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UNITED STATES—SOVIET UNION ECONOMIC AID TO AFGHANISTAN:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

BY

MOHAMMED JAMIL HANIFI

AN ABSTRACT
Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science
1962

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ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES-SOVIET UNION ECONOKIC AID TO AFGHANISTAN:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY
'by Mohammed Jamil Hanifi

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. In the
first chapter there is a brief presentation of the theme of
the thesis, a comparative study of United States and Soviet
Union economic aid to Afghanistan. It also includes a
discussion of Afghanistan's geography, history, economy,
government and foreign relations. Emphasis is placed on the
historical develOpments of Afghanistan's relations with its
neighbors, specifically the sub-continent of India and the
Soviet Union.

The second chapter presents, in detail, the position
of Afghanistan in the cold war, its position in the rivalry
between the communist and non-communist worlds.

The third chapter contains a description of the
developments leading to the present Afghan-Soviet-United
States relations in the past decade. It emphasizes the
change that has come about with competition in Afghanistan,
largely because the Soviet Union has matched every American
dollar since 1956, about $100 million, with approximately

two of its own.

Mohammed Jamil Hanifi

Included in the third chapter is a discussion of the
Pushtunistan issue, the Afghan government's demand for self-
determination for Pushtu-speaking people of the northwest
frontier of West Pakistan, which has contributed signifi-
cantly to the present Afghan position in the cold war.

Chapter four contains an account of the neutral
position of Afghanistan in world affairs, a presentation of
the historical, cultural, social, political and economic
factors that have contributed to Afghan neutrality, and how
the country has utilized its position to promote its develop-
ment.

Chapters five and six present a detailed description
and discussion of the United States and Soviet bloc economic
and military aid to Afghanistan.

Chapter seven contains some conclusions derived from
this study. These conclusions are focused on the ends and
means of the United States and Soviet aid programs, as well

as the goals, needs and aspirations of the Afghan nation.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET UNION ECONOMIC AID T0 AFGHANISTAN:

A CONPARATIVE STUDY

BY

MOHAMMED JAMIL HANIFI

A THESIS
Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service
Michigan State University of Agriculture and

Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

1962
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PREFACE

The writing of this thesis suffered from several
unavoidable handicaps. Perhaps the major limitation was
the lack of sufficient reliable statistical and factual
material, particularly concerning Soviet aid programs.
There are only about half a dozen references from which a
somewhat realistic picture can be obtained. Most of these
sources are not up to date. The author had to deal prima-
rily with material published between 1956 and 1959. Because
of the lack of an original reference, the inconsistent and
often contradictory nature of the available material was
another major problem encountered by the author.

Since 1959, both the United States and the Soviet
Union have increased their efforts to promote, along with
their own goals, the development of Afghanistan. Unfortu-
nately, there is very little information and literature
available on the events since 1959. If such material is
made available, undoubtedly the sc0pe and quality of this
study can be improved.

Another serious problem was the lack of published
information by the Afghan government. It is unfortunate
that the Afghan government has drawn a curtain of secrecy
over matters which are of vital interest to the Afghan

public, especially Afghan students, and to people and

11

students all over the world who are going to be affected

directly or indirectly by what goes on in Afghanistan.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author hereby expresses his deep gratitude to
Dr. Harry J. Friedman, upon whose suggestion this study was
undertaken and without whose constant guidance, assistance
and encouragement it would never have been completed.

I would also like to thank Mr. Tooryalai Etemadi,
the educational officer of the Afghan Embassy in Washington,
who made it possible for me to go to Washington, D. C. and
to use the facilities of his office and other facilities in
Washington.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my wife,
Sarah, for her constant patience, encouragement and moral
support without which the completion of this study would not

have been possible.

iv

TO THE MEMORY OF MY LATE FATHER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I.

II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND . . . .
Iii-Story o o o o o o o o o o o o 0
Foreign Relations . . . . . . . .

AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST .

PRELUDES TO AFGHAN-SOVIET-UNITED STATES

RELA‘I‘IONS 0 O O O O O O O O O O O
The Pushtunistan Issue , . . . . .

THE AFGHAN NEUTRALITY ,

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AID TO AFGHANISTAN

Mutual Security Programs

Wheat Program and other Activities

Nature of United States Aid to Afghanistan

Industry and Transportation

Air Transportation

Aerial Photography and Mapping

Afghan Regional Transit

National Roads Improvement and Maintenance

Motor Vehicle Transportation

Architectural and Engineering Services

Mineral Resources and Coal Production

Industrial District Kandahar
Nuclear Science and Engineering

The Helmand Valley . . . . . .

vi

39
LI3
53.
65
67
68
69
69
69
7o
71
71
72
73
73
73
7h
71+

CHAPTER

Helmand Resources Development . . . . .
Surface Water Investigation . . . . . .

Helmand Valley Authority Development
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Helmand Public Health and Sanitation ,
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Institute of Education . . . . . . . .
Educational Facilities . . . . . . . .
Kabul University Administration . , , ,
Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering
Afghan Institute of Technology . . . .
Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Public Administration . . . . . . . . . .
National Fiscal Administration . . . .
National Public Administration , . . .
Civil Police Administration . . . . .
VI. SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO AFGHANISTAN . . . . .
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGl—EAPHY O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

vii

PAGE

75
75

76
77
77
78
78
78
79
79
81
81.
81
61
83
100
118

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The importance of foreign aid to underdeveIOped
countries makes it necessary to consider the role of such
aid as one of the cornerstones for the deveIOpment and
progress of the host countries. The nature and objectives
of such aid programs have a significant bearing on the
direction a country might choose in the struggle of devel-
Oping nations for self-sufficiency, independence and free-
dom.

Afghanistan has been one of the traditional neutrals
in the conflict of East and West for the control and friend-
ship of the Asian, African and Latin American countries.
Since 1950, the country has received aid from both the USSR
and the United States. The objective of the Afghan policy,
as expressed by its external and internal policies, has been
to enable Afghanistan to muster all the help the country can
get to keep up with the fast moving world. So far, any type
of aid from any source has been accepted so long as it has
not borne any political strings and has not interfered with
the independence and the neutral position of the country.

Though some attempts at modernization were made in
the "20"s and "30"s, the material renaissance of the country

has really occurred during the past fifteen years. The

Americans have been active since 1950, the Russians since
1956, and in their efforts to outdo each other, they have
demonstrated their desire to win the friendship of the
Afghan peOple.

United States and Soviet economic competition is one
of the fundamental ingredients of the cold war. Economic
actions are both a part, and symptomatic, of the cold war.
The alert, agressive and calculating economic threat of the
Soviet Union reflects its attitude toward the cold war
generally, and its intentions to defeat the West. The
United States foreign aid to Afghanistan, although not as
substantial and spectacular, has recently been slanted not
only to help improve the lot of the Afghan peOple, but also
to outdo the Soviets by impressing the Afghans with the
superiority of western technology. The United States and
the Soviet Union have both, so far, avoided the attachment
of manifest political strings to their economic aid. Both
sides, perhaps more so the Russians, have done their best to
impress the Afghans that their interest in Afghanistan is
confined to the economic deveIOpment of the country.

The theme of this thesis, therefore, is to discuss,
compare and analyze the United States-Soviet aid to Afghan-
istan, the nature and type of both programs, and some of the
elements of success and failure.

Today Afghanistan, like all of South and South East

Asia, is in the path of a traditional Russian pressure
toward the sea and on the historic invasion route to India.
The result is that this remote mountainous kingdom is the
scene of a strange kind of tug-of-war. The "containment"
powers of the West are trying to pull the Afghans away from
the lengthening shadow of the USSR, both using the means of
foreign aid.

One of the backward countries in the Middle East,
Afghanistan is organized along tribal lines, with no organ-
ized political parties and no known Communist Party members.
But the Afghans tend to look upon their powerful northern
neighbor as a benefactor, and the Soviet Union has no inten-
tions of disillusioning them. On the contrary, the USSR
provided Afghanistan with a $100 million long-term credit in
1956, and an increasing number of Soviet-financed deveIOp-
ment projects have since been undertaken. In the same year,
Mr. Khrushchev visited the country, and in 1957 the King of
Afghanistan visited the Soviet Union and was warmly wel-
comed. Gradually, large numbers of Soviet specialists have
been introduced into the country, ostensibly to work on the
new projects under construction. While building roads,
exploring for oil, constructing bakeries and automotive
works and equipping the Afghan army, they may, of course,
attempt an ideological infiltration. At the same time,

Americans have been building irrigation networks, eXpanding

airport facilities, training Afghan teachers and advising
the country on its budget.

Afghanistan is, geographically, about the size of
Texas (250,966 sq. miles). The pOpulation is a mixture of
many racial stocks (some 13,000,000, divided into:.Pushtu:
60.5%; Tajik: 30.7%; Uzbek: 5%; Mongolian and others: 3.8%):-L
Islam is the dominant religion (Sunni: 90%; Shiah: 10%).

Wedged between Pakistan, Iran and the USSR, and with-
out outlet to the sea, Afghanistan became an independent
state only in 17h7; previously, it had been either a cluster
of small states under nominal Arab rule, part of Mongol or
Moghul empires, or dismembered among India, Persia and the
Uzbeks. By the 19th century, it had passed into the British
sphere of influence. In 1880, Great Britain recognized
Abdur Rahman Khan as Emir and gave him an annual subsidy of
more than half a million dollars to delegate management of
his foreign relations to London. His son, Habibullah,
succeeded him (1901) and kept Afghanistan neutral in World
War I despite strong pressure of pro-Turkish elements.

A treaty of August 8, 1919 made Afghanistan free and
independent of all control by Great Britain. The new state
was able to maintain its neutrality in World War II, and

joined the United Nations in November, 19h6.

 

lDonald Wilber (ed.), Afghanistan (Human Relations
Area Files. New Haven, 1956), p. 33.

 

Only a fifth of the soil is under cultivation, the
greater part of the country being mountainous and rocky.
Farming is limited to the fertile valleys and plains, some-
times with the help of irrigation. Two crOps a year are
usually grown. Important ones include fruits and nuts,
castor beans, cereals, madder, tobacco, cotton and vegeta-
bles. Wheat is the staple food. The fat-tailed indigenous
sheep is a principal source of meat and wearing apparel.
Industry is only in a primary stage of deveIOpment. Manu-
factured products include cotton and woolen textiles and
clothing, soap, leather, matches, beet sugar and furniture.

Among the items of eXports are karakul skins (mostly
to the United States), cotton, wool, rugs, carpets, spices
and dried fruit. Most of the trade has been carried through
Pakistan, until recently when Pakistan denied transit facil-
ities to Afghanistan. Wool and cotton are mostly eXported
to the USSR in return for consumers' goods.

Though there are modern roads built and under con-
struction, camels and pack horses are still used by the
natives, but motor transport is gaining importance. The
principal routes head south through the Khyber and Khojak
passes to Pakistan, and north to the Uzbek and Turkmen
Soviet Socialist Republics.

Except for the southwest, most of the country is

featured by high snow-capped mountains and deep valleys, and

the state is split east to west by the Hindu Kush range of
the Himalayas (reaching, in the east, 2h,000 feet). The
climate ranges from extremes of below zero to more than
100° in the north, and snowfall is heavy all over the
country in winter.

under the 1932 Constitution, Afghanistan is a consti-
tutional monarchy, with authority vested in the sovereign
and Parliament (which has a Senate of 50 members, named for
life by the sovereign) and a National Assembly of 171
elected members. But the real power is exercised by the
ruler, Mohammed Zahir Shah. There appear no definite signs
of unrest, although most of the peOple are extremely poor.
But they are isolated and illiterate, and anti-monarchical
prOpaganda, such as Nasser's campaign, for example, is
weakened in force by the time it reaches this remote land.
This is not to say there is enmity between Egypt and Afghan-
istan. Because of friendly relations, due to the Afghan
government's support of President Nasser's position and
ambitions in the Middle East, there is no Open campaign by
hum against the present Afghan Royal family. The anti-
monarchy campaign of Nasser, through the voice of Radio
Cairo, although directed primarily towards Iran, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia (all western allies), does reach Afghanistan in
a physical sense, but it has little significant effect

because of the absence of facilities to overcome the height

of the mountains. Premier Mohammad Daud, in office since
1953, and his relatives call the tune politically and eco-
nomically, as a kind of family corporation. As cousins of
King Zahir, Mohammad Daud and his brother Naim, the Foreign
Minister, are Princes. Together with the King they are the
key men in the Kingdom. The Premier's modernism.is reflected
in his use of the airplane; unlike his predecessors in office,
he likes to get a first hand view of what is going on in the
Kingdom. Within the last three years he has had a good look
around the Soviet Union, the United States and Communist
China.

Maintaining his role of neutrality, Daud has been
taking economic assistance from Moscow as well as from
Washington, considering it his duty to take economic help
where he can get it, so long as it has no strings attached.
His critics have from time to time raised cries of alarm at
his audacity in taking Soviet aid and in admitting 500
Soviet technicians. But, obviously, Premier Daud has no
illusions, and remembers that, historically, the Afghans,
like the Turks and the Finns, have been standing off the
Russians for centuries. As a soldier, who formerly com-
manded his country's military college, he insists upon
keeping up an army of about 200,000 men and a large Soviet

financed air force.2

 

2Edward Hunter, The Past Present (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1959), p- 920

Even though Afghanistan is rugged and the peOple
backward, the country is an important factor in world
affairs. The country has a long border in the north with
the USSR. If Soviet Russia were to gain control of Afghan-
istan, she would drive a wedge toward the Arabian Sea, a
wedge which would come perilously close to separating the
Middle East from the rest of Asia.

In spite of the denial about the political strings
attached to the Soviet help, its geopolitical implications
are evident. Much of the aid from the Kremlin, under a loan
of 100 million dollars for 30 years at only two per cent, is
being used to build a communications network between Afghan-
istan and the USSR. This involves widespread building of
roads and bridges in the northern part of the country, and
the construction of two airports with the latest in modern
equipment around Kabul. The stated object of all this
activity is to increase and facilitate Afghan-Russian trade.
The Soviets are also known to have given the Afghans at
least 25 jet fighters, about 25 medium.and a few heavy
tanks, four different types of artillery and various small
arms. Soviet officers are training the Afghan forces to use
these arms.3 By contrast, American aid is less directly

related to trade and defense, more with general develOpment

 

3New York Times, September 5, 1956.

 

of the land. The United States is helping the Afghans to
modernize and expand their fledgling air network, building
dams and extending irrigation. More than 50 American
teachers are working to improve the whole system of educa-
tion.h

In 1958, without any fanfare, Pakistan and Afghan-
istan signed a new treaty that may be of great significance.
It guarantees reciprocal rights of transit to each across
the other's territory. Thus a better outlet for landlocked
Afghanistan was assured and Pakistan was in a better position
to be a friendly neighbor. The Kabul covenant signalized a
marked improvement in relations of the two countries, strained
in 1955 to the point where Pakistan closed her border against
her neighbor to the west. The blockade was keenly felt in
Afghanistan because most of her exports and many of her
imports had for generations moved through the Khyber Pass.

Although the border was closed for only a few months,
the situation stimulated the develOpment of air transport in
Afghanistan. Her main exports and source of foreign
exchange, Persian lamb hides, were temporarily shuttled to
Beirut (Lebanon), for shipment to the West. Trade between
Pakistan and Afghanistan was resumed largely through the

intervention of the United States.

 

h1b1d., July 9, 1961.

10

Today, Afghanistan's centuries-long isolation from
the rest of the world has been broken down by the swift
advance of transportation and communication. Within recent
decades, and particularly since World War II, Afghanistan
has entered actively into the community of nations. The
country was admitted to the United Nations in 19h6. By a
policy of neutrality and non-alignment it seeks to maintain
its independence and avoid involvement in the conflict of

power between the eastern and the western blocs.
I. HISTORY

Afghanistan today is still a relatively unknown land,
until recently by-passed by modern technological progress,
and forgotten by all but its close neighbors. Not too long
ago, it was the pivot point of all Asia, the center of the
caravan trade between China and Rome, a mountain kingdom
through which every conqueror passed on his way to India or
the Near East. Now airplanes, railroads, ships and motor
vehicles have changed things. Afghanistan is no longer on
the beaten track of commerce, and in the Jet age, can
possibly be ignored by potential aggressors. As a cold war
economic battleground, however, Afghanistan is of primary
importance.

The Kingdom of Afghanistan was formed as a national

state by Ahmad Shah Durrani in the middle of the eighteenth

11

century. Following the death of the Persian Emperor Nadir
Shah in l7u7, the Afghan contingents of his army withdrew to
Kandahar where they chose their general, Ahmad Khan, to
serve as King. He then chose the title Ahmad Shah Durrani.
Under his leadership, the Abdali and Ghilzai tribal confed-
erations united the Persian provinces north and south of the
Hindu Kush with their diverse ethnic groups: Tajiks, Uzbeks
and Turkmen in the North, Hazara Mongols in the central
mountains, and Pushtuns, or "true Afghans", in the South.
With the third battle of Panipat and the Afghan capture of
Delhi, the Afghan Empire reached its zenith in 1761.5
Ahmad Shah Durrani's successors were less successful
campaigners, and had to contend with the power of the
British in India and the British-supported Sikhs in the
Punjab and Peshawar areas. Civil strife and dynastic
quarrels were added to external threats, and it was only in
1880 that the kingdom emerged in its present configuration.
Thanks to a "Memorandum of Obligation" with the British, the
Amir, Abdur Rahman, was able to secure Herat and the north-

western areas against Persian and Russian threats. The

western and northern boundaries were surveyed by British and

 

SAloy A. Michel, The Kabul, Knnduz and Helmand
Valle s and the National E§§E§§IR9£ Afghanistan (National
egearc Council, Foreign e esearcthrograms, No. S,
19 9), p. 3.

