AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE NATURE OF ARTISTIC INSPIRATION

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE

Donna Louise Parsons

1955

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

An Inquiry Concerning the Nature of Artistic Inspiration

presented by

Donna Louise Parsons

has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for

A. degree in Philosophy

Henry S. Leonard

Major professor

Date May 26, 1955

AN INQUIRY

CONCERNING THE NATURE OF ARTISTIC INSPIRATION

AN INQUIRY

CONCERNING THE NATURE OF ARTISTIC INSPIRATION

by

Donna Louise Parsons

A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan State College of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Philosophy

1955

AN ABSTRACT

This study concerning inspiration, the psychological phenomenon underlying artistic creation, was undertaken for the purpose of gaining some insight into the creative activity of the artist. The method employed, while essentially that of a psychological survey, was not aimed at the formulation of statistical data, but rather at a meaningful synthesis of widely varying interpretations of the subject here under consideration --- theories proposed by philosophers, psychologists, and artists in the different media. The necessity of this approach lies partly in the recalcitrance of the subject matter to admit of any purely 'objective' solution, as we shall see during the course of the inquiry; furthermore, it was believed that only through such a multiple-aspect approach could a just evaluation of the various positions be attained.

The inquiry may be divided into two sections: (1)historical-philosophical, and (2)analytical-psychological. In the first part we shall consider the views of inspiration prevalent in the different periods of history: the view of inspiration as of supernatural origin, bringing with it a revelation of the Divine, as Plato and the ancients believed; the view of inspiration as inessential, a fanciful flight of the imagination detrimental to the production of art works by rational means, as Sir Joshua Reynolds and the Academists held; the theory of inspiration as

insight into truth, generally having some philosophical import, --- the position held by Immanuel Kant and his idealistic successors; the view of inspiration as an intuitive grasp of the inner essence of an object or issue, as Benedetto Croce and Henri Bergson thought; all these theories, each in its own time, has been influential in the history of aesthetics.

In the second section the psychoanalytic theories regarding the motivation behind artistic creation, along with Freud's study of Leonardo da Vinci, will receive some attention. This will be followed by an examination of artists' own descriptions of their states of 'inspiration', and of the degree of 'methodicalness' or 'spontaneity' peculiar to certain individual artists, such as Beethoven, Leonardo, Tchaikovsky, Mozart, and others. Finally, an attempt will be made to formulate some tentative conclusions, and to suggest some further implications of the view of inspiration supported by this thesis.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor John F. A. Taylor, under whose guidance this study was carried out. Without his constant encouragement and many valuable suggestions, both as to form and content, this thesis could not have been completed.

I would like also to express my sincere appreciation to Professor John M. DeHaan, whose lectures on Aesthetics, the first philosophical lectures I attended, were truly an inspiration in themselves.

And I want to thank Professor Henry S. Leonard for his fine assistance in the later stages of preparation of this thesis.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

ON METHOD

The study of the psychological aspect of Aesthetics is as enthralling as it is difficult. Lying within the domains of both psychology and axiology, it is to some extent a part of neither, but as it were, an alien territory, a formidable wilderness between the two. And here in this labyrinth of darkness, the Mind in its age-old 'quest for certainty' is confronted with seemingly insuperable obstacles which forbode the premature end of its inquiry. And the Mind once again is a stranger outside the gates of what should be its own province --- the Realm of Truth.

And yet this strange predicament in which the search seems to terminate is paradoxically its point of origin; --- just as one who is lost in a forest at night during a storm may, if he does not despair, witness a manifestation of power and majesty of overwhelming intensity such as would have been withheld from him had he passed through the woods on a sunlit afternoon, following a series of familiar landmarks leading to his destination. In the latter instance he would have been largely oblivious of the nature that fleetingly surrounded him; in the former, he is, in the moment of becoming acutely aware of that nature, one with

it --- one with the night and the storm and the roaring crescendo of blind fury that resounds about him.

In like manner, the quest for truth must have its initial impetus and continuing motivation in what is essentially an emotional experience --- the fervent desire to know. Disinterested speculation lacks the power to overcome the obstacles that present themselves along the way; intellectual apathy ends in either nonchalant agnosticism or what is worse, dogmatic skepticism.

On the other hand, it should be acknowledged at the outset of an inquiry of this nature that no method yet devised is without specific limitations. The emotional element, if allowed to run rampant, would result in a naive subjectivism, which even if true, would, like the mystical experience, remain forever incommunicable; the intellectual factor, with its predilection for scientific formulae capable of logical or empirical demonstration, would likewise be at a loss to deal with certain phases of the subject which lie beyond the scope of scientific psychology proper.

For example, how would one set out to determine a psychological measurement of artistic inspiration? By the value of the work of art it creates? But this could be validated from a psychological point of view only if we should assume the equivalence of widely-varying standards of taste; but such a

shifting of the artistic standard would tend to refute the possibility of <u>any</u> standard of excellence and thus nullify the results purported to have been attained by measurement. But if on the other hand, we postulate the existence of <u>objective</u> criteria as determinants of artistic worth, and of an absolute standard in no way dependent upon individual tastes, we have taken recourse to a branch of study that belongs not within the sphere of Psychology at all, but within that of Philosophy.

And yet despite this inapplicability of psychological measurement to artistic inspiration and insight, the fact remains that the creative activity of the artist is essentially a mental phenomenon. That is, the whole act of creation from the inception of the idea through its development into an artistically expressive form (excluding the manipulation of its purely material structure, which often consists of mere trained technical facility) is from its beginning to its culmination a continuous psychological process.

Hence we are faced with the necessity of admitting to our inquiry two seemingly contradictory approaches --- the objective and the subjective; and like those medieval philosophers who refused to assert the primacy of either reason or revelation, but firmly held to both, we are presented the task of somehow resolving the apparent inconsistencies involved in these two sources of authority. It may be that human finitude is the

cause of our reading into their claims for validity a certain discrepancy....we cannot perceive the point at which the chasm between the two is bridged. Truth may indeed be one, but perhaps there are several parallel roads leading to that unity.

Having begun our investigation with an examination of the difficulties to be encountered in the study of the nature of artistic inspiration, it would be well to consider next the method of procedure and to note the further limitations which may be imposed on and by the procedure. From that vantage point we shall be better able to recognize and define the aims we may reasonably hope to attain in this present course of inquiry.

The question of method evokes a number of problems which are not to be disregarded. First, there is the danger that one of the various interpretations concerning the nature of the subject may come to the fore defending its position with such vehemence as to detract from the import of any views to the contrary that the others have proposed or may later venture to suggest. In extreme cases this can result in the complete annihilation of all opposition. Tyranny is ever prevalent in the war of ideas. This is particularly true in those instances where the subject is of a type that exhibits both highly controversial possibilities and no common frame of reference by which to judge the arguments that arise. Even in science, the most 'objective' branch of knowledge (indeed, the whole 'tree',

some may insist) there is still a certain amount of disputation going on as to the comparative reliability of different methods of hypothesis-verification. And if this be the case in science, what may we hope to achieve in the way of unanimous agreement in such 'non-scientific' fields as human values? The problem is a very real one, of which the twentieth century is bringing an ever more deepening awareness. We witness not only a war of ideas, but a war of ideals as well. As to what will eventually emerge from this conflict, we may only speculate, and hope....

So much for the first problem involved in the method of procedure. The second, very closely related to it, perhaps even a part of it, is the difficulty posed by the personal or 'individualistic' element. For just as every work of art is, as Zola writes, "nature seen through a temperament", so too every man becomes imbued with the eloquence of a dramatic actor when called upon to defend a position that is both near and dear to his heart. This 'individualistic' element is an inevitable stumbling-block. The best we can do is to seek to partially circumvent it by presenting with greater forcefulness those arguments which run alien to our own orientation. This intellectual ambivalence, while disconcerting at first, yields a rich harvest in the end, and its value both intrinsic and extrinsic may well be inestimable.

A third problem is created by man's innate tendency toward what might be termed "the construction of bridges out into space". In his quest for understanding --- that is, for passing from the known to the unknown, man invariably seeks to erect some structure, by means of which he might easily go from the one over to the other. In scientific terminology this is known as the process of hypothesis-formation; in everyday life it is the following-up of a "hunch"; in philosophy it is philosophical speculation --- hence the age-old love of metaphysics, which would illumine our minds to the ultimate end of all quests --- the Absolute.

These are but three of the more obvious difficulties with which we shall have to contend; no doubt, many more will come to light during the course of the inquiry.

As for the method itself, we shall approach the problem of artistic creation first of all from the historical-philosophical viewpoint and secondly from its analytical-psychological aspect, taking as our guide not statistical data, but rather the theories of genius and inspiration that have emerged in the course of time --- conceived by philosophers, psychologists, and artists themselves. The necessity of such an approach lies partly in the recalcitrance of the subject matter to admit of psychological measurement --- hence, of any "purely objective" treatment. It is true that in recent years much investigation and experiment-

ation have been carried on in psychological aesthetics, and tests have been devised which endeavor to determine one's aptitude for achievement in the various artistic media. Certainly one ought not to underestimate the great contributions such studies have made to aesthetic inquiry; nor should one evaluate them solely on the basis of what they have accomplished up to the present, without taking into consideration their potentialities for further contributions in the future, as their methods and measuring devices are improved.

No derogatory implication is intended therefore when we state that these psychological tests of artistic ability beg the question which is here at issue. They cannot do otherwise; for progress in any science is possible only within the framework of a given set of presuppositions that form a coherent system. We may demand of any science that it be not inconsistent with other sciences accepted as valid areas of inquiry; its status as a science demands that it be consistent with itself. We perceive a new difficulty in the moment we realize that a proposed solution to a problem in any field of study, such as psychological aesthetics, for example, may exhibit both these characteristics, i.e. self-consistency and lack of inconsistency with previously accepted data, without necessarily providing us with an adequate explanation of a given subject matter. For just as a dictionary is circuitous in that it defines terms by

means of other terms which in turn require still further definition in the same language, so too each science forms a system within itself; and in this essential feature lies both its strength and its weakness.

The limitation (if such it may be called) of the psychological tests here referred to is that they presuppose that which they set out to prove. For example, in relegating the concept of genius to a statistical position on a curve of distribution of intelligence (which in itself has been based on earlier measurements) the psychological statistician defines genius in terms of precisely this statistical position. Should one question the validity of the measuring device used to obtain the curve of distribution, further investigation could decide the issue as to whether or not it had been accurately established originally; should one, however, undertake to doubt the concept of genius employed by the statistician, he would immediately be obliged to formulate one of his own, which in its turn would require its own corroboration by observable, relevant data. In the same way, tests of artistic aptitude such as the Seashore measures of musical talent, for example, rest upon certain fundamental assumptions as to what constitutes aptitude in a particular art medium. If capacity for achievement in music is equivalent to one's power of aural discrimination --- the acuity of which may be objectively determined by means of finely grad-

uated tonal differences scientifically produced --- then beyond a doubt such talent is "measurable" in the strictest sense of the word. But let it be suggested that the relationship between the two is one of correlation rather than equivalence, that factors other than the aural must in the last analysis enter in to determine musicality, and at once a problem arises --- that of ascertaining the significance of the 'results' obtained. The test is subject to "proof"; that which is tested submits itself only to judgment.

This is not to say that all judgments are equally reliable; it is but to say that the validity of a test lies in its ability to measure what it purports to measure and in this alone. More we cannot require of it. Herein lies its hypothetical character: If its initial assumptions be true, and if its method be both accurate and adequate, then the conclusions must be assumed to be reliable, since they follow from these premises.

We have already noted the inapplicability of any such direct mode of measurement to the subject of artistic inspiration. The closest approach to an objective evaluation of the creative power of any given artist is to be gained only indirectly --- through a study of those art works of which that particular creativity was productive. And having entered into the sphere of aesthetic judgment we no longer tread on strictly psychological ground. For we are immediately faced with the need to state

and substantiate the criteria of our judgment, and this of necessity involves certain non-psychological factors. Our method is no longer "purely" objective, but has passed over into that relative objectivity to which every scientific inquiry is subject by reason of its ultimate foundation upon a set of postulates that must remain 'unproved'.

And yet despite this recalcitrance of the subject matter to admit of psychological measurement, one discovers the indispensableness of a psychological approach --- or we might qualify it thus, a psychological-philosophical approach --- for we have seen how aesthetic judgment must play an important role. For artistic ideas do not exist in isolation, but only in the mind of the artistically-inclined individual and later in the mind of the sensitive critic who observes the finished product; such ideas can be understood and evaluated only in context with their psychological import. To eliminate this element, "subjective" though it be, is to render void not only the particular aesthetic ideas themselves, but the whole concept of artistic creation, and to remove them from that fabric in which alone they can find meaning.

Thus, while this approach would appear, at least theoretically to result in the denial of the subjective element, in actuality (fortunately or unfortunately, depending upon one's point of view) it does no such thing. In the first place, the psychological and

philosophical theories to be discussed here were at their times of formulation excellent examples of "bridges out into space"; some of them, constructed by such master architects as Immanuel Kant, Sigmund Freud, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, have endured despite the periodical or even incessant avalanche of criticism hurled against them. These brilliant monumental structures bear testimony to the fact that the subjective element in knowledge (i.e. that which defies "proof") need not be, indeed, is not merely an ingenious device based on man's finitude, but rather, a mirror reflecting his inherent nobility.

Let us therefore begin our inquiry with a study of the major historical theories of artistic inspiration.

CHAPTER II

THE MEDIATORY ROLE OF THE ARTIST

Inspiration, the psychological phenomenon underlying artistic creation, may well be called 'the aesthetic mystery of the ages'. Ever since men first began to contemplate beauty in art and to speculate on its essence and origin, the compelling force behind its coming into being has been a subject shrouded in darkness.

There is in man a sense sympathetically responsive to that which he is unable to comprehend. He is alternately drawn to and repulsed by what he cannot understand. At times his primitive instinct to fear the unknown has led him to avoid it at all costs --- we witness this in the morbid dread of objects of taboo among modern primitives who will risk death rather than come into contact with 'the forbidden'; more often, however, this peculiar ambivalence has resulted in a form of religious awe or deification of the uncomprehended. It became invested with various supernatural powers which man might invoke for succour in times of trouble or danger. The object during this process generally underwent personification as well as deification, and there evolved those attitudes today referred to as animism, totemism, and the so-called 'mana reaction'.

Hence, it was almost inevitable that man with his peculiar tendency toward 'anthropomorphization' should ascribe to the force behind artistic activity a certain super-human divinity --- a genie who was said to inspire or 'breathe into' a few chosen ones the sacred mysteries, the secrets of the gods. This idea was prevalent as late in mankind's history as the Golden Age of Greece, when we find Plato speaking of the "divine madness of poets": "The poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired.... For not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine;"[1] and elsewhere in the Ion we read: "The gift which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but an inspiration: there is a divinity moving in you."[2]

By the time of Plato the concept of the 'genie' had undergone a transformation, which may perhaps have consisted of little more than a change of terminology. Here in the days of ancient Greece, mention is made of the Muses as divine instigators of creative activity. There is however at least one fundamental distinction between the two concepts --- that whereas the genie was envisaged as a largely personal guardian or tutelary divinity of the individual poet, the Muses were responsible for the larger spheres of the arts themselves. The actual process, however, remained the same --- the Divine spoke to men through a human mediator, the artist.

This attitude toward inspiration as an animating force or power transcending any mere human faculty, in which the artist fulfilled the role of passive mediator, was largely responsible for the veneration of the poet, Homer. True, he ascribed to the gods certain qualities which in man would appear contemptibly base, but nevertheless his words were not to be questioned, nor to be taken lightly. For when he spoke as an oracle of the gods, he spoke with divine authority, and his statements were therefore infallible, regardless of how corrupt such views might appear to the "just man" who sought temperance in all things.

Homer is here mentioned because there is in the Greek attitude toward him an unmistakable incongruity. It is true that the Greeks conceived of the gods of Mt. Olympus as titans, or "human beings writ large", who were to some extent subject to the same judgments of fate as men. But nevertheless, that mankind was exhorted to seek wisdom, justice, and the 'golden mean' is somewhat inconsistent with the notion of its gods as sinning against this mean. They could hardly be regarded as exemplary figures. It is not difficult in the light of this to understand the wisdom of the Greek doctrine of 'man, the measure of all things'.

There is, of course, something not to be overlooked in the attempt to resolve this incongruity in the Greek attitude, and that is the variety of religious trends. The uneducated masses had their Dionysian rites and orgies; but aside from this, there

are to be found in the writings of certain of the philosophers and "wise men", notably Plato himself, traces of a religious view of a suspiciously monotheistic cast. Thus, in the Timaeus we see references to a Demiurge or Divine Architect who fashioned the world after the pattern of the ideal Forms, hampered by the principle of matter. Plotinus too, in certain mystical treatises ascribed to him, speaks of the Divine, implying a singularity rather than a multiplicity of forms of divinity. It may be that these and others among the ancient Greeks who had looked into "the nature of things" were filled with a conviction of the reality of only monotheism or polytheism, but were forced for various reasons --- perhaps to render their outlook consistent, or perhaps to remain in keeping with the predominant spirit of their time, to give at least 'lip-service' to the other.

Plato's well-known reminiscence theory, which conceives of the soul as in a previous existence having witnessed the beautiful world of Ideals, bears a resemblance to the poetic insight into the beautiful and the true. We note this particularly in the Symposium, which so eloquently describes the mystical ascent of the soul through the various stages of the perception of, and love for, the beautiful. "He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty...a nature not

fair in one point of view and foul in another...but beauty, absolute, separate, simple and everlasting, which is... imparted to the ever growing and perishing beauties of all other things."[3]

There is, to be sure, a sense in which Plato did not intend this ascent to be interpreted as applicable to poetic vision. Plato is torn between scorn for the artist on the one hand and extreme admiration of him on the other. His own artistic nature enables him to argue with fiery eloquence from either point of view, paradoxically. He seldom completely abandons himself to unqualified eulogies of the poet, and in those rare instances where he does so, he cannot refrain from making references to the poet's pathological character. Poetic madness may indeed be divine, he says in effect, but it <u>is</u> none the less madness. The progressive ascent to ideal beauty "in due order and succession" is more the journey of the philosopher, who leads a contemplative life, than of the frenzied poet who in a moment of intense emotion expounds truths beyond his own comprehension.

We encounter in Plato as well as so frequently elsewhere a segregation of the emotions and the intellect, with the assertion or at least implication that these two polarities can never be reconciled. The one always appears virtually to exclude the other. Of the two, the former is by far the more to be guarded against. Emotion constitutes the uninhibited side of man's nature --- "the many-headed monster", which would make of him a

slave and then consume him. The poet in the state of emotional exaltation generally associated with 'inspiration' comes under the sway of the passions to the utmost degree. The impulse to create casts over him a spell, and under its influence his intellect and will are powerless to take the reins; as Shelley writes in his "Defence of Poetry":

> Poetry is not like reasoning a power to be excited according to the determination of the will. A man cannot say, "I will compose poetry." The greatest poet even cannot say it; for the mind in creation is as a fading coal which some invisible influence awakens to transitory brightness; this power arises from within; like the color of a flower which fades and changes as it is developed, and the conscious portions of our nature are unprophetic either of its approach or its departure.[4]

The element of spontaneity, the apparent lack of conscious deliberation, is almost universally ascribed to the process of inspiration. We shall consider some apparent exceptions to this later on, in a discussion of methodical versus spontaneous artistic creation; but even there we shall find no actual contradiction of this principle, since so-called 'methodical' artistic creation, if it be the work of genius, is capable of explanation according to the theory of "extended dormant inspiration". Suffice it for now to conclude that a certain degree of spontaneity is a primary factor in all artistic 'inspiration'.

It has been shown that inspiration in antiquity was set in a

supernatural perspective. It had about it the character of a revelation or a prophecy, the poet being the vessel or instrument. This view was influential and quite commonly accepted up until the latter half of the eighteenth century, when man's newly-discovered instrument of knowledge, Science, began to assert itself. More recently, the advent of 'depth psychology' with its theory of the subconscious has done much to displace, and all but overthrow, the view of inspiration as revelation. Some still cling to a version of this theme at the present time, interspersed with scientific variations. Evidence, however, is to be found which substantiates the existence of a relatively pure form of it even as late as the time when Nietzsche was writing:

> If one had the least vestige of superstition one could hardly refrain from supposing himself to be merely the incarnation, merely the mouthpiece, merely the medium of higher forces. It merely states the facts to say that one has revelation in the sense that suddenly with ineffable certainty and precision something becomes visible and audible that shakes one's soul to its foundations. One hears, one does not search; one receives, one does not ask who gives; like lightning an idea flashes out, appearing as something necessary, without any hesitation as to form --- "I never had a choice."[5]

But one need not subscribe to the theory of inspiration as divine revelation to realize that there is that quality in it which seems to defy explanation by the psychological laws assumed to be operative in 'ordinary' thought processes. The principle

of causality is applicable to the mental plane as well as to the physical. Every idea tends to call forth another, which by reason of some property of relatedness directly follows it in the train of association.

But what are we to say of artistic inspiration, which often appears to be without any such 'preparatory' series of ideas --- and which generally departs all too soon, taking with it the clarity of insight that betokened its presence? Here even any mental preliminaries or expectation seem unnecessary. The biographies of artists are filled with narratives of instances when in the course of an evening's stroll a sudden flash from out of nowhere struck them, carrying with it the conviction that if it could but find expression, it would immortalize that moment. Of such an occurrence A. E. Housman, for example, writes,

> As I went along, thinking of nothing in particular, there would flow into my mind with sudden and unaccountable emotion, sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole stanza at once, accompanied, not preceded by, a vague notion of the whole.[6]

But besides this apparent isolation of 'inspired' ideas, there is to be found in the works of art created under their influence an unusual degree of comprehensive relatedness. The artist in giving concrete form to these ideas perceives minute connections and relations among the individual parts, so that

the expression of the whole in some way illuminates each of its constituents. Relations heretofore passed unnoticed suddenly take on great meaning, and it is this bond of meaning that unites artistic fragments, making of them a complete work of art --- a true expression of artistic inspiration.

