ABSTRACT

ALIENATION FROM FREEDOM

by Karen Gernant

The intent in writing this thesis was to investigate the writings of Karl Marx, Paul Tillich and Sigmund Freud as they relate to the general subject of alienation.

Although they are concerned with somewhat different parts of the problem, all three writers appear to believe that man's alienation is essentially a lack of human freedom.

Marx sees the alienation in the context of capitalism, with both the laborer and the capitalist losing their human qualities in a capitalist society. Tillich sees the alienation in its religious context, as noted by the estrangement of man from other men and from God. Freud sees the alienation in its psychological context, particularly in the conflict between the ego and the id.

Marx and Tillich each offer solutions. Marx believes that the revolt of the working class and an eventual stateless society will result in reconciliation, while Tillich believes that reconciliation can only result when God accords grace to man. Neither solution seems a workable one.

If alienation exists in any or all of these contexts, it seems likely that very few persons are entirely alienated. Whether persons are alienated at all seems to depend upon whose classification one accepts.

ALIENATION FROM FREEDOM

By

Karen Gernant

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My interest in the subject of alienation began some four years ago in a course at Western Michigan University entitled "Christianity and Modern Thought." Dr. Cornelius Loew, the professor, deserves credit for awakening my curiosity particularly about Paul Tillich. The interest lay dormant until a couple of years later, in Dr. Alfred G. Meyer's course in Marxism and Communism which I took at Michigan State University, when I was struck by the coïncidence of thought between Karl Marx and Paul Tillich. When the time came to choose a thesis topic, I was once again attracted to the theme of alienation. Thus grew the current paper -- this time, with still another addition, that of Sigmund Freud.

To Dr. Meyer, who agreed to be the thesis chairman, goes much appreciation and thanks for his patience and understanding. Thanks also should be accorded to Dr. Alan P. Grimes, who consented to serve as chairman of the committee in the absence of Dr. Meyer, and to the other members of the committee, Dr. Robert Scigliano and Dr. Samuel Krislov.

As always in this kind of situation, too many people to name deserve thanks just for being available for discussion and relief when it was needed. Special thanks go to my parents, who have always appeared confident that the road to the thesis would finally be finished.

K.G.

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INTRODUCTION

Just what is alienation? It is a term used with wide applications, and thus, it is necessary to state several definitions.

One author views alienation as loneliness and claims that loneliness is characteristic of twentieth century life.[1] Another comments that "modern man... is in a perpetual state of doubt about the nature of himself and of the universe in which he lives."[2]

David Riesman notes that man today knows no real commitment to anything. He suggests that many people ". . . are not passionately attached to their lives, but rather cling to them."[3]

Alienation can be defined as apartness. This, in turn, may be broken down into several "separations," depending upon one's views as to which values are more important. It may mean separation from oneself, other

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[1]Margaret Mary Wood, Paths of Loneliness: The Individual Isolated in Modern Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. viii.

[2]Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 50.

[3]David Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), p. 112.

men, family, or God. It could also mean separation from a job, the nation, or from purposes, goals and freedom. Alienation may mean a feeling of loneliness and emptiness.

It seems possible that the lack of involvement in politics by a substantial portion of the American adult population may be related to the concept of alienation.

Clinton Rossiter writes that "there is little sense of 'belonging' among American voters, few signs of 'shared concern' with other men of like political mind."[4] He also points to the fact that, of approximately 100 million Americans who could have voted in 1956, 62 million persons actually did vote.[5] One reason which Robert A. Dahl cites to explain lack of political participation is that some persons may think there is little likelihood of their votes or participation making any difference in elections.[6]

Perhaps some citizens must first concern themselves with their lives as individuals, rather than as voters. They may need to consider first their working lives; and their psychological lives. It may be possible for them to become more strongly committed to

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[4]Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 25.

[5]Ibid., p. 30.

[6]Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 60.

politics, after they have become accustomed to commitments in other areas of their lives.

This paper will deal with the views of three writers on the subject of alienation, for the problem of alienation is one encompassing enough that it is unlikely that any one discipline working alone will be able to penetrate the area.

It is the common contention of Karl Marx, Paul Tillich and Sigmund Freud that man is alienated from freedom, although, for each of them, this alienation from freedom is seen in a somewhat more concrete form.

For Marx, the alienation is seen principally in the dichotomy between the worker and the capitalist. His setting is that of work, for he believes that man's freedom is dependent upon the possibility of using human faculties in the working process.

Tillich sees alienation against the setting of religion. His major concern appears to be man's estrangement from God and from man, as exemplified by man's objectification of both God and man. Tillich would have man attain an "I-Thou" relationship with God and man, as opposed to an "I-It" relationship.

Freud's primary concern appears to be the conflict between the ego and the id, or between reason and instinct, within individuals. This consideration also involves the conflict between the life and death

impulses within persons. On the one hand, individuals desire to remain alive, but on the other hand, each successive step to remain alive ultimately negates itself in death.

It is to these three writers that we turn now for their insights into man's alienation.

CHAPTER II

MARX

ALIENATION IN CAPITAL

In Capital, Karl Marx discusses at length a phenomenon which has been termed today "alienation."[1] Both laborer and capitalist are immersed in a system which leads to their alienation. Alienation in Capital may be seen as the absence of individual freedom or choice. Both the laborer and the capitalist are caught in a system which does not allow them to meet each other or their colleagues as human beings. Rather, they meet each other as objects.

To attain an overall view of the concept of alienation, it is important to review Marx's economic perspective on the subject.

For Marx, it is capitalism that brings about man's alienation from humanity. As society has become more industrial, technology has developed to such a point that the working man, according to Marx, has become a cog in the machine of capitalism.

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[1]My discussion of alienation in Marx's Capital is a departure from what is usual in this area. It is more usual to consider that there is a definite gap between the early Marx and the later Marx. The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 is the work usually referred to in discussing Marx and alienation. For a thorough discussion of this, see Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).

Manufacture and production presuppose that there is something to be manufactured that people want. The desired item is termed a commodity. The commodity has value because human labor is mixed in it. The quantity of labor determines the amount of value. In order to have value, the commodity must be utilitarian; that is, it must have use-value. Independently of use-value, it must have exchange value, which is a quantitative measurement.

The value of one commodity can be expressed only in relation to another commodity. Thus, we might say that ten handbags have the same value as one formal dress. Human labor-power becomes value when it is merged in the form of an object, a commodity.

> A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour.[2]

One kind of commodity, then, is the kind that is manufactured specifically for the purpose of exchange. But there are two other ways to view a commodity.

Any object is potentially a commodity. In other words, as soon as it has no utilitarian value for its owner, it has reached an alienable state, or a state of potential exchange. All that is necessary then is that

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[2]Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, edited by Frederick Engels and revised by Ernest Untermann, translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: The Modern Library, 1906), Vol. I, p. 83.

the owner actually alienate it from himself. It is implicit in capitalism, according to Marx, that all owners with commodities not useful to them will try to sell them (or alienate them) to persons for whom the commodities would serve a useful purpose.[3]

The second additional point that must be made here is that a commodity, in Marx's terminology, does not have to be a tangible object. It may be, instead, the labor-power itself, which is sold by its owner. According to Marx, the individual sells it for a defined period of time only. Selling it outright would be tantamount to enslaving himself permanently. The value of labor-power is determined by the cost of living for the laborer. The laborer gives credit to the capitalist, since the laborer's wages are given to him after he has completed his work for a given period of time.

If, as we saw on the preceding pages, commodities are produced because people want them, then there must be a way to acquire them. The sale of commodities is simplified by the use of a universal exchange medium, money. Money, as an external object, is also a commodity which can become the property of an individual. The cycle, then, is this: commodity to money to commodity.

> All commodities are non-use-values for their owners, and use-values for their non-owners. Consequently, they must all change hands.[4]

However, money need not be an ingredient in the transaction, for the credit system makes it possible to

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[3] Ibid., p. 99

[4] Ibid., p. 97

sell before the purchaser is able to pay the full price of the commodity. This leads to the creditor-debtor relationship. The money exists in the promise of the purchaser to pay for the article. Yet, the commodity itself changes ownership. The original owner retains the same exchange value. In the chain of events, he has, first, the exchange value of his own commodity; second, the money for which he sold the commodity; and third, the commodity on which he may spend the money.

Commodities, then, constitute the reason for manufacturing. We turn next to the mode of manufacturing.

In order to produce more efficiently, a division of labour is essential. Parts of an assembly-line, persons are restricted to the specific work of producing a part of the finished product. The result is " . . . a productive mechanism whose parts are human beings."[5] Criticizing this practice, Marx writes that the " . . . constant labour of one uniform kind disturbs the intensity and flow of a man's animal spirits, which find recreation and delight in mere change of activity."[6]

Separating the laborer from the result of his labor is the "instrument of labour" or the "conductor of his activity."[7] Thus, the human is separated from the object which he has a stake in producing.

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[5] Ibid., p. 371

[6] Ibid., p. 374

[7] Ibid., p. 199

> An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity from that state in which human labour was still in its instinctive stage. We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. . . At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will . . . The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.[8]

The machine, in contrast to the person, becomes paramount in the manufacturing process. Machines may wear out, but when they are replaced, they must be replaced by identical mechanisms, or, when they become obsolete, they must be replaced by improved mechanisms. The persons who operate the machines, however, can be replaced by other persons able to push the right button at the right time.

Use of the machine means loss of individuality or creativity for the labourer. In his own eyes and in the eyes of the capitalist, he becomes part of the machine. Machines make the work less difficult, but Marx sees this as a disadvantage rather than as an advantage.

> The lightening of the labour, even, becomes a sort of torture, since the machine does not free the labourer from work, but deprives the work of all

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[8] Ibid., p. 198.

