention period—among them, Senators Henry Jackson (Wash), Humphrey, Governors Freeman, Loveless, Docking, Senators Albert Gore (Tenn), Claire Engle (Calif), and William Proxmire (Wisc). However, the name that had topped the list during the convention week was that of Senator Symington who had the support of many party leaders.

When the fourth session of the convention commenced on Thursday, July 14th, most of the delegates were still completely unaware of the identity of the vice-presidential choice. To the surprise of most and the disappointment of many, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson was the only name put in nomination by Pennsylvania's Governor Lawrence. In a carefully preplanned maneuver, the convention, under the leadership of Permanent Chairman Collins, then suspended its rules and nominated the Texan by acclamation. Appearing before the convention, Johnson thanked the delegates and pledged warm cooperation with "the next President."[11]

Moving boldly to win party unity and new support in the

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[11] Ibid.

South, Senator Kennedy had chosen a Southern Protestant as his running mate. The convention's progressive platform and Johnson's defeat for first place loomed as the major causes for a rebellion by the conservative South, which until this maneuver had been faced with almost total defeat at the convention. Now, Southerners were jubilant and many Southern governors and senators declared that the doubt raised due to a strong civil rights plank had been swept away. Democratic unity and teamwork in Congress had also been greatly aided by the move.

Kennedy had overriden labor and Northern liberal protests. A fight by these groups had been averted due to Kennedy's position now to demand his choice, and because a willing alternative candidate could not be found. However, most leaders believed that the advantages which the Solid South gave to a presidential candidate would add more strength for the Democrats than it would detract in the North.

Senator Johnson had been regarded by many Northern and Southern delegates as being entitled to the first refusal of the vice-presidency due to his second largest bloc of support. His selection had been urged by a coalition of populous state leaders—New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, California, Illinois and New Jersey—who had agreed to throw their support to the Massachusetts Senator with the understanding that Johnson would be offered the second spot. If he refused, the nomination would then go to Senator Symington, since he was as well-known

to the public and no new orientation would be necessary.

Just as surprising as Kennedy's choice was Johnson's acceptance. Many times during the pre-convention period, he had stated that the majority leadership of the Senate was more important than the vice-presidency. The selection of Johnson had been undertaken when the Majority Leader had surprisingly made it known that he would settle for the vice-presidency after he had lost first place.

Now that his major goals had been won, Kennedy immediately undertook the restoring of party unity. However, in healing the breach with his major opponents, he had omitted the name of Stevenson. The major reason for this action had been Stevenson's refusal to agree to nominate Kennedy after a thinking-over period of 48 hours, even though his chances for the nomination were remote. The planned demonstrations on the floor had further angered the Kennedy strategists. Due to his behavior, many party leaders discounted Stevenson's chances for the position of Secretary of State in a Kennedy Administration. Stevenson's warm endorsement of Kennedy, however, with a complimentary statement from the Senator in return, helped dispel reports of a breach between the two leaders. The Democratic facade of unity was completed with Truman's pledge of his "personal services in any way that he may be asked by the party", and Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt's

plea for Democratic unity.[12]

The fifth and final session of the convention took place on Friday, July 15th, in the Memorial Coliseum where both nominees formally accepted the nomination. Following his introduction by Stevenson, Kennedy, in a message far sterner and much more partisan than past acceptance speeches, sharply lashed out at his soon-to-be nominee, Nixon, who took the brunt of the oratorical attacks. Kennedy stated that the Vice-President's career had been a direct opposite to that of Abraham Lincoln in that Nixon "seemed to show charity toward none and malice for all."[13] Besides being a partisan attack on Nixon and the Republicans, and a party-unifying plea for Democrats, his message was also a statement of problems facing the nation and world.

The highlight of the speech—overflowing with antitheses, which have become famous as his literary style—came when he called for a "New Frontier" with more sacrifices and not more luxuries, which "appeals to their pride, not their pocketbook," and "holds out the promise of more sacrifice, instead of more security."[14] He denied that his Roman Catholicism was a risk and declared, "I hope that no American, considering the really critical issues facing this

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[12] Ibid., July 16, 1960. Mrs. Roosevelt, as one of the most fervent Stevenson supporters had been instrumental in exciting Stevenson demonstrations with her frequent appearances.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

country, will waste his franchise by voting either for me or against me solely on account of my religious affiliation."[15]

Senator Johnson who was introduced by Senator Symington, also emphasized the unifying implication for the Democratic Party of his nomination, and said that the action spoke well for "a new day of hope and harmony for all Americans—regardless of religion, race or regions."[16] The unsuccessful presidential contenders also spoke before the 50,000 spectators in a calculated effort to demonstrate renewed party unity.

The final convention business of electing a new national chairman was undertaken on Saturday, July 16th, when Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington replaced Paul Butler.

During convention week, Senator Kennedy had again displayed his remarkable organizational ability and single-mindedness—almost ruthlessness—of purpose with which he had pursued his goal for almost four years. His nomination on the first ballot, during which no delegate questioned the state tally or demanded a polling of the delegation, was clinched by the support of the powerful big-city-state delegations whose leaders and a large proportion of whose delegates were Roman Catholic.

He had scored a remarkable feat in persuading the dissenters to accept the choice of Johnson—by retracting

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

their opposition and agreeing to a prearranged maneuver whereby Permanent Chairman Collins would rule that two-thirds of the delegates had voted "yes" and one-third "no" on the motion to nominate Johnson by acclamation. Even Senator Johnson, the independent and strong-willed Majority Leader, in completely subordinating himself, had renewed his support for the presidential nominee without reservation, and had emphasized his willingness to "work my fingernails out" in following his leadership.[17]

The week of victory had concluded with every National Committee member except one signing a written pledge to back the ticket, despite previous reports that they would not do so.

In spite of these Kennedy triumphs, Senator Johnson himself accomplished what the presidential nominee could not have done alone. He offered himself as a bridge between the Democratic conservatives and liberals. This politically expedient ticket of Kennedy and Johnson had re-established the old Roosevelt coalition of the urban North and the rural South which had kept the Democratic Party in power from 1932 to 1952. The combination of North and South, and Senator Kennedy's organizational efficiency, glamour and appeal to the young—feared by the G. O. P.—was highly qualified and more than ready to meet the Republican challenge.

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[17] Ibid., July 18, 1960.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CANDIDATE ACTIVITIES - REPUBLICAN

In 1960, the Republicans tried to maintain some semblance of a convention struggle, but Richard M. Nixon's nomination for the presidency was considered a long and foregone conclusion. The Grand Old Party had to be content with presenting 'a good show' and using the convention as a campaign rally.

The eve of the Republican Convention found Nelson Rockefeller in much the same position as Adlai Stevenson had been in two weeks before—an available inactive candidacy coupled with noisy amateur demonstrations but pitifully few delegates. However, he was more realistic than Mr. Stevenson in realizing the great improbability of a successful 'draft.' When he saw no hope for defeating Nixon for the nomination, he successfully concentrated on shaping the Republican platform more to his views that all is not rosy with America and the world.

At a time when the Governor's political luck was ebbing and his chances of swaying the convention were negligible, the brief and temporary flurry of excitement caused by the unexpected Nixon-Rockefeller meeting elevated the importance

of New York and its governor to new heights. The principal reasoning behind this extraordinary gesture on Nixon's part appeared to be the vice-presidential nomination of Johnson, which severely reduced Republican prospects for carrying the South and border states, but bolstered his hopes for winning a coveted prize—New York's 45 electoral votes and those of other important Northern states.

Prior to this extraordinary move by the Democratic National Convention, he had been willing to support a moderate civil rights plank, but the Johnson nomination reversed the picture entirely. Vice-President Nixon was faced with appeasing the powerful figure who dissented against the prearranged decisions of the convention, and it appeared as though the Governor emerged as the victor for the time being. Many of his platform views were incorporated into the Nixon-Rockefeller accord, with Nixon making most of the concessions. In addition, his adamant refusal, even in the face of intense pressure, to be nominated for the vice-presidency finally was accepted.

This major political compromise was expected to benefit both parties. For Nixon, it included guarantees of Rockefeller's active participation in the campaign and a dramatic method by which to disassociate himself from some of the Administration's policies and clarify his own position. This tactic was undertaken under the guise of mandatory action to preserve the backing of the popular

and powerful Governor of a crucial state. In reality, Nixon was indebted to Rockefeller who had provided such a timely opportunity.

On the other hand, Rockefeller was freed from a worsening political situation which was endangering the Republican Party in New York State, and his prestige with Republican professionals in other states.

On the eve of the convention, the prevailing harmony was disrupted by a committee revolt against the Nixon-Rockefeller civil rights proposals and threats by the two leaders to carry their fight to the convention floor. The possibility of a floor fight over the platform—the first since 1932—loomed ominously as delegates assembled for the opening of the twenty-seventh Republican National Convention.

Banging the gavel which was used a hundred years ago in this same location when Abraham Lincoln was nominated, Republican National Chairman Thruston B. Morton officially called the convention to order on Monday, July 25th, at 10:46 a.m. (Chicago time), in Chicago's International Amphitheatre. Unlike its Democratic counterpart, nearly every seat on the floor and in the gallery was occupied—a practice adhered to during every session which gave the observer the impression of a well-rehearsed and split second timed television show. Following opening festivities, addresses, adoption of rules, and selection of

officers, the convention recessed for the evening session which would feature three prominent speakers.

During the second session, an enthusiastic show of affection tendered by delegates and spectators greeted former President Herbert Hoover, and a demonstration of support by Republican conservatives was accorded to Senator Barry Goldwater. However, it was Representative Walter H. Judd's (Minn) brilliant keynote address which provided the partisan fireworks. His inspirational battle cry was cheered and applauded by a jubilant audience as he opened a massive counterattack on Democratic criticism of Republican foreign and domestic policy. He concluded by asserting that the Republican Party offered the country the best hope for avoiding war and maintaining prosperity, and declared the voters themselves will realize "that the course of wisdom and sureness is to continue to entrust the destiny of our nation to steady, competent, experienced, principled Republican hands."[1]

Tuesday, July 26th, was highlighted by Governor Rockefeller's statement definitely eliminating himself for the presidential nomination and swinging New York's 96 votes to Vice-President Nixon. This final action was taken following the New York leader's satisfaction with the civil rights plank of the platform, and growing audible displeasure by many New York delegates who resented their

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[1] New York Times, July 26, 1960.

'uncommitted' status on the eve of the Nixon nomination.

With Rockefeller bluntly threatening a convention floor battle if the Nixon-Rockefeller proposals were not incorporated into the platform, Nixon tirelessly and ably proved his persuasive powers with members of the committee. Though he knew he could win a floor fight, Nixon's main concern was that such a struggle would weaken his chances of winning the election. An additional test of the Vice-President's party leadership was met when he successfully placated a majority of Southerners and conservatives—most of them die-hard supporters of the late Senator Robert A. Taft. This group was led by Senator Barry Goldwater who considered the Nixon conciliation as a "surrender" and a "Munich of the Republican Party," and threatened to withhold finances and votes from the election.[2]

Tuesday's convention session was devoted solely to "Thank You, Ike" day as a wildly cheering and demonstrating audience greeted the President and First Lady. Earlier in the day, he had received a tumultuous welcome from one million spectators as he rode through Chicago.

To the partisan convention crowd the President listed the achievements of his Administration, painting a picture of unprecedented prosperity and peace, and concluded with the dramatic challenge to Soviet Premier Khrushchev to approve a United Nations sponsored plebiscite among people

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[2] Ibid., July 24, 1960.

of every country on whether they prefer to live under communism or democracy.

During its fourth session on Wednesday, July 27th, the convention conducted most of its business. Vice-President Nixon won the Republican presidential nomination by acclamation, following one of the briefest speeches in the history of nominating speeches by Oregon's Governor Mark O. Hatfield and a seventeen minute demonstration on the convention floor. Governor Paul Fannin of Arizona presented the nominating address for Senator Barry Goldwater who withdrew his candidacy following a demonstration for him.

On the first ballot, 1321 votes were cast for the Vice-President and 10 Louisiana votes for Senator Goldwater—which were later changed to make the nomination unanimous. Earlier, the convention had overwhelmingly approved by voice vote and without debate the revised party platform.

