“ :‘ NW“: A m
f:;.'u.LLL[.C.L

k1

FARM ullLIAiJU, 191:."1 "9]. {Ly-1.11 S, iLIDV “-11"
'AB”?(L1rl18 .E'1L 1111 111C311'1”;11;hgiu3 ISL) 1.111%1LIV.3
("I T .1111 IL CO 1-4113 FAACJC: I DI 111$C l1 [10211011 IN

PL AILDS Li QCCHOUIC DISlAQSS

1'.

The role of the rank ani file farmer has all but been
ignored in the popular histories of agricultural discontent.
Lost studies since World War I that concentrate on I-Icixlary-
hagenism, the Grange, the Farm—Labor party, the Farmers' Union
and the American Farm Bureau reveal what the leaders of those
gr oups wanted. Since those leaders frequently were politicians
and professional organizers and wealthy cor”czvative farme;s
at best the‘

y suppressed orass roots sentiment when it interfered

the national orvanization. Thus, this study

with the goals oi q
g: ew OUt of an awareness that the general farmerw1¢anizations
and movements did not always accuratelv reflect grass roots
preferences.

Now the chief desire a“ the farmer is to be paid a price
for his product that covers his cost-of-production. The method
to achieve that goal differed with each national movement. For
example, the Far . ers' Union called for gave'nncnc—established

minimum prices without regard to [roduction. The harm dureau

at the saumrixhne clamored lkn‘lxmrity payments arxilhx;ed controls

- - _.. :1 - o . .‘_,- ,-. -,-L'1 ,.L.ur ’,\ MAL _ r, 4L -.1 J- F, 1,7 .
on production LhUUUuM a voitntai; dontstic allotvnent cy-

D

t

In the period oetween the end of World War I and the crash

0
1'";

1-, ._

1929, farmers di not share the sate prosperity engoged LJ

business and labor.

By 1931, the farmers, who had alread; suffered a decade
of depression, grew tired of promises of assistance that never
seemed to materialize. Consequently grass roots uprisings
among farmers occurred throughout the nation. I have designated
those uprisings whether strihe, spontaneous rebellion, holding
action, or collective bargaining to be examples of direct
action by farmers intent upon improving the prices received ior
their production.

This paper takes each incident and analyzes the causes
of that particular type of direct action, its nature, and its
successes and failures. The incidents studied are: The farm
holiday in the Middle West; the dairv farmer strikes in Wisconsin,

Illinois, and New York; the proration schea and Associated

fir"

mo tions in California; ”he tobacco farmer protests;

F1!
0.)

19.61;“ 0

(7)
\u

n

’0

and the 1962 National Farmer Organization holding action.

This scudv is an attempt to synthesize and interpret the

small body of printed material which concerns twentieth-centurw

a
direct action by farmers. Since very little scholarly work

1 J

has been done on direct action this study rescs primarily on

J ”A

accounts in the popular ress. The dew York Times and such

 

periodicals as the how Republic, Nation, New Outlook, Business

 

. .L, r“ ,7 g
JQILLCI; ri-LILJUL

' - A1r "- ’1 "1. “1" 7'11: . -:W " V. ‘ '1’ -..». " 'r'. '. "‘ w .v ~r-.-~ >3
fleei, and Literal, Di.est weie LLQLLidilQ useful.

4'."

r"! .\ -. - -. . fl -. ‘ «. r. A "<1- ,' f‘ I A'. ‘~~ -' f“! A‘—..'——_r\ -'- L‘l" 1. -\ .. ‘ -.\ .3 .11- ..
i‘ne InaJOi‘ ilnCin-Q o‘i bill»; stud, -s that iaiulel‘s 11L)i)111dlld‘

J

1, - ., ~ _. . - -1. - . 1-1-4 ., ..».. ”-1 - .l. ,_.._. _ ,1, «CI - , N .' . n1...
seen to acnieVe their goals within one iiane ooih oi oioinaiy

~ 1

legislative and JUGiCifil proceedings. There have been times,

however, when economic distress in combination with slowness

‘L- .1" :- -,- J- rs‘ f') - ‘ -' , IrV I? 1 - 'l— "'i f; ‘. 1 I - \ r“ ‘. "1' ‘ x" '1“ 1' J‘ 1“ -‘ ,' ‘3’ . r‘
on the part oi business, loul, and government to lECOUHIéC

(

‘7“ \ " '. ‘1’5"' 1‘1" ' -«‘r‘\ ‘0‘” ‘.'.l’.‘ " 1‘ ' ‘ 1‘ .1 " -’ l J ‘1 J. ’1 .' '. "c ‘ "I "- "1 T ’9 I '. '. " "I ‘I‘

1.116-]? pligilb LilaL iczimeio L'Ci'e LL-i“1.CLt LL) LIIELL uCLiOxl ill log
I‘ ‘1". a 0 ~ 1-”, CW 4— " r" ‘7 J '—-1’—.‘ Irx‘:'\ (:1 ml ‘ I') (‘I i: ‘~, "5 ’.'\ ‘. 3'.‘ 2' ‘1‘» 1‘ . '\ . w 1. 1:, -. 17113.: - Jr— b ~-

VCIJ. .LOUL: J. Oi 111..) LO .8 v C L .LLILL VLL‘ - .L Lxld iLLLLJLilLJ .11?) ‘JUAlLLJ. dpoCJ .

Another finding was that direct action won several battles

J. _'_ , _, 1_ 1-1- _ ., - -. L,“ ”L, W! n ,. n, M.— _, ‘
in L110 V481” to rep one '90 Oi‘mloilt to LCCUQLLLLIG Lllt,’ iarmers

k4

plight. They include_ AAA for the nation's agriculture,

J-

(1')

. J a.‘ 1-1. — fl .. 3 _,- H ‘n i ,q --. .A‘ -. n. ' . -. r‘ "~.\,-" ,‘ 4:7 ' ‘ ,’_‘I,_ 1‘1"”"5’1'V’ -) ,- ...‘ _
licensiin,an;1uilk ocaltnm;_h1 CniCaLiu gfiiolgidCtAMwy contrac

for New Yorx dairy farmers, a proration scthe in California,

J

and a code for tobacco. Nevertheless, viccory, in the form

{1

-production,was denied the iarmer and thus proved

I

I

of cost-oi
that direct action, as such, without aqequate production

controls is bound to be an exercise in futility.

FARM SERIKJS, 133l-19o4: A SIUDY OF
EFFORTS BY AI‘IERICAN FARILEILS TC- II‘JPI-LOVE
THEIR IIICOILJS T IIIOUGI-I DIILIJ 'z.C'l IOIJ IN

PERIODS CF LCOHOIIIC DI TRESS

Submitted to
Michiga:1 State Universitv
in partial fulfillment of tie iequi.enentc
for tne ce~en of

MASTER OF ARTS

Mi/E’V‘:
Depa I’LLJCI’IC of -

1964

Acknowledgement

The author is indebted to Professor
Madison Kuhn for his helpful advice
and enlightening suggestions.

rant r 0 nv-J 'm“ A
lei/.10 UL Cunt/Cuts

Chapter
Introduction
I The Middle West Farmers Take a ”Holiday"...

The Cedar County Cow War..............
The Farm Stril:e.......................
The Origin of Direct Action...........
The Pern‘ly Sa‘es.......................

(III'Ie SGCOIICI I38 I’III StI‘iKC o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
- ~ —,.v I ,L ¢ “I
II The D811”) i‘1alqi.ICI’S {I‘d I‘Ce 'I'IC ulOII ’0 o o o o o o o o o o o

The Wisconsin Coope‘ative Milk Pool
Strike..............................

The Pure Milk Association Strike
(Chicago)...........................

The Western New York Milk Producers
Association Strike..................

III The California Faumers "Associate” for

ACtiOI—IOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO

The Revival of a Proratlon Scher.1e.....
The Suppression of Labor by the
ASSOCiaLed IraIII’IIeI-IS o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0

IV The Tobacco Farmers Declare Their "Holidav"
J

V "Minute Men" in the Middle West--l964......
Why Discontent in the Middle West?....
The September 19o2 Holding Action.....
A Second Prairie Fire of Protest?.....
Conclusion

Bibliooraphy

iii

1;
19
1a

{- In
d/«t

.I‘.‘
U)

[D

o\ \r
o\

108

109
113
126

Table
I

II

III

IV
V

VI

VII N

VIII

IX

ist of Tables

Parity of Farm Prices 1920—1932
Average Commodity Prices at Chicago 1923—1932

Index of Prices Paid to Prices Received
1910-1939

Pre-Strike Prices Co pared to Holiday Demand
Average Prices Received by Earmers 1949-1955
Purchasing Power of Factory Workers l932-l952
ational Farmer Organization Price Goals 1962
Cattle Receipts at the Twelve Major Terminal
Markets and Average Prices of Choice
Slaughtered Steers at Chicago

Price Conparison Before and After 1962 Strike

iv

Page

110
110

113

Introduction
Traditionally the need for business regulation, cheap
currency, and tax relief has been viewed as the chief motiva—
tion for agrarian protest which generally took the form of

of wide interest in

(D

farmer participation in politics. Becaus
agrarian protests there is a large body of literature that is
concerned with the social, political, and economic forces that
placed the farmer in an untenable economic relationship witi

his urban cousin in the post World War I period and then again
in the depression era. Little can be added to the work of Solon
J. Buck, John D. hicks, Orville M. Kile, Wesley McCune or

Edward Wiest on general a rarian protests and SpeCific farmer

organizations.

The purpose of this study is to fill in a major gap in
the literature of agricultural discontent. That gap exists
because in most studies the farmers' overt actions have been mere
footnotes in the broader study of agricultural organizations,
economic distress, and political protests. Thus this study
differs from previous studies of agrarian protest in that it
focuses attention on direct action by farmers to achieve costs
of production plus a profit. By direct action I mean farm strike,
holding action, or collective bargaining. In other words,
rank and file rebellion against normal marketing circumstances
where a farmer takes his produce to market and accepts

whatever price the processor is willing to pay. There

I'D

are numerous examples of efforts by farmers to set prices
on their own products but since those efforts were short-
lived and left no enduring results most writers have chosen
to ignore them.

Excellent examples of direct action to improve farm
income occurred during the depression and New Deal years.
Despite the short period of time, there is an adequate sample
for study because of the breadth of the occurrences. This
paper will reveal the attitudes, demands, and actions of
farmers as they spontaneously conducted the Farm Strike in
Iowa and dairy strikes in New York, Chicago, and Wisconsin.
The operations of the Associated Farmers of California and the
Burley tobacco growers will also be reviewed. A final
chapter will allow the author to review the brief history
of the more recent National Farmers Organization in the

light of the earlier ”actions"

as it seeks the goal of a
more equitable share of the consumers dollar for the farmer.
Assuredly, all farmer organizations from the Grange to
the American Farm Bureau have sought to increase the farmer's
income through favorable legislation by state and national
governments. Nevertheless, the thesis of this paper is that,
while political protest was the tool of the leaders of the
major agricultural organizations, the rank and file farmers
preferred direct economic action in the market place to force
prices to advance. Thus, direct action had its basis in rank
and file farmer demands for relief from maladjustments in

the economy. Normally direct action is uncongenial to farmers

it. (I‘ll! llll‘Il‘ll‘l’I'll‘ll‘ |' I‘ 'I III“: I III» III.

and incidents of it have not always been marKed by violence.
More often they have been marked by demands for state and
federal legislative action; attempts at cooperative buying
and selling; and on occasion direct political action. Only
when those efforts have failed will the farmers take up
direct action in substantial numbers for short periods of
time. Further, only the high tides in farmer discontent have
been marked by revolts and rebellion, and direct action
groups have constituted only the left wing of a more stable
and consistent farmer's movement which over the years has

tried to adjust to a changing price and market economy.

Cha pt er I

The Middle West Farmers Take a "Holi ”

Q;
Q)
Cd

The Cedar County Cow War

By the fall of 1(31 farmers throughout the nation wer
restive. The nationwide depression had caused farm prices
to fall below the level of the entire previous decade.
Significantly, in the twenties, those prices had been much
lower in relation to the prices of commodities purchased by
farmers than had been the case prior to World War I. The
relationship of prices received by farmers to the prices of
commodities purchased by farmers is expressed in terms of
parity. The index number of 100 is assigned to the period
August 1909-July 1914 because of the relative equality of
purchasing power of farmer and urban dweller. In 1920
parity stood at 205; in 1925 it dropped to 147; by 1930
it stood at 117. In 1931 parity plummeted to 57 (See Table
I).

Actual prices received by farmers reveal how incomes
had declined without considering short crops because of
drought. Corn that brought $.97 per bushel in 1928 brought
only $.53 in 1931. During the same period the price of wheat
per bushel had fallen from $1.54 to $.66. Choice steers had
fallen from.$1#.48 per hundred to $8.75. Hogs dropped from

$9.86 per hundred to $6.64 (See Table II). To put it another

4

5

way, in terms of prices received compared to prices paid the
armers, by 1951, were receiving only 88 per cent of their 1910—
1914 prices but yet were paying 132 per cent of the 1910-

1914 prices for commodities they needed (See Table III).

The farm depression thus was in its thirteenth year
whereas the industrial depression was only three years old.
Restiveness, due to the ills besetting agriculture, gave
rise to direct action in the form of farm strikes.

The Iowa farmers were the first to strike and the so—
called Cedar County Cow War was the first stage. It grew out
of farmer reaction to a compulsory testing program for tuber-
culosis in cows and reached its climax in September of 1931.
The program had been in Operation on a voluntary basis since
1926 but was made compulsory in 1929. By the spring of 1931
the farmers had begun to question the validity of the tests
as well as the integrity of those who administered them.

The farmers generally believed that they were not
adequately compensated for the condemned animals. They also
failed to understand that carcasses could be good for canned
beef but not for milk. Thus they suffered a loss on a capital

investment as well as a los of future income based on milk

6’)

production. There were other reasons for their objections.
They disliked having infected animals randed with T.D.
markings and the entire farm quarantined. Their loudest
argument was that the injection system of testing failed to

identify the worst infected and branded healthy cattlel as

1New York Times, April 19, September 23: 1931-

 

Average Farm Prices Aug wu t 1909- July 1914 = 100

(Year) (Parity) (Tear) (Parity)

1920 203 1927 131
1921 116 1926 139
1922 124 1929 136
1923 135 1930 117
1924 139 1931 60
‘1925 117 1932 57
1926 136

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States

79 1 LV 19331
p. 2".

 

 

 

Table II Avexa U8 COV100161 Prices at Chicago 1923_1932

1923- -1925 19271923 1929 19: O 1931 1932

Corn (1011.).91l .66 .97 .94 .62 .53 .31
w1eat (bu.) 1.90 1.37 1.54 1.30 .96 .66 .53
Steeis (cwt.) 10.09 12.66 14.96 13.49 11.02 6.75 7. 79
dogs Ecwt.g 9.53 10.00 9.86 10.66 9.93 6. 04 4.11
Milk cwt. 3.00 2.97 2.73 2.95 2.92 2. 77 2.18

Source: Statistical Aostract of the United States, LV, 1933,

 

 

p. 202.
Table III Index of Prices Paid to Prices Received
1910-1939
Period Prices Received Prices Paid
1910—1914 100 100
1915—1919 161 151
1920-1924 151 172
1925—1929 > 147 168
1930-1934 ' 88 132
1935-1939 106 129

Source: Year Book gf_Agricultural, 1940, p. 387.

 

 

1

VI
. A

J ..:
LL .L-

is

counties Landed

1. 2...?
17 L. ’16}

puqugse

11,." 1.”, .31-. t
VCDL'il11dlliaLiL; 2,

~- A A. 1 1 2.:
Wcfiu LlULsLu pi

19:1,

April 12,

Du; 11 111/.

“ ".‘Trr'u‘r‘ in"?
C)" V pl. LJVL

tuberculosis to
9

Mitchell fern.

“ . " - ._ Jr ‘1
(Li ozqioe as

officials

~"n4-~
bpdbc

1..

6118 t

conduct

1. QIHCS QI’QVG LLLC‘

arrived the ncx
County inr G c
mobilized. All
Large delegatio

7/.r‘ 1:- 1 rx '- ‘ ~~. '\ (w
“abut/11‘. Cvumtit a

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L’;

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3111‘," (,4 (in; p p. 1 t. S_LA_L_L_U, Lari/4.9%.. -L \4 K, ._L 1 LO p L ._.’1 H ,1 »_. {Q

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QL: bu .L align; LIILLL/ ‘JLLV'L JJ. ‘vli‘x.’ J. 'u} 4.11 (ALA L_LL1—

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.LL'JL'R‘LLL k, v.1. (4‘2,va , Uv‘g; 11V.L1;C14’ lkLVALL/tu. Quilt JJK,k,
pqgvonkvi‘. 111 011p 31.1311; -vvvvci\€, kayak/16.01.91.
.' 1, metfw +3“ *161r 7 7a’mqm. 4 ¢>~
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Q11C1_Li_l 13:44.; Junk .‘1L44wvd11 ig'xikszprU 11o lVNd

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but; 1.1K, beL1<aL1pru CAL/LU_CA_L1.Q bx) Ur. p11 Lily. 1.1. .

111'
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{1.1.1. ”o ".1. .1. \/‘\.J {‘5’}. .LLII; JUL b :3 K1110 UK) ULC|J4~1U

17,,
law

\ c— ’\

3' 1.. ‘_ '.T ' ,, . .. ., .'-,-_ ~. . .\ 1.. {f' ._11,
qu.) ULIU J..’J . LLL1-'Lt'-[l .LC-ILALA 11 UL. LLLJUULI

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. 1.4L) L1Lu1C11k-L. 11J11.M;1 *

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o1..1L,u :11 L11 ;)_LUC,11

1' \- - . r- ;V f I. u’\ . - r 1,. ,‘ . , 2 . _,——. ;'| I .1 -' . f: ', _.
unpuciea 1mae eyeming one nuuutaht

of the Governor mohilised 2,000

‘——_‘.‘

‘— ~ 7 ,~', (N — 1~ 4. w. ’6 f'-'1-——'|~ w. J.- 1.. — _‘
ep‘b‘Lloi bidim 0U lipovm. 61 Dupe

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6 Cult“) 61L. LOU dilu LLV’KJUCE '-1.L3'Ll 911 1C: (JL‘LSI'

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..
d

31‘ r 1

oi 11+un Lee, -6A;l£ incs, arm}

he

re. 1‘:- “j 1 ‘ ‘
A k; L; ‘1 ;
U

rrived Cedar County Farmers

April 19, 1931.

 

April 13,

1931.

 

should they decide to battle the troops.ir

Open rebellion occurred on October 12, near new London,
Iowa as Iowa National GJardsmen arrived to disperse 150
farmers who had gathered at the C. L. Mel-{innon farm to protest
the tests. Brig o‘ier General Park A. Findley ordered a detail
01 20 men to advance on the protesters with bayonets drawn.
They were backed by a machine gun squad who in turn were

.‘

supported by 250 more solders. As the Guardsmen advanced,

3

Ronald Hart, age 20, scoffed at them and was arrested. With
the arrest of Mike Ek enne ssey and Henry Connor, the ring-
leaders, the rebellion appeared to be crushed. Hart, however,
had been placed in the New London jail. Five hundred men
assembled and shortly marched on the jail, broke the jail
lock and cell bars, and freed Hart. Soldiers arrived to
disperse the farmers and onlookers but no attempt was made

to recover Hart. Meanwhile, at Tipton, where Connor and
Hennessey had been taken a mob converged on the jail and
compelled their release.-

A showdown was imminent at Burlington in Des Moines
County by the evening of October 22. Tweity-five hundred men,
women, and children had gathered at the farm of Jacob Everman
to resist the tests. Mysteriously the crowd began to disperse.

That resistance there would involve other than open rebellion

)J_ .. I ~. A ’r
rNew York TimeS, SGPQGHDGP 22: 23: 1931-

 

5New York Times, October 13, 1931.

 

of

U)

was probable because the arwival of twenty companie
Guardsmen had had a quieting effect on the townspeople and

6
farmers throughout the county. The next action took place
at the Frank Boeding farm near West Point on November 3, Two
sheriffs and three veterinarians were driven off by a mob
of 200 protesting farmers hurling clods and other misQles.

A‘ 7

Sheriff Moss thereupon said that he would ask Governor Turner

to transfer National Guardsmen into Lee Coun‘y from Des Hoines
County.7 The center of disturbance, interestingly enough,

was only 15 miles from West Branch, the birth place of

President Hoover who had once said that the good citizen had

no choice as to what law he shall obey and what he shall not.6
The rebelling farmers were not typical of the vast majority

of farmers. The Cedar County farmers viewed themselves as

fighting arbitrary confiscation of their property at a time

when the majority of the farmers in the Middle West and even

two thirds of the farmers in Cedar County for that matter

were convinced that the tests were reliable, that bovine

tuberculosis could be transmitted to humans andfinally that

the tests were in the interests of the farmer. The tests

were in the interest of the farmer because the packers preferred

to buy from inspected and accredited areas and those areas

already accredited enjoyed a premium price.

Protests against the tests occurred in other states as well.

New York Times, October 23, 1931.

 

 

7I'uew Yorx Times, November A, 1931.
8

New Yorm Times, April 19,1931.

 

Nebraska and Colorado were among them. Here however, the
chief a*gument was over how much the farmers should receive
in compensation from the state. In those states the legis-
latures still had not acted but it was expected that reim—
bursement would not exceed $50 for a registered animal and
$25 for a grade animal.9 The results of the Cow War were
not unlike what could be expected. The law enforcement
agencies won because of superior forces but the Farmers'
Protective Association was not completely through. C.L.
McKinnon, Vice President, and J.W. Lenken, President, of
the association, on whose farms most of the violence took
place, announced that their organization would demand the
impeachment of Governor Dan Turner should he continue to
ignore petitions for the repeal of the testing law. Even-
tually held constitutional by the Iowa Supreme Counrt, the
United States Supreme Court declined to review the law.
Most of the objectors to the testing program by late November
passively submitted and the war was over.

The outbreak was s'gnificant because it indicated the
temper of certain areas floundering in a depression with no
sign of relief. The tuberculin tests were not the main issue.
The agitation over them simply set off resentments that had
accumulated in thirteen years of farm depression. The outbreak

proved hostility of some farmers to encroaching governments,

9New York Times, August 23, 1931.

loNew York TifilCS, November 22, 193

 

 

colleges, and othe r LCMC7611460 a encies at a time of falling

prices. More 11 Lpomant, the Cedar County Cow War had served

0)

s a provin< ground for dire t action. It gave the Iowa
farmers hope that they could do for themselves what the
gover ment would not Co. All that remained was for some one
to seize upon this resentment, formulate a program, and win
for the farmer his costs of production.

The Farm Strike

The ”farmers hohoay” was the second stage of direct
action in the Middle West. Milo Reno was the leader; farm
strike, holding action, or ”holiday" in marketing was the
program; costs of production plus a profit for the farmer
was the goal.

The Farm Holiday Association was born on May 3, 1932
when three thousand farmers ass eatle d at the Iowa State Fair
Grounds to determine a name for the movement and elect a
p esident. Milo Reno, who had been president of the Iowa
Farmers' Union since 1‘20, was elected. It was fitting that
the office should go to colorful dynamic Reno. Reno had
been a farmer himself and now was a politician who understood
the farmer and was qualified to speak for him. In his youth

he had a I‘epUt tation for being a fiddler, dancer, drinker, and
11

,‘ .

wooer of ladies. He could be expected to bring the forcefulness

of his personality and fervency of his spirit to bear on the

problems of the farmers. he owned his own farm but also had

llFred Albert Shannon, American Farmers' Movements
(Princeton, 1957), p.60.

 

11

made a career of representing the farmer.

With labor on strike, businesses holding gotds from
markets to increase prices, and banks calling for a holiday
in the face of a run, Reno sought to win satisfaction for
the farmer by applying the tactics of big business, labor,
and banks to farm problems. The Farm Holiday Association
proposed,in Reno's words to, "fix a fair valuation on farm
products, based on production costs, "nd to refuse to leliver
1’)
until those prices were conceded.” L

The origin of the holiday concept is interesting because
it accounts in part for the attitude of the farmers. The
Farmers' Holiday area corresponded roughly to the area of
bank holidays. This included the areas surrounding Omaha,
Sioux City, and Des Moines. Bank failures were severe and
moratoria on bank deposits and withdrawals were an aggravating
factor since many of the farmers had heavy mortgaees and
were delinquent in taxes.13

Banks had adopted the holiday device to protect them—
selves from frightened depositors. The mayors in each town
were persuaded to close all business houses for a week or

1

ten day period. This extra-legal dev ce permitted bankers
to get depositors to promise to leave their deposits in for
a period of some months and to withbeiaw'only specified small

amounts. The Farm Holiday people urged farmers to join for

12fl§££9§,_CXXXV (September 7, 1932), 208,

’3

15Business Week, September 7, 1932, o.

12

his reason and even conservative farmers liked the prospect
'1 r, .0 - n \ 121: ’W - a . J - v
of the bankers squirming :or a CHBHQG. Significantly, the
National holiday Association represente‘ the tenant and
heavily indebted farmer as against the land owning farmer who
_ 1 v -. 1‘ ._ J__"i,.‘ _ x- '- - . . , A r. -113 V 15
had small debts that did not cause any particular worry.
The Farm holiday Association was the product of a dissident
group in the Farmers' union. While most of the local units
of the Association were organized under the militant Farmers'
Union, the two proups did not merge because of diveigent needs.
The Farmers' Union wss tied to producers' and consumers'
cooperatives. The Farm holiday Association was not in business
and owned no property. Its ourpose for existence was to stop

L

evictions and foreclosures and stage strikes. As late as 1924
4' -~._ ‘- w " t s’ w 19'“ - 1 Q t 1 l "”‘ ’lCZ' t“ (:15 ”J 1’
the parent oibanization came c ose o dep 0111.O he s lite
n * r” f": -.‘.. 1 O 1: v: A I 4‘ 11 :1... 1 Q C“ f’l‘, 1‘ 1' V)
as a weapon. 1he laimexs weie not dumb peons. idej weie

m‘

businessmen who had joined cooperatives to make money. rney
saw little reason to allow the cooperatives to come under
criticism by connecting them with the protest movement. The
farmers were capitalists__oppressed and dispossessed capitalists
at best-who were still dominated by the individualist business-

. 16
man’s psychology.

At the same time the members of the
Association apparently saw no inconsistency in combining for
purposes of striking and enforcing an embargo or in adopting

the tactics of militant labor unions. Indeed, the names of the

1“New Republic, LXXII (AUGUSt 31: 1932)’ 67-68'

 

15New York Times, March 19, 1933.

16

 

Nation, CXL (January 3, 1935), 105-106.

.1!

lijcal Uiliot; )IJl.i_LC.l .1.._1C.LLU.AL,U belt/111L311»: -.J.L JLI’UILML, LLLU LU-: dl

Car: 637’: n-F‘ P" 1’.') “mat: "3‘. - 31", 1 fwd/aw]: O ."IV'Q-lji“‘.-‘_'T"' "'" "‘-‘r‘C. 1'12: "‘1le.
1. bit... UL «LCLLCK/t’l. L») 91.0 LLLC 11.x: 1b.). 1 CL; AAUU A.)...L4\C.,J. n: $1MJ. J

f- r\ )‘7” ’ - -'. ’1 V n ,"\'V'" . ‘~~ (1 e 1‘ r J. . .1\ ‘L

ildve bile i'illL. U4. CUIILUI'VQ C.L...Hl. 7

The representatives to the fa~mers'

convention at the
91‘7"" ""’ G 1'" ‘ ‘ "w: r ’ «.2. 3 - ‘- ‘ Tram L 9,. r- r I l’ 3' -. “"1" '7 '1 ’3 "3 t' 5w".
.aii rounds voted on may 1 lo. a ho lead supp ”inc the c1 its
‘ 1 r‘ 'I— '\ ‘ "' “'. .- “ /‘ F‘ r‘ ‘-J' ‘\“' 7 ‘ } I "‘ ‘~ "\ ‘" I" -' " '\ I
and called foI the action to stait on July w-. neno, noweVeI

r)

preierred to wait for Congress to 801. fit appar»ntly
recognized that the farm strike was a hopeless economic devise.
There is no evidence that Reno (unlike Oren Lee S‘aley

of the 350 Quays V) Lelieved that the Holiday

fl]

Association could force a pC‘“auelt price increase. The
market was too favorable to buyers for a seller's strike to
Reno envisioned QQVCIRIUUL enio'cto minimum prices
regardless of production. Since collective bargaining to

establish minimum prices did not occur to him, the strike

ti"

ecame a device to get minimum prices whether agreed to by
packer and p1 ocessor or established by the federal govermient.
fhe leadership this encouraged the threat of its use in
order to get the farmer on the front page and make Washington
conscious of the gravity of the farmers' problems. To the

disappointment of the leadership, arguments failed, and congress

adjourned withvout acting. The strike thereupon, was set for

17 , ,-
Nation, cxxxv: (Aaron o, 1953 , 2st.

(
ldBasil hauch, The Historu of the How Deal, 1933-193 0,
(New York, 1949), p. 70.

