PLAY BALL: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SMALL MARKET BASEBALL
TEAMS
By

Jeffrey S. Keesler

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING
Urban and Regional Planning
2012

ABSTRACT
PLAY BALL: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SMALL MARKET BASEBALL
TEAMS
By
Jeffrey S. Keesler

This study examines the economic impact that the construction of the Lansing Lugnuts
baseball stadium (Cooley Law School Stadium) in Lansing, Michigan had on the businesses
surrounding the stadium. The Lansing Lugnuts are in the Midwest Baseball League (MBL), a
single-A baseball league in the upper Midwest. The goal of this study is to determine whether or
not constructing a stadium in a post-industrial city in the Midwest can be a catalyst for seasonal
economic growth in the surrounding district. The study will examine privately owned properties
in Lansing, MI that directly surround the Lansing Lugnuts baseball stadium, named Cooley Law
School Stadium, as well as properties in two other zones within the city of Lansing. This is a
mixed-methods study utilizing publicly available GIS parcel data for businesses located directly
adjacent to Cooley Law School Stadium, as well the other two business zones. In addition, the
study contains the results of a survey of business owners near the stadium.

Dedicated to my beautiful and phenomenal wife, Venessa, without whom all of this would never
have been possible.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Venessa, for her patience, love, and
unending support throughout not only this thesis project and my graduate school, but also our
marriage of 12 years. I would also like to thank my children, especially my daughter Rose (7
years old), who seemed to be able to tell when I was feeling down about my project and provided
support as best she could at all times. Secondly, I would like to thank Dr. Rene Hinojosa for his
patient support and encouragement on this thesis project and throughout graduate school. Also, I
am very thankful for the support and dedication that Dr. Zenia Kotval provided as well as Dr.
Trish Machemer. These individuals were instrumental in my graduate career from the very
beginning to the very end, and I am grateful for this involvement and guidance. Last but not
least, I would like to thank my parents, Tom and Carolyn Keesler, and my wife’s parents, Steve
and Peg Rose, for their countless hours of childcare and endless encouragement.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

xi

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Sample
Data
Measures
Methods: Quantitative Data Analysis

20
22
23
25
26

CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS

27

CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION, LIMITATION AND CONCLUSION

34

APPENDIX A: MAP OF PARCELS SURVEYED

40

APPENDIX B: COPY OF THE SURVEY USED FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

42

APPENDIX C: MAP OF THE PARCELS USED IN CALCULATING GIS DATA

45

BIBLIOGRAPHY

49

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Cost of MLB and MiLB Stadium Construction ...............................................11
Table 2: Potential Measures for Assessing Impacts and Outcomes ...............................18
Table 3: Mean SEV in Three Parcels Over 15 Years .....................................................27
Table 4: Change in SEV Over Time Within Parcels ......................................................33

vi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Lansing Population, 1940-2010 ......................................................................2
Figure 2: Mean SEV by Zone .........................................................................................29
Figure 3: Percent Change in Mean SEV .........................................................................30
Figure 4: Change in Mean SEV Over Time....................................................................32
Figure 5: Parcels in Study ...............................................................................................41
Figure 6: Parcel Maps .....................................................................................................46
Figure 7: Zone 2 Parcels .................................................................................................47
Figure 8: Zone 3 Parcels .................................................................................................48

vii

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Many former industrial cities in the northern Midwest have lost considerable population,
jobs, and tax revenue since the 1950s. Lansing, Michigan is one such city. Lansing became the
capital of Michigan in 1847, but had its largest period of growth during the industrialization of
the Midwest in the early 1900s. Lansing was the headquarters for Oldsmobile, a division of
General Motors, as well as other auto manufacturing-based companies. Oldsmobile was founded
by Ransom E. Olds in Lansing in 1897 (The History Channel). Olds moved his company from
Lansing to Detroit in 1900, presumably to be nearer to the auto production hub, but when a fire
destroyed his factory, he moved the company back to Lansing in 1902 (The History Channel).
From that time, until the last Oldsmobile was built in 2004, Oldsmobile was a main staple of the
Lansing economy. Oldsmobile was dissolved as an auto company by its parent company
General Motors in April of 2004. It was sad but fitting that it was in Lansing that the last
Oldsmobile came off the line. At the time, the 106 year old company was the oldest auto
company (Valdes-Dapena, 2004). Currently, Lansing continues to produce vehicles for General
Motors, although the workforce numbers have dwindled.
Industrialization helped Lansing’s population and infrastructure grow at a rapid pace in
the early 1900s from a small village that housed the state capital into a mid-sized industrial city.
The so called “Rust Belt” phenomenon where industrial boom towns of the late 1800s and early
1900s became the bust town of the late 1900s and early 2000s can be seen in Lansing. As with
other cities in the Midwest (e.g., Detroit, Cleveland, Flint) this trend of rapid population growth
due to industrialization would leave many of these same cities with job loss, population loss, a
largely vacant city center, increases in crime, and a declining revenue base a few decades later.
1
 

US Census data and data gathered from citydata.com show that Lansing’s population has
declined from a high of 131,546 in 1970 to 113,802 in 2009, representing a population loss of
17, 744 in 40 years, or slightly more than 13% of the 1970 population (US Census). Possibly
more telling is that, although the decline has been small and incremental, Lansing has lost
population in every US Census since 1970. Figure 1 below illustrates the loss of population
during this period.
Figure 1: Lansing Population 1940-2010

In addition to fewer jobs being available in Lansing, suburbanization left the city center
with high vacancy rates and few, if any, nighttime activities. The construction of the Meridian
Mall (Okemos, MI) and Lansing Mall (Lansing Township, MI) in 1969, pulled businesses out of
downtown Lansing and away from the traditional urban shopping district. As a result of job loss
and retail vacancy, downtown Lansing started to become a 9a-5p city with few amenities at

2
 

night. Individuals might drive into the city for work and venture out for lunch, but they weren’t
a part of the fabric of downtown Lansing, in any lasting sense.
In this void, many aspiring business owners saw an economic opportunity in the empty
storefronts in the late 1970s and 1980s and opened several adult businesses on Michigan Avenue
creating a “sin district”. Along with the adult book stores and adult businesses came other
nefarious activities such as prostitution and illegal drug use and sales. Within blocks of
Michigan’s capital was an area that was an embarrassment at best and at worst, unsafe. Lansing
needed something to revitalize their downtown but had the problem of declining revenues, jobs,
and population. To counter the negative direction of downtown Lansing, the city leaders turned
to baseball.
Many former industrial cities in the Midwest have begun to actively work to identify
engines for economic growth in the vacuum of lost population, jobs, and declining tax revenues.
As departing masses left the inner cities for the suburbs and beyond, municipalities were left
with the challenge of attracting people, business, and most importantly, money back into the
central business district. One approach that has been taken by many cities is the “bread and
circuses” theory (Eisinger, 2000). This theory holds that the way to drive economic development
in the inner cities is to build venues that are attractive to the suburban surroundings. Baseball
stadiums fit this general theory. However, stadiums may also drive economic development in
ways other than increasing the number of entertainment-seeking visitors from the surrounding
suburbs, such as through increases in the tax base, increased jobs, or other economic benefits.
A review of the academic literature about the economic impact of professional sports
stadiums is decidedly negative. Most researchers find that the enormous costs of stadium and
3
 