> interest. . . By means of its conversion into an automaton, the instrument confronts the labourer, during the labour-process, in the shape of capital, of dead labour, that dominates, and pumps dry, living labour-power. The separation of the intellectual powers of production from the manual labour, and the conversion of those powers into the might of capital over labour, is . . . finally completed by modern industry erected on the foundation of machinery. The special skill of each individual insignificant factory operative vanishes as an infinitesimal quantity before the science, the gigantic physical forces, and the mass of labour that are embodied in the factory mechanism, constitute the power of the "master."[9]

When machines "learn" to tend themselves, they become man's competitors, because the laborer's function necessarily becomes less important or even vanishes altogether. Marx believes that the conflict between machinery and worker, and between capitalist and worker, leads the workers eventually to revolt en masse against machinery. This, he thinks, is most decisive when new machinery replaces the need for individual men to work in handicrafts. Unemployment then leaves the labor force at the mercy of the capitalists. Children, too, are employed to learn a single task and are taught nothing which would help them secure other jobs when their current tasks are taken over by automation.

Machinery, then, according to Marx, is the foe of the working man. But machinery alone cannot be a foe. The force behind machinery is the capitalist.

The object to be produced is conceived in the mind of the capitalist in order that he may alienate

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[9]Ibid., p. 462.

it from himself through the exchange medium. It is something which, for the sake of expedience, will have the labor of many individuals mixed in it. The laborer expends energy for the ends of the capitalist, for the product is the property of the capitalist. The product fulfills the desires of the capitalist, in that it is an object with exchange value. Its value is greater than the sum of the values of the commodities used in the production process. That is, it has surplus-value.

Surplus-value can be introduced into the commodity only through the living labor-power, because constant capital (means of production, raw materials, instruments of labour) is static in value. Variable capital resides alone in the labor-power expended by workers, for -- in addition to working for his subsistence -- the laborer also works for the capitalist, thus creating surplus-value.

> The rate of surplus-value is . . . an exact expression for the degree of exploitation of labour-power by capital or of the labourer by the capitalist.[10]

For the capitalist, then, profit results from the exploitation of the laborer to the greatest possible degree. If there are twenty-four hours in the day, the laborer works X number of hours to earn his livelihood and Y number of hours to earn the livelihood of the capitalist. He is left then with Z hours, which are

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[10] Ibid., p. 241.

theoretically free for recreation. However, he may have to expend most or all of them in the processes of eating and sleeping in order to repeat the work processes the next day.

> Hence it is self-evident that the labourer is nothing else, his whole life through, than labour-power, that therefore all his disposable time is by nature and law labour-time, to be devoted to the self-expansion of capital. Time for education, for intellectual development, for the fulfilling of social functions and for social intercourse, for the free play of his bodily and mentally activity, even the rest time of Sunday . . . -- moonshine! . . . Capital oversteps not only the moral, but even the merely physical maximum bounds of the working day . . . It is not the normal maintenance of the labour-power which is to determine the limits of the working day; it is the greatest possible expenditure of labour-power, no matter how diseased, compulsory, and painful it may be, which is to determine the limits of the labourer's period of repose.[11]

Marx's capitalist does not worry if the length of the working day is physically and mentally taxing to the point of early death. His lack of worry stems from the knowledge that there is an excess population. It is this standby population which makes it possible for the capitalist to have his employees work beyond the time needed for minimum subsistence. The non-workers constitute a threat to the workers. The workers are aware that they are dispensable. In addition, the capitalist knows that the laborers, from animal instinct, will continue to propagate the species and will also

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[11] Ibid., p. 291.

continue to do whatever necessary to stay alive. Man, as laborer, has not only the function of working each day, but he has also the function of reproducing himself, both on a day-to-day basis and on a generation-to-generation basis, in order that the capitalist will always have a working force. Capitalism " . . . forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost . . . It creates . . . a mass of human material always ready for exploitation."[12] Furthermore, capitalists may purchase a greater amount of labor-power by hiring women rather than men, children rather than adults, and the unskilled rather than the skilled. The population remains in excess of the numbers the capitalists can absorb into industry.

In order to make a profit, the capitalist's main objective is to shorten the "subsistence" part of the worker's day and to lengthen the part of the day that yields the surplus-value. One way to accomplish this is to have a collective working arrangement, which results in more efficient production than to have either the same number of persons working individually or one person working the same total number of hours. The capitalist's task is to direct and supervise the cooperative working venture, with the most possible surplus-value his goal.

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[12] Ibid., p. 693.

The wage scheme provides another possibility for shortening the "subsistence" part of the working day. Wages, Marx says, end any necessity for talking of necessary labor and surplus-labor, for, on the face of it, all labor is paid labor. Unpaid labor is not apparent on the surface of the wage system. Hourly wages are fixed by dividing the daily value of labor-power by the set number of hours of the working day. But the capitalist retains the option of employing the worker for less hours. "The capitalist can now wring from the labourer a certain quantity of surplus-labour without allowing him the labour-time necessary for his own subsistence."[13] Another method of determining wages is a contract between the capitalist and the head laborer for so much money per piece produced. The exploitation in this plan, then, is a "double" one, with both the capitalist and the head laborer exploiting the laborers.

The capitalist-laborer dichotomy is reflected in this statement from Marx:

> On the one hand, the process of production incessantly converts material wealth into capital, into means of creating more wealth and means of enjoyment for the capitalist. On the other hand, the labourer, on quitting the process, is what he was on entering it, a source of wealth, but devoid of all means of making that wealth his own. Since, before entering on the process, his own labour has already been alienated from himself by the sale of his labour-power, has been appropriated by the capitalist and incorporated with capital, it must, during the

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[13] Ibid., p. 597.

> process, be realised in a product that does not belong to him. Since the process of production is also the process by which the capitalist consumes labour-power, the product of the labourer is incessantly converted, not only into commodities, but into capital, into value that sucks up the value-creating power, into means of subsistence that buy the person of the labourer, into means of production that command the producers. The labourer therefore constantly produces material, objective wealth, but in the form of capital, of an alien power that dominates and exploits him; and the capitalist as constantly produces labour-power, but in the form of a subjective source of wealth, separated from the objects in and by which it can alone be realised; in short he produces the labourer, but as a wage-labourer.[14]

The working class is not the only group which Marx sees as alienated. Yearning for profit leads the capitalist to more and more accumulation which, in turn, leads toward centralization. From Marx's viewpoint, this leads further to an alienation of the capitalists themselves, in that they become dependent upon one another as objects united in the common goal of centralization.

Although the capitalists have the common goal of accumulation, this in itself leads to competition among them. Each of them strives to be the one, or the part of the group of capitalists, who can amass the most and thus eliminate the smaller capitalists. Alienation exists, in other words, not only between the capitalist and the laborer, but also between capitalist and capitalist.

> The part of social capital domiciled in each particular sphere of production is divided among

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[14] Ibid., p. 625.

> many capitalists who face one another as independent commodity-producers competing with one another.[15]

The capitalist is not only set apart from other capitalists, but he is also split into two parts within himself, for he both owns capital and employs capital.

> The employer of capital, even when working with his own capital, falls apart into two personalities, into the mere owner of capital and the employer of capital; his capital itself, with reference to the categories of profit which it yields, falls apart into capital property outside of the process of production and yielding interest of itself, and capital in the process of production yielding profit of enterprise through its function in the process.[16]

Another phase in the capitalist alienation is identified by the fact that some capitalists are not industrial capitalists, but rather are money-capitalists. They are in a position to lend the money which makes possible capitalist production. Productive capital forms an object for interest-bearing capital, just as wage-labor forms the object for productive capital.[17]

Part of the industrial capitalist's alienation from the money-capitalist results from the fact that the industrial capitalist acts frequently as a laborer himself; that is, he performs supervisory tasks within the framework of his industry. In acting as a supervisor, he becomes at least for the moment a wage-laborer,

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[15]Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, edited by Frederick Engels and revised by Ernest Untermann, translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1889), Vol. I, p. 639.

[16]Karl Marx, Capital, edited by Frederick Engels (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1909), Vol. III, p. 441.

[17]Ibid., p. 446.

with the advantage of paying himself his own wages.

The vanishing of individualism for the capitalist is evident, too, in the emergence of stock corporations. With joint ownership of industries, individual capitalism becomes less defined and more submerged to a state of anonymity. The persons who invest in capitalist enterprises cannot identify part of the production as a direct result of their own investments; the investments are seen as a total sum, as are the products, or results of the investments.

> Credit offers to the individual capitalist . . . absolute command of the capital of others and the property of others, within certain limits, and thereby of the labor of others. A command of social capital, not individual capital of his own, gives him command of social labor.[18]

> The credit system appears as the main lever of overproduction and overspeculation in commerce solely because the process of reproduction . . . is here forced to its extreme limits, and is so forced for the reason that a large part of the social capital is employed by people who do not own it and who push things with far less caution than the owner, who carefully weighs the possibilities of his private capital, which he handles himself . . . The production of values by capital based on the antagonistic nature of the capitalist system permits an actual, free, development only up to a certain point, so that it constitutes an immanent fetter and barrier of production, which are continually overstepped by the credit system.[19]

Accumulation of industrial capital is dependent on the increase of the components of reproduction in

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[18]Ibid., pp. 519-20.

[19]Ibid., p. 522.

capital. Similarly, the person who lends money is dependent on the growth of industrial accumulation so that more money may be lent, and returned with greater interest. The interest comes from the industrial capitalist, whose existence as a capitalist depends on the money-capitalist. "The loan capital accumulates at the expense of both the industrial and commercial capitalists."[20]

Another form of capitalist alienation is reflected in the dichotomy between the land-owner and the renter of the land. Renting the land, the land-owner has as his object the capitalist. The capitalist gives up a portion of his profit to the person who owns the land. The renting capitalist may then exploit the land which he rents.[21] Thus, agricultural capitalism is not unlike capitalism in manufacturing.

