.4401. 1.0{ 140104 9 ....4 .n; O . w. . .4231... .4114 .1....4J..44u(.01...000l10;‘4 01? 104 s.— 0 .00 114.1“... . 1. .0. .4.-0401.44.00. 4 119 41 4110.4 40101- 4. 4 .4. i. 4 .‘.00. 1 . 40. .3.‘4'0. . . 00.... 410.. 10" .DA 0. 444.0 .1.. 04.4 4... 10:11.44... . .1 1‘10 4 . 1410044ol’1d114411‘4414 1 .04011 44401 1.4. .. . . . 1.. 4 «$.14 .11. I . 44. “11.1, . 104.11.041'0 . 0 0‘1. . 40104 .4 . . . . . .4.. 0rd 4 4. 144 . . . 4 .. . 4. 444 1.411 4 . "4. 1111 V4Uhu41pwmuh.“ £141. $.14183 :4. .4mmar..40.r14z gu‘k‘tflké 3:52.44?” 21.41.414- 1114.9‘404..1I.‘.4-1114.1 1 4 ..l4 4114100. 41...‘ 141 0.11... 90‘404 4 11-1 y 04 .444‘4411 .Q4010 .4 114 400. 44.0101414103441r 04.14IROI04-4d . ‘9 4.. ‘4'. 4|, 0' 1,4101...- .41 4---- --. a 0' ' > .11_____-___._- 41.34 404 00.1 14 1 1. v0- .00 ' 0 4. .4 4 V.Iv .lxfi“. 4 . 4.0.. . 11-..] 0“ 0.04”}... ..41..441.4.0§'11‘01'1001 101. 444.414. ’00 1141.“ .44... . 44.011.14.010 .0014441 .1 . 0 . 4., 6.141.444.9154 1 . I 1 1' . 41.4. 4.. 4440110.. 1014. 01.1 0 44.11.9111,..01” .41.U4.’4\0\\. l.01.01’)..14.01. 1.|141‘1.1.00.. . T4014 44(4- 4 4’300‘1’414” 1%,;13 00:}EII0.44$140.I . 0 4. ,05444. 04411! 001141 .4 04 040 . (11‘ 0 1 1.1'fS pub; 2 12:). 11”" 1 .1 .,€: ‘42“ if! .1..‘.119’14.1 .0I4 0440.41.14“- ' I “4:00,“. 1‘6 01"! ‘0 8 0‘00 0441.100 0.3.0-1104... 0 401.0110 4.0.4.4111‘4.I1.T1.‘ 1 12“ 9, II‘. .. 4 1 . 044.. .‘1 . 44 1 . u 4 4 4 4 . 101100 0 01110—404411 .0 0 1" 0 0' 1| 4149:).140‘34440 0414.454" 4.0 01.0.? 41 1.14 ‘10 10) «in 4&1 9414...? I l. 404.01.41.11! 0411:000‘440 104 1.”- 4. 1 - .0.“ 004000- 44'4‘ I. .\ 1011 100101.11 06H.'4‘44F0 4 ‘ '\4 1 1044.» 4 . I . . 4.4 0 19' 1 4 | illllillll’lllllllllllflllllllllilllilIllthJllllHlllHli 3 1293 01031 9659 l ' maxim ' ‘ M' 'CMQan State University This is to certify that the dissertation entitled BRIDGING PROM BASELINE TO BUY—IN THE ROLE OF CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM) PRINCIPLES IN AIRLINE INSTRUCTOR PILOT TRAINING presented by POLLY KEELING NIELSEN, has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph . D degree in Education 321,744 444/ / Major professor, Date November 15‘ 139M MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0- 12771 PLACE II RETURN BOX to removothb ohodrout from your noord. TO AVOID FINES return on or baton duo duo. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE MSU Io An Affirmative MONEQJOI OpponuMy trunnion Walla-9.1 4 _—.— b——-——-—-— __—_— BRIDGING FROM BASELINE TO BUY-IN THE ROLE OF CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM) PRINCIPLES IN AIRLINE INSTRUCTOR PILOT TRAINING Volume I BY Polly Keeling Nielsen A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Educational Administration 1994 ABSTRACT BRIDGING FROM BASELINE TO BUY-IN: THE ROLE OF CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM) PRINCIPLES IN AIRLINE INSTRUCTOR PILOT TRAINING BY Polly K. Nielsen The goal of this dissertation is to describe in detail, via a qualitative field study, how Crew Resource Management (CRM) principles are integrated into overall pilot instructor training at a large U.S. airline. It will also identify subject areas, and those instructional tools and techniques deemed persuasive by facilitators, instructor pilots (who are course students), and the airline. This study will explore what goes on in an actual CRM- specific training class, and in two different instructor training program classes, using direct researcher observation, supplemented by audio tapes and field notes; interviews with instructor pilots, course facilitators, and training center managers; and analysis of course activities. Copyright by POLLY KEELING NIELSEN 1994 DEDICATION To Tom For reasons only I understand AND To David E. Carter For the multitude of gifts he has given me over the years, I treasure his friendship more than I can articulate. Much has transpired since I began this degree program; some was terrible, much was grand. All led me to this place. Change has been the hallmark of this chapter in my life. Carter has shared of himself during the tough times and the not-so-tough times. I could count on him to share his wisdom, his technical expertise, and his experience. He encouraged, badgered, brainstormed, cajoled, nagged, and laughed with (and at) me. He demonstrated heroic patience in the face of my woeful lack of technical expertise with my computer software. He installed new software and taught me how to use it. Then he made himself available for consultation on that software at all hours. No matter how busy he was, he always had time for me. We shared good food, good conversation, good ideas, and good friendship. He has supported me wholeheartedly as I have moved forward in this academic journey. For these reasons and more, Carter, I dedicate this dissertation to you. Your friendship is wondrous gift. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the musical "Guys and dolls," as he laments losing yet another location for his game, Nathan Detroit and his gambling pals sing a song entitled "The Oldest Established Permanent Floating Crap Game in New York." Borrowing a page from Detroit’s songbook, I could vamp something along those lines, dub it "The Longest-Running, Most-Frequently- Changing, Permanent Floating Doctoral Committee in History," and not be too far off the mark. The final committee had only one member from the original, Dr. James Snoddy, mercifully a man long on patience and humor, and one to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. Jim was willing to allow me to follow my own path, and construct an out-of—the-mainstream program that suited my needs. Each "floating" committee member -- Dr. Cas Heilman, Dr. Richard Gardner, and Dr. Alisha Marshall -- brought a unique perspective to my doctoral program process, and gave me the twin gifts of time and guidance. My thanks to each for your assistance. Dr. Vernon Miller filled a particularly unique and valued role. He "pinch hit" when Alisha Marshall left JMichigan State for Cornell, tackling my dissertation ‘proposal, and then the dissertation itself, on short notice ii iii and without ever having met any of the other committee members. In addition, Vernon was tremendously supportive during the months after Tom’s death. Dr. Howard Hickey shall always occupy a special place in my heart. The first person I met at Michigan State, Howard was the reason I chose to attend MSU. He's funny, he’s wise, he’s compassionate, he’s smart. I treasure his willingness to assist me so enthusiastically over the years. And finally, a huge bouquet to Dr. Douglas Campbell, who shepherded me through the entire dissertation process, never once betraying any sense of frustration or impatience as I proceeded, sometimes sailing smoothly, sometimes plodding along, sometimes stumbling. My process was hardly a straight road, and Doug was there to share ever twist, turn, and pothole. Our bi-weekly, then weekly meetings kept me going in the right direction, kept me motivated, and kept me enchanted by the range of topics we discussed beyond my dissertation topic. No matter how my attitude sagged, flagged, or otherwise went haywire, Doug always met it with the serenity and calm so characteristically his. I have been blessed with a committee of warm and caring, yet demanding people, all of whom dedicated themselves to helping me do my best. I thank them all. CHAPTER I Part Part Part TABLE OF CONTENTS THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROACH TO IT . . . . . 1: Study Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Significance of the Study . . . . . . . . . . Study Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2: Background-Issues-Literature Review . . . The Pilot Persona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Corporate Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Airline Pilots - The Work . . . . . . . . Airline Pilots - What Being An Airline Pilot Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Airline Pilots - Preferred Learning Styles . Small Group Research . . . . . . . . . . . . Crew Resource Management History . . . . . . 3: How and Where the Study was Conducted: Methods and Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CRM Program History . . . . . . . . . . . . . CRM Evaluation/Effectiveness . . . . . . . . Crew Resource Management: Airline Pilots as Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER II CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING PHASE 1: ESTABLISHING A CRM BASELINE . . . . . . . . . . . Part Part Part 1: The Schoolhouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2: Aerostar’s One-Day Program . . . . . . . Getting Started . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Available Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . Accident Analysis: Continental Flight #1713 One Captain’s Story About Decision-Making . . CRM’s Four Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . Role-Playing Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . Communication Exercises and More Accident Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lightening Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3: Some Observations on Phase 1 CRM Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Multiple Agendas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Answering the Research Questions . . . . . . iv 54 54 59 62 65 68 72 72 79 80 87 88 97 103 113 132 141 158 162 164 V CHAPTER III INSTRUCTOR QUALIFICATION TRAINING COURSE: BRIDGING THE GAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part Part Part Part Part Part Part Part 1: Course Introduction . . . . . . . . . 2: Day One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Who' 8 Who and Why They' re Here . . . . Beyond Introductions: Establishing My Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . Moving On: Adult Teaching Strategies . . Tom Mitchell Interview . . . . . . . . . Day One's Remaining Modules . . . . . . . 3: Day Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CRM LOFT Introduction . . . . . . . . . . Aerostar’ 5 Philosophy on Windshear . . . Lunchtime with Captain Cagney . . . . . . Group Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . How CRM Tied In . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4: Day Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tolerances in Pilot Performance . . . . . A Conversation With Joe Williams . . . . The Crew Resource Management Module . . . 5: Comparing Modules . . . . . . . . . . 6: Roundtable Discussion . . . . . . . . 7: Interview With Pete Morgan . . . . . 8: Some Observations on the Course . . . Multiple Agendas . . . . . . . . . . . . Answering the Research Questions . . . . CHAPTER IV THE NEW TRAINING REGIME: AEROSTAR'S INSTRUCTOR TRAINING 1993 . . . . . Part 1: Preliminary Activities . . . . . . . Part A Conversation with Reg Pierce . . . . . Interview with Captain Rick Edwards . . . Lunchtime Conversation: Establishing My Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 : Day one I O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Introducing the New Instructor Training Program 0 I O I O O O O C O O O O 0 Lunch with Captains Fox and Greenwood: An Education 0 I O O O O O O O O O 0 Some Thoughts on Day One . . . . . . . . The Culture and Sexual Harassment Modules 166 166 177 184 187 190 196 202 208 208 220 228 232 246 247 247 252 256 301 304 338 353 360 361 365 365 369 378 385 391 391 397 402 404 Part vi 3: Day Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evaluating Technical and Human Factors Skills in a LOFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . First Officer Bill and the Captain . . . . . Evaluating CRM LOFTs - Theory & Practice . . Part 4: Day Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER V Part Part Part Part REFERENCES LOFT Facilitation Practice . . . . . . . . . Roundtable Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . Multiple Agendas . . . . . . . . . . . . . Answering the Research Questions . . . . . . SUMMARY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1: Answering the Research Questions . . . . 2: A Cautionary Tale . . . . . . . . . . . . Shifting Instructor Paradigms . . . . . .. Changing Attitudes or Changing Behaviors? . . 3: Moreland & Levine's Model At Work . . . . What's Persuasive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4: What I Make of All This . . . . . . . . . Suggestions/Recommendations . . . . . . . . . Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coming Full Circle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409 409 441 450 484 484 503 509 511 515 515 525 527 529 531 532 533 537 541 542 543 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 A Model of Group Socialization . . . . . . . 31 Figure 2 Course Syllabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Figure 3 Phase 1 CRM Syllabus . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Figure 4 Performance Motivation Curve . . . . . . . . 90 Figure 5 Class Syllabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Figure 6 Course Syllabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROACH TO IT ' t' 9 This study details how Crew Resource Management (CRM) principles are integrated into instructor pilot training for a U.S. Airline. The research was carried out via a quali- tative field study that began in August 1992 and ended in January 1993, and covers how CRM was taught in a generic one-day class, and in two three-day classes for instructor pilots. Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a relatively new aviation industry training discipline, whose history dates only to 1979. United Airlines is generally credited with being CRM’s original -- and only -- parent. United inaugurated the program that ultimately became CRM in the aftermath of an entirely preventable DC-8 crash in Portland, Oregon in 1978. The three-pilot crew, distracted by a landing gear warning light, failed to monitor its deteriorating fuel situation. The airplane ran out of fuel and crash-landed short of the airport, with several fatalities, including the flight engineer. United is credited with having the courage and foresight to probe what was lacking in its crew training that could have prevented the accident. The resultant program was called Command Leadership Resource (CLR) management. The United accident has become a classic in the aviation industry, the granddaddy of all so-called "CRM preventable" accidents, because its circumstances so 2 unmistakably and graphically demonstrate the situations, behaviors and attitudes CRM strives to prevent. CRM’s goal is to teach pilots to use all available resources and to share responsibilities while keeping the ultimate authority in the captain's hands. If the captain does not exercise his/her command authority and suggest a delegation scheme, the other pilots are taught they have an obligation to be assertive. Had the United crew been coordinating more effectively, with one pilot focusing on the landing gear problem, another actually flying the airplane, and the third monitoring fuel and other critical systems, it is likely an early awareness of the deteriorating fuel situation would have prevented the accident. Other accidents and incidents have joined United in creating today's pantheon of CRM-preventable classic crashes, including Air Florida or "Palm 90" (Washington, D.C.), Eastern 401 (Florida Everglades), Continental 1713 (Denver Stapleton Airport), Delta 191 (Dallas-Fort Worth), and Northwest 255 (Detroit). Painstaking investigations of each of these accidents by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have determined that causal factors included poor crew coordination -- lack of command authority combined with lack of crew member assertiveness -- cost hundreds of lives, often including the pilots’. Accident investigators know that an airplane accident generally has between four and seven causal factors, the 3 absence of any one of which would have prevented the accident. Such causal factors, identified after the crash by NTSB investigators, apply whether the crash had mechanical or human origins. But, unlike accidents caused by mechanical and/or structural failure(s), so-called CRM- preventable accidents are caused by a daisy-chaining failure of the human system. CRM aims to improve the human system, for while the percentage of crashes caused by mechanical failures has decreased dramatically over the last fifty years -- and particularly since the advent of the jet engine -- accidents caused by human error have not. In fact, human error now accounts for between 60% and 80% of all airline accidents: according to statistics provided by the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, that figure, as of 1994, is 73.7%. The literature (see Part 2) confirms the need for improved crew coordination and communication. United initiated what has now become an industry-wide adoption of CRM principles. Because the FAA has yet to issue any firm guidelines/regulations regarding CRM programs, individual airline CRM programs are more reflective of the corporate cultures in which they were developed than anything else. Whether this is problematic or not is unknown. In any event, whether created by outside consultants or in-house training departments, most (if not all) airlines have CRM programs in place. 4 While most airlines are offering CRM programs, many questions arise. There is a great deal that is not known, specifically what actually goes on in these programs. How are CRM principles reinforced once pilots have a basic grounding in CRM? Are CRM programs effective? Do they result in long-term changes in attitudes and behaviors? What training philosophies and techniques are employed in CRM programs? Where do airlines go CRM-wise once all pilots have been indoctrinated in basic CRM principles? What is persuasive to airline pilots when they are students in an instructional setting? What is the best/most effective vehicle for reinforcing CRM principles over the long term? Research to date has focused on quantitative measurement of pilot attitudes before and after exposure to CRM principles. Only one major study (Helmreich, et a1 1990) has evaluated actual behaviors in a simulated environment after CRM training has taken place. Previous explorations involve gathering of attitudinal data and quantifying them, emphasizing before-after CRM program data. Unfortunately, questionnaires can be easily decoded, enabling respondents to give the most acceptable or right response, particularly after training. Such attitude indicators do little to determine whether or not course participants have bought into CRM principles and are using them on the flight deck. Course evaluation forms, like those used at the subject airline, show that the vast majority of basic CRM program attendees felt the course was 5 of value. But the evaluation, completed at the end of the day-long seminar, emphasized the way the course was taught (module by module), rather than the utility of the information covered and cannot be a reliable predictor of behavioral changes in the cockpit. Little, if any, research has looked at what goes on in an actual CRM training program from a qualitative perspective. Why is this important? The airlines, the FAA and the NTSB, the military, and aviation organizations world-wide agree that CRM is the necessary, primary vehicle for lowering the number of accidents caused by pilot error. Knowing that commercial aviation remains the safest form of transportation and that 60%-80% of today’s accidents involve pilot error, it seems logical and safe to surmise that elimination of some portion of accidents termed pilot error or CRM-preventable can significantly enhance aviation safety over the long term. Thflmhlem The potential problem is one of persuasion: are instructor pilots buying into the company-mandated emphasis on inclusion of CRM principles in all training activities? The answer is unknown because there is no data to confirm or deny such a buy-in. Buy-in by line pilots and instructors/check airmen can be said to consist of four levels: 6 (1) This makes sense to the pilot, who finds it useful; (2) Pilot will use CRM principles when flying the line: (3) Instructor/check airman agrees to try to use CRM principles when training/checking: (4) Instructor/check airman routinely and enthusiastically employs CRM principles when training/checking. The one-day (Phase 1) CRM buy-in level was difficult to determine, as only two line pilots attended the one-day class. Class critiques indicated a high level of approval for the class itself. The November class expressed enthusiasm for CRM principles, asserting that they did use them on the line. There was less enthusiasm for using CRM principles in training situations. With few exceptions, the January seminar participants bought into CRM principles, but the buy-in with respect to whether or not the instructor participants would go much beyond level 3, trying to utilize CRM principles in training and checking, was less clear. It is believed that a qualitative study, which concentrates on what pilots find persuasive, and what actually goes on in instructor training programs vis a vis CRM principles, may document such a buy-in, or provide insights into how CRM principles are transmitted by the airline and perceived by instructor pilot groups. CRM has yet to be examined from a qualitative perspective. The subject airline has demonstrated its allegiance to CRM concepts by hiring a nationally-recognized 7 CRM expert and making substantial budgetary commitments to support multi-generational CRM training program development and implementation. This study will (with respect to the subject site): (1) igengifiy how CRM principles are transmitted to instructor pilots; (2) eeeeee how CRM principles are received/viewed by those instructor training program participants, i.e., what is persuasive to instructor pilots, who are presumed to be representative of the entire pilot group? (3) deeeripe what goes on in instructor training vis a vis CRM (old vs. new training programs); (4) ideneifiy what the airline thinks is important to transmit: (5) deeezipe how the training program is structured (new vs. old emphases; management participation and/or commitment; how cultural issues are reflected in training); (6) identify and deeegibe techniques used for CRM training; (7) dieeuee how participants view the training program; (8) deeenibe facilitator ideas of what is persuasive to pilots in a training setting. This qualitative study uses multiple foci in order to answer the core question -- what is really going on in each of the three classes? Subordinate foci include facilitating CRM buy-in, communication in the overall training process, and how CRM principles are communicated to line pilots, instructor pilots, and check airmen. In addition, the study touches on the issue of attitude vs. behavioral changes. Observation in classes and conversation with various participants and facilitators far AL'. 111] ‘1 0".- o to. I :V': ‘0‘. :r-A his 8 revealed disparate views and approaches to the best method for changing pilot CRM behaviors. Some favored emphasizing attitudinal change in order to bring about desired behavioral change, while others concentrated on changing CRM behaviors alone. WW First generation CRM provides the overall pilot group with a basic introduction to CRM principles. At the subject airline, this program was a one-day seminar and, except for on-going training for new hire pilots, has reached all pilots and is no longer being taught. For second generation CRM training, instructor pilots and check airmen (that corps of pilots who are self and company-selected, who represent the "cream of the crop") have been identified as the most logical and effective CRM message carriers. Check airmen are airline and FAA- certified pilots who train and evaluate other pilots’ performance on a recurrent basis. These pilots are uniquely positioned to influence the pilot group as a whole: they are the primary, on-going vehicles for transmission and reinforcement of CRM principles because each pilot returns at least annually for recurrent training (ART) and a simulator checkride with an instructor and/or a check airman. Continued flight status demands a satisfactory checkride: the check airman has the pilot’s career in his/her hands. 9 Because of this role, instructors and check airmen can make or break the airline-mandated commitment to CRM principles. Their buy-in is critical to long term dissemination and adoption of CRM principles by the pilot group. The stated goal of the subject airline is to have CRM principles so firmly embedded in all phases of pilot training that separate CRM training becomes unnecessary, except for new hires. The airline terms this "fade-away" training: once initial concepts/principles have been transmitted by the one-day course, instructors are expected to keep the message flowing and ultimately ensure that its inclusion as an integral part of pilot training, right up there with mechanical or "stick and rudder" skills. Waterline Chapter I's Part 2 details CRM’s background and orientation from an historical perspective. It also looks at where and how airline pilots work. Part 3 provides a look at the setting in which this research was conducted, and traces the subject airline's CRM program history. Researchable questions the dissertation attempts to answer are also laid out in Part 3. Chapters II, III, and IV cover the August one-day CRM class, the November Instructor Qualification Course, and the January Instructor Seminar, respectively. The emphasis in each of these chapters is on CRM principles, whether directly or indirectly addressed in each class and its 10 modules. In addition, Chapter V looks at the tests facilitators were being put to in order to make them amenable to the course participants, particularly the instructors and check airmen in the November and January classes. As observation progessed, the instructor participants seemed to be reacting to a sense of threat -- threat that their status was being undercut by the addition of tasks requiring expertise in soft skills, skills that emphasize dealing heavily in interpersonal (non—technical) behaviors and in eliciting feelings from pilots being trained. Chapter V is the summary analysis of the three classes being studied. It traces the progression of CRM principles from the initial Phase 1 training through the current CRM training for instructors. Chapter V also touches on persuasion, participants, facilitators, tools and techniques, and curricular emphasis. In addition, Chapter V takes a look at the multiple agendas that are being pursued during each class -- airline, facilitator, and participant. Not only are these agendas being pursued independently, they are oftentimes even at cross purposes. Finally, Chapter V looks at questions that were not answered by the research and suggests ways in which further CRM research might be conducted in order to ascertain the true degree to which pilots buy into and practice CRM principles. 11 ° - s - ° er u ev' Anyone investigating CRM training programs must first create a baseline of information about airline pilots, including: (1) their personality characteristics: (2) their work environment; (3) the nature of the various corporate cultures that employ them; (4) the actual work they do, which is tightly regulated procedurally by company and governmental agencies; (5) the kinds of small groups in which they function (dyads and/or triads); (6) what it means to be an airline pilot: and (7) preferred learning/communication styles. In addition to the above, the literature review needed to extend beyond the history and development of today’s CRM programs, and thus reached out to include organizational and small group communication issues, such as new hire socialization, small group cohesiveness, the role of coercion and social pressure on small groups, and the development and characteristics of organizational groups. We Perhaps the best place to begin is to identify and describe the personality characteristics of the typical airline pilot and the industry in which s/he works. Tom Wolfe, in his best-selling The_31gh§_§teffi probably described the pilot personality as well as anyone could: 12 Anyone who travels very much on airlines in the United States soon gets to know the voice of the girline 9119;...coming over the intercom...with a particular drawl, a particular folksiness, a particular down-home calmness that is so exaggerated it begins to parody itself (neverthelessl-it’s reassuring)...the voice that tells you, as the airliner is caught in thunderheads and goes bolting up and down a thousand feet at a single gulp, to check your seat belts because ’it might get a little choppy’...the voice that tells you (on a flight from Phoenix preparing for its approach into Kennedy Airport, New York, just after dawn): ’Now folks, uh...this is the captain...ummmm...We’ve got a little 01’ red light up here on the control panel that’s tryin’ to tell us that the lendin’ gears’re not...uh...leekin; into position when we lower ’em... Now...I don’t believe that little ’01 red light knows what it’s talkin about—I believe it’s that little ol’red light iddn’ workin’ right’ ...faint chuckle, long pause. as if to say "ILmLnot_exen_sure_all_this_is Ififlllfl HQIID going anQ-§th] 1; mg! gmuge 19g... But...I guess to play it by the rules, we oughta heme; that little ol’ light...so we’re gonna take her down to about, oh, two or three hundred feet over the runway at Kennedy, and the folks down there on the ground are gonna see if they caint give us a yieuel inspection of those ol’landin’ gears’ - with which he is obviously on intimate ol’-buddy terms, as with every other working part of this mighty ship - ’and if I’m right...they’re gonna tell us everything is QQDQQQLIQ all the way aroun’ an’ we’ll jes take her on in’...and, after a couple of low passes over the field, the voice returns: ’Well, folks, those folks down there on the ground - it must be too early for ’em or somethin’- I ’spect they still got the sleepeze in their eyes... ’cause they say they caint tell if those 01’ landin’ gears are all the way down or not...But, you know, up here in the cockpit we’re convinced they're all the way down, so we’re jes gonna take her on in...And oh’ ...(I almost forgot)...’while we take a little swing out over the ocean an’ empty some of that surplus fuel we’re not gonna be needin’ anymore - that’s what you might be seein’ comin’ out of the wings - our lovely little 1adies...if they’ll be so kind...they’re gonna go up and down the aisles and show you how we do what we call ’assumin’ the position’...another faint chuckle (We_ge ' ' I th1s_so_9ften1_and_1t_a_s9_mu§h_fun1_we_eyen_ha1e_a funhx_little_name_f9r_itl...and the stewardesses, a bit grimmer, by the looks of them, than thet_xeice, start telling the passengers to take their glasses off and take the ballpoint pens and other sharp objects out of their pockets, and they show them the peeitien, with the head lowered...while down on the field at Kennedy 13 the little yellow emergency trucks start roaring across the field-and even though in your pounding heart and sweating palms and your broiling brainpan you know this is a critical moment in your life, you still can’t quite bring yourself to belieye, because if it were... how could tne_eepgein, the man who knows the actual situation most intimately...how could he keep on drawlin’ and chucklin’ and driftin’ and lollygaggin’ in that particular voice of his - Well! - who doesn’t know that voice! and who can forget it! - even after he is proved right and the emergency is over. That particular voice may sound vaguely Southern or Southwestern, but it is specifically Appalachian in origin. It originated in the mountains of West Virginia, in the coal country, in Lincoln County, so far up in the hollows that, as the saying went, ’they had to pipe in daylight.’ In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s this up-hollow voice drifted down from on high, from over the high desert of California, down, down, down from the upper reaches of the Brotherhood into all phases of American aviation. It was amazing. It was Exgmalign in reverse. Military pilots and then, soon, airline pilots, pilots from Maine and Massachusetts and the Dakotas and Oregon and everywhere else, began to talk in that poker-hollow West Virginia drawl, or as close to it as they could bend their native accents. It was the drawl of the most righteous of all the possessors of the right stuff. Tom Wolfe, The_Bight_Stgff (1979) Wolfe was writing about test pilot Chuck Yeager, the first man to break the sound barrier, to whom Wolfe devotes an entire chapter of The_31ght_§teff, describing Yeager as '...(S)omehow Yeager was like the big daddy of the skies over the dome of the world" (Wolfe, p. 54). According to H. Clayton Foushee and Robert Helmreich, "Most of us are familiar with the common stereotype of the pilot as a fearless, self-sufficient, technically qualified, and slightly egotistical individual, whose job description calls for the defiance of death on a regular basis" (Foushee and Helmreich, 1988, p. 191). '. ::.:e.h ago, 0. succes: this r '4‘ PAIN.“- 'tvoul V . , PV‘I-ny 5541.1. Ital-‘0). “H ~UI 3» 6 15.3] ‘At WLH 14 Powered flight’s history, while relatively short, is nonetheless compelling and colorful. It was only 91 years ago, on December 17, 1903, that Wilbur and Orville Wright successfully flew the first powered airplane, at Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina. Since then we have put a man on the moon: space travel is commonplace. By World War I, man had learned enough about aviation technology to incorporate weapons on flying machines, bringing deliberate death to the skies alongside accidental death. After the war, writes Air Line Pilots Association historian George Hopkins, aviation pioneers had to give way to the next pilot group: A generation of fliers who were little more than circus performers replaced the pioneer inventors... (C)onsequently they cultivated the flamboyant and colorful quirks of character and dress common to show- business people. As one might expect of showmen, their backgrounds were diverse, their temperaments erratic, and their personal lives bordered on the psychotic. They shared a common tendency to die young, however, and it was this certain expectation of imminent death, combined with a visible scorn for personal safety, which added another ingredient to the curious mixture of attitudes and ideas which was gradually coalescing into the aviator’s special mystique. Largely to increase attendance at their exhibitions at country fairs and the like, the bird-men and their press agents encouraged the notion that flying was fitted only for a special man of nearly mystical talents...This view of pilots proved to be enduring, lasting long after the birdmen had folded their wings and flying had become little more than a practical exercise...Thus flying was, in the beginning, nearly an art form, and the man who dared the heavens could indulge in peculiarities usually conceded only to artists in our society (Hopkins, 1971, p. 8). In its formative years, flying was inherently dangerous. Early air mail pilots flying in 1918 had only a It) I ': (n {—f’ u." r‘-~ J... “‘8‘ s . Dug‘ ““ “1“: 15 25% chance of being alive in 1926, the year which saw the formation of the nation’s first airline companies. By then, however, the pilot mystique Hopkins described was firmly in place. In 1928 there were 7,000 pilots holding commercial licenses: 2,000 were employed in aviation jobs. It was during this era that airlines adopted the uniforms and rank systems familiar to all from the U.S. Navy. It was important to cultivate an image of stability and discourage the flamboyance of the barnstormers if the public was to be convinced that flying was a safe way to transport mail and people. The road to today’s airline companies and airline pilots was neither straight nor smooth. Labor—management disputes over pilot flying time, safety, and the intro- duction of new technologies became common in the late 1920s. Disputes over the same issues have marked the history of commercial aviation. Technology has bounded forward; airplanes are safer than ever. Pilots learned quickly that they needed to stick together. In the 19305, a pilot could be fired for any of myriad infractions. As early as 1928, pioneer organizers attempted to instill pilot-to-pilot loyalty with the following slogan, "Don’t overfly a brother pilot!" While part of an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to persuade pilots not to take over flights refused on safety grounds (generally weather-related) by another pilot, it marks a _————— _, Jet, 16 turning point in aviation history; pilots began to feel the need for pilot group solidarity. Since 1926, while the airline industry has changed dramatically, the airline pilot persona has remained stable. Surely, the psychotic barnstormer has disappeared, but not so the concept of the airline pilot as other-worldly and different from the rest of us, those pilots refer to as "earth people." Foushee and Helmreich elaborate on their earlier description of pilots: (I)ndeed, there is a grain of truth in these stereotypes derived from the early days of aviation when flight was not routine, and the dangers associated with the piloting profession were considerable, and it is also probably true that the characteristics of ’the right stuff’ were not only functional but a pre- requisite. These characteristics were much admired and became not only essential elements of the informal pilot culture which were passed on from generation to generation of pilots but they were also institution- alized in regulations governing pilot performance, as well as in policies guiding pilot selection criteria. They are so much a part of the culture that they are still with us in an age where flight operations are routine and aviation is by far the safest mode of commercial transportation. Since so much value has been placed upon personality characteristics such as self—sufficiency, machismo, and bravery, we may be selecting individuals who tend to keep to themselves, communicate less than the average person, and are not very good at sharing responsibility with others. Since the culture has fostered the myth of the brave, maverick, pilot, individuals possessing such characteristics have gravitated toward the profession in greater numbers. In addition, our selection criteria weight these characteristics more heavily, and for some piloting jobs this may be entirely appropriate (Foushee and Helmreich, 1988, p. 191-193). In some respects, today's pilots are little changed from 'their ancestors: whether to the casual observer or the insid ’ '1 rpm 2» r1 alrea he a my r m: .VH I :10: we: l 71m 213’ A I 915:; 19126 Q5. . 30., O i‘"! "Aoill .5... ‘ "at 51“; I t."“‘\ 17 insider, the image remains virtually intact. Overarching FAA regulations, which spawn airline requirements, the already-mentioned personality characteristics, the uniforms, the airline culture, and the heavily military background of many commercial airline pilots combine to contribute to a perception that they are so alike as to be effectively cloned. This perception is further abetted by the operational and organizational need for pilots to be virtually interchangeable parts in a specific airplane type’s crew. One is a "seven-two-seven second officer," for example, and is often identified as such by fellow crew members before names are exchanged at the start of a trip. What do today’s pilots value? What norms guide and drive their behavior, leading to such striking similarities not only pilot-to-pilot, but also airline-to-airline? During a fieldwork exercise about pilot story-telling, my conversations with numerous pilots revealed a list of norms -- personal and professional -- important to commercial airline pilots. The following were repeated, regardless of airline, cockpit position, or age: competence and proficiency, anonymity, image maintenance, adherence to hierarchical cockpit roles, professional autonomy in the face of increasing scrutiny and automation, and a sense of humor. Conversely, the pilots with whom I spoke were contemptuous of technical incompetence, intrusions into the cockpit by airline, FAA, passengers or the media, 18 affectations, disruption/destruction of the image and/or hierarchical structure, and mean-spirited humor/pranks. Pilot norms stress adherence to and reliance on the cockpit hierarchy that designates the captain as the pilot in command, followed by the co-pilot (or first officer) and the flight engineer (or second officer). These norms also dictate not attracting attention, whether from the chief pilot, the FAA, or the media, since such attention is generally the result of some sort of accident or incident. Norms further mandate flying safely, efficiently, and on time, and maintenance of a "we" versus "they" orientation ("they' being the airline, chief pilot, passengers, regulatory agencies or the media). An aviation training video, "The Legends," which features talks by various aviation experts, contains a segment entitled "The Pilot and His C0per," by Navy flight surgeon Frank Dully. Dr. Dully discussed some of the personality characteristics common to military pilots, labeling them linear thinkers who deal in the concrete, and who are highly analytical, self-sufficient, needing to be in control, possessing a high need for achievement, and using humor to cope with anxiety. Traits such as competitiveness, linear thinking, being practical, and dealing with the concrete are necessary when considering the technical skills flying airplanes requires but they are not always conducive 't0>open communication and the development of teamwork in the cockpit . r .v: you u :fa D ‘*rn Augv crh FHA: f‘av ,. g,- r~4 19 Window; Airlines are complex organizations which depend on safe, efficient deployment and utilization of equipment and personnel over vast geographic areas. Labor end equipment- intensive, airlines operate on thin profit margins, dependent on such variables as load factors, weather, air traffic control (ATC), and the overall economic outlook. Pilots normally constitute the smallest single segment of an airline’s total employee pool, but are generally the best compensated, most specialized members of the work force. They also work the fewest total hours ("hard" hours or hours actually spent flying) of any employees. While the airline’s priorities do not necessarily match pilot priorities, pilots are nonetheless aware that their career path expectations depend on the overall health and well-being of the airline company. They are also confident that the airline cannot function without them. Uneasy alliances are commonplace. QQIDQI§t§_QulIHI§ It has been my experience, as a staff manager at the .Air Line Pilots Association, responsible for providing information and services to member pilots, that a pilot's corporate affiliation could often be determined simply by observing the way he interacted with Association staff members. It seemed that the airline’ s corporate culture was :revealed by and reflected in the pilots it hired. For exam; Liiel E1“ I ‘1- Erie 20 example, the most polite and appreciative members were likely to fly for Delta, where the most arrogant were from Pan American, and the most demanding were from United. Delta is known throughout the airline industry for its cooperative labor-management relations. Of all the 30,000— plus Delta employees, only the pilots are unionized. At the other end of the spectrum was the once-proud Eastern, whose openly combative labor-management relationship directly contributed to its ultimate corporate demise. One additional factor that must not be overlooked when attempting to analyze or describe an airline’s corporate culture is the impact of one or more mergers on the original culture(s). The 19805 saw a crazy quilt of airline mergers and acquisitions that changed the face of the industry forever. Northwest merged with Republic, which itself was a merged carrier, with roots in Hughes Air West, North Central and Southern Airways. Continental merged with Frontier and People Express, while Pan Am, which had merged earlier with National, was absorbed in part by Delta, which also bought Western. All this takeover activity prompted one commentator to note that the Reagan Administration never met an airline merger it didn’t like. Because merging different corporate cultures means merging cockpit crews, CRM programs need to address issues and differences that can arise as the result of merging often disparate cultures. Often there is open hostility l 5W J.‘ pr £2 (.1: g; . (I) ' 1 I") n) :n' I L‘q ‘d 21 between pilot groups because of the real or perceived damage done by the merging of the seniority lists. In the absence (as of 1992) of any federally-mandated rules governing CRM programs, i.e., what is to be taught and how to teach it, individual airlines have been left to design their own programs, either in-house or with the assistance of outside consultants. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that individual CRM programs will differ as a reflection of individual airline cultures and corporate identities. While improved communication and crew coordination are the goals of CRM as a discipline, it is not a given that all airlines will structure their CRM programs identically. - W0 At the heart of the airline pilot’s job is flying safely from Point A to Point 8. Secondary, but nonetheless important, is to do so on time and efficiently. In flying passengers, another goal is to make the flight as comfortable as possible. But this just touches the overall goals. What does this entail underneath? At the beginning of a trip, the crew must come together and begin the process of interacting as a team. The team’s normal flight preparations include: ...checking the flight plan, obtaining the departure, enroute and destination weather, verifying fuel requirements, calculating weight and balance parameters, cross checking communication and navigation equipment, monitoring system performance on engine run- 5136 W": 551V; 4 .I C:Oo 00‘ tn. '4‘“ h 39‘} “I‘N-l 22 up, and arranging for clearance from Air Traffic Control (ATC). Additionally, on their first trip on any given aircraft, they must review the aircraft log which contains a record of maintenance performed and a listing of any open maintenance items. These open items, in conjunction with the Minimum Equipment List (M.E.L.), define the equipment limitations which might either preclude a flight or limit the performance parameters of the aircraft (Ginnett, 1987, pp. 46-47). The cockpit preparation is handled by crew members, depending on seat position. The captain prepares the left side, and the first officer the right, while the flight engineer monitors all systems from a seat behind the first officer. The captain and first officer alternate flying trip legs; the captain, however, always maintains final authority and is responsible for crew coordination throughout the flight. But the work extends far beyond the actual flying of the airplane, and includes the requirement to interact with g35‘0und personnel, cabin crew, ATC, passengers, and perhaps e"en an FAA representative, all in a constantly changing thironment. Equipment failures and/or malfunctions, hieather delays, cancelled or changed schedules, disgruntled, unruly or anxious passengers, crowded runways, gates and Itlaihtrways, missing or late crew members, silly mistakes, ll”hissing crew meals, and nonexistent layover hotel rooms can all crowd themselves into a typical day. In its simplest construction, being an airline pilot means being technically proficient, possessing superior +-. h“ S .. an 5.. Lt... ‘ t] '0. '1 ~- 56 l'.“ 23 stick and rudder skills. But considering today’s aviation environment, and in light of the above, the definition of being an airline pilot expands far beyond the bounds of mere technical proficiency. Today’s pilots, particularly captains, must be good mgere as well as good pilote. Being a pilot entails being able to handle whatever comes up with aplomb and a sense of humor, while maintaining solidarity with fellow pilots, and never allowing the pilot persona to slip, particularly in the presence of "earth people." Yet it must be remembered that airline pilots are still selected and hired first and foremost for their technical proficiency, with little if any consideration given to a pilot’s management skills (or lack thereof). The Self— and company selection process at work in the early Gal’s remains in place today. E'J' EiJI-EE 21 in 5!] Given the personality characteristics enumerated by bully, it follows that training programs for airline pilots injould be carefully scripted affairs that acknowledge and eitDloit pilots’ analytical skills and their need to control their environments. At the outset, training programs tip their hats to and reinforce much of what is sacred to {)1 lots, i.e., the captain’s final authority, and they rely heavily on real world scenarios. In keeping with the e‘ll'lphasis on reality and authenticity, most pilot training Fragrams are taught by pilots. flu Db Y‘~ 5r» 'l’ 24 W The research on small group influences, cohesion within groups, group communication, group goals, and the development of group norms is extensive and valuable in understanding the environment in which CRM programs operate. Zander (1963) discussed the effects of group goals on group members’ goals, identifying conditions that - - - heighten the tendency for a member to place his level of aspiration at the level advocated for him by others," including strength of social pressure ; relevance to group goals: publicness of activity; expertness of members; interdependence among members: relevance to member’s Purposes: clarity of path to goals: difficulty of goal: threat to group; group consensus on goal: motive base of Sc>C:.’Lal power. All listed conditions apply to the pilot group, with s‘IDecial emphasis, perhaps, on strength of social pressures, e3"‘I3ertness of members (more senior pilots), interdependence Qt members (cockpit crew structure), relevance to member’s purposes (the pilot group seeks flight safety, dollars, I):"~‘estige, seniority, cockpit autonomy), and clarity of path to goal (pilots seek to follow a linear, predetermined path t9 their goals of seniority and captain’s rank). Aqditionally, pilots must walk a fine line that considers the pilot group’s goals while not losing sight of the airline’s goals for continued economic well-being. ...L - Iner' an!!! 11er 25 Of social norms Sherif wrote, "...(W)e find norms wherever we find an organized society, primitive or complicated. These norms serve as focal points in the experience of the individual, and subsequently as guides for his; actions. This need not always be a conscious function; many times it is effective without our awareness of it" (Sherif, 1936, p. 85). Homans (1950) defined norms as expected behaviors that :ccxmnee from ongoing activities. In that sense, group norms, including pilot group norms, are evolutionary. Each group of new hire pilots brings with it a slightly different Perspective from the last, presumptively fostering a never- ending normative synthesis. But is this true, considering 'titlsa complex socialization processes that affect airline pilots? In their discussion of the pressures groups place on their members, Festinger, Schachter and Back ( 1950) write: Small groups occupy a strategic position as determiners of the behavior and attitudes of their members...(T)he type and degree of contact among members, the functions of the group, and the goals of the group will determine how and why the influences are exerted. The reasons a small group is able to exercise such influence over its members become clear when we examine the gratification available only as a result of member- ship in such a group. Friendships, companionship, and the warmth and pleasures of close emotional ties are, of course, available only as a result of our relation- ships with other people. Prestige, social status, and the approval of others are in themselves group-oriented goals (Festinger et a1, 1950, p. 3). 26 Further, they discuss group development and influence: Groups develop along several lines. They develop with respect to membership and size, but they also develop with respect to the activities they engage in, the areas of their members’ lives for which they are relevant, and their importance for their members... (G)roups have power over their members. They exert influences on their attitudes, on their behaviors, and even on the kinds of activities in which their members engage (Festinger, et al, 1950, p. 7). ...(P)eople’s aspirations and goal-setting behavior are strongly influenced by information they possess about how others behave and their relationship to these others. All of these influences produce change in the individual’s behavior which result in his being more similar to other members of the group to which he feels he belongs (Festinger, p. 73). The pressure which a group exerts on its members may be overt and sometimes even formalized. Laws, rules, mores, etiquette, and so on exemplify some of these overt pressures. It is likely, of course, that before a group norm or standard can be thus openly formalized it must be in existence for a long time, or else must be of such a nature that deviation from the standard is harmful to the group. Such open pressures are generally also accompanied by open punishment for deviation in the form of censure, overt disapproval, or even rejection from the group (Festinger, p. 101). What do we know about airline pilots in their workplace? Pilots are, in effect, interchangeable parts in the mechanism that is commercial aviation. They self-select be(:ause of their interest, and already highly-developed, (innonstrated skill in flying multi-engine aircraft, and are 81Illosequently selected and trained by pilots (former or Q”Lt-rent) (Foushee, 1988: Foushee and Helmreich, 1988). Their training requirements and career progression follow FAA and contractually-mandated guidelines. From personal e)‘tperience working with pilot contracts, I learned that with few exceptions, they live within a strict seniority system, 3:1 (I I yo V—h '1 .l I“! u} N'- we“ GTE 27 one which dictates when a pilot will be permitted to move upward from seat to seat or from one equipment type to another. Pilots bid and work monthly schedules based on seniority: concomitant cockpit work groups are a series of fluid but rigidly hierarchical dyads or triads (depending upon equipment type), that generally include pilots with widely disparate experience levels. After initial new-hire training, contact with peers (meaning those with similar seniority) is limited to encounters outside the cockpit, generally in airports, restaurants or hotels. What we have is a technically-proficient, highly cohesive group of people who, in the course of their everyday work life spend time with other pilots, but not with the game pilots (Ginnett, 1987). Here is where pilots differ most profoundly from most groups of co-workers. Because of this constant shifting of group members it would Seem reasonable to conclude that there would be far greater GiSparity in behavior and attitude among pilots than the connonality we know exists. Further, this commonality e3"K‘Izends beyond corporate boundaries, becoming what aviation writer Robert Serling identifies as "the comradeship and unity of a fraternity with wings" (Hopkins, 1982, viii). While small group research is useful in explaining and al‘ticulating certain basic concepts relating to group f<31:'mation and subsequent cohesion and influence, it does not at-‘-<:ount for the cloning phenomenon we see with commercial ailrline pilots. Regardless of carrier, age or experience, ”flu- in Sri- VI. 'I‘ltn H ‘A‘u‘.| “’1... 3.64.1 C“ 28 {filots all seem, at least, to be carved from the same basic raw material. Only individual size and shape are acceptable dissimilarities, and their edges are unclear. In any airport, one can see pilots from competing carriers walking atxout, eating, interacting with one another and yet, uniforms aside, they all seem eerily alike. Jablin and Sussman (1984, p. 12) list five (5) cilaijracteristics that identify organizational groups: embeddedness within the organization: task-orientation: :fc>1:1nally appointed leaders: formal status hierarchies: and mmezmnloers as part of an "interlocking network" of organi- zational roles and affiliated with multiple organizational Etlrtamaps. These characteristics are amplified by Putnam and Stohl’s (1990, p. 257) list that describes "bona fide" groups : stable yet permeable boundaries; interdependence with immediate context; and links between boundaries and Q ontext . My own personal experience as an employee/manager in ‘u'Eitious corporate and educational settings reveals these additional qualities: (1) (2) (3) (4) membership may/may not be volitional: membership can be disbanded from without but not necessarily from within: groups can have numerous configurations at one time or over time with or without member approval: groups can contain members with myriad or competing attitudes, abilities, interests, goals and motivations: 29 (5) length of time members spend together may be mandated by external force, i.e., management: (6) departure may be volitional or non-volitional, with varying penalties. Pilots constitute the smallest segment of an airline’s employee pool, but are arguably the most specialized and cohesive. An organizational group embedded within a larger organization, the pilot group contains its own embedded groups within the overall pilot population: individual crews constitute the smallest organizational groups. Crews, either dyads or triads, are formed when schedulers place two or three pilots together for a specific block of time, or "trip," which can be a few hours long or se‘reral consecutive days recurring within a particular month. The crew task is to fly safely and comfortably from point A to point B, on schedule. The captain is the leader in this rigidly hierarchical structure, and each crew member has a specific set of responsibilities, which dovetails into file overall crew task -- flying the airplane. Pilot norms fall into two categories: operational and behavioral/attitudinal. Attitudinal/behavioral norms were bOrn when the Wright brothers first flew in 1903: the pilot Image has been being polished ever since. The most iluportant norm is competence, followed by solidarity among Di lots. Pilots who are perceived by their peers to be Qt>mpetent are allowed more social latitude than those judged “ incompetent . " I'l‘a DQVV 30 Operational norms evolved as technology improved and the industry learned lessons from various accidents. This class of norms has solidified and is carefully documented in training and aircraft manuals, and government regulations. Operationally they include pre- and post-flight checklists and detailed procedures for each flight phase. Penalties for deviance can include re-training, suspension, loss of license, termination, or even death. Because general small group research does not adequately explain the cloning phenomenon, what can? Pilot role development and maintenance can perhaps best be explained by Morland and Levine’s model of group socialization (1982, p. 153) which graphically shows the five phases of group membership and the four possible role transitions or outcomes found within them, and which emphasizes the reciprocal nature of each: INVESTIGATION entry SOCIALIZATION acceptance MAINTENANCE divergence RESOCIALIZATION exit REMEMBRANCE EC 31 Prospective Member I New Member I Ful Member I Marginal Member I Ex-Member ..-..-.-......- -..-..-..-. -. ”-1”. _ .-._-, _ _,,_ -,,- _ .-.r, -, _ _ - 1-.-“-.- _, -, _.,-._-. -, _ .-,.-, - _. - .- -.._ _ -..-.._. _ .- ._ .-. -.,_ .-..-..-..-... .-..-. -.-my XC ,..- .-. O INVESTIGATION SOCIAIJZATION MAINTENANCE RESOCIALIZATIOI‘ REMEMBRANCE ENTRY ACCEPTANCE DIVERGENCE ; EXIT Smith—om mm Role mm mm; Reconnaissance mutton Nanci-lion Aeoimiotton Ronni-come 'finn——i> Figure 1 A Model of Group Socialization 32 Let’s follow a typical pilot who applies for a piloting job at a major airline. At this point, using Moreland and Levine’s model, the airline and our pilot applicant enter the initial phase of group socialization by engaging in a process of mutual INVESTIGATION. This phase includes a background check of flight hours, certificates held, equipment flown, references, skill and psychological testing, and a recruitment process, to determine if the pilot has the credentials and skills the airline requires. The pilot, meantime, explores the possibilities inherent in working for this airline, such as its reputation and economic viability, number of flight hours required, salary scales and seniority potential (e.g., "How many years until I make captain?"). At hire, the new pilot makes his first role transition, from INVESTIGATION to edggy by becoming a new (probationary) hire, receiving a seniority number, and entering a specific pilot training class. Our pilot’s first experience with the second group socialization phase, SOCIALIZATION, is as a company employee, end a member of a pilot training class, .and a member of the overall pilot group. SOCIALIZATION doesn’t terminate with a role transition to W, but rather continues to spiral downward as the groups within uniich the pilot has membership or contact become smaller and change more frequently (moving from new hire, to training class, to new FE/FO, to individual crew member). 33 It should be noted that pilots generally hire on with the intent to remain at the airline until age 60, the mandatory retirement age. When hired, a pilot is assigned a seniority number. Based on that number, s/he chooses schedules, moves from seat to seat and/or airplane to airplane over the course of his/her career. Seniority is not transferable. For this reason, pilots rarely change carriers. When an airline pilot is hired, s/he embarks on a journey characterized by multiple, parallel group member- ships. In a sense, the airline, in its hiring process, acts as screening agent for the pilot group’s membership selec- tion process. Because flying an airplane is heavily task- oriented, pilots tend to be task-oriented individuals with the physical and psychological qualities required to complete those tasks. On successful completion of new hire training, the role transition to eeeepgenee is signaled by placing the new pilot out on the line for what is called Initial Operating Experience or IOE. During the first twenty-five flying hours, the new pilot is supervised by a check airman. At the end of IOE, the pilot continues through the initial probationary year of employment. During, or at the end of the probationary year, the new pilot will likely have achieved eggeptenee as a member of the overall pilot group and within his seat position, and moved on to the IEAITRTENANCE phase, which involves working with various crews 34 over time. SOCIALIZATION is an on-going process, repeated each time a pilot joins up with a new crew. As flight engineer, the new hire is at the bottom of the cockpit hierarchy. Upgrading to first officer and then subsequently to captain is every pilot's goal, and status is accrued with each vertical move. Aeeeptance and MAINTENANCE are on-going and are social as well as technical in nature. For flight engineers and first officers, there is a proficiency check, evaluated by a check airman, in a full- mission simulator. For captains, checkrides are performed semi-annually, also evaluated by a check airman. The new hire pilot may experience a role transition to diyezgenee from the overall pilot group by violating pilot norms (social divergence) or from the airline by demonstrating a lack of technical proficiency (technical divergence). Social divergence can result in varying degrees of social sanctions, up to and including complete ostracism, as is the case of a pilot at a major carrier who crossed the pilot picket line during a strike in the 1970s and who was still shunned by his fellow pilots twenty years later for having done so. At the other end of the (iivergence scale, lack of or substandard technical proficiency (demonstrated by a poor or failed checkride) generally results in a program of extra or re-training by the company, but in extreme cases can escalate to the point of termination . 35 Dixergenee requires RESOCIALIZATION in order to re- establish one’s position socially or technically, at which time the pilot returns to MAINTENANCE, where s/he remains, hopefully, until it is time to exig. RESOCIALIZATION from a technical standpoint may involve successful completion of mandated training or perhaps a proficiency check (PC). RESOCIALIZATION from social divergence may be less straight- forward, but could include more closely demonstrating ad- herence to accepted pilot norms. Finally, on the pilot’s 60th birthday, the FAA mandates that s/he make the final role transition and exip. But re- tirement because of age is hardly the only means of exiting the pilot group. Other EXILS from the line pilot group include becoming a manager, medical disabilities, death, and termination. The final socialization phase, REMEMBRANCE, begins at exit, and often, in pilot circles, takes the form of stories, some of which grow into company legends. And as these legends are re-told, they become a compelling social- ization tool for new hire pilots. The new hire pilot will cycle through the SOCIALIZATION {and.MAINTENANCE phases and their subordinate outcomes -- imageptenee, diyergenee, and exi; -- numerous times during Ilia/her career: at each change of seat position or equipment type, the process repeats itself. Using Moreland and Levine’s model, we can see that socialization may have a greater effect on pilots than Perhaps any other class of employee, because while it may 36 not be obvious initially, closer scrutiny reveals that pilots are subjected to what can be called a "nested" socialization process, one that begins at their hire date and continues -- cycling constantly -- until retirement, one that reinforces the stereotype of what it means to be an airline pilot. The strength and repetitive nature of this constant socialization underpins the cloning process. Assuming Foushee (1988) is correct, airlines seek a certain type of person to fly their airplanes.» Further, self- selection has driven these people into the pool of potential candidates. These self- and now company-selected pilots go through a constantly cycling nested socialization process, one which begins at hire and continues through retirement. Nested socialization takes place on three levels: company, train- ing, and crew. These levels can be parallel or sequential. In addition, there is an informal or casual socialization process that occurs within pilot groups (base, layover, between trips, while deadheading, or part of ALPA activities). Further, each level includes within it a compressed version of Moreland and Levine’s model progress— :Lon from INVESTIGATION through REMENBRANCE. Moreland and Levine’s umbrella model covers the pilot’s unorkdng life, first as a member of the overall airline employee group. In any of the required training programs (irritial new hire training, recurrent or upgrade) under that unuxrialla, the pilot enters another socialization phase. Finally, each trip with a different crew constitutes the most compressed of the socialization phases, since the group must come together, develop, and disband in a time frame that can range from several hours to several days over a month’s time. Pilots are barraged throughout their careers with role-modeling, posturing, and commentary, all of which contribute to their socialization and foster similarities among pilots. The levels of nested socialization, and their Moreland and Levine counterparts, are shown below: Moreland_§_Lexine INVESTIGATION entry SOCIALIZATION acceptance MAINTENANCE divergence RESOCIALIZATION exit REMEMBRANCE SOCIALIZATION acceptance MAINTENANCE divergence .RESOCIALIZATION exit liEMEMBRANCE SOCIALI ZATION acceptance MAINTENANCE divergence RESOCIALIZATION exit RdflKEHlBRANCE ! i S . J' !' COMPANY EMPLOYEE PILOT GROUP MEMBER (Includes initial training, then goes to Seat/Airplane, shown below.) SEAT/AIRPLANE (Includes each trip flown and various training programs.) CREW (On/off duty) 38 Juxtaposing the various socialization cycles on the original career-spanning model (Figure 1), would show, for seat or equipment upgrade training cycles, a series of slopes (rather than just one) that gradually move upward on the commitment axis and which peak during full status in the seat or equipment type. The slope would move downward when the pilot entered training for interim upgrades and would rise again with subsequent achievement of full status. The highest socialization phase is company new hire training, the lowest individual crew socialization. Pilots are placed in new-hire classes of varying sizes, where they work in classrooms, with cockpit mockups, and in simulators, for about 30 days. During this period, instructors evaluate their progress on a daily basis through oral, written, and practical examinations. At the same time, while learning specifics about being a flight engineer (or first officer) on a particular piece of equipment, new hires learn about corporate culture, mission and goals. Each upgrade and recurrent training experience also contains each of Moreland and Levine’s socialization phases, i.e., INVESTIGATION, SOCIALIZATION, MAINTENANCE, and REMEMBRANCE, complete with 'their respective outcomes. Upgrade training, which takes place periodically, based CH1 company need and the pilot's seniority, may take several daYs or weeks, depending on the airline. This training, too, culminates with a simulator check-ride with a company and/ or an FAA check airman. In addition to technical 39 information, upgrade training provides information that constitutes a socialization phase regarding, for instance, the new seat position and its responsibilities. Training assists in teaching upgrading pilots what it means to be a first officer or a captain. Recurrent training, required for all pilots, takes place annually (for co-pilots and flight engineers) or semi- annually (for captains), and consists of four hours in a simulator with a check airman. Successful completion is .required before the pilot may return to flying the line. All training contributes to the overall socialization process exemplified by the models, teaching role specifics, based on seat and equipment type. New equipment and new roles are combined with new members in the classroom. The importance of training as a socializing agent cannot be Overstated; a new hire pilot may cycle through two or three cockpit positions on numerous equipment types during his/her career. Each training cycle supplements and solidifies prior training cycles. When the training group disbands, members take lessons learned out onto the line. The lowest, most frequent, intense, and perhaps most influential socialization process occurs in individual crews, who, more often than not, are unknown to each other before flying together. While deliberate repeated crew groupings do occur, it is the exception. At the end of a trip, crew members go their separate ways and may never work together again. 