 

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tailill,ggt eight (knits. Jo Lni3ust ll, 1Ln_1e1s, Linusmi picLete,
"'o ‘g ' ‘V‘ 1)" ‘. "J‘ r‘ ‘I 1:" " F" n ‘ 1r ‘ . ‘ ‘ "1.’ :r1‘ .".! " '
we-e pullinv up 1ail1oao LLUU and c11331nw plain uth spines
r‘ 'x .— «1“. fl , 1 1.— f‘\ " “" A u - <. ~. 'fi r.‘ l- J' . — 7'.". .v r\ 1“”
dc: LJSig roads LLJJ1 rakes 1“; step t1etu1; -nu 11M1is. LnJJL Ccuc
~~ '. "" ”.2 'I v ' - 1' .1: "1- iv- -‘ ~ ,r TI , ‘,’\ I »‘\< . (V H r11 " x ‘ -u ‘1.- 1‘
we1%2saithe1*111lutecxwhion -fiflJJUCHS 1h? else 11 pee 11m“. the
1.- _. .v H - v-- 1 ‘.. . 11‘ 1 .- r. v." u...“ .- :1 H ,- 1. f , -1- ... it .~ 1, n
eltcnes. with the halting o1 c1ains and 11ucic LUU 1low o1
. (‘1 - ' n 3‘ '.~~1 I ,V' . "1 ._ n“ (fl '. .‘\ "r‘ -. ‘v f‘ \ " «w "\ _. -. ~ I ‘1 ~ ('1 1 --.—. ‘-r
livestoctzchmi;uilm iJhAJLJiUUn Cit,’,m1 stopaed. _nn3 sciihe
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., -. ._ 1 ,. ,.,. 4- .- ‘ 1 ,1 4”,-.. , 1°.-;-‘ q ‘1 1. r1- -_
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‘1 \ . a r q - 1. . -‘ -. i» -7 'r _ ~ ' ,1. -, ’31,“ ‘O'N - < .- 1' ‘r‘ (H A l 1:}
‘MOWCO a severe eecline. hi i which “L11cll, has t1ucucu 11to
the eitv -o alrlost st: ;‘>ed arr1v1ng. LlVLStO'K 1eceiots,
1m. ~ . a a .HF ’n h i~ ~ ~ 1. -w .0 ‘1: Ti:
however, we1e aldos LUC. 1o 1.'wal Lecause ia1wae1 snipped
20
1 --~ I - L- - 1.“v "f‘ . r" ' (u;‘ '3. r - ‘fl 1' '37, .l\ -, VIC'
flOm and cattle L‘ 1ail. 1ne st11he 1ac.uall so1eae. pai x1-
IJ x.) A.
. ”t (,1 .u \ .1,‘ 4-... y w,” .- ., 1. ,. 1 ~ _ 4— .~ 4— fl J..- .1. -. , ,1. ' :
oi Daneta Count, addUIACdg on Luau: 19 that the, would Join

the striKe and p1ev nt

1

l ’ ‘.
g < , ‘1". .lr- ,r r‘ r
J. Con .

Sioux City eL1aLn

farmuz's tho

intention to

one hunired deputies co

farmers went to the

to Omaha.

 

 

a J— V :1- , 1 .r. ,.
qH1G ;;uTlJ.€ 14€Ccnic
lgTr‘ 4- ‘ ,7“, xrxrwrvv

.‘JC’J blel , CluuxVI
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HaVemLer Ly, lj33, LE1.
...\y/_\ ‘ " .."‘ r’». 1:: >’ ()2: I.
(UUStOLl, l\"J._,), 1. (._KJ“*'.
flew Yorn Times,
(“I
cl~- . a-.~ 11’. .
LBW YUB'LC .L.L1.1CU ,

 

{1 [- r\

produce and livestock fron entering

’f ‘ .T '. ‘ 1‘ ‘. 1’\ .I .: /‘ - I." ’\ '. ' '. .’ ' _ ‘ r' 1"
a. .x1tev 11s11n11h3, to Liilo 1mnio CLXxin,
1 ,1. . . :1.-. . p1,,i'.” ,1 -. " 4‘- '.,
11e(ei, outniq DdiAJLU zrhiou1mnee t1x31r

'_ Tr , ‘1‘- .- _ 311. - - 3.". r 1
”hile the woocturU Count, oneri1f and
- - L . ~nr 9: -, n'» v ’Lm
Uld 110-. OLJ‘CH Jtiall__C LO 1.)_LU .1. C.LLU, IUHE.
A 5'... ‘ /‘. .flr r-F )y-y r \~'\ 1 1 (N L
U1. LJTU‘l l ’ U1’1c311 1011.1Ci 0110 LlalLCCI 3111p Chop-

 

more violent when on August 23, the
33, 17, 1933), 544. how Republic, CKXVII,
Gilcert V. Saldes, l.c lears or the Lr'uC

 

 

- _ ’1 ,—.
August lo, 19;“.
AuguL 19, 932.

T)". :‘(V‘.":; 4. fr, ~-‘ ,.1 1 ‘V w --. ’Q‘ v, n‘ r ~ — ‘ ' .- . . ' . '1 .
L'JLUQHUAUUUULLU (1.11411L.d Q1191. .1..1.J_ Jilin .L_L.LLU‘ UNU'LJULJL'U‘L; LLuC, UJ Kat/(.11.)

”"117“ "1"". ‘ '-‘ ‘_ :1" :T- ‘1‘ ‘ -'.‘ ‘. j V1r1 ‘ 7 . ‘/‘" -' -. ' I“ »‘ A ' 1'" MW.- 17 1_
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e£l1€C 1i-o'ueib LJUi‘C, 00.1-..LCU. A 111UL U1 ;.,JUU id eU1‘ .111 11111“; 5411;213-
\ .~~ raw J“ r‘ r‘w "- . '\ 1 ‘V ,. 1~r - a ~~1~ *."\ 4—17., ’.'~ 7. — '1' 14' ' .1 - . , - - ' . —
11.1-41: 1,111 so 116.1th to 1::<..1U1'1 c111 L111? Use-1.1.. 11:4 L'JU.J_.LU" “wit: LJl'iSUiltl‘S

were :sleased on Lail. in: action had lc1t the 1icter dead
and fourteen wounded. Cutsunis also occuriee in the $18116?
centers of Cde‘once and Cashing.

Unhappy with the disolay of violen'e, Leno called a truce
on the eveninQ of AuQust g1, and officially called the ety'<c
to an end the next day Lefore the action had Larel3 gotten
into its fourth wees. Milo Leno, a 31o1c”s;dnal 01 aniz er of
Earn movements had started the sttixe with the e\ pectation
o1 enlistinQ the Qreat Loe3 cf aQricultui al inte1ccts in a
peaceiul Lo3c c'ct of its narxcts. Nith the turn to violence,
over which he had no control, fiend had no choice Lut to

I

declare a suspens1on. It was Just as well. The puLli

O
S
C)
(“1

losin"

Q s3npath3 with a non-violent peaceful st1'iie that
included L'rricaded hiwhna s destruction of ‘1o-e1t intim-
\J J J I. J)

,.

da tion or siane drivers L3 crowds of 25 to 200 men, and the

}—-0

[\D
R)

dumping of milx, 011ean, and eQQs' lo the credit of the
a1mers it must Le said that no one in the cities faced starvation.
Hospitals and 16 mili‘S with LaLies had Lcen assured an uninter-
rupted flow of milh.
Other factors iiQu1e d in Reno's decision. The strontl3
organized Des noines Cooperative HEE”LLiD” AtS“Ci&tiun refused

4" f‘ ‘1 ' '1“r\ 1"“ ‘ W: l’ 1 '~ ."‘ " ’ -1‘-‘ “ ’— 1;" f '1" “'1 v“. (w " "I‘ ' “~‘fi ’. "‘ ‘
to suptort che mil“ Llociaee. inch also tne1e Mac t1e coninQ

.‘ ‘ .‘ ri‘,‘ -,~ u -. «J, 1' ,‘ ~~ ,. ' g; .' 1
VHUW 1 mic iimes, ERQDLCnLGl l1, lj3a.

 

i. g -I -~.-l ' I “,F— " ‘ '11: -‘ ‘- :-.- -, 7' I\ ,r_ -‘ 1 . ' *1 '1 ,m ‘ 1 J ‘.~- ' I I. > -~(r >- 4 1 o Y\ I 'V

Gy.:YV€,-‘L]\/‘L i. (/V’LlJ—Ll.UL.1LIL' sv'v .1. iii, uvaiJ .L»..K;i_ j _L.x QLUL1J‘. C.L‘VJ L110 K.
f" f\
‘ '1 . . “'1 ,i\ .‘ ,.\ _| ,-\ V- . , , .; . 1 I“ I ‘ h .'_ _‘ f i“'a - _' r‘ I) ,7 __l I , q,‘ ' , ‘M, , " 1 . .. L ‘~
TVJULIIlO LJL L‘EJVSC (J EL'L/vi. 8AA. LJ‘J LiAUl (45‘ :‘IC LJ‘L .LC/tc .L \)L J- E‘L 111 LV’L’OC11JCLLJ . v
rm 5, :- -. a 4 - .4 ‘-,~.r_. 1 1 4‘ 4- I: . ""1 , c ' . W; 1'
.Lilk. LaL ‘1 L4 UL .LLgL ‘LU C4 L'J, KJ‘L-lr‘dlik/ 1.1x.) LtCLda. Ll—Ll.’ 6 vCVLA~J nLJ—C/ J. ~Ll bk;

.1 ,. - '_ -1 -,.—, .° ,. n i 1 ‘ 1M . . h 1! 4—4 -. 4.1. 1'. j... “
and Uith tne Lolllhg o the tlUCG the revolt quietl, sutsiced.

The stockyartls at in.1t\

Au Ust 13 in comparison with o,

L

te. Since the strike lasted or three

L)

d

of produce in general was hardly halted

inconvenienced. fine only

ment of the wholedsale price of milk

1eceivec 3,300 ani1als
300 the 3car before
w
110 01.
real acconplishnent was

in Sioux City

Oil

on the

eeks and the flow

H

"I’\

e was greatl;

from one

dollar per hundred weight to one dollar and seventy five
cents. Most farmers anew that force to raise prices was not
the answer jus” as early attempts at legislation had failed

because there was no attempt

(“)5

marketing controls.d“r The show of

very real thing. It relieved the farmers'

rocks th1ou: r11uiurn11elcc and taxe tnflua? positive steps no
matter how futile in the attempt to get better prices. While

all quarters anticipated that the strike would ail it showed
significantly enou h the state of mind of what 1Jas tr CiLlOWdllF

(N

considered to be a conservative class.

after twelve years of deflation,

that seemed to

25

to employ radical measures

to save them from general bankruptcy.

farm strike had

Times, Bytemter l, 1932.

 

New Outlook, CLXI, October, 1932:

 

I.-
01L,

Show OUthL LXKII, August 2

v

 

to reduce production

The fa rmers

gotten public notice:

1) 1332)

or enforce

force did accomplish one

feelinns

U

to throw

be the last chance

the readjus

same

were ready

falling prices, and depression

17
not the chief goal of the strike. Rather, heno had hoped
to educate the Association's members and other farmers in
the goals of the protest movement. Dy mid November, 1932,
Reno was saying that the association had just begun to fight.
In an interview he said,

The time has come for effective direct action. SO far
the holiday movement has been largely educational in nature.
From now on we will urge our organization to use every means
at its disposal to boost the price of farm products until it
at least equals the cost of production. harm organizations had
been passing beautiful resolutions on the plight of the farmer
and condemning Wallstreet bankers for years and years. Most
Iowa farmers would read them, shake their heads sadly, agree
with them and forget about them. It required more then
resolutions on paper to arouse the moral conscience of Iowa.
If Roosevelt makes a misstep, we will fight him just as hard
as we fought Hoover. This holiday movement just took time
out during the election. We are back in the fight now with
both feet and we will come down harder then ever.26

Were costs of production a legitimate goal? Admittedly
it is much more difficult for the farmer than the businessman
to figure accurately his costs of production. Traditionally
the farmer thought in terms of aggregate income and aggregate
expenses. If the former exceeded the latter he was content.
Now that latter had exceeded the former several years in a
row it became necessary to define the actual costs of production.
The Iowa Farmers' Union figured that the farmer should be
allowed 5 per cent on his real estate investment, 7 per cent
return on his personal property and equipment, and one hundred

dollars a month for his labor. In order to have achieved this

return the average Iowa farm with normal production would have

 

had to have received the following prices in comparison to

27

pre-strike prices.

Table IV

Pre-Strike Prices compared to Holidav Demand

I.)

Product Pre Strike Price - Goal

Corn $ .22 bushel $ .92
Oats » .11 bushel .49
Hogs 3.85 hundred 11.25
Eggs .15 dozen .35
Butterfat .18 pound .62

Milo Reno denied that these were radical demands. He
merely asked that farmers who produced the nation's food receive
in return the costs of production as twenty—five milliOn
hungry people were proof that there was no over production.

The Origin of Direct Action \

The farmers purchasing power in 1933 when compared to
pre-war prices was revealed in 8 Bureau of Agricultural Economics
report issued on August 28 of that year. As of August 15,
that year, prices received were 64 per cent of the average for
the pre-war period of 1909-1914. Meanwhile, as the prices of
his products had fallen, the cost of things he needed were up
as high as 12 per cent over the pre-war level. Using 100 to
represent pre-war prices, the Bureaus index showed the prices
of materials farmers purchased to be 105. Prices for farm
products on the same index were. grain, 65; chiCkensand eggs,

27......P‘18t1211: CXXXV (September 7. 1932), 208. New Republic
LXXII, August 31, 1932, 12o.

 

[flitllll‘ll‘i I It'll"!!! [ lull, (tilt
I ll‘

 

IIIII

19

53; cotton and cotton seed, 69. The report also indicated

that on the average the farmer received less while the consumer
paid more than the pre-war price. For example: The average
price paid farmers for wholesale milk was $1.39 per hundred on
August 15 compared to $1.79 during the pre—Jar period. The re—
tail price of milk meanwhile had gone from 6.8 cents to 8.8
cents per quart.

Purchasing power then, r the lack of it, was the farmers'
chief complaint. Indignatly he could point to the increasing
spread between the prices he received and the prices the
consumer paid. Clearly as far as he was concerned, the middle-
man was taking too large a share of the consumefis dollar. One
way to rectify this was to strike and force the processor or
packer to raise prices.

The origin of the imbalance of purchasing power lay in
the second decade of this century. Ironic circumstances of
war and prosperity generated the surplus commodities which
since 1922 had prevented the farmer from sharing in the good
things the nation had to offer. In 1916, with war raging in
Europe, the Federal Farm Loan Banks encouraged the farmers
to purchase tractors and fertilizer in order to produce to meet
the demand for American foodstuffs. On entering the war in
1917, prices kept well ahead of production. In 1918 the
government, in order to stimulate production even more, guaranteed
the farmer two dollars a bushel for his wheat. The efforts of

the government were rewarded. The farmers bought more land,

28New York Times, August 29, 1923.

d

 

q

worked it more intensively and acquired more an' newer equipment
with the result that agricultural production grew steadily.
In 1918 alone, wheat production was increased by two—fifths.

Tile post war period \.as not so kind to the farmer. In
the face of the over-extended capacity of the farmer to produce
foreign ma kets were lost. One— half of the world could not

afford to buy from the United States. Domestic consumption

declined. The loss of foreign and dOL estio narkets led to
stockpiles of food and fibre and the term "farm surplus"
came into use. Immediately the farmer beg an to feel the
effect of his ability to over supply the market. On Hav 31,
. . 29
1920 the government removed price supports and prices fell.
The farmer's problem caused concern in certain circles.
The Farm Bureau Federation, fO‘ided by the Depar rtment of

Agriculture to serve tr e interests of the government, grew

fearful tr at a farm-labor comeinati01

ha

might take over the

state governments in the Middle Vest and achieve a radical

arra angemen at between industrial and agricultural workers.

Out of this fear came the Farm Bloc which was a small group

of conservative memoers of cong res who feigned concern for

1 x , ‘ .q 30 i .

ne farmers' proolems at election time. The Farm 5100 did

make one si gnificant achievement. It passed into law the Capper—
Volstead Act of 1922. This law exempted agricultural COOperatives
from prosecution under the anti-trust laws and defined the

29Fred Albert Shannon, American iarmer's Movements
(Princeton, 1957), p. 85.

’Olbid., p. 85.

conditions under which they might engage in interstate commerce.
This was a milestone in that it put the farm cooperatives on
equal terms with private dealers.31

The farmers were also beginning to stir. Though
cooperatives struggled valiantly with the farm cost—price
squeeze they were able to reduce only slightly the total costs
of production. The cooperatives could not solve the farmers'
problem because they failed to attack the problem at the source.
It truly was a dilemma. The farmer was unable to control
total production of any given commodity. A surplus drove
prices down. Low prices encouraged the farmer to produce more
in order to achieve a level income the next year. It was a
vicious cycle and the facmer was in distress.

The Corn Belt Committee which met May 11 and 12 in 1925
indicated that the farmers had grown tired of farm relief
conventions dominated by such non farm groups as, bankers,
railroad men, lawyers, and politicians. The meeting, which was
called at the suggestion of Milo Reno of the Iowa Farmers' Union,
met at Des Moines, Iowa under the aegis of the National Farmers'
Union. The convention adopted three planks. The first
called for marketing machinery under the control of the farmer
that would include grain terminals. Second, the farmer should
get costs of production for his crops. Third, an export cor-

. . . . 32
poraticn should be created to buy up available surpluses.“ The

31John D. Hicks, {epublican Ascendancy: 1921-1933 (New York,
1960), pp. 194-195.

32Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural.
Discontent in the Middle float, 1900-1939, (Madison, 1951), p. 38o.

 

 

 

f",/‘)
(.4;

farmers returned home and the farm crisis grew worse in the
face of national misunders anding or deliberate wish to ignore
the farmers' plight. Other actions of the government hurt the
farmer even more. By retiring three billion dollars in currency
the farmers were forced to repay cheap loans with dear money.
The Fordney—HcCumber Tariff of 1322 and the Hawley-Snoot
Tariff of 930 while aiding industry all but destroyed
agriculture's European market.

mwo earlier periods in United States history saw agrarian
protest reach momentous proportions but that protest differed
in substance from the holiday movement. The first was the Granger
movement of the seventies 'nd eighties when the nation's
population was one-half rural. The second was the Populist
movement in the nineties when the nation's population was onc-
third rural. Both of these movements were confined chiefly
to political machinations to achieve political ends which,
it was believed, would lead to economic prosperity for the
farmer. It should also be noted that organizations were
founded periodically whose chief purpose was to organize
cooperative banks, elevators, warehouses and retail outlets
in order to cut out the high costs charged by middle men.
The Farmers' Union has already been mentioned. Others included
the American Society of Equity and the American Pool Movement.

Agrarian protest in the thirties took another form when
the rank and file farmers awoke to the real problems facing
them. They had gnwn tired of petitioning a deaf government for

assistance. The farmers in the past had made demands, controlled

\_J

"3
C.

legislatures, and frightened conrr

1932 that they laid siege to

33

on peril of starvation. Indeed,

peaceful that military tidin*s fr m its loamy plains

startled the nation. americr

resisting unpopular layg

to call out troops to enforce

On September 9, 1932,

met at the call of Governor

conference had been promised to

of the holiday Association centere

35

.1
{N (3 - \
._3 otfi LA.

citi

lowa vas

them.
a conference of hid-
Barren Green
Reno when

d attention on

ass but it was not until

demanded surrender
so

had

history of

'v yr
\
ll

*estern Governors
of South Dakota. The

activities

C)

_: 31,.44.) n‘
ixi<.1t b.LIlL)

—.

agriculture's

plight. It echoed the demands of the 1925 Corn Belt Committee.
Two hundred and fifty raik mid file fara ers met in Washington
and gave voice to their protest. For four years they had

not made costs of production yet tlieir ta XGS in the previous

ten years had been ra_sed more than two hundred a11d fifty

per cent. The individual farmers in their simple straight

forward manner told stories of was

Sheep when

of freight charges. Out of the c

for joint action
The government sliould appropriate

in cash for immediate relief.

\N
\N

 

('1

n1. -‘ (N -‘ ‘ I

 

 

shipped to market did not

by the government and financial in

Purcha

OXXXVTI (hovember 22,1

in the midst of want.

even bring the cost
onference came an appea al

stitutions.

500 million dollars

ses should be made

1935) 539-

mber 25, 1931.

 

 

|II|II.||I"IIIII'I‘|IIIIII

directly from the farmers, prices should be regulated by a
joint committee of consumers and producers charged with the
responsibility to reduce p“ices to consumers and at the same
time raise prices for all farm products. The farmers, it was
clear, believed that the distributors, packers, and laborers
and not the consumers were taking toolarge a share. The farmer
was willing and eager to pay a fair price for products of
industry —— a price which would ensure every workingman a
decent living. He asked in return a price for food high
enough to ensure a decent living for himself. His criticism
was aimed at the middleman who preyed on both.

For their part the financial institutions could declare
a debt holiday on mortgages, interests and rents. An appeal
was also made for the cancellation of back farm taxes and the
promise of no more evictions. The Relief Conference demands
were sent to the house and senate where they were read on the
respective floors. The Quaker farmer, Philip Smith of

Pennsylvania, headed the delegation that presented the demands

P‘ (I

to President Hoover.JO President Hoover listened politely
and did nothing.
The Penny Sales

In October when Reno called a halt to the farm strike he
promised that pressure to get farm relief would continue. By
early 1933 the farm protest had begun to take the form of
interference at tax sales and interruption of foreclosure

jbNew hepubl c, LXXIII, December 28, 1932, 183. Nation,
7 ),

j
CXL (January 23, 1945 104.

 

pp
\T‘,

proceedings. No definite crigin is known for the so called
”penny sales" but they are important for several reasons. The
farm strike had been an impersonal action in which unhappy
farmers struck out at the distant packer, processor, and bottler.
Picket lines that halted the movement of farm products in Iowa
had no effect on prices in Chicago nor were any other successes
immediately evident. Penny sales on the other hand were more
personal. They took place on the farms of respected neighbors.
Right under the farmer's eyes his neighbor's farm and equipment
would be confiscated in a sheriff's auction. Out of their
desperation and desire to do something came the spontaneous
interference at auctions that saved the property of numerous
farmers.

The penny sales started in Iowa and shortly spread to
Minnesota and Michigan and then as far east as Pennsylvania.
They all followed the same pattern. Banks or mortgagge would
start foreclosure proceedings and a judge would order a farm
or personal property to be sold to pay the debt of back taxes.
On the day of the sale large groups of farmers would appear
and place low bids on equipment, cattle, or the farm itself.
Since nooses were displayed in prominent positions, bids
seldom were more than a few cents. Host of the sales were
conducted in an atmosphere of a fiesta. The Ladies Aid would
dispense fried chicken, coffee and pie as the bidding went on
and after the sale the property would be returned to the
neighbor. Usually the subtv}e threat of violence was enough

to ha t a sale. Where sher ff's insisted in conducting auctions,

where Judges insisted on acting on foreclosures, where bidders

insisted on biting at tax sales, violence could be expected
to break out and it did.

Early in January, at Le Mars, Iowa five hundred farmers
stormed the court house, slapped Sheriff Rippey's face and
hurled him out of the way. Herbert S. Martin had submitted
a sealed bid for the John A. Johnson farm in the amount of
thirty thousand dollars which was three thousand dollars less
then the amount of the mortgage held by his company, a New
York concern. Martin was seized by the crowd and held until‘
he wired his company and received permission to increase the
bid.37

In Bucks County, Pennsilvania the ”Paul Reveres” of the
United Farmers' Protective Association drove through the
countryvside one Tuesday morning warning the members of a
Sheriff's auction to be held at the John hanzel farm that day.
At ten o'clock when the sheriff arrived over three hundred
farmers had already been assembled. Nooses, horse watering
troughs, and brooder coops with locks were in evidence and
served to intimidate potential bidders. Before the sale was
over Sheriff Horace Gwinner was forced to accept bids totaling
$1.18 for the personal belongings, stock, household goods,
and farm implements owned by Hansel. Fifty chickens were bid
in for three cents. Three horses sold for five cents each. Nine
head of cattle brought twenty five cents. After the sale the

buyers promptly gave Hanzel a 99 year lease on his former

Q '3’) ’\
‘7Literary Digest, CXV, January 21, 193;, 32—33.

 

27

property for one dollar.49

Che thousand irate 1arme1s, armed with axe handles, took
over a fa1 m mortga ge sale near Ithaca, hichigan on February

3 a 3 an.” r.,._.. .0 1 A.-- 4 1n1 . 1,7. -.
b, 19;3. The sale oi Lay Laryol1's property had been ordered

J

when he was unable to make payments on a personal property

mortca age of $870.00. The irate farmers manlw ndled and held
prisoner the bank representative and then purchased an automobile
and a cow at 10 and 25 cents we“ pectively'. Governor William

A. Comstock later denied that he had ordered the State Police
30
to stay away.

That same month another farm mortgage sale protest took:

place in Michi iga n's Manistee County . A hancfi ill tha had been
circulated in the county seat urgf ed the farmers and workers

to unite to prevent their neighbor from being driven off his
property. It said in part:

"Now is the time to act." For the past three and
a half years we have waited for our masters, who are
responsible for the situation, to find a way out. The
result is starvation in the cities and tax sales and
foreclos ur s on farms. While the rich are receiving
billions through the RFC, the producers of the nation
are being driven into slave like conditions such as
existed previous to 177d....0n Friday, Febrzary 3rd, the
property of of is to be sold at a
forced auction at the court house:"lt is typical of
thousands of such cases throughout the SLate. Only the
organized, united action of the working people on farms
and in the cities will put an end to such insanity. The
Farmers Committee has called a protest meeting to stop
the above mentioned sale. Come one and all and demonstrate
your protest in a manner that cannot be supp1es sed.

 

On the des irnated day trucks bearing farm rs rolled into

(,1)

O1b1d., p. 32-35.
9

(J)

rJew Yer}: Times, February 9, 1933.

 

town from all directions. Sign; on the sides of the trucks
.1, ‘ . ”r '1, , S - L“ . 1‘ ' m‘ A . A .... V. -. -‘ — In.“ 4 ‘1 1'“) .‘ J- _
.L 080,1‘81 161’ U]. 1°:c1111of-.t_:(: (31912111,, . NYC Lib4.l<.él.d 1,110 111L110 LO

. .1 1 ., n n 1.1. u .1 11 . -11.. ‘ ..--.
Live 1n Our own Hence, one 111.e11 of LiVlggpouu County.

I (3- f\ 7“" ‘- J‘ f\‘< -. “x \‘ 1.131 ‘l' ~I‘ w: " I ‘ ‘ r\- - J i‘f“ ‘— f‘- H
We Denand a morator1um on no t age Lo1eclos res and lam S ales.

.‘

Fai me rs from five counties, two hundred and fiity in '

a

ll,
gathered a 'lock and a half from ihe court house, asse called,
and then marched toward lb. The farners packed the corridors

and the leaders were ushered into the onC1111's office ior a

conference with local officials, the mortgagor, and the mortgagee

L;

J,

A half hour later the crowd filed out into the court yard co

hear an announcenent. A representative of the i-iner‘ read the
following resolution.

Whereas: An attempt is being node to taze away the
pIWJp‘sxty' oi‘ orka o1f nth? {filiLfilthJS, tinrotQ;1 tile 1.o1<3—
closure of a mortgage, which through no fault of his
own, he is Inatle to pay, and

Whereas: The Far.1ers Conmittee for Action believes
that a Uo*ato11u1 on the payment of mortgages, interest
and taxes, should and must Le immediately granted, and
that all farmers and workers, should unite in p1otcctin
their homes and means of life, and

tfiieIKXBs: rThe (Represmxion, twiiciijprevwnits 13 frtnn
meeting our obligations, was biou ht on through no
fault of ours, and

Whereas: C‘r repre ese tatives in Wasa1n1con and Lane in“
have failed to protect us against the loss of our means
of life;

Therefore be it

Resolved: That we demand a postponement of the fore—
closure of this property.

r). :4.

he is further

Resolved: That we, the farmers and city workers, unite
in the mu ual protection of our homes and prope rt,, and
that we take whatever means our creditors and officials

”1'"

Ly

. , 1;
make necessary to protect our lives and homes. 0

The Sheriff then announced a thirty day postponnent of

the sale duri1'1g which time the xxlortragcr thought he could

raise $400.00 to meet the interest payments and delinquent

taxes. Local reaction was mixed. It ranged from the belief

I

caters had been at work among the farmers to

M1
a belief that the farmer could have paid had he wanted too.

that radical agi

Cn April 23, 1933 Judge Charles C. Bradley of Le Mars,

-‘

Iowa was dragged from his bench and ordered to st

0

p signing
foreclosure orders on farms by 600 farmers. When he refused,

he was slapped, put into a truck and taken into the countryside.

I

There he was forced to get down on his knegs and pray for the

n
J

a . _ _' ‘ Y,“ _o _o ‘ . -,
tn Ll‘lfiuulSSlfid1

H

farmers. His face and trousers were 'neared w

(

grease and dirt. A noose was put around his neck and he was
hanged until he lost consciousness. The farmers thereupon
drove off and left him. That same month, in another county,
1,000 farmers appeared at a sheriff's sale in the forenoon.
By early afternoon the sheriff announced the plantiff had
#2

called off the sale.

Farm discontent as represented by the penny sales and even
the farm str'ke for that matter had its contradictions. All
of Iowa was not unanimous in its discontent. The Missouri

valley was hardest hit due to several years of bad harvests.

Even a corn loan program would do little to help those farmers

40
Louise V. Armstrong, We Too are_fpople (Boston, 1941),

pp. 39-43

 

l”111113., p.4u.

L' 1 ,_ -
*QNatioQ, CXXXVI (March 8, 1933 , 254-235.