infrastructure construction far outweigh the benefits in job and tax creation. According to
Dennis Coates and Brad Humphreys, (2005) “A large body of research has found that sports
teams and facilities have little direct impact on personal income, wages, and employment in host
cities.” Often, professional sports facilities cost hundreds of millions of dollars and employ
relatively few people on a seasonal basis. This has led many researchers to conclude that
taxpayer-financed stadium projects are not worth the economic burden, in a tangible, calculable
sense (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; Coates and Humphreys, 2005; Baade and Matheson, 2008).
These studies did not, however, address the issues related to potential increases in the tax base of
the districts in which the stadiums are located.
Other research has focused on large-scale events like the Olympic Games, the Super
Bowl, or the Final Four of the NCAA men’s basketball tournament (Matheson, 2006). While the
cost of the Olympic infrastructure is enormous, it is unclear the extent to which the benefits—
both long- and short-term—are worth the cost. One example of this is the Montreal Olympic
village. At the time the Olympic games were awarded to Montreal, then-mayor Jean Drapeau
boasted that the Montreal games would be the first self-financing Olympic Games through a
series of gold coin issues and other revenue generators (CBC News/Montreal, 2006). Despite
Drapeau’s enthusiasm, Montreal did not fully pay off the cost of the 1976 games until 2006
(CBC News/Montreal, 2006). The total cost of Quebec’s debt for the games was $1.6 billion in
1976 dollars (CBC News/Montreal, 2006). As a result, Montreal’s Olympic stadium, once
nicknamed “the Big O” came to be known to the citizens of Quebec as “the Big Owe” (CBC
News/Montreal, 2006). Despite the City of Montreal having to pay the bills for the Montreal
games for 30 years after the 1976 Olympics, there were some bright points. The city was able to
build a new subway line that extended out from the Centre-Ville (downtown) to the Olympic
4
 

village. This infrastructure improvement has been substantial for the city. Also, the former
Olympic Village now turned residential development called Habitat has been hugely successful
and often requires waiting on a list to live there. (Poynter and MacRury, 2009).
Another example of public expenditure for large-scale events was the summer Olympic
Games in Athens in 2004. According to Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008), “For the 2004
Summer Games, the government in Athens, Greece, spent $1.5 billion on security alone.” Given
that it has been less than ten years has elapsed since the Athens Games, it may not be possible to
determine the long-term economic impact of the Games. However, in the short term, the current
state of the economy in Greece is quite negative, due in no small part to the government debt. In
a 2004 report by the Greek embassy, the Economy and Finance Minister for Greece said that
while the original cost of 4.5 billion Euros was doubled, the country benefitted in the longer-term
from infrastructure improvements (Greek Embassy). Certainly, the Games were not the only
contributor to Greece’s current debt crisis, but at a cost of nearly 9 billions Euros, it is likely that
this had a significant role in the current state of the economy (Greek Embassy).
Although it seems to be the general consensus among researchers that expenditures for
events such as the Olympics rarely pay off in any tangible sense, one exception to this rule may
be the Winter Games in Salt Lake City. Before accounting for the cost of security, the Salt Lake
Games made a profit (Baade, Baumann, Matheson, 2008). This does not even take into account
the long-term benefit of improvements to infrastructure and the contribution of durable
construction such as stadiums that Salt Lake can continue to leverage for other purposes.
Clearly, the Olympics can be beneficial to a city, but it seems to require that the initial outlay be
carefully monitored relative the income.

5
 

Similar to the mixed evidence regarding the benefit of events like the Olympic Games,
baseball stadiums are often assumed by developers and city leaders to be positive sources of
economic development. Unlike the Olympic Games, a one-time event, baseball stadiums are in
operation in cites from the beginning of April through the end of September every year.
Baseball stadiums have stimulated seasonal economic growth in large US cities since the early
1900s (Johnson, 1995). Many Major League Baseball (MLB) stadiums have created
entertainment or business districts where souvenir shops, bars and restaurants, parking, and
various other retail and entertainment businesses supplement, and benefit from, the economic
activity of the stadium (Johnson, 1995). Historically MLB generally located its stadiums in large
urban centers where there was a demand for a baseball team and a market that could financially
support it (Johnson, 1995).
Cities attempt to capitalize on the ‘Bread and circuses’ model of using taxpayer funds to
construct stadiums that lure teams. Many researchers believe that this model does not work and
generally taxpayers don’t get revenue benefit (Rosentraub, 2006, Johnson, 2000). However,
other researchers believe that if clearly defined, stadium projects can contribute to economic
growth (Dye, 1988). In some cases, cities are put in the awkward position of having to ask
taxpayers to pay for the cost of constructing a stadium, or risk losing the potential revenue to
other areas. The implicit promise to the taxpayers in these situations is that this is going to be a
smart investment on the behalf of the community, and that the community will see a return on
that investment. As Safir, 1997 notes, “Intense competition between American cities to acquire
or retain sports franchises is generating unprecedented levels of municipal and state spending.”
State and municipal governments in the US devote millions of taxpayer dollars to the creation of

6
 

stadiums and entertainment districts, with the goal of stimulating economic growth (Eisinger,
2000).
Several examples of this sort of strategic economic development that uses the baseball
stadium as an anchor are Baltimore (Camden Yards), San Francisco (AT&T Park), and Detroit
(Comerica Park). Baltimore was one of the first baseball franchises to build a stadium in the new
style that incorporated a new baseball stadium in an area of downtown in order to drive
downtown revitalization. Camden Yards opened in 1992, and was one of the first modern
stadiums built that included crowd-pleasing amenities such as Ferris Wheels, multiple
restaurants, and a general “neighborhood” feel. This new development was located near
Baltimore’s waterfront, known as the Inner Harbor, which has experienced a total redesign and
revitalization in the years following the Camden Yards. Shops, restaurants and entertainment
venues now blanket an area that was once a working waterfront slipping into post-industrial
decline. Another example is AT&T Park in San Francisco. Built in the Mission Bay area of San
Francisco, the park is modern and open-air, including solar panels on the roof and access to the
ocean, where exuberant fans wait in kayaks to catch home run balls. Prior to a spurt of recent
development, Mission Bay was a very post-industrial, underdeveloped, dilapidated area of San
Francisco. With the construction of the stadium, as well as with substantial investment from
University of California-San Francisco (UCSF) for their medical school, this area now boasts
shops, restaurants, student housing, and a transportation line that provides direct access to
downtown San Francisco and other parts of the Bay Area. A final example is the close-to-home
Comerica Park, home of the Detroit Tigers. The former beloved Tiger Stadium was located on
the west side of downtown, in an undesirable area. Comerica Park was built strategically on the
site of the former Hudson’s Department Store, which had been vacant since 1982 and had
7
 