According to Marx, there is also alienation on an international basis. The bourgeoisie of one nation is pitted against the bourgeoisie of another nation, and yet they are interdependent. One country needs the products of another, and vice versa.

> Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of the industry and commerce

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[20] Ibid., p. 590.

[21] Ibid., p. 725.

> is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule . . . In these crises there breaks out. . . the epidemic of overproduction. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed. And why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.[22]

The theme of alienation permeates Marx's Capital. In each instance, as Marx views it, it is an alienation which negates the possibility of human freedom. The estrangement exists at many levels: capitalist-worker; worker-machine; worker-worker; within the worker; worker-family; parent-child; worker-commodity; capitalist-commodity; capitalist-capitalist; nation-nation. The capitalist works to accumulate capital and to eliminate competitors in the process of centralization. The laborer works to build capital for the capitalist. Marx sees no way for the laborer to manifest his own individuality. Working half or most of hours of the day for the capitalist and for his own subsistence, the worker loses the ability to be a person for the rest of the day. His spare-time hours are not his own, but are the capitalist's. Through eating and sleeping,

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[22]Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, edited by Samuel Beer (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p. 15.

the laborer preserves himself for the repetition of the production process the next day. Through feeding his wife and children, he preserves their lives for work. Through propagating the species, he creates a new working force, adding to the surplus population. And through all of these activities, according to Marx, the laborer utilizes only animal instincts. Human characteristics of creativity and thought have no place in the laborer's world.

If we accept Marx's statements, then, the worker has lost the spark of life which might characterize him as human.

> The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object . . . The life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien.[23]

What would make man human? Marx believes that man has the potential of consciousness, first in society and then within individuals. He believes man is capable of imagination. He believes man is capable of making history, but he believes that man has not yet made human history. As one critic writes:

> Man has made bad history because, in the dialectics of production, he has never been in a position to prevent the means of production from entering into conflict with the relations of production. Specifically, so preoccupied has he been with the immediate and practical exigencies of production and assuring from the available means of production, a preferred livelihood for himself as against his fellows, that

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[23]Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, no date), p. 70.

> he has not been able to anticipate and control the long term historical and human consequences of that material production itself. As a result, the objective factor of production, nature and technics, in the long run acts counter to rather than in support of the subjective factor, human needs and their appropriate social organization.[24]

Consciousness involves, according to Alfred G. Meyer, "man's awareness of himself and his environment, or, better, of himself within his environment."[25] Meyer then expands this definition to "purposiveness," or man's ability to conquer environment. If man were able to conquer environment, then he would be able to use it to further his humanity, rather than being subjected to the alienation from freedom which is environment in Marx's framework.

Without the potentialities of consciousness, imagination and human history, man would be -- in Marx's eyes -- nothing but another animal. Because Marx believes man to have these potentials, however, he attempts an explanation of man's predicament, and a solution.

Presumably, Marx's solution will bring about man's freedom and humanity. George Lichtheim writes:

> Now man cannot develop fully unless he is free, but this must not be done at the expense of others as in classical antiquity where work was performed by slaves; for both parties to such a relationship are

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[24]Vernon Venable, Human Nature: The Marxian View (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 147.

[25]Alfred G. Meyer, Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 14.

> inevitably dehumanized. Freedom, to be genuine, must be universal, hence the individual is free only if all other men are free and able to develop as "universal beings."[26]

Marx's solution to man's alienation is contingent upon the proletariat becoming conscious of itself as a commodity, becoming conscious of the fact that it is dehumanized. His solution centers in the hope of a proletarian revolution. Forced labor should be abolished to free man for human pursuits:

> The proletarians, if they are to assert themselves as individuals, will have to abolish the very condition of their existence hitherto . . . namely, labor. Thus they find themselves directly opposed to the form in which, hitherto, individuals have given themselves collective expression, that is, the State. In order, therefore, to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the State.[27]

Once this has occurred, it is assumed that men will take turns at working and will perhaps be able to perform one type of work part of the time and another type of work another part of the time. They will not be limited to single tasks, but will be able to work at a variety of human pursuits. Implicit in this assumption is that man will answer to inner dictates, rather than to external dictates. In other words, man will reflect in his work his own interests and abilities, rather than the interests of the capitalist.

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[26]George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1961), p. 43.

[27]Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I and III, edited by R. Pascal (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 78.

Marx's solution, then, represents an ideal: a world where labor is not forced; a world where man can fulfill his human potentialities as opposed to his animal functions; a world where labor may become human, in that it will be performed willingly; a world where man's creativity, consciousness and imagination will emerge; a world where equality will prevail, a world without exploitation of one class over another. Ideally, it would be a world of human freedom, a turning away from alienation.

A study of Marx's views on alienation raises several serious questions.

It seems to me that Marx's underlying assumption, that laborers are unhappy and are exploited under capitalism, needs support. How does he know that they are unhappy? What makes him think that, given their choice, these persons would prefer to follow the human pursuits he has set forth? I think, too, that Marx's terms need to be more clearly defined. Why is the work that he describes necessarily not human? Why does he make humanity primarily dependent upon creativity, thought and imagination?

Furthermore, why must creativity and thought be part of a man's working life? Why should not these human faculties be developed during a person's leisure time? In short, why must all humans fit Marx's pattern of humanity in order to fulfill themselves as human?



It seems to me, too, that Marx was so enamoured of the idea of a proletarian revolution that he did not think objectively of alternative solutions. A revolution is not the only means to achieve happiness and freedom, if those elements are missing. For instance, labor unions today bargain for the rights of their members. This is a way to achieve wages and hours conducive to the development of human functions, if persons choose to use their money and time in that way. Similarly, government control of monopolies may be viewed as a way to prevent any one capitalist from attaining too much control over other capitalists.

To suggest the overthrow of the state and thus a stateless society is to advocate anarchy. What grounds does Marx have for preferring anarchy to government? How does he think a stateless society will assure or protect freedom for individuals? How will it end alienation and exploitation?

It seems, furthermore, that automation makes it inevitable that the worker will be separated from his product in any society where there is automation. Marx might better have concentrated on the dehumanization inherent in automation, rather than placing the blame for dehumanization on capitalism. A socialist society which has automation would result in as much dehumanization of the worker as a capitalist society would.

Marx's scheme appears to be based on a predetermined belief: that the laborer is exploited by the capitalist. The arguments he uses are made to fit the pattern which he has already decided will emerge.

CHAPTER III

TILLICH

RELIGIOUS ALIENATION

Tillich's concern is man's estrangement from God, from other men, and from himself. Like Marx, Tillich finds that man is alienated, in that there is a lack of freedom. For Tillich, however, this is a problem not to be resolved by man himself.

For Tillich, estrangement is a necessary fact of existence itself. To exist is necessarily to be estranged. Man has no choice in the matter, according to Tillich, for man is part of the estrangement which began with "original sin" or with the "fall" of man. He describes the fall as the "transition from essence to existence."[1]

> The transition from essence to existence is the original fact . . . We do exist and our world with us. This is the original fact. It means that the transition from essence to existence is a universal quality of finite being.[2]

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[1]Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), Vol. II, p. 29.

[2]Ibid., p. 36.

Tillich says that man is bound by finite freedom:

> One can say that nature is finite necessity, God is infinite freedom, man is finite freedom. It is finite freedom which makes possible the transition from essence to existence.[3]

> Man is free, in so far as he has the power of contradicting himself and his essential nature. Man is free even from his freedom; that is, he can surrender his humanity.[4]

This, however, is not complete freedom, but rather, limited -- or finite -- freedom. How does Tillich know that man is in a state of finite freedom? Or, perhaps a more answerable question would be: How does Tillich know that man knows he is in a state of finite freedom? The answer lies in man's concern and anxiety. His awareness of his finitude is expressed through anxiety. And Tillich finds hope, I think, in the anxiety of man.

Tillich offers three characteristics of estrangement: unbelief; hubris; and concupiscence. Unbelief is man's turning away from God. Hubris involves man's failure to recognize his finitude and man's consequent attempt to become infinite. It is man's attempt to become divine, which involves the lack of recognition of his inability to join the circle of divinity. In Tillich's words, "It is sin in its total form, namely, the other side of unbelief or man's turning away from the

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[3] Ibid., p. 31.

[4] Ibid., p. 32.

divine center to which he belongs. It is turning toward one's self as the center of one's self and one's world."[5] Concupiscence is man's desire to draw all of reality into himself. It is complete self-centeredness.

For Tillich, estrangement may be equated with sin:

> Sin is a universal fact before it becomes an individual act, or more precisely, sin as an individual act actualizes the universal fact of estrangement.[6]

> Sin is estrangement; grace is reconciliation.[7]

Man's freedom is bound by his destiny and thus it is finite freedom. Man may turn his world into an object or he may turn himself into an object. At the moment he does either, however, he loses both. In other words, as soon as he holds the world at arm's length as an object, he himself becomes "object" or "thing" or "dehumanized." Conversely, if he makes of himself an object, his world, too, becomes an object.

Tillich discusses what man could do if he were completely individual and human. He would take part in the world, through perception, imagination and action. These are functions which would make man truly human, but Tillich acknowledges that these functions are only potential functions:

> In the state of estrangement man is shut within himself and cut off from participation. At the same time, he falls under the power of objects

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[5] Ibid., p. 50.

[6] Ibid., p. 56.

[7] Ibid., p. 57.