12

British-Russian commissions between 1885 and 1903.6 As the
price of British support, however, Afghanistan had to sur-
render control over tribal areas in the Northwest Frontier
of India and over its own foreign policy.

The position of Afghanistan as a "buffer state" thus
dates from the period when the Russian and British Empires
were thrusting toward each other in South-Central Asia, and
particularly from the 1907 Anglo-Russian general settlement
which cleared the way for their alliance in the First World
War. As the lines were drawn, therefore, Afghanistan was
not forced to choose between Russia and Britain, and.managed
to resist the invitations of Germany and Turkey to raise the
Moslems in a lihag (Holy War) against the Allies.

In 1919, however, King Habibullah was assassinated.
His young successor, Amanullah Khan, undoubtedly influenced
by the need to consolidate his position, launched an attack
on the Northwest Frontier in an attempt to recover the
tribal areas. Despite the success of General Nadir Khan in
the Kurram Valley, the month long conflict was abortive as
far as Afghan aims were concerned, and after British and
Indian forces had reinvaded Afghanistan, the Amir sued for

peace.

Negotiations lasted for two years, by which time the

 

6Wilber, 22, cit., pp. 23-2h.

13

British, more from weariness than from weakness, were ready
to concede Afghanistan full independence and control over
its foreign affairs. Since the Afghans had already entered
into direct relations with the Soviet Union, and since it
would have required a full-scale campaign to restore the old
domination, the British did little more than recognize the
fact that Afghanistan was prepared to plot its own diplo-
matic course in South Central Asia and the world.

Indeed, for most of the ensuing decade King Amanullah
did Just that, both domestically and in foreign policy.
After introducing a great many reforms, he embarked in 1927
on a tour of European and Middle Eastern capitals and the
Soviet Union. He was apparently deeply influenced by what
he saw, particularly in Turkey. But he lacked the degree of
domestic control necessary to impose his more radical reforms
in the face of strong Opposition from the conservative
religious mullahs (Moslem.religious teachers) who succeeded
in turning the tribes against him. When a local brigand led
a rising against Kabul, the capital city, in 1929, the
disaffected army proved unequal to the task and Amanullah
was forced to abdicate and flee. The ensuing chaos and
carnage in Kabul brought General Nadir Khan back from a
health resort in France. After initial difficulties due to
his lack of personal wealth, he was able to conciliate the

tribes, organize an army and recapture the capital.

11+

Nadir Khan was proclaimed King in October, 1929, and
took up the tasks of restoring internal order and inaugu—
rating a more moderate and reasonable program of modern-
ization. Indeed, the wisdom of Nadir Shah lay in his ability
to distinguish the practicable from the impossible, as well
as in a concentration upon economic rather than social
reforms. Nadir Shah was tragically assassinated in 1933, but
his son, Zahir Shah, has continued his policies with consid-
erable success since that time. Afghanistan obtained a new
constitution, giving it the form of a limited monarchy.
Actually, the office of Prime Minister was filled by one of
the King's uncles until 1953, and since then by his cousin,
Prince Sardar Mohammed Daud, so that close family relation-
ships have reinforced the solidarity of the Afghan government.

Afghanistan has the resources to improve the lot of
its peeple, but the transition to a modern economy will be
long and difficult. Many problems must be attacked simul-
taneously if progress is to be made on any front. The
economy of the country is not able to provide the large
amounts of capital required for economic development and out-
side aid is essential. While preserving its independence and
its neutral position in world affairs, Afghanistan is willing
to obtain economic assistance where it can from the United
States, from international organizations, such as the special-

ized agencies of the United Nations, and from the Soviet bloc.

15

II. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Afghanistan has traditionally pursued a policy of
neutrality in its foreign relations. Afghanistan's foreign
policy places emphasis on peace and the maintenance of
friendly relations with all nations. Being a Moslem.nation,
it is particularly interested in developments affecting the
Moslem.nations of the Middle East. In forums such as the
United Nations, Afghanistan has publicly avoided taking
stands on major East-West issues which could be interpreted
as favoring either side. Prime Minister Mohammad Daud,
during his official visit to the United States in June 1958,
described his country's position in a speech before the
United States House of Representatives:

Our history is witness to the fact that we have
tolerated many sufferings for the preservation of our
independence and freedom. At no time have we allowed
any influence to damage our national prestige or hurt
our national pride. We are determined to live in this
way; we cannot think of any materialistic factor that
would persuade us to accept the slightest change in the
course of our national determination for the preserva-
tion of our independence and of our freedom.7

Afghanistan's relations with its neighbor, Pakistan,
through which the bulk of its trade with the free world has

traditionally passed, have been in recent years severely

strained as a result of the Pushtunistan dispute. The

 

 

7Background: The Subcontinent ngSouth Asia--Afghan-
istan Ce lon India NepaI, Pakistan. ear and Kidd e st-
ern SerIes KI: (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1959).

16

controversy, now about 10 years old, constitutes a major
international problem for Afghanistan. Maintenance and
strengthening of Afghan ties with the non-communist world
are complicated by this controversy, which has also contrib-
uted to a measurable shift in Afghanistan's traditional
foreign trade pattern away from the non-communist world
toward the Soviet Union.8

The objectives of United States policy with regard to
Afghanistan are very much in harmony with the basic national
objectives of the government of Afghanistan. One of the
major objectives of the Afghan government, in the words of
its Prime Minister, is "to raise the standard of living of
the peeple and to insure their material and spiritual well
being, for the achievement of which we must fight ignorance,
disease and poverty".9 American economic assistance to
Afghanistan is given in order to help in this fight against
the common enemies of man.

As a symbol of the warm relations existing between
the two countries and as an indication of a desire of both
nations to base their relations on mutual understanding,
there was concluded a United States-Afghan cultural agreement

to promote the expansion of cultural contacts between the

 

8Peter G. Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West
(National Planning Association, 1935), p. 7I.

 

9Background, 92. cit., p. 20.

17

people of Afghanistan and the people of the United States.
The agreement provided that both countries will encourage
reciprocal exchanges of prominent citizens, specialists,
teachers and students, and will facilitate cultural activ-
ities such as the establishment of libraries and information
centers by the other government in each country.

Prior to the conclusion of this agreement, there had
already been some U.S.-Afghan exchanges under the provisions
of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of l9h8
(the Smith-Mundt Act). Through 1958, 15 Americans had
visited Afghanistan and 3h Afghans had come to the United
States.10

Upon the conclusion of discussions between President
Eisenhower and Premier Mohammad Daud during the latter's
visit to the United States in June 1958, a joint statement
was issued expressing areas of agreement between the two
governments. The President and the Prime Minister reas-
serted their firm attachment to the principles of the United
Nations Charter and it was agreed that both nations share a
belief in mutual respect for the sovereignty and independ-
ence of nations, in non-interference in the affairs of
others, in social and economic progress for all peOples.

With these principles as a guide, the United States

 

lolbid.

18

has maintained and extended the traditionally cordial rela-
tions which have existed between the two countries. The
United States has welcomed Afghanistan's efforts to promote
and extend its friendly contacts with other non-communist
nations and to assume a larger role in the community of
nations.11

Continuing the heritage of Czarist foreign policy,
the Soviet government began its attempts to establish its
influence in Afghanistan shortly after the Russian Revolution.
Since the early twenties, it has used economic means as well
as diplomacy in the attempt to achieve its objective.

In 1919, with the retreat of the British from their
previous position in Afghanistan and their recognition of
Afghanistan's independent status, the new Soviet regime
sought immediately to extend its influence. Soviet and
Afghan.missions exchanged visits and the Soviet-sponsored
Pan-Hindu Revolutionary Committee established a forward base
on Afghan territory.12 In 1921, Afghanistan and the Soviet
Union concluded a treaty of friendship providing for the
establishment of diplomatic relations, the Opening of a number

 

11Louis Dupree, Af hanistan's Bi Gamble, Part III.
South Asia Series, vol. V, no. 5 (KaEuI: American University
Field Staff, May 9, 1960), p. 13.

12Pan-Hindu Revolutionary Committee was established as
a joint Afghan-Soviet venture, with practically no Indian
leadership, to serve somehow as an Indian government in exile.

19

of Soviet consulates on Afghan soil, the payment of an annual
subsidy of one million rubles to the Afghan government and
the supply of munitions to Afghan armed forces.

During the twenties, Soviet technicians appeared in
Afghanistan, assisting in road building, surveys and con-
struction and providing instructions for Afghan Air Force
pilots. But, warned by Soviet conquests in the neighboring
Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, Afghan leaders were careful
to control Soviet activities.

Nadir Shah, who came to power in 1929, followed a
policy of carefully balancing British and Russian influence
in Afghanistan to preserve the country's independence. The
utilization of Soviet technicians was discontinued. In
1930, relations between the two countries were disrupted by
border incidents. However, trade and commerce continued to
grow and the Soviet Union became the primary source of
manufactured goods for Afghanistan.

During World War II, when the Soviet Union was unable
to continue its exports, Afghan trade gravitated toward India.
In the postwar period, trade with the Soviet Union was grad-
ually revived, though initially no Soviet trade agencies were
permitted to Operate in Afghan territory. After the end of
British rule in India, disputes with Pakistan were an influ-

ence in the Afghan decision to turn to Russia for support and

assistance.13

 

13The Pushtunistan Issue, discussed in Chapter III.

CHAPTER II
AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Although the cold war is generally understood to
typify the rivalry between the communist and non-communist
worlds, in fact the cold war assumes different aspects in
different parts of the world. In Europe, for example, it
is a relatively closely defined frontier separating the
Open from the closed societies. Not surprisingly, many
Americans and rather curiously, many Asians tend to force
the same conceptual framework on the cold war in Asia. The
present writer believes that the cold war, as seen from
Afghanistan, is only a continuation of an older pattern of
conflict.

Afghanistan, in the 18th and 19th centuries, was
surrounded by the advancing forces of Russia and Britain.
In the exact center, Afghanistan remained relatively un-
touched, while the great imperial forces of the century
whirled around her, one coming up through India, on the
flanks through Iran, Kashmir and even Tibet, while the other
steadily and ruthlessly subjugated the Moslem states of
Central Asia. The Russians moved from Orenburg to Termez
and Khushka and the British from Madras to Peshawar and
Quetta, always getting closer, but leaving the core more or

less intact. Perhaps a more accurate way would be to

20

21

compare Afghanistan with the eye of a storm or the vortex of
a whirlpool.

Although the progress of the British northward is
well known and well chronicled, it is easier to forget the
progress of Russia through Central Asia, perhaps because the
old Russian empire shared one trait with the Soviet empire
today-~namely, a pathological obsession with secrecy.
Although its authenticity has never been proved, the al-
leged testament of Peter the Great may have epitomized the
object of the Russian push by counselling his successors
"to approach as near as possible to ConstantinOple and
India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of
the world. Arrived at this point we shall have no longer
need for England's gold".l

Whatever the validity Of Peter's will, it is a fact
that, after taking the Caucasian peninsula early in the 19th
century, the Russians moved by force to take Samarkand,
Tashkent and Turkistan in the 1860's and Khiva in 1873 and
by the turn of the century had extended their influence to
the Oxus River Opposite Afghanistan. Although the Russians
occasionally sought to extend their influence into Afghan-

istan and a fluctuating British policy resulted in two .

 

lAfghanistan-Ariana (Royal Afghan Government Depart-
ment of Press and Information, Vol. I, NO. 2, July 1961),
(unpased).

 

22

abortive thrusts into Afghanistan, that country was gener-
ally squeezed but not swallowed.

Finally, in 1907, the Afghan position in the eye of
the storm was formalized in the Anglo-Russian convention
which sought, in the face of a rising German militarism, to
stabilize the Russian and British spheres of influence in
Asia. Persia was divided into spheres of influence, Tibet
was neutralized under titular Chinese suzerainty and, in the
middle, Russia declared Afghanistan to be outside her sphere
of influence while Britain agreed not to annex or occupy
Afghanistan.

After World War I, the first sign Of a changing
pattern appeared when Britain returned to Afghanistan
control over its own foreign relations, thereby withdrawing
British influence southward. At the same time, however,
Russia--far from withdrawing--was advancing under the new
Soviet leadership to consolidate its control over the Asian
Moslem states, the last of which, Bokhara, was finally sub-
jugated in 1922, just at the time the Soviet-sponsored
Congress of the PeOples of the East, in Baku, was proclaim-
ing the end of imperialism. In the face of overwhelming
Soviet power, Afghanistan was compelled to abandon its
support of Bokhara.

Finally, in 19u7, the old pattern was broken up with

the withdrawal of Britain from the subcontinent, the

23

independence of India and Pakistan and the rivalry between
these two. With this change, the Old rules of the game were
outmoded. Since 19h7, Afghanistan has been seeking to OOpe
with the changed circumstances. These changes are great.
The old bilateral pattern was simple. The Afghans
may have resented the constriction it imposed, but could
rely on Britain and Russia to restrain each other. Now the
pattern is complex and requires more vigilance. Partici-
pants in the power struggle now are the United States, the
USSR, Britain, in a different and less omnipresent role,
plus Iran, India and Pakistan, not to mention Communist
China, hovering in the wings. The point is that the alter-
natives in a six or eight-handed game of poker are more
difficult to calculate than in a two-handed game of chess.
Not only is the new pattern more complex, the old
area balance was upset. Whereas the southern flank became
weaker by a massive devolution Of power, the northern flank,
monOpolized by the totalitarian military power of the USSR,
remained intact. Afghan neutrality before l9u7 rested on
the balance of British and Russian power, manifested right
up to the frontiers of Afghanistan. The balance now has to
be maintained, if Afghanistan is to remain neutral, by a
combination of neighboring states and the power of the
United States, admittedly great in Afghan eyes but also very

far away by comparison.

2h

One way of righting the balance would have been to
encourage the military strengthening and political orien-
tation toward the West of the countries south of the Soviet
Union. When the United States signed an arms aid agreement
with Pakistan in 195M, the Afghans were shocked. "Why should
America arm Pakistan?", they asked. "Whom.would Pakistan
use the arms against?" Surely not the Russians, Afghanistan
argued, because Pakistan has no common boundary with the
Soviet Union. The Afghans made several requests for American
arms in order to restore what they called "the balance of
power in Central Asia". These requests were refused because
neutral Afghanistan refused to sign mutual security agreements.2
When the United States refused to give Afghanistan arms aid
after several requests, (1953-19511),3 Afghanistan contracted
in August 1956, for $25 million in arms from the USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and East Germany.

The major factor making the Afghan government receptive
to Soviet overtures was the Western handling of the conflicts
over the political status of Afghan tribes living beyond the
Afghan border in Pakistan. Afghanistan found itself isolated
on this issue from the family of Western nations on which it

had firmly hoped to rely when it joined various international

 

2Dupree O . cit. no. 3, p. 16.
9.2—9

31bid., no. u, p. 11.

25

organizations. In the views of the government and a large
number of enlightened Afghans, here was a clear case where
the principle of self-determination for eight million peOple
was being disregarded at the highest international policy-
making level. Not being able to marshal other support,
despite determined efforts to do so, the government found
solace and hoped for help in closer relations with another
major power center in the world. An Afghan Foreign Office
official, in the summer of 1957, put it this way:’*

The Afghan government was obliged to use Russia after
the United States showed itself unwilling to correct the
situation. The United States not only did not press
Pakistan into a more reasonable attitude, but indirectly
supported Pakistan by the military alliance and the sub-
sequent delivery Of military airplanes, including F-86
jets, and funds for the construction of air bases. More-
over, the attempted economic strangulation by Pakistan
undermined Afghanistan's position in the world. Without
alignment with a big power, it could not stand up to
Pakistan or the United States.

The anxiety over United States military support of
Pakistan flared up anew when after a seemingly successful
visit of Prime Minister Daud in America, the United States
government formalized its Baghdad Pact commitments in bilat-
eral alliances with Iran and Pakistan in the spring of 1959.
The Prime Minister was quoted as saying, "The most important
aspect is that such agreements result in the import and

stockpiling of arms in the countries concerned....This upsets

 

hIslah,.June 16, 1957.

26

the balance of power, causing lack of confidence between
neighboring countries. The upset balance of power also
creates a tense atmosphere and limits the likelihood of
peace and security in all parts of the region. Furthermore,
the existence of dreadful weapons exposes the regime to
danger."5

Superficially, the organization of SEATO and CENTO
might seem partially to restore the pre-war pattern, if not
a precise balance, leaving Afghanistan in a position similar
to the one it occupied before the war. Unfortunately this
is not the case. The most pertinent fact in this connection
is that, while Afghan relations with the USSR since 195k
have become progressively closer and more deeply intertwined,
some rather broad gulfs separate Afghanistan from her Moslem
neighbors on the west, south and east.1

Afghan-Iranian relations are cordial enough but
rather distant in view of the wide desolate wastes which
separate the main political and economic centers of the two
countries. Relations are also marred by the fact that in
the one area where the two countries have a common interest
which could and should be cooPeratively develOped, they are
unable to come to an agreement. This area is the lower

Helmand Valley and there has long been lack of agreement

 

5Quoted in Area Handbook for Af hanistan (Special
Operations ResearcH_Office,'Washington, I959), p. 571.

27

between Afghanistan and Iran on the prOper division of the
waters of the Helmand River.

Pakistan and Afghanistan, have been at each others
throats over the disputed area of "Pushtunistan".6 When
Pakistan was created in 19k7, Afghanistan wanted a plebecite
in the North West Province to determine whether or not
Pushtunistan would be independent or remain with Pakistan.
The Afghan demand is based upon eighteenth and nineteenth
century control of the area by the Afghan empire. The
Durand line of 1893, the basis of the new state of Pakistan,
between British India and Afghanistan had split the Pushtu-
1anguage area between these two countries.