Since there is a peculiar ambiguity in popular parlance over the different meanings of inspiration, let us now attempt to distinguish between two of the more common uses of the word. There is the connotation employed in the discussion of the 'revelation theory' --- namely, insight; and this is in accord with the modern concept of artistic inspiration, where it is believed to be a necessary factor, a prime requisite behind the production of works of art. The two theories differ, however, in one very important respect: that whereas the former is a passive insight imparted to the consciousness of the artist, senkrecht von oben, so to speak, the latter is an active insight wherein the artist is no mere mediatory instrument but contains within himself the source of that insight.

There is another usage of the word 'inspiration' --- the sense in which a person, place, or object is said to evoke an emotional or intellectual inclination in the artistic individual to commemorate it in art. Thus, the composer writes for his beloved,

O danke nicht fur diese Lieder,
Mir ziemt es dankbar Dir zu sein;
Du gabst sie mir, ich gebe wieder
Was jetzt und einst und ewig Dein.
Dein sind sie alle ja gewesen.
Aus Deiner lieben Augen Licht
Hab' ich sie treulich abgelesen,
Kennst Du die eignen Lieder nicht?[7]

It is in this same sense that Napoleon Bonaparte may be said to have been the inspiration of the Eroica Symphony. This type of 'inspiration' may endure unto the grave, or may vanish when 'the pale grey dawn of reason' once again appears on the horizon, or when the conflicts of life interfere. We do not know whether the tender sentiment that called forth the composer's "Widmung" lasted or not --- we like to think so; but we do know that in the case of the Eroica, Beethoven, with his faith in Napoleon shattered and his admiration for him gone, is said to have torn out the title page bearing the dedication and to have written on the score the inscription, "In memory of a great man" --- with the funeral march of the second movement providing an ironic touch of humor not originally intended.

This form of inspiration has beyond doubt exerted a tremendous influence on the creation of many great works of art, and it would be interesting to undertake a survey with the purpose of gaining some insight into its scope.

Nevertheless, the present inquiry will be confined to the first meaning ascribed to inspiration, which may be called 'general' or 'abstract' inspiration, in as much as it is derivative from the total psychical being of the artist, both past and

present, since it involves memory as well as association and integration. In the uniting of these three by means of artistic insight there is formed in the present consciousness of the artist a mood or momentary state of intuitive creativity wherein certain elements from past perception and introspection are called forth, or 'abstracted' from his psychical history in order to find expression in a work of art.

The other type of inspiration, of which Napoleon in the case of the Eroica is an example, might be called 'particular' or 'concrete' inspiration --- a source of an artistic idea embodied in a particular feature of the objective or imaginary world. The inclusion of 'imaginary' is important, for great works of art have been produced that were based on non-existent entities --- as for example, the ancient sculpturing of centaurs, and the various mythical beings and monsters inhabiting many literary productions. Modern art too may have 'concrete inspiration' deprived of actual existence in the world of fact --- namely, certain shapes and colors lacking an organization corresponding to an occurrence in 'the world of objective reality'.

Perhaps the best means of distinguishing the one from the other is to say simply that 'concrete inspiration' refers to the object that inspires, while 'abstract inspiration' refers to the psychological state or process itself. It is with this latter as defined at the beginning of the introduction --- "the psychological phenomenon underlying artistic creation", that we

shall be concerned in the following inquiry into the nature of artistic inspiration.

CHAPTER III

ART AND REASON

Aesthetics, the philosophy of the fine arts, is not a new branch of philosophical inquiry; nor is the psychological investigation of beauty in art and nature a study to be regarded as an outgrowth of that comparatively young science known as depth psychology. For in Aristotle's Poetics one finds in the brief discussion of the 'catharsis theory' a chord of strikingly similar timbre to the Freudian view of art as an outlet for repressed desires. The drama in ancient Greece, particularly the tragedy "with incidents of pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions"[1] had in common with all artistic media the ability to produce a desired psychological state in the sensitive observer. And it was not without reason that the ancient Greek philosophers spoke against the use of those musical modes which tend to instill fear or passivity in the listener. The well-known "doctrine of ethos" received a more complete elaboration and compelled stricter adherence then than at any time since. Even Plato recognized the extreme importance of the Dorian mode as a power capable of evoking valor and every manly virtue.

Nevertheless, while the study of Aesthetics goes back at least as far as the Golden Age of Greece, it was left to the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to bring it forth from its entombment in the Medieval Period, and to formulate most of the problems with which the aesthetic inquiry was to concern itself. And it was particularly in the writings of the German idealists that the philosophy of art was to have its re-awakening and first to attain the status of a scientific sphere of investigation.

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762) is sometimes considered the founder of this new aesthetics; actually, however, he did little more than give it its name. He was not a romanticist, nor even an idealist, who might see in art a revelation of the Absolute, but rather, he was a rationalist who in the cold light of reason foresaw the value of art as an exemplar of order and proportion.

> What reason showed him was that there is a specific and honorable kind of order and perfection, as also a separate field, in poetry and the like; that this order and perfection may be less glorious than the virtues of reason, but that they are sui generis, that they require interpretation by an independent discipline, that they can be methodically connected into a logical whole which is entitled to a freehold in the general community of philosophy.[2]

This association of art with reason was to enjoy great popularity during the Age of Classicism, particularly among the Academists on the continent. It was also to find expression in England in the precepts of the Royal Academy, whose principles are formulated in the Discourses of Sir Joshua Reynolds. With

the coming of the Romantic Era and an adventurous spirit that refused to be bound by rules, the 'rational' trend in artistic production and criticism was to suffer a temporary eclipse.

In the meantime, however, the classicist experienced no uncertainty in setting up reason as a faculty superior to imagination in artistic creation --- indeed, some went so far as to claim that it was the sole requisite in the production of works of art. We see this reflected in Reynolds' advice to young students, "You must have no dependence on your own genius. If you have great talents, industry will improve them; if you have but moderate abilities, industry will supply their deficiency."[3]

And in what did this 'industry' consist? In diligent practice of, and patient attention to, those art works of merit which a neophyte artist might copy with profit. He was, of course to be selective, and not imitate those crude idiosyncrasies of taste and mannerism from which even the paintings of the masters are not always exempt. Thus, for example, Reynolds cautions against portrayal of strong emotion, since this destroys the poised dignity and classic equilibrium of a figure: "If you mean to preserve the most perfect beauty in its most perfect state, you can not express the passions, all of which produce distortion and deformity, more or less in the most beautiful faces."[4] He cites Bernini's statue of David as a case in point where the

heroic ideality of this sculpturing is marred by a facial expression representing agitation.

Nature is not perfect, and for this reason a slavish aping of her multitudinous details, among which some defects abound, is never to be sought. It is an ideal beauty --- a beauty to be created according to certain established "rules" that will characterize a great work of art. And a knowledge of how to attain this perfection is to be gained not through perception of nature, as Leonardo thought, for nature cannot supply us with that which it itself lacks, i.e. perfect beauty, but only through reason. Reason guides the talented artist in his choice of valuable precepts in the works of his predecessors, and also aids in the production of formal symmetry and perfection of line and detail.

And yet this employment of reason is not in opposition to the study of nature as a basis of art, but contributory to it, or perhaps even akin to it. As Alexander Pope writes in his Essay on Criticism:

> Those rules of old discovered, not devis'd,
> Are Nature still, but Nature methodiz'd;
> Nature, like liberty, is but restrain'd
> By the same laws which first herself ordain'd.[5]

And also:

> Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem;
> To copy nature is to copy them.[6]

According to the teachings of the Academy, the artist must

from the very beginning of his study concentrate on those principles that the greatest artists of history have spent their lives testing and improving. To commence without such a background, in the hope that innate talent or "originality" will suffice is to sow the seeds of deterioration in a style whose roots are not yet strong enough to support such "originality", the value of which is even dubious in Reynolds' opinion.

But what of the genius? Is he not privileged to enjoy artistic freedom?

No, says Reynolds, the genius must likewise conform to the precepts of the masters, for otherwise his genius is worth nothing. Rules do not fetter genius, he tells us, but on the contrary, "Even genius...is the child of imitation."[7] Therefore what applies to artists in general applies equally to those of genius:

> I would chiefly recommend that an implicit obedience to the Rules of Art as established by the practice of the great Masters, should be exacted from the young Students. That those models which have passed through the approbation of ages should be considered by them as perfect and infallible guides.[8]

The same thought found expression in Pope's Essay, however in a more poetic form, where he wrote:

> Be Homer's works your study and delight,
> Read them by day, and meditate by night;
> Thence form your judgment, thence your maxims bring,
> And trace the Muses upward to their spring.[9]

Such rule-bound creativity would appear to leave little room for the phenomenon of inspiration; for the products of an imagination wherein free association holds sway are rarely characterized by tracings of a rationally constructed set of precepts. For this reason, 'inspiration' is held suspect by the most rigorous classicists who regard it as a creator of that which would overthrow the older artistic traditions. "...He who would have you believe that he is waiting for the inspirations of Genius is in reality at a loss how to begin; and is at last delivered of his monsters with difficulty and pain."[10] And elsewhere he speaks of that imitation "which alone is sufficient to dispel this phantom of inspiration".[11]

And even the Romanticist would agree with this latter assertion, although certainly not with the derogatory implication in regard to his 'inspired' creativity. He who sets up imitation as the conditio sine qua non of artistic production must disregard the possibility of inspiration having aesthetic merit; likewise, in affirming the value of 'flashes' of artistic intuition, one is denying, implicitly or explicitly, the intrinsic worth of any "mere" imitative faculty. For 'inspiration' is characterized by originality, in that it derives its being from a psychical history that is absolutely unique in its way, and distinct from any and every other totality of past experience. The 'inspirations' of a Schumann differ from those of a Wagner, just as those of a

Heine differ from a Keats, or a Titian from a Goya, precisely because of the different intellectual and emotional temperaments from which they spring. To compose a "Death and Transfiguration" such as that of Richard Strauss, one must be Richard Strauss. Furthermore, it is necessary that he be Strauss at exactly that period in his life which was productive of this type of work. Had he written this composition either earlier or later than he did, it would not be quite as it is. This assumption, controversial though it be, is validated by the admissions of many artists, and we shall consider this view later on, and attempt to demonstrate how it is supported by much relevant evidence.

For the moment, in due fairness to the opposition, let us turn to some arguments which seek to refute any such concept as 'inspiration'.

One writer speaks of the "mythological period of aesthetics" --- when people view genius as above rules.[12] And he tells us that "If art implies selectivity, skill and organization, ascertainable principles must underlie it. Once such principles are discovered and formulated, works of art may be produced by scientific synthesis."[13] And a little further on in his exposition he makes a suggestion in conformity with the materialistic outlook, "Perhaps in the near future, we may learn that creative experiences are merely geometrical projections of the electro-chemical patterns of thought on various materials having sensory effects

upon us."[14]

Now while there may be a correlation between so-called states of inspiration and "electro-chemical patterns" in the cerebrum or even in the neuro-spinal system, there is as yet at least no evidence warranting the conclusion that there is anything more than a correlation between the two. To postulate an equivalence or even a causal connection between the physical and psychical spheres is to fall back upon a particular metaphysics. Some may even object to the division into 'physical' and 'psychical', claiming that such a distinction may not exist. The question here at issue is of course that of the mind-body relationship --- a problem which modern psychology and physiology find confronting them --- a legacy of seventeenth century Cartesian dualism. The "bifurcation of nature" once effected, it remains an enigma how the two are ever to be re-united.

And the failure of science to find a solution for it during the past three centuries somewhat dims the hopeful optimism reflected in the phrase, "in the near future". There does appear to be a connection, but whether it be reciprocal or uni-directional is at present an unsolved riddle.

Let us therefore go on to consider an argument that may be advanced in an attempt to annul the possibility of "spontaneity" in art. "The argument of spontaneous creation must be repudiated, particularly since works of art generally conceded to be among the

greatest, have not been produced spontaneously...." (And to which is added the rather interesting suggestion:) "A spontaneous creation in the field of architecture would probably result in nothing more complex than a log cabin."[15]

It is evident from the illustration employed that the writer here quoted considers magnitude to be an important, (although surely not essential) element of "greatness". But in order not to be deterred at this preliminary stage of the argument, let us concede this point and go on to consider the main issue here at stake, namely, whether it is true that the greatest works of art "have not been produced spontaneously".

For one thing, there is the testimony of many artists to the contrary, and most of them have rated their creations in moments of a 'flash' of insight as far superior to the products of "plodding laboriousness". Are the artists then the victims of a self-deception when they believe themselves to have experienced such instantaneous insight?

It hardly appears likely; for he who seeks an understanding of the meaning of life must ultimately return to his own inner nature, otherwise he has no frame of reference by which to ascertain the full measure of what he has discovered. Without this self-knowledge, true intuitive insight is too rare and also too faint in its manifestations to produce many great art works.

Spontaneous artistic creation thus seems to be real. How is

it possible in the larger art forms? It is possible by means of "successive" inspirations. When, for example, a composer is writing a symphony or a novelist is writing a book, the whole must somehow be retained in memory if the finished creation is not to suffer from discontinuity. In this way, though a work of art should be many years in preparation, it will retain its unity, with each part growing 'inevitably' out of what preceded it. And what is it that impresses this oneness upon it? One would expect that numerous "fresh starts" would turn it into a series of isolated episodes; and so they would. But in a very real sense such "fresh starts" are nowhere found in the creation of a great art work. For from beginning to end it embodies the evolution of an aesthetic idea; and it is the development of this idea that determines the course of the total evolving scheme. The work of art but represents the culmination of a long series of spontaneous appearances of 'inspiration'.

And perhaps it is here in the complex sequence of aesthetic impressions where Inspiration might lose its foundation, that Reason --- not imitative, but creative, finds its unique role in Art.

CHAPTER IV

ART AND IDEALISM: KANT AND HEGEL

Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel are the first two major philosophers of the modern age to consider the problems of Aesthetics. In their systematic studies of art value, creation, and criticism, they go far beyond the limited inquiry initiated by Baumgarten, and in so doing bequeathe to philosophy a new study, to take its place alongside of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics.

There had been in Baumgarten's aesthetics an unmistakably apologetic tone. According to his view, there are two levels or 'apprehensions' in the mind. Of these the "upper apprehension" is devoted to the practical and rational, the scientific and the philosophical, as contrasted with the 'lower', which concerns itself with fanciful spheres such as poetry. But despite the obscure, unanalyzable character of this 'lower' part of the soul, a study dealing with it still possesses a certain value. The lover of knowledge loves the whole of his object, Plato once said, and this appears to be Baumgarten's attitude when he writes, "It can be objected to our science that it is beneath the dignity of philosophers, and that deliverances of the senses, fancies, fables, and stirrings of the passions are below the philosophical horizon. I answer: A philosopher is a man among men. Indeed he does not

think alien to himself so great a portion of human knowledge."[1]

Baumgarten's definition of aesthetics did not restrict it to the fine arts, but included the 'art of analogical reasoning', the 'art of thinking beautifully', and whatever might come under the heading of "the science of sensuous knowledge". Later its scope was to be narrowed somewhat, and its components were to undergo a more rigid and intense examination in the "critical idealism" of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). If Baumgarten gave Aesthetics its name, then Kant gave it its meaning.

Referring to the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, Hegel once said, "Kant spoke the first rational word on aesthetics."[2] (And we might add that Hegel himself spoke the second such word in his Philosophy of Fine Art.) Recently there has been doubt cast upon this claim for Kant's originality --- he is much indebted to some of his predecessors, we are told --- Addison, Hutcheson, and Baumgarten, to name but three. One writer says that if we believe that "what Kant did to Hume's epistemology was to systematize rather than to annihilate, there would be more truth in holding that Kant's philosophy of beauty owes nearly everything but its systematic form to English writers.... There are few original ideas in Kant's aesthetic.... He has systematized and hardened distinctions and oppositions current in English for the preceding eighty years, and this exaggeration results in a reductio ad absurdum."[3]

In evaluating the views just expressed, Gilbert and Kuhn in their History of Esthetics answer:

> But what a systematic form was that! With a little dramatic emphasis one might say that Kant and the idea of system are interchangeable terms: so that to leave him originality at this point is to leave him originality in all. Kant's mere system was in germ this world-shattering thing: the proof that esthetic enjoyment, while retaining its unique and characteristic quality (a-moral, a-logical, a-real), is more serious and philosophical than physical science.[4]

So Kant, while perhaps indebted to earlier aestheticians, surpassed them all by his introduction of the element of systematization, which permeates not only his aesthetic theory, but his ethical, epistemological and metaphysical views as well.

What then, did Kant, the philosopher, have to say concerning the psychological factor in artistic creation? To begin with, he reserved the title 'genius' for the artistic genius alone. In this respect he holds a position strikingly dissimilar to that of most writers who discuss the concept of genius --- a position that cannot go unchallenged. It is possible, of course, to define the term in any one of several different ways; Kant's exclusive sense of this word is justified only if we acknowledge the equality of the narrower with the broader definition --- an equality of validity, not of meaning. For taken in the more general sense of extraordinary capacity for achievement in an intellectural or cultural sphere of endeavor, the concept of 'genius' is <u>not</u> equivalent in denotation to the term 'artistic genius'. The latter is

included in the former not as its sole member, but as one among many.

Kant, however, does not employ the term in this general sense, but in its more restricted meaning, as the innate ability to produce original artistic ideas, referring to the derivation of 'genius' from 'genie' --- an inspiring divinity. Now, there can be little doubt that if there is such a thing as 'inspiration', the artistic genius is characterized by his possession of it to a high degree in moments of intense creativity. But what are we to say of the religious genius, the mystic, and of the scientific genius, the theorist, who likewise are subject to these exalted states to no minor extent? Are they not "inspired" also? Should one then claim that to the extent that the mystic and theorist are 'inspired' they are geniuses? Perhaps; for it may be that the most exquisite definition of a genius is, as someone once said, "an inspired virtuoso"; and virtuosity as supreme accomplishment is to be found in every aspect of life. The adroit craftsman, the skilled technician, is in his way a virtuoso. He may be nothing more, but this he is certainly.

And yet while efficiency and dexterity are fairly common, genius is a rare phenomenon. This is so because that 'inspiration' that transforms 'a mere virtuoso' into "something more" does not pervade every area of human activity. The sentimentalist who would have us believe otherwise is laboring under a delusion, for genius is notoriously unconcerned with the purely practical and instrumental in life.

Inspiration may, and often does, flourish amid simplicity, but it is not an unmixed or shallow simplicity. Always it is a simplicity concealing a greater complexity underneath --- in short, a simplicity that is merely on the surface. For the so-called "simple" joys of life are in reality the most complex that one may experience. The response to the beautiful in art and in nature is by no means an elementary one --- a sort of reflex mechanism produced automatically upon the appearance of a certain stimulus; on the contrary, the response springs out of the whole past of the individual perceiving that beauty, conditioned, reinforced, and enriched by the overtones that have found resonance there.

And what could appear more simple than love --- the love of one's friends or the love of one's God? And yet the whole galaxy of human emotions finds its heart here! Where is the harmony of life and the dissonance, where is the jealousy and reassurance, the turbulence and tranquillity, the hope and the fear, the joy and the pathos, if not here?

Perhaps they are right who say that one spends his whole life in preparation for death. For all are at last forced to abandon those things they have devoted a lifetime to learning to love. It would be ironic were it less pathetic.

In this sense it is in the 'simpler' aspects of life that the artist, like the philosopher, finds meaning. And it is 'meaning'

that constitutes the essence of inspiration. For while an 'inspired' idea may appear amid humble surroundings, and even in the presence of evil, it is forever a stranger to chaos. Chaos is the absence of meaning.

The intellectual fervor and emotional intensity that invariably accompany inspiration are due precisely to this factor of meaning. Any man, whether he be an artist, scientist, philosopher, or something else, who feels he has caught a glimpse, however fragmentary and transitory it may have been, into the inner meaning of life, is filled with a sudden inexplicable joy; for that one bright vision may cause a multitude of life's vicissitudes to fade into oblivion.

What then shall we say of Kant's concept of genius? We must acknowledge that it is not specifically <u>incorrect</u> but only <u>inadequate</u>. It is right as far as it goes; it does not go far enough. For inspiration does not always have as its end realization in a concrete artistic medium. To assume thus is to restrict its scope, which in turn is to falsify and distort it.

Inspiration <u>may</u> contain its end within itself, for the influx of meaningful impressions that accompanies it is capable of imparting a rare psychical harmony which not only possesses intrinsic value, but which may be in its most exalted form the highest good attainable by man.

In this sense 'inspiration' is not the unique property of the

artistic genius, nor even of genius in general. But that vision into the essence of things which is a rare phenomenon in the lives of most people manifests itself with greater frequency and intensity in the genius, as though it perceived a possibility of further realization in him that it could not find elsewhere.

The 'realization' may be a painting of sunlight filtering through the trees on an early April morning; or it may be a mathematical formula expressing the constancy of the velocity of light rays that penetrate that forest glade --- a law applicable to the most distant regions of inter-stellar space yet observable.

Thus, artistic and scientific genius have a common origin in the inspiration that gives birth to the greatest achievements in both their spheres --- Art and Science. They constitute the two most 'pure' or 'original' forms of genius --- the creative and the synthetic; and these forms in turn correspond to the two faculties of man's self-consciousness --- imagination and reason. In consciousness, perceptual vision is turned <u>outward</u>; in that self-consciousness which is man's exclusive possession, his vision, conceptual as well as perceptual is turned <u>inward</u>, and he views the processes and creations of his own mind. Hence, genius is an uniquely human possession because of the self-consciousness it necessitates.