> which tend to make him into a mere object without a self. If subjectivity separates itself from objectivity, the objects swallow the empty shell of subjectivity.[8]

Tillich's man cannot by himself overcome this estranged existence. Man must necessarily exist and if he exists, he must necessarily be estranged. If then he is part of existential estrangement (or finite freedom), he would negate his existence to attempt to reach his essence. In other words, for Tillich, man is bound up in the fact of estrangement. Man cannot escape "original sin," for if man escapes it, he loses existence as man. Tillich argues that man is estranged from the "ground of being" (God) and yet that he is not completely cut off from him. If the severance were complete, man would not ask questions about God. The fact that he questions implies the possibility of reunion or reconciliation. Yet, the reunion or reconciliation cannot be one of man's own making:

> Grace does not destroy essential freedom, but it does what freedom under the conditions of existence cannot do, namely it reunites the estranged.[9]

The implication is that grace must be accorded man from God. It is impossible to reach salvation on one's own. The answer for Tillich lies in the concept of "The New

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[8] Ibid., p. 65.

[9] Ibid., p. 79.

Being," or the Christ. Tillich says that the Christ appeared as the mediator between God and man:

> Mediation is reunion. God is the subject, not the object, of mediation and salvation. He does not need to be reconciled to man, but he asks man to be reconciled to him.
>
> Therefore, if the Christ is expected as mediator and savior, he is not expected as a third reality between God and man, but as him who represents God to man. He does not represent man to God, but shows what God wants man to be. He represents to those who live under the conditions of existence what man essentially is and therefore ought to be under these conditions.[10]

Appearing as the Christ, Jesus was subject to and part of man's finite freedom. Yet, says Tillich, he was able to exist under such conditions without being conquered by them. He was able, for instance, to resist temptation. Tillich uses the symbol of the "Cross of Christ" as representing his subjection to existence, and the symbol of the "Resurrection of Christ" as representing his victory over existence.[11]

For the Christ, essential union never gave way to the dichotomy experienced by the rest of mankind. Reunion for the Christ was not a necessary possibility, for the union itself never disintegrated. For the rest of mankind, though, Tillich would say that reunion with God is necessary to reach reunion with life.[12]

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[10] Ibid., p. 93.

[11] Ibid., p. 152.

[12] Paul Tillich, The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 11.

Or, more precisely, he would say that the two are synonymous. He would not give the two statements a cause-and-effect relationship, nor would he imply that one reunion is used only as a means to reach the end of the other reunion.

Necessary to the redemption of human life is healing, for man feels both insecurity and anxiety at all times. Healing, made possible by faith, is reunion not only with oneself, but also with others.

> Where one is grasped by a human face as human . . . there New Creation happens! Mankind lives because this happens again and again.[13]

Healing, like grace, comes from outside man, comes from the ground of being.

> Healing means reuniting that which is estranged, giving a center to what is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself.[14]

> In some degree all men participate in the healing power of the New Being. Otherwise, they would have no being. The self-destructive consequences of estrangement would have destroyed them. But no men are totally healed.[15]

Tillich gives the New Being characteristics which are diametrically opposed to those of estrangement: faith replaces unbelief; surrender replaces hubris; love replaces concupiscence.

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[13] Ibid., p. 23.

[14] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 166.

[15] Ibid., p. 167.

He weaves into his scheme the life-death dichotomy; the joy-pain dichotomy; and love as a thread which touches all. In his pattern, life and death are related of necessity, for death is inherent in life itself and in living. In the process of being alive, man continually moves toward the inevitable end, death. Man cannot negate this trend, for to do so would mean the immediate end of life. If man wishes to live, then, he accepts the fact that each minute of life is another minute closer to death.[16] Life and death are then inseparably mixed in all moments of time. Similarly, joy and pain are not at opposite ends of a pole. Man does not know joy one moment and pain the next; the two are usually intermingled, sometimes indistinguishably.

> There are people who believe that man's life is a continuous flight from pain and a persistent search for pleasure. I have never seen a human being of whom that is true. It is true only of beings who have lost their humanity, either through complete disintegration or through mental illness.[17]

Man attains joy when he meets persons for themselves, rather than when he meets persons in order to gain his own ends.[18] "In fulfillment and joy, the inner aim of life, the meaning of creation, and the end of salvation, are attained."[19] Blessedness, as the lasting transcending component of joy, makes it possible for joy to

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[16] Ibid., pp.56-7.

[17] Ibid., p. 144.

[18] Ibid., p. 145.

[19] Ibid., p. 151.

encompass sorrow and pain without negating its own existence.

When one is faced by the final separation brought by death, love intervenes to heal:

> Every death means parting, separation, isolation, opposition and not participation . . . Love overcomes separation and creates participation in which there is more than that which the individuals involved can bring to it. Love is the infinite given to the finite. . . Love, not help, is stronger than death.[20]

Love is not something which can be called up at will. It is an emotional state. Love works toward uniting the separated. It is seen as a movement toward reunion of the estranged; it links what has been split in order that the return to "essential oneness"[21] can be accomplished. Where the split is the sharpest, the force of love is the strongest. Tillich states that "the greatest separation is the separation of self from self."[22] The borderline character of the triumph over separation is reflected in this statement:

> Fulfilled love is, at the same time, extreme happiness and the end of happiness. The separation is overcome. But without the separation there is no love and no life. It is the superiority of the person-to-person relationship that it preserves the separation of the self-centered self, and nevertheless actualizes their reunion in love. The highest form of love . . . is the love which preserves the

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[20] Ibid., pp. 172-73.

[21] Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 25.

[22] Ibid., p. 25.

individual who is both the subject and object of love.[23]

The presupposition of essential reunion with the ground of being is man's ability to relate to others as men, rather than as "others." It is the I-Thou relationship in which Tillich would have men participate. Man's realization of his humanness occurs when he meets a "thou."

> Man becomes man in personal encounters. Only by meeting a "thou" does man realize that he is an "ego". . . The other one, the "thou," is like a wall which cannot be removed or penetrated or used. He who tries to do so, destroys himself. The "thou" demands by his very existence to be acknowledged as a "thou" for an "ego" and as an "ego" for himself. This is the claim which is implied in being. Man . . . can try to transform him into a manageable object, a thing, a tool. But in doing so he meets the resistance of him who has the claim to be acknowledged as an ego. And this resistance forces him either to meet the other one as an ego or to give up his own ego-quality. Injustice against the other one is always injustice against oneself. The master who treats the slave not as an ego but as a thing endangers his own quality as an ego. The slave by his very existence hurts the master as much as he is hurt by him.[24]

Justice is the road to reunion. Tillich categorizes the following principles of justice. Justice must be adequate, in that laws must be up-to-date, must fit the times in which we live. Justice must contain equality; men's essential equality must be made actual equality. Justice involves the concept of personality, with persons treating others as persons rather than as objects or

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[23] Ibid., p. 27.

[24] Ibid., pp. 78-9.

things. Justice must incorporate liberty, for slavery goes against the very idea of reconciliation.

Those who have being must make the claim for justice. Not to do so would be to lose justice by default. Justice must be what Tillich calls "tributive or proportional" justice.[25] And it must also take the character of creative or transforming justice.[26]

> What is the criterion of creative justice? In order to answer this question one must ask which is the ultimate intrinsic claim for justice in a being? The answer is: Fulfilment within the unity of universal fulfilment. The religious symbol for this is the kingdom of God.[27]

> Justice . . . means creative justice and is expressed in the divine grace which forgives in order to reunite.[28]

Justice is a part of love; without justice, love is self-surrender. "Love reunites; justice preserves what is to be united."[29] Love and justice are the key to salvation; love and power, to creation.

> The power of God is that He overcomes estrangement, not that he prevents it; that He takes it, symbolically speaking, upon Himself, not that He remains in a dead identity with Himself . . . This is the unity of love and power in the depth of reality itself, power not only in its creative element but also in its compulsory element and the destruction and suffering connected with it.[30]

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[25] Ibid., p. 63.

[26] Ibid., p. 64.

[27] Ibid., p. 65.

[28] Ibid., p. 66.

[29] Ibid., p. 71.

[30] Ibid., pp. 112-13.

From what does Tillich's concern stem? His obvious primary concern is the estranged character of man. His principal vehicle for examination of the concern is religion. But Tillich, for whom religion pervades all man, finds that nothing is irrelevant. Everything, either positively or negatively, is touched by religion.

> Essentially the religious and the secular are not separated realms. Rather they are within each other.
>
> But this is not the way things actually are. In actuality, the secular element tends to make itself independent and to establish a realm of its own. And in opposition to this, the religious element tends to establish itself as a special realm. Man's predicament is determined by this situation. It is the situation of the estrangement of man from his true being. One could rightly say that the existence of religion as a separate realm is the most conspicuous proof of man's fallen state.[31]

Tillich's immediate frame of reference is the present. Since he views the present as embracing everything that has gone before, however, his scope is necessarily a widened one. The present is a transition from past to future and leans constantly toward the future.

Creation makes man dependent on his origin, and yet, man is independent through individuality.[32]

> The question is not whether selves exist. The question is whether we are aware of self-relatedness . . . Self-relatedness is experienced in acts of negation as well as in acts of affirmation. A self is not a thing that may or may not exist; it . . . logically precedes all questions of existence.[33]

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[31]Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 41-2.

[32]Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, translated by N. A. Rasetzki and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 206.

[33]Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), Vol. I, p. 169.

What does it mean to be, to exist? The fact of existence points to the fact of participation in being. Tillich suggests that the seriousness of things is illustrated by all beings' participation in the ground of being, and conversely, that insecurity is mirrored in the separation from the ground of being.[34] In Tillich's scheme, the person sees objectively and yet is aware of being a part of that which he sees.[35] No person can legitimately make God part of the subject-object structure, for in doing so, humanity denies God as the ground of all being.[36] As being-itself or the ground of being, God has not existence, but is "beyond essence and existence."[37] The quality of God must be understood, rather, as a transcending quality, going beyond the forces which limit human beings.[38]

Being, mixed with freedom, creates meaning:

> The new, which occurs whenever history occurs, is meaning. In creating meaning, history rises above itself. For meaning . . . is realized by freedom and only by freedom; in creating meaning, being gains freedom from itself, from the necessity of

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[34]Tillich, The Interpretation of History, op. cit., p. 271.