Because the majority of the Afghan peOple belong to
the Pushtu element, and for ethnic considerations, the
government of Afghanistan has urged a special status for
Pushtunistan. In fact, however, independence for Pushtun-
istan would mean assimilation into Afghanistan. Pakistan
has resisted vigorously. When the government of Afghanistan
coupled its Pushtunistan demand with a demand for an outlet
to the Indian Ocean, Pakistan retaliated by threatening and
finally closing Afghanistan's principal transit route in
1950, 1955 and again in 1961.

 

6Based on the map of "Pushtunistan" published by the
Afghan government, Pushtunistan includes the geographic area
from Chatral in the north to all Of Baluchistan in the south,
practically all of West Pakistan west of the Indus River.

28

Another indigenous Afghan factor which changes the
situation from pro-war days is the Afghan determination to
force the rate of national economic and social develOpment
as rapidly as possible. The historical origin and signif-
icance of Afghanistan's underdevelopment may be illustrated
by a lamb roasting on a spit over a hot fire.7 The outside
of the meat may be seared and blackened by the flames while
the center remains raw. Thus did Asia revolve slowly through
the political fires of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
while Afghanistan was left raw and undeveloped in the center.
Turkistan, Bokhara, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia all suffered
deeply from the fires of the last two centuries while the
Arab states, Iran, Pakistan, India and Southeast Asia were
sorely tried but they all also profited as well in.military,
economic, social and educational develOpment, leaving Afghan-
istan at a relative disadvantage.

From one point of view this is the price Afghanistan
paid for the insulated hermit-like freedom it maintained
during the earlier centuries, a freedom which was dependent
as much on the balance of two world forces as it was upon
Afghanistan's own policies. Some traditionalist Afghans
say that the price was worth paying and some probably would
be willing to go on paying the price of underdevelopment in

 

7This is an old Afghan proverb, depicting the inten-
sity of a person's education and the depth of his scholarship.

29

return for a kind of cocoon—like independence behind
mountainous barriers. It is at least doubtful that this
would be possible. In any event it is not the policy of the
Afghan government which, on the contrary, feels almost
obsessively the need to catch up with its neighbors.8
Afghans realize that this underdevelopment danger-
ously exposes their country precisely at the time when it
has suddenly been swept into the changing pattern of world
forces on every side. The rapid Russianization and Modern-
isation of the Moslem Central Asian states to the north and
the menacing posture of the beehive state, Communist China,
the herculean efforts of India toward industrialization, the
rapid develOpment of Pakistan on the east and south and the
expanding economy of Iran on the west all symbolize the
great distance Afghanistan must still run if she is to catch
up. Situated in the middle of these dynamic forces, the
peeple of Afghanistan can no longer accept the role of an
underdeveloped trough between two great powers in rough
balance. This is particularly true since the old balance
no longer exists, from a regional point of view at least,
in the face of the devolution of power in South Asia as

contrasted with the accelerated aggrandizement of power in

the north.

 

8Current Problems in Afghanistan (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 71.

 

30

Over the past five years Afghanistan has made a
dramatic response to the challenges presented by the great
political and economic changes occurring in Asia. The
country has already emerged as an active element in the
Middle East-South Asia complex of nation states.

The basis of this transformation has been the adep-
tion of a program of forced-draft economic develOpment, for
which large-scale foreign aid was Obtained. Another funda-
mental departure was the re-equipping and modernization of
the armed forces. At the same time, the government encour-
aged far-reaching social changes, symbolized by the recent,
publicized "lifting of the veil", and undertook the expan-
sion and modernization of educational facilities, both in
the general and technical fields. Modern techniques of
public administration are gradually being introduced in the
highly centralized bureaucracy which governs the country.

These changes add up to revolution-~in the case of
Afghanistan, revolution from above, for it has been the
leaders of the present government who have provided the
impulse and set the course and speed on which the country
has embarked. 0f necessity, so sweeping a program of eco-
nomic and social change has been accompanied by a campaign
to build up national unity. Press and radio stress the
cultural and military heritage shared in common by the

Afghan peOples, despite their diversity of languages and

31

their multiple ethnic and tribal origins. While much is
made of the past, at least equal or greater emphasis is
placed on the present and future needs Of a developing

state: education, technical training, hard work and the
OOOperation of all ages and sexes in the tasks of develOp-
ment. Using the Pushtu-speaking tribes as the basis, the
government is endeavoring to impart a Pushtu character to
this modern national state it is in the process of creating,9
replacing the Persian cast which had been deeply etched into
it.

While much attention is understandably focused on
Afghanistan's relations with her neighbors, it is also
instructive to note the manner in which the Afghans are
establishing a place in the broader international arena.

Over the past few years one or another of the nation's
tOp leaders has exchanged official visits with many other
world leaders. King Zahir in 1961, completed state visits
to the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, and as recently
as December 9, 1959, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister
Nehru, the Prime Minister Of Iran, West German Vice Chancellor
Erhard, Premier Khrushchev and other communist bloc leaders
have been in Kabul. This partial list is indicative of the

spreading range of diplomatic contacts which the Afghan

 

91b1d., p. 102.

32

government now maintains. In increasing numbers, lower
level officials are complementing these tOp level trips with
technical and study missions abroad, while comparatively
large numbers of Afghan students, a substantial proportion
in the United States, are pursuing full courses of instruc-
tion in overseas universities.

These broadening contacts are not only indicative of
the internal changes which have begun to shape Afghanistan
into a modern state. They also underline the Afghan passion
for independence and the continuing sense of self-identity
which so sharply marks the Afghan character.

Just as Afghanistan's political role in the world is
changing in accordance with post-war rearrangements of world
forces, so is its economic role. Afghanistan's foreign
trade has experienced a significant growth in the last ten
years. Its principal exports are fresh and dried fruits;
furs, principally karakul or the so-called Persian lamb;
raw cotton, wool, including some very fine cashmere; and
carpets. Imports cover a wider range. Tea and sugar loom
large among imported foodstuffs. The largest import, however,
has been textiles, although this commodity will decrease in
importance with increasing domestic production. Motor
vehicles and spare parts and petroleum.products are large
items. Miscellaneous manufactures and consumer goods make

up the balance.

33

This increase in tOtal foreign trade has not occurred
in equal prOportions for all Of Afghanistan's trading part-
ners.10 Since 195k, especially, the share of the Soviet
Union and its satellites has increased more than that of the
non-communist world. To an extent this trend is natural.

In fact, prior to 19Sh, trade with the Soviet Union was
surprisingly low when geographic and economic factors are
considered. Afghanistan's other two neighbors have basic
economies which are more or less paralleled to Afghanistan's
while the economy of the Soviet Union is more nearly comple-
mentary. Pakistan, for instance, is Afghanistan's seventh
most important trading partner and trade with Iran has been
minima1.11

Trade with and through Pakistan in recent years has
been hampered,12 occasionally by the general state of unsat-
isfactory political relationships existing between the two
countries and more generally by the inadequacy of Pakistan's
port facilities and transportation system, severely over-taxed

by its own develOpment progrmm. Thus the traditional route

 

10Peter G. Franck, Af hanistan Between East and West
(National Planning AssociatIon, I955), pp. IE-ZO.

111b1d., pp. 19-20.

1ZSince September 1961, the Afghan-Pakistan border has

been closed, and the flow of transit goods through Pakistan
has been stopped. Items that are affected include American
aid goods, wheat, etc.

3h

of outlet to the sea is slow and at times uncertain. Under
these circumstances concessions, apparent or real, by the
Soviet Union are attractive to Afghanistan. However, Soviet
barter transactions have many flaws, such as blocked accounts,
limited range of selection of goods, low quality, and the
ever-present danger that the Soviets may dump imported Asian
products in the regular markets of the Asian countries.

Considering only pure economic and geographical
factors it would appear natural for the Soviet Union to be
one of Afghanistan's principal trading partners, yet we must
never lose sight of the fact that in the Soviet Union foreign
trade is merely an adjunct of foreign policy. Mr. Khrushchev
has said that his country values trade more for its political
aspects than its economic importance.13 So far, there is no
evidence that the USSR has used its economic position to
exert direct political pressure on Afghanistan.1u On the
contrary, it has made its offers more attractive with such
devices as seemingly low prices, arrived at through artificial
exchange rates, and by Offering consumer goods on a consign-
ment basis.

An Afghanistan excessively dependent on the USSR as a

 

13Robert L. Allen, "The Communist Economic Offensive,”
International Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Winter, 1958-9, p. 23.

11m. K. Ramazani, "Afghanistan and the USSR," Middle
East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring 1958, p. 151.

35

source of supply and as a market for its exports would be
highly vulnerable to a shift in Soviet foreign economic
policy. For instance, Afghanistan already relies on the
Soviet Union for an estimated 75 percent of its petroleum
requirements, almost all of its metallic building materials.15
On the export side the USSR takes over 70 percent of Afghan-
istan's cotton exports and over 75 percent, by quantity, of
wool exports.16 A shift in Soviet foreign economic policy
could even now cause a serious temporary economic malad-
justment in Afghanistan at a time in which it is deeply
committed to an all-out program of economic develOpment.

The Soviet Union has chosen to make Afghanistan a
battleground in the economic cold war. The non-communist
world faces a commercial challenge in this situation. The
United States, in particular, engaged in a vigorous export
promotion program, cannot afford to ignore the market
potential of Afghanistan as it has in the past. Not only
do the smaller, less develOped nations of the world collec-
tively constitute an important market for American experts,
but these same countries are all developing and will in time
individually provide significant markets.

American private business should also begin to

 

15Wilber, 32, cit., p. 21.

16Ibid., p. 22.

36

recognize Afghanistan as a distinct market area and attempt
to promote sales. The United States Trade Mission was a
good step in this direction. The fact that American-made
products already enjoy a good, if limdted, market in Afghan-
istan indicates acceptability. There is much evidence that
Afghan importers prefer American quality, even on slightly
stiffer terms. Afghanistan is not lost to the non-communist
world as a trading partner, but more vigorous sales activity
is needed to maintain and strengthen the Western position.
While the Soviet Union's state trading systerm.has some
tactical political advantages, the American free enterprise
system is in the long run a better and more reliable trading
partner for Afghanistan.

Soviet political aims in Afghanistan do not seem very
different from those of the United States. A policy of
force or subversion has never been tried in Afghanistan.
Instead there prevailed for a long time official indifference,
if not hostility, towards the Afghan rulers who, according to
orthodox Communism, are nothing but feudal exploiters and/or
tools of imperialism. However, since Stalin's death and.the
growing influence of the United States in Asia, Soviet policy
has freed itself from the shackles of orthodoxy. Instead, it
has taken advantage of the new exploitable possibilities,
such as the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan over

the border Pathans and the slow progress of the American

37

aided projects. The promising diplomatic harvest Russia
hOpes to reap includes;17 weakening the influence of the
United States, disturbing the relations between non-communist
neighbors and pushing Afghan policy into directions favorable
to Soviet interests. Effective economic aid serves as one

of the tools with which to reap it.

There is no reason to believe that Afghan leaders are
not sincere in wishing to maintain a free and neutral course
in foreign policy. Perhaps the recent official itineraries
of the King and Prime Minister, respectively, best symbolize
the orientation of that policy; Moscow-New Delhi-Washington
and Moscow-Washington-Peking.

In clarifying its own relations with the great powers,
the Afghan government repeatedly has defended neutralism.as
a means to further national objectives. Up until l95u,
probably more material appeared critical of the USSR than of
the West. Since then, the government has stressed its
friendly relationship with the USSR and the benefits it has
derived from this relationship. But this has not involved
the anti-westernism characteristic Of some other Afro-Asian
countries, such as Egypt and Indonesia.

Nevertheless, the Cabinet is concerned about a

 

17Charles Wolf Jr Foreign Aid Theory and Practice
in Southern Asia (Princeton, ew ersey: r ncetonUhiversity

Press, 1960), p. 38h.

,38

situation in which acceptance of aid from one power for a
specific project would compel it to accept a matching bid
from the other. Irrespective of the competing credit lines
Offered, the government attempts to keep the amount of aid

money actually at work in balance.

CHAPTER III
PRELUDES T0 AFGHAN-SOVIET-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

Next to Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan was the
most conservative of Moslem countries before World War II.
Its women saw their neighbors through the meshed visor of a
shapeless costume that covered them from head to toe. Kabul
was the most desolate of all capitals, its streets alter-
nately mudholes or dust heaps, according to the season, but
bearable only when they were frozen in the depths of winter.
The Hotel Kabul charged less than a dollar a day--and was
expensive at the price. If there was wealth anywhere, it was
nowhere evident. Even the pageantry of the middle eastern
kingdoms was missing. The royal oligarchy ruled firmly but
without pomp or show. Its trOOps often went barefoot.

Landlocked, weather-worn and friendless, Afghanistan
appealed to the United States for aid. It got a little--
a loan of $21 million in 1950, another $700,000 in 1953. some
wheat worth $1.5 million, a grant of the same size and two
further loans of $18.5 million in 195u and $39.5 million in
1955.1 The loans came from the Export-Import Bank and went
to the slow-moving irrigation and land-reclamation project

in the Helmand Valley. The average Afghan noticed no change.

 

lGeorge Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 229.

 

 

39

to

Change came only with competitive coexistence, and
largely because the Soviet Union has matched every American
dollar since l956--about H100 million-—with approximately
two of its own.

High in the blue skies are the vapor trails of
Russian-made Afghan-piloted jet bombers and fighters. The
trOOps not only have shoes and automatic rifles, but T5h
tanks. Toward the Soviet border in the north, Russian
engineers are burrowing through the peaks of the Hindu Kush
Mountains to build the most spectacular stretch of a thir-
teen-hundred-mile circuit of highways that will sweep in a
broad circle around the country, linking the interior towns
and villages with the new factories and the markets of Kabul,
Kandahar, Herat and Mazar—i-Sharif. Oil has begun to flow
from new wells in the northwest. Textile mills, sugar
refineries and cement factories have sprung up. Women have
thrown off the veil and are working side by side with men in
factories and in Kabul University. The new Hotel Kabul is
ten times more expensive than the old, and is fifty times
better.2

The changes should not be exaggerated. Men and women
still work as human beasts of burden, staggering along the

roads under crippling loads. Kabul is still unsewered and

 

2Afghanistan: Ariana (Royal Afghan Government Depart—
ment Of Press and Information, Vol. I, No. 1, June 1961),
(unpaged).

 

kl

perhaps less healthy than it was when farmers came with their
donkeys to cart away the night soil which householders are
now required to dispose of themselves. The unwary pedestrian
may fall through a manhole into a partly covered drain. The
markets Offer a wide range of consumer goods, but prices are
high. Inflation has hurt the poorly paid government servants
and corruption is becoming more widespread. Yet Afghanistan
is moving ahead, and much more rapidly than anyone might have
guessed before Bulganin and Khrushchev came this way in 1955.
America's early reluctance to upset its allies in
Pakistan and Iran by giving the Afghans weapons gave the
Russians an Opportunity and the terms of Russian economic
loans may mean that more and more Afghan trade will be
diverted from the West and1:owards the Soviet Union.3 Never-
theless, gratitude for Russian help is not expressed in
converts to communism. The Communist Party, like all other
parties, is illegal. For years the Russians failed to
persuade the Afghans to let them help in education,h while
the United States has been busy in such matters as the
preparation of textbooks in Persian, in technical and voca-
tional education, in teaching English and in the establish-

ment Of the faculties of agriculture and engineering at

 

3Robert L. Allen and R. K. Ramazani, "Afghanistan:
Wooed But Not Won," Swiss Review g£_World Affairs, October,

1957, p. 31.

thid .

Kabul University.S

Afghanistan remains, in fact, a strict and conser-
vative Moslem state, oriented more toward Iran and the
Middle East than toward its Russian, Chinese and Pakistani
neighbors. Not all women, and certainly not all men,
approved of women's emergence from Purdah (veil worn by
Afghan women until it was abolished by law in 1959). In
Kandahar, for instance, tanks had to be called to restore
order.6 The power of the mullahs is still strong. Russian
money is acceptable, Russian ideology is not.

Yet westerners in Afghanistan say that Russians have
made more friends in the past six months than they made in
all the preceding postwar years. The estimate does not seem
farfetched. American aid equipment valued at $10 million is
piled up in Pakistan and may not cross the border.7 Trade
with the West has all but dried up. The Russian "rich uncles"
have suddenly become guardian angels. Their fleet of jet
transport planes saved the Afghan vineyards from economic
disaster by whisking the grape crOp, usually sold to India
and Pakistan, to Tashkent.8 The Russians agreed that

 

5Pro ect Pro ress Re ort (United States Operation
Mission 0 A g anIstan, June , 1961), (unpaged).

6Denis Warner, "Afghanistan: A House with NOBDoorz,;
The Re orter. Vol. 26, No. 2, (New YOrk: January 1 , l9 2 ,
Po.29.

7New York Times, February 15, 1962.
8Ibid., September 16, 1961.

1+3

Afghanistan could use their communication system to continue
trade with the West, and hinted that even western aid.might
move through the Soviet Union.9

I. THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE

The chief reason for the recent increase in Soviet
prestige has been the border dispute between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Moscow can afford to be generous. While not
responsible for the Afghan-Pakistani border dispute, it can
only profit from it. Afghanistan feels that its future as
an independent neutral state depends on its ability to trade
freely with both East and West. Otherwise it must either be
drawn into the economic, and eventually the political, orbit
of its Russian neighbor or face the prospect of dismemberment.
Yet the way to the Middle East is blocked by the deserts of
eastern Iran and western Afghanistan, while Pakistan holds
the passes to the Arabian Sea.

Afghanistan's approach has been to work for the crea-
tion of Pushtunistan, which would carve a window to the west
out of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and other
border regions. Since the tribesmen who live on both sides
of the border are Pathans and since these peOple make up

about sixty percent of Afghanistan's pOpulation, the new

 

9Ibid.

uh

state would, by implication, become part of Afghanistan. The
Afghans deny this and insist that all they want is the right
of self-determination for the Pathans.10

In l9h7, those living south of the Afghan border were
called upon to decide whether they wished the region to
become part Of Pakistan or part of India. The majority of
those who voted, being Moslems, chose Pakistan, but the
plebiscite covered only the administered frontier regions,
omitting the considerable areas over which the British never
had control. Given the chance, the Pathans would have voted
for Pushtunistan.11 Pakistan's recent answer to this has
been to prOpose a plebiscite throughout Afghanistan and to
suggest that Afghan districts inhabited by those who do not
speak Pushtu be united with neighboring countries on a lin-
guistic and ethnic basis.