The main speaker of this fourth session was former Governor Thomas E. Dewey, who had been the Republican presidential candidate in 1944 and 1948. Called upon to set the general tone of the campaign, he presented a slashing attack on the Democrats, provoking frequent and loud outbursts of applause, and intoned warm praise for President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon.

Thursday, July 28th, the final session of the convention, was the day the vice-president would be nominated, as delegates convened to complete the Republican national ticket. Several

names had been in the spotlight for many months. Prominent among them were: Secretary of Treasury Robert B. Anderson, Attorney General William P. Rogers, Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Interior Fred A. Seaton, and United States Ambassador to the United Nations Henry C. Lodge; Governors Mark O. Hatfield (Oreg), and William G. Stratton (Ill); Senators John Cooper (Ky), Everett M. Dirksen (Ill), Barry Goldwater (Ariz), and Thruston B. Morton (Ky); House Minority Leader Charles A. Halleck (Ind), and Congressmen Gerald R. Ford (Mich), and Walter H. Judd (Minn). However, practically all Republican leaders, including Vice-President Nixon had preferred Governor Rockefeller as the strongest possible candidate. Upon his refusal, the field had narrowed to Henry C. Lodge and Thruston B. Morton. As nomination time approached, Mr. Lodge appeared to be the heavy favorite.

This belief was confirmed when, following a consultation with a caucus of 36 leaders on Wednesday night, July 27th, the Vice-President announced his personal choice, Henry Cabot Lodge, an urban liberal and internationalist. Undoubtedly his decision had been bolstered by the fact that Mr. Lodge was also the preference of President Eisenhower and former President Hoover.

Although a group of Midwest Republican leaders, in promoting Senator Morton's prospects, had requested that the choice be left to the convention and had argued that someone from the border states was needed to give the ticket

ideological as well as sectional balance, apparently Nixon again felt that Johnson's presence on the Democratic ticket offered dim hope for gaining strength in the Southern and border states. He hoped that Lodge could help retain New York and other key states in the Republican presidential column. In addition, Lodge was better known than any of the other prospects and therefore, much time and effort would be saved in promoting his image before the electorate. More important, with the issues of foreign policy and the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack uppermost in the campaign, his special background and experience would make his presence on the ticket a distinct asset.

Completing the Republican national ticket, the delegates formally took action on the dictum of their presidential candidate by unanimously nominating Mr. Lodge for the vice-presidency, following a nominating speech by Representative Judd.

In his acceptance speech that night, Vice-President Nixon, who had been presented to the convention by his former rival, Governor Rockefeller, declared that to be victorious over communism, the free world has to toil in the economic and social spheres, instead of piously intoning 'catch phrases' and slogans. He brought down the house with his electric extension of the Russian Premier's quotation, "When Mr. Khrushchev says our grandchildren will live under

communism, let us say his grandchildren will live in freedom."[3] In pouring scorn on the Democrats, he declared that as a party they "promised everything to everybody with one exception—they didn't promise to pay the bills."[4] Sarcastically he continued, "they composed a symphony of political cynicism which is out of harmony with our times today."[5]

Henry C. Lodge likewise emphasized the importance of world problems and praised the Vice-President as the best man "to represent us in the turmoil of world politics."[6]

The final business of the Republican National Convention concluded with the unanimous re-election of Senator Morton as National Chairman by the Republican National Committee. This action taken at the suggestion of President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon completed a week of triumphs for Richard Nixon.

It had begun with the secret meeting with Governor Rockefeller and the resulting successful placating of Southern and conservative Republicans. It continued with the show of deliberate political strength demonstrated by the Vice-President in tailoring the platform to the Nixon-Rockefeller accord over bitter opposition, and winning of

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[3] Ibid., July 29, 1960.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

enthusiastic support from the New York Governor and his delegation. Equally important, these actions had served to successfully change his image from that of a conservative to that of a liberal.

Nixon's keen political instinct was remarkably evident in the successful postponement of a day in the choosing of the vice-presidential nominee. This instinct had warned him against having his choice for running mate confirmed before he, in fact, had become the presidential nominee—lest the Democrats be given material for their campaign charge of a "rigged" convention, initiated by them many months before.

Even though Nixon had summoned the party leaders for a two hour and twenty minute consultation on the vice-presidency following his own nomination, the text of Mr. Lodge's acceptance speech had been dictated from New York to his headquarters in Chicago two hours prior to the meeting. The Republicans in general, and Mr. Nixon in particular, had come to the convention with a pessimistic outlook, but the gloomy mood substantially changed as the Vice-President skillfully ironed out controversies and eliminated elements of disunity. Mr. Nixon had called on all his powers as politician par excellence by demonstrating his remarkable talents as persuader, coordinator, arbiter and leader. He had completely dominated the convention. Republican National Convention week could justifiably be called 'Nixon week.'

CHAPTER VIII

TESTING THE WISCONSIN AND WEST VIRGINIA PRIMARIES

The closest presidential election in the 20th Century occurred on Tuesday, November 8th, 1960. Out of almost 69 million Americans who voted—the highest number to participate in any national election—49.7 per cent of the total vote, or 34,227,096 ballots, with 303 electoral votes, went to the column of the victor, Senator Kennedy. Vice-President Nixon received 49.6 per cent, or 34,108,546 ballots, and 219 electoral votes.[1] One tenth of 1 per cent of the total vote or 118,550 votes, had produced the man who would occupy the most important office in the world.

Election day marked the end of a long and tough battle by Senator Kennedy and his forces. He had realized from the very beginning of his campaign that the only route to victory was by a plurality in the primaries, which in turn would influence the party leaders. His string of primary victories supplied the principal and vital thrust to his bandwagon which steamrollered to a smashing convention triumph.

Two of these primaries, involving Senators Kennedy and

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[1] Harry Hansen (ed.), The World Almanac (New York: New York World-Telegram and The Sun, 1963), p. 417.

Humphrey, emerged as all-important in 1960—Wisconsin, because Kennedy was opposed in the 'open' primary by a Protestant from the neighboring state, and West Virginia, due to its religious importance—since only 5 per cent of its inhabitants are Roman Catholic.

This chapter will attempt to test county by county the adequacy or accuracy of these two primaries as political barometers for their respective states in the November 1960 elections.

The first comparison involves an attempt to relate the counties which Senator Kennedy won in the Wisconsin primary and election, (Table 1).

Table 1

WISCONSIN PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTION VOTE

County	Primary Vote[2]			Election Vote[3]	
	Humphrey	Kennedy	Nixon	Kennedy	Nixon
Adams	45.6%	24.1%	30.2%	42.2%	57.4%
Ashland	33.3	45.3	21.2	57.1	42.7
Barron	45.4	26.3	28.2	42.7	57.0
Bayfield	43.4	33.2	23.3	52.7	46.9
Brown	15.7	56.1	28.0	50.2	49.7
Buffalo	47.3	27.6	24.9	44.6	55.4
Burnett	52.6	19.7	27.6	45.6	54.0
Calumet	18.6	50.8	30.5	45.5	54.5
Chippewa	36.2	43.4	20.3	52.9	46.9
Clark	42.4	31.8	25.7	44.5	55.2
Columbia	36.32	27.3	36.33	39.0	60.9
Crawford	37.1	37.0	25.8	47.3	52.6

[2]Wisconsin Blue Book, 1962, (Madison, Wisconsin: Legislative Reference Library, 1962), p. 756. (Percentages calculated by author.)

[3]Richard M. Scammon (compiled and ed.), America Votes 4 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), p. 443.

Wisconsin - Primary and Election Vote, cont'd.

County	Primary Vote Humphrey	Kennedy	Nixon	Election Vote Kennedy	Nixon
Dane	40.6%	32.3%	27.0%	52.0%	47.8%
Dodge	31.4	34.1	34.4	37.1	62.8
Door	24.3	34.7	40.8	38.3	61.5
Douglas	45.6	38.1	16.1	60.7	39.1
Dunn	51.2	20.0	28.7	39.9	59.8
Eau Claire	47.0	27.1	25.7	43.7	56.1
Florence	31.6	35.2	33.1	47.9	51.8
Fond du Lac	24.1	41.1	34.6	40.2	59.6
Forest	31.8	43.5	24.5	52.7	47.0
Grant	29.8	35.4	34.7	39.9	60.0
Green	35.9	22.5	41.4	32.2	67.8
Green Lake	20.0	35.6	44.3	35.2	64.7
Iowa	38.4	31.6	29.8	40.8	59.2
Iron	34.3	53.6	11.9	68.9	30.9
Jackson	52.1	20.0	27.7	41.8	58.0
Jefferson	37.7	27.8	34.3	38.2	61.6
Juneau	40.5	27.5	31.9	39.3	60.6
Kenosha	26.4	49.1	24.3	53.4	46.4
Kewaunee	21.3	52.3	26.2	51.8	48.1
La Crosse	37.1	34.6	28.2	43.8	56.1
Lafayette	35.5	33.8	30.5	43.3	56.6
Langlade	30.4	43.2	26.3	46.5	53.3
Lincoln	39.4	27.0	33.5	38.7	60.9
Manitowoc	22.2	52.3	25.3	54.3	45.6
Marathon	37.1	35.2	27.5	45.3	54.7
Marinette	24.1	43.0	32.7	47.4	52.5
Marquette	29.8	24.2	45.8	29.7	70.1
Milwaukee	28.5	48.7	22.6	57.8	42.0
Monroe	44.5	27.8	27.5	41.0	58.9
Oconto	24.0	43.0	32.8	44.7	55.2
Oneida	29.4	39.5	30.9	46.6	53.2
Outagamie	15.8	47.5	36.6	41.6	58.2
Ozaukee	24.2	43.3	32.4	40.9	58.9
Pepin	35.9	41.1	22.8	52.2	47.7
Pierce	37.8	33.3	28.7	43.4	56.6
Polk	51.4	18.9	29.5	44.5	55.2
Portage	19.80	60.3	19.87	62.0	37.9
Price	38.5	35.8	25.6	48.6	51.1
Racine	31.0	42.3	26.5	50.7	49.0
Richland	39.4	25.3	35.1	36.0	63.8
Rock	28.5	32.2	39.2	39.2	60.6
Rusk	40.1	38.1	21.7	54.3	45.5
St. Croix	35.7	36.1	28.0	47.0	52.8
Sauk	36.2	27.5	36.1	38.2	61.7
Sawyer	35.6	34.4	29.9	46.2	53.6

Wisconsin - Primary and Election Vote, cont'd.

County	Primary Vote Humphrey	Kennedy	Nixon	Election Vote Kennedy	Nixon
Shawano	29.6%	29.0%	41.2%	32.7%	67.2%
Sheboygan	29.4	36.6	33.9	45.8	53.9
Taylor	45.5	36.7	17.6	52.1	47.6
Trempealeau	45.8	30.8	23.2	48.4	51.4
Vernon	59.1	16.1	24.7	41.1	58.8
Vilas	27.2	30.3	42.3	35.6	64.2
Walworth	23.1	31.8	45.0	32.7	67.2
Washburn	39.1	31.7	29.1	45.6	54.1
Washington	23.0	43.2	33.3	42.6	57.3
Waukesha	27.1	38.1	34.6	42.3	57.6
Waupaca	29.0	23.4	47.5	27.3	72.6
Waushara	29.0	22.0	48.8	27.8	72.2
Winnebago	21.5	37.0	41.4	38.1	61.7
Wood	29.9	38.5	31.5	42.0	57.8
Total	31.0%	40.2%	28.7%	48.0%	51.8%

The good positive relationship in the scatter diagram, (Table 2), demonstrates that Kennedy did approximately 6 per cent better in each county in the election than in the primary, with only 7 counties falling below the diagonal dividing line.

This relationship must be qualified by pointing out that the main feature in the Wisconsin primary was the contest between the two Democrats. Obviously, many Democrats who voted for Senator Humphrey in the primary election probably chose Senator Kennedy in the general election.