Jl‘ 1, H -' L ' .1 - V ' . " , .5 7 . ,. -. ‘ , 7‘ , J , , '
“>1: ..\' H." I .* ‘ - . .w v .1 s». . . .> 11.5, 1, lw': = i .
(AK, ULLU' [gdv .Lv'saL" it.4._\.aLL gJ-QL.gL./L- Lin) pix/kl (i. V ‘A ‘JU15. [‘LIKJLLLQJJ“ t)‘»J_i.LJ

4 , ‘ .- " 1‘ .' ‘ 4.7- ,7 1. ’ ,. 5‘ ,_7 i. ' .‘4 ,1, ‘,_, ' ,, H .‘1 Av) -|i ’ _ M a _ __‘

L3 L6 111306; Li; Lle L, LAC ML)- 1.]. 1 114%.“; ovulllp‘c 1.111 C'CluuUJ. (1.;

A‘ ." .13; ‘7' '."\- ' WC. '.‘.' - ”'1 '2 K‘- ' 3" “-' 3. o‘I‘ ,-. '. n 3": ‘, '1 . \" 1‘ * ‘ J- 'r‘" ~v,
UCCLII 1. cc} wrighul .L J _‘..'.1 d \J._LL; Lll'lb b uLbU-LJLCU a; bCLlaL.b ldl'ulbl S o

r" 4 ~' .- 'r ’x u 1": r ’2 7., J ‘ , :7" ‘. -r‘ ‘r- - ./-' I 3“) M 1’. - -~ a
,dclun CVHQUCLVQ e- VLC nocluhdl Chaim ulcei tub

U
2.

"'A" ‘ "1 ‘3': "' ‘l 'V‘ r5" 7‘1") "I! " ' " (V '.'v"‘n' h /_. . V ‘—.\" " lea'“ 'V ‘1
cciugice LATqWCCI Lhci, che inch Lure th;ua;HgivL1<JhL;fi5 1; w;1c

aCLually Lehahte chc larfi hahcz. gene were iclc. New were

cistrecee“ mortqaqcrc. “ Lc Herc was a net cec emu tMuUQH it
' "’ ’9 ' r1 ‘ '. “ (' “ ‘.‘r"1 ) ‘A " ‘I. 1". ’ "" I C‘ ‘ '” ‘J‘ ‘, l "‘ "‘" _ ' “~ .” j 1" ,- {’1 -H ‘\ "“
was ripe 10f incuriecciua 1L uve “cc uCLUdliJ L,.icd1 Q1 lche

or che diddle Meet. It had Lech one of the centers oi
speculation in 1919 and 13:0. hen nae etc C en the court hgu

cccpc Liccih; Icy lehcvehd Lena: had lQBMCQ iarmere us to

41,000 ch unsecured hctec. Emu: the violence was cue primari

.1

L0 Lhuec who were hep acle ,0 Lace the cleappeihtmeht c“ a :1;

d
moving Washington adhihiecrecich.
On balance 1; can Le calc “hat the farm ecrixe and
penny sale actions cic have a iaoical element. It was no:
hcwever wild—eyed raeicallem phat could lecc Lu LQ'CIMAQHL

.— . ,’ . r‘ - - .fi»- . J —. , .' ,-- ‘5’ -.‘ ~) 4“," ~§ —r)r' <VJ—‘r . -- .1f‘ I, - 1:“ 1» ’ A) 2 .' C‘ J~ n l.‘ .
UVHJCHNSYllg) 0110 (JUIlbllJl. HAJ Llle ceuicic1i, , .Lu IVUg: e>1ciu,ai.;c em;c

in defense of privace yrcpcrcy. Ncibhcr Lhe Icwa, the hichig“
nor the 1%nnuxfilvahia feimmnN3, tenant eM‘kfiWler, ecnmgit to sec

4

a'ide the capitalist SQSLGH.

(1

1h protestihé the sales Lhe farmers clearly viclated Lhe

'«Tn‘rw rar-n-‘~w‘i- “unr‘ " ' . a. " .;.-'.“
bncc GLOLHLL lcgdllblcfi, lLUaliuiLu

yielded. 10 the farmers credit, conciliatich was tried in

0)
Cu
i
O
(D
t:-
E

4|.~‘

Times, Novemter 1c, 193;. New Ycrk Times, Ac

 

 

41“.. ,— . »- t “v ’ f" 7 . . V . ' \>‘r' " ~ 1, I‘ r “-
id}? Yurk limes, pkg; {, 19': New Etiuiiigm:8, HQVemcer

JJJ

 

 

 

cases Lo scale CeLts Gown and where that rail:

1,

ion

all,

.5’ Z:

1c, 1

7/

.1

u‘.

<1
J

to freely offer grain and market stock saving only machinery,
chattels, and livestock in order to give the farmers a chance
to start over. lcvorLreleLL laws vere impeded and the courtL
did not void such sales. The penny s.ale: had met with success'

and in later meetings phras s such 2 "Jlstice above the Law,

(.0

and “the Right to save our lomes," seemed to justify the

afternoon's activity.;’ Yet there was n‘ wholesale violence.
Violence where it did occur, the destructive phase, the
smashing of property, was pretty: uch cut of the hand es of Milo
Reno. It was a matter of temporary and local inspiration.
The resistance to evictions, tax sales, and foreclosures came
from the rank and file and not the leaders of the national
movement.“6
The Second Farm Strike

Even as the penny sales took place, Reno was busy re—
grouping his forces for a new strike. On January 20, 1933,
Governor Cly de Herring of Iowa issued a proclamation urging
the holders of realty and personal property mortgages to re-
frain from foreclosing saying, ”these conditions are becoming

- . . "W

more acute and more aggravated. On February 6, Reno
announced that, ”A national farm strike in which every state in
the Union will participate will be called unless the incoming

"118

administration brings quick relief to the farmer. In order

45Nation, CXXXVI (March 8, 1933), 255.

46Lew Republic, LXXIII, December 28,1932,183. ng Eeggbch
LXXVI, November Cj, 1933, 64.

*4
\Q
(A)
(A)

b-
7New York Times_, January 20,

 

48New York Times, February 6,

l-—’
\O
U3
(H
O

 

 

I141II'IIIIIIII" III-I'll]

1‘: Ii! [In ’5. I

3'2

to win rank and file support and spread the movement into

neighborinq states Reno had organized a cahlpa ai n of slogan

U)

U:

and sonss to stir the sentiment of the uncommitted farmers
L.)

O

h ». fl " (V ”7‘. ‘1 ‘ (‘ ’\ I) v. 3" C" "-J (' ' H ‘7' ‘ ‘m.
Slogans such dc, L IiCL ts e1 reaLartL,' Ly Lei

(:x

tCIdAhn

(‘0

We Nean Debt holiday," ”NC Lviction for any Farmer,” ”By
Cost of Production WL Nean A Decent Living for Farmers,”
"We Got Our Back to the Wall,” and “On With the Strike"
appeared on bill boards, barns and sides of farm trucks. A
sample song went:

Come, fellow farmers, one and all——

We've fed the world throughout the years

And haven't made our salt.

We've paid our taxes right and left

Without the least objection.

We've paid them to the government

That gives us no protection.

Let's call a "Farmers" holiday

A Holiday lets' hold.

We'll eat our wheat and ham 71d egbs

and let them eat their gold.

The effect of the pro pose d strike on the Washington

9 0 J 0 0 1 ' 4 A. E-‘() ~

adminisuration can be seen in the events that 1011owed.“ Sec-
retary Henry allace met with or 5anized farm leaders on March
10 and together they drew up a plan for the relief of agriculture
which called for the president to assume dictatorial powers
similar to those he had requested for dealing with the banking

crisis. The purpose of the proposed legislation was to give

b9
‘ Sa aloutos, pp. DP3- ANN.

(I.
’ONew York Times March 12,1933 Carl T. Schmidt, American
Farmers in the world Crisis (New York 1941), pp. 120-121.

-_..__’- §....

See also Raymond Noley, After §eyen_}ear§ (New York, 1939),
pp. 107- 108. Time, XXI Feoruary 6, 1933 17.

.24)

 

v‘v

the p‘z es ident authority to bring about a parity of prices

between agricultural and ildustrial commodities based on their

pro—war relationship. Under the proposed 1 1L1; No the
adririsit1aiion 1Cbldl€t$- iand in order to curtail production

and at the same time fix the price of wheat, corn, cotton, h05s,

51
cattle, sheep, rice, tolacco, and do airy products.

The Farmers' Holiday Association convention met March 12,

‘ n7 - .' ‘1 a (V 4"- A r“ - T' -- (n .- ‘v -' v
1933 at Des noines and reL olve that, Unless we receive
legislative justice b3 Na3 3, 1933, we shall then prepare for

a marketing strike within ten dam; and a national farmers'
holiday will be declared and maintained. Copies were mailed
to President Roosevelt, Vice President John Ga1 ner, and to
all Senators and Nep1cLontativeL. After the convention
adjourned 3,000 farmers marched on the Iowa State Legislature
and declared thoir refusal to pa3 interest, taxes, or debts
"until the dollar is made to serve as an honest measure of

1

value." Further they declared, ”u’e do not desire to soon
relress of our w1inss and grievanceL th1ou 5h force except
as a last resort, but we are free men and we refuse to become

1:
1|)

the serfs and slaves of the usurer and money kin5.
Meanwhile, the Seiate Committee on Agriculture held
hearings on the proposed bill. In testimony before the committee
John A. Simpson, President of the National PL1ne's' Union said,
“i

”the biggest and 1 ines t oiop of revolutions you ever s w is

sprouting all over this country ri5ht now." Edward Asbury O'Neal

 

52New Ytrk Times, March 13, 19, 1933.

 

:15

III, President of the American Fa1m Lureau de1ation said,
"Unless something is done for the Ame rican £31m er we'll have
revolution in the count1yside in less than twelve months.

Time concluded an article on agricult‘ral concitioiQ s ying

”an agrar ian revolt is the last thing President-elect Roosevelt
wants on his hnds during his first year in the EJhit e Hous e.

He and his Democratic associates have been cudgeling their

brains to devise we; s and means of heading off such an up-

r":
o I 1 _ _ '1 _ - Lt
riSine before it reacned the blood—and-bullets stage.”J

On May 4 Reno held back on calling a strike vote all day
hoping to get word that the administration would include the
cost of production amendment in the pending farm 1elie f bill.
The 1,500 delegates present in the convention at Des Moines
claimed to represent 1,500,000 farmers and emotion was high as
the result of the martial law situation in the north'west part
of the state. The issue was put to the vote and the farmer
delegates from 18 states voted to take a holiday beginning
May 13. All farm products including eggs, vegetables, and

. 55 .
milk would be held at home. On May 9 Secretary Wallace
appealed to the industrial iast to support the farm bill.
He asserted that the farm bill was a deliberate choice
between the traditional policy of laissez-faire and that of
conscious control of agriculture and was an attempt to strike

and maintain a balance between the rural and urban life of the

53Time, XXI, February 6, 1933, 17.

54Ibid., p.17.

55New York Times, May 9, 1933.

 

country. He went on to say that if nature were allowed to
take its course the situation would eventually be rectified
but only at the cost of "time, suffering and bloodshed."56

On May 12, the day before the strike was to commence,
President Roosevelt signed the agricultural relief measure.

That same afternoon the offices of the National Farmers'

Holiday Association announced the indefinite postponement of

the May 13 strike. It was done, said Reno, because of the
President's statement urging mortgagors to be lenient issued

at the same time he signed the bill for farm inflation. While
declaring it was the patriotic duty of the farmer to give

the Federal administration an opportunity to redeem pre-

election promises, Reno made it clear that they werepn no way
receding from their fundamental demand for costs of production.57

Spring turned to summer and all eyes were on agricultural
prices. Of course there could be no real effect until the
1933 harvest got under way. When it did Reno was not so sure
that the relief measures were adequate.

On October 19, Reno declared that a new strike would be
necessary in order to compel the administration to put into
effect an NBA code for agriculture. Such a code was needed
in order to establish minimum prices for basic commodities
sold on the domestic market and to license producers, processors,

and dealers to insure code compliance and to prevent unfair

56 ._ Q .
New York Times, May 10, 1933.

 

57New York Times, May 13, 1933.

 

 

MC 1003.

r..;

The new strine was called for October ”1 and, according to
Walter »roth of the Minnesota Association, woull to effective
in 24 states that represented 2,000,000 farmers. The directors
of the association issued a statenent which said in part:

We will pa; no taxes or interest until we have
fll‘Et 0816C 101' Lilli" 381111116353.

«

he will pay no interest tearing oetts until we
receive the cost of production.

We asked for a tional moratorium to prevent

foreclosures and disposs essions while the administration

was spairing for tire to brinb us relief.

But no such mora ato1ium has been proclaimed.

It is now apparent that if thes homes a1e to be saved

we shall have to do it ourselves, and that

we intend to do. 59

Governor lsnger of North Dakota decided to support the
strike and ecla1ed an entar 0 on all wheat shipments on
October 22. He also ordered all sheriffs to compel elevators
to cease accepting wheat for shipment. Although the railroads
were ready to transport the grain despite the eltai 0, they
had little for shipment and the wheat trade was at a standstill
. TTr qt“ f‘ r \ ‘ 1 " \ ‘1"1 “’) r);- DO
in anbh Dakota t5 Octotei 23.

The 1933 strik= stands in larzed contrast to the 1932
holiday. In the 1irst place the salines did not occu1 a second
time in any one place. In Sioux Cit5, the center of the 1932
stri' {e violence, all was quiet the day after the strike was

declared. The association leaders there claimed that they

had not been officially notified of the stIike and would not

1

.‘-’)

 

”Uhew York Times, October 20; November 2: 1933-

NeVJ YOI’WC (fillies, OCtOny’ 20, 193:.

 

60‘ ‘-° . 1 ’\ "V’x -. I" , ,‘
New Yo1kTimes, October 22, 1933, October 2o, 1933.

 

act until they heard from Reno.61 Economically the strike
was even less successful. By October 29, grain, milk, produce,
and livestockWBrQ moving to market in little stinted volume.
The strike extended into six states but prices were no higher
because of it. Livestock receipts were higher in the first
week of the strike than during the preceding week. Reflecting
a seasonal trend egg prices were higher anyway. Governor
Ianger's embargo, finally, kept wheat shipments at a standstill
but grain prices still averaged lower.62
The 1933 strike also failed to enlist the support of the
milk producers. The year before they had been engaged in a
battle with the distributors and, in fact, had given the
first impetus to picketing activities. By 1933, however, they
were engaged in negotiations with the distributors under the
AAA code with the assistance of government conciliators. The
last thing they wanted was to have the milk bucket kicked
over just as they were on the brink of reaching a satisfactory
settlement.63
After one week the strike had had no appreciable effect
on the market. The great mass of farmers continued to send
their production to market in the usual quantity and acted as
though they did not know anything about the strike. The strike
also was met rather ccdfly because of the distrust of the Reno

organization after the futile attempt of the previous year.

Indeed the Holiday Association encountered some of its most

,

e1
62

New York Times, October 22, 1933.

 

New York Times, October 30, 1933.

 

63New York Times, October 29: 1933-

 

r } ‘
so
s/

I" I,
vak‘

serious opposition in its own strong'holds in Iowa and Wisconsin.L
Then also there was the matter of President Roosevelt's radio
address in which he called for patience and a period of time
to allow measures already enacted a chance to work. Popular
reaction appeared to be a disposition to go along with the
president's request in view of the fact he hadgromised to raise
farm prices in one way or another.

Reno however was not ready to give up. His call for a
code for agriculture ignored, Reno on November 4 ordered the
non-buying, non-selling movement into ”full gear” and called
on the leaders in 21 states to urge their units to strike.
Response was widespread. Farmers in Madison, Wisconsin; Birming-
ham, Alabama; Pipestone County, Minnesota; and Oklahoma res-
ponded with votes for strike action.6

Despite the Association leaders attempts to prevent it
violence did occur. Near Lawton, Iowfiflfreight train was halted
and eight car loads of livestock bound for Sioux City were
turned loose. One picket was killed near Dakota City, Nebraska.
Nails were strewn on highways near Racine, Wisconsin. At Waupun,
Wisconsin two men were arrested for sabotaging cheese at a
factory by pouring kerosene into the vats. Near Meriden, Iowa
an Illinois Central Rail Road bridge was burned.66 Advised of
the turn to violence at Sioux City, Reno at Des Moines said,

”These acts of violence are regrettable. The people have been

,
ouIbid.

r
05New York Times, November 5: 1933-

 

/
06New York Times, November 6, 1933.

 

39

admonished to carry on by peaceful picketing in the strike.

It would perhaps be impossible, however, to prevent actions

of this kind in the present frame of mind of the farmer. It's
easy to counsel respect for law and order by those who arefhotjin
dire distress. It's quite another matter, however, to the

farmer who sees the earnings and accumulations of a lifevtime
being taken from him and his righteous requests ignored."67

On November 12 as the strike ended its third week little
diminution of receipts was noticed at the markets. Outside of
Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin livestock and dairy receipts were
reported to be normal. In the three states where the Farmers'
Holiday Association had its greatest strength no serious
shortage of foodstuffs was reported.

That the farm strikes had sped rural relief there can be
little doubt. By November Senator Lynn J. Frazier of North
Dakota could tell the delegates to the National Farmers'

Union convention in Omaha that Congress finally realized that
something had to be done to restore the purchasing power of

the farmer. President Roosevelt at the same time pledged himself
anew to raise prices. That same month George N. Peek, Farm
Administrator, announced a corn loan program that would give
farmers one half billion dollars by January. At the same time
the Farm Credit Administration did not wait for the loans to
become effective but started immediately to buy wheat and

dairy products for relief distribution. In addition merchants

in rural communities were exempted from the retail codes that

67New York Times, November 7, 1933.

 

to
(a

that had required prices to include cost-plus-ten per cent.DO

The corn loans spelled an end to Reno‘s strike. The
approaching checks were like oil poured upon troubled social
waters. Significantly the farmers of Le Mars, Iowa, the
strongest backers of Reno, were the first to defect. Perhaps
Oluf C. Patterson of Story County, Iowa was typical of most
farmers at this point. He said, ”The 45 per cent corn loan will
be a big help.... Wallace is 100 per cent all right... The Gov-
ernor's trip to Washington didn't accomplish any good. The
government had its own program. Why should it be changed
now? It must be carried through and given a chance'.’69 A poll
taken among Iowa farmers in late November showed that farm
strike to improve income had fallen out of favor and that they
were willing to give the New Deal a chance. -Indeed, 72 percent
of the farmers polled expressed approval of President Roosevelt's
efforts while only 14 per cent still favored the farm strike.

If the holiday movement had no effect on raising prices,
one thing is certain. Advancing farm prices and a decline in
farm foreclosures spelled the end of the association. Enthusiasm
for the "holiday” evaporated as the farmers started to get
twice as much for their wheat and almost as much more for their
corn, hogs, and cattle as they were paid during the heyday of

the association. In five months, the New York Times reported,

 

the association had gone from 750,000 members to a thing of the

KU
Db. C ' O
Literaiy Digest, CXVI,November 8, l933,8. New York Times
November 16, 1933.

 

 

bflNew York Times, November 17, 18, 1933.

 

70New Republic, LXXVII, November 29, 1933, 64.

 

past. In its place was a feeling of hope and confidence not
seen among the nation's farmers for ten years.71

In conclusion it can be said that the farm strike was not
a radical revolution. While the farmers ‘enied that their

" the non-

actions could be termed "revolution" or "anarchy,
participating bv— sta ndeis were not inclined to be disturbed hy
the fai mers' actions. They saw not a Red revolution or an
organized movement to defraud creditors but rather a dispeiate
effort to preserve the existing property status from being
wrecked. They deplored the method while sympathizing with the
purpose.72 Certainly, the Soviet government proclamation to
her people that t; 1e revolution of the American proletariat had

’3
begun and the end of the capitalistic L,oVernlc t was at hand?)
was prenature to say the least.

It can also be said that the general respect for law
remained high despite the cow testing war, farm strikes, hi hway
picketing, and interference with tax and mortgage foreclosure
sales. The people of most communities knew of them only as
something which happened somewhere else. ‘he irreverence
for law in those cases was viewed as no more alarming than the
widespread contempt for Volsteadism. What the farmers wanted was

a moratorium on debts until a time Wish they could pay The

interference at sales was an emergency method of dealing with an

71New York Times, July 2, 1933.

 

72New York Times, February 12, 1933.

73

 

New Outlook, CXLI, October 1932, 13.

 

‘ier

t
‘-

OTCI‘ULI

p
.L

L i". t}

‘ \
0-..- LL

1‘

w
.L

53 it‘ua 1'. i011

run? if

(JV
\JJ.

‘ 1
nAL

e .

Cu
,2.“

 

I r ‘<1-~\s—) "I—
CLth/‘UCL .LI

.‘- Y‘rx . a - :(\~r 1 ,-,~, "r‘ '. .. 'l ‘ J- _' f '1
1110 Dairy Jenner: Take ACthIl

Even as Milo hens was prodding the farmers of Iowa,
Nebraska, South Dakota, and Linnesota into action; ‘he dairy
farmers of Wisconsin, Illinois, and New York had taken notice
and simultaieously strikes occurred in those states. Strikes
among the dairy farners in those states had a specia signifi-
cance. Whereas, the early farm strike conducted by the holiday
Association and the penny sales occurred out in the distant
Great Plains and for the most part did not affect the 1ar
centers of urban dwellers, the dairy strikes which followed
threatened to carry the prairie fire of protest into the labor
camp of the large cities. Indeed, it was nly a matter of months
before the big cities of Chicago, Milwaukee, New York, and
Philadelphia began to feel the full effect of a strike among
producers of mi k.

Aside from the radical implications, the dairy strikes
meant the halting of distribution of what was considered to be
the most vital of food products. The prospect of an end to
the supply of milk for any period of tim strucx fear into the
hearts of city health officials as well as mothers of small
children. There was also the fact that in swinging over to
direct action as a means to achieve their ends the dairy farmers
held an important position in the nation's economy. Milk, the

1

most important agricultural product, furnished one fourth of

In spite of dietary and national economic considerations

dairy strikes held reat pronise of success when contrasted

(U
L)

CD

with strikes mong non-perishable commodity producers.

First, processors would not be able to keep a large surplus
on hand for use in an extended strike. Because of its perish—
ability, milk supplies ordinarily would be exhausted in three
or four days. Second, lnlike non-perishable commodities, milk
could not easily be spirited into a struck city. It had to
move in refrigerated rail cars and tank trucks which were
easily detected and sabotaged. Third, and most important
from the standpoint of striking for improved prices, when the
strikes were halted there would not be a huge backlog of milk
held in storage ready to glut the market and drive prices down
even farther.
The Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool Strike

‘he dairy farmers in the Milwaukee milk shed were the
first to strike. On February 8, 1933 the directors of the
Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool announced that they had em—
powered the organization's president, Walter M. Singler, a
farmer from Shiocton, to set the date for a strike. "We will
not try to starve the cities. We have the milk and it is for

sale. But for once it is for sale at our price,h

said Singler.
That price, which was established by the Cooperative, was to
be H0 cents per pound of butterfat or $1.40 per 100 pounds of
milk testing 3.5 per cent butterfat regardless of the use to

which the milk would be put. This was in contrast to prices of

60 cents to $1.00 per hundred it had bean receiving depending

on whether the milk went to the bottler or other processing
plants.1

The strike, which was enforced by surly picke s spread
rapidly throughout Dodge County. In the vicinity of New
London, the action of the pickets was direct and positive.
There a group of pickets halted James Wells with a load of
milk he had tried to disguise with sacks of corn. The milk
was dumped as the Chief of Police fought several of the strikers.
That same day, February 18, to the south of the city, Milton
Puksan was dragged from his car and beaten when he tried to
break through a barrier in order to clear the way for a truck.
By the end of the day it was estimated that half of Dodge
County's cheese factories, condenseries, creameries, and

2
receiving stations were closed.

Meanwhile, tension in the Milwaukee milk shed during mid-
February had led the Wisconsin legislature to pass restrictive
legislation and orders went out to sheriffs to aid strike
breakers in crossing lines. On February 19, the same Milton
Puksan, mentioned earlier, reached New London with a load of
milk guarded by six car loads of special deputy sheriffs.

The same day)however, nine truck loads of milk totaling 25,000
pounds were spilled near Manawa in Waupaca County. Meanwhile,
Borden announced that the the condensery receipts were

drastically cut from the normal 90,000 pounds of milk received

1New York Times, February 9, 1933.

 

2New York Times, February 19, 1933.

 

J ‘/:-
at

3

daily. At this point, Singler sought to extend the strike

into Michigan and succeeded in getting the farmers of the

0)

Upper Peninsula county of Menominee to gree to support the

Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool in its strike by halting
u,
shipments to the Milwaukee area.

By April 20, Wisconsin's Governor Albert G. Schmedeman was
worried that the strike would spread into Illinois and Indiana.
He sought to relieve the exasperated farmers by encouraging
the condenseries to increase prices paid for surplus milk.

He believed a voluntary increase, though modest, was necessary
since the price for surplus milk demanded by the farmers would
have caused the price of butter to go from 55 cents to 60

cents and cheese from 25 cents to 30 cents per pound. Such

an increase, he believed would lead to a consumer strike from
which no one would benefit.5

Up to this time there was little bitterness or unrestrained
violence on either side and the strike was viewed by the non-
combatants as a sporting event rather than an insurrection.
In fact, so widespread was public sentiment in support of the
farmers that Governor Schdeman had used mildness in quelling
the outbreaks.

By early May events began to move more rapidly. The Holiday

3Nation, CXXXVI (May 17, 1933), 559. New York Times,
February 19, 1933.

 

uNew York Times, February 20, 1933.

 

5New York Times, April 23: 1933'

6

 

£22222; CXXXVI (May 31, 1933), 598.

CH
“1

Association had met in convention and was proceeding to get
ready for the general strike which was expected to be called

on May 13. In addition the Farm Holiday ssociaticn continued
to mobilize farm opinion behind the milk pool. With the
increase of Holiday prestige in Wisconsin, Governor Schmedeman,
on May 10, prepared to assume dictatorial powers in the farm
crisis should the general strike materialize. In that event,
his office announced that all processing stations would be
closed and no milk would be sold in stores. Children under
eight and the ill would receive milk transported into the
cities by police authorities.7 On May 12, when the news reached
Singler that the nationwide strike was called off in deference
to Roosevelt's plea, he said, ”The strike is onl,“ and declared
that his association would go throUgh with their plans to
strike. Township captains had been selected in each community
on the local level and a secret board had been created to

act in the event the acknowledged leaders were enjoined by

the courts from conducting the strike.

On May 14, four hundred enraged farmers battled dense
clouds of tear gas to dump six truck loads of milk, destined
for the Chicago market, south of Mukwonago. The truck drivers
and a few private guards armed with clubs were no match for
the aroused farmers. Some of the farmers charged into the
fray with milk can covers in their hands. While the driver-

farmer battle raged other farmers tossed milk cans to the

7N6W York Times, May 11, 1933.

8
New York Times, May 13, 1933. Nation, CXXVI (May 17, 1933 :

 

 

559.

{\-

pavement and milk ran several in*hes deep in a ditch. The
trucks had been halted by the farmers throwing logs and
upturned harrows to the pavement in the path of the trucks

as they headed for the United Dairy Company plant at Mukwonago.

, 9

In all 30,000 pounds of milk were spilled. The same night,

May 14, 300 striking producers gathered at Appleton and burned
a straw effigy of Milo Reno and denounced him for having
postponed the national farmers' holiday.

By May 15, the strike had spread into fourteen counties
along Lake Michigan and into the Fox River Valley. The same

day violence occurred at variou places. Milk was dumped near

03

Milwaukee, Benduel, and Menasha. In Waukesha County,where
the Mukwonago battle had been fought, the county officials
appealed for more tear gas bombs which were rushed to t em

. 10 . . . . .
by air. Meanwhile, it was expected that a price increase
of a penny a quart by the Chicago Milk Council to be charged
the consumers would give the farmers prices that would range
. (B E‘ ._ ('t . i _ 1 1 ll ' - J-
from al.43 to al.75 per hundred pounds. The expeCted
increase in price was not passed on to the dairy farmers,
however, and therefore they were not deterred.

On May 16, 650 National Guardsmen were called up and sent
into the troubled Zones. The next day Governor Schmedeman

ordered fourteen new companies to be in readiness. The day's

9Nation, CXXXVI (May 31, 1933 , 598. New York Time

w

May 15, 1933.

(I)

J

 

10New York Times, May 16, 1933.

11New York Times, May 15: 1933.

 

 

worst outbreak occurred at Shawano when the militia tried

to rout a gathering of farmers with tear gas. Dozens of
National Guardsmen were battered and bruised and 200 strikers
were taken prisoner. In all 1,000 deputies and 1,000 farmers
participated. The entire town had turned out to watch the
battle between the deputized militia and the striking farmer.
That the townspeople sympathized with the farmers was no secret.
What they objected to most was that the state militia men were
entitled to collect $4.00 a piece from the county treasurer
because they had been sworn in as deputy sheriffs. The
townspeople also objected because the town cemetery had been
over run in the battle and a mess had been made of the Ladies'
Cemetery Improvement Association beautification project.

The dairy strike was a unique demonstration in Wisconsin
history. The farmers faced with the lowest prices in 34 years
openly defied the authority of the state. For the first time
in Wisconsin history the militia was called out to subdue the
farmers.