In 1955, when Pakistan closed the border to the transit
of goods in and out of Afghanistan, Russia saw its Opportunity.
It provided Kabul with gasoline, transit rights and military
assistance. At that time, nobody took Russian economic aid
very seriously. Kabul's paved streets, its bakery, and its

Oil storage tanks, all of which were the result of Russian

aid, were regarded primarily as prOpaganda gestures.

 

10A speech made by Premier Daud, and quoted in Afghan-
istan News, March 1961, p. 18.

11This is the point of view of the Afghan government.

hS

Though the Afghans remained suspicious of Pakistan
after the border reOpened, the Pushtunistan issue went back
into the cold storage and relations between the two countries
slowly began to improve.

The advent of General Ayub Khan as president of Pak-
istan in 1958 upset the somehow cOOperative relations with
Afghanistan. The general is a tidy man and the unadmin-
istered regions of the North-West Frontier were untidy.

Ayub Khan decided to clean them up. Afghanistan reacted
angrily. If the unadministered regions of the North-West
Frontier came under Pakistani administration, the dream of
Pushtunistan would disappear for all time. Thereafter,
access to the west would be Opened or closed according to
Pakistan's whim and fancy.

The Afghans decided to stir up the border tribes.12
In September 1960, they reinforced one tribe with a sub-
stantial force of regular Afghan trOOps disguised as tribes-
men.13 In the ensuing battle the ruse was discovered. Early
last year, there were further border incidents and lives
were lost on both sides.lu

On both sides there were formal expressions of

 

12New YOrk Times, August 3, 1961.
13Ibid., August 5, 1961.

lhltid.

N6

disappointment that relations had deteriorated. Privately,
however, the Pakistanis indicated grave misgivings. They
offered Kabul talks with the suggestion that Pushtunistan
not be discussed.15 Kabul reacted predictably and became
even angrier in June when Pakistan complained that consular
officials in Kandahar and Jalalabad no longer were served
in Afghan stores and could not get Afghan servants to work
for them.16

Every year in Kabul, affairs of state are cast aside
in the latter part of August while the country spreads
itself on the week-long celebration of Jashyg (the anni-
versary of independence). Pakistan chose this time to be
firm. It demanded a decision on its complaint. The Afghans,
preoccupied with the impending festivities, did not reply.

On August 2h, 1961, the first day of the celebration,
Pakistan announced that it was closing its consulates at
Kandahar and Jalalabad. Sardar Mohammad Daud, the Afghan
prime minister, was unprepared for the shock, when, on the
following day, a second note demanded the closing of the
Afghan consulates at Quetta and Peshawar within two weeks.17

Five days later the Afghans replied that they would

 

15Ibid., August 10, 1961.
16Ibid.

17Ibid.

’47

break Off diplomatic relations unless Pakistan withdraw its
demands. Pakistan refused, and on September 6, 1961, the
18

Afghan consulates in Pakistan closed. The two countries
withdrew their embassies and trade came to a halt as the
border closed to the passage of goods, including supplies
for western embassies in Kabul.

Pakistan got all the blame for the collapse Of the
transit traffic. Since all goods destined for Afghanistan
were unloaded in Karachi, receipted by Afghan officials and
checked again by the trade agencies in Quetta and Peshawar,
the expulsion of the trade agencies destroyed the machinery
of the Afghan transit trade.19

There seems no reason, other than loss of "face",
why goods should not be cleared directly at the border.
This solution, however, is rejected by the Afghans. As a
temporary expedient, they suggest, it might work, but the
final result would be that the trade would cease to be a

right and become a favor, to be bestowed or withdrawn as

Pakistan sees fit.

 

181bid., September 11, 1961.

19Aftar several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate
with Pakistan, and after the abortive United States attempt
to mediate between the two countries; Afghanistan recently
signed a five year transit agreement with its western neigh-
bor, Iran, and turned down the Soviet offer to allow western
goods destined for Afghanistan its transit facilities. This
is another evidence of the desire of the Afghan government
to maintain its neutrality and of its determination to bring
about the reality of Pushtunistan.

h8

Angry and frustrated, the Afghans tend to blame
Britain, a traditional foe, and to a lesser extent the
United States for Pakistan's intransigence. Always critical
and even fearful of western military aid to Pakistan, they
are sure that the Pakistani Army has plans to invade Afghan-
istan, an impression that some officers at Rawalpindi do
nothing to discount.

In September 1961, Foreign Minister Prince Naim flew
to Moscow, where the Soviets once again agreed to provide
transit for goods that normally pass through Pakistan.
Purchase of the grape crop, usually worth about $1 million
to Afghanistan, was a bonus, though instead of much needed
foreign exchange, it earned only a credit entry on the
barter agreement.21

The feasibility of diverting all of Afghanistan's
normal transit trade through the Soviet Union is Open to
serious question. There is little reason to believe that
the Russians can really make good their promise. Goods
that came through this route six years ago turned up in poor
shape, and the completion of the vital tunnel link through
the Hindu Kush Mountains, which will shorten the journey
from the Russian-built Oxus River ports to Kabul by about

five or six hours and cut off 120 miles of extremely bad

 

21New Ybrk Times, September 28, 1961.

 

119

road, will be a long and difficult job.

Meanwhile, the deadlock continues. The Afghans demand
the restoration of the trade agencies and consulates and say
they will settle for nothing less. Ayub Khan has publicly
committed himself to keeping them.closed, and he is not
prepared to go further than recommending the appointment of
liaison Officers to discuss the trade block.

The Afghans are sure that American pressure, properly
applied, would force Pakistan to back down.22 Pakistan, on
its part, feels that American policy toward neutrals like
Afghanistan has been flabby.23 It neither consulted with nor
advised the United States of its intention to expel the
Afghan consulates and trade agencies and professed to be
unmoved by the argument that this sort of action would tend
to drive the Afghans closer to the Soviet Union.

According to one Pakistani view, Afghanistan has
already sold out tot:he Kremlin. A second Opinion, shared
by Ayub Khan, was that the Daud government was afraid of
committing itself too deeply with the Russians and would
quickly come to terms. Both conclusions have proved erro-
neous and damaging to western interests.

Under the circumstances it is less than surprising

 

22Islah, May 8, 1955.

231bid.

50

that the Russians now have won Afghan gratitude. The early
American inclination to give no more than token economic
aid--and not to give military aid at all-~was followed in
1957 by more substantial economic allocations. TOO often,
however, inertia succeeded indifference. For instance,
although funds were made available for the construction of
five buildings at Kabul University in 1957, Pacific Archi-
tects and Engineers, Inc., which got the contract in January
1958, did not deliver the plans and specifications for
nearly two years.2h Planning on the American-supported
sector of the 1,300 mile highway took many months and to
the Afghans seemed painfully slow in comparison with the
Russian's speed in getting started.

"We are not ungrateful for American aid. It has
helped us in all sorts of ways: but you must remember that
many of the things we asked the Americans to do, the Russians
have done for us,"253aid a Foreign Office Official. "We
pleaded for American aid in 1952, 1953 and 195A. We were
very hOpeful when Nixon came in 1955. But Bulganin and

Khrushchev understood our problems better."26

 

ZhWhat ICA is Doin $2 Af hanistan (Department of
State Puincation 557i, Near and EiddIe Eastern Series 31,
February 1959), P. 6.

25Louis Dupree, Af hanistan's Eifi_Gamble Part I
American University FieId Staff, Sout sian Series, V01. IV,
No. 3, 1960), p. 16.

26Ibid., Part II, Vol. IV, No. u, pp. 10-15.

51

In the hOpe that the Americans, the West Germans and
others might together match the Russian commitment, the
Afghans postponed their Second Five-Year Plan from September
1961 to March 1962.

The Germans have pledged more than $60 million27, but
with millions worth of American road-building equipment
already held up in Pakistan, the prospects of the long—term
American aid that the Afghans want are not very bright. Now
the Russians are in a position to attach strings to their
aid, to be allowed to "help educationally." It is also
widely believed that a substantial Russian military mission
will arrive soon.28

The Afghans pin their faith on the hOpe that either
the United States will put sufficient pressure on Pakistan
to reOpen transit facilities or that the government of
Ayub Khan will be replaced by a more sympathetic adminis-
tration. Neither seems likely, and the immediate prospects
for a settlement seem worse rather than better. Pakistan
has also brought the Afghan nomads into the dispute, denying
them.and their herds entry into Pakistan for the traditional

winter pasturing. Unless they are allowed to cross the

border, they and their herds will perish in the snow, for

 

27Afghan News (London: Afghan Embassy, September 1961)-
p. 90

28New YOrk Times, February 27, 1962.

52

there are no winter pastures for them in Afghanistan. If
they do go on, they risk death at the hands of the border
guards. Though to date they have been quiet, it would not
be like these peOple to choose to die meakly rather than to
fight for life.

On all counts, the need for a settlement of the
dispute is urgent. It is far from insoluble. Pushtunistan,
the state that never was and almost certainly never will be,
reflects the instinct of self-preservation on the part of
Afghanistan, not chauvinistic ambition. Some Afghan officials
admit privately that Pushtunistan would be forgotten if
access to Pakistan's ports and trade routes could be
guaranteed and.soma mgggg vivendi established for the nomads.
In a logical world there would seem to be no reason why
Afghanistan should not be able to arrange to buy a strip of
territory along the Iranian and Pakistani borders and enough
land at the end for a port while renouncing its claims to
Pushtunistan.

Mutual self-interest demands a solution. Despite
the good intentions of the Afghan leaders and their deter-
mination to continue their economic progress without losing
their sovereignty or their precarious neutrality, a contin-
uation of the border breaches with Pakistan, coupled with
Soviet aid.in its present volume, can lead only to the
extension of Russian influence and the disappearance of

Afghanistan as a traditional buffer state in Central Asia.

CHAPTER IV
THE AFGHAN NEUTRALITY

In the world of today it is questionable whether
any one nation can stay isolated and remain viable. Inter-
national OOOperation is on the increase. Some countries
move together in alliances to strengthen joint defense or
to promote mutual economic interests, and even the uncom-
mitted neutrals come tOgether to advocate the theme of
neutralism. Regional groupings tend to form. Rampant
nationalism features some of the so-called develOping
countries, and one goal of nationalism, international status
and prestige, is aided by regional identification. Thus,
the countries of the Middle East and those of South East
Asia tend to draw more closely together. Afghanistan, how-
ever, remains aloof and isolated from most of its neighbors.
As a result it is not considered by the countries of the
Middle East to fall within their areas, nor by those of
South East Asia to play a role in their region.

For a century and more Afghanistan was an unwilling
pawn on the vast board of Asia where the rival Russian and
British empires were Opposing each other in the great game
of penetration and consolidation. Afghanistan's Amiga
(rulers) found their best defense against penetration in

deliverate self-isolation; in a policy of closing the

53

SLL

country to all foreign influences, interests.and ideas. As
recently as the and of World War II, foreigners found it
quite difficult to get permission to visit Afghanistan.
Then almost overnight this situation changed. The ruling
oligarchy decided to lead the people out of a way of life,
unchanged for centuries, toward an era of economic develOp-
ment in which emphasis would be placed upon increased agri-
cultural production and the building of industrial enter-
prise.1

As the Old policy of isolation from outside contacts
was abandoned, it was replaced by a policy of neutrality.

The new policy of the government was to accept aid from any
quarter. Other neutrals have adOpted the same policy and
found it to be advantageous as the great power blocs competed
in extending aid, and in seeking their favor.

What then has been the practical relationship between
the policy of neutrality and the new era of economic develOp-
ment? Afghanistan's develOpment program moved into high
gear in September 1956 with the inauguration of the Five Year
Economic Plan which involved an expenditure of approximately

2

$600 million. A large amount of this vast expenditure was

 

1Afghanistan-Ariana (Royal Afghan Department of Press
and Information, Vol. I, No. 5, October 1961), (unpaged).

 

2Afghan Progress in_tha Third Year 3; the Plan (London:
Afghan Embassy Information Office, 1959), p. 32.

 

 

55

supplied by the United States and the Soviet Union. Since
l95h, both of these countries have competed for their
contributions to the Afghan develOpment plans. The United
States, up until 1961, has contributed $193.5 million in
grants, loans and gifts. The Soviet Union, up until the
and of 1960, has given Afghanistan about @250 million in
foreign aid.3 About $30 million of the Soviet aid has been
devoted to the equipping, training and modernization of the
Afghan Armed Forces. The nature, political and economic
implications of United States-Soviet aid programs will be
thoroughly discussed in the coming chapters of this thesis.
Afghanistan, with its thirteen million peOple,
enjoyed close ethnic, linguistic, religious and historical
ties with Iran to the west and with the lands to the east up
to the Indus River for centuries before the country attained
its present form in the 18th century, and up to the time
when complete independence was won from the British in 1919.
Since the later date, the country has not been able to find
its desired place in the society of nations. In 1937, Afghan-
istan did join Iran, Turkey and Iraq in an agreement for

mutual non-aggression called the Saadabad Pact“ but in the

 

3Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in_World
Affairs, 1960 (Council on Foreign Relations. New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 232.

 

 

uGeorge Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs

(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 219.

 

 

56

more recent years of ferment and change, the government has
shown no interest in alliances or regional arrangements with
its neighbors. As a relatively small country which stands
alone, it lacks identity on the world scene and the inter-
national community tands to overlook and neglect Afghanistan.
As a natural reaction its leaders bolster national pride and
prestige by displaying an unbendingly independent attitude
toward some of its neighbors.

With its neighbor Iran, the government Of Afghanistan
is in dispute over the water of the Helmand River which
rises in central Afghanistan, flows for hundreds of miles
toward the southwest and finally empties into lakes and
swamps astride the IranO-Afghan border. Iran wants a guar-
anteed flow from the river to farming land on its side of
the frontier. Year after year, teams of negotiators meet;
each side says that the other is stubborn and unyielding
and the talks break off to the detriment of good relations.

With its neighbor Pakistan, the Afghans have a dispute
over the issue of Pushtunistan, which has already been
discussed.

India's interest in Afghanistan has, in part, been a
reflection of its own diSpute with Pakistan over Kashmir.

As a natural result, India has chosen to support the Afghan
position on Pushtunistan, and has also welcomed the policy

of neutrality expressed by the leaders of Afghanistan. On

57

September 1h, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru came to Kabul

for a four day visit. In one of his speeches he stated:
"The non-alignment policy of India and Afghanistan brings
us together....We, like your country, are convinced that we
must keep away from military alliances and seek friendship
with all countries."5

What will the future bring in the field of relations
between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan? In the light of
the Chinese aggression against India it seems probable that
India may be less disposed to side with one of these neigh-
bors against the other, and may be less interested in
Afghanistan.

What states and what powers do display an extreme
interest in Afghanistan? They are the USSR and the PeOple's
Republic of China. The Chinese leaders have gone all out to
attract the attention of the Afghan oligarchy, although the
countries share only a few miles of sky-high frontier, have
no trade with each other and cherish no long established
ties and relations. According to Premier Chou En-lai the
reason is very simple: "The Afghan government...has won the
applause and admiration of the Chinese people."6

In January 1957, Chou En-lai visited Kabul and in

 

SAfghan Progress 13 the Third Year 2.1: the Plan (London:
Afghan Embassy Information Office, 1959), p. 18.

 

 

6Islah, January 18, 1957, (Persian and Pushtu).

58

October of the same year Prime Minister Mohammad Daud went
to China.7 On September h, 1959, Muhammad Naim, the Afghan
Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, arrived at
Canton. He left the country on the 111th.8 Premier Chou
En-lai devoted part or all of the days of the 5th through
the 9th in looking after his visitor, and his example was
followed by the ranking officials of the country. As that
visit ended, an official communique stated that both
countries had "agreed to continue, strengthen and develOp
their economic and cultural relations and expand their
technical OOOperation."9 While the Afghan leaders must be
flattered by the attention shown by the Chinese communist
state, they may well speculate on what may lie behind this
interest, especially in view of the fact that China extends
no financial aid to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has had a long experience of trying to
maintain its territorial integrity by playing off the
interests of rival powers, a strategy which Dr. Mossadeq of
Iran once described as "positive neutrality". In the world
of today the logical extension of this policy of a balance

of interests is the policy of accepting aid from one party,

 

71bid.

8Ibid., September 5, 1959.

9Ibid.

59

group or bloc in the expectation that a counter force will
extend a matching offer and offer as much, or more, friend-
ship.

In this great game Of action and reaction, according
to all logic, the United States should step forward and
match the amount of Soviet aid. So far this has not
happened! The American aid program in Afghanistan has not
been increased in response to massive Soviet loans and
grants. The United States is tied closely to Iran, Turkey
and Pakistan through its support of CENTO and with each
country named through bilateral treaties against aggression.
Iran and Pakistan stand firmly Opposed to communist expan-
sion and subversion and it seems unlikely that Afghanistan,
which denies that it is threatened by communism, will be
rewarded by the United States for this position. The United
States appears to have three choices with respect to its
policy toward Afghanistan. It can out down or out out its
aid to indicate the extent of American concern over the
continuing drift of Afghanistan into the Soviet orbit; it
can make no statement about Afghanistan's foreign policy
and maintain the aid program at the present level; or it
can extend additional aid on a scale matching that of the
Soviet Union.