Even though the main feature in the Wisconsin primary was the contest between the two Democrats, there is almost a perfect correlation between the Vice-President's primary



TABLE 2

KENNEDY
IN WISCONSIN PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTION—
SCATTER DIAGRAM

election vote and the subsequent general election vote, (Table 3). Generally, Nixon improved his percentage in each county in the general election over the primary by 25 per cent. Many districts, in which the Massachusetts Senator demonstrated his strength during the primary, went into the column of Vice-President Nixon in November. Twenty-eight out of 71 counties, or 39.4 per cent, produced different results in the primary and election.

Again, because of widespread interest in Wisconsin's Democratic primary, Nixon's poor showing in the primary must be attributed to the assumption that many Republicans participated in the Democratic contest.[4]

Looking at the percentage diagram, another relationship also emerges as valid. Every county that Nixon won in the primary—13 out of 71, or 18.3 per cent—he swept in the election, increasing his percentage greatly. Conversely, every county that Kennedy carried in the election—17 out of 71, or 23.9 per cent—he had won in the primary by a far greater margin. This points out the exaggeration in the primary when all attention was focused on the Democrats. The election was a contest between the candidates of the two major parties, with the Republicans emerging as the victors. However, despite the fact that the Republicans

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[4] John H. Fenton, The Catholic Vote (New Orleans, La.: Hauser Press, 1960), p. 130. New York Times, April 7, 1960.


TABLE 3
NIXON
IN WISCONSIN PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTION—
SCATTER DIAGRAM
WISCONSIN GENERAL ELECTION
WISCONSIN PRIMARY
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80

took 54 out of 71 counties, or 76.0 per cent, the total vote percentages were 51.8 per cent Republican, and 48.0 per cent Democratic, demonstrating the Democratic win in the more populated sections of the state.

In West Virginia, a comparison of Senator Kennedy's vote in the primary and election produced a different result from that of Wisconsin, (Table 4).

Table 4

WEST VIRGINIA PRIMARY AND ELECTION VOTE

County	Primary Vote[5]		Election Vote[6]	
	Humphrey	Kennedy	Kennedy	Nixon
Barbour	38.9%	61.0%	48.8%	51.2%
Berkeley	43.7	56.2	45.8	54.2
Boone	44.0	55.9	66.3	33.7
Braxton	41.7	58.2	58.4	41.6
Brooke	35.1	64.8	57.7	42.3
Cabell	53.1	46.8	43.7	56.3
Calhoun	44.1	55.8	50.4	49.6
Clay	46.9	53.0	54.3	45.7
Doddridge	41.9	58.0	30.5	69.5
Fayette	35.1	64.8	70.6	29.4
Gilmer	49.2	50.7	58.9	41.1
Grant	43.4	56.5	21.4	78.6
Greenbrier	34.8	65.1	55.7	44.3
Hampshire	56.7	43.2	52.9	47.1
Hancock	31.6	68.3	58.2	41.8
Hardy	38.7	61.2	54.7	45.3
Harrison	39.1	60.8	53.0	47.0
Jackson	40.5	59.4	39.5	60.5
Jefferson	38.2	61.7	60.1	39.9
Kanawha	48.0	51.9	48.8	51.2

[5]Howard Myers (compiled and ed.), West Virginia Blue Book 1960 (Charleston, West Virginia: Legislative Reference Library, 1960), p. 723. (Percentages calculated by author).

[6]Scammon, op. cit., p. 436.

West Virginia, Primary and Election Vote, cont'd.

County	Primary Vote Humphrey	Kennedy	Election Vote Kennedy	Nixon
Lewis	42.3%	57.6%	41.4%	58.6%
Lincoln	55.2	44.7	52.3	47.7
Logan	43.3	56.6	67.6	32.4
McDowell	15.8	84.1	74.8	25.2
Marion	37.6	62.3	55.9	44.1
Marshall	29.7	70.2	50.1	49.9
Mason	44.9	55.0	41.3	58.7
Mercer	31.4	68.5	59.6	40.4
Mineral	44.4	55.5	39.8	60.2
Mingo	41.5	58.4	69.7	30.3
Monongalia	30.0	69.9	53.2	46.8
Monroe	36.6	63.3	48.1	51.9
Morgan	50.8	49.1	33.2	66.8
Nicholas	44.1	55.8	57.3	42.7
Ohio	21.6	78.3	51.5	48.5
Pendleton	39.3	60.6	51.6	48.4
Pleasants	37.3	62.6	46.8	53.2
Pocahontas	31.6	68.3	53.3	46.7
Preston	33.4	66.5	37.9	62.1
Putnam	54.7	45.2	46.6	53.4
Raleigh	32.3	67.6	62.8	37.2
Randolph	48.3	51.6	58.2	41.8
Ritchie	37.4	62.5	28.6	71.4
Roane	34.5	65.4	42.5	57.5
Summers	46.2	53.7	59.6	40.4
Taylor	38.3	61.6	46.6	53.4
Tucker	46.3	53.6	52.6	47.4
Tyler	38.7	61.2	30.6	69.4
Upshur	39.2	60.7	33.6	66.4
Wayne	49.8	50.1	52.9	47.1
Webster	36.3	63.6	67.3	32.7
Wetzel	45.8	54.1	45.7	54.3
Wirt	48.7	51.2	43.7	56.3
Wood	46.4	53.5	41.0	59.0
Wyoming	21.3	78.6	62.9	37.1
Total	39.1%	60.8%	52.7%	47.3%

The negative relationship demonstrated by the following scatter diagram, (Table 5), indicates that the Massachusetts Senator did about 10 per cent poorer in the election vote


TABLE 5
KENNEDY
IN WEST VIRGINIA PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTION
SCATTER DIAGRAM
WEST VIRGINIA GENERAL ELECTION
WEST VIRGINIA PRIMARY
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80

than in that of the primary in West Virginia. In spite of the fact that Kennedy won the state of West Virginia in the general election, his vote in the primary was so outstanding due to his amazing show of strength against Senator Humphrey in the state's closed primary.

A comparison for Vice-President Nixon could not be cited since there was no Republican primary in West Virginia in 1960.

In comparing the Democratic total vote with that of the Republicans in Wisconsin's primary and general election, again a distortion is evident in the primary. The combined total vote for the Democrats won for them every county in the primary. But again, 54 of these 71 counties, or 76.0 per cent, which the Democrats had captured went into the Republican column in the November election, making Nixon the victor by a more than 3 per cent margin.

West Virginia again could not be cited in this comparison due to no two-party contest in the primary, but in the general election, Kennedy's winning margin was more than 5 per cent.

We have seen that the first comparison, i. e., comparing a candidate's vote in the primary and general election, gave substantial evidence of strength or weakness in one of the two types of election. However, since the second comparison—that of relating the Democratic and Republican results in both the primary and general election—

demonstrated no valid relationship, the introduction of new variables will strengthen our test.

Rural-Urban Relationship

Generally, it can be said that Senator Humphrey won most of the rural counties in Wisconsin's primary—25 out of 51, or 49.0 per cent, with Senator Kennedy coming in second with 15, or 29.4 per cent, and Vice-President Nixon third with 11, or 21.5 per cent, (Table 7). In the urban counties, the Massachusetts Senator came in the winner with 12 of the 20 counties, or 60.0 per cent. Senator Humphrey scored victories in 6 counties, or 30.0 per cent, and the Vice-President 2, or 10.0 per cent.

However, the general election in Wisconsin reversed the Democratic primary trend. The Republicans won a smashing triumph in the most rural counties, capturing 42 of the 51 counties, or 82.3 per cent, (Table 8). Nonetheless, their margin of victory was substantially reduced in the urban communities where they won 12 out of 20, or 60.0 per cent. In addition, the Democrats maintained an unbroken string of victories in the 6 most urbanized counties, (Table 6).

Table 6

WISCONSIN PRIMARY AND ELECTION—
RURAL-URBAN RELATIONSHIP

County	Rural[7]	Urban[8]	Primary	Election
Adams	100%		H	R
Bayfield	100		H	D
Buffalo	100		H	R
Burnett	100		H	R
Florence	100		K	R
Forest	100		K	D
Lafayette	100		H	R
Marquette	100		N	R
Pepin	100		K	D
Polk	100		H	R
Sawyer	100		H	R
Trempealeau	100		H	R
Vilas	100		N	R
Washburn	100		H	R
Waushara	99.6	0.3	N	R
Clark	91.3	8.6	H	R
Iowa	85.1	14.8	H	R
Vernon	84.7	15.2	H	R
Shawano	82.2	17.7	N	R
Taylor	81.7	18.2	H	D
Pierce	81.1	18.8	H	R
Oconto	80.8	19.1	K	R
Juneau	79.8	20.1	H	R
Calumet	79.7	20.2	K	R
Price	79.6	20.3	H	R
Jackson	78.9	21.0	H	R
Barron	78.6	21.3	H	R
Rusk	75.7	24.2	H	D
Richland	73.1	26.8	H	R
St. Croix	71.6	28.3	K	R
Grant	70.1	29.8	K	R
Sauk	69.4	30.5	H	R
Chippewa	66.1	33.8	K	D
Green Lake	68.9	31.0	N	R
Green	68.8	31.1	N	R
Dunn	67.0	32.9	H	R

[7] U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of the United States: 1960, Population, PC (1), 51B, p. 51-13. (Percentages calculated by author).

[8] Ibid.

Wisconsin, Rural-Urban, cont'd.

County	Rural	Urban	Primary	Election
Columbia	69.2%	30.7%	N	R
Washington	66.1	33.8	K	R
Crawford	65.4	34.5	H	R
Iron	64.7	35.2	K	D
Door	64.4	35.5	N	R
Kewaunee	63.7	36.2	K	D
Waupaca	63.7	36.2	N	R
Monroe	63.5	36.4	H	R
Walworth	62.3	37.6	N	R
Oneida	60.2	39.7	K	R
Marinette	54.3	45.6	K	R
Dodge	53.2	46.7	N	R
Marathon	53.1	46.8	H	R
Portage	51.7	48.2	K	D
Langlade	51.3	48.6	K	R
Jefferson	49.3	50.6	H	R
Wood	46.3	53.6	K	R
Lincoln	42.7	57.2	H	R
Fond du Lac	42.0	57.9	K	R
Ashland	41.6	58.3	K	D
Manitowoc	37.6	62.3	K	D.
Sheboygan	36.4	63.5	K	R
Eau Claire	36.0	63.9	H	R
Waukesha	34.9	65.0	K	R
Outagamie	32.7	67.2	K	R
Ozaukee	32.1	67.8	K	R
Rock	30.3	69.6	N	R
La Crosse	29.9	70.0	H	R
Winnebago	27.9	72.0	N	R
Kenosha	27.5	72.4	K	D
Racine	27.3	72.6	K	D
Dane	24.6	75.3	H	D
Douglas	24.5	75.4	H	D
Brown	22.3	77.6	K	D
Milwaukee		100.0	K	D

Table 7

WISCONSIN PRIMARY—RURAL FREQUENCY
DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM

Rural	Humphrey	Kennedy	Nixon
0-9.9		1	
10.0-19.9			
20.0-29.9	111	111	1
30.0-39.9	1	1111	1
40.0-49.9	11	111	
50.0-59.9	1	111	1
60.0-69.9	111	1111 1	1111 1
70.0-79.9	1111 1	111	
80.0-89.9	1111	1	1
90.0-99.9	1		1
100.0	1111 1111	111	11

Table 8

WISCONSIN ELECTION—RURAL FREQUENCY
DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM

Rural	Kennedy	Nixon
0-9.9	1	
10.0-19.9		
20.0-29.9	1111	11
30.0-39.9	1	1111 1
40.0-49.9	1	1111
50.0-59.9	1	1111
60.0-69.9	111	1111 1111 11
70.0-79.9	1	1111 111
80.0-89.9	1	1111
90.0-99.9		11
100.0	111	1111 1111 1

There is no definite relationship that can be made in West Virginia since Senator Kennedy swept 50 out of the state's 55 counties, or 90.9 per cent, in the primary, (Table 9). However, 4 of the 5 counties which Senator Humphrey won in the primary were in the 90 - 100 per cent grouping. With an overwhelming rural composition in the state—48 counties, or 87.2 per cent—Kennedy won 44, or 91.6 per cent, of these localities. Out of 7 urban counties, Kennedy won 6, or 85.7 per cent, in the primary. He likewise carried a majority of the rural and urban counties in the election—28 out of 48 rural communities, or 58.3 per cent, and 4 out of 7 urban counties, or 57.1 per cent.