become somewhat of a redevelopment albatross-too large to redevelop. Instead of being a once
proud landmark for success for the City of Detroit, the vacant Hudson’s building was a visual
reminder of economic failure. Additionally, with this move, Comerica Park was now situated
very near to downtown Detroit, and was part of a strategy that included restaurants and bars,
casino development, Ford Field, the theater district—in short, integrating the Tigers into an
entertainment district in Detroit, taking the concept of “bread and circuses” to new heights for
Detroit and its surrounding metro areas. Since the construction of Comerica Park and Ford
Field, Detroit has hosted the Super Bowl, the men’s basketball NCAA Final Four Tournament,
and the MLB All-Star Game. These were all huge one-off, mega-events that brought additional
revenue into the city to offset some of the high cost of infrastructure improvements.
A more recent trend since the 1990s is the emergence of single-A baseball stadiums in
smaller market areas in places like the Midwest, such as cities with 200,000 or fewer people.
While the most well-known MLB stadiums tend to be those in the large urban areas, MLB has
several divisions of minor leagues which include single-A, double-AA, and triple-AAA, with A
being the least developed players and AAA being one step away from the “big leagues.” All of
these divisions supplement a “farm system” for one MLB team, which is designed to develop
young talent which will ideally make it to the major leagues. An MLB organization can be
judged by critics not only on how its MLB level team performs, but also on how good its farm
system is. A good minor league system usually translates into a good MLB team however this is
not always the case. Many young, talented players are traded off in package deals to acquire
veteran MLB players, sustain injuries at the minor league level, or simply are never quite good
enough when the chance comes to make the big leagues.

8
 

MLB teams often sign young players to multi-million dollar contracts, sometimes, right
after high school graduation and bring them into the team’s farm system. Most often, young
players enter at the A or AA level, but if they produce, they are quickly moved up to AAA. At
the AAA level if someone produces well, they may either be traded or they might be developed
to take someone’s place on the MLB team. Derek Jeter is an example of a player who was
drafted out of high school by the New York Yankees and played in their minor league system
until being called up to play for the Yankees. Since playing for NY, Jeter has been a cornerstone
in several World Series championships, as well as receiving countless honors. Jeter has been in
the NY Yankee system since he was signed in 1992 (MLB, 2012). Players can move quickly
through the farm system and into the pros if they are able to produce, but others can linger in the
minor leagues from team to team for many years and hardly ever see the bright lights, lucrative
contracts, nice hotels, air travel, and countless other niceties that go along with being an MLB
player.
Along with a decrease in talent and salary at each level, the amenities are also less
opulent at lower levels of baseball. Instead of taking a private team jet from coast to coast, an Alevel player might ride a Greyhound bus for a regional game. Hotels, restaurants, rental cars,
even the cities in which the teams play, are less exciting and luxurious at the lower end of the
minor league scale. According to CBS Sports, the average salary for an MLB baseball player in
2010 was $3,297,828, with the highest paid player, Alex Rodriquez being paid $33 million per
year (CBS Sports, 2012). The NY Yankees combined 2011 team payroll is slightly less than
$207 million (ESPN, 2012).

9
 

Contrast those shocking numbers with the MiLB, where the Lugnuts play, which has a
maximum salary of $1100 per month for the first year and open to negotiation in following
years. Each player is also given a $25 per day meal allowance, when on the road (MiLB, 2012).
The Midwest League’s website suggests that entire franchises in their league are only worth
about $3-25 million (MiLB, 2012). While the game being played is exactly the same at all
levels, the similarities largely stop there. Major League baseball stadiums in major urban centers
are often expensive to build, and stocked with amenities. An example of this is the Detroit
Tigers who play in Comerica Park, which opened in 2000 and cost $300 million to build. Inside,
the stadium includes a Ferris wheel, a carousel, and a kid’s play area. These items of course are
for when the children get bored of watching the game that their parents likely spent about $250
to bring them to.
Another, more grandiose example of public expenditure on privately owned stadiums is
the New York Yankees and New York Mets. Toward the end of Mayor Giuliani’s
administration, a deal was made to finance two new baseball stadiums for the Yankees and Mets,
at a total cost to taxpayers of nearly $2.3 billion (Dodd, 2009). Mayor Giuliani sighted the need
to help the teams build new stadiums to retain them in the New York area. The new Yankee
Stadium is 60% larger than the “old Yankee Stadium” and has nearly $10 million worth of
baseball merchandise housed within the ballpark Dodd, 2009).
By contrast, MiLB stadiums are much smaller in scale. Generally housing 5,000 fans, as
opposed to around 45,000 in most MLB parks, and costing around $25 million to build, MiLB
stadiums cater to a smaller crowd, and offer a more “hands-on,” approach to baseball. This
lower cost of the stadiums and the teams may make MiLB stadiums more successful in
10
 

stimulating economic growth, as the entry cost and investment required from the community is
much lower, and potentially more easily recovered.
Table 1: Cost of MLB and MiLB Stadium Construction

Team

Year

Cost

Opened
Bush Stadium

Cost in

Ownership

2011 $$

1966

$25m

$169m St. Louis Cardinals

2006

$365m

St. Louis Cardinals

(St. Louis
Cardinals)
Bush Stadium II
(St. Louis

$398m

Cardinals)
Riverfront Stadium

1970

$45m

(Cincinnati Reds)
Great American

City of Cincinnati
$255M

2003

$290m

Ball Park

Hamilton County
$346m

(Cincinnati Reds)
Three-Rivers

1970

$55m

2001

$216m

$311m City of Pittsburgh

Stadium (Pittsburgh
Pirates)
PNC Park
(Pittsburgh Pirates)

City of Pittsburgh and Alleghany
$268m County
11

 

Table 1: Cost of MLB and MiLB Stadium Construction (cont’d)

Oriole Park at

1992

$110m

2000

$300m

$172m Maryland Stadium Authority

Camden Yards
(Baltimore Orioles)
Comerica Park
(Detroit Tigers)
Yankee Stadium

Detroit-Wayne County Stadium
$383m Authority

2009

$1.5b

NY Yankees

1987

$11m

City of South Bend

2009

$365m

(NY Yankees)
MiLB Stadium projects:
Stanley Coveleski
Stadium
(South Bend Silver
Hawks) AZ
Diamondbacks
affiliate
Bowling Green Ball

City of Bowling Green

Park
(Bowling Green
Hot Rods)

12
 

Table 1: Cost of MLB and MiLB Stadium Construction (cont’d)