President Eisenhower's trip to Kabul in December of

1959 seemed to reveal that the United States has chosen the

60

middle course of moderation. According to the official
communique, the president "gave assurances of an American
desire to continue to assist Afghanistan in its task of
strengthening its economical and social structure."10
Neither in the text of the communique, nor in two short
speeches delivered by the President at Kabul was there
any mention of the immediate neighbors of Afghanistan and
the unproductive atmosphere Of tension remains. Two state-
ments of recent months reflect this atmosphere. President
Ayub stated that the completion of the Soviet sponsored and
directed highway program in Afghanistan will represent a
menace directed against India and Pakistan, while Prime
Minister Daud referred to the bilateral pacts between the
United States and Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as short sighted
sections whichlvould compel the Afghan government to make a
close scrutiny of the situation created by these actions.11
Since it seems difficult to avoid the conclusions
that Afghanistan is being drawn into the Soviet orbit and
that the ruling oligarchy of the country seems undisturbed
by this trend, what develOpments may be expected in the

field of Afghan-Soviet relations? More specifically, what

 

10Louis Dupree, The Mountains Go 32 Mohammad Zahir
(American University FiEId'SEaff, SouEH'Asian Series, VOI. IV,

N00 6), p0 330

111s1ah, August 16, 1958.

61

are the probable Soviet objectives in Afghanistan, and how
may the Afghan government be expected to react to its own
interpretation of these aims? Thus far, the Soviet Union
has displayed a "correct" attitude with respect to the
internal situation of Afghanistan; Soviet technicians in the
country are said to remain aloof from the pOpulation:12 there
appears to be no subversive prOpaganda and no indications
that the Soviets are working with potential Opposition
groups;13 and, there have been no overt attacks on the Afghan
government by Soviet press and radio outlets.1u

This tolerant, objective Soviet attitude is, of
course, in sharp contrast with that displayed by the USSR
toward Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. It is of real interest
in light of the fact that the USSR can feel no relative
affinity for the "feudal-monarchical" government of Afghan-
istan as Marxists are compelled to regard such a backward,
outmoded kind of state as an anachronism in the modern
world and one which cannot long survive.

There may be three reasons for the Soviet attitude

toward Afghanistan but it is, of course, impossible to say

 

12Willard L. Thorpe, "American Policy and the Soviet
Economic Offensive," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 35, No. 2.
January, 1957, p. 19.

13R. K. Ramazani, "Afghanistan and the USSR," Middle
East Journal. Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring, 1958, p. lk6.

 

lhlbid.

62

what relative weight the USSR places on each such reason.15
First, the USSR feels that it must have friendly nations
along its frontiers and the posture of the present govern-
ment of Afghanistan satisfies this requirement. Second,
the "correct" example of Soviet aid extended without strings
is designed for a wider audience. That is, to illustrate to
all the neighboring countries that it is both safe and
advantageous to do business with the Russians. Third, all
the Soviet undertakings in the country are of just the kind
which will be most valuable when the USSR takes over Afghan-
istan. Among these projects are the construction of high-
ways traversing the country, the building of military air-
fields, the establishment of gasoline storage areas, the
exploitation of the Oil resources and the erection of silos
and bakeries. Some students of Soviet affairs believe that
Russian policy and plans are designed for the long rather
than the short term and that the actual passage of time will
aid in their fruition and resolution. According to this
theory, the third reason just cited is the prOper explana-
tion of the Soviet attitude toward Afghanistan.

Since the comments of the Afghan government about the
future of the country are guarded and reserved, it is

impossible to know what explanations they attach to the

 

ISRaymond F. Mikesell and Donald A. Wells, The Soviet
Economic Offensive, Headline Series, Fall, 1959.

63

active Soviet interest. It is possible that these leaders
are aware of the fact that Soviet economic aid is along the
lines favored by the USSR and that the eventual outcome may
be unfavorable to Afghanistan. They may feel that there is
no other alternative, that aid must be accepted from what-
ever sources it is offered in order to develOp the country
as rapidly as possible, hOping that the international situ-
ation will so evolve that the aggressive designs of the
Soviet Union will fade away and that the USSR will be
content to stay within its present boundaries. As a
corollary, they may feel it may become easier to withdraw
from intimate contacts with the Soviet Union at some later
data rather than at this time when such a move might place
them.in the camp of the enemies of the USSR, a camp now
represented in the region by the CENTO nations.

If there is validity in this portrayal of the belief
of the leaders of Afghanistan, the question remains as to
whether it is responsive to the political needs of the
country. First, it does seem that Afghanistan would be well
advised to adept a more friendly attitude toward their
ethnic and religious neighbors so that in case the day comes
when the country wishes to turn away from.the Soviet Union
it will not be rebuffed. Second, continuing contacts with
Soviet technicians in Afghanistan and by Afghans on training
missions in the USSR will demonstrate to the Afghans that

611

their government has not brought them the industrial develOp-
ment and intensive productivity now visible just to the
north of the frontier with the Soviet Union, and may lead
them to wonder whether there is not a direct relationship
between their type of government and the backwardness of the
country. Treading a delicate course in an effort to recon-
cile the rising middle class which favors rapid, even drastic,
reforms and advances, and the more conservative tribal and
religious elements which still represent the power elite of
the country, the Afghan government must be searching for
ways to enhance national stability and unity. It may be
suggested that programs and projects of social and economic
develOpment could be paralleled by develOpment in the
political field through the introduction of measures

designed to draw the peOple into participation in the
government and allotting to them a greater share Of the

responsibility for the future of Afghanistan.

CHAPTER V
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AID T0 AFGHANISTAN

The United States economic assistance to Afghanistan
began in November l9h9 with an Export-Import Bank loan for
develOpment of the Helmand Valley. This loan totaled
$21,000,000 and was followed by another loan Of $18,500,000
in 195k for the same purpose. Afghan-United States economic
cOOperation under the mutual security program.began in 1951
with a $100,000 program. The mutual security program at
that time was limited to technical assistance, in which
United States technicians, in COOperation with their Afghan
counterparts, undertook training and demonstration activities
to impart their specialties to local citizens.

There were two project agreements signed in 1952, one
for the develOpment Of vocational agriculture education and
the other for land reclamation demonstration in the Helmand
Valley. Subsequently, technical cooperation was extended to
many fields of activities in Afghanistan, including agri-
culture, mining, transportation, education and public admin-
istration. A loan of $1,k2h,00 in 1953 was for the purchase
of wheat.

Special assistance funds were added to the Afghan
program in 1956. They are intended for major develOpment

projects concerned with basic essentials which the country

65

66

needs for expansion of production and trade and for the

well—being of the peOple, such as roads, irrigation facil-
ities, electrical power, educational institutions, mining
equipment and industry.1

In fiscal year 1961, the year's obligations of the
United States (all funds and all in the form of grants) were
$30,845,000.2 Of this, $18,000,000 was obligated for wheat
imports under the PL h80 program, with the balance of
$12,8u5,000 for develOpment projects under the mutual
security program. Over the last five years the Obligations
averaged almost $26,000,000 yearly, including wheat grants,
and almost $18,000,000 excluding the wheat.

United States assistance since the beginning of the
program has amounted to a total of $19k million, including
grants of $102 million, loans Of $52 million and surplus
wheat valued at tho million.3 In addition, United States
citizens contributed to such programs for Afghanistan as the
Asia Foundation, CARE, UNICEF and MEDICO.

The United States Operation Mission (USOM) to Afghan-
istan is now one of the larger Of such missions if measured

by numbers of technicians. As of June 30, 1961 there were

 

lPro ect Progress Report (United States Operations
Mission to g anistan, June 30, 1961), (unpaged).

 

2Ibid.

31bid.

67

365 United States direct-hire and contract employees in
Afghanistan. Five years ago, in 1956, the comparable number
of Americans was 75. In addition, on June 30, 1961, there
were 201 nationals of other countries in Afghanistan,
financed by United States funds, who were helping to carry
out United States assistance projects. It is apprOpriate,
as the Afghan first five year plan has just ended, to review
the past performance of the United States in Afghanistan in

terms of aggregate Obligations and expenditures.
1. MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

About $59 million of mutual security funds (excluding
wheat and Export-Import Bank loans) have been spent in
Afghanistan since 1951 on develOpmental projects, while
total obligations have amounted to $115 million.

One reason for the lag between obligations and expen-
ditures is the distance between the United States and Afghan-
istan, necessitating careful forward planning and early
obligation of funds. In other cases, funds have been
obligated at the planning stage to insure availability of
funds when, in fact, expenditures were not expected for many
months. Funds for the Regional Transit Project, for example,
were made available as early as 1958, accounting for a
substantial increase in Obligations in that year. Expen-

ditures of much of this money could not take place until

68

detailed design work was completed and a construction
contract awarded. Similarly, a large part of the obli-
gations for the Air Transportation Project was made avail-
able in 1956 and 1959.

These two projects account for almost 50 per cent
of all dollar obligations to date and for more than 60 per
cent Of the current balance of unexpended funds. They,
and another large develOpment activity, Kabul University
construction, are rapidly being implemented. Further growth
in the expenditure can be expected as soon as these projects
move at an even more rapid pace. Whereas a major problem
confronting the ICA program eighteen months ago was the
delay in getting its major construction projects underway,
by June 1961 most construction projects were moving satis-
factorily, as is evidenced by the individual project

descriptions contained in this chapter.
II. WHEAT PROGRAM AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

A form of assistance to Afghanistan which has
materially lightened the Afghan burden of economic develOp-
ment has been the shipment of United States surplus wheat as
a gift from the American peOple under Public Law h80. In
four years, l95h, 1957, 1958 and 1959, a total of 151,000

metric tons of wheat was delivered to Afghanistan.h The

 

uIbid.

69

wheat served to augment the supply of food, and the sale of
the wheat generated a total of 220,000,000 afghanis for the
Afghan government to use for the country's economic develOp-
ment by providing local support of United States aided
projects. The wheat program was to continue with a shipment
of about 50,000 metric tons of wheat in the summer of 1961.
An additional 50,000 metric tons were scheduled for arrival

in the latter part of 1961.
III. NATURE OF UNITED STATES AID TO AFGHANISTAN

Industry and Transportation

 

Air Transportation. The basic objective of the air

 

transportation program is to meet a major transportation
need by creating a reliable and functional air service, both
within the country and to other countries. A total of
$27,657,000 in United States aid was spent on this program
in the years 1956 through 1959.5 The main goals of the air
transportation program are (1) to develop an international
airport at Kandahar; (2) to develop an Afghan airlines;

(3) to develop Afghan domestic airports; (h) to develop an
Afghan airways system; and (5) to develOp organizations and

skills in the Afghan Department of Civil Aviation.

 

5Statistics in this section based on Afghanistan Builds

 

92.22 Ancient Civilization, I.C.A. (not dated).

 

70

The International Airport at Kandahar has been
completed and is now in Operation. Twenty-five Pan-American
Airways specialists have been brought to Afghanistan through
an ICA contract and are supplying technical assistance in the
management and Operation of Aryana Airlines. Provision has
been made in the Aryana develOpment plan for maintenance
facilities, inservice training, advanced training abroad for
Afghan pilots, sales, traffic and management personnel.
Domestic airports are being built or improved. Approximately
pl,303,500 worth of communications and navigation equipment
has arrived in Afghanistan. Manuals for training, air
traffic control, air tower control, airport Operations and
many other subjects are being written to aid in establishing
a controlled and reliable Afghan air Operation. Under this
develOpment program, adequate air service between airports
within Afghanistan and to airports of other countries is

becoming more dependable daily.

Aerial Photography and Mapping. In 1957, Fairchild
Aerial Surveys, Inc., through ICA, signed a contract with
the Afghan government to provide aerial photographic
coverage of the greater part of the country. Ground control
surveys, compilation of photographic mosaics and topographic
contour maps of Afghanistan are also included in the plans.
A total of $1,250,000 in United States aid was Spent on this

project through 1959. Completion of the project including

71

photographic maps, is scheduled for the end of 1962. Naps
produced as a result of this project will facilitate future
studies of water, timber, mineral and agricultural resources

as well as transportation and civil aviation.

Afghan Regional Transit. A total of $18,993,000

 

was spent by the United States in 1958 for the improvement

of transit facilities from the Pakistan border at Spin
Baldak. This program, along with a companion sub-project in
Pakistan, was intended to increase the volume of Afghan
foreign trade by improving import and export facilities in
Karachi, by improving the Pakistan railways and by rebuilding
and paving the Afghan highway from the border at Spin Baldak
to Kabul. When completed this project will make available
convenient, economical, safe and speedy means of transporting
Afghanistan's import and export trade to the nearest major
international seaport, Karachi, provided the Pakistanis

allow Afghan trade to pass through their territory. If so,
this will stimulate the growth of regional as well as inter-

national trade.

National Roads Improvement and Maintenance. United

 

States funds totaling $3,336,000 were used in the three year
period of 1957 through 1959, for the purpose of establishing
an effective national highway department for road improvement

and maintenance. The Afghans have begun full-scale

72

Operations on a ISO-mile stretch of modern, two lane asphalt
surfaced roadwar from Kabul to Torkham near the Kyber Pass.
The E. B. Steele Company is under contract to ICA (now AID)
to help the ministry of public works implement this project.
In-service training is provided to the Afghan ministry
personnel by road engineers and other specialists provided
by AID. A technical training course was conducted near
Jalalabad for training highway technicians in reconnaissance
surveying, drafting, material sampling and testing and bridge
design. Less than 7,000 miles of primary and secondary roads
have been built at present, and many of these are impassable
during winter. Concentrated road building efforts in the
next few years should greatly aid in the develOpment Of

Afghanistan.

Motor Vehicle Transportation. A total of $2,576,000
in United States funds were spent in the three year period
from 1957-1959 on this program. The project involves
providing Ah3 new transport trucks and building, equipping,
and Operating motor vehicle maintenance and repair shOps in
Kabul and Kandahar, and a truck assembly shOp in Kandahar.
An in-service training program has been set up at the Kabul
shOp, and arrangements have been made for other Afghan shOp
personnel to study abroad. This project is handled by an
AID project technician and a specialist in truck transpor-

tation organization and management.

73

Architectural and Engineering Services. A sum of
$3h5,000 in United States aid for the three years 1957-1959,
has been Spent on this project. The services provided by
this enterprise were necessary for the completion of many
other projects, for example, the plans and Specifications
for the new Kabul University campus, the design for the
terminal building at Kandahar International Airport and
designs and plans for the Public Health Hospital Clinic at
the model city Of Lashkar Gah (the headquarters for the
Helmand Valley Authority).

Mineral Resources and Coal Production. From 1952
through 1959, $1,398,000 in United States aid money was
spent to solve various special problems with respect to
coal production and mineral explorations. Coal production
at Kar Kar and Ishpushta mines has already been increased
as a result of this project which includes use of imported
equipment and supplies and the construction of an eight-mile
long tension power line. The Afghan government is also
considering draft legislation of mining and petroleum laws
prepared by two Specialists from the United States Geolog-

ical Survey.

Industrial District Kandahar. In 1957, a total of

$100,000 was spent by the United States on a project to

discover what small industries might, technically and

7h

economically, be established near Kandahar. If it is
decided that an industrial district can be established,
further assistance will be considered for building and
equipping some plants of varied types on a Site in or near

Kandahar.

Nuclear Science and Engineering. From 1957 through

 

1959, $16,000 were used to send two Afghan scientists to
the United States to study nuclear physics in an effort to
pave the way for Afghanistan's future use of nuclear energy

in resource develOpment.

The Helmand Valley

 

A total of $10,1h5,000 in American aid was Spent on
the Helmand Valley Project during the period from 1952
through 1959.6 This is an irrigation and land develOpment
project with provisions for flood control and power develOp-
ment. Other facets of the project are broad programs of
improvement in agriculture, settlement of nomads as farmers
and rural develOpment, including health and education. At
the completion of this program, 202,138 acres of land will
receive water from newly constructed distribution systems
and an additional 337,685 acres will receive regular water

for use through existing canals.

 

6Statistics in this Section are based on the AID
publication United States Operations Missions £2 Afghanistan,
June 30, 196i.

 

 

75

Helmand Resources Development. This project has four
facets, irrigation construction, electric power, land develOp-
ment and resource develOpment. Morrison-Knudson Afghanistan,
Inc., has completed construction of main irrigation canals,
laterals, drains and intakes on the Arghandab and Darweshan
irrigation areas. An electrical distribution system for
Kandahar was installed and two 500-kw diesel driven genera-
tors are now in Operation.

Technical services and equipment are being provided
for the land develOpment branch of the Helmand Valley
Authority. This branch is responsible for land leveling,
leaching of saline areas, construction of irrigation.lat-
erals, as well as major canal repair work and construction
of public buildings and improvements.

Morrison-Knudson Afghanistan is also handling the
controlled intake and protection from the flood damage for
the Seraj canal and correcting the seepage problems in the
lower Boghra canal. The project also provides for the
purchas and installation of hydro-electric power equipment
at Arghandab Dam.

Over 250 kilometers of major canals have been built
to bring water to new land and to improve water delivery to

land previously irrigated.

Surface Water Investigation. This project has two

basic objectives: (1) to provide accurate stream flow and

76

climatological information for the develOpment program in
the Helmand Valley, and (2) to train Afghans to carry out
the investigations and assume ultimate responsibility.
Hydrologists have been furnished the project by the United
States Geological Survey. Several Afghans have been sent

abroad for advanced training.

Helmand Vallpy Authority DevelOpment Operations. The

 

Helmand Valley Authority, an agency of the Afghan government,
has the tremendous task of planning and managing Operations,
including preparing, settling and administration of large
areas of new land reclamation programs in southwest Afghan-
istan. The Agency for International DevelOpment (AID) has
supplied both technical and economic assistance to this
Afghan program. One important area of endeavor is the
provision of engineers and specialists to work with the

board Of directors of the Helmand Valley Authority.