Table 9

WEST VIRGINIA PRIMARY AND ELECTION—
RURAL-URBAN RELATIONSHIP

County	Rural[9]	Urban[10]	Primary	Election
Barbour	100%		K	R
Boone	100		K	D
Braxton	100		K	D
Calhoun	100		K	D
Clay	100		K	D
Doddridge	100		K	R
Gilmer	100		K	D
Grant	100		K	R
Hampshire	100		H	D
Hardy	100		K	D
Lincoln	100		H	D
Monroe	100		K	R
Morgan	100		H	R

[9] Ibid., PC(1), 50B, p. 50-10. (Percentages calculated by author.)

[10] Ibid.

West Virginia, Rural-Urban, cont'd.

County	Rural	Urban	Primary	Election
Pendleton	100%		K	D
Pleasants	100		K	R
Pocahontas	100		K	D
Ritchie	100		K	R
Tucker	100		K	D
Webster	100		K	D
Wirt	100		K	R
Putnam	93.7	6.2	H	R
Greenbrier	92.2	7.7	K	D
Preston	90.7	9.2	K	R
Tyler	90.7	9.2	K	R
Wyoming	89.8	10.4	K	D
Fayette	88.8	11.1	K	D
McDowell	88.3	11.6	K	D
Logan	87.7	12.2	K	D
Nicholas	83.8	16.1	K	D
Mingo	83.0	16.9	K	D
Roane	83.0	16.9	K	R
Jefferson	82.1	17.8	K	D
Mason	76.3	23.6	K	R
Mineral	72.3	27.6	K	R
Raleigh	72.0	27.9	K	D
Randolph	68.4	31.5	K	D
Wayne	66.8	33.1	K	D
Jackson	66.7	33.2	K	R
Summers	66.7	33.2	K	D
Upshur	65.0	34.9	K	R
Taylor	61.4	38.5	K	R
Wetzel	59.6	40.3	K	R
Mercer	59.4	40.5	K	D
Lewis	55.5	44.4	K	R
Berkeley	55.0	44.9	K	R
Harrison	55.0	44.9	K	D
Marion	52.1	47.8	K	D
Monongalia	51.0	48.9	K	D
Brooke	45.5	54.4	K	D
Marshall	44.7	55.2	K	D
Kanawha	33.2	66.7	K	R
Hancock	29.6	70.3	K	D
Wood	27.4	72.5	K	R
Cabell	26.2	73.7	H	R
Ohio	12.8	87.1	K	D

Religion

To demonstrate the strong relationship between Roman Catholic affiliation and the vote for Kennedy in Wisconsin, John H. Fenton in his book, The Catholic Vote, demonstrates that the average per cent vote for the Massachusetts Senator was smallest in the least Catholic counties. His diagram, cited below, shows how Kennedy's percentage increased as the Catholic percentage grew and finally culminated in the rousing average of 67.9 per cent in Wisconsin's most Catholic counties—40 per cent or more, (Table 10).

Table 10

"Relation Between Per Cent Catholic and Mean Per Cent Vote for Kennedy in the 1960 Wisconsin Democratic Presidential Primary by Counties"[11]

% Catholic	No. of Counties	Mean % Vote for Kennedy
0- 9	8	31.0
10-19	16	46.1
20-29	23	48.5
30-39	13	58.0
40 or more	11	67.9

The above diagram can be broken down county by county to illustrate the basis for this relationship, (Table 11).

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[11] Fenton, op. cit., p. 128. Note that the "Mean % Vote for Kennedy" differs from the figures employed thus far.

Table 11

WISCONSIN DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY—
KENNEDY-CATHOLIC RELATIONSHIP

County	Mean % for Kennedy as Against Humphrey	% Catholic[12]	Primary	Election	Rural-Urban
Brown	78.1%	60.7%	K	D	u
Portage	75.3	64.3	K	D	r
Outagamie	75.0	46.4	K	R	u
Calumet	73.1	58.6	K	R	r
Kewaunee	71.0	61.3	K	D	r
Manitowoc	70.2	47.8	K	D	u
Kenosha	65.0	34.6	K	D	u
Washington	64.9	45.2	K	R	r
Ozaukee	64.1	42.0	K	R	u
Oconto	64.1	29.3	K	R	r
Marinette	64.0	33.5	K	R	r
Green Lake	64.0	26.6	N	R	r
Winnebago	63.2	30.3	N	R	u
Fond du Lac	63.0	36.6	K	R	u
Milwaukee	63.0	34.3	K	D	u
Iron	60.9	52.6	K	D	r
Door	58.7	29.9	N	R	r
Langlade	58.7	31.9	K	R	r
Waukesha	58.4	23.0	K	R	u
Walworth	57.9	12.9	N	R	r
Forest	57.7	28.7	K	D	r
Racine	57.7	25.2	K	D	u
Ashland	57.6	39.9	K	D	u
Oneida	57.3	27.3	K	R	r
Wood	56.3	34.0	K	R	u
Sheboygan	55.4	21.7	K	R	u
Chippewa	54.5	33.3	K	D	r
Grant	54.2	30.8	K	R	r
Pepin	53.4	33.8	K	D	r
Rock	53.0	15.8	N	R	u
Florence	12.7	18.0	K	R	r
Vilas	52.7	18.7	N	R	r
Dodge	52.1	18.0	N	R	r
St. Croix	50.3	28.9	K	R	r
Crawford	49.9	29.6	H	R	r

[12] Churches and Church Membership in the United States, (New York: National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U. S. A., 1957), Series C, No. 19, Table 49-Part II.

Wisconsin Primary, Kennedy-Catholic, cont'd.

County	Mean % for Kennedy as Against Humphrey	% Catholic	Primary	Election	Rural-Urban
Shawano	49.5%	23.5%	N	R	r
Sawyer	49.2	16.8	H	R	r
Marathon	48.7	30.9	H	R	r
Rusk	48.7	26.2	H	D	r
Lafayette	48.7	26.0	H	R	r
LaCrosse	48.3	23.0	H	R	u
Price	48.1	14.8	H	R	r
Pierce	46.8	24.8	H	R	r
Douglas	45.5	22.3	H	D	u
Iowa	45.2	23.1	H	R	r
Washburn	44.8	19.3	H	R	r
Taylor	44.6	29.2	H	D	r
Waupaca	44.6	12.8	N	R	r
Marquette	44.5	16.3	N	R	r
Dane	44.3	22.3	H	D	u
Bayfield	43.3	25.1	H	D	r
Sauk	43.2	16.8	H	R	r
Waushara	43.2	9.1	N	R	r
Clark	42.9	25.9	H	R	r
Columbia	42.9	14.0	N	R	r
Jefferson	42.4	19.7	H	R	u
Lincoln	40.7	21.3	H	R	u
Juneau	40.4	29.5	H	R	r
Trempealeau	40.2	25.5	H	R	r
Richland	39.2	12.0	H	R	r
Green	38.6	8.0	N	R	r
Monroe	38.5	19.2	H	R	r
Buffalo	36.9	13.4	H	R	r
Barron	36.7	22.1	H	R	r
Eau Claire	36.6	13.3	H	R	u
Adams	34.6	7.4	H	R	r
Dunn	28.1	8.5	H	R	r
Jackson	27.8	8.0	H	R	r
Burnett	27.3	7.0	H	R	r
Polk	26.9	6.0	H	R	r
Vernon	21.4	7.4	H	R	r

Though it is not possible to analyze Republican Catholic "crossovers," since there is no election registration by party in Wisconsin due to its open primary system, Fenton cites the

Republican communities of Tennyson and Melrose in validating this point. Senator Kennedy emerged triumphant in Republican Catholic Tennyson by winning 54 votes to Nixon's 8 and Humphrey's 5. By way of comparison, in Republican Protestant Melrose, Nixon received more votes than the Democratic winner—Humphrey: Nixon 104, Humphrey 94, and Kennedy 31.

To further strengthen his point, Fenton cites their vote on a 1946 proposal which would provide free public transportation for parochial school children. Tennyson's vote was 82-0 in favor, and that of Melrose was 305-51 against the proposal.

These evidences suffice for Fenton in stating that Catholic Republicans "crossed over" to vote for Senator Kennedy, whereas many Republican Protestants were content to vote for Vice-President Nixon in the Republican primary. However, as is realized, it would be impossible to analyze this question county by county since there is no data covering this problem. Only a very thorough poll could unearth such information.

Nonetheless, it can safely be stated after examining the county diagram, that Kennedy's religious faith, rather than being a handicap, was a definite and notable asset.

The frequency distribution ratings, (Table 12), of the three contenders in Wisconsin's primary show that in addition to Kennedy's strength in the high percentage Catholic areas, both Humphrey and Nixon were victors in counties with

relatively low Catholic populations.

Table 12

WISCONSIN PRIMARY—
CATHOLIC RELATIONSHIP
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM

Catholic %	Kennedy	Humphrey	Nixon
0- 9.9		1111 1	11
10.0-19.9	1	1111 1111	1111 11
20.0-29.9	1111 11	1111 1111 1111	111
30.0-39.9	1111 1111	1	1
40.0-49.9	1111		
50.0-59.9	11		
60.0-69.9	111		

Of the 17 counties won by the Democrats in the election, 8, or 47 per cent, were in urban counties with a sizeable Catholic population—over 22 per cent, (Table 13); 9, or 52.9 per cent, of these counties were in rural areas also with a sizeable Catholic population—25 per cent and more.

Table 13

WISCONSIN ELECTION —
CATHOLIC RELATIONSHIP
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM

Catholic %	Kennedy	Nixon
0- 9.9		1111 111
10.0-19.9		1111 1111 1111 11
20.0-29.9	1111 11	1111 1111 1111 111
30.0-39.9	1111	1111 11
40.0-49.9	1	111
50.0-59.9	1	1
60.0-69.9	111	

In West Virginia, the Kennedy-Catholic strength relationship is invalid. It definitely cannot be said that the small percentage of Catholics in this state—approximately 5 per cent—had much effect on Kennedy's high showing. Most counties with percentages of Catholics more than 3 per cent went into the Kennedy column by huge margins—sometimes 2 to 1, (Table 14). However, a few of these counties scored upset victories for Humphrey—Cabell and Morgan. In addition, Kennedy's percentages were not so high in some of the counties with relatively large Catholic populations—Berkeley, Lewis, Mineral, Randolph and Tucker. Also, many counties with very little or no Catholic percentages scored outstanding victories for Kennedy—Greenbrier, Hardy, Marshall, Mercer, Monroe, McDowell, Pendleton, Pleasants, Pocahontas, Raleigh, Ritchie, Roane, Tyler, Upshur, Webster and Wyoming.

The election did not reveal any valid correlation either. Out of 15 counties containing a Roman Catholic population over 5 per cent, the Democrats won 9, or 60 per cent. However, this is not remarkable, since their ratio in the state itself was similar—32 out of 55 counties, or 58.1 per cent. Catholicism in West Virginia had little effect on the state's county or over-all results.

Table 14

WEST VIRGINIA DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY —
KENNEDY-CATHOLIC RELATIONSHIP

County	Primary-% Kennedy	% Catholic[13]	Election	Rural-Urban
Barbour	61.0%	2.3%	R	r
Berkeley	56.2	14.8	R	r
Boone	55.9	0.1	D	r
Braxton	58.2	0.1	D	r
Brooke	64.8	14.6	D	u
Cabell	46.8	3.9	R	u
Calhoun	55.8	0.0	D	r
Clay	53.0	0.0	D	r
Doddridge	58.0	1.6	R	r
Fayette	64.8	3.4	D	r
Gilmer	50.7	0.0	D	r
Grant	56.5	1.9	R	r
Greenbrier	65.1	1.6	D	r
Hampshire	43.2	0.3	D	r
Hancock	68.3	24.0	D	u
Hardy	61.2	1.6	D	r
Harrison	60.8	13.3	D	r
Jackson	59.4	0.0	R	r
Jefferson	61.7	7.1	D	r
Kanawha	51.9	2.3	R	u
Lewis	57.6	8.5	R	r
Lincoln	44.7	0.0	D	r
Logan	56.6	2.0	D	r
McDowell	84.1	2.4	D	r
Marion	62.3	10.8	D	r
Marshall	70.2	1.3	D	u
Mason	55.0	0.3	R	r
Mercer	68.5	1.3	D	r
Mineral	55.5	11.2	R	r
Mingo	58.4	1.5	D	r
Monongalia	69.9	6.5	D	r
Monroe	63.3	0.1	R	r
Morgan	49.1	8.3	R	r
Nicholas	55.8	3.0	D	r
Ohio	78.3	29.9	D	u
Pendleton	60.6	0.0	D	r
Pleasants	62.6	1.2	R	r
Pocahontas	68.3	0.0	D	r

[13] Ibid., Series C, No. 35, Table 81-Part II.