Fifth Third Field

2000

$22m

1996

$12.8m

Dayton Dragons

(Dayton Dragons)
Cincinnati Reds
Affiliate
Cooley Law

City of Lansing

Stadium (Lansing
Lugnuts)
Toronto Blue Jays
Affiliate
*2011 dollars are calculated using the Consumer Price Index:
(http://www.minneapolisfed.org/community_education/teacher/calc/hist1800.cfm)
The cities where MLB located teams had a built-in, seasonal economic engine for the
district surrounding the stadium. However, many smaller, northern US cities (pop., <250,000)
have not been able to benefit from this type of economic development strategy, because a small
market usually meant that a team would be unable to sustain itself financially (Johnson, 1995).
There have been a couple of examples in MLB where teams have failed financially and had to
relocate, due to having a smaller market (e.g., Washington Senators), or having to share a market
(e.g., Brooklyn Dodgers). If smaller market cities wanted to use a baseball stadium as a means
to economic development, they usually ended up vying for one of the limited minor league
franchises. While MLB may not be a viable economic engine for small and midsized cities,
13
 

leagues such as the MiLB may provide an economic opportunity. Arthur Johnson calculated in
1995 over 150 communities with minor league baseball teams, in the US and Canada.
The Lansing Lugnuts: A Hometown Economic Engine
Located in Lansing is the single-A level Lansing Lugnuts. The Lugnuts play at Cooley
Law School Stadium (originally Oldsmobile Park). The Lansing Lugnuts joined the Midwest
Baseball League (MiLB) in 1996 and constructed a new stadium at a cost of $12.8 million
establishing a stadium district.
According to notes from an interview with former mayor David Hollister about the
stadium project, the city wanted to renew itself and focused on three areas of redevelopment;
“Old Town,” Washington Square, and the site where Cooley Law School Stadium now sits. Of
all of the areas to focus on, the stadium district was of particular interest to the city, because it
contained several adult book stores and “velvet glove” types of businesses, and it was 3-4 blocks
from the capital (Hollister, 2011). The area lent itself to being a high crime area known for
illegal drug use and sales.
Although Mayor Hollister felt the city government lacked vision when he took office in
1993, he quickly provided his own. Shortly after Mayor Hollister took office the city finished a
new Capital Area Transit Authority (CATA) bus terminal downtown. The mayor points to this
achievement as a point at which the city started to work together and realized that they could
achieve something better. At about his time (1993-1994), Tom Dickson (then owner of a minorleague franchise in Springfield, IL) approached Mayor Hollister with an offer to relocate the
team to Lansing. Springfield refused to help build a new stadium for the team and they needed
to move (MiLB, 2012). Mayor Hollister agreed to the move with the conditions that the stadium
14
 

had to be built in the downtown area, it had to be family friendly, and it had to be multi-purpose,
“not just baseball.” Tom Dickson agreed to the conditions, and baseball was on its way to
Lansing. The City of Lansing used local labor to construct the stadium, local banks to finance
the project, and came in on time and on budget.
At the stadium’s groundbreaking in September of 1995, Mayor Hollister was quoted as
saying:

This is more than a baseball endeavor, we hope to change the culture of the city. By
opening Minor League Baseball two blocks from the Capitol, with most of the games
played in the evening and on weekends, when downtown is mostly vacant, we’re trying
to reverse the downward cycle.

Already property values around the stadium are going up, new restaurants are opening,
and businesses are beginning to extend their hours. We’ve galvanized the community and
created a sense of believing in itself again – that it can achieve an extraordinary goal
(Lansing Lugnuts).

The first game in the new stadium took place on April 3, 1996 between The University
of Michigan and Michigan State University’s baseball teams. The Lugnuts opened their first
game two days later and by the end of the season they had sold 538,326 tickets, and finished
fourth nationally in minor league baseball attendance (Lansing Lugnuts).
Cooley Law Stadium opened in 1996 in an area that, prior to redevelopment, had not
reached its full economic potential. Downtown Lansing showed the long, slow effects of
suburbanization and post-industrial decline. Like many Midwestern cities its size, Lansing
15
 

suffered high business turnover, vacant storefronts, and empty streets after 5p.m. Very few
individuals were thinking of downtown Lansing as a destination point for entertainment prior to
the Lugnuts locating in Lansing. In fact, in a discussion with a business owner in the area now
known as the stadium district, this entrepreneur told the story of coming to work one morning to
find a dead body in the entryway to their building. Prior to the building of the stadium, however,
this area had been lined with semi-vacant, outdated brick buildings that were not necessarily
desirable (Sport Lansing, May/June 2011). What was desirable about the property was that it is
located in the heart of downtown Lansing, three blocks east of Michigan’s state capitol. This
area of downtown Lansing where the Lugnuts have their stadium now draws crowds of up to 5,
000 people per game.
The businesses that surround the stadium shared in discussions that they felt the
presence of the stadium has helped to generate economic growth for Lansing, and most of them
felt that the stadium had increased the value of their business, either by increasing property
values or by increasing walk-by traffic and customer awareness. One business owner
specifically indicated that the stadium had made downtown more attractive and cleaner overall.
Generally, business owners felt that construction of the stadium has made the district safer, more
walkable, and better suited to business.

However, in talking with business owners in the stadium district, one of the common
problems with estimating the impacts of stadium construction was identified. Although owners
were in general very positive about the stadium, they often struggled to quantify that positive
impact in measureable terms, such as increases in sales during the baseball months. While many
16
 

of the businesses indicated busy months during the summer, they also indicated that they had
busy times in the winter as well, when baseball is clearly not in season and the stadium is closed.
Therefore, it was difficult for them to point the concrete evidence that the stadium had helped
their bottom line, even though they were uniformly positive about the impact. While the lack of
dead bodies in the entryway in the morning is certainly an improvement, it’s rather difficult to
quantify that in terms of economic growth.
Understanding the Impact of the Lugnuts Stadium on Lansing’s Economic Development
This study will examine whether or not building a stadium in Lansing, MI, has had a
positive economic impact on the surrounding parcels and businesses, as well as discuss whether
or not this is a positive redevelopment strategy for cities similar to Lansing. The study examines
the district of businesses and properties directly surrounding Cooley Law School stadium to see
if the economic development in adjacent areas around MLB stadiums can be scaled down to
minor league baseball stadiums. The question that this research attempts to answer is whether or
not the economic model that has worked for Major League Baseball stadiums and their
surrounding districts, will work to create stadium districts in comparatively smaller markets in
the Midwest? By examining the business district surrounding Cooley Law School Stadium this
study will determine whether or not seasonal economic growth model that has accompanied
MLB baseball stadiums is evident in Lansing.
One challenge that studies of the impact of stadium construction faces is identifying
appropriate anticipated outcomes and relevant and available measures of those outcomes. Below
is a table that maps some of the possible outcomes:

17
 

Table 2: Potential Measures for Assessing Impacts and Outcomes
Anticipated Factor or Outcome of

Possible Measures

Stadium Construction
Increased economic growth

Increase in tax base Æ state equalized
value
Increased sales in surrounding businesses
Increased development in surrounding
areas
Higher occupancy rates
Increased home ownership
Higher employment rates

Improved city culture

Higher rates of tourism
Stronger sense of community
Increased investment from
advertisers/marketing
Improved perceptions from residents
Spinoff cultural events

Improved safety and community health

Increased walkability
Lower crime rates
Lower obesity rates
Greater perception of safety

18
 

For this study, I tackle the issue of the appropriate outcome measure. Given the focus on
establishing the extent to which the construction of an MiLB baseball stadium may have been a
positive economic engine for Lansing, my theory is that when a community invests in something
like the Lugnuts stadium, they do so with the understanding that they may be able to recoup the
cost of that investment over time. The primary way this will happen is through an increase in the
tax base of the city, and in particular, the area surrounding the stadium, which will allow the
community to make back the money they invested in the stadium. A tangible measure of tax
base is the state equalized value (SEV) of properties in the city. Therefore, for this study, I focus
on increases and changes in SEV.
I also address the issue of what might have happened to the stadium district if there had
been no stadium construction. While it is not possible to reverse time and observe the stadium
district under both conditions (stadium and no stadium), it is possible to identify other similar
districts in the Lansing area and observe the changes in SEV in those areas as well. The two
locations chosen were Old Town and Reo Town. Both are near the downtown of Lansing. Old
Town provides an interesting counterpart as a neighborhood that has received substantial city,
state and federal investment, but where those investments did not include one major keystone
project, like the stadium. Reo Town provides the comparison to the Stadium District of a
neighborhood that was ostensibly part of Lansing’s redevelopment strategy, but which has not
received major investments like a stadium or like some of the developments that have gone into
Old Town. It is these comparisons that allow me to understand the unique impact of the stadium
construction on the stadium district, and to begin to understand potential alternate outcomes if
the stadium had not been constructed.