[35]Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 170.

[36]Ibid., p. 172.

[37]Ibid., p. 205.

[38]Ibid., p. 237.

> its nature . . . Freedom is the leap in which history transgresses the realm of pure being and creates meaning.[39]

Tillich suggests that meaning, in the form of fulfillment, has occured at different points in history for different groups: for the Jews, in the exodus from Egypt; for the Marxists, in the appearance of the proletariat; for the Christians, in the Christ. Particularly is he concerned with the latter example. The appearance of the New Being, in the Christ, is a fulfilled moment of time; it is "kairos."

> The consciousness of the kairos is dependent on one's being inwardly grasped by the fate and destiny of the time.[40]

Being is not only a positive quality, but it is also viewed as a negative quality in that it may include non-being. This gives human life the character of finitude, of enclosing within itself the possibility of non-being. Tillich suggests that, while being carries with it the potential of non-being, being will prevail over non-being; the infinite will shine through the finite.[41] The more separation within the self that can be overcome, the stronger the power inherent in human being. "The more reuniting love there is, the more conquered non-being there is, the more power of being

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[39]Tillich, The Interpretation of History, op. cit., p. 273.

[40]Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, translated by James Luther Adams (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 48.

[41]Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, op. cit., p. 38.

there is."[42] In Tillich's language, power of being is God, or infinitude.

Although finitude is characteristic of all living beings, man is separated from the others in that he alone is capable of awareness of finitude. Awareness, of course, does not carry with it the possibility of man's creating his own escape from it.[43]

Chains of finitude are the boundaries of time and space, which are found in the fact of mankind's historical existence. The overriding temporal scheme is the line of life which draws man gradually from birth to death, in an irreversible pattern. Nonetheless, the circular historical character of space makes possible the repetition of the life-to-death cycle.

> The direction of time is deprived of its power by the circular motion of continuous repetition. The circle, this most expressive symbol of the predominance of space, is not overcome in the realm of life.
>
> In man the final victory of time is possible. Man is able to act toward something beyond his death. He is able to have history, and he is able to transcend even the tragic death of families and nations, thus breaking through the circle of repetition towards something new. Because he is able to do so, he represents the potential victory of time, but not always the actual victory. What has happened in nature unconsciously happens in man and history consciously: The same struggle and the same victory.[44]

The despair, anxiety and insecurity which characterize our lives are symptoms of what Tillich terms the

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[42] Ibid., p. 49.

[43] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 98.

[44] Ibid., p. 31.

"human boundary-situation."[45] Man encounters this situation when he is threatened, not by death, but by the knowledge that he is separated. It is not a physical threat, not a threat that can be settled by death, but a transcending threat which would remain so even in the knowledge and the fact of death.[46] The possibility of such a situation arises because man is not one with the ground of being.

> Man is in a genuine sense the threatened creature because he is not bound to his vital existence, because he can say "yes" and "No" to it . . . Anyone who raises a question about true reality is in some way separated from reality; whoever makes a demand upon reality presupposes that it is not at hand. Man must raise the question, however, and must make the demand; he cannot escape this fate, that is, the fate of being man.[47]

The fate in which man is immersed embodies freedom. However, freedom and necessity are bound together in the scope of fate.[48] With freedom comes the possibility of contradiction and, thus, estrangement within each man -- both as an individual and as a part of continuing humanity. The concept of original sin indicates the self-contradictory character of man: the fall which pulled man from essence to existence and which cannot be overcome, for conquest of original sin would negate existence for man. Man, then, is bound to self-estrangement. His enslavement to self-estrangement is greater

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[45]Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 197.

[46]Ibid., p. 197.

[47]Ibid., p. 197.

[48]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

than his freedom as man. Historically, man has the character of determining himself, as opposed to beings without thought-processes. But historically, too, fate steps in and determines man. Man may, for instance, devise work-saving mechanisms in his role of "freedom." But fate enters the picture and turns the instruments against him in such a way as to make man, the motive power behind mechanization, lose his prime role and become subjected to the mechanization which he created.[49]

While personality represents either freedom or potential freedom, it has within it room for the submergence of self:

> The distortion of the relationship between personality and thing appears not only in the subjection of things to personality but also in the subjection of personality to things. Man who transforms the world into a universal machine serving his purposes has to adapt himself to the laws of the machine. The mechanized world of things draws man into itself and makes him a cog, driven by the mechanical necessities of the whole.[50]

Personality -- or the character of person-ness, humanness -- becomes possible only in the I-Thou encounter with another person.[51] Tillich does not deny that some persons have managed to retain personality, but he clearly implies that the masses of persons are no longer personalities.

Reunion is the ultimate goal in Tillich's eyes.

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[49] Ibid., p. 186.

[50] Ibid., p. 123.

[51] Ibid., p. 123.

Working toward this is the immediate goal of theonomy, which he defines as "the free devotion of finite forms to the eternal."[52] He views theonomy as a transcendence and mediation between autonomy and heteronomy:

> Autonomy asserts that man as the bearer of universal reason is the source and measure of culture and religion -- that he is his own law. Heteronomy asserts that man, being unable to act according to universal reason, must be subjected to a law, strange and superior to him. Theonomy asserts that the superior law is, at the same time, the innermost law of man himself, rooted in the divine ground which is man's own ground: the law of life transcends man, although it is, at the same time, his own . . . A theonomous creature expresses in its creations an ultimate concern and a transcending meaning not as something strange but as its own spiritual ground.[53]

Reunion is potential in reality, and is actual in symbolism. Its potentiality manifests itself in the possibility of moving away from self-centeredness toward union with another, a possibility which Tillich calls "ecstasy": "Only through ecstasy can the ultimate power of being be experienced in ourselves, in things and persons, and in historical situations."[54]

Symbolically, reunion takes place in the communion service. Here, persons partake of bread and wine, thus lending concrete reality to the idea of the Christ. Symbolically, then, the Christ is present in flesh and

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[52]Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, translated by H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1956), p. 216.

[53]Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 56-7.

[54]Ibid., p. 79.

blood which are consumed to nourish bodies which are in reality in existence today. Symbolism allows man to participate in the living reality of the Christ.[55]

In discussing estrangement, or alienation, Tillich does not confine himself to the strictly religious situation. He uses other categories, as well, to express man's dehumanization. He suggests, for instance, that there is a divine-demonic split:

> To come into being means to come to form. To lose form means to lose existence. At the same time, however, there dwells in everything the inner inexhaustibility of being, the will to realize in itself as an individual the active infinity of being, the impulse toward breaking through its own, limited form, the longing to realize the abyss in itself . . . Demonry is the form-destroying eruption of the creative basis of things.[56]

While the divine is characterized by creation, the demonic is characterized by destruction and is most recognizable when creativity exists to some degree.

Tillich identifies capitalism and nationalism as being demonries in this day and age. The demonic element of capitalist society, he says, is recognized by the class formation which has separated human beings from one another before the eternal.[57] Man has become accustomed in this consumer society to want things to the point that his desire for things is insatiable.

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[55] Ibid., pp. 96-7.

[56] Tillich, The Interpretation of History, pp. 84-5.

[57] Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 110.

Tillich sees the present-day economy as ruling man's life: "its consequence is bondage to time and hence also the lack of time for attention to the eternal."[58]

Under capitalism, individuals do not act as individuals, but instead act as other persons do. Conformity has forced persons into a pattern of acting alike, looking alike, thinking alike. Tillich claims that the mechanization of the individual in Europe is reflected in the production process; in America, he says, it is reflected more in the consumption process. He relates the dehumanization to one of the forces which he believes made it necessary: war. Americans have

> . . . not only standardized machines but also standardized human beings, conditioned by radio, movies, newspapers, and educational adjustment for a subpersonal conformity to this immense process. The ease with which, in the dictatorial countries as well as in America, the whole productive machine, including its human tools, has been brought into a unity for one purpose -- the war -- shows its completely impersonal and meaningless character.[59]

The other demonry Tillich sees in our time is that of nationalism. Tillich indicates that nationalism would be acceptable, but for the mixture of the demonic in it which leads nations to view themselves as superior and other nations as inferior. The destruction implicit in demonry also leads to war between nations.[60]

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[58] Ibid., p. 109.

[59] Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 262-63.

[60] Ibid., p. 223.

Tillich believes that part of mankind's hope as mankind lies in the new generations. Persons must be made aware of their inhuman character. If persons can understand that they are not whole human beings, that they lack the depth and creativity which underlie complete human life, then the present-day trend may be reversed. If they ask meaningful questions, hope for the salvation of man as man is present.

Tillich claims for man, too, that churches hold a promise for redemption, in that they have not ceased to resist dehumanization and mechanization.[61]

> They have preserved the message of an ultimate meaning of life which has not yet been exhausted and which, as Christians believe, never can be exhausted. However, this message can become effective for the coming spiritual reconstruction only if it is brought into the center of the present situation as an answer and not as another problem tied up with the general spiritual disintegration.[62]

Tillich's greatest hope lies in man's own possible awareness:

> Men are still able to feel that they have ceased to be men. And this feeling is the presupposition of all spiritual reconstruction during and after the war, for, in this feeling, humanity makes itself heard in its longing for a meaning of life, for community and personality . . . Fortunately, no generation of adults has ever succeeded in imposing its pattern of life completely on the following generation. This is one of the greatest hopes for spiritual reconstruction.[63]

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[61] Ibid., p. 267.

[62] Ibid., p. 267.