As violence spread throughout the state, authorities
grew concerned that the dairy strike was assuming the
proportions of an organized rebellion. Adjutant General, Ralph
M. Immell, thereupon ordered the sheriffs of 18 counties to
arrest all persons instigating violence or causing destruction
of property on charges of conspiracy against organized govern-
ment. The Pool, meanwhile, stood by its demands for, ”state

recognition” of the pool, immediate discharge of all special

12New York Times, May 18, 1933. Nation CXXXVI (May 31, 1933 ,

 

5‘98.

é

\ ‘

deputies, and a base price of $1.40 F.0.E. farm, for milk.13
In the face of the threat of renewed hostilities Governor
Ekflfixmmwn.secured from Borden and National Dairy an increase
of 15 cents per hundred pounds in the price of milk which
raised the price to $1.00 per hundred which was one half of
the Pool's earlier demand for $2.00 or 4 and 1/2 cents a quart}!1L
Having won this the Governor next called a conference with
leaders of the Pool. Late on the night of May 18, after a three
and a half hour conference, the Governor declared the strike
to be ended with picketing to be halted as soon as the
arbitration committee of the Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool
could ratify the agreement.15
The agreement which was ratified on May 19 was met with
the cheers of three thousand farmers who had gathered at
Madison. The agreement called for the P001 to promise to cease
picketing and the governor agreed to appoint a farmer controlled
committee to study and report on the grievances of the pro-
ducers. Most of the pickets who were arrested were released.
Those who were still held at Milwaukee and Shawano were not
expected to be prosecuted.16
The reaction in Wisconsin to the dairy strike was mixed.
As has been suggested, the non-participant did not View it
with any alarm while the state press viewed the strikers with

coolness. The Socialist Party took the occasion to endorse in

law- 0 -r (
Jflew York Times, may 16, 1933.
14

15

 

Nation, cxxxv1 (May 17, l 33), 559.

New York Tim s, May 19, 1933.

K
10}

 

few York Times, May 20, 1933.

 

L', l

/

full the demands of the Farm holidav Association and the

Progressives seized on the opportu11itr to critize the Democrats

U

for failing to all’eviate the arm distress. Later in the

same month, Singler retired from the office he held declaring

that there was a better way to deal with farh problems than by

striking. What he meant was the orderly piocess of a committee

representing the farmer, distributor, a1id public wormfin

together to solve a problem that Hf ected all. In Singler's

view, the one real succ>ss of the Pool's valient effort was

the appoint:1ent of a cok‘ission to conduct an inquiry.17
The rank and file farmers, however, were not so easily

satisfied. They continued to be dissatisfied with the slight

price improvement and in the fall of 1935 farmers in Northern

Illinois and Southern Wisconsin again went on strike. i‘his

time they demanded $2.50. Unlike the earlier strike this was
I

J J

a completely spOICencor rank and file proteSt. At Huntly,
Illinois, a train was stopiaed and two rail cars of milk were
dumpved. At henosha, Wisconsin kerosene was put into a truck
milk tank. In nc1c‘“y County, Illinois, farm women helped
the men by clustering in the highway. Their husbands mobbed
o

the drivers when they slowed their trucks. U r‘he effect of
New Deal legislation was another factor in this strike. More
will bezsid about this late r but the conflict between the AAA

and the NLRB began to tak shape. If the NLRB approved th

Union's driver demands for shorter hours ano higher wages it

17

. , _- w ,3 - 7, C) .
Jew York Times, may 20, 1933.

 

18Literary Digest, CXX, October 19, 1935, 6.

1 ‘ 1 :. v ‘ r“ g - l . V - .1 .1 I) ~ . ‘ h V \ "- I ‘1 h ’ c ‘ 7' ’ Q " s' 1
Li.‘«.‘L(.LCA L..~;“ L U. ntiJ. ..- U 0.1.; K- - A as an. _ 8 I. .‘. «J v.4 -. L- ‘- :LPQL L14. .LC‘QI4
:‘I, _ 1.1,.“ J1. - _ .- 1“. , _,.1 - 1; , ,‘1 ‘ 1 ‘ 7, '. 1 , .b' _ 1 ,i - ‘ .'
LUI.‘ til-c: (.u Ll"; ioL 1:1 . I 301C. k g; (J‘J‘il'upt “-1 so"; LLiC-L/ Cii‘LUL
r x — '. .f 1. f. - '1 , .7 . .07 1 “ .' j , . it . .1: ,7 , l .. , '1 1 - , .1 1
uCLip-lrl ill “.‘ILéC/‘Jilnfiifl Hm; Hut, 11bit. vi.) 1 k,’ L-1LL‘ iiild L-\.).LUL~_L’J11 Dbl,

rather a way to put the

public.

The Pure milk Associati

Actin; in conseque

1‘r\

AAA, dairy iarmers in t

strike in the fall of 1

action met with little

the railroads and had a

tiNi”

‘

L.—

ensuzdgw; Chicapi11f

to difficulties in prev
strikers accept d a thi
r . . 19
.Jo1n1er.

Earlier a CQJHLtL

J

‘7‘,L-1 r ‘r‘,zl-I'\ --~‘vr‘

net with Presiden”

for a NhA code of ayric

telieved,

invathi s 31

Chiea;

Q
\r

among th processors.

other demands to

faimlrmortgages, tnkj the

above the present level

:3
/

(‘.,
‘lr
VAI

N

L.

311,:
11v 1

I
A

Heal, XVII

 

II,

 

in

r currency inflation,

havemter ll,

,, .3 , If .V,_, V. .r‘ t 1 ~ s- ‘1 . ,J _, ._1, ,
toil ioifiueis pliyf1t 1eitule tin)
1,.1 "z ,I j , In: ~ ..

1:11 .301 .1. xE: (bfiiCu-Vo‘)
, -. ’1 x O 1.. 1‘r‘ -‘ . -‘" . :5 1 w ,. ..(1‘ ,r“ - l , ;. .1, -
LLUU UL ULQGE.)£)J_LLLL‘Q(A LLI‘JL-‘&,I- idLLEU levy

he C1icayo milk-shed launched a new

)3; initial effort at direct

success. Deputy sieriffs hao bUBDQLC
ceonpanied milk trucks into Chicago
1ft; per cent e1 its runnkhl supply. Due

ent in the picket lines the

by Governor henry

ee Qi‘g})VClfllJrS

"f'.l‘l ,,-,'\I‘. ~ C ‘. “‘1" 'r‘
Hicctjuciu, ouheil DQ110061,

n 4—

Franklin D. Roosevelt and had c“lled
ulture. Such a code was essentia

-- <~ ‘ 341,. —.- '-._r—‘ , 3 1n 1'."'-.-
Ui‘CzCI’ LU LL01 Hicil H110

ilk industry s well as restore order
President noosevelt terned this and

ieoeral refihahcih; oi

.3.

' "D
‘1 r . . ~. Y . 1‘ . C‘.
pty~pnh3 01 s

price

to Le rediculcus. The P1esioent's

-‘, A

11;;

1 (Cctoter 27, ), e1

U.

-“..

quS) Q.

answer precipitated the threat of widespread strikes and
J_.1 1,0 ,.., -- 1, 1... \mw ‘ 7‘7,“ (1.. .1. ._V, :9 , .1.“ 1: ¢._ .- i 12 .1 i, r, “ ._, ,3 ~ 11: 3
one distributois e111ihwnpte1 3 voluhtarily iiknxiaseo the piice
o 1 4_r V 1" v ._ -'. r z “-s- 1‘ H '1‘ f -\ _ r ‘_ 1h. ,3. . ‘1‘ o P‘
paid to farmers from al.{: per hundred pounce to ”2.10. This
4

increase was passed on to “he consumer by raisin; the retail

—-_-o

. . . . 2i - . p
price of milk from 10 to 11 cents per quart. This was tn-

crux of the dispute in the Chicago milk shed. The farmers
complained that the distributors always passed any price

1

increase to the producer on to the consumer thus decreasing the
demand for milk which the distributor insisted forced him to
reduce still farther the price paid to the producer.
An investigation into the spread between the price paid
to the farmer and the price paid by the consumer was launched.
It revealed that when retail prices were cut the farmer's price
was also cut but that the distributor's margin of profit
remained the same. Further, increased retail prices were seldom
p seed on to the producer. In 1929 the average price paid to
producers was $2.50 per hundred pounds, while in 1932 the
average price was down to $1.32, a cut of nearly fifty per cent.
In the same period retail prices had dropped 37 per cent but
0 22
the middle man's profits had fallen only lo per cent.
Bootlegging also figured in the farmers' predicament. By

purchasing milk from farmers at 6188860” rices the bootlegger

*d

and chiseler could undersell the established dealers. Milk
racketeering soon became big business and before long the Pure

21
Nation, CXXXVIII (February 7, 1934 , 156.

221:9: CXXXVIII (February 7, 1931:), 156.

Li?

L' .
I

j

T . 1r ("I . " .. a s . I“ 4" ‘ ,—.. 4— . 1r ' .- 1’ 1 "A, \ - . J ‘ f . v‘ . r-. . y- ‘ V~ —. ,
hi k AsSOCiation was iOJCUU to hire Thiee—Eingered Jack White

and Murray humphrey in order to stop the killing of cattle and

A

4

. 5 -, . . J . .
burning oi barns and dumping of milk. Sucn was the confusion

that some persons thought that farmers were burning their

(13

own barns and distributors mashing their own bottles.

At the height of this chaotic situation the government
announced that its efforts to enforce fixed retail prices were
unsuccessful because the marketing agreements were not designed
to cope with chiselers, racketeers, and just plain over pro-
duction. In its place the administration announced it would
institute a program that would emphasize producer's prices. By
this point recognition was given to the principle that
production controls would be necessary in order to sustain
higher prices.2u The flaw in the processing tax was that it
was passed on to the consumer in the form of a higher price
thus curtailing consumption and necessitating another production
cut in the future. The Chicago milk marketing agreement then
was bound to collapse. Effective enforcement was not provided
and the provisions of NBA that were observed served to enforce
exorbitant profits to the milk companies.

The reason for unrest am01g the dairy farmers is clear.

By Secretary Henry Wallace's own admission, the task of pro—
viding milk for the nation's second largest city was bungled

25

when AAA took over. Because the government was not willing to

23 o T ,— fi v
JBUSIHOSS Meek, Maren l, 1933, p.7. See also Newsweek,
III, January 13, 1934, 10.

 

 

Business Week, January 13, 1934, p. 10.

 

2DChristain Centurw, LI, January 17, 1934, 76—77.

 

\ 1‘1
\fl

back the agreement with its enforcement poweqs, Chicago did
not get its milk and the farmers did not get a fair price for
their product. The effect of the abrogation of the marketing
agreement, on the first of January, 1934, on the dairy farmers
was catastrophic. In a situation where nobody believed that
the farmers were getting a decent price for their milk, the
department's course of action threatened them with a cut of
70 cents a hundred pounds from a blended price of $1.90 per
hundred. That in effect was what the dealers proposed. The
price at the moment had been $2.10 per hundred for milk sold
to consumers as fluid milk and $1.45 for milk sold as cream.
On this basis the farmers were paid a combined price or
blended price of $1.90.26
The immediate cause of the January 1934 dairy strike
was the Chicago milk war. Unable to meet the competition
of the independent and cut rate dealers, the major processors
proposed to cut the price paid to producers from $2.10 to
$1.40 per hundred. Other factors contributed as well. The
Illinois dairy farmers had resisted appeals to join the
earlier strikes in Wisconsin and Iowa but nevertheless had
watched the militant action with interest. Meanwhile, their
greviance had grown because AAAhad failed, they believed,
to make good on its promise to stabilize the Chicago market
while at the same time seemingly condoned the unfair practices
of the distributors.27
The surprise came when the Pure Milk Association declared
Ibid. See also New York Times, January 0, 1934.

27

New York Times, January 11, 1934.

 

 

\fr

1. 1

one strike with out waiting to negotiate. The directors of
the associatiun met on Sunday January 5 and voted to strike the
next day. By allowing only one day's notice the Big Three
distributors, Bowman, Borden, and Wieland, who together
supplied Chicago with 70 per cent of its total needs, had
no opportunity to lay in a supply.

On January 6 the pickets were out in force and shortly
they made effective their vow to halt the flow of milk into
Chicago. Farmers armed with clubs blocked the roads and
milk trucks either turned back or their loads were dumped.
Disobedient drivers were mobbed and on several occasions blood
was spilled. In three days hicago was desperate as its milk
supply had almost completely dried up.29 By one account less
than twenty per cent of the normal supply reached Chicago.
Outlying towns received even less milk as the effectiveness of
the pickets lines extended from a point deep in Indiana all the
way to Racine and Kenosha in Wisconsin. Picket activity was
greatest in the vicinity of the Wisconsin~Illinois line, McFenry,
Lake, Kane, and Will counties and in Northern Indiana. Gary,

Indiana, for example, received only two truck loads of milk
“0

L:

on the sixth.

The 18,000 member Pure Milk Association that conducted the

New York Times, January 6, 1934.

 

29Nation, CXXXVIII (February 7, 193%), 156. Newsweek, III,
January 13, 1934, 10. Newsweek, III, January 20, 1934,12.

30

 

New York Times, January 7, 1931.

 

D7

.1

trike was a well disciplined organization. In fact, the

S

association was so well organized that it could legally have

.'.1

raised the prices to farmers within tie AAA code had it had

I O

the support of the national enforcement powers. With the strike
under way it quickly proved its effectiveness. First, in drying
up Chicago's milk supply. Second, by establishing strict
controls on the milk shed boundaries it prevented s bstandard
milk from reaching Chicago while at the same time it provided
the city with enough milk for its babies and hospitals.31
Walter Singler's Wisconsin Cooperative Milk Pool was the
only farm organization in the Chicago milk shed that was
opposed to the str ke. As we have already seen, the Pool had

conducted unsuccessful strikes in 1933 and had abandoned the

strike as a weapon. Now it was willing to ship 500,000

r)

2

quarts a day into Chicago.J That, however, was no; enough.

On January 7, wagon drivers were told not to report to
work as the supply of milk available would not be enough to
continue home deliveries. On January 8, association pickets
halted two trains of the 800 Line at high's Crossing in Lake
County by waving flares. The first was a passenger train and
was allowed to continue. The second, included several baggage
cars which were searched and a number of cases of condensed
milk were seized. Meanwhile, milk was also dumped at Walworth,

’3

4 Christian Century, LI, January 24, 1934, 122-123. New
I ff 4‘ I
York Times, January 0, l9j4.

 

 

(- I .

32New York Tim>s, January 7: 193“?

 

QC)

Lyons, and dast Troy in Halworth County. On the same day two
milk plants were wrecked.33

That Washington was not too concerned about the Chicago
situation can be seen by its formulation of a new dairy plan
which the Department of Agriculture officials thought would
allow milk producers and distributors a chance to work out
their differences: if they cared to take it. On the seventh,
Secretary Wallace sent a telegram to the Pure Mi k Association
offering to enforce a new price for milk if the association
would end the strike by Monday the eighth. He stipulated in
the telegram that the price would be, ”suggested by us for
farmers with additional understanding that an early attempt
will be made to improve all dairy farmers' incomes when the
administration's pending plan for production control takes

’\
4
II.)

effect for all dairy producers. On January 9, the

Association refused Wallace's offer of a new code under AAA

and instead offered a concession of its own. The original

demand for $2.10 a hundred was lowered to a basic rate of €’—,3l.85.35
The administration countered with an offer to enforce the AAA
agreement if the farmers would take $1.70. The Pure Milk
Association found this unacceptable, as the resulting price would
not have met the costs of production, and descended on city

hall. Mayor Edward Kelly and the City Health Commissioner

listened to the leadeiship and agreed to help. By threatening

Lk)
LA)

New York Times, January 8, 9, 193A.

 

LU
J:

New York Times, January 8, 1934.

 

Ur)
Ul

New York Times, January 9, 1934.

 

\CF
I")

to withhold operating licenses, the cut rate dealers were
forced to agree to respect the standard milk price.
At a time when all eyes were turned to Washington to
allievate the dairy producers condition, nothing more was
required than for a local government to refzse to allow cut
rate dealers to operate. The farmers had wanted this under
AAA but were denied it. Thus, control of the milk situation
in Chicago passed out of the hands of the national government
into those of the local.
On January 10, Mayor Kelly proposed submitting the issues
to arbitration and a truce in the strike was signed by the
Association and independent and organized dealers. Under terms
of the truce a three man arbitration board was to be
appointed. One member by the Milk Dealers' ssociation, one
member by the farmers, and they in turn would appoint a third
member. The appointees were to determine a fair price for
the farmers' milk which the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
would enforce by rigid licensing of milk distributors. The
arbitration committee determined on a price of $1.85 per

1_

hundred and expected that the retail price of milk would be
reduced from 11 cents and eventually to 9 cents per quart.37
Secretary Wallace, thereupon, hastened to inform Mayor Kelly that
$1.70 was the maximum price that was economically justifiable

and would not enforce an agreement calling for a figure higher

’1 /"

3UChristian Century, LI, January 24, 1934: 123-

’) 7
‘\
.2

 

New York Times, January 11, 193A.

 

id

to

than t1.70.

1

'.7,--\ .‘.. J .1- ~. -. -. 7. -I,. 'n ‘- I. ‘|“ - '. 1 , _ ~' r‘ ‘. '1’ “- «. 3‘ - I“: '. 1’ '- r
Hofsllingtt.‘fl UiC. 1-‘v'L: 111LL1.CI LL) 8:. r"111.'L;U1 L11L Cell"

.1

completely, however, and on r‘e ruary A ordered every distributor

-u

LDL’UUUCCLE. 1‘11.

:h1 ChicaLyD to payiinie

—q

5 a hundred for Class 1:
milk having a butterfat content of 5.5 per cent. The new
price, to be enforced Ly rigid AAA Licensing, compared un-
favorably to the 92. 20 provided for in the first AAA 8 ieentnt
and the $1.35 proposed by the artitration board which had
ended the producers' strixe. Thus, the AAA be ad a second

"1-4L. »‘ ’ ‘ ' r ' ’ ‘r ‘-‘ " ') N" ‘ "‘ ' fi 4’ ‘ z I; "\ "at.“ " ‘ I ‘ . -' -‘
attempt to control prices paid to p1ooute1s in the Chicago

area. Significantly, the second code did not include an

U3

9

attempt to regulate prices to consumers as did the first.
The Chicago housewife was the real winner of the Januarv
strike. Milk at the corner grocery cost 7 1/2 cents a quart
compared to the minimum 11 cents under the oriSinal AAA
marketing agreenent. As for the dealers, the shortage of
milk incieaseo CUMJUtitiuU even further. The independent
milk distributors won in the competition for home delivered
dilrilfiflile “Idwdjr, the la1gk3<iistributeu€3;h1te the "(sell and
carry” trade. Here the inde mp endents were forced to drop to
8 cents and in some cases offered two quarts for 15 cents.
Peace, however, still had not settled on the Chicago
nLi11:- sl1eci. lile :niljt

-rice war was resumed again in April as the

l
L

dealers sou th to ce11ese prices paid to farmers in order to

m

achieve an advantaye in the tattle for 1a: kets . r"he final

mu ines“ Week, January 27, 1934, of, 14- R

 

.711» V. '
43"- -- 1‘1 1i ‘ rt". 01‘ 1‘ ‘1 1»; fl*»-'f' V d11-
$.61] yet-31; _;_LL.LLS, flex/11,101 J ‘1, 1):)”.

 

blow to the illusory gains that the strike had won for the
farmers occurred on June 2d. Cn that Ca;, Federal Judge John
P. Barnes granted an injunction restraining Henry Welles and
Frank C. Baker, Milk Marketing Administrator, from enforcing

V

the marketing agreeaent. In his decision, Judge Barnes said,
ll —. (W t) 3’) . ‘7: ‘IF " Y‘x -: f - 3‘ ("C ‘v; a" f“ r‘v I 1 1 1 -' "V — 1 (‘0

‘he License ioi niln—dnicapo bales Alec, as deJQCUooogbCCmc
to the court to be an atteapt by the Federal Government to

1-

use milk dis

H

"ibutors for the purpose of doing what, under the
commerce clause of the constitution, the Federal Government
has no power to do, and what, under the T “nth amendment...

”"10

is reserved for action by the states or the people. On June

27, 43 dealers announced that the; would abandon the AAA
gulations, and thereupon the milk arice war was renewed in
earnest. The situation as it developed, needless to ear,
tenefitted neither the producer nor
In the fall of 1935, the dairy 'armers in the Chicago

milk shed made one final effort at direct action. The milk

before. The Pure Milk

(1)

marketing situation was as unstable a
ssociation, which had become jittery over slumping markets,
had voluntarily accepted reductions in the price until the

$1.47 per hundred or 3.07 cents

average for all milk fell to .
a quart against claimed production costs of 6 cents. In October

1

the Pure Milk Association split into two factions. Tae

A

dissident group, the Union Producers association urged a new

It

strike to bolster prices. The Pure Milk association was afraid

to
New York Times, June 27, 1954.

 

1

that higher prices would hurt sales even more. Nevem‘ heles* s
on October I, 2,500 independent farmers along with 5,000 Pure

M. . .. . U
milk Ass001ation ces~ erters went on rike. l

7

The dealers fou ht back by lowering prices and were met
on every road by farmers. Strikers in overalls blew up
rail road tracks and Stopped truclm enroute to Chicago. One
striker was killed. Ironically, the new strike was broken by
the very organization that had conducted the 1934 strike.
The Pure Milk Association sent ”flyinr squadrons" to break the
picket lines of the U:;1ion Producer's Association and the
cooperating Fa rme1s Educational and Cooperative Union of
American.L The latter organization commonly known as the
Farmers' Union which had given birth to the Holiday Association
ordina1ily did no t enga Se in direct action but rather preferred
to run cooperatives in the interest of its members. Despite
efforts by the Union Producer's Association, shipments rose
to 65 per cent of no1ral reaching Chicago and by late October,
the blockade having become a sieve, the Union Producers
Association decided to accept a truce during which they agreed
to deliver milk at pre-strike prices.

Neither strike had won the farmer any long range benefits.
He knew only too well the injustice done to him by the AAA in

expecting him to accept low prices with no real controls on the

distributor. It was his belief that if controls on bootleggers,

l
11TGWSVJ'CC11, VI, C>CtO~beI3 26, 193.1, lo.

42Ibid.

 

racketeers, and dealers were enforced that the demand for
mi k would have remained stable enough to ensure him his

I

cost of production. The 1edera1 government by showing
weakness put the burden on the dairy farmer. Direct action
was the result.
The Western, New York Eilk Producers' Association Strike

In September of 1932, the New Ytrk dairy farmers were
well aware of the farm holiday in the Riddle West. During
that same month, James N. Whitley, A Columbia County farmer,
who was president of the New York state Farmers‘ Cooperative
Union, proposed a similiar embargo on all products entering
New York cities saying that the New York State farmers had
suffered even more than the Mid Western farmers. Interestingly
enough, the dairy farmers of New York were not the first to
strike even though they understood the role played by the
distributor or milk dealer in depressed dairy prices better
than the Middle West farmers. Indeed, one gets the impression
that the holiday group believed in an uncertain, intangible
way that the system of distribution tipped the scales against
them. The New York farmers, however, were absolutely sure
that the middle man was taking too large a share of the
consumer's dollar. It therefore, became for the New York
producer a battle, not for attention, but rather, a battle to
reduce the middle man's profit.

The second point shoub be made perfectly clear. The efforts

43New York Times, September 1, 1932.

 

C' \x

of Reno and Singler were aimed in the direction of getting
national attention. True, they wanted costs of production.
But, they believed that costs of production would come as the
result of an NRA code for agriculture. The way to a code,

they believed was direct action to make their plight known.

The New York farmeis, on the other hand, went all out for
economic gains. This accounts in part for the relative better
discipline among New York farmers and the concessions by the
dealers that resulted. Indeed, whereas the Middle West strikes
ended because of lack of producer support; the New York strikes
ended because the dealers had partly met producer demands.

The New York farmers did have one thing in common with
the farmers of the Middle West. They also believed, by
mid-February 1933, that disaster would hit them before relief
measures could become effective. Justly or not, they feared
that soon milk would be selling for 50 cents per hundred.
Salvation, they declared, lay in their own hands.

On February 12, the farmers of Oneida and Lewis counties
watched with interest the actions of 6,000 striking Wisconsin
dairy farmers and shortly proposed a strike of their own.

The farmers of these two counties believed that with holding
on their part would have two important results. First, the
movement would spread to producers throughout the New York
milk shed. Second, the dealers would be forced to raise

- Lw
prices if the holding action lasted at least ten days.

The strike, which was declared on March 28, was under the

1M

New York Times, February 12, 1933.

 

' 1

~'“ f "316*“ . \ ‘1 1' ‘h' r "V " ' "" '17 '_ T-yr‘r')1 ""1‘1 ‘ ’ a . ,‘..x' r._. :’ 1"". ". “I"
leauei 1:11.11) DI. the 1161/11“, 1 1.11 Me's: New. 0th. 11 new 1011 11 1111:; P1 UUULE‘i e'
-~ '~ 1-, 1 F ‘»-M hm ‘1—1~~1 #1 ~ n. -
Aesoc1at1on. Pres1ueht Albeit ”coonceo nao tne stiike 1n 1u11

goal.

swing by harch 29. Price inprovesent was the immediate

'\ ll '-

‘j‘a ’ . .-‘ r ‘ r ‘ . 4 w 3 .1 1 4 a. ~. ‘ {a r. r — J -. ..- .1 v . ~--..(—. ,fi - -. — 1‘
11k: gtenl was; a 163ta111 o1 1+ 1/Q2 ce11ts c1 QUQL‘L 111 CO1A1ras11‘to «kle

(~11

1 1/2 cents they were gettin'. Since milk in Rochester was ei

‘4 15...;

retailed at 10 cents a quart, they thought their demand was
_- _‘ ._- f‘n- , ,7 14) rw. , 1. 1 . ...(- ,—. ,, 1.x. 1‘ 1. Wq V . ..- . .-.
JUbtilluu. 1ne producers also wanted guaranteed minimum

prices for the rest of 1933 according to a scale that took
into consideration seasonal supplies. The scale ranged from
$2.00 per hundred in April; to $1.50 in June; to t1.75 for

.00 in October. At the outset of the

N)

August; and tack t' 9

re the producers received a blended price of $1.00 per

stri

L
hundred.‘U

The strike errupted in the Rochester area on March 29
when the producers refused to renew their contracts with
the Dairymen's League because that organization was ‘he sole
supplier to the Metropolitan Milk Dealers’ Associat'on w1ich
appeared to the farmers to be an outright milk trust. Despite
the fact that thousan”s of gallons of milk were dumped and
the new producers' association claimed it controlled over half
of the Rochester milk supply there was no noticeable shortage
of milk. What had happened was the Rochester dealers had rec-

)

eived sufficient supplies of milk, amounting to 100,000 quarts, by

rail from Vernon and other outside points. These farmers who

4 '“ , _ - ., r a
DNew York Times, march so: 1933-

hfi,
'Uhew Yer1

 

Times, April 10, 93;.

r‘1

 

CC

remained loyal to the League also tried to make their regular

deliveries. Final y, trucks bearing milk purchased by retail

dealers from independent producers were allowed through the

picket lines. Only trucks bearing the Dairymen's League Label
1'.

were turned back or dumped.

The next day, the farmers were out in force and state
troopers weilding riot clubs convoyed trucks of the Dairymen's
League into Rochester. Pitched battles occurred at various
places as farmers ignored the state trooper's orders not to
try to dump milk. One arrest was made as farmers found them-
selves face to face with drawn guns. Lester Bennett, as a
result, was assessed a $10.00 fine for blocking a highway. That
evening it was decided at a conference of police officials to call
for 50 reinforcements and make wholesale arrests the next day
if the violence continued. Albert Woodhead on the same evening

' L 0
warned the members of the association to halt all violence.

The initial strike action by Woodheads farmers had a

significant result. In fact, the New York Times on April 1

 

reported that the New York Senate passed the so called Pitcher
Bill as a direct result of violence in the milk strike. The
Pitcher Bill, which took its name from its sponsor, Senator
Percy A. Pitcher, created a milk control board that was given
the power to fix maximum prices for consumers and minimum prices
for producers. Under the bill, dealers would be licensed and

fair practices would be enforced. Despite his disapproval,

L: . - '
‘7New York Times, April 10, 1933-

as

 

New York Times, March 31, 1933.

 

C",
-\

Governor Norman Lehman sent a message to the assembly urging

Q

P.

mme’iate action. The assembly leaders decided to call the

bill up early when Assemblyman Wadsworth, whose constituency was
Livingston County, pleaded for action on the bill saying,

”Blood has been shed out their near Rochester. Even if all

of us do not approve of this bill, I think it would go along

in. ‘ 7
” J The Senate and

way toward terminating this situation.
Assembly, thereupon, broke tradition and held a joint conference
on the bill too speed its passage.

When Woodhead was infonned of the Governor's message on
March 31, a Friday, he proclaimed a truce that would last until
the following Monday. Then, the strike would be resumed within
48 hours if the Pitcher Bill did not contain satisfactory pro-
visions. If it contained provisions to satisfy their demands,
however the strike would be permanently ended.

In the dehtes over the pass ge of the bill the advocates
pointed to the seriousness of the situation. For example, on
March 31, 100 riot ready state troopers were required to escort
ten truck loads of milk into Rochester fr m Syracuse and Penn
_ 50
Yard. Even the Dairymen's League approved the bill while
demanding an amendment to remove the provision giving the Milk
Control Board power to fix a minimum price to the producer. It
believed, sincerely or not, that the bill would spell the end
to cooperative farming in New York State.51

Passage of the bill, however, was not immediate. On April 7

49

New York Times, April 1, 1933.