West Virginia Primary, Kennedy-Catholic, cont'd.

County	Primary-% Kennedy	% Catholic	Election	Rural-Urban
Preston	66.5%	5.5%	R	r
Putnam	45.2	0.7	R	r
Raleigh	67.6	1.1	D	r
Randolph	51.6	6.0	D	r
Ritchie	62.5	0.9	R	r
Roane	65.4	0.0	R	r
Summers	53.7	1.4	D	r
Taylor	61.6	5.9	R	r
Tucker	53.6	17.4	D	r
Tyler	61.2	2.0	R	r
Upshur	60.7	0.7	R	r
Wayne	50.1	0.0	D	r
Webster	63.6	0.0	D	r
Wetzel	54.1	1.5	R	r
Wirt	51.2	0.0	R	r
Wood	53.5	4.4	R	u
Wyoming	78.6	0.8	D	r

Negroes

Due to the low percentage of Negroes in Wisconsin who are centered generally in urban communities—those counties with a low Negro percentage being mostly rural—there is no reliable relationship that can be ascertained between the Kennedy victory and the Negro population. Vice-President Nixon, and Senators Kennedy and Humphrey, all won, both in counties with the most Negro percentage and in counties with no Negroes, (Table 15). Likewise, there was no correlation in the future elections.

Table 15

WISCONSIN PRIMARY AND ELECTION—
NEGRO RELATIONSHIP

County	% Negro[14]	Primary Winner	Election	Rural-Urban
Adams	0.0793%	H	R	r
Ashland	0.0230	K	D	u
Barron	0.0262	H	R	r
Bayfield	0.0503	H	D	r
Brown	0.1023	K	D	u
Buffalo	0.0140	H	R	r
Burnett	0.1410	H	R	r
Calumet	0.0044	K	R	r
Chippewa	0.0066	K	D	r
Clark	0.0951	H	R	r
Columbia	0.0081	N	R	r
Crawford	0.0244	H	R	r
Dane	0.7253	H	D	u
Dodge	0.4416	N	R	r
Door	0.0483	N	R	r
Douglas	0.0688	H	D	u
Dunn	0.0344	H	R	r
Eau Claire	0.0222	H	R	u
Florence	0.0290	K	R	r
Fond du Lac	0.0719	K	R	u
Forest	0.0000	K	D	r
Grant	0.0157	K	R	r
Green	0.0193	N	R	r
Green Lake	0.0129	N	R	r
Iowa	0.0509	H	R	r
Iron	0.0255	K	D	r
Jackson	0.0396	H	R	r
Jefferson	0.0399	H	R	u
Juneau	0.0457	H	R	r
Kenosha	0.9511	K	D	u
Kewaunee	0.0000	K	D	r
La Crosse	0.0344	H	R	u
Lafayette	0.0110	H	R	r
Langlade	0.0853	K	R	r
Lincoln	0.0581	H	R	u
Manitowoc	0.0186	K	D	u
Marathon	0.0202	H	R	r
Marinette	0.0605	K	R	r

[14]Census, op. cit., PC(1), 51B, pp. 51-140—51-145. (Percentages calculated by author).

Wisconsin, Negro, cont'd.

County	% Negro	Primary Winner	Election	Rural-Urban
Marquette	0.0000%	N	R	r
Milwaukee	6.0831	K	D	u
Monroe	0.1696	H	R	r
Oconto	0.0000	K	R	r
Oneida	0.0316	K	R	r
Outagamie	0.0029	K	R	u
Ozaukee	0.0234	K	R	u
Pepin	0.0272	K	D	r
Pierce	0.0933	H	R	r
Polk	0.0480	H	R	r
Portage	0.0108	K	D	r
Price	0.0000	H	R	r
Racine	7.4608	K	D	u
Richland	0.0848	H	R	r
Rock	2.0138	N	R	u
Rusk	0.0811	H	D	r
St. Croix	0.1461	K	R	r
Sauk	0.0469	H	R	r
Sawyer	0.0000	H	R	r
Shawano	0.0145	N	R	r
Sheboygan	0.0069	K	R	u
Taylor	0.0056	H	D	r
Trempealeau	0.0384	H	R	r
Vernon	0.0272	H	R	r
Vilas	0.0000	N	R	r
Walworth	0.3017	N	R	r
Washburn	0.0970	H	R	r
Washington	0.0173	K	R	r
Waukesha	0.0922	K	R	u
Waupaca	0.0141	N	R	r
Waushara	0.0222	N	R	r
Winnebago	0.0481	N	R	u
Wood	0.0033	K	R	u

In West Virginia where there is a higher percentage of Negroes—approximately 4 per cent of the population—there again was no relationship in the primary and only a negligible one in the election. Though Senator Kennedy won counties populated both with a great many and very few Negroes in the

primary and election, it seems that in November he carried those counties with a Negro percentage over 1 per cent with a rousing 67.7 per cent—21 out of 31 counties—while his average for the state as a whole was 58.1 per cent to 41.8 per cent for Vice-President Nixon, (Table 16).

It is not the purpose of the writer to assume that this indicates a clear picture of most Negroes in West Virginia as preferring Senator Kennedy because of two important factors: 1) the low percentage of Negroes in practically all of West Virginia's counties; and, 2) other variables which probably would play a much more prominent role in West Virginia's vote.

Table 16

WEST VIRGINIA PRIMARY AND ELECTION—
NEGRO RELATIONSHIP

County	% Negro[15]	Primary	Election	Rural-Urban
Barbour	1.247%	K	R	r
Berkeley	3.850	K	R	r
Boone	1.188	K	D	r
Braxton	0.785	K	D	r
Brooke	1.416	K	D	u
Cabell	4.399	H	R	u
Calhoun	0.138	K	D	r
Clay	0.552	K	D	r
Doddridge	0.014	K	R	r
Fayette	12.313	K	D	r
Gilmer	0.012	K	D	r
Grant	2.793	K	R	r
Greenbrier	5.454	K	D	r

[15] Ibid., PC(1), 50B, pp. 50-74—50-77. (Percentages calculated by author).

West Virginia, Negro, cont'd.

County	% Negro	Primary	Election	Rural-Urban
Hampshire	1.384%	H	D	r
Hancock	3.839	K	D	u
Hardy	2.567	K	D	r
Harrison	1.691	K	D	r
Jackson	0.032	K	R	r
Jefferson	15.440	K	D	r
Kanawha	5.746	K	R	u
Lewis	0.481	K	R	r
Lincoln	0.014	H	D	r
Logan	7.757	K	D	r
McDowell	22.280	K	D	r
Marion	4.295	K	D	r
Marshall	0.946	K	D	u
Mason	2.162	K	R	r
Mercer	10.535	K	D	r
Mineral	3.046	K	R	r
Mingo	5.165	K	D	r
Monongalia	2.037	K	D	r
Monroe	2.986	K	R	r
Morgan	1.504	H	R	r
Nicholas	0.023	K	D	r
Ohio	3.052	K	D	u
Pendleton	2.125	K	D	r
Pleasants	0.112	K	R	r
Pocahontas	3.679	K	D	r
Preston	0.367	K	R	r
Putnam	0.055	H	R	r
Raleigh	12.255	K	D	r
Randolph	0.986	K	D	r
Ritchie	0.009	K	R	r
Roane	0.108	K	R	r
Summers	6.636	K	D	r
Taylor	1.285	K	R	r
Tucker	0.258	K	D	r
Tyler	0.119	K	R	r
Upshur	0.388	K	R	r
Wayne	0.061	K	D	r
Webster	0.007	K	D	r
Wetzel	0.025	K	R	r
Wirt	0.296	K	R	r
Wood	0.820	K	R	u
Wyoming	3.671	K	D	r

Eligibility Turnout vs. Relative Turnout

The only clear relationships emerging from Wisconsin's open primary were Nixon's strength in counties with under 50 per cent of those eligible voting, and Humphrey's strong showing in communities over 50 per cent, (Table 17). Out of the 13 counties the Vice-President captured in the primary, 9, or 69.2 per cent, fell in the column of counties whose percentages of eligible voting fell under 50 per cent. This strongly illustrated the Republican character of these counties—also very Protestant and mainly rural. Obviously, there was no strong incentive to vote in the Republican primary, since the battle was waged by the Democrats.

On the other hand, Senator Humphrey carried most of his counties—21 out of 31, or 67.7 per cent—in the grouping over 50 per cent. These communities, like those backing Nixon, were also chiefly rural and Protestant. However, it was doubtful whether a majority of voters was Republican or Democratic, since many Republicans crossed over to vote in the Democratic primary. The election seemed to be a better judge of the party division question.

Of the three contenders in the primary, Senator Kennedy polled the most counties in the category under 50 per cent. However, within his column of 27 victorious counties, 15, or 55.5 per cent, fell under the classification of more than 50 per cent. His strength, as has been noted

before, was centered mainly in the populous urban counties with a high concentration of Roman Catholics.

Many urban localities—12 out of 20, or 60.0 per cent—had higher than 50 per cent eligible voters who voted in the primary. In capturing 8 of these 12 counties, or 66.6 per cent, Kennedy demonstrated his strength in urban areas. The higher urban percentages emphasized the feverous excitement in the Democratic battle, especially among Democrats who are mainly centered in urban areas. However, equally interesting is the fact that many rural communities also had 50 per cent or more eligible voters going to the polls—28 out of 51 rural areas, or 54.9 per cent. Humphrey was victorious in 17 of these 28 counties, or 60.7 per cent.

From the primary to the fall elections in Wisconsin, there was an increase of approximately 25 to 30 per cent of eligible voters exercising their privilege. Of the 51 rural areas, the Republicans were victorious in 42, or 82.3 per cent, in November. Forty-two of these 51 rural areas polled a voter registration over 75 per cent—the average in the November elections—and of these 42 counties, the Republicans captured 35, or 83.3 per cent.

On the one side, it can be said that the increase in the number of people who voted in the Wisconsin election benefited the Republicans. However, more important, it must be noted that since the main primary interest was the Democratic contest, the Republican result was minimal

with many Republicans voting for one or the other of the Democratic candidates. It would not be accurate to attribute the 25 to 30 per cent increase chiefly to the Republicans. Nonetheless, it is true that a much higher percentage of people in rural communities went to the polls, and these counties were Republican-strength areas.

From the foregoing evidence, it is possible to deduce that most rural counties—except those principally Republican (and Protestant), where there was small participation in the Democratic struggle—demonstrated a higher percentage of voter participation than urban communities.

Table 17

WISCONSIN PRIMARY AND ELECTION—
VOTER TURNOUT

County	Primary[16] %	Winner	Election[17] %	Winner	Rural-Urban
Adams	46.3%	H	75.8%	R	r
Ashland	55.0	K	77.9	D	u
Barron	46.9	H	75.2	R	r
Bayfield	54.9	H	82.7	D	r
Brown	51.0	K	76.7	D	u
Buffalo	47.4	H	75.2	R	r
Burnett	49.9	H	80.6	R	r
Calumet	44.2	K	77.5	R	r
Chippewa	50.9	K	72.1	D	r
Clark	50.5	H	73.1	R	r
Columbia	50.1	N	75.5	R	r
Crawford	55.0	H	75.6	R	r

[16]Percentages calculated from Census and Wisconsin primary results.