40 Each trip, therefore, represents another socialization opportunity, with group members coming together, communicating role information, functioning together as a crew, then exiting at trip's end -- in effect a miniature of the "umbrella" group socialization model. This crew socialization process includes off-duty time on a trip, as well. Many crews dine together, for example, and it is common practice for the captain to be sure all crewmembers are ready for the crew bus the morning after a layover. Air carrier cockpit configurations (dyads/triads), working in concert with the seniority system, mandate that on the job, the most junior pilots will have the most contact with other pilots who are significantly more senior and experienced; contact with peers is limited to off-duty hours. As a junior, low status crew member, the new hire Pilot has extensive opportunity to interact with and observe more experienced pilots; given the new hire’s subordinate status and the rigid hierarchy that characterizes airline cockpits, such role modeling can neither be escaped nor ignored. Marginal members are not as easy to incorporate in the pilot group experience as are the other phases. Marginal members of the pilot group can include those whose piloting proficiency is marginal or those who are socially marginal. Airlines and the FAA closely monitor pilot proficiency. If check rides are failed, pilots are permitted re-checks, but can be fired or not permitted to upgrade if their 41 performance is sufficiently substandard. However, once a check ride is successfully completed, the marginal pilot is fully reinstated, albeit with a notation in his/her file. Social marginality appears to be handled differently by pilot groups. Except in cases of gross incompetence or negligence, pilots have little authority or desire to impose sanctions on one another. One of the strongest pilot norms Zhas to do with not "ratting" on a fellow pilot. Social «consequences of deviant behaviors can range from being the object of jokes or pranks, to being subjected to open disapproval of attitudes or behaviors deemed inappropriate, to being permanently shunned, as mentioned above. Because of the limited contacts pilots have with one another and the difficulty of establishing and maintaining stable relationships in a constantly-shifting workplace, stories and interactions with instructors and check airmen are particularly important socialization tools. When working together, pilots have only the time during cruise, or hours before or after flights or during layovers to interact socially. My own field research on pilot story- telling, demonstrated that stories are an easy, natural communication vehicle for people who must meet, interact, and become highly functioning groups in limited time periods. Training instructors and check airmen are also effective vehicles for transmitting company-sanctioned socialization experiences. 42 Moreland and Levine’s socialization model provides an ideal umbrella under which the pilot cloning phenomenon can be examined and cogently explained. Knowing how groups are formed, how they affect and influence members, and how cohesion produces conformity, only goes part of the way toward explaining why pilots resemble each other so strongly in attitude and behavior. Knowing that pilots are in a perpetual state of intense socialization, one unlike that found in most other work groups, explains why their cloning is not only comprehensible, but inevitable. Such a realization also makes the need for and the development, implementation, and subsequent evaluation of CRM programs industry-wide much easier to comprehend. Wm Armed with a baseline knowledge about the formation of organizational groups and information about the personality characteristics airline pilots possess, and the work environment in which they function, it is possible to view CRM in more concrete terms. CRM came into being as an industry response to the fact that more than two-thirds of all aviation accidents between 1960 and 1980 were caused, in part, by pilot error. With the advent of the jet engine, mechanical and/or structural failures became relative rarities and attention focused on the human components of the overall aircraft system. 43 The industry has identified several accidents as classic "CRM-preventable" ones, i.e., Delta 191 in Dallas- Fort Worth (1985) and Air Florida in Washington, D.C. (1982). Following each crash, the NTSB investigation determined that at least one causal factor was poor or non- existent crew coordination and/or communication. United took the lead when in 1979 it developed its Command Leadership Resource (CLR) management program after its 1978 Portland crash. That same year, industry experts convened for a symposium on "Resource Management on the Flight Deck." A subsequent conference, "Cockpit Resource Management Training," sponsored by NASA, was held in San Francisco in 1986. In attendance were representatives of airline and military training organizations from around the world. Presentations included in-depth descriptions of how organizations were incorporating CRM concepts and techniques in on-going pilot training programs. In a very short time, CRM went from being a concept to becoming an integral part of pilot training curricula. NTSB Member Dr. John Lauber, in his opening remarks at the 1986 CRM conference, discussed earlier NASA research he conducted, which focused on obtaining firsthand data from line pilots about factors causing accidents labeled "pilot error." A major finding was "...(O)ne consistent theme 'mentioned to us...was a dissatisfaction with pilot training programs. However, the concerns expressed by these pilots generally didn't have anything to do with the technical 44 training provided, but rather concerned other skills, like decision-making, command leadership, and communications skills" (Lauber, 1986, p. 7). This data, combined with the findings from various pilot error accidents and the now-classic simulator study by Ruffell Smith (1979), gave rise to "...the idea of applying classical business management concepts to cockpit operations..." (Lauber, 1986, p. 7). Ruffell Smith’s pioneering study zeroed in on problems associated with resource management early on, but recommended that the training emphasis be placed on captains, rather than on the crew working together as an effective team. Today’s CRM programs stress teamwork. Ruffell Smith also emphasized the importance of realism, a theme that echoes throughout the conceptualization, development, execution, and evaluation of today's CRM programs. Ruffell Smith’s work involved twenty volunteer three- man crews working in the same full mission simulator. The simulation had two phases, or flight segments, the second with a significantly higher workload than the first. Emphasis was placed on creating a realistic scenario for the crews, all of whom were fully qualified commercial pilots. According to Ruffell Smith: The results indicate that high workload can lead to decreased performance of flight crews...(S)ome of the difficulties are induced by deficiencies in the design of flight decks and instrumentation, others by documents and charts. Many of the problems, however, relate to management of human and mechanical resources. The variability between crews in reacting to the same 45 problems suggests that those who perform less well might be helped by special training. Consequently, it is recommended that...special training in resource management and captaincy be developed and validated. Such training should include the use of scenarios that are representative of actual situations. Special emphasis should be given to those situations where rapid decisions and safe solutions for operating problems are required (Ruffell Smith, p. 35). Lauber defined CRM as "...the effective utilization of all available resources -- hardware, software and liveware -- to achieve safe, efficient flight operations" (Lauber, 1986, p. 9). He went on to identify and define the various dimensions of CRM, including delegation of tasks and assignment of responsibilities; establishment of priorities; monitoring and cross-checking; use of information; problem assessment and avoidance of preoccupation: communications: and leadership (Lauber, 1986, p. 9-11). While there are a variety of CRM programs operating throughout the commercial aviation industry, the literature demonstrates that the universe of major CRM players is relatively small. Perhaps the most prolific CRM theoreticians are Robert Helmreich (University of Texas at Austin) and H. Clayton Foushee (formerly at NASA and the FAA, now at Northwest Airlines). Separately and in concert, they have produced a large body of work on how air crews interact and communicate. Helmreich, who is involved in a NASA-sponsored longitudinal study evaluating CRM, was concerned with attitudinal change as a primary goal of CRM and has probably 46 produced the most extensive body of CRM literature. He acknowledged that airlines hire pilots based on (1) technical skills and (2) a predetermined personality profile. This can result in the stereotypical macho pilot with whom we are familiar. Helmreich distinguished between pilot personalities, which he termed "...relatively enduring characteristics of the individual that are acquired during development and are resistant to change," and attitudes, which he defined as "...less deeply internalized components of the self and are subject to change through a variety of techniques" (Helmreich, 1984, p. 583). He went on to assert that personality characteristics are difficult if not impossible to alter, noting that even extended psychotherapy is successful in affecting change in only a small number of cases. Given the personality characteristics for which airlines hire, Helmreich believed that the only avenue to explore was changing attitudes, which then, it was hoped, would produce behavioral changes in the working environment. In his article, "Cockpit Management Attitudes" (Human Factors, 1984), he wrote: (A)ttitudes...are less deeply internalized components of the self and are subject to change through a variety of techniques that have been explored and refined by social psychologists, politicians, salesmen and managers. It follows, therefore, that if attitudes are major determinants of cockpit behavior, effective training programs should bring about significant improvements in resource management. 47 Early CRM literature focuses on explaining and justifying the need for instituting CRM-type training programs. In Billings and Cheaney's (eds.) 1981 work, "Information Transfer Problems in the Aviation System," seven studies of information transfer problems were compiled. In 1976, NASA implemented the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), through which pilots and other aviation employees could submit anonymous reports. In its first five years, ASRS gathered more than 28,000 reports, over 70% of which related to information transfer problems. With respect to the growing awareness of the need for CRM, the editors discovered that a lack of information was not generally the core problem with information transfer. "Instead, the most common findings showed that information was not transferred because (1) the person who had the information did not think it necessary to transfer it or (2) that the information was transferred, but inaccurately" (Billings & Cheaney, p. 2). One of the seven studies included by Billings and Cheaney, "Information Transfer Within the Cockpit: Problems in Intracockpit Communications," co-authored by H. Clayton Foushee and Karen Manos, furthered the case for improved communication among cockpit crew members with their identification of a strong cockpit communication-performance link. This work analyzed the cockpit communications from the simulations in the Ruffell Smith study. "Overall, there was a tendency for crews who did not perform as well to 48 communicate less, suggesting that as eXpected, poor crew coordination tends to result in more marginal performance" (Foushee and Manos, 1981, p. 66). Helmreich continued with his attitude-behavior linkage in 1984 when he concluded, based on the administration of Cockpit Management Attitudes surveys to 245 line pilots, that "(T)he divergence of attitudes about cockpit management indicates that there are many experienced pilots who are unaware or unconvinced of many of the findings regarding effective flight-deck management" (Helmreich, 1984, p. 588). He went on to suggest, echoing Ruffell Smith, that the most persuasive means of altering attitudes and subsequently, behavior, "...should probably include factual presentations on the body of empirical data now available, moderated group discussions, and behavioral exercises, including use of full-mission flight simulations designed to present problems requiring close coordination" (Helmreich, 1984, p. 589). Realism has emerged as a central component in the development of CRM training programs. Helmreich and Foushee continued work on the attitude- behavior link, and in 1986 authored "Cockpit Management Attitudes.” In it they identified and described the attitudes that differentiate the superior or effective pilot from those rated as below average or ineffective. They further asserted that while the overall effectiveness of existing CRM programs had yet to be evaluated, the demonstrated link between attitude and behavior and the fact 49 that "...training programs can effect changes in attitudes ...support belief in the utility of cockpit resource management training" (Heimreich, Foushee, et al, 1986, p. 1200). In 1990, Helmreich, Wilhelm, Gregorich, and Chidester reported on the first longitudinal research designed to evaluate the effects of CRM programs on flight crew behavior. "The initial findings showing that CRM training and LOFT (Line Oriented Flight Training) increase the incidence of excellent performance is...consistent with results obtained for modifying crew member attitudes" (Helmreich, et al, 1990, p. 579). In 1982, Foushee discussed how various crew member orientations -- goal vs. group -- affect performance, writing "(M)any incidents and accidents suggest that, under some circumstances, an ineffective group orientation and inadequate communications, coupled with the obvious role structure of the flight deck, are contributory factors" (Foushee, 1982, p. 1063). Foushee also discussed the problem of intimidation of subordinate crewmembers, who often have become conditioned to not speaking up or questioning captains in potentially dangerous situations. In 1984, Foushee again asserted that crew member intimidation had a strong negative effect on safe aircraft operation and suggested this problem could be assuaged by "...the development of a strong group norm of shared responsibility..." (Foushee, 1984, p. 888). He supported Lu—l .110 l) 50 the notion brought forth by Helmreich, that behavioral change can be brought about by attitude change, albeit not easily or quickly, considering the personality character- istics of most airline pilots, which mitigate against functioning as members of a team. While extensive literature about the problems associated with poor communication/crew coordination in the cockpit exists, little focused on specific parts of CRM, communication in particular. A great deal has been written about the need for improving communication, but the literature lacks a sense of how CRM programs set out to accomplish that goal. Similarly, while there is consensus in defining acceptable or desirable attitudes with respect to cockpit communication and interaction, there is a similar paucity of literature demonstrating how those attitudes may best be instilled through actual CRM program process or content. Another area with a paucity of information is CRM program evaluation. The 1986 NASA conference on CRM had two working groups (Working Groups IV-A and IV-B) that generated reports titled "The Effectiveness of CRM Training." Group IV-A focused its report on defining CRM and the knowledge and skills contained within it, and judged CRM effective despite an admitted lack of detailed information. The group cited the fact that CRM had what it termed "face validity" because CRM programs "reflect sound operating principles and focused on areas of known weaknesses as supported by 51 accident/incident data." It went on to state that the skills CRM targeted are those used in program in other disciplines, i.e., business management and "anecdotal evidence by pilots, training management, check airmen and others in the training community are generally positive with respect to the need for and effectiveness of CRM programs" (p. 231). Working Group IV-A was strongly negative regarding any type of formal CRM evaluation program because of perceived (anticipated) rejection of CRM as a discipline by pilots because CRM had not yet been fully accepted within the industry. Formal evaluation of CRM was considered to be synonymous with formal evaluation of pilots' CRM skills. This group felt a strong need to evaluate an organization's CRM program, but at the same time emphasized the need to maintain crew member confidentiality, and went on to recommend that a neutral organization perform such an evaluation and develop a database for participants. Working Group IV-B reported favorably on CRM, citing an "...intuitive feeling that CRM training may be effective..." in the absence of hard data. This group, too, recommended "a formal scientific evaluation" that would identify and assess specific CRM program objectives. Like Working Group IV-A, IV-B resoundingly rejected implementing checks of pilots with respect to CRM skills, citing the same concerns about reliable skill measurement techniques and the potential for CRM as a discipline to be 52 wholly rejected by pilots as a result. Group IV-B, too, suggested evaluation by a neutral organization, in this case, NASA. A 1992 work, Creg Resource Manegement: An Introductory Henfibggk, produced under contract for the FAA, devoted only three pages to CRM training evaluation. It suggested a variety of evaluative measures, based on a model in use at the Naval Training Systems Center, including pre-training assessment, trainee reaction, learning (tests), performance (based on observations), and organizational outcome (overall accident data). It has been said that a crew can manage an absence of secure command authority if the rest of the crew is assertive, or in the absence of crew assertiveness if there is sufficient secure command authority, but that a lack of secure command authority, combined with a lack of crew assertiveness is a recipe for an unsafe operation, if not disaster. Hindsight, long acknowledged to be 20/20, has determined that poor crew coordination -- lack of command authority combined with lack of crew member assertiveness -- cost literally hundreds of lives, including pilots'. CRM aims to improve the human system by effective utilization of all available resources --hardware, software and what NTSB Member John Lauber termed "liveware." The literature confirms the need for improved crew coordination and communication. Interestingly, the Federal Aviation Administration, which is responsible for promoting 53 and regulating commercial and general aviation, as of 1992 had yet to impose standards and/or guidelines for CRM programs. In fact, only in that year did the FAA begin to address this deficiency. The need for CRM programs has been ably demonstrated, through compelling accident statistics, accident investigations, and independent research by experts such as Helmreich and Foushee. Airlines are corporate entities that need to protect their operating profits by protecting their image as conservative and safe organizations. In doing so, they have historically relied heavily on the results of accident investigations to prevent future ones by changing operating procedures, maintenance schedules, and/or training programs in response to NTSB recommendations (which have no force of law) and FAA mandated requirements. In light of past initiatives, that airlines would voluntarily initiate CRM training programs, integrate CRM principles into their overall training programs and even share knowledge with competing carriers, without being compelled to do so, is unsurprising. The need for and initial acceptance of CRM programs firmly established throughout the industry, individual airlines set out to create programs. With little to guide them, carriers constructed their own programs based on their corporate needs, perceptions, and cultures. The airline at which this study was conducted was no exception. 54 3° ow d e e Stud was C ucted: Wm Methgds The purpose of this study is to examine what actually goes on in an airline pilot instructor training program with respect to CRM principles. It will look at how the airline, which employs several thousand pilots, approached and integrated CRM principles into its original program for all pilots, as well as its old and new training programs for instructor pilots and check airmen. This study will look at the original CRM program, one of the last "old" training programs, and one of the first "new" programs. Figure 2 shows a breakdown of topics for each of the three classes observed. The primary question is RQl: is s 'o sensible term 9f rhetgrig fer theee individgels? RQl is comprised of three subordinate questions, including (1) what is persuasive with these individuals (line and/or instructor pilots): (2) what do course facilitators think students are thinking; and (3) what approaches do course facilitators use to establish credibility with students? Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Day 1: Day 2: Day 3: Day 1: 55 PHASE 1 CRM SYLLABUS: Why we need training in Crew Resource Management Resources available to pilot to fly safely Performance/Motivation Curve Components of Effective Aircrew Coordination Levels of Assertiveness/Communication Communication Skills (Barriers to Understanding) Aerostar Airlines Culture Accident Prevention Review of CRM Concepts INSTRUCTOR QUALIFICATION COURSE SYLLABUS .Welcome/Course Overview/Introductions .Aerostar Flight Procedures 8 Training .General Principles of Teaching/Learning .Aerostar Training Standards & Grading Criteria .The Airline Operations Specifications .Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) .Windshear .Advanced Simulation Training .Special Subjects (TCAS, Rejected Take-Off) .Fleet Training Captain Discussion .Tolerances in Pilot Performance .Crew Resource Management .Instructor Qualification Requirements .Exam and Course Critique .Roundtable Discussion INSTRUCTOR SEMINAR 1993 .Introduction & Overview of 1993 Recurrent Training .Administering 1993 Recurrent Training .Dealing with Non-Standard Operations & Behavior 56 .Cultural Factors .Sexual Harassment Day 2: .Overview of the Day .Evaluating Technical & Human Factors Skills in a LOFT .Briefing & Debriefing Day 3: .Overview of the Day .LOFT Facilitation Practice .Roundtable Discussion Figure 2 Course Syllabi 57 Answering RQ1 and its component subordinate questions required the following data: interviews with individual facilitators, managers, and class participants to obtain a sense of what is persuasive with pilots from the perspective of all parties mentioned. A review of the course syllabus demonstrated how the airline implements and manifests its view of what is a sensible, persuasive form of rhetoric for training a group of experienced instructor pilots the airline anticipates will carry the message to the rest of the pilot group. Further data, in the form of field notes and audio tapes of classroom activities provided detail on what actually happens when the course outline and materials are put into play with actual students in a classroom setting. These data also document how students and facilitators interact and communicate with each other (facilitator-to—student and student-to-student). RQ2 asks: a 's i e a' l' e n t u ? In this question, I intended to identify the airline’s general CRM training objectives (old vs. new) as well as the specifics of what is contained in the CRM portion of the instructor seminar curriculum. Data gathered to answer this question included interviews with managers and course facilitators, course syllabus, field notes, and information about the history of the CRM program at the subject airline. Data collection also included taped interviews with managers and facilitators, gathering course materials (syllabus and 58 handouts), and researcher observation of classroom activities, supplemented by field notes and audio tapes of class sessions. While CRM principles were not the sole component in either instructor training program (old vs. new), they played a far greater role in the new instructor program. Thus it was useful to explore RQ3: How are C r' c' es integrered into rhe overall instructor training prggrem? In responding to RQ3, it was necessary to ask and answer a two-part subordinate question: (1) what are the course activities; and (2) why are particular instructional techniques used? The answers were obtained via interviews with course facilitators, reviewing course materials, and field notes of classroom observation. Data collection activities included audio taping of discussions with facilitators and course developers, audio tapes and field notes of classroom proceedings, and review and analysis of the course syllabus and materials. The final question, RQ4, asked Wher_ie_the_eyerell_rele O- {a 3,-.-1’ _.l -zjno 9.00 -_1- __-r _1_ - 0- 9,9 7 Originally it sought to determine the subsequent effeer of CRM training, but access to instructor pilots while working in full mission simulators training other pilots was impossible to obtain, so the question was rephrased to focus on the overall role only. Subordinate questions included (1) identifying the relationship between what happened in the course (CRM-wise) 59 and the stated or implicit objectives of the course, and (2) whether or not that relationship was negotiated or socially constructed. Answering RQ4 required data from field notes and audio tapes of class sessions, as well as interviews with instructors, managers, and class participants. Data collection involved observation and taping of actual classroom activities, writing notes from classroom sessions, and notes/tapes from interviews with program participants. It will emerge that there were multiple agendas working throughout each class session, often at cross purposes. Those agendas -- airline, facilitator and participant -- will be identified and briefly discussed at the each of Chapters II, II, and IV, as well as in Chapter V’s summary. The three chapters (II, III, and IV) will show that with the exception of the airline, via its facilitators, nobody got what they really wanted from the classes. The airline appeared to believe it got buy—in to its agenda, when in fact, all it likely got was what the participants thought management wanted to hear. Setting Access to the subject airline's (which, for the purpose of this dissertation will be called Aerostar Airlines) one- day CRM seminar came with the issuance of an unsolicited, surprise invitation to attend as a seminar participant in response to an earlier gatekeeping inquiry. The training 60 facility that presented the CRM seminar is a subsidiary of the Aerostar’s holding company, and resides in its own, modern structure near the airline's world headquarters, about ten minutes from a major U. S. airport. The Aerostar’s training arm is dedicated to pilot training, and while its parent company is its primary customer, it also sells simulator time and classroom training (including CRM) to various customers, in particular the U.S. Air Force. The training building and facilities are impressive, housed in a relatively new, three-story structure; flight attendants are trained at another site. The third floor of this three-story edifice houses executive suites, managers' offices, and staff cubicles, while the second floor contains classrooms, a media center, computer lab, cafeteria and other general resources. The second floor classrooms are contain nearly every sort of multi-media equipment imaginable. Media center VCRs, set out in clover-leaf clusters, allow pilots to view videotapes. In the computer lab, rows of PCs allow for individualized computer-based training and testing. Also housed in the facility is a variety of individual rooms, each of which is limited to training for specific emergency functions, such as firefighting and escaping through exits. The "exit room" for example, contains functioning mock-ups of door and window exits -- complete with seats to climb over and around -- for every type of airplane the airline flies. Pilots practice using those 61 exits in emergencies. Another room, dedicated to fighting fires, contains various firefighting gear, such as smoke hoods and fire extinguishers, and even comes complete with a functioning barbecue on which pilots can practice extinguishing actual fires. The first floor and sub-basement house cockpit procedures trainers (CPTs), briefing rooms, and simulators for each of the equipment types the company flies. CPTs are cockpit "cutaways" that have functioning gauges, switches and seats that duplicate real cockpits. Again, there’s a CPT for each equipment type. Pilots are taught specific operational procedures in CPTs because CPTs are less expensive to operate than full mission simulators. Full-mission simulators are operational and used 24- hours per day, seven days per week, 363 days per year. When pilots train or have check rides in simulators, sessions are broken into two 2-hour periods, with a briefing in between. Briefing rooms contain operational manuals for the particular airplane type, as well as blackboards for instructor/pilot discussion. Each simulator can exactly duplicate a flight -- sights, sounds, sensations, alarms, instrumentation, weather -- everything. Today’s simulators are so precise that pilots do 100% of their training on them, often flying passengers the first time s/he flies an actual airplane! Simulators can be programmed to generate any problem or emergency situation imaginable. Often, simulator check-ride and training scenarios exactly 62 replicate earlier accidents. Check airmen or instructors, using a control panel located behind the pilots’ seats, orchestrate the session, evaluating pilot performance. When "flying" a simulator, it’s virtually impossible -— at least for the lay person -- to discern any differences from an actual airplane, with the possible exception of the daytime visual array, which looks more like a computer video game than anything else. Night-time visuals, on the other hand, are eerily real. r m 's o The CRM manager at Aerostar Training is Pete Morgan, a 20-year Marine Corps veteran and one-time high school history teacher. A short, round, man with apple-red cheeks, he exudes enthusiasm for his program. His Marine Corps background included being a "back-seater" on an F-4 fighter jet, a squadron safety officer and director of various base family assistance programs. Contrary to the Marine Corps’ warrior image, Morgan is, in a word, a nurturer, and was extremely open about his program, including its goals, and its history. A day before the seminar was spent getting a feel for the place, the facilities, the climate, people, program, and naturally, Morgan himself. He has been at the training facility for a little over two years, starting out as a DC-9 ground instructor. From him I learned that at Aerostar, the "C" in CRM stands for CREW resource management rather than 63 COCKPIT, as is the case at most other carriers. Aerostar’s CRM program began as the result of a grass-roots movement by the pilot group. This sets Aerostar apart from other carriers, and it is a point that is made in each CRM class. Originated in late 1989/early 1990, the CRM program was initially managed by a line pilot with the assistance of two ground systems instructors. (A line pilot is one who flies a regular monthly schedule, which is called a "line of time.") The pilot group pushed management to institute CRM, and, sold on the safety-enhancing properties of the program, management agreed. The original program was taught by a corps of 25 pilots, some of whom were instructors. Aware they couldn’t put the program together on their own, they hired an aviation psychologist as program consultant, put themselves through Training the Trainer programs, and generally prepared themselves for the undertaking. In May 1990, instructors and check airmen (pilots who certify other pilots’ proficiency) were the first to go through CRM. The feeling was that the pilot training corps was the optimal group to provide reinforcement for long-term survival of CRM training benefits. The initial CRM program ran from May 1990 through October 1990, when it was cut back. Fuel costs, skyrocketing because of the developing situation in Iraq, drove operating expenses over the red line, forcing the V.P. of Operations to put CRM on hold. December 1990 brought a fatal accident on the ground. Another CRM- 64 preventable accident -- and the catalyst that breathed life back into the dormant CRM program. In January 1991, Pete Morgan and his assistant, Dana Hiller, were recruited to help the two ground instructors. The CRM manager at the time was a line captain, assisted by the original 25 line pilots, who rotated duty as CRM facilitators in teams of four. Morgan described the transition from the original captain managing the program to Morgan’s managing it as "very smooth." Morgan and Hiller designed the curriculum in use today, using the program Aerostar’s consultant developed at another U.S. airline as their prototype. Initially, Morgan was not allowed to teach CRM, because management believed the old canard that pilots won’t accept instruction from anyone but another pilot. While Dana Hiller is a pilot, Pete Morgan is not, but because he loves teaching and had designed the program, Morgan finally prevailed and taught the whole CRM program, experiencing no apparent problems with pilot acceptance of his role. The CRM program began in earnest in January 1991. By March 1992, with the exception of what Morgan termed a "few stragglers" (long-term sick, etc.), all 5,000+ company pilots had been through the eight-hour course. To communicate the airline’s commitment to CRM, all pilots were brought into the training facility, at considerable expense, considering the airline’s extensive international network, which includes overseas pilot domiciles. Aerostar’s concern 65 about having pilots take the program seriously outweighed economic anxieties. C va ' n Effectiveness Morgan opined that 85%-90% of participants "really embrace" the course, basing this figure on the critique sheets each participant completes. His confidence also stemmed from the fact that after three or four months of classes, pilots were entering the course with high enthusiasm levels because of what they had heard out on the line from past course participants. The remaining 10%, Morgan said, become what Robert Helmreich of the University of Texas (Austin) terms "boomerangs," those pilots who, in rejecting CRM principles, become even worse than they were prior to the course. Initially, classes were given six days per week, three weeks each month, with the fourth week reserved for bidding the next month’s schedules. Morgan estimated that 400-425 pilots were trained during each month’s 18 training days. While enthusiastic about the CRM program in place at the time, Morgan admitted it had some weaknesses. First was the absence of follow-up training and what is called LOFT (Line-Oriented Flight Training, which stresses full-mission crew interaction in a simulator), due to lack of funding. The next planned phase of CRM was part of the airline’s plan for single visit training or SVT. What Morgan terms "third generation" CRM or "fade-away" training will have CRM 66 integrated into every phase of pilot training rather than handled separately. He saw upgrade (seat/equipment) training as the natural vehicle for renewal of CRM principles/lessons. The other admitted and probably most significant weakness we discussed was the absence of criteria for determining and/or measuring the program’s success or failure over time. There is no mechanism, beyond the already-utilized critique sheet or outside researchers’ before/after questionnaires, with which to find out if the CRM program’s lessons took. One evaluative mechanism that exists for instructors uses what the airline calls "behavioral markers," and employs a document titled "Instructor Check Airman Training," developed by NASA and Dr. Robert Helmreich of the University of Texas at Austin. These markers ask check airmen to rate a lengthy list of demonstrated behaviors and/or attitudes on the part of the pilots being trained. Some of the markers include "inquiry/ assertion/advocacy," and "communications/decisions." By definition, evaluations are subjective. While subjectivity in and of itself is not inherently negative, there are some extenuating circumstances -- notably a merger -- at the subject airline that demand a higher level of vigilance than might apply at other carriers. During the 1980s, the subject airline merged with a smaller carrier, which itself was already a merged carrier. Top concerns 67 with any airline merger are seniority and corporate culture. The day a pilot is hired, he/she is assigned a seniority number. Because pilot schedules, cockpit position (captain, first officer/second officer), equipment types and, therefore, salaries are wholly determined by seniority number, a merger guarantees disruption of the established seniority order. The two seniority lists had to be merged in a fashion that was acceptable to both pilot union groups. In all probabilities, senior pilots on both carriers lost a portion of their high seniority; some captains likely had to downgrade to first officer, thereby displacing first officers, who displaced second officers and so on. All of this affects schedule bidding priority in addition to seat/equipment and salary. Morgan and I discussed still-existing hostilities at length. There were three distinct groups: original company pilots are called "red book" pilots, pilots from the airline taken over are called "yellow book" pilots, and pilots hired since the merger are called "orange book" pilots. The term "book" stems from the carrier’s predominant corporate color (red for the original carrier, yellow for the taken over carrier, or orange for the merged airline) as shown on their training manuals or "books." To further fuel the fire were the profound differences in corporate cultures. The red book company reportedly had a long history of antagonistic labor/management ‘C. ‘ a 5’s. 68 relationships. In contrast, the yellow book airline’s pilot group had a warm, respectful relationship with its management, which solicited and considered pilot input. At the parent airline, such participation was discouraged and discounted. So, in addition to seniority issues came the inevitable clash of corporate cultures. With that in mind, it seems logical to exercise caution when training check airmen, alerting them to the potential for basing subjective judgements about a pilot’s performance on his/her book status rather than on actual performance. The airline’s CRM program addressed this head-on. At the end of the session, it provided pilots with the opportunity to vent their feelings. Venting only was allowed; debating specific issues was not permitted. Crew Resonrce Management: Airline Pilets as Stndents The CRM course syllabus carefully scripted virtually everything said and done during the day. Other than supervising various discussion periods and exercises, facilitators were not given much improvisational latitude. Morgan spent a lot of time discussing pilot personality profiles, careful not to be too rigid about the characteristics. He gave students the option of accepting or rejecting the list, and filled out the list of pilot personality characteristics discussed above. Pilots, he told the group: 69 -are linear thinkers; -are physically/mentally healthy: -are self-sufficient; -need to be in control; -have high need for achievement; -prefer short-range goals to long-range goals; -are more concerned about modifying the environment than changing their own behavior; -have low tolerance for personal imperfections (self & others); -need excitement (dislike 9 to 5 routine); -don’t handle failure well; -ignore and avoid inner feelings; -avoid introspection; -are cautious about close relationships; -avoid revealing true feelings; -frequently use humor to cope with anxiety; -rank high on intelligence tests but are not intellectually-oriented; don’t enjoy traditional intellectual pursuits; -are practical people who deal in the concrete, and are highly analytical. Traits such as competitiveness, linear thinking, being practical, and dealing in the concrete are necessary strengths when considering the technical skills flying airplanes requires. But when it comes to human relationships or interpersonal skills, said Morgan, "It’s very detrimental." These characteristics make teaching CRM challenging; they do not lend themselves well to acceptance of the team building concepts CRM stresses. This is what facilitators at every airline in America face when teaching CRM classes, which makes the tightly structured, carefully calculated CRM course design not only critical but sensible. Painstakingly scripted, the program acknowledged and used pilots' analytical skills and their need to control their environments. At the outset, the program reinforced much of what is sacred to pilots, i.e., the captain's final 70 authority, and the need to be treated with respect as a person and as a pilot. It was not trying to take away from pilots’ views of themselves and their profession, but rather sought to augment them, playing to pilot concerns about performing well under pressure and remaining in control. In the case of the baseline CRM program, which is detailed in Chapter II, the students were all of the subject airline’s pilot group, some 5,000 strong. As mentioned, Aerostar brought all pilots to its headquarters for the day- long program. Students attended the CRM course because they were required to do so. With respect to the two programs for instructors, the first course, in November 1992 (detailed in Chapter III), was called "Instructor Qualification Training Course," and consisted of eight pilots. Included among the students were several current instructors from a variety of equipment types, who were slated to become instructors on a new airplane, a DC-9 training captain, and an in-house FAA representative. With the exception of the latter two, who were merely observing, course participants were there because attendance was mandatory for becoming an instructor on the new airplane. For the second training session (January 1993 and detailed in Chapter IV), entitled "Instructor Training 1993," the group was substantially larger; about 25 .instructor pilots from across the equipment spectrum tittended. Some had been instructing for many years, while 71 others had only two or three years’ instructing experience. All were attending as part of a sequence of instructor training seminars that were required of all Aerostar instructors. This particular CRM course attempted to convince pilots that it is not just O.K. to speak up but absolutely crirical that they do so. The evidence they presented -- audio tapes of actual accidents, NASA study data about cockpit communication patterns, and in-house simulations -- was compelling. We will have to wait and see what happens to accident statistics over the long term. CHAPTER II CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING PHASE 1: ESTABLISHING A CRM BASELINE ' Sc 0 s Arriving at Aerostar’s training arm for the first time in August 1992, I was greeted by an impressive, modern, three-story sandstone-colored building, whose entrance was flanked by rows of trees and round, low-growing evergreen shrubs. Outside the doors were 2 1/2 to 3 foot high clay flower pots overflowing that sunny morning with red geraniums and dark purple pansies. After parking at the front of the building, I entered its spacious lobby, whose expanse of gray ceramic tile floor was broken up only by the occasional tan tile. Once inside, I noted an airline scheduling desk to the left of the main doors and the visitor desk, with a sign that identified it as Customer Support, to the right, with employee cubicles beyond it. Scattered around the lobby were seating areas, airplane models (including an early company Electra) in glass cases, and various-sized potted plants. Visitors -- anyone who is not a company employee -- sign in at the security desk and are given identification jbedges to wear while on site. After signing in and asking for Pete Morgan, I waited for him to escort me into the facility. A long-time defense industry employee and teacher of’fear of flying seminars at an east coast airport, I was accustomed to closed facilities, wearing I.D. badges, and 72 73 needing escorts in certain areas, so I was surprised that after my initial meeting with Morgan, I only needed to sign in and out of the building. Other than that, I was free to move about as I chose, although I became aware as I explored, that the facility has card reader devices strategically placed throughout. Evidently the ID badges trip the card readers, enabling the security system to track the movements of badge-wearers. Perhaps I was not as free to move about as I thought. Beyond the lobby doors, I noted a company mission statement on the wall. As I explored the building, I saw that there were various motivational posters scattered throughout, each asking employees to participate in the company’s program to encourage cost-cutting. Further, the corporate Mission Statement was prominently displayed for everyone to see, and presumptively, integrate. In the lobby, was a large sign, employing Aerostar’s corporate colors, with just four words placed on it -- WINNING with the word together placed over it, and BUILDING with the word together over it. It appeared that the pilots who were on site for ‘training were dressed informally. Training center employees were relatively easy to distinguish, as men wore either shirts with ties or jackets with ties, while the women seemed dressed eclectically regardless of role (and, in cxrder to dispel any hint of sexism on my part, given the *very small percentage of women pilots at Aerostar -- or any 74 other large carrier --it was pretty much assumed that the women on site were n9; pilots). In fact, each day I rode the hotel bus to the facility, I was quizzed by the pilots going there to train about who I was and why I was there. The daily assumption was I was not a pilot. My sense of overall employee moral was positive. People I observed, as well as those with whom I met and interacted, were cheerful, smiling, apparently enthusiastic, and very cooperative. I overheard more than a little gentle teasing and light-hearted joking among co-workers. The CRM class was scheduled for a Tuesday, so I arrived at the training center on Monday morning, in order to get acquainted with Pete Morgan and any other facilitators who might be available, as well as to tour the training facility to get a feel for the organization as a whole. When Morgan greeted me, I had to admit to myself that I was surprised. The man in person was at odds with the voice on the telephone. From our preliminary conversations, I knew Morgan was an ex-Marine Corps officer, who flew "back seat" on F-4s (meaning he was not a pilot but performed other functions, i.e., radar or weapons officer), and had begun his training tenure at Aerostar as a DC-9 ground instructor. I was unprepared for the person I met, assuming, from my own experience with ex-Marines, that Morgan would typify the Corps’ familiar warrior image. To the contrary, Morgan was a compact, even round man ‘flith apple-red cheeks, who exuded enthusiasm for the airline 75 and for the CRM program he’d helped design. He was, in fact, the warrior’s antithesis, a 100% dedicated, warm, unapologetic nurturer. When I made my initial contact at Aerostar, hoping only to gain access to it as a potential fieldwork site, my name was passed along to Morgan, who unexpectedly invited me to attend the CRM class as a participant. This would enable me to establish my own CRM knowledge baseline, to meet the facilitators who taught CRM to every Aerostar line pilot, and to obtain a platform from which I could move into other CRM training venues for data collection. Morgan and I sat in his glass-walled manager’s office and talked about his background and the history of Aerostar’s CRM program. Displayed prominently in his office, amid family photographs and various aviation-type decorations, was another copy of Aerostar’s Mission Statement. What, I wondered aloud, qualified him (a non- pilot) to develop and teach CRM? Morgan related his qualifications for the task he’d accepted via an interesting vignette about his years as an F-4 "backseater." Little did I know at that point that Morgan's favorite instruct- ional technique was story-telling. But, in our conversation and in class, it became obvious. And, as I moved through interviews and subsequent class sessions, I saw how critical story-telling is in the pilot training environment. Pilots appear to be most persuaded by materials and information that they perceive as reelisrie. What, then, could be more 76 reel than sharing actual flying experiences with one another? Relegated to the back seat position because of poor eyesight, Morgan told of flying in an airplane that did not have dual controls, and explained that should the F-4 pilot become disabled, the back seater’s only option was to eject. Lacking visual cues, the pilot and back seater’s only link was the airplane’s intercom, which demands effective communication, teamwork, and mutual trust. Thus, Morgan concluded, people with his type and level of experience are among "the best people for CRM." Morgan’s later Marine Corps experience included completing aviation safety officer training in Monterey, California, earning an M.A. in Education, and ultimately becoming his squadron’s safety officer. After retiring from the Marines, Morgan briefly taught high school social studies before being hired by Aerostar as a DC-9 ground school instructor. After we talked about Morgan’s background and the history of the CRM program at the airline, we toured the facility. With obvious pride, he walked me through various areas, including the fire fighting room, and the media center. Morgan left me at the media center to view some videotapes he thought I might find interesting. The most noteworthy was put out by SimuFlite and titled "The Legends." Morgan suggested this tape because it featured a segment on Dr. Jerry Berlin, the aviation psychologist Morgan regarded as his mentor. These two tapes helped me 77 understand more about the pilot persona as it is perceived by the CRM course developers at Aerostar, and see how and why the CRM program was structured and presented the way it was. The first part of the tape was a presentation titled "The Pilot and His Coper" by Capt. Frank Dully, M.D., a Navy flight surgeon. Dr. Dully’s presentation provided interesting insights into the pilot personality profile. He stated that there are three components to what he termed an "intact coper:" being in control, calculated emotional distance, and the ability to compartmentalize. He described pilots as adventurous and competitive -- people who enjoy difficult tasks. More negatively, Dully stated that "occupationally-based copers fall on their faces at home." When confronted with emotions, a controller "will eject." The "coper," he asserted, keeps these people out of the realm of personal spontaneity. The better the pilot, the poorer the spouse. He went on to state that pilots tend to destroy their first marriages, and by the age of 40, finally begin to lose the need to be in control at all times. This theme, professional success coupled with domestic failure, was sounded in each class I attended. Continuing, Dully described "the failing aviator," using a checklist of seven characteristics that constitute "typical" responses to a failing marriage, and which are characterized by bitterness and put-downs at home. The seven are 2 78 (1) cigarettes (begin to smoke/smoke more); (2) booze (as anesthesia, "because"); (3) a new automobile (to look "cool"); (4) injuries; (5) pastimes considered "macho," i.e. hang-gliding; (6) sexual promiscuity; (7) using the airplane as a personality extension. When a pilot operates an airplane within the parameters of this list, Dully promised, "He will break it." From Dully’s presentation, I moved to one by Jerry Berlin. Since I had spoken to Dr. Berlin more than once, but had never met him, I wanted to get a look at him and hear what he had to say. His talk was titled "Recent Developments in Pilot Judgement." In it he discussed the phenomenon he called "sudden loss of judgement" or "SLOJ," a syndrome present in some recent airplane accidents. Berlin talked about the accommodation syndrome, in which he presented a performance/pressure curve that illustrates those points at which pilots are performing well, and the point at which there is a serious "declination in pilot behavior." When pressure on pilots is low, performance is concomitantly low; as pressures increase, so does performance. But, once pressures reach a certain level, there is a radical drop-off in pilot performance, which creates an unsafe situation. I encountered this curve again during both the basic one-day CRM program, and the November 1992 Instructor Seminar; it has become a staple in 79 Aerostar’s CRM curriculum. Further, Berlin asserted that when pilot self-concept is high, h/she is more ready to admit making a mistake, divert, or take a delay. P ° e r’s On -Da ro am When class began Tuesday, I had the sense of being a leg up on the other participants, since I had the opportunity to talk at length with Pete Morgan, meet the other facilitators, Dana Hiller and Reg Pierce, and get a sense of them and the program. As was true with each class I attended, this one began precisely on time. There were twenty-two participants and three facilitators. Nineteen participants were male and three were female. We ranged widely in age and professional background; only two participants were Aerostar pilots. Rounding out the class were several USAF pilots, three or four undergraduate and graduate students, and a number of state aviation department officials. Most, but not all were pilots, so the fact that I was not a pilot was not a handicap. As it turned out, this was the last of the one-day CRM seminars; all of Aerostar’s line, instructor and check airman pilots had been through the program. This session was geared toward what Morgan described as "stragglers," a few pilots who had been out on long-term sick leave, and who needed training. Once this seminar was finished, the company would begin moving CRM training into the planned Single Visit Training (SVT) program, where, rather than 80 being a stand-alone class, CRM principles would gradually be integrated into all training components. It would become what Morgan termed "fade-away" training, and be one of the threads woven into the fabric of all pilot training programs. Were one to identify a single overarching theme in this class, it would have to be improving communication between and among flight crew members. With one notable exception, the omission of most of the culture module, this program was identical to the ones already given (See Figure 3). The guts of the "culture" module were left out, according to Morgan, because the vast majority of the class members were not company employees, and he decided not to air corporate dirty laundry among so many outsiders. The culture module dealt with sensitive issues such as residual resentments about the years-earlier merger. In it, participants were free to ventilate about red book-yellow book-orange book issues, military vs. civilian background issues, male/female pilot issues, etc. et ' a e Class began when Morgan played a videotape clip from the movie "Top Gun," and grabbed everyone’s attention with a particularly compelling flight scene, a mock dog fight. Morgan allowed the clip to play for several minutes, stopping it at the climactic moment. With everyone’s full attention shifted to him, Morgan led off by stating: 81 "Unfortunately, we don’t always get a second chance, especially when it comes to aviation safety." Morgan employed videotapes liberally, not only throughout the class, but during each break. Tapes included one showing aircraft carrier operations, an Abbott and Costello classic called, "Who’s on First?," and another featuring Carol Burnett. Each break found a few participants clustered around the screen, leaning against the wall, coffee cups in hand. PHASE 1 CRM SYLLABUS Topic 1.1 Why we need training in Crew Resource Management Topic 1.2 Resources available to pilot to fly safely Topic 1.3 Performance/Motivation Curve Topic 1.4 Components of Effective Aircrew Coordination Topic 1.5 Levels of Assertiveness/Communication Topic 1.6 Communication Skills (Barriers to Understanding) Topic 1.7 Aerostar Airlines Culture Topic 1.8 Accident Prevention Topic 1.9 Review of CRM Concepts Figure 3 Phase 1 CRM Syllabus 82 Eyes and minds sharply focused on him, Morgan welcomed us to the class, and introduced himself by talking about his Marine Corps experience in F-4s and as a squadron safety officer, cracking a USMC joke, and then discussing his experience with Aerostar: Did you hear the Marine Corps library burned down? It was very tragic. Both books were destroyed and one of them hadn’t even been colored yet. Morgan provided more of his personal history, telling the group where "Top Gun" was filmed, then relating the following personal story about how it felt to investigate an airplane crash: (T)he first accident I ever investigated occurred in this R2301 area. We were on deployment from, my squadron’s based in Hawaii, we were on deployment to Yuma and one of our F-4s on a training mission ruptured a fuel line, the airplane caught on fire and crashed to the desert floor below. You know, as aviators, we all get this very warm feeling inside whenever we see an airplane in flight. It really doesn’t matter what type airplane it is, there’s just kind of an inexplicable warm feeling that we get. Well, for those of you who have experienced it, there’s also a totally opposite, very sick feeling we get inside if we’re at the scene of an aircraft crash, particularly if it would involve any fatalities. There’s just something about that bent metal there that gives you a very sick feeling. Fortunately, in this case, though, both crew members did eject, and that’s the good part of the story. In fact, a good CRM lesson came out of it. As you can see, this is desert, desert country all around and there’s no water anywhere near that and we got to the scene of the accident and we noticed that both of the crew members who had ejected safely had deployed their life raft. And we just couldn’t understand that, why in the middle of the desert, they would deploy their life raft. So, we go to the pilot first and we said, ’Why in the world did you deploy your life raft out here?’ And he says, ’Well, I’d never ejected before and I knew my backseater had ejected one other time,’ and so he says, you know, ’I get a good chute and I'm sailing down on my chute and I look over and I 83 see my backseater who had ejected before has his life raft out, so I figured I was doing something wrong, so I pulled my handle and deployed my life raft, too.’ Well, we’re going to learn today that it’s not always a good idea to assume that your fellow crew member knows what they’re doing. This story tied Morgan’s personal experience with CRM into his effort to establish credibility with the participants and set the stage for the program’s overall orientation, which emphasized communication, respect, and teamwork. The importance of establishing staff credibility cannot be minimized, given the pilot personality characteristics presented above. Absent high credibility, the program would fail before it could begin. Morgan introduced the other facilitators. This day’s program was unique in that the usual line pilot facilitator was absent, leaving three staff facilitators to teach the entire seminar. First to be introduced was Dana Hiller, the sole female, whose opening remark was "I’m a pilot." Hiller went on to describe a flying career spanning more than twenty years, including flying air ambulance, being a flight instructor, flying a Citation for a corporation, and towing gliders. Last was Reg Pierce, a company dispatcher with 12 years’ experience, who described himself as "on loan" to the CRM group. He was there because of the company’s desire to enlarge the crew concept. Facilitator introductions complete, Morgan covered administrative details, i.e., schedule, cafeteria, and rest room locations. Next, he set the tone for the day’s 84 activities, saying the seminar would be informal and stressing that it was our class. "We generally learn as much from the class as you guys learn from us," he said. Morgan asked each participant to give a brief introduction of the person in the next seat, encouraging us to use his personal staple -- humor -- wherever possible. We were allowed five minutes to get acquainted and decide what to say. Self-consciously, we introduced each other, and discovered a wide variety of experience and interests among our fellow students. We broke the ice with this exercise, and developed a good sense of who other participants were. Only two were Aerostar pilots. The rest of the participants were USAF pilots, state Department of Transportation pilots/ planners, students and academic types from the aviation program at Northwestern Michigan College in Traverse City, Michigan. Before getting into the class activities, Morgan played a videotape of the man he jokingly called the "lead facilitator," company chairman Mitch Weeks. The Weeks tape, aimed directly at company line pilots, gave kudos to the pilots who originated the CRM course and its modules, and a tip of the hat to the new culture that was emerging under Aerostar’s new management team: Your participation in the CRM program is a good example of our emerging Aerostar Airlines culture, which stresses individual participation. It was you, our line pilots, who initiated this new program. Long before the FAA issued an advisory circular, ALPA safety committees and many individual pilots brought the urgent need for this course to the attention of the 85 company. In fact, a group of your fellow pilots actually developed this course, with other professional support. Those twenty-five pilots put forth a great effort, collecting data and producing these training modules. The results of their efforts put Aerostar in the forefront of the industry. As we proceed with this program and its many benefits, it is important to note that superseding all of our interests is the issue of safety. Each day, thousands of passengers place their lives in our hands. It is our sacred trust to do all in our power to assure their safety. On this there can be no compromise. Weeks continued, talking about Aerostar’s most important corporate goal -- becoming the most preferred airline in the sky -- and explaining his philosophy of the role work plays in individuals’ lives: We have stated that one of our principal goals is to become the airline of preference, the one that most people want to fly. Further to achieving preference is the need to make our work enjoyable. We all spend the major portion of our lives on the job, so work ought to be fun and personally rewarding. To make Aerostar the best airline to work for, the company that treats its employees as its most important assets is, therefore, another of our important goals. To accomplish the goals of becoming the best place to work and the best airline to fly, requires that we organize, motivate, and direct our efforts better than anyone in our industry. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that we have set as our third goal to become the best managed airline in our industry. To do this will require that we tap into the creativity and energy of every one of our employees. All of us at Aerostar must become managers. Beyond your particular technical skills as pilots, you are the most visible representatives of our airline. Our employees look to you for leadership. You are highly trained and educated professionals, who by virtue of your positions command great respect. Your words and actions have a major impact on your thirty-five thousand colleagues. After discussing his view that every employee is critical to Aerostar’s success, especially the highly visible line jpilots, Weeks finished by saying that the CRM program was an 86 integral part of the airline’s push to enhance human resources: Today’s course is part of our effort to enhance all of our human resources. It is the beginning of a long- term effort to optimize the cockpit and cabin environ- ment and ultimately our entire corporate culture. We have one of the best programs in the industry and I’m proud that you’re the authors of it. I hope you have an enjoyable and productive day. Thank you. After Weeks’ tape, Morgan asked rhetorically, "What, exactly, is CRM?" and, without answering, played another video. This one, with the tune "Hi-ho, Hi-ho, It’s Off to Work I Go," from "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" playing in the background, showed various company employees being asked, by an unseen questioner, if they knew what CRM stood for. Except for the pilots, all of whom knew that CRM stood for Crew Resource Management, most did not. From this tape, Morgan moved on to the history of CRM as a discipline, detailing CRM’s 1979 origins at United Air Lines, following a DC-8 crash outside Portland, Oregon. By August of 1992, he said, all major airlines had some level of CRM training available for their pilots. As to why CRM was necessary, Morgan displayed a chart that graphically showed accident statistics for the last 50 years. The good news, he said, was that overall, accidents have declined. The bad news, however, is that of accidents over the past 50 years, those caused by technical factors or failures have declined, while those caused by human factors have increased. Between 65% and 80% of airplane accidents are caused, at least partially, by some sort of human 87 performance breakdown. This statistic led Morgan to remind us that the human system is just as important as the other systems on board an airplane, and to add, "That’s why you’re here today." es rces Morgan told us that the word resource is the key word in crew resource management and solicited ideas about what the three major resource areas were. Without waiting for input from the group, Morgan identified them as (1) xenrself ("you are your own best resource"); (2) grey members (captain (CA), first officer (F0), second officer (SO), extra crewmembers on board); and (3) errernel resgurees (anything that can help, including dispatch, the FBI, meteorology, local medical facilities, manuals & publications, etc.). Regarding resource #2, c e embers, Morgan discussed UAL 232, a DC-10 crash in Sioux City, Iowa several years ago. In that accident, the airplane lost all of its hydraulics, which meant the cockpit crew had no way to steer the airplane except by varying engine thrust, using the throttles. What was especially noteworthy about this crash was that there was an extra pilot in the cockpit jumpseat and, riding in the passenger cabin, was an off-duty DC-10 flight instructor. The flight instructor offered to help and was brought to the cockpit to assist. All the pilots in the cockpit 88 worked together as a team, pooling and utilizing their knowledge and experience to guide the crippled aircraft toward the runway. While the airplane cartwheeled and crashed on landing, said Morgan, "with creative problem solving, they were able to save a lot of lives." Discussing resource #1, yourself, Morgan stressed the importance of sharing information with fellow crew members. UAL 232 was a good example of "creative problem solving" using resource #2, e me b rs, he told us. That said, Morgan reminded us we would be returning to these resources again and again during the day. He repeated his welcome, invited participation and any personal stories. Morgan ended the opening module with a USAF/USMC joke, after which we took a ten minute break. Accident Anelysis: Continental Flight {1713 From defining CRM, we moved -- after the break -- to a videotape presentation involving Continental (CAL) 1713, a fatal DC-9-30 crash during blizzard conditions at Denver- Stapleton Airport. Reg Pierce facilitated this module, in which he demonstrated how pilot inattention, lack of concern about a worsening weather situation, inexperience, anxiety, and lack of situational awareness led to a crash that took the lives of both pilots, one flight attendant, and 25 passengers. Survivors, trapped upside down and soaked in jet fuel during the blizzard, were finally rescued during a four-hour effort. 