 

5ONew York Times, April 1, 1933.

 

51New York Times, April 5, 1933.

 

Albert Noodhead declared that, ”the legislature is trying to

tire us out,”

and announced that the truce would end the next
day and the members would start the holding action anew.

Nessa

(J)

ge

were sent to the independent producer's associations
of Water Town, Batavia, Syracuse and Newport urging them to
join the strike. The new strike plan called for dealers paying
directly to producers 3 1/2 cents a quart to have unlimited
supplies. A total blockade would be made effective against the
Dairymen's League, however.

Early on the morning of April 9 the senate sent the milk
control bill to Governor Lehmax. Albert Woodhead was roused
from his bed, informed, and immediately called a halt to the

[f'
strike. The next day, Governor Lehman signed the Pitcher Bill.)

(at)

Perhaps, this is the time to clarify the grievances of the
New York dairy farmers in general and more specifically, their
grievance against the Dairymen's League. Actually, the discon-
tent of the New York farmers went back to events in the twenties.
The Dairymen's League had struck successfully in 1919 because
it solely represented the producers and purchased only their
fluid milk for resale to the dealeqs. Surplus milk in the
form of cream was sent to the farmers' own cooperative cheese
factories for processing. Starting in 1919 the large milk
companies, chief of whom were Borden and Sheffield, bought up
the pasturization plants and cheese factories and by 1933 were

the only market left to purchase surplus milk. The farmers had

Ul

O
C— - . o '
New York Times, April 8, 1933-

 

\.I1

(,1)

New York Times, April 11, 1933.

 

no choice but to sell to the League which to all intents and

.1

purposes had become a subsidiary f the milk trust. The milk

Q)

trust which had actually become a monopoly, therefore, was in
a position to establish prices paid to farmers. The price paid
the farmers was a pooled price which as an average between the

higher price for bottled or fluid milk and the lower price for

54 .. .
the surplus milk. The manner in which the pooled price was
determined did not satisfy the farmers. They simply took their
milk to the company and accepted its word for the butterfat test
and the proportion of the milk used for fluid milk while the
surplus was used for the by-products.55

It goes with out saying that the farmers were unhappy with
the prices they xere receiving and by early 1933, Cornell
University could tell the farmers what they already knew:

These prices did not meet the cost of production. At that time
the New York dairy farm rs were getting between 1 and 2 cents
a quart for milk that cost them over 2 cents to produce. How

They totaled

(«
C
U)
'0

did they know that they were not meeting co=*
the sums of all expenses for cattle feed and divided by the
number of pounds of milk sold. They found the cost per cow

oy dividing the cost for feed by the number of cows. The latter
figure was then divided by the number of pounds per cow and

the result gave them their costs of production. while accurac

is almost impossible, the true costs of production were probably

 

r1
JLComi onweal, XVIII (October 27, 1933), oil. M tion
CXLI (0c :ober 50,1935)
55 T

hew Republic, LYKVI, September 13, 1933, 123.

 

I “ > d ’— l'fl ’\ ’- ?— \“'\ ‘* (w .~- ~v- r‘" j - - “6:: T) '— - 7., 51-. -- 1‘r 3 . ‘u —- r! ‘
1181111163011 3.3 c111 ' 4.3 thus Lie-1' 11181" .’ Rite: liLin’illL. their
costs, many farmers found themselves working for nothing. Others

’3

found that they could not get on relief because they owned
farms. Meanwhile the milk haulers got more in wages than
they did.

Even as the producers faced bankruptcy, the profits of the
milk companies continued to increase. In 1933, in New York
it was demonstrated that the dealers wer- getting two and a
quarter tilnes as much for distributing as the farmers ;ot for
producing the milk. Yet, their boo 'reeuire methods appeared
to show that they were almost charitable or;aniz at ions, worki1;

R7
without profit.“ An audit conduc‘t ed by the Agricultural

1

Adjustment zQfliUlet‘a i n about the same tine showed the dealers

to be making a real pro fit of more than 15 per cent.’” The

next year, 1934, estimated dividends for Borden and National
Dairy Products were fifteen million dollars. The average annual
salary of 22 principal executives of the two companies was

$fl8,055. To pay the salaries of those 22 executives, it required

59

gross income of 1,s50 fa11s with a total of 16,500 cow

U)

The same year that dairy farms were being sold for tax s because

prices to producers were so low; prices to the consumers were

00

_

so high that children hao to go without mi k.

The farmers were not the only ones who we re talien advantage

 

'3 1r . , _ _ .. ‘ . _ ‘rT -~—
5 IE tion, CALI October 30 1535): 502. Connonweal, AVIII,
(OCtObCl CF: 1933 , e11. New Yc-r k Times, August 2%, 1933.

 

New Republic, LXXVI, September 3, 19:3, 123.

 

New fie1tub1ic, LXXVIII, March 28, 1934, 171.

 

-~ vn "r—1- ’2! (‘9‘ "*7
OL'ULll, JXU , l'id d, ngzl, dUb—EdU o

ew Re1>ub1ic, LXXVIII, Narch 28, 1374, 171.

 

‘ r‘ r‘ \15' r-x‘r'. ‘ F 1' - -"‘ '3 ’*~ " 1N 7 A c“ ’. a, "3 F1113 'T‘H " V “' ' " r“
oi because c1 paoi tar albinQ positions. 1he criter-salcshcn
I _l .‘_ X 4" , “ '1 J.“ A _'_ V ‘I ~ I "\l .v-- .1 -_ ’_ ‘0 __ .‘ ,‘.” V 1" I” ‘, 1’_
ion the CO‘“8nlC‘ lound bHuu since 1323 their wages had seen

halved and were disha3ed that the cospanies 1esisted the

establishment of a milk code on the milk i1 du ’try. *n some

~ r7“ 1 1 ,1 UN ~r 1 ,'. Ll
areas they worked a (0 hour wee; ior wages of sl0.50 to 321.00.

The consumers were als hard hit. At one point a threat of a
consum r strike coincided with a protest b3 the farmers.hi1pl
raising the price of nilk was not the answer. According to

one study in New York, some families were pa3rin; as much as

l8 per cent of their income for mi k and not getting enough

An increase in the price of mil; would mean dec1e s ed cons ulpti on,

o2

J

oos e iniaht a rta it? ra‘1s 01L “t f rxers.
b (‘t d n n 10 ‘ l ‘3 to , nd b 1 1u a h

A word should be said about the marketing agreenents under
AAA. While there was Jus ice in the farmer getting one price

"surplus”, there

for his ”quota” and a smaller price for the
wer no restrictions on the disc1ibutors. As has been suggested,
the farmers believed that the distributors sold for ‘he fluid
milk price, milk that they had purchased at the surplus price.
Since price cuts to the consumer were always passed on to the
farmer while any price increases to the farmer were passed on to

the consumer, the dis tr ibutor's spread of profit iever diminished

/’ '3

1

_ , UJ .
and usually averaged 25 per cent. Further, representation

in the sessions that settled on the marketing a~reements was held

chiefly b3 the Dairymen's League because it was the sole farmers'
61
62

New Republic, LXXXI, Janua ar3 9, 1935, 243.

 

Nation, CXXXVIII (June 27, 1c3A), 719.

63Nation, CXXXVIII (Janua 1“y 10 1931), 33-

(‘V

‘.\,. . , ‘;,.‘-,,,_ j . “zip.” ITAAC‘.‘ ,, r,’ ‘1 1.3 - i,
000;.)CiuciVC Cl: .LCJ. allj i’C'C'JgiilacC Cli;C«C’l CCU 06 law’. .4 UCC’ CLLLC

uallgg docjjuited lg; tlm: '61;, co 4kuliu~

(—k

d o1 anization was qc

*5
Q)
I“\'

theortically was to Largaih with, the cisvii utors, in

},_J
or

fir-ll
r" 1 , t _ I-) ,t .. r .. .. .‘ U‘t'
81:1. ECt, Qifiew up L116: (JUL 'CC lCllCS LIlC‘nLL‘C’lV )L 0

These were the circumstances then that had led to the
initial strike action of the new Yorh dairy farmers. They
had gotten their state milx control board but were not read;
to completely forget “Lou; direct action. Indeed, the Central
New ikvrlc Staix: £81m eis, lJl Heiiehner Cwnh1t3, Sled lg; Starflxxy and

l 1

Philip Piseck, called for minimum prices to te estaeli s1 ed
immediately or they would ca all a new strike. Since they claimed

the support of 85,000 of New York's one million farmers they

,.

1’... r"

. . . , . ‘ U
were in a peeition to threaten a new strixe.
rm 1 - 4—H l exam-m '3'” m. l" d ‘t‘ a» a 4., ».
ine MilK Contio Loaie, howetei, ef se 0 we lusnee into
fixing prices to produce s. It prefer ‘ ed, it said, to stabilize

the market L3 es tatlisnih, consumer prices at 10 to 13 cents in

“ .1.) 0 l 1 7_ no - -.- 1 {)6 (n ' - ..
order to assure the iarmer a marget ler his HilK. inis it

did de sp pite the feeling in some quarters that by lowering the
price of milk and regulating the profits of the middlema:
demand would be stimulated to such an extent that restrictions
‘ - t , 67

on proouction mi ht not he needed.

On April 20, 1,000 angry farmers met at Albany and demanded

62+ 7 _ o r r1 ' - , 7‘?" '1’“;
hation, CkkAVlII (January 10, logb), Lo.

6’ - __ - . . ,
9 :ime, XXVIil, Septemter 14, 19:6, '3.

flew Verk Times, April 16, 1933.

 

67Wew Republic, LXXVIII, March 23, 1934, 171.

 

,- ~‘1 . '1 o _ n '_ _c '\“7 1' ‘_ '3 \ ‘ I, \ '1 fl r‘, A, ' ”_3 ‘. ° ‘3‘ ’v _ _I _ ,_ _, [1 ’. /-l
_LLAL..eCJlE-l‘t0 aCtloLl t3 LLIC‘ podl'o to LUV c3 “Linimum pi‘lCe‘ 0i l/f;

._l

cents a quart to the producers t* hay 10. Should the board

fail to act tv that time the leaders announced that thew would
a J J

I

call another stateL-Jide strike. Charles .1. Baldwin, chairman of

1 -\-- _ ,3 _ ,9 T .4 '__,.‘J. .0 ,. . " .. .—4- 1 ,~ l-H' -Y .- “n __ 3:!
the Milk Control hoard, said that it huth not te 'inLIMIoateo”

V

when threatened with aitnewed strik C. h. MacVe3, Chairman

(1‘

of the Dairynen's Protective Association oi St. Iawrence County,

countered, ”We intend to get what we want....If I can not go

bacnc‘to ttu: faimKHfiS...aIKj GCSLH%£ tneuxiniey 81%: belly, to {get a

fair price for their milk; I will not be responsitle for their

. )

actions.00
The Milk Control board net on May 13 and finally fixed the

minimun price to be paid the producer and thus definitel3

ended the threat of strike. The new order, which went into

effect on May l5, called for dairy farmers within a 200 mile

radius of New York City to be paid $1.83 for 100 pounds of

Class I milk. The producers had hoped for al.75 or 3 l/2

cents a quart. The new rules gave them M cents a quart. The

new rules also forbade the dealers to deduct the freight to New

York from the price paid to producers in up-state areas.
Significantl3, the new rules also prohibited the dealers from

selling milk purchased at the pool rate on the fluid market.

Thus, all milk bound for tne fluid market would have to bring

’ I 1 . .1 J . 3 _ E; k.)
the fluid price iron the dealers. ’

The interlude of peace on the dair3 front in New York lasted

r~r

until late Jul3, 1955. During that month the milk Control Leard

 

 

:’ 1‘:
‘7‘,

granted a two cent price increase to the consumer which did

not get passed on to the farmer. Hence, the farmer was disa—

ppointed with a state agency that had been created at his

insistence. Convinced that the Soard was showing favoritism

to the dealers by adopting a price classification plan proposed

by the Dairymen's League, Albert Woodhead threatened a new

strik-. As president of the newly formed Lurire Milk Producer's

‘ssociation, he warned the Milk Control Board that 40,000

dairy farmers would strike on August 1 if they were not guaranteed

#5 per cent of the retail price for their product.70
On July 31, representatives of 50,000 independent producers

net in Utica and announced a "milk holiday” to begin the next

day. Woodhead declared that the strike would consist solely

of holding milk from the market. Governor Lehman, meanwhile,

promised state police protection to anyone conducting legitimate

business.71
On August 1 the strike was begun in four counties. Milk

deliveries were effectively curbed for several hours in Oneida,

Herkimer, Chenango and Lewis counties. Oneida County was the

core of the strike and the largest disturbance occurred near

Boonville in that county. Four hundred farmers armed with

axes and clubs had halted two dairymen's League trucks being

conveyed by sixteen cars of State Police. Encountering an

insubordinate spirit, the troops, armed with sub-machine guns

and steel helmets, went into action with tear gas and night

70

New York Times, July 25, 1933.

 

71Commonweal, XVIII (October 27, 1933 , €10.

 

-.

sticks. ihe farmers who were unused to picketihg and unarmed
were put to flight with numerous cuts, contusions and broken

J J-

heads. The rest of the state remained quiet and the intake

of dairy plants was curtailed only in the four affected counties.‘2
Four days later the farmer- -pickets were better prepared.

They had piles of rocks ready to throw as troopers eBco: ted

a milk truck near Oriskany. ‘he angry armers wielding axe-

helves, pick handles and stones set upon the troopers and

five were hospitalized with stone bruisws. The conflict was

later referred to as the Lattle of Oriskany” after the fight

between the revolutionaries and Tories and Indians on the s me

. 73

site The same day at Norwich in Chenango County milk baths

were given to farmers who refused to strike. 4

As the strike spread to Madison, Onondega and Delaware
counties on August 2, key dairy plants in central New Ytrk
reported their daily supply to be 3/% to 1/2 under normal as a
result of the picketing. Amsterdam, in Hont~onesv County, was
7?
the first city to report a milk shortage affecting consumers. D
By August 3 the strike started to get some interesting results.
Ten thousand more farmers Joined the holiday even as the Milk
Control Board met and threatened to extend the New York milk

shed into other states should the strik continue. Based on

previous experience, the board said this would be a permanent

72%
73
74
75

New York Times, August 3, 1933.

Iew York Ti ines, August 2, 1933.

 

New Republic, LXXVI, September 13, 1933

 

Commonweal, XVIII (October 27, 1933 , 611.

 

 

.1 ,~\: {I ‘ '3 4:. " ,-.‘:’W \ -,' _‘1‘~<' ‘ _."'r‘7‘ ‘ ~‘ " ‘lt ", r‘;l"‘ " I‘d 1' J. Y‘ ' ' V1 ‘ “- I 1 _‘ ‘ r“
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- 1x" ' l' ' I“ ,\ . 1« ‘L‘ rg I“ I"; . a 1 r . \ <1 ., ‘ ~-_ -, v j . -. 1 ‘ , ‘ I\; ('1‘ . I“ 5‘ I" "1': ‘, -‘.~‘ '1 I '\_ ‘ . K‘ .1
LLIA..AI.1 LC) CVCt‘LJiJL‘a L/LJka‘ (.3119 CI‘J;1C4{JL1LLI\4C4 .AL_L..L-Lo .LJLLC .LQ..-L.1(:L S .A. {,ile—LL
1 1, y-l-,.~, 1.", . V . rai‘rv 1". 7-.—\ ’ ' "‘r’ .. '. ‘— -— 1»,- ~? --, .‘~4,_. .~_~‘.‘ 1.». . ‘11: “3 r» x ;;
1n, e11teyk;irr, Liie 1;t1unoo iki o,£lJJ Aiilxt pififlJULA.i£ tul {sic initlcnic

Cooperati a and 2,000 other producers in hiagara and srie

v‘
1 11,11 77 p‘., n ,_ I.imtit , M “be“ . .Jvi_ ,1.
Counties. ine; also threatened to carry tne strike into
adjoining states if the nilk shed were extended.

At this point a droup of oroducers' representatives met
with the governor and the chief spokesman, who was n.n. hathturn,
a director of the Dairynen's League, eXpressed the Lelief that
the violence was due to the work of outsiders. That same day,
August 6, the Agriculture Advisory Committee also charged
that the communists were tehind the disturbances. Felix Piseck
denied this saying, ”This strike is backhd by producers of
all nationalities...The Milk Control Board is endeavoring to
make communists of us, but we are peaceful, law abiding citizens
”78 ,

and intend to remain o. on the same day, Go ernor Lehnan

(D

was reported to be ready to transnit orders to the Adjutant
General, Franklin W. Ward, to mobilize the national guard. The
governor did, however, order the sheriffs of the twelve
affected counties to deputize as many men as necessary to quell

_ a 0 :1 . ~n , _- ,,\ ,i H - 1. ,1 7 ,.,,\ . .' n : ...3 - -\---—. — (.1, 3’" ,.‘ \u n r
the disorders Sayiu~ i nave leceIVec iepoits o1 violence and

intimidation in those counties which are preventing law abiding

'xl
cw

New York Tines, August A, i93g.

 

Itid.

CL"

«1 -q
«J

New york lines, August o, is

”(’7

citizens from conducting the business of marketing and
7e
_0 o _ o o 1 H J
distributing milk, .

Governor Lehman refused to consider the demands of the
farmers until the strike was halted and at his insistence
Albert Woodhead did so on August 13. While the strike in
western New York was called off completely, the Piseck brothers
in central New York insisted that their members intended to
grant only a one week truce in order to give the Governor, the

.1

legislature, and the Hi k Control Board a chance to act on
their demands. On August 14, 500 farmers marched on Albany
and when Governor Lehman refused to talk to them they decided

«L. 1 4i -1 o 80
also to call an and CO the strike.

As for the effects of the strike: There was no milk
famine in New York nor was there likely to be. The governor
had made it a policy to aid truck drivers in running the
picket lines. The Health Commissioner had formulated plans
that would have extended the milk shed into such states as

81
Minnesota and Iowa if that were necessary.

The public was more sympathetic to the Isirymen's League
and Milk Control Board because they sought to deal with the
surpluses. The violence on the part of the farmer was viewed

U
as premature.

Did the August strike affect price? In September the State

L3 . I“!
7)New erk Times, AuQUSt 7, 1933-

 

O - .1
New York Times, August 15, 1933.

81

‘ v ' 2.- '3
new York Times, August b, 1933.

 

 

New York Times, August 13, 1133.

 

J__ 0

Milk Board published its estimate for the returns to farmers
for August. It gave the figure of 81.80 for a hundred pound
whichvas t.7o more than the average price the preceding year.

On the averare the farmers nette“ d 3.o cents for milk produced

U)

8
in August.

The next four years saw relative calm return to the New
York milk shed. The calm was d1e in part to a revolutionary
court decision. In November of 1934 the State Supreme Court
upheld, in the hebbia vs. New York litigation, the fixing of

1

prices paid the farmer for milk and the prices to be paid
by the consumer. In so doing it abandoned its interpretation of
the due process clause to mean ”laissez-faire” and returned

to an earlier inteipre tation of due procedure. In effect it
held that milk was a paramount inducer; and not essentially
private. This decision cleared the way for the New York Milk
Board to regulate prices which it did until March of 1937 when
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the board had no
authority to control interstate milk.82+ The point was that

the surrounding states were a part of the New York milk-shed.
Hence, the milk control board in effect was attempting to

re dulate inte1 state commerce. The milk dealers took advantage

1

of this decision and snortly the price paid to producers began
to drop.
As the price dropped the dairy farmers be an to re; roup

again for another stIike. Thus, the Dai r37 Farmers' Union came

 

C) 9

U , -: ~ 3 3
New York Times, ocptcmocr 3, 193;-

O

011

New Republic, LXXXI, November 21, 1934, 35-

 

F
, J
._)
(-
Cs
('—

:1)
H
F
(L
If,
(5"
(”1
(j
(“1
:4
(N
C)
(‘1
C.)
h
C
}_

milk cow with due: of a

. - “Mir-M313 ‘ r N, " _" . ‘ _ ' .~ -' ‘l\’:
its henbershia was Letlu

‘-

In July, 1937, the

‘V 0

quart. mhe *istributgrs

. .f ‘3‘ v ‘ -1” - .
grace A. 7 The CuHSUhCr

o

the faimmn‘gpot e cents

report by John J. Bennett Jr.,
revealed that since her

all milk retailed in th'

fix- 'g._‘_, -1. i 3,-
CL: pd LilC Udi’,

,_
V

'11a11 3 jfEJ? (JCIit or: tiie tr

aim} E ntilh vniile 11183 Enid

 

 

 

1 1 r

 

‘iding. It ash: led

arm. It sou At to bar

W U H

Further, the

OJwew hepuhlic, XCII,

J ‘ ' .'-,,—. - 1 v »- . 1 .
ULUL; ihessweeh, “a you 19,

collective

uichly enrolled

initiation

per cow per

Le 1oo,ooo,

yain collectively,

the in01sinx3 to the

1r~ I u ,. .‘ n p‘ , . ‘ .q ‘ f \ «*‘ " j _ 4 J l V ,.J
,dihiflq agencies tended to to

J-

'. T’f‘x~~~,fi<r\ "
inVce went

profits

, 1,. .j . ,"_ \(r-f \ ‘5 ,i'. x“; (u - 1' f; ,
.AllilUllVlbdl’ xxJ{V, (/CztUL-C.L “'0, l)_;(_),

/

7-H»;
k/KAU

a raise

\n

\

fee e1 10 cent-

dominated

strial—l“bor technique to

3 ,. . , - 4.1,.
_Lll'... Va’luil

ODD produceri

At its

its stre‘

' a,
LILLK/

ichest

harxet collect-

f 3/% cent

Cdutfi.

dictated by

7 —.. 1“ " ‘. ~ . ~- 3... ‘ ‘-‘ 7- ‘ --~ :1 (N f A 0. ~_‘ *I "
CziSol’lbU‘t/UIS Silk/”NCO Guiqlll'tlpi;

I"

‘or Grade A

C 011E} U;.LE:l"

showed

\
v

":1,
'LiU

1t‘w"‘ci ‘-. "fili-
biiUcC‘, 0.1.1;—

“the
U x, .L

dd

J

n 1" '3 ._ - , _ I, 1. , . ,YP, V. . _ n w .. _, ,1,— 1 1; (I V.__- 1, U‘) 1' ,
Oi lOo per cent on the teiutnnixiy—prouucts of mili. J That
sa me month the average p1 1013 to the farmer for one hundred

pounds was 81.76.90

On July 25, 1937, Susan Jenkins, vice-chairman of the New
York City Hilk Cons11e1 Protective Association, s1nt a letter
to the Dairy Farmers' Union offering to ”do all in our power

”91

a strike.

*5

to build up consumer syniathy in case 0
The milk strike was begun on August 1 when union members
refuse d to deliver milk to twelve Sheffield plants in the north

part of the state because the company planned to lease the

plants as condenserie- w71ich would mean lower prices. The

effects were immediate. At Canton only 15 of 550 producers
'x . 1-1 _~ V - 1 J- r r ‘ ” n f" 5’ 9 2 C‘
delivered their niln. At halone only 40 01 210. support

was widespread and included consumer and trade unions. On

L;

(12

August 8 the Union claimed it was successful in diverting almo
total sales away from the Sheffield plants and announced that
it intended to continue the strike until prices were raised,
and the Sheffield Producers Coperative ssociation was abolished
because it was a company ur ion. 93
The power of disciplined direct act ion can be seen from the

events hat followed. On August 19, delegates of 75 farmers

marketing cooperatives voted to shut off the entire flow of milk

0
oC . m
JNewsweek, XI, January 10, 1938: 37-
90 T 0 (fi . _ . 1 ’3", ’5
hation, (septemoer 19, 1930), 321.
91‘T v ’ ‘ rfi! - rN’ "2
lieVJ XOY‘K iirllC‘C , JUl .77 (:0, 19370

92”
93?

 

ew York Times, Aug st 2, 1937.

 

ew York Times, Auy ust 9, 1937.

 

}_J

to New York City on September 1 unless their demand for A0
cents a hundred increase was met. The August price had been
91:

$2.00. ”Now its $2.40 or fight,” said one delegate. Pext

day, the dealers offered a 35 cent increase and plans for the
strike were temporarily deferred. On August 21 the offer was
accepted. It meant $750,000 added income for 50,000 upstate
farmers for September. homer S. Rolfe, president of the
Metropolitan Milk Producers Cooperative Bargaining Agency
Incorporated, said, "Our strike threat caused the dealers
1 _. , , J _. “93
to agree. It is recognition ior us.
On the twenty fifth the producers at Pulaski and Lacona

struck Sheffield plants when they were offered only $2.12

1 1 0 1 {'1 "~ [- J- n 96 ’1
per hundred for milk 01 3.; per cent butteriat. llO iarmers
at Boonville joined the strike on September 6 by diverting
their milk to other plants.

The str ke draii

(‘."“

ed on into the fall with sporadic picketing
and holding activity that extended from St. Lawrence, Franklin
and Clinton counties into the counties of Ostego, Lewis, Oneida,
and Madison. In order to reinforce their demands, the farmers
demanded that the Dairy Farmer's Union be recognized as the

sole bargaining agent in order to eliminate company controlled
unions. On October 28 the Sheffield Condensed Milk Company
announced a new schedule of prices to be paid producers in

St. Lawrence, Franklin, and Clinton counties where the boycott

94

Ibid.
95

,

K

0
New Republic, XCII, September 8, 1937, 127.

New York Times, August 22, 1937,

 

 

.0 <1 I.

had been in eiiecc since Aug st 1. The price offered was

S2.35 per hundred for fluid milk and $2.00 for milk sold a

97

(I)

fluid cream. Mire thousand farmers in 17 counties demanded
$2.50 and when refused declared a new strike.

The strike affected 2,500 dairies and because of diversion
of available supplies into the fluid milk market, cream fell
into short supply on the thirtieth. That same day 11 milk
plants with an output of 200,000 quarts signed agreements with
the Dairy Farmers' Union. The agreements included recognition
as sole bargaining agent, the union price of $2.50, and the
agreement to purchase from the union members only.98

Having met success the union intensified its efforts. my
October 31, Archie Wright, the president, claimed that the
members were holding a total of one million pounds of milk off
the New York market. While fresh cream continued in short
supply due to diversion of surplus milk to fluid sales, frozen
cream largely made up for the shortage. Supplies in the stores
fell off slightly but home deliveries continued.99 On November
6, Borden and Sheffield decided to capitulate and signed an
agreement with the Metropolitan Cooperative Milk Producers
Bargaining Agency to pay $2.63 for fluid milk and $2.25 for

fluid cream and the New York strike was brought to a permanent

97New York Times, October 29, 1937.
98

 

New York Times, October 31, 1937-

 

c 1 . . , ”
Jghew York Times, November 1, l9j7-

 

end.100

The New York dairy farners' actions represent a logical
outgrowth of farmer discontent in the early thirties. The
farm holiday and penny sales in Iowa got national attention.
The dairy strik s in Wisconsin and Illinois focused that
attention on the enormous gap between producers' prices and
consumers’ prices. When government help to rectify the
inequities in the marketing system was slow to materialize;
the New York dairy farmers set about to correct that imbalance
by reducing the middle man's share through direct action that
placed emphasis on collective bargaining. Significantly, the

dairy farmers of that state were the most successful.

100. . v . .q
New York Times, Lovember 6, 1y37.

 

Chapter III

1 o '1 0 _ _ 1 3 J- 1 _ -. .' .
The Calliornia Earmers 'AssOCIate' for Action

In the history of direct action the California speciality
crop farmers present a true dichotomy. On one hand the creation
of a prorating scheme to control marketing in order to in-
crease prices represents the best of the tradition of level-
headed businessmen solving a problem largely through a disciplined
but democratic organization. Because of this the California
farmers can be credited with bringing collective bargaining
to agriculture. 0n the other hand, the Associated Farmers'

rganization represents the worst in impassioned individuals
combining together to take mob action against otheis. The
actions of this group were based on the belief that they wer
fighting less fortunate individuals in order to survive

themselves. As such the actions of this group were reactionary

I.
A

O

at a time when radicalism seemed dominate the East and Middle

West farmers.

The Revival of a Proration Scheme

The citrus fruit, cotton, and other speciality crop
farmers sought to establish a legally sanctioned method to
raise prices in the early thirties. This goal grew out of the
peculiar nature of agriculture in California. California's
speciality crops which in addition to citrus fruit and cotton

included grapes and lettuce were extremely sensitive to demand

CC:
[\—

fl...

and the market price during the pol iod 19 29-l9 39 frequently
dropped to levels that did not meet a ia'1ers total operating
costs. Now the Califor 1ia Harmsis were subject to the same
fixed charges for taxes, interest, insurance, and operating
expenses as any other farmer in the Unite d States. There was,
however, one major dif; erelce. They had to pay migrate *
laborers to pick the crops. Wages paid those worke°s were
kept low because that was the only expense within the control

1_ W

of the farme*s. This o "C of direct action in California will

L

C.)
t.“

be discussed in more detail in the section dealing with the
Associated Farmers rganization.

n

In order to meet costs Oi production the farmers had to
have better prices. Thus, while attempting to control wage
costs by resisting unionization of the pickers, the farmers
sou ght to raise prices of their ,roducts by devising an
agricultural marketing proration scheme. They hoped to raise
price levels by controlling surplus* es and establishing orW<1l
marketing procedures. In their attempt at controlled marketing
they were more success1ul than the farlers in any other region.
The grain, dairy, and beef farmers met with little success in
putting controls on the marketing of their products chiefly
because many of them believed that their own production was

but a small part of the total production and had no significant
effect upon the market price. As we have seen, the fact that

3

individual farmers did not give whole heart- a support to with

J-
I

holding meant that direct action could boos prices, only slight-
ly if at all and then only for a short time of a few day's

duration. Undoubtedly, the California farmer's bus inessnanlike

o‘o

judgement led him to see the folly of such lack of discipline.
Hence his efforts were more highly oreanized, sought the

4")

sanction of law, and because oi self—discipline succeeded in
an unpre eds nt ed manner.