[17]Percentages calculated from Census and Wisconsin election results.

Wisconsin, Voter Turnout, cont'd.

County	Primary %	Winner	Election %	Winner	Rural-Urban
Dane	48.0%	H	69.8%	D	u
Dodge	49.7	N	70.9	R	r
Door	48.9	N	74.9	R	r
Douglas	61.7	H	77.5	D	u
Dunn	45.3	H	72.5	R	r
Eau Claire	54.7	H	74.4	R	u
Florence	48.6	K	87.4	R	r
Fond du Lac	50.7	K	73.8	R	u
Forest	43.6	K	80.8	D	r
Grant	45.6	K	76.4	R	r
Green	49.6	N	74.4	R	r
Green Lake	51.7	N	80.3	R	r
Iowa	54.4	H	76.8	R	r
Iron	66.8	K	84.6	D	r
Jackson	59.9	H	75.5	R	r
Jefferson	48.4	H	74.3	R	u
Juneau	55.3	H	78.3	R	r
Kenosha	45.6	K	72.0	D	u
Kewaunee	48.4	K	78.8	D	r
La Crosse	51.8	H	75.7	R	u
Lafayette	55.5	H	80.7	R	r
Langlade	51.0	K	76.2	R	r
Lincoln	55.7	H	73.7	R	u
Manitowoc	53.5	K	72.3	D	u
Marathon	57.2	H	78.7	R	r
Marinette	50.5	K	75.4	R	r
Marquette	47.5	N	76.4	R	r
Milwaukee	49.3	K	69.0	D	u
Monroe	48.5	H	68.4	R	r
Oconto	51.7	K	77.8	R	r
Oneida	59.0	K	82.3	R	r
Outagamie	50.6	K	75.0	R	u
Ozaukee	48.6	K	81.4	R	u
Pepin	48.4	K	79.8	D	r
Pierce	51.6	H	76.7	R	r
Polk	44.8	H	76.6	R	r
Portage	58.9	K	80.0	D	r
Price	58.6	H	78.8	R	r
Racine	47,1	K	72.3	D	u
Richland	58.6	H	78.7	R	r
Rock	43.8	N	72.8	R	u
Rusk	60.1	H	80.9	D	r
St. Croix	48.1	K	81.2	R	r
Sauk	53.9	H	78.1	R	r
Sawyer	48.1	H	85.6	R	r

Wisconsin, Voter Turnout, cont'd.

County	Primary %	Winner	Election %	Winner	Rural-Urban
Shawano	42.7%	N	71.8%	R	r
Sheboygan	53.0	K	75.4	R	u
Taylor	51.3	H	74.3	D	r
Trempealeau	51.1	H	75.0	R	r
Vernon	51.3	H	75.2	R	r
Vilas	54.7	N	92.6	R	r
Walworth	50.4	N	77.4	R	r
Washburn	55.8	H	83.6	R	r
Washington	48.6	K	76.3	R	r
Waukesha	50.1	K	76.9	R	u
Waupaca	46.7	N	76.1	R	r
Waushara	45.6	N	79.4	R	r
Winnebago	49.5	N	71.7	R	u
Wood	56.1	K	75.0	R	u

From the figures, it seems that practically all those counties in the closed West Virginia primary which had low percentages of people voting—32 and below—registered in the Republican column in the election, 20 out of 22 counties,or 90.9 per cent, (Table 18). From this evidence, it can be deduced that counties with low voting in the primary were primarily Republican. Unlike Wisconsin's open primary, only the Democratic voters could vote in West Virginia's primary.

Those counties registering more than 32 per cent, and especially those communities with more than 40 per cent eligibility turnout in the primary, remained in the Democratic column in the election—30 out of 33 counties, or 90.9 per cent.

Table 18

WEST VIRGINIA PRIMARY AND ELECTION—
VOTER TURNOUT

County	Primary[18] %	Winner	Election[19] %	Winner	Rural-Urban
Barbour	37.1%	K	86.8%	R	r
Berkeley	23.7	K	72.4	R	r
Boone	53.7	K	80.2	D	r
Braxton	47.5	K	83.4	D	r
Brooke	41.8	K	79.1	D	u
Cabell	26.2	H	70.1	R	u
Calhoun	44.9	K	86.4	D	r
Clay	42.3	K	88.4	D	r
Doddridge	21.2	K	81.5	R	r
Fayette	51.6	K	75.3	D	r
Gilmer	49.5	K	76.7	D	r
Grant	12.4	K	88.9	R	r
Greenbrier	40.5	K	74.7	D	r
Hampshire	38.2	H	79.6	D	r
Hancock	59.1	K	81.1	D	u
Hardy	44.9	K	82.1	D	r
Harrison	39.8	K	80.4	D	r
Jackson	25.8	K	86.5	R	r
Jefferson	35.2	K	66.5	D	r
Kanawha	31.3	K	75.6	R	u
Lewis	25.2	K	66.0	R	r
Lincoln	37.4	H	91.3	D	r
Logan	47.6	K	77.3	D	r
McDowell	47.0	K	71.9	D	r
Marion	39.7	K	79.6	D	r
Marshall	27.2	K	76.4	D	u
Mason	24.3	K	77.6	R	r
Mercer	41.1	K	72.4	D	r
Mineral	21.2	K	79.2	R	r
Mingo	51.5	K	81.3	D	r
Monongalia	33.7	K	74.1	D	r
Monroe	29.9	K	86.6	R	r
Morgan	23.0	H	81.9	R	r
Nicholas	40.8	K	73.8	D	r
Ohio	28.8	K	80.8	D	u
Pendleton	35.2	K	83.2	D	r

[18]Percentages calculated from Census and West Virginia primary results.

[19]Percentages calculated from Census and West Virginia election results.

West Virginia, Voter Turnout, cont'd.

County	Primary %	Winner	Election %	Winner	Rural-Urban
Pleasants	31.2%	K	90.7%	R	r
Pocahontas	36.0	K	85.6	D	r
Preston	17.1	K	72.6	R	r
Putnam	33.7	H	81.0	R	r
Raleigh	44.7	K	75.3	D	r
Randolph	46.8	K	78.3	D	r
Ritchie	19.0	K	81.8	R	r
Roane	23.1	K	79.7	R	r
Summers	50.6	K	81.3	D	r
Taylor	27.8	K	80.9	R	r
Tucker	39.4	K	85.3	D	r
Tyler	16.9	K	82.1	R	r
Upshur	18.4	K	72.8	R	r
Wayne	43.1	K	79.6	D	r
Webster	48.8	K	72.3	D	r
Wetzel	38.3	K	81.3	R	r
Wirt	30.2	K	91.7	R	r
Wood	27.4	K	79.5	R	u
Wyoming	48.7	K	79.4	D	r

Median Income

The data on income ratings demonstrates that Senator Humphrey led the low income counties—$4600 and below—in the Wisconsin primary with 22 counties out of 36, or 61.1 per cent, and Senator Kennedy was the leader in the higher income brackets with 19 out of 35 counties, or 54.2 per cent, (Tables 19 and 20). There also was a very definite income and rural-urban correlation, (Table 21). All urban counties except one were found in the higher income grouping, with the median income decreasing as the urban percentage did.

The election did not show a valid Kennedy-median income

relationship, even though Nixon—winner in both the low and high income groups—made a stronger showing in the low income divisions, 80.5 per cent as compared to his 71.4 per cent in the higher income areas.

Table 19

WISCONSIN PRIMARY AND ELECTION—
MEDIAN INCOME RELATIONSHIP

County	Median Income[20]	Primary	Election	Rural-Urban	Rural %
Burnett	$3120	H	R	r	100.0%
Adams	3446	H	R	r	100.0
Taylor	3462	H	D	r	81.7
Sawyer	3535	H	R	r	100.0
Vernon	3577	H	R	r	84.7
Clark	3608	H	R	r	91.3
Jackson	3709	H	R	r	78.9
Bayfield	3712	H	D	r	100.0
Waushara	3743	N	R	r	99.6
Marquette	3827	N	R	r	100.0
Price	3841	H	R	r	79.6
Crawford	3855	H	R	r	65.4
Washburn	3859	H	R	r	100.0
Pepin	3870	K	D	r	100.0
Richland	3930	H	R	r	73.1
Iowa	3936	H	R	r	85.1
Dunn	3961	H	R	r	67.0
Forest	3965	K	D	r	100.0
Vilas	3965	N	R	r	100.0
Shawano	3984	N	R	r	82.2
Polk	4039	H	R	r	100.0
Rusk	4039	H	D	r	75.7
Buffalo	4056	H	R	r	100.0
Trempealeau	4058	H	R	r	100.0
Barron	4167	H	R	r	78.6
Oconto	4201	K	R	r	80.8
Grant	4294	K	R	r	70.1
Lafayette	4321	H	R	r	100.0
Juneau	4329	H	R	r	79.8

[20] Census, op. cit., PC(1), 51C, pp. 51-268—51-273.

Wisconsin, Median Income, cont'd.

County	Median Income	Primary	Election	Rural-Urban	Rural %
Iron	$4367	K	D	r	64.7%
Langlade	4369	K	R	r	51.3
Door	4476	N	R	r	64.4
Ashland	4478	K	D	u	41.6
Florence	4544	K	R	r	100.0
Waupaca	4546	N	R	r	63.7
Sauk	4589	H	R	r	69.4
Monroe	4642	H	R	r	63.5
Lincoln	4672	H	R	u	42.7
Kewaunee	4690	K	D	r	63.7
Marinette	4741	K	R	r	54.3
Pierce	4804	H	R	r	81.1
Columbia	4874	N	R	r	69.2
Green Lake	4887	N	R	r	68.9
Chippewa	4950	K	D	r	66.1
Portage	4956	K	D	r	51.7
Green	5033	N	R	r	68.8
St. Croix	5071	K	R	r	71.6
Oneida	5157	K	R	r	60.2
Marathon	5194	H	R	r	53.1
Dodge	5245	N	R	r	53.2
Douglas	5461	H	D	u	24.5
Calumet	5525	K	R	r	79.7
Fond du Lac	5527	K	R	u	42.0
Wood	5588	K	R	u	46.3
Jefferson	5590	H	R	u	49.3
La Crosse	5671	H	R	u	29.9
Walworth	5692	N	R	r	62.3
Sheboygan	5727	K	R	u	36.4
Manitowoc	5737	K	D	u	37.6
Rock	6001	N	R	u	30.3
Brown	6016	K	D	u	22.3
Eau Claire	6042	H	R	u	36.0
Outagamie	6042	K	R	u	32.7
Winnebago	6070	N	R	u	27.9
Washington	6209	K	R	r	66.1
Dane	6518	H	D	u	24.6
Racine	6722	K	D	u	27.3
Kenosha	6916	K	D	u	27.5
Milwaukee	6969	K	D	u	0.0
Ozaukee	7152	K	R	u	32.1
Waukesha	7190	K	R	u	34.9

Table 20

WISCONSIN PRIMARY—
MEDIAN INCOME FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM

Median Income	Humphrey	Kennedy	Nixon
$3000-3499	111		
3500-3999	𝍸 𝍸 1	11	1111
4000-4499	𝍸 11	𝍸	1
4500-4599	1	1	1
Median dividing line between low and high income groups..			
4600-4999	111	1111	11
5000-5499	11	11	11
5500-5999	11	𝍸	1
6000-6499	1	111	11
6500-6999	1	111	
7000-7499		11	

Table 21

WISCONSIN
MEDIAN INCOME vs. RURAL-URBAN
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM

Median Income	Rural	Urban
$3000-3499	111	
3500-3999	𝍸 𝍸 𝍸 11	
4000-4499	𝍸 𝍸 11	1
4500-4599	111	
Median dividing line between low and high income groups		
4600-4999	𝍸 111	1
5000-5499	𝍸	1
5500-5999	11	𝍸 1
6000-6499	1	𝍸
6500-6999		1111
7000-7499		11

Neither in the primary nor in the election is there any valid Kennedy-income correlation in West Virginia. However, all 7 urban communities were located in the higher income group—$3800 and over—with 6 of the 7 leading the high income group, (Table 22).