89 Pierce encouraged discussion, reiterating Morgan’s assertion that this was our class, not the facilitators’ and apologizing for the small size of the room, telling the group that there had been a last minute change in facilities. .Before analyzing CAL 1713, Pierce introduced what he termed the "Performance Motivation Curve," the curve developed by Jerry Berlin and discussed earlier. On the vertical axis is performance, on the horizontal is motivation or motivators, which Pierce defined as "...stress, anxiety, pressure, fatigue, anything that affects performance." i 1 Performance ' 1 Airline / Pilot/ ‘/ ,/ ’ / 1 1 l L Figure 4 90 ——- Motivation (Stressmnxiey, Pressurekep Performance Motivation Curve 91 To illustrate, he posited the following situation, saying: (It’s a) VFR (visual flight rules) day, you’re at cruise altitude, radio chatter is light, no maintenance, favorite part of the country, you’ve got your feet up, you’re sipping a Coke as you’re flying along. The stress or anxiety in a situation like this is relatively low and the performance level that goes with it is low, which is fine, because that’s all that’s required in a situation like that. You contrast that with, I’ll take an example for our own airline, coming into one of our hubs, peak time, in the evening, weather’s bad, IFR (instrument flight rules), maybe you’re looking at making a CAT II approach, fuel’s getting a little low, you’ve been holding, radio chatter’s real heavy. Category II and Category III are approaches that require specially enhanced ground equipment (which has greater redundancy), an airplane with equipment that is certificated for such approaches, and a crew that has been qualified to fly such approaches. The regular decision height for a normal approach, called CAT I, is 200’ above the ground. For CAT II, the minimum becomes 100’, while for CAT III the minimum is essentially zero feet with an RVR (runway visual range -- the distance ahead of the airplane the pilot can see) of 700’ for CAT IIIA and 600’ for CAT 1118. CAT III approaches are, for all intents and purposes, auto-land situations. The ground equipment required for CAT II and CAT III includes additional ground lighting, i.e., runway centerline lights, enhanced approach lights, and green lights that show pilots where to exit the runway and find taxiways. It is important to note that landing minimums for CAT II and CAT III are operative only when all components and visual aids 92 (on the ground and in the airplane) associated with a particular instrument approach are fnlly functional. Should any visual aids or components be inOperative, minimums are increased. That information is fully documented in the pilot’s manuals, which they are required to have on board the airplane. Having set the stage, Pierce talked about the role that stress played for pilots: In a situation like this, the pressure or anxiety or stress is going to be much higher and accordingly, the performance level required is much higher. The situationally aware pilot will adjust him or herself up and down the curve as needed. We all want to perform or fly at our best at all times, but peak performance is just not necessary in every situation. As a matter of fact, the detriment toward danger functioning at peak performance at all times or for extended periods of time, is as fatigue sets in over time, is the danger of falling off the back side of the curve and performance is affected. That said, he launched his discussion of CAL 1713, a DC-9-30 series aircraft. He gave a detailed description of the weather into which the plane took off on that fateful day: ...the first snowstorm of the season, blizzard- like conditions, ramp was slick and congested, visibility was poor at best. Indefinite ceiling, 300’ obscured, half mile visibility, in moderate snow and fog. Temperature 28, dew point 27, wind was from zero-three-zero gusting to 17, and the RVR, or the runway visual range on runway 35 left was reporting two thousand feet. CAL 1713 further complicated matters by taxiing to the de-icing pad without clearance to do so. Ground control was in voice communication only. They couldn’t see the aircraft. we joined the CAL crew (via the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) ‘tape) while they were on the run-up pad, prior to departure. 93 The tape provided the last minutes of conversation between the CAL 1713 crew and ATC (Air Traffic Control). The voices on the tape betrayed no evidence of stress on the part of either CAL pilot with respect to the poor weather; neither pilot planned for the conditions they were experiencing. Rather, they chatted about a particular flight attendant, speculating about the first officer’s potential for having a one-night stand with her. Further, the CAL crew did not check the airplane’s wings for ice or snow, despite having already been de-iced once, and having waited in line for an extended period of time. It was believed that the first officer was flying the airplane for the take-off, during which the airplane flipped over onto its back, killing both pilots, one flight attendant and 25 passengers. Two flight attendants and 52 passengers survived, rescued after four hours trapped upside down under what Pierce described as the "crushing weight" of the airplane, in blizzard conditions, soaked in jet fuel. At the end of the tape, silence hung over the classroom like a pall. Pierce allowed a long, dramatic moment to pass before speaking again. He admitted that "the first time I saw this, I just thought, it’s another typical (Frank) Lorenzo operation. But, after reading some of the the NTSB findings, first three (findings) made me rethink that, at least somewhat," he said, sharing those findings with the class: 94 (1) The flight crew and flight attendants were properly FAA certified and deemed qualified for flight; (2) The airplane was certified, equipped and maintained in accordance with FAA regulations and company policies and procedures; (3) Continental’s DC-9 training program met, and in some instances exceeded the minimum Federal requirements and accepted industry standards. He told us that the captain had over 12,000 hours of flying experience, the first officer more than 3,000 hours. Said Pierce, "What these findings suggest to me is that a technically qualified crew does not necessarily guarantee a safe operation." Pierce opined that "as crew members, we tend to focus on the technical aspects accidents" and cited various technical anomalies that contributed to CAL 1713’s tragic end, including wing surface contamination, a rotation rate that was almost twice the normal rate, and a stall in which the left wing hit the ground. To illustrate, Pierce showed a graph depicting the coefficient of lift for a clean DC-9 wing, the coefficient of lift for a contaminated DC-9 wing, and a cross section of a contaminated DC-9-10 wing. But, having provided the technical explanation for the crash, Pierce moved to the real focus of the day, the accident’s CRM factors. Handouts in our course materials packet included a copy of the NTSB accident summary, which we reviewed prior to discussing it. Pierce provided some preliminary information, mentioning that on the day of the crash, both pilots were at the beginning of a three-day trip sequence. The captain, who had 133 hours in this airplane 95 type, with 33 or 36 hours as captain, had just commuted into Denver, arriving about 12 minutes prior to his check-in time (one hour before departure). The first officer, who had 33 hours in the airplane and had had problems in training, had been off for 24 days. CAL 1713 was not his regularly scheduled trip; he was assigned to it when the chief pilot "bought” the trip for him from a more senior first officer in order to provide him with some additional proficiency time. One of the surviving flight attendants reported that she had spoken with the captain before the flight and expressed some anxiety about the first officer’s youth and inexperience. Because the weather was so bad in Denver, she was concerned about who would make the landing, so she asked the captain who would be flying the return flight to Denver. Said Pierce: We can talk about the technical factors all day long. What we’d really like to talk about today here, though, are human factors, mainly focusing on two areas. One is the performance-motivation curve, and where you feel that these two crew members were situated on that curve, and the resources that they had available to them there -- themselves and external -- and how you feel they did or didn’t use these resources. There’s no answers, noconclusions here, we’ll just try to learn something from it. For CAL 1713, we participated in exercises in which three class members at a time, seated like pilots (two in front, side-by-side, with a third behind them) were asked to become the crew’s alter egos, and speculate about how crew members were feeling, why they were acting and reacting as 96 they did, and how they saw the situation(s) evolving. This put class members squarely into the situation. One of the first class comments was that, given the first officer’s low level of experience and the poor weather conditions, the captain would have been well advised to be more assertive and fly the take-off himself. Pierce went a step further, to suggest, using the performance-motivation curve, the crew was too far to the left on the curve (low motivation), given the weather situation and their experience levels. He also mentioned the need to assess the resources available, which include the level of experience of the pilot in the next seat. "You’d think there would be some sort of assessment of the experience level," he opined. Discussion was encouraged but not always forthcoming. While participants were not always verbal about what they had seen, judging from the non-verbals -- chins on hands, unwavering attention given to the videotape, sitting motionless in chairs -- nobody was unmoved by what they heard. Very compelling stuff, for the most part -- pilots’ last words, which we were asked to treat respectfully. Facilitators emphasized the real nature of the accidents, and of the men whose voices we were hearing, presumably to :minimize the potential for denial or rationalization by jparticipants, i.e., "It’s not real. It couldn’t happen to me. Those guys must have been incompetent." In fact, :facilitators stressed NTSB findings that indicated that all «of the pilots were well-qualified and well-trained. Again 97 the message, "technical competence doesn’t guarantee a safe operation." The talk moved to other areas, such as external resources, and Pierce asked which ones were used. The group agreed that the crew had not availed itself of any external resources, such as ATC or asking for runway condition reports from other pilots. When the discussion lagged, Dana Hiller commented that the crew had not received an ATC clearance to taxi, which caused them to get out of the take- off sequence and extended the period of time between de-ice and take-off so much that the wings became contaminated again. Pierce picked up the ball, explaining in detail what Hiller had just told the group. One Centein’s Stgry Abgut Decisign-Meking Pierce returned the conversation to resources that the group had or would use in similar weather conditions. This prompted Dick Jones, an Aerostar B-727 pilot, to talk about how external pressures can negatively influence a crew’s decision-making: I'd like to point out something here. A lot of times, when you’re taxiing out at major airports, you have a lot of pressure that’s brought to bear on that crew in the operation of that aircraft because of the line, your position in that line. How long it’ll take to get to the departure end of the runway. What will happen if you get out of line and go back and de-ice? How much longer the delay? You have to answer to so many people in the bureaucratic organization on why you’re so late. Why did everybody else get off in eighteen minutes and you’re still on the ground in twenty six minutes eng you’re coming back to the gate? 98 Pressures like this, I think, foster the first seed into poor judgement. That kind of pressure, that peer pressure, keeping up with the group, being the next one off and not complaining about contaminants on the runway. Clutter on the runway was one of the things mentioned in the film. Clutter on the runway. You basically, you need to have that looked at. You can’t take off with clutter on the runway if somebody reports it. But who’s the guy that’s going to say, ’I’m not gonna do it.’? We all have the Top Gun mentality and when things get tough, the tough get going and all that stuff. Those kind of pressures breed mistakes... Jones continued to talk, relating one of his own bad weather flying experiences as a 727 captain: I have been in -- Montreal -- is my greatest experience with contamination. We have our operation that is quite a distance, we’re at the southeast side of a northeast-southwest runway configuration, the terminal. It takes us a long time to get out to the runway if they’re using two-four. We were in an ice storm, the likes of which I have never seen and it was so bad you could barely taxi. You know, we’re in an international airport in Canada. They have different rules than we have in the States. They don’t really talk about contaminated ramps and taxiways. They like to ignore that so you can in fact taxi out on something that is more like an ice-skating rink. So, as we taxied out -- we were de-iced -- we taxied out and it was unbelievable. Jones’ description of the weather conditions and his airplane’s performance was detailed and riveting. After he related his hair-raising tale, more than one class member wondered why he decided to continue taxiing instead of returning to the gate: I mean the airplane jackknifed twice, just when the wind picked up and gusted. We sashayed all around. So we were creeping out to the runway. We were using (runway) two-four left. It took us, I would say, sixteen minutes to get to the runway. And there was no one ahead of us to speak of. I asked for braking action reports. ’We don’t have 99 any.’ Well, can you send a truck down the runway?. ’Well, we can if you want us to do that.’ Yeah, I’d like you to do that. OK, so the truck goes down the runway. It’s real poor. Well, there’s no ’real poor’ in the rating system. It goes ’good,’ ’fair,’ 'poor,’ 'nil.’ What is real poor? Well, it’s worse than ’poor’ but it’s less than ’nil,’ which means you can’t run at all. As he spoke, Jones explained his own decision-making process while he and his airplane full of passengers attempted to depart Montreal under the worst of weather conditions. As uncomfortable as he was in going, ner going apparently produced greater discomfort. Jones did not want to withstand commentary or criticism from the airline or from his fellow pilots. O.K. When we get out to the end of the runway, I said to the engineer, 'Go back and look at the wings.’ So while he’s back looking at the wings, I tell the first officer, you know, ’60 back to ground on pressurization and depressurize.’ So he goes back to ground and depressurizes the panel. I open up my window and I put my hand outside the window and it’s glare ice. On a vertical surface, there’s glare ice. What’s the horizontal surface gonna be like, you know? So I said, ’Can you send the ice truck, the de-ice rig out to the runway?’ And they go, ’No, we can’t. It’s against airport policy.’ I said, ’Well, by the time I taxi back and de-ice and then taxi back to this runway, I’m going to be in the same position I am right now.’ So we taxi back, get de-iced again, and then I request two-eight, which is a left-hand turn and then you’re on your way. And when we took off, we were off in, oh, I’d say, less than two minutes, after the second de-icing. I had a gear light that wouldn’t go out after the retraction of the landing gear, when the flaps and the slats were retracted, I had a leading edge device that wouldn’t retract. All because of ice. And that was doing things really methodically and really well. 100 As he continued, Capt. Jones gave us further insight into the ways pilots respond to situations that are anxiety- producing: And I’ve noticed over the years that the second the bad weather comes, the second that the really serious problems, here come the jokes. Here comes the nervous chatter. The damage is exactly what I feel is one of the greatest problems in aviation, when you start to kid which is real serious. But it’s the nervousness, it’s the pending anxiety I think that really winds up killing us... Jones was willing to admit, albeit obliquely, that he, too, was susceptible to peer and company pressures when making critical decisions such as whether to take off or not. Absent such real or perceived external pressure, it seemed clear that Jones would have taxied back to the gate and either waited for conditions to improve or cancelled the flight. It appeared, from his story, he never felt that the option of not going was available to him. After all, everyone else successfully took off. He felt tremendous pressure, despite his real and justified anxiety, to follow suit, which he did. Pierce agreed with Jones, then returned the talk to external pressures on the CAL 1713 crew, saying it was impossible to know what external pressures they faced on the day of the crash. While this discussion focused on CAL ,1 71 3 , he pointed out, those kinds of pressures, often driven by different corporate cultures from airline to airline, h£.JL.L]L exist for all pilots, regardless of company effi liation. 101 With that, Pierce ended his module and we took our second ten-minute break of the day. When we returned, Ed Bates, another class member, began the discussion, challenging Dick Jones’ earlier commentary and the following interchange provided a glimpse into how pilots view themselves, particularly in relation to their peers. They seem to experience tremendous pressure, from within as well as from without, to follow the leader rather than be the leader. The consequences can be severe, as Ed Bates took pains to point out. Bates: For Dick, who gave us this dissertation on not being a trend-setter, what would you have done if the airplane in front of you had turned back? Jones: Well, then it becomes easy. You just follow the leader. Say ’Me, too. (This comment evoked considerable [nervous?] laughter from the class.) I guess I’ll go back, too!’ It’s being number ene that’s hard. Unidentified class member: I guess would say as a passenger, I would want you to say that. Jones, obviously unhappy with the position he was in, attempted to defend it by deflecting a certain degree of responsibility onto passengers who are eager to get to their destinations, regardless of mitigating circumstances like poor weather. Jones: Well, of course. When you sit in the back, and somebody says, ’Would you like to be with the guy that will turn back when he should?’ Everybody says, ’Of course.’ But when, when somebody says, ’You’ve got to get me to Washington ‘to this business meeting, that two million dollars .are based on. This deal.’ Do you want to be flying with a top gun? Or some wimp that’ll go back at the slightest little crack of the whip? Iflhat are you gonna choose then? 102 One could not help but notice the pejorative language Jones chose, referring to the pilot who turns back as "some wimp." But the class was not about to let him off so easily and continued, without hostility, to challenge his position. Jones again fell back on the herd mentality as his rationale for taking off, before seemingly agreeing with the class. Class member: Well, the condition you described was not the slightest crack of the whip. Jones: No. Class member: You put your hand outside the airplane and felt glare ice on the aircraft. Your aircraft had gone uncontrollable on the ground twice... Jones: That’s right. Class member: ...and you continued. Jones: Well, there were several other aircraft taking off... Class member: I would have said, ’Excuse me, I want to get off.’ Jones: And, eventually, you have to say, ’This is as far as I’m going. This is as far as I go.’ Dana Hiller broke in, commenting that each person, each pilot, has his or her own "risk meter" and that each pilot arui only each pilot can get it from "in the red" to back "in the green." "Everybody’s bottom line is different. You’ve gcrt: to know your bottom line before you get there," she ggzjicig. Pete Morgan used this opportunity to share a story about a crew from another airline: (Good story that came out of one of the classes twas, another airline, not Aerostar, was in 103 position in hold, and they was this flight out of LaGuardia, I think he said, but just a solid line of thunderstorms off the departure end of the runway and this particular aircraft pulls into position and holds and sits there and for awhile and again, everybody had been...it’s the herd mentality. Everbody’d been taking off and all of a sudden comes this transmission: ’Tower, the first and second officer would like to say we don’t want to make this take-off.’ And then there was total silence and the airplane taxied off the runway. The guy said he would have liked to have been a fly in the cockpit just to see what the dynamics were going on at that point. (Laughter from the group.) But again, everyone is responsible, everyone has a certain amount of responsibility for the safe conduct of that flight and again, as Dana said, when your risk meter gets pegged, you’re the only one who can bring it back into the green zone. C ’ 0 Words One of the most important modules was a discussion of the four words that "summarize the essential elements of CRM," AUTHORITY with PARTICIPATION, ASSERTIVENESS with RESPECT. Over and over, facilitators hammered home the point that "people fly airplanes" and that there is a "brain strapped to the airplane." With a cockpit crew, they emphasized, there are two or three different perspectives on any situation, each of which is valuable. Morgan began discussing the four words of CRM by :eaLl.1¢ing a lengthy joke about one of Dana Hiller’s ancestors, 0131'. Ch the group seemed to enjoy, although it had no connection to the subject. Focusing on pilot personality War acteristics, Morgan started by talking about pilots’ 104 need for control of various situations, and how their choice of language exemplifies that need for control, citing how pilots, rather than saying "I’m going flying today," often will say instead, "I’m going to go out and strap on an airplane today." Morgan stressed Aerostar’s belief that airplanes are not strapped to pilot backsides, but rather are strapped to brains. While speaking, Morgan drew three capital letter Bs, one in each cockpit position, quipping that when Aerostar had Delta pilots in the class, they sometimes thought the Bs, rather than representing brains, stood for "Boss, Bubba and Boy." Again, there was much laughter from the class. Morgan went on: The beauty of this system, however, from an aviation aspect, is that for everything that happens, for everything that occurs out there, you’ve got at least two and in some cases, three totally different perspectives on that idea, or even on that goal, that common goal that you’re all working for. Provides a different set of ideas and knowledge to try to handle that problem or work toward that goal. Very, very important aviation safety aspect. Continuing, Morgan again used his staple -- humor -- to underscore a serious issue, in this case the need for nuiltiple perspectives in the cockpit: We often tell our pilots, imagine some day, because some of them, you know, would maybe prefer to fly solo, they kind of have that kind of personality or make up and may be distrustful of other people in the cockpit. So we try to tell them, imagine that you’re riding, that you’re deadheading from one point to another and you’re riding on the jumpseat. You sit down on the jumpseat and you look in the captain’s seat and jyou say, you see yourself sitting in the captain’s seat. You look in the first officer’s seat, you :see yourself sitting in the first officer’s seat. 105 You look in the second officer’s seat and you see yourself there as well. We say, probably several things that go through your mind. Undoubtedly the first that, you know, this is the best-looking crew that you’ve ever flown with in your life. But, once you got beyond that, maybe you want to wait and take the next airplane. And that’s not to cast any aspersions on anybody’s flying ability, but what it is is to say, if you’ve got the same person in all three seats, if you’re essentially flying solo, you’re going to make the same mistake under the same circumstances each and every time. You lose this valuable back-up of having a different set of ideas and knowledge to help you handle problems and work toward a goal. He reminded us that airline pilots cannot accept a success percentage less than 100%; 99.9% success isn’t acceptable. "The industry demands that you be 100% successful 100% of the time," he told us. When Morgan finished this introduction, Dana Hiller began telling the group about the four words of CRM. Because pilots are accustomed to and comfortable with checklists, the training group created one for CRM and provided a handout, perfectly sized and punched to fit into pilot flight manuals. On it are the four words of CRM: .AUTHORITY with .PARTICIPATION .ASSERTIVENESS with .RESPECT By beginning with AUTHORITY, facilitators allayed fears ¢z7c3111: CRM eliminating or eroding the captain’s authority. 01: scussion ensued about the differences between insecure all chority, embodied by the autocratic captain, and secure %:;JE:IJ<:>JEity, embodied by a captain who delegates I 106 responsibilities, is comfortable with his authority, and who empowers his crew. Participation is not only solicited, but encouraged/demanded by captains who possess secure authority. Again, "people fly airplanes." At the outset, Hiller stated flatly that CRM does not try to undermine the captain’s authority, as some pilots fear, but rather seeks to emphasize authority, saying "We all know airplanes aren’t run by committee rule. Someone has to be in charge. And we all know that the authority’s in the left seat. Even the traveling public knows the authority’s in the left seat." Branching off from the general concept of authority, Hiller discussed insecure authority versus secure authority, telling the class that someone with secure authority is a person who ...wears their authority very well. They’re very comfortable with authority, comfortable delegating to their crew members, and they empower their crew members to do a good job because they know that if their crew is completely working together and empowered to do a good job, it’ll even make them look better also. So we want that secure authority. The next word was PARTICIPATION, about which Hiller said, "Secure authority in the cockpit invites, demands and encourages participation. So we say that it’ s authority with participation. We all know what participation is, participation is sharing ideas among crew members." The talk then went on to repeat that the brains in the cockpit are attached to bodies -- that people fly airplanes. 107 The third word discussed was ASSERTIVENESS. Hiller began by defining assertiveness as "input from one of these crewmembers about what they see." Beating potential skeptics to the punch, she plunged ahead, citing the aviation psychology origins of the first three terms, and saying, "Our pilots, when they look at this list, they think, ’The words are great, but cockpits are a different place. It’s not like a normal little office. It's not like a retail store or anything else.’ These words won’t work unless you have a healthy dose of this fourth word, and that’s RESPECT." Rather than attempt to define respect, Hiller simply commented, "We all know what respect is. You know it when you give it, and you know it when you get it. As pilots, we need respect from about three different areas. We need respect, as everyone does, as a person. We need respect as a crew member, and we need respect as a pilot." The spareness of the words provided additional punch. Hiller hit on some of the pilot personality characteristics that can be detrimental to a safe operation when she suggested that pilots must learn to give a little to get a little back, regardless of the circumstances. Hiller then shared an anecdote from an earlier class what illustrated how a young pilot cajoled an older captain 611:0 treating him with more respect. She told the story of % ‘EE==><‘-military pilot, then flying as a DC-9 first officer, a 108 young man who wondered if he had made the right decision in leaving the military for a career in commercial aviation: One day, he checked in for a flight with a captain about whom he had heard numerous negative stories. At check-in, the captain refused to shake hands with the first officer, which showed a lack of respect for the first officer as a person. With that, the first officer proceeded to perform his pre-flight walk-around and as he did so, he said to himself, ’You know, this is going to be a bad five day trip. If I find anything wrong with the plane, he’s not going to listen to me, he’s going to call someone else to confirm it. So, he doesn’t respect me as a crew member. And I know I’m just going to be sitting there working the radio the whole trip because he’s not going to respect me, he doesn’t respect me as a pilot.’ So, after thinking about all this for awhile, the first officer came back into the cockpit, where he found the captain just about to bark another order at him, so he said, ’Captain, just a minute. I don’t know if you know it, but you’re truly a legend here at Aerostar Airlines and I consider it a real honor to fly with you on this sequence and I hope I’ll learn a lot.’ Caught off-guard, the captain, described as someone who was really fighting for respect all along, and here he (the first officer) handed it to him on a silver platter, became someone with whom the young first officer now chooses to fly. Again heading off potential skepticism from the group, Morgan quickly identified the moral of this story, reminding us that "sometimes if you give a little of something, you get a little bit back." Then Hiller segued into the background of the videotape we were about to see, in which a 8—727 crew was interacting in order to illustrate the points ,aade about the four words of CRM. Only one crew member, the captain, was briefed on what was supposed to happen; he was egjced to be totally dysfunctional and to keep a team from 109 forming. The other two crewmembers were instructed to act as they would on a regular flight. Morgan jumped into the discussion again, reiterated the four words, and made "a couple of disclaimers" about some of the terminology for the benefit of non-Aerostar partici- pants. One was "SOPA," which refers to standardization of procedures. Morgan noted that Aerostar personnel would probably notice that SOPA was violated in several places on the videotape but assured us that the violations we would see were deliberate. Morgan asked the group to "look past those and just concentrate on the interaction of the group." The first scenario was one in which a dysfunctional captain provides an entertaining but nonetheless realistic and blatant example of a boorish captain, one who instantly put down each crewmember in turn for his so-called lack of experience, and who draws an imaginary line down the center of the cockpit, declaring, "You don’t touch anything on my side, I don’t touch anything on your side." As they proceed, each crew member’s attempt to establish a sense of respectful teamwork is destroyed by this captain. In fact, the captain’s behavior is so terrible that on camera the second officer makes a spontaneous obscene gesture behind his back. This startling gesture gave Morgan the opening to alert the group to the dangers of assertiveness without respect -- .a situation, he intoned, that breeds aggression -- and tell to us that the second officer was "now set up for NIGYSOB." 110 Borrowed from Eric Bern’s Games Beeple Play, NIGYSOB stands for "Now I’ve got you, son of a bitch" and, according to Morgan, "NIGYSOB is not a game that winners play, it’s a game for losers." Unscripted and unexpected, the second officer’s gesture provided a laugh eng a perfect example of "NIGYSOB," familiar territory for pilots, most of whom come together to fly a month's schedule, go apart, and may never encounter one another again. Morgan referred to the "classic first officer sulk," which pilots use when they feel slighted or ignored. Morgan’s indictment of NIGYSOB was preceded by two anecdotes. In the first, a true story from a "competing airline," Morgan described a crew that was experiencing a high sink rate on approach. The first officer, although aware of the high sink rate, did not alert the captain and as a result, the aircraft "really pranged down." The captain, who had to own the bad landing, stormed off the airplane. Feeling guilty about not having spoken up, the first officer turned to the second officer and confessed to feeling guilty about not warning the captain. The second officer responded that the first officer had no reason to feel bad, telling him, "I just passed him (the captain) a .Landing weight 20,000 pounds lighter than we were." Because they lacked respect for the captain, his subordinate crew members did not keep him apprised of the situation as it developed on approach. Absent correct landing weight and sink rate information, it was difficult, 111 if not impossible, for the captain to make a good landing. As Morgan emphasized, all crew members have a responsibility for the safe operation of a flight. Failing to provide critical flight information in a timely manner is poor CRM at best, and potentially dangerous at worst. The second NIGYSOB story followed the same theme as the first -- junior crew members withholding information -- and took place in Europe on an unnamed airline. As the airplane landed and turned off the runway and onto a taxiway, the captain realized they were at the wrong airport, so he instructed the second officer to call the tower and report that they were in the wrong place. Responded the second officer, "I already called and told them when we were on short final, Captain." Morgan, as mentioned above, identified NIGYSOB as a game of losers and went on to state, "We need to overcome this tendency to get even or pay back. Try to keep a safe operation going and try to keep working as a group." Returning to assertiveness, facilitators talked about a another common situation with pilots, in which junior pilots are so respectful of captains that they are unable to be assertive, because they see assertiveness as criticism. This lack of assertiveness causes pilots to resort to what iS’iknown as "H&H" or "hinting and hoping." Because pilots tend to think alike, rather than confront a captain with a concern, and risk rebuke, ridicule or being ignored, they 112 will drop hints and hope that their message is not only received, but that some corrective action will follow. Steps toward assertiveness were suggested: (1) get the captain’s attention: (2) state the concern using an "I" statement; (3) state the problem; (4) offer a solution; (5) obtain agreement. It was not suggested that assertiveness be used 100% of the time, but rather "It’s something to use when the H&H either doesn’t work or isn’t appropriate and you need to have a tool to be assertive and to offer a suggestion to other crew members." Citing a NASA study on cockpit communication, Morgan told the group that pilots use H&H "a lot" and if they receive no response, one of two things soon happens -- either the pilot not flying (the one who used H&H) "goes non-responsive," or the situation escalates to criticism and/or conflict. Assertiveness steps were termed a "tool for your back pocket" for times when pilots begin to feel uncomfortable and need a respectful way to be assertive. The class was shown a graph depicting NASA findings on cockpit communication. According to NASA, 90% of all cockpit communication is either "non-reactive" or "data transfer." For the most part, this is no problem, but 25%- 35% of commercial pilots will find themselves out in the ldanger zone. And, two-thirds of that group of pilots, fiJuiing themselves in a particular situation for the first 113 time, do ebsolnrely ngrning, remaining non-reactive, sitting silently and hoping for a positive outcome. Said Morgan, "The chart says that the system you're counting on working for you, this backup system, according to NASA data, two- thirds of the time is not going to be there unless you really go out of your way." Another videotaped simulation showed assertive and aggressive ways to handle potentially dangerous situations, with facilitators discussing pros and cons of each method. At the end of the videotape’s discussion, Hiller and Morgan called for “three fun-loving volunteers." No hand was raised; the group was silent. Morgan had the solution: "I tell you what. Let’s take a ten minute break and the last three people back from the break will be our fun-loving volunteers." This generated much laughter, and brought the group together again in a positive fashion. - ' e ' e Establishing the role-playing group was a raucous affair; nobody wanted to volunteer, despite Reg Pierce’s assurance that "This is an extremely painless process." So, the facilitators chose "volunteers," while Morgan commented that.pilot personality profiles show that pilots dislike acting and role-playing. "So you know this doesn’t fit the aviator profile," said Morgan in a good natured attempt to ease the role players’ anxieties. "It’s not going to be as bad as you think it will be. And there are no right or 114 wrong answers. It’s just why do you think he did what he just did or how do you think he’s feeling now or what do you think just happened? So it’s not role-playing or anything like that." Morgan set up the scenario: a B-727 crew is about 100 miles from the company’s home airport, which is the crew’s final destination. They are flying at FL 290 (flight level 29,000 feet). Then he put the videotape on, but it didn’t function properly. In the silence that ensued while facilitators attempted to discern what had gone wrong, Dana Hiller commented dryly, "At these times, we usually say, you have to be A-320 qualified to work our AV equipment." Various class members posed solutions to the problem: "Push the play button." "It’s one of those digital things." "Put the panel down in front and push play." "Maybe it’s metric." This last comment generated a few laughs. But when the equipment still was not working, and Morgan asked if any of the facilitators had touched it during the break, Reg Pierce broke the group up by replying, "One of the last three people in the room probably touched it." With that, the balky VCR began working again. As the tape played, Morgan interrupted it frequently, clarifying what we’d heard and soliciting discussion from time role players about the simulation. The first tape break was made to note that the second officer had received a call (M1 the company radio informing the crew that there was 115 severe turbulence at 29,000 feet. The second officer calmly relayed the information to the rest of the crew. Asked Morgan of the role-playing second officer, "Do you think that your crewmembers heard what you just said to them?" His response was, "I would have thought so." Morgan pointed out that the captain is flying the airplane with his head "kind of cooked back" to hear what the second officer is saying. Then he let the tape continue to see what really happened. On the tape, the first officer requests a lower altitude ("two-seven-zero" or 27,000 feet) from ATC. Stopping the tape again, Morgan asked the role-playing first officer what he had just done. The reply was that he had asked for a lower altitude to avoid turbulence, "...and I didn’t ask the captain." "Yeah," replied Morgan, "why would you do that? Why do you think you might have done what you just did?" "Well, he drew a line like this," said the role playing first officer, gesturing down the center of his imaginary cockpit, "and I’ve got the radios!" Again, the group laughed enthusiastically. Stifling his own laughter, Morgan asked if there might be any erner reasons why the first officer might have made ‘the call. "Maybe I didn’t think if we were to bring it up t£> him he might have been too pig-headed to do anything about it, so I decided myself that something ought to be {done about it..." was the role playing first officer’s reply , 116 "Maybe you flew through turbulence yesterday and said ’I’m never going to do that again,’ right?" asked Morgan. "Or maybe you’ve been flying your C-9 with the reserves on the weekend, or maybe you’re a fighter pilot on the weekend and you’re used to making your own decisions and now all of a sudden you’re sitting here and you think, ’This is the right decision, I’m going to go ahead and make it.’ It could be a lot of reasons." Another participant remembered that on the videotape, when the crew first joined up, the captain remarked that he wasn’t really "in charge here." Morgan agreed that the first officer "might have jumped on that as a license to steal, right?" and then asked the role-playing captain, in this case Aerostar captain Dick Jones, "Dick, what are you thinking right now?" Chuckling along with the rest of the class, Jones responded, "Who’s running the show?" Morgan quipped, "Yeah, a little bit of non-verbal here..." and asked the group if there was a crew at work on the videotape. When there was no response, he gestured toward the crew diagram he’d drawn earlier and said, "Do we have a system working together for us right now, at this point?" .Again, silence, followed by tentative chorus of "No." The first substantive comment was that the crew was "in 311's first stage of breakdown." Morgan picked up on it, saying "We may have a loose cannon here and what’s going to happen, maybe we’ll get a fire warning light next and is the 117 co-pilot going to jump in and start pulling handles and hitting knobs without talking things over..." Morgan solicited ideas about what, if anything, needed to be done about this crew and its situation. Response was immediate; everyone agreed the captain needed to reassert his authority. "You know, you run into this a lot," interjected Dick Jones. "First officers, they truly think they know what’s going on as well as most captains. Really. They see that, you know, there’s turbulence at 29, well they assume instantly we’ll probably go to 27 and so he’s probably taking a shortcut saying ’I know what he wants to do. I’ll just ask for it.’ And that’s where the rub starts." Another class member, picking up on Jones’ use of the word assume, mentioned that it often stands for "makes an ass out of you and me." Morgan reinforced that point, sliding toward the need for communication when he was interrupted by another participant, who opined that the first officer’s use of the radio to request 27 might have been a NIGYSOB, as there was reported turbulence at 27,000 feet as well. After more laughter, Morgan returned to the tape, saying, "Let’s see how the captain handles the situation." On the tape, the captain is heard to say, "Say, George, I’d.sure appreciate it if you’d check with me before you go making any changes unilaterally, OK? Same goes for the seat belt sign." This comment is met with multiple reactions, 118 lots of "O-o-o-ohs!" "OK," said Morgan, "how do you think he handled this? Dick, I’ll ask you. You’re the captain here." Jones replied, "I don’t think he did a fine job. He’s really alienating at that point. I mean, it’s a real slap on the hand, OK?" Before showing the next tape, Morgan asked the role- playing first officer how he was feeling. "Probably like I just got my face smacked," was the immediate reply. "But I had it coming. . ." Morgan then turned to the second officer for his reaction, saying "All of a sudden you think maybe you’ve got some fuel figures you need to compute or something? Gonna hide a little bit for awhile, right?" The second officer nodded his agreement. Comments were solicited from the group as a whole. The first response was that the captain had set up the situation by being nasty with the first officer for making decisions unilaterally, when he added the zinger, "the same goes for the seat belt sign." Everyone agreed that the captain’s r‘e‘ltlark was uncalled for, and that the first officer could have been reprimanded gently, thereby getting the point across without resorting to the slap provided by the remark aID<>11t the seat belt sign. Morgan agreed, but also got the group to see the situation from a slightly different angle by Suggesting that perhaps the captain: ...was really biting his tongue. Perhaps that was as tactful as he can be. We all have different personalities. Maybe he’s just biting his tongue, and trying to be tactful and not alienate the guy but yet he’s really steamed, that this was kind of 119 a breach of cockpit etiquette here and that something needs to be said. The thing we have to remember is people fly airplanes. We all have different personalities and it’s incumbent on all of us to give a little bit of slack both ways and not sit there for the rest of the flight with the classic first officer sulk. Morgan again asked if the crew was together yet. Again, silence. "Anybody?" cajoled Morgan. A lone " probably not" from the group. "Whose court is the ball in to bring the crew back together at this point?" There were varying responses. Some said the captain, others the first officer. Morgan opined that it was up to the first officer to resolve the problem. "He can sit there and sulk all the way into their destination, or he can do something about it - " Turning the tape on again, he told us we’d see how it was resolved. On the tape, the first officer extended an apology, Which the captain accepted. Said Morgan to the group, "How are you guys feeling now? Think this crew’s ready to shoot this approach into their destination?" There was universal agreement that they were. Morgan pointed out that the caEJ‘lzain had tied it together, and in so doing had reclaimed the working crew structure. The facilitators asked for three more "fun loving volunteers," and had the original three role players pick their replacements. As this went on, there was a lot of Q'Qlllmentary and laughter. As the first volunteer I:‘Qluctantly moved to the designated seating area, Hiller, in a. Stage whisper told him, "Hurry up and you can be the 120 captain!" Still missing one volunteer, Hiller asked who hadn’t named a replacement. Amid quiet, jocular comments about "no leadership," Reg Pierce guffawed, "Dick (Jones) doesn’t think he can be replaced! !" This brought the house cicnnn As the second scenario began, Hiller reminded the ‘srcalunteers that they were playing the videotaped crew’s alter egos and were responsible for telling how they felt and why they did what they did in the videotape. Hiller explained where the crew was: "We’ re just outside the outer marker, flying into Tampa, the weather’s bad. It’s not a CAT II approach but the weather just isn’t real great and we ’ re shooting the ILS (instrument landing system)." The videotape was stopped about 45 seconds into the second scenario. Hiller repeated the captain’s calm comment to his first officer, "Got a little bit of wind off to your right, George," and asked the role-playing first officer What that comment referred to. The role-player opined that " He '5 probably trying to give me a hint, just to remind me that I have to make that correction." Hiller shifted the g31“=>up’s attention to the communication chart, asking where that communication fell on it, confirming that the captain i s hinting and hoping the first officer knows what action to take. Back to the videotape, we saw the crew shooting the ILS a‘:)I>Itoach at 500’ to minimums. Hiller stopped the tape galn, repeating where the crew was, that the captain had 121 said "Half a dot low," and again asked what he meant. The role-player was not a pilot, so in response to her question about what "half a dot low" meant, Hiller explained that it was a standard callout meaning that the airplane is coming in low on the glideslope. The question was re-directed to a role-player who was a pilot. He responded that since it was a: standard callout, something was wrong and it should be acknowledged and fixed. When the group was asked if anyone disagreed, there was no response, so Hiller started the v i deotape again . On this portion of the tape, the captain is heard telling his first officer, "You’re a full dot low now." Hi ller stopped the tape again, and repeated what the captain had said: What kind of communication are we doing here? Data transfer still. A full dot low is pretty low when you’re within five hundred feet on the ILS approach. I think you’d all agree? Getting a little uncomfortable maybe? Do you think data transfer is an appropriate level of communication to be going on right now? Reacting to a quiet, "next one up" comment from a class member, Hiller responded, "Next one up, yeah. Jack said we S11<>uld give him a suggestion. We have given data and he’s acknowledged that he’s heard it but nothing’s been done. So now we have to get a little more specific. What would be an eXample of something we could say?" The response is "Add Said Hiller, "Yes. Give him 99“ever, level the aircraft." & . <2"the suggestions. We’re a full dot low, we need to add lb‘b‘arer, change the pitch, things like that." 122 After joking about how the hypothetical captain has been flying with this particular first officer all month, and this is the best approach (to land) the first officer has made the whole time, Hiller got serious again, saying, " You know, the aircraft is heading more and more into a danger zone of flying, and our level of communication has to keep up with the situation." With that, she re-started the videotape. We watched the captain become increasingly agitated and involved with the deteriorating situation, repeating, "Bring it up, George. More! More! Let's go around." Hiller stopped the tape again, calling for more discussion, "OK, they’re saying the glideslope is going on. Both have their hands on the throttle. The question I ask this crew is Who’s flying the airplane? In fact, they're...what do you think (laughingly, to the second officer)? You haven’t been too involved in this." The role playing second officer replied, "I’m not sure who's flying it. Both of them look 3— ike they've got their hands on the throttles at the same time." Agreed Hiller, "Yeah. Very non-standard. Does that make you uncomfortable? You crash right after they do." 81101: back the role playing second officer, "I’d rather be up there...get three hands on it. . ." to the group’s amusement. Hiller defended the second officer's physical location Q1" the video tape, explaining that because of the camera, it was necessary to situate him farther back from the front ‘3 llots' seats than is normal, telling us that in a regular 123 flight situation, he would be part of the action. "Yeah, he’s back there and he may be wondering who’s flying the airplane. What he could do maybe is ask that question, ’Who’s flying the airplane?’ You know, get them more in the loop and find out who’s flying the airplane." At that point, Morgan interrupted to point out "...how gzjiickly you can proceed from a relatively safe situation to 23. very dangerous situation that we had deteriorate here, how :i.1mportant it is to move quickly through this process." The jEfleamale role playing first officer agreed, saying, "Right, I think too that if they want to say something like that, it might kind of snap us out of our power-tripping here maybe aaLJrlci..." Reg Pierce interrupted to support her assertion, saying: That’s a real good point. It’s the same point Dana was making before. Is the second officer in this case, in a lot of cases, has the best seat in the house and levels of assertiveness the distribution of authority and levels of assertiveness in the cockpit, as we’re trying to say all morning, apply to all three seats and this would be an excellent chance for the second officer, who’s really got a good view of things, to be assertive and take a position and say who’s flying this aircraft right now. It applies to every seat. Hiller set up the next scenario: the captain is flying the approach just outside the outer marker on the ILS aIz’rrroach into Tampa. A few seconds into the videotape she S":<>pped it, and asked the role playing first officer what he [neant when he said to the captain, "It looks like you’re Sagvging a little bit." There was confusion over this 124 comment, as Hiller’s strong regional accent left the role playing first officer asking twice what had been said, which the group found entertaining. Recovering, Hiller joked "Some people said maybe he was referring to the captain’s facelift..." and tried to bring the discussion back on t:Iack, carefully noting that "You’re sagging" is not a standard callout, and suggesting that as such, perhaps the captain had never heard that expression used before. The next segment shows the second officer becoming :ilracreasingly involved in what is going on, even mentioning 1t:<:> his crew members "You’re a dot and a half there." Hiller specifically pointed out the nonverbals in this clip, saying: But look at this body action there. He’s clenching onto the back of the seat, saying ’You guys just practically killed me the last time. I’m not going to sit back and let that happen again.’ Leaning forward, he’s definitely a part of the crew, straining at the shoulder straps. Any comments? f1?11l¢52 first response disputed the second officer’s need to ‘Ei<:=1t:, saying, "I think you can be a little bit too involved S-C>‘l'netimes. He might offer a suggestion...I don’t think he needed to grab onto the seat. I think he can see just as ‘“"5231.1 from where we’re sitting." Hiller did not support this comment, which ignored her point about participation being every crew member’ s I‘e‘Sponsibility. Instead, she acknowledged it with a half- Iieal'ted, "Yeah," and immediately continued emphasizing the Ge‘teriorating safety situation: 125 The only thing is, though, they’re a dot and a half low on the glideslope and they’re within the outer marker. So he’s got a reason to want to make sure that something is going to be decided up here in this crew. And like I say, he crashes just seconds after them, after those two guys do, so let’s see what he does. There was no further comment from the speaker, and the videotape was started again. Hiller played the tape for perhaps fifteen or twenty Seconds before stopping it and repeating what the first officer had said: "Thousand feet above touchdown. Dot and a. half low." Turning to the group, she asked, "What are you .1. ooking for, Scott?" Scott replied that he was hoping the captain would "fix the problem," but as Hiller pointed out, the captain’s response was kind of a "Yeah, yeah, yeah, I hear ya" non-response. As the tape was being shut off, the group could hear the word "glideslope" coming from the cockpit. This was the airplane’s automated warning, made to alert the crew that it Was not on the glideslope. 0n the tape, the captain punches the warning out, thereby turning it off. Said Hiller, "That’s not standard procedure, by the way. He punches out the glideslope but he’s probably wishing that each of these crewmembers had a little button on them that he could punch out , too, and make them shut up and not participate in this crew." Another brief tape clip shows the second officer Szpeaking up and the captain, sarcastically, saying "I’m 126 correcting." Hiller asked the role playing second officer how he was feeling. SO: I’m not feeling comfortable at this point. Hiller: You’re not are you? Are you getting any response from the captain? SO: It doesn’t appear so. Hiller: It doesn’t appear so. SO: I think he has to be a little more aggressive at this point. Hiller: So you made a comment, ’Too damn low, for right here.’ That’s sort of a criticism, maybe? You’ve hyperleaped out of suggestion into a criticism. The airplane’s in a pretty dangerous situation and you’re making those comments. You don’t have any throttles or anything close to you, which you wish you did, right now, I bet. SO: Yep. Hiller: So, you can see your hand here has moved from the seat up to the neck of the first officer... (laughter from the group and a quip ’Those backseat guys...’) This is your hope, right? The captain is ’Yeah, yeah, yeah,’ he’s punched off the glideslope, you’ve been asking him for some help but he’s not really giving it to you, right? So you’re kind of really talking to this guy, maybe (gestures to the first officer)...? SO: Well, maybe a little contact there... Hiller: A little like ’Nnnnngh?" SO: ...urging him on. Hiller: Urging him on. Empowering him to participate like a crew member like he’s ’sposed to up there? Let’s see what happens. On the tape, the first officer takes over the airplane :f33:?<31n the captain, saying, "I’m gonna take the airplane, :EDJE7EECS, here, I think we ought to go around here. We’re 127 getting awful low." Hiller turned off the tape there, saying, "Right before the first officer takes the airplane, I don’t know if you heard, the second officer said ’Still ‘too low.’ He’s leaning into the first officer, holding onto llis neck and saying ’Still too low.’ Do you think that’s czausing you at all to change your behavior, Scott?" There was a moment’s pause before Scott said, "Well..." and was immediately interrupted by Hiller, who demanded, I"INith that kind of encouragement from another crew member?" aa:11d.at the same time ran over Scott’s low-key "Probably, probably." Hiller went on: You know, he doesn’t have, his hope is the first officer and God he’s hoping the two are the same, you know, to keep that airplane from crashing so he’s leaning forward and empowering that crew member. If that person is at all unsure he’s got that kind of encouragement, that may make a difference. Talk about two people...and there is some of that, two people encouraging that behavior. Morgan leaped into the discussion, asking "Who’s the ItlS..-t assertive person in this cockpit?" The replies came instantaneously -- "The second officer." Morgan asked the USAF attendees, who flew two-person cockpit airplanes, how 'tzlblsse scenario might have gone if there had only been two pi lots in the cockpit, "based on the personalities you’ve Se€313?" Hiller jumped in to clarify that she meant the front twO crew members (the captain and the first officer). Again, the responses were immediate: "Splat." "It would have been the last one." Morgan agreed: "It might have been the last one. Absolutely. They might have flown it to 128 the point of impact. The second officer’s kind of his conscience back there. Again, as we said over and over, we have to draw this line here, of what we’re not going to go over." Pierce added a remark about how the crew on the trideotape never "made a decisive move into the suggestion .aixea" but rather went immediately from hinting into confrontation, which resulted in the first officer taking ¢:: be acknowledged as human beings. He cited research done if! orphanages in which babies had all their physical needs 144 met but not their nurturing needs. The findings concluded that these babies had a higher mortality rate as infants, a higher incidence of sickness as they approached adolescence, and higher incidences of behavioral problems than those who had received adequate nurturing. "It’s very, very normal," said Morgan, "we all have this need to be recognized." Continuing, he defined strokes as units of recognition and poked fun at himself and his age by talking about the song, "Different Strokes," calling it "a real groovy song, by the way." Group members guffawed and giggled. Returning from this brief diversion, Morgan again defined strokes and told us they came in three variables. The first is frequency ("every action deserves a stroke of some kind, every action deserves some kind of response"). He stressed the importance of positive strokes by suggesting that if we were small children attending our first day of school and the teacher was positive about our performance, lavishing praise on us, we’d feel very good about coming back the next day. Conversely, if the teacher’s strokes disappeared entirely over the ensuing weeks and months, "I think we can all see, it wouldn’t take very long for your metivation level to go down and for you to stop performing at the level she had recognized." The second variable was intensity. Morgan stated that any given stroke’s intensity should vary, based on the jJiitial action. He cited recent work that studied parents Who gave intense strokes (lavish praise) to children for any 145 and all —- even very minor -- actions, saying that when these same children entered school, they didn’t get strokes of similar intensity from their teachers, which created serious adjustment problems. "The intensity needs to be relevant to the activity itself," he said. The final variable was source. Morgan illustrated the importance of source by stating that if a line pilot complimented a fellow pilot by telling him that he was the best pilot at Aerostar, the line pilot would, undoubtedly, be flattered. But, he continued, if Aerostar chairman Mitch Weeks told that same line pilot that he’d heard he was the best pilot at Aerostar, the line pilot, because of the compliment’s source, would be even more flattered. Morgan mentioned that in Aerostar’s CRM program for flight instructors, facilitators stress the importance of strokes for line pilots from flight instructors. As he continued, Morgan asserted that the frequency, intensity and source of an individual’s strokes determines that individual’s outlook on life, how the world is viewed. Again turning to literature from the pop-psychology world, Morgan cited I’m 95, You’re 93 and drew the following chart, Which compared different attitudes: HEALTHY I’m O.K. You’re O.K. PARANOID: I’m O.K. You’re not O.K. 146 DEPRESSED: I’m not O.K. You’re O.K. SUICIDAL: I’m not O.K. You’re not O.K. Working his way through each category, Morgan told us that in pilots, paranoia isn’t necessarily a bad trait, saying: ...a little bit of paranoia is very, very healthy in a pilot. We want pilots to have a little bit of paranoia. You can’t blindly accept everything ATC tells you to do and all these things. Because of the nature of your work, you need to be a little bit paranoid. What we’re talking about is the insecure captain today, like on the tape, the one who just doesn’t trust anybody... Referring to those who are suicidal, Morgan noted, "Obviously, these are not the kind of people we want to have in our cockpit!" Continuing, he stated: The good news about this is that as a group, pilots are very, very healthy. Very, very healthy. Not only healthy physically, but healthy mentally, as well. And what I submit to you, one of the reasons why they are so healthy, is because flying airplanes satisfies this recognition hunger we all have. It’s a very, very good way to satisfy that. While asserting that flying satisfies recognition hunger, Morgan delved into some aviation history, telling us that being a pilot has not always been as prestigious and rewarding as it is today. In 1916, he related, pilot Selection was limited to those soldiers considered unfit for ground duty or suffering from combat fatigue. When this group of pilots crashed large numbers of airplanes, the Army re-thought its selection process. By studying the c3171aracteristics of those pilots who had been successful, the 147 Army decided to select individuals like them, and aviation psychology was born. From such inauspicious beginnings, a 1939 University of Michigan study found that being an airline pilot topped the list of prestigious occupations. Morgan then listed some of the characteristics that make up the pilot personality. Hedging a bit, he identified these as "characteristics which research says pilots tend to possess to varying degrees." The list included: (1) Physically/mentally healthy: (2) Self-sufficient; (3) High need to achieve: (4) Prefer short-range goals to long-range goals; (5) More concerned with modifying the environment than changing their own behavior; (6) Low tolerance toward personal imperfections (self and others); (7) Needs excitement; On this characteristic, "needs excitement," Morgan hastily added, "Now this doesn’t mean all pilots are bungee jumpers, although we know some pilots do do that, but what it does mean is that pilots generally don’t like a nine to five type existence. They do not like the boredom of a routine Situation." The list went on: (8) Doesn’t handle failure well; (9) Ignores and avoids inner feelings: (10) Avoids introspection; (11) Is cautious about close relationships; (12) Avoids revealing true feelings; 6? hi whl the 148 (13) Frequently uses humor to cope with anxiety; (14) Although intelligent, pilots are not usually intellectually-oriented; don’t enjoy traditional intellectual pursuits. Citing aviation psychologist Dr. Jerry Berlin, Morgan took the characteristics and drew them on a matrix on the easel, creating continuums: Linear ..... ...X... .......... . ............. Abstract Practical ..... X ........................... Theoretical Concrete ...... X ..................... ......Philosophical Competitive...x ........................... Nurturing Analytical....x... ........... ....... ...... Feeling As he wrote in the "X5" close to the left-hand side of each line, Morgan jocularly took a poke at himself while mimicking the stereotypical pilot: "Gimme a checklist. Gimme something I can use, something practical. Don’t bore me with these abstract, theoretical, philosophical concepts, i.e., CRM, right?" Morgan continued in his light-hearted tone as he proceeded down the list, especially enjoying himself when he came to competitive, asking rhetorically where the group thought pilots fell on that continuum and then answering himself: ...(T)hey’re going to be off the page over here on competitive, right? Pilots are very, very competitive individuals...they like to compete with others, but they like to compete with themselves, so we tell our flight instructors, take advantage of that trait... challenge them, allow them to compete with themselves in the flight training program...(If) you don’t think pilots are competitive you ought to see the comm exercises you did after lunch? The first thing the pilots do, and probably some of you in here 149 did the same thing, is you look over at the guy next to you and ’How did I do compared to him?’ It didn’t matter what your drawing looked like, ’Well how did I do compared to’...very, very competitive. Morgan went on, stressing the competitive personalities pilots tend to possess but noting with some irony that pilots "tend to marry nurturers, nurturers are social workers, school teachers, flight attendants, things of that nature." As Morgan spoke, there were knowing chuckles from the group. There was even more knowing laughter when Morgan went on to state, "And we generally add, they tend to divorce nurturers and marry another nurturer and another nurturer, on down the line." This prompted another by-now patented Morgan anecdote: One of our veteran pilots, I hate to use the word old, a veteran pilot, been around awhile, talking to a new hire sitting next to him and he looks over and he says, ’Kid, you want to know how you can save yourself thirty years of grief, right now?’ Of course the guy’s, the young man’s eyes got real wide and he looked at him and he said, ’Sure.’ He says, ’Right now, find three women who each hate your guts and buy each one of them a new house.’ Morgan again brought the house down, while making his point, saying, "One of the better quotes in the class." He continued with the list, emphasizing pilots’ analytical abilities, saying that pilots are hired for their analytical skills: ...(Y)ou can’t afford to get a fire warning light at flight level three-one-zero and break into tears, look at your co-pilot and say, ’I can’t cope with this. Please get me home safely.’ Pilot are hired becausethey are cool, calm and collected under pressure, under stress. 150 To re-emphasize this analytical quality, Morgan also cited Dr. Berlin’s research on the CVR tapes of fatal accidents, explaining that Berlin had never found a tape "where a pilot has broken down emotionally, even when that pilot knew that he or she was about to die." But, he admitted, there is a down-side to these qualities. While operating as a pilot, they can be considered strengths, he told us: ...(B)ut as you can see, when it comes to human relations skills or interpersonal-type skills, you can see they’re very, very detrimental. And it’s what makes teaching CRM challenging and causes many problems and is one of the reasons why many pilots’ homes break up, because of the fact that pilots, Jerry says, in counseling session after counseling session, particularly the teenage children of pilots, they’ll say, ’Well, I really know Dad loves me, I feel Dad loves me. But I don’t know if he knows that he loves me and if he did, I know that he would never say it to me.’ He says you hear that time after time because pilots have difficulty, one, recognizing their feelings and even if they recognize their feelings, difficulty in expressing them. And, as I said, that’s where CRM comes in to a great extent. And it was also his (Berlin’s) philosophical or his reason because you have these people with these traits -- strong in these traits -- is one of the reasons why we did experience some of the merger difficulties we did a few years back and the reason that really the people are ripe for these kinds of things to happen. Instead of team- building, it’s pulled apart, things of this nature. So it’s one of the things we’re trying to do in CRM to overcome these problems and try to help our airline move forward into the future. To end the class, Morgan showed a short video of a crew that did all the right things and was very successful. Again, he was unable to resist some comedy, saying, "We hope all of you continue to buy tickets with Aerostar Airlines. 151 Some of these crash videos may scare you away from ever flying again. We’ve probably filled Polly’s fear of flying class." Adopting a more serious tone, however, he continued, "But what we’re trying to show is we are making progress, we are meeting a need, just as this crew did." With that, he set the stage for the video, which involved an actual situation with an Aerostar B—727, out of Phoenix, bound for Dallas-Ft. Worth. After identifying the crewmembers by name, he played the tape. The tape related how, on board the Aerostar B-727, the number three (right) engine "suffered a catastrophic, uncontained failure, causing severe damage to the number two (center) engine, as well." The tape shows two of the three crewmembers re-telling the story -- in an interview format - - of how their CRM training made it possible for them to coordinate effectively during this in-flight emergency and successfully return to Phoenix, landing the airplane with no injuries or loss of life. Crewmembers discuss their initial reactions to a "loud bang," heard immediately after retracting the landing gear on take-off. After first believing they have a simple "engine out" situation, they quickly come to realize the situation is more serious than that. In addition to the initial engine failure, the number two engine is in "very deep and severe compressor stalls," although the crew has no fire warning indication in the cockpit. ATC notifies them about the fire. Relates the captain calmly and in 152 apparently typical analytical airline pilot fashion, "’Aerostar, you’re on fire. You’re on fire.’ And that, along with all the other things that were happening, you know, I thought, ’This is not our lucky day.’" He continues relating his problem-solving sequence: I thought number three had thrown some blades and was causing all the vibration. I still couldn’t figure out why the airplane was behaving the way it was. And I looked up there and I saw the EGT (exhaust gas temperature) for number two was pegged and then I realized that we didn’t have a engine failure, we had two, two engine failures. The captain takes the airplane from the first officer, who is initially flying it, at "about five or six hundred feet." Continuing, he relates: I remember that we were at V-two, approximately, with 15 degrees flaps, and one of the things that’s sort of drummed in you as you go through training is the seven twenty seven will not fly on one engine with flaps down. I said, ’Mike, declare an emergency and tell them we’re coming right back.’ I did take the one throttle, number one engine, put it to the firewall (maximum power) and called for flaps up, which is unusual in that we normally go from fifteen to five but I knew we had to get the flaps up. I knew that our time to make a decision...we had a very small window, maybe ten seconds until we were going to stall. Because the airspeed was decreasing, we could neither climb nor accelerate. At this point, the first officer offers that while the captain was evaluating the situation, he was looking ahead out of the airplane for a golf course or some other satisfactory location to land, saying, "When you say ’initially fly the airplane,’ you have to look out ahead and keep flying the airplane and I didn’t know where we were going to end up." The captain interjects again, sharing his 153 evaluation and decision-making process as the situation developed: I guess my reaction is that if I can just some speed back -- if I had to I was going to dive the airplane -- to pick up some speed. I knew that if I could get twenty knots, we had it made. But if I couldn’t, then we were, it was all over. We were gonna go into the river, or into the woods. The airplane would not turn to the right. So, then, I had to make another decision. So I decided then to come around and just ...sort of make a one-engine circling approach to runway two— nine left...As we got the flaps up and we got some speed, we never did get up to what Aerostar calls ’DZF’ -- we did climb. Once we had the flaps up and I looked up and I saw that number two was basically at idle, although the EGT (exhaust gas temperature) was pegged, I pulled number two back to idle and as soon as I did, it got very quiet. I mean, it seemed very quiet compared to all the noise that we had. My reaction is ’I am not going to shut this engine down’ because it has a hydraulic pump, and it has a generator. And as you know, on a 727 it gets to be sometimes, a little tough on one generator or one hydraulic pump. So, it was at idle and it was quiet so I elected not to shut the number two engine down. I also looked over there because number one was on the firewall. It, too, was on the peg. So I wanted to keep the time in the air down to a minimum. I didn’t want to go out and spend thirty or forty minutes configuring for a one-engine approach. And it was a good choice, because we didn’t have a lot of navigational instruments. Here the interviewer poses a question about how the crew had communicated with one another. The first officer, apparently choosing his words with care, comments that the second officer has done ...an outstanding job. He went to the single engine procedures right away. He got us the approach numbers -- I think the first thing he did was get us the approach numbers for our one-engine approach back to Phoenix. We could set up proper speeds, what would hopefully be the proper speeds for our approach back there. And he was, probably the busiest guy there... 154 The captain cut off the first officer in mid-sentence, saying of the second officer: He was great. And yet he didn’t pester us with wanting us to turn around and check something that he was doing. He could see that we were flying, we were working as a crew, and so he went and did what he had to do. And he secured the engines and came up with hard numbers and went through the single-engine checklist. The, it’s also a feather in Bill’s cap, too, if, I believe this was his first spot as a blockholder with Aerostar. Agreeing with the captain, the first officer continued, unwittingly providing further insight into the pilot persona: Well, the thing that kept going through the back of my mind was I didn’t want to screw up in a manner that people would talk about afterwards, saying ’If only they’d have done such and such, they would have been fine. If only they’d have noticed something else, they’d have been OK.’ So, at the time, we had to reevaluate the problem all the time, to make sure that we had caught everything and that the things we had done were the correct things and we had not, for instance, shut off one switch and probably shut off the left one and turn off the right one, things like that. I knew that we would be OK, but there was, of course, a steady, not a fear of what may happen... Again the captain interrupted his first officer. I wondered if the captain, a highly verbal, direct, and seemingly self-assured man, was impatient with the first officer’s slower, more methodical approach to describing the experience from his perspective. Or, might the captain be interrupting to avoid the possibility of a statement from a :pilot that might intimate that he was afraid during the situation? One cannot be sure. In any case, the captain stated: 155 Another thing that I have to think of. Somebody mentioned, what do you fear for your job? And I said, ’How?’ And they said, ’Well, you didn’t really do things according to the book.’ and I guess my reaction was, is, that there was nothing that the book covered. The book didn’t cover this. This was, here we didn’t have one simple problem, but we had multiple, multiple problems and so we were going through and sorting things out. We were improvising the entire time because there was no scenario ever written for this... The interviewer, perhaps to focus the limelight more evenly, suggested that the resources available to the captain came to him without his soliciting them. "They were just doing their job, but they were giving you information that you needed when you needed it. Would that be correct?" Replied the captain: That is absolutely correct. I had to keep the airplane flying and Mike and Bill were assisting and doing what they had to do. We were working together as a crew, without me having to say ’Mike, I want you to do this’ or ’Bill, I want you to do that.’ They knew what had to be done and they were doing it, leaving me to fly the airplane. The captain went on to describe the reaction of the flight attendants, who, unable to communicate with the cockpit due to the failure of the interphone, believed the airplane was doomed. What about utilizing the flight attendants as resources, too? The captain deemed communicating with them as a low priority, given the gravity of the situation. He told the interviewer the flight attendants: ...thought we were dead. It would have been nice to talk to the flight attendants and let them know...but I guess the most important thing that we had to do was fly the airplane. And we didn’t 156 have much time, there wasn’t time to call the flight attendants up and go into a big long briefing, because we simply made a left turn onto downwind and never got more than 1500’ above the ground at any one time. But they went through the cabin, talking to the people, because a lot of people were extremely upset. We had several of our pilots on board. We had several of our mechanics that were sitting back there in the back, and they, too, thought that it was all over. Once we cleared the runway and we taxied into the gate, and passengers were deplaned through normal means. The interviewer queried the captain about passenger reaction to the incident. According to the captain, there were a number of "hysterical" passengers, especially some "younger girls in coach," who had to be helped off the airplane by the flight attendants. When asked if he got involved with passengers at that point, the captain replied: No, I was standing at the door, standing in the door, saying thanks to the people as they got off the airplane. A lot of them, of course, they didn’t know the seriousness of the event and I downplayed that as much as I could. But they knew something was surely amiss, something very serious. One of the pilots, one of our pilots was sitting back in the back, he and his wife, when this was going on, he turned to his wife and said ’We’re not gonna make it’ and so, when we came around and he got off the airplane -- he was quite a large man -- and he came up and he gave me a bear hug and I had a little difficulty breathing there for few moments. There were some people who were pretty shook up about it. Concluding the video, the interviewer mentioned that the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) recognized the crew by presenting them with ALPA’s Superior Airmanship Award, and stated: "This crew is a team that utilized all of their resources -- themselves, training, and even their crippled aircraft -- to successfully return to a safe landing. And 157 averted a major tragedy." Seeking to end the day’s activities on a high note, Morgan reiterated the four words of CRM, "AUTHORITY with PARTICIPATION, ASSERTIVENESS with RESPECT" while the music to the video was still playing, saying "That’s what we’ve been talking about all day. And the crashes get all the headlines in the newspaper, but because of professionals like this, safe flights are going every day, literally thousands of them, and again, it’s unfortunate that it doesn’t get the publicity that when something goes wrong does." That said, Morgan asked us to complete Aerostar’s CRM program critique sheet before departing. Assuring us our comments would be treated anonymously, Morgan cited the value of such commentary for the improvement of this and the subsequent development of future CRM programs. While we completed our sheets, facilitators presented each of us with a CRM lapel pin, which was in the shape of an airplane tail, in Aerostar’s corporate colors, with the letters CRM emblazoned on it. "We do this for two reasons," explained Morgan. "Number one is to express our appreciation for your participation today. It’s been a really good group to work with...(W)e do it for a second reason also. We’d encourage you to wear this pin, to serve as a reminder of maybe the way you’re flying your airplane, some of the utilization of resources, some of the principles that we’ve talked about 158 today and maybe generate some discussion with other people in the interest of aviation safety." P 3° So bse at' s o Phas CRM Trai ' The August CRM program -- last in the "CRM - Phase 1" series that had reached every Aerostar Airlines pilot over a nineteen-month period -- provided a detailed tour of the specifics of the discipline that is CRM. The one-day course focused on: -pilot personality characteristics; -the "four words" Of CRM (AUTHORITY with PARTICIPATION, ASSERTIVENESS with RESPECT); -CRM and how it affects safety; -CRM-preventable real examples; -corporate culture and other pressures on pilots; -providing concrete examples of good CRM practices juxtaposed on poor CRM practices; and —demonstrating how personality characteristics spill over into the cockpit environment. Taught by a team of experienced facilitators led by Pete Morgan, the program provided no hard sell, but rather appealed to common sense, and the audience’s intelligence and experience, using actual videotapes and transcripts from past accidents. There were attempts to be interactive, but the program was largely pedagogical in nature. While student commentary and participation were encouraged, more often than not, facilitators rushed to fill empty space with 159 their own observations, often answering their own questions before any of us could do so. Apparently as part of the no hard sell approach, and in keeping with Jerry Berlin’s observation that while intelligent, pilots tend not to engage in traditional intellectual pursuits, scholarly research citations were kept to a minimum; other than Dr. Berlin’s research, the only scholarly work to which the program referred was a NASA cockpit communication study. References from outside the aviation environment were limited to what is considered "pop" psychology, i.e., Eric Berne’s Qemee_£eeple_£ley‘ and Thomas A. Harris’s I’m OK, You’re 9K. Classic accidents (CAL 1713, DAL 191), were handled separately using audio-tapes of actual cockpit/Air Traffic Control conversations superimposed on computer-generated simulations, which were based on flight data recorder information gleaned from the Flight Data Recorders or black boxes. Facilitators allowed a complete play-through of each situation, then went back and dissected the situation -- often phrase by phrase -— to discern and demonstrate what went wrong, where communication was poor or nonexistent, where crew members might have been more assertive, where more command authority should/could have been used to prevent the accident. It seems, from this first class, that what the organization deemed the most persuasive for communicating a CRM baseline to its overall pilot population was information and scenarios gleaned from actual accidents 160 or near-accidents. In other words, reality. We were provided with executive summaries of the crashes being discussed. Facilitators finely dissected the interaction between and among crew members, often stopping and replaying critical tape segments several times, being certain everyone heard and understood the points being made. In-house videos used actual line pilots, some of whom were acting out scripted roles, some of whom were not. These let us see actual Aerostar employees functioning normally in the simulators, or at least as normally as one could hope, given the videotaping. The absolutely unscripted, spontaneous obscene gesture made by one second officer in response to the dysfunctional behaviors of his captain, camera and all, demonstrates how little at least one pilot was affected by being filmed. As mentioned at the outset, while communication per se was not cited as the topic of the day, in point of fact, it was the theme for the entire class. The presumption is that pilots know how to fly airplanes, so technical proficiency is treated as a given and discussion about it discouraged. Where pilots are weakest is in confronting, dealing with, and communicating their feelings. They are reluctant to admit they are frightened or uncomfortable in certain situations. Said Dick Jones, the company pilot, about deciding not to take off in adverse weather, "It’s easy to make the decision when somebody else has done it before you. 161 It’s not easy to be first." Given their psychological profile, such pilot attitudes are to be expected. Throughout the seminar, we heard stories. We heard a lengthy vignette from a B-727 line captain, who described how he felt pressured to take off from Montreal in a terrible ice storm. He spoke convincingly of company- imposed (real or imagined) and self-imposed pressures, telling us nobody ever wanted to be the first to turn around and go back to the gate, but also mentioning how happy other pilots are to follow suit, once one pilot decides not to take off. But most of the stories came from Pete Morgan, whose story-telling skills and sense of humor were his primary instructional tools. Although playing the jokester through much of the day, Morgan was nonetheless able to gracefully shift gears and become serious when necessary. The back and forth nature of his delivery, in concert with the mix of activities, kept attention and enthusiasm levels high. What person, much less what pilot, could fail to be riveted to a videotape of a major airline crash? Who could fail to be moved hearing the last words of a highly experienced L-1011 crew as it blundered along the path toward certain death, a path littered with inept or nonexistent communication and poor decision-making? The sole apparent weakness was the facilitators’ inability to get the group to engage in any significant discussion of the issues being presented. Only B-727 Capt. 162 Dick Jones shared a relatively lengthy personal vignette that was illustrative of some of the points being made about the Continental 1713 crash. Other comments tended to be limited to one sentence. The facilitators, while soliciting comments, did not allow ample time to answer the questions, generally answering it themselves, or moving on to something else. The bottom line of this or any CRM course is this: Do CRM programs result in any substantive, lasting changes in how cockpit crews function? Do they improve communication? And if they do, is the overall accident rate affected by these changes? Morgan was quick to admit that, despite overwhelmingly positive commentary from participants’ critique sheets, there was no mechanism in place to measure program effectiveness. At the end of Phase 1, it seems, there is no clear-cut answer to CRM’s long-term effects or benefits. Multinle_Agenda§ Conversations with various management representatives demonstrated that Aerostar’s corporate agenda for the one- day, Phase 1 CRM program was multi-faceted, focusing on introducing CRM as a concept, selling it to pilots as a means of enhancing flight safety, and helping them become better pilots. Phase 1 was a day-long CRM indoctrination and was the first leg of a journey toward affecting a cultural shift 163 from the previous "bottom line" mentality of the former management team, to the new management’s emphasis on people. The video by chairman Mitch Weeks was one vehicle for carrying out this agenda item. Another was the Phase 1 culture module, whose purpose was to raise pilot awareness of damaging issues, i.e., red book/yellow book, male/female, military/civilian background. For facilitators, the agenda focused on presenting the script to all line pilots, selling the concept, and attempting to achieve some degree of acceptance of CRM by the program’s participants. Subordinate to the overall selling of the CRM message was persuading participants to look at flying situations from multiple perspectives, remaining flexible and being distrustful of assumptions. In addition, facilitators worked to fine-tune the CRM Phase 1 class through a daily review and analysis of written participant critiques. From a participant point of view, Phase 1’s agenda was simple; attend the required one-day class. Whether or not there was more to the agenda is not clear, as there were only two line pilots attending this session, and only one spoke up. Captain Jones’ agenda seemed to be communicating the pilots’ perceptions of peer/company pressures and the role they play in pilot decision-making. In his Montreal ice storm vignette, he strongly asserted he would have made a different decision regarding taking off were the threat of 164 censure and/or negative commentary from the airline and/or fellow pilots absent. sw ' e esea c estions The first RQ asks what is persuasive with airline pilots? Phase 1 CRM’s activities emphasized lecture, story- telling, and illustrative group exercises. Information came from NTSB findings on accident causation for CAL 1713 and DAL 191, "pop" psychology, and facilitator/participant experience. Facilitators established their credibility at the outset by stating their professional qualifications for teaching CRM; the use of Mitch Weeks’ video lent airline credibility to the endeavor. The class schedule was the likely driver in the choice to rely heavily on information dissemination, with group participation taking a backseat. There were no challenges from the participants to the facilitators. The class make-up -- mostly invitees, not Aerostar line pilots -- rendered challenges unlikely. It is not possible to know what facilitator challenges other groupings, with larger numbers of line pilots, produced. RQ2 asked what the airline wanted taught. In the case of Phase 1, Aerostar wanted an overall introduction to CRM principles, using graphic examples of the safety ramifications of poor CRM practices (CAL 1713, DAL 191) as well as an in-house example of how good CRM produced a successful ending to a potentially tragic situation (B-727 165 landing after two-engine failure on take-off). Aerostar wanted to provide a baseline CRM indoctrination for its line pilot population. RQ3 looks at tools and techniques. The Phase 1 CRM indoctrination class utilized the tools and techniques that became the staple of all three classes. The most frequently used tool was the videotape. Facilitators showed clips from actual accidents and from scripted simulator scenarios using actual Aerostar crews to illustrate CRM principles. The use of videotape made it easy for facilitators to stop and replay tapes in order to emphasize key points. The primary instructional technique was lecture, interrupted frequently by facilitator story-telling. Role- plays and group communication exercises were also employed during the one-day program. RQ4 does not apply to Phase 1 CRM training for the line pilot population. CHAPTER III INSTRUCTOR QUALIFICATION TRAINING COURSE: BRIDGING THE GAP Part 1; Course Introduction The November 1992 Instructor Qualfication Training Course turned out to be the last of the old-style instructor training programs; the new-style programs would begin in December of the same year. The so-called old-style program covered myriad topics, from adult education principles to Crew Resource Management. Interleaved were heavily technical segments, such as a module that dealt with Aerostar’s philosophy, policies, and procedures for handling windshear. Also included was a module on TCAS (Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System), an on-board collision avoidance system. The module brought instructors up to date on TCAS’s development and fleet deployment status. Another detailed Aerostar's "tolerances in pilot performances," in which instructors learned what Aerostar considered acceptable performance parameters for pilots in training. Figure 4 depicts the November program’s schedule, along with that of the one-day Phase 1 CRM program. The November program seemed above all to be what participants labeled a "square filler," a hybrid program characterized by a broad range of topics, most of which were mandated by the FAA for instructor qualification purposes. Because the pilot training at Aerostar was in a period of major transition, perhaps it is unsurprising that the 166 167 November program would attempt to satisfy FAA requirements while also meeting some of Aerostar’s new management team’s needs. Regarding CRM, the November program could be viewed as a bridge between the one-day Phase 1 indoctrination, and the up-coming Instructor Seminar, which would dedicate nearly two full days to employing, observing and evaluating CRM in the CRM LOFT environment. November’s CRM segment, which took approximately four hours, reviewed Phase 1 CRM basics and then paved the way for the more sophisticated soft skills —- evaluating intangibles like communication, team-building, workload management, and situational awareness -- that instructors were being asked to acquire and polish. This chapter describes several modules in the November Instructor Qualification Course. Not all modules are covered; those that were primarily dedicated to information transmission, with little if any facilitator-instructor interaction, if described at all, are described only briefly. Because this dissertation is not just looking at how CRM principles are taught in formal CRM modules, but also at how those principles may or may not bleed through into other areas, those modules with heavy interaction among participants were given closer attention than their titles might appear to warrant. Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Topic Day 1: Day 2: Day 3: 1.1 1.3 1.8 168 PHASE 1 CRM SYLLABUS: Why we need training in Crew Resource Management Resources available to pilot to fly safely Performance/Motivation Curve Components of Effective Aircrew Coordination Levels of Assertiveness/Communication Communication Skills (Barriers to Understanding) Aerostar Airlines Culture Accident Prevention Review of CRM Concepts INSTRUCTOR QUALIFICATION COURSE SYLLABUS .Welcome/Course Overview/Introductions .Aerostar Flight Procedures & Training .General Principles of Teaching/Learning .Aerostar Training Standards & Grading Criteria .The Airline Operations Specifications .Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) .Windshear .Advanced Simulation Training .Special Subjects (TCAS, Rejected Take-Off) .Fleet Training Captain Discussion .Tolerances in Pilot Performance .Crew Resource Management .Instructor Qualification Requirements .Exam and Course Critique .Roundtable Discussion Figure 5 Class Syllabi 169 Externally, at least, Aerostar’s training facility in November was a very different place than it was in August. No overflowing pots of blooms to greet arriving visitors this trip, just the relentless browns and grays of late autumn. Nonetheless, the atmosphere inside the building was as cordial -- in fact more so —— than it had been in August. Between the August and November visits, I had occasion to talk to Pete Morgan at some length as I planned my research. This helped me feel less like an outsider than I had during my initial time on site. I was welcomed like a returning friend. As in August, I arrived a day early so I could interview facilitators and discuss what this course hoped to accomplish. This particular course would run Tuesday through Thursday and was for experienced instructors who were becoming qualified to instruct on a new piece of equipment Aerostar was planning to obtain, the Airbus A-340, perhaps the most technologically-advanced airplane in the sky. However, as it turned out, sometime after this course was presented, the airline decided to defer the A-340 acquisition. On Monday afternoon I met with Josh Graham, who was scheduled to conduct the module on Line-Oriented Flight TTaining, or LOFT. LOFT is training that involves working with a full crew in a simulator. The crew is presented with a specific scenario through which it must work. While LOFT Scenarios are tightly scripted regarding the events that the 170 crew must work through, there is no one right answer or ideal solution; each crew behaves naturally and there are an infinite number of possible outcomes, including a crash. In a LOFT, the instructor or check airman functions as an observer, introducing the various LOFT events. In addition, the instructor fills all roles other than cockpit crew, including flight attendant, ATC (Air Traffic Control), dispatch, etc. LOFTs run in real time; they are generally not stopped unless there is some external interference. Instructors or check airmen may not coach crews. LOFTs typically are videotaped so that crew members can observe themselves during the de-brief that follows the LOFT and, it is hoped, learn from the experience. At the end of the de-brief, the videotape is destroyed. Facilitators observe and critique selected CRM behaviors. The emphasis is on how the whole crew functions together rather than each individual’s technical proficiency. Capt. Graham spent 22 years with United Airlines (UAL). He flew the DC-8 and was medically retired, arriving at Aerostar about five years before. Graham is a Scotsman with a strong accent and a dry sense of humor, who told me that if I had been going to videotape the class sessions, he would have worn his kilt! Probably 5’8" or 5’9", he’s a cIraggy-faced man with dark hair that was only slightly graying. I suspect he is older than his hair would lead you to believe. It is unclear whether he is past mandatory 171 retirement age (age 60) or not. When I said it was too bad he had been medically retired, he blew the comment off, seeming unconcerned. Graham’s emphasis in training is authenticity. That is one of the ways he establishes credibility with his students. In addition, his many years at UAL, the airline that gave birth to the CRM movement and LOFT training, further enhance his credibility. He is a very charming, easy-going man who sails and who, like me, used to live in Connecticut, so we hit it off well in August and again in November, discussing the merits of sailing in Aerostar’s territory vs. sailing on Long Island Sound, and whether or not I would make a good pilot. My first question had to do with how Graham went about establishing credibility as a facilitator: PKN: I’m making the assumption that at the outset any instructor has to spend time establishing credibility. Do you just give them what your background is? Graham: Yes, yes I do, because quite a few of these guys don’t know me and I find that those that find out that I’ve been (doing and have) done what they do and precisely what they’re going to do, a lot of them... the fact that I’ve administered and received CRM LOFTs, it gives me a whole different credibility. For Graham, facilitator credibility, it seemed, went hand in glove with overall LOFT credibility. Not every pilot will automatically accept LOFT as a training tool. ...(U)ntil you’ve seen yourself up there flying the airplane in the simulator, and really it’s very positive reinforcement for 98% of the people, it’s completely positive reinforcement. The only 172 negative is, and that’s the one that was supported by ALPA of course, was the fact that the guy stood up there and you had a record. PKN: I thought that with most of these programs they get to destroy the tapes... Graham: ...Well, that’s precisely what we do. We make a big point of destroying the tape in front of them. PKN: OK. But you go through the tape and you discuss what... Graham: ...Yes... PKN: ...what’s going on... Graham, from long years of experience at United, knows LOFT’s value as a highly persuasive agent for pilots: Graham: And you can turn back and say, ’In frame 346, look, you said that.’ And he’ll say, ’Gosh, son of a gun, did I?’ He’ll say, ’No, I didn’t." And you say,’Well...’ PKN: Let’s check. So they found it basically non- threatening? Graham: I think so. Um, I have never used it in a situation that would have been threatening. It was always presupposed it was a LOFT and we were going to learn from it. I don’t know what the reception would be if you had a guy that you were, you know, who’d failed two checkrides already and this was the last one and you said, ’Oh, by the way, I’m going to tape this.’ I think that’d be an entirely different kettle of fish. PKN: What about the 2% that don’t find it a positive experience? Graham: They’re, they’re the people that have probably done something a little bit less than correct and they don’t like their mistakes to be documented. Whereas before, there’s be a certain element of doubt that you said that, ’No, I didn’t.’ Now there’s none. It’s incontrivert— tible. It’s right there. 173 PKN: So, is part of what you’re teaching them, because they’re going to be instructors, is teaching them to evaluate other pilots in terms of how they perform on the... Graham: We are actually teaching them how to and what we’ll be talking about on Wednesday, is how to administer LOFT. This is the old recurrent training LOFT, which was LOFT in lieu of a check, which you’re allowed to do every second time. Like the captain has two checks a year, one of these could be done in a LOFT. Our talk progressed from credibility and overall LOFT training goals to crew complement. I inquired regarding the importance of having a whole crew available for the LOFT event: Graham: ...(V)ery much the crew concept. If it comes to the nitty gritty, and you're going to make the statement that the guys didn't do well the first time, pursuing the...disciplinary action...if you’re investigating that route, you’d make sure you had a crew. I mentioned to Graham that I had once observed a captain’s checkride at another airline, and was surprised by the apparent lack of effective communication between the check airman and the captain being evaluated. Initially Graham focused on the problems associated with older simulators and how idiosyncratic they can be, but then the talk moved on to how the check airman worked to overcome the communication barrier: PKN: I was kind of interested in how you would get over the fact that there was a real communication breakdown. Graham: You see, our teaching is no different from your teaching and that is, you’re going to do everything you can to get at that person. And you just have to try different avenues until you hit something. 174 Sometimes there are people that are almost oblivious to any approach (laughter) but normally if you show, especially with a pilot, you’ve got to realize the guy comes in there, not used to the simulator (and) you are. He’s nervous. His job’s on the line. All the pressure’s on himself. You really don’t put any pressure on him because you know very well you’re going to conduct a fair check. He doesn’t know that. Graham’s observation triggered a story from my own background, one in which I spent four hours observing a captain’s semi-annual simulator proficiency check. PKN: You know, it’s interesting, because...I sat in there (in the simulator) for four hours, shivering. When we got out, I said, ’You could hang meat in this thing. It’s so cold.’ And the captain whose checkride it was looked at me and said, ’You were cold?’ I said, ’I’ve been freezing for four hours.’ He said, ’My shirt is matted to my chest. That’s how much I’ve been sweating.’ You never would have known it from his behavior, anything in his tone of voice. No nonverbals, nothing else. And he said, ’I was dying I was so hot.’ Then I asked what Graham finds persuasive in LOFT scenarios: What have you found when doing your LOFT? How persuasive is the rhetoric that gets used? What, if anything, do you do to persuade the pilots that you’re training that the LOFT is the way to go? Graham: Well, I go to great pains to say it’s line-oriented flight training. That means it’s realistic. We don’t do things like we did in the training you probably watched. We don't back up the sim and do another approach. You do everything in real time. We do everything as much as we can with a real crew. The instructor, once the flight starts, is not there as an instructor. He’s there as ATC, ground control, anything outside, maintenance if they’ve got a problem. But he’s not there as an instructor. They have to sort out their problems. So it's totally different from what you watched, which was a check. This one, we let them dig a hole for themselves if they’re so inclined. What you watched, the person was a pass or a fail. There is much less of a pass or a fail in LOFT. It’s 175 much more. In fact, we rate it as ’Complete’ and ’Incomplete.’ Obviously, if we found somebody who was absolutely incompetent, that couldn’t fly in our estimation, we’re duty bound to identify and provide training and a check. But that would happen very, very rarely. It’s almost like post- graduate training. This guy can fly, now we’re just doing the niceties. I summed up what we’d been discussing with respect to facilitator credibility and persuasion in a LOFT environment and mirrored back to Graham my interpretation of his remarks so far: PKN: What I’m hearing is you can be particularly persuasive one, just because of who you are, with the background that you have and the many years of experience with CRM, with LOFT, so that by presenting yourself and giving a rundown on your background, you’ve established credibility right there. And then the emphasis is on full- mission...authenticity... Graham: Total authenticity. And also, them buying the fact that they're in an actual airplane and they will do everything that they do. The pick up the log book and they don’t understand it, then they have to dial the appropriate frequency and call line maintenance. PKN: ...(H)ow do you get them to buy into that? Graham: Well, you just explain it to them and then if they try to turn round and say, ’Hey, Josh, what about that?’ you say, ’Well, what would you do in the airplane?’ It says cell line maintenance, call line maintenance. They go through it and you answer. Most of them find it, that it’s a good learning experience, and most of them enjoy it. Wanting to dig a little deeper into what Graham attempted to teach pilots about being pilots in a LOFT environment, Graham anticipated my question’s direction and began speaking even before I’d finished asking it. 176 PKN: What are you trying to teach them about being... Graham: I’m trying to teach them about themselves and how they manage a crew, by putting them in a series of situations that they probably would not find themselves in a normal airplane ride...(T)hat’s the whole advantage of simulation. You can afford to do this. PKN: So, for somebody to be a good instructor for the LOFT portion, what are you teaching them? Graham: I think I want them to be as knowledgeable about the airplane, knowledgeable about the environment and I want him to present the problems as they would happen in the airplane, reasonably. We don’t want them to pile on one thing on top of the other. Obviously, if you pile on things, you can reach everybody’s saturation point. It’s got to be realistic, but yet you can still, as I say, you can do things you can never do in the airplane. The realism of working in simulators, coupled with well- constructed LOFT scenarios, produces effective learning experiences that home in on the CRM skills Aerostar is attempting to develop, according to Graham: You can fail engines, you can have fires, you can, some of the most persuasive ones are, you get into a problem with, you don’t have all the fuel you thought ’cause this tank isn’t feeding. So, suddenly, instead of having plenty to go to your alternate, you don’t have quite enough. Which way would you pick? And how much do you use the co- pilot to call up and find out what the weather was there? Or the engineer, if you’ve got one? How do you run your cockpit to get you all the optimum information you can all the time? So you can stay ahead of the airplane? That’s exactly what you want to do. Anybody that’s ahead of it is sitting there supremely confident that if anything comes up, he can handle it. Given all this simulator realism, I wondered aloud how far instructors would let crews go. Would they ever let them crash the simulator, I inquired? 177 Graham: Yes, I think there are times that it might be a viable thing to let the person crash. Most of the time it’s not, it’s a destructive thing if you let them crash it. Ah, one way I can say that we teach windshear, we teach varying amounts of windshear and one of the windshears that we used to teach was unsurvivable. And that really impressed people because it’d give them a healthier respect. If every windshear you ever looked at you’ve been able to fly out of if you did it right, you’ve a little bit more cavalier about it. If you know that there’s one out there that you can’t, so your only way of surviving it is not taking off or not landing into it. I told Graham about a commercial pilot I knew who, because he had successfully flown through every windshear his airline could generate in the simulators, believed there were no windshears he couldn’t conquer. Capt. Graham’s response was swift and emphatic: (T)hat’s absolute balderdash, because every airplane has it’s speed. There have been windshears documented in Denver of 87 knots. There’s no airplane that could hit that right and fly out of it. So, I mean, he was probably trying to impress you, but he was wrong. My final question was what he knew about the students in the class. Unfortunately, he was not familiar with any of them, with the exception of DC-9 fleet training captain Walt Pierson, so I was unable to get the inside track on who would be in the classroom with me the next day. BQIL_21__D§Y_QQQ The seminar’s classroom was an amphitheater-style room with three rows of seats. There was a three-panel dry ink board at the front, in the center of the room. To the right was a lectern, with an overhead nearby. There were track 178 lights illuminating the front board and a sign "Welcome to the Instructor Qualification Course" displayed prominently. Each row of seats becomes progressively longer as they move toward the back of the room. The last row seats between eight and ten students. At the back of the room is a projection booth and a training aid that looks to be an A- 320 cockpit array placed on a cross-shaped board. The carpet was a gray and tan tweed, the walls were tan and maroon and the rosewood-trimmed table tops completed the theme with their tan tops. The class was small, only seven participants, and of these, just five were really becoming qualified. Of the two who were not becoming A-340 qualified, one was Aerostar’s DC-9 fleet training captain and the other one of the FAA’s on-site representatives; both were observers who participated actively in classroom activities. Normal instructor qualification class size is between twenty and thirty students. The core five instructors came from different fleets. There were three B-747-200 instructors, one A-320 instructor and one B-757 instructor. All male, the students ranged in age from probably mid-forties to mid- fifties. Because the class was so small, it was possible to get a good look at each of the students. Apparently the most 179 senior were two of the B-747-200 captains who I initially tagged "The Bad Boys," for reasons that will become obvious. In the interest of clarity, however, I’ve named them "Charles Bronson" and "Jimmy Cagney" for two of Hollywood’s more notable "bad boys." Unsurprisingly, Bronson and Cagney chose to occupy the last row in the classroom. Alone in the first row sat DC-9 fleet training captain Walt Pierson. A friendly, sandy-haired forty-something man with an upturned nose, Pierson wore his Aerostar name tag prominently on his suit coat. Behind Pierson, on the right side of the room, sat FAA representative, Ken Rogers, a Texan, judging by his drawl. Probably in his late fifties, Rogers wore gold—rimmed aviator glasses, a white shirt with a dark tie. His dark, graying hair was styled in a brushcut. One vacant seat down from Rogers in the second row was Sam Tucker, an A-320 captain who appeared to be the youngest student in the class. Mid-forties and heavy-set, but not fat, Tucker had dark hair, graying at the temples. He was dressed casually that first day, wearing an off-white V-neck sweater with a blue button-down collar shirt, dark slacks and loafers. Also in the second row, but on the other side of the room sat Joe Williams, the B-757 instructor and check airman. Likely in his mid-fifties, Williams wore a green blazer, a beige/yellow shirt, olive slacks, and print socks with his loafers. He, too, wore metal aviator glasses. 180 Next to Williams sat B-727 captain Tim Clarke, a nondescript man with graying hair who also dressed casually and wore aviator glasses. He looked like he was in his early fifties. Taking up residence with me in the last row were Cagney and Bronson. Bronson, a mustachioed man who referred to himself as "the graybeard of the group" was sporting a blue and white gingham shirt, gray slacks, maroon tie, and tweed sport coat. He too, had dark, graying hair and wore gold aviator glasses. Bronson was a long-time B-747-200 captain, instructor, and check airman. Cagney, about Bronson’s age by the look of him, was also a B-747-200 instructor and check airman. Lighter complected than Bronson but graying, too, Cagney was attired in a striped shirt and print sweater. Bronson and Cagney seemed well-acquainted on arrival. As with the August class, we began on time, precisely at 8:00 a.m. with a welcome from course organizer Tony Dawkins, Aerostar’s B—757 fleet training captain, despite the fact that only five of the seven students were present. It seems that at Aerostar, time, tide and training wait for no pilot. I had been introduced to, and was able to have a fairly extensive conversation with, Tony Dawkins the day before the class began. Capt. Dawkins, at first glance, appears to be the quintessential ex-military officer he is. Tall and distinguished, wearing still the military bearing drilled 181 into him during his four years at The Citadel, Dawkins was not only surprisingly warm and human, but also a very, very funny guy. The interview I had planned to conduct immediately went by the boards as we discussed a wide variety of topics that were hardly limited to instructor pilot training in CRM. While I never did find out precisely what Dawkins regarded as persuasive to him as a pilot, I found out a great deal more in several other areas. I marveled at how easy it was to talk to this man I had only just met. As we conversed, it seemed as though we had been acquainted for a long time. Dawkins opened the session by establishing the course ground rules, emphasizing participation, schedule, program parameters and goals. That done, he introduced me, allowing me time to talk about who I was, what I was doing, answer questions, and get class members to sign consent forms. In keeping with Aerostar’s concern about punctuality, however, it was made clear before the class began that I could have no more than five minutes to address the group. Nobody had any particular questions and the initial participants signed the consent forms with no problems. In fact, everyone seemed quite uninterested in this study, and were surprisingly nonchalant about issues of confidentiality. At 8:30 a.m., while Dawkins was still involved in his introductory remarks, the two stragglers, Bronson and Cagney, entered the classroom, taking seats next to each other in the back row. On seeing them come in, Dawkins 182 proceeded to zing them for their tardiness, saying, "Oh, I see you’re of the 8:45 persuasion." There could be no mistaking the disapproval in his tone and his facial expression, and it came as a surprise to me after having seen only Dawkins’ amiable, light-hearted side the day before. Apparently unmoved by Dawkins’ remark, Bronson immediately shot back with, "No, we’re of the 8:30 persuasion," his tone equally negative. There was no further discussion but later that day, during another module, Dawkins publicly apologized for his remark. With all class members present, Dawkins continued talking, working through the initial pages of a handout contained in each participant’s class notebook. The first dealt with VISION. Dawkins read the handout aloud: To build together a Flight Procedures, Training and Standards Division that provides outstanding support to the Aerostar Airlines’ pilots. To be recognized as an industry leader in Flight Procedures, Training and Standards -- having superb instructors, staff, technical support and resources, all committed to exceed the Aerostar Airlines pilots’ expectations every day. Continuing, he moved to MISSION, again reading from the handout and telling the group that it was Aerostar’s mission "to produce the best-trained, most competent, and most professional pilot in the airline industry." This statement of the training arm’s mission evoked an immediate, and somewhat skeptical response from Walt Pierson, the DC-9 fleet training captain, who was concerned that while the words were fine, the application often didn't match them. 183 "It’s easy to sit here and just read these words, but to apply them is something else," he said. Dawkins responded by reminding the group of how things had been under previous management regimes. Citing a best-selling self help book (The Sev Ha 't O: Highly Effective People), he explained that the organization, via its mission statement, was establishing and broadcasting its overall goals and values. Given the new management structure and players at Aerostar, Dawkins compared the new regime and the old one, which seemed to be clueless about how pilots reacted to earlier stated values, or really, a lack of corporate values. It was natural, Dawkins seemed to be telling Pierson, to be skeptical about the mission statement, when previously there had been no stated corporate values beyond focusing on investment returns, as opposed to people. How many people are aware of a book called The ' ' t' e? ...recall one part of that book and one of the first things to do is in that book is to sit down and kind of come up with your own mission statement. And...statement as an instructor pilot or father or whatever, but what they’re looking for in a mission is a kind of an all-encompassing thing that sort of establishes what your values are. And I think values is really kind of a strange concept for this airline. The values I used to hear Stan Smith talk about were a five percent return on margin. I remember the guys on the hill would kill for a five percent margin, but what I’m telling you is that those issues didn’t quite translate to the pilots...(I)t just didn’t make sense. So, hopefully, you know, over time these things will be there’ll a little bit like a constitution. They take a little bit of interpretation. They mean different things, like 184 Walt pointed out...how you feel about them will change with time. GUIDING PRINCIPLES and PHILOSOPHY were mentioned, but not given the same thorough reading and discussion as the first two, and Dawkins quickly went over the organization chart, saying, "...you see there’s the new management team and then the fleet captains and then the training captains and then the flight instructors and all the permanent staff. It kind of shows where you fit in and what your reporting structure is." After that, Dawkins reviewed the requirements for becoming qualified as an instructor pilot. While Dawkins was speaking, the first facilitator, Tom Mitchell, had entered the room and waited quietly for him to finish before beginning his four-hour module on adult education. ’s d W ’ While Mitchell’s module does not particularly relate to CRM and will not, therefore, be discussed in depth, it was nonetheless interesting to listen to individual student introductions, which provided the opportunity to find out a little bit more about each participant, and his expectations for the course, in his own words. First was Walt Pierson: My name is Walt Pierson. I’ve been involved in the training department since 1989, ah, fleet training captain in DC-9, MD-80 I’m responsible basically for the check airman’s simulator program. My expectation of this course, I guess, is to see the transition between what we used to do in check airman training to what we do today. And, what I hope we do today is to prepare a line 185 pilot through this course to become an instructor pilot, to give the quality of instruction we put forth on Aerostar Airlines. And leading eventually to check airman status. Next came FAA representative Ken Rogers: I’m Ken Rogers with the local air carrier office. I’ve been here for twelve years in the local area and I guess my end of it is on the other end of it and that is to observe on the results of the instructors. As far as that, I came up through the military and I taught, I was always in the military, was always in maintenance. I taught at the test pilot schools for a few years for the Department of the Army and again, like I say, try to evaluate now being here, trying to evaluate the end results of instructors and trying to see how the people come out of the training course. Then, next to Rogers was Sam Tucker: I’m Sam Tucker and...I’ve been doing instructing in the three-twenties... (my) expectation of the course is to better prepare myself ah, and investigate ways to communicate to students better...I always use the analogy that I’m always reaching for the lowest common denominator, which is me. I try to anticipate what the student needs and to explain it as clearly as I can and I think I probably do that (by) identifying what needs to be said and saying it...everybody understands. I think most of our training in the sim early on...programs it was like as they say, drinking out of the fire hose. There was so much that had to be covered, and boy, if you just hiccup once, you’re behind it. On to Joe Williams: I’m Joe Williams. I’ve been in training for about six years...captain on the seven-four-seven...last two and a half years I’ve been on the seven-five- seven as an instructor/check airman...never been through a formal course like this. I guess I’m probably here to compare and you’re going to tell me what I’ve been doing and see how I’ve been doing it. I rated myself on the techniques and the philosophies that I had instructing, grade myself, I guess, see how well I’ve done. 186 In this comment I got my first clue that this course, contrary to my initial assumption, was anything but old for some of its participants. According to Williams, not all of them had received formal training in how to be an instructor/check airman. Tim Clarke was next: I’ve instructed on the DC-9, the MD-80 and the seven-twenty-seven for about ten years. Simulator and IOE (initial operating experience), and all those. I think that the instructor course, what it appears to expose the guy to (is) basic teaching and learning principles so that you know how to conduct yourselves, how to relate something, to teach someone things relative to our...OK, that’s what I think. I was surprised when Mitchell asked me to follow suit, but I mentioned that in addition to being most interested in the final day’s CRM module, I also wanted to see how, if at all, CRM principles bled into other modules, now that all line pilots had had the full day’s CRM training. Then we moved to the Bad Boys, Cagney and Bronson. Cagney, who was sitting next to me, spoke first: Well, I’m Jimmy Cagney. I’m a seven-forty-seven- two-hundred instructor. I’m going to be working on the A- three-forty program. I’m not sure that I can say anything that hasn’t already been said, other than this organization’s finished product is a qualified pilot at the end of it. And I guess my expectation is what can Learn here that will enhance my teaching abilities as an instructor to ensure that our finished product, the qualified line pilot, is the, is even more so. Finally, it was Charles Bronson’s turn to introduce himself and talk about his expectations. His introduction become part of a dialogue with Mitchell, and was a portent 187 of what was to come regarding his overall course participation: I’m Charles Bronson. I guess I’m the long-haired grey beard around here. I instructed in an Air Force school back in the early sixties...like this we taught instructors and that was really emphasized. It was a thirteen week school, so we got into it a lot deeper than we’re going to here. Mitchell: Which one’d you go to, by the way? Where? Bronson: Randolph, DIS. I was an instructor down there. Mitchell: I went to Maxwell. Bronson: Oh, you did? And, well as you know, we got into that aspect of it a lot more and if you’re instructing to the student you had to be able to understand what the student was all about...bringing change over the years, ah, the receptiveness of the younger people that we’re working with today...different kinds of instruction. I mean you can’t have ’em drag on, hang onto the wingtip of the airplane any more with your parachute buckled on and drag ’em around the airport and teach them a lesson. These kind of things don’t work (Bronson was laughing as he said this). But, you know, so you have to tailor your techniques to what you’re working with. 3f 010 t 00.1 ,,0! ‘ -tog ' 0 5: 1‘0-.- And so, introductions and expectations shared, the class took its first break. Because they had arrived late, Bronson and Cagney had not signed my consent forms, so I approached them as we headed for the door. It was to be my first encounter with the issue of credibility that is so important to airline pilots. I had never considered that my credibility might be questioned by -- or even particularly important to -- class members if for no other reason than 188 in order to even he on site, I had to have Aerostar management’s blessing. I was surprised that Bronson was quite aggressive with me, asking flatly, "What qualifies you to do this?" As I ran through my professional background for him, I mentioned working for a major defense contractor on various avionics projects for the U.S. Air Force. Bronson’s response was a skeptical, "Well, you couldn’t possibly have done anything technical on those projects, could you?" I told him about my managerial roles on those projects. When I mentioned my experience working for the Air Line Pilots Association, Bronson continued to be gruff, skeptical, aggressive and intense, demanding to know who I worked for, who I had trained, and where I had worked (the old location in Washington, D.C. or the new location near Dulles Airport, in Virginia.) Both pilots pressed for information, wanting to know more about my defense industry work. "Are you a computer nerd?" sneered Bronson. As I discussed my background, I mentioned the name of a former Aerostar Airlines consultant, telling them he had been influential in some of my career decisions. Hearing this, Bronson stormed out the classroom door, obviously angry, leaving Cagney to explain. According to Cagney, the consultant had conducted a seminar for Aerostar’s B-747 pilots during which he’d remarked that those pilots were the most non-standard he had ever seen. According to Cagney, at that point, all of the B-747 pilots shut down for the rest 189 of the presentation. While Cagney and I talked, Bronson returned, coffee in hand, explaining that "When I get upset, I just walk away." He offered no apology. This encounter reinforced the notion that airline pilots take the issue of facilitator credibility extremely seriously. I was reminded of my talk with Pete Morgan earlier in the year, in which he had told me that initially he was prohibited from teaching the day-long CRM class because he wasn’t a pilot, merely a back-seater. Well, Morgan had overcome that barrier, and successfully handled that class, even adding Reg Pierce, a dispatcher, to the mix. Nonetheless, in nearly every module in each class I attended, I watched the ritual in which the facilitator took pains to establish his or her credibility. During the final class I observed, in January 1993, I was questioned by more than one participant about my background and purpose, but the approach and accompanying questions were significantly gentler than the ones posed by Bronson and Cagney. When I interviewed Reg Pierce in January, I discussed the November interchange. Pierce suggested that Bronson and Cagney were engaging in an activity he’d seen often, in which some pilots feel the need to display their "machismo" to see whether or not someone will "give" or "push back." We agreed, though, that as a guest, my only option was to "give," no matter how much I might have wanted to "push back." The penalty for pushing 190 back might well have been removal from the current class and a dis-invitation for the January one. v' ° Ad Te chin Strate ies Tom Mitchell, facilitator for the morning’s module on adult education, was a large, burly man whose size was accentuated by his booming voice. Bald on top with a fringe of white hair on the sides, Mitchell wore silver aviator glasses. When he entered the classroom to begin facilitating, he was wearing a white shirt with a blue/gray/red necktie. He had apparently left his suit coat in his office. Mitchell remained in virtually perpetual motion throughout the session. Blessed with an energy level any two-year old might envy, he was barely still for a moment, using his body, his voice, his sense of humor, every resource available to him to track what was happening and keep the class moving. Mitchell discussed his background with the students, but not until after the instructor participants had introduced themselves and the class was well underway and had completed one preliminary exercise. Then, with what was uniquely his own decidedly folksy delivery, he introduced himself. As was typical of his teaching style, Mitchell took the long way home: There was a student in the room with one of you folks, an Aerostar pilot, obviously an instructor, and been an instructor for years and years. Fits the mold of any one of you. And he was sitting there with this glare, you know. I mean I 191 couldn’t help but -- not the kind of glare you see in me -- I mean just another type of glare, and his arms are folded like this (demonstrates his arms folded across his chest) and he turned to me and he said, ’Who are you and what gives you the right to teach a pilot?’ I said, ’Oh boy, this is gonna be a fun day.’ It was a kind of fun day and it took a long time to establish the fact that some of the stuff that I was presenting I had (taught) for a long time. I realized then I was not alone in needing to establish credibility with the instructor participants. Finally, he got to the heart of his introduction: For those of you who don’t know me, my name is Tom Mitchell. I’ve been teaching this course or one like it since 1966. I told you I went to Maxwell to the academic instructor course? My next tour was an instructor. And I was, I went to Mobile, Alabama and I started teaching this class in 1966, at the end of 1966 and I’ve been teaching it ever since. And we started having it here, that's a couple years, I’ve been doing it. I started doing this at Aerostar about three, four years ago. Moving from his own history to the history of the Instructor Qualification Course and his module, Mitchell explained his goals: Then We, Joe Williams and I, were talking during the break about how this course has evolved from ’Here’s the book, it’s your turn’ and we focused on the content as opposed to the process...(B)ut I have been doing it and I’ve tried to keep up throughout the years on the latest techniques and the latest theories and the latest principles of education, particularly in adult learning and that sort of thing. And what we have done in -- since I inherited this course -- is really try to make it really basic. It really is because it’s something that I enjoy doing. There’s a lot of different ways to approach it. he returned to his personal history, finishing it up. So that’s where I am. I spent thirty years in the Coast Guard. I’ve got a few thousand hours, (I was a) check airman. I’ve been, when I had my one 192 tour not flying was, I was the officer in charge of the National Search and Rescue School. If you want to know anything about search and rescue, I can at least tell you what it was five or six years ago. Been with Aerostar...now about five or something. That said, Mitchell segued into talking about learning. His emphasis was on the history and development of adult teaching principles and techniques for working with adult learners that stress participation by those learners. Most, although not all, of Mitchell’s presentation was straight lecture, despite hie admonitions to include adult learners in their own learning. I wondered if this was a function of the amount of material Mitchell needed to cover in his four hours, the smaller than normal size of the class, that particular group’s group dynamic, or multiple factors. When I interviewed Mitchell I asked about that, and found that he felt disappointed by the atypically small class size, and frustrated with the particular grouping of individuals, which produced the heavy reliance on lecture. Mitchell told me he prefers a larger group with more interplay among group members, and, concomitantly, less lecture. This class structure forced him to resort to lecturing more than he preferred; rather than having the instructor participants provide illustrative, first-person stories about their own experiences as was usually the case, Mitchell was forced to rely on his own stories, and carry the class in ways with which he was not entirely happy but for which he was prepared. 