[63] Ibid., p. 267 .

Tillich leaves man's final destiny in the hands of God. Beyond doing his best to achieve "I-Thou" relationships, man cannot do anything to effect his own reconciliation with God, or with other men. God must extend grace to man, in order for man to be reunited with the ground of being. Man is left in a state of doubt and perplexity as to whether the reunion will actually occur. Tillich offers no tangible solution, then, to the problem of man's alienation.

CHAPTER IV

FREUD

PSYCHOLOGICAL ALIENATION

For Freud, too, the alienation of man from freedom is one seen both in individual and in somewhat more universal terms. He is most concerned with individual man, but he also gives some emphasis to the repetitive process of life. Not unlike Tillich and Marx, Freud tends to follow a life-to-death pattern in his analysis.

Residing in all individuals, according to Freud, are an ego, an id, a super-ego and libido. All individuals also have both consciousness and the unconscious.

The ego is that which organizes the mental processes; consciousness is attached to the ego. Perceiving the external world, the ego has the characteristics of rationality and reality. The id is characterized by its encompassing of the passions, in contrast to the ego's common sense.[1] The super-ego, or ego ideal, exerts coercion over the ego and thus acts as the master

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[1]Sigmund Freud, "The Ego and the Id," Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, translated by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1961), Vol. XIX, p. 25.

of the ego. The ego strives to please its super-ego, as a child would strive to please a parent. Thus, the super-ego binds man to a condition of unfreedom. The energy of instincts which are classified as love are termed "libido."[2]

Freud discusses the individual's existence in terms of its twofold character: existence for self, which he considers to be principally sexuality; and existence as part of the entire chain of life.[3]

His overriding interests in the individual as individual are the individual's striving to stay alive, and his sexual pattern. These two forces are described as "primal instincts."[4] The goal of instincts is satisfaction, and the vehicle that leads to this satisfaction is an object, which may be part of the subject's own body or something extraneous to it. Sexual instincts are first attached to self-preservative instincts. This would mean, then, in Freud's view, that an infant being nursed is fulfilling the instinct to preserve himself through a sexual attachment to the woman nursing him. Or, in the more far-reaching point-of-view, the sexual instincts of the adult are a necessary part of the overall desire of mankind to perpetuate itself in further

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[2]Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, translated by James Strachey (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1951), p. 37.

[3]Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," CPWSF, Fol. XIV, p. 78.

[4]Sigmund Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," CPWSF, VOl. XIV.

generations.

> Biology . . . shows . . . that two views . . . may be taken of the relation between ego and sexuality. On the one view, the individual is the principal thing, sexuality is one of its activities and sexual satisfaction one of its needs, while on the other view the individual is a temporal and transient appendage to the quasi-immortal germ-plasm, which is entrusted to him by the process of generation.[5]

Looking at the individual first, Freud sees sexual instincts beginning in early childhood, with the male child identifying with the father and regarding the mother as a sexual object to be attained. Hostility to his father manifests itself when the child notices that his father stands in the gap between him and his mother. He wants to replace his father in the relationship to his mother. When the Oedipus complex ends, he may either identify strongly with the mother or the father. The former route will lead to homosexuality, while the latter route is the more masculine and normal path. It is also possible that the father-hostility may be transferred to an animal, with the fear of the animal constituting an animal phobia.

The ego is modified by such identifications and an ego ideal, or super-ego, arises. The super-ego then represses the Oedipus complex.

> The super-ego retains the character of the father, while the more powerful the Oedipus complex was

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[5] Ibid., p. 125.

> and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence of authority, religious teaching, schooling and reading), the stricter will be the domination of the super-ego later on -- in the form of conscience or perhaps of an unconscious sense of guilt.[6]

When the ego-ideal is established, the Oedipus complex is overcome and the ego becomes subject to the id. The super-ego represents the internal world, while the ego represents the external world.

The id, originally, contains all libido. The ego attempts to capture object-libido and to become an object of love for the id, thus leading to narcissism.

Able to act as a censor, the ego represses when it will not acknowledge an instinctual cathexis in the id. Repression is carried on at all times; even though "asleep" at night, the ego works to censor dreams. When remembered, dreams appear to be alien, to be from another world. The content of dreams is manifested in anxiety, but the latent content of dreams is wish-fulfillment. Usually dreams reflect happenings or thoughts of the very day of the dream, and include within them the wishes of the ego. In order for a dream to be produced, a conscious wish must have been reinforced by an unconscious wish. Thus, the dream results from the system of the Unconscious, whose aim is wish-fulfillment.[7]

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[6]Freud, "The Ego and the Id," pp. 34-5.

[7]Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, translated by A. A. Brill (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 422.

The pleasure principle, which dominates much of Freud's discussion of sexual instincts, gives way to and is replaced by the reality principle. This results from the ego's instincts of self-preservation. It is necessary for man to tolerate the unpleasure in life by appealing to the reality principle. From consciousness, man perceives excitations from the outside world and feels both pleasure and unpleasure arising within the mental structure. Necessary in reality's scheme of self-preservation is protection against external threats which lead to potential destruction. Freud points out, however, that the instinct of self-preservation conflicts with the theory that instinctual life leads naturally to death:

> Hence arises the paradoxical situation that the living organism struggles most energetically against events (dangers, in fact) which might help it to attain its life's goal rapidly . . .[8]

The ego instincts lead man rationally to death, while the sexual or libidinal instincts combat this inevitability and strive for longer life or continued life.

There is a natural dichotomy between life and death, and love and hate (or affection and aggression).

> With the hypothesis of narcissistic libido and the extension of the concept of libido to the individual cells, the sexual instinct was transformed for us

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[8]Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, translated by James Strachey, (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1950), p. 51.

> into Eros, which seeks to force together and hold together the portions of living substance. What are commonly called the sexual instincts are looked upon by us as the part of Eros which is directed towards objects . . . A portion of the "ego instincts" is also of a libidinal character and has taken the subject's own ego as its object. These narcissistic self-preservative instincts had thenceforward to be counted among the libidinal sexual instincts. The opposition between the ego instincts and the sexual instincts was transformed into one between the ego instincts and the object instincts, both of a libidinal nature. But in its place a fresh opposition appeared between the libidinal (ego and object) instincts and others, which must be presumed to be present in the ego and which may perhaps actually be observed in the destructive instincts. Our speculations have transformed this opposition into one between the life instincts (Eros) and the death instincts.[9]

Freud views love as having at its core the ideal of sexual love and sexual union. Linked to it, he maintains, are love of oneself, love for relatives, a general friendship and love for all, and devotion.[10] He believes that self-love helps the individual to assert himself. However, with the existence of group relations, people act as though all were alike; they tolerate each other; they feel no aversion toward others. Why? Because a libidinal tie negates narcissism. Thus, self-love can be submerged to love for others and love for objects.

> The ego becomes more and more unassuming and modest, and the object more and more sublime and precious, until at last it gets possession of the entire self-

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[9]Ibid., p. 84.

[10]Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, pp. 37-8.

> love of the ego whose self-sacrifice thus follows as a natural consequence. The object has, so to speak, consumed the ego.[11]

The sexual development of humans is split into two phases, the phase of early childhood and the one of adulthood. The two phases are separated by a latent period during which usually no sexual impulses manifest themselves.

In adult life, when a sexual object is given up, this may be followed by establishing that object within the ego. Because it has relinquished its object-choice, the ego can control the id. It forces itself upon the id as a love-object, thus attempting to compensate to the id for its loss of a sexual object. Object-libido, in other words, changes into narcissistic libido. This process may continue in a cyclical movement. In accomplishing this, the ego works at cross-purposes with the life instincts and actually serves the death instinct.[12] In lower forms of life, the two are actually synonymous:

> The ejection of the sexual substances in the sexual act corresponds in a sense to the separation of soma and germ-plasm. This accounts for the likeness of the condition that follows complete sexual satisfaction to dying, and for the fact that death coincides with the act of copulation in some of the lower animals. These creatures die in the act of reproduction because, after Eros has been eliminated through

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[11] Ibid., pp. 74-5.

[12] Freud, "The Ego and the Id," p. 46.

> the process of satisfaction, the death instinct has a free hand for accomplishing its purposes.[13]

The ego desires to subject the id to itself and attempts to accomplish this goal through the withdrawal of libido from the id, thus forcing the id into dependence upon the ego. Anxiety resides in the ego in its dread of the super-ego which is based on its original fear of castration. Its fear of death, too, stems from its fear of castration. Its wish for love is strong; for the ego, love and life may be one and the same. The id can show neither love nor hate to the ego, for it has no unified will. Struggling within the id for dominance are both Eros and the death instinct.

Bound up in the problem of fear is anxiety, which arises as a normal reaction to a dangerous situation. A child, for instance, feels anxiety when he is away from someone he loves. He feels the "danger" of not being gratified; tension due to economic need exists in the child. The child will be anxious, for instance, about the absence of his mother, because he feels keenly the survival problem. He has learned to associate his mother with milk, which represents survival for him.[14] Objective anxiety deals with known, external dangers, while neurotic

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[13] Ibid., p. 47.

[14] Sigmund Freud, Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, translated by Alix Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1936), pp. 106-8.

anxiety deals with the unknown, or instinctual, dangers.

Symptoms manifest themselves as warning devices against dangers which create anxiety.