But these two powers --- of rational thought and creative imagery, are not in opposition; for as soon as reason ventures

beyond the more mechanical forms of logic, a 'creative' element enters in to direct its course; and when imagery ceases to flow spontaneously, 'rational thought' appears on the scene to bind its fraying strands together --- as we shall see later on in a discussion of methodical artistic creation.

But some may question the possibility of a distinction between 'creative' and 'syntnetic' processes. Can there be any new mental "creation" --- one whose components have nowhere previously existed? Interpreting this in the Lockeian sense as to whether or not one may frame a new simple idea not found in experience, we must agree with the empiricist; if, then, 'creative' ideas are always complex aggregates compounded out of elements received through sensation, then all creation necessarily involves synthesis. Of this there can be no doubt.

And yet he who forms an image within his mind apart from any present sense awareness is the creator of something new nonetheless. The objection that he but reproduces a past perception is nullified by the recognition that while the mind may be passive in sensation, it is active in perception. Even in synaesthesia where the application of one type of sensory stimulus is said to call forth or evoke response in another sense, the mind is active in its judgment of the preliminary datum that occasioned such response. As for example in the phenomenon known as chromaesthesia, where tonal impressions tend to produce visual images of a certain color, the activity of

the percipient consists in ascertaining first of all what tone has been sounded, and in selecting its visual correlate. The fact that this discriminating function may be carried out unconsciously does not deprive it of its 'active' character.

This activity alone would suffice to entitle the mind's role in image-forming to the designation 'creative'. But in regard to the assertion that imagination is merely 'reproductive', let it be said that this could hold true only if the image were identical in all respects with the previous perception. For in the moment that a single new element enters in, the image appears in a strange, often more radiant light. Even a slight modification of internal structure or content alters the whole by setting up a different set of relationships among its parts.

The image in recollection is the image of perception in reflection plus something more. Even so-called after-images and eidetic images are not faithful reproductions of the original: the former generally appear in complementary colors and the latter usually suffer from being more elaborately detailed in that aspect to which attention was most persistently drawn in the original perception. And even when they appear in their 'true' color or timbre with details evenly distributed, their quality is altered by reason of their necessary transposition against a dimensional background. And how much less perfect are those images, visual or auditory, which find no such 'external' projection but are wholly contained

within the narrow confines of the imagination proper;

But even if one should grant the possibility of a recalled image being the same in every way, there would remain one insurmountable barrier to the assumption of equivalence --- that which psychologists refer to as its "affective tone." For the stream of consciousness, which is by nature dynamic, renders it impossible for the mind to ever perceive a thing twice in exactly the same light. Even if the form should remain the same, the psychical state through which we grasp its interpretative content must vary.

By means of the infusion of associative elements not present in the original perception, a 'new' idea is created, and it is this idea that is impressed in a work of art, thus stamping it with the individuality of its creator. Genius is nature transcending itself in order that it might more fully realize itself.

Kant, using similar terms, proceeds to define the concept thus: "Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental aptitude through which nature gives the rule to art."[5] In this way, Kant's aesthetic theory is directly bound up with his epistemology and the "Copernican Revolution" he effected --- namely, that the mind prescribes its laws to nature.

According to Kant, the artistic genius differs from the eminent man of science chiefly by reason of the former's primary property, originality. The performing of a scientific experiment or the working-out of a mathematical formula, however much ingenuity

it may require, he claims, is nevertheless based upon that which can be acquired, i.e. scientific or mathematical knowledge. And once a problem of such a nature has been satisfactorily solved, its results are apparent to all those with an adequate understanding of the subject involved. But this is not the case in art, where no amount of scrutiny or analyzation will enable one to paint like Michelangelo or compose like Bach if he lacks that type of innate ability. Hence the prime characteristic of genius is originality.

Kant, however, overlooks the fact that knowledge, artistic as well as scientific, is a thing to be acquired; originality, artistic or scientific, is not. Contrary to both Reynolds and Kant, one becomes neither a great scientist nor a great artist by mere conformity to "rules".

But this is not to say that any and every kind of originality is productive of great works of art. Indeed, many pseudo-artistic creations have nothing more to recommend them than a certain forced originality.

Kant seems to uphold the 'spontaneous' view of artistic creation, and would perhaps rule out "plodding laboriousness" as a vital factor in the creation of any true work of art. The artist works in darkness, so that his right hand verily knoweth nought of what his left hand doeth. Nor can he perceive the source of his inspiration; as Kant says,

> Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to others in such precepts as would put them in a position to produce similar products. (Hence, presumably, our word genie is derived from genius, as the peculiar guardian and guiding spirit given to a man at his birth, by the inspiration of which those original ideas were obtained.)[6]

Because of the quality of originality that characterizes genius, the spirit of imitation is completely alien to his nature. In science, Kant believes, the difference of capacity or accomplishment between master and pupil is one of degree, that is to say, it is quantitative; in art, the apprentice, as long as he remains a student, is separated from the mature artist by a gap of qualitative difference. This is so because in the learning process the faculty of imitation is usually predominent. The pupil, if he possess the innate endowment of a potential artist, may progress out of the ranks of imitation and attain his latent originality.

Does originality then exclude adherence to rules? Having shown why this quality must be the primary property of genius, Kant goes on to say that the fine arts do possess something of the mechanical in them, something based on industry and learning. Since art has (or should have) some definite end in view, the artist must at the outset give due cognizance to those rules that will best enable him to attain this end; and these academic

restraints "we cannot venture to dispense with."[7] And he adds that,

> Originality of talent is one (though not the sole) essential factor that goes to make up the character of genius.... Genius can do no more than furnish rich material for products of fine art; its elaboration and its form require a talent academically trained, so that it may be employed in such a way as to stand the test of judgment."[8]

What faculties then other than originality characterize the artistic genius? One of the most important ones is perhaps 'Geist' or what is sometimes translated as 'soul', sometimes as 'spirit', and which for Kant signifies "the animating principle in the mind." It is this that arouses the 'Seele' or psychic substance to a state that is favorable for the flow of artistic imagery. He also refers to this principle as "the faculty of presenting aesthetic ideas."

The thought thus induced is not of a conceptual nature, but is intuitive --- a representation of the imagination. Concerning the immense importance of this faculty in the artist, Kant writes:

> The imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is a powerful agent for creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature. It affords us entertainment where experience proves too commonplace; and we even use it to remodel experience, always following, no doubt, laws that are based on analogy, but still also following principles which have a higher seat in reason.... The material

> can be borrowed by us from nature in accordance with that law but be worked up by us into something else --- namely, what surpasses nature."[9]

It is the imagination that provides the aesthetic ideas that are essential to a work of art.

Kant believes that imagination and understanding carefully balanced constitute genius. This perfect equilibrium cannot be acquired either by learning or practice, but must exist in the soul from its very beginning. "Genius," he tells us, "according to these presuppositions, is the exemplary originality of the natural endowments of an individual in the free employment of his cognitive faculties."[10] And this definition would seem to re-admit the non-artistic genius.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was, as we have seen, a great admirer of Kant. He shared the latter's verve for systematization, and he shared his ability to integrate aesthetics with the studies of epistemology and metaphysics as he interpreted them.

Hegel, while a philosopher of strong convictions almost approximating dogmatism, approaches the subject of the artist and the psychology of artistic creation with a certain degree of hesitation. For he says,

> We have...to raise the question how it comes about that this product of men's inner world is not the direct and native growth of that

> world, but receives its due form through the creative impulse of particular men, in other words, by virtue of the genius and talent of the artist. At the same time we must admit that the question is only raised that we may be able to add the statement that it really is excluded from the sphere of scientific investigation, or, at the most, we can only furnish a few general remarks toward its solution.[11]

A Kantian influence is to be found in Hegel's summary of the attributes of artistic genius. For Kant the 'primary property' had been originality --- that is, in the imagination's capacity to represent original aesthetic ideas; Hegel broadens this definition, saying that the faculty of imagination itself is the most important single characteristic of genius. But he cautions against misconstruing that power from which a work of art springs as similar to the passive meandering of fancy. Unlike the psychoanalysts whom he preceded by about a century, Hegel would draw a sharp line of demarcation between the spheres of phantasy and art.

In his notion of the storing-up of sensory perceptions --- visual, auditory, tactile impressions, etc., and their subsequent emergence in an artistic form, he anticipates to some extent the later theory of memory-tracings in the subconscious that find an outlet, along with inhibitions in a product of artistic creation. Here in Hegelian aesthetics, however, one encounters no reference to the more intense repressions of the artist; rather the emphasis is upon his increased acuity of perceptual vision and insight into

the heart of things.

> The creative activity carries with it in possession and endowment a peculiar power of grasping reality and the forms it presents, all that through the channels of alert eyes and ears imprints pictures of infinite variety caught from the external world upon the mind, and further implies an exceptionally retentive memory wherein to store up this varied world of innumerable reflections.[12]

He agrees with Kant that the abstract process of concept-formation plays no role in artistic activity. "For what the imagination undertakes to do and only to do is not to bring to consciousness this inner core of reason in the form of general propositions and conceptions, but to apprehend it clothed in the concrete form of actual existence and individuality."[13]

Hegel departs from the formalists who claim that the major significance of a work of art lies in its external aspect --- its physical structure. According to him the various artistic media are just that --- <u>media</u> of expression. Their concrete structure can but serve to represent the Idea which the artist seeks to convey. The very 'objectivity' of the art medium is indeed an impediment to the realization of its purpose --- i.e. the transference of an aesthetic idea --- even while it is a <u>necessary</u> mediator between the artist and the appreciator of art. It tends to place us 'outside' the sphere it pervades, so that we can only with some amount of exertion --- that is, intellectually

and emotionally active perception, respond to the emotional energy it expresses, and enjoy affinity with it.

Hegel disagrees with Kant's emphasis on the principle of spontaneity in artistic creation. He was probably not referring to this oversight on Kant's part, however, when he said, "Only fools are of the opinion that the genuine artist does not in the least know what his hands and senses are about."[14]

He differs from Kant too in his differentiation of genius and talent. Kant had not arrayed the two under opposing banners, but claimed talent to be that natural endowment which genius possesses. Talent was not synonymous with genius, but neither was it a thing apart from it; it was one of its essential constituents. It is true that Kant speaks of the creations of the genius as providing exemplary models for others to follow. But the "others" here mentioned are likewise men of genius, whose innate disposition or capacity enables them to assimilate the styles of their predecessors, and then to erect on them their own unique forms, the standards of which will in turn serve to govern the initial productions of later geniuses. No, the 'man of talent' as he is generally envisioned, would find no place of importance in Kantian aesthetics --- he is a mere imitator who builds upon the efforts of the masters who have gone before him, making no significant innovation or contribution to entitle him to merit or honor.

Hegel defines 'talent' not as the 'native endowment' of genius,

but rather as "a form of executive versatility." In contrasting talent with genius he says that it (talent) "requires for its true perfection something of more universal art-capacity, as also that soul-animation, something more which is essentially the mall-mark of genius. Talent, in short, without that vital spark of genius, never gets much beyond a purely mechanical facility."[15] And here Hegel's view corresponds with the notion of genius as "inspired virtuosity."

Genius is innate; is talent so? Hegel answers in effect 'yes and no'. To be sure, a certain inclination or 'feeling for' correctness of proportion or for rhythm may be inborn, and these will be of vital aid if such a tendency is to be developed. But there is a vast difference between such isolated segments of ability or skill and the wider capacity for orientation in a particular sphere of endeavor that is to be found in the artistic genius, Hegel believes. The difference is both a quantitative and a qualitative one. The genius has the power of technical execution, but so much more besides. Genuine inspiration, according to Hegel, will not appear among those'semi-artistic' individuals who lack the power of aesthetic imagery; as he says, "The activity of the imagination then and the power of technical execution taking both together as the inseparable antecedents of a real artist are commonly understood as inspiration."[16]

Thus, in the aesthetic theories of these two great philo-

sophers of the school of German Idealism, we find a considerable divergence of opinion. Neither of them posed all the problems nor suggested all the solutions with which later philosophies of art were to be concerned; but each of them clearly foreshadowed what aesthetics was not to deal with. The scope of Baumgarten's definition had been too wide; not only that, but certain elements of it were unessential or irrelevant to aesthetic inquiry.

To Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was given the honor of laying the foundation stones upon which subsequent philosophies of art and beauty would be erected. Beyond doubt, they are the founders of the newly-awakened Science of Aesthetics.

CHAPTER V

ART AND IDEALISM: GOETHE, SCHILLER, AND SCHOPENHAUER

"Gebt ihr euch einmal fuer Poeten, so commandirt die Poesie."[1] This statement by Goethe (1749-1832) would seem to place him among those who believe like Josnua Reynolds that "even works of Genius, like every other effect, as they must have their cause, must likewise have their rules."[2] Hence, if one knows what the rules of poetry are, he should be able to apply them at will and thus create poetry. This is further substantiated by Goethe's advice to those who would be poets:

> Are you in earnest? Seize this very minute,
> What you can do, or dream you can, begin it.
> Courage has Genius, Power, and Magic in it.
> Only engage and then the mind grows heated.
> Begin it and the work will be completed.[3]

And yet elsewhere he speaks of "that glowing inspiration which alone makes true poetry." What then is his position in regard to the question of methodical and spontaneous artistic creation? To ascertain this, it will be well to consider Goethe's works themselves and his place in the history of aesthetics.

First of all, he, like Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel, was greatly influenced by Kant's aesthetic theory. He did not, however, share Kant's purely intellectual approach; as he says some-

where, "Ich habe nie über das Denken gedacht" --- 'I have never thought about thinking.'[5] Metaphysical speculation as to the nature of the Ultimate is not a favorite preoccupation of those who are much concerned with the world of appearances, unless like Goethe, they believe such an ultimate to be reflected in that world. "About the Absolute in the theoretical sense I dare not talk: yet I maintain that he who has recognized it in appearance and keeps his eye constantly fixed on it, will derive a great benefit from it."[6]

Like the later Romanticists, Goethe found much satisfaction in a study of the natural world. To be sure, there is something "more", something that transcends this world of appearances, but ought we on that account to turn away from that which <u>can</u> be known and lose ourselves in morbid introspection? No, answers Goethe, both from the standpoint of an artist and from that of a theorist --- and in this double capacity, incidentally, lies the uniqueness of his position in the history of aesthetics. As one writer says,

> In his person, people felt the creative imagination dwelt among them, and aestheticians looked upon the working of his spirit as the living model from which they abstracted their theories. But they viewed creative imagination not as the mere play of a natural force to be analyzed like any other phenomenon in nature. Their search for a definition of beauty was bound up with the quest for a beautiful life."[7]

So we see that Goethe was more of a humanist than a metaphysician. His <u>Götz von Berlichingen</u> and even his <u>Faust</u> do not

set out to solve a metaphysical problem. Both are reflections upon life, and perhaps each is to some extent a self-revelation. But it is not an intimate kind of confession such as one finds among certain other writers. One here feels that Goethe himself is on the outside looking in, so to speak. He reflects upon those situations he presents, but never participates or wholly enters into them. The truth expressed in them, while of a rational or even intuitive nature, is never the 'ultimate truth' so persistently sought by the metaphysician. Whatever 'truth' may emerge is due to the imagination's ability to 'anticipate' reality. Speaking of the Götz he says,

> I wrote my Götz von Berlichingen as a young man of twenty-two, and ten years later I marvelled at the truth of my representation. As a matter of fact I had not experienced or seen anything of the sort, and consequently I must have possessed the knowledge of manifold human conditions by anticipation."[8]

Thus, imagination is shown to play an important role in artistic creation as an anticipator of knowledge. "If imagination did not give birth to things which for ever will remain enigmatic to reason, then imagination would be altogether but of small account."[9]

It is so often the case when either imagination or reason is exalted, the other suffers an immediate rejection. It is so in Goethe. But Goethe is unwilling to let either predominate for very long. The artist in him sets up imagination as of higher importance; the theorist pleads the case for reason. In the drama of Faust the spirit of criticism claims the fore, as Croce in his book on Goethe states:

> In Faust the crisis of modern thought is very clearly reflected, when, having shaken off traditional religious beliefs, it began to perceive the emptiness of rationalistic philosophy, which had taken its place; there is also reflected in Faust an eternal moment of the human spirit, the moment in which thought criticizes itself and overcomes its own abstractions."10

Perhaps Faust, along with Werther had the value of a catharsis for Goethe. Maybe he, like Plato, felt the strain of two conflicting tendencies warring within him --- love of beauty and love of reason --- a conflict between art and science. Why such a conflict should exist is hard to see. For the love of beauty is not 'irrational' --- unless we more limit reason to its purely logical function. On the contrary, the love of beauty is intensely rational --- for this rational element enables one to perceive symmetry and perfection of line and detail, consonance, and rhythmic and melodic patterns. The Heart that loves sees not with the eyes, but with the Mind, and the heart that loves Beauty is no exception to this. Faith and Reason need not contradict one another; there is so much faith in back of even the most abstract operations of the Reason; and there is so much that is reasonable in even the blindest Faith. There is both an Art of Science and a Science of Art; and there is an Art of Philosophy as well as a Philosophy of Art.

What then was Goethe's position on the issue of methodical-spontaneous artistic creation, as may be symbolized by reason and

imagination in art? He appears to be of the opinion that they are equally essential: "The gods taught us now to imitate their work; yet we know only what we do, ignorant of that which we imitate."[11] So the artist has been 'taught' or inspired by something Demonic or Divine, something beyond himself; but he does not work in darkness --- he knows what he does to achieve a desired artistic effect, and can call forth this knowledge or ability --- this "method" at will.

Let us now turn to Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) to whom it was left "to fuse Goethe's unique intuition with the powerful current of philosophical thought initiated by Kant."[12] Schiller himself tells us in his "Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man" that his assertions rest primarily upon Kantian principles. In speaking of creative genius, he strikes a peculiarly Kantian and yet un-Kantian tone when he calls it "that great and patient temper which is required to impress the ideal on the dumb marble, or to spread it over a page of cold, sober letters, and then intrust it to the faithful hands of time."[13] Here as with Kant, the artist by virtue of some natural endowment imparts artistic form to that which previously had but meaningless form or no form at all; in Kant the important instrument in artistic creation was originality, while in Schiller it is a certain kind of temper, or temperament, characterized by patience and greatness.

But Schiller as an aesthetician is a descendent of Goethe as

well as of Kant, although probably to a lesser extent. He differed from Goethe in being less interested in 'appearances' and more aware of the 'transcendental' element in aesthetics. He was a moralist and a critic as well as a writer. Of this moralistic and critical side of his nature it may be said that,

> In the functioning of his intellectual life abstract reasoning played a role exactly the reverse of that of reflection in Goethe's creative process. For Goethe reflection stemmed from a surplus of conscious energy. It was creation carried beyond the limits of poetical representation. Schiller, on the contrary, arrived at poetry through philosophical thought."[14]

Schiller is not alone in this respect --- for other poets have done likewise --- nor does he fully realize in his works the immense potentialities of a 'philosophical art'. His art remains too conscious of itself, too critical and searching to ever attain that freedom so essential to true philosophical art. And yet this is not to say that Philosophy is devoid of restraint --- for a certain restraint is necessary if it is not to dissolve into purposeless speculation or 'metaphysical meandering'. But it is precisely this restraint that liberates philosophy, and differentiates it from the other sciences. The restraint of philosophy is self-imposed, guided by the end in view --- Harmony through knowledge. All the diverse factors which enter into knowledge must be shown to be integral components of a Unity --- which is Truth ---

and each part must be related to every other as well as to the whole. Here in Philosophy is the zenith of that 'unity in diversity' of which aestheticians are so fond of speaking. Every great philosophical system is in itself a work of art.

The other arts and other sciences (for Philosophy is both) must have some ends in view, but they can never possess this comprehensiveness. For those ends which any art or science determines to be irrelevant to its particular pursuit or inquiry are forever excluded from, and denied fulfillment within, its narrowly circumscribed sphere. Philosophy is unique in that nothing is irrelevant to it.

Schiller firmly believed in the capacity of art to reflect truth of a philosophical order. In his "Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man", for example, he writes:

> Humanity has lost its dignity, but art has saved it, and preserves it in marbles full of meaning; truth continues to live in illusion, and the copy will serve to re-establish the model. If the nobility of art has survived the nobility of nature, it also goes before it like an inspiring genius, forming and awakening minds. Before truth causes her triumphant light to penetrate into the depth of the heart, poetry intercepts her rays, and the summits of humanity shine in a bright light, while a dark and humid night still hangs over the valleys."[15]

For Schiller, artistic inspiration provided a revelation of truth --- but truth in its philosophical rather than in its supernatural sense.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) like Schiller, was greatly influenced by the Kantian system. Here, Kant's criticism of the intellect as an inadequate instrument in the search for the ultimate reality, is made the basis of a philosophy of pessimism. This world in which we find ourselves enmeshed is not the best of all possible worlds; we are all our lives subject to the insatiable, primordial Will, and free ourselves only by means of asceticism. In a state of complete self-denial, the Will within us soon withers and dies. But aesthetic contemplation, being a form of disinterested knowledge and hence independent of the will to live, makes life in this 'worst of all possible worlds' much more tolerable than it would otherwise be.

But, says Schopenhauer, not everyone is capable of engaging in this wholly disinterested contemplation which may alleviate one's misery. Most men pursue the fulfillment of the Will all their lives and seek only that practical knowledge that enables them more fully to comply with the demands of this Will.