193 Mitchell shared his personal experiences in his folksy, friendly manner, and told the group about various flight instructors he had encountered -- good as well as bad -- encouraging but not getting much participation from the group. Occasionally, as in the dialogue below, he dipped a toe or two into places where CRM principles fit nicely into his lecture, evoking an immediate, defensive response from Cagney: Mitchell: ...I mean, when we get into the simulator, we’re really thinking about can you get the airplane from point A to point B, follow all the rules and the guidelines and do it safely and operate within traffic control systems, in and through and around weather and, and, um, abide by all the laws of the land, whatever they may be, the FAA or CAA or wherever you happen to be. So that’s what we’re really concerned about is the, is doing the job. Going ahead, he acknowledged there is much more to flying an airplane than the stick and rudder skills once deemed sufficient. A whole crew was available to be considered and used. Only lately, only lately in the last few years has, have we become ingrained in us that it’s, that flying an airplane is a hell of a lot more than that. Because the psychomotor skills, if we depended on that alone, if we depended only on our psychomotor skills, we’re gonna get our butt in trouble. And there’s more than one person flying the airplane. That, that whole concept is relatively new to us. Now, what do we call that concept? CRM. Sure, crew resource management. We’re managing, it’s an attitude that says, hey, we’re doing more than just one person flying the airplane and the other person turning switches and reading checklists... But Cagney was unimpressed and discounted CRM’s value, laying claim to the need he saw to emphasize technical 194 flying skills. There wasn’t enough time, he claimed, to deal with attitudes. He did concede, though, that given more training time, he’d be willing to reconsider his stance. Cagney: (interrupting)...Tom, I’ve got a question. It seems to me that by the time I’ve, I get a student, that I don’t have the time, first of all, in my training program, to devote time to attitude or cognitive things, that by the time that he gets to where I am, he oughta know those things and that we’re gonna concentrate on his psychomotor skills and learning to fly this particular airplane. Now, if we want to Open up the training programs and include a lot of these things, then that’s wonderful. But we don’t have time for that. Mitchell assured Cagney that he needn’t change his instructing style, but did not alter his view that there was a strong relationship between attitude and/or behavior changes and improved psychomotor skills. They were all part of the whole, he was saying, and could not be ignored. I’m not suggesting that you change your style, Jimmy, I’m just suggesting that you recognize that these domains of learning exists...that’s all, that’s all I’m saying on this, is that we have to recognize that there are other domains of learning other than the psychomotor skills and of course we’ve already gone through some of these...that would indicate that even the psychomotor skills may be improved by a change in behavior and attitudes, a change in behavior of cognitive skills to really understand the level of learning. Despite the lecture format, for a while most group members appeared to be engaged in what was being said. But, as lunchtime approached, the instructor participants were beginning to sag. Charles Bronson was leaned back in his chair, eyes nearly closed, while Jimmy Cagney was leaned 195 back, arms tightly crossed over his chest. Everyone in row two, with the exception of Sam Tucker, looked disengaged. Only Tucker, who was taking notes, looked alert. After lunch, Mitchell continued his lecture, and presented the performance-arousal curve that is a staple in the CRM program, describing it in a rather more roundabout fashion than his CRM counterparts had: And it’s called the performance-arousal curve. This curve began, you’ve seen it before, every one of you has seen it. But we tend to forget it. This performance-arousal curve suggests...what this says is performance along the vertical axis will increase as arousal increases. Is that correct? A-r-o-u-s-a-l? As arousal increases, up to a point, up to a point. If we could put arousal, and you’ll see this those of you who are students of college football will recognize this instantly. The arousal portion. What’s the first thing to do after the team runs on the field from the locker room? Sure enough! Yeah! They’re all together and the coach is trying their best to build up their arousal. So, and they want to build them up to that peak. While he spoke, Mitchell drew the curve on the dry board, illustrating each point he made. Then he shifted slightly and defined what the airline dubbed "managed stress" and went on to talk about how stress effects performance. Management has taken that a step further and called this other, called it stress, managed stress. Setting deadlines, holding people to it. That’s managing a certain amount of stress. What this does, it manages people to operate at their maximum efficiency. This curve may be different from what’s in the big book, but let me tell you something. Everybody, everybody’s got it. OK? You can and you do it easily, you can manage stress to the point that productivity or performance drops straight down. You all know this. You’ve been doing it before. You’ve seen it. You’ve had to manage the tasks in the cockpit to the point you can’t keep the blue side up. 196 TQm Migcheii Interview While Mitchell relied primarily on what another facilitator nicknamed "The Telling," it was obvious from speaking with him one-on-one that he preferred otherwise. Mitchell and I met late in the day after Day Two's classroom activities had ended. I began by asking what his particular goals had been: Mitchell:...(T)he instructor seminar is designed to prepare the instructor to assess CRM and other things, how to work with the crew during LOFTs as opposed to training someone how to fly an airplane. This three day course...is designed to give the instructor the basic tools necessary to provide, to be able to teach, teach anything. Particularly how to fly airplanes. From overall goal, we touched on exactly who was participating in the program and the kinds of people who are selected to become instructors and check airmen, since one topic of conversation during the module he taught dealt with the issue of screamers, impatient, intolerant, angry instructors who are universally abhorred by student pilots. These types employ screaming at students to get desired results from them. PKN: Who are these guys (referring to class members)? A couple are very tough, but none seem to be screamers. Mitchell: There are probably some out there -- a minority -- who don’t know it’s not OK until they go through training and that corporate culture would not tolerate that kind of behavior. We switched from screamers to what is persuasive with instructor pilots when they are students themselves. While he began by emphasizing the instructor participants’ own 197 experiences as highly persuasive, he unwittingly moved to a discussion of one major barrier to effective cockpit communication, the air line pilot population’s nearly universal avoidance of talking about feelings, I think that the pilot instructors, particularly the pilots that we have here, and I suspect it’s probably true industry-wide, have tremendously high egos. Many of them think that their experiences are very important. And they are. And they’re super-important to them. And they like to share those experiences. They love to sit down and talk about those experiences. And it’s very obvious that they don’t do that in a social setting. They don’t talk about how bad this instructor was or what a bad experience this was. They just don’t do that. But when they have an opportunity to open up and say ’Hey, this was a good experience. I liked it. It gave me a warm, fuzzy feeling. I knew that learning really took place. I was really happy. I was proud of myself. I was proud of the student. I was proud of management. I was proud of everything, it just worked out great.’ People just don’t do that. Pilots just don’t open up and talk about those sort of things. I asked him, as a pilot, to elaborate on why pilots had trouble expressing emotions. Was this unwillingness to talk about feelings part of the overall pilot culture? It was, he confessed, and admitted to having no immunity in that area himself. But in his module, Mitchell helped pilots overcome their reluctance to talk about feelings by making them participate in exercises geared to elicit feelings. In the classroom, pilots would then go ahead, since participation was part of their professional requirements: Mitchell: Well, I guess it’s, I guess it’s that there were some studies done -- you can check with CRM -- I don’t recall who did it -- I think it was Jerry Berlin that came up with this initially and says, ’You know, pilots, if we had to categorize 198 pilots, they don’t like to share their feelings and they don’t, they don’t like that,’ you know. It makes them vulnerable and they just want to go by a checklist and they’re very linear thinkers and they just want to do things in order and ’Gimme a checklist and I’ll do it.’ It’s as simple as that. The exercise that I had them go through, reflective thinking on their part, the, to go back in time and look at some things that made them feel good or feel bad, I just don’t think pilots are gonna talk -- I wouldn’t, I don’t like to share my innermost feelings like that, which drives my wife nuts -- but in any event,they do it in a business setting like this, they recognize ’Hey, this is part of it.’ PKN: Is it a sense of not being vulnerable and feeling safe in that environment? Mitchell: Yeah, I think so. I think they just feel safe. They know that it’s required of them. This is the next thing on their checklist that they are supposed to do. That helps from the training and educational standpoint because it provides an activity, you know, it’s something that they can do. Then we discussed the individuals in this particular class, and why it had been less than satisfying for Mitchell as facilitator. We hit on a variety of reasons for his discomfort. Mitchell: ...(T)here wasn’t as much fun this time and I think it was because of the people, I know it was. It was just the makeup of the class...(T)his class was just a little different and I think it was probably because of the age of the people that were in there. PKN: Were these guys older? Mitchell: Yeah, they’re a little bit older than the typical...see, ’cause I can get -- the people we typically get are some people like this and some people that are just starting out as instructors, never been an instructor before. PKN: So you get more of a mix... Mitchell: ...more of a mix, yeah. 199 PKN: My sense was these were pretty senior captains. It was obvious that Mitchell was keenly aware of the participants and their attitudes and behaviors during his module. He had not missed anything as the morning progressed. Mitchell: Yeah, they were...(B)ut Jimmy Cagney, you notice him, sitting next to you? He was really turned off at the beginning of class. There was, the nonverbal communications were...he started coming around about the third hour, he started. I even made the comment, ’Well, if you don’t want to participate...’ and it was almost as though the light bulb turned on. The eyes lit up, probably a little bit of anger on his part ’cause -- that I would say that... PKN: Well, you know, they got nipped when they first came into the room, were you there? I was referring to Tony Dawkins’s wisecrack about their late arrival, and Mitchell confirmed my initial impression of Bronson and Cagney as Bad Boys. I continued talking about them, telling Mitchell I perceived them as: PKN: ...(M)ore skeptical and more willing to question and perhaps coming up with what’s persuasive for those two is a different kind of challenge than what’s persuasive for the other five? Mitchell: Absolutely. Yeah, they really were. You remember one question he asked about that very simple model that I had about challenge vs. skill? They were really, Charles Bronson was really getting down to the nitty gritty...yeah, he really was picking nits. He really was. And I tried to field the question, it’s not important, the important thing is the concept, not the technical way to read the chart and that’s what I was trying to say. I’m not sure I ever did get through. I think he just wanted to say, to disagree with something. 200 Searching for a way to link CRM with Mitchell’s adult learning module, I asked if he had any sense of what the instructor participants were thinking about. Mitchell elaborated on his earlier commentary about pilots’ dislike of dealing with feelings, and the need to focus on the whole person rather than on technical skills alone. PKN: With this particular group of people, with respect to concepts you were trying to get across that might relate to CRM, what would you say these guys were thinking about, basically? Mitchell: I think that particularly when I get into the model of the domains of learning where they’re broken up into the taxonomies of affective, psychomotor and the cognitive, I think that’s the first time that many of the people have really thought about that as being the whole person. They’ve been focused so much for so long for so many years on the content of the material that many times they don’t think about how people, how the people really do feel. I have a sense that they’ve hidden their feelings for so many years, their own feelings, that they really don’t want to recognize that anybody else has feelings as well. Or attitudes, or you know, they just do ’em and that’s the sense that I have and that’s the feeling I’m trying to break down. I’m trying to change their behavior so that they will look at a student or a trainee as a person, a person that has different skills... PKN: You’re trying to get them out of a unidimensional view of their students... Mitchell: That’s right. I’m trying to look at more of a macro type thing, more of a, the . holistic view of a person as opposed to the, just how well somebody flies stick and rudder...1t’s a lot more than that. We briefly touched on Mitchell’s feelings about having an FAA representative in the class and whether or not it affected his presentation. 201 Mitchell: Yeah...I was kind of watching what I said, you know, I was making sure that I, that I, I made doubly sure that I met the objectives and what’s required under 121-413 because he was there more, he had a dual purpose of being here. He wanted to go through the class but he was also observing the class and he’s gonna report on the performance, you know, so I wanted to make sure...and that may have affected my presentation somewhat. It just made me a little more cautious you know, to make sure I dotted all the Is and crossed all the Ts because it’s necessary to do that. I just was doubly cautious. My final question for Mitchell had to do with pilots having difficulty accepting instruction from somebody who is not a pilot. Along with the question, I mentioned that I had noticed every facilitator almost immediately take pains to establish credibility with the group and also told him about the aggressive and skeptical attitude I’d encountered vis a vis my consent forms. PKN: Generally, what have you found is persuasive when you teach a pilot, vis a vis rhetoric or technique? Mitchell: By building on their own experiences, I think, the teaching can come from them. They just have to feel as though the idea is theirs. If they take ownership, they’re gonna learn, they really are. And I think it’s if anything is persuasive, it’s just not letting it be my idea or the idea of a Bloom or a... PKN: I sense that with this group, citing an academic’s view is minimally persuasive. Mitchell: That is not persuasive. But what is persuasive is to say, ’There it is, there is, it’s there whether you like it or not. Now let’s prove that and you do the proving.’ That’s what I try to do is make them prove that that works or doesn’t work... PKN: ...’cause they’re hands on people... 202 Mitchell: They’re hands on people and that’s what they like. And then you can just see them c1ick...and it’s really interesting to watch the dynamics. I usually spend time with the groups...I’ll just pull up a chair and sit and listen. And it’s really interesting to listen to the dynamics saying ’Hey, you know, there really is something to this law of effect because, or you know, there really is something about how adult learners prefer the straight how-two stuff instead of what, cause I really don’t care why.’ Mitchell, an experienced pilot and long-time instructor, was sensitive to and aware of the ways in which pilots think and learn. He understood the importance of moving instructing beyond its earlier technical skills boundary to encompass and embrace intangibles that emphasized interpersonal skills. After so many years’ experience teaching pilots, he was adept at fine-tuning his own presentations in order to meet his students on their own ground. His physical size, and outgoing, cheerful personality combined with his heavy experience to render Mitchell a difficult target for instructor participant challenges. Who could argue with a person who was as passionately dedicated to turning out better pilots -- by looking at and utilizing the whole person -- as the instructor participants themselves were? ’s m ' ' les The remaining hours of Day One were spent telling the instructor participants about Aerostar’s Operations Specifications. This represented a major shift in emphasis; the morning was devoted to instructing adults, with the 203 focus on intangibles, such as how people learn. Now, abruptly, the focus became feeding the group factual information for which the group was the intended conduit from the airline to the line pilot. As mentioned, because many of the session’s modules do not relate directly (or, often, even indirectly) to CRM principles, they will be covered only briefly. Of chief interest with these modules will be ways in which facilitators establish credibility with the students and ways in which students challenge facilitators. The facilitator for Airline Operations Specifications was an ex-fighter pilot named Jack Mills. Currently working in the Flight Support Services Office, Mills is about 6’ tall, with salt and pepper gray hair. For this session he wore a white shirt with Aerostar name tag, a multi-color tie and suit pants sans suit coat. Before the session began, I asked Mills to sign a consent form and as we talked, he told me that he had been a fighter pilot and had no interest in becoming an airline pilot, saying, "If I wanted to drive passengers, I’d have become a bus driver." He went on to make several humorous comments about airline pilots, saying, "...some of these guys aren’t human." As a facilitator, Mills was what can only be described as a live wire, a man who sparkled at the podium. Introducing himself, he described his background as from "...Montana...a non-plastic...cowboy." In the back row, 204 the Bad Boys contrary to the rest of the group, via their identical twin body language -- frowning and leaning back in their chairs with their arms tight across their chests —- appeared to be conveying they were unimpressed by Mills’s fighter-pilot background and Montana cowboy roots. Ever the Bad Boy, Charles Bronson launched a dialogue with Mills regarding the definition of an "emergency." Bronson complained that there used to be a useful definition in the flight manual, but that someone had removed it: Bronson: My question is why did we take the definition of emergency procedure out of the manual so that we don’t have anything to hang our hat on because we, it says we can go into an emergency airport in an emergency situation and I think if you asked anybody in management in the company, they’d say you have to have an emergency. Let’s say you have a scenario of events from maybe one to a hundred and I guess in order or seriousness you’d say OK, number 50 is an emergency, but is number 49 not an emergency? When do you actually have to declare an emergency? Mills: If you declare an emergency on every flight, you’re going to have a lot of, you know, a lot of handwriting to do... Rogers: (interrupting)...Well, you’ve got to have a reason. Mills: That’s right...if there’s a reason and you’re a responsible enough pilot, that’s, that’s the decision that you make and you say, ’Hey, this is, no, I, this is business as normal is over. I, ah, I have, I need a different level of involvement from and support from individual people.’ Bronson: You can declare an emergency virtually any time, let’s say you want to get home early for your son’s football game and you want priority handling. I declare an emergency? What are you going to do? 205 Mills: Everybody’s gonna find out about it because an... Bronson: (interrupting)...there’s, there’s nothing you can do, no one, no ticket action, ah... Mills: No, but I’ll almost guarantee you that if you did that, I think people have been given a couple of days off for that kind of involvement, you know. Charlie Poole (the chief pilot) talks to those guys. Mills encouraged the group to utilize their CRM training and the resources available on the airplane by relating the following anecdote. In it, a newly upgraded B-727 captain caused himself and the airline major embarrassment by not availing himself of all the resources -- in this case written documentation of acceptable alternate landing sites for the B-727 -- that he had available to him. Had the situation been more critical, his error could have had disastrous consequences. As it was, his biggest problem was taking off from an airport not considered adequate for a B- 727. But, forced to rely on other resources, he was able to leave successfully. The moral of Mills’ story was to avoid such incidents by reading the manuals each pilot carries in his flight bag. ...DC-9 guy went through the program, you know, great guns, you know, got upgraded captain on a 727, flying along, has an emergency. His alternate went down. His destination went down. Alternate went down. ’ Oh, hey, I’ve been in that one many times, we’ll go right over here, you know, get some gas and go on, you know.’ Lands, you know, or he’s on short final and the tower, you know, he says ’Cleared to land,’ says ’This is gonna be nice, because we’ve never seen a 727 before.’ (Knowing laughter from the group over this.) It’s too late. He says, ’O-O-O-O-O-OK.’ He knows, you know? Calls up and says, ’Hey guys, 206 I’m here. I’m at a place that doesn’t have an ’A’ on the page, what do I do now?’ He calls over to FAA, talks to the rep, and got the guy the information he needed to get out. There was performance information for the 727...and he made sure he faxed the information over there. Weight and balance was done and he came out and says, ’Hey, I’m embarrassed,’ but you know, certain things like that happen and we can take care of them, but if you look in the book it will help keep the road a little smoother. Bronson, embodying the finding that pilots prefer to change their environments rather than change themselves, was unwilling to accept the level of responsibility Mills was asking him to shoulder. He immediately challenged the assertion that things would be better if pilots looked in their flight manuals before deciding to land at a particular alternate airport, citing an example of a dispatch mistake that, conveniently, occurred before Mills came to work at Aerostar: Dispatch isn’t always the answer, either. We had a dispatcher dispatch a 727 into Reno once when it was an emergency airport. Probably before your time, about seven, eight years ago. Boy, the captain got in all sorts of trouble going in there, ah, using an emergency airport as an alternate and he wasn’t completely blameless but there were a lot of circumstances there...(laughter from the group) While Mills declined to absolve Bronson of responsibility, neither was he about to get sidetracked into a lose-lose argument, so he set off on the high road and resolved the question this way: There’s, there’s a point of trust, you know. There’s a point of trust that you have developed with me without even knowing it. And there’s a point of trust that you have a dispatcher and you may not even know him, you know. And he with you. 207 And you know the pages that are in here have been validated on certain criteria and we try to keep them up to give you that information. And if all the pieces or one of the pieces falls out, then hopefully, the other two or three that are there will help bring it back to a good solution. After several minutes’ more discussion of flight manual pages and what the Bad Boys thought should be included -- a period during which no other class members participated in the dialogue, but rather sat back and observed the interchange -- Tony Dawkins returned. Inquired Mills, "Is it test time already?" Despite Dawkins’ presence, Mills continued talking for nearly an hour more, giving class members his telephone number prior to departure, encouraging them to call him if they had any questions. The day’s quiz was then handed out, Dawkins left, and the group proceeded to work on the quiz collectively. It was unclear to me whether or not this was standard procedure, but nobody seemed to think the collaboration was unusual, so apparently it was the norm. Once the quizzes were completed and turned in, class let out for the day. Day One got the Instructor Qualification Course off to a fast start. A block of time was dedicated to uncertainty reduction, that is, getting to know who the class participants were and what they expected to glean from the course. The class also got acquainted with overall coordinator Tony Dawkins, who outlined the mission and goals the new management team established for training Aerostar pilots. For most, if not all of these instructor 208 participants, this was their first official interaction with the new regime. The skepticism that was voiced was understandable, considering Aerostar’s long and colorful history of adversarial labor-management relations. Further, the first day set the tone for the subsequent two days with respect to who the class leaders or characters would be. Without question, from the moment of their grand entrance, the Bad Boys established themselves as a force to be reckoned with. Walt Pierson and Joe Williams stood out as well, but they chose to express themselves and handle difficult issues with less cynicism and hostility. Day One covered a lot of material, particularly Tom Mitchell’s extensive lecture on the history and development of adult learning concepts. While less than enthusiastic about sitting through a lengthy lecture, the group, due in part to its small size, but mostly because of its negative collective attitude, had only itself to thank for the lack of lively interaction. Mitchell saw no alternative to lecturing when other techniques failed. The inclusion of Mills’s presentation was puzzling. It seemed that what he had to tell the group could have been transmitted equally well via a memorandum to all instructors. Or, perhaps, as a part of a release of updated flight manual pages. 209 a t ° Two CRM LOFT Intreduction Wednesday’s session started, as expected, right at 8:00 a.m. with Josh Graham’s presentation on Line-Oriented Flight Training. This module will be discussed in depth because LOFT is a major vehicle for transmitting CRM principles to line and instructor pilots. All instructor participants arrived on time, sat in the same seats they’d occupied the day before, and were dressed almost identically from Day One to Day Two, with the exception of one class member who opted for casual attire like everyone else, rather than the coat and tie he’d worn the first day. The facilitator for the module was Josh Graham, substituting for Director of New Programs, Rick Edwards. Graham immediately set a low-key, friendly tone for his talk by stating, "I should introduce myself to all of you but that doesn’t explain why I’m up here talking. The reason I’m up here talking is because Rick Edwards is not here. And I’m standing in for Rick. As you know, Rick’s a hard guy to stand in for." Graham provided a detailed personal and professional history, to establish co-membership and credibility: I’ll give you a little bit of my background that’ll ensure some credibility maybe. I’m Scottish, before everybody asks, so that explains the accent. And when I was a young lad of eighteen, I was called up and I joined the British Air Force. I did that for four and a half years. Then I thought it was more lucrative over this 210 side of the Atlantic, so I joined the Canadian Air Force and I spent ten years there. That’s where I first got into instructing and all that stuff. And then United was recruiting in Montreal in 1966 and again, was the challenge of the bigger buck, joined United and in 22 years with United progressed through all the normal things. I was flight instructor in DC-6, then went back and flew the line for about 14 years and went back into the training center and I was on the 727 and the DC-8, and I was a check airman and flight manager. All the normal stuff that people like you go through now. While I was there, I was fortunate in one way because United...did CRM...so I have been exposed to LOFT for many years and I’ve been lucky enough to both participate in and given CRM LOFTs and LOFTs with the camera. It’s been my experience that the thing that really puts LOFT together for the pilot is when he can sit up there and see himself, and it’s so much more...reinforcing... Then Graham stated his goals for the module, telling the instructor participants how he saw their role in LOFT development, sounding a theme that we would hear again, that the instructor/check airman corps was the key to successful integration of CRM and LOFT principles across the entire pilot population: (W)hat I’m going to try to do is familiarize you...with the LOFT concept and hopefully this will help you be a better facilitator. When we look down the road, I think all of us will agree that this is precisely the way we’re going. It is essential that we have the body of people like you, you are the leading edge of the pilot population. How you accept things and how you portray them is largely how they’re going to accept them. Graham’s presentation emphasized what is called a recurrent LOFT, one that is part of a pilot’s annual recurrent training (ART), and which is considered to be a no 211 jeopardy training event. No jeopardy means that the LOFT training exercise, while commented upon and critiqued by a check airman/facilitator and the crew performing the LOFT, is not a pass/fail situation. LOFTs, unlike checkrides, cannot be failed; one’s flying status will not be jeopardized for poor performance during a LOFT. The sales pitch continued as Graham asserted that pilots prefer LOFTs, saying, "I haven’t met anybody who’d say, ’No, I’d rather do an old-fashioned check than do a LOFT.’" That said, Graham gave a small teaser about the soon-to-be inaugurated new training program, and cracked a joke that was quite sexist in nature. Surprisingly, it elicited only a small chuckle. I wondered if the smallness of the reaction was because I was present (the only female there) or because the students were more enlightened about that kind of humor in a professional environment than one might have anticipated. Continuing, Graham displayed a slide, using the overhead projector located by the lectern, on which he laid out the schedule for the rest of the session: Background, Concepts, LOFT Types, LOFT Phases, Crew Composition, Hours Involved, Scenarios, Evaluation, and Documentation. At the outset, Graham explained some of the key differences between old-style checking and LOFTs, stressing the facilitator’s role in observing and commenting on non- technical skills: 212 Now, you’ll be looking at a little bit more of how does a person get on with his crew. Does he have a resource that he could have used and he didn’t? So it’s not...black and white. You’re not looking at the motor skills and the procedures and systems knowledge quite as much as you’re looking at communication, decision-making, team-building, workload management, situation awareness. This is relatively new territory for most instructors, long accustomed to quickly evaluating and correcting a pilot’s technical skills and abilities. Graham also told the group that LOFT has been sufficiently successful at Aerostar that it "...was allowed to be substituted for PC (proficiency check) every alternate PC..." and mentioned the FARs (Federal Air Regulations) that applied, offering to obtain copies for the students. Graham went on, neither soliciting comments nor receiving any from the group. As he spoke, he stood behind the lectern, wearing half-glasses, and apparently reading from some sort of outline. This, he told us, was only the second time he had taught this module and the outline was put together by someone else, presumably Rick Edwards. The first major point Graham hit upon was the crew concept and what Aerostar was trying to accomplish in that regard: What we’ll try to really promote when we talk LOFT...is the crew concept. And, what you’re trying to do...(is) expand the operational experience and knowledge of the flight crew. You place the crew in an environment that’s semi- similar to which they operate on a daily basis, so they should be completely at home. It takes away some of the tension of the checkride. 213 Graham, along with Mitchell a believer in realism as the key to persuading pilots, took pains to stress the importance of creating as real an environment and situation for the LOFT crews as was humanly possible. That way, it was hoped, the crew would behave as they normally would on the airplane. As with other simulator work, the instructor was not to interfere; the crew was expected to rely on itself and as many external resources as it saw fit to utilize, considering the circumstances. It’s training that’s conducted in real time...and the time is exactly as it would be in an actual airplane. You try not to preposition or back up the simulator and do another approach or anything of that nature...(A)nd the big difference is the crew is not assisted, questioned, or interfered with...at any time...(T)he crew is expected, in fact, it’s demanded, to function as a coordinated team, make their own decisions...using their own resources, according to SOPA/SMAC... Graham emphasized that LOFT scenarios had the same overarching goal -- to improve flight safety via better crew interaction: ...(W)e hope by doing this to improve total flight crew performance. And because we’re in the simulator and can introduce more specific sets of circumstances which are interdependent, we will hope that we prevent these incidents...or certainly if they do happen,...the crew will be better able to cope with them...All LOFTs should emphasize the importance of operating the aircraft utilizing the coordinated efforts of every crew member. As far as you’re concerned, we want you to stress the necessity of following SOPA. We want you to emphasize on crew discipline. And above all, we want to stress the importance of solving problems as a crew. As Graham spoke, the Bad Boys were sitting in their back row seats with their chairs pushed back from the table, 214 leaning against the wall behind them. Again, they seemed isolated from the rest of the group. It was not readily apparent why this was so. Were they just naturally aloof? Were they antagonized by something Graham said? Were they feeling remote because they’re more senior than the others? In contrast, the members of row 2, Joe Williams and Tim Clarke, appeared to be totally absorbed in Graham’s presentation, sitting with almost identical body postures, leaning forward, chins on hands. Other class members were either following along in the course notebook or alternating between their notebooks and the presentation. Graham continued to lecture, running through the types of LOFT (recurrent, qualification, or special purpose), the phases of each LOFT (briefing, pre-flight planning, flight segment, and debriefing) and how long each should take. The first question from the group came from Walt Pierson, the DC-9 fleet training captain, who voiced a concern about having to be ATC during a LOFT scenario, complaining that: ...we don’t give check airman instructors too much training in how to be ATC...there isn’t training on how to be ATC. As you know, you can give a holding instruction as an ATC person that yields nothing but confusion...so it’s incumbent upon the check airman himself to make sure that his ATC work, his terminology and stuff is understandable to the pilots. That’s an area where I think we have not quite grilled in yet. Graham assured him that each LOFT scenario had a written script, so there should be no problems with portraying ATC instructions correctly, saying, "There shouldn’t be any doubt, because one thing we don’t want is 215 your interpretation of this LOFT being dramatically different from yours to two different people. Although they’re not ever going to be the same, but we do want them to be standardized to a certain extent." With that, Graham returned to his lecture. And Pierson, apparently satisfied, said no more on the subject. Graham moved to LOFT crew complement, that is, the required composition of a crew, and began to address what substitutions are acceptable, and what are not, but before he could immerse himself in the topic, Cagney raised a question about the day-to-day sequence for single visit training. Graham answered immediately, again attempting to return to the specifics of crew complement: If, after doing your very best, you can’t find a crew for this LOFT, there are substitutions allowed, and if we’re talking about the PIC (pilot in command), the PIC position can be filled by another line-qualified PIC. If you can’t find one of them, a pilot instructor of that airplane can fill that out. I’d like you to note, it’s not kosher for you as an instructor conducting the LOFT to jump in the seat. You can’t do that. So, anybody that’s qualified in the seat can do it except the guy conducting the check. He continued in the same vein, discussing various acceptable substitutions for each cockpit seat position, making sure everyone understood the ultimate limitation being placed on the LOFT instructor with respect to crew complement: In a three-man crew, if the FE (Flight Engineer)/SO (Second Officer) is absent, you can use another line qualified FE or a FE instructor. If you absolutely can’t do this and you can’t get anybody like that, you’re forced to revert and give a PC (proficiency check). 216 As he worked through the outline, Graham’s manner remained low-key. Perhaps deliberate is the term that best describes his approach to the class. He lacked the oomph of a Tom Mitchell, and the high-energy sparkle of a Jack Mills, but exuded relaxed good-humor as he proceeded; it was clear he was enjoying himself during the session. The next topic, no jeopardy training, evoked some lively exchanges, particularly from Charles Bronson. Clearly anticipating at least the potential for some sort of negative reaction from the group, Graham took pains with his description of no jeopardy LOFT training: We like to think of LOFT as graduate school. The guy knows how to fly. He’s been out there, but we’re just adding to his knowledge. No jeopardy is very much misunderstood. Let me read it as much as I can so that I can get it absolutely right because it’s slightly different from what I was used to. The first thing that you have to realize is that you don’t issue a passing or failing grade anymore. When you do LOFT, and I’ll show you the form shortly, it says either ’COMPLETE’ or ’INCOMPLETE.’ As we’ve been saying, the LOFT scenario is allowed to continue without interruption. No sooner was this said than Bronson interrupted with his first challenge about how he perceived this stated notion of what no jeopardy really meant to instructors and line pilots. To him, being taken off a trip due to poor LOFT performance did not look like no jeopardy: If you reckon that the person does very poorly on the LOFT and you recommend them for further training and a proficiency check...(H)e’s removed from his trip, he has to get this additional training before he can take the next trip, so he’s going to be off line. What’s the difference 217 between that and actually failing other than the fact that this... Graham: (interrupting)...It’s a very...thin line, but the basic thing in the LOFT, you let the person, you present the situation, you let the crew get into it and sometimes their solution will not be yours and they’ll go down the path and almost kind of dig a hole for themselves, but if the actual way they fly and things like that are concerned...(S)o if, the LOFT, if you identified deficiencies in the crew member performing as a crew or utilizing the crew resources, you might also recommend that you give, be given additional training. Now that could be another LOFT or a PC. Graham acknowledged Bronson’s concern, but held onto his position that more training might be required. He went on to place responsibility on the instructor to gauge whether additional training was needed. Bronson, however, was not satisfied with Graham’s response and persisted. Ultimately, Graham retreated. That’s...quite often you’ll see that they’ve made decisions that produced unwanted results. And an unwanted result doesn’t really really indicate a training failure. You have to kind of look at it as a learning experience and then you have to take all your own (experience) and everything and decide, well, has this guy, have they learned from this, is this a good experience? Or is this something that they wouldn’t have run up against as opposed to this guy is not safe, he can’t fly this airplane. Bronson: Well, I think this is really been sold to the guys in a misleading fashion. We’ve always said, ’Well, you can’t bust a LOFT.’ And you couldn’t. I mean, there was no provision in there for giving a person a down and putting it... Graham: ...As I say, you either mark it ’COMPLETE’ or'INCOMPLETE.’ Bronson: ...but now there is. I mean, in effect, when you take a man off the line and give him training and a PC afterwards, and this can be procedure knowledge too, not just basic flying 218 skills, but also SOPA/SMAC. If he, if he if it’s said that the deficiency in these areas, ah, you know, then you’re required to take him off the line and it’s exactly the same thing to my thinking as busting a PC. Graham: Well, I agree. It’s a fine line and I, not having been a check airman with Aerostar, don’t really know. Having encountered a hole in his own professional experience, and not readily able to satisfactorily address Bronson’s concern, Graham sought assistance from other class members. When nobody jumped in with a comment, Bronson opined that "I just think it’d be presented to them fairly as to what it really..." But before Bronson could finish his sentence, Graham, apparently feeling more comfortable, seized the opportunity to segue into the general realm of debriefing a LOFT to state: Oh, oh it has to be. Yes, you have to be up front. They will come up with things and very many times they’re a lot harder on themselves than you would be. So, the learning comes from the crew debriefing themselves and bringing out any. points that they missed. This grade, the LOFT is complete or incomplete only. A brief discussion of which forms to complete for LOFTs and the appropriate office to receive them then followed, with Walt Pierson playing a leading role. Cagney talked about the differences between PCs and LOFTs, stating that he believed they should be totally different. Graham agreed, but Bronson did not, saying he saw no difference between a LOFT and a type rating. Graham mentioned a couple of significant differences, saying that LOFTs should not have 219 nearly as many failures as rating rides, and that unlike rating rides, LOFTs have no pre-ordained list of maneuvers, because in LOFTs the goal is, as he put it, "to get happenings to happen." He continued, telling the group, "You people are setting the tone and standard at Aerostar." The discussion moved away from LOFTs, digressing into PCs, with everyone agreeing there should be no surprises during PCs, with the exception of a V1 cut (the point during the take-off roll at which power to one engine is cut by the check airman) or a rejected take-off (RTO). The absence of standardization is apparently universally perceived to be a problem; for once, everyone is in agreement. Graham, pulling the discussion back on track, talked about how events from PCs can be tied into LOFT scenarios, then moved to discuss instructors using their best judgment when conducting LOFT scenarios. He reemphasized not deviating from the LOFT script, but did say that instructors might choose to delete portions of the LOFT if time was a factor. He also discouraged using what he termed "compounded emergencies" but emphatically stated that instructors should focus on "realistic operational conditions, creating a real-time learning experience." Finishing, he told the instructors that Aerostar wanted them to supply feedback to their training captains: ...(I)t’s a complete versus an incomplete that we’re looking for on the file. I think we’ve had a healthy discussion today and I certainly learned something about it...I hope you learned something. 220 I know I did. And I’d just like to thank you all very much. With that farewell, he finished and the group took the first break of the day. Capt. Graham’s open and friendly manner, coupled with his extensive pilot background and easy familiarity with CRM and LOFTs, made for a smooth and informative presentation, despite his admitted inexperience teaching the module. He was confident but not authoritarian, willing to be challenged but unafraid to admit his own weaknesses or knowledge gaps. It seemed that Graham’s wholehearted endorsement of LOFTs ultimately won over everyone, including non-believer Charles Bronson, who had voiced his concern about jeopardy vs. no jeopardy training. Even he had to drop the bat when Graham stated with eloquent simplicity that the key to true no jeopardy training was instructor fairness in conducting the LOFT itself. Bronson held the solution his problem in his own hands. WWW Back into the room, promptly at 9:30 a.m. ready to talk about windshear, strode B-757 fleet training captain Tony Dawkins, who greeted each student by name and quipped, "It’s like deja vu all over again." By this time, all but two class members had returned from the break, but Dawkins began his talk anyway. At 9:39 a.m. the first straggler, Tim 221 Clarke, arrived looking sheepish. He was closely followed by Walt Pierson, who was carrying coffee. By this time, it was abundantly clear from observing and from talking with instructors and students, that it is considered critical that class begin and end at the appointed hours. Breaks are taken on schedule, and whether students are back or not, class continues. I was uncertain whether this was a contractual issue or whether the maxims of adult learning, i.e., beginning and ending classes on time, are taken seriously. Perhaps it had to do with the fact that many of the managers, and the pilots, too, were ex-military. Or, it could also stem from the general on- time mentality that any airline must embrace if it is to retain market share. Dawkins did not begin by establishing his credibility during this module any more than he had done so with his opening remarks on Day One; apparently everyone in the class was aware of his role and stature at Aerostar. Instead, he began by stating his goal for the module: What I’m going to do this morning is spend just a few minutes with you, actually maybe more than, more than a few, we’re gonna show a video that was a result of a kind of compilation of the body of knowledge of windshear. You’ve seen it before, but I want you to take a look at it from a different point of view, and that’s the instructor that’s going to sit down with the student, show the video, and kind of debrief the video, kind of go thought it that way. It’s post-Delta 191, so it has the current philosophy on windshear, which is go to a pitch attitude. They’ll talk a little bit about avoidance of windshear, a lot of things that you can do.They’ll show an analysis of weather summaries and things like that which 222 probably we don’t do very well at Aerostar looking for windshear. (Windshear is defined as any sudden change in the wind’s velocity or direction. It is a weather phenomenon that poses significant hazard to airplanes.) Having laid the discussion’s foundation, Dawkins talked about Aerostar’s philosophy for handling a windshear situation, carefully pointing out where Aerostar policy was not in concert with the video he was about to show, using the black humor pilots frequently employ when taking about crashes: I guess our basic philosophy is when you have done that (gone to a pitch attitude based on the gross weight of the airplane), you have done about all you can do and you firewall the throttles and go to a target pitch attitude and adjust from there, and then kind of see what happens. Don’t change the configuration. And I guess, being a little sarcastic, all you may wind up doing, having done all that, if it’s a non-recoverable windshear, at least you should be in a flare (a nose up attitude or angle) when you hit the ground. The video was entitled "A Windshear Avoided," and states that 40% of U.S. aviation fatalities are caused by windshear. The video places its primary emphasis on timely recognition of windshear. When the video was finished, Dawkins broke ranks with the facilitators who preceded him and began asking, by name, what each student had gotten from watching the video. Even I was asked to share what I had learned. Students gave a variety of answers, including: recognition, awareness, avoidance, crew coordination, weather packages at Aerostar, aggressive escape maneuvers, and the importance of pilot reports. 223 Dawkins took the comment about using Aerostar weather packages as an opportunity to address a major CRM issue, crew communication: I think at Aerostar, we make a lot of assumptions sometimes that the other person sees the same thing we do when they look at the flight package and the weather package and all the rest of it. We don’t talk very much about it, um, I don’t know how you change that culture but it might be appropriate to sit down and to spend a little bit of time talking about it if the weather’s even close to marginal. When called on, Ken Rogers cited the importance of informing other pilots about weather conditions, saying, "Let somebody else know about what you just hit." This gave Dawkins an opportunity to continue tying crew communication into the windshear discussion: You bet...(A)s we go through a couple of scenarios, you’ll see that in each...of these there was an opportunity, because someone had gone through there before, to communicate to the flight crew that had the problem... At this juncture, Charles Bronson punctured the conversation by asking FAA representative Ken Rogers about "the certificate action that’s being taken on lack of PIREPs (Pilot Reports)?" When Rogers professed ignorance, Bronson continued, "Well, was it in Air Line Pilot Magazine or one of the local ALPA publications, there was some mention of FAA certificate action against some pilots for...failure to give a PIREP in a windshear situation?" Rogers turned the topic over to Dawkins, who neatly wove the question into a comment about how instructors could inform their students regarding Aerostar’s windshear policies: 224 So it’s kind of a brother’s keeper issue, you know. What we’ll see here as we go through is that people did make a PIREP but it didn’t do any good. OK? Let’s just take a couple of minutes, and what I suggest to you is these are pages right out of the FOM or an AOM. What I suggest is that maybe you build a little bit of a library to kind of stick in your instructor manual so that these are things that you call to students’ attention as far as the policies of Aerostar Airlines. Dawkins brought up several classic windshear accidents, i.e., Eastern #166 at JFK, which, he stated, first got people’s attention directed toward windshear, then Pan Am at Kenner, LA, and Delta #191 at Dallas, TX. Using the overhead, Dawkins gave a detailed, in-depth analysis of what had happened aboard Delta 191, concluding: So, post mortem, and I don’t mean to dance on anybody’s grave, they didn’t use all the energy they had would, I guess, be a way of looking at this. And this was the, ah, kind of the seminal, if you will, accident that made people look at energy management, total energy management, as opposed to just going through the motions. After some technical dialogue with Jim Cagney and Ken Rogers, Dawkins continued, discussing "how we want it taught" to student pilots, saying, "When all is said and done, what I will do on the line is whatever I can do to keep the aircraft from hitting the ground." He hit hard on the need for pilots to use "graphic language" rather than remaining macho or cool: They talked in the video about graphic language and I...can come up with some pretty graphic language to convey what it was that I just experienced...Remember that in Ihe_3ight_§tuff, they talk about how the captain comes on and just reports that the left wing fell off and he does it with the Chuck Yeager West Virginia (accent), you 225 know, like that, no big thing folks, we’ve got two wings? You know, we’re taught to be macho and we’re taught to be cool, either by culture or by design, when we need in some cases not to do that. Maybe we need to go up about an octave higher than we normally had to make the report very clear. Lots at stake. There was more about Aerostar’s policy regarding windshear, delivered so no one could be left in doubt about the company’s intentions: Advance the thrust lever to the forward limits. Our policy at Aerostar for a long time has been use it all. And we will reconcile the damage to the engines later on, and that they’re designed to go to redline plus seventy-five degrees for five minutes, or something like that. You may damage them, but the philosophy for a long time here has been that engines are cheaper than pilots. So use it all. Walt, you had what I thought was a good line when you taught this quite a few years ago and said, this was in reference to Air Florida Flight 90 and said, ’How in the world when you get to the Big Aviator in the sky can you somehow resolve the fact that your throttle was at seventy-five percent when you hit the water...’ And he returned to his by now twin themes, Aerostar’s philosophy about and procedures for dealing with windshear, and improving crew communication in the event windshear is encountered. Regarding procedures, he told the group: In all the manuals it’s written up in this bullet format, and...we say at Aerostar we don’t have any memory procedures but if you have, like they say in there, five seconds to recover, you better know these kind of by heart. The general tendency is going to be get rid of the automatics, full power, target pitch attitude and hold what you’ve got. That’s not real hard. 226 Then it was on to cockpit communication, concluding his presentation with some blunt talk about effectively handling windshear: Talk a little bit about communications. In the manual the airspeed starts to decrease, what’s the cause? Or what do they say? Let’s say airspeed decreases, so what does that mean? Well, the pilot has to make a little bit of a calculation ~- I’m stabilized, power’s OK, pitch is OK, rate of descent was OK -- what’s happening? Why not just say ’windshear’ and if you’re wrong, you’re wrong,OK? It...eliminates one whole level of communication ...(W)hy don’t you just say ’The aircraft is climbing or it’s descending or we’re gonna hit the ground’ or something that does not require a lot of interpretation? But the point is to be communicative, and don’t sit there and watch and try to see what’s gonna happen. If we have only five seconds, we can’t afford to be that unproactive. Dawkins’ teaching style was relaxed, yet confident and authoritative. Even though he read from slides, left hand planted in his pants pocket, there was no sense that he was anything but totally conversant with the topic of windshear. As he worked, he moved within a relatively small space that surrounded the lectern, exuding his military-inspired command presence, which appeared to have captured and held everyone’s full attention. While there were several technical discussions, about specific target pitch attitudes, for example, there was no real disagreement from anyone; and, unlike some of the previous modules, the Bad Boys threw no grenades. Did their better behavior have to do more with Dawkins’ authoritative, no-nonsense demeanor and managerial role within Aerostar’s training organization or with the topic itself, which did 227 not lend itself to wide variations in interpretation? My suspicion was that, to give them the benefit of the doubt, it was a bit of both. By lunch on Wednesday, we were midway through the Instructor Qualification Training class, and student personalities were clear. Bad Boys Cagney and Bronson had established their identities the moment they entered the classroom late on Day One, thirty minutes after the class had begun, and slung Tony Dawkins’ sarcastic remark right back at him. These two, who sat together and mirrored each other’s body language throughout the session, were what I call "grenade throwers." They were the most inclined to be skeptical, to ask tough questions, or make comments with a bite to them. Joe Williams and Tim Clarke, who also sat together throughout the session, also shared similar mannerisms. On balance, they seemed to be pleasant, earnest fellows. While they did not always buy the company line, they were uniformly low-key and polite when disagreeing. Not only was there no bite to their remarks, they never directly issued any sort of challenge to the facilitators. Their comments tended to be neutral, but on those occasions when they disagreed with the company line, their remarks were respectful and appeared to be carefully considered before they were presented. Ken Rogers, the FAA representative, was the senior member of the group. A good old boy with a strong twang, 228 Rogers was very low key and remained pleasant, cooperative and non-controversial throughout the session. DC-9 fleet training captain Walt Pierson assumed what I have labeled the hero role. Pierson had many answers during the session and spoke with authority. He was the one class member facilitators deferred to in the event they did not know the answer to an instructor participant question. He was knowledgeable on a variety of training issues and appeared intense and serious, totally engaged in what was happening in the classroom. Sam Tucker was the group enigma. He sat slightly apart from the other students and kept to himself throughout the three day session. I observed little, if any, interaction between him and any other student(s). The only comments he made during the three days were those that were directly solicited, i.e., by Tom Mitchell and Tony Dawkins. From what little he did say, he seemed to be a pleasant, competent guy, albeit aloof. c t' ' ' C I invited myself to join Cagney for lunch on Wednesday. I had planned to ask him the questions I’d outlined for this dissertation, i.e., what did he find persuasive rhetoric in a training environment? Does CRM do anything? That kind of question. Aerostar’s employee cafeteria is on the schoolhouse’s second floor, and includes facilities for hot meals from a 229 grill, as well as salads and cold sandwiches that one makes for oneself. Cagney and I got our lunches, chose a table by one of the windows and, sitting across from each other, began to eat and chat. I was unable to tape our talk; like others with whom I spoke individually, Cagney did not want our conversation recorded. It was not long before it became obvious that CRM and Aerostar’s former consultant were topics that generated strong feelings for Cagney. Cagney’s negative feelings about the consultant apparently spilled over into his general view of Aerostar’s CRM program, since the consultant had designed it. He objected particularly to the communication exercise that used geometric shapes, although he did not articulate why. With respect to this instructor seminar, Cagney stated that he wanted more information and/or exposure to teaching methods and techniques than he was getting. The conversation moved quickly from Aerostar’s consultant to the yellow book/red book merger issues mentioned in the one-day CRM class, and briefly touched upon during Tom Mitchell’s adult learning module. It should be remembered that these colorful terms, used to identify Aerostar’s pilots, came from the predominant corporate colors on the pilot training manuals, called "books." The original Aerostar’s corporate color was red, while the airline with which it merged used yellow, hence red book and yellow book. I’ve tagged pilots hired in the post merger 230 period as orange book because combining red and yellow produces the color orange. Bringing up red book vs. yellow book issues was like pouring salt in an open wound. Cagney became visibly angry when discussing the merging of the two seniority lists, expressing his resentment of yellow book pilots who were now flying the biggest, heaviest airplanes (which ensured them the biggest paychecks), and who he perceived as having taken his rightful place in the cockpit. This was said despite the fact that Cagney is a senior B-747-200 captain, at the top of the pay scale. I was uncertain how he was hurt by the merger, other than perhaps by having his piloting and salary progression slowed slightly. In spite of his obvious anger, I took a stab at the idea of letting the past go, since the merger had taken place nearly a decade ago. No sale. Cagney stated that he felt done in by ALPA, Aerostar, and the yellow book pilots. While we talked, he asked if I had noticed a pilot who had been at the table prior to our arrival. I said I had not. Cagney told me the man had crossed the picket line when Aerostar pilots struck the airline in the late 1970s and that W This was a startling piece of information. I suggested that perhaps the man had strong reasons for crossing the line, such as personal or economic ones, and since it had happened a long time ago, why the continuing hostility? Again, no sale. 231 Much of the conversation with Cagney was conducted with him shouting at me. I was surprised by the vehemence with which he spoke about yellow/red/orange book issues, the years-old strike, and the CRM consultant. It was more a monologue than a dialogue, since Cagney seemed uninterested in anything I had to share, i.e., my limited experience at ALPA during the Pan American/National merger. He did offer one backhanded compliment saying, "You probably understand the importance of a seniority list better than most people, but you can’t really understand..." He talked about how he came to work for Aerostar and how precious his place on the seniority list was to him. Our conversation was interrupted by the arrival of another pilot, whose name I did not get but whose wife was a good friend of Cagney’s wife. I was uncertain whether the new arrival showed up because he saw what was happening or whether he just wanted to talk to Cagney. We chatted for a few minutes, then I excused myself, leaving the two of them alone to talk. My personal appeal to put the past behind was met with a stonewall. There appears to be a strong tendency among pilots to hang onto old grudges, slights, pain, etc. One wonders what it is in the pilot make-up that accounts for this attachment to the pain of the past. I had no doubt Cagney was genuinely angry; the issues, while old, were certainly alive and well in his head. Was he typical of the pilot population? Are old hurts nursed and nurtured 232 throughout the pilot community? If the discussion about "flaming yellow and flaming red book" pilots was correct, he is probably typical. These old animosities between the two pilot groups seem to be no closer to resolution now than they were at the time of the merger. In August, when attending the CRM Phase 1 class, Pete Morgan told me that the usual Aerostar classes had a segment devoted to the airing of yellow/red book grievances. During this segment, people were allowed to vent only. Dialogue and arguing were not permitted. Evidently Aerostar considered this unresolved conflict worthy of considerable energy and effort. How does an organization heal old wounds? This relates to the nested socialization process identified earlier, in which trip after trip a pilot is resocialized about what it means to be an airline pilot. This nested, spiraling process provides ample opportunity for opinions to be shared, sold, expressed in such a fashion that old animosities are kept alive. When dealing with relative strangers in the work setting or cockpit, it is natural to want to begin the relationship with uncertainty reduction and determine how much common ground exists between/among the pilots. This way, yellow/red book issues, such as who got hurt by the merger, and how much damage pilots pereeiyeg they sustained, seem natural topics for discussion, and can remain viable many years later. But there are grave corporate concerns about the continued 233 presence of yellow/red/orange book hostilities -- about safety in the cockpit and about the pilot group as a whole. Grgup Discussign Tony Dawkins led the first afternoon module, billed as time during which he would touch on any topics the group liked. Here we saw the only significant deviation from the stated three-day schedule. On the course schedule, this time slot was originally slated to be spent with the various fleet training captains. Rather than break out into different rooms, the group remained in the original training room and Dawkins came to us. Sam Tucker and Ken Rogers had left, leaving only six instructor participants. Dawkins was less formal for this session than he was in either his opening remarks or the windshear module. This time he was in shirtsleeves, and sat in a chair. When he suggested brainstorming topics that the group might wish to discuss, the talk moved toward posing solutions to stated problems and/or concerns of the instructor participants, i.e., redoing the briefing cards. Charles Bronson wanted to get "...away from these canned scenarios," mentioning weight, weather, and runway parameters in such scenarios. He expressed discomfort with current training methods, feeling that older ones, those with which he felt familiar and comfortable, were better: Good Lord, that’s not instructing. You know, if the guy needs something else, then let’s give him what he needs. You know, we spend all the time 234 doing this kind of stuff. Now, admittedly, my credibility with this glass cockpit type training is not real great. I have no real experience with that stuff. But what I see is what I work with out on the line, the finished product of training, and he gets out there to do IOE, now you’ve got a problem with this guy because he’s never developed, he’s never done the reps on the things you do day in and day out that you have to do on the line. We used to really be able to work with that and you never put a guy up for a type rating until he was good at it. And if you just caught the repetition in there till he was good and then you put him up. Well, you don’t do that. You’ve got this structured scenario and it goes right up and you don’t even have a pre-rating ride any more. The term "glass cockpit" is aviation slang for the newer technology avionics employed by such airplanes as the McDonnell-Douglas MD-80, the Boeing B-757/767 (which have identical avionics), and the Airbus A-320. Instrument arrays in glass cockpits are software-driven, and are characterized by the extensive use of CRTs (cathode-ray tubes), which display flight and navigation instrumentation and information on several brightly-lit color screens. This remark evoked an immediate response from Dawkins, who disputed Bronson’s assertion that pre-rating rides were not used any more. Bronson backed down momentarily, then continued his diatribe, during which he brought up qualifying to fly what are known as CAT II and CAT III approaches. (See Chapter II for definitions of CAT II and CAT III.) Bronson: ...