Helmand Public Health and Sanitation. The improve-

 

ment of health practices and the general level of public
health are being accomplished by completing and equipping a
public health hospital and clinic at Lashkar Gah and by
providing training abroad for Afghan public health personnel.
The training center and hospital at Lashkar Gah will be
staffed with Afghan personnel with assistance from WHO and
MEDICO. So far many public health activities, such as small

77

pox vaccination, malaria control and public health education,

have been successfully undertaken.

Education

 

Institute of Education. During the years, 1955-1959,
a total of $2,528,000 in United States funds was Spent for
the development of the Institute of Education.7 Nine
American Specialists in teacher education were sent to
Afghanistan from Teachers College, Columbia University.
These specialists are working closely with the Afghans who
will eventually take over the complete leadership respon-
sibility for an adequate and self-sufficient Afghan educa-
tional program. WOrk is being done on Similar lines to
provide for the education of women in Afghanistan. Books,
paper, and other tools of knowledge, including visual aids,
have been furnished by AID. The Institute of Education has
now been made officially a part of Kabul University and is
responsible for experimentation and research in education.
One important facet of the Institute of Education is the
English language program. The purpose of this program is to
assist in develOping basic linguistic research, to improve
instruction in English in Afghan schools, and to prepare

Afghans to take complete responsibility for teaching

 

7Ibid.

78

English in Afghanistan. Seventeen Specialists in teaching
the English language were provided by Columbia Teachers
College. In-service training is given English teachers,
and special research in Pushtu and Persian has been done on

the problems of teaching English to native speakers.

Educational Facilities. Funds totaling $3,100,000

 

have been provided by the United States for the construction
of a new Kabul University campus and the equipping of
Habibia college. Pacific Architects and Engineers has
designed the new campus which will provide classrooms, lab-
oratories, offices and other space for the Faculty of Agri-
culture and Engineering, the Faculty of Education and other
faculties, as well as space for administration offices, a

library and a student dormitory.

Kabul University Administration. The United States

 

has provided $2h5,000 to help Kabul University improve its
administration and to expand its facilities. Areas to be
covered under this program are the organization of the
administrative staff, the relationship of physical facilities
to the educational program, instructional administration and
the administration Of publications and other communications

media.

Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering. A total of

 

$1,105,000 in United States aid is being Spent under an

79

AID financed contract with the University of Wyoming to
establish a Faculty of Agriculture and Engineering at Kabul
University. The staff consists of American instructors and
their Afghan counterparts and according to plan for training
instructors, both by study abroad and the counterpart

program, all the Americans should be replaced by 1965.

Afghan Institute of Technology. From 1951 through

 

1959, $627,000 were spent on this program, the completion

of which is based on the creation of a wholly Afghan faculty
through participant training. The University of Wyoming is
furnishing American technicians in vocational technical
education, and instructors in mechanics, hand tools and
electrical and civil technology. A.I.T. now offers training

in civil, electrical, aeronautical and mechanical technology.

Agriculture

United States technical assistance in agriculture
is directed towards finding the solution of several problems
such as low soil fertility, inadequate irrigation water,
primitive farming methods, poor seeds, plant disease and
insects, absence of agricultural credit, uneconomic breeds
of livestock and low crOp yields, which have been hampering
agriculture, the bulwark of the Afghan economy. Through

June 1960, $1,323,500 has been Spent by ICA on various

agricultural subprojects in Afghanistan.

80

8

The major goals

of the National Agriculture DevelOpment project are as

follows:

1.

7.

To assist in the reorganization and strengthening
of the technical and administrative divisions of
the Ministry of Agriculture

To develOp a national agriculture extension
service.

TO improve the supply and utilization of water in
small irrigation systems.

To develOp a national forestry and soil conser-
vation program.

To implement an effective plant protection
program.

To continue agricultural research (including
livestock and soils), varietal testing and
related experimentation.

To establish an agricultural machinery workshOp
and develOp agricultural hand tools.

To assist in develOping a workable agricultural
credit organization and establish pilot credit

projects.

 

8Ibid.

81

Public Administration

 

National Fiscal Administration. Because of the
growing complexity of the Afghan economy, the increase in
loans, a multitude of governmental projects and a need for
a sound and balanced budget, there is a growing need for
the application of modern fiscal management systems and
principles. The United States has aided the government of
Afghanistan in this area by providing advisory services to
key ministries in areas Of general management, budgeting,
accounting, revenues, statistics, cadastral survey and
assessment. The total United States aid from 1956 through

1959 was $777,000.9

National Public Administration. Training of Afghan

 

officials in public administration is the main objective Of
this project. The program in general is a very important
part of AID activities in Afghanistan, with over 300 students
having already been sent abroad for training. The total
United States aid for this project from 1957-1959 was

$82,000.

Civil Police Administration. Improvement of civil

 

police services through introduction of modern equipment and

 

9Ibid.

82

techniques is the basic goal of this program. AID has

provided the Afghan Police Department with an advisor and
has sponsored the training of 20 civil police officers in
the United States. This program used a total of $h99,000

in United States aid from 1956 to 1959.

CHAPTER VI
SOVIET ECONOhIC AID TO AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan, lying at the triple junction of the Far
East and Middle East with Soviet-dominated Central Asia, has
been one of the major targets of the recent Soviet economic
offensive in the underdevelOped countries of the world. The
complete economic and political domination of that country
by the Soviet Union, if established, may well jeOpardize the
position of the West in the area between the Mediterranean
and the South China Seas.

One of the four remaining non-communist countries
bordering on the USSR, Afghanistan is committed to a policy
of neutrality under the Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-
Aggression with the Soviet Union of June 2h, 1931,1 extended
in December, 1955. This neutrality possibly derives to some
extent from Afghanistan's long tradition of isolationism,
and from an uneasy consciousness of her vulnerable border
position.

An examination of postwar develOpments reveals clearly,
however, that the present position of Afghanistan derives, to

a more significant extent, from intensive Soviet economic

 

1For the authentic text in Persian and Russian with
French and English translations see, League of Nations,
Treaty Series, no. 3611, Vol. 157 (1955), pp. 370-381.

83

811

activities in Afghanistan during recent years. Afghan
neutrality is regarded by the Soviet Union as an important
step toward the attainment of its Objectives in South Asia
and the Middle East. The Opportunism, insidiousness and
remarkable flexibility which constitute some of the most
dominant characteristics of the Soviet economic policy in
underdevelOped countries can find, perhaps, no more striking
illustration than the example of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, following the end of the Second World
War, demonstrated an unprecedented desire for quick economic
develOpment. She sought United States and United Nations
assistance. The United States has made grants of about
$15 million in the last five years for technical assistance.
The United States has also granted another $10 million (plus
a loan of $5 million) to improve air tranSport. Export-
Import Bank loans to Afghanistan, beginning in April, 1950,
have amounted to $39.5 million. The major portion of this
sum.has been expanded on the Helmand-Arghandab Valley
Project, the most vital irrigation project in the country.
The first stage of the project, consisting of soil drainage
survy and the building of the Kajaki and Arghandab dams and
the BOghra-Marja-Shamalan canal system has already been
completed.

Afghanistan was also one of the first applicants for

United Nations technical assistance, covering 17 projects.

85

Technical assistance since 19h9, provided through UNTA, ILO,
FAO, UNESCO, ICAO and WHO has indeed materially helped the
economy of the country. In 1957, for instance, Afghanistan
received nearly $1 million in United Nations technical
assistance in the fields of agriculture, health and public
administration.2
Despite the valuable assistance furnished by the
United States and the United Nations, Afghanistan is funda-
mentally dependent upon her own resources for economic
develOpment funds. Exports, mainly karakul and wool,
constitute nearly 12 per cent of the gross national product.
At least half of Afghan imports, at present, are finished
cotton and rayon. The prOportion of capital goods imports
is climbing rapidly as Afghan economic develOpment plans,
formalized in a Second Five-Year Plan adOpted by the parlia-
ment in 1956, become of greater significance to the overall
economy. Foreign trade has been increasing steadily in the
postwar period and has usually produced an export surplus.
In the light of the continuous dependence of Afghanistan's
economic develOpment expenditures on her earnings by exports,

the main source of capital for the country, the vital nature

 

 

2United States Department of Commerce Basic Data pp
the Economy of Afghanistan, Part 1, NO. 55- 7&. See also,
United Nations Technical Assistance Committee, Seventh Report
of the Technical Assistance Board, (New York: 1956) and
United Nations Re ort on the Training Center of Vital and
Health Statistics (Doc. St ./Stat. Ser. N72E)._

 

 

 

 

 

86

of foreign trade for the nation's overall economy is
apparent.

The foreign trade of Afghanistan, however, is cru-
cially conditioned by the country's geographical location.
Afghanistan is landlocked, is without rail transportation
and is therefore anxious to develOp her air transport exten-
sively. Only three main overland routes exist; to Iran, the
USSR and Pakistan. The route through Iran is long, tortuous
and expensive. Traditionally, the Soviet Union has not
permitted Afghan trade through its territory. The route
through Pakistan to Karachi, the most extensively used in
the past and the most natural transit route for Afghanistan,
is thus the jugular vein of that country's foreign trade.

In 195h-1955 alone, for instance, about 80 per cent of both
imports and exports of that country were carried along this
route.3

However, the suppurating sore of "Pushtunistan" has
poisoned Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan since l9k7
and has, at times, created tremendous foreign trade diffi-
culties for the latter. When Pakistan was about to be
created the Afghan government demanded a plebiscite in the
Northwest Frontier Province to determine whether the dis-

puted area of Pushtunistan would become an independent state

 

3United Nations Economic Survengf Asia and the Far
East, 195k, p. 61.

 

 

87

or remain with Pakistan.5

Afghanistan's demand is based in part upon past
control Of the Afghan Empire over the area. The so-called
Durand Line of 1893 (the basis of the border of the new state
Of Pakistan) between British India and Afghanistan had split
the Pushtu-language area between these two countries. The
Afghan ruling family belongs to this Pushtu element which,
in fact, comprises only one-third of the inhabitants of
Afghanistan. So far, Pakistan has indignantly rejected any
prOpOsal for a plebiscite in Pushtunistan, c arging that
Afghanistan's real motivation is annexation of the Pushtu-
inhabited area rather than the creation Of a truly independent
and sovereign state. This bitter dispute threatened Afghan
foreign trade seriously in 1950, 1955 and again in 1961.

In 1950, Pakistan cut off the importation of pet-
roleum products into Afghanistan for about three months, by
closing Afghanistan's main transit route. Under these
circumstances, and in dire need of petroleum, Afghanistan
relaxed her traditional cautious and suspicious attitude
toward her northern neighbor. She agreed resignedly, if not
reluctantly, to expand her trade with the Soviet Union in a
four-year trade agreement Signed in July 1950. Under this

agreement the Soviet Union undertook to export oil products

 

LLSee, H. E. Crocker, "Afghanistan, a Buffer State,"
Contemporapy Review, June 1, 1953, pp. 3h3-3h6.

 

88

and cotton cloth, among other commodities, while Afghanistan
would export wool, cotton, etc.5 The Soviet Union also
offered the services of its own oil-prospecting technicians,6
after having been assured of an indefinite suspension of the
United Nations project for oil exploration.

The Afghan government had long set itself the goal of
an oil production sufficient to satisfy the home market. In
pursuance of this goal the government requested the United
Nations as early as 19h9 for assistance in oil exploration.
At the beginning, the Soviet Union watched the United
Nations activities in Afghanistan quietly, but later it
vigorously protested against the United Nations mission,
condemning the "suspicious attitudes of the Americans"
serving on it.7

The 1950 trade agreement marked only the beginning of
intensification of Soviet economic activities in Afghanistan.

8

By early 1952, Afghan-Soviet trade had doubled, and the

Soviet Union had Opened a trade office in Kabul. In 1952

 

SForeigpAssistance Activities g£_the Communist Bloc
and Their Implications for the United States, 55th Congress,
lst Sess. (March, 1950), p. 80.

 

 

 

6Christian Science Monitor, September 2, 1950.

 

7Howard M. Teaf Jr. and Peter G. Franck (eds.),
Hands Across Frontiers, p. 32.

8Vneshniaia Torgovlia, 195R, No. 5, p. 3, as cited
in Soviet Technical Assistance, 8hth Congress, 2nd. Sess.
(July 12, 1956), p. 8}

 

 

89

also, the construction of four oil tanks having a general

capacity of about 1200 cubic meters was started. Vneshniaia

 

Torgovlia, the official Soviet foreign trade journal,
commenting on the Soviet technical assistance to Afghanistan
prior to 1953, stated in part that Soviet Specialists in the
fields of entomology, veterinary medicine and in the exploit-
ation of Oil resources had been sent to that country.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union had built the largest cotton
cleaning plants in the country, and had delivered metal
poles and wires for the establishment of over 1,000 kilo-
meters of telegraph and telephone lines. All this Soviet
assistance, the journal concluded, had received "high
praise from the Afghan peOple."9

Further credit for capital goods and technical
assistance was provided in 195h when the Soviet Union granted
at least $8 million credit to Afghanistan.10 Having by 195A
completed the construction of eight gasoline storage tanks,
the Soviet Union then signed an agreement for a loan Of
$3.5 million to Afghanistan at 3 per cent interest to be
applied to the construction of two wheat silos, in Kabul and
Pul-i-Khumri, a flour mill and a bread-baking plant. The

loan, to be spent on Soviet equipment and technical services,

 

9Ibid.

10This figure was given publicly by the Ambassador of
Afghanistan to the United States, New York Times, January 16,
1954.

 

90

was repayable in United States dollars, or in karakul, cotton
and other commodities at the rate of $1 million a year.

Another loan, $5.6 million, was granted in the same
year and was tot>e repaid in deliveries of cotton and wool
over a five-year period beginning in 1957. This loan has
been used in part to purchase Soviet materials and equipment
for the construction of silos, a mill, a mechanized bakery
and for asphalting the streets of Kabul. It has also been
expanded on Soviet specialists who are in Afghanistan to
teach Afghan workers how to Operate the grain silos located
on the outskirts of Kabul.

The Soviet Union also agreed to commence construction
of a 60-mile pipeline from Termez in the Uzbek Soviet Social-
ist Republic across the Amu Darya (Oxus) River to the Afghan
city of Mazar-i-Sharif. This pipeline, which will have an
annual capacity of 30 million gallons of gasoline will be
paid for through the barter of cotton and other commodities.11

Soviet economic activities in Afghanistan reached
their peak in 1955, again subsequent to a grave intensifi-
cation Of tensions between that country and Pakistan over
the question of Pushtunistan. When Afghanistan learned in
March, 1955, about the plan of the government of Pakistan

to merge the provinces of West Pakistan, including the area

 

11New York Times, June 3, and July 30, 195a.

 

91

of Pushtunistan, into a single administrative unit, Sardar
Mohammad Daud Khan, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan,
bitterly protested against any such action.

A month later, in April 1955, the Pakistan consulate
in Jalalabad was attacked by Afghan street demonstrators.
In retaliation, the Afghan consulate in Peshawar was
attacked and the Afghan flag burned. Finally when Pakistan
decided definitely to implement her plan on the merger of
provinces, the Afghan government recalled its Karachi envoy
from his post and the government of Pakistan did the same.

Following these events Pakistan closed her border to
Afghanistan for the second time, this time for a period of
five months. Disastrous consequences from this action
inevitably followed for Afghanistan's economy. Afghanistan's
exports, especially of fruits, were substantially reduced.
Afghanistan's imports of consumer goods and the capital goods
required for develOpment projects were injuriously delayed.
Her earnings from eXports which, as stated above, constitute
the main source of capital for the country and on which
develOpment expenditures materially depend were sharply
curtailed.

Despite all this, the Afghan government did not
immediately turn to the Soviet Union for a right of way
through its territory. Rather it continued earnestly to

negotiate with Iran for a right of way across that country

92

to the port of Chahbar, on the Persian Gulf. This would
have required the improvement of 3,600 miles of Iranian

roads,12

too costly and time-consuming a project to furnish
any prompt and effective solution to the vital transit
problem of Afghanistan.

In the face Of this economic strangulation the Afghan
government turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. A
transit agreement was promptly concluded, and Afghanistan
acquired the right of duty-free transit for her goods over
Soviet territory.13

Subsequently, the trade between the two countries
increased substantially}!+ The protocol on commodity
exchange, Signed on August 27, 1955, provided for the export
of, to mention a few items, petroleum products, rolled
ferrous metals and building materials by the Soviet Union,
and the export of wool, cotton and raw hides by Afghanistan.15

The value of eXportS to the USSR in 195h-l955 was approx-

 

12Peter G. Franck, "Economic Progress in an Encircled
Land," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 10 (Winter, 1956), p. 58.

13United Nations Economic Survpng£_Asia and the Far
East, 1955, p. 55.

 

 

th. Von Ostrowska, "Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and
the West," Bulletin (Institute for the Study of USSR), Decem-
ber, 1955, p. 17.

15Review 2: Soviet Press, August 27, 1955.

 

93
imately 19 per cent of the total exports of Afghanistan.16
This Showed an increase of seven per cent over that of the
previous year.

In l95h-l955 about half of Afghan cotton, three-
fourths of its wool, one-fourth of its hides and more than
nine-tenths of its oil seeds were exported to the USSR, which
supplied four-fifths of the imported sugar, two-thirds of
the imported iron and steel products, more than one-third
of the imported cotton piece goods, one-fourth of imported
construction materials and one-tenth of the petroleum
requirements of the country.17 The l953-l95h trade deficit
of Afg. 156 million with the USSR was changed into a surplus
of Afg. 57 million in 19511-1955.18

December 18, 1955, marked the high point of Soviet
economic assistance to Afghanistan. At the end of their
three-day state visit to Afghanistan, Premier Bulganin and
Mr. Khrushchev Offered a long-term loan equivalent to
$100 million to the government Of Afghanistan,19 amounting

to about five times the total revenue of that country

 

16United Nations Economic Survey pf Asia and the Far
East, 1955, P. 55-

 

 

l7Ibid.
18Ibid.

19Robert L. Allen, Soviet Economic Warfare (Washington
D.C.: Pacific Affairs Press, 1960), p. 182.