The genius differs from other men, by virtue of his capacity for disinterested contemplation --- as Schopenhauer writes:

> The man of genius...whose excessive power of knowledge frees it at times from the service of will, dwells on the consideration of life itself, strives to comprehend the Idea of each thing, not its relations to other things; and in doing this he often forgets to consider his own path in life, and therefore for the most part pursues it awkwardly enough. While to the ordinary man his faculty of knowledge is a lamp

> to lighten his path, to the man of genius it is the sun which reveals the world."[16]

How does Schopenhauer define "genius"? In his essay on "Genius and Virtue" he speaks of it as "a kind of knowledge, namely, of ideas", and as a knowledge "which is unconcerned with any principle of causation. For him, knowledge is an end in itself, apart from any human desire it may help satisfy; in this way he differs from the saint for whom contemplation is centered around the hope for salvation."[17] Thus, Schopenhauer speaks of the essence of genius as lying in "a measure of intellectual power far beyond that which is required to serve the individual's will."[18]

We see in Schopenhauer's theory of genius a drifting-away from the popular emphasis upon the highly emotional nature of the artistic genius; Schopenhauer believes such an individual to be considerably freer from the strivings of will and human desire than the average man. His intellect dominates the whole self --- which domination results in a greater freedom than his more common brethren can ever hope to attain.

The difference between the genius and the 'ordinary man' is both a quantitative and a qualitative one --- of degree and of kind. The former not only sees <u>more</u> of the truth of life, but also sees it from a totally dissimilar perspective. As Schopenhauer writes:

> A genius is a man in whose mind the world is presented as an object is presented in a mirror, but with a degree more of clearness and a greater

> distinction of outline than is attained by ordinary people. It is from him that humanity may look for most instruction; for the deepest insight into the most important matters is to be acquired, not by an observant attention to details, but by a close study of things as a whole.... Thus, genius may be defined as an eminently clear consciousness of things in general, and therefore, also of that which is opposed to them, namely, one's own self."[19]

Kant had seen originality as the 'primary property' of genius; Schopenhauer too believes that it is essential, but not sufficient in itself to entitle a man to be classed as a genius. If anyone will but estrange himself from the world for a short while, he will begin to envision even those things that were formerly very familiar in a strange, new light. His thoughts and the expression of them will acquire a startlingly original quality.

But most men cannot thus "lose" themselves in disinterested contemplation for very long at a time. Solitude and isolation find little favor with any except the genius and the ascetic. The majority of mankind cannot sever itself from the Will to which it is subject without experiencing a great loss --- a terrifying alienation or estrangement. Not for the masses is the genius' "lonely existence in a world with which he has nothing in common and no sympathies."[20]

Schopenhauer then, believes that originality of temperament as well as of style is an important constituent of the artistic

genius --- as Ariosto once said, "Natura lo fece e poi ruppe lo stampo" --- 'After Nature stamps a man of genius, she breaks the die.'[21]

But one who is highly endowed in one respect may be quite deficient in some other way --- there is often a weakness in one area to compensate for greatness in another. Kant lacks that which makes Goethe great, and vice-versa.

Here, as in the philosophy of Hegel, a distinction may be drawn between talent and genius in art --- but a distinction based on the nature of the end pursued in artistic activity; for whereas, the man of talent creates for the purpose of fame or material gain he may thereby achieve, the genius' motivation is much more difficult to determine, for it lies deeper....

> It seems as though...the will to live, which is the spirit of the human species, were conscious of having, by some rare chance, and for a brief period, attained a greater clearness of vision, and were now trying to secure it, or at least the outline of it, for the whole species, to which the individual genius in his inmost being belongs; so that the light which he sheds about him may pierce the darkness and dullness of ordinary human consciousness and there produce some good effect."[22]

The source of inspiration, for Schopenhauer, would probably lie in this "greater clearness of vision" of which he speaks. How often in a study of artistic inspiration one encounters expressions that bear a sharp resemblance to this! Mozart once compared his musical imagery with "a beautiful strong dream" that came not in temporal succession, but, as it were, "all at once."

And many other artists have testified to the unique clarity and vividness with which such a 'vision of the whole' is presented.

Schopenhauer too speaks of the integral relatedness of the whole of existence which is accomplished through memory and which emerges in a great work of art --- that is, in the creation of genius; --- as he says, "Genius might have its root in a certain perfection and vividness of the memory as it stretches back over the events of past life. For it is only by dint of memory, which makes our life in the strict sense a complete whole, that we attain a more profound and comprehensive understanding of it."[23]

In this aspect of his theory, as well as in his distinguishing between two types of knowledge, one of which is the rightful domain of art, Schopenhauer almost anticipates a later view that was to be very influential in shaping the course of modern aesthetics --- the theory of art as intuition.

CHAPTER VI

ART AND INTUITION

The aesthetic theory of Benedetto Croce, the foremost exponent of art as intuition, is closely interwoven with his epistemology. An idealist, he believes that the 'unreality' of the physical world has been "proved in an indisputable manner and is admitted by all philosophers (who are not crass materialists and are not involved in the strident contradictions of materialism)."[1]

Hence Croce disagrees with the formalists who hold that the essence of art lies in its concrete structure. Art is not a mere physical fact; --- a collection of colors or tones is not a work of art, regardless of the degree of symmetry or numerical beauty it may possess; --- for he says, "If it be asked why art cannot be a physical fact, we must reply, in the first place, that physical facts do not possess reality, and that art, to which so many devote their whole lives and which fills all with a divine joy, is supremely real; thus it cannot be a physical fact, which is something unreal."

The things commonly called "physical facts" are for Croce but useful constructs of the intellect. Without these constructs derived from perception we would not have science. He argues that art, unlike these "physical facts", cannot be constructed physically. For in the moment one permits his intellect to break into his

experience of art, in order to note a harmonic progression, or to measure a statue, or to count the words in a poem, the true aesthetic experience is gone. Thus, Croce would consider futile the attempts to systematically work out a "mathematical basis of the arts."

But if art is not a physical fact, then what is it? "As to what is art --- I will say at once, in the simplest manner that art is vision or intuition."[3] And what is intuition? It is not sensation, for sensation is passive, while intuition is active; nor is it perception (which is somewhat different from sensation) since although every perception is an intuition, not every intuition is a perception. It is not the knowledge of concepts, for their formulation is a function of the intellect, not of the imagination. What is intuition?

And to this Croce answers:

> Every true intuition or representation is also expression. That which does not objectify itself in expression is not intuition or representation, but sensation and mere natural fact. The spirit only intuites in making, forming, expressing. He who separates intuition from expression never succeeds in reuniting them. Intuitive activity possesses intuitions to the extent that it expresses them."[4]

Thus, he would find no sense in the phrase "mute, inglorious Miltons;" one who has not the power to express artistic intuitions has no such intuitions. This is not to say that his expression must be of a verbal nature, for color, line, and sound

may likewise be "manifestations of the man", hence valid media of expression. And expression is also present in pure contemplation: "It is impossible to distinguish intuition from expression in this cognitive process. The one appears with the other at the same instant, because they are not two, but one."[5]

Art then has its origin in the imagination; and this faculty is greater in the artist than in other men. The inspiration or intuitive image in the mind of Raphael when he painted his "Sistine Madonna" was not one that he might share with hundreds of other people, but was his alone. They argue erroneously who claim that many others might view Raphael's intuition of the "Madonna" and be unable to create it simply because they lack the technical ability. No one except the painter himself could put on canvas that vision that was his unique possession.

The artist differs from other men by reason of the greater clarity and strength with which his vision presents itself to him. One is accustomed to grasping at a fleeting impression, feeling he has perceived a thing thoroughly when he has done no more than observed this or that trait of the object under consideration, a few details out of a complex mass. The artist in contemplation sees more than this superficial array of isolated data. His gift is the 'vision of the whole' which he intuites, and in so doing gives expression thereto. "To intuite is to express, and nothing else (nothing more, but nothing less) than to <u>express</u>."[6]

The difference between genius and non-genius is purely a quantitative one, Croce claims. Were the artistic genius qualitatively distinct from those who do not create, but only appreciate art, he would find no reception for his works of art. To fully appreciate art, one's imagination must be of the same nature as that of its creator, he argues, and therefore, since art surely is appreciated, the difference between genius and non-genius can be only one of quantity. To assume otherwise is to adopt a supernatural view of genius.

While Croce is certainly not an Hegelian, he sides with Hegel in opposing Kant's notion that the genius works in darkness, unaware of the means and ends of his artistic creative process. Intuition is not blind; nor is intuitive activity a blind mechanism. Consciousness of what he expresses is indeed present in the artist, even though it be not the reflective consciousness of the critic.

A little earlier we claimed Croce's aesthetic theory to be in opposition to those of the 'formalists'. This is so only in regard to the latters' assertion that art is a physical fact. Croce does not deny the important role of form and impression in artistic activity, for they are as essential as content: Art is neither pure form nor pure content, but both --- impression plus expression. Because of this, art is not mere appearance nor mere feeling, but rather, a kind of knowledge --- i.e. intuitive.

Kant had reserved the title, 'genius' for the artistic genius

alone; Croce recognizes the existence of four types of genius, which correspond to the four forms of human activity: genius in artistic, scientific, military, and economic pursuits. And "to dispute as to whether the word 'genius' should be applied only to creators of aesthetic expression or also to men of scientific research and of action would be a mere question of words. To observe, on the other hand, that 'genius' of whatever kind it be, is always a quantitative conception and an empirical distinction, would be to repeat what has already been explained as regards artistic genius."[7]

In evaluating Croce's concept of genius, one may question his assertion that it is a mere matter of words. Not lexicography but the structural analysis of a phenomenon is at issue here.

We have suggested that there may be two species, or types of genius --- the synthetic and the creative, according to whether the faculty of reason or imagination predominates. It may occur that these two powers are found in approximate equality in a given individual --- each of which is intense enough to entitle its possessor to the designation 'genius'; it may also happen that among geniuses in a single field both types are to be found in different exemplars. This is most likely to occur in the spheres of religion and philosophy, which by nature partake of the characteristics of both science and art. In religion the

'synthetic' genius (that is, one in whom the faculty of reason is dominant) will appear as a theologian (e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas); the 'creative' genius (i.e. one in whom the faculty of imagination is unusually strong) will be a mystic (e.g. St. Thomas a Kempis). (Lest it be thought we are here assuming the mystical experience to be a product of imagination, let it be said that this is not intended; rather, we mean to say that that attitude or temperament conducive to the steady flow of intuitive imagery is quite apt to be a suitable nature for envelopment of the mystic aura.)

In philosophy as in religion one finds both synthetic and creative genius to manifest itself. In the ancient world, Aristotle and Plato correspond to these two types respectively; in more modern times we witness Kant himself and Schopenhauer as exemplars of the 'rational' and 'imaginative' forms of genius.

In regard to Croce's mention of 'military' and 'economic' genius, it may be questioned whether such do in fact exist. Military leaders such as Alexander the Great, Bismarck, and even Napoleon do not strike one as being "geniuses", but more as "heroes", as men who became great partly through the circumstances brought about by destiny and partly through their possession of characteristics other than those requisite to genius, such as strength of will, desire for domination, ungrounded sense of self-importance, etc. The same is to be said of the so-called 'economic' genius.

It is true that there have been geniuses in the military, political, and economic spheres, but their genius lay not in their prowess along these lines, but rather in that innate ability that under different circumstances would have produced a scientist or an artist. Military strategem involves the use of reason --- not the general or 'pure' reasoning employed by the scientist in his formulation of a theory, but 'applied' reason concentrated into one territory. In the same way, the military or political leader of creative genius will capture the hearts of those he hopes to lead by means of artful devices; by appealing to their sense of hero-worship, their desire to idolize an incarnate symbol of valor or trust, by skillful persuasion and the art of suggestion at which he is adept, such a leader with a slight dramatic flourish and a touch of the tragically ennobling in his character will bring a whole populace to its knees in reverence or send them raging against one another, impelled by a blind craze for battle and conquest.

But to return to Croce: Croce, unlike the psychoanalysts, whom we shall consider in a subsequent section, differentiates between phantasy and artistic activity. Phantasy and the dream are akin to sensation in being passive forms of imagery-construction; art is active, and requires for its creation as for its appreciation (which for Croce is essentially 're-creation') the employment of the active faculty of the imagination. A capric-

ious succession of images does not constitute an aesthetic intuition, for a work of art requires that there be an integration of elements and a unification of the whole --- a unity in diversity.

> The intuition is truly artistic, it is truly intuition, and not a chaotic mass of images only when it has a vital principle that animates it, making it all one with itself. [8]

What is this principle? The 'feeling' that makes of the intuition a single unified entity.

> Not the idea, but the feeling, is what confers upon art the airy lightness of the symbol: an aspiration enclosed in the circle of a representation --- that is art; and in it the aspiration alone stands for the representation and the representation alone for the aspiration. [9]

Henri Bergson, the second great exponent of the theory of intuitionism, agrees with the Crocean idea that in ordinary perception the individuality of perceptual objects escapes us. We isolate certain of their more obvious features and this facilitates practical recognition of them. But it is not from only these external things that we are cut off, but also from our own states of consciousness, except in moments of artistic insight.

> Between nature and ourselves, nay, between ourselves and our own consciousness a veil is interposed; a veil that is dense and opaque for the common herd --- thin, almost transparent, for the artist and the poet.[10]

Because of the utilitarian function of perception, one tends

to come to know only those data that are of 'practical' importance to him; the remainder is only glossed over. The heavy veil thus cast over things is lifted for the artist, enabling him to perceive more clearly those visual or auditory impressions for which he will find expression in his art. According to the Bergsonian view, therefore, "The loftiest ambition of art...consists in revealing to us nature." 'Nature' here may be taken to mean 'reality', for he goes on to say that,

> Art, whether it be painting or sculpture, poetry or music, has no other object than to brush aside the utilitarian symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short, everything that veils reality from us, in order to bring us face to face with reality itself.... Art is certainly only a more direct vision of reality.[11]

Every vision viewed thus is unique --- therefore one finds in art not that which is universal, but that which is individual. The mood, the emotion represented in a painting, a poem, or a musical composition may perhaps never recur; but the artist who has succeeded in lifting the veil for even a short while, can create a work of art expressing his vision, his intuition, such that others may to some extent partake of the brightness of that vision and see, although with less vividness than he, that which otherwise they might never have seen at all.

The impressions of the artist do not remain sealed up within, but are 'realized' in an artistic medium; and from this, the artist

as well as the appreciator benefits --- as Croce writes:

> By elaborating his impressions, man frees himself from them. By objectifying them, he removes them from him and makes himself their superior. The liberating and purifying function of art is another aspect and another formula of its character of activity.[12]

It was this "liberating and purifying function" of art that was to form the basis of the psychoanalytic theories of artistic creation and appreciation.

CHAPTER VII

ART AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

The advent of depth psychology, and in particular its psychoanalytic interpretation of art based upon the theories of Sigmund Freud and to a lesser extent on those of Jung and Adler, has opened up a whole new vista of research in psychological aesthetics. Still a comparatively new science, psychoanalysis has initiated a trend of investigation into the deeper mental processes such as was heretofore impossible.

The relationship of art to the dream has of course long been recognized. Plato himself referred to art as a "waking dream", and many since his time have noted the similarity. Schopenhauer, for instance, once wrote, "A great poet, a great imaginative writer such as Shakespeare is one who in his waking life can do what we all do in dreams."[1]

But it was left to Freud and the psychoanalysts to find the common frame of reference of art, the dream, phantasy, and other forms of imaginative activity. While Freud was no aesthetician and evolved no 'system' of art, being primarily a psychologist, or more specifically a psychotherapist, he nevertheless left some papers which suggested certain lines along which a psychoanalytic exploration of art might be carried out. And his most notable contribution to art theory was of course his emphasis on the

'division' of the mind into various levels of awareness --- the 'conscious', the 'foreconscious', and the 'subconscious' --- the last two being sometimes referred to as the 'pre-conscious' and the 'unconscious'.

Artistic creation, as well as appreciation, is thus seen to be, like phantasy, a means of wish-fulfillment, or an outlet for repressed desires. Even the infantile desires of the first three years of life, which are soon relegated to oblivion, remain deeply embedded in the network of the subconscious. Thus, one may truly say that nothing that enters into consciousness is ever forgotten. It may lie so deep or be so intricately surrounded by inhibition as to be forever beyond the possibility of voluntary recollection, but it is not "gone" by any means.

Hoffman once said, "No fact has challenged the psychologist as much as the fact that we have a memory."[2] And it is indeed a mystery --- which perhaps Maudsley and others who write treatises on the 'physiology of mind' can unravel only to the satisfaction of their fellow mechanists and materialists.

But regardless of <u>how</u> perceptions are retained, the ability to re-capture and re-create past experience is one of the most enriching constituents of human life. Were all "flux and flow" as some ancient philosophers of change maintained, there would be no possibility of Man's ever rising much above the plane of an automaton. Without the Kantian "transcendental unity of apper-

ception" all experience would involve but a 'modification of states of consciousness' with no bond of continuity to clasp them together.

But just as chaos would be the lot of an existence devoid of memory, so too the continuous presence in consciousness of everything ever perceived would result in confusion and would render intelligible thought impossible. Therefore, by some kind providence the mental anatomy has been so constructed that those ideas which have no bearing on our present situation are relegated to the background, while those of immediate pertinence come to the fore and break through into consciousness. Freud's analogy of this with a watchman standing guard before the occupants of an antechamber is an apt one. The "watchman" here signifies a sort of 'endopsychic censor' who prohibits the passage of objectionable desires into consciousness. When the center of awareness is switched to a different stratum, as for example during sleep, the watchman relaxes his guard a little, and the desires that have been repressed emerge from their prison and find expression. The 'dream content' represents these repressed desires, usually in disguised form, while the 'latent dream' consists of the desires themselves, that seek refuge behind certain significant dream symbols.

The mechanism behind phantasy or day-dreaming is much the same as that of the dream proper. It too is an indulgence of

wish-fulfillment --- but here it is consciously invoked, in contrast with the night-dream which is a form of involuntary meandering in imagery. But while phantasy is a conscious process, we experience only a mild degree of shame or guilt. Concerning this weakening of the sense of guilt, one author writes:

> The privileges of fantasy are manifold. When fantasy has taken us far afield we do not as a rule experience shame or guilt --- shame, for instance, for having arrogated some of the properties of infantile omnipotence, guilt because the fantasy may have been ruthless or antisocial.... There is a feeling of not being responsible for one's fantasies.... In preoccupation with fantasy the ego withdraws cathexis with some functions of the superego.[3]

And as in phantasy, so it is in artistic creation. The artist may linger amid scenes he will never revisit; the poet may sing of a love that can never be; the composer may impart to his music a thousand fearful meanings that his lips would never dare to utter. For where the heart beckons, there the artist must go, even though his Painting, Poetry, or Music be the only portal....

Surely the philosopher Nietzsche was right when he said, "Art is with us in order that we may not perish through truth.... The essential feature in art is its power of perfecting existence, its production of perfection and plenitude; art is essentially the affirmation, the blessing, and deification of existence."[4]

Art, then, is seen to be an outlet for repressed desires according to the Freudian theory. The artist differs from others in that he has a means of self-expression which they can partake of only through artistic appreciation. But he differs from them in another respect also --- namely, in the intensity with which his desires assert themselves and demand rather than beg expression. Because of the extreme complexity and depth of the emotional fabric of the artist's mind --- falsely named the "artistic temperament", he is regarded with suspicion by some of his less sensitive brethren, and classed as a 'neurotic' or even as a 'degenerate'.

This is not to say that the appellation of 'neurotic' or 'psychotic' often attached to the artist is entirely a misnomer. Beyond doubt, many creative artists, particularly those of the stature of 'genius' have exhibited certain traits of character that were of a decidedly pathological cast. But such artists are as far above their fellow-neurotics as genius is itself superior to the average. The popular question as to whether a genius may be 'normal' is absurd and rests upon a misconception concerning the nature of genius and normality. Of course the genius is not 'normal' --- he is a genius precisely to the degree that he is <u>abnormal</u>!

This does not mean that abnormality <u>per se</u> is the essence of genius. There are perhaps thousands of deviations from the norm, but only one of them is Genius; there may be countless aberrations

in the sphere of the emotions, but only one of them constitutes the soul of the Artist.

Nevertheless, the high emotionalism mentioned earlier as characteristic of the artistic genius and of artists in general may warrant the assumption that while artists are by no means always neurotics, there is ever a tendency toward neurosis lurking about them. Acute sensitivity hovers on the verge of insensibility; it contains within itself the germ of its own overthrow. The danger is ever present that in its all-consuming passion it may consume itself, and flicker out like a candle that is left to burn through the night.

In finding expression, emotion is momentarily mitigated; as Freud says,

> If the individual who is displeased with reality is in possession of that artistic talent which is still a psychological riddle, he can transform his phantasies into artistic creations. So he escapes the fate of a neurosis and wins back his connection by this roundabout way.[5]

Thus, Freud envisages art as a possible preventative measure, or where a neurosis has already developed, as possessing therapeutic properties. Some other psychoanalysts, on the contrary, notably Adler, see artistic genius as being <u>based</u> on a psychic disturbance already present: "Genius is the overcoming of a marked psychic inferiority, often physical in its genesis, by unusual

application either in the line that originally generated the inferiority (Demosthenes) or in an unlike field (Byron)."[6]

Adler, in associating genius with "a marked psychic inferiority", views the goal of superiority as the objective of the psyche. In his Individual Psychology he writes that this is so "whether a person desires to be an artist, the first in his profession, or a tyrant in his home, to hold converse with God, or humiliate other people; whether he regards his suffering as the most important thing in the world to which everyone must show obeisance.... He is guided and spurred on by his longing for superiority, the thought of his godlikeness, the belief in his special magical power."[7]

One of the foremost evidences of superiority has ever been thought to be the quantity and quality of one's possessions --- material or spiritual. Speaking of this in regard to artistic activity, Havelock Ellis says:

> In creation we have not really put aside the possessive instinct, we may have even intensified it. For it has been reasonably argued that it is precisely the deep urgency of the impulse to possess which stirs the creative artist. He creates because that is the best way, or the only way of gratifying his passionate desire to possess.[8]

Freud, in his study of Leonardo da Vinci, shows how a vague desire for possession reaching back to infancy may so dominate the unconscious life of an artist as to color all his

artistic creations, or even give life to some which lacking its animating influence, might never have found expression at all.