(B)ut, say the guy that you had in the period before wasn’t qualified to sign off CAT II, CAT III approaches, so you spend all your time doing that sort of nonsense on what’s supposed to be a pre-rating ride... 235 This moved the discussion to the issue of how some pilots take "four periods and some guys took fourteen periods." Bronson agreed, saying, "And the thing was, it could be 100% tailored to individual needs." He went on to ask why a student should repeat maneuvers if the student can get the training jacket signed off? Pierson’s immediate response was a light-hearted quip, "Makes your fleet training captain feel good about himself!" that generated no laughter from the group. Bronson again took the floor to express his concern that current training was not producing good pilots because it failed to emphasize the basic skills he felt it should: There is so much stuff in this program that is very, very time-consuming and very very minimally associated with getting these guys to be good pilots out on the line. I mean, they’re great if it ever comes to, you know, the flag goes up and a wing should fall off, they’re gonna be trained for that, but the every day in and day out stuff which is where we’re having problems when we get out and we get some of these guys to do IOE, they can’t fly for sour owl shit. This drew commentary from other class members, Joe Williams in particular, whose concern about CAT II and CAT III recurrent checks and the frequency with which pilots forget to do their altitude callouts was sandwiched between Bronson and Dawkins’s back-and-forth. These omitted callouts were so frequent, Williams asserted, that many pilots were forced to ask who was actually flying the airplane, saying with pilot-like understatement, "This is pretty scary stuff." He went on: I. t V. A. L V. A» Lal- . L . .1. 236 You’d be alarmed at how many people at that alert height there’s confusion as to calling out the alert height and the person, the captain who is going to make the landing making the decision whether he is going to land or not land and actually taking over the aircraft, and the first officer... Bronson: (interrupting)...I agree one hundred percent... Williams: ...it’s real confusing... But Bronson was uninterested in Williams’s concern. Like a bulldog with a bone in its teeth, Bronson wanted to gnaw further on the training to proficiency, and CAT II/CAT III concerns merely provided a useful vehicle with which to illustrate his point. Bronson: Yeah. They haven’t done it for six months. I can see that. That is really important. However, that is not what we’re talking about here, we’re talking about we get a (trainee) in there, goes through the CAT II, CAT III videos, OK. You sit there for an hour and a half going through the whole video and that, you’ve got a handout and that’s yea thick and you read, you do a little bit of chair flying, you go in and have a complete briefing, everything’s drawn on the board, you sit there and you talk about it for an hour, you go in there and maybe you screw up the first one, you don’t get all the calls done right but then you go into another one and you get all the calls right, OK? You do a CAT II, a CAT III, I mean, you’re proficient...you need to do it. Surely, let’s train proficiency so when you get down to minimums and if a guy still isn’t knocking the co-pilot’s hands off the throttles at, ah, you know, at the alert height, well then you probably ought to re-train the guy, right? Williams: Well, I’ve had guys stop me on the crew bus and say, ’I did this and I did that’ and they thought they should have been doing it off the radio altimeter or they were doing it visa versa they didn’t even know, but they were out and they made an actual approach and they weren’t even sure what the heck they should have done. 237 Dawkins interjected a question about the kind of briefings these crews must have been doing and Williams’ response showed his irritation with what he perceived as a simplistic remark to an urgent, CRM-related problem: Well, I know it’s on the briefing card, but the confusion exists, but I mean, this is a real thing and that’s the last time and the last place I want to be confused about who the hell’s flying this airplane when you’re at one hundred feet and you’re on a CAT III and you can’t see anything. While nobody talked specifically about CRM regarding crew coordination during CAT II and CAT III approaches, the issue of who was in control continued to dominate. Williams had finally managed to wrest the floor from Bronson and retain it, despite Bronson’s repeated attempts to de-rail him. Williams: ...(I)f something goes wrong, who’s flying the airplane? Is anybody flying it or who’s flying it? You don’t want confusion as to what’s going on. You want definite reactions by the pilot who’s taking over the airplane and the pilot who was the pilot flying, you know, what his duties are...(Y)ou really need to run through those things enough times repetitively so that both guys know what the heck their job is and what they’re supposed to do and there’s no doubt about it ’cause at a hundred feet, you don’t want doubt. When the floor was available, Bronson acknowledged having hit a "pet peeve" of Williams’ and apologized for beginning the talk about CAT II and CAT III. He stated that in general, students spend too much time with one instructor. With a bow to the benefits of as much training experience as possible, he cited an example of a typical first four training periods during which a pilot learned 238 about engine-out take offs, and then moved to another instructor with a different orientation from the first. Apparently everyone was familiar with the phenomenon in which the pilot, on switching instructors, has a moment of saying, "Oh, my God!" learning what the new instructor wants, then moving along, "...then you go for the type rating and you get a new guy who says, ’No, forget all of that stuff. That’s wrong.’" His basic concern centered on instructors with varying emphases, some of whom dispense incorrect information, leaving pilots "all screwed up," and having to unlearn a great deal. He Opined that it was nice having one instructor if: ...you’re just learning how to fly and you have to have some guy there to teach you how to land this airplane, but by the time you progress to 340 or 747, you’re better off with exposure to more instructors. You’ll learn more and have less of a chance of glitches in the instruction. Dawkins disagreed, this time less diplomatically than before. Assuming a defensive posture, Dawkins opined that some divergence from the standards for each training session was to be expected, but that such divergence did not extend to what Aerostar pilots call "gouges," which are acronyms or other unauthorized, non-standard gimmicks to jog the pilot’s memory about a piece of information or a procedure. Bronson held his ground on multiple instructors, but did not offer data to support his own position, shifting instead to his perception of the FAA’s strong presence in the training process. Dawkins rejected Bronson’s contention 239 that the FAA was really the instructors’ boss, citing the way the schoolhouse had been run just fifteen months earlier, and how it was functioning at the time of the class. He called for standardizing the body of knowledge for all instructors, so "gouges" would not be necessary. Ultimately, he agreed with Bronson's overall goal of focusing on what good line pilots need to learn. What you say is probably correct, but it’s also, in my mind, very illogical...(T)here is a body of knowledge associated with each of those periods, OK? Let’s assume that the right stuff is in the right period for most of the people who go through the program. What’s happening is just a fair divergence, I mean, trust me, Aerostar policy does not include FRED, it does not include GOMER, it doesn’t include any gouges at all other than what’s in the AOM someplace. These are just little techniques that people have picked up, and they’re counter-techniques is what’s happening on this...(B)ut if you’re going to have a different instructor, if you’re a student and you’re having a different instructor for all those periods, then I think in the end the student’s going to lose because he loses the continuity and he loses the relationship that you can build up with an instructor. Bronson was not about to back down from his assertion that multiple instructors better served the students but neither did he support his argument beyond stating, "Well, that’s good if it’s being done that way but I haven’t seen that happening." And then he changed the subject. As Bronson spoke, Dawkins appeared to be taking in what he heard, thoughtfully nodding his head and saying, "Mm-hmm, yes," apparently agreeing. When Dawkins tried to interrupt his commentary, Bronson short-circuited him by slightly raising his voice and continuing. But Dawkins was not about 240 to be shut down completely, and forcefully rejected Bronson’s assertion that the FAA was "with you every period, year after year, so everybody, you did things the right way." Never as an instructor was the FAA your boss. If you were APD he was and if you’re a check airman he certainly had an advisory interest in what you’re doing. But as an instructor, they’re not your boss. The FAA should not be our safety net for quality control. Dawkins talked about combining functional areas, getting people working together to agree upon and sign off on policies, and securing "reality checks from a trap line" of line pilots. Fifteen months earlier, he said, the training captain was "...nothing more or less than a scheduler" who just scheduled instructor time and made sure "it all worked out well and, you know, taking care of your needs as an instructor, making sure you were happy with the days you worked and that sort of stuff..." Training captains helped select instructors for a particular month, he told Bronson, but now were theoretically free to do quality control work for instructors. Dawkins suggested that what was needed was a standardization of a body of knowledge for all instructors so they did not have to "invent FRED or GOMER (gouges)." (Every instructor wants to) leave his own footprints, so they get bored and invent stuff and sooner or later that stuff gets into the syllabus and they’ve left their mark (but) not in the best way. What do you actually need to know to be a good line pilot? Focus on that stuff, then increment the single visit training (SVT) program when it happens. 241 He finished by explaining that the emphasis on what training was needed by a good line pilot was indicative of the kind of thought process the training center management was utilizing in its efforts to revamp instructor and line pilot training. Ever the bulldog, Bronson hung on, dipping into Day One’s training, and hauling out the law of primacy to support his argument about multiple instructors: The first instructor that gets a crack at this guy, he creates a clone, because he’s got him for five periods and this has been this guy’s first exposure to all this stuff and he’s gonna latch onto that stuff. Now he’s got his own ego and personality invested in the fact that this is the way to fly this airplane, OK? And you’ve got a clone of this first instructor. Now you’ve got another guy come along and he’s gonna have to, there’s gonna be a certain amount of negative learning going on, you’re gonna have to de-learn some of this stuff because this other guy’s got a new way of doing things... Bronson was rolling, relishing center stage, so even when Dawkins interrupted to tell him that what he was describing would vanish over time, Bronson kept right on talking. The roundtable had become a form of ego-driven trench warfare, with Bronson iterating and reiterating his original position on the hazards of having one instructor have too much influence on a student. To boost his argument, he tried to skewer Dawkins with his own words, but Dawkins dodged the blade and clarified what he had said. Bronson took one more crack at Dawkins, asserting that different airplane technologies (glass vs. non-glass) and crew configurations (two-pilot vs. three-pilot) required 242 different training programs. Dawkins, perhaps tired of this verbal war of attrition, declared victory by agreeing with Bronson, who at last had nothing to add. Bronson: ...but there’s one thing you said, I think it was this morning, you said that you didn’t think that we should be trying to fly all airplanes the same way. Dawkins: No, that isn’t what I said. What I said is there are things you have to do differently because the airplanes are different. Bronson: OK. Well, I think that applies to what we’re talking about here. I think different airplanes, when you start training in different airplanes, each program has different needs. I mean, you’re working with a different product and you’re not gonna try and fly, you know, do the same thing in a three pilot airplane that you do in a two pilot airplane, a glass versus a non- glass, these things are all different and they are tailored differently but I don’t think we should be trying to adopt the same training regimen to all these different environments because the... Dawkins: I agree. Bronson: ...and this is what I’m saying. Dawkins continued, talking about how within the industry, as well as at Aerostar, the training standard had become train to proficiency, accounting for differences in experience between and among pilots being trained rather than taking a cookie-cutter approach. On the average, I think what Aerostar is really driving at is that you can provide quality training within a footprint with some adjustments. There will be some people that will need maybe all five of the additional periods. Maybe some people won’t need any, and there’ll be some people that maybe can finish a little bit early, but on the average... 243 From Bronson to Williams to Dawkins, the discussion ranged over three topics, which ultimately melded into one. The initial point of contention was Bronson’s belief that pilots should train to proficiency, emphasizing real world skills. Then he moved to one instructor vs. multiple instructors, arguing that multiple instructors better served the goal of producing good line pilots. His third point was the FAA’s profound influence on training and instructors. The talk was confusing, and often difficult to follow, since they proceeded in a very unlikely -- for pilots -- non-linear manner, bouncing back and forth among the issues, with Bronson defiantly resisting all of Dawkins’s attempts at achieving closure. After Dawkins’ last remark, he was interrupted by the observation that some pilots can accomplish more in one day of training than others can. Dawkins related his own personal experience on training for the B-757, calling for instructor awareness of gross differences between pilots thrown together for the same training period: I wasn’t an expert on it but I was very comfortable with it and this guy, the first thing out of his mouth is, ’Jesus Christ, I don’t know why I did this airplane. I’m gonna die.’ You know, this is my initial 757 checkout and I knew I was gonna be in (the simulator) for a long, long time. But you know what happened was he got all the FMC (flight management computer) time and I let it happen. The student would just say, ’Feed me, feed me’ and they’d feed him and the next thing you know four hours would have gone by and I’d gotten maybe fifteen minutes on the FMC. Well, as an instructor, you can’t let that happen. Somewhere along the line you’ve got to say, you know, this is the best pairing you can have of 244 students and chances are maybe it isn’t. Maybe you can do a little gerrymandering or something like that. Using his own disastrous training experience as a model of what not to do, Dawkins laid the responsibility for keeping training sessions balanced between trainees at the instructors’ feet. He suggested that they take some action, specifically "gerrymandering," to rectify out of balance situations. Bronson asserted that the instructor was using his "discretionary authority to modify the training syllabus" based on the needs of the situation. He went on to ask rhetorically how much time the instructor needs to spend on something like hydraulic failures for an experienced B-747 co-pilot who is in training to become a B-757 captain "...so you end up compressing a lot of stuff and like you said, the first period you’ve got half of that stuff signed off because he’s current in it, you know. Why go through this structured training program and hit ’em all?" He suggested "you’re turning out a much better product" if the instructor focuses on the items the student really needs, "...when that guy hits the line and goes out for his IOE and sees that airplane for the first time, you have got a qualified person." Dawkins continued with the parry and thrust, again becoming aggressive with Dean, asserting that "we instinctively practice the things we do well," labeling such behavior "stupid." Again calling on his own experience, 245 Dawkins told the group about flying with a guy in the National Guard, describing him as someone who liked to practice the things he did well, but who refused to practice the things he needed to improve. (A)s an instructor, you have to have the discipline to, you know, fine, you don’t have to do that any more. Let’s go on to something else. And that’s what AQP is all about, it’s a tailored program. It’s almost like a contract. He went on to talk about how instructors need to do things "smart" in light of Aerostar’s financial situation. He asserted that instructors needed to have the discipline to stay within the syllabus and then work on changing it if that was what was required. Dawkins rather abruptly ended the discussion by saying "Thank you very much." One instructor participant asked about starting time for the next day, "Eight o’clock tomorrow morning?" "Eight o’clock," responded Dawkins. The zinger from Bronson, apparently determined to get in the very last word, came without hesitation, "If we all show up at eight-thirty, how’s he going to start at eight?" This generated some mild laughter, and everyone left for the day. This module was characterized by the on—going dialogue between Bronson and Dawkins on various training issues, most of which centered on their respective training philosophies. Dawkins outlined and defended the Aerostar party line, while Bronson apparently saw himself as the spokesperson for the instructors who had been at Aerostar the longest. He seemed uncomfortable with the changes, and longed for a return to 246 more familiar ground. Anyone else who wanted to be heard had to shoehorn himself into the conversation. What went on appeared to be a titanic clash of egos. It likely was the conflagration sparked by Day One’s sniping between Bronson and Dawkins, an interchange that attempted to delineate their respective role and territorial boundaries. Bronson, a senior B-747-200 captain, would not be one-upped by a B-757 captain, obviously his junior, even if he was part of the management team. In the end, they played the match to a draw, neither pilot winning or losing, but each keeping his ego intact. HQW_QBH_Ti§Q_In Day Two’s LOFT session was the most likely place for the reinforcement or inclusion of CRM principles and, in fact Josh Graham did both. A strong CRM adherent, Graham deftly wove its principles into his presentation. In LOFTs, he told the instructor participants, their role would shift. Now they’d be asked to focus less on individual technical proficiency and more on overall crew interaction and performance, which are CRM’s heart and soul. Graham stressed evaluating the crew as a whole, rather than dividing it into individual technical piloting performances. As he outlined the mechanics of LOFTs, he inserted and reinforced the overall crew message. In his windshear module, Dawkins squandered an opportunity to beat the CRM drum when he talked about using 247 efficient, easy-to-decipher language when confronted with a windshear. Even as he spoke of how failures to communicate windshear information to pilots who subsequently crashed, he neglected to connect them to CRM principles. Dawkins spoke of crews not using all the energy available in terms of airplane abilities, but by-passed the chance to draw an analogy between overall crew resource management and energy management. Had CRM been better, one could speculate, perhaps energy management would have been better, too. Dawkins’ call for pilots to use "graphic language" when dealing with windshear was another good moment in which to slide CRM into the module, perhaps by mentioning how better CRM might have affected the final outcome. As might be expected, those modules dedicated to disseminating volumes of technical information yielded little fertile ground in which to sow any CRM seeds. Pa ° T ee a e ' ' e "Tolerances In Pilot Performance" was scheduled to run from 8:00 a.m. until 9:00 a.m. Everyone showed up on time, despite the Bad Boys’ threat the day before, so the session began on time. There were a couple of small differences in the classroom this day, however. Sam Tucker had moved his seat and was in row 3 rather than in his usual position in row 2, and both he and Jimmy Cagney were dressed in coats 248 and ties. This latter change was likely due to their leaving for home after the last module that afternoon and being required by Aerostar to wear a coat and tie when pass- riding. The facilitator for this module was Mike Campbell, who specifically requested that this session not be taped owing, he said, to his use of "colorful language." Campbell, in many respects, fit the classic instructor participant description -- balding, graying hair combed straight back from his forehead, probably early 50s, wearing a striped shirt with a pen in the pocket, a bold print red tie, and dark suit pants. His suit coat was placed over a chair in row 1. He differed, appearance-wise, in two respects from the others in that he wore a beeper on his belt, and he wore a noticeable amount of gold jewelry -- a bracelet on his right wrist, a signet ring on his left hand, and a gold and diamond ring on his right hand. It was obvious that everyone in the class knew Campbell and before he began the session, he walked around the room, greeting students individually. At the outset, Campbell stated his concern that "we’re not all calling the same strike zone," referring to the ways in which instructors evaluate student pilot performance. In his talk, Campbell stressed the importance of having line pilots feel they were treated fairly by the instructors. The reason(s) why this module was deemed necessary went unstated, although Campbell’s initial "strike 249 zone" remark alluded to some sort of generally-recognized problem in the area of instructor fairness. Arriving at his presentation’s core, Campbell stated that the instructors had to more narrowly define what Aerostar wanted its pilots to know, but not expect student pilots to know "things we want them to memorize." He said that the training organization was pushing toward greater standardization of useful information, "We want to cut out, if possible, the chaff in the system." As he spoke, he was engaged in a brief search for the "On" button on the overhead projector. While he tried to talk and find the button, he was prompted by several students who said, "Orange button, Mike." When he still couldn’t find the button, Walt Pierson nipped him by adding, "There are seme memory items!" At this, everyone laughed heartily, and Mike exclaimed, "O-o-o-oh!" laughing along with the group, becoming red-faced. The first overhead was titled "Pilot Perception" and on lines below the title was the word "fair," which was followed by "even-handed." About this slide, Campbell said, "Everyone, whether a DC-9 or a 747-400 pilot should expect to be treated on even par...(it) hurts the morale of the entire airline if pilots don’t think they’re going to be treated fairly and evenhandedly." The second overhead was titled "Instructor" and below the title were three phrases: "clear guidelines," "apply evenly," and "maintain established standards." According to 250 Campbell, a recent survey of Aerostar’s instructor population showed, on the section reserved for open comments, what he termed "a cry for standardization." He did not elaborate on the survey. The discussion moved to the topic of technique vs. policy, with technique defined as a way of doing something that can be done in any number of different ways. Campbell was concerned about instructor participants portraying techniques as "The Way." Charles Bronson suggested that technique becomes important to instructors because all airplanes aren’t the same. Campbell responded to Bronson with a technical comment about using five degrees flaps for the B-747, and how doing so gives drag and little, if any, additional lift. This sparked a dialogue between them regarding discrepancies between the book and what was actually being taught. "If the book is wrong," charged Bronson, "change the book." Campbell answered that the B-747 manual had recently been re-written by B-747 instructors themselves. He went on to state that Aerostar was hoping that discrepancies between the training and procedures manuals were minimal. When this interchange threatened to become lengthy, Campbell stopped it. Bronson apologized for having brought the subject up. Campbell rejected the apology, telling Bronson that his question and comments were "perfect." Then he moved to subsequent overheads. 251 Overheads 3 through 6 were titled, respectively, "Takeoff/Missed Approach," I'Approach," "Stabilized Approach," and "CAT I Precision Approach." As Campbell detailed the airline’s philosophy and procedures, he mentioned the fact that Aerostar had never had a landing accident with a jet airplane in its entire history, finishing with "knock on wood." From each seat came spontaneous knocks on the tables’ wood trim. Charles Bronson was knocking as Campbell began speaking, apparently knowing where his comment was headed. Campbell tempted fate by continuing and stating that "...the competition all burned people and airplanes." Overheads 7 & 8 were titled "CAT II/III Approach," and "Non-Precision Approach." Campbell briefly discussed the value of a missed approach by asking, "If things aren’t right...what can be safer than getting farther away from the ground?" There was no response. He went on, saying, "Don’t ever hammer someone for using the kind of judgement we expect him to use." He suggested, instead, praise for the pilot who executes a missed approach, calling it "good head work." Campbell further suggested that instructors get a feel for a student, helping the pilot get relaxed for the training session. If a student is really tense, he said, try to give him something he/she can do correctly in the context of giving the same checkride as everyone else. Campbell advised against "setting traps," thereby destroying 252 the pilot’s confidence. Again, there were no comments or questions. Overheads 9 & 10 were titled "Landing" and "Steep Turns." Before Campbell began talking, Cagney suggested that Aerostar establish a database of questions/answers for orals. When Campbell enthusiastically supported him, Cagney added that instructors ought to be able to determine within about one hour whether the student knows what he should know, "surely within two hours." He further asserted that there is no reason for orals to run the allotted three and a half to four hours. Pierson weighed in, saying the DC-9 program had already established a data bank of approximately 600 questions. Campbell finished up by telling the group that they, as instructors, needed to let students know what was expected of them. He further suggested that FOM (Flight Officer Manual) drills would be useful. v a ' 't e Between modules, I had a brief discussion with Joe Williams and Tim Clarke. Williams was the main interviewee, with a couple of comical side comments provided courtesy of Clarke. I began by asking Williams what he found persuasive when he was functioning as a student himself: Clarke: ...threats and coercion... PKN: Oh, threats, harassment and intimidation? 253 Clarke: And then you kind of went into CRM, so you have to be convinced. I’m sure most of us have to be somewhat convinced of the necessity for it. PKN: What’s the best way to get you there? Williams: Well, CRM is, those of us who have been around a long time, you don’t have to be around a hell of a long time to see that CRM is a beneficial tool because you take, you go into training situations when you’re not using good CRM things get real messed up and are uncoordinated and the whole situation can be handled real, very sloppily. You maybe get the job done OK, but you wish you’d done some things different afterward. Referring to some pilots’ attitude that if the plane did not crash the flight could be considered a success, I led Williams into defining how the situation could be better managed. PKN: You mean, everybody walked off, but...? Williams: Yeah. When you’re, when everyone’s briefed and everyone knows what’s going on, the coordination in the cockpit is good, you know, you can see that that’s a good benefit when it works real well for you. So I think everybody’s...I think most of the people, pilots are people, have to be convinced of that it’s of benefit... PKN: What’s the best way to do that? Accident statistics? Williams: No, you can explain. I think the best way is to explain it. Now some things a lot of pilots may not agree with, some of the procedures, but those pilots have to be disciplined enough to say ’I’m gonna do it because that’s the way that they pay me to do that..." We stopped the conversation when the break ended, and then picked up over lunch, with my asking again about what is persuasive for pilots and us talking about viewing videotapes. I had to initially ask for clarification 254 regarding whether Williams was talking about role-playing videotapes produced by the airline for training purposes or videotapes that would be used in the upcoming LOFT scenarios. Williams was referring to the LOFT tapes, enthusiastically endorsing their use and overall value as learning tools. Well, I was going to get into seeing yourself. I think it’s great to see the scenario depicted...but when you start seeing yourself, that’s going to be way better. It’s going to be ten times better...(T)o me, it’s good to comfortably get everybody thinking along the same track. Trying to go beyond the videotapes to see if Williams would validate others’ assertions that reality was persuasive to pilots, I asked him what worked with him. PKN: What else appeals to you? What are the emphases? As I talk to instructors, one of the emphases they have is making things...as authentic and real-time, real-world as possible for you, so you’ll buy in. Williams: I think in the sim, when it’s real time there are some good benefits there because you see other things that just jump right through the hoop. It appeared that I had gotten all I could from persuasion, so I changed topics, which yielded an unanticipated opportunity to touch on still-festering red book/yellow book merger issues. Williams’s response provided a glimpse of how the culture was adapting to the upheaval the merger represented: PKN: What led you to instructing? Williams: I don’t know. I’ve always, I’ve done it for so long. I actually did like to do it 255 ’cause I thought that I could put people at ease and relay what was supposed to be done in a receptive manner that people would receive it, you know? And I think I’ve done that somewhat pretty good, you know. When I first started doing it, we had just merged with (the red book carrier) and I think there was a lot of, you know, there was a lot of guys that I’m sure after I left said ’Screw you,’ they seemed to take it pretty well. We were changing. We had a lot of procedures changes, so that’s why, that’s kind of what I thought I could do well. And that’s when I first started. PKN: Have you run into any trouble being an instructor who is (ex-yellow book) with somebody who’s a trainee who is not? Williams: No. I haven’t been an instructor for two years. I’ve been doing a lot of checking out in different airplanes, though. PKN: What are you driving now? Williams: Well, I just got checked out in the three twenty...(I)’m going to be an instructor on the three forty. I flew the seven-fifty-seven. That’s what my status is and I flew the 747 for about a year. As lunch progressed, other topics temporarily impinged and other people joined in the discussion; the initial conversational train had run off the track. We regained it a few minutes later, when I asked Williams if he had any sense of what his fellow students were thinking during the three days: PKN: Do you have a sense of whether they’re buying it? Particularly with respect to CRM? At this point, another pilot made a sound that does not lend itself to description here, but to which I responded, "Is that a yes?" Williams dove back into the conversation, saying that good CRM was the norm at Aerostar. 256 Williams: I think all those guys, the CRM stuff, for us is the way we normally operate anyway, and I think that they’re just or at least the way we try to operate, try to think of ourselves, at least I do...I’m not always consistent but that’s the way I think I try to be and those guys are the same, too...(I) don’t want to say (it’s) reassuring, it’s confirming, kind of the way that you think that you operate is probably the right way. The other people...the guys that are way out of that loop...opposed to that depiction in the video would maybe realize a few things. I mean, they’re not going to obviously make a great big 180 degree change just to be good, but they might pick out a few things though that might be just be an exact same thing they’re dealing with and ’Maybe I shouldn’t be doing that’ and they might start to loosen up and mellow up and communicate better with the rest of the crew. Seeking to know more about how Williams viewed CRM as an instructor, and how he handled CRM issues, I asked him what level of influence he felt he had CRM-wise with student pilots. Williams: Well, you try to find examples of where things went awry or not particularly as good as they could have and then you can use it as a positive reinforcement of ’If you’d have done it this way’...I mean, you know, you just use what you see there. And just like we do for the regular procedures that you mentioned that are more concrete if they’re not followed and something happens because of it, you can use that as an example of why you should then do that procedure. And the same thing with CRM, I think. PKN: So, would you be inclined to cite something like Delta 191 as an example? Williams: More, much more minor things than that... PKN: You don’t think you need to go to that extreme? Williams: No, that’s pretty extreme... 257 The talk ended about then, and, after clearing off the lunch table, we headed back to the classroom. The Crew Resouree Management Module Dana Hiller was teaching this module solo; Pete Morgan and Reg Pierce were elsewhere. Hiller began with introductions, established the ground rules, and encouraged instructor participants to have an open forum. She stressed flexibility, and discussed Aerostar’s overriding goal of integrating CRM into the entire training process. In addition, she emphasized the instructor participants’ influence as CRM role models, since they represented the first level of management most pilots ever encountered. She talked briefly about the addition of stress management, and cabin-cockpit communication issues to the CRM curriculum. Her first questions to the group were about past instructing experience, total years of flying, and CRM exposure. The responses were revealing. Each instructor participant gave a brief summary, starting with Tim Clarke, who talked about flying the DC-9, MD-80, and spending ten years on the B-727. He said he had not instructed recently and was introduced to CRM while flying for the yellow book carrier. In addition, he had gone through the Aerostar one- day line pilot CRM program. Joe Williams had been a B-727 instructor, but was now instructing on the B-757. Attending this course for A-340 instructing, he had attended the one- day CRM seminar in 1991. 258 Before continuing the introductions, Hiller provided some CRM program history, saying it had originated within Aerostar’s pilot ranks. She went on to discuss her own professional piloting experience, telling the group that she was a B-727-qualified flight engineer. Introductions continued with FAA rep Ken Rogers, who detailed his experience with various airlines and gave no indication he had had any formal CRM training. Charles Bronson was uncharacteristically laconic, stating only that he had come to be trained for A-340 instructing, that he had been instructing "for a number of years," and that he’d started out on the 727 "twenty some years ago now, I guess." After Bronson was Sam Tucker, who said he performed A320 IOE line checks and flights, that he had spent three months working offline on training programs, and that he had gone through the one-day CRM program. Walt Pierson was not present for the introductions, so the last to speak was Jimmy Cagney, who spoke of having instructed on the 747-200 for about 6 years and who was now transitioning to the A- 340. He got aggressive quite quickly after that introduction, leaving little doubt what he thought of CRM, stating that he had gone through the Aerostar CRM training program: ...very early on and my opinion of CRM is quite low. I was one of the ALPA proponents to get CRM brought to the department because I was, I watched United’s program develop and was very interested in getting CRM here, but I saw when we got CRM that it was not what I had expected and I have a very low opinion of what was taught. 259 He did not state what he had expected as opposed to what was taught in the Aerostar program. I could not help but wonder if the geveiopeg, for whom Cagney had already vociferously expressed his dislike, was more of an issue than the actual course eontent. Hiller’s response was not to inquire what he had expected or why he felt so negatively about the CRM program, but rather to ask Cagney if he was based in Seattle, to which he replied affirmatively. I was unable to determine if there was a particular significance to the question; it is possible that there was a pocket of CRM dissenters among the pilots based in Seattle, but nothing further was said. Hiller said she would modify the program as she went because she wanted to spend the majority of her time on the last two sections shown in the class schedule -— CRM behavioral and performance markers, and CRM’s role in pilot training. She asked that the group "all teach this together," encouraging them to learn together saying, "CRM is not charm school, it’s safety information." Continuing, she told them that this information was now being shared openly among competing carriers and because of that informational interchange, "we don’t have to reinvent the wheel." She admitted that CRM had come to Aerostar later than it had to many other carriers, saying, "We’re behind, but the good thing about that is we can learn from other people’s mistakes and what roads not to go down. We 260 can learn a lot from small airlines who can be more responsive because their pilot groups are smaller." Again, Hiller touched on the theme of instructor influence, telling the group that one important lesson Aerostar had learned from LOFT at other carriers was that "you instructors and check airmen are the only way to keep CRM alive and well and keep it going." Further, CRM’s goal was to be integrated into everything the training department was doing -- to intertwine and disperse it in such a manner that CRM becomes a basic, integral part of all training. She suggested to the group that as role models, if they practiced and believed in CRM, others would pick up on it. CRM would die on the vine, she told them, without instructor reinforcement. After pitching the importance of instructor buy-in to the future of CRM at Aerostar, Hiller began her presentation by asking, "Why CRM?" and giving some history and statistics behind the evolution of CRM programs industry-wide. Although she had never used the term "pilot error" in her initial remarks, Charles Bronson nonetheless asked her how the term was defined within CRM. Her response was diplomatic; she seemed to sense a potential confrontation, and wanting to avoid it, attempted to defer the discussion to a later time, something that happened several times during the module: How they define things that are, that could have been changed because of a skill that they did, that they didn’t have or they didn’t use, such as 261 communication or management. They look at, did some CRM behavior, was that a major contributing factor to the accident? Such as did one crew member know they were on an active runway and not speak up or know that they weren’t cleared for takeoff and not say anything to the other crew members? Why did this happen? It’s not that a mechanical system broke down, it’s that some behavior, like KLM taking off, that was definitely a pilot error accident, because one knew that they weren’t cleared for take off...and they took off without a clearance. Is that clear enough? And we’ll get into that a little bit more throughout the day, too. I’d rather not do pilot error, and thank you, I’d rather say human factors was the result in some sort of breakdown and how the humans interacted together. This explanation did not apparently suffice, as Bronson pressed for something more concrete: When I hear pilot error, I think of the NTSB accident statement which nine times out of ten is pilot error, I thought we were trying to get away from that in CRM and I was a little bit curious when I hear pilot error mentioned in a CRM context, well, just what are we talking about here? Hiller ducked again, and Bronson did not pursue his point. Right. O.K. I was mentioning it as how NTSB reports accident causes...pilot error. Let’s keep that thought and if I don’t address it in the next two hours then let’s bring it up again at the end. That said, Hiller discussed how other airlines use different terms (such as eeekpit resource management) to define their courses, and stressed that Aerostar wanted them to utilize all available resources, which was why their course was titled grew resource management. Then she reviewed the CRM basics regarding the three major resources -- the crew, external resources and yourself. Cagney suggested 262 "airplane" as the third resource, before Hiller mentioned "yourself." Hiller responded with: This is always left for last. Not because we’re shy, non-egotistical people either, but because we just take it for granted that we are always going to be top gun. We’re always going to be good. We’re always going to be the same way in the cockpit. And you know, you know you’re not. She went on to suggest, using the term "our" to connote co- membership with her audience, "our role" as instructors is to model "when we’re fit to fly and when we’re not." She said stress, including current Aerostar financial problems, can cause one to be not fit to fly, linking it to the laws of readiness Tom Mitchell talked about on Day One. Instructors need to recognize, she explained, when trainees are not using themselves as a resource, and when they are not fit to learn on a particular day. The first step in coping with stress, she asserted, was recognizing its existence. Harking back to the one-day CRM program, Hiller talked about how brains are connected to bodies and, while drawing a three-position cockpit diagram with an upper case letter B at each position, re-told Pete Morgan’s joke about Delta cockpits, in which three pilots reside -- the captain ("Boss"), the first officer ("Bubba"), and the flight engineer ("Boy"). This evoked a hearty laugh, and gave her the entre to discuss crew member interaction, saying "They interact together and this is the human system. Basically 263 this is what CRM is all about. How does this crew member, this crew interact together?" Drawing the parallel between human systems and mechanical systems, she explained that while all systems have to work together, there is redundancy and "that’s the beauty of it." Aerostar, she asserted, realized that there are benefits to human system redundancy as well as mechanical redundancy because: ...(W)e need that redundance, in case something breaks down, but also because two perspectives or three perspectives on something that’s happening out there, a mechanical problem, a weather situation or whatever. Now you don’t just have one person’s perspective, you’ve got two people. This led to her joking about how, when flying in the jumpseat, pilots often see themselves in the captain’s seat, in the first officer’s seat, egg at the flight engineer’s panel. These how jumpseat riders often think, "Hey, that’s the best-looking crew I’ve ever seen." But, she said, If you’ve got any smarts at all, you’ll get off that plane. That’s not to say you’re not a great pilot, but there’s no back-up. You tune in the wrong frequency or you hear the wrong clearance, your read the wrong checklist and there’s no one there to back you up. And that’s what the beauty of the system is, the back-up there. Pilots share certain documented psychological traits. In addition, they are part of a culture whose daily work environment discourages individuality. Work performance is governed by employer and FAA-mandated policies and procedures. Hiller was pointing out the dangers inherent in having any two or three crew members think and respond 264 identically to any given situation. Absent multiple perspectives -- the human system’s back-up -- crews risked making grave operational errors. Having, recognizing, encouraging and rewarding multiple perspectives improved CRM and made for safer flying. Seeing two or three clones in the cockpit, she asserted, should be a warning signal to a pilot. Hiller covered CRM’s four basic words, asking that they be called out, but getting no answer. Rather than sit in silence, she teasingly looked at Walt Pierson and coaxed him, saying, "I know you know the first word." Pierson complied, answering "Are we talking about authority?" Adopting a tone of voice that sounded like she was talking to a group of small children, Hiller replied, "Yes, we’re talking about authority. Four big words in CRM. Who can tell me what AUTHORITY is?" Again there was no response, so she prodded some more, asking, "You guys are all captains, right?" From an unidentified speaker came the jab, "Anypedy knows what authority is." Sounding exasperated, Hiller demanded, "Well, what ie it?" Charles Bronson filled in the silence by quietly intoning, "Those four stripes is authority." Over the ensuing laughter Hiller echoed, "Four stripes is authority." Then, again from an unidentified speaker came what is perhaps the ultimate pilot view of authority, "Being in charge and accepting responsibilities when somebody screws up." 265 Hiller moved to the kind of authority deemed desirable in an airline captain, asking "Do we want high authority in the cockpit?" There was a long pause before someone responded affirmatively, which Hiller then echoed, "Yes, we do." Cognizant of how jealously airline captains guard their hard-earned authority and prerogatives, Hiller hastened to add the same caveat heard in the one-day program: This is one of the things, when CRM got going, a lot of the captains, not a lot, some captains weren’t real excited about it because they thought it might be mutiny training and maybe we were trying to get a community rule, all three of these seats would be equal and we weren’t going to have as much authority in the captain’s seat, we were going to share it out. Uh—uh. No way. Authority has to be in the left seat. Airplanes are flown by the one person being in charge because time is critical in making decisions and we know committees take long. So, but we want that authority to be secure authority. We want high authority but the psychologists tell us that there’s two kinds of authority and that’s probably why you had a little hard time defining it, is secure authority and insecure authority. It might be more easy if we talk about what is insecure authority.You’ve all flown with that kind of person. What is that? What is, what does that remind you of? What does that person do? Someone with insecure authority? The response to her questions came relatively quickly, given the reluctance with which previous answers were given. Jimmy Cagney was the first to speak up, saying, "Sure, we all know that kind of a guy. He’s the guy who doesn’t, his insecurity asks, he asks for respect. He asks for the input more than (giving orders) and confirming those with his crew." He described two kinds of insecure authority, citing 266 captains who do everything themselves, and captains who ask permission of subordinates before acting. Hiller supported Cagney’s assertion, going on to define and describe secure authority captains: We want secure authority. And secure authority is a little hard to find, because this person invites and demands participation, they empower their crew members. It’s very subtle, they’re very comfortable with their authority, because they wear it well. It’s the kind of person that...when you walk into that cockpit, you know they’re in charge. They’re not trying to show off and they’re not...giving it away and they’re not grabbing it. They’re just very comfortable with their authority. So, that’s what we want. We want secure authority. That said, Hiller moved to the second major term in CRM, PARTICIPATION, asking class members why they might want it. Wisecracked Dean, "To save your ticket!" This generated laughter and agreement from most of the group. Hiller, who apparently didn’t catch Bronson’s comment, appeared confused. The group repeated the comment several times and she still seemed confused, finally repeating, "Save your ticket?" Her confusion was greeted by more laughter; it was obvious the group was laughing at her, not with her, because she clearly didn’t get it. Embarrassed, Hiller hurried on, defining participation in a manner that cut to the heart of every pilot’s ego, saying: (W)hat participation really is is a sharing of ideas and knowledge among crew members. So when a secure authority captain invites and demands participation from crew members, he’s making himself look better. Saving his ticket, whatever, because he knows that if his crew members do good, 267 and look good, he’s gonna look good because he’s in charge of that cockpit on that flight. That said, Hiller moved on to ASSERTIVENESS, asking what it was and holding the answer open in hopes that someone would respond, but no one did. "Assertiveness. O.K. This is the word that takes the biggest hit. What is it?" Still no response. Allowing no silence to accumulate, Hiller charged ahead, saying: Gets confused a lot with aggression and we notice when we’re teaching that sometimes it did get confused with that in the classroom and we had some captains come back to us saying, ’You guys, I don’t know what you’re teaching in there but this first officer is just way too assertive and dah dah dah dah dah...(W)e don’t want that. We don’t want a breakdown of the system. What we want is input from the components of the system. If they see something that’s bothering them, the participating gives that input. That’s assertiveness... (I)t’s very hard for pilots to be assertive...we have more problem with pilots being under-assertive than over-assertive. And you wouldn’t think that when you think about pilot personalities, maybe, but part of it comes from our training and our background. We expect the other people in that cockpit to know what they’re supposed to be doing. Hiller’s brief talk about assertiveness spawned no comments, questions or disagreements, nor did she solicit any, before moving to the last term, RESPECT, and asking the group to define it. Again, nobody volunteered a definition. Again, filling the silence, Hiller asserted, "This is why if you’re assertive without respect, then it is aggressiveness. So we need to be respectful of authority." Respect is defined this way at Aerostar: "You know it when you get it and you know it when you give it." There 268 was no attempt to define it further. Writing on the easel, Hiller used different colors for different definitions. Authority was penned in green, participation in red, assertiveness in black and respect again in red. Then it was back for a re-cap of assertiveness with the question "What is assertiveness and how do we do it?" Already posted was a list of the five steps in an assertiveness statement and going over to it, she asked the group for an assertive statement. Once again, no prompt response came, so Hiller dove in and challenged, "You know what assertiveness means." Goaded, Cagney took a stab at constructing an assertive statement, saying, "Gee, what do you think about those thunderstorms over there?" Hiller, telling him it was not much of an assertive statement, sought more, but threw him a small, encouraging bone saying, "It’s an opening, though." Cagney tried again: "Gee, Captain, which way do you want to go around those thunderstorms?" Hiller pressed for the use of "I statements," which are irrefutable. She praised Cagney’s tactful approach and found positives, but returned to suggesting he use the pronoun "I" for greater impact, giving him an example: "Gee, Captain, I’m concerned about those thunderstorms off the end of the runway. Boy, we’re gonna have an awful rough ride if we fly through them. What do you think? Should we go to the left or the right? What do you think?" 269 Neither soliciting nor allowing time for commentary, Hiller forged ahead, explaining why she crafted the statement in that particular manner: What I just did is the kind of thing, or what you didn’t do is just so typical, that’s why I wanted you to do it, is that we as instructors have to give them the tools...to say ’I’m concerned’ or ’I’m not comfortable.’ It’s really hard for them to do that...(N)obody can refute an ’I statement,’ so if you say ’I don’t like, I’m uncomfortable, I’m really bothered by’ or whatever kind of words you want, then it’s your problem in case they’re not doing it the same way you do, your problem, now you can discuss it cause you’re not pushing anything on him. If you’re saying ’you’ type things, then you’re kind of pushing things... Interrupting, Cagney attempted to defend his approach, one which was calculated to avoid confrontation with the hypothetical captain, saying: But then you see you can break this down into levels. Step one, you’ve opened it up. You’ve opened the problem up. Chances are the guy’s going to solve the problem. Problem’s over. Number two, if he doesn’t do anything, now you state the concern. He doesn’t say anything. ’I think we’ll go out straight ahead.’ ’See, I think we shouldn’t go through those things, we’re gonna get the heck knocked out of us.’ Now you’ve stated your concern, end of problem. Hiller supported Cagney’s multi-level approach to some extent, but pointed out that time can be of primary importance and that often the situation was sufficiently time-critical that taking a two- or three-tiered approach would not work. Supporting Cagney, however, she praised him for moving slowly and demonstrating respect for the captain, but reinforced the issue of time, tying it to the group’s responsibility as instructor pilots: 270 ...(I)f the airplane starts getting a little bit more into a danger situation, our communications have to move along with it, speed it up just a little bit, become more suggestive. Ninety percent of our communication is data transfer and non-reactive...and that’s where as instructors when things are getting a little bit more . dangerous and using the simulator you’re setting that stage that they are getting a little more dangerous, you need to give some suggestions. Going another step further, she acknowledged pilot anxiety about looking wimpish for stating personal concerns, reinforcing the idea of personal responsibility, which she related to the notion of a crew working together as a unified team, saying: ...(W)e have to take responsibility for ourselves. We hope we never get into conflict with the door open and they’re punching each other out going down the aisle, but confrontation is something that’s the hardest thing for a pilot to ever do is take over for another crew member...it’s just really hard. She bolstered her statements about assertiveness and personal responsibility by making a rare reference to technical literature on the subject, telling the group that NASA statistics showed that 25-30% of pilots will silently fly in the danger zone rather than speaking up to fellow crew members. She cited a U.S. Air Force study in which the captain exhibited some form of subtle incapacitation; captains were instructed to simply stop flying the airplane. So reluctant were first officers to take over that 90% of the simulators crashed. We heard story after story in our class about . people not taking over. They’re low on the glide slope, different things are happening...they didn’t want to embarrass the other crew members or 271 they, you know, they thought they’d be chastised ...(or) yelled at. Which is worse? And it’s just amazing that as many people get out of the situations they do without something like that. She continued, relating her own experience about attending a class at another airline. In it, they talked about an incident aboard DC-lo in which the captain had a heart attack on flare (the airplane’s nose-up angle, preparatory to landing). The captain was a check airman, a highly experienced pilot who had the airplane trimmed up perfectly with everything going fine. The co-pilot’s first indication that something was wrong was that the airplane landed slightly harder and rougher than was customary with this particular captain. When the airplane began veering off the runway, the co-pilot looked over at the captain and "saw him not the way he normally would be." Only at that point did the co-pilot take action, putting his foot on the rudder to steer the airplane, but continuing to hope, even when using full rudder, that the captain would respond and take back control of the airplane. "We still, to the very end, want to have that other person as part of our crew and when do we make the decision that something has to be done?" asked Hiller. As she spoke, the group was silent. Next, Hiller began setting up the VCR but had trouble getting it to work properly. Nobody offered to help her but there were a couple of undiscernible but, judging from the tone, condescending remarks made about her difficulty. She 272 seemed a bit flustered about having equipment problems since she had taken care to set up the VCR in advance. The first videotape was set in a cockpit, with crew members discussing their bids for the next month. A flight attendant interrupts their conversation, asking for meal choices. Available, she says, are one seafood, two steaks and two chickens. One selects seafood, while the two others debate their choices. One says he would take whatever the other does not want. A second voice says it did not matter. There is much discussion about who will eat what; one talks about his cholesterol and how he needs chicken, and it all becomes rather confused as they discuss and discuss and fool around with this business of selecting a meal. There are extra people in the cockpit -- somebody deadheading, and an FAA representative, for a total of five occupants who need to make meal selections. As the tape played out, the group was laughing over the ridiculousness of the situation. At last, all the meals are parceled out and the tape ends when the fight attendant says, "I hate to ask, but what would you guys like to drink?" Hiller inquired about the flight attendant’s perception of the chaos? There was no discussion of the tape; it spoke for itself. Using the performance-motivation curve the group had seen with Tom Mitchell on Day One, Hiller discussed performance and motivation issues for instructors, stressing their need to be able to assess/diagnose the level of 273 student stress and the importance of the first few minutes of what she termed "join up" with the students. With that, asking for questions, but again not waiting to determine if the group had any, she ended the one-day CRM program’s review. After a break, Hiller began a presentation on pilot personality traits using the same kind of lengthy disclaimer Pete Morgan employed during the one-day seminar. Hiller emphasized she was not a psychologist, recalled her co- membership by declaring herself a pilot first, and denied being an advocate for the list she was presenting. She told the group that the list contained job-specific, not gender- specific traits. She further stated that the instructors were free to accept or reject the list. I do need a disclaimer here. I’m not a psychologist, I’m not a psychiatrist, I’ve not had any real formal training in this. I consider myself more of a safety person and an educator. A pilot first and educator second. I have a master’s degree in adult ed, which sometimes does me some good and sometimes doesn’t, but what I want to relate to you is not something I’ve discovered or I’ve learned...I’m basically going to be a relayer of information. I really can’t defend this and I can’t advocate it. It’s just sort of nice to know this type of stuff that maybe will help you out. The disclaimer out of the way, Hiller got to the list; she talked about the first characteristic on it, telling the class that pilots as a group are considered to be physically and mentally healthy. This was unsurprising because pilots have to pass stringent physicals once or twice per year, 274 depending on cockpit position. As to the idea that pilots are mentally healthy, Hiller said: Mentally healthy. Hm-m-m-m. Maybe we’re a little paranoid, but that’s OK based on the system that we work in. We can’t blindly expect ATC clearances, we can’t blindly accept what instruments are telling you if we disagree. We have to be a little bit paranoid. We’re selected for that. But the mentally healthy...what was that a Fed Ex pilot who burned up his wife in the van or the one who put his wife through the wood chipper, you know, some of that. We’re not all completely mentally healthy. But, probably healthier than the average population. This was too good for Cagney to resist, "Did he get away with it? That’s what I want to know." Hiller responded, before moving along with the topic of pilot stress, saying, "He’s still in court. They take forever." She mentioned the need for pilots to recognize when they are under stress and not dealing with it effectively, to get help, suggesting they utilize the airline’s Employee Assistance Program (EAP). Then she went on to list several other traits, including "avoid introspection," telling the group that pilots: ...don’t usually like to look inside and see how we’re at. That’s what makes CRM so hard to teach because you have to...look at your own behavior ...we’re cautious about close relationships, avoid revealing true feelings. She told the instructors that one of their responsibilities was "to know that what they’re (students) saying to you isn’t really what they mean and you need to be able to read into or ask the right question to try to pull out their real feelings..." 275 Pilots, she asserted, citing NTSB reports, frequently use humor to cope with anxiety. In these reports, cockpit voice recorder transcripts show time and time again, moments before a pilot is going to die, "there’s often a bit of levity or a little bit of humor being used because it’s so tense in there and that’s the way crew members can cope with the anxiety." She continued, uninterrupted and unchallenged, not seeking comments or questions, clearly into what another facilitator called "The Telling." She stated that pilots, while highly intelligent, are not intellectually oriented and that they operate on "continuums." This, too, harked back to the one—day seminar in which Pete Morgan drew the opposite ends of the continuums, and put Xs at the end that applied to pilots, which generally showed them residing in the realm of concrete thinking rather than that of philosophical and/or theoretical thinking. Said Hiller: As pilots, we’re way back, we’re way down here. We’re very logical, analytical. We like checklists. We like to be able to see, touch and hear things. Read the gauges? That’s what it says. That’s reality. On she went, touching on pilots’ competitive natures, the dispassionate way in which they handle their feelings, and repeating the August class’s assertion that the very personal qualities that make for good pilots produce poor husbands and fathers, people who are weak in interpersonal areas . 276 Next, she hit on a particularly sensitive area, the merger, telling the group that because pilots have a hard time getting in touch with their feelings, some have had difficulty expressing grief over what they felt they’d lost. This unexpressed grief, she told them, sometimes led to anger: We’re good about anger. We’re not good about grief. And in our class we talked about different words that pilots have for anger and I think there’s eighty-some words you can use for anger and we basically get ’pissed off’ and ’extremely pissed off,’ like there are two. We have those two words to express anger. The next planned activity was another videotape, which Hiller decided omit, saying, "You guys are experienced instructors," opting instead to move to the tools available to instructors for assessing CRM and CRM LOFT sessions. The interchange that might have been expected earlier, when talking about personality traits and the emotionally loaded topic of the merger, occurred here, with a tense-sounding Jimmy Cagney interrupting her presentation, while Hiller attempted to move toward discussing evaluative tools: Cagney: Could you, quick question? Hiller: Yes. Let’s just finish this section first... Cagney: (interrupting her) Stress. Hiller: Mm-hmm? Cagney: Is the company aware of the stress that the pilots are under right now and are they doing anything to cover it? 277 Cagney left Hiller with no choice but to answer his direct, undeniably loaded question. Hiller: Well, the company is aware of the stress. Are they doing anything to cover it? There’s stuff planned, the survey that went out in 1991 for all the line pilots, stress came back as a really big thing that was not included in our present CRM program and needed to be included. So, we had a couple of line pilots...develop this one hour training on stress management, that’s where we talk about long term, short term, financial things, how to deal with it, how to manage it. We’re not just going to describe it but we’re talking about tools to use to deal with it. The economy is something we can’t deal with. It’s like what can we have control over? What can we not? ...(W)e’re not going to crash airplanes because of stress. The next few comments shed further light on the pilot personality, particularly the independent, self-contained qualities most possess. Cagney: The pilots are 12% of the airline. Do the pilots use the EAP 12% of the time? Hiller: I don’t know. I don’t know. I would bet not. Cagney: I would bet not, too. I’d bet we’d be down around 1%. Hiller: Because of these characteristics of... Cagney: Yeah. I can do it, I... Hiller: I can compartmentalize, I can. I’m OK to fly, it’s not going to affect me...I hate to say it, but it’s a masculine trait, too... Cagney: ...Well, I’m sure it is... Here Hiller interjected a remark that focused on male vs. female gender differences in response to marriage problems. She never had the opportunity to demonstrate how it related to the overall line of discussion. Instead, the 278 conversation moved to more work-specific causes for pilot stress. Hiller: ...And how many men that are having marriage problems are the ones that want to go to counseling versus how many women? This last comment produced a response from Walt Pierson, who asserted that what he was observing at Aerostar was a trend toward asking more of the employee group, particularly the pilots, as the airline’s financial situation continued to worsen. The deteriorating economic environment made it easier for management to justify pushing people harder, he opined: And who’s the ultimate payer of that price? Not just the pilot employees, but any employee and of course that’s the, shortages are developing for pilots now in certain categories and there’s the attitude is ’Well, we gotta fly the airline.’ We gotta fly the airline but the stress reduction on the ultimate people affected by that is not even a consideration. He stated the importance, in his opinion, of providing praise for pilots, who are concrete thinkers. Cagney returned to his original topic -- concern about pilot stress. He asked if the airline was aware and doing anything about pilot stress. When Hiller answered affirmatively, he continued, describing stress-related symptoms he claimed he had observed among the pilots with whom he had contact. He contended that he was seeing signs of more stress-related illness among pilots, including shaking hands and increased alcohol consumption. 