Table 22

WEST VIRGINIA PRIMARY AND ELECTION—
MEDIAN INCOME RELATIONSHIP

County	Median Income[21]	Primary	Election	Rural-Urban	Rural %
Grant	$2437	K	R	r	100.0%
Webster	2476	K	D	r	100.0
Pendleton	2490	K	D	r	100.0
Monroe	2597	K	R	r	100.0
Braxton	2610	K	D	r	100.0
Clay	2614	K	D	r	100.0
Calhoun	2635	K	D	r	100.0
Lincoln	2659	H	D	r	100.0
Summers	2698	K	D	r	66.7
Gilmer	2719	K	D	r	100.0
Hardy	2795	K	D	r	100.0
Barbour	2807	K	R	r	100.0
Tucker	2887	K	D	r	100.0
Hampshire	2925	H	D	r	100.0
Doddridge	3041	K	R	r	100.0
Wirt	3058	K	R	r	100.0
Roane	3098	K	R	r	83.0
Pocahontas	3160	K	D	r	100.0
Preston	3214	K	R	r	90.7
Upshur	3256	K	R	r	65.0
Ritchie	3355	K	R	r	100.0
Mingo	3410	K	D	r	83.0
Taylor	3425	K	R	r	61.4
Greenbrier	3426	K	D	r	92.2
Lewis	3503	K	R	r	55.5
Nicholas	3507	K	D	r	83.8
Randolph	3547	K	D	r	68.4
Morgan	3608	H	R	r	100.0

[21] Ibid., PC(1), 50C, pp. 50-170—50-174.

West Virginia, Median Income, cont'd.

County	Median Income	Primary	Election	Rural-Urban	Rural %
Raleigh	$3845	K	D	r	72.0%
Fayette	3862	K	D	r	88.8
Tyler	3903	K	R	r	90.7
McDowell	3932	K	D	r	88.3
Mercer	4073	K	D	r	59.4
Wayne	4110	K	D	r	66.8
Boone	4139	K	D	r	100.0
Jefferson	4201	K	D	r	82.1
Mason	4418	K	R	r	76.3
Mineral	4491	K	R	r	72.3
Monongalia	4515	K	D	r	51.0
Pleasants	4664	K	R	r	100.0
Jackson	4707	K	R	r	66.7
Berkeley	4725	K	R	r	55.0
Wyoming	4740	K	D	r	89.8
Putnam	4779	H	R	r	93.7
Logan	4876	K	D	r	87.7
Harrison	4969	K	D	r	55.0
Marion	5153	K	D	r	52.1
Marshall	5157	K	D	u	44.7
Wetzel	5249	K	R	r	59.6
Cabell	5278	H	R	u	26.2
Ohio	5428	K	D	u	12.8
Wood	5499	K	R	u	27.4
Kanawha	5862	K	R	u	33.2
Brooke	5984	K	D	u	45.5
Hancock	6912	K	D	u	29.6

Table 23

WEST VIRGINIA
MEDIAN INCOME vs. RURAL-URBAN
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM

Median Income	Rural	Urban
$2000-2499	111	
2500-2999	1111 1111 1	
3000-3499	1111 1111	
3500-3999	1111 111	
4000-4499	1111 1	
4500-4999	1111 111	
5000-5499	11	1111
5500-5999		11
6000-6499		
6500-6999		1

Dividing the state of Wisconsin into its 10 Congressional districts—the best division for analyzing the results of this county by county test—we see that a few generalizations can be drawn.

Senator Kennedy lost the western part of Wisconsin conclusively—i.e., the 3rd, 9th and 10th districts. Of the 35 counties in this area, Senator Humphrey won 26 or 74.2 per cent. The election saw Vice-President Nixon sweeping 22 of the 26 Humphrey-primary districts in addition to 4 Kennedy-primary and 1 Nixon-primary communities, making a total of 27 of the 35 counties, or 77.1 per cent.

There are many reasons which might explain the Humphrey-primary and Nixon-election results. Among them are the Protestant preponderance and/or farm-low income nature of

this area. However, it is also possible that the strong Republicanism in these communities made its voice effective against Kennedy, the front-runner, by voting for the weaker of the two Democrats. And again, being on the Minnesota-Wisconsin border, they just might have preferred Senator Humphrey.[22] Any single reason, or combination of these reasons, is possible and quite probable.

The 2nd Congressional district—a swing district in the south-central part of the state—was lost equally heavily by Senator Kennedy. Out of 5 counties, Senator Humphrey and Vice-President Nixon each carried 2 in the primary. The Vice-President won 4 of the 5 in the election, comprised of 2 Nixon, 1 Humphrey and 1 Kennedy counties. Again, strong Protestantism, Stevenson influence, or Humphrey support, or all three could have been chiefly responsible.

The 7th district—normally Republican—in the center of the state, went into the Kennedy column by a narrow margin. Though he won only 3 strongly Catholic counties of the district's 10 counties in the primary, these were populous areas in which his margin of victory, coupled with his votes in other counties, helped him win. Vice-President Nixon swept every county except the most Catholic areas. Again,

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[22] New York Times, April 7, 1960.

Catholicism may have been the principal reason that caused Senator Kennedy to carry the district. However, the strong Republican character of the district probably was the most outstanding factor in explaining why the Vice-President won 5 of the 10 counties. Another may have been the overwhelming rural nature of the district.

Senator Kennedy's win in the heavily Roman Catholic and urban districts—the 1st, 6th and 8th—was substantial. Fifteen of the area's 20 counties, or 75 per cent, went into the Kennedy column in the primary. However, election day saw 14 counties, including 10 of the Kennedy primary election wins, going to Vice-President Nixon. Who can say whether the Massachusetts Senator's election victory in this area was principally due to its heavily Catholic or heavily urban-industrial-high income nature. On the other hand, the Vice-President's showing may have been possible due to the proper party perspective in the election which was lost during the primary period.

The 4th and 5th Congressional districts—the mainly Catholic and urban-industrial-high income area of Milwaukee—were won by Senator Kennedy both in the primary and election. However, again we are faced with the problem of whether this area went to him because of the religious or socio-economic factors, or both.

From the 6—of 10—districts which Senator Kennedy won in the primary, it is possible to deduce that religion

played a major role in shaping the results. However, the high income-industrial character is not to be discounted. In the same vein, no one can tell whether Senator Humphrey won his districts because of the Protestant dominance or because they were farm territory closest to Minnesota.

Since the Republican Party-Democratic Party division played a more prominent role in the election, Vice-President Nixon's victory in Wisconsin may be explained on this basis. Nonetheless, the rural character and/or Protestant preponderance may also be conclusive explanations.

Two valid relationships which were fairly obvious and which have been cited in the early part of this chapter are worth repeating. Republicanism or party influence played a strategic part, if not the major role, in the counties which Vice-President Nixon won in the primary, (and which he swept in the election by a much greater margin). Likewise, those counties which went into the Kennedy column in the election (being won by a much higher percentage in the primary), emphasized the Democratic or party influence in these areas.

There was no valid relationship in West Virginia. Senator Kennedy overwhelmingly carried the state in the closed primary and registered a substantial victory in the election. However, the Senator's triumph emerged in the primary rather than the election, since West Virginia is a traditionally Democratic

state. The variables which were later introduced in the test did not shed much light as to the main reasons for Kennedy's double win.

Lack of sufficient data is mainly responsible for the lack of reliable relationships. Many other variables are necessary to adequately analyze a primary-election correlation. One of the most important variables is that of personality influence—a force for which there is no scientific data.

Other important variables in these two states include the labor force, animosity to Benson in the farm areas, poverty in West Virginia, the Republican-Democratic breakdown in Wisconsin, and Stevenson influence. Data is almost impossible to obtain and quantify in these areas; however, their weight in analyzing the influence of primary results in Wisconsin and West Virginia in 1960 would be considered crucial.

CHAPTER IX

VALIDATION OF THE THREE GENERALIZATIONS

The 1960 national conventions produced two presidential nominees who set interesting precedents along with introducing striking similarities.

Both Vice-President Nixon and Senator Kennedy heralded in a new era of politics and politicians—young, intelligent, practical, educated, urbane, sophisticated in national politics and world-traveled. Kennedy became the second Roman Catholic to achieve a major party nomination—the other being Al Smith who lost the election. He was also the first incumbent senator to receive the Democratic nomination since Stephen A. Douglas in 1860, and the only incumbent senator to win a presidential election other than Warren G. Harding.[1] Likewise, Nixon was the first vice-president in the history of the modern two party system to achieve the presidential nomination without succeeding to it by the death of the incumbent president.

However, the likenesses existing between the two men appeared more significant than these precedent setting

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[1]Paul T. David (ed.), The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961, (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 312.

events. Following World War II, both men had been elected to the House of Representatives on the same day in 1946 and continued to serve in national elective office until their nominations. The added asset of being Vice-President—an office widely expanded under the Eisenhower Administration—put Nixon in an enviable position in administrative as well as legislative experience. Nevertheless, Kennedy's personal assets—a politically fresh face with pluses in the popular appeal and personality division—sufficiently offset this lack with the electorate.

In 1960, the emphasis in the choice of candidates and in the conventions was on national and international experience and programs. Except for Governor Rockefeller and ex-Governor Stevenson, all major contenders, and all presidential and vice-presidential nominees, either had served or were presently serving in the Senate of the United States. The sectional elements which had been strong in the conventions of 1948, 1952 and 1956 were almost completely subordinated.[2]

As both parties entered upon the campaign trail, the Democrats appeared to be in a stronger tactical position—being the majority party in the country and possessing thirty-four of the fifty governorships, and a great majority in both houses of Congress. However, the Republicans

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[2] Ibid., p. 313.

controlled the power and prestige of the White House, having won the last two presidential elections by landslides.

Lacking the winning personality of Eisenhower, could Nixon rise above his party and attract Democratic and Independent voters? Entering the final phase of the campaign, could Kennedy retain his pre-convention strength among the electorate or would his obvious liabilities finally defeat him?

In prophesying the rough battle ahead, Vice-President Nixon stated the truism of his political life and a most prophetic statement three months before election day—November 8th, 1960. "I expect that this will be the closest election in this century in America."[3]

The Testing of the Three Generalizations

Relationship between Nominations and Polls

As opposed to the case of Vice-President Nixon, Senator Kennedy had been given no clear mandate by his party for the presidential nomination before it actually occurred. For more than a year, he had used every forum of voter expression to strengthen his case—one burdened with many obstacles. On the basis of preference and trial heat polls, and primaries, he was entitled to the first prize before the

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[3] New York Times, July 31, 1960.

convention met. It was the tremendous popular mandate for Kennedy and the resulting weakness of the other candidates—who failed to cause even a ripple among the electorate no matter what mechanism they employed—that caused the delegates to jump on his victorious bandwagon.

The bandwagon psychology in turn caused his lead in the preference and trial heat polls to increase again, resulting in added delegate support. This cycle of strength building on strength was classically illustrated with the Massachusetts Senator in 1960.

In a paper read to Brookings Institution, Professor Paul T. David cited a belief held by some election theorists that when no first-choice majority exists among several candidates, "any candidate should be preferred who could defeat each of his opponents if paired against them separately, one at a time."[4] With the evidence which is available to strengthen this belief, Kennedy obviously was the majority choice of his party by convention time.

Johnson, despite valiant efforts, never lost his sectional typing. Symington, likewise, failed to cause any excitement outside of the Missouri delegation. Humphrey, in taking the primary road, used the only available tactic open to him, but miserably failed against the financial and personality resources of Kennedy. And Stevenson, the

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[4] David, op. cit., p. 19.

only contender who possibly could have won the nomination with a spirited campaign, substantially lost whatever voter and delegate backing he possessed at the start of the pre-convention battle by his reticence.

On the other hand, Vice-President Nixon had been given the mandate of the Republican Party long before the official decision of the convention. In preference and delegate polls, he received an overwhelming vote of confidence against his only opponent, Governor Rockefeller.

In all fairness, however, it must be said that possibly, though not probably, the New York Governor may have been able to walk away with first prize if he had stayed in the race and put a little of the heat and sweat into it that Senator Kennedy did.