Concerning the recurrence of this complex into consciousness by means of an artistic medium one biographer writes:

> Very early in his career as an artist Leonardo formed the habit, an almost unconscious habit, of tracing on the paper the contrasted profiles of a stern warrior, and a pretty youth. No doubt these types corresponded to some deep-seated longing of Leonardo's; perhaps he thought of himself in the character of Caesar laying a conquered world at the feet of his lover, the beautiful youth. Both types persist almost to the end, modified from time to time.[9]

Freud believes that Leonardo himself very clearly defined the origin of his complex without being aware of its implications for the later theory of psychoanalysis when he wrote:

> It seems that it had been destined before that I should occupy myself so thoroughly with the vulture, for it comes to my mind as a very early memory, when I was still in the cradle, a vulture came down to me, opened my mouth with his tail and struck me many times with his tail against my lips.[10]

Freud acknowledges that while memory reaching as far back as infancy is unlikely, it is not impossible. But what discredits Leonardo's account, in his opinion, is the absurdity of a vulture opening a child's mouth and striking its face. It is far more plausible that the vulture is a symbol formed later in phantasy

and transferred back into his childhood --- Leonardo himself remaining unaware of either the symbolization or transference, and quite sincere in his belief that this event with the vulture actually occurred.

Da Vinci was no doubt familiar with the ancient Egyptian myth concerning Mut, the vulture-headed goddess. Since according to mythology vultures were always feminine, he perhaps thought of himself as a vulture-child, because he lived alone with his mother for the first five years of his life. Like the young vultures, he appeared to have only one parent.

Freud assumes that Leonardo's mother lavished much attention on this, her only son, to compensate her ego for the loss of his father, who had married a noblewoman. Leonardo in turn probably cared so much for his mother that love for another woman even after he had become an adult would have seemed an injustice to her. Being around his mother exclusively during his formative years he came to identify himself with her, and thus took delight in being kind and gentle to youths, whom he now identified with himself as a boy. Quite early in life he often half-consciously sketched heads of laughing women and beautiful children; perhaps they represented his mother and himself.

Freud believes that the sudden upsurge of artistic creation after the "Mona Lisa" was because there was something about La Gioconda, probably her smile, that haunted Leonardo and re-awak-

ened in him memories of the one ideal love he had known --- that for Caterina, his mother, during his boyhood. After the "Mona Lisa" that strange smile which critics like to call 'enigmatic' plays over the features of almost all his portraits and paintings of heads. The "Mona Lisa" appears to have had as profound an effect on its creator as it has had on most art-lovers ever since. Freud quotes Muntz as calling it "the very essence of femininity; the tenderness and coquetry, the modesty and quiet voluptuousness, the whole mystery of the heart which holds itself aloof, of a brain which reflects, and of a personality who watches itself and yields nothing from herself except radiance."[11]

What then shall we say of Leonardo? That he was a great artist? But who will deny that? How shall we classify his psychological constitution? Surely not as a vicious psychopath, for his abnormality was a passive abnormality that found sublimation in the creation of magnificent paintings.

Freud concludes that,

> According to the slight indications in Leonardo's personality, we would place him near the neurotic type which we designate as the 'obsessive type' and we would compare his investigations with the 'reasoning mania' of neurotics, and his inhibitions with the so-called 'abulias' of the same."[12]

Here in psychoanalytic terminology we find a means of classifying Leonardo da Vinci.

And yet Freud himself would no doubt be among the first to

acknowledge that such a psychoanalytic investigation as he undertook in his study of this artist by no means suffices to explain his greatness, or his extraordinary artistic dexterity. Here even 'depth psychology' does not delve deep enough to unearth the source of that "psychological riddle" known as Inspiration.

To say that a poet writes nostalgic lyrics because he has loved and lost does not reveal the ultimate origin of his sonnet, nor does it tell us why its mood of wistfulness should so stir the heart of one who has never loved at all.

The Freudian theory of the subconscious does not explain inspiration; it merely pushes the mystery further back. And yet one feels that he has here touched upon a chord sympathetically attuned to the true nature of artistic creation. Depth psychology cannot take us to our destination; but perhaps it can suggest the course our quest might take.

That which we call 'inspiration' appears to spring from deep within the well of the subconscious. There is perhaps in those regions of the mind most distant from consciousness an unusual power of integration --- a harmonizing factor that brings together diverse, isolated elements encountered in experience, making a systematic unity of them. To what extent this power of unconscious integration can come under the influence of conscious volition is uncertain. We are not even capable of grasping wherein the connection between the different spheres of awareness lies. The

problem Descartes posed in regard to the mind-body relationship finds its purely psychological correlate in depth psychology. By what means does the subconscious act upon the conscious, and how does an idea pass from the level of the foreconscious into consciousness itself? And what is the link between these three? Might there not be other planes into which they merge? And what is to be found at the extreme polarities? Might there not be a "greater consciousness" which transcends normal awareness to the same extent or perhaps to even a higher degree than 'normal' awareness is removed from the foreconscious? Might this not account for the mystic's "heightened sense of reality", as well as for certain exalted states of 'inspiration'?

But before considering the possible metaphysical implications of this theory, let us turn to some explanations of the creative process that have been given by artists themselves; in so doing we may gain new insight into a problem which while distinctly psychological, touches upon many different studies, culminating perhaps in Philosophy.

CHAPTER VIII

METHODICAL VERSUS SPONTANEOUS ARTISTIC CREATION: --- METHODICAL

"Aus meinen groszen Schmerzen
Mach' ich die kleinen Lieder...."

So wrote Heinrich Heine, in simple but beautiful language expressing an equally simple and yet profound truth concerning artistic creation --- that it is an outpouring from the depths of the human soul. The great masterpieces and even the humbler works of all ages of mankind's history are rich in overtones of ecstasy and of anguish that echo from the recesses of the hearts of men. Herein lies the spontaneity of all true inspiration; herein lies the key to the Aesthetic Experience.

But inspiration improvises; art systemizes.

The instantaneous appearance of an artistic idea in the artist's awareness has about it the character of an improvisation. It may bring with it all the brilliancy of an unpremeditated rhapsody, a brightness which may perhaps momentarily blind its possessor to a lack of structural congruence. At such times it is not a deficiency of intuitive insight that distracts the artist and renders him incapable of noting the merits and defects of the art work he is creating, so that he might form an accurate evaluation of it; rather, it is the superfluity of the ideas produced by inspiration, the great velocity with which successive

ideas, often contradictory, invade his consciousness and pursue one another in an almost dialectical fashion. He is then confronted with the exhausting task of choosing which of two or more possibilities will best fulfill his purpose; and here, aesthetic taste may supplement or even replace altogether a 'rational' mode of selection. This need not be in any way inferior to the criterion of rationality --- for as Pascal once said, "The heart has its reasons which the reason does not know," --- but beyond a doubt the work of art so produced will differ greatly from one that has undergone a series of conceptual examinations under the scrutinizing eye of reason. The "art" of the artist lies partly in this ratiocination, but even more in his aesthetic judgment as to what constitutes beauty and perfection. It is this bilateral power of judgment, rational and aesthetic, that is responsible for the 'systematizing' of the content supplied by the original inspiration into a work of art.

Inspiration seeks an end; art discovers the way.

It is in this sense that one may speak of methodical and spontaneous artistic creation. The two, however, must not be thought of as being mutually exclusive. In the creation of any great work of art an element of both is present. Alone, the former yields technicians; alone, the latter remains forever mute.

Hence, any attempt to classify particular artists as belong-

ing to one or the other category must to some extent rest on a purely arbitrary delimitation. One may say only, for example, that Beethoven's artistic creation differs from that of Mozart by being relatively nearer to the opposite extreme --- the methodical.

Let it be noted that the quality of inspiration is not here being considered. Inspiration in its every manifestation is spontaneous. But its road to expression, to fulfillment in an aesthetic form is perhaps never absolutely so. The following description of Chopin's manner of composing clarifies this distinction:

> His creating was spontaneous and miraculous. He found it without seeking it, without foreseeing it. It came on his piano suddenly, complete, sublime, or it sang in his head during a walk, and he was impatient to play it for himself. But then began the most heart-rending labor I ever saw. It was a series of efforts, of irresolutions and of frettings to seize again certain details of the theme he had heard; what he had conceived as a whole he analyzed too much when wishing to write it, and his regret at not finding it again in his opinion clearly defined, threw him into a kind of despair. He shut himself up in his room for whole days, weeping, walking, breaking his pens, repeating and altering a bar a hundred times, writing and effacing it as many times, and recommencing the next day with a minute and desperate perseverance. He spent six weeks over a single page to write it at last as he had noted it down at the very first.[1]

A work of art produced under such conditions may exhibit

the characteristics peculiar to both the 'spontaneous' and 'methodical' types of artistic creation. In the compositions of Chopin, as in those of most romanticists, the element of spontaneity appears to overshadow all else. In listening to a Chopin sonata or nocturne one is impressed first of all with the pure lyricism of the melodic line, constructed with a facility reminiscent of Mozart; but the rich harmonic texture, the subtle yet typically romantic modulations into remote keys is not that of a Mozart. Here too the A-B-A form of the classical sonata has lost some of its rigidity; one senses no necessity for a return to the tonic key, nor for a repetition of the theme in the recapitulation; in listening to a sonata by Mozart or to one of Beethoven's earlier sonatas, conformity to this fixed structural procedure strikes one as essential if the whole is to be grasped as a coherent entity; but the 'sonata' of romanticism partakes of a sheer exuberance that is almost fantasy-like in its lack of rigidity.

And yet while the creations of a romanticist in music, art, or literature may appear at first to be devoid of any purposive formal structure, one discovers upon closer examination that this impression of 'formlessness' is false; the traditional mould has been replaced by a new one. An artistic content does not derive its being from this mould, but this mould is none the less essential to its expression in an art medium. It is of course

possible to overemphasize the formal element. One may question Clive Bell's definition of art as "significant form" or Hanslick's description of music as "form moving in sounds." A chair has 'significant form', a significance closely bound up with its utility, but one would hesitate to claim that for that reason every chair is a work of art; just so, one may drop pebbles into a stream in a rhythmic succession such that the recurring sounds demonstrate a certain formal unity, but this is not what we generally understand by the term 'music'.

No, form is not enough: the greater classicists recognized this; but <u>some</u> formal structure is essential; the greater romanticists recognized <u>this</u>. A work of art whose components exist in isolation, not bound together by a progressive and 'inevitable' evolution toward some finality of expression is actually not a work of art at all, but merely a production in an artistic medium.

A romantic composer such as Chopin is not content to create works consisting of discrete fragments. A series of ideas must be drawn together in a manner so that it may be classified as a series only by reason of its temporal succession. It must be a <u>unity</u> amid diversity.

But 'inspiration' is frequently fragmentary, as we have already noted. It may illumine all of life, but not every aspect of life with equal clarity and intensity at once. Chopin, along with most artists, felt the necessity of "working out" the details

of a plan he had in mind. The improvisatory character, however, never is absent, and it is this quality that lends to his compositions a charming freshness, a facility of expression rivalled by few of his contemporaries even in that period when the romantic spirit was dominant.

Facility is one element in the spontaneity of an art work; immediacy is another. The composition or poem or painting should involve no unnecessary circumlocution, no mere complexity for the sake of complexity.

But the methodical factor has its own unique contribution to make to an art creation --- its power to convey the impression of a purposive evolution toward an end. This 'end' is inextricably bound up with all that has preceded it; it represents a culminating point, and yet it carries its whole past with it. This evolution is a complex process; it may be called "simple" only in regard to its mode of development --- each idea springs 'naturally' and as it were, inevitably out of its entire history.

Art may be great because of the element of spontaneity it exhibits; and Art may be great because of the complexity of design, the profound intricacy of pattern it reveals. Artistry lies in the harmonious synthesis of the two.

* * *

In the music of Beethoven, as in the paintings of Leonardo, we find a strong proclivity to the 'methodical' factor in artistic

creation. Concerning Beethoven, one author writes:

> Beethoven's method was the reverse of that employed by other composers, say by Mozart. With Mozart as with most composers, the themes came to him first, and attention was then centered on working them out.... With Beethoven it seems that the entire movement came as a whole, but vaguely, the themes were not well-determined, and he had to find ideas that would fit into the incomplete conception.[2]

There is, however, strong evidence to the contrary. This is solved by reversing the names in the above quotation, which is done easily enough. It was Beethoven whose preoccupation with themes resulted in the Notebooks, which have been preserved and to which we may turn for insight into the evolution of his works of art; the vision of "the whole at once" is attributed to Mozart, whom we shall consider later.

Of the influence of Beethoven's sheer force of will upon his composing, it is said:

> He felt, he knew, that his was a creative power to which all opposition in the matter with which he dealt must succumb; he formed it after his will, and filled it with the contents of his soul. Thus was born a peculiar music, music that was the incarnation of strength and integrity. There is in these sounds nothing of the dreamy weaving of sentiments which casts such a spell over the musical lyricism of the romanticists; the emotions in them are sired by great and fully conscious intentions, governed by ideas, hence their unheard-of unity. The main impression they create is of greatness. No

> other musician has ever approached this gigantic, never-slackening will power; no one has ever coerced so impetuous, demonic a nature into following the dictates of his will under all circumstances, converting its energies into sheer creative power.[3]

It was perhaps this element of will so pervasive in Beethoven's music, particularly in his symphonies, that caused Goethe to speak of it as "grandiose, great, and mad music."[4] And we are told that "the demonic frenzy to which his symphonic developments lead frightened some of his more sensitive contemporaries, and as fine a musician as Carl Maria von Weber heard the violent torrent of tones and rhythms of the Seventh Symphony as if listening to the work of a madman."[5]

But in contrast to this emotional intensity, one also sees in Beethoven traces of a quieter nature, and of an intellectual spirituality. Here is a man who loved the tranquillity and solitude of the woods --- "All my mornings I pass with the Muses, and they make me so happy during the walk;"[6] a man devoid of worldly ambition --- "I have never thought of writing for fame and honour. What I have in my heart must come out, and therefore I write;"[7] here too is a man who despite his self-affirmed verbal inaptitude could utter with fervent sincerity sentiments and convictions verging on both poetry and philosophy: "Truth exists for the wise, beauty for a sensitive heart. The two are destined for each other,"[8] and "Display your power, Fate! We are not masters

of ourselves; what is fated must happen, and so Amen!"[9]

We know much about Beethoven's method of composition, not only from his Notebooks, but also from the various references he makes to it in letters and diaries that have been preserved. Both the Classicist and the Romanticist in his nature find expression there, as well as in his musical creations. Because of this "dualism" there arises at times a certain incongruity between some views he expresses --- as for example, in the following where he speaks of his regard for the performability of his works:

> My 'Fidelio' has not been understood by the public, but I know it will yet be appreciated; but still, although I know quite well what my 'Fidelio' is worth, I am at the same time equally conscious that the symphony is my actual element. If it sounds in me then I hear always the full orchestra; instrumentalists I can trust everything to; with vocal compositions I have constantly to ask myself, 'Is it singable?'[10]

And on another occasion, he writes to the eminent violinist, Schuppanzigh, who had protested concerning the difficulties of a passage: "Do you really believe that I think of your wretched violin when the Spirit speaks to me?"[11]

Another view on which he appears to oscillate is revision of his compositions. At one time we find him saying: "I carry my ideas for a long time with me before I write them down; with

this my memory remains so alive that I am sure of a theme that I have taken up unto myself; even after years I shall not forget it. I alter one thing and another, discard and try again until I am satisfied...."[12]

But to a publisher who requested some alterations he answered: "I am not accustomed to revise my compositions. I have never done it because I am convinced that every partial alteration changes the character of the whole."[13]

Perhaps, however, there is no real contradiction here; perhaps Beethoven employed an artful excuse to be relieved of the indignity of the disheartening task of making changes that he felt were unnecessary or even injurious to the work of art he had already so painstakingly perfected.

There is a vacillating emphasis between the methodical and the spontaneous modes of composing. In giving advice to the Archduke Rudolph from Vienna, he says:

> Accustom yourself to note down at once when at the pianoforte any ideas that may come to you.... By such means not only will imagination be strengthened, but one learns also how to fix at the moment the most out-of-way ideas.[14]

But also:

> You will ask me how I come by my ideas? That I cannot say with certainty; they come unsought, indirect, in a direct way, I could seize them with my hand in free nature, in the forest, on walks, in the silence of the night, in the early

> morning, aroused by moods, which with a poet are transformed into words, with me into tones, sounding, foaming, streaming, until at last they stand before me as notes.[15]

And elsewhere he says:

> So far as I am concerned, yes, good heavens, my kingdom is in the air; just like the wind, the tones often whirl around, and so often it eddies in my soul.[16]

The "dualism" in Beethoven's nature is perhaps one of the factors behind that inner conflict that produced works that appeal to widely varying types of musical taste; music, and the fine arts in general can supply diverse needs and may evoke many different kinds of aesthetic response. The scope of Beethoven's appeal is larger than that of certain other composers whose charm lies in one particular aspect of their art.

In Leonardo da Vinci we perceive an analogous case in the sphere of painting. Like Beethoven, Leonardo, while fulfilling the possibilities of existing forms, was sufficiently imbued with the spirit of a visionary to seek out new vistas of expression. Concerning his role in the history of painting one author writes:

> Great artists contain but also overleap the period in which they work.... Leonardo da Vinci belongs both to the Renaissance and the following Baroque period. Early Renaissance artists with some notable exceptions, had been obsessed with one element of painting to the neglect of others. In the field of painting, Leonardo's importance lies in the fact that he was able to

> encompass all of the diverse experiments that he had made and fuse them in a single work. In this, he is a summation of the Early Renaissance. Simultaneously, he was to delve into the field of psychology and suggest accents and stresses that were to find expression only in subsequent periods.[17]

The psychological effects of certain devices he employed --- notably chiaroscuro, which Rembrandt was to later make use of in his portraits --- have probably never been fully exploited. This is due not to a misconception of their value such as would discourage endeavors along such lines, but rather to the immensely rich potentialities inherent in them.

There is also another way in which Beethoven and Leonardo may be said to be 'kindred spirits' --- and that is in their methodical mode of creation. Vasari relates how Leonardo would stand for long intervals of time gazing up at the ceiling or wall on which he was to paint. His notebooks contain sketches of many art works never completed. Here too we find a parallel with Beethoven. Among those that were eventually to be worked out there are far more plans of total schemes than of details. The "Battle of Anghiari", for example, has about eight small composition sketches with three detailed studies of heads. It appears that he made these preliminary sketches very rapidly, but took much time concentrating on the best means of developing details.

Leonardo, while in many ways a typical man of the Renaissance, departs from its principles in certain very important respects. For one, he deplored the common practice of imitation of other art

works which leads to artistic atrophy and decline of progress. "A painter will produce works of but poor quality who takes for his guide the paintings of others; but if he will learn from natural objects he will bring forth good fruit. This we may see exemplified in the later Roman painters, who by continually copying the work of others from age to age hastened the decay of their art."[18]

The pedagogical value of observation of nature here referred to is of course a theme familiar to the Renaissance, just as it was later to be a vital constituent of the Romantic attitude. The first was based on the attempt to emerge from the stifling darkness of the Middle Ages into the fresh air and sunlight of the glorious world men had forgotten was a divine creation; the second 'discovery of nature' consisted of a breaking away from the restraint of Classical rules and 'laws', and an increasing awareness of the inexplicable wonder and mystery behind even the more 'simple' phenomena of the universe.

The inestimable worth of nature as "a school for the artist" is referred to by Leonardo in his Notebooks where he writes:

> The mind of the painter must be like unto a mirror which ever takes the color of the object it reflects, and contains as many images as there are objects before it. Therefore realize, O Painter, that thou canst not succeed unless thou art the universal master of imitating by thy art every variety of nature's form.... His mind will by this method be like a mirror, reflecting truly every object placed before it, and become, as it were, a second nature.[19]

Leonardo once called beauty "arrested grace"; and perhaps no expression more aptly defines the charm of his own art.

Among painters, as among creative artists in general, one finds fervent exponents of both the methodical and spontaneous types of artistic activity. We find those who stress method saying, "When the first idea is transferred to paper or canvas, the second kind of vision begins to take charge, and the actual development of the work suggests criticisms and modifications unforeseen in the mental image.... During the growth of a work on canvas or paper one sees combinations and suggestions that themselves become a fresh inspiration and so lead to the completion of the work."[20]

On the other hand, there are those who believe that such criticisms and modifications need not be 'unforeseen in the mental image'. All the planning and preparation should take place in the mind of the artist before any attempt is made to render ideas concrete in a physical medium: --- as Reynolds writes, "The painter who has a genius first makes himself master of the subject he is to represent, by reading or otherwise; then works up his imagination into a kind of enthusiasm 'til in a degree he perceives the whole event before his eyes when quick as lightning he gives his rough sketch on paper or canvas. By these means his work has the air of genius stamped upon it."[21]

However, the chasm between the two views just expressed is

not as great as might at first appear. Both are to a large extent 'methodical' --- the first of course more than the second. The main difference lies in the shift of emphasis from physical to mental systematization.