279 Hiller, apparently uneasy about this departure from the script, attempted to deflect his comments, mentioning an exercise she conducts in the check airman class in which the group talks about where they think the next accident will happen at Aerostar. From the group comes an anonymous "There isn’t going to be any more..." As Hiller continued, she made the connection between stress and accidents, relating stress management issues to CRM training, repeating, "You know, CRM is not charm school. It’s not how to communicate better with your wife. It’s safety training. It’s how to be safer in the cockpit..." Any hope of changing the course of the discussion was abandoned when Cagney again interrupted, stating: "You ever want to see a classic stress-related accident it’s that Strasburg A-320 accident. You read that report. That crew was under such stress that they didn’t even know they were going." That evoked a curious "Which one?" from a class member, and in the sliver of silence that followed, Hiller began to talk about how stress and fatigue affect one another, explaining that fatigue illuminates one’s stress level. She put a stopper in the conversation by saying "We need to look back into that. O.K. Anything else?" After pausing for approximately five seconds, Hiller transitioned to CRM LOFT tools for instructor pilots. "What we’re going to be doing now is looking at some of the tools that you can use to pick out -- good and bad -- CRM skills in the crew members that you’re working with." Again she 280 iterated Aerostar’s belief that the instructor cadre was a critical influence on the pilot group and the primary vehicle for selling CRM throughout the airline: If they see you do something that is poor CRM, they’re going to say, ’Ah, those check airmen, those instructors, that’s how they do it. It’s just the schoolhouse that does it that way.’ But if you reinforce it and you believe in it and you buy into it and you encourage it in the de-brief, it’s going to go a long way and that’s the way CRM has to go. You’re a very powerful influence. Hiller showed videos depicting a LOFT being role- played; the scenarios involved a DC-9 crew experiencing a hydraulic problem. Hiller briefed the instructor participants on the technical aspects of the situation they were about to observe. The first video role-play demonstrated poor CRM by the captain in particular, which resulted in the development and ultimate resolution of an unnecessarily tight situation. At the end of the tape, Hiller asked if anyone had ever witnessed anything close to that scenario. Smart remarks flew: "Looks normal to me." "Looks fine." "Hell, they didn’t crash." and "I just don’t want to fly with Mike (the pilot who played the captain on the tape)!" Everyone was laughing. Hiller brought the group back to seriousness by focusing on the need for the instructors to de-brief the LOFT. "You’ve got these guys, they’ve flown this LOFT and now we have to talk to them and de-brief it. You have, have you experienced things this bad in a LOFT that you’ve instructed?" Several comments were begun but not finished 281 when Joe Williams’ voice stood out and he offered that he believed the captain had acted with insecure authority, saying "I’ve got a lot of stuff here I want to de-brief." That won him the not-so-coveted role of de-briefer, as Hiller broke the group into the crew and the crew’s alter egos for a role-playing exercise. As she attempted to get the exercise underway, there was a lot of laughter and wise-cracking, but in the end, Hiller prevailed. In her instructions, she told the group that as the crew participated in the de-brief, the alter egos would chime in with what the crew members were really thinking as the de-brief was conducted. Williams asked for clarification, "Somebody’s going to stand behind me and say what I’m really saying?" Hiller confirmed, "What they think you are really thinking, OK?" It took a few minutes for the exercise to get rolling. Apparent levels of discomfort varied. Pierson was with the role play the whole time, actively portraying the first officer’s alter ego. Williams, the de-briefer, seemed to be earnestly trying to do his best, while Charles Bronson stood leaning against the wall, arms folded, a smile on his face. The others remained silent. Hiller stopped the exercise periodically, doing what she termed a "freeze frame" during which she would make a point, tying the discussion in with the LOFT training session on the video, stressing the de-brief as an opportunity for dialogue among crew members, not a lecture 282 by the facilitator. Williams expressed discomfort about taking on a personality that was not his own. The awkwardness continued, but Hiller reminded the group: ...their minds are going constantly and they’re constantly thinking things and your talking is having to get into the lineup of all those powerful thoughts that our people have in their minds and that’s an important thing for us as instructors to realize, that we’re not just talking to silent people. As the group warmed to its task, the commentary from the alter egos became increasingly scathing and undeniably real, including this interchange: Cagney: I’m gonna act like a co-pilot because co- pilots with the captain next to them don’t always give you the answer that they’re really (thinking). Cagney (as co-pilot): You know, those procedures, they really really, really kind of burdened and kinda maybe we ought to think about maybe rewrite some of those procedures so we don’t (get) all wrapped up here at the last minute. Gee, I was doing the checklist and we’re on approach and boy, we always get busy there. Maybe we ought to think about SOPA to... Cagney had zeroed in on the typical pilot’s preference for changing the environment rather than changing himself. And Pierson, unwittingly, did precisely the same thing as alter ego, but with a slight twist. Pierson (as co-pilot alter ego): What we really need to do is change captains. Cagney (as himself): That’s exactly what I’m thinking. The jerk! Hiller: As the check airman or instructor, we have to realize that that first officer is not really saying what he thinks. So you throw it out and then you need to kind of ’Gee, what is he 283 really saying?’ and empower him to feel the right way. Cagney (as co-pilot): Maybe I should have been a little more assertive in asking Mike to slow down a bit, give me a little more time to get these things done. Maybe I should have asked to do a holding pattern while I got this thing squared away here. Pierson (as co-pilot alter ego): He’s gonna be having his retirement party in a phone booth. Who cares? (Laughter) My flight leaves for home in thirty minutes.Let’s move it along. While the group did not disagree with Hiller on how to de- brief the LOFT, Cagney had reservations about long-term consequences of handling de-briefs: It’s a tough position to put the second officer and the co-pilot, because, with the captain sitting there, the captain really is the leader of the crew and he’s the one who sets the tone and he does a lot of things, and it’s tough to be a second officer or a co-pilot, especially in front of this captain, to say ’This was a lousy job. This was terrible. I, we got all screwed up. We you know, we should have gone in, we should have done whatever, um, I thought we could have done a little better’ is something that you’re going to say, but it’s not what you really mean... Pierson: ...because there’s life after training... Cagney: ...and he may have to go out with the guy on a trip... Hiller attempted to assuage this anxiety by emphasizing the de-brief’s focus on the total crew, not just the captain. She reminded them that if the first officer became overloaded, as our video co-pilot did, he had a responsibility to speak up and find a solution to his workload problem. 284 At that point, the group decided to take a "pit stop" rather than break for lunch, and, as the instructor participants were leaving, I overheard Bronson say to Joe Williams, "Why do we have to do this again? I’ve been through this four times now. Do you think they’re trying to tell me something?" After the break, Hiller discussed developing the captain’s ability to command and to lead, mentioning an article she’d read that had been written by the wife of an American Airline’s pilot. The substance of the article was the care and feeding of a new captain. Hiller pointed out that there was concern at Aerostar about helping pilots make their way through that transition period. This prompted Dean, in his self-proclaimed position as "gray-beard," to talk about the kind of training the airline provided for new captains during the 1960s: Bronson: Back in the 60s, we had a captains . school ...charm school...(A)t that time, captains were all, I think the average...age was like 26 or something. That was, those were some pretty young captains at that time. Hiller: Then you’re teaching some basic experience, judgement things. It’s useful to teach. There’s a lot of argument around that, whether you can or you can’t. You can teach leadership. Bronson: No, no. This is a completely different company we’re talking about. At that time, there was no such thing as teaching whatever was gOIng to happen in the cockpit or anything like that. The sole reason for the school was to get the pilots on the company side and away from the union, so it was, it was a big sale job on the part of the company to try and sort of turn the new captains, if you will, and get them to be pro- 285 company. So it wasn’t any of this stuff, this touchy-feely stuff... Apparently caught off-guard, and unhappy with the conversational turn, Hiller cut Bronson off in mid-sentence, returning to defining training objectives. This was the beginning of another of Hiller’s lengthy lecture, this one on the LOFT checklist for facilitators. She provided a bit of history on how the checklist was developed, saying: We took the 64 crew performance indicators (developed by NASA) and...we condensed them into something usable and workable that we figured that instructors will look at again, knowing the busy- ness of the sim, the darkness, all that kind of stuff. She told the instructors they would be dealing with four main CPI (crew performance indicator) clusters -- Communication, Team-Building, Workload Management, and Technical Proficiency -— emphasizing the reciprocal nature of technical proficiency and good CRM, saying: If we have two great CRM pilots, they can’t find the airplane, we don’t want that either, so the two are interrelated that when we’re assessing CRM, we have to be assessing technical at the same time. It really ties together. Hiller went farther, offering a specific example of how technical proficiency and good CRM must interrelate to achieve maximum crew efficiency: ...we don’t assess one thing and not another. If the crew is so out of whack as far as workload management and distribution of tasks, they’re going to shoot a poor ILS (instrument landing system). I mean, and so you’re going to see that poor ILS. Why did it happen? Did they not have the skills to shoot the ILS? No. They just got behind down there and that’s CRM and that’s crew coordination. So it all really ties together... 286 From there, Hiller moved to the various components of the CPI clusters with which the instructor were going to be de-briefing and critiquing LOFT crews. She began with the second cluster, COMMUNICATION, and even suggested specific words the instructors could use to de-brief a crew like the one they’d just watched on the video, one that hadn’t communicated very well: "You didn’t clearly communicate on that MEL (minimum equipment list) and that caused some problems down the road." Hiller abruptly moved to EXPLICITLY ENCOURAGES PARTICIPATION, the first CPI under COMMUNICATION, telling the group that the captain in the video hadn’t let the first officer do his job, which was to look up information in the FOM (Flight Officer’s Manual): ...we’re looking to see that the crew seeks information and direction from others when necessary and you want to provide positive and negative examples of it. If they did that, you want to tell them, pat them on the back. It was difficult to discern exactly what Hiller’s path was as she worked her way through these CPIs, because she took them out of the order shown in the course handout. The third CPI she covered, shifting as abruptly from the second CPI as she had from the first, was ASSERTIVENESS. After naming each CPI, Hiller provided a few sentences about what to look for when evaluating LOFT crews. In addition to the clusters and CPIs mentioned already, Hiller covered the remaining ones in similar fashion: 287 COMMUNICATION .critiques self and other crew members when appropriate; .briefs crew thoroughly; TEAM-BUILDING .uses appropriate techniques to manage interpersonal and operational conflict; .involves entire crew in decision-making; .clearly communicates decisions about operation of flight; WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT .distributes tasks to maximize efficiency, preventing overload for one crew member; .prioritizes for effective accomplishment; .manages time for accomplishment; .monitors and analyzes all relevant operational factors to remain situationally aware; and last, TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY Hiller covered these clusters and CPIs uninterrupted; only when she asked for comments did anyone speak up, and an obviously agitated Cagney described what he apparently perceived as a radical departure from how he was accustomed to grading LOFTs, "Are you telling me we're going to have this in the cockpit and this is how I’m going to grade my LOFTs from now on?" Hiller sought to mollify him: ...(T)his is an objective way to look at behavior in training, this is CRM emphasis and we are going to be scoring it but it’s not going to be just like this. But this will be available to you and you’ll be getting...so much more training about this that you won’t even have to look at this anymore, because it’ll be like the checklist. 288 Not mollified, Cagney suggested that Aerostar look at the instrueters’ workload management. Hiller tried to calm his anxiety about what using this list of clusters and CPIs might mean to the instructors, initially groping for a rationale that would satisfy Cagney and doing some selling of the information contained on the list, ultimately settling on an analogy between the clusters and CPI list and a pilot’s study guide: Yeah. That’s why you will not be needing this, because it’ll be, it’ll be the kind of stuff that you know when I say authority you know what that means now, you don’t need to have a little card that says authority. It’s gonna be so logical and you’re going to be so used to it by the time you start doing LOFTs for SVT, that you’re, it, it, this is like a study guide for ground school? Once you got out of ground school and you learned your systems, you don’t ever look at your study again, but you look at your AOM and your COM? This is like a study guide. This is a tool to learn...but you’re right, that’s why we took those 64 and said...no way. Still unconvinced, Cagney began to protest anew, but was cut off in mid-sentence, "Even this is too much for..." by Hiller’s assertion that he should tell her in a year that he still felt the same way. Cagney could not be bought off so easily and the following by-play ensued, terminated when an uncomfortable Hiller called for another video, then lunch: Hiller: But to be complete and to cover some of. the behaviors, it, tell me what in about a year if you still can... Cagney: Trust me. Hiller (laughing): Trust you. Cagney: Trust me...I don’t like it yet. 289 Hiller: O.K. We’re going to watch one more scenario and then we’re going to come back from lunch and we’re going to do some scoring. The second video depicted the same crew, with the same hydraulic problem, only this time the captain consults with his first officer, asking him if he is comfortable with going with the hydraulics and alternate pump the way they are. "It’s fine with me," responds the first officer, "The MEL (minimum equipment list) says we can do it." Even so, the captain suggests looking at the MEL to be sure they are familiar with the procedures. Throughout the video, we saw a crew that worked well together, with the captain fully in command while encouraging his first officer’s participation, and taking the first officer’s concerns and comments seriously. As the situation deteriorates, the captain consults with the first officer, soliciting his participation and input; there are problems involved in terms of weather and the fact that in order to get the landing gear down, they will have to free- fall it, since their hydraulics are not functioning. That meant that once the gear was down, it could not be retracted. Facing bad weather at their destination and reluctant, in the event of a missed approach, to attempt to fly to an alternate airport with the gear down, considering the amount of fuel that would burn, the captain asks, "You want to go some other place?" Responds the first officer, "I think it’s a good idea." That decided, the captain notifies ATC 290 while the first officer contacts Aerostar dispatch and determines a suitable alternate. Ultimately they decide to divert to Indianapolis. The flight attendants are notified, the captain speaks to the passengers on the public address system, and they land without mishap. Said Hiller about this scenario, "O.K. A little bit different? A little bit." She talked about how we had seen a captain who was very secure with his authority, and who communicated well with his first officer as they worked their way toward a successful resolution. Bronson made the first instructor participant comment about the video, comparing it to the first one we had seen. Interestingly, despite his open contempt for CRM, and stated annoyance at being in this session, Bronson was well versed in CRM principles, and readily picked up on the CRM aspect of the video: There’s a whole lot of subtle things he did to build up the co-pilot...call(ed) him by his name. You never heard that in the first one (video). He brought him into the loop by getting out the MEL and...his cockpit discipline was good as far as the (delegation) of duties, when he got (the first officer) into the CRM, he took responsibility of dealing with approach control and ...then when (the first officer) was doing the check-1ist...the importance of what he was doing was emphasized all the way along, so I guess you’d call that team- building... Ken Rogers joined the discussion, seeing the scenario a little differently than Dean, but easily linking the concept of technical proficiency to good CRM in order to produce a 291 positive outcome. Additionally, Rogers reinforced the airline pilot’s comfort with and reliance on procedure: What I see in these two things that we’ve seen is technical proficiency. That if a person is first of all not willing to follow SOPA, SMAC or FARs or accepted procedures that are trained to them, then they wouldn’t have CRM to start with and if they did it wouldn’t be any good because the first demonstration showed someone who is unwilling to follow any guidelines that he has, procedures, he didn’t follow any procedures. Therefore, he had no CRM in mind, anyway. And in the second one, the reason the CRM was good was because he had a foundation that allowed it to be there and that was following procedures. If you don’t follow procedures, you don’t have CRM. Hiller enthusiastically agreed, saying, "That’s great. Very good point. We need SOPA/SMAC..." With that, she promised that after lunch, having seen "the bad" and "the good," we’d see what she termed "what they normally see in real life, the middle of the road." After lunch, Hiller showed the third video, telling the group: What I’m hoping we can do on this last LOFT is look at these groupings of behaviors, crew performance indicators we call them, and can look at the LOFT and you can make some pluses and some minuses so that we can, as a group, do a de-brief of this crew. Before she could begin the tape, Cagney rolled another grenade into the proceedings, challenging Aerostar’s use of two instructors for each LOFT session. Hiller had a ready response. Cagney: Why do we have to have two instructors in a LOFT? Hiller: It’s the union contract. There’s always a second officer instructor whenever there’s a 292 second officer in the sim. But that may be...something that should be looked at as a cost. Apparently Hiller, aware from earlier comments that Cagney was an active ALPA member at Aerostar, thought this explanation would settle the issue right away. It did not. Cagney continued: I’m not saying it as a cost. I’m saying it if I’m going to grade the crew, if I’m going to grade the crew’s performance, then you don’t need two guys. Hiller tried another tack, instructor workload, which Cagney had hit on earlier, and stressed that when there were three crew members in the simulator, someone had to be responsible for monitoring the second officer at the second officer’s panel, in addition to monitoring the captain and first officer: One of the reasons...is running a LOFT with three crew members is very busy when you are being ATC (Air Traffic Control), FA (Flight Attendant), dispatch, plus you’re trying to make sure that you are seeing what is happening on that second officer’s panel, at the same as trying to assess what’s going on with the front end crew members. She went a step farther to address Cagney’s concerns about two instructors by giving the impression, at least, that his objection was worth Aerostar’s consideration, saying, "If we have video, it may take the place of having to have someone always watching (the second officer). You know, it’s something to consider..." This did not satisfy Cagney and he said so in no uncertain terms, reminding Hiller of his lofty status as a B-747-200 instructor and check airman, and all that such status implied: 293 I know. But you know, as the captain instructor on the 747-200, I know as much about the second officer’s panel as most line second officers do. And I can certainly, I think, evaluate the second officer’s performance, not in the same vein as a second officer instructor would, but at least at the point that I could judge it as crew performance, if that’s the goal... Hiller: That’s the goal... Cagney: ...then we don’t need it. This dialogue was finally halted when Hiller cut it off, commenting that the airline would ultimately be getting rid of its three place airplanes over time, so the problem would disappear of its own accord. When Cagney disputed her assertion, claiming that the airplanes would be replaced, Hiller terminated the discussion: That’s a good point. Let’s sit back and watch this DC-9 and see what they do. Same scenario. Now you’ve seen both of the sides of it and pick and choose the things that you can positively de- brief and the things that you think they need talking about in the de-brief. The final scenario involving the DC-9 with the faulty hydraulic system began with the captain telling the first officer he has talked to dispatch about the alternate pump and, in response to a question from the first officer, that he (the captain) has checked the MEL. The first officer comments that it is nice that the captain included him in the decision, to which the captain replies, "Aw, no problem." As the situation deteriorates, the captain admits to the first officer that they should not have left with the alternate pump as they would have to free-fall the gear in order to land. 294 As they work through their checklist, preparing to land, the first officer questions the captain’s decision to extend the gear, asking "Are you sure you want it down now? With the weather the way it is?" The captain responds that the weather is RVR (runway visual range) 2600,’ but the first officer persists, reminding him that once the gear is down it cannot be retracted. The captain pushes back, saying, "I haven’t heard anybody miss it out there." The first officer continues, suggesting getting dispatch into the loop to "see what they have to say about it." He cajoles the captain a bit, reminding him that since they had plenty of time, why not just give dispatch a call? "It won’t take but a second." Grudgingly, the captain agrees, "If it’ll make you happy, go ahead. Do that. I’ll tell approach we’re going to have to wait." Using input from dispatch, the decision is made to lower the gear and land, which they do. On the ground, the captain thanks the first officer for his persistence, "It worked out pretty good. Listen, I do appreciate your speaking up back there. At first, I was opposed to taking the time to talk to dispatch, but I think that was the proper thing to do and you did a good job." Replies the first officer, "Thanks, Mike. I really appreciate it." Hiller asked what the group would say to this crew and then gave them permission to use either the CPIs they had gone over earlier or do the de-brief the way they normally 295 would, saying that since in the morning’s first exercise, they had "intuitively" done a good job. Cagney jumped in first with a generic comment, saying that while the CRM was shaky initially, it "really wasn’t too bad." Hiller pressed for specifics, "...What do you mean they start off a little bit bad?" Never one to hold back, Cagney was prepared: Well, I’ve got a number of things that I...put down here. Number one, I don’t think the captain briefed the first officer thoroughly about their little hydraulic problem. I just, I went down this checklist and I gave people a plus or a minus. Hiller: Mmm-hmmm... Cagney: Number two, clearly communicates the status about the operation of the flight. I think the captain when he made the command decision about we’re going to go ahead and land anyway, I don’t think he communicated that’s what we’re going to do right away. The co-pilot kind of had to guess that. I think CRM would have had them discussing that a little bit more, so I think he was a little lax there. Hiller asked the rest of the group if they agreed with Cagney’s assessment so far. A lone voice that said, "Yes," to which Hiller responded, "O.K." Then Cagney was back at center stage: I gave the captain a minus on three, ’explicitly encouraged participation’ because he didn’t seek out participation from his first officer. He’s ’I’m doing. I made the decision.’ He didn’t seek out any participation. Again, Hiller sought comments from other class members, saying, "You guys feel the same way?" Joe Williams opined that the captain had exhibited two different personalities 296 during the course of the video, and expressed his concern about it: Well...the briefing was almost like in the first one, you know, on this on the MEL item, you know, he really sloughed it off. Very poorly and then he was such a gentleman at the end, you know...about thanking him for getting him to talk to dispatch, which is the total opposite personality... When Hiller pressed for how he would structure his comments during de-brief, Williams dodged the bullet by contending that he did not believe such behavioral swings would actually happen, saying, "If a guy was going to do that in the beginning, I don’t think his personality would have allowed him to speak up at the end and apologize and thank him. I just can’t see that that would really happen that way, but..." It appeared that at last there was going to be a real group discussion regarding de-briefing this LOFT, as Ken Rogers interrupted Williams with a comment on how he saw the personality change, and what he thought might have prompted it. Rogers stated that the captain may have realized, by merit of other training, that: ...(H)e was out of line and he corrected himself for it. That’s what I got out of it. He came on strong and then later on, after he saw the first officer with the other decision-making he was originally was against...I think he saw that it was time to listen to the first officer...and so he thought about that and flipped over the other way. Hiller supported Rogers’ assertion, telling the group about cyclic communication feedback loops: 297 ...(I)f the captain shoots and says one thing but the first officer responds to it and goes the other way, by the first officer being assertive ...holding his ground, the captain saw how that worked and then his behavior changes. And you may see that. Maybe it’s not as likely that you would see it...but...you may see it. It’s kind of like...when we’re assessing the whole crew, it’s how the first officer reacts to what the captain says that may change how the captain reacts back and vice versa. You give a little respect, you get a little. Cagney challenged Hiller’s claim that the captain showed the first officer respect: I don’t think he showed the first officer much respect, though, as much as he should have. The first officer was persistent...and finally, ’OK, if it makes you happy, go ahead and do it.’ I don’t see that as the captain’s being respectful to the first officer. He went on to demonstrate how the captain eeulg have shown respect to the first officer, suggesting the captain say something like, "’You know, I think you’re right. Maybe you should go ahead and call them. That’s a good idea.’ That shows him respect. But to belittle him, I think that’s the wrong way to go." Hiller did not disagree with Cagney, but rather demonstrated how, in the de-brief, the first officer could be complimented for being persistent, while the captain could be complimented for recognizing and acknowledging the first officer’s persistence and worthwhile contribution and for..."being man enough in the end to realize that he should thank him, because he did a good job." Bronson entered the conversation, supporting Hiller and initiating a discussion on maturity, saying, "Well, I think 298 you have to be prepared to do that in life unless you’re infallible, if you have this concept of yourself as the omnipotent captain or you’re infallible as a human being..." In response, Hiller mentioned an Aerostar pilot, who she described as one of the "original CRM guys," who opined that "It’s a mature person that would tell you their strengths and their weaknesses...it’s hard to admit that we’re not perfect." Cagney continued his critique, saying he’d give the captain "a real strong plus on number 6...’critiques self and other crew members.’" He termed the captain’s ability to realize what was happening, assess the situation and praise the first officer "real positive." He complimented the captain for changing his personality as the situation developed and for seeking information from the first officer. He went on to state that he would give the first officer "a real strong plus..." Cagney was not without criticism for the first officer, however: I’m going to give the first officer a minus on number 2. The first officer actually started the gear extension procedure without a direct command from the captain. Hiller agreed. Cagney continued: It’s was not, you know, ’O.K. Gear down.’ and the first officer reached, jumped in there and started to put the gear down without a direct command, although it was implied. Hiller asked for further commentary on communication but nobody filled the brief silence she allowed before 299 continuing, raising the issue of informing the flight attendants. On this, the group promptly disagreed with her, asserting that because there was no diversion to an alternate airport, there was no need to talk to the flight attendants or passengers. But Hiller reminded the group that there was more to the scenario than a simple, normal landing: It might be good, when you land and your gear doors are dragging and there are sparks coming out that they know that maybe something is going on. Are they gonna stop on that stop and the maintenance trucks are gonna come out with their lights flashing to do something with your plane. You know, the passengers might like to know that (you’re going to pin the gear) and you’re going to taxi to the gate. Normal procedures. Cagney disputed the need for this kind of flight attendant and passenger announcement, citing the activity and the simulated situation in a LOFT. He told Hiller, "I don’t care how real you make a LOFT, they’re (the flight attendants and passengers) not there, the pilots know they aren’t there and they don’t even think about it..." Bronson, sounding disgusted growled, "Aw, let’s skip the PA now..." The conversation proceeded to how flight attendants deal with what they perceive as unusual circumstances, with Walt Pierson reminding the group that oftentimes, "The senior flight attendant comes in and says ’What’s going on? I ll Hiller asserted that some LOFT scenarios, which included having the flight attendant call the cockpit and ask what was happening, were being developed. This 300 triggered another interchange between her and Cagney, whose instantly bristled: "They better not be doing that in my cockpit!" Hiller, startled by Cagney’s vehemence, said only, "Huh?" Cagney continued, "They better not be doing that. If I’m below ten thousand feet, they better not be calling me up wanting to know what’s going on." (Cagney’s reference to being "below ten thousand feet" relates to the Sterile Cockpit Rule, which prohibits pilots from engaging in any conversation not directly related to flying the airplane whenever they are below ten thousand feet in altitude.) Hiller attempted to smooth his ruffled feathers by hypothesizing that he was climbing out and above ten thousand feet. Cagney’s response was a terse "O.K." She went on to suggest that if there is time, he could consider making an exception. He retaliated with his own hypothetical situation, in which he had two engine fires, then the conversation moved to overall crew briefings. Hiller discussed the disparity between flight attendants and captains and their respective perceptions of recent crew briefings. Almost everyone had something to say on the "question of communication" between the captain and the flight attendants. Pierson contended that organizational diffusion separated flight attendants from pilots, asserting that there was no need for flight attendants to feel that they are part of the crew since they answer more to the lead flight attendant and the gate agents than to the captain. 301 Self-proclaimed elder Bronson suggested that captains use "a stronger moral tone" when briefing flight attendants and that they conduct those briefings in the cockpit for some additional impact. Following his own remark, Bronson waxed nostalgic about how Japan Air Lines pilots brief their crews with flight attendants waiting, eyes cast downward, while the captain smokes a cigarette and tells them what he wants them to know. Beneath the joking manner with which Bronson spoke was an undertone of seriousness to his tale. One gets the distinct impression he would like to have flight attendants be totally subservient to pilots at all times. When Bronson exhausted the subject of briefing flight attendants, the conversation moved on the CPI checklist and where it would be kept. Hiller suggested it would probably be kept in the FOM (Flight Officer’s Manual). Predictably, Cagney objected: Don’t put it in the FOM. There’s too much junk in the FOM right now. You can hardly find anything in it there’s so much junk in it. I don’t know why you need to have it... Hiller: O.K. But it will be distributed...but the thing is there’s no way we’re going to be assessing crew members on a LOFT unless they have previously, know what kinds of things we’re going to be looking for, so O.K. That said, the conversation degenerated into a mix of voices, none of which could be clearly discerned. This talk went on for several seconds until someone arrived to pass out the day’s tests. Apparently the CRM session had ended, 302 although Hiller did not wind it up formally. There was no re-cap of the day’s activities. There was no call for comments or questions. There was no closing comment from Hiller or from any of the participants. The module just stopped. At the appointed hour, naturally. Part 5: Qempering Modules The CRM module differed from those that went before it in several significant ways, and left me wondering why. The first and most obvious difference was CRM’s built-in emphasis on group participation. Hiller solicited participation more frequently than other facilitators had. There was one role—playing exercise, in which three members played the part of the crew they had watched on a video, while the other three members played their alter egos, and kept up a running stream of commentary designed to reflect what the pilots were really thinking, as opposed to what they said during LOFT de-brief. Because the group was so small, the exercise required that everyone participate; there was no opportunity for anyone to hide or simply be an observer. While Tom Mitchell had one marginally interactive exercise in his adult education module, and Tony Dawkins led a group discussion, no other facilitators actively solicited participation. To be sure, some facilitators fielded technical questions, or engaged in a dialogue with group members about how Aerostar handled procedures such as those 303 developed for landing different airplane types at various alternate refueling airports, but the CRM module, to a greater extent than any other, demanded their active engagement. Since the instructor participants were going to have to be evaluating LOFT sessions in the fairly near future using the new CPIs as their evaluation criteria, it was in their self—interest to participate actively. Another major difference between the CRM module and the others was the apparent willingness of instructor participants to challenge and confront the facilitator. In the CRM module, Cagney repeatedly challenged Hiller, going so far as to force her to acknowledge comments and concerns that did not relate to the topic at hand. He challenged some of her lecture assertions, over which she did have a certain level of control, but he did not stop there. He continued the onslaught by challenging company policies and union contractual obligations over which she had zero control. Again and again, I wondered why this confrontation came about. Was it because of Hiller’s gender? Was it because she was facilitating a module that was attempting to teach the participants how to do their instructing jobs better or differently? Was it because Hiller was considered low status because she was only qualified as a flight engineer on the B-727, while class participants were all captains? Was it because of the subject matter, given Cagney’s distrust of and disdain for the CRM program as it had 304 evolved at Aerostar? Was Cagney just tired of the class by the third day and venting his frustration? Or was it a combination of all of these? I was never fully able to discern the exact reason for Cagney’s behavior; he did not say anything to me beyond our lunchtime conversation and some very friendly parting comments -- that were unrelated to the course content -- when the entire course was finished and he was heading for the airport and his flight home. Hiller and I spoke briefly about the module, and she expressed her disappointment, telling me, as Tom Mitchell had, that the small size was problematic for her. In previous courses, her students had quickly bonded with her. She told me she felt they saw her as quite nurturing, while she tended to take longer to bond with them. I came away with the impression that Hiller felt that no bonding whatsoever took place with this class. Pa ' abl ' 0 55' The three days wound up with what was billed as a roundtable discussion with Steve Harris, who had the distinction of being the starring captain in the DC-9 videos the group had seen during the CRM session. Harris was an ex-yellow book pilot who entered the room wearing a white shirt, red tie with a large print on it, and a dark suit. On his shirt was his Aerostar name tag; two gold pens occupied his shirt pocket. Harris was gray-haired, thinning 305 on top, with a pink complexion one could term Irish-looking. He looked like he was in his late forties or early fifties. Before the roundtable got going, there were questions from the group about how Harris had ended up in the video and who would be running the discussion. To break the ice, Harris told how he got talked into doing the videos: ...(A)ctually, they couldn’t find anybody else to do ’em and I came walking in one day and Jack Jacobs came running up to me and said, ’Steve, we’ve been looking for somebody with extraordinary talents and blah, blah, blah-blah, you know, to do your CRM, oh no, do some tape, videotape for it.’ And I thought about Rob Lowe. Remember Rob Lowe and his little videotape incident? They had no script or anything, so we had to figure out what we were going to do. The tough one, all I had to do was put it in my mind the worst people I’d ever flown with, right? It was a one take. We just went right through it, one take, no problem. The good ones, it could have been three takes to get through this. Cagney tried interrupting him, but Harris, undeterred, finished his anecdote, running right over Cagney’s "I’ll bet, because..." Harris: ...that’s actually the phone rang one time. So, I showed that to my wife. I took it home to Memphis and I said, ’Kay, I want you to watch me in this video, my first job of acting.’ So she watched the first one and said, ’Well, when are you going to start acting?’ The group evidently loved the story, judging by the amount of laughter it evoked. At that point, the question about who would be participating in the roundtable came up and Harris told us it would be just him. He promptly put the ball in the group’s court, saying, "I’ll try to facilitate that for you and we can stay as short as you’d like or as 306 long as you’d like." He went on, telling them how instructor training had been conducted in the past, while establishing broad parameters for the session: ...(O)ver the years, we certainly haven’t provided a classroom like this, or a ground school like this. I mean, you know, we got it through osmosis practically. You got selected and if you did well you stayed selected and if you didn’t do well you still stayed selected...so I am very pleased to see that we have this school so that today...to allow you to bring up the topics that you would like to discuss that maybe didn’t get to full fruition within the classroom discussions, or something that’s been bothering you or that you want a clarification on policy or something like that. He solicited discussion topics from the group, say they would vote on however many they listed initially, selecting "...the one, two or three that seem to be the hottest issues and discuss them, OK?" After an initial silence, which Harris waited out, some suggestions surfaced. From Bronson came, "Who am I and why am I here?" Harris simply said "All right." and wrote it on the board. But others were not about to let it go by that fast: Williams: We were just joking. (Laughter from all.) Harris: Are you joking? Or are you... Williams: That’ll be good for an hour and a half. (More laughter.) Cagney: You think, therefore you are. Is that what this is all, I’m OK, you’re OK? Bronson: You guys didn’t watch the debates. Harris: All right. Do we have another? Cagney: O.K. I’ll bring one up. Instructor workload analysis. 307 Harris: Instructor workload analysis? Cagney: Yeah. Cagney gave a long-winded explanation of what he meant by instructor workload analysis, stating his concern about what he saw as problems inherent in incorporating the technical biases of various people in the training department. The example he used was the inclusion of a lot of TCAS information into the training regimen because one person is particularly enamored of TCAS. Claimed Cagney, such additions were routinely made without regard to the instructors’ other tasks. Harris attempted to clarify Cagney’s description, labeling it, "...partially emphasis, standardization, those type of issues." Cagney did not disagree. The third subject added to the pot came from Walt Pierson, who wanted to talk "...about the instructor’s responsibility to A., the line pilot and second, to the training department." After a long pause, Joe Williams brought up what he termed "standardization vs. technique in training." Harris reframed this topic, too, suggesting it might best be termed "policy vs. technique." Again, no disagreement with his interpretation. With these topics written on the easel, Harris asked the group to vote on each, saying they could vote as many times as they wanted. When he asked about Bronson’s topic, "Who am I and why am I here?" Williams immediately quipped, "Who is Charles Bronson and why is he here?" which broke 308 everyone up. The mood during the early stages of the roundtable discussion period was light, significantly more so than it had been during the CRM module. Everyone wanted (or needed) relief from the CRM session’s serious tone. Even Dean, who nonetheless sought to clarify what he was trying to accomplish by modifying the last line to be "Why are we here?" and asking, "What are we doing or what is the company hoping to achieve out of this?" was part of the general laughter. When Harris asked him to elaborate, Bronson obliged: With this course. I mean, is this something that is being driven by regulations? Is this something that the company is hoping to achieve a more unified, standardized product? A more, just a better instructor? Or tighter control of the training process, or what is, what is this all about? Harris said nothing about the fact that Bronson had gone through nearly the entire three-day Instructor Qualification Course and had no clue as to what the airline hoped to accomplish. Instead, he went on with the voting. After a brief detour to talk about Joe Williams’s concern about policy vs. technique, Harris began the roundtable discussion with instructor workload analysis. Harris left the podium, and pointedly established his role as facilitator by taking a seat in row 1, facing the group, all of whom occupied what had become their normal seats. He asked Cagney to start, since he had brought up the subject. Ready to roll, Cagney was not shy about expressing his opinion. Assuming his wiseman role he said: 309 Well, if you look at the training program that we used to have in days of old, if you will, where you took a guy out and you taught him how to fly an airplane, you taught him how to fly this particular airplane. He already knows how to fly an airplane. And then over the years, we got everything piled in here, a special interest group wants a windshear, and then we get TCAS and then we get CRM and we get all this crap piled in there but nobody seems to take a real strong look at how the overall package works, and somebody says, I just think somebody says ’Let’s see, we’ll put the Hong Kong approach in Lesson 7. OK, you’ve got that. That’s good. Yeah.’ Well, geez, in Lesson 7, I’ve got hydraulic failures to learn. I haven’t got time to do Hong Kong approach. Nobody’s looking at that and I think that’s something that program managers, the instructors, the whole thing has to work together and I don’t see that. Harris clarified what Cagney was saying, using a mirroring technique in which he isolated and identified Cagney’s areas of concern as course and/or syllabus development, and proficiency checks (PCs). Harris’s mention of proficiency checks evidently jogged Cagney’s memory about what he wanted to add to his initial statement, because he veered off, complaining about having to do two proficiency checks in one training period. "I can’t get two proficiency checks done in one period and do a good job of it. If the guy asks me for a warm-up, I refuse to do two proficiency checks in one period." Harris iterated the training department’s support of the instructors for that type of refusal, but Cagney was not satisfied: But how many times do, I get it all the time where Joe Blow didn’t get a warm—up and you’ve got to have a co-pilot, ’Just a second, Captain, you’re gonna have to do the whole thing.’ 310 Harris agreed, saying, "...(Y)ou certainly can’t gun that sucker." Joe Williams seconded Cagney, saying: And that’s right, exactly what Jimmy was saying. Over a number of years things have been added to these checkrides to where you’ve got too many things on them and you almost have to have a two day (session) if you ever want them to some of those things out of the way. Your, I guess, CAT II, CAT III would be the biggest intruder. Voices echoed their agreement, adding "...and windshear training. And some of us were pulling windshear training into a non-precision approach and (the FAA) said ’No, you can’t do that.’ so I said, ’Holy cow!’" Williams asked for more information, sounding surprised by what he had just heard. Harris elaborated, telling him that the FAA had said that Aerostar should not put non-precision approaches together with windshear: I mean, it’s no problem with giving a windshear if you want to on non-precision approach, but for the training part of it, you should differentiate and say this is training and we’re going to do a windshear on this approach...(S)ingle visit will tend to fix this for the proficiency check, because everybody will get two simulator periods, OK? They won’t have a choice. So that’ll help on the workload thing. Cagney re-entered the discussion, saying it would be beneficial for instructors to be given more discretionary authority when it came to passing or failing a student during a checkride: ...I would dare guess that there isn’t an instructor here that doesn’t know within ten minutes after the checkride starts, what the outcome is going to be. I mean, I, you just know how they guy’s going to do. It’s just the way the guy does it, and that’s in the cockpit, the way the guy handles the before start checklist and the 311 first take-off, you might as well just pass the guy, flunk the guy right there. I would like to see some latitude on the part of the instructor. When I’ve got a guy that I, here’s the ace of the base, he doesn’t have to jump through every hoop here. Let’s do something different. Let’s maybe do some training on this, or I know we can’t FAR- wise, do that, but I’d like to see some... Uncharacteristically, Harris cut Cagney off in mid-sentence, emphatically telling him, "Well, you can’t..." Cagney tried to interject, but was cut off himself, when Harris stated flatly: We’re out of time (in the simulator). The solution will be single visit. Single visit proficiency check will look different than our current proficiency check. We can design, that, with the FAA’s concurrence, to be whatever we want it to be...(S)o when we get to single visit, we will design the components of the proficiency check part. Cagney shifted to viewing lesson plans as a vehicle for conducting instructor workload analysis. He objected to being "just a square-filler...being a square filler isn’t too much fun." Harris suggested that this problem could be ameliorated by having the same student for four or five training periods, during which the instructor would be relatively free to modify the syllabus, provided all the requirements were completed during the training. He also advised the instructors to notify their training captains if they experienced problems with particular lesson plans, telling the group that "...two lesson plans in our fleet were just mind-boggling with what we ask the pilots to do and we need some breathing room just do some shuffling 312 around. You’re the best judge of the pilot." Cagney agreed, saying confidently, "I think so." While most of this discussion was going on, Bronson was leaned back, chair against the wall, arms folded across his chest, pensive. Every bit the non-participant. The others, while not actively involved in the discussion, appeared engaged in the proceedings. The talk remained lively, moving to Pierson’s pet topic, what do instructors owe the line pilot? Harris laid the groundwork for the discussion, describing how he saw the relationship between student and instructor: ...(F)irst of all, if the instructor and the check airman are the two people in the program, the line pilot who looks to the instructor as the embodiment of the training department and there’s an implied trust that the line pilot will get from the instructor the (training) will culminate in a recommendation ride...some instructor will fill out a form, ’I recommend (name) for a checkride.’ and that’s the ultimate goal of the line pilot... (A)nd that doesn’t happen without a lot of work by the instructors... Cagney brought up what he called the "flip side" of Harris’s assertion, asking what the student’s responsibility to the training center ought to be. "Student walks in and says, ’Well, gee, here I am. Train me.’ Now that guy, you might as well send him home, because you’re not going to train him." Pierson agreed and added some pithy commentary about the problems inherent in training in a post-merger environment: Yeah. I think...because if you take the 727 second officer training or the DC-9 first officer training, by definition, they can’t be that way 313 because we bring people in who aren’t even Aerostar Airlines employees and what are the, you ' know we do a lot of this thinking, what are the prerequisites for the courses? What is the prerequisite for the DC-9, a new hire DC-9 first officer, a new hire 727 second officer...? Evidently this conversational turn struck a nerve with Bronson, because he roused himself from his somnolent state, suddenly becoming part of the proceedings, emphatically voicing his opinion on the state of student responsibility to the training center: ...(The) guy’s got the book. But they expect him to read it. And study it. There’s a certain responsibility on the part of the student that’s, as well as on the part of the instructor, to present this information to the student, but it’s incumbent upon the student to take information and digest it, read the book, learn the numbers, learn the procedures. We can’t spoonfeed the student... (there’s a) difference between an enablement program and an entitlement program. We bring these people in here, we create a situation where we enable them to succeed. This training program isn’t an entitlement (program) where you come in here and you’re entitled to sit in here and... Harris attempted to slow Bronson down, apparently sensing the direction in which he was going now that he had the floor. Harris did this by talking about Training Review Boards (TRBs) and FAA requirements. Bronson was undeterred, and verbally ran Harris down, opining that by working harder students would be better able to measure up with their pilot peers. There appeared to be a general airline orientation toward what could be called intangibles. During this roundtable session, participants aired more human being- oriented concerns and attitudes than in previous sessions 314 and frequently, comfortably using such terms as bonding, self-esteem, self-confidence, and vulnerability. This was surprising as these intangible items obliquely get at emotions and feelings, areas which are openly acknowledged during the training as difficult for pilots to identify and deal with. The main players in the discussion so far were Williams, Cagney, Bronson, and Pierson. Rogers, Clarke, and Tucker, while not totally silent, took only minor roles. The roundtable continued to be an enthusiastic interchange of ideas that ranged from modifying training department evaluation forms to the tricky issue of how much negative information about a student to put on those forms. The group admitted that instructors do not like to write anything bad about a student on the forms, but acknowledged the other edge of the sword, that if the student fails to progress, the absence of instructor documentation regarding why the student cannot progress produces problems for the board of review. Bronson suggested using a multi-part form that would enable instructors to exchange negative information about students without the students’ knowledge. Williams vehemently disagreed: Bronson: Why don’t we have a two sheet form...and do it like business does invoices? And I think there should be some way that we can pass on to other instructors a little bit of information that’s not privy to the student. Let’s face it. There are a lot of things that go on within the training department, the training environment that the student doesn’t have to be privy to all this information and that would be detrimental for him 315 to know and right now the only way I can do that is I staple or take a paper clip and put a little note on the (form) and say to the next instructor, you know, watch out for this or you know, he’s having a problem with... Williams: ...(W)hy shouldn’t he know those remarks? I think anything you want to say, that’s why I say, it’s the price of doing the job, that you have to tell those guys. You know, like, it’s not comfortable, I hate doing it. But you know, if I write something bad and tell this next instructor, I should be telling him, because I don’t want him thinking everything is OK. I really have concerns about a particular area or something... Bronson interrupted, quickly paying lip service to Williams’s opinion, but disagreeing with it in the name of student self-confidence: Yeah, but you know, there are certain things that you, you don’t want to break down a student’s confidence or, or there’s a lot of things that are detrimental for him to know. If a guy is really one of these people that doesn’t have a lot of confidence in his ability and this sort of thing, you certainly don’t want to go loading up his (form) with a bunch of negative comments that are, that are going to make it even more difficult for him to progress. Harris supported Bronson, suggesting that being aware of too much negative information could create a self- fulfilling prophecy for the student. He advised caution in handling such data. At the same time, he reiterated the company’s position on the difficulty in getting adequate documentation of sub-standard student performance. Cagney entered the conversation by firmly planting one foot in each camp, asserting that if the student has a particular problem, "...that’s what the student needs to see." end that subsequent instructors need to be informed 316 about student inadequacies and suggested including a note on the form stating what the inadequacy was and what could be done to solve the problem. "Now, I think those kind of comments really destroy a student’s confidence in himself," he stated, "but on the other hand, he needs to know that he’s having trouble..." While the conversation devolved into specifics about teaching a particular kind of landing approach, Cagney cut through the theoreticals and pinpointed what he felt were the instructors’ responsibilities, saying: Our responsibility as an instructor is to not get back on the plane and go home tonight because I’m through with my five days back here in the box, (but rather) to pick up the phone and call the next instructor and say, ’Hey what. This guy’s having a hell of a time shooting NDB approaches.’ Williams continued dissenting, holding his ground on making students aware of problems the instructor perceived with his flying performance: I think...you have to be very careful that you don’t start making judgement calls on things that you don’t know. For instance, if I’m not doing something and you want to tell me something negative but you’re worried about how it will affect my performance level, maybe I can accept that criticism and if I didn’t know about it, how could I ever work on correcting it? And so if you take the instructor as putting himself into a position of ’I’ll make a judgement call on what I think is happening here...’ it would be a shame to get all the way through eight periods and find out that ’Hey, why didn’t you tell me that? If I’d known that I could have probably done something about it.’ 317 And Bronson clung to his argument, ever-so-subtly shifting his position to discuss the damage that preconceived notions can do: Yeah. Well, I’ll tell you what happens on these things. It’s you get these students in here and you’ve got the ace of the base. Everybody knows he’s the top student and you look at him in that light. He comes in there and he’s upgrading maybe from co—pilot to captain or transitioning to another airplane and you look at this guy in the light of his past experience and say, ’Hey, you know, boy, he didn’t do a very great approach’ and this sort of thing. He made a mistake. And you say, ’Well, anybody can make a mistake.’ and so you’ve got this preconceived idea of this guy in your mind. And the same thing can happen when you start writing negative comments on this (form), and I’ve seen it dozens of times, where a guy is going along and everything is looking good and nobody’s saying anything negative about him. But the first guy that writes up a negative comment then there isn’t another good thing about this guy...I mean, everything, it’s unremitting criticism of the guy from that point on. Evidently this topic was near and dear to Bronson’s heart; as he spoke, he pounded his fist on the table. Williams tried to interrupt, but Bronson silenced him before he could utter more than a couple of words: And I’ve seen this happen over and over again with problem students. They’ll go along and nobody’ll say anything, nobody’ll say anything because you just don’t like to do this to a guy. I mean, once you load ’em up, I mean, you know, it’s sort of like you get ’em down and everybody starts kicking them. We’re not doing this. Nobody’s trying to do that but all of a sudden now it seems to be ’Well, OK, yeah, every, you know, this is what everybody’s talking about. I see the same thing myself. He did everything wrong today that he did in this lesson, this lesson, this lesson.’ You see. 318 Williams did not let this issue die and allow Bronson the last word. Obviously, the subject evoked strong memories of personal experience for both instructors. Williams: But now what you’re doing is you’re putting everything in the category of the instructor and what you said you wanted to do without having the student see it. You’re passing down negative information on this person... Bronson: Well, yeah, but... Williams: ...and you’re doing it from instructor to instructor... Bronson: ...if you have a note from the next guy, that everybody on down the road isn’t gOIng to be reading, you know... Bronson thought the student was better served by limiting negative commentary about performance to instructors only. Williams had grave reservations about such a tactic, asserting that students should know if their performance was substandard. Williams: Well, I mean, what you’re relating to right now is simply an instructor-to-instructor ...type information rather than instructor- student, because you’re saying that because I saw that he had such a negative period that I’m going to sort of start out with ’Well, this guy’s really having a lot of trouble.’ When I get all done, I’m gonna continue, I’m afraid to say he’s improving because I don’t want to be the guy who says, ’Hey, he’s doing a good job,’ when he’s been doing a lousy job all the way along. But it’s only instructor, instructor, instructor now you’re talking about rather than instructor-student. Bronson posited that his method would keep students "safer" than Williams’ then backpedaled and was reduced to blaming the instructor qualification course for not addressing the issue as he’d anticipated. 319 Bronson: Well, you see, what you’re talking about is what we’re trying to guard against. I, I, I’m what I am expressing is what I’ve seen happen, and a number of cases of that and what we’re trying to do is achieve a mechanism where we don’t have this, and this is what I was hoping that we were going to be doing in this course. I mentioned on Day One, you know, that’s mine, right there at the top (pointing to a sheet from Tom Mitchell’s module)... 'The sheet to which he referred had the questions "What makes .an.instructor tick?" and "What makes a student tick?" raritten on it. Harris volunteered to address the question ()f what makes students tick and stated that instructors had :an obligation to be professional enough to communicate with cone another regarding lack of progress by any students. He zalso supported William’s assertion that students need esimilar communication from their instructors, saying that 'there have been occasions when students have gotten through 2311 eight training periods without being aware that they are not progressing: ...(T)hey get to the eighth period and they say you’re not progressing, we’re going to kick you out of the program and they go ballistic, they get ALPA in here, the crew base gets to whining about it and we can’t prove it. And you know, so that’s a damned if you do, damned if you don’t, you may have been trying to encourage him with positive statements, but it bites us, so that’s why we’ve got to be fair. Harris acknowledged that this particular three-day (sourse was a "basics of instructing" program, but reminded -the group that the new up-coming three day instructor aseminar would prepare instructors for the single visit 320 training world. He talked about some of the new program’s goals for instructors: We hope to get into learning styles and barriers to communication, and penetrate some of those things so that the instructor has the tools...We ought to have three, four, five ways to recognize when a student is gone blank on ’em or is distracted with something perhaps in the briefing room and ways to bring focus back and penetrate and so that will be an integral part of the thing, along with the CRM and really what we’re talking about here is basically resource management. It’s how you’re going to evoke change in the pilot. So, it’s tough and that’s the sensitive thing and that’s the adult learning side that we should get into in single visit training. So that’ll be a help. Harris made what, until that point, was the sole mention of CRM and how it dovetailed with Aerostar’s overall training agenda. He did not use the opportunity to elaborate about CRM, and, having mentioned it, moved on. Considering CRM’s emphasis on improving crew communication, it seemed this would have been a natural bleed-through point. Here, in the dicey area of whether or not to share negative information with a student, was a perfect opportunity to hammer home the importance of open communication. Why not employ the briefing techniques talked about in CRM to overcome the discomfort associated with telling a student his work was not up to Aerostar’s standards? The group was aware of the pitfalls of not communicating openly (union grievances, training review boards, etc.) but gave more weight to their fear of damaging student self-esteem. What resources might the instructors 321 have used to improve communication in uncomfortable situations? The moment was lost and the discussion continued in its original philosophical vein. Williams did not seem satisfied by Harris’s promise of future help for the instructors when dealing with students who were experiencing training difficulties. He explained how he would go about encouraging a student in trouble: When you’re talking about grading and somebody truly is, is starting out right away having trouble, everyone likes to see that well, they’re trying hard and they’re improving, they’re shooting to try to get that thing on an upward plane and so if you start out right away indicating that there are some problems or whatever the area is, and then the next report is OK, these problems seem to be improving, student is showing steady improvement, that makes him feel good even though he started out negative, he at least thinks, ’OK, well, I’m climbing out of the hole here, I’m getting there and somebody’s recognizing it’ and that keeps a person, I think, going. A storm of commentary from Cagney, Harris, and Bronson followed. Each pilot cited personal experience with students who were, for one reason or another, unable to get through training successfully. Harris, agreeing with Williams, related an anecdote about a highly-experienced ex- military pilot who had not been trained to use Jeppesen approach charts and who, as a result, was in terrible trouble with his training at Aerostar. Rather than fire him, Aerostar sent him home with instructions to find himself a fixed base operator, hire a general aviation instructor pilot, and learn how to use the Jeppesen charts. 