For unlike Adlai Stevenson, here was a bright new face on the national political scene with great personal magnetism, who had won the New York governorship in a year—1958—that had otherwise brought tremendous victories for the Democrats. In addition, significantly different and more important, even among the most ardent Nixon supporters was the admission that his presence on the national ticket would add great strength and unity to the Republican campaign. When the New York Governor eliminated himself from the pre-convention race, the organized popular support for him—which could have been used as an effective tool to influence the victory-conscious professional politicians if sufficiently

strengthened—faded away.

The 1960 convention demonstrated more clearly the significant change that has taken place in conventions of recent times as compared to those occurring in the hundred years from 1832 to 1932. In general, there has been a shift to more 'open politics' from that where sectionalism and machine bosses dominated the action, because the area of uncertainty has been reduced.[5] The prevalent feeling has been that the national electorate should participate to a greater extent in influencing the nominating function.

The machine bosses are still interested in who can win, but recently, mainly due to improved and increased technology, a particular kind of poll—the primary poll—has been forcing its hand on the leaders. These cross sections of people who vote in the final election work in a cycle, influencing voters whose views are recorded in public opinion polls and additional primary polls, which in turn influence convention delegates and party leaders. Again, these in turn influence more voters, public opinion and primary polls, and again finally, the party decision makers.

To demonstrate the adequacy or accuracy of the primary polls as indicators of the election results, the primary outcomes of Wisconsin and West Virginia were tested against their respective election results. Because of the fairly

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[5] Goldman, op. cit., p. 321. David, op. cit., p. 28.

narrow margin by which Senator Kennedy won the Wisconsin primary—where the main interest was centered in the Democratic battle—it could not be predicted that the Republicans would win in November in this swing state.

The only valid relationships that can be ascertained in Wisconsin are the strong Republican character of the counties which the Vice-President won in the primary and swept in the election, and the highly Democratic, Catholic and urban nature of most of the counties which Senator Kennedy won in the primary and retained in November.

On the other hand, no valid correlation emerged from the West Virginia primary and election from the data introduced, in spite of the fact that Senator Kennedy triumphed in both the primary and general election in this traditionally Democratic state.

In summary, the state primaries in Wisconsin and West Virginia were not adequate forecasters of general election results in those two states, respectively.

Nominating Patterns

In 1960, both party presidential nominations can be classified under two different categories of the five types of nominating patterns set up by Brookings Institution.

The Democrats fit into the pattern of "successful factionalism," more specifically, "coordinate factionalism." As was described in chapter one, the out-party in 1960

found itself in this position when its titular leader, Adlai Stevenson, did not seek active renomination.

In the case of the successful contender, Senator Kennedy, his highly efficient group of key strategists—mainly from Massachusetts and the New England states—was strengthened by the many Democratic professional politicians in every state (notably the powerful New York State organization which was the nucleus of support for Averell Harriman in 1956), the intellectuals (formerly in Stevenson's camp), and the labor and Negro leaders (formerly supporting Humphrey). This impressive cross section of Democratic strength ushered the Massachusetts Senator to his first-ballot victory.

However, the dominant representative of the group was Kennedy himself who actively planned his campaign tactics and overtly fought against the three active Democratic contenders and the one inactive titular leader. Being a fairly new 'glamour boy' on the national political horizon, Kennedy took full advantage of the ensuing struggle and benefited greatly from the enormous publicity.

If Senators Johnson and Humphrey had received the presidential nod by the convention, their nominations would also have been considered "coordinate factionalism." Senator Symington's candidacy likewise would have fallen into the same category even though he had been publicized as a compromise candidate.

Both Humphrey and Symington were relatively unknown

out of their respective states. Their campaigns had been launched from Minnesota and Missouri, respectively, which were their main bases of operations, and their key supporters included the state's political leaders.

Humphrey, a fervent Stevenson man in 1952 and 1956, attempted to win a hard core of Midwest states by appealing to the Negroes, intellectuals, farmers, and laborers. Unsuccessful in his effort, he threw his support to Stevenson whose political ideology most nearly resembled his own.

Symington, with his backing of Truman war horses and Missouri politicians, never made any headway outside of his own state. His supporters favored Johnson as their second choice in the event of a Symington defeat, with the reverse also being true. It was their hope that a Johson-Symington coalition would stop Kennedy.

Johnson, with his coalition of Southerners, old New Dealers and few Southwesterners, was the only other contender besides Kennedy whose candidacy approached serious proportions. However, moderate as his Congressional record was, he never threw off his choking regional bonds.

Inactive Adlai Stevenson was the only contender whose nomination would have fallen under that of "confirming an existing leadership." With enthusiastic backers operating from four key points—Wisconsin, New York, Los Angeles and Washington, D. C.—they hoped to channel his tremendous grass roots support into an active Stevenson candidacy and

vital votes in the Los Angeles Memorial Sports Arena. The continuing Stevenson silence had discouraged Kennedy and especially Humphrey supporters who had counted on the psychological boost his support would provide.

Factionalism would also have been evident if Governor Rockefeller had won his party's top prize. However, in his case, "insurgent" rather than "coordinate factionalism" would be the classification, since he would have been forced to overthrow the faction controlling the leadership, i. e., President Eisenhower's hand-picked successor.

Coming on the presidential horizon as a new and attractive political personality like Kennedy, Rockefeller also employed the mass media as an effective forum. However, the interests of the Republican Party as an 'organ of vitality'—and even those of Richard M. Nixon appeared to have been advanced to a greater extent than those of Rockefeller himself.

With a working organization composed chiefly of New York State politicians and leaders in the Rockefeller empire, the Governor found minimal support in the party structure and could not afford with his time, energy or pressing duties, the strenuous and possibly hopeless campaign ahead. In addition and perhaps more important, he would have to fight a Nixon who had championed the policies of the "most popular Republican President of modern times."[6]

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[6] White, op. cit., p. 75.

The small nucleus of Southern California key men was multiplied many times by the practically unanimous Republican Party leaders who promoted the presidential candidacy of Vice-President Nixon. This wing of the party was paying its great campaigning debt to Nixon in the form of crucial convention support. With Rockefeller vacillating in his presidential plans and finally withdrawing, an overwhelming majority of party voters in public opinion polls added their vital strength to the huge party organizational faction supporting the Vice-President.

Vice-President Nixon, as heir apparent, enjoyed all the privileges which accompany this status. Probably more responsible than any other factor for his favorable position was the 22nd Amendment. If President Eisenhower had not had to face this obstacle to a possible third term, he might have withheld his decision until the convention so as not to decrease his effectiveness in Congress. With this possible handicap, the Vice-President could not have worked toward the achievement of his nomination for fear that he be accused of deliberately undermining the President. Equally important, the President's delayed decision could have afforded every other presidential hopeful equal time with the Vice-President in planning campaign strategy.

The 22nd Amendment has effectively increased a vice-president's chances of inheriting a two-term incumbent president's position. In this respect, the nominating

pattern of "inheritance" will play a more prominent role in future such cases.

Relationship between Nomination and Front-Runners.

It has been a tradition in American politics that the front-runner in a presidential race is bound to be tripped up unless he produces a bandwagon whose momentum continually increases. The theory behind this thinking is that a front-runner—a party's leader in popular as well as delegate strength—to stay in the forefront must display such prodigies of energy and endurance that the public may tire of hearing and seeing so much of him.

Finding himself as front-runner early in the pre-convention period, Senator Kennedy was faced with this danger in a field of numerous and readily available Democratic contenders. However, following his West Virginia triumph—the real turning point in his successful quest for the nomination—his bandwagon gathered steam and roared to a brilliant first-ballot victory.

As has been pointed out in chapter one, the general action of national conventions has been to reject any candidate who cannot enter the conventions with at least 40 per cent of the total vote on the first ballot. Having crossed the 40 per cent line before the convention met and evidently stronger than his opponents, Senator Kennedy clearly deserved the prize. His 53 per cent vote was made

unanimous on the first ballot with no other candidate even approaching the 40 per cent mark. Partially due to the advantages of mass communication, the 1960 Democratic National Convention adhered to the practice of recent short-ballot conventions and concluded its presidential nomination in one ballot.

It seems safe to state that without the particular type of pre-convention campaign which Senator Kennedy conducted, i. e., the state presidential primary trail, he could not have been nominated. "If the Kennedy choice was rational, it was the prior campaigning that made rational choice possible."[7] Professor David succinctly summarized the situation by declaring, "President John F. Kennedy is the first to attain the office who is himself the beneficiary of an active out-party campaign in the primaries under his own leadership."[8]

On the Republican side, because of no overt pre-convention battle, there was never any doubt about Nixon's pre-eminent position. His 99 per cent vote—normal in cases involving heir apparents—which was speedily changed to a unanimous ruling on the first ballot, caused no raised eyebrows. The internal struggle, provoked by Nixon's

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[7] David, op. cit., p. 21.

[8] Ibid., p. 30.

ambivalence on major issues and future party action, strengthened the Vice-President's secure position and proved highly educative for the Republicans and the public at large.

APPENDIX

VOTE ON THE PRESIDENCY[1]

State	Votes	Johnson	Kennedy	Stevenson	Symington	Others
Ala.	29	20	3½	½	3½	1½
Alaska	9	..	9	..	..	..
Ariz.	17	..	17	..	..	..
Ark.	27	27	..	..	..	..
Calif.	81	7½	33½	31½	8	½
Colo.	21	..	13½	5½	2	..
Conn.	21	..	21	..	..	..
Del.	11	11	..	..	..	..
Fla.	29	..	..	..	..	29
Ga.	33	33	..	..	..	..
Hawaii	9	3	1½	3½	1	..
Idaho	13	4½	6	½	2	..
Ill.	69	..	61½	2	5½	..
Ind.	34	..	34	..	..	..
Iowa	26	½	21½	2	½	1½
Kan.	21	..	21	..	..	..
Ky.	31	25½	3½	1½	½	..
La.	26	26	..	..	..	..
Me.	15	..	15	..	..	..
Md.	24	..	24	..	..	..
Mass.	41	..	41	..	..	..
Mich.	51	..	42½	2½	6	..
Minn.	31	..	..	..	..	31
Miss.	23	..	..	..	..	23
Mo.	39	..	..	..	39	..
Mont.	17	2	10	2½	2½	..
Nebr.	16	½	11	..	4	½
Nev.	15	6½	5½	2½	½	..
N. H.	11	..	11	..	..	..
N. J.	41	..	..	..	..	41
N. Mex.	17	13	4	..	..	..
N. Y.	114	3½	104½	3½	2½	..
N. C.	37	27½	6	3	..	½
N. Dak.	11	..	11	..	..	..
Ohio	64	..	64	..	..	..
Okla.	29	29	..	..	..	..
Oreg.	17	..	16½	½	..	..
Pa.	81	4	68	7½	..	1½

[1] New York Times, July 15, 1960.

APPENDIX

Vote on Presidency, cont'd.

State	Votes	Johnson	Kennedy	Stevenson	Symington	Others
R. I.	17	..	17	..	..	..
S. C.	21	21	..	..	..	..
S. Dak.	11	2	4	1	2½	1½
Tenn.	33	33	..	..	..	..
Tex.	61	61	..	..	..	..
Utah	13	3	8	..	1½	½
Vt.	9	..	9	..	..	..
Va.	33	33	..	..	..	..
Wash.	27	2½	14½	6½	3	½
W. Va.	25	5½	15	3	1½	..
Wis.	31	..	23	..	..	8
Wyo.	15	..	15	..	..	..
C. Z.	4	4	..	..	..	..
D. C.	9	..	9	..	..	..
P. R.	7	..	7	..	..	..
V. I.	4	..	4	..	..	..
Total	1521	409	806	79½	86	140½*

*This total includes the following: Smathers 30 (Alabama ½; Florida 29; North Carolina ½); Meyner 43 (Alabama ½; New Jersey 41; Pennsylvania 1½); Barnett 23 (all Mississippi); Faubus ½ (Alabama); Brown ½ (California); Loveless 1½ (Iowa); Humphrey 41½ (Minnesota 31; Nebraska ½; South Dakota 1½; Utah ½; Wisconsin 8); Rosellini ½ (Washington).

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