Among poets and authors a divergence of a similar nature is to be found. Although the methodical element may be said to have a small margin in its favor here, there are many voices raised acclaiming the superiority of the spontaneous. This is especially so among the Romanticists, whom we shall consider in the next section --- on spontaneity in artistic creation.

In defence of "method", Kipling offers this advice:

> Read your final draft and consider faithfully every paragraph, sentence, and word, blacking out where requisite. Let it lie by to drain as long as possible. At the end of that time, re-read, and you should find that it should bear a second shortening. Finally, read it aloud alone and at leisure.... I have had tales by me for three or five years which shortened themselves almost yearly.[22]

Burns said too that he always composed hastily and corrected at leisure. And even Poe in his Philosophy of Composition speaks of "the painful erasure", "interpolations", and "black patches".

An examination of poetic first drafts reveals that although the words sometimes fall into place as though some force external to the poet had put them there, this is perhaps the exception rather than the rule among most poets. The evidence on this point,

--- that is, favoring one or the other mode, in a particular poet's creations, is not always adequate, however, and is often purely circumstantial. Certain first drafts, as for example those of Tennyson, are locked in a library vault, safely hidden from the eyes of the curious. Then too, these 'first attempts' are often destroyed by their author as soon as a perfect copy has been made --- for various reasons, not always merely to safeguard vanity. Even where a first draft may be found intact, there remains the difficulty of deciphering a page "smothered with alternative words and phrases crowded into every available space --- around the edges upside down, wedged between the lines."[23]

A psychologist, working on a problem in the field of the creative imagination, provides this account:

> I was reading a volume of the Russian poet, Lermontov. It contained two facsimile reproductions of his manuscripts. One was the usual clean-copied page that embellishes fine editions. The other facsimile was of a first draft, very different in appearance from the clean copy: scratched up, scored, and interlined at places to the point of illegibility. While I was trying to decipher Lermontov's script, the idea occurred to me that this scarcely legible page was a virtual laboratory record of the poet's experience, in which one word replaced another and whole lines were altered, crossed out, and sometimes restored.
>
> If we could only trace and establish the precise order in which pen-stroke followed pen-stroke, should we not be in a position similar to that of the psychological experimenter who reads on the smoked drum the zigzag record of his subject's reactions? A poem's first

> draft is an objective record of a spontaneous process. The smooth or the stormy or turbid current of images, the driving ideas or the emotional charge that dominate the poet's mind and dictate his choice of words, step by step the process has inscribed itself on the scored page. Even the impatient scratches, the idle sketching on the margin, then some smooth-running stanza, all register the ongoing course, coloring, and tone of the poet's consciousness.[24]

There is, besides this difficulty to be encountered in deciphering and analyzing from a psychological point of view, the antipathy already suggested --- the poet's unwillingness to submit his works to the critical, impersonal eye of the research investigator. Amy Lowell gave expression to this in her poem called, "To a Gentleman Who Wanted to See the First Drafts of My Poems in the Interest of Psychological Research into the Workings of the Creative Mind:"

> So you want to see my papers, look what
> I have written down,
> 'Twixt an ecstasy and heartbreak, con them
> over with a frown;
> You would watch my thoughts' green sprouting
> ere a single blossom's blown.[25]

It is not difficult to understand the poet's attitude, nor is it strange that he should seek to avoid any cooly detached analysis of his poems.

A deeper enigma remains, however, the solution of which we have not yet ventured upon. To what extent can the presence of

so rationally-systematized a method be rendered consistent with genuine Inspiration, the animating principle of which is spontaneity? Does inspiration in seeking expression in artistic creation at times violate its own constitution and seek to improve upon itself? If this be so, then it deprives itself of its raison d'etre, and in so doing, destroys itself.

Before attempting to solve this problem, it will be necessary to grasp the nature of 'spontaneous' artistic creation; and it is to this we shall now turn our attention.

CHAPTER IX

METHODICAL VERSUS SPONTANEOUS ARTISTIC CREATION: --- SPONTANEOUS

In the preceding section we cautioned against interpreting 'method' and 'spontaneity' as two discrete elements in artistic creation. They should not be viewed as isolated territories; rather, one should speak of points on the scale of methodical-spontaneous artistic activity. The distinction between Beethoven's and Mozart's modes of composing has already been mentioned.

The peculiarity about the admittedly arbitrary differentiation thus set up is that it brings to light a problem that might otherwise pass unnoticed, or even if hinted at might meet with uncritical rejection. This problem is the one referred to at the conclusion of the last chapter.

The truth is, one does not ordinarily think of inspired artistic creation as involving any question at all as to method. It is 'inspired' to the extent that it is free from all such objective, 'rational' intrusions. Should the slightest indication of plodding laboriousness appear on the scene, one might immediately dismiss the possibility that the end-product of it could be the result of an "inspiration." But to disturb such complacence, it is necessary only to turn to Leonardo's "Last Supper" or to the setting of Schiller's "Ode to Joy" in the choral movement of the Ninth Symphony, to mention but two of numberless

examples that might be cited. Here is great art --- great art that did not have its origin in a half-hour of casual reverie. Should we set up the criterion of spontaneity as the determining factor, we should be compelled to admit that the "Ode to Joy" falls far short of the standard of excellence to be found in some of Schubert's lesser songs, while "The Last Supper" could probably be surpassed quite easily by an amateur artist setting out on a spring morning to paint a picture of the countryside.

It is obvious that such a criterion is somewhat inadequate, to say the least. "It does not tell the whole story," one might be tempted to suspect.

Having brought Spontaneity "down a peg", let us now rescue it from these depths and proceed to extol it for a while, in the hope of attaining in the end a more comprehensive notion of its nature and value, and of its relationship to 'method'.

* * *

In any discussion of the spontaneous type of artistic creation, the subject of Mozart inevitably comes up. Here is a composer of tremendous artistic stature who apparently produced great musical masterpieces at a very short notice with a maximum of ease and facility. Concerning him, Goethe once said, "Mozart is and remains a wonder that cannot be further explained."[1] And Beethoven too paid tribute to him, saying, "I have always reckoned myself among the greatest veneraters of Mozart, and I shall remain so until my latest breath."[2]

While some accounts of prodigious feats accomplished by him are no doubt spurious, there remains a considerable amount of reliable information concerning Mozart and his manner of composing. We have, in fact, Mozart's own account of his composing. It is an introspective account, rich in imagery, bare of any psychological terminology, and quite obviously sincere. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, renders it thus:

> First bits and crumbs of the piece come and gradually join together in his mind; then the soul getting warmed to the work, the thing grows more and more, 'And I spread it out broader and clearer, and at last it gets almost finished in my head, even when it is a long piece, so that I can see the whole of it at a single glance in my mind, as if it were a beautiful painting or a handsome human being, in which way I do not hear it in my imagination at all as a succession --- the way it must come later --- but all at once, as it were. It is a rare feast! All the inventing and making goes on in me as in a beautiful strong dream. But the best of all is the hearing of it all at once.'[3]

But it must not be thought that this type of composing is peculiar to Mozart alone. Were this the case, we might speak of Mozartean and non-Mozartean composition. Mozart is but one of the more illustrious examples of this type, or to put it otherwise, 'he exhibits a strong tendency toward the polarity of spontaneity in artistic creation', just as Beethoven exhibits a tendency toward the polarity of method. We find in certain other composers, such as Tchaikowsky, for example, these two tendencies

in relatively equal proportions, drawing the artist first one way and then the other. Tchaikowsky presents this description of his sensations during artistic activity:

> It would be vain to try to put into words that immeasurable sense of bliss which comes over me directly a new idea awakens in me, and begins to assume a definite form. I forget everything, and behave like a madman. Everything within me starts pulsing and quivering; hardly have I begun the sketch ere one thought follows another. In the midst of this magic process it frequently happens that some external interruption wakes me from my somnambulistic state. Dreadful, indeed are such interruptions. Sometimes they break the thread of Inspiration for a considerable time, so that I have to seek it again --- often in vain.[4]

But in contrast to this, he also writes concerning inspiration:

> This guest does not always respond to the first invitation. We must always work, and a self-respecting artist must not fold his hands on the pretext that he is not in the mood. If we wait for the mood, without endeavouring to meet it half-way, we easily become indolent and apathetic. We must be patient and believe that inspiration will come to those who can master their disinclination.[5]

Hence, he seems to be saying that while 'pure' inspiration may at times suffice to produce the general idea of the work, an unfailing persistence may be necessary for the achievement of the completed product as a fine composition. "What has been set down in a moment of ardor must now be critically examined, improved,

extended, or condensed as the form requires."[6]

Franz Schubert provides another interesting example on the scale of methodical-spontaneous composition --- perhaps midway between Mozart and Tchaikowsky. He was a prolific song writer, at times writing twelve songs in one day. Not without foundation did Schumann say of him, "Everything that he touched turned into music;"[7] and Schindler tells us that Beethoven on his deathbed exclaimed, "Truly he has the divine spark!"[8]

There is in fact a certain similarity between Beethoven and Schubert --- not so much in regard to musical style as in regard to spirit. Speaking of the latter, Lang says, "...Schubert was the unique early romanticist whose inspiration had its roots in Beethoven, who came nearest to Beethoven, and who at the same time was the greatest individual personality next to him. There he stood with the archclassicist in that peculiar period in which classicism and romanticism converged, at times called the classicist of romanticism, at others the romanticist of classicism, sharing to a certain extent the ambiguity that surrounded Beethoven."[9] And Schubert's last wish --- to be buried near Beethoven --- was fulfilled.

He has been called by some "The Father of the Song," which while an erroneous title, nevertheless conveys the general acceptance of his vast contribution to the German Lied literature. His tremendous output of vocal compositions attests to the spontaneity

of his musical creation. Yet even here the 'methodical' element is not entirely absent --- the "Erlkönig" is supposed to have been partially revised several times before it satisfied him. And while he wrote "Hark, Hark, the Lark" on the back of some menu cards at an inn during a 'flash of inspiration', the fact that he had earlier memorized the poem indicates that he probably had intended for some time to set it to music. This might seem to suggest that some inner faculty of which he was unaware had been at work seeking a musical expression of the poem, and in the moment of discovering it forced it out the pathway to consciousness, in order that the "inspiration" might find realization there.

What? An unconscious aesthetic idea? Why, that is absurd!

But is it?

How often we hear someone advise a friend who is worrying over a problem, to 'sleep on it'! Sleep, which "knits up the ravelled sleeve of care," often acts as a charm; the mind, momentarily freed from the exigencies of its life of awareness, may continue to scrutinize, analyze, criticize, and go through its other processes for the most part undistracted by externalities. We witness this in dreams which are often presented to us in truly amazing clarity and vividness, and the 'normal' concepts of space and time are all but obliterated. How many scenes we have thus visited, how many different lives we have lived in one short hour!

The analogy of art and the dream has long been emphasized;

ever since Plato referred to art as a "waking dream," and perhaps even prior to his time, the similarity has been recognized. You will remember how Mozart compared his mental vision of the whole of a composition to "a beautiful strong dream;" and another composer, Max Bruch, has said, "My most beautiful melodies come to me in dreams."[10]

Artistic activity, like the dream, appears to involve a certain degree of dissociation. The poet lives for the moment in the world of his poem, the painter is a part of the landscape on his canvas, the composer dwells in a whirling current of expressive sound. Reality is to be found not in physical nature --- "this world of space and time in which things rise and perish,"[11] but Reality is here within....

The artist seeks to express that reality, and in expressing it, he paradoxically enters <u>into</u> the sphere it pervades. He imparts form to that reality of which he himself becomes a part.

Every true artist journeys down the same road up to this point; inspiration, while varying in intensity and in aesthetic profundity and worth, retains its essential nature in the midst of a wide course of possible variations; but in realizing itself in the fullness of consciousness and later in concrete form, it invariably passes through a series of stages wherein it may easily become transformed or even "lost" altogether. Tchaikowsky spoke for a multitude of artists when he decried its vagueness and erratic

quality. Then too, even when the inspiration is complete, it may require revision so as to be adaptable to the particular art medium. A composer may hear in his imagination a brilliant finale of a symphonic movement only to discover upon a critical examination that it is impossible, at least in that key and at that tempo, for certain passages in it far transcend the possibilities of the instruments. Hence Beethoven mused, "Is it singable?" Occasionally, he concluded that perhaps it stretched capacities to very near their utmost --- and went ahead and wrote it the way he heard it anyway --- as in the choral movement.

So we see that while the artistic idea often has its source in the unconscious, it does not manifest itself as inspiration until it has reached consciousness. And on this plane it is apt to appear in a guise somewhat alien to it in order to accommodate itself to the inclinations of the individual artist; --- just as in dreams, repressed desires that might disturb the sleeper if revealed for what they truly are, assume intricate disguises and find an outlet in that way.

But there is in the dream no <u>third</u> stage such as is to be found in art. For art is not a mere imitation of an imitation, but, to paraphrase Plato, "an expression of an expression". The ideas that find an outlet to consciousness must then find an outlet into a concrete medium. And here, still further alterations may occur. In this way the quality of the art creation is, while

dependent upon the quality of the original inspiration, not synonymous with it. It may be only a shadow, the original idea transfigured.

Now the artist in giving expression to the idea that animates him, strives to make it as nearly perfect a replica of the original artistic idea as possible. And in so doing, he takes recourse to 'method'. The 'methodical element' in artistic creation is this light of introspection cast about here and there to illumine some of the darker recesses of the mind, in a search for a fragment of the inspirational content that may have gone astray.

* * *

Spontaneous artistic creation then, is seen to entail less of this 'searching' element. In the case of students in the art media it may be due to a deficiency in regard to the critical faculty or to an undeveloped discriminatory sense; among artists such as Mozart and Schubert it is due to the clarity and "inevitability" with which the psychological impressions attain fullness in consciousness, rendering further analytical introspection unnecessary.

At times those artists who employ 'method' regularly and most extensively (and perhaps most artists fall within this classification) find that an occasional impression is of such unusual clarity and intensity that the methodical approach is scarcely necessary, when, as Lamartine said, "It is not I who think. It is my ideas that think for me,"[12] or as Stevenson said, it appears

as though the real work is done by "some unseen collaborator."

The cause of this change of inspirational intensity may sometimes be a novelty in the life of the artist or an altered attitude toward a common occurrence, such that his emotional life undergoes a transformation, wherein he sees things in a different perspective. Burns writes, "I never had the least thought or inclination of turning poet till I once got heartily in love, and then rhyme and song were, in a manner the spontaneous language of my heart."[13] And Beethoven (to whom we keep reverting because of the wealth and scope of ideas he left in written form) once said: "A musician is also a poet; he can feel himself suddenly removed by a pair of eyes to a more beauteous world, where greater spirits plague him and give him much to do."[14]

Thus, any rich emotional experience may result in a deepening of the artist's inner life, and in an increase of his capacity to perceive artistic concepts as they appear in moments of inspiration. At such times he may experience "the aching tremor of a poetic idea to find and recognize itself and achieve finality or perfect utterance."[15] And Keats, in expressing the indescribable delight of this state, wrote, "Then felt I like some watcher of the skies when a new planet swims into his ken."[16]

Keats, along with most of the poets of romanticism, created artistic works in a highly spontaneous way --- the way of Mozart and Schubert.

The sudden upsurge of emotion that is an almost constant

accompaniment of true inspiration may take the form of elation described by Shelley:

> Sudden, thy shadow fell on me;
> I shrieked, and clasped my hands in ecstasy![17]

Or it may create a vague but none the less intense melancholy, as it did upon occasion with Keats:

> My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains
> My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk,
> Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains
> One minute past, and Lethe-wards had sunk.[18]

Almost always it brings with it what William James would call "a heightened sense of reality." It may take on also a rather religious tone:

> Poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man.... It is as though it were the interpenetration of a diviner nature through our own; but its footsteps are like those of a wind over the sea, which the coming calm erases, and whose traces remain only as on the wrinkled sand which paves it.[19]

At times this period of emotional exaltation up to the heights of ecstasy or entombment in the depths of despair is followed by a state of extreme physical exhaustion, as well as emotional strain. This was especially noticeable in Chopin. Concerning it, one author writes,

> If that condition of mind and soul which we call Inspiration lasted long without interruption, no artist could survive it. The strings would break and the instrument be shattered to fragments. It is already a great thing if the main idea and general outline come without any racking of brains, as the result of that supernatural and inexplicable force we call Inspiration.[20]

In conclusion, what shall we say of the problem of Methodical Versus Spontaneous Artistic Creation? Perhaps only that the 'versus' should be omitted; and also perhaps we may conclude that an examination of both forms has tended to impress more deeply upon us the truth earlier stated:

Art may be great because of the element of spontaneity it exhibits; and Art may be great because of the complexity of design, the profound intricacy of pattern it reveals. Artistry lies in the harmonious synthesis of the two.

CHAPTER X

EXTENDED DORMANT INSPIRATION

A study of various theories concerning the nature of artistic inspiration in both its philosophical and psychological aspects reveals a higher degree of consistency among even the more radical views than one might at first expect to attain on an issue admitting of diverse interpretations. The positions supplement one another, while each retains its own facet of exploration. The philosopher seeks to find a place for the artistic genius and his creations within a particular metaphysical framework; the psychologist looks not beyond but rather within the fabric of the creative mind for an explanation; the artist endeavors to render intelligible to himself and to others a phenomenon of which he has knowledge by acquaintance. If he be gifted in the art of introspection, he may grasp intuitively that which the psychologist comes to understand by means of observation.

While the methods employed by the artist and the psychologist differ in respect to the data considered for elucidation of the subject, (the one analyzes moods, impressions, and psychical elements in general, while the other examines empirical evidences of such inner states), the two nevertheless demon-

strate a remarkable similarity in their conclusions. The philosopher or student of philosophy, whether he accept these conclusions in their entirety or in part, is not primarily interested in them for themselves, but only as they may provide a stepping-stone in the progressive confirmation of an ontological or epistemological theory. He is, in short, concerned with their philosophical implications.

In this present discussion it is proposed that we concentrate our attention on the psychological aspect of inspiration, reserving a consideration of its philosophical implications until later.

As we have seen, Freud and his immediate disciples have little to say about 'inspiration' in the usage here involved --- Freud himself referring to it as "a psychological riddle." He and the psychoanalytic school are more concerned with the therapeutic possibilities of art. The whole motivation behind artistic production and appreciation, as well as play and the dream, is vicarious wish-fulfillment, the unattainment of which would result in a neurosis or even in a psychosis. Let us go on, however, to discuss inspiration in the non-pathological sense.

"Inspiration in its every manifestation is spontaneous." In making this assertion one is confronted with the necessity of explaining what is here meant by 'inspiration'. Neither of the

two definitions previously presented[1] would seem to suffice when placed in this context. The "concrete" form need not be 'spontaneous', indeed probably rarely is so. Only a few of the poets who write of love refer to 'love at first sight'. Hence the poet's query, "Who ever loved that loved not at first sight?" has as its underlying assumption a sweeping generalization which lacks the universal validity it claims. "Concrete" inspiration seldom appears so suddenly; what then of the "abstract" type --- "the psychological state or process?" But we perceive its lack of spontaneity too, for the very terms used to define it (i.e. 'state' or 'process') have temporality or extension in time as an essential constituent!

It is apparent the meaning of inspiration as used in connection with the concept of spontaneity must be still more limited --- it can be only a culminating moment in the 'state' or 'process' of abstract inspiration proper.[2] Let us define it as "that moment of the inception of the aesthetic idea."

But ideas ever flow into one another --- hence William James' delightful little analogy, "the stream of thought." Each thought or idea, by means of association echoes its predecessor and then calls forth its own successor. This continuum of personal identity is never broken (except perhaps in death --- but maybe we shall never know whether or not it is broken then); in dreams, as in intervals of dissociation and unconsciousness, it is not

severed, but rather, transferred to a different stratum of awareness, which at risk of a verbal contradiction we may call the 'unconscious'.

Nevertheless, despite the inevitably temporal nature of the series of associative ideas, each idea is an indissoluble entity, glorying in its moment, absolutely unique and supreme in itself. An idea does not, like the varying colors of a chameleon, change into its successor, but rather, gives place to it.

The philosopher David Hume in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding discusses three different ways in which ideas may be related in an associative sequence: resemblance, contiguity in space or time, and as cause and effect; some psychologists would reduce the number to two, maintaining that causal relations are nowhere discerned, but only temporal succession; they would apply Hume's skepticism in regard to the causal principle not only to physical phenomena, but to mental events as well.

Contrary to this, some other psychologists contend that these three fundamental means of relating ideas, besides being irreducible, also fail to account for certain mental phenomena that recent scientific investigation is tending more and more to demonstrate to be legitimate areas of inquiry that demand explanation. The field of psychical research is only beginning to be explored, having been neglected and left to lag behind while great strides of progress were being made in the physical sciences.

Once the barriers of crudely unscientific distortion of its data by some misguided enthusiasts and uncritical rejection of its suppositions by biased antagonists have been overcome, it may perhaps be free to advance as a science in its own right, unfettered by the chains of barbarous superstition on the one hand and nihilistic skepticism on the other.

And when psychical research shall have attained the status of a science, it will be confronted with the necessity of providing explanations for problems that have hitherto eluded the older introspective and behavioristic psychologies. It probably will not supplant them, just as behaviorism cannot omit introspection as a method without dissolving into a warpedly one-sided interpretation of a complex subject. Mere empirical observation of external states and of conduct does not yield the secret of their motivating force; in seeking to answer the question "How?", it fails to do justice to the query "Why?" If man is but a machine, a very cleverly wrought machine to be sure, but a machine nevertheless, the purely mechanical element in his thought and action is the only one that may be considered, for it is <u>all there is</u>; but if there be a 'non-mechanical' factor in his nature, a freedom of choice, a purposive evolution tending toward ever higher stages of development and consequently toward progressively greater power of self-determination, then any <u>empirical</u> attempt to acquire an adequate comprehension of the problems of psychology

and sociology, along with those of ethical and political theory, must prove futile because of a general misconception regarding the nature of the determination of behavior. But this issue is one that might more properly and advantageously be dealt with in the subsequent chapter, after a consideration of the causative sequence behind one particular sphere of human activity --- the creation of works of art.