> If the ego succeeds in protecting itself from a dangerous instinctual impulse, through, say, the process of repression, it has certainly inhibited and damaged the particular part of the id concerned; but it has at the same time given it a bit of independence and has renounced a bit of its own sovereignty . . . The repressed is now, as it were, outlawed; it is excluded from the great organization of the ego and is only subject to the laws which govern the realm of the unconscious. . . The ego may occasionally manage to break down the barriers of repression which it has itself put up and to recover its influence over the instinctual impulse and direct its course in accordance with the changed danger-situation. But in point of fact the ego very seldom succeeds in doing this: it cannot undo its repressions.[15]

The goal of repression is, obviously, to keep something away from the conscious, to push it continuously into the realm of the unconscious. To succeed, a repression must prevent feelings of unpleasure or anxiety from emerging to the conscious sphere. The conscious is something directly present to the senses and consciousness, something which is perceived. The unconscious is something latent that might re-appear, something in one's memory. The unconscious is the "true vehicle of mental activity."[16] If a latent idea never reaches consciousness, it is because

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[15]Ibid., pp. 136-37.

[16]Sigmund Freud, "Totem and Taboo," CPWSF, translated by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955), Vol. XIII, p. 94.

repression prevents it from doing so. If the unconscious remains unconscious, it becomes known only through dreams and neuroses. The unconscious is divided into two types: the latent ideas which will be able to reach consciousness (the preconscious); and the repressed ideas which cannot ever reach consciousness (the unconscious).

> In psycho-analysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs.[17]

In the individual, as perceived by Freud, then, it seems reasonable to say that there is basic conflict or alienation between the ego and the id; between the conscious and the unconscious; between self-love and love for others; between love and hate; and above all, between life and death. Contradictions are implicit in all of these human splits. If the split between the ego and the id is conquered, it is conquered by means of the ego forcing the id into a position akin to slavery. This lends the character of narcissistic self-love to the individual, for a part of his mental processes (the ego) is saying to another part (the id), "I'm taking away the libido which you have conferred on your sexual object and incorporating it into myself. To get to the sexual object which is now part of your ego, you will have to

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[17]Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," CPWSF, translated by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1957), Vol. XIV, p. 171.

love me." The subjection of the id to the ego, then, can be viewed as the love of one part of a person for another part of his person.

The conscious and the unconscious seem irreparably at odds with each other, since the ego's force of repression keeps some instincts submerged in the unconscious. Thus the conscious and the unconscious have no opportunity to become one. The separation is contained in the existence of man.

Love for others, in Freud's language, seems not to be love for them for themselves but love for them for their ability to satisfy one's own selfish desires, in their ability or potential to give a person the feeling of wholeness as a person. It is principally sexual union that Freud seems concerned with, rather than union in a more pervasive sense of the word. It appears that Freud attaches two meanings to sexual love or sexual union: pleasure, and the propagation of the species.

Before discussing the love-hate and life-death dichotomies, it will be important to delve into Freud's discussion of man in the more general sense.

Freud relates the primitive forces of totem and taboo to the mental processes of man. A taboo is a prohibition which is imposed by some outside force. Unconsciously, human beings wish to go against the taboo.

The taboo, to which magical power is attributed, commands obedience; if the taboo is violated, the violator atones for this by renunciation.

The ceremonial taboo existing against kings carries with it the appearance, in the conscious mind, of a high honor for the kings, but in the unconscious mind, it is actually punishment for the kings, "a revenge taken on them by their subjects."[18]

In the taboo concerning the dead, living persons refuse to recognize any hostile feelings held toward the dead. Rather, the survivor believes that hostility is kept within the soul of the dead. In spite of this defense mechanism to keep back live hostile feelings against dead persons, emotions break forth showing the survivor's remorse.

> The taboo upon the dead arises, like the others, from the contrast between conscious pain and unconscious satisfaction over the death that has occurred.[19]

Unconsciously hostility is projected to the dead, thus making an enemy of the dead.

Freud likens the taboo to conscience by pointing out that the conscience involves the recognition of some particular wish inside us. The taboo built by primitive man is a command from the conscience; if it is violated, a sense of guilt results.[20] Guilt is like anxiety, except

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[18] Freud, "Totem and Taboo," p. 51.

[19] Ibid., p. 61.

[20] Ibid., p. 68.

that anxiety comes from unconscious sources, from repressed wishes. Prohibition found in the form of the taboo means that there must be some underlying desire, for there would be no need to attach a taboo to something for which no one has desire.

Comparing the taboo to neurosis, Freud comments that a person restricted by the taboo prohibition submits because of fear of personal punishment; the person, in psychoanalytic terms, however, who is held by obsessional neurosis, submits because of fear for someone he loves. Freud indicates that this fear on the part of the neurotic results from an earlier wish for the loved person (such as the wish that that person die) which has been repressed and subsequently replaced by the fear.

> The asocial nature of neuroses has its genetic origin in their most fundamental purpose, which is to take flight from an unsatisfying reality into a more pleasurable world of phantasy. The real world, which is avoided in this way by neurotics, is under the sway of human society and of the institutions collectively created by it. To turn away from reality is at the same time to withdraw from the community of man.[21]

Freud draws into his discussion animism, which is the doctrine of souls and involves control over other objects or over the spirits of other objects. Sorcery and magic act as the immediate controls. Magic protects persons from enemies and from dangers, while at the same

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[21] Ibid., p. 74.

time giving a person the power to injure his enemies. Injury may be accomplished through the possession of a part of a person -- his hair, his nails, his clothing, his name. Complete and total injury is accomplished through complete possession of a person; in this instance, through cannibalism. Injury to a person may also be accomplished through making an effigy of him, with injury to the effigy considered tantamount to injury of the individual enemy. Still another type of magic are the rain and fertility rites, accompanied by the fear that incest will cause crop failure and sterile land.[22]

> At the animistic stage men ascribe omnipotence to themselves. At the religious stage they transfer it to the gods but do not seriously abandon it themselves, for they reserve the power of influencing the gods in a variety of ways according to their wishes. The scientific view of the universe no longer affords any room for human omnipotence; men have acknowledged their smallness and submitted resignedly to death and to the other necessities of nature. None the less some of the primitive belief in omnipotence still survives in men's faith in the power of the human mind, which grapples with the laws of reality.[23]

Freud compares this process in all of mankind with the sexual development in individual man. He reminds us that the first manifestations of sex are the auto-erotic ones; that, later, they are directed toward another object; and that, in between, there is a period of narcissism,

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[22] Ibid., p. 80.

[23] Ibid., p. 88.

an intermediate stage in which sexual instincts are directed toward a person's own ego. Freud posits that animism in the whole of mankind is comparable to narcissism; that the phase of religion is like the sexual stage at which the child feels an object-cathexis with his parents; and that the dominance of science in the world corresponds to the stage of maturity in the individual at which he is part of the world of reality and looks to the external world for his sexual object.[24]

In totemism, the taboo prohibitions are: first, not to kill the totem animal which represents the father; and second, not to have sexual relations with a woman of the same totem. The violation of these taboos is reflected in Oedipus, who murdered his father and married his mother. The taboos also correspond to the wishes of young male children who hope to replace their father in their mother's affection.

Kinship in primitives is a bond which allows participation together. "If a man shared a meal with his god he was expressing a conviction that they were of one substance; and he would never share a meal with one whom he regarded as a stranger."[25] Important to the totemic religion are the sacramental killing and the common eating of the totem animal -- a ritual which does not exist except at the time of the sacramental killing.[26] Resulting

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[24] Ibid., p. 90.

[25] Ibid., p. 135.

[26] Ibid., p. 139.

from the killing are both festivity and mourning, an ambivalence which is also noted in man's feelings about the father image. That is, the brothers in a clan kill the father whom they had both hated and admired. This deed is revoked by forbidding anyone to kill the totem, which is set up as a father-substitute. The brothers renounce the advantages of killing their father by giving up their claim to women, who are set free by the second totem dictate. Springing from their sense of guilt, then, in the murder of the father, the brothers establish the two taboos of totemism which correspond to the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex. Harbored in theprohibition against killing the totem animal is a type of reconciliation with their father. Added to this is a prohibition against fratricide, thus forestalling the possibility that their father's fate should befall one of them.

> Totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt to allay that feeling and to appease the father by deferred obedience to him. All later religions are seen to be attempts at solving the same problem.[27]

After a period of totemism, the brothers of the clan eventually elevate their father to a state of godhood. Thus, the father regains his human, as opposed to his animal, shape, and the clan members claim that they are descendants of a god. While the animal-substitute for the father and the related taboos are one means of reunion with the

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[27] Ibid., p. 145.

father, the religious ideal of making the father a god is "a far more serious attempt at atonement."[28]

Later on in time, the killing of the totem animal becomes regarded as a sacrifice to the god.

> We find the myths showing the god killing the animal which is sacred to him and which is in fact himself. Here we have the most extreme denial of the great crime which was the beginning of society and of the sense of guilt. But there is a second meaning to this last picture of sacrifice which is unmistakable. It expresses satisfaction at the earlier father-surrogate having been abandoned in favour of the superior concept of God. At this point the psycho-analytic interpretation of the scene coincides approximately with the allegorical, surface translation of it, which represents the god as overcoming the animal side of its own nature.[29]

Turning from the primitive concept of totemic religion, Freud concentrates briefly on a comparison with Christianity.

> There can be no doubt that in the Christian myth the original sin was one against God the Father. If, however, Christ redeemed mankind from the burden of original sin by the sacrifice of his own life, we are driven to conclude that the sin was a murder. The law of talion, which is so deeply rooted in human feelings, lays it down that a murder can only be expiated by the sacrifice of another life: self-sacrifice points back to blood-guilt. And if this sacrifice of a life brought about atonement of God the Father, the crime to be expiated can only have been the murder of the father.
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> In the Christian doctrine, therefore, men were acknowledging in the most undisguised manner the guilty primeval deed, since they found the fullest atonement for it in the sacrifice of this one son. Atonement with the father was all the more complete since the sacrifice was accompanied by a total renunciation of the women on whose account the rebellion against the father started. But at that

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[28] Ibid., p. 149.

[29] Ibid., p. 150.