19
 

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH:
In order to understand the economic impact that Cooley Law School Stadium has on the
surrounding business district, this study focuses on the area of the stadium before its construction
and after its construction. To accurately describe the area at two different periods in time, I
employ a quantitative study that utilizes publicly available GIS data.. The GIS data is at the
parcel level for the properties surrounding Cooley Law stadium and includes a very detailed
property description. An example of a parcel level GIS information document is available in
Appendix D. After compiling GIS data on all of the properties in the business district
surrounding the stadium, two other business districts in Lansing were chosen and data was
gathered for them, as well. The two other Lansing business districts are referred to as “Old
Town, and “Reo Town,” named after R.E. Olds, the founder of Oldsmobile. Coincidentally,
these two areas were also a part of an overall reinvestment strategy for the city, along with the
stadium district.
In addition to the snapshot that the GIS data gives of the area before and after the stadium’s
construction, this study also used survey data of the business owners.1 Using multiple types of
information helps to triangulate findings, and understand not only economic impact as measured

                                                            
11

In the original study design, this was intended to be a mixed-method analysis, including both
the GIS data and interview data that would be used for the qualitative portion of the study.
However, after collecting the data and reflecting on sample size and range of responses, I
decided to use the survey results for contextual purposes only and to avoid trying to draw
inferences from those results. Some of the methods are still presented to explain how that
information was gathered; however the results and study now focus more specifically on the
results on change in SEV from the GIS data.
20
 

by state equalized value of parcels but also types of economic and other impacts that are less
easily detected in the GIS data alone.
Baseball stadiums are generally considered to be a valid engine for economic development.
If this is the case, the main type of evidence that will be available in this study is increases in the
tax base, as measured by positive changes in SEV, for the parcel surrounding the stadium. This
helps quantify the extent to which the community investment in the stadium is likely to be
recouped in property taxes, which is a concrete measure of economic growth. In the GIS data,
the first hypothesis is that there will be an increase in the state equalized value (SEV) of the
parcels immediately surrounding the stadium between pre-stadium construction and post-stadium
construction. If this hypothesis is correct, SEV will be higher post-stadium construction, and the
rates will also be highest in the stadium district, and lower in the other districts. The second
hypothesis in the study is that this increase in value will be greater than increases in value
detected in other similar parcels of land in other areas of Lansing. If true, the increases in tax
base (as measured by SEV) in the stadium district will be more dramatic than those in other
areas. This study involves primary data collection of GIS data. This data collection process
involved visiting the Ingham County Tax Assessors Office and hand-entering data on each of the
parcels identified for a period of nearly 20 years. After the data were collected, they were
analyzed using different techniques to compare pre-and post-stadium construction data. The fact
that these are completely new data is an added strength of this study, in that it utilizes innovative
and previously unused data to address this question and attempt to empirically establish the
potential economic effectiveness of stadium construction.

21
 

The remainder of this chapter will describe in greater detail the sample, data, and methods
utilized in this study, as well as the results and findings.
Sample
To test the first and second hypotheses, this study examined 26 properties in the Stadium
District, 30 properties in Old Town, and 29 on South Washington Avenue as areas of
comparison. I selected only profit-generating businesses in each zone, and attempted to collect
data on all of the possible parcels in the stadium district and comparable parcels in Old Town
and South Washington Ave. Since GIS data are available for each zone and each parcel, these
data allowed me to demonstrate any changes that have taken place since the stadium’s
construction. Again, I chose to focus specifically on SEV as a measure of the increase in the tax
base experienced by the various districts.
The parcel surrounding the stadium is the parcel under consideration, and where we would
expect the main impact of the stadium to be seen. However, in order to understand if any
improvements were related to the stadium or just generally the kind of economic development
happening throughout the Lansing area, it was necessary to identify a comparison group of
parcels. I chose the Old Town area, as it is a neighborhood that was similar to the Stadium
District prior to stadium construction. Both were areas of Lansing that had previously been nice
areas, but that had fallen into disrepair. Both have been the target of economic renewal
initiatives in the last twenty years, and both target a similar demographic of individuals to live
and work there. I also examined South Washington Avenue known as Reo Town, as that area is
the main business district of Lansing. Old Town and Reo Town were near or directly part of a
redevelopment grant in the early 1990s, which focused on these two areas and what is now
22
 

Cooley Law School Stadium. It was important to include these three areas in the study as they
were all recipients of an economic stimulus, and if there are significant differences in the stadium
district, it might be more strongly tied to the stadium.
To obtain contextual and historical information, I spoke with 12 business owners from the
area surrounding the stadium. The reason that I did not interview individuals at all 26 parcels in
the stadium district is that some individuals owned multiple properties in zone 1. For example,
one individual owns The Exchange, Omar’s, Tin Can, and Harem. This allowed me to get the
perspective of multiple businesses while speaking to one individual. Other businesses were not
retail outlets and didn’t really fit the study’s focus. The owners represented businesses including
bars and restaurants, coffee shops, motorcycle shops, a trade and loan store, auto parts store, a
real estate office, a bicycle shop, and the Radisson hotel. I identified these businesses by
walking the area immediately surrounding the stadium, taking care to ensure representation from
all different types of business in the area. The interview data allowed me to understand any
economic benefit of proximity to the stadium from the perspective of each business.
Data
GIS Data
The GIS data used in the study is from the Ingham County tax equalization website found at:
http://ingham-equalization.rsgis.msu.edu/viewer.htm. The Ingham County GIS map is an
invaluable resource for conducting parcel-level research in the Tri-County area. The GIS map
includes ownership information for each property in the county including, taxable, assessed,
SEV, land value, as well as information about past sales of the property, and photos of the