9

 

9h

during the l95h-1955 fiscal year. The offer of this loan
was accompanied by a gift of a one-hundred-bed hospital and
fifteen buses to the city of Kabul.20 An agreement regarding
the $100 million loan, Signed on January 28, 1956, provided
that the USSR would export equipment and materials for
OOOperative ventures in develOpment of agriculture, building
of irrigation projects, etc. Afghanistan would repay in
export goods, within 30 years, in twenty-two annual install-
ments at two per cent interest.21
Another agreement also concerned with the loan,
signed on March 1, 1956, provided that the Soviet Union
would supply materials, equipment and technical aid for the
construction of two hydroelectric stations, three vehicle
repair factories, irrigation works, a physics and chemistry
laboratory, reconstruction of the airport at Kabul, con-
struction of a new airport at Bagram and a highway across
the Hindu Kush mountain range. Further, Soviet Specialists
and technicians would supervise the construction of these

pPOjectS and would train local labor.22

 

20Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 1958), p. R7.

 

21Soviet Technical Assistance, 8hth Congress, 2nd
Sass. (July 12: 1956), pp. 11-12.

22R. K. Ramazani, "Afghanistan and the USSR" The
Middle East Journal, Vol. 12, NO. 2, Spring 1958, p. 150.

95

On the same day that the offer of $100 million loan
was made, the Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression
of 1931, mentioned above, was extended for ten years. Later
develOpments also indicated clearly that the Soviet Union
has no intention of confining itself solely to economic
activities in Afghanistan.

On August 25, 1956, the Afghan Prime Minister
announced in Kabul that the Soviet Union had agreed to give
military aid to Afghanistan.23 An eight-year easy-install-
ment agreement for arms was signed between Afghanistan on
the one hand, and the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,2h
Poland,25 Hungary and East Germany on the other. The
$25 million credit granted under this agreement is to be
repaid in Afghan goods. Already, eleven jet aircraft, a
Soviet Ilyushin-lu.plane for the King's use, and two Soviet
helicOpters have been delivered to Afghanistan.26

From the foregoing considerations three points

 

23New York Times, September 5, 1956.

 

2hrOn August 22, l95h Czechoslovakia granted Afghan-
istan $5 million credit for eight years at three per cent
interest. For details see, Foreign Assistance Activities
g£_the Soviet Bloc and Their Implications for the United
States, 85th Congress, lst Sess. (March, 1957), p. 81.

 

25On August 30, 1956, Poland concluded a trade
agreement with Afghanistan.

26Ibid., p. 82.

96

appear clearly: (l) The present close economic link between
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union is unmistakably a result of
the frustration of the former's anxious and laudable desire
for rapid and extensive economic develOpment. (2) The
vexatious and harassing problem of Pushtunistan has, more
than any other single factor, given rise to that frustration.
(3) The Soviet government, constantly alert to any favorable
Opportunity, has skillfully eXploited Afghanistan's economic
predicament in an attempt to draw her closer to itself and
away from the West.

Accurate determination of the implications of Afghan-
istan's present close economic relations with the Soviet
Union is at best a difficult task. Nevertheless, some
observations may be ventured. Economically speaking, it
must be admitted that the Soviet economic activities in
Afghanistan could meet, to a satisfying extent, the imme-
diate wants, if not the fundamental needs, of that country.
The canstruction of the oil pipelines, gasoline tanks, grain
silos, bakeries and the paving of the streets of Kabul would
mean, in plain terms, better and a greater variety of bread,
more electricity and better streets for the Afghan peOple.
Furthermore, the combination of these means of production
with the benefits derived from trade with the Soviet Union
could measurably increase the output of Afghanistan.

The short-run profits derived from trade with the

97

Soviet Union should be balanced against Afghanistan's com-
mitments to repay the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary
and East Germany in goods for the credits they have granted
her. Repayment in goods of about $150 million in credit will
inevitably require the earmarking of substantial quantities
of Afghan wool and cotton as well as Opium, dried fruits
and skins and result in a serious strain on the international
economic position of Afghanistan for many years to come.

However, the biggest item of these credits is that of
the p100 million, which has not been used up thus far.27 But
the fact of its availability to the government of Afghanistan
is no slight temptation. Since Afghanistan's Second Five-
Year Plan is to be financed in part by borrowing from abroad28
such temptation may become increasingly difficult to avoid,
unless some offers of financial assistance, at least as
attractive as those made by the Soviet Union, are forthcoming
from other sources.

It is clear that Afghanistan, in establishing close
economic ties with the Soviet Union, has not been motivated
by any political or ideological predilections toward that

country. Nevertheless, it is not justifiable to assume

 

27Reportedly about $10 million had been used by
1957. New York Times, August 29, 1957.

 

28United Nations Economic Survey 2f.Asia and the Far
East, 1955, p. 53.

 

 

98

that such ties can have no political implications. It is
true that the Prime Minister of Afghanistan told the Soviet
leaders emphatically and seriously that his country would
accept the Soviet assistance provided that it is not linked
to any political obligations.

While it is also true that Afghanistan has not so
far entered into any alignment with the Soviet Union, she
has definitely accepted a significant obligation toward that
country. On the same day that she accepted the $100 million
she also undertook, through the extension of the Treaty of
Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression of June 24, 1931, not
to become a party to any alliances or agreements of a
military or political character, a most conspicuous political
string attached to the Soviet economic assistance.

To Afghanistan this obligation may seem eminently
compatible with her independence and sovereignty as well as
her long tradition of neutrality. To the Soviet Union,
however, it is a most desirable political return that its
calculated economic assistance to Afghanistan since 1950
has finally yielded. Neutralization of Afghanistan is, for
Moscow, a matter of many beneficial possibilities. It can
assist the successful attainment of the short-run objective
of the Soviet South Asian and Middle Eastern policy which

only begins in Afghanistan and ultimately aims at "New

99

Delhi and Cairo”.29

This short-run objective, according to Mr.
Khrushchev, 30 is the destruction of all military alliances
in that region. Afghanistan, politically neutralized and
economically dependent upon the Soviet Union, can well
serve as a wedge between Iran and Pakistan, two members of
CENTO. Until the destruction of CENTO is insured, the
Soviet Union may conveniently tolerate Afghanistan's view
on neutrality and her determination to preserve her terri-
torial integrity and independence. Whether the Soviet
Union would still maintain this attitude if and when that

objective were effectively achieved will remain to be seen.

 

29Ramazani, 22° cit., p. 152.

30He made this statement publicly while in Kashmir,
on his way to Afghanistan. New York Times, December 17, 1955.

 

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Afghanistan has no tradition of democratic government
and efficient civil service. Established authority governs
tribal and family relations and autocratic rule by the king
and appointed officials is the norm on the national level.
The idea of strong government is thus deeply ingrained, but
this is not necessarily an advantage for either the United
States or the Soviet Union. The Soviet bloc has made a point
of getting along well with the feudal system and the military
aid that it has given to Afghanistan has incidentally served
to strengthen the central government against the possibility
of regional tribal Opposition. But even without communist
prOpaganda which is strictly outlawed,l the massive presence
of Soviet officials, advisors and technicians has probably
furthered a sense Of identification of the Soviet bloc with
economic progress through government activities, in line with
the vaguely anti-capitalistic leanings of many highly placed
Afghans.

In Afghanistan, as in most other underdevelOped

countries, economic develOpment has become a driving force of

 

1Henry G. Aubrey, Qgexistence (Washington, D.C.:
National Planning Association, 19617, p. 39.

 

100

101

great power, whether it serves as a symbol of enhanced
status through participation in international progress or

a desire to meet the urgent needs of the peOple. For its
consumption, for its eXports, and thus for its imports as
well, Afghanistan depends primarily on the products of its
soil. But techniques have barely changed for centuries and
irrigation, while well known in this semiarid land, was
primitive. An improvement Of irrigation was a prime need
and the government first turned to the United States for
technical assistance on a contract basis, then Obtained
governmental help, and finally, but significantly only after
overtures by the Soviets, capital assistance as well. Thus,
American aid became identified with a real need, but one
geographically remote from the centers of political activity,
its visible impact a long way Off. Moreover, the United
States aid program was beset by innumerable difficulties,
some perhaps foreseeable, while other lessons were only
learned in time-honored fashion, the hard way.

By contrast, the Soviet bloc initially addressed
itself to aspirations that could be satisfied more readily.
It supported Afghanistan's nationalistic sentiments in the
protracted quarrel with Pakistan over the allegiance of the
border tribes, "the Pushtunistan issue", both morally and

with arms,2 while the United States appeared to stand on the

 

21bid., p. no.

102

other side of the fence through its military alliance with
Pakistan and the large economic aid associated with it.

When the Afghan government wanted grain silos, a
flour mill and a bread plant to achieve a better leverage on
the supply and use of grain and the provisionment of the
Army, the USSR supplied them, even though there were undoubt-
edly projects of greater develOpmental importance than these.
The Soviets also paved the streets of Kabul and donated some
buses and a hospital, all highly visible tokens of Soviet
capabilities. Gasoline storage tanks in urban centers and a
pipeline to facilitate import across the northern border
filled another visible need. A cement mill and other manu-
facturing enterprises catered to the desire for industrial-
ization. Important and potentially strategic road projects
which modernize age-old routes of trade and communication are
being surveyed or already taken in hand. The enlargement of
the airport in Kabul, the capital, is a project of immediate
usefulness in a landlocked nation. And exploration by the
Russians for natural resources, such as Oil, in a resource-
poor country is obviously as welcome to the beneficiary as
it may be interesting to a solicitous neighbor.

Lately, however, the contributions of East and West
in Afghanistan have become more similar. The Soviet Union
has gone in for some projects with remote payoff, such as

irrigation, and the United States has undertaken assistance

103

to civil aviation and helped improve Afghanistan's two
vital transportation links with the outside world through
Pakistan. The interruption of these routes for political
reasons had given the Russians one of their most important
Openings. While initially the transit arrangements for
Afghan exports and imports through the USSR were not effi-
cient, the Soviets are now striving to improve these
arrangements, both physically and economically.

For isolated Afghanistan, trade with the outside world,
its neighbors, including the Soviet Union and Western
countries, is a vital need. Because of proximity, Soviet
trade is important for Afghanistan and every effort has been
made by the USSR to make it more so. Demand and price fluc-
tuations in Western markets for cotton and wool, compared
with Russian willingness to absorb anything proffered, have
played a part. Karakul, the most important Western import,
still is the largest earner of hard currency from the West.
But the growing Soviet predominance in aid and technical
assistance tends to implant Soviet standards in related
branches of the Afghan economy and increases trade with the
Soviet Union. Moreover, the closing of the transport link
with the West through Pakistan in 1955 and the resulting
fear of overdependence are unlikely to be soon forgotten.
Accordingly, Afghanistan's need for trade and foreign

exchange does not afford the West any ground for complacency.

10h

This thumbnail sketch of the constellation of needs
in Afghanistan was focused on the elements that give rise to
an interaction between Afghanistan as a develOping country
and the rest of the world, for it is these foreign require-
ments that provide the Openings for competitive moves by
East and West. The extent to which either side can make
this interaction serve its policy interest depends on its
affinity with the needs of Afghanistan and the endorsement
of her aspirations in a credible and impressive manner.

This credibility constitutes an important element because

the political impact of economic relations does not rest
solely on the economic effects achieved. The impression left
on the other party is apt to be colored by the spirit and
intent inferred, by historical experience, and even by
prejudice. Since the West labors under a heritage of dis-
trust that goes back to the days of colonialism, its

reliance on the profit system wakes a suspicion of ulterior
motives where this bias is prevalent. And as the aspirations
of Afghans are fanned by their ambitions to catch up rapidly,
a counsel of moderation and a long view of develOpment
priorities can be interpreted as a deliberate go-slow policy
by important leaders who have been suspecting the West of
holding back for fear of losing business.

The communists, of course, have been taking this

prOpaganda line all along and using such sentiments to good

105

advantage. What is more, the Soviet Union is not liable to
these historic suspicions, partly because she was in the less
develOped league only recently, partly because she does not
Operate under the profit system, and partly because she
sincerely endorses rapid industrialization and state initia-
tive in line with her own dogma. It is well for the United
States to be aware Of this handicap without necessarily
permitting it to deflect western policy from its concern with
the long-term aspects Of economic development.

In Afghanistan, not only the speed of develOpment, but
the selection of projects for which assistance will be avail-
able, has been colored by the East-West competition. In line
with its own philosOphy, each side implicitly backs different
priority concepts. The Soviet bloc in Afghanistan has demon-
strated a great deal Of affinity to industrialization, the
most emphatic of develOpment aspirations, and certainly a real
need, even if priorities may be subject to argument while, on
the whole, the West is content to leave industry to the
uncoordinated initiative of private investment. The problem
is not as it has Often been said, the absence Of entrepre-
neurial initiative. 0n the contrary, where conditions permit,
this has Often been forthcoming with surprising vigor; in
fact, in recent years, private industry has far outdone the

public sector in the fulfillment Of plan targets in Afghanistan.3

 

3Peter G. Franck, Af hanistan Between East and West
(National Planning Association, 1950), p. 25.

106

But for very large projects, Afghanistan finds it difficult
to muster the requisite large finance. Public initiative is
therefore Often favored where rapid growth is desired, though
no one can deny that a statist-ideOIOgy inclination is Often
at work, too. It is frequently emphasized by brave words
even where the practice is more moderate. Thus, in a rel-
atively figurative sense, the state probably plays as large
an economic role in America as it does in Afghanistan. The
United States government, in comparison to the Afghan govern-
ment, provides some of the most essential, and indeed only,
services in terms of tabulations Of business statistics,
economic data and information, price fluctuation, investment
abroad and other vital economic data. This enhances the
controlling role of government on the functioning Of free
enterprise and the competitive, capitalistic, American econ-
omy. There are also federal agencies and laws that provide
for governmental control on business. On an informal basis,
the role played by the government in controlling and preventing
a price rise in the steel industry would also help to illus-
trate this statement.

The United States, for its part, has largely, though
not exclusively, interested itself in long-range needs for
irrigation, agricultural improvements, community develOpment,
small industry and the immensely important field Of education,
technical training, administration and health. This is

107

unquestionably appreciated by the Afghans, but it is none
the less true that these programs lack the visibility and
develOpmental "glamor" of the projects with which the Soviet
bloc is largely identified in Afghanistan. The payoff of
the American-assisted projects is usually far away, the
American contribution is often intangible and the result is
not easily identified with western achievements, while a
Russian factory Of silo is more visible as a monument to
Soviet accomplishment and as tangible evidence of identifi-
cation with.progress and modernism.

Mere amounts of aid apart, some differences in Soviet
and Western terms are frequently discussed. Except for some
hospitals and "ceremonial" gifts, Soviet assistance has been
in the form Of credits; the Chinese Communists have also
given some grants.h The United States has been far more
liberal with grants and it has been said that the more
"businesslike" loan method Of the Soviets is a psychological
advantage. The author is not convinced that such a general-
ization is justified. Much depends on the purpose and
circumstances of each case. It is wondered whether, for one
instance, food grants under Title II Of Public Law ABC to
Afghanistan or other countries were ever resented. In any

event, Congressional attitudes are now leaning toward loans

 

hNew York Times, January 6, 1960.

108

in preference to grants; but critics Of the United States
have no trouble finding fault with such a "Shylock-like"
attitude as well.

The length Of Soviet credits is not unusual; they are
in the medium-to-long range, perhaps not unlike Export-
Import Bank practice. The United States still holds the
edge in the long-term field.5 There is a great variety of
repayment terms in Soviet credit agreements, ranging from
convertible exchange to local currency6 or local products
at prices to be negotiated later but presumed to be at world
market levels. There are indications that some early expe-
riences with the price relationships in Soviet trade agree-
ments have not been uniformly happy for Afghanistan. But we
ought to recognize that we are not certain how "hard" Soviet
loans will turn out to be. If eventually the Soviets want
to be gentle and extend, or perhaps even forgive, payments,
they might gain the psychological benefits Of giving grants
in two installments, first by giving "businesslike" loans,
and later by being "generous" with regard to repayments.

Moreover, uncertainty about prices may be discounted

 

5Most Soviet loans are repayable in 12 annual install-
ments beginning from.one to three years after delivery. In
the Afghan case, 22 annual installments, beginning after
eight years, have been stipulated.

6Many Soviet agreements seem to provide maintenance
of value clauses for local currency deposits.

109

by Afghanistan which is happy at the prospect of paying with
commodities it is perennially unsure of placing in world
markets. In fact, it may feel that it risks less in bar-
gaining with the Soviets than in facing the erratic and wide
price swings of Western markets. Some shrewd politicians
might well bank on the chance that Afghanistan, rather than
the Soviets, can afford to be stiff-necked about prices.

But accepting payment in local currency or products, the
lender is in effect shouldering the task of creating a
market, a grave burden that primary products Often face in
the West. Except for refusing further loans, there is
little the Soviets could do with a recalcitrant debtor,
unless they were to apply political or military pressure in
the "imperialist" manner; and by such an attitude they would
risk undoing whatever good their deeds have wrought.

The United States has been slower to recognize the
important place of soft loans repayable in local currency
and, for obvious reasons, is not willing to accept local
products in payment.7 Actually one might speculate whether
in procedures laid down for commodity disposal under Public
Law hBO the United States is not getting the worst of two
worlds. Although much of the sales proceeds is reloaned for

develOpment on the "never-never", as the British aptly call

 

7Except by the barter of strategic materials against
surplus commodities.