322 When the pilot returned to Aerostar, he successfully completed his training. "But," said Harris, "we had to identify what the problem was or we never would have been able to help him..." From here, the conversation shifted topics, becoming something of a ping-pong match between Cagney and Bronson, each of whom expressed his concern about senior pilots forgetting how to fly because of the small number of take- offs and landings they do each year, and the potential for large blocks of time between checkrides with the up—coming single visit training program. Bronson: And we have a lot of people that’s been years as second officers and by the time they got into co-pilot, you know, they can’t find their rear end with both hands. Cagney: We’ve got captains right now flying the line that are forgetting how to fly. Bronson: Sure. Cagney: We’ve guys flying the (B-747) -400 that are getting four or five landings a year, you know, seriously... Harris: All automation. Cagney: They’re forgetting how to fly airplanes. Harris: I think we don’t know what the lapse is going to do to us, you know... Bronson: You can see what single visit training does. And now here you can be a whole year between. Cagney: And it may be three years before you see him again on a line check. I’m worried about that. I think that’s not often enough. Bronson: I’d still like to see, I’d still like to see... 323 Harris: ...Well, we’ve got to be willing to look at change. Cagney: I think change is good, but I think we’ve gotta be careful when we change. If we don’t, you know, step into the frying, you know, the fire... Solving this perceived problem was not discussed because the subject veered, courtesy of Steve Harris, from the hazards of changing the way training was carried out at Aerostar to the instructors’ responsibility to the training department. Perhaps to clear the air or lower the level of tension, or maybe even to save face, Williams questioned Harris about accepted dress standards for instructors, "...I haven’t been an instructor for a couple of years and maybe things have changed, like do you still have to wear a tie? Sport coat? I assume you did." Without warning, the discussion turned away from some very serious topics -- student evaluations, experienced pilots who have lost the ability to fly due to infrequency of trips, a training program that is about to undergo some radical changes -- and came to rest on coats and ties! Williams went even further, wanting to know the reason for the dress code for instructors, complaining that it had never been explained. He even suggested devoting course time to explaining why instructors were expected to wear coats and ties when they trained. Harris addressed Williams’s concern by touching on the dress code, but expanding his response to more adequately address the overall role and responsibilities Aerostar 324 assigned to its instructor cadre. He attempted to close the issue of instructor-student relationships and responsibilities. I can probably address a couple of issues. Responsibility of the instructor...we all know that hopefully the selection process has identified not only some of the best pilots, but the best communicators, ’cause that’s really what we’re doing. Teaching adult learning, adult education, but also the ability to call it like it is, and that’s the unfortunate part of our job, that you have to do, you do fiddle with people’s careers but the responsibility then is the training department and then of course, to the flying public and I think we all hold that very dear. Harris also went into Aerostar’s philosophy of using and treating the instructors as the company’s primary link between management and the pilot group. He stressed their influential role in every line pilot’s life, in and out of the cockpit. Who is the real emissary, ambassador between management and the line pilot? It’s the instructor corps. There’s no doubt about it. That’s the most influential sphere of people and you have to be above reproach. You know, when you go to the ball game, you shouldn’t be falling out of the stands drunk...I mean, you should exemplify the professional airline pilot. Is that sort of what you’re thinking about? Williams never had the opportunity to respond to Harris’s question because Walt Pierson, who had been sitting quietly on the sidelines, intently listening as the discussion swirled around him, again became an active participant. Judging by his comments, Pierson had given the issue of instructor responsibility to the training department more than a little thought: 325 If I could sum up the whole thing into one word, it would be involvement. Because, for example, I sit upstairs and you know the check airmen are down there and the check airmen don’t have to ever come up to the third floor. I mean really never. All the work for the check airmen is on the second floor as they see it. I have a little different view, but (the average check airman) does an excellent job of briefing, does an excellent job during his four hour period, does an excellent job of his debrief and that’s where it ends. In my view, that’s not the complete check airman because there’s the whole additional world of stuff out here of improving the course, of extra projects that would improve the check airman himself as well as helping the line pilots and everybody else by finding a better way. He continued to talk about projects, small and large, that could be undertaken by the check airmen, were they so inclined. He talked about how much he felt could be accomplished if every one of Aerostar’s 98 DC-9/MD-80 check airmen/instructors/simulator instructors got involved, saying, "And who’s the ultimate beneficiary of that? Not the fleet captain or the fleet training captain. They’re not the ultimate beneficiaries. It’s the check airmen for themselves and primarily the line pilot." Questioned about what he meant, Pierson continued, "The job is more than just the instructor-student portion of the job. There is a responsibility to the training department to stay more involved in the program." Williams challenged him again, wanting to know what was meant by being more involved, "Like what?" Pierson tried to explain, citing what he termed "projects of interest" but was mowed down before he could 326 get any farther. It was apparently open season on fleet training captains: Williams: You mean, just come up and say, ’Hey, I’ll do work on this or that for you? Pierson: For example, we put out the... Here Pierson was completely drowned out by an avalanche of comments about volunteering for extra projects beyond the mandated instructing schedule. Bronson was the most vociferous opponent of Pierson’s call for additional instructor hours: This is baloney. You guys have got a bureaucracy up there that won’t quit and now you want the rest of the guys to come up there without a ten percent (salary) override, and come up there and do these projects? I mean I’ve got so damn many comp days with this company, and I’ll guarantee you comp days don’t spend at Red Owl worth a damn. And as soon as they put a new manager in there, this is all gone. And as soon as you start doing this, it starts as a favor. You’re not expected to do it but you go up and you do it to help the program. Everybody know you need this and you need that and when we’re short-changed on people. We used to be short-staffed, which I don’t believe we are anymore. But all of a sudden...it starts to become expected. Perhaps because he realized how really angry and harsh his words were, Bronson softened his language and manner a bit, but gave no quarter on his underlying argument: I know what you’re saying, Walt, it’s really nice to feel that the troops are involved and this sort of stuff, and...we all have an obligation and responsibility that flows both ways. It flows upward to the company and the passengers ultimately, and it flows downward to the pilot and we have to balance that, but you know, if you’re going to expect and sit here and say ’Well, I think we ought to have all our instructors in here on their days off, you know, doing this and doing that’ I can’t agree. I think if you get a good 327 training period out of these guys and they’re really doing their jobs, and they’re staying up to date on the procedures and they’re keeping their manuals up and they’re good representatives to the pilot group and the public for the airline and vice versa, I don’t know what more you can expect of these guys. Williams agreed with Bronson, and again called for Pierson to be more specific about what he meant when he talked about greater involvement. Pierson could not respond right away, because Cagney entered the fray to defend Pierson’s position, something I found surprising, given his tendency to mirror nearly everything Bronson had said up to that point in the seminar: You can be a line pilot. You can come to work here and you can go fly your trips and you can collect your paycheck...and you can go home and that’s all that’s expected of you at Aerostar Airlines and nobody’s going to complain about that. And if you do that your entire career, you’re going to retire with the same pension as the guy that comes in and says ’I’m going to be more than a line pilot. I’m going to be an ALPA representative, I’m going to work hard to get some things done. I’m going to do some special projects around here to promote aviation. I’m going to be an instructor pilot. I’m working sixteen days a month in training. I’d be working eleven or ten days a month flying the line. Now that tells me that a guy is doing more than just the basic...job. Initially, it sounded like Cagney was gearing up to side with Bronson’s position that instructors did more than their fair share at Aerostar, but as he spoke, it became obvious that he truly was espousing Pierson’s view that instructors and check airmen could do more than they were doing. His attempt at persuasion was marked by his emphasis on what the instructors themselves, not the airline, would derive from 328 the extra effort. Enlightened self-interest was his selling tool: And when you get all through with it, you can look up at your career and say, ’You know, I had a lot more fun doing that.’ I, as an instructor, I got involved in writing LOFTs, I did a lot of that on my own time. I got involved with the Russian over-flight thing. I did that on my own time. I got to fly the first flight across Russia. It was great. Was a great reward for me to do that. And so the rewards are there, you, if the instructor will take the time to do just a little bit more. It doesn’t take that much, you’re here anyway, you’re back here on your day, you know, like your twelve days a month...and what am I going to do for the rest of the day? Let’s see if I can do something that’s a little interesting and that’ll help promote Aerostar Airlines, promote aviation, and I think when you get all through with that, you have a more satisfying experience. Williams stated that in the past he, too, had involved himself in some extra projects, but vehemently asserted that he was not going to go upstairs after his assigned simulator period and ask what else his fleet training captain wanted him to do that day. When Pierson finally managed to elbow his way into the discussion again, he explained that what he was looking for from instructors and check airmen was net to have them come up to him seeking administrative tasks, but rather was "... looking at something the check airman himself enjoyed, an area of interest that he has and that he would share his area of interest with the rest of the check airman group, which ultimately benefitted the line pilot." He went on to state that he did not want an instructor doing anything about which he was not enthusiastic because "...he won’t do 329 the quality of job that I want to have done. But the guy who’s motivated, who’s interested in it, yeah, he can exceed my expectations every time." Harris allowed the conversational flow to take its natural course, commenting only that those kinds of projects tended to by cyclical in nature, that pilots might want to do them for a year or two and then decide they felt a little burned out and opt not do anything special for some period of time. Supporting Pierson, he told the group about newsletter teaching tips provided by instructors that had been beneficial to the instructor group as a whole, and about instructors volunteering to re-write and proofread Airman’s Operating Manuals (AOMs). He emphasized that the training department was not looking for instructors to come upstairs and perform functions that training department employees were supposed to be carrying out. After hearing Cagney’s comments, which were followed by Harris’s comments in defense of Pierson’s position, Bronson eased up slightly, stressing his concern about the airline’s coming to expect extra work from instructors and check airmen, saying: I guess in the past, I’ve seen the other side of the coin...and if you went in and helped, all of a sudden well, gee, we’ve got nineteen days out of this guy, let’s go for twenty-one next month and I mean it was cynical exploitation...and I’ve seen more good guys get burned out...and all of a sudden they won’t do anything anymore because they come to realize that you’re being played for a sucker. 330 He continued softening his stance, denying that he was accusing the current management team of engaging in the same tactics of past management and going on to opine that he did not think that "guys should make a career of being instructor pilots." He voiced his concern that the typical instructor spends four or five months a year all told in the training department, leaving himself little latitude for flying the line and keeping his skills sharpened: Since I’ve been on the whale (the 747), I’ve been in here at least twice a year getting bounced so I can stay current, so I think guys should consider themselves primarily as line pilots and maintain a rapport with the line pilots...but have that extra edge so that when you come in here you’ve got the credibility that you know you’re an instructor pilot and people take the things you say seriously. Bronson continued, asserting that instructor pilots who commute "don’t want to be in here all the time," and their desire to go home caused commuters to be labeled the bad guys because they were not in the training center on their days off. He finished by stating, "...I don’t even think we ought to be encouraging these guys to be...expected to come in on their days off and do these extra projects." Pierson rebutted Bronson’s assertion that commuters were often labeled as bad guys, saying: The most prolific guys are the commuters because they sit on the airplane hour after hour and instead of just sitting there reading Life Magazine or something, the guy’s you know, he’ll write down some experience from a student he had that morning on a way that, a new way to teach something and he’ll share that with the rest of the pilot group...If those things aren’t shared, if there aren’t 98 brains thinking about how to 331 improve the program, and then those same people communicate that to the training program, how will we ever improve? Pierson was reluctant to have just two pilots be responsible for the entire DC-9 program, and sounded the clarion call for shared responsibility and feedback within the entire DC- 9 pilot population. We put the monopoly for improving the program on, well, in the DC-9 (program) there’s only two pilots involved in the DC-9 administration. You’re looking at them both right here. But we rely on the other guys, for all pilots to give us feedback. When they fly the line, if there’s something on the line that doesn’t work, we gotta have it. You know, and most of them aren’t even in the training department. They’re coming in. They’ll call us on the phone, ’Hey, this powerback on the MD-80 -- terrible.’ Or ’Single engine taxi on the MD-80’s terrible. We sucked all the acoustical material out of the engine and ruined the engine.’ I mean that’s the kind of stuff we need to know. Harris guided the discussion away from instructor responsibilities to the training department to talk briefly about how one other carrier handled its relationship with its instructors. After he finished describing that relationship, the group agreed that Aerostar’s philosophy was preferable, with Cagney telling Harris, "You ask our pilots. They’ll all tell you they’d rather have it our way." This seemed to bring the group back together. Harris praised Aerostar’s training programs and shared some of the corporate thinking that produced this and subsequent instructor training programs: I think that most of the (FAA) inspectors will tell you that they’re very happy with the training program...as I said at the beginning, we got it 332 (training in how to be instructors) through osmosis if we got it at all and we hope this course helps...I know it does help the brand-new instructor, somebody that hasn’t been around here. It’s given him some foundation. And the check airman course. Unfortunately, there’s been some repetition of this and that and we need to fix that. Most everybody’s gone to this and then they go to that (check airman course) but again, it’s, boy, have we gone light years from where we were one year ago today... Even Bronson agreed, adding his voice to the chorus of those who believed Aerostar had done a good job improving its training department: Well, this facility here is good evidence of the commitment that the company has put into training ...this is the first training department that I went to that...I didn’t set at some damn folding table, you know, with splinters and an old tin folding chair that you sat on and you got hemorrhoids after the first week... Harris agreed, reminiscing about his earlier years at the yellow book carrier, telling everyone, "We had a tin roof quonset hut...at (yellow book airline), I promise you, with holes in the wall, so we have made good strides." The only negative comment came, unsurprisingly, from Bronson, who bemoaned the fact that the program he’d attended was "too damn long, it’s too long." Joe Williams concurred, confessing he was "kinda tired at the end." Harris asked if the group felt satisfied that the first two topics had been adequately covered, and moved on to "Why this course?" Bronson went first, talking extensively about the financial and personnel resources that had gone into to producing the course, and asking Harris what he wanted to 333 see out of the course, "...so I can evaluate for myself what we’ve done in this last three days." Harris replied that one reason for the course was that it was mandated by the FAA, about which there could be no argument. He went on to say that historically Aerostar had courses that were what he termed "square fillers," courses for which there were no designated facilitators, courses for which nobody took any real responsibility. He told the group how Aerostar’s training department had come to View the Instructor Qualification Course: But we want to fill the square but we want to fill the square in a better fashion than we had done before. As I said, Charles, the course is evolutionary and with your critiques, we can go back and re-massage if there’s an area of emphasis or something that we didn’t touch on that we should, like the learning rules, that there’s something that needs to be embellished there, that Mitch does, we can do those type of things so that the next recipients of the course will be even better for it. He also talked about Aerostar’s corporate training philosophy: We are committed to trying to have the tools for the instructors to be the best instructors in the industry and consequently we will hope that if we have the best instructor cadre, we will have the best pilots in the industry. And I think they go just like that. You cannot have one without the other. Instructors have to come first. So there’s more and more emphasis being driven towards giving all of us the tools, the tools of CRM, the tools to communicate, the awareness of behavior and those type of things. At this point, somebody mentioned something about "4:30" to Harris, who responded with "O.K." and then finished what he 334 was saying about Aerostar’s training commitment and requested feedback from the instructor participants: If it hasn’t done it or if it doesn’t fulfill those types of goals, then we need to do some more revisions to it. So, your honest critique will help. If it’s done that, then we need to know that, too. Tony (Dawkins) came up with the idea of a roundtable and that has been one of the things that has been well-received in this class and the check airman class... Interrupting him were Bronson and Cagney. Bronson mentioned that he and some other pilots had conducted their own roundtable the night before, and Cagney offered "I think it’s the best part of the whole school." Bronson agreed, giving his take on how the course could be improved, seeking a situation in which a group of instructors could be brought together for the purpose of discussion, ...maybe even a heated discussion...about how they handle different situations and what they feel works and what they feel doesn’t work and you know, if you have a problem with a student, what do you do...a little bit of what, you know, we just maybe saw the tip of here. He continued, emphasizing the fact that, as he saw it, instructors did not have anybody from whom they could learn except, perhaps "...all the instructors that you’ve ever known in your career and you’ve taken the things that you’ve liked that they’ve done and maybe modeled yourself after one particular individual that you respected particularly..." The advent of the glass cockpit and the new, structured training formats, he felt, made it even more important that instructors have feedback with each other. As evidence, 335 Bronson cited his own lack of experience in the glass cockpit. Now I’ve got a lot to learn about this glass cockpit stuff, you know, and I, I’m looking forward to doing that, but part of that you know, the guys that have instructed on glass cockpit, I’d like to get more input from them... That said, Bronson moved on to a more global criticism of the kind of training Aerostar provided its pilots and the policies and procedures that drove the training department, flexing his muscles as the "long-haired gray beard" in the group, as he had tagged himself on Day One: ...I’ve got a, I, maybe this is a bunch of shit but I feel that my experience that spans four decades as a check airman, that there is some perspective here that, you know, watching what we used to turn out and I’m pretty good, I have a pretty good idea what we’re turning out now because I see it on IOE (initial operating experience) all the time and ah, you know, I just don’t like it. You know, the FAA’s sitting here and I’ll say it. I don’t think we’re giving the reps in training that we should give on the important things that a guy ought to know when he gets out on the line. And we say not to handle the catastrophic emergency, I mean, Christ, we cover that a million times going through this training. That’s why it’s so long. All this mandated stuff that we’ve gotta do. There’s not enough white time in there to go and give a guy a few extra reps and... Apparently, Harris was not about to let Bronson’s charge that the pilots Aerostar was turning out were not as good as those trained in earlier years stand; he interrupted Bronson rather than following his usual pattern of allowing participants to speak before responding: Well, I think that’s a good point and you know, you are the judge, particularly the IOE instructor, on what the product of the schoolhouse 336 is, and if you’re not getting what you need, you need to communicate and with some recommendations of what would be best. I mean, we have to have that feedback. I know, I’ve done it for twenty years here and I feel that the product that what we put out in our fleet is better than what we used to put out in the past... Bronson returned the favor and interrupted Harris, who had been referring to Aerostar’s DC-9 training program, before he could finish what he had to say. Tempers began to flare: Bronson: In certain areas, it’s much superior. I mean, the things that we’re exposing people to in training today, in initial training... Breaking in again, Harris sounded genuinely angry with what he was hearing. It was unclear just why he was so angry. He may have been sick of being bullied and interrupted by Bronson, or perhaps he anticipated a criticism of the DC-9 training program from a B-747-200 captain. In any case, Harris lobbed the ultimate responsibility for the quality of line pilot training back to Bronson. Likely Harris was tired of sparring and of Bronson’s harping on how current training was not as good as past training had been. Tough shit. But we’re not international, we’re not glass, and we’re not INS (Inertial Navigation System), I mean, so, you know, we’re a pretty generic kind of a machine, a domestic operator (the DC-9) so, my, you know, what we need to see coming out of the pipeline we are seeing, but we may not be fulfilling it in the other fleets and certainly that’s what we have to address...because if you’re not seeing that, Charles, you need to define what you’re not seeing and what would be a potential fix. His anger apparently spent, Harris moved on to what he termed "cross-pollinization," in which each month one 337 instructor would be held off line and able to go visit other instructors while they worked, relating that in his own experience he had seen some "phenomenal (simulator) rides, some just excellent instructor techniques...that I try to put them in the newsletter and pass them on." The group heartily endorsed the benefits of such a program. Bronson suggested getting the instructors together and "...let them go fly the simulator and exchange ideas or something like that." This evoked the quip, "Uh-oh. Two captains in the cockpit" from Cagney and laughter from the group. Harris followed, joking, "That’s almost as dangerous as a doctor in a Bonanza. I’m going to tell you, they get dangerous." This remark relates to an expression in commercial aviation circles that terms the Beech Bonanza a "V-tail doctor killer" because so many doctors 1) fly them, and 2) get themselves killed flying them. It was Cagney who finally ended class for the day, saying, "We’ve got to get out of here." He was heading to the airport for his flight back to Seattle and was anxious to complete the critique sheet and leave. The class ended with some informal banter involving Cagney, Joe Williams and me, in which Cagney referred to me as "doctor." Interestingly, most of his initial level of hostility toward me at the beginning of the class had evaporated. I wondered if I had passed some test or if he was just eager to get on his flight home. It seemed, after exchanging comments about kenneling dogs and my voicing an opinion on a 338 non-aviation subject that ran exactly opposite to his, to which he responded quite graciously rather than with the hostility I anticipated, that I had become an accepted part of the classroom environment. There was no formal end to the three day seminar. Tony Dawkins did not drop by to wrap things up or say good-bye. Like the CRM module earlier, it just stopped. There was no summary or re-cap, just an abrupt end to the roundtable prompted, or so it appeared, by considerations of the clock rather than the topics. Again, Aerostar ran exactly on time; time, tide and training all gave way to finishing at the appointed hour. Group members got up as one, gathered their belongings and went out the door. a t : n e v' i Before leaving Aerostar, I had one more major task, to tape a conversation with Pete Morgan, Aerostar’s CRM Manager. I began by asking him about what I termed the "softer side" of the instruction, wondering, when Morgan taught CRM, what sense he had of what his students were thinking vis a vis CRM. His answer was immediate and focused on the need to sell CRM to Aerostar’s pilot population: Morgan: ...I think when you are instructing CRM, or facilitating CRM, you consider yourself as much a salesperson as you do a facilitator or instructor in that...the principles, the theory, all that we’re trying to teach in CRM, is very often kind of the antithesis of the typical aviator personality and...so we’re not only 339 putting on a mass of information, we’re also trying to sell that information...and for that reason...quite honestly, it’s very fatiguing to teach CRM...because you are really...trying to be high energy all the time to come across...as this is good stuff we’re giving you, it really is, guys, listen to us...and all this. I wondered if the high-energy sales pitch was necessary to counter perceived skepticism and negativity about CRM on the part of the pilot population. Morgan admitted that it was, citing pilots’ dislike of topics that required them to deal with their feelings: Morgan: Well, yeah. Because...you hear all the time the touchy-feely training and again this is not...pilots are cool, calm, collected, and stoic personalities and...it’s I don’t want to be bothered with this touchy-feely stuff and, you know, give me my airplane. Let me fly my airplane... that’s my job, that’s what I’m paid to do.’ So again, you have to sell it from the aspect of...we’re not teaching you these qualities to make you a better person, although interestingly enough, one of the satisfactions I get in CRM is in fact you are doing that, but we’re teaching this to make you have a safer, more efficient cockpit...because studies have shown this is the way cockpits work...and you have to kind of overcome that hurdle, but...we’re not trying to save the world and make you all better people. We’re trying to make Aerostar Airlines cockpits safer places to fly airplanes. I said found Dana Hiller’s class quite persuasive insofar as she had told the group that while they were technically able and could fly airplanes safely, CRM was there to make flying more safe, and help them become better pilots. I found it persuasive, I told Morgan, because I found her comment extremely logical, grounded, like so much in aviation, on common sense. While Morgan agreed with my interpretation, he was initially unable to point to one thing he believed 340 was particularly persuasive to pilots. When I prompted him by asking about techniques and activities he had found useful, he then concluded, as had Tom Mitchell and Josh Graham, that reality and relevance were persuasive to pilots. As was Morgan’s wont, he relied on an anecdote from one of the one-day CRM classes to illustrate his point: What I think works is making it relevant to them. Is to making them say, ’I can see myself in that guy,’ or ’Yeah, this makes sense, you know.’ To somehow crack the shell...that exterior...(T)he thing that’s so satisfying is we had an individual come into the one day course...and this individual was so upset about being, you know, obviously he was assigned to come and all this stuff, I mean, he knew it was a requirement. He had to come. But he literally, he refused to shake hands with the facilitators in the back of the room...and refused to shake hands and made it very clear that ’I’m only here because I have to.’ In fact, he made such a scene upon his entry that the team leader went over to him and said, ’Hey, you know, did you get up on the wrong side of the bed?...If this is a bad day...’ I interrupted to ask if the team leader for that particular class was a staff person or a line pilot. He was a line pilot, Morgan told me, retired with an estimated 25 or 30 years’ seniority at Aerostar. That added to his credibility with the students. Morgan continued his story: ...(T)he team leader went over to him and said, ’If this is a bad day, why don’t you just reschedule and come back?’ ’No, I’m here now. I’m going to get it out of the way.’ Well,...so he sat there with his arms folded the first hour, you know, and then he started loosening up a little. During ’four words’ he started to throw in a few comments and opinions and all and at the end of the day he left a critique sheet. Morgan digressed briefly to explain the value of the student critiques. 341 Our critique sheets, we really emphasize we want these strictly anonymous because we want an honest evaluation ...because we read those every night...and really looked at them very thoroughly as how we can tune up the program? How can we make it better? How can we meet the pilots’ needs? So we said, ’We want your honest evaluation...if you really don’t like something, please tell us...(T)here’s no way we’ll be able to trace who did it or anything.’ Complete anonymity. Yeah, complete anonymity. Well, he signed his critique sheet. The pilot’s willingness to go public with his commentary by signing his critique sheet surprised me. Morgan was as surprised as anyone, but he put the comments on the critique sheet to good use in subsequent seminars. And...his comment was, and I use it in the instructors’ course...as to what the impact of the one—day program was on the line pilot...he put ’Kind of makes you think about some of the things you do in the cockpit.’ and then he signed his name. Well, you know, that’s not really a ringing endorsement for CRM, but on the other hand, when you put it in the context of here is an individual who was so angry about being here that he literally wouldn’t shake anybody’s hands, wouldn’t, you know, made everybody feel very uncomfortable about the fact that he had to be here, and he put his critique, and after being told that these were strictly anonymous, that he signed it. I really thought that sent a very powerful message on the effect of this program on some of the guys. Morgan took it a step further, opining about the effect he felt the program had on that particular individual and the efforts that went into designing a relevant CRM program: But I think he started to see that ’Hey, they are talking to me...that this makes sense’ and so as far as persuasiveness, I think it’s the total package. It has to be, it’s a real art, I think, to design it, and I think it has to be really relevant. I think it has to have some psychological highs, some psychological lows, i.e., Delta 191, you know, the crash films and 342 all. You ...can’t leave them at that low, you got to bring them back up before you finish and I think there’s a real art to designing the training, but I think it’s kind of the total package that...I think if it comes across that you’re trying to sell them something, even though I’m contradicting myself because I said to you you are, but I think if the pilots perceive that, then I think they’ll tune you out. We clarified Morgan’s apparent contradiction about needing to sell CRM, agreeing that the hard sell does not work with pilots; they are not persuaded by high pressure sales tactics in their training. Morgan stressed again that if pressured, the pilots would simply tune out for the remainder of the session. This comment recalled my lunchtime talk the day before Jimmy Cagney, who had been so negative about one of Aerostar’s consultants, and who had used the same expression, "tuned out" when he talked about the B-747 pilot group’s reaction to hearing a negative assessment of their standardization. We delved a little deeper into what deee work with pilots, what is persuasive with them when they’re students in a classroom training situation and instead defined what does get work with pilots: PKN: I remember in August and then again this morning with Dana...the part about the personality profile. That seems to be a real soft sell...with some caveats and... Morgan: Mm-hmm. Yes. PKN: ...lots of caution and concern... Morgan: Yes. Yes. PKN: ...because I remember you had said the same thing that she did, which is... 343 Morgan: We’re not trying to stereotype you, pigeonhole you... PKN: Exactly. We don’t necessarily buy this, we’re not asking you... Morgan: Yeah... PKN: ...My sense is that one of the things that is not necessarily persuasive with a group of pilots is some academic person’s... Morgan: Yes. PKN: ...you know, here’s a piece of research and this guy says... Morgan: ...absolutely... PKN: ...you’re this, this, and this. That is not what’s going to cut it with pilots. We moved from persuasion to how the original CRM class was developed. Now I understood the emphasis on what is probably best termed pop psychology, as opposed to taking a more academic approach with pilots. Morgan told a long story about how, when he was preparing to "...pick up the mantle" from the consultant, the two men met during a class break to critique Morgan’s presentation. The consultant objected to the way Morgan handled the aviator personality profile, feeling his presentation was "too black and white." But before the class period began again, two "rather senior- type pilots," who had overheard the critique, encouraged him to not be talked out of including the aviator personality profile the way he had done earlier, despite the consultant’s concern, saying, "When you went through those traits, it was like I was looking in a mirror." They continued, urging him to not change his presentation, 344 particularly the segment about interpersonal relationships and the problems pilots have dealing with spouses and teenage children. "And," said Morgan, "I can’t tell you how many people have come to me since we did that. We did a little segment of that during annual recurrent training. One of those traits, you know, they said, ’Can I get a list of those traits? Boy, I listen to that and I want my wife to see those.’" The stage was set for Morgan to talk about the origin of one of his own goals for Aerostar’s CRM program, his own history as a base family services officer coming forward, which was to bring spouses into the CRM program: I mean, pilots don’t have a great track record when it comes to marital happiness, but because of that, I really would like to see the airlines expand into (it) because I think it would be tremendous for spouses to hear. I mean, they already know that, they’ve lived with this person for X number of years and they know these things, but to have both of them together hear what research shows... From there our conversation shifted slightly with respect to pilot personality profiles, with me commenting that airlines hire for: ...a certain set of traits, in addition to the technical skills...a certain kind of person becomes a pilot or a doctor or a nurse, or whatever...I don’t know that a profile, by . definition, is a problem. I think probably pilots loathe being pigeon-holed more than the average person does... As I spoke, Morgan was agreed, saying things like, "Right," and "Absolutely." He supported my assessment that pilots 345 hate being pigeon-holed and said, laughing heartily, especially when he got to the last sentence: They do. They do. Well, and that’s part of their desire not to be introspective. They don’t really want to know about themselves that much, to be honest with you. I mean...they want to go fly airplanes. ...(T)hat’s what they want to do. I told Morgan that I found the most interesting trait from the class list to be the pilot’s desire to change the environment rather than change themselves, something I felt summed up the personality quite succinctly. Agreeing again, Morgan shared another observation based on his experience facilitating Aerostar’s CRM program: The interesting thing about that is when we have air traffic controllers in the class, because they like that. They like hearing that because, you know, they deal with pilots on the radio for years and they know that pilots want you to change ...what they’re doing. They don’t want to change what they’re doing up in the cockpit. You make it easier for them. You do, you know, you be the one that bends over. They’re not going to bend. This anecdote prompted one of my own, taken from my days teaching my fear of flying class out of Baltimore- Washington International Airport: PKN: Well, you know, at least at Baltimore, and I don’t know about other places, but I’ve spent a lot of time in the Baltimore tower and approach control, with my fear of flying students and just doing some observing on my own, so I got to know a lot of the guys there and one of the things that they’ve always told my students and always told me is ’Our job, as far as we’re concerned, is to make each one of the captains think he’s first in line.’ Morgan: Yeah! Yeah! PKN: Even if he’s twenty-second out there... 346 Morgan: Absolutely! PKN: As far as he’s concerned, from us, he’s number one in line. And they really... Morgan: (laughing) ...as long as you can succeed in doing that, he’s going to be happy, right? PKN: (laughing) You’re not going to see him in the tower two minutes after the captain parks it... Morgan: That’s a...great thought. We talked about how much CRM Morgan senses bleeds through into what the instructor pilots do in their instructing roles. Morgan protested that such an idea would be hard to quantify, so I asked if he perhaps had an intuitive feel for the answer. Buying some time to frame his ultimate response, Morgan began his answer by re-telling a great deal of Aerostar’s CRM history, reminding me that they had gotten a late start relative to their competitors and that they had to stop for awhile once they’d begun. He cautioned that: ...by the time we start classroom CRM training with the pilots again, it’s almost a year for the most recent attendees and as much as three years for those who were one of the first ones to go through the class and...any data you read, any statistics on CRM, really emphasizes the constant need for follow-up because, you know, you’re talking behavior modification and if you don’t follow that up, it’s going to revert to the old way. And I think we’ve been real weak in that area. That groundwork laid, Morgan moved on to a discussion of LOFT training, stating his belief that LOFT, because of its emphasis on reality, was the place "...where you make or break your CRM program." He explained how Aerostar’s goal 347 of using instructors to filter CRM principles to line pilots would facilitate the bleed-through process: Morgan: And that instructor...that’s why we do concentrate on this instructor’s course and why we’re going to have this extensive training in the three day instructors’ seminar, because these guys are crucial to your program. These are the guys that are going to be the CRM program in the cockpit, you know, in their de-briefing and especially with the aid of...we’re still hOping the videotape flies, again, that’s on the borderline for budget, but if they have a videotape in there now...what’s going to be so effective about that is these guys who don’t realize maybe what a jerk they are in the cockpit, are suddenly going in living color, going to see and it’s going to be ’Do I really sound like that?’ and it may be totally unintentional. A guy may just have a naturally gruff voice, you don’t know. PKN: Maybe he’s having a bad day... Morgan: Yeah, or a bad day. But he’s going to, all of a sudden say, ’Gee, do I really sound like that? I mean, that looks like that Capt. Gil Colquitt in that video they used in CRM of the bad captain...maybe I am...’I mean, I think it’s going to be so effective when we do that. But you know, again, that’s down the road a few months...in the best case, so I think we’ve lost a lot because we haven’t followed up our training quickly enough with reinforcing, so it’d really be hard. Morgan went on to say that after reading and analyzing all of the critique sheets from the CRM classes, 90% of the respondents reported that they were very pleased with the training they’d received. He believed this high number demonstrated that the pilot group as a whole had either fully bought into CRM or at least thought it was worth thinking about more or maybe investigating. He did caution that, given the lag time and the lack of timely 348 reinforcement between CRM programs for the general pilot group, the 90% approval figure would likely be much lower. Citing some earlier NASA research at Aerostar, but declining to provide with a copy of the report, Morgan said the results showed that Aerostar generally needed a lot more training in CRM, saying, "We have a long way to go. But then again, we’re not really surprised about that because we really haven’t been functioning that long." We agreed that Aerostar was "...playing catch-up...in a very tough climate." The tough climate to which he and I referred was not only the difficult economic one, which the airline industry in general was experiencing, but also the airline’s earlier merger, source of red book vs. yellow book employee antagonisms, and it’s earlier management team, a major source of employee hostility. Citing his views on Aerostar’s corporate culture and combining them with some of the academic research that the CRM program itself does not directly utilize, Morgan described his view of CRM and the cultural changes at Aerostar: Your corporate culture really has to be conducive for a CRM program to really explode...we can use the grain of sand effect and keep going...and, in fact I don’t know if I showed you the...videotape ...by Hackman? What effects an event?...And he has this shell on the outside, but...he shows how...’what effects an event’ is his little buzzword and what it is is a cockpit event, whether it’s good or bad...surrounding that what effected it was the interrelations among the crew members...how they reacted to each other and all that. Around that was the training environment, how the crew was trained and what methods were 349 used, how realistic was the training, both human factors and technical training. And then around that is the corporate culture...What environment is this training...conducted in and what environment...do these pilots work in and all. So they have all these outer shells. Well, you know, if change can come either from the outside in, obviously it’s faster if the corporate structure, the corporate culture changes and it works its way inward. That’s faster, but a slower change is the pilots, a group of pilots getting together and trying to change the outside culture and we have a little bit of that at Aerostar because the CRM program was a movement among the pilots. They said the other airlines are doing this. We need to do it. We’re behind... Because of the nested socialization construct that I believe explains the cloning that affects pilots across the airline industry, Hackman’s shell model was appealing; it was easy to see what Morgan was trying to explain about ways to facilitate change within Aerostar. In fact, I was a little surprised that, given the visually appealing and straight- forward, non-academic seeming nature of Hackman’s model, it was not utilized in the CRM program during the culture model at Aerostar. Referring to Hackman’s shell model, Morgan continued, explaining that management, at the time CRM was being touted by the pilots as a necessary training tool, was not receptive to the pilots’ suggestions: ...(T)he management was not a real, ah, you know, one really in tune with all the concepts of quality you see now and...all the interpersonal things and all. This was not, was not the way they ran Aerostar at all back then. So...they (the pilots) were trying to work their way out. I think now we’re kind of getting...both. I think the management, my observations are, very much pro-people...I think they could teach CRM, just 350 their philosophy on management. It’s totally in tune with CRM. So, it appeared that what Aerostar chairman Mitch Weeks had said on the videotape for the one-day CRM program was not just hype for the pilots, but rather an accurate reflection of his management philosophy. I told Morgan that I had heard a great deal during the three days that stressed concepts like self-esteem and self-confidence -- intangibles -- from facilitators end the instructor participants in the course. PKN: If you had asked me before I came in here, I would have said, ’Well, I don’t know, but I would imagine this is a fairly hard-nosed sort of data- driven group of people and I don’t think I’m going to hear much...’ Morgan: We’re trying to get away from that. We’re really trying to get away from that. You know, guys like (the new training management team) that are really responsible for that because once upon a time...it was going to the schoolhouse was a dreaded experience. You were going to go in and...you bet your wings. Your wings were going to be put on the line every...if you’re a captain, every six months, and now they have really stroved, striven, whatever the right word is, to say that we’re not, we’re not a checking, we’re a training center, not a checking center...You come in for training, not merely for checking. And I think the message is finally getting out and I think...the curriculum on the instructor’s course you sat in is only one year old...It was just developed a year ago and part of the marching orders in development was very much ’We are trying to build quality instructors and quality training and looking at the whole person, not just technically proficient people.’ We’re looking at instructors who are empathetic with their students... That emphasis on producing quality instructors capable of empathy with their students led me to inquire about 351 Aerostar’s instructor selection process. I sensed some discomfort on Morgan’s part when I asked my question, but he forged ahead and answered nonetheless: I’m probably not the best person to answer this because it varies from fleet to fleet...and...you bring up something that’s in the works right now and that is to tighten up the instructor selection process. As he continued with his response, it became obvious why he might have been a little uncomfortable with the question, but characteristically, Morgan answered in detail: Now, in the past, and there’s still a perception out there among the line pilots, a lot of it was a good old boys network...that there are advantages to being an instructor. Especially if you live in the (metropolitan) area. You go home every night ...You’re not out on the road somewhere sleeping. You get a little bit higher status on your flight passes...and you and your spouse don’t have to pay a service charge because of that, so there are some tangible advantages, not the least of which if you live in the (metropolitan) area you can probably work it out so you’ll be home with your family on Thanksgiving and Christmas. So, there are people who become instructors for the wrong reasons, and some of these it comes out very quickly and one of the things where I think we’re lacking, which is being corrected, is a real... method of identifying these instructors who are instructors for the wrong reasons, by either student critiques... At that point, I interrupted Morgan to ask if students critiqued their instructors at Aerostar. He responded that while classroom instructors were critiqued, simulator were not, but the policy was being changed. He reprised a point he had made earlier, that Aerostar was in a time of transition, particularly with respect to it’s training 352 center activities and that management wanted training to be dynamic and positive. Now, any time you have to do a check ride, obviously,...you can’t take away all the stress and you really wouldn’t want to. I mean, flying an airplane...you’ve got a lot of people in the back you’re responsible for and obviously...people have to assume that responsibility and have to be able to show a degree of proficiency in doing that...(B)ut what they’re trying to take away is this fact that you’re really coming here in a very threatening, hostile environment. That it will be a much more nurturing environment, so a lot of that is selecting the right people to be your instructors...(I)n the past, a lot of it, unfortunately, has been kind of someone knows so and so, this guy’d like to be an instructor and there was no thought given to what his interpersonal skills were. It’s you know, ’Hey, he’s a really good pilot. He can really fly a good airplane.’ That was primarily the criteria. But, as Morgan continued it became increasingly clear that "flying a good airplane" was no longer the sole criterion for becoming an Aerostar instructor. Now, what they’re looking at and again, it’s all dynamic...(is)...a formal interview. They’ve always had an interview process but it was always kind of like one guy interviewed you and gave you a thumbs up or a thumbs down or whatever and now they’re looking at...more of a...maybe perhaps a board-type interviewing these guys. Perhaps having the guy stand up and all the ground instructors out there...(I)t is changing and I think what you’ll see is a process...an interview process, perhaps...even though they don’t spend a lot of time in the classroom, it’s more in the sim, they still give them a chance to see how they stand up on their feet and all this. And perhaps even, they’re talking about giving them a LOFT, observing on a LOFT, of seeing if somebody’s interpersonal skills would come out themselves in the way they operate, fly an airplane. Morgan hastily added that Mitch Weeks’ phi1050phy and, as a result, the training center’s philosophy was "If you see 353 somebody doing something wrong, you don’t get rid of them, you try to help them to do it right...and teach them to do it right." Morgan’s statement was in concert with much of what had been expressed during the three-day seminar. Time and again facilitators and instructor participants talked about wanting to make line pilots successful in their training and checking programs. There was no sense that any instructor participants were eager to stick it to a student pilot; only as a last resort would they give up on a student. We ended our talk on an up note, with Morgan summarizing his and Aerostar management’s goals for the training center: ...I hope the economy allows all these things to come to fruition, ’cause I think there’s a lot of good people trying to do a lot of good things here and trying to do it the right way and...are committed. We really want to have a first class training center, a first class operation, and meet the total needs of the pilots, so, we’re trying to get there, slowly but surely. The shrill ring of Morgan’s telephone cut the interview short. Because it was the end of what had been a long day for both of us, we shook hands and said good-bye. Interestingly, while I spoke to Morgan on the phone a few times after our interview, that session was the last time I ever saw him. In early January, he left Aerostar to pursue his long-time goal of teaching a CRM class for pilots and their families at a competing airline. 354 Pett 8: Some Observations en the Cogtse The three day Instructor Qualification Course covered a lot of ground. A relatively new course, judging from what I had been told, and some comments made by facilitators, it bracketed a number of heavily technical modules with three that placed their emphasis on interpersonal skills -- how to work with students better, and evaluate their interpersonal skills in a non-threatening fashion. Two of the first three modules covered teaching adults and LOFT training, both of which emphasized softer skills, as opposed to focusing on technical proficiency or knowledge of company policies and procedures. Tom Mitchell devoted four hours to telling the group, in his folksy manner, that teaching adults is different from teaching children, and providing substantial historical detail about adult education theories. Mitchell, like Morgan, relied heavily on personal anecdotes to make his points. When we talked one-to-one, he stressed that realism is persuasive with pilots. How better to reach them, then, than by sharing his own experiences, whether they involved watching his children learn to ride bicycles or his own student pilot days? Josh Graham’s LOFT presentation combined airline policy and procedures with the interpersonal requirements inherent in critiquing a LOFT, emphasizing the whys and hows of performing LOFTs at Aerostar. Graham’s style, while less relaxed than Mitchell’s, was nonetheless friendly and enthusiastic. His lengthy experience at United gave him ‘— 355 substantial credibility with the group. It seemed that his easy manner and long years of experience with LOFTs eased some of the instructors’ anxiety about this new training regime. Sandwiched between Mitchell’s and Graham’s modules was Jack Mills’ talk about airline operations specifications. Primarily a recitation covering Aerostar’s handling of various pilot manual (Airman’s Operating Manual, Flight Officer’s Manual, and Jeppesen charts) updates, Mills nonetheless addressed instructor questions and concerns as they were presented to him. His module did not provide much room for development or demonstration of interpersonal skills. He said what he came to say, the instructor participants asked questions, he answered them, then he went away. Between LOFT on Day Two and the CRM module on Day Three fell several other, highly technical modules: Windshear, rejected take-off (RTO), TCAS, Advanced Simulation Training, and Tolerances in Pilot Performance. Windshear was handled, from a teaching standpoint, differently from any of the other modules, regardless of content. Dawkins conducted it like an undergraduate college course, weaving direct questions to students into his lecture, allowing for discussion and questions, but always maintaining his position as leader. By asking specific questions of each student (including me as an observer), Dawkins kept everyone on his toes. This module did not 356 allow complacency; Dawkins put individual knowledge on display for the rest of the group to see. There was no place to hide from his questions. I came away uncertain whether or not the instructor participants felt discomfort with this classroom style. Ultimately, I surmised they were accustomed to such question and answer sessions after years’ of experience with ground and simulator instructors, and check airmen. Further, the questions Dawkins asked about windshear and how to handle it seemed to be fairly basic, ones that any pilot ought to be able to answer easily. The remaining technical modules fell into what Steve Harris labeled during the roundtable discussion as "The Telling." Each module was a virtual showcase for the facilitators’ knowledge of his subject, brimming with detailed data for the instructors to hear and pass along to their students. The facilitators for these modules were really more aptly titled lecturers, for lecture is what they did, in the main. To be sure, they answered questions that were posed and fended off some challenges, but these modules were essentially pure information dissemination. The only module that attempted to employ adult learning principles was the four-hour CRM module, whose activities were oriented toward getting participants to think and work together to improve CRM in the overall training process. These activities were interspersed with lecture segments. Despite the stated goal -- improving communication in the '\ 357 cockpit and among crew members -- the module relied heavily on information dissemination. One distinguishing feature of the CRM program was the instructor participants’ willingness to openly challenge facilitator Dana Hiller. These challenges were not directed solely at the information she was imparting, but spilled over to Aerostar policies and procedures, over which she had no control. Only in the roundtable discussion module were participants as willing to be confrontational, even hostile, with the facilitator. Again, the question remains whether participants were unhappy about CRM as a discipline or whether they saw Hiller, though a pilot, as a sufficiently low status facilitator that she could be confronted with impunity. Or, perhaps the participants were uncomfortable about the dissonance between the module’s content and the manner in which it was being communicated. For example, while Hiller espoused open communication, individual responsibility to the entire crew, and respectful assertiveness, on more than one occasion she behaved in a fashion 180 degrees from what she was teaching the instructors. She relied heavily on lecture, and several times out aggressive speakers, notably Cagney and Bronson, off mid-sentence. She infrequently solicited comments or questions from the group. And, more than once, she deferred stated concerns were until later in the module but never mentioned them again. 358 Hiller’s gender may also have been a factor. With the exception of the representative of training administration, who gave a brief talk on record-keeping and training requirements, Hiller was the lone female facilitator. And as such, she was the only female who was teaching a module that would profoundly affect how the instructor participants did their jobs. It has been noted more than once that pilots prefer to change their environments rather than change themselves. Perhaps being told by a female facilitator -- though a rated pilot -- that they had to change in their own environment, produced anxieties that were more safely voiced obliquely, via challenges to the facilitator herself, rather than directly to Aerostar’s new training philosophy, policies and procedures. When I had the opportunity to speak with Hiller after her module, she expressed disappointment with the size of the group and its overall attitude, saying she did not feel she ever bonded with the group. It was difficult, she told me, to get good interaction going on some activities, particularly the one utilizing alter egos, since everyone had to be pressed into service and there were no observers available to comment on what they had witnessed. She echoed Tom Mitchell’s dismay over how the group, due to its small size, failed to coalesce and function as well as the larger groups that were the norm for instructor qualification training sessions. She did not say anything about how the 359 participants treated her, thus giving no indication whether or not their behavior was out of the ordinary. Aerostar’s instructor qualification training program employed CRM principles in only a small segment of the overall program. From talking to various facilitators, I came away convinced that this group of instructors was unique, in size, experience, age, and attitude. Facilitators would have preferred to lecture less and have the instructors participate more actively, especially in the adult learning and CRM modules. While there was some active participation in the CRM module, the greatest interaction occurred in the session-ending roundtable discussion. It seems reasonable to draw an analogy between CRM and the roundtable, which could be seen as a demonstration of good CRM. Session parameters were laid out at the beginning of the hour, driven by the instructor participants’ expressed concerns. Facilitator Harris, exercising secure authority, invited the group to establish discussion boundaries. As the roundtable progressed, he kept the participants within those boundaries, allowing for the occasional excursion elsewhere, but demonstrating good situational awareness, deftly pulling the group back onto its conversational course. Everyone, with the exception of Sam Tucker, who said almost nothing throughout the three days (unless specifically called upon to provide input) got 360 into the discussion. Harris gets a plus for encouraging participation. Although the roundtable occasionally got hot and heavy with the language deteriorating and tempers flaring, everyone was treated respectfully, and encouraged to share his feelings. Harris led the group expertly, even using his background as a yellow book pilot to his advantage. This was no mean feat, since Cagney and Bronson were red book pilots with intense feelings about how they had been hurt by the merger and the potential for trouble was real. Again, we witnessed an eloquent demonstration of Harris’s secure authority. Harris, more than any other facilitator, employed the four words of CRM throughout his module -- AUTHORITY with PARTICIPATION, ASSERTIVENESS with RESPECT. Wearing his facilitator’s authority loosely and comfortably, he stated his goals, and created an atmosphere that made participation safe. He showed respect for everyone in the room, this observer included. As a result, group members felt free to be assertive, while showing virtually unwavering respect for Harris. The only real lapses into aggression were Bronson’s, who repeatedly carped about how good pilot training used to be. As Morgan defined it in the one day CRM seminar, respect is something that "you know when you give it and you know when you get it." The atmosphere of respect during the 361 roundtable was unmistakable, and I’d suggest that’s why the session worked so well. Multipie Agendas During the November Instructor Qualification Course, management’s agenda cast a wider net CRM-wise than it had during the Phase 1 CRM indoctrination. It sought to reinforce the original CRM baseline, then moved to use the instructor corps to continue beating the CRM drum by introducing the instructors to their soon-to-be expanded role in the CRM LOFTs that were being added to the training curriculum. In the November class, unlike the one-day Phase 1 CRM program, the airline provided a mechanism for acquiring participant feedback by scheduling a moderated roundtable discussion. Management’s agenda also included satisfying FAA requirements for certifying A-340 instructors, discussing issues intended for transmission to line pilots, i.e., windshear policies, the TCAS system update and information about RTOs, and encouraging instructor group cohesion with regard to tolerances in pilot performance in training. November’s facilitators were, in large part, focused on disseminating extensive bodies of information (adult learning theory, TCAS, CRM, RTOs, windshear, etc.) in limited time frames. Some, but by no means all, facilitators’ agendas included encouraging the exchange of ideas between facilitator and participants. 362 November’s instructor participants, with the possible exception of the two observers, were present to gather useful information and to fulfill airline and FAA requirements for certification as A-340 instructors; they were "filling squares." As became obvious as the class progressed, for some participants -- the Bad Boys -- the program provided a platform for expressing dissatisfaction and asserting instructor pilots’ traditional independence. e Resea s ' s RQ1 asks what’s persuasive with the individuals in the class. The lion’s share of the November class was conducted in a lecture format. If realism is what is persuasive to airline pilots, how persuasive is the recitation of facts and technical data? With respect to modules such as TCAS or windshear, recitation of operational data, which instructor participants were expected to absorb and transmit to student pilots, is likely quite persuasive. Experienced instructors are being given technical data with which they are comfortable and which they can comprehend and integrate with their existing storehouse of technical data such as aircraft and/or system performance parameters. For the most part, facilitators established credibility by giving a summary of their individual professional credentials. Those who did not -- Mike Campbell and Tony Dawkins -- appeared to rely on their job titles and 363 participant familiarity with their roles within Aerostar’s training organization. RQ2 asks what the airline wanted taught. Aerostar, with respect to CRM, wanted a review of the information taught in the Phase 1 CRM indoctrination program. In addition, from the CRM baseline, the CRM module sought to prepare instructor participants for their soon-to-be expanded role in conducting CRM LOFTs. The module did not get into any actual discussion of the tools they’d use, but rather alluded to them instead. The CRM LOFT module dealt with procedural issues for the new environment, providing little additional information about CRM principles. For other modules, with the exception of the free- wheeling roundtable discussion, the airline appeared to want these prospective A-340 instructors exposed to a cornucopia of information that ranged from an introduction to adult learning theory, to what was going on with simulator technology, to what Aerostar’s policies and procedures were on handling windshear. The emphasis was on information dissemination provided by subject matter experts. RQ3 asks what tools and techniques were used in the Instructor Qualification Training course. Again, Aerostar relied on its line-up of tried-and-true tools and techniques. The primary instructional technique was the lecture, since the central purpose of the course was the dissemination of large amounts of information, much of it highly technical. 364 There was a certain amount of facilitator-participant interchange in each module —- mostly asking and answering questions about technical data -- but real interaction between facilitator and participant only occurred in the CRM module and the two discussion sessions. As with the Phase 1 CRM program, the most frequently used tool for the CRM module was the videotape. Again, participants saw actual and scripted CRM situations and used them as the basis for group analysis and discussion. Looking at RQ4, the overall role of CRM training in the Instructor Qualification Training was minimal. Only two modules emphasized CRM’s importance in improving flight safety. However, looking at the syllabus, there is little reason to surmise that Aerostar intended to do more with CRM principles than was done. Except for the roundtable discussion, classroom activities were neither negotiated nor socially constructed but rather were imposed on the participants by Aerostar, via the facilitators. Tight scripting, working in concert with tight scheduling, left no latitude for socially constructed activities. Only the roundtable discussion allowed or encouraged excursions beyond the syllabus. umumuygugumm 111;]? 11111! WIMWIII Es 659