23
 

property, when available. Data for each property at this level of detail is the framework for this
study.
This study chose to focus on the SEV of each property, which the state of Michigan defines
as one half of a property’s true cash value. A true cash value is established when a property is
purchased. As property values in crease, SEV increases, making this an important variable to
use to describe the stadium’s impact on property values. Higher SEVs indicate that the tax base
of the area is also increasing, which in turn means the community is able to recoup greater
amounts of their investment. By looking at each parcel before and after stadium construction, it
can be determined whether or not building Cooley Stadium has had a positive economic impact.
The study used 1993 SEV in GIS data as a starting point, because it was before construction
of the stadium and because it was the closest year which was available. I also selected all of the
available years after construction, 1998, 1999, 2008, 2009 and 2010, for all of the zones.
The GIS data from each of the study areas was gathered from the Ingham County Tax and
Equalization map found online, for the tax years: 2008, 2009, and 2010(Ingham County, MI).
Property information for the tax years 1993, 1998, 1999 had to be gathered from the Lansing
City Assessors office on the 3rd floor of Lansing City Hall, due to records not being available
online, prior to 2008. The data that were collected from the assessors’ office were housed in
large volume books with each page representing a parcel. This process involved sitting at a desk
in the assessors’ office, searching through the volume for the parcel number, and recording the
results for each property’s SEV for the study years. To eliminate errors in recording the data by
hand, I rechecked each parcel year-by-year, before moving onto the next parcel. The staff in the
assessors’ office was helpful, but the historic data should be added to the current online system,
24
 

which houses the parcel data for 2008, 2009, and 2010. In nearly all cases, the parcel numbers in
the volumes matched the parcels found online, except several parcels where the stadium is now
located. These parcels were combined into one, to make the stadium and no longer existed, after
stadium construction.
Interview Data
The qualitative data are the results of an interview of business and land owners at each of the
parcels in the stadium area. These data represent a firsthand knowledge of the economic impact
that the stadium has on the surrounding businesses. I anticipate that these individuals probably
chose to locate their business near the stadium, in anticipation of reaping financial benefits.
Although not used to produce generalizable results, I provide a review of how these interview
data were gathered below to assist the reader in understanding the genesis of this information.
In order to gather these data, I created an interview protocol (included in Appendix B). This
interview protocol is designed to gather information from the business owners regarding the
economic impact they perceive the stadium has had on their business. The questions were openended, without any specific follow-up probes, and the interviews were unscheduled. Questions
addressed the business owners’ personal views of the stadium, whether or not they have noticed
increased economic activity as a result of the baseball season, and whether or not they have
experienced negative impacts. I recorded the answers of the business owners by hand.
Measures
To test the first hypothesis, the main measure used to investigate the economic impact of
stadium construction on economic development is the SEV for each year as well as for each
25
 

zone. In order to test the second hypothesis, the measure is the change rate of SEV for each year
which is calculated by dividing the SEV of the most recent year with the SEV from the previous
available year as well as for each zone.
Methods: Quantitative Data Analysis
First, I produced the descriptive analyses of SEV in each year for each zone. This provided
the overall means for each of the years, as well as giving an overall mean for all years, by zone.
To address the key question of interest, whether or not the stadium construction had a
positive impact on economic development, it is necessary to compare the pre-construction values
with the post-construction values, and to determine if they were significantly different and if so,
if they were higher or lower. To do this, I used paired t-test to compare the SEV in 1998 to that
in 1993 for the stadium zone. I also used paired t-test for all possible years and all zones to
identify trends over time and to compare the trends among zones. This allowed me to determine
if the value of each parcel’s SEV was significantly different from one year to the next. Next, I
compared the rate of SEV change for each study area against one another by using an
independent samples t-test. This method allows me to not only compare the change of each
property, but also helps me to understand if the parcel surrounding the stadium had higher
amounts of change than the other parcels, which would be evidence of the impact of the stadium
on economic development.

26
 

CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS
Analysis of the state equalized value of the parcels surrounding the stadium and
elsewhere in the city is summarized in Table 3 and Table 4, in order to compare mean SEV
values for parcels over time, as well as compare zone to zone (where Zone 1 is the Stadium
District, Zone 2 is Old Town Lansing, and Zone 3 is Washington Avenue in Reo Town).
Examining Trends over Time. To understand how the SEV changed in the Stadium
District over time, the mean SEV for a 15 year period is presented in Table 3 below.
Table 3: MEAN Sev in Three Parcels Over 15 Years
Zone
1

Zone 2

1993

2023175

1993

696800

1998

2802700

779525

0.3852979

1998

1096500

399700

0.5736223

1999

3675400

872700

0.3113783

1999

1210500

114000

0.1039672

2008

6196300 2520900

0.6858845

2008

2383600 1173100

0.9691037

2009

6576900

0.0614238

2009

2339700

-43900

-0.0184175

2010

5713100

-863800 -0.1313385

2010

1982300

-357400

-0.1527546

380600

 

27
 

Table 3: MEAN Sev in Three Parcels Over 15 Years (cont’d)
Zone
3
1993

4647878

1998

4872522

224644

0.0483326

1999

5424461

551939

0.1132758

2008

5460700

36239

0.0066807

2009

5331300

2010

4267400 -1063900 -0.1995573

-129400 -0.0236966

In 1993, which was pre-stadium construction, the mean SEV in the Stadium District
(Zone 1) was $2,023,175. In 1998, which is post-stadium construction (constructed in 1995, first
season in 1996), the mean SEV was higher, at $2,802,700, which is approximately an $800,000
increase, or 39%. A similar increase was noted for the same time period in Old Town (Zone 2),
from $696,800 to $1,096,500, or a 57% increase. However, in the following year (1998-1999),
the Stadium District demonstrated another 31% increase in mean SEV, while Old Town only
increased mean SEV by 10%. Reo Town (Zone 3) experienced a much more modest increase in
SEV, with only a 5% increase between 1998 and 1993, and an 11% increase between 1999 and
1998. Mean SEV by zone is demonstrated in Figure 2 below. These years immediately precede
and follow the construction of the stadium, and are therefore good measures of immediate impact
of stadium construction.

28
 

Figure 2: Mean SEV by Zone

Mean SEV by Zone
$7,000,000

Mean SEV Over Time

$6,000,000
$5,000,000
$4,000,000

Stadium

$3,000,000

Old Town
Reo Town

$2,000,000
$1,000,000
$0
1993

1998

1999

2008

2009

2010

The time period between 1999 and 2008, and then the rapid change experienced between
2008 and 2010 represents longer-term impacts of stadium construction, as well as other
economic factors and changes. The Stadium District experienced another large increase in mean
SEV between 1999 and 2008 (a 69% increase, from $3,675,400 to $6,196,300). Old Town
(Zone 2) also had a very dramatic increase—mean SEV increased by nearly 97%, and rose
nearly $1.2 million between 1999 and 2008. However, Reo Town, which was not given the
same development focus during this time period, barely increased mean SEV, with mean SEV
rising by less than 1% over the time period.
Between 2008 and 2010, however, Lansing (along with the rest of the world), was
significantly and importantly impacted by large-scale economic factors, including the housing
crisis and the global economic decline. Interestingly, between 2008 and 2009, the Stadium
29
 

District was the only zone studied not to experience a decrease in mean SEV, and actually
experienced a 6% increase, while both Old Town and Reo Town decreased by approximately
2%. Between 2009 and 2010, as the economic conditions worsened nationwide, all three zones
decreased mean SEV; however, the Stadium District had the smallest relative loss (13% decrease
in mean SEV), followed by Old Town (decreasing by 15%) and finally Reo Town (decrease of
19%). This change in SEV is demonstrated in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Percent Change in Mean SEV