110

their installment plans, the United States insists on calling
the transactions "sales". As a result, Afghanistan feels it
is doing the United States a good turn by taking the sur-
pluses; but in reality these transactions are apt to become
permanent investments, or perhaps even grants, unless the
United States eventually becomes willing to accept more
imports and in this way use inconvertible currencies. It is
hardly necessary to describe what difficulties this might
create in the United States, while the perennially resource-
starved bloc economies find it much easier to absorb more
imports without economic cost and perhaps even with benefit.
While this difference in "comparative aid-and-trade
advantage" has perhaps not yet received sufficient attention,
the East-West discrepancy in interest rates is frequently
discussed. Soviet loans to Afghanistan usually carry only
2 1/2 percent interest;8 United States and international
loans cost more, Often much more.9 Why the Soviets picked
2 1/2 percent has never been clearly explained; perhaps
such a rate looked "businesslike" though inexpensive for the
borrower, and at the same time comfortably lower than the
Western rates, which are denounced as "exploitative". The

problem is awkward for the United States, where interest

 

8Joseph Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid, Council on
Foreign Relations (New YOrk: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958),

P. 39.
9Ibid., p. 179.

111

rates have important institutional functions in the capital
and money markets which they lack under the Soviet system.
One might consider getting around the problem by mixing loans
with grants and thereby lowering the average interest cost.
This would not work well with Afghanistan which does not
want grants, because loans and grants register at quite
different levels Of political receptivity. At present there
is no easy answer to the Soviet gambit, short of subsidizing
interest rates. Nonetheless, it seems that the problem.of
low-interest loans would exist even in the absence of
"competitive coexistence"; the real obstacle in cOping with
it is the difficulty of the United States in meeting certain
external situations for internal institutional reasons of
its own, such as the interest rate structure in free money
markets.

For our present purpose, these strands of thought can
be gathered in three conclusions. First, since aid is only
one Of a number Of instruments of foreign policy, we cannot
be certain of the precise extent to which Soviet aid has
paid Off, or will do so; and the Soviets are no wiser in
this respect than the United States. Secondly, in the face
of this indeterminacy, it seems risky, perhaps even futile,
to let competition be the primary guide Of United States aid
policy. In concrete instances, as in Afghanistan, one cannot

fail to note the degree to which the Soviet and Western aid

112

programs complement each other. For reasons of differing
economic philosophies, they have been concentrating on
different sectors of the economy; and if one believes that
greater develOpment in Afghanistan will ultimately benefit
the United States along with the develOping countries, this
may be all to the good.

True, it is Often said that the Soviets build impres-
sive monuments Of modernism.in places where peOple can see
them rise in short order while the Americans seem.to putter
around the countryside and initiate projects that will not
bear fruit until many years later. For the purpose of the
present thesis, the third point is that, whatever policy may
be decided upon in a specific situation, the decision ought
not to be primarily or preponderantly dictated by what the
Soviets do. I anlnot saying that the policybmaker can
ignore the actions of the other party, for he can never
afford to overlook tactical considerations, knowing that
the failure of the United States to act prOperly will be
capitalized upon by the Soviets. The United States might
well be less concerned with Soviet motivations and more
concerned with its own.

By way of an example, in Afghanistan, the Russians,
probably encouraged by repeated faltering in the United
States programs, have perhaps deliberately decided on a
radically different approach. While they may have made some

113

gains, the United States has not lost in the process. On
the contrary, with a certain dogged determination, possibly
in the absence Of a realistic alternative, an independent
course was pursued by the United States.

But such.pragmatic reasoning is not the only, or the
most important, argument against a policy of response and in
favor of a broadly autonomous approach. If the American
foreign-aid.policy has seemed to lose support in Congress
and elsewhere, it is believed that the reason has been not
so much the lack of demonstrable results as the paucity of
inspired purpose. It was probably heartening to many to
hear the Secretary of the Treasury point to the obligation
of rich nations toward the poor.10 But whether one speaks
of a moral Obligation, or of greater equality Of Opportunity,
or of enlightened self-interest in a shrinking world, one
seeks a broad, autonomous motivation as the foundation of a
policy that the United States would want to pursue even in
the absence of Soviet competition. It is the incurable
weakness of the "security" argument that it is inevitably
governed by an adversary who is thereby implicitly accorded
an important measure of initiative in policy formation. In

contrast, a confident, autonomous policy of assistance,

 

1°C. Douglas Dillon, "Imperatives of International
Economic Growth," speech delivered before the Foundation for
Religious Action in the Social and Civil Order, Washington,
D.C., January 16, 1959, Department of State Release No. 37.

11b,

based on a genuine community Of interest between the United
States and Afghanistan, would find its reward in whatever
appreciation foreign aid can still kindle in a cynical world.
It is suspected that whatever psychological success the
Soviets may have so far reaped from their economic assist-
ance program in Afghanistan has been due to their vocal and
unqualified endorsement of the recipients' develOpment
aspirations.

Economic actions are both a part and symptomatic of
the cold war. The alert, aggressive and calculating economic
warfare of the Soviet Union reflects its attitude toward the
cold war generally and its intention to out-do the West. The
Soviet Union feels that the world is moving in its direction
and that with its assistance the historical processes can be
accelerated.

In some ways it is unfortunate that Afghanistan is one
of the targets Of Soviet attention in its economic offensive.
It subjects it to the possibility that it will lose its
freedom and that its economic develOpment will be impaired.
On the other hand, to the extent that an underdevelOped
country can exploit both sides in the power struggle, can
extract economic assistance from both without alienating
either, and can maintain its economic and political integ-
rity, the cold war setting can.be beneficial. It is a

hazardous prOposition, threading the way between two great

115

powers, especially when one of the powers has announced its
intention to control the world, by force, by revolution or
by any other means.

The United States, Of course, has no choice but to
meet the challenge, to compete with the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan and to prevent that country from endangering
the values inherent in the Afghan spirit and tradition of
freedom and independence. How to compete effectively is
beyond the scope of this thesis. It is certain, however,
that it cannot be done by the same methods and techniques
and same purposes and.motives employed by the Soviet Union.
To do so would do as much violence to democratic values as
the Soviet Union prOpOses to do.

United States foreign assistance to Afghanistan, at
least in part, serves the purpose of preventing those
conditions from arising which the Soviet Union can exploit
to its advantage. The apparent success of Soviet efforts
with foreign assistance have made some wonder whether or not
the United States should emulate the Soviet Union in the
conduct of its foreign assistance program. It must be
understood, however, that the Soviet program in Afghanistan
is an imitation of the United States aid, particularly as
embodied in the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine.
Furthermore, the Objectives of the two nations must be borne

in mind. The Soviet Union hOpes to break Western alliances

116

and gain political influence by selective use of small

amounts of assistance and a great deal of publicity. The
United States is interested in economic develOpment, hOping
thereby to create conditions helpful to United States
interests in terms of an economically and politically stable
democratic Afghanistan. If the United States were to try

to imitate the Soviet Union, it would in essence be abandoning
its basic aims and would probably spend its entire time and
substance chasing around putting out fires.

The United States requires an assistance program
based coordinately upon the develOpment needs Of its friends
and allies and those neutrals, like Afghanistan, who share
the smme general public philosOphy, and upon the United
States ability to supply public loans and grants. Such an
effort should be supplemented by large-scale private invest-
ment, fostered by whatever public measures are necessary to
encourage this<ievelOpment. This program.would not be
insensitive to what the Soviet Union does, but would not
be built around Soviet actions, either in fact or in the
minds of the American peOple or the peOple of Afghanistan.

In sheer power the West has an overwhelming margin.
Should the United States decide so, by concerted action it
could squeeze the Soviet Union out of the Afghan market,
itself supply every economic develOpment program, embargo

the Soviet Union and get along without any Soviet products.

117

Fortunately, the organization and concepts of the United
States prevent this, but there remains the problem Of
effectively mobilizing the United States' resources to
counter the Soviet economic offensive in Afghanistan.

One thing is certain; the United States will find that
combination of public and private activity and those methods
which will promote and expand an equitable economic system
and a value system which attaches the highest priority to
the Afghan people an not an in the in; nu. '

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. BOOKS

Adams, Walter, and John A. Garraty. Is the World Our Cm mpus?
Eazt Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State Univers It ty ress,
l9 0.

Allen, Robert L. Middle Eastern Economic Relations with the

Soviet Union Eastern Eur e and Mainland ChIna.
CHarIott evallW MI UnIv ersIty of VIr gIn ia Press,

1958.

. Soviet Economic Warfare. Washington: Public
airs Press, I950.

Almond, Gabriel A. and James S. Coleman (eds. ). The Politics
of DevelOpinngreas. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
UfiiversityPress, 1960.

 

Bauer, P. T. Economic Analysis and Policy in UnderdevelOped
Countries. 41957.

Berliner, Joseph. Soviet Economic Aid. Council on Fbreign
Relations. New YorE: FrederIcka. Praeger, Inc., 1958.

Curti, Merle and Kendall Birr. Prelude 33 Point Four. l9Sh.

Current Problems in Afghanistan. Princeton, New Jersey:
r nceton UniversIty Press, 1961.

Franck, Peter G. Afghanistan Between East and West.
National Planning Associati ion I960.

Golenpaul, Dan (ed. ). Information Please Almanac. New YOrk:
McGraw-Hill, 1961.

Hazelwood, Arthur. The Economics of "Under-Developed" Areas,
an Annotated ReadIgg‘List, etc. l95h.

Hunter, Edward. The Past Present. London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 19§9._

Kovner, Milton. The Challegge g£_Coexistence. Washington:
Public Affairs Press .

118

119

Lenczowski, George. The Middle East ig'World Affairs.
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1953.

 

 

Mason, Edward S. Promoting_Economic Development, The United
States and Southern Asia. Claremont, California: 1955.

 

 

 

 

Michel, Aloy A. The Kabul, Kunduz and Helmand Valleys and
the National Economy of Afghanistan. National Research
Council, Foreign Field Research Programs, No. S.
Washington: 1959.

 

 

Mid-West Debate Bureau. what Should Be the Nature of United
States Foreign Aid? Normal, Illinois: (no datET.

 

 

 

Nurkse, Ragnar. Problems of Capital Formation in Under—
developed Countries. 1955.

 

 

Smith, Howard K. The Ruble War. Buffalo: Smith, Keynes
and Marshall (Economica Books), 1958.

 

Specter, Ivar. The Soviet Union and the Moslim World.
University of Washington Press, 1956}

 

Stebbins, Richard P. The United States i2_World Affairs,
1960. Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1961.

 

 

Walch, J. Weston. Discussion Handbook gn_Foreign_Aid.
Portland, Maine: J. Weston Walch Publisher, 1957.

 

 

Wilber, Donald N. (ed.). Afghanistan. New Haven: Human
Relations Area Files, 1956.

 

Wilson, Andrew. North From Kabul. London: George Allen
and Unwin, Ltd., 1961.

 

Wolf, Charles Jr. gForeign Aid Theory and Practice in_
Southern Asia. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1960.

 

 

B. PERIODICALS

Afghan Progress in_the Third Year of the Plan. London:
Royal Afghan Embassy, Sept. 1935.

 

 

 

120

Afghan Progress 1E.th° Fourth Year of the Plan. London:
Royal Afghan Embassy, Sept. 1960.

 

Afghanistan Builds on E2 Ancient Civilization. International
COOperatIon Administration. (no date).

 

Allen, Robert L. "The Communist Economic Offensive,"
International Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Winter, 1958-

1959.

. "A Critical Appraisal of the Soviet Aid Program,"
Review gvaoreign Policy, 1958. Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
Pagg I, testimony before the Committee, February 27,

19 .

. "Economic Motives in Soviet Foreign Trade Policy,"
Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXV, No. 2, October, 1958.

 

. "Soviet Russia and the UnderdeveIOped Countries:
Trade and Aid," The World Today, Vol. 13, No. S, May,
1957.

. "Soviet Russian Economic Penetration in the Middle
East," Free World Forum, September-October, 1959.

 

 

, participant. "What the Communist Offensive Means
to American Business," Chamber of Commerce of the
U. S. Special Committee report, 1959.

and R. K. Ramazani. "Afghanistan: Wooed But Not
Won," Swiss Review g£_World Affairs, October, 1957.

 

 

 

 

Armstrong, Willis 0. "Russians, Asians, and DevelOpment,"
School of Advanced International Studies Review, March

19 7. __'

Background: The Subcontinent of South Asia--Afghanistan,
Ceylon, India, Nepal, Pakistan. Near and Middle Eastern
Series kl. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1959.

 

 

 

 

 

Crocker, Lt. Col. H. E. "Afghanistan and Russia," Eastern
World. Vol. 10, January 1956.

. "Russia and Afghanistan," Contemporary Review.
February 1956.

 

121

Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan's Big Gamble. Part II. South
Asia Series, vol. IV, no. u. Kabul: American University
Field Staff, May 2, 1960.

 

 

. Afghanistan's Bi Gamble. Part III. South Asia
Series, vol. IV, no. 5. Kabul: American University
Field Staff, May 9, 1960.

Galay, N. "The Soviet Breakthrough in the Near East and in
Southern Asia," Bulletin 2: the Institute for the Study
g£_the USSR, Vol. III, March, 1956}

 

Knorr, Klaus Eugene, Ruble Diplomacy: Challenge £2 American
Foreign Aid. Princeton: Princeton University (Center
of International Studies, Memorandum No. 10), 1956.

 

 

 

Mikesell, Raymond F., and Donald A. Wells. The Soviet
Economic Offensive, Headline Series. Fall, 1959.

 

 

Nielson, Waldemar A., and Zoran S. Hodjera. "Sino-Soviet
Bloc Technical Assistance--Another Bilateral Approach,"
Annals of the American Academy 2: Political and Social

Science, May, 1959.

 

 

Ramazani, R. K. "Afghanistan and the USSR," Middle East
Journal. Vol. 12, No. 2, Spring, 1958.

 

. "Economic Aid to Afghanistan," Danneshjoo, Vol. 6,
No. 2, March, 1958.

 

. "Soviet Military Assistance to Uncommitted Countries,"
Midwest Journal 23 Political Science, Vol. III, No. h,

 

 

Rubinstein, A. Z. "Point Four Soviet Style: Russia's
Economic Courtship of UnderdeveIOped South Asia," New
Leader, March 5, 1956.

. "Selected Bibliography of Soviet Works on Southern
Asia, l9Su-l956," Journal 9: Asian Studies. November

 

1957.
. "Soviet Policy Toward UnderdevelOped Areas in the
Economic and Social Council," International Organization.

 

Vol. 9, May 1955.

Thorpe, Willard L. "American Policy and the Soviet Economic
Offensive," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 35, No. 2. January,

1957.

 

122

 

Warner, Denis. "Afghanistan: A House with No Doors," _
The Reporter. Vol. 26, No. 2. New York: January 16,
1962.

Whitnack, Doris S. "Sino- Soviet Economic Offensive in
Underdeve10ped Countries, Foreign Agriculture. (USDA),
Vol.20, October, 1956.

 

Wilson, Andrew. "Inside Afghanistan--A Background to Recent
Troubles, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society.
Vol. XLVII, July-October, 1*6 .

 

Zyzniewski, Stanley J. "The Soviet Bloc and the Under-
develOped Countries: Some Economic Factors," World
Politics, Vol. XI, No. 3, April, 1959.

 

. "Soviet Foreign Economic Policy," Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXIII, No. 2, June, 1958.

 

 

C. NEWSPAPERS

Christian Science Monitor, September 2, 1950.

 

Isiah, January, 1950 to current issues. (An organ of the
Afghan government, published in Pushtu and Farsi. ).

New York Times, June, l9Sh to current issues.

 

D. UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations. Economic Development and Planning in Asia
and the Far East (from Economic Bulletin for Asia and
the Far East, November 1955),19SS.

 

 

United Nations. Some Problems in the Organization and
Administration pf Public Enterprises in the Industrial
Field. l9Sh.

 

 

 

 

United Nations. Training ip_Public Administration. 1958.

 

123

E. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Criticisms pf the Foreign Aid Program. Comments by the
Department of State, the International COOperation
Administration, and the Department of Defense. Washington:

1959.

Mutual Security ip'Action--Afghanistan. Fact Sheet. Depart-
ment of State Publication no. 6752. International
COOperation Administration. January 1959.

 

 

 

"United States Operations Mission in Afghanistan" Project
Progress Report. International COOperation Administration.
January 1, 1960.

 

 

United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Soviet

Economic Growth: A Comparison with the United States,
by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of
Congress. 65th Cong., lst. sess. Washington: Govern-

ment Printing Office, 1957.

 

 

 

United States Department of Commerce. Foreigp_Grants and
Credits RE the United States Government. Quarterly
reports. Washington: Author, various years.

 

United States Department of State. The Sino-Soviet Economic
Offensive $2.the Less Developed Countries. 1958.

 

 

 

United States House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign
Affairs. Mutual Security Act g: 1961. 87th. Cong. lst
sess. Washington, 196I.

 

United States House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign
Affairs. Report g£_the Special Study Mission 32 Asia,
Western Pacific, Middle East, Southern EurOpe, and North
Africa. _Ubth Cong. 2nd. Sess., House Report no. 1366.
Washington. 1960.

 

 

 

 

United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
Foreigp Assistance Act g: 1961. o7th Cong. lst. Sess.,
Report no. 612. Washington, 1961.

 

 

 

United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
International Development and Security. Parts 1 and 2.
67th. Cong., lst. Sess., Washington: 1961.

12h

United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
United States Foreign Policy--ComEilation of Studies.
o7th Cong., lst. Sess., Document no. 2h. Washington:

1961.

United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
United States Foreign Policye-Niddle East. both Cong.,
2nd. 3683., No. 13. Washington: 1960.

United States Senate. Special Committee to Study the Foreign
Aid Program. Foreign Aid Program--Compilation.g£ Studies
and Surveys. 85th. Cong., lst. Sess., Document no. 2.

 

United States Senate. Studies and Surveys perpared by or
for the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid

Program. 1957.

United States Senate. Subcommittee on Technical Assistance
Programs. Soviet Technical Assistance. 8hth. Cong.,
2nd. Sess., Staff Study no. 7. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1956.

 

‘MA “I -M‘hwn--_ n

 

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