> point the inexorable psychological law of ambivalence stepped in. The very deed in which the son offered the greatest possible atonement to the father brought him at the same time to the attainment of the wishes against the father. He himself became God, beside, or more correctly, in place of, the father. A son-religion displaced the father-religion. As a sign of this substitution the ancient totem meal was revived in the form of communion, in which the company of brothers consumed the flesh and blood of the son -- no longer the father -- obtained sanctity thereby and identified themselves with him.[30]

In Freud's eyes, the communion practiced in Christianity is a repetition of the killing of the father, or of the killing of God.

While building up a rationale of religion on the one hand, on the other hand, Freud destroys it in a discussion of illusions. He claims that illusions come from human wishes and that, as such, religion is an illusion.

> Where questions of religion are concerned, people are guilty of every possible sort of dishonesty and intellectual misdemeanour . . . They give the name of "God" to some vague abstraction which they have created for themselves.[31]

Religion, Freud says, has not given happiness to people, nor has it made them satisfied with civilization. He points out that society prohibits murder and kills those who violate the prohibition. The justice and punishment inherent in this scheme is rational. However, he says that the emotions of mankind insist that this prohibition

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[30] Ibid., p. 154.

[31] Sigmund Freud, "The Future of an Illusion," CPWSF, translated by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1961), Vol. XXI, p. 32.

comes from God. Urging that it would be better to credit man with the origin of the regulations of civilization, Freud says that people could then understand that the rules were adopted to serve their own interests. Rather than try to abolish regulations, people might try to improve. This, Freud claims, would help to reconcile individuals with civilization.

Civilization, he argues, depends on work and on the renunciation of instincts. This forces a coercive pattern, for men do not work of their own volition, nor can logical arguments be used to stay men's passions. External coercion may become internal coercion in the form of the super-ego. Those persons in whom this occurs become the vehicles of civilization, rather than the opponents of it.[32] Freud suggests that the purpose of civilization is to protect man from nature.[33]

Because the killing of the primitive father resulted in the regulation against murder, the fallacious link between civilization's rules and "God's commandments" exists. He condemns religion as being "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of children, it arose out of the Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the father."[34]

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[32] Ibid., p. 11.

[33] Ibid., p. 15.

[34] Ibid., p. 43.

In another account of civilization, Freud says that civilization itself can be blamed for some pain. Happiness would be more attainable, he says, in a primitive society. Unhappiness reigns because of several factors: Christianity's victory over paganism; discovery voyages which lead to contact with primitives where happiness seems present; and progress which results in disappointment because there is no more pleasure than existed previously.

Men naturally desire happiness from life, which means that they want pleasures and hope to eliminate pain and discomfort. Pain and suffering may come from one's own body; from the outer world; and from relations with others. One possible safeguard to pain is isolation from others. But seen as a better solution is mingling with the community of humans to attack nature. Through this attack, aided by science, nature may be submerged to humanity for the mutual good.

Wags to avert private pain are categorized by Freud as being: intoxication; creativity, which he acknowledges few persons have; illusions, or a world of fantasy; living in solitude as a hermit; and sexual love. He cautions that there is no certain road to happiness, but at the same time that no person avoids trying to find the road to happiness. It is within the framework of culture that this attempt is made.

> The word "culture" describes the sum of the achievements and institutions which differentiate our lives from those of our animal forebears and serve two purposes, namely, that of protecting humanity against nature and of regulating the relations of human beings among themselves.[35]

Freud defines the common characteristics of humanity as being the necessity to work, and the "power of love."[36] Love forces the male to desire the female to be near him and the female to desire the child, which was once part of her body, near her.[37] Man's work forces him into dependence on other men and tends to alienate him from his duties as husband and father.

Civilization is jeopardized because of men's aggressions toward one another. Work interests are not strong enough to hold them together against instinctual passions. Freud argues that the communist ideal of abolition of private property would not rid man of the aggressive instinct, for that instinct was present in the absence of property.

Love can be a uniting force for men, as long as some men remain as objects for aggression.

Man in the primitive state was more fortunate in a sense than today's man in that he had no restrictions on his instincts. Today's civilized man has traded part of

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[35]Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, translated by Joan Riviere (London: The Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1955), p. 49.

[36]Ibid., p. 68.

[37]Ibid., p. 68.

his opportunity for happiness for some measure of security.[38]

Eros is the binding force bringing together two persons, families, tribes, races, nations. It is a libinal force, for they could not be held in a group by the necessity of work. Aggression, on the other hand, is derived from the death instinct; it is part of man's natural instincts and it works against the common culture.[39] Aggressiveness turns against the ego; the super-ego conquers it and turns it against the ego in the same way that the ego wanted to use it against others. The resultant tension between the ego and the super-ego is called guilt and is seen as the need for punishment.

> Since culture obeys an inner erotic impulse which bids it bind mankind into a closely knit mass, it can achieve this aim only by means of its vigilance in fomenting an ever-increasing sense of guilt . . . If civilization is an inevitable course of development from the group of the family to the group of humanity as a whole, then an intensification of the sense of guilt -- resulting from the innate conflict of ambivalence, from the eternal struggle between the love and death trends -- will be inextricably bound up with it, until perhaps the sense of guilt may swell to a magnitude that individuals can hardly support.[40]

As Freud sees it, then, happiness is submerged to the greater feeling of guilt as the civilization progresses. The sense of guilt may be likened to anxiety in individual

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[38] Ibid., p. 92.

[39] Ibid., p. 105.

[40] Ibid., pp. 121-22.

life -- to the dread of the super-ego.[41] Happiness is made subservient to the more overriding need and/or desire for unity of all mankind in a civilized cultural development.

> It almost seems as if humanity could be most successfully united into one great whole if there were no need to trouble about the happiness of individuals.[42]

The tragedy of civilization, as Freud views it, is that man has been so successful in his victory over nature that he now has the power at his ready disposal to annihilate all mankind. This is the destiny from which there is no turning back. Freud says that mankind knows this and "hence arises a great part of their current unrest, their dejection, their mood of apprehension."[43]

Love vs. hate, or love vs. aggression, is unlikely to be reconciled, if one accepts Freud's thesis that aggressive tendencies and hate are natural instincts. His suggestion that love may be a uniting force for men is not an all-inclusive suggestion, in that he stipulates that there must remain men who can be objects of aggression. As long as aggression and the tendency toward it exist, there can be no successful reconciliation of this split. Freud strongly suggests that man has forfeited

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[41] Ibid., p. 125.

[42] Ibid., p. 135.

[43] Ibid., p. 144.

his chance for happiness by believing that mechanical progress will lead to future happiness.

The life-death dichotomy poses similar difficulties. On the one hand, man wants to live and in living, wants a fulfilled life, while on the other hand, the very fact of man's existence is one step followed by another on the path toward death. Life and death are essentially not in conflict, for they need each other for continuance. Death could not occur without life, nor could the life of mankind be a possibility without the death which logically follows each individual life. Yet, within man, there is conflict. There is the constant will to live which includes libidinal impulses on both a private and a universal plane, clashing with the necessary fact of death, destruction and aggression. This ambivalence is brought out rather clearly in Freud's discussion of totemism, with the taboos which are attached to it. Apparently unavoidable are the instincts which lead to the murder of the tribal father, but just as unavoidable are the instincts which lead to the subsequent replacement of the tribal father with a totem animal. The taboo restrictions place the animal on a pedestal -- a pedestal which the brothers view as holding the symbolic replacement of their father. The later elevation of the father to a place of godhood intensifies the feeling of admiration

or esteem in which the brothers hold the father. Adulation has replaced hatred, but hatred is nonetheless the underlying motive behind according the dead father such a high place within the clan. Paradoxically, because of the fact of the murder, the brothers have succeeded in giving continued life to the father.

Freud cannot let man become totally reconciled within himself or in relation to other human beings, for Freud's system means that the ego and the id must continue to be separate. They have separate functions and they cannot be joined.

For Freud, society and civilization appear to play the same type of role that capitalism does for Tillich. Freud's man is a creature who thinks he has found freedom in civilization, but actually he has only found greater enslavement.

Freud discusses the various dichotomies within man and between men, but he offers little in the way of possibilities for overcoming the estranged character of existence. In fact, for Freud, as for Tillich, it seems that existence must necessarily involve estrangement.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Alienation has been seen in the writings of Marx, Tillich and Freud as the absence of freedom for individuals.

None of these writers has posited a solution which would seem to bring about a "non-alienation." Theoretically, since each of them is concerned about alienation, such a state as "non-alienation" ought to be possible. Practically, however, non-alienation within the frameworks of Marx, Tillich and Freud seems not to be possible.

The reason may lie in the possibility that man actually is not alienated, that the phenomenon which these writers believes exists actually does not. It may be that only those persons who write or speak of alienation are actually empty of freedom. Conversely, those persons who are not aware of alienation may believe that they have human freedom.

There may be degrees of alienation. A person who is separated from that which he has a stake in producing may have "I-Thou" relationships with other persons. Another person may be able to attain reconciliation with God. It seems likely that, even accepting the systems of Marx, Tillich and Freud, many persons might be alienated from freedom in parts of their lives, but at the same time, they might exercise freedom in other parts of their lives.

The term "alienation" is too general a term. If it is to be used, it would seem more sensible to qualify it with an appropriate adjective in each instance. Marx's kind of alienation is not identical with Tillich's kind of alienation, nor Tillich's with Freud's. Even though there are points of similarity, it makes slightly more sense to speak of Marx's as economic alienation, Tillich's as religious alienation, and Freud's as psychological alienation. Ideally, a new vocabulary in the area of alienation would be desirable.

The subject of alienation is one that appears to be subjective to the point that whether man is alienated depends upon which writer's system is being scrutinized and what one's own personal values are.

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