We have seen how even artists themselves are not infrequently baffled by the sudden appearance and equally abrupt departure of artistic ideas. Those of us who are not artists but only lovers of art may marvel at the remarkably consistent explanations of this state even among artists of widely varying temperaments; unfortunately, however, we may also become perplexed by their liberal employment of cliches, which while intended to convey something of the "feeling" of inspiration tend rather to obscure its meaning. This difficulty is not peculiar to these attempts at explication of the phenomenon of artistic insight; it occurs whenever one endeavors to set in a conceptual framework that which is by nature non-conceptual. He who has a 'knowledge by acquaintance' of the fragrance of lilacs on a cool evening in early spring will try in vain to render this perception in vivid form and will fail to provide a 'knowledge by description' for one who has never partaken of this intuitive experience.

Thus, what might appear at first to be our most reliable

source of insight into the process of artistic creation, namely, the reports of the artists themselves, is seen to fall short of our expectations. The artist is not aware, except under rare circumstances, of the source of his ideas, nor of the causal element involved in their sequential development. It is to the psychologist we must turn for possible solutions to these questions. The artists' comments are invaluable in as much as they furnish the groundwork, the starting-point, for an investigation of the phenomenon of inspiration; and yet it being the case that it is a psychological phenomenon that we are here dealing with, as was stressed earlier, we can perceive the import of artists' descriptions only by subsuming them under certain psychological laws assumed to be valid; where an explanation appears highly plausible and cannot as yet be grasped as in accordance with any known law, the gap can be bridged only by speculative hypotheses, psychological or philosophical. Such speculation is subject to the rules of coherence and consistency --- the solutions it proposes should not contradict any 'law' or theory to which we ascribe validity.[3]

This being the case, let us first of all determine how much of the phenomenon here being considered is explainable according to previously accepted 'laws', and how much, if any, remains unanswered by modern psychology.

The three primary faculties involved in the creation of a

work of art appear to be memory, association, and integration. (It is the psychical process that is here referred to, rather than the physical manipulation of materials in any particular art medium, and for that reason the following remarks are applicable to all domains of art; and perhaps it might not be too radical to suppose that these three elements are influential in such purely "utilitarian" constructions as the preliminary formulation of a simple sentence in theoretical discourse or even in social conversation!)

Having named these three, memory, association, and integration (and in a somewhat dogmatic fashion) as being <u>the</u> constituents of 'inspiration', it is necessary to examine them closely if we seek to substantiate an assumption which is, on the surface at least, highly contestable.

Every artistic idea must spring from the psychical past of the individual becoming introspectively aware of that idea; stated more simply, it must have its roots in <u>memory</u>, and in that alone. He who would assume a point of origin other than this is immediately impelled to 'invent' a new faculty or new terminology for an old faculty if he is not to fall prey to the ancient mythical concept of inspiration as supernatural revelation. And even this view, if carried out consistently, might well culminate in a position similar to Plato's reminiscence theory, which is actually nothing but memory once again --- memory reaching into the

remote past. Furthermore, even apart from acceptance of the Platonic theory, the individual supposed to be in rapport with the Divine is enmeshed in a relationship wherein he discerns not merely that segment of history encompassing his life span --- but universal history, and here too we encounter a form of 'memory'. Thus, he who rejects the notion of past experience as the well-spring of inspiration is actually straining at the proverbial gnat while being compelled to swallow a camel!

The possession of memory is a remarkable asset in life; indeed, we might go further and say that without it life would be impossible. What a precarious existence we should lead if we were forced to learn over and over again that fire burns us when we approach it, that our bodies tend to fall when unsupported, or that certain plants are edible while others are poisonous! Thus, some degree of memory, rudimentary though it be in lower organisms, seems essential for survival over any considerable period of time.

But it is not with this purely practical aspect of memory that we are here concerned, but rather, with its power to enrich existence and to transform it into a continuous and meaningful whole.

Now, it is generally conceded that every recollection is based on an initial impression derived from experience --- extrospective or introspective; and because the mind on which these

various images and ideas are imprinted is one and the same entity throughout its whole course of existence, there is no reason to suppose that anything that has entered our purview of consciousness as an object of extrospective or introspective awareness should ever be really forgotten. Moreover, there is much evidence to corroborate the view that something may be discriminated in memory that was never presented to consciousness at all. But how can this be? Does it not contradict the assertion made prior to it --- that every mental image has its ultimate origin in experience? No; for in any act of perception, whether of an external event or of an internal state, there is, besides the 'given' datum or conglomerate of data upon which the attention is focussed, a "fringe" of perceptual elements; the latter do not manifest themselves (except in rare instances) as discriminated elements of the immediate perception. Unlike these peripheral relationships, which usually pass unobserved, the relationships obtaining <u>among</u> the various parts of the perceptual 'object' ('object' taken in the epistemological rather than ontological sense) <u>must</u> be discerned if it is to be grasped <u>as a determinate object</u>: as for example, in my perception of a chair, I may note brownness, hardness, solidity, and so on, but these isolated qualities do not convey the idea of a chair; it is only by conjoining them in a series of reciprocal relations, that is, by an act of intuition --- in which <u>no logical</u> necessity is entailed, incidentally ---

that I ever do in fact judge it to be a chair. The intuitive mental process may inter-relate the 'series' of sensuous ideas with such rapidity that the discrimination of them as parts of a series never takes place and the interval of time that elapses during the process is for all practical purposes negligible. For example, upon hearing 'a' above 'middle c' sounded, the aural impression conveyed is a singular one, seemingly possessing great unity; and yet we know that about 440 double vibrations per second are striking our ear, carrying with them a host of harmonics.

Thus, whether we perceive a visual image such as the chair or an auditory image such as the musical tone, it is not by means of a 'breaking up' of the constituents of the perceptual object that we grasp its significance; on the contrary, the elements originally present themselves in this very isolation, and if perception of an object as an object is to be gained, it is only through this intuitive process of inter-relating discrete factors. In viewing the chair, one may consciously and quite voluntarily conjure up novel relations among its qualities by abstracting them from their original context, and uniting them in a new intuition. Here the mind is very versatile. In the case of the single tone one may do likewise: by isolating certain tonal properties, its timbre and intensity, for example, he may relate these to a tone of a different pitch, and then retaining this new pitch may increase or diminish its volume, or alter its quality by imagining

it produced by a different instrument.

This conscious discriminative undertaking is in its earlier stages exactly the reverse of the perceptual process, in that it abstracts from a preconceived whole certain of its attributes susceptible of a new formulation; in its later phases, however, in the re-grouping of these elements into a complex psychical entity, it is directly correlative to the synthesizing act of the perceptive faculty in its re-presentation to awareness of presentational data supplied by sensation. Of this we shall have more to say in a subsequent discussion of the philosophical implications of this view of creative activity in the fine arts.

Now the artist possesses this power of inventing novel means of relating data supplied by past experience and of incorporating them in a "new" idea to a greater extent than do those of us who are not artists. But he possesses another ability mentioned a little earlier, and this is perhaps of still greater importance to him --- the unconscious assimilation into memory of perceptual elements which belong to the "fringe" of the given data. A painter, attempting to express his intuition of a landscape by giving it concrete form on a canvas, cannot divorce those colors and shapes he views at a distance, from their peripheral relationships. The landscape can never be seen as a painting of it will appear to the objective eye of a critic later on, when such a painting will be

surrounded by a frame and hung in a museum amid a group of other paintings dealing with various subjects. It can never be truly 'recaptured', precisely because its "peripheral relationships" must of necessity undergo change. The artist, in perceiving the rolling hills, the small farmhouse off to one side, the trees in back of it, the blue sky and white clouds beyond that, is part of the nature that is the object of his perception. His 'aesthetic contemplation' is less 'detached' than it will ever be again. However vivid his memory, it will not bring back to him in later years the diverse interrelationships among the sights, sounds, fragrances, tactile and kinesthetic sensations in which he is presently immersed. Of even greater import in the determination of an experience by peripheral relations is the psychical state or frame of mind in which the "totality of the experience," the intuition is grounded. And every psychical state is in some sense unique; it will never recur.

It is this multiplicity of peripheral elements and their interrelationships that differentiates aesthetic contemplation from 'practical' perception. Contrary to popular opinion, aesthetic contemplation varies <u>inversely</u> with the degree of detachment of the percipient from the object of his awareness. Sensitive criticism or appreciation of art requires that the percipient relate the artistic content to something in his own past experience, and that he view this latest manifestation of aes-

thetic beauty and meaning as complementary to that of past perceptual objects that have entered his sphere of awareness; but even this is not enough; to be truly a work of art it should seem to surpass them all in one way or another or to provide something that was lacking in all previous perceptions. It is only by going beyond past observations that it may complement them by broadening the scope of their own meaning. Thus, ideally not only aesthetic contemplation but the whole of life would become more rich and meaningful the longer one lives; disenchantment would find an abiding place only in the hearts of those who created their ideals from fragments of the transient and illusory aspects of life.

But some may find nothing in life that is not transient and illusory. Media in vita in morte sumus. And they may be right. Perhaps the artist is deluded when he believes himself to have discovered meaning somewhere and when he seeks to recapture and express that insight; and even his periods of intuitive understanding may all too often alternate with intervals of despondence wherein the totality of experience is viewed as a meaningless phantasmagoria --- a mere succession of appearances and strivings, the futility of which joy can but temporarily mitigate and only death can terminate.

Be that as it may; the fact remains that artists and non-artists alike do profess at times to discern harmony amid this

whirlpool of chaos. Even dissonance may intensify the harmony. The problem of evil is an old one, and we need not concern ourselves with it here; let us rather devote our attention to the query, "Whence comes this impression, illusory or not, of having gained insight into the meaning of existence?" And setting aside for the moment the philosophical issues that might aid in its solution, let us return to the psychological aspect of the problem.

For an image or event to have meaning ascribed to it, it must be envisaged in a larger context than that of the present moment of awareness. What William James called the "blooming, buzzing confusion" into which the infant is born must be supplanted by an array of colors, sounds, odors, etc. that possess <u>significance</u> for him. Each successive impression of a given datum will render it more intelligible up to a certain point which might be called 'the plateau of acuity of perceptual awareness". Beyond this, impressions have no longer the capacity to present themselves to our awareness with any <u>increase</u> of clarity. In the perception of a single tone one may be drawn to analyze its properties as an aural datum --- frequency, intensity, timbre; if the analysis ends here with the attributes of the tone, one will shortly lose all interest in the sound stimulus, and if he be compelled to endure it over a fairly long period of time, he may become irritable; if it is continued still more he may succeed

in shutting it out of his sphere of consciousness to such an extent as to be unaware of its presence.

Now, the acknowledgement of what we have been referring to as 'peripheral interrelationships' greatly heightens the "plateau of acuity of perceptual awareness." What holds true in the case of constant or continuous stimuli such as in the example stated above holds true of successive stimuli, although the degree of irritability and subsequent inurement may be altered by the intervening span of time, and in many cases will never appear at all. Consider again our hypothetical victim of a single tone sounding throughout a seeming eternity: If his power of analyzing the sound stimulus be not confined to a scrutiny of its attributes (that is, those properties which it possesses 'in itself' --- pitch, timbre, etc.) but is expanded so as to include so-called peripheral elements, the irritation and inurement may be considerably delayed or even postponed indefinitely. He may transform the object of extrospection (the sound) into an idea that is colored by introspective elements, while none the less retaining these 'objective' features. He may by so willing combine it in imagery with two other tones encountered in past experience and which are suggested by the harmonics of this particular manifestation, and in that way he may form a chord. His knowledge of harmony, or if he be lacking that, the capricious character of his imaginative undertaking may further suggest a possible direc-

tion of movement for the chord; this sequence may create in him a certain mood, of frivolity, restlessness, or anticipation, for example, that will incline him toward a particular type of sequential development. In this way, the germ of a sonata or symphony may sprout in the adjunction of a single tonal impression, a receptive aesthetic faculty, and a complex process of imaginative evolution.

The art of the artistic individual lies in his capacity for discrimination of these intricate 'peripheral relationships'. Since these are not attributes of the "given" in itself, but come into existence only as properties of the psychical apparition, the process is truly a creative one, and not a mere synthesis of elements perceived. For that reason any attempt to produce a work of art by purely 'mechanical' or 'mathematical' devices will be in vain, in so far as it fails to take account of that introspection by means of which an insight into such relationships is to be attained.

In that psychological state or process which we have been referring to as inspiration during the course of this inquiry, the introspecting mind revives elements derived from past sensuous intuitions, which intuitions, as we have seen, contain unconscious as well as conscious components. The unconscious fragments may be sensuous, as in the case of the "fringe" perceptions of the artist painting the landscape; or they may be non-sensuous

purely psychical properties such as we have been discussing. All extrospection involves the former, since no empirical observation can at any moment discriminate all sensuously observable elements within the range of perception; and all introspection involves the latter (e.g. associative properties) because of our possession of memory. In the absence of memory every impression and idea would retreat irrevocably into the past. Thus, memory is essential to the unfolding of any psychological process, including the evolution of an artistic idea, which creative process we designate by the term 'inspiration'.

Association is but the means by which impressions and ideas buried in memory emerge into consciousness. Integration is the combining of these psychical fragments recovered by the associative tendency into an aesthetic whole.

In this way, every 'inspiration', however instantaneous its appearance, is only the last link in a chain of a causal psychical sequence. No work of art is created in temporal isolation; the seeds of its origin are abstracted from the totality of the artist's past experience; regardless of the 'methodicalness' or 'spontaneity' with which an idea is impressed upon a physical art medium, the process of sequential evolution that underlies its psychical creation is spread out over a considerable period of time. In this sense all 'inspired' ideas are the products of extended dormant inspiration, and serve to manifest its existence. And

without this extended dormant inspiration and its three components, memory, association, and integration, an aesthetic idea could find no expression in a work of art.

CHAPTER XI

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

An inquiry concerning the nature of a psychological phenomenon such as we have been investigating has about it this rather curious fate: that while its approach must of necessity be the method of an empirical science, it nevertheless touches upon spheres of study whose hypotheses and theories admit of no exact scientific formulation, at least according to our present means of empirical verification. And yet its principles, could they be discovered, would be of such far-reaching import, not only for psychology, but for philosophy as well, that we cannot afford to ignore the consequences of any potentially valid (although non-validated) theory proposed toward the solution of the problem.

Since in any inquiry there is, or should be, a continuous line of development from its presuppositions through to its implications, and since a cleavage in this continuum would demonstrate a lack of consistency that is fatal to the 'scientific' status of any investigation, it might be well to begin our philosophical consideration of the subject with an examination of its presuppositions. Since the latter may be placed into three categories, psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical, let

us examine them in this order.

First of all, we find among the major psychological presuppositions a 'depth' view of mind. In order that the evolutionary process of an artistic intuition take place by means of the phenomenon we have been calling inspiration, it is necessary that the various strands of its unfolding revert to a background of perceptual impressions, not all of which are equidistant from the center of awareness. The degrees of distinctness with which mnemonic elements derived from past experience emerge into consciousness suggest a varying density of psychical being which a theory of mind non-cognizant of the 'depth' factor cannot adequately account for.

There appears to be in man a hierarchy of consciousness; whether or not this is so in the case of lower organisms (of which we may postulate the possession of rudimentary 'minds') is uncertain. Not all living beings are conscious; some are conscious, but no more; in the human mind alone is self-consciousness or reflective thought attained. The motivation behind behavior is no longer purely a matter of reflex or instinct; any given impulse, even that of self-preservation, which seems the most closely bound up with man's instinctive nature, may be modified, conditioned, or even thwarted altogether by the influence of his intellect, the two constituents of which are reason and imagination. Thus, artistic creation is not instinct sublimated, an innate tendency div-

erted from its normal course of fulfillment, as some contemporary schools of psychology would have us believe.

While an artistic creation derives its being from the 'higher' faculties of man's awareness, reason and imagination, there is in it an unmistakably "primitive" quality nevertheless. Inspiration reaches back into the more distant spheres of consciousness, unearthing phantom-like images and vague nostalgias long since forgotten. These fragments of past perception may be so intricately ensnared in a maze of repressions and so concealed by the elapsing of time that all sense of their mnemonic character is lost. In view of this, is it any wonder that the artist in an inspired state often attributes to his revelatory ideas an objective source? They possess a certain "given" quality similar to that which is encountered in sensuous presentations.

This apparent 'objectivity' of the ideational sequence in the creative process may thus have relevance for epistemological inquiry, in as much as it suggests the possibility of unconscious psychical action upon a chain of impressions. The objection that that which we call a sensory datum presents itself with an immediacy that permits no preliminary activity on the part of the mind would perhaps seem to nullify this suggestion of relevance. But a little further consideration of the matter shows it to be not so easily refutable. Whether or not it be refutable at all is dependent upon the distinction between 'sensation' and 'perception'

and upon the scope we are willing to ascribe to each. We are not here denying the temporal contiguity of the two in extrospective experience; we are only asserting that such contiguity does not destroy the essentially interpretative factor in experience.

The claim that the immediacy characteristic of a series of sensuous perceptions renders it something wholly 'other' than a series of purely psychical images, cannot be substantiated, for this impression of immediacy is derived not from sensation, but from perception. In saying that something is immediate, we are but interpreting its relation to us.

Now sensation, being merely passive receptivity of sensuous properties, does not provide us with a knowledge of the interrelationships existing among those properties, or of their relation to us. This is the function of the interpretative perceptual faculty, and the attainment of such knowledge is through an active process analogous to that involved in artistic creation. Because 'immediacy' is not grasped sensuously, but only perceptually, a purely 'introspective' experience may in this respect equal or even exceed (as it often does) an 'extrospective' experience.

What then of the temporal contiguity of sensation and perception in an experience of an 'external' sequence of events as contrasted with the absence of 'sensation' in an internal sequence

of images? Does this not preclude the possibility of any intervening psychical activity in perception as is to be found in 'purely' mental creation? No; for in such phenomena as illusions and hallucinations which strike one as 'external' there is evidence of genuine psychical activity. The former consists in misinterpreting a sensation: we say that the perception is non-veridical even though the sense data proceed from an 'objective' source. Consider the experience of one who is half-asleep, and who believes he hears a flute playing in the distance; in a moment he awakens to find his alarm clock sounding. Here the physical occurrence that occasioned the aural illusion is real; real too is the sensation of sound waves striking the ear of the sleeper; the misinterpretation of the datum is attributed to erroneous perception. The mind's activity is demonstrated by its judgment, in this case a false one, of the initial stimulus.

In the case of an hallucination the mind is yet more active in perception. In an illusion, the data of the experience are misjudged; in a genuine hallucination the data are created. There is in an hallucinative image no external basis for either sensation or perception, for here is a pure mental construct. The same holds true of after-images and eidetic images: the sensuous qualities we perceive are unmistakably "out there," and yet we say they are not 'real', for they do not issue from a present external source of sensation.

But some may object that this argument in support of the mind's creative role in perception is invalid, in as much as the phenomena alluded to are not 'external' in the real sense, (with the exception of the illusion, which has such a basis) but are merely "externalized." They need not be directly occasioned by any sensation, and since they are therefore mental constructs rather than veridical perceptions, there is no reason to deny the mind's creativity in their production. And they will re-state their assertion that the mind is purely passive in the perception of those spatio-temporal events known by means of sensation.

Now in view of the theory of extended dormant inspiration, as outlined in the preceding chapter, which theory attempts to explain one particular type of psychical activity, namely artistic creation, it is difficult to conceive of such passivity on the part of the mind. Were not the mind active in its acquisition of perceptual impressions and in their ordering, sheer chaos would result; what mind, however creative, could construct a meaningful work of art amid such a debris of unsynthesized fragments? In order that the psychical impression be realized in a concrete medium, or even that it have any existence at all, it is necessary that it be composed out of elements in some way associated. And by what means do we associate them? Only by abstracting them from the moulds in which they were originally perceived and by conjoin-

ing them in a new associative sequence. But in the very recognition of such an 'original mould' with the various interrelationships among its parts providing material for association, one returns to a concept of mind as an active "interpreter" and "orderer" of that which is given by sensation. If the mould is to be conceived as a whole at all, the reciprocal relations of its parts among themselves and to such a greater whole must be perceived.

This brings us back to an issue we were discussing a little earlier --- that of peripheral interrelationships. We saw how these might be physical (as in the case of the painter's "fringe" perceptions) or psychical (as in the associative conjunction of mnemonic elements). Both types exist in the mind of the percipient as influential factors in all perception and imaginative construction even if they should never reach the level of his conscious awareness.

The physical "fringe" seldom concerns us except in moments of aesthetic contemplation when we seek an 'intuition of the whole'. While a true "vision of the whole at once" is an impossibility due to the interrelatedness of all things (any number of perceptions being necessarily finite), we can nevertheless considerably broaden our scope of awareness by attending to it until it tends in the direction of this ideal.

It is not this, however, that is of primary concern to us

here, but rather the penumbra of psychical elements. The former are of importance chiefly to the artist and to the aesthetician; the latter leave their mark upon the lives of all men.