The background oflxoration in California can be traced
briefly. The depressinn had a serious effect on the citrus
fruit industry. Mass unemployment had produced a slash in
demand for California specialty crops and prices were at a
drastically low level. Voluntary plans for cooperative
marketing began to break down. As prices continued to decline

thousand s of producers began to market their crops independently.
The result was a more demoralized market than before. Voluntary
proration plans among growers of lemons, oranges, grapes,
lettuce, apples, and nuts collapsed completelyb by 1932.
Prorating, therefore, was not new to California farme1s. They
had throu; hout the twenties regulated the size and timing of
marketin1 in order to keep the price level up.2 The point to
be made is that these early plans were voluntary and did not
have the force of law.
Baily in 1933, with the backing of the California Farm
Bureau, an act for compulsory prorating was passed by the
state legislature. Under the Agricultural Prorate Act local
prorate committees s si ned to each producer the proportion of
1Clark A. Chambers, California Farm Organizations:

A Historical Study of the G1an e, The iParm Bu1eau and The
Associated Farmers, l92 - 971. (Berkeley, l9j2), p. 134.

 

 

2ChamberS, pp. l33-L A. John D. {10' s, The American Nation:
A History of the United States F o;'n 180 L5 the P,e<1nt
(:knJ'York,* lfflML), p. 54o.

 

 

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DU

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(D

"‘8 OTIS .

(1")

On the tas is of this proratine appeared to be successful.
Opinions of the growers themselves differed. ihe l rte
operators and the Fa rtl Lureau maintained it raised the
general income and prices. The small farmers and the State
Grange maintained that proration brought lower prices and

decreased general income. ihey also claimed that the big

growers dominated the local program committees and Juggled
8
marketing permits to their own benefit. Here again, the

q

farmer who had only s1all qaant1t 68' to market could see no
benefit in holding a portion of his In Wdt tion off the market.

Despite the objectio1s of the small fai mei to it, the
history of prorating throughout the thirties is rather notable.
By 1936, the California F1uit nnc1an c with a member ship of
13,#OO of LEGO citius growers, had become the larsest farm
cooperative in the nation. It marketed 75 per cent of the

o

citrus fruit in California.“ Its policy of cooperation and
re 1tm~ntation enabled its members to s rvive as pr sperous,
conservative, m1ddle class gentleman farmers. It was
democratically 1un with each prodt ce1 controlling his own
production and right to withdraw on two week's notice. Each

W a

U]

paid for the precise grade of fruit delivered. Unable to
control production it did an admirable Job of controlling costs

of storage, handling, and coulmissions and even during the worse

7N

ew York Times, November 19, 1936.

 

D

EJChambers, pp. 139-140, 141.

9Fortune, XIV (July, 1936), 47-48.

09

years of the depressiom kept prices at a level that ensured
l I,

0

its members a profit.

q

The success of the association rested upon the reco nition

that when a cooperative controlled a sufficiently lar e

['3

proportion Oi any given pretucc it could dictate the

at which it would sell. The Lxchange, in effect, created a

closely integrated bureaucracy that saw to the

packing, shipping and orderly distribution of the product on a
nationwide basis. Most important it avoided putting large
Quantities of fruit on the market in any one area a1d thus
held prices up.

J

The harvegt of 1937 started out to be the “886 since the

(‘4

1

depr ssion. Carryovers oi dried and canned fruit were small.

‘ J

actor; and supplies were not more than

F’j

Qaality was satis

J

market could absorb. Canners starte

Q;

to pay good prices and
it looked like prices would be us 12 to 15 per cent over the
19?6 level. Suddenlv offers slumped off and a few Deck-rs
J u) J.

‘ 1 ' 1' 1 '6" _ - ll 0
oegan to guess prices lower than the 19;o prices. The prices
quoted threatened disaster to the growers and depression to
the state.

Theiarmers were ready to rebel. They charged the packers
with conspiracy to lower prices. The packers explained that
a country wide abundance forced California prices down. The

growers met in San Francisco in late August, 1937. Funds were

10 _ Mn

Ibi( . , I). LTD

11'3“: 1C!
_L_)\A

-' . . . TI 1.. ,. “J“ ‘7“- « f; .1 r
Lair-10:21; NCO-ix.) I‘XTL’ILJLXK; U 2U, 19¢?) ‘1').

 

-' 1 -' ~. A. J~- 7r} , .~.
_LCiiiL’lu, blOUCJLJ-llw,

collected for a publicity campaign. California senators and

representatives were urged to ’et the Federal Trade Commission

U

to investigate packers, canners and food speculators on the

grounds f unfair trade practices. Newspaper ads, ratio

’rOCrams and mass meetin s were used to inform farmers to
e. ) _J

(4 .l_ .L_ L ‘ J_ ’1 p C“ J_ F. W 1‘? 3 l [1* a o _I_ 12 (a ‘o r. _ 1 J_ _o ‘

pet them to leiuse to sell their iiUlb. since any cat in

the farmer's buying power was a serious threat to business in
California, the campaign to prevent speculators from depressing

prices to starvation levels” got the attention of all business—

n1er1.

The farmers had a legitimate complaint acainst the packers,
The California C nners' Industry Board had been created earlier
in the summer of l937 by 35 independent packers to establish
price controls on peaches. It failed to stabilize prices in
the peach industry because it functioned too well. In l937

the growers get $40 a ton. In 1938 they t p12. What had

to o

L)
1 7:) r -. ,..- s 1. 4- U- ”bl . - 1 . .0 . -‘-
happened. The control price set at 91.93 per oozen ior the
1937 crop had curtailed sales and led to a large carry over.
Wholesalers anticipating a price drop delayed their purchases.
Retailers used up their stocks and bought sparingly. Meanwhile
consumers shifted to competing canned fruits especially pine—
apple. By autumn, 1938, it was expected that some packers
would increase their pack more than normal because of the cheap
supply. The growers decided to create a new organization to
counter the canners' group.

The new group was called California Fruit Factors. It was
12 o 1 '.
Ibid., p. 45.
’3
th

_. - . 7_r . 1,, f- .L. P. ' 1:) r1)"
euSiness wees, MUUUSC c7, l9jo., do.

 

organized in San Francisco in hid-February of 1939 by bringing
represeitatives of cooperative grower organizations, canners,
and bankers together. Its purpose was to bring order to the
chaotic canned peach industry that had broUth heavy loss s
to everyone from orchard owner to distributor.ll‘L The new
organization dealt only with growers' groups, individual
canners, lending agencies and wholesalers of canned fruit. It
proposed to get an agreement among all elements on a standard
schedule of costs for fruit, picking, hauling, freight, and
packing. Fruit Factors purchased the cans, sugar, boxes, and
did the selling. It intended to fix the price at which the
fruit would be sold and divide the difference realized between
the fixed costs and the sales price proportionately between
grower, canners, and suppliers according to their share on the
fixed cost schedule.15

Later in the spring of the same year the small farmers
and the State Grange succeeded in getting a revision of the
prorate program through the state legislature on the grounds
that Proration served the large farmer and big business
interests while ruining the small farmer. The new law
abolished the Prorate Commission and placed administration of
prorate programs in the hands of the state Department of

,i .. . 1

Agriculture. By fall of 1939, prorating ceased to function.

Wartime conditionstad increased purchasing power and raised farm

 

1H
Business Week, February 25, 1939, 34.
15Ibid., p. 34.

/

lo -
Chambers, p. 143.

[‘0

prices. The question now was how to increase production

rather than how to restrict production and marketing.
The Suppression of Labor by the Associated Farmers

There is yet that other side of direct action among
farmers in California during the early thirties. It has been
suggested that the California farmers were like any others
in that they had certain fixed costs of production. They did
however, have control over one cost item which if kept low
meant they could stay in business. That item was the wages
paid to migratory laborers who picked the crops. Thus the
farmers, when threatened with the loss of their land due to
debts and tax delinquency, were determined to hold down the
one cost within their control.17 The technique brought into
use by the farmers to curtail the organization of agricultural
unions which meant higher costs for better wages and working
conditions for workers was violence clothed in the aura of
anti-communism.

The year, 1933, was marked with increased communist
agitation among the migratory workers. By the end of that
year 50,000 field workers had been involved in 30 major strikes.
Leadership for the strikers was provided by the Agricultural
Workers' Industrial Union which was under control of avowed
radicals.18 The field workers were ripe for strike action

against their farmer—employers. That year, also, problems of

1 , ..
7New Republic, LXXVIII, March 21, 1934, led.
18

 

Chambers, pp. 37, 42.

x
1‘

11L

F)

(1‘

low wages, long hours, poor housing, and other working con-
ditions were made worse by the influx of more than a million
migrants from Oklahamo and Arkansas. Collective bargaining

for the pickers had little succe s because even if the strikes

0’;

were success°u1, the workers after the short harvest season
for one crop would move on to harvest other crops in different
parts of the state. The radicals seized upon their discontent
and strike action ensued.

In August, while 700 lettuce pickers strucl n Salinas

(\I
H‘

Valley, 500 pear pickers in Santa Clara County also struck
for higher wages. Two hundred cotton pickers in San Joaquin
Valley immediately declared a sympathy strike. On October 3,
the grape pickers near Lodi went on strike. On October 10,
1,000 lettuce workers at Salinas and Watsonville struck for

19

wage increases. By October 18, 1933 San Joaquin Valley
had taken on the atmosphere of a civil war. On one side were
the migratory workers, 95 per cent of whom were Mexican, and
on the other the ranchers and their supporters who were bent
on breaking up the solidarity of the picke s.20 This intense
strike activity gave the chief impetus to the formation of
the Associated barmers of California.

The Associated Farmers organization was formed for the
purpose of dealing with the field workers' demands. Through
this agency the demands of the workers were resisted and the

formation of a workers' union repressed. The cause for reaction

19New York Times, August 16, 1933.

20
New York Times, October 22, 1933.

 

 

among the growers lay in the fact that they had several bad
years. With a good harvest in sight for 1933 and an advance
in prices they had hoped to recoup recent losses. Their

lopes were dashed when they were faced with demands for increases

y...

in wages to pickers. Communist propgandists took advantage
of the situation. Enraged over the activities of the Communists
and belieVing that strikers were intimidating non-strikers,
the farmers armed themselves to meet the situation.

In the suppression of the workers, the fruit, vegetable,
and cotton farmers had the tacit approval and cooperation of

22

city, county and state officials. In the Lodi strike, for

example, 40 grape picker strike agitators were run out of the

community by growers and citizens who had gathered ostensibly
2

for the purpose of helping the officers to keep order. In
Tulare County, on October 10, 1933, four men were killed and
two were left lying after a pitched battle between farmers

and cotton picker strikers. Every available deputy sheriff

and state patrol man were sent to the scene until finally,
Governor James R. Ralph made it clear that he would send the
state militia into the county if the county officials proved

24

unable to quell the disturbance. Likewise the farmers had
the support of muncipal and superior courts. Most of the press

also threw itssmpport to the side of the farmers. Meanwhile,

farther south, in the Imperial Valley an investigation into

 

 

2libid.
22 1, ,’.. 04"“: "YW _ 1 1 1, _W 1 (‘8 ~ rs." PC)
Cniistain Century, LI (February 2 , 193%), 2o2.
JNew York Times, August Id, 1933.
24

New York Times, October 11, 1933.

the violence of the winter of 193% and 1934 was conducted.
It showed that tear gas, clubs, and illegal arrests were

. , . . 2 7 _
used by police to break the union. 3 In tne aifected areas
extra-constitutional vigilantes operated through the Imperial
Valley Anti-Communist Association. The unit used ”shock

troops' provided by the American Legion whose leadership

,—

.- . . . . 2b
took pride in remOVing un-American influences from the valley.

The relationship of the farmer to laborer in California
should be clarified. In earlier chapters we saw where farmer
and laborer were for the most part on the same side in their
attacks on the middle man. This was not the case in California.
The specialty crops raised in that state required hired help.
This was unlike the family-type grain or dairy farmer who
needed little help outside of the farmer's own family. Thus
the farmer in California had a different status. He was a
semi-rural grower whose farm was a business. He belonged to
several producers exchanges and protective associations. He
employed a bookceeper and looked like a banker. He had
learned to dabble in publicity. It would be inconsistent to
say he was an ally of labor.27 He could, instead, be expected
'to exert the usual efforts by management to cope with unions
and their strikes.

Support for the Associated Farmers came from a variety

of sources. Assistance in organization and dual membership was

25New Republic, LXXVIII (March 21, 1934), 148.

26American Mercuiy, XXXIII (October, 1934), 244.

 

27Ibid., p. 245.

granted by the California State Farm Bureau. Organizational
aid was also given by various Chambers of Commerce. Its
membership reached a peak of approximately 50,000 and got its
operating funds from assessments on members' crops. Besides
the use of violence in the fields to suppress the workers its
f L. , , .__ . - _ , , u 28 2,
0800108 included boy00tts 01 unsympathic buSinessmen. The
prosperous conservative farmer together with the large farm
employer formed the backb ne of the organization. They were
unwilling to allow control of the one cost factor left in
their control to pass into the hands of a union. They were
further unwilling to allow a strike to be called. Unlike
other businesses that could increase prices if necessary, or
ride out a strike, the farmers stood to lose the entire
year's crop if picking were halted for even a short while.
Politically the supporters were conservative and reactionary
Republicans and conservative Democrats. The Associated Farmers
received heavy contributions from such businesses as Southern
California Edison, Co.; Dried Fruit Association of California;
Southern Pacific Railroad; and Pacific Gas and Electric

29 .
Company. To the critiCism that it was a mere front for
big business which feared property losses due to radicalism
and was not really representative of the dirt farmer; the reply
was made that the president, Holmes Bishop, made his living
on a 20 acre citrus grove near Orange, California.

The first and fiercest clash between cotton farmer and cotton

,’.)
2K)Newsweek, XII, November 14, 1938, 44.

290hambers, pp. 45, 199-200, 201-202.

H~ -. WFI‘ “.1 ‘. 4. ‘ '1) 1'1 'T‘ "‘ 1 . " "y “ "V ‘1 '1' 'v ‘I J "3 i . — .21.? r“1 . ' ', J": ‘ ~‘\
;J_LC'LLKJ‘.L’ (”XL/Ck}; .1 [44.4 LJ L, Pi4\l‘_u 4.11. _LL- 0‘9 L‘C \IK/‘Jti ’ "L/VJ . _'_ilCL’C, LLIC

A.

ranchers oryanizcd a caravan of ;0 autonobiles, drove into Pixley

4.-

and surrounded a mass meetin; of strikers. First a single
C11!“ “ I h " d J": '1? i “ll _.'..' ‘ a“ "u " '“ ' 'r fly-,'." '1 ‘jr — '3 - _ ' 2’5 Y'f‘“ ‘ j. 1'!“‘Virf'~, ,
shot all tIlCfl a Vo Cd loll. UUL lion; OllL caio’Voii 8110 {.111le

Q

s'ixikers fzfiLl dead Yflqfll marnr‘others vummuded. ‘fhe hEfil‘WhO

fired the first shot claimed that he had heard a speaker refer

disparagin;lv to the Anerican F ag. The bloodshed did not

0

r.‘

Lreak the strike.30 While workers talked or arming thenselves,
the county sheriff issued permits to 600 ranchers to carry
concealed weapons. Fortunately, on October 25, the strike w s
ordered ended by state and federal authorities after eighty
per cent of the growers agreed to a suggested wage of 75 cents
per 100 pounds to superseic the old rate of 00 cents. Cotton
picking thereupon was resuned under armed protection of the
state authorities.3
Sporadic strikes occurred throughout the spring and early
suhmer of 1934. In certain agricultural areas it was persistent—

J,

ly reported that ranchers and citizens would take care of the
Reds in there own way where legal technicalities interfered.

Cn July 14, 1934, Clarence horrill, Chief of the State
Division of Criminal Identification, said that he lad
information that the Communists planned to start a general strike
in the Stockton area. He went on to say that such a strike
would ”only be a step further" for the communists to attempt

a state wide individ al and agricultural strike.52 His statement

I

”O
l

1

New York Times, October 22, 1933.

 

\ ,— —< 1r W" n f‘ lL‘ " q; ’2":
Lew york times, Caterer 2t, 19,,.

U.)

 

13

1
JE?
New York Tides, July 15, 1934.

 

n.

has special significance in view of the ;eneral strike called

LU
L: l

in San Francisco at the same time. There was no doubt but

that the communists had instiyated that strike. On July 20
state wide raids were conducted to remove radical agitation
f“om California agriculture. The headquarters of the communist
party and its workers' school at Sacramento were raided.

34

Raids were also conducted at Carmel, San Jose, and Berkeley.

Thus, the strikes among agricultural work rs were suppressed

O”

y a smoothly run vigilante device that operated at times
outside of the law and at other times in cooperation with the
law. The reign of terror which had begun in late 1933 had by

’3

mid-1934 crushed efiective resistance.

JJNew Ycrl Times, July 29, 1934

 

New York Times, July 21, 1934.

 

Chapter IV
V” fl‘."‘\' , "h. 1'H'“r we? T) x .l' 1 rid" ‘w' "'2 ”'wal’ “'7 \'”
ine iotacco saimeis Dec ale ineii no load

The tobacco growers of Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia
North Carolina and South Carolina had an important advanta e.

The way to governuent aid had been shown by the dairy, fruit,

grain, hog, and corn farmer.

1

I,_J

that remained for the tobacco

3:;

growers was to apply presslre. The extension of marketing
agreements under AAA to their production would follow. Here

again direct action was seized upon to force the government to
act on their demands. The growers first succeeded in getting

a tobacco marketing holiday declared by the governors of the

bove states. The governors were willing to do this because

(I)

(‘1‘

hey were certain the federal government would act to put
tobacco under AAA controls. They believed also that the
holiday would provide sufficient time to allow the federal
authorities to act. There can be little doubt but that the

L.

governors had no desire 00 see a re’ival of the Night Rider
operations of the twenties. Hence, their prompt consent
to declare the holiday when presented with the growers' demands

formulated in protest meetings. However, for reasons that will

be seen, the tobacco growers were no more successful than any

other group of farmers in wetting a larger share of the consumer's

dOllar.
The tobacco farmer was not in a pleasant mood by August

1933. The previous four years had seen violent fluctuations

99

100

in production and prices. The average price for flue cured
tobacco had declined from an average of $25.60 per hundred
pounds in load to an average of a3.50 in 1931. Gross returns
had fallen from 283 million dollars in 1929 to 105 million

_ r M in l . r. J
dollars ior the 1931 crop. The year 1932 was better. A

08

C1“

late spring frost, blue mold, and the beetle had led
short crop. Prices averaged double that of the 1931 price
and were a reflection of reduced production by almost half
of the previous year's harvest. Gross returns amounted to

$107 million for the 1932 CPOP-g

The 1933 crop was estimated
at 600 million pounds which was lower than the 726,398,000
average for the 1926-30 period. The farmers expected increased
prices but were surprised when the market opened on August 1
to find prices about the same as in 1932 or an average of
10.41 cents a pound.3
On August 3, 1933 farmers of Lanier and Coffee counties,
Georgia held a pretest meeting. The mass meeting announced
that, ”the farmers are being paid ruinous prices for tobacco
and the market is lower than last year, considering the quality
of tobacco; and bankruptcy, starvation and ruin face the
tobacco farmers of South Georgia, unless tobacco prices are
put on parity for the period between 1919 and 1929 as established
by the Agricultural Department of the United States of America."
The meeting next resolved ”that it is the sense of this meeting
Business Week, January 20, 1934, 10. New York Times,
AUgust 13, 1933.

2 . - - \ r‘ ~ - 2
BUSlnCoS ween, October 26, 1932, 15.New York Times, Augusc
8:13; 1933.

 

 

 

 

3New York Times, Ausust 3: 13) 1933'

 

101

that a committee be directed to take up immediately with
proper authorities of all markets in Geo1gia the matter of
closing all tobacco warehouses thiou hout t1e entire tobacco
section of Georgia until relief is g1an ted.
The Department of Agriculture shortly thereafter announced
that it would not subject manufacturers to a marketing
agreement calling for higher prices to producers. It would

however help the :1owers to establish a voluntaiy program

a
for control of production on the 1934 crop. The likelihood
of this happening was questionable because one faction of
growers was satisfied with the then current p1 ice of 13 cents
a pound. Other farmers insi ted they needed to realize 20
cents a pound in order to meet costs of production.5 Meanwhile,
prices continued to fall. Tobacco sales in Georgia for the
week ending August 28, totaled 10,728.002 pounds at an average
price of 7.47 cents a pound;0 which was lower than the previous
week's price

On August 31, Governor J.C.E. Ehring haus met the demands
of the Eastern North Carolina tobacco g rowers and declared a
voluntary marketing holiday for an indefinite period. The
action came after 2,000 farmers held a mass price pretest

meeting at Raleigh earlier in the day in which speakers urged

”force" to 1aise prices and sprinkled their discourse with

1.
lNew York Times, Aug wu t 4,1933.

 

U1

New York Times, Au; us t 14,1933.

 

C"\

New York Times, August 29, 1933.

 

.,.» . ",‘ 1 f:.."‘7» ‘ 1 7' 1 H 1““ (I, r‘ (i l c - ‘ 1),,11
AALULL‘JL4.4’L1 L‘; LLV‘V'iL/‘IVJ‘\)LAQ J.L'-I\»' ' \Z’KQA-nL LLLLLI LU \lVL-L’: (—A idl‘V-‘L‘.Ldl\an J—JA.‘

1.. ', 19 _ 1-1‘ I" 1‘ F“. m. _, . 1,3 _‘ «in: , ,1“ ,.., __‘_, ,- - ,. ,..l A :1, -
10116113 boobies-o. LIMA/64111.21 .5111. _LIELJL.C»L{L‘ Lent toioui’onn; to the;
n - -. ‘fi. --- .—\ 1" \ 1—7~‘; l” — ‘ -., ~‘. 1- r» r~ 41-". ,—‘ . ‘1 -' , , -~ \ . ‘ r v! a h 5.". ‘ ». -1:' —- »
UOVEL‘UJJL’ LU. 801101} Cui 'vliijei C1LL:LJ-11Q 1111.1 CL) proclaim a .leJliLICJ“)
-' 4 r: 1' C.L.? A -~ -i- . .‘J'.’.'-n ~~ 1~- Ln Valle -.
.Lll U110 u L- «J DC, . iflth.)bl.i‘v.L VLLL LOLLL LU ’V ESL/Ella LL VLJLU ‘ IJU dCC

"I ”I

saic,to1acco iarners oi Lfllbn Ca roliia vc1cnencly plot e’st

present destructive prices and Le“ assistance of your

‘.J
'1 . > ( ,‘.,» in.‘ -.~-\ ,_ .) r. -.> ‘o w“) . . _ "f 1r)" . v.“ \ HR.) {.:1_ r‘ "‘f ._..v_1‘ 1‘ ,1 _\' .3 ”_‘_,
QCiDle LL.€[1L L1] LLLC/UJ. Lil; d .LCJ_L.L .L C VIA; 11. 411K; 4.:K/l. UL; CLJJ. Dial—Lid
* ~ ‘\ r‘ N r ,._,\J ‘. . v '1 1"‘-. "V‘r‘i ‘1‘ v‘ ‘; _’gj '. a‘ 3}“ {‘ 7-’../~.1_‘v \1 ,‘_\ ' ,rx ' 1‘.
ia rmeis also sent iesolotions to Picsiocnt nooceJtlt calling
ior emergency maasures to provide Letter 1933 prices, an
n W x!“ “A "\ 'o '1" on" -‘7 ”‘x ”‘1’ 3 "‘ "1‘; '1‘?“ ’1 a“ "0‘1" " ‘3 "‘ ~'“ fl. '“ ‘x‘.~" ) 1/‘\
acreage CUhoLQl pie 1am 1o1 1934, and cieation of a tobacco

division in the “fricultural Departnent. Reports at the end

ILL‘

of the day from mar:cts at Wilson, Tartoro and Rocky Mount
ifldicath 3431 prices had inc * eased about an avers e of a

\
V

penny over the previous day's sales.

The next oay, September 1, Governor ltra C. Blacxwood of
or r '. {,‘. v? 1, ,- -' 7r. Hr. lo .1

South Carolina declared a MullUdJ in his state, thus
supporting the brower's claims that 11 or 12 cents a pound
was too low to cover costs and that 20 cents was a more
realistic figure. That same day, in was hin'ton, the Farm
ment Administration replied to the growers demand for
relief by announcing a program including Lenefi payments in
return for promises to reduce the crop the hex” rear. honey

U

to paJ the farmer would be rotten from a processing ta" being

F'
O

levied on all flue cured tobacco processed for do mest‘

7New York Times, S ptemter 1, 1933.

 

81 gid.
911,16

10.

New York Times, Septemt r 2, 1933.

 

'\ "1 -" ~ ' 1| ' H? “-J' 1 '7‘ ,'l ’ \" v‘ , ‘1'. ' V- '1 ‘ r~ "1 J \
Coluflkdgoluhl. lb ERA, LnKKAJoLU llei LMS
which was the difference tetueen eh cu

l

311-,
i Ui’

.
1'11
1

t-RT .L _L

‘L (1
1L.

Lv

1 5;.

*5."

aii price 90 09

. 1"». ,1 . -.-‘ ,,_ ‘ "\ .t,__ ‘17._i‘_‘_“k_, 1.1 * F
(/11 QtfiJLLnniul J the \JVUL 1it..>i 1;; iii VJ.

J

announced that the tolacco narhets in

4.

closed indefinitely to give the rederal

chaimxe do enroll all {Eitmflfiihl the cre

(‘1

To some it scent d assured that when the

tobacco would coananc materiall; pher

The nar;etih¢ 'rte1ent Ler flue c

‘l
A-

t'

r:

(.1

mould r

ya
.—

lev;

rren
l

C '1‘ '
5..“
.__)

ildn1ia 81x3 Gecn ia

maaL g+
LIV 5.:

f.)

nose to would

adninistration a

p reduction program.

(\ - - v- 1 ‘ ,. ,-. 1 , .-. fi “1 ’-~ ., r~ r1
Markdofi fCUpLhCU LMQL

prices.

used totacco was signed

October l2, Lut was to te retroactive to Septeater 25.

Secretar, Wallace in the narnctii agreement was given authority
to set prices paid to; flue cured tota acco s3 manuiact u: ers
naiuractuisrs weie to Le licti ed and would have to rurnish
periodic reports. ”allure to pa, the estatlished price made

then liatle

- ,~ r\ r. ‘ - . {V -. .-\‘.‘ #1") '-‘r*; , -. 1 f
c to a suspension oi their li

would Le in*re aseo to the totacco raine
at higher levels. in efiiect, the povrrn

001188 0

fl

and hopefully statiliz~d

sent guaranteed the

grower'“ an averaQe m1 Aliad price in exchange for the grower's
promise to reduce future production The ab rec ent called

for the totacco companies to pa; an ave
pound from Septemter a; to Aaron ;l for
destined for domestic c DHSLiptiON. J

Agricultural Adjustient Administration

 

~

10,

;1 .. ,‘.4— j 1....
1gb L1 b61111- {ri'

 

Cctoter El, 195,,

 

. ;__ -. A ‘ -1 ._ -.‘ ‘1 _ V
Ottosbl LJ, LjJJ.

0n

announced that

19;

ra~e or 17 cents a

k.)

flue cured totacco

November 20 the

totacco

1;).
V" ‘7 . l r!"
"‘0 l‘;- ‘J lx1L’xC _L_Li1LCn_:

 

10%

growers then participating in the reduction pro ogiam would
receive 30 million dollars more than they would have if there
were no program. Total inconc was JVpcccco to be 75 million
dollars greater than in 1132 and CO million dollars greater

_ . 111-
tnan in 1931.

The holiday was not over yet. The debt ridden farmers

(‘I ’i

meanwhile, had found it di iicult to ride out the holiday. Those

who needed money trucked their tobacco into Eastern South
Carolina, where the Lar”et had remained open, causing con-
gestion there. The farmers became impatient. The benefit
paMrner ts wer slow in coming. On December 16, 1933 Governor
Ruby Laffoon issued a proclamation closing all of Kentucky's

"DJ

tobacco warehouses 815

(D
&
C1
(0
F'-
,’V
S
O
Q
0)

er more than 100 grower
petition calling for that action. The purpose of the new
holiday was to give the federal government time to put into
effect acreage reduction and adjust prices. Prices the same
day for burley tobacco was $12.46 per hundred.15 On December

18, Governor Hill D. McAlister of Tennessee declared a

o '1 16 L1 ‘1 1 r) o o 0
holiday. On the same cay Governor John G. Pollard 01 Virginia

also declared a holiday at the behest of more than 2,000
’1“1 1 “)0 17 ”W 1.2 -' 'i' C' 1'“; ' S ' 1 1 V) 1-
bLOWC s. lne nolioay spread acros o KGHtUCAd b01oe1 to

the markets in Indiana and Ohio. On December 19, Governor

Ehringhaus extended the holiday in North Carolina to include

 

l 4.. T - ’ F A A
NOW Y'“k Times, November cl, 1933-
r-
l)T

low Yoak Times, December ll, 1933.