Percent Change in Mean SEV
120%

Percent Change in SEV

100%
80%
60%

Stadium

40%

Old Town

20%

Reo Town

0%
‐20%

1998

1999

2008

2009

2010

‐40%

These findings suggest that, while the stadium did not fully immunize the surrounding parcel to
the pressures and effects of negative economic conditions, it did appear to mediate the impact
and losses to some extent, when compared to the other zones studied. As might be expected, the
Reo Town neighborhood—the neighborhood that lacked significant investments—experienced a
steady decline in SEV over the years studied. By contrast, the Stadium District and Old Town
30
 

both experienced positive increases and decreases. Old Town’s increases and decreases were
more volatile than the stadium district. One potential reason for this may be the fact that the
Stadium District included more than the stadium alone. The area is transforming into a true
entertainment and housing district, including apartments, restaurants, and other services. All of
these developments help extend the reach of the stadium construction beyond the benefit of the
stadium itself. Stadiums and other related construction projects may be more “recession-proof,”
as individuals continue to patronize both the stadium and surrounding businesses, even in
difficult economic times.
Although not directly studied in this analysis, a review of aerial maps of other MiLB
stadiums and findings from other developments suggests the importance of stadiums as part of a
larger district. One element of this is the location of stadiums near the downtown. Cooley Law
School Stadium was very intentionally located near downtown Lansing. Several other MiLB
stadiums, such as the Fort Wayne Tin Caps, are also located near downtown, while others are
located on the urban fringe. This impacts the extent to which the stadium can become part of a
district that includes housing, entertainment, shopping and business. In Lansing, there is a
definite Stadium District, and that district is growing. This may be a critical factor in the
success, because all of this related development also increases the tax base and therefore earns
the community tangible rewards for constructing a stadium and patronizing a hometown team.
Comparing the Rate of Change over Time Between Zones. Table 4 shows the change in
SEV over time within parcels, using a paired samples t-test. This table shows the change in SEV

31
 

between 1993, which is pre-stadium data, and 2008, a post-stadium date.2 In the Stadium
District (Zone 1), there was a 255% increase in the mean value of parcels, which was a
statistically significant increase (p >= .001). However, we see a larger increase in Old Town
(Zone 2), which had the mean SEV increase by 340% (p >=.001). Reo Town (Zone 3) saw the
lowest increase, with SEV barely increasing over a 15 year period, and this rate of increase was
not statistically significant. A visual demonstration of this change over time is in Figure 4
below.
Figure 4: Change in Mean SEV Over Time

                                                            
2

1993 was the first year for which complete data were available on the necessary parcels in the
Lansing assessor’s office. 2008 is a post-stadium construction year, and was chosen because it
directly preceded the housing market crash and worldwide economic downturn; data following
that year likely reflect factors far beyond the reach of the stadium’s influence. Analyses were
conducted using the post 2008 data to verify this hypothesis.
32

 

This suggests that property values increased in areas of Lansing where there were
specific community development efforts. Additionally, both Old Town and the Stadium District
received community development block grants from the federal government (Interview with
Mayor Hollister). These increases were not mirrored city-wide as Reo Town did not experience
an increase in SEV. One note on Old Town, however, is that mean property values were
substantially lower to begin; in the table below, note that the mean 1993 SEV for Old Town
(Zone 2) was $24,027, while the mean SEV for the Stadium District (Zone 1) was nearly
$70,000 higher. The ending property values are also much higher in the Stadium District. While
Old Town’s increase in mean SEV was statistically greater than the Stadium District’s mean
SEV, substantively, the increase in the Stadium District arguably represents greater value to the
city of Lansing.
Table 4: Change in SEV over time within parcels

Table 4
1993

2008 Increase rate

p-value

zone 1

91962.50

235222.73

2.557811361 -3.546563 0.001910

zone 2

24027.59

81931.03

3.409873708 -6.685160 0.000000

zone 3

165995.6429

187589.29

1.1300856 -1.014818 0.319201

33
 

t-value

CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the extent to which the construction of the
Cooley Law School Stadium and the integration of the Lansing Lugnuts MiLB baseball team
into Lansing had a positive economic impact on the area surrounding the stadium. I tested two
hypotheses—that state equalized value would be higher in the Stadium District after the
construction of the stadium and that the rates of change would be greater for the Stadium District
than other areas of town. I also asked neighboring business owners to reflect on the impact of
the stadium on their businesses. In general, I found reasonable support for each of these
hypotheses. The state equalized value of parcels in the Stadium District was generally higher
than that in comparable areas, and the rate of change suggested that the stadium construction had
an important impact on this area, and was potentially successful in increasing the property tax
base for that district. Additionally, interviews confirmed that the business owners in the district
surrounding the stadium generally were positive about the stadium. Although not all business
owners directly credited the stadium with their own profits or loss, they were uniformly positive
about the impact of the stadium on Lansing as a whole. Despite the fact that they were not able
to point to things like increased sale receipts or more employees hired, I was able to detect the
increase in SEV, which suggests that some measures, while good indicators of positive economic
change, are not necessarily identified by the neighborhood because they are more difficult to
observe.
This coincides with the general research on professional sports teams and venues and
their economic development. Studies find that there is a positive, sometime intangible, civic
pride in having a professional sports franchise and the related stadium in their municipality
34
 

(Carlino and Colson, 2004). Also, sports teams and stadiums help form a city’s brand identity
which helps with economic competition within cities (Carlino and Colson, 2004). This echoes
what I found in my interviews, which is that while the business owners can not always point in
their books to actual dollars made as a direct result of the Lugnuts stadium being adjacent to their
property, they do all agree the stadium makes the neighborhood more lively, cleaner, and a better
reflection on the city of Lansing overall. This may be one of the reasons why economic impact
of these types of developments can take longer to detect, because the impact is more diffuse at
the beginning.
In Lansing, however, it should be noted that there has been a large amount of
development in the stadium district, since its construction. Numerous restaurants and bars have
had successful businesses catering at least partly to baseball patrons. Bars and restaurants in the
area have also seemed to hit a critical mass, where the area is now a district for nightlife, even
during months of the year when baseball is not being played. One such business is the Nuthouse,
which opened in 1996, the same year that the Lugnuts moved to Lansing. The Nuthouse has
become synonymous with the Lugnuts.
While the Nuthouse has the corner on the market for pregame burgers and drinks, Pat
Gillespie is one individual who has been largely responsible for the vision of redeveloping the
entire area. In 2008, Pat opened the Stadium District apartments, which is a $12 million dollar
development directly adjacent to Cooley Law School stadium (Stadium District Apartments).
This building includes first floor retail space, office space, and apartments and condominiums on
the upper floors. This single building has truly changed the face of downtown Lansing as much
as any other, in the author’s opinion, and helps make a gateway to the state capital. Prior to
35
 