We have asserted that due to the self-identity of the mind through its diverse experiences, there is no reason why it should not retain its whole past in memory. How then are we to account for the phenomenon known as "forgetting?" Only by assuming that the mind is selective in the process of recollection. The mind cannot remember because it has chosen to forget. The whole past is there ready to be brought forth, but there are some things it would prefer to leave concealed in those murky depths. Psychoanalytic psychology regards all such 'intentional' (although note, unconscious) forgetting as being of a "censorial" nature, with its roots in inhibition; certain psychologists of other schools of thought (e.g. William James) believe all recollection to be in part selective. The distinction, while not a weighty one (since what one chooses to forget is "censored") is yet worth mentioning because of the different degrees of importance placed on inhibition in the psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic systems.

So it is seen that the mind is active in remembering; and this is a more problematic issue in the controversy of the passive-active status of the mind, than we encounter in either its associative or integrative role. It is true that many modern psychologies, especially those that are an outgrowth of the mechanistic-materialistic concept of the universe, will look with distrust upon the notion of mind as an active agent, and are even rather

skeptical in regard to the existence of such a thing as 'Mind', at least with a capital 'M'. This circumstance once led someone to remark that "First psychology lost its soul, then it lost its mind, then it lost consciousness; it still has behavior, of a kind."[1]

Regardless of the term employed (and I see no reason for qualms of uneasiness over the usage of 'mind' with or without a capital 'M', although I would object to the concept of a "thinking substance") --- something appears to be active in the three phases of artistic creation, i.e. memory, association, and integration.

Is it active in perception? It would seem so; that is both a presupposition and an implication of the thesis of "extended dormant inspiration" which we are here seeking to defend. The mind in perception is as a painter standing before his canvas; the colors of the palette indeed are given, but who can discern amid those hues the work of art, expressive of beauty and truth, that as yet but hovers about the artist's brush? The value of an artistic creation lies in its power of transcending the physical medium upon which it is impressed.

Perhaps the value of mind, indeed its entire role, lies in its power of transcending this or that particular manifestation of being which is given in sensation and which is to be understood only in perception. Because of the incomplete nature of

all experience and its fleeting appearance in awareness, an immediate apprehension of it is rendered possible only through an interpretative synthesis that encompasses the totality of a psychical past. Thus, not artistic inspiration alone, but every intuition, represents the culmination of a creative process.

And perhaps it is only through a series of intuitive syntheses that the mind may attain to an awareness of the varying degrees of Reality; in a world where change is ultimate and becoming alone is continuous, there is need of a relativistic ontology.

But here we pass beyond epistemological inquiry to the realm of metaphysics; and it is here that we should pause for a moment and retrace our steps. We have noted how the artist perceived a certain 'passivity' on his part in regard to the succession of artistic ideas, their unpremeditated schematic development. The possibilities once presented, he is free to choose among them; but their immediate presentation in his awareness seems to be an instantaneous occurrence prior to, and independent of, volition. The ideas emerge in a sequence devoid of any rational control, often apparently without any connection according to the laws of association. If such a chain be associative, the "gaps" can be explained only as concealed links which remain below the level of awareness, while nevertheless affecting the causal sequence developing in consciousness. These ideas, for one reason

or another, are rejected before reaching the conscious level!

The acceptance of this premise (which is actually little more than the Freudian "endopsychic censor") necessitates one of two possible conclusions: one must either admit the existence of unconscious volition (since selection and rejection involve the activity of the will), or he must assert the presence of a conscious faculty (what may be called "the inner attenuation of the Self") in the lower depths of awareness, as well as its capacity for movement throughout the varying planes.

Now actually, I believe one may accept both these hypotheses, in as much as there is no inconsistency thereby entailed. In selecting only the latter for discussion, therefore, I am guided not by a metaphysical predilection in its favor, but by its more fruitful implications for the subject here under consideration.

That which we have been referring to as inspiration and which we defined at the outset of our study as "the psychological phenomenon underlying artistic creation" was seen to involve a highly complex psychical process, the three main stages of which were memory, association, and integration. By means of "extended dormant inspiration," the gradual evolving of an aesthetic idea carried it through a progressive development to concrete embodiment in an artistic medium. It was a purposive scheme wherein each phase grew 'inevitably' out of the one that preceded it. This process, often unconsciously pursued in its preliminary phases

(hence, "dormant") consisted in the abstraction of elements out of a psychical history, a "totality of past experience."

Now, while the theory of extended dormant inspiration presupposes a 'depth' view of mind, it poses problems which depth psychology as it is generally conceived cannot answer without the addition of some new assumptions. It may be that the psychological 'division' of the mind into the levels of the conscious, foreconscious (preconscious), and subconscious (unconscious) is based upon a purely arbitrary delimitation of their boundaries; but like the older 'faculty' psychology, this distinction into "levels of awareness" has a certain pragmatic merit and provides us with a very convenient terminology which for all practical purposes we ought not to dispense with.

That all psychical being of which we have any knowledge exists only within a temporal framework is an assumption that no one can seriously undertake to doubt, for the very act of doubting takes place in time. Furthermore, all experience, both extrospective and introspective, occurs within such a temporal order; because all sensory impressions are given as a series of rapid stimuli, extension in time is requisite to all sensuous perception.

To the extent that the mind, unlike matter, is not subject to the spatial dimension, it is free; to the extent that the mind is subject to the temporal dimension, its freedom is finite.

The Mind's extension in time is analogous to a horizontal movement (e.g. a "stream of consciousness"); its intension as being is comparable to a vertical equilibrium. The former is dynamic; the latter is dynamic within a static frame.

One may view the 'stream of consciousness' as flowing through a continuum of Present Instants; or one may view it at any given moment as being halfway between the immediate past and the immediate future --- always at some vague, theoretical point called 'present'. While the concepts of 'past' and 'future' acquire meaning only in relation to the present, they paradoxically remain irreconcilably apart from it.

And just as time is in some sense relative to the 'horizontal movement' of a consciousness through it, so too, consciousness itself as a 'vertical equilibrium' may be relative. What the depth psychologists designate by the terms 'foreconscious' and 'subconscious' may be but lesser degrees of 'consciousness'. We might even go beyond this and assert that there is no basis for the assumption that that which we call 'consciousness' is the highest plane of awareness attainable by Mind. So too, there is only circumstantial evidence based upon empirical observation of behavior for the belief that the degree of 'consciousness' among members of any given species is a constant, rather than a variable. For there may be not only a relativity of consciousness within any given mind, but also a relativity in regard to variations of con-

scious acuity and intensity among different minds.

The phenomenon of inspiration, along with certain other states of heightened suggestibility, as for example those produced by hypnosis, would seem to indicate that in moments of intense concentration accompanied by high sensitivity, the mind is capable of exhibiting extraordinary mnemonic, associative, and integrative powers that far surpass its meagre attainments in states of 'normal' sensitivity. It would appear in such instances that the mind-of-the-present, or what we have referred to as "the inner attenuation of the self" is living momentarily at a higher level of awareness; it is more 'conscious', and more acutely susceptible to response to a particular line of psychical stimuli; and yet paradoxically, it appears to be in touch with elements from its whole psychical past, which, as it were, erupt from the depths of the so-called subconscious. How can this be?

In sleep, dissociative insanity, and periods of unconsciousness, there is a shifting of the inner attenuation to a lower stratum of awareness; during states of heightened sensitivity, such as the manifestations of inspiration we have been considering, this inner attenuation appears to move erratically from one level to another.

It may be that consciousness is circular: If one traces the line of a closed curve far enough, he returns to the point from whence he came....

Now, intuitive insight such as the artist experiences in moments of inspiration involves a widened perspective if the diverse elements encountered are to be interpreted as parts of a greater totality. The present moment of awareness, or even what is sometimes called the "specious present", affords no such comprehensive view. Images are presented to the various senses in a highly irregular, and often disconcerting fashion. All experience is at best transient and fragmentary; we would linger amid these scenes and flee from those, but time pays no heed to our requests. As the poet wrote,

> You linger your little hour and are gone,
> And still the woods sweep leafily on,
> Not even missing the coral root flower
> You took as a trophy of the hour.

Thus, great art may represent Man's defiance, often an ironic one, and his protest, all too often an anguished one, against that time that enshrouds his brief existence; or it may express his faith in ideals thought to transcend time.

* * *

And so a study of the psychological process underlying artistic creation has shown it to involve the complex evolution of an aesthetic idea through the phases of recollection, association, and integration, to culminate in an aesthetic whole we call a work of art. The quest for concrete embodiment of a series of meaningful impressions is to be attained only through

an immediate, intuitive grasp of that greater totality.

In this role, at once synthetic and creative, lies the essence of artistic inspiration.

This bibliography is not meant to be a complete list of works dealing with the subject; it consists, rather, of those works I found especially helpful.

Bosanquet, B., A History of Aesthetic, George Allen and Unwin Ltd,. London, 1892.

Carritt, E. F., Philosophies of Beauty, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1931.

Chambers, F. P., The History of Taste, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1932.

Chandler, A. R., Beauty and Human Nature, D. Appleton-Century Co., New York, 1934.

Croce, B., Aesthetic, (trans. by D. Ainslie), Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1922.

Freud, S., A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, H. Liveright Co., New York, 1920.

Freud, S., Leonardo da Vinci, Random House, New York, 1947.

Gilbert, K., and Kuhn, H., A History of Esthetics, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington, 1953.

Goethe, J. A., Literary Essays, (trans. by J. E. Spingarn), Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1921.

Griswold, F. H., Creative Power, David McKay Co., Philadelphia, 1939.

Guggenheimer, R., Creative Vision, Harper and Bros., New York, 1950.

Harding, R. E. M., An Anatomy of Inspiration, W. Heffer, Cambridge, England, 1948.

Hegel, G. W. F., Philosophy of Fine Art, (ed. by F. P. B. Osmaston), G. Bell and Sons Ltd., London,1920.

Hirsch, N. D. M., Genius and Creative Intelligence, Sci-Art Publishers, Cambridge, 1931.

Kant, I., Critique of Aesthetic Judgement,(ed. by J. C. Meredith), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1911.

Kris, E., Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, International Universities Press, Inc., New York, 1952.

Kruseman, P., Beethoven's Own Words, Harrisen Edition Ltd., London, 1947.

Lange-Eichbaum, W., The Problem of Genius, Macmillan Co., New York, 1932.

Lowes, J. L., The Road to Xanadu, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1927.

Parkhurst, H. H., Beauty: An Interpretation of the Imaginative Life, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1930.

Pope, A., The Poetical Works of Alexander Pope, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1927.

Rader, M., A Modern Book of Aesthetics, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1952.

Reynolds, Sir J., Life and Discourses of Sir Joshua Reynolds, Dwyer, Ingersoll and Co., Hudson, Ohio, 1853.

Schiller, J. C. F. von, "Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man," The Harvard Classics, (ed. by C. W. Eliot), Vol. 32, P. F. Collier and Sons Co., New York.

Schillinger, J., The Mathematical Basis of the Arts, Philosophical Library, New York, 1948.

Shelley, P. B., Literary and Philosophical Criticism, H. Frowde and Co., London, 1909.

Schopenhauer, A., Essays, (trans. by T. B. Saunders), Willey Book Co., New York, 1942.

Tsanoff, R. A., The Ways of Genius, Harper Bros., New York, 1949.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. Plato, Ion (Jowett translation), marginal p. 534.
2. Ibid., marginal p. 533.
3. Plato, Symposium (Jowett translation), marginal pp. 210-211.
4. Shelley, P. B., Literary and Philosophical Criticism, H. Frowde and Co., London, 1909, p. 153.
5. Nietzsche, F., Introduction to Also Sprach Zarathustra, Werke, VII, xxv, Leipzig, 1906.
6. Housman, A. E., The Name and Nature of Poetry, Cambridge Univ. Press, London and Cambridge, 1933, p. 49.
7. Wolfgang Müller's "Widmung", which Robert Franz set to music.

CHAPTER III

1. Aristotle, Poetics, (Oxford translation), marginal p. 1449b.
2. Gilbert, K., and Kuhn, H., A History of Esthetics, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington, 1953, p. 291.
3. Reynolds, Sir J., Life and Discourses of Sir Joshua Reynolds, Sawyer, Ingersoll, and Co., Hudson, Ohio, 1853, p. 30.
4. Ibid., p. 70.
5. Pope, A., The Poetical Works of Alexander Pope, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1927, p. 52.
6. Ibid., p. 53.
7. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 90.
8. Ibid., p. 12.
9. Ibid., p. 53.

10. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 34.

11. Ibid., p. 89.

12. Schillinger, J., The Mathematical Basis of the Arts, Philosophical Library, New York, 1948, p. 10.

13. Ibid., p. 3.

14. Ibid., p. 10.

15. Ibid., p. 30.

CHAPTER IV

1. Baumgarten, A. G., Aesthetica, Vol. I, vi, Frankfurt, 1750.

2. Hegel, G. W. F., Samtliche Werke, Stuttgart, 1927, Vol. 19, p. 601.

3. Carritt, E. F., "The Sources and Effects in England of Kant's Philosophy of Beauty", The Monist, 1925, Vol. XXXV, pp. 315, 323.

4. Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., p. 323.

5. Kant, I., Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, (ed. by J. C. Meredith), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1911, p. 168.

6. Ibid., p. 169.

7. Ibid., p. 171.

8. Ibid., p. 171-172.

9. Ibid., p. 176.

10. Ibid., p. 181.

11. Hegel, G. W. F., Philosophy of Fine Art, (ed. by F. P. B. Osmaston), G. Bell and Sons Ltd., London, 1920, pp. 379-380.

12. Ibid., p. 381.

13. Hegel, op. cit., p. 383.

14. Ibid., p. 383.

15. Ibid., p. 385.

16. Ibid., pp. 388-389.

CHAPTER V

1. Goethe, J. A., Faust, "Prelude on the Stage," lines 220-221.

2. Reynolds, Sir J., Discourses, Macmillan and Co., London, 1924, p. 84.

3. Griswold, F. H., Creative Power, David McKay Co., Philadelphia, 1939, p. 168.

4. Goethe, J. A., Literary Essays, (trans. by J. E. Spingarn), Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1921, p. 199.

5. Goethe, J. A., "Zahme Xenien," 7. Series, quoted in Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., p. 345.

6. Goethe, J. A., "Maximen und Reflexionen über Literatur und Ethik," Werke, Grossherzogin Sophie Ausgabe, XXXXII, 142.

7. Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., p. 346.

8. Goethe, J. A., Gespräche mit Eckermann, Feb. 28, 1824.

9. Ibid., July 5, 1827.

10. Croce, B., Goethe, Alfred A. Knopf, and Co., New York, 1923, p. 56.

11. Goethe, J. A., "Aus Makariens Archiv," Grossherzogin Sophie Ausgabe, XXXXII, 185.

12. Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., p. 358.

13. Schiller, J. C. F. von, "Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man," The Harvard Classics, (ed. by C. W. Eliot), Vol. 32, P. F. Collier and Sons Co., New York, p. 246.

14. Gilbert and Kuhn, op. cit., p. 389.

15. Schiller, op. cit., p. 245.

16. Schopenhauer, A., The World as Will and Idea, (trans. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp), Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1948-1950, III, 38.

17. Schopenhauer, A., Essays, (trans. by T. B. Saunders), Willey Book Co., New York, 1942, p. 89.

18. Ibid., p. 94.

19. Ibid., pp. 100-101.

20. Ibid., p. 105.

21. Ibid., p. 110.

22. Ibid., p. 113.

23. Ibid., p. 98.

CHAPTER VI

1. Croce, B., "Intuition and Expression," A Modern Book of Esthetics, (ed. by M. Rader), Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1952, p. 95.

2. Ibid., p. 95.

3. Ibid., p. 94.

4. Croce, B., Aesthetic, (trans. by D. Ainslie), Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1922, p. 8.

5. Ibid., p. 9.

6. Ibid., p. 11.

7. Ibid., pp. 61-62.

8. Croce, B., "Intuition and Expression," A Modern Book of Esthetics, (ed. by M. Rader), Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1952, p. 104.

9. Ibid., p. 106.

10. Bergson, H., "The Individual and the Type," A Modern Book of Esthetics, (ed. by M. Rader), Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1952, p. 114.

11. Ibid., p. 118.

12. Croce, Aesthetic, p. 21.

CHAPTER VII

1. See Lange-Eichbaum, W., The Problem of Genius, Macmillan Co., New York, 1932, p. 82.

2. Koffka, K., Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Harcourt, Brace, and Co., New York, 1935.

3. Kris, E., Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, International Universities Press, Inc., New York, 1952, p. 314.

4. Nietzsche, Werke, XIV, 134.

5. See Hirsch, N. D. M., Genius and Creative Intelligence, Sci-Art Publishers, Cambridge, 1931, p. 285.

6. Ibid., p. 286.

7. Adler, Individual Psychology, p. 8.

8. See Hirsch, op. cit.

9. Popham, A. E., The Drawings of Leonardo da Vinci, Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1945, p. 39.

10. Freud, S., Leonardo da Vinci, Random House, New York, 1947, p. 82.

11. Ibid., pp. 86-87.

12. Ibid., p. 113.

CHAPTER VIII

1. Sand, G., Autobiography, quoted in Griswold, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

2. Griswold, op. cit., p. 125.

3. Lang, P. H., Music in Western Civilization, W. W. Norton and Co., New York, 1941, p. 750.

4. Ibid., p. 751.

5. Ibid., pp. 773-774.

6. Kruseman, P., (ed.), Beethoven's Own Words, Hinrichsen Edition Ltd., London, 1947, p. 41.

7. Ibid., p. 37.

8. Ibid., p. 16.

9. Ibid., p. 54.

10. Ibid., p. 25.

11. Ibid., p. 23.

12. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

13. Ibid., p. 34.

14. See Griswold, op. cit., p. 30.

15. Kruseman, op. cit., p. 28.

16. Ibid., p. 23.

17. Taylor, J. F. A., and others, An Introduction to Literature and the Fine Arts, "The High Renaissance in Italy," by Paul V. Love, Michigan State College Press, East Lansing, 1950, p. 79.

18. Leonardo da Vinci, Notebooks, Empire State Book Co., New York, 1923, p. 270.

19. Ibid., p. 235.

20. Hutchinson, P. I., No. III in "The Symposium on the Psychology of Music and Painting," British Journal of Psychology, XXXIII, Part One, July, 1942, Cambridge Univ. Press, London.

21. Reynolds, Sir J., Literary Works, Vol. I, T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1797, pp. 116-117, (from W. W. Beechey's Memoir).

22. Kipling, R., Something of Myself, Macmillan Co., London, 1937, pp. 206-207.

23. Bingham, M. T., (ed.), Bolts of Melody: New Poems by Emily Dickenson, 1945, p. xii.

24. Tsanoff, R. A., The Ways of Genius, Harper Bros., New York, 1949, pp. 82-83.

25. See Tsanoff, op. cit., p. 80.

CHAPTER IX

1. Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe, (ed. by Bartels), Vol. I, p. 49.

2. Kruseman, op. cit., p. 36.

3. James, W., Principles of Psychology, Book I, Dover Publications Inc., 1950, p. 455.

4. Tchaikovsky, M., The Life and Letters of Peter Ilyitch Tchaikovsky, Bodley Head Ltd., London, 1906, pp. 274-275.

5. Ibid., p. 281.

6. Ibid., pp. 311-312.

7. Bartholomew, E. F., Relation of Psychology to Music, New Era Publishing Co., Rock Island, Ill., 1899, p. 228.

8. Lang, op. cit., p. 776.

9. Ibid., p. 776.

10. See Griswold, op. cit., p. 136.

11. Taylor, J. F. A., and others, op. cit., "Medieval Christianity," by J. F. A. Taylor, p. 37.

12. See Griswold, op. cit., p. 137.

13. Allen, F. H., (ed.), The Letters of Robert Burns, 1927, Vol. I, p. 248.

14. Kruseman, op. cit., p. 18.

15. Tsanoff, op. cit., p. 80.

16. Keats, "On First Looking into Chapman's Homer."

17. Keats, "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty."

18. Keats, "Ode to a Nightingale."

19. Shelley, op. cit., p. 164.

20. Tchaikovsky, op. cit., p. 274-275.

CHAPTER X

1. See above, pp. 20-21.

2. Max Schoen, in his analysis of the creative process (Human Nature, Harper and Bros., New York, 1930, pp. 324-336), reserves the term 'inspiration' for the "flashlike aspect" of artistic activity. It is preceded by the periods of preparation and incubation, and succeeded by a period of verification. He refers to Beethoven's and Coleridge's note books as evidence of the great importance of the preparatory stage. We have already discussed Beethoven's 'methodicalness'; in the teeming imagination of Coleridge one finds 'spontaneity with a methodical background'. John Livingstone Lowes, in his classic study of Coleridge's creative process (The Road to Xanadu, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1927) shows how the rich storehouse of the artist's memory provides more than ample material for his art works. In regard to Coleridge's Note Book, Lowes writes that it is "a repository of waifs and strays of verse, some destined to find a lodgment later in the poems, others lying abandoned where they fell, like drifted leaves. It is a mirror of the fitful and kaleidoscopic moods, and a record of the germinal ideas of one of the most gifted and utterly incalculable spirits ever let loose upon the planet. And it is like nothing else in the world so much as a jungle, illuminated eerily with patches of phosphorescent light, and peopled with uncanny life and strange exotic flowers. But it is teeming and fecund soil, and out of it later rose, like exhalations, gleaming and aerial shapes." (p. 6). What Schoen calls the period of incubation, of unconscious elaboration, is likewise dominant in Coleridge's artistic creation. The "period of verification", the final stage, consists in a critical examination of that which inspiration has produced.

3. See above, p. 7.

CHAPTER XI

1. Woodworth, R. S., Psychology, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1921, p. 2.

55

Jul 30 58

58

MAY 18 1960

AUG 8 1960

JAN 6 1961

FEB 23 1961

2-1-61

JUN 24 1961

NOV 3 1962

MAY 28 1963

JUN 8 1963