 

0‘? . ( .' ’3")
new york Times, December 18, 1933-

 

hew York Times, December 19, 1933.

10:;

burley tobacco b; closin; the only Burley mailzetin; point
at shville.18
The purpose of the widespread holiday was to halt marketing
until enough growers accepted the government's plan to curtail
production and stabilize prices for the nex year. The benefit
payments to farmers wer the direct result of the efforts
of growers to get higher prices by first demanding a plan for
tobacco under AAA and then by demanding a holiday on marketing
until the plan could be put into effect. The holiday itself
had no noticeable effect on prices. At Weston, Miss ou1i
where the market was one of the few markets open prices averaged
.12.8 cents a pound on December 19.19
The government, in effect, had become tobacco's silent
partner when the codes were finally stablished. By fixing
minimum wholesale and retail prices the industry was protected
from unfair competition and assured manufacturers reasonable
profits. The effect on the consumer was to stabilize price
and quality of the cigarettes and cigars he used.20
What was the result as far as the tobacco growers were
concerned? Initially the farmers were disappointed. Although
the program applied to the 1933 crop that had just been harvested
its full effect would not be felt until the 1934 crop, which
was subject to acreage reduction, could be harvested.
Meanwhile the farmers prepared their tobacco and were

0
U I
New Ytrk Times, December 20,1‘33.

19f

 

ew York Tirnes, December 19, 1933.

 

20Business Week, June 30, 1934, pp.11-12.

 

10a
suiprise ed wilen the markets reopened to find that prices were
lower than ever. In fact many loads bare 1; pai” the costs of
shipping. The farmers complained that the official graders

scanned the leaf and graded it in a ma1n1er that was unfair

because tobacco of good quality was pushed into lower grades

f\
C

which were not subject to the prity price of 13.5 cents a pound.
t the same time that the farmers were forced to accept the
lower prices, the manufactu1m 1s early in January of 1934

I

claimed higher production coscs resulting from the industry's
NRA code made increases in prices necessary. In line with this
wholes ale prices were establis 1ed at $6.10 per thousand which
represented an advance of 60 cents per thousand. A general
increase in retail prices followed. hetailers announced
increases of prices to 13 cents a package or two for 25 cents
4 1 n v- n , J- 1 2'3 __ 22
from the lormer 12 cents a package or two ior 3 cents
On December 3, 1934 Kentucky's first Federal controlled
burley tobacco crop went on the auction block and brought the
highes t prices since 1929. Prices throughout the first day
of sales averaged $18 to $20.95 a hundred, as opposed to the
. - ‘ '1 ('- d V 23 1 . ’3
opening day average in 1933 of 113.so. The year 1934 was

an exceptionally good year for the tobacco farmer. In North

Carolina, for example, prices averaged 27 cents. Prices in

24

1

the other states ranged from $18 to $19.78 a hundred.

With the opening of the markets in September, 1935 at an

11:81” Ilepublic , ‘r‘{VII, (1‘18 1,011 7, 1(‘ 3’1], 13. 1011.

 

New York Times, January 10, 1934,

 

New York Times, December 4, 1934.

 

new York T mes, September 22, 1935.

107

average 01 ld cents growers beéan to grow restive and talk

’3.”-
1 o 'I C'- N .1 ,. _--,. _’ v ". .
aoout another ho11cay. “ The lower prices were looked upon

with alarm in view of the higher production and living cos’s.

If it was clear that the holiday of 1933 had been preferable to
the Night Riders of the twenties to get governmental assistance,
1 m1st also have been clear that tobacco growers, just as
any other producer, must be subject to distress prices when
ever supply exceeds demand. In the latter respect tobacco
differed slightly from corn and wheat reduction. Wheat and
corn were subject to intensive applications of fertilizer and
equipment which boosted production even though acreage was
limited. In utilizing allotments, tobacco farAers actually

did limit production but not enough so as to keep a stable price

level.

‘1' , 1r mt.” *» Q ”1::
LCW Y rn wines, December o, 1s

-\ ._
k" 1 .

 

minute hen H‘St-—lgu4

.1- 117' J. n 11,- ‘ ' .-. 7 - J-‘
LS anqcirect action declined with

'1—1f‘ ~.- -1 -I/ I‘—
rarm prOtes

of World War II and little was heard from the rank
far: r throu ghout the biosperous post war years.

fifties, however,

were not sharing in the new prosperity that labor
enjoyed. Repo1ts from the Middle West indicated th

farmers were beginning to think in terms of

agrarian discontent

to believe that

the coming

and file
By the mid
they

at again the

direct action.

in 1984

ould come f the Riddle e t was significant. We have
already seen how discontent in the early thirties first led
to direct action in the Middle West which thereupon spread
throu; hout the nation. Would the same thing happen 30 years
later? The Middle West is, of course, the stronghold of
agrarian power. First, because it is America's ‘read basket.

Nearly 70 per cent of America's food is produced in that

Second, unlike Middle West industry which differa

essential r espect f1om eastern industry, Middle

speaks of its own authority and generally

of agricdfiural forces tniouc'out the nation.

1John D. H1cks, ”Our own Middle He
Den oc1tmr in Lixalliddle 11135; 1840- JKVKD, ed.
Lichols and James G. handall (hew Ytrx, 194

 

 

). p.

108

Wes

commands

region.
in no
t agriculture

the support

t, 1900-1940,” in
Jeannette

P.
113.

or,

an, Discontent in the Middle west?

and his neighbors foraed the national Earner: Organization to
protest lov he; prices. Despite the organization's 1fia r1
pu1pos e ane rather local chara ter the idea of protesting low
prices cau h: on and support be an to blossom. Dr 1958

a new and broader issue was ne

C;
C“
C)
O
CO
(‘1‘
C)
[._J
1.,

F.

Cf.
C

O

5

0

O

}._1
H
(D

O

C.#.
I...

«2‘

D

bargaining between farner and processor. holding actions would

be used to force the proc>sso1s to guarantee future prices.

A
l
J

*3
11)..
P..—

u
(D
C7"
0')
:3
O
1.4
Q
1-

actions were t1ied between 1958 and 1932.

In each case the purpose was to determine how widespread support

would be from non-members as well as dues paying members of

the National Farmers Organization. 3; the fall of 1‘62 Staley
thought the tine was ripe for a full fledged all-out holding
action.

m1 4

1he Rational garner Organization complaint, fundanentally,
was that the 1armer's purchasing power had not kept pace with
that of the factory worker. Me worged long hours utilizing
expensive equipment at great risk of natural disaster and earned
an average wage computed at $1.21 per hour. The average factor;
1 . . 1 1 1, , 2 1. n
at the same t1ne earned 92.39 per nour. the 1armer, even
though he was producing more, was getting proportionately less
ZEN? unit of production. Hog, corn, and beef prices 1ad fallen

drastically. (See Table v).

2 M .7 . -- n .- . -
”A Messa e to Our Farm friends, Pamphlet issued by

7" I- o o - '1
1a bllonal Farmer s t1.aniza ion, (Corning, Iowa), undated.

Duri n” the same period oi time tne factory workers enjoyed

‘L‘

pu1cnasing power that sueaoil; increased. ile it was true
tnat food costs had increased, factory workers found that the
length of working time reduired to purchase food items had

actually dropped (See Table VI).

Table V Average Drices Received by Fa1nc 1949—1955
Year Beef (cwt.) Hogs (cwt.) Corn (bu.)
1949 $ 19.80 $ 18.10 n.a.
1950 23.3 10.00 s 1.53
1951 25.70 20.00 1.66
1C 352 24.30 17.80 1.53
1953 10.30 21.40 1.49
1055 15.00 15.00 1.35

t 01 afical Absuract of t e United States, LXXVIII,
@371 pp. U50, 079.

 

Table VI Purchasing Power of Factory Worgers 1932-l952

‘1

Year Average Bacon Eggs
Hourly Wage (Cencs)(Minutes) (Cents)(Minutes)

1932 $ .44 $ .24 33 $ .39 41

1942 .35 .39 20 .40 3Q

1952 1.05 .65 24 .07 24
Milk Butter
(Cents)(Minutes) (Cents)(M1nutes)

1932 $ .4h .11 15 .28 38

1942 .85 .15 11 .37 33

1952 1.65 .24 9) .85 31

Siource: Nation's Business, LII, Hay l964, 106—107.

 

FJ
1.;
I...)

On Au. :ust 20, 19L2 the 20, 000 (is conLe Led 1a1e1rs, that

‘

were delegates to the 1ationa1 Farmers rganization convention
ja “L red the municipal Veteran's Auditorium in Des Moines, Iowa

to give their approval to President Staley's plan for a holding

' 1

4

action to begin on August 31.) While preferring ”holding

action” to the word ”strike” and abhoring violence. Staley

said the group was ready to battle for prices that would keep

farm income up to the levels achieved by other segments

4
of the economy, Thus, the first regional or nationwide

organization since Milo Reno's Farmers' Holiday Association
to advocate the holding of certain products in order to force

prices up had ratified a strike date.)

The goals of the latest protest movenlent grew out of the
poor bargaining position of the iarme1. He was the only
producer left who still took his produce to marl :et and as ked,
"What'll you give me?” The farm price problem could be solved,
according to S;aley, through collective bargaining contracts
with processors.

We hold that pe mitting the p1ocessor to set the
price on the sale 01 Lommoe1L1eL 1ais ed by the American
farmer is a complete reverse of the tradition of the
American system of government which normally permits
Lhe manuiacturer of products to set ‘he prices of the
products thaL he produces. We hold these conditions
to be utterly at variance with the spirit of justice
and the needs of the American farmer. We believe the
right of the ia1mer to or;anize for his mutual protection
is compatible with the r1 hts 01 other segments of our
society to organize for their mutual protection.U

5New York Times, August 29, 1962 Julius Du‘cna,'Earner“
0n Strike,” Reporter, )3 VIII vovezbe1 22, 15 02, 33.
11

New York Times, August 29, 1962.

 

5
Duscha, p. 33.

/

o.

Erom the Beamble to
adopted at 101’)? nnnvpn‘i-inn

H r .1 _ p .0 1-3.. *5.
ational Fa1mers' Organ1zaL1on s ”

~\
U

-Laws,

112

-

In a letter to the author Gordon Shafer, hief Negotiator, said,
The NFO has bee n 012anized to price farm commodities
at a cost of production plus a 1‘easonable profit price....
We thinl: Lhe p11hary problem is the banding together
of enou h of the total production so we will be in a
position to act as otl1er businessmen do and place a price
on commodities. We have come to believe that it is
impossible to ever 1eceive cos t 01 production by waiting
for the government. The principle reason for that is
that 92s of our population no longer lives on faims.
It seems foolish to expect 925 to grant the othe1 of5
more than is absolutely necessary to asure adequate supplies
of food.7
In line with this the National Farmers Organization sought to
get eiough members and enough geographic coverage to organize
the orderly marketing of specific farm products. Processors
who refused to sign contracts for a definite amount of a
commodity at a definite price were faced with the prospect of
a holding action on that commo ty until agreement on price
was reached. The National Farmers 01 L,anization claimed that
it could contiol marketinr if only thir‘y per cent of the
producers agreed to hold their production until their price
was met. Officials of the organization believed that processors
were not adverse to bargaining but saw no need as long as
supply exceeded demand. Drying up the supply would force
the processors to act. Thus, the immediate goal of the
September 1962 action was to force processors of livestock
products to bargain for prices and arrange for long term

contracts to fulfill future needs. An even more important

goal was to show a majority of fa1mers that collective action

-\]

April 27, 1904

03‘

" " (3 r f- C ("I ’
newsweek, LIX 1a y 20, 1902, 3, DuLcha, p. 33.

#3
_a

:hW
could work.J

National ra1ne1s
in corn prices.

four
follows

table that

organization's

‘able VII

The September 1962

The livestock
saw a
main midwast
number shipped the

in fourteen years.

|()

Time,
h po1‘t, LIII,

LXXX,

(D

specific

rush of cattle to

v r~»1— ~:-(-‘
111d L’Ae bx:

September 2

indicates

demand.

National Fa1mer

1-[oldi1 g

markets

week

September 7,

(\O

Sixteen per

totale

11?

J.‘ ,
Lne

Organization Price Goals,

Middle
(Au‘us

Action

on August

. ,. 1,. J-
IA-lL‘ 1711.8 Ll .

d 18

19 02,

price demands

cent increa
per cent for Lneep and eleven per

pre

Cattle receipts

before and

IGBSODS we

1932, 19.

re;

XVCLC

Orga nization wanted a 37 pe1°

West PTice
t 1902)

,200 which was

1-1~ ( -, \I ‘1"- 4“ ‘
Lue largesL 10?

se for cattle.

cent for soybeans.

31, the eve of the
at tn

double

current

ccn1ce111ed tfl1e

cent increase

Thirty

The

-strixe price and the

1962

NFC Demand

2;; 32.115
22.75
29.45

1.49

2.56

strike
twelve
{—1-

L118

a Friday

'1

 

57.

lONewsweelc, LX, September 10 1952, 79-

 

1.1. C; 1’35“
yug, (.0 .

#5.

57,117
£100

17,

29:
loss,

U.S.

LOWS 8?:

World

". ., J1.
thOi‘ 'o ,

 

good prices)
U.S. News and World
eek, LIX
LIII, September

ll!

ll

1-.

the holida; weexend, and finall; the prospect of the strike.
Due to the Labor Day holiday the markets were not open on
Monday September ;.

‘
l

p Q, .'_r “1“,". .' > . a} fi;_ j, Y .-'__ r7 L 1-17, ', ,‘-. __,nr 1'1":
d. UQLQLCHLLJLL' ‘r, was LllC .LJ. “Cb (AC3; blldu L116} 1.1CA‘LALeL/LJ

L13

Wu d

(:3:

were open. Since the ho; narhet is primaril; an interior one
the st1dix21w3s felt anJre firifli. lhe {In ited Sta1<L.chpartnmmn;
of Agriculture reported 35,000 head of ho;s in Iowa reached
market as compared to 54,000 the week before and 90,000 on the
same day the previous year. As for price, butcher hogs were
up $.50 a hundred .12
Cattle receipts on September 5 were 1V2,L00 head at the
twelve major marketing centers. This was in comparison to
50,024 the week before and 51,132 the year before. As for price,
13

slaughter Steers were up $.25 to $.75 per hundred.

by September 6 there were other sign of side effects.

(13

Swift 3‘: Co. went on a shorter wo1i: week. In L‘gadison, ‘LrJisconsin
the Oscar Ia; e1 & Co. laid off 70 enplo ees in the slaughtering
department. In Iowa the hath Packing Company had to close

down operations for wart of cattle. On September 10 Wilson

33

f‘

° Co. and Armour a CO. announced that several hundred packing

, , . . .1 1 . 14
nouse worwers would be laid off due to the li; hter supplies.

I

The first week of the stri he ended on the eighth with

11. ,. . .-
‘ew Y rk Times, September 2L, 19o2.

 

New York Times, September 5, 1962. U.S. News and World
Report, LIII, Septesber l7, 19o2, 45.

 

 

%Ie w York Times, September 6, 1932.
1L

idCVJ YJLiC $1-1qlei; SGLDLDGJL‘DCII 7’8, 1992.

 

 

II;

H
:1

_' ‘

livestock prices at the higflCSt level in several year

(/3

(See Tables v and VIII).

Table VIII Cattle Receipts at the Twelve Major ierminal
Markets and Average Prices of Choice Slaughtered
Steers at ‘hicago.
IAJKE Period If) I

 

Week finding No. heceived Avg. Price No. hec'd Avg.Price
Sept. l,'c2 236,o06 S 28.91 24”,GC7 $24.18
a - < rt .;0 e ' _ as e «
brpb. d, o2 lZo,O4o 20.19 208,133 24.13
Sept. 15, be 235,464 29.91 231,t58 24.12
Sept. 22, 62 220,472 29.86 249,652 24.45
Sept. 29, 62 212,972 29.75 246,846 2L8o0
Oct 6 62 229 ?“V “C 08 237 9‘4 2” 37

o , {— ,‘JCJ CJ. / ,JUI‘ “f..)

Source: Fidures taken from Department of Agriculture and

(i)

quoted in GCOTEG BTaHdSber? The Two Sides in NFO'

C1)

 

Battle (Ames, Iowa), 134.
It appeared that Staley had picked a good time for the action.
Supplies were not large and prices had been good. Very early
two processors, exhibiting a concern for a steady supp y, agreed
to National Farmers ‘rganization demands and signed contracts.
Names were kept secret to avoid intimidation. Prospects for
the action to succeed looked good because it appeared the
members did indeed control 25 to 30 percent of total production
16

which by most accounts w s sufficient to support the hold out.

The farme 3' price was not the only price affected. Oh

LT _ I,
lJNCW York Times, September 9, 1902.

lUNew York Times, September 7, 1962. Newsweek, LX,
September 10, I962, 7o.

 

F)
i’“
(

UJLUK.LL/tl.‘ :9 Lil; amide/‘11 kirk/«cpl»; e-LLC. Liidiil nudity Lill-1v'UL.L/LU

increases in retail prices mace necessary L; the strike aetion.

.L
,, --. 41". .A .‘ ..‘ '."‘ :~ '_ /‘7.‘ 11" T F" - ’ ': \_ ,..,‘__ ”f .3 , .; 4 , »- 7.124-" ,3)-.-
ucdlbda oficibdwui: 001.1.ka V11 00L, uUebith, LLpoi’ouleIlo CL» 1.1Veboivete

- J

P‘.-. '1,‘ . .' I " ‘. J 'l s “ .1 - V.” 1‘ ‘ l‘ . fl .'\“. f ’ ‘ ‘11.;“1”. "‘\"'I .T"“'I “ "‘- -“" ‘— ,« ’f’
c2110 Ueto_mii;c ii Collusion one piiuc I..1.J'x.i.L1U tacit: ihVoiveu.

r717... -'. . ‘- .~ {‘n‘ -' ... ‘. . “", -' .a» ' J I I. w ~.-v-‘.~‘\ _~ -. ~~-.z~‘ ‘w '. 3-~ “‘ 1. (1 .‘ 'I A. , I. ~ - .’
inc JAMILease iii..eaail LALICL was cu.p1aihetixn.en on Ix;;teiter'li)

.'
x
L

-_I

the United States Departhent oI Agriculture issued fipures

""W' ~ 3 ‘- ' T" '1‘, '. ‘.." (‘ 'f. I ‘. 'W ‘ 'l ’ .1 "'. i\ r ' r; " \‘4 1 . ‘ .- \ *1 ‘I ’ £4" ' ,‘.n I" '1" - 3' a‘
snowih; yilde oi he s to st up dJ aveia_e oi al.09 pei UhHQLCU

U

iron Ihe two weeks previous or an increase iPOfl $16.30 to
a1~.53. Average cattle prices were also up $1.90 or an increase
from 52a.2r to S29.75.ls

In its second week the action Le¢an to falter. The
movement of hops to market was on the increase and prices Ior
cattle as well as for hogs were steady. In order to give an
added push, Sta1e5 announced on Septeaber 11 that the action
.would Le extended to corn and soybeans. To help the tarmers
who lacked stora e facilities, arrangements were made with
the Triplett Grain Company of Kansas City to provide stora;e
space for 1,000,000 bushels.

I, . {an .t_ i.) .1.‘ ._ ‘J.,.'1._ _. 3.1.,- .-. 1 .1“
B; Septemter 14 the eiieCt oi the strike on prices became

diff cult to analyze. Hop and steer prices started to fall.

.I

A “e djustment seemed to t takilg place. Supplies remained

CD
.__)

high even though the volume of ca;t1e and “-e

Io a going

H“

to market slumped 24 to *5 per cent. Unemployheht in the packinc

houses, which protatlv never exceaded 700, fell as Wilson & Co.

1.)

T M.’ ‘ ‘ q : '- 7‘} ..' ‘ fi‘ 1 ,. -5 1.. 1,1,1 “’1 ‘ r‘\
inibl‘vfl’ YL)1. IL 1.1.11.6», EJCLJUCAALLCL lo, l\U2.

 

, September 11, 1992.

 

qu :oIk Limes, Septehier 12, 1902.

 

117

recalled its workers. heat production in the Middle East
had dropped eight per cent below the same period in 1961 with
a resultant increase in wholesale prices. Retailers had a
choice of raising prices to housewives or absorbing the higher

costs themselves. Th

(D

butcners chose to capitalize on the
headlines in the newspapers and conseeuently the price of
meat rose in cities. Choice cuts of beef, for example, were

I
4_

. . .,. ‘..- . . J- '-‘. f .,.. . — ° 20 {2'1" , 1, ." 1, Y n ." a ,.\ .—
up twenty cents over the august prICe. ine strike had shown
that a relatively small number of farmers by holding their
production could actually force prices up for a time. This was
however a critical feriod. The strike was only in its second
we k. Signific<nt results could be expected only after the
third week according to Stalcy. On September 19 the action

21

r, “L
U

Ias extended to "rain and dairy products.

U1

Heavy cattle and how sales swap the Middle We t on

U

”strike”

September 24. Spokesman for the packers said the
could not last much longer. At Corning, Inwa farm spokesmen
said they had no intention of calling off the action. Rather,
plans were underway to extend the holding action to milk on

that very dav

3. Nevertheless, the same cap, the twelve major
xaarkets received 103,100 cattle, the largest number since

April 30. Sales were up 23,700 head or 27 per cent over the
receipts of the preious week and most cattle sold $.50 lower.

Ho ‘receipts were 82,500, the largest since July 5. The total

r-~ /‘ .__ {: TIA - --' (V
15, 1902, go. new York Times

Business w r
and World Report, LIII, September

SGptember 15, 190
F] r‘ r“ 1"")

21

 

 

 

 

New York Times, September 20, l9t2.

 

a .

“‘ ‘ Fr\ I ‘ A". '4 ”r ‘ .'—' I..- ‘.7 fl. l" . '.‘ -' ".“.- 1“"
1.10:; LC, \)K)\J L/1;1C2 £3141. Lb'ilb llLQJ. L: uklv11 ULUQ LJ1)(LVY.1.LJLJ.L; VHLLL'LO hp

'.

'1 ‘3‘": r 1"- *~ . ~ . "'.-.r :7 1‘ '- " .1 a ,j' -",,‘._1 3‘1. "u .'~" ‘A.";.'“\"‘ I ' J' a”
t.lC ti.lc Lilc LatCLllx.C 1.1 ILQLJ bfl.i(.C.. Rule 011: CLKJLLJC.;U 111 thl

v.‘ ;‘," ‘~ {11“ s I ‘ I" f" '3.- " w _ f‘ :1 (‘v ,'." ."‘ r.‘ ‘~ .""" ' ’I '\“ . " ”
HC‘Cue. 111C dVCl "V1: 1'31 0.1.1. ClcsoCCC‘ how; C11. 9.“.0 Di C1C"'1J1 to

(‘32
'1‘ l-’) '_ ‘- ',’\ r»«, ‘\ ..‘,,",‘- a I L‘ ' -.r-- f ‘- '.""\ 3 z- ; x": - 1‘- (a ~ .
cplbjg'; 7:) '1' .lLALLUL'CCc. L‘LC'ulleLL1lL‘, COME 11116300111115 1"‘-.': Were

.- r » .' ., 4-1 ». .. - —' ‘— ,-\ C {I i—r‘ "~ ‘... . *, r\ .3" - a ‘-'- :v- r r) '1' .» ‘ . 1 ‘~ ‘— . ‘
1C1C3¢CC Lu tilt; U111. tCC Joucce utpol 0-...C'.lo J1 {\ULlelLLt1c.
‘1.-- H7

barn product piice a had advanced 2.5 per cent during the

month ended Septenter 1?. higher prices were reported ener'll

for e953, milk, hogs, and cattle.d5 The taple that iollows
indicates tne relative prices.

,le IX Price Comparison before and Arter 13c2 Strike.
Commodity “LC-hh ust Mid-Septemper Paritv
Wheat a 1.)) d 1.99 o 2.4a
Corn 1.02 1.04 1.01
20;; 17.Ao 13.20 21.80

Cattle (Leer) 21.60 22.00 23.?0

-, 3 , ' rw. .- ff)
111.14,}. 4.0:: L104; 3.CU

The holding action had affeCLeo other factors as well.
Figures as of Septemter 21 revealed that for the fiirst of the

‘ \
u'

‘

{‘1

(—L

‘c wecxs or the Strixc sales oi li es tack were eown,

(

slaughtering declined 0 per cent and wholesale prices were up
A to 10 per cent. In the second week livestocn sales lecoxerce,
slaughtering was down uth 4 per cent of

d

nor al and wholesale neat

prices were down slightly. In the third weex livestoch sales

' r' K. r .11 1 r\, ' ’
{ iimCC, Septeneer LS, lypa.

 

v - ,1. ('1.-

~‘ ‘\ /-.v. ‘ _ ‘ “ ‘ ~ _ _ 'w \~ A . .-
“NUM liddx limbs, .yupLCnpei‘cé-, 1962.

 

were near nor al but wholesale prices renained above normal.

133 ifiie exld .if .xzotc.tuci tins deuioruil 10a121e;i: Or;fin1ize3ticr1
was in a tight spot. hon me: fibers continued to sell despite
Jert. henbers' flattened cattle meanwhile

the earlier sup

p01UoCICC oveiwei:;ht and eiscounts would have to be taken it

.‘

tl.e;' held out much longer. Debts also normally fell due in

:4
(U
._-
F)
C?‘
I

mid October and ciecitors were beginning to
Thus the members needed an o,poiou1ty to sell their livestock

in order to ya; bills.

("i

On October 2, the hational Farmers Organization called a
'r cess” in the action. It did so, said Oren Staley, to give

the strikers an opportunity to consolidate pains already made

0 if
. J -. . -- - i , . i L)
and enable th m to exert far more pressure at a later date.
The effect of the ecess was immediate. Hog prices slumped
$1.75 as farmers flooded th“ 311’93- The price drop at Chicago

was the sharpest one day drop in six years. Farmers sent

99,000 hogs to the twelve major marxets or 42,000 more than

r
f \

the previous week. V By mid October wholes ale meat prices

that had gone up 6.5 per cent from August to September were
back down to their Augu st level. Retail neat prices tlwai had
risen 3.5 percent from August to September had by mid October
slipped only half way back to their August level in eight major
27

cities. While the farmers did not achieve a permanent price

U.S. News and World iep ort, LIII, October 1, 1902, 3.

 

 

New “ark TimeS, October 3, 1962

as . . - ,/
New York Times, Octooer 5, 1902

 

 

Q

New York Times, October 27, 1902.

 

120

increase it appeared that the consumers had.
Thus, anothe farm protest in which direct action played
a part cane to an end. Surprisin;ly in view of the violence
of the earlier movehents, the Hational Farmers Organization
conducted a holding action throughout sixteen states

I

only sporadic violence to intimidate the reluctant. Re where
did it approach the scale of the holiday movement or that of
the Associated Farmers.

the first direct action beyond withholding at the iarm
occurred at Palmyra, hissouri on September 4. There the weekly
livestock salexas halted after members of the National Farmers
Organization caused a disturbance. While there was no physical
violence, the farmers caused so much commotion and confusion
with their hollering and hand clapping that the sale was called
off. On hearing of the action Governor John Dalton ordered
the local law enforcement agencies to see to it that no
further violence occurred. At Lewiston, Missouri on the
same day 500 National Fermers Organization members from Iowa

23

and Illinois prevented the Lewis County auction from starting.

Other events occurred as well. On the fifth at Savannah,

(/3

His ouri two farmers reported that their trucks were fired upon
at a National Parners Organization checkpoint.29 On September
28, 500 farmers picketed and demonstrated at the Oscar Mayer

packing plant in Davenport, Iowa. Incidents of fence cutting

CUNew York 2.

.3.
if.
5
(W

\o
CA

September 5, 19

 

(

Lew York Times, September 6, 1302.

 

 

 

 

and barn burnings occurred but not in sufficient hunter to

merit further discussion. At Colchester, Illinois, approximately
300 farm women took over an auction barn sale for 25 minutes.

Six of the ladies took over the auctioneers microphone and

each delivered a short speech on the NE holln; action. The

S

0)

le was resumed after the ladies had led the assembly in
SinngQ God Bless anerica.
It has been sug ested that the farm situation in 1962 was
similar to that of 30 years ago in several respects and serves to
xplain why there was a resurgence of interest by the farmers

in direct action. An oversupply of such products as hogs, cattle,
and corn had led to a low price level. Farmers began to

tighten their belts by running older tractors and automobiles.
Household appliances were made to go longer. Bankers worried
while prospering because farmers collectively had the greatest‘
debt ever with the least relative ability to repay. It was not
hard to understand why. They were getting less income per

dollar grossed than at the bottom of the depression. The

farmers' share of every dollar spent on food had hit an 18 year

a

v r f 1 1 . rji’ 3
low in June, 19o2 when he received only 33 cents.

The cost-price squeez had also taken its toll. While

farm prices dropped from a relatively high level in 1947-19M9

"l
I- J-

farm costs increased by as much as 50 per cent.32 Corn that

3 From an account in Omaha World-Herald, September 15, le2,
reported in George Brandsberg, op.cit., p. 120

 

JlU'S' News and world Report, L. harch 13, 1961, 82. The
State Journal, (Lansing): August 13, 1303

222., - .") ‘ (“7 "
v newsweek LIX, may 20: 1902: 30‘29'

 

 

122

brought p1.54 in 194K brought $1.11 per bushel in 1902.