construction of the Stadium District apartments, this parcel was a vacant lot that was primarily
only used for parking.
Another development directly to the west of the ballpark is the Lansing City Market,
completed in 2010 also by Mr. Gillespie. The Lansing City Market had been located across
Cedar St. from the stadium parcel since 1909. Through all of the changes in the city and the
neighborhood, the market stayed open in one building. The redevelopment of the Lansing City
Market was a heated political issue in the Lansing area in 2008-2009 with many residents
wanting to keep the existing structure, due to its historical significance. Eventually, it was
decided that the structure would be demolished and would be replaced by a new $1.5 million
facility (Hogan, 2012). The new city market facility opened in spring 2010 and has been a
success for Lansing.
In addition to the two completed projects by Mr. Gillespie, the Accident Fund Insurance
company bough the vacant Lansing Board of Water and Light Ottawa St. power station and
renovated the building for its headquarters. The Ottawa St. power station was built in 1939 and
was decommissioned by the City of Lansing in 1992 (The Christman Company). Since that
time, the building has been the source of redevelopment discussions, but had remained vacant
since 2001. In April 2011, the $182 million dollar renovation of the 332,000 sq. ft. building was
completed by the Christman Company.
According to the company website, the completed office can house up to 1,200
employees (The Christman Company). Within the past year the building has won numerous
green design and historic preservation awards. The Ottawa St. power station project is within the
study area to the west of the Lansing City Market and across the Grand River from the baseball
36
 

stadium. While it is difficult to determine the degree to which the Ottawa St. power station
project was based on its proximity to the stadium, it does show that large-scale capital
investment in this area continues.
Mr. Gillespie had also planned a development directly north of the baseball stadium that
was to be called Ballpark North. This project was planned to cost around $25 million and would
have been a mixed-use project with office, commercial, and residential spaces overlooking
Cooley Law School stadium’s outfield (City of Lansing). This project seems to be on hold for
the moment, likely due to the change in the larger economy, however, if completed it would add
significantly to the district. Even without completion of the Ballpark North project, Mr.
Gillespie’s contributions to the stadium district have been enormous.
The placement of the stadium matters as well. Within this new trend in the MLB,
stadiums are located in downtowns (near waterfronts, in densely settled areas), as opposed to in
the suburbs where land is cheaper. Two examples of this type of a MiLB stadium construction
that follow an older model of locating stadiums in the suburban fringe are the West Michigan
Whitecaps (outside of Grand Rapids) and the Great Lakes Loons (in Midland). While both
franchises appear to be reasonably successful in terms of fan base and ticket sales, they are not
able to stimulate downtown economic development simply because they are not located there.
They have likely not witnessed the same larger returns on their investment that Lansing has
because they are located in such remote areas.
Conversely, an example of a franchise that has followed the Lansing model is the Fort
Wayne Tincaps, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. They are located in the downtown area, and they are in
the process of using the stadium to revitalize their downtown. This year, the city has purchased
37
 

dilapidated houses surrounding the stadium and is demolishing them, in order to put up nicer
residential housing (like the Stadium District housing in Lansing) as well as other types of
business (personal correspondence, Austin Allen, 2012). Within the MiLB, there is a divergence
in location of stadiums and the extent to which they are standalone developments or anchor
developments as part of a larger urban redevelopment scheme. Further studies should compare
the impact of stadiums in both contexts.
Limitations
While there are substantial studies on MLB stadiums and other large-events, there do not
appear to be many studies that focus on single-A baseball stadiums or other Minor League
baseball stadiums. This study provides an important look at one baseball stadium in a postindustrial community, and leverages new data on state equalized value and first-hand interviews.
However, a more extensive study should be done that compares stadiums located in downtowns
across multiple contexts with each other, as well as with stadiums located in the suburbs.
Additional data from more parcels could also be gathered. Finally, more interviews with a
greater diversity of respondents could be useful in further leveraging the qualitative impact of
these stadiums. Particularly given the fact that some of the benefit may be longer-term or harder
to quantify in direct economic terms, a more extensive use of interviews may be warranted in
future studies. It may also be important to quantify economic growth using other outcome
measures aside from SEV, to see if other types of economic development can be detected.
Conclusions
In conclusion, I feel that the construction of Cooley Law School Stadium in Lansing has
made a significant impact on the city in two ways. First, the neighborhood or district level
38
 

shows that the Lugnut’s have help create a sense of nightlife and entertainment that has been
lacking from downtown Lansing. The business owners in the surrounding district are unanimous
in their praise for what the stadium has done for the district. However, as is clear in the literature
as well, the tangible economic benefits are hard to decipher. That is to say, that while business
owners credit the stadium for creating a district, they can rarely point to a bottom line in their
bank ledgers that says “Lugnut’s.”
The second way that the stadium has helped the city is in the area of civic pride. Prior to
the Lugnut’s, Lansing had only had one semi-professional sports team, which was the Lansing
Capital’s ice hockey team. Similarly to what Carlino and Colson, 2004 found, the Lugnut’s have
given the city a sense of identity which, in addition to a nightlife district, was also missing from
the city. Now, people wear Lugnut’s hats and T-shirts and support the team by attending games.
This is a neighborhood that is much different than it was in the early 1990s, and the Lugnut’s,
Mayor Hollister, Pat Gillespie, and countless other individuals can claim some of the credit.

39
 

 
 
 
 
 

APPENDIX A: MAP OF PARCELS SURVEYED

40
 

APPENDIX A: MAP OF PARCELS SURVEYED
FIGURE 5: PARCELS IN STUDY

-Parcels and businesses surveyed in red.
For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other figures, the reader is referred to
the electronic version of this thesis.

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APPENDIX B: COPY OF THE SURVEY USED FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

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APPENDIX B: BUSINESS SURVEY
Name:
Business:
Address:
1. How long have you been in business at this location?
If after Lugnuts stadium was in existence, how much did locating the business near
the stadium affect your decision to locate here?
2. Why did you choose to locate your business at this location? (convenience, etc)
3. What was the land use in this location before your business? (circle one)
Empty

Different business

Similar business

Unsure

4. What are your highest sales months throughout the year?
5. Does your business see an increase in sales during the Lansing Lugnuts baseball season?
If yes, what is the extent of the sales increase? (circle one)
Slight

Moderate

Significant

6. What degree do you think the Lugnuts contribute to the increase in sales? (circle one)
Slight

Moderate

Significant

7. During the past year, what percent did your business increase, decrease, or stay the same,
compared to 2009?
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Increase ____ ____%
Decrease________%
8. In your view, has being located near the Lansing Lugnut’s stadium increased the value of
your business?
In what ways?
9. How has the value of your business changed since the construction of the Lugnut’s
stadium? (circle one)
Increase

No change

Decrease

10. Do you offer any game day incentives, such as bring a Lugnuts ticket and receive $ off a
purchase?
11. From the perspective of a business owner, are there any challenges or downsides to
owning a business in the near vicinity of the stadium?
12. In your view, does constructing a baseball stadium in a city like Lansing generate
economic growth in the surrounding district? (circle one)
Yes

No

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APPENDIX C: MAP OF THE PARCELS USED IN CALCULATING GIS DATA

45
 

APPENDIX C: PARCEL MAPS
FIGURE 6: PARCEL MAPS

-Zone #1: Michigan Ave, Lansing, “The Stadium District”

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Figure 7: Zone 2 Parcels

-Zone #2: Grand River Ave, Lansing, “Old Town”

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Figure 8: Zone 3 Parcels

-Zone #3: Washington Ave, Lansing, south of I-496.

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