D'fi
P-1
I“.
k!

.
I

L)

that brought 21.9 cents a pound in 1949 brought 16.? cents in

d

(M)

19o2. hilk that brought 9.5 cents a quart in 1949 brought 0.8

1....

cents in 1962. Meanwhile, costs had skyrocketed. Nails which

j

sold for 11 cents a pound in 1949 cost 17.7 cents in 19C2. A
thirty—five horsepower tractor that cost $2,100 in 1949 cost
$3,890 in l9o2. Farm wagons increased from $lt3 in 1949 to

$193 in 1962. Self propelled combines that sold for $4,310

’3’:
J.)

in 1949 cost do,o90 in 19o2.

n

t first the farmers' attitude was mixed. In 1pite of

f

the mounting debt and farm costs most of the farmers continued

in their resistance to collective action. Some believed that

a

the surpluses were a blessing 11 they only could be utilized.

Others said the government should get out of agriculture and let

1-

the free economic forces operate. Others yet said government
n"
I J . JLIL " _‘. _ J- I‘"' .. 4’. —»—.
controls were essential.J Indeed, the graserOts attitude by

late 1961 was that of hope that the new administration would
reverse the decline in farm income. Secretary Orville Freeman‘s
acreage reduction program of soil payments plus price supports

was a step in this direction and had popular approval because

35

it hit at the heart of the farm problem: over-production.
The farmers also agreed upon one additional point. They
did not get a fair return on their ’nvestment when compared to

“JFigures as given by National Farmers Organization taken
from United States Department of Agricultur- statistics.
'1 I

‘ (-4- - 1. —._* - ,. A v Q |.— ' if, r
“ newsweek, LIX, may 2o, 19o2, 2o-29.

\

|\

W
v

l’U.S. dew: and World Report, L. March 13, 1961, bl.

J

i

r-J
11'.
(3

indus trg. Further, it be an to appear that even though 1

prices had iallen drastically the cciws hie? still paid the

same prices. Thus chain stores, """ rain and livestock exchanges
and other middletm n were criticized for taking a disproportionate

share of the consumer's dollar. The latter point is a difficult
one to nail down. It is possible for a farmer to take a loss

’1

on a steer that he has fed ior two years while at the same time
chain stores can de1onstrate a net loss in the retailing of
that same animal. Peri aps it would not be too far afield to
suggest that the farmer subsidiZ-s the consumer and not the
other we 3' a round.

If industry nao wanted to it could have picked no better
time to set off a farm rebellion. In the s mmer of 1962

'\ 1..

tie Committee ior economic Development, representative of

regressive usinescden, recommended a plan to the administration

J

that would have involved the national government in giving aid
to help move two million farmers off the farm in the succeeding
five years. The plan enraged the farmer and his dependert
friends. The small town businessman owed his living to the

farmer and he knew it. The 1“anlcers in the small towns shuddered
at the thought. Ore n Staley turned the report into a rallying

cry and got the fa1m ers to pile Sears and Roebuck mail order
catalogs in front of Sears' stores in the Middle West. Boycotts
of International iaivest r and other businesses were threatened.37

ob T _ -. ‘ __ _ P ,,
b. S. hews and World heport, LIII, September 24, 19o2, 57.
New York lines, Au ust Q1, 1992-

 

 

;7Dugcha, p, 33. New sweek, LX September 10, 1962, 76.

 

On top of disbelief that businessmen could View the farm
problem with such naivete, Stalev's farmers be an to question

’3

the role o1 the government in agriculture. Why was it that the
fa M’ier was in such a spot, that the Department of A riculture,
the second largest business of the Love rnme1; with a bud et 01
7 billion dollars a year, with 100,000 employees in 13 separate
agencies could do nothing? The department had spr d like

crab grass and according to one official, with its administrative

complexity, the Department of Agriculture was ”the damnedest

_ 1 ~ . r , :1 - 30
entrencneo bureaucracy in Ja shinbton.”

By 1962 the farmer had gone full circle in his attitude
towards government assistance. The narrow wheat referendum
on August 30, 1962 nearly ended the program of acreage controls
and price supports in effect since 1938.39 sven Farm Bureau
members by this point could accept the National Farmers

. . . . l—i-o.

Or~anization ar Qument that With collective bargaining ior
agriculture farm subsidy programs which cost three billion dollars
a year could be reduced thus reducing the cost to the taxpayer
despite slightly increased food prices while at the same time
farmers would get a substantial price increase. ren Stale, and
his farmers began to think that it was time for the farmers to do

hewsweex, LIX, nay 2o, 19o2, 26.

 

J9U.S. News and world Report, LIII, September 24, 1962, 57.
MO”, 7,,\ _ V u ,, _. D D /1 ._, ..
nicnigan apple growers in tne 1a11 oi 19o3, with the
approval of the Farm Bureau secured ”membe r marketing “o‘eenents
with the Michigan Agricultural Coope1ative harseting Association
and accomplished in essence what the hrO seeks to do.

for themselves what the government l1ad been unable to do.
That is, force an optimum price level by holding action and
then negotiate annual cont1acts with the packers and other

processors guaranteein; satisfactory future prices to farmers.

Support for the Eational Esrm-rs 01=aanizatio

r-«

1 came mostly
from the small and mediun size farmers of sli htly inferior
soil. They were the hard working farmers who wanted to stay
on the family fa rm but were hard pressed to keep up with the
rapidly Chan gins technology of agriculture. Ironically, they

f‘l

also were the iarmers who beneiitted least from the price

supports and other governmenti a rm p1 en: rams.41

President Staley is a typical member. He is 41 years of
age and farms 400 acres near Rea in northwest Missouri. He
raises hogs, pure bred cattle and corn for feed. Like so
many of the members he paid a high price for his land after
World War II and new is faced with sgeep fixed costs despite
declining income. Oren Staley res mbles Milo Reno in his
fiery, righteous speeches that take on a religious fervor. An
occasional Sunday 8011001 teacher in the udpbl~L Church, he is
at his best spea icing off-the-cuff to overflow crowds. he runs
the organization from an old store front in Corning, Iowa and

1.12

supervises 300 paid organizers.

Total membership in the organization is secret but has been
estimated at various times to number as many as 300,000. More

b1

V l
Dusena, p. 14.
1:")

.l.
f‘rN

New Y Pk Times, September 7, 1902. Duscha p. 33.

 

probably

unce iInuii,

and hinnc

r r"“\1’\ ‘
_Letoirv, \—

CL:»_CLJ. H.111,

7", ”are ‘E‘T'IC‘ '
:a .

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eilectively

{‘0

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in 1. 4‘ . ‘--‘
O .L _L L. L;

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of a I,

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it is closer

also

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in

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each

2
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2o. Lusc

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activities

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‘\" 1' "Jim F, ._ I. ,..-:_’. ,3
’UOO. *1 lbp kJJLJJ."-\:‘Lluuii’ 01101.}. Qil

v .

.wa. Missouri, hi seonsin, Illingig’

f" "‘T ‘x ' ,-.1_~\ '\ 7 f' (7“ ' ‘x" " "‘ f l‘ 1
goi’Ulluli’Uldu. uulJLJOijb dlSU COLLCL‘

"1"

‘ 1 ‘ ‘. ~' ?'-/’."\ I" 77". ’ r“ r‘\ 1" --~ ’7 r ‘3'
lid, CLLLU, .LLLILUUCALU ’ DUU Dial UC.‘ 1:008,
'anization has widespread suppoit

lacking in the farm Bureau, the

p has

*9-

"'~ me ~ - ~ 1.. n r- “ .-I.
e whose entrenched leacersn

uh

" a" N4" ‘v -.) ' ‘\ I " “w -. -° ,4 .~-1 —. r1
iocts ievclts. Che tninb is

I (I H st. I-I ,, I _ II ,‘ _ l n -I.
to Le u irin e €lUmCLL’ a low

\J

to e00 people to meetings that feature

[1!)

1.\r\-_ I—f“ 4C
.LQ..-1.€'...~, La‘uflnifiiqs, GNU UL..L€1»J

predicament.
’Ir—
H,1 1 1 ”L') T: -i , \ ,-.
iAL'rlL/tk/L sill] .LOL' CV64. J’ sliI Luv
7: pioud of the fact that word

flrn ~ r‘« ,v ~;- ‘1 "I, .~ -.- .-\ - r“ ~.. rx . /- -.
iol’ chad. as i‘iiCJi-Qall in d aloe di‘

word of mouth.

Fire of Protest?

—electi n in a bitterly iou ht convention

300 acre farm urged

1?,

opponent
moderation.

September_lO,1962, 3k, U
19e2,44—45 .
(D.v4-1JU"FCHJJLB’,\JD 01

to 125,000

platform of ”all out

F
G)
t“:
I...)
Q)
‘\
PO
C
I)
0)

Robert Jasper, an Iowa proprietor
.7 v /‘

LT O

S. N018 and World

.
T.’ _1 n (-I I )1" if ‘-\,r ‘ '2'!“ 'r r) T} 'l‘ ,’.
L>JJLJCH‘JE,\LJ.L, lex, 119.57 LU, S's/‘2,

s to set the

 

hr'

it . 2

"spert,LIII, September 17, lgt2,H5.

 

be

T/ ‘ ‘1‘ ,_‘ r'\- w I
U.S. 1x14: nit]..o:lo 11

[26:37-“ * ... r1). , n 1
new york ii‘e- DGCCHL

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in the ileloe. AUQD idihort uaVo all the lunuileo ohO hooeih

,, - ,,-‘.,. ' . , ' r 3- h“ ,. -.- ;__ _-‘ 3.. ,.. ,‘... 7m- x“ ,|,_ ,.f_ I? r1 2 A, .- 1 1. .‘
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'1) ' v +5 w", | , “ "L‘o' ;" i f‘.“"‘. ‘ r~ 1. v n“), '- .--, ‘ “\J ' I". ‘ f: 1 x “-1 : J‘“‘J . 4 5': '.""',x«
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U116 olidb EI/i'U'J-L'UL‘U‘ LL) .‘oUlVC 163.1. All LJL1LC€¢ plU,./lk, .: C(ll LIL/.9411. CUileLL‘V’U

tarQaining contracga with Drcceaea 8.
Che most recent activity along the line of direct action
occurred when Stale; called for a J state haldin
on nL u:t l), ljofl. uuCTLOlC violenc ce has occurred.
hevertheiees, even's of the pflst two 3eare rive little evidence
hat the fiational -ihe~e Crga lization ii the militant 8Q;-

rneaive force it once prohiaed to be. Holding ac

’l

:2 coamuoiti‘v tut tney have not met

r .
(TN
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i' .- ' V C ". , r, .I t.‘ N l -. , .- V, r... .3 _ v.‘ .I 1 -, 3"“, \I>,\1 r 1, ’- .,,,\ .. M {:1
in ljo; on Corn, cUJCUdML, and SUiQMUJ the Lepartheht oi

Agricultuic:1%mxy" ed Octotem‘le in that gcxr° that itm‘iflre

month ending Octoter 15, prices wer actually lower for cattle

and CQITIlANg prices tor-ujjjzzmzd wheat :Kiwaiip slightly. “XL:

general level of parity of faim prices stood "t 77 per cent o‘
r, - 1" n w I‘- I- i,, .,‘ ‘i .' ' f If [:8 T‘,‘ _ ', 1 r _ "\
parity : opposed to -0 per cent in ljoa lu Dec»u->r, lje;,

'YNFO Reporter (Corning, Iowa), FeL ruary, 1903.

 

MSW York Times, Novemter l, 1903.

 

Lhe ULi‘Led

Qriccc Icy

LJJ. CVJ. \J‘Uli:

1 Y

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ill lyucz cut, 'LJVE: lulu- Ucllcf

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eucccceec kc; “use ihycicahi in LML lJJQ iuh. in chc lilbb PLUCL
' *‘ "V .. 'P "w h- '- ‘- '3 .; ‘. ' ’. ‘ ' '. 7 "’1 . "N7 x‘ ' n: C: ' "a .7. r " .‘y‘ . ' w r'I I aw

lc cluhnec Lac hell 6’ ca.llcueu laih luccicc, but nmeilcou nuih
QLLIEHJ, the liflxichal in 118- ' lixban, 81M} Lhe Lia cicdkfil Gialltg chap

hag previously

ahu cucctec lLS

cargalhihé

ca

1. Sec'unuld‘

;
margctihg ex
production

1'13,- V‘, _-‘,7. 1 {‘1“ "
1.04.1.1C3LEQ ,Ll-luti

is *o cuccce t
tn“ government
managcicnt d an

giv :ihahCial

The alternative

in line.

with

per

Honfl

LfilitLlCQ the upct

a W n

cruccgcaic whicn

, it pruvcu Lath

is Due

-. a"! .
.163.‘L~4UL‘S

could take

if direct action a

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0
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cr

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_LE cue ui Dalliac Liullc Cilici

what the

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advantage ul the supporting

hd eventual collective barbainih;

cci mucc Le restricceu or

1?!

ole as C dcwmazui later-

ii

oee who with hold must be

theh to hold until eucceesf

ul.

cc to Keep the indepc' ndehts

1,

Conclusion

’liis Linicd, tn ;its veag; natur*‘, in (kiternnsrhi; tin:
successes and i ilures of specific farner actions contains

certain implicit conclusi01s. Nevertheless, a summary of

broad “enezalia ations would seem to be entirely in order at

The traditional romantic concept of agrarian life as
being conducive to civic virtue is partially dispelled by
accounts of violence, rebellion, ha rras -ment and defiance of
court processes. Certainly, the reisn of te11o1 conducted
by the Associated Farmers rep1 esents extreme disregard for
democratic processes. Despite all of that there still remains
the fact t1at the farmers were not attacking the institution
of private property. They merely sought to retain their own
property. If the agrarian element has an enduring grace it
must be that of patience. In all ns tances the farmers were
slow to take up direct action but very quick to abandon it.
Witness how quickly direct action subsided when the farmers
acheived partial gains. The Holiday Association, the Niscons -in
Cooperative Milk Pool and the New York dairy farmers are notable
examples.

q

Specific success s can be listed without comment. The

1-, 1

farm strike and nortsage sale protests won a code for agriculture.
The Illinois dairy fa1me1s forced ChiCa; o to regulate the milk

dealers in that city. Wisconsin and New York dairy farmers won

‘1_'

3&1

‘f-‘D

iactory price increases. California farmers succeeded in

m

settirig up a practical business structure with the sanction of

129

in.

law. The tobacco farmers won a code for their production.

”'1 J.

1 all the 1ove1e1ts the latest N30, was least successful.

\o

It won only illusory price gains for p1ic es averaged lower
after the holding action than before.

The evidence indicates that direct action's greatest
success was the speedy enactment of the New Deal. The early
prairie fire of protest was an unxnown quantity and it could
not be ignored. The first major legislation, AAA, sponsored
by the administration effectively do used that prairie fire.
Significantly, AAA helped p1imarily the corn and hog farmer.
Dairy, fruit, cotton, and tobacco larmers had to wage their

. ,1 ~ 1 1 H - 1 ~ 1 11 a -- . ~ 3
ions in order to net 'coees” 1dr their prooucts.

p

(1

own direct ac
The legitimacy of the claim to costs— —of-production is
best left to another study. This study, however, demonstrated
that where farmers were willing to discipline then'elves to
cuitail production as in the case of the Ca liiornia speciality
crop 1a1mers, under proration, and to a certain extent the
tobacco fa’lers, under the AAA code, costs—of—production became an
achievable goal. In the Middle West where the tradition of
individual action remained drong government codes were not the
ans we1. Indeed, the holidar Association demand for costs—of-
production without regard to productionpresaged ominous events

ior the future. NEO owes its existence to the fact that

production of agricultural products has not been brought into

his study also demonstrated that 11CL1stances litera ll;

1orcec3 the h‘afimers to take action in their own behalf. thitanc;

o 7 I '7 r» - V \- 4‘» _- 1 1‘ _o _ _’_ (W _o _A x“. _. ~:-r\"' 1, {'.c‘ r‘ ‘r‘ _ N H u" ‘ a -,- t‘
1n the early tni1t1ts hue 1neV1tasle. 1nc lufiLGIS LleU not

‘7 r- "j 11 ‘ I’. 'z‘ I "‘f’ —.I ' f‘. 7‘ ' ~ I “I 1‘: I r“ ’1‘? ’ _ - ‘ ‘ -- ,x "- 1. '3‘: -> I“ If“ ‘"
DJ 1ecuceu to 1a1h labo1e1s. iney we1e not ignorant

and inarticulate. Lhey saw business bein~ helped by way 0

x.) U

*3

31C and bank holida s aniong other things. They too wanted

state and ultimately federal assistance in ceoin’ with the
economic depriss ion. Grass roots support gave the administration
courage to pass it. Despite its going beyond the embargo
envisioned 1y hilo heno, direct action to date has drawn more

att ntion to the farmers' plight than all the years of peaceful
negotiations when t1e governhent and public only responded by

in effect, ”Good boys, go home and feed the hogs.”

saying
Finally this study under scored the spirit generally held
that far f1 on being radical the farmers had merely discovered
that they also could use the power of government to advance
their own economic interests. In so doing they stood to the
left-of-eenter in demanding far more government action to
1elp the farmer than the two major parties appeared 1eady to
give. That the industrial has should view such government

I n

assiscance and support for projects that would pr mote iarm

p.

prosperity as wild-eyed radicalism is no surprise. Perhaps

the fact that the principle of government restraint on industry
owed its rise primarily to the insistence of the agricultural

l
ntributee to the industrial Aast's opposition.

i...
C;
CJ
I.._’
O
('1‘
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C1“
0
O

1 an. 3 a v I A« .
John D. J- cks, ”Our wn thQle Nest, lQOO—lyAO,” 1n
enocracy in the Middle Jest; 1040-1940, ed, Jeannette P. Nichols
and James G. handall (flew Ioix, 1941), pp. 105-107.

 

7—\

I} ,31 n (111,1,11 .._ 11 .‘.'.',1 ‘1‘.» ‘1
n priei Annotated h1ol1'11a1n

 

iesearen on tirect actio11 or iarJers resent ed soe01al
d
.v 1,. .1 -.D.-- MAJ} Am .. .1 C. - 2 .4.-. '\ -. f , .,— L
11oolems. SQQILIQCLQ.~ ooJ lenatJ studies siJol- do not
b p A d

‘ U'

"""" \‘ r\ ' £— . ’— (‘ ‘1‘“"1‘14‘1 AIL-‘7 J -; .4 ' ‘E C ‘ 1‘-1-‘ fl‘
bcuflfial stud1es that Je ntion tJe events cove1ce

1 V _ 47‘ 1 _ o ‘ (.r‘ ",.'_ ,‘ ‘. _- ,A 1‘ \ V'f‘ 1'- —‘ ,~_ .—~' C“ .3 1 ,'." _ a {_ '_ A MD ’1‘.” _f _" ,.‘ ., 1
eJ bHiSceUQJ are inadequate Lecause o1 a paueitg o1 evidence.
L1 1 “2 ’1" J 1 ,1 a" ’1 ‘V' “I" ’1” '7 e1 ' ENG"? " ”- ha - '11 "1 ‘1 '“ '1 r" 1‘1"C: "’ ‘1" J} 1:,
I‘LL; bllC 111k)»; '-./ {JCJL L- 11.1.»... 1J0- L/LJ. _Lx. ~CL LILJQL’l UCLJL411‘-4~ J.“ L 1L,

popular press and Jore speciiically, the pe ’oeieals

Jhile the objectivity o1 the New ht111l c and Kation can be

 

 

questioned I found them to be especially use“ul because ooth
periodicals sent their o111n 1 porters into the striJe are as.
Jhile their accounts “wquently wer not unfriendly to

(“F-4:" ) l"‘ ‘11:) "“*‘v:; Ci") ‘1" 4".\",".1C J‘:.- j '4 ”‘1' 1*!"1t ”31“)": L r: (v , 4v‘1~_ r ,4—w4
aL,_1ctl ou111, t1n,.1ac1. ha tne.1.ept1 e11 JithE ed 1J1e ac;ts

they described eontributed to an authorivtativeness that could

not 1e discounted. The New {orh Times likewise was indis ensatle.

'O'

 

1n adritien :0 serving as a guide to the chronology of events
i was especially valuable as an accuracy check on dates

1

recorded in the periodicals. Occasionally there was some

dis c1epanc; on dates. In most cases I accepted those in the

New V01: Times because of the daily publication of events.

 

F:
(‘f‘
(D
I.
(—L
h.‘
P-’
l)

periodical accounts appeared some weeks after the

event and exact dates were occasionally in doubt as reie e1ence '

would be made to such imprecise tiJes as "he past week.
In the use of the periodicals a significant georiaphical

{'3

1a

0

ton be came obviozs. The hiddle Jest fa1m pape 1s and journals

1

intludin the liichi an Farmer and Jalla ce's Fa rwer were of

 

 

PO

( .1

little value because they ignored discussion oi the rank

and file farmer moaements. Since most oi hose farmers favored
cost-of—p iUQUCtiOI legislation wish no production controls

the Journals avoided comment apparently in fear of losing

subscribers. They continued, rather, to deal with everyday

_‘r‘x‘q 17"

questions of general farming interest. boi eiample: Wallace's

 

4‘. . --.‘ . 0 V. l‘ v ‘ 1 ‘. f" “-1'1‘ 31 ‘ ’T a n" _ h ‘V ‘y’ '. ' J ‘ ’ '. h ‘ "“ 0
Farmer, Iowa's Leadinu berm heuspape: in the issues Oi

 

43

September 15 and Octoter 6 and 20 during the height oi the
1362 holding action published two editorials expressing doubt
as to the advisitility of the strike. It published 4 letters
on UFO during that time but no feature articles.

The eastern press, while opposed to farm relief, gave
lengthy accounts of the stiires, flOlbUaUC sale protests, and
sporadic violence. While the eastei n poi 1t of View was not
of any particular value in understanding discontent in the
agricultural regions the factual content was invaluable.

I

Generally speaking Wacion, New Republic, and New Outlook were

 

 

especially useful for accounts of the sociological and economic
aspects of farm discontent. For matter of fact accounts and
, .

eeneral information the following served well: Fortune, iOZUfil,

\T
\x
o

>- I
03

ti n's _3us iness, and Time.

.Business Jack was especially useful ior statistical

 

informmiLion on the tobacco and dairy actions. Julius Duscha

reported first hand accounts of the NFC holding action in the

Reporter,. U.S. News and World Report and was useful 10: the

 

(‘I

political. implications of iarmer discontent. Other periodicals

that caittied articles on direct action and contributed to

 

 

‘AR ’ 4" - .1x I 1 .1 r ’- " . ' 1" I- .r‘. (’4 r . r~ - ‘o '. . 4" ' > ”7 v V‘.‘ v . q‘ " .1 1"; "‘ "i “

Lulanl’S uUilLiijL} .hu CAL; (.1 ‘LJUL‘L/ U ~k)C.LCA.1. L1l:bb‘l—Iu' “Lie, bili';.3V-LQll
,u» r- .w.--.‘- w-..wi:- ~r,q~ L c-w“=* D'" at ‘

C»_.L‘1.-1,?.1’U.’ C EL:.L.1‘\LKLYI'J{\.:L<:L, ALLJHILJUL’ k- 1.0 9:. 1.2.;(18, _'_LJCLGJ-1 “._Ve»: L4, 'CIIJU

r..- ' .— . V.

[U lci'iCdn 1.(.’.'_ C1L1)_q_s"/' .

 

The UFO Reporter .s the oificial organ of the national

 

Tr " n -x_ r‘v \‘. rd“ ' ‘. I" "‘ I" '3 \1 _ 1r‘.‘ r- ‘ v’ "‘1“ - 1‘ " T ' (5") " " ‘ M": ’ -'. ' " "I
rail in; UJ-dhléalufiul. rcr ciatEMKfllL 01 imnqiwee and 0' ' aILLhitional

u
‘ , a - A m - ”‘Tv’ — VHF-Ha who —‘- ‘-' --~~~ ': . r (‘H
{set-Ll}? CurlcUlt Lile ichl‘JHUl i‘1c..i..1€i o Oi qdilizaolu‘ll bal-ILJWK;
”2' ‘7 y“; 1:“\r\‘~1f'."‘~' " m. (""1 ‘ .- E F”, _; ‘TTJ '- c (7‘ 1 '.T‘ r“ “" 1~- ‘3'”) x C.‘
0110 “Lenlppi pulp 00L CC! IUUV . .LAlCa IND O 113 s; QU v UU La nhulti DU»;

undated pamphlets and verifax cooies o-

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C
(I

S3
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(D

t“ J

friCNUlJ CO UFO. Gordon Schafcr, Negotiator for NFO,

questions sent to Oie1

H:

was kind enough to ans*er a list o
Staley concerning the H30. For the attitude oi conse1va tive

1
~—

1arhers towards EEO see fiation's A;riculture, the organ of the

 

I 1

American Farm Bureau Fc‘eration. lcqvpaoe‘\ that included

the Detroit News and the State Journal (Lansing) were read for

 

 

recent activities of UFO. For perceptive dis ussions of the

J

I ‘ 1‘". r ‘ (T - T‘ J- n (- ‘_ f, ha I u.) r,ql\ ~ —. l—v '- 3 .- , 1‘. 1 H
cohnaiati ve CUVGHOQ.CS c1 eneral ia Oiuafliaatiuns and

A. k.)

ccnmaodiigy ia1m1torgarm¢u3tic¢n3 see 1£unn Politx; Fezmt1.

 

JLIU 1.:1‘; S

 

Von tfiwwer res ti-n to An} see Gil crt C. rite ”nsruc1
Opinion and the agricultural Adjustaent Re“, 193;,” Vol.
XLVIII, I=iVL£Ii (L-Zarch, 1312). a--- 1;. 114.11% ”lhe California
ProngSLPive and His nationals: A Study in Riddle Class Politics,”

7— 1.7-}. ‘ ‘ ~ - r ..- ' T" .’ (‘1 ‘ .1 ‘ 1” r~ .- ~ - r A—\ ,
tel. AAV-L: LVAM (c-0tch or lme) is a u ciul aparoaCn to

, L
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_’i'v ~biv~4 J.L .1Vil.,‘_Jvl..L,L/.1_C Quip lCL. dun. chu UL’ 011.1. up ~ULJ..I- J-.- . e..

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[.L‘LlUi'U mic: Olild Lula) LOU.L ltiipeil CLLUUil‘E Q‘Jailoble db

L.
I
k
.3
J
J
I

time that ane COMCQULGU sae115icallu with di: ect action bv

L

Earners. Both are inadequate JUUifluli tic accounts that
failed to utiliz~ t3e original sources to full advantage.

‘_(—.. - —. 1'- T" -‘ 1‘1 1 (“\ v -' wn .l. T ,x 5‘; .- r1 1». j « , ' 7' T7 ‘1‘” \ r‘ r 7"- I‘ 3.x .1 -. l7-‘u
Ik3s1Ji..e 1113. ilaiviihg .Je1.1et. LLiLuji‘ LLLlCD 1.siio, ikilc: 133a.3ei 's 1;-e

Wilt}.fi3chassesz {hue Aiericar111a 1“i1er iiiiarvolt, (iknv .ork:

 

 

L

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3estings nouse, ljoe is not the solid account eddb one Miphb

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r ,"‘, ~ ,w - . . r — 1‘ , r~ (‘14-— " 1. ‘ . - r~_~;r'fi " _'_-" ~73' l1". ' f' I n-- ‘- 1,\
. tle, (nch, ioua: iowa State JMiVUicibJ PiesszlSea) spends

 

thnxa'tiMD analgsflii" the LEM mars proole31ifleh11ua does in £31333:
"\ 1": v1" 77!" F“ '7 3 A 2* 1“ NV‘ “1 '. . *7 fi \.)I1 3' 7 ~-' "'3
action. Jis acCOuht c1 Ccen Staled's leacc1Snip oi the 330

1: tie MuSt useful section.

., 4. .31.-. .. 4--
Ll‘fll S Lil‘iiLUS LIL). tilt: AL \J‘LIC

C
be
p.)
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C\

nan; writers have touched u

r} .. '.' I" I.“ _o v_ > fi' _0 u ‘i _v_~ r. /__1"' >0 - _'_. O “Ii _0 \ T—T'. ;‘ J _'_ _ _ ‘Ci 1-1" _
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w _fl

 

1’ ‘ T- 1"" {W19 :7 ' t. I: N T"\ . 7r\* 1 f‘ fl —- - 3 n ( ." l r‘ w- .,
Lew deal, lyJJ-lQJc, (new iorxz C1 eative “De Piess, qu4) GHQ

 

Arthur M. Scilesin; er Jr.'s The Cr‘s s of the Old Order, 1919-

 

 

1933 (steto3: 3»3 3t03 3135113, 1957) are .3u3 the test
for outtin~ the Farmers' Holiday ”s“ociation into p'opei

liie best stud; of agricultural disconhnt and the changing
position of the Jazme: in the thirties is ZheoC ore Saloutos and

thn D. HiCkS A lot thujal Dis COltcnt ii the Hi dle WGSt 1000-
) .9 J

 

 

C?-
W

ljgg, (.acisen. Universiti Wisconsin Press,: 1951). Their
inte1 Die tation of the Holiday mosement is especially valuable.
For an excellent discussion of the urban View towards the Riddle

West see John D. Ilicks, ”Our Riddle West, lQOO-lQHO,” in

Democracy in the Middle Nest318AO-1940, ed. Jeannette P. Nichols

 

 

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